The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 9 (1998)

A Democracy at War:The American Campaign to Repeal Chinese
Exclusion in 1943
Xiaohua MA
Osaka Kyoiku University“It is with particular pride and pleasure that I have today signed thebill repealing the Chinese exclusion acts. . . . An unfortunate barrier
between allies has been removed. The war effort in the Far East can
now be carried on with a greater vigor and a larger understanding of
our common purpose.”1
The words are taken from President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s address
to Congress made on December 17, 1943, on the occasion of his signing the bill that repealed the Chinese Exclusion Acts. They not only
demonstrate Roosevelt’s eagerness to eliminate the “unfortunate barrier” between the United States and China, but also suggest that a transformation of America’s East Asian policy had taken place during
World War II.
Scholarship on U.S.-East Asian relations during World War II has
long concentrated on the complexity of political affairs, especially on
military strategy, while racial issues in international relations havebeen largely ignored.2 On the other hand, studies of Asian immigration
into the United States have usually focused on the enactment of racially discriminatory legislation.3 There has been little research on how
Asian immigration, especially from China, was affected by American
foreign policy during World War II.4 Nevertheless, the war in fact
Copyright © 1998 Xiaohua Ma. All rights reserved. This work may be used,with this notice included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work
may be distributed, electronically or otherwise, in whole or in part, without
permission from the author.
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played a cricial role in altering America’s exclusionist anti-Chinese
immigration policy. It also showed that American immigration policy
toward Asians was overwhelmingly inﬂuenced by its foreign policy.
This paper will explore how American foreign policy inﬂuenced its
immigration policy during World War II. It will focus on the repeal of
the Chinese Exclusion Acts in 1943. By examining the interaction
between American domestic politics and its foreign policy, it willshow that the abrogation of the Chinese Exclusion Acts not only
marked a historic turning point in American immigration policy, butalso had a great impact on the policy-making process regarding East
Asia, especially towards China.
I

FORMATION OF ASIAN EXCLUSION POLICY

The ﬁrst Asian immigrants to enter the United States were Chinese,
lured to California by the Gold Rush of 1848. The construction of theAmerican railroad in the 1860s further accelerated the inﬂux ofChinese laborers. Chinese immigration to the United States peaked at
15,740 in 1870, over ninety percent of whom settled on the Paciﬁc
Coast.5
As the number of Chinese increased, Caucasian workers in California began to resent Chinese laborers. The Chinese were considered“culturally and racially inferior” and a threat to wage levels and working conditions. By the mid-1870s, the completion of the transcontinental railroad, the growth of the white labor force in the West, and thenationwide economic depression all encouraged white working men toturn against the Chinese. Responding to the pressure of anti-Chinese
sentiment on the Paciﬁc Coast, on May 6, 1882, Congress enacted abill prohibiting Chinese immigrants from entering the United States.6
The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was the ﬁrst restrictive immigration law in American history. The emergence of this discriminatory
legislation initiated a gradual process of immigration restriction basedon race. The enactment of this legislation marked the end of the freeimmigration era in American history. This discriminatory law not only
had long-term repercussions for America’s relations with China, butalso affected overall immigration policy and internal politics. On theother hand, it can also be considered as merely one step in the growthof anti-Asiatic legislation. Following enactment of the act, Asian
immigration became a constant target of American nativism andA DEMOCRACY AT WAR

123

racism. Subsequently, the Immigration Act of 1924 completely stopped
the ﬂow of immigrants from Asia into the United States.
II

THE WAR AND CHINESE EXCLUSION

This restrictive immigration policy, which excluded “aliens” deﬁned
by race, did not change until after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941. That sudden attack directly led to a crucial transformation of America’s anti-Chinese immigration policy.
Immediately after the attack, President Roosevelt signed a presidential proclamation permitting the apprehension of any alien Japanese“deemed dangerous to the public peace or safety of the UnitedStates.”7 Although Kido Saburo, president of the Japanese-American
Citizens League, explicitly declared in a radio broadcast the next day
that Japanese Americans were “loyal Americans,” agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation picked up hundreds of Japanese Americans.
Subsequently many of them were drafted into the U.S. army in orderto test their “loyalty” to the United States.8
In contrast to this deterioration in U.S. relations with Japan, the war
united China and the United States. The day after the attack, theUnited States together with China declared war on Japan, and the twocountries became allies immediately. The special wartime alliance
between China and the United States resulted in the transformation ofAmerica’s East Asian policy, especially its China policy.
(1) Transformation of America’s China Policy
Traditionally, America’s China policy had been based on the Open
Door doctrine, which sought to maintain the balance of power in East
Asia while pursuing commercial interests in China. The essence of thispolicy did not include defending China’s independence and sovereignty. During World War I, the Chinese were disappointed by Woodrow
Wilson’s policy towards China. Throughout the 1920s, the UnitedStates failed to give any effective support to Dr. Sun Yat-sen and theChinese Nationalist movement. In the 1930s, America’s policy of
appeasement toward Japan led it to sacriﬁce the interests of China.
Typical of this policy was Henry L. Stimson’s non-recognition policy
towards Japan’s Manchurian occupation; the United States made every
effort to avoid involvement in the Sino-Japanese War. Nevertheless, asJapan’s aggression in China became more widespread, the United

