The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 30 (2019)
Copyright © 2019 Fumiaki Kubo. All rights reserved. This work may be used, with thisnotice included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work may be distributed,
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Japan-US Alliance in the Face of Populism:
The Vulnerability of an Alliance Based on
Asymmetric Rights and Obligations

Fumiaki KUBO*INTRODUCTION
The asymmetry referred to in this article does not refer to asymmetry inmilitary strength or, more broadly, national strength. Rather, it refers to therights gained and the responsibilities borne under a treaty. It would seem that
it is typical of the countless bilateral alliances throughout world history—
ancient and modern, Eastern and Western—for both partners to promise
nearly the same types of rights and responsibilities to each other. For
instance, if Country A and Country B are in an alliance, B will defend A if it
is attacked, and A, correspondingly, will support B if it is attacked. By thedefinition used in this article, partners’ rights and responsibilities are
symmetric when, in this typical form of an alliance, countries A and B haveestablished between themselves, substantively, the same rights andobligations.
In this article I basically limit the discussion to the Japan-US Security
Treaty (henceforth “the Security Treaty”) as it has existed since its
amendment in 1960. Because US military strength is far superior, theJapan-US alliance is clearly asymmetric in terms of the parties’ military
power. In that sense, all alliances that the United States has formed have*Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo

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FUMIAKI KUBO

been asymmetric. Using the unique asymmetrical Japan-US alliance, whichis unequal in the allocation of rights and duties, I consider the strengths andweaknesses of such atypical alliances in the context of rising populism.
Though it can mean many things, populism in general is an attitude, apolitical orientation, a movement, or a thinking of nonelite people who
oppose the elite or the establishment members of a polity. In domestic
politics, it often supports generous government expenditures for ordinary
people or more restrictions on immigration, while in foreign affairs it pushes
nationalistic goals or inward-looking policies. How it emerges differs fromcountry to country. In the context of this article, it is notable that the publicof the United States, since the end of the Cold War, seems to be weary of aninterventionist, internationalist, globalist foreign policy, while ordinary
Japanese citizens, especially residents in Okinawa, actively support apacifist foreign policy, in particular regarding US bases in Okinawa, paying
less attention to the international security environment that has become
more strained in the past two decades. In some cases, there emerges adivision among establishment politicians, some of whom come to embrace
positions that nonelite people support.
In the Security Treaty, the United States gained the right to use bases inJapan and, in return, took on the duty of defending Japan. Japan’s duty was
to allow the United States to use bases located in Japan, and it won the rightto be defended by the United States. Of note here is that Japan has no duty
to defend the United States except in the event of an attack on a US
government facility in an area under Japan’s administration. Because an
attack on a US government facility located in Japan would, in effect, be thesame as an attack on Japan, and because it would be virtually impossible toattack US government facilities in Japan without attacking Japan itself, it
seems safe to assume that Japan has a de facto exemption from any duty to
defend the United States.
There has been a legion of books and articles on not just alliances andalliance theory but also the US-Japan alliance. Virtually no study, however,has been conducted on the asymmetric nature of the US-Japan alliance interms of the partners’ rights and obligations and, in particular, no explorationof the strengths and weaknesses of this alliance structure.1
There is, however, an article on populism and alliance, “Partnership in
Peril: Populist Assault on the Transatlantic Community” by Vikram Singh,
Dalibor Rohac, and Danielle Pletka; although it is written out of a concern
for the effect of rising populism on the alliance, that article’s focus is clearlyon the North Atlantic alliance.2

JAPAN-US ALLIANCE IN THE FACE OF POPULISM

I.

