Discussion Paper Series

University of Tokyo

Institute of Social Science
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December 2018
No.109  
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF TOKYOInstitute of Social Sciences
University of Tokyo
Panel Survey Project Discussion Paper Series No. 109
December 2018

Life Course Events and Attitudes toward Immigrant Inflow in Japan: An Analysisof the Japanese Life Course Panel Survey Data
Kenji Ishida(Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo)

Acknowledgement
This research was supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S) (number
18103003 and 22223005) , Specially Promoted Research (number 25000001, 18H05204)
from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) and Scientific Research (B)(number 18H00931). The research support in conducting the panel surveys from theInstitute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, and OUTSOURCING, Inc. is gratefully
acknowledged. The permission to use the panel data is obtained from the Management
Committee of the Japanese Life Course Panel Surveys.

Life Course Events and Attitudes toward Immigrant Inflow in Japan: An Analysisof the Japanese Life Course Panel Survey Data
Kenji Ishida(University of Tokyo)
Abstract
This paper aims to investigate associations between several life course events, changes
in socio-economic and household statuses, and attitudes toward immigration inflow.
Many scholars have regarded Japanese society as a negative case of an immigration
state, which is usually much reluctant to welcome immigrants. However, the number of
immigrants has rapidly increased since the revision and amendment of the Immigration
Control and Refugee Recognition Act. Japan is gradually becoming an immigrationsociety, and immigrants are becoming visible for local Japanese people. However, it has
not been realistic yet to assume that immigrants deprive the employment opportunities
of Japanese people. The group threat thesis is not necessarily applicable to Japanesesociety now, but changes in life course situations will affect people’s social attitudes andinterests.
With a panel data analysis, we found socio-economic factors are not associatedwith the attitude toward immigrant inflow in Japan. For Japanese women, instead,changes in household situations such as marriage, having little children and owning ahouse affect the attitude toward immigrants. We suggest the effectiveness of utilizing apanel data for investigating the formation of attitudes toward immigrants and discussthese results from the viewpoint of responsibilities of family lives in Japan.

11. Introduction
Japan as an Emerging Immigration Society
Migration scholars are aware that the foreign population in Japan is small. Many regard
Japan as a latecomer to immigration or a negative case (Bartram 2000; Hollifield et al.
2014). With respect to the foreign population proportion, Japan is indeed different fromother immigrant societies. Foreign residents in Japan comprise only 1.9% of the total
population, which is much lower than in other OECD countries (OECD 2018). Moreover,the current Cabinet of Japan, administered by the Liberal Democratic Party, is reluctant
to make immigration policy.
Meanwhile, Japanese society is becoming an emerging migration state (Hollifieldand Sharpe 2017), which means that the country is in a transitional situation. From a
temporal viewpoint, population censuses show that Japan’s foreign population has
increased more steeply since the early 1990s. This is due to the re-organization of theresidential status framework. In 1990, the Japanese government revised the Immigration
Control and Refugee Recognition Act, under which long-term resident visas can beobtained by second- and third-generation Nikkeijin (Japanese descendants), mainly from
Brazil and Peru. Also, the technical intern training visa was introduced in 1993, providing
another form of residential status that has mostly been utilized by Chinese and Vietnamese.
Following these changes, the number of foreign residents doubled from 1990 to 2017,exhibiting an almost monotonic upward trend over this period. A recent simulation study
estimated that the share of Japan’s population with foreign roots will exceed 10% in 2065
(Korekawa 2018). It is, thus, no longer reasonable to see Japan as a non-immigrantcountry.
Purpose of the Present Study
This study aims to reveal how people form attitudes toward immigration incontemporary Japan, where the foreign population is steadily increasing. It adopts the life
course perspective to empirically analyze and discuss this topic. Since the mid-1990s,
Japanese society has experienced a long-term recession, population aging, birthrate
decline, and foreign population expansion. With these social changes, many young
Japanese people have become unable to experience life course events such as getting afull-time (stable) job, marriage, childbirth, and home-ownership, which were generally
accessible to the previous generation. Therefore, there is now variation in life course riskboth within a cohort and in individual lives. Within a cohort, some people can attain
desired social and economic statuses, while others cannot. Moreover, an individual may

2succeed in some respects but fail in others. The between- and within-individual life course
risks represent social and economic vulnerabilities, and people in a more vulnerable
situation are more inclined to feel fear and anger, and experience low social cohesion(Thoits 1989; Simon and Nath 2004; Vergolini 2011; Jakoby 2016). These negative
sentiments can provoke hostility and opposition toward outgroups (Kim 2016).
Japan is a good example for deepening understanding of the formation of anti- orpro-immigration sentiment. This is because the country differs from traditional
immigration societies in which the immigrant research framework has been developed.
In terms of immigrant population scale, Japan is a latecomer (Hollifield et al. 2014). The
local situation should be considered in developing theoretical arguments, as a given
research framework will have different implications among the several types ofimmigration situation (Bartram 2000).
Relatively few studies have examined how people form attitudes toward immigrationfrom a view of the latecomer society, which have not traditionally welcomed immigrants.
Typical frameworks such as the group threat and intergroup contact theories (Quillian
1995; McLaren 2003; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010) implicitly assume that the numberof immigrants is already non-negligible, and that it is normal for native people to see themin their daily lives. These assumptions hold in immigration societies but also seem to havebeen applied in empirical studies in Japan (Nukaga 2006; Ohtsuki 2007; Nagayoshi 2008).
According to the Ministry of Justice’s Foreign Residents Statistics, as at the end of 2017,46% of the total foreign population actually live in 6% of local districts (city, ward, town,
and village). Since most of these districts are located in metropolitan areas, Japanesepeople in most local districts have no daily contact with foreign people. Applying theperspective developed for immigration societies, it is difficult to explain how such people
form anti- or pro-immigration attitudes because Japan’s foreign population is just an
abstract group for them. It is, therefore, necessary to focus on more general social attitudes,
as well as those concerning threat, to better understand how attitudes toward immigration
form in the emerging immigration society of Japan. The implications of this study havepotentially broad application: as the influx of migrants continues expanding around theworld (OECD 2018), current non-immigration countries could be transformed into
societies of immigration in the near future. Thus, beyond the focal country of Japan, thisstudy’s findings could provide some insight regarding possible emerging immigration
countries.

