Coalichain
People. Direct. Democracy.
.............................................................................

Shahar Larry, Levi Samama

Version 3.0 | February 16th, 2023

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1.

Executive Summary

1.1.

Overview: Blockchain- powered Group-governance

Coalichain – tech-platform for effective, accountable, people-driven governance of groups (e.g., NGOs,
decentralized communities, municipalities, companies, or political parties). Representatives present theiragenda directly to voters; make clear and enforceable promises; transparently raise money and more. Voterstrack reps. performance and use smart-contracts to enforce accountability. The blockchain architecture
ensures all transactions are public, transparent and immutable. The ZOOZ crypto-token facilitates andguarantees the independence, transparency and integrity of transactions and measures participation andgovernance impact.

1.2.

Opportunity: Solving Representative Democracy

Coalichain is addressing a global problem that most of us have given up on: How to create a governancemechanism that is truly representative, that is immune to corruption, that makes it easy for people to voice
their opinion, continuously without slowing the group down. The reality is that we all live in groups and at thesame time we are not involved in how they are run.

1.3.

Problem: Too Much Power. Too Few Reps. Not Enough Accountability.

Representative democracy is rigid, slow and lacking in its ability to
self-regulate.
No accountability – Weak restraints on elected officials●
leads to systemic corruption“Carte-blanche” – Electing one person/small group to●
speak for us on all things

1.4.

Solution: Frictionless, Inexpensive and Flexible Democracy

Governance as a Service solution that allows group members to delegate other members as representatives.
Accountable – Delegates’ commitments are formalized and recorded and enforced by smart●
contracts. Crowd-based monitoring triggers the smart-contracts and delivers affective oversight.
Accessible – People participate and engage in their group-governance from their mobile phone.
●“Liquid” – Reduced cost and friction makes the democratic process “liquid” – people can split their●vote and delegate power, any time, to different reps depending on the issue.
The ZOOZ –– is a dedicated crypto-token for in-DApp transactions (e.g., donations) and for incentivizing
participation.

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2.

Context and Motivation

2.1.

We live in Groups

People live in groups.
We all belong to many groups: our neighborhood, town, district, country or continent, at work, in unions,where we volunteer, where we play, where we study, on social media.
What do we mean, at least in this paper, when we say "Group"?
Think of a group as a set of people that 1) identify themselves as belonging to that set, and 2) are accepted by(enough) other members of the set as belonging to that set.
The source of this identification of belonging can stem from multiple sources. It could be a common purpose,
geography, language, preference, and even medical condition. As long as enough people in that group agree
on the identifier and recognize it.
We employ different forms of government to manage, guide and operate our groups.
2.1.1. Unpacking Group Governance
Governance systems describe the ways in which groups manage, guide and operate. Governance includes thedifferent ways in which decisions are made, policy, purpose and rules are set and enforced, and how disputes
are settled in a group.
When we think about governance, we must first go beyond the popular notion of the word and realize that it
does not necessitate centricity. Governance must be an efficient, effective mean of realizing the group's
purpose.
2.1.2. Who Sets the Policy?
Think of corporate governance. The shareholders can express their wants in the general assembly and in theirbuy, sell or hold actions. The company's board of directors is supposed to represent the interest of theshareholders. The Executive Suite is responsible for executing the directions of the board. However,effectively, who sets the policy? Who defines the agenda? In one company a strong CEO can be the dominant
force in setting the policy, in another, it is the board and in a third, it can be the union. If you think about thegroups that you are members of, you will soon see that in most, if not all, of them the policy is set by a small
leadership.
2.1.3. Representative Democracy - Compromise and Proxy PowerWe all know democracy is not perfect. Nevertheless, most of us think it is the “least worst” form ofgovernance. In order for democracy to be effective and efficient we needed to make some concessions. The
most apparent1 was moving from direct and pure democracy to the representative model. It makes sense:
Consensus – It is not clear that it is easy or practical to decipher the wants and purpose of the group’s●
members. How do you decide what the “group wants” if on a specific issue there are diametrical positions
that are split 70/30 among its members? Do you ignore the 30%? In all cases? Representative democracy
acknowledges this problem and solves it by transferring the decision-making power to a smaller group thatcan more easily get to a reasonable consensus.
Cost – Even if we could find a way to measure consensus and balance the different variables in a●reasonable way, in large groups, asking the members every time a decision needs to be made, what they
think, is too expensive to be practical.
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Others included, the protection of minorities, taking measures to ensure basic rights supersede the majority vote and more.

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Expedience – A small, authoritative set of representatives has the ability to act fast. Deliberating●
every decision with the entire membership body is many times too slow to be effective.
Expertise – Some decisions require knowledge and expertise that are not common.
●
Simply put, the day-to-day operations of a group, be it a country or a start-up company, are made out of manydecisions. Too many for the group members to consider and vote on. A CEO of a company cannot go and ask
her board every time she wants to buy a computer or engage a client. For the CEO to perform her job, sheneeds the freedom and power to act independently. If a hospital is considering the best medical procedure totreat a patient, asking the entire body of stakeholders is unlikely to yield the best decision. Most people will
not have the required knowledge to understand the pros and cons. Asking a select group of experienced
doctors is a far more promising avenue. The representative democracy allows group members to transfer theirright to affect decisions (delegate power) to a smaller group of representatives.
So, we compromised and gave our representatives the right to decide for us, to vote for us, and the power toact on our behalf. Since we cannot effectively monitor their every action and since we have to give themenough freedom to operate, we effectively allow them to set the policy, that dictates the operations,
allocation of resources and the issues that demand decisions. Too many times, this leads to corruption.
2.1.4. Power Attracts the Corruptible
So? Is that a bad thing?
Yes! It is, in many cases, a bad thing. The roots of this problem of corruption stem from a misunderstanding ofrepresentation. We assume that representatives should have power (ideally derived from their people). This issimply not the case. Representatives are not supposed to have any power at all. Ideally, they are supposed to
be a vehicle of power, carrying and using the group members’ power (not their own).
We gave them power as a compromise and inadvertently provided them with almost unchecked power.
Putting so much power in the hands of very few representatives, that are not accountable to the purpose of
the group or the wants of its members, is a problem. This power is seductive. Baron Acton famously wrote:"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men..."Just under a 100 years later, David Brin wrote: "It’s said that 'power corrupts,' but actually it’s more true thatpower attracts the corruptible." Either way we are stuck with corruption.
The fact that the representatives’ actions should be transparent and open to oversight, and that the groupmembers can decide not to elect them next time – should be sufficient deterrents from representatives
taking advantage of their power. Well, they are not (sufficient deterrents).
2.1.5. How Groups Should Be
We want our groups to be effective and efficient in realizing the purpose, sustainable in being robust, stable
and adaptive, and just (fair) in execution.
These categories are not mutually exclusive, and they echo of each other. For example, if we are fair in
execution, group members feel better and therefore are more likely to stay and support it making it more
effective and more sustainable.
Unpacking these terms, we identify additional required attributes:●

