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INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY
2, RUE ANDRÉ-PASCAL, 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16, FRANCEThe International Energy Agency (IEA) is an autonomous body which was established in
November 1974 within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) to implement an international energy programme.
It carries out a comprehensive programme of energy co-operation among twenty-three*of the OECD’s twenty-four Member countries. The basic aims of the IEA are:i)
co-operation among IEA participating countries to reduce excessive dependence on
oil through energy conservation, development of alternative energy sources andenergy research and development;ii) an information system on the international oil market as well as consultation withoil companies;iii) co-operation with oil producing and other oil consuming countries with a view todeveloping a stable international energy trade as well as the rational management
and use of world energy resources in the interest of all countries;iv) a plan to prepare participating countries against the risk of a major disruption ofoil supplies and to share available oil in the event of an emergency.
* IEA participating countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States. The Commission of the European
Communities takes part in the work of the IEA.

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention signed in Paris on 14th December 1960, andwhich came into force on 30th September 1961, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) shall promote policies designed:— to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising
standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, andthus to contribute to the development of the world economy;— to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member
countries in the process of economic development; and— to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory
basis in accordance with international obligations.
The original Member countries of the OECD are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The following countries became Members subsequently through accession at the dates indicatedhereafter: Japan (28th April 1964), Finland (28th January 1969), Australia (7th June 1971)
and New Zealand (29th May 1973). The Commission of the European Communities takes
part in the work of the OECD (Article 13 of the OECD Convention).
Any reference in the present publication to States, entities or territories which do not belong to
the OECD shall neither imply their recognition by OECD Member States nor approval by OECD
Member States of the designations used in the publication.

© OECD/IEA, 1994
Applications for permission to reproduce or translate all or part of thispublication should be made to:
Head of Publications Service, OECD2, rue André-Pascal, 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16, FranceTHE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY

VOLUME II

MAJOR POLICIES AND ACTIONS OF THE IEA

Table of Contents
Table of Abbreviations .........................................................................9
Chapter I

Introduction........................................................................13

Chapter II

Energy Policy Overview .............................................23

A. Introductory Summary....................................................................... 23
B. Energy Policy Origins of the 1973 - 1974 Oil Supply Vulnerability:
The Optimistic-passive Approach to Oil Policy ................................... 25
C. Corrective Policies Adopted in the I.E.P. Agreement ............................ 33
D. IEA Energy Security: Expansion of the Vital Concept......................... 37
E. Long-Term Energy Policies: Reducing Oil Imports ............................. 42
1. Conservation ................................................................................ 43
2. Direct Measures for the Reduction of Imported Oil ....................... 44
3. Alternatives to Oil: Energy Diversity............................................. 46
3

F. Energy and the Environment: A Major Policy Force ........................... 52
G. Research and Development: The Still Longer-Term ........................... 56
H. The Oil Market: Transparency and Dissemination.............................. 59
I. Globalisation and Non-Members........................................................ 61
J. Looking to the Future: Freer Markets and Shared Goals .................... 63

Chapter III

IEA Oil Security:
The Core of Energy Security .......................... 67

A. Oil Security Policies and Systems ....................................................... 67
B. Oil Sharing: The Emergency Sharing System..................................... 71
1. Oil Stock Building ........................................................................ 73
2. Demand Restraint ........................................................................ 80
3. Allocation ..................................................................................... 83
4. Activation and the Trigger Calculation .......................................... 86
5. Operations .................................................................................. 92(a) Operation of the Sharing System ............................................ 92(b) European Communities (EU) ................................................ 98(c) Non-Member Countries .......................................................... 99
6. Information Systems................................................................... 101
7. Co-operation with the Oil Industry............................................. 105(a) Oil company Co-operation.................................................... 105(b) Industry Advisory Board (IAB)............................................... 106(c) U. S. Antitrust Defence and EU Competition Exemption....... 107
8. Resolution of Differences and Disputes ....................................... 109
C. The 1979-1981 Oil Supply Disruption ............................................. 114
1. IEA Response.............................................................................. 114
2. December 1981 Decision on Supply Disruptions......................... 121
D. CERM: Co-ordinated Emergency Response Measures...................... 123
E. The 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis ............................................................. 133
1. Preparation for Action................................................................. 134
2. The IEA Contingency Plan of 11 January 1991 .......................... 139
4

F. Continuing Emergency Response Readiness ..................................... 148
1. Systems Tests ............................................................................. 149
2. Country Reviews ........................................................................ 153
Chapter IV Long-Term Energy Policies:
Reducing Members’ Dependence
on Imported Oil ................................................. 157
A. The Long-Term Co-operation Programme (LTCP) .......................... 158
B. Energy Conservation and Efficiency................................................. 160
C. Oil Import Reduction Policies and Actions ........................................ 164
1. Oil Import Objectives and Ceilings ............................................. 164
2. Energy Investment Measure (MSP) ............................................ 167
3. Indigenous Production of Oil ...................................................... 168
D. Alternatives to Oil: Energy Diversity ................................................ 170
1. Principles for Energy Policy (1977) ............................................ 171
2. Coal Production, Trade, and Use ................................................ 172
3. Natural Gas................................................................................ 181
4. Nuclear Energy .......................................................................... 185
5. Hydroelectricity and Other Renewables ...................................... 191
6. Electricity................................................................................... 194
7. Energy Trade and Investment..................................................... 197
E. Energy and Environment................................................................. 207
F. Reviews of Members’ Energy Policies and Goals............................... 218
G. Freer Markets and IEA Shared Goals of 1993 ................................... 223
Chapter V

Energy Research and Development:
Towards Long-Term and Still
Longer-Term contributions ............................ 227

A. IEA Organization of R & D .............................................................. 230
B. Research and Development Policies and Strategies ........................... 235
5

C. System for International Collaboration on Energy R & D Projects.... 257
1. Purpose, Scope, and Application ................................................. 258
2. Project Formation and Management .......................................... 260
3. Financing and Facilities .............................................................. 266
4. Intellectual Property ................................................................... 269
5. Participation............................................................................... 272
6. Functions of the Implementing Agreements ................................. 278
7. Role of the IEA ........................................................................... 282
D. Country Reviews and Technology Reviews ....................................... 283

Chapter VI The International Oil Market:
Transparency and Information
Dissemination...................................................... 287
A. Oil Market Information Policies ........................................................ 288
B. General Oil Market Information System ........................................... 304
1. Early IEA Systems...................................................................... 304
2. Crude Oil Import Register .......................................................... 312
C. Role of the Oil Industry .................................................................... 314
1. Industry Working Party (IWP)..................................................... 314
2. Formal Consultations with Oil Companies .................................. 317
D. Dissemination of Oil Market Information.......................................... 320

Chapter VII Co-operation with Non-Member Countries:
The Global Perspective................................... 325
A. Non-Member Policy Arrangements ................................................... 326
1. Institutional Arrangements .......................................................... 327
2. Information Exchange Among Members ..................................... 329
B. Early Producer-Consumer Dialogue ................................................. 332
C. Policies and Actions Concerning Developing Countries...................... 342
6

D. Globalisation of IEA Policies and Actions........................................... 348
E. Producer and consumer Relations: New Ministerial Conferences
and IEA Meetings of Experts (Beginning in 1991) ............................ 360
F. The IEA Review of Relations with Non-Members 1992-1994 ........... 365

Appendices ................................................................................... 373
Appendix I

Officers of the Governing Board at Ministerial and
Official Level, Standing Groups and Committees,
and Senior Members of the Secretariat ......................... 373

Appendix II

Oil Import Dependence of OECDCountries 1950-1973 ................................................... 379

Appendix III

1977 IEA Principles for Energy Policy .......................... 381

Appendix IV

1993 IEA Shared Goals ................................................ 385

Appendix V

IEA Energy R D & D Implementing
Agreements and Other Instruments 1975-1994 ............ 387

Appendix VI

Highlights of Recent IEA Developments 1994............... 391

Appendix VII

Table of Ministerial Communiqué
Document References ................................................... 395

7

8

INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY

Table of Abbreviations

ADD

Addendum

Ad Hoc Group/ The Ad Hoc Group on International Energy Relations
CNMC(AHGIER), later renamed the Committee on Non-Member
Countries (CNMC)
AHGIERAd Hoc Group on International Energy Relations
APEC
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
API
American Petroleum Institute
AST
Allocation Systems Test
bbl

price per barrel (of oil)C
CADDET

Council (OECD document reference)Centre for Analysis and Dissemination of Demonstrated
Energy Technologies
Commerce Clearing House
Co-ordinated Emergency Response Measures
Committee on Energy Research and Technology
Coal Industry Advisory Board
Conference on International Economic Co-operation
Cost, Insurance and Freight
Committee on Non-Member Countries
Carbon Dioxide
Centrally Planned Economies
Committee on Energy Research and Development
The Committee on Energy Research and Development(CRD), later renamed the Committee on Energy Research
and Technology (CERT)

CCH
CERM
CERT
CIAB
CIEC
CIF
CNMC
CO2
CPE
CRD
CRD/CERT

DAE
DED
DSC

Dynamic Asian Economies
Deputy Executive Director
Dispute Settlement Centre
9

EBRD
EBV
EC
ED
EDDC
EEC
ECG
EET
EMM
ENERLAC
EOT
EPCA
ESCAP
ESS
ETP
EU

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Erdölbevorratungsverband (German Stockholding Agency)
European Communities
Executive Director
Energy Deficient Developing Countries
European Economic Community
Energy Co-ordinating Group
European Economies in Transition
Emergency Management Manual
Energy Conference of Latin America and the Caribbean
Emergency Operations Team
Energy Policy and Conservation Act (United States, 1975)
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asiaand the Pacific
IEA Emergency Sharing System
Energy Technology Policy
European Union

FCCC
FIS
FOB

Framework Convention on Climate Change
Financial Information System
Free on Board

G-7
G-77
GATT
GB
GDP
GREENTIE

Group of 7 industrial countries: Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom
Group of 77 developing countries
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Governing Board (document reference)
Gross Domestic ProductGreenhouse Gas Technology Information Exchange

HLG

High Level Group for Energy Technology Commercialization

IAB
IBRD

Industry Advisory Board
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development(World Bank)International Energy Agency
International Energy InstituteInternational Energy Program
International Energy Relations (document reference)
International Energy Technology Group

IEA
IEI
I.E.P.
IER
IETG
10

I.L.M.
IMF
INC
INFCE
IPCC
ISAG
IWP

International Legal Materials
International Monetary FundIntergovernmental Negotiating Committee on a Framework
Convention on Climate ChangeInternational Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Industry Supply Advisory Group
Industry Working Party

LTCP

Long-Term Co-operation Programme

mbd
Mtoe
MOA
MSP

Million barrels a day (of oil)
Million tonnes of oil equivalent
Memorandum of Agreement
Minimum Safeguard Price

NEA
NESO
NIS
NMC

Nuclear Energy Agency
National Emergency Sharing Organisation
New Independent States
Non-Member Countries, or Committee on Non-Member
Countries

NOX
NRC

Nitrogen Oxide
Non-Reporting Company

OECD
O.J.E.C.
OLADE
OLC
OMR
OPEC

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Official Journal of the European Communities
Latin American Energy Organization
Office of the Legal Counsel
The IEA Oil Market Report
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PROV

Provisional

QuA
QuB
QuC

Questionnaire A
Questionnaire B
Questionnaire C

RC
R&D

Reporting Company
Research and Development
11

RD
RD & DREVRoom Document
Research, Development, and Demonstration
Revision

SEQ
SFRY
SLT
SOM
SOX
SPC

Standing Group on Emergency Questions
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Standing Group on Long-Term Co-operation
Standing Group on the Oil Market
Sulphur Oxide
Standing Group on Relations with Producer and Other
Consumer Countries

T.I.A.S.
TPES

Treaties and Other International Acts Series
Total primary energy supply

U.N.T.S.
U.S.T.

United Nations Treaty Series
United States Treaties and Other International Agreements

12CHAPTER I

Introduction

olume I of this History surveyed at some length the institutional originsof the International Energy Agency in the 1973-1974 oil crisis, andexamined the 1974 I.E.P. Agreement and other oil consumer actions which
established the Agency as an operational intergovernmental institution.
Volume I also considered the most important IEA relationships, the internal
structure of the Agency, and the institutional arrangements which enabled
the Agency to develop over the years into an effective instrument for energy
policy co-operation among its Members.
Volume II moves on from these essentially institutional considerations
to take up the energy policies and actions of the Agency during its firsttwenty years, from 1974 to 1994 inclusive. While the weak institutionalsituation of the industrial countries in the 1973-1974 crisis period madeit all but impossible for them to adopt decisive and effective responses
when the time for action came, the reasons for their vulnerability to the oil
producer countries were perhaps less their underdeveloped institutions thantheir essentially optimistic and passive oil management policies during theyears preceding the crisis. Other policy choices which might have prevented
or softened the crisis were available to them, as Volume II will show.
However, the oil security problem was poorly understood whenpolicy makers confronted the dramatic disruption of oil supplies and theunprecedented increases in the price of oil during the 1973-1974 crisis. The
rapid rise in imports of inexpensive oil, especially during the early 1970s,
provided obvious economic advantages, but the industrial countries failed
to give full attention to the vulnerability of their supply of oil, which was
physically situated chiefly in the politically fragile Middle East region. The
security problem was compounded by the absence of sufficient investment
in indigenous oil exploration and development in the industrial countries,
where increased investment might have added significantly to their own
supplies as a balance against the growing import dependency. At thesame time the industrial countries became increasingly dependent on oilin comparison with alternative fuels which might have brought a greaterV13measure of energy security through diversity of energy sources. Under suchcircumstances, longer-term research and development in alternative energy
sources and in conservation and energy efficiency inevitably suffered. An
added element of vulnerability in the industrial countries arose from theirabsence of understanding about the operation of the energy markets during
the period building up the crisis and in the course of the crisis itself,
which meant that these countries were ill-equipped, for lack of information,
to cope with the supply emergency when it came in 1973. All of thesefactors were exacerbated by the absence of institutional arrangements for
co-operation, as shown in Volume I. While more effective institutionalarrangements might have softened the impacts of the events of 1973-1974,
the cause of the crisis is to be found more in the industrial countries’“optimistic-passive” approach to oil security in the period leading up to
the crisis.
To give the necessary background on the industrial countries’ policies,
the “Energy Policy Overview”, which follows in Chapter II, begins with a
Section on “Energy Policy Origins of the 1973-1974 Oil Supply Vulnerability:
The Optimistic-passive Approach to Oil Policy”. The main events anddevelopments leading up to the crisis are briefly outlined in this Section,
together with a short presentation of the policy views and critical conclusions
that were made on that situation by some of the most knowledgeable oil
specialists of the period. If the policy views and warnings of these specialists
were not sufficiently accepted early enough to help avoid the crisis, they did
have considerable influence afterwards on the industrial countries’ “corrective
policies”, adopted in the IEA. The remainder of Chapter II focuses on these“corrective policies”, first as reflected in the I.E.P. Agreement which contains
the Members’ strongly held policy views on this subject, and then in the
Agency itself over the period of its first twenty years. These policies are
discussed in the overview Chapter under the following categories, which also
provide the subjects of the ensuing Chapter: IEA energy security, long-term
policy, R & D, oil market transparency and information dissemination, andglobalisation of IEA activities, all of which have implications for energy
security. Since environment and globalisation have played important andgrowing roles in all sectors of IEA work, these subjects are taken up as
well in the context of each of the other Chapters which follow. Chapter
II closes with a look to the future, to freer markets and the IEA Shared
Goals adopted by Ministers in 1993, in the most recent comprehensive IEA
policy statement.
Passing from the “overview” to more detailed description and analysis,
Chapter III of this Volume surveys IEA oil security, beginning with themain initial raison d’être of the IEA, the oil Emergency Sharing System.
14

The discussion moves next to the 1979-1981 oil supply disruption, to
the IEA’s responses to this first crisis managed by the Agency, and to thestrengthening of the oil disruption response measures which then became
necessary. New measures included the IEA’s flexible emergency response
system for “Co-ordinated Emergency Response Measures” known as“CERM”. The IEA applied in essence a CERM-type response in the 19901991 Gulf crisis, which in turn is examined in some detail. Discussion of thecontinuing readiness of the IEA response measures concludes this Chapter.
The IEA’s long-term policies for reducing its Members’ dependence on
imported oil are the subject of Chapter IV. These long-term policies include
not only measures for the reduction of oil import dependence and for theincrease in indigenous production of oil and other energy sources, but also
the more interventionist measures adopted in the early years of the Agency
to fix oil import objectives and ceilings, to establish firm and comprehensive“Principles for Energy Policy”, and to protect new investment in energy
producing assets. Long-term policy naturally extends to the promotion of theenergy conservation and efficiency and to the development of a host of energy
alternatives to oil, such as coal, natural gas, nuclear energy, hydroelectricity
and other renewable sources of energy. In the IEA, long-term policy also
includes the subjects of electricity, and energy trade and investment.
Chapter IV next describes the development of some of the leading IEA
work in the field of energy and the environment, which is also seenin the Chapters on Energy Security (Chapter III), on Energy R & D(Chapter V), on the Oil Market (Chapter VI), and on Relations with NonMembers (Chapter VII). The Long-Term Chapter then surveys the Agency’s
far-reaching reviews of Members’ policies in this sector and closes with a
discussion of the “free markets” policy and of the IEA Shared Goals of 1993.
The still longer-term Energy Research and Development in the IEA
is the subject of Chapter V which reviews the internal organization of IEA
work in the R & D field and looks closely at the various energy R & D
policy and strategy exercises which have been carried out in the Agency
over the years. A later Section of this Chapter is devoted to the IEA systemof collaborative R & D programmes and projects, and to the IEA energy
project “Implementing Agreements”. The discussion of this system isfollowed by historical and current material on the R & D policy reviews.
Chapter VI follows with the discussion of the Oil Market policies
and practices of the Agency, where the main and durable goals are“transparency and information dissemination”. In the IEA’s early years, thepolicy objective was the development of formal information system, withthe assistance of the oil industry. Having developed the system of principal
15

information sources (mainly Member governments and oil companies, but
including other knowledgeable sources as well), the IEA has concentrated
more recently on widening the information base and on disseminating the
expanding information products to the growing numbers of participants inthe markets and to other interested parties. This includes the IEA’s monthly
Oil Market Report, which has achieved recognition as a leading source of
reliable oil market information.
The final Chapter addresses the Agency’s policies and actions withrespect to Co-operation with Non-Member Countries, which began with theinformation exchange and related functions for Members that continue tothe present day. Chapter VII then takes up Members’ policies and activities
in connection with the oil producer and consumer country dialogue of
1976-1977 (called also the North-South Conference or CIEC) and outlines
its disappointing outcome. The conclusion of this dialogue led to a periodof IEA emphasis on policy relating to developing counties, where the Agency
could be helpful without becoming a vehicle for development assistance.
In the late 1980s, the Agency deepened its policy interest in a world-widerange of non-Member countries, as IEA energy policy became increasingly
affected by changes in energy supply, demand, and environmental impacts
on a global basis. Policy with respect to Central and Eastern Europe, the
New Independent States, and particularly the Russian Federation, as wellas other regions moved up on the scale of IEA priorities. These events
also led the Agency to adopt a more inclusive approach to the participationof non-Members in many of its activities, thus bringing non-Members into
closer relations with the Agency.
This Volume concludes with a number of appendices containingreference information closing in most cases at the end of 1994. Appendix
I updates the lists of officers of the main IEA bodies and adds to thatlist senior members of the Secretariat going back to 1974. Appendix II
on “Oil Import Dependence of OECD Countries 1950-1973” provides the statistical data employed in creating the graph on this subject found in Chapter II,
Section B. Appendix III reproduces the full text of the 1977 IEA “Principles forEnergy Policy” which is discussed in Chapter IV, Section D-1 and elsewhere,
while Appendix IV does the same for the “1993 IEA Shared Goals”, discussed
mainly in Chapter II, Section J, and in Chapter IV, Section G and generally inthat Chapter. To complement the references in Chapter V on energy R & D,
Appendix V contains a list of the main subjects of the “IEA Energy RD & D
Implementing Agreements and Other Instruments 1975-1994”. In “Highlights
of Recent IEA Development 1994”, Appendix VI carries forward for the year
1994 the IEA “Highlights” described in Volume I, Appendix VI for the period161974-1993. Appendix VII of this Volume contains a “Table of Ministerial
Communique Document References” to facilitate the reader’s access to theCommunique texts which appear in both the Governing Board document
series and the IEA “PRESS” document series.
The continuation of the history of the IEA in this Volume is notintended to provide simply a traditional narrative of leading or interesting
IEA events, although there are necessarily elements of narrative in Volume I
as well as in the pages that follow. Building on the institutional basedescribed in Volume I, this Volume presents the policies which the IEA
founders sought to establish at the outset and those developed andarticulated in the course of the Agency’s first twenty years. This isaccompanied by a description of the leading IEA actions which have been
intended to give tangible expression to the Agency’s policy objectives. The
actions comprise the main activities of IEA Ministers, the Governing Board
at official level, the leading bodies of the Agency, and the Secretariat.
Volume II is organized topically with material presented mostly inchronological order within each topic and sub-topic. While Volume II refers
to a number of general international political and economic events which
influenced IEA policies and actions, the broader elements of backgroundand context, as well as the policy views of individual Members as expressedin the IEA, fall outside the intended scope of this work.
In this Volume as in Volume I, the author’s intention is to describe
and analyze the IEA’s historical policies and activities particularly for
Agency constituents, for governments, their officers, energy co-operation
planners and builders, for scholars and others who concern themselves withinternational co-operation in energy or in other domains, and for those who
might do so one day in the future. Researching, reflecting, and writingon the Agency’s first twenty years has strengthened the author’s hope that
historical works on subjects of this kind will continue to advance the cause
of inter-governmental co-operation and relations. As Volume I put it, theworld system is
too limited in resources, too fragile in structure and too hazardous
overall for those relations to be left to the individual circumstancesof each government’s independent actions [Page 24].

This book will show that the story of the policy origins of the
IEA and first twenty years of IEA policy and actions is a history of the17Agency’s “optimistic-active” policy approach overcoming the effects of theearlier “optimistic-passive” one, whereby the industrial countries “active”
approach favoured co-operative policies developed in the institutionalframework of the IEA. In the early years of the Agency, Members adopted
interventionist policies which were later displaced by the free market
orientation which represents the mainspring of IEA policy at the time ofwriting. If the establishment of the Agency in 1974 demonstrated theenormous political will necessary to prevail over competing pressures andobjectives, the successful operation of the Agency since that time confirms
the fact that the Members’ active and continuing dedication to energy cooperation has been an essential element of their broad policy to achieve
what has been called in IEA shorthand the three “Es” of energy policy:
energy security, sustainable economic growth, and protection of theenvironment [See Chapter II, Section J, Chapter IV, Section G, and the IEA
Shared Goals of 1993 in Appendix IV below].
If the creation of the Agency demonstrated that a group of like-minded
governments facing an adverse and deteriorating economic situation such as
oil import vulnerability is capable of responding constructively in building
a sound and stable institutional mechanism for achievement of common
objectives, twenty years of IEA history have demonstrated that dedication,
flexibility and adaptability in the policy and actions of the institution are
also essential to its continuing relevance and success. Initially, the Agency’s
principal role included the establishment, start up, and membership growthof the Agency itself, the adoption of its modes of operation and approaches
to problem solving, the development of numerous policy objectives andmechanisms left in the I.E.P. Agreement for later decision, the creation of theoperational essentials of the oil emergency response system, and the analysis
and choice of strategic alternatives and modalities of action in virtually every
sector of the IEA’s responsibilities. The early years formed perhaps themost heroic period of the IEA. In the face of changing circumstances andchallenges, however, the Agency soon applied a process of rapid adaptation,
now recognized and respected as one of the major strengths of the Agency, todevelop and apply new approaches to energy policy.
Until the early 1980s, the IEA had a penchant for adopting market
intervention and firm statements of principles for policy guidance. Many
examples of such measures are seen in Chapter IV below, including the major
effort to fix Group Objectives and individual country ceilings for oil imports
and like measures, together with the adoption of the “Principles for Energy
Policy” and the Coal Principles. The response of the IEA to the 1979-1981
18

oil disruption, often called the “second oil supply crisis”, was to adopt agroup of interventionist measures, mainly a policy agreement to reduce oil
demand by five per cent in Member countries. When doubts about theeffectiveness of measures of this type became evident, the IEA moved rapidly
away from such actions and emphasized preparations for more concrete
responses, like the development and use of oil stocks and demand restraint
for early use in a range of oil supply disruption, including the situations
foreseen in the IEA’s formal system for sharing oil in cases of emergency.
The IEA’s adaptability is clearly exemplified in Chapter II below, in the
expansion of the energy security concept beyond the oil emergency response
mechanisms, to policies concerning natural gas, energy and the environment,
and the globalisation of energy policy. Further examples of adaptability
will be seen throughout Volume II, as the Agency moved strongly into
environment work generally and expanded the scope of its overall work
world-wide, re-established meetings of the industrial countries and other oil
consumers with the oil producer countries, and adapted itself to changes inenergy, markets and to the growing impact of non-Members on the worldenergy situation.
Just as the founders’ establishment of IEA was made possible by anessentially optimistic judgement that constructive co-operation in a coherent
institutional setting provides the best means for tackling serious multinational
problems, so the Agency’s actions since 1974 and its capacity to adapt tochanging conditions may be in part also attributed to an “optimistic-active”
approach which made possible new departures in IEA co-operative policies
and actions. Indeed, as will be seen in Chapter II, Sections B and C below,
it has been the “active” part of this “optimistic-active” approach to energy
co-operation which has distinguished the IEA period from the “passive” partof the “optimistic-passive” energy policy followed during the lead up to the
1973-1974 crisis. In sum, Volume II of the IEA History emphasize that thisspirit has continued to guide and shape the work of the Agency to the present
day over the entire range of its operations.

The author has been greatly aided by the interest, support, andassistance of a large number of highly talented people in the research,
writing, and production of Volume II of this History. Former Executive
Director Helga Steeg who initiated the IEA history project continued to
guide it personally as the work progressed. Her support, insights andwise judgements were always invaluable, as were those of her successor
Executive Director Robert Priddle and those of John P. Ferriter as Acting
19

Executive Director and as Deputy Executive Director. Craig Bamberger,
my successor as IEA chief Legal Counsel, read an early draft of theentire manuscript of Volume II, as he had done for the first Volume; hiscomments and suggestions were always of inestimable value. Throughout
the preparation of Volume II, as well as of Volume I, Natalie Newbern served
admirably as research and editorial assistant; she also prepared series of
documents and summaries which proved extremely useful to the author.
Drawing upon the Governing Board Conclusions and the material submitted
for the 1994 Annual Report of the Governing Board to the OECD Council,
she took the major responsibility for preparing the Appendices, including
Appendix VI, the “Highlights of Recent IEA Development 1994”. Lynette
Rogers-Goderum assisted with editorial experience and acumen, and shared
the arduous task of proof-reading the final text.
Most of the colleagues and others mentioned in the acknowledgements
in Volume I, p. 25 also assisted with Volume II. Moreover, parts of earlydrafts of volume II were read and commented upon, with great benefit to
the author, by Jasper Abramowski, Leslie Boxer, Guy Caruso, Ken Friedman,Peter Huggins, Hans Jorgen Koch, Kristine Kuolt, Timothy Simmons, Robert
Skinner, Philip Starling, Tomihiro Taniguchi, and John Tilley, all members orformer members of the IEA Secretariat.
Useful suggestions and information were also provided by Anne Bolle,
Henry Bottomley, Sylvie Boxer Decaen, Angela Dredden, Stéphane De
Loecker, Sam Flaim, Scott Foster, Annemarie Frank, Debra Justus, Ria
Kemper, David Knapp, Randolph Gränzer, Gudrun Lammers, Gareth LewisDavies, Gudren Maass, Annick Mathis, Tim Mclntosh, Bruce McMullen,
Jeroen Meijer, Trevor Morgan, Sean O’Dell, Mehmet Öǧütçü, Mashiro Okuda,
Robert Ovart, Monica Petit, Mieke Reece, David Rubin, Bjørn Saga, Eric
Savage, Maureen Simmons, John Söderbaum, Lee Solsbery, James Tapper,
Frank Tamburrano, Karen Tréanton, Paul Vlaanderen, E. Lakis Vouyoukas,
and Michael Williams of the Secretariat. Lorraine and Karen Scott suggested
many improvements throughout the manuscript.
For IEA work on the tangible production of this book, I am heavily
indebted to Sue Adams, Muriel Custodio, Ian Denison, Françoise Full,
Joyce Heard, Christopher Henze, Claudine Petit, and Michael Prange. The
necessary computer expertise was ably furnished by Claudie Brinkmeijer,
Tim Linwood Brown, Einar Einarsson, Angela Gazar, Mastan Mohamed,
Jim Murphy, Jean-Claude Petiot, Greg Prowse, and Bertrand Sadin of theSecretariat, and by Jeffrey Scott.
Many other colleagues provided logistical and other valuable support,
including: Jonathan Angel, Barbara Avrillon, Mario Barreto, Gladys Boisard20

Findlay, Thérèse Bürger, Shirley Burnet, Graciela Canedo, Teresa Coon,
Gwyn Darling, Olivier Elkaim, Catherine Foureix, Mary Harries-White, Eva
Hayem, Margaret Jones, Malcolm Keay, Gillian Laing-Balitrand, Michael
Lawson, Béatrice Le Men, Lynne Leterme, Maggy Madden, Teresa Malyshev,
Sandra Martin, Anne Mayne, Alison McLatchie, Sharon Michel, Sandra
Mooney, Jean-Louis Mourao, Anke Mungen, Olivier Parada, Arne Paulson,
Jeff Pierson, Linda Purdy-From, Susan Purtell-Stolarow, Olivier Rech, PaulSankey, Holly Sullivan, Jennifer Vacciannia, Rosemary Williams, Norbert
Wholgemuth, Catherine, Wynaendts, and Elisabeth Young. Ines Price of theUnited Nations, New York, provided valuable treaty information.
In the absence of the may significant contributions mentioned above,
the preparation and production of volume II cound not have taken place.
It goes without saying, however, that the author remains solely responsible
for any errors of omission or commission, of fact or of judgement, whichmight appear in this Volume.

21

22

CHAPTER II

Energy Policy Overview

T

his Chapter first surveys broadly the energy policies, more particularly
the oil policies, of the industrial countries during the lead-up to the
1973-1974 oil crisis and upon the establishment of the Agency in November
1974. The focus then shifts to the ensuing twenty year period when energy
policies evolved within the framework of the IEA, in all the major sectorsof IEA activities which will be taken up in the more technical and detailed
Chapters to follow.

A. Introductory Summary
In the pre-IEA years, the industrial countries viewed energy policies in an
essentially “optimistic-passive” fashion. Characterized by unco-ordinatedand independent actions permitting the importation of “cheap oil”, thesepolicies ultimately created an unacceptable vulnerability to oil supply
disruptions. One major response to this vulnerability was for the industrial
countries to co-operate in developing and implementing common energy
policies where their interests converged. The question, however, as later
formulated by former IEA Governing Board Chairman Ulrich Engelmann,
was whether it would “be possible for the Western industrialised countries
to find a common line between the interests of the Western producing andthe Western consuming countries” [Statement at a special seminar on “TheIEA in the 21st Century: Challenges and Prospects” in commemoration of
the 20th Anniversary of the IEA, held in Kyoto, Japan on 14 April 1994].
Following the 1973-1974 oil crisis, the oil producing and non-producing
industrial countries alike shifted dramatically to co-operation in energy
policies as their modus operandi, and as a result they developed and enteredinto the Agreement on an International Energy Program [usually called the“I.E.P. Agreement”, reproduced in Volume I, Appendix III]. In that process,the IEA governments embarked upon an earnest and concentrated effort
to build policies which responded favourably to the concerns underlying
Dr. Engelmann’s question.
23

These early IEA policies consisted mainly of the short-term type of
response embodied in the IEA’s Emergency Sharing System and the longerterm policy commitments designed to reduce the dependency on imported
oil which had been allowed to build up over the previous decades. The
industrialized countries first adopted the IEA’s energy policies in the I.E.P.
Agreement and then over the years developed them in both depth andbreadth. This made the IEA leading energy policy forum of the industrial
countries.
While the IEA Members’ policy concept of energy security during thesecond half of the 1970s was largely devoted (1) to developing systems forthe sharing of oil and related measures in response to short-term oil supply
disruptions and for oil market transparency, and (2) to reducing their longterm oil import dependence, there began at the turn of the decade a processof broadening the scope of energy security to include other subjects anddifferent instruments. In the early 1980s, IEA Members extended security
policy to include the management of oil disruptions which do not fully fit theoil supply disruption scenario foreseen in the Emergency Oil Sharing Systemor which otherwise require more flexible oil disruption response measures. In
1983 the Members found it necessary to include natural gas security, as well.
In the years which followed, environmental concerns strengthened steadily,
to become in the early 1990s one of the core elements of IEA policy andoperations, and a key element in the Agency’s approach to energy security.
During the same period, the evolution of the world energy system brought a
growing global interdependence, extending beyond IEA countries and the oil
producing countries on a world-wide basis, and this led the IEA to expand
generally the geographical reach of its energy security concept to include
greater emphasis on relations with non-Member countries.
Early IEA actions in the long-term sector focused on energy
conservation, reduction of imported oil, and the development of alternative
energy sources. These policies were grounded largely on the free market forenergy, though they did not escape entirely from market management efforts
intended to strengthen the consumers’ interests. During this period the IEA’s
Governing Board adopted the Agency’s comprehensive framework for longterm energy policy co-operation, the Long-Term Co-operation Programme(LTCP). The Governing Board also adopted energy conservation goals,
then oil import goals and targets, first for the group and later for theindividual Members’ but such intervention measures eventually proved to beineffective or unnecessary and gave way to less ambitious but more effective
policy instruments for energy security. Throughout its history the IEA has
made major contributions to promoting energy conservation and efficiency;
24

indigenous and worldwide oil producing; coal production, trade and use;
natural gas; nuclear power; and renewable sources of energy. The energy
and the environment responsibilities of the IEA have increased as the Agency
has sought to balance the Members’ objectives in both of these sectors.
With a long-term energy perspective, the Agency has also carried out acontinuous series of analyses of energy R & D strategies, and has established
a comprehensive network of projects in this sector.
Since its earliest days, the Agency has supported the objective of
increasing the development and availability of international oil market
information, and has established a number of systems designed to achieve
this objective. Dissemination of the information has equally received IEA
policy support, leading to the highly regarded IEA monthly Oil Market Report
and to other information dissemination actions.
The globalisation of IEA policy and actions that was mentioned abovein the discussion of oil security has occurred more broadly. The IEA’s
perspective in recent years has been enlarged to include greater focus on
Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Asia-Pacific region, andAfrica, because of their growing impacts on all participants in the worldenergy system, notably with respect to their growing energy demand and totheir role in environment questions.

B. Energy Policy Origins of the 1973-1974
Oil Supply Vulnerability: The OptimisticPassive Approach to Oil Policy
Much of the direction of IEA policy over the Agency’s first twenty years wasforeshadowed in the industrial countries’ experience with policy weaknesses
during the lead-up to the 1973-1974 crisis. These weaknesses brought tothe fore a sharp awareness of energy generated risks to the economies of theindustrial countries, and to their political and social stability. It was all but
inevitable that the lessons of that crisis would have a strong influence on thedevelopment of Members’ “corrective policies” established in the IEA.
The vulnerability of the industrial countries to serious oil supply
disruptions and to price shocks occurring largely outside of their control was
not a sudden development, although the awareness of the associated risk did
appear suddenly to many energy policy makers only late in 1973 when thecrisis began. The combination of situations which created the crisis evolved
over a number of years before the crisis occurred.
25

The first step in the series of events leading to the energy vulnerabilityof the industrial countries was doubtless the shift from coal to oil as thefavoured source of energy. Coal was the ever present energy source prior to
the 1930s, accounting for over eighty per cent of the industrial world’s fuelconsumption, but it was destined to be overtaken and displaced becauseof the practical advantages, the ready availability, and the lower price ofoil. One immediate disadvantage of the change to oil was the loss of anabundant domestic supply of the favoured energy source: there was a great
deal of domestic coal in many important industrial countries, but most ofthem lacked a large domestic supply of oil. The advantages of oil were thus
obtained at the cost of potential vulnerability to disruption of the supply ofoil derived from foreign sources.
This vulnerability did not affect all major consumers to the same
degree. It was not so much an immediate concern for the United States,for example, because until the 1960s the United States remained capable ofmeeting the bulk of its oil supply needs from domestic sources. Yet fromthat time forward the United States became increasingly a major importerof oil and thereupon joined the ranks of Europe, Japan, and others in facing
potential supply vulnerability. Moreover, the net oil importer status of theUnited States increased the vulnerability of the other consumers as well,because the United States soon proved incapable of making an excess supply
available to the others when the need arose. The excess United States supply
had disappeared, and no other industrial country could replace it.
Besides the shift from coal to oil, the industrial countries’ energy
vulnerability was created not by a single event or policy line, but rather
by the interaction of a host of other critical factors, especially the rapid
and unprecedented growth in the industrial countries’ appetite for oil, andtheir notable reduction in domestic oil production (particularly in the UnitedStates). Demand grew with the shift to oil as the energy of choice andwith the rapid economic growth generally over the 1960s and early 1970s.
This was a natural consequence of the then prevailing conditions of ample
oil supply at relatively low prices compared to the prices of other energy
sources. In one of the Foreign Affairs articles which appeared during theperiod leading up to the 1973-1974 crisis, Iranian Ambassador Jahangir
Amuzegar characterized these conditions aptly as “Cheap oil as a matter ofnational policy”, and stated that
The artificially low price of oil (a) discouraged oil producers fromsearching effectively for new sources of supply; (b) helped holddown prices of substitutes (e.g. coal, gas and hydroelectricity),26

and likewise dampened their development prospects despite
their huge reserves; (c) stifled and/or delayed research in thedevelopment of more efficient technology for the economicaluse of nonconventional energy sources; and above all, (d)contributed to an inexcusably reckless waste and inefficient useof world premium fuels [Jahangir Amuzegar, “The Oil Story:
Facts, Fiction and Fair Play”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51 (July 1973)
p.676, 681].
Some of the flavour of these early 1970s trends was caught remarkably
well by Anthony Sampson in this passage from The Seven Sisters:. . . the signs of a shortage were now visible everywhere. The
summer of 1973 was an eerie one for the oil companies. The
demand for oil was going up above the wildest predictions — inEurope, in Japan, and most of all in the United States. Imports
from the Middle East to the U.S. were still racing up: production inside the United States was still falling. In April
President Nixon had again lifted restrictions on imports of oil,so that Middle East oil flowed in still faster; and the administration did nothing to control a scramble for oil. While themajors were trying to establish their safe sources of supply, theindependents were bidding frantically for the “participation oil”
from the producers, thus pushing the price up and up [TheSeven Sisters, (1975) p. 242].
The oil shortage was not solely a function of demand growth. It wasalso a function of changes in the supply sources of the industrial countries.
In the United States, domestic production decreased as a consequence of
the absence of policies discouraging the importation of oil, and because of
insufficient domestic investment to develop indigenous supply. In many
countries, these factors were exacerbated by the absence of suitable energy
conservation measures and by the insufficient development of domestic
or otherwise secure alternative energy sources. The potential for such
vulnerability to damage industrial countries economically was strengthenedby the growing demands of the oil producer countries and by the progressive
weakening of the role of the international oil companies which had primary
responsibility for bringing oil to the consumers.
The growing oil requirements of OECD countries and their decreasing
reliance upon domestic production of oil during the years building up to27

the first crisis are readily visible in the table set forth in Appendix II. The
falling oil supply self-sufficiency and the consequential rising oil importdependence of the industrial countries make clear the growing trend of energy
vulnerability during the years before the 1973-1974 crisis:
Oil Self-Sufficiency and Import DependenceOECD Total 1950-1973
Per cent
80
70
60
50
40
30
20

1950

1953

1956

Self-Sufficiency

1959

1962

1965

1968

1971 1973

Import-Dependence

Notes :
Oil Self-Sufficiency is calculated as domestic oil production/oil supply.
Import dependence is calculated as net oil imports/oil supply.
Oil supply in this table is defined as Production + Imports - Exports.
For comparability purposes, the graph includes for each year data for all
countries which were OECD Members in 1973.
Data for the new Federal states of Germany are not included.

The numbers in Appendix II tell the story in more detail. During
the time span covered in the above graph, the demand for oil in OECD
countries increased dramatically. It grew in North America from 320 Mtoe
(million tonnes of oil equivalent) in 1950 to 907 in 1973 and in OECD
Europe from 61 Mtoe to an impressive 764 for the same years. For all
28

OECD countries demand rose from 386 Mtoe in 1950 to 1980 in 1973, morethan a five-fold increase. Despite the gradual rise in domestic production
in all OECD regions during this period (domestic production rose from 280
Mtoe in 1950 to 662 in 1973), growing demand was increasingly met byimports of oil which multiplied over ten-fold for the OECD as a groupbetween the years 1950 and 1973. Consequently, OECD import dependencerose from 28 per cent in 1950 to 67 per cent in 1973, the year the crisis
began. With the advantage of hindsight, it is not difficult to envisage thatin 1974 the future carried a strong risk of serious oil security uncertainty,
to say the least.
The policy implications of these declining self-sufficiency and growing
import dependency numbers are best seen in their economic and politicalcontext. The low price and apparent abundance of oil encouraged its
growing use, while the impact of any policy efforts to reduce oil use wasrestrained by the factors moving consumers rapidly in the opposite direction.
Although leading policy makers in the industrial countries were fully aware ofthis rapidly growing vulnerability (either by virtue of the warnings sounded
quite clearly in serious policy journals or in such other fora as the U.S.
Congress), they were unable to act decisively to arrest it.
A brief look at some early warnings during the 1970s helps put the
problem in perspective, in showing the depth of the problem and theissues requiring examination in searching for solutions. One of the mostpenetrating and comprehensive early analyses was written for the July 1971
issue of Foreign Affairs by the respected oil consultant Walter J. Levy, under
the title “Oil Power”. This article described the significant shifts in oil
politics, economics and market structure, and the confrontations between
the international oil industry and the major oil producing countries during
1970. It charted trends over several years, especially the strengthening ofproducer demands and organization, and the industrial countries’ growing
dependence on imported oil. Levy made it clear to all that more serious
troubles were fast approaching:
And the traumatic experience of confrontation between theindustry and the producing governments raises new questions as
to the security of essential oil flows against interruption. Clearly,
a very real challenge to the historical structure and operation of
the internationally integrated oil industry is emerging — at atime when demand for oil is increasing swiftly [Walter J. Levy,“Oil Power”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 49 (July 1971) p. 652].
29

Despite discoveries in the North Sea, Far East and elsewhere,
it is clear that the Eastern Hemisphere will continue to depend
decisively on OPEC oil to meet mounting oil requirements. With
its surplus productive capacity largely gone, the United States,
too, will probably have to increase its oil imports [Levy, p. 653].
The question now arises, what should or can constitute a Western
oil policy? The major concern is oil availability — on acceptablecommercial terms, strategically secure and not subject to political
blackmail. These require bargaining leverage and countervailingpower [Levy, p. 656].
And with oil reserves so heavily concentrated in a handful ofdeveloping countries of North Africa and the Middle East, it
is inevitable also that these countries will use to the utmost
their control over the resources — certainly for their economic
advantage, but also where possible for political purposes [Levy,
p. 664].
The political effectiveness of OPEC unity, of unilateral action
and of the threat of an embargo—these are the realities towhich companies and consuming governments must now begin
to address themselves [Levy, p. 658].
In this particular case, the early warnings of 1971 were accompanied
by a number of now familiar policy questions and suggestions. Mr. Levy
stated that
The issue is whether we are prepared to expose ourselves toundue dependence on insecure oil imports, or whether we willkeep import volumes under restraint and foster a domesticenergy environment with adequate incentives to continuing
exploration and development [Levy, p. 663].
In addition to diagnosing the problem, Levy suggested a number of possible
solutions. He referred to the diversification of oil supply sources, to suchalternatives to oil as nuclear energy and coal, to the need for more effective
relations between the oil industry and the industrial countries [Pages 663664], to the importance of increasing oil stockpiles, storage facilities, andadequate tanker tonnage, and to the exploration and development of oil
30

resources in “safe” areas. He pointed to the unattractive prospects ofdirect negotiations between industrial countries and producing countries (asrespects both the terms of trade and the risks of political confrontation
between the negotiating governments). In his article there were some hints
of industrial country co-operation, but as yet no concrete international
institutional proposals. Certainly nothing like the 1974 IEA co-operation
notions was envisaged in these 1971 reflections, but such ideas were “in theair” and were soon to surface in the growing energy debates in industrial
countries.
One of the most visible and respected statements which pointed toward
the future IEA approach to energy security was made by Ambassador JamesE. Akins, during his U.S. State Department energy service in 1973, inan article entitled “The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is Here”. After
analysing the strengths of the oil producers and a potential parade of“political nightmares” (many of which took tangible form within months
after this article appeared), Ambassador Akins turned to possible co-operative
responses by the industrial countries:
The consumers are not without power of their own — or theywould not be if they were united. So far they have not been,
and they have as yet shown little inclination toward collective
action in spite of repeated urgings by the United States. In thefall 1969 meetings of the OECD oil committee, before the first
OPEC crisis, the Department of State first raised with the EEC
the possibility of a common approach to the energy problems
we would all soon be facing. Assistant Secretary of State PhilipTrezise, in the OECD meeting in Paris in May 1970, urged thatenergy problems be considered in a multilateral context, but got
little positive response.
In the fall of 1971, the United States raised more formally with
Europeans and the Japanese the possibility of a joint approach to
the energy problem; apart from a general expression of support
for the companies in their dealings, no ideas were forthcoming[James E. Akins, “The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is Here”,
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51 (April 1973) p. 462, 485-486].
At various times, according to ambassador Akins, the United States discussed
consumer co-operation from the standpoint (1) of finding new sources ofenergy and new sources of hydrocarbons and (2) of forming “an international
31

authority to avoid cutthroat competition for available energy in times ofshortage” [Akins, p. 487], in essentially an “optimistic-active” modality.
Some of the later IEA notions then appeared: he considered that “all agreed”
in the OECD that a consumer organization should be formed, not as achallenge to OPEC, not to drive down prices, “not to ruin the producers”,
but “to protect to consumers” [Akins, pp. 487-488]. Another of Ambassador
Akins’s main suggestions was the requirement for the industrial countries
to develop in the long run alternative energy sources and conservation
practices. Elements of this suggestion would soon become the core of IEA
long-term energy policy.
However, as it turned out, these suggestions did not find decisive
acceptance before the industrial countries had to absorb the lessons of
the 1973-1974 crisis, just a few months later. There were a number ofreasons why Ambassador Akins’s reflections were not accepted with fullunderstanding and conviction in many countries, including his own. The
short-run advantages of plentiful and “cheap” oil seemed manifest. The
views and threats of the oil producers were not taken seriously, because it was
believed that the producers had to sell their oil and the industrial countries
were the only buyers, that the producers were more eager to sell than the
consumers were to purchase, that producers would often enough seek the“quick return” rather then follow longer-term price increase policies, that
OPEC would not be aware of its apparent power if the consumers kept quite
about it, that boycotts were not to be feared because they never work, that
OPEC itself feared that competition among producers would always drive
prices down, that there were vast new reserves to be found, that arctic andNorth Atlantic reserves would solve all problems of supply, that prices would
continue to fall, and that the Arabs would never use oil as a political weapon(or the like). Events would prove that these essentially “optimistic-passive”
assumptions were all erroneous.
Hence the ideas apparently justifying continuing dependence on“cheap and abundant” foreign oil were firmly entrenched. As the foregoingsuggests, those ideas were fuelled by an optimistic outlook which foresaw,
without the need for concerted actions of the industrial countries, thecontinuation indefinitely of an ample supply of imported oil at low cost andat moderate or negligible political risk. This all but ensured thecontinuation of their higher demand and lower indigenous production
policies and practices. In the early 1970s the modest counter-forces had
little hope of bringing about policy changes designed to offset the trend.
One result of this optimistic outlook was relative policy passivity and inaction,and this at a time when there might still have been the opportunity to reduce32the industrial countries’ vulnerability to deliberate, accidental, natural orother supply disruptions and to the oil producers’ power to impose damaging
price increases. Another result was the shock of the first oil crisis, whichbrought severe economic damage to the industrial countries. It was outof this shock, however, that the industrial countries realized at last that
corrective policies would have to be developed and carried out on an
urgent basis.
This background to IEA energy policy developments is further describedand analyzed in Ulf Lantzke, “The International Energy Agency”, inEuropean yearbook, Vol. XXVI (1978) p. 41, Daniel Yergin, The Prize, (1991)
Chapters 28-31, Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters, (1975) Chapters
11-15, the Foreign Affairs articles cited above, and the literature cited in thesesources. As the industrial countries suffered the consequences of the firstoil crisis, their attention turned swiftly to the analysis of their vulnerability,
and to the appropriate remedial policy responses as well as institutionalarrangements to be envisaged. The next Section looks at the “corrective
policies” adopted in the I.E.P. Agreement, the first systematic effort of theindustrial countries to develop a coherent co-operative response to the newchallenges which arose out of that crisis.

C. Corrective Policies Adopted
in the I.E.P. Agreement
As the potential for significant oil supply disruption grew in magnitude during
the early 1970s , the worst fears of the industrial countries’ forward looking
policy analysts were to be realized in the first oil crisis in 1973-1974, when
the intentional interruption of supply brought about devastating economic
consequences. The main Arab producers were successful in establishing an
unprecedented embargo of oil deliveries to a number of industrial countries,
and they galvanized the oil producers countries, organized in OPEC, toraise crude oil prices [See Volume I, Chapter II for more background on
this subject]. Not only could oil producers impose an embargo as an “oilweapon” to strengthen their hand for political purposes, they were alsoable to bring about an increase of almost 400 per cent in the market
price of crude oil. The oil producers imposed this price increase by“legislative” actions of their own, without negotiating with the internationaloil companies, while only a few years earlier the companies had been fully
able themselves to legislate prices without negotiating with the producers.
33

Control over significant oil supplies had thus completely changed handsfrom consumers to the producer governments. With that change theproducers acquired extraordinary economic and political powers as well as asignificant institutional triumph. Although somewhat reduced in the 1990s,
that fundamental change of power has persisted through various periods ofwaxing and waning of the relevant market conditions.
In 1973 and 1974 this left the industrial countries in an oil policy
quandary. As Dr. Ulf Lantzke, the first Executive Director of the IEA, put
it a few years later.
Unprepared to face this sudden situation, the industrialised
countries felt the immediate impact of the oil shock in different
degrees, depending on the extent of their dependency on oil
imports, the fragility of their balance of payments, and theorientation of their foreign policy. Due to these fundamental
differences and in contrast to the common view on prices andproduction shared by the oil-producing countries, the Westernindustrialised nations reacted in almost total disarray. Divided
on the type of measures to take, they responded in an uncoordinated manner, implementing emergency measures with very
limited effect and often going in the direction of panic in efforts
to secure preferential positions. In the event, no real measures
were taken … [ Ulf Lantzke, “The International Energy Agency”,
in European Yearbook, Vol. XXVI (1978) p. 41, 44].
The institutional lessons of the 1973-1974 crisis are described generally
in Volume I of this History at pp. 38-40 and need not be reviewed here.
However, the durable energy policy lessons of the crisis do need to beconsidered. The most far-reaching lesson was, of course, the need to reversethe “go-it-alone” approach of the industrial countries in the early 1970s
and adopt a co-operative approach. In late 1974 this approach found its
ultimate expression in the creation of the International Energy Agency, where
co-operative and realistic policies on oil and other forms of energy could
be developed, adopted, and executed in an intergovernmental forum. Oneof the key objectives of IEA’s founders was to establish and maintain asystem of mutual relations which would remove energy as a source ofserious competition and conflict among the industrial countries. The farreaching substantive policy changes, as reflected in the I.E.P. Agreement,
covered both a comprehensive short-term oil supply disruption response
system (the IEA’s Emergency Sharing System) anda number of34

longer-term objectives for reducing the Members’ oil imports. These policies
were also designed to provide the market information, political understanding, and other elements necessary to help the industrial countries avoid thepitfalls of over optimism and policy inaction that had brought them to griefin the crisis of 1973-1974.
The major lessons on policy and the corresponding I.E.P. Agreement
policy commitments that were taken in 1974 may be summarized as follows:

The World Market for Oil. Oil market events almost anywhere in
the world affect consumers everywhere in the world and will continue
to do so in the future. Hence oil policy must be formulated on a broad
basis which takes into account the world-wide scope of oil-related
actions by individuals, companies, and governments. Operations in
the market and its trends must be known to policy makers and be
understood by them.
Energy Security. Energy security is the paramount policy objectiveof the IEA. It requires “secure oil supplies on reasonable and equitableterms” [I.E.P. Agreement, Preamble, paragraph 1] and “common
effective measures to meet oil supply emergencies” [Paragraph 2].
In order to respond to short-term oil supply disruptions caused by
future embargoes or by natural or other causes, these policy objectives
are best achieved by a combination of obligatory response measures,
including the maintenance of substantial levels of oil stocks to meetpart of the disrupted supply (“emergency self-sufficiency”, as appears
in Chapter I of the I.E.P. Agreement), the programmed reduction ofoil use during supply interruptions (contingent oil demand restraint
measures, as appears in Chapter II of the I.E.P. Agreement), andthe institutionalized system for allocating oil equitably among theMembers (the system for oil allocation, as appears in Chapter III of
the I.E.P. Agreement).
Oil Sharing Safety Net. The oil Emergency Sharing Systemshould maintain safeguards against any disruption of the Members’
co-operation, in case of rising pressures during an emergency for eachcountry to go its own way without proper regard for the interests ofother Members. The arrangements for triggering the System shouldreflect the policy of requiring all Members of the IEA to respect andapply the Sharing System. Hence policy requires that the trigger
decision be an objective one, without being conditioned by priorpolitical agreement among the Members (a condition which was foundin the 1973-1974 crisis to be a disabling one). The trigger decisions
35











36

would normally be administrative and technical ones made by the IEA
Secretariat, rather than political ones made by the Governing Board or
the individual Members. The Secretariat’s decisions would bebased upon objective data showing the level of the disruption, and thesystem would be triggered when the level reaches or is reasonably
expected to reach a minimum of 7 per cent reduction in supplies forthe group or any Member. As a fail-safe device, the System would
then be activated, and the legal obligations of the Sharing System
would become operative unless a strong majority of the Governing
Board were to decide otherwise. (These “activation” policies appear in
Chapter IV of the I.E.P. Agreement).
Information Systems. Systems should be devised to develop
more relevant and detailed information for oil market transparency
generally and for the particular information, including confidential
and proprietary data, required to operate the oil Emergency Sharing
System. Arrangements should be made for the dissemination of suchinformation as appropriate (as appears in Chapter V of the I.E.P.
Agreement).
The Broader Energy Problem. Dependence on imported oil is afunction not only of direct supply and demand for oil, but also of theestablishment or not of conservation and energy efficiency practices,
together with the availability and usability of all other major energy
sources such as natural gas, coal, nuclear, and renewable energy sources(and the more exotic sources which might emerge from energy researchand development). Hence the promotion of these energy sectors mustalso be included in a comprehensive policy on energy security, but suchpolicies cannot all be expected to succeed in the near-term (the resulting
long-term policies appear in Chapter VII of the I.E.P. Agreement).
Long-Term Energy Co-operation. The reduction of oil importdependency and the accompanying economic vulnerability should beviewed as a long-term goal. Policy in this sector should increase
incentives for developing the supply of oil as well as for enhancing
energy conservation and the use of alternative energy sources to reduce
oil imports (as appears in Chapter VII of the I.E.P. Agreement).
Arrangements with Oil Companies. Regular and systematic arrangements would have to be made with oil companies not only to provide
to the IEA relevant information available to them, but also to advise the
IEA on the development and operation of the oil Sharing System (asappears in Chapters IV, V and VI of I.E.P. Agreement).
Relations with Non-Members. Industrial countries should establish
arrangements for co-operative relations with non-Member countries

(oil producing countries as well as other consumers) in order to achieve
better mutual understanding and to benefit from developments in theenergy field (as appears in Chapter VIII of the I.E.P. Agreement).
Combined with the foregoing substantive energy policy notions,the industrial countries made provision in the I.E.P. Agreement for suchsupportive institutional policies as co-operative arrangements for developing
the Members’ future energy policies, for establishing the Agency itself, andfor agreeing on membership, structure, and the other institutional elements
taken up in Volume I of this History. Once the Agency was under way on
15 November, 1974, it became the center for developing, applying, adapting,and updating those energy policies which appear in the I.E.P. Agreement
and which are summarized above. The remainder of this Chapter will be
devoted to a concise discussion of some of the leading policy evolutions which
occurred over the first twenty years of the IEA between 1974 and 1994,
mainly with respect to energy security long-term energy co-operation energy
and the environment, energy R & D, oil market information transparency
and dissemination, the globalisation of energy markets, relations with nonMembers, freer markets, and IEA Shared Goals.

D. IEA Energy Security:
Expansion of the Vital Concept
The search for “energy security” was the main objective of the IEA’s founders
in establishing the Agency and it remains so twenty years later. Energy
security was defined in 1993 by Executive Director Helga Steeg in her
statement that
Our Member countries’ common objective remains energy security;i.e., diversified supplies of energy being available at affordable
prices to help economies continue to grow [Remarks at The Second
World Coal Institute Conference, London, 25 March 1993].
The content of that objective can first be discerned in the 1974 I.E.P.
Agreement (as seen in Section B above), particularly in the first four
Chapters of the Agreement where the main oil security principles are set
forth. Over the ensuing twenty years, the Governing Board’s actions focused37

sharply upon the specific policies, obligations, and mechanisms designed
to realize the energy security objective. In both the I.E.P. Agreement
and Governing Board actions, energy security concerns extend not only toresponses to short-run emergencies (taken up in this Section), but also tolong-term ameliorative solutions to the problems of reducing oil importdependency. In recent years energy security considerations have increasingly
influenced energy policy more generally as well. [See Section E below].
For short-term oil emergencies, the IEA maintains a treaty-based
system for the physical sharing of oil (the Emergency Sharing System)
which requires the Members to build and maintain oil stocks (the IEA stock
obligations, to plan for an carry out a short-term reduction of demandfor oil (called demand restraint in IEA terminology), and to gather andtransmit emergency oil data (to enable the Agency to make knowledgeable
and coherent emergency decisions). Arrangements are in place to ensure theassistance of the oil industry (for expertise required in improving, testing,and operating the Sharing System). At the center of the Sharing System
there is an institutional mechanism designed to enable these elements towork together smoothly, objectively, and reliably (the IEA role overall). Whensupply disruptions occur, all of these oil security measures require of Membersa spirit of co-operation, a willingness to share sacrifices, and a resolve to
avoid “going it alone” at the expense of others. Moreover, the Agency has
regularly refined, tested and improved its array of oil disruption response
and emergency data systems and has conducted country reviews to ensure
the systems’ completeness, readiness and credibility.
Over the years the IEA’s operating concept of energy security has
evolved to reflect the Agency’s growing experience, as well as changes inthe energy world and in Members’ policies. In this continuing process, four
major evolutionary shifts have occurred so far. They concern (1) levels of
disruption and flexible responses, (2) the security of natural gas supplies, (3)energy and the environment, and (4) global interdependence and relations
with non-Member countries.
The first evolutionary shift concerns the level of an oil supply disruption
which is considered to present a risk to energy security. In 1974 the IEA’s oil
Emergency Sharing System assumed that a major disruption of at least 7 percent of available supply would be required before action would have to betaken. The threshold of 7 per cent accordingly entered the IEA’s operational
concept of security, and the oil Sharing System was built to this specification.
It remains unchanged in that respect today. Within a few years after thefounding of the Agency, however, IEA countries realized that this threshold
was too restrictive, because serious economic damage could result from38

disruptions of lesser amounts of oil. This was one of the most telling
lessons of the 1979 oil crisis, when the IEA found that flexible responses andprocedures, including the judicious use of oil stocks and demand restraint,
should be envisaged in these lesser disruptions. The IEA then created,in part for that purpose, the arrangements called “CERM”, which stands
for “Co-ordinated Emergency Response Measures”. Under the CERM
procedures, a wide variety of response measures may be adopted in whole
or in part in response to oil supply disruptions, and the operational decisions
may now be made and carried out on a flexible basis whether the supply
shortfall is less than or exceeds the level of 7 per cent.
The flexibility of this multiple approach has been a basic and consistent
IEA emergency response policy. It was expressed in 1987 as follows:
Ministers reaffirmed the high priority given to the IEA emergency
preparedness system, including both IEP oil sharing and theco-ordinated early response stipulated in the Governing Board
Decision of 11th July 1984 [Emphasis added].
The IEA successfully applied a mechanism of this kind during the 1990-1991
Gulf crisis: the IEA’s “Contingency Plan”, activated by the Executive Director
on 17 January 1991, provided for 2.5 million barrels of oil a day to be madeavailable to the market. The building blocks for the Gulf crisis actions had
been put in place over the preceding ten years, as the IEA security concept
was adapted to a broader range of possible oil shortfall situations. These
innovative building blocks remain available as needed for service in future
oil supply disruption actions.
Continuing the evolutionary trend of Members’ oil emergency response
expectations, the Governing Board in February 1995 further emphasized
flexibility and effectiveness in IEA response instruments and Member
countries’ cohesion and capacity in responding to oil crises. Following
a review of this subject in 1994-1995, in which oil market changes andcontinuing vulnerability of IEA countries to oil supply disruptions were
examined, the Board agreed that the Agency’s crisis response measures“should be tailored to specific circumstances, underpin the efficient functioning of the oil market, and minimize damage to Member countries”. When an
oil supply disruption reaches the IEP emergency threshold (7 per cent lossof supply), the relatively light-handed CERM measures are to be considered
before the full IEP Sharing System would be activated. Thus
39

. . . the Governing Board, as a matter of policy, would normallyfirst give consideration, consistent with the IEP, to a step-by-stepprocess involving adequate opportunity for the co-ordinationand implementation of stockdraw, demand restraint and otheremergency measures to be fully effective, in a manner compatible
with the timely and effective preparation and activation of oil
sharing should that prove necessary [Emphasis added].
In reaching this conclusion, the Board also agreed that even in times of crisis
markets should remain “unconstrained by price controls or restrictions otherthan those consistent with the implementation of IEA emergency measures,and voluntary measures should be encouraged”. The foregoing developments
represent the most recent manifestation of the first evolutionary shift in the
Agency’s operational concept of energy security.
In the second shift in the scope of the IEA’s security concerns, the focus
on security was enlarged to include natural gas as well as oil, which suggests
a wider concept of “energy security”. The 1974 Agreement had mentioned
natural gas as one of the alternative sources of energy, rather than as
an energy source requiring security measures. By the early 1980s that
focus had evolved to include specific security protection for natural gas
because of political risks stemming from the Cold War. In May 1983, IEA
Ministers agreed. . . on the importance of avoiding the development of situations
in which imports of gas could weaken rather than strengthen theenergy supply security and thus the overall economic stabilityof Member countries. They noted the potential risks associatedwith high levels of dependence on single supplier countries.
Ministers stressed the importance of expeditious development ofindigenous OECD energy resources. They …Agreed that …steps
should be taken to ensure that no one producer is in a position to
exercise monopoly power over OECD and IEA countries.
The Agency is now engaged in a new natural gas study that takes into accountthe changes in geopolitics and potential risks for gas supply which might
result from technical breakdowns, management failures, and tensions among
the gas producing states and their neighbours [See Section E below].
A third shift in the energy security focus is found in the domainof “energy and the environment”. Although the IEA never has been an“environmental protection agency for energy” or a “ lobby” for environmental
40

questions (and this is still so today), environmental concerns have always
played a certain role in IEA activities, and in the late 1980s the “interplay
between environmental policies and energy policies” entered the main lines of
IEA work. One of the IEA’s priority policies is the development of “economic
non-fossil sources” of energy, along with the “clean and efficient use offossil fuels”. Another priority is to ensure that energy security considerations
are properly taken into account when environmental policies on fossil fuels
and nuclear power, among others, are being developed. IEA policy on
this point found recent expression in the 1993 “IEA Shared Goals” whichfavours the “environmentally sustainable provision and use of energy” andstates that
Decision-makers should seek to minimise the adverse
environmental impacts of energy activities, just as environmental
decisions should take account of the energy consequences[Goal 3].
The notion of energy security has thus been broadened to include the need to
strike the optimal balance among policies for energy security, environmental
protection, and economic growth. It is clear that the environment element
will continue as one of the driving forces of energy policy in the years to come[See Section F below, and Chapter IV, Section E for additional discussionof energy and the environment].
In the fourth evolutionary development, the IEA’s energy security
concept has been enlarged to include increasing attention to the Agency’s
relations with non-Members. From the beginning, relations with non-Member
oil producers and other consumer countries were included in IEA policy
objectives, as seen in the oil Sharing System requirement for emergency
oil allocation to take into account the situation of non-Member countries.
In actions taken since the late 1980s, however, the IEA has given specificpolicy recognition to the increasing global interdependence in energy. Global
interdependence derives from the continuing, if not greater, importanceof key non-Member as sources of oil to IEA countries, from the rapidly
growing role of non-Members in determining global energy demand, fromthe perception that a greater portion of global energy-related environmental
impacts would arise in non-Member countries, and from the movementof many of these countries towards closer relations with IEA. Recent
developments such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Agency’s
responses to the energy problems of the Central and Eastern European
countries, the Agency’s recognition of the growing economies of41

Latin America, the Asian-Pacific regions, and Africa are requiring the IEA
to devote greater attention to global markets and to policies concerning
non-Members, as elements of overall energy security.
In sum, over the years energy security has remained the dominant IEA
objective, but with evolutionary adjustments made to add security elements
flexibly as required and to realize in fact the concrete objectives of each.
Energy security underlies most of the IEA Shared Goals adopted by IEA
Ministers in 1993. Policy for responding explicitly to energy emergencies
is stated as follows:
Energy systems should have the ability to respond promptly
and flexibly to energy emergencies. In some cases thisrequires collective mechanisms and action — IEA countries cooperate through the Agency in responding jointly to oil supply
emergencies [Goal 2].
Energy security is the common thread which binds together each of the nineelements of the IEA Shared Goals, including policy on “diversity, efficiency
and flexibility within the energy sector”, energy and the environment, energy
efficiency, R & D, energy pricing, energy trade, energy investment, and cooperation among all energy market participants. Most of these Goals reflect
considerations of long-term energy policy designed to reduce IEA Members’
dependence on imported oil under the Agency’s Long-Term Co-operation
Programme, taken up in the next Section. In the future, the success or failureof IEA Members in realizing these Goals and carrying out the associatedpolicies will have a direct effect on IEA oil security and will influence thevulnerability of Members to oil supply disruptions as well as the possible
severity and duration of the disruption crisis.

E.

Long-Term Energy Policies:
Reducing Oil Imports

The IEA’s long-term energy policy co-operation objective of assuring
the continuous strengthening of protection from oil supply disruptions isexpressed in a brief passage of the I.E.P. Agreement declaring that Members“are determined to reduce over the longer term their dependence on
imported oil for meeting their total energy requirements” and stating acommitment to “undertake national programs and promote the adoption of42

co-operative programs” in a number of areas set out in the Agreement. The
Governing Board adopted the IEA’s comprehensive Long-Term Co-operation
Programme (LTCP) early in 1976, reflecting the IEA Ministers’ judgementon the importance of a regular and stable energy supply and the Agency’s
aim of accelerating the transition to an oil-scarce world economy. Though
the LTCP still provides the conceptual basis for the IEA’s long-term policies,
including conservation, reduction in oil imports, accelerated development ofalternative sources of energy, energy investment, and co-operative activities
in this sector, these policies have also undergone a continuous process ofevolution over the history of the Agency.
1. Conservation
IEA conservation policy as set forth in the LTCP is concerned with reducing
the rate of growth of energy and particularly of oil consumption, eliminating
waste, promoting more efficient energy utilization, and applying energy pricelevels to reduce demand for energy. Conservation policy actions moved
forward rapidly in the IEA, particularly the sharing of information andexperience in this field. In keeping with the Agency’s policy during theearly years to establish numerical objectives, conservation “targets” were
almost immediately fixed, but after a few years Members discontinued thiskind of measure.
The Governing Board’s early adoption of an indicative list of recommended conservation measures played a role in policy making, in educationof the public, and in the IEA’s periodic reviews. By 1979 the Agency
viewed conservation policy in terms of the “overall energy/economic growthratio” and of “energy efficiency”. The ratio of energy consumption to grossdomestic product, known as “energy intensity” was an important policy
indicator, but did not prove to be altogether satisfactory. Moving fromstatements of intention to more specific actions, in 1980 the IEA Ministers
adopted “lines of Action for Energy Conservation and Fuel Switching” tobe implemented in national policies. Here one of the key provisions wasappropriate energy pricing, to allow the level of energy prices to encourageconservation, as well as movement away from oil, and the development of
new sources of energy.
Since the mid-1980s the trend in IEA conservation policy has been toplace greater emphasis on market forces, although Minister stated in 1985
that the full potential for realizing energy efficiency and conservation
gains “can best be realised through market forces and government policies
complementing one another in a manner which depends on national
43

circumstances”. In more recent years, IEA conservation policy has emphasized the contributions to be made to environmental objectives, the removalof barriers to efficiency gains, the co-operation with industry, the accelerated
deployment of new technologies and the need to strengthen conservation. In
the 1993 IEA Shared Goals, Ministers stated that:
Improved energy efficiency can promote both environmental
protection and energy security in a cost-effective manner. There
are significant opportunities for greater energy efficiency at allstages of the energy cycle from production to consumption.
Strong efforts by Governments and all energy users are needed
to realise these opportunities [Goal 5].
Over the twenty year period of the IEA, the energy conservation andefficiency results are impressive: per unit of GDP, OECD energy demandfell 25 per cent, and oil demand fell 43 per cent, although total energy
consumption increased over that period [See Energy Policies of IEA Countries:
1993 Review, Table A-19, p. 568]. These results are related to structuralchanges in Member country economies and changing energy prices as well as
the effective application of energy efficiency policies and practices developed
or promoted in the IEA.
2. Direct Measures for the Reduction of Imported Oil
Since vulnerability to disruption of imported oil was the Members’ main
policy concern, there was a logical force behind the notion that as adirect response Members should adopt measures tending to restrict their oil
imports. In 1977 the IEA Members made a political commitment “to holdtheir total oil imports to not more than 26 million barrels per day in 1985”.
This Group Objective was accompanied by the IEA’s “Principles for Energy
Policy”, to be pursued in the formulation and development of national energy
policies on a large number of subjects, mostly with respect to developmentof alternative energy sources [See Chapter IV, Section D-1 below]. An
important Principle directly affecting oil imports provided that Members
should establish national programmes and policies formulated as specificallyas possible for reducing oil imports through the “expansion of indigenous
energy sources” (as well as other means).
The setting of an objective for reducing oil imports, first as a groupobjective and later as individual country ceilings, was the most direct
approach to the problem of reducing dependency on imported oil, but in44

the end that approach could not produce the desired results. Although thisobjective suffered from a lack of country-specific precision, it was seen as
a first step in a process of establishing co-ordinated control over the levelsof total IEA oil imports. In the next step, the IEA sought to break down
the group numbers into specific ceilings for each country individually. The
country-specific import ceilings were set for the year 1980, but none was set
thereafter, for they soon fell into disfavour.
The LTCP sought to encourage and protect investment in the indigenous production of energy and particularly of oil in Member countries. In
the so-called Minimum Safeguard Price (MSP) measure, Members agreed to“ensure that imported oil is not sold in their domestic markets below a pricecorresponding to US$ 7/bbI”. The $7 level was adopted at a time when
it appeared that oil producers cold reduce prices to make certain domestic
oil investments uneconomic. The MSP would maintain the minimum
price necessary to prevent that from occurring. Although initially the
MSP attracted considerable interest, after a few years this measure became
inoperative, and it has never been invoked.
The IEA has also made a number of policy statements favouring
enhanced domestic oil exploration, production, and processing, including
a strong statement in the “Principles for Energy Policy” supporting the
expansion of indigenous energy sources generally. In 1980 the IEA Ministers
recognized that “oil prices in general should reflect international oil prices”
and agreed on the need for closer monitoring and price transparency, and forthe structuring of oil and gas fiscal regimes to encourage timely action. In
1991 the Ministers encouraged the Members “to minimise declines in theirown indigenous oil production and to promote diversified investments inworldwide production”, and they confirmed this in 1993 when the Agency’s
oil production concerns reflected the IEA’s growing dependence on imported
oil once again.
The rise in imports, with most coming from the politically fragile
Middle East, was clearly discerned as presenting a new challenge of increased
vulnerability to oil supply disruptions. This would inexorably result in“short-term market instability and longer-term investment indecision”. In
1993 Ministers concluded that:. . . investment requirements in the oil sector will be substantial
over the next decades and the supply response to meet the
expected upsurge in oil demand could be improved by greater
predictability in the policy framework.
Recognising theimportance of adequate oil production and refining capacity for45

achieving security and environmental goals, Ministers call on
IEA to closely monitor and analyse capacity developments inparticular the effects of environmental constraints on refining
capacity, from both a regional and a global perspective.
In the 1993 IEA Shared Goals, parallel lines of policy concerningindigenous oil production are assumed. Measures affecting those lines ofpolicy include the emphasis on free and open markets and on energy security
as underlying objectives.
3. Alternatives to Oil: Energy Diversity
The early IEA measures in support of alternative energy sources were heavily
influenced by government intervention notions, particularly with respect to
the Group Objectives, the country ceilings for the reduction of oil imports,
and the minimum safeguard price for imported oil. Although thosemeasures would in effect disappear in the early 1980s, they represented
for energy investment policy an altogether different approach from the freemarket concepts which have since provided the mainspring for IEA policy
making. The Members’ 1977 Group Objective was accompanied by the
IEA’s “Principles for Energy Policy”, which call for the formulation anddevelopment of national energy policies on the following subjects:






Establishment of national programmes and policies formulated as
specifically as possible for reducing oil imports through the conservation of energy, the expansion of indigenous energy sources, and oil
substitution.
Speedy procedures to reconcile conflicts arising between energy policies
and other concerns in the environmental, safety, regional and security
fields.
The pricing of energy in domestic markets at levels which encourageconservation and stimulate supply.
Vigorous conservation policies using price mechanisms, efficiency
standards and increased investment.

The Principles also stated Members’ commitments on fuel switching,
the active promotion of coal, the priority uses for natural gas, thesteady expansion of nuclear power, the stronger support for research anddevelopment, and the establishment of a favourable investment climate.
These comrephensive Principles provided the Agency’s leading standing46

statement on energy policies until the IEA Governing Board adopted theIEA Shared Goals in 1993.

Coal
Coal has been a leading energy source because of its promise in contributing
significantly to the reduction of dependence on imported oil, and particularly
because of the ample availability of coal in many industrialized countries. In
the IEA’s 1977 “Principles for Energy Policy”, a “strong steam coal utilisation
strategy and active promotion of an expanded and reliable international tradein steam coal” were announced. In 1979 the Agency adopted comprehensive
Principles for IEA Action on Coal which stated policies on coal production,use, and trade, together with coal policy review procedures and coal industry
advisory arrangements, all of which remain in force today.
The IEA Coal Principles protect the expansion of international tradeand investment in coal from new restrictive measures and favour energy
pricing policies that would allow coal to “develop its full competitive
power”. There are also policy provisions favouring long-term supply
arrangements, greater certainty about national coal policies, environmental
considerations, and restrictions on oil-fired capacity for electricity generation.
The Coal Principles also support coal facilities and other policies favouring
the expansion of coal use.
Although environmental concerns were quietly but firmly reflected in
IEA coal (and other energy source) policy from the outset, in 1985 IEA
Ministers adopted the principle that “just as the formulation of energy
policy should give due weight to environmental consideration, so should
environmental policy give due weight to energy policy considerations”. This
type of formulation has largely maintained its force in IEA policy with regard
to coal and other energy sources since that time. Active environmental
opposition to coal expansion policy has been a constant IEA preoccupation.
The Agency has confirmed that the large number of suppliers andother factors assure adequate coal supply. However, there exist continuing
problems, including those relating to subsidies for high-cost coal production
and other protection measures for domestic production, as well as the
problem of meeting climate change and other environmental concerns. Yet
the overall desirability of adequate production, trade, and use of coal remains
a matter of policy concern. Strong support for coal as an alternative to oil isseen most recently in the emphasis which IEA Ministers have placed on the“Diversity, efficiency and flexibility within the energy sector” in the first IEA
Shared Goal, as well as in the other Goals adopted in 1993.
47

Natural Gas
As demand for natural gas increased after the founding of the IEA, security
concerns about reliance upon single suppliers of natural gas and about
accidents, break downs, and other disruption possibilities attracted Members’
policy interest. This interest in natural gas was already rising rapidly in
1979, when IEA Minister stressed the importance of natural gas and agreed
on the need to encourage both indigenous production and international
trade in natural gas.
Following the dissemination of the Secretariat’s policy work on naturalgas, the stage was set for the major decisions on natural gas security whichwere taken in the course of 1983, when IEA Ministers emphasized theimportance of gas security, particularly with respect to Soviet source supply
to Western Europe [See Section D above]. IEA policy has stressed theimportance of expeditious development of indigenous OECD energy resources
and has urged that steps be taken to ensure that no “one producer” could
exercise monopoly power over Members’ supply of natural gas. In 1991
ministers noted that “natural gas is a relatively clean fuel and that demandfor it is expected to grow rapidly in most IEA countries”. They added that
“ a commercial approach to the development of more open and competitivemarkets would ensure the exploration, development and production” ofnatural gas resources. The IEA Shared Goals, adopted in 1993, make no
specific reference to natural gas as such, but include a number of general
Goals which bear directly on natural gas as an energy commodity. The
essential point for natural gas is that it could play a role well beyond its
present applications in various energy sectors, such as electricity generationand heating and transport, with clear environmental advantages. As IEA
policy aims at overcoming the natural and man-made barriers to such wider
use of natural gas and particularly in electricity generation, this fuel may beseen as a continuing subject of IEA policy actions.

Nuclear Energy
Since nuclear fuel supply is assured by the existence of abundant andwidespread uranium reserves held mostly in OECD countries, the IEA
undertook the accelerated development of nuclear power without serious
concerns about the security of supply, although there were concerns about
the familiar problems of nuclear safety, waste disposal and non-proliferation.
When IEA Ministers in 1977 made the first of a consistent series ofstatements supporting the expansion of nuclear energy use, there was48

evidence of a lack of consensus on all but the most general statements ofthat support. In recognizing the important role nuclear energy would haveto play, Ministers noted that “some Participating Countries had reservations
due to specific domestic political situations” [Emphasis added]. In 1979
the acceptability of nuclear power was weakened by the accident at theThree Mile Island facility in the United States. This development would
later combine with the ChernobyI accident in the Soviet Union in 1986
to impair the acceptability of nuclear power expansion, which continues
in 1994. In the intervening years IEA policy emphasized nuclear safety,
the environmental advantages of nuclear power, and the need for further
education of the public on this energy source. A decline in nuclear power
projection levels and a reduction of public confidence in nuclear power
combined to stimulate in 1979 a strong Ministerial response for building
public support for nuclear energy. The IEA retained the established policy of
supporting nuclear power, but it also recognized the urgent need for effective
safety systems to minimize the possibility of nuclear plant accidents.
In the diversified mix of fuels for the production of electricity, a needfor nuclear power continued, despite the absence of consensus among IEAMembers concerning the use of nuclear power in their countries. This isclearly confirmed in the major IEA policy statements of 1991 and 1993,
although the focus shifted then to greater emphasis on the environmental
advantage of relatively pollution-free electricity production, compared to oiland coal fuelled power stations. Nuclear power is promoted in the 1993
IEA Shared Goals, where Goal 1 refers to the contribution of nuclear power
to energy diversity, and Goal 4 includes the statement that “A number of IEA
Members wish to retain and improve the nuclear option for the future, atthe highest available safety standards, because nuclear energy does not emit
carbon dioxide”. Other Shared Goals, for example those on R & D, free andopen trade, and co-operation among energy market participants, will also
have future applications to nuclear energy.

Hydroelectricity and Other Renewables
Renewable sources of energy, particularly hydroelectricity, play an importantrole in a number of countries and have received considerable policy attention
in the IEA. Although other renewables, such as solar, biomass, wind,geothermal, ocean and tidal energy, have played a lesser role, they have all
been the subject of intense interest in energy R & D. By 1985, environment
concerns had quickened the interest in renewables generally, as seen in the
Ministerial commitment to promote “renewable sources of energy which are49

environmentally acceptable and competitive”. Despite their recognition of
the physical limitations and environmental constraints on new hydropower
facilities, Ministers continue to support this energy source.
In the future, more important contributions can be expected from therenewables, and Ministers agreed in 1993 “on the need for continued strong
government support and international collaboration” in this sector. The
IEA Shared Goals speak of the need for diversity, efficiency, and flexibility
in the energy sector. Goal 1 refers to hydro power, among others, andgives a priority status to economic non-fossil fuel sources. In Goal 4 onenvironmentally acceptable energy sources, Ministers stated that “Renewablesources will also have an increasingly important contribution to make”. Still
greater recognition of the possible future role of these energy sources may be
expected while they increase in economic viability as substitutes for relatively
less benign alternatives.

Electricity
Since 1960 electricity generation in OECD countries has more then quadrupled. Its strong growth continues, giving rise to the need for substantial
new generating capacity in the future. While early IEA policy was dedicatedto oil, to the other primary energy sources employed to produce electricity,and to efficiency in the use of electricity, since the mid-1980s this focus
has broadened beyond the underlying primary fuels and efficiency to theparticulars of electricity generally, including its environmental and energy
security aspects.
The objective of promoting electricity trade and competition without
endangering security of supply emerged in the 1991 IEA policy statement.
Ministers “agreed to remove impediments to electricity trade where present”
and also agreed that “flexible generating capacity and diversified fuel sources
will be required”. Limitation of any generating option would increasedemand for other sources “and thus potentially reduce energy diversity
and security”. The following year the IEA published Electricity Supply
in the OECD, which referred to the increasing challenges to electricity
generators, such as tightened environmental standards, ever-changing rules,
and limited supply choices in this sector; and all of these raised questionsof availability and price.
The 1993 IEA Shared Goals made no reference to electricity as such,
but a number of the Goals affect electricity policy. An important example
is Goal 1 on diversity, efficiency and flexibility, where the contribution of
non-fossil fuels, “particularly nuclear and hydro power” is noted. Other
50

Goals also reflect themes which relate to the IEA’s electricity policies andactions. The IEA’s most recent specific policy statement on electricity was
made by Ministers in 1993 as follows:
Electricity demand in OECD countries continues to grow steadily
and substantial new generating capacity and energy efficiency
gains from demand-side management practices will be required
over the next several decades. Thus, greater efforts are needed
to win public understanding and co-operation for the sitingof new facilities and investments in efficiency to meet future
demand, while continuing efforts to mitigate environment effects.
Enhanced electricity interconnection and trade offer many
security of supply, economic efficiency and, in certain instances,environmental advantages.