32. Research Framework and Previous FindingsLife Course Perspective and its SignificanceSocial status and role are embedded into one’s life course and are obtained
through life course events. In life course studies, the individual is regarded
as undergoing a sequence of transitions in social status and role thatcharacterize “the lives of individuals, population subgroups, and populations”(George 1996: 249). The life course approach focuses on the heterogeneity
among individuals’ life course trajectories. This perspective differs from thedevelopmental approach, which basically focuses on a single trajectory in linewith age at the population level, with little interest in variance. Scholars
focusing on the life course perspective try to explain what happens after
status changes and how other life situations differ among heterogeneous life
course patterns (Elder 1985; George 1993).
The social-psychological approach investigates the effects ofcontemporaneous social environments on individuals’ subjective states andbehaviors. Many scholars interested in attitudes toward immigration adopt
this approach, and usually investigate “Who is against immigration?” using
cross-sectional analysis (Mayda 2006). They primarily emphasize “here andnow” aspects, with the temporal aspect often beyond their research scope(George 1996: 253).
Whether we should consider the temporal aspect conceptually andanalytically depends on purpose of each research. Nonetheless, the life course
perspective will contribute to furthering understanding of how attitudes
toward immigration form. The former argument about ethnic competition,
which mainly focus on factors causing anti-immigration attitudes, does notnecessarily exclude the dynamic aspect of racial prejudice (Blumer 1958;
Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013). From the ethnic competition perspective, on
which many immigrant scholars rely, the degree of one’s socio-economic
advantage/disadvantage defines inter-ethnic relationships. Because thissituation varies across an individual’s life course, the relationship among
ethnic groups can also change.
In addition to the level of socio-economic advantage, transitions in social
status and role also shape one’s social situation and interests, since failure to
behave and perform in accordance with associated expectations will result insocial sanctions. In most prior studies of attitudes toward immigration,4

scholars have scarcely considered changes in social status and role
expectations across one’s life course, focusing instead on inter-ethnic
relationships. However, it cannot be assumed that inter-ethnic relationships
will be shaped by socio-economic power throughout today’s Japanese society.
The ethnic competition perspective is certainly theoretically persuasive andworthy of empirical examination in Japan; however, it assumes that
immigrants are visible for Japanese people. Although this assumption is
gradually becoming more applicable in Japan, there remains a substantial
difference in foreign population size between metropolitan and rural areas,
as mentioned in the previous section. In addition, there is no clear evidence
that the foreign labor force deprives Japanese workers of labor market
opportunities (Nakamura et al. 2009).
Whereas the ethnic competition perspective is somewhat limited inscope, the assumption that transitions in social status and role affect one’ssocial, economic, and political interests, from which attitude toward
immigration emerges, is more widely applicable. The life course perspective
assumes that anti- or pro-immigration feelings emerge from not only ethnic
competition but also broader daily life experiences. In addition, the life course
perspective is more relevant in current Japanese society, and can contributeto the concept of inter-ethnic relationships. The life course and inter-ethnic
relationship perspectives are not mutually exclusive since opportunities forboth immigrants and natives in the host society interdependently determine
relationships between the two groups. Previous studies have tended to focus
primarily on immigrants, considering the size of the immigrant populationand their socio-economic situation. While these aspects are clearly important,the standpoint of people in the host society has largely been neglected byscholars. As an emerging immigration society, whether Japan proceeds tobecome an immigration state or remains reluctant to open up to immigrants
depends on public opinion about immigration. The present study will provide
findings to enrich understanding of inter-ethnic relationships in Japan.
Age-based and Event-based Approaches
There are two main types of life course approaches. One focuses on age levels, while theother concentrates on events across the life course. This subsection briefly introduces thetwo approaches and explains why this study especially relies on the latter.
What this paper terms the age-based approach suggests that age represents “a basis

