Munich Personal RePEc Archive

On the Development Gap between Latin
America and East Asia: Welfare,
Efficiency, and Misallocation
Mendez-Guerra, Carlos
Nagoya University

5 February 2014

Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62588/
MPRA Paper No. 62588, posted 06 Mar 2015 06:51 UTC

On the Development Gap between
Latin America and East Asia:
Welfare, Efficiency, and Misallocation
Carlos A. MENDEZ-GUERRA

Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3
（Feb. 2015）

On the Development Gap between
Latin America and East Asia:
Welfare, Efficiency, and Misallocation
Carlos A. MENDEZ-GUERRA*
Abstract
Both long economic stagnation in Latin America and sustained growth and in East Asia imply a rapidly
raising development gap between the two regions. Using a series of numerical decompositions, thisarticle documents three facts about this gap. First, differences in welfare-adjusted development arelarger than those predicted by per-capita GDP. Second, differences in labor productivity account for mostof the differences in both production and welfare-adjusted development. Third, inefficient production is
the main factor holding down labor productivity. Furthermore, detailed analysis of the sectorial dynamics
suggests that labor misallocation across sectors had been reducing economy-wide efficiency in Latin
America. In particular, premature deindustrialization (i.e., workers moving from manufacturing into
services) and falling productivity in the service sector had potentially large negative effects on efficiency,
productivity, and welfare-adjusted development.

1. Introduction
The contrasting economic performance of Latin America1 and some fast growing countries in East
Asia2 constitutes one of the most interesting cases in modern development studies. Just after WorldWar II, GDP per capita in Latin America was just under 30 percent relative to that of the UnitedStates, while relative GDP per capita in East Asia was just under 20 percent. By 2010, Latin America
has not only failed to catch-up, but its relative GDP per capita had fallen to 23 percent.3 In contrast,
relative GDP per capita in East Asia increased to 83 percent. From a welfare perspective, results
are mixed. Latin America is lagging behind in life expectancy and inequality, yet it enjoys a larger
consumption share and higher leisure per adult. These contrasting experiences in both production
and welfare motivate what I call the development gap between Latin America and East Asia. How
large is this development gap? How can we add up measures of the production and welfare into a morecomprehensive measure of development4? What explains the evolution of this development gap?
Using aggregate data on production and welfare, I document three facts about the development gap
between Latin America and East Asia. First, based on the expected utility framework suggested by* Doctoral Student, Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University.

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Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

Jones and Klenow (2011), in 2000, differences in welfare-adjusted development are larger than thosepredicted by per-capita GDP. Second, although differences in life expectancy and consumption inequality
hold down welfare and development in Latin America, labor productivity actually accounts for mostof the development gap between the regions. Third, based on the production framework described in
Caselli (2005), most of the labor productivity gap steams from a continuous fall in aggregate efficiency
in Latin America.
The importance of aggregate efficiency5 as the main determinant of production has been well
documented in the growth and development literature, in particular for a large set of countries at apoint in time (Caselli 2005; Hall and Jones 1999; Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 1997). This article,
however, not only emphasizes its importance from a time series perspective, but also evaluates
its contribution to a welfare-adjusted measure of development. As expected, the contribution of
aggregate efficiency to development (27 percent) is less than that in production (49 percent)6, yet thiscontribution is still larger than other factors such as physical capital or human capital.
Given its relatively large contribution, and the recent availability of industry-level and firm-level
data, the growth and development literature has focused its attention on a well-known theoretical
determinant of aggregate efficiency: resource misallocation (Banarjee and Duflo 2005; Hsieh andKlenow 2011; McMillan and Rodrik 2011; Restuccia and Rogerson 2008; among others). Using
industry-level data on employment and value added, I explore the efficiency consequences ofintersectorial labor misallocation. First, from an empirical standpoint, I document a strong negative
correlation between aggregate efficiency and the variation in intersectorial productivity. Second,from a theoretical standpoint, I adapt the simple two-sector model suggested by Jones (2011) andshow that labor misallocation across sectors reduces aggregate efficiency. Finally, in line with theempirical findings of Pages (2010) and McMillan and Rodrik (2011), I argue that both premature deindustrialization (i.e., employment moving from manufacturing into services) and falling productivity inthe service sector have deteriorated the overall efficiency of Latin America.
This article builds on a large literature that studies the proximate sources of economic divergencein Latin America from a comparative perspective. This literature (Cole et al. 2005; Daude 2013;
Ferreira, Pessoa, and Veloso 2013; among others) typically focuses on the development gap between
Latin America and the technological leader of the post-World War II period--the United States. This
article, however, focuses on the development gap with respect to some economies of East Asia thatwere at similar or even lower stages of development in the early 1950s.
In terms of methodology and data this article is closest to Daude and Fernandez-Arias (2010) and
Restuccia (2013). Using similar data sources, both studies evaluate the relative the contribution ofcapital accumulation and aggregate efficiency to per-capita GDP.7 Restuccia (2013) goes further andproposes a model in which resource misallocation across firms reduces aggregate efficiency. Despite
these similarities, my article still differs in other aspects, both methodological and empirical. First,