Energy Trade and Investment
Energy trade and investment objectives of the IEA touch all leading alternative energy sectors discussed above. The Agency has considered overall that
free and open trade and a favourable climate to investment, in Member aswell as in non-Member countries, are vital to the realization of the more
specific sectoral objectives and policies. Among the leading IEA energy tradeand investment issues in the mid-1970s were “legislative and administrative
obstacles and discriminatory practices”, which were the subject of Chapter Vof the LTCP. All IEA Members except Canada and Australia have accepted
Chapter V which remains operational in 1994 and contains provisions on
identifying and removing legislative and administrative measures which
impair the achievement of the overall objectives of the Programme. These
provisions also refer to “national treatment” for all nationals of IEA Members,
particularly with regard to energy investments, the purchase and sale ofenergy, and the enforcement of competition rules.
Most recently, IEA policy in this sector is stated in the 1993 IEA Shared
Goals which emphasized the establishment of “free and open markets” forenergy, as well asFree and open trade and a secure framework for investment
contribute to efficient energy markets and energy security.
Distortions to energy trade and investment should be avoided[Goal 8].
51

As provided in Goal 9, co-operation and “flexible energy systems andmarkets worldwide” are “needed to help promote the investment, trade andconfidence necessary to achieve global energy security and environmental
objectives” [Emphasis added].
The European Energy Charter process has produced on these subjects
a parallel declaration to which all IEA Members except New Zealand havesubscribed, and the Energy Charter Treaty which was successfully negotiatedin 1994. The Energy Charter Treaty and its Protocol on Energy Efficiency and
Related Environmental Aspects were initially signed in Lisbon on 17 December
1994 on behalf of forty-one and thirty-nine states respectively, including
all but five IEA Members, and on behalf of the European Communities.
The Charter process grew out of a realization in mid-1990 that special
opportunities were arising particularly in Central and Eastern Europe andthe Former Soviet Union after the end of the Cold War for IEA countries
to enter into mutually advantageous energy relations with governments in
those areas. In 1991 and again in 1993, IEA Ministers gave their support
to this energy trade and investment process, although the IEA has not itself
become a party to either of the two instruments. The Charter states broad
policy in terms which are not legally binding. However, the Charter Treaty
is “designed to promote East-West industrial co-operation by providing legal
safeguards in areas such as investment, transit and trade”, to stimulate theflow of investment, capital, goods, and energy, and the Treaty creates acontinuing organizational structure for this purpose. Signature of the Charter
Treaty is shifting the IEA Members’ focus from the essentially soft or nonlegally binding nature of their trade and investment commitments to legal
obligations taken in a treaty formally binding under international law.

F.

Energy and the Environment:
A Major Policy ForceThe IEA has viewed environment policy across the entire spectrum ofenergy options, not only to enhance protection of the environment, but also
to avoid unnecessary or disproportionate constraints on energy policy wherea potential conflict with environment policy might occur. IEA concerns inthis field extend to conditions in IEA countries and in other countries: inCentral and Eastern Europe and in the New Independent States in partfor historical reasons, and in developing countries facing the environmental
problems of rapid expansion of industrial activity and increased energy52consumption. Throughout the world environmental concerns are a potential
constraint on the use of oil, coal, and other energies presenting adverse
effects, while these concerns tend to support policies promoting energy
efficiency, natural gas, nuclear power, non-polluting renewable energies, andrelevant energy R & D programmes. Environmental policies are now amajor components of energy policy generally.
Although environmental policy was featured in the I.E.P. Agreementin 1974 and was the subject of early IEA actions, in the coal andnuclear sectors, for example, the Agency maintained a relatively low profile
approach to environmental questions until 1985, when Ministers adopted
comprehensive policies on “Energy and the Environment”. The Ministers
first adopted general principles that energy production, conversion, transport,
and consumption should be carried out in an “environmentally acceptablemanner”, that solutions to the environmental problems are fundamental tothe maintenance of “adequate, economic and secure supplies of energy”,
and that “Ministers will therefore promote actively in their energy policies
those lines of action which advance the objectives of both energy andenvironmental policy; paying particular attention to the development of newenvironmentally favourable energy technologies and to the efficient use andconservation of energy”. Additional principles referred to “improvementof the energy mix, energy security, and minimisation of costs as well asprotection of the environment” as factors to be taken into account in
the formulation of energy policy. When these factors conflict, a balancemust be struck between them, “both nationally and internationally”, andresulting decisions may “differ between countries according to their energy
mix and degree of pollution”. More specifically the IEA adopted policies
on environment, energy efficiency, and conservation (emphasizing “economic
energy pricing”), R & D (including improved energy technologies on aeconomic basis), and the Polluter Pays Principle (and its application toenergy). The policy of giving energy due consideration was delineatedclearly: “just as the formulation of energy policy should give due weight
to environmental considerations, so should environmental policy give due
weight to energy policy considerations”. Other policies included the principle
stating the need for comparable progress in all Member countries, taking
account of flexibility, environmental conditions, and prior progress over theyears. Ministers recognized that the foregoing actions would “affect all
aspects of the work on energy demand and the future energy mix, butparticularly the work on conservation, coal and nuclear energy”.
The next IEA Ministerial policy statement on energy and theenvironment confirmed the Ministers’ earlier work in this field, and in 1989
Ministers stressed “the need for integrated policies which further energy
53security, environmental protection and economic growth”. A major growing
concern in 1989 was global warming and climate change. IEA Ministers
spoke out on “the complexity and uncertainties of the relationships between
greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels and atmospheric concentrations
and consequent climate change, as well as the world wide dimensions
and implications of these issues”. Since these emissions arise not only in
IEA countries, but also in a large and growing proportion of non-Member
countries (with all countries being affected), Ministers stressed a “highdegree of international co-operation” and “the need to pursue greater
scientific understanding, to assess the kinds of policy responses which may
be necessary, and to implement them on a global scale”. Ministers also
supported the IEA’s participation in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) and the IEA’s work in the quite different field of “preventing
and treating oil spills and other accidents in the petroleum production,transportation and processing system”. They pledged to proceed prudently
in the face of uncertainty, and cautioned against quick solutions in theseareas.
In the ensuing years the basic elements of the IEA’s established policies
were restated and new features were added. By 1990 the IEA had publishedthe “broad brush” study entitled Energy and the Environment — Policy
Overview on long-term impacts and policy choices, and it had contributed to
the IPCC, to the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on a Framework
Convention on Climate Change (INC), and to environment work on theeconomies of Central and Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation, and Asia.
In 1993 the global climate change issue continued to pose a challenge toenergy policy makers, requiring greater efforts overall and the reflectionof “external costs of energy production” in energy prices. Members supported energy efficiency, for which market forces ought to have priority to
produce the environmental benefits of energy efficiency gains, and for which“innovative and bold approaches are required by governments, in cooperation with industry”.
Ministers noted that some Members favoured the advantage of nuclear
power in emitting no sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, or greenhouse gases,
yet the division of opinion among IEA countries on the use of nuclear power
continued [See Section E above]. Ministers acknowledged “the need tofurther integrate environmental objectives into national energy technology
research, development and demonstration programmes”. Co-operations with
non-Members received a higher IEA priority because of the expected futurerole of those countries in CO2 emissions growth control. This led to a request
for the IEA to assess “joint implementation” with non-Member countries in54

the process of IEA support to the objectives of the Framework Convention
on Climate Change, and Members were asked to strengthen their bilateral
co-operation with non-Members to this end.
In adopting the 1993 “IEA Shared Goals”, IEA Ministers strengthened
the Agency’s environment commitment and confirmed its policy approach,as reflected in Goals 3 and 4:
3.

The environmentally sustainable provision and use ofenergy is central to the achievement of these sharedgoals. Decision-makers should seek to minimise theadverse environmental impacts of energy activities, just as
environmental decisions should take account of the energy
consequences. Government interventions should wherepracticable have regard to the Polluter Pays Principle.

4.

More environmentally acceptable energy sources need to
be encouraged and developed. Clean and efficient use offossil fuels is essential. The development of economic
non-fossil sources is also a priority. A number of IEA
members wish to retain and improve the nuclear option
for the future, at the highest available safety standards,
because nuclear energy does not emit carbon dioxide.
Renewable sources will also have an increasingly important
contribution to make.

The comprehensive IEA Shared Goals contain other provisions which
respond less directly to environmental concerns, yet do affect them, forexample: Goal 1 on diversity, efficiency, and flexibility within the energy
sector; Goal 5 on improved energy efficiency; Goal 6 on research anddevelopment; Goal 7 on undistorted energy prices; Goal 8 on free and open
trade; and Goal 9 on co-operation among all energy market participants.
These Principles reflect the IEA’s policies on energy and the environment asthey have evolved and strengthened over the years.
In an informal Ministerial “brainstorming” session early in 1994 onenergy and the environment, Ministers gave policy direction for IEA workon energy related greenhouse gas emissions. Policy was seen as moving in
the direction of a mix of responses to climate change, in the context of free
and open market and without the adoption of new trade restrictions in thename of environmental protection. Within the energy security conceptual
framework, environmental considerations must now be seen as likely tocontinue as a major determinant of IEA energy policy generally.
55

G. Research and Development:
The Still Longer-Term
The case for international co-operation on energy R & D could not be ignored
under the conditions prevailing after the 1973-1974 crisis. The long-term
policies of Members would require R & D support in the improvement oftechnologies in energy conservation, nuclear safety, fossil fuels, substitutes
for oil and other energy areas. Moreover, major contributions might bederived from a wide range of “New Technologies”, including those exploitinghydrogen fuel, advanced geothermal energy, fast breeder nuclear reactors,
nuclear fusion, and the renewable energies (solar, wind, ocean and biomass).
The many advantages of co-operation in R & D helped to set the stage
not only for the increased development of energy R & D in IEA Member
countries and in the many IEA R & D collaborative projects, but also forthe linkage of energy R & D with the industrial countries’ broader energy
policies and objectives.
During the period of 1976 to 1980, the Agency developed a “Group
Strategy” for energy R & D, designed to guide Members as to the potential
contributions and probable time scale of technology options, and to lead tothe development of viable and productive energy policy options. The study
assessed the relative importance of individual technologies, estimated targets
for the energy impacts to be achieved, provided a tool for developing andassessing national R & D policies and plans, and identified non-technology
issues which could affect the ability of the new technologies to contributeto energy requirements. The Strategy also recommended specific priorities
in the leading areas of energy R & D. This was the first in a series ofstrategy studies which have been undertaken on a continuous basis in orderto maintain the most current analytical support for Members’ decisions
in this sector.
In 1980 IEA Ministers endorsed this work and declared in theCommunique that they would attach greater political importance to energy
research, development, and demonstration, as well as commercializationof new technologies. A High Level Group was formed to undertake astudy on commercialization and the technology aspects of the policy oftransition to minimum oil economies. This Group’s report the following year
identified those individual commercial scale projects with a high probabilityof realization that were planned for completion by 1990 in the areas of Tar
Sands and Heavy Oils, Oil Shales, Coal Liquefaction, Coal Gasification, New
Coal Combustion Technologies, Fuels from Biomass and Liquid Fuels fromNatural Gas. Although IEA Ministers, meeting in 1981, endorsed that report,56

within one year the marked reduction in many countries in expenditure
on commercialization raised questions about “whether private investment
would be available to provide adequate and timely development of sometechnologies that have high costs and long lead times”.
In the mid-1980s a new policy study concluded that energy R & D
should be geared to energy security objectives and should seek to support
oil and gas supplies, to safeguard against supply disruptions, to promote
efficiency, to encourage environmental protection, and to support long-term
energy options. The Study developed a body of criteria for investmentin this sector, and noted the differences between the national interestsof governments and the views of industry. International collaboration
was found to offer particular advantages in a number of technologies,
especially where an “active programme of information sharing” best served
implementation, high technical risks existed, or the design, development,
construction, and operation of a high-cost facility were sought. Other
advantageous situations for international work included those in whichcollaboration would increase the efficiency and/or pace of R & D or thosein which unique trans-boundary implications were present. While the Study
confirmed the IEA policy of strong government commitments to maintaining
overall energy R D & D investment, it concluded that
Significant energy R D & D initiatives have been undertaken
since 1973-1974, with mixed results. Some have resulted
in technological advances, some have achieved commercial
application, while others have demonstrated the inability offinancial resources alone to assure technical or economic success.
The 1985 Ministerial Conclusions also contained decisions on future
R & D work in the IEA, which should ensure that an efficient process exists
for joint programme planning discussions, bilaterally and multilaterally.
The IEA should also “identify national barriers to collaboration” and“recommend measures for consideration by Member countries to reducesuch obstacles”. The IEA Ministerial Communiqué in 1991 reflected theSecretariat’s study known as “Energy Technology Strategy 21” in statingthatSpecial emphasis should be placed on those technologies which
enhance diversity, efficiency and safety, extend and improve
prospects for utilising reserves of conventional fossil fuels, andmake available new and alternative energy sources.
57

Ministers also agreed that if the global challenges are to be met, R & D
programmes should reflect the “integration of energy and environmental
goals”, particularly in such areas as renewables, nuclear power systems,
innovative conservation technologies, CO2 capture and utilization, and fossil
utilization. The Communique emphasized the need for “development anddiffusion into the market” of new and improved technologies on a global
basis [Emphasis added]. The preparation and dissemination of IEA R & D
studies as well as conferences, symposia and workshops continued at a rapid
pace during this period, giving a higher priority than before to environmental
issues, with particular attention to energy technology dissemination policies
and mechanisms and to market deployment of new and improved energy
technologies.
In 1993 IEA Ministers gave emphasis to the role of energy
R & D in contributing to the realization of environmental objectives,
particularly technology promotion by governments, intensified energy technology co-operation among Members and with non-Members of the Agency,
and further integration of energy and the environment in national
programmes. Ministers declared that “Access by individual developing
countries and economies in transition to modern, cost-effective energy
technologies appropriate to local circumstances will promote sustainable
development”. They concluded that the “Adoption of clean, efficienttechnologies throughout the world” will help reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, and they called upon the IEA to step up its development ofinternational co-operation in this technology area.
In 1993 IEA energy R & D policy was also directly stated in the“IEA Shared Goals”:
Continued research, development and market deployment of
new and improved energy technologies make a criticalcontribution to achieving the objectives outlined above. Energy
technology policies should complement broader energy policies.
International co-operation in the development anddissemination of energy technologies, including industry
participation and co-operation with non-Member countries,
should be encouraged.
IEA R & D policy analysis is most recently reflected in the IEA/OECD
publication Scoping Study: Energy and Environmental Technologies to
Respond to Global Climate Change Concerns (1994) which broadened
previous assessment work and brought a sharper focus on climate
58

change and related problems. This Study examines factors influencing technological development, technology options and strategies, and national andinternational efforts to enhance co-operation in this field.

H.

The Oil Market:
Transparency and Dissemination

The need for Members to have access to international oil market
information, reflected in the IEA’s “general oil market information system”,
was one of the compelling reasons why the industrial countries decided toestablish the Agency in the aftermath of the 1973-1974 oil crisis. In thismarket, the founders sought to bring about “transparency” and to makerelevant: oil market information available to IEA Members and to the public.
The main sources of such information at the outset were the oil industry
and the industrial governments, and that remains the case in 1994, although
the number and diversity of sources have increased notably over the years.
While the Agency gathers from these sources the information it requires incarrying out its missions, the IEA also disseminates oil industry information.
The dissemination, which takes place as required within the Agency and to
Members, enables the Agency to do its work in the oil market sector andserves the needs of the general public as well.
With the assistance of the oil industry, the IEA developed in its earlyyears a number of oil market information systems for which information was
supplied by industry to governments, which in turn supplied the information
with appropriate security arrangements to the IEA. The IEA’s 1979 Crude
Oil Import Register is the chief survivor of these information systems. Its
main objective is to provide data to be used essentially in three ways:(1) for both Members and the Secretariat, to enhance their understandingof oil price developments and patterns in general; (2) when necessary, tocontribute to the base for analysis of short-term price developments andoil quality changes; and (3) to be utilized in the IEA quarterly publication
entitled Energy Prices and Taxes as well as in the monthly Oil Market
Report. This Register has been updated a number of times to adjust tochanges in market structure or to make it more realistic or easier to manage.
Important new crude oil streams have been added to the Register as
required. The break-up of the Former Soviet Union and the subsequent
increase in crude oil export streams from its territory have been reflected in59the provision of separate categories for each of the main exporting Republics.
On a broader basis, in 1993 sulphur content data was also introduced
in order to provide information relevant to environmental standards andrefinery emissions.
Throughout its history, the IEA has followed the policy of obtaining oil
market information and advice on information arrangements directly fromthe international oil industry as well as from Member governments. Whileindustry advice in the Agency’s early years was supplied by an Industry
Working Party (IWP), and in formal consultations as provided in the I.E.P.
Agreement, as well as in bilateral contacts with industry sources, in more
recent years the direct bilateral contacts have been enlarged to become amost productive means of obtaining information from industry and othersources.
IEA policy promotes dissemination of oil market information in avariety of ways, with the publication of this information receiving highpriority because it normally provides the broadest and most rapid coverage.
The IEA publishes the oil and gas and other energy series taken overfrom the OECD shortly after the formation of the IEA as well as other oilmarket materials developed by the Agency. The Agency’s current oil market
assessments are made known notably in the IEA’s monthly Oil Market Reportwhich the Agency has published for over a decade.
The Oil Market Report grew out of the practice of regular Secretariat
reports to the Governing Board on the short-term outlook for the international oil market, containing the Secretariat’s views on the general situationand major developments, on oil supply and demand, and on prices for crude
oil and products. Over the years the Secretariat has refined the Reports in
the interest of greater scope, precision, and clarity. Since the April 1991
issue, the Reports on the oil supply/demand balance have been presented
on a “truly global basis”, as a result in part of the breakdown of barriers
between Eastern and Western Europe and the availability of adequate dataand estimates. Much greater attention is now devoted to oil supply anddemand in Latin America, the Asia-Pacific region, and Africa. The Reports
have been expanded to provide greater detail as to countries, regions andproducts, seasonally adjusted changes in demand, structural changes, cyclicalchanges, and features of particular topical interest. There is now publisheddetail on world oil production, prices, stocks and other global oil market
elements of current interest. The Reports have become a standard forgovernments and industry, as an authoritative source of the best available
oil market information, and the Agency has come to serve as an informal“clearinghouse” for that information.
60

I.

Globalisation and Non-Members

From the outset the Agency’s policy approach was outward looking,particularly with respect to relations with the oil producing countries andother consumers, as clearly provided in the I.E.P. Agreement and in otherearly policy declarations and actions. The IEA bodies responsible for nonMember country relations have functioned principally as the IEA’s focal point
for exchange of information on this subject among the Members, and as acaucus point for Members to share and develop their energy policies.
There were high hopes for a constructive producer-consumer dialogue
in the early years of the Agency, which led up to the Conference on
International Economic Co-operation (the CIEC or North-South Conference)
held in Paris in 1976-1977. In December 1974 the Governing Board gave
top priority to the definition of a common position of Members on the crucial
issues in the CIEC, including the general “concept” of the dialogue, the priceof oil, and the security of supply. The IEA participated as an observerin the Conference and provided the principal caucus and briefing point
for its Members. After almost two years of preparations and Conference
meetings, the CIEC produced only meagre and disappointing results. The
participants were unable to agree on the most important issues, including
the price of energy and the continuing consultations on energy. Despite
this disappointing outcome in the CIEC, the IEA continued afterwards tomaintain its policy objective of carrying out a constructive dialogue with theoil producer countries, but the focus was shifted by the CIEC to the problemsof the developing countries, particularly as presented in the United Nations.
In this phase the IEA could offer political support, including the promotionof indigenous energy production, augmented by energy assessments andplanning, the conduct of energy data workshops, the granting of access toenergy R & D projects, and the provision of information and training, but
not costly development assistance. In recent years, energy developmentsin these countries are taking on still greater IEA policy importance as theyplay a larger role in energy consumption and contribute increasingly to theglobal environment problems.
The Agency has continued to broaden its focus to increase its alreadyestablished interest in the global dimensions of energy, as the IEA’s pursuitof energy security is enlarged, as non-Member countries play a larger rolein energy demand and in environmental questions, as energy supplies comeincreasingly from those countries, and as many non-Members draw closer
to the OECD world. Although this interest extends to the oil producing
countries and developing countries as before, the globalisation of IEA policy
61has brought greater attention to energy questions in Central and Eastern
Europe, Latin America, the Asia-Pacific region and Africa. Systematic IEA
policy work increased with the dramatic political and economic changes inCentral and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and has continued to growthrough the period of this History.
As part of the globalisation of the IEA’s outlook during the early
1990s, an opportunity arose for more systematic IEA contacts with the oil
producer countries to promote communication and understanding, market
transparency, and efficiency. The IEA supported these contacts which were
designed not to take up energy production volumes and price determination,
for they were to be left to market forces. Inaugurating a new and different
pattern of “dialogue” in 1991, three Ministerial or political level meetingsof producers and consumers have been convened by host governments,
and three meetings of experts from these groups and from other interested
participants have been convened in Paris by the IEA. The meetings haveconsidered a wide range of current energy policy subjects, including the
global energy policy inter-relationship, the common energy future, energy
co-operation among producers and consumers, energy and the environment,
energy investment, and energy efficiency. At this stage these meetings haveproduced useful but not dramatic outcomes. Early in 1995 the continuationof these meetings could be forseen.
Like most other subjects of major IEA policy interest, the Agency’s
approach to non-Member questions was featured in the 1993 IEA Shared
Goals. In the introduction to the Goals, IEA Ministers stated the globalisation
policy quite broadly:
IEA countries recognise the significance of increasing global
interdependence in energy. They therefore seek to promote theeffective operation of international energy markets and encourage
dialogue with all participants [Emphasis added].
In Goal 9, Ministers spoke more specifically:
Co-operation among all energy market participants helps
to improve information and understanding, and encourage
the development of efficient, environmentally acceptable andflexible energy systems and markets worldwide. These areneeded to help promote the investment, trade and confidence
necessary to achieve global energy security and environmental
objectives.
62

These objectives in non-Member relations have already given impetus to athorough policy review within the IEA. In 1992 and 1994, they produced
initiatives for bringing non-Members into closer relations with the Agency
by means of new and more inclusive approaches to their participation in
IEA meetings and other events, their participation in the Agency's energy
R & D projects and meetings, and their access to IEA statistical services.
The Agency also envisages more extensive contacts to assist non-Members
in developing energy strategies and adopting policies that would “contributeto their development and enhance global energy security”. In 1993 IEA
Ministers saw this as a “balanced approach”, which extends to considerationof qualified countries for membership in the Agency, and in 1994 theGoverning Board approved procedures and criteria for membership in the
Agency. Together with environmental concerns, this inclusive non-Member
policy will doubtless continue to provide a strong influence on IEA policyin the years ahead.

J.

Looking to the Future:
Freer Markets and Shared Goals

Notwithstanding the numerous IEA achievements over the past twenty years,
none of the major energy policy problems which gave rise to the IEA has
been definitively resolved. The constant evolution of energy markets and ofMembers’ policy demands has changed the economic and political context
in which the IEA operates, but the fundamental problems persist. A current
example of this process appears in the following passage of the IEA’s 1994
World Energy Outlook.
World demand for primary energy will continue growing, at an
average annual rate of 2.1 per cent. By 2010, the world will be
consuming 48 per cent more energy than it was in 1991. WorldGDP is expected to be more than 70 per cent higher in 2010
than it was in 1991. It is this underlying assumption of economic
growth which, more than any other factor, is the reason for the
inexorable increase in energy demand.
In the OECD, energy consumption could increase by 28 percent between now and 2010; and oil demand could increase
to some 45 million barrels per day, up 18 per cent over 1991
consumption of about 38 million barrels. This rise in oil
63demand, at an average rate of 0.8 per cent per annum, occurs
entirely in the transport sector. With the long-term gradualdecline in OECD oil production expected to continue, imported
oil, which met 58 per cent of OECD oil requirements in 1991,
could account for close to 70 per cent of OECD oil demand by
2010. This represents a rise in oil imports of some 9 million
barrels per day, an increase which will likely have to be met
primarily by the major Middle East producers and Venezuela.
Production in these countries will have to double over the next
sixteen to seventeen years to meet expected world oil demand.
The forecast increase in energy and oil demand in [the rest of
the world] is expected to be even more pronounced than in
the OECD. In these countries, particularly in China and the
dynamic economies of East Asia . . . , growth in energy use
could be more than 4 per cent per annum on average over theoutlook period [Page 18].
Such rapid growth in oil consumption and increased dependence of thegrowing number of industrial countries upon imported oil echo the conditions
which led to the 1973-1974 oil crisis, suggesting again an unacceptable
vulnerability to oil supply disruptions continuing for years into the future.
But such vulnerability need not be destructive in the years to come, if thenecessary energy policy measures are taken in time. Hence it should come asno surprise that the search for “energy security”, the principal objective of the
IEA’s founders in establishing the Agency in 1974, may be expected to remain
firmly established as a main determinant of future energy policies.
The Agency’s ever sharpening focus on new energy policy requirements,
developed in the forum function of the Agency, is already visible in the Agency’s
work on freer markets and on IEA Shared Goals. Among the main free market
issues being considered in the IEA are deregulation, reduced government
interventions in markets and particularly in respect of price, privatization,
greater competition, and the increased productivity of undertakings in theenergy sector.
The overall policy thrusts for the IEA were stated in the IEA Ministerial
Communique in these words: “Ministers believe that global economic
development, energy security and environmental protection will be enhanced
if all nations of the world subscribe to the goals which the IEA countries
share”. These words were translated into “IEA Shared Goals” and wereadopted by IEA Ministers on 4 June 1993 with the following themes:
64Diversity, efficiency and flexibility within the energy
sector.
Systems for prompt and flexible responses to energy
emergencies and joint responses through the IEA in thecase of oil supply emergencies.
Environmentally sustainable provision and use of energy,
with minimization of adverse environmental impacts andwith energy security considerations taken into account.
Improved energy efficiency.
Continued R & D and marketing of new and improved
energies.
Undistorted energy prices.
Free and open energy trade and a secure framework forinvestment.
Co-operation among all energy market participants.
These Goals constitute the best comprehensive formulation of future policy
directions of the Agency and its Members. On a more conceptual level, Mrs.
Steeg recently stated these essentials:
First, it is important to be vigilant — to safeguard our energy
security. One can never predict what type of emergency may
arise, as the Gulf Crisis demonstrated. In addition, we must
continue to have the will and resolve for international cooperation, along with a preparedness for compromising andconsensus. It is also clear that the role of governments in theenergy sector will continue to be important, since the market
alone can meet most but not all the challenges. Flexible energy
sectors in my view are the best guardians against unforeseenchallenges and risks. Last but certainly not least, we must notforget the pivotal role that new technologies play and we must
continue to pursue their development and public acceptanceof them [Remarks at a special seminar on “The IEA in the
21st Century: Challenges and Prospects” in commemoration of
the 20th Anniversary of the IEA, held in Kyoto, Japan on 14
April 1994].
65

66

CHAPTER III

IEA Oil Security:
The Core of Energy SecurityT

he main objective of the IEA’s founders in establishing the Agency wasto ensure their “energy security”, with emphasis on oil security, on aworkable and reliable co-operative basis, and this remains the casetoday. In 1993 IEA Executive Director Helga Steeg defined energy
security in terms of “diversified supplies of energy being available ataffordable prices to help economies continue to grow” [Remarks at
The Second World Coal Institute Conference, London, 25 March 1993].
The initial content of the security objective can be discerned in
the 1974. I.E.P. Agreement, particularly in the first four Chapters of theAgreement where the main principles are set forth. Over the ensuing twenty
years, the Governing Board’s actions focused sharply upon the specificpolicies, procedures, and mechanisms designed to realize the energy security
objective. In both the I.E.P. Agreement and Governing Board actions, energy
security extends to responses to short-run oil emergencies (taken up in this
Chapter) and to long-term ameliorative solutions to the broader problemsof reducing oil import dependence and energy policy which have tended
increasingly to the understood and developed as part of energy security
policy (long-term policies are taken up in Chapter IV below).

A.

Oil Security Policies and Systems

In the Preamble to the I.E.P. Agreement, the founders of the Agency statedquite clearly the importance of policy on short-term oil supply disruptions
and the high priority to be assigned to it, as appears in the first two
paragraphs:
DESIRING to promote secure oil supplies on reasonable and equitableterms,
67

DETERMINED to take common effective measures to meet oil
supply emergencies by developing an emergency self-sufficiency
in oil supplies, restraining demand and allocating available oilamong their countries on an equitable basis.
The Preamble also stated that IEA governments were convinced that theobjectives “can only be reached through continued co-operative efforts within
effective organs”, and referred to the “special responsibility of governments
for energy supply”. Moreover, in the arrangement of Chapters of theAgreement (the oil Emergency Sharing System occupies the first four
Chapters) and in the intensity as well as detail and binding force of those
provisions, the founders highlighted the sense of urgency and priority theyaccorded oil security in 1974.
These views also appeared in Chairman Davignon’s statement published in the OECD Observer soon after the founding of the Agency:. . . the intention of the Participating Countries was to takeout a sort of insurance policy against supply difficulties whichmight occur. That is why they have established a program of
emergency measures, including a system for sharing oil in an
emergency. This system is precise, strict and detailed, but itwould be a mistake to infer that it is of a more fundamental
nature than other aspects of the program or that it constitutes
the essence of the program. The sharing agreement is based onequal sacrifice for everybody, and every participant must make acomparable effort. This is worked out in great detail and is very
highly organised from a technical point of view. The oil is pooled
under the control of governments and thus the system is based on
the political responsibility of governments [Davignon, “The New
International Energy Agency of OECD”, OECD Observer No.
73, 1974, p. 20, 21; Ambassador Davignon chaired the Energy
Co-ordinating Group which negotiated the I.E.P. Agreement andserved as the first IEA Governing Board Chairman; his statement
was based upon his report to the Board, see IEA/GB(74)9 (1stRevision), Item 5 and Annex II; see also, Ulf Lantzke, “TheOECD and Its International Energy Agency”, Daedalus, Vol.
104, Fall 1975, p. 217, 224].
For major international oil disruptions, the IEA founders establisheda treaty-based system for the physical sharing of oil (Emergency Sharing
68System) which requires Members to build and maintain oil stocks (the IEA
stock obligations), to plan for and carry out short term reduction of demandfor oil (called demand restraint in IEA terminology), and to gather andtransmit emergency oil data (to enable the Agency to make sound emergency
decisions). Arrangements are in place to ensure the assistance of the oil
industry (for expertise required in improving, testing and operating the
Sharing System). At the centre of the Sharing System is an institutional
mechanism designed to enable these elements to work together fairly,
efficiently, and reliably (the IEA role overall). When serious oil supply
disruptions occur or may be reasonably expected, the IEA Secretariat is
to make a “finding” as provided in the Agreement, which begins a formal
procedure leading to the “triggering” of the oil sharing obligations ofMembers. Unless the Governing Board decides otherwise by a strong
majority, the obligations are automatically activated without a prior politicaldecision, and the sharing of available oil takes place on the basis of previously
fixed principles and in accordance with established mechanisms. All of theseoil security measures require Members to co-operate, to share the burdens of
the Sharing System and to avoid “going it alone” at the expense of others[The Sharing System is described in more detail in Section B below].
Over most of the life of the Agency, the IEA arrangements for thephysical sharing of oil, integrated with oil stock and demand restraint
measures, and the supporting data system, have been called the “Emergency
Sharing System” or “Sharing System” or “ESS”, and that terminology isretained in this IEA History: In recent years the Sharing System and its
composite elements have been at times referred to as the “IEP emergency
measures”. The definitions appear in the current edition of the main IEA
emergency response operating manual known as the Emergency Management
Manual (EMM), [See EMM, 5th Ed. 1994, Section 1.1, 1.2], and both are
generally accurate. In addition to the formal and thoroughly developed
Emergency Sharing System, which has not yet needed to be activated assuch, the IEA developed in the 1980s an array of ad hoc alternative measures
which the Governing Board can adopt on a case-by-case basis as required,
and this includes the selective use of one or more Sharing System elements
such as stockdraw, demand restraint and the emergency data system, when
the Governing Board makes the appropriate decisions to do so. The I.E.P.
Agreement extends to the Agency quite extensive and flexible powers for suchmeasures, for example the power to act when an oil supply reduction does
not rise and is not expected to rise to the level required for triggering the
Sharing System (7 per cent of supply).
69

The Governing Board acted effectively in such a situation in the 1979-1981
crisis [See Section C below] and again in the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis[See Section E below]. The Board has also shaped procedure and otherpreparations to facilitate and expedite in actions over the entire range ofsupply disruptions, both I.E.P. trigger situations and lesser disruptions [SeeSection D below on Co-ordinated Emergency Response Measures (CERM)],
and has widened the general scope of energy security policy over the years.
In employing the Sharing System or ad hoc measures or both, the Agency has
the institutional competence and the choice of policy instruments necessary
to manage serious disruptions in Members’ oil supplies. For a summary of
the IEA’s February 1995 Decision emphasizing flexibility in the adoption of
emergency response measures, see Section D below.
In the oil security sector, many of the Agency’s achievements are quite
visible to the alert observer, but there may be other security achievementsthat are not so visible. The invisible deterrent effect of IEA readiness toshare oil or to release stocks, and to carry out demand restraint or othermeasures, may have effects which cannot be verified empirically. Meanwhile,
the Agency has continued to enlarge, refine, test, and improve its array ofoil disruption response and information systems and to conduct systems tests
and country reviews to ensure the completeness, readiness, and credibilityof these systems.
Energy security has remained the dominant IEA objective, but withevolutionary adjustments made to add security policy and institutional
flexibility as required and to realize in fact the concrete objectives of each.
Energy security concerns appear in most of the IEA Shared Goals adopted
by IEA Ministers in 1993 [See Chapter IV, Section G below]. Policy for
responding to energy emergencies appears specifically as follows:
Energy systems should have the ability to respond promptly
and flexibly to energy emergencies. In some cases thisrequires collective mechanisms and action — IEA countries
co-operate through the Agency in responding jointly to oil supply
emergencies [Goal 2].
The success or failure of IEA Members in realizing their broader energy
goals and carrying out the policies associated with them (for example, theAgency’s environmental, conservation, alternative energy sources, and otherlong-term policies) may well have a direct effect on IEA oil security, andultimately influence the vulnerability of Members to oil supply disruptions,or the possible severity or duration of the disruption crisis. The IEA’s treaty70

based and most elaborately developed defence against such disruptions is
the oil Emergency Sharing System which will be treated in detail in thenext Section.

B.

Oil Sharing:
The Emergency Sharing System

At the time the Agency was established, the founders considered the oil
Emergency Sharing System to be the industrial countries’ first line of defence
against serious oil supply disruptions. The establishment, development and,in case of need, the operation of Sharing System were indeed the main
(but by no means the only) objectives of the Agency. The Sharing System
type of response could be effected only through an established co-operative
institution, as the lessons of the 1973-1974 crisis taught so well. The
operation of an effective oil sharing system would require treaty obligations
covering the essential rules and creating the necessary infrastructure, decision
process, information services, trained personnel, and procedures, all of which
had to be available on a permanent basis for urgent calls to action. Onlya set of institutional arrangements like those created in the IEA could meetthese requirements.
As will be seen below, the IEA Sharing System comprises a comprehensive network of emergency rules, preparations and responses. While it canbe operated on a flexible basis, the System has limitations. It was designed
principally to operate only in case of quite serious disruptions, involving
an actual or anticipated loss of at least 7 per cent of expected supply. The
System involves a complex procedure, taking some weeks to bring fully into
operation with arrivals of allocated oil at the destinations directed by the
System. Up to the present time, the System has not been activated, although
7 per cent supply shortfalls for particular countries have occurred, and in one
case the Agency was formally requested to act (by Sweden, in 1979; in theend, no formal action was necessary). Despite the presence of the formal
conditions necessary to activate the Sharing System as written in the I.E.P.
Agreement, other solutions have been found case-by-case to deal with theimmediate situations as they have arisen so far (as in the 1979-1981 Middle
East crisis and again in the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis), and this has proven to
be an acceptable approach.
In the early 1980s, the ad hoc approach was institutionalized inGoverning Board decisions arranging for flexible procedures [See Section71

C below] and early use of oil stocks [CERM, see Section D below].
These alternative arrangements could be invoked together with the Sharing
System or quite independently of it, as the Governing Board might decide.
The Sharing System remains fully available, not only in the formal treaty
sense, but also in terms of infrastructure and readiness; it continues tobe developed, tested, and maintained in place. It now appears that the
Sharing System is less likely to be needed than the founders foresaw in1974, although rising net oil imports may again change this situation. The
Sharing System continues to serve the purpose of providing elements that
could prove essential on a selective basis in any disruption (for example, thereadiness to use oil stocks and demand restraint in the market, the emergency
data system, trained personnel, and high performance expectations). And incases where stockdraw, demand restraint, or other ad hoc measures proveinsufficient or unsuitable for any reason, the Sharing System provides theultimate backup System for sharing the available oil.
Turning to the Sharing System itself, the System provides mechanisms
offering short-term protection against serious disruptions of oil supply, following a number of classical preparatory or responsive measures available ineveryday situations for consumers to ensure sufficient supply of a commodity
at affordable prices. The first of these measures is to build up a reserve ofsupplies of the commodity in the possession or under the control of consumers
to supplement supply still available in the market. Another is to reduce or
eliminate consumption of the commodity during the period of short supply
in order to lengthen the period in which available supplies would continue tomeet consumers’ minimum needs. A third measures is to share the available
supply among the consumers in such a way as to distribute the loss on thebasis of an equitable formula (either prearranged or ad hoc), in order to avoid
scrambling for supply and unacceptable price increases. Taken together, these
constitute co-operative measures to ensure a swift and effective response. In
the case of oil and the IEA, all of the foregoing short-term response measures
are written into the I.E.P. Agreement. The establishment of co-operation
among consumers, the fourth response in the above enumeration, is the
subject of Volume-I of this History, especially Chapters II, III and V. The
three other responses, on Oil Stock Building, Demand Restraint, Allocation(including Activation and the Trigger Calculation) are the subjects of thecurrent Section of this Chapter.
Reflecting the immediate concerns which led to the establishmentof the Agency in 1974, Chapters I to IV of the I.E.P. Agreement addressthese emergency oil supply problems. The Agreement adopts provisions for
emergency self-sufficiency in oil supplies, demand restraint commitments,
and rules for allocation of oil in times of shortage, together with a trigger
72

mechanism for bringing the emergency system into operation. Under thosetreaty provisions, IEA Members take legal commitments on the essential
elements of the International Energy Program, and Agency organs are
empowered to undertake the necessary preparatory work to translate these
Agreement provisions into a workable administrative system and to put theminto operation when the occasions arise.
1. Oil Stock Building
The basic oil stock obligation of each IEA Member as formulated in 1974
is to “establish a common emergency self-sufficiency in oil supplies”. In
order to meet that objective each Member agrees, with immediate effect, to“maintain emergency reserves sufficient to sustain consumption for at least 60
days with no net oil imports” [Article 2.1; emphasis added]; and, at a date
to be determined, to maintain 90 days of emergency reserves (Article 2.2).
The Members undertake to “endeavour” to achieve the 90-day emergency
reserve level by a date which was to be fixed by the IEA Governing Board.
In 1975-1976 the Governing Board raised the level from 60 days by steps
over a period of about five years, increasing to the 70-day level with effectfrom mid-1976, followed by suggested increments of 6 days each year until
the 90-day level was reached on 1 January, 1980 [IEA/GB(76)53, Item 2],
and it remains at that level today.
Since 1974 the treaty provisions have been supplemented by Governing
Board actions, such as those taken in the 1979-1981 and the 1990-1991
crises, usually to meet the demands of the immediate situation, but there
have been longer-range supplementary actions as well. In 1982 the Board
was concerned about the decrease in the stock commitment due to declines in
consumption and in net imports over the previous years. To remedy in partthe resulting commitment reduction, the Board decided this:IEA Member countries will make efforts not to let stocks
fall below 90 days of the average net imports during thepreceding three calendar years, if this is higher than the existingcommitment of 90 days of net imports during the previous
calendar year, except where oil consumption had declined
because of clearly established long-term structural change[IEA/GB(82)92, Item 2(e) and Annex II].
While this was a decision for Members to “make efforts” rather than toreach the ultimate objective, the decision did reflect the need to adjust the73commitment upward to maintain stock coverage at close to a constant level
during the down-side of the economic and oil import cycles, so that reduced
commitments would not apply during the early years of the up-swing of
the cycles when there might be greater vulnerability than during the few
previous years.
Whatever the applicable level of required stocks might be, theemergency reserve measures are designed to aid Members to maintaineconomic activity during the supply emergency. With the advantage ofa buffer period based on co-ordinated stock levels, Members should becapable of relying securely upon their own energy resources, notwithstandinga significant shortfall in oil supply, whether or not the Sharing Systemis activated. When the Sharing System is activated, Members would bepermitted to draw upon stocks at a calculated level, which should reduce
the pressure on the group as a whole, even though the draw on stocks is
not mandatory. Since the oil supplies available to a Member country mightthus depend upon the stock position of other consumer countries as wellas the existence of sufficient reserves in its own country, the performanceof each country in maintaining reserves is essential to the security of thegroup as a whole.
For this reason, it was important that the I.E.P. Agreement state inmandatory terms the obligation to maintain emergency reserve stocks andprovide for IEA monitoring and administration. The Standing Group on
Emergency Questions (SEQ), a plenary committee of the Agency [See Volume
I, Chapter V, Section B], is required under Article 4 to review on a continuingbasis the effectiveness of the measures taken by each Member to meet its
emergency reserve commitment. Members systematically report stock levels
to the IEA, which reviews stock developments regularly and reports to theGoverning Board on the stock levels of all Members with particular attention
to the situation of any Members which fail to meet the commitment. The
Governing Board is empowered to adopt recommendations to Members on
their compliance with the emergency reserve commitment, and does so as theneed arises. The IEA’s emergency response reviews provide the Agency with asystematic means of monitoring stock policies of Members and of discerning
the underlying reasons for the levels of their compliance, satisfactory orotherwise. To meet the need for information exchange and training foroil stock management, the IEA has also conducted workshops on practicalaspects of stockholding and stockdraw, bringing together participants withresponsibilities for stock policies and operations in Member governments,
stockholding entities, and industry [See Workshop on Practical Aspects ofStockholding and Stockdraw, Paris, 27-29 September 1989, Proceedings74

(1989); Workshop on Stockdraw and Emergency Response Policies andManagement, Kagoshima, 21-24 February 1994, Proceedings (1995)].
Although this emergency reserve commitment is seen essentially as anarrangement to maintain oil stocks (and in fact has been met by oil stocks),
the Agreement provides that the commitment may also be satisfied by “fuelswitching capacity” and by “stand-by oil production” [Article 3], and nothing
would prevent the use of a combination of these measures. While thesealternatives to oil stocks are theoretically available and physically exist ina number of Member countries, the Agreement provides for the Governing
Board to decide the extent to which the commitment might be satisfied bythem (and the date 1 July 1975 was mentioned). Since no decisions of thiskind have yet been made, the role of those elements remains uncertain andthe commitment has in practice been satisfied by oil stocks alone.
Over the years the performance of most IEA Members has been fullyin compliance with the emergency reserve commitment. A few countries
foresaw difficulty in immediate compliance at the time they became Membersof the Agency (Austria, Turkey and France), and the need for additionaltime in those cases was recognized by the Governing Board [See Volume I,
Chapter IV, Section B-5(a)]. There have sometimes been a few countries
not in full compliance. However, the performance of the group as a whole
has been more than satisfactory, with the aggregate oil stock holdings of
all Members exceeding their total commitment level, as appears in thefollowing table.
Development of Stocks in IEA Countries on the
1st of July each year in the period 1975-1994
As of 1st July

Days of Net Imports

1975

109

1976

115

1977

113

1978

112

1979

113

1980

138

1981

159

1982

165

1983

168

75

Development of Stocks in IEA Countries on the
1st of July each year in the period 1975-1994(continued)
As of 1st July

Days of Net Imports

1984

182

1985

182

1986

193

1987

181

1988

186

1989

176

1990

174

1991

169

1992

173

1993

174

1994

168

Notes:
Includes emergency reserves for all current IEA Members for eachyear although they have not all been Members for the whole
period. Includes stocks held by net oil exporting countries (Canada,
Norway and the United Kingdom).
Stocks are measured in terms of net imports of the previous year.

The drop in relative stocks since the mid-1980s has been disquieting but not
so far alarming. Nevertheless, the Governing Board has acted on numerous
occasions to strengthen the situation. The Board regularly receives reportson the state of Members’ stockholding, and makes recommendations toMembers who are not meeting the obligation. For example in 1993, someMembers found themselves in that position and explained their particularsituations. The Board then noted the explanations andurged the countries concerned to make every effort to meettheir emergency reserve commitments at the earliest possible
date and to provide definite timetables ensuring compliance[IEA/GB(94)13, Item 7].
76

Moreover, IEA Ministers at times call for full compliance by those not meetingthe commitment or for vigilance to ensure the continuing adequacy of stocks
in terms of amount, structure, and flexibility [See IEA/GB(83)36(Final),
Annex I, paragraph 10]. This has been done in laconic terms, for example,
by Ministers simply agreeing to the “Fulfillment of IEA stock-holding
obligations” [IEA/GB(85)46, Annex I, paragraphs V.4) and 5) with respect
to stock levels for CERM]. Calls for compliance have been made morecomprehensively, as in 1987 when IEA Ministers assessed the situation as
follows:
Ministers reaffirmed the high priority given to the IEA
emergency preparedness system, including both the IEP oil
sharing and the co-ordinated early response stipulated in the
Governing Board Decision of 11th July 1984 [Note that this is
the CERM Decision, discussed in Section D below]. Total stocks
held in IEA countries are now equivalent to more than 160
days of 1986 net imports, which is considerably more than theminimum legal obligation of 90 days by each country. Ministers
welcomed the further progress made since they last met in
July 1985. Procedures to co-ordinate, carry out and monitor
stockdraw and other measures early in an oil supply disruption
are being further enhanced. However, a small number ofcountries is still required to continue efforts to achieve their individual obligations. Ministers emphasized the necessity of complying with the legal obligations of the IEP concerning emergency
oil stocks and demand restraint measures [IEA/GB(87)33,
Annex, paragraph 17].
The year 1987 was also a time for Ministers to warn against “complacency”
because of the prevailing market conditions. Ministers supported Members
efforts to raise stock levels and acknowledged the benefits of having stocks
held in accordance with the I.E.P. Agreement exceed the required level.
They welcomed action by countries “to improve the ability to bring about
stockdraw by government initiative” [Paragraph 18] “under clear anddefinite authority” [Paragraph 19] and favoured the increasing “level ofgovernment and public entity stocks” [Paragraph 20].
These Ministerial pronouncements were reconfirmed in 1989
[IEA/GB(89)36, paragraph 4(a)], and their impact was strengthened in 1991
and again in 1993, in part to fulfil the treaty commitment on emergency
reserves, in part to provide greater flexibility in CERM-type operations, andin part as a result of experience gained in dealing with the 1990-1991 Gulfcrisis. At their 1991 meeting77

Ministers recommended that Member countries with stock
obligations strengthen, where necessary, government control overemergency industry stocks and/or increase government-owned
or controlled stocks. Given the unpredictable nature of supply
disruptions, Ministers urged all IEA countries to meet fully
their emergency reserve commitments, and encouraged Member
countries to increase their emergency reserves above the 90-day
level, as appropriate . . . [IEA/GB(91)42/REV2, paragraph 6;
emphasis added].
The sense of the last sentence was repeated in 1993 [IEA/GB/(93)41,
paragraph 7]. Oil stocks were not mentioned specifically, but the IEA
stock policies were indirectly reconfirmed in Goal 2 of the 1993 Shared
Goals, quoted above, on the subject of the joint response of Members tooil supply emergencies.
In 1994 stock management issues received considerable IEA Secretariat,
Member government, and industry attention in the IEA Workshop on
stockdraw and Emergency Response Policies and Management, held in
February at Kagoshima, Japan. Although the Workshop was not directly
charged with developing stock policy recommendations, a number of policy
concerns did emerge from the Workshop and were taken under considerationby the Agency. Some of these, with potentially far-reaching consequences,
were:




The major effort required from IEA countries to maintain stocks
proportionate to rising imports, notably from the politically fragile
Middle East.
The fact that the IEA’s stocks have dropped from some 170 days importcoverage in the mid-1980s to less than 140 days in 1993.
The existence of the political will as well as the technical ability touse stocks [IEA/GB(94)19].

Other concerns included the need to present a strong policy responseto the public of IEA countries during a period of low oil prices andto improve response mechanisms (including flexibility and stockdraw
enhancement). Also noted were deficiencies of legal underpinning in somecountries (particularly concerning CERM), more constraining environmental
regulations, as well as the need for closer international co-operation on
information exchange and technology transfer, and an IEA Implementing
Agreement to help Members on technical issues. These concerns and others
78

developed at Kagoshima may indicate some of the future directions of IEA
policy work in the field of stockdraw and emergency response management.
IEA oil stock policy, which began with the I.E.P. Agreement
commitment to maintain emergency stocks at the agreed level for use
pursuant to the Emergency Sharing System, has evolved not only pursuant
to the technical rules described above but also in relation to the types ofsituations in which stocks would be employed. Almost from the outset of the
Agency it became clear that stocks would play a role in any IEA response
to oil supply disruptions, whether or not the disruption met the formal
requirements of the Emergency Sharing System. As will be seen below,
stocks played an important role in the response to the 1979-1981 crisis,
when the Sharing System was not activated. From that time forward
oil stocks assumed greater importance in IEA oil disruption preparations,leading to the 1984 CERM Decision which emphasizes early use of stocks.
During the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, the IEA mounted an ad hoc responsewith great reliance on oil stockdraw. The important question of the relation
between the Sharing System and CERM approaches is discussed below
in Section D.
The adoption of CERM has strongly influenced IEA policy statements
on stocks since 1984. Both the emergency reserve commitment and the
preparation for CERM responses have been combined in many IEA policy
statements, as seen in the Ministerial statements quoted or noted above. In
one situation, the ad hoc CERM approach has a potentially direct effectupon the emergency reserve commitment, and that is the possible release of
Members from the 90-day commitment, where necessary, to free-up stocks
to be employed in the ad hoc response. This has actually occurred only
once in the history of the Agency to date. Ministers agreed in 1980 in
relation to the IEA response to the 1979-1981 crisis that “Reduction in stocks
below the I.E.P. 90-day emergency level might be considered in countries
with particularly difficulties” [IEA/GB(80)97, Item 2(f) and (g)(i)]. One cancharacterize this action as the Members’ waiver of their legal right to insist
upon preservation of the 90-day stock level and as a proper response to aparticular situation [See Volume-I, Chapter IV, Section B-5(a)].
Certainly one effect of the policy movements described above has been
to increase the role of stocks in IEA oil supply disruption planning. The
basic 90-day emergency reserve commitment remains, of course. It now
serves the Sharing System directly and the CERM indirectly. The overallemphasis on stocks and demand restraint enhances the Agency’s ability
to respond rapidly and flexibly, whether the measures employed be the
Sharing System or the CERM or both. In each of these cases stocks
79and demand restraint reinforce each other as vital elements of the Sharing
System, as will be seen in the following Section.
2. Demand Restraint
Another security element in the Sharing System is found in the measures
which Members are to take in preparation for the restraint of demandfor oil supplies during an emergency, and in the application of effective
measures of restraint during oil emergency situations. Since effective
measures are quite specific to demand patterns, legislation and other factors
in individual countries, no specific demand restraint measures are adopted in
the Agreement. However, in recognition of the need for preparedness, each
Member undertakes legal obligations to prepare for and to restrain demandin accordance with the Agreement. These obligations refer not to specificmeasures as such, but rather to the achievement of the objective expressed interms of a specified percentage reduction of consumption.
The demand restraint obligations are different for cases of the “generaltrigger” (shortfalls for the group of IEA countries as a whole) and for the“selective trigger” (shortfalls suffered by one or more IEA countries). Article
13 of the Agreement provides that in the event of an oil supply reduction
equal to 7 per cent of the group’s consumption, the obligation of each
Member is to implement measures sufficient to produce a corresponding 7
per cent reduction in consumption. Under Article 14, if the supply of thegroup is reduced to the 12 per cent level, each Member’s measures must
reduce consumption by 10 per cent. Although in these situations the shortfall
is measured for the group as a whole, the 7 per cent or 10 per cent reductions
refer to oil demand in the individual Member country. In certain disruptionsof long duration, the Governing Board is empowered, by special majority,
to increase the “level of mandatory demand restraint that may be necessary”[Article 20.3]. In the case of the selective trigger, the country affected isrequired to reduce its demand by 7 per cent, but the other Members areunder no obligation to do so.
The objective of the demand restraint provisions is to reduce oil
demand in the circumstances of a specific shortfall in oil supply. Members
thus agree that they will at all times have ready a programme of contingent
oil demand restraint measures. Article 5.1 provides this:Each Participating Country shall at all times have ready aprogram of contingent oil demand restraint measures enabling
it to reduce its rate of final consumption in accordance with
Chapter IV.
80

The reduction in rates of final consumption, defined in Article 7.8 as “total
domestic consumption of all finished petroleum products”, are continued in
Articles 8, 13 and 14. Under Article 16, a Member is entitled to substitute fordemand restraint measures the use of stocks held in excess of its emergency
reserve commitment, as discussed above in Section B-1.
The precise measures to be taken are to be determined freely byeach Members, which would normally adopt the measures best suited tosucceed in the circumstances of its particular country. The Governing Board
has decided that the objective of oil emergency “demand restraint can beachieved by measures which either reduce the amount of oil actually usedby consumers or limit the amount of oil supply available to consumers”[IEA Emergency Management Manual (EMM) 5th Ed. 1994, Section 4.2].
Demand restraint does not mean the long-term “conservation of energy as
provided in the Agency’s Long-Term Co-operation Programme to reduce
dependency on imported oil. Instead, the Board said, “Demand restraint
acts on a level of oil demand which should already reflect high standards ofefficiency in energy use. To achieve demand restraint, emergency measures
will be required”. In any case, each Member remains free to adopt measures
which it finds appropriate to its country’s circumstances.
Demand restraint measures are emergency measures, adapted to theparticular emergency on an urgent and short-term basis. These measures fallbroadly into three categories: (1) persuasion and public information, (2)administrative and compulsory measures, and (3) allocation and rationing.
Typically, demand restraint programmes may include measures to reducethe consumption of transport fuel (by speed limits, car pooling, restrictionof weekend or holiday driving, odd day/even day driving limitations,fuel rationing and increased surveillance), of heating and cooling (bytemperature rules, start and end dates for heating and cooling, fuelrationing), of public and private residential and commercial lighting (bypower reductions, operations hours, wattage restrictions), and the like.
Tax increase on petroleum products, as well as the rationing of deliveries
to bulk users, retailers, and consumers, are other possible measures. In
addition, some programmes include more light-handed and qualitative
measures, such as educational campaigns designed for the public or specificoil users, government “example setting” (highly visible lighting, heating andcooling, driving and other restrictions concerning government owned orcontrolled facilities), and removal or moderation of price controls which may
permit demand-driven price increases during the period of short supply.
Such measures are not of uniform effectiveness, and there is no consensus
on whether all of them should be considered effective parts of the81

government “measures” required by Article 5. Nor are they fully comparable
one with the other as far as the achievement of results is concerned. Thus,
Article 5 presents firm obligations, but in practice the uncertainties ofoperation of the measures may soften considerably the effectiveness of thedemand restraint commitment. The ease of assessing the self-evident degreeof performance and compliance for some of the other IEA obligations gives
way, in the case of demand restraint, to the difficulties of institutional
fact gathering and of reviewing, measuring, and assessing a body of thesometimes obscure and vague measures implemented by Members as well
as a body of disparate responses by consumers. However, the demand
restraint system has been strengthened by the experience gained during theoil crises of 1973-1974, 1979-1981 and 1990-1991, by the Systems Tests
and country reviews [See Section F below], and by the IEA’s Workshop on
Demand Restraint in 1987.
When the emergency measures are activated, the demand restraint
provisions become mandatory. Since a commitment of this nature should not
be left to the mere statement of an abstract obligation to reach a numericalobjective (for in the short-run it might be difficult to measure success),
there is clear need for reporting, monitoring, and assessing results. Hence
the Agreement charges the Standing Group on Emergency Questions (SEQ)with the responsibility to review and assess each country’s demand restraint
programme on a “continuing basis” ( i.e. even in the absence of a supply
disruption). When a disruption occurs, the SEQ is responsible for reviewing
and assessing “the effectiveness of measures actually taken” by each Member.
The SEQ’s reports on demand restraint are reviewed by the Governing
Board, which may make recommendations to Members on this subject.
Demand restraint, like stocks, is a particularly active subject in the IEA’s
emergency response reviews [See Section F below]. In 1987 IEA Ministers
referred specifically to demand restraint:
Mutual exchange of information and experience and the newround of emergency response reviews would also identify areas
for further improvements in the effectiveness of national demand
restraint programmes [IEA/GB(87)33, Annex, paragraph 23].
In these reviews the Member’s array of demand restraint measures is
examined closely, and the review team at times investigates with theMember’s representatives the scope of the measures, their application andtheir expected effectiveness. Following the SEQ’s examination of the reporton the review, the Governing Board is informed of the results of the review.
82Opportunities to discuss compliance issues exist in both the SEQ and theGoverning Board where the other Members’ views, as well as the viewsof the country under review, may be taken into account. Additional
support for demand restraint is provided regularly by the Governing Board,usually by references to the need to strengthen measures [See for example,
Ministerial statements in IEA/GB(81)34(Final), paragraph 5; IEA/GB(85)46,
Annex I, paragraph V. 5); IEA/GB(87)33, Annex paragraphs 18 and 22;
IEA/GB(89)36, Annex, paragraph 4(a); IEA/GB(91)42/REV2, paragraph 6;
IEA/GB(93)41, paragraph 7].
During an oil supply emergency, a Member cannot ignore its demand
restraint obligation with impunity. Like the sanction for non-compliancewith the stock obligation, a Member’s oil supply rights during the disruption
will be calculated upon the assumption that the Member’s demand restraint
obligation has been satisfied in full, with the result that the Member will beconsidered to have saved the applicable percentage of its consumption (7 or
10 per cent or more) and will not receive the corresponding amount fromallocated oil. The Member then suffers the consequences of the absence ofthe oil which would have remained available to it if the requirements of thedemand restraint rules had been fully satisfied. The more technical rules on
demand restraint are contained in the EMM, 5th Ed. 1994, Section 4.2.
The history of demand restraint in the IEA is similar to the historyof stocks, in that almost from the outset of the Agency it became clearthat demand restraint as well as stocks would play a role in almost all IEA
responses to oil supply disruptions, whether or not the Emergency Sharing
System would be activated. Demand restraint played a vital role in the
response to the 1979-1981 crisis, when the Sharing System was not activated[See Section C below]. In the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, an ad hoc CERM-type
response was mounted by the IEA, with significant reliance on both demand
restraint and stockdraw. Demand restraint and stockdraw can be expected
to play a significant role in future oil crisis management, either in the
Sharing System or in CERM responses [See Section B-1 above for further
discussion of these questions].
3. Allocation
After stocks and demand restraint, the third element of the Emergency
Sharing System is the actual allocation of the available oil. Under the
allocation provisions set forth in Chapter III of the Agreement, each Member
is entitled to a “ supply right “ representing its fair and equitable share of
the oil supplies available to the Agency countries as a group (those supplies
83are defined in Article 7.7). The “supply right” is equal to a country’s
permissible consumption (which takes into account the country’s demand
restraint) reduced by the amount of its emergency reserves (the oil stocks) it
may draw in accordance with the rules. These concepts and the mechanicsof the calculations appear in detail in Chapter III of the Agreement and are
explained in the EMM, 5th Ed.1994, Section 2 . The essential point is thateach Member’s “supply right” is the amount of oil the country is entitled to,for purposes of calculating whether in the allocation the country is to receive
oil from other Members or give up oil to them.
In cases of a qualified disruption of oil for the group as a whole, theallocation of available oil is made on the basis of calculations applying theforegoing principles. If a Member’s supply right exceeds its domestic oil
production and the net available imports during an emergency, the member’s
oil position is on the short side, and it enjoys an “allocation right”, a rightto receive additional net imports of oil equal to the amount of that excess.
The additional imports for that country are to be supplied from the domestic
production or imports of other Members, those which are found to havean “allocation obligation” determined pursuant to similar principles. An“allocation obligation” arises for a Member whose position is on the long sideof oil supply, when the sum of its normal domestic production and actual net
imports of oil exceeds its supply right, calculated as indicated above.
In the case of a reduction of oil supply of a single Member country, thatcountry would have an “allocation right”, and the other Agency countries
together would have a corresponding “allocation obligation”. Under Article
17.1 allocation of oil to that member takes place when the reduction exceeds
7 per cent of its normal consumption. The country concerned is required, in
accordance with Article 8.1, to absorb the first 7 per cent of its reduction inoil supplies; its supply right is limited to the amount by which the shortfall
exceeds the amount required to be absorbed. The obligation to allocate
is shared among the other Members proportionately on the basis of their
historical consumption. These Members may balance their oil supply bymaking up for their allocation obligation through means of their choice,including demand restraint measures or the use of stocks. In this way, thesingle Member (i.e. one or more Members, but not the group as a whole)which suffers a supply shortfall is supported by the entire group’s sharing of
the available oil. There is no provision in the Agreement specifically requiring
the Members actually to draw upon their oil stocks, but of course eachremains free to do so within I.E.P. limits, if it wishes.
84

The allocation system is subject as well to certain equitable “rulesof the game”, as respects other countries and industry. Article 9.3 of theAgreement provides for the maintenance, insofar as possible, of “normal
channels of supply” [All emphasis in this paragraph has been added], as wellas “normal supply proportions” between crude oil and products andamong different categories of crude oil and products. Under Article 9.4,
one of the objectives of the Program is to maintain historical supply
patterns within the industry. Article 10.1 provides for “fair treatment for
all Participating Countries and basing the price for allocated oil on theprice conditions prevailing for comparable commercial transactions”. The
important formulation of price rules, developed with the advice of industry, isconsidered in the Section below. Article 11.1 provides this:
It is not an objective of the Program to seek to increase, in an
emergency, the share of world oil supply that the group had
under normal market conditions. Historical oil trade patterns
should be preserved as far as is reasonable, and due accountshould be taken of the position of individual non-participating
countries.
Each Member’s actual supply of indigenous and imported oil thus falls
under international allocation rules in time of an emergency. Each Member
has in effect surrendered its right to determine unilaterally the amount ofoil which would be made available for its own use. The oil available to theMember is determined pursuant to the allocation principles noted above, notby its own perceptions of need or by the political or economic judgementsof the oil companies or of the oil producer countries outside of the Agency.
In that way, the IEA countries have organized themselves into a cohesive
group in which indigenous oil and imported oil could be shared and used
on a rational basis.
The centrepiece of the emergency system is the oil sharing obligations
summarized above. The essential rules are stated not as recommendations
or requests to Members but rather as firm legal obligations. In addition
to the commitments taken in the Agreement, Members have adopted in the
Governing Board a number of refinements in the system, which the Board
is empowered to adopt by majority vote under special provisions containedin the Annex to the Agreement and in the emergency Chapters. Moreover,the Governing Board has been granted general powers to decide on practicalprocedures for the allocation of oil and for the participation of oil companies
in the emergency system [See Section B-5 and B-7 below].
85

In Article 6.1 of the Agreement, IEA Members have accepted the basic
commitment to ensure that the allocation of oil will be carried out pursuant
to the relevant Chapters of the Agreement. The administration of thecommitment is provided by Article 6.2 which requires the SEQ to review
and assess on a continuing basis each Member’s emergency measures andthe effectiveness of measures actually taken. The work of the SEQ isin turn reviewed by the Governing Board, which has adopted in the
Emergency Management Manual detailed procedures for the application of
the emergency system.
4. Activation and the Trigger Calculation
The IEA’s oil Emergency Sharing System as set forth in the I.E.P. Agreement
and Governing Board actions has been for many years fully developed andready for action. It is not, however, a regularly running machine. It is kept
on “stand-by” status, ready to go forward but in need of being “switchedon”. Because of potentially far-reaching effects, the “switching on” process
is not a simple one. In IEA terminology this process is called “activation”,
and it occurs when the qualifying factual situation is determined and when theprocedural process is completed. Activation is carried out through either of
two quite different procedures, sometimes called the “triggers”. The System
may be triggered by the operation of a “finding” by the Secretariat,
unless the Board makes a different determination after the finding is made.
Or the Governing Board can, without a Secretariat finding, make thenecessary finding itself and thereby trigger the System. The delegationof responsibility to the Secretariat to make the operative find represents
a significant innovation in international organization practice and merits
particular attention.
While the oil Emergency Sharing System established by the Agreement
is not a fully self-executing one, the “finding” process is a procedural
safeguard to ensure that in major disruptions the System will be implemented
without a prior political decision of IEA governments on the particularsituation. The emergency sharing obligations are subject to a determinationof the existence of certain qualifying events set forth in Chapter IV of theAgreement. Article 12 provides this:Whenever the group as a whole or any Participating Country
sustains or can reasonably be expected to sustain a reductionin its oil supplies, the emergency measures, which are themandatory demand restraint referred to in Chapter II and theallocation of available oil referred to in Chapter III, shall be
activated in accordance with this Chapter.
86

The qualifying events for triggering the Sharing System and forbringing its legal obligation into play are the following [Article 19.1]:

Whenever the group sustains or can reasonably be expected to sustaina 7 percent reduction in the daily rate of its oil supplies [Article13], referred to as the “general trigger” because it relates to the
IEA as a whole.
Whenever the group sustains or can reasonably be expected to sustain
a 12 percent reduction in its daily rate of oil supplies, which triggers ahigher demand restraint commitment than does the foregoing trigger[Article 14].
Whenever any particular Participating Country sustains or canreasonably be expected to sustain a supply reduction exceeding
7 percent of its normal consumption [Article 17], referred to as
the “selective trigger” because is relates to one or more Members’
individual situations and not to the group as a whole.

Each of the triggering events noted above involves necessarily a findingof fact as to the specified reduction in the daily rate of oil supplies. The
calculation of the general trigger finding is essentially a determination that
the IEA group of countries as a whole has in fact suffered or is expected tosuffer a 7 per cent oil supply reduction. The calculation includes several
elements involving the application of the I.E.P. Agreement’s concepts of“normal supplies” and “disrupted supplies”. The difference between the two
represents the amount of the loss to the group, and when that level is at least
7 per cent of the normal supplies, the trigger finding as a rule is to be madeas provided in the Agreement. This calculation may not be as simple as it
might appear, for it involves a mass of data, the application of a complex
network of Agreement concepts and computations, as well as some elementsof judgement. The process is outlined in detail in the EMM, 5th Ed. 1994,
Section 2 and Format 3A.
What are the sources of this vital data? The “normal supplies” data
is derived from the Agency’s Base Period Final Consumption calculations
made from the Monthly Oil Statistics Questionnaires, data supplied by all
OECD governments to the IEA. The data reference period is the mostrecent four quarter period established under Article 18 of the Agreement.
While the reference period is subject to adjustment in appropriate cases,
the determination of “normal supplies” is generally a straightforwardmechanical process. However, the calculation of “disrupted supplies” is more
complex. When the detailed Questionnaire A and B data are available from87

co-operating oil companies and Member governments [See Section B-6
below], these data are employed. Otherwise“disrupted supplies” arederived from the most recent
assessment of forward industry supply contained in the SEQ
Quarterly Oil Forecast (in turn derived from data supplied by anumber of oil companies at IEA request) available immediately
before a potential emergency situation occurs, adjusted forthe estimated effect of the supply disruption on Participating
Countries by assuming a supply cut proportionate to the disruption in world-wide supplies [EMM, 5th Ed. 1994 Section 2.1.2].
The determination of the net supply reduction can only be an estimate, inthis case an estimate made by the Secretariat
by quantifying the information received through, a variety ofmeans including governments, diplomatic channels, and the oil
industry and the IAB (Industry Advisory Board) [EMM, 5th Ed.
1994. Section 2.1.2].
The worldwide net supply reduction is then deducted from the forecast
worldwide supplies prior to the emergency to determine the figure for the total
worldwide disrupted supplies. It is the latter number which is deducted fromnormal supplies to determine the amount of the shortfall employed in the 7
per cent trigger calculation mentioned above. It will be noted that elementsof good judgement must be employed in determining two of the numbers
employed in these computations: the SEQ forecast of forward supply andthe Secretariat’s estimate of the net supply reduction. These reliable but
not mechanical elements involve judgements which the Secretariat needs
to consider in making its final decision on whether or not to make the“finding”, i.e. the trigger decision to activate the Sharing System. Once the
Sharing System is triggered, the Secretariat continues to make the trigger
calculation once each month in order to determine whether the emergency
conditions continue, or whether they do not, in which case the System would
be deactivated as provided in Article 23 of the Agreement.
The foregoing applies to the “general trigger” for disruptions of supplyof the entire group of IEA countries. When a supply disruption affects any
individual Member but not the entire group, the calculation of the trigger,
called the “selective trigger”, follows the same principle as the general trigger
in measuring the affected country’s actual or expected supply reduction. The
88

system is to be triggered for that country when the reduction exceeds 7 percent of the country’s previous supply (i.e. its Base Period Final Consumption).
The disrupted supplies are taken from the individual country’s Questionnaire
B submission. If the activation is upheld by the Governing Board, theSecretariat then calculates the supply right of the affected country and the
supply obligations of the other Members, and allocation is carried out [SeeEMM, Section 2.1.7].
Even when the foregoing general or selective trigger requirements
are fully satisfied, the triggering of the Sharing System is not altogether
automatic, for the founders of the Agency considered that some types of cases
were intended to be the subject of action, and others were not. On thissubject Executive Director Ulf Lantzke reported to IEA Heads of Delegationby letter on 2 June 1980 (following a request from the Governing Board),
concluding that
Under IEP Agreement Article 19.1 the types of cases in which
the allocation system is intended to be activated include curtailments of oil exports from producing countries where economically or politically motivated, or interruption of production ortransportation due to war or other hostile acts or major natural
disaster, and do not include fluctuations of supply attributable
to normal market forces, ordinary operational difficulties of theindustry, interruptions of supply due to strikes or cases inwhich activation would shortly become unnecessary because of an
anticipated resumption of sufficient supply to the affected country
or countries [See EMM, 5th Ed. 1994, Annex III, containing thetext of the letter which elaborates on the foregoing statement].
In the EMM provision on the trigger mechanism, the Governing Board statedthat the Secretariat would make the determination under Article 19 “inaccordance with the IEA Executive Director’s letter of June 2nd, 1980 toHeads of Delegation of IEA Participating Countries” [EMM, Section 1.2.2.].
Judgements to be exercised in the foregoing situations reduce somewhat the
automaticity of the triggering of the Sharing System, although the decisions
rest with the Secretariat, a politically neutral group of international civil
servants [See Volume I, Chapter VI]. The founders considered that the trigger
decision should be a technical and administrative one in the first instance,with the political safeguard that ultimate authority rests with the Governing
Board, which could act by a strong majority to reverse the Secretariat’s
decision to activate or not to activate.
89

If the trigger findings were left for decision by each Member
government or even by the group as a whole, political elements could
influence the determination, and this precisely at a time when the Systemshould be free of political elements if it is to function effectively in theuniform interest of all Members. In this process the framers of the Agreement
sought a means to minimize non-technical considerations in the activation of
the System. The administrative rather than political approach to triggering
the System stemmed directly from Members’ experiences in the 1973-1974
crisis, when the need for a prior political decision, as in the OECD, wasnecessary before co-operative responses to that crisis could be mounted.
Since that decision would have required unanimity of OECD Members,
the presence of opposition would have made any effective response of theindustrial countries impossible [See Volume I, Chapter II, Section A and B,
and Chapter II above].
Insulation from political considerations is achieved for the Sharing
System by a process which includes a certain delegation of power to theimpartial Secretariat of the Agency. Article 19.1 of the Agreement delegatesto the Secretariat the responsibility to make the initial emergency “finding”
which launches the formal process:The Secretariat shall make a finding when a reduction of oil
supplies as mentioned in Article 13, 14 or 17 has occurred or canreasonably be expected to occur, and shall establish the amountof the reduction or expected reduction for each Participating
Country and for the group.
By satisfying the condition precedent to the obligation to implement
the emergency measures, the Secretariat’s finding leads inexorably, in theabsence of blocking action by the Governing Board, to the activation of
the System within twenty-four days (under the formal rules of the I.E.P.
Agreement, Article 19), and most probably within a much shorter time
period. Nor is it an easy matter under the IEA’s voting rules to block
the implementation of the Sharing System once it is triggered. Under theapplicable “First Special Majority” voting rule, a blocking decision requires
the support of approximately 75 percent of the Agency countries holding atleast 60 percent of the voting power in the Governing Board, as provided in
Article 62.4 [On the voting rule, see Volume I, Chapter V, Section A-13 (c)].
In practical terms this means, on the one hand that neither the United States
nor the European Union countries as a group (as constituted at the end of1994) could block the trigger, and on the other hand that such blocking
90

action could be prevented by the European Union Member States acting
together, or by the United States with the support of a few other Members,
depending on their respective voting power. Thus it may be seen that since
blocking action is very difficult to achieve, the system ensures that in theabsence of significant opposition, the Secretariat's finding would be given
operative effect under the Agreement.
The twenty-four-day trigger mechanism mentioned above is the “worst
case”, however, in terms of the timing of the obligation to implement
emergency measures. The procedure outlined in the Agreement could
be shortened substantially, when the need for urgent response appears.
Theoretically, implementation could arise on the first day of a crisis if all theMembers agreed and in cases of urgency it is highly unlikely that the fullperiod of time allowed by the Agreement would be required, in any event.
The Agreement does contain procedures which might be employed to reducethese activation periods. Under the longer procedure, when the Secretariat’s
finding reaches the Governing Board for its consideration under Article 19.3,
one of the options specified in the Agreement is for the Board “to fix anothertime limit” (i.e. other than the limit specified in the Agreement) for the
implementation of the emergency measures. Article 22 provides still anothermeans by which the activation process could be shortened, and this at any
stage of the proceedings, by as much time as might be desired, irrespective of
the foregoing timing rules. Article 22 provides this:
The Governing Board may at any time decide by unanimity toactivate any appropriate emergency measures not provided for inthis Agreement, if the situation so requires [Emphasis added].
Under that provision, the Governing Board is enabled to shorten theprocedure at will when it can act by unanimity.
Emergency measures which are activated must of course at some point
be phased-out. The Agreement provides procedures for deactivating the
emergency measures, parallel to the finding procedure for activating thesystem [Article 23 and 24]. The Secretariat first makes a finding that theconditions for activation of the System under Articles 13, 14 or 17 no longer
exist. A report is made to the Governing Board and deactivation takes
place automatically unless, within a specified time period after the Board
meets it decides to maintain the emergency measures or to deactivate them
only in part. If the Secretariat has not made a deactivation finding, theGoverning Board may at any time decide by “special majority” to deactivate
the measures either wholly or in part.
91

The Agreement does not deal expressly with the problem of sanctions
when Members fail to fulfil their obligations, although it is clear that under
Sharing System operations a Member which does so may be denied thebenefits of certain rights under the Agreement. Provision is made for this typeof sanction, without designating it as such, with respect to demand restraint
and the emergency reserve obligations, since a Member’s “supply right” inan emergency is calculated upon the assumption that those obligations are
fully satisfied, whether in fact they are or not, and there are doubtless othersituations where sanctions of that nature could be imposed by the Governing
Board in the course of a crisis. The monitoring function of Agency organs
may be expected to reveal implementation problems for which remedialaction might become necessary. Yet the formalization of sanctions was notcontemplated in the Energy Co-ordinating Group discussions on preparationof the draft Agreement, and therefore words like “enforcement”, “sanction”,
or “penalty” are not employed in the text.
Though there is no formal sanction system, a still effective incentive forcompliance is found in the inherent value of the system to Agency countries.
So long as the I.E.P. Agreement provides a viable system of protection,
the Members are likely to respect their obligations. Serious failures of
performance by one or more countries would doubtless bring a weakeningof resolve and possibly failure of performance by the others. A powerful
sanction is thus the possible cost of a full break-down of the Sharing System.
That would almost certainly mean an increase in the Members’ vulnerability
to external situations, including political developments beyond the control
of industrial countries, returning them to the crisis management vacuum
experienced during the 1973-74 crisis. In the worst case the Agency might
be so weakened by inaction that continuing co-operation in other sectorsof the Agency could be impaired, with adverse effect on Members’ vitalinterests in oil market information systems, in long-term policy, in researchand development, and in international energy relations, conducted in the
IEA or under its auspices. Members thus have a clear overall interest in
ensuring that their obligations under the Emergency Sharing System arefully carried out.
5. Operations(a)

Operation of the Sharing System

In the operation of the Sharing System, the available oil supplies subject toMembers’ commitments under the Agreement are physically redirected as92

required to match each member’s supply right in order to realize the Agency’s
objective of an equitable distribution during the supply disruption. Despite
the Sharing System’s elaborate timing arrangements mentioned above, it
can be expected that from the beginning of a crisis, the System would be
operated as far as possible provisionally or on an ad hoc, pragmatic basis by
the Secretariat, the co-operating oil companies and Member governments.
Once the trigger finding has been made and the confirmation proceedings
under Article 19 are complete, however, the Sharing System enters formally
into operation. Institutionally, the function of managing and operating
the Sharing System is then conferred upon the Emergency Management
Organisation, constituted as follows:
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION
Governing
Board
National Emergency
Sharing Organisations(NESOs)Standing Group on
Emergency Questions(SEQ)

Industry Advisory Board(IAB)

Office of the
Allocation Coordinator
EOT

IEA Secretariat

Reporting Company Affiliates
and Non-Reporting Companies

Industry Supply
Advisory Group(ISAG)
Reporting Companies

Each of these elements in the Emergency Management Organisation is
described in the EMM, Section 1.2.1, where the above diagram appears.
Most are described briefly in Volume I of the History [the Governing Board(p. 157), the Standing Group on Emergency Questions (SEQ) (p. 230), theIndustry Advisory Board (IAB) (p. 220), and also Section 7 below], but several
need further identification in this context. In the case of a crisis, the Allocation
93

Co-ordinator is the IEA Executive Director, responsible for the supervisionand guidance of the allocation process. The National Emergency Sharing
Organisation (NESO) of each Member provides information, organizes
national oil sharing, and conducts the necessary liaison. The Industry Supply
Advisory Group (ISAG) is an ad hoc group of the IAB. Under the guidanceof the Allocation Co-ordinator, ISAG provides expertise on emergency supply
matters and communicates with co-operating companies on voluntary offers
and other matters. The Emergency Operations Team (EOT) is comprisedof the Allocation Co-ordinator, the IEA Secretariat, and the ISAG; they are
expected to function at the IEA’s Paris offices throughout a crisis. The
Reporting Companies (RCs) are the co-operating oil companies operatingin Member countries; they advise, consult, and co-operate with the Agency.
They also supply Questionnaire data and make voluntary offers to reallocate
oil. The Reporting Company Affiliates transmit data and co-operate with
the IEA, not directly but through their respective Reporting Company
headquarters. Non-Reporting Companies do the same through theirrespective NESOs.
These are the main allocation actors. Their overall function inallocation is to provide information, to develop solutions to the problemsof balancing supply rights with the available oil, and to see that thosesolutions are converted into oil supply actions that bring about the necessary
reallocation. For the IEA much of the incoming information is provided
by Reporting Companies in Questionnaire A submissions and by Members
in Questionnaire B submissions [See Section 6 below]. The solutions toallocation problems are developed by all of the participants described above,
but especially by the Allocation Co-ordinator, the Secretariat, the ISAG, andthe Reporting Companies. The supply actions are of three types, which
may be taken simultaneously:
TYPE 1: Reporting and other companies “will voluntarily andindependently of any requests by the IEA” re-arrange their own
supply, including commercial transactions, in response to theemergency situation, taking into account Members’ allocationrights and allocation obligations as they are informed of themby the IEA.
TYPE 2: Companies will voluntarily re-arrange supplies anddevelop possible supply transactions with other companies in
response to a specific request by the Emergency Operations
Team, to assist in meeting Members’ calculated supply rights, i.e.
94

to balance allocation rights and obligations including the removalof significant product imbalances. The Allocation Co-ordinatormust approve Type 2 transactions before they are implemented.
TYPE 3: If, in spite of the best voluntary efforts of theindustry, additional actions to meet countries’ supply rights
are required, Members acting together through the SEQ will
establish what further measures are required and how they will
be implemented. This might include “direct instructions fromindividual governments to companies”.
While these actions need not be taken in the order in which they appear
above, and while the Agency would expect Type 1 actions to be taken
continuously without direct IEA requests but in the knowledge of the needs
developed in the Sharing System, Type 2 Voluntary Offers would be solicitedby the Agency when Type 1 actions are insufficient. Voluntary Offers would
come in a number of different forms. They could be in “Closed-Loop” form,
where the supplier and receiver of oil have arranged the transaction (in eitherof two ways, as between affiliates of the same company or as between two
non-affiliated companies) in advance of the submission of the offer. When atransaction has not been “Closed” or matched ahead of time, the companies
supply “Open” Voluntary Offers, either a Supply Offer or a Receive Offer,and it is a function of the ISAG to find a suitable match of the Offers for the
Allocation Co-ordinator’s approval. In 1986 the Governing Board modified
the operational arrangements for handling Closed-Loop Voluntary Offers, tolengthen the period of time for the submission of such offers, in what became
known as the “Wider Window” concept, and to accelerate IEA processing andapproval. The purpose of this arrangement was to reduce antitrust risks[See Section 7 below] and to encourage companies to make as many Offersof this type as possible and as early as possible. Instead of a brief period
for these Offers to be submitted to the Allocation Co-ordinator and to beapproved (or not), the “Wider Window” concept allows the Offers to bemade and to reflect IEA allocation needs at almost any time during themonthly allocation cycle [See IEA/GB(86)31(1st Revision), Item 2(d)(ii)].
The allocation process moves in successive monthly cycles until the disruption
is resolved and the System may be deactivated.
One question which falls across all types of emergency transactions
is the determination of the price to be paid for allocated oil. The I.E.P.
Agreement anticipated this question by the basic but not fully developed
price provision in Article 10.1:
95

The objectives of the Program shall include ensuring fairtreatment for all Participating Countries and basing the price forallocated oil on the price conditions prevailing for comparable
commercial transactions.
Prices are likely to be volatile in an emergency, as they had been during
the 1973-1974 crisis, but the standard had essentially to be either market
price (with its volatility) or some sort of managed price system. Bothnotions have been cited when price questions have been considered. The
fact that oil prices were being quite deliberately and openly managed by theoil producers’ organization did not simplify the problem. The Governing
Board’s first formulation of more detailed rules provided for continuity ingovernments’ price policies, for the emergency not to result in higher prices
or abnormal profits, for similar prices to affiliates and to non-affiliates, andfor term rather than spot prices [See EMM, 4th Ed. 1982, p. 20]. As
experience was gained through the Systems Tests or other developments,
the managed price flavour of parts of this formulation did not sit well withmany governments and oil companies. In the early 1980s there began amovement, initiated by the Industry Advisory Board (IAB), to revise the priceformula to give greater weight to market prices, in part also because it
became increasingly difficult to imagine that oil would flow under voluntary
IEA allocation actions at lower prices than might be applied in fully freemarket transactions directing the oil to other destinations. In 1983 the SEQ
and the Governing Board became convinced that the formulation should
be changed to provide this:the price for allocated oil shall be based on price conditions
prevailing for comparable commercial transactions; comparable
transactions do not exclude any types of transactions in themarket.
Moreover, the earlier references to “abnormal profits” and losses andto “term prices not spot prices” were deleted [see the 1983 amendments
in IEA/GB(83)69, Item 2(b) and Annex I; and Corrigendum].
The most clearly market oriented concept was adopted by the Board
in October, 1994 when the formulation was reduced to two clear
statements:
With regard to pricing policies of companies and governments, thefollowing principles apply to oil trading in an emergency:
96




governments have autonomy in price policies, and retain their rightto continuity in these policies with due regard to Article 10.1 ofthe IEP;
the price for allocated oil shall be based on price conditions prevailingfor comparable commercial transactions and shall be negotiated by theparties involved [See EMM, 5th Ed. 1994, Section 4.4.7].