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States became anxious about the China crisis, as Japanese troops were
occupying most areas of China and menacing vital American interests
in Asia. In November 1940, as soon as Japan recognized the Wangpuppet regime in Nanjing, the United States responded vigorously byoffering lend-lease aid to Chiang Kai-shek.9 However, the crucialtransformation of America’s China policy did not occur until late1941, after Japan’s sudden attack at Pearl Harbor.
Upon hearing of the attack, Chiang immediately summoned theAmerican Ambassador to China, Clarence Gauss, and proposed a military alliance of Allied nations ﬁghting against the Axis powers.10 On
December 13, Secretary of State Cordell Hull asked Maxwell M.
Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs “to draw up a
draft of a declaration to be made by the nations ﬁghting the Axis,
which would bind them together until victory and would commit themto the basic principles that we uphold.”11 On January 1, 1942, a Joint
Declaration by the United Nations was issued, with China listed as the
fourth signatory, following the United States, Great Britain, and theSoviet Union.12 The inclusion of China as a major power in the
Declaration demonstrated that China had become indispensable toAmerica‘s war strategy.
In the early part of the war, nevertheless, the United States adopted
a “Europe First Policy.” This policy implied that the war in Asia wassecondary in America’s global strategy. Although the outbreak of the
Paciﬁc War altered American concerns and forced the United States tofocus on the war in Asia, the United States’ primary aim was to “keepChina in the war” in order to tie up millions of Japanese troops until
the ultimate Allied victory in Europe. As Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Adviser to the Secretary of State Cordell Hull, pointed out when the
United States decided to lend China ﬁve hundred million dollars inJanuary 1942, it was “the time for us to tie China into our war (whichstill is her war) as tight as possible.”13
For the United States, China’s importance in the war was twofold.
America intended to make use of Chinese resistance forces to ﬁght
against the Japanese. Meanwhile, from the perspective of America’s
own military strategy, bases on the Chinese mainland would permit
American bombers to strike Japan. Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, former
Commander in Chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, testiﬁed before theHouse Committee that the Chinese mainland was “the only area fromwhich long-range bombers can reach Japan.” This led to the conclu-

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125sion that allied success against Japan required the continued participation of China in the war.14
By early 1943, the United States had begun developing concreteplans for using Chinese bases as the launching pad for an air offensive
against Japan. In March, President Roosevelt suggested organizing a
ﬁve-hundred-plane air force in China for launching air attacks.15 This
plan was considered the most effective means to demonstrate thestrategic cooperation between China and the United States. Thus thecontinuation of Chinese resistance and cooperation was certainly an
important American objective.
In order to achieve this goal, the United States attempted to buttress
China. Politically, one of the most important measures taken was toaid China’s participation in international affairs, recognizing China asa “Great Power” on the world stage. This strategy emerged in thespring of 1942. On May 2, 1942, President Roosevelt declared that “inthe future an unconquerable China will play its proper role in maintaining peace and prosperity not only in Eastern Asia but in the wholeworld.”16 Soon after, in discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister V.
M. Molotov in May-June, 1942, Roosevelt emphasized the importanceof postwar cooperation among the “four policemen,” which included
China together with the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet
Union.17 In December 1942, in a conversation with Owen Lattimore,
American special adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt stressed therole of China as a member of the “Big Four” after the war.18 Moreover, the treaty reached with China on January 11, 1943, to relinquish
extraterrioriality, further demonstrated that the United States intended
to give formal expression to China’s “Great Power” status. Besides
military and political considerations, however, another factor played
an even more fundamental and decisive part in forcing the UnitedStates to alter its China policy.
(2) The Paciﬁc War as a Propaganda War
Soon after the outbreak of the Paciﬁc War, another battlefront,
which used propaganda, started. On this battleﬁeld to establish a newworld order, the conﬂicts between Japan and the United States became
more aggravated as the war developed.
Five days after the attack, Japan began to call the war “The Great
East Asia War” and to assert that the purpose of the war was to “overthrow the American and British imperialists, who have oppressed and126

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squeezed one billion Asians, in order to establish an ideal order of coprosperity and co-existence in East Asia.”19 Meanwhile, Japanese propagandists utilized “psychological weaponry,” emphasizing the discriminatory racism of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, to ﬁght against
Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, from which racial equality was excluded.
In February 1942, an article entitled “A New Step Towards the
Emancipation of Asiatics” appeared in Toa Kaihou [Emancipation ofEastern Asia]. It proclaimed that the essence of “injustice and inequality” was rooted in the American exploitation of “the yellow race.”20
In early 1942, with the guidance of the Japanese Army, FRONT,
one of the most important wartime propaganda magazines, began publication, condemning Western oppression in Asia and extolling “racial
harmony” in “the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Japanese
propagandists claimed that equality slogans from the United States
were “hypocritical” and that the essence of “so-called equality” was
the “beast-like treatment or semi-starvation pay to the Asiatics.”21“Asia must be one—in her aim, in her action and in her future,” itinsisted; “when Asia becomes one in truth, a new order will be established throughout the world.”22
As mentioned above, the alliance between China and the UnitedStates was established as soon as the Paciﬁc War broke out, because
China, according to President Roosevelt, was “the ﬁrst to stand up andﬁght against aggression in this war.”23 This formal alliance, however,
did not alter the unequal relations (both internationally and racially)that existed between China and the United States. The continuing existence of the Chinese Exclusion Acts was one example of this unalteredinequality.
Under these circumstances, Japanese propagandists found valuable
ammunition for their appeals to other Asians and began to utilize theChinese issue in their ﬁght against the Allied powers, pursuing a campaign of “Asia for the Asiatics.”
As the 100th anniversary of the ratiﬁcation of the Nanjing Treaty,
the ﬁrst unequal treaty made between China and the Western colonial
powers, approached, the Japanese government decided to make fulluse of this event to condemn British and American imperialism andtheir brutal invasions in Asia. On August 17, 1942, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Japanese Ambassador to Nanjing, sent a conﬁdential telegram
to the Foreign Ministry proposing that this unusual opportunity be
used to further anti-British propaganda.24 Two days later, the Japanese