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Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

it measures the contribution of capital accumulation8 and efficiency to a welfare-adjusted measure ofdevelopment, not only to per-capita GDP. Second, it proposes a model in which labor misallocation
across sectors reduces aggregate efficiency. And third, it highlights the time-series perspective9 of thedevelopment gap between Latin America and East Asia.
Among the limitations of the methodological approach of this article (and this particular literature),
one deserves attention at the outset. Proximate sources of growth and development such physicalcapital, human capital, and aggregate efficiency ultimately depend on deep rooted factors suchas institutions, culture, history, and geography (Acemoglu et al. 2005; Nunn 2009). Also, tradeprotectionism, Dutch disease, competitive barriers, and macroeconomic volatility are typically citedas deeper causes of the Latin American underdevelopment. (De Gregorio 2004; Edwards 2009; Elson2013). The analysis of proximate sources, however, still might prove useful. It not only gives a firstpass and a quantitative description of the mechanics of development, but also imposes disciplinein our thinking and discussion. Ultimately, any more fundamental source should affect growth anddevelopment through one or more the proximate channels emphasized in this article.
Another caveat has to do with the selection of countries and generalization of findings. The
criterion for the selection of countries, in particular for the East Asian sample, was limited by theavailability of long-run time series. Although, the four economies in the East Asian sample grew fasterand achieved higher levels of development, this is not the case for other countries in the region thatstill remain underdeveloped.10 Historically, however, the average performance of these four countries
may still provide a useful alternative to the typical benchmark used in the literature--the UnitedStates.11 Regarding the Latin American sample, the selected seven countries may not fully depict thelarge heterogeneity of the region. Yet, they still represent more than 80 percent of the regional GDP
and almost 80 percent of the total population.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 first characterizes the development gap
between Latin America and East Asia in terms of welfare and production differences, then it evaluates
their the contribution. Section 3 further decomposes differences in production into differences in laborproductivity, employment-to-population ratio, and annual worked hours. Section 4 uses a neoclassicalproduction function to evaluate the relative contribution of capital accumulation and aggregate
efficiency as proximate determinants of labor productivity. Section 5 discusses one of the main sourcesof aggregate efficiency: labor misallocation across sectors. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding
remarks.

2. The Development Gap: Production and Welfare
Lucas (1988) famously points that differences in production across countries imply staggeringconsequences for human welfare. After the World War II, GDP per capita in East Asia rapidly

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Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

converged to the levels of advanced economies, while Latin America first remained stagnated and thendiverged (Figure 1). Following Lucas’s observation, these convergence and divergence experiencessuggest not only an increasing production gap, but also a welfare gap between the two regions. Thislarge gap in production per capita and its welfare consequences constitute what I call the developmentgap between Latin America and East Asia.
Figure 1 The Production Gap, 1960―2013

Note: East Asia (EA4) is composed by: Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. Latin America (LA7) iscomposed by: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. Both figures are in log scale.
Regional values are unweighted geometric averages.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the Conference Board (2013).

When evaluating a set of standard welfare indicators, the overall welfare gap between the tworegions is not immediately clear, at least quantitatively. Table 1 shows that, on the one hand, welfare
in East Asia tend to be higher due to its higher life expectance and lower inequality. On the other,
welfare in Latin America could be higher due to its higher consumption share and leisure time. Adding
these differences, and having and overall picture is not a straightforward task, since all these indicators
are qualitatively different.12
In an attempt to add up and compare different measures of welfare, Jones and Klenow (2011) use
an expected utility framework. They constructed and aggregate welfare statistic which includes
differences in life expectancy, consumption share in GDP, leisure per adult, and consumption inequality.
An attractive feature of their methodology is that each welfare component is measured in consumptionequivalent units, and therefore, quantitative comparability and additivity seems reasonable. Also, one
can use this overall welfare measure to evaluate differences in welfare-adjusted development and thencompare such differences with those predicted by GDP per capita.13
Table 2 presents the results of the decomposition of the development gap into its production andwelfare components following Jones and Klenow (2011)’s methdology. The most important finding is

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Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

Table 1 Production and Welfare Indicators, 2000
GDP

Life

Consumption

LeisureConsumption

per capita

Expectancy

Share in GDP

per adult

Inequality

Brazil

21.80

70.40

0.86

0.79

52.10

Chile

37.40

76.90

0.65

0.79

49.60

Colombia

17.00

71.10

0.86

0.76

50.50

Mexico
Peru

25.90
12.90

74.00
69.30

0.75
0.79

0.78
0.77

50.90
44.00

Venezuela

27.40

73.30

0.54

0.79

47.70

Hong Kong

82.10

80.90

0.71

0.76

41.70

Japan

72.40

81.10

0.66

0.81

28.50

Singapore

82.90

78.10

0.43

0.74

37.90

South Korea

47.10

75.90

0.58

0.75

31.50

Latin America

22.42

72.46

0.73

0.78

49.06

East Asia

69.41

78.97

0.58

0.76

34.51

EA/LA

3.10

1.09

0.80

0.98

0.70

Note: GDP per capita is measured relative to that in the United State (USA＝100). C/GDP includes both private and government
consumption. Leisure is measured as 1－(annual hours worked per worker/(16 365))x(employment/adult population).
Inequality is measured in terms of the consumption Gini coefficient. Regional averages are unweighted geometric averages.
Source: Jones and Klenow (2011)

Table 2 The Development Gap: Welfare and Production in 2000
Countries

Log

Life

DEV (wa)

Exp.