Incorruptible and Transparent – Avoid/prevent the abuse of power by the few●

Trustworthy – Ensure that records/transactions are immutable●

Equitable – Distribute resources and value fairly

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Unbiased – Allowing for anonymity and removing personal judgment in decision making, where it is●possible and useful, will reduce bias
Ethical – Act in a way that is congruent with what the group members believe to be self-evident and●inalienable rights.
●

Productive – Avoid waste, optimize efficiency and keep cost effective

2.2.

Escapism

This paper does not describe an agenda to replace governments. In fact, it describes a decentralized platformthat abdicates the agenda and gives it back to the people that make the groups – for them to decide how to
run their lives. Nevertheless, we would like to demonstrate a few points by looking at facts from the domainof general elections and systems of governance of countries. General election is an easy example because it isusually public, and therefore provides a lot of insightful information. The sentiments we identified are found,
if you think about it, in almost every other governance system of any other group.
Here’s the gist of it. There seems to be a growing consensus that democracy is what people need and at thesame time there is a constant decline in participation. It is as if we assimilated the concept of democracy,
and once we did that, we “checked out”. The reason for this trend of disengagement and escapism stems
from the growing feeling that what we do does not matter and will not affect how things are run, so whybother?
2.2.1. Confidence in Democracy is Falling
According to Freedom House2, out of 195 countries, 87 countries have reasonably free and fair elections (~2bn voters). According to the World Bank, 88% of people think that elections are important for economic
development, while only 45% have confidence in the honesty of the elections. Indeed, the influence ofinterest groups on elections is increasing. In the US in 2016 alone lobbying spend exceeded $3bn USD3. A
paper published in 2009 in the Journal of Law and Politics4, showed that lobbying delivered $220 USD forevery dollar spent (22,000% ROI).
2.2.2. Voters Disengaging
With low levels of confidence, fewer voters exercise their right. Voter turnout rates in democratic countries
are quite low and have been steadily declining5. In the US 2016 elections, voter turnout was only 55%.
According to a World Bank report from 20176, election turnout over the last 25 years dropped by more than10%.
2.2.3. Expensive Process
Elections are expensive. In the US the combined direct cost of the 2012 presidential elections and the 2014
midterm elections was around $13bn USD. With 126 million voters, that is around $100 USD per voter.
Although the US spend on elections is extraordinarily high, even at $50 USD or $10 USD, it is an expensive
venture for such poor results.

2

https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-20173https://www.statista.com/statistics/257337/total-lobbying-spending-in-the-us/

4https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1375082

5

https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/voter-turnout-trends-around-the-world.pdf

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http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017

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2.3.

More than Voting

2.3.1. Wrong Challenges / Right Opportunity
Over the past couple of decades there has been significant work done in developing electronic voting. Thesedevelopment tracks are not the concern of this paper. Application of blockchain technology and especially theability to transact, directly, peer to peer, is not about progressing from the paper ballot.
So, what is it about? Well, some claim that it is about a secure vote. In fact, most of the “blockchain
democracy” ventures out there either state this as their prime driver or give it a significant role. The problem
with this approach is that it addresses a challenge that does not exist. Election fraud is a very rare andinfrequent problem (in democracies)7.
Indeed, most blockchain-based governance solutions focus on the tokenization of the vote. If we transfer our
vote power to a token that can be moved and used in different ways, we get all kinds of cool advantages. For
example, (as is shown in Democracy Earth), it will allow us to make the democratic “liquid”, i.e., voters will beable to split their vote and “micro-transact” with their voting power on different issues. That’s pretty cool. We
like Democracy Earth. Nevertheless, they are the exception. Most governance ventures do not transcend acyber security, potential problem of secure voting.
2.3.2. “Currencization” of Influence
In our work, we identified a key element, missed by others. If we are successful in promoting the participationof the public in the governance of their groups, we will see a new type of human activity. One that was notcommon before. Much the same way that touchscreens and smartphones changed the way we behave andact. People and organization are soon attracted to these new types of human activities and try to provide
value and profit from them. For example, we are now used to being exposed to advertising while playing
games on our smartphone. Attention is a new type of “currency” and it is measured and traded in fungible
units of impressions or time. In the same way we can say that the activity of stating one’s opinion on various
topics relating to the governance of one’s group, is a new value-creating activity. This new activity will create
value and there’s no reason we will not be able to harness it as a currency. We call this the currencization of
influence. For more about this see § ‎A in the Appendices. It is important to make clear, that we see theblockchain, cryptocurrencies and smart contracts trifecta not as a solution for the tokenization of the vote. We
see them as the foundations of an opportunity to deliver value-creating, fair governance platform that create
a new economy, capable of supporting a new currency.

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Election fraud may become an issue if we use digital voting – which is why blockchain is such an attractive solution. Indeed, the fact thatthe blockchain is both public and anonymous, and it being immutable will solve for this potential challenge.

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3.

The Coalichain Platform

3.1.

Rationale and Purpose

The reality of our different systems of governance is one of powerless, discounted voters and “bent”,
disillusioned candidates. The biggest pain we identify is that we have resigned and accepted this as a reality
we cannot change. We have become sedated.
Representatives are not born bad - they become bad. A candidate that wants to win and keep her position,quickly learns that she cannot rely on her ideals alone. She has to either bend or fail.
That sucks.
Coalichain is a decentralized-democracy ecosystem, based on blockchain and smart-contracts and fueled by
the ZOOZ – a new cryptocurrency. It delivers effective, accountable, people-driven governance to any
organization or group of people, from DAOs, through companies, NGOs, municipalities, and all the way toprimaries and general elections. Coalichain allows representatives to showcase their agenda directly to theirvoters; make clear and enforceable promises; transparently raise money and more. It also allows anyone to
track the performance of elected officials and hold them accountable.
In an ideal world, all representatives would communicate directly with each and every potential voter. They
would be able to promise things to them, share their platform and win over their votes. They would also be
accountable for those promises. Sounds like a dream?
Today’s technological reality of global access to information and hyper-interconnectivity, and recent
developments in Distributed Ledger Technology (i.e., blockchain) and cryptographic currencies, have madethis dream a real possibility.
Coalichain’s purpose is to realize an effective, democratic and accountable electoral, representational system
and reestablish a direct, transparent and trusting relationship between voters and their elected officials.