5

of historical differentiation through cohorts and of social differentiation according to agegraded statuses and role sequences” (Elder 1985: 26). In an industrialized society, the vast
majority of people follow a common sequence of socially distinguished events, which areclosely connected through institutional settings and social norms (Mayer 2005; Diewald
and Mayer 2009). Under the standardized life course trajectory paradigm, each stage ofthe sequence strongly corresponds to a certain age level (Elder 1994). In other words, “thetiming of life course transitions is usually operationalized as either the average or medianage at which a transition occurs or the age by which a majority of cohort members”(George 1993: 359). Given the assumption that an age level can represent a life course
stage at the population level, we can interpret the effect of age as that of life course events,
or transitions. Some empirical studies have adopted this view (Alwin and Krosnick 1991;
Eaton et al. 2009). Life course scholars interested in the age effect’s specification haverecently employed the Age-Period-Cohort decomposition approach, interpreting theimpact of age as the influence of life stage after considering the period and cohort effects(Yang 2008).
In contrast, the event-based approach directly examines the effects of life course
events on outcomes. While life course events and aging are inseparable in the age-based
approach, the event-based approach distinguishes between them, taking greater interestin the meanings of life events themselves, rather than life stages. Changes in social status
represent shifts in social roles and the degree of socio-economic advantage, which areinter-related. In the social role view, life course transitions, through which social statuschanges, represent entry into and exit from social roles (George 1993). Socio-economic
vulnerability causes negative and pessimistic social perspectives, since downward social
mobility usually deprives one of the social roles one is supposed to perform (Thoits 1989;
Aneshensel 1992; Jakoby 2016). These aspects do not always change along with aging,and the timing of life events can vary among people. For scholars interested in specific
events across the life course, it is more straightforward to operationalize and examine
their effects.
This study adopts the event-based perspective to empirically analyze therelationship between attitude toward immigration and life course transitions. Based onprior research findings, we especially focus on how social and economic life events
influence anti- or pro-immigration feelings. In other words, our focus is not on the effectof aging. The aging effect can be interpreted as the composite effect of life course events
assumed to be age-graded. However, it is difficult to identify the impact of each specific
event using the age-based approach. It is questionable whether aging represents what
people experience at a certain life stage. Scholars point out that the life course trajectory6

in industrialized societies is increasingly becoming de-standardized, introducing variancein the timing and order of each event (Brückner and Mayer 2004; Iwai 2006). While someyouths can still follow the traditional life course, an increasing proportion of young people
will only experience certain life events, like marriage and having a stable job, later in life,
if at all. Especially regarding public opinion on immigration, there is little evidence of theinfluences of life events from a longitudinal or dynamic view. As the following section
will elaborate, we utilize a panel data including information on both attitudes toward
immigration and life events. This data enable us to examine within-individual changes in
attitude from the life course perspective, focusing on social roles and interests.
Several Types of Life Events
In analyzing attitudes toward immigration, it is a widespread approach to empiricallyconsider socio-economic situations. This is because immigrant researchers usuallyassume that socio-economically vulnerable people feel deprived of opportunities byimmigrants. However, socio-economic situations do not represent only a individual’svulnerability, but social roles and interests. Household situations are especially related towhat matters to people in their daily lives. In this subsection, we briefly review previous
findings to discuss how the household situation, socio-economic status, and other socialand cultural factors affect attitudes toward immigration.
Household Situation
One’s social position within the household or family is related to responsibility forother members. Gender-role attitude is a typical example associated with family position.
Previous studies reveal that both men and women have more traditional views about thegender-role when they become parents (e.g., Perales et al. 2018). However, at least one
study argues that the relationship between parenthood and gender-role attitude in Japanis empirically questionable (Yu and Janet 2018), but also advocates focusing on the lifecourse perspective.
Parenthood also influences attitudes on government responsibility. In an empirical study
using European Social Survey data, people with children at home were found more likely
to think that governments should contribute to social welfare policies (Banducci et al.
2016). The same study found that married people have more traditional social views.
Home-ownership is another important household event. Real estate is an expensive asset,
and its value depends on living standards in the area. Ethnic composition is a key
component of the environment, and people do not want their houses to decrease in value.
Empirical studies have shown that housing value can depreciate as the number of7

immigrants increases (Saiz and Wachter 2011; Accetturo et al. 2014). Some scholars in
the United States have examined the white flight hypothesis, which predicts that white
people leave neighborhoods in which there are a large number of minority people(Crowder 2000; Crowder and South 2008).
In the few studies of attitudes toward immigration that focus on social roles within thehousehold, findings indicate that the household situation is related to many social
attitudes, including issues of immigration. From the interest-based perspective,
parenthood, marriage, and home-ownership can be expected to negatively influence proimmigration attitudes because the inflow of immigrants makes the local people in the hostsociety to communicate with people from various ethnic backgrounds and changes in
one’s living environment. It is anticipated and harmonious for people in the host society
to live in homogeneous groups (Guest et al. 2008), and social roles stemming frompositions within the household may generate sensitivity to ethnic heterogeneity in one’s
living area.
Socio-economic Status
Prior research has typically investigated the relationship between socio-economic
status and immigration sentiment, and the perceived threat theory is frequently cited(Qullian 1995). It presumes that people with high socio-economic vulnerability are more
likely to oppose immigration inflow. For people in a lower socio-economic group,
immigrants may be perceived as depriving local people of jobs by accepting lower pay.
From the self-interest view, it is rational for them to reject immigrants so as to protect
their job opportunities.
Many researchers regard educational level as a major socio-economic factor
affecting attitudes toward immigration. Education not only makes an individual more
employable but also has a liberalizing force, providing “broader knowledge, increased
reflexibility, a more critical stance, greater personal and familial security, substantial
exposure to foreign cultures, higher acceptance of diversity, or the generation ofcosmopolitan social networks among the young adults living in urban settings” (Ceobanu
and Escandell 2010: 319). Numerous studies report that people with a higher educational
level have more positive sentiments toward immigrants (Kunovich 2002; Mayda 2006;
Rustenbach 2010), including empirical findings from Japanese data (Ohtsuki 2007;
Nagayoshi 2008). However, most previous studies have utilized cross-sectional data.
Moreover, the effect of education is controversial, since a study examining unobserved
heterogeneity in the fixed effect model demonstrates that education does not positively
influence attitudes toward immigration (Lancee and Sarrasin 2015). With the panel data8

