THE ORIGINS OFINTELLIGENCEIN

CHILDREN

JEAN PIAGET

$6.00

THE ORIGINS OFINTELLIGENCE IN CHILDRENJEAN PIAGET
Translated by MARGARET COOK

This book deals with the origins
ofintelligenceandchildrenincontains original observations on
young children, novel experiments,
brilliant in theirsimplicity,theauthordescribes

in

which
detail.

Piaget divides the growth of intelligence into six sequential stages:
the use o reflexes; the first ac-quiredadaptations

and primarycircular reaction; secondary circular

reactions and the child's proceduresfor prolonging spectacles interesting to him; the co-ordination of

secondary schemata and their application to new situations; tertiary
circular reaction and the discoveryofnew meauB through active exof

and finally, the innew means by mental

combination. Particular attention is
given to the formation of the sensotimotor schemata and the mechanism! of mental assimilation. Pia-

get emphasizes the importance of'

which Jiton back'

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IAP 21 Wl

APR 2? 19??

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1980

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136*72
PiagetThe origins of intelligence inchildrenr A Tr
-

.

Tfce-

lni;elligence in Children

THE ORIGINSOF INTELLIGENCEIN CHILDRENJEAN PIAGET
Translated by

MARGARET COOK

INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITIES PRESS, INC.
New York

New York

Copyright 1952, by International Universities Press, Inc.

Second Printing, October, 1956
Third Printing, March, 1965

Manufactured in the United States of America

CONTENTS.........

Forewordix

Introduction

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OFINTELLIGENCE
1.

1......

The Functional Invariants of Intelligence and Biological Organization

3

2.

Functional Invariants and the Categories of Reason

83.

Hereditary Structures and Theories of Adaptation

13

Part 1

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR
ADAPTATIONSI.

II.

THE FIRST STAGE: THE USE OF REFLEXES

21......
.

1.

Sucking Reflexes

2.

The Use of Reflexes

3.

Assimilation: Basic Fact of Psychic Life

.

23

25

29
.

42

THE SECOND STAGE: THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS AND THE PRIMARY CIRCULAR REACTION
1.

Acquired Sucking Habits

2.

Vision

.

oo

....
.

47

49
62

a00&34

CONTENTS

vi

3.

Phonation and Hearing

4.

Prehension

5.

The

...

76
88

First

Acquired Adaptations:

Conclu-sions

Part IITHE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR
ADAPTATIONS
III.

145

THE THIRD STAGE: THE "SECONDARY CIRCULAR
REACTIONS" AND THE PROCEDURES DESTINED TO.153
MAKE INTERESTING SIGHTS LAST
.

1.

.

.

LThe
.157
Facts and Reproductive Assimilations

The "Secondary Circular Reactions".

2.

The Secondary Circular Reactions

II.

Ac-

commodation and Organization of the Sche174

mata
3.

Recognitory Assimilation and the System of

Meanings
4.

.

.

.

.

.

-

.185

Generalizing Assimilation and the Constitution of "Procedures to Make Interesting Spec-.196

tacles Last"IV.

THE FOURTH STAGE: THE COORDINATION OF THE
SECONDARY SCHEMATA AND THEIR APPLICATION
TO NEW SITUATIONS

210

The "Application of Familiar Schemata to
I. The Facts.212
2. The "Application of Familiar Schemata to
1.

New Situations"

New Situations"

3.

.

II.

.

.

.

225

.

.

236

Commentary
Accommodation
and OrganizaAssimilation,
tion Peculiar to the Mobile Schemata

CONTENTS
4.

.....

The Recognition of Signs and Their Utilization in Prevision

5.

vii

247

The Exploration of New Objects and Phenomena and the "Derived" Secondary Reac253

tions

THE FIFTH STAGE: THE "TERTIARY CIRCULAR RE-

V.

ACTION" AND THE "DISCOVERY OF NEW MEANS
THROUGH ACTIVE EXPERIMENTATION"
.

.

263

The Tertiary Circular Reaction.265
2. The Discovery of New Means byExperimentation
I. The "Sting" and the "Stick"279
3. The Discovery of New Means Through Ac1.

.

.

.

tive Experimentation
4.

Other Examples.

305

The Discovery of New Means Through Active

VI.

II.

.

Experimentation

III.

Conclusions.

320

THE SIXTH STAGE: THE INVENTION OF NEW MEANS.331
THROUGH MENTAL COMBINATIONS
333
1. The Facts.341
2. Invention and Representation
.

.

.

.

Conclusions"SENSORIMOTOR" OR "PRACTICAL" INTELLIGENCE AND THE THEORIESOF INTELLIGENCE
1.

Associationist Empiricism

.....

2.

Vitalistic Intellectualism.

3.

Apriority and the Psychology of Form

The Theory of Groping
5. The Theory of Assimilation

4.

.

357

359

.

.

.

369

.

.

.

376

.....

395

407

FOREWORD TO THE SECOND EDITION
This work, a second edition of which has very kindly beenrequested, was followed by La Construction du reel chez Fenfant
and was to have been completed by a study of the genesis ofimitation in the child. The latter piece of research, whose publication we have postponed because it is so closely connected withthe analysis of play and representational symbolism, appeared in
1945, inserted in a third work, La formation du symbole chez
I'enfant. Together these three works form one entity dedicatedto the beginnings of intelligence, that is to say, to the various

manifestations of sensorimotor intelligence and to the most elementary forms of expression.

The theses developed in this volume, which concern in parthe formation of the sensorimotor schemata and themechanism of mental assimilation, have given rise to much discussion which pleases us and prompts us to thank both our opponents and our sympathizers for their kind interest in our work.
It is impossible to name here all the authors on whose observations we would like to comment, but we should single out for
mention the remarkable studies made by H. Wallon and P.
ticular

Guillaume.
In his fine work De I'acte a la pensee, HL Wallon did us thehonor of discussing our work at length; we have already com-mented on this in La formation du symbole chez I' enfant. Wallon's main idea is the distinction which he makes between therealm of the sensorimotor (characterized by the "understandingof situations") and that of expression (verbal intelligence). His
remarkable study on Les origines de la pensde chez I'enfant^ published since, places the origins of thought at the age of four, as if
nothing essential transpired between the attainments of thesensorimotor intelligence and the beginnings of conceptual expression. It is apparent how antithetical to everything we mainix

FOREWORD

xtain in this book this radical thesis is, and we can answer it today

by invoking two kinds of arguments.
In the first place, meticulous study of a definite area, that ofB. Inhelderofperceptions, has led us with

development

spatialto discover an even greater correlation

than there seemed to be

between the sensorimotor and the perceptual. Doubtless nothingis directly transmitted from one of these planes to the other, andallthat the sensorimotor intelligence has constructed must firstbe reconstructed by the growing perceptual intelligence before
overruns the boundaries of that which constitutes its substructure. But the function of this substructure is no less apthis

in coordiparent. It is because the baby begins by constructing,theofunchanging
nating his actions, schemata such as thoseobject, the fitting in of two or

three dimensions, rotations, trans-

organizpositions, and superpositions that he finallying his "mental space" and, between preverbal intelligence andsucceeds inthe beginnings of Euclidean spatial intuition, a series of "topoas manifested in drawing,
logical" intuitions are intercalatedof objects, etc.;
stereognosis, the construction and assemblingthat is to say, in the areas of transition between the sensorimotor

and the perceptual.
In the second place, it is primarily preverbal sensorimotor
activity thatisresponsible for the construction of a series ofperceptual schemata the importance of which in the subsequent
structuring of thought cannot, without oversimplification, bedenied. Thus the perceptual constants of form and size are con-nected with the sensorimotor construction of the permanent ob-

For how could the four-year-old child think without havingreference to objects having form and invariable dimensions, andject:

how would he adapt his belief without a long preliminary development by the sensorimotor?
Probably the sensorimotor schemata are not concepts, andthe functional relationship which we stress in this book does not
exclude the structural opposition of these extremes, despite thecontinuity of the transitions. But, without preliminary schemata,nascent thought would be reduced to mere verbalism, which

would make one suspicious of many of the acts mentioned byWallon in his latest work. But it is precisely on the concreteFOREWORD

xi

plane of action that infancy makes its intelligence most manifest
until the age of seven oreight, when coordinated actions areconverted into operations, admitting of the logical constructionof verbal thought and its application to a coherent structure.

In short, Wallon's thesis disregards the progressive construction of performance and that is why it goes to extremes instressing the verbal at the expense of the sensorimotor whereas
the sensorimotor substructure is necessary to the conceptual forthe formation of the operational schemata which are destined tofunction finally in a formal manner and thus to make language
consistent with thought.

As far as P. Guillaume's 1 very interesting study is concerned,it, on the other hand, agrees in the main with our conclusions,
except in one essential point. In accordance with his interpretations influenced by "the theory of form," P. Guillaume presents afundamental distinction between the perceptual mechanisms
and the intellectual processes which explains the second in termsof the first (the reverse of Wallon). This controversy is too
lengthy to consider in detail in a preface. Let us limit ourselves
to answering that the systematic study of the child's perceptions,in which we have since collaborated with Lambertier 2 has, on thecontrary, led us to doubt the permanence of perceptual constantsin which P. Guillaume believes (the invariability of size, etc.) andto introduce a distinction between instantaneous perceptions
which are always passive and a "perceptual activity" connecting
them with each other in space and time, according to certain
remarkable laws (in particular a mobility and reversibility increasing with age). This perceptual activity, which the theory ofform partially disregards, is but one manifestation of the sensorimotor activities of which preverbal intelligence is the expression. In the development of the sensorimotor schema in the firstyear of life, there is undoubtedly a close interaction between
perception and intelligence in their most elementary states.
IP. Guillaume, L'intelli^ence sensori-motrice d'apres J. Piaget, Journalde psychologic, April-June 1940-41 (years XXXVII-XXXVIII, pp. 264-280).
2 See Recherches sur ledeVeloppement des perceptions (I-VIII), Archives
de psychologic, 1942-1947.

INTRODUCTION*
The Biological Problem of Intelligence
The question of the relationships between mind and biological organization is one which inevitably arises at the beginning of a study of the origins of intelligence. True, a discussionof that sort cannot lead to any really definite conclusion at thistime, but, rather than to submit to the implications of one of thevarious possible solutions to this problem, it is better to make aclear choice in order to separate the hypotheses which form thepoint of departure for our inquiry.
Verbal or cogitative intelligence is based on practical or
sensorimotor intelligence which in turn depends on acquired andrecombined habits and associations. These presuppose, furthermore, the system of reflexes whose connection with the organism's
anatomical and morphological structure is apparent. A certain
continuity exists, therefore, between intelligence and the purely
biological processes of morphogenesis and adaptation to theenvironment. What does this mean?
It is obvious, in the first place, that certain hereditary factors
condition intellectual development. But that can be interpreted
in two ways so different in their biological meaning that confusing the one with the other is probably what has obfuscated theclassic controversy over innate ideas and epistemological apriorism.

The hereditary factors of the first group are structural andare connected with the constitution of our nervous system andof our sensory organs.

Thus we perceive certain physical radia-*

Another translation of this chapter was published in Organization andPathology of Thought, by David Rapaport (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1951). The footnote commentary to that translation provides an introduction to Piaget's thinking, and may serve as an introduction to the investigations and thinking contained in this volume.

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

2

tions, but not all of them, and matter only ofa certain size, etc*

Now these known structural factors influence the building up of
our most fundamental concepts. For instance, our intuition ofeven if, by means ofspace is certainly conditioned by them,and purelytransintuitiveout
inworking
thought, we succeed
deductive types of space.

These characteristics of the first type, while supplying theare thus essentially limiting,intelligence with useful structures,ofthe second group. Our perfactors
tothein contradistinction

amidst all those which could
ceptions are but what they are,which is linked to ourpossibly be conceived. Euclidean space
of
kinds
the
space which are adapted toorgans is only one ofthe deductive and organizing
physical experience. In contrast,
andleads, in the realm of space,activity of the mind is unlimited
intuition. To the exprecisely to generalizations which surpass
istent that this activity of the mind
hereditary, it is so in quite adifferent sense from the former group. In this second type it isprobably a question of a hereditary transmission of the function
itself and not of the transmission of a certain structure. It is in
was able to consider thethis second sense that H. Poincarasabeing priori because of its connecspatial concept of "group"
tion with the very activity of intelligence.

We find the same distinction with regard to the inheritanceOn the one hand, we find a question of strucThe "specific heredity" of mankind and of its particularof intelligence.
ture:"offspring" admits of certain levels of intelligence superior tothat of monkeys, etc. But, on the other hand, the functional activity of reason (the ipse intellectus whichisdoes not come fromobviously connected with the "general heredity" ofexperience)
the living organism itself. Just as the organism would not know

how to adapt itself to environmental variations if it were not already organized, so also intelligence would not be able to apprehend any external data without certain functions of coherence(of which the ultimate expression is the principle of noncontradiction), and functions making relationships, etc., which arecommon to all intellectual organization.

Now

this second type of hereditary psychologicalreality isof primary importance for the development of intelligence. If

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

8

there truly in fact exists a functional nucleus of the intellectualorganization which comes from the biological organization in its
most general aspect, it is apparent that this invariant will orient
the whole of the successive structures which the mind will thenwork out in its contact with reality. It will thus play the role thatphilosophers assigned to the a priori; that is to say, it will impose
on the structures certain necessary and irreducible conditions.
Only the mistake has sometimes been made of regarding the apriori as consisting in structures existing ready-made from the
beginning of development, whereas if the functional invariant ofthought is at work in the most primitive stages, it is only little byconsciousness due to the elaboration of structures which are increasingly adapted to the function
itself. This a priori only appears in the form of essential struc-

little that it impresses itself ontures at the end of the evolution of concepts

and not at theira priori is thus the
beginning: Although
of
what
were
calledideas.""innateformerly
very opposite
itishereditary, thisThe structures of the first type are more reminiscent of classic
innate ideas and it has been possible to revive the theory of innateness with regard to space and the "well-structured" perceptions of Gestalt psychology. But, in contrast to the functional
invariants, these structures have nothing essential from the pointof view of the mind:

They are only internal data, limited anddelimiting, and external experience and, above all, intellectual
activity will unremittingly transcend them. If they are in a sense
innate, they are not a priori in the epistemological sense of theterm.

Let us analyze first the functional invariants, and then (inof special
3) we shall discuss the question raised by the existence

hereditary structures (those of the first type).

THE FUNCTIONAL INVARIANTS OF INTELLIGENCE AND BIOLOGICAL ORGANIZATION. Intelligence1.

isan adaptation. In order to grasp its relation to life in general

it istherefore necessary to state precisely the relations that exist

between the organism and the environment. Life is a continuous creation of increasingly complex forms and a progressivethat inbalancing of these forms with the environment. To say

4

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE
is

thus

instance of biological adaptation
telligence is a particularfuncto suppose that it is essentially an organization and that its
structurestheasorganismtion is to structure the universe justits

immediate environment. In order to describe the functional

mechanism of thought in true biological terms it will suffice todetermine the invariants common to all structuring of which life
is capable.

What we must translate into terms of adaptation arein

not the particular goals pursued by the practical intelligence
to include
its beginnings (these goals will subsequently enlarge
fundamental
relationship peculiar
all knowledge), but it is theThe
to consciousness itself: the relationship of thought to things*

new forms toorganism adapts itself by materially constructing
whereasintelligence extends
fit them into those of the universe,
which can be
structures
this creation by 'constructing mentallyat the beand
sense
one
In
applied to those of the environment.

intellectual adaptation is thus more
ginning of mental evolution,
the latter,
restricted than biological adaptation, but in extending
the
from
it.
If,
biological point
the former goes infinitely beyondof view, intelligence is a particular instance of organic activity
and if things perceived or known are a limited part of the environment to which the organism tends to adapt, a reversal ofnothese relationships subsequently takes place. But this is ininvariants.
functionalforsearchtheway incompatible with
In fact there exists, in mental development, elements which
are variable and others which are invariant. Thence stem thesomemisunderstandings resulting from psychological terminologyof which lead to attributing higher qualities to the lower stages
and others which lead to the annihilation of stages and operations. It is therefore fitting simultaneously to avoid both theand theofhypothesis
preformism of intellectualistic psychology
mental heterogeneities. The solution to this difficulty is precisely
to be found in the distinction between variable structures andinvariant functions. Just as the main functions of the living being
are identical in all organisms but correspond to organs which arevery different in different groups, so also between the child andthe adult a continuous creation of varied structures may be observed although the main functions of thought remain constant,

These invariant operations exist within the framework of

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

5

the two most general biological functions: organization andadaptation. Let us begin with the latter, for if everyone recogthat everything in intellectual development consists ofadaptation, the vagueness of this concept can only be deplored.

nizes

Certain biologists define adaptation simply as preservationand survival, that is to say, the equilibrium between the organism
and the environment. But then the concept loses all interest
because it becomes confused with that of life itself. There aredegrees of survival, and adaptation involves the greatest and theleast. It istherefore necessary to distinguish between the state ofadaptation and the process of adaptation. In the state, nothing
clear. In following the process, things are cleared up. There isadaptation when the organism is transformed by the environis

ment and when this variation results in an increase in the interchanges between the environment and itself which are favorable
to its preservation.

Let us try to be precise and state this in a formal way. The

organism is a cycle of physicochemical and kinetic processes
which, in constant relation to the environment, are engendered byeach other. Let a, b, c, etc., be the elements of this organizedtotality and x, y, z, etc., the corresponding elements of the sur-rounding environment. The schema of organization is therefore
the following:

The processes (1), (2), etc., may consist either of chemical
reactions (when the organism ingests substances x which it willtransform into substance b comprising part of its structure), orof any physical transformations whatsoever, or finally, in particular, of sensorimotor behavior (when a cycle of bodily movements a combined with external movements x result in b which

the cycle of organization). The relationship which
unites the organized elements a, b t c, etc., with the environmental
itself enterselements x, y f z, etc., is therefore a relationship of assimilation,that is to say, the functioning of the organism does not destroy it

but conserves the cycle of organization and coordinates the given

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

6

to incorporate them In
data of the environment in such a way asin the environment, athat cycle. Let us therefore suppose that,x into x'. Either thetransforms
variation is produced which
and the cycle ruptures, or else adaptation
organism does not adapt
has beentakes place, which means that the organized cycle

modified by closing up on itself:

If we call this result of the pressures exerted by

the environ-ment accommodation (transformation of b into b ), we can acf

cordingly say that adaptationisan equilibrium between assimila-tion and accommodation.

This definition applies to intelligence as well. Intelligence isassimilation to the extent that it incorporates all the given

data of

Whether it is a question ofexperience within its framework.
the new into the known
thought which, due to judgment, bringsaand thus reduces the universe to its own terms or whether it iswhich also structures things
question of sensorimotor intelligenceits schemata, in every case ininto
themperceived by bringing
that istellectual adaptation involves an element of assimilation,
to say, of structuring through incorporation of external reality
the differences
into forms due to theactivity. Whateversubject's
in nature may be which separate organic life (which materiallyandelaborates forms and assimilates to them the substancesfrom practical or sensorimotor inacts and assimilates to the schemata
telligence (which organizes

energies of the environment)of motor behavior the various situations offered by the environreflective or gnostic intelliment) and separate them also fromis satisfied with thinking of forms or constructing
gence (whichthem internally in order to assimilate to them the contents ofexperience)

all of thesetheadapt by assimilating objects tosubject.

There can be no doubt either, that mental life is also accommodation to the environment. Assimilation can never bepure because by incorporating newschemata the intelligence constantly modifies the latter in orderelements intoIts

earlier

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

7

to adjust them to new elements. Conversely,
things are neverknown by themselves, since this work of accommodation is onlyWepossible as a function of the inverse process of assimilation.
shall thus see how the very concept of the object is far from being

innate and necessitates a construction which is simultaneously
assimilatory and accommodating.

In short, intellectual adaptation, like every other kind, conmechanism and a complementary
accommodation into progressive equilibrium. The mind can only
be adapted to a reality if perfect accommodation exists, that issists of putting an assimilatory

to say, if nothing, in that reality, intervenes to modify the subject's

schemata. But, inversely, adaptation does not exist if the

new reality has imposed motor or mental attitudes contrary to
thosewhich were adopted on contact with other earlier given

data: adaptation only exists if there is coherence, hence assimila-

Of course, on the motor level, coherence presents quite aon the reflective or organic level, andisevery systematization
possible. But always and everywhereis onlyadaptationaccomplished when it results in a stable sysis
to
that
tem,
say, when there is equilibrium between accommodation and assimilation.
This leads us to the function of organization. From thetion.

different structure thanbiological point of view, organization is inseparable from adaptation: They are two complementary processes of a single mecha-

being the internal aspect of the cycle of whichconstitutes
the external aspect. With regard to inadaptationnism, thefirsttelligence, in its reflective as well as in its practical form, thisdual phenomenon of functional totality and interdependence
between organization and adaptation is again found. Concerning
the relationships between the parts and the whole which determine the organization, it is sufficiently well known that every
intellectual operation is always related to all the others and thatits

own elements are controlled by the same law. Every schema isthus coordinated with all the other schemata and itself constitutes a totality with differentiated parts. Every act of intelligencepresupposes a system of mutual implications and interconnected
meanings. The relationships between this organization andadaptation are consequently the same as on the organic level.

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

8

The principal "categories" which intelligence uses to adapt toand substance,
space and time, causality
these
of
each
etc.
and
classification
number,corresponds to an
the
of
each
as
body is related to aorgan
aspect of reality, justthe external world

environment but, besides their adaptation
special quality of thein each other to such a degree thatinvolvedareto things, they
The "accord of thoughtthemtoisolateit is
impossible

logically.

with things" and the "accord of thought with itself" express thisdual functional invariant of adaptation and organization. These
two aspects of thought are indissociable: It is by adapting toitself and it is by organizing itself
things that thought organizes
that it structures things.
2.

FUNCTIONAL INVARIANTS AND THE CATE-

GORIES OF REASON.

The problem now is to ascertain how

these functional invariants will determine the categories of reason,in other words, the main forms of intellectual activity which arefound at all stages of mental development and whose first structural crystallizations in the sensorimotor intelligence we shall
now try to describe.
It is not a matter of reducing the higher to the lower. The
at deduction tohistory of science shows that every attemptanother results
andone
betweenestablish continuity
disciplinein creating a
lower
but
to
the
the
of
reductionainnothigherthe two terms which does not atreciprocal relationship between
of
the
the
all destroy
higher term. So it is that theoriginality

functional relations which can exist between intellect and biono way diminish the value of reason
logical organization can in

but on the contrary lead to extending the concept of vital adaptation. It is self-evident that if the categories of reason are in asense preformed in biological functioning, they are not containedin it either in the form of conscious or even unconscious structures. If biological adaptation is a sort of material understandingof the environments, a series of later structures would be neces-sary in order that conscious and gnostic image may emerge fromthis purely active mechanism. As we have already said, it is therefore at the end and not at the point of departure of intellectual
evolution that one must expect to encounter rational concepts

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

9initialreally expressing functioning as such, in contrast to thestructures which remain on the surface of the organism and of theenvironment and only express the superficial relationships ofthese two terms to each other. But in order to facilitate analysisof the lower stages which we shall attempt in this work it can beshown how the biological invariants just mentioned, once they
have been reflected upon and elaborated by consciousness during
the great stages of mental development, give rise to a sort offunctional a priori of reason.
Here, it seems to us, is the picture thus obtained:
Biological Functions

Intellectual Functions

Categories

A. Totality x
Relationship(reciprocity)

Regulating function .

Organization.

.

B. Ideal (goal)x Value(means)A. Quality x
Class

Assimilation.

.

.Implicative
function

B. Quantitative
1

rapport x

number
Adaptation

A. Object x

.

Space

Accommodation

.

.

.

Explicative
function

B. Causality x

Time

The categories related to the function of organization constitute what Hoeffding calls the "fundamental" or regulativeHnthis diagram we distinguish between "relationships'* in the mostwhich corresponds togeneral sense of the word and "quantitative rapport"
what is called, on the level of thought, the "logic of relationships." The relations which the latter envisages in contradistinction to the logic of classes are"more" or "less" asalways quantitative, regardless of whether they interpretor whether they simply
comparisons (for example, "more or less dark," etc.),
such
imply ideas of category or of series (for example, family relationships
relathe
the
On
which
contrary,as "brother ofquantity.
etc*),

presuppose

the quantitative and only
tionships on a par with the idea of totality surpassof the term (reciprocity between
sensewidesttheinarelativity
imply general

the elements of a totality).

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

10

with all the others and"categories/* that is to say, they combine
are found again in every psychic operation. It seems to us thatthese categories can be defined, from the static point of view, by

the concepts of totality and relationship and, from the dynamicof view, by those of ideal and value.

point

The concept of totality expresses the interdependence inherent in every organization, intelligent as well as biological.
Even though behavior patterns and consciousness seem to arisein the most uncoordinated manner in the first weeks of existence,

which antedates them
they extend a physiological organization
into
outsetfromtheand they crystallize
systems whose coherenceForlittle.
becomes clarified little
example, what is the con-byessential to the formation
cept of "displacement groups," which ismaniofof space, if not the ideaorganized totality making itself
theschemataarefest in movements? So also
belonging tosensorimotor intelligence controlled from the very beginningby the law of totality, within themselves and in their interrelaan incoherent
tionships. So too, every causal relation transforms

datum into an organized environment, etc.

The correlative of the idea of totality is, as Hoeffding has
shown, the idea of relationship. Relationship is also a fundamental category, inasmuch as it is immanent in all psychic
activity and combines with all the other concepts. This is because
every totality is a system of relationships just as every relationship is a segment of totality. In this capacity the relationshipmanifests itself from the advent of the purely physiological activities

and is again found at all levels. The most elementary

perceptions (a? shown by Kdhler with regard to the color perception of chickens) are simultaneously related to each other andstructured into organized totalities. It is useless to emphasize
analogous facts that one finds on the level of reflective thought.

The categories of ideal and of value express the same function, but in its dynamic aspect.

We shall call "ideal" every system

which constitutes a whole, hence every final goal ofactions; and we shall call "values'* the particular values related
to this whole or the means making it possible to attain this goal.
The relations of ideal and value are therefore the same as thoseof totality and relation. These ideals or value of every categoryof values

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

11

are only totalities in process of formation, value only being theexpression of desirability at all levels. Desirability is the indication of a rupture in equilibrium or of an uncompleted totality

whose formation some element is lacking and which tends
toward this element in order to realize its equilibrium. The
relations between ideal and value are therefore of the same
tocategory as those of totality and of relations which is self-evident,
since the ideal is only the as yet incomplete form of equilibrium

between real totalities and values are none other than the relations of means to ends subordinated to this system. Finality isthus to be conceived not as a special category, but as the subjective translation of a process of putting into equilibrium whichitself does not imply finality but simply the general distinction
between real equilibria and the idea equilibrium. A good example
is that of the ndrms of coherence and unity oflogical thought
which translate this perpetual effort of intellectual totalities
toward equilibrium, and which therefore define the ideal
equilibrium never attained by intelligence and regulate the particular values of judgment. This is why we call the operations
relating to totality and to values "regulative function," in contradistinction to the explicative and implicative functions. 2

How are we to consider the categories connected with adaptation,

that

is

to say, with assimilation

and accommodation?

Among the categories of thought there are some, as Hoeffding
says, which are more "real" (those which, besides the activity ofreason, imply a hie and a nunc inherent in experience such as
causality, substance or object, space and time, each of which

operates an indissoluble synthesis of "datum" and deduction) andsome which are more "formal" (those which, without being lessadapted, can nevertheless give rise to an unlimited deductive
elaboration, such as logical and mathematical relations). Hence itis the former which
express more the centrifugal process of
explication and accommodation and the latter which make pos2 In

The Language and Thought of the Child, London, Routledge, 1932,

p. 236, we called "mixed function" this synthesis of implication and explication which at the present time we connect with the idea of organization, But
thisamounts to the same thing since the latter presupposes a synthesis of

assimilation and accommodation.

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

12

sible the assimilation of tilings to intellectualorganization andthe construction of implications.

The implicative function comprises two functional invariants which are found again at ail stages, the one corresponding to the synthesis of qualities, that is to say, classes (concepts orschemata), the other to that of quantitative relations or numbers,

Ever since the formation of the sensorimotor schemata the ele-mentary instruments of intelligence reveal their mutual dependence. With regard to the explicative function, it concerns
die ensemble of operations which makes it possible to deducereality, in other words to confer a certain permanence upon it
while supplying the reason forits

transformations.

From thispoint of view two complementary aspects can be distinguished inevery explication, one relating to the elaboration of objects, theother relating to causality; the former is simultaneously the

product of the latter and conditions its development. Whence thecircle object x space and causality x time in which the inter-dependence of functions is complicated by a reciprocal relationof matter to form.

We see the extent^to which the functional categories ofknowledge constitute a real whole which is modeled on the systemof the functions of intelligence. This correlation becomes still

more clear on analysis of the interrelations of organization andadaptation, on the one hand, and assimilation and accommodation, on the other.
As we have seen, organization is the internal aspect ofadapta-tion, when the interdependence of already adapted elements andnot the adaptational process in action is under consideration.
Moreover, adaptation is only organization grappling with theactions of the environment. Now this mutual
dependence isfound again, on the level of intelligence, not only in the interactionofrational

activity (organization) and of experience(adaptation) which the whole history of scientific thought reveals
are inseparable but also in the correlation of the functional

categories:

Any objective or causal spatial-temporal structure is

only possible with logical-mathematical deduction, these twokinds of reality thus forming
mutually interconnected systems of
totalities and relations. With
regard to the circle of accommoda-

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

13

tion and assimilationthat is to say, of explication and implicathe question raised by Humeconcerning causality illustrates it clearly.
can the concept of cause be simultaneously

tion

How

rational

and experimental? If one puts causality in a purely

formal category reality escapes it (as E. Meyerson has admirably

shown) and if one reduces it to the level of a simple empiricalsequence, necessity vanishes. Whence the Kantian solution taken
up by Brunschvicg according to which it is an "analogy of experience," an irreducible interaction between the relation of
implication and the spatial-temporal known data. The same canbe said of the other "real" categories: They all presuppose implication although constituting accommodations to external known
data. Inversely, classes and numbers could not be constructedwithout connection with the spatial-temporal series inherent inobjects and their causal relations.
Finally, it remains for us to note that,living bodyisifevery organ of aorganized, so also every element of an intellectualorganization also constitutes an organization. Consequently thefunctional categories of intelligence, while developing along the

major lines of the essential mechanisms of organization, assimilation and accommodation, themselves comprise aspects corresponding to those three functions, the more so since the latter arecertainly vicarious and so constantly change in point of application. The manner in which the functions which thus characterize
the chief categories of the mind create their own organs andcrystallize into structures is another question which we shall nottake up in this introduction since this whole work is devoted to
study of the beginnings of this construction. To prepare for thisanalvsis it is simply fitting to say a few more words about thehereditary structures which make this mental structuring possible.
3. HEREDITARY STRUCTURES AND THEORIES OF
ADAPTATION. Two kinds of hereditary realities exist, as

we have seen, which affect the development of human reason: thefunctional invariants connected with the general heredity of theliving substance, and certain structural organs or qualities, con-nected with man's particular heredity and serving as elementary
instruments for intellectual adaptation. It is therefore fitting toTHE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE
examine how the hereditary structures prepare the latter andhow biological theories of adaptation are able to cast light on the14

theory of intelligence.

The reflexes and the very morphology of the organs withwhich they are connected constitute a sort of anticipatory knowledge of the external environment, an unconscious and entirely
material knowledge but essential to the later development of realknowledge. How is such an adaptation of hereditary structures
possible?

This biological problem is insoluble at present, but a briefsummary of the discussions to which it has given and still gives
seems useful to us, for the different solutions supplied areparallel to the various theories of intelligence and can thus il-

riseluminate the latter by setting off the generality of their mechanism. Five principal points of view exist concerning adaptationand each one corresponds, mutatis mutandis, to one of the interpretations of intelligence as such. Of course this does not meanthat if a certain author chooses one of the five characteristic

doctrines that can be discerned in biology he is forced by this toadopt the corresponding attitude in psychology; but whatever
the possible combinations with regard to the opinions of thewriters themselves may be, "common mechanisms" undeniablv
exist between biological and psychological explanations of general and intellectual adaptation.

The first solution is that of Lamarckism according to which
the organism is fashioned from the outside by the environment

which, by its constraints, trains the formation of individual habitsor accommodations which, becoming hereditarily fixed, fashion
the organs. There corresponds to this biological hypothesis of
the primacy of habit associationism in psychology according towhich knowledge also results from acquired habits without there
being any internal activity which would constitute intelligence assuch to condition those acquisitions.

on the other hand, interprets adaptation by atto
thetributingliving being a special power to construct useful
Vitalism,organs. So also intellectualism explains intelligence by itself byendowing it with an innate faculty for knowing and by consider-THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE
its

ing

activity as a

primary

fact

15

whence everything on thepsychic plane derives.

With regard to preformism, the structures have apurelyendogenous origin, virtual variations being made up-to-date
simply by contact with the environment which thus only plays
a role of "detector." It is through the same sort ofreasoning thatvarious epistemological and psychological doctrines that can belabeled apriorism consider mental structures as
being anterior toexperience which simply gives them the opportunity to manifest
themselves without explaining them in any respect. Whether
structures are considered to be
psychologically innate, as they
are thought to be by the classic proponents of innate ideas, or

merely as logically eternal, "subsisting" in an intelligible worldin which reason participates, is of little importance.
They arepreformed in the subject and not elaborated by him as a functionof his experience. The most parallel excesses in thisrespect werecommitted in biology and in logic. Just as a hypothesis was madeof a preformation of all the "genes" which were made manifest
in the course of evolution
species

including genes injurious to theso also Russell came to allege that all the ideas

germinating in our brains have existed for all eternity, including false
ideas 1A

separate place could be set aside for the biological doctrineof "emergent evolution," according to which structures appear as
irreducible syntheses succeeding each other in a sort of continuous creation, parallel to the theory of "shapes" or "Gestalt"
in psychology. But actually only a more dynamic apriorism ofintention is involved which, in its particular explanations, only

amounts to apriorism properly so called to the extent that it is
not frankly directed toward the fifth solution.

The fourth point of view which we shall call mutationalism
by biologists who, without believing in preformation, also
believe that structures appear in a purely endogenous way but
is held

then consider them as arising by chance from internal transformations

and adapting to the environment due to a selection after

the event. Now, if one transposes this method of interpretation
to the level of nonhereditary adaptations one finds it is parallelto the schema of "trials and errors" belonging to pragmatism orTHE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

16

to conventionalism: according to this schema, the adjustment ofis also explained by selection after the event
behavior

patternsof behavior arising by chance in relation to the external environment. For example, according to conventionalism Euclidean

dimensions seems to us more "true" than thespace with threeother kinds of space because of the structure of our organs ofmore "convenient" because it permits

simplyperception, anda better adjustment of those organs to theisknown data of theexternal world.
the organism and the
Finally, according to a fifth solution,
environment form an indissoluble entity, that is to say, besidechance mutations there are adaptional variations simultaneously
and an action of the eninvolving a structuring of the organism
vironment, the two being inseparable from each other. From themeans that the subject's activity
related to the constitution of the object, just as the latter involves the former. This is the affirmation of an irreducible interpoint of view of awareness, that
is

and

rela-

reasoning. Biologicaldependence between experienceis thus extended into the doctrine of the interdependence
tivityof subject and object, of assimilation of the object by the subject

and of the accommodation of the latter to the former.
The parallel between the theories of adaptation and thoseof intelligence having been outlined, study of the development of

the latter will of course determine the choice it is fitting to makebetween those different possible hypotheses. However, in orderto prepare for this choice and primarily in order to expand ourconcept of adaptation given the continuity of the biologicalthat an attempt has
processes and the analogy of the solutions

been made to supply on the different planes on which this problem is encountered we have analyzed on the plane of thehereditary morphology of the organism a case of "kinetogenesis"
suitable for illustrating the different solutions

catalogued.

we havejust

3&For details, see our two articles: Les races lacustres de la 'Limnaea
and Recherches sur les rapports de Fadaptation h<rdditaire avec lestagnalis'milieu, Bulletin biologique de la France et de la Betgiqu t LXH, 1929, pp.
424-455; and 2. Adaptation de la Limnaea stagnalis aux milieux lacustres dela Suisse romande, Revue Suisse de Zoologie, XXXVI, pp. 263-531,

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

17

There is found in almost all European and Asian marshes anaquatic mollusc, the Limnaea stagnalis (L.) which is typicallyelongated in shape.

Now in the great lakes of Switzerland,

Sweden, etc., this species is of a lacustrine variety, shortened andwhose form can easily be explained by the animal's
motor accommodation, during growth, to the waves and moveglobular,

ment of the water. After having verified this explanation experimentally, we succeeded in proving, by means of many breedingsin the aquarium, that this shortened variety whose geologicalhistory can be followed from the paleolithic age to our own,

became hereditary and perfectly stable (those genotypes obey inparticular the laws of Mendelian segregation) in the places most
exposed to the winds in the lakes of Neuchitel and Geneva.
Thus it appears at first glance as though the Lamarckian
solutionfitssuch acase:

The habits of contraction acquired

under the influence of waves would have ended by transmitting
themselves hereditarily in a morphologico-reflex ensemble constituting a new race. In other words, the phenotype would be
imperceptibly transformed into a genotype by the lasting actionof the environment. Unfortunately, in the case of the Limnaea asin all others, the laboratory experiment (breeding in an agitator

producing an experimental contraction) does not show a traceof the hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics. Moreover the lakes of medium size do not have all the shortened
varieties. If there is an influence of the environment in the constitution of hereditary contraction this influence is subjected tothresholds (of intensity, duration, etc)

and the organism,

far

from suffering it passively, reacts actively by an adaptation whichtranscends simple imposed habits.

Regarding the second solution, vitalism would not be able
to explain the particulars of any adaptation.

everywhereit

Why does the un-

not intervene
could be useful? Why did contraction take cen-

conscious intelligence of the species,

if it exists,

the lakes andappear after the post glacial stocking of
all the lakes?
in
not
exist
does
it
why
yet
turies to

The same objections apply to the solution of the problem
in accordance with the theory of preformation.

On the other hand, the fourth solution appears to be im-

18

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

to the theory of mutation the
pregnable to attack. According
be due to chance endogewould
hereditary shortened structures
relation to the environno
with
is to
nous variations

(that

say,

ment nor with the phenotypic individual adaptations) and it
would only be after the event that these forms, better preadapted
than the others to the rough zones of the lakes, would multiply
be exin the very places from which the elongated shapes would
the
event
after
selection
andChancecluded by natural selection.
would thus account for adaptation without any mysterious action
theof the environment on hereditary transmission, whereas
remainwould
variationsindividual
adaptation of non-hereditaryconnected with the environmental action. But, in the case of ourto such an interpretation can be
Limnaea, twostrong objections

made. In the first place, if the elongated forms of the species
could not endure as such in the parts of the lakes where thewater is roughest, on the other hand the shortened genotypes canlive in all the environments in which the species is represented,
and we have introduced some to a new climate years ago, in aa quesstagnant pond in the Swiss Plateau. If it were, therefore,
scatteredbeshouldthosetion of chance mutations,genotypes
in lacustrine eneverywhere; but, in fact, they only appeared
most
those
in
vironments and moreover
exposed to the wind,
to theprecisely where the individual or phenotypic adaptation
the
after
selection
waves is most evident! In the second place,

event is, in the case of the Limnaea, useless and impossible, forthe elongated forms can themselves give rise to shortened variations which are not or not yet hereditary. One cannot therefore

speak of chance mutations or of selection after the event to explain such adaptation.
Therefore only a fifth and last solution remains: This is toadmit the possibility of hereditary adaptations simultaneouslyof thepresupposing an action of the environment and a reaction
as theAsofhabits.
fixation
than
the
other
early
simpleorganism
thebetweeninteractions
exist
level
there
morphologico-reflex

environment and the organism which are such that the latter,without passively enduring the constraint of the former, nor limiting itself on contact with it to manifesting already preformed
structures, reacts by an active differentiation of reflexes (in theTHE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

19

particular case by a development of the reflexes of pedal adiierence and of contraction) and by a correlative morphogenesis.

in other words, the hereditary fixation of phenotypes or individual adaptations is not due to the simple repetition of habits
which gave rise to them but to a mechanism sui generis which,through recurrence or anticipation, leads to the same result on
the morphologico-reflex level.

Concerning the problem ofintelligence,

the lessons fur-nished by such an example seem to us to be the following. Fromdue to the hereditary adaptations of the organism,network of relations between the organism and the environment. Intelligence does not

its beginnings,

intelligence finds itself entangled in atherefore appear as a power of reflection independent of the particular position which the organism occupies in the universe but

from the very outset, by biological apriorities. It is not
an independent absolute, but is a relationship among
others, between the organism and things. If intelligence thus
extends an organic adaptation which is anterior to it, the progressof reason doubtless consists in an increasingly advanced acquisi-

is linked,

at alltion of awareness of the organizing activity inherent inand the primitive stages of psychological development

itself,

life

only

constitute the most superficial acquisitions of awareness of thiswork of organization. A fortiori the morphologico-reflex structures manifested by the living body, and the biological assimilation which is at the point of departure of the elementary formsof psychic assimilation would be nothing other than the mostexternal and material outline of the adaptation whose profoundnature the higher forms of intellectual activity would express
increasingly well.

One can therefore believe that intellectual

departing from a relation of interdependence between
organism and environment, or lack of differentiation between
activity,

subject and object, progresses simultaneously in the conquest ofthings and reflection on itself, these two processes of inverse
direction being correlative. From this point of view, physiological and anatomical organization gradually appears to conscious-

ness as being external to it and intelligent activity is revealed forthat reason as being the very essence of the existence of our subjects.

Whence the reversal which is at work in* perspectives as

20

THE BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

mental development progresses and which explains why thepower of reason, while extending the most central biologicalmechanisms, ends by surpassing them at the same time in comple-

mentary externalization and internalization.

PARTI
Elementary Sensorimotor Adaptations

Intelligence does not by any means appear at once derived
from mental development, like a higher mechanism, and radically distinct from those which have preceded it. Intelligencepresents, on the contrary, a remarkable continuity with theacquired or even inborn processes on which it depends and at thesame times makes use of. Thus, it is appropriate, before analyzing
intelligence as such, to find out how the formation of habits andeven the exercise of the reflex prepare its appearance. This iswhat we are going to do in the first part, dedicating one chapter
to the reflex and to the psychological questions that it raises, anda second chapter to the various acquired associations or elementary habits.

21

CHAPTER ONE

THE FIRST STAGE:The Use of Reflexes
If, In order to analyze the first mental acts, we refer tohereditary organic reactions, we must study them not for theirown sake but merely so that we may describe in toto the way inwhich they affect the individual's behavior. We should begin,
therefore, by trying to differentiate between the psychologicalproblem of the reflexes and the strictly biological problem.
Behavior observable during the first weeks of life is very
complicated, biologically speaking. At first there are very different types of reflexes involving the medulla, the bulb, the optic
commissures, the ectoderm itself; moreover, from reflex to instinct is only a difference of degree. Next to the reflexes of thecentral nervous system are those of the autonomic nervous system

and all the reactions due to "protopathic" sensibility. There is,above all, the whole group of postural reflexes whose importancefor the beginnings of the evolution of the mind has been demonstrated by H. Wallon. It is hard to envisage the organization of
the foregoing mechanisms without giving the endocrine processes
their just due as indicated by so many learned or spontaneous
reactions. Physiological psychology is confronted at the present
time by a host of problems which consist of determining theeffects on the individual's behavior of each of these separate
mechanisms. H. Wallon analyzes one of the most important ofthese questions in his excellent book on the disturbed child(I'Enfant turbulent): "Is there an emotional stage, or a stage of

postural and extrapyramidal reactions prior to the sensorimotor
or cortical stage?" Nothing better reveals the complexity of ele23

24

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

between thementary behavior and the need to differentiate
successive stages of concurrent physiological systems than Wallon's scholarly study of their genesis in which a wealth of pathosubstantiates his analysis.
logic material always
Notwithstanding the fascinating conclusions thus reached,
it seems to us difficult at the present time to go beyond a general

the continuity between thedescription when it comes to grasping
earliest behavior of the nursling and the future intellectual behavior. That is why, although in complete sympathy with Wallon's attempt to identify psychic mechanisms with those of life
to emphasizing funcitself, we believe we should limit ourselves
tional identity,from the point of view of simple external be-

havior.

In this respect the problem which
reactions in the first weeks is only this:arises in connection withHow do the sensorimotor,

inherent in the hereditary equippostural, and other reactions,ment of the newborn child, prepare him to adapt himself to his
external environment

and to acquire subsequent behavior dis-tinguished by the progressive use of experience?
The psychological problem begins to pose itself as soon as
the reflexes, postures, etc., are considered no longer in connection
with the internal mechanism of the living organism, but rather
in their relationships to the external environment as it is subthis point
jected to the individual's activity. Let us examine, from
first
in
the
weeks:of view, the various fundamental reactions
1
andvocalization, movesucking and grasping reflexes, crying
ments and positions of the arms, the head or the trunk, etc.
What is striking about this is that such activities from thestart of their most primitive functioning, each in itself and somein relation to others, give rise to a systematization which exceeds
their automatization. Almost since birth, therefore, there is **behavior'' in the sense of the individual's total reaction and not only
a setting in motion of particular or local automatizations onlyinterrelated from within. In other words, the sequential manifestations of a reflex such as sucking are not comparable to theperiodic starting up of a motor used intermittently, but constitute1 We shall return to thesubject of prehension, vision and vocalization in
the course of Chapter II.

THE USE OF REFLEXES

25

an historical development so that each episode depends on preceding episodes and conditions those that follow in a truly
organic evolution. In fact, whatever the intensive mechanism of
this historical process may be, one can follow the changes fromthe outside and describe things as though each particular reaction
determined the others without intermediates. This comprises
total reaction, that is to say, the beginning of
psychology.
1.

SUCKING REFLEXES.

Let us take as an example thesucking reflexes or the instinctive act of sucking; these reflexes
are complicated, involving a large number of afferent fibers ofand the glossopharyngeal nerves as well as thethe trigeminal

efferent fibers of the facial, the hypoglossal and the massetericnerves, all of which have as a center the bulb of the spinal cord.
First here aresome facts:

Observation Jf,

From birth sucking-like movements may be observed:

impulsive movement and protrusion of the lips accompanied by displacements of the tongue, while the arms engage in unruly and more orless rhythmical gestures and the head moves laterally, etc.

As soon as the hands rub the lips the sucking reflex is released.
The child sucks his fingers for a moment but of course does not know
either how to keep them in his mouth or pursue them with his lips.
Lucienne and Laurent, a quarter of an hour and a half hour after
birth, respectively, had already sucked their hand like this: Lucienne,
whose hand had been immobilized due to its position, sucked her

fingers for morethan ten minutes.

A few hours after birth, first nippleful of collostrum. It

is known
how greatly children differ from each other with respect to adaptation

For some children like Lucienne and Laurent, conand probably the tongue with the nipple suffices to
produce sucking and swallowing. Other children, such as Jacqueline,
to this first meal.

tact of the lips

have slower coordination: the child lets go of the breast every moment
without taking it back again by himself or applying himself to it asvigorously when the nipple is replaced in his mouth. There are somechildren, finally, who need real forcing: holding their head, forcibly
putting the nipple between the lips and in contact with the tongue, etc.

Observation 2. The day after birth Laurent seized the nipple with his
without having to have it held in his mouth. He immediately

lips

seeks the breast whenitescapes him as the result of some movement.

During the second day also Laurent again begins to make suckinglike movements between meals while thus repeating the impulsive

26

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

movements of the first day: His lips open and dose as if to receive aan object. This behavior subseshall not take it up again.
we
and
more
becamefrequent
quently
The same day the beginning of a sort of reflex searching may beobserved in Laurent, which will develop on the following days andreal nippleful, but without having

which probably constitutes the functional equivalent of the gropings
characteristic of the later stages (acquisition of habits and empirical inhis back with his mouth open, his lips
telligence). Laurent is lying on

and tongue moving slightly in imitation of the mechanism of sucking,and his head moving from left to right and back again, as though
or interrupted byseeking an object. These gestures are either silent
of
and
of
an
with
hunger.
Impatiencegruntsexpression
Observation 3. The third day Laurent makes new progress in hi& admouth
justment to the breast. All he needs in order to grope with open
toward final success is to have touched the breast or the surrounding
teguments with his lips. But he hunts on the wrong side as well as on
the right side, that is to say, the side where contact has been made.
Observation 4.

Laurent at 0;0(9) islying inbed and seeks to suck,moving his head to the left and to the right. Several times he rubs his
lips with his hand which he immediately sucks. He knocks against aquilt and a wool coverlet; each time he sucks the object only to relinquish it after a moment and begins to cry again. When he sucks his
hand he does not turn away from it as he seems to do with the woolens, but the hand itself escapes him through lack of coordination; foethen immediately begins to hunt again.
Observation 5. As soon as his cheek comes in contact with the breast,
Laurent at 0;0 (12) applies himself to seeking until he finds drink. His
search takes

itsbearings: immediatelyfrom the correct

side,

that

is

to say, the side where he experienced contact.

At 0;0 (20) he bites the breast which is given him, 5 on. from thenipple. For a moment he sucks the skin which he then lets go in orderto move his mouth about 2 cm. As soon as he begins sucking again hestops. In one of his attempts he touches the nipple with the outside of
his lips arid he does not recognize it. But, when his searchsubsequently

him accidentally to touch the nipple with the niucosa of theupper lip (his mouth being wide open), he at once adjusts his lips andleads

begins to suck.

The same day, same experiment: after having sucked the skin forseveral seconds, he withdraws and begins to cry. Then hebegins again,
withdraws again, but without crying, and takes it again 1 on.
away; hekeeps this up until he discovers the nipple.

Observation tf.The same day I hold out my crooked index

Laurent, whoisfinger to
crying from hunger (but intermittently and without

THE USE OF REFLEXES
violence).

27

He immediately sucks it but rejects it after a few seconds

and begins to cry. Second attempt: same reaction. Third attempt: hesucks it, this time for a long time and thoroughly, and it is I who retract it after a few minutes.

Laurent at 0;0 (21) is lying on his right side, his arms
hisbody, his hands clasped, and he sucks his right thumbtight against
Observation 7.

thelength while remaining completely immobile. The nurse madesame observation on the previous day. I take his right hand away andhe at once begins to search for it, turning his head from left to right.
As his hands remained immobile due to his position, Laurent found
his thumb after three attempts: prolonged sucking begins each time.
But, once he has been placed on his back, he does not know how to coordinate the movement of the arms with that of the mouth and hishands draw back even when his lips are seeking them.
At Q;0 (24) when Laurent sucks his thumb, he remains completelyatimmobile(asthough having a nippleful: complete sucking, pantings,

When his hand alone grazes his mouth, no coordination.
etc.).
Observation #.-At 0;0 (21): Several times I place the back of rny index
Each time he turns to the correct side while
finger against his cheeks.
reactions with the nipple.
Samemouth.
his
opening
the same experiments as those in observation 5. At
Then I
repeathe comes0;0 (21) Laurent begins by sucking the teguments with whichin contact. He relinquishes them after a moment but searches withthe skin with his lips. He seizes theopen mouth, while almost rubbing
as soon as he brushes against it with the mucosa of his lower lip.
nippleThat evening, the same experiment, but made during a nursing
which has been interrupted for this purpose. Laurent is already half
down and his hands are open (at the beginning
asleep; his arms hang
hands areof the meal his arms are folded against his chest and his
clasped). His mouthisplaced against theskin of the breast about 5 cm.

from the nipple. He immediately sucks without reopening his eyeshim. His eyes are wide open,
but, after a few moments, failure awakens
inhis arms flexed again and he sucks with rapidity. Then he gives up,
which
side
left
the
on
happens byorder to search a little further away,
chance to be the correct side. Again finding nothing, he continues tobut the rotatory movement which hechange places on the left side,inresultsheadthus gives his
making him let go the breast and go off ona tangent. In the course of this tangential movement he knocks against
the nipple with the left commissure of his lips and everything that hapthat he recognizes it at once. Instead ofpens would seem to indicate
at random, he only searches in the immediate neighborhood
gropinghimof the nipple. But as the lateral movements of his head madedescribe a tangential curve opposite and not parallel to the curve of

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

28

conthe breast, he oscillates in space guided only by light, haphazard
lothe breast. It takes a short time for these increasingly
tacts

with

been

of groping has
calized attempts to be successful. This last phaseeach approach to it has been folwhich
with
the
for
speed
noteworthy
the lips open
lowed by an attempt at insertion of the nipple, whileand close with maximum vigor; and noteworthy also for the progressive

adjustingofthetangential

movements around the points ofcontact.

At 0;0 (23) a new experiment. Laurent is 10 cm. from the breast,on the right. While he searches on the
searching for it on the left andturns andleft the nipple touches his right cheek. He immediately
toHe
continues
cm.
5
then
moved
is
He
the
on
away.
searches
right.
search on the correct side. He is brought nearer as soon as he grasps
the skin; he gropes and finds the nipple.
Same experiment and same result that evening. But, after several
swallows, he is removed. He remains oriented to the correct side,
At 0;0 (24) Laurent, during the same experiments, seems much
faster. To localize his search it suffices for the nipple to be brushed by

the outside of his lips and no longer only by the mucosa. Besides, assoon as he has noticed the nipple, his head's lateral movements become more rapid and precise (less extensive). Finally, it seems that heraisis henceforth capable not only of lateral movements but also ofthetouches
head
when
his
his
nipple,upper liping

Observation 9 .At 0;0 (22) Laurent

isawakened an hour after his

meal, and only cries faintly and intermittently. I place his right hand
before he begins to suck. Then, sevenagainst his mouth but remove ittimes in succession he does a complete imitation of sucking, opening

and closing his mouth, moving his tongue, etc.
Observation 10.

Here are two facts revealing the differences in adapta-

tion according to whether the need for nourishment is strong or weak.
At 0;0 (25) Laurent is lying on his back, not very hungry (he has notcried since his last meal)and his right cheek is touched by the nipple.

He turns to the correct side but the breast is removed to a distance of
5 to 10 cm. For a few seconds he reaches in the right direction andthen gives up. He is still lying on his back, facing the ceiling; after a

moment his mouth begins to move slightly, then his head moves fromA

brief search in thisside to side, finally settling on the wrong side.
direction, then crying (with commissures of the lip lowered, etc.), andanother pause. After a moment, another search in the wrong direction.

No reaction when the middle of his right cheek is touched. Only
when the nipple touches his skin about I cm. from his lips does lie
turn and grasp it.

On reading this description it would seem as though all the practice of the last weeks were in vain. It would seem,

above all, that the ex-THE USE OF REFLEXES

29

citation zone of the reflex stops about 1 cm. from the lips, and that thecheek itself is insensitive. But on the next day the same experiment
as we shall see.
yields opposite results,
At 0;0 (26) Laurent is lying on his back, very hungry. I touch the
middle of his cheek with my index finger bent first to the right, then to

the left; each time he immediately turns to the correct side. Then henipple in the middle of his right cheek. But, as he tries tofeels thegrasp it, it is withdrawn 10 cm. He then turns his head in the right
direction and searches. He rests a moment, facing the ceiling, then his
mouth begins to search again and his head immediately turns to theright side. This time he goes on to touch the nipple, first with his noseand then with the region between his nostrils and lips. Then he twice

very distinctly repeats the movement observed at 0;0 (24) (see Obs. 8):
He raises his head in order to grasp the nipple. The first time he justcatches the nipple with the corner of his lips and lets it go. A secondor two later, he vigorously lifts his head and achieves his purpose.
The way in which he discerns the nipple should be noted; at
0;Q (29) he explores its circumference with open and motionless lips
before grasping it.

The theoretical importance of such observations seems to us
to be as great as their triteness. 2 They make it possible for us tounderstand how a system of pure reflexes can comprise psychological behavior, as early as the systematization of their functioning. Let us try to analyze this process in its progressive

adapta-tional and organization aspects.
2.

THE USE OF REFLEXES.

Concerning its adaptation,no matter how well endowed with hereditary physiological mechanism, and no matter
it isinteresting to note that the reflex,

how stable its automatization, nevertheless needs to be used inorder truly to adapt itself, and that it is capable of gradual accommodation to external reality.
Let us first stress this element of accommodation. The sucking reflex

ishereditary and functions from birth, influenced

either by diffuse impulsive movements or by an external excitant

(Obs.

1);

this is thepoint of departure. In order that a useful

2 We areparticularly happy to mention their agreement with those of
R. Ripin and H. Hetzer: Fruhestes Lernen des Sauglings in der Ernahrungssituation, Zeitschr. f. PsychoL, 118, 1930, pp. 82-127. Observations of our chil-made several years ago,
their convergence a real one.

dren,

were independent of the latter which makes

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

30

it often suffices tofunction may result, that is to say, swallowing,
newbornchild, but, as we
the
of
mouth
the
put the nipple indoes not adapt
child
the
that
know (Obs. 1), it sometimes happens
to normal functionlead
will
at the first attempt. Only practicecontact with theis the first aspect of accommodation:
ing. Thattheand, even ifofreflex,theainactivityway,
object modifies,
the
such
to
contact,oriented
werehereditarily

thisactivity

consolidation of the former. Thislatter is no less necessary to theor certain reflexes cease to funcis how certain instincts are lostenvironment, 3 More-tion normally, due to the lack of a suitable
not only results in developing
over, contact with the environment
them in some way. Observain
alsobut
coordinating
the reflexes,
who first does not knowthehowchild,
show8
and5
tions 2, 3,

how to suck the nipple when it is put in his mouth, grows into grasp and even to find it, first after direct
creasingly able
4
touch, then after contact with any neighboring region.
can such accommodations be explained? It seems to us

Howdifficultto invoke

from birth the mechanism of acquired

or ofsociations, in the limited sense of the term,as-"conditioned

On the conreflexes," both of which imply systematic training.
at oncereveals
behavior
these
of
the
patterns
examining
trary,
association*:fromdifferwhich
inthe respects
acquiredtheyto the latter, including conditioned reWhereas withregardflexes,associationisestablished between a certain perception,

3 Thus Larguier des Brancels (Introduction & la Psychology, 1921, p. 178),

the declineorecalling Spalding's famous experiments concerning
instinct is transitory.
instincts in newly hatched chickens, adds: "The sucking
after

A calf which has been separated from its mother and fed by hand for a day
or two and then is taken to another cow, more often than not refuses to nurse,

The child behaves somewhat similarly. If he is first spoon-fed, he subsein taking the breast again."quently has great difficulty
4 See Preyer (L'Ame de FEnfant, translated by Variguy, 1887, pp. 213-217),
in particular the following lines: "To be sure, sucking is not as fruitful thechildrenfirst as the second day and I have often observed in normal newborn
at sucking were completely vain in the first hours of(1869) that attempts
life: when I made the experiment of putting an ivory pencil in their mouth,
Also: "It is well known that newborn
they were still uncoordinated" (p. 215).
children, when put to the breast do not find the nipple without help; they
later (in one case only on the eighth
only find it by themselves a few days
later than animals" (pp. 215-216). And: "When the childday), that is to say,is put to the breast the nipple often does not enter his mouth and he sucks
the neighboring skin; this is still evident in the third week . /' (p. 216).
.

THE USE OF REFLEXES

31

foreign to the realm of the reflex, and the reflex itself (forexample, between a sound, a visual perception, etc., and thesalivary reflex), according toour observations, it is simply thereflex's own sensibility (contact of the lips with a foreignbody)which is generalized, that is to say, brings with it the action of
the reflex in increasingly numerous situations. In the case of
Observations 2, 3, 5 and 8, for example, accommodation consists
essentially of progress in the continuity of the searching.

In thebeginning (Obs. 2 and3) contact with any part of the breast
whatever sets in motion momentary sucking of this region, im-mediately followed by crying or a desultory search, whereas after5), the same contact sets in motion a groping
which
the
child is headed toward success. It is very induring

several days (Obs.

teresting, in the second case, to see how the reflex, excited by eachcontact with the breast, stops functioning as soon as the childperceives that sucking is not followed by any satisfaction, as is
the taking of nourishment (see Obs. 5 and 8), and to see how the
search goes on until swallowing begins. In this regard, Observations 2 to 8 confirm that there is a great variety of kinds of ac-

commodation. Sucking of the eider-down quilt, of the coverlet,
leads to rejection, that of the breast to acceptance; suckingof the skin (the child's hand, etc.) leads to acceptance if it is onlyetc.,

a matter of sucking for the sake of sucking, but it leads to rejection (for example when it involves an area of the breast otherthan the nipple) if there is great hunger; the paternal index
finger (Obs. 6) is rejected when the child is held against the breast,
but is accepted as a pacifier, etc. In all behavior patterns it seems

evident to us that learning is a function of the environment.
Surely all these facts admit of a physiological explanation
which does not at all take us out of the realm of the reflex. The"irradiations," the "prolonged shocks," the "summations" of excitations and the intercoordination of reflexes probably explains
why the child's searching becomes increasingly systematic, why
contact which does not suffice to set the next operation in motion,
does suffice in doing so a few days later, etc. Those are not necesthe reflex such as
sarily mechanisms which are superposed on
habit or intelligent understanding will be, later. But it remains
no less true that the environment is indispensable to this operzi-

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

32

accommodation, in other words, that reflex adaptation is partly
tion. Without previous contact with the nipple and the experience of imbibing milk, it is very likely that the eider-down quilt,
the wool coverlet, or the paternal index finger, after setting inmotion the sucking reflex, would not have been so briskly re5jected by Laurent.
But if, in reflex adaptation, allowances

accommodation,must be made foraccommodation cannot be dissociated fromuse of the reflex.
progressive assimilation, inherent in the very
In a general way, one can say that the reflex is consolidated andvirtue of its own functioning. Such a fact is thestrengthened bymost direct expression of the mechanism of assimilation. Assimilation is revealed, in the first place, by a growing need forof the reflex (functional
repetition which characterizes the useby this sort of entirely
enables the childwhich
sensorimotororrecognition
practical
to adapt himself to the different objects with which his lips comeassimilation) and, in the second place,in contact (recognitory and generalizing assimilations).

The need for repetition is in itself alone very significant;it is a question of a behavior pattern which shows aandwhich proceeds to complicate the simple stimuli
historyin effect,connected with the state of the organism considered at a given

moment in time. A first stimulus capable of bringing the reflex
into play is contact with an external object. Preyer thus set inmotion the sucking movements of a newborn child by touching
his lips, and Observation 1 shows us that children suck theirhand a quarter of an hour or half an hour after birth. In thesecond place, there are internal stimuli, connected with thesomato-affective states: diffuse impulsive movements (Obs. 1) or
excitations due to hunger. But to these definite excitations, con-nected with particular moments in the life of the organism, there
is added, it seems to us, the essential circumstance that the very
repetition of the reflex movements constitutes a cynamogeny forthem. Why, for instance, does Lucienne suck her fingers soonafter birth for ten

minutes in succession? This could not be

cin animals every slightly complicated reflex mechanism occasions resame kind. The beginnings of copulation in the mollusks,
for example, give way to very strange gropings before the act is adapted.
actions of theTHE USE OF REFLEXES

S3

because of hunger, since the umbilical cord had just been cut.
There certainly is an external excitant from the moment thelips touch the hand. But why does the excitation last, in such acase, since it does not lead toany result except, precisely, to theuse of the reflex? It therefore seems that, from the start of thisprimitive mechanism, a sort of circular process accompanies thefunction, the activity of the reflex having augmented due to its

own use. If this interpretation remains doubtful, in so far as thepoint of departure is concerned, it obtains increasingly, on theother hand, with regard to subsequent behavior patterns. Afterthe first feedings one observes, in Laurent (Obs. 2), sucking-likemovements, in which it is difficult not to see a sort of autoexcitation. Besides, the progress in the search for the breast in Observations 2-5 and 8 seems also to show how much the function

strengthened the tendency to suck. The counterproof ofas we have seen, the progressive decay of reflex mechanisms which are not used. How to interpret these facts? It is
itselfthisis,self-evident that "circular reaction/

1

in Baldwin's sense of theterm, could not yet be involved, that is to say, the repetition ofa behavior pattern acquired or in the process of being acquired,and of behavior directed by the object to which it tends. Here it
only a matter of reflex and not acquired movements, and ofsensibility connected with the reflex itself and not with theexternal objective. Nevertheless the mechanism is comparable
to it from the purely functional point of view. It is thus veryisclear, inObservation 9, that the slightest excitation can set inmotion not only a reflex reaction but a succession of seven reactions. Without forming any hypothesis on the way of conserving this excitation, or a fortiori, without wanting to transform
this repetition into intentional or mnemonic behavior, one iscompelled to state that, in such a case, there is a tendency toward
cumulative repetition.
repetition, or, in objective terms,
This need for repetition is only one aspect of a more general

The tendency ofprocess which we can qualify as assimilation.
the reflex being to reproduce itself, it incorporates into itself
every object capable of fulfilling the function of excitant. Two
distinct phenomena must be mentioned here, both equallyfrom this particular point of view.
significant

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

34

The first is what we may call "generalizing assimilation/'is to say, the incorporation of increasingly varied objects
into the reflex schema. When, for example, the child is hungry

that

but not sufficiently so to give way to rage and to crying, and his
lips have been excited by some accidental contact, we witness
the formation of this kind of behavior pattern, so important due
to its own future developments and the innumerable analogous
cases which we shall observe in connection with other schemata.
Thus, according to chance contacts, the child, from the firsttwo weeks of life, sucks his fingers, the fingers extended to him,
his pillow, quilt, bedclothes, etc.; consequently
these objects to the activity of the reflex.

he assimilates

To be sure, we do not claim, when speaking of "generalizing" assimilation, that the newborn child begins by distinguishing a particular object (the mother's breast) and subsequently
applies to other objects the discoveries he has made about thisone. In other words, we do not ascribe to the nursling con-

firstand intentional generalization with regard to transition
from the particular to the general, especially as generalization, in

sciousnever begins by such a transition but always
theundifferentiated schema to the individual andfromproceeds
to the general, combined and complementary. We simply mainitself intelligent,

tain that, without

any awareness of individual objects or ofthechild at once incorporates into thenewbornlaws,
generalaschemaofof increasingly varied objects,
numberglobalsucking

whence the generalizing aspect of this process of assimilation.
But is it not playing on words to translate a fact so simple into
the language of assimilation? Would it not suffice to say "thesetting in motion of a reflex by a class of analogous excitants?"

And, if one sticks to the term assimilation, must the conclusion
then be reached that the nonhabitual excitants of any reflex (forexample the aggregate of objects capable of setting in motion
the palpebral reflex when they approach the eye) give rise to an
identical phenomenon of generalizing assimilation? There isnothing to it. What does present a particular and truly psychological problem, in the case of the sucking reflex, is that the as-

similation of objects to its activity will gradually begeneralized

until, at the stage of acquired circular reactions and even at theTHE USE OF REFLEXES

35

stage of intentional movements, it gives birth to a very complex
and strong schema. From the end of the second month the childwill suck his

thumb systematically (with acquired coordinationand not by chance), then at nearly five months his hands will
carry all objects to his mouth and he will end by using these behavior patterns to recognize bodies and even to compose the firstform of space (Stern's "buccal space"). It is thus certain that thefirst assimilations
relating to sucking, even if they reveal a lackof differentiation between contact with the breast and contact

with other objects, are not simple confusion destined to disappear
with progress in nutrition, but constitute the point of departurefor increasingly complex assimilations.

How to interpret this generalizing assimilation? The sucking
reflex can be conceived as a global schema of coordinated move-ments which, if it is accompanied by awareness, certainly does
not give rise to perception of objects or even of definite sensorial
pictures but simply to an awareness of attitudes with at most some
sensorimotor integration connected with the sensibility of theand mouth. Now this schema, due to the fact that it lends
to repetitions and to cumulative use, is not limited tofunctioning under compulsion by a fixed excitant, external or
lips

itselfbut functions in a way for itself. In other words, thechild does not only suck in order to eat but also to elude
hunger, to prolong the excitation of the meal, etc., and lastly, heinternal,

sucks for the sake of sucking. It is in this sense that the object

incorporated into the sucking schema is actually assimilated tothe activity of this schema. The object sucked is to be conceived,

not as nourishment for the organism in general, but, so to speak,as aliment for the very activity of sucking, according to its various forms. From the point of view of awareness, if there is awareness, such assimilation is at first lack of differentiation and not attrue generalization, but from the point of view of action, it
a generalizing extension of the schema which foretells (as has

first
is

just been seen) later and much more important generalizations.

But, apart from this generalizing assimilation, another assimilation must be noted from the two first weeks of life, which

we can call "recognitory assimilation." This second form seems
inconsistent with the preceding one;

actuallyit

only reveals

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS
we have just said
progress over the other, however slight. What

36

characterizes gen*regarding the lack of differentiation which
with
true
in
assimilation
effect,is,respect to states
only
eralizingof slight hunger or of satiety. But it is enough that the child bevery hungry for him to try to eat and thus to distinguish theseem to us
nipple from the rest. This search and this selectivity
to imply the beginning of differentiation in the global schema ofsucking,
pletely

and consequently a beginning of recognition, a comneedless to say, but
practical and motor recognition,

be called recognitory assimilation. Let us examine,from this point of view, the way in which the child rediscovers
the nipple. Ever since the third day (Obs. 3), Laurent seems tohedistinguish the nipple from the surrounding teguments;

sufficient tonurse and not merely to suck. From the tenth day (Obs.
the alacrity with which he rejects the eider-down
weobserve4),
tries toin order to search
quilt or the coverlet which he began to suck,for something more substantial. Furthermore, his reaction to hisfather's

index finger (Obs. 6) could not be more definite: disap-

pointment and crying. Lastly, the gropings on the breast itself(Obs. 5 and 8) also reveal selectivity. How is this kind of recognition to be explained?

Of course there could be no question, either here or in connection with generalizing assimilation, of the recognition of an"object" for the obvious reason that there is nothing in the statesof consciousness of a newborn child which could enable him tocontrast an external universe with an internal universe. Suppos-

ing that there are given simultaneously visual sensations (simple
vision of lights without forms or depth), acoustic sensations and atactile-gustatory

and kinesthetic sensibility connected with thesucking reflex, it is evident that such a complexus would in noway be sufficient to constitute awareness of objects: the latter
6

implies, as we shall see, characteristically intellectual operations,necessary to secure the permanence of form and substance.

Neither could there be a question of purely perceptive recognition or recognition of sensorial images presented by the external world, although such recognition considerably precedes
the elaboration of objects (recognizing a person, a toy or a linen& Volume II, La ConstructionduMM chez VEnfant,THE USE OF REFLEXES

37

cloth simply on "presentation" and before having apermanent
concept of it). If, to the observer, the breast which the nurslingisabout to take is external to the child and constitutes an image

separate from him, to the newborn child, on the contrary, there
can only exist awareness of attitudes, of emotions, or sensationsof hunger and of satisfaction. Neither sight nor hearing yet gives

perceptions independent of these general reactions. As
H. Wallon has effectively demonstrated, external influences only
have meaning in connection with the attitudes they arouse. Whenthe nursling differentiates between the nipple and the rest of thebreast, fingers, or other objects, he does not recognize either an
object or a sensorial picture but simply rediscovers a sensorimotor
and particular postural complex (sucking and swallowing combined) among several analogous complexes which constitute hisuniverse and reveal a total lack of differentiation between subject
and object. In other words, this elementary recognition consists,in the strictest sense of the word, of "assimilation" of the wholeof the data present in a definite organization which has alreadyfunctioned and only gives rise to real discrimination due to its
past functioning. But this suffices to explain in which respect
rise torepetition of the reflex leads by itself to recognitory assimilation
which, albeit entirely practical, constitutes the beginning of

knowledge.

7

More precisely, repetition of the reflex leads to a

general and generalizing assimilation of objects to its activity,
due to the varieties which gradually enter this activity

but,(sucking for its own sake, to stave off hunger, to eat, etc.), theschema of assimilation becomes differentiated and, in the mostimportant differentiated cases, assimilation becomes recognitory.
In conclusion, assimilation belonging to the adaptation reflex appears in three forms: cumulative repetition, generalization of the activity with incorporation of new objects to it, andrepeat that we do not claim to specify the states of consciousness
this assimilation. Whether these states are purely emotional or affective, connected with the postures accompanying sucking, orwhether there exists at first conscious sensorial and kinesthetic discrimination,
we could not decide by studying behavior of the first two or three weeks.
What this behavior simply reveals is the groping and the discernment whichcharacterizes the use of the reflex, and these are the two fundamental facts
7 Let uswhich accompany

which authorize us to speak of psychological assimilation atstage.

this primitive

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

38

motor recognition. But, in the last analysis, these three
The reflex must be conceived as an organized totality whose nature it is to preserve itself by functioning
and consequently to function sooner or later for its own sakefinally,

forms are but one:(repetition) while incorporating into itself objects propitious tothis functioning (generalized assimilation) and discerning situa-

tions necessary to certain special modes of its activity (motor rec-We

and this is the sole purpose of this analyshall see
ognition).
that these processes are again found, with the unwedging ac-

sis

counted for by the progressive complexity of the structures, inthe stages of acquired circular reactions, of the first voluntary
schemata and of truly intelligent behavior patterns.

The progressive adaptation of the reflex schemata, therefore, presupposes their organization. In physiology this truth istrite. Not only does the reflex arc as suchpresuppose an organi-zation but, in the animal not undergoing laboratory experimentation, every reflex system constitutes in itself an organized totality. According to Graham Brown's theories, the simple reflex is, in effect, to be considered as a product of differentiation.

From the psychological point of view, on the other hand, there
too great a tendency to consider a reflex, or even acomplexinstinctive act such as sucking, to be a summation of movementsiswith, eventually, a succession of conscious states juxtaposed, andnot as a real totality. But two essential circumstances induce us
to consider the sucking act as already constituting psychic
zation:organi-

The fact that sooner or later this act reveals a meaning,

and the fact that it is accompanied by directed searching.
Concerning the meanings, we have seen how much sucking
acts vary according to whether the newborn child is hungry andtries to nurse, or sucks in order to calm himself, or whether ina way he plays at sucking. It seems as though they have a mean-

ing for the nursling himself. The increasing calm which succeeds a storm of crying and weeping as soon as the child is in
position to take nourishment and to seek the nipple is sufficientevidence that, if awareness exists at all, such awareness is fromthe beginning awareness of meaning. But one
sarily relative to othermeaning is neces-meanings, even on the elementary planeof simple motor recognitions.

THE USE OF REFLEXES

39

Furthermore, that organization exists is substantiated by thefact that there is directed search. The precocious searching of thechild in contact with the breast, in spite of being commonplace,is a remarkable thing. Such searching, which is the
beginning ofaccommodation and assimilation, must be conceived, from thepoint of view of organization, as the first manifestation of a duality of desire and satisfaction, consequently of value and reality,of complete totality and incomplete totality, a duality which ison all planes of future activity and which the enevolution of the mind will try to abate, even though it is

to reappear
tire

destined to be emphasized unceasingly.

Such are, from the dual point of view of adaptation andorganization, the first expressions of psychological life connectedwith hereditary physiological mechanisms. This survey, though
schematic, we believe suffices to show how the psyche prolongs
purely reflex organization while depending on it. The physiologyof the organism furnishes a hereditary mechanism which is already completely organized and virtually adapted but has neverfunctioned. Psychology begins with the use of this mechanism.
This use does not in any way change the mechanism itself, contrary to what may be observed in the later stages (acquisition of
habits, of understanding, etc.). It is limited to strengthening it
and to making it function without integrating it to new organi-zations which go beyond it.

But within the limits of this func-

tioning there is room for a historical development which marks

Thisdevelopment
precisely the beginning of psychologicalundoubtedly admits of a physiological explanation: if the reflex
life.

mechanism is strengthened by use or decays through lack of use,
this is surely because coordinations are made or unmade by virtueof the laws of reflex activity. But a physiological explanation ofthis kind does not exclude the psychological point of view which

we have taken. In effect, if, as is probable, states of awarenessaccompany a reflex mechanism as complicated as that of thesucking instinct, these states of awareness have an internal hiscould not twice reproduce ittory. The same state of awarenessself identically. If it reproduces itself it isby acquiring in addi-

tion some new quality of what has already been seen, etc., consome meaning. But if, by chance, no state of aware-sequently

40

ELEMENTARY SENSORJMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

or ofness yet occurred, one could nevertheless speak o behavior
sui
the
one
hand,
generis charbehavior patterns, given, on the
their
the
on
other,
continuity
and,acter of theirdevelopmentwith those of subsequent stages. We shall state this in precise
terms in our conclusion.
The true character of these behavior patterns involves the inIn so far as the reflex is a
dividual utilization ofexperience.
constitutes a racial utilization
hereditary mechanism it perhaps
of experience. That is a biological problem of which we have
and which, while of highest
already spoken (Introduction, 3)
be solved by his particular
cannotinterest to thepsychologist,

methods. But, inasmuch as it is a mechanism giving rise to use,and consequently a sort of experimental trial, the sucking reflex
in addition to heredity, an individual utilization
presupposes,of experience. Thisisthe crucial factwhich permits the incor-of such a behavior pattern into the realm of psychology,

porationwhereas a simple reflex, unsubordinated to the need for use ora function of the environment (sneezing
experimental trial asinterest to us. Of what does this experino
isoffor example)
withAnmental trial consist?
attempt can be made to define ittoout subordinating this analysis
any hypothesis concerning thewhichofconsciousness
kinds of states
eventually accompany such
reflex or instinctive mechthewithconnected
a process. Learning
due to habits or inattainments
thefromanism is distinguishedthe fact that it retains nothing external to thetelligencebymechanism itself. A habit, such as that of a 2- or 3-month-old
an object, presupposes ababy who opens his mouth on seeing
thistorelatedfixationmnemonic
object. A tactile-motor schemaof the object and thisvariations
thetois formed according
schema alone explains the uniformity of the reaction. In thesame way the acquisition of an intellectual operation (counting,for instance) implies memory of the objects themselves or of exmade with the objects. In both cases, therefore, some-perimentsof the act in question isthing external to the initial mechanism
retained. On the other hand, the baby who learns to suck retains nothing external to the act of sucking; he undoubtedly
bears no trace either of the objects or the sensorial pictures on
which later attempts have supervened. He merely records the se-THE USE OF REFLEXES

41

ries of attempts as simple acts which condition each other.

When

he recognizes the nipple, this does not involve recognition ofa thing or of an image but rather the assimilation of one sensori-motor and postural complex to another. If the experimental trial
involved in sucking presupposes environment and experience,since no functional use is possible without contact with the environment, this is a matter of a very special kind of experimental
trial, of an autoapprenticeship to some extent and not of an actual acquisition. This is why, if these first psychological behavior
individual use
patterns transcend pure physiology just as theof a hereditary mechanism transcends heredity
pend on them to the highest degree.

they

still

de-

But the great psychological lesson of these beginnings of behavior is that, within the limits we have just defined, the experimental trial of a reflex mechanism already entails the most complicated accommodations, assimilations and individual organiAccommodation exists because, even without retaining
from the environment as such, the reflex mechanism

zations.

anything
needs the environment. Assimilation exists because, throughits very use, it

incorporates to itself every object capable of sup-it withwhat it needs and discriminates even these objects

plyingthanks to the identity of the differential attitudes they elicit.
as organization is the inFinally, organization exists, inasmuch
ternal aspect of this progressive adaptation. The sequential usesof the reflex mechanism constitute organized totalities and theand searchings apparent from the beginnings of thisgropings

thestructurevery
period of experimental trial are oriented byof these totalities.
But if these behavior patterns transcend pure physiology
use has a hisonly to the very slight extent in which individual
tory independent of the machine predetermined by heredity (tothe point where it could seem almost metaphorical to character-donethem as "behavior patterns" as we havehere), they
nevertheless seem to us to be of essential importance to the rest
In effect, the functions of accommoof mentalizedevelopment.

dation, of assimilation and of organization which we have justdescribed in connection with the use of a reflex mechanism will

be found once more In the course of subsequent stages and will

ELEMENTARY SENS0RIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

42

acquire increasing importance. In a certain sense, we shall evensee that the more complicated and refined intellectual structures

become, the more this functional nucleus will constitute the essence of these very structures.
3. ASSIMILATION; BASIC FACT OF PSYCHIC LIFE.
In studying the use of reflexes we have ascertained the existence of a fundamental tendency whose manifestations we shallrediscover at each new stage of intellectual development: the tendency toward repetition of behavior patterns and toward theutilization of external objects in the framework of such repetition. This assimilation
simultaneously reproductive, generaliz-and recognitory constitutes the basis o the functional use
which we have described with respect to sucking. Assimilationis therefore
indispensable to reflex accommodation. Moreover, it
ing,

is

the dynamic expression of the static fact of organization. From

thisdouble point of view it emerges as a basic fact, the psycho-

logical analysis of which must yield genetic conclusions*Three circumstances induce us to consider assimilation thefundamental fact of psychic development. The first is that assimilation constitutes a process common to organized life and mental
activity and is therefore an idea common to physiology and psychology. In effect, whatever the secret mechanism of biologicalassimilation may be, it is an empirical fact that an organ devel-ops while functioning (by means of a certain useful exercise andfatigue). But when the organ in question affects the external be-

havior of the subject, this phenomenon of functional assimilation
presents a physiological aspect inseparable from the psychoits parts are
physiological whereas the reaction of
the whole may be called psychic. Let us take forthelogical aspect;

exampleeyewhich develops under the influence of the use of vision (perception of lights, forms, etc.). From the physiological point of viewit can be stated thatlight is nourishment for the eye (in particular in primitive cases of cutaneous
sensibility in the lower in-vertebrates, inwhom the eye amounts to an accumulation of pig-

ment dependent on environing sources of light). Light is absorbed and assimilated by sensitive tissues and this action
bringswith it a correlative development of the organs affected. Such aTHE USE OF REFLEXES
process undoubtedly presupposes

43

an aggregate of mechanisms

whose start may be very complex. But, if we adhere to a global
description that of behavior and consequently of psychology
the things seen constitute nourishment essential to the eye since
it is they which impose the continuous use to which the organs

owe their development. The eye needs light images just as thewhole body needs chemical nourishment, energy, etc. Among theaggregate of external realities assimilated by the organism there
are some which are incorporated into the parts of the physico-chemical mechanisms, while others simply serve as functionaland general nourishment. In the first case, there is physiologicalassimilation, whereas the second may be called psychological assimilation. But the phenomenon is the same in both cases: theuniverse is embodied in the activity of the subject.
In the second place, assimilation reveals the primitive fact
generallylife:

conceded to be the most elementary one of psychic
How can we explain why the individual, on

repetition.

however high a level of behavior, tries to reproduce every experience he has lived? The thing is only comprehensible if the behavior which is repeated presents a functional meaning, that is
to say, assumes a value for the subject himself. But whence comes
this value? From functioning as such. Here again, functional assimilation is manifest as the basic fact.
In the third place, the concept of assimilation from the very

embodies in the mechanism of repetition the essential element >vhich distinguishes activity from passive habit: the coordination of the new with the old which foretells the processof judgment. In effect, the reproduction characteristic of the actof assimilation always implies the incorporation of an actual fact
first

into a given schema, this schema being constituted by the repetition itself. In this way assimilation is the greatest of all intellectual mechanisms and once more constitutes, in relation to them,

the truly basic fact.

But could not this description be simplified by eliminating
a concept which is so fraught with meaning that it might seemon functional psychology
equivocal? In his remarkable essays
8 chooses without
adding anything as a point of deClaparMe
8 See

rEducation fonctiontielle, Delachaux and Niestte, 1931.

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

44

parture of all mental activity the very fact of need. How can it
be explained that certain behavior patterns give rise to spontane-

ous repetition? How does it happen that useful acts reproduce
themselves? Because, says Claparede, they answer a need. Needs
thus mark the transition between organic life, from which theyemanate, and psychic life, of which they constitute the motive

power.

The great advantage of this phraseology is that it is much
simpler than that of assimilation. Besides, on the basis of what
Clapar&de maintains, it is very difficult not to agree with him.
Since need is the concrete expression of what we have called theprocess of assimilation, we could not raise doubts concerning the

ground for this conception to which we personally owe much.
But the question is to know whether, precisely because of its simthe concept
plicity, it does not bring up initial problems whichof assimilation permits us to refer to biological study. Thereseems to us to be two difficulties.
In the first place, if need as such is the motive power for all
activity, how does it direct the movements necessary to its satisfaction? With admirable analytical acuteness, Clapar&de himself

has raised the question.

Not only, he says, does one not under-

stand why the pursuit of a goal coordinates useful actions, but
furthermore, one does not see how, when one means fails, others
are attempted. It transpires, in effect, especially when acquired
associations are superimposed on the reflex, that an identicalneed releases a succession of different behavior patterns, but always directed toward the same end. What is the instrument of
this selection and of this coordination of advantageous reactions?

Itisself-evident thatitwould be useless to try to resolvethese fundamental problems now. But does not the question arise

because one begins by dissociating the need from the act in its
totality? The basic needs do not exist, in effect, prior to thetivating cycles which permit them to be gratified.

mo-

They appear

during functioning. One could not say, therefore, that they precede repetition: they result from it as well, in an endless circle.
For example empty sucking or any similar practice constitutes
training which augments need as well as the reverse. From thepsychological point of view, need must not be conceived as be-THE USE OF REFLEXES

45

ing independent of global functioning of which it is only anindication. From the physiological point of view, moreover, needpresupposes an organization in "mobile balance" of which it
simply indicates a transitory imbalance. In both kinds of terminology, need is thus the expression of a totality momentarily incomplete and tending toward reconstituting itself, that is to say,precisely what we call a cycle or a schema of assimilation: Need
manifests the necessity of the organism or an organ to use an ex-

ternal datum in connection with its functioning. The basic factistherefore not need, but the schemata of assimilation of whichaspect. Henceforth it is perhaps a pseudo question to ask how need directs useful movements. It is because these

it is the subjective

movements are already directed that need sets them in motion.
In other words, organized movements, ready for repetition, andneed itself constitute only one whole. True, this conception, veryclear with regard to the reflex or any innate organization, ceases
to seem so with respect to acquired associations. But perhaps thedifficulty comes from taking literally the term "associations/*
whereas the fact of assimilation makes it possible to explain how
every new schema results from a differentiation and a complication of earlier schemata and not of an association between elements given in an isolated state. This hypothesis even leads to anunderstanding of how a sole need can set in motion a seriesof successive efforts. On the one hand, all assimilation is generalinterizing and, on the other hand, the schemata are capable ofcoordination through reciprocal assimilation as well as being
able to function alone. (See stages IV-VI concerning this.)

A second difficulty seems to us to appear when one considNeeds are supposed, insuch a case, to insure the transition between organism and psyche; they constitute in some way the physiological motive power
for mental activity. But if certain corporeal needs play this roleers need as the basic fact of psychic life.

in a large number of lower behavior patterns (such as the search
for food in animal psychology), in the young child the principal

needs are of a functional category. The functioning of the organs
engenders, through its very existence, a psychic need sui generis,or rather a series of vicarious needs whose complexity transcends,
from the very beginning, simple organic satisfaction. Further-

46

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

more, the more the intelligence develops and strengthens, themore the assimilation of reality to functioning itself is transformed into real comprehension, the principal motive power ofintellectual activity thus becoming the need to incorporate things

into the subject's schemata. This vicariousness of needs, which
unceasingly transcend themselves to go beyond the purely oris not needganic plane, seems to show us anew that the basic fact
as such but rather the act of assimilation, which embodies in one
whole functional need, repetition and that coordination between

subject and object which foretells discrepancy and judgment.
To be sure, invoking the concept of assimilation does not

an explanation of assimilation itself. Psychology can
only begin with the description of a basic fact without being able
constituteto explainit.

The ideal of absolute deduction could only leadto verbal explanation. To renounce this temptation is to choose

an elementary fact amenable to biological treatment simultaneously with psychological analysis. Assimilation
answers this. Explanation of this fact is in the realm of biology.
The existence of an organized totality which is preserved while
as a principle

assimilating the external world raises, in effect, the whole problem of life itself. But, as the higher cannot be reduced to thelower without adding something, biology will not succeed inclarifying the question of assimilation without taking into ac-

count its psychological aspect* At a certain level life organizationand mental organization only constitute, in effect, one and thesame thing.

CHAPTER II

THE SECOND STAGE:
The First Acquired Adaptations and thePrimary Circular Reaction
The hereditary adaptations are doubled, at a given moment,by adaptations which are not innate to which they are subordinated little by little. In other words, the reflex processes are progressively integrated into cortical activity. These new adaptations constitutewhat

are ordinarily called "acquired associa-

tions/' habits or even conditioned reflexes, to say nothing of intentional movements characteristic of a third stage. Intent, whichmore primitive levels of psychocouldin effect, be aware of itself, andassimilation,not,logicalthus differentiate behavior, before assimilation through "secis

doubtless imminent to the

ondary" schemata, that is to say, before the behavior patterns
born of the exercise of prehension and contemporaneous withthe first actions brought to bear on things. We can therefore
ascribe to the present stage intentional movements as the higher

limit and the first nonhereditary adaptations as the lower limit.
In truth it is extremely precarious to specify when acquired

adaptation actually begins in contradistinction to hereditarycriadaptation. From a theoretical point of view, the following
terion can be adopted: in every behavior pattern of which theadaptation is determined by heredity, assimilation and accommodation form one entity and remain undifferentiated, whereas
with acquired adaptation they begin to dissociate themselves. In
other words, hereditary adaptation does not admit of any apprenticeship outside its own use, whereas acquired adaptation
implies an apprenticeship related to the new conditions of theexternal environment simultaneously with an incorporation of47

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

48

the objects to the schemata thus differentiated. But if one proceeds from theory to the interpretation of particular facts, greatfrom simple
distinguishing real acquisition
preformed coordination.
In effect, how is it possible to have a clear idea of the moment whence there is retention of some other condition externaldifficulties arise into the reflex mechanism itself? In the use of the reflex, as we haveas such, and It isseen, there is only fixation of the mechanism
aofaccommodation
that
hereditary schema, whilein this respect

and contact with the environment,
presupposing experiencewithassimilation, that is to say, with theforms only one entity
At a given moment, on the otherschema.
thisoffunctional use
hand, the child's activity retains something external to itself,that is to say, it is transformed into a function of experience;in this respect there is acquired accommodation. For instance,
when the child systematically sucks his thumb, no longer due tochance contacts but through coordination between hand andmouth, this may be called acquired accommodation. Neither thereflexes of the mouth nor of the hand can be provided such coordination by heredity (there is no instinct to suck the thumb I)

and experience alone explains its formation. But if this is clear

with regard to that kind of behavior pattern, in how many otha clear boundary between the pure
impossible to drawofutilization
theandreflexexperience? The multiple aspects offoraccommodation,
visualexample, comprise an inseparable
true
and
use
reflexof
mixtureacquisition.
There is the same difficulty from the point of view of asers

is it

similation. Psychological assimilation characteristic of the reflex
consists, as we have seen, in a cumulative repetition with pro-of the objects into the cycle
gressive incorporation

which has

But nothing, in such a behavior pattern,thus been reproduced.
to which it leads.
yet implies that it is directed by the new results
To be sure, in the sucking act, there is from the beginning directed searching and, in case of hunger, success alone gives mean-

ing to the series of gropings. But the result sought yields nothing
new in relation to the primitive sensorimotor field of the reflex

On the contrary, in the realm of acquired adaptation
toward a new result (new either through the character of the senitself.

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

49

serial pictures which define it, or through the procedures set inmotion to obtain it), this directs repetition. Whereas, in the reflex, assimilation only formed one entity with accommodation,

henceforth the reproduction of the new act, or the assimilationof objects to the schema of this act, constitutes a process distinct

from accommodation itself. Such a process can be very slightly
differentiated when the acquired adaptation merely prolongs thereflex adaptation, but it is the more distinct from accommodation as the new act is more complex. Thus it is that, in the ac-quisition of prehension, it is one thing to repeat indefinitely amaneuver which has been successful and quite another thing toattempt to grasp an object in a new situation. The repetition of
the cycle which has been actually acquired or is in the processof being acquired is what J. M. Baldwin has called the "circular
reaction": this behavior pattern will constitute for us the principle of assimilation sui generis characteristic of this second stage.
But if such a distinction between the simple repetition of the reflex

and the"circular reaction"istheoretically clear,

it

goes

without saying that here again the greatest difficulties confront
concrete analysis.

Now let us proceed to examining the facts, first grouping
them according to separate and distinct realms of activity.
1.

ACQUIRED SUCKING HABITS.

Superimposed on

the reflex behavior patterns, which we have described in thefirst chapter, are, from the second or third month, certain forms

We shall begin byof .sucking which are unquestionably new.
describing the two principal circular reactions

the systematicoftheactionwith
theofsaliva, of the
tongue (later
protrusion
two
activities will
These
thumb.
and
of
the
the
lips, etc.),
suckingprovide us with the type of that which is spontaneous acquired
habit, with active assimilation and accommodation.

Thereupon

we shall discuss some facts concerning accommodation, commonly
called "association transfers" or "sensorimotor associations" (set-motion of sucking by various signals: position, noises,
optical signals, etc.) and we shall see that these partial accommodations, however mechanical and passive they may appear tobe, in reality constitute simple, isolated and abstract links of theting in50
cyclesELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS
inherent in circular reaction. Finally we shall speak ofcertain coordinations between sucking and vision.
Here are examples of the first group of facts (circular reactions):

Observation 71. -Laurent at 0;0 (30) stays awake without crying, gazHe makes sucking-like movements aling ahead with wide open eyes.
in slow rhythm, hisandmostclosing his mouth

continually, opening
moments his tongue, instead of
tongue constantly moving. At certain
the sucking recommences
lower
lip;
remaining inside his lips, licks thewith renewed ardor.
Two interpretations are possible. Either at such times there is
the protrusion of the tongue is merely asearching for food and thenor elsereflex inherent in the mechanism of sucking and swallowing,
the
time
for
It
seems,
reaction.
circularofthethis marks
beginning
acof the tongue
Sometimes
are
both
that
protrusion
present.
^isbeing,
the arms and leads to impaof
movements
disordered
companied by
to suck,
tience and anger. In such a case there is obviously a seeking
other
the
on
hand,
protrusion of theand disappointment. Sometimes,of the arms andmovementsslow,
isrhythmical
accompanied by
tonguean expression of contentment. In this case the tongue comes into playthrough circular reaction.
Observation 12. -At Ojl(3)

Laurent puts out his tongue several times

in succession. He is wide awake, motionless, hardly moves his arms andmakes no sucking-like movements; his mouth is partly open and he

the lower lip.-At 0;1 (5) Laurent bekeeps passing his tongue overthen the sucking is gradually reandmovements
gins sucking-likebehavior.-At
0;1 (6) he plays with his tongue,
placed by the preceding
sometimes by licking his lower lip, sometimes by sliding his tongue
between his lips and gums. The following days this behavior is frewith the same expression of satisfaction.
quently repeated and always

Observation 13 .-At 0;1 (24) Lucienne plays with her tongue, passing
over her lower lip and licking her lips unceasingly. Observation ismade of the existence of a habit acquired a certain number of days
extended to sucking the thumb and beyond.
previous. The behavior isit

Observation /^.During the second half of the second month, that is
to say, after having learned to suck his thumb, Laurent continues tothe otherbut intermittently.
play with his tongue and to suck,
hand, his skill increases. Thus, at 0;1 (20) I notice he grimaces whileOnbulging
lips,
placing his tongue between gums and lips andwell as making a clapping sound when quickly closing his mouth afterin

these exercises.

his

as

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

51

Observation 15. During the third month he adds to the protrusion of
tongue and finger sucking new circular reactions Involving themouth. Thus from 0;2 (18) Laurent plays with his saliva, letting it accumulate within his half-open lips and then abruptly swallowing it.
About the same period he makes sucking-like movements, with orwithout putting out his tongue, changing in various ways the positionof his lips; he bends and contracts his lower lip, etc. These exercises
subsequently become increasingly varied and do not deserve more detailed examination from the point of view we have taken in this study.
hisFinger sucking also gives rise to evident acquisition.
Observation 16. At 0;1(1)

Laurent is held by his nurse in an almostHeis very
vertical position, shortly before the meal.
hungry and tries
to nurse with his mouth open and continuous rotations of the head.

His arms describe big rapid movements and constantly knock against
when his hand was laid on his right cheek, Laurent
turned his head and tried to grasp his fingers with his mouth. The
first time he failed and succeeded the second. But the movements of hisarms are not coordinated with those of his head; the hand escapes
while the mouth tries to maintain contact. Subsequently, however, hecatches his thumb; his whole body is then immobilized, his right hand

his face. Twice,happens to grasp his left arm and his left hand presses against his
mouth. Then a long pause ensues during which Laurent sucks his left
thumb in the same way in which he nurses, with greed and passion(pantings,etc.).

There is therefore a complete analogy with Observation 7 of Chapter I. But it is more firmly established that nothing external forces thechild to keep his hand in his mouth; the arms are not immobilized by
the reclining position of the subject but by a spontaneous attitude.
Nevertheless the fact observed lends itself to two interpretations: either,as may be the case from the first consecutive days after birth, sucking
immobilizes the whole body and consequently the hands the arms re-main tight against the torso while the newborn child nurses, and it isconceivable that it may be the same when he sucks his thumb which
he has found by chance or else there is direct coordination between
observations seem tosucking and the arm movements. Subsequentshow that actual behavior foretells this coordination.
Observation 77. At 0;1 (2) Laurent in his crib cries with hunger. He isan almost vertical position. His behavior then goes throughfour sequential phases quite distinct from one another. He begins by
his head from left tocalming himself and tries to suck while turningand back again while his arms flourish without direction. Then

lifted torightmovements of maximum(second phase) the arms, instead of describing
breadth, seem to approach his mouth. Several times each hand brushes

52

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

his lips; the right hand presses against the child's cheek and clasps it
for a few seconds. Meanwhile the mouth is wide open and unceasingly

The left thumb is then caught and thetwo arms become rigid, the right arm against the chest under the left
arm which is held by the mouth. During a third phase, the arms again
wave about in space without direction, the left thumb leaving themouth after a few minutes. During this time the child becomes angry,
his head thrown back and his cries alternating with attempts to suck.
Finally a fourth phase begins during which the hands again approach
the mouth which tries to seize the fingers which touch it. These lastattempts meet with no success and crying ensues.
Can coordination be mentioned this time? Each of these phases finds
its parallel in the behavior of the preceding weeks; from the first days oflife babies are seen slashing their faces with their fingers while themouth seems to try to grasp something. Nevertheless the sequence ofthe four phases seems to indicate a beginning of a connection between the movements of the arms and the sucking attempts.
attempts to grasp something.

Observation 18. At 0;1 (3) Laurent (same position) does not seem toreveal any coordination between hands and mouth before nursing.

Onthe other hand, after a meal, when he was still wide awake and trying
to suck, his arms, instead of gesticulating aimlessly, constantly movetoward his mouth. To be more precise, it has occurred to me several
times that the chance contact of hand and mouth set in motion the
directing of the latter toward the former and that then (but only
then), the hand tries to return to the mouth. Laurent succeeded in sucking his fingers four times, his hand and arms immediately becoming
immobilized. But that has never lasted more than a few seconds. The
evening of the same day Laurent, after nursing, remained wide awake
and continued to try to suck, interspersing his attempts with vigorous
cries. I then grasped his right arm and held it until his mouth began tosuck his hand. As soon as the lips were in contact with the hand, thearms stopped resisting and remained still for several moments. Thisphenomenon has been confirmed since I made the experiment since0;0 (15) but as a rule the position is not maintained. Only when the
thumb is sucked does immobility result (see Obs. 7 and 16). This time,on the contrary, the arm remained immobile for a moment, although
the back of the hand only was in contact with the lips; the latter obviously tried to explore the whole hand. After a moment, the handlost the contact but rediscovered it. It is no longer the mouth thatseeks the hand, but the hand which reaches for the mouth. Thirteentimes in succession I have been able to observe the hand go back into
the mouth. There is no longer any doubt that coordination exists* The
mouth may be seen opening and the hand directing itself toward it
simultaneously. Even the failures are significant. It thus happens thatTHE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

53

the fingers are planted on the cheek while the open mouth Is ready toreceive them.