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127

government decided that this action would be the best method forlaunching a vehement propaganda offensive against the British invasion of Asia and decided to set up a special week called “A Week to
Attack Britain,” in order to condemn the hypocrisies contained in the
Allied espousal of democracy and freedom.25
At the same time, Japan manipulated its puppet government inNanjing to denounce the “hypocritical democracy and equality” of theAllied powers. On August 29, 1942, on the 100th anniversary of the
ratiﬁcation of the Nanjing Treaty, the Wang puppet regime in Nanjing
convened a momentous mass meeting. At this meeting, Wang Jing-wei
condemned the unequal treaty forced upon the Chinese by “the British
and American imperialists,” as well as American racial discrimination
against Chinese. He also appealed to the Chinese to unite with theJapanese, to “drive away all the American and British imperialists
from Asia” in order to “vitalize East Asia.”26 Simultaneously, Japanese
propagandists denounced British imperialism as a “vampire” in Asia,and appealed to Asians to unite to eradicate this “Asian humiliation.”27
As a result of the verbal offensive of this Japanese propaganda,
demands to abolish the symbols of inequality in relations with China
appeared in the United States. On May 18, 1942, an article entitled“Exclusion and Extraterritoriality” was published in Contemporary
China. The author denounced the “white Supremacy” of American
immigration laws and the perniciousness of the extraterritorial system
in China, and demanded that “the era of the unjust system” applied to
the Chinese must “come to an end.”28 Three months later, in order tosilence Japanese propaganda, another article came out, entitled “ThisIs No Racial War,” which called for freedom and equality to be given
to “all the oppressed races and nations.”29
In response to public opinion, on August 13, Roger S. Greene, a former U.S. diplomat in China and a prominent wartime pro-China lobbyist, wrote to his friend Stanley Hornbeck to ask the State Department to concern itself with this issue, since it would “help to convince
some doubters in Asia that we really do mean that the Atlantic Chartershall apply to the Far East as much as Europe.”30 The State Department decided to deal with the issue. Finally, on October 10, 1942,
China’s Independence Day, President Roosevelt sent a “special gift” toChina in the form of his statement to Chiang Kai-shek that the UnitedStates had decided to rescind the unequal treaties.31 Chiang, greatly
moved by this unexpected action, sent a telegram to Roosevelt to128

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respond that “unquestionably, it will boost morale of our Chinese toﬁght against aggression continuously,” and further that “any otheractions can not compare with the abolition of the unequal treaties.”32
Nevertheless, China’s equality with the United States in international
affairs, as indicated by the relinquishment of the unequal treaties, did
not suggest any fundamental sense of racial equality and silence theJapanese propagandists. A few days after the ratiﬁcation of the newtreaty between China and the United States on January 11, 1943,
which abolished extraterrioriality, the Axis propagandists initiatedanother offensive on the ideological battlefront. In January 1943,
Cheng Gong-bo, Minister of Justice in the Wang puppet regime,
issued a statement in Chuo Koron denouncing the evils of racial discrimination against Chinese. He declared that the Chinese were readyto “share hardship” with Japan in this war.33
In addition, Japanese propagandists distributed leaﬂets widely in
Asia attacking the double standards of the Allied democracies. A typical one read:
America is China’s ally. Americans say they love and admire theChinese. But can you go to America, can you become citizens? No.
Americans do not want you. They just want you to do their ﬁghting.
Their Exclusion Act names you and says you are unﬁt for American citizenship. . . . There will be no such discrimination against you in the
Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.34

Japanese propaganda such as this, directed at America’s antiChinese discriminatory laws, attempted to appeal to Asians by emphasizing American racial discrimination. In support of Japan’s strategy,on June 24, 1943, an editorial entitled “The Hypocritical and Ugly
Face of the United States” was published in the Zhonghua Ribao[China Daily], a newspaper controlled by the Wang puppet regime. Its
author condemned the evils of American democracy and insisted that
“if the American government does not abolish the discriminatory laws
against the Chinese, Asian people have no real equality.” Finally, it
appealed to “all Asians to unite together to drive away American andBritish imperialists from Asia in order to establish a prosperous Asia
for the Asiatics.”35
Meanwhile, while touring Japan in June, 1943, U. B. Lwin, Burma’s
Minister of Education, made a signiﬁcant radio broadcast from Tokyo.
Supporting the concept of “Asia for the Asiatics,” he insisted that

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Burma saw itself as “an integral part of Asia.” “We are Orientals,” headded, “and [the] Japanese are also of the Orient. As Orientals, we areproud to see the Japanese achieving victories unprecedented in history.
Therefore, we in Burma should do our best for the ultimate victory ofJapan in this war.”36
America’s racially discriminatory immigration laws were thus avital resource for Japan in its campaign of “Asia for the Asiatics.” Itshould be borne in mind, however, just how little the Japanese new
ideal order of “the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity” was itself basedon equality. In January 1941, the Japanese government unequivocallydeclared that the foundation of establishing the new order was basedon the “Yamato people.”37 On January 21, 1942, Prime Minister Tojo
Hideki reiterated in the Diet the principle that within the new order
only the Japanese could be the “meisyu” (master) in “the Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”38
III

THE INTERACTION OF AMERICA’S EAST ASIAN POLICY ANDITS IMMIGRATION POLICYJapan’s use of the Chinese Exclusion Acts to ﬁght a propaganda war
against the Allies embarrassed the United States, since China was its
most populous ally in Asia. Furthermore, the assumption of “whitesuperiority” impeded America’s inﬂuence on and domination of theideological battlefront of the Paciﬁc War. Having been battered by avehement offensive from Japan’s propaganda guns, the United States
decided to eliminate the “unfortunate barrier” on the ideological battleﬁeld.
(1) The War in American Eyes—“Justice to Our Allies”
After the United States entered the war, Chinese exclusion was
brought to the forefront of American public awareness. In February
1942, Charles N. Spinks, a specialist on East Asian relations, published his article “Repeal Chinese Exclusion” in Asia and theAmericas. He pointed out that the United States was now ﬁghting side
by side with China, one of its most important allies, to build a newworld order based on the fundamental principles of freedom, justiceand equality for mankind, which had been destroyed by the Axis.
Nevertheless, he argued, the United States was not treating “the130