C/GDP

Leisureper adult

Inequality

Log
GDPpc

Brazil

2.49

－0.38

0.12

－0.03

－0.3

Chile

3.19

－0.01

－0.16

－0.02

－0.24

3.62

Colombia
Mexico

2.24
2.75

－0.33
－0.17

0.12
－0.02

－0.12
－0.05

－0.26
－0.27

2.83
3.25

Peru

1.96

－0.42

0.04

－0.08

－0.13

2.56

Venezuela

2.54

－0.21

－0.35

－0.01

－0.2

3.31

3.08

Hong Kong

4.36

0.23

－0.06

－0.12

－0.1

4.41

Japan

4.48

0.25

－0.15

0.03

0.07

4.28

Singapore

3.67

0.06

－0.58

－0.19

－0.04

4.42

South Korea

3.37

－0.07

－0.27

－0.18

0.04

3.85

Latin America

2.53

－0.25

－0.04

－0.05

－0.23

3.11

East Asia

3.97

0.12

－0.27

－0.12

－0.01

4.24

EA/LA

1.57

1.36

Note: Regional averages are unweighted arithmetic averages. DEV (wa) refers to welfare-adjusted development. Inequality refers to
consumption inequality. GDPpc refers to per-capita GDP.
Source: Jones and Klenow (2011)43

Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)that this gap is actually larger than that predicted by GDP per-capita. The log of the development gap
is 1.57 whereas the log of the production gap is 1.36. The main driving forces behind these differences
are also tractable. Higher inequality and lower life expectancy have large negative effects in Latin
America. While lower consumption and leisure in East Asia are partially compensated by a longer life
expectancy.
Though the qualitative aspects of the Jones and Klenow (2011) decomposition are alreadyobservable in the standard welfare indicators of Table 1, their quantitative approach may help us
evaluate the contribution of labor productivity, capital accumulation and aggregate efficiency beyond
their production scope. For instance, Section 4 quantifies what fraction of the welfare-adjusted
development gap is explained by the efficiency with which the economies use their resources.
To summarize the results of this section, in 2000, differences in welfare-adjusted development
between East Asia and Latin America (4.22)14 were larger than those implied by per-capita GDP (3.10).
However, the GDP gap is still the main determinant of the welfare-adjusted development gap, since
it explains 78 percent (log 3.10/log 4.22) of its variation. Given this large contribution, what factors
account for differences in per-capita GDP between the regions?

3. Decomposing Production
To further understand the evolution of GDP per capita we can decompose it into tree components:
labor productivity, employment-to-population ratio, and worked hours. Following Restuccia (2013),
production per capita for an economy at any time can be written as:
Y
Y
E
＝
×
×n,
Pop nE Pop(1)

where Y / Pop is GDP per capita, n is the average annual worked hours, E / Pop is the employment-topopulation ratio, and Y / nE is labor productivity (GDP per labor hour). Then taking two economies iand j, and dividing their GDP per capita we can rewrite the previous decomposition in ratio form:（Y / Pop）（Y / nE）（E / Pop）i （n）
i
i
i
＝
×
×
（Y / Pop）j （Y / nE）j （E / Pop）
（n）
j
j

(2)

The interpretation of Equation (2) is intuitive. The per-capita GDP gap between economy i and jis the product of their gaps in labor productivity, employment, and worked hours. Results from Figure
1 indicate that the per-capita GDP gap between East Asia (economy i) and Latin America (economyj) increased from 0.75 in 1960 to 3.62 in 2010.15 Which factors from the above decomposition would
mostly account for this increase? To answer this question I compute and discuss the evolution of eachfactor in turn.

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Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

Hours Gap
The main finding regarding gap in worked hours is that due to its decline over time, differences inhours cannot explain the gap in per-capita GDP. Figure 2 documents that since late 1980s there has
been convergence in worked hours.16 In 1988, the average worker in East Asia worked 18 percent
more hours than the average worker in Latin America. By 2010, however, the average worker in East
Asia only worked 6 percent more.
Over time, with the exception of Argentina, economies in both regions declined their number ofhours worked, however Latin America experienced a much slower decline.17 Note that during thewhole 1960―2010 period, East Asian workers have worked more hours than their Latin Americancounterparts. Yet, by 2010 worked hours only accounted for 5 percent of gap in per-capita GDP
between the regions. Given these results, most of the per-capita GDP differences must be explainedby employment and labor productivity differences.
Figure 2 Worked-Hours Gap and Employment-to-Population Gap, 1960―2013

Note: East Asia (EA4) is composed by: Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. Latin America(LA7) is composed by: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.
Regional values are unweighted geometric averages.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the Conference Board (2013).