Observation 19.-At 0;1 (4) after the 6 P.M. meal Laurent is wideawake (as was not the case at the preceding meals) and not completely
satisfied. First he makes vigorous sucking-like movements, then his
right hand may be seen approaching his mouth, touching his lower
lip and finally being grasped. But as only the index finger was grasped,
the hand fell out again. Shortly afterward it returned. This time thethumb was in the mouth while the index finger was placed between
the gums and the upper lip. The hand then moves 5 cm. away fromthe mouth only to reenter it; now the thumb is grasped and the otherfingers remain outside. Laurent then is motionless and sucks vigorously,
drooling so much that after a few moments he is removed. A fourth
time the hand approaches and three fingers enter the mouth. The handleaves again and reenters a fifth time. As the thumb has again been
grasped, sucking is resumed. I then remove the hand and place itnear his waist. Laurent seems to give up sucking and gazes ahead, contented and satisfied. But after a few minutes the lips move and thehand approaches them again. This time there is a series of setbacks;
the fingers are placed on the chin and lower lip. The index finger
enters the mouth twice (consequently the sixth and seventh time thishas succeeded). The eighth time the hand enters the mouth, the thumbalone is retained and sucking continues. I again remove the hand.

Again lip movements cease, new attempts ensue, success results for the
ninth and tenth time, after which the experiment is interrupted.
Observation 20. At 0;1 (5) and 0;1 (6) Laurent tries to catch his thumbas soon as he awakes but is unsuccessful while he is lying on his back.

His hand taps his face without finding his mouth. When he is vertical,
however (held by the waist, his arms and torso free), he quickly finds
his lips. At 0;1 (7) on the other hand, I find him sucking his thumbwhile he is lying down. But it keeps escaping him because it does not go
far into his mouth but between the upper lip and the gum. Progressensues, however, because the thumb, after leaving the mouth, returns
to it several times in succession. Unfortunately, between these successful attempts, Laurent taps his nose, cheeks and eyes. Finally he becomes
angry as the result of an unsuccessful attempt. The following days, coordination is accomplished. At 0;1 (9), for example, Laurent sucks his
thumb while lying on his back, I take it out of his mouth and, several
times in succession, he puts it back into his mouth again almost immediately (having at most groped between nose and mouth) and only
grasping the thumb, his other fingers remaining outside the mouth.

Observation 21 .At the end of the second month Laurent sucked hiswhile lying onleft thumb as well as his right. At 0;1 (21), for example,

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

54

he tries to suck his left thumb. After failure due to Ms
raises his right arm. Unable to grasp the thumb he thenheposition,turns to the right, manages to lie on his back and continues searching.
He almost reaches his right thumb but, happening to fail, he returns
to his left hand and directs it toward his mouth. Failing once more, heand this time succeeds in seizing the rightagain turns to the rightthumb.-This example reveals that Laurent is equally adept at suckhe became more accustomed
ing both thumbs. Subsequently, however,to sucking the left thumb so that he injured it slightly and it had tohis left side,

be bandaged with his hand attached. After some anger and groping hethen resumed sucking his right thumb (0; (7) and the days following).
Observation 22. During the third month thumb sucking grew less imof new interests, visual, audiportant to Laurent due to the pressure
I note that Laurent now sucks his thumb only
tory, etc. From 0;2 (15)to assuage his hunger and chiefly to put himself to sleep. This is analso observable ininteresting example of specialization of the habit,

his thumb goes to the rescue. At Q;2Jacqueline. When Laurent criesthat he even closes his eyes and turns on his right side to(19) I note
his lips. During the
go to sleep at the moment his thumb touchedthird month the thumb is opposite the fingers at the moment sucking

takes place. At the end of the second month Laurent began by sucking

the back of his hand and of his fingers, or several fingers together, or the
thumb and index finger, before finding the thumb alone. During thethird month, on the contrary, the thumb gradually placed itself opand Laurent managed to grasp it at the first
posite the other fingers

attempt and suck it alone.
Observation 23 .In the case of Lucienne who did not undergo thewhich I subjected Laurent, the coordination be-sort of training totween arm movements and sucking was only definitely established at
0;2 (2). At 0;1 (25) and 0;1 (26) the hands touch the mouth constantly
but I still observe Lucienne's incapacity to hold her thumb between her
time and above all to find it again once it has left.
for a
lips

long

On

the other hand, at Q;2 (2) I was able to make the two following observations. At 6 P.M., after the meal, her hands wandered around her
mouth and she alternately sucked her fingers (chiefly the index finger),the back of her hand and her wrist* When her hand escapes her mouth
it again and coordination is reestablished. At 8 PM.

itapproaches

Lucienne is awakened and again sucks her fingers: her hand remains
still for long moments and then the mouth opens to grasp it at thesame time as the hand approaches the mouth. The following day, thesame observations: coordination was reestablished during the whole
morning and for several moments in the evening. I particularly noted
the following: the hand groping in the right direction, then an abrupt

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

55

movement of the fingers into the mouth which was already open andmotionless.

The rest of the observations confirmed the fact that co-ordination had become permanent.

Observation 24 .In the case of Jacqueline the first sure signs date fromand the days following. She puts her left hand in her mouthwhen she is very hungry, a few moments before nursing. After themeal she often puts her fingers in her mouth again, to prolong sucking.
From approximately 0;4 (5) the habit becomes systematic and she mustsuck her thumb in order to go to sleep.
In addition it is to be noted that the objects grasped are carried
0;1 (28)

to the mouth from approximately 0;3 (15).

Putting out the tongue and finger sucking thus constitutethe first two examples of a behavior pattern which prolongs thefunctional use of the reflex (sucking-like movements), but withthe acquisition of some element external to the hereditarymechanisms. The new use of the tongue seems to go beyond thesimple reflex play involved in sucking. With regard to the thumb,let us repeat that no instinct to suck the fingers exists and, even
if the act of bringing food to the mouth were a hereditary behavior pattern, it is evident that the late appearance of this act
indicates the interdiction of acquired associations, superimposedon ultimate reflex coordination. In characterizing these acquisitions it must also be noted that they imply an active element. It
is not a question of associations imposed by the environment,
but rather of relationships discovered and even created in thecourse of the child's own searchings. It is this twofold aspect ofcharacterizes what we shall henceacquisition and activity which
forth call "circular reactions" not in the rather loose sense of1
the term as used by Baldwin, but in Mr. Wallon's limited sense;
the functional use leading to the preservation or the rediscovery

of a new result.

Along with actual circular reactions sucking also gives rise
to behavior patterns in which accommodation is predominant.
Here are involved those acquired associations which are often
called "associative transfers"

when one does not wish to go so

far as to speak of "conditioned reflexes." Let us first note thatcircular reaction brings such transfers with it. In the course of

between sucking
progressive coordination1

L enfant turbulant, p. 85.
fand hand and arm

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

56

movements it is evident that associations are established which
direct the thumb to the mouth. The contact of the fingers withasthe covers, with the face, lips, etc., thus serves sooner or latera signal which directs the hand. But, outside these mnemonictransfers inherent in circular reaction, there are
acquisitions or
to result from single automatic training without
which
seem
some
of
the element of activity characteristic of thetheappearance
we think of this?
preceding reactions. What mustof twoIt is appropriate to recall here the fine observations
2of Charlotte Biihler's collaborators, M. Hetzer and R. Ripin,
as a function of feeding conditions
on thenursling's training
to these authors, three stages(Ernahrungssituation). According
in the child's behavior may be distinguished. The first stage
the nursling attempts to suck only
comprises the first week:
are in contact with the breast or the bottle. This
when hislips

we have seen in Chapter I (1

and 2). The second stage extends

from the second to the eighth or ninth week: the nursling seeks
the breast as soon as he finds himself in situations which regua stretchedlarly precede the meal (dressing, diaper changing,
between 0;3
out
Finally the third stage begins
position, etc.).

and 0;4 and can be recognized by the appearance of visual signals.
It is enough that the child sees the bottle or the objects whichremind him of the meal for him to open his mouth and cry. Let
us examine separately the second and third of these behavior
are in the category of acquired associapatterns; both of themtions, but under different headings.
The behavior patterns characteristic of these stages seem toconstitute the prototype of passive association (Signalwirkung).
circular reacContrary to the transfers characteristic of active

circumtion, the former seem due to the pressure of external
stances subject to repetition. But, as we shall see, this is only aan element ofprobability and such accommodations presuppose
the reality of the facts observed we obviactivity.

Concerning

collaborators. It isously agree with Charlotte Btihler and hfercertain that, at a given moment in development, relationships

are established between the position of the child, tactile

H. Hetzer, and R. Ripin, op. cit.; and Ch. Btihler, Kindheit
3rd edition, Jema; Fischer, 1931, p. 14 f.
2

and

und Jugend,THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS
acoustic signals, etc., and the release of sucking movements.

57

On

the other hand, the date of the appearance of these behavior
patterns as well as their interpretation both seem to us to be
subjects for discussion. First, here are two observations which
will clarify the meaning of our remarks:

Observation 25. I tried to determine with respect to Laurent when
there began to be association between the position of the baby andthe seeking of the breast. But it seemed to me impossible to affirm
the existence of the association before the second month. At 0;0 (6)and the days following, Laurent, it is true, sought to nurse as soon as
he was put on the scale, the dressing table, or his mother's bed, whereas
previously he sought nothing and cried in his crib. At 0;0 (9) Laurent
is half asleep in his crib; he sought nothing as long as he wasbeing
carried, but as soon as he was placed on the bed he opened his mouth
and turned his head from side to side with more rapid arm movements
and tension of the whole body. At 0;0 (10) he no longer seeks whilein his crib but as soon as he is in the nurse's arms, etc. This was his behavior until the end of the first month. But is it a matter of pure coincidence or of an actual association betweeen position and sucking?
It is impossible for us to decide this question, because the facts can beinterpreted quite independently from the existence of an associativetransfer. It is sufficient to state, as we have done in Chapter I, how
precocious sucking-like movements and the groping characteristic of
the reflex are, to understand that the child will try to nurse as soon
as he is neither crying, nor asleep, nor distracted by movement. In his
crib he does not seek because nothing distracts him from his cries ofhunger, and these cries engender others through this sort of reflex
repetition of which we have already spoken; so long as he is carried
he seeks nothing because the rocking motion absorbs him; but as soon
as he Is placed on the scale, on the dressing table where his diapers arechanged, or in his nurse's or his mother's arms, he tries to suck before

recommencing to cry because neither his weeping nor the excitemeritsof motion prevent him any longer from sucking. Does this mean there
is a connection between Trinklage and sucking? Nothing authorizes us
to deny it, or to affirm it either as yet. Besides, when one knows thea conditioned reflex in animals and especiallydifficulty of establishing
the necessity to "strengthen" it all the time in order to preserve it, one
can only be prudent in invoking such a mechanism in so far as the behavior patterns of the first weeks are concerned. 3Weado not mean to deny that certain conditioned reflexes may be constituted at birth, as D. P. Marquis succeeded in proving this with babies
from 3 to 10 days old by associating certain sounds with sucking reflexes

58

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

On the other hand, from the moment Laurent knows how to findthumb (beginning of the second month), the seeking of the breast
may be differentiated from the other tendencies and one thus succeeds in establishing a connection between the Trinklage and thishisseeking. Before the meal the child is only inclined to suck his fingers
in the crib when he is not crying or is not too sleepy; but, as soon as
he is in position to eat (in his mother's arms or on the bed, etc.) his

hands lose interest, leave his mouth, and it becomes obvious that thechild no longer seeks anything but the breast, that is to say, contact
with food. At 0;1 (4) for instance, no experiment involving finger
sucking was possible before the meal as Laurent turned his head fromside to side as soon as he was in position to eat.
During the second month coordination between position andseeking the breast has made considerable progress. Thus at the end of
the month Laurent only tries to nurse when he is in his mother'sarms and no longer when on the dressing table.

Observation 26.

In correlation with this progressive accommodation

to the situation as a whole, it seemed to us that accommodation to thebreast itself madesome progress during the second month and went
beyond the reflex accommodation of the first weeks. We noted in
Jacqueline from 0;1 (14) and in Lucienne from 0;1 (27) the naturaldisposition to turn the head to the correct side when the breast waschanged; whereas their body's rotation should have directed the headto the outside, they themselves turned it in the direction of the breast.
Such behavior does not of course imply in any way correct orientationin space; it only indicates that henceforth the child knows how toutilize the contacts with Ms mother's arms as signals enabling him tomark the location of the food. Now if this is the case, there is ob-

viously acquired association, that is totranscends simple reflex accommodation.

say,accommodation which

From the second month we again find the correlations observed by Charlotte Buhler and her collaborators. But do these
correlations

between the situationasa wholeand sucking

necessarily presuppose the hypothesis of the "associative transfer"("Signalwirkung'yThat is a general problem to which we shall return in5.

(Journ. of Genet. Psychol, XXXIX, 1931, p. 479) and W. S. Ray was evenable to provoke conditioned reflexes in the fetus (Child Development, III,We

1932, p, 175).
only claim that, granted the difficulties of the question of
conditioning which increase daily, caution compels us whenever possible tohave recourse to more satisfactory explanations than those which one sometimes hopes to draw from the existence of the conditioned reflex.

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

59

Let us limit ourselves to emphasizing from now on the fact thatthe association acquired between the signals characteristic of
the Trinklage and the sucking reflex was not imposed on thechild in a wholly mechanical way. There is not only
passiverecording. Through the constant seeking which characterizes thesucking instinct it is always in connection with the efforts andgropings of the subject himself that the association is acquired.
Here again let us beware of too simple a comparison with theconditioned reflex. As we understand it, if association is established between Trinklage

and sucking, it is not through mere

training, otherwise one would not see why optic signals would
not also give rise to training of the same kind from the second

month. It is simply that the sucking schema that is to say, theorganized totality of the movements and attitudes peculiar tosucking comprises certain postures which extend beyond the
buccal sphere. Now these attitudes are not entirely passive andsooner or later involve the compliance of the whole body: thelimbs become rigid, the hands clenched, etc., as soon as thenursling adopts the position characteristic of nursing. Thenceforth the simple recall of these attitudes sets in motion thewhole cycle of the sucking act because the kinesthetic sensations
and postural sensibility thus released are immediately assimilated
to the schema of this act. Therefore association between an independent signal and a given sensorimotor schema does not exist,
nor coordination between two groups of independent schemata
but rather(as will be the case between vision and sucking, etc.),
the constitution and progressive enlargement of a single schemaof accommodation and assimilation combined. At most can it
be said, in such a case, that accommodation prevails over assimilation.

Let us now come to the most complex acquisitions pertaining to sucking (the third of the stages of Hetzer and Ripin)
the associations between sucking and vision. From the third andfourth month, according to Hetzer and Ripin, the child may beobserved getting ready to eat as soon as he sees the bottle or any
there isobject connected with food. In such a behavior pattern
no longer simple, more or less passive, association between a

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

60

signal and the act but recognition of
meanings attributed to this image.

an external image and of

We have been able to make similar observations:Observation 27. -Jacqueline, at 0;4 (27) and the days following, opens
her mouth as soon as she is shown the bottle. She only began mixed
her mouth differfeeding at 0;4 (12)* At 0;7 (13) I note that she opens
a bottle or a spoon.
ently according to whether she is offered
unLucienne at 0;3crying when she sees her mother(12) stops

fastening her dress for the meal.
visual signals. When,

Laurent too, between 0;3 (15) and 0;4 reacts toafter being dressed as usual just before the meal, hein position for nursing, he looks at me

looks atme again, etc.

is
put in my arms
and then searches all around,but he does not attempt to nurse.

When I

his touching the breast, he looks
place him in his mother's arms withoutat her and immediately opens his mouth wide, cries, moves about, inshort reacts in a completely significant way. It is therefore sight andno longer only the position which henceforth is the signal.

Such behavior patterns are surely superior to those which
are governed only by coordination between position and suck-

They imply, in effect, actual recognition of visual images
and the attribution of a meaning to these images through ref-ing.

erence to the sucking schema. Is this tantamount to saying thatthe bottle, etc., already constitute "objects" for the child, as Ch.

We would not dare to go so far. 5 Sensorialbecanimagesrecognized and endowed with meaning without
the
same
token
by
acquiring the characteristics of the substantial
Biihler maintains? 4

and spatial permanence inherent in the object. But we recognizethat such images are evidently perceived by the child as "external"; that is to say, they are projected in a coherent whole ofimages and relationships. In effect, through the very fact thatfor the nursling the bottle belongs to two series of schemata
capable of giving rise to adaptations and functions independentand sucking) and through the fact that it
coordination of these two schemata, it is necessarilyof each other (vision
realizes theendowed with a certain externality. On the other hand, thumbsucking does not realize this condition. Even though this sucking
presupposes for the observer coordination between the move*5

Op, dt.t p. is.

We shall see why in the course of Volume H.

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

61

ments of the hand and those of the mouth, the thumb is at first
only known by the child to the extent that it is sucked and there
no coordination between two
schemata for theisindependent

subject himself.
release o

We shall speak, therefore, in the case of thesucking through visual signals, of recognition as func-tion of the coordination of two schemata of assimilation(sucking

and vision).
In conclusion, the acquisitions which characterize the sucking mechanism past the stage of purely hereditary adaptations,
are three in number. In the first place there is actual "circular
reaction" playing with the tongue, systematic thumbsucking,etc. This reaction constitutes anessentially active behavior

pattern which prolongs the reflex use described in the first chapter but with, in addition, an acquired element of accommodation to the facts of experience. Passivity increases, on the other

hand, in the accommodations which are constituted more orless automatically as a function of the external environment, butthese accommodations, too, presuppose, at their point of departure, activity of the subject. Finally, the behavior is complicated by the coordination of heterogeneous schemata at the timeof the recognition of the visual signals for sucking.

Without wanting to anticipate the theoretical conclusions
which we shall try to draw from the facts in 5, it is possible atthe beginning to ask ourselves what these three types of conduct
represent from the point of view of the mechanisms of adaptation. Circular reaction is surely to be conceived as an active
synthesis of assimilation and accommodation. It is assimilation
to the extent that it constitutes a functional use prolonging theassimilation reflex described in the first chapter: to suck thumbor tongue is to assimilate these objects to the very activity ofsucking. But circular reaction is accommodation to the extent
that it realizes a new coordination, not given in the hereditaryreflex mechanism. With regard to the so-called associative transfer, it is chiefly

accommodation in so far as it presupposes as-sociations suggested by the external environment. But it implies

an element of assimilation of earlier circular reactions,to theextent that it proceeds by differentiation. Between its own accommodation and that of the circular reaction there is only a

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

62

difference of degree: the latter Is more active and the former
the schemata in which
more
Finally, the coordination ofpassive.

the recognition of the visual signals for sucking consists, is only
a complication of these same mechanisms: it is assimilation toinasmuch as it is coordination of two schemata
the second

degreeof assimilation (vision and sucking) and it is accommodation to
the second degree inasmuch as it prolongs the chain of acquired
associations.
2.

VISION.

We are here not at all going to study percep-

tions and visual accommodations in themselves but only attempt,in accordance with the aim of this work, to distinguish in the

behavior patterns pertainingtovisionthedifferent

aspects

We

shall resumeof intelligence.
applying to the development
accommodations
consideration of the particulars of certain visualconnected with the formation of the idea of space.
As with sucking, we shall distinguish in the behavior patterns controlled by vision a certain number of types proceedingreflex to the circular reaction and from there tofrom thepure

the acquired coordinations between the visual schemata andthose of other activities.
The reflexes should have been dealt with in the first chapter.

But, as they are far from interesting inasmuch as the sucking
reflexes, we can limit ourselves to mentioning them here as amemorandum. Perception of light exists from birth and consethe adaptation of this percepquently the reflexes which insureandtion (the pupillarypalpebral reflexes, both to light). All therest (perception of forms, sizes, positions, distances, prominence,isthrough the combination of reflex activity withetc.)

acquiredhigher activities. But the behavior patterns connected with theperception of light imply as they do with sucking, but to amuch lesser degree a sort of reflex apprenticeship and actual
searching. I noted, for example, from the end of the

first

week

how much Laurent's expression changed when he was nearluminous objects and how he sought them, as soon as they weremoved, without of course being able to follow them with his
glance. His head alone followed their movement for an instant,
but without continuous coordination. Preyer (op. tit., p. 3) notes
during the first days the child's expression of satisfaction at softTHE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS
light;

63

from the sixth day, his son turned his head toward thewindow when he was moved away from it. It seems as thoughsuch behavior patterns are explainable in the same way as thereflex behavior pertaining to sucking. Light is an excitant(consequently a functional aliment) for visual activity, whence atendency to preserve perception of light (assimilation) and agroping to rediscover it when it Vanishes (accommodation). But
nothing acquired is doubtless yet superimposed on this reflex
adaptation and, if it is already possible to speak of activity at
this level, since there is searching, this activity does not necessarily imply apprenticeship as a function of the external environment.
On the other hand, toward the end of the first month thesituation
glance. Itchanges, as the result of progress in directing theis known that there is surface
participation as earlyas the motor accommodation of the eye to the moving of objects.

From the point of view of psychological accommodation, thestage thus surmounted during the fourth week is extremely significant. As Preyer says, the child begins "really to look, instead ofcontemplating vaguely" and the face assumes "a definitely intelligent expression" (op. cit., p. 35) this is the time when thebaby stops crying in order to look before him for long minutes
in succession without even making sucking-like movements.
Here are a few examples:
Observation 28. Jacqueline at 0;0 (16) does not follow with her eyes
the flame of a match 20 cm. away. Only her expression changes at thesight of it and then she moves her head as though to find the lightagain. She does not succeed despite the dim light in the room. At 0;0(24), on the other hand, she follows the match perfectly under the same

conditions. The subsequent days her eyes follow the movements of myhand, a moving handkerchief, etc. From this date she can remain awake
without crying, gazing ahead.
Observation 2P.

Lucienne also has directed her glance since the fourthweek and is able to rediscover the object when it has escaped hersight and it follows its previous movement. She also finds the object byfits and starts,
moving her eyes slightly, then losing sight of the object,then readjusting her head, then following the object with her eyes
only, etc.

Observation 30. Laurent, until 0;0 (21) has only been capable ofbadly coSrdinated movements of the head previously reported in con-

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

64

nection with the perception of light and simply revelatory of an attempt
to make the excitement last. At 0;0 (21) on the other hand, for the
first time his eyes follow a match in a dimly lit room, 20 cm. from his
his head resting on his right cheek;eyes.-At 0;0 (23) he is lying down,
cm.
20
him
I showaway and he follows them so that he
my fingers
to the left.-At 0;0 (25) same experiment with a handturns all theway

kerchief: I make his head describe an angle of 180 moving backward
and forward, so attentively does he follow the object.

Observation 57.-Laurent at 0;0 (24) watches the back of my^hand
which is motionless, with such attention and so marked protrusion of
the lips that I expect him to suck it. But it is only visual Interest. At
0;0 (25) he spends nearly an hour in his cradle without crying, his
He stares at a piece oeyes wide open. At 0;0 (30) same observation.
little readaptive movements aswithcontinuous
hiscradleonfringeand his gazethough his head had difficulty in not changing position
hisarms are
thus
he
as
So
the
it
to
gazes
long
right place.
brought
his arms
still, whereas when sucking-like movements are paramount,I
when
Laurent
At
and
fro
to
0;1
put mystops crying(6)
again.
swing
handkerchief 10 cm. away from his eyes. He looks at it attentively,
then follows it; but when he loses sight of it, he does not succeed incatching sight of it again.

begins to look at immobile obBut for this
it is essential that a previous movement excite his curiosity. He is, forexample, lying in his bassinet, looking at a certain place in the hood.

Observation

32.-

Laurent

at 0;1(7)

jects with direction, naturally without much coordination.

I pulldown the hood to the other end of the bassinet so that insteadof having over his head the usual material, he finds an empty space,
limited by the edge of the hood. Laurent immediately looks at this,seeking from side to side. Thus he follows, roughly, the line of a whitefringe which edges the hood and he finally fixes his gaze on a particularly visible point of this fringe. At 0;1 (8) same
result. But when he looks at the fringe he sees

experiment and same

my motionless face (IHe then gazes alternately at
the fringe and my head, directing his gaze himself, without having any
stood there in order to observe his eyes).

external movement distracting his attention.

How

can such behavior patterns be classified? There is not
involved, it goes without saying, any interest of the child in theobjects themselves that he tries to watch. These sensorial images
have no meaning, being coordinated neither with sucking, grasping or anything which could constitute a need for the subject.
Moreover, such images have neither depth nor prominence (thefirst accommodations to distance areexactly contemporaneous toTHE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS
the beginnings of the directing of the glance).

65

They therefore

only constitute spots which appear, move, and disappear without
solidity or volume. They are, in short, neither objects, independent images, nor even images charged with extrinsic meaning.
What then is the motivating force of the child's behavior? There
only remains the very need to look which can play this role. Just

from the earliest days, the newborn child reacts to light andseeks it to the extent that the reflex use concomitant with thisas,perception makes of the latter a need, so also, as soon as theglance is able to follow a moving spot, the use of the glancesuffices to confer a functional value on objects which can befollowed with the eyes. In other words, if the child looks at moving objects it is simply because, at the beginning, they constitutean aliment for the activity of the glance. Later, when the various
accommodations to distance, prominence, etc., enrich visual
perception, the objects looked at serve as more differentiatednourishment for these multiple operations. Still later, or concurrently, the visual images acquire meanings connected withhearing, grasping, touching, with all the sensorimotor and intellectual combinations. Thus they support increasingly subtle
functions.

The rough initial assimilation of the object to the

becomes recognition and
inofand, to sum it up,
images,projecting
spaceorganization
this state of solidificabefore
vision.
But,reaching"objective"

very activity of the glance graduallytion the visual perception of the nursling is only a functional
exercise. The object is, in the true sense, assimilated to the sub-

The perseverance and searching characteristic of
the beginnings of looking are therefore of the same kind as thefunctional exercise of sucking activity, to take an example which

ject's activity.

has already been analyzed. At first purely reflex, this exercise isdoubled by an acquired exercise or "circular reaction." At thesecond or third month level circular reaction seems to us defilook itself depends on the
nitely to exist. The direction of theof reflexes but these, being cortical, can from the beginningplay

be extended into acquired reactions
very beginningthemselves.

that

is

to say,from thethere is apprenticeship as a function of the objects

Having stated this, let us now try to analyze

these circular

66

ELEMENTARY S&NSO&IMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

reactions. Circular reaction is, therefore, an acquired functional

exercise which prolongs the reflex exercise and has the effect of
fortifying and maintaining, no more only

a completely assembled

mechanism, but a sensorimotor whole with new results pursued
for their own sake.

Inasmuch as it is adaptation, circular reaction involves, according to the rule, a pole of accommodation anda pole of assimilation.

Accommodation is the whole of the associations acquired at
the contact of objects due to the increasingly complex play ofthe "reflexes of accommodation": accommodation of the crystalline lens, pupillary reflex to distance, and binocular convergence.

The instruments of this accommodation are certainly reflex andare contained in the hereditary structure of the eye itself. But
the instruments only achieve effective utilization in the courseof exercise in which experience is a factor. In other words, it is

only in exerting himself to perceive forms, prominence, depth,
in measuring distances, in seeing things in perspective, in shortin making his accommodation reflexes function with respect tothings that the child arrives at the correct handling of these instruments. It is useless to emphasize here the particulars of thesemechanisms since we shall come across some of them again when
dealing with space (Vol. II). Let us limit ourselves to one remark.
It is an observed fact that the child at the stage under present
consideration does not yet know how to measure distances. Not
only are pupillary accommodation and binocular convergencenot stabilized with regard to all distances at the age of 4-5
months, but the child makes all sorts of mistakes when he wishes
to grasp objects (see Vol. II, Chapter II). Does this mean that thesense of depth is entirely due to acquired experience? Obviously"accommodation reflexes"' shows
even
if
first
the
evaluations are erroneous, he isthat,
subject's

no, because the existence ofnecessarily led, by means of his hereditary constitution, sooner
or later to attribute depth to space. Is this to say henceforth that

accommodation to depth is a pure reflex exercise comparable tothe exercise by means of which the newborn child learns to suckan apprenticeship presupposing the external environment because every function is relative to the environment but owing
nothing to it because retaining nothing of the things themselves?

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONSThis could be maintained

67

space were independent of theobjects it contains. But it is apparent that depth is nothing independent of concrete evaluations of the distances of objects. To
if

say that a certain subject possesses the sense of depth necessarilymeans that he perceives a particular
object as being farther awayor nearer than another. But it isprecisely in the acquisition ofthese particularthatperceptions
experience plays a role. For
the baby to discover that the handle of his bassinet is farther
removed in depth than theof the same
it is notedge

bassinet,

enough that he possess the sense of depth by heredity, but hemust put things in perspective,
compare his perceptions, inshort, make experiments. Therefore no accommodation reflex
to depth in itself exists; there are
only accommodations peculiar
to the different objects
perceived which presuppose, in addition
to hereditary adaptation,acquired "circular reactions." It is in
this respect that the functional exercise ofof which we

looking,
are now speaking in general, involves an element ofacquiredaccommodation and not only reflex use.
But the circular reaction proper tolooking also presupposes
an element of assimilation. First, as we havealready said, thereisessentially reproductive assimilation. If the child looks constantly, and more each day, at the objects surrounding him, thisis not, at the
beginning, because he is interested in them as ob-

nor as signals devoid of external
meaning, nor even (atthe very beginning) as sensorial
images capable of being recog-

jects

but simply because thesemoving, luminous spots are an
aliment for his glance andpermit it to develop while functionare
therefore
first
assimilated to the very activity
ing. Objects

nized,

of looking; their
only interest lies in being objects of vision.

How shall we proceed from this purely functional assimila-tion (through puretorepetition) to objective visionthat is to say,an assimilation which presupposes theprecise adaptation of
the structure of the subject to the structure ofthings and viceversa? Three steps must be considered here:
generalizing as-

similation, recognitory assimilation, and the coordination of theschemata of visual assimilation with the other schemata of
mental assimilation.

We can use the term "generalizing assimilation" (in the

68

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS
firstchapter dealing with the sucking

system) to designate the factwhich is as important as it is trite

same senseasin thethat from the fourth and fifth week the child looks at an inconcentriccreasing number of things but by proceeding throughwaves. In the beginning, as revealed by the above observations,the nursling limits himself to watching objects which are slowly

moved at a distance of 20-30 cm. from his face (Obs. 30) or to
he applies
staring in front of him (Obs. 31), Then (Obs. 32)
himself to directing his glance to certain objects. From now on it
becomes possible to make a general appraisal of the child'sthat the subject
spontaneous visual interests. Then one observes
looks neither at what is too familiar, because he is in a way
surfeited with it, nor at what is too new because this does notcorrespond to anything in his schemata (for instance, objects
too remote for there yet to be accommodation, too small or too
In short, looking in general and theto be analyzed,

large
etc).
different types of visual accommodation in particular are put touse progressively in increasingly varied situations. It is in thissense that the assimilation of objects to visual activity is "generalizing."

Here are a few examples:
Observation 35. Having learned to direct his glance (Obs. 32), Laurent
explores his universe little by little. At 0;1 (9), for example, as soon as
he is held vertically in the arms of his nurse, he examines successively
the various images before him. First he sees me, then raises his eyes andlooks at the walls of the room, then turns toward a dormer window,
etc. At 0;1 (15) he systematically explores the hood of his bassinet which
I shook slightly. He begins by the edge, then little by little looks back-ward at the lowest part of the roof, although this had been immobile
for a while. Four days later lie resumes this exploration in the opposite
direction. He begins with the hood itself and then examines a piece ofthe coverveiling which extends beyond the edge of the roof, a part oflet (in the same position), my face which he finds before him and finallyempty space. Subsequently he constantly resumes examining the cradle
but, during the third month, he only looks at the toys hanging fromthe hood or at the hood itself when an unwonted movement excites
his curiosity or when he discovers a particular new point (a pleat in
the material,etc.).

Observation 34.
cially after 0;1

His examination of people
(15);

that

is

to say, after hisis.

just as marked, espeone
smiles.

first

When

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

69

leans over him, as when dressing him, he explores the face section bysection: hair, eyes, nose, mouth, everything is food for his visual curiosity. At 0;1 (10) he alternately looks at his nurse and at me and, in

examining me, his eyes oscillate between my hair and face. At 0;1 (21)he watches his nurse enter and leave the room. At 0;1 (25) he looks inturn at his nurse, his mother, and myself with a change of attitude
when confronted by each new face and a abrupt and spontaneous
moving of his glance from one face to the other.
But, quickly enough, his interest in faces is no longer a purely visual
one. Through coordination with the schemata of hearing in particularand with the global situations of eating, dressing, etc., the familiar
faces become fraught with meaning. Thus we leave the realm of purely
generalizing assimilation. This reappears, on the other hand, as soon
as an unfamiliar feature appears, to alter his visual image of people.
Thus at 0;2 (4) Laurent notices his mother wearing a pearl necklace
in which he is more interested than in her face. At 0;2 (13) my be*ret
catches his attention. At 0;2 (18) the shaving soap on my chin, then mypipe; the following days it is my tongue which I stick out at him hav-

ing in mind experiments concerning imitation, etc. At 0;2 (29) hewatches me eat most attentively. He successively examines the bread I
hold and my face, then my glass and my face. He watches my handwhen I raise it to my mouth, my mouth, etc.

Observation 35. There is generalizing assimilation, not only with respect to the successive objects which the child sees, but also in connection with the successive positions which the subject assumes in order to look. The acquisition of the "alternate" glance may be cited inthis connection.

During the second month we have seen Laurent looksame object, as ex-in turn at various objects or different parts of theample (Obs. 34) three motionless people next to his bassinet or the hairand face of the same person. But in this case he looks at each image
irregularly. On the other hand, during the third month, the emergence of the following behavior pattern may be observed: the glancecompares, so to speak, two distinct objects while alternately examining them. For example, at 0;2 (11) Laurent is looking at a rattle suspended from the hood of his bassinet when I hang a handkerchiefat the handkerchief andparallel to the rattle. He then looks alternately
at the rattle and smiles. At 0;2 (17) he explores a part of the hood of his
bassinet when I shake it slightly. Laurent then looks at a certain placein the hood, then observes the moving rattle, then returns to the hoodand so on, six times in succession. I repeat the experiment a moment
later and count nine more alternate glances. 6 Such behavior surely constitutes the beginning of comparison, but as yet, it seems to us, purely
6 See also Observations 92, at 0;3
chain.

(13),

the example of the case and the

70

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONSLaurent should alreadyvisual comparison. It is inconceivable thatto the relationship he observes between thecausalainterpretation
give
movement of the hood and that of the rattle; he simply compares twothings seen.

Observation 5.-Here is another example of generalization due to theAt 0;2 (21), in the morning, Laurent spontaneously
subject's position.

bends his head backward and surveys the end of his Bassinet from thishe smiles, returns to his normal position and then beposition. ThenI
observed this several times. As soon as Laurent awakens
gins again.
this acafter the short naps to which he is accustomed, he resumes
has
he
a
after
afternoon
inthebarelylong sleep
tivity. At four o'clock
awakened before he bends his head backward and bursts out laughing.

Such behavior reveals all the characteristics of a typical circular

reaction. The days following he continues to explore and the next week
his interest is almost as keen.

Thus it may be seen how the child's spontaneous looking

The bassinet hood, having
develops through being exercised.
at first only been the object of "looking for the sake of looking,"
arouses growing interest through its particularities as well as
fromthrough its successive modifications (the objects hanging
interest in all others and in
adduces
faces
certaininInterestit).
of theeverything which complicates the original appearance
former. New perspectives due to positions fortuitously dis-through comparison withIn short, practice of looking brings

covered, arouse immediate interest

habitual perspectives,etc.

with it the generalization of its activity.

But this growing generalization of the schema of sight isof the global
accompanied by a complementary differentiationdifferentiation
schema in particular schemata, thisleading towhich pre"recognition." The purely functional assimilation
vailed in the beginning (looking for the sake of looking) is thustransformed into an assimilation of objects to limited schemata

which is tantamount to saying that sight is on the way to obin order to see). For example, among thejectification (looking
which
child
the
which
contemplates all the time are somethingsare immobile (the hood of the bassinet), some which sometimes
move slightly (the fringe of the hood), some which constantly
for achange position, appear and disappear, remain stationary
while and suddenly disappear (human faces). Each of these cate-THE FI&ST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

71

visual images gives rise to progressive exercises
gories of(generalization) but, at the same time, to differentiations in functioning.

Each one presupposes, in effect, an exercise sui genesis ofvision, just as the breast, the thumb, the pillow, etc., actuate
sucking in different ways: so generalizing assimilation brings

with it the formation of particular schemata. The child, in assimilating to these schemata the objects which appear in his fieldof vision, "recognizes" them through this very act. This recogni-tion is therefore probably global in the beginning. The childdoes not recognize a certain face as such, but at first recognizes
this face in a given situation. Only, the more generalizing as-

similation permits the subject to incorporate the visual environ-ment into his schemata, the more the latter dissociate themselves
and permit precise recognition.
But if purely functional and generalizing assimilation canbe observed thanks to the mere behavior of the child, how canwhat we have just said about recognitory assimilation be verified?

From the time when the nursling is able to smile and thus todifferentiate his gestures and the expression of his emotions, thewithout too great a risk
analysis of recognition becomes possible
thisofview, to analyze the firstof error. Let us try, frompoint
smiles produced in the presence of visual images and to collectwhat they can teach us about the beginnings of recognition.
The smile is, as we know, a reflex mechanism whose association with pleasurable states makes it possible sooner or later tomake a social sign assuming varied meanings but always related
to contact with people. Must it be said, therefore, that the smileisa hereditary social behavior pattern which from the beginning
Gh. Buhler maintains, a "reaction to people" orconstitutes, assmile only becomes specialized
possible to think that theasocial sign and consists duringasfunctionsprogressively in its
is

it

the

first

months of a simple pleasurable reaction to the mostvaried excitants, even though it begins in the presence of thevoice or movements of the human face? Ours is the second into us a good indication
terpretation which is why the smile seems
inof the existence of recognition
general. Ch. Biihler's interpre-

tation does not seem to us to withstand factual examination as

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

72

has been already elucidated by C. W. Valentine. 7 In a somewhat
8categorical note Ch. Buhler has answered him by presenting
statistics which contradict his observations. But an acute observation, especiallywhen made by as good an observer as C. W.

Valentine, surpasses all statistics. As for us, examining our threechildren has left us no doubt concerning the fact that the smile

primarily a reaction to familiar images, to what has alreadybeen seen, inasmuch as familiar objects reappear suddenly andrelease emotion, or again inasmuch as a certain spectacle gives
rise to immediate repetition. It is only very gradually that peopleismonopolize the smile precisely in so far as they constitute familiar objects most inclined to this kind of reappearances andrepetitions. But in the beginning anything at all can give rise to
the emotional recognition which elicits the smile.
Observation 57. Laurent smiled for the first time at 0;1 (15) at 6
o'clock, 10 o'clock and 11:30 while looking at his nurse who is wagging

her head and singing. Apparently there is a global impression involving visual recognition, perception of a rhythmic movement, and hearing. The following days the voice remains necessary to produce thesmile but at 0;1 (25) merely seeing the nurse suffices. Same observation
at 0;1 (30). On the other hand, it is not until 0;2 (2) that he smiles at
his parents when they do not make noises. At 0;2 (3) he refuses to smile
at his grandmother and an aunt despite all their advances, but hefinally smiles at the latter when she removes her hat. At 0;2 (4) he smiles
a lot at his mother (while she remains silent) but a few moments later
refuses to smile at a woman of the same age. During this third month
I do not succeed in making him smile only on
seeing me if I remain

immobile (without head movements) or if I appear at a distance (of1 meter ormore). On the other hand, during the fourth month these
conditions are no longer inhibiting. At 0;2 (26) Laurent does not recognize me in the morning before I am groomed. He looks at me with afrightened expression and drooping mouth, then he suddenly rediscovers me and smiles. Seeing his systers does not cause him to smile as
quickly as seeing his parents, but the reaction became identical after
the middle of the third month. During the fourth month he even
seems already to prefer children to adults when his
acquaintance withboth is equally slight. Thus, at 0;3 (7) Laurent is afraid of aneighbor
but reveals great interest, with smiling eyes, in the man's
12-year-oldson (blond with a very youthful appearancecomparable to Laurent's
sisters).

7 C.

W. Valentine, British -Assoc. 1930, The Foundations of Child Psy-

chology.
8 Ch. Buhler,

op. cit.

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

73

Observation 38. With regard to inanimate objects, from the beginningmonth Laurent revealed great interest in the cloth andcelluloid toys hanging from the hood of his bassinet. At Q;2 (5) he looksof the third

at them as yet unsmilingly but emitting

periodically the sound aa with,an expression of enchantment. At 0;2 (II) he smiles broadly when hesees his toys move. He has not seen or heard anyone either
previouslyor when confronted by this spectacle, for I move the toys from a dis-

tance with a stick. Besides, the toys have no human appearance; they
are little balls of wool or celluloid. The sound of the toys which could
have played a role in this first smile, does not do so subsequently; fivetimes in succession on the same day Laurent smiles at these motionlesstoys.

The evening of the same day I hung a handkerchief next to theLaurent compares them (see above, Obs. 35) then smiles (he has
not seen or heard me). The following days the reaction is just as definite
and frequent. At 0;2 (15) I notice seven smiles at things (the motiontoys.

less toys and hoodof the bassinet, the movements of the bassinet when
carried without the person making noise or showing himself toLaurent, etc.), and three smiles at people (his mother). At 0;2 (18) hesmiles five times in succession while looking at the mosquito net (I obit

isserve this through the bassinet hood). The same day he laughs andbabbles with great excitement while watching the toy. As soon as he is

naked he laughs loudly, gesticulating and looking at the objects surrounding him including the brown wall of the balcony. At 0;2 (19) he
did not smile at people a single time in a whole day; on the other
hand, he smiled at all the familiar objects. In particular he smiles for the
first time (five times during the day) at his left hand which he looks atsince about fifteen days before (see Obs. 62). At 0;2 (21) he even smiles
beforehand while drawing his hand toward his face. The same day helearns to look backward (as seen in Obs. 36) and almost infallibly smiles
at this new perspective. From 0;2 (25) he smiles during his experiments with grasping; in shaking a toy, etc. At 0;3 (6 and 7) for example,
he manifests a certain astonishment and even anxiety in the presenceof new objects which he would like to grasp (shiny paper, tinfoil,
medical tubes, etc.) but smiles (or smiles only with his eyes) while taking
familiar objects (cloth and celluloid toys, package of tobacco, etc.).
Observation 3.~Lucienne likewise expresses with smiles certain definite recognitions of things and people. She too begins by smiling at apersonat

0;1

(24)

as

the result of head

movements and sounds.

Then she smiles at her mother merely at the sight of her, at 0;1 (27)before smiling at her father. Then from 0;2 (2) she smiles at familiar
for example,
objects attached to the bassinet or its hood. At 0;2 (13)she smiles at the hood. She looks attentively at a particular place, thensmiles while wriggling all over, then returns to this place, etc. At 0;2
the ribbon which always hangs from this hood arouses her hi(19)ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

74

at it
she looks at it, laughs while twisting herself about, looks
At 0;2 (27) same reactions with, in addition, broad smiles
the hood which isat the toys which are swinging. At 0;3 (0) smile ator hearing theLucienne's
seeinginposition (without
being replaced

larity;again, etc.

person).

the extent to which smiles evidence
reactions differ withrecognition. The
to the same person, to different
andtodifferent
peoplerespect
situations (according to distances, movements, etc.). If, then,that is to say, related to varied
primitive recognition is "global"
situations and to different types of looking becoming differentiated as a function of generalizing assimilation and of accommodaandtion combined nevertheless this recognition becomes more
The reaction is exactly the same with regard to
more

Thus may be seendifferences

subtleinprecise.

things.

In conclusion, visual circular reaction or acquired adaptation in the realm of looking requires a component of accommodation of the function to the object and a component of assimilationof the object to the function.

Such assimilation, at first simply

functional and reproductive (repetition or pure circular reacand recognitory. It istion), becomes simultaneously generalizing
when it attains a certain level of recognition that visual perception may be considered as perception of images distinct from one
another and no longer only as a simple exercise of which thesensorial image constitutes the aliment without exciting interest
in itself.

But the process is far from adequate to explain the growing
It is not enough that aobjectification of visual adaptation.
it
when
be
sensorial image
reappears for it to constirecognizedtute by itself an external object. Any subjective state can berecognized without being attributed tothe action of objects in-dependent of the ego. The newborn child who nurses recognizes
the nipple by the combination of sucking and swallowing remaking the nipple a thing. So also a month-old
child can recognize certain visual images without, however,really exteriorizing them. What is the next condition necessary
flexes without

for the solidification of such images? It seems to us essential thatthe visual schemata be coordinated with other schemata of assimilation such as those of prehension, hearing, or sucking. They

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

75

must, in other words, be organized in a universe. It is their insertion in a totality which is to confer uponthem an incipient

objectivity.

This leads us to the third aspect of visual circular reactions
their organization. It may be stated that the visual images towhich the child adapts himself are, through the very fact of thisadaptation, coordinated among themselves and also in relation
to other kinds of schemata. The organization of visual images

among themselves can itself give rise to a distinction. First there
are the coordinations of distance, size, etc., which constitute visual

space and which we shall not mention here because the matter
deserves special study (see Vol. II). Then there are the wholly
coordinations (relationships of color, light, etc., andqualitative
the sensorimotor relationships), whose activity is made manifest
in generalizing and recognitory assimilation. Thus it may besaid that, independently of any coordination between vision andthe other schemata (prehension, touch, etc.), the visual schemata
are organized among themselves and constitute more or less well-coordinated totalities. But the essential thing for this immediateof the visual schemata, no longer
question is the coordination
among themselves, but with the other schemata. Observationshows that very early, perhaps from the very beginnings of orientation in looking, coordinations exist between vision and hearing
the relationships between vision(see Obs. 44-49). Subsequently
and sucking appear (see Obs. 27), then between vision and prehension, touch, kinesthetic impressions, etc. These intersensorial
coordinations, this organization of heterogeneous schemata willrich meanings and makegive the visual images increasingly
visual assimilation no longer an end in itself but an instrument
at the service of vaster assimilations. When the child seven orat unknown objects for the first time beeight months old looks
fore swinging, rubbing, throwing and catching them, etc., he notries to look for the sake of looking (pure visual assimila-longertion in which the object is a simple aliment for looking), noreven to look for the sake of seeing (generalizing or recognitory
visual assimilation in which the object is incorporated withoutvisual schemata), butadding anything to the already elaborated
to assimilate the
order
in
to
is
that
to
he looks in order
act,
say,

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR. ADAPTATIONS

76

new object to the schemata of weighing, friction, falling, etc.
There is therefore no longer only organization inside the visual
schemata but between those and all the odiers. It is this progressive organization which endows the visual images with theira total unimeanings and solidifies them in inserting them inverse.

From

the point of view of the functional categories ofinvariants of mental
thought which correspond to the biological
it is interesting to note the extent to which thisdevelopment,element of organization is, here as everywhere, the source of
totalities and of values. In so far as the organization of the visual
schemata forms a more or less closed totality, vision constitutes
a value in itself and the assimilation of things is an assimilation
to vision itself.

On the other hand, in so far as the visual universethat is to say, where there
and adaptation between the visual andother schemata visual assimilation becomes a simple means at
the service of higher ends, and consequently a value derived in

is coordinated tothe other universes

is reciprocal organization

relation to principal values (the latter being constituted by theto hearing, prehension and the activities
totalities

pertaining

proceeding from it). This iswhat we shall see in the following

pages.

PHONATION AND HEARING.

As is the case withandhearing give rise to acquired
sucking and vision, phonation
on hereditary adaptations
themselves
adaptations superimposing
3.

and, again in this case, the first acquired adaptations consist in
circular reactions to the breast in which it is possible to distin-

guish the processes of accommodation, assimilation,and organi-zation.

Phonation is evidenced at birth by the cry of the newborn
child

and his whining in the first weeks. That

this reflex be-

havior might from the beginning be subject to some complications analogous to those we have rioted in connection with visionand especially sucking, is not impossible if one considers these
two observations, both unfortunately to be received with caution.

The first is this sort of rhythm which appears very early in thechild's cries.

Laurent has hardly ever cried at night during theTHE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

77

first three weeks but almost every day between 4 and 6 P.M.;
Lucienne cries mostly in the morning, etc. The second is thepossibilityof a contagious spreading of crying beginning thefirst week.

When a baby cries in the room shared by the newborn

babies in a clinic, several seem to copy him; furthermore it
seemed to me that my voice (I said, "Aha, aha/' etc.) madeLaurent cry beginning 0;0 (4 and 5). But the rhythm in question
may be due to an organic rhythm (particularly digestive) without
any reflex involvement, and the supposed contagious spreadingof crying may be due to coincidence or to the simple fact thatthe others' voices

awaken the child and a newborn child criesalmost immediately upon awaking. Let us therefore conclude
nothing.
On the other hand, circular reaction is superimposed onreflex phonation as soon as, at one or two months, the little wailwhich precedes crying is kept up for its own sake and gradually
gives rise to modulations. This is the point of departure for ouranalysis of phonation in so far as it is acquired adaptation.

With regard to hearing, an interest in sound may be observed in the first days of life. At the end of the second week, forinstance, Laurent stopped crying for a moment In order to listen
to a sound coming from near his pillow. But it cannot be called

acquired adaptation until the second month from the time theheard sound provokes a somewhat prolonged interruption of theaction in progress and an actual search.
If

we study phonation and hearing simultaneously, we obfrom the stage when circular reaction prolongs, inserve that,these

two realms, hereditary adaptation,

to the child hearing

and voice are connected.

Not only does the normal child regu-

own phonation

acoustic
primarily according to the

late

his

effects he notices, but also the voices of others seem to react on

his own voice. Is such a connection between hearing and phona-tion partly hereditary and consolidated by acquired adaptation,difficult to decide. If from birth
It is
or is itvery
only acquired?
the cries were really imitative there would definitely exist aeven if thehereditary connection. But, as we have just seen,fact of a contagious spreading of crying were established, it
otherwise than by imitation. Let us therefore
could beexplained

78

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

not form hypotheses concerning the heredity of connections between phonation and hearing and limit ourselves to studying therelated to these functions from the time when
behavior
patterns

acquired adaptation exists.
First, here are some observations concerning phonation:
Observation 40. Jacqueline, until the middle of the second month, hasand certain more violent cries of
only used her voice for daily wails
desire and anger when hunger became persistent. Around 0;1 (14) It
seems as though crying stops simply expressing hunger or physical discomfort (especially intestinal pains) to become slightly differentiated.
The cries cease, for example, when the child is taken out of the crib
and resume more vigorously when he is set down for a moment before
the meal. Or again, real cries of rage may be observed if the feeding is
It seems evident, in these two examples, that crying is coninterrupted.

nected with behavior patterns of expectation and disappointment which
differentiation of mental states conimply acquired adaptation. This
comitant with phonation is soon accompanied by a differentiation in

the sounds emitted by the child. Sometimes crying is imperious and
It is then that the first "circuenraged, sometimes plaintive and gentle.
lar reactions" related to phonation may definitely be observed. Somethe crying istimes, for instance, the wail which precedes or prolongs
it is an interesting sound: 0:1
because
sake
(22).
own
its
for
kept up
Sometimes the cry of rage ends in a sharp cry which distracts the childfrom his pain and is followed by a sort of short trill: 0;2 (2). The smile
the sounds
may be accompanied by indistinct sounds: Q;l (26). Finally,areofsmilesorofas
immediately
thus produced
cryingprolongations
rediscovered and sustained as such: at 0;2 (12) Jacqueline prattles fora moment without smiling or wailing. At 0;2 (IS) she emits a sort ofthe crying is transformed into playing with the voice,trill. At 0;2^(15)

to resume her"aha," "ahi," etc. At 0;2 (15) she even interrupts her meal
her voice becomes routine
babbling. Finally, at 0;2 (18) playing withwhen she is awake.
It is to be noted, as we shall see concerning imitation, that thesefirst circular reactions are almost immediately accompanied by vocal

contagion and then, at 0;2, by definite imitation,

Observation */.

Until 0;1

(8) I noticed

nothing in Laurent resemblinga vocal circular reaction. His phonation only consists of cries of hunger
the cries. True, at 0;0
andandor In wails

prolonging
precedingpain
Laurent makes a sound similar to aha, without crying, but only
once; usually this sound precedes crying. On the other hand, beginningbe the0;I (8) vague voice exercises may be observed, but these could
At 0;1interest.
orvisuala
auditory
beginning of a wail interrupted byits own sake, forfor
maintained
is
other
the
the
on
hand,
wailing(9)(9)

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

79

several seconds before the crying. As soon as the firstcry ensues I
imitate Laurent's wailing; he then stops crying andbegins to wailagain. This first vocal imitation seems to me to substantiate the existence of circular reaction. If imitation of others exists, there also exists,

and a fortiori, imitation of oneself, that is to say "circular
At 0;1 (15) I note a sort of fleeting arr or rra, and at 0;1
sounda
resembling en indicating contentment interspersed with(20)
sucking-like movements in which he indulges, alone and wide awake.
The latter sound reappears intermittently at 0;1 (22) and at 0;1 (26) inin effect

reaction/'

the same situations, whereas the sound aa or rra which I emit inLaurent's presence in order to copy him releases analogous sounds, after
a smile, at 0; 1 (22). At 0; 1 (28) circular reaction begins with the sounds
aha, en henf etc., and at the third month vocalizations are produced.
At 0;2 (7) Laurent babbles in the twilight and at 0;2
he does this(16)

on awakening early in the morning often for half an hour at a time.
In certain special cases the tendency torepeat, bysounds discovered by pure chance, may be observed.
Thus at 0;2 (12) Lucienne, after coughing, recommences several times
for fun and smiles. Laurent puffs out his breath, producing an indefinite sound. At 0;2 (26) he reproduces the peals of his voice which
ordinarily accompany his laughter, but without laughing and out ofpure phonetic interest. At 0;2 (15) Lucienne uses her voice in similar
Observation 42.

circular reactions,circumstances, etc.
It is useless to continue this description since phonation does
not interest us for its own sake but simply inasmuch as it is subject to adaptations of general form. In this respect it is easy tofind in circular vocal reactions of which we have just spoken,

the processes of accommodation, assimilation and organization towhich sucking and vision have already accustomed us. Accommodation, first, because circular reaction is an effort to rediscover
the new sound discovered by chance. There is thus perpetual
accommodation of the vocal organs to phonic reality perceived

by hearing (see for example Obs. 42) even though this reality is the
product of their own activity. Very early too, vocal accommodation will consist in the imitation of new sounds made by others,
but we can remit study of this question to the volume on"Imitation."

The use of the voice is then assimilation in the

triple sense of the term. There'is assimilation through repetition,

to the extent that each, vocal system is consolidated while func-

tioning. There is generalizing assimilation to the extent thatcircular reaction progressively diversifies the phonic material in

80

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

indefinite combinations which the authors have noted in detail.
assimilation to the extent that circular reThere isrecognitory
action and beginning imitation entail the discrimination of one
sound in relation to another. Finally phonation is organization
senses, first inasmuch as the totality ofin twocomplementary

the sounds produced constitutes a systemofinterdependent

articulations and then inasmuch as phonation is immediately
coordinated with other schemata and in particular with theauditory schemata.
This leads us to hearing. The first acquired adaptations
related to hearing date from the second month, from the time
when two essential coordinations are established coordination

with phonation and coordination with vision. Until then theis the child's interest in the voice. But as
only reaction observed

by no other visible accommodationand the coordinations of which we have justto fix the boundary of reflex adaptation
spoken, it is very difficultand of acquired adaptation.
this reaction is accompanied

except the smile

Observation 43. -At 0;1 (0) Jacqueline still limits herself to intershe hears an agreeable voice or sound but she
rupting her crying when
does not try to mark the sound. At 0;1 (6 and IB), same reaction. At
smile at the voice. From now
0;1 (10) on the other hand, she begins toon it is possible in a general way to distinguish the sounds which she
her smile (vocalizations, singing intonations,recognizes and which makethose which astonish, worry,
etc., resembling her own phonations) fromor interest her. The same is true of Lucienne, beginning Ojl (13). The
sound rra which is a copy of her own vocalizations almost invariably
makes her smile for three or four weeks, beginning at 0;1 (25) and
Laurent smiles at the
produces a vague imitation beginning 0;1 (26),atbut
0;0 (12) the voice sufficed tovoice alone beginning 0;1 (20),insoundinterest
and
this
his
gave rise to attempts at
cryinginterrupt
localization from 0;1 (8). As a rule high-pitched sounds in a childish
intonation make him smile; deep tones surprise and disturb him. The

sound bzz is sure to make him smile during the third month (before hehimself emits it) provided that it is sung on a sufficiently high key. At
cel0;1 (22) he easily recognizes the sound of the metal rattle in his
luloid balls and he immediately looks in the right place as soon as hehears them.

These facts suffice to make us state that the child behaves
with respect to sounds as with respect to vision. On the one hand,THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

81

he progressively accommodates himself to them; on the other
hand, he assimilates them. This assimilation is at first the simple
pleasure of hearing (circular reaction to the sound or assimilation
through repetition). Then, to the extent that there is discrimination of the sounds heard, there is simultaneously generalizing
assimilation (that is to say, interest in Increasingly varied sounds)

and recognition of certain sounds (rra, bzz, etc.).
Let us proceed to the coordinations between sound and sight:
Observation 44. At 0;2 (12) Jacqueline turns her head to the side
whence the sound comes. For example, hearing a voice behind her,
she turns in the right direction. At 0;2 (26) she localizes the source ofthe sound quite accurately. It seems she searches until she finds the

person who Is speaking but it is of course difficult to say whether she
identifies the source of the sound and the original image or whether
there is simply accommodation to the sound.
Observation 45.

At 0;1 (26) Lucienne, whose head is turned to the leftwhen I call her from the right, turns her head at once and seeks bylooking. At 0;1 (27) she is carried under my window whence I call her;
she turns her head left and right and finally above her at an angle 45
too much to the left but revealing obvious control. In this last example
it seems as though she tries to see what has produced the sound andnot only to accommodate herself to the sound. At 0;2 (12) also, sheturns her head when I call her and looks until she has seen me, even if
I remain motionless.

Observation 46.--At 0;1 (8) Laurent reveals an incipient localization ofsound. He lies on his back without seeing me and looks at the roof ofthe cradle while moving his mouth and arms. Then I call him softly,"Aha, aha." His expression immediately changes, he listens, motionless,and seems to try to locate the sound by looking. His head oscillatesslightly from right to left without yet finding the right location andhis glance, instead of remaining fixed as previously, also searches. The
following days Laurent better directs his head toward the sound and ofcourse he then looks in the right direction, but it is impossible to de-cide whether the child tries to see the source of the sound or whether
his looking simply accompanies pure auditory accommodation.

Observation 47. At 0;1 (15), on the other hand, it seems that on hearing

my voice Laurent tries to see the face that goes with it but with two
conditions which we shall try to specify. That morning Laurent smiled
for the first time, three times, and, as we have seen, It is probable thatthe smile was started by a global impression, auditory as well as visual.
That afternoon I stand at Laurent's left while he is lying in his cradleM
and looks to the
I call, "Aha, aha. Laurent then slowly turns his
right.

82

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

head to the left and suddenly sees me after I have stopped singing. He
looks at me at length. Then I move to his right (without his being able
to follow me with his eyes) and I call. Laurent again turns in my direction and his eyes seem to search. He sees me and looks at me but thistime without an expression of understanding (I am immobile at thismoment). I move back to the left, call, and he turns back again. As a
I tap the window panes
counterproof I repeat the same experiment butwith my hand (the cradle is between the two leaves of a French window).
Each time Laurent turns to the correct side and looks in the directionof my face which, however, he perceives in passing. It appears therefore
that he associates the sound of the voice with the visual image of thehuman face and that he tries to see something else upon hearing a newsound. But the rest of the observation shows that two conditions arestill necessary for Laurent to look at a face when he has heard a voice:he must have seen this face shortly beforehand and it must be in motion. For example at 0;1 (20) I enter unobserved by Laurent and say.
"Aha." He looks and searches most attentively (his arm movements
the visual field exstop completely) but limits himself to exploring
posed to him through his initial position (he examines the hood of thebassinet, the ceiling of the room, etc.). A moment later I appear infront of Laurent, then disappear and call him sometimes at the leftsometimes at the right of the bassinet. Henceforth he searches in theright direction every time. The next day, same experiment and same
result; furthermore I note that if I remain immobile he looks at mewithout interest and without even recognizing me, whereas if I movehe looks at me and his searching ends as though he knew it was I whosang. At 0;1 (22) in the same way he searches anywhere at all although
manifesting much attention to my voice; then he perceives me while T
am immobile and continues searching without attributing importanceto my visual image; after this I shake my head and thereafter he turns
toward me whenever I call and seems satisfied as soon as he has discovered me. The following days, same phenomenon.
Observation 48,

From 0;1 (26) on the other hand, Laurent turns in

the right direction as soon as he hears my voice (even if he has not seen

me just before) and seems satisfied when he has discovered my faneeven whenitisimmobile. At 0;1 (27) he looks successively at his
and again at his father after hearing mv voice. It

father, his mother,

therefore seems that he ascribes this voice to a visually familiar face.

At 0;2 (14) he observes Jacqueline at 1.90 to 2 meters, at the sound ofher voice; same observation at 0;2 (21)- At 0;3 (1) I squat before him
while he is in his mother's arms and I make the sound bzz (which helikes). He looks to his left, then to his right, then ahead, then below
him; then he catches sight of my hair and lowers his eyes until he sees
my motionless face. Finally he smiles. This last observation may be con-THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

83

sidered as definitely indicating identification of the voice
image of the person.

and visual

Observation 4P. Regarding the noises made by things, it seems as
though Laurent acquired his auditory-visual coordination around thesame time as that relating to persons. At 0; 1 (22) for example, he turns
immediately in the direction of a celluloid ball in which there is a
rattle. True, it is moving, but at 0; 1 (26) he finds it again when it is immobile. At 0;2 (6) he looks at an electric kettle as soon as I produce asound by means of its lid. At 0;2 (11) he is sucking his thumb whilelooking to the right when I shake a celluloid rattle which has been
attached to the hood of his bassinet for several days only (two weeks atmost). He immediately lets go his thumb to look up at the right place,thus showing that he knows where the sound came from. That evening,same reaction, very rapid even though he was half asleep after a longnap. The next day and the following days: same phenomena. At 0;2

Laurent observes, one meter away, my pipe which I knock lightly(14)
on wood; he stops looking at the place of contact when the sound stops
and immediately finds it again when I resume. Same reactions at 0;2(15),with a cane (at 1.50 to 2 meters), then he rediscovers the cane invarious places whenIchange the point of contact.

It is therefore permissible to regard as certain the existenceof coordination between sight and hearing from the third monthon, whereas the facts observed during the second month can be
due to a simple accommodation of the head to the direction of

the sound. These ideas coincide with the results obtained by
B. Ldwenfeld. 9This coordination between sound and vision poses an interesting question. The coordinations which we have hitherto
encountered oscillate between two extreme types. On the one
hand, there is the more or less passive association imposed by theenvironment; thus the special position at mealtime is accompanied in the 1- or 2-month-old nursling by a search for thebreast. True, such associations have seemed to us only capable ofbeing constituted through accommodations and searchings, indicating a certain activity. But, granted this element of active
accommodation, it must be recognized that it is reduced to its
the consimplest expression and that the environment imposes
assimilates
the
child
beforetent of these accommodations
really9 Berthold

Lowenfeld,

Systematisches

StudiumderReaktionenderSauglinge auf Klange und Gerausche, Zeitschr. /. Psychol. CIV, 1927, pp. 6296.

84

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

them in detail (through recognition, etc.). At the other extreme

we have the active recognition of a sign charged with meaning.
It is thus that the 3- to 4-month-old nursling recognizes his bib byvisual perception and knows that it announces the coming meal.

With regard to the coordination between hearing and sight, weare now confronted by behavior patterns contemporaneous withcoordinations of position and of sucking (first type), but behavior
the later coordinations of vision and ofpatterns which resemble

How should they be interpreted? Must
we state that the sound of the voice is a simple signal forcing thesucking (second type).

baby to search with his eyes for the face corresponding to thisvoice in the manner in which the sound of the bell sets in motion
salivation in the dog by conditioned reflex, or must we think thatthe sound of the voice constitutes a sign charged with meaning
and is recognized by the child as going with the visual perceptionof someone's face? If, in the coordinations of position and suckthe existence of an element of active accommodaing, we admittion,

however small, then it is evident that aseries of inter-mediaries will link the two extreme types (active and passive
between sight and hearcoordination) and that the coordination

between these extremes. In othering will be located midway
words, the association between a sound and a visual perception
is never a purely passive association, but it is not at the outset aHowof meanings).
relationship of understanding (recognition
then can this intermediary state and the progress of understand-ing be explained?

In view of all we have seen regarding assimilation we may
schema tends to conquer the
hypothesize that every assimilatory

whole universe including the realms assimilable by means ofother schemata. Only the resistances of the environment or theincompatibilities due to the conditions of the subject's activity
curb this generalization. So it is that the child sucks everythingthat touches his mouth or face and learns to coordinate themovements of his hands with those of sucking as a function of his
pleasure in sucking his thumb. When he will know how to grasp
he will suck everything he will have in his hands. Concerning
what he sees or hears, if the nursling does not try to suck thisfrom the outset it is perhaps less because these realms have noTHE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

85

connection with sucking (it often happens that he makes suckinglike movements as soon as he hears a sound) than because it is

do two things at once (looking attenand
making sucking-like movements, etc.). But instead of
tivelyimmediate coordination between sucking and sight it is possible

difficult for the child tothat there exists nevertheless excitation of the sucking cycle in
the presence of especially interesting visual images. The re-markable protrusion of the lips observed in the youngest children
Obs. 31) in states of great attention could not be other than(seesucking-like movements if it cannot be explained by a purely
automatic or tonic postural mechanism. 10 In the same way, withregard to the visual, hearing and grasping schemata, etc., thechild will try little by little to see everything, hear everything,take everything, etc. This is well put by Ch. Biihler when sheto the first sensorial reactions that the responsesays with regard
to an excitant during the first months depends more on thesubject's functional

needs than on the nature of this excitant. 11

Consequently it is natural that the nursling should try in thecourse of his first auditory adaptations to look at the same time
as listen, at least from the time when he has learned to direct the

movement of his eyes [at 0;1 (7) in Laurent's case (see Obs. 32)].
This beginning of coordination between hearing and sight does
not necessarily presuppose a passive association but can be exIt is true that, when he turns his
plained by active assimilation.
head to accommodate himself to the sound, the child comes
anautomatically, in the case of the human voice, to perceive
the element ofinteresting visual image (the corresponding face);
But simple asexcluded.
tobeentirely
passive association is nottoactualrisesociations would never give
searching in the co-ordination between sight and hearing (looking for the face which
the sounds which corcorresponds to the voice and later forof visual and audiif
theschemata
to the objects seen)

respondthis protrusion of the lips aslOPreyer, op. cit., p. 251-252, construes
and sight (his son evidenced it
betweenassociationasuckinghereditary
being
the tenth day while looking at a candle). But it goes without saying that, if
association exists, it can be explained by reflex assimilation without recourse

to heredity.
11

Op. dt., p. 26.

86

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR. ADAPTATIONS

tory assimilation did not succeed

in reciprocally directing their

them in an active way.
respective realms by assimilating
More precisely, if at a given moment the child applies himsearching systematically for the visual images which corin the first place because
respond to the sounds heard, this is so
he forces himself to look at everything. Without yet knowing thata sound necessarily comes from a visible object, the child isself tovisually excited by the sound as

well as through hearing it. Thusin Observation 46 the sound aha releases a need in Laurent tolook as well as to listen; and this is true, probably, not because

Laurent already knows that this sound emanates from a precise
visual image but simply because the excitant arouses all hisneeds at once; in other words, because the child tries to integrate
the new reality into all the available schemata of assimilation.

In the second place, the child turns his head in the direction of
the sound through an accommodation to the sound comparable
to the movements of the eye following an object. It is self-evident,
is directed to the same side as theconsequently, that the glancehead, whence the observer's impression that the baby tries to see
what he hears (see end of Obs. 46), whereas he undoubtedly only

tries to see at the sametime he hears. In the third place, in cer-tain cases success confirms the searching. The sound of the voiceof others in this respect constitutes a privileged example; such asound nearly always gives rise to double assimilation, auditory
and visual. In other words, the human face has the almost uniqueproperty, in the universe of the child of 1 to 2 months, of lending
itself to a totality of simultaneous assimilation. This face is at
the same time recognizable and mobile, thus exciting visual interests to the highest degree; it is this face that the baby contemplates or rediscovers when he fixes his attention on the sound of
the voice; again it is this face which is central in the most interesting moments of existence (coming out of the bassinet, dressing,meal, etc.). In the case of the appearance of other people it ispossible to speak, not of association between various assimilations, but of global assimilation, and it is apparently this factwhich explains why the smile occurs more frequently in thepresence of persons than with respect to things. As far as coordination between hearing and sight is concerned it is thus

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

87evident that the child early identifies someone's face inasmuch
as it is a visual image o this same face, inasmuch as it is a sonor-

ous image. It is self-evident that, to the child, another person is
not yet an object conceived as cause of the voice. But it cannot

be said, inversely, that sound and vision are simply associated.
This is why it must be asserted that visual and auditory schemata
are reciprocally assimilated. The child tries, in a sense, to listen
to the face and to look at the voice. It is this reciprocal assimilation that constitutes the identification of visual and sonorous im-ages prior to the more complex solidifications which are to giverise to the object and to the causality. 12 In other words, the hu-

man face is one entity with regard to looking, listening, etc., andonce he has acquired, in this case and some other privileged examples (rattles, etc.), coordination between hearing and sight, thechild will search systematically and everywhere for correlations
between sounds and visual images.

Let us finally proceed to the coordination between hearing
and phonation. This coordination seems much simpler since every phonation is accompanied from the outset by auditory perception and is controlled by it. It seems therefore that here thereis

not intersensorial coordination, but pure circular reaction; aculminating in a sensorial effect and main-series of movements

tained by the interest of this result. But if that is true of simple

phonation, the inverse process may also be observed: the actionof hearing on phonation. In effect, as we have seen (Obs, 41) vocal contagion is almost as precocious as the first circular reactions
which are the basis of phonation; the wailing of another person
maintains that of the child, etc. What does this mean, if notthat the schemata of phonation and hearing are reciprocally assimilated and in the same way as those of hearing and sight?

sound of his voice instead
Just as the child comes to listen to theof merely crying and thus inaugurates acquired circular reactions,
so also he listens to the voice of another and, inasmuch as thesounds heard are analogous to the sounds he himself makes, hecan only perceive them by means of corresponding auditory-vocal
schemata. The imitation of sounds, in the beginning, is thus only
12 Thisrelatively

explains why attributing the voicelong stages; see Obs. 47 and 48.

to a face is only achieved by

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS
the confusion of one's own voice with that of another, coming

88

from the fact that the voice of others is actively perceived, thatis to say, assimilated to the schemata o phonation.
In conclusion, analysis of the schemata of phonation, of hearconfirms what we haveing and of their coordination completely
Each of these adaptavision.
andtostated with regard
sucking
to the external
accommodationofmeasureitawithtions brings

accommodation to the direction of sounds, to theireach one also involves an element ofgradual variety, etc. But

environment

listeningassimilation. First it is assimilation by pure repetition
or wailing in order to hear these
for the sake oflistening, crying
to or
sounds, etc. Then it is generalizing assimilation listening
it is recognitory
sounds.
variedFinally
producing increasingly
assimilation rediscovering a definite sound. These perceived oran internal organization.
produced sounds at first only present
Related to each other they only have meaning in relation to thethat the child maintains andsystem they form; it is this systemheard sounds and which
varioustheassimilates
he
which
to
uses,
he accommodates as much as possible to the new heard sounds.
Then this internal organization is itself inserted into a wider orit new meanings; sound is coordinatedwith vision, etc. But this coordination involves no new process;ganization which gives
it is constituted

by reciprocal assimilation of the visualand audi-

etc.

tory schemata,If the latter process is difficult to study at so early an age as
will now afford us the op1 to 2 months,

analyzing prehensionof the mechanism of the coportunity to extend the description
schemata.
ordinations among heterogeneous
4.

PREHENSION. With the mouth, the eye, and the ear,the hand is one of the most essential instruments of which thewill make use. One canintelligence, once it has been established,even say that the definitive conquest of the mechanisms of grasp-

which

ing marks the beginning of the complex behavior patterns
we shall call "assimilations through secondary schemata" andwhich characterize the first forms of deliberate action. It is therefore important to analyze fundamentally the way in which this
discovery of grasping takes place: here, more even than with theTHE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

89

preceding schemata, we find an indispensable connecting link
between organic adaptation and intellectual adaptation.
The hand's chief activity is grasping. But it is self-evident
that this function cannot entirely be dissociated from touching or
the coordinations between kinesthesia

and sight, etc. We shalltherefore touch on these questions in passing, but only in passing.

The aim of this work is not to supply an inventory of behavior
the first year of life and we shall only dwell on exampatterns ofples of use

to the analysis of intelligence.

It seems to us five stages

may be discerned in the developmentof grasping. If, as revealed by studying our three children, thesestages do not correspond to definite ages, their sequence nevertheless seems necessary (except perhaps with regard to the third

Let us therefore examine the facts by classifying them according to the way they succeed one another.

stage).

The first stage is that of impulsive movements and of pure reflex. The newborn child closes his hand when the palm is lightly
touched. Lucienne, a few hours after birth, closed her fingers
around my index finger without resistance of the thumb. But at
first it seems as though this reflex were unaccompanied by any
search or appreciable use: the child immediately relinquishes
that which he grasped. It is only while nursing when his hands
are tightened and almost clenched, before the general relaxationof tonicity, that the child is able to hold on to a solid object fora few minutes (pencil, etc.). But it would be rash to conclude
that this is due to a pure automatism and thus to contrast thegrasping reflexes to those of sucking whose use we have seen presupposed to a great extent active accommodation and assimila-

In effect when the child closes his hand around the object
which touched his palm, he reveals a certain interest, Laurent,tion.

when I put my finger in his hand andrecommences shortly afterward. The grasping reflex is thus comat 0;0 (12) stops crying

parable to sight or hearing during the first two weeks and not at
all comparable to reflexes such as sneezing, yawning, etc., which
do not attract the subject's attention in any way. True, things
remain thus for a long time and prehension does not from theoutset lend itself to systematic use as does sucking But we may
ask ourselves whether the impulsive movements of arms, hands,

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

90

and fingers, which are almost continuous during the first weeks
and closing the hands, moving(waving the arms, slowly opening
sort of functional use of theseathe fingers, etc.) do not constitutereflexes.

The second stage is that of the first circular reactions related
hand movements, prior to any actual coordination between
We shall group here the whole
prehension and sucking or vision.
too the circular reactions leading to prehension for its own sakewithout seeing them or attempting(grasping and holding objects
to carrythem to the mouth),(scratchingtactileand kinesthetic reactions

a body, moving the fingers, hands or arms, etc.), thecoordinations between sucking and hand movements (finger suckand finally the coordination between sucking and actual
ing, etc.)

an object in order to carry it to the mouth),prehension (grasping
the coordination which characterizes the third stage and realizes
notable progress in the way of systematic prehension and the coand grasping (grasping in order toordinations between
sight
look, grasping objects perceived in the visual field),which will

be formed during the fourth and fifth stages and indicate definitive success in grasping.

Thus defined, the first circular reactions related to hand
movements and to prehension begin by autonomous activities ofhands or fingers which prolong in a continuous way the impulsive
movements and reflexes of the first stage. We have stated, in effect,that from birth certain impulsive movements seem to constitutean empty use of the grasping mechanism. From the second month
it becomes evident that some of these movements are so systematized that they give rise to true circular reactions,capable ofgradual accommodation and assimilation.
Observation 50.

At 0;1(8)

Laurent's arm is stretched out and almost

immobile while his hand opens, half closes and then opens again, etc.
When the palm of his hand strikes the covers, he grasps them, lets themgo in unceasing oscillating motion. It is difficult to describe these vague
movements, but it is also difficult not to see in them grasping for thesake of grasping, or even empty grasping analogous to the phenomena
described in connection with sucking, vision, etc. But there does not
yet exist, in such behavior patterns, either true accommodation to theobject or even any continuity.

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

91

Observation 51. Until 0;1 (19) I did not observe in Laurent any accommodation, even momentary, of the hand to the object outside ofreflex accommodation. It seems, on the contrary, that today the contactof my hand with his little finger or of a handkerchief with the outersurface of his finger sets in motion a certain searching. True, his handdoes not remain on the spot as it will do later on. There are attempts,
back and forth, and each time his hand touches my fingers or thehandkerchief and seems more ready to grasp (the palm seems to be
directed toward the object). But it is self-evident that the interpretationof such movements remains a very delicate one. At 0;1 (20) also, contactof his dosed left hand with a rolled up handkerchief which I holdproduces this result: the hand moves away while opening, then returns,
open, to strike the object, grasps it feebly, then moves away again, returns to grasp it, etc. The hand seems to be stimulated by contact withthe object, a beginning of accommodation. But the hand comes andgoes instead of remaining immobile and really searching.
Observation 52, Beginning at 0;1 (22), on the other hand, there seems
be more continuity in the grasping movements. Thus at 0;1 (22)
Laurent holds in his hand four and a half minutes an unfolded handkerchief which he grasped by chance (his arm is occasionally immobile
and occasionally in slow movement). At 0;1 (23) he holds about two
minutes a toy which I placed on his palm. When he half lets it go hegrasps it again by himself (twice). But soon complete lack of interest
ensues. Same observation at 0;1 (26) and 0;1 (29). At 0;1 (25) he opens
his hand and grasps my index finger when I touch the back of his
at first but seems to be confingers. This observation seems doubtful
firmed on the following days. In particular, at 0;1 (30) for a few
moments Laurent pulls my thumb without letting it go, having by
chance knocked it with the back of his hand.
toObservation 55. From 0;2 (3) Laurent evidences a circular reaction
which will become more definite and will constitute the beginning ofandsystematic grasping; he scratches and tries to grasp, lets go, scratches
be observed durgrasps again, etc. On 0;2 (S) and 0;2 (6) this can only
bare shoulder.
ing the feeding. Laurent gently scratches his mother's
But beginning 0;2 (7) the behavior becomes marked in the cradle
itself. Laurent scratches the sheet which is folded over the blankets,then grasps it and holds it a moment, then lets it go, scratches it again
and recommences without interruption. At 0;2 (11) this play lasts a
the day. At 0;2 (12)quarter of an hour at a time, several times during
he scratches and grasps my fist which I placed against the back of his
bent middle finger
right hand. He even succeeds in discriminating my
and
it
and
holding it a few moments. At 0;2 (14)separately,
grasping
0;2 (16) I note how definitely the spontaneous grasping of the sheet
reveals the characteristics of circular reaction-groping at first, then

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

92

and

letting
regular rhythmical activity (scratching, grasping, holding
loss of interest.
andfinally
progressivego),
But this behavior grows simpler as it evolves in that Laurent
a brief tactile
scratches less and less, and instead really grasps after
andholds his
Laurent
at0;2
Thus
grasps(11)
already
exploration.
time, shortening the preliminary
sheet or handkerchief for along

he pulls with his rightscratching stage. So also at 0;2 (14)hand at a

his left. The following days his
bandage which had to be applied toabsorbedtactile interest is entirely
by reciprocal hand grasping andtotactile exploration of the face to which we shall return. With^ regard
with
noted
been
has
regardobject grasping Laurent (whose precocity
to grasp into thumb sucking) begins, at the end of the third month,
third
the
to
secondthefromstage.
order to suck. He thus passes

Observation 54.~-Lucienne manifested the same vague reactions as
Laurent (see Obs. 50-52) until about the age of 2 and i/2 months. Aboutof her hands when in contact with the coversI note
0;2 (12)agitation

the

etc.

Same reactions onmaterial,
grasping and releasing, scratching
the following days. At 0;2 (16) she pulls at a pillow. At 0;2 (20) she
and scratches a piece of material.
opens and shuts her hands in space,
At 0;2 (27) she holds her cover for a few moments, then a corner ofthe sheet which she grasped by chance, then a small doll which I placed
At 0;3 (3) she strikes her quilt with her rightagainst her right palm.
she is doing, thenwhile
itscratchesshehand;carefully watching what
etc. Then she loses contact with it, but asitlets itgo, grasps

again,

soon as she feels it again, she grasps it without scratching it first. Samereaction several times in succession. There exists therefore a quite
directed by touch and not by sight.
systematic circular reaction
It is not difficult to find in these reactions

the first behavior

or hearing; assimilation by pure
patterns pertaining to sightof grasping) and the beginning
sake
the
for
(grasping

repetitionof accommodation (orientation of hand and fingers as a functionof the object when they are in contact with this object). But there
are not yet subtler accommodations or recognitory or generaliz-ing assimilations.
From the onset of these primitive behavior patterns, on theother hand, a coordination between hand movements and thoseof sucking may be observed. Actually, with regard to our threechildren, the systematic sucking of the fingers either precededor accompanied the first acquired activities involving only thehand or the fingers. It is also possible to find other very precocious reactions of the fingers coordinated not only with sucking

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

93

but also with all the tactile sensibility of the face and discovered
parts ofthe body:
55

while

Observation.Jacqueline,
learning to suck her fingers [achieved
at 0; 1 (28)] constantly moved her hand over her face without appearing
to explore it systematically but undoubtedly learning to recognize cerher
hand on her
tain contacts. For instance at 0;2 (77) she

puts
right
nose when it is being cleaned. So also, during the third month, sherubs her eyes several times in succession so that they become irritated.

Observation 56. At 0;2 (17) and the days following, Lucienne more orputs the fingers of her right hand on her right eyeless systematicallyand goes to sleep in this position. Perhaps the irritation of the eye before her nap provoked this repeated reaction. At 0;2 (25) she scratchessoher eye with the back of her hand and recommences
momentarily

that the whole eyelid is reddened.

Observation 57. Beginning Q;2 (8) Laurent constantly pulls at his face
before, during, or after sucking his fingers. This behavior slowly gains
interest for its own sake and thus gives rise to two distinct habits. The
firstconsists in holding his nose. Thus at 0;2 (17)Laurent babbles andsmiles without any desire to suck, while holding his nose with his righthand. He begins this again on 0;2 (18) while sucking (he holds his nosewith four fingers while sucking his thumb), then continues later. At
0;2 (19) he grasps his nose sometimes with his right, sometimes with his
hand, rubs his eye in passing but constantly returns to his nose.

left

That evening he holds his nose with both hands. At 0;2 (22) he seems
to raise his right hand to his nose when I pinch it. At 0;2 (24) and thefollowing days he touches his nose again.

Observation 58. The second habit acquired by Laurent at the same
sometimes with the back of his hand,
period consists in rubbing his eyes
sometimes with the fingers. This may be observed when he awakens andis stretching but not only a particular reflex must be involved forstretching is present from birth but eye rubbing has just occurred andonly sporadically. Furthermore and more important, Laurent rubs hisof his nap as though he has made theeyes all the time independently
tactile discovery of his eyes and kept returning to it through circular
reaction. At 0;2 (16) I even note that he closes his eye before his righthand approaches it and while he does not yet see it. At 0;2 (18), same
reaction: both of his eyes close before he scratches the right eye. At
0;2 (19) he turns his head to the left as his left hand is being directed

toward his eye. Then he rubs both eyes simultaneously with both hands
At 0;2 (20) he makes fists in order to rub his eyes, again closes his eyes
beforehand and smiles with joy; there is no connection with stretching
The following days, same reactions.

94

ELEMENTARY SENSORJMOTOR ADAPTATIONS
The activity of the hands with, respect to the body Itself
to the nose and eyes. Sometimes the whole face is covered

Observation 52.
is not limited

by both hands joined together. Sometimesin Laurent's case at 0;2 (24)the chest receives regular blows. But it is chiefly the hands which discover and touch one another. This phenomenon wasparticularly important with respect to Laurent not only because it gave rise to an
especially tenacious habitual schema but also because this schema
subsequently set in motion very precocious behavior patterns of prehension coordinated with sucking and above all with vision. It is noteworthy in the first place that already during the acquisition of thumbsucking (Obs. 6-21) Laurent often clasped his hands while he sucked
the fingers of one of them. This pattern was revealed
sporadically
until the end of the second month. At the
beginning of the third month
it gave rise to aand 0;2very systematic habit. 1 note that at 0;2
(4)

(10)

he seems to touch his hands. At Q;2 (14) his right handpulls a bandage
on his left. At 0;2 (17) 1 draw away his left hand by means of astring(attached to it to prevent Laurent from sucking his left thumb), hecatches this hand several times by means of his right hand. The
precision with which he performs this function while his left hand tries toovercome the resistance of the string and to enter his mouth, showsthat a solidly constructed schema has already been formed. At 0;2(19)
Laurent clasps his hands several times and toward evening does it almost continuously. He touches them, then sucks them together, lets
them go, grasps them again, etc. The interest is primarily ingraspingand only secondarily in sucking. The following days this behavior isincreasingly frequent but here we must interrupt our description of it
because looking intervenes and begins tomodify this "schema ofjunction." Beginning 0;2 (24) Laurent is observed to examine his clasped
hands so attentively that their movement is transformed by this, which
is characteristic of the third
stage. Primarily, the systematization of thishabit of joining results in hastening the moment when Laurent will

grasp with both hands some object in order to keepitin hismouthwhich is also typical of this third stage (it is evenby this last characteristic that we shall arrive at
defining the transition from the second

to the third stage ofprehension).

These coordinations between the movement of hands andface (Obs. 55-58) do not raise any

particular question. They arehearing, for exam-

not, like the coordination between sight andple, reciprocal assimilations of independent schemata; they

only

actually constitute an extension of the primitive and purely tactile schemata ofof theprehension (Obs 50-54). The

clasping

hands on the contrary, is in one sense a mutual assimilation,
but not outside the realm of tactile
Until now theprehension.

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

95

above-mentioned coordination of the thumb and of sucking (Obs.
16-24) involves a beginning of reciprocal assimilation between
independent schemata; but if the mouth sucks the hand and thehand directs itself to the mouth, the hand is not yet able to grasp
everything that the mouth sucks.
Let us now proceed to the coordinations between vision andhand movements. Preyer and Tournay observed that during theseventeenth week the child looked at his hands for the first timein a systematic way. Wallon 13 who quotes this, seems to envisage
an indication of a general truth.
Observation of our children unfortunately does not corroborate these dates; rather it seems to show that coordination between vision and hand movements is a continuous process depending on functional use more than on acquisitions which candefinitely be placed in time. The only date which is easy to determine is that of the appearance of the following behavior pattern: at a given moment the child grasps the objects which heit as

has perceived in the same visual field as his hand and before

grasping them he alternately looks at his hand and the objects.
Now this occurrence (fixed by Preyer at the 17th week) took placein Jacqueline's case at 0;6(1),

in Lucienne's at 0;4 (15)and inLaurent's at 0;3 (6). It characterizes what we shall call the fourthstage of prehension. But earlier all sorts of coordinations between
vision and hand movements may be observed, coordinations

which begin at the present stage and continue through the third.
Here are those which we have observed during the second stage:
Lucienne, at 0;2 (3), that is to say, the day after theshedaybegan systematically to suck her thumb, twice looked at her
Obs. 23). This glance
fingers as they came out of her mouth (see above,
was fleeting, but with accommodation of the eye to distance. At 0;2
next day she looked at her hand more(12), on the other hand, and theObservation 60.

lies
attentively. At 0;2 (15) I watch her while she

sticks her bib.

on her right side andHer hands move in front of her (the fingers constantly
the

and

cover,
moving), grasping and letting go the sheets, scratching
the right hand or both hands momentarily enter her mouth. Lucienne's
her hands (her glance rises andeyes seem to follow the movements offalls correctly, etc.) but her hands do not yield to the exigencies of thevisual field. Vision, therefore, adapts itself to the movements of thehand but the converse is not yet true.-At 0;2 (16) Lucienne is lying on
18

op. <jt., pp. 97-98.

96

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

her left side, her right hand pulling at the pillow; she attentively looks
at this hand. At 0;2 (17) Lucienne is on her back, her right hand
stretched out and the fingers moving slightly; she looks at this handmost attentively and smiles. A moment later she loses sight of it (herhand having lowered); her glance obviously seeks it and, when her handis raisedagain, it immediately follows it. At 0;2 (20) Lucienne continues to look at her hands, including the left one. For instance thehands open and close alternately; they do so simultaneously and frequently outside the visual field which surely reveals that an entirely
motor circular reaction independent of vision is involved. But as soon
as the phenomenon is produced opposite her face, Lucienne directs her
glance to her hand and watches it for a long time. She also inspects her
right hand which scratches a piece of material. At 0;2 (27) she looks at
her right hand which is holding a doll but is unable to keep this spectacle in her visual field. She also looks at her empty hands, the left almost as much as the right, but also without keeping them in the visual
field; the glance searches for the hands but they are not subordinatedto the glance. At 0;3 (3) she looks attentively at her right hand whichscratches a quilt, then relinquishes it, then grasps it again, etc. While her
hand loses contact with the quilt she looks at the latter but without coordination with the hand movements. Her hand rediscovers the quilt
through tactile accommodation and not through accommodation withsight. That evening, she watches her hand open and close. There is as
yet no precise coordination between these movements and sight exceptthat the fingers seem to move more when Lucienne looks at them. At

0;3 (8 and 9) she looks attentively at her clasped hands while sucking
the index finger and the back of her right hand.
shall stop withWe

from this date on, Lucienne begins to carry to hermouth the objects she has grasped which marks the beginning of thethis observation for,third stage.

Observation 61. Jacqueline seems not to have looked at her hands before 0;2 (30). But on this date and the following days she
frequently
notices her moving fingers and looks at them attentively. At 0;3(IB)
she rumples her quilt with both hands. When her hands move into hervisual field she looks fixedly at them just as she looks at the folds of thequilt when they appear before her but, if her eyes attempt to see thehands, the hand movements do not yet depend on vision at all. At
0;3 (21) likewise, her eyes follow her hands. At 0;3 (22) her glance follows her hands which turn aside and she seems very muchsurprised tosee them reappear.

62,A.t 0;2 (4) Laurent by chance discovers his right index
finger and looks at it briefly. At 0;2 (11) he inspects for a moment his
Observation

open right hand, perceived by chance. At 0;2 (14), on the other hand,
he looks three times in succession at his left hand and chiefly at his

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

97

raised index finger. At 0;2 (17) he follows its spontaneous movement fora moment, then examines it several times while it searches for his noseor rubs his eye. Next day, same observation. At 0;2 (19) he smiles at thesame hand

after having
contemplated it eleven times in succession
been untied); I then put this hand in a bandage
has
(when
again; assoon as I detach it (half an hour later) it returns to the visual field andit

Laurent again smiles at it. The same day he looks very attentively at
his two clasped hands. At Q;2 (21) he holds his two fists in the air andlooks at the left one, after which he slowly
it toward his facebringsand rubs his nose with it, then his eye. A moment later the left handagain approaches his face; he looks at it and touches his nose. He
recommences and laughs five or six times in succession while moving
the left hand to his face. He seems to laugh before the hand moves, but
looking has no influence on its movement. He laughs beforehand but
begins to smile again on seeing the hand. Then he rubs his nose. At agiven moment he turns his head to the left but looking has no effecton the direction. The next day, same reactions. At 0;2 (23) he looks at
his right hand, then at his clasped hands (at length). At 0;2 (24) at last
it may be stated that looking acts on the orientation of the hands which
tend to remain in the visual field. Thus we reach the third stage.
It may thus be seen of what the coordinations between visionand the first circular reactions of the hand and fingers consist.
We can say that the visual schemata tend to assimilate the man-ual schemata without the converse being yet true. In other words,
the glance tries to follow what the hand does but the hand does
not tend in any way to realize what the glance sees; it does noteven succeed in remaining in the visual field! Later, on the contrary, the hand will be regulated by vision, and vice versa; thiswill enable the child to grasp the objects seen. But, for the time
being, the hand moves independently of the glance, the few
vague circular reactions to which it gives rise being only directed by touch, kinesthetic sensations, or sucking. The relations

between sight and hand movements are therefore different fromthose which exist between sucking and these movements; in thecase of sucking, the schemata external to the hand movements
control tjiem and incorporate them (sucking entails circular reaction of the arms and hands) while in the case of vision hand
movements are autonomous and the glance is limited to assimiclear that fromlating without controlling them. It is therefore
this point of view sucking is ahead of vision. Thus at the third

98

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

to carrystage we shall see the hands grasp objects
mouth and not yet in order to look at them.

them to the

In a general way we may conclude the following with regard to the second stage. During this stage the hand movements
are no longer controlled only by reflex and impulsive mechanisms but give rise to some acquired circular reactions.

The re-actions certainly remain indefinite and it seems as

though withthem (opening and closing thehands, scratching with the finger tips, grasping and letting go,ofrespect to the most primitivethat a simple impulsive automatism were always involved.
But the question is to know if these behavior patterns are inde-etc.)

terminate because they are still entirely "impulsive" or because
as yet they

only constitute empty circular reactions without in-terest in the object grasped. The case of prehension is, in effect,
exactly analogous to that of sucking, vision, or hearing. Just as

there exists empty sucking, tongue sucking, etc., so also the nursling can wave his arms, open

and close his hands, clench them,move the fingers, etc., for weeks without an object and without
true contact with a reality which resists. And just as vision passes

through a stage during which objects are aliments for the glance
without assuming interest as external images, so also the firstcontacts of the hand with the things it grasps, touches andscratches by chance, bear witness to a purely functional phase of

assimilation (grasping for the sake of grasping) by repetition andnot yet by combined generalization and recognition. It is to thisphase that Observations 50-52 apply- On the other hand, Observation 53 and Observations 55-58 are evidence of a generalizing assimilation and a beginning of tactile recognition in addition to this primitive functioning. On the one hand, as soon as

the child learns to scratch and pull at objects (Obs. 53) he extends this behavior to everything, including his face and his
own hands (Obs. 55-58). On the other hand, through the very
fact of the extension of the schema it becomes differentiated andgives rise to a recognitory assimilation. This is why the child recnizes his nose, eydl and hands by touch, when he is searching forthem. In correlation with the progress of assimilation thereisgradual accommodation to objects. The hand takes the form ofa thing, thethumb gradually is opposed to the other fingers,

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

99

beginning the third month (or even shortly before) it is enoughto touch the back of the hand to make the hand attempt toWith regard to coordinating organizations there is, as
grasp, etc.
we have seen, a beginning of coordination with sucking and withvision but without reciprocal assimilation of the schemata. The

mouth sucks the hands but the hands do not try to carry to themouth everything they grasp nor to grasp everything that themouth sucks, and the eye looks at the hands but the hands do not
try to feel or to grasp everything the eyes see. These two essential
coordinations will develop during the three succeeding stages.
The coordination between sucking and grasping is more precocious and thus characterizes the third stage. But there is no

logical necessity for this order of succession and it is possible toconceive of the existence of a partial reversal in the case of cer-tain exceptional subjects.

During a third stage notable progress is revealed: henceforth
there is coordination between prehension and sucking. In otherwords, the hand grasps objects which it carries to the mouth andreciprocally it takes hold of objects which the mouth sucks.

Let us first describe the facts in order later to analyze theirvarious aspects.
Observation 63. At 0;3 (8) Lucienne grasps her coverlet in her righthand and sucks it. I then place a pencil in her hand; her hand moves
slightly toward her mouth and stops. As yet it is impossible to decide
between chance and coordination. But that evening three times in succession I place a soft collar in her right hand which is stretched out on
the coverlet and each time she carries it to her mouth. No attempt at
seeing. At Q;3 (9) I place a wooden object in her hand; she brings it
toward her mouth, then lets it go. At 0;3 (13), same experiment: sheholds the object, carries it to her mouth and alternately licks the object
and her hand without appearing to dissociate these two bodies fromone another. At Q;3 (24) she grasps bib, quilt, covers by herself andcarries them to her mouth. At 0;4 (4) she grasps a toy by chance (ofcourse without seeing it) and holds it firmly for a few moments. Thena sudden movement to put it in her mouth without trying to look. Samereaction with a part of the coverlet. She does not yet direct the object;

she sucks that which comes first. There exists therefore in some way a
conjunction of two schemata (grasping and holding) and (putting thehand to the mouth) and not yet the single act of putting the object tothe mouth.

100

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

Observation 64. At 0;4 (9) I put a rattle before her eyes: no reaction.

Then I place it in her hands: she immediately puts it in her mouth,sucks it, then moves it at random while looking at it. It seems as though
this time the act of grasping a substance in order to suck it forms asingle organized whole. This is confirmed by the following reaction.
That evening I show Lucienne her usual rattle: she looks at it fixedly,

opens her mouth, makes sucking movements, opens her mouth again,etc., but she does not grasp it. The sight of the toy, therefore, set inmotion movements of sucking and not of prehension. But barely
touching her stretched-out hand with the handle of the rattle suffices
to produce movements of prehension: successive attempts with thefingers until the opposition of the thumb leads to success. The rattle,
as soon as it is grasped, is carried to the mouth. At 0;4 (10) same

reactions: the object, as soon as it is grasped, regardless of the visual
field, is carried to the mouth. If it falls to the side groping ensues until

success is attained.

Observation 65. At 0;4 (10) Lucienne is lying on her back. I put a dollin front of her mouth. She manages to suck it while moving her head,but with difficulty. She then moves her hands but without bringing them
together appreciably. A moment later, on the other hand, I place therattle in her mouth, the handle lying on her chest; she immediately
brings her hand to it and grasps it. The experiment is repeated threetimes: same reactions. At 0;4 (15) as soon as the rattle is in contact
with the mouth, the hand moves in this direction. But Lucienne does
not persevere. That evening, however, she grasps it immediately. Thisbehavior seems to be definitely acquired and coordinated. To accomplish this Lucienne does not look at her hands at all and as soon as shetouches the rattle she succeeds in grasping it. She does this with herleft as well as with her right hand, but less often. From this observation on, Lucienne begins to coordinate her grasping movements withvision, and thus enters the fourth stage.

Observation <56.~~At 0;3 (2) Lucienne carries to her mouth what she has
grasped at random, opposing her thumb to the other fingers. At 0;4 (8)too, she carries to her mouth ribbons, corners of pieces of material, herbib, etc.

Observation 66 repeated.

Already at 0;2(17)

Laurent, after graspingsame time as his hand. There is therefore achance connection between the schema of prehension and that of finger
sucking. The next day he sucks the bandage on his left hand while
holding it with his right. The following days the relations between prehension and sucking remain at random. On the other hand, at 0;2 (28)
it isenough for me to place his rattle in his left hand (outside the visual
field and the extendedarm) to cause Laurent to introduce this object
his sheet, sucksitat theTHE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

101

into his mouth and suck it. The experiment succeeds a series of times,
with the right hand as well as the left, and the systematization of thereaction shows that this new schema was constituted several days before. Same result on the following days. At 0;3 (4) he carries to hismouth ribbons, fringes of covers, cloth dolls, etc., and, at 0;3 (5) hedoes the same with unfamiliar objects (package of tobacco, cigarette
lighter, tobacco pouch, etc.) which I put in front of his face and which
he grasps after having touched them while putting his hands together.

So alsoitsuffices that I

place in his outstretched hand, outside thevisual field, ,an object which is unfamiliar (visually and tactilely) suchas a clothes pin, for Laurent to carry it immediately to his mouth andnot to his eyes.

Thus it may be seen that from the second half of the third month
there exists, in Laurent, coordination between sucking and grasping
but, as we shall see later, this third stage was shortened in his case bya certain precocity in coordination between vision and prehension.
Moreover the sequential order of the acquisition of coordinations wasalmost reversed in the case of this child.