The operation of the Sharing System proceeds in an orderly fashion
step-by-step. Provision is made in the EMM [5th Ed.1994, Section 3] fora series of ten basic Sharing System steps which can only be summarized
briefly here. In Step I, the Secretariat communicates the allocation rights
and obligations to the Allocation Co-ordinator and to the ISAG. In Step
2 the corresponding advice is given to the Reporting Companies andto the Members. Voluntary offers are then received by the Emergency
Operations Team (Step 3). These offers are evaluated by the Team (Step4) before selected offers are approved by the Allocation Co-ordinator (Step5) for implementation. The Offering Company or NESO reports on theimplementation of the approved offer (Step 6); the ISAG consults with the
Allocation Co-ordinator on any further action which might be required, by
reason of non-implemented offers or other reasons; and the ISAG advises
the Companies and NESOs as necessary to ensure the fullest exploitationof the voluntary offer potential of the situation (Step 7). In Step 8, if nosubstantial discrepancies remain, ISAG reports the situation to the Allocation
Co-ordinator, who in turn reports the SEQ, to draw the cycle of actions toa close. If substantial discrepancies do remain and cannot be resolved byfurther voluntary offers or in future cycles, then following the ISAG’s reportto the Allocation Co-ordinator, the SEQ is informed, and if the SEQ sorequests, the Allocation Co-ordinator consults the IAB on ways to resolve thediscrepancies. If this does not lead to the resolution of the discrepancies on
a voluntary basis, the Allocation Co-ordinator so advises the SEQ (Step 9),
and the process moves to possible compulsory action under Step 10. In Step
10 there is provision for considering the companies’ reasons for declining
to undertake on a voluntary basis the suggested corrective actions and forintergovernmental consultations to resolve the discrepancy. If in spite of thisconsultation, the SEQ still considers that there is need for corrective action
and that this can be done only by direct instructions from governments
to the companies, then the governments concerned must instruct the
responsible companies as to the disposition of oil under the I.E.P. Agreement.
This determination by the SEQ is legally binding upon the governments
concerned [See Volume I, p. 213]. At the end of this ten step procedure,97

and after the needed number of successive allocation cycles is completed, theallocation process is concluded and the Sharing System may be deactivatedand shut down.
This description of the operation of the Sharing System requires
reference to the legislative authority of Members to take the necessarycommitments and actions. When the IEA was established in 1974, not all
Members had in place the necessary legislative measures to enable theirgovernments to take all the actions which they might be called upon to takeunder the Sharing System. Before giving their consent to be bound by the
I.E.P. Agreement. Members had to hold the legislative authority to take allof these actions, and all eventually did so. In a number of cases, measuresgeared directly to the IEA were adopted. Members report periodicallyon the readiness of their legislative measures under the Agreement andspecifically under the Sharing System. These reports have been summarized
in IEA documents, the most recent being the “Draft Summary of Energy
Emergency Legislation of IEA Countries” [IEA/SEQ(89)25(1st Revision)]and “Member Countries’ Legislation, Administrative Procedures and Policy
Attitudes Concerning the Use of Stocks in Supply Disruptions” [IEA/
GB(89)26(2nd Revision)]. The effect of the I.E.P. Agreement in the nationallaw of IEA Members is discussed in Volume I, Chapter III, Section B.
(b)

European Communities (EU)The extensive co-operative relations between the IEA and the European
Communities are described in Volume I, Chapter IV, Section D-3, where
it is noted that the European Commission participated in the general
preparatory work and in developing, refining, and testing the Emergency
Sharing System over the years. The Commission is regularly represented
in the Governing Board on emergency and other questions as well as
in the Standing Group on Emergency Questions which bears a principal
responsibility in this sector. The Commission has adopted two decisions
granting oil companies a necessary exemption from the competition rulesof Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome [See Section 7(c) below]. Commission
representatives have met regularly with the IEA’s oil Industry Advisory Board,
have participated in the Agency’s tests of the Sharing System [See Section F
below], and have contributed to the development of the Dispute Settlement
Centre [See Section B-8 below].
Perhaps the closest co-operation between the two institutions has takenplace in connection with the so-called “interface” between the IEA and EU
oil emergency systems. There are links to be made in the decision making,98

political monitoring, and crisis management structures of the two institutions,as well as in their approaches to crisis operations, industry assistance,stockholding rules, demand restraint, data sources, trigger calculation,
allocation concepts (total energy sharing concepts in the EU, and oil sharing
concepts in the (IEA), and a number of technical elements. In the late1970s, it became clear that there was nevertheless a great deal of potential
overlap, and that a means should be developed for the two systems tooperate together, despite the fact that one EU Member, France, was notthen a Member of the IEA. The IEA had the data system and industry
co-operation mechanisms which might be put to use for both the EU systemand the IEA to avoid unnecessary duplications and costs. Hence the stage
was set for an “interface” arrangement which the Governing Board adopted
on 13-14 March 1980 [IEA/GB(80)21, Item 10; IEA/GB(80)27] in the formof amendments to the EMM [The current text is found in the EMM, 5th
Ed.1994, Section 2.2.10].
The interface applies to the IEA Emergency Sharing System (not to
the CERM or other response measures) on the IEA side, and to the “PhaseII” sharing system on the EU side. The interface involves essentially arecomputation of the EU Members’ supply rights, as well as their allocationrights and obligations, after adjustment among the EU countries on the basisof the EU concepts. It can also accommodate within the EU group an EU
Member State which is not a Member of the IEA, such as France until 1992.
At the time of writing there are no countries in that particular situation.
(c)

Non-Member Countries

Although the IEA has not entered into any co-operative relations with nonMembers on the application of the Sharing System, there are provisions
in the I.E.P. Agreement which establish IEA policy on certain interests of
non-Member countries. Thus Article 11.1 of the I.E.P. Agreement makes it
clear that “It is not an objective of the Program to seek to increase, in an
emergency, the share of world oil supply that the group had under normal
market conditions”. This means simply that no advantage would be takenof opportunities of the IEA group to receive proportionately more oil thanthey had before the crisis, and the non-Members as a group would not
suffer at the hands of IEA countries. Article 11.1 goes still further in stating
as well that “Historical oil trade patterns should be preserved as far as isreasonable, and due account should be taken of the position of individual
non-participating countries”. Thus traditional trade patterns would not99become IEA targets. These patterns could be adjusted if necessary, or if
adjustment would be reasonable under all of the circumstances, but otherwise
they would not be disturbed. The position of individual non-Members would
have to be taken into account by the Agency in the absence of compelling
reasons for making this impossible or impracticable. While the Governing
Board has been empowered to make decisions on these questions, up to thepresent the Board has not had occasion to adopt concrete measures of thissort. However, the Board has been attentive to the oil supply problems of
non-Members, not in relation to their possible participation in the Sharing
System, but in relation to the possibility of their benefiting from the IEA’s
experience in this sector. Thus in 1993, “given the increasing importanceof non-Member countries in international oil markets”, IEA Ministers asked“the IEA to make available its expertise in emergency response strategies
to appropriate non-Member countries [IEA/GB(93)41, paragraph 7]; this isoccurring on a bilateral basis with prospective new Members of the IEA,
and on a multilateral basis with many non-Members, as in the Kagoshima
Workshop discussed in Section B-I above.
From the time of the founding of the IEA, the Member countries have
kept under consideration the needs of non-Members in times of oil supply
disruptions. There is nothing in the Sharing System to prevent Members insuch times from exporting oil to non-Members, whether or not the Sharing
System is activated. Nor does the I.E.P. Agreement restrain Members fromentering into bilateral agreements with non-Members to export oil to them,even agreements which might provide for the amounts of such exports to
be calculated in accordance with Sharing System principles. At the timeof the second oil shock, the United States, for example, entered into suchagreements with Israel which provide for the supply of oil by the UnitedStates to Israel [See the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) of 26 March
1979, 30 U.S.T. p. 5989, T.I.A.S. No. 9533, U.N.T.S. No. 19923, Vol. 1234,
p. 221 and the Contingency Implementing Arrangement of 17 October 1980,
32 U.S.T. p. 3667, T.I.A.S. No. 9908, U.N.T.S. No. 19923, Vol. 1266, p.
370]. Section (b) of the Annex to the MOA provides that if the oil needed tomeet normal requirements for domestic production is unavailable to Israel,under stated conditions
the United States Government will promptly make oil available
for purchase by Israel in accordance with the International
Energy Agency Conservation and allocation formula, as appliedby the United States Government, in order to meet Israel’s
essential requirements [Emphasis added],100and pursuant to the Contingency Arrangement,
Should the IEA General Trigger emergency procedures be
activated the U.S. Government would make oil available forpurchase by Israel in accordance with the IEA General Allocation
formula [Paragraph 6].
Since the IEA Sharing System has not been activated to the time of writing,there has not been an occasion foregoing provisions of the arrangements
between the United States and Israel to be applied.

6. Information Systems
The Agency’s work in the emergency response sector, as well as thegeneral operations of the IEA, are supported by legal commitments on theestablishment and operation of the Agency’s Information System as provided
in Chapter V of the Agreement. The “General Section” of this Information
System. Concerned with information about the operation of the internationaloil market and activities of the oil companies, is established under Article
25.1 of the Agreement [See Chapter VI below]. Separate provision is also
made for the so-called “Special Section” devoted to the efficient operationof the Emergency Sharing System. Both Sections of the IEA Information
System are operated on a permanent basis under the responsibility of theSecretariat. As will be seen below, some elements of the Special Section
concerning particularly sensitive information are activated only in connection
with actual or expected oil supply disruptions.
The Special Section provisions obligate Members to make available to
the Secretariat “all information which is necessary to ensure the efficient
operation of emergency measures” [Article 32]. Each Member agrees to “takeappropriate measures to ensure that all oil companies operating within its
jurisdiction make such information available to it as is necessary to enable
it to fulfil its obligations” under the Special Section. On the basis of thisinformation and other sources of information, the Secretariat is required tosurvey continuously the supply and consumption of oil within the IEA groupand within each Member country.
Article 33 lists the subjects on which Members are to provide
information, as follows:

oil consumption and supply,
demand restraint measures,101levels of emergency reserves,

as well as relevant aspects of transportation, international levels of supply
and demand, and other subjects as decided by the Governing Board. Under
Article 34, the Standing Group on Emergency Questions (SEQ) identifies“the precise data within the list of subjects in Article 33 which are required
under the Special Section”. In preparing its reports on this subject, the SEQ
consults with oil companies and works out precise standards of harmonizationand procedure to ensure confidentiality [Article 35]; the decisions on thisinformation system are made by the Governing Board, and the SEQ ischarged with the responsibility for reviewing the operation of the system on acontinuing basis and to report on its reviews. The Governing Board again has
the power of decision on proposals concerning the emergency information
system. The Board’s decisions on the more precise data requirements forthe efficient operation of the Sharing System and other major data systemdecisions are indicated in the EMM, 5th Ed. 1994, Section 1.2.6.
Over the years, the data system has been developed by the SEQ
and the Secretariat, with the advice of the oil industry. The data consistsof the following:








Monthly historical oil supply and demand used in key emergency
calculations; this data is collected from Members on the Monthly Oil
Statistics Questionnaire.
Quarterly IEA world oil supply and demand forecasts, prepared by the
Secretariat from data provided voluntarily by some oil companies andgovernments, for preparation of the SEQ Quarterly Oil Forecast which
is used to establish “Disrupted supplies” in the trigger calculation
described above.
Monthly emergency oil supply data (Questionnaires A and B, discussed
below).
Demand restraint, stockdraw, and other information supplied by the
NESOs to the Secretariat during a crisis.
Advice received from Reporting Companies and the IAB.
Supplementary information available to the IEA, including the IEA
monthly Oil Market Report.

In responding to the problems of the 1979-1981 crisis, the Governing
Board initiated another system (called Questionnaire C), which was intended
to provide more detailed and extensive data than that which had been
available in non-emergency periods, and to give the Agency a better102

understanding of pre-emergency supply conditions [this was part of the 1981
Decision on Preparations for Future Supply Disruptions, IEA/GB(81)86,
Item 2(b) and Annex I, paragraph 2 and Attachment; see Section C-2
below]. It called for Members to provide three months of data centered
upon the reporting month, with the third month therefore being a forecast.
Questionnaire C was employed for over a decade, but the usefulness ofthe transmitted data did not live up to expectations. After careful review
and attempts to correct the situation, in December 1993 the Governing
Board approved the SEQ’s recommendation to discontinue Questionnaire C[IEA/GB(93)65, Item 5(b); IEA/GB(93)61].
Questionnaires A (QuA) and B (QuB) have, however, proven to be quite
useful and successful. When activated during an emergency, they provide
month-to-month data on the current and scheduled oil supplies to and from
Members. Questionnaire A information is provided by each of the Reporting
Companies, while Questionnaire B information is provided by each Member’s
NESO (and covers its non-Reporting companies as well). The data supplied
under Questionnaires A and B include:








Indigenous production of crude oil and natural gas liquids (NGLs).
Imports of crude oil and products.
Exports of crude oil and products.
Closing stock levels and stock changes.
Stock levels and changes by category.
Stocks held for other countries and stocks held abroad.
Stocks at sea.

Each of the Questionnaires covers a five month period, including the current
month in which the Questionnaire in submitted, the two previous months,
and two forward months. Data for the future months consists of realistic
assessments of the IEA countries’ oil supplies, including scheduled movements
which are expected to take place.
This QuA/QuB data is essential to the monitoring and assessment of
the supply situation, to the trigger determinations, to the calculationof country supply rights, allocation rights and obligations, and to theimplementation of allocation procedures. Reallocation of oil to balance
allocation rights and allocation obligations is not possible without suchoperational data. The EMM [5th Ed. 1994, Section 1.2.6] concludes on
this point that “The questionnaires have been designed to obtain detailed
data on as large a proportion of oil supplies as possible within the limitsof practicability”.
103Since the preparation of the Questionnaires represents a sizeable
responsibility for the co-operating oil companies and for Members, thetriggering of the information gathering process through the Questionnaires
is not automatic. The Executive Director has been authorized to activate
the Questionnaires, and indeed did so during the 1979-1981 crisis andin the Gulf crisis in 1990. In the early EMM, the Executive Director
was authorised, after consulting the Chairman of the SEQ and contacting
Member governments, to “request” the submissions of the Questionnaires“if developments in the international oil supply situation call for a moredetailed monitoring through the Agency” [See EMM, 4th Ed. 1982, pp.
15-16; EMM, 5th Ed. 1994, Section 1.2.6]. Once the Questionnaires wereactivated in the 1979 crisis, the Governing Board agreed to continue thesubmissions in October 1979 [IEA/GB (79)64, Item 2(h)], in December 1980
[IEA/GB(80)97, Item 2(g)(v) and Annex I, Paragraph 2], and in March
1981 [IEA/GB (81)21, Item 2(d) and Annex]. In the 1981 Governing Board
Decision on “Preparation for Future Supply Disruptions” [See Section C-2
below], the following formula was adopted in paragraph 2(d):In the event of a supply disruption, the Executive Director
may also decide (after consultation with the Chairmen of theSEQ, the SOM and the Governing Board and contact withMember governments) to activate submission of Questionnaires A
and B, consistent with procedures established for the emergency
allocation system.
The most recent activation of the Questionnaires occurred during the
1990-1991 Gulf crisis. Following completion of the foreseen consultations at
the beginning of the crisis, the Executive Director activated the Questionnaires,and the Governing Board on 9 August 1990 “noted” and thus approved
this action [See IEA/GB(90)24, Item 2 Annex; see Section E below]. In thisinstance of the emergency data system in action (this was not merely a test,
which imposes a number of artificial conditions), the QuA/QuB emergency
data system proved to be quite successful. The Gulf crisis confirmed thatthe continued readiness of the emergency data system is indispensable to theeffective operation of the Emergency Sharing System overall.
In 1994 the Governing Board confirmed the Executive Director’s
authority to request the submission of emergency data and introduced anelement of flexibility. This decision is contained in the 1994 Emergency
Management Manual as follows:
104

The Executive Director may, after consultation with the Chairmanof the SEQ and contact with Participating Countries, requestof RCs [Reporting Companies] and Participating Countries tosubmit questionnaires A and B or, in situations which do not
require the full submission, may introduce a reduced or limited
form of Questionnaires A and B or introduce the questionnaires
in a staged manner. Submissions will be requested periodicallyfor test purposes [EMM, 5th Ed. 1994, Section 1.2.6].

7. Co-operation with the Oil Industry(a)

Oil Company Co-operation

As is evident from the foregoing discussion, the IEA depends heavily upon
the assistance which the oil industry provides directly to the Agency. In quiet
times as well as during periods of oil supply emergencies, the co-operation ofoil companies is essential to the development and operation of the Emergency
Sharing System.
The governments of the major oil consumer countries learned during
the 1973-1974 oil crisis that they were dependent upon oil companies forassistance with respect to oil supply emergencies because the companies
alone had:







The information on oil imports, exports, indigenous production,
inventories, etc., which would be necessary to make an allocation
system function properly in an emergency.
The oil industry expertise necessary to design in detail a workablesystem of allocation in the complex oil market serving consuming
countries.
The knowledge of the industry and markets necessary to advise theSecretariat, when making the emergency “finding”, about the actual
state of the oil supply situation and the appropriateness of the measures
which might be taken.
The expertise to operate an international allocation system and toadvise on particular movements of oil that would become necessary
in the course of allocation.
Control over a large part of the oil itself as well as the relevanttransport, refining, and distribution systems.
105

Industry co-operation largely on a voluntary basis has been established,upon the invitation of IEA governments, with respect to each of the foregoingelements. The group of co-operating oil companies, which now consistsof about forty companies covering an estimated seventy per cent of theinternational oil supply, provides data in normal times to IEA governments
for compilation and transmission monthly to the IEA. The governments,
in turn, will supply to the Agency data received from these and othercompanies operating within their territories. In times of supply disruption, thecompanies will supply data directly to the Agency and to the governments.
By these channels the Agency will receive confidential and proprietary data
concerning consumption, supply movements, indigenous production, andstocks necessary for the operation of the Sharing System. General advice on
the design of the Sharing System and related matters is provided to the IEA
regularly by the Industry Advisory Board (IAB). The IAB has systematicallyaided the Agency in developing the mechanics of allocation.
The Industry Supply Advisory Group (ISAG) provides the industry
operational assistance in the course of an emergency. The ISAG oil company
supply experts provide operational and technical expertise to the IEA in
Paris to operate the sharing system under IEA direction. They retain
their status as company employees but are solely responsible to the IEA
while carrying out their ISAG functions. These functions include analysing
data and supply problems, developing voluntary offers of companies tomeet allocation rights and allocation obligations, providing advice to the
IEA Allocation Co-ordinator on the acceptability of voluntary offers, andmonitoring company implementation of approved voluntary offers.
The most visible and important industry functions in the System
consists of company supply actions, the execution of IEA approved voluntaryoffers (Type 2 activity), as well as independent trade operations which
may take into account countries’ allocation right and obligation information
supplied by the Agency (Type 1 activity), and the latter particularly is
growing in importance. These company activities ultimately involve thediversion of oil cargoes from destinations in countries with allocation
obligations toward destinations in countries with allocation rights. All of theindustry functions and supply activities described above are performed on
a voluntary basis and may be supplemented by mandatory supply activity(Type 3) as necessary.
(b)

Industry Advisory Board (IAB)

Much of the oil industry co-operation described above has been carriedout by the IEA Industry Advisory Board, which was established by the106Governing Board for that purpose early in 1975. The IAB membership ofnearly twenty companies is drawn from the group of Reporting Countries ina fashion which maintains a balance between major international and othercompanies, with some degree of rotation of membership. The IAB meets whenconvened by the IEA, at the level of senior officials of its member companies,
and provides advice and operational assistance but not operational decisions,which remain fully in the hands of the IEA itself. The Secretariat participatesin IAB meetings, but government Members of the IEA do not, except as may
be required under the law of the Member. So far this has resulted in theparticipation of antitrust monitors, as required by United States law, andEU competition monitors, as required under EU rules. A few members of
the IAB meet regularly with SEQ, and when required, as in the 1990-1991
Gulf crisis, the IAB Chairman has participated as an observer in Governing
Board meetings during consideration of a matter on which the Board wishedto have IAB advice. Effective operation of the Emergency Sharing Systemdepends upon IAB advice, and upon IAB staffing support through the ISAG.
The ISAG consists of oil supply experts drawn from the companies; in an
emergency, they provide much of the industry expertise for advising the
IEA in detail on the operation of the Sharing System. The IAB has been
the source of a number of useful Sharing System developments, innovations
and improvements over the twenty years that the companies have been
co-operating with IEA, and this co-operation has contributed significantly tomaintaining the Sharing System as a ready and effective instrument.
(c)U.S. Antitrust Defence and EU Competition Exemption

Antitrust and competition questions about oil supply emergency actions
arose during the 1973-1974 crisis before the IEA was established. The oilcompanies dealt with the crisis as best they could on an individual company
basis, but they considered that they could not co-ordinate their actions either
directly or indirectly. This was because private companies operating in the
United States were concerned about possible liability under the antitrust lawsof the United States. For companies operating in the European Economic
Community the same concerns arose under the competition rules embodied
in Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome. These questions immediately reappearedwith the creation of the IEA, since the Agency would become itself thecentre of co-ordinated efforts to deal with future crises. In the Agency’sview, the participation of U.S., European, and other oil companies would beindispensable to the effectiveness and success of the actions which the Agency
was preparing to take in future emergencies.
107For co-operating oil companies, antitrust questions could arise inrelation to a number of expected IEA activities and actions. From the outset,
the IEA has needed industry advice on the details of the Sharing System,
and it still does on a regular basis. That advice is provided not only bycompanies acting individually, but also and more systematically by means of
the Industry Advisory Board [described above in Section (b)] in essentiallya co-ordinated fashion. When the Agency requests oil companies to provide
confidential and proprietary information for use in tests of the System,
just as it would in an actual emergency, industry personnel participate in
the ISAG to advise on specific movements of allocated oil, and companies
participate in the redirection of oil under IEA auspices. These company
actions raise serious risks of antitrust enforcement litigation on the initiativeof governments or of private litigants who may bring actions under U.S. law
in civil litigation for treble damages against alleged antitrust violators.
Since these problems were known to the founders of the Agency, it was
not altogether unexpected that company representatives found it necessary
to delay their participation in some early IEA preparations while the antitrust
problems were being resolved in Washington and Brussels. Although thecompanies were co-operative, they insisted that their governments provide
them with protection against antitrust proceedings grounded on actions the
IEA or their governments would ask them to take under the Sharing System.
The most serious problems arose with respect to the United States and theEuropean Communities.
In the United States these concerns led to the Congressional
enactment of an antitrust defence, initially for two years, in the Energy Policy
and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA) [CCH, Federal Energy Guidelines¶10,879], which also adopted a number of conditions and restrictions. A
Voluntary Agreement and Plan of Action [¶15,845] was thereafter adopted
to provide for certain conditions and restrictions that are to be respected
if the antitrust defence is to be applicable. Specific provisions describe thetypes of substantive actions which companies may take, the confidential or
proprietary information which may be communicated, the disposition of andaccess to such information, the requirements for recordkeeping, reporting andmonitoring, rules for notice of meetings, and U.S. government monitoring.
The U.S. system has at times proved to be burdensome to the Agency andcompanies, and the periodic need for renewal of the antitrust defence
provisions has caused a brief hiatus in coverage and longer periods of
uncertainty. The time limits requiring renewal every few years give rise torecurring concerns about the expiration of this legislative protection at times
108when the defence would be necessary to IEA operations. Such concerns wereraised in the midst of the gulf crisis in 1990-1991, but fortunately the renewal
legislation came into force before the scheduled expiration date.
The risk of company liability under the EU rules of competition,
particularly under Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, also brought calls forrelief. In 1976 the Agency received a “light negative clearance letter” from Mr.
Schlieder, Director General for Competition of the Commission [See IEA/SEQ(76)27], declaring in effect that the contemplated company actions with the
IEA “are not in themselves incompatible with the rules of competition of theTreaty” so long as these actions also complied with a number of conditions
and restrictions. This served the companies well until the early 1980s when
it began to appear that the letter, which became known as the “Schlieder
letter”, might not fully protect companies in litigation initiated by Member
States or by private litigants. In order to strengthen their protection, anumber of companies initiated a proceeding under Article 85(3) of theTreaty for an exemption decision, which was granted by the Commission
on 12 December 1983 for a ten year period [See IEA/SEQ (84)62], alsowith conditions and restrictions. That Decision was in turn extended by theCommission on 21 February 1994 for a further period of ten years [See94/153/EC, O.J.E.C., No. L 68/35, 11 March 1994].
The IEA has fully understood and has consistently supported thecompanies in their efforts to remove or reduce the hazards associated withantitrust and competition rules which might otherwise interfere with thesmooth operation of the Sharing System, because the IEA has continued toneed the co-operation of the oil companies as an essential support for thedevelopment, testing, and operation of the Sharing System.
8. Resolution of Differences and Disputes
The modalities for settling differences which might arise under the Emergency
Sharing System were not foremost among the Members’ concerns in
November 1974 when the Agency was established. Their primary concern
was the resolution of the industrial countries’ problems with practical and
immediate issue of energy policy, with short and long-term response to the“energy crisis”. Thus, it is not surprising that specific dispute settlement
procedures were omitted from the I.E.P. Agreement. Nor were they discussed
as such at any length in the preparatory work on the Agreement. While anumber of Agreement provisions was designed to help shape the resolutionof policy disagreements within the Agency, there was no specific provision for
the resolution of disputes of a legal nature, such as questions of interpretation109

of the Agreement, competence of the various IEA bodies, the validity of
the innovative actions to be taken by the Secretariat, and compliance bygovernments with their new I.E.P. obligations, or disputes which might arise
between the co-operating oil companies and the Agency or governments
or other companies.
The sense of the Energy Co-ordinating Group was that legal as wellas political disagreements among the various participants would have to beresolved in accordance with the future decisions of the Governing Board,which is the senior decision-making body of the Agency. Such questions as
whether the Governing Board’s actions concerning disputes would be taken
case-by-case or whether the Board would establish separate mechanisms
for dispute resolution were not explicitly addressed. Nor would it have beenfeasible for the founders to write into the I.E.P. Agreement a comprehensive
dispute settlement mechanism while there was clearly a more urgent needto proceed with broader questions of policy. Furthermore, it would havebeen difficult at that early date to make a thorough analysis of the kindsof disputes which might arise under the Emergency Sharing system andit would have been quite impossible to foresee the nature of disputes inthose sectors which would be developed only after the Agency had become
fully operational.
One can surmise that in the operation of the Sharing System, disputes
could arise out of any of the oil company activities described above in
Sections 5 and 6, particularly out of supply actions taken by the companies,
whether voluntary or mandatory. In some cases, the supply actions may
require companies to terminate existing commercial arrangements and toenter into new ones, with some degree of political as well as commercial risk.
Disputes could also arise out of the application of rules governing competition
under the Treaty of Rome, the antitrust laws of the United States, andsimilar measures in other countries. Most disputes would be expected to beresolved through discussion, negotiation, and agreement among the parties,
or through such mediation and conciliation procedures as the parties might
adopt. There could well remain, however, other disputes for which someform of arbitral or legal proceeding would be the most appropriate or the
only effective means of settlement.
In the absence of a specified dispute resolution procedure, the Agency
itself could help resolve disputes, but the Agency is not well-placed froma juridical or practical standpoint to impose settlements on oil companies.
Theoretically the relevant I.E.P. Agreement provisions and Governing Board
decisions could have been made directly applicable to oil companies, which
was not done. None of the I.E.P. Agreement provisions concerning oil
companies is directly addressed to them. Under Article 52.1, Governing
110

Board decisions are explicitly made binding on Members but not upon oil
companies. Since the Agency’s relationship with the companies is one ofvoluntary co-operation except insofar as they may be compelled to act undernational legislation or by agreement, it is clear that the I.E.P. Agreement was
not intended to apply directly to the oil companies. The I.E.P. and Governing
Board texts have created a high expectation of company co-operation, butthere is no international legal or contractual obligation for the companies toparticipate either in the Sharing System or in dispute settlement proceduresor to abide by any settlements developed in the IEA except by voluntaryagreement. The companies co-operating with the IEA found that the costly
and lengthy remedies available under national legal systems are not fully
satisfactory for disputes which might arise under the Sharing System.
There was accordingly a case to be made for creating a specialized
dispute settlement mechanism to which the parties to a dispute could turn, if
they so choose, for resolution of IEA related disputes. The availability of sucha mechanism would make it easier for oil companies to make Type 1 andType 2 voluntary supply arrangements [See Section 5 above] in the allocation
process. It could be particularly important in Type 3 mandated actions, wherecompanies might not have at their disposal the options available to themin normal commercial transactions. Hence early in the life of the IEA, theco-operating companies proposed that an alternative and specialized disputesettlement mechanism be established under the auspices of the Agency.
The oil industry group’s initial suggestions to the Agency concerned
the special risks companies might incur in taking supply actions under
the Sharing System, especially in respect to mandatory (Type 3) supply
actions because company compliance directives could bring the company
into conflict with non-IEA governments, private commercial partners, orboth. There were also suggestions that the Agency adopt procedures for the
resolution of disputes arising under the I.E.P. Agreement involving a broad
category of parties, including disputes between (1) two or more companies,(2) co-operating companies and Member countries, and (3) two or more
Member countries (although suggestions focused particularly on disputes
among companies, and between companies and governments). A broad
subject matter jurisdiction was also foreseen.
Early in 1977, the Industry Advisory Board developed a systematic
proposal for the Dispute Settlement Centre modelled after the World Bank’s
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. These initialsuggestions of the oil companies did not attract full support within the
Agency. Although the Governing Board found no difficulty in adopting thesuggestion that it should consider the potential impact upon the companies
111

concerned before taking a mandatory supply action, Members could not
accept liability for such costs or the establishment of a dispute resolution
system with jurisdiction over such claims against Members.
The IEA Dispute Settlement Centre (DSC) was established by theGoverning Board on 23 July 1980 on the basis of modified IAB proposals,
made after extensive consultations with governments, oil companies, theSecretariat, and the SEQ [See text in IEA/GB(80)56, Item 8 and Annex;
20 I.L.M. 241 (1981)]. As finally presented, the modified proposals were
designed principally to meet industry concerns about the resolution ofcommercial-type disputes which might arise out of the application of the
Sharing System. Commercial-type disputes could arise from the terminationof existing supply contracts in some cases, the rapid conclusion of newcontracts, or commercial situations where buyers and sellers might deal
with new and unfamiliar partners and where questions of the buyer’s credit
worthiness might arise, all occurring under strong pressures for rapid actionin the course of an emergency. Under these circumstances, disputes of acommercial nature might raise issues such as price, liability, damages for
failure of delivery or untimely delivery, responsibility for freight, insurance,
port and demurrage costs, responsibility for costs of vessel diversion, breachof contract, and so forth.
While arbitration for commercial disputes may be obtained undersystems and facilities available in Paris, Stockholm, London or New York,
there are a number of advantages to be found in specialized arbitration
conducted under the auspices of the Agency. The particular advantages of
the Centre include the availability of an expert panel of arbitrators withspecialized experience IEA matters, a greater uniformity and continuityof decision, the promise of greater speed, and the availability of IEA
facilities and support staff. The IEA system is also less expensive than otheralternatives. Overall, the DSC provides a rapid, coherent, and reliable system
of arbitration specifically designed to meet the needs of the co-operating
oil companies.
The jurisdiction of the Centre and tribunals has been necessarily
restricted to a relatively narrow category of disputes. The subject matter
jurisdiction of the Centre is provided in Article II(a) of the Charter of theInternational Energy Agency Dispute Settlement Centre, which provides asfollows:
The jurisdiction of Arbitration Tribunals convened pursuant to
the Charter extends to any dispute between a seller and a buyerof oil, or between the parties to an exchange of oil arising112

out of an oil supply transaction during implementation of theemergency allocation of oil and under the International Energy
Program and as between the parities to a particular supply
transaction but not to decisions or right or obligations of I.E.A.
Countries under the International Energy Program, including
allocation rights and allocations obligations of I.E.A. Countries.
The parties to disputes remain fully free to pursue other means of dispute
resolution before they enter into a DSC arbitration, and even then and at any
later time they remain free to agree upon other procedures or to terminate
their DSC arbitration. Jurisdiction of DSC arbitration tribunals is limited
to disputes where the parties to the arbitration have consented in writing
to arbitration pursuant to the Charter. Consents to arbitration are made inmuch the same way that they are made in systems of private arbitration.
One exception foreseen under the DSC in the establishment of a special
inducement for a party to accept arbitration in Type 3 mandated oil supply
actions. The idea is that a government issuing the supply order might
authorize the supplier to require the other parties to the transaction to accept
Dispute Settlement Centre or other means of dispute settlement, and in thatcase the supplier would be free to do so, which could make the mandatorytransaction more acceptable.
Institutionally, the Centre is organized on a standby basis, ready to be
activated when the Emergency Sharing System is operating and if disputes
arise. The parties to a dispute may choose the arbitrators either from the
DSG Panel of Arbitrators or from outside of the Panel. The DSC Panel of
Arbitrators has been selected in advance and is maintained in place. The
responsibility for operating the Centre is assigned to the IEA Secretariat.
No arbitrations have yet been conducted by the Centre because its
jurisdiction extends only to cases arising out of the Emergency Sharing
System and the activation of that System has so far not been necessary.
There is always a possibility that the jurisdiction provisions of the DSC
Charter could be amended to extend the jurisdiction of Tribunals to
additional categories of disputes. Suggestions in the 1980s that DSC
arbitration might be used to fix the price of allocated oil in transactions
during a period of activation of the Sharing System have not been pursued.
Although there has been no modification of the DSC rules since the Centre
was established in 1980, the DSC could be adapted or further developed by
the Governing Board to satisfy additional dispute settlement requirementsof the Agency.
113

C.

The 1979-1981 Oil Supply Disruption

1. IEA Response
Since the founding of the IEA in 1974, there have been two oil supply crises
which raised questions about whether the loss of supplies might be sufficient totrigger the Emergency Sharing System and, if not, what other responses might
be appropriate: (1) the 1979-1981 crisis arising out of the Iranian Revolution
and the Iraq-Iran War, and (2) the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 [See Sections
C and E below]. In neither of these crises was the loss of supplies sufficient
to trigger the Sharing System although in 1979-1981 the selective trigger
might have been reached because of the temporary short supply of individual
countries (but not the general trigger for the group as a whole). In the caseof the Gulf crisis the threshold of 7 per cent actual or expected shortfall for
individual countries or for the group was not reached. The 1979-1981 crisis
caused severe economic damage to IEA countries. It also stimulated for the
first time the adoption of alternative response measures in situation where the
Sharing System trigger level was not reached, and it later brought about afar-ranging reform movement in the IEA, leading to greater awareness of thepossibilities of employing oil stocks and demand restraint and to the adoptionof procedural changes designed to enable the Agency to respond more rapidly
and flexibly to future oil supply disruptions.
During the five years following the first oil crisis of 1973-1974, theindustrial countries adjusted to the resulting “oil shock” and refined the
Sharing System on an operational basis. Although Significant measures had
been taken to reduce the Members’ dependence on imported oil [See Chapter
IV below], Members still remained vulnerable to oil supply disruptions, as the
1979-1981 crisis would show. World oil consumption in 1978 (not counting
the centrally planned economies) was about 52 million barrels of oil per
day, of which some 38 mbd were produced by OPEC countries (i.e. over 70
per cent). As these figures indicate, by 1978 the acute vulnerability seenin the lead-up to the events of 1973-1974 had not been overcome. The
main importers were the United States, the European Community countries,
and Japan, in that order; the main OPEC exporters were Saudi Arabia,
Iran and Iraq. The state of the oil market at the outbreak of the Iranian
Revolution, and succeeding oil market development, including changes insupply, deliveries, stocks, and price levels during the 1978-1981 period,
are reported and analyzed in detail in Daniel Badger and Robert Belgrave,“Oil Supply and Price: What Went Right in 1980?”, Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs, Energy Paper No. 2, (1982).
114

Following months of political and labour unrest in Iran during 1978,
with serious interruptions in oil production, Iranian oil exports virtually
stopped in December 1978. The IEA Secretariat reported these developments
to the responsible government expert bodies of the Agency and to theGoverning Board. Though the IEA did not immediately find the need totake responsive measures, that was soon to change. One early question
was the need for detailed supply information from oil companies andgovernments. This information was rapidly called for by the Executive
Director, who activated the emergency information system, Questionnaires
A and B [See Section B-6 above]. Supply was falling; prices were rising.
Largely independent actions were taken by a few countries to permit the
drawdown of stocks below the 90-day IEA level, to cease the purchase of
strategic stocks, and to persuade buyers to avoid paying the rising spot
market prices. By March 1979, the Secretariat’s assessment showed thatthe disruption was serious, not sufficient to trigger the Sharing System forthe group, but severe enough for some Members to experience individual
reductions above the 7 per cent trigger level.
At its 1-2 March 1979 meeting, the Governing Board adopted the“Action on the Oil Market Situation in 1979” [IEA/GB(79)8. Item 3, Annex
III], in which it found that “there exists a serious risk that in 1979 oil supplies
could fall short of anticipated oil demand by some 2mb/d”. The Board
noted uncertainty ahead, exacerbated by the substantial possibility of further
deterioration in the situation, and agreed to the objectives of improving
the supply/demand balance, of implementing flexible stock policies (whileproviding an adequate stock level for the following winter), and of relieving
the “current abnormal market conditions, with their pressures on prices”. In
the action part of its decision, the Governing Board.
(f) agreed that IEA countries will contribute to a stabilization of
the world situation by reducing their demand for oil on theworld market. The reduction would be in the order of 2 mb/dwhich would correspond to about 5% of IEA consumption.
Each Participating Country will regard this as guidance inthe policies it will pursue to achieve its contribution to thisreduction. These policies are expected to yield equivalent
results in Participating Countries [Emphasis added].
The 2 mbd reduction would be achieved by short-term action appropriate
to each country’s circumstances and as determined by each including115

reduced demand for oil (more efficiency, avoidance of energy consumption
not essential for maintaining high-level economic activity, and short-term
fuel switching away from oil), indigenous production, a shift to non-premium
grades of fuel, the adjustment of regulatory systems, and the adoptionof supporting domestic pricing policies [Paragraph (g)]. The Board also
expressed its expectation that “oil companies pay particular attention in
the present situation to the need for the fair distribution of oil among
consuming countries” [Paragraph (j)]. The Governing Board’s action, taken
under general powers conferred upon the Board in Article 51 of the I.E.P.
Agreement, was intended not as a legal decision but as a political one,
the Board stating that
although the Governments of Participating Countries were notthereby establishing legally binding commitments, they wereexpressing their firm political determination to give effect to thisAction [IEA/GB(79)8, Item 3(a)].
This decision suffered from the infirmities of not being legally binding andof stating the oil demand reduction action only as a “group objective” which
substantially impaired its effectiveness. (As will he seen below [Section E],
when the Board acted in the Gulf crisis in 1990-1991, its decision avoided
both of these problems). The 1979 action did not assign to Members firm
commitments as to the particular measures to he taken (unlike the 1991
Gulf decision which was specific as to measures (quantified by country as
to stockdraw, demand restraint, fuel switching and increased indigenous
production). Although the 1979 action was carefully monitored by the IEA
and individual country responses were scrutinized, the calculation of the
5 per cent contribution could not be precise. Moreover, as in all “groupobjectives” without specific commitments quantified country-by-country, theresponsibility for performance was diffuse, and accountability was difficult,for oil would be saved in fact by government interactions with consumers,
not by a group of governments seeking to act as “a whole”. This group actionof 1979 would provide the lessons which afterwards could he applied withadvantage to the more coherent Gulf crisis decision.
In March and again in May of 1979, the Governing Board met toconfirm the importance of the 1-2 March action and to consider detailed
performance information produced by the government expert Standing
Groups on Emergency Questions (SEQ) and on the Oil Market (SOM). On
22 May 1979, the Board convened in a special Ministerial Level meetingon this situation. BY that time IEA Ministers could agree that “the 1979116

world energy situation is a serious one with an oil shortfall of 2 mbd
still a reality and that there are at present no signs of improvement for1980” [IEA/GB(79)32, Item 3]. Ministers also confirmed the 1-2 March
action, recognized that implementation measures needed to be strengthened,
undertook to accelerate and improve those measures, and agreed on the
Board’s systematic monitoring of the Members’ progress in meeting thiscommitment. Ministers were particularly concerned about the effects ofhigher oil prices (then in the process of rising to the $25 per barrel range),
and they expressed the objective of “moderating this development andof bringing about more understanding of the overall price structure”. In
extending the 1-2 March action into 1980, IEA Ministers expressed concern
about the Members using up their oil stockdraw and demand restraint
cushions which might be needed soon as a defence against further supply
interruptions, which the Ministers rightly foresaw.
Immediately following the meeting of Ministers, the Governing Board
met again on the crisis, this time at official level to consider the request by
Sweden for activation of the selective trigger to meet its particular situation,
which involved a shortfall exceeding the 7 per cent trigger level [See Section
B-4 above; I.E.P. Agreement Articles 17 and 21]. In the history of the Agency,
this was a carefully monitored first (and to date the only) formal request
for activation of a Sharing System trigger. Finding insufficient support toactivate the Sharing System, the Board referred the matter to the Secretariat“to examine the case of Sweden further, and to consult with oil companies
as provided in Article 19.6 of the I.E.P. Agreement in order to obtain theirviews regarding the situation and the appropriateness of the measures tobe taken” [IEA/GB(79)33 Corrigendum 1, Item 2]. The Secretariat foundthat the Swedish problem could be attributed to special conditions, including
severe winter weather conditions, reduction in supplies from the Soviet Union
for technical reasons, price controls, and technical problems. In June 1979, theExecutive Director identified several major international oil companies which
had expressed their willingness, at the request of the Swedish government, toconsider specific measures by which they could contribute to an improvementin the Swedish oil supply situation. However, it soon appeared that theforegoing causes of the Swedish situation were being reduced or eliminated.
With the Swedish problem thus resolved and with future prospects becoming
more promising, there was in the end no need to trigger the Sharing System.
During the months that followed, the Governing Board made some
improvements in the Agency’s response capability, by making adjustments
to the data system, developing a registration system for oil import transactions and working on improving understanding of the oil spot market. In
117

October 1979, the Governing Board examined some of the problems ofeffectively managing demand restraint decisions, particularly the problems ofovercoming statistical difficulties in measuring performance on demand
restraint. As a matter of course, the Board decided to continue the submissionof Questionnaires A and B to provide adequate data for monitoring the fragile
situation that would continue throughout the crisis. The Board also
agreed that a continued or increased effort should be made forthe rest of 1979 in order to assure that the agreed demand
restraint objective of 2 mb/d (5% of consumption) will bereached at the end of the year [IEA/GB(79)64, Item 2(i)].
Prices continued to rise during this period, having doubled since thebeginning of the year, and reaching the range of $25 - $30 per barrel. In
December IEA Ministers met again to fix import targets for 1980 and goals
for 1985, assigned this time country-by-country. Ministers also tightenedmonitoring procedures and principles, and sharpened the focus on thepotential role of oil stocks in dealing with the crisis, thus foreshadowing laterchanges in the Agency’s response systems which enlarged the role of stock
management and demand restraint.
The second phase of the 1979-1981 crisis began in the autumn of1980 with the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War, which resulted in the blockingof all exports from Iraq, and caused a loss of about 3 mbd from Iraq and 1
mbd from Iran. Concerns about more price rises led the Governing Board in
October 1980 to meet urgently to take measures designed to reduce pressureson the oil market. The Board noted [IEA/GB(80)61, Item 2 and Annex] thatwhile consumption in IEA countries was lower than in recent years and oilstocks were at a high level, responsive action was still required. Members
agreed to urge private and public market participants “to refrain from any
abnormal purchases on the spot market” [Emphasis added] and to undertake
consultations with oil companies
to carry out the policy that in the 4th quarter there will bea group stock draw sufficient to balance supply and demandtaking into account whatever additional production is available
to the group [Emphasis added].
Prices nevertheless continued to rise. When IEA Ministers next met in
December, spot prices had continued their rise into the $40 range, up onethird in the course of a few months. The need for further and rapid action118was clear to Ministers, and they accordingly acted along five main lines:(1) to extend the October stockdraw and abnormal purchase decisions into
1981, (2) to draw on stocks as necessary to maintain a balance between
oil supply and demand in the world market, (3) to discourage “undesirable
purchases” of oil at price levels which have the effect of increasing market
pressures, (4) to correct severe imbalances between countries or companies asa result of the Iran/Iraq supply (disruption, and (5) to encourage and support
high levels of indigenous oil and gas production. In doing so, Ministers
agreed that the objective of IEA countries is to remove serious
potential market pressures which unnecessarily lead to higher
prices, thereby damaging the world economy [IEA/GB(80)97,
Item 2(f) and Annex I].
A number of noteworthy policy elements and precedents made theirappearance in these actions. Influencing price through supply measures was
the Members’ clear objective. Members in effect waived their right to insist
that the 90-day I.E.P. emergency stock levels be maintained [Paragraph2(g)(i)]. To contend with the so-called “undesirable purchases”, buyers with
ample stocks of oil were encouraged to delay purchases and run down
their stocks instead. Buyers short of both stocks and supply sources were,
to be assisted by other and better situated participants in the market. If
buyers were seeking to meet their oil stock legal requirements, these could
be temporarily relaxed, and maximum political influence could be brought
to bear to attain these objectives, especially where legal powers did not exist
to compel compliance.
With regard to country imbalances of oil supply, the Executive Director
would play a leading role in identifying the imbalances, in consulting with thecountries concerned, in assessing the situation, and in finding possible solutions to redress the balances. Actions were to be taken by the governments ofcountries principally concerned with the company imbalances of oil supplies,
including encouraging of companies to refrain from decisions which increasepressures on price. In both country and company imbalance conditions,
there would be applied the principles of fair treatment and oil pricing based
upon price conditions prevailing for comparable commercial transactions,as provided in Article 10 of the I.E.P. Agreement for the Sharing System.
Moreover, Members explicitly recognized that one of the purposes of theagreed measures was to prevent Members from finding themselves insituations which would justify the application of the relatively heavy andcostly selective trigger of the Sharing System. These market intervention
119measures were among the most detailed and far reaching that the Agency
would take in the course of its first twenty years. One long-term consequence
was the, consideration of stockdraw measures which would later be taken up
in the 1984 CERM Decision [See Section D below].
By January 1981 the worst of the crisis was over. At no point had
the supply loss approached 7 per cent for the IEA group as a whole. The
situation that induced Sweden to make its request for a selective trigger
had been successfully resolved by other means. When Turkey also reported
a particularly disruptive oil supply situation due to financial difficulties, apipeline closure, the low level of stocks on hand, and the absence of any viable
solution in view, the IEA entered into consultations and sought assistance for
Turkey. Ultimately, however, the Turkish problem was resolved without theneed for conclusive IEA action, when additional supplies became available toTurkey by means of pipeline transport in January 1981.
The resolution of the crisis, following IEA actions and appeals, isdescribed by Badger and Belgrave as follows:
These appeals from governments to draw down stocks also
coincided with the physical situation in the industry and with therefiners’ own perception of their commercial interests. Business
was slack. Refiners’ stocks were at high levels, and there wasa desire to reduce them because of growing evidence that themarket was weak, and because of the high prevailing rate ofinterest. Customers’ storage was also probably unusually fullin anticipation of winter and with the experience of 1978/9 inmind. It is probable, therefore, that the industry would haveacted in accordance with the wishes of the IEA, even if it had
not been asked to do so. But the encouragement by governments
through the IEA, their abstention from competitive bidding, andin particular the indication of their readiness to authorise useof the 90 days stocks did much to ensure that, by the end of
the year, the ‘1980 supply crisis’ was over, even though the war
between Iraq and Iran was continuing [Page 124].
For the IEA as an international institution, among the most important
outcomes of the 1979-1981 crisis was a thorough review of emergency
response principles and procedures, and the adoption of new emergency
response measures in 1981 and in 1984 [Taken up in Sections C-2 andD below].
120

2. December 1981 Decision on Supply Disruptions
At the outset of the 1979-1981 crisis the Agency sensed the need for a numberof changes in the structure, principles, and procedures of the Agency’s
emergency response system. Early in the crisis it was clear that evenan oil supply loss of less than the I.E.P. trigger threshold of 7 per centcould bring serious economic damage. The Agency took the specific ad hoc
measures described in Section C-1 above, but a strong consensus favoured
the erection of further, institutionalized defences for the management ofcrises of that kind. This was the problem characterized at the time as the“Italian Proposal”, “pre-crisis”, “mini-crisis”, “sub-crisis”, “creeping crisis”,
or “simplified sharing system”. The problem was to find ways of responding
to supply disruptions which either would not qualify under the Sharing
System’s 7 per cent threshold rule, or could be managed through other IEA
procedures without triggering the Sharing System. This interest led to thecreation by the Governing Board of a High Level Ad Hoc Group, chaired by
Executive Director Ulf Lantzke, to consider generally short-term oil supply
disruption measures.
In February 1981 the Ad Hoc Group, consisting of all Members of
the Agency, began work on the issues under its broad mandate. By June
the Group reported to the Governing Board at Ministerial Level on themain features of the proposals it was developing, drawn largely from pastexperience. At this stage Ministers concluded that
the IEA and its Member countries should he prepared to preventa disruption in oil supply from again resulting in sharply higher
prices and severe economic damage. The full implementationand strengthening of market forces in consuming countries willcontribute heavily to this objective. Supplementary action by
governments may he necessary in those areas where market
forces do not sufficiently counteract the adverse impact of
supply disruptions, particularly in international markets [IEA/
GB(81)33(2nd Revision), Item B.3].
Ministers approved the general concept of what would become the December
1981 Decision on this subject and they called for an in-depth consultation
between IEA governments and oil companies, which took place soon after.
In the first institutionalized extension of the IEAs emergency response
capability, the Board adopted on 10 December 1981 the “Decision on
Preparation for Future Supply Disruptions”. Carrying forward the Ministers’
policy declaration of June, quoted above, the Board again spoke of oil
121

supply disruptions below the 7 per cent level, of price increase problems
and economic damage, of market forces, and of supplementary action by
governments, nothing that such action should be “light-handed and flexible
in, responding to the specific situation at hand and at the same time be taken
promptly and effectively” [IEA/GB(81)86, Item 2 and Annex I].
The Secretariat would continuously monitor current and expected oil
supply, demand, and stocks of IEA countries in order to permit “an accurate
and timely assessment of the nature, extent and probable impact of supply
disruptions” [Section 1]. This would be done with the assistance of a newmonthly information system described in the Decision [Section 2]. Thissystem which soon became known as “Questionnaire C”, was intended toenhance the regular availability of relevant information without invoking the
emergency data system. However, the new system was never fully satisfactoryin producing accurate and consistent data as required. Although several
efforts were made to improve its performance, in 1993 the Agency concluded
that the poor data quality would not justify the effort and discontinued theQuestionnaire [IEA/GB(93)65, Item 5(b)]. Other data sources would provide
the necessary information.
In the event of a supply disruption, consultations on the situation
are to take place promptly on the-initiative of the Executive Director,
after preliminary consultation with the Chairman of the IEA government
expert bodies responsible for emergency questions (SEQ) and the oil market(SOM), and contact with Members. IEA governments will then promptly
enter into substantive consultations on the situation. Under the Decision the
Executive Director may decide to activate the emergency information system
Questionnaires A and B [See Section B-6 above], and the “Governing Board
will meet promptly at the appropriate level to consider and decide upon what
action, if any, is necessary to meet the situation as it exists so as to avoid
serious economic damage, should the assessment of the situation indicate that
this might otherwise occur” [Section 3; emphasis added]. This quoted text
makes obligatory for the first time the convening of the Governing Board, a
procedure clearly necessary to enable the Board to act promptly in cases ofsignificant oil supply disruptions. The measures to be considered and decided
upon include those which had been used in the past, such as:




122

Discouragement of abnormal spot market purchases or other
undesirable purchases.
Restriction of consumption.
Short-term fuel switching.
Increased indigenous production.



Stockdraw by government decision or through government
consultation with oil companies.

Informal efforts to minimize and contain the effects of supply imbalances [Section 4].
In the interest of flexibility and effectiveness, the 1981 Decision also provided
that measures would “be applied on an IEA-wide basis, although the detailed
methods of implementation will be decided by governments in accordancewith national law and the IEP, and could vary from country to country
while aimed at achieving the overall result desired on an integrated basis”.
Moreover, governments would individually consult with their oil companies
concerning any measure agreed upon under Section 4 [Section 5].
This Decision was strongly influenced by the experience gained during
the 1979-1981 crisis. Institutionally, the Decision strengthened the potential
measures by identifying in advance which ones were the most likely options
to be considered and applied. The stated options were not at all binding,and they could he applied on a phased or other basis as circumstances might
require. Overall the Decision created the expectation that these potential
measures would be available and serviceable, an expectation that indeed
reflected the growing experience of the Agency and of Member governmentsin this sector. The Governing Board employed these options in the 1990-1991
Gulf crisis, in conjunction with the CERM Decision of 1984 which advanced
further the institutionalization of these procedures and strengthened thepolicy conclusion that oil stocks should be considered with other measures inbuilding flexible and effective defences against future oil supply disruptions.

D.

CERM: Co-ordinatedEmergency Response Measures

Of all the alternative measures foreseen under the 1981 Decision on
Preparation for Future Supply Disruptions, discussed in Section C-2
above, the prospect of stockdraw seemed to be the most promising for
further development. During the 1982-1984 period the Secretariat and IEA
government expert groups on emergency questions (SEQ) and the oil market(SOM) developed suggestions along these lines. When this work began to taketangible form in 1984, the Governing Board requested these two Standing
Groups to examine the following key elements: the stockdraw possibilities,
123the practical instruments for consultation on stockdraw in time of an oil
supply shortfall, and the possibilities for other responses including demand
restraint [IEA/GB(84)15 Corrigendum, Item 3(a)(ii)]. On the basis of a
discussion held in a joint meeting of the two Standing Groups, the Secretariat
prepared a paper on oil stocks, reporting on potential benefits and costs,
physical availability, legal or political availability, logistical availability,
and methods for release [IEA/SEQ(84)38; IEA/SOM(84)22]. The general
assessment contained the following:
9.

As a measure for responding to a supply disruption, stock
draw has several advantages. The most direct effect ofstock draw is to provide additional supplies to the market,
thereby immediately improving the supply/demand balance
and reducing the pressures for short-term price increases
resulting from physical loss of supply. Since this effect canbe perceived and quantified at once by market participants,
the release of stocks also has a psychological effect onmarket participants, i.e. reassuring them that alternative
supplies are available and reducing their expectationsof price increases. By dampening price increases, stock
draw can limit the economic damage resulting from thedisruption. The willingness of governments to implement
stockdraw policies should help calm psychologically induced
fear and panic buying. In addition, by allowing consumption
to continue not too far from pre-disruption levels, stock
draw can further contribute to economic well-being. The
economic cost of stocks used in a disruption would beincurred prior to the disruption and would therefore not
add to the adverse economic impacts of the disruption itself[Emphasis added].

The Agency’s analysis made out the case for developing procedures forusing stockdraw as an emergency response measure. By 1984 more stocks
had become available for use in a supply disruption than had been at the
beginning of the IEA, although they were to decline from the mid-1980s
onward [See the table contained in Section B-1 above]. The level of stocks
held by governments had increased considerably, creating greater assurance
that they could be used promptly for emergency purposes. Moreover, stocks
were being held under a variety of legal regimes, with governments having
access to, or control over, a considerable portion of them. Suitable techniques
124were available to move those stocks into the supply system in the eventof a supply disruption. So the necessary physical, legal, and technicalrequirements for stockdraw were satisfied, although as a practical matter
further effort and actions could strengthen the levels of stocks which could
be drawn upon [See IEA/GB(84)17].
In 1984 other considerations also played a role in developing stockdraw
arrangements. All countries intended to use one or more of various methods
for reducing consumption, including the operation of market mechanisms,
the promotion of voluntary conservation, fuel switching, and allocation,
among others. Although demand restraint and stockholding are provided inboth the I.E.P. Agreement and the 1981 Decision, the actual use of stocks
under flexible arrangements merited further consideration. Stockdraw insufficient quantities could present a rapid and effective means of restoring
lost oil supplies, particularly in the early stages of a crisis (even the known
presence of the stockdraw mechanism could have a calming effect onmarkets, before stocks would actually be drawn). While precise decisions as
to the timing, rate, and duration of stockdraw cannot realistically be taken
in advance of a supply disruption (before the surrounding circumstances
are known), “it is highly desirable for the IEA as a whole to establish clear
and firm procedures for prompt decision on stockdraw and other measures”,
procedures which should be closely related to, and should not alter existingarrangements [IEA/GB(84)17, paragraph 2]. These were some of the main
considerations which led the Secretariat to propose the “Decision on Stocks
and Supply Disruptions”, adopted by the Governing Board on 11 July
1984 [IEA/GB(84)27, Item 2(a)(ii), Annex 1 and Appendices]. This Decision
established the IEA’s Co-ordinated Emergency Response Measures system,
commonly known as CERM, which not only highlights stockdraw but also
retains the important IEA emphasis on demand restraint measures.
The CERM Decision itself recites much of the analysis described above,
but also refers specifically to the severe economic damage which could result
from supply disruptions involving a significant net loss of world oil supply,“whether or not sufficient to activate the I.E.P. emergency oil sharing system”[Paragraph 1]. The Decision also makes reference to “exaggerated crude oil
price increases” which could result from public panic. Although the Decision
acknowledges that responses to the disruption will vary from country tocountry, the “aggregate of national responses designed to minimize economic
damage is more likely to achieve a coherent overall result if they are coordinated and are as complementary as the circumstances and individual
national policies permit” [Paragraphs 1 and 2].
125Since decisions on the details of stockdraws could not realistically betaken in advance, the operative parts of the Decision constitute mainly a
network of procedural commitments of Members. When the Governing Board
Chairman determines that a supply disruption “involving a significant net
loss of world oil supplies” exists or is imminent, the Chairman calls a meetingof the Governing Board, and the Board is then required to meet “promptly
at the appropriate level”. In making his determination the Chairman surveys
the overall loss of “world oil supplies” and takes into account estimatedexcess production and facility capacity.
The Governing Board’s responsibility to act in such circumstances isa broad one. First, it should assess the situation by considering, among
other factors, those listed in Appendix 1 to the Decision: origins, causes,
probable evolution, magnitude, and probable duration of the crisis; the world
economy; the probable impact of the crisis on particular countries; the oilmarkets; current available stock levels; probable effects of actions pursuant
to the 1981 Decision or the I.E.P.; the effectiveness of oil consumption
reduction measures; and any other material factors.
Secondly, the Board is to “determine what action would be advisable
under the December 1981 Decision or, in accordance with its terms, underthe I.E.P.; and [it] will consider all measures which could contribute torestoration of the supply/demand balance” [Paragraph 8], which include
demand restraint as well as stockdraw measures. Paragraph 5 states that
Member countries recognise that, in the event of an oil supply
disruption of the nature referred to in paragraph (1) above [“Oilsupply disruptions involving a significant net loss of world oil
supply, whether or not sufficient to activate the I.E.P. emergency
oil sharing system”], each country would follow or implement
oil consumption reduction policies appropriate to it in light ofthe circumstances and its national policies. Policies to reduce
consumption will vary from country to country and could
include, inter alia, such methods as allowing market mechanisms
to operate, and/or urging voluntary emergency conservation
and/or fuel switching measures by individuals and enterprises,
and/or regulation of oil consumption. Other measures, including
those referred to in the December 1981 Decision, might also beappropriate, depending on national circumstances.
Moreover, this Decision does not detract at all from the formal authorities
which have been previously established for IEA actions. There is no126

displacement of the Emergency Sharing System, although the Governing
Board would be free, of course, to decide under Article 19.4 of the Agreement
whether or not to activate the Sharing System or to act pursuant to the 1981
Decision, or not to act at all [Members’ decisions under Article 65 might also
be useful in such circumstances]. Another possibility would be for the Sharing
System and CERM measures to run in parallel, or one could follow the other.
The flexibility of this dual approach has been a fundamental IEA policy. In
1987 it was expressed as follows:
Ministers reaffirmed the high priority given to the IEA
emergency preparedness system, including both IEP oil sharing
and the co-ordinated early response stipulated in the Governing
Board Decision of 11th July 1984 [IEA/GB(87)33, Annex,
paragraph 17; emphasis added; see also IEA/GB(89)36, Annex,
paragraph 4(a) to the same effect].
Flexibility on all such questions is essential to applying the right measuresat the right time under the precise circumstances of a particular supply
disruption. The inflexible application of one or another response measure has
not been the IEA’s way of viewing the conduct of this important business.
In a third phase, when the Governing Board wishes to implement
CERM measures, the 1984 Decision provides further procedural guidance.
Those countries which wish to contribute meaningfully to stockdraw as
described in the Decision (by drawdown or implementation of mutually
reinforcing measures) will then proceed with the consultation in a context
which takes account of the Members’ obligations and of information provided
by the Secretariat, and which reflects all the relevant circumstances of the
disruption,
including the availability, timing and quantitative effectiveness ofmeasures to reduce oil consumption and the special attributes ofoil stocks and the volume and manner in which they are held in
Member countries [Paragraph 9; emphasis added].
The consultation is to consider a wide range of questions. It will be open to
all IEA and OECD Members (the only OECD Members not now Membersof the IEA are Iceland and Mexico; in 1984 Finland and France were also
included in that category, and Mexico was not yet an OECD Member). The
objective of the consultation will be not only to determine what volume andduration of stockdraw and other measures would be effective in responding127

to a serious disruption and in calming markets, but also to determine thestockdraws individual countries could make to achieve that volume, andthe duration and methods for implementing stockdraw. Another objective
will be to reach “a consensus as to the action which those countries plan
to take, by national decision, concerning co-ordinated stockdraw”. The
consultation could also develop recommendations to the Governing Boardon other actions, such as demand restraint, which could complement sucha stockdraw.
After the consultation is complete, the CERM process moves to theGoverning Board, which of course might be meeting in parallel with theconsultation process. The consultation results, as described above, arereported to the Governing Board. The Board is to take them into account inreaching its overall decision, which is to reflect the following considerations:

all countries must take action to help restore the supply/demandbalance;some countries plan to engage in co-ordinated stock draw, others toundertake complementary actions, and others both [Paragraph 10].

The Governing Board’s decision is required to clarify the relationship between
the stockdraw and other action decided upon, and the rights and obligationsof all Member countries under the I.E.P, including the 90-day stockholding
obligation. Under the flexible CERM approach, it is not inconceivable thatthe Board could decide to implement other measures instead of stockdraw,
such as those designed to produce oil demand restraint or other desirable
effects.
The Decision also provides that Members whose stocks did not at thetime of the Decision meet the I.E.P. requirement would intensify their efforts
to do so, and that Members whose stocks were below the levels required
to make “a meaningful contribution” to a co-ordinated stockdraw would“promptly” use their best efforts to improve their stock positions [Paragraph12]. One of the most significant innovations is the commitment, quoted
above, of all Members to take action to help restore the supply/demandbalance. Although the particular modalities of that action are not adopted,
because they could not be determined in advance, each Member is committed
under the Decision to contribute substantially in co-ordination with theothers. This established commitment also helps to overcome the CERM’s
reversal of the Sharing System’s automaticity. The Sharing System wasdesigned to ensure activation by virtue of an administrative rather thana prior political decision, reflecting lessons of the 1973-1974 crisis. The
CERM in effect requires a political decision, which excludes the “fail-safe”
128

activation feature of the Sharing System [See Section B-4 above]. The
absence of the “fail-safe” feature in the CERM is tempered, however, by theaction commitment of all Members under the CERM and by the continuing
availability of the Sharing System (with its fail-safe feature) for the mostserious supply disruptions which require a Sharing System response.
Any decision on such a broad, important, and sensitive subject as the
CERM, was bound to leave a few issues for later consideration, and the1984 Decision was no exception to the rule. The Secretariat, the SEQ, andthe SOM were instructed to examine further a number of related questions,
including minimum operating stock requirements, current and appropriate
levels of available stocks (taking into account all pertinent factors), theeffectiveness of different methods of holding stocks intended to be available
for drawdowns, practical problems in implementation, the range of
economic consequences of various types of oil consumption reduction
measures, the economic impacts of serious oil supply disruptions, andshort-term fuel switching potential [See paragraph 11 and Appendix 2].
In March 1986 the Secretariat reported to the Governing Board on thesesubjects [IEA/GB(86)10], and the Board requested further work on monitoring and preparation of concrete procedures [IEA/GB(86)15, Item 3(b)and Annex IV].
At the 1987 Ministerial Level Governing Board meeting, IEA Ministers
favoured further improvements in effective demand restraint measuresand stockholding, particularly for countries whose degree of emergency
preparedness was relatively low. Moreover,
Ministers asked the Governing Board to conclude within one
year whether and, if so, what steps should be taken within
this context to further improve IEA Member countries’ capacity,
both individually and collectively, to contribute effectively toearly responses, including the level and availability of stocks
and demand restraint [IEA/GB(87)33, Annex, paragraph 22;emphasis added].
Thereafter, all Members tested their appropriate procedures andmechanisms. The CERM itself was tested in the IEA in early 1988, anda test appraisal was made [See IEA/GB(88)18]. The CERM Operations
Manual was prepared during the ensuing period. After further procedures
were developed, the Governing Board adopted the CERM Operations
Manual in September 1988 [IEA/GB(88)25, Item 2(b)(ii)]. The Manualcontains detailed information on the context of CERM consultations, thedecision-making process, information requirements, response development
129

methodology, timetable, and monitoring systems. Practical expertise has beendeveloped by means of the IEA workshops conducted in the field of demand
restraint in 1987 [See Section B-2 above], and in oil stockdraw in 1989 andin 1994 [See Section B-1 above]. The SEQ’s report to the Governing Board
in response to the Ministerial request in reproduced in IEA /GB(88) 15 andthe Board’s action noting the report, in IEA/GB (88)25, Item 2(b)(iv).
This CERM Decision is the latest of the major emergency response
institutionalizing actions taken by the IEA. With the 1981 Supply Disruptions
and the 1984 CERM Decisions in place, the IEA has become fully armed
institutionally to manage a wide range of oil supply disruptions. The I.E.P.
Sharing System provides the relatively heavy but indispensable response toperhaps the worst supply disruptions, those exceeding the Sharing system’s
7 per cent threshold. The 1981 and 1984 Decisions provide the framework
for managing lesser crises, as well as the more severe ones if that shouldbe the Members’ wish. The 1984 Decision adopts special procedures which
would make deliberations on stockdraw better prepared and in the end
more effective. The main conclusion to draw from these developments isthat with this array of flexible measures, the Agency is procedurally andoperationally ready to act. These Decisions have doubtless induced Members
to increase their logistical and other internal measures, which in turn meansthat the Agency as a whole is better prepared to act, not only at its Paris
headquarters, but also through the Members’ potential for successful response
actions throughout the energy world.
Since its inception, the CERM Decision has been the subject ofnumerous follow-up actions by the Secretariat, the SEQ, the SOM, and theGoverning Board. In the first Ministerial Level Governing Board meeting
following the adoption of the CERM Decision, IEA Ministers fully endorsedthat Decision and adopted continuing preparation decisions on the Appendix
2 points summarized above and on other questions. Ministers again endorsed
the CERM and stockdraw preparedness in 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993
(indeed from the first Ministerial meeting onward, IEA Ministers havestrongly and consistently supported the building of emergency oil stocks).
In 1993 Ministers also urged all Members to meet fully their emergency
reserve commitments and encouraged “Member countries to increase theiremergency reserves above the 90-day level” [IEA/GB (93) 41, paragraph 7;
emphasis added]. Although the CERM as such has not been applied in namesince it was adopted, it provided the inspiration for the successful Gulf Crisis
Contingency Plan, as will be seen in the following Section.
130

The CERM measures preparations are still undergoing review andadjustment in order that might best realize their full potential when called
upon. A CERM review and a simulation test (CERM Test II) are plannedfor 1995. Proposals were being developed in late 1994 for a high-level
conference to familiarize decision-makers with present day oil market
conditions and CERM analyses and responses, to examine Members’
operational considerations and anticipated measures, and to consider overall
the many and varied aspects of responding to future energy crises in a
flexible, co-ordinated manner.
In the ten years since the Governing Board adopted the CERM
Decision, the oil market has undergone a transformation which would
justify consideration of reassessment and up-dating of the CERM system.
In short, the market has become more capable of immediate responses to
disruptions, much more sophisticated in its operations, and more “global” inits geographical reach. Spot market transactions have multiplied by perhaps
a factor of twenty since the IEA was founded and they now account for thebulk of international oil transactions. Price movements now become known
almost instantaneously to a large number of market participants, making
potential market reactions to supply disruptions and other market affecting
events appear almost without delay [These developments are reflected in the
updated version of the Emergency Management Manual, 5th Ed. 1994].
With the emergence of these market developments combined with thegrowth in strategic stocks held in Member countries, as well as perceptionof increasing vulnerability to oil supply disruptions in the years ahead [seethe IEA’s 1994 World Energy Outlook, p. 18], the Agency in 1994-1995
undertook a review of IEA emergency response mechanisms and procedures.
Concerned about the need to ensure the flexibility and effectiveness ofthese mechanisms and the cohesiveness and capacity of IEA Members in
responding to oil crises, the IEA focused this review on a wide range of
response measures and on the policy context in which the selection of
appropriate measures would be made, particularly with respect to the IEP
Sharing System and CERM measures. On 22 February 1995, the Governing
Board took a number of policy decisions on this subject and initiatedfurther studies on related questions [The Decision is contained in IEA/GB(95) 11, Item 4; see also the Executive Director’s explanation entitled“The IEA Governing Board’s Decision on Emergency Response Policies”,
document IEA/ED/95.73, dated 10 March 1995]. In reaching its decisions,
the Governing Board reaffirmed “the importance it attaches to all aspects of
the Agency’s emergency preparedness system” (which is based on the IEP
complemented by the CERM Decision) and to “close co-operation among
131

IEA countries in their implementation” [Paragraph (b)(i)]. The Board also
reaffirmed its intention of “placing the Agency’s emergency preparedness
system in a policy context which reflects the current oil market situation”
and its intention that the CERM Decision (with co-ordinated stockdraw andcomplementary measures) pertain “to all disruptions, regardless of size”, andnot just to those falling below the 7 per cent level provided in the Sharing
System [See paragraph (b)(iii)].
The 1995 Decision clearly places its principal emphasis on “the needfor flexibility in exercising the Agency’s emergency preparedness system”
and outlines specifically the textual and other bases for this flexibility [Seeparagraph (c)], before adopting the operational language which provides
that before activating the Sharing System, with its relatively heavy andcostly procedures, consideration would be given to co-ordination andimplementation of stockdraw, demand restraint and other emergency
measures. This would be done in a manner which in effect maintains theoption of using the full IEP oil Sharing System if necessary. The Decisionalso retains the IEA emphasis on free markets and voluntary measures[See paragraph (d)]. Finally the Board requested the Standing Group on
Emergency Questions (SEQ) to examine and report to it on a number ofrelated technical matters concerning measures available in Member countries
for stockdraw, demand restraint and oil sharing, the conditions under whichstocks could be drawn below the 90-day IEA level, the use of demand
restraint and other measures complementary to stockdraw, and issues arisingin a possible transition from initial use of stockdraw, and demand restraint tofull use of IEP measures [See paragraph (e)].
The principal operating part of the Decision is contained in paragraph(d) in which the Governing Board agreed that(i) IEA measures in response to a crisis should be tailored to
specific circumstances, underpin the efficient functioning of
the oil market, and minimize damage to Member countries;(ii) the Secretariat, in reporting on whether a disruption reaches
the threshold for a finding that can activate IEP emergency
measures, or whether a resumption of sufficient supply canbe anticipated, should include full consideration of any
stockdraw, demand restraint and complementary measuresthat may be provided for in the overall Governing Board
decision that is contemplated by the 1984 CERM Decision;(iii) in the event of an oil supply disruption which reaches thethreshold for a Secretariat finding that can activate IEP
132

emergency measures, the Governing Board, as a matter ofpolicy, would normally first give consideration, consistent
with the IEP, to a step-by-step process involving adequate
opportunity for the co-ordination and implementation ofstockdraw, demand restraint and other emergency measures
to be fully effective, in a manner compatible with thetimely and effective preparation and activation of oil sharing
should that prove necessary;(iv) markets should even in times of crisis remain unconstrainedby price controls or restrictions other than those consistent
with the implementation of IEA emergency measures,and voluntary measures should be encouraged [Emphasis
added].
It should be recalled that the intention of the foregoing Decision is tostate a policy approach rather than to change the legal terms of the texts
governing emergency response measures. The Sharing System as provided
in the IEP Agreement remains unchanged, as does the Governing Board’s
discretion under the Agreement to determine when oil sharing or other
response mechanisms should be employed, and indeed the 1995 Decision
quoted above provides additional emphasis on that discretion. As stated in the
IEA Executive Director’s explanation cited above, the “Decision reflects theMembers’ commitment to a new policy as to how they will take such future
decisions”, thus enhancing the flexibility and efficiency “without imposing
new legal obligations on Member countries”. With this Decision in place, the
IEA has not only updated its emergency measures, it has also confirmed theinstitutional flexibility and decisional policies to enable it to deal with future
oil supply crises like the Gulf crisis, taken up in the next Section, or evenmore serious oil supply disruptions.

E. The 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis
Since 1979-1981 there has been only one live test of the foregoing Decisions
and the Agency’s response measures, and that was the Gulf crisis of
1990-1991, when the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait led to the United Nations
embargo of all exports of oil from Kuwait and Iraq. This Section examines
how the Agency employed its array of possible measures under the I.E.P. andthe 1981 and 1984 Decisions in responding to the challenge of that crisis.
133

When the Gulf coalition forces began the military campaign for theliberation of Kuwait on 17 January 1991, the IEA was well prepared torespond to the resulting threat to oil supplies. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
and the United Nations embargo on Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil had removed 4.3
million barrels of oil per day from the market. About two-thirds of thatloss directly affected IEA countries. The amount and duration of any further
loss of oil supply in the course of the military action was potentially quite
extensive at worst, and highly uncertain at best, given the vulnerabilityof Saudi Arabia and the difficulty of forecasting the responses of otheroil producers, especially the Arab producers. Hence on the day the air
campaign began, the IEA acted to add oil to the market. IEA Executive
Director Helga Steeg gave formal notice to all IEA Member governments andother participants to activate the Co-ordinated Energy Emergency Response
Contingency Plan to make available to the market 2.5 million additionalbarrels of oil per day within 15 days’ time. Two million barrels were tocome from participants’ oil stocks, 400,000 barrels from demand restraint
measures designed to reduce oil consumption, and 100,000 barrels from fuelswitching out of oil and the use of spare capacity. All IEA countries, joined by
Finland, France, and Iceland, had adopted the IEA Contingency Plan earlier
in the month [11 January 1991, IEA/GB(91)1, Item 3 and Annex], following
an extensive preparation and build-up of measures going back to 2 August
1990, the day Iraq invaded Kuwait. As will be seen below, the IEA’s successful
response presents a procedural model of how an international institution
and the industrial countries should respond to supply crises of this natureand scope.
1. Preparation for Action
The invasion of Kuwait carried the immediate threat of a major disruptionof oil supplies, the third in less than twenty years. The Agency estimatedthat the Middle East Gulf countries produced about 17.0 million barrels aday (mbd) of crude oil and natural gas liquids (NGLs), and that they had
exported 14.5 mbd in the second quarter of 1990. Of this amount Iraq had
produced 3.1 mbd and exported 2.7 mbd, while Kuwait had produced 1.8
mbd and exported 1.7 mbd. This accounted for 29 per cent of Gulf oil
production and 31 per cent of Gulf crude oil exports. IEA country imports
from Iraq accounted for 7.8 per cent of their total imports, and imports
from Kuwait amounted to 3.6 per cent of total imports. On 1 August 1990,
combined government and company stocks on land in OECD countries
amounted to the equivalent of some 150 days of IEA net imports and134

99 days of forward consumption, while stocks either owned or controlled bygovernments were held at levels of around 30 days of forward consumption.
In this overall supply situation, it was clear that the IEA would have toprepare itself to act decisively in this crisis.
When the invasion occurred, the IEA had in place two principal oil
emergency response systems. The first and most far-reaching of these was
the oil Emergency Sharing System, taken up in detail in Section B above,
designed to respond massively to oil disruptions exceeding 7 per cent of
expected supply. The other was the Co-ordinated Emergency Response
Measures, known as CERM, a comprehensive and flexible set of procedures
adopted by the Governing Board in 1984 in the aftermath of the 1979-1981
oil supply crisis [See Section D above]. CERM is intended to facilitate rapid
agreement on stockdraw and demand restraint in response to an oil supply
disruption below the 7 per cent level, or in a more severe supply shortfall, orin conjunction with the Emergency Sharing System. Both systems were readyfor implementation before the Gulf crisis began. In support of these response
systems, the IEA also had in place a number of oil supply information
systems, probably the best in the world. Some were in normal operation
with monthly and other periodic reporting by all Members to the IEA on
supply balances, stock levels, imports, and other data, including the Monthly
Oil Statistics. Moreover, a monthly emergency data reporting system wasavailable on a standby basis. When activated, it could provide more detailed
data in the form of individual company and government reports to the IEA[This is the Special Section of the Information System; see Section B-6
above]. Legislation was in place for operation of the Emergency Sharing
System and the CERM under national legal systems and for the provision ofnecessary confidential and proprietary information by oil companies underthe monthly emergency data reporting system. The contrast between theforegoing levels of preparedness for the Gulf crisis, and the inchoate measuresand the disarray of the industrial countries in the period leading up to andduring the 1973-1974 crisis is quite remarkable [See Volume I, Chapters I
and II, and Chapter II above]. The depth of the preparations as well as theaggregate co-operation and political readiness of the industrial countries to
act must be credited to the IEA which transformed the degree of co-operationand preparedness of the industrialized countries over the period 1974-1990
and made possible their vigorous response to the Gulf crisis.
Four days after the invasion of Kuwait, the United Nations acted on
proposals to impose an import embargo on Iraqi and Kuwaiti commodities
and products. In its binding Resolution 661 of 6 August 1990, the Security
Council135

3.

Decides that all states shall prevent:(a) The import into their territories of all commodities
and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported
therefrom after the date of this resolution;(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories
which would promote or are calculated to promote
the export or transshipment of any commodities or
products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by
their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories
in any commodities or products originating in Iraq
or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date ofthis resolution, including in particular any transfer
of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purpose of suchactivities or dealings.

On 25 August the Security Council adopted a maritime enforcement
resolution to support the embargo. The Security Council in Resolution 665
1.

Calls upon those Member States cooperating with thegovernment of Kuwait which are deploying maritime
forces to the area to use such measures commensurate
to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under
the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward
and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect andverify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict
implementation of the provisions related to such shipping
laid down in resolution 661 (1990).

In the IEA, a process of data collection, monitoring, analysis, and legal
preparations was already underway, in order to enable the Agency to act
promptly if the crisis should lead to an actual oil supply shortfall or otherevents requiring co-operative action. The initial review of the supply/demandsituation in the face of the embargo of oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait
led to the conclusion that compensatory oil supply would be available fromother OPEC Member States and from high stock levels, if necessary, tosupply the market adequately, without need for recourse to either of the IEA
emergency response systems. On 9 August, the Governing Board confirmed
this assessment, stating thatsufficient oil supplies are currently available to compensate forthe loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude and product to the market.
136Therefore, there is no need for recourse to the IEA emergency
response system at this time [IEA/GB(90)24, Item 2 and Annex].
The Board at that time also took the first of a number of precautionary
actions, including a recommendation for companies to avoid abnormal spot
market purchases and a statement of the need for consumer restraint.
Monitoring and implementing measures were set in place. In the samemeasure, the Board adopted the first in its series of decisions on themonitoring of the situation by Member governments and by the Agency
itself, while setting the stage for convening the Governing Board on short
notice if necessary, and preparing such national procedures and instruments
for implementing co-ordinated actions, including the drawing on stocks,
as might be needed.
The Agency thus found it unnecessary to apply in the early phase of
the crisis either the Sharing System (the trigger level would not be reached)or the CERM, because any shortfall in the months ahead was expected to becovered by other sources of oil and preparations were already made for any
accelerated action which might prove to be necessary or appropriate. Highoil stocks also provided a cushion. The public was immediately informed of
the Governing Board’s actions, and at later meetings the Board specifically
recommended that Members and the Secretariat keep the public informedof oil market developments.
An early operational step was the Executive Director’s decision takenon 9 August 1990 to activate the detailed emergency data reporting by
individual companies co-operating with the Agency and by governments[See IEA/GB(90)24, Item 2 and Annex, where this action, approved by
the Board, is referred to technically as the “submission of Questionnaires A
and B”]. That additional data, consisting in large part of informationon the production, trade, stockdraw, and deliveries of oil scheduled bycompanies for the current month, two prior months and two forward months,
was essential to enabling the Agency to consider on a contingency basis
whether the conditions existed for triggering the Sharing System (whether
the data showed that the required 7 per cent shortfall had occurred or
could reasonably by expected to occur). On the same day the Secretariat
formally requested the United States Secretary of Energy to issue an approval
letter foreseen under United States law and regulations for U.S. companies
to provide the confidential and proprietary information called for under
this data system. The approval letter was required as a condition to theprotection of U.S. companies, pursuant to Section 252 of the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, from U.S. antitrust liability [See137Section B-7(c) above]. The U.S. authorities responded on 17 August by
granting the approval in accordance with the Secretariat’s request for datasubmissions until the end of 1990, subject to the renewal of the applicable
U.S. legislation, which was scheduled to expire at the end of September, Thatlegislation was indeed renewed, and the U.S. approval was later extended at
the Secretariat’s request until the end of June 1991. Companies operatingin Europe might also have found an obstacle in the competition rules of
the European Communities (EU), but these companies enjoyed the benefitof the exemption under Article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome as provided
in the Commission’s exemption decision of December 1983 [See Section
B-7(c) above]. Specific approvals for the submission of data by oil companies
in Europe were not necessary under the terms of the exemption, andCommission officials confirmed this expressly to the Secretariat in writing
before the data submissions commenced. The smooth application of both theUnited States and European Union antitrust and competition arrangements
for the IEA made it possible for the Agency to receive the vitally necessary
information. A series of legal obstacles which might have prevented companies
from supplying this information in the absence of these arrangements wasthereby overcome.
After its first meeting on the Gulf early in August 1990, there followed
regular meetings of the Governing Board, convened for further monitoring,assessment, and adoption of preparatory measures. Throughout the crisis
the assessments continued to show that, due principally to increased oil
production by OPEC and others, the market was generally adequately
supplied. By the end of September, the Board sharpened its recommendationthat each IEA country
now complete preparations and take all decisions necessary, ona standby basis, to enable its authorities to act immediately andeffectively to implement stockdraw and/or demand restraint orsurge capacity measures at the outset of any further significant
oil supply shortfall [IEA/GB(90)32, Item 2 and Annex).
By virtue of the Board’s recommendation that its Chairman and the
Executive Director convene the Board on short notice in emergency session,
the Agency itself became better geared to rapid action if a further oil
supply shortfall should occur. Participants would be expected to have thenecessary Ministerial authority in order for the Board to decide promptly on
co-ordinated measures “warranted by the situation”.
138

At the same meeting in September 1990, the Board also recommended
that Members take additional precautionary measures concerning energy
conservation and efficiency, “full price pass through” to markets for crude
oil and products (i.e. the price rises would be reflected down the line tothe consumer), fuel switching, monitoring of stock building, and overcome
product supply difficulties by “introducing temporary flexibility in theapplication of environment measures”. The Board instructed the government
expert group on emergency questions (SEQ)
to include in its assessments a description and evaluation of
the potential response of each Member country broken down
specifically as to stockdraw, whether company or government
owned or controlled, and government mandated demand restraint[IEA/GB(90)32, Item 2 and Annex; emphasis added].
The Board at the same time requested the SEQ and the SOM to continue
on an urgent basis to “refine their assessments of emergency preparation
measures and the oil market situation on the basis of possible further oil
supply disruptions arising during the uncertain period ahead”. One month
later when the Board convened its fourth session on the Gulf crisis, it was
clear that the earlier requests for preparations to be ready on a standby
basis had been carried out and that the Agency could indeed act quickly andeffectively if necessary [IEA/GB(90)39, Item 2]. The high state of readiness
was again confirmed by the Governing Board in December [IEA/GB(90)46,
Item 2]. By that time, alternative supplies were helping to improve thesupply/demand situation, higher oil prices were exerting downward pressureon oil demand, and government actions were producing desirable effects;
reduced economic activity in some countries also contributed to the reductionin oil demand. IEA preparations had advanced by December 1990 to thepoint where the Board could note that “each Member country now hascompleted preparations and taken all decisions necessary, on a standby basis,to enable its authorities to act immediately and effectively to implement
stockdraw and/or demand restraint or surge capacity measures at the outsetof any further significant oil supply shortfall” [IEA/GB(90)46, Item 2(d)].