3.2.

Problem – No Real Accountability, No Real Choice

We are addressing two key problems:“Carte-blanche” – We normally elect one person or a small group of people that are supposed to●
speak in one voice – our voice. This representative covers all the decisions. We give them “carte-balance”
and we do not have the freedom to express our vote per decision, case or situation.
Accountability – there is no real accountability for representatives. With no real consequences, they●
are free to do what they want. Democracies slowly become de-facto oligarchies. Moreover, even if we don’t
vote for them again, the choice of candidates is so limited, it does not really matter.

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3.3.

Principles

Coalichain follows several principles, aimed at realizing its above stated purpose:
Disintermediation – break the existing insulation between the candidates and their voters and●allow for direct accountable communication8
Transparency – all actions made by candidates on Coalichain are visible to all users – voters and●other candidates alike
Inclusiveness and Democratization – people can become candidates without the support of major●sponsors. Anyone can support a candidate – no matter the amount of contribution.
Liquidity – real life can’t be “boxed” into a single representative’s views. We think it is critical to●have the possibility of splitting our views and empowering different representatives to have our
proxy-power for different issues.
Accountability – we teach our kids that breaking a promise has consequences. It’s time we all adopt●
this principle
Integrity – it is vital to keep the integrity of the political process and we try to systematically●weed-out foreign interferences or immaterial influences

3.4.

Overview

There are two main target audiences for Coalichain. The voters and the candidates (both current and potential
politicians, elected officials, leaders, etc.).
If you are a voter who wants to join Coalichain, you will register and identify yourself (using best-of-breed
KYC). Each Coalichain user and potential voter will have a unique and virtually impossible-to-tamper-with
Coalichain profile and identity. Coalichain users can also become candidates. They can use the many
Coalichain features (see below) to present themselves to the voters and try to rally support. They can use theapp to raise money, build a network, publish their opinions and more.
The key aspect of Coalichain is smart contract-based accountability. The first stage of implementing
accountability would be based on a “carrot and stick” strategy. Voters will be able to condition (thanks tosmart contracts and crypto) donations with real results. For example, promise to donate money if a certain billis passed (the “carrot”). At the same time, voters can impose a fine on the candidate if he fails to uphold his
promises. The details of this mechanism are described below.
We hope you are starting to see the bigger picture. Coalichain is a platform for fair and free elections andpolitics. It gives power to the people and “levels the playing field” with the powerful interest groups. It will
incentivize a new generation of effective leaders with a true mandate from the people.
From the candidates’ point of view, this type of direct contractual relationship with the voters, means she will
not need millions to fund her campaign. Logistics will be simplified. This technology is making it possible for a
candidate to communicate, interact and transact with a large public without needing for mass-media outlets.
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It is true that the proliferation of social media has made it easier for voters to interact with their representatives. However, theseinteractions are still not an efficient tool for influencing or affecting decision-making and the layer of insulation is still there for mostpractical purposes. In fact, Coalichain can be perceived as an upgrade to these social media. It will be more transparent, secure andharder to manipulate. It will have built-in accountability mechanisms. A true voice of the people.

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The platform will reduce the cost of elections by a factor of 10 (and up to 100 in certain countries). It means
candidates will be freed from the “vice” of the wealthy power-groups and it will reduce the risk (or certainty)of corruption.
Coalichain will be active year-round and not only around elections. It will serve as a direct one-to-manychannel of communication and will allow elected representatives to communicate directly with their potential
voters about both daily matters, and especially around significant decisions.

3.5.

Liquid Representation

Liquid Representation means we have the ability to express our different views about different topics inmultiple votes, through multiple representatives. Coalichain allows voters to decide who their rep will be foreach topic and they can also change this decision continuously. This means:●●●●

Rich and dynamic reflection of opinions (No more “one vote for everything”)
Better more professional decisions
Everyone’s voice is heard
Anyone can be a candidate

3.6.

Smart Contracts for Accountability

A representative using Coalichain will seal his promises into smart contracts. It means that we, the people, canmonitor his promises and actions and rate them. If he does not keep his promises the smart contract willautomatically execute consequences that the representative himself recorded.
Here’s a concrete example.
Imagine Bob wants to be a representative in the local municipality.
●
Bob promises to be active on topics of education.
●
He makes several promises. Let’s focus on one of those promises. Bob promises to propose and●promote and vote for allocation of city budget to raise salaries for teachers.
Bob commits this promise into a smart contract with the following condition:●
If I am elected to the position of [name_of_position], I promise to:○
Propose to allocate city budget of at least [X], towards raising teachers' salaries at a rate of at least■[Y] percent.
Promote this proposal by convincing other representatives to support it.
■
Vote for this proposal.
■
Do all that within 6 months of the 1st of the month, following my election.
■
To ensure this condition is met an automatic poll will be launched on the 1st on the month after I am○elected. City residents will be able to rate my performance on this issue in this poll. The poll will be closed
after 6 months.
If the average rating of my performance will be:○
Below [n], I will reimburse 50% of all ZOOZ donations■
9Below [m], I will resign from office■
Residents monitor Bob’s activities and rate his performance and the smart contract is activated or●
not according to the tallied score.9

3.7.

Key Features

3.7.1. Election Setup and Voting
Coalichain’s voting tool is easy to use, adaptable and secure. It can be used for any type of election (DAOS,
local government, premieres, corporate board, unions and any other group of people that decide to organize
in a representation democratic governance), to vote for candidates, or on polls and surveys.
To maintain the integrity and safety of votes and prevent fraud, both voters and candidates registering to theplatform go through a rigorous verification and authentication process, that is recorded on the blockchain andcreates a unique ID for each user. Before voting, voters go through a second authentication process. The useof blockchain for authentication, as well as voting itself, makes sure no one can tamper with votes, polls or
petitions – not even the platform itself.
3.7.2. Fundraising and Donations
The ZOOZ, allows any voter to donate to a campaign, starting from the smallest amount. Candidates cancollect donations directly from their supporters, and see which initiative is most important for the voters,
based on the amount of funds raised and number of supporters.