Employment-to-Population Gap
The main finding regarding the employment to population ratio is that despite its initial divergence,
the following convergence episode significantly reduced its contribution to the gap in per-capita GDP.
Figure 2 documents the inverted-U pattern in employment.18 In 1960, both regions had almost thesame employment to population ratio. Since 1962, however, employment grew faster in East Asia,and by 1983 it was 30 percent higher relative to that in Latin America. After its lost decade (1980s),
employment in Latin America started recovering, and by 2010 employment in East Asia was 15
percent larger.

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Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

As in worked hours, an implication of the previous convergence episode is that it reduces the
explanatory power of employment. For instance, in 1983, differences in employment explained 39
percent of their per-capita GDP gap. By 2010, however, it explained only 12 percent. As a result,given these findings, differences in labor productivity must explain most of the current differences in
per-capita GDP.
Figure 3 Labor Productivity Gap, 1960―2013

Note: East Asia (EA4) is composed by: Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. Latin
America (LA7) is composed by: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, andVenezuela. Regional values are unweighted geometric averages.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the Conference Board (2013).

Labor Productivity Gap
The main findings regarding labor productivity point to both the continuous divergence in Latin
America and its large contribution to per-capita GDP. Figure 3 documents that first East Asiacaught up with the productivity of Latin America in 1976, and then left it far behind. By 2010,
labor productivity in East Asia was almost three times larger (See Table 3) than its Latin Americancounterpart. In this process, note that it was not only fast convergence of East Asia, but also fast
divergence of Latin America what drove the evolution of the productivity gap. For instance, in 1960
labor productivity relative to that in the United States was 8 percent in South Korea and 71 percent in
Venezuela. By 2010, productivity in the former increased to 44 percent and in the latter decreased to
22 percent. Table 3 reports that these type of convergence-and-divergence patterns still hold for theregional averages during the 1960―2010 period, though they are less severe.
Overall, the gap in labor productivity mirrors the behavior of the gap in per-capita GDP (See Figure3). It also explains most of the differences in per-capita GDP between the regions. By 2010, laborproductivity differences explained 83 percent of the per-capita GDP differences between East Asia andLatin America.

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Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

Table 3 Relative GDP per hour, 1960―2010
Countries
Argentina

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

37.30

40.11

41.17

28.94

30.49

21.69

Brazil

16.86

17.54

24.01

17.99

17.41

16.22

Chile

25.05

26.13

24.98

20.64

25.27

26.75

Colombia

19.62

19.06

20.91

19.85

16.37

15.19

Mexico
Peru

37.84
27.41

42.50
30.53

41.56
28.74

30.78
15.94

26.65
13.32

23.88
15.48

Venezuela

71.17

68.30

48.21

34.19

27.24

21.93

Hong Kong

31.94

25.63

38.15

52.24

51.52

60.27

Japan

23.50

43.40

56.74

67.37

66.88

65.32

Singapore

22.39

31.96

42.51

51.88

61.16

62.62

South Korea

8.48

10.77

14.78

24.55

34.44

44.43

Latin America

30.18

31.54

31.34

23.16

21.50

19.72

East Asia

19.43

24.87

34.15

46.01

51.90

57.53

EA/LA

0.64

0.79

1.09

1.99

2.41

2.92

Note: Regional values are unweighted geometric averages. Country values are expressed relative to those in the United States (USA
＝ 100).
Source: Authors calculations using data from the Conference Board (2013).

To briefly summarize the results of this section, the per-capita GDP gap between East Asia andLatin America in 1960 can be accounted for as follows:（Y / Pop）（Y / nE）EA （E / Pop）
（n）
EA
EA
EA
＝
×
×
,
（Y / Pop）（Y / nE）（E / Pop）LA （n）
LA
LA
LA
0.75

0.64

0.99

1.18

and in 2010:（Y / Pop）（Y / nE）EA （E / Pop）
（n）
EA
EA
EA
＝
×
×
.
（Y / Pop）
（Y
/
nE）
（E
/
Pop）
（n）
LA
LA
LA
LA
3.62

2.92

1.16

1.07

Finally, the decomposition for the year 2000 is also particularly useful for extending the results ofthe decomposition implemented in Section 2. Since differences in per-capita GDP accounts for 78
percent of development gap, and labor productivity accounts for 71 percent of the per-capita GDP, thenby composition, labor productivity could potentially account for 55 percent of the development gap.
Give its large contribution, what factors account for differences in labor productivity?