5US INTERESTS

The question that is sometimes asked in the United States is why thenation—by agreeing to the Security Treaty—has accepted the duty ofdefending Japan without acquiring a commitment from Japan to defend theUnited States if it is attacked, even to the extent of risking the lives of its
own people. The answer to the question lies in the right the United States
gained from the Security Treaty. Under Article 6 of the Security Treaty, theUnited States obtained the right to use bases in Japan for the purpose ofproviding “peace and security in the Far East.” In other words, in exchange
for the responsibility of defending Japan, the United States gained the rightto use bases in Japan for purposes other than the defense of Japan. This,
indeed, is the core national interest that the United States has secured
through the Security Treaty.
This article is too brief to describe in detail why such an alliance,
asymmetric in terms of its rights and duties, came into being. I would
merely like to note the following points.
When the first Japan-US Security Treaty was signed in 1951, Japan’sconstitution, including Article 9, which outlaws war as a means of settlinginternational disputes, had already come into force. Japan was entirely
disarmed, without even the Japan Self-Defense Forces that would beestablished in 1954. In 1951, Japan had no military with which to defend theUnited States. At the same time, the United States possessed overwhelming
military strength and, thus, had no need to rely on Japan to defend its
territory. In this backdrop, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 showed
many Japanese the existence of a direct threat to Japan and confirmed theUnited States’ contention that it was necessary to continue to use bases inJapan to resist the military threat posed by the Communist bloc. In addition,
it seemed that there was no hope of the United Nations guaranteeing thesecurity of Japan given that its Security Council was paralyzed by thegrowing rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Many commentators have used the word “unilateral” to describe the
Security Treaty that has existed from 1960 to the present. Strictly speaking,however, this description is not accurate. Because the United States has theduty to defend Japan and Japan has the duty to allow the United States touse its military bases for purposes other than the defense of Japan, both
Japan and the United States are subject to obligations, and in that sense, thetreaty is reciprocal. To reiterate the explanation already provided in thisarticle, because the substance of the rights and responsibilities differs, the6

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treaty is asymmetric.
As an aside, in the original 1952 Japan-US Security Treaty, the UnitedStates obtained the right to use bases in Japan without accepting
concomitant duties, including the defense of Japan. Therefore, the first treatyof 1952 was truly unilateral. It is, thus, only natural that the first treaty was
subject to strong criticism in Japan.
Further, there are differences between the Japan-US Security Treaty andother alliances to which the United States is party. The Mutual Defense
Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea(ROK), signed in 1953, was symmetric and reciprocal in terms of the
defense obligations it imposed. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
established in 1949, is similarly based on a mutual sharing of defense
responsibilities among its members. Under the US-ROK alliance andNATO, in addition to these mutual rights and duties, the US military is
stationed in South Korea and in some European NATO member states.3
In this article, I consider the strengths and weaknesses of the Security
Treaty, which has a rare legal structure. Particularly, I discuss these mattersby emphasizing comparisons with alliances in which the rights andresponsibilities are structured symmetrically.
II. WEAKNESSES OF THE US-JAPAN ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCEFirst, it is extremely difficult for people other than specialists in national
security to understand this type of alliance. The complicated legal structure
is itself a source of political weakness. Within each nation, its perceived
national burden alone tends to be emphasized; further, this burden captures
the attention of the public and the mass media. As a result, the understandingof the alliance never increases, and criticism—particularly criticism that iswide of the mark—tends to circulate.
The Japan-US alliance tends to invite discontent from US citizens who
understand it only superficially. In the United States, the alliance has beenfrequently understood as a one-sided and unfair alliance in which the UnitedStates has the duty to protect Japan while the latter has no responsibilities.
Some Americans even add that Japan sells many cars to steal jobs in the
United States, even as the alliance makes the United States defend Japan.
Such arguments were made quite frequently during the 1980s and 1990s
when trade friction between Japan and the United States were at its worst.
The argument was something along the lines of “Why should Americans
have to spill their blood defending such a strong—or even threatening—