2. The IEA Contingency Plan of 11 January 1991
The process of data gathering, analysis, assessment and preparations, withthe assistance of the IEA’s SEQ and SOM groups and advice from the IEA’s
139

oil industry supply experts [IAB, see Section B-7 above] continued without
interruption during the crisis. It provided the basis for the adoption of the
IEA Contingency Plan which followed the Board’s assessment of the situationin view of the then approaching 15 January deadline set by the Security
Council in Resolution 678 for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, and in viewof the possibility that armed force might have to be used to enforce the
Security Council’s Resolutions.
When the Governing Board convened on 11 January 1991, OECD
crude oil and product stocks were found to be higher than one year earlier
and to be well balanced between crude oil and the main product groups.
Despite the continuing availability of ample oil supplies to the market, theBoard agreed that “the outbreak of hostilities in the Gulf could lead toheightened uncertainty and volatility in the market as a result of the possible
temporary shortfall of some Gulf supplies”. That judgement induced theBoard to conclude that it would be prudent to complete preparations for aco-ordinated response in the event of hostilities. In the operative part of its
Conclusions on this subject the Governing Board
Adopted a coordinated energy emergency response contingency
plan for use in anticipation of any possible temporary shortfall
in oil supplies in the event of hostilities in the Gulf which,through a combination of stockdraw, demand restraint, andother measures, would make available to the market 2.5 million
barrels of oil per day [IEA/GB(91)1, Item 3 and Annex].
Since the hostilities had not actually commenced at that time, theBoard made the plan contingent “upon notification by the Executive Director,
after prompt and wide-ranging consultations with Member governments,of the need to activate the contingency plan”. The Board also agreed thatthe measureswould be implemented so as to take effect, in terms of additional
availability of oil to the market and reduced demand for oil,beginning within 15 days after notification by the Executive
Director.
Upon receipt of the Executive Director’s notification, the commitments would
be activated not only for each IEA Member country, but also for Finland,
France and Iceland.
140

The specific commitments [See IEA/GB(91)67, p. 14] expressed inprecise numbers of thousands of barrels per day were agreed with regard toeach country in relation to stockdraw, demand restraint, fuel switching, andincreased indigenous oil production, as follows:

OECD Country 2.5 mbd Emergency Response Programme
Adopted at the IEA Governing Board Meeting of 11th January 1991
(thousand barrels/day)
Stockdraw Demand
Fuel
Increased
Total
Restraint Switching Indigenous Response
Production [th.b/d]
CanadaUnited States
North America
AustraliaJapan
New ZealandPacific
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
GreeceIreland
Italy
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
NorwayPortugal
Spain
SwedenSwitzerland
TurkeyUnited Kingdom

1125
1125
0
350
3
353
6
9
11
169
9
5
74
0
25
5
10
0
0
6
0
120

0
0
33
0
0
33
5
18
2
18
9
1
24
2
7
7
2
62
21
12
20
0

0
0
0
0
1
1
5
0
0
0
0
0
32
0
0
0
5
0
0
1
11
0

0
0
13
0
3
16
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

115
1125
1240
46
350
7
403
16
27
13
187
18
6
130
2
32
12
17
62
21
19
31
120

IEA Europe

449

210

54

0

713

Total IEA

1927

243

55

16

2356
141

OECD Country 2.5 mbd Emergency Response Programme (continued)
Adopted at the IEA Governing Board Meeting of 11th January 1991
(thousand barrels/day)
Stockdraw Demand
Fuel
Increased
Total
Restraint Switching Indigenous Response
Production [th.b/d]
FinlandFranceIceland
Total OECD

0
59
0

12
58
1

0
9
0

0
0
0

12
126
1

1987

314

64

16

2500

The Plan consisted, therefore, of four-fifths stockdraw and of one-fifth othermeasures, mostly demand restraint.
In the Governing Board’s Conclusions of 11 January, the Board also
welcomed the participation of Finland, France and Iceland in the Contingency
Plan, on this first occasion in which non-Member countries participated ina Governing Board action. These three countries participated fully in the
Governing Board’s preparations which culminated in this unprecedented
decision. In the following year, Finland and France both became Membersin accordance with IEA rules.
Since the Contingency Plan would be activated by decision of the
Executive Director but without the Board’s having an opportunity forlast-minute fine tuning, the Board arranged to meet again soon after
activation. It agreed to meet within ten days afterwards, “to assess the energy
implications and to decide upon any modifications which may be requiredin the contingency plan”, thus providing an opportunity for the Board’s
assessment and further decisions after the activation notifications would be
despatched but before the close of the period for implementation. The SEQ
and the SOM were requested to “continue to monitor closely the oil market
situation and, if activated, the implementation of the contingency plan”. As afurther response measure the Governing Board
Recommended that oil companies continue to draw on theircommercial stocks, that governments and consumers maintainand intensify their conservation efforts, and that oil companies
and consumers exercise restraint in purchases, in order to reduce
uncertainty and volatility in the world oil market.
142

This recommendation, like the parallel action in earlier meetings on
the Gulf crisis (9 August and 28 September), established an institutionalinnovation, in addressing not IEA Member governments but oil companies
and consumers directly. International organizations normally address
recommendations and decisions to their member governments, and do
not reach into the member countries to act directly upon companies andindividuals (for example, the IEA Contingency Plan was addressed to“Member governments”, and the Iraq and Kuwait embargo decision of the
Security Council quoted above was addressed to “states”, in accordance withtraditional practice). The Governing Board’s recommendation quoted above
doubtless gained in stature and rhetorical effect by virtue of its addressing oil
companies and consumers directly.
The Agency viewed its proper role as requiring responses not toundesirable price movements, but to disruptions of physical supply, to theactual or anticipated loss of oil volumes in the market. This policy in thecircumstances of the Gulf crisis was explained by Peter D. Huggins, a senior
IEA official, as follows:
At no stage of the crisis up to the expiration of the Allied
Ultimatum to Iraq in January were there actual or imminent
shortages of oil to the Group or individual countries which could
justify activation of IEA emergency measures. This is not to saythat the crisis did not cause problems to Member countries andthe world. Prices were for much of the period high and erratic.
Spot prices doubled over a two month period in contrast to the
Iran crisis when doubling took place only after seven months.
Average IEA import prices were about $34/barrel in Octoberagainst $16 in July but that has to be seen against the firm
objective set by the OPEC meeting a few days before the Iraqi
attack to limit production to obtain a $21 price. Prices in the
Crisis reflected fears about imminent rather than actual loss of
supplies in the Gulf. The market did, of course, take accountof the fact that provision of alternative supplies had virtually
exhausted spare productive capacity .... The IEA was able,
however, to base its operations on the information that there wasno global or regional shortage of oil supplies to meet current
requirements [Peter D. Huggins, “Lessons from the Gulf Crisisof 1990/91”, statement at the University of Dundee, United
Kingdom, September 1991: IEA archives].
143

The time for the IEA to act came when the air campaign against Iraq
commenced on 17 January. Acting upon the authority delegated to her in
the Contingency Plan adopted a few days earlier, and following a lengthy
telephone authorization consultation with participants in the Plan, on 17
January Executive Director Helga Steeg gave the formal notification which
activated the Contingency Plan. She then explained to the press the action
which would he taken, and stated that
There is no need for concern about physical supplies of oil. World
petroleum markets are comfortably supplied and additional
refinery capacity is available. But the outbreak of hostilities
could lead to heightened uncertainty and volatility in the market.
Therefore, these countries [IEA Members, Finland, France and
Iceland] are making available additional oil to meet any possible
temporary shortfall which may occur [IEA Press Release. 17
January 1991].
Mrs. Steeg also made it clear that the IEA had not established any pricetargets or considered price numbers. There was no intention of influencing
price, but rather, the intention was to avoid a possible far-reaching panicin the market after the outbreak of hostilities. In the following summary of
the procedures used by the IEAs three biggest countries, the United States,
Germany and Japan, Peter D. Huggins illustrated how the Contingency Plan
worked in practice:
The U. S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve made available morethan 4 million tons of crude oil for release through a bidding
procedure. About half of this was actually taken up and delivered tothe market. The German EBV, which is an industry body set up to
meet national stockholding commitments jointly, made available some
650,000 tons of oil products to its members. Again, only about half of
this was taken up. The Japanese authorities, on the other hand, cut the
emergency reserve commitment of industry by an amount equivalent
to four days of imports thus allowing industry to deliver 1.4 million
tons of oil which otherwise would have been unavailable. In all threecases, however, it was the amount made available rather than that
actually delivered that mattered. This reassured market operators thatoil supplies were sufficient to meet current needs [Peter D. Huggins,
144

“The IEA’s Response to the Gulf Oil Crisis of 1990/91”, statement at
the Node Conference of the UK Oil Industry Emergency Committee,
20 March 1992].
The Governing Board convened as foreseen on 28 January 1991 toassess the energy implications of the hostilities in the Gulf and the activationof the Contingency Plan eleven days before. The Board noted the reportof the SEQ government expert group that the 2.5 million barrels per
day to be added to the market was “comfortably within the capacityof OECD countries, that countries had taken or were in the process oftaking all necessary actions for its implementation, and that higher levels of
emergency response could he maintained for an extended period if necessary”[IEA/GB(91)3, Item 2 and Annex]. Activation of the Contingency Plan had
helped to discourage abnormal purchases by “instilling confidence thatany possible temporary shortfall in oil supplies from the Gulf would be
mitigated”. The Governing Board accordingly
Decided that the co-ordinated energy emergency contingency
plan, adopted at its 11th January 1991 meeting and whichmakes available to the market 2.5 million barrels of oil per
day, would remain in effect and that it would continue to be
implemented flexibly in close consultation with the Executive
Director.
In addition the Board welcomed the participation of the three non-Membersin the Contingency Plan, agreed to convene again quickly if the Executive
Director determined the need for further review of the Plan, and continued
the established monitoring process.
In its later assessment of the IEA response, the IEA government expert
group (SEQ) concluded that
The Allied advantage which emerged within hours of theoutbreak of war had a decisive effect on markets. A significant
calming effect was also attributed to the IEA Contingency Plan,
which was seen to make available large quantities of oil to themarket . . . . In a longer term context, doubt was dissipatedabout the will of the IEA to implement programmes such as
the 2.5 mb/d Contingency Plan as well as design and prepare
them. The Contingency Plan comprised oil actually saved or145released to the market and oil made available to the market,
thus strongly underpinning confidence, but not fully taken up[IEA/GB(91)67, p.13].
With the end of hostilities, the fall of oil prices closer to normal levels, andthe reduced immediate risk of supply reductions, the Contingency Plan
had performed its function. The IEA could thus terminate the Contingency
Plan, and it did so promptly. When the Board met on 6 March 1991, lessthan a week after the cessation of hostilities, the Board terminated theContingency Plan with immediate effect [IEA/GB(91)19, Item 31, and thedata system was deactivated with the March 1991 submissions by companies
and governments.
The Agency then embarked upon a penetrating assessment of its
management of the Gulf crisis. This was carried out by the Secretariat, by
the SEQ, the SOM, and the Industry Advisory Board. Each of these groups
reported to the Governing Board to enable that body to make the official
assessment of performance and to formulate conclusions on the “lessons” tobe drawn and on future actions to be taken. By and large the assessments
were quite favourable, but they were not without caveats for the future. The
IAB’s report recounted the major events and showed that the Contingency
Plan achieved the intended results in a positive fashion. Moreover, the IAB
suggested the need for the Sharing System procedures to take account of the
major changes which had occurred in the oil industry since the Agency was
founded. It also identified some problem areas in the emergency information
system, and drew attention to the ability of the refinery system and tanker
fleet to adjust to the rapidly changing supply pattern. This report wasnoted by the Governing Board and submitted to IEA Ministers at their
June 1991 meeting.
The IEA Ministers were impressed with the “co-operation and cohesionof IEA countries”, with the “resolution and pragmatism”, flexibility, andparticipation of the non-Members, as well as with the advice of the IAB andthe co-operative spirit of the oil producing countries which had increased oil
production. The fundamental lesson they drew from the Gulf War experience
was that Members must “continue their successful efforts to reduce theirvulnerability to oil supply disruptions” through means employed in the IEA.
Ministers noted the “efficient working of oil markets” aided by improved
trading practices and the “unimpeded pass through of oil price changes
during the crisis”. They also confirmed IEA emergency policies on stocks anddemand restraint, remarked upon the need for enhancing refinery flexibility,and noted the importance of the adequacy of the oil tanker fleet andother policies. They expressed “abhorrence at the continuing ecological146

effects and the waste of petroleum resources associated with the wanton
destruction by Iraq of Kuwaiti oil facilities”, and for the first time theyrecognized the need to explore means “to advise non-Member countries on
emergency preparedness, drawing on IEA models” [IEA/GB(91)46, Section
11; emphasis added].
In December 1991 the Governing Board at official level endorsed the
SEQ’s conclusions on the Gulf crisis, much of which was a more detailed
treatment of the subjects already addressed by Ministers [The SEQ Report
is contained in IEA/GB(91)671. The Board noted that the Middle Eastsituation remained fragile, and that the “IEA and Member governments
should ensure that they can continue to respond promptly and flexibly tofuture disruptions, whatever their nature” [Emphasis added]. The Board
also confirmed that
IEA emergency mechanisms take actual or imminent loss ofphysical supplies of oil as the criterion for their activation. Thisapproach was vindicated during the Gulf Crisis.
On other points, the Board referred to the “success of the Contingency
Plan”, the need to “strengthen Government control over oil stocks”, thecomplementarity of stock and demand restraint, and the significant role of“unimpeded price pass-through”. The Board spoke favourably on productstocks and refinery flexibility, refinery capacity, the emergency data system(and the need to improve data quality and systems for gathering data fromindustry), the possibility of providing advice on emergency response systems
to non-Member countries (while respecting the need to protect confidentialityof information), and the need for further analysis of the Gulf crisis experience.
The Governing Board “recommended that those Conclusions he taken
carefully into account in further IEA work on emergency preparedness”. The
sound relations with oil producers played an important role in mitigating
the effects of the Gulf crisis, especially the increased oil production by
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. The Board agreed that “contacts among all oil
market participants should he further developed to promote communication
and understanding” [IEA/GB(91)79, Item 4 and Annex 1]. Thus the IEA
closed the response and appraisal phase of the Gulf crisis, after initiating
preparatory measures promptly as the crisis began, completing its readinessas the crisis continued, exercising restraint when the need for action had
not been fully established, and acting promptly under established procedures
when the. time for action came in January 1991.
147

F.

Continuing Emergency
Response Readiness

The Agency’s emergency response systems have been fully maintained inaccordance with their terms, the Emergency Sharing system since 1975,
the CERM measures since the Governing Board’s Future Supply Disruptions
Decision in 1981, and the CERM system as such since the Stocks and Supply
Disruption Decision of 1984. Emergency response systems readiness requiresthat political support continue regularly, that the systems be maintained
operationally, that they be adjusted, updated, and even overhauled asconditions evolve, that competent personnel be trained, that the systems
be tested periodically under changing operational conditions, that Members
respect their commitments, and that their performance be thoroughly andregularly reviewed and assessed.
All of these requirements have been the subject of regular IEA actions
over the years. Political support from the Ministers occurs at virtually each
Ministerial meeting of the Board, and the Governing Board provides parallel
support at official level. This is done specifically meeting by meeting, as
appropriate, but also in more permanent policy statements such as thosecontained in the 1993 IEA Shared Goals discussed above [See Chapter II,
Section J above], where energy security is a prime objective. In that decision
the emergency response goal is stated as follows:
Energy systems should have the ability to respond promptly
and flexibly to energy emergencies. In some cases this requires
collective mechanisms and action — IEA countries co-operate
through the Agency in responding jointly to oil supply
emergencies [Goal 2].
The IEA provides constant institutional support for the response systems
by maintaining the IEA infrastructure, the specialist staff responsible for
emergency response work, and statistical as well as other services. The
systems themselves have been regularly adjusted as required to keep themup to date. Training of specialized staff for emergency response is a high
IEA priority. For co-operating company staff, the Agency periodically mounts
training seminars. The most extensive and thorough training exercises consistof the periodic systems tests described below. Finally, the Agency conducts
in a regular cycle an emergency response review of a number of individual148

countries, also described below. Not to be underestimated in any assessmentof IEA readiness is the vivid sense within the Secretariat that emergency
response has been the main mission of the Agency from the outset in1974 and that the future success of Agency may depend largely upon its
performance in dealing with oil supply disruptions.
1. Systems Tests
The IEA has not been content with establishing, maintaining, and improving
its emergency response systems, as important as those actions have been
throughout the Agency’s history. The Agency has also on a regular basis
tested by simulation the potential operation of those systems. Beginning in
1976, Allocations Systems Tests (ASTs) have been carried out every few
years with varying purposes and scenarios, as will be seen below. There has
been a total of seven ASTs to date and the Agency also conducts separate
data transmission tests, using current operation data. Since the CERM wasadopted in 1984, moreover, there has been one simulation test of CERM
operations as well. The Gulf crisis response may be considered also as a “livetest” of the CERM, in response to an actual situation, although it was notofficially identified with the CERM as such.
The structure of the ASTs and the conduct of the tests have evolved
over the years into a now well-established pattern. Their primary purpose
is to test the capacity of Members the Secretariat, and the international oil
industry to respond to major oil disruptions. They also test changes in the
Sharing System, reveal the need for improvements in the System, and train
key personnel. At the outset of each AST, a disruption scenario sufficient totrigger the Sharing system is devised and communicated to the participants.
Questionnaires A and B are usually activated in advance to provide thedata base, except in the most recent test (AST-7) for which the actual datasubmitted during the Gulf crisis was utilized. The test periods have ranged
from less than one month to over two months. Participation is broad in scopeand includes the Secretariat, the Industry Supply Advisory Group (ISAG),
Reporting Companies (RCs), Non-Reporting Companies (NRCs), National
Emergency Sharing Organisations (NESOs), and the SEQ. All Member
countries are expected to participated. The key procedures and necessary
information are set forth in a detailed operational guide. The ISAG convenes
at IEA offices in Paris to work with the Secretariat throughout the durationof the Test, just as it would in an actual emergency. The ISAG makes its
assessments of the simulated crisis situation. Supply rights, allocation rights,
and obligations are calculated and circulated. The re-allocation process
is conducted broadly as described above in Section B-3, including the149submission of Voluntary Offers and the conduct of the Voluntary Offer
matching process, but without actual contracts or movements of oil,stockdraw, demand restraint, or Type 3 mandatory supply actions.
The ASTs are followed by a number of appraisals, usually by the
NESOs, the ISAG, the Reporting Companies, the IAB, and the Secretariat,
which are reported to the SEQ and to the Governing Board. These test
outcomes contain evaluations of the conduct and results of the test and makerecommendations for changes in future tests, in the Sharing System, andin the Emergency Management Manual. In AST-7 in 1992, the extensive
recommendations were formulated as an “Action Programme” which wasendorsed by the Governing Board [IEA/GB(93)26, Item 9]. IEA Ministers
expressed strong support for the tests in the Communiqués of 1982, 1985,
1989, 1991, and 1993.
Over the years, the specific elements and objective of the ASTs havechanged, as they are formulated test-by-test to meet particular developments
or concerns. Some of these have been the following:
AST-1, 1976: data flow from Members and oil companies on actual andscheduled oil supplies, in a fast-data system; computerized calculationsof supply rights under the I.E.P. Agreement; companies’ reschedulingof supply movements; and procedures and mechanisms for balancing
allocation rights and obligations.
AST-2, 1978: the first full-scale test of co-ordinated emergency
measures by Members, the oil industry, and the Secretariat.
AST3, 1980: assessment of effectiveness of the NESOs, assessmentof the procedures, communications, and data processing on which
the Sharing System is based, and training the NESOs and industry
personnel in the implementation of the System.
AST-4, 1983: continuation of the programme of training personnel
in Member countries, oil companies, and the Secretariat, involving
to the fullest extent possible the NESOs in each Member country(including submission of Voluntary Offers by NESOs for Non-Reporting
Companies), test modifications and improvements in the systems andprocedures made since the previous test, and identification of waysby which the actual functioning of the Voluntary Offer system could
be improved.

AST-5, 1985: training of Secretariat, Member government, and oilcompany personnel, particularly on the compilation, transmission,
handling, and verification of data on detailed flows of oil supplies;
communication of data and other messages; calculation of countries’
150





Supply Rights, Allocation Rights, and Allocation Obligations; andtransmission, matching, and simulated implementation of Voluntary
Offers for international redirection of oil supplies.
AST-6, 1988: again training as in AST-5, extended to include allfeatures of the Voluntary Offer process and necessary communications
between the Emergency Operations Team, oil companies, and the
NESOs, testing of improvements in telecommunications and dataprocessing facilities, identification of modifications and possible
improvements of procedures defined in the EMM and the Operations
Manual, testing of such new procedures as the “Wider Window”
enlarged period for handling Closed Loop Voluntary Offers, pricing
elements, an arbitrary non-implementation procedure, andteleconferencing with the ISAG for part of the test period.
AST-7, 1992: again training as in previous tests, but especially thoroughtraining of new ISAG members; identification of possible improvementsin the Sharing System, including procedures to be followed by theMembers, the IEA Secretariat, and the oil industry in response to major
oil supply disruptions, as well as possible EMM amendments; flexible
responses and fine tuning to actual conditions of crude oil availability,
refining configurations, and transport constraints.

The overall objective of these periodic Allocation Systems Tests has
been to ensure that the Emergency Sharing System could be activated, could
function effectively as intended under the I.E.P. Agreement, and could bringabout a suitable resolution of a major oil supply disruption. In this process,the tests have revealed needs for training of personnel and improvements in
the Sharing System, leading to appropriate adjustments in both. In addition
to the technical details, ASTs enable the IEA to keep up-to-date with evolving
oil market conditions. Following AST-7, the Agency’s operating manuals forthis sector were completely revised to correspond to the oil market andother conditions of the mid-1990s. One other result has been the highdegree of IEA readiness to respond promptly, realistically, and effectively
to future disruptions, as has also been the case from the testing of the
CERM measures.
A CERM Test was conducted for the first time in early 1988 inorder to test co-ordinated emergency response procedures under the July
1984 Governing Board Decision on Stocks and Supply Disruptions. All
IEA Members participated. The purposes of the Test were to train the
personnel of Member governments and the Secretariat in the essential
procedures and mechanisms necessary to implement an early co-ordinated151response to a Significant oil supply disruption in accordance with the July
1984 Decision. Beyond training, the purpose was to exercise the Members’
domestic procedures for such response, to exercise procedures for relevant
data handling, to determine what data is “truly required” for this purpose,and to identify useful modifications and improvements to international aswell as domestic procedures.
ASTs are operational in their approach, while the 1988 CERM
Test was more of a textbook exercise, without oil company participation,
concentrating on procedural rather than operational issues. The national
Emergency Organisations in Member countries, virtually identical to the
NESOs, participated in the CERM Test. Members’ efforts were directed tothe administrative, logistical and legal procedures, not to policy. There was noattempt to simulate the consultative process, which in any case would dependon the overall market and other conditions existing at the time of a crisis.
Working on the basis of a disruption scenario as in the ASTs, the Members
analyzed the scenario and carried through all of the respective procedural
steps which would be required if their measures were implemented in an
actual emergency. The Test was also a data development and transmission
exercise, although it did not involve operational data as in ASTs, and extensive
reports were made by Members to the Secretariat on details of actions
taken and measures implemented. The Test appraisal found the Test to
be a good indicator of the existing state of preparedness and identified
the basis for Member to improve further their readiness in general. The
1988 CERM Test also provided valuable training to participants, and theoverall performance was considered adequate in view of the new groundcovered in the Test.
The Agency’s favourable experience with systems tests points the way
to the continuation of these exercises. A second CERM test was foreseen a
few years later, but the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis intervened. Since the IEA’s
Gulf crisis Contingency Plan consisted of CERM-like elements and provided
a more than sufficient exercise of many CERM procedures, there was noneed during that period to proceed with another simulation exercise. The
Gulf crisis reality had fulfilled the required need at that point. The “livetest” satisfied the Members that the required state of readiness for CERM
was well in hand. Another test of the CERM (CERM Test II) is planned for1995 as part of the expected review of CERM procedures. Planning for 1995
also includes a test of the Questionnaires A and B data systems, which could
provide data for a further AST. Systems test are thus expected to continue tocontribute to IEA readiness in this sector, as are the country reviews which
are taken up as the last topic in this Chapter.
152

2. Country Reviews
Emergency response reviews of the IEA Members’ preparedness represent a
major IEA activity to maintain readiness to manage oil supply disruptions.
The need for periodic reviews was foreseen by the IEA’s founders, who wrote
review requirements into the I.E.P. Agreement. They made provision forreviews by the SEQ on measures taken by Members to meet their emergency
reserve commitment (mainly oil stocks) [Article 4], demand restraint [Article5], allocation [Article 6], and the emergency data system [Article 36]. The
resulting review information, assessments and recommendations are reported
to the Governing Board which is empowered to make its recommendations
or to take other appropriate action. In order for the SEQ’s reviews to be
grounded on an accurate and full presentation of the facts on these fatreaching and at times complex subjects for each country, the Agency has
developed a pattern of thorough and detailed reviews under which each
Member is periodically reviewed by a team to experts which then makes its
findings and views known to the SEQ.
The reviews began on a limited basis in the early years of the Agency,
as in 1979 for example, when reviews were conducted for ten Member
countries on demand restraint to be implemented upon triggering of the
Sharing System. Similar reviews were conducted in 1980 for seven Members.
The first cycle of reviews of all Members was Completed in 1981, and a
new cycle was begun. The 1985 IEA Ministerial Communiqué gave explicit
support to continued reviews of emergency preparedness [IEA/GB(85)46,
Annex I, paragraph V. 6)], and in 1987 it did so for a new round of reviews[IEA/GB(87)33, Annex, paragraph 23] which were expected to identify
areas of improvement in effectiveness of demand restraint programmes.
Following completion of the review cycle which ended in 1989, the Governing
Board “noted that procedures for the current cycle of reviews have been
demonstrated to be efficient and productive” [IEA/GB(89)54, Item 4(b)].
Another review cycle was completed in the period 1989-1993, and still
another is scheduled to commence in 1995. Over the years, the scope ofthe reviews has evolved to cover not only demand restraint but emergency
response preparedness generally under the Sharing System, and since 1984
also under CERM measures.
The scope of subjects presently reviewed is indicated in the Emergency
Response Programme Review Questionnaire Outline [IEA/SEQ(94)26]:
I.

Oil Import Dependence and Market Structuresi) Oil Supply, Demand, and Import Issuesii) Market Structures
153

II.

Emergency Response Policy and Emergency Organisationi) Emergency Response Policyii) Emergency Organisationiii) EMM Allocation Procedures
III. Emergency Reservesi) Policy and Legal Instrumentsii) Operational Aspects of Stockdrawiii) Compensation and Costsiv) Compliance Issues
IV. Demand Restrainti) Policy and Legal Instrumentsii) Procedures and Monitoringiii) Decision Processesiv) Costsv) Evaluation of Measures
V.
Surge Production and Fuel Switching Capabilities
VI. Data Issuesi) Compilation and Transmissionii) Forms, Procedures and Legal Instruments
VII. International Co-operation on Oil Security Issues
VIII. Other
The questionnaires provide a principal basis for preparation of the Review
Team which makes the review investigations and analysis. The Teams
typically consist of two or more senior officials from other Member
governments and members of the Secretariat. Some of the reviews are
conducted in the country concerned when that is required because of thecomplexity of the mechanisms and the numbers of personnel involved inthose countries. The other reviews are conducted at IEA offices in Paris.
The periodic reviews are essential to the maintenance and improvementof the Member’s emergency response potential. Thorough and detailed, thereviews need to be frequent enough to “reflect major changes in emergency
response legislation, important developments in long-term net oil importprospect and other fundamental changes in the emergency response situationof Member countries” [IEA/GB(94)26, paragraph 1]. In the cycle beginningin 1995, the Secretariat expects to pay particular attention to new legislation,
new stockholding agencies, major changes in supply/demand trends, andother factors affecting response potential. More particularly, the reviews willemphasize meeting the IEA’s 90-day emergency reserve requirement (mostly154through oil stocks), strengthening further holdings of emergency oil stocks
beyond 90-days, increasing the efficacy of demand restraint programmes,and developing, national fair sharing systems. The reviews will also focus
sharply on the specific recommendations made to the reviewed countries in
the previous review cycle, on the results of the 1994 Kagoshima Workshop on
Stockdraw and Emergency Response Policies and Management, and on the
results of an oil security review foreseen for 1995. Moreover, for the first time,
the results of these reviews have recently been published by the IEA [OilSupply Security: The Emergency Response Potential of IEA Countries, 1995].
Along with the recently published Proceedings of the Kagoshima Workshop
they constitute a comprehensive guide to the state of IEA preparedness forinternational oil disruptions in 1995.
The Agency has thus moved well beyond the initial I.E.P. provisions
for SEQ reviews, to develop an elaborate, thorough, and effective systemof supporting investigations, assessments, and recommendations. Combinedwith the emergency response tests taken up in the previous Section of this
Chapter, the emergency response reviews play a vital role in maintaining the
Agency’s emergency response readiness.

This concludes the discussion of the Agency’s policies and practices
with respect to oil security, which treats essentially the short-term responses
to oil supply disruptions. As seen above, the Agency disposes of a considerable
array of measures which may be employed for that purpose. Moreover, theAgency has installed systems of flexibility for the decisions selecting andapplying particular measures, and it maintains these measures at a highdegree of operational readiness. Yet the IEA’s energy security problem is
not limited to these short-term oil supply disruption measures. Relatively
long-term policies and actions have also proved to be necessary to strengthen
the industrial countries overall energy security, as will be seen in the following
Chapter on that subject.

155

Chap. IV et V

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14:46

Page 157

CHAPTER IV

Long-Term Energy Policies:
Reducing Members’ Dependence
on Imported OilT

his Chapter is devoted to the IEA’s co-operation on long-term policies
and actions for reducing its Members’ dependence on imported oil. This
broad energy policy subject includes not only measures to increaseindigenous production of oil, but also the Agency’s early measures fixing
numerical objectives and ceilings for oil imports, adopting firm energy
policy principles, and protecting new energy investments. Long-term
energy policy also extends to energy conservation and efficiency, as well as
to the energy alternatives to oil, and thus to coal, natural gas, nuclear
energy, hydroelectricity and other renewable energy sources. The discussion
continues with electricity generally, and energy trade and investment.
Energy and environmental policies and actions feature prominently in this
Chapter. After describing the IEA’s energy policy review process, this
Chapter closes with a discussion of the Agency’s “free markets” policy now
in effect and its comprehensive declaration in the 1993 IEA Shared Goals.
While the IEA’s most immediate problems of protection against oil
supply disruptions received highest priority when the Agency was firstestablished [See Chapter III above], the founders of the Agency were also
keenly aware of the need for effective policies to reduce their dependence on
imported oil, which they could achieve only over the long term. The IEA’s
long-term energy policies began with only the sparest of guidance from the
Agency’s founders, although the general objectives of long-term policy were
well understood twenty years ago. During the negotiation of the I.E.P.
Agreement, there was little time to devote to long-term policy for addressing
the problems of continuing oil import dependence. At that time thefounders of the Agency were unable to finish the details of the Agency’s oil
Emergency Sharing System, much less to develop in the short time available
a coherent long-term programme. This task in fact would later consume
over a year of concentrated IEA deliberations to complete. Yet the founders
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started in the IEA a process of long-term policy co-operation to ensure thecontinuous strengthening of protection from oil supply disruptions.
When long-term policies began to take form in the IEA, the Members
gave effect to early policy outlooks favouring direct intervention measures, asseen in numerical objectives for oil import reductions, conservation, andexpanded use of an important alternative fuel like coal, with support in the
IEA’s 1977 “Principles for Energy Policy” covering most aspects of long-term
policy, taken up in Section D-1 below. When it became clear in the 1980s
that this approach could not produce the intended results, the Agency shifted
the emphasis of long-term policy to more pragmatic means of promoting the
production and use of alternatives to oil, to energy security, to sustainableeconomic development, to protection of the environment, and to theenlargement of the scope of IEA policies and actions on a worldwide basis.
These developments culminated in the IEA Ministers adopting in 1993 theIEA Shared Goals, which stated the Agency’s overall policies also in terms of
free markets and globalisation [See Section G below].
This IEA process of developing long-term energy policies began withmodest general guidance contained in the brief passages of the I.E.P.
Agreement’s Chapter VII on this subject, consisting of a declaration that
Members “are determined to reduce over the longer term their dependence
on imported oil for meeting their total energy requirements” and ofcommitment to “undertake national programs and promote the adoption of
co-operative programs” in a number of areas set out in the Agreement. The
scope and character of their commitments were to be developed later in the
Governing Board, in the specified areas of conservation of energy,
development of alternative sources of energy, energy research anddevelopment, and uranium enrichment. The Agreement charged theGoverning Board to adopt the long-term policy decisions by 1 July 1975;
i.e. in a little over seven months. This schedule ultimately did not prove
possible. Preparations in the Standing Group on Long-Term Co-operation
for submission to the Governing Board and the adoption of the decisions
took overall about fourteen months to complete.

A. The Long-Term Co-operation
Programme (LTCP)
Following an arduous negotiation, the Governing Board officially adopted theresulting Long-Term Co-operation Programme (LTCP) on 30 January 1976,
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with effect from 8 March 1976 [IEA/GB(76)5, Item 2]. The LTCP was
adopted by consensus without formal reservations or exceptions, aside fromthe Canadian exception to the Programme’s Chapter V on legislative andadministrative obstacles and discriminatory practices [See Section D-7
below]. The Programme reflected the IEA Ministers’ judgement on“the importance for the world economy of a regular and stable energy
supply” [PRESS/A(75)20, p. 1] and the Agency’s aim of “accelerating andfacilitating the medium and long-term transition to an oil-scarce world
economy” [IEA/GB(80)5, paragraph 1]. Some of the commitments weretaken in legally binding form; others adopted essentially politicalcommitments formulated as declarations or recommendations which are notlegally binding. The comprehensive and detailed programme, designed
ultimately to contribute to the security of energy supply, still provides theconceptual basis, framework and essential policies for IEA long-term cooperation.
The LTCP is to be carried out through the co-ordination of national
efforts and by co-operative activities designed to accomplish the following
objectives:
■
■

■
■

Promote the conservation of energy.
Accelerate the development of alternative sources of energy, throughan overall framework to increase and stimulate energy investment, ageneral measure to safeguard such investment, and co-operation in
the production of energy.
Encourage and promote new and beneficial technologies for theefficient production and utilization of energy.
Work toward the removal of legislative and administrative obstacles
and of discriminatory practices that could impede the realization of
the Programme [See LTCP, Chapter I, paragraph 2].

Members accepted commitments to establish on a periodic basis medium- andlong-term objectives for reducing the group’s dependence on imported oil, toreview progress toward meeting these objectives, and to assess the adequacyof their national and co-operative activities [See Chapter I, paragraph 3]. The
LTCP is designed to achieve an “equitable balance of advantage” among
Members, taking into account their respective economic and social interestsand objectives. All the elements of the Programme are “regarded asinterlinked” and are to be implemented “to ensure a continuing balance
between burdens and benefits” [Chapter I, Article 1]. Each of the IEA’s main
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twenty years is specifically foreseen or foreshadowed in the I.E.P. Agreement
or the LTCP, although the priorities, intensity of interest, and focus of theMembers and the operational scope of the various Programme elements would
rise and fall as a function of the changing conditions, opportunities, andseverity of the challenges facing the Agency. Since the LTCP was adopted in
1976, the Programme has not been formally amended except for several
additions to the R & D Guiding Principles set forth in Annex II to theProgramme [See Chapter V below]. The major policy directives andprogramme structure remain textually unchanged, although the operating
policies have since evolved in many cases, as will be seen in the history of thelong-term sector developed in this Chapter.

B. Energy Conservation and Efficiency
Conservation policy as stated in the 1976 LTCP focuses on the reduction of
the rate of growth of energy and particularly oil consumption, on theelimination of waste, on more efficient energy utilization, and on theapplication of energy price levels to reduce demand for energy. The
principal instruments to be employed are the fixing of “conservation
objectives” and periodic reviews of national programmes and policies in this
sector [LTCP, Chapter II]. Analytical studies, publications, and public
education programmes were soon added to the instruments at hand. As
developed in the Agency, energy conservation has come to refer to policies
on the use of less energy, by reducing the extent or quality of the services
resulting from energy use, and the related notion of energy efficiency refers
to policies designed to produce essentially the same services with the use ofless energy. A key role of Members’ co-operation in this sector has been the
sharing of information and experiences as well as the development ofcommon objectives and policies.
Conservation activity in the IEA moved forward rapidly. In keepingwith the Agency’s policy during the early years to establish numericalobjectives, ceilings, targets, and goals as policy implementing andperformance measuring devices, conservation “targets” were almost
immediately fixed, first for 1975 (and medium-term targets for 1980 and1985), then for 1976 and 1977. These targets were expressed as percentage
reductions of primary energy and oil consumption growth, and Members
expected that additional targets would be fixed for later years. However, theAgency’s agreement on broad policy pronouncements and its fixing of targets
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Page 161in the conservation field would not suffice. The Agency’s assessment of theMembers’ national conservation policies and programmes led to the early
preparation of an indicative list of recommended conservation measures,
which would also play a role in the IEA’s periodic energy policy reviews [SeeSection F below]. While conservation was included as one of the instruments
for realizing the later Group Objectives for reducing oil imports, the practiceof establishing specific targets for conservation on a continuing basis was not
welcomed by all Members and would eventually disappear.
Conservation figured prominently in the “Principles for Energy
Policy” adopted in 1977 [See Section D-1 below], where policy was stated
not in the form of ultimate objectives but more in terms of actions which
could contribute to the realization of the objectives. Principles 3 and 4
stated the basic conservation actions to be taken:
3.

4.

Allowing domestic energy prices to reach a level which
encourages energy conservation and development of alternative
sources of energy.
Strong reinforcement of energy conservation, on a high priority
basis with increased resources, for the purpose of limiting growthin energy demand relative to economic growth, eliminating
inefficient energy use, especially of rapidly depleting fuels, andencouraging substitution for fuels in shortest supply, byimplementing vigorous conservation measures in various sectors
along lines which include the following elements:– pricing policies (including fiscal measures) which give
incentives to conservation;– minimum energy efficiency standards;– encouragement and increase of investment in energy saving
equipment and techniques.

These Principles were accompanied by an inventory of still more specificconservation measures applicable to industrial, residential, and commercial
installations, transport, and the “energy sector” (the latter referred to district
heating, combined production of heat and power, waste products, and heat, as
well as full cost tariffs for electricity generation) [IEA/GB(77)52(1st Revision)
Appendix A to the Principles, pp. 23-24].
By 1979 the IEA was framing the objective of conservation policy inpart as an “overall energy/economic growth ratio” and as a measure of“energy efficiency”, as suggested in Principle 4 quoted above. The ratio ofenergy consumption to gross domestic product, known as “energy intensity”,
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became an important policy indicator. However, the use of an indicator ofenergy efficiency improvement became problematic when it developed that
other factors, especially the changing structure of the economy and thechanging products and value additions of major energy intensive industries,
had major influences on intensity. Another measuring device was the ratio
between the rate of increase in energy consumption and the rate of economic
growth, a formula which found its way into IEA deliberations in 1980 whenthe expectation was that over the decade to come that ratio could be reduced
to about 0.6, and when it was assumed that the share of oil in total energy
demand could be reduced from 52 per cent in 1980 to about 40 per cent by
1990 [IEA/GB(80)58, paragraph 10].
However, guidelines for more specific policies and actions had also
become necessary for policy making. In December 1980 IEA Ministers
adopted additional measures for structural change, including “energy demand
management” to promote conservation and to encourage substitution awayfrom oil. In order to increase public awareness of useful conservation actions,and to “move from statements of general intention to more specific actions toachieve results”, IEA Ministers adopted a decision containing “Lines of Action
for Energy Conservation and Fuel Switching” to be implemented in national
policies [IEA/GB(80)97, Item 4 and Annex II]. The key provision of the“Lines of Action” was appropriate energy pricing, to “Allow energy prices toreach a level which encourages energy conservation, movement away from oil,and the development of new sources of energy” [Paragraph 5]. Also included
were specific measures for industry, road transportation, residential andcommercial buildings, and electricity generation and transmission.
IEA Ministers found in 1982 that the increase in oil prices over theperiod 1978-1982 “has made conservation more economically attractive”[IEA/GB(82)51(1st Revision), paragraph 11]. After noting that significant
progress had been made, Ministers concluded that there was more progress
to come, depending upon further efficiency efforts in Member countries,“particularly in areas where government action can remove barriers to theoperation of market forces, or is needed to supplement market forces”[Emphasis added]. Ministers agreed to keep their national programmes
under review and to pay particular attention to the retrofit of rental
dwellings, to the industries’ difficulties in developing their own electricity
supplies, to bulk metering practices in multiple unit dwellings, and to district
heating. The eased market situation in 1984 still caused concern about
conservation in motor car fuel efficiency, since reduced consumer interest infuel efficiency could impair car manufacturers’ efforts in this sector. Noting
again that gains had been made, the Governing Board adopted its “Decision
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on Policies to Improve the Fuel Efficiency of New Passenger Cars”[IEA/GB(84)42, Item 3(e) and Annex I], a text that reflected agreement on agroup of measures to be applied as appropriate on enhanced testingprocedures, on the dissemination of information to consumers, on fuelefficiency programmes, and on the evaluation for policy purposes of new andstringent automobile exhaust emission standards.
Since the mid-1980s the trend in IEA conservation policy has been toplace greater emphasis on market forces, although the IEA has stated thatthe full potential for achieving energy efficiency and conservation gains“can best be realised through market forces and government policies
complementing one another in a manner which depends on national
circumstances” [IEA/GB(85)46, p. 4]. In 1985 the Ministers agreed that“government policies remain important to continued progress in reducing
energy intensity, and that those policies should be selective, carefullyplanned, cost effective and their results periodically assessed”. At their
1989 meeting, IEA Ministers cited efficiency gains as one of the factors
contributing positively to overall economic activity and energy security in
IEA countries [IEA/GB(89)36 Annex, paragraphs 2 and 4(c)]. The
Ministers agreed on the need to “continue the gains already achieved and toincrease the rate of improvement above present levels” [Emphasis added].
The IEA published at this time its important work on Electricity End-Use
Efficiency. Future action on energy efficiency would concentrate on the large
and fast growing sectors of transportation, electricity generation and end
use, heating and energy process requirements. The means to be employed
would be market-based pricing and detailed measures, as appropriate tonational circumstances, on information provision and dissemination, on theremoval of institutional and other market barriers, on the development andapplication of technologies, on financial or fiscal incentives, on taxation,and voluntary and mandatory standards, taking account in each case of theeconomic and other costs.
In more recent years, IEA conservation policy has retained theforegoing policy measures, while emphasizing the contributions to be madeto environmental objectives, the removal of barriers to efficiency gains, cooperation with industry, and the accelerated deployment of newtechnologies. In the 1993 IEA Shared Goals, Ministers stated this:
Improved energy efficiency can promote both environmental
protection and energy security in a cost-effective manner.
There are significant opportunities for greater energy efficiency
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consumption. Strong efforts by Governments and all energy
users are needed to realise these opportunities [IEA/GB(93)41,
paragraph 5].
Some of the results of IEA conservation and energy efficiency policies
and actions are especially worthy of note. During the Agency’s first ten
years, the IEA Members’ energy demand and oil demand per unit of GDP
both declined, energy demand by 19 per cent and oil demand by 34 percent. Over the longer period of the IEA, the results are even more
impressive: per unit of GDP, IEA energy demand fell 25 per cent, and oil
demand fell 43 per cent, although total energy consumption increased overthat period [See Energy Policies of IEA Countries: 1993 Review, Table A-19,
p. 568]. This reduction in the intensity of energy consumption resulted
from a number of factors, including structural changes in Member country
economies and market reaction to changing energy prices, as well as theeffective application by governments, industry and private individuals ofenergy efficiency policies and practices developed or promoted in the IEA.

C. Oil Import Reduction Policies andActions
Direct measures for meeting the Agency’s objective of reducing Members’ oilimports attracted strong support in the early years of the IEA. The notion ofagreed limits on oil imports at levels below expectations was at that time thepreferred policy instrument. These limits were expressed as numericalobjectives, ceilings, or targets, and the corresponding reductions were to beachieved by application of the “Principles of Energy Policy”. In addition,
the Agency adopted a number of policy declarations and actions promoting
greater indigenous production of oil in Member countries and elsewhere.
These policy developments are the subject of this Section of the long-term
energy policy Chapter.

1. Oil Import Objectives and Ceilings
After beginning with quantified conservation objectives in 1975 and 1976,
the IEA was attracted in 1977 to quantified oil import objectives. In the
Ministerial Decision on Group Objectives and Principles for Energy Policy[IEA/GB(77)52(1st Revision), Item 2(c) and Annex], Members agreed to a164Chap. IV et V

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political (not legal) commitment to “hold their total oil imports to not morethan 26 million barrels per day in 1985”. This policy mechanism wasintended to be repeated and developed in subsequent years as well. IEA“Principles for Energy Policy” consists of a broad statement of key
principles to be pursued in the formulation and development of nationalenergy policies. The Principles were initially intended as instruments toassist in the realization of the Group Objectives, but they later served, andcontinue to serve, a more general energy policy guidance function.
Since the Group Objectives for reducing oil imports expressed a global
figure for the IEA group as a whole, they could provide only generalguidance to individual countries seeking to apply it. Although this Objective
suffered from a lack of country-specific precision, it was considered a firststep in a process of establishing co-ordinated control of IEA oil import levels.
In the next step, the IEA sought to break down the group numbers into
specific ceilings for each country individually, which was not an easy
objective on which to reach consensus. The country-by-country ceilings wereintended to provide responsible officials with a more concrete and realistic
basis for setting policy and to offer the IEA review process a more specificmeasure for assessing the effort of each Member to reduce oil imports.
Following decisions taken at the Tokyo Summit in 1979, not only was
the Group Objective for 1985 reduced to 24.6 mbd from 26 mbd, but country
specific import ceilings were set for the year 1980. This was the first and only
time that the Agency officially adopted individual country ceilings of thatnature. However, the 1980 individual country import ceilings were taken as
firm commitments, while the 1985 adjusted import reduction Objective wastaken rather as a “goal” to be pursued. Both of these decisions had beencharacterized as “political commitments” [See IEA/GB(77)52(1st Revision),
Item 2(d); IEA/GB(80)58, paragraph 12(a), third tiret], which meant thatthey were not intended as “legal commitments”. As such, the decisions could
be more far-reaching in scope and more flexible in application than legal
commitments could be on such subjects.
The expectation that the Group Objective would be adequately
implemented through the application of the “Principles for Energy Policy”
was almost immediately challenged, as revealed first by the 1977 country
review [See Section F below more generally on country reviews]. In the
Governing Board’s April 1978 assessment, the Board concluded that the
Review “demonstrated very clearly that efforts undertaken are not sufficient”,
with respect to the group as a whole and for a majority of individual Members[IEA/GB(78)18, Item 2(a)(3)], and the Board then made a number of policy
recommendations for both the group and individual countries. In their review
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Page 166the following year, Ministers again noted that the Group Objective of limiting
oil imports to the agreed level “seemed capable of realization, but expressed
deep disquiet that the achievement of this Objective might result principallyfrom a lower level of economic growth than had been assumed when the
Objective was established” [IEA/GB(79)35, paragraph 5; emphasis added].
This statement assumed doubts about the effectiveness of the Members’
performance and of the assessment of their efforts, notwithstanding the factthat there was a short-term rhetorical value associated with the numericalmeasures. The problems included uncertainty about the realism of thequantified Group Objective and about the ultimate credibility and utility ofpolicy reviews based upon them. Since it was clear that the national importceilings and goals would have to be modified from time to time to reflectpotential change in a multitude of underlying factors, in May 1980 theGoverning Board at Ministerial Level adopted an adjustment system[IEA/GB(80)49, Item 3(a)(ii) and Annex II] which would take into accountthe existing ceilings and goals, existing estimates of national oil requirements,
oil supply and demand developments, and equitable burden sharing, among
other considerations. Whether adjustments were to be made or not, questions
about the desirability and effectiveness of the co-ordinated control of group orindividual country oil imports could not be ignored, in view of the differencesamong Members’ situations generally and among their respective current andprospective growth rates, and in view of the important role to be accorded tofree market notions.
Following vigorous monitoring and assessment in the IEA’s Standing
Group on Long-Term Co-operation (SLT) and in the Governing Board, theMembers’ interest in numerical objectives, ceilings, and similar instruments
seemed to reach its peak. By May 1980, the Ministers noted that imports for1985 “should substantially undershoot the existing 1985 Group Objective”, inrealizing both the potential for savings in oil use and for increased oil
production [IEA/GB(80)58, paragraph 9]. The Ministers discussed
arrangements for considering future yardsticks and ceilings, but none wasadopted. The Secretariat’s analysis of the Members’ performance with many
country-specific suggestions and recommendations was published in an Annex
to the Communiqué. In December 1980 new Objectives and Ceilings were notestablished, but the Ministers agreed simply that “total IEA net oil imports will
have to substantially undershoot both the 1985 Group Objective and Member
countries’ current estimates of net oil imports for 1985. They noted theSecretariat assessment that prudent policy suggests aiming for net oil importsof between 22 and 23 mbd in 1985” [IEA/GB(80)85(FINAL), paragraph 11].
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existing policy principles and “stressed the need for consequent and continued
implementation”. While they noted that “the Secretariat has indicated apotential for limiting IEA net oil imports to 19-21 mbd in 1990 and evenlower by the end of the century, if appropriate policies are carried through”, no
new numerical criteria were adopted [IEA/GB(81)34(Final), paragraph 6]. In
March 1981 the SLT expressed concern about the realism of estimates on
growth rates, domestic production, and import levels employed in the
numerical calculations. The SLT “agreed that more emphasis should be given
to a qualitative approach rather than a quantitative approach” and noted the
difficulties of several Delegations in accepting specific net oil import levels[IEA/SLT(81)52, paragraph 33; italicized emphasis added; underscoring in
the original]. Two years later, IEA Ministers listed in the Communiqué their
IEA commitments, including the “Principles for Energy Policy”, but they
made no mention of the Objectives and Ceilings or any other numericalcriteria [IEA/GB(83)36(Final), Annex I, paragraph 3].

2. Energy Investment Measure (MSP)
In addition to the oil import Objectives and Ceilings discussed above,
another interventionist feature of the LTCP is the so-called Minimum
Safeguard Price (MSP) mechanism, contained in Chapter III, Section D of
the Programme under the caption “General Measure of Co-operation”. In
the MSP Decision, IEA Members agreed to “ensure that imported oil is not
sold in their domestic markets below a price corresponding to US$ 7/bbl”,
in accordance with the terms of the Decision. The MSP Decision applies toimported crude oil and certain products. The minimum price of $7 is not
specifically indexed; although it can be modified by Governing Board
decision, it never has been. To apply the MSP, the Members would choose
from a list of approved measures: a specific or variable charge (levy, duty,
tariff, or fee) on oil arriving at the border at an f.o.b. price below the MSP,
an import quota, consumption or other appropriate taxes, or other measuresdeemed appropriate by the Governing Board.
The MSP remains on the books, but it became inoperative as apractical matter a few years after it was adopted, for lack of supporting
decisions necessary to its application. The $7 level was adopted at a time
when it appeared that oil producers could impose oil price reductions to alevel which would make certain domestic oil investments by IEA Members
uneconomic (North Sea, Alaska, and tar sands oil resources were mentioned
at the time). Assuming a challenge of predatory pricing of oil in producer
countries, the MSP would maintain the minimum price necessary to ensure
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Page 168that the necessary investment in industrial countries would not be adversely
affected. This measure has never been applied; indeed its activation has
never been proposed to the Agency. Broader principles of energy policy
almost immediately assumed greater importance in the IEA’s deliberations
on long-term policy. The MSP has been treated for years as of little otherthan historical interest.

3. Indigenous Production of Oil
The IEA has pursued a number of policy developments favouring enhanced
domestic oil exploration, production, and processing, although early
expectations of extensive co-operative efforts and joint projects by Membersin this sector [See LTCP, Chapter III. C] have not been realized. When the
IEA adopted comprehensive “Principles for Energy Policy” in 1977, an
important first Principle stated that Members would pursue the establishmentof national programmes and policies formulated as specifically as possible for
reducing in absolute terms or limiting future oil imports
through . . . expansion of indigenous energy sources . . .
[IEA/GB(77)52(1st Revision), Item 2 and Annex I, Principle 1].
In May 1979 IEA Ministers “considered that oil exploration and development
and enhanced recovery techniques, within the IEA and worldwide, should bestrongly encouraged by policies which promote the development of reserves
on a timely basis, under sound economic and reservoir management
practices, and by appropriate pricing policies”. They also initiated an
Agency study on “the capability of refineries in IEA countries to increase theyield of light products” and mandated work on “the need for policies
designed to achieve a better balance between future crude oil availability andrefinery configuration” [IEA/GB(79)35, paragraph 12]. Moreover, in May
1979 the Agency launched an R & D enhanced oil recovery collaborative
project in which a large number of IEA countries still participate [the R & D
projects are described in Chapter V below].
Broad policy statements to encourage the indigenous production of oil
in IEA countries have been made by IEA Ministers on a regular basis. In
December 1980 for example, they recognized that oil shortages could be
avoided by “strong and urgent policy measures to . . . expand supplies ofliquid fuels through . . . exploration and development efforts in IEA countries
in order to maximise indigenous production on a long-term basis”. They
also recognized that “oil prices in general should reflect international oil
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prices, in order to promote a balanced energy market [and] the developmentof alternative fuels and an associated reduction of dependence on oil”. They
agreed “that in order to assist in achieving these goals, the IEA should
examine more closely the pricing of energy in general and institute a more
effective monitoring system on energy pricing” [IEA/GB(80)85(FINAL),
paragraphs 13 and 15].
At the IEA Ministerial meeting three years later, the price and fiscal
elements were highlighted more specifically. Ministers agreed to pay
particular attention to■■■

the removal of those price regulations which discourage thedevelopment of indigenous energy or the displacement of oil by otherfuels or the efficient use of energy; . . .
reviewing of energy pricing policy with the aims that energy prices
should be more transparent and more closely reflect market prices or
the long-term costs of maintaining supplies, as appropriate;
the structuring of fiscal regimes for oil and gas production so as toencourage timely development [See IEA/GB(83)36, paragraph 5].

In the period following the 1990-1991 Gulf War, heightened oil
security concerns and rising demand brought renewed Ministerial
declarations on the need for greater indigenous oil production in Member
countries. In the early 1990s the Agency’s oil production concerns reflected
the IEA’s growing dependence on imported oil once again. IEA Ministers
clearly discerned that the rise in imports, with most coming from the Middle
East, presented a new challenge of increased vulnerability to oil supply
disruptions, which would inexorably result in “short-term market instability
and longer-term investment indecision”. In 1991 the key words were these:
Ministers encouraged Member countries to exploit all economicand environmentally appropriate opportunities to minimise
declines in their own indigenous oil production and to promote
diversified investments in worldwide production [IEA/GB(91)42/
REV2, paragraph 9; emphasis added].
Referring to investment, oil production, environmental and security goals,
IEA Ministers in 1993 confirmed that. . . investment requirements in the oil sector will be substantial
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Page 170expected upsurge in oil demand could be improved by greater
predictability in the policy framework. Recognising theimportance of adequate oil production and refining capacity forachieving security and environmental goals, Ministers call on
the IEA to closely monitor and analyse capacity developments,
in particular the effects of environmental constraints on refining
capacity, from both a regional and a global perspective[IEA/GB(93)41, paragraph 9].
The 1993 IEA Shared Goals assumed the same lines of policy
concerning indigenous oil production. Relevant measures include theemphasis on “the establishment of free and open markets” and on energy
security as underlying objectives. More specifically the Shared Goals call fordiversity of supply, minimization of environmental impacts, clean andefficient fossil fuel use, improved energy efficiency, R & D, undistorted
energy prices, free and open trade, and co-operation among all energy
market participants. It is likely that the application of each of these lines ofpolicy developed in the IEA Shared Goals will play a significant role in thefurther development of indigenous oil resources. However, the IEA has
never considered that indigenous oil production alone could remove therisks of oil import vulnerability. From the outset, the IEA’s other major
policy approach to this problem has been the development of alternative
energy sources, formulated in recent years as “energy diversity”, which isthe subject of the Section which follows.

D. Alternatives to Oil: Energy Diversity
In addition to conservation and indigenous oil production, the Agency’s longterm programme relies heavily upon alternatives to oil, or the policy of“energy diversity”, to reduce oil import dependency. The Members agreed in
the LTPC to “carry out national programmes and to undertake co-operative
measures and programmes to stimulate and increase production fromalternative sources of energy as rapidly as possible, consistent with theireconomic and social conditions” [Chapter III, Article 1]. To that end, theMembers undertook to “create a climate favourable for investment in energy”[Article 2] and to “establish medium- and long-term objectives for the groupas a whole for the production of alternative sources of energy”[Article 3]. The
LTCP also established the IEA’s system of periodic reviews of Members’
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Page 171“national programmes and policies relating to the accelerated production ofalternative sources of energy” [See Section F below]. The Members
undertook as well to “co-operate, to the extent feasible and desirable, inincreasing the production of energy from specific energy sectors” andestablished a framework for co-operation on energy projects [LTCP
Chapter III, B and C]. This Section considers the general energy policies
contained in the “Principles for Energy Policy” and the IEA’s policies andactions with respect to the particular alternative energy sectors.

1. Principles for Energy Policy (1977)
The discussion of the Group Objective in Section C-1 above referred to theadoption of the IEA “Principles for Energy Policy”, which provided
Members with agreed guidance on the optimal means for realizing that
Objective. However, these Principles set forth the general principles IEA
countries are to pursue in the formulation and development of nationalenergy policies on a broader basis. Moreover, they remain in force today(together with the IEA Shared Goals) and thus merit particular attention.
In sum, they fix IEA energy policy on the following themes:
■

■

■
■
■
■
■
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Establishment of national programmes and policies formulated as
specifically as possible for reducing oil imports through conservationof energy, expansion of indigenous energy sources, and oil
substitution.
Attention to important environmental, safety, regional policy, andenergy security concerns, and improvement of speedy procedures toreconcile conflicts arising between energy policies and these concerns.
Pricing energy in domestic markets at levels which encourageconservation and stimulate supply.
Vigorous conservation policies using price mechanisms, minimum
efficiency standards and increased investment.
Progressive replacement of oil in electricity generation, district
heating, industries, and in other sectors.
Strong steam coal utilization strategy and promotion of trade in steam
coal.
Concentration of the use of natural gas on premium requirements,
and gas infrastructure development.
Steady expansion of nuclear generating capacity, consistent withsafety, environmental, and security standards.
Emphasis on energy R & D, including collaborative projects.
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Establishment of a favourable investment climate which encourages theflow of public and private capital to develop energy resources.
Development in energy policy planning of alternatives to oil to meet
supply shortfalls.
Co-operation on energy with other countries and with internationalorganizations.

[The adopting decision and full text of the Principles are found in
IEA/GB(77)52(1st Revision), Item 2 and Annexes; the Principles are
reproduced in Appendix III below. Document IEA/GB(77)53 describes ingreater detail the policies and measures which IEA Members intend to pursue
in order to achieve the Group Objective, once they have taken into accountthe Principles and the results of the IEA’s country reviews].
These comprehensive Principles constituted the leading standing
statement on the Agency’s policies until the IEA Shared Goals decision was
adopted in 1993. The Governing Board stated that the decision containing
the Principles does “not establish legally binding commitments” and that
Member governments “express their firm political determination that, taking
into account their individual energy circumstances, they will give effect to thisDecision in carrying out their policies” [IEA/GB(77)52(1st Revision),
Item 2(d)]. However, the Principles have been largely overtaken in practicalterms by the 1993 IEA Shared Goals which emphasize market forces morethan governmental intervention as an instrument of policy [See Section G
below]. Both the Principles and the Shared Goals figure prominently in thediscussion of energy sectors which follows. In policy developments geared lessto government intervention and more toward market forces, productive efforts
have been made by the Agency to encourage the development of increased
domestic production of oil and the other alternatives to imported oil.

2. Coal Production, Trade, and Use
From the time of the founding of the IEA, coal was already identified as theprincipal energy sector to be developed as an alternative to oil. Whiledomestic oil production, natural gas, nuclear energy, hydroelectric power,
and renewable energies were also strong elements, coal was the leading
alternative energy source. Coal benefited from its ample supply availability
in many industrialized countries and from its favourable transportation andtrade prospects. Environmental considerations were taken into account, but
early IEA policies were developed before climate change became a public
policy concern.
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Although long-term energy policies are not developed in detail in the
I.E.P. Agreement, Article 42.1(b) refers specifically to coal, and lists it firstafter domestic oil. The I.E.P. Agreement envisions a co-operative
programme on information exchange, on the ways and means of reducing
imported oil consumption through such alternative energy sources(including jointly financed projects), and on environmental protection.
Nothing further on coal appears in the Agreement; indeed coal received
little specific attention in the LTCP when it was finally adopted in 1976.
However, the LTCP did mandate energy co-operation among
Members to increase “the production of energy from specific energy
sectors” [Chapter III, B]. The alternative energy Chapter of the LTCP
referred to the establishment of national programmes, to the creation of aclimate favourable to investment, to the use of public resources tocontribute to or engage in the production of energy, to medium- and longterm objectives, and to periodic reviews, all of which applied to coalproduction, use, and trade. Coal was listed in Chapter III, B. 3 with
nuclear energy as a key sector for co-operation in the production of energy,
in annual programme reviews, and in periodic assessments of the potential
for additional production. More specific substantive policy actions on coal(and the other alternatives to oil) were left to the later determination of theGoverning Board following more systematic research and analysis in this
sector.
IEA policy statements on coal began to take more concrete form withthe 1977 “Principles for Energy Policy” [See Section D-1 above], in whicha “strong steam coal utilization strategy and active promotion of an
expanded and reliable international trade in steam coal” were announced[Principle 6]. These efforts would be composed of the following elements:■■■

Rapid phasing-in of steam coal as a major fuel for electrical power
generation and in industrial sectors.
Further development of steam coal policies within producing,
exporting, and consuming IEA countries in order to support theincreased utilization of coal by enhancing market stability throughreliable and increased export and import flows under reasonable
commercial terms.
Development of policies to remedy anticipated infrastructure
bottlenecks.

While the foregoing text stated basic IEA coal policy, other provisions of the
Principles also affected coal policy; for example, Principle 1 on the173

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formulation of specific policies, Principle 2 concerning environmental,
safety, regional and security concerns, Principle 3 on price levels,
Principle 5 on discouraging oil-fired electricity generation, and on district
heating and industrial use, Principle 9 on research and development,
Principle 10 on a favourable investment climate, Principle 11 on emergency
planning, and Principle 12 on international co-operation. These Principles
evolved into more concrete formulations for coal in 1979, but technicallythey remain still in force. Their application would be affected by the 1993
IEA Shared Goals, although the Goals did not formally replace thePrinciples [See Section G below and the remainder of this Section].
In the year following the adoption of the “Principles for Energy
Policy”, the Secretariat conducted a major analytical study on the subject of
the role and potential of coal for the remainder of the century. This study
was published in 1978 under the title Steam Coal Prospects to 2000. It
concluded that the presence of adequate reserves and the economic
advantages of coal use indicated a potential for increased coal production,use, and trade. It also concluded that even to maintain modest economic
growth, a massive substitution of oil by coal would be required. This work
had a significant influence on the major coal policy developments which
took place in the IEA in the course of 1979.
The year of coal in the IEA was unquestionably 1979, when the
Agency adopted the far-reaching policies and actions on coal production,use, and trade which remain in force today. The first of these is the
specialized “Principles for IEA Action on Coal” [IEA/GB(79)32, Item 4(a)and Annex I], accompanied by the “Decision of the Governing Board on
Procedures for Review of IEA Countries’ Coal Policies” [IEA/GB(79)32,
Item 4(f) and Annex II]. In the same year the Agency was assured of the
co-operation of the coal-related industries, particularly for advice on policy
formation, by virtue of the “Decision of the Governing Board on the
Establishment of an IEA Coal Industry Advisory Board” [IEA/GB(79)49,
Item 5 and Annex]. These actions set for years to come the pattern of coal
policy, the IEA’s internal procedures for review of coal policy, and theadvisory role of the coal related industry.
In adopting the Coal Principles, the Board first assessed the potential
for coal, affirmed its previous policy statements, and outlined long-term
considerations, noting the continuing problem of oil supplies, the relatively
limited scope of the other alternatives to oil, the economic competitivenessof coal, and the long lead time for investment in coal utilization equipment.
While the Board did not fix formally a group objective for increasing coalutilization, it did consider that174

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thermal coal utilization in the IEA area, which in 1976 was
475 Mtoe, could, by adoption of strong national coal policies,
increase beyond the 900 Mtoe for 1990 in current forecasts basedon country submissions towards the 1500 Mtoe level for 2000
projected in the Secretariat’s accelerated policy case in “SteamCoal Prospects to 2000” [IEA/GB(79)32, Annex I, paragraph 5].
The Board thus showed the expectation that a doubling of thermal coalutilization could be achieved by 1990.
In addition to considering the differing constitutional structures ofMember countries as an important factor, the Governing Board’s 1979assessment also recognized that the achievement of this rate of thermal coalutilization would require policies to “encourage the necessary capital
investment” in coal, that significant coal producers would wish to safeguard
domestic coal production at required levels, and that “increased coalutilization, trade and production must proceed under acceptableenvironmental conditions” [Annex I, paragraphs 6-9]. The assessment
concluded that long-term oriented government action would be necessary to
reduce uncertainties and to improve coal development. It also concluded that
this would have to be done within the IEA in co-operation with non-Members,that domestic measures to encourage expanded trade and investment in coalshould be implemented, and that continuing review and assessment within the
IEA would be necessary.
In the specialized provisions of the Coal Principles themselves, IEA
Members agreed to “ensure that an economic, fiscal and investment climate
prevails which is conducive to development of coal production, trade andutilization” as envisaged in the Principles [Principle 22]. “Standstill”
provisions were included to protect the expansion of international trade andinvestment in coal from new measures inconsistent with the Principles [SeePrinciples 23 and 25]. Energy pricing policies were established to allow coal
to “develop its full competitive power” [Principle 18]. There are also
provisions on long-term contracts [See Principles 22 and 24], on reduced
uncertainty about national coal policies [See Principles 15 and 16], andenvironmental questions [See Principles 16 and 17]. Specifically on thesubject of electricity generation, Principle 19 commits Members to preclude“new or replacement base load oil-fired capacity”, to confine oil use
progressively to “middle and peak loads”, and to make “maximum use offuels other than oil in dual-fired capacity”, while Principle 7 of the earlier“Principles for Energy Policy” reserved natural gas for premium uses, not forelectricity generation. The Coal Principles also refer comprehensively to coal
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Page 176“transportation systems, port facilities and other infrastructure, where
necessary, to handle much larger volumes of coal” [Principle 20], to advanced
methods of coal mining, transport, and combustion, to R & D programmes,
and to commercialization of advanced coal technologies [Principle 21]. In a
more detailed Annex to the Principles, IEA Members agreed to take a numberof specific steps concerning coal utilization, mining, and transportation.
In order to complete the essential framework of coal actions, in
December 1979 the Governing Board established the Coal Industry Advisory
Board, which now consists of up to 50 “individuals of high standing active incoal related enterprises to assist the IEA in the practical implementation of
the Principles for IEA Action on Coal”. The CIAB is composed of individuals
who are active in coal producer, user, trader, transportation, or other energy
related enterprises. The members are proposed by their respective
governments or by the Executive Director and are appointed by theGoverning Board in consultation with the Executive Director (or by the CIAB
itself for individuals from non-Member countries), and CIAB members servenormally for three year terms in an individual capacity. The CIAB provides
an independent forum in which industry leaders meet with Agency officials toadvise on a range of coal industry related questions covering opportunities for
expanding coal production, requirements for transportation facilities,
expansion of the steam coal trade, electricity generation, investment capital,
acceptable environmental conditions, advanced technologies, and national
and international coal developments and trends as set forth in the CIAB termsof reference [IEA/GB(79)49, Item 5 and Annex, paragraph 1]. The CIAB
thus became the third group of IEA industry advisors, in company with theIEA Industry Advisory Board (IAB) which advises on oil emergency questions
and with the oil Industry Working Party (IWP) which advises on the oilmarket.
In the year that followed, for the first time the IEA’s annual review
assessed the Members’ policy actions in the light of the Coal Principles.
Coal proved still to be the alternative energy with the most substantial
growth potential, but insufficient progress had been achieved undernational policies. At the May 1980 Ministerial meeting, the Secretariat’s
analysis of the annual review produced the following conclusion on coal:
Stronger actions are required to expand coal production(Australia, Canada and the United States, which should be
prepared to develop further their capacity to export substantial
quantities of coal); use (Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the United
Kingdom); and trade, where greater attention to long-term
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contractual arrangements is necessary to provide the stability
and confidence to develop new mines and transportation
facilities. Positive action is required to deal with environmental
considerations, including demonstration projects and othersupport for technologies that can reduce environmental impacts[IEA/GB(80)58, paragraph 5 and Annex I, paragraph (vii)].
By December of that year, the CIAB had delivered its first report to theGoverning Board, and Ministers again addressed the coal problems. The
CIAB had cautioned that without stronger actions against uncertainties, “theobjective of doubling coal production and use by 1990 is not likely to bemet”, and stronger commitments and actions are required “if the potential ofcoal in reducing dependence on oil is to be achieved in a timely way”
[IEA/GB(80)85(FINAL), paragraph 19]. Carrying the question one stepfurther, the CIAB prepared an action programme with recommendations on
the steps which would need to be taken for coal use to double by 1990 andto triple by 2000. In response to this report, IEA governments agreed tostrengthen their efforts for coal use, production, and trade in the frameworkof the Principles, to carry out national coal policy reviews of the CIAB
recommendations, and to act on them as appropriate. Ministers also
mandated the development of a coal information system to be prepared with
CIAB advice and endorsed the CIAB’s plans for follow-up on the report.
Although the basic coal policy lines were thus in place by the late1970s and early 1980s, the coal policies have since been confirmed, and attimes enlarged upon in successive Ministerial meetings. Coal plays a majorrole in the annual energy policy reviews, and the results of these reviews all
but ensure that the higher bodies of the Agency will review coal policy on aknowledgeable and systematic basis at least once each year. In addition, theAgency has conducted several specialized reviews of coal policies andprogrammes from which assessments are derived for further policy action on
coal [See for example the policy outcomes of the coal reviews in
IEA/GB(84)15, Item 3(c) and Annex I; IEA/GB(88)14, Item 2(ii) andAnnex I]. The CIAB reports regularly with pertinent and respected advice on
current coal questions. In 1982 the CIAB and the IEA published The Use of
Coal in Industry, which confirmed analysis showing a large potential for coalin IEA countries. The IEA Coal Information System was established in thesame year, following a CIAB recommendation and with Ministerial blessing;the System provides the basis for the IEA’s annual Coal Information
publication which has become the standard reference work on this subject.
Another CIAB contribution, in the form of a report on Coal Use and the177Chap. IV et V

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Environment which appeared in 1983, concluded that the use of coal could
be expanded in an environmentally acceptable manner and suggested actions
which governments and industry could take to increase coal use. Morerecently the CIAB’s reports have included Global Climate Change (1991),
Industry Attitudes to Combined Cycle Clean Coal Technologies (1994), andGlobal Methane and the Coal Industry (1994).
Coal policy in the early 1980s began an enlarged and closer relation toenvironmental concerns, although those concerns were present in the IEA
from the outset [See Section E below on energy and environment]. By 1983
the IEA was saying that “Coal use must be environmentally acceptable”, withemphasis on “clean use of coal” and the need for R & D on coal use
technologies [IEA/GB(83)36(Final), page 3 and Annex I, paragraph 7]. In its
1985 statement to Ministers, the CIAB addressed industry’s concerns about
environment strategies, funding for R & D, the electricity sector as an energy
option, the information system, free trade, coal use in industry, and technicalco-operation with developing countries [See IEA/GB(85)45]. R & D wasstressed in 1985 when Ministers agreed to give weight to “the combustion ofcoal or its conversion to other forms of energy in an environmentally
acceptable manner” [IEA/GB(85)46, Annex I, paragraph III.3], the statement
appearing under an environmental rather than a coal rubric, presaging atheme which would reappear in the years to come. Other environmental
policies endorsed at that time also had direct effects upon coal, such as the
Polluter Pays Principle, environmentally acceptable ways of burning coal,better coal preparation, and use of low sulphur coal. Stating the governing
environmental principle
Ministers urge that, just as the formulation of energy policy
should give due weight to environmental considerations, soshould environmental policy give due weight to energy policy
considerations [IEA/GB(85)46, Annex I, paragraph III.5].
This type of formulation has continued to receive support in IEA policy
since that time. It appears as recently as 1993 in the important IEA Shared
Goals adopted that year by Ministers [See Section G below]. But
environmental opposition to coal expansion policy has been a constant IEA
preoccupation. In 1987, the atmospheric content of carbon dioxide stemmingfrom use of fossil fuels was beginning to attract a great deal of policy attention.
Damage to the climate, agriculture, and sea levels was cited as a reason forundertaking a “well co-ordinated multinational research effort . . . to assess
the likelihood, extent, and timing of such consequences” [IEA/GB(87)33
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Annex, paragraph 33]. Similar concerns were expressed two years later, whenthe IEA spoke out on “the complexity and uncertainties of the relationships
between greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels and atmosphericconcentrations, and consequent climate change, as well as the world wide
dimensions and implications of these issues”. At the same time, IEA Ministers
pledged, when fossil fuels are used, to set “strict standards for SOx and NOx
emissions” and to encourage the “introduction of advanced cleaning andcombustion technologies” [IEA/GB(89)36 Annex, paragraph 4(d)].
In major policy statements made in 1991 and again in 1993, the IEA
confirmed the objective of energy supply diversity through coal expansion
and the concerns about environmental constraints. The basic assessment
was retained: “Ministers observed that ample, low cost, secure sources ofcoal and other solid fuels are available to OECD countries, and that coal
importers have a wide choice of suppliers” [IEA/GB(91)42/REV2,
paragraph 12]. While progress had been made on the reduction of barriers
and other distortions to coal trade, the IEA called for further significant
reductions “leading to improved competition, accompanied by appropriate
regional and social policies” without new barriers or other distortions. The
other potential limiting factor for coal was the concern about “greenhousegas emissions”, for which “greater use of clean coal technologies with highconversion efficiencies”, the commercial availability of new technologies,
and international co-operation are necessary.
IEA coal policies were again confirmed in 1993, but this time with theadvantage of the World Energy Outlook projection which showed that the“solid fuels’ share in total energy requirements is expected to remain fairly
constant at about 30 per cent worldwide, and 25 per cent in OECD
countries. This implies about a 45 per cent increase in worldwide solid fuelconsumption from 1990 to 2010, with more than half of this increase
coming from China and India” [IEA/GB(93)41, paragraph 11]. Under
these circumstances the IEA policies on trade barrier reduction, regionaland social matters, and the absence of new barriers or other distortions wereconfirmed. Given that clean coal technologies can substantially reduce CO2
emissions, IEA Ministers also called upon the IEA “to expand international
co-operation, information exchange and technology dissemination toprovide incentives for and eliminate barriers to clean coal technology
deployment”.
The IEA Shared Goals, adopted in the same meeting, reconfirmed thefamiliar elements of IEA coal policy outlined above without specificallyreferring to coal as such but including it in the generic “fossil fuels” concept.
Reflecting a trend away from statements of preference in the selection of fuels,
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the Goals take a more general and conceptual approach than did the 1977
“Principles for Energy Policy”. Thus, the most directly stated Goal withrespect to coal is that “Clean and efficient use of fossil fuels is essential”.
More general Goals also have applications to coal, including the Goal
statements concerning free and open markets, energy security and theenvironment, energy diversity, efficiency and flexibility, minimization ofadverse impacts of energy activities, taking into account energy consequences
in making decisions on the environment, the Polluter Pays Principle, and suchother policies as continued R & D, undistorted energy prices, free and open
trade, a secure framework for investment, and co-operation among all energy
market participants [See Section G below].
Much remains to be done, in accordance with the coal and environment
policies outlined above, to meet the IEA’s objectives. The Members’
performance in expanding coal production, use, and trade has not lived up to
the high expectations in this sector, as appears in the Agency’s Energy Policies
of IEA Countries: 1993 Review [See pages 42-44 and Table A-19, pp. 565,
566]. The share of coal in total energy supply (TPES) had risen only
modestly from 20.3 per cent in 1973 to 20.8 per cent in 1992, mainly bymeans of substituting coal for fuel oil in electricity generation. The early IEA
notion of doubling IEA coal demand by 1990 was all but hopelessly under
shot: total supply (TPES) of 706.3 Mtoe in 1973 grew slowly to 907.3 Mtoe
in 1990, an increase of only about 28 per cent and it fell below that supply
level to 872.7 Mtoe in 1992. Hence it comes as no surprise that the IEA
review concluded in 1992 that
Coal production in IEA countries does not use full capacity andcould be increased substantially in major producing countries
such as Australia, Canada and the United States without
significant additional investments. The large number ofsuppliers, improved infrastructure and mature international
trading system assure adequate supply [1992 Review, p. 34; theSecretariat also confirmed this assessment in the 1993 Review,
pp. 42-43].
While recording a favourable coal supply situation, this review also
underscored the existence of significant state support of uneconomic supply insome Member countries. These were problems of subsidies for high cost coalproduction and of other protection measures for domestic production as wellas problems of overcoming environmental concerns, among others, which had
become a focal point for the energy policy reviews after 1986. In the 1993
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Review [p. 44], the Secretariat concluded that “Protection of domestic coalmining thus not only distorts markets and reduces efficiency; it has no
justification in terms of security of supply”. At the close of 1994, the Agency
continues, with the regular co-operation of industry (CIAB), to give attention
to such coal issues as expanding coal trade, reducing state aids, reducing theenvironmental effects of the coal cycle, improving the efficiency of its
combustion, and in particular, reconciling coal’s clear energy security attributewith the concern about rising concentrations of CO 2, for which the
combustion of coal played a significant role.

3. Natural Gas
Like coal and nuclear energy, natural gas was seen from the outset of the IEA
as a realistic alternative to oil in many - but not all - applications, andespecially in power generation which twenty years later became the mostimportant application, with major implications not only for other fuels,
especially nuclear, but also for the very structure and organization of theelectricity supply industry. The I.E.P. Agreement refers to the developmentof natural gas as an alternative to oil on the same basis as domestic oil, coal,
nuclear energy, and hydro-electric power, and foresees programmes forexchanges of information, concrete projects, and policy reviews, but only inthe most general terms [Article 42.1(b)]. The same is true of the LTCP
provisions where gas is linked to the other alternatives to oil, althoughnatural gas is not mentioned by name in the LTCP (only coal and nuclear
were identified specifically as alternatives to oil). Still in an early
development phase in the mid-1970s, natural gas policy was “in the air”, soto speak, but the consensus was that any substantive policy detail concerning
it should be determined later by the Governing Board, and this indeed has
been the case.
In the early years the Agency’s interest in natural gas was modest andtechnical, compared to the relative attention given to other energy
alternatives. There was no specific concern either about possible security
threats to the natural gas supply, because gas was not yet imported into IEAMember countries in substantial amounts from insecure sources, and theemergency focus at that time was all but exclusively fastened upon oil
security. In the years to follow, however, the expected role of natural gas and
IEA policy actions in this sector would evolve to give gas much more
prominence. Security concerns about reliance during the Cold War uponsingle suppliers of natural gas and about accidents, breakdowns, and otherdisruption possibilities would attract sharply concentrated policy interest.
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Between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s, IEA policy sought toincrease the availability of natural gas, but it did so in a relatively low key
fashion. The 1977 “Principles for Energy Policy”, in their sole specificreference to natural gas, state this objective:
Concentration of the use of natural gas on premium users’
requirements, and development of the infrastructure necessary to
expand the availability of natural gas [See Section D-1 above].
This “premium use” concept arose because natural gas was viewed at thetime as a component of the oil industry, and could be used as a replacementfor oil derived products in petrochemical feed-stocks. Under thesecircumstances, there was little or no policy encouragement to use natural
gas to raise steam to generate electricity. Yet the above Principle supported
development of natural gas, and a number of broad formulations in otherparts of the Principles apply to natural gas or have implications for it.
These include the Principles dealing with specific policies, environmental
safety, regional and security concerns, price levels, research anddevelopment, favourable investment climate, and others, as is also the casefor coal.
In 1979 the general interest in natural gas was already rising rapidly.
At the May 1979 meeting,
Ministers stressed the importance of natural gas as the most
readily available alternative fuel, and agreed on the need toencourage both indigenous production and international trade innatural gas [IEA/GB(79)35, paragraph 11; emphasis added].
In December 1979 the Ministers added more specifically that action must be
taken to bring about “rapid medium term substitution of natural gas foroil” [IEA/GB(80)5, paragraph 2]. The IEA Secretariat embarked upon anassessment of the potential in OECD countries for natural gas supply,
demand, and international trade. At the 1982 Ministerial meeting, thepolicy analysis became more precise, as Ministers stated that the expansionof natural gas use depended heavily on international trade. They referredto options for encouraging reliable gas trade and for reducing vulnerability
to potential natural gas supply disruptions, including:■■
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Diversification of supply sources.
The timely development of indigenous IEA sources.