used in this study, it is difficult to examine the effect of education since most respondents
had already finished their schooling at the time of the survey. Unobserved heterogeneity
captures a large part of the education effect, so we need to control for the time-invariant
factor in order to more accurately identify other time-variant, life-course related factors.
Employment opportunities also determine one’s socio-economic living standards.
Where local people and immigrants compete in a given labor market sector, the former
may attribute the risk of unemployment to immigrants. From the perceived threat theory,
we can predict that unemployment will lead local people to reject immigrants because
they believe their chances of securing employment are higher with a small immigrant
population. Previous empirical studies support the effect of unemployment on negative
attitudes toward immigration (Kunovich 2002; Schneider 2008; Lancee and Pardos-Prado
2013).
Even among the employed, there are supporters and opponents of immigration
inflow. From the social class perspective, people in a class without socio-economic powerlack resilience in the face of an economic downturn. One prominent example is the
manual class, and prior research in Western societies shows that socio-economic
vulnerability in this class negatively influences opinions on immigrant inflow (Quillian
1995; Kunovich 2002; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006). In the Japanese context, immigrants
are generally not permitted to provide manual labor. However, the Technical Intern
Training Program (gino-jissyu-seido) allows certain immigrants to perform these jobs,
and the number of technical intern trainees, who mainly comprise immigrants from Eastand South East Asia, exceeded 270,000 at the end of 2017. Furthermore, many
immigrants from South American countries (e.g., Brazil) are likely to be manual workers
because their long-term resident visas usually allow them to perform such jobs. Thus, therelative impact of immigrants in the manual class seems likely to increase, and we canposit from the group threat perspective that Japanese manual workers are likely to oppose
immigration. As in Western societies, previous studies in Japan have reported a negative
association between being manual class and pro-immigration attitudes (Hamada 2008).
These prior findings are insightful for developing our understanding of how
attitudes toward immigrants form in Japan. However, few studies in any region haveadopted a longitudinal approach (with Lancee and Pardos-Prado (2013) and Lancee andSarrasin (2015) being two rare exceptions). Most previous studies cited in this section
rely on cross-sectional data, but this approach cannot control for unobserved
heterogeneity among individuals. It is necessary to empirically consider the timeinvariant difference to correctly estimate the effects of life course events, sinceheterogeneity often has a confounding bias in the relationship between independent and9dependent variables. Another methodological issue is the importance of the longitudinalview in analyzing attitudes toward immigration. As mentioned in the Introduction, Japanis currently an emerging immigration society; changes in the policy context surrounding
immigrants since the early 1990s mean that inter-ethnic relationships between Japanesecitizens and immigrants may also be evolving. Changes in these relationships are shaped
not only by societal factors such as GDP, unemployment, and crime rates but also bychanges in one’s life course situation, which have received little prior attention from mostimmigrant scholars. In the present study, we try to fill this research gap and propose anadditional approach to complement the group threat, intergroup contact, and other typicaltheories.
3. Data and Method
Data and Variables
To examine whether one’s life course events affect attitude toward
immigrants, we empirically analyze data from the Japanese Life Course
Panel Surveys (JLPS). The first wave of the JLPS was conducted in 2007, andthe randomly selected original respondents were aged from 20 to 40 at theend of 2016. The youth sample, aged from 20 to 34 years old, is termed the
JLPS-Y, while the middle-aged sample, aged from 35 to 40 years old, is termed
the JLPS-M. Response rates of the first wave of the JLPS-Y and JLPS-M were
34.5% and 40.4%, respectively, for a total sample size of 4,800 in the first wave.
Follow-up surveys have been carried out annually since the first wave in 2007,
and the response rate in each wave is around 80%. The JLPS also recruitedan additional sample aged from 24 to 44 in 2011, comprising 712 youths and251 middle-aged respondents. We use both the original and additional
samples from the 1st to the 11th wave in 2017 in the present study.1
The dependent variable is attitude toward immigrant inflow. In the
JLPS, this item is measured by the following question: “It would be good tohave more foreigners coming to Japan to settle down.” Responses range from
1 (Agree) to 5 (Disagree), and we reversed the values so that higher values
represent more positive agreement. Figure 1 shows the means for the
dependent variable across survey waves. The average score for this item isslightly below 3 (Neither agree nor disagree), which indicates that Japanese
See the JLPS project website for more information (https://csrda.iss.utokyo.ac.jp/en/panel/overview/).
110

people feel slightly negative toward immigrant inflow. However, the score has
increased over the last 10 years, reflecting that negative sentiments have
gradually been mitigated. This change is partly due to within-individual
aspects, since the intra-class correlation (ICC) is 0.476 for the male sample
and 0.448 for the female sample. The ICC describes within-individual
variance as a proportion of the total variance, so these figures imply that
individual changes contribute to almost half of the variation in immigrantsentiment in our data.
2.75
2.7
2.65
2.6
2.55
2.5
2.45
2.4
2.35
2008 (w2)2010 (w4)2012 (w6)Male2014 (w8)2017 (w11)FemaleFigure 1. Mean Score by Gender for Attitude toward Immigrant Inflow in Each Wave of theJapanese Life Course Panel Surveys

We primarily focus on two sets of independent variables in this study.
The first category is socio-economic status, for which we use three variablesin the following analyses. Employment status indicates one’s employment
opportunities. We assume that non-regular employment, which includes parttime, temporary, and fixed-contract jobs, and unemployment will be
associated with greater opposition to immigrant inflow. We also use
occupational status, comprising upper, lower non-manual, and manualclasses.2 In addition, we investigate the effect of personal income.
The second set of key independent variables concerns family- andhousehold-related factors. An individual’s marital status, their household size,