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7

country like Japan?” In 2016, Donald Trump—the front-runner in the
Republican Party contest for winning the nomination to the 2016
presidential election—demonstrated precisely this sort of understanding, orlack thereof.
In Japan, the burden of military bases that is borne by local residents
tends to be an issue. This is a particularly serious political problem in
Okinawa. Some Japanese, while demanding the withdrawal of US troops
from Okinawa and even from mainland Japan, still think that the UnitedStates would be obliged to defend Japan; this is also a reflection of naive
understanding of the alliance-obligation framework. Among those who
thought that way was former prime minister Yukio Hatoyama.
Hatoyama’s idea was that there could be a security treaty without thepresence of US military in Japan. The notion was that the US military would
not station troops in Japan during peacetime but would come to Japan’s aid
and defend it during a crisis. While in office, Prime Minister Hatoyama
stated that this plan had been shelved; however, he did not retract it as a
mistaken idea. It is understood that acceptance of this proposal would notbring any benefits to the United States in terms of its national interest.
Hatoyama had envisioned it, however, before he became prime minister,calling his plan “an alliance without US troops being stationed in Japan.”Some even called it “a baseless security treaty.”4
Herein lies the vulnerability of this complicated alliance with its
asymmetric legal structure of rights and obligations when it faces populism.
Political leaders are expected to enlighten ordinary citizens about the true
meaning of an alliance treaty, including the Japan-US Security Treaty. But
what if they are misinformed, misguided, or have a partial understanding of
the treaty, or even exploit or instigate misunderstandings by their fellow
citizens?
The second, and related, weakness is that the Security Treaty tends toraise opposition within areas of Japan that bear the major burden of thebases. It is safe to assume that the reason for this opposition—besides themere fact that these bases exist—is that these bases house foreign military
personnel, particularly US military personnel. Friction with Okinawans isoften reported, caused by, for example, serious crimes committed byAmerican soldiers.
It is certain that even without a security treaty, Okinawa—a strategic hub
in the realm of security, especially for defending Japan’s territory in thesouthwest—would have a concentration of Japan’s Self-Defense Forcesbases. There is a clear difference, however, between the level of military

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presence required purely for the defense of Japan and that required whenmilitary force beyond what is needed for the defense of Japan is involved.
The difference between the level required exclusively for self-defense andthat required for ensuring “the peace and security” of the entire Far East isparticularly striking. It is obvious that the level of force required when the
defense of Japan is not the only concern is higher. This is the reason the US
government has deployed troops and divisions in Okinawa in order to have arapid response to situations outside Okinawa. In that sense, the significant
local burden in terms of bases is still, arguably, a weakness of theasymmetrical alliance.
Moreover, in Okinawa, where US military bases are highly concentrated,crimes committed by US troops are sometimes a significant issue. Some of
the crimes are serious. According to the US military, however, the crime rate
among US soldiers is lower than the average crime rate of Okinawans.5 Thisis an issue that requires more thorough investigation and consideration.
The third issue is that, for some Japanese, the stationing of US military
troops appears to be a continuation of the postwar US occupation from 1945
to 1952. Some Japanese, who have a nationalistic bent, see the stationing of
foreign military forces on their national territory as an infringement ofsovereignty and consider it demeaning.
The fourth weakness in the alliance that I would like to note is that theJapanese public’s willingness to protect the security of its nation may havediminished. Even in the current tense international security environment,
Japan spends less than 1 percent of its GNP on defense. Based on the poll by
the Cabinet Office in 2014, to the question what you would do if yourcountry is attacked by a foreign country, only 6.8 percent of the respondents
answered that they would resist the invasion by joining the SDF, while 56.8
percent replied that they would resist by all means, though they would notjoin the SDF.6
Because of the continuous presence of the US military in Japan, and its
overwhelming power, it has been easy for many Japanese to pay less andless attention to the need to defend their own country, while at the same time
feeling more and more dependent on the United States. Because of thisdependency psychology of the Japanese, the “in this fight together” aspect of
the Japan-US alliance has been weak; this was the case even during the peakof the Cold War. In contrast, the US-ROK alliance that was established in
1953 after the end of hostilities in the Korean War was truly an allianceforged as the result of fighting side by side against Communist forces.
Fifth, there are other problems arising from the stationing of the US