Such observations are interesting inasmuch as they indicate

how systematic prehension is acquired. Following the circular
reactions of the second stage (pure, generalizing, and recognitory
assimilations) the child begins to interest himself in the objects
themselves which his hand has touched. Here the same phenome-

non is produced as with respect to vision or hearing. After having
looked for the sake of looking the child becomes interested in
the objects he looks at, because the assimilation of reality to vision
is completed through coordination between vision and the otherschemata. So also, after having practiced in space various hand

movements and having grasped for the sake of grasping, after
having used his prehension with respect to all the solid objects
he encounters and having thus acquired an increasingly precise
accommodation to objects concomitant to generalizing assimilation, after having even developed a sort of tactile-motor recognition of things, the child finally becomes interested in thewhich has thus beobjects he grasps inasmuch as prehension,come systematic, is coordinated with an already completed
schema, such as that of sucking. How can this coordination bethat there is only
explained? In the beginning (Obs. 63) it seems
that is to say, simple conjunction of two
partial coordination
partiallytakes hold of the
independent schemata. The hand

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS
attracts the hand. Thus at 0;4 (4) Lucienne
objects and the mouthor object when the hand brings thes.till Indifferently sucks hand102

moment, on the other hand,
But here as with regard to sight andthat this coordination results from ahearing, it clearly appears
schemata under consideration. The
theofassimilation

At a given
objects to the mouth.
coordination becomes total.

reciprocal
mouth seeks to suck what the hand grasps just as the hand seeks
theto grasp what the mouth sucks. In effect, in Observation 64,
thediscovered
has
hand
the
beforeobjectsuck
tomouth is readyand then what the child grasps is at once brought to the mouth.
Lucienne seeks to grasp the object
Inversely, at 0;4 (10) (Obs. 65)
which her mouth sucks when this object has not previously passed
it may once more be seen ofthrough manual prehension. Thus
what the progressive organization of schemata consists: a mutual
accommodation and assimilation.
adaptation with reciprocal
This leads us to the coordination between vision and prethe second stage the glance alreadyrecall that
hension.

We

duringfollows the hand movements but the latter are not governed^bythe fourth stage we shall see that prehension
the former.

Duringitself is controlled by vision.

With regard to the third stage which

concerns us at the moment, it may be said that vision, without
still only depends on touch
yet controlling prehension (whichand sucking) already exerts an influence on hand movements.
The act of looking at the hand seems to augment the hand's
to limit its displacements to the inactivity or on the contrary
terior of the visual field.
Observation rf7.-Lucierme, at 0;3 (IB) looks at her right hand for aand opens and closes it. Thenlong time (her arm is outstretched)
her hand moves quite suddenly toward her left cheek. Her eyes follow
this movement with exactitude, her head moving continuously as
resumes its position.
though there were prevision. The hand thenLucienne looks at it again and smiles broadly while shaking herself,then the same game begins again. The following days her visual interest in hand movements or the hand holding an object remains conthan a vague
stant, but vision does not seem to have any effect otherdynamogenization of these movements.
Observation 68. At 0;4 (9) Lucienne makes no motion to grasp arattle she is looking at. But when she subsequently brings to her mouth

the rattle she has grasped independently of sight and sees the handwhich holds this object, her visual attention results in immobilizingTHE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

103

the movement of her hands; however, her mouth was already open to
receive the rattle which is 1 cm. away from her. Then Lucienne sucks
the rattle, takes it out of her mouth, looks at it, sucks again, and soon. The same day, a new experiment: I place a case in her left hand.
Lucienne carries it directly to her mouth, but, as she is about to put itin (her lips already open) she perceives it, moves it away and holds it
before her eyes at a distance of about 10 cm. She looks at it most attentively while holding it almost motionless for more than a minute.
Her lips move and she carries the object to her mouth and sucks it forseveral seconds but she removes it to look at it. The same day, Lucienne
engages in the same play with her coverlet, but as yet there is no coordination between the sight of an object or of the hand and pre-hension as such.
Observation 69. At 0;4 (10) Lucienne looks at her rattle with the same
reactions of buccal desire. She opens her mouth, makes sucking-likemovements, raises her head slightly, etc. But she does not stretch out
her hands although they make grasping-like movements. A moment
later, her right hand being outstretched, I place a rattle next to her.
Lucienne looks alternately at her hand and the rattle, her fingers
constantly moving, but she does not move her hand closer. However,when the rattle touches her hand she grasps it immediately.

Observation 70. Jacqueline, at 0;4(1)

looks attentively at her righthand which she seems to maintain within the visual field. At 0;4 (8)she sometimes looks at the objects which she carries to her mouth andholds them before her eyes, forgetting to suck them. But there does
not yet exist prehension directed by sight nor coordinated adductionof objects in the visual field. It is when the hand passes at random before her eyes that it is immobilized by the glance. Sometimes, too, she

looks attentively at her hands which happen to be joined. At 0;5 (12)I observe that she constantly looks at her hands and fingers but always
without coordination with prehension. At 0;6 (0) she has not yet established this coordination. She watches her hand move; her hand moves
movement of fright andtoward her nose and finally hits her eye.
retreat: her hand still does not belong to herl Nevertheless the hand ismaintained more or less successfully within the visual field.

A

Observation 71. At 0;S (23) Lucienne's right arm is outstretched, her
hand remaining outside the visual field. I grasp this hand. She tries tofree it but does not look in this direction at all. Same result at 0;4
the following stages that Lucienne will(9), etc. It is only during
search with her eyes for the hand which is held.

Observation 72. Jacqueline still reacts in the same way at 0;5(12)that is to say, during the present stage. She is on her back and I alterflat on the mattress.
nately hold her right and left hands which are lying

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

104

the
She makes vain attempts to face her hand but without looking
she tries to see what is going on. At a given
directionalthoughrightmoment while wriggling about Jacqueline happens to perceive myhand which is holding her right hand. She looks attentively at thisat thisunfamiliar image but without making an effort to free herself
all aroundexact moment. Then she resumes the struggle while looking
inher head but not in the right direction. The consciousness of effort isbut in thetherefore not localized in the visual image of the hand,absolute. At 0;5 (25) same reaction.

Observation 73 .-Laurent has revealed, with regard to the coordinationof vision and hand movements, remarkable precociousness which must,
we feel, be attributed to his development acquired by the schema ofObs. 59). In effect, through clasping of the hands
joining the hands (seein front of the face in a reclining child,
takes
which
place

necessarily

Laurent eventually studied them by looking at them attentively [seeObs. 52 at 0;2 (19) and 0;2 (23)]. This regular connection, although its
cause is fortuitous, results quite naturally in leading to the influence ofthe glance on the movement of the hand. Thus at 0;2 (24) Laurent rubs
his hands, 5 to 10 cm. from his mouth, without sucking them. He
then grasps them again at least twenty times inseparates them andsuccession while looking at them. It would appear, in such an instance,that visual pleasure alone were the cause of the repetition of thethis impression is strengthened when
phenomenon. An hour later

Laurent, having grasped his right hand with his left and having removed the bandage (placed on the right thumb) holds the bandage
within the visual field and looks at it with curiosity. At 0;2 (25) Laurent
looks at his motionless left hand, after having rubbed his eye. At 0;2
he looks at a rattle which he has in his hands and at 0;2(26 and 28)
a new combination derived from differentiation of thisobserveI(29)

schema of clasping the hands. Laurent holds his hands with the tips of
his fingers only, and 10 to 15 cm. away, exactly opposite his eyes. He
the visual field and reveals no tendency toobviously keeps them withinsuck or even actually to grasp for at least a quarter of an hour. Thereis only involved playing with thefingers discovered tactilely andto the eye. The next day, same observation.
agreeable

Observation 74. The significance of the preceding behavior patterns
with regard to Laurent, they give rise to a very curious reaction
facilitated access to the definitive coordination
whichis that,particularly
characteristic of the fourth and fifth stages of prehension. Beginning
0;3 (3) Laurent began to grasp my hand as soon as it appeared before
hand was visually assimilated to one of his hands
his face because

myand so set in motion the schema of hand clasping.
At 0;3 (3), around 2 P.M. I place my motionless hand opposite his
face, 10 to 15 cm. from his mouth. He looks at it and immediately makes

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS
sucking-Iike

movements while looking

at

it,

as

105

though b^ wereas-similating it to his hand which he constantly examines before or after
sucking. But he looks at my hand without trying to grasp it. Then,
without changing its location, I open my hand more and manage totouch his left hand very lightly with my little
Laurent immedifinger.

ately grasps this finger without seeing it.
searches for it until he rediscovers it

When I withdraw it, Laurent(which is the first example of aimportant to the development of prehension: recapturingthat which escaped the hands). Finally this use ofprehension passes
into the visual field and Laurent looks at my finger most attentively.

reaction

The same day, at 6 P.M. if I display my hand in the same position thisisenough to make Laurent grasp it! I touched his hand (with my little
just once, then five times in succession he grasps my handfinger)without

my having previously touched his nor his having seen his

hand at the same time as mine! At first I assumed this phenomenon to
be a coordinated act of prehension regulated by sight of the object
alone (hence an act characteristic of the fifth stage) but the rest of theobservation suggested a simpler interpretation. The sight of my handsimply set in motion the habitual cycle of movements of bringing thehands together (the schema of clasping) and as my hand was in the
trajectory of his hands, he met and grasped it.
The next day, at 0;3 (4) he at once grasps my hand even though
I have not touched his at all. I find, moreover, confirmation of the preceding interpretation in the following threefacts.

In thefirstplace,

when I present Laurent with some objects instead of my hand, he does
not attempt to grasp them and confines himself to looking at them. In
the second place, when I present my hand at a certain distance (20 to 30cm.) and not just in front of his face, he is content to grasp his hands
without trying to reach my hand. In the third place, when I separate
and clasp my hands, at a distance of about 50 cm., Laurent imitates me,

These three combined facts seem well to demonLaurent grasps my hand in front of his face, this isthrough assimilating my hand to the schema of clasping his own.
At 0;3 (5) Laurent imitates less well my clasping movement when
I am at a distance. As soon as I bring my hand closer to his face, heI again
joins his hands and, at the proper distance, grasps them. Whenmove my hands away, he joins his. That afternoon, I present my motionless hand: he grasps it and laughs. Then I replace my hand with ahepackage of tobacco, a cigarette lighter and finally my tobacco pouch:the schema ofgrasps all three in sequence! By means of my hand andas we shall see later.
stratethat,

ifjoining, Laurent thus arrives at the beginning of the

fourth stage.

Observation 75. At 0;3 (5) that is to say, the third day of the precedfield:
ing observation I immobilize Laurent's hands outside the visual
he does not look (see Obs. 71 and 72).

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

106

Observation 76. Finally here is an example of the conjunction of the
combined schemata of vision, prehension and sucking. At 0;4 (4) Ishow Lucienne my motionless hand. She looks at it attentively, thensmiles, then opens her mouth wide and finally puts her own fingers
into it. Same reaction many times. It appears that Lucienne assimilates
my hand to hers and thus the sight of my fingers makes her put hers
into her mouth. It is noteworthy that shortly afterward she looks at her

own index finger, sucks it, looks at it again, etc. So also Laurent, at
0;3 (6), while looking at my hand in the same position, opens wide hismouth. Then he grasps my hand and draws it toward his open mouth

while staring at my fingers.
It

may thus be seen in what these coordinations between

vision and hand movements consist. It is not yet possible to speakof coordination between vision and prehension, since the childknows neither how to grasp what he sees (he does not grasp what
he touches or sucks) nor how to hold before his eyes that which
he has grasped (he carries things to the mouth and not to theeyes), nor even how to look at his own hand when it is held by
the hand of someone else (Obs. 71, 72 and 75). It can no longer
be said, however, that the child is limited to looking at his hands
without having them react to his looking. When the hand bychance enters the visual field it tends to remain there. It evenhappens that the child postpones sucking the grasped object
through pure visual interest (Obs. 68 and 70). In short, there is abeginning of true coordination that is to say, of reciprocal
adaptation. The hand tends to conserve and repeat the movements that the eye looks at, just as the eye tends to look at everything the hand does. In other words the hand tends to assimilate
to its schemata the visual realm just as the eye assimilates to Its

schemata the manual realm. Henceforth when the child perceives
certain visual images (sees the fingers move, the hands hold an
object, etc.) this is enough to make his hand tend to conserve
them through reproductive assimilation to the extent that theseimages are assimilated to manual schemata.

How is this reciprocal assimilation to be explained? Weunderstand the meaning of the assimilation of the motor realm
by the visual schemata, since the hand and its movements can beseen and watched. But what does the assimilation of the visualby the manual mean? In what follows this will be tantamount toTHE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

107

saying that the hand tries to grasp everything that the eye sees.
But this coordination will only be exactly produced later, during
the fourth or fifth stage. For the time being the manual schemata
only assimilate the visual realm to the extent that the hand conserves and reproduces what the eyes see of it. Now how is thispossible? Associationism simply responds: the visual image of thehand, through being associated to the movements of this hand,acquires by transfer the value of a signal and governs sooner orlater these very movements. Concerning the fact, as such, of thisassociative transfer, everyone

isof course in agreement. Every

accommodation involves putting into relationship known quantities imposed by experience, and the child discovers the connection
between the visual image of the hands and their movements
quite a while before attributing this image and the corresponding kinesthetic. impressions to a unique and substantial "object."
But the problem is to find out whether this relation between thevisual and the motor is established by "association." On the contrary, we place in opposition to

the passive concept of association
the active concept of assimilation. That which is fundamental andwithout which no relationship between sight and hand movements could be established is that the hand's activity constitutes
schemata which tend to conserve and reproduce themselves(opening and closing, grasping bodies and holding them, etc.).
Through the very fact of this tendency toward conservation suchin itself every reality capable of supporting
activity incorporates

This explains why the hand grasps that which it encounters,
Now comes the moment when the child looks at his handwhich is moving. On the one hand, he is led, by visual interest,

it.

etc.

to make this spectacle lastthat is to say, not to take his eyes off

his hand; on the other hand, he is led, by kinesthetic and motor
interest, to make this manual activity last. It is then that the co-ordination of the two schemata operates, not by association, but

by reciprocal assimilation. The child discovers that in moving
his hand in a certain way (more slowly, etc.) he conserves thisto his glanceinteresting image for his sight. Just as he assimilates
the movement of his hands, so also he assimilates to his manual
He moves with his hands
activity the corresponding visual image.
the image he contemplates just as he looks with his eyes at the

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

108

movement he produces. Whereas until now only tactile objects
served as aliments for the manual schemata, visual images now
become material for exercises of the hands. It is in this sense thatthey may be called "assimilated" to the sensorimotor activity of
the arms and hands. This assimilation is not yet an identification:
the visual hand is not yet a tactile-motor hand. But the substantial
identification will result from assimilation as the geometric point

The intersection of the assimilating acdefine the object, in proportion as these activities
applied to the outside world will constitute causality.
of the crossing of lines.
tivities will

An excellent illustration of this process is supplied by Observations 73

and 74. After watching his hands join for several
Laurent manages to grasp a privileged object as

days, at 0;3 (3)represented by my hand. How can this precocious prehension be
explained, if not precisely as being due to the fact that this visual

image of my hand is assimilated to the visual image of his hands,
and that this latter image is already incorporated in the schemaof joining the hands. 14 Here we see at work, in the most definite
way, the play of assimilation in its dual reproductive and recognitory character. If the coordination of vision and prehension

were a matter of pure physiological maturation of the nervous
system, the differences in dates of acquisitions as revealed bythree normal children such as Jacqueline, Lucienne and Laurent

could not be understood.

On the other hand, by following indetail Laurent's psychomotor assimilations (the use of the cycle
it may be thought strange that we should assert withregard to Observation 74 that at 0;3 (3) Laurent manages to assimilate my hand to his,
despite differences in size and position. But a good reason impels us to thisi*interpretation. Beginning 0;3 (4) I have been able to establish that Laurent
imitates my hand movements; he separates, then joins his hands in responseto(8),

my suggestions. This imitative reaction recurred at 0;S (5), 0;3 (6), at 0;S
at Q;3 (23), etc. Now if there is imitation of such a movement, to the ex-clusion of so many others, it is obvious that there is assimilation.

That thisentirely synthetic, without objective identification, is evident;
it does not
yet involve either the distinguishing of another's body and his own

assimilationisbody or the concept of permanent and comparable objects grouped in categories, and it is doubtless even based upon a confusion rather than an actual
comparison. But no more than this is needed to enable us to speak of assimi-

which is the source of imitation as it is of recognition,an earlier mechanism than objective comparison and, in this sense, there
is no obstacle toasserting that a 3-month-old child can assimilate another's
hand to his own.
lation. Assimilation,isTHE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

109

to the joining of the hands, the assimilation to this schema of thevisual image of the hands and finally the assimilation of my handto his hands) the reason for his precocity may be understood.
The same applies to the still more complex example of as-

similation of the visual to the manual furnished by observation
76. At 0;4 (4) Lucienne sucks her hand while looking at mine. Be-fore that time Lucienne has already coordinated the grasping ofobjects to sucking movements. She carries to her mouth everything that she grasps, regardless of the visual field. In addition she
visually recognizes the objects she sucks or is going to suck andthus a coordination between vision and sucking is establishedwhich we have analyzed in connection with thelatter. Now,among these objects the hand plays a central role, since Lucienne
is visuallyacquainted with it at about two months, that she knows

how to suck from a still earlier date and knows how to carry her
hand to her mouth after having looked at it. There exists, therefore, as far as thethree schemata

hand is concerned, a conjunction of at leastsucking, vision, andmotor activity to the ex-clusion of actual prehension. Lucienne looks at my hand; herreaction is to suck it immediately and perhaps to move it. But,
either she confuses

itat first with her

own and then sucks herown, or else, what is more likely, she has the impression, due toglobal assimilation, of an object capable of being carried to themouth more easily than the others, and, not knowing how tograsp what she sees, it is her own hand that she brings between
her lips. In this second case, there was only semiconfusion; but
in both cases the visual image of my hand is assimilated to thesimultaneously visual, motor, and buccal schema of her own hand.
Regardless of these last examples, the coordination between
visionand hand movements until the present only affect thelatter to the exclusion of prehension.

In other words, except inObservations 74 and 76, the child still only grasps objects when
he touches them by chance, and, if he looks at his hands when they
are holding the object, vision does not yet help at all in theactual act of grasping. During the fourth and fifth stage, thecoordination between vision and hand movements will be ex-tended until it arrives at actual prehension.

The fourth stage is that during which there is prehension as

110

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

soon as the child simultaneously perceives his hand and the desired object. I have been able to observe, In effect, in the mostdefinite way with respect tomy three children that the grasping

to beof objects which have simply been looked at only begins
hand
the
are
and
the
which
in
cases
in
come systematic
objectvisual field.
same
the
in
perceived

Observation 7 7. -At 0;6 (0) Jacqueline looks at my watch which Is 10
cm. from her eyes. She reveals a lively interest and her hands flutter as
however discovering the rightthough she were about to grasp, without
her being ableherdirection. I place the watch inright hand without
the watch
to see how (the arm being outstretched). Then I again put
before her eyes. Her hands, apparently excited by the contact justto move through space and meet violently,
experienced, then proceed
hand happens to strike the watch:subsequently to separate. The rightthe watchtotries
adjust her hand toand^thus
Jacqueline immediately
three times: it is almanages to grasp it. The experiment is repeatedsame time as the watch that theways when the hand Is perceived at thenext day, at 0;6 (1) I resume theattempts become systematic.-The
her eyes Jacqueline does not atexperiment. When the watch is before
it although she reveals a lively interest in this object.
to
grasp
tempt
When the watch is near her hand and she happens to touch It, or it isseen at the same time as her hand, then there is searching, and searchingdirected by the glance. Near the eyes and far from the hands, the watch
but do not apis again simply contemplated. The hands move a little
I again place the object near her hand: immediateother.
each
proacha third time a few centisearching and again, success. I put the watch
these move In all direchands:
her
from
far
and
her
from
meterseyes
still twotions but without approaching each other. In short, there areIt
Is onlyvisual.
and
the
other
kinesthetic
one
forworldsJacqueline,
when the object is seen next to the hand that the latter is directed
toward it and manages to grasp it. That evening, the same experimentswith various solid objects. Again and very regularly, when Jacquelinesees the object facing her without perceiving her hands, nothing hapof object and of hand (right orpens, whereas the simultaneous sightinmotion.
Finally it is to be noted that, that day,left) sets prehension
withwatchedgreat interest her empty hand crossing
again
Jacqueline
the visual field: The hand is still not felt to belong to her.

Observation 78.

Lucienne, at 0;4 (12) looks attentively at her mother's

hand while taking the breast. She then moves her own hand while lookher own hand. Her glance thening at her mother's. Then she perceives
between the aforementioned hands. Finally she grasps hermother's hand.The same day, In the same situation, Lucienne again
her mother's hands. She then lets go the breast to stare atoscillates

perceives

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

111

hand while moving her lips andtongue. Then she puts forward
her own hand in the direction of the maternal hand andsuddenly, sheputs her own between her lips, sucks it a moment and takes it out, thethiswhile looking at her mother's hand. There ensues a reaction
analogous
to that of Observation 65. As she did a weekearlier, Lucienne sucks
her own hand out of confusion with the hand she
perceives. But thistime the confusion does not last; after
having removed her hand rom
between her lips she moves it about at random,haphazardly touches
her mother's hand and
immediately grasps it. Then, while watching
this spectacle most attentively, she lets
go the hand she was holding,looks alternately at her own hand and the other one,again puts her
hand in her mouth, then removes it while
the wholetime her mother's hand and finallya long moment.

contemplating
grasping it and not letting it go for

Observation 75>.-Lucienne, at 0;4 (15) looks at a rattle withdesire, but
without extending her hand. I place the rattle near her
right hand. As
soon as Lucienne sees rattle and hand
she moves her hand
together,closer to the rattle and finallyA

moment later she is engaged
grasps it.
in looking at her hand. I thenput the rattle aside; Lucienne looks atit,then directs her eyes to her hand, then to the rattle
again, after

which she slowly moves her hand toward the rattle. As soon as shetouches it, there is an attempt to grasp it andfinally, success. After
this I remove the rattle. Lucienne then looks at her hand. I
put therattle aside. She looks alternately at her hand and at the
rattle, thenmoves her hand. The latter happens to leave the visual field. Lucienne
then grasps a coverlet which she moves toward her mouth. After thisher hand goes away haphazardly. As soon as it reappears in the visual
field, Lucienne stares at it and then immediately looks at the rattle
which has remained motionless. She then looks alternately at hand andrattle after which her hand approaches andgrasps it.

Observation 80. The same day progress is revealed after the facts
related in Observation 65 (taking the rattle placed against themouth).

above Lucienne's face. The immediate reaction consistsin trying to suck it; she opens her mouth, makes sucking-like movements,
pulls her tongue, pants with desire. Thereupon her hands approach
her mouth and seem to stretch toward the object. As soon as therighthand is seen, it directs itself toward the rattle and grasps it. It is therefore the desire to suck the object which set the hand in motion; thereinisprogress toward the fifth stage .I then place the rattle higher up.
Same expression of buccal drive. The hand tries to grasp, in space. As
soon as Lucienne perceives her hand she looks alternately at the rattle
and at her hand, then tries to grasp, which she achieves after somegroping. At 0;4 (19) same reactions with my finger: she makes suckingI put the rattle

112
like

ELEMENTARY 5ENSORIMOTOR A0APTAT1GNS
movements while looking at it, then moves her hand toward her

mouth and when she sees the hand, grasps.
Observation 81. At 0;3 (6) that is to say following Observation 73
and 74 Laurent looks at my watch which I hold not in front of his
face, but to his right. This spectacle sets in motion activity of both
hands, but not a joining movement. The right hand remains in thezone of the watch, as though he were searching for it. As soon as
Laurent sees watch and hand together, he grasps! The hand was welloriented, open, with the thumb opposite, A moment later, I present
a cloth doll on the left side. The reaction is the same; Laurent looks
at the doll, then perceives his left hand, looks at it, then his eyes
return to the doll. He then grasps it, carries it to his mouth and sucks it.

That evening, an essential observation. Laurent's hands are outstretched and he looks ahead of him, wide awake. I present to him thecustomary objects (rattle, cloth doll, package of tobacco, etc.): he grasps
nothing and looks at them as though he knew nothing whatever about
grasping. Thereupon 1 place my motionless hand in front of his face,in the same place as the objects: he grasps it immediately; my hand isbarely in position when his hands move and with one motion seize myhand. It seems that, through lack of seeing a hand, Laurent did nothave the idea of grasping the objects presented at first, arid that thesight of my hand (in its role of hand and not of object) immediately
stimulated his schema of prehension.
A little later I present to Laurent a cloth doll (on the left side):
he looks at it attentively without moving his hand (except for a few
vague movements). But, as soon as he sees his hand (I observe his glancethrough the hood of the bassinet), he grasps. Same experiment with thecustomary series of objects and same reactions.
Observation 82, At 0;3
his
first

the following day, Laurent is motionless,(7),
hands outstretched, engaged in babbling, when I begin the day's

experiment. I present tohim on the left side (without showing

myself) a roll of tinfoil (to him an unfamiliar object). Three definite
reactions succeed one another. In the first place, his hands immediately

move, open and tend to approach one another. Meanwhile Laurent
looks at the object without looking at his hands. His left hand passes
near the paper, very slowly, but instead of bifurcating in the directionof the object, it pursues its trajectory toward the other hand whichcomes to meet it. The hands then meet while Laurent continues to lookat the object. The sight of the object has therefore set in motion thecycle of the functioning of the hands, without modifications. In thesecond place, while Laurent's hands are joined, I put the tinfoil op-

posite him. He looks at it but does not react at all. In the third place,put the paper in the same visual field as his hands. He then looks atI

his hands, losing sight of the object for a moment, thenagain looks at

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

USthe object; then he separates his hands and directs them toward theobject which he manages to grasp. The simultaneous viewing of hands
and object is therefore still necessary for prehension.
The next day, same observations, in the morning. In the afternoon
I present one of his rattles to Laurent; when the rattle is in the trajectory of his hands, he grasps it immediately. Otherwise he looks alternately at his hand and the object. In particular, when I place the rattle
on his quilt, before his face at a distance of about 10 cm., he looks at

length at his hand and the rattle before attempting to grasp; his handremains 5 cm. from the rattle. Then at last he makes an attempt andsucceeds.

Same reaction for two more days, then Laurent enters the fifth
stage.

Observation 83. During this fourth stage I was able to observe inLaurent a beginning of the reciprocal relation between vision andactual prehension. But it is only a beginning. At 0;3 (7) when he has
succeeded in grasping the tinfoil, Laurent lets it go soon after (withhis left hand). He then turns his head to look at his empty hand. Sameobservation a moment later. I then hold each of his hands in succession, outside the visual field, to see whether he takes notice of the position. In seven attempts Laurent succeeds twice on the left side, but not
at all on the right. Then I place an object in his right hand (tinfoil).
He at once carries it to his rnouth. But, before introducing it between
his lips, he perceived it and then maintains it in his visual field.
At 0;3 (8) after the experiment with the rattle (Obs. 82) he loses
it on the right side (but he has let it go with his left hand while he wasshaking it from side to side). Laurent then looks four or five times insuccession at his empty left hand. He even shakes his hand very
markedly, at a certain moment, as though this shaking would start thesound of the rattle! Regardless of this last point, in any case he marks
with his glance the position of his hand.

The importance of this fourth stage Is evident. Henceforth
the child grasps the objects which he sees, and not only those hetouches or those he sucks. It is thus the beginning of the essential
coordination which will aid prehension. The only limitation
which still exists and which thus makes the fourth stage standin the way of the fifth is that the child only tries to grasp thesame visualobjects seen to the extent that he perceives, in theexaminfrom
as
is
It
is
his
hand.
own
even,
field,
clearly apparent
and
hand
of
the
simultaneousthefacts,
object which
sight
ing

induces the child to grasp; neither the sight of the object nor of
the hand alone leads to this result. It might appear that an ex-

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

114

Lucienne tries to
ceptlon should be made of Observation 80.
tosuck. But the exwants
that
she
the
or
rattlethefingergrasp
is only ostensible. Either Lucienne simply brings her
ceptionhand to her mouth and it is on seeing it that she tends to grasp
the object, or else from the outset it is in order to grasp that she
the behavior patterns recorded in Observation

simply prolongs
65 (grasping objects placed against her mouth) which was revealed several minutes before those of Observation 80 which is inquestion.

How can we explain this tendency to grasp objects when
the hand? It is poswaver between two extreme solutions: the associativetransfer and the Gestalt. Concerning associationism, as the sightof the hand holding the object has been associated to the act of

they are perceived in the same visual field assible toat a given moment,
grasping a certain number of times, it suffices,
for the hand and the object to be visually perceived separately
but simultaneously, in order that this perception may set pre-hension in motion. But, as we have already seen with regard to
the third stage, such an explanation overlooks the element ofactivity peculiar to such establishing of relationships. The visual

image of the hand is not only a signal which sets prehension in
motion; it constitutes, with the grasping movements a total
schema, in the same way that, during the third stage, the visual
schemata of the hand are coordinated with the motor schemata
other than that of prehension. Is it then necessary to speak of
Gestalt and to say that the simultaneous sight of the hands andof the object causes a "structure" to appear which neither thesight of the hands nor of the object was sufficient to give rise to?

About the fact itself we are certainly in agreement, and Observations 77-83 may be compared to those of W. Kohler according towhich the monkey uses the cane when he perceives it at the sametime as the objects to be drawn to him and not when the cane has
been seen outside of the same visual field. Only it must be notedthat this "structure" did not appear suddenly, but in close relation to a whole series of earlier searchings and of coordinations
between sight and hand movements. Once the child has learned,
during the third stage, to conserve and reproduce by means of
movements of the hand that which the eye has been able to seeTHE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS
of these115

same movements, he becomes able tograsp under the
influence of the glance. In other words, it is not so much the new"structure" which is of importance here as theprocess leading tothis structure. This is why we speak of active assimilation.

Actually, once the visual schemata and the sensorimotor
schemata of the hand have been mutually assimilated
during thethird stage (the eye looks at the hand just as the hand

reproduces

those of its movements which the eye sees), this kind of coordination is applied sooner or later to the very act ofgrasping. Look-

ing at the hand which grasps an object, the child tries, with thehand, to maintain the spectacle which the eye contemplates aswell as continuing, with his eye, to look at what his hand isdoing. Once this double schema has been constituted, it is selfevident that the child will try to grasp an object while he looks
at the same time at his hand when he is not yet capable of thisbehavior when he does not see his hand. Grasping the object
when he sees the object and the hand at the same time is therefore, for the child,simply assimilating the sight of the hand tothe visual and motor schema of the act consisting in "looking at

grasping."

Proof that this act of "looking at grasping" simply condouble schema of assimilation and not a "structure"

stitutes a

independent of the effort and progressive activity of the subject
is that this act was revealed at 0;3 (6) by Laurent, at 0;4(12 to 15)
andatLucienne
that
to
is
0;6
by
(0-1) by Jacqueline
say, witha distance of nearly three months between the extremes. Now
this difference between one child and another is explained by
the whole history of their ocular-manual coordinations. Lucienne
looked at her fingers since 0;2 (3), Laurent since 0;2 (4) whereas
Jacqueline waited until 0;2 (30) and 0;3 (0), etc. However, nothing justifies us in considering Jacqueline retarded in relation to
Lucienne. The explanation is very simple: Jacqueline, born
January 9th and spending her days outdoors on a balcony, wasmuch less active in the beginning than Lucienne and Laurent,
born in June and in May. Furthermore and by virtue of thisvery fact, I made many fewer experiments on her during the firstmonths, whereas I was constantly busy with Laurent. Regarding
the latter, his precocity can be explained, as we have seen, first by

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS
the fact that he sucked his fingers much earlier than the others

116

and chiefly by the fact that(partly because of my experiments),
this finger sucking gave rise to a very firm schema, that of joining
the hands (Obs. 59). Constantly joining his hands, he applied
himself to watching them function (Obs.

73).

Once accustomed

hands throughspectacle, he precociously grasped niy
assimilation with his own (Obs. 74), and he thus arrived quite
he only grasps objects,
naturally at grasping objects (see Obs. 81:
to

this

at a given moment, after having seen and grasped my hand). It
seems therefore that the appearance of the essential coordinations
between sight and grasping depends upon the whole psychologicalhistory of the subject and not on structures determined by aninevitable physiological unfolding. It is therefore the history, theassimilating process itself, which is of the essence and not theisolated "structure" of this history. It even appears as though acertain chance intervenes in the child's discoveries

and the as-thus moresimilating activity which
the
case
be.
or less slowed down or accelerated, as
may
During the fifth stage, at last, the child grasps that which heutilizes these discoveries issees

without limitations relating to the position of the hand. 15First here are the facts:

Observation 84. At 0;6 (3) that is to say, three days after the beginningof the fourth stage Jacqueline, at the outset, grasped pencils, fingers,
neckties, watches, etc., which I present to her at a distance of about 10
cm. from her eyes, regardless of whether or not her hands are visible.

The same day Jacqueline brings before her eyes theinto
her hand outside the visual field (pencils, etc-). This
put

Observation 55.
objects I

reaction is new and did not appear on the previous days.

Observation 86. Finally, the same day, Jacqueline instantaneously
looks in the right direction when I hold her hand outside the visual
field. This too is new (see Obs, 72). These three behavior patterns whichappeared simultaneously (grasping what one sees, carrying the objects
to the eyes, and looking at the hand which is being held) were maintained and established the following days.

Observation 87. Lucienne, at 0,*4 (20), looks at my finger and opens
her mouth in order to suck. Meanwhile her right hand touches mine,is See in this connection H. Hetzer, with H. H. Beaumont and E. Wiehemeyer, Das Schauen und Greifen des Kindes, Zeitschr, f. PsychoL, 113, 1929,
p. 239 (see in particular pp. 257 and 262-263).

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

117

feels it and climbs little by little toward the finger, while her glance islowered and looks for the hand. This coordination of the directionof the glance with a gesture made by the hand outside the visual field
is new in connection with the fourthstage and presages the fifth stage.
So also, a moment later, Lucienne looks at a rattle located above herface. Without seeing her hand, she raises it toward the rattle. As soon
as she perceives the hand, prehension follows (left hand). When therattle is higher, Lucienne wavers between putting her hands in her

mouth and trying to grasp. The sight of the hand stimulates prehension.
At 0;4 (21) in the same situation, Lucienne brings her hand at once into
the visualgrasps.

field,

looks alternately at thishand and at the rattle andWhen I place the rattle higher up, on the other hand, shegesticulates without bringing the hand nearer and it is necessary forher to have perceived the hand for her to attempt to grasp the object.

When the rattle is lower down, the hand is then brought into the visualand then the simultaneoussight of hand and object induceswhentherattleis
Likewise,grasping.
high up, but Lucienne has justtouched it (without seeing it), she tries to grasp while steering her handin the right direction. All these facts, therefore, indicate an interfield

mediary behavior pattern between the fourth and the fifth stage. Sightof the hand remains adjuvant to prehension, but sight of the object
suffices to bring the hand into the visual field.

Beginning at 0;4 (26), on the other hand, it seems thattheofobject at once sets prehension in motion in the case ofsight
Lucienne; all the day's attempts are positive. At 0;4 (28) she seems at
first to have regressed; simultaneous sight of hand and object is necessary, at the beginning of the day. But that evening she immediately
Observation ##.

tries to grasp what she sees. For instance, I place my slide rule above
her eyes. She looks for a moment at this unfamiliar object, then both
her hands simultaneously direct themselves toward it. From 0;5'(1)there is no longer any hesitation; Lucienne attempts to grasp everything she sees.

Observation #. At 0;5 (1) also, Lucienne immediately brings to herofeyes the object she grasps or which is placed in her hands, regardlessthe visual field. Then she sometimes sucks the object, but not always.
It is only on an average of 3 out of 10 times that she sucked before
looking. Furthermore, at the moment that she brings the object toward
the visual field she expects to see something and searches with her
glance even before seeing.

Observation #0. At 0;5 (1) Lucienne looks in the direction of her handwhich is being held. For example, I clasp her right hand while she
looks to the left; she immediately turns in the right direction. Until
moment later, I
now such an experiment yielded negative results.
athevisual
hand
her
left
in
bulky object (afield)(outside
place

AELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

118

tries to grasp but which I retain. She
gourd), which she immediately
even though her ami is outstretched
this
for
hand,
looks
then definitely
beside her body and thus her hand is hard to see.
At 0;5 (18), Lucienne corroborates these last acquisitions: taking
what she sees, bringing the object before her eyes when she has grasped
it outside the visual field, and looking in the direction of the handwhich is being held.

Observation 91. At 0;3 (11) Laurent is pulling toward himself sheets,
covers, etc., to suck them (he does this a part of each day since he has
I hold out directly in front of him alearned how to grasp).
it immediately, without looking at hisof tobacco, he

Whengraspspackagehand. Same reaction with an eraser. At 0;3 (12) under the same conditions he grasps my watch chain which is on his left and outside theof the joining of his hands. That evening, same reaction withtrajectory
thischain and with a roll of cardboard. At 0;3 (13) he immediately
hold out to him. He does not look at his hands

grasps a case which I
or attempt to join them but at once directs the right hand toward thecase. When he has grasped it, he does not suck, but examines it.

Observation 92. At 0;3 (12) when I put a key in his hand, outside thevisual field, he carries it to his mouth and not to his eyes. But he is very
hours have elapsed since his last meal). That evening same

hungry (fivereaction with the case with which he is familiar but, when I place mywatch chain in his hand, he looks at it before attempting to suck it.
The next day he swings a hanging chain in order to move his
rattle (see below, Obs. 98).
twice he looks at his hand

He has grasped it without looking at it, butwhile it is holding the chain. In the sameball before sucking it and fromway, he rolls part of his sheet into atime to time he looks at what he is doing (with both his hands).
At 0;3 (13) likewise, while he still holds in his left hand the casewhich he grasped (see Obs. 91) and looks straight at me, I slip into his
chain rolled into a knot
right hand without his noticing it, my watch
is outstretched beside him). Then I withdraw and observe
hand
(his

through the hood of the bassinet. He immediately brings the chain
before his eyes (and not to his mouth) and, as he still holds the casein his left hand, he looks alternately at case and chain. At a certain
moment he loses his case. He searches for it (without seeing and stillwith his left hand), then he touches it without succeeding in extricating
it from the folds of the coverlet. A long attempt. As soon as he succeeds in grasping it, he brings it before his eyesl
Observation 93.~~At 0;3 (12) Laurent's left hand is outstretched. I thenhold it outside the visual field: he immediately looks at it. The experiment fails with his right hand, but he seems unnerved. That evening,when I hold his right hand, he looks at it at once.

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

119

We see what comprises the acquisitions belonging to the
fifth

stage

which denote the definitive triumph ofprehension.

The coordination between vision and prehension is now sufficient for each object which meets the eye to give rise to a

grasp-

ing movement even when the hand is not yet perceived in thesame visual field as the object.

How can this final coordination be explained? It can beconceived as being the simple result of the effort of reciprocal
assimilation which the visual and manual schemata have hitherto
revealed. As early as the second stage the glanceattempts to fol-low (hence to assimilate itself) everything that the hand performs.
During the third stage the hand attempts, in return, to reproduce those of its movements which the eye sees; that is to say, as
we have seen, to assimilate the visual realm to the manual
schemata. During the fourth stage this assimilation of the visual

manual is extended to prehension itself when the handappears in the same field of observation as the object to be
grasped. The hand thus takes hold of what the eye observes, justas the eye tends to look at that which the hand grasps. During
to thethe fifth stage reciprocal assimilation is finally complete. All thatisto be seen is also to be grasped and all that is to be grasped isalso to be seen. It is natural that the hand should seek to grasp

everything that the eye looks at, since the behavior patterns
characteristic of the fourth stage have taught the child that thiswas possible when the hand is perceived at the same time as theobject. The behavior belonging to the fifth stage is in this respect
only a generalization of the coordinations belonging to thefourth stage. With regard to looking at everything that is grasped,that this tendency appears precisely at the sametime as the complementary tendency. Observations 85 and 89
show that Jacqueline at 0;6 (3) and Lucienne at 0;5 (1) bring to
it is remarkable

their eyes that which they grasp, on the very date when they
begin to grasp systematically what they see. The same day theyalso tend to look at their hand when it is held outside the visual

86 and 90). Such facts adequately demonstrate howmuch the coordination of vision and prehension is a matter offield (Obs.

reciprocal assimilationsociative transfer.

and not of simple and irreversible as-

120

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS
In conclusion, the conquest of prehension, while much more

complex than that of sucking and the other elementary acquired
have observed of the latter. All
adaptations, confirms what weof a complementary accommodation and assimilation and is itself correlative to aninternal and external organization of the adaptational systems.
In the realm of prehension, the accommodation of the hand tothe object is what has chiefly held writers' attention. Pure reflex

adaptation is a putting in equilibrium

an apprenticeshipbeginnings, it subsequently involves
and themovements
hand
of
the
which
accomplishment
duringof the thumb are on a par with the coordination of

in

its

opposing

these movements as a function of sucking and of the tactile andvisual characteristics of the object. This aspect of the questionof the conis
important, particularly in regard to the elaborationof the real to the
cept of space. With respect to the assimilation
towhat we have
thisschemata,
develops analogously
grasping
seen in the other realms. The child begins by moving his handfor the sake of moving it, to grasp for the sake of grasping,andhold for the sake of holding, without any interest in the objects
themselves. This purely functional or reproductive assimilationis(assimilation through simple repetition)
the reflex stage and of the second stage.

proceed fromthisseen in the course of

How will the subject

purely functional interest (denoting anele-mentary assimilation of the real to the activity) to an interest in
the objects grasped? Through a dual process of complication of
assimilation and coordination among the sensorimotor schemata.

As far as an assimilation itself is concerned, it becomes complicatedthrough generalization. In the beginning the nursling

immobile objects of a certain conwhichcomein contact with the palm of the hand or thesistency
limits himself to grasping

inside of the fingers; then through very repetition of the act ofprehension he applies the same schemata to objects of various
consistencies,

animated by different movements and which thehand approaches

in different ways. There exists, therefore,"generalizing" assimilation and through that very thing, theconstitution of differentiated schemata, that is to say, "recogni-

tory" assimilation. But the manifestations of the latter are lessclear in the realm ofthan in that ofprehension

sight, hearing,THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS
etc.,

121

because prehension is too quickly subordinated to external

ends, such as sucking or sight. Nevertheless tactile recognition
exists as revealed by the different ways in which a childgrasps ahandkerchief or a pencil, for example: from the first contacts
the accommodation is different. This diversification of schemata

during which generalizing and recognitory assimilation are ona par with the progress of accommodation explains in part how
interest in the objects grasped follows purely functional interest.

But it is chiefly the coordination of prehension with sucking andvision that accounts for the progressive objectifying of the universe in its relations to the activity of the hands.

Here we reach the organization of the grasping schemata.
These schemata become organized among themselves through thefact that they adapt themselves to the external world. Thus every

act of prehension presupposes an organized totality in which tactile and kinesthetic sensations and arm, hand and finger movements intervene. Hence such schemata constitute "structures" ofa whole, although they were elaborated in the course of a slow
evolution and over a number of attempts, gropings, and corrections. But above all these schemata are organized in coordination
with schemata of another kind, chief of which are those of sucking and of vision. We have seen in what this organization con-a reciprocal adaptation of the schemata in view, natumutual accommodation but also with collateral
with
rally
assimilation. Everything that is looked at or sucked tends to be
to be sucked andgrasped and everything that is grasped tends
then to be looked at. This coordination which crowns the acquisition of prehension also indicates an essential progress in oban object can be simultaneously grasped andjectification. When
sucked or grasped, looked at and sucked, it becomes externalizedsists: it isin relation to the subject quite differently than if it could only
be grasped. In the latter case it is only an aliment for the function
itself and the subject only attempts to grasp through the need tois coordination, on the contrary, thegrasp. As soon as there
to several schemata simultaneously.
object tends to be assimilatedItthus acquires an ensemble of meanings and consequently aconsistency, which endow

itwith interest.

ELEMENTARY SENSOHlMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

122
5.

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS: CONCLU-

SIONS. After having analyzed in detail the first adaptations
which are superimposed on the reflex adaptations, it is appropriate to draw some general conclusion which can subsequentlyof actual intelligence. The behavior patguide us in our study
terns which we have described in the foregoing chapters in effectform the transition between the organic and the intellectual.
cannot yet be described as intelligent behavior patterns

Theybecause intention is lacking (the differentiation between means
and also mobility, which allows adaptation to continue
and
ends)

in

new circumstances. But certain intersensorial coordinations,such as those of prehension with vision, are not far removed fromand already presage intention. On theintelligent connection
other hand, these adaptations can no longer be characterized as

add to the simple reflex an element
purely organic because theyof accommodation and asimilation related to the subject's experience. Itistherefore important to understandhow the be-havior patterns of this second stage prepare intelligence.
the problem which conExpressed in ordinary language,
fronts us here is that of acquired association or habit and therole of these mechanisms in the genesis of intelligence. Sucking

thumb or tongue, following with the eyes moving objects, searchsolid objects to sucking for where sounds come from, graspingor look at them, etc., are the first habits which appear in thehave described their appearance in detail but
human being.

Wethe question may be asked in a general way, what sensorimotor
habit is and how it is constituted. Furthermore, and it is with this

aim that we have studied the first acquired adaptations, it
may be asked in what way habitual association prepares thethe relationships are between these two
intelligence and whatsole

Let us begin with this last point.
types of behavior patterns.
In psychology there has always been a tendency to traceback the active operations of intelligence to the passive mecha-

nisms arising from association or habit. To reduce the causal
link to a matter of habit, to reduce the generalization characto the progressive application of habitual
teristic of theconcept

systems, to reduce judgment to an association,common positions of a certain psychology datingetc.

such are the

from

Hume

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS
123
and Bain. The Idea of the conditioned reflex, which is perhaps
misused today, undoubtedly revives the terms of the problem,
but its application to psychology certainly remains in the prolongation of this tradition.

Habit, too, has always seemed tosome people to be the antithesis of intelligence. Where the second
is active invention, the first remains
passive repetition; where
the second is awareness of the problem and an attempt at comprehension, the first remains tainted with lack of awareness andinertia, etc. The solution we shall give to the question of intelli-gence thus partly depends on that which we shall choose in therealm of habit.

Now at the risk of sacrificing precision to a taste for symmetry, we believe that the solutions between which one may
waver with regard to the relationships between habit and intelligence are five principal ones and that they are parallel to thefive solutions (delineated in ourIntroduction) regarding thegenesis of the morphological reflex structures and their relationship to intelligence. Let us examine these various solutions.

The first consists in asserting that habit is a primary factfrom which, through progressive complication, intelligence isderived. This is the associationist solution and the doctrine ofconditioned reflexes insomuch as the latter attempts to be an
instrument of general explanation in physiology. We have seen
(Introduction, 3) to which Lamarckian attitude this first solution in biology proper corresponds.

The second solution which is on a par with vitalism inbiology and the doctrine of "intelligence faculty" in psychology,
consists in considering habit as being derived, through automatization, from higher operations involving intelligence itself. Thus

to Buytendijk, the formation of habits, in animal psychology,

presupposes something quite different from association: "Notonly are the phenomena much more complicated, but here wesee appear, in the sensitive-motor realm, phenomena which bearconsiderable analogy to the higher process of thought/' 10 This
analogy, according to this writer, rests upon the fact that "thecenter whence emanate all the functions of the soul ...
i

Buytendijk, Psychologic des animaux, Paris, Payot, p. 205.

isan

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

124

immaterial cause, as much, of sensorial activities as of the motor
animal's psychic function." 17
A third and a fourth solution, which are on a par with the(activities) of theand mutation in biology and withandpragmatism would be tantamount to saying that
apriority
habit is absolutely or relatively independent of intelligence andtheories of preformation

in some ways even its opposite. Although this point of view has
not yet been systematically supported with regard to the theoryof habit itself, many indications of it may be found in connection

with intelligence in the work of writers whose chief commonof the intellectual
preoccupation is to emphasize the originality

Thus it is that the Gestalt theory (third solution) radicallyto understanding andopposes the putting into structures fitted
act.

Among the French psyis also very decisive: "Far from necesDelacroixH.
chologists
it seems on the contrary as though it
sarily depending on habit,
with the power to free oneself
connected
were(generalization)
the simple automatism due to habit.

of it. ... Thus, even while asserting the importance of habit asa means of grouping, all generalization remains irreducible to

So also when Clapar&de (fourth solution) describes intelligence to us as a searching arising on the occasion of the defeatsof instinct and of habit, he partially puts the latter in opposition
it/' 18

to the former. 19

A fifth solutionis,finally,

conceivable: thisisto consider

the formation of habits as being due to an activity whose analogies
with intelligence are purely functional, but which will be foundagain at the point of departure of intellectual operations when
the suitable structures will permit it to go beyond its initial
As we understand the very important work of J. M.

structure.

Baldwin, it seems to us that the concept of "circular reaction" isprecisely destined to express the existence of this active factor,
the principle of habit, and at the same time the source of an

adaptational activity which intelligence will prolong by meansof new techniques. It is through being inspired by this kind of
tradition that we have, for our part, interpreted the genesis of.,

pp. 290-291.

is Delacroix, inDuman, TraiU, 1st edition, II, p. 135.

i9Claparde, op. cit. f pp. 137-161.

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

125

the first habits of the nursling in terms of active assimilation andaccommodation. This is not to say that thisadaptational activityof which habit is only an automatization isalready intelligence.
For this it lacks the structural characteristics (intention,systemsof mobility, etc.) whose advent we shall describe in connection
with the following stage. But it does present all the functional
characteristics of intelligence which will arisereflexive progress and a differentiation of thefrom it throughrelationships beplaced intween subject and object more than by simply being

opposition to acquired habits.
Having distinguished these five solutions, let us try to discuss them in the light of the facts
previously established. This
will provide us with an opportunity to state
precisely the meaning of the general concepts of conditioned reflex, associativetransfer, habit, and circular reaction to which we have alluded
criticism, and finally to elaborate upon theofassimilation and organization whichaccommodation,
concepts
will subsequently aid us in analyzing intelligence itself.

without sufficient

The first solution is tantamount to explaining the formationof habits by the hypothesis of training or of passive association.

Do the facts which we have analyzed in the course of

1-4 lend
themselves to such an interpretation? We do not think so. Neither

the physiological concept of the "conditioned reflex" transposed
into psychology without addenda, nor the concept of "associativetransfer" seems adequate to account for the formation of the first

habits which we have described.

As far as the conditioned reflex is concerned it is certain that
thisconcept corresponds to facts which have been well estab-lished in physiology. But are these facts of sufficient importancein that field to support on themselves alone the whole weight ofas some people demand of them today? In thesecond place, assuming that they are utilized in psychology,
should they then be translated into the language of association

psychology,

by the new associationism born of reflexology, or else
have they a quite different meaning? To the first of these two
as desiredquestions we shall reply that the conditioned reflex is essentiallyfragile and unstable if it is not constantly "confirmed" by theexternal environment.

And to the second, we shall reply that,

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

126

to the extent that the conditioned reflex is "confirmed" it ceases
association and is inserted in the more complex
to be asimpleschema of the relationships between need and satisfaction, consethe relationships of assimilation. That the conditioned
quently
reflexisthat is to say, that the results of training are

fragileconfirmed by new training has been
have rethe
physiologists. Moreover, theybythan psychologists in employing
moresoon lost if not constantly

brought

to light

mained much
this concept.

prudent
In order that a conditioned reflex

may becomein effect, necessary either that it cease to be constabilized
becomeandditioned
hereditarily fixed, or else that it be "conit is,firmed" by experience itself. But the hereditary fixing of conditioned reflexes, maintained at first by Pavlov who subsequently
withdrew his assertion, and then by MacDougal, seems im-

seen why in our Introduction. Therefore
probable and we havestabilization
there only remainsby the environment itself andtobackthis brings us
psychology.
A conditioned reflex can be stabilized by expedience when
which sets the reflex in motion is followed by a conthe
signalfirmationthat is to say, a situation in which the reflex has theHence in order to confirm
opportunity to function effectively.
the salivary reflex, the
and
a
sound
betweenthe association
animal is periodically given real food which gives the signal backits first meaning. So also could many of our observations be inconfirmed by experiterpreted in terms of conditioned reflexes
ence. When the nursling makes ready to nurse when in his
mother's arms and then actually finds the breast; when he turns
his head to follow with his eyes a moving object and indeed findsit;when he searches with his eyes for a person whose voice hehas heard and succeeds in discovering his face; when the sight ofan object excites his movements of prehension and he subsequently manages to grasp it, etc.; it might be said that the reflexes of sucking, of visual and auditory accommodation and of
prehension have been conditioned by signals of a postural,visual, etc., nature and that these conditioned reflexes have beenstabilized because of being constantly confirmedby experience
But such a manner of speaking would elude the mainquestion: How does experience confirm an association; in otheritself.

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

127

words, what are the psychological conditions necessary in orderthat success may consolidate a behavior pattern? It is in order toanswer this question that we have invoked combined assimilation
and accommodation and this is why the term pure conditioned
reflex seems to us inadequate.
In effect, when a conditioned reflex is confirmed by exthat isperience, through this very fact it enters a whole schema
to say, it ceases to be isolated and becomes an integral part of areal totality. It is no longer a simple term in the series of acts
leading to satisfaction and it is this satisfaction which becomesthe essential. In effect a series of movements resulting in gratifying a need cannot be interpreted as a juxtaposition of associatedelements: it constitutes a whole that is to say, the terms which

compose it only have meaning in relation to the act which regulates them and to the success of this act. It is because the objects
to the act of grasping
perceived by the child are thus assimilated
that is to say, because they have set in motion the need tothat the hand reaches forgrasp and allow it to be gratified
has been established bean
association
because
not
and
them,

tween a visual image and the reflex of prehension. The latterof a conditioned reflex, is only an
association, in thecapacity
abstraction, only a movement artificially cut in the series itself
which also presupposes an initial need and a final satisfaction.
been
hasby the association of images

explained
long
or of sensations. Today we know that the simplest association

Judgment

in thealready presupposes some activity which participatesofgrasping objects visually
judgment. In the same way the act
a chain of conditioned reflexes.
bebyexplained
may
perceived

But the links will never be coordinated except insomuch as aconfer on the object seen the
single act of assimilation will
meaning of an object to be grasped.
about the conditioned reflexes is all the more
What wesaythat this is already true of the simple reflexesin
acceptablethemselves. It is known to what extent the story of reflexes has
became aware
been renovatedSherrington's fine works.

Webythat the classic reflex arc is an abstraction rather than a reality.
In the living organism, the reflexes form organized totalities andto Graham Brown, amechanisms.

not juxtaposed

According

128

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

rhythmof thewhole always precedes the differentiation inreflexes: "The reflex does not explain the rhythm. In order tounderstand the reflex, the rhythm itself must first be invoked."
And Herrick and Coghill, in studying the embryologkal dethe batrachians, speak ofvelopment of the locomotor reflexes iniswhich
reaction
locomotor
a "total"
subsequently dissociated20 If all this is true of the reflexes themreflex.
aintoparticularselves there is all the more reason to accept it as true of the con-ditioned reflexes. Let us be careful not to make of the conditioned
reflex a new psychological element through whose combinations

we shall reconstruct complex acts, and let us wait until
have defined its

thereal meaning rather than use it inordi-

biologists
and consequently
nately to explain that which is most elementary

most obscure in mental phenomena.
In short, wherever we may speak of conditioned reflexes

we always perceive
being stabilized as the result of experience,
thethat a schema of the whole organizes
parts of the associations.
the nursling seeks the breast when he is in position to nurse,with his eyes, tends to look at the people
follows
If

moving objects
whose voice he hears, grasps objects he perceives, etc, it is because the schemata of sucking, vision, and prehension haveassimilated increasingly numerous realities, through this very
fact endowing them with meaning. Accommodation and assimilation combined, peculiar to each schema, insure its usefulness and coordinate It to the others, and it is the global act ofwhich explainscomplementary assimilation and accommodation
why the relationships of the parts which presuppose the schema
are confirmed by experience. 21

But is that not a completely verbal explanation and would
be clarified if, for the concepts of assimilation andnotthingsaccommodation, the apparently clearer concept of "associativetransfer" were substituted? The concept of the associative trans20 Concerning all these points see Larguier, Introduction & la psychologic,

pp. 126-138.
21 This continuous subordination of the conditioned reflexes to organizedtotalities or global schemata of assimilation is demonstrated experimentally inthe realm of the conditioned motor behavior
by a series of studies

patterns

which M. Andr Rey, Chief of the work at our Institute, is pursuing at thepresent time and which will soon be published.

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

129

fer is more general than that of the conditioned reflex: associa-

tion is involved, no longer only between asignal and some movement. Thus the sight of stairs suffices to set in motion

appropriate

movements of the legs and feet in the subject accustomed toclimbing a staircase, etc. The associative transfer is thus regarded
as the basis of the habit, by the first of the five above-mentioned
solutions. According to this hypothesis our schemata of assimilation would not be anything other than the totalities of associativetransfers whereas, according to us, every associative transfer

pre-supposes a schema of assimilation in order to be constituted. It istherefore fitting to discuss this point closely; only this discussionisable to elucidate the true nature of sensorimotor assimilation

and accommodation.
Let us first distinguish the two principal cases in which theassociative transfer seems to intervene
the associations which areconstituted within the same schema and the associations between

heterogeneous schemata. The criterion of this distinction is thefollowing. When the sensorial movements and elements are associated which do not yet present themselves, by another road,in the isolated state, we shall say that there is a single schema. We
shall say,on the contrary, that coordination between schemata

exists when they are able to function separately in other situations. For example, putting the thumb in the mouth constitutes

a single schema and not a coordination between the sucking
schema and the manual schemata because, at the age at which thechild learns to suck his thumb he knows, it is true, how to sucksomething other than his thumb, but he does not know how toaccomplish in other circumstances, by means of his hand, theaction which he performs in putting it into his mouth (the few
spontaneous movements of the hands which we have noted atabout 1 to 2 months cannot even yet be definitely considered as
independent schemata for it is not certain that they alreadyconstitute circular reactions distinct from impulsive movements).

On the other hand, the behavior pattern consisting in grasping
objects seen (4 to 5 months) may

be cited as an example of co-ordination between heterogeneous schemata, for grasping objects
as the fourth month,independently of sight constitutes, as early
an autonomous schema and looking at objects independently of

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS
from i to 2 months. Hence we see how
prehension is prevalent130

the two cases are different: in the first association appears as constitutive of the schema itself, whereas in the second it superadds
itself to already existing schemata.

The concept of the associativetransfer must therefore be discussed separately in each case.

Concerning the first case, the doctrine of the associative
is tantamount to saying that each of our schemata istransfer

constituted by virtue of a sequence of independent associations.
if the child has acquired the habit of sucking his
Forexample,then seeking the breast when he istongue, then his thumb, andwould
be for the following reasons:
thistoin position
nurse,
certain sensations of lips and tongue having regularly preceded
the movements of the latter, and these movements having led to

the first sensations (contact of theagreeable sucking sensations,
would
become a sort of signal autothe
andlips, etc.)
tongueand leading to the desirable
movements
matically starting tongue
result.

In the same way that certain sensations of empty sucking

have preceded the introduction of the thumb into the mouth asufficient number of times and this has been followed by agreeable
sensations of

thumb sucking, it would suffice for the child to

make sucking-like movements or to have just finished his meal inorder that the sensorial elements peculiar to this situation serve
as a signal and set in motion by association the putting of thethumb into the mouth. Finally if these sensations peculiar to thenursing situation set in motion the search for the breast, it is because they would be associated to these movements in the capacity of a signal regularly preceding them. So also, in the realmof vision, if the glance follows objects it is because, the perceptionof the initial displacements having regularly preceded the movements of the muscles of the eye permitting it to rediscover the
displaced object, this perception would have become a $ignal
regulating the movements of the eye itself: hence there would bein the act of following with the glance, a chain of associativetransfers. Such an interpretation thus applies to everything: it
is not one of the schemata, which we have delineated, which could
not be conceived of as being a combination of associative transfers.

But such a manner of speaking seems to us more convenientTHE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS
181
than precise. The same criticisms can betotheasappliedsociationist explanation thus renovated as can beapplied to thegeneralization of the conditioned reflex. As the essential 'in every

behavior pattern seems to result from an associative transfer,the essential is not the association itself; it is the fact that theassociation leads to a favorable or unfavorable result: without therelationship sui generis existing between this result and thesubject himself, the association would not be consolidated inanything. When the hand is retracted when confronted by fireor the foot is raised at the step of a staircase, theof theprecision

sensorimotor accommodations which constitute these behavior
patterns depends entirely on the meaning which the subject attributes to the flame or to the staircase. It is this active relation-

ship between the subject and the objects that are charged withmeanings which creates the association and not the association

which creates this relationship. So also, when the child sucks his
tongue and his thumb, seeks the breast when he is in nursing
position, follows with his eyes moving objects, etc.; it goes without
saying that such habits presuppose regulated associations be-

tween sensorial elements and movements, but these associative
were only able to be constituted and consolidated
thanks to a fundamental relationship between the activity of thesubject (sucking, vision, etc.) and the sensorial subject endowedwith meanings because of this very activity. It may therefore betransfers

said, in a general way, that if the association of ideas presupposes

judgment instead of constituting it, so also the associative transfer
presupposes a relation sui generis between the act and its result
instead of constituting it.

What, then, is this relation between the act and its objective?
Here intervene the concepts of assimilation, accommodation andorganization, outside of which the associative transfer seems to
us meaningless. The point of departure of all individual activity
is,in effect, one or several reflexes already hereditarily organized.

There are no elementary habits which do not graft themselves

upon reflexes; that is to say, upon an already existing organization,

capable of accommodation to the environment and of asits own functioning. Now,
that is to say where the associative trans-similation of the environment towhere a habit begins

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

132

fers begin to constitute themselves

there may always be observed

combined assimilation and accommodation
between the reflex activity of the subject and the new result
which the nascent habit tends to attain and conserve. It is, in
effect, the relation between the act and its result which alone
this relationship ofpermits the establishing of associative transfers.

Now, suchamakes the interest or
relationship involves assimilation, for whatthemeaning of the new result pursued by the subject is pre-can be assimilated to the reflex activity
upon which the habit information grafts itself: hence the tongue
cisely the fact that it

and thumb are sucked because they serve as aliments for sucking,serve as aliments forobjects are followed by the eye because theytheacts, which alone gives
looking, etc. In short, the result ofto these acts their direction
transfers, sustains,

and thus "confirms" the associativewith the initial reflex schemata, a functional

relation of gratifying need, consequently of assimilation. Besides, and by virtue of that very fact, the assimilation of newanobjects to schemata preformed by the reflexes presupposes
accommodation of these schemata to the situation insomuch as itis new.

Thus it is that in order to suck his tongue and his thumbthe newborn child is obliged to incorporate into the movements

constituting his hereditary sucking schema new movements, discovered in the course of individual experience: pulling the

tongue, bringing the hand to the mouth, etc. It is precisely thisincorporation of movements and of sensorial elements into theschemata which have already been constituted that is called inassociationist terminology conditioned reflex or associative trans-

Only this accommodation is inseparable from assimilationand in this resides the fact that it is much more than an association. It is an insertion of new sensorimotor elements into a
totality which has already been organized, which totality constitutes precisely the schema of assimilation. Hence, in sucking his

fer.

tongue or his fingers, the child incorporates the new sensations
he experiences into those of former sucking (sucking the breast,
therein is assimilation and, at the same time, he insertsetc.)
movements of putting out his tongue or putting his thumb into
his mouth into the already organized totality of sucking movements and this is what constitutes accommodation. It is thisTHE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

138

progressive extension of the total schema that enriches itself

while remaining organized which constitutes accommodation.
That is not "association" but progressive differentiation. Thus

when the child seeks the breast when he is in nursing position, it
cannot simply be said that the attitudes

peculiar to this position
are henceforth associated toItmust be said that thesucking.
schemaofhasmovements
globalsucking
incorporated into itself
these attitudes and that from this moment
they form a wholewith the schema itself. In short, the associative transfer is only amoment,artificially cut,proceeds byin the act of accommodation, whichfrom an earlier schema and by thedifferentiation

incorporation of new elements into this schema, and not by association; furthermore, thisaccommodation is inseparable fromassimilation, since it presupposes a total schema and this schema

only functions in assimilating to itself new realities. This assimilation alone can explain the satisfaction to which the act leads

and which determines the so-called "associative transfers."
As far as the associations producing themselves within an
identical schema are concerned, it is therefore illusory to speakof associative transfer.

contexture, whichisOnly the result of an act determines its
tantamount to saying, in associationist

terminology, that sanctionisnecessary to consolidate training

and stabilize associations. The relationship between an activity
and its object cannot be dissociated from the assimilation of theobjective result to this activity and of accommodation of theactivity to this result. This being so, it necessarily follows that theactivity proceeds by global schemata of organization and not by
associations. Not only, in effect, does assimilation presuppose such

schemata, but further, it unceasingly reconstitutes their unity.
that is, theIf we now go on to the second possible casecoordination between two separate schemata we do not findmore associative transfers in the pure state. When the child coordinates his hearing with his vision (and tries to see what hehears) or his prehension with sucking and vision, etc., it cannot
be said that this is simple association between a sensorial signal

or(acoustic, visual, or tactile) and the movements of eye, mouth,
hand. In effect, all the reasons previously involved with regard to
the single schemata apply here. The only difference is that in the

134

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

of simple assimilation andpresent case there is no relationshipand thethebetweenaccommodation
activity of the subject
and acassimilation
ratherbut
reciprocal
object of this activity,
schemata.
Betweentwo
betweencommodation
already existing
the coordination of schemata and their internal constitution,a difference of degree and not of quality.
there is therefore

only
In conclusion, the first solution could not account for thefacts which we have analyzed in this chapter, for reasons analo-

Lamarckism fromexplaingous to those which prevent simple
reflex variations and which
ing the hereditary morphologicalitself. In
prevent associationism from exhausting intelligenceandintelsensorimotorofreflexes,
the three realms
acquisitionsof habit or of passive association, leads to aligence, the primacy
of combined assimilaof
factortheorganization, hence
neglect ofand accommodation which is irreducible to automatism.
Habit, as such, is certain only an automatization, but in order
to be constituted it presupposes an activity which goes beyondtionsimple association.

Then is it necessary to adopt the second solution and to
consider, as do vitalism or spiritualistic intellectualism that every

habit is derived from intelligence itself? The preceding remarkson the complementary relationships of assimilation and accommodation which connect the act to its result bring to mind
inBuytendijk's arguments concerning the intelligent finality
animal.
herent in every activity giving rise to habits, even in theMust the conclusion be drawn from this that habit presupposes

intelligence? For our part wewould refrain from going that far.

It seems indisputable, in effect, that the formation of habits pre-cedes all truly intelligent activity. It is functionally, and not fromthe point of view of structure, that the behavior patterns describedin this chapter can be compared to those we shall subsequently
of intelligence itself.
analyze as characterizing the beginnings
Furthermore the workings of assimilation and accommodation do

not necessitate any recourse to finalism or to "immaterial" acto a realism useless to psychology one deduces
tivities. In
yieldingfrom the fact of psychological organization the hypothesis of a
into assimilatory
special force of organization, or one projects
of
an
the
structure
implicit intelligence. Pseudopsychoactivity

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

135

of which one is thus the victim
logical realism
simply springs
from the twofold illusion of philosophical common sense ac-cording to which we can grasp in ourselves our own intellectual
activity as a known datum of internal experience (whence theideas of synthetic ''reason/' of spiritual energy, etc., which extend

the Geist or the "soul" itself) and according to which this given
activity(whencestructurally preformed at the most primitive stages
the ideas of vital force, of a priori reason,isetc.).

Quite

different is the meaning which we would attribute to the concepts
assimilation, and accommodation. Those arefunctional processes and not forces. In other words, these func-of organization,

tions crystallize in sequential structures and never give rise to ana priori structure which the subject would discover directly
within himself. In this respect nothing is more instructive thanthe comparison of the picture of the first infantile activities withthe renowned studies by Maine de Biran. Probably no writer has

observed better than Maine de Biran the contrast between activity

andpassive associations in theindividual's

elementary

and the voice, vision, touchacquisitions. Concerning hearing
other
and
and prehension
manyprimordial functions, Mainede Biran always emphasizes the factors of effort and of active
motive power which are contrary to the passivity of "affective
sensibility" and he concludes the impossibility of an associationistic explanation.

In this respect the concepts of assimilation

and accommodation which we have employed could be conceived
without adding anything, Biran's docBut an obstacle remains, which seems to us tobe the following: Biran's "effort" which is found at all levels ofand explains the "living intelligence" ofpsychological activity

as hypotheses extending,trine of activity.

the adult reflected in the formation of the

firsthabits,istheemanation of a self which apprehends directly in the capacityof substance. It is therefore a force remaining identical to itself
in the course of its history and opposing itself to the environmental forces which it comes to know by their resistance. Quite
such as the analysis of assimilationdifferent is active
adaptation

and accommodation obliges us to conceive it. Neither assimilation nor accommodation is a force which presents itself just as itof imis to consciousness and which furnishes in the capacity

ELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

136

mediate data the experience of a "self and of an external world.

On the contrary, through the very fact that assimilation and accommodation are always on a par, neither the external world nor
the self is ever known independently of the other. The environ-ment is assimilated to the activity of the subject at the same timeas the latter accommodates itself to the former. In other words, itthrough a progressive construction that the concepts of thephysical world and of the internal self will become elaborated asa function of each other, and the processes of assimilation andaccommodation are only instruments of this construction withoutisever representing the actual result of it. Regarding this result, it isalways relative to the construction as such, and besides there
does not exist, at any level, direct experience either of the self orof the external environment. There only exist "interpreted" ex-periences and this is true precisely thanks to this double play ofcorrelative assimilation and accommodation. In short, the organization peculiar to intellectual becoming is not a faculty which
would form intelligence itself nor a force which would form the"self": it is only an operation of which thesequential structural

crystallizations never realize intelligence as such. All themorereason why it is unlikely that the most elementary acquisitions
that is to say the subject's first habits which are under discussion,from the higher intellectual processes
would have it.
deriveasspiritualism

But if habit does not derive from intelligence, without adding anything, it cannot be said, as in the third and the fourth
solution that it does not have, or almost does not have,any
relationships to intellectual activity. If association and habit areconsidered not in their automatized form, but to the extent thatthey become organized at the level at which we have consideredthem in analyzing the facts, it seems indisputable that they reveal
close functional analogies tointelligence. The
of habit as of imitation. Its automaticsame is true, inform is not theprimitive form and the primitive form presupposes a more comeffect,

plex activity than the evolved forms. In the case of habit, thiselementary activity is that of the sensorimotor organizations
whose schemata function in the same way as
itself,intelligencethrough complementary assimilations and accommodations. We

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS
shall see in what follows that there are137

present all the transitions

between these schemata and those of intelligence. Besides, it is
too early to show now in which respect the Gestalt theory has
exaggerated the contrast between the higher structures and themore fluctuating behavior of the elementary stages, and in which
respect the schema of assimilation is to be conceived of as a system of relations less rigid than a Gestalt and itself involving anorganizing activity of which it is only the expression. Let us limit
ourselves to recalling that schemata such as those of sucking
thumb or tongue, grasping seen objects, the coordination of hear-

ing and of vision, etc., never arise ex abrupto but constitute thepoint of arrival of a long effort of gradual assimilation and ac-commodation. It is this effort which foretells intelligence. Besides,

when Delacroix tells us that intellectual generalization is in asense the opposite of habit, that is true of habit which has been

formed and is degenerating in passivity, but that is not certain
concerning the assimilation which is at the point of departure ofthis habit. There is, as we have seen, a generalizing assimilation
which works in the same way as intelligence, through a sequenceof choices and corrections. Even groping, which Clapar&de regards as the characteristic of nascent intelligence is therefore notexcluded from the formation of habits which does not mean thatthe latter are already intelligent, but rather that there is a con-tinuous organizing activity connecting organic adaptation to in-through the intermediary of the most eleschemata.
sensorimotor
mentary
tellectual adaptation

It is therefore the fifth solution which we shall adopt. Asso-

ciation and habit form the automatization of an activity whichfrom itbyfunctionally prepares intelligence while yet differinga more elementary structure. Let us try to state these assertions
the general characteristics
precisely and to do so let us first recallof the stage under consideration, contrasting them to those of
the preceding stage and those of the following one.
In general it may be said that the behavior patterns studiedin
1-4 consist in searchings which prolong reflex activity andwhich are as yet devoid of intention but which lead to new reconsults of which the mere discovery is fortuitous and whose
sensoricombinedfromamechanismtoservation is due
adaptedELEMENTARY SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

138

motor assimilation and accommodation. These behavior patterns
prolong those of the first stage

in that the needs connected withthe reflex (sucking, looking, listening, crying, grasping, etc.) arewithout there yet being needs conmotive
still their

power
only
nected with derived and deferred aims (grasping in order toto purely
throw, in order to swing to and fro, etc.). But, contraryreflex searching, the searching peculiar to the present stage islead to new results. Contrary to thedisplayed in gropings whichthese results are not pursued intentionally.
inThey are therefore the product of chance, but, resembling
of
which
we
behavior
thepatterns
telligent behavior patterns,
are speaking tend, as soon as the result is obtained, to conserve

subsequent

stage,

by correlative assimilation and accommodation.
This conservation of advantageous results obtained bychance is, of course, what Baldwin has called "circular reaction/'
This concept of which we have made use in describing the facts

itseems to us exactly to define the position of the present stage.
Circular reaction involves the discovery and the conservation of
the new, and in that it differs from the pure reflex; but it is anterior to intention, and in that it precedes intelligence. Only,

such a concept requires interpretation. If one limits oneself, as
the "reaction of
frequently done, to explaining repetition byexcess" and tracing, one returns to automatism to account foriswhat is, on the contrary, preeminently active searching. If thechild tends to rediscover an advantageous result, this is not because that is the course of least effort, but on the contrary, it isbecause the result is assimilated to an earlier schema and theThequestion is to accommodate this schema to the new result.
"circular reaction" is, accordingly, only a global concept, embracing in reality two distinct processes. Let us try, in conclusion,
to summarize what we know about these processes.
First there is accommodation. The great novelty inherent inand habit compared to the reflex, is that accommodation begins to be differentiated from assimilation. At
the heart of the reflex, in effect, accommodation mingles withcircular reaction

The use of the reflex is at once pure repetition
to say, assimilation of the object to an already constructedassimilation.
(that isschema) and accurate accommodation to its object. On the otherTHE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

139

hand, from the moment when the sensorimotor schema is applied to new situations and thus dilates to embrace a larger realm,
accommodation and assimilation tend to be differentiated. Take,for example,

thumb sucking. During the reflex stage this be-

havior pattern consisted in a simple, occasional animated application of the sucking schema to a new object but without having
thiscircumstance transform the schema in any way whatever.

The new object was assimilated to the old schema and this generalizing assimilation had no other effect than to exercise the reflex in general; at most it permitted it to discriminate in future

breast sucking from what was not breast sucking. During thepresent stage, on the contrary, application of the sucking schema
to anew object such as the thumb or tongue transforms theschema itself. This transformation constitutes an accommodationand this accommodation is consequently distinct from pure assimilation. In a general way, contact of some schema with a new
reality results,

during the present stage, in a special behavior

pattern, intermediate between that of the reflex and that of intelligence. In the reflex the new is entirely assimilated to the oldand accommodation thus mingles with assimilation; in intellisuch and accommodation isgence, there is interest in the new asconsequently definitely differentiated from assimilation; in the
behavior patterns of the intermediary stage, the new is still onlyof interest to the extent that it can be assimilated to the old, butitalready cracks the old frameworks and thus forces them to anaccommodation partly distinct from assimilation.
How does this accommodation work? We have seen in theabove: not through association, but through differentiation ofan existing schema and insertion of new sensorimotor elements

among those which already form it. In effect, with the reflex activity

a series of already constructed schemata are hereditarily

given and their assimilatory function thus represents an activity
directed toward performance dating from the very beginning ofWhen these schemata are differ-

life and prior to all association.
entiated by accommodation in other words, in physiologicalto a corterminology, when a reflex connection is subordinatedticalconnection and with it forms a new totalityitcannot besaid that a given reaction is simply associated to new signals or

ELEMENTARY SENSOKIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

140

to new movements. It must be said that an activity which has al-

ready been organized from the beginnings is applied to new situations and that the sensorimotor elements connected with these

new situations were comprised in the primitive schema in thus
differentiating it. There is no subordination of the reflex schemato new associations nor inverse subordination. There is continuity ofa single activity with complementary differentiation andinterpretation.

Accommodation, then, presupposes assimilationas,in re-

flective intelligence, empirical association presupposes judgment.
It is this factor of functional assimilation which forms the organ-

izing and totalizing activity insuring the continuity between theschema considered before accommodation and the same schema
after the insertion of new elements due to this accommodation.
What, then, is assimilation?

Assimilation is first of all purely functional that is to say,cumulative repetition and assimilation of the object to the function: sucking for the sake of sucking, looking for the sake of looking, etc. As such psychological assimilation prolongs without adding anything to organic functional assimilation and does not re-quire any special explanation. Then, to the extent that assimilation of the object to the function extends to include increasingly
varied objects, assimilation becomes "generalizing"; that is tosay (as regards the present stage), combines with multiple accommodations. Finally, and through the very fact of this differentiation, assimilation becomes 'Yecognitory"; that is to say, per-ception of objects or more precisely, of sensorial images as afunction oi the multiple activities delineated by the generalizing
assimilation. Therein resides a first principle of exteriorization
which combines with the exteriorization due to the coordination
between heterogeneous schemata.

To describe this assimilation clearly one can do so either
from the point of view of consciousness or from that of behavior.
What can the consciousness of the infant be concerning the
thumb he sucks, the object he looks at, the object he will grasp
after having perceived

it,the sounds he makes, etc.? Stern 22 as-

Stern, Psychologic der frtihen Kindheit bis
jahre, Leipzig, Quelle & Meyer, 1927.

zum sechsten Lebens-

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

141

serts that an impression is
only individualized if it is connectedwith a movement experienced as being active or at least connected with the context of the activity itself. One could, at first,

object to this way of seeing the 2-month-old baby's attention tothings and people (Lucienne, at 0;1 (28) looks at the trees above
her, laughs when people move about in front of her). But, inorder to look, there exists accommodation of the eyes and of thehead and this accommodation is probably experienced as a real
activity much more by the nursling than by us. Mimicry denotes

unceasing effort, tension, expectation, satisfaction or disappointment, etc. Besides, perception is already extended into imitation,
as we shall see later. We therefore fully concede Stern's remark. 23
Now, the following, it seems to us, results from this, from thepoint of view of the states of consciousness concomitant to as-

During the elementary stages of consciousness things
are much less apprehended in their own form than is the casewith the adult or the child who talks. There is not a thumb, asimilation.

hand, a ribbon about to be grasped, etc. There is a variety oftactile, visual, gustatory, etc., images which are not contemplated
but rather operated that is to say, produced and reproduced,
impregnated, so to speak, with the need to be supported or rediscovered. Hence this conclusion which must always be bornein mind in order to avoid the associationist error constantly re-appearing under cover of the law of transfer: the new objects
which are introduced to consciousness have no peculiar andseparate qualities. Either they are at once assimilated to an already existing schema: a thing to suck, to look at, to grasp, etc.
Or else they are vague, nebulous, because of being unassimilable
and then they create an uneasiness whence comes sooner or latera new differentiation of the schemata of assimilation.

From the point of view of behavior, assimilation is revealedin the form of cycles of movements or of acts bringing each othertrue ofalong and closing up again on themselves. This is clearlyisThis
the reflex whose various forms of use we have studied.

again true of circular reaction: the performed act leaves

a vacuum

23 Ch. Btihler, op. cit., adds that the child's interest in a situation culmimoment that actual activity begins to triumph over his diffi-

nates at theculties.

ELEMENTARY SENS0RIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

142

of the same act.
which, in order to be filled, leads to the repetitionoranensemble
of
form
the
cycle of organizedHence there exists
a real need. Each
act
the
that
the
extentgratifies
movements, toactivity

forms a whole. To be sure, the ensemble is not perfectfrom the outset. There is groping in its performance and it isin the course of this groping that it is easy to dissociate the sein order to describe them in terms of asquential movements
the so-called signal which would deterButsociative transfer.
more of an indication in comconstitutes
mine the movements

which tries to gain satisfaction for itparison with an activity
true cause of
self than a trigger starting up movements. The
assimilation.
of
act
total
the
to
is
that
movement is need;say,This is not to say yet that the movement is intentional. Need isthan the vacuum created by thenothing other, for the moment,of the act and, at the beginning, by thepreceding performancechance discovery of an interesting result, interesting because directly assimilable.

In short, the uniting of accommodation and assimilation
exists within eachpresupposes an organization. Organizationeach onerecalled
have
since
it)
schema of assimilation
just
(we
a
elementeachonmeaning
constitutes a real whole, bestowing
there is above all total organization;
relating to this totality. Butthat is to say, coordination among the various schemata of assimilation. Now, as we have seen, this coordination is not formed dif-ferently

from the simple schemata, except only that each one

assimilation. At the point ofcomprises the other, in a reciprocalof needs which attain satisfacdeparture we are in the presencetion separately. The child looks for the sake of looking, grasps
etc. Then there is an accidental coordinationin order tograsp,

between one schema and another (the child looks by chance at
the hand which grasps, etc.) and finally, fixation. How does thisfixation work? It seems at first that this might be by association.
Contact of the hands with an object or of an object with the lips
seems to be the signal which sets in motion the movement of thealso

object to the lips and sucking. But the opposite procedure
The need to suck sets in motion the movement of theispossible.

hand to the mouth, etc- The possibility of the two complemenbut
tary actions shows sufficiently that they form

one unit. All

.

the

THE FIRST ACQUIRED ADAPTATIONS

more reason why this is so when theschemata is reciprocal, when, forhe sees and brings before hiscoordination of theinstance, the childgrasps what *eyes that which he grasps. In short,the conjunction of two
cycles or of two schemata isceived as a new143

totality, self-enclosed.

to be con-There is neither associa-

tion between two

groups of images nor even association between
two needs, but rather the formation of a new needand the organization of earlier needs as a function of this newunity.
It is then, let us remember, that
assimilation becomes objectified and perception is externalized.

A

sensorial image whichat the point of intersection of several currents
of assimilationis, through that very fact, solidified andprojected into a universe where coherence makes its firstisappearance.

In conclusion it may be seen to what extent theactivity ofthis stage, activity from which the first
sensorimotor habits

pro-

ceed,

is

identical,

from the functional

point of view, with thatof intelligence, while

differing from it in structure. Functionallytheaccommodation, assimilation and organization of
speaking,
the first acquired schemata are
altogether comparable to thoseof the mobile schemata of which sensorimotor
intelligence will

make use and even to those of the concepts andrelationships
which reflective intelligence will employ. But, from the structural point of view, the first circular reactions lack intention.
As long as action is entirely determined bydirectly perceived
sensorial images there can be no question of intention. Even

when the child grasps an object in order to suck or look at it,
one cannot infer that there is a conscious purpose. The

goal ofthe action is one with the point of

departure only by virtue ofthe fact of the unity of the schema of coordination. It is with theappearance of secondary and mobile schemata and of deferred reactions that the purpose of the action,
ceasing to be in some way
directly perceived, presupposes a continuity in searching, andconsequently a beginning of intention. But, to be sure, all gradations exist between these evolved forms ofactivity and the primitive forms of which we have spoken hitherto.

PART II
The Intentional Sensorimotor Adaptations

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR
ADAPTATIONS
The coordination of vision and prehension, which we havestudied in Chapter II, inaugurates a new series of behavior patterns:

the intentional adaptations.

Unfortunately, nothingismore difficult to define than intention. Shall it be said, as is frequently done, that an act is intentional when it is determined byrepresentation, contrary to the elementary associations in which
the act is controlled by an external stimulus? But if representation is taken in the strict sense of the word, there would not thenbe intentional acts prior to languagethat is to say, before thefaculty of thinking of reality by means of signs making up the
deficiency of action. Now intelligence presupposes intention. If,

on the other hand, one extends the term representation so thatcomprises all consciousness of meanings, intention would exever since the simplest associations and almost since the beginning of reflex use. Shall it be said that intention is connecteditistwith the power of evoking images and that searching for the
fruit in a closed box, for instance, is an intentional act to theextent that it is determined by the representation of the fruit in
the box? But, as we shall see, it appears according to all probabilities that even this kind of representations, by images andindividual symbols, makes a tardy appearance. The mental image is a product of the internalization of the acts of intelligenceand not a datum preliminary to these acts. Since then we see

only one method of distinguishing intentional adaptation fromthe simple circular reactions peculiar to sensorimotor habit: thisisto invoke thenumber of intermediaries coming between thestimulus of the act and its result. When a 2-month-old baby sucks
his thumb this cannot be called an intentional act because thecoordination of the hand and of sucking is simple and direct. It
therefore suffices for the child to maintain, by circular reaction,
147

148

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

the favorable movements which satisfy his need, in order thatbehavior become habitual. On the other hand, when an

this

8-month-old child sets aside an obstacle in order to attain an objective, it is possible to call this intention, because the need set
in motion by the stimulus of the act (by the object to be grasped)isonly satisfied after a more or less lengthy series of intermediary

acts (the obstacles to be set aside). Intention is thus determinedby consciousness of desire, or of the direction of the act, thisawareness being itself a function of the number of intermediary
actions necessitated by the principal act. In a sense, there is therefore only a difference of degree between the elementary adaptations and the intentional adaptations. The intentional act is only
a more complex totality subsuming the secondary values underthe essential values and subordinating the intermediary movements or means to the principal steps which assign an end to theaction. But, in another sense, intention involves a reversing in
the data of consciousness. There is henceforth the influence ofrecurrent consciousness of direction impressed on the action or

no longer only on its result. Consciousness arises from dis-adaptation and thus proceeds from the periphery to the center.
In practice, we can acknowledge provided we bear in mind
that this division is artificial and that all the transitions connect
the acts of the second stage to those of the thirdthat intentional

adaptation begins as soon as the child transcends the level ofsimple corporal activities (sucking, listening and making sounds,
looking and grasping) and acts upon things and uses the interrelationships of objects. In effect, to the extent that the subject islimited to sucking, looking, listening, grasping, etc., he satisfies
in a more or less direct way his immediate needs, and, if he acts

upon things, it is simply in order to perform his own functions.
In such a case it is hardly possible to speak of ends and means.
The schemata serving as means become mingled with thosewhich assign an end to the action and there is no occasion forthis influence of consciousness sui generis which determines intention. On the contrary, as soon as the subject,possessing the coordinated schemata of prehension, vision, etc., utilizes them inorder to assimilate to himself the totality o his universe, themultiple combinations which then present themselves (by gen-THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

149

eralizing assimilation and accommodation, combined) bring withthem the momentary hierarchies of ends and means; that is tosay, there is the influence of consciousness of the direction of theact or of its intention.

From the theoretical point of view, intention therefore
denotes the extension of the totalities and relationships acquired
during the preceding stage and, by the fact of their extension,
their greater dissociation into real totalities and ideal totalities inrelationships of fact and relationships of value. As soon as there
is intention, in effect, there is agoal to reach and means to use,consequently the influence of consciousness of values (the valueor the interest of the intermediary acts serving as means is subordinated to that of the goal) and of the ideal (the act to be ac-complished is part of an ideal totality or goal, in relation to thereal totality of the acts already organized). Thus it may be seenthat the functional categories related to the function of organization will henceforth become more precise, from the time of the

global schemata of the preceding stage. Concerning the functionsof assimilation and accommodation, intentional adaptation also

brings withita more pronounced differentiation of their re-spective categories, ever since the relatively undifferentiated stateof the first stages. Assimilation, after having proceeded ashitherto, by nearly rigid schemata (the sensorimotor schemata ofsucking, prehension, etc.) will henceforth engender more mobile
schemata, capable of various involvements and in which we shallfind the functional equivalent of the qualitative concepts and of

the quantitative relationships peculiar to reflective intelligence.

With regard to accommodation, by clasping more tightly theexternal universe, it will clarify the space-time relationships aswell as those of substance and causality, hitherto enveloped in
the subject's psycho-organic activity.

In other words, we now arrive at the problem of intelligence
which we shall study with regard to stages III to VI. Hitherto wehave stayed on this side of actual intelligence. During the first
involved.
stage this was self-evident, since pure reflexes were
the
known
it
not
was
secondthehow,despitestage
Concerning
functional resemblances, to identify habit and intelligent adaptation, since it is precisely intention that separates

them. This isTHE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

150

not the place to define this structural difference which analyzing
the facts alone will permit us to fathom and which we shall takeat the conclusion of this book. Let us say only that theup againto the system outsequence of our stages corresponds in the main
lined by Glaparede in a remarkable article on intelligence published in 1917. 1 To Claparede intelligence is an adaptation to
new situations as opposed to reflexes and habitual associations
which also constitute adaptations, either hereditary or due towhich repeat
personal experience, but adaptations to situations
themselves. Now these new situations to which the child willto adapt himself appear precisely when the habitual
schemata, elaborated during the second stage, will be applied forthe first time to the external environment in its complexity.
Furthermore, there may be distinguished, among the in-have

tentional acts which constitute intelligence, two relatively opin the main to what Claparede calls
posite types, corresponding
andsystematic intelligence. The first conempirical intelligencesists

in operations controlled by the things themselvesand notby deduction alone. The second consists in operations controlled'from within by the consciousness of relationships and thus marks
the beginning of deduction. We shall consider the first of thesebehavior patterns as characteristic of the stages III to V and shallmake the appearance of the second behavior patterns the criterionof a sixth stage.

On the other hand, the concept of "empirical intelligence"remains a little vague as long as one does not put into effect, inthe sequence of facts, some divisions intended, not to make discontinuous an actual continuity, but to permit analysis of theincreasing complication of the behavior patterns. This is why weshall distinguish three stages between the beginnings of the action

upon things and those of systematic intelligence: stages III to IV.

The third stage appearing with the prehension of visual objectives is characterized by the appearance of a behavior patternwhich is already almost intentional, in the sense indicated before,
which also foretells empirical intelligence but which neverthelessremains intermediary between the acquired association belonging
to the second stage and the true act of intelligence. This is the1

Republished in Education jonctionnelle, op* dt.

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

151"secondary circular reaction," that Is to say, the behavior which
rediscovering the gestures which by chance exercisedan advantageous action upon things. Such a behavior pattern, in
effect, goes beyond acquired association to the extent that almost

consists in

intentional searching is necessary to
reproduce the movements
until then performed
But
it does not yet constitutefortuitously.

a typical act of intelligence since thissearching simply consists in
that
which
has
been
done and not in inventing
rediscovering
justagain or in applying the known to new circumstances: the"means" are hardly yet differentiated from the "ends" or at least
they are only differentiated after the event, at the time the act isrepeated.
fourth stage begins at around 8 to 9 months and lasts untilA

the end of the first year. It is characterized by the appearance of
certain behavior patterns which are superimposed on the preced-

ing ones and their essence is "the application of known means to
new situations." Such behavior patterns differ from the preceding
ones both in their functional meaning and in their structural

mechanism. From the functional point of view for the first timethey fully correspond to the current definition of intelligence:
adaptation to new circumstances. Given a habitual goal temporarily

thwarted by unforeseen obstacles, the problem is to sur-mount these difficulties. The simplest procedure consists in tryingout different known schemata and in adjusting them to the goalpursued: in this consist the present behavior patterns. From thestructural point of view they therefore constitute a combinationof schemata among themselves, so that some are subordinated toothers in the capacity of "means"; hence two results: a greater
mobility of the schemata and a more accurate accommodation toexternal conditions. If this stage is to be distinguished from thepreceding one with respect to the functioning of intelligence, it
is to be distinguished still more with regard to the structure ofobjects, space and causality: it marks the beginnings of thepermanence of things, of "objective" spatial "groups" and of
spatial and objectified causality.
At the beginning of the second year a fifth stage makes
manifest, characterized by the first real experimentations;hence the possibility of a "discovery of new means through active
itself

152

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

experimentation." This is the impetus of the instrumental behavior patterns and the acme of empirical intelligence.
Finally this totality of the behavior patterns, the applicationof which determines the beginning of the sixth stage, will becrowned by the "invention of new means through mental combination."

CHAPTER III

THE THIRD STAGE:
The "Secondary Circular Reactions" andthe Procedures Destined to Make
Interesting Sights Last

From the simple reflex to the most systematic intelligence,the same method of operation seems to us to continue throughthe stages, thus establishing complete continuity between
increasingly complex structures. But this functional continuity in
no way excludes a transformation of the structures being on anallequal footing with an actual reversal of perspectives in the subject's consciousness. At the beginning of intellectual evolution, in
effect, the act is set in motion all at once and by an external
stimulus and the individual's initiative consisted merely in being
able to reproduce his action when confronted with stimuli

analogous to the normal stimulus, or by simple empty repetition.
At the end of the evolution, on the other hand, every action involves an organization versatile in making dissociations and unlimited regroupings, the subject thus being able to assign tohimself goals which are increasingly independent of instigationby the immediate environment.
How does such a reversal work? Due to the progressive

complication of the schemata: by constantly renewing his acts
through reproductive and generalizing assimilation, the childsurpasses simple reflex use, discovers circular reaction and thus
forms his first habits. Such a process is obviously capable of unlimited extension. After applying it to his own body, the subject
will utilize it sooner or later in order to adapt himself to theunforeseen phenomena of the external world, whence the be153

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

154

havior patterns of exploration, experimentation, etc. Wherefore

andthe possibility, subsequently, of decomposing
recomposing
the same schemata: gradually as the schemata apply themselves
to more varied external situations the subject is, in effect, led todissociate their elements

and to consider them as means or as

ends, while at the same time regrouping them among themselves
It is this distinction of means and ends which
in all sorts ofways.

sets intention free and so reverses the act's direction.

Instead ofthat is to say, toward repetition
being turned toward the past
combinations and actual innew
towardisdirected
the action

vention.

Now the stage which we are about to describe forms exactly
the transition between the behavior patterns of the first type andthose of the second. The "secondary circular reactions" prolong,in effect, without adding anything to, the circular reactions under

examination hitherto; that is to say, they essentially tend toward
the interesting results discovered
repetition. After reproducing
child tries sooner or later to conthe
own
his
body,
by chance on
serve also thosewhich he obtains when his action bears on theexternal environment. It is this very simple transition which
determines the appearance of the "secondary" reactions; acare related to the "primary"cordingly it may be seen how they

But it is necessary immediately to add that, the more
the effort of reproduction bears upon results removed from thoseof reflex activity, the clearer becomes the distinction between
means and ends. To the extent that it is a hereditary assembly
the reflex schema forms an indissociable totality. The repetition
belonging to "reflex use" would only know how to make themachine go by activating it completely without distinction between the transitive terms and the final terms. In the case of thereactions.

(thumb sucking, for example) the complexity
schema augments since an acquired element is inserted
among the reflex movements; repeating the interesting result
therefore will involve a coordination between terms not necessarily united with each other. But, as their union, although an
acquired one, was in a way imposed by the conformation of the
body itself and sanctioned by a strengthening of reflex activity, it
first organic habitsof theis stilleasy for the child to rediscover through simple repetition

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

155

the result obtained

without distinguishing the transitive terms
and the final term of the act. On the other hand, as soon as theresult to be reproduced is connected with the external environment that is to say, with independent
objects (even if theirmutual relationships and their permanence are still unknown tothe child)the effort to rediscover a
propitious gesture will leadthe subject, after the event, todistinguish in his action the transitive terms or "means" and a final term or "end." It is from thistime on that it is possible
toof "intention" and of areallyspeak
reversal in acquiring consciousness of the act. But this reversal
will only be definitive when the different terms will be

sufficiently

dissociated so that they
may recombine among themselves invarious ways; that is to say, when there will be apossibility ofapplying known

means to new ends or, in a word, when anintercoordination of the schemata will exist (fourth stage). The"secondary circular reaction"

simply to reproduce everyis

not yet at thislevel;

ittends

advantageous result obtained in rela-tion to the external environment, without the child's yet dissociating or regrouping the schemata thus obtained. The goalistherefore not set ahead of time, but only when the act is re-

Therein the present stage forms the exact transition
between preintelligent operations and truly intentional acts. The
peated.

behavior patterns which characterize it still owe a great deal torepetition while being superior to it from the point of view ofcomplexity and they already possess intelligent coordination
while remaining inferior to it from the point of view of dissociation of means and ends.

This intermediary characteristic will be found again, as weshall see in Volume II, in all the behavior patterns of the samestage, whether it is a matter of the content of intelligence or ofreal categories (object and space, causality and time) as well as ofitsform (which we shall study).

With regard to the object, for example, the child at thisstage arrives at a behavior pattern exactly intermediary between
those of nonpermanence, belonging to the lower stages, and the

new behavior relating to objects which have disappeared. On the
one hand, in effect, the child knows henceforth how to grasp theand this
objects he sees, bring to sight those he touches, etc.,

THE INTENTIONAL SENSIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

156

coordination between vision and prehension indicates notableof the external world: acting upon
progress in the solidification
he considered them unyielding and permanent to thethings,extent that they prolong his action or thwart it. On the other
hand, to the extent that objects leave the perceptual field anddirect action, the child no longer reacts
consequently, the child'sand does not apply himself to active searching to find them again,
the next stage. If there is permanence of theas he will doduringto the action in progress and not a fact
object it is still relativein itself.
on things byConcerning space, the actions brought to bearaofinresult
third
the
at
child
perception
forming
thestageof schemata of displacements capable ofthat is tosay,"groups";
In this sense, the behavior
returning to their point of departure.
mark
this
important progress in relation to thestage
patterns ofin fixing securely the intercoordination of theones
precedingvarious practical spaces (visual, tactile, buccal spaces, etc.). But

the "groups" thus formed remain "subjective" for, beyond theimmediate action, the child does not yet take into considerationinterrelations oftheCausality, too, takes form toobjects.

spatialthe extent that the child acts

henceforthit

unites certain

upon the external environment:
acts
separate phenomena to thewhich correspond to them. But, precisely because the schemata
dissociated in their elements,

belonging to this stage are not yet
the child only gets a confused and global feeling of the causal
connection and does not know how to objectify or spatialize
causality.

The same is true a fortiori of the temporal series which willlink the different phases of the act but not yet the different eventsin an environment independent of the self.

produced
In short, during the first two stages that is to say, so longas the child's activity consists in mere repetitions without intenthe universe is not yet at all dissociated from the action
tionitself and the categories remain subjective. As soon as theschemata become, on the other hand, capable of intentionalof really indecompositions and recombinations that is to say,the consciousness of the relations thus implitelligent activity
cated by distinguishing means and ends will necessarily bringSECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

157

with it the elaboration of a world independent of the self. From
this point of view of the contents of intelligence, the third stage,
therefore, also marks a turning point. Its particular reactions
remain midway between the solipsist universe of the beginningand the objective universe belonging to intelligence. Without
being requisite to the description of the facts which follows, suchthoughts nevertheless clarify many aspects of them.

THE "SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS"THE FACTS AND REPRODUCTIVE ASSIMILATION.
We can call the circular reactions of the second stage "primary."
1.

I.

Their character consists in simple organic movements centeredon themselves (with or without intercoordination) and not
destined to maintain a result produced in the external environment. So it is that the child grasps for the sake of grasping, sucking, or looking, but not yet in order to swing to and fro, to rub,or to reproduce sounds. Moreover the external objects uponwhich the subject acts are one with his action which is simple,
the means being confused with the end.

On the other hand, inthe circular reactions which we shall call "secondary" and whichcharacterize the present stage, the movements are centered ona result produced in the external environment and the sole aimof the action is to maintain this result; furthermore it is more

complex, the means beginning to be differentiated from the end,
at least after the event.

Of course, all the intermediaries are produced between the
primary circular reactions and the secondary reactions. It is byconvention that we choose, as criterion of the appearance of thelatter, the action exerted upon the external environment. Henceforth if they make their appearance, for the most p'art, after thedefinitive acquisition of prehension, it is nevertheless possible tofind some examples of this phenomenon prior to that.
First here aresome examples of circular reactions relating

to the movements the child gives to his bassinet and to the hang-

ing objects:
Observation 94. At 0;3 (5) Lucienne shakes her bassinet by moving her

which makes theandlegs violently (bending and unbending them, etc.),
cloth dolls swing from the hood. Lucienne looks at them, smiling,THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

158

recommences at once. These movements are simply the concomitants ofLucienne externalizes it injoy. When she experiences great pleasurea total reaction including leg movements. As she often smiles at her
knick-knacks she caused them to swing. But does she keep this up
through consciously coordinated circular reaction or isher behavior?

itpleasure

constantly springing up again that explains
That evening, when Lucienne is quiet, I gently swing her dolls.
The morning's reaction starts up again, but both interpretations re-main possible.

The next day, at 0;3 (6) I present the dolls: Lucienne immediately
moves, shakes her legs, but this time without smiling. Her interest isintense and sustained and there also seems to be an intentional circular
reaction.

At 0;3 (8) I again find Lucienne swinging her dolls. An hour laterImake them move slightly: Lucienne looks at them, smiles, stirs alittle,then resumes looking at her hands as she was doing shortly before.