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Moderation mechanisms and opportunities for the representative to defend their actions will be available on the platform and will makesure this mechanism is not abused. In addition, sanctions can be imposed Pro-rata: If for example 65% of the voters feel that thecandidate did not meet his promise (and 35% feel that he either did or that he was justified in not keeping it), the unhappy voters will
have the right to claim the pro-rata reimbursement - meaning they can demand 65% of their money (out of the 50% promised) back.
There is a range of potential implications for a candidate not keeping his word. Coalichain will offer a “menu” of potential implications, forexample, a fine, full reimbursement, denial of additional funds and even resignation. These options will be recorded on the smart
contracts.

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3.8.

The ZOOZ

3.8.1. Definition and Purpose
The ZOOZ is the crypto-asset Coalichain is using for the operation of theplatform. The ZOOZ will function as an internal token facilitating transactions,
donations, acquisition of services, etc., by users of the platform. It will be theonly allowed in-DApp “currency”. As the platform matures, we see the ZOOZ
evolving and becoming a metric for measuring and encouraging participation,
influence and impact of people in the different members they belong to (i.e.,unit of accounting for caring about and being active in group governance). We
call that stage ZOOZ. For more about the ZOOZ see ‎A in the Appendices.
3.8.2. ZOOZ Functionality
Facilitation of internal transactions – ZOOZ is the official “Currency” of Coalichain – It is used to raise●
funds, buy services, such as polls and surveys, and for in-kind transactions with service providers such as KYC
service providers, or consultants, writers, marketers etc.
Support tool – Voters will be able to use ZOOZ to show support. For example, they can use ZOOZ to●promote and improve the visibility of a candidate on the platform. The impact and popularity of different
promises and decisions can be measured by the number of different voters supporting them and by theaccumulated amount of ZOOZ used to promote them. Since support does not have a price or denomination(it is “liquid”), the ZOOZ as a cryptocurrency allowing for micro-payments is not only the ideal tool for
inclusion, it is the only tool that allows this type of public support.
Accountability – ZOOZ donated to a campaign can be associated (committed) to a specific promise●and conditioned by its fulfillment. In case the promise is not fulfilled, sanctions will be activated, ranging frompublication of “breaking a promise” all the way to donation retraction and fines (under certain conditions).
Community Building – In being the sole currency for all on-platform transactions it will build a shared●sense of trust, purpose, and community.
Financial Management – It will make tracking and financial management easier and more directly●
related to the platform’s performance.
Transparency – Since all commitments (promises enforced with Smart Contracts) made by candidates●
to supporters are public, anyone trying to influence the election will risk exposure and public ramifications(e.g., loss of reputation).
At a later stage, Coalichain intends to expand the ZOOZ functionality to include:
Participation measurement – ZOOZ will be used to measure the level of activity, participation and●influence its holder has or has demonstrated. These may include: service provision, supporting, voting,publishing information, setting up events and elections, etc. For more about that vision see §‎A in the
Appendices.

113.8.3. FAQ about the ZOOZ
Shouldn’t voting be free?
●
Perhaps. However, voting is not free. Today when we vote, we pay – in time, in gas and of course in taxes.
There’s a cost associated with elections and governance, and one way or another, the group members needto cover it.
Coalichain is more than just voting. Candidates that run for office need to finance campaigns and that means
donations, services and financial transactions. So, elections are not free.
●

Why does Coalichain need a token?

It doesn’t. It is possible to use existing crypto-assets such as ether (or any other form of money) to run
Coalichain.
●

So, why do we need the ZOOZ?

Using a platform-dedicated crypto-token insulates the Coalichain economy from other economies (e.g., theether economy). This insulation provides two key protections:Protection from dilution of value – Value created by the platform-users does not dissipate in the○much larger cryptocurrency economy (for example ether).
Protection from price fluctuations – If we use ether, we become subject to price fluctuations that are○
not caused by or related to the activity on the Coalichain platform.
Voting might be too expensive in the future if we use ether or other currency. Thanks to Coalichain○
private Blockchain and new Blockchain protocol (POI), vote price will always be reasonable or close to free inthe future if we gain nodes willing to donate and write transactions for free.
The value of a crypto-token is set by demand and supply. If Coalichain provides an attractive service, thatpeople find value in, they will adopt and increase demand and with it the price of the ZOOZ. This will benefit
Coalichain users and especially the early adopters that took most of the risk.
We created the ZOOZ as a dedicated token not because we had to. We did it because we can and because it
will benefit our users.
●

So, what’s that talk about the ZOOZ being a unit of measurement?

We see the ZOOZ evolving and one day becoming a general-purpose crypto-currency. That is another reason
why it is important to set it apart as an independent crypto-token, today.

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4.

ZOOZ Economics

4.1.

ZOOZ Allocation

Coalichain will issue a total of 770,000,000 ZOOZs according to the following distribution:●

Public - 35%●

ZOOZ “Fuel” – 65%

Let’s break the 35% down:
Platform development - 10%
Investors (Private - presale): 3%●

Team - 12%○

Founders: 7%○

Executive Team: 2%○

Advisors: 1%○

Bounties: 2%○

Charitable causes - 10%

If not all the 3% ZOOZ will be sold during the crowd sale, the remaining will be burn or transferred into the“Fuel” reservoir.
65% (or more) for rewarding History-telling and participation – driving liquidity into the eco-system in a ratethat is proportional to its growth.
All vested tokens to the team will be released according to users' adoption of the Coali app and ecosystem. A
decentralized governance will ensure the users’ adoption status and sign the token release.

4.2.

Discounted ZOOZIn order to avoid a dump of discounted ZOOZ sold during the different stages of the crowdsale, there will be avesting period on all pre-ICO allocated ZOOZ: 10% will mature every month, starting 12 months after presale
ends.

4.3.

Platform Development

The 10% allotted to platform development will serve two missions:
Development of the platform, including the new feature development, set-up of an open-innovation●
platform for other development teams and the design, making and maintenance of the Coalichain-dedicatedblockchain infrastructure and protocols.
●

Funding Coalichain’s geographical expansion to additional locations

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4.4.

Donation to Charities and Causes

10% of all ZOOZ issued will be allotted to charities. These ZOOZs will be distributed according to the sameschedule described in § ‎4.2. Any charity organization will be able to apply for a donation and all decisionpublicly published.

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AppendicesA.