4. Decomposing Labor Productivity
Labor productivity is determined by the inputs that workers have at their disposal (i.e., physical andhuman capital) and the way in which they use those inputs (i.e., efficiency). Following Caselli (2005),

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Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

labor productivity for an economy at any point in time can be written as:
Y
K α
＝ A×
×h1－α
nE
nE

（ ）

(3)

where Y / nE is labor productivity, K is the aggregate stock of physical capital, nE is the employedlabor force, h is a measure of human capita per worker, A is the level of aggregate efficiency19 and α isa technological parameter (typically20 set to 1/3)
While data on physical capital can be constructed from the investment series of GDP21, data on
human capital requires further elaboration. Motivated by the extensive micro literature on the returnsof schooling, Hall and Jones (1999) suggest the following production function for human capital:
h＝n×E×e φ（s）,(4)
if s ≤ 4

0.134s
φ
（s）＝

0.134
（4）＋0.101（s－4）

if 5 ≤ s ≤ 8

0.134（4）＋0.101（4）＋0.068（s－8）

if s＞8(5)

where s is the average years of schooling of the workforce and φ（s）is a piecewise linear functionin which the coefficients represent world averages of the returns to schooling for different levels of
education.22 Given the previous economic framework, let us consider two economies i and j. We candivide their GDP per worker and rewrite Equation (3) as:（Y / nE）
Ai（K / nE）i 1/3
hi
i
＝
×
×
（Y / nE）
Aj（K / nE）
hj
j
j

（

2/3

）（ ）

(6)

The interpretation of Equation (6) is intuitive. The gap in labor productivity between economy i andj is the product of their gaps in aggregate efficiency, physical capital, and human capital. Results from
Table 3 indicate that the gap in labor productivity between East Asia (economy i) and Latin America(economy j) increased from 0.64 in 1960 to 2.92 in 2010. Which factors from the above decomposition
would mostly account for this increase? To answer this question I compute the contribution of eachfactor and discuss its evolution in turn.

Physical Capital Gap
Over time the gap in physical capital gap increases monotonically (See Figure 4). In 2010, thisgap had a quantitatively large effect (37 percent) on the labor productivity gap. This effect, however,
becomes relatively small once the endogeneity of physical capital to aggregate efficiency is taken into
account (See Restuccia 2013 for details). Note that in 1973 both regions had similar capital stocks per
worker. Thereafter, it grew much faster in East Asia, and as a result, by 2010 the average worker in
East Asia had 40 percent more physical capital at his disposal than his Latin American counterpart.

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Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

Figure 4 Physical and Human Capital Gap, 1960―2010

Note: East Asia (EA4) is composed by: Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. Latin
America (LA7) is composed by: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, andVenezuela. Regional values are unweighted geometric averages.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the Conference Board (2013) and FernandezArias (2014).

Human Capital Gap
Over time there has been considerable progress in human capital accumulation, both in East Asiaand Latin America (See Figure 5). Since both regions have been accumulating human capital at afairly similar speed, the initial gap remains stable. For instance, in 1960 human capital was 12 percent
higher in East Asia. Since then this gap fluctuated between 12 and 15 percent, in 2010 human capital
was 12 still percent higher in East Asia. As a result, Figure 5 documents this gap as a horizontal
line. In terms of its contribution to productivity, human capital explains only 11 percent of the laborproductivity gap.23

Aggregate Efficiency Gap
Figure 6 documents that the efficiency divergence between the regions started in the early
1970s. Similar to the labor productivity gap, the post―1980 evolution of aggregate efficiency not onlyreflects an acceleration of efficiency growth in East Asia, but also lower efficiency in Latin America.
As a result, in 2010, aggregate efficiency in East Asia was 55 percent larger relative to that in Latin
America. In terms of its effect on the labor productivity gap, in 2010 differences in aggregate efficiency
explained 52 percent of the differences in labor productivity.

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Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

Figure 5 Human Capital, 1960―2010

Note: East Asia (EA4) is composed by: Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. Latin
America (LA7) is composed by: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, andVenezuela. Regional values are unweighted geometric averages.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the Conference Board (1993) and FernandezArias (2014).

To briefly summarize the results of this section, the gap in labor productivity between East Asia andLatin America in 1960 can be accounted for as follows:（Y / L）（AEA） （K / L）EA
EA＝×（Y / L）LA （ALA） （K / L）
LA

（

0.64

1/3

2/3

LA

1.12

0.93

0.62

hEA

） ×（ h ）and in 2010:（Y / L）（AEA） （K / L）EA
EA＝×（Y / L）LA （ALA） （K / L）
LA

（

2.92

1.74

1.49

1/3

hEA

2/3

） ×（ h ）LA

1.13

Finally, the last paragraph of the previous section points out that labor productivity in the year
2000 could potentially account for 55 percent of the welfare-adjusted development gap between
East Asia and Latin America. Adding the results of the current section, aggregate efficiency could
potentially account for 27 percent of the welfare-adjusted development gap. Given this relatively large
contribution (compared to physical and human capital), what factors can explain the differences inaggregate efficiency?

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Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

Figure 6 Aggregate Efficiency Gap, 1960―2010

Note: East Asia (EA4) is composed by: Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. Latin
America (LA7) is composed by: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, andVenezuela. Regional values are unweighted geometric averages.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the Conference Board (2013) and FernandezArias (2014).