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Chinese people, our allies, with the justice and equality they deserve.”39
In addition, other articles referred to the serious effect of Japanese
propaganda, which was using Chinese exclusion to “spread rumors” inAsia. They pointed out that the danger was the more acute since Japan
controlled not only “the radio but all forms of communication andsocial organization” throughout Asia. The main points of the advocates were that Japanese racial propaganda would not only menace
America’s interests in East Asia but also would contribute to the quick
defeat of the Allied forces in the war, because it focused on the undeniable fact that Chinese were excluded by American immigration laws.
In sum, they urged the government to quickly “end the affront toChina” in order to destroy Japan completely and win the war forjustice.40
One of the most important reasons for the enactment of the Chinese
Exclusion Act in 1882 had been American racism, or the sense ofwhite superiority, which was ﬁrmly rooted in the ideology of social
Darwinism and late nineteenth - century American nativism. This
dominant ideology became the critical factor in the exclusion not onlyof the Chinese, but of all Asian races. Although in explaining the universality of the Atlantic Charter in his address on Memorial Day,
1942, Under Secretary of State, Summer Welles insisted that “the discrimination between peoples because of their race, creed or color must
be abolished,” in fact, the racially discriminatory laws against Asians,
particularly Chinese, did exist at that time in American legislation.41
The outbreak of the Paciﬁc War altered America’s traditional attitudes towards China. Two days after the attack, an editorial appearing
in the New York Times argued that if the United States united with
China, “a loyal ally with . . . inexhaustible manpower,” it would have“the key to the strategy of the Paciﬁc.”42 In April, another editorial,“China’s Splendid Fight,” appeared in the New Republic, in which theauthor insisted that China, “by virtue of her dogged struggle for independence” could help the United States “immeasurably in winning the
war quickly.”43 The heroic and continuous Chinese struggle against
Japanese aggression won high praise from the American public, andconvinced Americans that China shared the principles of democracywith the United States. In the meantime, equality for all, which was
the oldest principle of American ideals, now became a new symbol ofAmerican democracy and freedom, brought forth again in the process

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of ﬁghting against fascist aggression and winning the war. Pearl S.
Buck, a Nobel-Prize winning writer, regarded as the most inﬂuential
Westerner to write about China since Marco Polo, quickly emerged as
one of the most tenacious wartime opponents of racial discrimination.
She used every occasion to press her demands for racial equality.
In February 1942, for example, speaking at a literary luncheon,
Pearl S. Buck surprised the 1,700 people gathered at the Astor Hotel of
New York. “The Japanese weapon of racial propaganda in Asia is
beginning to show signs of effectiveness,” she told her audience,“prejudice is the most vulnerable point in our American democracy.”44
She indicated in the most unequivocal terms in her address that victoryin the war demanded the cooperation and solidarity of peoples regardless of race, color or nation. If Americans did not abandon “white
supremacy,” the United States would lose the war. “We cannot win
this war,” she asserted, “without convincing our colored allies —who
are most of our allies— that we are not ﬁghting for ourselves as continuing superior over colored peoples.”45 A month later, in a radio
broadcast, Pearl S. Buck emphasized that the aim of the war was to“give real freedom and human equality to all people.”46 In sum, in avariety of ways, in books, in magazines, in speeches and on the radio,
she concluded bluntly that discrimination against the Chinese in the
United States had to come to an end, because while it existed, “we are
ﬁghting on the wrong side on this war. We belong with Hitler.”47 She
continued her crusade for total freedom and equality for all people
throughout the war. Buck and her second husband, Richard J. Walsh,
who was her publisher and editor of Asia and the Americas, became
leading ﬁgures in the movement to abolish Chinese exclusion. Under
their leadership, a national campaign to repeal the Chinese Exclusion
Acts was begun.
On November 10, 1942, Richard J. Walsh made a speech at the
Town Hall Round Table of New York City, urging that America
repeal the Chinese Exclusion Acts, place immigration on a quota basis,and make Chinese people eligible for American citizenship.48 His
speech evoked a tremendous reaction. In the spring of 1943, “TheCitizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion and Place Immigration on A Quota Basis” was formed in New York City by a group of
notable intellectuals, including Pearl S. Buck and Henry R. Luce,founder of Time, Life and Fortune.49 These pro-China intellectuals
such as Pearl S. Buck and Henry R. Luce served as the chief spokes-

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persons in the repeal campaign. Walsh, chairman of the Citizens
Committee, appealed to the members in May, “Last year we celebrated
Double Ten [October 10] by announcing the end of extraterritoriality. . . . This year let Double Ten resound with the news that we haverepealed the exclusion laws.”50 In the meantime, the Citizens Committee published a pamphlet —Our Chinese Wall— to arouse public
interest. Over 30,000 copies were distributed to libraries, universities,
and religious, social and labor organizations.51 The Citizens Committee began to inﬂuence public opinion in favor of repealing the
Chinese Exclusion Acts. The strategy of the Citizens Committee wasto stress the military necessity of counteracting the Japanese propaganda that was disturbing good U.S. relations with China.52(2) Strategy of the State Department
When, with the outbreak of the Paciﬁc War on February 17, 1942,
the Japanese propaganda guns also opened ﬁre, an American missionary informed the State Department that the United States should beseriously concerned about Chinese exclusion, because it had both“propagandic and political value” in the struggle against Japan’s“Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”53 Although the State
Department recognized the problem, it had no intention to solve it,since from its point of view the matter was “regulated strictly by
statutes, the enactment or repeal of which falls within the province of
the Congress.” The State Department therefore avoided the “intricate
and controversial” issue, which would involve “extensive revision of
our immigration laws.”54
On April 6, Warren A. Seavey, a well-known professor of law at
Harvard University, strongly advised the State Department to terminate the injustice towards China, and abandon the anti-Chinese discriminatory laws immediately, on the grounds that China had succeeded
in “holding [back] the Japanese and in aiding India.”55 The State
Department, however, held to the opinion that the government could
not proceed with this issue at that time, since the United States was at
war.56 The implication was that the Chinese issue should be taken up
only after the war.
Nevertheless, Japanese propaganda, which used Chinese exclusion
to promote its campaign of “Asia for the Asiatics,” continued to bolster Japanese morale in Asia. Especially, as some intellectuals warned
the State Department, if the United States lost China’s goodwill