A chance movement disturbs the dolls: Lucienne again looks at themand this time shakes herself with regularity. She stares at the dolls,
barely smiles and moves her legs vigorously and thoroughly. At each
moment she is distracted by her hands which pass again into the visual
field: she examines them for a moment and then returns to the dolls.
This time there is definite circular reaction.
At 0;3 (13) Lucienne looks at her hand with more coordination
than usually (see Obs. 67). In her joy at seeing her hand come and go
between her face and the pillow, she shakes herself in front of thishand as when faced by the dolls. Now this reaction of shaking reminds
her of the dolls which she looks at immediately after as though sheforesaw their movement. She also looks at the bassinet hood which also
moves. At certain times her glance oscillates between her hand, thehood, and the dolls. Then her attention attaches itself to the dolls
which she then shakes with regularity.
At 0;3 (16) as soon as I suspend the dolls she immediately shakes
them, without smiling, with precise and rhythmical movements withquite an interval between shakes, as though she were studying thephenomenon. Success gradually causes her to smile. This time the circuis
indisputable. Same reaction at 0;3 (24). Same observations during the succeeding months and until 0;6 (10) and 0;7 (27) atlar reaction

sight of a puppet and at 0;6 (13) with a celluloid bird, etc.

Observation 94 repeated. At 0;3 (9) Lucienne is in her bassinet without the dolls. I shake the bassinet two or three times without her seeing
me. She looks very interested and serious and begins again, for a long
stretch of time, rough and definitely intentional shaking.
I rediscoverThat evening
Lucienne in the act of shaking her hood spontaneously.

She laughs at this sight.

Here is involved, therefore, the schema described in the foregoingSECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

159

observation, but applied to a new object. Same observation on the fol-lowing days.

At 0;4 (4) in a new bassinet, she moves her loins violently in orderto shake the hood. At 0;4
she moves her
while

(13)
legs very rapidly
looking at the festoons on the bassinet hood; as soon as she sees themagain, after a pause, she begins once more. Same reaction with regard
to the hood in general. At 0;4(19) she recommences by examining eachpart of the hood in detail. At 0; 4 (21) she does the same in her carriage(and no longer in the bassinet): she studies the result of her shaking

most attentively. Same observations at 0;5(5) etc., until 0;7

(20)

and

later.

Observation 95. Lucienne, at 0;4(27) is lying in her bassinet. I hanga doll over her feet which
immediately sets in motion the schema ofshakes (see the foregoing
But her feet reach the doll

observations).
right away and give it a violent movement which Lucienne surveys withdelight. Afterward she looks at her motionless foot for a second, thenrecommences. There is no visual control of the foot, for the movements
are the same when Lucienne only looks at the doll or when I place thedoll over her head.

On the other hand, the tactile control of the footapparent: after the first shakes, Lucienne makes slow foot movements
as though to grasp and
explore. For instance, when she tries to kick thedoll and misses her aim, she begins again very slowly until she succeeds(without seeing her feet). In the same way I cover Lucienne's face or
distract her attention for a moment in another direction: she nevertheless continues to hit the doll and control its movements.
At 0;4 (28), as soon as Lucienne sees the doll she moves her feet.
When I move the doll toward her face she increases her movements
and thus resumes the behavior described in the preceding observations.
So also at 0;5 (0) she oscillates between the global reaction and specificis(1) she resumes the latter movements onlyand even seems to regulate them (without seeing them) when I raise thefoot movements, but at 0;5
doll alittle.

A moment later she gropes until she has felt contact be-

tween her naked foot and the doll: she then increases her movements.
Same reaction at 0;5 (7) and the days following.
At 0;5 (18) I place the doll at different heights, sometimes to theleft, sometimes to the right: Lucienne first tries to reach it with her feet,and then, when she has succeeded, shakes it. The schema is therefore
definitely acquired and begins to be differentiated through accommodation to various situations.

Observation 96.-At 0;5 (8) Jacqueline looks at a doll attached to a string
which is stretched from the hood to the handle of the bassinet. The
doll is at approximately the same level as the child's feet. Jacqueline
moves her feet and finally strikes the doll whose movement she im-mediately notices. A circular reaction ensues comparable to that in the

160

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

coordinated in view of Jacqueline's reforegoing observation but lesstarded development as she was born in winter and had less physicalexercise than Lucienne. The feet move, first without conscious coof the feetordination, then certainly by circular reaction. The activity
are fixed on thegrows increasingly regular whereas Jacqueline's eyes
herself
doll. Moreover, when I remove the doll Jacqueline occupies^
I replace it, after a moment, she immediquite differently, and whenrecommences to move her legs. But, contrary to Lucienne,
ately

for contact between feetthenecessity
Jacqueline does not understandand doll. She limits herself to noting the connection between the movement of the object and the total activity of her own body. This is why,
as soon as she sees the doll, she places herself in the situation of total
movement in which she has seen the doll swing. She moves her arms,
her torso and her legs in a global reaction without paying particularattention to her feet. The counterproof is easy to furnish. I place thedoll above Jacqueline's face, outside the range of any possible contact:
her arms, torso, and feet, exactly as
Jacqueline recommences to wriggle
the
doll
at
while
(and not at her feet). Jacqueline
before,staring only
between her movements in generalaccordingly establishes a connection
and those of the object and not between her feet and the object. I do

not observe any tactile control either.
The objection might then be raised that Jacqueline establishes noconnection and limits herself to manifesting her joy at the doll's movements without attributing them to her own activity. The child's

attitude accompanying pleasure andwriggling would thus be only an
not a circular reaction tending toward an objective result. But, withoutthat there is anhaving proofs in the particular case, we can conclude
intentional connection by analogy with the foregoing and following
observations in which the child's much more precocious reactions permitted us to make quite a different interpretation.

Observation 7. Laurent, from the middle of the third month, revealed
at the toys hanging from theglobal reactions of pleasure, while looking
hood of his bassinet, or at the hood itself, etc. He babbles, arches himbeats the air with his arms, moves his legs, etc. He thus moves theself,bassinetand recommences more vigorously- But it is not yet possible

to speak of circular reaction: there is no connection felt between the
movements of his limbs and the spectacle seen, but only an attitude ofthat when his
joy and of physical exertion. Again, at 0;2 (17) I observe
to contemplate them, farhemovements induce those of the
toys,

stops

from grasping that it is he who produces them; when the toys are
motionless, he resumes, and so on. On the other hand, at 0;2 (24) I
made the following experiment which set in motion a beginning of
secondary circular reaction. As Laurent was striking his chest andshaking his hands which were bandaged and held by strings attachedto the handle of the bassinet (to prevent him from sucking), I had theSECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

161

idea of using the thing and I attached the strings to the celluloid balls

hanging from the hood. Laurent naturally shook the balls by chanceand looked at them at once (the rattle made a noise inside them). As
the shaking was repeated more and more frequently Laurent archedhimself, waved his arms and legs in short, he revealed increasingpleasure and through this maintained the interesting result. But nothing
yet authorizes us to speak of circular reaction; this could still be a simple
attitude of pleasure and not a conscious connection.

The next day, at 0;2 (25) I connect his right hand to the celluloid
balls but leave the string a little slack in order to necessitate ampler
movements of the right arm and thus limit the effect of chance. The
hand is free. At first the arm movements are inadequate and thedoes not move. Then the movements become more extensive,
more regular, and the rattle moves periodically while the child's glanceis directed at this sight. There seems to be conscious coordination but
both arms move equally and it is not yet possible to be sure that this is
not a mere pleasure reaction. The next day, same reactions.
At 0;2 (27), on the other hand, conscious coordination seems
definite, for the following four reasons: (1) Laurent was surprised andleftrattlefrightened by the first shake of the rattle which was unexpected. On
the other hand, since the second or third shake, he swung his right arm(connected to the rattle) with regularity, whereas the left remained almost motionless. Now the right could easily move freely without moving the rattle, the string being loose enough to permit Laurent to suckhis thumb, for instance, without pulling at the balls. It therefore seems
that the swinging was intentional. (2) Laurent's eye blinks beforehand,
as soon as his hand moves and before the rattle moves, as though thechildknew he was going to shake it. (3) When Laurent temporarily

gives up the game and joins his hands for a moment, the right hand(connected to the rattle) alone resumes the movement while the leftstays motionless. (4)The regular shakes that Laurent gives the rattle

the movement is regular and the child mustarm backward sufficiently to make the rattle sound. The
reaction is the same on the following days: the right arm connectedto the rattle is always more active than the left. Moreover the interestis growing and Laurent swings his right arm as soon as he has heard
reveal a certain

skill;

stretch his

the rattle (while I fasten the string) without waiting to shake it bychance.
At 0;3 (0) I attached the string to the left arm after six days ofexperiments with the right. The first shake is given by chance: fright,
circular reaction: thiscuriosity, etc. Then, at once, there is coordinatedarm is outstretched and barely mobile while the lefttime therightelse withswings. Now Laurent has plenty of room to do something
his left arm than shake the rattle, but he does not try at all to free hishand from the string and his glance is directed at the result. This time162

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

therefore possible to speak definitely of secondary circular reaction,even though Laurent only learned a week later to codrdinate hisfact is all the more certain because atprehension with his vision. The
middle finger in his left
0;2 (29) I observed the following. Putting myto that required
movement
a
in
arm
his
analogous
hand I madeswing
to set the rattle in motion: when I stopped, Laurent continued thismovement by himself and directed my finger. Such a movement therefore lends itself to intentional coordination beginning at this age.
At 0;3 (10), after Laurent has learned to grasp what he sees, I
is attached to the rattle,, in his right hand,place the string, which
so that he may grasp it better. For a moment
littleamerely unrolling it
first shake due to chance movements of his
at
the
but,
nothing happens
Laurent starts when looking at theimmediate:
hand, the reaction israttle and then violently strikes his right hand alone, as if he felt thelasts fully a quarter of an hour
resistance and the effect. The

it isoperation
The phenomenon is all
during which Laurent emits peals of laughter.
the more clear because, the string being slack, the child must stretch his

arm sufficiently and put the right amount of effort into it.
Observation ^.-Subsequently, at 0;B (12) Laurent is subjected to therattles (hanging from the bassinet
following experiment. I attach to theuntil it almost reacheshood) my watch chain and let it hang vertically
his face in order to see whether he will grasp it and thus shake thecelluloid balls. The result is completely negative: when I put the chain
in his hands and he shakes it by chance and hears the noise, he imbut lets themediately waves his hand (as in the foregoing observation)
without understanding that he must grasp it in order to shake
chain

go

the rattle. The following day, however, he discovers the procedure. At
do so in order to start
first, when I place the chain in his hand (I only
would in any case be produced,
as this act oftheprehension
experimentsooner or later and fortuitously), Laurent waves his hand, then lets
the chain go, while looking at the balls. Then he strikes great blows at
random which shake the chain (and the rattle) without his grasping it.
Then, without looking, he takes hold of the sheet in front of him
he does a part of the day) and at the same time
(doubtless to suck it, as
the chain without recognizing it. The chain then moves thegraspsand Laurent again is interested in this sight. Little by little,
Laurent thus arrives at discriminating tactilely the chain itself: his
hand searches for it and as soon as the outer side of his fingers strikes
in order to hold the chain alone.
it, he lets go the sheet or coverlet

rattleThen he immediately swings his arm while looking at the rattle. He
therefore seems to have understood thatitisthe chain,and not his

body movements in general, that shakes the rattle. At a certain moment
he looks at his hand which holds the chain; then he looks at the chain
from top to bottom.

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

163

That evening, as soon as he hears the sound of the rattle and sees
the chain
hanging, hetries to

grasp

it

hand or at the lower end of the chain

without looking either at his(he only looks at the rattle). It
happened exactly as follows; while looking at the rattle, Laurent letgo with his right hand the sheet which he was sucking (hekeeps it in
his mouth with his lefthand) and searched for the chain, his right handopen and the thumb opposed; as soon as he made contact with thechain he grasped and shook it. After a few moments of

this, he resumes
sucking his fingers. But when the chain touches him lightly he at once

removes his right hand from his mouth,

grasps the chain, pulls it very
slowly while looking at the toys and apparently expecting a noise: aftera few seconds
during which he still pulls the chain very gently, heshakes much harder and succeeds. He then bursts into
peals oflaughter, babbles and swings the chain as much as possible.
At 0;3 (14) Laurent looks at the rattle at the moment I
hang upthe chain. He remains immobile for a second. Then he tries to
grasp
the chain (without
brushes it with the back of his
looking at

hand,

it),

grasps it but continues to look at the rattle without moving his arms.
Then he shakes the chain gently while
studying the effect. Afterward
he shakes it more and more vigorously. A smile and expression of de-Flight.

But, a moment later, Laurent lets go the chain, unawares. He
then keeps his left hand (which thitherto held thechain) tightly closed
whereas his right hand is open and immobile and he continues to shakehis leftarm as though he held the chain, while looking at the rattle.

He continues thus for at least five minutes.

This last observation shows
although Laurent knows how to coordinate his grasp movements
and the shaking of the rattle, he little understands the mechanism ofthat,

these connections.

The following days, Laurent grasps and shakes the chain as soon
up and thus shakes the rattle, but he does not look at the
chain before grasping it: he limits himself tosearching for it with his
hand (right or left, as the case may be) and to grasping it when hetouches it. At 0;3 (18) on the other hand, he looks first at the rattle,
then at the chain which he grasps after having seen it. The chain has
therefore acquired a visual and nolonger only a tactile meaning:
Laurent knows henceforth that this visual obstacle is simultaneously athing to be grasped and a means of shaking the rattle. But this tactilevisual coordination
relating to the chain in no way implies that
Laurent has understood the particulars of the mechanism. There issimply an efficient connection between the grasping of the chain, followed by the adaptation of the arm, and the movements of the rattle.
The rest of the observation (see below, Obs. 112) will show us, in effect,
to what extent this schema remains
phenomenalistic: the chain is notconceived as the extension of the rattle, it is simply a thing to be
as I hang it

164

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

grasped and shaken when one desires to see and hear the rattle inmotion.

Observation 99, After having thus discovered the use of the chain
hanging from the toys, Laurent generalizes this behavior pattern byapplying it to everything that hangs from the hood of his bassinet,
For example, at 0;3 (23) he takes hold of the string attaching arubber doll to the hood and shakes it immediately. This gesture, simple
assimilation of the perceived string to the habitual schema, has ofcourse the effect of shaking the hood and the toys attached to it.
who did not seem to expect this result, considers it withgrowing interest and his vigor increases, this time apparently in order

Laurent,

ta make the spectacle last. After an interruption, I myself shake thehood (from behind): Laurent then looks for the string, grasps andshakes it. He then succeeds in grasping and shaking the doll itself.

The following evening: identical reactions. I observe that Laurent,
when he pulls the string, looks at it from top to bottom: he therefore is
expecting the result of his act. He also looks at it before grasping it,
but not in general: he does not need to do so, since he knows the visual

meaning of this object and how to guide his arm by using his kinesthetic
sense.

At 0;4 (3) he pulls at will the chain or the string in order to shakethe rattle and make it sound: the intention is clear. I now attach apaper knife to the string. The same day I attach a new toy half as
high as the string (instead of the paper knife): Laurent begins byshaking himself while looking at it, tnen waves his arms in the air andfinally takes hold of the rubber doll which he shakes while looking at
the toy.

The coordination is clearly intentional.

At 0;4 (30) Laurent, seeing the doll hang from the rattles at thehood at once looks at these and then shakes the doll only: it is clearlyin order to shake the rattles that hegrasps the doll.
At 0;5 (25) the same reactions on seeing the string. Furthermore,
if I shake the hood(from behind, without being seen) this suffices tomake Laurent pull the string in order to make this movement continue.
Observation 100, At 0;7 (16) Jacqueline reveals a circular reaction
analogous to that in Observation 99, but with the delay explained by
the three-month retardation which separate her from Laurent fromthe point of view of prehension of seen objects. She is presented with adoll suspended from the string which connects the hood to the handleof the bassinet. In grasping this doll she shakes the bassinet hood; she

immediately notices this effect and begins again at least twenty times inmore and more violently and while watching the shaken

succession,

hood laughingly.
At 0;7 (23) Jacqueline looks at the hood of her bassinet which I
shake several times while I remain unseen. A$ soon as 1 have finishedSECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS
she grasps and pulls a cordhanging where the doll had been.

165

My

movement of course reminds her of the familiar schema and she pulls
the string at the usual place without

having necessarily understood themechanism in detail. Same reaction, but entirely spontaneous, at 0;8(8),0;8 (9), 0;8 (IS), 0;8 (16), etc.

Observation 100 repeated.-Lucienne,

similarly, at 0;6 (5) pulls a dollhanging from the hood in order to make it move; she even looks at thehood ahead of time while grasping the doll, thus revealing accurate
foresight.

Same observation at 0;6 (10), 0;8 (10), etc.

Observation 101. Finally two other procedures were employed by
Jacqueline, Lucienne, and Laurent in order to shake their bassinetor the objects hanging from the hood. At 0;7 (20) Lucienne looks at thehood and the hanging ribbons; her arms are outstretched and slightly
straightened, at an equal distance from her face. She gently opens andcloses her hands, then more and more
rapidly with involuntary arm
movements which thus gently shake the hood. Lucienne then repeatsthese movements with increasing speed. Same reaction at 0;7 (27), etc.
I again observe the phenomenon at 0;10(27): she moves her bassinet
while waving her hands.
At 0;8 (5), Lucienne shakes her head from side to side in order toshake her bassinet, the hood, ribbons, fringes, etc.
Jacqueline, in the same way, shakes her bassinet, at 0;8 (19) while
swinging her arms. She even succeeds in differentiating her movements
in order to conserve certain effects obtained by chance. She waves her
right arm in a certain way (obliquely to her trunk) in order to makethe bassinet grate while shaking it all over. In case of failure she corrects herself and gropes, places her arms perpendicularly to her trunk,then places them more and more obliquely until she succeeds. At 0;11(16) she shakes at a distance (at the end of her bassinet) a jack-in-the-box,
while swinging her arms.
At the end of the fourth month Laurent discovered these same twocircular reactions which shows that they are general. Thus at 0;3 (23) I

him shaking his head spontaneously (a lateral movement) whenconfronted by the hanging toys, before grasping the cord which enables
him to shake them. Actually this head movement sufficed to shake thefindwhole cradle slightly.

With regard to the arm movements, they are partly the result of
the reactions learned in Observations 97 and 98, but partly also of the
movements of the whole body which the child sometimes performs inorder to shake his bassinet. At 0;3 (25), for example, and at 0;4 (6) hebegins by shaking himself all over when confronted by hanging objects,
then he shakes his right arm in space. The reaction becomes generalduring the following days.

166

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS
Here are some observations concerning secondary circular

reactions relating to objects, usually not hanging, that the childgrasps in order to move, swing, shake, rubcause them to make a noise, etc.

them against others,

Observation 102. The simplest example is doubtless that of the objects
the child simply shakes as soon as he has grasped them. From this elementary schema, which is almost "primary," the following Is immediately derived: if the objects brandished produce a sound this is enoughto make the child attempt to reproduce it.

As early as Q;2 (26) Laurent, in whose right hand I have put thehandle of a rattle, shakes it by chance, hears the noise and laughs at theresult. But he does not see the rattle and looks for it in the direction of
the hood, at the place from which such a sound usually comes. Whenhe finally sees the rattle he does not understand that this is the object
which is making the noise nor that he himself makes it move. He
nevertheless continues his activity.

he grasps the(6), during the fourth stage of prehension,having seen his hand in the same visual field, then brings
it to his mouth. But the sound thus
produced arouses the schema of thehanging rattle: Laurent shakes himself all over, especially moving hisarm, and finally only moves the latter, astonished and slightly worried

At 0;3rattle after

by the increasing noise.

From 0;S (15) that is to say, the present stage it suffices for Laurent
to grasp an object to make him shake it and that he observe the rattlewith the handle to cause him to grasp and shake it properly. But
subsequently the reaction becomes complicated through the fact that
Laurent tries rather to strike it with one hand while holding it withshall rethe other, to rub it against the edges of the bassinet, etc.
turn to this in connection with these latter schemata.
At 0;4 (15) Lucienne grasps the handle of a rattle in the shape ofa celluloid ball. The movements of the hand in grasping the rattleWe

result in shaking it and producing a sudden and violent noise. Lucienne at once moves her whole body, and especially her feet, to makethe noiselast.

She has a demented expression of mingled fear andpleasure, but she continues. Hitherto the reaction is comparable to thatof Observations 94-95 repeated, and the movement of the hands is not

yet maintained for itself, independently of the reaction of the wholebody. This reaction lasts a few days but then Lucienne, when she is inpossession of the rattle, limits herself to shaking it with the hand that
holds it. But a curious thing at 0;S (10) and again at 0;5 (12) she ac-companies this movement of the hands with shakes of the feet analogous
to those she makes to shake a hanging

object (see Obs. 95).
Jacqueline, too, at 0;9 (5) shakes while holding a celluloid rattle
in the form of a parrot which she has
just been given. She smiles when

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS
the noise is slight, is anxious when it is too loud and knows167very well

how to gradate the phenomenon. She progressively increases the noise

until she is too frightened and then returns to the soft sounds. Furthermore, when the rattle is stuck at one of the ends, she shakes theparrotby turning it in another direction and thus knows how to reestablish

the noise.

A second classic schema is that of "striking." At 0;4
Lucienne tries to grasp the rattle in Observation 102 when it is
attached to the bassinet hood andhangs in front of her face. During an
unlucky attempt she strikes it violently: fright, then a vague smile. She
brings her hand back with a doubtless intentional suddenness: a new
blow. The phenomenon then becomessystematic: Lucienne hits theObservation 103.

(28)

rattle with regularity avery great number of times.
At 0;5 (0) the same happens to her hanging dolls which she strikes

violently.

At 0;6 (2) she looks at a wooden Pierrot which I have hung before
her and with which she has rarely
played. Lucienne at first tries tograsp it. But the movement she makes in holding out her hand shakes
the Pierrot before she has touched it: Lucienne at once shakes her
legs
and feet in a regular and rapid rhythm in order to maintain the swinging of the object (see Obs. 94). Then she grasps and pulls it. 'The
Pierrot again escapes her and swings; Lucienne reacts
by shaking her
legs again. Finally she rediscovers the schema of 0;4 (28) and 0;5 (0): she
strikes the toy more and more vigorously, without
trying to grasp it,
and bursts out laughing at the Pierrot's antics. Same reactions at 0;6(3). At 0;6 (10) she begins by striking the puppet that I hang up, andso makes it swing, then she maintains the movement by shakes of thelegs.

At 0;6 (19) she strikes the hanging dolls in order to make themswing.

Jacqueline in the same way strikes her toys, from 0;7 (15); at 0;7
her cushions, from(28) strikes her duck, at 0;8 (5) a doll, at 0;9 (5)0;8 (5) to 0;9 (0) her parrot, etc.

With regard to Laurent the schema of striking arose in the following way. At 0;4 (7) Laurent looks at a paper knife attached to thestrings of a hanging doll. He tries to grasp the doll or the paper knife,
but, at each attempt, the clumsiness of his movements results in causing
him to knock these objects. He then looks at them with interest andrecommences.
The next day, at 0;4 (8) same reaction. Laurent still does not strike
intentionally but, trying to grasp the paper knife, and noting that hefails each time, he only outlines the gesture of grasping and thus limits
himself to knocking one of the extremities of the object.
At 0;4 (9), the next day, Laurent tries to grasp the doll hanging infront of him; but he only succeeds in swinging it without holding it.
He then shakes it altogether, while waving his arms (see Obs. 101). But

168

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

he thus happens to strike the doll: he then begins again intentionallya series of times. A quarter of an hour later, as soon as he is confronted
by the same doll in the same circumstances he begins to hit it again.
At 0;4 (15), faced by another hanging doll, Laurent tries to grasp it,then he shakes himself in order to make it swing, happens to knock it
and then tries to strike it. The schema is therefore almost differentiatedfrom the preceding ones but it does not yet constitute a principal andindependent behavior pattern.
At 0;4 (18) Laurent strikes my hands without trying to grasp them,but he has begun by simply waving his arms in the air and only "hit"subsequently.
At 0;4 (19), at last, Laurent directly strikes a hanging doll. The
schema is therefore completely differentiated. At 0;4 (21) he strikes thehanging toys in the same way and thus swings them as much as possible.

Same reaction on the following days.

From 0,*5 (2) Laurent strikes the objects with one hand while holdthemwith the other. Thus he holds a rubber doll in the left handingand strikes it with his right. At 0;5 (6) he grasps a rattle with a handle
and strikes it immediately. At 0;5 (7) I hand him different objects
which are new to him (a wooden penguin, etc.): he hardly looks at thembut strikes them systematically.
It may thus be seen how the schema of striking hanging objects
became differentiated little by little from simpler schemata and gave
rise to the schema of hitting objects held in the hands. It is noteworthy,

however, that though the 4- to 7-month-old child thus learns to swing
hanging objects by hitting them as hard as possible, he does not attemptsimply to start their swinging to observe it, but often achieves this bychance. It is only at about 0;8 (10) that I observed the latter behavior
pattern in Lucienne and Jacqueline and about 0;8 (30) in Laurent,
But it definitely differs from, the preceding one both from the point ofview of causality and that of the intellectual mechanism. The child who
strikes in order to swing is, in effect, active himself, whereas he who
limits himself to starting the swinging transfers this activity to the obTherefore that is no longer a simple secondary circularject as such.

reaction but an exploration and almost a sort of experimentation. For
this reason we shall not speak of this behavior here but shall study it inconnection with the next stage.

Observation 104,

A final noteworthy example is the behavior patternconsisting in rubbing objects against hard surfaces such as the wickerof the bassinet. Lucienne, from 0;5 (12), and Jacqueline a little later,

about 0;7 (20) used the toys they held in their hands to rub the surfacesof the bassinet. Laurent discovered this at 0;4 (6) in circumstances which
it isworthwhile to analyze.

At 0;3 (29) Laurent grasps a paper knife which he sees for the firsttime; he looks at it a moment and then swings it while holding it inSECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

169

his right hand.

During these movements the object happens to rub
against the wicker of the bassinet: Laurent then waves his arm vigorously

and obviously tries to reproduce the sound he has heard, but without
understanding the necessity of contact between the paper knife andthe wicker and,
consequently, without achieving this contact otherwise
than by chance.

At 0;4 (3) same reactions, but Laurent lookc at theobject at thetime when it happens to rub against the wicker of the bassinet. The
same still occurs at 0;4 (5) but there is slightprogress toward systemati-

zation.
Finally, at 0;4 (6) the

movement becomes intentional: as soon as

the child has the object in his hand he rubs it withregularity against the
wicker of the bassinet. He does the same,
subsequently, with his dolls
and rattles (see Obs. 102), etc.

These few examples of secondary circular reactions thus coninvolving an action brought tobear upon things and no longer a utilization, in some way organic, of reality. Such a question again raises the whole problem of mental assimilation.
When the nursling takes the breast for the first time andthen immediately begins to suck and swallow or, even earlier,when he impulsively moves his lips and then continues empty
sucking, one might suppose that this reproductive assimilation
as well as the recognitions and generalizations which prolong it
are themselves dependent for their conditioning upon an earlier
need: the organic need to take nourishment and to suck. So also,
stitute the first behavior patterns

when the child learns to look, listen, or grasp, it could be asserted that this functional activity is only assimilatory because it
constitutes first of all a satisfaction of physiological needs. If such

were the case, it would not be possible to understand how thechild's activity can become centered beginning at 4 to 6 months
on results such as those of the secondary circular reactions which

do not correspond, in their externality, to any internal, definite
and particular need.
But, as we have seen (Chapter I, 3) the retention in consciousness of a physiological need is not a simple fact nor an immediate condition, and it is fitting to distinguish two distinct series in the humblest act of repetition, by which reflex use or ac-

quired association begin: the organic series and the psychic se-

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

170
ries.

From the physiological point of view it is certain that need

explains repetition: it is because sucking corresponds to a needthat the nursling does not stop sucking, and it is because of thethumb sucking and satisfying
to 2-month-oId child puts his thumb backinto his mouth as soon as he is capable of this coordination. But

connection established between
this need that theI-noteworthy, from this strictly physiological point of view,that all needs depend, either immediately or remotely, upon afundamental need which is that of the organism's development;
it isthat is to say precisely,

upon assimilation: it is due to the sub-ordination of the organs to this chief tendency which defines
life itself
that the functioning of each one gives rise to a particular need. Now, from the psychological point of view, it proceeds in exactly the same way. The need sets in motion the act

and its functioning, but this functioning itself engenders a greaterneed which from the very first goes beyond the pure satisfactionof the initial need. It is therefore fruitless to ask if it is need that
explains repetition or the reverse: together they form an inseparable unity. Hence the primary fact is neither the need anterior
to the act nor repetition, the source of satisfaction, but it is thetotal relation of the need to the satisfaction. From thepoint ofview of behavior, this relation is none other than the operationby which an already organized mechanism becomes establishedby functioning and functions by utilizing a condition external
to itself:

it istherefore functional assimilation. From the pointof view of consciousness, this relationis also of an operative
and this is why one cannot seek the fundamental truthof psychology either in a state of simple consciousness or in an
isolated tendency. Need and satisfaction are, in effect, vicarious,and oscillate between the purely organic and the functional;
moreover, they are experienced relatively to one another. Consequently they are both connected to a fundamental operationof which they are only the influence of variable and approximative consciousness by which the behavior pattern puts its

nature,own functioning into relationship with the conditions of the environment. The relation of need and satisfaction thus reveals a
relation anterior to assimilation,according to which the subject
only apprehends the object relatively to his own activity. Conse-

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

171

quently, just as all physiological needs depend on a main tendency that of the organism's development through assimilation
to the environment so also
every elementary psychic function,
however subordinated it may seem to be to the satisfaction of a
precise physiological need, involves an activity which will gradually integrate the whole of the behavior patterns: the assimilation of the object to the subject in general.

When these principles are remembered it is easy to understand how needs which were at first chiefly organic can be subordinated little by little to functional needs and how the lattercan give rise to operations concerning the interrelations of thingsand no longer the relations of things to the organs of the body.
For example, how does it happen that the child, instead of merely
grasping the doll hanging from the hood of his bassinet, makes
use of it in order to shake the hood (Obs. 100)? Until then, in
effect, the doll was an object to be looked at, grasped, sucked,

heard, etc., but not at all a thing to produce extrinsic results suchas the shaking of the hood. The transition from the first state to
the second must therefore be explained. With regard to the move-ments of the hood, either they are perceived for the first time,
and then it must be understood why from the very first they giverise to an attempt at repetition, or else they have already beena thing to look at, to hear, etc., and it must be understood how
they are transformed into a result to be maintained by newmeans.
The question is simplified as soon as one sees the essential
fact that, among the unknown phenomena observed by the child

only those which are experienced as dependent on the activity
itself give rise to a secondary circular reaction. But let us notethat this is not as natural as it might seern. One might very wellthink that the child, confronted by any new spectacle at all, evenone independent of him from the observer's point of view, tries
from the very first to reproduce it or make it continue. This isexactly what is subsequently revealed when, accustomed to repeat everything through circular reaction, the child generalizes
this behavior pattern and tries to discover "procedures to makeinteresting sights last" (see Obs. 112-118). But observation showsthat that is derived behavior and that, before practicing the sec-THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

172

to assimilate new
ondary circular reaction, the child, in order
to utilizing the primary reactions. For inhimself
limitssights,stance, when he sees the hanging toys move without yet knowingthat it is he who sets them going, or when he sees the rattle witha handle without yet realizing that he is the cause of the effectproduced, Laurent

isalready interested in these phenomena;that is to say, he tries to assimilate them but he tries to conserve
them only by looking at or listening to them without yet at-

hand or arm movetempting to reproduce them by means of
that
these
mean
not
does
ments. This, however,phenomena areconceived by him as "objective" and independent of his activity
in general. It is very possible, on the contrary, that when looking
at ar* object or turning his head to listen to it, etc., the subject
may have the impression of participating in the repetition orcontinuation of the sensorial image. But, to be precise, such a
relationship must be experienced in order that the attempt at
which constitutes the secondary circular reaction may
repetition

begin.

Hence it cannot be said that the present behavior patternconsists in repeating everything which happens to appear in thechild's visual field.

The secondary circular reaction only begins

when a chance effect of the action itself is understood to be theresult of this activity. Thereafter it is easy to grasp the continuity

which exists between the primary and secondary reactions. Justas,in the first, the objective is aliment for sucking, vision or pre-hension, so also, in the second, it becomes aliment for any movement produced by differentiation of prehension and the move-ments of the forearm. True, the difference is great between thesomewhat centripetal interest of sucking, or even of sight, andthe centrifugal interest of the present level, an interest directed
at the external result of the acts. But this contrast is modified if
it isrecalled that a sensorial

image is the more objectified andexternalized because it coordinates within itself more schemata

and because all the intermediaries between the primary and secondary reactions therefore exist. A visual objective, for example,
ismuch nearer the actual "object" if it is simultaneously a thing

to see, to hear and to touch than if it is only an image to contemplate. Consequently the movement of the hood or the soundSECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

173

of a stick against the wicker of the bassinet will
give rise to an
externalization all the greater because they are simultaneously
to be seen, heard, and reproducedby means of hand movements.
development of theThrough a paradox analogous to that of thesciences, it happens that reality is objectified in proportion as itis elaborated by thethinking and working of the subject's sche-mata, whereas the phenomenalism of immediate perception is
only subjectivism. Furthermore, while incorporating in his activity results so remote from himself, the child introduces into
his proceedings a series of intermediaries. For instance, when heshakes the hood of his bassinet by grasping a hanging doll he is
obliged, even without any understanding of the relations which
exist between the two states, to see in the hood's movement the

prolongation of the act of grasping the doll. The assimilation of
the movements of the hood to the schema of prehension thus pre-supposes putting these movements into relationship with those

Such a process explains why every reproductive assimilation of a remote spectacle brings with it an active elaboraof the doll.

tion of relationships. The action ceases to be simple in order tointroduce a beginning of differentiation between means and ends,

and the assimilation of things to the self becomes constructionof relationships between things.
The assimilation characteristic of secondary circular reaction is, in short, only the development of assimilation at workin the primary reactions. Just as everything, in the child's primifor sucking, looking, listening, touching, andgrasping, everything gradually becomes something to be shaken,
tive universe,isswung, rubbed, etc., according to differentiations of the manualand visual schemata. But before discerning the mechanism according to which these progressive accommodations operate, there
remains to be explained how a remote spectacle can thus be conceived as produced by the action itself (which is, as we have justnoted, the condition for the advent of the secondary reaction).

This question can be answered in one word:

this discovery ismade through reciprocal assimilation of the present schemata.
We recall, in this connection, how coordination such as that ofby seeking to see that which he
he
which
that
hear
and
to
sees, the child perceives little
hears

vision or hearing is established:

174

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

by little that a same given object is simultaneously the source ofsounds and visual image. It is in an analogous way that the coordination of vision and prehension subsequently is brought
about. After having looked at his hands and at the objects
grasped, the child tries to move the visual image which he also
sees; in that way he discovers that one may grasp what one sees
as well as look at what one grasps. Now in the case of the beginnings of secondary circular reaction a phenomenon of the samekind ensues. For instance when Laurent unwittingly starts amovement of the toys by pulling a chain or rubs a paper knife
against the wicker of his bassinet he is looking at, listening to,
the effect thus produced without trying to conserve it byetc.,other means. But, precisely because he is in the act of shaking
the chain or the paper knife while he looks at or listens to thetwo kinds of schemata sooner or
The child then apthe
hand
with
his
to
himself
image that he looks
moving
plies
was
as
he
led
at, just
intentionally to move the visual
formerlyThis
does
not yet mean that he tries to
of
his
own
limbs.
image

result of these movements, thelater end by being reciprocally assimilated.

reproduce the objective phenomenon as such (which will constitute the secondary circular reaction), but simply that his visualand manual schemata, being simultaneously active, tend to assimilate each other according to a general law. But as soon as thisreciprocal assimilation has been formed the child understands
that the external result which he has observed (the movementsof the toys or the sound of the paper knife against the wicker)

depends upon his manual as well as his visual or auditory activity, and this understanding thereafter gives rise to an immediate
circular reaction; that is to say, to an act of reproductive assimilation.

From the point of view of assimilation itself, secondary

circular reaction thus prolongs the primary reaction, and thechild's interest only becomes externalized on the interrelationsof things as a function of the increasing coordination of the present schemata (the primary schemata).
2. THE SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONSII.
ACCOMMODATION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE

SCHEMATA.

Until the present behavior patterns

that is, dur-

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

175

ing the entire stage of the pure primary reactions accommodation remained relatively subordinated to assimilation. Sucking,looking, grasping, consisted in incorporating observed objects
into corresponding schemata of assimilation, free to accommo-

date these schemata to a variety of things. So it is that the move-ments and positions of hands, eyes, and mouth vary as a functionof the objectives, in a continuous accommodation concomitant
to assimilation, although of opposite direction. At the other extreme of sensorimotor behavior patterns that is to say, in theon the contrary, thattertiary circular reactions, we shall see
accommodation precedes assimilation, in a sense. Confronted by
new objects the child intentionally seeks to find out in what way
they are new and so experiments upon them before assimilatingthem to a schema constructed on their effect. Hence accommodation evolves from the simple differentiation of schemata, peculiar
to the primary reactions, to the search for the new, peculiar to
the tertiary reactions. What of the secondary circular reaction?
In its point of departure the latter reveals no accommoda-

tion other than that of the primary reactions: a simple differentiation of schemata as function of the object. So it is that Laurent
discovers the possibility of hitting a hanging doll, simply while
trying to grasp it (Obs. 103), and that Lucienne and Laurent

learn to rub a toy against the side of the bassinet simply while
swinging it (Obs. 104, etc.). But, contrary to that which occurs
in the primary reactions, this initial differentiation of the schema
does not, without adding something, lead to its application to

new objects, precisely since Laurent does not succeed in grasping
the doll nor in moving the rattle as he intends to, but discovers
an unforeseen phenomenon due to this very defeat: the dollswings when one strikes it and the rattle rubs the wood of thebassinet. It is then that the specific accommodation of the sec-

ondary circular reaction is produced: the child tries to rediscover
the movements which lead to the result observed. As we have
in

to

as

he has discovered,effect, by trying
previously demonstrated, the child begins,
assimilate this new result while limiting himself to looking at it,

etc.

(primary schemata). Then,

as

soon

through reciprocal assimilation of the schemata, that this result

depends on his manual activity, he tries to reproduce

itby as-

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

176

similation to this activity. But, as it is just in differentiating thelatter that the subject has by chance obtained the new result,the question is to establish this differentiation intentionally andin this that the accommodation peculiar to the secondary

it isreactions consists: rediscovering the movements which have given

This accommodation, without preas
is the case in the tertiary reaction, or simassimilation
cedingrise to the result observed.

ply doubling it, as is the case in the primary reaction, consists,
then, in completing it at the moment when the new schema isformed. Therefore accommodation is no longer an almost automatic differentiation of the schemata, nor yet an intentional
search for novelty as such, but it is a voluntary and systematic
fixation of the differentiations

by chance.
stand:
arise

imposed by new realities which

A concrete example will enable us to under-

Observation 1 05. Laurent, from 0;4 (19) as has been seen (Obs. 10S)
knows how to strike hanging objects intentionally with his hand. At
0;4 (22) he holds a stick; he does not know what to do with it andslowly passes it from hand to hand. The stick then happens to strike a
toy hanging from the bassinet hood. Laurent, immediately interestedby this unexpected result, keeps the stick raised in the same position,then brings it noticeably nearer to the toy. He strikes it a second time.

Then he draws the stick back but moving it as little as possible asthough trying to conserve the favorable position, then he brings itnearer to the toy, and so on, more and more rapidly.
The dual character of this accommodation may be seen. On the

one hand, the new phenomenon makes its appearance by simple fortuitous insertion in an already formed schema and hence differentiates
it. But, on the other hand, the child, intentionally andsystematically,
applies himself to rediscovering the conditions which led him to thisunexpected result.
It goes without saying that the use of the stick described in thisexample was only episodical: it has nothing to do with the "behavior
pattern of the stick" which we shall describe in connection with thefifth stage.

This analysis of the accommodation peculiar to the secondary circular reactions makes it possible to understand why thechild's activity, which hitherto seemed to us
essentially conservative, henceforth appears to be indefinitely diversified.

That activity should be conservative at the reflex stage is

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

177

The schemata belonging to the reflexes having alonly
ready been hereditarily elaborated, reflex behavior simply consists in assimilating the datum to these schemata and in accommodating them to reality by simple use without transforming
them. With regard to the primary circular reactions and the habnatural.

itswhich derive from them the same is true fundamentally, de-the obvious acquisitions characteristic of these behavior
patterns. When the child learns to grasp, to look, to listen, to

spite

suck for the sake of sucking (and no longer only in order tohe assimilates

to his reflex

eat),schemata an increasing number ofrealities and, if acquired accommodation to these realities exists,they remain nevertheless simple aliments for the conservationof the schemata. With regard to acquisitions through the coor-dination of schemata, the question is, as we have seen, only oneof reciprocal assimilation, thatisto say, again of conservation.

This assimilation, consequently, does not exclude enrichment
and cannot be reduced to identification pure and simple thisgoes without saying but it nevertheless remains essentially conservative.

How, then, can it be explained that at a given moment thecircle of conservation

seems to break and the reproduction of

new results prolongs the primary reaction by thus creating multiple relations between the things themselves? Is it reality alone
which makes the framework of assimilation crack by confining

the child's activity to a progressive diversification, or can thisdiversification be considered as a function of assimilation and as

always depending on conservation?

There is no doubt that both are present. On the one hand,reality forces the child to make indefinite accommodations. As
soon as the child knows how to grasp that which he sees, the obhe manipulates put him brutally in the presence of themost varied experiences. The rattles which swing while producing disturbing sounds, the bassinet which shakes while producing
the movement of the hanging toys, the boxes which offer opposition by reason of their weight and shapes, the coverlets or
strings held back or attached in an unpredictable way, everything is an opportunity for new experiments, and the content

jects

178

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

of these experiments cannot give rise to assimilation without ait in a way.
continuous accommodation which

opposesis never pure,But, on the other hand, this accommodation
be
not
would
reaction
explainable if theand secondary circularremainnotchild's behavior did
basically assimilatory and con-

As we have just seen, each of the secondary circular
reactions which appear in the child is derived by differentiationfrom a primary circular reaction or a secondary reaction graftedback to moveupon a primary reaction. Everything thus goes"circular"
these
is
it
and
or
arms
hands,
ments of legs or feet,in movedifferentiatedbecomewhich
movements ofservative.

prehension

ments directed at pulling, shaking, swinging, displacing, rubbing,etc. When Lucienne, at 3 to 4 months, shakes her bassinet andher dolls (Obs. 94-95) she limits herself to moving feet and legs,
in conformity to a primary schema. When Laurent at 0;2 (24)be0;3 (0) shakes a rattle attached to his arm (Observation 97)
the
is
he
fore knowing how to grasp,
spontaneonly prolonging

And when at 0;3 (13) hea chain, this is simplyofmeans
learns to shake the rattle byofschemabecause he uses his nascentprehension (Obs. 98). The
reactions: each is thecircularsame applies to all the secondary
With regard to "proschema.
prolongation of an already existing
we shall speak
which
of
last"
cedures to make interesting sights
ous circular movements of that arm.

later on, they in turn prolong these circular reactions.

The only

difference between the secondary reactions and the primary reactions is, therefore, that henceforth the interest is centered on

the external result and no longer only on the activity as such.
But that is not contradictory to the conservative character of thisthe external result, arising suddenly at theinterests him at one and thecenter of the child'sfunction: invery

effect,activity,same time inasmuch as it is related to his essential schemata andinasmuch as it is unforeseen and baffling. If it were only new it
would merely deserve momentary attention; but on the contrary,with his most familit
appears to the subject as being connected
iar acts or with his schemata in actual use. Moreover this unforeseen result leads astray all that of which these schemata hacentered on

bitually admit. The attention is, therefore, perforce
the exterior and no longer only on the function. In short, theSECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

179

secondary circular reactions are essentially conservative and assimilatory since they prolong without adding anything to theprimary reactions and,if the child's interest Is
displaced andexternalized on the material result of the acts, it issimply because this result is function of anrich
increasingly
assimilatory

activity.

What do these acquisitions mean now from the point ofview of organization?
Organization, we recall, is the internal aspect of the functioning of the schemata to which assimilation tends to reduce theexternal environment. It is therefore, one
an internal

might say,adaptation of which accommodation and assimilation combinedform the external expression. Actually each schema, or each ensemble of schemata, consists in a "totality" independently ofwhich no assimilation would be possible and which in turn rests

upon a number of interdependent elements (see Introduction,
Furthermore, to the extent that these totalities are not entirely realized but are in process of elaboration, they involve a
differentiation between "means" and "ends," between "values"
2).

subordinated to the formation of the whole, this whole not complete for an "ideal* totality. This fundamental mechanism oforganization accompanies internally the external manifestationsof adaptation. How then does it function, during this stage, andin what form is it made manifest in the child's behavior?

not difficult to see, in effect, that the secondary scheonce
mata,
they have been elaborated through complementary
It isassimilation and accommodation, consist in organized schemata:in the capacity of a practical concept in which the schema thus
constitutesa"totality,"

whereas the "relations" on whichitrests determine the reciprocal relationships which constitute thistotality.

With regard to the interorganization of the schemata

that

it only
is to say, the coordination of the secondary schemata
shall therefore
manifests itself during the following stage.

We

speak of it again in connection with that fourth stage. But it isapparent that the different schemata of this stage, without intercoordination in intentional series conscious of their unity, havealready reached balance among themselves and constitute a sys-

180

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

tern of unconsciously Interdependent relationships. Without this
it would be impossible to explain
total

subjacent organization

how any object which is presented to a child is immediately classified,that is, assimilated through a simultaneously reproductive

and recognitory act of assimilation suitable to this object andno other.

The totalities in process of being constituted or reconstituted remain to be examined. An original totality is constituted,
in effect, every time that a new schema is elaborated by contact
with things, and this contact is reconstituted every time the subfinds himself confronted by suitable objects and asject again

them to the schema in question. The organization ofthese totalities marks progress over that of the "primary" schemata in this sense that, for the first time, and to the extent thatsimilates

we shall presently speak are formed,
the "means" begin to be distinguished from the "ends": conseand the objects used henceforthquently the movements madeassume different "values" subordinated to an "ideal" totality,the "relations" of whichthat is to say, not yet realized. For instance when, in Observation
98, Laurent discovers that the hanging chain can be used to shakethe rattle to which it is attached, it is certain that the action ofa "means" toward the "end" ofpulling the chain is conceived as
theresult,although the means have beeninteresting
reproducing
supplied at the same time as the end in the initial action reproduced by circular reaction. It is after the event, and when thesubject seeks the result for himself, that he distinguishes between
means and ends. Now, such a distinction is certainly new to thechild's consciousness. It is true that one could in the same way
analyze any primary schema such as that of thumb sucking. The
action of introducing the thumb into the mouth could be conceived as a means at the service of the end which consists in sucking. But it is clear that such a description does not correspondto anything from the point of view of the subject himself, since
the thumb is not known independently of the act which consists in sucking it; on the contrary, the chain serving to shakethe rattle has been perceived and manipulated before being conceived as a "means" and does not cease to be regarded as distinct
from the rattle. With regard to the coordinations among primary

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

181

schemata (grasping In order to suck, etc.) they make manifest, It
istrue, the present distinction

between means and ends, pre-cisely since "secondary circular reaction" is only made possibleby this kind of coordination (that of prehension and vision and,in the elementary cases, that of foot movements withvision).
But, as we have seen, they consist in simple reciprocal assimilations, resulting in the formation of new global entities in which,consequently, the difference of which we speak is immediately
obliterated.

But, if the distinction between means and ends is only
established in the course of the elaboration of secondary schemata, we must not allow ourselves to believe that it is thusachieved and to identify it with that which it will become during
the next stage that is to say, at the time of the coordination of
the same schemata. In effect, we have just seen that, during thepresent stage, the secondary schemata are not yet intercoordinated; each one constitutes a more or less self-enclosed totality
instead of arranging itself in series analogous to that which inreflective thought is reason or the implication of concepts. From
the fourth stage, on the contrary, these schemata will become intercoordinated when it will be a question of adapting themselves
to unforeseen circumstances, thus giving rise to behavior patterns which we shall call the "application of known schemata to

new situations." It is only in this connection that the "means"
will be definitely dissociated from the "ends": the same schema

being capable of serving as "means" to different ends will therefore assume an instrumental value which is much clearer thanthat which can be offered, during the present stage, by a movement (such as pulling the chain) always connected to the sameend (shaking the rattle) and whose function of "means" has been
discovered fortuitously.

In conclusion, it can be said that the secondary circular reactions make intelligent adaptation manifest, without, however,If compared to primaryconstituting true acts of intelligence.
circular reactions they reveal intelligence because they elaborate

an ensemble of almost intentional relations between things andthe subject's activity. In effect these relations with the environ-ment being at the outset complex, they give rise, as we have justTHE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

182

seen, to a beginning of differentiation between means and ends
the child pulls
and thereby to a rudiment of intention.

When

the chain in order to shake a rattle, he carries out a much higher

behavior pattern than simply grasping an object which he sees.
But, furthermore, the secondary circular reactions do not yet
constitute complete acts of intelligence for two reasons. The firstthat the relations utilized by the child (shaking himself inisorder to move the bassinet, pulling a chain in order to shakea rattle, etc.) were discovered fortuitously and not for the puror satisfying a need. The needpose of resolving a problem
arises from the discovery and not the discovery from the need.

Onthe contrary, in the true act of intelligence there is pursuitof an end and only subsequently discovery of means. The second
reason, closely connected with the first, is that the only need involved, in the secondary circular reactions, is a need of repetition. For the child, the question is simply to conserve and repro-

duce the beneficial result discovered by chance. It is need thatsets the act in motion at each new turn of the circle of circular
reaction and it can surely be said, in this sense, that need is anterior to the act; in any case it is this fact which makes it possible to speak of intention and of intelligence. But, this needbeing only a desire for repetition, the means put to work in order to reproduce the desired result are already found. They are
entirely contained in the fortuitous action which is at the pointof departure of the ensemble of the reaction and which it is sim-

The role of intelligence involved inply a question of repeating.
such behavior patterns therefore consists simply in rediscovering
the series of movements which have given rise to the beneficial
and the intention of these behavior patterns merely conin
sists
trying to reproduce this result. Therein, let us repeat, isresultan outline of an intelligent act, but not a complete act. In effect, in a true act of intelligence, the need which serves as motive
power not only consists in repeating, but in adapting, that is
to say, in assimilating a new situation to old schemata and inaccommodating these schemata to new circumstances. It is tothis that secondary circular reaction will lead by extension; but,in this respect, it is not yet there.

All the more reason why it is impossible to attribute to such

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

183

behavior patterns the capacity to engender or to utilize representations. There could be no question, at first, of a representation of the means employed: the child does not know in advancethat he will perform a certain movement, since he simply tries
to rediscover the motor combination which succeeded and since
he subsequently limits himself to repeating his acts. With regard

to the goal, does the child, for example, keep the memory of the
shaken rattle in the form of visual or auditory images and does
he try to reproduce something which conforms to this representation? There is no need for so complicated a mechanism to account for such behavior patterns. It is enough that the sight of

the rattle created a sufficiently powerful interest for this interest
to orient the activity in the direction already followed

an in-

stant before. In other words, when the rattle stops moving, there

ensues a vacuum which the child immediately tries to fill andhe does so by utilizing the movements which have just been
performed. When these movements lead to a result which resembles the earlier spectacle, there is certainly recognition, but recognition does not presuppose the existence of representation.

Recognition simply requires that the

new result embrace en-tirely the structure of the assimilatory schema outlined at the be-ginning of circular reaction. Of course, if this mechanism repeats itself indefinitely, there can be a beginning of representation but, without being able to determine precisely when thisappears, it can be said that it is not pristine and that it is uselessto the formation of the present behavior patterns.
On the other hand, the secondary schemata constitute theoutline of what will become "classes" or concepts in reflecr
tive intelligence: perceiving an object as being something "tofirstshake/' "to rub," etc. This is, in effect, the functional equivalent of the operation of classification peculiar to conceptual
shall return to this, in connection with the fourththought.
have become more "mostage, when the secondary schemata willWebile," but the observation arises now.

Furthermore, just as the logic of classes is correlative to thatof "relations," so also the secondary schemata involve putting
wethings into conscious interrelationships. Herein resides, as
have seen, their chief novelty in relation to the primary sche-THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS
mata. What are these relationships? It is apparent, since they are184

established within the same schema and not due to coordinations
between separate secondary schemata, that they remain essentiallyand phenomenalistic, without
practical and, consequently, globalofelaboration
thereally "objective" substantial,
yet involving
in the example already commented upon, the child pulls a chain in order to shake a rattle,
the relation he establishes between the chain and the rattle is
not yet a spatial, causal and temporal relation between two
between the act"objects," it is a simple practical relationshipof pulling and the result observed. It is during the fourth stage,
with the coordination of the secondary schemata and the implications which result, that these relations begin to become obspatial, or causal structures. When,jectified,with the sole disadvantage of not being really objecti-

fied until the fifth stage.

But, however empirical these relations remain, they nevertheless constitute, from the formal point of view, the beginningwhich

of a system separate

from that of"classes'*

become increasingly

differentiated.

Furthermore,

will later

thiselemen-of relations" of retary elaboration of relations, like the "logic
flective intelligence, leads, at the outset, to the discovery of quan-from simple qualitative comas such.
inherent
inclassification
theparisons
We know, in effect, that if the concepts or "classes" only
titative relations as distinguishedstructure reality as a function of the qualitative resemblances ordifferences of the beings so classed, the "relations," on the other

hand, involve quantity and lead to the elaboration of mathematical series. Even the relations with qualitative content, such as"darker" or "brother of" constitute, in effect, a "seriation" of akind other than the relations of appurtenance or of inherence
and hence presuppose either the concepts of "more* and "less"which are frankly quantitative, or a discrimination and ordering
1of individuals, which relationships envelop number.

Now this is precisely what happens on the sensorimotor
plane as soon as the first relations are elaborated. For instance,
the relations established by the child between the act of pullingthe chain and the movements of the rattle (Obs. 98) at the outset leads the

subject to the discovery of a quantitative connection

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

185

Immanent in this relation: the more the chain is shaken the more
violently the rattles move.

Observation 106 In the evening of 0;3 (13) Laurent by chance strikes
the chain while sucking his fingers (Obs. 98): he grasps it and slowly
displaces it while looking at the rattles. He then begins to swing it very
gently which produces a slight movement of the hanging rattles and an
as yet faint sound inside them. Laurent then definitely increases bydegrees his own movements: he shakes the chain more and morevigorously and laughs uproariously at the result obtained. On seeing
the child's expression it is impossible not to deem this gradation intentional.

At 0;4 (21) as well, when he strikes with his hand the toys hanging
from his bassinet hood (Obs. 103) he visibly gradates his movements asfunction of the result: at first he strikes gently and then continues
more and more strongly, etc.
These gradations are found in nearly all the preceding observations as well as in the use of "procedures tomake interesting sights

last" (see below, Obs. 112-118).

Thus it may be seen how the secondary schemata constitutes
not only a kind of concept or practical "class" but also a systemof relationships enveloping the quantity itself.
3.

RECOGNITORY ASSIMILATION AND THE SYS-TEM OF MEANINGS.

The facts hitherto studied constituteessentially phenomena of reproductive assimilation: through repetition rediscovering a fortuitous result. Before seeing how thisbehavior is extended into generalizing assimilation and thus gives"procedures to make interesting sights last/' let us once
more emphasize a group of facts, which no longer constitute cirrise tocular reactions in themselves but which are derived from second-

ary reactions, in the capacity of recognitory assimilations. What
happens, in effect, is that the child, confronted by objects orcircular resights which habitually set in motion his secondary
actions, limits himself to outlining the customary movements in-stead of actually performing them. Everything takes place as
though the child were satisfied to recognize these objects or sights

and to make a note of this recognition, but could not recognize
them except by working, rather than thinking, the schema helpful to recognition.

Now this schema is none other than that of

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

186

the secondary circular reaction corresponding to the object inquestion.

Here are some examples:
Observation 107. At 0;5 (3) Lucienne tries to grasp spools suspended
above her by means of elastic bands. She usually uses them in order tosuck them, but sometimes she swings them while shaking herself when
94 repeated). She manages to touch but
they are there (see Obs. 94 andthem. Having shaken them fortuitously, she then breaks
to
not
yet

grasp

moment while looking at them (shakes of the legs
and trunk), then she resumes her attempts at grasping.
Why has she broken off in order to shake herself a few seconds? It
was not in order to shake the spools because she did not persevere andwas busy with something else at the moment when she made this moveoff to shake herself ament: neither was it in order to facilitate her attempts at grasping. Is
movement started by the sight of
it aquestion of a purely mechanicaltheir chance swinging? It would seem so, but the rest of the observation shows that this behavior pattern was renewed too often to be
automatic: it therefore certainly has a meaning. Neither is it a questionof a sort of ritual analogous to those we shall study in connection withthe beginnings of play because the child, far from seeming to amuse
herself, was perfectly serious. Everything transpires as though the suba moment with reflection and internal language, had
ject, endowed forsaid to himself something like this: "Yes, I see that this object could beswung, but it is not what I am looking for." But, lacking language, it
is by working the schema that Lucienne would have thought that, before resuming his attempts to grasp. In this hypothesis, the short interlude of swinging would thus be equivalent to a sort of motor recognition.
Such an interpretation would remain completely hazardous whenconfronted by a single fact. But its probability increases along with thefollowing observations. For instance at 0;5 (10) Lucienne again relapses
into states identical to those vis-&-vis a rattle. So also, at 0;6 (5) she
shakes herself several times in succession, very briefly each time, as soon
as she has caught sight of her hand (which comes out of her mouth orby chance enters the visual field, etc.). One cannot see what this movement might mean if not that it is the outline of some action suggestedby this sight.

At 0;6 (12) Lucienne perceives from a distance two celluloid parrots
attached to a chandelier and which she had sometimes had in her bassinet. As soon as she sees them, she definitely but briefly shakes her legs
without trying to act upon them from a distance. This can only be amatter of motor recognition. So too, at 0;6 (19) it suffices that she
catches sight of her dolls from a distance for her to outline the movement of swinging them with her hand.

From 0;7 (27) certain too familiar situations no longer set in motion

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

187

secondary circular reactions, but simply outlines of schemata. Thus

when seeing a doll which she actually swung many times, Lucienne
limits herself to opening and closing her hands or shaking hervery briefly and without real

legs,

but

At 0;10 (28) she is sitting in her
bassinet. With my hand I slightly shake the wholeapparatus by touching the handle. Lucienne laughs and responds by gently shaking her
hand, but this is not an attempt to make me continue; it is only a sorteffort.

of acknowledgment.

Observation 107 repeated. Lament, too, at 0;4 (21) has an object in his
hands when, in order to distract him, I shake the hanging rattles which
he is in the habit of striking. He then looks at the rattles without relinquishing his toy and outlines with his right hand the movement of"striking." From 0;5 I often note such outlines of acts when confronted
by familiar objectives; they are similar to Lucienne's.
It may be seen how such behavior
patterns constitute a separate class. It is no longer a question of a simple secondary cir-cular reaction, since the child reveals no effort to arrive at a result. It is truethat there might be a simple automatization of
on the one hand, the child's expression

earlier reactions. But,

does not give the impression that he acts mechanically and, on
the other hand, we do not see at all why an automatic reproduction of useless acts would last so long (we have only chosen one
or two examples from among innumerable ones). In the second
these behavior patterns cannot be identified with the"procedures to make an interesting spectacle last," of which weplace,

shall speak presently. These "procedures . . ." appear at the mo-ment when a sight contemplated by the child is interrupted, andtheir purposeisto actupon the things themselves, while thepresent behavior patterns arise at simple contact with an object,regardless of whether this is immobile or mobile, and without

an attempt at acting upon it. In the third place, neither is itandpossible to reduce these behavior patterns to "explorations"
shall
of
which
we
reactions"circularspeak subsequently.
"tertiary

The latter relate to new objects whereas the present behavior
patterns are set in motion by familiar objects.
therefore only see one interpretation for Observations

We

107-107 (repeated): they are acts of recognitory assimilation. Confronted by a familiar object or event, but whose sudden appearance was not foreseen by the child, the latter needs to adapt him-

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

188

the unexpected. This Is what occurs, for example, when
Lucienne sees a spool swing at the moment she wishes to graspa moment and init, or perceives her hand, the parrots, etc., ata place she did not expect them, etc. To adapt oneself means, insuch cases, simply noting the event, in so far as it is known andof no use at present: it is then, without adding anything, a matter of recognizing and classing the thing. The subject will subsequently do this in enunciated words or in internal language but,due to his present lack of such symbolic instruments, the childself tois limited to outlining the gestures of the corresponding schema,
used thus in the capacity of a recognitory schema. In other words,
instead of saying: "Oh! the spool is swinging/' or: "There is my

hand.

.

.

.

There is the parrot.

.

,

There is the bassinet which ismoving," the child assimilates these facts by means of motor
concepts, not yet verbal, and, by shaking his own legs or hands,
so indicates to himself that he understands what he perceives.

The existence of this recognitory assimilation might seem
doubtful if it had not been prepared by all the reproductive assimilation of the secondary circular reaction. Two circumstances

show that reproductive assimilation brings with it at the outset
the formation of a sensorimotor recognition. In thefirst place,the very fact of rediscovering an interesting result that is, thedefinition of secondary circular reaction entails an increasingly

accurate recognition. In the second place, once the schema has
been constituted, it is reactivated by each new contact with theobjects due to which it arose. Each time, for example, the childsees the doll hanging he is in the habit of swinging byshaking

himself or striking it, etc., of his own accord he resumes shaking
himself, striking, etc. This activation of the schema by immediate assimilation of the object to its function is simultaneously arecognitory and reproductive fact of assimilation, these two aspects of the assimilatory process being as yet undifferentiatedduring this initial phase. It is therefore very natural that simply
recognitory assimilation should dissociate itself at a given mo-ment from reproductive or purely active assimilation. At first, as
revealed by the beginning of Observation 107, it canhappenthat the child finds himself incited by external facts to activate
a schema at the exact moment when his interest is elsewhere andSECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS
is

189

already acting there according to a different schema. In thiscase the schema which interferes with the main action will sim-ply be outlined whereas the activity in progress will be pursued
normally. Then, it can happen, as revealed by the end of thesame Observation 107, that the schema excited by the external
events is too familiar to give rise to a real action and so is
again
limited to a short and simple indication of it. In both cases theoutline of activity, replacing real activity, isconsequently equivalent to a step which is more contemplative than active; in otherwords, to an act of simple recognition or simple classification
rather than to effective action. So it may be seen thatrecognitory
assimilation, at first involved in reproductive assimilation, detaches itself from it little by little, to remain in the half-active,
half-verifying state which is the state nearest to the pure judgment of verification of which the sensorimotor intelligence iscapable.

These remarks lead us to the analysis of "meanings" and to
the study of the signals or signs characteristic of this third stage.

To understand the nature of the following facts it behooves us
first

to

remind ourselves briefly how the problem of meaning

arises.

Toa sensorial image or an object, whether
assimilation,
recognition, or generalizing extenthrough simple
a
it
in
to
insertofisschemata, in other words, to givesion,
systemit

assimilate

a "meaning." Regardless of whether these schemata are global

and vague or, as in the recognition of an individual factor, they
are circumscribed and precise, consciousness does not know any
state except in reference to a more or less organized totality. Ever
since then it is necessary to distinguish, in every mental element,

two indissolubly bound aspects whose relationship constitutes
meaning: the signifier and the signified. With regard to "meanings" of a higher order, which are also collective meanings, thedistinction is clear: the signifier is the verbal expression, that is,a certain articulated sound to which one has agreed to attributea definite meaning, and the signified is the concept in which themeaning of the verbal sign consists. But with regard to elementary meanings (significations) such as that of the perceived
object, or even, in the small child and prior to the formation of

190

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

substantial objects, that of the simply "presented" sensory imThe "signified*' of objective perceptions
ages, the same applies.
such as that of the mountain I see from my window or the ink-

well on my table is the objects themselves, definable not only bya system of sensorimotor and practical schemata (climbing amountain, dipping pen in ink) or by a system of general concepts
which., etc.), but also by their in(an inkwell is a container
dividual characteristics: position in space, dimensions, solidity.

.

and resistance, color in different lights, etc. Now the latter characteristics,

although perceived in the object itself, presuppose an

extremely complex intellectual elaboration; for example, in order
to attribute real dimensions to the little spots which I perceive
to be a mountain or an inkwell, I must place them in a substan-and causal universe, in an organized space, etc., and accordThe signified of a perception
ingly construct them intellectually.
tialthat is to say, the object itself

istherefore essentially intellec-

tual. No one has ever "seen" a mountain or even an inkwell fromall sides at once in a simultaneous view of their different aspects

from above and below, from East and West, from within and
In order to perceive these individual realities asreal objects it is essential to complete what one sees by what one
knows. Concerning the "signifier," it is nothing other than the
few perceptible qualities recorded simultaneously and at the present time by my sensory organs, qualities by which I recognize a
mountain and an inkwell. Common sense, which prolongs in eachwithout,

etc.

of us the habits of infantile realism, certainly considers the signifier as

being the object itself and as being more "real" than any
But when one has understood that

intellectual construction.

every concrete object

isthe product of geometric, kinematic,

causal, etc., elaborations, in short, the product of a series of acts

of intelligence, there no longer remains any doubt that the trueis the object in the capacity of intellectual
thethatapprehensible elements considered at a fixed
reality andsignified of perception

moment of perception serve only as signs, consequently as "signifiers."

With regard to the simplest sensory images which are assimilated by the nursling and which are anterior to the permanentand substantial object, the same distinctions can be made, though

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

191

Thus when the baby gets ready to grasp thewhich he sees, the visual appearance of this toy is only

to a lesser degree.
rattlea "signifier" in relation to the"signified" which the other qualiare not given simul-

ties of the same object constitute and which

taneously but are collected by the mind in a unique bundle (inparticular its quality of object to be grasped). Here again thesignifier refers to a system of schemata (of vision, prehension,
hearing, sucking, etc.) and only has meaning, even with regard
to the precise image given
through perception, in relation to thewhole of the system.
But if we interpret the idea of signification in this way, including the complementary ideas of "signifier" and "signified"
it isnecessary at once to distinguish between three kinds of sigwhich we shall call the "indication," the "symbol" andnifiers,the "sign" so as to place in their true perspective the facts ofcomprehension of significations that we shall presently describe.

The "symbol" and the "sign" are the signifiers of abstract
meanings, such as those which involve representation. A "symbol" is an image evoked mentally or a material object intentionally chosen to designate a class of actions or objects. So it isthat the mental image of a tree symbolizes in the mind trees ingeneral, a particular tree which the individual remembers, or acertain action pertaining to trees, etc. Hence the symbol presup-

poses representation.

We shall see it made manifest during thechild's second year at the time of the appearance of the symbolic

game (the game of make-believe) or when the progress, intelligence and use of practical deduction will really evoke absent objects. The "sign," moreover, is a collective symbol, and consequently "arbitrary." It also makes its appearance in the second
year, with the beginning of language and doubtless in synchro-nism with the formation of the symbol. Symbol and sign are only
the two poles, individual and social, of the same elaboration of
meanings.

Concerning the "indication,"

this is the concrete signifierconnected with direct perception and not with representation.
In a general way we shall call indication every sensory impression
or directly perceived quality whose signification (the "signified")isan object or a sensorimotor schema. In the strict and limited

192

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

fact which ansense of the word, an indication is a perceptibleof an event
imminencetheornounces the presence of an object
as we haveButa
and announces person).
(the door which opens
to include
extendedbe
could
of indication
theconcept
assimilation. What I see of an inkwell or of asensorimotor
every
mountain is an indication of the existence of these objects; thejust seen,

virtual prehenan indicationis
touch
which the nursling's lips

rattle which the baby looks at is an indication ofsion; the nippleof possible sucking, etc. The facts belinging to the present stage
thus belong in the class of concrete significations of which thesignifier is "indication."these facts, it
But, in order to understand the true nature ofvarieties
different
theis fitting first to divide into different typesof thewhole
theof indications and, to do this, to recapitulate
under study.
"significations" hitherto
we have been able to speak of recognitory
In the firstplace,

assimilation since the very beginning of the reflex (Chapter I).
When the child is hungry and is not limited to sucking for thesake of sucking (reproductive assimilation) nor to sucking the first
he wellobject that reaches his lips (generalizing assimilation),to therelationinitknows how to seek the nipple and discern
that
the
if
not
mean
surrounding teguments. What does thistorelationinandcontrast
nipple has a meaning for him, in
first
This
of
other
type ofsucking, etc.)?
significations (thatemptythe simplest possible. In such a case the signifier
significationis the elementary sensory impression accompanying the play of
the reflex (whence the impression which serves as "excitant" toisthe sucking schema. The proof ofsucking) and the signified issuch an interpretation has in it nothing artificial; it is that thisrecalled, a certain number ofschema involves, as we havejust
differentiated subschemata: contact with the nipple entails suck-ing with swallowing, whereas contact with the surrounding
the sake ofteguments or with an object only entails sucking forentails empty sucksucking, the erethism of the buccal apparatus
is therefore already
these
of
etc.
Each
sensory
impressions
ing,classed and corresponds to a fixed subschema. At the very least,

when a child is hungry and seeks the nipple, it can be said thatthe impression peculiar to this contact is subject to recognitory

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS
assimilation and consequently that it comprises a precise

193"signi-fied/"In the second place come the significations peculiar to theandhabitstoassimilation through acquired schemata
as
we
have
But,
seen, the recognition characteristic of(primary).

first

this level presupposes as "signifiers" in addition,
simple sensory
impressions identical to those of the preceding level which it has

been agreed to call "signals." The signal is an as yet elementary
indication;

consists in a sensory
impression simply associateditto the reaction and to the perceptual images characteristic of any

schema; thereafter it announces these images and sets in motion
these reactions to the extent that it is assimilated to the schema
under consideration. For example, the consciousness of a certain
attitude in the position for nursing sets the sucking schema inmotion. What does this mean if not that this consciousness is asignal or a signifier for the signified which the feeding constitutes?
Such a signifier is surely more complex than that of the first type
(direct sensory

contact with the nipple or the surrounding tegu-

presupposes an acquired extension of the schemaof assimilation, but the signification which it permits remains
elementary. The consciousness of the position for nursing does
not signify anything more, from the subject's point of view, thanments), sinceitthe awaiting and the beginning of the sensory images connectedwith sucking. It is therefore necessary to avoid comparing, as issometimes done, the signal to the "arbitrary" sign. Doubtless any
in motion: training
signal at all can serve to set any reaction
the most varied asoperates in this way, in animals, establishingsociations. But, as we have seen, association only becomes "fixed"
if the signal is incorporated in a schema of assimilation and thus
receives

with

its

signal
say,

is

its

meaning from the single act connecting the effort

result.

Thereafter, to the subject's consciousness, thean indication and not a sign; an indication, that is toa given objective aspect of external reality, as the track ofis to the hunter the indication of the passing of the game.

paws

The signal is therefore no more "arbitrary" in the sense thatto this word than the association of soundand sight in perceiving a clock in movement, is arbitrary.

linguistic scholars give

The latter example evokes a particular variety of this second

194

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

founded on the coordination of heterogeneous
type: the signals
schemata. As we have established in analyzing the different coordinations of sight and hearing, of sight and sucking, of graspingwith sucking and sight, etc., the objects which give rise to such
coordinations through this very fact acquire a complex significa-

and

con*

permanent
begin to assume a certain
texture. In looking at a feeding bottle or a rattle, the childunderstands that it is a thing to suck or a thing to grasp; inchild understands that the thing heard islistening to a noise thesearch then ensues which comprises
activeAn
to be looked at, etc.
a certain sound the childprogress in foresight. Upon hearingacertainseetohimself
image, etc. But in such signifisolidtion: they

preparescations the signifier is always constituted by sensory impressions
and the signified stillorsimply more varied than before,
signals,
consists in coordinated practical schemata.

of significations which we
Finally there comes the third typeindication
the
of
that
shall now
belonging to theemphasize

secondary circular reactions.
Whether there is a secondary circular reaction such as pullto shake objects hanging from theing a chain or a string in orderaorandhood (Obs. 99
procedure to make interesting spec100)
tacles last, such as pulling the same string in order to swing these
it is apparent that the signifiobjects from a distance (Obs. 113),
more complex than the
much
are
cases
such
in
cations involved

preceding ones while being

derived from them by differentiation.

In effect, the significations of the second type remain essentiallyfunctional and related to the subject's own activity. That which
the sensory signals announce is that a certain thing is to be seen,
heard, grasped, etc. On the contrary, the significations of thisthird type comprise from the beginning an element of foresightfrom theandbassinet hood is not only to be seen, grasped,pulled, it servesto swing the objects from a distance, etc. There is, accordingly,

related to the things themselves:the string hanging

in the signification of the string a content related to the foresightof events.

Without yet understanding, of course, the details of

this connection, the child knows that the gesture of pulling thestring brings with

foresight

is

it

the

movement of other objects. But thisnot always independent of the action. The string is

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

195

a signal whose signification is the schema of"pulling inorder to shake the hood." The foresight is therefore not yet pure;still

it is comprised in a motor schema. But, in relation to thesignifications of the second type, there is certainly
progress and, in
addition to the merely active "signal," one already anticipatesthe "indication" in the strict sense of the word: the string is
indication of a series of possible movements.

This characteristic of transition between the "signal" belonging to the preceding stages and the "indication"

belonging to thefourth stage which will set free foresight of the context of theaction in progress is found again in a series of signs which are

made manifest between 0;4 and 0;8, independently of the circular
reactions under study hitherto.
From 0;4 (12) to approximately 0;4 (30) Laurent
when, after his feedings, a handkerchief or napkin
was placed under his chin: they announced a few spoonsful of abeverage he disliked.
At 0;7 (10) he cries in the morning as soon as he hears his mother's
bed creak. Until then, although awake, he did not show his hunger.
But, at the slightest creak, he moans and thus demands his bottle.
The same applies, for a stronger reason, to the noises of the door, but
he remains insensible to external sounds (noises in the hall or neighborObservation 108.

cried with rage

ing rooms).

From 0;7 (15), also in the morning, when I play with him andmother appears he immediately cries with hunger.
The same applies at 0;9 (20) when a maid and not his mother gives
him his morning bottle: at sight of the maid he loses all interest inwhat is going on, even when he is in his mother's bed.
his

Observation 109.At 0;8 (3) Jacqueline smiles and says aa as soon as thedoor to her room opens, before seeing the person who enters. She
therefore understands by this sign that someone will appear. At 0;8
enters the room; she(10) she cries from hunger as soon as her mother
does not do this for her father. Same reaction in negative form at 0;9
her mother (due to lack of appetite 1 ) when(9): she moans at sight ofshe had been laughing and enjoying herself.
At 0;8 (13) she raises her hand to grasp her mother's face when
the latter whispered in her ear from behind her. Without seeing anybehind her. Likething, Jacqueline understands that there is someone
wise, at 0;9 (27) she laughs and turns when I blow down her neck, eventhough she has neither seen me nor heard me arrive.
i

At that time she suffered from anorexia.

196

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

At 0;8 (18) she is still not hungry and cries when her bib is put on,
she opens her mouth as
knowing that a meal awaits her. Furthermore,soon as her forehead is touched by her sponge (which she has not seen)
because every day she amuses herself by biting it.

Such recognitions of indications at first appear to be suffithe action to give rise to truly objective
ciently detached fromthe case during the fourth stage. But inforesight as will behere are not yet "mobile in thereality the signs in question
sense in which we shall interpret this term in connection with thefourth stage; that is to say, they do not give rise to foresight re5 *lated to the activities of the objects themselves independently to
The indications described in Observations 108-109
thesubjects.

all make up a part of the global schema: either that of the meal,

in which the child is certainly active, or else that of an "interesting
as having his neck or hands blown on, etc.)
spectacle" (suchwhich the childcomparable to those "interesting spectacles"
and which"circular"
maintains due to procedures which are still

we shall study in the next paragraph. If such indications alreadyannounce objective foresight, it cannot then be said that they arecircular reaction. They are
entirely detached from secondary
schemata and only acquire
simply inserted in the preestablishedof the latter. Like the indications andfunctionaasmeaning
we have recalled, they merely form a transisignifications whichtion between the primary "signals" and the actual indicationsof the fourth stage.

GENERALIZING ASSIMILATION AND THE CONSTITUTION OF "PROCEDURES TO MAKE INTERESTING SPECTACLES LAST." The generalization of secondary
4.

schemata is produced when the child is confronted by new obcases the child from the outset makes use of his
jects. In suchusual behavior patterns and assimilates the unfamiliar to theirschemata, without adding anything. It is a remarkable thing thatthe younger the child, the less novelties seem new to him. Unfortunately, it is impossible to compare in this respect secondarywith primary reactions in the presence of unfamiliar objects forthere is no appreciablecommon gauge for them. But if the re-SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

197

actions of the present stage are compared to those of the following
one and above all to the "tertiary circular reactions" of the fifth
stage, the difference is all the more striking as the situations be-come more homogeneous. In the face of a new phenomenon, thechild in the fifth stage is capable of adopting the attitude of ex-

perimentation (this does not mean that he necessarily adopts it,
but he is apt to do so). He seeks novelty and varies the conditionsof the phenomenon in order to examine all of its modalities. The
child in the fourth stage, without reaching these true "experi-ments to see," is also interested in the new object in itself. But, inorder to "understand" it, he tries to apply to it in turn the wholeof the known schemata in order to find which one in particularwill be most suitable to it. On the other hand, the child at thepresent stage, while sometimes feeling surprise in the presence ofan unknown object, nevertheless from the outset treats it as afamiliar object and employs it in the use of his habitual schemata.

Thereafter one has the impression that the child, far from still

being interested in the thing in itself and far from appreciating
its novelty as such, merely tries to use his secondary schemata by
pure functional assimilation, as he did hitherto by means of the
primary schemata. Consequently there exists a simple generalization of secondary schemata.

Here are examples of this elementary generalizing assimilation:

Observation 110. At 0;3 (29) for the first time Laurent sees the paper
knife which figured in Observation 104. He grasps and looks at it, but
only for a moment. Afterward he immediately swings it with his righthand as he does all the objects grasped (see the schema of Obs. 102). He
then rubs it by chance against the wicker of the bassinet and tries toreproduce the sound heard, as though it were a rattle (see Qbs. 102).
It then suffices that I place the object in his left hand for him to shake itin the same way. He ends by sucking it. The novelty of the object has
therefore in no way interested the child, except for the brief glance atthe beginning: the paper knife from the outset was used as aliment for
the habitual schemata.

At 0;4 (8) I place a large rubber monkey in front of Laurent; themobile limbs and tail as well as its expressive head constitute an absoastonishment
lutely new entity for him. Laurent reveals, in effect, lively
and even a certain fright. But he at once calms down and applies to themonkey some of the schemata which he uses to swing hanging objects;

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

198

he shakes himself, strikes with his hands, etc., gradating his effort according to the result obtained.
Likewise, at 0;5 (25)and the days following, Laurent looks at an

unfolded newspaper which I place on the hood of his bassinet. He imfrom the hood, to shakemediately begins to pull the strings hanging
himself or his feet and arms. He bursts out laughing on seeing the
movements of the newspaper just as he frequently does when the rattles
shake.

At 0;6 (0) Laurent at once grasps a big box of lozenges which isunfamiliar to him. He hardly looks at it but immediately uses it to rub
then he passes it from one hand to theagainst the sides of the bassinet,
other and rubs the object against the opposite side of the bassinet.
At 0;6 (1) he grasps a new rattle made of three parts: the handle,
a middle ball of medium size and the end ball, a large one, Laurent
looks at the object quite a long time while passing it from one hand tothe other and even seems to palpate the surface which foretells the behavior patterns of the following stage. But he quickly desists in orderto move the object in the air, at first slowly, then more and more
he shakes it, rubs it against the sides of the bassinet,
rapidly, and finallyetc.

At 0;6 (7) I offer him various new objects to see if he will resume
which seemed to appear in connecnot
does
This
occur; the child utilizes the newtion with the last object.
his habitual schemata. So it is that a penguin withforaliment
asobjectat briefly: at first Laurent
long feet and a wagging head is only looked
strikes it, then rubs it against the side of the bassinet, etc., without payit. Several knick-knacks
ing attention to the end by which he grasped
receive the same treatment: he grasps them with one hand and strikes

his attempts at spatial exploration

them with the other.
At 0;6 (14) he takes hold of a new doll, looks at it for a moment
without investigating either its shape or clothing: he strikes it, rubs itin the air, etc.
against the wicker, shakes it
At 0;6 (18) a pipe holds his attention more but is subsequently
utilized in the same way. At 0;6 (16) a new swan, encircled by a ring

and with a handle is looked at with curiosity arid immediately struck,
shaken, rubbed, etc. At 0;6 (26) a series of unfamiliar objects (a rattlewith a bell, a bear, a lamb, etc.) are barely examined before being struck,

shaken, etc.

At 0;7 (2) he only looks a little at an unfamiliar bird of complicatedto shaking
shape mounted on a plank with wheels. He limits himself
and striking it, and rubbing it against the side of the bassinet.
Observation 111. At 0;5 (3) Lucienne only has one schema at her disposition which she employs in the course of her circular reactions and ator
tempts to make interesting spectacles last: that of shaking her footentire body to cause swinging (see Obs. 116). Furthermore, of course, sheSECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

199

knows how to grasp, suck, etc. When a new object is presented to her
there ensues the curious result that she tries in turn the schemata of
the first
toprehension and of shaking the feet, but

applying

chiefly

immobile and near objects and the second mainly to objects in motionor hanging before her. Here is the series of attempts:
First of all, before a cross of Malta whichhangs above her, Lucienne
immediately moves her feet only. Then she slows down her movements
and begins empty sucking while looking at the object; after this she
grasps it and brings it in front of her eyes in order to examine it.

A pipe, motionless: attempts at prehension, sucking at a distanceand foot movements, all simultaneous.

An eraser: surprise, sucking at a distance and prehension. Once theeraser has been grasped, Lucienne looks at it briefly, in her hand, then
immediately begins to move her feet.
Again the cross of Malta: immediate and sustained foot movements. Then Lucienne's hand having knocked against the object, there
is an attempt at prehension, but this second reaction is
obviously due toa fortuitous cause.
A hanging puppet: she grasps it and pulls but, not succeeding in
drawing it to her, she periodically desists in order to give hard shakesof the feet. She then resumes, grasping, then moves her legs again: there
is constant alternation between these two activities.

A slide rule: exclusive attempts at prehension. No movement of thefeet.

A strap which I swing slowly: shakes of the feet, then attempts at
prehension.

A stick of sealing wax; only prehension.
A watch placed very near her face: first prehension, then when I

raise it too high, shakes of the feet.

This observation consequently shows us how much the new object
immediately assimilated to a schema; that is to say, generically recognized as being able to give rise to a familiar behavior pattern, evenwhen the habitual schemata are very limited in number. In what follows it goes without saying that the more these schemata are multipliedisthe more the new object is subjected to various attempts.
It may be seen in what such behavior patterns consist.

When

confronted by new objects the child does not yet try to find out inwhat way they are new, he limits himself, at the outset or after ashort pause, to using them as aliments for his habitual behavior
without adding anything forpatterns. He therefore generalizes,
their use, the schemata he possesses.

But the generalizing assimilation belonging to this stage is
not limited to this elementary form. It sometimes happens thatTHE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

200

the novelty presented to the child does not consist in a particularan actual spectacle on which the subject
object but in an event, in
occurs then? The child, desirous
Whatinfluence.
has no directofseeingthe spectacle

prolonged,alsoutilizes

hishabitualschemata which he generalizes without adding anything to thiseffect. That is what is revealed by Observation 110. When Laurent, at 0;4 (8) and 0;5 (25) cannot grasp the monkey or theat once applies to themnewspaper which he sees from afar, hetorelatedthe schemata
hanging objects and thus seeks to act
From that to trying to act upon anyadistance.
fromupon themphenomenon whatever, independently of any real contact, is only
a step.

This step is taken as a result of the following behavior pattern: It is a transitional behavior pattern which stems fromsecondary circular reaction but whose higher forms foretell the
combinations of the fourth stage. It is the activity by means ofwhich the child tries to make last the interesting spectacles ofwhich he has just been witness without himself having provoked
their first appearance (for example, prolonging theswinging ofa watch seen from afar, etc.). SLuch behavior patterns still partakeof circular reaction, since it is simply a matter of conserving andreproducing, but they generalize its principle, since the schemata
hitherto inserted in actual circular reactions are henceforth applied to entirely new circumstances. Here are some examples ofthese behavior patterns:

Observation 112.

The first example will make us understand how thesecondary circular reaction is prolonged in procedures to make an interesting spectacle last. Following Observation 98 at 0;3 (20) I make thefollowing experiment on Laurent. I give him a rubber doll, unfamiliar
to him and attached to the usual rattle by a string sufficiently loose sothat the doll's movements do not shake the rattle. As soon as Laurent
sees the doll, he grasps it in his right hand and sucks it. This preliminary phase lasts ten minutes during which the rattle has neither moved
nor made a noise. After this Laurent lets his arm drop to the side while
keeping the doll in his hand. I then shake the rattle without shaking
the string or Laurent's hand; moreover, he did not look at the rattle atthis time. Then, as soon as he hears the rattle, he looks at it and stretches
out his right arm, while holding the doll in his hand, then he shakes
this doll in a perfectly adapted way.

But a moment later Laurent's right hand is in contact with the doll,

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

201

without holding it. I then shake the rattle again. He immediately moves
his right arm, his handremaining empty and not attempting to grasp
the doll.

Thus it may be seen how, as soon as circumstances are changed,
the schema becomes dissociated and the efficacious
gesture (grasping,and shaking the arm, or simply shaking the arm) is advanced to therank of procedure to make the interesting spectacle last, in the very
absence of the usual intermediaries (of thechain).

The rest of the observation well shows, in effect, that this arm movement has become, for Laurent, a constant "procedure" and has not
simply consisted in an episodic effort. At 0;3 (5) for example, Laurent
practices grasping my hand when it is within his direct reach; but,when I put it at a distance of 50 cm. or more, he looks at it and thenswings his arms rapidly just as he does when confronted by his usual
rattle. At 0;3 (23), I present him(at a distance of 50 cm.) with an unfamiliar doll (in costume) which I swing for a moment. As long as it
moves, he looks at it, motionless, but as soon as it stops, he shakes hisarm. Same reaction with respect to my watch and my wallet. The same
day I saw him behave spontaneously in this way while looking at his

hanging doll.

At 0;3 (29) I shake his arm as soon as I stop swinging a paper knife
100 cm. away from him. At 0;4 (18) he shakes his arm in order to makeme continue when I shake his feet. He laughs and waves his arms more
and more vigorously until I resume. At 0;5 (26) he does the same assoon as a grating sound stops, a sound which I had made without his
seeing me. He definitely gradates his movement according to the variations of the waiting time.

At 0;6 (27) again, he shakes his arm when he does not succeed ingrasping a distant object or in order to make an object move at a
distance (a sheet of paper placed on a cupboard, at a distance of 150
cm. from him, etc.). Same observation at 0;7 (5).
At 0;7 (7) he looks at a tin box placed on a cushion in front ofhim, too remote to be grasped. I drum on it for a moment in a rhythm
which makes him laugh and then present my hand (at a distance of 2 cm.
from his, in front of him). He looks at it, but only for a moment, thenturns toward the box; then he shakes his arm while staring at the box(then he draws himself up, strikes his coverlets, shakes his head, etc.;that is to say, he uses all the "procedures" at his disposition). He obviously waits for the phenomenon to recur. Same reaction at 0;7 (12),at 0;7 (13), 0;7 (22), 0;7 (29) and 0;8 (1) in a variety of circumstances(seeObs. 115).
It therefore seems apparent that the movement of shaking the arm,

schema of the whole, has been removed
from its context to be used, more and more frequently, as a "procedure"
to make any interesting spectacle last.
at first inserted in a circular

202

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONSLaurent
Observation 112 repeated.-A.nother hand movement of which
but in contrahas made use as a "procedure" is the act of "striking";
for the first
distinction to the preceding one, this schema was utilized
time as a "procedure," due to a simple association of continuity.
At 0;7 (2), in effect, Laurent is in the process of striking a cushion
thumb. Laurent
middlewhen I
against the ball of myfingersnap mythen smiles and strikes the cushion but while staring at my hand; as I
no longer move, he strikes harder and harder, with a definite expressionof desire and expectation and, at the moment when I resume snapping
my fingers, he stops as though he had achieved his object.
A moment later, I hid behind a big curtain and reappeared every
few minutes. In the interim, Laurent strikes his covers harder andharder while looking at the curtain.-Same reaction while looking at anelectric light. At 0;7 (5) he strikes the side of his bassinet while looking
failure.
at the hanging rattles and continues for a long time despite
At 0;7 (7) he strikes his coverlets while looking at a tin box onwhich I have just drummed (see Obs. 112). Same reactions until about0;8.

At 0;7 (11) he strikes the wrong end of his bottle in the hope of
seeing the nipple come up (see Vol. II, Obs. 78).

Observation 113. -Jacqueline, likewise, at 0;7 (16), that is to say, after
Observation 100, applies the schema of pulling the strings of the hood to

new circumstances. After having moved the hood by moving a hanging
at a certain distance.
Jacqueline looks at my watch which I swing
She begins by trying to grasp my watch, then she happens to graze thethen she grasps it and shakes it violently
string hanging from the hood;
while looking at the watch, as though her movement were going to makethe object continue to swing.That evening, same reaction with regard
to a doll which I swing from a distance. At 0;7 (23) after having pulled
the same string to shake the hood of the bassinet, Jacqueline looks at abook which I pass back and forth in front of her, at the level of thehood but in the open. As soon as I stop, Jacqueline, who until thenwas motionless, without hesitation pulls the string hanging from thehood while staring at the book. She shakes the string harder andharder, ten times, then stops. I then recommence to move the book. As
soon as I stop doing it, Jacqueline pulls the string, but less energeticallyand less frequently. And so on, twice more. If the number of shakes she
doll,gave the string during these four attempts is counted, the following
series is obtained: 8-10; 5-8; 3-4; 2. It is apparent from her countenanceand from this series, that Jacqueline hoped to make the book continue
to move by pulling the string and that she gave up little by little. At
the fifth and sixth attempts Jacqueline limits herself to looking at thebook while it moves without attempting anything afterward.

At 0;8 (8) on the other hand, after having used the string to makethe hood of the bassinet move, she looks at a bottle which I swing 50

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

203

cm. away from her. As soon as I stop, she pulls the string to make it
continue while staring at the bottle with a very typical expression of

expectation and anxiety. When she notes the failure, she tries anotherprocedure and imitates with her hand the movement of the bottle
without trying to grasp it.

At 0;8 (16) Jacqueline looks at me while my lips imitate themewing of a cat. She holds a little bell suspended from the hood. Aftersome other procedures (see Vol. II, Obs. 132), in order to make me continue, she shakes the little bell she holds. I answer

by miauling. As
soon as I stop, she again shakes the little bell, and so forth. After a few
moments I definitively stop my miaulings. She shakes the bell two or
three times more and, confronted by failure, she changes means.
Observation 114. At 0;7(29)Jacqueline answered herself by rubbing

the wicker side of her bassinet with her right hand. At a given moment,

when her hand is outstretched beside her, without her knowledge I
shake the hood once or twice. She does not then try to pull the string
but again rubs her hand against the wicker while watching the hoodas though this were going to move. Same reaction many times. It istrue that when the hand movements are sufficiently violent they makethe whole bassinet shake slightly, but the rest of the observation willshow that this relative success is not enough to explain the use of theprocedure.
The next day, at 0;7 (30) I clap my hands in front of Jacqueline.
When I have finished she moves her hand against the wicker of thebassinet while looking at my hands. When I recommence she stops as
though she had attained her goals and, when I stop, she begins again.
A few hours later, same reaction with regard to my be"ret which I
hold (without showing myself) 100 cm. from his eyes. At the beginningthe child's expression leaves no doubt of her desire to prolong theinteresting spectacle by this means, but the child progressively slackens
with failure. Finally, Jacqueline only moves her hand slightly, then not
at all.

Observation 115

Everyone knows the attitude of nurslings when freely

enjoying themselves or when an unexpected sightcauses them a lively

on their feet
feeling of pleasure. They draw themselves up by pressing
and shoulder blades and let themselves fall back in a heap. Moreover
it is

not difficult to note that this movement is often utilized in orderto make the bassinet move. It is enough that the child has observed theshakes for him to draw himself up intentionally whilehood and the hanging objects. Now this schema, once
is subsequently applied to anything at all, in the capacity ofacquired,
to make an interesting spectacle last." In the course ofaeffect of theselooking at the"procedure

Volume II (Obs. 132) we shall cite a long observation made of Jacque-204

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

line concerning the development of causality.

Here is its equivalent inLaurent.

At 0;4 (2) Laurent simply shakes the bassinet by drawing himself
this schema as a "procedure." When
But
already at 0;4 (7) he utilizesup.
and then draws himself up,
moment
brief
a
for
waits
he
I stop humming
while looking at me.
at first very gently, then more and more vigorously,

The intention is clear. Same reaction at 0;7 (3).
Between 0;4 and 0;6 he uses the same procedure to prolong theit to cause me toetc. At 0;6 (6) and 0;7 (2) he makes use ofswinging,

continue to snap my fingers (see Obs. 112 repeated). He visibly gradates
his effort as a function of his impatience.
From 0;7 (7) to 0;8 (1) he draws himself up to act upon a tin box
on which I drummed or upon a series of similar objects (see Obs. 112).
In short, the action of drawing himself up is prompted to therank of a magic-phenomenalistic procedure and is used in the mostvaried circumstances.
Observation 116. Lucienne revealed exactly analogous behavior patterns but with procedures of course varying as a function of her earlier
circular reactions. Now, we recall
94-95) that one of her most(Obs.
to shake her bassinet or the rattles by means
frequent reactions wasof repeated vigorous shakes of legs and feet (movements analogous to
the sixth month this behavior pattern gave rise topedaling). Fromto satisfy desires or make interesting spectacles
destined
procedures
I show her
last. Already at 0;4 (14) Lucienne looks at my hand whichfrom a distance. Her fingers move, but her arms and trunk remain im-

mobile; she has an expression of desire and makes sucking movements;
she becomes red with emotion while opening and closing her mouth andshe brusquely moves her legs with all possible speed. But is this simply
an attitude or already an attempt at action? This remains in doubt until
0;5 (21). At 0;5 (10) she shakes her legs while holding a rattle with ahandle, as she does when confronted by the hanging rattle. Then at
0;5 (21) she does it as soon as I stop swinging my hands. Instead ofshakes her legs to make me continue. At 0;7
imitating my gesture she
the same when I move my fingers, wag my head, move my(1) she does
hands, etc., in order to study imitation. She begins by imitating, thenshakes her legs, paying great attention to what I do. At 0;8 (5) same
reaction in the presence of all sorts of spectacles: a doll that I swing,
etc. At 0;8 (13) she watches me open and close my mouth. She begins
notby examining me with great interest, then tries to grasp, then,succeeding, she moves her legs slightly; as soon as I stop, she shakes
them violently, apparently to make me continue. Same reaction at 0;8
not a question of a simple receptive attitude but of an(15). Now this isactive procedure, for Lucienne constantly gradates her effort according
to the result. She tries at first prudently and slowly and if I respond by

moving my lips, she shakes herself more and more vigorously.

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

205

Observation 1 1 7. Here are some more
procedures which Lucienne hasused. From 0;7 (20) when she shook her bassinet
her hands

by moving(see Obs. 101) she used this procedure for quite other purposes. Thus,
at 0;7 (23) she looks atwithinterest when I unfold a news-

me

great

paper and rumple it. As soon as I have finished she moves her hands
several times in succession. The same day I
appear in her visual field,
disappear, reappear, etc. She is very much puzzled and (after my disappearance, I see her through the hood) moves her hands while looking
in the direction where I should havereappeared. She subsequently
applies this schema to everything: at 0;7 (27) to make me continue mygestures, at 0;8 (0) to move a puppet from a distance, at 0;8 (18) tomake me repeat a cry, at 0;IO (12) to make me put my index finger
back into my mouth, etc.
From 0;8 (5) as we have previously seen (Obs. 101), she shakes herhead in order to move the bassinet. The following days she applies thisschema to the most varied situations: at 0;8 (12) she tries them in orderto make me repeat a cry, at 0;10 (7) in order to makeswing a placard
hanging in a car and rendered immobile by the stopping of the train,etc.

At 0;9 (28) she puffs through her mouth in analogous situations
me repeat my gestures, etc.). At 0;10 (8) she draws herself up,
like Jacqueline (Obs. 115) to prolong a gesture, a whistle, a movementof the dolls, etc. At 0;10 (24) she vigorously scratches her coverlet with(to makethe same intentions, etc.

Observation 118. Let us finally mention the manner in which Laurent
has come to utilize his head movements as "procedures" charged withefficacity. From 0;3 Laurent is able to imitate a lateral displacement of
the head. Now, as early as 0;3 (23) I find him moving his head in thisway when confronted by a hanging rattle, as though to give it a real
movement (see Vol. II, Obs. 88).
At 0;3 (29) he shakes his head when I stop swinging a paper knife.
The following weeks he reacts in the same way as soon as I interrupt
a movement he has observed.
At 0;7 (1) he does it to incite me to continue to snap my middle
finger against my thumb. At 0;7 (5) same reaction in the presence of anewspaper which I unfolded and which remains motionless. At 0;7 (7)he shakes his head the same as he shakes his arm or draws himself up

when he sees a tin box on which I have drummed.
Until toward 0;8 he thus continues to use this schema to make any
interesting sight whatever last, whether it is a visually perceived movement, regardless of the direction of this movement, or even a sound(humming, etc.).

Thus it may be seen that it is not an exaggeration to talk ofthegeneralization in characterizing such behavior patterns. In

206

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

six observations which we have just summarized thereisa ques-tion of schemata elaborated in the course of the child's circular
to new circumstances. These situations
reactions, but

appliedhave in common the fact that the child has just witnessed an
an influence upon itinteresting spectacle and would like to havein order to make it last. This desire, not being coordinated withany adapted mechanism since precisely in such cases the subject
is impatient, is radiated, quite naturally, in movements connected with the circular reactions, that is to say, to situations inwhich the child can prolong the desirable result at will. So it isthat the schemata originally related to limited circumstances areapplied at first" to all analogous situations, then to any activity
whatever on condition that it is a question of reproducing aninteresting spectacle.
But the latter condition at the same time shows us the limitsof circular reaction.

On the one hand, as we have already stressed,

only a question of repeating and not of inventing, truly toadapt oneself to new circumstances. On the other hand, to the

it isextent that there is generalization, the procedures employed do
not apply in detail to these new situations. There exists, so to
speak, abstract generalization (the effective gesture being applied
to empty space) and not concrete insertion of the means employed
into the context of the situation. Let us remark, moreover, withregard to this last point, that the same is true at all levels. Not
only the schemata due to secondary circular reactions but also

most precise discoveries can subsequently be
empty space and give rise to magic-phenomenalistic

those due to theapplied toconnections (see below, Chap. V, Obs. 176). But, at the level
which we are now considering, that is to say, at the beginning of
the action upon things and the interrelations of things, theseconnections remain the only possible ones.
Fortunately, there is a second method of generalization of
the secondary schemata: that which we shall study in the next

chapter in trying to find out how the child will intercoordinate
his schemata when it will be aquestion not only of repeating or
prolonging, but of really adapting himself to new situations.

Before that, let us emphasize the lasting importance of
secondary circular reaction during the last stages of intellectual

SECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

207

development. Secondary circular reaction, in so far as it is a
reproduction of an interesting result fortuitously obtained, is, in
effect, far from constituting a behavior pattern peculiar to thechild. An adult, unacquainted with machinery, does not behave
differently from the baby when, having by chance touched partof a motor, he does not understand the effect produced and repeats the action which set it in motion. Like the reflexes of thestage and the acquired associations or habits of the second,
the secondary reactions are behavior patterns whose mere appearance characterizes a given stage but which are conserved as
first

substructures in the last stages.