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Emergency storage in excess of storage required for normal technicaland seasonal reasons.
Greater reliance on interruptible contracts with adequate provision fordual-fired equipment and back-up fuel supplies.
Flexibility in supply arrangements from secure sources, together withadequate integration of pipeline systems [See IEA/GB(82)51(1st Revision), paragraph 15].

In the same year the Agency published a major study on Natural Gas
Prospects to 2000 analysing the potential for natural gas and critical issues
for gas development, particularly the price of gas and security of supply. A
further and more intensive study of gas security was then undertaken.
These actions set the stage for the major decisions on natural gas security
which the IEA took in the course of the next year.
In May 1983, after confirming the policies described above, IEA
Ministers emphasized the importance of gas security, mainly as a result of
the Cold War concerns and the importance of the Soviet Union as a major
exporter of natural gas to Western Europe. In the Communiqué,
Ministers agreed that gas has an important role to play in
reducing dependence on imported oil. They also agreed,
however, on the importance of avoiding the development ofsituations in which imports of gas could weaken rather thanstrengthen the energy supply security and thus the overall
economic stability of Member countries. They noted the potential
risks associated with high levels of dependence on single suppliercountries. Ministers stressed the importance of expeditious
development of indigenous OECD energy resources. They notedthat existing contracts are currently insufficient to cover expected
gas demand by the mid-1990s, and agreed that in filling this gap,
steps should be taken to ensure that no one producer is in aposition to exercise monopoly power over OECD and IEA
countries [IEA/GB(83)36(Final), Annex I, paragraph 9;emphasis added].
This policy statement was followed by a number of commitments by theMembers on actions to be taken to make gas supplies more secure. These
included commitments to avoid undue dependence on single sources of gas
imports, to obtain future gas supplies from secure and diverse sources, tostrengthen gas companies’ and other undertakings’ ability to deal with183

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supply disruptions. The Members also undertook to avoid or reduce tradebarriers, to encourage imports from a variety of OECD sources, to develop
indigenous sources, to give attention to future supply in the annual country
reviews in various international organizations, and to inform other Membersof relevant policy changes. These 1983 policy statements and commitments
represent the most far-reaching actions on natural gas yet taken by the IEA.
In 1985, IEA Ministers again addressed gas security and adopted anumber of measures designed to implement the 1983 policy statements on thissubject. Here they emphasized the development of indigenous gas resources,
particularly in North America and the North Sea, including the NorwegianTroll field, which had been mentioned in 1983 as well. This policy was to be
carried out “with a view to making supplies available at prices competitive
with other fuels in the mid-1990s” [IEA/GB(85)46, Annex I, Section II]. The
actions also referred to cost-effective measures to strengthen the Members’ability to deal with gas supply disruptions, and to avoid reliance on oil if gas
supplies should prove inadequate. The Secretariat continued its research andanalysis in this sector, leading to the publication in 1986 of Natural Gas
Prospects, and in 1991 of Natural Gas Prospects and Policies, followed in
1994 by Natural Gas Transportation — Organisation and Regulation.
Natural gas questions continued to preoccupy Ministers as well as the
Secretariat. In 1991 IEA Ministers noted that “natural gas is a relatively
clean fuel and that demand for it is expected to grow rapidly in most IEA
countries” [IEA/GB(91)42/REV2, paragraph 10], that it could contribute to
the transport sector where diversity is weakest, and that “a commercial
approach to the development of more open and competitive markets would
ensure the exploration, development and production” of natural gas resources.
In 1993 Ministers again addressed natural gas issues, carrying forward thepolicy analysis and actions by noting that imports of gas from outside the IEA
were increasing, that gas systems are less flexible than oil systems, and mostsignificantly that “the potential for interruptions of gas supply has grown”[IEA/GB(93)41, paragraph 10]. Noting that gas markets tend to be regional
and largely unconnected, Ministers called upon the IEA to analyze regional
gas security issues. The Agency is now engaged in a new natural gas security
study, in which both the practical risk of technical breakdowns and politicallyconditioned disruptions in supply are being studied.
Unlike the 1977 Principles which conferred “noble fuel” status on
natural gas, the IEA Shared Goals, adopted in 1993 [See Section G above],made no reference to natural gas as such, but adopted a number of Goals
which bear directly on natural gas, much as described above in thediscussion of the IEA Shared Goals and coal [See Section D-2 above], in184

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effect recognizing the use of natural gas whenever the market would allow
it. Perhaps the essential point for natural gas is that it could play a role wellbeyond its present applications in various energy sectors, such as electricity
generation, heating and transport. Natural gas does not carry the danger ofpollution or potential destructiveness associated with some of the otheralternatives to oil. As IEA policy aims at overcoming the natural and manmade barriers to the wider use of natural gas, gas may be taken as a major
and permanent subject of IEA research, analysis, and policy. Over the firsttwenty year period of the IEA, the status of natural gas evolved from being
treated as a “noble fuel” with its particular rule system, to becoming a“general commodity” subject to the rules of competition, with spot markets
in some regions, and with an international natural gas industry now
developing links for the generation of electricity with this energy source.

4. Nuclear Energy
The IEA’s founders considered nuclear energy, along with coal, to be the twomost promising alternatives to imported oil. Already well-established in thefield of electricity generation by 1974, nuclear power could replace existing
oil-fired electrical power stations and could be employed in new installations
to meet the growing demand for electricity, with the expectation ofsubstantial savings in oil consumption. Since the nuclear fuel supply was
supported by the existence of abundant and widespread uranium reserves
held mostly in OECD countries, the accelerated development of nuclear
power could be undertaken without serious concerns about the security ofsupply, although there were familiar problems of nuclear safety, waste
disposal, and non-proliferation. With oil security the main energy
preoccupation of the mid-1970s, there was much policy interest in theadvantages of expanding nuclear energy when the IEA was established.
Hence nuclear energy appeared immediately after coal and natural gas
in the alternative energies inventory of Article 42.1(b) of the I.E.P. Agreement,
and radioactive waste management and nuclear safety were featured in the listof priority subjects for energy R & D co-operative programmes under
Article 42.1(c). Uranium enrichment was highlighted in the Article 42.1(d)provisions for monitoring, facilitation of development, consultations on
international issues, and information on planning of enrichment services. Likeother elements of long-term energy policy work in the IEA, the nuclear energy
questions were granted only initial recognition and support in the I.E.P.
Agreement, and it was left to the Governing Board to develop them with more
precision, as it did in adopting the LTCP and in other actions over the years.
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Technical aspects of nuclear energy had been managed by the OECD Nuclear
Energy Agency prior to the founding of the IEA; and that work has continued
in the NEA to the present day, while the broader questions of energy policy
concerning nuclear energy have been taken up in the IEA.
Although the LTCP did not develop detailed policies on nuclear
energy, the LTCP’s elaborate and systematic framework for alternative
energies referred specifically to co-operation on increasing the production of
nuclear energy. Work on nuclear energy co-operation was alreadyunderway when the LTCP was adopted in January 1976. In the R & D
Chapter of the LTCP (Chapter IV, Section 4.1), there was provision for a
programme of high priority R & D on “High Temperature Reactors for
Process Heat” to be added to the nuclear safety work already mentioned in
the I.E.P. Agreement. More broadly speaking, the LTCP’s provisions fornational programmes, the creation of a favourable investment climate, useof public resources to contribute to or engage in production, and periodic
policy reviews all applied to nuclear as well as the other alternative energies.
Early nuclear energy work in the IEA included a study to assess thelikelihood of Members’ achieving projected long-term nuclear power growth
and the conclusion in the R & D sector of a co-operative agreement on nuclear
safety information exchange. In 1977 IEA Ministers made the first of aconsistent pattern of statements supporting the expansion of nuclear energyuse, the sense of which was restated as a matter of routine in a number ofsuccessive Ministerial meetings. However, in most of the Ministerial
formulations, there is a lack of consensus on all but the most generalstatements supporting the expansion of nuclear power. This lack of consensus
continues to this day.
In the Conclusions of their 1977 Meeting, the Ministers recognized theimportant role nuclear energy would have to play “in reducing the risk of
insufficient energy availability as early as the 1980s, although someParticipating Countries had reservations due to specific domestic politicalsituations” [IEA/GB(77)52(1st Revision), Item 2(b)(7); emphasis added];also, Ministers “agreed that further measures must be found to increase
nuclear co-operation and that the IEA has an active role to play”. This
Conclusion should be read with the text of Principle 8 of the “Principles forEnergy Policy” [See Section D-1 above] which provides for:
Steady expansion of nuclear generating capacity as a main andindispensable element in attaining the group objectives,
consistent with safety, environmental and security standards
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prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In order to provide
for this expansion, it will be necessary through co-operation toassure reliable availability of:■adequate supplies of nuclear fuel (uranium and enrichment
capacity) at equitable prices;■
adequate facilities and techniques for development of
nuclear electricity generation, for dealing with spent fuel, forwaste management, and for overall handling of the back endof the nuclear fuel cycle.
Individual country positions reserving or hesitating upon all or part ofPrinciple 8 were expressed by six Delegations in their respective statements
which appear in the Conclusions cited above.
Problems of a relatively thin consensus on nuclear energy were also toappear in the language of the Ministerial Communiqué in 1977. Ministers
agreed to “maintain steady expansion of nuclear power, consistent with
non-proliferation and environmental concerns, as a main and indispensable
element in attaining IEA group objectives” [IEA/GB(77)48(2nd Revision),paragraph 6]. Yet the division of views and concerns among IEA Members
again became apparent in paragraph 7 of the Communiqué which repeatedthe general support language on a qualified basis: “Ministers of many
Member countries expressed the determination of their governments to
expand their nuclear generating capacity” [Emphasis added]; there weresome Ministers who did not join in this statement. In addition: “Ministers
recognised that some of the constraints on development of nuclear energy
can only be reduced by international co-operation”. In taking a policy
commitment on the role the IEA should play in developing nuclear energy
policies, the Ministers hesitated between a role of “facilitating” and a role ofmerely “studying the problems relating to” that function. In the end theydecided upon a more neutral formulation:
They agreed that given the importance of nuclear power as analternative source of energy, the IEA should play an active role inthe development of nuclear energy policies, taking full account ofwork being done elsewhere.
In 1978 the Governing Board adopted a Programme of Work in
Nuclear Energy directed specifically at assessing “the ability of nuclear power
to fulfil its necessary role in meeting the overall energy objectives of IEA” andto strengthen that ability [IEA/GB(78)5, Item 4]. This comprehensive
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Programme provided for an examination of alternative scenarios with varying
nuclear energy components, including the supply of uranium raw material,
mining policies, and exploration programmes. The Programme also referredto the back end of the fuel cycle, a multinational demonstration programme,
and non-proliferation objectives. A few months later the Board confirmed theWork Programme, and stressed the need for greater co-operation on nuclear
waste and for “smoothly flowing trade”.
By the following year the acceptability of nuclear power had been
weakened by the accident in 1979 at the Three Mile Island facility at
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in the United States, which would later combinewith the 1986 Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union to bring about asubstantial setback to the acceptability of nuclear power expansion, asetback still strongly felt in 1994. This difficulty was first addressed by IEA
Ministers in 1979 when the IEA policy emphasis shifted, as would be
expected, to nuclear safety and the need for public education on nuclear
power. The combined decline in nuclear power projection levels and fall off
in public confidence in nuclear power stimulated a strong Ministerial
response for building public support. The Communiqué pointed out thatshortfalls in energy supply, which should be expected if nuclear power were
not to realize its full potential, would lead to undesirable economic and social
consequences [IEA/GB(79)35, paragraph 10], and the formal Conclusions
more robustly foresaw “serious setbacks in economic activities, withconsequences for social and political stability” [IEA/GB(79)32, Item 3(m)].
The IEA retained the established policy of supporting nuclear power, but the
IEA also recognized “the urgent need for effective national and international
efforts to ensure that safety systems are sufficient to minimise the possibilityof nuclear plant accidents and their consequences, and to adequately informthe public of the results” [Communiqué, paragraph 10]. The Communiquéemphasized the need to explain to the public the consequences of the nuclear
power loss which could not be made up from other energy sources. During
this period, analytical work in the IEA continued, of course. The Ministers
supported the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) andrecognized the need “to ensure that effective action is taken to resolve longterm waste disposal and non-proliferation questions”. All IEA Members andthe Secretariat participated in the INFCE which led to clarifications andunderstandings intended to help resolve international nuclear fuel issues andto reduce uncertainties about the future use of nuclear power.
In 1980 a document entitled “Secretariat Analysis of Areas Where
Energy Policies Could be Strengthened in Individual IEA Countries” wasprepared for Ministers [Reproduced in the Ministerial Communiqué set forth
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in IEA/GB(80)58, Annex I; see also paragraph 5 of the Communiqué]. In thisdocument the Secretariat concluded that in the area of nuclear energy greater
efforts must be made to accomplish nuclear programmes and “to create anenvironment in which discussion of nuclear issues can take place in an
objective and balanced way” [Paragraph (ix)]. This textual fragment gives a
glimpse of the tense atmosphere in which nuclear issues were then being
considered. By “balanced way” the text meant that there was a need to take
into account economic and energy policies as well as safety and nonproliferation policies (and Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States were
specifically mentioned; France was not yet a Member of the IEA at that time).
The Secretariat also urged greater efforts to “streamline regulatory processes
for the licensing of nuclear plants and for authorisations related to nuclear
fuel cycle activities in other Member countries”. Streamlining the regulatory
process would become a frequent theme in subsequent IEA policy work on
nuclear energy.
IEA Ministers again considered nuclear policy in 1983, when they
confirmed the established policies and accorded greater attention to stabletrade in nuclear equipment, fuel cycle services, nuclear fuel, andmanagement of the “back end” of the nuclear fuel cycle. Moreover, the“IEA and NEA were requested to work together on periodic consultations
on the progress of Member governments in the waste disposal programme”,
and they were also requested to identify new R & D possibilities inadvanced technologies to support the Conclusions on nuclear power.
Ministers concluded that action along these lines would “provide the basis
for both institutional impediments and public acceptance concerns on
nuclear power to be vigorously addressed and allayed wherever possible”[IEA/GB(83)36(Final), Annex I, paragraph 8].
Despite these efforts, the following years brought more policy
reservations about the use of nuclear power. By 1985 nuclear power
accounted for 15 per cent of IEA electricity production, as some countries
continued to develop their programmes, but slow-downs were reported inothers [IEA/GB(85)46, page 6]. Ministers again endorsed nuclear power bystating that “under stringent standards for health, safety, and waste disposal,and strict respect of current non-proliferation policies, [it] generally has
environmental advantages” [Emphasis added]. This formulation, found in
the environment section of the Annex to the Communiqué, was the firstoccasion on which environmental advantage was listed as a policy element
supporting nuclear power. However, the environment element was a twoedged sword. After the Chernobyl accident, nuclear energy was again set
back, as health, safety, and environmental risks took on a new dimension in
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the public mind, and policy makers remained concerned about the particularkind of reactor which failed at Chernobyl. Policy reactions to this vexing
situation varied markedly, as the 1987 Ministerial Communiqué demonstrates[IEA/GB(87)33 Annex, paragraph 14(d)]. Members which viewed nuclear
power as a viable option carefully assessed the safety of their particular
reactors (which had little in common with the Chernobyl-type installation),and more importantly they assessed the approach to nuclear plant operationand containment. The IEA would later, at the request of the G-7, work with
the World Bank (IBRD) and with the participation of the EBRD to prepare areport on “alternative sources of energy in the event that some Soviet-designed
nuclear reactors are shut down in Central and Eastern Europe and the New
Independent States” [IEA/GB(93)41, paragraph 29]. The IEA countries
which accounted for the bulk of electricity production considered “that thestandards of safety in their reactor systems and procedures are so high that therisk of major accidents is too remote to justify a change in policy”, and theystated their intention to continue their programmes. On the negative side:
A few countries still have their programmes under review. Other
countries have decided not to produce nuclear power either
because they have other non-oil resources available or because
they consider the long-term environmental impacts and theresidual risks of nuclear energy production, even under thehighest safety standards, to be unacceptable. One country has
decided to discontinue its existing nuclear programme by early inthe next century [IEA/GB(87)33 Annex, paragraph 14(d)].
Notwithstanding the decision of some countries to limit or end their nuclear
programmes, the need for nuclear power in a diversified mix of energies forthe production of electricity continued to be felt. This is clearly confirmedin the major IEA policy statements of 1991 and 1993, although the focus
shifted to greater emphasis on the environmental advantage of relatively
pollution-free electricity production. In 1991 Ministers declared theirsupport for the substantial contribution made by nuclear power “to theoverall energy supply and mix of IEA countries”[IEA/GB(91)42/REV2,
paragraph 13]. Some Ministers were “of the view that the use of nuclear
energy because it emits no sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides or greenhousegases, provides an important response to the challenge of stabilizingof greenhouse gas emissions”. The acceptance of differentiated policies
among IEA countries was confirmed in a renewed statement that “each
IEA country will have to decide on the mix of fuels used for electricity
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generation best suited to its particular circumstances, taking account ofenergy security, environment, safety and the possible effects of theirdecisions on other countries”. The essence of these policies was restated in
the 1993 Ministerial meeting and represents the IEA’s position at the time ofwriting [IEA/GB(93)41, paragraph 12 and Annex I].
Nuclear power promotion was retained in the IEA Shared Goals, thelatest systematic statement on IEA policy. Goal 1 refers affirmatively to thecontributions of “Non-fossil fuels, particularly nuclear and hydro power” toenergy supply diversity, and Goal 4 includes the statement that “A numberof IEA members wish to retain and improve the nuclear option for the future,at the highest available safety standards, because nuclear energy does notemit carbon dioxide”. The application of other IEA Goals will also affectnuclear power, some favourably, others perhaps not. They include continued
R & D, undistorted energy prices, free and open trade, a secure framework
for investment, and co-operation among all energy market participants.

5. Hydroelectricity and Other Renewables
Although hydroelectricity and other renewable energy sources provide a
relatively small part of IEA countries’ total primary energy supply, renewables
play an important role in a number of countries and have received
considerable policy attention in the IEA. Hydroelectricity supplies over 50 per
cent of electricity generation in several countries, and (with geothermal, solar,
and wind) more than 16 per cent in the IEA as a whole [See Energy Policies of
IEA Countries: 1993 Review, p. 58, and Table A-13 in the 1992 and 1993
Reviews]. Non-hydro renewables, such as solar, wind, biomass, geothermal,
tidal, and ocean energy constitute only about 3.4 per cent of total IEA energy
supply [1993 Review, p. 60]. However, they and other renewables have been
the subject of intense interest in the energy R & D field where a basis for more
impressive results might appear in the future. Non-hydro renewables are
expected to grow at an average annual rate of about 8.5 per cent to 2010 in
IEA countries [World Energy Outlook, (1994) p. 233].
Renewable energy sources were not altogether ignored by the IEA
founders, who mentioned “hydro-electric power” in the enumeration ofalternatives to oil contained in Article 42.1(b) of the I.E.P. Agreement, but
made no reference to the other renewables, except to a few as subjects forenergy R & D projects. Still, it is clear that the other renewables were notexcluded, for the enumeration in Article 42.1(b) is only indicative andleaves ample room for the others. Article 42.1(c) mentions solar energy, theproduction of hydrogen from water, and municipal and industrial waste as
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Page 192high priority subjects for R & D co-operative programmes. The I.E.P.
Agreement leaves policy development on renewables, as well as on mostother long-term sectors, to later actions of the Governing Board.
The LTCP included renewables by implication in the broad languageof the programme policies and structure, but without mentioning any of therenewables in the general provisions [See Section A above]. However, theenergy R & D Chapter of the LTCP mentioned some key renewables: small
solar power systems, geothermal energy, wind power, wave power, ocean
thermal gradients, and biomass conversion, all of which have since been thesubject of IEA policy research and analysis and co-operative R & D projects
or programmes.
The IEA’s general declarations on energy policy have consistently
supported the expansion of renewable energies, despite their apparently
modest potential for the substantial replacement of imported oil, in theabsence of major R & D breakthroughs. Renewables have become
particularly attractive as energy sources in recent years, because they areperceived as environmentally acceptable without carrying the risks
associated with the expanded use of fossil fuels and nuclear energy.
Early IEA policy statements gave relatively low priority to renewables,
since they could not be immediately hailed as promising major contributors
to the imported oil reduction challenge. Yet as early as 1977, IEA Ministers
gave renewables a boost with the commitment “to put more emphasis on
development and use of less depletable energy sources” [IEA/GB(77)48(2nd Revision), paragraph 4; emphasis added]. Ministers made no specificreference to the “less depletable” energies or “renewables” as such in the
IEA’s 1977 “Principles for Energy Policy”, although renewables would
clearly have benefited from the broad application of a number of the
Principles, including those dealing with environmental concerns, energy
pricing, R & D, favourable investment climate, and international cooperation [See Section D-1 above]. More intense interest in renewables had
to await a few more years of developments, with 1979 bringing only a tepid
statement on the “pursuit of new energy technologies for the long term”[IEA/GB(80)5, paragraph 2]. Likewise in 1983 Ministers spoke of theirreadiness to pursue national and international policies “aiming at
exploitation of other indigenous energy resources such as hitherto
unharnessed hydropower” [IEA/GB(83)36(Final) Annex I, paragraph 11].
By 1985, the environment concerns quickened the interest in
renewables, but still mostly in abstract terms, as in the Ministerial
commitment to promote “renewable sources of energy which areenvironmentally acceptable and competitive” [IEA/GB(85)46 Annex I, III,
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paragraph 3]. Ministers noted the role of hydropower and renewables inelectricity generation depending on national circumstances and emphasized“the importance of research and development where this would reduce thecosts of renewable energies and enable them to realise, on an economic basis,
their potential contribution to energy supplies in the medium and longerterm” [IEA/GB(85)46, page 7]. The sense of these policies was restatedin 1987, again with hydropower highlighted [IEA/GB(87)33 Annex,
paragraph 14(c)], and once more in 1989 with respect to “growing energy
needs” [IEA/GB(89)36 Annex, paragraph 4(d)(iii)].
The promotion of hydropower was bound sooner or later to encounter
stiff resistance not only from the realities of geography, but also from policy
opposition to the potentially adverse effects of new facilities on surrounding
areas and peoples. In 1991 Ministers recognized “the physical limitations andenvironmental constraints on substantial further expansion” of hydropower,
and acknowledged that the other renewables “are unlikely to replace otherfuels in a major way over the coming years” [IEA/GB(91)42/REV2,
paragraph 14]. Nevertheless, the Ministers again promoted renewables fortheir environmental advantages and for energy security reasons, and saw
them as likely candidates for “increased commercial development,
demonstration, and integration into energy systems”.
Renewables also figured prominently in the IEA’s major policy
declarations of 1993. The over-riding environmental concern at this time
was climate change. From the energy perspective, carbon-based fuels were
becoming problematic, while nuclear, hydro and other renewable energy
sources assumed greater importance. The 1993 Ministerial Communiqué
noted their modest contributions and cited technical development anduncertainties regarding the economic viability of non-hydro renewablesources as the reasons for their lack of further development [IEA/GB(93)41,
paragraph 13]. However, important contributions could be expected fromrenewables, despite the limitations on hydro development and the slow
increases foreseeable for other renewables; hence Ministers agreed “on theneed for continued strong government support and international
collaboration” in this sector.
The 1993 IEA Shared Goals, annexed to the Communiqué, also
supported renewables. In speaking of the need for diversity, efficiency, andflexibility in the energy sector, Goal 1 stated that “Non-fossil fuels,
particularly nuclear and hydro power, make a substantial contribution to
the energy supply diversity of IEA countries as a group” [Emphasis added].
Goal 3, on the environmentally sustainable provision and use of energy,
gave a priority status to economic non-fossil fuel sources. After referring to
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nuclear energy, Ministers stated that “Renewable sources will also have an
increasingly important contribution to make”. As with the other energy
sectors, the Goals contain general provisions which would indirectly support
renewables, on such topics as R & D, energy pricing, free and open trade, asecure investment framework, and co-operation among all energy market
participants.
Thus policy recognition of renewable energy sources has grown
remarkably since 1977 when those sources were not mentioned as such in
the “Principles for Energy Policy”. The situation of renewables has evolved
to the point that they received explicit recognition in the 1993 IEA Shared
Goals, despite the acknowledgement of practical limitations upon
improvement in the overall contribution of renewables.

6. Electricity
Electricity has always been a major element of IEA long-term energy policy,
but electricity as such received relatively little attention in the early days of
the Agency, when policy was more dedicated to oil, to the other primaryenergy sources employed to produce electricity, and to efficiency in the useof electricity [See Sections B, C, and D-2 above]. Over the years, however,structural change in Member countries brought significant increases inelectricity use; indeed, electricity generation in OECD countries has morethan quadrupled since 1960 and it has continued its strong growth to thepresent day [IEA/GB(93)40, paragraph 27]. Despite improvements in enduse and generating efficiency at the time of writing, it is clear that
substantial new generating capacity will be needed to meet this growing
demand in the future. As this development became known and understood,
the Agency’s focus on electricity has broadened beyond the underlying
primary fuels and efficiency to include the particulars of electricity as well as
the environmental and energy security aspects of electricity policy. It may be
expected that the decisions to be taken on the creation of that new capacity
will have a significant impact on the effectiveness of energy policies
generally.
The I.E.P. Agreement makes no specific reference to electricity,although it does speak of such primary fuels as domestic oil, coal, naturalgas, and nuclear energy as alternatives to imported oil, and specificallymentions hydro-electric power [Article 42.1(b)]. Solar energy appears in
the list of R & D subjects, among a number of others which also touch uponelectricity fuels. The 1976 LTCP says nothing specifically about electricity,
but does feature coal and nuclear development [Chapter III, B], and it lists
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small solar power systems, geothermal energy, wind power, and ocean
thermal gradients, all of which are relevant to electricity, among the new
subjects for R & D co-operation under IEA auspices.
Electricity is more prominently featured in the IEA’s 1977 “Principles
for Energy Policy” [See Section D-1 above] which established the Agency’s
early core policy on this subject: the “Progressive replacement of oil inelectricity generation”. The Principles also adopted specific actions,
including “discouraging the construction of new exclusively oil-fired power
stations” and “encouraging the conversion of existing oil-fired capacity tomore plentiful fuels” [Principle 5]. Principle 6 promotes the “rapid
phasing-in of steam coal as a major fuel for electrical power generation”;
Principle 8 speaks of the need for co-operation to assure the reliableavailability of “adequate facilities and techniques for development of
nuclear electricity generation” [See Section D-4 above]; and otherPrinciples, such as those on conservation, R & D, investment, planning, andco-operation, also have applications for electricity.
When the IEA adopted the Coal Principles two years later, electricity
was also highlighted [See Section D-2 above]. The Coal Principles refine
and expand the earlier and broader “Principles for Energy Policy”
mentioned above, insofar as coal is concerned. Referring to the statement of
IEA Ministers, Paragraph 19 of the Coal Principles provides that
They will ensure that the use of oil for electricity generation isminimized by national policy planning which, with a minimumof exemptions, precludes new or replacement base load oil-fired
capacity; progressively confines oil to middle and peak loads; andmakes maximum use of fuels other than oil in dual-fired capacity.
The specific action steps set forth in the Annex to the Coal Principles [Seeparagraphs 2, 3 and 4] strengthen the Principle of limiting oil-fired base load
power plants, and provide that dual-fired power plants are not to be “firedwith oil unless other fuels are unreasonably expensive in comparison with oilor it is temporarily necessary for environmental reasons”. Improved siting
and licensing procedures for new coal-fired power plants are also envisaged.
Since the early 1980s, IEA Ministers have regularly included
electricity in major IEA energy policy statements. In their 1982 assessmentof the future role of electricity in achieving structural change, Ministers
agreed to examine future prospects for electricity and “factors which may
constrain fuel-switching”, including uncertainty about demand, costeffective patterns of electricity generation, the competitive position of coal
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relative to oil, regulatory impediments, safety, and environmental factors[IEA/GB(82)54(Final), paragraph 8; emphasis added]. At the following
Ministerial meeting in 1983, the scope of IEA interest expanded to include“the pricing policies and, where it exists, regulation of the tariffs ofelectricity utilities so as not to impede the provision of funds for investment
in new generating capacity” [IEA/GB(83)36(Final), Annex I, paragraph 5;emphasis added]. These subjects were taken up in a thorough Secretariat
study, published under the title of Electricity in IEA Countries, Issues andOutlook, which led to a comprehensive policy statement on electricity in
1985. In that year, Ministers affirmed “the need for strong and effective
policies to enable electricity to make its appropriate contribution toeconomic development and energy security” [See IEA/GB(85)46, page 6
and Annex I, Chapter III, 4; emphasis added]. Ministers reviewed theleading primary energy sources for electricity (particularly coal, nuclear,and renewables) in the light of electricity policy and they revived theenvironment factor in a statement supporting “promotion on an economic
basis of the use of electricity when it can be produced in an environmentally
acceptable way”.
In 1987 Ministers renewed their assessment of present and potential
demand (still on the rise) and surveyed the problems for electricity in each of
the primary energy sectors (coal and other solid fuels, natural gas,hydropower, and nuclear), confirming much of what had been agreed
previously. They noted that “Where economic, multi-fuel generating plants
enable consumers to take advantage of competition between fuels”[IEA/GB(87)33 Annex, paragraphs 13-16], suggesting the prospective policy
importance of fuel switching as a means of enhancing energy diversity. During
this period, IEA interest in efficiency and electricity continued, notably withthe completion of the Agency’s Electricity End-Use Efficiency study in 1989.
The promotion of electricity trade and competition, because of theireconomic and environmental advantages, emerged in the 1991 IEA policy
statement. The Members would explore the ways to enhance electricity tradeand competition, without endangering security of supply. Ministers “agreed
to remove impediments to electricity trade where present” and also agreed
that “flexible generating capacity and diversified fuel sources will be
required”. The limitation of any generating option would increase demandfor other sources “and thus potentially reduce energy diversity and security”[IEA/GB(91)42/REV2, paragraph 11]. The 1991 Ministerial statements inthis field were based upon the work later reflected in Electricity Supply in theOECD, published in the following year, and which remarked upon theincreasing challenges to electricity generators: tightened environmental
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standards, ever-changing rules, and limited supply choices. The inescapableconclusion was that for electric power sources: no supply source, “whether
oil, coal, nuclear, natural gas, hydroelectricity, or other renewables, iswithout constraints. Their prospects raise questions of availability andprice” [IEA/GB(93)8, page 12].
The 1993 IEA Shared Goals [See Section G below] made no reference
to electricity as such, but a number of the Goals affect electricity policy. An
important example is Goal 1 on diversity, efficiency, and flexibility, where
the contribution of non-fossil fuels, “particularly nuclear and hydro power”,
is noted. Others are Goals 3 and 4 on the environment, Goal 5 on energy
efficiency, Goal 6 on R & D, Goal 7 on energy prices, Goal 8 on trade andinvestment, and Goal 9 on co-operation among energy market participants,
all of which reflect themes which appear regularly in the IEA’s considerationof electricity policy.
The IEA’s most recent specific policy statement on electricity was
made by Ministers in 1993 as follows:
Electricity demand in OECD countries continues to grow steadily
and substantial new generating capacity and energy efficiency
gains from demand-side management practices will be required
over the next several decades. Thus, greater efforts are needed towin public understanding and co-operation for the siting of new
facilities and investments in efficiency to meet future demand,
while continuing efforts to mitigate environmental effects.
Enhanced electricity interconnection and trade offer many
security of supply, economic efficiency and, in certain instances,environmental advantages [IEA/GB(93)41, paragraph 14].

7. Energy Trade and Investment
The energy trade and investment objectives of the IEA comprise“horizontal” concerns which stretch across the leading alternative energy
sectors discussed above in this Chapter, i.e. indigenous oil, coal, nuclear,
natural gas, and renewables [additional references to trade and investment
are found above in the Sections devoted to those sectors]. The Agency has
considered in a broad sense that free and open trade and a favourable
climate to investment in Member countries as well as in non-Members arevital to the realization of its more specific sectoral objectives and policies.
The stake in the trade issue is suggested in the following Table [See Energy
Policies of IEA Countries: 1993 Review, Table A-19, p. 565]:
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OECD Trade in Energy for 1992
Million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe)
Total Net Imports

1105.7

Coal

Exports
Imports
Net Imports

174.2
195.4
21.1

Oil

Exports
Imports
Bunkers
Net Imports

481.0
1520.0
72.6
966.4

Gas

Exports
Imports
Net Imports

113.9
231.2
117.3

Electricity

Exports
Imports
Net Imports

17.6
18.4
0.8

The importance of energy trade and investment to the realization of
IEA alternative energy objectives can hardly be exaggerated today. It can
only increase in future years as energy demand grows on a global scale [Seethe IEA’s 1994 World Energy Outlook, p. 18] and especially if the Agency isreasonably successful in pursuing its policies of enhancing energy trade andinvestment.
The I.E.P. Agreement treats trade and investment issues sparingly. For
the oil sector, the Agreement [See Chapters III, V and VI and Article 47] has
well-developed emergency sharing and oil information provisions which
necessarily concern oil trade during periods of supply emergencies; and theoil information system serves in normal times as well. Yet trade andinvestment in the other energy sectors are not mentioned as such in the longterm policy Chapter of the Agreement, though the founders implied theirpresence in the broad framework provisions on long-term energy policy
development. As with the other elements of long-term policy, the Governing
Board is charged with the responsibility to develop and adopt appropriate
trade and investment policies within the context of the I.E.P. Agreement
objectives. The Board first exercised that responsibility in the Long-Term
Co-operation Programme (LTCP) in 1976 [See Section A above].
Among the leading energy trade and investment issues in the mid1970s were the “legislative and administrative obstacles and discriminatory
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practices” which would be incompatible with the IEA long-term policies
adopted in the LTCP. Chapter V of the LTCP bears a descriptive title
referring to those obstacles and practices. It sets the basic IEA policy on
promotion of trade and investment, the policy which is still operational in
1994. The objectives for Members are (1) to “work towards the identification
and removal of legislative and administrative measures which impair theachievement of the overall objectives of the Programme” [Chapter V,
paragraph 1]; (2) to afford “national treatment” to all nationals of IEA
Members, “in particular with regard to energy investments, the purchase andsale of energy, and the enforcement of rules of competition” [Paragraph 2;emphasis added]; and (3) to “refrain from introducing legislation oradministrative regulations in the energy field which would prevent them fromaffording the nationals of other Participating Countries treatment no lessfavourable than that afforded to their own nationals” [Paragraph 3]. A
fourth objective directs the Agency “to pay particular attention” to the effortsof Members to carry out their commitments “to identify and progressively
remove obstacles to their implementation and to assess progress achieved” byMembers “in approaching the overall objectives of this Chapter and to keep
the overall balance of the implementation of the Long-Term Programme”[Paragraph 4].
These are mainly political commitments, although they are framed as
relatively soft legal obligations. Paragraph 1 provides that Members “shallwork towards the identification . . .”. Under paragraphs 2 and 3, Members“shall use their best endeavours to . . .”. Paragraph 4, however, contains amore rigorous legal obligation, not on Members directly but upon the Agency,
by stating that “. . . the Agency shall pay particular attention . . .”[Emphasis added]. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 are “soft” in the sense that they do
not require Members to achieve the stated objective, but only to “worktowards” it in the first case and “to endeavour” to do so in the second andthird. Nevertheless, Chapter V of the LTCP could not be accepted by Canadaor Australia, although it was accepted by all other Members. Both Canada
and Australia cited their respective constitutional systems and particularenergy situations in explaining their reasons for declining to accept Chapter V.
In response, the other IEA Members stated their belief that both Canada andAustralia would find it possible, as their respective policies evolved, to movecloser to the position of the other Members as expressed in Chapter V [SeeIEA/GB(76)5, Item 2 (Canada) and IEA/GB(79)8, Item 2 (Australia)].
The Chapter V energy trade and investment provisions have been
applied by the Agency in the reviews of Members’ energy policies and have
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have largely retained their subjective, inchoate, and somewhat hortatory
character. However, in the future the character of IEA commitments in this
sector could evolve further as a result of the European Energy Charter andEnergy Charter Treaty negotiation process. Commenced in 1991, thisprocess has sought to establish a much more robust system of commitments,
not only among European countries, but also among non-European
Members of the IEA and with the Central and Eastern European and otherCharter participants, as will be seen below.
One other concrete provision adopted in 1976 in the LTCP toencourage and safeguard energy investment in IEA countries was the socalled “Minimum Safeguard Price” (MSP) as it is known generally or the“General Measure of Co-operation” as it is designated in the LTCP
[Chapter III, D and Annex I]. The application of the safeguard price was
expected to reduce the risk of investment in higher cost conventional energy
sources, which could be jeopardized deliberately or through market forces bya drop in the price of much lower cost oil produced outside of the IEA area.
Under the MSP system, Members agree not to permit imported crude oil to be
sold in their domestic markets below the safeguard price corresponding (in1976) to $7 per barrel of marker crude oil. While the MSP demonstrated IEA
Members’ commitment to the promotion of energy investment, the MSP level
was soon out of date, and the supporting measures required to maintain thesystem’s readiness were allowed to expire after a few years. The MSP has
never been activated or updated. Additional background on this subject isfound in Section C-2 above. The development of a more comprehensive andeffective trade and investment policy came with the Governing Board’s actionsin 1977 on the “Principles for Energy Policy”, and in later years on othermeasures.
The IEA “Principles for Energy Policy” [IEA/GB(77)52(1st Revision), Item 2(c) and Annexes; see Section D-1 above] refined thesubstance of the investment policy. Principle 10 calls for the
Establishment of a favourable investment climate which
encourages the flow of public and private capital to develop
energy resources by appropriate pricing policies, by minimizing
uncertainties about the general directions of energy and otherpolicies such as mentioned in Principle 2 (environmental,
regional and security concerns and conflict resolution), and byproviding government incentives where necessary, in order to:■give priority to exploration activities including those in
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encourage rates of exploration and development ofavailable capacities which are consistent with the optimum
economic development of resources.

The Principles were written in 1977, at a time of great preoccupation with oil.
They are not intended to be legally binding, even in a soft sense, but only to
express the Members’ “firm political determination”. Although the Principles
did not refer specifically to trade (and investment policy was not specificallydeveloped in the other Principles dealing with various energy sectors), thePrinciples as a whole imply that trade and investment policies are necessary to
carry out the Principles successfully. Both trade and investment would havegreater visibility in later measures adopted by the Governing Board.
The first of these measures is the Principles for IEA Action on Coal,
adopted in 1979 [IEA/GB(79)32, Item 4(a) and Annex I; see Section D-2
above]. The Members’ basic coal trade commitment is formulated inparagraph 15 of the Coal Principles as a common objective to “expand . . .
international trade in coal to meet increased demand” [Emphasis added].
Members agreed, moreover, todo so on a basis which encourages the development of stable
relations between consumers and producers, on fair, reasonable
and competitive terms, especially by means of long term
contracts. They will ensure that an economic, fiscal andinvestment climate prevails which is conducive to developmentof coal production, trade and utilization as envisaged in these
Principles for IEA Action on Coal [Paragraph 22].
The Principles provide for Members which have measures on international
coal trade in force to apply them “in a manner which fully supports these
Principles”. Members adopted a “standstill” agreement on new measures,
stating that they would not introduce any new measures “which areinconsistent with these Principles . . . except for over-riding reasonsconcerning the national interest, in which case they will take full account ofthese Principles” [Paragraph 23; the exception stated at the end of thisparagraph was included at the request of Australia and Canada, and it was
accepted by the others on the basis of statements by these two countries].
Moreover, Members undertake not to interfere with the implementation of
long-term contracts “unless they are compelled to do so by severe
developments in the coal supply situation occurring in an individual country
which threatens that country’s wellbeing; or by a severe international energy
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supply emergency in which latter case they will apply any restrictions on an
equitable and non-discriminatory basis” [Paragraph 24]. Paragraph 26
states that Members agree, in order to maintain coal flow in commercial
channels on a non-discriminatory basis, to “monitor the structure and growthof international coal trade as it develops”.
Parallel provisions of the Coal Principles apply to investment in coal.
Members agreed to assess their environmental and other policies, taking
into accountthe need to provide long-term reliability for investments byminimizing revisions of environmental standards for existing
facilities which disproportionately increase costs in relation toenvironmental benefits [Paragraph 16(c)].
The main Principle on coal investment, contained in paragraph 25,
merits quotation in full:In their efforts to establish an investment climate which
encourages the investment necessary to expand coal production,
IEA countries will in general maintain positive attitudes towards
investment for coal projects, including international investment
flows. Insofar as IEA countries have measures in force which
provide for review or control of international investment flows,
they will implement and apply those measures in a manner which
fully supports these Principles for IEA Action on Coal. They will
not introduce new measures regarding international investment
flows for coal projects which are inconsistent with these
Principles for IEA Action on Coal except for over-riding reasonsconcerning the national interest, in which case they will take fullaccount of these Principles for IEA Action on Coal [note that the
exception at the end of this paragraph was made for the same
reason as the exception in paragraph 23 on trade, as statedabove].
The Coal Industry Advisory Board (CIAB) and the IEA Secretariat havefollowed up on this Principle with a number of detailed studies of coal tradeand investment. In the IEA’s annual policy reviews and the special coal
policy reviews in the Agency’s long-term work, the Principles have provided
an essential measuring rod for assessing the Members’ efforts in applying
the IEA actions on trade and investment.
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Some of the same can be said for natural gas. Natural gas investment
and trade have also been the subject of Ministerial statements. In 1979, theMinisters “agreed on the need to encourage both indigenous production andinternational trade in natural gas” [IEA/GB(79)35, paragraph 11],although the relatively elaborate Principles adopted for coal were notestablished for natural gas. In 1983 the Governing Board adopted a policy
statement on security of supply of natural gas and risks of dependence on
single suppliers [See Section D-3 above on natural gas], which wasessentially a formulation of natural gas trade policy.
Turning to broader statements on trade and investment, in 1981 theGoverning Board adopted its more general “Decision on an Approach
to Investment in Energy Projects to Promote Structural Change”[IEA/GB(81)86, Item 6, Annex II], which emphasized international cooperation on energy planning, the demonstration of achievements in energy
policy, further development of country review procedures, and Secretariat
contacts with international financial institutions with a view to providing
energy information relevant to investment decisions. The following year
Ministers recognized still more broadly “the importance of energy
investment in bringing about a better energy mix” [IEA/GB(82)51(1st Revision) paragraph 16]; they also noted “the general sluggishness ofprivate investment in current economic circumstances and that several
large energy projects that have high costs and long lead times have been
recently deferred or cancelled”. As a result the Ministers stressed “theimportant role that energy investment must play in assuring energy
security”.
Energy pricing attracted Ministerial policy interest in 1981, when
Ministers supported an approach to consumer pricing which promoted
world market prices, where markets exist, and the cost of maintaining
supply in the long term, where they do not exist [IEA/GB(81)33(2ndRevision), paragraphs 11 and 12]. The document states that subsidies
which discourage conservation should be avoided and that “a thriving
energy trade should be developed”. IEA Ministers also addressed electricity
tariffs, which they said should not prevent utilities from raising revenue
needed for future requirements, and considered tax policies and thetransparency of energy prices. In 1984 the Governing Board reachedconclusions on both energy pricing [IEA/GB(84)15, Item 3(d) andAnnex II] and barriers to trade [IEA/GB(84)15, Item 3(e) and Annex III],
which contain specific requests directed to particular Members to takeaction in a number of sectors, such as prices, (for example, Canada should
continue moving gasoline prices upwards) and trade barriers (for example,
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Germany and the United Kingdom should consider the disadvantages tointernational trade of protecting or subsidizing domestic high cost coalproduction).
The most recent comprehensive IEA policy statement on energy tradeand investment is found in the 1993 IEA Shared Goals [See Section G
below] which emphasized the establishment of “free and open markets” forenergy as “a fundamental point of departure”[See the introductory
paragraph to the Shared Goals]. Goal 8 addresses trade and investment
briefly but directly:
Free and open trade and a secure framework for investment
contribute to efficient energy markets and energy security.
Distortions to energy trade and investment should be avoided.
Goal 9 on co-operation among all energy market participants also refers totrade and investment. Co-operation “helps to improve information andunderstanding, and encourage the development of efficient, environmentally
acceptable and flexible energy systems and markets worldwide. These areneeded to help promote the investment, trade and confidence necessary toachieve global energy security and environmental objectives” [Emphasis
added].
Moreover, the European Energy Charter process has produced onenergy trade and investment a declaration, to which all IEA Members except
New Zealand have subscribed, and the Energy Charter Treaty which was
initially signed by all but five IEA countries. The Charter process grew out ofa realization in mid-1990 that special opportunities were arising, particularly
in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union after the end of theCold War, for IEA countries to enter into mutually advantageous energy
relations with governments in those areas. The IEA Secretariat participatedin the development of these instruments from the outset, providing support
from the Agency’s staff responsible for non-Member relations, long-term
policy, legal counsel, and other functions within the Agency. The IEA
Secretariat produced a preliminary paper entitled “Improvement of Energy
Investment Climate” which outlined typical investment improvement
measures which might be considered. The Secretariat also participated fullyin the Charter process and made a number of other contributions to theCharter.
In June 1991 IEA “Ministers noted with interest the expressed
objectives of the draft European Energy Charter, namely to develop closer
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protect the environment, to enhance security of supply, to promote free andundistorted energy trade, and to assist the process of their economic reform”[IEA/GB(91)42/REV2, paragraph 31]. The Communiqué declared that“the development of any Charter and protocols thereto should be
non-discriminatory, and the European Community, the IEA and otherinternational organisations should co-operate closely”. Thereafter, theGoverning Board requested that the IEA Secretariat continue its participationin the negotiating process of the Charter [IEA/GB(91)65, Item 4(c)(iii)]. On
17 December 1991, the European Energy Charter was signed at The Hague,
as a political (not legally binding) document. In addition to the IEA
Members, the parties included the Russian Federation, other Central andEastern European states, and the European Communities. The parties
undertake to “promote the development of an efficient energy market
throughout Europe, and a better functioning global market, in both cases
based on the principle of non-discrimination and on market-oriented priceformation, taking due account of environmental concerns” [Title I, second
paragraph, see IEA/GB/RD(91)3, December 1991].
The main policy thrusts of the European Energy Charter are inenergy trade and investment policy. On trade, the signatories agree to takeaction to develop
trade in energy, consistent with major relevant multilateralagreements such as GATT, its related instruments, and nuclear
non-proliferation obligations and undertakings, which will beachieved by means of:■an open and competitive market for energy products,
materials, equipment and services;■
access to energy resources, and exploration anddevelopment thereof on a commercial basis;■
access to local and international markets;■
removal of technical, administrative and other barriers totrade in energy and associated equipment, technologies andenergy related services.
In addition, the signatories agree to other provisions on the improvement ofservices and installations, transport infrastructure, access to capital, andaccess to transport infrastructure [Paragraph 1].
To promote the free flow of energy investments, the Chartersignatories agree that at the national level they will “provide for a stable,transparent legal framework for foreign investments, in conformity with the205Chap. IV et V

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relevant international laws and rules on investment and trade” [Title II,paragraph 4]. In addition, they affirm
that it is important for the signatory States to negotiate andratify legally binding agreements on promotion and protectionof investments which ensure a high level of legal security andenable the use of investment risk guarantee schemes.
Other commitments concern the right of investors to repatriate profits orother payments relating to investments and to obtain and use needed
convertible currency. There is provision for the avoidance of double
taxation. Many other energy policy elements, such as energy efficiency(including environmental protection), oil, natural gas, the nuclear fuel cycle,
power stations, coal, renewables, R & D, safety, and major accidents arealso developed in the Charter.
The policies set forth in the Charter have since been transformed into
treaty obligations in a second instrument called The Energy Charter Treaty,
which was negotiated after the Charter was signed in December 1991. The
IEA has not itself become a party to the Charter and would not be expected
to become a party to the Charter Treaty. Neither instrument states IEA
policy as such, but all IEA Members have endorsed the Charter informallyand all have supported the Charter Treaty generally (although all Members
might not fully agree with all provisions of the Treaty). Hence the IEA
status of the Charter policies is an informal but effective one. This wasmade clear in the IEA Ministerial Communiqué of June 1993, when
Ministers gave their support to the early completion of the Charter Treaty,
stressed the importance of the full range of measures “designed to ensurestability and transparency in trade and investment”, noted the role this canplay in “integrating the energy sectors of IEA countries with those ofCentral and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States”, and statedthat they “welcome the IEA’s substantial assistance to the Treaty
negotiations and support the IEA’s active involvement in the ensuing
Charter implementation” [IEA/GB(93)41, paragraph 31].
While the Charter states broad policy in terms which are not legallybinding, the Charter Treaty is “designed to promote East-West industrial cooperation by providing legal safeguards in areas such as investment, transit
and trade” [See Final Act of the European Energy Conference, AF/EECH/en
1, 12 December 1994; emphasis added]. The Treaty is intended to stimulate
the flow of investment, capital, goods and energy, and it creates a continuingorganizational structure for this purpose. The Energy Charter Treaty and its
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Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects weresigned in Lisbon on 17 December 1994, the Treaty by forty-one states, theProtocol by thirty-nine states, and both by the European Communities. All
but five IEA countries were among the initial signatories of both instruments,
which will remain open for signature for six months and also provide foraccession. Negotiations also were begun on two additional Protocols to theTreaty, on the subjects of nuclear safety and of hydrocarbons. The detailed
provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty are summarized by the IEA LegalCounsel, Craig Bamberger, in a recent IEA publication entitled The Energy
Charter Treaty – a description of its provisions (1995).
One effect of these developments has been to shift the focus from theessentially soft or non-legally binding nature of the Members’ IEA trade andinvestment commitments (equally true of most other IEA long-term energy
commitments) to legal obligations taken in a treaty formally binding underinternational law. With the Charter Treaty commitments in that binding
form, the relatively soft provisions of LTCP Chapter V as well as therecommendation or declaration type IEA commitments on the same subjects
might be reviewed, and this could result in moving IEA energy trade andinvestment policy and procedures a major step forward. One question would
be whether these IEA commitments should also be formulated in moreformally binding terms.

E. Energy and Environment
Environmental concerns are “horizontal” factors in the development ofenergy policy, much in the same way that trade and investment issues wereconsidered in the foregoing Section. Environment policy too is viewed acrossthe entire spectrum of energy options, as a policy not only to enhance theprotection of the environment, but also to avoid unnecessary or
disproportionate constraints on energy policy where a potential conflict withenvironment policy might occur. In IEA countries, environmental
preoccupations include problems of clean air and water, acid rain, climatechange, ozone depletion, waste disposal, nuclear safety, and the impacts ofenergy installation sites. In other countries, these problems may be evenmore troublesome, as in Central and Eastern Europe and the New
Independent States where a rapid improvement in environmental conditions
is particularly necessary in part for historical reasons relating to the policies
followed by the former regimes during the period following World War II,
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Page 208and in developing countries facing the environmental problems of rapid
expansion of industrial activity and increased energy consumption.
Throughout the world these concerns are a potential constraint on the use ofoil, coal, and other energies presenting adverse effects, while these concerns
tend to support policies promoting energy efficiency, natural gas, nuclear
power, non-polluting renewable energies, and relevant energy R & D
programmes. In the 1970s the term “balance” was often employed in
speaking about energy and the environment; i.e. the balance between thequality of life as a social goal of environment policy, on the one hand, andthe then prevailing strategic/economic goals of energy policy, on the otherhand. By the 1990s, this notion of balance had been supplemented by thepolicy of “integrating energy and the environment”, and by economic goals
as well, as will be seen in the discussion to follow.
From the outset IEA policies have reflected Members’ environmental
concerns, although this occurred on a relatively modest basis in the earlyyears of the Agency before the environment became a growing energy force inthe 1980s and explicitly part of energy security policy in the 1990s. The I.E.P.
Agreement which established the Agency in 1974 integrated environment
policy de jure but not fully de facto into the IEA’s programme on long-term
energy co-operation, where it appears as a carefully stated element of policyon the development of alternative sources of energy. In establishing long-term
policy, the IEA was enjoined to include co-operative programmes on “criteria,
quality objectives and standards for environmental protection”. This placed
the IEA in the mainstream of the environmental policies of the day [I.E.P.
Agreement, Article 42.1(b)]. In the IEA’s Long-Term Co-operation
Programme, adopted in 1976, environment policy was not spelled out as
such, but was left to later development under broad policy guidelines on theaccelerated development of alternative energy sources. Despite these earlyreferences to energy and the environment, at no time have the Members
considered the IEA to be an “environmental protection agency for energy”,
and it is still not so considered today despite the enormous growth in IEA
work on energy and the environment. More precisely, the IEA has moved frombeing an institution which took note of environmental concerns to one which
has fully integrated these concerns into its comprehensive energy policies.
This movement was already visible in the 1980-1981 period, when cooperation between the Agency and the OECD Environment Directorate
began to appear in the IEA Programmes of Work [See IEA/GB(80)59,
Annex I, p. 13; IEA/GB(81)58, Annex I, p. 6]. By 1985 work in that field
was accorded much more attention (yet only at the formal level of eightmonths of staff effort over the year), and the Programme of Work contained
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broad provisions about an environment programme with little specificactivity description [IEA/GB(84)28, Annex I, p. 13]. During this period
the IEA maintained a preliminary “watching brief” consisting mainlyof monitoring, analysis and policy identification. With the amount ofLong-Term Office Staff time dedicated to the environment growing
from eight months in 1985 to ninety-nine months in 1995
[IEA/GB(94)38/REV1/ANN1, p. 9], one can see the magnitude of thechanges which were soon to come for IEA policy in this field.
In 1977 discussions were well underway between Europe and North
America on the subject of long-range transport of air pollutants (acid rain),which was a major environmental concern. Coal, as a recognized major
contributor to acid gases, could not be promoted without due attention to theenvironmental consequences, although at that time CO2 was not a foremost
environmental concern, even though the risk of climate change was known.
In the IEA, firm policy declarations on environmental questions were
emerging by 1979, when the Agency stepped up its efforts to develop coalproduction, use, and trade, and IEA Ministers adopted the Principles for IEA
Action on Coal [See Section D-2 above]. In their assessment of the potential
for coal, Ministers “agreed that coal must make a greater contribution to theoverall energy balance and that the serious environmental concerns about theuse of coal have to be resolved” [IEA/GB(79)32, Item 3(n); emphasis
added]. They clearly recognized the trade-off between energy concerns andthe environment, when they said that increasing the role of coal “mustproceed under acceptable environmental conditions” and that “This will
require careful planning from the beginning in order to assure a reasonable
and continuing balance between energy requirements and environmental
requirements” [Annex I, paragraph 9; emphasis added]. More specifically,
Ministers stated in paragraph 16 that
They will assess their environmental policies, provisions andpractices affecting coal mining, transport and combustion,
disposal of coal waste, and land reclamation and, where
necessary, will amplify and clarify them, taking into account:a. technology which is already available and which can be more
widely and effectively utilized in commercial applications;b. the need to develop technologies for additional
improvements through research and development, and tocommercialize them as soon as they are economically viable;c. the need to provide long-term reliability for investments byminimizing revisions of environmental standards for
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existing facilities which disproportionately increase costs inrelation to environmental benefits;
the need to minimize the complexities, costs and durationof procedures for obtaining necessary approvals [Emphasis
added].

They also agreed to assess “the wider environmental impact of increasingcoal production and combustion”, taking into account an OECD Council
Recommendation on the same subject [Paragraph 17]. This OECD
Recommendation mentioned integrated energy and environment policies andthe balance between the two, research, the definition of acceptable fuelqualities, the Polluter Pays Principle, the assessment of environmental andsocial consequences of a large scale introduction of coal, information
programmes, and guidelines for Member countries [See OECD document
C(79)117]. In addition, the IEA action supported R & D work and the rapid
commercialization of improved technologies for coal combustion, includingmeans for keeping the combustion cycle “environmentally acceptable”[Paragraph 8 of the Annex to the Principles].
As the tide of policy interest shifted in favour of stronger measures onenergy and the environment during this period, both the Secretariat and the
Coal Industry Advisory Board (CIAB) devoted considerable effort toenvironmental questions. After they jointly published The Use of Coal in
Industry and after the IEA Coal Information System was established in 1982,
the CIAB produced its 1983 report on Coal Use and the Environment, bearing
the general conclusion that the use of coal could be expanded
in an environmentally acceptable manner and suggesting actions
which governments and industry could take to increase coal use. By 1983 the
IEA was saying again that “Coal use must be environmentally acceptable”,
with emphasis on the “clean use of coal” and R & D regarding coal use
technologies [IEA/GB(83)36(Final) and Annex I, paragraph 7]. Highpriority was assigned to work on the implications of environment concerns forthe other energy sectors as well as for coal [IEA/GB(84)27, Item 2(c)].
The landmark Ministerial Conclusions on “Energy and theEnvironment” of July 1985 broadened the focus again beyond coal to moregeneral considerations on the inter-relations between energy andenvironment policies [IEA/GB(85)46, Annex I, Chapter III]. This is still the
IEA’s most comprehensive and thorough policy statement on this subject.
They confirmed much of what the Ministers had previously accomplished in
the environment field, with the notable evolutions which will be seen in thefollowing summary of the main points of the document:
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General Principles
■

■

■

■

■

Energy production, conversion, transport, and consumption should be
carried out in an environmentally acceptable manner; reliable
technologies and methods exist to control most of the relevant
environmental impacts.
Solutions to the environmental problems are fundamental to themaintenance of “adequate, economic and secure supplies of energy”,
and the form of solutions would be important to energy policy.
“Ministers will therefore promote actively in their energy policies
those lines of action which advance the objectives of both energy andenvironmental policy, paying particular attention to the developmentof new environmentally favourable energy technologies and to theefficient use and conservation of energy” [Emphasis added].
Ministers recognize that many factors affect the formulation of energy
policy, “including improvement of the energy mix, energy security,and minimisation of costs as well as protection of the environment”,
all of which should be taken into account “at an early stage in theformulation of energy policy”.
When these factors conflict, a balance must be struck between them,“taking into account all the costs and benefits involved, bothnationally and internationally”. The resulting decisions may “differ
between countries according to their energy mix and degree ofpollution”.

Efficiency and Conservation■■

Energy efficiency and conservation are (when applied on an economic
basis) of “primary importance for achieving the objectives of both
energy and environmental policy”; in general they lack environmental
disadvantages and carry the advantage of using less energy.
Ministers will thus promote these policies by “economic energy
pricing, removing barriers to the effective operation of pricesignals through the market and adopting specific measures andprogrammes”.

Research and Development■

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environment questions. The development of cost-effective newtechnologies is particularly important. Proper weight will therefore be
given to R & D programmes which enhance the efficient use andconversion of energy, coal combustion or conversion, the safe disposalof nuclear waste, and renewable energies which are environmentally
acceptable and competitive.
R & D information and the developing technologies should beexchanged among IEA Members.

Polluter Pays Principle■

The Polluter Pays Principle will assist in the reconciliation of energy
and environment objectives, as will other lines of action such as:
the use of natural gas, environmentally acceptable methods of burningcoal, the better preparation and use of low sulphur coal, thedevelopment of nuclear power (under stringent health, safety, waste
and non-proliferation constraints), the economic use of electricity
produced in an environmentally acceptable way, the use of district
heating, combined heat and power and other types of waste heatutilization, the manufacture and use of more efficient and lesspolluting motor vehicles, and the more efficient use of public
transportation.

Giving Energy Policy Due Consideration
■

■

■

212

“Just as the formulation of energy policy should give due weight toenvironmental considerations, so should environmental policy give
due weight to energy policy considerations”.
In the early stage of considering changes in environmental
policy, there should be consultation with all actors in the energy
sector likely to be affected; environmental objectives should beclearly articulated; regulations should be flexible and avoid setting
precise technical methods of control; in appropriate cases emission
standards should be set by reference to the industry rather thanspecific plants.
Environmental regulations should be subject to review, but
requirements changes “should be infrequent and as predictable aspossible”; new environmental requirements for existing installations
and for new ones under construction should take account of the needfor “a reasonable adjustment period”.

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Comparable Progress in All IEA Member Countries■■

There is need for comparable progress in all Member countries,
taking account of flexibility, environmental conditions, and priorprogress over the years.
There is also need for “close co-operation on the local, national andinternational levels between those responsible for energy policy andfor environmental policy”, and Ministers will consider whether coordination within their own governments needs strengthening.

Implementation in Consultation with the OECD■

The IEA Governing Board at official level is requested, in close
consultation with the OECD Environment Committee, to implement theConclusions, and in particular, to “give weight to environmental
considerations in their work on energy policy” and to keep in touchwith the OECD Environment Committee on relevant questions.
Ministers invited the OECD Environment Committee “to take these
Conclusions into account and to continue their co-operation with the
IEA in their work in this area”.

The 1985 Ministerial Conclusions on Energy and the Environment
were integrated into the 1986 IEA Programme of Work, with the statementthat special attention to these Conclusions would “affect all aspects of thework on energy demand and the future energy mix, but particularly thework on conservation, coal and nuclear energy” [IEA/GB(85)47, Annex I,
pp. 12-13]. In 1987, Ministers explicitly confirmed these 1985 Conclusions[IEA/GB(87)33 Annex, paragraph 32] and acknowledged the follow-up
actions which had already been taken. For the first time, IEA Ministers
addressed the specific question of the increased atmospheric content ofcarbon dioxide stemming to a large extent from the burning of fossil fuels.
Damage to climate, agriculture, and sea levels was cited as a reason forundertaking a “well co-ordinated multinational research effort . . . to assess
the likelihood, extent, and timing of such consequences” [Paragraph 33].
Two years later in 1989 the IEA Ministers issued another general policy
statement on energy and the environment, confirming their earlier work, butadvancing fresh analysis and policy prescriptions. They “stressed the important
links between energy and the environment, and consequently the need for
integrated policies which further energy security, environmental protection andeconomic growth” [IEA/GB(89)36 Annex, paragraph 4(d); emphasis added].
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Page 214This became known as the “Three Es” of energy policy on these subjects.
Major specific concerns in 1989 were global warming and climate change. IEAMinisters spoke out on “the complexity and uncertainties of the relationships
between greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels and atmosphericconcentrations, and consequent climate change, as well as the world wide
dimensions and implications of these issues”. At the same time, IEA Ministers
pledged to pursue this line of policy: “when fossil fuels are used, setting strict
standards for [acid gases] SO x and NO x emissions and encouraging
introduction of advanced cleaning and combustion technologies”. Since
greenhouse emissions arise not only in IEA countries, but also in a large andgrowing proportion in non-Member countries (with all countries being
affected), Ministers stressed a “high degree of international co-operation” and“the need to pursue greater scientific understanding, to assess the kinds ofpolicy responses which may be necessary, and to implement them on a global
scale”. Ministers agreed to integrate “energy security and environmental
policies”, and they supported continued co-operation with the OECD as well as
IEA participation in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change[Emphasis added]. In the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster in 1989,
the possibility of technological collaboration on “preventing and treating oil
spills and other accidents in the petroleum production, transportation andprocessing system” was also envisaged. Ministers pledged broadly not to wait
for all uncertainties in the environment area to be resolved, but to “act now by
taking energy policy measures promptly to address these problems, focusing on
prudent steps that take account of the various costs involved and are consistent
with agreed IEA policies for energy security” [Emphasis added]. They also
cautioned against quick solutions (such as “sharp tax increases or other abruptchanges in the economics of providing and using energy”), and remarked upon
the importance of economic growth to the process of providing environmental
protection. “They therefore stressed the need for a balanced, integrated bundleof realistically implementable and cost-effective energy-related and other
responses, without losing sight of the need for energy security”.
The evolutionary process of developing IEA policies on energy and theenvironment continued in 1991 and 1993, when the basics of establishedpolicies were restated in many cases and new features were added. In 1991
[IEA/GB(91)42/REV2, Chapter IV] Ministers cited work already accomplishedin the IEA (among other contributions, the IEA had published the “broad
brush” study entitled Energy and the Environment: Policy Overview on longterm impacts and policy choices), and the IEA had contributed
to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and to theIntergovernmental Negotiating Committee on a Framework Convention on
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Climate Change (INC). In June 1992, the Executive Director made animportant address to the United Nations Conference on Environment andDevelopment (the Rio Conference) in which she offered the free exchange of
information and expertise of the Agency, which led to IEA assistance in thefollow-up to the Conference. During this period, moreover, the IEA organized
its procedures for obtaining advice from the energy industries on energy and theenvironment questions. Although the IEA received coal industry advice fromthe CIAB and other industry advice was also obtained on a pragmatic basis, the
IEA’s Executive Director arranged for such industry advice to be communicatedin a more organized fashion. Following a preparatory meeting in 1990, theExecutive Director on 1-2 December 1992 convened an Ad Hoc Industry
Group on Energy and Environment to advise the Secretariat on IEA work inprogress in this field, particularly on climate change, greenhouse gas emissions,energy subsidies and market distortions. When the Secretariat arranged forother productive channels to be used for this advisory purpose, the Ad Hoc
Industry Group type of organized meeting proved to be no longer necessary.
The Agency took a number of additional energy and environment
actions during the period 1991-1993. It continued to contribute toenvironmental elements of the work on the economies of Central and Eastern
Europe, the Russian Federation, and Asia. In their 1991 meeting, IEA
Ministers referred to the need to act on problems of energy facility siting, andhighlighted “the IEA’s ongoing work on emissions inventory methodologies
and databases, and its analyses of policy instruments and technologies
relating to major energy sectors, such as transport and electricity, and ofimportant responses, such as energy efficiency”. They emphasized “theimportant roles of industry and consumer awareness”, urged more “energy
education and information on the part of government, industry andconsumers”, and supported the bringing of industry expertise into IEA
analytical work and R & D collaboration. The potential for improved energy
efficiency policy work to reduce the environmental impacts of energy use, as
well as the important role of governments in reducing the gap between newopportunities for improving energy efficiency and the decisions of consumers
in the market place, were examined in the IEA’s Energy Efficiency and theEnvironment, published during this period.
The year 1993 was also an important one for progress on IEA policy onenergy and the environment. The global climate change issue continued topose a challenge to energy policy makers, requiring greater efforts overall andthe reflection of “external costs of energy production” in energy prices. The
IEA had recently published Climate Change Policy Initiatives, a country-bycountry record of energy source greenhouse gas emissions and Members’
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commitments to reduce these gases (in 1994 it issued an updated version),and the IEA publication on Cars and Climate Change had appeared in
May 1993. Ministers then urged the rapid ratification of the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), which had been signed by all IEA
Members except Turkey, and they requested the IEA to augment its
contribution to the implementation of the Convention. During this period the
IEA assisted in the development of guidelines for the national
communications to be made under the FCCC, for the purpose of combatting
climate change and to achieve transparency and compatibility of national
reports to be made under this Convention.
Ministers identified and highlighted several “Areas for Improvement” inenergy and environment policy development and performance. These
included energy efficiency, for which market forces ought to have priority to
produce energy efficiency gains, but also “innovative and bold approaches are
required by governments, in co-operation with industry” [IEA/GB(93)41,
Chapter IV]. Following renewed support for energy efficiency and renewables,
Ministers referred to the nuclear policies of IEA countries. Some Members
emphasized, as a response to the greenhouse gas challenge, that nuclear
energy had the advantage of emitting no sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, orgreenhouse gases, yet the division of opinion among IEA countries on the useof nuclear power continued [See Section D-4 above]. Ministers acknowledged“the need to further integrate environmental objectives into national energy
technology research, development and demonstration programmes”. They
asked the IEA to analyze “the factors that influence new technology diffusion
into the markets, identifying barriers and assessing policy options; the roleinternational technology co-operation policies could have in meeting theobjectives of the Framework Convention on Climate Change; and the effectenvironmental and other governmental policies have on the penetration ofnew, more environmentally benign, technologies”. Ministers welcomed the
IEA’s Greenhouse Gas Technology Information Exchange (GREENTIE) topromote R & D co-operation in this area. Co-operation with non-Members
had become a higher IEA priority because of the expected future role of thosecountries in CO2 emissions growth control, leading to a request for the IEA toassess “joint implementation” with non-Member countries, in accordance with
the Framework Convention; Members were asked to strengthen their bilateral
co-operation with non-Members to this end. The OECD and the IEA joined
in a project to provide guidelines for national communications under the
Framework Convention in order to achieve transparency and comparability ofnational reports. They also carried out an IEA/OECD Scoping Study: Energy
and Environmental Technologies to Respond to Global Climate Change
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Concerns, published in 1994, which emphasizes the need to strengthen
government and industry efforts toward longer-term technologicalbreakthroughs [See Chapter V, Section B below]. The potential of biofuels to
reduce dependence on petroleum products and to curb emissions ofgreenhouse gases is the subject of Biofuels, also published in 1994, as the first
title in the IEA’s new Energy and the Environment Policy Analysis Series.
In 1993 Ministers established for the first time a list of “Policy
Instruments: A Mix of Measures” with which to respond to the emissions
challenge. The list includes energy and carbon taxes, fiscal and other financial
incentives, and regulations to reduce emissions. Ministers stated that the
response of each country would be a “complex mix of possible measures” andagreed that “concerted actions by IEA Member countries are needed”.
Although each Member’s respective stage of development and regionalarrangements among countries should be taken into account, the effects ofMembers’ efforts should be as comparable as possible. The IEA should
develop “criteria and methodologies to permit an assessment of thecomparability of country responses”, and to do so Ministers should supply thenecessary information.
At the same time, IEA Ministers adopted the “IEA Shared Goals” [SeeSection G below; IEA/GB(93)41, Annex I] which are based on the “Three Es”
of energy: energy security, economic development, and energy and theenvironment, in a formulation which has come to symbolize current IEA energy
policy overall. Energy and the environment is the subject of Goals 3 and 4:
3.

The environmentally sustainable provision and use ofenergy is central to the achievement of these shared goals.
Decision-makers should seek to minimise the adverse
environmental impacts of energy activities, just as
environmental decisions should take account of the energy
consequences. Government interventions should wherepracticable have regard to the Polluter Pays Principle.

4.

More environmentally acceptable energy sources need to be
encouraged and developed. Clean and efficient use of fossil
fuels is essential. The development of economic non-fossil
sources is also a priority. A number of IEA members wish toretain and improve the nuclear option for the future, at thehighest safety standards, because nuclear energy does notemit carbon dioxide. Renewable sources will also have an
increasingly important contribution to make.
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The comprehensive IEA Shared Goals contain other provisions which
are less directly stated to respond to environmental concerns, yet do affectthem, such as the introductory paragraph in stating the objectives of thismeasure, Goal 1 on diversity, efficiency, and flexibility within the energy
sector, Goal 5 on improved energy efficiency, Goal 6 on research anddevelopment, Goal 7 on undistorted energy prices, Goal 8 on free and open
trade, and Goal 9 on co-operation among all energy market participants.
Most of these Goals, stated briefly and abstractly, reflect the IEA’s policies onenergy and the environment as they have evolved and strengthened over theyears. While environmental concerns played a relatively minor role in theearly years of the Agency and were not specifically mentioned in the 1977
IEA “Principles for Energy Policy”, these concerns now constitute a major
component of the Agency’s most vital objective of maintaining energy
security.
In early 1994 environmental concerns received still greater prominence
as the topic of the IEA’s first informal Ministerial “brainstorming” session onenergy and the environment, which resulted in an improved understanding ofefforts to reduce energy-related greenhouse gas emissions and provided policy
directions for future IEA work in this sector. Ministers gave policy direction
for IEA work in such areas as economic instruments and tax shifts,
comparability of the effects of policy measures to limit greenhouse gases, joint
implementation, voluntary agreements/partnerships with industry, andtechnology development and co-operation. Policy was seen as moving in the
direction of a mix of responses to climate change, a mix which reflects IEA
Members’ national economic and political circumstances, rather than auniform set of policies to be applied by all. It would follow that the entire
range of policy instruments should be open to consideration in the context offree and open markets and without the adoption of new trade restrictions in
the name of environmental protection [See IEA/GB(94)33, pp. 3-4]. Within
the energy security conceptual framework, environmental considerations must
now be seen as likely to continue as a major determinant of IEA energy policy
generally.

F. Reviews of Members’ Energy Policies
and Goals
While it is one thing for international institutions to adopt broad statementson policies, it may be quite another for them to monitor the application of218

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these policies, to assess their effectiveness and to recommend or to arrange
specific compliance actions by the individual Members. In international
economic organizations, it is not an uncommon practice for suchmonitoring, assessment, and action functions in part to be carried out in thecourse of “peer reviews”, as in the IEA where these functions are conductedannually in the long-term policy sector under a far-reaching system ofindividual country policy reviews. Briefly stated, the purposes of the IEA
reviews include the provision of information and data on energy markets
and policy developments in each country, the measurement and comparisonof the reviewed country’s implementation of policies adopted in the Agency,
the provision of a mechanism for each country to learn from the experiencesof the others, and the stimulation of Members’ compliance actions andincreased co-operation on energy policy.
Each year a number of IEA Member countries is the subject of an “indepth” review which is essentially a “peer review” carried out by a team of
officials from other Member governments and by the Secretariat, first on thebasis of a questionnaire addressed to the country under review and thedetailed data on energy policies and programmes submitted in the country’s
response. This is followed in a second stage by the Secretariat’s preparationof a “main issues” paper, by the review teams’ country visits, by discussions
in the responsible long-term policy (SLT) and R & D (CERT) bodies, andby the conduct of comprehensive country assessments. In four year cycles,
each Member receives an in-depth review. Each year the Members nothaving the in-depth review receive a “standard review”, which consists
mainly of a policy and factual update and a review of compliance with IEA
long-term policy objectives. The results of the annual reviews, including therecommendations addressed to individual Members, are then publishedannually by the Agency.
These policy reviews were inaugurated in the 1976 Long-Term Cooperation Programme [See Section A above] which provides that Members“shall periodically review progress toward . . . [medium- and long-term]
objectives and assess the adequacy of their national and co-operative
activities” [LTCP, Chapter I, paragraph 3(a)]. More specifically forconservation [Chapter II, Article 3] and for alternative source of energy
activities [Chapter III, A.1], the LTCP provides that periodic reviews are to
be designed■■

To provide a thorough and systematic assessment of evolving national
programmes and policies on the basis of common criteria.
To identify areas in which programmes might be improved.
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To promote co-operation in the area of accelerated production,
including a detailed exchange of information, experience andexpertise in the production of alternative sources of energy.

The pattern and frequency of the reviews have evolved over the years
in accordance with Governing Board decisions taken for the purpose ofstrengthening the system. In 1975 the first alternative energies review
assessed favourably the need for the LTCP, and called on Members todevelop national energy development plans, if they had not done so, and torealize and strengthen their plans, if they already existed. The Board also
stated broad policy support on the integration of national strategies forenergy demand and supply, on national price and taxation policies in relation
to alternative energy investment, and on the desirability of increased cooperation among Agency countries, without addressing recommendations onthese subjects to particular Members [IEA/GB(76)24, Item 6]. In adopting
the 1977 Group Objectives and Principles for Energy Policy [See Section D-1
above], the Governing Board instructed the Standing Group on Long-Term
Co-operation (SLT) and the CRD/CERT [See Chapter V, Section A] toconduct each year a “thorough and systematic review”, to take account of
the “Principles for Energy Policy”, and to make a full report, “together withconclusions and recommendations” to the Governing Board
IEA/GB(77)52(1st Revision), Item 2(e)-(g) and Annex, paragraph 2(c)].
The Board also agreed that it would assess the contribution of each Member
to the achievement of the Group Objectives, and that Members would
endeavour to strengthen their policies, taking into account the results of thereviews. In the 1977 review assessment, the Governing Board added
recommendations directed to particular Members as a means of making thereviews more specific and effective [IEA/GB(78)18, Item 2]. The Board also
endorsed particular recommendations contained in individual country
reports, and authorized the publication of the long-term and R & D sector
reports on the review. Individual country recommendations and publication
would become regular features of the IEA’s review process in later years.
With the advantage of experience derived from two more review cycles,
the Governing Board adopted the Agency’s Country Review Procedures for
1980, which still guide the review process for the most part [IEA/GB(80)21,
Item 11; IEA/GB(80)25]. The new Procedures confirmed the scope of thereviews (expanded to include oil import goals), the annual reviews for every
Member (now called standard reviews), the periodic “in-depth” review (nowat four year intervals for each Member), and the rapporteur lead system forthe conduct of the reviews. New elements included the thorough discussion of220

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Page 221major issues, greater attention to results achieved, an emphasis on large
economies, timing flexibility for in-depth reviews, and more effective
communication of results to the reviewed countries. In 1980 and again in1982 the Secretariat analyzed the areas where further action in individual
countries could provide results, and Ministers agreed to give weight to thisanalysis [IEA/GB(80)58, paragraph 5 and Annex I; IEA/GB(82)51(1st Revision) paragraph 9 and Annex].
On various occasions the energy policy review procedures have beenfurther strengthened. In 1981 the coal review was separated from thegeneral review [IEA/GB(81)30, Item 5 and Annex], and several separate
coal reviews have been conducted over the years, with the participation of
the Coal Industry Advisory Board. The reviews make recommendations onparticular Members’ situations and policies; sometimes particular country
situations are the subjects of discussion in the Governing Board. The Board
has often identified particular issues to be the subject of special attention in
the review process, a process which offers opportunities for highlighting
particular policies in need of special attention. In 1982 these issues included
energy investment prospects, future electricity prospects, market
imperfections, pricing policies, and taxation practices [IEA/GB(82)81,
Item 3(d) and Annex I]. In the interest of efficiency and overall
effectiveness, since the mid-1980s the long-term and the R & D reviews
have been conducted together. The review results are submitted to, andsometimes commented upon, by the Governing Board, which authorizes
their publication each year.
The reviews are conducted by teams formed by members of the IEA
Secretariat and by Members’ officials. The rapporteur is usually an officialof a Member government who leads the work of the team. By 1983 theofficials in some cases were representatives to the Governing Board andsenior officials from national administrations, and this practice wasendorsed by the Board [IEA/GB(83)17, Annex II]. The staff of theEuropean Commission have participated as observers, upon their request, inreviews of Member States of the European Union. In certain cases,
members of the Nuclear Energy Agency have participated in theexamination of the nuclear aspect of an in-depth review of a Member with
an important nuclear programme.
The most recent “review of the reviews” took place in 1993 when the
Governing Board agreed that the review process model discussed above,
seen as a key element in international co-operation on long-term and R & D
policy in the IEA, needed to be retained [See IEA/GB(93)35, Item 5(b);IEA/GB(93)28; IEA/SLT/CERT(92)1]. The “peer review” concept was
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retained as a vital principle providing for the Secretariat and energy experts
representing Member countries to participate. The in-depth review cycle
was extended from three to four years. In-depth reviews would focus on
major issues of energy policy, like energy and the environment. Standard
reviews would be developed annually, and they would examine the extent towhich the Member had progressed since its last in-depth review or had
responded to the recommendations made in that review. The Secretariat
would ensure greater consistency of coverage between country reviews,
using the IEA Shared Goals to facilitate that process. Finally, the Governing
Board decided to continue the policy of separation of these reviews from the
IEA’s oil emergency response reviews [See Chapter III, Section F-2 above], aseparation required to maintain the coherence of the two systems forreviewing quite different subjects of IEA energy policy and actions.
At the conclusion of the review process each year, the Agency
publishes the Energy Policies of IEA Countries review for the year, which
typically contains a general report on the review, current and backgroundinformation and analysis concerning energy demand and efficiency
developments, energy production, supply, and distribution, energy and theenvironment, energy developments in non-OECD countries, and othertopics of current interest, as well as relevant statistics. This comprehensive
and thorough review publication also reproduces the texts of the individual
country reports and of the recommendations directed to each country as aconsequence of the review. The appearance of the review is a major
publication highlight for the IEA each year. In addition, at the close of eachin-depth review, the IEA releases the report of the review at a press
conference held in the capital of the reviewed country, giving additional
visibility to this co-operation among Member governments. The IEA’s 1992
publication entitled The Role of IEA Governments in Energy surveys
government involvement in the energy sector of Member countries and theactions of the IEA and other international organizations in each of thesecountries, which are also taken up in the reviews.
The “peer reviews” in the long-term and R & D sectors have provento be one of the IEA’s most successful and influential institutional
instruments. These reviews have resulted in many direct and pointed
critiques and recommendations derived from Delegations of other Members,
the Secretariat, and other participants in the reviews, and addressed
specifically to the reviewed country, on the subject of its particular energy
policies, programmes, and actions. The success of the reviews is doubtless
due not only to the “peer participation”, but also to the sharpening focus of
the reviews on major issues of energy policy, to the constructive critique and222

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recommendation process, to the growing consistency among the individual
country reviews and, more recently, to the usefulness of the agreed IEA
Shared Goals as the common touchstone for policy review.