ZOOZ – a new type of currency

ZOOZ is the name we use for the future of the ZOOZ. It will be a new cryptocurrency
that like all other crypto-assets will be durable and easily transferable, and thatmeasures and stores the value10 of participation in governance.
People that will use the Coalichain platform to participate in the governance of theirgroups will invest energy through their actions. This investment will yield new value inthe performance of the group. That value will be measured and represented by the
ZOOZ.
Before we delve into the details, we think it is important to review some money
fundamentals. It has been our experience that this is a cause of much confusion.

i.Money Fundamentalsa.
Measurable Value
What are the fundamental building blocks of a tender/currency/money11? Without going into the detailed
canonical definitions of economics, we suggest the following necessary conditions:
It measures something – in most cases purchasing power. Being measurable also means it is●countable – it has different denominations. $ 100 bill would be meaningless if there weren’t otherdenominations for the dollar.
It has, or it represents value – which means people are willing to use it as tender.
●b.
Valuing a Currency
Determining the value12 of any currency (cryptocurrency or fiat) can be done in three ways:
1.
Market Supply13 and Demand. Allowing the “free”14 market to set the exchange rate in, theoretically,
frictionless and free exchanges.

We are alluding to Aristotle’s definition of money: durable, portable - or easily transferable, divisible - or serves as a unit ofmeasurement, and intrinsically valuable - let’s change that to has or represents value.
The first two conditions describe a technical issue that can easily be resolved with today’s technology. The two last condition touch, IMHO,at the true essence of money. It measures something, and it has or represents value.
11
We purposefully avoid the “sound money” vs “stable money” debate because we think it does not really matter for our purposes. It deals
with the distinction between money deriving its value from the free market and money that its value is controlled by a central body, that,for example controls its supply. For more about this: www.aier.org/article/sound-money-project/sound-money-vs-stable-money
12
In this context, value means purchasing power as reflected in exchange rates (which, therefore, serv as a proxy for purchasing power
value).
13
This a narrow definition of “Supply”. Free markets reflect the supply of existing money. They, prima facie, do not control the overall
supply of money, since only central banks issue new money. This is part of the “sound money” vs “stable money” distinction that discerns
money deriving its value from the free market, from money that its value is controlled by a central body. This distinction is a bit detachedfrom what is actually happening. It is now quite easy to circumvent the central supply mechanism. Most free-market financial and legal
infrastructures allow [or are coerced by special interest groups (that are able to do that because of the same freedoms) to allow] enoughfreedom for people to create a variety of financial instruments, from the simplest of tradable shares and bonds to the most complex
derivatives. These financial instruments account for at least 90% of the world’s money (in its wider definition as a tradable unit of value).
There are ~25 bn traded derivative contracts (Source: April 2017 WFE IOMA 2016 derivatives report) compared with ~600,000 publicly
traded stocks (Source: www.investopedia.com). That’s more than 40,000 derivatives for each traded stock. The value the derivative market
reflects ranges between 500 and 1,200 tr USD (Sources: “The Global Derivatives Market – An Introduction”, Deutsche Börse, andhttp://money.visualcapitalist.com/worlds-money-markets-one-visualization-2017). As such, they allow the “market” to affect the actual
supply of money in the system.
14
In an ideal market the fact that the markets do, de-facto, control the money supply, would not be a problem. However, since markets ingeneral and specifically the derivative markets are operated by a small number of exchanges and are dominated by a very small numberof very large brokers (“95% of the total transaction volume is split among 20 different OTC derivatives broker-dealers”. Source: “The Global
Derivatives Market – An Introduction”, Deutsche Börse) that enjoy an unfair advantage, they are, in fact, not free.
10

15

2.
Growth-rate of Source(s) of Value. Measuring the positive or negative growth rate of the sources ofvalue15 that are reflected in its exchange rate and adjusting its supply to fit that rate. Central banks (try to or
are supposed to try to) do that in order to reduce the risk of toxic inflation /deflation.
3.
A bit of both16. The exchange rate of most, if not all, fiat currencies is set by both floating rates in freemarkets and by the actions of central banks that have control over some of the supply.
c.
Intrinsic value and representation of value
We’ve all heard the claim that some types of money do not have intrinsic value. Some people have said thatabout the bitcoin. Others have said that about the US dollar. What are the implications of this debate? This
question becomes more pronounced when one looks at the crypto-token markets with their massive value
fluctuations and crashes.
Here’s our position: there’s a confusion between money having or not having intrinsic value and money beinga function of real value created by a group (company, ecosystem or country). Money doesn’t have to have
intrinsic value. Money needs to reflect value. Indeed, we have been using money that has zero intrinsic value
for a while now and it seems to be working fine (without implying that it doesn’t represent actual value).
d.
Underlying Value
What about the claim that if there are no specific, tangible assets backing a currency, perhaps it has nosources of value and the only determinants of its value are the “free” markets and the feeble actions ofcentral banks. The fact that the “free” market is probably the most dominant determinant of the value ofmoney does not mean that money does not have sources of value (it’s an enthymeme). We claim that all
currencies reflect actual work-driven, underlying value created in the world and appreciated as such by users.
This “underlying value” is hidden underneath the local exchange-rate fluctuations (that can be the result of avariety of volatility-inducing events or manipulation or both).
e.
Currency Stability
The interesting question is the relationship of the money being minted and the Underlying Value created by
the entity minting it. On a long-enough time-scale, and after cleaning out the local fluctuations, we will seethat if there is a lasting discrepancy between the traded value (exchange rate) and the actual Underlying
Value, the traded value will eventually correct to fit the Underlying Value. In simple terms, if country X issues acurrency and if country X’s economy (being the underlying value) does bad and, for example, its GDP drops, its
currency exchange rate will, eventually, drop proportionally. Even without tangible, clearly visible backing
assets, all currencies reflect Underlying Value and have “sources of value”. Moreover, if the rate in which a
country, for example, is printing and introducing money into circulation is different (faster or slower) than thegrowth rate of the economy that it represents, it will lead to inflation/deflation and devaluation/revaluation of
the currency. If the money is completely disconnected from the actual value being created, there is almost acertainty that such discrepancies will occur, and they can become toxic very fast. If we have something that ismeasurable, countable, fungible and directly connected to the Underlying Value, we have a good candidate
for a new currency that is less likely to suffer toxic fluctuations17.
f.
Source of Underlying Value
Here are the assumptions we use when we describe the source of Underlying Value:
15

We talk about the sources of value below.
If you accept my arguments so far, I think the implication is that the “sound” vs “stable” debate is moot.
17
It is not a sufficient condition. Stability is also closely related to tradability and control over supply and demand of money. We willaddress these conditions later.
16

16

The source of Underlying Value is the energy invested through purposeful action. This means two●things:○The only way to create new underlying value is by investing energy into the system.