The peculiarity of the circular reactions of the present stage
during this period, they constitute the highest intellectual
manifestations of which the child is capable, whereas subsequentlyis that,they will only fill an increasingly derived role. This point is of acertain importance and justifies the distinction we shall henceforth make between "typical" secondary circular reactions and"derived" secondary circular reactions. In effect, when the childat the present stage tries to reproduce an interesting result, he has

never obtained this result except in an entirely fortuitous way;that is to say, without the context of his activity being one of research, of experimentation, etc. On the contrary, when the childat a final stage or an adult discovers a fortuitous result, it is al-

most always in a context of research or of experimentation andthereafter the action of reproducing the effect obtained only constitutes a "derived" action.

For example we shall observe such "derived" reactions during
the fourth stage when, in the presence of new objects, the childat "explorations" (see Chap. IV, 5).
applies himself to attempts
If in the course of "exploration" the child fortuitously discovers

an unforeseen result, he immediately reproduces it. Such behavior
identical to that of the secondary circular reaction, but is"derived." During the fifth stage, too, it happens that in experi-isto say, in organizing what we shall call thethe child comes little by little toreactions""tertiary circularwhichengendered an unforeseen effect. He
repeat the movements
circularreaction, but this is, in suchthen relapses into secondary"derived."
a case, once morementing

that

is

208

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS
The time has not yet come to study these derivations. Let

us limit ourselves to citing an example of these final circular reactions in order to show their structural identity with the preced-

ing ones:
Observation 119 .Jacqueline, at 1;1(7)continues to reproduce all the

new movements which she discovers by chance and everything she ismade to do. For instance, I put a stick on her head: she immediately
puts it back there. I hold her cheeks in my hands, then let them go: sheputs her cheek back into my hand, or grasps my hand in order to press
it against her

cheek, or she applies her own hand.

At 1;3 (12) she is sitting in her play pen with one leg through thebars. When she tries to lift herself up she does not at first succeed inwithdrawing her foot. She moans, almost cries, then tries again. She
then painfully succeeds in disengaging herself, but as soon as she hasdone so she replaces her leg in the same position and begins all overagain. This happens four or five times in succession until the situation
completely assimilated.
At 1;3 (13) while walking, she knocks her head on a table so that
she has a very noticeable red mark. Nevertheless she immediately grasps
a stick which is beside her and strikes her forehead on the same place.
Then as this dangerous instrument is taken from her, she again knocks
herself intentionally, but with very great prudence, against the arm of aischair.

In conclusion, the deep unity of the behavior patterns of
this stage may be seen. Whether it is a question of pure "secondary

circular reactions'* or of movements of recognitory assimilation oragain of generalization of schemata in the presence of new objects or of spectacles to be prolonged, in all these cases the behavior of the child consists in repeating what he has just done oralready used to doing. The action performed by the childtherefore always consists in a global and unique action of a single
isadvent and characterized by a single schema. One can, it is true,already distinguish the means and ends in such an action, in thesense that the child's movements are seriate and complex in theirinterrelations. But means and ends are inseparable from one another and, consequently, produced in the same entity. On theother hand, the behavior patterns of the following
stage will
furnish us an example of coordinations between separate sche-mata, some of which will serve as ends and others as means.

Now this need of repetition, which characterizes this stageSECONDARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

209

and which explains the global aspect of assimilation throughsecondary schemata, also conditions the accommodation to external environment peculiar to such behavior patterns. Whether
it is a question of secondary circular reactions or of thegeneraliza-

same schemata in the presence of new objects orsights, this accommodation always consists in rediscovering withtion of thethe maximum precision possible, the movements which were effectual.

The accommodation characteristic of the fourth stage

will be quite different. By virtue of the coordination of theschemata, it will constitute an adjustment of their contexture to

the objects themselves and thus will go beyond the simple, con-fused and whole application.

In short, if the elaboration of the secondary schemata of thethird stage marks perceptible progress over that of the primaryschemata in the sense that the child begins really to act uponthings, it nevertheless prolongs the assimilation and accommodation characteristic of the primary reactions in that the child's
activity remains centered on itself more than on objects.

CHAPTER IV

THE FOURTH STAGE:The Coordination of the Secondary Schemata andTheir Application to New Situations
At about 8 to 9 months a certain number of solidary transformations appear concerning at the same time the mechanism ofof spatial groups asintelligence and the elaboration of objects,
well as of causal and temporal series. These transformations
even seem important enough to characterize the appearance ofa stage: that of the first actually intelligent behavior patterns.

From the point of view of the functioning of intelligence
this fourth stage marks considerable progress over the preceding
one. The behavior patterns of the third stage, as we have seen,

only consist in "circular reactions." No doubt these reactions are
related to the external environment and no longer only to thebody itself. Moreover, we have called them "secondary" to distinguish them from the "primary" reactions. No doubt either
that the activity of the secondary schemata can start wheneverthe child wishes to prolong any interesting phenomenon and nolonger only the result in connection with which the schemata inquestion were constituted. But, as we have stated, that is only asimple generalization of schemata without elaboration of thespecial relations between each of them and the new goal to bereached. In short, the reactions of the third stage therefore constitute the simple prolongation of the primary circular reactions;they owe only to their complexity the fact of drawing, after the
event, a distinction between transitive and final states, between

means and ends. On the other hand, the behavior patterns of the
fourth stage involve such a distinction from the very outset. The
210

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA
criterion of their appearance

211

is, in effect, the intercoordinationof the secondary schemata. Now, in order that two schemata, until

then detached, may be coordinated with one another in a single
act, the subject must aim to attain an end which is not directly
within reach and to put to work, with this intention, the schemata

thitherto related to other situations. Thereafter the action

nolonger functions by simple repetition but by subsuming under
the principal schema a more or less long series of transitional
schemata. Hence there exists simultaneously the distinction between the end and the means, and the intentional coordinationof the schemata.

does not limit

The intelligent act is thus constituted, whichmerely to reproducing the interesting retoatbutthem due to new combinations.
sults,
arriving
From the point of view of the real categories such progress
leads, as we shall see in Volume II, to an essential result. By coordinating the schemata which constitute the instruments of his
itselfintelligence, the child learns ipso facto to put things in relationship to each other. In effect, the concrete connections uniting

objects of the external world are constructed at the same time as
the formal interrelations of schemata since the latter represent

actions capable of being brought to bear on objects. The parallelism of these

two series, real and formal, is even so close that,during the first stages, it is very difficult to dissociate action fromin proportion as the action becomes
object. On the other hand,complicated through coordination of schemata, the universe becomes objectified and is detached from the self.
The phenomenon is apparent, at first, with regard to theconcept of "object." It is to the extent that the child learns tocoordinate two separate schemata that is to say, two actions
until then independent of each other that he becomes capableof seeking objects which disappeared and of attributing to thema consistency independent of the self. Searching for the object

which has disappeared is, in effect, to set aside the screens whichmask it and to conceive it as being situated behind them; it is, inshort, to think of it in its relations with things seen at the present
time and not only in its relations with the action.

This progress in the formation of the object Is on a par witha correlative elaboration of the spatial field. As long as the child's

212

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

in the form of isolated movements
activity is made manifest only
are not intercoordinated, thewhichschematathat is to say, of

remainon the movements;

dependent"groups" of displacements
in other words, space is only envisaged as a function of the self
and not yet as an immobile environment connecting things to
one another. With the coordination of the schemata, on the other
hand, begins the putting of the bodies themselves into spatialthat is to say, the formation of objective space.
interrelationships,

To be sure, the formation of this space, like that of the "objects"
which are correlative to it, is not achieved at one time and at thisof the preceding stages are found. But thestage many remnants
mind is henceforth different and intheoforientation
subject's

stead of bringing the universe to himself, the child begins touniverse which is independent of him.
place himself in a
in the realm of causality and of time. Duris
true
same
The
series go beyond the purely
ing the present stage the causal
the activity and the external movements,
betweenrelations
globalto become objectified and made spatial In other words, thecause of a certain phenomenon is no longer identified by thechild with the feeling he has of acting upon this phenomenon.
The subject begins to discover that a spatial contact exists between cause and effect and so any object at all can be a sourceof activity (and not only his own body). Consequently the temfor their part, to be set in order as a function
poral series begin,of
events, and not only of the sequence of actions.
of the sequence
Thus one catches a glimpse of how the intercoordination of

secondary schemata is accompanied by a correlative progress with"real" categories of intelligence.
regard to the elaboration of the
But let us save the study of these transformations for Volume II

and only analyze at the present time the formal elaboration of
the mechanism of intelligence.

THE "APPLICATION OF FAMILIAR SCHEMATA
TO NEW SITUATIONS." I. THE FACTS. The essential
1.

novelty of the situation which we shall now study is that: thechild no longer merely tries to repeat or prolong an effect which

he has discovered or observed by chance; he pursues an end not
immediately attainable and tries to reach it by different inter-

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

213

mediate "means/* As far as these means are concerned it is truethat familiar schemata are always involved and not new means;but, granted that the subject no longer limits himself to reproducing that which he has just done but pursues a distant goal, he
adapts the familiar schema to the particulars of this situation andso raises it to the level of a true "means." With regard to the"purpose" it goes without saying that the child does not decide
about it in advance, in the sense that we manage, through reflection, to impose a plan on our conduct, independently of any
external suggestion. It is always under the pressure of perceived
facts, or by prolonging a recent reaction, that the child acts. His
acts are still, therefore, in this sense, conservative, and have nofunction other than the use of his earlier schemata. That conforms, moreover, to the fundamental law of assimilation and we
do not see how it could be otherwise. But and it is in this sensethat the goal is set in advance and that the situation is "new"obstacles intervene between the act and its result. Where the childwishes to grasp, to swing, to strike, etc. (as many ends as are
consistent with primary and secondary circular reactions), circumstances erect barriers he must clear. Hence it is a question of
keeping in mind the "goal" to be reached and of trying different

known means of surmounting the difficulty. The act of intelligence properly so called develops in that way, to the extent that
it is differentiation of the secondary circular reaction and involves to a higher degree the "reversal" in the consciousness
which constitutes intention and of which we have spoken before.

Let us try to analyze some samples of this behavior, beginningby describing three cases intermediate between the secondary
circular reactions and the true "applications of familiar means to

new situations."
Observation

120.We believe we have observed in Laurent an ele-mentary example of these behavior patterns as early as 0;6 (1), provided
that the facts we have described were observed correctly. If this was thecase, the thing has nothing extraordinary about it, for three reasons.

The first is that this first manifestation of the "application of familiar
schemata to new situations*' is not yet typical and forms the transition
between the simple "secondary circular reaction" and the freer behavior
which will follow. The second reason ispatterns, the description ofthat Laurent has always been ahead of his sisters, after the circumstances

214

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

and that consequently, at 0;6 (I) he has utilized, forpreviously noted,
schemata. Hence
three months already, all sorts of secondary circularother in cereach
to
them
at
coordinating
it is natural that he arrive
which we emphasize
tain exceptional situations. The third reason,
the behavior patterns characteristic of a stage appear
strongly, is thatso much the less at one time, in the form of simultaneous manifestations,more evolved and these behavior patterns areaccording as this stage isthat these
therefore more complex. Thereafter it is perfectly normal
constituted
arefourththesporadicallystage
first behavior patterns offrom the middle of the third stage, except that these episodic productwo months later.

tions are only systematized and consolidated one or
In the same way we shall see that the behavior patterns of the fifth stage
those of the sixth
are foreshadowed from the apex of the fourth andthat the beare foreshadowed at the fifth stage. Inversely, it is evident

havior patterns belonging to a given stage do not disappear during thea role whose importance only diminishes
following stages but conserve
relatively).
(andvery graduallyof these remarks to this observation,
Regardless of the applicationthat I offer him
Laurent, at 0;6 (1) tries to grasp a big piece of paper
the string conon
bassinet
his
hood
of
the
on
(and
and
finally place

handle of the bassinet). Laurent begins by
necting the hood with theas soon as the object is placed, he reacts
then
his
out
hand;
stretching
he shakes himas he always does in the presence of distant objectives:
waves his arms, etc. The desire to grasp the paper seems to inspire
such reactions, as I regulated it by removing the objective from thehood for a few seconds in order to move it progressively closer andfarther away. It is when the paper seems inaccessible to the hand alonethat Laurent shakes himself. After having behaved thus for a moment,
he seems to look for the string hanging from the hood, then pulls it
self,harder and harder while staring at the paper. At the moment when
this is ready to fall off the hood, Laurent lets go the string and reaches
toward the objective of which he immediately takes possession. Several
have yielded the same result. It goes without saysequential attempts
that Laurent pulled the string in
ing that it cannot be demonstratedorder to grasp the paper, but the whole behavior pattern gave me thethis end in view and of being perimpression of being performed withfectly coordinated.
If such is the case, it can be asserted that theschema of "pullingthe string" has momentarily served as means to attain the end assignedby the schema "grasping the objective." This of course does not meanthat Laurent has foreseen the object's fall, nor that he has conceivedof the string as its extension: He has simply utilized a familiar schemawith a new intention, and this is what characterizes the behavior patterns of the fourth stage. But, as the paper was placed in the same situation which habitually sets in motion the schema of "pulling the string,"

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

215

such an example still partakes of the generalizing assimilations of the"secondary circular reaction" (see Obs. 99).

Observation 121. Here is an analogous example, but easier to interpret.
At 0;8 (20) Jacqueline tries to grasp a cigarette case which I present toher. I then slide it between the crossed strings which attach her dolls
to the hood. She tries to reach it directly. Not succeeding, she immediately looks for the strings which are not in her hands and of which she
only saw the part in which the cigarette case is entangled. She looks infront of her, grasps the strings, pulls and shakes them, etc. The cigarettecase then falls and she grasps it.
Second experiment: same reactions, but without first trying tograsp the object directly.
At 0;9 (2) Jacquelinetries

directly to grasp her celluloid

duck

when I put its head between the strings I have just described. Not succeeding, she grasps both strings, one in each hand, and pulls. She looks
at the duck who shakes when she shakes. Then she grasps both stringsin

one hand and pulls, then grasps them in the other hand a little

higher up and pulls harder until the duck falls.
I begin over again, but attach the duck more firmly. She then atonce pulls the strings, systematically, until she can touch the duck withher finger, but does not succeed in making it fall. She then gives up
although I shake the duck several times, which shows that she tries tograsp the duck and not to swing it.
It may be seen that these behavior patterns differ from those in
Observation 113, even though in both cases it is a question of shaking
the string to exert influence on a distant object. In the case of Observation 115, the child limits himself to utilizing a procedure which he has
employed just previously, and to utilizing it in order to prolong a spectacle he has just had before his eyes. On the other hand, in the present
case,

he tries to grasp an object and to do so he must find the appro-

priate means. The means to which Jacqueline has recourse is of course
borrowed from the schemata of her earlier circular reactions, but theact of intelligence has precisely consisted in finding the right means

without limiting herself to repeating that which has already been done.
These behavior patterns must not, however, be overestimated andone must not so soon see in them a utilization of instruments (the behavior pattern of the "stick") or even a utilization of extensions of theobject (the behavior pattern of the "string"). There could be no question of instruments for several more months (concerning the "string"
we shall return to it in Chap. V, 2). The following observation, which
can be cited in the margin of this one, shows that Jacqueline does not
yet consider the strings as extensions of the desired object.

Observation 121 repeated. At 0;9 (8) Jacqueline tries to grasp her parrot which I placed between the entwined strings (in the same position

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

216

a string from theduck in the previous observation). She pulls
sees the parrot swing and,
She
is
doll
her
which
of
hanging.
lower end

as theshe merely tries to shake it.
instead of trying to grasp it, henceforth
and
shall
we
emphasize here arises
behavior
thethat
It is thenpatternlooks
which constitutes a true act of intelligent adaptation. Jacqueline
it with one hand andfor the doll at the other end of the string, grasps
the parrot. She thenatwhilestaringhits its head with the other handat doll andlookingwhile
alternatelyintervals
atdoes thisregularat eachresultswings(the parrot
time controlling theparrot and eachStr

Now the genesis of this act is easy to grasp. Three days earlier (seetoher parrot, while holding it, in order102) Jacqueline shooksees the hanging parrot,
hear the rattle it contains. Hence when she
it again. Moreover, she knows
shake
to
order
it
in
to
she wants
grasp
her parhow to strike objects and, in particular, has constantly struck
as soon as
Thereafter
Obs.
weeks
103).
(see
rot during the precedingas her doll,is connected to the same string
she discovers that theObsparrotHere again she does
she uses the doll as a means to shake the parrot.
made
she
which
a
previously (as istonot limit herself
gestureapplying
known earlier tothe case in Obs. 112-118). She really adapts a schemaa new situation.

does not at
But furthermore, when Jacqueline hits the doll she

all have inmind pulling the string (which connects the doll to the par-theorder to augment the effect. As in the previous observation,"extension of the object" and Jacqueline isantherefore
notstringHence thenot yet concerned with spatial and mechanical contacts.
tactile and kinesthetic meaning: it is only
a
than
no
other
has
stringobtaina material for manual and muscular schemata, a procedure toa certain result, and not yet a physical object as the "string" and above
all the "stick" are later to become.

rot) inis

Let us now proceed to clear cases and begin by the simplest
intervene be-withdrawing the material objects which
tween the intention and the result. Among the behavior patterns
possible:the most elementary of all is that
corresponding to this definition
which consists in moving away someone's hand or a certain object
which one places between the child and the objective at the time
the act of grasping is performed. The objective must of course
be left entirely visible, hiding it constituting an additional difficulty which we shall only examineat the end of these observations.

Observation 122. Concerning Laurent, this sort of behavior (the acwas made manifest only
quiring of which we have just studied closely)at 0;7 (IB). It is this coordination between a distinctly differentiatedCOORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

217

action serving as means (=setting aside the obstacle) and the final actionof the(=grasping the object) which we shall consider as the

beginning
fourth stage.
Until 0;7 (13) Laurent has never really succeeded in setting aside
the obstacle; he has simply attempted to take no notice of it, or else to

the magic-phenomenalistic "procedures" taken
up in Chapter
instance at 0;6 (0) I present Laurent with a matchbox, extending my hand laterally to make an obstacle to his prehension. Laurent tries to pass over my hand, or to the side, but he does not
utilizeIII,

4. Forattempt

to displace it. As each time I prevent his passage, he ends by stormingat the box while waving his hand, shaking himself, wagging his headfrom side to side, in short, by substituting magic-phenomenalistic "procedures" for prehension rendered impossible. Afterward I hold out thebox to him while merely holding it by the edge. Laurent pulls, tries tosnatch it away from me, but does not push back my hand.
Same reactions at 0;6* (8), 0;6 (10), 0;6 (21), etc. At 0;6 (17) I present a rattle to him while placing my hand in front of it, so that only
half the object is visible. Laurent tries to grasp
set aside

it directly,

but not tomy hand.

At 0;7 (10) Laurent tries to grasp a new box in front of which I
place my hand (at a distance of 10 cm.). He sets the obstacle aside, but
not intentionally; he simply tries to reach the box by sliding next to
my hand and, when he touches it, tries to take no notice of it. This behavior gives the impression that he pushes the screen away, but there
does not yet exist any differentiated schema, any "means" dissociatedfrom the final action (from the schema assigning an end to the action).
The behavior pattern is the same when I use a cushion as an obstacle.

Same reactions at 0;7 (12). Finally, at 0;7 (13) Laurent reacts quite
from the beginning of the experiment. I present a

differently almost

box of matches above my hand, but behind it, so that he cannot reach
it without setting the obstacle aside. But Laurent, after trying to takeno notice of it, suddenly tries to hit my hand as though to remove or
lower it; I let him do it to me and he grasps the box. I recommence tobar his passage, but using as a screen a sufficiently supple cushion tokeep the impress of the child's gestures. Laurent tries to reach the box,
and, bothered by the obstacle, he at once strikes it, definitely loweringituntil the way is dear.

At 0;7 (17) I resume the experiment without there having been intervening attempts. First I present the object (my watch) 10 cm. behindthe cushion (the object of course being visible). Laurent tries at firstcushion. Same thing withjust to grasp the watch, then pauses to hit thehis hand: he at once strikes the obstacle.
From the outset it may be seen how this act of pushing back an
obstacle by striking it constitutes a new behavior pattern in relation
to the behavior patterns of 0;6 (0) to 0;7 (12). Before trying to attain

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

218
his

end (grasping the objective) Laurent henceforth pauses and exerts

a completed action on the obstacle (striking it to remove it), definitely
subordinated to it.
differentiated from the final schema and neverthelessas meansMoreover, one notes that the intermediate act serving
the schema
schema:afamiliarfromborrowedis(removing the obstacle)
and above all fromof striking. We recall that Laurent, from 0;4 (7)to swing them
order
in
of
hitting hanging objects
0;4 (19) has the habitof striking the objects (see Obs. 103). Now, thisfrom 0;5
and
finally,(2)

the usual schema of which Laurent makes use at the present time, noan end in itself (of a final schema) but as alonger in the capacity ofmobileortransitional
schema) which he subordinates to a
means
is

(a

different schema.

The need to remove the obstacle arouses, throughgeneralizing assimilation,

the simplest of the schemata of displacement

which he knows and utilizes: the schema of striking. It is noteworthy,that the child does not yet displace the objects from one
in thisrespect,

he will do later, in order to study experimentally
position to another as
3 and 4). That is
the groups of displacements (see Vol. II, Chap. II,is so difficult whentheobstacle
of
or
of
act
the
displacing
removing
why
the child of 0;6-0;8 is not yet ait seems so simple. The universe ofworld of permanent objects animated by independent movements into demonstrate this in Volume II in studying thespace (we shall tryofBesides, in order to push awayof thedevelopment

concept

space).

schemata of
the obstacle the child is obliged to call upon his circularwhich the most appropriate to the situation is that of "striking in orderto swing."

Let us observe, finally, that the procedure thus discovered by Laurent has nothing in common with the behavior pattern which consists
in removing annoying objects (pillows, etc.) from in front of him. Lauthrows aside without hesitation a pillow
for
at
rent,

0;5 (25)

example,which I put over his face. But such a reaction, in which there is probcomes into play if the screen is placed inably a reflex element, only
front of the child. The child no longer removes it if he is in front of
the object (see Vol. II, Obs. 27). Therein is not a "means" related tothe objective, but simply the elimination of a cause of annoyance related to the subject. Consequently it would be entirely artificial to saythat the child removes a screen (= means) in order to see something
The act of ridding himself of the obstructive object forms an(= end).
a question of searching in this behavior patentity in itself. So it is nottern for the origin of the one which we are now examining: proof in

itself that between 0;6 (0)and 0;7 (12) Laurent has never succeeded inwhenremoving the obstacles, in the sense we give to these terms here,
he knew ever since 0;5 and doubtless long before how to push any obstructive screen away from his face or from before him.
Observation J 23 .From 0;7 (28) the transitional schema of "pushing
the obstacle away" is slightly differentiated in Laurent: instead of sim-

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

219

ply hitting the things which intercede between his hand and the objective, he has applied himself to pushing them away or even to dis-placing them.

For example at 0;7 (28) I present to him a little bell 5 cm. behindthe corner of a cushion. Laurent then strikes the cushion, as previously, but then depresses it with one hand while he grasps the objectivewith the other. Same reaction with my hand.
At 0;7 (29) he immediately depresses the cushion with his left handin order to reach the box with his right. He does the same at 0;8 (1):when my hand intervenes as the obstacle I definitely feel that he depresses it and pushes harder* and harder to overcome my resistance.
At 0;8 (1) right after the attempt just described, Laurent swings his
box in order to cause the lozenges within to make a noise. I then keep
my hand on his arm to prevent him from playing. First he tries toproceed with the very arm whose hand holds the box, then he brings
forward his other hand and removes mine. It is the first time he succeeds in this attempt, already made for weeks and days before.
At 0;8 (28), on the other hand, 1 observe that he does not know
how to push my hand away when I hold the object1 nor when I movemy hand closer to the object from behind in order to take it away fromhim. Both these behavior patterns appeared simultaneously at 0;9 (15).
When I hold one of these rattles by its extremity he pushes my handaway with his left hand while pulling the object with his right, andwhen I get ready to take the rattle back, he pushes away my hand or
forearm before I reach it.
It may thus be seen that these perfections of the transitional
schema were constituted by gradual differentiation of the original pro-cedure: "Hitting the object in order to push it away."

Observation 124. At 0;8 (8) Jacqueline tries to grasp her celluloid
duck but I also grasp it at the same time she does. Then she firmly
holds the toy in her right hand and pushes my hand away with her
left. I repeat the experiment by grasping only the end of the duck's
tail: she again pushes my hand away. At 0;8 (17) after taking a first
exspoonful of medicine, she pushes away her mother's hand whichtends to her a second one. At 0;9 (20) she tries to place her duck against
the wicker of the bassinet but she is bothered by the string of the bell
which hangs from the hood. Then she takes the string in her righthand and moves it to the far side of the left arm (the arm holding thewhere the string no longer is an obstacle. Sameandduck),
consequently
operation shortly afterward.
with
Unfortunately, we have been unable to determine precisely
the action of "reregard to Jacqueline, from which circular schema
1 1 started thisexperiment at 0;6 (10): he simply pulls
out removing my hand.

the object with-

220

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

moving the obstacle" was differentiated. It was probably not from theschema of "striking" since she only made the latter manifest shortly
before. It must be, rather, the act of holding the object in order toshake, swing, or rub it which gave her the idea of displacing the obwithout saying that the filiation can vary in each childstacles. It goes

between the transitional or mobile schemata of the fourth stage andthe circular schemata.
merely assert that the subordination of means
to ends belonging to the fourth stage begins by a simple coordinationof earlier circular schemata.

We

Observation 725. If one

is

still

doubtful that this assertion

is

well

founded, in other words, if one considers the act of removing the obstacle as being too simple not to be able to be formed by itself independently of the earlier schemata, the following example is of a nature
to furnish a counterproof to the foregoing considerations.

Suppose there is an intentional act, which is performed as a means
and which is more elementary than that of "removing the obstacle,"
this is doubtless the act which consists in relinquishing an object or
putting it down, in order to grasp another. In effect, as soon as the childknows how to coordinate prehension with vision (beginning of thethird stage), he sometimes lets go voluntarily the objects he was holding.
Furthermore, he observes this phenomenon very early, since from thefirst weeks of the same stage (about 0;4, in Laurent) he seeks the lost
object with his hand (see Vol. II, Chap. I, 2), and from the middle ofthe stage (about 0;6, in Laurent) his eyes follow

it (see Vol. II,
1,
Obs. 6). Now, far from furnishing, from the outset, a "means" to use
in all circumstances, this falling of the grasped object remains unused
for a long time. It therefore in no way constitutes a "schema" that is
to say, a positive action but simply an accident, a failure of the act.
(One cannot speak, in this connection, of a negative act, for a negative act is a complex act inasmuch as it isalways subordinated to another). It is only at the end of the fourth stage and the beginning of
the fifth that the act of relinquishing an object becomes an intentionalact (concerning Laurent, see Obs. 140 and141): This fact obviously

schema of "relinquishing thefrom the chancefalling of the object, but is formed as a function of other schemata, suchas those of "removing the obstacle." This is what we shall now
prove.
At 0;6 (26) Laurent holds a rattle with which he no longer doesvery much (satiety after use). I then offer him a doll which he immediately tries to grasp with both hands (as he always does). He grasps
it with his left hand,holding the rattle in his right, but he brings hishands closer together in the obvious wish to hold only the doll. He
remains perplexed, alternately looking at both objects, and does notconstitutes proof thatthe transitional

object," utilized as a "means," does not merely stem

succeed in relinquishing the rattle.

At 0;6 (29) same reaction with two other objects.

I offerhim aCOORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

221

third toy: he tries to grasp it with his right hand, without
letting go
what he is holding in it. Finally of course he fortuitously loses the object in which he is no longer interested, but he does not remove it on

purpose.

At 0;7 (0) he has in his hands a small celluloid doll when I offer
him a box (more interesting). He grasps the latter with his left hand

and tried to grasp it with both hands. He then knocks both objects together, at once separates them (very much surprised at the result), andrecommences to knock them again, wishing to surround the box withhis hands*,

He then knocks "them several times in succession for fun,which gives him the idea of rubbing the box against the wicker of thebassinet. Then he tries once more to surround the box with both
hands; surprised at the resistance due to the doll, he looks for a moment at the two contiguous objects.
At 0;7 (28) I again note the same reaction: he knocks involuntarily
the two objects he is holding when he wants to grasp one of them withboth hands. Of course, in order that this experiment have some meaning, it is fitting to choose two objectives of very unequal interest, forotherwise one could always wonder if the child was not trying to keepthem both. This objection, moreover, is not theoretical since Ch. Biihler has demonstrated that an 8-month-old baby can very well pay attention to both toys simultaneously. In fact, the look and expressionof the child are enough to show which toy he prefers and wishes toconserve. It is necessary, moreover, to act quickly and to surprise thechild by means of the second object before he has let go the first, without realizing it, due to lack of interest. In daily life, that is to say, independently of the experiment under discussion, these things always
take pl-ace as follows: "When the child whose two hands hold an oba second one and tries to grasp it, he lets go the first involunject, sees
tarily,out of pure lack of interest, whereas he strains to reach the sec-

ond one. In order that the experiment succeed it is therefore necessary
to offer the object at a distance of several centimeters from the handso that the child may have no difficulty in taking possession of it nor
have time to lose the first one.
finds the solution. He holds a little
Finally at 0;7 (29) Laurent
small bell is held outlamb in his left hand and a rattle in his right.
the rattle in order to grasp the bell. The reaction is
to him: he letsAgo

the same several times in succession but I have difficulty in discerninglets the rattle escape him or really discards it. Whilewhether hesimplyhe holds the bell I offer him a big box: he grasps it with his (free) left
hand and with his right (by sticking the bell against the box) but, notime he definitely discards the bell. Same reticing the difficulty, thisaction at 0;7 (30) with a big rattle.
At 0;8 (1) he has a big box in his hands and I present my watch
chain to him. He then places the box on his coverlets in order to grasp

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS
the chain. Now this gesture is new (hitherto he only performed it by222

the act of "discarding" observed
chance): It apparently derives from
I again offer him the box while he holds the chain: heremoves the box.
Henceforth Laurent knows how either to discard one object infor three days.

order to grasp another or to place it, or to let it fall intentionally. Thistransitional schema, given the tardy and complex character of its advent, apparently derives from the preceding schemata which consist in"removing the obstacle" and not in the fortuitous escape of objects heldin the hand.

Observation 126. A final behavior pattern belonging to the present
group of schemata ("removing the obstacle") consists in searching under a screen for invisible objectives. We shall closely study this behavior in connection with the development of the concept of the obof the working of intelligence, it isject. But from the point of viewan act is constituted by coordination offitting to show now how such

independent schemata.
For example Laurent, at 0;8 (29), plays with a box which I remove
from his hands in order to place it under a pillow. Although, four days
before, he did not react at all in an analogous situation, this time he atonce takes possession of the pillow. Though it cannot be stated that heexpects to find the box under the pillow (for the behavior is too undecided), it is nevertheless apparent that Laurent is not interested in
the pillow as such and that he lifts it in order to try something. The
act of lifting the pillow is therefore not a sure means for the child, but
it already constitutes a "means" for the attempt, that is to say, a separate action from grasping the box.
Likewise, at 0;9 (17), Laurent lifts a cushion in order to look fora cigar case. When the object is entirely hidden, the child lifts thescreen with hesitation, but when one end of the case appears, Laurent
removes the cushion with one hand and with the other tries to extricate
the objective. The act of lifting the screen is therefore entirely separate

from that of grasping the desired object and constitutes an autonomous "means," no doubt derived from earlier analogous acts (removing
the obstacle, displacing and pushing away objects which are a barrier,etc.).

This proves that in all these examples, the action of "removing the obstacle

1'

definitely constitutes a transitional schema dif-ferentiated from the final schema. As we have seen in each caseanalyzed, either these transitional schemata derive from earlier
circular schemata (Obs. 122), or else they derive from other transitional schemata (Obs. 123-126). The subordination of transitional

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

223

schemata to final ones

hence of "means" to ends always takes
place by coordination of the independent schemata.
Here, finally, is a third group of examples of the "application of familiar schemata to new situations." Henceforth it is nolonger a question of removing obstacles, but of finding intermediates between the subject and the objective. These intermediates are not yet "instruments," as in the fifth
stage, but they are

more complex than the organized schemata borrowed withoutchange from the secondary circular reactions (as is the case with
our first group of examples: Obs. 120-121 repeated).
Observation 127. If Jacqueline, at 0;8 (8) has shown herself capable ofremoving a hand which forms an obstacle to her desires, she has notdelayed in making herself capable of the inverse behavior pattern:using the other person's hand as an intermediate in order to produce
a coveted result. Thus at 0;8 (13) Jacqueline looks at her mother who
is swinging a flounce of material with her hand. When thisspectacle isover, Jacqueline, instead of imitating this movement, which she will doshortly thereafter, begins by searching for her mother's hand, places it

in front of the flounce and pushes it to make it resume its activity.

Certainly it is not a question here of only making last a spectacle
which has just been seen. In this respect these cases can be comparedto those of Observations 112-118. But notable progress is made by vir-tue of the fact that Jacqueline mentally decomposes the spectacle shewitnessed and utilizes the other person's hand as intermediary. Furthermore, two months later she applies this means to a new situation.

At 0;10 (30) Jacqueline grasps my hand, places it against a swinging doll which she was not able to set going herself, and exerts pressure
on my index finger to make me do the necessary (same reaction threetimes in succession).
We shall later study (Vol. II, Chap. Ill, 3), these behavior patterns
in detail, in connection with making causality spatial, but it behooved
us to cite them now from the point of view of the "application of familiar schemata to new situations" to show how they arise from coordination of independent schemata. The great novelty of such a behavior

pattern is the following. Until about 0;8 the child, when an interesting
result is produced before him, tries to act upon this result directly. He
looks at the objective and, according to cases, he draws himself up,
he can reach the(see Obs. 112-118), or else, if
Furthermore
objective (a rattle, for instance), he strokes it, shakes it, etc.
it constantly happens that he reacts in the same way solely in the pres-waves his hands, etc.

ence of the adult's hand. If I snap my middle finger against my thumband present my hand to the child, either he draws himself up, etc., if

224

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

to make me conunattainable, or else he strokes it, shakes it, etc.,
Hence this reveals two kinds of independent secondary circular
schemata: actions upon the objective and action upon the hand (which
Now, in the observationanin this case as

it istinue.

isconceived

being

objective).

which we have just described, Jacqueline uses the other person's hand

What does thisas intermediate, in order to act upon the objective.
the obof
schematatheto"removingmean if not that, as with regard

toor the simpler schemata of the first group, the child begins
to
act
tries
He
thitherto
independent?
coordinate two kinds of schemata
as this hand can itself act
upon the other person's hand, but inasmuchof the two schemata in
one
he
puts
upon the objective: accordingly
other.
thewithrelationshipstacle*'Observation ;2#.-Laurent too, from 0;8 (7) uses my hand as an intermediate to make me resume the activities which interest him. For exleft middle finger, then I drum on myample, I tap my cheek with myI put my hand halfway between his
Afterward
eyeglasses (he laughs).
atmy glasses, then at my hands, and ends
eyes and my face. He looks
towardhand
my face (see the continuation ofby gently pushing myObs.
these observations, Vol. II,
144).
As in the preceding observation, for the child it is a question of
But instead of applying the habitprolonging an interesting spectacle.
ual procedures (Obs. 112-118) without adding anything to them, or of
himself reproducing the thing by imitation, Laurent utilizes as means
an element of the whole which he has just observed and an element

which can be assimilated to his own activity. The other person's handthe child simply prolongs its
comparable to that of the subject andaction due to an intermediate whose power he knows by analogy to his
isown earlier experiences.
Observation 129.-A.I 0;9 (24) Jacqueline is seated and tries to grasp her

duck which is near her feet. Not succeeding, she draws it toward her
with her right foot. I was not able to see whether there was still groping
or if the reaction was immediate. At 0;11 (21), on the other hand, shelets fall a celluloid swan from its swinging nest. Unsuccessful in her
it with her feet andattempts to pick it up, she immediately displaces
reaction with herbrings it nearer to her. At 1;0 (7) same immediate
Of course Jacqueline also uses her feet to strike the objects withparrot.

which they coine in contact, etc.
These behavior patterns can surely be conceived not as acts of into those of manualtelligence but as simple coordinations analogous
rise to a series of
as
as
But
soon
they
gave
they appeared
prehension.
applications which definitely bear the seal of intelligent generalization.
Thus, at 0;11 (28), Jacqueline is seated and shakes a little bell.
She then pauses abruptly in order delicately to place the bell in frontof her right foot, then she kicks hard. Unable to recapture it, she grasps

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

225

a ball which she places at the same spot in order to give another kick.
It is therefore

apparent that before the act there was intention andutilization adapted from the schema of kicking.

Furthermore, the same day, Jacqueline, while playing with a thimble, struck awooden box. Interested by this contact, she repeated it

two or threetimes, after which at one leap she struck the thimble
against her leather shoe. This gesture was precise and rapid, revealing
all the signs of a typical intentional act.
Moreover, at 1;0 (10) she is in the act of striking a piece of woodagainst the wicker of her bassinet when she suddenly pauses, obviously
to look for her shoe. As her feet are covered by a shawl, she immediately removes the shawl (see Obs. 124) and taps her shoe.

These last three observations correspond in the most characteristic

way to the definition of the behavior patterns which we shall now analyze: First, the intention

preceding the act (increasing the contact of
the bell, the thimble, or the piece of wood); second, the search for a"means" capable of being subordinated to such an end; third, the application to that end, of a schema discovered earlier (using the footto stir up, strike, etc.).

Observation 1 3 0.

Laurent, at 0;10 (3) utilizes as a "means" or a transi-

tional schema, a behavior pattern which he discovered the previous day
and whose genesis we shall describe in Observation 140. By

manipucream he learned, at 0;10 (2) to let this object
fall intentionally. Now, at 0;10 (3) I give it to him again. He at once
begins to open his hand to make it fall and repeats this behavior acertain number of times. I then place, 15 cm. from Laurent, a large
wash basin and strike the interior of it with the tin in order to make
Laurent hear the sound of the metal against this object. It is noteworthy

lating a tin of shavingthat Laurent, already at 0;9 (0), had, while being washed, by chance
struck a small pot against such a basin and immediately played at rethis sound by a simple circular reaction. I therefore wanted

producing
to see if Laurent was going to use the tin to repeat the phenomenon
and how he was going to go about it.
Now, at once, Laurent takes possession of the tin, holds out his

arm and drops it over the basin. I moved the latter, as a check. He
nevertheless succeeded, several times in succession, in making the obthis is a fine example of the coordination
ject fall on the basin. Henceof two schemata of which the first serves as "means" whereas the second
an end to the action: the schema of "relinquishing the object"assigns
and that of "striking one object against another."

2. THE "APPLICATION OF FAMILIAR SCHEMATA
TO NEW SITUATIONS" II. COMMENTARY. These kindsof behavior patterns

constitute

the

first

acts

of intelligence,

226

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

properly so called, that we havefore fitting to try

hitherto encountered. It is thereto characterize them exactly and, to do this, tobegin by distinguishing them fromhavior patterns previously under study.
These behavior patterns at first contrast with the primarycircular reactions and the sensorimotor habits which derive fromthe different varieties of be-them. In the case of these reactions, the contact (tactile, visual,with theimmediately sets in motion a global assimila-

objectable to distinguish between the end
tory act without our beingof the action and the means employed, whereas in the present
case the contact with the external object only releases intentionetc.)

and the search for appropriate means. Intention exists, that is
to say, consciousness of a desire to the extent that the assimilatory

schema set in motion by contact with the object is opposed byan obstacle and thereafter only is made manifest in the form ofa tendency and not of immediate realization. This same circumstance explains the search for means: It is, in effect, a question of

overcoming the intervening obstacle. So it is that in Observation
122, the sight of the object merely sets in motion the schema of
prehension but, when obstacles intervene, prehension is promoted to the rank of a distant end and certain means must besought in order first to remove these difficulties. When Laurent
tries to grasp the object behind my hand we see, in the simplest
way, how the sensorimotor schema characteristic of the steps ofprimary circular reaction and the first habits is differentiated in

an intentional act due to the intervention of intermediate obstacles. When he raises a screen in order to find a hidden object(Obs. 126), the same thing becomes complicated, but the principle
remains the same: It is therefore the dissociation of means andends, due to intervening obstacles, which creates intention andputs the present behavior pattern in opposition to simple habits.

Perhaps the objection will be raised that the intersensorial
coordinations peculiar to some of the primary circular reactions

seem very early to make us witness seriations of the same kind.
When the child grasps an object in order to suck it, look at it,
etc., he seems to differentiate the means from the ends and, consequently, set a goal in advance. But, for want of an obstacle capableof attracting the child's attention, nothing warrants
attributing

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

227

these distinctions to the subject's consciousness. Grasping in orderto suck constitutes a single act in which the means and the end

andthis single act is formed by immediate
reciprocal
assimilation between the schemata present. It is therefore theobserver, and not the subject, who makes divisions in the case of

are one,such schemata. It is only when the child seeks to put things inthemselves into relationship that the differentiation of meansfrom ends appears in other words, the acquisition of consciousness characterizing intention and arising when external obstacles

are produced.

How are the present behavior patterns thereafter to be distinguished from the secondary circular reactions which also
involve the utilization of connections between the things themselves?

With regard to the actual circular reactions (Obs. 94-104), first by the way in which they assign a purpose. The circular

reaction has no other end, in effect, than that of reproducing a
result obtained earlier, or

which has just been Discovered bychance. This kind of process can be accompanied by intention
but after the event, to the extent that there is repetition and when
the result to be reproduced presupposes a complex activity. The
effect which is tobe repeated is then posited in advance, as anend, and the child tries to rediscover the means which have justled him to it (in this, let us recall, these behavior patterns alreadypresage intelligence). But, although intentional, an end of thissort is nevertheless the simple prolongation of an earlier effect.

On the contrary, in the present behavior patterns, the end isposited without having been attained beforehand, at least, notin the same situation. When the child tries to grasp his toys bypushing an obstacle away (Obs. 122-124), tries to act upon objects through the intermediary of someone's else hand (Obs. 127128), tries to shake a parrot from a distance (Obs. 121 repeated) or

to knock objects against his shoes (Obs. 129), these are projects
which arise in the course of his action, in conformity, it is true,
with his earlier circular reactions (the very nature of the end
consequently does not differ from one behavior pattern to another), but in an actually new situation. The novelty of thissituation pertains, in effect, either to the presence of obstacles orto the unexpectedness of the combinations observed.

With re-228

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

the difference Is just as clear. In thegard to the means employed,
utilized were discovered
secondary circular reaction, the means
hence it is only
beforehand;
fortuitously and were applied justbehaviortheInpatterns now
a question of rediscovering them.

under study, on the other hand, it is necessary to improvise means
and remove obstacles which separate the intention from its final

without saying that before inventing new means
the child at first limits himself to aphe will doresult. It goeslater),(whichwith which he is familiar. Moreover thetheschemata
plyingmeans which are found are borrowed, like the ends themselves,from the schemata of earlier circular reactions. But the chiefat the right time and adapt them topoint was to remember themthe current situation.

behavior patterns to the "proFinally, if we compare thesecedures to make an interesting spectacle last" the differences areless accentuated (these "proapproximately the same, althoughcedures" form, in effect, the transition between the circular reaction and the true act of intelligence). On the one hand, thecontrast remains, from the point of view of ends, between "making

last" that which one has just seen and pursuing an end in a newsituation. Besides, from the point of view of means, the following

difference exists. In the case of procedures to make spectaclesfrom a circular reaclast, the means utilized are borrowed either

tion immediately preceding which was interrupted by the interestthe child pulls a string in ordering spectacle (for example, whento prolong the swinging of a watch, from a distance, when he wasin the process of pulling this string in order to swing the hoodof his bassinet), or else they are borrowed from schemata whichhave become so familiar or even automatic (for instance, drawing
oneself up, etc.) that no effort is any longer necessary to rediscoverthem and they apply to everything. In both cases the "procedure"a preciseaccordingly remains, so to speak, "empty" without
connection with the effect sought after. On the contrary, true
involve a combination sui generis of theacts ofintelligencemeans and of the situation. In effect, they strive in vain to beborrowed from earlier circular reactions, for they are adjusted
to the goal by a special accommodation, and it is this adjustment
which characterizes the beginning of intelligent action.

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

229

In short, compared to the earlier stage ("secondary circular
reactions" and "procedures to prolong an interesting spectacle"),the behavior patterns analyzed here present two new character-The
pertains, not to the very nature of the goal, but
to the situation in which it is pursued, hence the way in whichistics.

first

the subject assigns it to himself. Instead of merely "reproducing"that which he has seen or done, in the situation of the initial act,

the child tries to attain the desired result in the midst of difficulties not yet observed or of unforeseen combinations, that is toalways in a new situation. The second (behavior pattern)pertains to the means employed. These means are henceforth
entirely differentiated from the end itself, the child's behavior
say,consequently consisting in a coordination of two independent
schemata the one, final (the schema assigning an end to theaction), the other transitional (the schema utilized as means)and no longer in the application of a single more or less complex
schema. It is only after the event that the means and the ends become differentiated in the midst of a "secondary circular reaction." In reality, it is always a question of a single act, of a completely constructed schema, so that the use of the means supplied always is on a par with the same end, or the same kind ofends. When the child generalizes the schema, that is to say, applies it to other objects (pulling the string in order to shake a

new doll which is hanging from it, etc.), one cannot say, either,that the familiar means apply to a new end. It is simply theschema in its entirety the child generalizes to a new object, justas when he grasps one object instead of another or sucks his
thumb instead of the maternal breast. With regard to the"procedures to prolong an interesting spectacle" the same applies,in spite of appearances. The child who draws himself up whenconfronted by anything at all, in order to prolong a movement ora sound, in no way combines two schemata, he merely generalizes

a behavior pattern which he found successful. This is why weremarked before that the use of such means is, so to speak,"empty," without precise adaptation to the goal pursued. On

the contrary, the "application of familiar schemata to newsituations" always presupposes the coordination of two schemata
Hence there exists simultaneously a clear
thitherto

independent.

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

230

differentiation of means from ends and an exact adjustment of

the former to the latter.

In contrast to thealways double, since it

earlier forms, intelligent adaptation is
involves a relationship between at least

two acts of assimilation. The choice and the pursuit of goals
constitute the first of these adaptations, the adjustment of means
to ends involves, besides, a second adaptation henceforth essential
to the first. Let us try to analyze the nature of these two phases.
As far as the first is concerned it can be said that the present

behavior patterns merely prolong the preceding ones. Primitive
other function than that of assimilating
intelligent activity has no
the universe to the schemata elaborated by the primary andcircular reactions, while accommodating these schemata

secondaryto the reality of things. In other words, elementary intelligence,
like all spontaneous activity, is essentially conservative. What thechild seeks, in the observations just made, is to grasp or to hold,to shake or strike, in short, exactly that to which his circular
reactions have accustomed him.

Now we have seen that thesecondary circular reaction, which is alreadyalmost intentional,

and assimilatory, despite appearances, as
just as conservative
the primary reaction. Hence the difference between primitive in-isand the preceding activities does not
telligent behavior patterns
stem from the nature of the goals pursued: it simply results, as
we have seen, from the fact that obstacles arise between intention
and realization and necessitate the use of intermediate means.

With regard to the "means" giving rise to this second adaptation

which constitutes the distinguishing characteristic of in-telligence, it

can be said that they are adapted to the "goal" ofthe action in the same way that the entire act, in its intention, is
In other words, the intermediates
to the desired

adaptedobject.

or obstacles which intervene between the subject and the goalof his acts are themselves assimilated to familiar schemata in thesame way that the object of the action is assimilated to the schemaof the goal. But these transitional schemata are not chosen forthemselves but as a function of the final schema. Consequently,
the intermediate objects are simultaneously assimilated to thetransitional schemata and to the final schema and this is what

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

231

insures the coordination between the former and the latter due
to a process of reciprocal assimilation.

In order to make clear the meaning of this formulation, let
us first remark that the coordination between means and endsof the same order, in its point of departure, as that of thesensorimotor schemata belonging to the primary circular reacis

tions.

When prehension is coordinated with sucking or withvision the phenomenon is explained, as we have seen, by simple

reciprocal assimilation. The mouth tries to suck that which thehand grasps, or the hand tries to grasp what the eyes see, etc.

This is what gives the illusion of a subordination of means toends (the child seems "to grasp in order to suck," etc.) when there
is simply a fusion of heterogeneous schemata in new global
schemata. Now, the coordination of secondary schemata whichconstitutes the behavior patterns of the present stage is, in its
beginnings, nothing other than a reciprocal assimilation of this.

kind. This is the case in the elementary and transitional schemata
which we have assembled in a first group (Obs. 120-121). For example, when Laurent tries to grasp a piece of paper situated too
high up and to do this, searches, then pulls a string hanging fromthe hood, he at first assimilates the paper to a schema of prehen-sion (or to a more complex schema: feeling it, etc.), then, withoutceasing to want to apply this first schema to it, he assimilates thesame object to a very familiar schema of "pulling the string inorder to shake." This second assimilationis,therefore, itself

subordinated to the first; that is to say, pulling the strings inorder to move the paper, he continues to desire it in the capacityof an "object to grasp" (he must at least have the impression thatby shaking the objective he acquires a power over it which puts
it more at his disposition.). Due to this double assimilation theschema of "pulling the string" is coordinated with the schema of"grasping" and becomes a transitional schema in relation to aschema (Obs. 120; the same applies to Obs. 121). Such a

final

to a symmetrical relation
reciprocal assimilation can lead either
and
to
order
in
grasping in order to pull), or to a
grasp
(pulling

relation of simple inclusion (pulling in order to grasp).
But it is only in the elementary situation in which the childacts

on an object only (the paper, for example, which is simul-

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

232

that the coordination o thetaneously for shaking and grasping)schemata works due to so primitive a reciprocal assimilation. In
such cases there is almost a fusion of the schemata present, as is
the case in the coordination of the primary schemata, with thesole difference that the double assimilation is not instantaneous
but is arranged in a sequence of two separate moments. On theother hand, in the majority of cases, the existence of an obstacleor the necessity for varied intermediates makes the coordinationof the schemata less simple. This coordination most certainly

continues at that time to operate, by reciprocal assimilation, butwith a double complication. In the first place the schemata hence-

simultaneously subsume several objects whose mutualof establishing. In the second place,
relationships it is a question
forthand as a result, assimilation between the schemata ceases to work
to diversified operations ofby simple fusion in order to give rise
inclusion or of hierarchical implication, of interference and evenof negation, that is to say, to multiple dissociations and regroupings.
It must be recalled that the secondary schemata hitherto
examined (the third stage) only comprehend one object at a time(arattle for shaking, etc.)

even when a complex object

is

in-

volved (string and hood joined together, etc.). Moreover, when
two primary schemata are reciprocally assimilated they apply to
one and the same object (one person to look at and listen to
simultaneously, etc.). Henceforth, on the contrary, the coordination of schemata bears upon two or several separate objects pro-

duced together (the objective and the obstacle or the objective
and the intermediate, etc.) in such a way that the reciprocal assimilation of the schemata surpasses simple fusion to construct a
series of more complicated relationships. In short, the genericcharacter of the schemata is accentuated according as the relationsof the objects to each other multiply, the(spatial, causal, etc.)
elaboration of the "kinds" or "classes" and that of the relationsor quantitative relationships always being on a par.

An example of transition will enable us to understand thething. It is that of Observation 121 repeated: striking the dollin order to shake the parrot. In this example the child utilizes

an intermediate (the doll) to act upon the objective (the parrot).

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

233

But the intermediate is still only one sort of substitute for theobject. Wishing to grasp her parrot to shake or strike it and not
succeeding, Jacqueline at first tries a procedure to draw it to her

and pull the string. Hitherto we are still in the situation of
Observations 120-121. But she remembers the doll located at theother end of the string, searches for it and applies to it exactly
the schema which she wanted to apply to the parrot. She could,
thereafter,

have forgotten the parrot and only acted upon thedoll; that is how she would have behaved at the stage of the puresecondary circular reactions. But she saves herself the trouble ofshaking or striking the parrot and only uses the doll as a "means"

toward this "end." This entails a putting of the two objects into
relationship by assimilation of their schemata. This coordination,
it is true, remains very primitive since it merely results from thefact that the intermediate has been assimilated to the objective.
It is nevertheless real, since the two objects are distinguishedfrom one another while being subsumed under an identicalschema and are, thenceforth, placed in interrelation. In orderthat the coordination become effective, it will therefore sufficethat this relation become spatialized and truly objectified.
This positive progress is achieved with Observations 127130. How do Jacqueline and Laurent, for instance, come toutilize someone else's hand in order to act upon the object
aimed at? On the one hand, the child already knows how to act

upon the objective varied schemata for swinging the material,
Besides, he also knows how to act by imitation (see Vol. II,
Chap. Ill, 2) on someone else's hand and thus knows its powerby analogy with that of his own hands. In order that he use thishand as a "means" when the final object is inaccessible, it will
therefore suffice for him to assimilate their respective schemataetc.).

to each other and through this very act to put the intermediate
into physical relation with the objective. Now this reciprocal
assimilation is easy: The hand of someone else being, like thecan make last or
objective itself, a source of activities which one
it is natuown
one's
that
of
with
etc.
hands,
byanalogyreappearral that, not succeeding in moving the objective at a distance, thechild seeks to apply to this hand the schemata he expected toapply to the objective (on the one hand, the child has just seen

234

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

with the objective
or has earlier seen the hand joined together
and the obhimself
betweenand, moreover, the hand is situatedhand and
the
to
with
respect
the child behaves,jective).

Hencewith respect toto the objective, as in Observation 121 repeated,
does not here

the doll and the parrot. But reciprocal assimilation
as in the case in which two different
proceed by simple fusion,or yet as whenschemata apply to the same object (Obs. 120-121)
to eachassimilable
interconnected objects are almost entirely
conremotemoreaexistsother (Obs. 121 repeated); there only
that
of
and
hand
else'snection between the activity of someone
Thereafter,thematerial,etc.).
the object aimed at (swinging ofschema (someone
the two objects joined together in the same total
from eachdistinctmaintained
else's hand and the objective) arenoworks
longer by fusion
other and the reciprocal assimilationin the other.
theschemataofbut by virtue of an inclusion of one
the interof
schemathethat
Now, through the very fact
the
of
that
and
objective are
mediary (the other person's hand)schematotal
theresultingassimilated without being confused,from this junction comprehends two separate objects which havethe behavior
to be put in relationship. Here the real novelty of

The coordination, in a way formal,
patterns of this stage appears.
accomof the schemata due to their reciprocal assimilation, isthebetweenestablishedobjects
panied by a physical connection
themselves; that is to say, by their being put in spatial, temporaland causal relationships. In other words, the fact that the handof another person and the objective are mentally connected
confused involves the construction of a real
without

being
and the final
by bringing together the intermediate
himself to
limit
not
does
child
the
object. This explains why
anotherofhand
theperson, but why
striking and shaking, etc.,
this schema becomes differentiated, through accommodation, into
totalitya propulsive movement destined to bring this intermediate closer
to the objective.

This last remark leads us to examine the most complex of
the present behavior patterns: that in which the child comes toremove obstacles and differentiates toward this end the schemataof striking, etc., into movements of repulsion.

We recall how thisbehavior pattern arose in Laurent: After having tried for a long

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

235

time to go over my hand, or a cushion which prevented him fromgrasping a visible objective, the child finally pushed away theseobstacles, at first by striking them, then, little by little, by reallyremoving them. Now, it is apparent that such a behavior pattern
could not be explained as simply as the preceding coordinations.

The schema of the obstacle could not be assimilated, without adding something, to that of the objective, since far from joining theobject-screen to the objective, the child puts the former further
away from the latter. But does not such a complete contrast of
meaning conceal a true identity, the tendency to remove the
obstacle constituting the negative of that which is, as positive,
the utilization of intermediates? It is easy to see this. In effect,

the capacity of coordinating the schemata involves that of contrasting them or of feeling them to be incompatible. Affirmation

presupposes the power of negation; the latter is even often used
before the former, affirmation sometimes remaining implicit before being willed. So also can the first intentional coordinations

be very negative. They nevertheless presuppose a reciprocal assimilation. When the child who is trying to grasp the objective

knocks against the intervening obstacle, this obstacle only acquires the meaning of an "object to be removed" relatively tothis objective which it prevents the subject from reaching. Consequently, it is assimilated to the schema of the objective, butwith a negative result. Just as a negation only exists as a functionof a previous affirmation, 2 so also an exclusion necessarily rests
on an earlier assimilation. Being on the road to the objective,
the obstacle is assimilated to the schema of the latter (otherwiseitwould not be an obstacle), but through a negative connection(as in the judgment
is"this stone is not heavy/' the quality "heavy"

connected to the subject "stone," but in order to be excluded

from it). The obstacle is therefore conceived as a thing whichtakes the place of the objective (in this it is assimilated to it) andfrom which one must detach oneself in order to reach the latter.
Moreover, the child begins by turning away from the obstacle
2 "An affirmative proposition conveys a judgment passed on an object: aa judgment," said H. Bergnegative proposition conveys a judgment passed onson (Creative Evolution, 12th edit., p. 312) after Kant, Lotze, and Sigwart.

THE INTENTIONAL SENSOJUMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

236

form of negait or beside it) which is the simplest(he passes overThedifficulty requires ation. But the attempt does not succeed.
of thecoordination
thethat
It is thenspecial behavior pattern.
takes
the
place, but
objective
schema o the obstacle with that ofofassimilating the obcoordination. It is aa negative
questionof objectstacle to a schema which is suitable to it in the capacity
final
the
to
goal of theand, at the same time, but negatively,
Laurent's
caseIn
hence to the schema of the objective.
action,the transitional schema chosen was that of striking. Such aschema is suitable to the hand or the intervening cushion, and atof negation
the same time it involves the element of repulsion orandof the objective. Moreover,by virtuenecessary to the pursuitinisspatialputof this double assimilation, the object-screen
relation to the objective, but in equally negative relation: It isfurther away rather than brought nearer. In the case,
to be

put

in short, of a screen completely masking the objective, the double
assimilation is of the same nature but with this supplementarythat it involves coordinating the schema related to thedifficulty

obstacle with the pursuit of an objective which has ceased to be
directly perceived.

ACCOMMODATION AND ORGANIZATION PECULIAR TO THE MOBILE SCHEMATA.
3.

ASSIMILATION,

The conclusion to which we are thus led is that the coordination of means to ends always involves a reciprocal assimilation of
the present schemata as well as a correlative putting into relationsubsumed by these schemata. In the simplest
ships of the objects
cases this double assimilation is almost equivalent to a fusion andso calls to mind that which accounts for the coordination of theit can also remain truly retoand give rise in that way
symmetrical series. For ex-

cases
primary schemata. In otherciprocalhis hoe with a thimble which he has
ample, when the child taps
first rubbed against another object, he applies the schema of
made use of his feetstriking to the shoe because inversely heshortly before in order to strike objects, etc. But in most cases,
reciprocity leads to more complex relationships of inclusion, interference, negation, etc.

In order to understand this diversity we should emphasize

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

237

a fact to which we have already referred and which will assume
great importance in the rest of our analyses: This is the functional analogy of the schemata of this stage (and of the following

with concepts, of their assimilations with judgments andof their coordinations with logical operations or reasonings.

stages)From the point of view of assimilation, two complementary
aspects characterize the schemata of which we have just spoken,
when we compare them to the secondary schemata of the third

stage from which they nevertheless derive: they are more mobileand consequently more generic. True, the secondary schemata

encroaches upon all the characteristics of the "mobile" schemata
peculiar to the present stage, but in a form to some degree morecondensed (because undifferentiated) and consequently more
This secondary schema is a complete totality of interco-

rigid.

ordinated movements and functions every time the child perceives
the objective in connection with which the schema was formed, or

analogous objectives. For instance, the schema which consists inpulling a string in order to shake a hanging rattle presupposes avery complex coordination of movements and perceptions related to at least two objects (the string and the rattle). From thisfirstpoint of view, it presages the schemata of the fourth stage

which involve, as we have just stated, a putting into relationshipof the objects themselves. Furthermore, the schema of "pullingthe string," as has been seen, applies sequentially to a series ofobjects hanging from the hood (and not only to the first rattle)
and even to objects presented from a distance, having no connec-

From this second point of view as well, it"mobile" schemata which are capable of unlimited
generalization. But, if one examines this closely, one notices thattion with the hood.

presagescertainessentialdifferences

are

in

opposition to the simple

secondary schema (that of the third stage), the same schema having become "mobile" during the present stage. At first the relations between objects, relations already utilized by the secondary
schema, are given just as they are in the midst of the latterwithout the child's having elaborated them intentionally, whereas
the relations due to the coordination of "mobile" schemata havereallybeen constructed by the subject. Through the very factthat secondary circular reaction consists in simply reproducing a

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

238

result discovered by chance, the schema which proceeds from its
and indissoluble totality. It applies itself
use constitutes a

globalin one block and if it envelops certain relations between separate

and canobjects, these relations remain purely phenomenalisticnewtoconstrucrise
tocontext
their
of
out
taken
give
only bebetween schemata
Consequently there is no coordination
remain invariable
schemaofeachcoordinations
and the internal
tions.

and hence rigid. The considerable progress in this respect madein the fourth stage is that the same schemata are made "mobile."
They intercoordinate and consequently dissociate to regroupin a new way, the relations which they involve, each in itself,
becoming capable of being extracted from their respective totalities to give rise to varied combinations.

Now these various novel-

ties have combined solidarity. In becoming "mobile"that is toand syntheses the secondarysay, fit for new coordinations
their usual contents to apply
fromdetached
schemata become
themselves to a growing number of objects. From particular
schemata with special or peculiar contents they accordingly be-come generic schemata with multiple contents.
It is in this sense thatthe coordination of the secondaryand regroupings,
whosea"mobile"schematafunctioning issystem ofgive rise toschemata, and consequently their dissociations

comparable to that of the concepts or judgments of verbal or reflective intelligence. In effect, the subordination of means to ends

on the plane of practical intelligence, of thesubordination of premises to conclusions, on the plane of logical intelligence. The mutual involvement of schemata, which theisthe equivalent,

former presupposes, is therefore assimilable to that of concepts,
which the latter utilizes. But, in order to understand such a comparison, we should consider separately the logic of classes andthat of relations, that is to say, the two complementary systems ofoperations constituting every act of intelligence.
As we have emphasized, the coordination of the schemata

which characterizes the behavior patterns of the present stage isalways on a par with a putting into relationship of the objects
themselves subsumed by these schemata. In other words, the relations which determine a given object are not only relations ofappurtenance which permit it to be inserted in one or several

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA
schemata,

but all the relations which define it from239

spatial,tem-

poral, causal, etc., points of view. For example, in order to remove a cushion which is an obstacle to grasping the objective,

the child does not simply class the cushion in the schema of strik-

ing and assimilate, by inclusion, this schema to that of the endof the action, but he must understand that the obstacle is "infront of" the objective, that it must be removed "before" trying
to grasp this objective, etc. In short, the coordination of theschemata presupposes the existence of a system of relations between objects and between schemata other than the simple inherent relations. Let us observe that the schemata themselves involve, in order to be formed, these same relations. Therefore asecondary schema is not only a sort of primitive "concept," it isa number of "relations" in the sense which we have just recalled.
But it is only from the time when the schemata become "mobile"that the working of "relations" is clearly dissociated from thatof "classes." It is after this fourth stage, as we shall see in Vol-ume II, that the constitutive connections of the object and of
space, of causality and of time become truly differentiated fromthe simple, practical and subjective connections bound to theschemata themselves.

Now such a distinction between schemata

and relations recalls exactly tKe difference brought to light, bymodern logic between "classes" or "concepts" on the one hand,with their inherent connections (appurtenance and inclusion)and "relations," on the other hand, with their original operationsof conversion and multiplication. In order to compare the processes of

sensorimotor intelligence to those of reflective

intelli-gence, it is fitting to respect such a classification.
First, with regard to classes or kinds, it is apparent that the"mobile schema," despite all the structural differences which sep-from these logical beings, is functionally analogous tothem. Like them, the mobile schema always denotes one or sevarate

iteral objects, by "appurtenance." Like them, the mobile schemata

involve each other due to diversified connections, proceedingfrom pure "identification" to fitting in or "inclusion," and tointersections or "interferences." So too can the mobile schema
function actively due to an assimilatory operation which constitutes the equivalent of a judgment, or be applied passively in the

240

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

manner of a concept. Moreover, it is self-evident that, to the extent that sequential assimilations condition each other (as in thesubordination of means to ends), such totalities are equivalent
to elementary reasonings. These functional analogies of course

do not at all imply an identity of structure between such practical schemata and the unities of reflective thought. Two essential differences contrast, from this second point of view, these two
extreme states of infantile intelligence. In the first place, the sensorimotor schemata are not "reflective" but are projected into
the things themselves; that is to say, the child is not conscious of
the operations of his intelligence and considers the results of his

own activity as being imposed merely by facts as such. In thesecond place, and concurrently, the involvements between theschemata are not yet regulated by a system of internal norms:

The only verification of which the child is capable is of the typeof success and not of truth.

Concerning the "relations" implied by the coordination of
the mobile schemata, their situation is the same in comparison

with that of the relations of reflective intelligence. First, a functional analogy:

ranged among

these relations are also capable of being arthemselves, of ''multiplying," etc. But also a

structural difference: as we shall see when studying, in VolumeII,the development of the object, of spatial "groups" and causal

or temporal series, the first differentiated relations which thesensorimotor intelligence uses are not "objective" but are centered on the self and dominated entirely by the same perspective.

Despite these structural differences, the "relations" of the
fourth stage definitely involve, still more than those of the third,
the element of quantity inherent in every system of relations.
If it is a question of causal relations, the child perceives apro-

portionality between the intensity of the cause and that of the
could cite here observations analogous to Obs. 106).

effect (oneIf,on the contrary, it is a question of spatial, kinematic, or eventemporal relations, the child, in order to put the objects into
relationship to each other is obliged to distinguish them in order to arrange them, and this double factor of dissociation andof serialization presages thefirstrudiments of number.

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA
It is easy to furnish a

Observation 131.

counterproof

241

:

At

0;9 (4) Laurent imitates the sounds which heknows how to make spontaneously. I say "papa" to him, he replies
papa or baba. When I say "papa-papa" he replies apapa or bababa.
When I say "papapapapapapa" he replies papapapa, etc. There exists,
consequently, a global evaluation of the number of syllables: The quantity corresponding to 2 is in any case distinguished from 3, 4 or 5,
which are experienced as "many."
At 0;10 (14) Laurent repeats pa when I say "pa," papa for "papa"
and papapa for a number of 4 or more than 4.

Such are the "mobile schemata" from the point of view ofassimilation. It may thus be seen that the three aspects of assimi-

which we have emphasized in connection with the priand
secondary schemata (repetition, recognition, and genmary
eralization) tend to join together or to combine more and moreclosely to the extent that the schemata become more supple andmore complex. We shall not return to these distinctions except
lationto study, in the following paragraphs, certain particular aspectsof recognition and generalization peculiar to these schemata.

On the other hand, it is fitting to emphasize the process ofaccommodation characteristic of this stage because it is above
all this mechanism of accommodation which will permit us todistinguish between the "application of familiar means to newsituations" and the behavior patterns of the fifth stage and, inparticular, the "discovery of new means through active experimentation."

One remembers that during the preceding stage accommodation consists simply in an effort to rediscover the conditions
in which the action has discovered an interesting result. Such aform of accommodation, like that of the first two stages, is therefore, so to speak, dominated by assimilation: To the extent thatthe child tries to reproduce his acts he accommodates the schemata to the object which does not yet interest him in itself. During the next stage, on the contrary, the child will try to discover
new properties in the objects. Moreover, and in correlation withthese beginnings of experimentation, in order to attain ends

which are unreachable by the simple coordination of alreadyThis elaboraacquired schemata, he will elaborate new means.
tion presupposes, as we shall see, an accommodation which also

242

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

controls assimilation, that is to say, directs it as afunction of theproperties of the objects.

The accommodation characteristic of the fourth stage,
whether it is made manifest in the "explorations" which we shallor in the "application of familiar schepresently describe (5),mata to new circumstances," is exactly intermediate between theOn the one hand, it is only to the extent that the cotwo
types.

ordination of schemata works, hence their reciprocal assimilation, that their accommodation to the objects progresses.

Therein,the accommodation characteristic of the fourth stage simply pro-longs that of the preceding ones. But,

accommodation, evenon the other hand, such

subordinated to theworking of assimila-

between objects andtion, leads to the discovery of new relations
so presages the accommodation of the fifth stage.
With regard to the first point, it can therefore be said thatas a function
during this stage accommodation only progresses
in behavior
obviousisThisof the coordination of the schemata.
thebackobstacle,bringing anotherpatterns such as pushingcases the child
such
In
etc.
hand closer to the objective,

person's
tries neither to reach a new goal relating to the object nor to disHe limits himself to intercoordinating
cover a newprocedure.

two schemata according to the variations of that of the two which
and it is in order to operate this coassigns an end to the action,
ordination that he is obliged to accommodate the transitional
schema to the situation (pushing the object back instead of simhe discovers in the
striking it, etc.). But, while doing this,plycourse of the accommodation

itself, a

new relation ("pushingback in order to," etc.) and in that the second point consists; thatis to say, the outline of a more advanced accommodation which
will develop during the fifth stage.

Hence the accommodation of this stage is more refined thanthat of the schemata hitherto under study, since the mobile
schema applies to relations between external things and no longer

only to things in their mere connection with the activity itself.
Does this accommodation involve representation? If one understands representation to mean the capacity to confer upon things

a meaning before the action which this meaning permits,

it isapparent that representation exists. The act of looking under a

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

243

shawl for a shoe in order to strike it with a piece of wood (Obs.
129) is the prototype of this behavior pattern. But a capacity ofwhich naturally increases as a function of the inten-

this kind,tional nature of the acts, is already observable before this andgoes back to the very beginnings of mental life. On the other

hand, if one understands representation to mean the capacity
to evoke by a sign or a symbolic image an absent object or an
action not yet carried out, then nothing yet warrants asserting
its existence. In order that he look for his shoe it is riot necessary that the child picture it to himself or that he imagine thecontact of the wood with the leather. It suffices that a sensori-motor schema lead him. to his foot and that this schema be put
to work, by virtue of the fact that the collision of the wood withan object is assimilated to the kicking of the foot.
It remains for us to draw a conclusion, clarifying the meaning of mobile schemata from the point of view of organization.
As we have already emphasized often, organization or internal
adaptation characterizes the interior of each schema as well as
the interrelations of the schemata. Now the chief originality ofthis stage in comparison to the preceding stages is that the or-

ganization of the schemata among themselves is established forthe first time in an explicit way and thereby reveals the internalorganization of the schemata considered as totalities.

Moreover, it is good to distinguish, as before, between the
totalities in the process of elaboration and the completed totali-

Concerning the former, what has been said in 2 withregard to the subordination of means to ends sufficiently showsthe existence of categories to which we have simply alluded
hitherto and which henceforth acquire a precise meaning: thoseties.

of "value" and of "ideal" totality.

As long as the schemata are not intercoordinated but function each for itself, the child's judgments of value, so to speak,
are almost entirely confused with his judgments of reality. Moreprecisely,

they

are

one with theschema. When confronted by

activity

inherent in

eachrattles, for instance, either the childshakes them and their value becomes thus identified with theirloses interest in them, andproperty of being shaken, or else helack of value becomes identified in the same way
their

temporary

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

244

with the subject's inaction. On the other hand, another person'shand, in the behavior patterns of the present stage, is no longer
characterized by one value only, or by the pair "value" and"nonvalue"; it can be considered either as an obstacle, or as a
useful intermediate, or else as an end in itself according as towhether it is put into relationship with an objective from which
it separates the child, or with an objective upon which it can act
or again, is envisaged in itself. It thus assumes a series of different values according to the way in which it is utilized as means inview of different ends. With respect to these ends, it can be said
that, to the extent that they require, in order to be attained, amore complex coordination of the means for use, they are more
remote and so determine more "ideal" totalities. Hence the categories of "value" and of "ideal" become much more clearly differentiated during this stage than when the means and ends

were enveloped within the same schemata as was the case withrespect to the schemata of the third stage not intercoordinated.
Regarding the completed organizations, these are characterized by the two complementary modes of "totality" and "rela-tion" which also are henceforth revealed more clearly than before.

As far as "totality" is concerned, we have already emphasized that every schema of assimilation constitutes a true totality,that is to say, an ensemble of sensorimotor elements mutuallydependent or unable to function without each other. It is dueto the fact that the schemata present this kind of structure thatmental assimilation is possible and any object whatever can beincorporated or serve as aliment to a given schema. Inversely wehave seen that the existence of this "total" structure was con-nected with the act of assimilation, a sensorimotor coalescence

only constituting a true totality if it is capable of conversation
or repetition due to the action of assimilation. "Total" organi-and assimilation are consequently two aspects of thesame reality, one internal and the other external. How can we
surpass this analysis and grasp the intimate mechanism of thisorganization? This is precisely what the behavior patterns of thiszation

stage

make

possibleby showing us simultaneously how theCOORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

245

schemata are organized in relation to each other and inrespects this coordination corresponds to their internal

whichorganiza-tion.

The important

thing that the behavior patterns of theteachus
is that the coordination ofpresent stage
theschemata iscorrelative

totheir differentiation;in other words,

that theorganization works by complementary regroupings and dissociations. Thus pushing back the obstacle in order to attainthe objective presupposes a coordination between the schema of striking and that of grasping, but such a coordination that fromtheschema of striking is extracted that of"pushing back" which isimmanent in it. Now such correlation between external coordination and internal differentiation reveals a fundamental character of organization.

That is that every schema, insomuch as it ispregnant with a series of schemata virtually conbeing, not composedof totalities of a lower grade, but a possible source of such formations. These virtual totalities are not encased andpreformed in
the combined totality but result from it precisely to the extent

a totality,istained within it, each organized totality thusthat thecombined

totalities

intercoordinate

and thereby

be-come differentiated.

An organized totality consequently never merely constitutes
but one unity relating to the grade under consideration. Let it
be said in passing, that explains why psychological assimilationor organization are of the same nature as physiological assimilation or organization, their grade alone contrasting them to theselatter.

Thus every act of intellectual assimilation presupposes aof lower-grade assimilations protracted to the plane ofvital
assimilation. Moreover, if one remains on the psychotruly

seriesand considers this relation between the coordination or external organization of the schemata and the differentia-

logical plane,tion revealing their internal organization, one understands why,in the rest of mental development, the individual's every external conquest founded upon a new coordination will reecho
if

the acquisition of consciousness functions normally (that is to
if no obstacle looms to impede it) in a thought about the

say,
self

or an analysis of the internal mechanism of organization.

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

246

That parenthesis aside,

the coordination of the schemata

characteristic of this stage constitutes a new organization whichforms above the schemata a totality actualizing the balancesince the preceding stages. Now, as we see,existing between themthis external

totality only extends

the internal totalities con-sidered hitherto. Furthermore, the very fact that this external
virtue of a reciprocal assimilation of
totality is constructed byuntil now
schemata
the existing
brings to light the existence,aclose relationship between the cateof
merely anticipated,and "reciprocity." In effect, the fundamentalgories of "totality"of every "totality" is that its elements maintain amongproperty
themselves the relations of reciprocity.

The category of relation (reciprocity) is as fundamental tothe human mind as that of totality. If the purpose of this book
did not prohibit us from making digressions in the realm of thein general, this would be the time topsychology of intelligenceshow that the so-called "identification" in which a famousthe characteristic process of thephilosophy of science envisages
relaneverofgives itself an aim of forming
thought""progressofofratherbut
reciprocal relations of identity
forming systems
tions.

The ultimate fact, in the analysis of intelligence, conse-

quently is not thebystatic affirmation of identity,

but the process

which the mind distinguishes between two terms by putting

them into relationship and forms this relation while solidifyingof whichthem.
is, accordingly, a dynastic identity

Reciprocity
the act of coordination is on a par with that of differentiation.
Now, considered thus, reciprocity is the fundamental relation which one finds within each totality. When the totality isconstructed by coordination of two or more schemata, the relabetween these schemata are relations of reciprocity,
tions
existing

whereas the relations established between the objects subsumed
by these schemata themselves constitute reciprocal relations. With
the schemata, the same apregard to the internal structure ofan organized whole necessarily maintainplies: The parts ofof reciprocity. We shall examine thisrelationsthemselves
amongin Volume II when studying the objective, spatial or
moreclosely

causal structures. Concerning space, in particular,

it isobviousCOORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

247

that every motor totality tends to form a "group" whose elements
are defined precisely by reciprocity. 3

be sure, true totality and complete reciprocity are
But,
only limited cases that every schema and every ensemble ofschemata tend to realize to the extent that they actually tend
totoward a state of equilibrium. It is this difference between theand the highest state which justifies the distinction
between real totalities and ideal totalities which is characteristic
state of factof the categories of organization.
4.

THE RECOGNITION OF SIGNS AND THEIR UTI-LIZATION IN PREVISION.

It goes without saying that an
operation as complex as that of the coordination of mobile
schemata involves a use of recognitory assimilation as well as ofreproductive or generalizing assimilation. Moreover, it is uselessto study separately the acts of repetition of which the child becomes capable at this stage. On the other hand, it is interesting
to try to describe how the recognition of signs which the "application of familiar schemata to new situations*' presupposes,

surpasses this behavior pattern and can give rise to previsions
independent of the action in progress.
It is only natural that prevision should become independentof action at the present stage and so engender a sort of concreteprevision,

precisely

becausethe

constitution

of

the

mobileschemata and their coordination attest to the power which thechild acquires of dissociating the thitherto global totalities andof again combining their elements. But it is still necessary tounderstand through analysis of the facts how this liberation of
meanings works and in which respect the signs peculiar to thisstage differ from the various types of signals which have been

under study.
3 Thus, from thethe conlogical point of view, the difficulty inherent incept of identification is removed. Nothing formally distinguishes false fromtrue identification and the experimental proof necessary for this distinction
therefore either remains foreign to the mechanism of reason or else bound together with internal identifications whose validity one does not know how todemonstrate. On the other hand, a system of reciprocal relations obtains its
facts which
security simultaneously from its internal structure and from theit has succeeded in coordinating. Its constitution is a proof of its value sincein itself it comprises an element of verification.

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

248

We recall that to each of the preceding stages a particular
To the reflex stage cortype of signs and meanings corresponds.
of meanings immanent inandofarecognitions
type
responds
the use of the reflex. The child recognizes whether he is sucking
whether he is sucking a tegument or is really
without anobject,reactions then engender a second
nursing. The primary circularinsertion of a new pertheof"signals" acquired bysigns,
type
familiar schemata. Whether they aretheinelement
ceptivecoordination of heterogeneous schesimple or derived from theset inmata, the signals thus form part of the act which they
theofobjective. So
motion in the manner of direct perception
thefor
corresponding
it is that a heard sound provokes the searchetc. As we have seen, with the secondary reactions a third

image,are intermediate between the "signal"
type of signs begins which
and the "sign," that is to say, form the transition between thethe action and that which permits insign which simply releases
For instance, when a child hears
dependent prevision of the act.
a bed creak and by this sign recognizes the presence of his mother
who will be able to feed him (Obs. 108) he limits himself to inthe complex schemata coordinatedserting a new perception ina "signal"
that
and
in
with sucking
respect the sign is still onlyanmother
to
his
to
the
activityison
but heattributing
wayof himself and, to this extent, the prevision under

independentconsideration presages the true "sign."

This decisive progress, which consists in bringing prevision
to bear upon events independent of the action itself, is achievedofduring the fourth stage in correlation with the objectifying
the relations which characterize this stage in general. In otherwords, a fourth type of sign is now constituted which we shallcall the actual "sign," which permits the child to foresee, notcononly an event connected with his action, but also any event
ceived as being independent and connected with the activity ofthe object.
Observation 132. At 0;8 (6) Laurent recognizes by a certain noisecaused by air that he is nearing the end of his feeding and, instead ofinsisting on drinking to the last drop, he rejects his bottle. Such a behavior pattern still pertains to the recognition of "signals" since theperception of stmnd is inserted in the schemata of sucking, but the fact

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

249

that, despite his hunger,
his bottle seems to us to

Laurent at once resigns himself and rejects
show that he foresees the events as functionof the object itself as much as of the action. He knows that the bottle isemptying although a few grams of milk still remain.

At 0;9 (8) likewise, I observe that Laurent constantly follows mywhereabouts in the room without either seeing me or hearing my voice.
His mother's voice or his sisters' voices in the hall or the neighboring
rooms set no reaction in motion, whereas the slightest creak of my tableor armchair starts his search or significant sounds of his voice. Hencehe knows I am there and notes my presence as well as my changes oflocation by all these signs. Now this interest is independent of thehour of his meals.

Observation 133. At 0;9 (15) Jacqueline wails or cries when she sees
the person seated next to her get up or move away a little (giving theimpression of leaving).
At 0;9 (16) she discovers more complex signs during a meal thanpreviously. She likes the grape juice in a glass but not the soup in abowl. She watches her mother's activity. When the spoon comes out of
the glass she opens her mouth wide, whereas when it comes from thebowl, her mouth remains closed. Her mother then tries to lead her tomake a mistake by taking a spoon from the bowl and passing it by the
glass before offering it to Jacqueline. But she is not fooled. At 0;9 (18)Jacqueline no longer even needs to look at the spoon. She notes by
the sound whether the spoonful comes from the glass or from the bowl
and obstinately closes her mouth in the latter case. At 0;10 (26) Jacqueline also refuses her soup. But her mother, before holding out the
spoon to her, strikes it against a silver bowl containing stewed fruit.
Jacqueline is fooled this time and opens her mouth due to not having

watched the move and to having depended on the sound alone.
At 1;1 (10) she has a slight scratch which is disinfected with alcohol.
She cries, chiefly from fear. Subsequently, as soon as she again sees thebottle of alcohol she recommences to cry, knowing what is in store forher. Two days later, same reaction, as soon as she sees the bottle andeven before it is opened.
Observation 133 repeated. Lucienne has revealed most of the sameThus at 0;8 (23) she also closes her mouth to the spoonsful

reactions.

coming from the bowl (of soup) and opens it to those coming from theshe wails as soon as the person withglass (of fruit juice). At 0;10 (19)whom she is playing gives the impression of leaving. It is enough to turnoneself away from her, without rising, to worry herl
Observation 134.-At 0;10 (26) Jacqueline has watched for a long timea red balloon attached to the handle of her bassinet and floating toward
the ceiling. At a given moment I detach the balloon without her seeing

250

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

me. Shortly afterward she looks at the handle at the usual place, looks
for the balloon and, not finding it, examines the ceiling. At 0;1I (14)she cries when I take a mirror from her hand without her watching thisnot see it any more.
operation. She therefore knows she will
In a general way, from 0; 1 1 Jacqueline cries when one pretends totake an object away from her because she awaits its disappearance. Thiskind of understanding is related to the development of the behavior
Vol. II, Chap. I).
patterns of searching for the absent object (seeSo it is that from 0;11 (15) Jacqueline cries as soon as her motheror anxiety as before but due toputs her hat on. This is not due to fear
the certainty of the departure.

Observation 135. It is fitting, moreover, to class among the signs of the
fourth stage those which the child uses to identify his own features by
those which correspond to them on the face of another person.
We shall study these signs in connection with the acquisition ofimitation (see "The Genesis of Imitation") and shall see that in thisregard they could not be confused with simple "signals."
For example, before 0;10 (7) Laurent has not succeeded in imitatit out
spontaneously
ing the act of sticking out the tongue. Now he sticks
while accompanying this movement with a sound of saliva. I thenimitate him and he in turn imitates me. But the imitation fails when
I stick my tongue out in silence. From 0;10 (10), on the contrary, it
suffices that I stick out my tongue, even without the accompanying
sound, for him to imitate me. The sound of saliva has consequently
served as a sign to permit him to identify his tongue by mine.
That is not a question of a "signal" setting the act in motion since
the sound alone does not induce the child to stick his tongue out, butrather of a sign enabling the subject to put a group of factors observedin someone else into relationship with the corresponding parts of his
own body. The sign again is brought to bear upon events independentof the self.

The principal novelty of these facts compared with those of
the preceding levels is that they presuppose a prevision independent of the action in progress. When the child notes thepresence of persons independently of his meals, wails on seeing
someone rise, turns on hearing a breath, recognizes an alcoholbottle, etc., he performs an operation more difficult than connecting a signal with the schemata relating to the meal (thirdtype), and trying to see the thing he hears or to grasp an object
which has grazed his fingers (second type). In these last three

behavior patterns the signal has exclusively a practical meaning;that is to say, its only effect is to set in motion the action of a

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

251

schema of assimilation to which it is connected by a constant andnecessary bond. True, this bond presages prevision, particularly
when the intermediates between the signal and the act are com-plex as in the third type, but this prevision remains connectedwith the immediate action and is not yet dissociated from it. On
the contrary, the behavior patterns of the fourth type reveal amore advanced

differentiation between prevision and action.
Undoubtedly all the intermediates are given between this level
and the preceding ones and some of the behavior patterns citedprolong without adding anything to those of the third type andeven of the second. Thus the fact of marking by the sound of
the spoon or the sight of the receptacle that which the spoon
will contain merely constitutes an extension of the schemata of

coordination between sight and eating. But, although the signsof the present type are sometimes derived from more or lesshabitual schemata they can henceforth enter into new behavior
patterns in the capacity of components. If Jacqueline, for ex-

ample, foresees what the content of the spoons will be, this is inorder to reject her soup and only accept the fruit juice* And,
above all, it is remarkable that henceforth prevision becomes
possible in connection with facts rarely or very recently observed,
or even in connection with the actions of other people. Thus toforesee the departure of a person when he rises or even turns
away is a prevision which is already very much detached from theaction in progress; and to manifest aversion for a bottle of alcoholisto utilize a rare or very recently acquired connection.

In short the novelty of these behavior patterns, althoughdifficult to grasp precisely, is made manifest in that prevision be-comes objectified and detached from simply circular reaction.
Thus it may be seen that these behavior patterns are in close
relation with those of Observations 120-130, that is to say, withthe application of familiar schemata to new situations. Thisthat

application of familiar schemata also presupposes prevision,
to say, the utilization of signs. And, primarily, the relationshipbetween these two groups of facts consists in that in both casesisthe schemata utilized are "mobile," in other words, subject tothismultiple combinations. In the case of Observations 120-130,
is recognizable by the fact that theoftheschemata
mobility

252

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

familiar schemata, habitually constituting ends in themselves,
serve momentarily as means for a new end. In the case of theon the contrary, signs ordinarily
present observations they are,embodied in general schemata which are henceforth understoodin themselves and utilized separately in order to give rise to an
Thus the signs consisting of creaks of
independent prevision.

the table or of chairs, of the person rising, etc., were acquired, likemost of the others, as function of the schemata of the meal. They
are henceforth utilized in any circumstance whatever. In bothof the utilization ofcases, consequently, whether it is a question
or of the utilizaend
familiar schemata in the pursuit of a newtion of signs in a new independent situation, the schemata become mobile and subject to unlimited combinations. The only
difference between the two behavior patterns is that in Observations 120-130 there is seeking and invention of a means, whereas

in the present observations there is chiefly comprehension, but,in both cases, the process of assimilation is the same.
to theFinally let us remark, before proceeding

new facts,that the term prevision which we have used must not create anillusion or evoke more than concrete expectation. Deduction

does not vet exist, because there is doubtless still no "representation." When Jacqueline expects to see a person where a door isa certain reopening, or fruit juice in a spoon coming: out of
be
there
that
order
in
understanding
not
it
is
ceptacle,necessary,of these signs and consequently prevision, that she picture theseobjects to herself in their absence. It is enough that the sign set
in motion a certain attitude of expectation and a certain schemaof recognition of persons or of food. Thus the sight of obstacles
in a cluttered street permits us to steer a bicycle or an automobile

with enough prevision to adapt ourselves to the barely outlined
movements of another person without our needing to picture

them to ourselves in detail. It is during the later stages that true
deduction, with representation, will be superposed on these elementary meanings. But we are not yet there and have not evenreached the level at which the meaning of sensorial signs is constituted by the "object" itself, with its characteristics of permanence and solidity.

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

253

5. THE EXPLORATION OF NEWOBJECTS AND
PHENOMENA AND THE "DERIVED" SECONDARY RE-

ACTIONS.

Granted what we have seen of theapplication of
new situations and of the understanding

familiar schemata toof signs independently of the action in progress, we can ask
what the child will do when confronted by objects or phenomena
which are entirely new to him. Such objects could not set inmotion behavior patterns analogous to those in Observations
120-130 that is to say, the application of familiar means to a
new end precisely because the child, when confronted by suchobjects, cannot set himself any definite goal except "understand-ing" them. Moreover the understanding of signs, while playing
a role in this assimilation, would not suffice to account for it.

Then what will happen? We are now to encounter a very significant behavior pattern which, more than any other, will make us

grasp the importance of assimilation through mobile schemata.

The child will try, by virtue of a sort of "generalizing assimilation/' to make the new object enter into each of his habitual
schemata, one by one. In other words, the child will try to"understand" the nature of the new object, and as comprehension

confused with sensorimotor or practical assimilation, hewill limit himself to applying each of his schemata to the object.
But in doing this he will not, as in the third stage, set theschema as goal and the object as means. On the contrary, theschema will be, so to speak, the instrument of comprehension,is still

whereas the object will remain the goal or intention of thiscomprehension. To put it more simply, the child will apply himself in acts to the operation to which older subjects apply themselves in words: He will define the object by its use.

Here are examples of these behavior patterns:
Observation 136. At 0;8 (16) Jacqueline grasps an unfamiliar cigarette
which I present to her. At first she examines it very attentively,
turns it over, then holds it in both hands while making the sound apffcase

she usually makes in the presence of people).
(a kind of hiss which
After that she rubs it against the wicker of her bassinet (habitual movement of her right hand, Obs. 104), then draws herself up while looking
at it (Obs. 115), then swings it above her and finally puts it into hermouth.

A ball of wool: She looks at

it,turns it over, feels it, squeezes it,

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

254

then lets it go, accidentally. I rest the ball on her stomach. Jacqueline
draws herself up three or four times while looking at it,^ then feels its
it in all direcsurface again, pulls the string while staring at it, shakes
tions and finally again goes apff.
feels it, thentin box: Jacqueline grasps it, examines it all over,sound when striking it.
shakesit, then hears ashe
Afterward
goes apff.
while looking at itthen draws herself

Aup
from the side whileemits some sounds
sheAfterward
holding it in the air and going apff.
in all direcsuch as adda, bva> etc., while brandishing it and turning it
She then strikes indefinitely,and striking it. Then she examinesitat length

tions. Finally, she rubs it against the wickerof the bassinet again goingapff.

At 0;9 (4) she looks for a long time at a straw table mat, thenbold enough to touch it, then grasps
delicately touches the edge, grows
air while slowly displacing it, shakes it and ends byit, holds it in thehand. This behavior is accompanied by antapping it with her otherof expectation and then of satisfaction. Jacqueline finallyexpression
Then she rubs the object against
expresses her feelings by going apff.
the edge of the bassinet, etc.

a notebook
Observation 137. --At 0;8 (29) Laurent examines at length

which he has just grasped. He transfers it from one hand to the otherwhile turning it in all directions, touches the cover, then one of theand finally the edge. Afterward he shakes
then the covercorners,again,

head while looking at it, displaces it more slowly
with a wide motion and ends by rubbing it against the side of the basthe notebook
sinet. He then observes that in rubbing against the wicker
does not produce the usual effect (sound? consistency?) and examines
the contact most attentively while rubbing more gently.
At 0;9 (6) he examines a series of new objects which I present to
him in sequence: a wooden figure of a man with movable feet, awooden toucan 7 cm. high, a matchbox case, a wooden elephant (10cm. long) and a beaded purse. I observe four quite constant reactions.
In the first place a long visual exploration: Laurent looks at thehimself, shakes his(1)which are at first immobile, then looks at them very rapidly
from one hand to the other). He seems to study(while transferring them
their various surfaces or perspectives. In particular, he folds the pursein two, unfolds and refolds it in order to study the transformations; assoon as he sees the hinge, he turns the object over in order to see it fullobjects

face, etc. (2) After the visual exploration a tactile exploration begins:feels the object, especially the toucan's beak, the little man's feet,He

and gently passes his fingers over the unevenness of the object (thecarved wood of the toucan, the beads of the purse, etc.), he scratches
certain places (the case of the box, the smooth wood of the elephant,moves the object in space: chiefly movements perpenetc.). (3) He slowly
dicular to his glance, but already perhaps desired displacements in

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

255

depth. (4) Only at last does he try the various familiar schemata, using
them each in turn with a sort of prudence, as though studying the effectproduced. He shakes them, strikes them, swings them, rubs them against
the bassinet, draws himself up, shakes his head, sucks them, etc.
At 0;9 (21) same reactions in the presence of a big red crayon: He
touches its point with interest, then turns the crayon around manytimes, strikes it, rubs it, shakes it, scratches it, etc. At 0;9 (26) the same
applies to a bath thermometer: He looks at it, scratches it, shakes himself in front of it, then shakes it, turns it over, feels the handle aroundwhich he finally puts his hand, sucks the end of the handle (withoutwishing to suck, but "in order to see"), takes it out of his mouth, follows
the thermometer itself with his left palm, shakes himself again, examines
the glass part, touches it and scratches it, looks at the string and feels
it,

etc.

At 0;9 (30) same reactions in the presence of a new plush cat: He
turns it in all directions, touches its head cautiously, touches the ribbon,
the feet, discovers a cardboard disc attached to its tail and scratches itwith his nail. He ends by striking the cat, swinging it in space; heshakes himself while looking at it, says papa, baba, etc.
Before discussing these facts of "exploration of new objects,"
let usagain see how they can give rise to new "secondary circubut "derived" ones, when the exploration bylar reactions,"

chance results in the discovery of an unknown phenomenon. As
we have already emphasized (see Chap. Ill, 4, Obs. 119), newsecondary reactions are formed at every age (and not only during
the third stage), but in the midst of new contexts. This is precisely what happens in the course of the behavior patterns of"exploration." It suffices that an unforeseen result has been
fortuitously set in motion for it to give rise to immediate andsimple repetition which in turn results in the elaboration of aschema. Here are some examples:~We

have already seen (Obs. 103) how the schemata
Observation 13 8.
of striking hanging objects is derived from simpler schemata (grasping,schemata (hitting withetc.) and has itself given rise to more complex

one hand an object held in the other, etc.). Now we shall see how, withat about the same time,
respect to Laurent, Lucienne, and Jacqueline,
this same schema of striking engendered a new schema of "settingin theswinging in motion" and how this latter schema was discovered

course of actual "explorations."
At 0;8 (30) Laurent, for the first time, examines a wooden hen fromwhich hangs a ball which actuates the animal's head by its movements.
First he sees the hen, touches it, etc., then examines the ball, feels itTHE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

256

he thenwatches

attentively
and, seeing it move, strikes it immediately;sets itits own sake; he simply
it swing and then studies it for
his attention is brought to bear
Then
and
more
more
motion,gently.
the ball whileon the accompanying movement of the hen and he swings
thehen.
watchingm

examines a
Observation 138 repeated.-luudennz, at 0;8 (10), likewise,at it forlooksShebassinet.
her
of
hood
new doll which I hang from thea long time, touches it, then feels it by touching its feet, clothes, head,
the hood sway. She thenetc. She then ventures to grasp it, which makes
this movement. Then sheofeffects
the
while
the
doll
watchingpulls
it with thereturns to the doll, holds it in one hand while striking
her and finallysucks it and shakes it while holding it above
other,

shakes it by moving its legs.
the string
Afterwards she strikes it without holding it, then grasps
with the other hand. She thenby which it hangs and gently swings it
becomes very much interested in this slight swinging movement whichis

new to her and repeats it indefinitely.

necktie
Observation 139.~At 0;8 (9) Jacqueline looks at a hanging
which she has never seen. Her hands move around it and touch it very
its surface. At a certain moment part ofwarily. She grasps it and feels

the necktie escapes her grasp: visible anxiety, then, when the phenomenon is repeated, satisfaction and, almost immediately after, somethingwhich resembles an experience of letting go and recapturing.
That evening, Jacqueline is lying on her back having at her righta rag which is drying on a line. She tries to grasp it, then immediately
it go and watches it oscilit; then she draws it toward her, lets

swingslate.

When it stops, she rebegins, evincing great interest in this move-ment.

At 0;8 (12) Jacqueline at first tries to make another hanging necktielets it go, etc., in a regular and con-swing. She grasps it very gingerly,
tinuous oscillating movement.

At 0;8 (13) Jacqueline watches her mother who is swinging theflounce on the bassinet. As soon as she stops, Jacqueline pushes her handto make her continue. Then she herself grasps the flounce and imitates
the movement Thatswings a hanging doll in theevening Jacqueline

same way, with great delicacy.

At 0;8 (26) Jacqueline feels and explores the surface of a lamp
shade which then begins to swing. She waits until this movement has
almost stopped (after many oscillations) in order to start the object
moving again with one blow of her hand. This reaction reappears
regularly the days following as soon as she is brought near the lamp in
her room. I again observe it at 0;9 (5), etc.

At 0;9 (6) Jacqueline accidentally starts a sudden movement of thelamp shade by striking it from the inside. She then immediately tries

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

257

to rediscover the result by placing her hand, not with the palm against
the material as usual, but with her palm in the air. She gropes in thisway, very warily, becomes entangled in the fringe, then is completely
successful.

Observation .Z-/0.~-Here is a second example of "exploration" leading to
a 'derived secondary circular reaction" and to a new schema, that of"letting go." This second example is particularly instructive since it'

presages the most important of the "tertiary circular reactions" and thus
will permit us to form the transition between the behavior patterns of
the present stage and those of the fifth stage.

At

0;10

(2)

Laurent examines an empty (white metal) case ofshaving soap which he sees for the first time. He begins by turning it inall directions while passing it from one hand to the other as he did withthe objects in Observation 137. But the object being slippery and hard
to handle, slips from his hand two or three times. Then Laurent, struckby this phenomenon, applies himself to reproducing it a certain numberof times. At first I had some difficulty in deciding whether it was indeed
an intentional act for Laurent begins each time by holding the case fora moment and turning it over before letting it go. But then it fell more
and more frequently and above all systematically as revealed by thefollowing statements concerning the procedures employed by Laurent
for relinquishing the objective.

In effect, what interests Laurent at the beginning of this behavior
pattern is not the trajectory of the object that is to say the objective
phenomenon of its fall but the very act of letting go. Sometimes
Laurent delicately opens his hand (his palm upturned), and the caserolls along his fingers, sometimes Laurent turns his hand over (vertically) and the case falls backward between the thumb and index finger

which are separated, sometimes Laurent simply opens his hand (palmdownward) and the object falls.
It is this characteristic of Laurent's behavior pattern which permits
us still to class it among the secondary circular reactions and not among
the tertiary reactions. The "tertiary" reaction will begin, in effect, atthe time when Laurent will study the trajectory of the object and to do
this will organize a true "experiment in order to see." He will vary theconditions, relinquish the object in different situations, watch it, try torecapture it, etc. For the time being, on the contrary, he limits himself
to repeating the same gestures and is only interested in his own action

which certainly constitutes a "secondary" reaction.
Above all, for several days Laurent has only utilized this schema of
the case of shaving
relinquishing in connection with the same object,
the next day, he immedisoap. At 0;10 (3), for example, that is to say,his behavior of the previto
order
in
case
of
the
makes
use
repeatately
ous day, but he does not let go either of the little box which hemanipulates for a long time or of his plush cat, etc. At 0;10 (4)

same

258

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

reaction. At 0; 10 (5) he twice lets fall a small bottle (new to him) whichfell from his hands fortuitously the first time. It is only at 0;10 (10) that

he begins to throw everything to the ground, but then at the same time
he becomes interested in the trajectories of the falling objects and so
inaugurates his "tertiary circular reactions."
Hence it is fitting to terminate this observation by drawing theconclusion that this secondary circular reaction is apparently "derived"from "exploration" of the case of soap and thus reveals no relationshipto the transitional schema of removing or letting fall the object asstudied in Observation 125. On the other hand we have seen how theas a "means," in Obpresent schema has subsequently been utilized
servation 130.

Behavior patterns of this sort are found exactly between thein the presence of new
generalization of secondary schemata
objects(Obs.

110-111)andthe"tertiarycircularreactions/'

hence between the behavior patterns of the third stage and thoseof the fifth.