G. Freer Markets and IEA Shared Goals
of 1993
Although the constant evolution of energy markets and of Members’ policies
has modified the economic and political context in which the IEA operates,
the fundamental long-term policy problems identified by the IEA’s founders
persist twenty years later. Changes in the structure of the energy markets,the reduction in trade and investment barriers, the growth in environmental
concerns, the transformation of the Former Soviet Union, the globalisationof energy interdependence, and the other changes which have taken place
have not recast the essential objectives of energy policy, although thesechanges have altered some specific policy content and the instruments
employed by the Agency and its Members. Thus energy security remains the
key objective of the IEA, twenty years after energy security concerns led tothe establishment of the Agency, and the IEA’s long-term policies discussed
above have played a major role in the efforts of the Agency to achieve that
objective.
As indicated in the IEA’s 1994 World Energy Outlook, the IEA will needto address in the future some familiar and recurring situations: world demandfor primary energy will continue growing, to 48 per cent more energy in 2010
than in 1991; in the OECD, oil demand could increase 18 per cent over 1991;
and this increase is expected to occur entirely in the transport sector; the longterm gradual decline in OECD oil production is expected to continue;
imported oil could account for close to 70 per cent of OECD oil demand by
2010 (up from 58 per cent in 1991); most of the increase will likely have to
be met by the major Middle East producers and Venezuela. “The forecast
increase in energy and oil demand in [the rest of the world] is expected to beeven more pronounced than in the OECD” [Page 18].
The rapid growth in oil consumption and the increased dependence ofa growing number of industrial countries upon imported oil are reminiscentof the conditions which led to the 1973-1974 oil crisis, carrying again an
unacceptable vulnerability to oil supply disruptions. But such vulnerability
may be reduced or eliminated if the necessary energy policy measures are
adopted and implemented on a timely basis. The search for “energy
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security” is thus expected to continue as a main objective of the IEA’s longterm energy policies and actions in the foreseeable future.
In 1992 the IEA took a fresh look at long-term policy contained in the“Principles for Energy Policy”, adopted in 1977 [See Section D-1 above], inthe light of the Agency’s experience, of the changed circumstances of energy
markets, and of Members’ energy objectives and policies. The Agency alsoneeded updated bench-marks for developing energy policies and formeasuring the Members’ efforts and accomplishments in carrying them out,
as well as updated IEA goals as the Agency expanded relations with nonMember countries and sought to influence their energy policies. These
considerations led to the adoption of the “IEA Shared Goals” by IEA
Ministers on 4 June 1993 [IEA/GB(93)41, paragraph 4 and Annex I; thefull text is reproduced in Appendix IV below]. These Goals have been
mentioned throughout this Chapter as the latest major comprehensive
Ministerial statement on long-term energy policy, and at the time of writing
they continue to fulfil this function.
The new long-term energy policy requirements led naturally to the
IEA’s current and future work on creating freer markets and on realizing the“IEA Shared Goals” generally. The emphasis on the free market issues isreflected in the IEA’s work on deregulation, reduced government
interventions in markets (particularly with respect to price), privatization,
greater competition, and increased productivity of undertakings in theenergy sector.
IEA Ministers stated succinctly in the 1993 Ministerial Communiquéthat they “believe that global economic development, energy security andenvironmental protection will be enhanced if all nations of the worldsubscribe to the goals which the IEA countries share”. These “Three Es” ofenergy policy provide the base for the IEA Shared Goals [See Chapter II,
Section J above]. They are reflected in the following themes of the IEA
Shared Goals with respect to long-term policy:
Diversity, efficiency and flexibility within the energy sector
Environmentally sustainable provision and use of energy,
with minimization of adverse environmental impacts andwith energy security considerations taken into accountMore environmentally acceptable energy sources,
including clean and efficient use of fossil fuels, the nuclear
option and renewable sources of energy
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Improved energy efficiency
Continued R & D and marketing of new and improved
energy technologies
Undistorted energy prices
Free and open energy trade and a secure framework forenergy investment
Co-operation among all energy market participants toachieve global energy security and environmental
objectives.

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CHAPTER V

Energy Research andDevelopment: Towards Long-Termand Still Longer-Term Contributions

E

nergy Research and Development in the IEA from the outset attracted
policy interest of a high order, because R & D would become a major
element of the IEA’s long-term energy policy to reduce dependency on
imported oil. R & D held exceptional promise of making critical contributions
to many facets of energy conservation, nuclear safety, fossil fuels, and otherenergy areas. But a still greater contribution in potential R & D
breakthroughs might also be envisaged in “new technologies”, such as those
exploiting hydrogen fuel, advanced geothermal energy, fast breeder nuclear
reactors, nuclear fusion, and the renewable energies (solar, wind, ocean, andbiomass). Yet these developments would require an extensive investment of
resources, organization of research, and new forms of co-operation among
countries undertaking or sponsoring the corresponding R & D efforts. This
Chapter recounts the Agency’s contributions to this co-operation, beginningwith the founders’ views on the role of energy R & D programmes, andfollowed by a description of the organization of R & D in the IEA and thepolicies and strategies developed in the Agency over the years in a number ofcritical studies. The discussion continues with a description in some detail ofthe IEA’s system of collaboration, mainly in the form of energy project
Implementing Agreements, and closes with a brief survey of the role andstructure of the Agency’s system of R & D country reviews and technology
reviews.
The 1973-1974 crisis and the resulting energy policy reviews in theindustrial countries provided a unique opportunity to organize co-operationin energy R & D. Important R & D policy lessons were there to be learned.
In short order, the crisis changed energy from a low-cost situation to a
relatively high one. If energy R & D had suffered during previous years
from a cost-benefit analysis using high-cost assumptions on research andlow-cost assumptions on oil, the crisis dramatically changed that227

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perception. High-cost oil could create opportunities for R & D to be carriedout on a more productive basis, with greater incentives to investment andhigher expectations that the cost-benefit analysis would now be sufficiently
favourable for research to make the greater effort economically worthwhile[See OECD, Energy R & D (1975) p. 7].
The case for international co-operation on energy R & D could not beignored under the conditions prevailing after the 1973-1974 crisis. Some of
the general considerations as summarized in a 1975 OECD study were thefollowing:
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■

■
■

■

■

R & D co-operation would facilitate the integration of R & D policies
and activities with the broader long-term energy policy objectives of
the group of co-operating countries.
Co-operation could make greater resources available, in the sense of
information, knowledge, and know-how necessary for the R & D
activity.
The whole R & D process, from research to application of the results,
could be speeded up.
In cost sharing, R & D co-operation could make larger projects
possible when individual countries could not alone make the required
investment.
Co-operation could reduce the overall cost of R & D programmes, bymore efficient use of financial resources, equipment, and skilled
personnel, and by the avoidance of duplication.
Co-operation could make possible a wider range of approaches tothe particular R & D objectives [See OECD, Energy R & D (1975)
p. 154].

Other factors noted in the cited 1975 study related more specificallyto energy R & D conditions at the time. Prominent factors were theimportance of the industrial countries’ “stake” in energy, “the international
dimension of all aspects of energy”, the “vital importance of research”
in helping to resolve the problem of dependence on imported oil,the “extent of the energy sector” (no country alone could do it all),and the “increasing complexity of the field”. Moreover, in Members’
R & D decision process, there was a need for broader energy policies
and realistic prospects of the technological research to be given due
weight. Although international co-operation in energy was not unknown
even at that time, there was little more than information exchange
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projects, and the pattern was “uneven in coverage and highly dispersed”.
The 1975 study also considered this:Research and development is one means of promoting
the achievement of objectives set by an overall energy policy,
and the size and content of R & D strategies should not be
decided independently of that policy. In view of the timeneeded to implement research programmes and then to apply
the results, this is a relatively urgent task, but one whichneeds to be correctly formulated before expensive R & D iscommenced.
Energy policies must clearly be based on the prospects offeredby the various technologies, on the extent and distribution of
the different energy resources, and on the economic andindustrial structure as well as the scientific and technologicalcapacity of each country. It is evident that any medium- andlong-term energy policies or objectives must include R & D
efforts as a key component [See p. 16].
Thus the stage was set not only for the increased governmental support forthe development of energy R & D, but also for its links with the formulationof the industrial countries’ broader energy policies and objectives, which
would be taken up and agreed to within the IEA.
The Energy Co-ordinating Group (ECG), which met during much of1974 to prepare the I.E.P. Agreement [See Volume I, Chapter II, Section C-3],
fully recognized “the significant role Energy R & D including intensified
international co-operation, can play in helping to solve energy problems”.
Early in its deliberations, the ECG created the Ad Hoc Group on International
Co-operation on Energy Research and Development to makerecommendations on the expansion of international co-operation on energy
R & D, to develop criteria on appropriate co-operative efforts, to identify
constraining factors, and to review the R & D programmes of ECG
participants, all for consideration in preparing for the new energy agency. In
its report [ECG/ERD/36 final, 6 June 1974], the Ad Hoc Group outlined
findings and policies which anticipated those reached in the 1975 study as
indicated above, and recommended actions in ten areas which were thenadopted in the I.E.P. Agreement [Article 42.1(c), set forth below in
Section A], thereby providing the basis for launching R & D work in the
Agency and giving initial direction to this activity.
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A. IEA Organization of R & D
In giving effect to the foregoing concerns about research and development,
the Agency established a coherent structure for the management of R & D
policy questions, collaborative projects, and related activities. Describedbriefly below, the structure evolved over the years in a continuing processof adjustment designed to safeguard the essential initial elements andto adapt to the changing policy and operational needs of Member
governments.
The ultimate authority for direction of R & D efforts in the Agency, as
for other sectors of the IEA activity, is the Governing Board, which hastaken many decisions on R & D policy generally and on broad questions
arising out of the projects programme. The I.E.P. Agreement confers this
responsibility directly on the Governing Board, with little guidance on
substantive R & D questions, as part of the Board’s overall authority overlong-term questions [Article 43]. The broad powers of decision andrecommendation, conferred upon the Board in Article 51 of the Agreement,
are also applicable to the R & D sector. Since the main objective in this
sector was to tie R & D policy to the IEA’s long-term energy policies, andsince much of the useful R & D was thought to be already available, thefounders did not create in the Agreement a separate Standing Group for
research and development. Instead, the Agreement made specific provision
for the integration of energy R & D into the general long-term energy policy
provisions of the Agreement. Hence the Agreement confers upon the
Agency’s government expert Standing Group on Long-Term Co-operation(SLT) responsibility for examining and reporting on co-operative action in
the R & D sector as well as in other long-term policy areas. On R & D the
Agreement provides for consideration ofEnergy research and development, including as a matter of priority
co-operative programs on
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–
–
–
–
–
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coal technology;
solar energy;
radioactive waste management;
controlled thermonuclear fusion;
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municipal and industrial waste utilisation;conservation;
overall energy system analysis and general studies [Article 42.1(c)].

The IEA gave immediate priority to the institutional and conceptual
framework for R & D, and began work on the above energy areas, as well as
on a broad range of renewable energies. At its first meeting in late 1974, theSLT established the “Sub-Group on Energy R & D” with a broad mandate
to implement the ten programmes listed above and to consider the full range
of energy R & D projects, subject to SLT guidance to ensure consistency“with the overall objectives and programmes of the Agency”[IEA/SLT/M(74)1, part IV]. The SLT also agreed that Sub-Group
membership “include national R & D officials as well as officials who areresponsible for energy policies”. Indeed the Sub-Group and its successor
Committee were Chaired by Mr. W. J. Schmidt-Küster of Germany, who had
chaired the ECG Ad Hoc R & D Group mentioned above, and the IEA SubGroup was seen in 1975 as tantamount to a continuation in Paris of the ECG
Ad Hoc Group of R & D experts which had prepared in its Brussels meetings
the basis for launching the IEA’s work in this sector. The Sub-Group
promptly designated working parties and lead countries, or leadorganizations (the NEA and EEC), for nine project areas. Those areas
consisted of the ten listed above, except for systems analysis, which wasconsidered later. In the nuclear R & D field, the OECD Nuclear Energy
Agency took responsibility for nuclear safety, radioactive waste management,
fast breeder reactors, and high temperature reactors, while the IEA
undertook R & D on thermonuclear fusion. The Sub-Group then embarked
upon an ambitious programme to develop a number of projects, which soon
became the subject of the Agency’s first Energy R & D Implementing
Agreements [taken up in Section C below], to act on R & D policy andstrategy questions, and to prepare guiding principles and intellectual
property guidelines for Agency R & D projects. Before long, however, IEA
R & D work would require high-level R & D specialist representation in abody with higher status reporting directly to the Governing Board rather
than in a Sub-Group which was institutionally subordinate to the SLT.
As a result of these considerations, in November 1975 the Governing
Board established the IEA Committee on Energy Research and Development(CRD) [IEA/GB(75)94, Item 7, Annex II], an IEA plenary committee which
is tantamount to an IEA Standing Group in all but name. (The maindifference is that the Standing Groups are created by the I.E.P. Agreement,
while the Committees are created by the Governing Board.) This action
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ensured a more direct relationship between the IEA body responsible for
R & D and the Governing Board, but kept intact the close functional cooperation between the Committee and the Long-Term Standing Group,
thereby continuing the important link between R & D work and broader
elements of energy policy.
The Board conferred upon the Committee a more comprehensive andstructured mandate than that of its predecessor, requiring the Committee in
effect to
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■

■
■

■

■

Submit “a strategy for energy research and development and tooversee the implementation of this strategy”.
Ensure, through consultation and collaboration with the SLT, a close
co-ordination between the R & D strategy and other aspects of theLong-Term Co-operation Programme.
Review periodically national R & D programmes in the light of the
preparation and surveillance of the strategy.
Identify opportunities for collaboration among Members (within the
R & D strategy and utilizing the national reviews), and promote suchcollaboration.
Continue the promotion and implementation of co-operation inenergy R & D as decided by the Board on 21 November 1975 [SeeSection C below].
Report to the Governing Board as appropriate (at least once eachyear) on the above subjects in conjunction with the SLT, and carryout such other functions as the Governing Board might delegate to it.

Since 1975 the formal mandate of the Committee has remained unchanged,
except for the Governing Board’s decision in March 1992 to change thename to “Committee on Energy Research and Technology” (CERT)[IEA/GB(92)17, Item 8(b)], the name it bears to the present day. However,the Governing Board has on numerous occasions since 1975 given
instructions to the CRD and the CERT on specific programme questions.
The Committee’s current functions are thus in constant evolution. In order
to avoid confusion in the remainder of this Chapter, references to the CRD
will be shown in the text as “CRD/CERT”, since the two names refer to thesame Committee.
In addition to the CERT and its predecessor, specialized working
groups have made important contributions to IEA R & D activities since thefirst groups were created by the SLT Sub-Group in 1974. A number of theearlier groups, following each of the ten initial areas of R & D co-operation,
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were discontinued when their work was no longer necessary or could be
consolidated with that of another group. Participation in the working
groups and later in the Working Parties has always been open to all
Members and to the Commission of the European Communities. In
addition, in October 1982 the Governing Board authorized the participationof the then non-Member Finland in the Working Parties on Fossil Fuel
Technology, End-Use Technology, and Renewable Energy, the only occasion
on which such participation of a non-Member has been authorized[IEA/GB(82)81, Item 3(h)]. This followed from the participation of
Finland in a number of Implementing Agreements in fields of interest tothat country and from the prospect of Finland making a broader
contribution to the Agency’s work in this field. The participation of nonMember parties generally in the Agency’s R & D project Implementing
Agreements is discussed below in Section C-5.
Specialized work in R & D has been carried out in four Working
Parties with their own mandates as adopted by the Committee and as set
out in the OECD’s Bodies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development updated each year. The four Working Parties are■■■■

The Working Party on Energy End-Use Technologies.
The Working Party on Fossil Fuels.
The Working Party on Renewable Energy Technologies.
The Fusion Power Co-ordinating Committee (Fusion Working Party).

Each of the Working Parties has general competence in the field appearing
in its name, and the names carry a Committee policy statement as to themain areas of IEA R & D activity. While each Working Party has its own
mandate reflecting its technology subject area, the four mandates state
generally that the Working Parties are to provide “advice to, and support
the activities of, the Committee on Energy Research and Development[CRD/CERT] and other IEA Standing Bodies” in the areas of the Working
Parties’ competence. Most of the mandates also provide for the Working
Parties to identify priority interests common to Members and to promotecollaboration by arranging studies, information exchange, conferences,
workshops, and other activities. They are also to initiate, evaluate, andreview Implementing Agreements and other collaborative activities, to coordinate their activities with other IEA sectoral bodies active in related
matters, and to review, evaluate, and participate in related activities
conducted by IEA bodies. In addition, each Working Party is to carry out
particular functions in its special field.
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One early R & D policy priority was the formulation of the R & D
Chapter of the Agency’s Long-Term Co-operation Programme (LTCP)
adopted in early 1976 [See Chapter IV, Section A above] which contained
continuing policy statements and established links between R & D andbroader IEA policy developments. On the subject of energy R & D,
Chapter IV of the LTCP contains four main elements:
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■

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■

Members agree to carry out national programmes and, as may be
agreed among them, co-operative activities, including jointly financed
programmes and projects in energy R & D.
Members adopt the Guiding Principles on R & D and the Guidelines
on Intellectual Property contained in Annex II to the LTCP [SeeSection C below].
Members agree to develop and implement “a strategy” for R & D,
closely linked to, and co-ordinated with, the other parts of the LTCP.
The strategy is to identify major new energy sources and conservation
possibilities and their potential energy contribution. It is to identify
the probable time scale of commercial implementation and define
options. It is to provide for a periodic review of national efforts andidentify possible new areas of fruitful co-operation. The CRD/CERTwith the SLT is to propose a basis for the choice of such a strategy forconsideration by the Governing Board.
Members agree to continue and intensify their co-operation in the firstten areas listed above and to examine possibilities in the seven new
areas of High-Temperature Reactors for Process Heat, Small Solar
Power Systems, Geothermal Energy, Wind Power, Wave Power, Ocean
Thermal Gradients, and Biomass Conversion.

With the CRD/CERT and LTCP in place and the Group Strategy
exercise under way, the organizational requirements for continuing R & D
work were achieved. The organization outlined above, with some
adaptation, continues to the present day, while recent consideration of therole and organization of the CERT in the changing energy context isreflected in IEA/CERT(93)2/REV2 of 4 November 1993. In sum, IEA
energy R & D activities are organized in an integrated fashion. The IEA
Secretariat plays a significant role in initiating, promoting, andimplementing policy and operational actions; it supports each of the
Agency bodies active in this as well as other sectors. Technology expertiseand policy considerations are conveyed from the Working Parties to
the CERT which in turn supports the work of the IEA Governing Board
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at both official and Ministerial levels, resulting in IEA feedback toeach Member’s R & D policy officials in capitals and to the administratorsof the project Implementing Agreements and other IEA co-operative
activities.

B. Research and Development Policies andStrategies
In contributing to the Agency’s objective of reducing long-term dependence
on imported oil, the energy R & D programme comprises essentially fourinterrelated activity areas. The first is developing appropriate policy andstrategic approaches to R & D, taken up below in this Section. The second
is the promotion of collaborative activities, including the establishment of
Implementing Agreements, conferences, seminars and workshops [SeeSection C below]. The third is the conduct of annual country reviews ofnational energy R & D programmes, and the fourth is the sponsoring of“state-of-the-art” reviews of particular energy technologies [See Section D
below]. Each of these activity areas has undergone a constant process ofreview and adaptation over the past twenty years. The IEA R & D activity
which has perhaps evolved the most, in consequence of the strategic
reviews, has been in the R & D policy and strategy area. Since these
activities necessarily govern the other three overall, the policy and strategies
area deserves first consideration.
In 1974 and 1975 R & D work got under way on the basis of the
ECG Report mentioned above, with particular attention dedicated to the ten
R & D priority areas identified in the Report and in Article 42.1(c) of the
I.E.P. Agreement. The Agency soon investigated other possible areas ofenergy R & D, developed proposals for the R & D Chapter of the LTCP and
for a group strategy exercise, and engaged overall in the process of
formulating a coherent energy R & D programme.
In November 1975, the Governing Board conducted a special meetingon energy R & D in which Members were represented by their respective
R & D chiefs. This was the only Board meeting to date so devoted to this
sector, and it took a number of decisions on strategy and programmes. The
Board endorsed the R & D work then accomplished in the IEA and notedthat five Implementing Agreements on coal technology and one on nuclear
reactor safety had already been signed. The Board also enlarged the IEA’s
R & D topics by the addition of those topics which were soon to be235Chap. IV et V

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enumerated in the LTCP and which are mentioned above in Section A; italso adopted the Guidelines on Intellectual Property, advanced the R & D
Chapter of the LTCP, and adopted its decision establishing the CRD/CERT.
In doing so, the Board endorsed the R & D policy assumptions of each of
those actions. Moreover, on the important IEA R & D strategy, theGoverning Board
decided to develop, by initiating analyses, a strategy for energy
research and development which would:(i) provide guidance to Participating Countries as to thepotential energy contributions and probable time scaleassociated with different technology options, leading inturn to energy policy options;(ii) provide, in the course of its establishment andimplementation, opportunities for periodic reviews ofnational programmes of energy R & D;(iii) be closely co-ordinated with the other aspects of the
Agency’s Long-Term Programme;(iv) provide guidance for the review of projects alreadyundertaken in the Agency [IEA/GB(75)94, Item 3(a)].
Beginning in the summer of 1976, this work was undertaken by
two multinational teams proceeding in parallel at Brookhaven National
Laboratory in the United States, and at Kernforschungsanlage, Jülich, inGermany, under the direction of a Systems Analysis Steering Groupestablished by the CRD/CERT. Preliminary reports were submitted in 1977
and 1979, and utilized by the Agency in its work during those periods. IEAMinisters in 1977 and 1979 reviewed progress on the Group Strategy andexpressed their satisfaction with the results obtained, while giving policy
direction for IEA activities then under way. The 1977 “report, as well as
studies by others since then stressed the high probability of a fundamental
imbalance between energy supply and demand during the remainder of thiscentury” [See the final report completed in 1980 and published by theOECD under the title A Group Strategy for Energy Research Development
and Demonstration (1980), also appearing as an IEA document in
IEA/GB(80)32].
The purposes of the Strategy were:(1) To provide an assessment of the likely relative importanceof individual technologies for the IEA nations as a group;
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technologies during the latter part of the century;(3) To provide a tool for:– developing and assessing national R D & D policies andplans;– achieving the most effective relationship between the
R D & D activities of the Member countries;(4) To identify non-technology policy issues which can affectthe ability of new technologies to contribute to energy
requirements [See pp. 9 and 10].
Although the Strategy was not fashioned to be identical to individual country
strategies and programmes, it was intended to be a guide for individual
Members’ RD & D programmes, permitting them to take into account thecollective needs of the Agency in the light of defined priorities (the top ones
offering the most energy in substitution for oil at the lowest cost). The Strategy
recommended acceleration of the pace of technology development andintroduction, emphasis on environmental considerations, and indicative actions
as to future stages of development for each technology area. In addition, theStrategy tackled such questions as which new technologies the IEA countries asa group would need over the next several decades, and how much energy thesetechnologies could be expected to contribute. The Strategy also addressed thequestion of how to structure IEA programmes in order to maximize the chanceof having the technologies in commercial use when the need would arise. The
Strategy produced a table of Generic Technology Priorities in four categories
with Indicative Actions specified for the various technologies falling withineach of the priorities (Priority One, for example, identified various specificenergy activities in the fields of end-use, production, conversion and supporting
technologies), and showed whether the indicative actions were classified as
R & D, pilot scale testing, demonstration, or commercialization. In the Priority
One category, for end-use the first subject mentioned was “Automotive
Transport Systems”; for Production it was “Enhanced Gas Recovery”; forConversion, “Advanced Converter Nuclear Reactors”; and for Key Supporting
Technologies, “Environment-Protecting Coal Technologies” [See p. 14;
also IEA, Annual Report on Energy Research and Development and
Demonstration - Activities of the IEA 1979-1980 (1980), p. 13].
In May 1980, IEA Ministers acted upon both the Group Strategy andthe Report of the International Energy Technology Group (IETG). The
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Kingdom, and the United States had created the IETG as foreseen in theSummit Conference held in Tokyo in June 1979. The IETG was designed tobe linked to the OECD/IEA, and the IEA provided the Secretariat support
for the Group, which then expanded to include high-level officials fromseventeen countries, the European Communities, the OECD and the IEA.
The IETG Report made a number of recommendations on the accelerationof commercialization of new energy technologies.
Acting on the IETG Report at their May 1980 meeting, IEA Ministers
declared in the Communiqué that they would “attach greater politicalimportance to energy research, development and demonstration, as well as
commercialization of new technologies, as essential elements for ensuringthat medium-term structural changes in their energy economies are carriedover into the long term”. IEA Ministers “endorsed” the Report of the IETG
“and its recommendations for accelerating commercialization of new energy
technologies” [IEA/GB(80)58, paragraph 15].
At the same meeting, the Ministers considered the more comprehensive
and far-reaching Group Strategy described above, concluding this:
Ministers noted that an IEA RD & D Group Strategy has beendeveloped. They concluded that the Governing Board at official
level will pursue the strategy’s accelerated scenario, which
minimizes oil imports for the IEA as a whole. They agreed that
IEA countries will use the IEA RD & D Group Strategy as a guidefor setting national priorities and funding levels as well as for IEA
collaborative project priorities. The Committee on Energy
Research and Development [CRD/CERT] will closely monitor
and periodically consider the extent to which aggregate national
RD & D efforts are consistent with the Group Strategy. The Coal
Industry Advisory Board is invited to provide recommendations as
to which new technologies should be pursued in order to further
speed up expanded production and use of coal [Paragraph 16].
In their Communiqué Ministers also emphasized the “political aspects ofenergy RD & D issues” (and particularly in the follow-up to the IETG andGroup Strategy Reports) and referred to consideration of an energy
technology Ministerial Level meeting, but this meeting did not take placebecause of current oil market priorities during this crisis period. In themeantime, while the Group Strategy work continued, the CRD/CERT and theGoverning Board took a number of complementary policy actions. In 1976
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national resources” and to assist each Member country in selecting newtechnologies “most suited to its needs and national resource endowments”.
New Implementing Agreements on nuclear safety, thermonuclear fusion,energy conservation applications to building complexes, advanced energy
systems, and solar heating and cooling had entered into force.
In the course of the development of the Group Strategy, in 1977
Ministers emphasized the strategic focus on the “most promising conservationand supply technologies”, and the need for “new energy technologies” and for“rapid application of alternative energy sources” [IEA/GB(77)48(2nd Revision), paragraphs 9 and 10]. Ministers undertook to examine “theircountries’ national energy research and development efforts” and endorsed
work carried out “to establish for the group of IEA countries as a wholeestimates and objectives for the contribution of new technologies to both
energy conservation and supply programmes over the remainder of thiscentury”. There was agreement concerning “co-ordination in the planning of
national R & D programmes” and concerning broader participation in“collaborative major hardware developments” in the interest of achieving
significant economies. Commercialization in such fields as electricity, liquidand gaseous transport fuels, and energy efficiency received strong Ministerial
support in 1979. A recurring Ministerial theme was expressed in support for“greatly expanded international collaboration through the IEA” as an aid inmaking the most effective use of resources where considerable additional
funding and manpower were required [IEA/GB(79)35, paragraph 13].
During this period the IEA established its review procedure for nationalenergy programmes [See Section D below]. In connection with the 1977 Paris
Conference on International Economic Co-operation [See Chapter VII,
Section B below], the Governing Board considered modalities of R & D
collaboration with developing countries, and in particular their possible
participation in R & D project Implementing Agreements. In cases where adeveloping country had currently under way or planned to sponsor an R & D
programme in the subject area involved, those Agreements were opened byinvitation to that developing country on the basis of the IEA rules applicableas well to Members [IEA/GB(77)23, Item 4 and Annex]. Moreover, during
this period five Implementing Agreements on energy conservation topics weresigned, as were ten other Agreements on coal gasification, small solar power
stations, geothermal energy, fusion, hydrogen, and wind energy. There wereadditional efforts to develop liquid and gaseous fuels for transportation andfor domestic and industrial uses. Substitutes for oil received high priority for
R & D on energy supplies, and technologies which could “significantly
improve energy efficiency” received strong support.
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After the IETG Report received Ministerial support in May 1980, themomentum toward increased commercialization continued in policy actions
taken in the years that followed. In July 1980 the Governing Board and theOECD jointly created for that purpose a High Level Group for Energy
Technology Commercialization (HLG) [IEA/GB(80)56, Item 5] to focus on
one of the groups of technologies that would be needed for the transition tominimum oil economies. The ITEG’s Report of May 1981 stated that
The HLG has identified those individual commercial scale
projects with a high probability of realisation that are planned forcompletion by 1990 in the areas of Tar Sands and Heavy Oils,
Oil Shale, Coal Liquefaction, Coal Gasification, New Coal
Combustion Technologies, Fuels from Biomass and Liquid Fuels
from Natural Gas and has distinguished these projects from thosewith uncertain prospects. Participating governments have also
made projections of production capacity for 1990 under various
scenarios, and a range of output levels has been estimated for theyear 2000 that are achievable if industrial capability to deploy
commercially these technologies is developed during the 1980s[IEA/GB(81)45, p.7-8; also in GETC(81)5 (1st Revision) p. 3].
Based upon a detailed study of projects and of future projections of output,
the HLG concluded that the foregoing technologies could be producing theequivalent of between 1.6 and 2.6 million barrels per day by 1990 if present
government policies were implemented and if certain constraints tocommercialization were removed. The HLG recommended a phased
approach to commercialization and set out a number of specific measures for
adoption at the national level. The HLG concluded that commercial scaleinternational co-operation could accelerate the rate at which technologicaldevelopments in one country could be used in other countries and thatexisting IEA/OECD bodies should be charged with monitoring andassessment responsibilities and with making appropriate recommendations[Pages 11-12]. IEA Ministers, meeting in June 1981, endorsed the report andrecommendations of the HLG and “stated their intention to work to establish
conditions, by applying measures appropriate to national requirements, underwhich industry would be prepared to design, build and operate commercial
scale plants by 1990 in the requisite technologies” [IEA/GB(81)34(Final),
paragraph 12].
Within one year, however, the underlying economic situation had sochanged that commercialization was again the subject of Ministerial
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Page 241deliberations. In 1982 Ministers were constrained to stress “the continued
importance of energy RD & D, despite changing expectations regarding thedevelopment and commercialization of new energy technologies. They noted
the marked reduction in many countries in expenditure on commercialization,and questioned whether private investment would be available to provide
adequate and timely development of some technologies that have high costs
and long lead times” [IEA/GB(82)54(Final), paragraph 13]. A review ofnational programmes requiring significant funding would thus be in order, to“ensure that they are in line with current views of future needs and to see how
further sharing of cost and expertise could contribute to more effective
action”. It was then observed for the first time in eight years that government
energy R & D budgets were levelling-off. At the same time, continuing
recessionary economic pressures on public expenditure supported a policy of
encouraging industrial participation in new energy technology development.
The results of annual R & D reviews during this period helped in the analysisof the prospects for large project commercialization, which came to appear
less promising due to the general economic situation and the need for
substantial amounts of high cost capital for these projects. Moreover, anumber of smaller collaborative projects was completed or terminated during
this period, but new ones brought the total to nearly fifty separate project
activities being conducted under the auspices of the Agency.
In 1982 the Governing Board reviewed the R & D policy goals on thebasis of a CRD/CERT Chairman’s document [IEA/GB(82)79], and it
endorsed “the principal orientation and direction of the IEA RD & D
programme thrusts” towards removing impediments to the use of coal, cooperating with the NEA to reduce “impediments to the safe use of nuclear
electricity generation”, “continued vigorous pursuit of conservation and fuelswitching technologies”, and “long-range, high risk technologies such as
fusion”. The Board also requested the CRD/CERT to review the Group
Strategy and to “make proposals as to whether it should be revised, and theprogramme actions necessary to do so” [IEA/GB(82)81, Item 2(a)]. The
intention had been that the Group Strategy would be subject to review andtake in increasing experience, changing circumstances, and evolving
assumptions. In 1982 and again in 1983, the need to refine and updatestrategic planning was found to be appropriate to ensure that the Strategy
take into account emerging long-term structural changes in IEA countries
and current projections developed in the IEA [See IEA, World Energy
Outlook, (1982), Chapter I, Section V].
The CRD/CERT in 1983 began a process of review of the Group
Strategy, appointed a Study Advisory Group, and with the Secretariat
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undertook the policy studies that would ultimately take the form of the IEA
publication entitled Energy Technology Policy which appeared in 1985.
The downward trends in oil prices and economic activity further reduced
interest in energy R & D investment in 1985. However, work on this study
helped to sustain political interest and support for energy R & D activities
which may have been weakened by the softening of oil markets. When theGroup Strategy study came before the Governing Board for reconsideration,
positive action was taken to maintain the IEA’s programme on course.
Work on this Energy Technology Policy (ETP) study was carried out
over a period of several years in a process by which the Agency benefited fromthe work as it progressed and the study benefited from feed-back from IEA
bodies, the Secretariat and R & D experts. The study re-examined the R & D
sector comprehensively in the light of conditions expected in the mid-1980s
and beyond, ranging from the underlying IEA objectives to the various
current and future technologies in detail. Energy security requirements called
for further structural changes in the Members’ energy economies, changes inwhich energy RD & D would have a “decisive impact”. The ETP study was
intended to provide a basis for the decisions that would ultimately achieve thisobjective. Hence the study stated that energy RD & D should seek to addressenergy security concerns, to avoid damaging competition for oil and gas
supplies, to safeguard against supply disruptions through diversification, to
promote energy efficiency, to encourage environmental protection, and to“encourage the generation of, and provide access to, the basic technologicalknowledge and competence which will provide long-range energy options”[Pages 9-10]. Taking current economic conditions into account, the ETP
study noted the “general belt-tightening” of that period, and the tendency offinancial managers to marginalize RD & D by reducing expenditure whichmight appear not to result in measurable short-term achievements. A periodof low-cost oil could provide opportunities for reducing vulnerabilities,
however, through wise decisions on technology infrastructure on both the
supply and the demand side.
With respect to the estimated annual public sector outlay in IEA
countries of US$ 7 billion in energy RD & D, the more specific purposes of
the ETP study were to identify issues and provide conclusions to aid policy
makers in reviewing national activity portfolios. Drawing on ten years ofexperience, the study explained how technology could contribute to national
goals, identified impediments to the development of those technologies
which could contribute most immediately to IEA policy goals, and promoted
the adoption of technical and policy approaches for the mitigation of those
impediments.
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The ETP study also developed a body of criteria for investment in this
sector. Although IEA Members’ individual perspectives would necessarily bediverse, the study developed common criteria concerning the timing ofpotential RD & D contributions, competition among technologies, project
effectiveness, international collaboration potential, benefits vs. costs, theenvironment, and health and safety. The study noted the national interests ofgovernments (e.g. long-term economic and energy security, as well as health,safety, and environment) and the interests of industry (e.g. economicallycompetitive products, a reasonable market, time for commercial penetration,
and acceptable returns on investment) which are driven by market influences.
The study then observed thatAs a consequence of differing government and industry
interests, energy RD & D supported by each may not coincide
and technologies promoted by governments may not meetindustry criteria. A smooth transition between the two cannot
always be expected, and policies may be necessary to overcome
these differences [Pages 13-14; emphasis added].
The ETP study examined in some depth the vulnerabilities associatedwith liquid fuels, energy security and diversity, environmental concerns, andpolicy issues within the particular technological areas. Concerning thelatter issue, the study considered technologies in accordance with a numberof pertinent criteria, including the degree to which the technologies makeenergy use more efficient, expand the use of conventional fuels (e.g. extend
the life of oil and gas resources, and remove impediments to coal and gas),promise to contribute to longer-term energy supply (e.g. breeder technology,
synthetic fuels, and fusion energy), and facilitate the use of renewables.
The study’s attention to the environment foreshadowed the Agency’s shiftingemphasis which soon thereafter, as will be seen below, raised environmental
issues to a level of high interest and priority.
The ETP study found that international collaboration offeredparticular advantages in a number of technologies, especially when an“active programme of information sharing” best serves implementation, hightechnical risks exist, or design, development, construction and operation of ahigh-cost facility is sought. Other advantageous situations include those inwhich collaboration would increase the efficiency and/or pace of R & D or
those in which unique trans-boundary implications are present.
The study went on to examine the current RD & D situation in the
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examination. The study’s conclusions reflected the constant IEA theme
about the need for “strong government commitment to maintaining overall
energy RD & D investment”, accompanied by the need for recognition in
the technical community that technologies and projects must produce
steady progress towards the objectives for which they were established. The
conclusions stated that
Significant energy RD & D initiatives have been undertaken since
1973-74, with mixed results. Some have resulted in technologicaladvances, some have achieved commercial application, whileothers have demonstrated the inability of financial resources alone
to assure technical or economic success [Page 23].
In general, the lead times for new energy technologies to movefrom the laboratory to the point of making even modest
contributions to the market (a few per cent) have generally
been measured in decades. Thus, while some R & D on newtechnologies may offer little promise for solving short-term
energy problems (to 1990), RD & D decisions made bygovernments in the near term can have a significant effect andbenefits in the medium to long term.
While government RD & D may have a lesser direct role in the
short term than RD & D conducted by industry, there is muchwhich remains to be done. The role of governments is to ensurethat the proper climate exits for short-term technology
development, including the identification and implementationof measures to promote the introduction of new technologies
and the improvement of existing ones.

International collaboration in the field of energy R & D alreadyis important in certain technical areas and can make major
contributions if properly planned and managed. Suchcollaboration can be particularly valuable when it:■
increases efficiency of RD & D and resource application;■
involves RD & D relating to technologies with transnational
implications, particularly in the environmental, health andsafety areas, such as acid rain and atmospheric carbon
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■

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is based upon joint planning leading to the identification anddefinition of major new facility or experimental needs;
permits proceeding with expensive and/or high risk newundertakings which would be difficult or impossible forindividual countries to do on their own; andallows more rapid technical progress than otherwise possible.

Given the unpredictability of oil and gas supply interruptions,
governments should ensure that technical measures capable ofaddressing short-term supply disturbances or price shocks havebeen taken. This might include work on:■
more flexible and efficient end use;■fuel switching technologies, e.g. burner design;■
reducing the lead time for the introduction of enhanced oil
recovery and coal liquid mixtures; and■alternative indigenous resources.
IEA R & D made use of the ETP study as it developed in 1983-1985
and in later years, for many of the points developed in the study remain
relevant even to the present day. It was presented to IEA Ministers in 1985,
when they adopted extensive formal Conclusions on IEA R & D policies. It is
no surprise that Ministers recognized the need “at this time to improve theresults of energy research and development through enhanced international
collaboration” [IEA/GB(85)46, Section IV]. This improvement should
proceed from national needs and programmes, and build upon existing
bilateral arrangements and activities in other fora. The work of the previous
ten years provided a basis for “more selective and rational planning of
national programmes”; future aggregate effort was likely to be more effective
through “early consultation at both the technical and political levels”.
Ministers agreed that the “increasing stringency in national energy RD & D
budgets places greater urgency on the need for collaborative projects insupport of national programmes, and the necessity for more effective
monitoring”. They supported continuing and new activities in fossil fuels,
renewables, fusion, and efficiency, and agreed that “early consultations should
be directed towards investigating possibilities for joint programme planning”
in the clean use of coal, advanced techniques for resource exploitation, andenergy technology information systems.
The 1985 Ministerial Conclusions also contained decisions on future
R & D work in the IEA, with particular reference to the CRD/CERT, which245

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should serve as a “forum for discussion” and as a “catalyst for facilitating”
enhanced R & D collaboration. According to this text, IEA work should
ensure that an efficient process exists for joint programme planning
discussions, bilaterally and multilaterally. The IEA should also “identify
national barriers to collaboration” and “recommend measures forconsideration by Member countries to reduce such obstacles”. The Governing
Board should receive annual reports on progress made on those decisions andon the results of the monitoring process.
In 1985 IEA Ministers noted “with satisfaction” that agreement had
been reached between the European Communities, Japan, and the UnitedStates on a new fusion energy project (on large Tokamaks), and between theEuropean Communities and the United States on two other projects in thefusion energy field. In the autumn of that year the Governing Board
adopted conclusions on early consultation and joint programme planning,and endorsed the Secretariat’s proposals concerning the modalities ofconducting R & D workshops [IEA/GB(85)53, Item 2(b)]. In-depth
reviews of synthetic liquid fuels programmes in a number of countries
revealed a wide range of activities and significant differences in the sharingof RD & D efforts between industry and government. Althoughencouraging advances had been made (particularly in coal gasification),current economics did not favour widespread commercialization of synthetic
fuels. However, during this period work began on a new coal combustion
project, and the number of operating IEA R & D projects was maintained at
the overall level of about fifty different activities.
Much of this direction of IEA and national R & D efforts continued
into, and was given effect in, later years. Following the 1985 Ministerial
Conclusions, in 1986 the IEA conducted three workshops on technological
topics related to clean coal: one on coal liquefaction, another on pressurized
fluidised bed combustion, and the third, hosted by Japan, on flue gas
treatment. The IEA developed planning on information systems
collaboration looking to co-ordinated exchanges through national computerbased systems linked to the United States Energy Data Base at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee. Together with the European Economic Community and theUnited Kingdom Department of Energy, the IEA conducted a seminar on
the dissemination of demonstrated energy technology, and it supported theestablishment of an IEA information centre to focus on demonstrated
energy efficiency technologies. A thematic review was conducted on thesubject of clean use of coal technology, a high priority sector. The Agency
completed a study of renewable forms of energy, examining a broad rangeof technologies in this sector. These and other activities, utilizing the results
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Page 247of the ETP study, were designed to give effect to the 1985 and earlier
Ministerial Conclusions on R & D policy for Members and for the IEA.
The problems of soft oil price trends and reductions in private andpublic RD & D expenditure did not disappear immediately. In 1987 IEA
Ministers again evoked these problems, stating that “Technology continues
to have a major role to play in providing alternatives for a more balanced
and diversified energy mix to ensure medium- and long-term energy
security”, and concluding that “it is essential that those activities on whichenergy security depends should not be prejudiced” [IEA/GB(87)33 Annex,
paragraph 25]. They re-emphasized their commitment to pursue“economically sound and environmentally acceptable energy technology
options”, undertook to seek to improve co-operation between government
and industry in the end-use technologies, and agreed to examine withindustry the means for assuring continuity in technology projects on thedevelopment of indigenous hydro-carbon supplies. Much of the sense of the1985 Ministerial Conclusions found itself re-affirmed in 1987, with specificmention of energy efficiency, renewables, diversity in the transportation
sector, joint consultations at an early stage of R & D planning, nuclear
fusion, and strong support for enhanced international collaboration.
Of course, IEA activities during this period reflected the fresh statementof Ministerial views, and earlier ones as well. Eleven IEA countries
established the computer based energy technology information system linked
with Oak Ridge, and an Implementing Agreement on Multiphase Flow in
Fossil Fuels was signed. The IEA also made progress in assembling the
CADDET Centre project (Centre for Analysis and Dissemination ofDemonstrated Energy Technologies). New workshops dealt with thetechnologies of coal/water mixtures and integrated gasification/combined
cycle electricity generation, associated with the clean use of coal. The themeof the 1987 technology reviews of Members’ energy policies was the efficient
end-use of energy, still another high priority sector. Reflecting a broader
perspective, the IEA published in the same year its study entitled A Ten Year
Review of Collaboration in Energy RD & D 1976-1986 (1987), containing
descriptions of projects, an assessment of the IEA energy R & D collaborative
effort, and suggestions on how this effort could best contribute to theachievement of IEA goals.
In September 1988, the Governing Board reviewed progress onenergy R & D collaboration and energy related issues more broadly[IEA/GB(88)25, Item 2]. The Board concluded that energy technology
would be, “in the future even more than in the past”, a major determining
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challenges to environmental policies. The Board requested the CRD/CERT
to make an assessment of a number of policy areas, thus beginning a newassessment process which continued on an evolving basis into 1995. On thesame occasion, the Board “reaffirmed the roles of the CRD [CRD/CERT] intechnology assessments and as a technical advisor to the Governing Board
as well as the other bodies of the IEA”; and the Board also requested closer
co-operation among IEA bodies “in order to improve the integration ofenergy technology programmes and energy policies”. Other policy
directions at this time referred to identifying factors inhibiting flows oftechnology into the market and possible remedies for them, technologicaloptions for reducing the emission of greenhouse gases, and thediversification of transport fuels.
Energy R & D work advanced along these lines in 1988. The CADDET
information dissemination Centre was formally established with close links to
the other IEA energy information centres. In accordance with the Ministerial
recommendation, the IEA study on substitute fuels for road transport wascompleted. The Agency prepared and published a set of monographs ontechnologies adopted by eleven countries on energy efficiency or fuelsubstitution or both, in buildings, industry, and transport, with environmental
aspects and constraints taken into account. The monographs evaluate thetechnical and organizational factors that may have a positive influence on the
progress and dissemination of these technologies. As in previous years, the
IEA initiated new collaborative projects, following direct contacts withMember countries and as a result of ad hoc workshops organized by hostcountries. Workshops organized in 1988 examined technology topics ofindustrial separation, advanced underground coal mining, advanced fuel cells,
long-range opportunities for renewables, air quality, heating and cooling ofbuildings, geothermal energy, and natural gas conversion. An IEA specialist
seminar was held in Japan to explore the possible applications of the new“warm superconducting materials” in the electricity sector.
Energy R & D received a further boost and additional direction from
Ministers in 1989, reaffirming prior themes and technologies, but adding
elements derived from recent trends and developments. Perhaps the strongest
ever general statement of Ministerial support may be seen in the declarationthat RD & D
should be intensified in all Member countries across the full
spectrum of laboratory development, testing, pilot plantand prototype demonstration, and dissemination andcommercialization and within a context of strong international
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collaboration; government and private sector participation
within competitive energy markets; and cost effectiveness[IEA/GB(89)36 Annex, paragraph (e)].
IEA R & D policy as well as other aspects of long-term energy policy during
this period were evolving toward greater emphasis on environmental
considerations (which had always been present with lesser or greaterpriority) and, in 1989, particularly on the technology of possible responses
to the growing greenhouse gas problems. Building upon the results of
the OECD/IEA expert seminar on reducing greenhouse gas emissions,
Ministers agreed that “the main priorities for future IEA RD & D activities”
should include technologies for better energy efficiency, for a moreenvironmentally acceptable use of coal, and for enhancement of low-cost
indigenous oil and natural gas availability. In further response to thegreenhouse gas problems, Ministers also supported technologies foraccessing remote natural gas reserves, for integrating renewable sources ofenergy into energy systems, for upgrading the electricity sector, and for
improving fission and demonstrating the feasibility of nuclear power fusion
systems. Ministers considered that goals and directions for the orientationof future IEA RD & D activities should be defined on this basis, as was
generally the case.
The year 1989 also brought work on a group of new IEA technology
studies, including the “energy technology reference study” (Energy
Technology Strategy 21), to assess again policy goals and significant actions in
the various energy priority areas from a long-term perspective (thirty years)
as must be done on a regular basis in order for the IEA to “keep current” in a
rapidly changing world of energy policies, resources, and technologicaladvances. Moreover, the Agency found that the prospect of global climatechange raises complex problems of technology transfer to non-Member
countries, and it thus undertook a feasibility study to define clearinghouse orother arrangements for the exchange of information on greenhouse gas related
energy systems and options. The Agency also prepared a report on technology
options for stabilizing and reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.
Superconductivity was the subject of another report, as were technical andeconomic guidelines for assessing the potential of renewable energy sources.
During the year, R & D collaborative projects became the subject of a periodic
review, and two new Implementing Agreements entered into force, one on the
new “warm” or higher temperature superconductivity materials in theelectricity sector and the other on the cleaning of hot gases from advanced
coal-fuelled power plants.
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The year 1989 was also a landmark year for IEA conferences,seminars, and workshops, with increasing participation of non-Member
countries. In the seminar on greenhouse gas emissions mentioned above,
two hundred experts participated from twenty-four governments andinternational organizations, and the seminar received seventy-two papers
prepared by individuals with first-hand knowledge of energy technologies.
The IEA organized other seminars and workshops, as well, taking up suchpriority topics as clean coal technology, enhanced oil recovery, oil spill
prevention and clean up, efficient uses of energy, renewables, and nuclear
fusion energy devices. In many cases IEA sponsorship was extended to these
events convened by IEA project “lead countries” or by project Executive
Committees, with the participation of experts from non-Member countries
for the purpose of providing their unique input to the meeting or to stimulate
their interest in joining IEA R & D projects. A system of prior consultation
was established to review non-Member participation in IEA activities. Under
this system the host organization provides the IEA Secretariat prior notice of
the intention to invite a participant or representative of a non-Member
country or international or regional organization which does not haveestablished links to the Agency. The CRD/CERT then notifies the officials of
the interested IEA projects and the Working Parties, and the Executive
Director may approve, or (in consultation with the Governing Board
Chairman) decide whether to refer the proposal to the Governing Board[IEA/GB(89)42, Item 4(a); IEA/GB(89)40]. In that fashion the possible
political considerations of non-Member participation are taken up at thepolitical level in the Agency.
In 1990 IEA R & D activity continued largely on the basis of the samepriorities and concerns as before, while the Energy Technology 21 energy
technology reference study was still in progress. In recognition of thetransnational nature of global climate change, the IEA undertook a numberof related energy and environment technology programmes and actively
sought the wider participation of non-Member countries. The IEA devoted
considerable attention to the subject of improving the commercialization
prospects for priority technologies through earlier industrial involvement,
more rapid diffusion of R & D outcomes, and a clear focus on market entry
requirements.
The IEA Ministerial meeting in 1991 again reviewed R & D strategy
and major programme elements, recognizing the need for “an assessment of
the long-term options in an energy technology strategy for future decades”[IEA/GB(91)42/REV2, paragraph 18]. This reflected the Secretariat’s
assessment work as it was expressed in the draft study entitled “Assessment
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of Energy Technology Priority Areas: Energy Technology Strategy”.
Ministers declared in their 1991 Communiqué thatSpecial emphasis should be placed on those technologies which
enhance diversity, efficiency and safety, extend and improve
prospects for utilising reserves of conventional fossil fuels, andmake available new and alternative energy sources. Ministers
underlined the importance of sustained and balanced R & D anddemonstration funding for energy technology innovation if
the goals set for energy security, environmental protectionand economic growth in the long-term are to be achieved[IEA/GB(91)42/REV2, paragraph 18].
Largely building on previous policy statements, the foregoing paragraph of
the Communiqué applied to R & D the “Three Es” of overall IEA policy:“energy security, environmental protection and economic growth”. Ministers
agreed that if the global climate change challenges are to be met, programmes
should reflect new priorities “resulting from the integration of energy andenvironmental goals”, particularly in such areas as renewables, nuclear powersystems, innovative conservation technologies, CO2 capture and utilization,and fossil utilization.
A “phased and flexible strategy” for technology development andtransfer could be expected to help reduce energy related greenhouse gas
emissions. The Communiqué emphasized again the need for “development
and diffusion into the market” of new and improved energy technology
options, and it explicitly extended the geographical reach of this policy not
only to the OECD region, but also to “the non-Member country area”, inrecognition of the globalisation of energy markets and the growing impacts ofenergy policies worldwide [Emphasis added]. Referring to the importance ofaccess to technology as a response to global climate change, Ministers invited
IEA Members “to explore means for more effective energy technology transfer,information dissemination, and training for effective utilisation”. They thenrequested an early evaluation of an information clearinghouse mechanism andinformation exchange system among innovative environmental technology
programmes and suggested other practical proposals for realizing the goal of
speeding the development and diffusion into the market of new and improved
technology options to help reduce energy related greenhouse gas emissions.
Still again in 1991, Ministers pledged continued support to“multilateral R & D and demonstration collaboration” on new and improved
energy technology and they endorsed further the broadening of participation
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Page 252in the Agency’s collaborative mechanisms, such as energy R & D project
Implementing Agreements [Discussed in Section C below]. They pledged
continued support for collaboration in order to minimize duplication of efforts
and to enhance the impact of financial and other resources available toMembers for “preparing new and improved energy technology”. Ministers
urged the early and full participation of the energy industry in thiscollaboration, and requested that a legal framework be developed to facilitate
the participation of non-Member countries and multilateral organizations in
IEA Implementing Agreements, later adopted in a system of “Associate”
participation [See Section C-5 below].
IEA R & D activities during the period 1991-1992 reflected the policy
guidance of Ministers summarized above, as the Agency shifted its policy
interest from promoting large demonstration projects to technology
deployment and qualitative questions, such as those relating to energy and theenvironment. As would be expected, environmental concerns now found their
way across the broad spectrum of R & D studies, conferences, workshops, andcollaborative project work. The Agency devoted intensified attention to
information exchange on environmental questions. Based upon a 1991
feasibility study, further steps included the definition of management
structure, resource requirements, information suppliers, and the customer
base of a new technology information exchange system. A preliminary
programme for an IEA/OECD Greenhouse Gas Technology Information
Exchange, known as “GREENTIE”, was launched in 1992. The objectives of
GREENTIE are to create a directory of sources of information on technologies
which contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gases; there are also an
information dissemination network and a query response mechanism for theuse of developing and industrializing economies as well as for IEA and OECD
Member countries. In addition to GREENTIE, the Agency continued its effort
to establish information access links among the existing IEA information
centres and to widen opportunities for non-Member country and private
sector involvement.
The preparation and dissemination of IEA studies as well as
conferences, symposia, and workshops continued at a rapid pace, giving ahigher priority than before to environmental issues. In addition to theAssessment Study mentioned above, this period saw the appearance of the
IEA Guidelines for the Economic Analysis of Renewable Energy Technology
Applications. The Guidelines deal with the computation of costs of eight
renewable energy technologies: active and passive solar systems, solar
thermal and photovoltaic electricity generation, bioenergy, small-scalehydro power, geothermal energy, and wind power, which do not present the252

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environmental problems associated with fossil fuels. Additional studies
were carried out on “Electric Vehicle R & D and Prospects for International
Collaboration”, as well as new work on a thematic review on Members’
energy technology dissemination mechanisms and policies. The publication
Collaboration in Energy Technology: 1987-1990 (1992) carried forward asimilar study for the years 1976-1986, with an assessment of collaborative
efforts, recommendations for specific technology areas, and generalsuggestions for improving collaboration. The Agency emphasized in thetechnology selection process the market entry requirements and likely
commercialization barriers in each instance, thus ensuring a realistic
appraisal of the impact of individual technology options. Further efforts
were also being applied to utilize the most efficient and cost effective
diffusion processes, ranging from the removal of undue market barriers to
the establishment of more clearinghouse mechanisms.
IEA conferences, symposia, and workshops offered opportunities for
IEA technology contacts in non-Member countries, including Central andEastern Europe and the Pacific area, as well as in Member countries. In
1992, Member countries supported more than twelve conferences,
symposia, and workshops, on such topics as advanced electric systems forthe next century, electric vehicles, carbon dioxide removal and disposal
technology, and the Agency recognized the information diffusion andmarket entry advantages of these events which brought together Members,
non-Members, and researchers as well as R & D marketers and users, with
benefit to the objectives of each. Many of the leading project developments
during this period were influenced by information exchange, analysis andideas produced in connection with IEA R & D conferences and othermeetings. During this period the Agency also identified its future work
priority actions which included removing barriers to new technology
deployment, monitoring technology developments and R & D trends inMember countries, framing a technology response to global environmental
issues, developing technology information exchange on greenhouse gases,
enhancing the elements of R & D collaboration to serve information
diffusion as well as new technology objectives, and coping with thetechnology requirements of transitional economies.
Particular energy sectors also featured strongly in IEA work in the
R & D field. The transport sector has been a troublesome one for energy
policy makers. The persistent growth in energy use in this sector has resisted
the efforts of Members to reduce oil consumption for transport purposes,
although a variety of technology approaches has stimulated R & D cooperation, including electric vehicles and the use of alternative fuels.
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Electricity supply was taken up in the Tokyo conference on advanced
technology in this sector, providing a basis for increasing co-operation
between governments and public utilities on the new global environment
challenges. A workshop on energy fuel and life-cycle analysis focused on
methods for carrying environmental costs into technology cost
determinations. The IEA conference on urban transport and the electric car
addressed the problems of mobility in cities in the light of environmental andenergy security concerns. During this period, the Agency sponsored or
established new programmes and projects on a natural gas technology
information centre, photovoltaic power systems, electric demand-side
management, nuclear fusion power reactors, and the arrangements for
GREENTIE. Each of these topical events reflected the evolving concerns of
IEA Ministers as stated in their Communiqués of recent years.
In 1993 IEA Ministers gave additional and strengthened impetus toenergy R & D on the two major themes of technology promotion by
governments: (1) to contribute significantly to mitigating and solving
environment problems, and (2) to intensify energy technology co-operation
among Members and with non-Members of the Agency, as an indispensablemeans of accelerating technological advances, and to enhance energy security
and environmental protection. Ministers highlighted the further integration ofenergy and the environment to promote collaboration and co-ordination aimed
at sustainable development and respect for intellectual property rights.
Ministers noted the establishment of the IEA International Centre for Gas
Technology Information. They asked the IEA to study “the factors that
influence new technology diffusion into the markets, . . . the role international
technology co-operation policies could have in meeting the objectives of the
Framework Convention on Climate Change”, and the effect “government
policies have on the penetration of new, more environmentally benign,technologies” [IEA/GB(93)41, paragraph 19]. Ministers declared that “Accessby individual developing countries and economies in transition to modern,cost-effective energy technologies appropriate to local circumstances will
promote sustainable development”. The “Adoption of clean, efficienttechnologies throughout the world” would help reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, they said. Ministers welcomed GREENTIE and called upon the
IEA to step up the promotion of international co-operation in energy R & D inthis area [Communiqué, paragraph 20].
R & D work in the IEA during 1993-1994 reflected the foregoing
Ministerial objectives, including the further development of the IEA energy
technology Assessment Study mentioned above. This was the most recent in
the series of strategy-type studies and assessments intended to keep the IEA’s
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R & D work up-to-date, relevant and useful. Begun in 1988, this Study
aimed at providing guidelines for the review and evaluation of the Members’
programmes and identifying opportunities for further collaboration over athirty year period. It was developed by teams of energy technology experts,
whose work in seeking a consensus was of considerable use to Members in
helping them understand the importance of the options and in characterizing
needed R & D activities. The evolving document has been discussed by the
CERT on several occasions and has been employed in a number of countries
in formulating policy. It develops priorities derived from a consideration ofenergy security, environmental protection, and changing relations with nonMember countries. It analyses barriers to technology diffusion for selectedpriority areas and examines the changing role of governments in promoting
R & D results in the development of useful equipment, services, and energy
systems. However, this broad effort has been widened and updated mostrecently in the IEA/OECD publication Scoping Study: Energy andEnvironmental Technologies to Respond to Global Climate Change Concerns(1994), which absorbed and broadened the previous assessment work andbrought a sharper focus on climate change and related problems.
Most IEA and OECD governments have agreed under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) to take actions to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions; these are new commitments which will
require the development and commercialization of new technologies.
Although many existing technologies for the efficiency of energy supply andend-use are already available, they require more improvement, dissemination,
and application. New technologies as well could play a pivotal role over the
medium- to longer-term. The Scoping Study focused first on new technologies
which are likely to be commercially available near the year 2010, and then on
those which could follow around 2030 or beyond. The Study was conductedby the OECD and the IEA together, with an inter-disciplinary team oftechnology and policy experts. The Study aims at identifying opportunities
and strategies to enhance international co-operation on “longer-term energy
and environmental technology options that are still pre-commercial, but which
could contribute to reducing or avoiding greenhouse gas emissions” [Scoping
Study, p. 18; emphasis added]. Overall the Study’s purpose is to help
“accelerate the pace of future technology developments needed to respond to
global climate change concerns” [See p. 20]. This comprehensive work
examines such topics as factors influencing technological development,
technology options and strategies, and national and international technologicaldevelopment efforts to reach conclusions for enhancing international
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IEA/OECD High Level Meeting was convened in late 1994 to discuss the
Study and possible strategies on priorities to enhance the development of newtechnologies to respond to the global climate change concerns.
During 1993-1994, IEA R & D work also included the start of a major
study on the market deployment of energy technologies, a study designed toevaluate the experience and barriers encountered in market deployment. The
study, being carried out in co-operation with three of the R & D Working
Parties, is also expected to produce suggestions for facilitating andaccelerating the introduction of new and improved technologies into themarket, and to offer proposals for international programme co-ordination andimproved information exchange and collaboration. During this period,
Member countries again supported a large number of conferences and likeevents on current technology topics relating to end-use, hydropower, carbon
dioxide removal and disposal, natural gas, and clean coal for countries in the
Asia-Pacific region. In December 1994, the IEA and the OECD conducted in
Valbonne, France a Technology Transportation Forum on “Energy,
Environment and Transport Systems Perspectives”. The topics of otherconferences supported by the IEA ranged from Energy Efficiency in Latin
America to Carbon Dioxide Removal and Disposal. Working Parties and IEA
R & D project groups operating under Implementing Agreements organized
additional conferences, workshops, and symposia. In accordance with IEA
policy, these conferences and other events enjoyed a widening participationfrom non-Member countries on subjects of shared interest. During the same
period, the Agency applied new arrangements to facilitate non-Member
participation in IEA energy R & D Implementing Agreements [See Section C
below], giving new expression to the opening of IEA R & D to a wider world
as the scope of IEA contacts with non-Members in this sector became an everbroadening one. Meanwhile, IEA countries have had to face tightening
budgets for energy technology, which has heightened interest in improving therelevance and value of their activities in this sector. The IEA has assisted
Members in this process by establishing an Experts’ Group on Energy
Technology Assessment and Methodologies for R & D Priority Setting and
Evaluation designed to enable Members to share experience in methods for
improving their internal programmes.
IEA energy R & D policy was also strongly and directly stated in the“IEA Shared Goals” adopted by Ministers on 4 June 1993 [IEA/GB(93)41;
see Chapter II, Section J above]:
Continued research, development and market deployment of
new and improved energy technologies make a critical
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contribution to achieving the objectives outlined above. Energy
technology policies should complement broader energy policies.
International co-operation in the development anddissemination of energy technologies, including industry
participation and co-operation with non-Member countries,
should be encouraged.
The “objectives outlined above” in the IEA Shared Goals are stated generally
in the “Three Es” of energy policy: energy security, sustainable economic
growth, and the protection of the environment, and more specifically in the
support of open and free markets and in the recognition of global
interdependence in energy. IEA objectives are also expressed in the more
specific Shared Goals of diversity, efficiency, and flexibility within the energy
sector, of prompt and flexible responses to energy emergencies, of theenvironmentally sustainable provision and use of energy with minimal
environmental impacts, and of improved energy efficiency and co-operation
among all market participants. Similar goals have appeared throughout this
Chapter in the evolution of R & D policies and strategies over the first twenty
years of the International Energy Program, with many of the Shared Goals
being reflected in the energy R & D actions of the Agency.

C. System for International Collaboration
on Energy R & D Projects
In surveying the evolution of the IEA’s R & D policies since 1974, thepreceding Section examined the origins and purposes of the project as wellas the policy collaboration among Members in this field, and it identified anumber of the specific project topics which have been developed under the
auspices of the Agency. IEA energy R & D projects are carried out under abody of Governing Board decisions which inaugurated the “Implementing
Agreement” as the principal mechanism for the establishment,
administration, and dissemination of the results of the projects. This
Section will review more specifically the R & D project policies of the IEA
and their evolution to the present day. It will also examine the structure
and operational points of its project system and the access of non-Membersof the IEA to the projects, mostly as reflected in Governing Board decisions
and in provisions of the Implementing Agreements.
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1. Purpose, Scope, and Application
The objective of organizing R & D collaborative projects in research areas
relevant to the Agency’s long-term energy policies was evident in the
preparatory work of the Agency as well as in the Agency’s actions taken
immediately upon its establishment. Co-operation on research was a toppriority, because of the mutual advantages it would bring. The first ten
areas of research were identified before the Agency was founded; others
were added soon thereafter. All of the Agency’s early R & D policy
statements referred to project co-operation. Most of the advantages of cooperation on R & D policy, as invoked in the IEA, were in fact a reflection of
the benefits to be derived from collaborative research projects. Theseadvantages included the integration of R & D with the group’s general longterm policies, the dedication of greater resources, more rapid research
progress, cost-sharing to make possible larger projects, reduced costs of theparticipants’ pooled resources, a wider range of approaches, the better
dissemination of the results of the co-operation, and the avoidance of
duplication, among others. In 1985, the objectives of IEA collaborative
projects and the basic approach to be taken were summarized as twofold:■■

To provide a framework in which Member countries canachieve the advantages of sharing costs and benefits fromtechnology development activities of common interest;
To demonstrate a cohesiveness in the individual approaches ofMember governments to the longer-term objective of reducing
dependence on oil.
It was decided from the outset that if such co-operation was tobe worthwhile, the results would ultimately be destined for themarketplace. A business-like approach thus seemed mostappropriate, which demanded a commitment of resourcesamong equal partners, with provisions for both Government
and industry participation, and for the protection of intellectual
property. Such considerations have led to the use of a contract(or Implementing Agreement) among participants, and largely
determined the content of the Agreements [Leslie Boxer, “IEA
Energy R & D Co-operative Projects”, Table Ronde sur les
Entreprises de Co-operation Technique Internationale, writtenwith the author, 1985, on file in the IEA].

The IEA’s founders and early policy makers gave high priority to the
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referred to “co-operative programs” and listed the first ten sectors in which
they would be carried out [Article 42.1(c)]; the Long-Term Co-operation
Programme (LTCP) provided for “jointly financed programmes andprojects” in energy R & D and adopted detailed Guiding Principles for them
[Chapter IV, Article 1; see Section A above on the I.E.P. Agreement and the
LTCP]. Early IEA concerns relating to technology co-operation did notquestion the desirability of promoting and developing collaborative projects
on energy research in the Agency, but focused on the identification of specificsubjects of R & D. Questions did address the priorities to be applied, theallocation of resources, the precise objectives of the work to be undertaken,
the particular means to be employed to protect the resulting information andexperience, and other questions of that nature. The answers to thesequestions have varied over the Agency’s history, in consequence of the IEA’svarious R & D strategy studies which have been undertaken over the years,
as the preceding Section shows. The Agency started with heavy emphasis onconservation, nuclear energy, and coal technologies, which are still priorities
but which are now seen more broadly in the environmental and global
context, as well as in the context of their inherent energy supply advantage.
In the intervening years, they have been joined by a host of other technology
fields which now appear on the IEA’s actual or foreseeable project list,
covering many if not all of the possible fields of energy R & D relevant to the
IEA. The scope of these topics can be discerned at a glance in the list
compiled in Appendix V below.
Another question to which the Agency had to respond almost
immediately in 1974 was the organization of the projects. Once the topics
had been selected on the basis of policy and of their technical merit for
R & D, there were additional questions to consider. How would the final
selection decision be made institutionally? What would be the relation
between the project and the IEA? Who would carry out the work? Whowould be eligible to participate in the project? What would be themanagement structure and procedures of the project? Would participants
take legal obligations concerning the project? Who would have legal rights
to the resulting intellectual property? What would be the situation of IEA
Members not participating in the particular project? These and otherquestions of project management had to be understood or answered in an
authoritative and reliable way before the projects could be established, andsystematic co-operation could get under way. The structures andprocedures which were devised in the IEA to enable the Agency’s R & D
projects to get off to a rapid, effective, and productive start are taken up in
this Section.
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2. Project Formation and Management
As it turned out, the Agency’s consideration of management questions and thedevelopment of the first IEA energy R & D projects proceeded in parallel overthe first few months, to come together in the course of 1975 when the
management issues were largely settled in the IEA “Guiding Principles” forthese projects and when the first five project Implementing Agreements
prepared in conformity with the Guiding Principles were signed. In
March 1975, the Governing Board authorized the first projects (waste heatutilization, municipal and industrial waste utilization, and the production ofhydrogen from water). In July, the Board approved six more programmes in
the areas of coal technology, nuclear safety, radioactive waste management,
conservation, fusion, and solar energy [IEA/GB(75)54 and Corrigendum 1,
Item 4(d) and Annex IV] and it adopted the essential project management
rules in the Guiding Principles for Co-operation in the Field of Energy
Research and Development (called the “Guiding Principles”) [See Annex III].
The Guiding Principles, which provide for a decentralized project
structure and management, were later re-adopted with the General
Guidelines Concerning Information and Intellectual Property in
Implementing Agreements (called “Intellectual Property Guidelines”), both
placed in Annex II of the Long-Term Co-operation Programme in 1976 [SeeChapter IV, Section A above]. However, the Guiding Principles entered into
force immediately in July 1975, and the first Implementing Agreements(establishing five coal R & D projects, on Fluidised Combustion and on
Services for Technical Information, Economic Assessment, the World Coal
Resources and Reserves Data Bank, and the Mining Technology Clearing
House) were signed on 20 November 1975. Governing Board authorizationsof other projects followed shortly, and the number of signed Agreements rose
rapidly. In a few years the total project activities approached the number offifty (since some Implementing Agreements cover a number of separate
project activities, there are fewer Agreements) and it has remained at aboutthat level with some rise and fall to the present day. The projects have been
described generally in a series of Explanatory Notes presented in each case to
the Governing Board in support of the request for Governing Board approval.
More detailed information is contained in the various IEA activities reports
and reviews of the projects [See particularly, A Ten Year Review ofCollaboration in Energy R D & D 1976-1986 (1987), followed by
Collaboration in Energy Technology 1987-1990 (1992); a third review
covering 1991-1994 is in preparation for publication in 1995]. Further
information, including the formal details of each Implementing Agreement
and of each Task Annex contained in multiple task or “umbrella”
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Agreements (technology area, Contracting Parties, Task participants, dates offormation, expiration, last renewal, expected results, and so forth), isavailable on the IEA’s “Computerized Register for Implementing
Agreements” which was inaugurated in 1993 [See IEA/CRD/EU/WP(92)2].
The IEA’s formal arrangements for the projects run through several
levels, beginning with the I.E.P. Agreement, then Governing Board
decisions, including the Guiding Principles, the Implementing Agreements
for the project (including project Annexes of multiple project, umbrella-type
Agreements), and the decisions of an Executive Committee established foreach project. They are also governed typically by the national law of thecountry in which the project is conducted and by contractual arrangements
made on behalf of the projects, usually by an Operating Agent designatedfor the project by its participants.
At the apex of this hierarchical system of arrangements, the rules
concerning the Agency’s decision authorizing the individual projects arecontained in Article 65 of the I.E.P. Agreement which provides theprocedure for a group of less than all Members to agree upon special
activities within the scope of the Agreement. These Members maythemselves make the decision without interference of the other Members
which are not participating in the activity, for those other Members are
required to abstain from taking part in the decision and are not bound by it.
The Members participating in the special activities are required to keep theGoverning Board informed of them. Since all activities falling within thescope of the I.E.P. Agreement are eligible for the Article 65 special activity
procedures (except for activities required to be carried out in the oil
emergency provisions of Chapters I to V of the Agreement), virtually all IEA
energy R & D activities and interests are qualified under that Article. In
practice the proposals for new Implementing Agreements are reviewed in
the appropriate Working Party and then in the CERT where they are madeknown to all IEA Members. When the proposal goes forward to theGoverning Board, it is accompanied by a brief description of the project orprogramme background and objectives, the initial means for carrying it out,
the duration, possible participants, and finance. A recent example is theProcess Integration Technologies Programme covering the application of
methodologies for system-oriented and integrated approaches to industrial
process plant design for both new and retrofit applications [SeeIEA/GB(94)37, Item 11(b) and Annex]. Typically the Governing Board
approves the addition of the new project or programme as a “special
activity under Article 65 of the I.E.P. Agreement”, and the Explanatory
Note is annexed to the Board’s Conclusions. Thereafter, reports on the261

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progress of the project are to be submitted at least annually to theGoverning Board [Guiding Principles, Article X(b)].
The importance of the Article 65 decision formality by the Governing
Board cannot be over-estimated. It provides the link between thedecentralized project and the IEA. It affords the project participants the rightto use the IEA mechanism and name, which otherwise would not be properly
available to them. If the project departs seriously enough from the IEA
management rules in administering the project, it is not excluded that the
Agency could consider the possibility of rescinding the decision and thereby
removing the IEA link, although the Governing Board has not had occasion to
do so. Some have considered the Article 65 decision of the Governing Board
authorizing the project as tantamount to an agreement among theparticipants, initially as an oral agreement made in the Governing Board
proceedings, then as confirmed in the written Conclusions of the Board. The
definitive agreement is concluded among the Contracting Parties to the
Implementing Agreement in the next stage of development of the project.
Once the Governing Board’s authorizing decision is made, theparticipating Members and other authorized parties may proceed to sign theIEA Implementing Agreement, prepared in accordance with the Guiding
Principles and with other applicable Governing Board decisions. The
Governing Board initially adopted the Guiding Principles in a “decision” on
28 July 1975, “to serve as the framework for carrying out individual
programmes and projects”, noting that the Members’ agreement on guiding
principles “would significantly contribute to facilitating and accelerating theimplementation of their programmes and projects” [IEA/GB(75)54, Item
4(b) and Annex III]. However, in Article II of the Guiding Principles, theBoard stated that
The Implementing Agreements establishing such programmes
and projects shall, as appropriate, take into account the
Guiding Principles set forth herein” [Emphasis added].
When the Governing Board integrated the Guiding Principles into the LongTerm Co-operation Programme (LTCP) in 1976, the Board adopted as well
the Guidelines on Intellectual Property annexed to the Guiding Principles[LTCP, Chapter IV, paragraph 2, and Annex II]. Insofar as the Implementing
Agreements are concerned, the Guiding Principles are to be taken into
account “as appropriate” and the Guidelines on Intellectual Property areframed as a “recommendation” rather than a binding decision. There is also
provision that the termination or modification of the Guiding Principles “shall262

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not automatically affect either the carrying out of any programme or project
undertaken in accordance with this Decision or the provisions of any
Implementing Agreement previously concluded”, and the projects must
accordingly be fully able to stand on their own. The foregoing rules havebeen carried into the Implementing Agreements, so the rules apply
contractually to the parties to these Agreements. The Guiding Principles andthe Guidelines, as their names suggest, provide useful guidance but not rigid
rules to be followed where unreasonable or harmful results might occur.
These instruments thus offer management direction on a relatively “soft”
basis, which can give way to more compelling priorities. Yet both instruments
have been generally followed in practice, and cases of major departure havethemselves been the subject of authorizing Governing Board actions, as will beseen below with respect to the participation of non-Members.
The commitments to participate in information exchanges and to
identify and promote programmes and projects, including joint activities inthis field, appear in Article I of the Guiding Principles, which states that
Members shall■■

Encourage and implement exchanges of information among all
Participating Countries regarding national programmes, public andprivate, on energy R & D and energy-related technologies; andIdentify and promote programmes and projects in which two or more
Participating Countries can join for their mutual benefit or for thegeneral benefit; this may include the formation of consortia, involving
both public and private interests, to implement certain joint activities.

Article II of the Guiding Principles states the Members’ commitment tocontribute as follows:
Each Participating Country shall contribute as fully as possible
to the programmes and projects identified in accordance with
Article I of the present Decision and shall endeavour to secure
the necessary scientific, technical and financial resources, as
appropriate, by attracting both public and private support tosuch programmes and projects.
These commitments are accompanied by the project provisions which guidesuch subjects as the content, form, participation, financing, and operationof the activities generally, and specifically of the Implementing Agreements,
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evolving conditions. The financing provision is important, because theAgency does not finance these projects and it leaves this element to theparticipants. Perhaps most fundamentally, the governing principle of“equitable sharing in IEA energy R & D projects” is stated in Article IV(a):Participation in programmes and projects under the present
Decision shall be on the basis of equitable sharing of obligations,contributions, rights and benefits. Participants in programmes
and projects shall undertake to make a constructive
contribution, whether technical, financial or otherwise, as may
be agreed [Emphasis added].
This principle of equity permeates the Guiding Principles as well as theIntellectual Property Guidelines, and it finds expression in the Implementing
Agreement provisions on the scope of obligations and the level ofcontributions of participants (which are determined by them as appropriate),
as well as on their rights in the management of the projects and their share of
the resulting intellectual property.
The possible subjects of projects, outlined in Article V of the Guiding
Principles, are quite extensive, including information exchanges on national
programmes and policies, on scientific and technological developments, andon legislative and other subjects. There are many such activities conducted
as specialized information projects or as parts of projects embodying otherforms of co-operation. Meetings to identify programmes and projects are
frequently employed, as are visits and exchanges of scientists, technicians orother experts. More ambitiously, there are
Special programmes and projects in the form of co-ordinationand planning of specific R & D studies, works or experiments
carried out at national level, with subsequent exchange, joint
evaluation and pooling of the scientific and technical results
acquired though such studies, works or experiments [Article V(d);emphasis added].
These projects are called “task sharing” in IEA terminology. They are
many in number, and they are potentially highly productive of pooled
intellectual property, as will be seen below. While task sharing projects are
inherently highly decentralized, another modality is the more centralized
jointly-funded programme or project, reflected as follows in the Guiding
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Creation of programmes and projects, including participation in
the operation of special research or pilot facilities andequipment provided by a Participating Country, or in the formof joint design, construction and operation of such facilities
and equipment [Article V(e); the joint development andharmonization of technical criteria is foreseen in paragraph (f)].
The Guidelines do not specify in any detail the particular areas in whichenergy R & D might be carried out under IEA auspices. Article I refers
broadly to “energy R & D and energy-related technologies” without
limitation. In practice, the IEA projects have covered most research topics
which might come to mind, including the relevant possibilities for diversifying
energy demand and supply, in the fields of conservation and efficiency,
enhanced oil recovery, coal technology, natural gas, renewable energies,
thermonuclear fusion, advanced nuclear fission, environmental research, andcomprehensive information services and systems analysis, as may be seen in
more detail in Appendix V where the individual Implementing Agreement
topics for the period 1975-1994 are listed.
In the formative years of the Agency, projects were often initiated by theMember governments which had been assigned lead country responsibility forparticular technology sectors. Later the initiatives came from a broader
spectrum of Members and other sources and they were channelled through the
IEA’s R & D management structure described above, the Secretariat, theWorking Parties, and the CRD/CERT, at times after having been developed in
the Executive Committees of established projects. There is no prescribedchannel for the initiation of projects; they have been initiated at each level inthis system, and this procedural flexibility is encouraged.
Viewed from the Agency’s perspective, IEA energy R & D collaboration
has always been carried out on a decentralized basis. The laboratory
research, construction, testing, pilot plant, and prototype demonstration andmuch of the dissemination are conducted under national rather than IEA
authority; i.e. the IEA itself does not carry out or finance such research
activity itself. There are no IEA energy R & D laboratories or other researchfacilities. Since the research is conducted in Member countries, the Guiding
Principles contain few provisions on the administration of the collaboration.
Article IX(c) maintains the lead country concept adopted in the early days of
the Agency, whereby a Member or international organization “may be invited
to assume responsibilities in relation to the initiation of programmes andprojects or the practical arrangements necessary for the preparation or
execution of them”. The designation of a lead country is typically made in the265Chap. IV et V

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early phase of development of a new activity, and the lead country frequently
provides the Operating Agent, which often has the major responsibility for
conducting or co-ordinating the work. A further element of decentralization in
IEA practice is the absence of international entities which might have beencreated to carry out the work. Normally the work is carried out directly by
the participants, sometimes by the Operating Agent, more frequently by anumber of participants in the task sharing projects. The projects are subject
to the “applicable laws and regulations” of the Participating Countries; inpractice this means the laws and regulations of the country in which the
project operates, frequently the country of the Operating Agent.
The Guiding Principles make general provision for the content of the
Implementing Agreements [Article VI]. These Agreements “should establish
the terms of the contribution for scientific and technical information, knowhow and studies, or manpower, or capital investment and other forms offinancing to be provided by each participant” [Article VI(e)]. The Agreements
are to assign the responsibility for the “operational management” of a project
to a single entity which is to be accountable to a specific Member country, inpractice the Operating Agent of the project (always from a Member country or
participating organization; never the Agency itself). The Implementing
Agreements are intended to establish contractual relations among the parties.
They become legally binding on the parties in order to create firm
commitments on participation and contributions, so that each participant canrely on the specified funding levels and other contributions which may berequired in the aggregate to make the project viable. The Agreements also
grant the participants legal rights of access to the resulting intellectual
property, so that they are assured of receiving the benefits of the work to which
they have contributed. The Agreements are also made legally binding upon an
Operating Agent by means of a separate instrument when the Operating Agentis not a Contracting Party to the Agreement. However, the Agreement is notbinding on others; for example, it is not binding on the IEA itself (to date the
IEA has never become a Contracting Party to an Implementing Agreement),
and the Agreement is not binding on a Member which designates one or more
non-governmental Contracting Parties from its country and when thedesignating government does not itself become a Contracting Party.

3. Financing and Facilities
Financing arrangements for programmes and projects are also the subject of
the R & D Guiding Principles, in two provisions which state the basic
financial concepts:
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Subject to provisions in specific Implementing Agreements
relating to the sharing of expenditure, each participant shallbear the cost of its own participation in the programmes andprojects under the present Decision [Article IX(a)].
Programmes and projects shall be subject to the applicable laws
and regulations of the Participating Countries and shall be
subject to the appropriation of funds of the Governments andtheir national agencies concerned [Article IX(d); emphasis
added].
Funding is thus entirely in the hands of the participants in the projects.
The IEA does not fund any of these projects. The participants do notcontribute project expenses to the IEA to be disbursed or allocated toparticular projects, but contribute to the project directly. This enables theparticipants to exercise jointly and directly full financial autonomy in the
conduct of the project, thus avoiding the need for an IEA Secretariat
function in the administration of the funds or the conduct of the work. The
Agency has not developed the infrastructure that would be required to carryout responsibilities of that nature.
Accordingly, the participants normally bear all of their own direct
expenses, except to the extent that joint funding or other arrangements are
fixed in the Agreement or adopted by the project Executive Committee.
There is no requirement that all IEA Members participate in the projects, northat all Members contribute to them, although there is a general commitment
to contribute as fully as possible in the broad sense and to endeavour to secure
the necessary “financial resources, as appropriate, by attracting both public
and private support” to the projects [Article II]. The Members are free toparticipate or not; if they do, they assume legal obligations for the funding as
provided in the Implementing Agreement. If they do not participate directly as
Contracting Parties, Members do not incur financing obligations under the
Agreements, although they are free to make their own financial support
arrangements with others, for example with an entity which the Member
might designate as a participant from the Member’s country.
In task sharing projects each participant bears the costs of carrying out
its particular Task. In such cases there is normally no need for funds to leave
the contributing country, for the commitment of resources is for work to be
performed within the participant’s country. The participants decide theirrespective commitment levels among themselves, usually in terms of personyears of effort to be dedicated to the work which will produce information
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for the project pool. The cost of visiting technicians is usually met by theparticipant sending the individual to work in the facility of anotherparticipant, although the receiving participant might bear some of the local
costs. Hardware projects are often carried out mainly by an Operating Agent,usually (but not always) a participant from the host country for the project,
at relatively high-cost levels (e.g. initially in the range of the equivalent of
US$ 90 million for the Grimethorpe Fluidised Bed, US$ 32 million for the
Small Solar Power Systems, and US$ 13 million for the Testing of HighTemperature, High-Pressure Filters). The various IEA technology
information centres are also jointly funded by the participants in much thesame way. Some projects for the commissioning of technology studies havefound it convenient to fund the work in this fashion. In such cases it isappropriate for the costs to be shared in accordance with fixed levels or witha formula set forth in the Agreement or adopted by the project Executive
Committee, or both methods may be employed. In practice the scales ofcontributions have been established pragmatically, with the differences inability to contribute and the differences in priority assigned to the particulartechnology by the different participants having roles to play. Often thecontributions are determined by reference to a percentage of the participant
country’s national GDP, to a percentage of the Member’s IEA contributions,to a percentage of the relevant national expenditure on R & D, or by a
combination of these measurements. In all joint financing projects, theparticipants contribute to a “common fund”, usually held by the Operating
Agent it its country, which involves a transfer of funds from the contributing
participants to the common fund account. Audits and other safeguards offinancial integrity are always provided in the Implementing Agreements inwhich common funds are to be established. There are no requirements thatthe common funds be expended proportionately in participants’ countries
and there is no other provision for “a fair return” to participants in theplacement of contracts, although the financing arrangements are subject tothe general principle of “equitable sharing” mentioned above.
In addition to financing in the strict sense, the Guiding Principles callupon IEA Member governments to assist on a “best endeavour” basis with the“formalities” required for the purpose of the project. Although there are noprovisions in the Guiding Principles or the Implementing Agreements for the“privileges and immunities” usually granted to international organizations,
the Guiding Principles state this:Each Government of a Participating Country shall use its best
endeavours to facilitate the accomplishment of formalities
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involved in the exchange of persons, the importation of materials
and equipment and the transfer of currency, which are required
for the purpose of the programmes and projects undertaken
under the present Decision [Article IX(b)].
While this provision is carried into the routine provisions or “boilerplate” ofthe Implementing Agreements, it has been necessary only in rare cases tomake special arrangements to facilitate the “formalities”. In the case of the
Small Solar Power Systems Project, carried out in Almería, Spain, there
were extensive provisions for privileges and immunities for Stage 2 of theAgreement, on construction and operation. In the Stage 2 Supplement to
the Agreement, signed on 22 May 1979, in addition to the obligations of thehost with regard to the site, special arrangements were made on theprovision of services, indemnity of the Operating Agent, and protection of
the site; to these were added provisions on currency transfer privileges, on
the exemption of project property from direct taxes, customs duties, andlocal contributions, on facilities for the Operating Agent’s personnel, and onother matters [Article 8].