In the following analyses, the lower non-manual class includes those without a job
because we estimate the effects of both employment and occupational statuses. The
effect of unemployment is adequately captured by a dummy variable for employment
status, and we can interpret dummy variables for occupational status as the effects of
the upper non-manual and manual classes compared to the lower non-manual.
2

11and whether they have children define their role in the household. In thechild-situation variable, we consider the age of the youngest child as childcare responsibility is greater in early childhood. Since primary and lowersecondary education up to 15 years old is compulsory in Japan, we distinguish
those whose youngest child is below 15 from those whose youngest child hasreached this age. We also utilize home-ownership to indicate the degree towhich one is embedded in the neighborhood.3
We include several other time-variant covariates in our empiricalmodels. Regarding hopes for Japanese society and for one’s future job and life,
people with higher values are more hopeful. The perspective on one’s living
standards can be similarly interpreted. We also use subjective social class,the strength of an individual’s political interest, and how favorably they feeltoward Japan, the U.S., and China. In addition to these attitudinal covariates,
the dummy variable of each wave, respondents’ residential area, andrespondents’ prefecture are controlled in the following fixed effect models.
Although we do not focus on socio-economic circumstances, which may haveconfounding effects on the relationship between the focal explanatory
variables and the outcome, the wave, residential area, and prefecture dummy
variables can control for these effects. Finally, we will perform acomplementary analysis on the effect of education, categorizing educational
level into four groups. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the
independent variables.

This item concerns whether one’s family lives in an owned house, regardless of theactual home owner.
3

12

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables
Mean

Employment Status (Ref: Regular)
Executive / Self-employed
0.113
Non-regular
0.094
Other
0.002
Unemployed
0.034
Student
0.024
Occupational Status (Ref: Lower Non-manual + Unemployed)
Upper Non-manual
0.253
Manual0.398
Personal Income (Ref: 250-350 million yen per annum)
No income
0.023
Less than 150 million yen
0.072
150-250 million yen
0.100
350-450 million yen
0.187
450-600 million yen
0.210
600-850 million yen
0.152
850 million yen or more
0.062
Do not know
0.011
Marital Status (Ref: Married)
Never married
0.396
Widowed
0.001
Divorced
0.025
Youngest Child's Age (Ref: Less than 15 years old)
No child
0.519
15 years or older
0.045
Single Household (Yes)
0.123
Occupy Owned House (Yes)
0.661
General Trust (Ref: Depends on circumstances)
Yes
0.270
No
0.092
Hope for Japanese Society (1: Disagree – 5: Agree)
2.588
Hope for One's Future Job and Life (1: Disagree – 5: Agree)
3.281
Perspective on One's Living Standards (1: Poor – 5: Affluent)
3.235
Subjective Social Class (1: Bottom – 10: Top)
5.192
Strength of Political Interest
2.861(1: Not interested at all – 4: Very interested)
Favorable Feelings toward Japan (0: Dislike – 100: Like)
55.287
Favorable Feelings toward the U.S. (0: Dislike – 100: Like)
50.507
Favorable Feelings toward China (0: Dislike – 100: Like)
26.823
Waves (Ref: W2)
W4
0.172
W6
0.211
W8
0.204
W11
0.176
Residential Area (Ref: Cities of 200 thousand people or more)
Metropolitan Area
0.369
Other Cities
0.325
Town or Village
0.074
Education (Ref: Senior high school)
Junior high school
0.016
Technical or Junior college
0.220
Undergraduate or Graduate degree
0.495
Number of Observations
Number of Individuals
Notes. Descriptive statistics are calculated based on observations.
We also control for the prefectures where respondents live in each wave.

Male Sample
S.D.
Min

Max

Mean

Female Sample
S.D.
Min

0.317
0.292
0.048
0.181
0.154

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

0.057
0.350
0.003
0.218
0.015

0.232
0.477
0.056
0.413
0.120

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

0.434
0.489

0
0

1
1

0.207
0.189

0.405
0.391

0
0

1
1

0.150
0.259
0.300
0.390
0.407
0.359
0.241
0.104

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.173
0.333
0.174
0.089
0.059
0.017
0.004
0.013

0.378
0.471
0.379
0.285
0.237
0.129
0.060
0.114

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.489
0.027
0.155

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.301
0.004
0.043

0.459
0.066
0.202

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.500
0.206
0.328
0.473

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

0.414
0.088
0.075
0.691

0.493
0.283
0.263
0.462

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

0.444
0.289
1.062
0.901
1.094
1.664
0.890
24.96018.951
21.248

0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0

1
1
5
5
5
10
4
100
100
100

0.258
0.072
2.593
3.292
3.074
5.017
2.415
57.40549.80327.086

0.438
0.259
0.947
0.850
1.000
1.519
0.835
21.93817.54619.952

0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0

1
1
5
5
5
10
4
100
100
100

0.377
0.408
0.403
0.381

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

0.173
0.216
0.214
0.190

0.378
0.411
0.410
0.392

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

0.483
0.468
0.263

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.319
0.347
0.079

0.466
0.476
0.270

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.124
0.415
0.500
6,823
2,172

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.008
0.438
0.293

0.088
0.496
0.455
8,005
2,465

0
0
0

1
1
1

MethodWe employ fixed effect models in the following analyses to control forunobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. This model is expressed as follows:
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡(1)

𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦̅𝑖 = 𝜇 + 𝛾(𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥̅ 𝑖 ) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡(2)