5. Exploring Aggregate Efficiency
The literature on economic growth and development typically emphasizes two main determinantsof aggregate efficiency: technological progress and resource misallocation. On the one hand, an
economy-wide efficiency increases when there are new production methods (e.g., new blueprints, newproduction processes, new organizational structures, new management techniques). On the other,efficiency gains occur when there are improvements in the allocation of resources (e.g., capital, labor,
and technologies) across production units (e.g., when resources move from less productive units tomore productive ones). The distinction between technological progress and resource misallocation
matters because the policy implications of each factor could be totally different.
This section explores the role of resource misallocation on aggregate efficiency. The motivation
comes from the fact that developing countries are characterized by a large variety of allocation
problems, which arise from both government and market failures. Latin America, in particular, showsa history of protectionist policies and recurrent crises that may have drastically altered the allocation of
resources.

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Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

Figure 7 Aggregate Efficiency and Sectorial Productivity Gaps, 2005

Source: Author’s calculations using data from the Conference Board (2013), Fernandez-Arias(2014), and McMillan and Rodrik (2011).

To introduce the discussion the negative effects of resource misallocation on aggregate efficiency,
Figure 7 documents the strong negative relation between these variables. Here, large variationin average labor productivity across sectors could potentially reflect differences in marginal
productivities,24 which ultimately provide prima face evidence for labor misallocation.25 Though thiscorrelation could prove useful as a starting point, we need a model (and further evidence) to clarify themechanisms by which sectorial productivity gaps affect aggregate efficiency.
Based on the simple misallocation model suggested by Jones (2011), consider an economy
composed by two sectors (manufacturing and services):
Production in Sector 1：Xman＝2Lman,(7)

Production in Sector 2：Xserv＝Lserv,(8)

Resource Constraint：L＝Lman＋Lserv,(9)

GDP (Aggregation)：Y＝X

0.8
man

X

0.2
serv

.

(10)

The only difference between them is their labor productivity. In particular, assume that laborproductivity in manufacturing is two times the productivity of services. Then, define the employment
share allocated to manufacturing as θ＝Lman / L, where L is the total labor force and Lman is the numberof employed workers in manufacturing. Note that θ could be either an outcome of competitive freemarkets or government planning. Given the resource constraint (Equation 9) and the aggregation of
output across sectors (Equation 10), total GDP in this economy is
Y ＝ A（θ）L，

(11)

52

Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

and the equilibrium aggregate efficiency, A（θ）
, is only determined by allocation of workers acrosssectors:
0.2
（1－θ）
.
A（θ）＝
（2θ）0.8(12)

Figure 8 Sectorial Misallocation Reduces Aggregate Efficiency

Source: Author’s calculations

Figure 8 shows the nonlinear behavior of Equation (12). Aggregate efficiency attains its maximum
value, 1.06, when 80 percent of the labor force works in manufacturing and 20 in services. But if 80
percent were employed in services, aggregate efficiency would fall to 0.46. From Figure 8 it is clear
that--given the relatively low productivity of services--increasing its employment share would reduce
aggregate efficiency. In other words, reallocating workers from relatively high-productivity sectors
into relatively low-productivity sectors reduces overall efficiency.
The main prediction of the above model describes fairly well the industrial dynamics of Latin
America in the post-World War II period. Figure 9 shows the continuous raise of the employment
share in the service sector. Relative to the economy-wide level, however, productivity in the service
sector had been rapidly falling (See Figure 11). As a result, this large reallocation of labor to relative
low productivity sectors should reduce the overall efficiency of the region.

53

Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

Figure 9 Premature Deindustrialization and the Raise of Services, 1960―2005

Source: Author’s calculations using data from McMillan and Rodrik (2011).

Figure 10 Raising Productivity in Agriculture and Manufacturing, 1960―2005

Source: Author’s calculations using data from McMillan and Rodrik (2011).

Figures 9, 10 and 11 describe the structural transformation patterns of Latin America and how thisprocess deteriorated aggregate efficiency in the region. Three patterns require particular attention.
First, contrasting the typical structural transformation process exhibited by South Korea (and otherfast growing and developed economies), the region transitioned into a service economy without aconsolidated industrial base.26 Second, although labor productivity had been raising in both agriculture
and manufacturing (Figure 10), by 2010 these sectors employed less than one third of the labor force.
Third, between 1960 and 2005, the employment share in the service sector increased by 80 percent,27
yet productivity in this sector decreased by 35 percent.

54

Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

Figure 11 Falling Productivity in Services, 1960―2005

Source: Author’s calculations using data from McMillan and Rodrik (2011).