Like the "generalization of secondary schemata" the present
behavior patterns consist, in effect, of applying acquired schemata
to new objects or phenomena. Just as, at 4 to 6 months, the childstrikes, shakes, rubs, etc., the unfamiliar object which is offeredto him, so also, at 8 to 10 months, he displaces it, swings it,
shakes it, etc. The exploration of which we now speak therefore
prolongs without adding anything to the generalization of theschemata to such a degree that all the transitions are exhibited
between the two behavior patterns and it is impossible to draw
a definite boundary between them. Nevertheless they do not seem
to us to be identical because, however d'elicate the evaluation ofsuch characteristics may be, their orientation is different. At the

beginning of the third stage, in effect, the new object does notinterest the child at all as a novelty. Its novelty only arrests his

curiosity fleetingly and the object immediately serves as alimentto habitual schemata. Interest is consequently not centered on

the object as such but on its utilization. On the other hand, when
the 8-month-old child examines a cigarette case or a hanging
necktie everything transpires as though such objects presented aproblem to his mind, as though he were trying to "understand."Not only does he look at such objects for a much longer time thanthet 4- to 5-month-old child before proceeding to acts, but

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

259

furthermore, he engages in an ensemble of exploratory movements relating to the object and not to himself. He feels, explores
the surface, the edges, turns over and slowly displaces, etc., andthe last behavior patterns are very significant of a new attitude.

The unfamiliar obviously represents to the child an external
reality, to which he must adapt himself and no longer a substancewhich is pliable at will or a simple aliment for the activity itself.
Finally comes the application of habitual schemata to this reality.
But in trying out each of his schemata in turn, the child at thisstage gives more the impression of making an experiment thanHe tries to "understand."In other words, it is as though the child said to himself
when confronted by the new object: "What is this thing? I see
of generalizing his behavior patterns:

it,hear it, grasp it, feel it, turn it over, without recognizing it:

what more can I do with it?" And as understanding, at this age,ispurely practical or sensorimotor and the only concepts which
exist as yet are mobile schemata, the child tries to make thenew object enter into each of his schemata in order to see inwhich respect they suit it. As we have already noted, such behavior patterns constitute the functional equivalent of "definitions through use" so important to a child's verbal intelligence.
Concerning the secondary circular reactions which can"derive" from this exploration, their genesisiseasy to under-

stand when a new phenomenon appears unexpectedly. In effect,when the child tries to assimilate a new object to his earlier

schemata, two things can happen. Either the object comes up to
expectation and so fits the schemata tried out, and then adaptation is acquired. The new doll can indeed be swung, shaken,
rubbed, etc., and the child is satisfied. Or else, on the contrary,
the object resists and reveals properties hitherto unknown, butthen the child behaves as he has always done in a similar case. He
tries to rediscover what he has just discovered by chance andmerely repeats the movements which led him to this fortuitousthe nature of adiscovery. So it is that, when trying to explore

hanging necktie or a lamp shade, Jacqueline discovers the phe-nomenon of the spontaneous swinging of these objects. Until
then she was only familiar with the swinging of toys hanging
from the hood of her bassinet, a swinging prolonged or main-

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

260

tained by her schemata of "striking" or "drawing herself up,"(Obs. 103). Now on the contrary, she becomes aware of aetc.

swinging which is in a way inherent in the object, hence of a newphenomenon. She immediately studies it and, to do this, applies
herself to reproducing it indefinitely. The same is true of Laurent(Obs. 140)

when he discovers the possibility of "letting go" of

objects.

New behavior patterns of this kind obviously prepare thethrowing and picking up,
causing sliding, rolling, splashing, etc.) which will develop during the fifth stage and will constitute the first real experimentations of which the child is capable. The "tertiary circular reaction" is, in effect, an "experiment in order to see," which nolonger consists in simply reproducing an interesting result but"tertiary circular reactions" (such as

in making it vary in the very course of repetition. At this level ofdevelopment the object definitely becomes independent of theaction. It is the source of completely autonomous activities which
the child studies from the outside, as he is henceforth oriented
toward novelty as such.
But if these actions of "swinging" and "letting go" which wehave seen appear in the course of the "explorations" of this stage
presage this kind of "experiments in order to see" it would not
yet be possible to identify them entirely by the latter. Not only, indoes the child always limit himself to "reproducing" what
he observes and not to innovating but furthermore, as we shalleffect,state primarily in Volume II, the "object" characteristic of thisfourth stage remains partly dependent on the action.

At last it may be understood why we class facts of this kindin the same stage as the "application of familiar means to new

Like the intelligent behavior patterns under study
above (Obs. 120-130), the latter consist essentially in adapting
early schemata to current circumstances. In a sense, it is true,

situations."

such applications protract without adding anything to secondary
circular reactions but, contrary to the "procedures to make aninteresting spectacle last," the present behavior patterns have as
their function not only to make the given result "last" but toadjust to novelty.
Moreover these facts bring tomind the understanding of

COORDINATION OF SECONDARY SCHEMATA

261

signs, which was treated previously. In the course of attempts at

assimilation of new objects many signals and signs intervene
which guide the child in his choice of schemata to apply. So it
that in Observation 139 the fact that the object is mobile orimmobile, hanging or handed to him, orients his search. We canagain remark, in this connection, that the fewer schemata thechild has at his disposition the less useful is the sign because
assimilation is immediate and global; whereas the more theschemata multiply, the more the organization of signs becomesiscomplicated and necessary to action.
But the difference between the present facts and the preceding ones is that the orientation of the assimilatory effort isdifferent.

There is an effort to understand and no longer toinvent, or even to foresee. In the case of Observations 120-130

the child, from the outset of the act has the intention of apply-ing a given schema to the object, and the problem is to know
which intermediate schemata are suitable to serve as means tothis end. There is therefore an attempt to invent and compre-

hension only intervenes to facilitate invention. In the present
case, on the contrary, the problem is to know which schemata aresuited to the object. Consequently there exists an attempt tocomprehend and, to the extent that invention intervenes in theform of the search for schemata, it is simply in order to facilitate
comprehension. With regard to the recognition of signs of which
we have spoken in connection with Observations 132-135, it
constitutes an intermediate behavior pattern in this respect: It
is comprehension, since it is immediate assimilation of a datum
to a schema, but this comprehension is oriented toward prevision; that is to say, toward the utilization of the same schemawith the intention of assimilating coming events and in thissense it is invention.

In a general way, the behavior patterns peculiar to thisfourth stage manifest a real unity. Intercoordination of theschemata and their adaptation to the object are their constantand these two characteristics are complementary.
The "application of familiar means to new situations" is decharacteristics

termined by the coordination of two groups of schemata of whichsome serve as ends and the others as means: whence a more ac-

262

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

curate adjustment of the latter to the circumstances

motivating

this union. The "signs" belonging to this stage permit a prevision

which begins to become detached from the action itself. Consequently there exist simultaneously the application of familiar
schemata to new situations and progress in adaptation to thedate of perception. The same applies to the "explorations" ofwhich we have just spoken. Doubtless the last of these behavior
patterns does not necessarily presuppose coordinations between
separate schemata; it only implies the application of the sche-mata to new objects. But, like the first behavior patterns, the last
one permits a real accommodation of the schema to the object
and no longer merely a global application as in the third stage.

CHAPTER V

THE FIFTH STAGE:
The "Tertiary Circular Reaction" and the"Discovery of New Means ThroughActive Experimentation' 9
During the third of the stages which we have delineated,the child, by manipulating things, constructed a series of simple
schemata due to the "secondary circular reaction," such as"shaking," "rubbing," etc. These schemata, while not yet intercoordinated, nevertheless comprise, each in itself, an organization of movements and perceptions and, consequently, a commencement of putting objects into interrelations. But thisorganization, remaining within each schema, does not involvea clear distinction between "means" and "ends" and this putting
into relationship, for the same reason, remains entirely practicaland does not lead to the elaboration of actual "objects."
In the course of the fourth stage, which immediately precedes this one, the secondary schemata become intercoordinatedand so give rise to the complex actions which we have designated"applications of familiar means to new situations." This coordination of schemata, which clearly differentiates "means"from "ends" and so characterizes the first acts of intelligenceproperly so-called, insures a new putting into relationship ofobjects among themselves and hence marks the beginning of theformation of real "objects." But two circumstances limit theeffectiveness of this behavior and at the same time define thedifference which separates it from those of the fifth stage. In thefirst place,in order to become adapted to the new circumstancesthat is to say, in order to remove thein which he finds himself

263

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

264

obstacle or discover the requisite intermediate

the child at the

fourth stage limits himself to intercoordinating familiar schemata,accommoda-

except for differentiating them through progressivetion while adjusting them to each other. In the second place,that very fact, the relations which the child estabandthrough
between things still depend on completed schemata of
which only the coordination is new; besides, they do not lead tothe elaboration of objects entirely independent of the action, norof spatial "groups" which are entirely "objective," etc. This islisheswhat we shall see, in particular, in Volume II, in studying conand of time which are
cepts of the object, of space, of causality
characteristic of the fourth stage.

In short, the fourth stage, inso far as it is defined by the commencement of the coordination of
more as a phase of initiation or of gestation
schemata,

appears

than as a period of realization or accomplishment.
The fifth stage, which we now undertake to study, is, on
the contrary, primarily the stage of elaboration of the "object."by the formation of new schemata

It is characterized, in effect,

which are due no longer to a simple reproduction of fortuitous
results but to a sort of experimentation or search for novelty as

such. Moreover, in correlation with this same tendency, thefifth stage is recognizable by the appearance of a higher type of

coordination of schemata: the coordination directed by the search
for new "means."

Now both of these behavior patterns protract those of thepreceding stages. As far as the "tertiary circular reaction" is concerned, it derives directly, as we shall see, from the secondary
reactions and "explorations" to which the latter finally give rise.
The only difference is that in the case of "tertiary" reactions the

new effect obtained fortuitously is not only reproduced but
modified to the end that its nature may be studied. With regard
to the "discoveries of new means through active experimentation"
they simply crown the coordination of schemata already in use
during the fourth stage, but the reciprocal adjustment of theschemata which we have described in the preceding chapter, becomes accommodation for the sake of accommodation, that is tosay,

a search for new procedures.

But if the behavior patterns of the fifth stage protract thoseTERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS
265
of the fourth and so constitute their natural
result, they nevertheless mark decisive
progress and theof areally chartime, the child truly adapts

beginning

acteristic phase. In effect, for the firsthimself to unfamiliar

situations, not only by utilizing the schemata acquired earlier but also
by seeking and finding new means
whence a series of consequenceson the one

concerning,
hand,
the functioning ofintelligence and, on the other, the essential
categories of concrete thought.

Of the first of these points of view, the coordination of schemata henceforth being
accompanied by intentional accommodation and differentiated to new
circumstances, it can be said thatthe mechanism of
empirical intelligence has been
formed. The child is henceforthdefinitely

capable of resolving new prob-

if noacquired schema is directly utilizable for thisandif the solution of these
purpose,problems has not yet beenfound by deduction or representation, it is insured inprinciple
in all cases due to the combined
working of experimental searchand the coordination of schemata.

lems, evenWith regard to the "real categories' of thought, this kindof accommodation to things, combined with the coordination of1

schemata already acquired during thepreceding stage, result infrom the activity itself while
inserting it in coherent spatial groups in the same way as in thecausal and temporal series which are
independent of the self.
definitely detaching the "object**1.

THE TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTION.

The

peculiarity of the behavior patterns which we shall now describe
is to constitute, for the first time, an effort tograsp novelties inthemselves.

To be sure, from the very beginnings of mental life, it canbe said that the external environment imposes a constant enlarging of the subject's reactions and that new experience always
causes the old framework to crack. That is why acquired habits
are sooner or later superposed on reflex schemata and on the for-mer are superposed the schemata of intelligence. And, of course,
can also be said that the subject accepts this necessity withpleasure since the "circular reaction*' at all levels is precisely an
attempt to conserve novelties and establish them by reproductive
it

266

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

in a sense
assimilation. In the third place, one can maintain
the
since
itself,assimilation
heterogenefrom
that novelty stems
numerous, which are bestowed at the benot

ous schemata,very
to assimilate each other and so leadginning, tend reciprocallycoordinations, either intersensorialof
combinations
to multiple
or intelligent.
the same facts show theBut, considered from another angle,
resistance of mental life to novelty

and the momentary victory

the peculiarity
of conservation over accommodation. So it is thatand events inof assimilation is to neglect what is new in things
schemata.
oldorder to reduce them to the state of aliments forWith regard to circular reaction, if it tends to reproduce the new
to state
result fortuitously observed, it is nevertheless necessarythat it did not seek it but that it imposed itself by appearing by
chance and in connection with familiar movements. To sucha degree that circular reaction only remains, at first, pure repro-

is,ductive assimilation and, if it is applied to a new datum,theto speak, because this datum forced
positions by surreptielaborated
its way into the interior of an alreadyfindingtiouslywhich
resultsexternal
newtheschema. Let us recall thatifasreaction
sprung fromcharacterize secondary circularappearunderschemata,pressure from thea differentiation ofitsoprimary

and that primary circular reaction
from the reflex schemata.
velops, by differentiation,

external environment,de-different: if it also arises

Tertiary circular reaction is quite
circular schemata,by way of differentiation, from the secondary
environment but
the
no
is
differentiation
thislonger imposed byso to speak, accepted and even desired in itself. In effect, notor situations to thesucceeding in assimilating certain objects
schemata hitherto examined, the child manifests an unexpectedis,behavior pattern: He tries, through a sort of experimentation, tofind out in which respect the object or the event is new. In otherwords, he will not only submit to but even provoke new results
instead of being satisfied merely to reproduce them once they
have been revealed fortuitously. The child discovers in thisthat which has been called in scientific language the "ex-way

periment in order to see." But, of course, the new result, though
and thesought after for its own sake, demands to be reproduced

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS
initial experiment is267

immediately accompanied by circular reac-tion. But, there too, a difference contrasts these "tertiary" reactions to the "secondary" reactions.
the child repeats theWhenmovements which led him to the interesting result, he no longer
repeats them just as they are but gradates and varies them, insuch a way as to discover fluctuations in the result. The "experiment in order to see," consequently, from the very beginning,has the tendency to extend to the conquest of the external environment.

These tertiary circular reactions will lead the child to newcomplete acts of intelligence which we shall call "discovery of
new means through active experimentation." The acts of intelligence hitherto under study have only consisted in an applicationof familiar means (already acquired schemata) to new situations.
But what will happen when the familiar means reveal themselves
to be inadequate, in other words, when the intermediates between subject and object are not assimilable to the habitual
schemata? Something will transpire which is analogous to what
we have just said about tertiary circular reaction. The subject
will search on the spot for new means and will discover them
reaction. It cannot be said that he will
precisely through tertiary
to these situations since, by definition,
schematathetertiary
apply

the tertiary circular reaction is vicarious and only exists during
the elaboration of new schemata, but he will apply the method of
tertiary circular reaction.

The invention of new means through active experimentais to tertiary reaction what the "application ofmeans to new situations" is to secondary reaction: ation, therefore,familiar

combination or coordination of schemata in comparison to thesimple schemata. To be more precise, we are confronted here bya distinction analogous to that which can be made on the planeof reflective or verbal intelligence between reason and judgment,
reason being a combination of judgments of which some serveas means and the others as ends. In effect, a judgment is nothingother, from the functional point of view which is common to reflective intelligence and to sensorimotor intelligence, than theassimilation of a datum to a schema.

From this point of view

simple circular reactions, whether primary, secondary or tertiary,

268

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

are judgments. Moreover, the application of familiar means to
new situations or the invention of new means constitute, fromthe same functional point of view, actual reasonings since, as wehave already emphasized, the schema used in the capacity ofmeans (it makes little difference whether it is familiar or invented on the spot) is subsumed under the schema characterizing

the final end in the same way that judgments are put into a stateof mutual implication in the framework of the conclusion. Withto the comprehension of signs, it constitutes an inter-

regardmediate term between judgment and reasoning. It is judgmentinasmuch as it is immediate assimilation of the sign, andis fraught withprereasoning inasmuch as this assimilation
But this interdeduction.
virtual
with
is
to
that
vision,say,

mediate state also finds its equivalent in verbal thought: Most

judgments are implicit reasonings.

Having stated that, let us now try to analyze the tertiary

circular reactions which thus constitute what one might call thefunctional and sensorimotor point of departure of experimental

judgments.
first example will make us understand the
between secondary and "tertiary" reactions: that of thewell-known behavior pattern by means of which the child explores
distant space and constructs his representation of movement, the be-

Observation jW. Thistransition

havior pattern of letting go or throwing objects in order subsequently topick them up.

One recalls(Obs. 140) how, at 0;10 (2) Laurent discovered inof soap, the possibility of throwing this object andacase"exploring"letting it fall. Now, what interested him at first was not the objective
phenomenon of the fall that is to say, the object's trajectorybut thevery act of letting go. He therefore limited himself, at the beginning,merely to reproducing the result observed fortuitously, which still
constitutes a "secondary" reaction, "derived," it is true, but of typicalstructure.

On the other hand, at 0;10 (10) the reaction changes and becomes"tertiary." That day Laurent manipulates a small piece of bread (without any alimentary interest: he has never eaten any and has no thoughtof tasting it) and lets it go continually. He even breaks off fragments
which he lets drop. Now, in contradistinction to what has happened on
the preceding days, he pays no attention to the act of letting go
whereas he watches with great interest the body in motion; in partial-

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS
lar,

269

he looks at it for a long time when it has fallen, and picks it up

when he can.
At 0;10 (11) Laurent is lying on his back but nevertheless resumes
his experiments of the day before. He grasps in succession a celluloidswan, a box, etc., stretches out his arm and lets them fall. He distinctly
fall. Sometimes he stretches out his arm
sometimes
heholds
it obliquely, in front of or behind his
vertically,varies the positions of the

When the object falls in a new position (for example on his
helets it fall two or three times more on the same place, as
pillow),
though to study the spatial relation; then he modifies the situation. At
a certain moment the swan falls near his mouth: now, he does not suckit (even though this object habitually serves this purpose), but drops it
three times more while merely making the gesture of opening his mouth.
At 0;10 (12) likewise, Laurent lets go of a series of objects whileanvarying the conditions in order to study their fall. He is seated ineyes, etc.

and lets the object fall over the edge, sometimes to theto the left, in different positions. Each time he tries tosometimes
right,
when therecapture it, leaning over and twisting himself around, eventries to find the
He
or
50
from
him.
40
cm.
falls
away
especiallyobjecthence canobject again when it rolls under the edge of the basket andoval basket

not be seen.
Observation 142. At 0;10 (29) Laurent examines a watch chain hanging
from his index finger. At first he touches it very lightly simply "explora little and ating" it without grasping it. He then starts it swinging

once continues this, thus rediscovering a "derived secondary reaction"of swinging). But, inalready described in Observation 138 (schema
stead of stopping there, he grasps the chain with his right hand andtheswings it with his left while trying some new combinations (hereheslides it along the back ofinreaction''
particular
begins);"tertiary
his left hand and sees it fall off when it reaches the end. Then he holds
the end of the chain (with his right index finger and thumb) and lets

is now
it slide slowly between the fingers of his left hand (the chain
horizontal and no longer oblique as before). He studies it carefully at
the moment when the chain falls from his left hand and repeats thisten times. Afterward, still holding the end of the chain in his right hand,
he shakes it violently which makes it describe a series of varied trajecthe
tories in the air. He then slows these movements in order to see howchain slides along the quilt when he merely pulls it. Finally he drops
from different heights and so rediscovers the schema acquired initthe preceding observation.
From his twelfth month Laurent has repeated this kind of^experiments with everything that his hand came upon: my notebook, "plugs/
or fallribbons, etc. He entertains himself either by making them slide
or by letting them go in different positions and from different heights
in order to study their trajectory. Thus, at 0;1I (20) he holds a "plug"1

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

270

3 cm. above the ground, then 20 cm., etc., each time observing the fall
most attentively.

Observation 143.

Here is another example of an "experiment in order

to see/' observed with respect to Laurent and pertaining to sound.

At 1;1 (24) Laurent finds himself for the first time in the presenceof a piece of furniture of which we shall speak later in connection withthe "invention of new means through active experimentation": a tiered
table of which each circular tier pivots around a single axis. Laurent
takes hold of one of the tiers in order to draw it to him. The tier moves,
but turns around instead of being displaced in a straight line as thechild was expecting. Laurent then shakes it, knocks it, then yields to adefinitely "experimental" reaction in order to study the sound. He
strikesitseveral times in succession, sometimes gently, sometimes hard,and between times hits the surface of his own table. There is no doubt
whatever that he is comparing the sounds. Then he strikes the back ofhis chair and again the wide circular tier. Consequently this is morethan "exploration" since there is a comparison of several objects toeach other and a serialization of the effects produced.
Afterward he again wants to pull the tier toward him and happens
to make it turn. But we shall describe the rest of this behavior in Observation 148 repeated, for it quickly became complicated.

W.

Observation
From 0;11 it seemed to me that, in the same way,
Jacqueline intentionally let objects she was holding fall to the ground,to take them up subsequently or limit herself to looking at them. But
at first it is difficult to distinguish between chance and intention. At
0;I1 (19), on the other hand, the thing is quite clear: During her meal,
while she is seated, she moves a wooden horse to the edge of her table
until she lets it fall. She watches it. An hour later she is given a postcard.
Jacqueline throws it to the ground many times and looks for it. At
0;11 (28) likewise, she systematically pushes a thimble to the edge ofthe box on which it is placed and watches it fall. But it is necessary tonote, in observing such behavior patterns, that the child has not yet
perceived the role of gravity. In other words, when he lets go of an
object, it is without knowing what is going to happen; and, when hetries to send it to the ground, he belieyes himself to be obliged to push
it down, without
confining himself simply to letting it go. Thus, at
1;0 (26), Jacqueline pushed her ball to the ground instead of letting
it fall. The same
day she tries to get rid of a cushion which eclipses anobject. She then simply puts this cushion against the back of the sofa,
as though it would stick there, and starts overagain indefinitely, notthrough circular reaction, but to get rid of the object which is annoying
her. 1 At 1;1 (28), in the sameway, Jacqueline watches me while I let go

1A. Szeminska pointed out to me an observation she made on a oneyear-and-a-half-old boy. This child tried to draw a large object to himself

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

271

of a napkin ring 15 cm. above her table, several times in succession.
She then takes it and simply places it on the table; afterward she reveals definite disappointment when she notices that nothing else happens. She then does this five or six times; then, as I repeat the experiment, she systematically places the object at the same place as I did (15cm. above the table), then, instead of letting it go, from there she places
it on the tablel

Concerning the schema of throwing to the ground and picking up,
has been conserved a long time while being differentiated little bylittle. At 1;3 (21) and 1;3 (27) I note that
Jacqueline begins to let fallinstead of throwing to the ground. In particular she raises her arm byholding her hand backward and so manages to let go of objects frombehind. At 1;4 (1) she throws an object under her mother's work tableseveral times in succession and has difficulty in obtaining it again. Samereaction under the tablecloth of the lunch table. Finally there is proit

gressive accommodation in the very manner of picking things up. At
1;5 (7) Jacqueline picks up objects without sitting down and gets up

without leaning on anything.
Observation 145. At 0;11 (20), that is to say, the day after the experiment with the wooden horse (see the foregoing observation), Jacqueline
slides a series of objects

along her slanting coverlet. This is an experi-

ment and not merely repetition, because she varies the objects andthe positions. At 1;0 (2) she rolls a pencil on a table by dropping it justabove the surface or by pushing it. The next day she does the same witha ball.

At 1;0 (3) also, she takes her plush dog and places it on a sofa,
obviously expecting a movement. As the dog remains motionless, sheelse. After several vain attempts she pushes it
places it somewhere
millimeters above the material, as though it
gently, while it is several
would roll better. Finally she grasps it and places it on a slanting

cushion, so that the dog rolls. She then immediately begins all overexists. But in the last attempt definite
again. Experimentation certainly
know
be
seen.
cannot(Obs. 144) that still at 1;0 (26),prevision
is not able to foresee the effects of gravity.

We

Jacqueline

Same reactions at 1;1 (18) with her rabbit.
At 1;1 (19), likewise, Jacqueline places her red ball on the groundand waits to see it roll. She repeats the attempt five or six times andreveals a lively interest in the object's slightest movement. Then she puts
rolls better.
it down and gives it a slight push with her fingers: the ballharder.
andharderwhile
She then repeats the experimentpushing
he decided to pull it overthrough the bars ot a play pen. Not succeeding,the bars. To do so he raised the object to the place where his arm was held
the object to try to catch it on thethe horizontal bar, then let
back

by

other sidelgoTHE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

272

At 1;3 (6) having dropped a stick parallel to the framework of her
it roll several centimeters on the floor
play pen, Jacqueline watches
As soon as I bring the stick toward her, Jacque(outside the play pen).
line grasps it and repeats the experiment. She raises it slightly, then lets
it fall, so that it may roll. The same happens ten times. Then 1 place adoth under the framework to prevent the stick from rolling. Jacqueline
lets it fall, then seeing that it remains motionless, passes her hand
this two or three
through the bars and gives it a fillip. She repeats
times then, noticing her failure she gives up, without trying to throw
the stick from higher up.
Same attempts at 1;4 (0). During one of these, she happens to let
the stick drop from a height and it rolls superbly to the end of theroom. Jacqueline is stupefied by this result but, as soon as I return the
stick to her, she simply places it gently on the ground 3 or 4 cm. fromthe pen. She looks at it for a long moment, apparently expecting it toroll by itself.

Observation 146. At 1;2 (8) Jacqueline holds in her hands an object

which is new to her: a round, ilat box which she turns all over, shakes,
rubs against the bassinet, etc. She lets it go and tries to pick it up. But
she only succeeds in touching it with her index finger, without grasping
it. She nevertheless makes an attempt and presses on the edge. The
box then tilts up and falls again. Jacqueline, very much interested in
fortuitous result, immediately applies herself to studying it.
Hitherto it is only a question of an attempt at assimilation analogous
to that of Observations 136 to 137, and of the fortuitous discovery of a
new result, but this discovery, instead of giving rise to a simple circular reaction, is at once extended to "experiments in order to see."this

In effect, Jacqueline immediately rests the box on the ground andpushes it as far as possible (it is noteworthy that care is taken to push
the box far away in order to reproduce the same conditions as in thefirst attempt, as though this were a necessary condition for
obtaining
the result). Afterward Jacqueline puts her finger on the box andpresses it. But as she places her finger on the center of the box she

simply displaces it and makes it slide instead of tilting it up. She
amuses herself with this game and keeps it up (resumes it after intervals, etc.) for several minutes. Then,changing the point of contact, she

finally again places her finger on the edge of the box, which tilts it up.
She repeats this many times, varying the conditions, but
track

keepingof her discovery: now she onlypresses on the edgel
moment later I offer my cigarette case to Jacqueline. She throws
as far as possible andwith her index
presses it at differentAitpointsfinger to tilt it up. But the problem is above her level and she tires ofit.

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

273

Observation 147. In her bath, Jacqueline engages in many experimentswith celluloid toys floating on "the water. At 1;1 (20) and the days following, for example, not only does she drop her toys from a height tosee the water splash or displace them with her hand in order to makethem swim, but she pushes them halfway down in order to see them riseto the surface.

At 1;7 (20) she notices the drops of water which fall from thethermometer when she holds it in the air and shakes it. She then tries
different combinations to splash from a distance. She brandishes thethermometer and stops suddenly, or makes it catapult.
Between the ages of a year and a year and a half, she amuses herself by filling with water pails, flasks, watering cans, etc., and studying
the falling of the water. She also learns to carry the water carefully
without spilling it and by holding the basin horizontally.
She entertains herself by filling her sponge with water and pressing
it against her chest or above the water;
by filling the sponge at thefaucet; by running the water from the faucet; by running the waterfrom the faucet along her arm, etc.

The relationship between these tertiary circular reactions
and the secondary or even primary reactions is evident: On the
one hand, the new result is always discovered by chance since,even in searching for novelty as such, the child does not know

how to find it except by groping. Moreover, the "experiment"always begins by repetition. In order to study changes in position, the trajectory of objects thrown or rolled, etc., it is always
necessary to return to the same movements, with the intention ofvarying them little by little. The "experiment in order to see"is therefore surely a circular reaction, of a higher type undoubtedly, but conforming in principle to the preceding reactions.

But thetertiary reaction

brings several innovations.

Ateven in repeating his movements to seek and find an init is that,teresting result, the child varies and gradates them. So
first,

when throwing objects from a distance or rolling them (Obs.
144 and 145), tilting up a box or making it slide (Obs. 146), etc.,
he drops these objects from increasingly high altitudes, places
his finger on a certain part of the box or on another part, etc.
is the case since the earlier circular reactions.
thesecondary reactions, in particular, the child always
Duringhis
effects. He shakes his bassinet more or less, pulls
gradates

Doubtless thisTHE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

274

harder or less hard on the hanging strings, gradates the sound of
the rattle he shakes, etc. But, in the latter cases, it is always inthe same fixed framework that these variations are made manifest

and one has the impression that the child is trying rather

to reproduce a certain result while exploring all possible modalithe contrary, in the present
than to discover a new one.

On

ties,

and he tries tocase, the child does not know what will happen
or which heunfamiliar
are
which
ferret out new
phenomena,141-144, the childsimply senses. For example, in Observationsof throwing or rolling;
constantly repeats the act of letting go,
and precisely with thefollowwill
what
but it is without knowing
146 and 147
Observations
in
out.
True,
intention of finding
observed
effectan(tilting
already
Jacqueline tries to reproduce
this effecta box,
throwing, pouring water, etc.), butupfloating,

a theme with variations, and chiefly constitutes a phenomenon
to be understood rather than a simple result to be repeated. In

isthe case of the earliest secondary reactions,on the other hand,the child seems to try less to analyze and understand than merely
to reproduce.
It is thislastnuance which best characterizes

tertiary re-action. As we
beginning of this chapter, the origiconstitute a searchbehaviorof thesepatterns is that theysaid at thenalityfor novelty. For the child it is no longer a question of applying
familiar schemata to the new object but of grasping with themind this object as it is. In this respect, varying positions, throw-ing or rolling objects, tilting a box, floating objects, pouring
water, etc., are active experiments which, it goes without saying,are still far removed from the verification of a preliminary deduction, as in the scientific experiment, but which already constitute the functional equivalent of the "experiment in order tosee/ Moreover, by virtue of the very fact that the experiments
1

areaccompanied by variations and gradations, they almost

thepresage the right experiment. When Jacqueline discovers
in the middle,
necessity of pressing her box at the edge, and not
she reveals a directed and conin order to tilt it up (Obs.

146),
trolled effort. Doubtless, here also secondary reaction outlines
a string in order to shake theall that; when the child mustpull

objects hanging from the hood of his bassinet, he mustalso dis-TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

275

cover the correct movement. But it is one thing to select almost

automatically the right movements in the course of more or lessdiffuse groping and it is another thing to search for the condition essential to a certain result.

This search for the new raises the most interesting question
which we have to discuss in connection with these behavior
patterns. How does it happen, when all the behavior patterns
hitherto under study are essentially conservative, that at a certain

time the child comes to pursue novelties? The problem is foundagain, in analogous conditions, in connection with situations inwhich the child invents new means due to this same process ofactive experimentation. But let us limit ourselves, for the
moment, to this precise question: How to account, through theplay of assimilations and accommodations, for the interest in

novelties peculiar to the "experiment in order to see"?

In the course of the primitive behavior patterns, in effect,
through a paradox which we must subsequently analyze, ac-commodation and assimilation are simultaneously slightly differentiated and antagonistic. They are relatively undifferentiatedin the sense that every attempt at assimilation is at the sametime an attempt at accommodation without its yet being possible to distinguish in the child's intellectual activity a particular

moment corresponding to what is deduction in reflective thought(assimilation as such) and another moment corresponding towhat is experience (accommodation as such). Every schema of
assimilation is therefore forthwith a schema of accommodation;orprimitive assimilation, whether reproductive, generalizingthat
it is accommodation
extenttothefunctionsrecognitory, only

growing toward reality. However, although differentiated and,in this sense, closely correlative, assimilation and accommodation are, in another sense, antagonistic at first. In effect, in the
beginning the child only accommodates himself to things when
he is in some way forced by them, whereas at the outset he tries
to assimilate the real, impelled by an invincible and vital tendis only interested
ency. So it is that, during the first stages, hein the external environment to the extent that objects can serveas aliments to his schemata of assimilation. This is why thechild's activity begins by being essentially conservative and only

276

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

are imposed within a schema alreadyaccepts novelties when they
constituted (as when, busy grasping the strings hanging fromthe hood of his bassinet, the child perceives that he thus shakes

the hood).

But after the progress of assimilation, things change little
has been organized throughby little. In efiect, once assimilation
it
how
seen
have
mobile schemata (weprotracted, by continuous
through simple schemata), the childfrom the point of view which
tendencies
reveals two importantdifferentiation, assimilation

now occupies us. On the one hand, he becomes increasingly interested in the external result of acts, not only because this result
because it is to be asis to be seen, heard, grasped, etc, (hence,ofmeans
similated
schemata), but also becauseby"primary"

imposed at first by the external environment, prodifferentiates the "secondary" schemata and thus con-this result,gressively
centrates on itself the subject's attention.

Moreover, the childthen tries to make all new objects enter into the schemata alreadyeffort to assimilate leads him to disacquired and this constantexistence of certain
certainofcover the resistanceobjects and theirreducible to these schemata. It is then that accom-

properties

modation assumes an interest in itself and that it becomes differentiated from assimilation, subsequently to .become more andmore complementary.
Accommodacion to novelties acquires interest precisely byreason of the two tendencies which we have just called to mind.

To begin with the second one, it is clear that to the extent thatthe child, seeking to assimilate new objects, will encounter resistance, he will become interested in the unforeseen properties

which he will thus discover. This interest in novelty, therefore
however paradoxical this assertion may seem results from assimilation itself. If the new object or phenomenon had no connection with the schemata of assimilation they would not be ofinterest and that is why, in fact, they rouse nothing in the child

who is too young (even if he already knows how to grasp) except
visual or auditory attention. Whereas, to the extent that they
are almost assimilable, they rouse an interest and an attempt at

accommodation still greater than if they were assimilable imthe
mediately. That is why, the more complex the system of

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

277

schemata of assimilation, the greater the interest in novelty ingeneral. New events have the more opportunities of animating atleast one particular schema according as the ensemble of theschemata formed is large. For instance, interest in changes ofperspective and displacements of objects, throwing, rolling, etc.,
takes root in many secondary circular schemata (shaking, swinging, rubbing, etc.) to which the new schemata are analogous but
not at all identical. In this first sense, the progress of assimilation
brings with it that of accommodation. Accommodation becomesan end in itself, separate from assimilation but complementary.
We have already stated something similar in connection withvision: The more objects the child sees the more new ones hewishes to see. But, in the latter case, accommodation only forms
one entity with the generalizing extension of as assimilatory
schema, whereas henceforth accommodation exists before every
true assimilation, and this accommodation is simply set in motion
by earlier assimilations without being directly derived from them.

With regard to interest in the external result of acts, characteristic of thesecondary circular reactions, it is also sooner orlater a source of accommodation for the sake of accommodation.

In effect, as we shall emphasize in connection with the conceptof object and of causality, the very progress of assimilatory
utilization of material objects results in substantiating them. For
example, a hanging object which one can shake, swing, strikeand finally drop, becomes little by little an independent centerof forces and ceases to be simply an element of a self-enclosed
assimilation. Now at thecycle circumscribed by the schema oftime when causality thus becomes objectified and the universe
becomes stocked with the centers of forces, it is apparent thatthe child's effort will no longer only consist in making thingsenter into known schemata but also, in the case of thwarting of
the immediate assimilation, in discovering which are the properties of these centers of forces. For example, in

Observation 145,

can clearly be seen how the attempts to "cause rolling" engender attitudes of expectation, surprise, and almost of anxiety
and great astonishment [as when the stick rolls at 1;4 (0)] whichitreveals the progressive spontaneity that the child concedes toto whom thethings. This is not yet the place to speak of people,

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

278

child naturally attributes a still greater spontaneity. In short,the objectification of causality is the source of experimentation.

Here again, assimilation is protracted in accommodation and the
becomes differentiated from the initial tendency which

lattergave rise to it.
Thus can be explained how the growing complexity ofassimilation brings with it the advent of an interest in novelty
as such, that is to say, of an experimentation composed of accommodation henceforth differentiated. But must the assertion bemade that this liberated accommodation will remain antagonistic
to assimilation or that it will become more and more complementary? In studying the invention of new means through active
experimentation we shall see how assimilation and accommoda-

tion are reconciled when there is a question of attaining a certain end. In such cases accommodation realizes what assimilationfrom now on, when accommodation seems to remain in its pure state under the formof "experiment in order to see" it is possible to discern what
assigns as the goal of the action. But,

close correlation it in fact maintains with assimilation.

The procedure of accommodation, in the case of the experiment in order to see, is that of groping. Now there is a numberof distinct types of groping as we shall see when discussing
Claparede's theory (see conclusions 4). Regarding the present
case, let us limit ourselves to the following remark. Far fromconstituting pure groping which would furnish the prototype ofaccommodation without assimilation, the experiment in order
to see consists in a sort of cumulative groping in the course ofwhich each new attempt is directed by the preceding ones. So it
is that when
Jacqueline varies the perspectives of an object,
throws or rolls what she holds in her hands, she doubtless experiments blindly at first, but directs increasingly her subsequentattempts; this is particularly apparent when she tilts up the box
in Observation 146. Thereafter it can be maintained that, it theensemble of the behavior pattern is due to a need for accommodation, the successive attempts are assimilated to each other as

they occur. In this respect tertiary reaction is certainly a "circular" reaction despite the search for novelty which characterizes

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

279

Thereafter, if there is differentiated accommodation,
mediately evokes assimilation.
it.

it

im-

In the last analysis, in order to contrast these behavior
patterns with the earlier ones, it must simply be said that in the"experiment in order to see" accommodation becomesdiffer-entiated from assimilation while directing it at each moment,
while in the secondary circular reactions and the behavior

patterns which are derived from them, it is the attempt at assimila-tion which controls and precedes accommodation. Moreover, inthe earlier cases, accommodation remains simultaneously undifferentiatedfrom and partly antagonistic

toassimilation,

whereas henceforth accommodation begins to become complementary to the assimilatory tendency from which it dissociates
itself.

Finally, let us recall, in order to avoid ambiguity, that, evenwhile in a sense preceding assimilation, the accommodation
peculiar to the "experiments in order to see" is always the accommodation of a schema, and that the act of accommodating

an earlier schema of assimilation consists in differentiating it
according to the variations of the actual experiment. There isnever, in effect, a "pure experiment/' Even when he gropes inorder to discover something new, the child only perceives andconceives of the real as a function of his assimilatory schemata.

when confronted by a new experiment is albut henceforth one which is dean
accommodation
ways only
sired and sought for its own sake of these earlier schemata.
Besides, groping

Varying the perspectives, dropping or throwing, rolling, floating,at the point of departure, a simple differentiation of
secondary schemata such as displacing, swinging, etc. While

etc.,

is,

preceding and henceforth directing new assimilations, accommodation always prolongs earlier assimilations. We shall see thisstill more clearly in connection with the following behavior patterns.
2. THE DISCOVERY OF NEW MEANS BY EXPERIMENTATION. I. THE "SUPPORTS," THE "STRING" AND

THE "STICK/'

The "discovery of new means through active

experimentation" (an abstraction drawn from the speed of de-THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

280

velopment) is to the tertiary circular reactions what the "application of familiar means to new situations" is to secondary circular reaction. The behavior patterns which we shall study thus
constitute the highest forms of intellectual activity before theadvent of systematic intelligence which implies deduction andof intelligence
representation. Furthermore, contrary to the acts
described in Observations 120 to 130, those acts which we shallnow examine constitute inventions or at least real discoveries,
already manifesting the constructive element peculiar to humanexamine these
intelligence. All the more reason, consequently,
facts closely. Moreover, we shall analyze each of them separately,toand shall ony group afterward the conclusions obtained.
The first manifestation of inventive intelligence which weobserved in our children consisted in bringing distant objects
closerby drawing to oneself the supports on which they wereWe

shall call this behavior pattern the "behavior patplaced.
tern of the support" in contradistinction to that of the string orthat of the stick. This kind of a behavior pattern, being at thesame time the simplest of those of the fifth stage, will enable us
from the outset, like all cases of transition, to understand thedifference between the behavior patterns of the fourth stage andthose of the present one.

In principle, nothing would prevent the "behavior patternof the support" from arising during the fourth stage and, in fact,sometimes appears sporadically during this period in the capacity of a simple coordination of schemata. But, as we shall see,its systematization requires more than such a coordination: It
presupposes a special accommodation whose function we shallitTo

do this, let us take as our point
precisely try to understand.
of departure the episodic situations in which the behavior pattern of the support is made manifest in the fourth stage. In sucha case the child, trying to attain a too-distant objective, satisfies

an ungratified need by applying the schema of "grasping" to theobject which appears and, when this object happens to be
the support of the objective, he thus draws the latter to him. The
schema of prehension of the objective is thus momentarily cofirstordinated with the prehension of another object, just as, inObservation 121 repeated, the act of striking a doll attached to a

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

281

is coordinated with the schema ostriking a parrot attached to the other end, or again, as in Observation 127, theaction exerted upon the hand of another person is coordinatedstringwith that which the child wishes to apply to the objective itself.
But, if such an episodic coordination can give rise to somewhen the support is particularly mobile, it
could not insure the formation of a stable procedure, and this iswhy. In the examples cited of behavior patterns of the fourthstage, the connections established by the child between the obfortuitous successplay are always on a par with the coordination of theschemata, given the apparent or real simplicity of these relationships. So it is that, in order to push back an obstacle or utilize

jects insomeone else's hand as intermediary, etc., the child has no connections to understand except those which are given either inthe familiar schemata envisaged separately (the hand of another,for instance, is assimilated to his own), or in the very fact of theircoordination (the connection implied in the act of removing the
obstacle presupposes nothing more than the comprehension of
an incompatibility between the presence of this obstacle andthe action which the child wishes to exert on the objective). To

put it more simply, the coordination of the schemata peculiar to
the fourth stage does not involve any invention or constructionof new "means." On the contrary, the relation which exists between an object and its support is a relation unfamiliar to thechild at the time that the behavior pattern which we are going
to describe makes its appearance. 2 At least the thing took placein this way with our children and that is why we class this behavior pattern in the fifth stage: If the relation "placed upon"
had already been known to them (which could doubtless hapwith other subjects), the behavior pattern of the support

penwould only have been a matter of coordination of schemata
and we would have classed it in the fourth stage. This relation thus being new to the child he will only come to utilize
it systematically (in contrast to the fortuitous and episodic successes which have been under study) by understanding it, and hebetween an object and its sup"placed upon" or relation
discovered except through "tertiary circular rebein
could
effect,not,
port
2 The relation

action" (see Vol. II, Chap. II,3

and 4).

282

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

will understand it due only to active experimentation, analogous

to that of "tertiary circular reaction." It is precisely in thisrespect that the behavior pattern which we are about to examineisnew and differs from a simple coordination of schemata. But it

rests

upon that kind of coordination and it is even under the

influence of this coordinating activity that the child applies himself to searching for new means by accommodating in

the processof coordination to the unknown data of the problem.

In a general way, the "discovery of new means throughactive experimentation" involves, therefore, not only a coordina-tion of familiar schemata (like the behavior patterns of the fourthstage that the present behavior thus protracts), but also a construction of new relations, obtained by a method similar to thatof tertiary circular reaction.
Here are the facts:
Observation 148. Until 0;10 (16) it can be said that Laurent has notunderstood the relation "placed upon/' hence the relation existing
between an object and its support. This is what we shall try to demonstrate at greater length in Volume II (Chap. II, Obs. 103) when studying the concept of space characteristic of the fourth stage.
/. With regard to the "behavior pattern of the support," numerous
experiments repeated between 0;7 (29) and 0;10 (16) reveal that Laurent,
until the latter date, has remained incapable of utilizing it systematically.

At 0;7 (29) he has succeeded, once in four attempts, in drawing a cushion
toward him in order to grasp a box placed upon it; at 0;8 (1) he behaves in the same way, as well as at 0;8 (7) etc. But there it is still only
a question of a coordination of schemata, analogous to that of the
fourth stage. Being unable to grasp the box directly, the child instead
takes possession of the first object encountered, while
subordinating
this act to the persistent desire to attain the objective. The
proof that
this is the case is the existence of the following reactions:(1) When the

support (the cushion, for example) is not within immediate reach of
the child's hand (when it is 15 or 20 cm. away), Laurent does not
try toreach it in order to draw the objective toward him, but tries to
grasp
the objective directly, and subsequently
situated on
grasps theobjects

support (for instance he pulls his covers or his sheets).
(2) When I hold the objective in the air, 20 cm. above the support,
Laurent pulls the latter toward him, as though the object wereplacedupon it. (3) When the support is placed obliquely, thus being at thechild's disposition, not exactly in front of him but a little to the side
(20 cm. from his waist), Laurent does nothing to reach it, trying to grasp
this side of the

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

283

the objective directly or, failing this, the objects
interposed between
himself and the objective (the sheets, forexample). For more details onthese preliminaries, see Volume II, Observation 103.
II. At 0;10 (16) on the other hand, Laurent discovers the true relations between the support and the objective andconsequently thepossibility of utilizing the first to draw the second to him. Here are thechild's reactions:(1) I place my watch on a big red cushion (of a uniform color andwithout a fringe) and place the cushion directly in front of the child.
Laurent tries to reach the watch directly and not succeeding, he grabs
the cushion which he draws toward him as before. But then, instead ofletting go of the support at once, as he has hitherto done, in order totry again to grasp the objective, he recommences with obvious interest,
to move the cushion while looking at the watch. Everything takes placeas though he noticed for the first time the relationship for its own sakeand studied it as such. He thus easily succeeds in grasping the watch.

I then immediately attempt the following counterproof. I put(2)
two colored cushions in front of the child, of identical form and dimensions. The first is placed as before, directly in front of the child. The
behind, at an angle of 45 , that is to say, so that asecond isplacedcorner of the cushion is opposite the child. This corner is placed on thefirst cushion but I manage to flatten the two cushions at this place,where one is partially superposed on the other, so that the second does
not protrude and is not too visible. Finally I place my watch at the otherextreme end of the second cushion.
Laurent, as soon as he sees the watch, stretches out his hands,
then grasps the first cushion which he pulls toward him by degrees.
Then, observing that the watch does not move (he does not stopissuperlooking at it), he examines the place where the one cushiontheslight displacement
despiteposed on the other (this is still theof the first one), and he goes straight to the second one. He grasps it by
the corner, pulls it toward him over the first cushion, and takes thecasewatch.

The experiment, when repeated, yields the same result the second
time.
(3)

I now place the two cushions next to each other, the proximalside of the second parallel to the distal side of the first. But I superpose
about 20 cm. wide (the watch of course
the first on the second on a
strip

Laurent immediately
being at the extremity of the second cushion).
watch
is not displaced, hethethatcushionfirst
but, observing
pulls thecertain moment
tries to raise this cushion to reach the second one. At ahe has succeeded in raising up the first cushion, but without removing
his chest with his left hand while trying toit, and he holds it against
the second one with his right hand. He finally succeeds and takes
pull

284

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

of the watch, thus revealing his perfect comprehension of thepossessionrole of the support.
I place the second cushion as in (2) but sideways, the(4) Finallycorner of the second superposed on one of the distal corners

proximalto reachof the first. Laurent does not make a mistake and at once tries
the second cushion.
These four reactions combined reveal that the relation between theand its support has been acquired.

objective

Observation 148 repeated. During the weeks that follow, Laurent reandiscovers the same schema every time there is a question of drawingarectilinear
theandfollowingsupportdisplaces
object toward himself,necessitating a rotary moveOn the other hand, thetrajectory.

supports

ment give rise to a new apprenticeship.
In Observation 143 it has been shown how Laurent, at 1;1 (24) had
toward him one of the circular tiers of aunsuccessfully tried to pull
an axis thento turnslightly,
began
table. The tier pivoting aroundchild's interest I
instead of coming nearer. In order to strengthen the
an interesting toy beyond his reach. The "experi-

immediately placed
ment in order to see" was thus transformed into an effort entering the
behavior patterns.
present group of
At first Laurent looks at the toy without moving but never tries toreach it directly. Then he grasps the tier of the table and tries to draw
turns by chance (a few
it toward him in a straight line. The tier again
lets it go again, then recommences, and so on a
Laurent
degrees only).
certain number of times. That is only a series of attempts without
the child apparently considers failures.
being linked to each other which
But he suddenly seems to perceive that the desired object comes closer.
He again grasps the tier, lets it go and grasps it again until he has attained success. But the child's behavior does not yet give the impressionthat he has understood the role of rotation; he simply repeats a movement which was once efficacious, without turning the tier intentionally.
At 1;2 (6) Laurent is again confronted by the tier of the table andlooks at a pebble which I place at the opposite extremity. He immeditier toward him in a straight line, but only
ately tries to pull the
succeeds in making it turn on itself a few degrees. He then grasps it in

the same way a certain number of times until he is able to reach the
not always have the impression that thepebble. However one doeschild is turning the tier intentionally.
At 1;2 (7) on the other hand, Laurent only tries to pull the table
once; he then definitely pivots the tier. From 1;2 (10) he tries at theoutset to move the tier circularly in order to get hold of the objects outof reach. The schema appropriate to the situation accordingly is definitely acquired.

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

285

Observation 149. As early as 0;9 (3), Jacqueline discovers by chance thepossibility of bringing a toy to herself by pulling the coverlet on which
it is placed. She is seated on this coverlet and holds out her hand to

grasp her celluloid duck. After several failures she grasps the coverlet
abruptly, which shakes the duck; seeing that she immediately grasps thecoverlet again and pulls it until she can attain the objective directly.
Two interpretations are possible. Either she perceives the duck and thecoverlet as a solidified whole (like a single object or a complex of connected objects) or else she simply satisfies her need to grasp the duck by
grasping no matter what and so discovering by chance the possible roleof the coverlet.
Until 0;11 Jacqueline has not again revealed analogous behavior.
At 0;11 (7), on the other hand, she is lying on her stomach on anothercoverlet and again tries to grasp her duck. In the course of the movements she makes to catch the object she accidentally moves the coverlet
which shakes the duck. She immediately understands the connection
and pulls the coverlet until she is able to grasp the duck.
During the weeks that follow Jacqueline frequently utilizes theschema thus acquired but too rapidly to enable me to analyze her behavior. At 1;0 (19) on the other hand, I seat her on a shawl and placea series of objects a meter away from her. Each time she tries to reachthem directly and each time she subsequently grasps the shawl in orderto draw the toy toward herself. The behavior pattern has consequently
become systematic; but it seems that it does not yet involve conscious
foresight of the relationships since Jacqueline only utilizes this schema
after having attempted direct prehension of the object.

In the case of Lucienne, the same behavior pattern
on her bed Lucienne tried to grasp aappeared
distant toy when, having by chance moved the folded sheet she saw theobject sway slightly. She at once grasped the sheet, noticed the object
shake again and pulled the whole thing toward her. But as this reaction was too rapid to be properly analyzed, I devise the following:At 1;0 (5) Lucienne is seated on her folding chair and in front of
her a small tier A erected on the tier B of the table attached to the chair.
The tier A only covers part of tier B. I spread a handkerchief on tier
B in such a way that the frontal edge of the handkerchief is undertier A and cannot be grasped directly. Then I place a small bottle on
the handkerchief. Lucienne then grasps the handkerchief at once, without any hesitation, and draws the bottle to her. The same occurs fiveor six times whether I place the bottle or my watch on the handkerchief. But the reaction again being so rapid, it is not even possible toknow whether Lucienne has tried to grasp the object or whether thehandkerchief itself attracted her. I repeat the experiment, but in the
Observation 150.

at 0;10 (27). Seatedfollowing way:THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

286

a handkerchief In the same way as before but instead ofit next to it, about 5 cm. away fromtheobject upon it I place
putting
on tier B. Lucienne at once pulls
also
handkerchief,
the left edge of the
Not succeeding, she
the handkerchief, then tries to reach the bottle.
or two seconds and
one
for
it
holds
searches for the handkerchief,
I placethenthen rejects it. Same reactions to my watch during a second attempt but
it.
she rejects the handkerchief still more quickly after having sought
and the handkerI now increase the distance between the objectof the handkerchief.
chief. I place the bottle 10-15 cm. to the side
the
reach
to
to
herself
object directly andlimitsthenLucienne
tryingthe handkerchief. When I bring the object
and the handkerchief andlooks
nearer she
alternately at the bottle
I place the bottle on the handkerchief, she at once grasps
whenfinally,Ithe latter. It therefore seems that she has grasped its signification.
the distances from 15 cm. tothegradatingagainexperiment,
repeatdirect contact: same reactions.
This time I place my watch 15-20 cm. away from the handkerchief:
Lucienne tries to grasp it directly. Then I stretch the chain between
the watch and the handkerchief, leaving the watch at a distance of 15

no longer bothers withcm. and putting the end of the chain on the handkerchief: Lucienne,
who at first did not notice what I was doing, begins by trying to reachthe handkerchief, then perceives the chain and then pulls the handkerchief! 3 This last behavior pattern well shows that the prehension of thehandkerchief is not a mechanical act.
Observation 150 repeated. The same day, seeing a green bottle whichinaccessible but placed on a cover which is within reach, she at oncethe cover in order to grasp the bottle (see Obs. 157).

is

pulls

Observation 157 .-At 1;0 (16) Lucienne is seated before a big squarecushion C, placed on the ground. Beyond cushion C is a second identical cushion D, so that Lucienne has two cushions facing her. I place
my watch on D, the farthest from the child. Lucienne looks at the watch
but does not try to grasp it directly. She takes cushion C and removes it
toward her and takes the watch.
at once, then pulls cushion
At 1;1 (4) Lucienne is seated on an adult's bed in front of a cleanAs soon as I put my eyeglasses on the rag,
ing rag placed on the sheet.
Lucienne pulls it. When I place my glasses beyond the rag, she removes
it at once and pulls the sheet toward her.

D

Observation 152. At 1;0 (5), that is to say, right after the attempts
described in Observation 150, Lucienne is confronted with a solid
as coverlets, shawls, or handkersupport and no longer a soft one (suchchiefs. On tier B of her table I place a box with upturned edges (thecover of a large box, turned upside down), in such a way that thesit is necessary to know that since 1;0 (3) Lucienne knows how to use thechain to draw the watch to her.

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS
frontal side of the box is wedged under tier287

A and I place on the box, as

far away as possible, the bottle or the watch which were used with the

handkerchief (Obs. 150). I was thus able to observe seven sequential
reactions:(1)

Lucienne at first tries to grasp the box, but she goes about it

as though the handkerchief were still involved. She tries topinch it between two fingers, in the center, and tries this for a moment without
being able to grasp it. Then, with a rapid and unhesitating movement
she pushes it at a point on its right edge (apparently Lucienne, unable
to grasp it at the center, tried to roll it up or unstick it or simply todisplace it slightly, and that is why she pushed it to the edge). She thennotes the sliding of the box and makes it pivot without trying to lift it;
as the box revolves, she succeeds in grasping the bottle.
(2) This time I place the watch at the extremity of the box.
Lucienne again tries to grasp the box in the middle. Being unsuccessful, she gives up more quickly than in (1) and displaces the box bypushing it on the right edge.
(3) She no longer tries to grasp it at the center and immediately

makes the support pivot.
a new doll on the box in order to revive her interest:(4) I place
Lucienne again tries at first to make the box pivot. But not having
brought it sufficiently near to her, she cannot grasp the object. She
then returns to the right edge and pushes it more.
(5)

Same play, with corrections at the center.

(6)

She tries, doubtless for the sake of greater speed, to r,aise thebox right away by grasping it in the same place as before, but by pulling it toward her instead of sliding it. Failing in this (the box is heldby tier A), she gives up and resumes the pivoting.
(7) Same reactions, but Lucienne resumes the pivoting more
promptly.

At 1;0 (11), that is to say, six days later, I repeat the same experiment with another box without edges (a simple box and no longer acover). I also wedge this under tier A, and place different objects on thefarthest extremityfrom Lucienne. She then manifests three sequential

reactions:

In the first place, she tries to pinch the box in the center, as
though it were a piece of material.
In the second place, she tries to lift the box by the right edge andso to draw it directly to her. This second attempt lasts several minutes
because she always thinks she is near success.
In the third place, she finally returns to sliding. By gently pushing
the right edge of the box, she makes it slide over tier B with the part
wedged under tier A as center of the pivoting, and so succeeds in grasping the objects. In the subsequent attempts she adopts this last method
right away.

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

2S8

The first examples show us at once In what the behaviorof new means through active
The whole situation is exactly thepattern which we call "discovery
consists.

experimentation"same as with respect to Observations 120 to 130, that is to say, themeans to new circumstances": The child"application of familiar
obstacles (distance, etc.) prevent him.
buttries to attain a goal"new" and the problem is to discover
thereforeisThe situationfrom the behavior patterns
appropriate means. But, reversely
method presents itself tofamiliarnomentioned (Obs. 120-130),athereforeisItthe child any more.
question of innovating. It is
which is analogous tointervenes
then that a behavior pattern
is to say, an "experithat
circularreactions,that of the tertiary
The
child
the
see":
to
only difference isment in ordergropes.
now, the groping is oriented as a function of the goal
the need anitself, that is to say, of the problem presented (ofthat,terior to the act) instead of taking place simply "in order to see."In the particular case, and without yet wishing to discuss
the ensemble of the general problems raised by these observato thediscovery
apparent that the groping leadingof new means presupposes an accommodation of familiar schemata to the present experiment. The accommodation as such isthe earlier schemata give meaning to what thisgroping, but only
discovers. When, for instance, Jacqueline, unable togroping
catch her duck, grasps the coverlet instead and sees the duckshake, she would not understand this phenomenon at all if she
tions, it iswere not accustomed to seeing objects move when a string isthat intermediates
pulled (secondary schemata). But, knowing
cannot be directly
which
act
to
it
make
can
upon objects
possiblethe coverlet
betweenconnection
a
once
at
she
perceives
grasped,she then
the
to
the
need
latter,and the duck: impelled bygrasp
a beInsuch
ensues.
success
andthesupporthaphazardly pulls
a
hand
one
the
on
existshavior pattern, then, theregroping
the schema of the goal (to grasp the duck) and on the
directedbyof significations attributed to intermediate events as a function of the earlier schemata and as aotherhand an ensemble

function of this very goal.

So also, when Lucienne tries to grasp an object on a box(Obs. 152) and discovers the possibilityof making the box pivot,

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

289

it is certainly due togroping that the child comes to push the box
by its edge, but the groping is double directed. It is directed at
first by the schema
assigning an end to the action. Wanting to
draw to herself the object placed on the box and treating thislike the handkerchief to which she is accustomed, Lucienne tries
to grasp the box. Not succeeding immediately, shegropes, thatto say, tries to accommodate the schema to the present situa-istion. It is then that she goes so far as to touch the edge of thebox. In the second place, the groping is directed by the earlier
schemata which give a meaning to the events arising by chance

and again as a function of the goal of the action. Having touched
the edge of the box, Lucienne sees it move and at once assimilates
it to an object which can be displaced; she thenpushes it inorder to grasp the desired object.
Such is the nature of groping: As in the case of the tertiary
circular reactions, it is an accommodation of earlier schemata
which become differentiated as a function of the present experi-ment. But, in the particular case, accommodation, instead ofbeing an end in itself, is only a means at the service of the pursuitof the goal.

Furthermore, groping, in which this accommodation consists,that is to say, each successive attempt constitutes a

is cumulative,

schema of assimilation with regard to the following attempts.
When Lucienne discovered that it was necessary to push the box
in order to draw the object to her, this means is rediscovered

more rapidly each time in the course of the subsequent attempts.
In this there is apprenticeship. Accommodation is therefore
directed not only from the exterior (by earlier schemata), butalso from within (due to this apprenticeship): It is therefore

dually united to assimilation.
second example of "discovery of new means through active
experimentation" is the "behavior pattern of the string/' whichA

was so well studied by Karl Biihler: drawing an object to oneself

by using its extension string, chain), etc.

44 Ch. Biihler and H. Hetzer (Kleinkindertests, in Testing Children's De-

velopment from Birth to School Age, translated by H. Beaumont, London,
G. Allen & Unwin, 1935) believe this behavior pattern appears during theeleventh and twelfth months.

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

290

Observation 153. It has been shown, in Observations 121 and 121 repeated, how Jacqueline made use of the strings hanging from the hoodof her bassinet in order to pull desired objects to her. But it is not yet
possible to compare these efforts to the behavior pattern which consistsin pulling an object by means of a string. In the latter case the stringin effect, considered as being the extension of the object, whereas
in the first case the object is simply assimilated to the objects which canis,be swung by means of a string.

The true behavior pattern of the string began in Jacqueline's casewith a brush when, before her eyes, I at(7). She was playing
tached this object to a string. Afterward I placed the brush at the footof the armchair on which Jacqueline was seated, so that she was nolonger able to see it (but the child could follow all my movements)
and I left the end of the string on the arm of the chair. As soon as mypreparations were finished, Jacqueline leaned toward the brush while
stretching forth her hands. But not observing anything other than thestring, she grasps it and pulls. The end of the brush then appears;
Jacqueline at once drops the string in order to try to grasp the object
directly. Of course the brush falls again, Jacqueline bends to look for it,
rediscovers the string, pulls it again and lets it go once more when she
perceives the desired object. The same series of operations ensues threeor four times; each series ends in failure because Jacqueline lets go of
the string as soon as she perceives the brush. However, when Jacqueline pulls the string she definitely looks in the direction of the brushat 0;11and so expects to see it.
It is accurate to add that the child is still unaware of the role ofgravity (see Obs. 144) and so, when he lets go of the string to grasp thebrush he acts as though both were on a horizontal plane. The only realaccommodation to the situation has been this: At a certain moment
Jacqueline pulled the string with one hand when she perceived a very
obvious knot not far from the brush (10-15 cm. away). The fraction ofstring between the knot and the brush appeared to her to constitute theextension of the brush. In effect, while she was still trying to pull theend of the string with her right hand, she tried to catch the knot with
her left hand. As soon as the knot was grasped it served to pull thebrush.

During the subsequent series of efforts the behavior pattern seems
have been acquired. I detach the brush and replace it, before
Jacqueline's eyes, with a parrot; then I place this at the foot of thearmchair and leave the other end of the string next to the childJacqueline grasps the string and, hearing the sound of the rattle inside
the parrot, immediately pulls while looking beforehand at the place
where the latter must appear. When she sees the toy she tries to grasp itwith one hand while still pulling the string with the other. During thesubsequent attempts, same reactions and same success.
toTERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

291

Third series: I replace the parrot with a book. Jacqueline pulls thestring while staring at the place where the object will appear. As soon
as she sees it she manages to grasp it. Same reactions with a clothespin

and a safety pin.
Observation 154. At 1;0 (7) Jacqueline is seated in her bassinet whose
handle is supported by a table facing the child. I show Jacqueline herswan whose neck has a string attached to it, then I put the swan on atable while leaving the string in the bassinet. Jacqueline grasps it immediately and pulls it while looking at the swan. But as the string islong she does not stretch it out but is limited to waving it. Each shakeof the string makes the swan move but it comes no nearer.
After many attempts of the same kind I move the swan farther

away which results in stretching the string. Jacqueline still shakes it,
without really pulling it. The swan falls; Jacqueline holds onto thestring, pulls it, but as the swan does not come at once, she resumes shaking the string.
New attempt: Jacqueline shakes harder and harder which resultsin making the swan move forward a little. But she tires of this and givesup.

At 1;0 (8), the next day, I resume the experiment. At first Jacqueline shakes the string, then pulls it. When the swan is near enough shetries to reach it directly with her hand.

When she does not succeed she

gives up instead of resuming pulling. The following days, same reactions,but it seems that she shakes the string less each time and pulls it more.
Finally, at 1;0 (19) Jacqueline draws the object to her correctly bypulling the string but she never does it without shaking it beforehandas though that were necessary. Only ten days later does she pull it rightaway.

Observation /55. At 1;0 (26) in Jacqueline's presence I place my watch
on the floor, beyond her field of prehension. I put the chain in astraight line in Jacqueline's direction but place a cushion on the partwhich is nearest the child. Jacqueline at first tries to grasp the watch
directly. Not succeeding, she looks at the chain. She notes that thelatter is under the cushion. Then Jacqueline removes the latter at one
stroke and pulls the chain while looking at the watch. The movement
is adapted and quick. As soon as the watch is within reach, Jacqueline
lets go of the chain in order to grasp the object directly. There is, conit is the watch that is wanted.
sequently, no interest in the chain itself;

Same reaction several times in succession in a variety of conditions.
In the same way, Lucienne, at 1;0 (3) and the days following, looks
at thewatch as soon as she perceives the chain around her mother's

neck.

When she finds a necklace she confines herself to grasping it,

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

292

whereas sight of the chain always sets in motion search for the watch

and the action of pulling.
Observation 156. In a single day Laurent acquired the "behavior pattern of the string" but he only succeeded in this through "active ex-perimentation" and not through immediate comprehension or mental
construction.

noteworthy that until 0;11 despite his earlier utilizations ofhanging strings I was not able to cause Laurent to reveal the existence
It isof any tendency to make use of extensions of the objective in thecapacity of intermediates or of "strings." Thus at 0;8 (1) after having
played with my detached watch chain he does not have the idea of using
it todraw to him the watch he wants once the chain is again attached.

He stretches out his hand toward the watch only and neglects the chain
which I place between him and the watch. Various analogous attempts
either with the same chain or with strings attached to several objects
yielded nothing until 0;10.
On the other hand, at 0;11 (16) Laurent manifests the following
behavior pattern: He is seated on a dark rug. I show him a red object(a shoehorn) hanging from a string, then I place this objective about ameter from him while making the string describe a winding trajectory
culminating next to the child. But Laurent, instead of using the string
to attain the objective, confines himself to stretching out his hands
toward it. I displace the string several times to draw Laurent's attention
to it but each time avoid stretching it out in a straight line between thechild and the objective. Each time Laurent looks at the string but without utilizing it, again trying to grasp the object directly.
Then I stretch the string in a straight line but making it end next
to I aurent and not yet in front of him. He nevertheless reacts as before; that is*to say, he still does not pay attention to the string and tries
to reach the objective directly (it must be said that I displace the latterslightly, at each new attempt, in such a way as to revive the child's interest).
Fit) illy I

give the string once more a sinuous shape but this timemaking it end in front of Laurent. Laurent, after trying twice to grasp
the objective directly, takes possession of the string. He does not try to
stretch it but confines himself to looking at it whileitshakingslightly.

He therefore took it simply for its own sake because of having been unable to reach the shoehorn he wanted; he does not yet understand at all
the relations which exist between the two. But, in shaking thestringhe perceives that the shoehorn moves. He shakes the string more andmorevigorously while attentively observing the

movements of theshoehorn.

This last behavior pattern still does not differ in any way fromthe secondary circular reactions such as those in Observations 94-104:

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

293

pulling a string in order to shake the bassinet hood, etc., when the childhas just discovered by chance the effect thus produced. But, having discovered the possibility of acting upon the shoehorn by means of thestring, Laurent returns to his initial desire, which is to attain the object. Instead of shaking the shoehorn in every direction, he then seems
to pull the string intentionally and thus gradually brings the objective
nearer to him. Once he has grasped it, I repeat the experiment several
times in succession. Every time Laurent at first grasps the string, shakes
it a moment and then pulls it more or less systematically.
But this last behavior pattern does not, it seems to us, yet constitute an authentic example of "behavior pattern of the string." In effect, while already attaining his ends, Laurent still believes himself to be
obliged, before pulling the string, to shake it for a moment, and hecontrives all the transitions between the act of shaking and that ofpulling. In other words, he utilizes an already acquired schema toward
a new end. The action thus carried out therefore still remains at thelevel of the actions of the fourth stage, that is to say, the stage of thecoordination of schemata. At 0;6 (1) Laurent has already revealed avery similar behavior pattern (Obs. 120).
How does the child transcend this stage of simple coordination ofschemata to arrive at the discovery of the role of the string? During

subsequent attempts, I make the string describe an increasingly winding
trajectory so that Laurent, in shaking one end of it, does not at first succeed in moving the shoehorn. He nevertheless still tries, once or twice,
to shake the string. But each time he applies himself more promptly todescribe in detail, without the aid of a film,
pulling it. It is difficult to
how the movement of traction is learned. But, in the main, one canthe child elimisay that there was groping by progressive correction;nates from his earlier schemata the movements consisting of shaking

and develops those which result in pulling. Very rapidly, despite thecomplications I introduce into the experiment, Laurent succeeds infinding the best procedure. He pulls the string with each hand alternately and so attains the objective with only a few movements.

Observation 156 repeated.

An hour later I put Laurent on a sofa andplace the same red shoehorn on a chair, facing him. The string to which
this objective is attached hangs from the chair onto the floor, then goes
the sofa next to the child. He looks at the objective for a moment,upthen his eyes follow the string, he grasps it and pulls it first with one
hand, then with the other. When the shoehorn disappears from his
visual field he nevertheless continues his maneuver until he has been
completely successful.
I then present several objects to him (books, toys, etc.) but out ofreach and attached to ribbons, cords, etc. (different from the string
hitherto involved). Moreover, I vary the trajectories of these inter-THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

294

Laurent
mediates in such a way as to avoid any visual suggestion.
with almost no groping; thesucceeds, however, in all these attempts"schema of the string" has therefore been acquired.
The following days I regulate the thing with several new objects.
Laurent immediately uses both hands to draw them to him by meansat the objecof the cords to which they are attached. At first he looks
tive,

then seeks the proper intermediate.

Let us resume, in connection with this "behavior pattern of
the string/' the discussion of "supports." The child's behavior,
which once more consists in finding a procedure to draw distant
to him is constituted here also by a groping accommodaobjects
tion doubly directed

portant

It is im-by the schemata of assimilation.
to determine exactly the role of this accommodationand that of assimilation. It is the problem of the relations beand intellectual activity of which we shall findtweenexperiencea particular aspect once more.

Accommodationisnecessarily

the adjustmentof earlier,to new circumstances. It is in thisalready constituted schemata
at first, that it is directed by assimilation. It is directed bysense,

the schema assigning an end to the present action as well as bycertain schemata serving here as means and which, accommodation will differentiate. Confronted by a brush attached to a

wishes to grasp this brush and, tostring, for example, Jacqueline
do so, utilizes once more the schema of objects hanging from thehood and from which hangs a string. We recall, in effect, that
she has already made use of these strings to grasp objects attached to them (Obs. 121 repeated). Hence she pulls the string inorder to attain the brush. But, in acting thus, Jacqueline still
as being a magic-phenomenalistic proonly considers the string
extension of the object [see Obs. 153,
an
all
at
not
cedure andat 0;11 (7)].

In effect, when she sees the brush appear, she forgets about
the string, tries to grasp the object directly and fails. It is thenthat actual accommodation and groping begin. The experimentshows the child that his earlier schema is not adequate and Jacqueline finds herself obliged to find the true

relations joining theto Obstring to the object attached. The same applies exactly
servation 154: Jacqueline shakes the string as though a string

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

295

hanging from the hood were Involved, then, observing her
failure, she must accommodate herself to the new situation.
How does this accommodation work? Through tertiary
circular reaction. In Observation 153,
Jacqueline tries new combinations; at first she grasps the string at a visible knot and so
succeeds in catching the brush, or else she pulls the string more

and more until she is able to attain the parrot and hand it over.
less and less andstretches it more and more, etc. Hence there is experimentation
and utilization of this experimentation. But how can this dual

In Observation 154 she shakes the string

capacity be explained?

As far as accommodation in the capacity of experimental
contact with the given reality is concerned, there is nothing to
explain if not that in searching, the child hits upon facts. This
happens by chance and the facts obtrude to the extent that they
refute the expectation due to earlier schemata. All that we havesaid regarding interest in novelty in connection with tertiary
circular reaction easily applies here. Lying in wait for the newexperience, the child encounters it to the extent that he no longer
tries to force reality to enter into his earlier schemata.

With regard to what is, on the other hand, utilization of theexperience, groping accommodation must once again be directedby assimilation, but in a second sense. This time it is directedby the schemata capable of supplying a meaning to the events
arising by chance, these schemata being themselves subordinatedto the schema which assigns an end to the ensemble of the action.
The events which arise in the course of the experiment could not
be apprehended by the subject's consciousness except as a function of the earlier schemata of assimilation. For example, when
Jacqueline discovers that by pulling and stretching the string
she draws to her the object attached toit, she necessarily asfamiliar
schemata. Shetotosimilates this fact, however new
her,"understands" that the string is a "means for bringing," that is
to say, she classes it among the other "means for bringing" suchas the "supports," etc.

The vicissitudes of searching, therefore,

only acquire meaning as functions of the schema of the goalpursued and of the schemata which were earlier in relationshipwith this precise goal.

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

296

In short, accommodation is directed by two kinds of assimiby the "initial" schemata (the schema of the end andthose of the means) which it is precisely a question of adjusting
to the new situation, and by the schemata evoked on the way
which give meaning to(let us call them "auxiliary" schemata)lation:the products of experience or accommodation, and that again asfunction of the goal of the action. But then, do these productsof accommodation present no new aspect to the child's eyes? Inother words, by dint of being interpreted, does the new experiment seern from the outset as though it were already familiar?

There is of course nothing to this, precisely since accommodation upsets and differentiates all the schemata which direct it, as

we have noted in connection with tertiary circular reaction.

How should this acquisition be regarded? Here apprenticeship intervenes, that is to say, the cumulative element of groping.

While being directed or oriented by the earlier schemata of assimilation, accommodation (hence experience) makes them flexible, differentiates them and so precedes, this time directing a new
attempt at assimilation. This assimilation, interior or immanentin successive acts of accommodation, is the apprenticeship:

Eachattempt constitutes a mold for the next one,hence the embryoof an assimilatory schema. So it is that after having learned topull the string by stretching it, Jacqueline pulls it better and
The three series of Observation 153 and the successive

better.

series of attempts described in Observation

154 demonstrate thisprogress very well.

Now it is not a play upon words again to speak of assimilation to characterize this progress

Apprenticeshipisnothingelse

immanent in accommodation.

but a circular reaction proceed-ing by reproductive, recognitory and generalizing assimilations.
As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, it is only because the complexity of the schemata of assimilation henceforth

permits intentional searching for novelty for its own sake, thatcircular reaction is "tertiary," that is to say, oriented toward ac-commodation as such.
In short, one understands how extremelycomplicated isthat which associational
empiricism considered a primary factor:
the contact with experience. The contact, that is tosay, the ac-

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

297

commodation, is always inserted between two (or even three)series of assimilatory schemata which frame it: the schemata(initial or auxiliary) which give direction to accommodationand those which register its results by thus letting themselves be
directed by it.

Let us note, finally, that once the new schema is acquired,that is to say, once the apprenticeship is finished, this schema isapplied from the outset to analogous situations. Thus it is thatin Observation 155 the "behavior pattern of the string" is with-out any difficulty applied to the watch chain. Thus at each acquisition we fall back on the application of "familiar means to
new situations'* according to a rhythm which will extend to thebeginning of systematic intelligence (Chap. VJ).
A third "discovery of new means through active experimentation" will permit us to make this analysis still more precise.
This is the "behavior pattern of the stick." The string is not an
instrument; it is the extension of the object. On the contrary,the "stick" is an instrument. How is the command of this firsttool acquired? Possibly this occurs by a sudden mental construc-tion when the child only discovers the stick late, at the level ofsystematic intelligence (see Chap. VI, 1). Or else it might occur
by means of groping and active experimentation. Lucienne andJacqueline have furnished us with the example of the latter procedure, Lucienne by acting in an entirely spontaneous way, Jacqueline aided by imitation. We shall emphasize here the case ofLucienne, that of Jacqueline merely serving as supplementarymeans of analysis: 5
Observation 157. At 1;0(5) Lucienne already possesses the "behavior
as has been seen in Observations 150 and 152.
theofsupport/*pattern
I try to determine, the same day, if she is capable of that of the stick.

One will see that she is not.
The child is playing with a very elongated cover which can fulfill
a stick's function; with it she hits the tiers of her table, the arms of her
chair, etc. Then I place before her, out of reach, a small green bottle
for which she immediately has a strong desire. She tries to grasp itwith outstretched hands, struggles vigorously, wails, but does not havethe idea of using the cover as a stick. I then place the cover between
5

According to Ch. Biihler and H. Hetzer (op. cit., p. 63) the behavior pat-tern of the stick normally appears during the second half of the second year.

298

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

her and the bottle: same lack of comprehension. Then I place thebottle at the end of the cover: Lucienne pulls the cover to her and
150 repeated.
grasps the bottle as we have observed in Observation
Then I again put the bottle out of reach, but this time I place thecover next to the object and at the child's disposal; nevertheless it does

not occur to Lucienne to use it as a stick.
At 1;2 (7), on the other hand, Lucienne happens to make a notable discovery: While playing at hitting a pail with a stick she is holding (all this without preliminary goals) she sees the pail move at eachblow and then tries to displace the object. She strikes it more or lessbut sheobliquely to augment the movement and does this many times;
does not utilize this finding to bring the pail nearer to her nor to moveitin a certain direction.

Observation 15 8. At 1;4 (0) Lucienne is seated opposite a sofa on
which is placed a small aluminum flask. Next to it lies the same stickas before with which she amused herself of recent weeks, using it tohit objects and the floor, but without progress since 1;2 (7). At first, shetries to grasp the flask directly, with her right hand. Not succeeding,she takes the stick. This behavior constitutes an important novelty: The

stick is no longer only utilized when it is already in hand, it is sought
for its own sake. Moreover, having grasped it by the middle and observ-

ing, after trying it out, that it is not long enough, Lucienne switches it
to her other hand, then takes it again in her right hand, this time by

the end. But the rest of the observation shows that the stick is not yet

grasped with the purpose of pushing the flask; Lucienne merely hits
the object and this does not authorize us to envisage that as previsionof its falling. The flask, however, falls and Lucienne picks it up. It isclear that the desire to attain the flask aroused the schema of striking

by means of a stick, but one cannot therefore see in this behavior pattern a procedure already adapted to the particulars of the situation.
A moment later, on the other hand, I place the flask on the floor,
50 cm. away from Lucienne. She begins by wanting to grasp it directly,
then she takes the stick and hits it. The flask moves a little. Then Lucienne, most attentively, pushes it from left to right, by means of the
stick. The flask is thus brought nearer. Lucienne again tries to
grasp
it directly, then takes the stick again,
pushes it once more, this timefrom right to left, always bringing the object towards her. Delighted,
she grasps it, and succeeds in all the subsequent attempts.

Observation 159.

It

has been seen before (Obs. 139) how Jacqueline,

at around 8 months, made objects swing by "derived circular reaction."
In her case this behavior fortuitously prepared the behavior
ofpattern

the stick. At 1;0 (13) Jacqueline holds an elongated rattle when she

perceives the tail of a leather donkey which hangs in front of her. She im-mediately tries to make it swing. But, having the rattle in her hand, itTERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

299

hand but the rattle which she directs toward the donkey. She
thus shakes its tail and repeats theexperiment many times. One cannot
yet speak of the behavior pattern of the stick in this connection. The
rattle has not been
grasped in order to act upon the object but wasused by chance in the capacity of a chance extension of the hand. As
this behavior did not recurduring the following days, I tried to reconstruct an analogous situation, making use of imitation, not in order to study the latter but in order better to analyze the mechanismof the acquisition. At 1;0 (28)Jacqueline tries to attain a cork placed
before her at eye level but out of reach. In her right hand she holds
a stick but does not use it and tries to grasp the cork directly with herleft hand. I then take the stick and make the cork fall and
Jacqueline
is not her

once grasps it. Then I put the cork back in place and return theJacqueline, who has watched me most attentively, at once repeats my movement with precision. She directs the stick toward thecork and makes it fall.
At this point of the experiment two explanatory hypotheses present themselves to us and it is in order to decide between them that we
atstick.

forced things by causing the factor of imitation to intervene: either

when imitation set in motion a sort of already prepared "structure,"
the child would henceforth apply the latter without any groping, orelse when imitation limited itself to setting an example, the child would

subsequently grope to rediscoverit,in theway in which Lucienne

groped when confronted only by objects. The rest of the observationshows that this second solution is the right one.
I put the cork on the edge of the bassinet. The stick is placed next

to the child. Jacqueline stretches her arms toward the cork, groans withdisappointment and ends almost by crying, but always without think-ing of grasping the stick. I show it to her, raising it and resting it infront of her, before her eyes, but she does not take it and continues
to try to grasp the cork directly.
New attempt: I offer her the stick; she grasps it and immediately
directs it toward the cork which she causes to fall and grasps. The factthat she has the stick in her hand makes her reproduce, by circular reaction, the movement imitated before, but the capacity to perform thismovement does not suffice to enable the child to rediscover it andutilize it when he does not hold the stick and he sees it lying beforehim.

During the three following attempts the same result ensues. Jacuses the
and

only
queline continues to wish to attain the cork directly
stick when I offer it to her. I then interrupt the experiment for a mo-ment.

On resuming it she reveals progress. Jacqueline again tries to grasp
the object, she still does not look for the stick which is, however, infront of her within reach and in her visual field, but when I point toTHE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

300
itwith my finger, she grasps and uses it. Same reaction Eve times insuccession.

A final series: She still tries to reach the cork with her hand (although the cork remains in the same place) but, after a moment's wailto use it immediately.
ing, seeks the stick by herself, in order
It is noteworthy that, during these attempts, Jacqueline has revealed a sustained interest, that she constantly wailed or even cried in
the event of failure (when her hand did not attain the cork) and thateach time her expression changed and her lamentations ceased when
she understood the role of the stick; in the beginning, when I put itin her hand, then when I pointed to it with my finger and finally when
she recalled its use by looking at it. Thus it may be seen that the dy-

namic schema outlined by the initial imitation only incorporated optical factors little by little, that is to say, it was slow to confer a signification to the visual spectacle of the stick.

Observation 160.The next day, at 1;0 (29) I present the same cork to
Jacqueline, at the same place and putting the stick in front of her,
without hesitation she grasps the latter and directs it toward the cork.
But she observes while doing this that the stick is too short (she grasped
it

three quarters of the way down). She transfers it to her other handby grasping its end. Still without hesitation, she holds it out toward
the cork and grasps it and it falls within reach.
After playing with the cork for a moment, I take it back from her
and again place it out of reach of her hands. Jacqueline at once looks
for it on the floor (she is seated), but, instead of grasping the stick
which she sees, she takes her picture book (made of cloth) and directs it
toward the cork. The book folds and does not reach the goal. Jacqueline wails but perseveres in about ten attempts. Afterward she puts it
down, tries with her hand alone, then with the stick (grasping it sothat it is too short); she rejects it and takes a rubber banana. As thisis still too short, she removes it after several fruitless
attempts and returns to the stick. She finally succeeds.
It may therefore be seen that the behavior pattern of the stick has
been acquired and immediately generalized even with respect to flexible objects.

Observation 16LAt 1;1 (0) Jacqueline tries to attain a plush cat located on the wood of her bassinet outside her field of prehension. She
gives up after a series of fruitless attempts and without thinking of thethen put my finger 20 cm. above the latter. She perceives thegrasps it at once and makes the cat fall. At 1;1 (28) she isseated on the floor and tries to reach the same cat, this time
placed on
the floor. She touches it with her stick but withouttomake thetryingcat slide to her, as
though the act of touching it sufficed to draw it
stick. I

stick,

to her.

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

301

Finally, at 1;3 (12) she discovers the possibility of making objects
slide on the floor by means of the stick and sothem to her;drawingin order to catch a doll lying on the
ground out of reach, she begins
its
sheby striking it with the stick, then,noticing

slight displacement,

pushes it until she is able to attain it with her right hand.

These observations make it possible, it would seem, to progress a step further in the analysis of accommodation. But firstlet us emphasize what they have in common with theprecedingones.

The behavior

pattern of the stick, like the behavior patternsof the support and of the string, arises by differentiation of earlier schemata. The desire to strike or swing
objects fortuitously
reveals to the child the power of the stick when by chance thelatter extends the action of the hand.

Observation 157 and theof'Observation
thus
159
show
us what makes readybeginning
the behavior pattern of the stick. Thereafter, when the child aims
to reach an object situated outside his field of prehension, it isnatural that his desire should arouse the schemata in question(due to the mechanism of the coordination of schemata, existingfrom the fourth stage); the beginning of Observation 158 shows
us this. At its point of departure, accommodation is therefore directed by the schema of the goal (to grasp the distant object) inthe same way as by the schemata coordinated with it (striking,as "means." But it is a question of accommoetc.) and serving

dating these schemata to the present situation. It is not enoughto strike an object with a stick in order to draw it to oneself and
it is necessary to discover how to give an object an appropriate
movement. It is then that accommodation begins.

Let us again note that this accommodation, as in the caseof the supports and of the string, is conditioned by a series of
earlier schemata which give a signification to the successive discoveries. So it is that the child, as soon as he sees the object be-

ing displaced a little under the influence of the stick's blows,
understands the possibility of utilizing these displacements withthe view of drawing the object in question to him. This compre-

hension is not only due to the "initial" schemata which are at
the root of the subject's searching (schema of grasping and thatof striking) and of which the present accommodation constitutes

302

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

a differentiation, but it is also due to the "auxiliary*' schemata

which join themselves to the former. It is doubtless because heof the supalready knows how to displace objects by means
theunderstands
child
the
that
and
the
signification
stringports
of little displacements due to blows of the stick.
But how does this accommodation work, that is to say, thisdifferentiates for that purpose (striking); this conjunction conmulative process will give rise to a new assimilation? Here theobservations relating to the stick enable us to transcend the con-clusions obtained by analyzing the behavior pattern of the sup-port and that of the string.

We have seen, in connection with theof novelties, that is to say, apprenticestring, that the acquisition
consisted in a tertiary circular reaction itself operating
through reproductive, recognitory and generalizing assimila-ship,

tions. Accommodation to old schemata thus gives rise to new schemata capable, as such, of assimilation. But how is that possible?

The observation of the behavior pattern of the stick will now
show us.
Three solutions are conceivable. Either the differentiationof the old schemata, which accordingly constitutes accommodation (in the particular case, the transformation of the schemaof "striking" into a new schema of "displacing with the stick")schema; that is to say,undirected
there would be simple,
groping, entailing by chance

consists in a sort of dislocation of thisvariations on the general theme of the schema. In this first solution,

attainment of the end would have to be conceived as being

a selection after the event of chance variations. The second solu-

on the contrary, of assuming an immediatetheschemata: the schema of "striking with aofreorganization
stick" coordinated with that of "grasping" or "bringing to onetion would consist,self" would, at a given moment, suddenly give rise to the systemof "bringing to oneself with a stick." This sudden crystallization

would therefore be comparable to those reorganizations of theensemble of the field of perception which Gestalt psychology
makes the essence of intellectual invention. In the third place
one could posit an intermediate solution which would not at all
consist of a mixture of the two others or a compromise but which
would introduce a factor of directed activity. The schema serv-

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

303

ing as means (striking, swinging, etc.) would become differentiated as a function of the final schema(bringing to oneself) andconsequently would be directed by it, but this conjunction of

two schemata instead ofgiving rise to a sudden reorganization
would simply engender a series of cumulative efforts, that is tosay, a progressive

accommodation whose every term would be

assimilated to the preceding terms while

being oriented by theensemble of the conjunction. The originality of this third solution, in relation to thesecond one, would therefore be that the

new schema would not be structured at the outset but would remain in a state of structuring activity until the time when it
would have assimilated to itself the ensemble of the situation.
These three solutions having been separately delineated, it
is clear that the third is the
only one which conforms to Observations 157-161, as well as to the preceding ones. The first solu-

tion must be withdrawn because in such cases the child's groping
never consists in a series of acts performed by chance. On the

one hand, accommodation is enclosed in the schema of the goal
(to bring to oneself) and that which serves as means which it
differentiates for that purpose (striking); this conjunction conthe othersequently reduces chance to small proportions.

On

hand, each attempt conditions the attempts that follow and de-pends on the preceding ones. Doubtless chance can sometimes
play a role in discovery. So it is that in Observation 157, Lucienne perceives that by hitting a pail she displaces it. But this
discovery which characterizes a pure tertiary circular reaction(but which we class here because it could just as well occur inthe course of seeking to bring things to oneself) is immediately
assimilated

andat onceconditions the subsequent attempts.
Chance, therefore, in the accommodation peculiar to sensorimotor intelligence, plays the same role as in scientific discovery.
It is only useful to the genius and its revelations remain meaningless to the unskilled. In other words, it presupposes a directed
search and is incapable of orienting it by itself.
The second solution is more satisfactory. But it encounters

the difficulty that, in our observations, accommodation

is

not

immediate. What is essential appears as being not the structurein which this accommodation results, but the structuring activity

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

304

which makes possible its culmination. In this respect Observation 159 is very instructive. By presenting Jacqueline with an
the behavalready structured example to imitate with regard toior pattern of the stick I must have, it would seem, evoked in
the child's mind an immediate comprehension of the use of that
instrument. Jacqueline imitates me unhesitatingly, with interest and precision, giving the impression that she would now beable to repeat the same behavior pattern indefinitely. Now therest of the observation shows that the schema aroused by imitation remains simply in the state of tendency or dynamism anddoes not give rise at the outset to a reorganization of perception.
During the attempts immediately following the imitation, thesight of the stick does not suffice to set in motion its utilization
and Jacqueline must already hold it in her hands in order torediscover its signification which she can then do without any
difficulty. Subsequently, on the other hand, visual elements areincorporated into this dynamic schema, very slowly and progressively. First I must point to the stick with my finger in orderthat the stick be used, then the sight of it alone suffices to pro-

duce this result.
We can conclude from such observations that accommodation characteristic of the discovery of new means operates due
not to a sudden reorganization but dne to a series of cumulative

attempts being assimilated to each other and thus entailing theformation of a schema which assimilates to itself the ensemble ofthe situation (including, little by little, visual elements). It may

thus be seen how, as we glimpsed in connection with the "supports" and the "string/* accommodation is directed not only
from the outside by the coordination of the final schema (theschema assigning an end to the action) and of the initial schemata serving as means, schemata that accommodation differentiates,

not only by the auxiliary schemata which give meaning to

the discoveries made by this accommodation, but that it is also

and primarily directed by an assimilation immanent in accommodation and resulting from it just as circular reaction resultsfrom the novelties which give rise to it.
Itisnoteworthy

that, as inconnection with the "string"and the "supports/* the new schema, as soon as it has been ac-

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

305

quired, is applied by generalization to analogous situations, thebehavior pattern thus entering the group which we have called"applications' of familiar means to new situations. So it is that,1

in Observation 160, Jacqueline, knowing how to use a stick with-out hesitation, also uses a book and a banana as instruments.
3. THE DISCOVERY OF NEW MEANS THROUGH
ACTIVE EXPERIMENTATION. II. OTHER EXAMPLES.

The analysis we have just attempted to make concerning the accommodation characteristic of the discovery of new means can
now be extended by the study of more complex behavior patterns. We shall first try to find out how the childgoes about
drawing objects to him through the bars of his pen. This kindof an experiment is such as to permit us to examine the relations between the dynamic schemata and visual perception or
representation.
Observation 162. At 1;3 (12) Jacqueline is seated in her playpen, thatto say, in a square enclosure whose four sides are formed by verticalbars connected at base and summit by a horizontal bar. The bars are
6 cm. apart. I place outside the pen, parallel to the side where Jacqueline is, a stick 20 on. long which takes up the distance of aboutis

5 spaces between the bars. We shall call these three spaces a, b and c,
space b corresponding to the middle part of the stick and spaces a and cto the end parts. The problem is to transfer this stick from outside to
inside the pen.

L Jacqueline begins by grasping the stick through space b, shealong the bars but holds it horizontally and parallel to theframe so that the harder she pulls the less it moves. She then extends
her other hand through c, but holds the stick horizontally and does not
succeed in making it come through. She finally lets go of the object
which I put back in its initial position.
2. Jacqueline at once begins over again, by again grasping theraises it

stick at c. But, in raising it, she tilts it up a litde, by chance, and somakes it slightly oblique. She immediately takes advantage of what
she perceives and, passing her hand through c, she tilts the stick until
it is sufficiently vertical tob.

pass through. She then brings it into the pen

Why did she tilt it up? Was it through foresight or did she

through
was due to chance so as to see what
simply extend the movement which

would happen? The rest of these attempts rather substantiate this second interpretation.
3-4. This time Jacqueline grasps the stick through space

c,

that

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

306

at c durto say, at one of Its ends (doubtless because she tilted, it up
draws it horizontally against the bars
Shetheattempt).
ing
precedingbut encountering resistance from them she quickly makes it verticaland pulls it through without difficulty. The speed of this adaptation isby one of its ends; the subthe fact that the stick wasisdue tograspedthat nothing systematic yet exists.
sequent attempts showat 6. She raises
5. Jacqueline again grasps the stick by the middle,
as in 1. She pulls and seems
the
bars,
it
it, puts
horizontally against
It is only after a while that she tilts itvery surprised by her failure.
in bringing it in.
it appears, intentionally) and succeeds
time,up (this
she
new
At
each
begins by trying
6-10. Same reactions.
attempt,
It is only after
to make it penetrate horizontally, parallel to the frame.
this preliminary failure that she tilts up the stick, still quite slowly.
turns the stick more rapidly because she
11. This time

Jacqueline
grasped it at
12-15. She again grasps it at b and recommences to try to bring it
Then she tilts it up, more slowly than
through horizontally, as in 5-10.
.

in 11,and succeeds.

She continues to take it at b and to try to pull it through horidoes not persist and tilts it up immediately.
zontally but, this time she
it touched
17. For the first time Jacqueline tilts the stick before16.

the bars and no longer tries to bring it in horizontally.

However, shegrasped it at the middle (at b).
18-19. She again begins by trying to bring it through horizonthat this was due to automatism and she tilts it up
tally but it seems

immediately afterwards.
20 et seq. She finally turns it systematically before it touches thebars (see 17).

Observation 163.At 1;3 (13) we resume the same experiment with Jacit in the following way: the stick hencequeline, but by complicating
forth used is too long to pass through horizontally. The bars of the pen
are 50 cm. high (with a space of 46 cm. between the lower bar andshall
the upper one) and the stick given to the child is 55 cm. long.
call the middle of the stick A, and B and C the two points situated atWe

one third and two thirds of the distance between the middle and theend. The stick is again placed on the ground parallel to the side of
the frame which Jacqueline is seated facing. Ten attempts were enoughto enable her to solve theproblem:

at J5. She raises it horizontally and
Jacqueline grasps the stickthus pulls it against the bars. She pulls it against the bars with all her
1.

strength and then displaces it unsystematically,raises it and all at once

through by chance without having understood how she did it.
brings
2. This time she grasps the stick at A, puts it horizontally against
the bars and pulls as hard as she can. She then tilts it up systematicallyitTERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

307

but the stick, touching the ground at its lower end, remains
oblique.
She again pulls very hard, thengives up.
3-4. She still begins
then raises it,bypulling horizontally,pulls
again and finally tilts it in such a way as to bring it through correctly.
Both times she grasped it at B.
5.

Jacqueline grasps the stick at C, pulls it horizontally, then raises

But she tilts it up so that it is higher than the frame at the
top andremains caught at the bottom. She then shakes it and ends by bringing
it.

itthrough accidentally.

6. Samebeginnings. The stick is held at the top by the edge ofthe frame and at the bottom
by Jacqueline's dress which is pressedagainst the lower edge of the pen. Jacqueline then watches both endsof the stick attentively, then raises it
gently to disengage it from her
dress. She then brings it inslowly by the bottom part and then pulls
until she has been completely successful.
7.

First she grasps the stick at A,
applies it horizontally and pulls.

Then she grasps it with the other hand at C (still holding it firmly at
A, tight against the bars) and brings it through by raising it first andthen pulling it by the lower part, as before (in 6).
8. Jacqueline succeeds at once this time, almost without
pulling
the stick against the bars. She grasps it, tilts it up and brings it throughby the lower end.

it

9. She grasps it with thewrong hand (too high to be able to pullthrough by the lower part). She immediately switches to the other

hand and succeeds at once.
10.

Immediate success, without groping and without first touching

the bars: she barely grazes them when bringing the stick through.
At 1;3 (15) Jacqueline fails at the first attempt and again pulls horizontally but, during this second attempt, she rediscovers the combined
two acts of tilting up the stick and bringing it in by the lower part. At
1;4 (0) after an interruption of several days, she relapses into her former
mistakes, then succeeds.

Observation 164. -The following facts will help us to clarify the powers and limitations of visual perception. At 1;3 (13) Jacqueline tries tobring in a case for eyeglasses: she succeeds at once. However, shegrasped it but turned it to the vertical position before it touched thebars. Same success subsequently with a stick of sealing wax.

Then I place a book on its edge outside the frame (the spine of
the book upward and parallel to the frame). She grasps it and pulls thewhole width of it against the bars. Afterward she pulls it with theshespine of the book placed horizontally against the bars, then, thirdly,
tilts up the book and brings it through vertically, spine first, without
any difficulty.
A half hour later Jacqueline begins again by pulling the wholewidth of the book against the bars in order to bring it inside in this308

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

way, and she again pulls with all her strength. Afterward, she places
it on the floor on its edge, parallel to the frame, then she grasps itwith her other hand by the spine, raises it up vertically before it
touches the bars and brings it through.
In the course of a final experiment she tilts it up right away before another attempt and bringsitin unhesitatingly.

At I;4 (21), on the other hand, she tried to take out of her pen
cylindrical, wooden, Russian dolls, too wide to push through thebars. She does not understand her failure and pushes them anyway.
She does not succeed in inventing the procedure which would consist
in sliding them along the bars in order to bring them over the top.
Observation 165. At 1;3 (14) Jacqueline received a cardboard rooster

by means of which I try the following experiment. I place it lying on
the ground, outside the frame but introducing the head and tail of thecock in the direction of the child. In other words, the head passes
through a space between two bars, the tail passes through the next
space and the rooster's back is held back by the bar separating these
two spaces. If the child wishes to pull the rooster to him he must first
push it away, then tilt it up and finally bring it through head or tailfirst.

During this first experiment Jacqueline confines herself to merely
pulling the rooster by the head or by the tail but without previously
pushing it away or tilting it up; she consequently fails completely.
At 1;3 (16), on the other hand, I simplify things a little by putting the rooster back a little; it still faces a bar but, instead of being
in contact with it, it is 5 on. behind it. Here is the series of attempts:
1.
Jacqueline pulls the rooster toward her and it gets caught inthe bars. She pulls hard for a while, then switches hands. While she isdoing this, the rooster happens to fall quite far away so that when
picking it up again, she tilts it to a vertical position without difficulty.
She then sees it in profile and has only to turn it full face to bring it
through. These acts of raising the recumbent animal, then of bringing it in full face only constitute, of course, the application of discovmade in connection with the stick (Obs. 162 and 163) and primarily in connection with the book (Obs. 164), that is to say, the discoveries made the preceding days.

eries

2. In grasping the rooster Jacqueline pushes it back slightly andso again succeeds in tilting it up without difficulty. She does this systematically and without hesitation.
3. The rooster gets caught this time.
Jacqueline nevertheless pulls
without thinking of pushing it back. After vain attempts she changes
hands and begins over again. Then she takes it in her right hand andpulls it with renewed strength. At last she tries to tilt it up, but still
without pushing it back, She then gives up and lets it go.
itTERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS
4-6.

309

The rooster again gets caught at each attempt. Jacqueline

recommences to pull with each hand alternately. But each time therooster finally falls

sufficiently far away to enable her to tilt it up without difficulty. She therefore knows how to tilt theobject up but still
does not know how to push it
away for this purpose; it is only chancethat allows her to do it.

7. The rooster remains
caught for a long time. She pulls it withboth hands. It falls but she gets it caught while trying to tilt it up;
she does not understand andpulls harder. At last it falls far enoughaway to permit her to tilt it up and pull it in without difficulty.
8. This time the rooster,caught at first, falls six times a short distance away and each time it would have sufficed to pull it back evena little bit to tilt it up. However, she
got it caught at each new attempt
and resumed pulling without understanding.
9-10. Same reactions. She fatigues and we pause.

The afternoon of the same day, around 1 o'clock, we resume theexperiment: complete failure.

That evening, around 6 o'clock, new attempts which this time are
Here is the series of attempts:

successful.

1.

2.