4. Intellectual Property
The IEA’s General Guidelines Concerning Information and Intellectual
Property in Implementing Agreements were developed in the CRD/CERT
following the Governing Board’s request of July 1975 [IEA/GB(75)54, Item4(c)] and were adopted as an Annex to the Guiding Principles which wereattached to the Long-Term Co-operation Programme in 1976. The Guiding
Principles [Article X] and Intellectual Property Guidelines stated a broad
principle supporting the widest possible dissemination of project information
to all IEA countries, and the Guidelines adopted a few broad principles on
the protection of intellectual property, the treatment of backgroundintellectual property utilized in the projects, and the allocation of rights toarising intellectual property in several different types of projects (e.g.
exchanges of scientists and experts, and jointly funded R & D). In
recognition of the difficulty or impossibility of forecasting the nature, value,and cost of the intellectual property or the future surrounding circumstances,the Intellectual Property Guidelines were cast as a recommendation notlegally binding on the participants. It was understood that the Agreements
would be developed “with regard to the special circumstances of eachprogramme or project, taking into account” the Guidelines set forth in therecommendation [Article 1]. That indeed was done quite rapidly, before the269

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Guidelines were finally adopted, and the first Implementing Agreements, aswell as all those which have followed, have largely given effect to the
Guidelines in the situations in which they were applicable. As it turned out,
the problems of future uncertainty left the Implementing Agreement
draftsmen with little choice but to employ general principles and proceduresin the Agreements and to defer the substantive decisions until the issues
would arise and could be determined in the light of the actual situations.
Accordingly, the Implementing Agreements normally contain principles
governing the right to publish, the protection of proprietary information, theproduction of information by the Contracting Parties to the Agreements andby the governments of IEA countries, and the acquisition of information forthe project. When proprietary information or patents may be produced, theAgreements provide for the holding of the rights (e.g. by the Operating Agentor by a Contracting Party individually or jointly, acting on behalf of all
Contracting Parties) or the division of ownership rights among theparticipants. The Agreements then provide for compulsory licensing of suchproperty and patents as well as the underlying intellectual property supplied
to and used in the project. As will be seen below, however, it has not proved
possible to remove all of the uncertainties in this field. For that reason the
Implementing Agreements usually provide in the first paragraph of theintellectual property Article a clause such as this:Executive Committee’s Powers. The publication, distribution,
handling, protection and ownership of information andintellectual property arising from activities conducted under thisAgreement, and rules and procedures related thereto, shall be
determined by the Executive Committee, acting by unanimity, in
conformity with this Agreement.
This paragraph vests in the Executive Committee the residual decision
power over the subjects listed. Yet the Agreements provide that most of the
difficult decisions are to be taken by unanimity, which creates a negotiation
framework with which the Contracting Parties must ultimately come toterms and in which the rights and equitable interests of the possible
minority are fully protected.
The arising patent licensing provision in joint hardware projects
usually contains a text along the following lines:
Licensing of Arising Patents. Each Contracting Party shall havethe sole right to license its government and nationals of its
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country designated by it to use patents and patent applications
arising from the Project in its country and the Contracting Party
shall notify the other Contracting Parties of the terms of suchlicences. Royalties obtained by such licensing shall be theproperty of the Contracting Party. Other licences under suchpatents and patent applications shall be granted by the Operating
Agent:(1) To each Contracting Party, its government and nationals of
its country designated by the Contracting Party for use in all
countries on favourable terms and conditions as stipulatedby the Executive Committee, acting by unanimity, taking
into account the equities of the Contracting Parties based
upon the sharing of obligations, contributions, rights andbenefits of all Contracting Parties;(2) To the government of any Agency Participating Country
and nationals designated by it for use in such country on
reasonable terms and conditions as stipulated by the
Executive Committee, acting by unanimity, in order tomeet its energy needs.
Royalties obtained from such other licensing shall be held by
the Operating Agent for the benefit of the Contracting Parties.
It will be noted that the foregoing provisions contain subjective standards suchas “favourable terms and conditions”, the “equities of the Contracting
Parties”, and “reasonable terms and conditions”. The key decisions on thesesubjective standards are to be taken by the Executive Committee (composedof all the Contracting Parties) “acting by unanimity”, which means that there
would have to be a negotiation taking into account past and present
circumstances as well as estimates of future conditions and values. Thus the
key elements are left to future negotiations under continuing conditions of
uncertainty; in the worst case the issues could be submitted to arbitrators,
under dispute resolution procedures provided in the Implementing
Agreements, but this has not become necessary. The project participants andthe Agency have considered the kind of negotiation described above as about
the best outcome that could be foreseen for Agreements of this type. There has
been no substantial change in this approach over the history of the Agency.
The situation for “task sharing” projects is clearer, but similar
uncertainties remain. In task sharing, each Contracting Party undertakes aparticular Task as part of an R & D project and typically agrees to furnish
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to all of the other Contracting Parties all background intellectual property,
as well as all arising intellectual property, in a pool-type arrangement, on aroyalty-free basis (sometimes called “fully paid royalty basis”) where this ispossible. Thus the Implementing Agreement may state this in a task sharing
project:
Licensing of Inventions. Each Contracting Party agrees tolicense all pre-existing inventions covered by patents owned orcontrolled by it which are necessary for practising the results of
its Task and which have been utilised in the Task, and all arisinginventions to the Contracting Parties, their governments and thenationals of their respective countries designated by them:(1) Royalty-free for use in their country only; and(2) On reasonable terms and conditions for use in all othercountries.
Each Contracting Party agrees to license all such arisinginventions to all Agency Participating Countries on reasonable
terms and conditions for use in their own country in order tomeet their energy needs.
Here the problem of uncertainty disappears with regard to the royalty-free
exploitation rights, because the Agreement definitively fixes these rights, but
uncertainty continues under the “reasonable terms and conditions” provisionof paragraph (2) quoted above and in the requirement of licensing across theboard to IEA countries. Again, the retention of some uncertainty has appeared
to be the best option under the circumstances of uncertainty mentioned above.

5. Participation
Implementing Agreement participation, first regulated by the Guiding
Principles in 1975, has undergone a process of constant expansion. Even at
the outset, the projects were in practice more open to non-Members of the IEA
than would have seemed to be the case under the strict terms of the
Guidelines. As early as 1976, the Governing Board admitted the first nonMember (Finland, not yet an IEA Member) to an Implementing Agreement(nuclear safety); then in 1977 Agreements were opened under Governing
Board decision to developing countries, in the first formal change to theapplicable rules. During the ensuing years the Board agreed to theparticipation on a “case-by-case” basis of a number of non-Members, some of272

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which were OECD Members, and some not; and in 1991 the Board formalized
the non-Member admission process by establishing “Associate” participationin accordance with rules adopted as amendments to the Guiding Principles.
The decision on Associates gave strong support to non-Member participation,in keeping with the Agency’s growing recognition of the globalisation ofenergy policy in recent years.
Participation is governed by the Guiding Principles, by ad hoc
decisions of the Governing Board, and by the decisions of the Contracting
Parties to the Agreements. Despite the “soft” formal nature of the Guiding
Principles, which provide that the guidance should “be taken into account”
and which do not require absolute compliance, the Principles and the Board’s
ad hoc decisions on participation have always been scrupulously respected.
As originally adopted in 1975, Article IV of the Guiding Principles provided
for four narrow categories of participation:
■
■

■
■

Governments of IEA Member countries.
National agencies, public organizations, private corporations,companies or other entities which have been designated by theirgovernments as the vehicle of their participation.
The European Communities (EU).
Other Members of the OECD, with the agreement of the Governing
Board.

Each of the foregoing categories of participants has been employedextensively. In many cases the government, a ministry or anothergovernmental entity participates directly. Designations of public or private
Contracting Parties in place of the Member government have been quite
common, although designations of public entities have been the more frequentof the two. The European Communities (EU) participate in a number ofAgreements through the European Commission or EURATOM. In 1990 a
new category of participant, called a “Sponsor”, was devised on a pragmatic
basis in order to permit an important non-governmental institution from a
Member country to participate in a project, when the Member government
was not ready, for internal reasons, to make the designation in the normal
way, but had no objection to this participation. Non-governmental bodies inwhich one or more entities from Member countries are represented present
another situation for participation as a “Sponsor” rather than as aContracting Party in the usual sense. In 1993 the Guiding Principles wereamended to establish the detailed procedures to be followed for participation
by Sponsors [Article VIII; see IEA/GB(93)57, Item 7 and Annex 1].
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The Guiding Principles also determine the cases in which theagreement of the Governing Board is required for participation in an
Implementing Agreement. There is no need for such agreement in individual
cases to participation by IEA Members, by entities designated by Members,
or by the European Communities. However, the participation of OECD
countries which are not IEA Members has from the outset of the Agency
required the Board’s specific approval. The practical need for suchapproval has receded with the growth of IEA membership to include all
OECD Members except Iceland and Mexico. When Finland and France were
non-Members of the IEA (but were Members of the OECD), they did
participate in a number of Implementing Agreements. In each such case theGoverning Board was able to give its agreement to their participation
without difficulty. Indeed, while still a non-Member, Finland was quite
active in a number of IEA R & D sectors: it participated in the relevant
Working Parties and received a formal “open invitation” to participate in all
Implementing Agreements in those sectors, if it and the other participants so
decided [IEA/GB(83)57, Item 4(d)], and they did so in a number ofprojects. France first indicated interest in joining the IEA Energy
Technology Data Exchange Implementing Agreement, and the Board agreed
in 1988; France later joined several other projects as well before becoming
an IEA Member in 1992. In recent years the Agency has given particularattention to the possible participation of non-Member countries, including
Korea, the Russian Federation and developing countries.
The Guiding Principles were initially silent on the question of thepossible participation of countries not Members of either the IEA or theOECD, but this question would soon arise in connection with the 1977 Paris
Conference on International Economic Co-operation (the North-South
Conference), when the IEA Governing Board considered possible modalities
of R & D collaboration with developing countries, and in particular their
possible participation in R & D Implementing Agreements [See Chapter VII,
Section B]. Where a developing country would have currently under way,or have planned to sponsor, an R & D programme in the subject area of an
IEA project, the Agreement for the project was opened by invitation to thedeveloping country on the basis of the IEA rules which applied as well toMembers [IEA/GB(77)23, Item 4 and Annex]. This was done in the IEA’s“Preliminary Guidelines for Collaboration on Energy R & D Between
the IEA Countries and Developing Countries”, which indicated thatsuch participation was not intended to offer another international
mechanism for aid, but would open the possibility for developing countries
to be invited to participate on the basis of the Guiding Principles, taking274

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into account the “special circumstances” of the developing countries“consistent with these principles” [Preliminary Guidelines, paragraph (c)].
Under these Guidelines, the modalities of collaboration with
developing countries included■■■

Invitations to participate in technical discussions in the IEA R & D
Working Parties when the countries “have underway or seriously plan
to sponsor an R & D programme in the subject area involved”.
Invitations to participate in information exchange projects when theircontribution in whatever form is substantial, and in task sharing
projects “when they have programmes underway, or plan to financesuch programmes, which are reasonably comparable to those of the
IEA Participants”.
Invitations to participate in jointly-funded projects on bases reasonably
equivalent to that of IEA country Participants. If the developing
country received financial or technical aid through other international
mechanisms, and thereby could satisfy the above Guidelines, it could
participate.

Developing countries would be able to suggest new projects in three categories(information exchange, task sharing, and joint funding). Applications forparticipation would be considered initially by the CRD/CERT, which could
refer them to the appropriate IEA R & D sectoral Working Party for
examination. The CRD/CERT would make its recommendations to theGoverning Board, which would make the decision in each case. The
Guidelines also provided that “In deciding on programme priorities, industrial
countries should take account of the technologies needed by the developing
countries” [Paragraph (f)].
These decisions undoubtedly heightened developing country interestin such participation, and a number of non-Members’ requests were
thereafter approved: Mexico (Geothermal Equipment, IEA/GB(78)32),
Brazil (Alcohol and Alcohol Blends as Motor Fuels, IEA/GB(81)75; Brazil
ultimately did not join the project), Egypt (Enhanced Recovery of Oil,IEA/GB(83)69), and Yugoslavia (Atmospheric Fluidized Bed Combustion,
IEA/GB(87)29). Since the participation is contractual in nature, in eachcase all of the Contracting Parties to the Agreement in question also had toagree to the admission of the new party, which is the case for all newparticipants in Implementing Agreements, including IEA Members.
The most recent and comprehensive Governing Board action to open
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the 1991 decision on “Associate” participation [IEA/GB(91)79]. “Associates”
are defined as “participants from non-Members of the OECD and frominternational organisations in which non-Members of OECD participate”[Guiding Principles, Article IV(e)]. In addition,
The Associate may be the government of a non-Member of OECDor a national agency, public organisation, private corporation,company or other entity designated by that government or by theGoverning Board or an international organisation in which nonMembers of OECD participate” [Article VII(a)].
Under the 1991 decision, the Governing Board, as before, retains thedecision responsibility, but the principles to be applied are now spelled out inmore detail. Admission also requires that the Associate “be able to make a
substantial contribution to the programme or project”, and that it participate
under the terms of Associate participation reflecting the Guiding Principles
and “any applicable Governing Board decisions”, and in accordance with theterms of the “formal arrangements for such participation” [Article VI(d)].
The level of Associate participation is a matter of agreement between
the Associate and the Contracting Parties to the Implementing Agreement.
The terms, conditions, and duration of Associate participation are “to beagreed in each case on an equitable basis” as they are for the Contracting
Parties. However,unless the Governing Board decides otherwise in specific cases,
Associate participation shall not give rise to voting rights on
the following structural and policy questions: the admission of
new Contracting Parties or Task participants, adoption of new
Tasks, adoption of Annual Programmes of Work and thedetermination of intellectual property questions. Associates
which participate on an equitable basis in the funding of the
Budget shall enjoy a corresponding right to vote on the Budget,
Annual Programmes of Work and relevant activities. They
shall not serve as Operating Agents or as Executive Committee
Chairmen [Article VII(c)].
The procedure for the admission of Associates is much as it was fordeveloping countries under the 1977 Guidelines, but participation by the
project Executive Committee has been formally added, and the IEA
Committee on Non-Member Countries is to be informed. A request is made by276

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the Executive Committee for review by the CERT which reports its views to
the Governing Board. The Secretariat informs the Committee on Non-Member
Countries. The final decision is taken by the Board, which remains fullycompetent to amend the foregoing rules or to decide in particular cases not toapply them or to apply other rules as appropriate to the particular situation.
Overall the effect of the Associate participation arrangements has been toencourage greater non-Member participation, and thus to widen opportunities
to develop the projects, but at the same time to define the limits of suchparticipation on a narrower basis than had previously been the case. Since
the decision on Associate participation was adopted in 1991, the Governing
Board has given its approval in the following cases:
Governing Board Approval of Associate Participation in IEA
Implementing Agreements(1991-1994)
RegionAsia
Korea

Malaysia

Agreement

Reference

GREENTIECADDET
Energy Technology Data Exchange
Demand-Side Management
District Heating and Cooling
Photovoltaic Power Systems

IEA/GB(93)57

Advanced Heat Pumps

IEA/GB(92)17

Central andEastern Europe
PolandEnergy Technology Data Exchange
IEA Coal Research

IEA/GB(94)13

IEA/GB(94)13
IEA/GB(94)54

RussianFederation

International Centre for
Gas Technology Information
IEA/GB(93)57
SolarPACES
IEA/GB(94)13
Stellarator
IEA/GB(94)54
Environmental, Safety and Economic
Aspects of Fusion Power

UkraineInternational Centre for
Gas Technology Information

IEA/GB(94)54

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Governing Board Approval of Associate Participation in IEA
Implementing Agreements (continued)(1991-1994)
RegionAgreement

Reference

Latin America
BrazilEnergy Technology Data Exchange

IEA/GB(94)54

Venezuela

Greenhouse Gases

IEA/GB(94)54

Middle East
IsraelSolarPACES
IEA/GB(92)17
High-Temperature Superconductivity IEA/GB(92)45
Photovoltaic Power Systems
IEA/GB(94)13

Thus the new Associate participation has been approved in a total of 19 cases
from non-OECD countries, and more are expected in the years to come.
In completing the provisions on participation, the Guiding Principles
also anticipated the possibility of the withdrawal of a Contracting Party froman Implementing Agreement. Article VI(b) thus provides that “a participant
may withdraw from an Implementing Agreement in accordance with theterms and conditions defined in such Agreement”, and the Agreements
contain detailed provisions on this subject. These typically provide for a rightof withdrawal with the unanimous agreement of the Executive Committee orafter a period of notice, usually one year following an initial period of
operation of the project. In hardware projects where the firm financial
contributions of all participants are essential to the success of the project,
there may be a withdrawal right only with the unanimous agreement of the
Executive Committee. Over the first twenty years of operation of theseprojects, there has been a number of voluntary withdrawals, but there wasonly one case of withdrawal arranged by the Governing Board, and that
occurred after the Board determined in 1993 that the “dissolution of theformer Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had brought about
the extinction of the Board’s invitation to the SFRY to be a Contracting Party”
to one of the Implementing Agreements. The other Contracting Parties wereasked to take the necessary action, and that was done [See IEA/GB(93)11,
Item 6].
6. Functions of the Implementing Agreements
The main functions of the Implementing Agreement texts are to establish the
project in formal terms, to identify and legally commit the participants to the278Chap. IV et V

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project, to fix their contributions and benefits, obligations and rights, toidentify the R & D work to be carried out, to assign the responsibility for the
execution of the work, and to make the necessary administrative
arrangements for the project to commence, to operate as foreseen, to carry out
its work, to distribute the project results, and eventually to terminate,effectively and smoothly. The texts contain provisions dealing with all ofthese subjects in legal terms. The text is also the vehicle for ensuring that the
Guiding Principles and Intellectual Property Guidelines are taken into
account, and that the project decisions under these instruments are respectedby all of the participants.
Sometimes the Implementing Agreements provide for a single project,for example a single hardware construction project. But they can also provide
for multiple projects (called Tasks), each with its own project activities,
parties, financing, intellectual property rights, and operating provisions.
These are called “umbrella agreements” in IEA terminology, for they “shelter”
a group of separate Tasks in one general area of R & D and thereby avoid theneed for multiple agreements with their respective multiple preparations,clearances, signatures and administration. The grouping together of different
IEA project Tasks in the same activity area has proved to be an efficient anduseful process. It was begun in 1977 with the Buildings and Community
Systems project. The umbrella form has since become the preferred IEA
instrument, when the conditions for it exist. There have been cases where asingle hardware project has been converted, upon the completion of the
hardware phase, into an umbrella of mostly software-type Tasks for research,
information exchange, assessments, and the like. The umbrella form contains
in the general part of the text the usual Implementing Agreement“boilerplate” found in most Agreements and consisting of much of thematerial described in the preceding paragraph. Then the particulars of each
Task under the umbrella are provided in a separate “Task Annex”, of which
there may be any number desired by the participants; there have been as few
as one and as many as 28 Task Annexes in a single umbrella Agreement.
In more specific terms, the Implementing Agreements typically contain
formulations concerning the background of the activity (preamble), thedefinition of objectives and scope of the activity, the project Executive
Committee (powers, membership, responsibilities, procedures, voting, andreports to the Agency), and the Operating Agent(s) (designation, scope of
authority, reimbursement of costs, replacement, accounting). The
Agreements also provide, as appropriate, for finance (common fund,obligations, financial rules, accounting, programmes of work and budgets,and audit), and information and intellectual property (acquisition of rights,
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publishing, licensing, and copyrights). Additional subjects usually covered
include legal responsibility and insurance (liability of the Operating Agent,indemnification), legislative provisions (formalities, applicable law, decisionsof the Governing Board, settlement of disputes), the admission andwithdrawal of parties (new parties, contributions, withdrawal, change ofstatus of a party, and failure to perform contractual obligations), and final
provisions (term of Agreement, termination, amendment, and depositary).
There have been various provisions on the duration and termination of
the Implementing Agreements. Some early Agreements were made for an
initial period (of three years, for example), and indefinitely thereafter until
they would be terminated by a unanimous decision of the Executive
Committee; others provided for termination by majority decision ofparticipants after the passage of a specified period of time; still others
provided for a fixed term duration. The desire of Members to exercise closer
control over the duration of Agreements (in which not all the Members might
be participants and significant numbers of participants might be nongovernmental entities) led to a request in 1987 that the R & D Working
Parties set a maximum initial term for new Implementing Agreements[IEA/GB(87)44, Item 3(e)]. The Secretariat has sought to apply a maximum
initial term of five years [See IEA/CERT(92)10]. In addition, the CERT in
1992 agreed that the Secretariat take appropriate steps (1) to limit to thesame maximum term the Agreements which have expired and for which theappropriate Working Party has recommended continuation, and (2) torecommend that the Executive Committees of all Agreements with unlimited
terms agree to set a new maximum term of five years starting from the date ofthis CERT action [IEA/CERT/M(92)1]. Under the current policy, there is areview of each Implementing Agreement every five years, and the Governing
Board’s prior agreement is sought before the term of an Agreement is
extended.
While the Implementing Agreement has been largely the vehicle ofchoice for the establishment of IEA collaborative projects since the first
Agreements were entered into in 1975, collaborative projects have beendeveloped for which a simpler formal mechanism would be sufficient. Suchprojects might include those in preliminary stages in which a “Statement ofIntent” or “Memorandum of Understanding” would contain earlyarrangements before an Implementing Agreement would be necessary, but
this is a seldom used approach which has not given full satisfaction.
However, where a number of participants might wish to collaborate on aregular basis on IEA sponsored conferences and technical meetings or on theexchange of unprotected information on R & D programmes in preparation
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for thematic reviews or the establishment of energy technology priorities, thearrangements could take a simplified form without a full Implementing
Agreement text. In simple forms of energy technology co-ordination projects
where the activities do not require resource transfers, task sharing,
intellectual property, or other contractual provisions, the participants might
prefer to proceed informally, either without any formal arrangements or withsimplified forms of agreement, and the Agency has thus taken these
possibilities into account.
IEA Implementing Agreements are the subject of a regular review
process. Each Executive Committee typically is required to provide theAgency annually with reports “containing technically substantive, nonproprietary information on the progress of the Project and its results”, andthe Secretariat regularly monitors the projects. Each project is also subject tothe five year review mentioned above, to examine the accomplishments andthe costs of the project and to determine whether it should continue. The
Executive Committee of the project undertakes this review in co-operation
with the CERT and at times with the aid of an external peer group. The
CERT’s recommendation is then transmitted to the Governing Board for its
decision [See also Section D below on country reviews and thematic reviews].
More general reviews of projects have taken place periodically overthe life of the IEA. The Ten Year Review (1976-1986) and the 1987-1990
review, mentioned above, described the projects and assessed their outcomes
and objectives, new project possibilities, the wider participation of
governments and industry, the duration of projects, and the diffusion of
results, as requested by the Governing Board [IEA/GB(88)25, Item 2]. Afterconsidering the 1987-1990 review, the Board requested the CRD/CERT and
the Secretariat to “implement the recommendations of the review” andto undertake regular reviews of the Implementing Agreement
process [IEA/GB(92)17, Item 6].
Pursuant to that request, the R & D Working Parties and the Secretariat
have conducted a further review covering the period 1991-1994. This
review is expected to be published in the course of 1995. Similar reviews areto be expected as well on a regular basis in response to the Governing Board’s
1992 request. “Guidelines for Review of Technology Collaboration
Activities” are considered in IEA/CERT(94)40. In October 1994, the CERT
Agreed to strengthen, simplify and streamline the IEA
Implementing Agreement review process; to request the CERT
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Working Parties and Advisory Bodies to report to the CERT
annually on actions taken to improve the efficiency andeffectiveness of the IEA Implementing Agreements for which
they are responsible, and to request the Secretariat to develop
guidelines for reviews and reports on IEA Implementing
Agreements [IEA/CERT/M(94)3/PROV].

7. Role of the IEA
While the IEA R & D projects are fully decentralized, in the sense that the
project activity is usually carried out in Member countries (and not in the
IEA or in facilities of the IEA), and in the sense that the Agency is not a
Contracting Party to the Implementing Agreements and provides nofinancing, the Agency does play a vital role in the formation and operationof the projects. The IEA provides an overall framework for the projects,
brings the prospective participants together, and keeps in the forefront theadvantages of the Members’ collaboration in place of their “going it alone”
in the field of energy R & D. Such a programme requires a central place for
consultation, strategic thinking, joint planning, and information exchange
on objectives, projects, and modes of operation as well as unobtrusive
monitoring of the overall project portfolio. For IEA Members, the Agency
has proved to be the best place for these functions to be carried out.
The Secretariat works with representatives of Members and with the
project parties and staff to ensure that they are informed of current
Ministerial policies and priorities and that they are developing strategicplans and annual reports on their activities and accomplishments.
The Secretariat also ensures that project participants are aware of
the activities taking place in related projects and that all related projects
are co-ordinated as appropriate. These liaison and information functions
are also carried out in a number of other meetings, conferences andworkshops.
Notwithstanding the national venue of most of the project activities,
the Secretariat has responsibilities in all of the foregoing Agency functions.
The Secretariat brings prospective participants together, acts as a catalyst in
forming new projects, provides experience and advice on organization of the
projects, helps negotiate and draft the Implementing Agreements, and attimes nurses them into existence out of a precarious preparatory stage.
After the Implementing Agreement enters into force, the Secretariat follows
project activities, participates in Executive Committee meetings, continues
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project and various bodies of the Agency. The Secretariat continues toprovide advice, assists in the administration of the project, and performs
agreement depositary and other legal functions.
As part of the IEA R & D team, the Secretariat joins with theMembers’ representatives to the IEA’s Working Parties, the CERT, and theGoverning Board, together with officials in capitals, the various Contracting
Parties, both in the public and the private sector, and with the institutions
and individual researchers, investigators, scholars, and their supporting
staff and services, to make the IEA’s R & D projects contribute to theobjectives Member governments seek to achieve in the Agency.

D. Country Reviews andTechnology Reviews
As in the long-term and emergency response sectors, policy reviews in the
R & D sector have provided valuable information on Members’ policies andactivities, assessments and recommendations. In the R & D sector the reviews
began in 1977 as national policy reviews, but expanded to include a focus on
the “state-of-the-art” of particular technologies and of collaborative projects.
The first reviews were specialized R & D reviews which were merged in 1986
with the long-term reviews, and the two have since been conducted together
on an annual basis.
The Long-Term Co-operation Programme in 1976 included specificprovision for a periodic review of national efforts in the R & D sector [LTCP,
Chapter IV, Article 3]. In 1977 the IEA established a review procedure fornational energy R & D programmes. The first R & D review was conductedin that year, and the results were published in 1978 [See Energy Policies andProgrammes of IEA Countries - 1977 Review, (1978)]. At that early date, thereviews were expected to find and did find that much remained to be done.
The CRD/CERT found some basic problems: that a number of countries had
not yet adequately defined their objectives and policies in this field, that there
was more room for improving the tie between energy policy and R & D, andthat a number of countries should increase their R & D efforts to ensure theavailability of new technologies to meet national goals. The CRD/CERT also
referred to the need for more national R & D effort on non-conventional oil
deposits and renewables, for strengthened organization and planning, forcommercial use of technologies, and recognized the potential for independent
national programmes to give rise to collaborative projects.
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The R & D reviews continued in the following year, with nine countries
reviewed in-depth in 1979. By 1980 the IEA was completing the first cycleof these reviews. A new cycle was then prepared with the inclusion ofprogress on commercialization of technologies. Work was begun on a thematic
review of technologies which could contribute significantly to energy supplies,
beginning with a review of constraints on commercialization of heat pumps
and of coal liquefaction processes in Member countries. Annual statisticalmonitoring of IEA Members’ RD & D budgets and an evaluation of national
programme balance were continued. Indeed, in that year Ministers “called for
a comprehensive review of the IEA programme of collaborative R & D
projects to ensure proper balance, timeliness of completion, cost effectivenessand technical prospects” [IEA/GB(81)34(Final), paragraph 12], and noted
the results of the 1980 reviews. The three systematic collaborative programme
reviews covering the periods 1976-1986, 1987-1990 and 1991-1994 arenoted in Section C above].
In 1982 the IEA carried out the in-depth reviews of heat pumps andcoal liquefaction mentioned above, and recommendations were madesupporting the significant future contributions of these technologies and theneed to build the economic incentives vital to their future development andapplication. Analytical work on these technologies continued during 1983,
when the Agency also conducted technology reviews on the clean use of coaland on combined power/district heating which carried into 1984. Moreover,the 1983 annual review helped to sharpen the focus of objectives of RD & Dplanning, but found that the Members’ desire to achieve economies appeared
to be leading them to a more selective approach to government support inthis field. The 1985 in-depth review of technologies employed in a numberof countries in their synthetic liquid fuel programmes revealed a wide rangeof activity, significant national differences in sharing of RD & D effort
between governments and industry, and economic difficulties which did notfavour widespread commercial applications. During this period, the Agency
also reviewed renewable sources of energy and the use of microprocessors inenergy related functions in buildings.
Beginning in 1986 the Agency’s R & D reviews were conducted jointlywith the Agency’s more general long-term energy policy reviews, but thethematic technology reviews of selected countries were continued, and theseparate ten year review of collaborative projects was carried out. The topic
of the thematic review for 1986 was again the clean use of coal; for 1987 thetheme was the efficient end-use of energy. In more recent years the thematictype reviews have been conducted by the R & D Working Parties, and by
CERT Roundtables where the topics have included energy technology and284

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R & D activities related to the United Nations Conference on Energy andDevelopment, implementation of the recommendations made in the IEA
policy reviews, the effects of recent events on activities in the energy R & D
sector, policy initiatives concerning dissemination and market deployment of
new and improved energy technologies, changing energy policy priorities,
evolving government vs. energy industry relations, proposals for increased
international co-ordination and collaboration in this sector, building links
between national laboratories and industry, and environmental problems andcompetition.
The evolving pattern of the joint long-term and R & D annual reviews
is described in Chapter IV, Section F above on long-term energy policy andneed not be re-examined in this Chapter. However, the R & D elements of the
SLT/CERT Annual Questionnaire for Country Submissions should be noted
here [Most recently appearing in IEA/SLT/CERT(94)12/REV1 for 1994
reviews]. The Questionnaire calls for the responding country to give a briefsummary of major energy and environmental policy issues, recent
achievements, and general objectives, with inclusion of R & D elements foreach of these subjects. Material on government organization for energy R & D
is also requested. More specifically on R & D, the Questionnaire requests
detailed information on overall objectives, major research programmes andpriorities, government activities, industry and non-government supported
R & D, technology demonstration, market deployment, transfer of technology
to other countries, and international collaboration. The Questionnaire also
requests information on energy efficiency and the leading particular energies
utilized. Statistical information on RD & D expenditure is to be supplied onenergy RD & D budgets of governments, industry, and nationalized industry.
Beginning in 1993 efforts have been made to improve the quality and thetransparency of energy R & D expenditure data. The response material
derived from the Questionnaire is gathered, assessed, and processed for
publication in the annual Energy Policies of IEA Countries publication.
This annual publication contains a General Report for the year andindividual country reports developed in the annual review process, withanalysis of the relevant information, a critique, and recommendations foraction by Members. The analysis usually covers general political andeconomic developments, energy price trends, government R & D policies,
funding levels, budget priorities, and emerging directions for RD & D
collaboration. In the 1988 Review, for example, the analysis noted thereallocation of R & D resources and suggested that partial relief might “comefrom indirect government actions such as the removal of institutional or otherbarriers to increased competition within private industry and to greater285

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international co-operation [Page 53]. The following year’s Review referred toincreased competition, reduced government regulation, and “more open
markets”, but noted that “greater market competition is also apt to focus
attention more on near-term and less on long-term profits”, and that
“Governments will need to carefully monitor developments and stand ready tofill the gaps as they become evident” [See p. 44]. In more recent years there
has been greater emphasis on energy and environment questions and on theimportance of non-Members of the Agency, in keeping with overall IEA policy.
The 1993 Review identified the subjects of the Members’ strategic
technology focus, including advanced technology for clean coal supply anduse, for efficient natural gas use and transportation, and for enhancedhydrocarbon exploitation. The Review also listed technology using new andrenewable sources (and its integration into conventional energy systems),
advanced nuclear fission systems and their safety, and the demonstration ofadvanced nuclear fusion systems. The Review list mentioned optimal
resource use in electricity production, “clean car” technology, and alternativetransport fuels, and improved end-use technology to enhance energy
efficiency in all sectors [See pp. 73-74]. With this strategic focus appearing
in the 1993 Review, published in the autumn of 1994, the Agency’s R & D
analysis was well placed to contribute to future R & D developments as
Members make the adjustments to the increasing energy demand forecast to
the year 2010 [See Chapter II, Section J above; and the IEA’s World Energy
Outlook, 1994, p. 18].

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CHAPTER VI

The International Oil Market:
Transparency and Information
DisseminationT

his Chapter traces the history of the IEA’s policies and actions in relation
to the international oil market, a high priority preoccupation of thefounders of the Agency in 1974. These oil market policies are first reviewed
broadly in order to set the scene for discussing the principal IEA oil market
information system actions. The result of these actions was the creation of
the “general oil market information system”. The need for this system was
one of the compelling reasons for establishing the Agency in the aftermathof the 1973-1974 oil crisis. The founders sought to bring about what theycalled “transparency” in the international oil market, in the sense of more
complete, reliable, and accurate information on oil market structures,operations, prices and trends, and they wished to make that information
available to IEA Members and to the public. The main sources of suchinformation at the outset were the oil industry and the governments
of industrial countries, and that remains the case in 1994. Hence theco-operation of the oil industry with the IEA is featured in the discussion
which follows; it includes co-operation not only in the group called the(oil) Industry Working Party (IWP) which advised the IEA systematicallyon oil information system questions during the early formative period, butalso in the Agency’s formal framework for consultations with oilcompanies and in the extensive informal contacts of the Secretariat, bywhich the IEA is informed by companies on a wider range of industry
issues.
While the Agency gathers from these sources the information it
requires in carrying out its missions, the IEA also disseminates oil industry
information. Dissemination takes place as required within the Agency andto Members, as will be seen throughout this Chapter, to enable the Agency
to do its work in the oil market sector. Dissemination is also directed toindustry and the general public, as will be seen particularly in Section D
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below. This Chapter examines all of these developments as well as theevolutionary process by which the Agency’s general information systemreached its present state of effectiveness and acceptance. Oil market policies
with respect to non-Member countries are considered in Chapter VII below.

A. Oil Market Information Policies
The IEA’s oil market information system is a direct outcome of the oil market
information difficulties which the industrial countries experienced during the
1973-1974 crisis. In the course of that crisis, the industrial countries were
not able to activate the then existing OECD oil apportionment system or tomount any other coherent response measures. Ulf Lantzke, one of theleading industrial country managers of that crisis and the first IEA Executive
Director, stated the generally understood reasons for that unenviable
situation of the industrial countries. There were problems in achieving thenecessary agreement of the industrial countries and concerns about offending
the oil exporting countries,
but lack of information must be regarded as the really decisive
element [Ulf Lantzke, “The OECD and Its International Energy
Agency”, Daedalus, Vol. 104, (Fall 1975), p. 217, 220; emphasis
added].
Oil market information needs accordingly featured prominently in thelist of major lessons which the industrial countries were to draw from thatcrisis. The “information” lesson is described as follows:
Information Systems. Systems should be devised to develop
more relevant and detailed information for oil market
transparency generally and for the particular information,
including confidential and proprietary data, required to operate
the oil emergency sharing system. Arrangements should be madefor the dissemination of such information as appropriate [SeeVolume I, page 40; emphasis added].
The “lessons” also included the need to make “arrangements with oilcompanies” on a “regular and systematic” basis in order “to provide to the
new institution relevant information” available to the companies. In this288

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formulation the “new institution” is, of course, the IEA, and the information
to be provided by companies is the general oil market information which isthe subject of this Chapter (as well as emergency response measures data
which is taken up in Chapter III, Section B-6 above). The industrial countries
needed “close relations with oil companies and better understanding leading
to more transparency in the international oil market”, that is, a general oil
information system, designed to provide “an accurate assessment ofconditions in the international oil market”. This would lead to entirely newreporting systems for “crude oil costs, crude oil and petroleum product importprices, and oil companies’ financial structure and capital investments”. The
overall system would be organized to provide “transparency in the oil market
without impairing competition within the oil industry” [Ulf Lantzke, “TheInternational Energy Agency”, European Yearbook, Vol. XXVI (1978),pp. 41, 56-57 ].
These concerns found concrete policy expression in Chapters V(Information System on the International Oil Market) and VI (Framework
for Consultation with Oil Companies) of the I.E.P. Agreement which call for
the Members to establish an Information System, including “a General
Section on the situation in the international oil market and the activities ofoil companies” [Article 25.1] and a permanent framework for consultation
with oil companies [Article 37]. These provisions are intended to ensurethat the Agency receives from governments and oil companies theinformation it requires in order to carry out its functions in connection withthe oil market. They also require that the System be operated on apermanent basis [Article 25.2] and assign responsibility to the Secretariat
for the operation of the System and for the dissemination of the informationcompiled to the Member countries, as will be seen below.
In this sector, the central commitment requires Members to makeavailable on a regular basis a set of precise data to be identified by theGoverning Board from a list of “subjects relating to oil companies operating
within their respective jurisdictions” [Article 27.1]. The list of subjects
covers corporate and financial structure, capital investments, crude oil accessarrangements and rates of production, allocations to affiliates, stocks, crude
oil and product costs, and prices. Other subjects may be added by theGoverning Board, acting by unanimity [Article 27.1]. A key commitment
with respect to oil companies appears in Article 27.2:
Each Participating Country shall take appropriate measures toensure that all oil companies operating within its jurisdiction
make such information available to it as is necessary to fulfil its
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obligations under paragraph 1, taking into account such
relevant information as is already available to the public or toGovernments [Emphasis added].
The Agreement charges the IEA government expert group on the oilmarket, called the Standing Group on the Oil Market (SOM), to report on theidentification of the particular topics mentioned above and on the proceduresfor obtaining such data on a regular basis. In this exercise, the SOM is toconsult with the oil companies, to identify problems, to identify specific datafor resolving these problems, and to work out information harmonization
standards and confidentiality procedures. The SOM is charged withresponsibility for reviewing the operation of the general information systemand for making proposals for changes in the system in the event of changes in
the conditions of the oil market. The SOM is also responsible for carrying out
the broad general information functions assigned to it in Chapters V and VI of
the Agreement “and any other function delegated to it by the Governing
Board” [Article 56]. It is competent to review any matter within the scope ofthese Chapters and it reports to the Governing Board. The Agreement also
provides that the SOM “may consult with oil companies on any matter within
its competence”. However, unless the Governing Board delegates decisional
power to the Standing Group, all decisions in this sector of IEA operations, aswith the other sectors, are taken by the Governing Board itself. In all of its
activity, the SOM is supported by the IEA Secretariat, which provides
significant support in the information sector as in other sectors of IEA
responsibilities. As will be seen below in Section C-1, the oil Industry
Working Party provided the SOM with indispensable industry advice on thevarious general information actions which the Agency took during its
formative years.
The main IEA activities in the general information sector have been
(1) the establishment, operation, and updating of the oil market
information system which provides the base for the work of the SOM in
advising on oil market and related developments, (2) the development andoperation of the system of formal consultations with oil companies in theearly period, (3) the analyses and assessments of the oil market and ofparticular questions about it as they arise, and (4) provision of oil market
data and assessments to the Agency and its Members on a regular basis, anddissemination of data and assessments to the public. In its early years, theAgency pursued these objectives largely by the installation of a system
which has been repeatedly modified to produce the essential information
required by the Agency over the years. The SOM and the Secretariat have290

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continuously provided oil market information and assessments, as required,in virtually all situations of supply shortfall, or when measures were being
considered, to complement the information available from the SEQ
emergency data system, as well as in other special situations and instabilized or relatively “normal” market conditions.
Soon after the Agency was created, the SOM began producing reports,
at the Governing Board’s request, on such key issues as oil prices, following
the December 1974 meeting of OPEC, the procedures for consultations withoil companies, and the broader scope of the international oil market
information system. At its February 1975 meeting, the Board approved theprocedures for consultation and the system for collecting, processing, andsubmitting crude oil import price information [IEA/GB(75)8, Item 8]. In
April the system was broadened [IEA/GB(75)25, Item 4] to include productimport prices in the data supplied to the Secretariat, and in the following
month the IEA conducted the first oil company consultations. Meeting forthe first time in May 1975, IEA Ministers confirmed the underlying policy
approach to the oil market. They
noted the importance of the collection and analysis of
information on the oil market in order to ensure greater
understanding and transparency in international oil trade. They
agreed that the oil market information system should be
promptly completed and evaluated [IEA document
PRESS/A(75)20, paragraph 4].
The Board also gave early attention to some of the technical problems
which had arisen in the information system, including the far-reachingproblem of reconciling data security requirements with the Secretariat’s needto have data which could reveal individual company positions in areas otherthan the emergency data system. This was the solution that was reached: inorder to preserve confidentiality, the oil companies normally submit theirdata not directly to the IEA, but to their respective governments, which inturn report the data to the Secretariat in a form which preserves as muchdetail as possible without revealing individual company data. The Secretariat
may further aggregate the national reports before the data is submitted to
the Members. Some delegations saw oil market transparency as requiring
the provision of detail which could in some cases include individual company
data, while others considered aggregated data to be sufficient. Afterextended consideration in the SOM and the Governing Board, in May 1976
the Board adopted the “Chairman’s Compromise Procedure for Requesting291

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Unaggregated Oil Market Data” [IEA/GB(76)24, Item 5(g)-(m)]. Under the
Chairman’s Compromise, as it came to be known, an elaborate procedure
was devised by which the Executive Director reviews unaggregated data
insofar as necessary to reconcile anomalies or inconsistencies in theaggregated data submissions. The Executive Director first consults the SOM
and the Legal Counsel. If the Executive Director then “deems it necessary inorder to reconcile anomalies or inconsistencies” with respect to the data, he
may request one or more Members “to review with the Secretariat, on acompany-by-company basis if appropriate, unaggregated data” submitted
by such Members for the purpose stated. The Board also “reconfirmed thatno unaggregated company-by-company data made known to the Secretariat
by these means will be made available to any Participating Country or to any
oil company”. The handling of oil company data, it will be recalled, issubject to strict controls under the Agency’s security rules [See Volume I,
Chapter VIII, Section B-1].
In 1977 the Governing Board decided to widen the application of the
Chairman’s Compromise to possible price disputes under the Agency’s
Emergency Sharing System [See Chapter III, Section B-5(a) above]. In its
Guidelines on Oil Pricing Disputes, the Board decided that
the Chairman’s Compromise procedure for requesting
unaggregated oil market data, adopted by the Governing Board
on 21st May, 1976 [IEA/GB(76)24, Item 5, paragraphs (f) to(m) inclusive], will be applicable in an oil supply emergency
under the same conditions in which the procedure is applicable innon-emergency situations [IEA/GB(78)18, Item 7(b)].
[The implementation of the Chairman’s Compromise is described in
IEA/SOM(77)45, and the results of its invocation in 1977 are assessed in
IEA/SOM(77)111].
The Governing Board considered in December 1976 a number of otheroil market issues, including the outcome of the OPEC Ministerial meeting held
in Doha, and particularly the possible repercussions of the OPEC decision
resulting in a “dual pricing” system on the world market. The Board
emphasized the “urgent need” to obtain the underlying facts and “to make anin-depth analysis of the impact of this situation on the IEA’s overall energy
policy objective”. The Board also requested the SOM to report on a number ofrelated questions, including stock changes, supply patterns, price structure,and “possible scope for co-ordinated policy approaches if necessary tominimise market confusion” [IEA/GB(76)56, Item 2]. During this period at292

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each meeting the Governing Board was receiving systematic reports withinformation and assessments of the current situation in the oil market. In
March 1977 [IEA/GB(77)17, Item 5] it “agreed to include as a regular itemon its agendas a review of the current situation and main problems” of the oilmarkets, a practice which evolved into the IEA’s monthly Oil Market Reportand is maintained to the present day [See Section D below].
With the establishment early in 1978 of the financial section on oil
industry activities, the main elements of the general oil market information
system, as initially foreseen, were essentially completed. Included at thattime in the financial section was data on the financial structure, sources ofcapital, investment, and revenues of some thirty international oil
companies. The SOM’s activities continued to reflect other particularconcerns of this period, notably worldwide oil exploration and reserves, andthe future balance between oil product demand structure and crude oil
supply quality. With the oil market information system in place, the SOM
was well situated from an information standpoint to assist in the market
analyses which became necessary during the crisis period of 1979-1981
occasioned by the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq-Iran war.
The management of the 1979-1981 crisis, described in Chapter III,
Section C-1 above, required stepped-up oil market information andassessments, in addition to the emergency supply data developed under the
Questionnaires A and B [See Chapter III, Section B-6 above], which wereactivated for that crisis period, and the IEA’s system of Monthly Oil Statistics.
The Governing Board was well supplied with oil market assessments to
support the IEA’s responsive actions, including the 2 million barrel a day oil
demand reduction decision of 1-2 March 1979 and the Board’s follow-up
actions. Some of the data reporting was accelerated; for example, theMembers’ reports to the Secretariat on crude oil prices and costs were moved
up from a quarterly to a monthly schedule with effect from 1 March, andsteps were taken to expand the system to include product imports as well as
crude oil. The SOM and the Agency’s government expert group on
emergency questions (SEQ) agreed in a joint meeting on the use of a special
questionnaire addressed to Members to develop additional information on
measures taken to deal with the market imbalances at that time, and toenable the Board to evaluate those measures more effectively[IEA/GB(79)14, Item 2]. In May the Board agreed “to publish weighted
average IEA crude oil import price data for the period 1973-1978 takenfrom the Oil Market Information System” [IEA/GB(79)28, Item 9].
Confirming earlier action of the Board at official level, Ministers in May
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Page 294(i) the impact of a fragile market situation on spot prices; (ii) the
impact of spot prices on the overall price structure; (iii) changes
in oil market structures; and (iv) the effect of increasing
competition for limited supplies of oil. The purpose of suchanalysis will be to improve understanding of the operation of theoil market [IEA/GB(79)35, paragraph 4(d)].
As the crisis continued, the autumn of 1979 brought a number of newefforts to improve the oil market information system and to increase the abilityof Members to avoid undesirable developments in the market. The Board
agreed in principle to set oil import targets for 1985 and for 1990, to revise the1985 Group Objective of 26 mbd, and to increase efforts to realize the March
1979 action on restraining demand [See Chapter IV, Section C-1 above]. All ofthese actions involved informational and analytical contributions from the oilmarket as well as the emergency sides of IEA operations. The Governing Board
decided to implement the first steps towards a “register of international oil
import transactions”, on which an early start would be made, even if all
Members were unable to participate immediately [IEA/GB(79)64, Item 3].
This broad register was instituted for crude oil, on a monthly basis beginningin November 1979, while technical work on the system continued in a SOM Ad
Hoc Group. The Board also asked for rapid development of the oil products
register. It requested the SOM to examine the possibility of a “Quick Response
System” to monitor the oil spot market. In December, IEA Ministers assessed
the changing oil market structures, noting thata rapid change in the channels through which crude oil flows
from the producer country to the refinery has reduced flexibility
in the overall supply system and has contributed to upward
pressure on price, to general uncertainty and to tension in themarket [IEA/GB(80)2, Item 5].
This judgement was accompanied by agreement “on the necessity of
improving understanding of and ability to cope with changing oil market
structures”. One step was to shift priorities on IEA work towards expanding
the international oil transactions register by adding to the register data on
products, by expanding the list of Reporting Companies [See Chapter III,
Sections 6 and 7], by “obtaining more information regarding state-to-statetransactions, and introducing a rapid price reporting system if required”[IEA/GB(80)2, Item 5(d)(i)]. Another step was to study the possibility of“enhancing the stability of oil markets” through a more “co-ordinated294Chap. VI et VII

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approach” to spot market activities, in order to bring “more order into the oilmarket”. Changes in the “nature of the spot market in 1979 and particularly
the dramatic growth in crude oil trading which accompanied the rapid
increase in spot prices”, gave rise in the Governing Board to the suggestion(which was considered but not adopted) that the following items should be
added to IEA measures:■■■

A national, and possibly international, system for registering allentities engaged in oil trading.
A code of conduct to set out the basis on which governments expect
oil trade to be carried out under normal conditions.
Procedures designed to “cool down” oil markets in periods ofexcessive disturbance [IEA/GB(80)2, Item 5; see IEA/GB(80)16].

While none of these suggestions ultimately proved to be necessary, andnone was formally adopted or carried out, short-term concerns continued tofocus on rising oil prices during this period. Recognizing the important roleof oil stock building on upward price pressures in 1979, IEA Ministers
decided in May 1980 to adopt a stock assessment and consultation system,
whereby the Secretariat would increase its monitoring of stock developments
and provide assessments to the SOM and to the Board, which in turn would
seek to identify “undesirable features of stock trends, such as heavy stockbuild which is putting a strain on supplies, or differences between theposition of different Countries which seem likely to create market
disturbances, and recommend possible remedial action” [IEA/GB(80)49,
Annex III, paragraph (ii)]. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Iraq
and Iran in September 1980, the Board adopted another group of measures
to respond to the new market disruption. Members agreed to take measuresurging and guiding both private and public market participants
to refrain from any abnormal purchases on the spot market,
as well as other measures designed to influence the market [SeeIEA/GB(80)61, Item 2 and Annex; emphasis added].
In December the Board provided for parallel measures to be applied
through the first quarter of 1981, and it adopted the “Decision of theGoverning Board for Correcting Imbalances” [IEA/GB(80)97, Item 2(g) andAnnex I]. This decision was designed to correct “serious imbalances which
remain despite national efforts to correct internal imbalances and which are
likely to result in undue market pressures on price”, the measures consisting295

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largely of Secretariat consultations with Members and companies andMembers’ consultations with companies, for the purpose of identifying andbringing about appropriate corrective action. For company imbalances, thegovernment of the country concerned would carry the main responsibility,with the possibility of the matter being brought to the Governing Board if
governments found the need for international action or if the imbalance
extended beyond any one country’s jurisdiction. This decision was applicableduring the first quarter of 1981, but it could be continued thereafter or be
kept available for further use. In the end, there was no need to extend thedecision beyond its initial duration. On 31 March 1981, the Board decided
that the Decision on Correcting Imbalances would “be kept available for
future use if necessary” [IEA/GB(81)21, Item 2(d) and Annex], but nooccasion has arisen for it to be invoked since that time. By spring 1981, themarket was returning to more normal conditions, and IEA market policy
entered a different phase in response to lowering prices and more stablesupply. Thereafter, the question of applying market intervention measures ina supply disruption did not arise until the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. In themeantime, IEA policy had moved decisively towards supporting free markets,as will be seen below.
The early 1980s saw relatively calm market conditions and at times
lower oil prices, which enabled the Agency to strengthen its general
information system and its arrangements for dissemination of oil market
information. Yet in June 1981, IEA Ministers adopted a cautionary approach:
Ministers recognized that the oil market situation remains
fragile, and that continuing stability depends upon avoidance ofcomplacency and upon significant levels of supply from several
major producing countries. They noted however that continued
decline in oil consumption (due in part to the effect ofconservation) and stable supply have improved the oil market
situation, and expressed satisfaction that policies adopted
earlier had contributed to avoiding serious market disturbancesin the second half of 1980 and in 1981 [IEA/GB(81)34(Final),
paragraph 2].
Similar themes appeared in the 1982 Ministerial Communiqué, when
Ministers also “emphasized the important role that market forces,
supplemented where appropriate by government action” could have incontributing to the realization of IEA objectives [IEA/GB(82)54(Final),
paragraph 1].
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During this period, the Agency systematized and strengthened its
monthly (initially quarterly) oil market assessments on short-term supply,
demand, and stock developments. The assessments employed datasubmitted under a new, simplified information system (called Questionnaire
C, discussed in Chapter III, Section B-6 above), among other sources.
Initially designed for the use of Members, IEA bodies, and the Secretariat as
an aid to understanding oil market developments within and outside of the
IEA, the assessments could also be disseminated widely to the interested
public, with only slight adjustments to exclude sensitive data. Accordingly,
the Governing Board decided to publish these assessments, which have since
become well known as the IEA monthly Oil Market Reports [See Section D
below].
Work on improving the oil market information system also continued
throughout this period. In October 1982 the SOM submitted a comprehensive
analysis and report on information requirements to the Governing Board[IEA/GB(82)73]. With this document in hand, the Board adopted a numberof technical amendments to the Crude Oil Cost Information System and to the
Crude Oil Import Register, as proposed by the SOM, and continued them on apermanent basis [IEA/GB(82)81, Item 3], subject to later review,
amendment, or discontinuation “at any time should this become desirable”.
However, in July 1984 the Board decided to maintain the Crude Oil Import
Register, but to discontinue the Crude Oil Cost Information System, andagreed that the Secretariat should continue its analysis of acquisition costs on
the basis of information from other sources [IEA/GB(84)27, Item 2(e)]. By
that time, the financial information system had also been discontinued, andthe SOM Chairman could report to the Board on the SOM’s satisfactory use ofavailable financial information on the situation of the oil industry, in place ofthe discontinued system [IEA/GB(84)27, Item 3(c); see IEA/GB(86)31,
Item 2(e)].
As this work continued, the changing oil products and oil refinery
situation of industry led the SOM and the Secretariat to carry out a study ofthe oil refineries in Member countries. After reviewing this situation, in
July 1985 Ministers agreed
to pursue expeditiously a common approach whereby theywould maintain or create conditions such that imported refined
products could go to the markets of the different IEA countries
and regions on the basis of supply and demand as determinedby market forces without distortions [IEA/GB(85)46, p. 5,
paragraph 4].
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Ministers also instructed the Secretariat to monitor product tradedevelopments, and the Governing Board at its next meeting set in place an oil
product monitoring procedure calling for quarterly reports from theSecretariat on product supply and consumption, trade measures, or otherpolicies in Member countries affecting international oil product flows andrefinery trends in non-Member as well as Member countries [IEA/GB(85)53,
Item 2(a)], a procedure which has since been discontinued.
In 1984 and 1985 the IEA gave special attention to the ways in which
the structure of the international oil market had changed over the period
since the Agency was founded. Long-term contracts with fixed prices had
given way to the trend towards short-term contracts, spot-market sales, andfutures trading. The number of traders in the market had substantially
increased. The large international oil companies had lost much of theirhold on a number of sources of supply around the world. The market had
become correspondingly broader and more complex. In this process, oil
trading was taking place more in a “true market” in the traditional sense,
and the IEA recognized these as well as other structural changes in themarket and the implications they would have for future IEA operations.
In the 1980s important structural changes were also occurring in the
IEA’s approach to oil disruptions, as discussed in Chapter III, Sections C andD above. Following the “lessons” of the 1979-1981 crisis, the Board adopted
two major response system decisions, the first in December 1981 on“Preparation for Future Supply Disruptions”, and the second in July 1984 on“Stocks and Supply Disruptions”, known as the “Co-ordinated Emergency
Response Measures” (CERM). Each was developed with extensive assistancefrom the Agency’s oil market governmental and Secretariat experts as well as
those engaged in the IEA’s emergency response sector, and each would giverise to new responsibilities for the SOM, as well as the SEQ and theSecretariat. According to the 1981 Decision, the Chairman of the SOM(among others) is to be consulted in the event of a supply disruption, before
the Executive Director begins the process of refining the Secretariat’s
assessment of the situation, and before the Executive Director activates the
emergency information system’s Questionnaires A and B [See Chapter III,
Sections C and D]. As in the 1979-1981 and the 1990-1991 crises, the SOM
is expected to play a major role in providing assessments of the oil market
aspects of the disruption (both the emergency data and the SOM general oil
market data have important roles to play, for each views the supply situationfrom different but useful perspectives). The CERM Decision in 1984 is afollow-on to the 1981 Decision, and it charges the Secretariat, the SOM, andother IEA bodies, as appropriate, to examine a number of technical subjects
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related to the CERM [See Chapter III, Section D]. In a crisis, oil market
considerations would have a prominent role to play in the Agency’s
consideration of oil supply disruptions and in its decisions about effective
responses.
By 1984-1985, the international oil market information system was
well-developed for the needs of the time. No new systems have been
adopted during the remainder of the period covered in this History,
although technical changes were made as recently as in 1993 to the Crude
Oil Import Register reporting form [IEA/GB(93)65, Item 4(b)], and much
more data is being obtained through informal and direct contacts withindustry and other sources than was the case in the earlier period. Indeed,
the basic pattern of IEA oil market information dissemination was alsoestablished by the mid-1980s. By that time, the Agency had madesubstantial progress towards its dual objectives of oil market informationtransparency and dissemination. Since then, in this sector the Agency has
focused on the operation and expansion rather than the construction of theinformation system. The expanded coverage is now truly global in scopeand provides more information than before on such subjects as pricing andrefinery operations. [The various oil market reporting systems are discussed
in Section B below].
Still in the period of calm oil markets, in 1986, the Governing Board
addressed the problems of lower prices in crude oil transactions, noting “thesatisfactory progress which has been obtained over the past decade in
moving towards a better balance of supply and demand through market
forces and sound energy policies” [IEA/GB(86)15, Item 2(a) and Annex I,
paragraph 1]. However, the Board also “took note of the volatility andrelative lack of transparency in day-to-day oil market conditions”, and it
agreed thatIn the long term, neither concerns about energy supply security,
nor the need for continuity in energy policy objectives havebeen removed by lower oil prices. On the contrary, a prolonged
period of relatively low oil prices might intensify those concerns
and bring forward the period when tighter energy markets canbe expected [Annex I, paragraph 4].
Oil information policy and systems can reveal such problems as increasing
eventual risks of tighter energy markets, but the existence of theinformation and its dissemination do not resolve them. In this case, thesolutions the Board found were “flexible, open and resilient markets,
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supplemented by government policies consistent with the national
circumstances of each country and based on the long-term outlook and not
on short-term developments alone” [Annex, paragraph 6(a)]. The chiefpolicy responses were found in the long-term and oil security sectors of the
Agency’s activities. The Board also noted the Executive Director’s statementthat these issues would be developed in greater detail by the Secretariat andthe SOM “particularly as regards the impact of lower prices on the energy
market as a whole and on exploration and drilling” [IEA/GB(86)24,
Item 2].
In the years since the mid-1980s, the operation, use, and expansion of
the system have been evident in four different respects: (1) in making
numerous studies on relevant oil market information questions, (2) in
responding to the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, (3) in collecting the relevant dataand in making and disseminating the monthly oil market assessments, and(4) in expanding the IEA’s information coverage globally in recognition of theincreasing impact of energy developments in non-Member countries. During
this period, the Agency’s receipt of oil market advice and information fromthe Industry Working Party (IWP) and from formal consultations under the
I.E.P. Agreement gave way to the contributions from increasing numbers ofindustry speakers at SOM meetings and to direct contacts between industry
and the Secretariat.
Throughout the Agency’s first twenty years, the IEA’s oil market
sector has produced many studies on particular questions, on its own
initiative or at the request of the Governing Board. A number of thesestudies made during the period 1974-1985 are mentioned above. Morestudies on topics of current interest were carried out during the ten years
that followed. In 1986-1987 an important concern was short-term
developments in supply, demand, and pricing, and the effect of lower
oil prices on exploration and development. This work continued in
1988-1989, with studies on industry restructuring and new market
conditions. Various aspects of the oil industry in both upstream anddownstream sectors were also featured in reports in 1990. The following
year saw a range of SOM papers on market mechanisms, demand
developments, industry financial analysis, and the impact of environmental
legislation on the refining industry (e.g. bunker fuel sulphur specifications),
with growing attention to non-Member countries. In the period through1994, additional topics included international crude oil pricing, OECD oil
trade and stock developments, downstream investments by major producing
countries, downstream integration in the industry, and other structuralchanges in the oil industry.
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Oil market information was an essential element of the IEA
preparations made during the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, as discussed in
Chapter III, Section E above. At its first meeting on the Gulf crisis, held one
week after the crisis began, the Board’s review of the supply and demandsituation led to the conclusion that
The present oil supply situation is such that, given theavailability of supplies at sea, the high level of company andgovernment controlled stocks, as well as the possibility ofhigher output from oil producers, including OPEC Member
states, sufficient oil supplies are currently available tocompensate for the loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude and productto the market. Therefore, there is no need for recourse to the
IEA emergency response system at this time [IEA/GB(90)24,
Annex].
This market assessment was to be confirmed throughout the crisis, on thebasis of information derived from a number of sources, including the
Agency’s oil market information system and its internal expertise,developed in reports of the SOM and the Agency’s Oil Market Report. With
the combination of elements from the general oil industry information
system and the emergency data contained in the responses to theemergency Questionnaires A and B, the Agency could produce clear
assessments of the situation following the embargo of Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil[See Chapter III, Section E-1 above], and of the likely implications of the
Coalitions’ military actions against Iraqi forces. When the Governing
Board adopted the Contingency Plan in January 1991, the Board had
at its disposal well developed and current oil market information
and assessments, permitting it to note not only the level of available oilstocks (some 3 600 million barrels) and the “ample availability ofoil to the market”, but also the “heightened uncertainty and volatility”
which could occur “as a result of the possible temporary shortfall of some
Gulf supplies”. This information and analysis were essential building
blocks of the Contingency Plan. Because of the utility of the IEA’s
information systems in adopting the Contingency Plan, the Governing
Board also
Requested that the Secretariat, the Standing Group on the Oil
Market, and the Standing Group on Emergency Questions
continue to monitor closely the oil market situation and, if
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activated, the implementation of the contingency plan
[IEA/GB(91)1, Annex (g)].
Following the Executive Director’s activation of the Contingency Plan on
17 January 1991, the Governing Board convened on 28 January 1991,
reviewed the situation, and decided to keep the Contingency Plan in effect.
The Board then had available fresh assessments showing that “despite thehostilities, the world petroleum market continued to be amply supplied, withoil stocks high, and additional oil refinery capacity available if required”.
The Board also concluded that the Contingency Plan “was comfortably
within the capacity of OECD countries, that countries had taken or were in
the process of taking all necessary actions for its implementation, and thathigher levels of emergency response could be maintained for an extended
period if necessary” [IEA/GB(91)3, Annex]. The Board also continued themonitoring functions referred to above. Chapter III, Section E above
describes the IEA’s preparations leading up to the Contingency Plan, theContingency Plan itself, the outcome of the Agency’s response to this crisis,
as well as the lessons that the Agency drew from that experience. Overall,the industrial countries had never been so well informed — and thus
forearmed — in any of the earlier oil supply disruptions as they were in the
1990-1991 Gulf crisis, and that favourable position was possible only
because of the IEA’s information systems, together with the work of theSecretariat and the government expert groups on emergency preparedness(SEQ) and the oil market (SOM).
The IEA’s continuous collection of information and the preparation of
the more routine monthly oil market assessments must be mentioned inorder to complete the current picture of the IEA’s oil market information
function. The information systems are described generally in the next
Section. The monthly Oil Market Reports are reviewed in Section D below.
The monthly assessments, which appear in part in the published Reports,
represent a major contribution to the understanding of the oil market and tothe visibility of the Agency to the public. The Oil Market Reports are
increasingly accepted as the most authoritative source of information on the
short-term oil market. In the aggregate, these activities are perhaps mostvaluable in ensuring that the Agency maintains the capability ofanticipating major changes in the market and keeps IEA Members’ policy
makers informed of current developments and future trends.
In 1993 IEA Ministers made their most recent general energy policy
statement in the “IEA Shared Goals” [See Chapter II, Section J above]
which contain this broad declaration on IEA oil market policy:
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In formulating energy policies, the establishment of free andopen markets is a fundamental point of departure, thoughenergy security and environmental protection need to be given
particular emphasis by governments. IEA countries recognise
the significance of increasing global interdependence in energy[IEA/GB(93)41, Annex I; emphasis added].
Oil market policy today is also strongly affected by the Goals dealing withdiversity, efficiency, and flexibility within the energy sector [Goal 1], with
undistorted energy prices [Goal 7], and with free and open trade [Goal 8].
Moreover, the statement in Goal 9 has direct application to oil market
policy:Co-operation among all energy market participants helps toimprove information and understanding, and encourage thedevelopment of efficient, environmentally acceptable andflexible energy systems and markets worldwide. These areneeded to help promote the investment, trade and confidence
necessary to achieve global energy security and environmental
objectives.
At the beginning of 1995, the Agency’s objectives in this sector
retain the sharp focus on improving the transparency of the global
oil market and on identifying relevant policy issues, especially those relating
to energy security. The Agency’s oil market work is expected to continue
the close monitoring of developments concerning oil supply anddemand in the short-and medium-term global markets for both crude oiland products. The dissemination of relevant analyses to governments,
industry, and the public will also continue. The highest priority is being
assigned to the improvement of monitoring of short-term market
developments, with particular attention to the Former Soviet Union,
to Asia, and to the Pacific. Greater attention is to be given to medium-termchanges in the structure of the oil industry, to the development of oil
markets, to the evolution of governmental policies, and to the impacts ofenvironmental legislation in oil markets. Although the Agency’s oil market
objectives remain essentially as they were formulated in 1974, the IEA
general oil market information system was well constructed and it is fully
operational. The Agency continues to maintain and operate the system
which ensures that oil market information activities will respond to new
topical issues as they arise.
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B. General Oil Market Information System
While Section A above surveys the full sweep of the Agency’s general
information system and related activities over the history of the Agency, thisSection looks at more technical detail in each of the particular systems andrefers to the documents where more complete information on them may befound. This Section begins with the group of early IEA information systems
on crude oil and product import prices, crude oil costs, financial information,and the product price register, all of which have been abolished or suspendedor, as in the case of financial reporting have become periodic but not regularlyscheduled. Market changes and technical considerations led to the adaptation
or displacement of many of the early IEA systems, with the 1979 Crude Oil
Import Register remaining as the main survivor. While most of the formal
systems were being phased out, more information was actually becoming
available from public sources, from the IEA’s informal consultations with theoil industry, and from other relevant sources, as the Secretariat has expanded
and now continues to expand its direct and regular contacts with industry
sources of market information. When all of these information sources aretaken into account, over the years the oil market’s “transparency” has been
substantially improved on a regular basis to meet the needs of the Agency andits Members.

1. Early IEA Systems
The Crude Oil Import Price Information System was the first oil market
reporting system to be established in the IEA on an operating basis, and it
was quickly adopted in February 1975, three months after the Agency itself
was established [See IEA/GB(75)8, Item 8]. This system called forquarterly crude oil price reports by companies to their respective
governments, which in turn aggregated the individual company data in theMembers’ reports on this subject for transmission to the IEA. Timeliness ofthe data was assured by having each company transmit its data to its
government within thirty days after the end of each quarter and by having
the governments’ reports submitted to the Agency within forty-five days
after the close of the quarter. This System called for data, as set forth in thetable below, on each of seventeen designated categories of crude oil imports.
The left-hand column shows data submitted to each Member government
by companies operating in its jurisdiction. Once the company data wascollected and aggregated, they were forwarded by the recipient government
to the IEA Secretariat, as shown in the right-hand column.
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Crude Oil Import Price Information System[IEA/SOM(81)11, p. 13]
Data from Company to Member
Government for Each of
17 Designated Crude Categories(Disaggregated)

Data from Members to IEASecretariat for Each of
17 Designated Crude Categories(Aggregated)

VolumeAggregate quarterly volume

Average FOB price

Weighted average FOB price and10th and 90th percentiles

Ocean freight, insurance, other costs

Number of companies reporting

Average CIF price

Weighted average CIF price and10th and 90th percentiles

Real average API gravity

Real average API gravity

Length of days credit

Length of days credit

Whether purchased from an affiliate
or a non-affiliate

Total purchases from affiliates andfrom non-affiliates

The IEA maintained this system until the fourth quarter of 1979, when it wasin effect replaced, following a transition period, by the Crude Oil Import
Register, discussed below. The Register would prove to be more effective inproviding details of all transactions on a monthly rather than quarterly basis,
and it produced price data on individual transactions rather than a weighted
average of aggregated imports. The Register was judged to be better suited asa device for monitoring high-priced purchases in a disturbed market or in afull emergency [See IEA/GB(81)52; IEA/SOM(81)22, page 4]. The Industry
Working Party provided recommendations and technical advice in support of
the foregoing actions.
In April 1975 the Petroleum Product Import Price Information
System was established by the Governing Board on the same reporting
calendar as the Crude Price System. Product price reporting began with thefirst quarter of 1975 on the following products: straight run naphtha, mogas
premium, mogas regular, kerosene turbo fuel, gas oil, regular sulphur fueloil, and low sulphur fuel oil [See IEA/GB(75)25, Item 4; IEA/SOM(75)10].
The left-hand column below indicates the data submitted to eachgovernment from those companies importing a minimum of 10 000 tonnes
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of a designated product per quarter. Once the data were received andaggregated by Member governments, they were forwarded to the IEA
Secretariat, as shown in the right-hand column.
Petroleum Product Import Price Information System[IEA/SOM(81)11, p. 14]
Data from Company to Member
Government for Eachof 7 Designated Categories(Disaggregated)

Data from Members to the IEA
Secretariat for Each of
7 Designated Categories(Aggregated)

VolumeAggregate quarterly volume

Weighted average CIF/border price

Weighted average and 10th and90th percentile CIF/border prices
Number of companies reporting

For 16 designated supply sources

For 16 designated supply sources

Whether purchased from an affiliate
or non-affiliate

Whether purchased from an affiliate
or non-affiliate

This Product Price System was maintained to the close of the first quarter,
1980, when it was replaced by the Product Price Register, discussed below.
The advantage of the Register was the production of price information at
the national level on each import in place of the older system’s quarterly,
weighted average prices of aggregated imports, an advantage parallel tothat of the Crude Register over the former Crude Price System mentioned
above [See IEA/GB(81)52].
The Oil Product Import Price Register was short-lived, buttheoretically it was an improvement over the former Product Price System.
The Product Price Register, begun in April 1980, called for monthly rather
than quarterly reports on essentially the same products as did the former
system. Companies were to report to their respective Member governments
within twenty days after the close of each month, and Members were toreport to the IEA within thirty days after the end of the month. This
resulted in considerable improvement in timeliness. As shown below,
the contents of the reports were much more specific than those in
the prior system’s reports. Companies registered with their respective
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products, as shown in the left-hand column below. Aggregated company
data submitted in turn by Member governments to the IEA are shown in theright-hand column.
Oil Product Import Price Register[IEA/SOM(81)11, p. 11]
Data from Company to Member
Government for Each Importby Designated Product(Disaggregated)

Data from Members to IEASecretariat for Each
Designated Product(Aggregated)

VolumeAggregated volume

CIF price

CIF price (weighted average andmasked minimum and maximum)

Whether purchased from an affiliate
or non-affiliate

Whether purchased from affiliates
or non-affiliates
Number of reporting companies

Loading point and delivery point
Delivery date
Whether or not acquired undera continuing supply arrangement
This Product Price Register never lived up to its expectations,
essentially because the information on products was fragmentary and difficult
to monitor and report. A reporting volume threshold of 2 000 tonnes meantthat considerable volumes in the aggregate escaped the Register. The problem
of insufficient data joined with practical difficulties of reporting performance,
delays in data submission, inaccuracy of the data, and security problems to
make the Register much less workable than the corresponding Crude Oil
Import Register [See IEA/SOM(81)11, p.11]. Although the difficulties were
not insurmountable, the considerable effort required to resolve the Product
Price Register problems was not thought to be cost effective, so in accordancewith the advice of the Industry Working Party, the Agency abolished this
Register [IEA/GB(81)30, Item 8(e)] with effect from 30 June 1981. In theyears that followed, the Agency has not found it necessary to resurrect eitherof the previous product registers or to develop new ones.
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The other IEA system developed shortly after the Agency wasestablished was the Crude Oil Cost Information System, created in 1976.
This system required monthly (initially quarterly) reports, beginning early in
1975. Companies lifting oil above a specified amount outside of the IEA area
reported to their respective Member governments, and Members transmitted
their reports to the IEA on the same schedule adopted for other monthly
systems. This system was operated under carefully designed data security
arrangements known as the “Black Box” procedure [See IEA/SOM(75)52],
whereby a courier from each Member government brought the Member’sreport (on data processing cards) each month to a designated secure computer
facility at IEA Headquarters in Paris and physically inserted the reporting
cards into the IEA computer for processing. The computer aggregated all of
the individual Member reports as required, and then suppressed anddestroyed the bulk of sensitive data (most items reporting on less than three
countries), thus ensuring the security of the data. The data submitted byindividual companies to Member governments (not seen by the IEA
Secretariat) are shown in the left-hand column, while the aggregated datasubmitted by the Member governments to the IEA are shown in the righthand column below.
Crude Oil Cost Information System[See IEA/SOM(84)19, p. 5]
Data from Company
to Member Government(Disaggregated)

Data from Members
to IEA Secretariat(Aggregated)

By reporting company

By country aggregate for each of
the 19 designated crude streams

Volumes acquired and average
dollars per barrel for eachof the following:– FOB purchases– All other acquisitions– TotalVolumes acquired and weighted
average dollars per barrel for eachof the following:– FOB purchases– All other acquisitions– Total10th and 90th percentile for eachof the following:– FOB purchases– All other acquisitions

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Designed to provide transparency of crude oil import acquisition costs, this
System was expected to show the degree to which cost terms for “equity” or“concession” oil differed from cost terms of companies importing oil
acquired on an “arm’s-length” basis. The system provided information
which helped measure the differences between “official selling prices” andFOB purchase costs, particularly in the rising price market of 1979-1980
when special premia and increased spot sales pushed FOB costs higher thanthe official selling prices, and the net economic effect was obscured. A
similar situation existed in the assessment of FOB and CIF transactions, forwhich comparisons had to be made in order to understand the market
actions of the sellers. Although the Crude Cost System provided useful
information for assessing market actions, the market structure wastransformed in the ensuing years by a major reduction in the amount of“equity” or “concession” oil or of other “official selling price” oil available
for sale, with a corresponding increase in the volumes sold on “arm’s-length”
or market terms. Eventually the small amounts of official selling price oil
made it difficult or impossible to carry out an assessment of the advantages it
offered, and the system lost its practical usefulness. On 11 July 1984, withsupporting advice from the Industry Working Party and the SOM, theGoverning Board,
agreed that the Crude Oil Cost Information System bediscontinued from the date of this decision and that the
Secretariat continue its analysis of acquisition costs on the basisof information from other sources [IEA/GB(84)27, Item 2(e); seealso IEA/GB(84)19, IEA/SOM(84)27 and Addendum 1 andIEA/SOM(84)19].
In addition to the foregoing information systems, the Agency also
developed an oil industry Financial Information System. In November
1977 the SOM proposed that the Governing Board adopt the first elementsof the Financial System on an annual reporting basis, to cover capital
investment and the source and use of funds [IEA/GB(77)57], beginningwith 1976 data which had been developed in consultation with the Industry
Working Party and outside consultants. The SOM described the objectivesof the Financial System as follows:
The main purpose for which this part of the General Section is
being developed is to achieve a better understanding of thefinancial structure and structural changes which are taking place309

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in the oil industry: in effect mainly to find out to what extent andhow the industry can be relied on and will be able to continue toprovide an important fraction of total energy supplies in the
future. The greater transparency thereby gained will give
Participating Countries a better basis for policy decisions[IEA/GB(77)57, paragraph 3].
The SOM had considered using either data already being collected by
the Chase Manhattan Bank or data collected from companies via Member
governments; in the end, the SOM’s recommendation was to adopt the latterprocedure. As initially constituted, the Financial System contained three
categories of information (developed by separate questionnaires), summarized
as follows:
1. Worldwide Capital and Exploratory Expenditures
This data is broken down by region and expenditure category
covering all aspects of oil company operations including otherenergy and non-energy. It is to be supplied by a selected
number of oil companies with international interests andsubmitted in a largely disaggregated form containing single
company (non-proprietary) information. Some categories andregions will, however, be aggregated by Member governments
before forwarding to the Secretariat.
2. Domestic Capital and Exploratory Expenditures
This data follows the same functional breakdown as above,
however it is intended to be used by Member governments toobtain information on local capital investments from companies
operating in their jurisdictions (including affiliates ofinternational companies). The number of companies isdetermined by the government concerned, which would thenestimate total national expenditure based upon the informationcollected using this questionnaire and other information
available to it and forward the total to the Secretariat.
3. Worldwide Source/Use of Funds Statement
This information refers to the source of funds for capital
investment and the other uses of these funds. It is submitted
on a single company basis by the companies reporting on item 1
above [See IEA/GB(77)57 for detail on the foregoing].
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Although the Industry Working Party recommended that the system include“gross revenue” and a statement of net income, the details for these subjects
had not yet been worked out in final form and they were left for later
addition once the system was in place. Questionnaires on those subjects
were added to the system in September 1978 [IEA/GB(78)32, Item 4;
IEA/GB(78)20 and Corrigendum].
The Financial System never became fully operational in a satisfactory
fashion. The SOM conducted a number of reviews, but the data submitted
proved to be fragmentary and not fully useful. Following an SOM
recommendation to discontinue the system in April 1983, the Governing
Board in October 1983
agreed that reporting under the Financial Information Systemshould be suspended while keeping the system in place;agreed that the Secretariat, for a trial period of two years, should
use its best efforts to prepare and report periodically to the SOM
financial information on the oil industry using available sourcesof information [IEA/GB(83)57, Item 3(c)].
Later developments in this sector have proceeded along the lines of theforegoing Governing Board Decision. In January 1986 the SOM madepermanent the replacement of the system with the Secretariat’s periodic
analysis of information from public sources. The Secretariat has done thison a number of other occasions without setting a fixed schedule [See, forexample, IEA/SOM(90)16], and the next Secretariat report is scheduled for
the March 1995 meeting of the SOM.
Looking over the range of information systems considered above, one
may note that none of them survived fully intact in late 1994. Each waseither formally abolished or permitted to remain theoretically available but
out of regular current use. In some cases this resulted from changing
market conditions, while in others the cost-benefit analysis was
unfavourable, or the necessary data could be derived from other available
sources. Nevertheless they served useful purposes in providing whatever
information they could, and they served to educate the responsible officers
in Member countries and in the Secretariat, thus helping to make theAgency’s later decisions more effective. Finally, in the case of the crude oilsystems, the establishment of a superior successor system, the Crude Oil
Import Register taken up immediately below, was seen to meet major futureneeds.
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2. Crude Oil Import Register
The Crude Oil Import Register is the chief survivor of the various
information systems adopted by the IEA since 1975. Inaugurated in 1979
[IEA/GB(79)64, Item 3], initially for a one year period to obtain reports on
a monthly basis, the Register provided its first data reports for the month ofNovember 1979 and it has continued to do so to the present day. As
described in an SOM document some years later, the two main objectives of
the Register are to:■■Provide reliable crude oil price information which can be particularly
useful in changing oil market situations as well as during supply
disruptions.
Increase government knowledge of pricing aspects of the internationaloil market including:– Import prices for particular crude streams in one country
vs. another.
– The shift in volumes over time among crude streams
including trends in average API gravities.
– Trends in price differentials between crude streams imported
into IEA countries [See IEA/SOM(87)18, paragraph 8].

The reports are scheduled to be made by companies to their respective
governments within twenty days after the close of the month (see left-handcolumn below) and by Member governments to the IEA within thirty days
after the end of the month (see right-hand column). The following data are
currently reported on a CIF basis for crude imports:
Crude Oil Import Register[See IEA/GB(93)58, Annex]
Data from Company
to Member Government(Disaggregated)

Data from Members
to IEA Secretariat(Aggregated)

For each individual importby crude category

Country total for each of the over
100 crude categories

VolumeAggregate volume imported
for each crude category

Dollar value

Total dollar value

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Crude Oil Import Register (continued)[See IEA/GB(93)58, Annex]
Data from Company
to Member Government(Disaggregated)

Data from Members
to IEA Secretariat(Aggregated)

CIF cost for each crude category

Average weighted CIF cost for each
crude category (value divided
by volume)

Per cent sulphur content

Weighted average sulphur content

API gravity

API gravity (weighted average)
for each crude category

The Register has been updated a number of times to adjust to changes inmarket structure or to make the system more realistic or easier to manage.
Early requirements that reports contain data on continuing and noncontinuing supply arrangements and on affiliated and non-affiliatedcompany transactions were dropped in 1988, as were requirements forreporting minimum and maximum days of credit. Important new crude oil
streams have been added to the Register (e.g. from Canada, Dubai, andOman) [IEA/SOM/M(88)2; IEA/SOM(88)29(2nd Revision)]. In 1993changes were made in categorization of crude oil flows to improve theaccuracy of reporting and to simplify the system. Crude oil categories havebeen created for a number of “new” exporting countries, e.g. Vietnam,
Denmark, Yemen, and Papua New Guinea. The break-up of the Former
Soviet Union and the subsequent increase in crude oil export streams from its
territory have been reflected in the provision of separate categories for eachof the main exporting republics. The reporting problems associated with thetransit of Russian crude oil and condensate through adjacent non-Russian
republics are acknowledged in the system’s reporting papers. In 1993
sulphur content was also introduced in order to provide information relevant
to environmental standards and refinery emissions [IEA/GB(93)58].
The data derived from the Register continue to be used essentially inthree ways: (1) for both Members and the Secretariat, to enhance
understanding of oil price developments and patterns in general; (2) whennecessary, to provide the base for analysis of short-term price developments
and oil quality changes; and (3) to supply information to be used in the IEA
quarterly publication Energy Prices and Taxes and in the monthly Oil
Market Report. As the SOM concluded in 1987
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The important thing to bear in mind is that the Register is used
for assessing historical information and trends, not as a tool formaking immediate decisions, and that it is not possible to obtain
the information which is reported in the Register, with the samelevel of coverage and comprehension, from the trade press,
industry contacts and other available sources [IEA/SOM(87)18,
paragraph 34].
In the foregoing broad review of the IEA oil market information system andthe present state of refinement of the Crude Oil Import Register, some of thecontributions of the oil industry have been noted, and this requires now acloser look at the overall co-operation of the oil industry with the IEA in
constructing and operating the system.

C. Role of the Oil Industry
It was quite clear to the founders of the IEA that their objective of oil market“transparency” could not realistically be achieved without the extensive cooperation of the oil industry in both the construction of the system and in its
operation. In parallel with the IEA’s emergency information system, the oilmarket system required industry expertise in developing relevant andworkable information flows and in functioning as the ultimate source ofmuch of the desired information. What the Agency sought to make more“transparent” was precisely the oil industry’s international operations; andfor the most part, the companies themselves had the best if not the only
knowledge of these operations. Hence the SOM received full competence todevelop such co-operation between the IEA and the oil industry, while theMembers undertook to ensure that the co-operation of companies under theirjurisdiction would be provided. Indeed this co-operation has been
forthcoming from the outset of the IEA and regularly thereafter, and thiseven before the Agency was formally established in November 1974.