That energy being invested is “directional”. If it promotes the purpose of the economy, it creates new○value. If it impedes, it destroys existing value.
Different actions (invested energy), applied by different agents, at different times and circumstances●
create/destroy value at different rates.
●

It’s possible to measure the value created/destroyed.

●

It is possible to change the unit of measurement over time without destabilizing the economy.

If we look at fiat money, and if we exclude non-productive actions, such as forex or derivative trading, theremaining volume of activity is a very good proxy for the energy invested by the people using the money inthe economy that it represents. It means, under these assumptions, that the value represented by the money
comes from the users of that money in an economy. If we count and tally the commercial monetarytransactions, we can have a measurement of the overall value being created and its growth rate.
g.
Viable, Stable Money in a Blockchain, Crypto Environment
We can now suggest that for a cryptocurrency to be viable and stable, it must adhere to the following
conditions:
It reflects and measures the Underlying Value or at least something that directly depends on the●
Underlying Value●

It is adopted and productively used by a large enough group of users●

Unproductive use is limited and very small in comparison to productive useh.
Fixed or Inflationary
What’s better, limiting the total number of coins to be minted (as is the case with bitcoin), or generating newcoins as the platform’s economy grows in an inflationary model (as is the case with Ether and most fiats)? For
all intents and purposes, it does not matter. For money to be both viable and useful it needs to be stableenough for people to use it. In simple words, we want the money to represent the actual Underlying Value of
its economy. We assume that the Underlying Value of money comes from the users of money in an economy,
the more people using it implies that more Underlying Value is being created. If the economy doubles in size,
we need to double the purchasing power of money. We can do that either by printing more money (at therate of the growth of the economy it represents) or by revaluating its exchange rate. If we print more money I
will pay 1 dollar per apple just as I did before the economy doubled. If I don’t print more money, I will only
need 50 cents to buy the apple – which effectively means that the money I have now represents twice thevalue.
The latter is more difficult with fiat money, since the lower denomination limit of most fiat currencies is not
small enough (10-2 in case of printed/minted fiat and 10-4 in the case of digital fiat). Cryptocurrencies/tokens,like bitcoin and Ether are much more adapt for this type of approach with an almost unlimited denomination
minimum (10-8 in the case of bitcoin and 10-18 in the case of ether). This is the source of the crazy-sounding
predictions that a single bitcoin will one day be worth up to 100 million dollars. They are not that crazy. If the17

bitcoin would have been adopted as a global currency, and if it had replaced all of the fiat money today, thevalue of 1 bitcoin would have been around 5 million dollars and 1 Satoshi would have been worth 5 cents.
Satoshi Nakamoto opted for a fixed number of coins and a revaluation of the currency. However, he did not
flow the entire amount into circulation. The mining process exposes new bitcoins out of a limited “reservoir”.
Think of this like the central bank printing new money whenever they need to pay for certain work that isbeing done (that work being a proxy indicator for the growth of the economy). Since the supply is limited, thevalue of the money will go up and the number of coins to be minted and payed will go down. Since bitcoin isdecentralized and has no central body to regulate this process, Satoshi Nakamoto came up with an elegant
solution – the number of bitcoins generated per block is halved every 210,000 blocks. The number of blocks
created provides an indication for the size of the economy and therefore an indication of the growth of theUnderlying Value behind the bitcoin (completely ignoring the markets and the exchange rate volatility).
Simplistically, If the underlying value doubled, the worth of the bitcoin should double as well and the pay forthe same work should be halved.
Clearly this is a simplification. There are a lot of assumptions and approximations. Nevertheless, the rationale
is sound. To make a cryptocurrency stable enough for people to use it, we should connect its supply to the sizeof the Underlying Value it represents. Adoption, use-rate, # of transactions, these are all good indications forthe size of the economy.

18

ii.Introduction to the ZOOZ
The purpose of the ZOOZ in the 2nd phase is to serve as a unique currency. The ZOOZ will translate personal
influence, participation and social capital into a transactional currency that can be used to incentivize people
to participate and to allow them to monetize on their governance related activities.
a.
Definition
Let 1 ZOOZ be the average value created by all Influential participation on the Coalichain blockchain that fits asingle block18.
Influential participation will be defined by the following function: 1 ZOOZ = [Function of the cost of producing
a block]+[ Function that connects the number of transactions with a decay mechanism]b.
Valuation
The minimal value of 1 ZOOZ will be the cost of creating and maintaining the Coalichain blockchain for 1
second.
c.
Pricing the ZOOZ
The price of money is affected by:1.

Cost of production

2.

The underlying value it represents (its economy)3.

Supply and demand (scarcity)

The price of the ZOOZ is affected by the same 3 factors.
Cost of production as the baseline, value of activities (participation in governance) as the underlying value,
and a combination of scarcity and expected growth as the future value.
Say that a Historian (block producer) creates a block on the Coalichain blockchain. He can either be paid withether or with ZOOZ. If the value of the ZOOZ is connected to the size of the network and the volume ofactivities recorded, the Historian will prefer to be paid in ZOOZ, if she thinks that Coalichain adoption willgrow. If Coalichain indeed grows then, 1 ZOOZ she earns today will be worth more tomorrow.
This is how the ZOOZ will drive participation - people participating will be remunerated with a coin that has avalue that depends on how much people participate. The early adopters will be rewarded for the risk they
took.

18

Block-size limit to be defined19

iii.“Under the Hood” – The ZOOZ Value Enginea.
Influential Participation ⇒ Value
We believe19 that people should participate more in group governance. We believe that the more people
influence their group’s activities by participating in decision-making, the better their group will be - the moreproductive and efficient it will become. In short, we believe that the value created by any group of people is afunction of the influential participation of its members.
b.
How Much Participation?
Say we want people to participate and influence more. How much more? How do we quantify influential
participation? We came up with an equation to describe how we will measure influence through participation●
Trust Actions are actions, by a group member, that reflect the trust of that group member in anothergroup member. For example, delegating his vote to a representative.
●
Influence Actions are actions, by a group member that directly affect group’s governance. For example,
incepting a group, inviting new members, proposing a new delegate, proposing a resolution and voting.
●Participation Actions are also actions, by a group member, that affect the group governance, but notdirectly. For example, publishing an opinion post, sharing, commenting, following/unfollowing, liking/disliking,attending an event, and responding to a poll.
Important notes:●
This distinction is significant for two reasons: 1) it affects the value tariff of the different actions, and 2) it
is useful for demarking the actions that should be recorded on the blockchain (trust and Influence) and those thatshould not. The participation actions are far more frequent and at the same time, do not demand the blockchain
immutability (as long as we record their value).
●

This taxonomy is not “set in stone”. Different groups may opt for, or suggest, different taxonomies.