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through continuing discrimination against the Chinese, it would risk
another war in which white supremacy might be ferociously challenged by Asians in general. Therefore, they requested the repeal of
the Chinese Exclusion Acts in order to “prevent a third war of white
versus colored races.”57
In the spring of 1942, with Japanese propagandists repeatedly calling on Asians to “drive out all Americans, Britons, and Dutchmen
from Asia,” and to “let Asia be for the Asiatics,” the State Department
began to be concerned about this psychological strategy, which wasimpeding America’s domination of Asia. On June 17, 1942, Maxwell
M. Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, pointed outthat the Japanese in their psychological campaigns of “Asia for the
Asiatics” and “the colored races of the world united under Japaneseleadership against the white races,” could win a great victory in Asia.
Having analyzed China’s war potential, he indicated that if China
collapsed, it would contribute immeasurably to the Axis’s psychological offensive, and would “greatly bolster morale in Japan and increase
the effectiveness and appeal of Japan’s psychological warfare.”Consequently, he asserted, ﬁrst, that China, the largest Oriental power,
could prevent through its war against Japan the “success of Japan’s
psychological warfare.” Secondly, he asserted that China would supply the “decisive factor in the psychological warfare against Japan”
and could deny to Japan the possibility of uniting Asia, and thirdly, heargued that China could “dampen moral in Japan itself by her stubborn
refusal to accept Japan’s program of ‘Asia for the Asiatics’.” As forthe role of China’s resistance in the war, he concluded that the “psychological factor” was also important.58
For the United States, the importance of China at this time was amatter of political propaganda, as well as of political and militarynecessity. The propaganda had two main goals: ﬁrst, to strengthen
Chinese morale and defeat the Japanese campaign of “Asia for the
Asiatics”; second, to meet America’s desire to establish a new system
in Asia, which was oriented toward Western democracy instead of theJapanese “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” On February 27,
1943, Hamilton directly stated that China’s continued involvement in
the war on the side of the United States was “the best insurance thatthe present war not become a race war.” In particular, he emphasizedthat China’s role in the war effort was not only “extremely important
for the present but for the long future as well.”59 Therefore, it became

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necessary as part of the propaganda war for the United States to repeal
the Chinese Exclusion Acts. To the State Department, the repeal of
Chinese exclusion involved both immediate questions of war strategy
and long-term considerations of postwar policy. The United States
decided to eliminate the “possible obstacle” between the two nations,when Chinese Foreign Minister T. V. Soong requested the repeal ofthe discriminatory laws against the Chinese in March 1943, as the
Chinese were “eager for recognition” and “equality.”60 On May 13, theAssistant Secretary of State, Breckinridge Long, discussed the Chinese
issue with House Speaker Sam Rayburn and House Majority Leader
John W. McCormack and explicitly declared that the State Department
would support “a movement to permit the immigration and naturalization of persons resident in China and born in China to be admitted
under the quota.”61 On May 19, the ﬁrst hearing of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization was held to debate the issueof repealing the Chinese Exclusion Acts.
(3) The Chinese Issue in America’s New World OrderIn May-June of 1943, the House Committee summoned ﬁfty-one
witnesses in six hearings. The repeal campaign led to a demonstrationof vigorous American nativism. The traditional opposition forces, primarily from labor, veterans’ organizations, West Coast interests, and“patriotic” societies, took a vigorous stand against Chinese immigration. For example, representatives of the American Coalition, an association representing approximately one hundred patriotic societies andWest Coast interests, expressed a strong, racially motivated, dislike of
the Chinese, calling them, for example, “morally the most debased
people on the face of the earth.”62 In addition, representatives of theAmerican Federation of Labor and the Veterans of Foreign Warsstrongly opposed a “radical change of immigration laws” from “aneconomic standpoint.”63 However, the pro-repeal force was promoted
by inﬂuential groups such as the Citizens Committee and missionaryorganizations. Eventually forty-two witnesses before the House Committee favored repealing the Chinese Exclusion Acts. The advocatesfavored the following three-point program: the abolition of theChinese Exclusion Acts, the establishment of a quota for Chinese immigrants, and the eligibility of Chinese immigrants for American
citizenship. The argument with the widest appeal and greatest weight
was that the repeal would help the United States to win the war.