JAPAN-US ALLIANCE IN THE FACE OF POPULISM

9military in Japan besides the burden of the bases. Japan and the UnitedStates have also signed a status of forces agreement establishing rights andprivileges for the US troops. This has frequently been a source of discontent
or the cause of conflict over the rights of the stationed forces, environmental
pollution and degradation, responsibilities to be borne by Japan, and the socalled sympathy budget, which is called omoiyari-yosan (Japanese-provided
host-nation support) in Japanese.
III.

STRENGTHS OF THE US-JAPAN ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCE

There are advantages for Japan as well as disadvantages in theasymmetric alliance between the United States and Japan. The firstadvantage of having the US military stationed in Japan is that deterrence of
foreign aggression is strong in terms of both force and credibility. Having
the US military stationed on one’s soil clearly provides a stronger deterrent
than having US forces merely able to rush in from far away—the US
mainland, Guam, or Hawaii—after an incident has occurred. It is clear to
Japan that, in most cases, there is no room for doubt that the US militarywould come in to lend support. Attacking Japan is practically the same asattacking the United States. It also appears that US military presence
functions as a deterrent against the threat of or attack by nuclear weapons.
Second, the US military’s disaster-response capabilities should be noted.
The people of the Tohoku region witnessed these capabilities during the
March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and the resulting tsunami andnuclear accidents. The US military’s Operation Tomodachi was conducted
on a massive scale and was effective, saving many lives. The cost incurredby the US government in the operation was more than $80 million andinvolved 24,000 US troops. The benefit of having military forces nearby was
truly demonstrated. There is considerable value in having permanently
stationed units in Japan that are responsive, well-trained, well-equipped(including with aircraft carriers), and, above all, possessing good will.
Third, contributions to local communities by bases, particularly economic
benefits, is widely noted. The economic contribution of bases to larger
regional economies is likely to be considerable. The US Department of
Defense, for example, has long been trying to close redundant bases in the
United States with little success. This is because the members of Congress
who represent local communities work diligently to prevent closures.
Naturally, these members represent the desires of their local constituencies.
Bases can be a means of helping strengthen and revitalize sparsely

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populated areas. Japan Self-Defense Forces bases in rural areas or on remoteislands appear to be appreciated for this effect. It is possible, however, thatthe existence of a base can be an impediment to economic growth and/or
tourism, as is pointed out by the Okinawa prefectural government and local
Okinawan newspapers;7 thus, it is necessary to carefully analyze the effectsof having bases on a case-by-case basis.
Fourth, US bases serve as points of contact for cultural exchange. People
from Japan can encounter US culture, while being stationed in Japan
provides opportunities for US military and related personnel to become
familiar with Japanese culture. Furthermore, there is even a chance thatsome of these people will become friends of Japan. If enough thought is put
into it, truly substantive cultural exchanges are possible. Additionally, it ishighly likely that people working on the bases, as a result of a deeper
understanding of a Japanese culture, will develop a favorable view of their
host country and remain admirers and supporters of Japan after returning to
the United States.
Fifth, the alliance contributes to regional security among Japan’s
neighbors. This is a direct consequence of the asymmetric allocation ofrights and obligations under the Security Treaty. The US military can use
this alliance, by right, for the defense of countries beyond Japan. Because of
the support it gains from having military bases in Japan, the United Stateshas been able to project its military influence in the Korean Peninsula,across the Taiwan Strait, in the Philippines, and in the South China Sea, andeven as far as the Middle East. Needless to say, the US bases in Okinawa
played a crucial role during the Vietnam War.
Sixth, one can argue for economic benefits in a broader sense.
Specifically, because Japan has been supported by the robust deterrence that
the US military stationed on its soil provides, the country has been able tospend a relatively small amount on defense. Notably, as mentioned before,
defense costs have long been less than 1 percent of its GDP, except for a few
years in the 1980s, and despite the national security threats that the nation
has faced from North Korea and China. Japan was able to devote itself toeconomic development to a considerable degree while being essentiallylightly armed. This lack of militarization had the added effect of Japan being
unlikely to appear as a threat to other countries.
I have already mentioned Hatoyama’s idea of “a baseless security treaty.”
There are many examples of remarks of this kind by leading politicians.
Ichiro Ozawa, the former chairperson of the Democratic Party of Japan, said
that the US Seventh Fleet alone would be adequate for Japan’s protection;8