In Eq. (1), 𝛼𝑖 indicates unobserved heterogeneity, which is difficult to control

13

Max

in a pooled OLS (conventional regression) model. Because 𝛼𝑖 does not change
across time, we can remove that heterogeneity by taking person-mean
deviations for both independent and dependent variables. Eq. (2) is the fixed
effect regression model, and we rely on the results from this model in thepresent study.
A shortcoming of the fixed effect model is that we cannot estimate thecoefficients of time-invariant covariates. We use educational status as a timeinvariant variable because it changes for most people in the current Japanesesociety. Because it is not possible to consider the unobserved heterogeneity,
we also employ between effect models. The person-mean is used in the
between effect model, which is expressed as follows:𝑦̅𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑥̅ 𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡(3)

The estimates from this model correspond to previous studies using the crosssectional approach.
4. Results
Table 2 shows the results of the fixed effect models for attitude toward immigrant inflow.
Male and female samples are analyzed separately because men and women have different
social contexts in Japanese society. The ICCs are high for all models in Table 2, meaningthat the residuals of observations nested in each individual are not independent and OLS
models would not be adequate. Since high ICC values except for Model 1-2, these results
imply the necessity of using a fixed effect model, as time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity affects both the independent and dependent variables.
Models 1-1 and 2-1 are the fixed effect models including only socio-economic andhousehold-related variables for the male and female samples, respectively. Labor market
events are not related to attitude toward immigrants for both men and women, but family
and household events have some impacts on attitudes toward immigrants for women. In
Model 1-1, neither labor market or household events have an impact on attitude toward
immigrant inflow among Japanese males. Although “No income” is positively significant,we cannot conclude that personal income overall has some effect because the otherdummy variables in this category are not statistically significant. Aside from this result,only two of the wave dummy variables are found to be statistically significant. However,for Japanese females, the results for Model 2-1 shows some significant effects for marital

14

status, the youngest child’s age, and home-ownership. The “Never married” dummy
variable for marital status has a positive effect on attitude toward immigrants, suggestingthat women become more opposed to immigrant inflow when they marry. Women whose
youngest child is aged at least 15 years old are more positive about immigrants than thosewith a child below that age. Finally, living in an owned home is negatively related toattitude toward immigration among women.
Table 2. Estimates from the Fixed Effect Models
Male Sample
Model 1-1
Coef.
S.E.
Employment Status (Ref: Regular)
Executive / Self-employed
0.059
Non-regular-0.104
Other
0.386
Unemployed-0.044Student-0.142
Occupational Status (Ref: Lower Non-manual + Unemployed)
Upper Non-manual-0.008Manual-0.035
Personal Income (Ref: 250-350 million yen per annum)
No income
0.278
Less than 150 million yen
0.113
150-250 million yen
0.056
350-450 million yen-0.061450-600 million yen-0.070600-850 million yen-0.074850 million yen or more
-0.147
Do not know
0.045
Marital Status (Ref: Married)
Never married-0.045
Widowed
0.298
Divorced-0.106Youngest Child’s Age (Ref: Less than 15 years old)
No child
0.016
15 years or older
0.008
Single Household (Yes)
0.063
Occupy Owned House (Yes)-0.046
Generally Trusting Others (Ref: Depends on circumstances)
Yes
No
Hope for Japanese Society
Hope for One’s Future Job and Life
Perspective on One’s Living Standards
Subjective Social Class
Strength of Political Interest
Favorable Feelings toward Japan
Favorable Feelings toward the U.S.
Favorable Feelings toward China
Waves (Ref: W2)
W4-0.030
W6
0.029
W8
0.116
W11
0.103
Residential Area (Ref: Cities of 200 thousand people or more)
Metropolitan Area
0.065
Other Cities-0.027
Town or Village
0.145Intercept
2.780
𝜎𝑢2
1.090
2
𝜎𝑒
0.633
𝐼𝐶𝐶
0.633
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑢𝑖 , 𝒙𝒊𝒕 )-0.473
2
𝑅𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛
0.02102
𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛
0.0006
2
𝑅𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙0.0013
No. of Observations
6,823
No. of Individuals
2,172*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 (Two-tailed test)
Note: The prefectures where respondents live are controlled in all models.

*

*

***

Model 2-1
Coef.
S.E.

Model 2-2
Coef.
S.E.

0.083
0.066
0.244
0.104
0.113

0.070
-0.1090.418-0.042-0.199

0.082
0.066
0.242
0.103
0.112

-0.009-0.005
0.204
0.014
0.164

0.071
0.044
0.181
0.057
0.098

-0.011-0.011
0.152
0.014
0.120

0.070
0.043
0.179
0.056
0.096

0.063
0.057

-0.010-0.035

0.062
0.056

-0.040-0.007

0.052
0.041

-0.027-0.003

0.051
0.041

0.133
0.078
0.058
0.047
0.056
0.071
0.100
0.136

0.259
0.117
0.051
-0.072-0.084-0.097-0.176
0.072

0.132
0.077
0.057
0.046
0.056
0.071
0.099
0.135

-0.063-0.014
0.008
0.017
0.109
0.151
-0.065-0.194

0.062
0.047
0.041
0.047
0.062
0.105
0.213
0.110

-0.071-0.018
0.008
0.010
0.084
0.137
-0.121-0.215

0.061
0.046
0.041
0.046
0.061
0.103
0.209
0.108

0.075
0.672
0.119

-0.0420.417-0.051

0.074
0.664
0.118

0.135
0.272
-0.029

0.058
0.267
0.089

0.136
0.252
-0.013

0.064
0.071
0.065
0.047

0.031
0.000
0.054
-0.042

0.063
0.070
0.065
0.047

0.076
0.119
-0.016-0.107

0.057
0.047
0.066
0.036

0.071
0.110
-0.037-0.0930.071-0.042
0.120
0.023
0.026
0.013
0.001
-0.001
0.002
0.003

**

Female Sample

Model 1-2
Coef.
S.E.