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Furthermore, the repeal would be the best manifestation that thepresent war was not a “racial war,” but a war for “justice.”64 As
Congressman Walter H. Judd, a key person in “China Lobby,” testiﬁedin the House Committee: “there never will be a war between the whiteand colored races, if only we keep the largest and strongest of them,
the Chinese, with us.”65 Thereby, the abolition of the Chinese Exclusion Acts became a new means for the United States to adjust its East
Asian policy, especially its China policy.
America’s China policy showed this consideration in two ways.
First, it reﬂected wartime necessities. Second, it acknowledged theneed to address postwar possibilities. When Congressman Warren G.
Magnuson presented the bill to repeal the Chinese Exclusion Acts inCongress in October 1943, he stressed that the repeal of the antiChinese discriminatory laws went far beyond American wartime
demands:
This bill goes far above and beyond its present war necessity. If any
one position of our foreign policy should be clear in the post-war world
it should be this, that we need in the Orient, democracy needs in the
Orient, a strong Allied nation, practicing the same principles of democracy that we intend to keep. Without such a strong nation it does nottake much intelligence to visualize what might come out of the greatcauldron mass of millions of Asiatic peoples. Without the clear leadership of such a democratic Asiatic nation as China, with our help,
alliances could form and other Japanese types of destructive empires
could arise that would make the present island empire look like adwarf.66

The Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius held the same
opinion, and emphatically pointed out that the renouncement of theChinese Exclusion Acts should be carried out “in recognition ofChina’s place among the United Nations ﬁghting for democracy andher great future in a democratic world.”67
What was China’s “great future in a democratic world”? For theUnited States, the most important question had to do with postwar politics. The stabilization of East Asia would require a strong counterweight to the Soviet Union. President Roosevelt outlined this positionin discussions with Britain’s Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, who visited the White House in the fall of 1942. Talking about the role China
would take internationally after the war, Roosevelt told Eden that hebelieved that “in any serious conﬂict of policy with Russia, [China]

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would undoubtedly line up on our side.”68 Therefore, in order for
China to be able to take up this position, she must not only emerge
from the war as a strong nation with “Great Power” status, but mustalso be oriented toward the Western powers and encouraged to practice “the same principles of democracy” as the United States.
On the other hand, China’s cooperation was indispensable for theUnited States in helping to weaken British forces in postwar Asia. This
strategy was expressed clearly in a conversation between Joseph
Stilwell, the Allied Military Commander in China, and Chiang Kaishek in the winter of 1943. General Stilwell told Chiang that “theUnited States was against any form of imperialism, including British,”and believed in “a free, strong, democratic China predominant inAsia” after the war.69 Thus, to the United States, if Japan was to be
demilitarized, the emergence of a new China with “Great Power”
status would be a prerequisite for the stable and peaceful Asia neededin America’s global strategy.
What was China’s response to the American vision of this newworld order in East Asia? During his visit to Chongqing in October
1942, Wendell L. Willkie, Roosevelt’s Special Envoy, told Chiangthat postwar cooperation between the two nations was “increasingly
necessary” in order to weaken the inﬂuence of British imperialism.
Chiang explicitly declared China’s commitment to cooperation with
the United States in the postwar world.70 Furthermore, in her visit to
the United States in early 1943, Madame Chiang indicated unequivocally in conversations with Harry L. Hopkins, Special Advisor to
President Roosevelt, that China would give strong backing to theUnited States in international affairs.71 This commitment to “accept
American proposals once a divergence of views among the UnitedStates, Britain, and the Soviet Union occurs,” became one of the mostimportant principles for the Chinese role in postwar international politics.72 Therefore, “practicing the same principles of democracy” andmaintaining “pro-Americanism” in the China that emerged after the
war was certainly an indispensable American diplomatic and politicalobjective.
At the same time, as a market, China was also extremely attractive
to American businessmen. The traditional “Open Door Policy” andwartime diplomacy based on America’s interests demonstrated that theUnited States needed China not only as a “friend” in wartime, but alsoneeded her, the greatest potential market for many varieties ofA DEMOCRACY AT WAR

137

American goods, as a “customer” after the war. On October 20, 1943,
Congressman Ed Gossett, a member of the House Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization, testiﬁed in the Committee that potential trade with China after the war would not only beneﬁt Americanbusiness, but would also furnish jobs to hundreds of thousands ofAmerican soldiers when they returned from the war.73 Not surprisingly, this pragmatic consideration, based on commercial interests, further
reinforced the position held by advocates of the repeal campaign.
Finally, the support of President Roosevelt was a decisive force inthe success of the repeal movement. On October 10, 1943, the House
began a general debate on the Chinese problem. Immediately President
Roosevelt sent a special message to Congress. He appealed toCongress to “take the offensive in this propaganda war and repeal thelaws that insult our only ally on the mainland of Asia.”74 Ten days
later the House passed the bill, which allowed one hundred and ﬁve
Chinese (based on the quota of the Immigration Law of 1924) to enterthe United States annually and also admitted the granting of American
citizenship to Chinese immigrants. On November 26, the Senate
approved the abolition of the Chinese Exclusion Acts which had constituted an integral part of American immigration policy for over sixty
years.
CONCLUSION
The outbreak of the Paciﬁc War highlighted the Chinese Exclusion
Acts and established a new direction in Asian American history. To
some extent, the repeal of the anti-Chinese discriminatory laws did
give the Chinese technical equality, in granting them a symbolic quota
per annum and allowing Chinese immigrants to acquire American citizenship. From this point of view, the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion
Acts in 1943 marked a historic turning point in American immigration
history, since it accepted the idea that Chinese immigrants were“assimilable” within the United States, despite the fact that the quota
granted to them at ﬁrst was only symbolic.
Superﬁcially, the repeal reﬂected a general trend towards the removal of racial discrimination in American domestic legislation. Nevertheless, the repeal itself did not place the Chinese on a full quota parity
with other, European countries eligible for immigration and citizenship.
In fact, traditional nativism was still vigorous and played a signiﬁcant