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11

however, this statement only considers the defense of Japan under Article 5of the Security Treaty and ignores the rights to which the United States is
entitled to under Article 6. The necessity of the presence of US Marines on
Japanese soil as a force to defend Okinawa or Japan has been repeatedly
questioned, but this seems a one-sided and not thoroughly considered pointof view. The Marines appear to aid Japan’s defense in various ways, buteven if that were not the case, they could still be stationed anywhere theUnited States deems appropriate; this is because under Article 6 of the
Security Treaty, it has the right to do so.
These remarks cover just a small number of the many cases of leading
politicians not fully understanding the meaning of the alliance that I could
provide; however, they demonstrate how many people in Japan—including aformer prime minister and leading politicians—do not fundamentally
understand or purposely disregard the legal basics of the Security Treaty. In
this sense, the populist perspective is shared by some of the leading
politicians, who are in most cases in the center-left or leftist political parties.
Thus, there is a serious cleavage in the elite politicians on national defense,
amplifying the voice of the populists.
IV. TRANSFORMATION OF THE ALLIANCE?
The purpose of this article is not to propose the elimination of thedescribed asymmetry in the Japan-US alliance, nor do I even intend tosuggest such a thing. In the preceding sections, I have focused on theasymmetry of rights and responsibilities in the Japan-US Security Treaty andconsidered the strengths and weaknesses of the treaty’s structure. The
discussion up to this point has confirmed that despite the serious weaknesses
in alliances that are asymmetrical in their allocation of rights and duties,
they also have strengths as an alliance. Thus, we should next consider how
to retain, to the greatest possible extent, the strengths of the alliance as
noted—or bolster them further—while simultaneously decreasing, andcompensating for, the weaknesses.
Needless to say, if we live in a world without any threat to Japan’snational security, Japan may not need an alliance. Given the military power,
military posture, and the behaviors of some countries in Japan’s vicinity,
however, we have to assume that there is a threat that cannot easily be dealt
with by Japan alone.
Considering matters in this context, the 2015 change in the Japanese
government’s constitutional interpretation concerning the exercising of the12

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right of collective self-defense under new security legislation was arguably
an epoch-making development in terms of the structure of this kind ofasymmetrical alliance; it was called the Legislation for Peace and Security.
Although Japan’s defense policy is still subject to various constraints, thechange in the Japanese government’s interpretation of the right of collective
self-defense greatly expanded the scope of Japan’s contribution to theactions of the US military. Under the legal structure of the asymmetricalalliance, Japan changed the interpretation of Article 9 in 2015 tocompensate, to a certain degree, for the weakest part of that structure; thus,
Japan is not required to defend the United States—not as a duty placed onJapan by the treaty but, rather, Japan will do that as part of its own right toself-defense. Specifically, if certain conditions are met, Japan can now cometo the aid of the US military and fight alongside it for Japan’s own security.
The handling of alliances is not always easy, regardless of the rights andresponsibilities that have been defined by treaties. When the rights andduties are asymmetrical, as they are in the case of the Japan-US alliance, thedifficulty only increases. Thus, the peace and security legislation of 2015 in
Japan is a step toward ameliorating that difficulty over the medium to longterm, although it has proved to be a controversial political decision at home
simply because the public still prefers a more pacifist approach to national
security affairs.
V.