Following McMillan and Rodrik (2011), Figure 12 provides a more detailed sectorial view thatsummarizes two contrasting patterns of structural transformation.28 Similar to Latin America, most of
the labor force of Hong Kong and Singapore transitioned to the service sector, in particular wholesale
and retail. Yet, Latin American productivity in these sectors is considerably lower; arguably due to theabundance of very small and low productivity firms, which are typically associated with the informal
sector (Pages 2010). Although productivity in business and financial services is relative high in Brazil,
its employment absorption is much smaller compared with Hong Kong and especially with Singapore.
Over time, poorly educated and rural workers from Latin America kept gravitating to sectors in which
the scale of production is minuscule (e.g., informal retail trade), mostly non-tradable (e.g., communityand personal services), and hardly standardizable.
Although a comprehensive discussion of the factors and policies driving the patterns of Figures
9―12 goes beyond the scope of this article, the regression results of McMillan and Rodrik (2011)
are a good starting point. Using a sample of developing countries from Latin America, Asia, andAfrica, the authors show that there is a strong (consistently significant) negative association between
growth-enhancing structural and the reliance on exports of primary products. They also show thatboth currency overvaluation (a symptone of Dutch disease29) and employment market rigidities areassociated with the movement of labor30 towards relatively less productive activities.
In the context of Latin America, increasing concentration exports in primary products, historicalprevalence of overvalued currencies,31 and rigid labor markets are well documented features of theregion (See Bertola and Ocampo, 2012; Edwards, 2010; Franko, 2007; and the references therein).
Detailed quantitative evaluations of policy efforts in these and other related areas, however, are lessstudied. In this context of scarcity, the works of Lora (1997, 2001, 2012) are noticeable contributions.

55Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

In these studies, the author evaluates the progress in the structural reforms that were implemented
in Latin America during the 1985―2010 period. It stands out that among the five areas of structuralreform (trade policy, financial policy, privatizations, tax policy, and labor regulation), there has been theleast progress in policy initiatives dealing with the flexibility of labor markets. This result is consistentacross most countries in the region and over the last three decades.

Figure 12 Patterns of Structural Change, 1975―2005

Note: Size of the circle represent employment share in 2005. Since movements from agriculture initiate the process ofstructural change, the fitted line excludes agriculture from the regression.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from McMillan and Rodrik (2011)56

Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

6. Concluding Remarks
Rapid growth and convergence in East Asia and stagnation and divergence in Latin America imply arapidly raising development gap between the two regions. In fact, this gap is larger than that predictedby differences in per-capita GDP. Higher inequality and lower life expectancy have large negative
effects in Latin America.
Despite large differences in welfare and production, the latter still accounts for most of thevariation of the welfare-adjusted development index suggested by Jones and Klenow (2011). Further
analysis suggests that labor productivity is the main force driving the production gap between theregions. Although physical and human capital per worker is relatively low in Latin America, the lackof investment is not the main productivity problem. Inefficient production is the main factor holding
down labor productivity.
A more detailed view of the sectorial dynamics suggests that labor misallocation across sectors
had been reducing economy-wide efficiency in Latin America. In particular, premature deindustrialization (i.e., workers moving from manufacturing into services) and falling productivity inthe service sector had potentially large negative effects on efficiency, labor productivity, and welfareadjusted development. Over time, workers kept gravitating to sectors and firms in which the scale ofproduction is minuscule, mostly non-tradable, and hardly standardizable.
Looking ahead, Latin America still faces three policy challenges. First, the region should gradually
diversify its export base away from primary commodities. Progress in this domain not only creates
new and more productive jobs, but also reduces both pressures toward the overvaluation of local
currencies and the prevalence of Dutch-disease concerns. Second, the region should flexibilize its
labor markets. Progress in this domain generates incentives for the creation of larger and moreproductive firms. Third, when implemented, industrial policy should be pragmatic and experimental.
It should be guided by careful diagnostics and identification of public and private constraints.

Endnotes
1

Economies in this sample include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.

2

Economies in this sample include: Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea.

3

In this article, all GDP measures are expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Also, regional measures
are un-weighted geometric averages, unless otherwise specified.

4

The development index used in this paper is based on the expected utility framework proposed by Jones andKlenow (2011). This approach differs from the United Nations’ Human Development Index, not only from atheoretical perspective (a.i., aggregation method), but also in the type of social indicators that are used to construct
the index.

5

Also known in the growth literature as total factor productivity (TFP) or Solow Residual.

6

Welfare-adjusted decompositions are only available for the year 2000. Production decompositions, however, are57

Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

implemented for the periods 1960―2013 and 1960―2010.
7

Both studies, however, focalize its analysis on the development gap between Latin America and the UnitedStates.

8

When decomposing the contribution of physical capital, Restuccia (2013) uses the capital-output ratio insteadof the more intuitive capital-labor ratio. This adjustment aims to control for the endogeneity of physical capital to
improvements in aggregate efficiency. This paper follows the production decomposition suggested by Caselli (2005),
and thus it uses the capital-labor ratio.

9

Daude and Fenandez-Arias (2010) also emphasize the trend of aggregate efficiency of Latin America relative tothat of East Asia. However, they leave aside the evolution of physical capital and human capital.