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role in the debate connected to the repeal campaign. According to the
Gallup Poll carried out in November after Congress passed the bill
repealing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, the approval/ disapproval rate
was quite close, forty-two to forty.75 Undoubtedly, the strong nativism
of wartime American society had impeded the development of therepeal campaign.
On the other hand, even the advocates themselves favored the limitation of the repeal movement. As Congressman Walter H. Judd, amajor supporter of the repeal movement, testiﬁed before the House
Committee, had the opening of immigration to the Chinese not been
limited to a symbolic quota of only one hundred and ﬁve, it would
have been opposed.76 In particular, Pearl S. Buck, another active initiator of the campaign, explicitly acknowledged that the repeal was only
“a war measure,” and that social equality really had nothing to do with
the Chinese issue.77 These qualiﬁcations held by the initiators andadvocates themselves hampered the further development of the repeal
campaign.
The strategic signiﬁcance of repealing the Chinese Exclusion Acts,
nevertheless, went far beyond the repeal itself. In 1943, China’s precarious military and political position was reinforced, while the political and military necessities made psychological gestures appear moresigniﬁcant than ever before. Moreover, China’s postwar cooperation
with the United States in America’s global strategy became increasingly indispensable.
Therefore the repeal was a prerequisite for the United States toreduce the East-West barrier on the ideological battlefront, and to psychologically batter Japan in particular. It became an important means
for America to eliminate the potential “racial crisis” between the
United States and China, so that the American vision of a new, strong,and democratic pro-American China in postwar Asia could be realized. Thus, the repeal became an essential step for the United States in
its policy of establishing China as a “Great Power.” This meant thatthe abolition of the Chinese Exclusion Acts was not only the result ofAmerica’s wartime strategy, but also the reﬂection of its long-term
considerations in East Asian policy in the postwar era.
Furthermore, it was based on these political and military strategies
that other anti-Asian discriminatory acts, such as those laws targeting
Indians and Filipinos, were renounced subsequently.78 However, as
was the case in the repeal of Chinese exclusion, these enactments

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139

could not alter the racially discriminatory treatment of Asian peoples.
It would take a long time for them to be treated with full equality in
American legislation. After World War II, especially as a result of the
upsurge of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, another campaign
to repeal the Immigration Law of 1924, based on “white superiority,”
was launched. This movement not only led to the enactment of a newimmigration law in 1965, which placed Asian peoples on a full quota
parity base with European countries eligible for immigration and citizenship, but also became a milestone in American immigration history. It marked the beginning of a new era of racial tolerance.

NOTES
I am indebted to Professor Iriye Akira, Dr. Eugene W. Wu and Harvard College
Libraries. Without their assistance this project could not have been completed.
1
United States Department of State, Bulletin, 18 December 1943, 431.
2
For U.S.-East Asian relations in World War II, see Iriye Akira, Power andCulture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1981); Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort from
Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953);
and Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938–1945 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1979). Racial issues in international relations are mentioned in
Christopher Thorne, Allies of A Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against
Japan, 1941–1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1978); and Racial Aspects of the
Far Eastern War of 1941–1945 (London, 1982). The best treatment of racial issues
between the United States and Japan in the Paciﬁc War is John W. Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Paciﬁc War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).
3
For the formation of anti-Asian legislation, see Ronald Takaki, Strangers from A
Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (Boston: Little Brown, 1989) and
Roger Daniels, Asian Americans: Chinese and Japanese in the United States since1850 (Seattle: University of Wash. Press, 1988).
4
In Japan, the best treatments on the wartime experience of Asian Americans are
Yui Daizaburo, “From Exclusion to Integration: Asian Americans’ Experiences inWorld War II” and “From Exclusion to Integration: Search for Postwar Hegemonyand Repeal of the Oriental Exclusion Acts,” Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies,24, no. 2 (December 1992): 55–67.; 25, no. 2 (December 1993): 95–101, and Yui,“World War II and Repealing Process of the Discriminatory Laws against Asians,”
Ethnicity in the History of the U.S.- Japan Relations (Tokyo: NIRA Research Report,
1994), 53–63.
5
Mary R. Coolidge, Chinese Immigration (New York: Henry Holt, 1909), 498.
6
For the anti-Chinese movement, see Elmer C. Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese
Movement in California (Urbana: University of Ill. Press, 1973) and Alexander
Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in
California (Berkeley: University of Calif. Press, 1971).
7
Brian Niiya, ed., Japanese American History (Los Angeles: The Japanese

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American National Museum, Facts on File, Inc., 1993), 16.
8
San Francisco Chronicle, 8 December 1941.
9
For Sino-U.S. Relations in wartime, see Arthur N. Young, China and the Helping
Hand, 1937–1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963) and Michael
Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938–1945.
10
Zhang Yu-fa, ed., Zhongguo xiandaishi lunji [Selected Works on Modern Chinese
History] (Taibei: Lianjing Publishing Inc., 1982), vol. 9, 383.
11
U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, 1942 (Britain), 1. (Hereafter cited as FRUS)
12
U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, vol. 6, 3 January 1942.
13
FRUS, 1942 (China), 443.
14
U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the Committee on Immigration
and Naturalization, Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., May
and June, 1943, 249. (Hereafter cited as House Hearings).
15
Iriye Akira, Power and Culture, 142.
16
U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, 2 May 1942, 381.
17
Iriye Akira, Power and Culture, 53–54.
18
FRUS, 1942 (China), 186.
19
Asahi Shimbun, 13 December 1941.
20
Toa Kaihou [Emancipation of Eastern Asia], February 1942, 62.
21
FRONT, vol. 5–6, 1943.
22
Ibid.
23
U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, 2 May 1942, 381.
24
Shigemitsu Mamoru to Foreign Ministry, 17 August 1942, Daitoa senso kankei
ikken: kakkoku no taido—chuka minkoku (kokumin seifu) [Files Relating to the Great
East Asia War: The Attitudes of the Governments—The Chinese National Government], Foreign Ministry of Japan, Tokyo.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid., and Chuo Koron, January 1943, 123.
27
Asahi Shimbun, 21 August 1942.
28“Exclusion and Extraterritoriality,” Contemporary China, 18 May 1942, 1–4.
29
“This Is No Racial War,” ibid., 10 August 1942, 1–4.
30
Roger S. Greene to Stanley Hornbeck on 13 August 1942, Roger S. Greene
Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.
31
Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui (Qing Xiaoyi, chief editor), ed., Zhonghuaminguo zhongyao shiliao chubian: Duiri kangzhan
shiqi [The Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China: In the Period of
the Anti-Japanese War] part 3, vol. 3, (Taiwan: Central Book Publishing Co., 1981),
712. (Hereafter cited as ZZSC)
32
ZZSC, 713.; and Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Destiny (New York: Macmillan,
1947), 151.
33
Chuo Koron, January 1943, 123–125.
34
This leaﬂet is recorded in U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1stSess., vol. 89, part 11, 3127.
35
Zhonghua Ribao [China Daily], 24 June 1943.
36
The Public Opinion, Summer 1943, 200–201.
37
Asahi Shimbun, 28 January 1941.
38
Foreign Ministry of Japan, ed., Nippon gaiko bunsho narabini shuyou bunsho[Main Documents of the Foreign Affairs of Japan] (Tokyo: Harashobo, 1969),
576–577.