0.034
0.034
0.036
0.041

-0.039
0.062
0.109
0.095

0.105
0.092
0.137
0.331

0.047
-0.030
0.138
2.081
1.001
0.618
0.618
0.020
0.04590.01970.0204
6,823
2,172

15

*

***

***

†
**
*

***

*

*

**

0.035
0.050
0.016
0.020
0.017
0.011
0.021
0.001
0.001
0.001

0.030
0.015
0.179
0.028
0.011
-0.0060.006-0.001
0.001
0.003

0.035
0.035
0.038
0.042

-0.006
0.108
0.229
0.191

0.104
0.091
0.136
0.346

-0.026-0.064-0.130
2.974
0.805
0.491
0.621
-0.4750.03810.00020.0002
8,005
2,465

***
***
***

***

0.028
0.028
0.030
0.034

-0.009
0.132
0.198
0.182

0.080
0.069
0.102
0.314

-0.007-0.063-0.124
2.374
0.758
0.473
0.616
-0.4250.07380.01060.0157
8,005
2,465

*

*

*

**

***

***

***
***
***

***

0.058
0.262
0.088
0.056
0.046
0.065
0.036
0.029
0.046
0.014
0.016
0.014
0.010
0.018
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.028
0.029
0.031
0.034
0.079
0.067
0.100
0.320

In Models 1-2 and 2-2, we added covariates concerning social and political attitudes.
Even after introducing these variables, the coefficients of the life course event variables
exhibited little change. The effect of hope for Japanese society is significantly positive
for both men and women, but hope for one’s future job and life does not have a significant
effect. Favorable feelings toward China also has a positive effect on attitude toward
immigrants, but such feelings toward Japan and the U.S. are insignificant. For the malesample, the dummy variable of generally trusting others has a positive effect, but this is
not found in the female sample.
Finally, Table 3 shows the results of the between effect models, in which we added
the educational status variable. Other independent variables are the same as in the fixed
effect models of Table 2.
For both men (Model 3-1) and women (Model 4-1), the dummy variable ofundergraduate or graduate degree has a positive effect on the dependent variable.
However, in Models 3-2 (male sample) and 4-2 (female sample), that dummy variable isnot statistically significant and the magnitude of the coefficient also decreases by half.
This means that a considerable part of the effect of education results from the social
attitudes of more educated people.
The results for labor market and household-related life events differ from those in
the fixed effect models in Table 2. In the between effect models, labor market events
seem to be more important. For the male sample, the manual dummy variable shows anegative coefficient in Model 3-1, while the coefficient for non-regular employment issignificantly negative in Model 3-2. For the female sample, non-employment also has anegative impact in Models 4-1 and 4-2. These results are consistent with those ofprevious studies.
By contrast, the household situation shows almost no significant effects. An exception is
the negative coefficient for having a youngest child aged 15 or older. However, thisbecomes insignificant after introducing other social attitude variables in Model 4-2. Thus,
the household-related factors seem to be irrelevant to attitudes toward immigration in
the between effect models.

16

Table 3. Estimates from the Between Effect Models
Male Sample
Model 3-1
Coef.
S.E.
Employment Status (Ref: Regular)
Executive / Self-employed
0.094
Non-regular-0.153Other
1.437
Unemployed-0.152Student-0.218
Occupational Status (Ref: Lower Non-manual + Unemployed)
Upper Non-manual-0.061
Manual-0.121
Personal Income (Ref: 250-350 million yen per annum)
No income
0.144
Less than 150 million yen
0.241
150-250 million yen
0.167
350-450 million yen-0.058450-600 million yen-0.011600-850 million yen
0.237
850 million yen or more
0.069
Do not know
0.446
Marital Status (Ref: Married)
Never married-0.103
Widowed-0.011
Divorced
0.197
Youngest Child's Age (Ref: Less than 15 years old)
No child-0.02015 years or older
0.035
Single Household (Yes)
0.024
Occupy Owned House (Yes)-0.100Generally Trusting Others (Ref: Depends on the circumstances)
Yes
No
Hope for Japanese Society
Hope for One's Future Job and Life
Perspective on One's Living Standards
Subjective Social Class
Strength of Political Interest
Favorable Feelings toward Japan
Favorable Feelings toward the U.S.
Favorable Feelings toward China
Waves (Ref: W2)
W4-0.110
W6
0.131
W8
0.092
W11
0.019
Residential Area (Ref: Cities of 200 thousand people or more)
Metropolitan Area
0.011
Other Cities
0.028
Town or Village
0.083
Education (Ref: Senior high school)
Junior high school-0.125
Technical or Junior college
0.025
Undergraduate or Graduate degree
0.168Intercept
2.527
2𝑅𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛0.004
2
𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛
0.069
2𝑅𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙
0.042
No. of Observations
6,823
No. of Individuals
2,172*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 (Two-tailed test)
Note: The prefectures where respondents live are controlled in all models.

5.

*

*

*

0.071
0.091
0.816
0.195
0.176

0.057
-0.1831.035-0.266-0.291

0.062
0.058

-0.097-0.084

0.222
0.123
0.101
0.089
0.083
0.092
0.123
0.220

0.316
0.278
0.155
-0.067-0.057
0.165
0.004
0.393

0.089
0.642
0.147
0.082
0.143
0.086
0.054

***

Model 4-1
Coef.
S.E.