10 Also, the growth literature normally reports specific groups and subgroups originated from the East Asian
Miracle. They include Japan, the “Four Tigers” (South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan), and the highperforming NIES (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand). Those eight economies together are typically known as the High
Performing Asian Economics (HPAE).
11 Recall that these four countries had similar or even lower levels of per-capita GDP than Latin America at the
beginning of the period of analysis (1950s).
12 For instance, it is not clear whether differences in life expectancy and leisure time should have the same weighton welfare. Yet, aggregate development indicators such as the United Nations’ human development mechanically
add up differences in health and education and give them equal weights.
13 Jones and Klenow (2011) find that differences in per-capita GDP are highly correlated with differences in theiroverall measure of welfare. The correlation coefficient is 0.95 for a sample of 134 countries in the year 2000.
14 To obtain the gap in adjusted-welfare development, first compute the antilog of the regional averages of Table 2,
and then take the ratio ((exp(3.97)/exp(2.53)) ＝ 4.22). Use the similar procedure to compute the production gap.
15 For this and the following two sections, the main time period of analysis is from 1960 to 2010.
16 Note that this convergence pattern of hours contrasts sharply the divergence pattern of GDP per capita (Figure 1).
As a result, we can expect that differences in hours explain relatively little of the GDP gap.
17 Both regions, however, still work more hours relative to the United States. For example, in 2010 the average
worker in Latin America worked 18 percent more hours than the average worker in the United States. Similarly,
the average worker in East Asia worked 24 percent more hours. As noted in Section 2 working more hours affects
negatively the suggested welfare measure. Ideally, an economy could both increase its welfare and production by
reducing working hours and increasing labor productivity.
18 This gap is after controlling for the effect of population.
19 In the literature, aggregate efficiency is typically know as total factor productivity (TFP). For the purposes of thisarticle, and to emphasize the distinction (and minimize any source of confusion) between labor productivity (Y/L)
and total factor productivity (A).
20 See Caselli (2005), Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001), and Gollin (2002) for a discussion on the robustness of thisvalue.
21 See Caselli (2005) or Hall and Jones (1999) for a detailed description of this procedure.
22 Note the diminishing returns property of the accumulation of human capital.
23 It is important to note that this measure abstracts from differences in the quality of human capital, which are
likely to play a large role given the large regional differences in the results of the PISA tests.
24 Recall, for instance, that in a Cobb-Douglas production function the marginal product of labor is proportional to its
average product. If the proportionality factor, the elasticity of output with respect to labor, is relative stable acrosssectors, then differences in average average products reflect differences in marginal products.
25 The recent literature on economic growth and development interprets the differences in marginal products
across productive units as prima face evidence for resource misallocation. See, for instance, Banerjee and Duflo(2005) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008).
26 In addition, since the early 1990s, there has been an acceleration deindustrialization process of the region.
27 From 35 to 63 percentage points.

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Forum of International Development Studies. 45―3 (Feb. 2015)

28 The contrasting patterns of structural change between Latin America and East Asia were originally documented
in the seminal work of McMillan and Rodrik (2011). Although similar in nature, Figure 12 describes thesepatterns using a longer sample period (1975―2005), different countries (Hong Kong and Singapore), and a different
regression to fit the line (employment weights are those of the end of the period). Altogether, these results point
to the robustness of the previously documented structural change patterns. In Latin America workers moved from
relatively high-productivity sectors to low-productivity sectors, whereas in the East Asian sample the opposite
holds true.
29 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this symptom.
30 Note that labor movement towards and within the informal sector are still possible (and even more likely) when
there are rigidities in the formal labor market. In a highly regulated labor market, new and existing firms have more
incentives to initiate operations in the informal sector. As a result, entrants to the labor market (e.g., high school
and college graduates) have more changes to end up in low productivity firms.
31 Overvaluation of currencies in Latin America reflected one of the negative outcomes of the import substitution
industrialization (ISI) policies that were implemented in the region during the 1950―1970 period. More recently,
however, noticeable progress has been made due to a better monetary policy framework and more flexible
exchange regimes.

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Appendix
Welfare-Adjusted Development: A Brief Summary～, between country i and a benchmark country us (e.g., theFist, let us define the development gap, ψUnited States) as the sum of their production gap, ～y, and welfare gap λ. In log terms this means:
～
logψ
（e,
c, , σ, ～y）＝log ～yi＋logλ（e,c, ,σ）,i
i

Development Gap

Production Gap(1)

Welfare Gap

where e is average life expectancy, c is average consumption per capita,  is average leisure per adult,
and σis the standard deviation of consumption within a country. To add up different welfare measures
into one welfare-adjusted development index, Jones and Klenow (2011) suggest the following
adjustment:
λiei－eus1log ～ ＝
u＋log ci＋ν
（i）
－ σi2
yi
eus
2

（

）

Life Expectancy＋ log ci / yi－log cus / yus

Consumption Share

＋ν
（i）
－ν
（us）

Leisure1
2＋ （σi2－σus）.
2Inequality.

(2)

After computing this expression for a sample of 134 countries in the year 2000, Jones and Klenow(2011) find that differences in per-capita GDP are highly correlated with differences in welfare-adjusted
development--the correlation coefficient is 0.95.

62