US-JAPAN RELATIONS UNDER PRESIDENT TRUMP

Donald Trump was an isolationist during his presidential campaign. But
he changed his position dramatically after assuming the presidency in 2017.
In a March 21, 2016, interview, Trump told an editorial board member of the
Washington Post that the US-Japan alliance is unfair because Japan is not
required to defend the United States. He demanded that Japan pay more, andeven demanded it pay 100 percent of the cost of stationing US soldiers inJapan. He did not, however, respond to the question of what he would do
about the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, which are claimed by both
Japan and China.9
Therefore, it was not surprising that there was a tremendous amount ofanxiety in the Japanese government on November 8, 2016, when it became
clear that Trump was the presidential election winner. Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe worked hard to persuade president-elect Trump to value thealliance, in an informal meeting with the president at the Trump Tower rightafter he was elected president in November 2016. Abe found a totally

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13

different Trump at the first formal summit meeting in February 2017.
President Trump agreed to a joint statement about the United States
defending Japan, including the Senkaku Islands, and he even expressed his
appreciation for Japan’s hosting of American troops.
The most important and pressing issue was whether President Trump
would continue the previous US official policy of applying Article 5 of the
Security Treaty to the Senkaku Islands. President Barack Obama had statedin public in Tokyo in 2014 that Article 5 of the Security Treaty would beapplied to the Senkaku Islands. That was the first official pledge by a US
president to defend those islands. If President Trump had not accepted thistreaty obligation, the provocative activities by China in the vicinity of the
Senkaku Islands might have escalated. This was a dramatic change from
Trump’s position on Japan in 2016. Due to this great turnaround, the USJapan alliance did not face a crisis.
Still, there are lingering concerns—in the minds of the Japanese and manyother people around the world who depend on the United States for national
security—about the direction that Trump’s foreign policy will take in the
coming years. President Trump is unpredictable. Above all, we do not knowwhether he understands an alliance in the same way as most leading
politicians and many experts in international relations do.
Generally, when two countries enter into an alliance, they go through aprocess of hard negotiation over the terms of the alliance, as Japan and theUnited States did in 1951 and 1960. However, once they strike a deal, theytend to work together to guarantee each other’s national security. When one
country faces a national security threat, the other country normally lends asmuch support as possible. In this context, President Trump might have a
different understanding than presidents in the past of the alliance. The
Republic of Korea (South Korea) is a case in point. When it faced a serious
national security threat from the increasingly belligerent Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) in 2017, President Trump was
helpful in guaranteeing the national security of South Korea, while forcing it
to accept the renegotiation of the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement. In asense, he was ready to exploit an ally in trouble. The next question iswhether he would do the same thing to Japan.
There is still serious concern about what President Trump will doregarding the US-Japan alliance. Obviously, the difficulty for the allianceremains, though the worst-case scenario—virtual breakdown of thealliance—has been avoided, at least for the time being.