●
This “participation algebra” that we will elaborate on, is not absolute. There is no one value measurement
formula that we simply need to uncover. Our approach is pragmatic. The values we assign the different actions area calculated guess. We expect them to change and evolve over time and with each group. It is also possible thatthe taxonomy itself will evolve, if the user community will indicate that this is needed.

c.
Promoting Participation
When members participate in governance (in any way – it could be liking something or running for office – different
actions will have different values), they are rewarded twice. First, their Influence Score20 ("I-S") is updated. Thatmeans that Zetas are added to their wallets according to an agreed tariff, that will be public and adjusted
periodically to fit changing circumstances and group needs. Second, group members will be allowed to transfer
their I-S to special mining nodes (“Historians”) and get a pro-rata reward for the work done in recording the new
I-S, or other records onto the blockchain. This mechanism can be used to disincentivize destructive behavior. If
people do not trust a member, and show that by either stating it, her I-S will go down and with it the rewards she
could get in the History-telling process.

19

We have not, nor will not prove this assumption to be true in this white paper. Think of it as something that is self-evident for us. If foryou it is not, perhaps this paper is not for you.
20

The term “Influence Score’ is central to this white paper. We will describe it in detail below. In a nutshell, it is a gauge that isused to measure individual participation in governance.

20

iv.“Under the Hood” – Proof of Influence Protocola.
Overview and History-telling
Proof of Influence is a new consensus algorithm. Its rationale is simple. We separate the remuneration for thework of encrypting the new block from the mechanism that ensures the chain is not contaminated bymalicious mining nodes. Here’s a quick overview:●

Actions of the nodes/members are scored●This score is attributed to individual members●

The score is both recorded on the blockchain and is used a sort of Stake in the consensus protocol

Members with an I-S that is higher than a set bar (e.g., the top 10%), are allowed to be Historians –●the “miners” of the blockchain21.
Once you become a Historian, you must keep your I-S above the minimum bar, to keep the right to●“Tell History”. In addition, you are allowed to pool the I-S of other members. However, this will only affect the
reward you will get for mining. It will not improve your probability of being selected to mine. The only
criterion is the minimal bar. If one Historian has an I-S score that is twice that of another Historian, he will nothave a higher chance to win the right to mine a block. The mining is assigned randomly.
The reward for the work covers the cost of the work, plus an additional amount that is proportional●
to the I-S of the Historian and that of all the members that assigned him with their I-S.
Every time a historian is mining a new block, she is staking her entire I-S and that of the people who gave her
their proxy I-S. All other Historians can see the block she adds. If they flag it as false, and indeed it is verified
as false, she will not only lose her entire stake, she will lose the stake of everyone who gave her their own I-S.
The most likely candidates to be Historians are the people that are active, as candidates or representatives.
This means that they are trust worthy – because literally people gave them their trust, are the ones that are
entrusted with keeping records clean. They are selected at random, so they don’t know when they willvalidate which transaction. They are rewarded and they distribute the reward between their supporters
pro-rata.
b.
The Influence Score (I-S)
Coalichain records the activities of group members and tallies them into a personal Influence Score (I-S), thatgets recorded on the blockchain as an asset assigned to a unique user. The I-S is directly proportional to themember’s activities and if she misbehaves/becomes inactive, her I-S may be reduced. The I-S acts as a recordof “stake” in the process of forging new blocks. Every member in the group, and possibly, across groups,
delegates her I-S to the “Historians”. Delegation is random. The share of I-S holding and pooling is limited (inorder to avoid few nodes holding too much power). Creating new blocks – History-telling – awards theHistorian with Zeta from a platform “fuel” reservoir. Zeta’s are distributed, pro-rata, between the different I-S
delegating members, with a larger consideration to the Historian. Simply put, the more people participate in
the decision-making process the higher their I-S will be, the more reward they will get via the History-telling
process.
Moreover, different groups may decide to use the I-S for other purposes. For example, it can be used to definea minimal barrier for becoming a representative, by demonstrating real action and not just talk.

21

They do not need to own specialized hardware or be crypto-savvy. Those capabilities are a commodity nowadays.

21

c.
Tariff and Reward Functions
We are still working on the participation tariff and History-telling reward function and we will publish themsoon. They will include an internal decay mechanism that will most probably be tied to the overall I-S counter.
The Rationale is that there should be a connection between the value of the ZOOZ and the amount awarded.
Instead of guessing this relationship by using an exponential decay, we use the counter of the I-S (the sum of
all of the individual scores), as a metric that indicates the platform’s actual growth rate. This way the tariffadjusts automatically to reflect the real value of the ZOOZ (based on the underlying value).
d.
Architecture and Protocol Mechanics
The schematic architecture described below, discerns between “on-chain” and “off-chain” processes. The
rationale is simple: Recording anything on the blockchain has a cost. That cost is a direct result of thecryptographic mechanism designed to keep the blockchain immutable. The implication is that Coalichain will
only record things on the blockchain that we have a strong interest to keep immutable. That is why we do notrecord participation actions.

See drawing below (next page)

See drawing below (next page)

22

23

e.
Adaptiveness
The PoI protocol is designed to measure participation and influence. We don’t think there’s a single formulafor calculating and evaluating that. That is why the protocol is designed to adapt to changing circumstances
and to fine-tune its algorithm.
1.
List key actions: Try, as best you can, to list as many as possible value producing actions (trust,
influence and participation Actions)2.
Prioritize: Arrange them randomly or by intuitive order of importance in their role in creating value
3.
Create a scale: Assign relative values to them according to the prioritization
4.
Measure: Count the actions
5.
Tally: Add the values according to the different types of actions
6.
Evaluate: Check the result to see if it correlates with other value measuring metrics (inc. for example,
group members’ satisfaction with the results)
7.
Adjust: Change weights, values and tallying function to mitigate gaps and go to 4

f.