0.067
0.085
0.759
0.183
0.165

-0.215-0.091-0.277-0.223
0.010

0.058
0.054

0.019
0.001

0.207
0.115
0.095
0.083
0.079
0.089
0.119
0.206

0.227
0.161
0.045
0.140
0.022
0.329
0.215
0.227

-0.080
0.177
0.075

0.083
0.597
0.137

0.021
-0.160-0.004

0.003
0.053
0.018
-0.068

0.076
0.133
0.080
0.051

0.030
-0.1830.042-0.0300.177-0.108
0.149
0.015
0.053
0.002
0.079
-0.006
0.002
0.014

**

Female Sample

Model 3-2
Coef.
S.E.

0.123
0.102
0.126
0.134

-0.170
0.233
0.244
0.149

0.066
0.058
0.094
0.152
0.058
0.057
0.144

*

*

**

***

*

**
***

***

-0.027-0.022-0.001

0.061
0.054
0.087

0.007
0.028
0.039

-0.036
0.059
0.089
1.516
0.023
0.202
0.133
6,823
2,172

0.142
0.055
0.053
0.180

-0.040
0.070
0.116
2.498
0.003
0.053
0.021
8,005
2,465

***

*

*

-0.209-0.075-0.264-0.217-0.014

0.050
0.054

-0.034
0.019

0.047
0.051

0.120
0.081
0.078
0.098
0.103
0.172
0.340
0.160

0.198
0.117
0.030
0.121
0.069
0.239
0.036
0.310

0.113
0.076
0.073
0.092
0.097
0.162
0.319
0.151

0.067
0.269
0.085

0.015
0.012
0.034

0.064
0.253
0.081

0.062
0.083
0.080
0.044

0.057
-0.1210.050-0.039

0.058
0.078
0.075
0.042

0.031
-0.204
0.184
0.028
0.047
-0.0200.073-0.004
0.003
0.010
0.200
0.215
0.476
0.095

*

*

*
*
***

*
***

*

0.091
0.060
0.475
0.101
0.180

0.056
0.082
0.025
0.032
0.025
0.016
0.025
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.115
0.095
0.119
0.126

*

*

Model 4-2
Coef.
S.E.

*

*

**
***

*

**
***
*
***

0.085
0.057
0.445
0.095
0.171

0.045
0.075
0.023
0.028
0.022
0.014
0.021
0.001
0.001
0.001

0.099
0.086
0.093
0.102

0.108
0.204
0.478
0.209

0.052
0.045
0.071

-0.014
0.042
0.036

0.049
0.042
0.067

0.162
0.041
0.048
0.127

-0.071
0.041
0.057
1.544
0.031
0.174
0.111
8,005
2,465

0.153
0.039
0.047
0.160

*
***
*

***

0.094
0.081
0.088
0.097

Conclusion
These empirical findings from nationally representative panel data suggest that the

fixed effect model is useful to investigate the impacts of life course events on theformation of attitudes toward immigrants. In the fixed effect approach, the difference17

between the results in Tables 2 and 3 comes from unobserved heterogeneity, which affects
both independent and dependent variables. It is, thus, misleading to rely only on the crosssectional approach, since this unobserved heterogeneity generates a substantial part of therelationship between the independent variables and attitude toward immigrant inflow.
Methodologically, the fixed effect approach will contribute to obtaining more adequate
findings.
This paper adopted the life course perspective to investigates how attitudes toward
immigrants form in Japan. Neither family nor household-related events have previously
been examined in Japan (Ohtsuki 2007; Nagayoshi 2008; Hamada 2008). We found thatlife events such as marriage, having children under 6 years old, and home ownership are
negatively associated with pro-immigration sentiment among women. Japanese womenare expected to take responsibility for housework and childcare (Yu and Janet 2018). In
playing family roles as wives and mothers, they need to be conscious about their living
circumstances. By contrast, husbands are likely to entrust domestic matters to wives, sohousehold events do not directly influence the formation of their social attitudes. In futurestudies in Japan, immigrants should be considered not only as labor market competitors
but also neighbors.
Inconsistent with the group threat hypothesis, the effects of labor market life eventswere insignificant in the fixed effect model for males and females. These results imply
that negative labor market events do not tend to cause negative feelings toward
immigrants among Japanese citizens, presumably because there is little direct competition
between the two groups for labor market opportunities. Immigrants in Japan are
institutionally segregated from Japanese workers by their resident statuses (Kamibayashi2015); this segregation makes immigrants invisible to many local people and preventscompetition between ethnicities in the Japanese labor market. This poses a dilemma
regarding the future social integration of immigrants in Japan’s emerging immigrationsociety, as Japanese workers may come to feel they are competing with immigrants forjobs.
In addition to these life events, changes in other social attitudes are also found to
influence attitude toward immigrant inflow. Though not our paper’s primary focus, hopefor Japanese society is associated with a positive attitude toward immigrants. By contrast,
hope for one’s future job and life shows no significant association with this attitude ineither the fixed effect or between effect model. One possible interpretation is thatJapanese citizens see immigrant inflow as not a personal matter but a social matter, andthat interpretation is consistent with no effect of changes in socio-economic statuses in
the fixed effect models. Hope for Japanese society concerns expectations of society’s

18ability to cope with the challenges accompanying social changes, and raising expectation
is important for welcoming immigrants and constructing a good relationship between
immigrants and Japanese people. Social science research can provide empirical findingsthat help us to think what we should and can do. To better understand this topic, further
studies in societies with a variety of social contexts are necessary.
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