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FUMIAKI KUBOCONCLUSION: US-JAPAN RELATIONS IN A COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICALPERSPECTIVE
The US-Japan alliance is very different from the US-UK alliance, which
many people often regard as a natural alliance. It is certain that the USJapan alliance is not so natural, given the difference in race, ethnicity,religion, and culture of the two nations, along with a modern past that
includes a terrible war. It is these very differences and difficulties that makethe US-Japan alliance even more remarkable and rare in world history. It haslasted for sixty-six years in spite of the serious weaknesses arising from theasymmetrical structure in terms of the rights and obligations of the alliancepartners. The United States and Japan have overcome their negative past
relationship and have achieved a lot. This achievement is symbolized by themutual visits of President Obama to Hiroshima and Prime Minister Abe to
Pearl Harbor in 2016.
This is a case of two democracies with very different backgrounds
realizing a strong alliance based not only on national and strategic interests
but also on shared values, mutual respect for each other’s culture andtradition, and cultural understanding and exchanges. Therefore, in a very
different way, US-Japan relations are as remarkable as those in any otheralliance. Many of us can be optimistic about the future of our relations.
People, especially political leaders and public intellectuals who
understand the alliance’s value, nevertheless must keep working to maintainthis unusual alliance, whose structure is not easily understood by somepoliticians and many ordinary people. The survival and stability of thisalliance in the face of rising populism should never be taken for granted.
NOTES
This article is based on a paper prepared as the presidential address for the
special symposium at the 52nd Annual Meeting of the Japanese Association
for American Studies, June 2, 2018, held at the University of Kitakyushu,
Fukuoka. This is also a part of the research result conducted when I was a
Japan Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in
2014.
1
The following studies on the US-Japan alliance are worth mentioning: Kent Calder,“Securing Security through Prosperity: The San Francisco System in Comparative
Perspective,” Pacific Review 17, no. 1 (March 2004): 135–57; Victor Cha, “Powerplay:
Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia,” International Security, no. 3 (Winter 2009/2010):

JAPAN-US ALLIANCE IN THE FACE OF POPULISM

15

158–96; Inh-Hwi Park, “Changing US Alliance Strategy and the Limits of Bilateral Alliance
Structure in Northeast Asia,” Journal of East Asian Affairs 21, no. 1 (2007): 49–91; Evelyn
Goh, “Hierarchy and the Role of the United States in the East Asian Security Order,”International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8 (2008): 353–377; however, there is no in-depth
exploration of the alliance’s asymmetrical structure in the sense used in this article.
2
Vikram Singh, Dalibor Rohac, and Danielle Pletka, “Partnership in Peril: The Populist
Assault on the Transatlantic Community,” Center for American Progress, American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, July 2018, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/07/SinghAuthoritarianPopulismAndTransatlanticAllianceReport.pdf.
3
For a more detailed comparison, refer to Fumiaki Kubo, “Amerika Gaikō ni totte no
Dōmei to Nichibei Dōmei: Hitotsu no Mitorizu” [Alliances and the Japan-US alliance interms of US diplomacy: A sketch], Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2012; Fumiaki
Kubo, ed., Amerika ni totte Dōmei to wa Nani ka [What is an alliance to the United States?](Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2013), 3–30.
4This expression was used by Strobe Talbott at the symposium held in Tokyo by Nihon
Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei) and the Brookings Institution on April 26, 2010; its summary can befound in Nihon Keizai Shimbun, April 27, 2010. The expression itself is recorded by
Tatsuhiko Yoshizaki at http://tameike.net/diary/apr10.htm.
5“Despite Low Crime Rate, US Military Faces No-Win Situation on Okinawa,” Stars &Stripes, May 24, 2016, https://www.stripes.com/news/despite-low-crime-rate-us-militaryfaces-no-win-situation-on-okinawa-1.411132.
6
An Opinion Poll on the Self Defense Force and Defense Issues, by the Cabinet Office, theGovernment of Japan, 2015, https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/2-5.html. In thesame question, 19.5% answered that they would resist through nonmilitary means, while
5.1% said they would not resist and 1.9% of them responded that they would resist throughguerrilla-like ways.
7“US Military Bases and Economy and Budget of Okinawa Prefecture,” http://www.pref.
okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/tyosa/documents/p18.pdf; “US Military Bases as a Hindrance
to Economic Growth,” Ryukyushimpo, May 22, 2016, https://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/
entry-283959.html.
8
Sankei Shimbun, February 25, 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20090227081405/
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/090225/stt0902250151000-n1.htm.
9“A Transcript of Donald Trump’s Meeting with the Washington Post Editorial Board,”
Washington Post, editorial page, March 21, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
post-partisan/wp/2016/03/21/a-transcript-of-donald-trumps-meeting-with-the-washingtonpost-editorial-board/?utm_term=.c91d9951d19c.