Failure: she pulls, switches hands, and gives up.
She succeeds by chance in tilting it up before it touches thebars and doubtless before

it

becomes caught. It goes through without

difficulty.
3. It

becomes caught and she pulls it for a moment, then lets it
drop, perhaps intentionally, after which she tilts it up before it touches
the bars.
4-9. Same beginning, but this time it is certain that she lets it fallintentionally and sooner after the beginning of the attempts. Then she
tilts it up very well, taking care to do so ahead of time (before pulling)
and at last she pulls it to her. The game amuses her to such an extent
that as soon as the rooster is inside the frame, she puts it outside byherself in order to begin all over again.
10. I now wedge it ahead of time as at the beginning o our experiment [at 1;3 (14)]. Jacqueline then pulls at first and is surprised byher failure; she still does not know how to push the object back be-forehand. On the other hand, when she observes the failure, she knows

how to drop the rooster intentionally. It then falls 3 cm. away fromthe bars, she tilts it up and brings it in without difficulty.
11-12. This time, a noteworthy novelty: The rooster gets caught,
she pulls it for a moment, then, without letting it fall, she places it on
the floor (while holding it by its head)tilts itup and pulls it to her.

She has not definitely pushed it away but by placing it on the floor she
had sufficient leeway to enable her to tilt it up without difficulty.

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

310
13.

She

pulls,

thenlets it fall

again (intentionally), as in 4-10.

Then she tilts it up and brings it in.

rooster up, on theJacqueline pulls, then once more tilts thewithout letting it fall or letting it go (as in 11-12).
15-16. She again lets it fall but then returns it very carefully, while
watching its tail which was in danger of catching in the bars.
17. This time, Jacqueline definitely pushes the rooster back be14.

floor,

fore pulling it and tilts it up without letting it go.
18. Same reaction, but in addition, she takes the rooster outside thebars by herself, as soon as she has brought it in, in order to repeat theThis playexperiment because she is so delighted at her last discovery.
goes on until satiety.

Observation 166. At 1;3 (17) the day after the preceding series, I resume the experiment of pulling the rooster through the bars. It is

worthwhile to describe in a new observation the results of thesere-peated attempts after the discovery of the correct procedure, for they
are of a kind to clarify the relations of visual representation with the
dynamic schema.

Here is the series of these new attempts:
Jacqueline pulls the rooster to her, as if the bar located between
tail were not going to catch the animal's back. She
as
she
did
the
first day, perseveringly and recommencing withpulls
vigor after short rests. Then the rooster falls by chance and she is thenable to tilt it up without difficulty and to pull it to her.
1.

the head and the

2. Same reaction, but she lets it go quickly, perhaps intentionally,
and tilts it up on the ground.

She begins again by pulling, then, without letting it go, lowers
the ground, pushes it back intentionally, tilts it up and brings it in.

3.
it to

4.

Same reaction, very definite, but she pushes it back by making
floor and turns it so much that it catches on the otherit slide along theside.

5-7. She pushes it back almost immediately, but commences eachtime by pulling it directly.
It

may thus be seen how much more rapid is the discovery of thecorrect procedure than it was the day before but one observes that,nevertheless, progress always takes place through motor assimilation andnot through representation. A quarter of an hour later, I resume theexperiment and observe the ten following attempts:
1-4. Jacqueline first pulls the rooster,
after,

then pushes

itback soonand tilts it up without letting it go.

5-6. She pushes it back, this time, right away. She evenpushes itback the second time 15 cm. along the floor, without letting it go, andonce it is tilted up, brings it in victoriously.

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS
7.
it

311

She begins again by pulling first, then pushes It back and tiltsup.
8-10. Correct procedure as in 5-6.

At 1;3 (21), that is to say, four days later, Jacqueline again pulls
the rooster directly twice and then pushes it back at the third
attempt.
At 1;3 (27) same sequence. At 1;4 (0), she pushes it back beforehand at
the second attempt but simply from habit because, at the fifth attempt,
when the rooster gets caught by chance, she pulls it again with all her
strength without knowing how to correct it. Then at the sixth attempt,
she again pushes it back beforehand. At 1;4 (20) I make the same observation. But it suffices to show her a new rooster to make her succeed
in bringing it in right away and push it away and tilt up ahead of time
both the old and the new rooster.

This new series of facts warrants our resuming the discussion of the mechanism of accommodation. As we have seen inconnection with the "stick," there are three possible solutions
for interpreting such facts; chance and selection, the hypothesisof "structures," and that of a structuring assimilatory activity
which is not structured from the outset.
The first of these solutions seems at first very likely. Theseobservations, still more than those pertaining to the stick (seeObs. 159 during which Jacqueline learns little by little to utilize
an imitated example) seem to speak in favor of a sort of training, the incorrect procedures being gradually replaced by correct methods. But, on examining things closely, one sees that thisapparent and that the gradual victory of the correct procedures is not at all due to an automatic selection: It is simply
is onlya question of progressive comprehension analogous to that which

we observe in ourselves when we only grasp little by little thefactors of a problem and only after much groping arrive at clear
and unified vision. In such cases, we begin by anticipating, in away, the right solution. In other words, an accommodation offamiliar schemata to the new situation permits us to differentiate them in a relatively adequate schema but the latter remains
in the state of intention or of simply structuring outline; that is
to say, it orients searching without yet being sufficiently strong

to eliminate false solutions,itcoordinates the progress of grop-

and finallying without
without
circumstances
nate chancebeing yet able to do without
itselfbeing structured,it utilizes

fortu-

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS
their cooperation (but it is never derived from them). The sameis true of our Observations 162 to 166. The child tries to bring312

the object to him (there is the schema assigning an end to theaction and thus directing the groping), and quickly understands,
when he fails, that certain displacements of the object become

schemata serving asnecessary (there are themeans which ac-commodation will differentiate). With regard to the origin of
these latter schemata,it isto be sought in the tertiary circular

reactions relating to changes of position (Obs. 141-142 and 144-

and primarily in the many experiments which the childmakes each day in order to grasp a cumbersome object, to tilt it
those in which it is inserted, etc. (seeup, to dissociate it from
145)

Obs. 146). This outline of a solution, obtained by directed differentiation of earlier schemata, then gives rise to a series of atchance certainly intervenes untempts in the course of which
but which are not dominated by chance. If, thereafter,
ceasingly,

the false solution continually reappears (drawing the object dito oneself), that simply means that the outline of the cor-

rectlyrect solutionis

too weak to counterbalance the influence of ahabit and the allurement of approcedure having the force ofat all that the correct solumean
not
that
does
parent evidence;

obtained by purely automatic training founded uponchance and selection. The correct solution, once glimpsed, grows
tion

is

progressively stronger,

not in the manner of a phenomenon thatoutweighs another as function of a selection taking
but in the manner of a cumulative experience or
in
time,
place
statisticallycomprehension. For example, in Observation 165, the first ten
attempts reveal no progress because the solution (pushing theobject back in order to tilt it up) has not been glimpsed; but assoon as it has been (beginning of the second series) it becomesconsolidated (attempts 3-10), then becomes explicit (attempts 1114),

and finally is definitively established (attempts 17-18). Thisdevelopment is therefore not that of a series of blind gropingsin the course of which propitious acts become fixed due to conit is that of a directed apprenticeship,analogous to
the example of a student trying to solve the same problem infirmation;arithmetic twenty times, knowing the final result but without

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

313

having understood the connection, which he guessed at, between
the different operations to be
performed.
These remarks make us realize at the same time the differences existing between the cumulative assimilation
presupposedby such accommodations and the ready-made "structures" of Gestalt

psychology. Again referring to Observation 165, there arethree operations to perform:
pushing back the rooster, tilting it
and
it
in
full
face.
up,
bringing
Jacqueline knows how to per-form the two latter ones due to her recent acquisitions (Obs. 162only remains for her to discover the necessity for thein order to intercoordinate the other two.
she antici-164). It
first

Now

pates this solution assoon as she lets the rooster fall and there-

after acquires the possibility of tilting it up without difficulty.

The schema thus outlined (beginning of the second series) becomes consolidated, explicit and finally established, as we have

How can this development be explained? It cannot
be a question of an immediate structurization precisely because,in the course of attempts 1 to 16, there is no correct solution but
simply progress towards a solution. All that remains is to assert
just recalled.

the existence of a cumulative assimilation, analogous to that of
the tertiary circular reactions and according to which the new
motor schema, outlined by accommodation, like every assimilatory schema, is developed by repetition, recognition and generalization. Once again we find a structuring assimilation andnot at the outset a structured coordination. It is by functioningthat a schema structures itself and not before functioning. It istrue that, in order to function, that is to say, in order to assimilate the real situation, a schema has need of at least a minimumof structure; but this structure is nothing Independently of theact of assimilation and so only becomes crystallized in the course

Regarding Observations 162-164, the same is true:
The solution outlined at the beginning becomes consolidatedof this act.

and explicit through reproductive, generalizing and recognitory
assimilation.

In connection with this dynamism it remains to speak of
the respective roles of visual representation and simple motor
assimilation. How does it happen that, in the course of Observations 165 and 166, Jacqueline tries again and again to bringTHE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS
a rooster through the bars when she sees that one of these bars
314

back systematically and when she has already discovered the correct solution beforehand and several times in succes162 and 163) that she even tries
sion? How does it

holds

it

happen (Obs.
to bring in a long stick held back by 2, 3 or 4 bars at once, as
the stick were going to cut the bars or cross them as athoughwire cuts butter? Or why (Obs. 164) does she persist in trying tobars a doll which is wider
bring through the space between two
a secvisual
than this space? Is it because
perception only plays
are
that
and
purely arole in such behavior
they

ondarypatterns

matter of motor searching; or because this perception is different
and does not take account of the solidity of objects? In fact,
it seems to us that both solutions amount to the same thing.
the bars constituted

Everything occurs as though, to the child,and not subpure images without depth or solidity (pictures
traversedbe
could
throughstances) and as though these images
and through without difficulty. But why is this so? Precisely because a sensorimotor elaboration has not yet conferred uponthem the qualities of resistance and substantiality which theylack. Here again it is difficult to speak with the Gestalt psychologists of asudden reorganization of the perceptual field inde-

It is the action
pendently of structuring assimilatory activity:
reverse.
not
the
and
that fashions the field of perception
the discovery
of
makes
of
In short, the theory
pure gropingof new procedures a simple accommodation, thus neglecting theformal coordination belonging to assimilation: hence this the-invention to experiory is analogous to an empiricism ascribing
mind. The theory
theofence alone and neglecting the activity
existence of fortheof "structures," on the contrary, emphasizes

mal coordinations but neglects accommodation, in this being
For us,comparable to an apriority which disdains experience.
accommodation is necessarily on a par with a cumulative assimilation, structuring and not structured from the outset. The

schema of assimilation thus reconciles the necessary role of exthe no less necperience, that is to say, of accommodation, withessary role of formal coordination.

Before concluding, let us cite a certain number of mixed
observations in which the discovery of new means through ac-

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS
tive experimentation

315

simultaneously raises all the problems dis-cussed hitherto:
Observation 167. At 1;3 (12) Jacqueline throws a plush dog outside thebars of her playpen and she tries to catch it. Not succeeding, she thenpushes the pen itself in the right direction By holding onto the framewith one hand while with the other she tried to grasp the dog, she observed that the frame was mobile. She had accordingly, without wishing1

to do so, moved it away from the dog. She at once tried to correct thismovement and thus saw the pen approach its objective. These two

fortuitous discoveries then led her to utilize movements of the playpen
and to push it at first experimentally, then systematically. There was amoment's groping, but it was short.
At 1;3 (16), on the other hand, Jacqueline right away pushes her
playpen in the direction of the objects to be picked up.
Observation 168. This last observation during which the child displaces himself in order to attain the objective, leads us to the situationin which the subject is obliged to withdraw part or all of his own bodyin order not to interfere with the movements of the object. For instance, at 1;6 (15) Jacqueline is standing on a rag (50 x 30 cm.) which she
is trying to pick up. She pulls, is surprised at the resistance, but it

does not occur to her to move. Finally, she gives up.

At 1;7 (0), on the contrary, she is standing on a handkerchief and,after having pulled it, she moves her feet until it is free. At the second
attempt, she moves away beforehand, but at the third, she continues topull a long time before taking away the foot that was impeding her.

Observation 169. Here is a behavior pattern intermediate between thepreceding ones and those that consist in utilizing the relationships ofcontents and container. At 1;3 (14) Jacqueline tries to open a jewel
case (3x5 cm.). With one hand she holds it and without knowing ittightens the cover on the box, and with the other hand she tries toraise this cover, of course without succeedingl However, by dint oftransferring the object from one hand to the other without the posshe finally draws back her rightsibility of noting all the vicissitudes,
hand (which holds the case) as much as possible while she pulls at thelid with the other. But there is not yet any systematic procedure.
At 1;3 (15) on the other hand, after two attempts during which
cover with one hand while
Jacqueline recommences trying to hold theshe tries to displace it with the other, she places the box on the
ground and opens it without difficulty. This act of placing it on the
ground was not the result of invention, properly so called. She simply
removed her right hand and, unable simultaneously to hold the box

and open it with her left hand, she placed it on the ground.
That evening, she tries to open a pipe case (same kind of fastening:316

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

two valves applied against each other). She tries indefinitely to open itwith one hand while holding it closed with the other. But then thecase happens to fall and opens: Jacqueline opens it and then closes it
several times in succession on the ground and with one hand. Then she
takes it up again in one hand and recommences to try to open it withthe other: complete failure. She then rests it on the ground, this timeintentionally, and opens it without difficulty.
After a new attempt with both hands, she rests it again on the floor

and only tries this way.
At 1;3 (16) same reaction. On the one hand, Jacqueline well knows
how to open the case when she rests it on the ground. She searches forthe slit with one finger and raises one of the valves without touching theother. When her finger again covers both, she lowers it very attentively
until she feels the slit and then opens the case easily. But, on the other

hand, when she holds the case in both hands, she is incapable of proholds it firmly with the otherceeding. While trying to raise a valve, shehand. In the latter case, she rests the case on the table and succeeds in
opening it by means of one hand only. Finally, she only attempts thissecond procedure and gives up all efforts with both hands.
Observation 170. Hereisan analogous observation concerning Lu-

cienne. At l;l (23) Lucienne puts (by chance?) a cake in the form of aring or a torus in a circular wooden box. She immediately tries to takeit out. But she puts her thumb against the outside of the box whilethat the very palm
pulling the cake with her index and other fingers soof her hand prevents the object from coming out. She finally attains
her goal after extensive efforts. She then at once begins over again andso on twenty times in succession through an apparent need of assimilation. From time to time she does it by simple empirical groping,by shaking the box or turning it upside down (not deliberately), but, on
the whole, there is definite progress. Little by little she manages to holdthe box in one hand while she pulls the cake with the other without
obstructing the cake with her thumb.
There exists in this case, besides cumulative assimilation, a processof progressive dissociation. The child detaches three objects from one
another: box, cake and hand. At first she does not see that the hand isan obstacle as well as an instrument. Then, due to her directed gropings, she understands the exact interrelations of the objects and succeeds in solving the problem she herself raised.

Observation 171 .These

last

behavior patterns lead us to the acts

relating to the connection between container and contents. Here is thesimplest of those we have observed:

At 1;3 (28) Jacqueline receives a toy consisting of hollow blocks
which fit into each other and which we separate before her eyes andTERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS
scatter about.
little317

The problem is to know how she will learn to put theblocks into the large ones.

1.
Jacqueline begins by manipulating eight blocks of different sizes
by trying to put the little ones in the big ones and the big ones into

thelittleones, varying the combinations (see particulars in Vol.

II,

Chap. II).

Toward the end of these first gropings she seems more rapidly than
before to abandon the project of

putting a large block into a small one.

She finally grasps a large block with one hand, a small one withthe other and looks for the
opening of the former in order to place thesecond one systematically in it; hence theexperiment is accompaniedat this time by a sort of reflection or mental concentration.
2. At 1;3 (29), thefollowing day, I again give the blocks to Jacqueline who is in her playpen. She
begins by trying to make a block whichis too big comethrough the bars. After having given up, she puts asmall block into a big one and shakes the latter in order to make a

block which is too big come through the bars. After having given up,
she puts a small block into a big one and shakes the latter in order tomake a noise. She is not interested in anything else so I take the gameaway from her.
3. At 1 ;4 (0) she tries at first to
put one block into another whichis slightly larger. Then she recommences
trying to place a large one ina small one but corrects herself very quickly.
4. From 1;4 (5)Jacqueline's attempts lead to satisfying results on
the whole. She no longer tries to put large blocks inside small ones, shetakes account of the position of the angles and succeeds in extricating
the enclosed blocks by sliding them out with her index finger. These
three behavior patterns have consequently been acquired due to
directed gropings and the progressive correction of the initial schemata.
is a slightly more complex example. At 1;1
present Lucienne with a wooden pail (10 cm. in diameter) towhich she is accustomed and place my watch chain next to it. At first
Lucienne tries to put the chain into the pail, being accustomed to putting different objects into it. She grasps the middle of the chain be-

Observation 172. Here(3)

I

tween thumb and index finger and places it on the edge of the pail.

But of course the greater part of the chain remains outside the pail.
Lucienne at once grasps the outside end in order to make it all go inside, but she grasps it so high up, as though the part already insidewere not joined to the other, that the whole chain comes out and she
has to begin all over again. This recurs many times because Lucienne,
through lack of assimilation, each time puts the chain into the pail but
always goes about it in the same way. However, little by little she
manages to make her movements gentler and to pick up the hanging
end of the chain without jostling the other. At last she succeeds oncein making the whole chain enter the pail.

318

THE INTENTIONAL SENSOBJMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

At 1;3 (13) she tries to solve the same problem by herself, but with
the necklacea necklace and a watering can. First she puts the end of
introthewithout
alreadymakinginside, then the rest of it by degrees
in makingduced part fall out. She thus succeeds, after several failures,the whole necklace go inside the can twice.
Observation 173.-These last experiments now lead us to the analysis
fruitful:amakingof a proof which has shown itself to be particularly
watch chain enter a narrow opening. This experiment, which in
difLucienne's case took place after the preceding ones, yielded quite

new both withferent results than with Jacqueline, results which were
and to the necklace and watering can.
respect to the chain and pailwhich we shallLucienne solved thisby an act of true invention

problem

179. With regard to Jacqueline, on
study in the course of Observation
analothe other hand, the behavior pattern was revealed to be exactly
in the preceding observation.
Lucienne
that
of
to
gous
At 1;7 (25) Jacqueline holds a rectangular box, deep and narrow^
1 use the cover
thismeasures 34 x 16 mm.

whose opening
purpose(forto put myof a match box which is three quarters open), and she tries
she
fifteenfirst
theattempts,
cm.
it
into
watch chainlong). During(45
end of the chain
it in the following way: First she puts one
about
goes
the chain about 5 cm. fromthen sheto 4
into the box
(2

cm.),

graspsend and thus puts a second segment into the box. She then gets
when the chain, no longer
ready to do the same with a third segmentof the box and falls noisily.
outslideschild'sthehand,supported byat once and fourteen times in succession sees
Jacqueline recommencesthethe chain come out as soon as it is put in. It is true that, around
to
about
was
and
it
of
has
tired
give
up;
tenth attempt, Jacqueline
but I placed the chain in the box (without the child's seeing how) ^andthen she regained hope by noting that such a result was not impossible.
At the sixteenth attempt, a new phenomenon: Jacqueline having
the chain no longer lengthened as
grasped the chain nearer the middle,
before at the time when the child raises it but takes the form of two
this

entwined cords. Jacqueline then understands the advantage she canand tries to make the two ends enter thetake of this newpresentation

box together (more precisely, one immediately after the other, thesecond following shortly after the first). She no longer lets the chain go
one of the ends into the box, as was the case in attempts
after
puttingoccurs when a child of
1-15, but tries to put all of it in. But, as always
considers the chain as
flexiblethis age manipulates
objects, Jacqueline

both extremities have been
being rigid and lets go the whole of it when
out
comes
then
chain
again somewhat, but Jacqueput in the box. Theline gently reintroduces the part that hangs (the middle part).
Attempt 17: Jacqueline distinctly tries to repeat the preceding
movement. At first she does not grasp the chain at one end but pulls it

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

319

together somewhat and grasps the middle part (without of course trying
to find the actual middle). Sheagain succeeds in putting both ends intogether.
Attempt 18: resumes the initial procedure and fails.

Attempt 19: rediscovers the procedure of attempts 16 and 17.
Attempt 20: same reaction, but this time Jacqueline encounterssome difficulty in putting the second end in. Not succeeding, she recommences trying to put in a single end first. But as the chain slides out,
she resumes the procedure of attempts 16, 17 and 19.
Attempts 21-22: same hesitations, with ultimate success.
Observation 173 repeated. An hour later I again present the box andchain to Jacqueline. Four interesting attempts ensue.
1.
Jacqueline grasps the chain with both hands, probably bychance. Then she examines with curiosity the shape thus obtained: thechain being grasped simultaneously at about one third and two thirdsof its length, these two ends hang parallel, about 15 20 cm. away,
while the middle part is horizontal. But then Jacqueline, instead of
putting both ends inside simultaneously by bringing them near eachother, confines herself to putting one of them in the box with great
delicacy, and lets the whole of the chain go as though this end would
draw the rest after it: the chain collapsed.
2. She now grasps the chain toward the middle and tries to put
both ends in at once. This is the procedure discovered during the preceding series and it succeeds again this time.
3. This time she begins by grasping the chain not far from one ofits ends but she corrects this movement before letting it all go. Seeingthat only a small part of the chain entered the box, she intentionallydisplaces her hand toward the middle of the chain in such a way as toacquire a better grip and to put both ends inside at the same time. But,
experiencing some difficulty in this operation (the chain spreads out
and becomes too wide) she corrects herself a second time and simultaneously invents a new procedure.
4. Seeing both parts of the chain separate, Jacqueline rolls thechain up and puts it into the box very easily.

This last procedure, which is the simplest, is only discovered after
the stage constituted by attempts 16-22 of the preceding series, byattempt 1 of the present series and finally by correction of the beginningof attempt 3. Instead of inventing all at once the procedure of "rollingup," as Lucienne will do, Jacqueline forms it progressively by combined
assimilation and accommodation.
At 1;8 (2) Jacqueline rediscovers the procedure of rolling up at theabeginning, then returns to the system of the chain hanging by

very

middle part. This last method is alone utilized at 1;9 (21) after failure
due to a regression of the initial incorrect procedure.

320

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

Observation 174. These kinds of apprenticeship can be further complicated by requiring the child to correct the position, not only of theobject to be put in, but also of the container. So it is that at 1;1 (23)
Lucienne sees me put a ring into half of a case for eyeglasses. She looks
at the object inside the case, shakes the case and lets the ring fall out.

She then tries immediately to replace it but the apprenticeship is accomplished on two occasions.
During a first phase, Lucienne tries four sequential maneuvers, allunsuccessful. (1) She first presses her three fingers holding the ringagainst the opening of the case and drops the ring. The ring falls tothe side because her fingers prevent it from entering. (2) She presses
the ring against the closed end of the case and lets it go. (3) She holds

the case upside down and puts the ring into the opening but without
the case. (4)tilting it up. The ring falls out at the first movement of
She places the ring on the floor and presses both ends of the caseagainst it, alternately, as though the ring would enter it by itself.
During a second phase, on the contrary, Lucienne learns to correct her attempts. First, she

no longer places the case on the ring as

though the latter would enter by itself. Then when she presses the ringagainst the wrong end of the case, she does not let it go but turns thecase over in order to slide it into the opening. She holds the case almost vertically and, when it is too slanting, she straightens it before
letting the ring go. Finally, she learns only to drop it inside the case by
first sliding it to the end of her fingers instead of letting it fall when

the fingers still obstruct an opening of the case.

At 1 ; 1 (24) after having disengaged the ring from her thumb aroundwhich it fell by chance, Lucienne sees me put it around a stick. She
then tries to draw it toward her without putting it along the wood. Thenshe shakes the stick and the ring falls. In order to put it around the
stick again, she simply presses it at a certain place and lets it go. Samereaction six times in succession. Then she tries to put it on at the end,

but lets it drop. That afternoon she succeeds twice in putting it on the
but she merely presses it several times against the stick. The following days both reactions subsist without excluding each other, but
the attempts to put it on the stick prevail increasingly above the others.
stick

4.

THE DISCOVERY OF NEW MEANS THROUGH

ACTIVEEXPERIMENTATION.

III.

CONCLUSIONS.

These last facts having thus completed the preceding ones, let us
try to draw from all our data a conclusion relating to the present
type of behavior patterns, beginning by trying to place them in
the general picture of intelligence.
The behavior patterns peculiar to sensorimotor intelligence

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

321

can be divided into two big groups. First there are those whose
goal is in some way imposed by the external environment. Suchare the circular relations, secondary or
which consist in
tertiary,

merely repeating or varying an interesting result obtained bychance. Such, too, are the facts of thecomprehension of signs orof exploration in which an external factor obtrudes without having been chosen and requires assimilation by the subject. These
different behavior patterns certainly constituteintelligent behavior since it is always a question of adjusting means to ends,
and whether these ends consist in repeating, understanding, orforeseeing is of little importance. But they are intelligent in different degrees. It can be said, on the whole, that an act is themore intelligent the greater the number of schemata it subsumes
and the more difficulties the latter present in intercoordinating.
Thereafter, the operation requiring the least intelligence is thatof secondary circular reaction: merely rediscovering the meansthat made it possible to obtain an interesting result. Concerningcomprehension, prevision and exploration, they are the more"intelligent" the more complex they become, and they can reacha high degree of complexity. But as these behavior patterns arein a way directed from the outside by the facts which come to thechild's attention, they do not give rise to actual inventions, thatis to say, to the most complex systematizations of which sensori-.

motor intelligence is capable at its beginnings. Moreover, thefirst comprehensions, previsions and explorations simply consist
in making an object or an event enter into one or more sequenschemata, intelligent search consisting not in coordinating
the schemata, but in appropriately choosing between them.
A second group of intelligent behavior patterns is constituted by those whose purpose is, on the contrary, due to thetialthat thissubject's spontaneous intention. It goes without saying
occasioned
distinction is relative, since intention is always
byencountering an external fact. But this fact does not here impose
itself in the capacity of an external motor of thought; it isis these projects
simply an opportunity for various projects and it
which Impose themselves on it. It goes without saying, thereafter,that obstacles arise between the intention and its realization andthat a more or less large number of means must be put to work

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

322

to remove these difficulties. It is the subordination omeans toend that constitutes the intelligent act. In such behavior patterns
the principal schema which, by assimilating the data, gives aschemata which constipurpose to the action, and the secondary
the former; a cerwith
coordinatedbecomeandtute the means
tain number of auxiliary schemata can intervene besides as thesearch goes on; the final schema is thus called upon to systematize
the ensemble of these terms in a new unit. If behavior patterns
circular reaction, the comprehenor
such assecondarytertiarysion of signs or exploration constitute the sensorimotor equivabehavior patterns of which
the morelent ofjudgment,

complex

we now speak constitute reasonings. As we have already seen, thesubordination of means to ends is, in effect, comparable to thesubordination of premises to the conclusion. This situation exof the first group enter ceaseplains why the behavior patterns
those of the second group.
intoelements
ofin thelesslycapacityThis distinction must not, however, be considered as being too
absolute; just as judgment is virtual reasoning, so also there exist
all intermediates between the two groups until the time whenan end in itself and gives rise tocomprehension even becomes
itself.
deductiveandthe same complex
steps as invention
second
this
this
last
of
group of intellipoint,
Regardlessgent behavior patterns admitsof three distinct types: the "appli-

means to new situations/' the "discovery of
means
new
through active experimentation," and the "invention
cation of familiarof new means through mental combination." In order to understand the nature of the behavior patterns of the present type it
isnecessary to analyze

them in relation to the two others: dis-a transition becovery through experimentation is essentially
new and invento
thefamiliar
tween simple application of thetion properly so called.

Two characteristics common to these varied behavior patterns should be noted here in order simultaneously to grasp thecontinuity and relative contrast of the three types under consideration. These are experimentation through directed groping,

the source of acquisition, and the application of familiar sche-mata, source of systematization. In a word, it can be said that thethe second by
firsttype is defined by the primacy of application,

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

323

the primacy of groping, and the third by the unification of thesetwo characteristics. But groping is not foreign to any of the threeterms of the series, as we shall see, and application remains essential to the second one, although dominatedby groping.
The relationship between the three types of behavior patterns therefore consists in that the subject finds himself confronted by a situation new to him and, in order to arrive at his

ends, hemust discover suitable means not immediately given.

The simplest solution in such a case, it goes without saying, consists

in searching in the stores of already acquired schemata forsome known procedure which might solve the problem. It is thisstep which constitutes the first type of behavior patterns: the"application of familiar means to new circumstances." It goes
without saying that application predominates in such a behavior
pattern. But groping is not excluded from it since it is a questionof adapting old schemata to the new situation and this adaptation presupposes, on the one hand, a search for the right schemaand an elimination of the useless schemata and, on the other
hand, an adjustment of

thissuitableschema. Consequently,

either in the course of this search or of this adjustment, the subject will be seen

to hesitate and correct himself, in short, behave

in a way which presages the second type. Moreover all the inter-mediates exist between them: Observation 122 thus furnishes us

with an example of evident groping. But as long as this groping
simply results in rediscovering a familiar procedure and adjusting it without transforming it, we remain confronted by a behavior pattern of the first type.

The behavior patterns of thesecond type begin in exactly the same way; but, after having tried
an initial means (which was discovered by the child due to theassimilatory process belonging to the "application of familiar
means to new situations"), the subject finds himself obliged todifferentiate it. It is in the course of this operation that groping

accommodation intervenes, as we have seen in connection withthe "supports/* the "string/' and the "stick": from the time when
the familiar means does not suffice to solve the problem, it isat simple
necessary to grope. This groping begins by attempts

on thisadjustment, then, gradually as the child's experiments goof the differentiation ofadjustment is transformed so that out

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

324

come new schemata, thus implying a real
a behavior pattern which is increasingly
suchBut
discovery.
thefromsimple "application of the familiar to the
distinguishednew" nevertheless conserves one of its essential characteristics.
As we have remarked ia connection with each of the examples
the initial schemata

analyzed, it is by constant application of earlier schemata to thepresent situation that groping is deserted and the events arisingduring this searching are interpreted. In short, if there is a difference between types I and II, there is nevertheless complete
continuity.

Analogous comments apply, as we shall see, to the relations
which connect types II and III. Groping, which has primacy indoes not disappear in the "invention of new means
combination" but is internalized and proceeds bymentalthroughtype

II,of representations instead of depending exclusively on
external and immediate activity. In other words, effective experi-means

mentation becomes "mental experience." On the other hand, theapplication of earlier schemata which is not absent from behavior patterns of type II (effective groping) again assumes, ininvention through mental combination, the importance it hadin behavior patterns of type I (application of the familiar to thenew). Invention thus synthesizes searching and deduction by
merely protracting the two preceding types of behavior patterns.

These remarks enable us to understand the relations between assimilation and accommodation in empirical groping.
As we have seen, it is only at the level of tertiary circular reactions

that assimilation

and accommodation begin

tobecometruly differentiated. At the time of acquisition of the first habits

through primary circular reaction, the two terms remain relatively undifferentiated. Every attempt at assimilation is simultaneously an attempt at accommodation. With the advent of
secondary circular reaction a new fact appears: interest in theexternal results of acts. This interest surely marks progress
toward differentiation, since the external result of acts, by differentiating the primitive schemata, thus compels them to incessant accommodation. But, as we have noted, this accommoda-

tion is still imposed and not yet sought after for its own sake.
The interesting act which the child tried to conserve through

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS
assimilation arises ex abrupto and, if it interests theis325

subject,itinasmuch as it is connected, by continuity or contrast, withOn

the already -existing schemata.
the contrary, with the adventof tertiary circular reaction, accommodation becomes an end in
itself which certainly protracts the earlier assimilations(thesubject only accommodates already formed schemata), but which
precedes new assimilations and so intentionally differentiates

the schemata from which

it sprang. It is then thatexperience
begins to be formed and is distinguished from simple utilizationof the real with a view to fueling the internal functioning. Hence-

forth there exists interest in the new as such. But will this differentiated accommodation be antagonistic or complementary toassimilation? Study of empirical groping in the search for anddiscovery of new means furnishes in this respect an exact answer.

Accommodation to experience and deductive assimilation henceforth alternate in a movement whose rhythm can vary but whosecyclical character attests to an increasingly close correlation between the two terms. It is, in effect, under the pressure of necessity (hence of the principal assimilatory schema) and of theschemata tried out in the capacity of initial means, that groping

accommodation goes in quest of new means and results in theformation of new schemata capable of being coordinated withthe old ones. The ''discovery of new means through active experimentation" thus marks the beginning of a union of experience and assimilatory activity, a union which "invention throughmental combination" will consecrate by raising it to the rank ofinterdependence*

However, we must not exaggerate. At the level of empirical
it may be with refergroping, this union, however remarkableence to the preceding behavior patterns, remains in a state ofpromise or outline, compared to its future developments. Primitive

accommodation to experience and complementary assimila-tion of the datum which characterize empirical groping present

the common aspect of being immediate and hence limited. "Eximmediate inperience" as practiced by sensorimotor groping, isthe sense that it considers things as they appear to be instead ofcorrecting them and elaborating them mentally. Assimilation,on the other hand, only bears upon direct perception, and notTHE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

326

on representation. These two characteristics constitute one
and the same phenomenon, only envisaged from two different

yet

points of view.

As far as representation is concerned, we have already dealt
in connection with the experiment of objects to bebrought through the bars of the playpen. Observations 167-174

with

it

wholly confirm these conclusions: At the level of groping, representation does not precede action and does not even directly reit. On the contrary, everything occurs as though theseenwere conceived as being identical to that which it apobject
in immediate perception. So it is that, in Observation
be
to
pears
173, Jacqueline, in order to put a long chain into a small box,

sult from

confines herself to putting one end of this inside, without rollingthe whole chain or foreseeing the object's flexibility and fall.

up

Despite the first fruitless efforts she recommences indefinitely andsensorimotor groping alone corrects her vision of things. So alsoin Observation 174 Lucienne, in order to put a ring in a case or

around a stick confines herself to placing the ring under the caseor against the stick. Now it is again experience, and not representation, which permits her to transcend this initial level. In
accounting for such facts one is in the habit of saying that
"optical contact" prevails over the subject's every other preoccuto understand that, if the visual seems
pation. But it is necessary

thus to predominate, this does not speak in favor of the primacy
On the contrary, it shows that the subject'sof representation.

and does not yet give rise to the mental
constructions transforming the object as it appears to be into theoptics remains immediateobject as it is. Furthermore, this transformation is effected as afunction of the motor schemata in the very course of the experi-mental groping; therefore it could not be directed by representations precisely because it consists in preparing their elaboration.

In short it can be said that, at the level of empirical groping,
representation does not yet intervene and that progressive comprehension is assured by a purely sensorimotor assimilation.

With regard to accommodation, that is tantamount to saying
the subject's experience remains immediate and consequently victim of the most naive phenomenalism. That is demonstrated not only by the primacy of the "optical contact" as wethat

TERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS

327

have just interpreted it, but also by Observations 168-170. Twocorrelative conditions are necessary to replace the universe suchas it is: the constitution of permanent objects (inserted in co-herent groups of displacements and maintaining among themselves clear causal relations) and the elimination of illusions dueto the particular point of view (by insertion of this point of viewin an objective system of laws of perspective). These two processes are interdependent: In order to constitute "objects" in asystem of spatial and causal relations, one must place oneself
among these objects and, in order thus to come out of one's own
andperspective one must elaborate a system of spatial, causal,
objective relations.

Now Observations 168-170 show us, in themost naive and concrete form, how immediate experience does
not consist in relating oneself to the object and how the constitution of the object first consists in detaching it from oneself.
in picking up
Jacqueline and Lucienne do not at first succeed
container befrom
thecontentsboxes
orremoving
rags, opening
cause unknowingly they create an obstacle to their own efforts
and because the most difficult obstacle to perceive in everythingis oneself! It can readily be seen how such facts again reveal thethe imprimacy of action over representation and consequently
mediate character of the subject's experiences as well as his assimilatory activity.
On the other hand if, during this fifth stage, representation
is not yet freed from perception, the system of signs due to thenew progress toward
growing mobility of the schemata effects
the time when the secondary schefrom
that
recallprevision.
mata begins to be coordinated (fourth stage), this mobility alto become detached from the activity itself inlows theWe

signalsorder to constitute a prevision relating to the objects themselves.
still develops during the fifth stage
for
This

prevision
capacity
toand, without resulting in actual representation, it gives rise
exearlierofbased upon generalization
practical anticipations

periences.

Here are some examples:
Observation 175.~At 1;2 (30) Jacqueline is standing in a room which is
not hers and examines the green wallpaper. Then she touches it gently
and at once looks at her fingertips. This is evidently the generalization

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

328

of schemata due to the following secondary or tertiary circular reactions:
touching food (jams, etc.) and looking at her fingers, or dipping her
fingertips

in soap

lather while

being washed and examining themafterward.

Another example. At 1;1 (23) Jacqueline, finding an orange peel,
turns it upside down on the table to make it rock. She therefore immediately foresees the signification of this object.
At 1;3 (12) she is standing in her playpen and I place a clown,
which she recently received, on the top of the frame, in different places
in sequence. Jacqueline advances laboriously along the frame but, when
she arrives in front of the clown, she grasps it very cautiously and delibehaved incately, knowing that it will fall at the slightest shake. She
this way ever since the first attempt.

One observes that, in each of these three cases, Jacqueline
foresees certain properties of the object which are independent ofaction with respect to herself. The green wallpaper is conceived as though it ought to leave colored traces, the orange peelIts

as being able to rock itself once it is placed in a suitable position

and the clown as falling down at the first touch. These previsions,like those of the fourth stage, reveal an objectification of thesignals into signs relating to the external processes themselves.

In other words, the signification of perceived objects is not onlythat they are to be grasped, shaken, swung, rubbed, etc., but thatthey are the cause of phenomena external to the action itself.
But, on the other hand, these signs are not limited, like those in
Observations 132-135, to basing prevision on sequences alreadyobserved in the same form. It would seem that there exists, in thethree cases of Observation 175, a generalization from analogous
experiences and a generalization with present groping. In short,such signs add to the characteristics of those which are based on
simple mobile schemata the advantage of the "experiment inorder to see" or of the directed groping belonging to the present
stage.

Before proceeding to the study of inventions through mental
combinations and representations, it is fitting again to rememberthat thedirected groping of active experimentation is essentiallyvicarious. As soon as this process results in the formation of new

schemata, the latter can function either in invention throughmental combination as we shall see, or in the capacity of familiar
means which apply to new circumstances. In the second case weTERTIARY CIRCULAR REACTIONS
refer to the situations studied in

329

Chapter IV: that is quite natu-

ral and amounts to saying that "familiar means" can have beenasacquired just as well through active

experimentation
throughsecondary circular reaction.
In a general way, the fact should be emphasized that the
behavior patterns characteristic of the different stages do not
succeed each other in a linear way (those of a given stage disappearing at the time when those of the following one take form)
but in the manner of the layers of a pyramid (upright or upside

down), the new behavior patterns simply being added to the oldones to complete, correct or combine with them. In this connection we can cite certain behavior patterns in the course of which
the schemata in process of formation due to the process oftertiary circular reaction are applied to new circumstances, notthrough "active experimentation" nor even through "application of familiar means to new situations/* but simply in themanner of the "procedures to make an interesting spectacle last"(studied in Chapter III, 4). Here is an example:
Observation 17 6. At 1;6(8)Jacqueline

isseatedon an adult's bed

having in front of her a big slanting quilt. I place a little wooden lambon the peak of this mountain and, striking the lower part of the quilt,
I made the animal descend several centimeters at each shake. Jacquelineat once profits from this observation and brings the animal back to hereach time I put it again on the summit of the quilt.
I then place the lamb on a table, 1 m. away from the bed, at thesame height but separated by a corridor 50 cm. wide which Jacqueline
notices; nevertheless she strikes the quilt as before while watching thelamb. I remove the latter after a moment and then put it back on thesame table; Jacqueline recommences hitting the quilt.
A quarter of an hour later I begin the experiment over again witha celluloid fish. Jacqueline makes it fall by hitting the quilt and, when
I place the fish on the table, she continues to hit the quilt. On theother hand, when I place the fish (or the lamb) on a window sill,
further away and higher up, she abandons all efforts.
At 1;6 (12) Jacqueline spontaneously engages in behavior of thesame kind but without any possible suggestion from the preceding experiment. She happens to shake a chair whose back touches the open
window. She thus indirectly makes the window move and then recommences intentionally to shake the chair while watching the window.

Then she walks in the room without seeming to think about the thing
any more. But, knocking another chair 1.50 m. away, she immediately

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

330

shakes it in the same way and looks at the window. She continues for awhile in spite of failure while attentively watching the window.

At 1;6 (20) Jacqueline brings down a watch chain from the top ofa quilt by hitting the latter. I then place the chain on a chair, 50 cm.
from the bed. She strikes the quilt three times while watching the chain
but without conviction and as though "to see if" that can yield something.

Thus it may be seen how directed groping as well as theapplication to the experiment of schemata due to tertiary circular reaction can, in situations of which the child does not under-

stand the particulars, be extended in "applications of familiar
means to new situations" and even in "procedures to make aninteresting spectacle last" reminiscent of the behavior patternsof the fourth and third stages.

In conclusion, the behavior patterns characteristic of thestage constitute a homogeneous totality: The "tertiary
circular reaction" marks the beginning of experimental behavior,

fifth

whereas the "discovery of new means through active experimentation" utilizes the method thus found by the child for the solution of new problems. As we shall see in Volume II, moreover,thismore advanced adaptationof intelligencetothe realisaccompanied by a structurization of the external environment
into permanent objects and coherent spatial relations as well as
by a correlative objectification and spatialization of causality andtime.

CHAPTER VI

THE SIXTH STAGE:The Invention of New Means ThroughMental Combinations
The ensemble
hithertoofintelligent behavior patterns studied
secondary circular reaction, application of familiar

means to new situations, tertiary circular reaction and discoveryof new means through active experimentation characterizes a

To be sure, there is progress from one type toanother behavior pattern and so one can consider the three maingroups which we have delineated in the preceding chapters as
single, big period.

forming three sequential stages (it being understood that theadvent of each new stage does not abolish in any way the behavior patterns of the preceding stages and that new behavior
patterns are simply superposed on the old ones). But the facts
remain so complicated and their sequence can be so rapid that
it would be dangerous toseparate these stages too much. On theother hand, with the behavior patterns, which we are now going
to describe, begins a new period which everyone will concur inconsidering as appearing tardily, much later than the preceding
behavior patterns.
can therefore speak of a sixth stage whichWe

does not mean that the behavior patterns hitherto under study
will disappear, but merely that they will henceforth be completed by behavior patterns of a new type: invention throughdeduction or mental combination.
This new type of behavior patterns characterizes systematic
intelligence.
is

Now it is the latter which, according to Clapar&de,

governed by awareness of relationships and no longer by em331

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

332

pirical groping. It operates, according to Kdhler, by sudden
structurizations of the perceptual field or, according to Rignano,is based on
purely mental experience. In short, all writers,
whether associationists like Rignano, believers in "structures"
like Kohler or, like Claparede, believers in a more or less directed
groping, agree that there exists an essential moment in the de-velopment of intelligence: the moment when the awareness ofrelationships is sufficiently advanced to permit a reasoned prevision, that is to say, an invention operating by simple mental
combination.

We are consequently confronted by the most delicate problem which any theory of intelligence has to treat: that of thepower of invention. Hitherto the different forms of intellectual
activity which we have had to describe have not presented parof interpretation. Either they consisted inapprenticeships during which the role of experience is evident,
ticulardifficulties

discovery consequently surpassing true invention, or else they
consisted in simple applications of the familiar to the new. In

both cases, thereafter, the mechanism of adaptation is easy to
explain and the play of assimilations and of primitive accommodations suffices to explain all the combinations. On the other
hand, as soon as real invention arises the process of thought
baffles analysis and seems to escape determinism. Will the schemata to which the preceding facts have accustomed us fail in
the task, or will the new facts which we are about to describe
appear once more to be prepared by all the functional mechanismof earlier activities?

Let us observe at the outset, in this connection, but withoutwishing to find an explanation ahead of time, that real invention
arises as a function of a sort of rhythm conditioned by the ensemble of the preceding behavior patterns. This rhythm deter-

mines the sequence of acquisitions and applications. With secondary circular reaction we are in the midst of acquisition: Newschemata are constructed through reproductive assimilation andaccommodation combined. With the application of familiar
means to new situations, these same schemata give rise to someoriginal applications (through generalizing assimilation) without
actual acquisition being involved. With tertiary circular reao

INVENTION OF NEW MEANS

333

tion and the discovery of new means through apprenticeship, weare once again in a period of apprenticeship but, in this case, thevery complexity of acquisition involves a constant interventionof all that has been acquired earlier. With invention throughmental combination we can at last speak of a new process ofapplication, for all invention presupposes a mental combinationof already elaborated schemata, but an application on a par withacquisition since there is invention and consequently there are
original combinations. Given this rhythm, invention is therefore

comparable to the "application of familiar means to new situations" since, like the latter, it operates by deduction; but thisdeduction, being creative, also partakes of the processes of acquisition hitherto under study and, oddly enough, of the discovery of new means through active experimentation.
1.

THE FACTS.

First,

hereisa series of observations

beginning with those most reminiscent of the discoveries due to
directed groping. It happens that the same problem, such as thatof the stick to be brought through the bars, can give rise to solutions through real invention as well as to solutions involving
simple experimental groping. Analysis of such cases will enable
us to see right away both the originality of the new behavior

patterns and their relationship to the preceding ones. This relative contrast of solutions can be observed either in passing fromone child to another or in the same child several months later.
Observation 777. In order to explain the difference between the present and preceding behavior patterns it can be instructive to examine
the way in which Laurent all at once discovered the use of the stickafter not having known how to utilize that instrument for several

months.
In contradistinction to Jacqueline and Lucienne whom we know
were subjected to numerous experiments during which they had opportunity to "learn" to use the stick, Laurent only manipulated it atlong intervals until the time when he knew how to use it spontaneously.
It is therefore worth while, in order to characterize that moment,
briefly to retrace the ensemble of Laurent's earlier behavior patterns
relating to the stick.
As early as 0;4 (20), that is to say, at the beginning of the third
stage, Laurent is confronted by a short stick which he assimilates to some
object.

He shakes it, rubs it against the wicker of his bassinet, draws

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

334

himself up, etc. In a general way he makes it the equivalent of the104. But, at 0;4 (21), when Laurent is holdpaper knife in Observation
strike a hanging toy and immediately
ing the stick, he happens totries to reprocontinues. But during the next hours Laurent no longer

even when 1 put the stick back into his hand,-Thisof theis not an example of the "behavior patternelementanewtohimself
momentarily inserting
stick/' Laurent confined

duce
first

in

this result

situation, the'n,an already constructed schema(theschema of striking). But thefortuitous intervention of the latter gave rise to no immediate comprehension or even experimentation. The following days I give him theof the various
stick again and try to make him associate it to the activity
weeks.
schemata. But Laurent does not react then or in the followingof theutilization
the
is
to
that
the
stick/'
say,
The "behavior pattern of
not seem able
stick in the capacity of intermediate or instrument, doeseven
to be acquired during the stage of the secondary circular reactions,when chance has favored the momentary insertion of the stick in an

already existing schema.
In the course of the fourth stage, characterized by the coordination
durof the schemata, the use of the stick makes no progress. However,to use the hand of another person as an
comes
child
the
this
stage,
ing
intermediate to act upon distant objects, thus succeeding in spatializing
the way for experimental behavior. But when,causality and preparing
it to strike
at 0;8 or even 0;9 I give Laurent the stick, he only uses
around him and not yet to displace or bring to him the objects he
,

hits.

At 1;0 (0)that is to say, well into the fifth stageand Lucienne succeeded in

(it

is

during thisthe utiliza-

discovering
stage that Jacquelinetion of the stick) Laurent manipulates a long wooden ruler for a longreactions. In the first place,time, but only arrives at the three following

he turns the stick over systematically while transferring it from one
hand to the other. Then he strikes the floor, his shoes and various obwith it. In the third place, he displaces it by pushing it gently overjects

the floor with his index finger. Several times I place, at a certain distance from the child, some attractive objective to see whether Laurent,
how to use it. But each time Laurent
already holding the stick, will know
tries to attain the object with his free hand without having the idea ofI place the stick on the floor, between theusing the stick. Other times
in order thus to provoke a visual suggestion.
theandchild,
objective
But the child does not react to that either.-There does not yet exist,
trace of the "behavior pattern of the stick/'
therefore,any

At 1;0(5),

on the other hand, Laurent is playing with a little

He is visibly surprised
the interdependence he observes between the two ends of thiscane in all directions, letting the free end
object. He displaces thestudies the coming and going of this end as
andthefloor,
drag alongchild's cane which he handles for the first time,atINVENTION OF NEW MEANS

335

function of the movements he makes with the other end. In short, hebegins to conceive of the stick as a rigid entity. But this discovery does
not lead him to that of the instrumental signification of the stick. In
effect, having by chance struck a tin box with the cane, he again
strikes, it but without the idea either of making it advance in that way
or of bringing it to him.I replace the box with various more tempting
objectives: the child's reaction remains the same.
At 1;2 (25) I give him back the stick because of his recent progress.
He has just learned to put objects on top of one another, to put theminto a cup and turn it upside down, etc.: the relationships which belong
to the level of the behavior pattern of the stick (see Vol. II). He grasps
the stick and immediately strikes the floor with it, then strikes various

objects (boxes, etc.) placed on the floor. He displaces them gently but
it does not occur to him to utilize this result
systematically. At a given

moment his stick gets caught in a rag and drags it for a few moments inthe course of its movements. But when I put various desirable objectives
50 cm. or 1 m. away from Laurent he does not utilize the virtual instrument he holds. It is apparent that, if I had repeated such experiments
at this period, Laurent, like his sisters, would have discovered the useof the stick through directed groping and apprenticeship. But I broke
off the attempt and only resumed it
during the sixth stage.
At 1;4 (5) Laurent is seated before a table and I place a bread crustin front of him, out of reach. Also, to the right of the child I place astick about 25 cm. long. At first Laurent tries to grasp the bread without

paying attention to the instrument, and then he gives up. I then put
the stick between him and the bread; it does not touch the objective but
nevertheless carries with it an undeniable visual suggestion. Laurent
again looks at the bread, without moving, looks very briefly at the
stick, then suddenly grasps it and directs it toward the bread. But hegrasped it toward the middle and not at one of its ends so that it is too
short to attain the objective. Laurent then puts it down and resumes
stretching out his hand toward the bread. Then, without spending muchtime on this movement, he takes up the stick again, this time at one ofits ends (chance or intention?), and draws the bread to him. He begins
by simply touching it, as though contact of the stick with the objective
were sufficient to set the latter in motion, but after one or two seconds
at most he pushes the crust with real intention. He displaces it gently
to the right, then draws it to him without difficulty. Two successive
attempts yield the same result.
An hour later I place a toy in front of Laurent (out of his reach)and a new stick next to him. He does not even try to catch the objectivewith his hand; he immediately grasps the stick and draws the toy to him.

Thus it may be seen how Laurent has discovered the use of the
stick almost without any groping when, during the preceding stages, heTHE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

336

handled it without understanding its usefulness. This reaction is therefore distinctly different from that of his sisters.
Observation 178.--We recall Jacqueline's gropings at 1;3 (12) whenconfronted by a stick to he brought through the bars of her playpen
to Lu(Obs. 162). Now it happens that the same problem presented
cienne at 1;1 (18) gives rise to an almost immediate solution in which
Lucienne is seated in front of the bars
invention
surpasses groping.

and I place against them, horizontally and parallel to the bars (halfway up them) the stick of Observation 162. Lucienne grasps it at the
middle and merely pulls it. Noticing her failure, she withdraws the
stick, tilts it up and brings it through easily.
I then place the stick on the floor. Instead of raising it to pull it
beforehand and presses
directly, she grasps it by the middle, tilts it up
in easily.
it. Or else she
grasps it by one end and brings it
I start all over again with a longer stick (30 cm. long). Either sheor else she
grasps it by the middle and tilts it up before pulling it,
end.
it
one
on
in
bringsby pulling
Same experiment with a stick 50 cm. long. The procedure is obviit away briefly,
ously the same but, when the stick gets caught, she pulls
then lets it go with a groan and begins over again in a better way.

The next day, at 1;1 (19), same experiments. Lucienne begins by
merely pulling (once), then tilts up the stick and so rediscovers theprocedures of the day before. At 1;2 (7) I resume the observation. This
time Lucienne tilts up the stick before it touches the bars.
It may thus be seen how these attempts are reminiscent of Jacquetaking place through groping and apprenticeship. Lucienne
begins by merely pulling the stick and repeats this once the next day.
But, in contrast to her sister's prolonged efforts, Lucienne at once
she invents rightprofits from her failure and uses a procedure which

line's,away through simple representation.
Observation 179.

The example of the watch chain to be put into an

aperture 16 x 34 mm. is more complex. Here again we remember Jacqueline's gropings (Obs. 173 and 173 repeated). But Lucienne hassolved the problem by sudden invention:
At 1;4 (0) without ever having contemplated this spectacle, Lucienne looks at the box which I bring nearer and return without her
having seen the contents. The chain spreads out on the floor and she

immediately tries to put it back into the box. She begins by simply
putting one end of the chain into the box and trying to make the rest
follow progressively. This procedure which was first tried by Jacqueline,
Lucienne finds successful the first time (the end put into the box stays
there fortuitously), but fails completely at the second and third attempts.

At the fourth attempt, Lucienne starts as before but pauses, andafter a short interval, herself places the chain on a flat surface nearby

INVENTION OF NEW MEANS

337(the experiment takes place on a shawl), rolls it up in a ball intentionally, takes the ball between three fingers and puts the whole thing

in the box.

The fifth attempt begins by a very short resumption of the firstprocedure. But Lucienne corrects herself at once and returns to thecorrect method.

Sixth attempt: immediate success.
Thus one sees the difference between the behavior patterns ofJacqueline and of Lucienne. What was, in the former, the product of along apprenticeship, was suddenly invented by the latter. Such a difference is surely a question of the level. So it is that at 2; 6(25) Jacqueline, with whom I repeat the experiment, solves the problem unhesitatingly. By grasping the chain in both hands she puts it in with herleft hand while holding the remaining part in her
right, to prevent itfrom falling. In the event that it gets caught, she corrects the movement.

Observation 180. Another mental invention, derived from a mental
combination and not only from a sensorimotor apprenticeship was thatwhich permitted Lucienne to rediscover an object inside a matchbox.

At 1;4 (0), that is to say, right after the preceding experiment, I playat hiding the chain in the same box used in Observation 179. I
begin
by opening the box as wide as possible and putting the chain into its
cover (where Lucienne herself put it, but deeper). Lucienne, who has
already practiced filling and emptying her pail and various receptacles,
then grasps the box and turns it over without hesitation. No invention
involved of course (it is the simple application of a schema, acquired
through groping) but knowledge of this behavior pattern of Lucienne
is useful for understanding what follows.
Then I put the chain inside an empty matchbox (where the matches
belong), then close the box leaving an opening of 10 mm. Lucienne
begins by turning the whole thing over, then tries to grasp the chain
through the opening. Not succeeding, she simply puts her index finger
into the slit and so succeeds in getting out a small fragment of thechain; she then pulls it until she has completely solved the problem.
isHere begins the experiment which we want to emphasize. I put
box and reduce the opening to 3 mm. It isthe chain back into theunderstood that Lucienne is not aware of the functioning of the opening and closing of the matchbox and has not seen me prepare the experiment. She only possesses the two preceding schemata: turning thebox over in order to empty it of its contents, and sliding her finger into
the slit to make the chain come out. It is of course this last procedurethat she tries first: she puts her finger inside and gropes to reach thechain, but fails completely.
pause follows during which LucienneA

manifests a very curious reaction bearing witness not only to the factthat she tries to think out the situation and to represent to herself

through mental combination the operations to be performed, but also

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

338

to the role played by imitation in the genesis o representations. Lucienne mimics the widening of the slit.
She looks at the slit with great attention; then, several times insuccession, she opens and shuts her mouth, at first slightly, then wider
and widerl Apparently Lucienne understands the existence of a cavity
subjacent to the slit and wishes to enlarge that cavity. The attempt at
representation which she thus furnishes is expressed plastically, that is
to say, due to inability to think out the situation in words or clear
visual images she uses a simple motor indication as "signifier" or symbol. Now, as the motor reaction which presents itself for filling thisrole is none other than imitation, that is to say, representation by acts,
which, doubtless earlier than any mental image, makes it possible not
only to divide into parts the spectacles seen but also to evoke and reproduce them at will. Lucienne, by opening her mouth thus expresses, oreven reflects her desire to enlarge the opening of the box. This schemaof imitation, with which she is familiar, constitutes for her the meansof thinking out the situation. There is doubtless added to it an elementof magic-phenomenalistic causality or efficacy. Just as she often uses
imitation to act upon persons and make them reproduce their interesting movements, so also it is probable that the act of opening her mouth
in front of theslit

to be enlarged implies

some underlying idea of

efficacy.

Soon after this phase of plastic reflection, Lucienne unhesitatingly
puts her finger in the slit and, instead of trying as before to reach thechain, she pulls so as to enlarge the opening. She succeeds and grasps
the chain.

During the following attempts (the slit always being 3 mm. wide),
the same procedure is immediately rediscovered. On the other hand,
Lucienne is incapable of opening the box when it is completely closed.
She gropes, throws the box on the floor, etc., but fails.
Observation 181. At 1;6 (23) for the first time Lucienne plays with adoll carriage whose handle comes to the height of her face. She rolls it

over the carpet by pushing it. When she comes against a wall, she pulls,
walking backward. But as this position is not convenient for her, shepauses and without hesitation, goes to the other side to push the carriage again. She therefore found the procedure in one attempt, apparently through analogy to other situations but without training,
apprenticeship, or chance.
In the same kind of inventions, that is to say, in the realm of
kinematic representations, the following fact should be cited. At 1;10

Lucienne tries to kneel before a stool but, by leaning against it,
pushes it further away. She then raises herself up, takes it and places it(27)

against a sofa. When it is firmly set there she leans against it and kneels

without difficulty.

INVENTION OF NEW MEANS

339

Observation 181 repeated. In the same way Jacqueline, at 1;8 (9)with a blade of grass in each hand. She stretches
out her right hand toward the knob but sees that she cannot turn it
without letting go of the grass. She puts the grass on the floor, opens
arrives at a closed door

the door, picks up the grass again and enters. But when she wants toleave the room things become complicated. She puts the grass on theand grasps the doorknob. But then she perceives that in pullingthe door toward her she will simultaneously chase away the grass which
she placed between the door and the threshold. She therefore picks it
up in order to put it outside the door's zone of movement.
floorThis ensemble of operations, which in no way comprises remarkableinvention,isnevertheless very characteristic of theintelligent

acts

founded upon representation or the awareness of relationships.
Observation 182. At 1;8 (30) Jacqueline has an ivory plate in front ofher, pierced by holes of 1-2 mm. in diameter and watches me put theremains stuck vertipoint of a pencil in one of the holes. The
pencilcally there

and Jacqueline laughs. She grasps the pencil and repeats

the operation. Then I hold out another pencil to her but with the un-

sharpened end directed toward the plate. Jacqueline grasps it but does
not turn it over and tries to introduce this end (the pencil is 5 mm. indiameter) into each of the three holes in succession. She keeps this up
for quite a while even returning to the smallest holes. On this occasion we make three kinds of observations:
1. When I return the first
pencil to Jacqueline she puts it in thehole correctly at once. When I hand it to her upside down, she turns
it over even before
making an attempt, thus revealing that she is very

capable of understanding the conditions for putting it in. On the other
hand, when I hold out the second pencil correctly directed (the pointdown) she also puts it in by the point. But if I offer it to her upside
down she does not turn it over and recommences wishing to put it inby the unsharpened end. This behavior pattern remained absolutely
constant during thirty attempts, that is to say, Jacqueline never turned
the second pencil over whereas she always directed the first one cor-

Everything happens as though the first attempts had given rise
schema which persisted in acting during the whole
series: the two pencils were accordingly conceived as being in contrast
to each other, the first being that which one puts into the hole easily
and the second that which resists. However, the pencils are of course
identical from the point of view of the facility with which they can be
put in the hole; the first is merely shorter than the second and is green
and the second is brown (both have hard, black lead).
2. Several times Jacqueline, seeing the second pencil will not go
in, tries to put it in the same hole as the first one. Hence, not only
does she try to put it in by the unsharpened end but also she wants
to put it into a hole which is already filled by the other pencil. She
rectly.

to a sensorimotor

340

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

resumed this strange procedure several times despite total failure. Thisobservation shows very well how, in a child of this age, representation ofand physicalthings is still ignorant of the most elementary mechanicallaws and so makes it possible to understand why Jacqueline so obstinately tries to put in the second pencil by the wrong end. Ignorant of
the fact that two objects cannot occupy the same small opening, there
in diameter in a
is no reason for her not to
try to put an object 5 mm.
1-2 mm. hole.
8. At about the thirtieth attempt, Jacqueline suddenly changes
methods. She turns the second pencil over as she does the first and nolonger tries a single time to put it in by the wrong end. If the seriesof these new attempts is compared with the first series, one has theimpression of a sudden understanding, as of an idea which arises andwhich, when it has suddenly appeared, definitively imposes itself. In
other words, the second pencil has suddenly been assimilated to thehasfirst. The
primitive schema (connecting the two pencils by contrast)
dissociated itself and the pencil which one did not turn over has been
assimilated to the particular schema of the pencil that one had to turnover. This kind of a process is consequently again capable of making us

understand the mechanism of invention.

The respect in which these behavior patterns are original
in relation to the preceding ones may thus be seen. The childfinds himself in a situation which is new to him, that is to say,the objects arising between his intentions and the arrival at anend demand unforeseen and particular adaptation. It is therefore necessary to find adequate means. Now these means cannot
be brought back to the procedures acquired earlier in other cir-in the "application of familiar means to new
circumstances"); it is therefore necessary to innovate. If thesecumstances(asbehavior patterns are compared to all the preceding ones, they

resemble most the "discovery of new means through active experimentation." Their functional context is exactly the same.
But, contrary to the latter, the present behavior patterns do notappear to operate by groping or apprenticeship, but by sudden
invention; that is to say, that instead of being controlled at eachof the stages and a posteriori by the facts themselves, the search-ing is controlled a priori by mental combination. Before trying
them, the child foresees which maneuvers will fail and which
will succeed. The control of the experiment therefore bears

upon the whole of this deduction and no longer, as before, upon
the details of each particular step. Moreover, the procedure con-

INVENTION OF NEW MEANS

341

ceived as being capable of succeeding is in itself new, that is tosay, it results from an original mental combination and not froma combination of movements actually executed at each stage ofthe operation.

2.

INVENTION AND REPRESENTATION. The two

essential questions raised by such behavior
patterns in relation
to the preceding ones are those of invention and representation.

Henceforth there exists invention and no longer only discovery;
there is, moreover, representation and no longer only sensorimotor groping. These two aspects of systematic intelligence areinterdependent. To invent is to combine mental, that is to say,
representative, schemata and, in order to become mental the
sensorimotor schemata must be capable of intercombining inevery way, that is to say, of being able to give rise to true inventions.

How can this transition from directed gropings to invenand from motor schema to representative schema be ex-tion,

plained? Let us begin by reestablishing the continuity between
the extremes in order subsequently to account for the differentiations.
It must be understood, with regard to the first point of view,that the contrast between directed groping and actual invention

primarily due to a difference in speed. The structuring activityof assimilation only operates step by step in the course of experi-ismental groping, so that it is not immediately visible, and one is
tempted to attribute the discoveries which result from it solely
to fortuitous contact with external facts. In invention, on thecontrary, it is so rapid that the structurization seems sudden. The

structuring assimilatory activity thus once again passes unnoticed
at first glance and one is tempted to consider the "structures" asorganizing themselves. Thereafter the contrast between the empiricism of simple groping and the intelligence of deductive

invention seems to be complete. But if one thinks about the roleof intellectual activity peculiar to combined assimilation andaccommodation, one perceives that this activity is neither absent

from empirical groping nor useless to the structuring of representations. On the contrary, it constitutes the real motor of both,

342

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

and the primary difference between the two situations stems fromthe speed at which the motor goes, a speed slowed down in thefirst case by the obstacles on the road and accelerated in thesecond case by the training acquired.

But this continuous increase of speed entails a differentiationin the very procedure of the functioning. At first cut up andvisible from the outside, it becomes regularized and seems to beinternalized by becoming rapid. In this respect, the difference
between empirical groping and invention is comparable to thatwhich separates induction from deduction. The empiricists have
tried to reduce the second to the first, thus making induction the

only genuine reasoning. Induction being, according to them, onlya passive recording of the results of experience, deduction thenbecame a sort of internal replica of this experience, a "mental
experience" as Mach and Rignano put it. In contrast to this thesisis that of a certain
logicism according to which induction anddeduction have nothing in common, the former consisting, according to the empiricists, in a catalogue of statements, and thesecond in purely formal combinations. At last came the soundlogistic analysis which showed the relationship as well as thecontrast between these two complementary processes. Both conin constructions of relationships, induction, thus involving
deduction and resting upon its constructive activity. But in thefirst, construction is ceaselessly controlled from without and so
sist

can appeal to those extralogical procedures of anticipation whichappeared to the empiricists to constitute the essence of thought,whereas in the second, construction is regulated from within,
So also, empirical groping althemechanismof invention. As we have seen,
ready presupposessolely by the play of operations.

there is no pure accommodation, but accommodation is always
directed by a play of schemata whose reorganization, if it were

spontaneous, would become identified with the constructive deduction of the present behavior patterns. But as this reorganization peculiar to accommodation is unable, when the problem
transcends the subject's level, to dispense with a continuous

external control, it always works through cumulative assimilation; that is to say, the structuring activity keeps a slow paceand only intercombines the sequential data of assimilation. In

INVENTION OF NEW MEANS

343

the present case, on the contrary, in which the question raised isaddressed to a mind sufficiently furnished with already constructed schemata so that the reorganization of these schemata
operates spontaneously, the structuring activity no longer needs

always to depend on the actual data of perception and, in theinterpretation of these data, can make a complex system of simply

evoked schemata converge. Invention is nothing other than this
rapid reorganization and representation amounts to this evocation, both thus extending the mechanisms at work in the ensemble of the preceding behavior patterns.
From this point of view let us again take up Observations
177-182, comparing them to the mechanism of empirical gropings. As before, the point of departure of these behavior patterns
consists in the impetus given by the schema assigning an end to

the action; for instance, in Observation 180, sight of the chain
matchbox sets in motion the schema of grasping. Thisin theschema of the goal immediately arouses a certain number ofschemata which the child will utilize as initial means and which
he must accommodate, that is to say, differentiate according to
the variations of the new situation. In Observation 180, Lucienne tries to turn the box over or to slide her finger into theslit in order to extract the chain. But in utilizing these schemata
the child perceives at the same time the difficulties of the present
situation. In other words, there occurs here, as in the course of
empirical groping, an encounter with the unforeseen fact which
creates an obstacle (the slit is too narrow to admit the finger).
Now in both cases, this encounter entails a new intervention ofearlier schemata. It

isdue to the latter that these unforeseen

meaning. The only difference is that, henceforth,such encounters with the obstacle no longer take place in thefacts acquirecourse of discovery (since the latter is no longer groping andconsists in -sudden invention) but beforehand, at the moment

when the first procedures tried out as hypotheses fail, and when
the problem is clarified by virtue of that very failure. In Observation 180, these auxiliary schemata which attribute a meaning to

the facts are those that permit the child to understand what theslit is that he sees before

him (= sign of a subjacent opening) and

how it is troublesome (because it is too narrow). The child often

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

344

opens and closes boxes, wants to put his hand through very
etc. Those are the schemata which confer aonthemeaningpresent situation and which at the same timesmall openings,

direct the search. They intervene, therefore, as secondary meansand hence are subordinated to the initial procedure. It is thenthat invention comes in, in the form of sudden accommodationof the ensemble of those schemata to the present situation.

How

does this accommodation work?
It consists, as always, in differentiating the preceding sche-mata according to the variations of the present situation, but
this differentiation, instead of operating through actual groping

and cumulative assimilation, results from a spontaneous assimilation, hence more rapid and operating by means of simply representative attempts. In other words, instead of exploring the slit

with his finger and groping until he has discovered the procedure

which consists in drawing to him the inner side (of the box) inorder to enlarge the opening; the child is satisfied to look at the
opening, except for experimenting no longer on it directly, but
on its symbolic substitutes. Lucienne opens and closes her mouth
while examining the slit of the box, proving that she is in the actof assimilating it and of mentally trying out the enlargement of

the slit; moreover, the analogy thus established by assimilation
between the slit perceived and other openings simply evokedleads her to foresee that pressure put on the edge of the opening
will widen it. Once the schemata have thus been spontaneously
accommodated on the plane of simple mental assimilation, Lu-cienne proceeds to act and succeeds right away.

An interpretation of this sort applies to each of our observaIn Observation 179, for example, if Lucienne rolls thechain up into a ball to put it into the box after having noted thetions.

failure of the direct method, it is because the schemata acquiredin putting the chain into a pail or a necklace into a watering can(Obs. 172) or again in squeezing materials, putting her pillow or
handkerchief in her mouth, etc., afford her sufficient assimilationof the new situation. Instead of groping she mentally combines
the operations to be performed. But this mental experience does
not consist in mnemonic evocation of already manufactured

images; it is an essentially constructive process the representation

INVENTION OF NEW MEANS
of which

is345

only a symbolic adjuvant, since genuine invention

exists and it never perceived areality identical to the one it is in
the process of elaborating. In Observations 180 and 180

repeated

there also exists spontaneousfunctioning of the schemata of displacement, by analogy, to be sure, with the experiments the child
was able to make in reality, but this analogy entails imaginationof new combinations. Finally, in Observation 182, we see how an
initial schema can be differentiated, without

progressive groping,through sudden dissociation and assimilation. 1
But how can we account for the mechanism of this sponl In order better to understand the mechanism of this assimilation which
has become deductive while remaining on the plane of sensorimotor operations, let us again analyze a case of elementary practical invention observedin an adult and consequently capable of correct introspection. While driving
an old automobile I am bothered by oil on the steering wheel which makes it

slippery. Lacking time to stop, I take out my handkerchief and dry the spots.
When putting it in my pocket I observe that it is too greasy and look for aplace to put it without soiling anything. I put it between my seat and the

one next to me, as deeply as possible in the crevice. An hour later the rain
forces me to close the windshield but the resulting heat makes me try to

open it a little. The screws being worn out, I cannot succeed; it only stays
wide open or completely shut. I try to hold the windshield slightly open withmy left hand, but my fatigue makes me think that some object could replace my hand. I look around me, but nothing is in evidence. While looking
at the windshield I have the impression that the object could be put, not at
the bottom of the windshield (one pushed it at the bottom to open it), but
by wedging it in the angle formed by the right edge of the windshield andthe vertical upright of the body of the car. I have the vague feeling of ananalogy between the solution to be found and a problem already solved before. The solution then becomes clarified. My tendency to put an object into
the corner of the windshield meets a sort of motor memory of having just a
few minutes before placed something into a crevice. I try to remember what
it was, but no definite representation comes to mind. Then suddenly, without
having time to imagine anything, I understand the solution and find myself
already in the act of searching with my hand for the hidden handkerchief.
Therefore the latter schema directed my search and directed me toward thelateral corner of the windshield when my last idea was a different one.
This trite observation demonstrates very well how a sensorimotor search
can arouse schemata previously acquired and make them function independently of internal language and clear representation. The tendency to introduce an object into a slit, in this example, is modeled exactly on a schema re-maining in an almost purely motor state, and the conjunction thus produced
suffices to insure discovery of a solution. One therefore understands how asensorimotor deduction is possible in the small child through simple practical evocation of the schemata and independently of a well-defined systemof representations.

346

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

taneous reorganization of schemata? Take, for example, the coninto a ball" in Observation
struction of the schema of"rolling

does this179, or that of "widening the slit" in Observation 180;
construction consist in a sudden structurization of representations or of the perceptual field, or is it the result of assimilatory
activities prior to invention? As we have just recalled, a certain
number of already acquired schemata direct the search at the
moment of invention without, however, any one of them con-

For example, before rolling
taining in itself the correct solution.
narrow opening, Lucienne
the
in
it
to
a
ball
the chain up intoputthematerial, (2) put the chain in a wide
has already: (1) squeezed
toinadequate openings
opening, and (3) compared large objects
the bars of her play(as when she tried to bring objects throughschemata
also
she
180
possesses the earlierpen). In Observation

we have already emphasized. The question raised is therefore tofind out how these schemata will intercoordinate in order to giverise to invention:Isitby a structuring independentof theirthem andwithout any longer depending on the ex-

to the very activity which engenderedgenesis or due
which is now pursued

ternal circumstances in which it began? One might as well ask
whether ideas organize themselves in the course of theoreticalinvention or whether they are organized as a function of implicit
judgments and of the potential intelligent activity they represent. We do not doubt that the second of these two theses is insensorimotor intelligence as well as in reflective
both cases(inmuch the most satisfying to the mind, the first only
which veils the dynamism ofconsisting in a manner of speaking
thought)

the facts with static language.

But how is this reorganization of schemata to be conceived
if it must fulfill the dual condition of extending their assimilafrom the external circumtory activity and of liberating itself
stances in which this activity began? It is due to the process of
assimilation but in so far as it is henceforth extended

reciprocal

on a plane independent of the immediate action.
Here we rediscover a remark already made in connection
with the "application of familiar means to new circumstances";
it is that, in the act of practical intelligence, means -are subordinated to ends through a coordination analogous to that of theINVENTION OF NEW MEANS

347

heterogeneous schemata in the case of intersensorial coordinations (hearing and sight, etc.), hence through reciprocal assimilation of the schemata. In other words, each schema tends to extend
the assimilatory activity that gave rise to it (just as every idea
tends to extend the judgments from which it derived), and conse-

quently applies to the ensemble of the situations which lendthemselves to it. Thereafter, when there is a watch chain to be
put into a narrow opening, the schemata presenting someanalogy to the situation and so capable of assimilating the data
will enter into activity by themselves.

We have constantly met

with examples illustrating

this process. But, until the present
time, the activity thus set in motion has always given rise to realactions, thatisto say, toof familiar means to
ings.

immediate applications ("application

new circumstances") or to empirical grop-

The novelty of the case of invention consists, on the con-trary, in thathenceforth the schemata entering into action re-main in a state of latent activity and combine with each otherbefore (and not after) their external and material application.
This is why invention seems to come from the void. The act
which suddenly arises results from a previous reciprocal assimilation instead of manifesting its vicissitudes before everyone. The
best example of this process is in footnote

1of this chapter. In-

trospection enabled us to observe clearly how the schema of thehandkerchief wedged down into a slit assimilated progressively
and mentally the schema of the object to be slid into the openingof the windshieldand vice versa,

this reciprocal

assimilation

bringing with it the invention of the correct solution. With
180 also shows this explanation
respect to Lucienne, Observation
to be well founded. The gesture of opening and closing themouth in the presence of the opening to be widened indicatessufficiently clearly

how the internal reorganization of the sche-mata works through assimilation. G. Tarde's 2 well-known formula illustrates this mechanism: Invention, Tarde said, resultsfrom the interference of independent currents of action. The
process of this interference could only be, in our language, thatof reciprocal assimilation.
In short, invention through sensorimotor deduction is
2 G. Tarde, Les lois sociales, Paris, Alcan.

348

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

nothing other than a spontaneous reorganization of earlier schemata which are accommodated by themselves to the new situation,

through reciprocal assimilation. Until the present time, that is toearlier schemata only
say, including empirical groping, thefunctioned due to real use, that is to say, by actual application
to a concretely perceived datum. So it is that in Observation 165
the bars
Jacqueline must really see that the rooster is stopped byof the playpen and she must really have noted the possibility of
backward by chance, in order that she
tilting it up when it fellmight acquire the idea of pushing it back systematically before
it in between the bars. The earlier
tilting it up and bringing
schemata thus intervene to give a meaning to these events, butthey only intervene

when a concretely perceived datum

rooster's fall, etc.) excites and makes them function.

(theOn the con-deduction, the schemata function internallywithout
requiring a series of external acts toby themselves,aliment them continually from without. It is also necessary, ofcourse, that a problem be raised by the facts themselves and that
this problem set up, in the capacity of hypothesis, the use of atrary, in preventive

sensorimotor schema serving as initial means (otherwise wewould no longer be in the realm of practical intelligence andwould already reach the plane of reflective intelligence). But,
once the goal has been set and the difficulties encountered by theuse of initial means have been perceived, the schemata of theinitial means and the auxiliary schemata
goal, those of the(evoked by awareness of the difficulties) organize themselves into
a new totality, without there being need of external groping tosupport their activity.
therefore inaccurate to speak, as does the empiric"mental experience," of a simple internalization ofoftheoryearlier actual experiences; what has been internalized is solely
It is

the knowledge acquired due to these experiences. But actual orexternal experience involves from the outset, as does simply
mental deduction, an internal assimilatory activity which forms

schemata, and it is this activity, internal from the very beginning,which henceforth functions by itself without having any further
need of external alimentation. Let us keep the term "mental

experience" to designate these primitive deductions. But this isINVENTION OF NEW MEANS

349

on condition that we remember that all
experience, including
empirical groping, presupposes a previous organization of assimilatory schemata and that contact with the facts is nothing,at any level, outside of accommodation to these schemata. The
baby who mentally combines the operations to be performed inorder to widen the slit of the matchbox is in the same situation
as the older child who nolonger needs to count apples with his
2 are 4" and who confines
fingers in order to establish that "2
himself to combining the numbers. But the latter "mental experience" would be incomprehensible if, ever since the numeration of concrete objects, an abstract
activity did not assimilate+

the realities not provided by themselves with numericalproper-Mental experience is therefore an assimilation
functioningby itself and thus becomes partly formal, in contrast to the initial
ties.

material assimilation. So also, Lucienne's deduction
pertaining
to the matchbox results from aspontaneous functioning of her
assimilatory schemata when they succeed in intercombining without any immediate perceptive content and only now
operatingthrough evocations. Deduction thus appears at its beginnings as
the direct extension of earlier mechanisms of assimilation andaccommodation, but on a plane which begins to become differentiated from direct perception and action.

Thereafter can one state, as does the theory at the opposite
extreme, that invention is due to an immediate structuring of
the perceptual field independently of any

apprenticeship and of

earlier actions? The foregoing observations do not seem to favor

any more than the thesis of "mental experience" of the pure empiricists. The defect of the empirical thesis
so radical a thesisisthat it does not explain the creative element of invention.

Bymaking all deduction the internal repetition of external gropings, it ends by negating the existence of a constructive activity,

remaining internal (at all levels) and which alone accounts forthe progressive purification of reasoning. But the theory of"structures," by emphasizing the originality of invention too

much, leads

to thesame result and, in order to account for

novelties without invoking the activity belonging to combined
assimilation and accommodation, finds itself obliged to attributethem to a structural preformation. While empirical association-

350

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

ism considered all constructive deduction as being the internal
replica of external experiences already completely organized, according to the theory of structures it is an outward projection ofinternal forms also completely prepared in advance (because they

are connected with the nervous system, with the a priori laws ofperception,etc.).

But analysis of the assimilatory activity leads

us to doubt this. If the schemata of assimilation seem to us, inthe case of Observations 177-182, to reorganize themselves spon-taneously when confronted by the problem raised by the external
environment, that does not mean at all that these schemata,however global and totalizing they may be, are identical to"structures" imposing themselves independently ofanyintel-

lectual construction. The assimilatory schema is not, in effect, an

and accommodating activity.
It is only formed by functioning and it only functions in experientity separable from assimilatory

ence. The essential is, therefore, not the schema in so far as it isa structure, but the structuring activity which gives rise to theschemata. Thereafter if, at a given moment, the schemata reorganize themselves until they bring about inventions throughmental combination, it is simply because the assimilatory activity,
trained by many months of application to the concrete data ofperception, finally functions by itself by only using representative
symbols. That does not mean at all, let us repeat, that this purification is a simple internalization of earlier experiences: Gestalt

psychology has happily emphasized this point by showing thatthe reorganization peculiar to invention creates the new. Butthat means that the reorganization is not produced by itself, as
though the schemata were endowed with a structure indepen-dently of the assimilatory activity which gave rise to them; thereorganization that characterizes invention simply extends thisactivity.

So it is that, in observing our children (Obs. 177-182)

and doubtless every time the history of the subjects examined is
known in detail, it is possible to discover which old schemata intervened in the course of invention. Invention is no less creative,
for all this, but it also presupposes a genetic process which functioned long before it.

What is now the role of representation in these first sensorimotor deductions? At first it seems vital: due to representation,

INVENTION OF NEW MEANS

351

reciprocal assimilation can remain internal instead of giving rise,from the outset, to empirical gropings. It Is therefore due torepresentation that "mental experience" succeeds actual experimentation and that assimilatory activity can beandpursuedpurified on a new plane, separate from that of immediate perception or action properly so called. That explains how Kohler,
in his research concerning animal intelligence, was led toplaceemphasis on the reorganization of the field of perception, as
though it were that reorganization which brought intellectual
invention after it, and not the reverse. 3 Representation is, inalla novelty essential to the formation of the behavior
patterns of the present stage; it differentiates these behavior patterns

effect,from those of earlier stages. As we have seen, the most complex
behavior patterns of the preceding stages, including the "discovery of new means through active experimentation/* can dispensewith representations, if one defines the latter as the evocationof absent objects. The motor anticipation peculiar to the mobile

schemata of assimilation suffices to insure the comprehension ofsigns and the coordination of means and ends, without need forperception to substitute for representation. Rolling a chain up
into a ball to put it in a narrow opening (when the subject never

had occasion to roll anything up in such circumstances), combining in advance the positions of a stick before bringing it
through bars (when the experiment is new to the child, widening a slit in advance in order to pull a hidden object out of it(when the child comesto grips with such a problem for thethat presupposes that the subject represents thedata offered to his sight otherwise than he perceives them difirsttime), allIn his mind he corrects the thing he looks at; that is to
evokes positions, displacements or perhaps even objects
hesay,
without actually contemplating them in his visual field.
But if representation accordingly constitutes an essential
rectly.

this stage, we should not, however,acquisition, characteristic of
exaggerate its scope. Representation is surely necessary for in3 This role attributed to visual representation

explanations, as revealed by the applicationsof form on the activity itself.

isnot essential to Gestalt

made by K. Lewin on the theory

352

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

vention, but it would be erroneous to consider it the only cause.

Furthermore, it can be maintained, with at least as much veri-

from invention. The dynamic process belonging to the latter precedes the organizationof images, since invention arises from spontaneous functioningof the schemata of assimilation. The truth seems to be that between invention and representation there is interaction and notsimilitude, that representation results

simply a connection. What can be the nature of this interaction?
Things are clarified as soon as, with the theory of signs, one
makes of the visual imagery peculiar to representation, a simple

symbolism serving as "signifier," and of the dynamic process peculiar to invention the signification

itself,in other words, thethus serve as symbol to invensignified. Representation would
tive activity which takes away nothing from its utility, since thesymbol is necessary for deduction, but which relieves it of theburden of the too-difficult role it is sometimes made to play of
being the motor of invention itself.
Here it is necessary to distinguish between two cases. The
first is that in which the child merely evokes a movement or an
operation already performed previously. For instance, when Lu-

cienne perceives that her stick does not enter through the bars

and that she tilts it up before trying to bring it through (Obs.
178), it is very possible that, in combining the new movements
required by the operation, she visually evokes the movements ofthe stick previously performed (either just before or during otherexperiments). In that case representation plays the role of simple visual memory and one might think that invention consists
in merely intercombining these image memories. Unfortunately

simple hypothesis, which is all on which the associationist
theory of mental experience rests, encounters serious obstacles.
this

Observation does not seem to show at all that during the firstyear of life the visual image extends action so easily. The observations described in connection with the "invention of newmeans through active experimentation" (Obs. 148-174) would
be unexplainable if visual imagery formed itself by itself as afunction of perception. How can it be explained, for example,
that in Observation 165 Jacqueline
profiting from her experiences

had so much difficulty in(impossibility of bringing theINVENTION OF NEW MEANS

353

rooster through the bars) if an adequate visual representation
allowed her to record what she sees? It seems, on the contrary,in such a case as though the apprenticeship were of a motor kindand the image did not yet extend the movement. Thereafter it
would seem difficult to interpret invention through mental combination as a simple reorganization of the perceptual field. Thatreorganization results from the organization of the movements
themselves and does not precede it. If images intervene it istherefore in the capacity of symbols accompanying the motor
process and permitting the schemata to depend on them to function by themselves, independently of immediate perception. Im-ages are not in this case elements but simply the tools of nascent

thought.

4With regard to finding out why the image does not intervene at the level of empirical groping and seems necessary for
invention through mental combination, that can be explainedin accordance with the same hypothesis. The image being a symbol, it does not merely extend movement and perception joined
together, and that is why it does not intervene in empirical groping. On the other hand, as soon as the schemata begin to function spontaneously, that is to say, outside of immediate groping
and so to combine mentally, by that very fact they confer mean5
ing on the traces left by perception, and thenceforth raise themto the rank of symbols by relation to themselves. The image soconstituted therefore becomes the signifier of which the signified
isnone other than the sensorimotor schema itself.
This leads us to the second case: when representation ac-companies invention or mental combination, it happens that the
4 See the excellent article
by I. Meyerson, on Sur les images, in Dumas,

Nouveau Traitd de Psychologic, vol. II.
8Perhaps it will be said that these traces constitute images by themselves
and that thus the image precedes invention. But, as we shall see ("The genesis
isof imitation"), perception is only extended in a representative image, thatto say only leaves a durable trace to the extent that it is revealed in imi-

and that imitation itself is internalized. Now this internalization ofimitation (of things as of persons) only occurs during the sixth stage at thetime of the conquest of the mechanism of imitation under the influence ofthe liberation of schemata in connection with the immediate action. There isan ensemble of united intellectual processes and not at all a simple seriation
going from sensation to the image as classic associationism believed.
tation354

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

child does not simply evoke the operations already performed
but combines or compares the various images in his imagination.
Observation 180, in which Luis furnishedAbygood example

cienne opens her mouth while looking at a slit to be widened
and so reveals the representative combinations she is in the proca fortiori a symess of realizing. But in such a case, the image ismouth in orderthemovements ofbol. To utilize theimaginedinto think out the operations to perform on an opening given
into a simple "signifier"perception is surely to make the image

whose signification is to be sought in the motor operation itself.
In short, the fact that invention is accompanied by representation does not speak in favor either of the associationist theof the thesis of a spontaneous
ory of mental experience or eventhe thesis maintained byreorganization of the perceptual field,
certain famous works derived from the Gestalt theory. All representation admits of two groups of elements which correspond
themto words or symbols, on the one hand, and to the concepts
theoretical representation:
selves, on the other, with regard to
Now the image is to beand
Those are thesigns

significations.

is formed
group, whereas the second groupwhose
themselves
activity engenders invenby the schemata
inventionif
tion. This shows that
presupposes representation,
the converse is true, because the system of signs could not beclassed in thefirstelaborated independently of that of significations.
The manner of this advent of the image still remains to beof the scheclarified, inasmuch as it is derived from the activity

not the place to discuss it, for an importantthe problem of imitation. If it
question must first be taken up:
mata. But

this istrue that the image does not, from the outset, accompany the
movement, an intermediate term must be able to explain theistransition from the motor to the representative and the image
must in some way be acted before being thought. This intermediate is none other than imitation. Observation 180, in which
Lucienne imitates the opening contemplated and imitates it withmovements of the mouth that is to say, with an organ not diof this transirectly perceived by sight is an excellent exampletion.

Let us postpone the problem until we can give the historyINVENTION OF NEW MEANS

355

of the motor schemata from the particular point of view of imitation.

Let us limit ourselves to concluding that the interventionof "representations" in the mechanisms of the present stage implies thatof a sixth and last type of "signifiers," that ofsymbolic

images. One recalls that, during the fourth stage, the "signals

1 'thitherto connected with the child's very movements begin to
break away from the immediate action in the form of "signs/'

permitting prevision of events independent of the activity itself(Obs. 132-135). In the course of the fifth stage, the character ofthese "signs" is again accentuated; that is to say, they allow thechild to foresee the properties of the objects themselves, thus

adapting to the mechanism of the "tertiary circular reactions"(Obs. 175). Now, the development of signs in the dual sense ofaccommodation to the things themselves and of detachment withrespect to the immediate action reaches its conclusion during thesixth stage when the schemata become capable of functioning
alone through purely mental combination. On the one hand,due to the progress of accommodation (which, as we shall statelater on, is perforce extended in imitation), the signs are modeled
increasingly upon the characteristics of things and so tend toform "images." On the other hand, due to the progressive detachment of the signs with respect to the immediate action for the
benefit of mental combination, these images are liberated fromdirect perception and become "symbolic."

One observes this dual movement in the facts of imitationand of play. Imitation characteristic of the sixth stage becomes
representative as much because the child begins to imitate new
movements by means of parts of his body invisible to him (imitation relating to head movements, etc., which leads to a representation of his own face), as because of the "deferred imitations" which presage symbolism (imitating absent persons,etc.).

On the other hand, play, during the same period, becomes symbolic inasmuch as it begins to involve the "as* if."

Now, from the point of view of meanings and of intelligencein general, the development of representations is not only predicated on the "invention of new means through mental combination" but on a series of other behavior patterns bearing wit-

356

THE INTENTIONAL SENSORIMOTOR ADAPTATIONS

ness to the existence of representative images necessary for the
evocation of absent objects. Here is one example:
Observation 183.-At 1;6 (8) Jacqueline plays with a fish, a swan and afrog which she puts in a box, takes them out again, puts them back in,etc. At a given moment, she lost the frog. She places the swan and thefish in thebox and then obviously looks for the frog. She lifts every-

thing within reach (a big cover, a rug, etc.) and (long after beginning to"frog"). It is not the
search) begins to say inine, inine (= "grenouilleword which set the search in motion, but the opposite. There was there-=of an absent object without any directly perceived
stimulus. Sight of the box in which are found only two objects out offore evocation

three provoked representation of the frog, and whether this representation preceded or accompanied the act is of little importance.

Thus may be seen the unity of the behavior patterns of thesixth stage:

Mental combination of schemata with possibility ofdeduction surpassing actual experimentation, invention, representative evocation

by image symbols, so many characteristics

marking the completion of sensorimotor intelligence and making it henceforth capable of entering the framework of language
to be transformed, with the aid of the social group, into reflective intelligence.

CONCLUSIONS'Sensorimotor" or "Practical" Intelligenceand the Theories of Intelligence
There exists a sensorimotor or practical intelligence whosefunctioning extends that of the mechanisms of a lower level:
circular reactions, reflexes and, still more profoundly, the morit seems tophogenetic activity of the organism itself. That is,
of
this
is
It
now
conclusion
main
the
us,
study.
fitting to clarify
the scope of such an interpretation by trying to supply a viewof the whole of this elementary form of intelligence.
First, let us recall the picture of the possible explanationsof the different psychobiological processes, in order to be able
to insert our description. There are at least five different waysof conceiving the operation of intelligence and they correspondto the conceptions which we have already enumerated with reand of habits (Chap.
gard to the genesis of acquired associations
II,5)and of biological structures themselves (Introduction,

3).

In the first place, one can attribute intellectual progress tothe pressure of the external environment whose characteristics
constituted independently of the subject's(conceived as being
child'swould
impress themselves little by little on theactivity)when
Lamarckism
ofaanmind. Suchapprinciple
explanation,leads to setting up habit as a priplied to hereditary structures,
mary act and to considering mechanically acquired associations
as being the source of intelligence. It is, in effect, difficult toconceive of links between environment and intelligence otherthan those of atomistic association when, like the empiricists,
one neglects intellectual activity for the benefit of the constraint
The theories which regard the environment as a totalof
things.
of totalities are obliged to admit that it is inity or a collection
357

CONCLUSIONS

358

telligence or perception which endows it with this quality (eventhe latter corresponds to dataof ourselves, whichifindependent
then implies a preestablished harmony between the "structures"of the object

and those of the subject). One does not see how,in the empirical hypothesis, the environment, were
as constituting a totality in itself, coulditregarded

impose itself on themind

not by successive fragments, that is to say, again by association. The primacy accorded to the environment therefore
bringswith it the associationist hypothesis.
if

In the second place, one can explain intelligence by intelligence itself, that is to say, presuppose the existence of an activity structured since its beginnings by merely applying itself toincreasingly rich and complex contents. Accordingly an "organic
intelligence" would exist as early as the physiological plane andwould be extended into sensorimotor intelligence and, in theend, into truly reflective intelligence. This kind of an interpretation is of course on a par with vitalism in biology. With re-gard to associations and habits, as we have already seen, it conthem derived from intelligence at its different levels andnot as primary facts. We shall call this second solution Intel-

siderslectualistic.

In the third place one can, in accordance with the a prioriconceptions, consider the progress of intelligence as being due
not only to a faculty given in a completed state but to the manifestation of a series of structures which areon perception andintelligencein

imposed from withinproportion to the needs

aroused by contact with the environment. The structures would
thus express the very contexture of the organism and its hereditary characteristics, which would nullify any reconciliation between intelligence and the associations or habits acquired un-

der the influence of the environment.

In the fourth place, intelligence can be conceived as consisting in series of attempts or gropings, inspired by needs andthe implications that result from them but selectedby the external environment (as in
biology the mutations are endogenous
but their adaptation is due to a selection after theThisevent).

pragmatic interpretation of intelligence would be intermediate
between the empiricism of the first solution and theofapriority

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

359

the third. From the point of view of the relationship between
intelligence and association based on habit it results, like thelatter, in contrasting these two types of behavior, but less radically, sinceacquired association plays an essential role in grop-ing.

Finally, in the fifth place, one can conceive of intelligenceas the development of an assimilatory activity whose functionallaws are laid

down as early as organic life and whose succes-

sive structures serving it as organs are elaborated by interaction

between itself and the external environment. Such a solution
from the first in that it does not place the accent on experience alone but on the subject's activity making this experidiffers

ence possible. It therefore allies itself principally with the threeother solutions. It is distinguished from the second one in that

does not consider intelligence as being ready made and given
from the very beginning: Intelligence elaborates itself and only
its functional laws are involved in organic organization and asitTo

the static apriority of the third solution it presents in contrast the idea of a structuring activity, without pre-similation.

formed structures, which engenders the organs of intelligence inproportion to the functioning in contact with experience. Finally, it differs from the fourth solution in that it limits the roleof chance in groping in behalf of the idea of directed searching,
this direction being explained by the continuity of the assimilatory activity, of the reflex organization and of the elaboration of

the most elementary habits to that of the most complex structures of deductive intelligence. But this continuity does notamount to reducing the higher to the lower nor to effecting theinverse reduction; it consists in a gradual construction of organs

obeying the same functional laws.

To justify the fifth interpretation, let us first examine thefour others possible, limiting ourselves to discussing them inthe light of our results.

1.

ASSOCIATIONIST EMPIRICISM.

It

seems impos-

sible to deny that environmental pressure plays an essential rolein the development of intelligence and we cannot follow Gestalt

psychology in its effort to explain invention independently ofCONCLUSIONS

360

acquired experience (3). That is why empiricism is destined toarise perpetually from its ashes and to play its useful role ofantagonist of a priori interpretations. But the whole problem is
to find out how the environment exerts its action and how thesubject records the data of experience. It is on this point thatthe facts demand departure from associationism.

permissible to invoke, in favor of empiricism, everythat
in the sequence of our stages manifests an influence
thing
It is

of the history of the behavior patterns on their present state.
The importance of the environment is only evident in an historical unfolding, when additional experiences put the individual series sufficiently in opposition to each other to make it possible to determine the role of external factors. On the contrary,

the actual pressure of things on the mind, in an act of comprehension or of invention, for example, can always be interpreted
as a function of internal qualities of perception or intellection.

Now the role of the history lived by the subject, that is to say,the action of past experiences on present experiences, has seemed
to us to be considerable in the course of the successive stages wehave studied.
As early as the first stage one notices how the use of a reflex
mechanism influences its maturation. What does this mean if notthat, from the beginning, environment exerts its action. The
use or nonuse of an hereditary arrangement of parts depends
principally on external circumstances. During the second stage
the importance of experience merely increases. On the one hand,conditioned reflexes, acquired associations and habits whose advent characterizes this period, consist in connections imposed by
the external environment. Whatever explanation one adopts
with regard to the capacity for establishing such connections(hence relatively to their formal mechanism), it is beyond doubtthat their content is empirical. On the other hand, we have ob-served that certain maturations ordinarily considered

as

de-

pending solely on internal factors, are in reality controlled, atleast partially, by the environment. So it is that coordination
between vision and prehension occurs at dates which vary between 0;3 and 0;6 according to the experience acquired by the
subject (Obs. 84-93).

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

361

The behavior pattern, whose apparition characterizes thethird stage is, it will be recalled, the secondary circular reaction.

Now, here again, no matter what interpretation one may giveto the capacity of reproducing interesting results obtained bychance, there is no doubt that the connections acquired by virtue of such behavior patterns are due to empirical comparisons.
Secondary circular reactions thus merely extend the primary reactions (to which the first habits are due). Whether acting upon
real connecthings or his own body, the subject only discovers
tions through continuous exercise whose power of repetition
as substance the data of experience as such.

presupposesWith the advent of the coordination of schemata belonging
to the fourth stage, the child's activity no longer only consists inOnerepeating or conserving but also in combining and uniting.
to the addiminish
to
the
of
role
then
experience
expectmightovantage of a priori structurizations. That is not the case. First
theirof
schematatheall,experience,always being abridgments
however refined they
reciprocal assimilations or combinations,
may be, only express an experimental reality, past or future.
Next, if these coordinations of schemata presuppose, as do thecircular reactions

and the reflexes, an activity peculiar to theas function of the action, its successes
subject, they only operateor its failures. The role of experience, far from diminishing fromthe third to the fourth stage, only increases in importance. Durthe fifth stage, the utilization of experience spreads still more,ingsince this period is characterized by the "tertiary circular reacin order to see," and the coordination oftion" or"experimentschemata extends henceforth into "discoveries of new means

through active experimentation."
one more behavior pattern to"Lastly, the sixth stage adds
the preceding ones: the invention of new means through deduction or mental combination. As with regard to the fourth stage,

one can ask oneself if experience is not thereafter held in checkprioriby the work of the mind and if new connections,the experimental relationships.
doublehenceforth
not
will
gin,

of a

ori-

This is not the case, at least with respect to the content of therelations elaborated

by thesubject.

Even in invention

itself,which apparently precedes experience, the latter plays its role

362

CONCLUSIONS

as"mental experience." Moreover invention, however freeit

may be, joins experience and, in the last analysis, subjects it to
its findings. This subjection can, it is true, sometimes assume theof immediate andharmony, whence the illusion

complete
aspectof a structure endogenous in its very content and joining the realof casesthrough preestablished harmony. But, in the majority
observed
uscontrast to the facts of the first type cited by

by

(in

W. Kohler) the harmony is only progressive and does not at all
exclude a series of indispensable corrections.

In short, at every level, experience Is necessary to the devel-

opment of intelligence. That is the fundamental fact on which
the empirical hypotheses are based and which they have theOn this question our analyses ofthe origin of the child's intelligence confirm that point of view.
But there is more in empiricism than just an affirmation of themerit of calling to attention.

role of experience: Empiricism is primarily a certain conception
and its action. On the one hand, it tends to conof

experiencesider experience as imposing itself without the subject's having
to organize it, that is to say, as impressing itself directly on thecon-organism without activity of the subject being necessary to
On the other hand, and as a result, empiricism regards
value to aexperience as existing by itself and either owing its

stitute it.

system of external ready-made "things" and of given relations
between those things (metaphysical empiricism), or consisting ina system of self-sufficient habits and associations (phenomenalism). This dual belief in the existence of an experience in itself

and in its direct pressure on the subject's mind explains, in thelast analysis,

why empiricism is necessarily associationist. Everymethod of recording experience other than association in its different forms (conditioned reflex, "associative transfer/' association of images, etc.) presupposes an intellectual activity partak-ing of the construction of the external reality perceived by the
subject.