Examples of protocol application

24

25

B.

Ontology

General caveat: We do not presume to produce a complete extensional ontology here. What we offer is ataxonomy that can be expanded and augmented over time. As such, please assume this is a work in processthat will never really end.

i.Thingsa.
GroupsGroup X (GRPX): A set of people, organizations or things, u identify themselves and are accepted by●other members of that set as belonging to that set and that act in a way that affects other set members. The
source of this identification can be a shared purpose, geographic location, language, etc.
●

Classification of the Groups: We map the Groups in the Coalichain eco-system on two axes:

X axis: Group’s Size (# of Members) – a decimal exponential scale with X marking powers of 10 (0-10).
○
Y Axis: Decision Impact Index – an arbitrary index (A…E) reflecting the magnitude of○
impact the Group’s decisions have.
Each Group can be mapped on this matrix. For example, A1 denotes a Group of 10 members with a low
impact decision mandate, while D3.76, denotes a Group with a high-impact decision mandate and 5754
members.
Each Group incepts at the bottom left and grows according to different possible paths to its potential.
The functionality required for an A1 Group is very different from the functionality needed for an E8 Group. As
the Group grows more possibilities and functionalities will become available.
26

The reason for this is that we think it is important to start off simple and easy and not overwhelm the Group
with a menu of options that are not yet relevant. As the Group matures, so will its ability to understand anduse additional functions.
b.
People/Nodes
Pioneer: The person that incepts GRPX. The person registering GRPX can nominate up to [X] other●people to be defined as Pioneers (pending KYC).
Member (MGRPX): User belonging to GRPX, registered to the platform, KYC-verified / eligible to vote.
●
Qualified Member (QMGRPX): A Member that is allowed to serve as a proxy voter (allowed to vote for●others). Voting for others is not a general permission. It is always assigned to a specific Governance Domain(GD, see below). QMs can be candidates and run campaigns to persuade members to delegate them with theirvotes.
Delegates (DLGGRPX/GDi): Qualified Members that have the power to vote on specific GDs by other●members. Members can transfer their vote on specific GDs to QMs. This right can be revoked at any time. The
extent of this right can be configured during the Inception.
Historians: The “miners” of the Coalichain Blockchain (CB, see below). The Historians are specialized●
nodes in the network with the right to validate the new CB blocks. According to the Proof of Influence
Protocol. Similar to PoS, they are selected at random with their weight determined by their Influence Score
pool.
c.
Governance
Governance Domain i of GRPX (GDXi): Topics/issues that are in the decision mandate of Group X.
●
These are determined by the Pioneers during the Inception (see below) and can be altered according to theGovernance decision making processes also defined in the inception.
Decision (D): A specific question up for decision in one of the GDs.
●
Support Event (SE): A physical or virtual event, limited in time, in which members debate a specific●Decision.
d.
Digital things
Coalichain Blockchain (CB): Coalichain’s Blockchain and the only source of rewards for Historians and●active Members based on PoI.
ZOOZ: A Coalichain-dedicated cryptocurrency, used for all on-platform transactions and as a means of●measuring influence and rewarding Historians, and preventing SPAM. Generated by Coalichain in a single TGE.
Zeta: Participation-generated ZOOZ. The Zeta is a type of ZOOZ, exclusively used by the Coalichain●
platform to demark rewards that come from either block validation or members’ participation activities. 1
Zeta = 10-8 ZOOZ.
Influence Score (I-S): A function that counts Zeta awards. Actions taken in the Group and●History-telling, award the Members with participation-generated Zetas, according to a set tariff.
Proof of Influence (PoI): A consensus protocol, similar to PoS, that is used for determining a single●
history of activities and decisions. Historians enter a draw to win the right to validate blocks on a PoI CB. Theirweight in the draw is determined by their pro-rata, Influence Score. Pooling I-S is not only possible, it is thedefault state. However, Pooling cannot exceed 0.5% of the total I-S.
Public Profile (PP): Each member will have a record of his/her relevant attributes and actions, kept on●
the CB.

27

i.Processesa.
Foundations
Inception: Creating a new Group on the Coalichain platform. Pioneers define: GDs (to determine GRP●
classification), Uses (e-voting in A1 GRPs), Member Classes (just Members in A1 GRPs), On-/Off-chain,required majority for changing governance policy, specific voting policies (for example if approval of a vote isrequired, if a voter can decide to change Delegate if she is unhappy with a decision, Decision proposition
criteria, etc.)
Changes Governance Rules: The process of changing the configuration defined in the Inception,●
including criteria, adding/removing GDs etc. All depending on the Group’s settings.
Become a Member: Being approved as a Member – customizable, authentication process designed to●ensure that the member is eligible to be a part of GRPX.
Become a QM: Being approved22 as a Qualified Member – customizable, authentication process●
designed to ensure that the Member is accepted by the Group as a GD-specific QM. For example,
authentication of formal credentials and internal criteria such as: top 10% Influence Score (I-S).
Become a Delegate: The process of being authorized to vote for at least one member on at least one●
GD.
Become a Historian: The process of being approved as a “mining” node in the CB.
●
Polling: All Smart Contract commitments will include auto-activation of a poll that will allow members●that are a party to the smart contract, or to other members, if so defined, to rate the performance describedin the smart contract.

ii.Actions
As mentioned above, we identify and discern three groups of actions: trust, influence and participation
actions. The following list is not exhaustive, and we expect it to evolve over time.
b.
Trust Actions
Delegate voting power to a QM.
●
A Member gives his/her vote per specific GD to a QM for that GD.
Donate to support a Delegate or QM●
Commit to groups Member(s)●Any member that makes a conditional promise to other members and committing it and the ramifications ofbreaking that promise into a smart contract.
c.
Influence Actions
Incept a Group●
Initiate an Event●
Invite a member●
Become a member●
Propose a QM●
Become a QM●
Propose a Delegate●
Become a Delegate
●
Vote
●
22

Part or all of the KYC, can be done by a 3rd-party service provider, or by the Group members (open to all or a selected Group). Thisdepends on the size of the Group, the qualifications of its members and the level of authentication chosen by the Group. Note that theterm “KYC” is used without determining the method and as a general term that describes an authentication process.

28

●
●
d.
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

Initiate a Poll
Propose a decision
Participation Actions
Publish a post
Share
Comment
Follow/unfollow
Like/dislike
Respond to a poll
Attend an event

29

C.

Use of proceeds

30