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141

39
Charles N. Spinks, “Repeal Chinese Exclusion,” Asia and the Americas, February
1942, 92–94.
40
Richard J. Walsh, “Freedom and Equality for All,” Asia, May 1942, 258–259;“Our Great Wall against the Chinese,” The New Republic, 23 November 1942,
671–672; “Repeal Chinese Exclusion Now,” Asia and the Americas, January 1943, 4;
Eliot Janeway, “Fighting A White Man’s War,” Asia and the Americas, January 1943,
4–5; Richard J. Walsh, “Repeal Exclusion Laws Now,” ibid., June 1943, 322–323;
Quintus Qust, “Drop the Asiatic Color Bar!” Christian Century, February 1943,
191–192; Y. C. Shen, “High Time to Repeal Anti-Chinese Laws,” Chinese Mind, June
1943, 1–3; Bruno Lasker, “End Exclusion Now,” The New Republic, May 1943,
698–699. and “Our Humiliation—Not Theirs,” Common Ground, Autumn 1943,
71–76.
41
The New York Times, 31 May 1942.
42
Ibid., 9 December 1942.
43
The New Republic, 20 April 1942, 544.
44
Pearl S. Buck, “Tinder for Tomorrow,” delivered at the Book & Author
Luncheon, Astor Hotel, New York, 10 February 1942, reprinted in Asia, March 1942,
153–155.
45
Ibid.
46
Pearl S. Buck, “What Are We Fighting for in the Orient?” delivered in Town
Meeting of the Air in Town Hall, New York, 26 March 1942, reprinted in The
Christian Science Monitor, 25 April 1942.
47
Pearl S. Buck, “Freedom for All,” Asia, May 1942, 324–326. For detail of Pearl
Buck’s crusade in wartime for freedom and equality, see Pearl S. Buck, American
Unity and Asia (New York: The John Day Company, 1942) and What America Means
to Me (New York: The John Day Company, 1943).
48
Richard J. Walsh, “Our Great Wall against the Chinese,” The New Republic, 23
November 1942, 671–672.
49
Records of the Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion and Place
Immigration on A Quota Basis, New York Public Library. (Hereafter cited as Recordsof the Citizens Committee)
50
Richard J. Walsh to All Members of the Committee, ibid.
51
Fred W. Riggs, Pressures on Congress (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1950),
58.
52
Richard J. Walsh to All Members of the Committee, Records of the Citizens
Committee.
53Conﬁdential U. S. State Department Central Files, United States-China Relations,
1940–1949, National Archives, Washington D.C., vol. 1.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Maxwell M.
Hamilton), “China’s War Potential: Estimate,” 17 June 1942, FRUS, 1942 (China),
71–79.
59
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton), 27
February 1943, ibid., 1943 (China), 14.
60
Memorandum of Conversation by the Adviser on Political Relations (Stanley
Hornbeck), 10 March 1943, ibid., 769–770, 771–773.
61
Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Secretary of State (Breckinridge

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Long), 13 May 1943, ibid., 770–771.
62
House Hearings, 109.
63
Ibid., 177, 178.
64
For detail, see Xiaohua Ma, “Taiheyo sensoki ni okeru beikoku no taichu ‘seishinenjo’” [America’s “Spiritual Help” to China during World War II: A Pro-China
Lobbyist and Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts], Ochonomizu Shigaku[Ochanomizu Historical Review] 41, 1997: 1–42.
65
House Hearings, 151. For detail, see Xiaohua Ma, “America’s ‘Spiritual Help’ toChina during World War II,” ibid.
66
U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 89, part 9, 4427.
67
The Under Secretary (Edward R. Stettinius) to the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives (Sam Rayburn), 27 October 1943, FRUS, 1943 (China), 783–784.
68
Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945(New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 390.
69
Joseph W. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers (New York: W. Sloane Associates, 1948),
240.
70
Memorandum of Conversation between Chiang Kai-shek and Wendell L. Willkie,
5 October 1942, ZZSC, part 3, vol. 1, 762.
71
Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York:
Harper, 1948), 706.
72
ZZSC, part 3, vol. 3, 832.
73
U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 89, part 6, 8581.
74
Message of Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress, 11 October 1943, National
Archives, Washington D.C.
75
The New York Times, 21 November 1943.
76
House Hearings, 162.
77
Ibid., 73.
78
For detail, see Yui Daizaburo, “From Exclusion to Integration: Search for Postwar
Hegemony and Repeal of the Oriental Exclusion Acts,” Hitotsubashi Journal ofSocial Studies, 25, no. 2 (December 1993): 95–101.