To be sure, empiricism thus presented is nowadays only alimited doctrine. But certain famous theories of intelligence arestillvery close to it. For example, when M. Spearman describes

his three steps of intellectual progress, the "intuition of experience" (immediate apprehension of the data), the "eduction of

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE
relations/'363

and the "eduction of correlatives," he uses language

very different from that of associationism and which seems to indicate the existence of a sui generis activity of the mind. But
what comprises it, in the particular case? Immediate intuitionof experience does not surpass passive awareness of immediate
data. Concerning the "eduction" of relations or correlatives, it is

only the reading of an already completely formed reality and
one which does not clarify the particulars of the mechanism.

M. N. Isaacs, subtly continuing the ideas of Spearman, has, it istrue, recently tried to analyze this process. 1 The important thing

in experience would be "expectation," that is to say, anticipation
resulting from earlier observations and destined to be confirmed
or belied by present events. When prevision is invalidated by

the facts, the subject would yield himself to new anticipations(would form new hypotheses) and finally, in case of failure,

would return to himself to modify his method. But, either theschemata thus serving "expectation" and the control of its results only consist in a mnemonic residue of past experiences,and we fall back into an associationism whose sole progress is
to be motor and no longer only contemplative, or else they involve intellectual organization properly so called (an active
elaboration of the schemata of anticipation due to an assimilatory or constructive mechanism) and we depart from empiricism since, in this case, experience is structured by the subject

himself.

Now if we admit the necessity for experience, at all levels,and if, in particular, we can follow Isaacs in all that he affirms(if

not in everything that he negates), the facts analyzed in thisvolume seem to prohibit us from interpreting this experience inthe empiricist fashion, that is to say, as a direct contact between
things and the mind.

The first reason may seem paradoxical but, if it is carefully
weighed, it carries all the others with it. It is that the importanceof experience augments rather than diminishes in the course of
the six stages we have singled out. The child's mind advances
to the conquest of things as if the progress of experience presupi In S. Isaacs,

ledge, 1930.

The Intellectual Growth in "Young Children, London, Rout-CONCLUSIONS

364

the latter instead

posed an intelligent activity which organizesof resulting from it. In other words, contact with things is lessdirect at the beginning than at the end of the evolution envisFurthermore, it never is direct, but only tends toward beaged.

that ex-coming so. This is what we have established by showing
however exact it may beperience is only an "accommodation,"come. Now, it is the essence of empiricism, on the contrary, tothat isput the "thing" or, lacking it, the "immediate datum,"
the
at
the
of
mind,
attitudeto say, always the receptive
pointof departure of all intellectual evolution, the progress of intelliof reactions
gence simply consisting in constructing abridgments
todestined"deferred"or increasingly
reactions,dispense withdirect contact to find it only at long intervals.

Let us recall how things occur in the course of our six stages
from the point of view of this progressive accommodation withthe external environment. During the first stage there exists, ofcourse, no direct contact with experience, since activity is simply
reflex.

Accommodation to things is therefore confused with re-During the second stage, new associations are formed
But these associations
to
at
the
are limited,interconnecting two or more
beginning,of the subject to anareactionmovements of the body or else
an
That
is
external signal.
certainly
acquisition due to experidoes
not
But
this
ence.
"experience"
yet put the mind in theflex use.

and so the pressure of experience begins.

presence of the "things" themselves; it places it exactly halfway between the external environment and the body itself.

Hence' accommodation remains undissociated from the activityof repetition, the latter bearing simply on the results acquired
fortuitously instead of being due to the development of reflex
activity.

In the third stage, the acquired associations constitutebetween the things themselves and no longer only between different body movements. But these relations still remain

relationsdependent on the action, that is to say, the subject still does notexperiment; his accommodation to things remains a simple attempt at repetition, the results reproduced just being more complex than in the preceding stage. In the fourth stage, experiencecomes still closer to the "object," the coordinations between sche-mata permitting the childto establish real relations

betweenTHEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

365

things (in contrast to practical, purely phenomenalistic relationBut it is only in the fifth stage that accommodation isships).

and gives rise to true experience whichin the course of the sixth stage.

definitively liberated
still develops

The mind, then, proceeds from pure phenomenalism whose
presentations remain half-way between the body and the external
environment, to active experimentation which alone penetrates
inside things. What does this mean, if not that the child does

not undergo simple external pressure from the environment buton the contrary, to adapt himself to it? Experience, accordingly, is not reception but progressive action and construction:
tries,

This is the fundamental fact.

Now

this first reason forcorrecting the empirical interpretation entails a second one. If the "object" is notat theimposedbeginning of mental evolution but is proposed as highest goal,
would this not be because it cannot be conceived independentlyof an activity of the subject? Examination of the facts seems to
us to admit of a decisive answer: "Accommodation" by which wehave defined contact with experience is always indissociable from"assimilation" of the data to the activity of the subject himself.
Let us choose something which we, as observers, shall consider
as an "object" independent of ourselves
which doubtless meansthat we assimilate it to the mental structures of our adult mind
and let us try to find out how the child progressively adapts
himself to it.

During the first two stages, external reality can have only
one meaning: Things are only aliments for reflex use (sucking,in process of being acquired (following withetc.) or mechanisms
the glance, etc.). If, then, the subject adapts himself empiricallyto the qualities of the objective, it is only a question of accommodating to it the innate or acquired schemata to which he was

assimilated from the outset. Acquisition of schemata of the sec-

ond type necessitates assimilation. It is by trying to assimilate
the objective to an earlier schema that the child accommodates
the latter to the former (thus going back to the reflex schemata),
and it is by repeating (through "reproductive assimilation") the
movement which is successful that the subject performs this operation and constitutes the new schema. Experience cannot there-

CONCLUSIONS

366

fore be, even at the beginning, a simple contact between theof himself, since accommodasubject and a reality independentassimilation which assigns to
of
act
an
from
tion isinseparable

the objective a meaning relating to the activity itself.
that experience isDuring the third stage it may seemthe child discovers
whenFor
freed from assimilation.
example,a cord set in moin
handhisthat the movements ofgrasping
seems that such a phenomeconstitutes
non, whose sudden appearance was not anticipated,tion those of the bassinet hood,itthe prototype of pure experience. Nevertheless this spectacle
to an immediate attempt at reproduction,
gives rise, in the child,to an assimilatory reaction, accommodation simthat is tosay,

to rediscover the movements which led
ply intervening in orderto the desired result. Now this repetition would be unexplainable if, as soon as it was produced, the fortuitous phenomenon
had not been assimilated, in one of its aspects, to an earlier sche-theirmata, of which it is a differentiation. So it is that, fromearliest manifestations, themovements of the bassinet hood areas things to see, to hear, etc. (primary scheperceived, not onlyof the action of the hand (pulling themata), but as extensions

cord, etc.) or of the whole body (shaking oneself, etc.). Moreover,as soon as these first secondary reactions, through their assimila-

the formation of new

the latter

schemata,
tory activity, result in
new
the
all
turn
assimilate in theirempirical events which will
differentiate them.

The first secondary schemata, consequently,

derive from the primary schemata by a continuous assimilatory
all the later secondary schemata by differprocess and engenderfree from any assimilation.
accommodation
entiation. Never isfourththeIn the course ofstage, the coordination of sche-mata results in attempts which are confirmed or nullified by exthe result of aperience alone. But that coordination being itselfofschemata
is conaccommodation
thereciprocal assimilation,
their
from
assimilation.
Inthe course
sequently again inseparableof the fifth stage, on the other hand, accommodation tends tofree itself in order to give rise to essentially experimental behavior patterns. But with regard to these "tertiary" reactions,two circumstances suffice to demonstrate that they always pre-suppose assimilation.

On the one hand, the tertiary schemata

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

367

derive through differentiation from the secondary schemata. It
during the use of the latter that the new fact arises which pro-isvokes experimentation. Concerning the latter, it too consists ina circular reaction, that is to say, in active searching, and not inpure reception. However advanced the accommodations to which

may be, it always has assimilation itself as motor andlimited to differentiating circular reactions in the directionof conquest of the new. On the other hand, the behavior patterns
it gives riseisof "discovery of new means through active experimentation"
consist in coordinations analogous to those of the fourth stage,

but with, in addition, an adjustment to the data of experiencedue precisely to the method of the tertiary reactions. Hence thismeans that such behavior patterns are doubly dependent on assimilation. In the course of the sixth stage the same is true a fortiori, since the "mental experiences" which then appear attest
to the assimilatory power of the schemata which thus intercombine internally.

In conclusion, not only does experience become more active
and comprehensive as intelligence matures, but also the "things"
on which it proceeds can never be conceived independently of
the subject's activity. This second statement reinforces the firstand indicates that, if experience is necessary to intellectual development, it cannot be interpreted as being self-sufficient as theit. It is true that the more active
empirical theories would have
the
the
more
reality on which it bears becomes inexperience is,dependent of the self and consequently "objective." We shalldemonstrate this in Volume II in studying how the object is dissociated in proportion to intellectual progress. But, far from subthe constantiating empiricism, this phenomenon seems to us, on
the better able to characterize the true nature of experitrary,ence. It is, in effect, to the extent that the subject is active thatis objectified. Objectivity does not therefore mean

experienceof intelli-

independence in relation to the assimilatory activity
from the self and from egocentric
gence, but simply dissociation
The objectivity of experience is an achievement ofsubjectivity.

accommodation and assimilation combined, that is to say, of theintellectual activity of the subject, and not a primary datum
imposed on him from without. The role ofassimilation is con-

CONCLUSIONS

368

in importance in the course of
sequently far from diminishing
the evolution of sensorimotor intelligence, by virtue of thefact that accommodation is progressively differentiated. On theto the extent that accommodation is established ascontrary,

assimilation fills its role ofcentrifugal activity of the schemata,coordination and unification with growing vigor. The ever-inof these two functions allows
creasing complementary character
us to conclude that experience, far from freeing itself from in-inasmuch as it is organized
and animated by intelligence itself.
A third reason is added to the first two reasons to prevent
us from accepting the "empirical" explanation of intelligence:
It is that contact between the mind and things does not consist,tellectual activity, only progresses

at any level, in perceptions of simple data or in associations ofsuch unities, but always consists in apprehensions of more orless "structured" complexes. That is clear during the first stage,
since the elementary perceptions which can accompany reflex

use necessarily extend its mechanism. They are therefore organized from the outset. With regard to the second stage, we have
tried to establish that the first elementary habits and associations

are never made manifest as connections constituted later between
isolated terms, but that they result from behavior patterns whichhave been complex and structured ever since their point of dehabitual association is only formed to the extent
parture. Anthat the subject pursues a determined end and consequently attributes to the presenting data a meaning relating to this exact
end. That results from the already mentioned fact that accommodation to things always depends on an assimilation of thesestructured (the formation of a newthings to schemata alreadyschema always consists in a differentiation of the preceding schethat the connections which aremata). It goes without saying
established in the later stages (from the third to the sixth), areand tertiary
simple, since they derive from secondaryofinterassimilations
reactions and from the various reciprocal
still lessschemata. Thereafter they can lay claim still less to the quality
associations. They are always formed in the midst of toof

pure

talities

which are already organized or are in process of reor-

ganization.

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

369

Now, as we have already said, one does not very well see
how empiricism could stop being associationist. To say, as does
Hume, that spatial and temporal perceptions are from the outset"compound impressions" and to say that the order othesequence of sounds, in a musical phrase, constitutes a directly
perceived "form" is to abandon, on these points, the empiricalexplanation. To the extent that experience appears to perception
as organized from the outset, this is either because perception isitselfstructured in a corresponding way, or else because it im-poses its own structure on the matter perceived. In both cases,
contact with experience presupposes an organizing or structuring
activity, as

experience does not impress itself just as it is on thesubject's mind. It is only in the hypothesis of isolated mnemonic
traces and of associations due to mechanical repetition (to therepetition of external circumstances) that one understands that
there can be pure reception. Every hypothesis surpasses empiri-

cism and attributes to the subject a power of adaptation with allthat such a concept allows.

In short, if experience appears to be one of the conditions
necessary to the development of intelligence, study of the firststages of that development invalidates the empirical conceptionof experience.

2.

VITALISTIC INTELLECTUALISM.

If intelligence is

not a sum of traces laid down by the environment nor of associations imposed by the pressure of things, the simplest solution
consists in making it a force of organization or a faculty inherent

in the human mind and even in all animal life of whatever sort.
It is useless to recall here how such an hypothesis, abandoned

during the first phases of experimental psychology, reappears
today under the influence of preoccupations which are at thesame time biological (neovitalism) and philosophical (the revivalof Aristotelianism and of Thomism). We are not interested here
in the various historical or contemporary forms of intellectualism,
but only in the grounds for such an interpretation to the extent
that it is applicable to our results. Now it is undeniable that the
hypothesis has its merits and that the very reasons which militate

CONCLUSIONS

370

in favor of vitalism in biology are of a kind favoring intellectual-ism in the psychology of intelligence.
These reasons are at least two in number. The first stems
from the difficulty of accounting for intelligence, once it has beenachieved, by anything other than its own organization considered
as a self-sufficient totality. Intelligence in actionis,in effect,

ir-

reducible to everything that is not itself and, moreover, it apone cannot conceive one partpears as a total system of which
without bringing in all of it. From that to making intelligence a
the exprespower sui generis just as vitalism makes the organism
is only a step. Now, in speaking, as wesion of a
special force)

have done, of an "organization" of schemata and of their spontaneous "adaptation" to the environment, we have constantly
skirted this kind of explanation of totalities by themselves inwhich the vitalistic and spiritualistic interpretation consists. We
resist it inasmuch as we call neither organization nor assimilation
as soon as
forces, but only functions; we yield, on the other hand,
we substantiate those functions; that is to say, as soon as we con-ceive them as being mechanisms with a completed and permanent
structure.

Whence the arguments of the second group which are genetic
Granted that intelligence constitutes a self-explanatory
mechanism, the organization which characterizes it is immanentin the most primitive stages. Intelligence thus germinates in life
itself, either because the "organic intelligence" which is at workin kind.

on the physiological plane potentially contains the highest
realizations of abstract intelligence, or because it progressively
rouses them by conducing toward them as a necessary end.

Now

let

us not try to conceal the fact that, despite the difference invocabulary, our interpretations also lead to establishing behavior which is between the vital and the intellectual and, to thisextent, they can make use of vitalistic inspiration.

We have al-ways emphasized the profound unity of the phenomena of organization and adaptation on the morphological reflex plane ofsystematic intelligence itself. Intellectual adaptation to the external environment and the internal organization it involves

thus extend the mechanisms which one can follow from the be-ginnings of the elementary vital reactions. The creation of intelli-THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

371

gent structures is related to the elaboration of forms which characterizes life as a whole. In a general way, it is difficult not tomake the relationships between knowledge and reality the idealbalance to which all biological evolution leads because they alone

completely blend assimilation and accommodation thitherto
more or less mutually antagonistic. Nothing, therefore, would beeasier than to translate our conclusions into vitalistic language, toappeal to the hierarchy of vegetative, sensitive and rational souls
to express the functional continuity of development and to op-

pose in principle life and unorganized matter in order metaphysically to justify the activity of the intelligent subject.
But if vitalism has the merit, unceasingly renewed, of undersolulining the difficulties or above all the gaps in the positive
tions, it is only too clear that its own explanations reveal the

disadvantages of their simplicity and their realism; that is to say,they are always threatened by the progress of biological analysis
as well as by that of the reflection of intelligence on itself.

Now

our ambition being precisely to make the dual light of the bio-and the critique of knowledge converge on
logical explanation
the development of reason, it would be paradoxical if that union
were to result in a reinforcement of the vitalistic thesis. In reality,
three essential divergences distinguish the description we haveadopted from the system we are now examining:

The first per-tains to the realism of intelligence as a faculty, the second to thatof organization as a vital force,and the third to the realism ofadaptive knowledge.
In the first place, it is of the essence of vitalistic intellectualism to consider intelligence a faculty, that is to say, a mechanism

an essential
complete in its structure and its operation. Now,
If
thisconnection.
inobtrudesdistinction
epistemological analybears upon scientific knowlsis, whether it is simply reflexive or
intellection an irreducible act, inedge, results in considering
inasmuchathe latter case it is only
question of knowledge itself,
as it is obedient to the ideal norms of truth and translates itself

in thought in theform of different states of consciousness sui

generis. But from this intimate experienceof intellection nothingcan be drawn concerning factual conditions, that is to say, psychoof the intellectual mechanism: proof
logical and biological ones,

CONCLUSIONS

372
that,

without speaking of metaphysical theories of knowledge,
is far from being realized, in the scientific field, between

harmony

the various logical-mathematical analyses of rational truth, between the multiple theories of the psychology of intelligence, nor

a fortiori between these two groups of research. Now, intellectualism claims to draw from the fact of intellection the conclusionthat there exists a psychic faculty which is easy to know, which
would be intelligence itself. It is therefore not intellection as

such that this doctrine posits as irreducible, it is a certain reification of that act in the form of a given mechanism in the completely formed state.

Now, it is from this point on that we can no longer follow.
From the fact that the living being achieves knowledge and thatthe child is one day destined to master science, we certainly believe the conclusion must be drawn that there is a continuum
between life and intelligence. Furthermore we infer, from the factthat the most complex operations of logical thought seem prepared from the time of the elementary sensorimotor reactions,that this continuum can be already observed in the transition
from the reflex to the first acquired adaptations and from thelatter to

the simplest manifestations of practical intelligence.

But the entire question remains of finding out what is permanentin the course of this evolution and what remains characteristicof each level under consideration.
The solution to which our observations lead is that only thefunctions of the intellect (in contradistinction to the structures)are common to the different stages and consequently serve as

connecting link between the life of the organism and that of theintelligence. So it is that at every level the subject assimilates theenvironment, that is to say, incorporates it to the schemata while

maintaining the latter through this use and by means of a constant generalization. At every level accommodation is hence
simultaneously accommodation of the organism to objects andassimilation of objects to the organism's activity. At each levelaccompanied by a search for coherence which
diversity of experience by intercoordinating theschemata. In short, there exists an operation common to allstages of sensorimotor development and of which the operation
this adaptation is

unifiestheTHEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE
of logical intelligence seems to373

be the extension (the formal

mechanism of concepts and relationships extending the organization of the schemata and adaptation to experience following accommodation to the environment). Moreover, this sensorimotor
operation in turn extends that of the organism, the working ofschemata being functionally comparable to that of the organs,whose "form" results from an interaction of the environment andthe organism.

But it is apparent that one could not draw from this permanence of functioning the proof of the existence of an identity ofstructures. The fact that the working of reflexes, of circular reac-mobile schemata, etc., is identical to that of the logicaloperations does not prove at all that concepts are sensorimotor
schemata nor that the latter are reflex schemata. It is therefore
tions,

necessary, beside the functions, to make allowance for the structures and admit that the most varied organs can correspond to

the same function. The psychological problem of intelligence isjust that of the formation of those structures or organs and thesolution of this problem is in no way prejudiced by the fact that

one acknowledges a permanence of the functioning. This permanence does not at all presuppose the existence of a ready-made"faculty" transcending genetic causality.
Could one not, however, raise the objection that a perma-

nence of functions necessarily implies the idea of a constantmechanism, of a "function" conserving itself, in short, whether
one likes it or not, of a "faculty" of invariant structure? So it isthat, in current psychological parlance, theword "function" issometimes used as a synonym for "faculty," and under cover ofthis terminology is hidden a virtual collection of entities. Memory,
attention, intelligence, will, etc., are thus too often called "functions" in a sense which hardly has anything "functional" in It

any longer and which tends to become structural or pseudoanatomical (as though one said "the circulation" no longer
thinking of the function but only of the assemblage of organs into concede thevolved). That being the case, have we the rightexistence of a permanent intellectual function without recogthe comparinizing the existence of an intelligence faculty? Heresons with biology seem decisive. There are functions whose abso-

CONCLUSIONS

374

lute invariability is accompanied by considerable structuralvariations from one group to the other (nutrition, for instance).
and general funcIt can even be said that the mostimportant

tions by means of which one can try to define life (organization,

assimilation in the wide sense of the word, etc.) do not correspondto any particular organ but have as their structural instrument

the whole organism. The permanency of these functions is on awith a still greater variability of the organ. Consequently, toparassert that a permanent intellectual function exists

isin no way

to prejudge the existence of an invariable structural mechanism.
to thePerhaps it exists, just as a circulatory system is necessary
circulation. But perhaps also intelligence is confused with thewhole of behavior2 or with one of its general aspects without
there being need of isolating it in the form of a particular organ
and conservation. Moreover, if it characendowed withpowersbehavior as a whole, it is not therefore necessary tocall it a faculty or the emanation of a substantial soul, for theterizes thesame reasons.
isBiological realism to which the vitalistic interpretation refers
exactly parallel to intellectualistic realism which we have re-functions may
jected; just as the permanency of intellectual
seem to imply the existence of an intelligence faculty, so also thefact of vital organization leads

improperly to the hypothesis of

a "force" of organization. The vitalistic solution is the same inboth cases. From the function one proceeds to the structural interpretation and thus one "realizes" the functional totality in theform of a single and simple cause. Now, with respect to this sec-

ond point too, we are unable to follow vitalism. From the factthat the organization of the living being implies a power of adaptation which leads to intelligence itself, it does not follow at allthat these various functions are unexplainable and irreducible.

But the problems of organization and of adaptation (includingthat of assimilation) surpass psychology and presuppose a biological interpretation of the whole.

These first two expressions of vitalistic realism lead to arealism of adaptation itself, in relation to which the contrast
2 H. Pteron,
Psychologic Experimental, Paris, 1927, pp. 204-208.

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

375

between the results of our studies and the system ofinterpretation we are now examining seems to us still more marked. Inas-much as it considers life as irreducible to matter, and intelligence
as a faculty inherent in life, vitalism conceives
knowledge asanadaptation sui generis of that faculty to an object given independently of the subject. In other words, this adaptation, whileremaining mysterious because of these very contrasts, is reducedin fact to what common sense has

always envisaged as being of
the essence of knowledge: a
simple copy of things. Intelligence,
we are told, tends to conform to the object and possess it due to asort of mental identification; it "becomes theobject" in thought.

Thus vitalism always joins empiricism on the field of knowledge
as such with thisfaint difference that, from our present
point ofview, intelligence subordinates itself to the thing instead of being

subordinated to it from without. There is voluntary imitationand not simple reception.
But that epistemological realism, it seems to us, clashes withthe fundamental fact we have emphasized in the course of ourintellectual and biological,
analyses. That is, that adaptation
hence adaptation of intelligence to "things" as well as of theorganism to its "environment" always consists in a balance between accommodation and assimilation. In other words, knowledge could not be a copy, since it is always a putting into relationship of object and subject, an incorporation of the object tothe schemata which are due to activity itself and which simply

accommodate themselves to it while making it comprehensible
to the subject. To put it still differently, the object only exists,
with regard to knowledge, in its relations with the subject and, if

the mind always advances more toward the conquest of things,

because it organizes experience more and more actively,
instead of mimicking, from without, a ready-made reality. The
this isobject is not a "known quantity" but the result of a construction.
Now this interaction of intelligent activity and experiencefinds its counterpart, on the biological plane, in a necessary inter-action between the organism and the environment. To the extent
that one refuses to explain life, as does vitalism, by a force sui

generis of organization, one is obliged to consider living beings
simultaneously as being conditioned by the physicochemical uni-CONCLUSIONS

376

verse and as resisting it by assimilating it. Consequently there is
between the organism and the entire universe,interdependence
on the one hand, objectively, because the former results from thelatter while completing and transforming it, on the other hand,because the adaptation of the mind to experience
subjectively,

presupposes an activity which enters

as a component into the playof objective relationships.
esses
all

In short, the biological interpretation of intellectual procbased upon the analysis of assimilation does not result atin the epistemological realism of vitalistic intellectualism.

Even by making knowledge a singular case of organic adaptation
one ends, on the contrary, with the conclusion that true reality isneither an organism isolated in its entelechy, nor an external
environment capable of subsisting if one abstracts life andensemble of the mutual
thought from it. Concrete reality is the
the
and
the
environmentoforganism, that is to say,relationships
the system of interactions which unify them. Once those relationcan try to elucidate them either byships have been posited, one
the biological method starting with a ready-made environment
to try to explain the organism and its properties, or by the psychological method, startingwith mental development to try to findout how environment is constituted for the intelligence. Now, if
in a balance between
adaptation does consist, as we have asserted,accommodation of the schemata to things and the assimilation ofthat these two methods
things to the schemata, it is self-evident
are complementary: but provided one no longer believes in readyor a vital force independent of the environmade
intelligence

ment.
3.

APRIORITY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FORM.

development results neither from constraint
exerted by the external environment nor from the progressive
If intellectual

affirmation of a ready-made faculty forknowing that environ-ment, perhaps it should be conceived as being the gradual explanation of a series of preformed structures in the psychophysiological constitution of the subject himself.
Such a solution obtrudes in the history of philosophicaltheories of knowledge when, disappointed by both English em-

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

377

and classical intellectualism (and above all by the Wolffpiricism
ian theory of the rational faculty), Kantianism resorts to the apriori hypothesis to explain the possibility of science. In biology,
moreover, apriority arose when the difficulties related to the
problem of heredity of acquired characteristics led it to reject
Lamarckian empiricism. Some people tried to return to vitalism,
whereas others tried to account for evolution and adaptation by
the hypothesis of the preformation of genes. Finally, in thea solution of the same kind took the place of
psychological field,
associationist empiricism and intellectual vitalism. It consists ina renewed andexplaining every invention of intelligence byfield
orof the system ofoftheperceptual
endogenous structuringwhich
thus succeed
structures
Theandrelationships.
concepts

each other always constitute totalities; that is to say, they cannot
be reduced to associations or combinations or empirical origin.

Moreover, the Gestalt theory to which we allude, appeals to no
As these "forms" spring
faculty or vital force or organization.
a formative faculty,
fromnorthemselves
thefromneitherthingsas having their root in the nervous system or,conceivedaretheyin a general way, in the preformed structure of the organism. In
this regard we can consider such a solution "a priori" Doubtless,in most cases, the Gestalt psychologists do not clarify the originof the structures and confine themselves to saying that they arein a given situation. This
necessarily imposed on the subject
doctrine is reminiscent of a sort of Platonism of perception. But,
as Gestalt psychology always returns to the psycho-physiologicalhimself when it is a question of exconstitution of thesubject

for forms, such an interpretation certainly
plaining this necessity
consists in a biological apriority or a variety of preformation.

Now, the theory of form, far from confining itself to theenunciation of general principles, has furnished a series of funda-

mental works for understanding the mechanism of intelligence:
those of Wertheimer on the psychological nature of the syllogism,of Kohler on intelligence and invention, of K. Lewin on the"field" theory, etc. These studies all result in explaining bystructures of the field of conception or perception what we attribute to assimilation. It is therefore essential to compare closely
this

we have used andsystem of explanation with that which

378

CONCLUSIONS

to interpret
even, in order the better to conclude this comparison,at least two essential points
our results in terms of "Gestalt."On

we agree with the "theory of form/'
In the first place, it is quite true that every intelligent solution and even every behavior pattern in which the comprehension
situation intervenes (however wide the meaning atof agiven
tributed to the word "comprehension") appear as totalities andnot as associations or syntheses of isolated elements. In thiswhose existence we have always acknowlbe
cancompared to a "form" or "Gestalt." The system,
edged
and completed movements and percepof
determinedcomposedof being structured (hence ofcharacterthedual
reveals
tions,
respect the "schema"andstructuring the field of perception or comprehension)of constituting itself from the outset inasmuch as it is a totality

itselfwithout resulting from an association or synthesis between elements separated earlier. Without speaking of the reflex schemata
which are the more totalized and structured since they were already assembled at birth, one can observe thesedue to the primaryearly as the first nonhereditary schemata,characteristics as

The simplest habits, as well as the so-called
do not result from true associations, that"associations"acquiredcircular reactions.

is to say, interuniting the terms given as such, but also result

fromconnections implying a structured totality from the outset. Only
the global signification of the act (the place of assimilation whichconnects the result to the need to be satisfied) insures, in effect,the existence of relations which, from the outside may seem to be"associations." The "secondary schemata," moreover, also always
constitute systems of the whole analogous to "Gestalts." It isonly to the extent that a child tries to reconstruct a spectacle
which he has just witnessed or created that he connects one move-

ment with another. Perceptions and movements are hence only
associated if their significations are already related to each otherand if this system of mutual relations itself implies a meaning of
the whole given in the initial perception. With regard to the coordinations between schemata characteristic of the fourth stage,

one could not consider them associations either. Not only do thework by reciprocal assimilation that is to say,
due to a process which stems more from global reorganization
coordinations

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE
than from simple association

but also379

this reorganization rerevealing all thesults at once in the formation of a new schema

characteristics of a new and original

totality.

With the "experi-ments in order to see" and the acts of intelligence which flowfrom them (fifth stage) we are surely outside the realm of pure
"Gestalt." But the theory of form has never claimed tosuppress
the existence of groping searching; it has only tried to remove itfrom the realm of actually intelligent behavior patterns in order
to consider it a substitute forstructuring and place it in theintermediate periods between two structures. At the sixth stage
we again find, on the contrary, authentic "structures." The invention of new means through mental combination manifests all thecharacteristics of these rapid or even instantaneous
regroupings
by means of which Kohler has described the true act of intelli-gence.

Taken as a whole, except with regard to groping whose role
but is revealed particularly during the first
behavior
the schemata whose
patterns (fifth stage)
experimental
existence we have recognized manifest the essence of the characis

really constantteristics of a structured totality by means of which the theory ofform opposed the "Gestalts" to classic associations.
A second point of convergence between the two systems ofinterpretations is the rejection of every faculty or special force
of organization. W. Kohler emphasizes the fact that his criticism
of associationism frequently rejoins analogous objections alreadyformulated by vitalism. But, he adds, with reason, one cannot
deduce from this agreement that the "forms" are to be interpreted as the product of a special energy of organization; Vitalism too quickly reaches the conclusion that totalities exist
from the hypothesis of a vital principle of unification. We therefore sympathize completely with the effort of Gestalt psychology
to find the roots of intellectual structures in the biological processes conceived as systems of relationships and not as the expression of substantial forces.

Having thus defined these common traits, we find ourselvesmore free to show how the hypothesis of assimilation tries tosurpass the theory of forms and not to contradict it, and how the"schema" is a "Gestalt" made dynamic and not a concept destined

CONCLUSIONS

380

to react against the progress of the Gestalt movement. To resume

our comparison between the theory of form and epistemologicalmanifests theapriority, the "Gestalt"

same advantages over as-sociation as were formerly made manifest

by Kantian apriority

over classical empiricism, but only to arrive at parallel difficul-

having conquered static realism without, apriority finds it
again within the mind and runs the risk, in the last analysis, ofending in a restored empiricism. In effect, the theory of form,
like former epistemological apriority, wanted to defend the internal activity of perception and intelligence against the mechaties:

nism of external associations. It has therefore located the prinand not outside us, and, theciple of organization in ourselvesbetter to shelter it from empirical experience, it rooted it in the
preformed structure of our nervous system and our psycho-physiothus to guarantee the internal
immixtures of the external

logical organism. But, by trying
activity of organization against theenvironment, it finally withdrew it from our personal power. It
conceived as preconsequently enclosed it in a static formalism
deliberate intenof
ouroutsideelaborated
or
as
being
existing
tion.

This formalism certainly marks great progress oversociationism because
totalities

it

as-

predicates the existence of syntheses orinstead of remaining atomistic, butitisprecariousthat "forms," like the categories of yore,progress. To the extent

antecede our intentional activity, they revert to the rank of inert

mechanisms. That is why, in the theory of form, intelligence ends

by disappearing to the advantage of perception, and the latter,conceived as being determined by ready-made internal structuresthat is to say, consequently as preformed from within ends bybecoming more and more confused with "empirical" perception,
conceived as preformed from without: In both cases, in effect, theactivity disappears to the advantage of the elaborated whole.

Our critique of the theory of form must therefore consist
in retaining all that is positive which it opposes to association-

ism

that is to say, all the activity it discovers in the mind

but

in rejecting everything in it which is only restored empiricism
that

is

to say,psychology

isits static

apriority.

In short, to criticize Gestalt

not to reject it but to make it more mobile andconsequently to replace its apriority with a genetic relativity.

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

381

The analysis of a primary divergence will permit us todefine these positions from the outset.
"Gestalt" has no history

Abecausedoes not account for earlier experience, whereas aschema embodies the past and so always consists in an active
itorganization of the experience lived. Now this point is fundamental: the analysis of three children, almost all of whose reactions were observed, from birth to the acquisition of speech, hasconvinced us of the impossibility of detaching any behavior pattern whatever from the historical context of which it is a part,
whereas the hypothesis of "form" makes the history useless andthe Gestalt psychologists deny the influence of acquired experi-ence on the solution of new problems. 3

So it is, to begin at the end, that we have never, even during
the sixth stage, observed "intelligent" reorganizations, even unforeseen and sudden ones, unless the invention or mental combination which determined them was prepared, however little, by
earlier experience.

With regard to the theory of form, on thecontrary, an invention (like that of the ladder of boxes made by
Kohler's chimpanzees) consists in a new structuring of the per-ceptual field, which nothing in the subject's past can explain:
whence the hypothesis according to which this structure would
come solely from a certain degree of maturation of the nervous
system or the organs of perception so that nothing from without,that is, no present or past experience, would cause its formation(present experience is confined to starting or necessitating structuring, but without explaining it). True, some of our observationsof the sixth stage seem at first to corroborate this outlook. Thus

Jacqueline and Laurent gradually discovered the use of theLaurent, whom we let go muchwithouthim
inthesame situation, understood at
longerputtingifstick due to empirical groping,once the signification of that instrument. Everything occurs as
though a structure not yet mature in the case of the two former

were imposed ready-made on Laurent's perception. So also Lucienne immediately found the solution to the problem of thewatch chain, whereas Jacqueline groped laboriously. But before
3 See
Claparede, La Genese de 1'hypothese, Archives de PsychoL, XXIV,
the summary (pp. 53-58) of the works of K. Duncker and N. R. F. Maier, intended to demonstrate the uselessness of acquired experience.

CONCLUSIONS

382

concluding that there is radical novelty in such mental combinations, and consequently before having recourse, in order to exno
plain them, to the emergence of endogenous structures havingroot in the individual's past experience, it is necessary to maketwo remarks. The first is that, in default of external groping one
cannot exclude the possibility of a "mental experience" which
would occupy the moments of reflection immediately preceding
the act itself. The most sudden inventions which we can introof search or internal
spect always reveal at least a beginning
and
ideas
of
which
outsideperceptions cannot regroupgropingthemselves all alone. It goes without saying and we have emphais not simply the passive ex-

sized that this "mental experience"tension of states lived through earlier

and that it consists, likeactual experience, in real action. But the fact remains that, even

without visible groping from the outside, the subject's thought
can always yield internally to experimental combinations, however rapid. Sudden reorganization can therefore be conceived
as an extreme case of mental combination. Now, and this second

remark is essential, these mental experiences, even if the known
are entirely new, can always apply toquantities of the problem
the present situation earlier schemata utilized in more or lessanalogous cases, whether these schemata merely apply to somethe method to be folaspect of this situation or simply inspire
lowed in order to solve the problem. Thus, if Lucienne neverrolled up a watch chain in order to put it in a small opening,
she was able to execute similar movements when rolling up pieces
of material, cords, etc. So also Laurent, without everutilized the stick,ishavingable to apply to the new situation the sche-mata drawn from the use of other intermediates ("supports,"
strings, etc.). Between simple prehension and the idea that one
solid can cause displacement of another is found a series of imperceptible transitions.
The idea is therefore conceived that the sudden inventions
characteristic of the sixth stage are in reality the product of a longevolution of schemata and not only of an internal maturation ofperceptive structures (the existence of the latter factor having ofcourse to be reserved). This is revealed by the existence of a fifth
stage,

characterized by experimental groping

and situated be-

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

383

tween the fourth (coordination o schemata) and the sixth (mental combinations). If, with respect to the theory of form, groping
search constitutes an activity In the margin of the maturation of
structures and without influence on what maturation, we, on theother hand, believe we have established that the sudden invention of new structures, which characterizes the sixth stage, only
appears after a phase of experimentation or of "tertiary circular
reaction/' What does this mean if not that the practice of actual
experience is necessary in order to acquire the practice of mental
experience and that invention does not arise entirely preformed
despite appearances?
Furthermore, the entire sequence of stages, from the firstto the two last, is there to attest to the reality of the evolution ofschemata and consequently to the role of experience and of history. A complete continuity exists between the behavior patterns
characteristic of the different stages. The primary circular reactions thus prolong the activity of the reflex schemata by systematically extending their sphere of application. The secondary circular reactions, moreover, derive from the primary reactions to theextent that every discovery historically entails a series of others.

Thus coordination between vision and prehension induces thechild to grasp the objects which hang from the hood of his bassinet and the manipulation of these objects leads him to act upon
the hood itself, etc. Thereafter, once the secondary schemata havebeen formed as function of the historical development of thecircular reactions, a coordination of schemata is established during the fourth stage, which itself results from earlier activities.
The act of pushing back the obstacle, for example, coordinates
the cycles of prehension with the schemata such as striking, etc.,
and it has seemed to us impossible to explain the advent of such
coordinations without knowing the subject's past, in each particular case.

Concerning the discovery of new means throughactive experimentation (fifth stage), it constitutes a coordinationof schemata extending that of the preceding stage, with only thisdifference that the coordination no longer occurs in an immediate

way but necessitates a more or less laborious readjustment,that is to say, an experimental groping.

Now this groping is itself

CONCLUSIONS

384

prepared by the exploratory behavior patterns

inherent inas-similation by mobile schemata.

In short, the new behavior patterns whose appearance marks
each stage are always revealed as developing those of the precedof this same fact.
ing stages. But two interpretations can be given
One could see in it, first of all, the expression of a purely internalmaturation, such as that the formal structure of perceptions andof acts of intelligence develops by itself without use as a functionof experience or transmission of the contents from one stage toanother. One can, on the contrary, conceive of this transformation
due to an historical evolution such as that the use of the
as

being
schemata is necessary to their structuring and that the result of
their activity is thus transmitted from one period to the other.
alone seems reconcilable with
Now this second
interpretation
the particulars of the individual facts. In comparing the progressof intelligence in three children, day after day, one sees how eachnew behavior pattern is formed by differentiation and adaptationof the preceding ones. One can follow the particular history ofeach schema through the successive stages of development, as theformation of structures cannot be dissociated from the historicaldevelopment of experience.
The schema is therefore a Gestalt which has a history. But
how does it happen that the theory of form came to dispute thisrole of past experience? From the fact that one refuses to consider the schemata of behavior as

being the simple product ofexternal pressures (like a sum of passive associations) it clearly
does not necessarily follow that their structure is imposed byvirtue of preestablished laws, independent of their history. It is
an interaction of form and content, thetoenoughacknowledge

structures thus being transformed gradually as they adapt themselves to increasingly varied conditions.

For what subtle reasons

do writers as informed as the Gestalt psychologists reject an interaction which seems so obvious?

A second divergence should be noted here: A "schema" isapplied to the diversity of the external environment and hence
generalized as a function o the contents it subsumes, whereas

isa "Gestalt" is not generalized and even is "applied" less than itisimposed in an immediate way and internally to the situation

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

385

perceived. The schema, as it appeared to us, constitutes a sort ofsensorimotor concept or, more broadly, the motor equivalent ofa system of relations and classes. The history and development ofa schema therefore consist primarily in its generalization, throughapplication to increasingly varied circumstances. Now a "Gestalt"
manifests itself quite differently. Take two objects, for example

an objective and its "support" at first perceived without interrelationships, then suddenly "structured"; and let us say that the
subject, after having "understood" the connection which links
them, subsequently understands a series of analogous relations.
In order to explain this, the theory of form does not maintaineither that the "Gestalt" which intervenes here is generalized, oreven that it is "applied" successively to various objects. If perception, at first not structured, suddenly acquires a "form," thisis because at any degree of maturation whatever it is impossible
for the subject to see things differently, given the ensemble of thesituation. The "form" thus constitutes a sort of ideal necessity or
immanent law which is imposed on perception, and when the
Gestalt psychologists describe the thing from the phenomenological point of view, they speak of this form as Platonists speak of an"idea" or logicians of a "subsistent" being: The Gestalt is simply
established by virtue of its "pregnance." When the same writers

speak as physiologists, they add that this internal value is related
to the subject's nervous constitution. In both cases it is always aquestion of an immediate necessity which can be renewed at thetime of each perception but which does not require the existenceof a generalizing schematism. This is what the Gestalt psycholo-

by invoking the Einsicht or the total compreaccording to the variations of the goal4
andby specifically stating, as does Duncker, that
pursued"reasoning is a battle which creates its own weapons." If we saygists again express

hension whicharisesthat the theory ofform constitutes a sort of apriority,

this issimply because, according to this doctrine, structuring resultsfrom an intrinsic necessity and not at all from experience, and isthus connected with the conditions of the subject himself; thecriterion of the "a priori" has always been necessity as such. The"Gestalten" do not therefore consist in mobile frames successively
4

Quoted by Claparede (above-mentioned article), p. 53.

CONCLUSIONS

386

applied to various contents: structuringissimply a predeterminedto say, obtruding necessarily, sooner or later, andprocess, that isthereafter this process can repeat itself every time the situation
demands, but without involving the activity of schemata supof generalization.
plied with a history and capable
does genetic observation determine the choice between

Howapparent
necessary preformation and generalizing activity?
to the structures,aattributes
one
that
extentthetohistorythat,to admit an element of generalization, that is to
one isItisobligedsay, one is led

to detach the structures from structured situations

to make active schemata of them which are due to a structuring
as the use of hereditary reflexes, one has
assimilation. As

nearlythe impression that the subject searches for aliments for his acand that thus the latter is generalizing: so it is that thetivitynumber of given situations.
baby sucks, looks, listens in a growing
But if, during this first period, just as during that of the primarycircular reactions, it is difficult to dissociate active generalizationfrom simple structuring, the contrast becomes striking from thethird stage on, that is to say, with the advent of the secondary
circular reactions. From the moment when the child truly acts

upon the external world eachof his conquests gives rise, notbut also to a generalization which
only to immediate repetition,
obvious. Thus after having grasped a cordis henceforthvery

hanging from his bassinet hoodand having by chance discovered

the results of this traction, the child applies this behavior to all
Now it is very hard not to interpret the thing as

hanging objects.

a generalization since the child is not satisfied to shake the hood
but will go so far as to use the same means toin a different

waymake interesting spectacles last, whatever the distance whichthem may be. This perpetual extension which
separates him fromwe have noted of the secondary schemata into "procedures tomake interesting spectacles last" is the best proof of their gencharacterizederalizing power. Concerning the fourth stage,by a greater mobility of schemata than before, that is to say, by
it is

new progress in generalization. In effect, not only is the coordination of certain schemata due to their reciprocal assimilation,that is to say, to a generalizing process, but in addition the powerof generalization belonging to the mobile schemata is confirmed

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

387

by certain special behavior patterns which we have called "exploration of new objects." These behavior patterns, which extend the generalizing assimilations of the third
consist in
stage,

applying to new objects all the familiar schemata in succession,
so as to "understand" these objects. It seems evident, in such acase, that the effort to generalize obtains over all
preformed
structures, since there
to the unfamiliarisa laborious adjustment of the familiarand since this search presupposes a series ofchoices. So also, during the fifth
stage, the series of gropings
which lead the child to discovery of the use of supports, ofstrings
and of sticks is directed by the ensemble of the earlier schemata
which give meaning to the present search. This application of

the known to the unknown also presupposes constantgeneralizaFinally, we have considered generalization as being indispensable to the mental combinations of the sixth
tion.

.

stage.

one follows, then, the development of schemata, stage
after stage, either in general or taken eachindividually, one
that
this
is
one
of
continuous
history
provesgeneralization. Not
If

only is all structuring capable of reproducing itself when confronted by events which caused its appearance, but also it isap-

plied to new objects which differentiate it in case of need. This
correlative generalization and differentiation reveal, it seems tous,that a "form" is not a rigid entity to whichperception leads

as though under the influence of predetermination, but aplasticorganization, just as frames adapt themselves to their contents
and so depend partially on them. This means that "forms," farfrom existing before

their activity,

are rather comparable toconcepts or systems of relationships whose gradual elaboration

works when they are generalized. Observation forces us, therefore,
to detach them from pure perception and raise them to the rankof intellectual schemata.

Only a schema, in effect, is capable ofand differentiation

real activity, that is to say, of generalization

combined.

This leads us to examine a third difficulty in the theory of

To the extent that the "forms" do not have a history ora generalizing power, the very activity ofintelligence is preterit
to the advantage of a more or less automatic mechanism. The
structure.

"Gestalten" do not have any activity in themselves. They arise

CONCLUSIONS

388

the perceptual fields and aresuch without resulting from any dynamism anterior
are accompanied by an internal maturato themselves; or, if

at the time of the reorganization o

imposed astheytion, the latter is itself directed by preformed

structures which it

therefore does not explain.

Now, it is there that the facts envisaged in their historicalfrom accepting unreservedly
continuity prevent us all the more
the theory of form, whatever the static analogy which can exist
between the "Gestalt" and the schemata may be. In effect, theschemata have always seemed to us to be not antonomous entities
but the products of a continuous activity which is immanent inthem and of which they constitute the sequential moments ofis not external to them, it therecrystallization. As this activity
theconstitute
notfore does
expression of a "faculty," and weIt
seen
have already
only forms one whole with the schemata
why.
themselves, as the judgment's activity is made manifest in theformation of concepts; but, just as the concepts become dissoci-ated from the continuous chain of the judgments which gave riseto them, so also the schemata detach themselves little by little

from the organizing activity which engendered them and withwhich they became confused at the time of their formation. Moreprecisely, the schemata,once formed, serve as instruments forthe activity which engendered them, just as the concepts, once
they have been derived from the judicatory act, are the point of

departure of new judgments.
What, then, is this organizing activity, if it is not external
but immanent in the schemata, without however consisting in a
simple maturation? As we have constantly repeated, the organization of schemata is only the internal aspect of their adaptation
which is simultaneously accommodation and assimilation. The

primary fact is therefore the assimilatory activity itself without
which no accommodation is possible, and it is the combined action of assimilation and accommodation which accounts for the

existence of the schemata and consequently of their organization.

In
first

effect,however high one may raise the advent of thepsychological "behavior pattern/' they are revealed in theform of mechanisms leading to the satisfaction of a need. Thatmeans that the behavior patterns are from the outset the func-

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

S89

tion of the general organization of the living body. Every living

being constitutes a totality which tends to conserve itself andconsequently to assimilate to itself the external elements it needs.

From the biological point of view, assimilation and organization
on a par, without its being possible to consider organized
forms as being anterior to assimilatory activity or the contrary.
Need, the satisfaction of which is insured by the reflexes subordinated to the whole of the organism, is thus to be considered as theareexpression of an assimilatory tendency simultaneously dependent
on the organization and fit to conserve it. But, from the subjective
point of view, this same need, however complex the reflex organization of which it is the expression may be, appears, in its
that is toprimitive form, as a global tendency simple to satisfy,ofdifferentiatedfromstatesconsciousness
asproceedbarelysay,

ing from desire to satisfaction and from satisfaction to the desire
to conserve or recommence. From the psychological point of view,
the assimilatory activity, which is immediately extended in theform of reproductive assimilation, is consequently the primaryfact.

Now this activity, precisely to the extent that it leads toschema the schema being
repetition, engenders an elementary
formed by active reproduction then, due to this nascent orof generalizing and recognitory asganization, becomes capablesimilations. Moreover, the schemata thus constituted accommodate themselves to external reality to the extent that they try toassimilate it and so become progressively differentiated. Thus, on

the psychological as well as on the biological plane, the schematism of the organization is inseparable from an assimilatory
and accommodating activity, whose functioning alone explains

the development of successive structures.

can now be understood how the fact of considering the"forms" as having no history and of conceiving their continuousItreorganizations as independent of active generalization amounts
sooner or later to neglecting the activity of the intelligence itself.

To the extent that the schemata are regarded as subtended by anactivity atonce assimilatory and accommodating, only then dothey appear as being capable of explaining the later progress ofstructures and logisystematic intelligence in which conceptual
cal relationships are superposed on simple sensorimotor

mecha-

CONCLUSIONS

390
nisnis.

To the extent, on the contrary, that static "form'* excels

activity, even if this "form" is endowed with an undefined power

and of reorganization, one does not understandwhy intelligence is necessary and is dissociated from simple perception. Here we probably touch on the essential point of diverof maturation

gence: In the theory of form, the ideal is to explain intelligenceby perception, whereas for us perception itself must be inter-

preted in terms of intelligence.
There is undoubtedly a continuity of mechanism between

perception and intelligence. All perception appeared to us to be
the elaboration or the application of a schema, that is to say, amore or less rapid organization of sensorial data as function of an
ensemble of acts and movements, explicit or simply outlined.
Moreover, intelligence, which in its elementary forms involves anelement of search and groping, ends, in the course of the sixth
sudden reorganizations consisting in extreme cases, inalmost immediate "perceptions" of the correct solution. Hence
it is accurate to emphasize, with the theory of form, theanalogystage, inof perception and of practical intelligence. But this identification

can have two meanings. According to the first, perceptions are
self-sufficient,and search only constitutes a sort of accident orinterlude revealing the absence of organized perception. Accord-

ing to the second, on the contrary, all perception is the productof an activity whose most discursive or groping forms are only theclarification. Now, it is in this way that things are always
presented to us: All perception is an accommodation (with or with-out regrouping) of schemata which have required, for their construction, systematic work of assimilation and organization;

andonly the progressive complication of this same
intelligencework, when immediate perception of the solution is not possible.
is

The reciprocating motion between direct perception and searching does not warrant considering them as essentially opposites;
only differences of speed and complexity separate perception
from comprehension or even from invention.
These remarks lead us to examine a fourth objection to the

How

is it
theory of form.
possible to explain the mechanism of
the reorganizations essential to the act of intelligence, and more

precisely, to account for the discovery of "good forms" in contra-

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

391

distinction to those which are less good? When it is only a question of static perception (for example, perceiving a figure formedby scattered points on a white sheet of paper) and of a highmental level, one often finds that such a form is more satisfactory
than that which immediately succeeds it. Thus, after having
perceived the points as constituting a series of juxtaposed triangles one suddenly perceives a polygon. Thereafter one has theimpression that forms succeed one another according to a "law ofpregnance," the good forms, which end by prevailing, being thosewhich fulfill certain a priori conditions of simplicity, cohesion
and completion (those which are "closed," etc.). Thence thesupposition that the act of comprehension consists in reorganizing the perceptual field by replacing the inadequate forms withmore satisfactory ones and that in general the progress of intelligence is due to an Internal maturation directed toward the bestforms. But, in our hypothesis, the perceptions of completed structure constitute the coming to a head of complex elaborations, inwhich experience and intellectual activity intervene and cannot
therefore be chosen as representative in the problem of the discovery of "good" forms. As soon as one goes beyond the particularcase of static perceptions to analyze how the perceptions are struc-tured once they are placed in intelligent activity in which theybathe as in their natural environment, one observes that the"good forms" do not arise all by themselves, but always as a function of previous searching which, far from being lost in simple
maturation or use, constitutes real searching, that is to say, involving experimentation and control.
Groping, let us repeat, appears in the theory of form as an
extraintelligent activity, destined to replace by the empiricism of
fortuitous discoveries the reorganizations too difficult to accom-

plish systematically. If we have often recognized the existence ofdisordered gropings, corresponding in part to this conception andproceeding from the fact that the problem involved was too far
above the subject's level, we have constantly emphasized, on theother hand, the existence of another type of groping which is
directed and manifests this activity whose completed structures
constitute the result. This second groping would therefore beCONCLUSIONS

392

the very expression of the reorganization in progress and of the

dynamism of which the schemata are the static product.
In effect, if at all stages, the schemata seemed to us toemanate from assimilatory activity, the latter was always revealed
as a functional exercise before resulting in the various structures.

As early as the first stage it is apparent that a certain use is necesthis use
sary to make the reflex mechanisms function normally,of course allowing an element of groping. During the second andthird stages, the primary and secondary reactions result from a
reproductive assimilation, whose gropings are therefore necessary
to the formation of the schemata. The same is true of the coordinations belonging to the fourth stage. With regard to the
behavior patterns of the fifth stage, they reveal still better thanthe preceding ones the connection that exists between groping

and the organization of the schemata. Far from manifesting itself
as a passive recording of fortuitous events, the search characteristic of this type of behavior is directed simultaneously by theschemata assigning a purpose to the action, by those which serveby turns as means and by those which attribute a meaning to thevicissitudes of experience. In other words, groping of the second
schemata to thetype is primarily gradual accommodation of theconditions of reality and to the exigencies of coordination.
Whether it is external as during the fifth stage or becomes internal at the same time as the behavior patterns of the sixth stage,itthus presupposes a permanent process of active correction orcontrol.

Now this question of control of schemata is fundamental.
By very reason of its hypothesis of pregnance (or theory of best
shape), the theory of form has been led to neglect almost entirely
the role of correction. The good forms, it is true, are supposed toeliminate those that are less good, not only to the extent that thelatter are not very satisfactory in themselves, but also to the ex-tent that they are inadequate to the whole of the given situation.
But the process of reorganization, although set in motion by asort of global control, remains, in its intimate mechanism, inde-

pendent of this very control. On the contrary, every reorganization of the schemata has always seemed to us to constitute a correction of earlier schemata, through progressive differentiation,

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

893

and every organization in the process of becoming has manifested
us as a balance between the assimilatory tendency andthe exigencies of accommodation, hence as controlled use.

itself toThus as early as the first stage, reflex use is corrected by its
very

effects;itisreinforced or inhibited according to circum-

stances. During the second and third stages, the formation of thecircular reactions presupposes a development of this control; inorder to rediscover the interesting results obtained by chance,
one must correct the searching according to its success or its

The coordination of the schemata, characteristic of the
fourth stage, also only works by being sanctioned by its results.
From the fifth stage on, the control operations become differentiated still more; the child no longer limits himself to suffering an
failures.

automatic sanction from facts, he tries to foresee, by a beginning
experimentation, the object's reactions and so submits his search
for novelty to a sort of active control. Finally, during the sixth
stage, the control is internalized in the form of mental correctionof the schemata and their combinations. It can therefore be said

that control exists from the very beginning and becomes more
and more established in the course of the stages of sensorimotor

To be sure, it always remains empirical, in the
it
is
that
sense
always the success or failure of the action whichdevelopment.

constitutes the sole criterion, the search for truth as such only
beginning with reflective intelligence. But control suffices toinsure an increasingly active correction of the schemata and so
to explain

how the good forms take the place of the less satis-

factory ones through a gradual accommodation of the structures
to experience and to each other.
We have hitherto taken up four main divergences between

the hypothesis of forms and that of schemata.

A fifth difference

would seem, from the four preceding ones and evenresults,sums them up in a certain way. In a word, it can be said that theit"forms" exist by themselves whereas the schemata are only systems of relationships whose developments always remain inter-dependent.

The various extensions of the theory have adequately
demonstrated that the "Gestalten" are conceived as existing by
themselves. To the writers who have confined themselves to theCONCLUSIONS

394

fact of perception or intellection,
analysis of the psychologicaltne forms are, it is true, simply given in the same capacity as anyof "form" thus
relationships whatever and the very concept
involves no realism. But, to the extent that one refuses to try totend to become entities
explain the genesis of these forms, theyof which perception or intellection partake (in the Platonic
this phenomenological "subsistence"way). Then one passed fromto the hypothesis of their a priori character. One is thus temptedto account for their necessity by the innate psychobiological strucwhich makes them definitely anterior toture of theorganism,comes a third step: the "forms" beexperience. Finally there
This is how, on
allforcondition
thecomepossible experience.
the plane of scientific thought, Kohler has described "physicalforms" as though they conditioned the phenomena of the external
world and imposed themselves on the electromagnetic, chemicalor physiological systems.

Now, if the foregoing reservations are taken into account,nothing warrants our believing in

the existence of "structures"in themselves. As far as their external existence is concerned, in
it is self-evident that, to the extent that phenomena
the first
place,

are structurable in conformity to the framework of our mind, it
can beby an assimilation of the real to the forms of

explained

as by the realistic hypothesis. With regard to
intelligence as well
as
of
forms
the
intelligence they cannot be considered, either,inasmuch as they have a history and"subsisting" by themselves,as they are mobile, the forms are
far
so
In
an
revealactivity.
badortherefore only good
relatively to each other and to thedata to be systematized. Relativity, here as always, must temper a
constantly renascent realism.

Undoubtedly such relativity presupposes the existence ofsome invariants. But the latter are functional and not structural.
Thus a "form" is the better the more it satisfies the dual exigencyof organization and adaptation of thought, organization consistof given elements and adaptation coning in an interdependence
assimilation and accommodation.
sisting in a balance between
But if this dual postulate excludes chaotic forms, the coherence
it claims can no doubt be attained by means of an infinity ofdiverse structures.

Thus the principle of contradiction does not

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

395

teach us whether two concepts contradict each other, and that two
propositions can appear to be mutually compatible for a longtime and subsequently be disclosed to becontradictory (thereverse also being
possible).
4.

THE THEORY OF GROPING.

According to a fa-

mous hypothesis due to Jennings and taken up by Thorndike, anactive method of adaptation to new circumstances exists
themethod of groping: on the one hand, a succession of "trials"
admitting, in principle, of "errors" as well as of fortuitous success, on the other hand a progressive selection
operating after
the event according to the success or failure of these same trials.
The theory of "trials and errors" thus combines the a priori idea,

according to which the solutions emanate from the subject's
activity and the empirical idea according to which adoption of
the right solution is definitely due to the pressure of the external environment. But, instead of acknowledging, as we shalldo (5), an indissoluble relation between subject and object, thehypothesis of trials and errors makes distinction between two
terms: the production of trials which are due to the subject since
they are fortuitous in relation to the object, and their selection,
due to the object alone. Apriority and empiricism are here juxtaposed, in a way, and not outstripped. Such is the dual inspirationof the pragmatic system in epistemology and the mutational
system in biology. Intellectual or vital activity remains independent in origin from the external environment, but the valueof its products is determined by their success in the midst of thesame environment.
In his well-known theory of intelligence 5 Clapar&de takes up
Jennings' hypothesis, but by generalizing and inserting it in aconcerted conception of adaptational

acts. Intelligence,

accord-ing to Claparede, constitutes a mental adaptation to new circumstances or, more precisely, "the capacity to resolve new problemsby thought." Hence every complete act of intelligence presupposes three periods: the question (which orients searching), thehypothesis (or actual searching), and control. Moreover, intelli5367.

Claparede, La Psychologic de I'intelligence, Scientia, XI (1917), pp. 353-

396

CONCLUSIONS

a lower order,
gence would not be derived from the adaptations of
the reflex or hereditary adaptation and the habitual association
or adaptation acquired in circumstances which repeat themselves,
but it would arise at the time of the insufficiencies of the reflex

and of habit. What happens when the novelty of the situation
overflows the framework of instinct or of acquired associations?
The subject does not remain passive but, on the contrary, manithe behavior pattern emphasized by Jennings: He gropes
and abandons himself to a series of "trials and errors." That is,

fests

Before theaccording to Claparede, the origin of intelligence.
ofinternalization
thecharacterizedby"systematic intelligence"the processes of search is elaborated, intelligenceisrevealed inan empirical form which prepares the higher forms and constitutes their practical or sensorimotor equivalent.

Thus to the

new situation in"question" corresponds the need aroused by thewhich the subject finds himself. To the "hypothesis" groping
but thecorresponds, the series of trials and errors being nothing
successive suppositions assumed by action before being assumed
by thought. Finally, to the "control" corresponds the selectionof trials which results from the pressure of things before theawareness of relations enables thought to control itself by mental
experience. Empirical intelligence would consequently be explained by groping and it would be the progressive internalization and systematization of these processes which would subsequently account for intelligence properly so called.
The generality of the phenomenon of groping in all thestages we have outlined can be cited in favor of such a solution.

In the first place, the "correction" of schemata by progressive accommodations, which we have just emphasized in connection

with the "Gestalt," constitutes a primary example of this groping.

Now it is stated, on the one hand, that groping is internal-

ized during the sixth stage in the form of a sort of experimental
reflection or mental experience (as when Lucienne, in Observation 180, opens her mouth in front of the opening which must

be enlarged in order to reach the contents of the match box),
and, on the other hand, that before this internalization, the same
groping is revealed externally during all the fifth stage during

which it constitutes the basis for the "tertiary circular reactions"THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

397

and the "-discovery of new means through active experimentation." Then it is easy to observe that thisgroping, which is so
evident in the fifth stage, is itself prepared by a series of analogous processes discoverable as early as the first stage. Ever sincereflex accommodation we have noted thegroping of the newborn
child seeking the nipple. Since the acquisition of the first habits,
moreover, one finds the importance progressively augmenting
with the formation of the secondary schemata and the later co-ordination of those schemata. In short, the history ofgropingisnothing but that of accommodation with its successive compli-

cations and, in this respect, it seems as though much truth must

be ascribed to the theory which identifies intelligence withsearching which proceeds by active groping.
But there are two ways of interpreting groping. Either one
asserts that groping activity is directed, from the outset,
by arelatedthetoexternal
situation
andthencomprehension
groping is never pure, the role of chance becomes secondary, andthis solution is identified with that of assimilation(groping bea
toreducedaccommodationoftheprogressiveing
assimilatory
schemata); or else one states that there exists a pure groping,that is to say, taking place by chance and with selection, after
the event, of favorable steps. Now, it is in this second sense thatgroping was at first interpreted and it is this second interpretation that we are unable to accept.
It is true that certain facts

seem to substantiate Jennings.

It happens that groping really does

develop by chance, that thesolutionsarediscovered
and become fixed byfortuitously
right
simple repetition before the subject has been able to understand their mechanism. Thus the child sometimes prematurely
discovers the solutions which transcend his level of understanding, this discovery

being only due to happy fortuitous circum-

stances and not to a directed search (proof of which is that theacquisitions are often lost and later give rise to an intelligent rediscovery). But that is because, as we have already said, two kindsof groping exist, or rather, two extreme terms between which awhole series of intermediates extends. The one emerges when aproblem, while being at the subject's level, does not give rise to
an immediate solution, but to a directed search; the other ap-

398

CONCLUSIONS

pears when the problem

transcends the intellectual level or theand then the search operates by chance. It
subject's knowledge
isthat Jennings'
only to the second of these two situations

schema applies, whereas the other interpretation applies to thefirst case. The whole question, therefore, is to ascertain whichof groping: Are they inderelationship unites these two kinds
the other and which?
fromderive
the
one
does
or
pendent
is more inthis
toresolve
order
in
Now,
question, nothing
structive than to examine the evolution of Claparede's doctrine
which, from 1917 to 1933, has been thoroughly examined and,influenced by excellently analyzed facts relating to the "genesisof the hypothesis/' 6 has resulted in an exact delimitation of therole of groping.

From the very beginning of his studies, Claparede has disbetween the two kinds of groping which we have justtinguishedreviewed:

had then established two kinds or degrees of groping: nonis purely fortuitous and the "trials" atsystematic groping, which
which would be selected, chosen mechanically, as by a sieve, by external circumstances; and systematic groping, guided and controlledI

relationships. Nonsysteby thought, especially by the awarenessmatic groping would characterize what I call "empirical intelligence";ofthe other belongs to intelligence properly so called.

7

But, between the study of 1917 and that of 1933, a reversal ofof thesemeaning is observable with regard to the relationships
conwastwo kinds of gropings. In 1917 nonsystematic gropingtoexwhichissidered the primitive act of intelligencesupposed
theof systematic groping, throughprogresplain the development
sive contact with experience to which it gives rise and the awareness of relationships which springs from it: "The act of intelligence consists essentially in groping which derives from the grop-

ing manifested by animals of the lowest order when they findthemselves in a new situation/' 8 On the contrary, in the study
made in 1933, three innovations in reality result in reversing the6

Clapar&de, La Genese de 1'hypothese, Arch, de PsychoL, XXIV, 1933, pp.

1-155.
7 Ibid.,p. 149.

* Ibid.,p. 149.

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

399

order of that filiation: (1) The two kinds of groping are no longer
conceived "as two entirely separate types, but as the two extremities of a chain which

comprises all the intermediates";

9

(2)

Non-

systematic groping itself is already relatively directed:

No groping is altogether incoherent because its function always
some end, to satisfy some need, it is always oriented insome direction. ... In the lower forms of thought, this direction isstill very vague, very
general. But the higher the mental level of theseeker becomes, the more the awareness ofrelationships is strengthened and, consequently, the more specific becomes the direction inwhich the search for the problem's solution must take place.
Thus every new groping tightens a little the circle within which theisto attain.

next gropings will occur.

.

.

Groping, at first guided by the awareness of relationships relationships between certain acts to bepertheformed and a certain end to be attained 10 is.

.

.

consequently

agent

which permits the discovery of new relationships. 11

and most important, not only does nonsystematic
groping presuppose, as has just been shown, awareness of certain
relationships which direct it from the outset, but furthermore
those elementary relationships themselves stem from a fundamental mechanism of adjustment to experience which Clapardewisely emphasizes in his 1933 article, and which like the logi(3)Finally,

cians he calls "implication": "Implication is a process indispen-

Without it we would not know
how to profit from experience." 12 Hence implication is a primisable to our needs in adjusting.

tive phenomenon which does not result from repetition, as does

but on the contrary, from the outset introduces alinkbetween the terms which are implied. Thus implinecessary
association,

cation is rooted in organic life:"The organism seems to us, as

early as its most reflex manifestations, to be a machine for im13 It is also the source of the conditioned reflexes andplication."the circular reactions. Moreover, from its inception it directs
even nonsystematic groping. "To imply is to expect, and that is* Ibid.,p. 149.
10 Our italics.

11 Ibid.,

pp. 149-150.

12/fezU, p. 104 (italicized in the text).
id., p. 106.

CONCLUSIONS

400

to aim toward what one expects/' 14 to the extent that the expec-

tation is not disappointed, groping is useless, but to the extent
that it is disappointed, groping, oriented by expectation, is di-rected toward the goal by the implications which connect it with
the need experienced.

Having said this, we should now like to show why the hypothesis of a pure groping should not be retained and how thecorrections made by Claparde in his last interpretation not only

completely square with what we have observed regarding the origins of intelligence in children but also seem to us to involve thetheory of schemata and assimilation in general.
The hypothesis of pure groping conceived as being the pointof departure of intelligence cannot be justified because, either
this nonsystematic groping appears in the margin of directed

groping and often even after it, or else it precedes directed groping, but then it is either without influence on the latter or else
relatively directed and consequently already systematic.
In a general way, let us recall first of all that the difference
between nonsystematic and directed groping is simply a matterof proportion and that the situations in which these two typesof behavior are made manifest only differ from one another indegree and not in quality. Systematic groping is, in effect, characterized by the fact that the successive trials condition eachother with cumulative effect, that, in the second place, they are
illuminated by earlier schemata conferring a meaning on thefortuitous discoveries and, last, they are directed by the schemata
it is itself

assigning a purpose to the action and by those serving as initialmeans and whose groping attempts constitute the differentiations or gradual accommodations (see Obs. 148-174). Systematic

groping is therefore triply or quadruply directed, according towhether the end and the initial means form a whole or are separate. On the contrary, in nonsystematic groping like that ofThorndike's cats, the successive trials are relatively independentof each other and are not directed by experience acquired earIn this sense groping is fortuitous and the discovery of thelier.

solution is due to chance. But, from the time when the gropings,
even nonsystematic, are always oriented by the need experienced,,

p. 102.

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

401

hence by the schema assigning a purpose to the action (Thorndike himself recognizes that the selection is made among the at-

tempts due to annoyance at failure) it is apparent that earlier
experience plays a role in spite of everything and that the system of schemata already elaborated is not unconnected with thesubject's seemingly

most disorganized behavior. The successive

gropings are only relatively independent of each other and thewhich they lead, while largely fortuitous, only acquire meaning from hidden but active schemata which illuminate them. The difference between nonsystematic gropings anddirected search is therefore only of degree and not of kind.
That being true, it is evident that very often, far from pre-results toceding the directed search, nonsystematic groping only appears
in the margin of this search, or after it, and that, when it precedes it in appearance it is either already oriented by it or without influence on it. In effect, the relationship between the two

extreme types of behavior is determined by the situations inwhich they are made manifest. There is directed groping whenever the problem is sufficiently adapted to the intellectual leveland knowledge of the subject for the latter to seek the solution
by means of an adjustment of his habitual schemata, whereas
there is groping when the problem is too far above the subject's
level and when a simple readjustment of the schemata does not
suffice to solveit.

Groping, consequently, is the more directed

when the situation approximates the first kind, and the less systematic when it approaches the second.
There are two possible cases with regard to the sequence ofthe two kinds of groping. Concerning the first, the subject onlyand errors" after

adopts the method of pure groping by
having exhausted the resources of directed searching. This modeof sequence is observable even in the adult. When an automobile
breaks down, the intellectual, who is not a mechanic, begins by
to thetrying to utilize various bits of knowledge pertainingaThat
constitutes
etc.
carburetor, the spark plugs, the ignition,"trials

search directed by earlier schemata, hence a systematic groping.

Then, having achieved nothing, he tries everything haphazardly,
touches parts of whose function he is ignorant and thus succeeds
in repairing his motor by a purely chance maneuver: this is non-CONCLUSIONS

402

it is clear that pure groping
systematic groping. In such a case,extends the directed search. It is the fact of having tried an ininduces the subject to genercreasing number of solutions that
alize that behavior and it is to the extent that he understands thedata of the problem less andlessthat he goesfrom directed

first case, groping is thegroping to nonsystematic groping. In thismost slack form, so to speak, of intellectual searching, and not
the point of departure of the act of intelligence.
But there is a second case: that in which the problem is ab-

and in which nonsystematic groping
solutely new to the subject
seems to appear before directed searching. For example, an anichance in a series of sucinvolved
food canmalseekingby

getways without being capable of perceiving theora child, in order to attain an object half hidden by
ships,
various obstacles, can manage to extricate it without understandthe relation "situated under or behind." But then, one ofrelation-cessiveing

considerable in the suc-chancetwo things: either the role
cessful trial and the nonsystematic gropings thusofsuccessiscrowned withremain unconnected with intelligence and do not enor else

searches,
gender by themselves and as suchis already sufficiently directed so that one
nonsystematic groping
may attribute success to that direction and then it is this beginInning system which explains the later systematic searching.
the example of the child who wants to grasp a half-hidden obachieve his ends
it isclearly, that the subject may
later directed

ject,possible,without knowing how; but in this case, the nonsystematic gropresult does not at all pave theing which led to this fortuitousfor the directed searching which will later enable the childway

to discover the relations "placed

upon," "situated below,"etc.

then, only a sporadic behavior pattern

Nonsystematic groping
atappearing in the margin of intelligence and prolonging thecircutoallcommonsearchuse,
titude of groping
stages (reflex
lar reaction, etc.). It is only the extreme limit of accommodation,is,when the latter is more controlled by assimilation. On the confor the
trary, it is possible that the searchhalf-hidden object,while not yet involving more than knowledge of the relation"situated below" and thus permitting a great deal of haphazard
groping,

may nevertheless be directed by certain general sche-THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

403

mata, such as those of pushing back the obstacle, of utilizing amobile object to bring a distant objective to oneself
the case(inof the toys hanging

from the bassinet hood, etc.). In this case,nonsystematic groping certainly paves the way for later directed
searching (which will permit the child really to understand therelation "situated below"); but thisgroping is already itself directed although in a vague and generalway. The difference be-

tween these two possibilities is easily discerned by the fact that,in the first, the child's fortuitous

discovery is not followed by any

lasting utilization, whereas in the second, it gives rise to various
uses (to circular reactions or acts ofassimilation

reproductivewith gradual accommodation) and to a more or less continuous
progress.

Thus it may be seen that, even when nonsystematic groping
seems to appear before the directed search, it does not explain
the latter but is already explained by it, since from the very beginning it allows a minimum of direction. Without rejecting theidea of groping, we do not consider it adequate, in itself alone,
to explain the mechanism of intelligence. Now, this isprecisely
what Clapar&de, in his most recent study, has pointed out withgreat wisdom. Led to reject the hypothesis of pure groping, he
has come to acknowledge that, if needs and awareness of an end
to be attained orient even the most elementary gropings, that is
because an -elementary implication of the acts and interests constitutes the primary datum presupposed by the groping itself.
We should now like to show how this implication necessarily
comprises assimilation and the system of schemata.
As far as reflective intelligence is concerned, it is self-evident
that implication presupposes a system of concepts and conse-

quently the assimilatory activity of judgment. To say that A implies B (for example that the fact of being "right angle" implies that a triangle satisfies Pythagoras' theorem), is to affirm,

that one is in possession of a certain concept C (for example thatof the "right angle triangle"), in which
and B are united bylogical necessity or by definition. The implication is thus the re-Asult of thejudgments which have engendered the concepts C,

A and B, and the necessity of the implication results from previous assimilation operated by those judgments.

CONCLUSIONS

404

The same is true of sensorimotor intelligence, including its
preparatory phases constituted by the acquisition of the first
habitual associations (second stage). Clapar&de, who rightly considers implication toit,

be the condition of experience ("without

we could not profit from experience"), shows in some verysuggestive pages that the conditioned reflex is a phenomenon of
when,
implication. In effect, he says, "B is implied in
being

A

A

given, the subject behaves toward it as he would behave toward

B." "If the dog sees a pink-colored A presented at first with themeal B, this will provoke the salivary and gastric reaction set inmotion by meal B. The dog reacts to A as if B were contained,
were implied in A." "If there were simple association and not
implication, the color pink would simply evoke in the dog's memory the recollection of the meal but without being followedby any reaction signifying that the color pink is taken for themeal, functions like the meal." 15 But how can it be explained
why, according to this excellent description, the color "is takenfor" the meal? Claparede emphasizes the fact that the necessity
for such connections appears from the beginning: "Far from its
being the repetition of a pair of elements which creates between

them a link of implication, the implication already arises at thefirst meeting of the two elements of thispair. And experienceintervenes
to
this
break
of
only
rapportimplication where it is
not legitimate."

And again: "The necessity for a connection

tends, accordingly, to appear at the very beginning. If the necessity did

not exist at the very beginning, one does not see when
16

appear, for habit is not necessity." But the problem
extended.
How is it possible to explain this necessity
onlywhich appears at the first meeting of two terms thitherto foreign
to each other so that they immediately appear to the subject as
it will everis

implying each other?
In the same way Mr. Claparede interprets the classic analogy of perception and reasoning in the light of implication: "If
the operation which constitutes perception is identical to thatwhich forms the backbone of reasoning, it is because this operation is an implication. If we notice the sweet flavor in the colis Ibid.,.,

pp. 105-106.
p. 105.

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

405

ored spot which the orange forms to our eye, this is not solely byvirtue of association but due to implication. It is because thissweet flavor

isimplied in the other characteristics of the or-," 17But, here again, how can it be explained why thegiven qualities in the sensation immediately assume a deeper
signification and invoke an ensemble of other qualities necesange.

.

.

sarily interconnected?

The only possible answer is that schemata exist (that is tosay, theorganized totalities whose internal elements are mutu-

ally implied) as well as a constitutive operation of these schemata

and of their implications, which is assimilation. In effect, without this formative operation of implications which is the sensorimotor equivalent of judgment, anything at all would imply
anything at all,mercy of the fortuitous comparisons ofperception. Implication would be governed by William James'"law of coalescence" according to which the data perceived simultaneously form a totality as long as they have not been dissociated by experience. "The law of coalescence," Clapar&de alsosays, engenders implication on the plane of action and syncretism on the plane of representation/* 18 But then one can ask
oneself if the idea of implication still keeps its value and if thenecessity of which the implying relationships admit is not illuat thesory. Claparede's interpretation is much more profound when
he connects implication with his "law of reproduction of thesimilar" and when he adds: "Implication is rooted in the being's
motor strata. It might be said that life implies implication." 19

But then a connecting link between the motor organization andthe implication is lacking, and this connecting link is assimilation. But, in effect, assimilation explains how the organism tends

simultaneously to reproduce the actions which have been profitable to it (reproductive assimilation) which suffices to constitute schemata, not only due to the repetition of external conditions, but also and primarily due to an active reproduction ofearlierbehavior patterns as function of those conditions

andto incorporate, in the schemata thus formed, data capable of
IT ibid.,p. 107.

18/fricZ., p. 105.

19 Ibid.,

pp. 104-105.

CONCLUSIONS

406

conseserving them as aliments (generalizing assimilation). But,
activehowassimilationengenders
reproduction
explains
quently,in order to reproduce
implication. On the one hand, in effect,
the interesting behavior patterns, the subject constantly assimilates to the schemata of these behavior patterns the familiar obthat is to say, hejects already utilized in similar circumstances,
confers a signification upon them; in other words, he inserts themin a system of implications. So it is that the doll hanging fromthe bassinet hood implies to the baby the quality of being pulledetc., because every time he perceives it,
assimilated to the schemata of pulling, etc. Moreover, the new
to their apparent characobjects are themselves assimilated, due
teristics or their situation, to familiar schemata, whence new net-or struck, shaken,

it isworks of significations and implications. Thus in Observation
136 the cigarette case examined by Jacqueline is successfully
sucked, rubbed, shaken, etc Reproductive (and recognitory) assimilation, on the one hand, and generalizing assimilation, on
the other, are hence the source of the implication which could
not be explained without them, and these implications, far fromfrom the outset diresulting from simple "coalescences," arerected and organized by the system of schemata.

In the conditioned reflex, to resume Claparde's examples,
A is implied in the meal A because, according to thethe pink

author's terms, that color "is taken for" the meal. What does
this mean, if not that the color is assimilated to the meal itself,

or that it receives a signification as a function of this schema?
Here as everywhere, the implication results from a previous assimilation. So also, in perception, the orange's sweet flavor is
implied in the color perceived at first, because this color is im-

mediately assimilated to a familiar schema. In short, without assimilation, this implying "necessity" which Claparde places "atand which he rightly distinguishes from habit due
to passive repetition (which is quite different from active reproduction), remains unexplainable and implication remains without organic basis. Inasmuch as implication is really rooted in
the organism, which seems to us indisputable, this is because all
the source"

sensorimotor activity develops by functioning (reproductive assimilation) and through generalizing assimilation utilizes the ob-

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE
jects capable of serving it as aliments.

407

Thereafter every external

datum is perceived as function of the sensorimotor schemata andit is this incessant assimilation which confers on all
things meanings permitting implications of every degree. Through that very
fact it can be understoodever

why all groping is always directed, how-

Groping proceeds necessarily by accommodation ofearlier schemata and the latter become assimilated or tend to aslittle:

similate to themselves the objects on which the former

operates.

So it is that, corrected by Claparede's remarks concerning thecontrolling role of need or the issue and concerning the priorityof implication in relation to "trials

and errors/' the theory ofgroping joins that of assimilation and the schemata.
5.

THE THEORY OF ASSIMILATION. Two conclu-

sions seem to us to derive
first isfrom the foregoing discussions. The

that intelligence constitutes an organizing activity whosefunctioning extends that of the biological organization, while
surpassing it due to the elaboration of new structures. The sec-

ond is that, if the sequential structures due to intellectual activity differ among themselves qualitatively, they always obey thesame functional laws. In this respect, sensorimotor intelligencecan be compared to reflective or rational intelligence and thiscomparison clarifies the analysis of the two extreme terms.
Now, whatever the explanatory hypotheses between which
the main biological theories oscillate, everyone acknowledges acertain number of elementary truths which are those of which

we speak here: that the living body presents an organized structure, that is to say, constitutes a system of interdependent relationships; that it works to conserve its definite structure and, todo this, incorporates in it the chemical and energetic aliments
taken from the environment; that, consequently, it always reacts
to the actions of the environment according to the variations ofthat particular structure and in the last analysis tends to impose
on the whole universe a form of equilibrium dependent on thatorganization. In effect, contrary to unorganized beings which arealso in equilibrium with the universe but which do not assimilate

the environment to themselves,

it can be said that thelivingassimilates
tohimselfwholetheuniverse, at the same time
being

408

CONCLUSIONS

that he accommodates himself to it, since all the movements ofevery kind which characterize his actions and reactions withrespect to things are regulated in a cycle delineated by his own

organization as well as by the nature of the external objects. It
is therefore
permissible to conceive assimilation in a general
sense as being the incorporation of any external reality whatever
to one part or another of the cycle of organization. In otherwords, everything that answers a need of the organism is material
for assimilation, the need even being the expression of assimila-

tory activity as such; with regard to the pressures exerted by theenvironment without their answering any need, they cannot giverise to assimilation as long as the organism is not adapted tothem but, as adaptation consists precisely in transforming constraints into needs, everything, in the last analysis, can lend itself to being assimilated. The functions of relationship, inde-

pendently even from psychic life which proceeds from them, arethus doubly the sources of assimilation: On the one hand, they
help the general assimilation of the organism, since their use isessential to life; but, on the other hand, each of their manifestations presupposes a particular assimilation since this use or
exercise is always related to a series of external conditions which

are peculiar to them.

Such is the context of previous organization in which psychological life originates. Now, and this is our whole hypothesis, it
seems that the development of intelligence extends that kind of
mechanism instead of being inconsistent with it. In the firstplace, as early as the reflex behavior patterns and the acquired
behavior patterns grafted on them, one sees appear processes ofincorporation of things to the subject's schemata. This search forthe functional aliment necessary to the development of behavior

and this exercise stimulating growth constitute the most elementary forms of psychological assimilation. In effect, this assimilation of things to the schemata's activity,
although not yet experienced by the subject as an awareness of objects andthoughconsequently not yet giving rise to objective judgments, nevertheless constitutes the first
operations which, subsequently, will result in judgments properly so called:
operations of reproduction,
recognition and generalization. Those are the operations which,THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

409

already Involved in reflex assimilation, engender the first acquired
behavior patterns,
consequently the first nonhereditary schemata,the schema resulting from thevery act of reproductive andgeneralizing assimilation. Thus every realm of sensorimotor reflex organization is the scene ofparticular assimilations extending, on the functional plane, physicochemical assimilation. In
the second place, these behavior
patterns, inasmuch as they aregrafted on hereditary tendencies, from the very beginning findthemselves inserted in the general framework of the individualorganization; that is to say, before any acquisition of consciousness, they enter into the functional totality which theorganism
constitutes. Thus they contribute
immediately to insuring andmaintaining that equilibrium between the universe and the bodyitself, an equilibrium which consists in an assimilation of theuniverse to the organism as much as in an accommodation of thelatter to the former.

From the psychological point of view, thatmeans that the acquired schemata form, from the outset, not only
a sum of organized elements, but also a
global organization, asystem of interdependent operations, at first virtually due totheir biological roots, thenactually due to the mechanism of thereciprocal assimilation of the presenting schemata.
In short, at its point of departure, intellectual organization

merely extends biological organization. It does not only consist
as accepted by areflexology entirely impregnated with empirical associationism
in an ensemble of responses
mechanicallydetermined by external stimuli and in a correlative ensemble ofconductions connecting the new stimuli with old responses. On
the contrary, it constitutes a real activity, based upon an
appropriate structure and assimilating to the latter a

growing number ofexternal objects.

Now, just as sensorimotor assimilation of things to the subject's

schemata extends biological assimilation of the environ-ment to the organism, so also it presages the intellectual assimilation of objects to the mind, such as is proven to exist in the most

evolved forms of rational thought. In effect, reason simultaneously manifests a formal organization of the ideas it utilizes andan adaptation of those ideas to reality an organization andadaptation which are inseparable. Now, the adaptation of reason

410

CONCLUSIONS

to experience presupposes

an incorporation of objects

to thesubject's organization as well as an accommodation of the latterto external circumstances. Translated into rational terminology,

can therefore be said that organization is formal coherence,accommodation is "experience" and assimilation the act of
judgment inasmuch as it unites experimental contents to logical

it

form.

Now these comparisons, which we have often emphasized,
between the biological plane, the sensorimotor plane and therational plane, make it possible to understand how assimilation,from the functional point of view, constitutes the primary fact
whence analysis must proceed regardless of the real interdependence of the mechanisms. On each of the three planes, in
effect, accommodation is only possible as function of assimilation,
since the very formation of the schemata called upon to accommodate themselves is due to the assimilatory process. Concerning
the relationships between the organization of those schemata andassimilation, one can say that the latter represents the dynamic
process of which the former is the static expression.
On the biological plane one could, it is true, raise the objection that every assimilatory operation presupposes a previousorganization. But what is an organized structure, if not a cycleof operations of which each one is necessary to the existence ofthe others? Assimilationishence the very functioning of thesystem of which organization is the structural aspect.

On the rational plane, this primacy of assimilation is expressed by the primacy of judgment. To judge is not necessarily
to identify, as has sometimes been said, but it is to assimilate; thatisto say, to incorporate a new datum in an earlier schema, in an

already elaborated schema of implications. Hence rational assimilation always presupposes a previous organization. But

whence comes that organization? From assimilation itself, forevery concept and every relationship demands a judgment inorder to be formed. If the interdependence of judgments andconcepts thus demonstrates that of assimilation and organization,at the same time it emphasizes the nature of thatinterdependence.
Assimilatory judgment is the active element of the process ofwhich the organizing concept is the result.

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

411

Finally, on the sensorimotor plane which is that of elementary intellectual life, we have always emphasized the assimilatory
mechanism which gives rise to the schemata and to their organization. Psychological assimilation in its simplest form is nothingother than the tendency of every behavior pattern or of every
psychic state to conserve itself and, toward this end, to take its
functional alimentation from the external environment. It is
this reproductive assimilation that constitutes the schemata, thelatter acquiring their existence assoon as a behavior pattern,

however small its complexity, gives rise to an attempt at spontaneous repetition and thus becomes schematized. Now, thisreproduction which, by itself and to the extent that it is notencased in an earlier schematism does not involve any organization, necessarily, leads to the formation of an organized whole. In
the successive repetitions due to reproductive assimilation

effect,at first bring with them an extension of assimilation in the form

and generalizing operations. To the extent thatthe new objective resembles the old one, there is recognition and,to the extent that it differs from it, there is generalization of theof recognitory

schema and accommodation. The very repetition of the operation hence entails the formation of an organized totality, thefrom the continuous application
organization resulting merelyof an assimilatory schema to a given diversity.
In short, in every realm, assimilatory activity appears simulsource of organization; that is
taneously as the resultant and thefrom the psychological point of view which is necessarilytosay,

and dynamic, it constitutes a veritable primary act.
we have shown, stage after stage, how the progress of thefunctional

Now,

if

assimilatory mechanism engenders

the various intellectual opera-

be explained, more synthetically, how thetions, it remains
initial act of assimilation takes into account the essential characor the combined workings of mental conteristics oftointelligence,

struction leading to deduction

and to actual or representative

experience.

The principal problem to be resolved for an interpretation
based upon assimilation as well as for every theory of intelligencehimself is, it seems
theactivity of the subject

biologicalentailingof theto us, the following: If the same process of assimilation

CONCLUSIONS

412

universe to the organism occurs from the physiological to therational plane, how is it possible to explain why the subject comesto understand external reality sufficiently to be "objective" andto place himself in it? Physiological assimilation is, in effect,

entirely centered on the organism. It is an incorporation of theenvironment to the living body, and the centripetal character ofthis process is so advanced that the incorporated elements lose
their specific nature to be transformed into substances identicalto those of the body itself. Rational assimilation, on the contrary,
as revealed in judgment, does not at all destroy the object in-corporated in the subject since, by manifesting the latter's activity, it subordinates it to the reality of the former. The antagonism of these two extreme terms is such that one would refuse to attribute them to the same mechanism if sensoriinotor as-

similation did not bridge the gap between them. At its source, in
effect,sensorimotor assimilation is as egocentric as physiologicalassimilation, since it only uses the object to aliment the functioning of the subject's operations, whereas at its end the same

assimilatory impetus succeeds in inserting the real in frameworks
exactly adapted to its objective characteristics, so that the frame-works are ready to be transported to the plane of language in theform of concepts and logical relationships. How can this transition from egocentric incorporation to objective adaptation be explained, a transition without which the comparison of biologicalassimilation with intellectual assimilation would only be a play

on words?

An easy solution would consist in attributing this evolution
to the progress of accommodation alone. One recalls that accom-

modation, at first reduced to a simple global adjustment, gives
the time of the coordination of the secondary schemata

rise, atand above all of the tertiary circular reactions, to directed gropings and increasingly accurate experimental behavior patterns.

Would it not suffice, then, to explain the transition from distorted assimilation to objective assimilation, to invoke the con-comitant factor of accommodation?
It is undoubtedly the progress of accommodation whichmarks the increasing objectivity of the schemata of assimilation.
But to be satisfied with such an explanation would be tantamountTHEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

413

either to answering the question by thequestion itself, or else tosaying that the assimilation of things to the subject loses in importance in proportion as intelligence develops. In reality, ateach step assimilation conserves the same essential role and thetrue problem, which is to find out how the
progress of accommo-

dation is possible, can only be resolved by having recourse once

again to analysis of the assimilatory mechanism.
In effect, why is the accommodation of the schemata to theexternal environment, which becomes so accurate in the courseof development, not given at the outset?

Why does the evolutionof sensorimotor intelligence appear as aprogressive extraversion
instead of the elementary operations being turned toward the external environment

from the very beginning? Inreality

thisgradual externalization, which seems at first to be the essential
characteristic of the sequence of our six stages, only constitutes
but one of the two aspects of that evolution. The second move-

ment, exactly complementary and necessary to the explanation of
the first, is none other than the process of growing coordination

marking the progress of assimilation as such. Whereas the initial
schemata are only interconnected due to their reflex and organic
substructure, the more evolved schemata, at first primary, thensecondary and tertiary, become organized little by little into coherent systems due to a process of mutual assimilation which wehave often emphasized and which we have compared to the increasing implication of concepts and relationships. Now, notonly is this progress of assimilation correlative to that of accom-

modation, but also it makes possible the gradual objectificationof intelligence itself.

In effect, it is the nature of a schema of assimilation to apply
itself to everything and to conquer the whole universe of percep-

tion.

But by being thus generalized it is necessary for it to be-comedifferentiated.

This differentiation does not only result
from the diversity of the objects to which the schema must accommodate itself. Such an explanation would lead us back to thesolution already rejected which is too simple because nothing
forces the child to take into consideration the multiplicity ofreality so long as his assimilation is distorted, that is to say, solong as he utilizes objects as simple functional aliments. The dif-CONCLUSIONS

414

ferentiation of schemata works to the extent that objects areseveral schemata at once and that their diversity
assimilatedbythus becomes sufficiently worthy of interest to be imposed on accommodation (for example, visual images are differentiated byeven without

prehension, sucking, hearing, etc.). Undoubtedly,of them gives rise
being coordinated with other schemata, eachtodifferentiations, but they remain of small im-

spontaneousof combinations possible
portance and it is the infinite variety
is the big factor In differentiation. This
which
schemata
amongis correlative to that
explains how the progress of accommodationof schecoordination
thethatextentisthetoItof assimilation:mata leads the subject to interest himself in the diversity ofthat accommodation differentiates the schemata, and not

realityaccommodation.
by virtue of an immediate inclination towardof schemata sufdifferentiation
andthiscoordinationNow
assimilation

growing objectifkation of
the
break
to
need
without
unity of this process to explain theat the beginnings
thefromtransition
egocentric incorporation
us compare theletForcalled.
so
to judgment properly
example,heantowardtheofattitudeswings or a body heobjectbaby
throws to the ground to that which is presupposed by the judgments "this is a hanging object" or "bodies fall." These judgments are certainly more "objective" than the active correspondficeto account for theing attitudes in the sense that thelatter are confined to assimilat-of the subject, whereas
ing perceived data to a practical activity
the formulated propositions insert them, no longer into a single,
elementary schema, but into a complex pattern of schemata andor the fall of
relationships. The definitions of the hanging object

bodies presuppose an elaboration of things in hierarchical classes
and relationships
joined by multiple relationships, the schemata

and past
comprising, from far or near, all the subjects presentindifferencecomplexity, hence
experience. But, apart from thisin differentiation and coordination of schemata (without, ofof their symbolic translation to the plane ofcourse,speaking

andlanguage and the regrouping that this verbal constructionsocialization presuppose), these judgments do nothing other thanof schemata definiincorporate perceived qualities into a system
the subject's action. There would be no diffitively resting upon

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

415

culty in showing that the hierarchical classes and relationships
to theimplied by these judgments in the last analysis

apply
sensorimotor schemata subjacent to any active elaboration. Thus
the qualities of position, form, movement, etc., perceived in the

hanging object or the falling bodies are in themselves neither
more nor less objective than the more global qualities enabling
the baby to recognize the object to be swung or the object to be
thrown. It is coordination itself; that is to say, the multiple assimilation constructing an increasing number of relationships
between the compounds "action
object" which explains theX

objectification. This is what we shall see in detail in Volume II,

when studying the construction of the object and the objectification of space, of causality and time during the first two years ofchildhood.

Hence it is one and the same process of assimilation whichleads the subject who is in process of incorporating the universe

in himself to structure that universe according to the variationsof its own organization and finally to place his activity among thethings themselves. But if this gradual reversal of the meaning of
assimilation is not due to experience alone, the role of accom-

modation to experience is no less necessary to it, and it is fitting
to recall it now. The current theories tend either to overestimate
the role of experience, as does neoassociationist empiricism, or
to underestimate it, as does the psychology of form. In reality,
as we have just seen,

accommodation of the schemata to experi-ence develops to the very extent of the progress of assimilation.

In other words, the relationships between the subject and his
environment consist in a radical interaction, so that awarenessof objects nor awareness of the
begins neither by the awarenessstate and from thisanundifferentiatedbutitself,byactivity
state proceed two complementary movements, the one of inof things to the subject, the other of accommodation
corporation
to the things themselves.

But in what does the subject's share consist and how todiscern the object's influence? In the beginning the distinction
remains illusory: the object as functional aliment and the activity itself are radically confused.

On the other hand, inasmuch

as accommodation is differentiated from assimilation, one can say

CONCLUSIONS

416

that the subject's role is essentially established in the elaborationof forms whereas it is up to experience to provide them with acontent. But, as we have already observed, form cannot be dissociated from matter.

The structures are not preformed within

the subject but are constructed gradually as needs and situations
occur. Consequently they depend partly on experience. Inversely,

experience alone does not account for the differentiation of sche-mata since through their very coordinations the schemata arecapable of multiplications. Assimilation is therefore not reduced
to a simple identification, but is the construction of structuresat the same time as the incorporation of things to these structures.

In short, the dualism of subject and object is brought back to asimple progressive differentiation between a centripetal pole

and a centrifugal pole in the midst of the constant interactions oforganism and environment. Also, experience is never simply passive receptiveness: it is active

accommodation, correlative to as-

similation.

This interaction of accommodation to experience and oforganizing assimilation makes it possible, it would seem, to supply
an answer to the crucial question of every theory of intelligence:
How can the union of the fecundity of intellectual construction
with its progressive rigor be explained? It must not be forgottenthat if, in the order of the sciences, psychology stems from thebiological disciplines, it is nevertheless on the former that theformidable task devolves of explaining the principles of mathematics

for, given the interdependence of subject and object,thesciences themselves constitute a circle and, if the physicochemical

sciences which furnish biology with their principles are based on

the mathematical sciences, the latter, in turn, stem from the ac-

and are based on psychology and, conseit is that geometers resort to psychologicalSoonbiology.
quently,
data in order to explain the formation of space and of solid
objects and that we shall see, in Volume II, how the laws of
sensor imo tor intelligence account for the beginning of "groupsof displacements" and for the permanence of the object. It istivity of the subject

therefore necessary, in every theory of intelligence, to think of thegenerality of problems that it raises,

which was understood by

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

417

Wertheimer, for example, when he tried to apply Gestalt theory
to the question of the syllogism.

As far as the fecundity of reasoning is concerned, one canconceive of the act of intellectual construction in a great number
ways varying from the discovery of a ready-made external
reality (empiricism) to the making explicit of a preformed inof

ternal structure (theory of form). But, in the first case, if the workof intelligence leads to indefinitely fruitful results, since the mindiscalled upon to discover little by little a universe which is al-

ready completely structured and constructed, this work does not

admit of any internal principle of construction and consequentlyof any principle of deductive rigor. In the second case, on thecontrary, it is from the subject as such that intellectual progress
stems, but if the internal maturation of the structures is capableof explaining their progressive coherence, this is at the expense of

fecundity, because what reason have we to think that forms, however numerous they may be, sprung only from the subject's

structure without his experience playing any part, will suffice toembrace reality in tot of Now, inasmuch as one acknowledges thenecessary interdependence of accommodation to experience andof assimilation to activity itself, fecundity becomes correlative tocoherence. In effect, all the intermediates are then made manifest
between simple empirical discovery which results from the purely
fortuitous insertion of a new datum in a schema, and the internal
combination of schemata resulting in mental combination. In
the most empirical discovery (like that which results from thetertiary circular reactions), an element of assimilation alreadyintervenes which, in the case of active repetition and of the intellectual need for conservation, presages the judgment of identity, just as in the most refined internal combination (such as
mathematical constructions) a factor again intervenes to whichthought must accommodate itself. Consequently, there is naturally no antithesis between discovery and invention (no morethan between induction and deduction), both simultaneously
revealing activity of the mind and contact with reality.
Thereafter will it be said that the assimilatory organization
does not show any fecundity in itself and is limited to work of
identification, novelty always resulting from assimilated external

CONCLUSIONS

418

But the Interaction of subject and object Is precisely
accommodasuch, given the interdependence of assimilation andwithout
terms
the
of
of
one
conceive
to
it
that
Is
tion,
impossible

reality?

the other. In other words, intelligenceisthe construction of

The elaboration ofrelationships and not only Identification.
schemata involves a logic of relationships as well as a logic ofclasses. Consequently, Intellectual organization is fecund in Itself,
since the relationships engender each other, and this fecundity
cannot beis one with the richness of reality, since relationships
connect
which
them,
terms
the
of
any
conceived independently
reverse.
the
than
more
With regard to the rigor or the coherence thus obtained, it
isin direct proportion to the fecundity, to the extent that the co-ordination of schemata equals their differentiation. Now, as It is
which permits accommodaprecisely this growing coordination
as the coordination is obandofthetion toreality,
diversity

tained not only by identifying fusion but also by any system
whatever of reciprocal relationships, there is certainly a correlation between the unity of the system of schemata and its richthe rigor of the operations does not necessarily
result from identification, but from their reciprocity in general.
The reciprocal assimilation which accounts for the coSrdinatlon
ness.

In

effect,is therefore the point of departure of this reas the criof
versibility
operations which, at all levels, appears
andcoherence.
terion of rigorof the schemata

In short, the problem of invention, which in many respects
constitutes the central problem of intelligence, does not, in the
hypothesis of the schemata, require any special solution because
the organization- which assimilatory activity reveals is essentiallyconstruction and so is, in fact, invention, from the outset. That Is

why the sixth stage, or the stage of invention through mental
combination, seemed to us the crowning of the five preceding
ones and not the beginning of a new period. As early as the empirical intelligence of the fourthand fifth stages and even as

early as the construction of primary and secondary schemata, thispower of construction is in bud and is revealed in each operation.

In conclusion,, assimilation and accommodation, at first antagonistic to the extent that the first remains egocentric andtheTHEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

419

second Is simply imposed by the external environment, complete

each other to the extent they are differentiated, the coordinationof the schemata of assimilation favoring the progress of accom-

modation and vice versa. So it is that, from the sensorimotor
plane on, intelligence presupposes an increasingly close unionof which the exactitude and the fecundity of reason will one day
be the dual product.

(Continued from inside flap)

tains has been neglected by the too
static Gestalt theory

believesHeof form.

that mental faculties de-velop through being used, and that
impressions received enable the intelligence to grasp

more involved

concepts, in a sort of constantly up-

ward

spiralling.

This

theoryisapplied to the sucking reflexes of
the infant as well as tp the highest

forms

of

creative

intelligence.

Piaget states his views concerning
the task of intelligence in differentiating

between the apparent andthe real. Among the theories of intelligence considered by the author

areassociational

vitalisricthor

empiricism

and

The

au-

intellectualism.

refersto

Plato,

Aristotle,

Hume, Kant, Bergson, and others
in well-reasoned philosophical ar-

guments, integrating his scientificfindings with a view of man's rolein the universe

and the relativityof knowledge.

International Universities Press, Inc.

227 West 13 Street New York, N.Y, 1001 1

Si

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