1. Industry Working Party (IWP)
After the Brussels Energy Co-ordinating Group (ECG) negotiating the I.E.P.
Agreement in 1974 had made substantial progress in drafting the text of theAgreement, the ECG agreed that arrangements should be made for it tohave the benefit of early advice from the oil industry and that314

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representatives of the ECG and industry should meet for that purpose. The
meeting was designed to explore and promote the willingness of a numberof key international companies to co-operate in the implementation of the
I.E.P. Agreement and to identify particular aspects of the Program which
would require participation by the companies [ECG doc. No. 82,
10 September 1974]. The invitation to the oil companies was extended onbehalf of the ECG by its Chairman Viscount Davignon. As the companies
later reported to the SOM
At a meeting in London on October 23/24, 1974, representativesof the governments constituting the Energy Co-ordinating Group
received comments on their proposed International Energy
Program (IEP) from representatives of a number of oilcompanies. The government representatives asked Exxon toconvene an Industry Working Party (IWP) to develop suggestions
concerning design of the General Section of the IEP’s Information
System on the International Oil Market and Framework for
Consultation with Oil Companies [IEA/SOM(75)1, p. 5].
On 26 November 1974, about one week after the IEA was founded,
Exxon dispatched a cable to the companies concerned setting forth theproposed mandate of the IWP [Copies of the cable are contained in the IEA
archives in Paris]. As stated in this cable: “The objective of this Working
Party will be to prepare suggestions and recommendations for considerationby the Standing Group on the Oil Market”. The cable continued by sayingthat the Working Party would
A. Propose a set of objectives upon which the design andcontent of the General Information System and the
Framework for Consultations on the International Oil
Industry might be based.
B. Identify the type of information and data on theinternational oil industry that will be needed to meet theseobjectives.
C. Develop recommendations both on procedures for
obtaining this information and data, and with respect tothe operation of the General Information System.
The cable then outlined in some detail the information flows, the respectiveroles of the parties principally concerned (individual companies, the IEA
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governments, and the Agency itself), the procedures for periodic IEA reviewof the content of the system, and other matters. The consultations went
forward promptly.
The IWP’s co-operation was essentially a pragmatic arrangement
between the Agency and the oil industry, since the I.E.P. Agreement had
made no specific reference to an industry working party, which has since
been regarded as established by the companies themselves outside of theformal IEA framework (unlike the oil Industry Advisory Board (IAB) which
was established by the Governing Board and was foreshadowed by Article
19.7 of the Agreement) [See Chapter III, Section B-7(b) above]. It has not,in the end, proved necessary for the Governing Board to take any action on
the formation or procedures of the IWP, because the pragmatic approachhas proved to be an adequate one.
The IWP immediately set to work on the General Section of theInformation System, holding its first meeting in December 1974, one monthafter the IEA was established, and submitting in January 1975 its firstreport on implementing the oil market section of the information system[IEA/SOM(75)1]. During the period 1975-1986 when the various elementsof the oil market information system were being developed, reviewed,
modified, discontinued, or maintained, the Industry Working Party
participated constantly and advised or made proposals as required, often in
the form of written comments on proposed SOM papers. The IWP took partin most of the SOM meetings during that period and advised on theobjectives, activities, and information requirements of the SOM as well.
The IWP advised the SOM systematically on the Agency’s oil market
information system, including the need for and establishment of each partof the system, the content of reporting forms, the practical use of the data to
be supplied, amendments, retention or discontinuance, methodologicalissues and publication of oil market data.
As the information system stabilized and took its continuing form,
however, the need for IWP participation was reduced, and the IWP met lessfrequently. Both of the Agency’s oil industry advisory bodies (the IWP and
the IAB) sought to simplify their procedures and reduce the costs of their
participation. In some cases the two government expert bodies concerned,
the SOM and the SEQ, met together or on successive days, in part as aconvenience to industry to help reduce the time expended on IEA questions
and other costs, but these did not prove to be adequate solutions. A
suggestion that the two industry bodies merge did not present a practicalsolution because the specialist expertise for each would not always be
available when necessary (the IAB required expertise on oil industry
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operational questions and oil supply disruption response measures, while
the IWP required oil market information expertise). Moreover, institutionalarrangements would have to be made, and legal uncertainties would have to
be clarified. In the end, no steps were taken to effect a merger of the twobodies. Each remains separate to the present day, although the IWP as suchhas been largely inactive since 1987, while mainly bilateral contacts
between the Secretariat and individual companies have provided thenecessary industry advice.
Although the IWP’s work has been largely confined to the information
system details outlined above, there has been IEA interest in having the
IWP’s views on the Secretariat’s assessments of the oil market situation andon related policy questions, such as the potential impacts on industry ofenvironmental measures. However, the IWP was concerned about whether
its participation in such questions might fall outside of the antitrust defence
for United States companies [See generally on the antitrust defence,
Chapter III, Section B-7(c) above]. Since in practical terms the defence waslimited to IWP work on the information provisions of the I.E.P. Agreement,
advising on broader market assessments and other policy issues could
present an antitrust problem. Accordingly, in 1982 the IWP declined toadvise on such questions, and they were taken up in the SOM without thepresence of the IWP. The IWP Chairman suggested that bilateral
consultations might be better channels for the SOM to solicit industry
opinion on the assessments, and the SOM gave effect to the IWP’s wishes onthese institutional and procedural matters.
In recent years industry advice on the oil market information system
has reached the Agency for the most part in direct bilateral contacts
between the Secretariat and industry officials, and in the increasing
numbers of presentations by these officials at meetings of the SOM. The
IEA has not found it necessary to convene the IWP since 1987, and the IWP
has not met with the SOM since 1986. However, the IWP’s co-operation
with the IEA made immense contributions to the soundness of the oilmarket information system over the years, and the industry remains
available under various forms of co-operation for further service to the
Agency as the occasions arise.

2. Formal Consultations with Oil Companies
The founders of the IEA foresaw not only the oil industry’s technical workon oil market information systems, carried out largely by the IWP, but alsobroader and more penetrating consultations with companies individually or317

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in small groups apart from the IWP. These consultations were intended togive Members the opportunity toconsult with and request information from individual oil
companies on all important aspects of the oil industry [I.E.P.
Agreement, Article 37].
Members established within the Agency a “permanent framework” for suchconsultations and agreed to share among themselves on a co-operative basis
the results of the consultations. Responding rapidly to a directive in theAgreement, the SOM submitted draft “Procedures for Consultation with Oil
Companies” to the Governing Board following consultation with the IWP,
which had played a major role in preparing the draft. The Board also acted
promptly in adopting the proposal on 5 February 1975 [IEA/GB(75)8,
Item 8]. These Procedures do not displace direct contacts or any other existing
modality of consultation. They provide for the mechanics of convening theconsultation meeting (which normally would be held in Paris), the possibilityof a written procedure without a meeting if so agreed by the parties, or of adirect consultation open to all interested IEA Members. Direct consultations
would be chaired by the SOM Chairman, and reports would be circulated to
all Members. These Procedures were put into immediate effect, and the first
consultation took place with Exxon a few months later. Over the years nearly
fifty consultations or parallel presentations have taken place in the SOM,
usually with up to three companies appearing together or successively.
Reports on the early consultations were normally made by documents
submitted to the Governing Board or by references contained in the SOM
meeting records.
In 1976 the SOM’s initial written report to the Governing Board
covered the first five consultations. In that report the SOM concluded thatthe consultations produced valuable information, and it noted examples ofgeneral consultation subjects:(a) terms of arrangements for access to major sources of crudeoil, including acquisition costs paid by the oil companies to
producer governments, their offtake arrangements,
including volume availability etc.;(b) a particular oil company’s views of the worldwide supply
and demand outlook (short, intermediate and longterm),
including an evaluation of supply availability, transport
capability, refinery capability, etc.;
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programmes, availability of investment capital andinvestment intentions [See IEA/GB(76)17, which also
contains a list of the consultations and references].
In reporting on nine consultations which had taken place since its earlier
report, in 1978 the Governing Board reaffirmed the value of these
consultations in providing oil market information [IEA/GB(78)2].
The companies and other organizations which have participated over
the years on one or more occasions in these consultations (or in parallel andless formal consultation-type meetings), as shown in the order in which they
appear in IEA records, include Exxon, BP, Mobil, Shell, Petrofina, ENI,
Statoil, Gulf, Veba, Standard Oil of California, Pemex, BNOC, Texaco,
Petrobas, Petroleum Association of Japan, New York Mercantile Exchange,
London International Petroleum Exchange, Norsk Hydro, Petrol Canada,
Shell International Trading, Petroleum Industry Research Associates,
Petroleum Economics (London), Sun, Kuwait Petroleum, Shell International,
CONCAWE (Oil Companies’ European Organization for Environmental
Health Protection), Phibro Energy, World Petroleum Congresses, Booz Allenand Hamilton, Total Exploration Production, Shell International Shipping,Pira, Europia, APPE, Caltex and FACTS.
In addition to these formal contacts, the Secretariat has held manybilateral and informal meetings with about forty oil companies, consultants,
and other experts each year. Many substantial and direct contacts are madeeach month during the preparation of the Oil Market Report. The reduction
in many companies of their manpower dedicated to short-term oil market
information analysis has joined with the growing reputation of the IEA’s Oil
Market Reports to cause the IEA to function increasingly as an information
clearinghouse for the global oil market.
The subjects of the consultations have varied widely over the Agency’s
twenty year history. In addition to the subjects mentioned above in the 1976
SOM annual report on consultations, later consultations covered such diverse
subjects as the situation of the particular company in the consultation, therole of consumer country national oil companies, the relation of a state oilcompany to its government, changes in the organizational structure of the oil
industry to meet changes in market conditions, international marinetransportation and the tanker market, the OPEC two tier pricing system (in1977), the situation of smaller companies in the international market,
worldwide exploration prospects, the cessation of supplies from Iran, theeconomics of oil stock levels and policies, oil futures markets, the impact of319

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declining prices on cash flow, trading methods and market transparency,
developing country oil demand trends, and synthetic gas fuels. The subjects
have also included changing specifications of gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil
and their impact on the refining industry, long-term derivative instruments,
processes of deregulation and privatization in energy industries, the pipelinetransportation industry, pipeline options for exports from the Caspian Sea,and the appropriate roles of governments, national oil companies, andprivate oil companies. While these consultations and parallel events have notbeen the subject of formal reports to the Governing Board since 1978, they
have often been the subject of reports in SOM documents and in SOM
meeting records.
The foregoing consultations, mostly held in an organized form carriedout in the Agency’s Paris meeting rooms, have made invaluable contributions
to the Members’ and the Secretariat’s understanding of the current oil
market situation, as have the individual bilateral consultations by the
Secretariat. They have all combined with the information system generally
to support the Secretariat’s oil market analyses and assessments for internal
use of the Agency, for Members, and for the public in the monthly Oil Market
Report and other publications.

D. Dissemination of Oil Market Information
The dissemination as well as the production of oil market information was
one of the principal objectives the founders sought to achieve in the IEA.
They were particularly concerned about disseminating information to
governments and to the Agency for use in developing oil market and otherenergy policies, but their interest clearly extended to information for the
IEA’s industry advisory bodies and for the public as well. To the extent that
oil market information could be disseminated without impairing either
sensitive Member government information or industrial competition, theAgency’s policy has been to support wide dissemination and to implement
progressively the measures required to help bring that about.
The IEA disseminates oil market information in a variety of ways,
with the publication of this information receiving high priority in providing
normally the broadest and most rapid coverage. Although publication
meant mostly “hard copy” distribution in the early days of the IEA,
publication now includes on-line transmissions, disks, magnetic tapes, andother advanced transmission systems. The IEA publications started with320

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the oil and gas and other energy publications taken over from the OECD
shortly after the formation of the IEA (for example, the publications now
known as the Monthly Oil and Gas Statistics and Trade Data, and the
Quarterly Oil Statistics and Energy Balances). Crude Oil Import Prices
covering the period back to 1973 was published in 1979 and again in 1981,
and these statistics now appear quarterly in the publication entitled Energy
Prices and Taxes, with IEA averages and other information. To these must
be added the oil market elements contained in the IEA’s annual publication
series, as seen currently in the Energy Statistics of OECD Countries 19911992, Energy Balances of OECD Countries 1991-1992, Energy Statistics
and Balances of Non-OECD Countries 1991-1992, and Oil and Gas
Information (1993), together with such specialized statistical works as
Electricity Information 1993 and Coal Information 1993.
Moreover, the Agency’s current oil market assessments, in quite generalterms, were often made known and at least in part discussed by IEA
spokesmen in their public appearances, by IEA Ministers in the Communiqué
issued at the close of each of their meetings, and by officials of Member
countries and the Secretariat in press conferences and other appearances
following many Governing Board meetings when oil market interest wasparticularly high or important actions were taken. These practices continue
to the present day, notwithstanding the publication of the IEA’s monthly Oil
Market Report since 1983 with more systematic and complete oil market
information derived from all IEA information sources.
In 1975 the Governing Board began receiving regular Secretariat
reports on the short-term outlook for the international oil market, and in1977 the Board agreed to have a corresponding item on the agenda of eachfuture Board meeting [IEA/GB(77)17, Item 5]; this is a continuing andconsistent practice. Initially produced quarterly, this report evolved into themonthly Oil Market Assessment, containing the Secretariat’s assessment of
the general situation and major developments, oil supply and demand, prices
for crude oil and products, and supporting statistical data. At times theassessments for the Governing Board also have contained sensitive Member
government material on calculations forming part of the IEA’s emergency
response preparations (such as historic base period final consumption
numbers for each Member, oil stock levels of Member countries as required
under the I.E.P. Agreement, and quarterly oil forecasts).
Initially intended as a briefing document for the Governing Board, thegovernment expert groups on the oil market (SOM) and emergency questions(SEQ), and the co-operating oil companies, the assessments did not receive
wider distribution until after the Governing Board decided to publish the321Chap. VI et VII

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greater part of the assessments on a commercial basis. Some officials
perceived that the former practice of distributing the assessments to the cooperating companies gave these companies the advantages of the assessments,
while other oil companies not represented in the groups co-operating with the
IEA might not receive them. The publication of information on a commercial
basis would not only resolve this problem, but would also inform a muchwider audience on current oil market matters [See IEA/GB(82)77], and infact this occurred rapidly once the publication began.
Following exploratory discussions in the Governing Board andconsultations with the SOM, the SEQ, and their industry advisory groups (theIWP and IAB), the Governing Board decided in December 1982 to begin
publication of the monthly oil market assessments, after removal of sensitive
Member government material [IEA/GB(82)92, Item 2(c); see IEA/GB(82)83;
and the joint document IEA/SOM(82)52, IEA/SEQ(82)47]. The first issue
appeared in September 1983 as the IEA Oil Market Report - A Monthly Oil
Market and Stocks Assessment (commonly abbreviated as the “OMR”). The
Report contained information on current oil consumption (mainly in theOECD area), oil supply (OPEC and non-OPEC producers), oil stocks,
supply/demand balance, average price levels with reports on significant pricerelated events, spot market trends, and statistical detail. The IEA continued
to supply Members through other channels with the sensitive Member
government material not included in the publication. An Annual Oil Market
Report has also been published by the Agency, beginning with the Annual
Report for 1983, and continuing to 1990 inclusive. Thereafter the Annual
Reports were replaced by annual addenda to the monthly Reports as theannual data became available [See for example, for 1994, the Report’s
Annual Statistical Supplement in the new format adopted for the annualmaterial].
Over the years the scope and content of the Reports have been reviewed
regularly by the Secretariat and IEA Members. The Secretariat has refined
the Reports in the interest of greater precision and clarity. The data coveragehas been revised in scope and depth, and the assessments have been enlarged
accordingly. Since the April 1991 issue, the Reports on the oil
supply/demand balance have been presented on a “truly global basis”, as aresult of the breakdown of barriers between Eastern and Western Europe andthe availability of adequate data and estimates [See “Changes to Oil
Supply/Demand Balance in Oil Market Report “Global Basis”, SOM, Room
Document No. 1, pp. 3-4, 13 May 1991; OMR, April 1991, pp. 2-3]. Much
greater attention is now devoted to oil supply and demand in Latin America,
Asia, and Africa. In the process of review and change, “apparent”
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consumption has largely given way to “observed consumption” and then to“demand” with greater detail as to countries, regions, and products. Other
notable developments include seasonally adjusted changes in demand,
structural changes, and cyclical changes. There has been more material on
OECD regional demand by product, and more on non-OECD regions and inselected countries. There are additional features of particular topical interest(for example, OECD oil demand for public electricity generation,
October 1994). There is now much more data on world oil production withdetail for the OECD and OPEC by country, the Former Soviet Union andother non-OPEC (and some individual) countries, and there is more analysis
of significant oil supply movements. OECD oil stocks are also reported in
more detail with data on regional changes, industry stocks, government
controlled stocks, as well as product stocks. On the topic of oil prices, theReports contain more developed information on CIF crude import prices, on
spot crude oil prices over time and by market, on product prices, on
differentials in various markets, and on end-user product prices. Refineryquestions have been added to the price topic, with material on refining
margins and refinery crude “throughputs” in OECD countries.
The monthly Oil Market Report, published under the responsibility of
the Executive Director of the Agency, is prepared on the basis of a numberof separate sources. Historical supply, demand, stock, and refinery activity
data are derived from data that Members submit for the IEA’s Monthly Oil
Statistics system. The Secretariat supplements these data with information
derived from numerous other sources, including industry contacts andconsultancy services. Price data are derived from the monthly average CIF
crude oil price data supplied by Members under the Crude Oil Import
Register, discussed in Sections A and B above, as averaged and processed by
the Secretariat. These price data are supplemented by material drawn frompublished sources, such as Platt’s, and are also processed by the Secretariat.
While the Secretariat believes its sources to be reliable, the data appearing
in the Reports are meant to be indicative of broad trends rather than be a
numerically accurate description of the world oil markets at any particular
moment [See Oil Market Report, “Sources and Use of Data” etc., attachedas the last page to each Report].
The Reports have enjoyed an extraordinary informational andcommercial success, the number of subscribers having risen to nearly 800 in
1994, more than double the number of subscribers in its first year. For
governments and industry, the Reports have become a standard andauthoritative source of the best available oil market information. They arewidely reported on wire service on the day of publication and by the press,
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radio, and television. Because of the authority of the Reports, they have attimes had discernable market effects, without carrying that intention, forthey report facts and assessments without regard to political or otherconsiderations. The Reports continue to serve as a principal instrument forachieving the IEA Members’ goals of general oil market transparency anddissemination.

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CHAPTER VII

Co-operation with Non-Member
Countries: The Global PerspectiveT

his Chapter reviews the Agency’s evolving policies and experience in the
conduct of its relations with non-Member countries. The Agency’s early
policies, institutional arrangements, and information exchange practices inthis sector are summarized in Section A below. From the outset the Agency’s
policy approach was outward-looking, particularly with respect to relations
with the oil producing countries and with other consumers, as clearly
contemplated in the I.E.P. Agreement and in other early policy declarations
and actions. After the institutional arrangements to implement these policies
were rapidly established in the mid-1970s, they evolved over the years toreflect changes in policy emphasis. High hopes for a constructive producerconsumer dialogue were seen in the early years of the Agency, leading up to
the Conference on International Economic Co-operation (North-South
Conference or CIEC) held in Paris in 1976-1977 [Section B]. As it became
clear in this period that little could be expected from the proposed dialogue
but that productive energy policy work could be carried out in co-operation
principally with the developing countries, the IEA enlarged its emphasis on
developing country questions [Section C]. By 1990 the Agency had turnedmore of its attention to the growing globalisation of energy developments andgave it significant energy policy interest [Section D], particularly with respect
to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the New
Independent States that succeeded the Soviet Union. The Agency has sinceremained quite active in that area, while it has strengthened its global
perspective also in Latin America, the Asia-Pacific region, and Africa. The
Agency promoted a new approach to relations with the oil producer countries
in the 1991-1994 Ministerial level conferences and in the IEA’s Meetings ofExperts from energy exporting and importing countries [Section E], and it
conducted a general review of relations with non-Members in the period
1992-1994 [Section F]. Since the Agency’s policy interests in each of theforegoing developments had been established from its beginning in 1974, thedevelopments described in this Chapter reflect not so much entirely new325

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departures as changes in priority and emphasis in response to particular
problems and opportunities as they presented themselves over the Agency’s
first twenty years.

A. Non-Member Policy Arrangements
The IEA’s energy policy perspective has always extended beyond theMembers’ internal policies and the Agency’s co-operative programme andadministration to include external relations policies of both the Members
and the Agency. From the earliest stages of the IEA, it was evident that the
new Agency would have to become deeply involved in external relations
across the entire spectrum of its functions. This is evident in one of “thelessons” of the 1973-1974 crisis:
Relations with Producers. Consumer countries should
establish arrangements for co-operative relations with the oil
producer countries and with other consumer countries in orderto achieve better mutual understanding and to benefit fromdevelopments in the energy field [See Volume I, p. 39].
In the IEA’s energy policy outlook extending to all market
participants, the objective of co-operation in energy was seen not only as cooperation among Agency countries themselves, but also as co-operation
between them as organized in the IEA, on the one hand, and the rest of theenergy world, on the other. This broad concept of co-operation was
explicitly stated in the Communiqué of the Washington Energy Conference
on 13 February 1974, in the early preparatory stages of the Agency [SeeVolume I, p. 45]. Participants “agreed that there was need to develop a cooperative multilateral relationship with producing countries, and otherconsuming countries that takes into account the long-term interests of all”
[Paragraph 14]. In that context the Conference also mentioned the role ofthe international oil companies, initiatives in the United Nations, theconsumer and producer country conference, and consultations with
developing countries and other consumer and producer countries. All ofthese concerns indirectly found their way into the I.E.P. Agreement whichcontains the most authoritative statement of the founders’ energy policy
views at the time the Agency was established. The Agreement clearly states
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the founders’ objectives concerning co-operative international energy
relations and provides the broad institutional framework for its cooperation with other countries and organizations.
The Agency’s objective in co-operating with non-Member countries
appears in several paragraphs of the Preamble to the I.E.P. Agreement[Paragraphs 3-4] where the Members state that they are
DESIRING to promote co-operative relations with oil producing
countries and with other oil consuming countries, including
those of the developing world, through a purposeful dialogue,
as well as through other forms of co-operation, to further theopportunities for a better understanding between consumer andproducer countries,
MINDFUL of the interests of other oil consuming countries,
including those of the developing world . . .
A co-operative rather than an adversarial approach towards other countries
is apparent in Article 11 of the Agreement, which makes it clear that IEA
countries do not intend “to seek to increase, in an emergency, the share ofworld oil supply that the group had under normal market conditions”.
More specifically, “Historical oil trade patterns should be preserved as far as
is reasonable, and due account should be taken of the position of individual
non-participating countries”. The Agency’s approach would thus be one offairness and constructive co-operation in its external relations, as the more
operational texts of the Agreement confirm, and the actual external
relations of the Agency have demonstrated over the years.

1. Institutional Arrangements
The founders of the Agency confirmed the foregoing views in the policy
statements contained in a number of the Agreement’s specific mandates andin a general grant of external relations powers. The principal specificmandate is contained in Chapter VIII entitled “Relations with ProducerCountries and with other Consumer Countries”. In this Chapter IEA
Members restate their objectives concerning other countries [Article 44] andthey take the commitments (1) to give full consideration to the needs ofother consumer countries, particularly to those of the developing countries[Article 45], (2) to keep developments under review for that purpose[Article 44], (3) to exchange views on their relations with producer
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countries [Article 46], (4) to seek opportunities and means of encouraging
stable oil trade and secure supplies, (5) to consider other possible fields ofco-operation, and (6) to “keep under review the prospects for co-operation
with oil producing countries on energy questions of mutual interest, such asconservation of energy, the development of alternative sources, and researchand development” [Article 47].
In addition to the relatively sharp focus of the foregoing external
relations mandates concerning non-Members of the Agency, the IEA’s nonMember co-operation policy is reflected in the all but complete grant of
power to the Agency to enter into the corresponding external relations as
required to realize its objectives. This was established in both the I.E.P.
Agreement [Article 63] and in the Council Decision [Article 12]. Thus
I.E.P. Article 63 contains the following:
In order to achieve the objectives of the Program, the Agency
may establish appropriate relations with non-participating
countries, international organisations, whether governmental or
non-governmental, other entities and individuals.
This grant of authority was intentionally designed to give the Agency
the widest latitude and flexibility in determining the nature, scope, andform of its external relations and the categories of particular parties
with which it should enter into relations. The Agency exercises theseexternal relations powers, it should be added, in complete formal autonomy
from the OECD. The quoted text of Article 63 and the specific I.E.P.
Agreement mandates referred to above comprise the formal sources ofcompetence for most Agency relations with others and convey a powerfulpolicy statement. They provide the operational basis for the IEA’s relations
with the oil producing countries and with other oil consuming countries,
and for its enhanced relations in recent years with the Central and Eastern
European countries, the Former Soviet Union, Korea, Mexico, and othercountries, as well as the United Nations, the World Bank, the Latin
American Energy Organization (OLADE), the Asian Development Bank,other international organizations, and a multitude of other entities andindividuals.
Initially the Agency’s relations with non-Members were developed in
the Standing Group on Relations with Producer and other Consumer
Countries, one of the four plenary Standing Groups established by theAgreement, and its mandate is set forth in Articles 44-48 and 58 of the
I.E.P. Agreement. Under Article 48, the Standing Group is to examine and328

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report to the Management Committee (in practice the Governing Board andthe Management Committee meeting together) and to “carry out thefunctions assigned to it in Chapter VIII and any other function delegated to
it by the Governing Board” [Article 58].
After the Standing Group had functioned several years under thismandate, the Agency found that it was emphasizing more its relations with
developing countries, and this emphasis needed to be reflected in its
institutional arrangements. The Governing Board also considered that itneeded direct advice from Members’ officials who were operationallyresponsible in their capitals for international energy relations. Since theStanding Group was not always best suited to meet these needs, in June 1977
the Board decided to establish an informal Ad Hoc Group on International
Energy Relations, initially chaired by Mr. R. A. Burrows (United Kingdom)and often called the “Burrows Group”. The broader mandate of the Ad HocGroup was “to report to the Governing Board on international energy
relations and to carry out such other functions as may be assigned to it by theGoverning Board” [IEA/GB(77)33, Item 8]. Once the Ad Hoc Group began
its work, the greater suitability of this Group as the general forum wasapparent, and the functions of the Standing Group were thereafter fully takenover by the Ad Hoc Group. In 1990 with the end of the Cold War and thechanging political and economic situation in Central and Eastern Europe, IEA
Members could foresee that the emphasis of IEA work would broaden
permanently on a more global basis, and they changed the Group’s name tothe “Committee on Non-Member Countries” (CNMC), the name it bears to
the present day. Future references to the Ad Hoc Group will appear as “Ad
Hoc Group/CNMC” to show that the two names refer to the same IEA body.
Pertinent extracts from the mandate of the Committee are set forth in theOECD’s document “List of Bodies of the Organisation - Mandates Membership - Officers”, updated annually [See also IEA/GB(89)36, Item 5].
The Committee mandate changes adopted by the Governing Board in thecourse of the 1992-1994 review of relations with non-Member countries aretaken up in Section F below.

2. Information Exchange Among Members
The IEA bodies responsible for non-Member country relations (formerly theStanding Group and the Ad Hoc Group, now the Committee) havefunctioned principally as the IEA’s focal point for exchange of informationon this subject among the Members, as a convenient place for Members toshare policy notions and to develop views to be expressed elsewhere, and as
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a co-ordination point for the preparation of advice for the Governing Board,
other IEA bodies, and the Secretariat. These functions began with theestablishment of the IEA and have continued regularly since that time.
Internal information exchange has been one of the most vital andconstant functions of the IEA’s non-Member bodies. Article 46 of the I.E.P.
Agreement contains the specific commitment of Members for this exchange:
The Participating Countries will, in the context of the Program,exchange views on their relations with oil producing countries.
To this end, the Participating Countries should inform each otherof co-operative action on their part with producer countries
which is relevant to the objectives of the Program.
Almost immediately after the Agency was established, the Governing Board“recognised that the Standing Group was the natural forum for the exchange
of information on bilateral contacts with the oil producers for which provision
was made in the Agreement; this item should be included in the agenda of theStanding Group as a matter of routine” [IEA/GB(74)11(1st Revision), Item4(g)]. This is still done regularly in the Agency’s Committee on Non-Member
Countries. Accordingly, OPEC and individual producer country actions havebeen a regular subject of analysis and information exchange, during periods ofboth lesser as well as greater contacts between the Agency and OPEC. The
Members report on bilateral contacts with non-Member countries generally
and with universal, regional, and functional international organizations, andthey also report regularly on their own national developments that concern
areas of interest to the Committee. These functions were highly developed
during the preparations for the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) and during the Conference itself (sometimes called the“North-South Conference”) in 1976-1977 [See Section B below]. The
Agency played an important role in facilitating the Members’ consultations on
the Conference, assisting Members to co-ordinate their views for presentation
to the Energy Commission of the Conference, and in conducting regular
information briefings for all Members after each session.
IEA Members have been informed through this same process about
energy-related discussions taking place in the United Nations and othermultilateral organizations, particularly on developing country energy
questions during and following the CIEC. The Agency carried out parallel
functions for the preparation and participation of Members in many othermeetings on energy in international relations, such as the 1981 Summit
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Sources of Energy held in Nairobi in 1981, and the International Meetingon Co-operation and Development held in Cancún. In each case the IEA
provided an internal “platform” for the exchange of information and an
exploration of avenues for possible action, and later it did the same for theexchange of views on appropriate follow-up actions. In the same year
preparations for consideration of the East-West energy issues in the U.N.
Economic Commission for Europe’s Senior Advisors to ECE Governments
on Energy were similarly co-ordinated in the IEA’s Ad Hoc Group/CNMC.
Centered in the Agency’s non-Member bodies, these activities
continued on a regular basis over the years that followed. Preparatory
discussions, information exchange, co-ordination of Members’ views andfollow-up took place on whatever the immediate questions of internationalenergy relations were at the particular time. These internal exchanges havebeen conducted through periods of policy emphasis on the oil producerconsumer dialogue, on developing countries, and on East-West relations.
Exchanges have continued as well with respect to the new series of IEA
hosted Experts Meetings, the political level conferences of energy exportingand importing countries, and the recent general review of relations with
non-Member countries within the IEA. The scope of these internal
exchanges has expanded as the range of IEA contacts with non-Member
countries has itself expanded with the periodic support and direction
provided by IEA Ministers, as will be seen below in the Sections dealing
more specifically with the major changes of emphasis in IEA work in this
sector.
At its meeting in May 1992, the Governing Board carried out a generalreview of the Agency’s relations with non-Member countries, based on
proposals contained in the Secretariat’s Note entitled “Participation by NonMember Countries in the Activities of the IEA” [See IEA/GB(92)18/FINAL].
This review resulted in two decisions affecting internal informationexchange, which at the same time confirmed and enlarged the Committee’s
mandate on this subject [IEA/GB(92)25, Item 5(d)]. The first of theseprovided that(i) the Committee on Non-Member Countries shall, taking
into account the views of the Standing Groups and theother committees of the Agency, advise the Secretariat andadvise the Standing Groups and other committees of the
Agency with regard to non-Member country activities;(ii) overall policy guidance and decisions shall continue to be
the responsibility of the Governing Board.
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In the second decision, the Board requested the Committee to ensure that
information on the Agency’s activities in this sector be communicated toMembers and that Members’ views be communicated to the Secretariat. The
Committee is also required to report regularly on this subject to the Board.
The Secretariat’s review document [IEA/GB(92)18/FINAL] containedin Part IV an additional passage entitled “Expanded Role of the NMC
Committee”, in which it was recommended that the Committee’s role beexpanded and that it serve a consultation function entailing more frequentmeetings and more functions. The Committee would also receive more direct
reporting of deliberations and recommendations from the other Standing
Groups and Committees and enjoy wider review and recommendation
responsibilities. Although at its May 1992 meeting the Board did not reach
final Conclusions on Part IV, it did note that the role of the Committee“needs to be further developed over time, bearing in mind that specific areasof co-operation with non-Member countries must be integrated into the workof other Standing Groups” [IEA/GB(92)25, Item 5(c)]. At that time
the Board also adopted general policy guidance and specific guidelines
for areas of co-operation with non-Member countries [See Item 5(b);IEA/GB(92)18/FINAL]. Following further review of these and other nonMember questions in 1994, the Governing Board adopted amended
guidelines and approved procedures for accession to the I.E.P. Agreement
without modification of the internal information exchange function of theCommittee described above [See Section F below].

B. Early Producer-Consumer Dialogue
Diplomatic movement towards an oil producer and oil consumer “dialogue”
began in the earliest stages of the creation of the IEA during and after the
1973-1974 oil crisis, in response to the disruption of supply and the increases
in the price of oil which occurred in that crisis [See Volume I, Chapter II,
Section A]. The potential stakes of both producers and consumers in the“dialogue” were enormous. On the one hand, the producers saw the dramaticincreases in price as already fully “acquired”. They viewed these elevatedprice levels as needing protection and a method for adjustment into still
higher ranges, if possible, together with recognition of oil as a “wasting” andprecious asset. The producers needed stable markets and assurances that
their oil would find willing buyers. On the other hand, the industrializedcountries sought to guard against actions which might have the effect of332

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damaging world economic growth, and they sought more reasonable prices
and stabilized sources of supply without arrangements that might lock-in thethen prevailing prices or lead to still higher prices.
The producers had been organized for some years in OPEC, theorganization which had played a major role in bringing about the almost
400 per cent increase in crude oil prices during the 1973-1974 crisis andwhich it was thought might be mobilized to bring about further increases.
The producers had demonstrated their newly acquired ability to legislaterather than to negotiate international oil prices. Moreover, in
December 1974, a few weeks after the IEA was formed, the producers foundsupport for their views in the United Nations General Assembly action on
the “Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States” [General Assembly
Resolution 3281 (XXIX)], adopted during one of the high points ofdeveloping country influence in the General Assembly despite strong
opposition from major industrial countries. This Charter contained
provisions seen as favouring and protecting commodity cartels [See
Article 5], which were not acceptable to all of the industrial countries.
Although during the crisis the industrial countries were inadequately
prepared from an institutional standpoint [See Volume I, Chapter II], in1974 they were engaged in the process of organizing themselves into what
would become the International Energy Agency. Among the purposes of thisnew organization described in detail in Volume I, Chapter II, Section C-4,
the development of a “purposeful dialogue” with the oil producer countries
received a high priority. Many participants in the preparations for the IEA
believed that one of its main functions would be to establish a caucus point
for the negotiation of oil price and supply issues with the producers (notexcluding the possibility that the Agency itself might act directly inthe market for consumer countries), and to do so in an institutional context
in which the two groups would be better balanced than they had been
in 1973-1974.
The corresponding policy threads found their way into IEA actions
almost immediately after the Agency was founded, as the two groups moved
gradually but deliberately towards establishing the “dialogue”. While
formal Agency contacts with OPEC did not take place before the CIEC
preparations discussed below, the Secretariat enjoyed many informal
contacts with OPEC officials not only during the build-up to the CIEC in
the mid-1970s, but also throughout the entire history of the Agency to date.
These contacts have occurred unofficially in connection with meetings inother organizations or during unofficial functions, and they have proved tobe quite useful on a technical level.
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In October 1974, while the IEA was still in the preparatory
stage, President Giscard d’Estaing of France, whose country was
not then participating in the IEA, took the initiative to launch officially theidea of the producer-consumer dialogue. Promptly upon its formation, theAgency took up the question of preparation for the dialogue. At its firstmeeting, held on the day the I.E.P. Agreement was signed, the Governing
Board(h) agreed that an eventual meeting with the oil-producing
countries should be carefully prepared and that in thisconnection a means of associating France with the Agency’s
work should be found . . .
(i) agreed that an important objective should be mutual
enlightenment between the Agency and OPEC . . .
(k) agreed that the Agency’s objectives should be presented tothe oil-producing countries in the Participating Countries’
bilateral contacts with those countries(l) . . . IEA Members should explain bilaterally to OPEC
countries the wide scope of IEA showing that IEA is not acounter-OPEC institution [IEA/GB(74)9(1st Revision),
Item 8; emphasis added].
In December 1974 the Governing Board [IEA/GB(74)11(1st Revision),
Item 4] gave top priority to the definition of
a common position on the crucial issues which would fall to beconsidered in a dialogue with producers; the topics which werementioned and could be included are:(1) the general concept of the dialogue, strategy and thedevelopment of appropriate concrete topics of discussion;(2) the price of oil and security of supply . . . .
Other issues, including the producers’ investment of funds and the matchingof their investments to the investment needs of the consuming countries
were mentioned as topics of discussion. The Board then proceeded withmeasures to gear up the new Agency to prepare for the dialogue, in “fourinterrelated sequential stages” that can be summarized in this way:
(1) satisfactory progress in the establishment of concerted
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the accelerated development of new energy supplies, andfinancial solidarity on an appropriate basis.
(2) the convening of a preparatory meeting with producers
with a target date of March 1975 to develop the agenda
and procedures for consumer-producer dialogue.
(3) the preparation of common consumer positions of theagenda items to be agreed under stage (2).
(4) the holding of a consumer-producer conference[IEA/GB(74)11(1st Revision), Item 4].
This began an intense period of dialogue meeting preparations which lasted
almost one year. The IEA had to organize the work on both procedural andsubstantive matters over the long period before the Conference could
complete the preparatory phase and begin its systematic work. During the
preparatory phase, the Agency prepared position papers, co-ordinated theviews of Members, participated as an active observer in the work of the
Preparatory Meetings, and kept IEA Members informed.
The Agency continued to fulfil these functions during the period of theConference itself in 1976-1977. The CIEC’s early preoccupation withprocedural issues provided participants with useful contacts and preliminary
encounters with the substantive questions, which were necessarily imbedded
in procedural questions and thus partially obscured [See IEA/SPC/M(75)5(1st Revision); IEA/IER(81)5]. Preliminary questions about the possible
participation of the IEA and the nature of its participation would influence
the role that energy issues would play in relation to linkages with other issues(the IEA sought an invitation to the Conference as an observer andparticipated in that capacity on its own behalf, but not as the representativeof Members). Even the place and name of the Conference had substantive
implications for the participants. The Conference could not easily be held ineither an OPEC or an IEA country, but France was suitable because it did
not belong to either group (only in 1992 would France join the IEA). France
had also taken the diplomatic initiative to hold the Conference, enjoyedconstructive relations with countries in both groups, and could provide thenecessary conference and communication facilities. While the IEA might
have preferred a relatively narrow Conference title along the lines of “Energy
Conference”, the title as adopted revealed some of the impending issue links
with developing countries. The title, “Conference on International Economic
Co-operation”, was a broad formulation indeed. The agenda of the
Preparatory Meetings and the Conference itself also contained policyquestions. The IEA initially sought to limit the agenda to oil questions, but
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this did not prove possible in the face of the developing country issues whichwere also pressed on the Conference, which then became less of an energy
conference and more of a North-South conference, with the industrial
countries seen as the “North” and the developing countries as the “South”.
Other procedural questions also attracted particular attention in view of
their potential impact on policy. The question of whether the structure of theConference should be plenary or broken up into topical Commissions wasostensibly procedural, but the creation of four Commissions (Energy, Raw
Materials, Development, and Financial Affairs) actually facilitated the serious
discussion of energy by separating it at that level from some of the issues
assigned to the three other Commissions. The choice of participants had
obvious substantive consequences in the sense that the principal issues werefairly represented, for the overall balance of the various issues considered, andfor the general atmosphere of the Conference. In the end there were twentyseven members of the Conference, with seven consumer countries represented
directly (all were IEA Members) plus the European Economic Commission(EEC), and with the remaining nineteen being developing countries. Elevenobservers also attended, including the IEA, OPEC, the OECD and a numberof United Nations agencies. The question of Chairmanships also could not be
excluded from consideration among the procedural questions with important
substantive ramifications. Despite early suggestions that France as the hostmight chair the Conference in a “technical” sense, leaving its national
interests to be represented by the EEC, the “Co-Chairmanship” conceptcarried the day, when Allan J. MacEachen of Canada and Dr. Manuel Pérez
Guerrero of Venezuela were selected to co-chair the Conference. In the same
spirit, the Energy Commission was co-chaired by Stephen Bosworth of theUnited States Department of State (also Chairman of the IEA’s Standing
Group on Long-Term Co-operation) and by Dr. H.E. Abdul-Hadi Taher,
Director and President of Petromin, the Saudi Arabian state oil company.
Rather than a single conference, the IEA sought an early Conference
meeting in 1975, to be followed by continuing meetings thereafter. Yet the
preparations alone eventually took almost a full year, from 1 March 1975,
when the invitation was made, to late February 1976 when the Energy
Commission was organized and ready to begin substantive work. The
Conference discussions then continued over fifteen additional months toearly June 1977, when the Conference Report was completed at the end of
the process. There was no provision for a Conference follow-on devoted
specifically to oil producer-consumer dialogue-type issues.
While such procedural-substantive issues were under consideration in
1975, IEA Ministers met to consider the policy objectives of the Agency. In
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May 1975, Ministers “reaffirmed their commitment to work for thedevelopment of a co-operative multilateral relationship among oil producing
and oil consuming countries” [IEA document PRESS/A(75)20, paragraph 2].
Addressing the situation of developing countries, which would preoccupy the
IEA’s non-Member relations functions throughout the CIEC and for many
years after, Ministers agreed that “For its part, the Agency will do all within
its competence to work for the solution of the problems of the developing
countries, so far as they are concerned with energy” [Paragraph 8]. Speaking
more generally on their view of the then forthcoming Conference,
Ministers declared themselves ready to pursue discussions at any
time and in any manner found mutually convenient, andreaffirmed their common willingness to continue the dialogue
and to encourage initiatives directed towards further progress.
This statement was made after the first CIEC Preparatory Meeting in April
1975 in which insufficient progress had been made to launch the Conference.
Therefore the Ministers also adopted practical measures to expedite thedialogue, in agreeing to continue bilateral contacts and agreeing to instructtheir representatives in the Governing Board to address the issues “as amatter of urgency” and to “co-ordinate their efforts” in order for “formal
deliberations” to be held “as soon as possible”. Four more preliminary
meetings were to be held before the Conference Energy Commission entered
the analytical or substantive phase of its work, only to find insurmountabledifficulties lying in the road ahead. Altogether, eighteen CIEC formal
meetings relevant to energy (mostly Energy Commission meetings, and mostlasting several days or more) took place over the period from April 1975 toJune 1977, when the Conference ended.
The composition of the Commissions foreshadowed the difficulties tocome. Each of the four Commissions was composed of ten developing
countries and five industrial countries. The Energy Commission wascomposed of Algeria, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, EEC, India, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica,
Japan, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, United States, Venezuela, and Zaire. As
noted above this Commission was co-chaired by representatives of Saudi
Arabia and the United States. Many major energy issues arose during theConference, most of which ultimately proved to be intractable, as will be seen
below in the summary of the agreements reached in the CIEC and the issues
on which agreement could not be reached. The Commission’s work
programme and agenda presented difficulty not only in the preparation of theConference, but also throughout the period of the Commission’s substantive
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work. The participants’ views diverged sharply at various phases of the
dialogue, “with regard to the extent to which, and the way in which, theenergy problem should be addressed as well as [in] conceptual differences ofthe linkage between energy and other international economic issues” [See
IEA/IER(81)5, page 4]. Other major energy issues on which participantsdisagreed included the supply of oil (responsibility for adequate and stablesupply), the price of oil (including indexation and purchasing power), thecontinuation of consultation after the CIEC, the financial assets of oil
exporting developing countries, and the needs of the energy deficientdeveloping countries.
As the substantive work progressed in the Commission, the participants
did not achieve notable success in narrowing the scope of disagreement on the
key issues. Close co-ordination of views in both groups was maintained. For
the industrial countries this was carried out on a regular basis in the IEA; andfor the OPEC and the oil importing developing countries, views were coordinated in separate caucuses. Early in 1976 the IEA presented to theCommission a document entitled “Statistical Data and Projects, World Energy
Consumption and Supply”, and other participants submitted documents on a
range of subjects. Both groups soon agreed that the “era of oil is transitional
and a switch to other sources of energy will have to be made”, but they could
not agree on the timing of this switch or on the corresponding structuralchanges. Price issues, as expected, attracted special attention. Indexation was
promoted by the developing countries, but within a broader framework ofcommodity prices, so the price issue was also examined in the Raw Materials
Commission. Both the United States and the EEC acknowledged that
protection of the producer countries’ purchasing power was a legitimate
concern, yet the industrial countries rejected the indexation of prices as asolution. While the industrial countries sought an uninterrupted supply ofenergy, the producer countries stated that they would talk about supply onlyin “commercial” terms. Early meetings did take up the United States’
proposal for an International Energy Institute (IEI) to organize work on
developing country problems and considered the special problems of theenergy deficient developing countries as well. At the close of the first phase of
the Conference in July 1976, the participants recognized that the analyticalwork had made a contribution to an understanding of the problems, but“some disappointment was expressed at the lack of concrete results”[IEA/IER(81)5, p. 10].
The second phase, beginning immediately thereafter, was to be “action
oriented”. The participants produced a number of clarifying proposal papers
which dealt with the major issues, supported with additional technical338

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analysis. Subjects included supply, prices, co-operation, the International
Energy Institute, research and development, and “action oriented
consultations” to be conducted on a continuing basis after the close of theConference. While some progress was made on issues which had been
essentially agreed upon earlier, the main controversial issues remained
unsettled. By November 1976 there were signs that arguments were simply
being repeated and that the Commission was unable to make progress.
The concluding phase of the Conference occurred in April andMay 1977, when intense discussions continued and proposals were formulated
for agreements, decisions, commitments, and recommendations to be taken
up in the Commissions and eventually by the closing Ministerial Conference.
In the end, despite a few points of agreement, the areas of disagreement
continued to predominate. After further intense discussions in the Final
Ministerial Conference on 30 May - 2 June 1977, the CIEC Ministers adopted
the Report of the Conference, in which they recognized that the issues in eachof the areas examined by the Conference were closely interrelated, and theyagreed on a number of points on energy, stated as follows:
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.

Conclusion and recommendation on availability andsupply in a commercial sense, except for purchasing power
constraints.
Recognition of depletable nature of oil and gas. Transition
from an oil based energy mix to more permanent andrenewable sources of energy.
Conservation and increased efficiency of energy utilization.
Need to develop all forms of energy.
General conclusions and recommendations for national action
and international co-operation in the energy field [See p. 22].

One of the recommendations referred to in item 5 above concerned energy
R & D co-operation, on which the IEA had made suggestions in the courseof the Conference on the Agency’s openness to greater participation of thedeveloping countries in IEA programmes and projects [See Chapter V,
Section C-5 above].
Though the participants found some points of agreement, they
disagreed on the other issues which were, of course, among the mostimportant ones to them:1.

Price of energy and purchasing power of energy export
earnings.
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2.
3.

4.
5.

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Accumulated revenues from oil exports.
Financial assistance to bridge external payments problemsof oil importing countries or oil importing developing
countries.
Recommendations on resources within the Law of the Sea
Conference.
Continuing consultations on energy [See p. 23].

In addition, the participants were not able to agree on questions concerning
the financial assets of oil exporting developing countries.
Overall the “participants considered that their intensive discussions
have contributed to a broader understanding of the international economic
situation and have been useful to all participants”[IEA/IER(81)5, p. 23].
They agreed to transmit the results of the Conference to the United Nations,where the dialogue would be continued between developed and developing
countries. Finally, the participants agreed to carry out “in a timely andeffective manner the measures for international co-operation agreed to” in
the Conference and invited the countries which did not participate in the
Conference to join in this co-operative effort. The CIEC closed on that note,with a greater sense of disappointment than achievement.
The second regular meeting of IEA Ministers convened a few months
after the close of the Conference, providing them with an immediate
opportunity to assess the CIEC [See IEA/GB(77)48(2nd Revision),paragraphs 13-17]. There was little occasion for rejoicing about theConference, but taking a positive view of the outcome, Ministers. . . expressed their view that the Conference had helped oil
producing and consuming countries to improve theirunderstanding of the world energy supply and demand situationand of their respective responsibilities for managing the transition
from oil to more plentiful and renewable energy resources.
Ministers expressed their conviction that problems of energy
supply and demand are among the important issues which will
have to be resolved in order to assure an improving world
economy, and that international co-operation has a considerable
role to play in this.
Ministers reaffirmed the objective of IEA Member countries
to make a positive and constructive contribution to such
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international energy co-operation. They stressed their
preparedness to intensify effective co-operation with developing
countries in ways which are suitable to all countries concerned.
A hint of constructive disappointment may be seen in this Ministerial
statement. The Conference failed on the essential points, an outcome notmentioned at all in the Communiqué. In the Conference process, theparticipants did deepen their understanding of the issues and the various
positions and views, which was inevitable. Although IEA Members would
continue their spirit of international co-operation with others on energy,
notable promise could be seen clearly only with respect to the developing
countries. Co-operation with the developing countries would have to takeplace, not in a specialized and efficacious energy forum, but in the United
Nations where the industrial countries, as a minority, would find it difficult
to achieve progress in dealing with their concerns, and where a maininterest of the majority of U.N. Member States at that time was theestablishment of the New International Economic Order promoted by thedeveloping countries.
Throughout most of the 1980s, IEA Members continued to speakof a resumption of the dialogue with the oil producers, but withoutaffirmative results. Successive IEA Ministerial meetings referred generally
to the importance of a common approach of producing and consuming
countries. These statements of continuing policy furthering dialogue weresoftened as the years passed; eventually they disappeared entirely from the
IEA Ministerial Communiqués. The IEA’s relations with oil producers on
the major issues thus fell away from consideration in a multilateral forum,
and all the parties returned to the process of essentially bilateral contacts
between individual producer and consumer countries. IEA Executive
Director Ulf Lantzke summarized this situation in 1984 at the timeof his retirement, looking back over his years of IEA responsibilities:“The one area where the IEA has made little progress during the last
10 years is in its relations with OPEC” [AHGIER, Room Document No. 2,
26 March 1984].
That characterization did not, however, prove to be altogether accurate
for the second ten years of the Agency’s history. In 1991-1992, organizedcontacts between producers and consumers were resumed at both thepolitical and technical levels, as discussed in Section E below. In themeantime the Agency’s focus on non-Member relations shifted by necessity inthe aftermath of the CIEC to the problems of the developing countries, whichis the subject of the next Section.
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C. Policies and Actions Concerning
Developing Countries
The Agency has always been responsive to the particular energy needs of thedeveloping countries, especially of those which have been characterized as“energy deficient developing countries”, sometimes abbreviated as EDDCs in
CIEC documents. If the industrial countries suffered economically inconsequence of the 1973-1974 crisis oil supply disruptions, supply
instability, and price increases, the developing countries suffered as much or
more so, and their problems were not ignored when the founders of the
Agency were developing the new energy policies and expectations of theindustrial countries. Both the Washington Energy Conference and the I.E.P.
Agreement which established the IEA referred specifically to the developing
countries in the context of future multilateral relations with the oil producers
and “other consumers” [See Section A above], and the Agency’s preparations
for the CIEC took these elements fully into account. In the CIEC’s 1977 final
Report, the Conference agreed that the ongoing dialogue between developed
and developing countries should continue to be actively pursued in the
United Nations system and in other appropriate bodies, thereby shifting theissues institutionally into a forum where the developing countries enjoyedsignificant advantages. In the U.N. General Assembly, developing countries
held a substantial majority of the voting power and were in the process ofattempting to establish a New International Economic Order (NIEO) basedon the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which had been
adopted in 1974 by the General Assembly with massive developing country
support despite the opposition of major industrial countries. After their
CIEC experiences, developing countries could expect to find in the U.N.
greater opportunities to advance their interests in■■■

The financing of exploration and development of their indigenous
energy resources.
Access to and transfer of energy related technology on concessionalterms.
Financial aid to help them bridge their oil-induced balance of
payments deficits.

However, there was a risk that in the U.N. system energy issues would bejoined with the broader range of developing country demands and thus
would fail to receive the attention desired by the developing countries andproducer countries alike. For the consumer countries this outcome could
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reduce the effectiveness of efforts to assist the developing countries. Yet atthat stage there was no viable alternative to the United Nations forum, anddeveloping country energy policy action became lodged in the U.N., while the
IEA continued to act within its own institutional framework as opportunities
were presented.
Despite the potential difficulties brought by these 1977 institutionalchanges, the IEA maintained its strong support for helping to meetdeveloping country energy needs and concerns. Shortly after the close of
the CIEC, IEA Ministers “stressed their preparedness to intensify effective
co-operation with developing countries in ways which are suitable to all
countries concerned” [IEA/GB(77)48(2nd Revision), paragraph 15].
Ministers made a searching inquiry into various areas of co-operation with
developing countries, noting that better systems of regular exchange of
information on world energy demand and supply, of co-operation indevelopment of their various energy sources, and of co-operation in energy
R & D might prove suitable for further examination [See paragraph 16].
On a broader basis,
Ministers agreed that IEA Member countries would keep underreview developments in the field of energy with a view to
identifying opportunities for co-operation with developing
countries, (both bilaterally and within the framework of
the United Nations and other international organisations)[Paragraph 17].
An important practical step was to prepare an inventory on aid given
by IEA countries to developing countries in the field of renewable energy,
which the Agency’s Ad Hoc Group/CNMC did in 1978. The Secretariat
expanded its contacts with officials of developing countries to discuss energy
problems and issues of common interest, and the Agency participated in a
growing number of non-OECD intergovernmental meetings on energy in1978 and later years. In December 1978 the IEA hosted in Paris aWorkshop on Energy Data of Developing Countries to examine the collection,
reporting, and analysis of energy data of the developing countries, and to
improve energy forecasts and policy analysis. Over thirty energy experts
from fifteen developing countries, international organizations, and OECD
countries participated in the Workshop. The IEA published and widelydistributed the proceedings of the Workshop together with comprehensive
energy statistics and energy balances for sixteen developing countries. In
1980 the IEA joined with the Commission of the European Communities and343

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the U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)
to organize a second energy data workshop, this time on the subject of dataon non-commercial energy sources.
In May 1977 IEA Ministers reaffirmed their objective of making “apositive and constructive contribution” to international energy co-operation,and in successive Ministerials they made similar statements of this policy
priority for developing countries. They also agreed to continue their ongoing
IEA activities involving developing countries, “including informal contacts
with a variety of developing countries and international organisations, IEA
workshops and R and D projects, and close attention to the United Nations
Conference on New and Renewable Energy Sources” [See IEA/GB(79)35,
paragraph 17]. In December 1979
Ministers underlined their concern and recognition of the factthat development policies might be compromised if developing
countries do not have sufficient energy resources at reasonable
prices and stressed the need for energy specific action to help
developing countries in meeting their energy requirements[IEA/GB(80)5, p. 2; emphasis added].
In the years that followed, the IEA participated in a number of U.N.
sponsored conferences and other activities designed to assist the developing
countries. Work on renewable energy sources was highlighted during 19781981 as part of the energy issues considered in the U.N. Global Negotiations.
Recognizing the need for greater co-ordination of the industrial countries’
efforts to assist developing countries with renewable energy sources, in 1978
the OECD Council established a Working Party on this subject. The Working
Party’s Report, known as the McPhail Report, reviewed the state ofdevelopment of renewable technologies and opportunities for co-operation inthis field, preparing in this way the work of the Nairobi Conference on New
and Renewable Sources of Energy in 1981 which adopted many of thepriorities identified in the McPhail Report [See IEA/IER(82)1].
In 1981 IEA Members continued to exchange views and explore
possible lines of action concerning energy issues of interest to the developing
countries, in particular in connection with the Nairobi Conference and related
meetings in which the IEA participated. The Secretariat followed events inthis broadening spectrum, including the work of the Brandt Commission and
the Cancún Summit and reported on energy aspects of the conferences andother activities to the Ad Hoc Group/CNMC and the Governing Board as
appropriate. The Agency submitted to the Nairobi Conference a document on344

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the R & D co-operation of IEA Members in the field of new and renewablesources of energy, as well as on the possibilities for co-operation with nonMember countries and in particular with developing countries. The Nairobi
Conference situated new and renewable energy sources in the “global energy
context” with emphasis on developing countries, but dealt with these energy
sources separately from other global issues [See IEA/IER(82)1]. Restating theneed for a transition away from hydrocarbon energy, the Conference adopted
the “Nairobi Programme of Action” which dealt specifically with new andrenewable energy sources at all levels, but recognized the importance of workat the national level. The Programme identified the following areas forpriority action:■■■

Energy assessment and planning (calling for international cooperation to be directed to the assistance of national efforts to assessneeds and technologies and to develop energy programs).
Research, development, and demonstration (stating the need for focal
points to develop and implement a systematic approach).
Information flows, education and training.

In February 1982 the Secretariat noted in a circular letter to IEAMember Heads of Delegation that although the Nairobi Conference andCancún Summit “were conducive to creating a better political climate foraddressing issues pertaining to international energy co-operation”,. . . it is still difficult to see that practical results are flowing
from these conferences, or indeed from earlier international
discussions of similar topics [IEA/DED/82.29; emphasis added].
The circular letter called for a comprehensive review of this subject in the Ad
Hoc Group/CNMC and expressed the hope that progress might be madetowards some degree of consensus on (1) agreement that the industrial
countries should “help alleviate the energy problems of the developing
countries”, (2) the need for a “high degree of international co-ordination (atboth multilateral and bilateral levels) in order to obtain practical and effective
results”, (3) the direction of the IEA’s work in this area, and (4) ways for
Members to contribute to “improved practical results in energy through otherinternational organizations working in this area”.
This comprehensive review took place as proposed, and the issues
raised in the circular letter were addressed by IEA Ministers in their meetingof May 1982, in a major statement on developing country questions:345

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Because of the global nature of energy questions, Ministers
agreed on the importance of all countries recognising the natureof energy as a decisive element for progress in the world economy
and, in particular, for the development of the poorer countries.
They agreed that the Programme of Action adopted by the
Nairobi Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy
reflects a pragmatic approach to that end, and that the IEA and
its Member countries will make a positive and constructive
contribution to its sustained and effective implementation[IEA/GB(82)54(Final), paragraph 14].
The Ministers went on to emphasize the need for a co-ordinated effort todevelop the indigenous resources of developing countries and recognized“that their expeditious development will require finance, expertise andtechnology”. While external financial support had risen significantly,“continued weight will be given to energy in both multilateral and national
aid programmes”. The Ministers “agreed upon the need for better
understanding of constraints affecting energy investment in developing
countries, and for co-operative participation by enterprises with significant
financial and technological resources as well as by governments andinternational organisations” [Emphasis added].
In the Nairobi Conference follow-up meeting held in Rome inJune 1982, the IEA Secretariat offered stepped-up co-operation with
developing countries in the fields of energy data, education, and training(workshops, seminars, and traineeships in the energy area), as well as
collaboration in energy RD & D. These concrete contributions were made by
IEA Members after the Ad Hoc Group/CNMC carried out thecomprehensive review referred to in the Secretariat’s circular letter ofFebruary 1982 on this subject.
In later years, IEA Ministers continued generally to support theenergy objectives of the developing countries. In 1983 they emphasizedthat energy “is particularly important for developing countries” [IEA/
GB(83)36(Final), p. 3] and referred again to indigenous energy resources,
stating that
Development of the indigenous energy resources, including
new and renewable energy, of the developing countries
could in its turn make an important contribution to improving
the world energy situation [IEA/GB(83)36(Final), Annex I,p. 5].
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Four years later the increased production of hydrocarbons in developing
countries remained a major Ministerial concern. In their most specificstatement on hydrocarbon investment, Ministers declared in theirCommuniqué that
IEA countries will give increased attention to sound investments
in exploration and development activities of developing countries
with significant potential for future hydrocarbon supply.
Ministers will support activities of international organisations to
help improve investment regimes or to help finance investment inenergy sectors of developing countries, as well as bilateraldevelopment aid projects directed towards energy[IEA/GB(87)33, Annex, paragraph 35].
In the fashion of earlier policy statements, this passage provides essential
policy support in general terms without promising direct and tangible
contributions from the IEA. The IEA was not intended to be, and has not
evolved into, a development assistance distribution agency. The IEA does
not dispose of the infrastructure or resources needed to dispense development
assistance, which the Agency leaves to the United Nations institutions and toother organizations as well as to Members’ bilateral programmes. What the
IEA could envisage was to share experience, to lend political support in this
sector, and to promote and develop such practical activities as energy
analyses and assessments, energy data availability, energy policy advice,
relevant education and training, and developing country participation in the
IEA’s energy R & D projects in appropriate cases.
These activities continued throughout this period and to the presentday. In 1983 the IEA, together with the Latin American Energy
Organization, the Government of Peru, and the European Communities,
organized in Lima a Seminar on the “Rational Use of Energy in Industry”,
and the IEA expanded and up-dated its energy data base to include data on
forty-five developing countries, thus ensuring the production of more accurate
and useful energy statistics. In 1984 at St-Germain-en-Laye, near Paris, theAgency conducted a “Consultative Meeting on Hydrocarbon Investment in
Developing Countries” which was attended by high-level participants fromdeveloping countries, financial institutions, and the oil industry, and the views
expressed on this occasion were later integrated into IEA work in this field. In
1987 the IEA conducted a third developing country energy data Workshop(following the Paris Workshops in 1978 and in 1980). The IEA organized
this third Workshop in Tokyo with the Government of Japan and the Asian347

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Development Bank. The participants consisted of a number of IEA Members
and representatives from twelve developing countries. In 1991 the Governing
Board took further action to welcome developing country (and other nonMember country) “Associate” participation in the Agency’s energy R & D
programmes and projects, and since then a number of developing countries
have already joined these IEA activities [See Chapter V, Section C-5 above].
To the present day the Agency has also continued to co-operate with
developing countries and to monitor and report on developments in thesecountries, particularly through bilateral contacts and the activities ofmultilateral and regional organizations, energy conferences, and workshops.
As the IEA’s non-Member country activities enlarged significantly during
the late 1980s and early 1990s, increasing attention was devoted to Central
and Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Asia-Pacific region, and Africa,
and the Agency’s global perspective was confirmed. In recent years,
the Agency’s policies and actions with respect to developing countries
have evolved in that global context, which is taken up in the Sections tofollow.

D. Globalisation of IEA Policies and Actions
The worldwide energy perspectives of the IEA from the outset in 1974 areapparent from the early IEA history discussion in Section A above, whichshows that the broad international aspects of the IEA’s energy policies andactions were not only anticipated, but also sanctioned and regularly acted
upon. In the mid-1970s the IEA placed its main non-Member countryemphasis on the dialogue with oil producing countries [See Section B above],
and then from 1978 to the mid-1980s it concentrated more on the developing
countries, as discussed in Section C above. Since that time, the Agency has
broadened again its focus to increase its already established interest in the
global dimensions of energy. Although this interest has extended to the oil
producing countries and developing countries as before, the globalisation of
IEA policy has brought greater attention to energy questions in Central andEastern Europe, Latin America, the Asia-Pacific region, and Africa. The
signs of this shift in emphasis began appearing as early as 1981 when the Ad
Hoc Group/CNMC took up the question of East-West energy relations thenunder consideration in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe,and in 1982 when IEA Ministers first spoke of “the global nature of energy
questions” [IEA/GB(82)54(Final), paragraph 14; emphasis added]. More
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systematic work in this area began with the dramatic political and economicchanges in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, and thisglobalisation trend has continued to the present day.
IEA Ministers carried out a major assessment of IEA non-Member
country policy in 1993, stating in their Communiqué some of the reasonsfor the global perspective:
The IEA’s pursuit of energy security has been enlarged, now
encompassing more intensive contacts with non-Member
countries to assist them in developing energy strategies andadopting energy policies that will contribute to their development
and enhance global energy security. There are several reasons for
this:■
Non-Member countries are playing and will play anincreasingly important role in global energy demand, as
energy demand growth there continues to outpace that in
IEA countries.
■
Consequently, non-Member regions will also be of greater
significance in terms of global energy-related
environmental problems.
■
In a number of key areas, energy supplies increasingly
come from non-Member countries, and Member countries’
energy logistical systems are more tied to them.
■
A growing number of non-Member countries are reaching a
stage of transition or development that is drawing themcloser to the OECD world and prompting collaboration
between them and the IEA [IEA/GB(93)41, paragraph 26;
emphasis added].
This overall assessment, addressing the recent past as well as the future,strongly reflects IEA policy statements and actions of the period from themid-1980s on. In 1985 IEA Ministers spoke of energy developments being of“global” importance and referred to “sound energy policy actions both insideand outside IEA countries” [IEA/GB(85)46, page 9]; and they spoke again
to like effect in 1987 [IEA/GB(87)33, Annex, paragraph 34]. IEA actions
during the corresponding period reflected these policy broadening
declarations. In 1984 the IEA kept under review the supply and demandsituation of the Centrally Planned Economies, especially the Soviet Union,and gave specific attention to questions of East-West trade and to energy
developments in the People’s Republic of China. In the following year, the349

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IEA analyzed energy developments in the Asia-Pacific region, and on natural
gas issues in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, while work continued on
East-West trade, and an analysis of OPEC financial questions and future
supply potential was carried out by experts in the Secretariat. The IEA
enlarged this work in 1986 to include the future impact of lower oil prices on
the energy needs of non-OECD countries, and energy developments in the
Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America, and in 1987 this work was
further broadened to include sub-Sahara Africa, China, the Soviet Union,
and the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf area. In 1988 the IEA continued
these activities and extended them further to include South Asia.
When IEA Ministers met in 1989, the scope of IEA work had alreadybecome truly “global”, but the nature of its global focus evolved as the postWorld War II status quo in Central and Eastern Europe gave way to
movement towards democratic institutions and to the transition to market
oriented economies. Ministers noted the stronger impact of non-Member
demand on the world energy situation and upon the ability of IEA countries
to pursue effectively their energy policies, “especially those relating to greater
energy efficiency and to energy and the environment”. Ministers “welcomed
the significant progress which the IEA has made in providing more
information and better understanding about energy developments in nonMember countries (including a more comprehensive statistical data base)”.
Ministers agreed that the Agency’s actions in this sector should be continued,that contacts with non-Members on energy data, energy demand andefficiency, and energy and the environment should be established andmaintained, and that the IEA should “help keep non-Member countries
informed as to the content and purposes of the IEA and its policies”[IEA/GB(89)36, Annex, paragraph 5].
The changing political situation in Poland sharpened the IEA’s focus
on Central and Eastern Europe, both for energy policy and forenvironmental considerations. In 1989 Poland was moving towards its firstelection with contesting parties since 1949, and the IEA took the first of
many initiatives in response to movements in the region. Acting on an offer
by Denmark to host a seminar on the energy sector of Poland, the Governing
Board agreed that the IEA and Denmark should serve as its co-sponsors. The
seminar, on the subject of “Energy in East and West: The Polish Case”, took
place in Copenhagen in April 1990. The IEA then carried out a detailed
survey of the Polish energy sector, the first IEA energy survey of a nonMember country. The results of this work were published the following year
under the title Energy Policies - Poland 1990 Survey. Demonstrating thegrowing collaboration of the Agency and the Polish authorities, the survey
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assessed Poland’s energy situation and its energy policies and industries, andlooked carefully at energy efficiency, conservation, and environmental
questions in Poland. This IEA initiative also offered policy recommendations
and indications of areas where the IEA might be of assistance to Poland.
Studies of national and regional energy policies continued in othercountries and regions. The IEA prepared a report on the energy sector in the
USSR as part of the joint IMF, IBRD, OECD, and EBRD study on “TheEconomy of the USSR” initiated by the July 1990 Houston G-7 Summit.
The IEA also analyzed the rapid rates of growth in energy demandoccurring in non-OECD countries, particularly the Dynamic Asian
Economies (DAEs): energy demand had already increased to the point
where over 50 per cent of it was arising in non-OECD countries. In
consequence, the IEA stepped up its worldwide energy monitoring andmaintained close co-operation with regional international organizations.
In 1991 when IEA Ministers next met, IEA policy declarations on
non-Member policy were further strengthened:
Non-Member Countries: Ministers welcomed the growing
convergence of the energy interests of OECD and non-OECD
countries. With half of the world’s energy consumption now
occurring outside the OECD area, Ministers stressed the need forthe IEA to develop expanded relations with these countries.
Assisting non-OECD countries in the development, and where
necessary, the restructuring of their energy systems would bemutually beneficial. Ministers recognised the importance ofsound relations with oil producing countries and agreed that
contacts should be further developed to promote communication
and understanding among oil market participants[IEA/GB(91)42/REV2, paragraph 3; emphasis added].
IEA Ministers confirmed their 1989 policies as described above andunderscored the active role the Agency should play in its relations with nonMember countries, including “the need for the IEA to provide advice tothese countries on the development of sound energy policies and strategies,
based upon a market-oriented approach” [IEA/GB(91)42/REV2, Section V;
emphasis added]. More specifically,In the face of growing environmental difficulties and thechallenge of global climate change, they noted that thesecountries could benefit from the experience of IEA countries in351

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integrating energy and environmental policies. Ministers also
recognised the vulnerability of these countries to oil supply
disruptions and price variations, and therefore urged the IEA toundertake work on how market mechanisms might be used tohelp them cope with such contingencies [Emphasis added].
IEA Ministers then declared more specific Agency policies (in addition to thegeneral policies quoted above) on a broad range of non-Member countries,
regions, and functions, which may be summarized as follows:
■

■

■

■

■

■

352

Central and Eastern Europe: The Agency should have acomprehensive policy, including support for energy surveys and thecountries’ participation in appropriate IEA activities, for assisting inliberalization and reform.
USSR: As the USSR progresses in its fundamental economic reforms,
the IEA should extend a wider range of assistance, along the lines
identified in the IEA’s 1990 report on the energy sector in the USSR.
The IEA should provide more detailed information, policy analysis, andrecommendations on energy in the USSR. Special attention should begiven to the oil and gas sectors and to the Soviet nuclear programme.
European Energy Charter: Expressing interest in the objectives of theCharter (signed in December 1991; see Chapter IV, Section D-7 above),
Ministers stated that the development of the Charter and protocols
should be non-discriminatory. The European Community, the IEA, andother international organizations should co-operate closely on it.
Asia: Ministers expressed confidence that the continued high rate of
growth of the Dynamic Asian Economies would result in wider
reliance on energy efficiency and fuel substitution technologies, andthey requested the IEA to expand its contacts with the DAEs, “as they
move closer to the OECD world”, and with the large Asian producing
and consuming countries likely to have an influence on the global
economy and environment.
Latin America: Ministers stressed that such major producers andemerging industrial consumers as Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, andArgentina would be increasingly influential in world energy markets,and viewed the interplay of energy and environmental concerns in theregion as “particularly significant”.
Africa: While energy changes in Africa are more moderate than those in
Asia and Latin America, Ministers saw clear evidence of the potential
for change through commercial energy inputs in the continent, and as

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environmental constraints interact with the traditional use of biomassenergy. Ministers also noted the supply-side implications ofcontributions by Nigeria and the Maghreb to energy markets.
Oil Producing Countries: Ministers confirmed their recognition of theimportance of sound relations with oil producing countries. They
agreed that contacts among all market participants should be further
developed “to promote communication and understanding” and that
this would benefit market transparency, and efficiency. Since themarket is the best allocator of resources, “oil production volumes andprice determination should be left to market forces” [Emphasis
added]. The post-Gulf War period provided an opportunity forconstructive discussions which “should be informal and as broadly
based as possible”. (This initiative was an important element in thelead-up to the meetings of producer and consumer countries, which
inaugurated a new and different phase of the “dialogue” beginning in
1991, discussed in Section E below).

During the period between the 1991 and the next Ministerial
Governing Board meeting in mid-1993, the Agency was actively engaged inpursuing the foregoing policies and objectives in a wide spectrum and evergrowing number of specific activities which can be referred to here only
briefly. The IEA responded rapidly to the serious energy problems inheritedin the former Centrally Planned Economies. Calls for IEA assistance inthese countries were made by the conference on “Co-ordination ofAssistance for the New Independent States” held in Washington in January
1992 and by the G-7 Economic Summit countries’ meeting in Munich inJuly 1992 to provide expert advice on potential alternatives to unsafe
nuclear reactors of Soviet design.
The IEA expanded bilateral and multilateral contacts in all of the major
regions of the world. Studies of national energy prospects in non-OECD
regions were a major IEA function, particularly in Central and Eastern
European countries. The 1990 survey of Poland was followed by detailedenergy policy surveys of Hungary (1991) and the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic (1992). The IEA also conducted a survey of Korea which appearedin 1992, and a 1993 survey of Romania which was published in 1993. In
addition, the IEA provided ad hoc advice on energy questions to nonMembers, to the Czech and Slovak Republic, for example, on energy
efficiency and emergency oil supply arrangements, and it developed an energy
study of the three Baltic Republics. Jointly with the World Bank, the IEA
carried out a study of the refineries of Central and Eastern Europe; the353

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Agency also continued to monitor and analyze the far-reaching changes
occurring in the Former Soviet Union and it prepared a seminar on oil
legislation. In 1991 the Secretariat organized a seminar in Berlin on “Power
Generation Management and Structures in East and West” and one in Vienna
on “East-West Energy Trade”; in 1992 seminars were organized in Prague on“Energy and the Environment in European Economies in Transition” and in
Moscow on “Natural Resource Management: The Crude Oil Sector”.
The IEA participated in the “Co-ordinating Conference on Assistance to
the New Independent States”, convened in Washington in January 1992. The
Conference established an Energy Working Group chaired by Venezuela and
The Netherlands with the following objectives: (a) to ascertain the current
situation of the New Independent States and their problems, (b) to selecthumanitarian and short-term activities in support of market-oriented reforms
in the energy sector in order to alleviate these problems, and (c) to ensure
implementation of as many of these activities as possible [See IEA/GB(92)49;
the Working Group’s final report is contained in IEA/GB(92)28ADD]. The
IEA hosted most of this Group’s meetings in Paris, provided secretariat
services, and organized missions to the New Independent States to explore
their assistance requirements in the energy field [See IEA/GB(92)53].
During this period the IEA also provided energy expertise to the WorldBank in the areas of electricity and statistics, and participated with the Bankin missions to Bulgaria and Romania. Since the IEA’s own statistical andreporting work had to be enlarged to meet the growing demand for energy
information in the non-Member areas, the IEA’s monthly Oil Market Report
was expanded in 1991 to include more specific information on the former
Centrally Planned Economies [See Chapter VI, Section D above], and the
Agency stepped up its publication programme on non-Member country
subjects.
Throughout the 1991-1994 period, the IEA continued its active
participation in negotiations on the European Energy Charter, which wassigned in December 1991, and on the Energy Charter Treaty and its Protocol
on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects, which wereopened for signature on 17 December 1994 in Lisbon. The Charter Treaty
establishes legal commitments among the signatories (a number of IEA
Member countries, Central and Eastern European countries and New
Independent States) on such issues as energy trade, investment, and disputesettlement [See Chapter IV, Section D-7 above]. The Treaty also establishes
an organizational process for extending the range of commitments, and fordeepening existing commitments in areas such as nuclear safety andhydrocarbons, and for other purposes.
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IEA activities in Asia and other regions continued as in earlier years
but with greater breadth and depth. The Agency’s relations with Korea
were advanced by the IEA’s first energy survey of Korea, mentioned above,
which was carried out at the request of the government of that country. The
survey was conducted by a Secretariat team, which included a member
from the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency to assist on nuclear matters. The
team visited Korea to examine that country’s energy situation and policies,in what constituted the first IEA review of an Asian non-Member country.
Like other energy surveys by the IEA, the Korean survey developed policy
recommendations adapted to the particular situation of the country. In thiscase, the recommendations concerned measures to enable Korea to reach its
objectives in the energy security and environment sectors, and to reduce its
high level of market intervention. This survey represented a significant step
forward for Korea towards realizing its announced intention of joining theOECD and the IEA [See Section F below on recent membership questions].
In the early 1990s the IEA was also active in enlarging its contacts withother countries in the Asia-Pacific region and in Latin America. The
Secretariat’s visits to these regions contributed to expanding relations
concerning statistical exchange, energy economic modelling, and technology
information. In 1992 the IEA extended its bilateral contacts andmultilateral relations by participating in meetings of regional organizations
such as OLADE, and participating in major regional conferences, including
the 3rd Jakarta International Energy Conference, the 6th Symposium on
Pacific Energy Co-operation, and the APEC Energy Project Group. Thisextended participation of the IEA in bilateral and multilateral meetings has
continued to the present day.
With the Ministerial policy decisions of 1989-1991 and the Agency’s
vastly increased implementing activities described above, the outlook of the
IEA had become well globalised by 1993, when IEA Ministers gave still
more policy guidance for the Agency in this sector, in effect confirming theirearlier declarations and leading the IEA in the direction of further
globalisation. This Ministerial meeting adopted the statement on the reasonsfor globalisation, quoted above. In addition, Ministers stated broadly that
In its relations with non-Member countries, the IEA willcontinue to take a balanced approach, tailoring relations withindividual non-Member countries to the prevailingcircumstances and ensuring that such contacts further IEA
energy security objectives [IEA/GB(93)41, paragraph 27;
emphasis added].
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This “balanced approach” meant that while the IEA would not become auniversal international organization attempting to carrying out all of its
functions worldwide, the Agency would seek to differentiate between groupsof countries on a pragmatic basis to make the most effective use of its
resources. Moreover, Ministers also mentioned the “multiplier effect” to beobtained by closer relations with such international organizations as theWorld Bank, EBRD, OLADE, and APEC, with which the Agency alreadyhad relations and operating experience in working together. Ministers asked
the IEA to continue its analytical work in this sector and emphasized theimportance of developing further bilateral contacts with non-Member
countries.
In Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States,
Ministers noted with concern the decline in Russian energy production, andthey remarked that “Russia’s oil and gas reserves are huge and could
provide significant amounts of foreign exchange needed for critical imports
and to finance the economic reform programme”. Welcoming theconsiderable work already accomplished in the IEA, Ministers agreed on theneed for close co-operation with countries in this region “to improve theoperation of their nuclear facilities to the highest available standards ofsafety, and to contribute to the development of sustainable long-term energy
solutions”. The IEA was instructed to continue its co-operative activities“with a view to helping those countries successfully reform their energy
sectors”. The IEA is to increase its efforts to work with them on“developing safe and clean energy systems and . . . realising the enormous
potential for energy savings and efficiency gains”. Particular emphasis wasplaced on the need for Russia to establish “as quickly as possible the legal
framework necessary to attract investment in its energy sector, particularly
to reverse the decline in oil production”. On a related subject, Ministers
confirmed their earlier support for the European Energy Charter, welcomed
the “IEA’s substantial assistance to the Treaty negotiations”, and supported“the IEA’s active involvement in the ensuing Charter implementation”.
Confirming earlier statements with respect to the Asia-Pacific region,
Ministers supported the co-operative relations developed with Korea andasked the IEA to devise practical ways to expand further its contacts withthis region, including co-operative contacts with APEC. Ministers also
welcomed increased IEA contacts in other regions and again asked the IEA
to intensify its efforts in this sector. They spoke favourably on the subject ofbroader contacts, including the Energy Experts meetings which had brought
together market participants from oil producers as well as consumers andothers.
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The year 1993 also witnessed the adoption of the “IEA Shared Goals”
as a more permanent declaration of IEA Ministers’ energy policies andobjectives [On the adoption of this measure, see generally Chapter II,
Section J above]. In the introduction to the IEA Shared Goals, Ministers
stated the globalisation policy quite broadly:
IEA countries recognise the significance of increasing global
interdependence in energy. They therefore seek to promote theeffective operation of international energy markets andencourage dialogue with all participants [See IEA/GB(93)41,
Annex I; emphasis added].
In Goal 9, Ministers spoke more specifically:
Co-operation among all energy market participants helps toimprove information and understanding, and encourage thedevelopment of efficient, environmentally acceptable and flexible
energy systems and markets worldwide. These are needed tohelp promote the investment, trade and confidence necessary toachieve global energy security and environmental objectives.
In 1993 and 1994 IEA activities with non-Member countries
continued to expand to reflect the Ministerial declarations described above.
Central and Eastern Europe again took the spotlight. In 1993 the IEA
published the proceedings of the “International Conference on Natural
Resource Management: Crude Oil Sector” (Moscow, 1992). The survey of
Romania was published in 1993, following IEA “reconnaissance missions”
and close consultations between Romanian officials and representatives of
IEA Member countries in Paris. In Poland and the Czech Republic, IEA
Secretariat members worked with energy officials on the follow-up to theenergy surveys on these countries published respectively in 1991 and 1992,
and on the development of national energy legislation. The second IEA
survey of the Czech Republic’s energy policies was published in 1994, andthe second energy policy surveys of Poland and Hungary are being publishedin early 1995. As an outgrowth of the Washington Conference of 1992
mentioned above, the Agency participated in technical assistancearrangements, and provided back-up support to help co-ordinate energy
assistance to the New Independent States. Co-ordinated country groupmeetings under the auspices of the World Bank were held for the purpose ofmatching offers with requests for technical assistance, and the IEA
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participated in the discussions of assistance in the energy sector. Moreover,the IEA established the energy part of the OECD/IEA online Register ofmatched and unmatched technical assistance projects, as a service torecipients and to donors in the implementation of its policy of assistance tocountries in this region.
By 1994 a number of these countries, which had not yet become
Members of the OECD, sought membership in the IEA, and the Governing
Board asked the Executive Director to begin discussions with them inparallel with their respective applications for membership in the OECD [SeeIEA/GB(94)25, Item 8]. This was an acceptable and workable procedure inview of the IEA rules limiting access to IEA membership to countries which
are Members of the OECD [See Volume I, Chapter IV, Section A-2]. The
non-Members of the OECD making this request to the IEA were Korea, theCzech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic.
The IEA commenced in 1994 a major survey of the Russian Federation
which is expected to be completed and published in 1995. The preparations
for the survey included an “IEA Workshop on the New Energy Strategy ofRussia”, hosted in Tokyo by the Government of Japan in October 1994. The
Secretariat also carried out a number of research and analysis projects,
including the Central and Eastern European and NIS Chapters of the IEA
study on worldwide natural gas transportation, published in 1994 under thetitle Natural Gas Transportation: Organisation and Regulation. In the same
year the IEA also published works on Russian Energy Prices, Taxes andCosts, and on Electricity in European Economies in Transition.
A major event in IEA co-operation with Russia occurred in Moscow
on 6 July 1994, when representatives of the Russian Federation and the
Agency signed the Joint Declaration of Co-operation in the Field of Energy,
a unique framework declaration on the areas, forms, and modalities of theirco-operation in the energy field [See IEA/GB(94)31; IEA/NMC(94)20]. In
entering into the Declaration, the parties recognized the key role of theenergy sector, the experience of the IEA, andthe desire of the Russian side to create conditions for thedevelopment of the energy sector in the Russian Federation on amarket economy basis . . . [and] to co-operate toward achieving
both that goal and the objectives of the European Energy Charter[Emphasis added].
Energy conservation and efficiency topped the list of the areas of cooperation, followed by “rational and efficient production, extraction and358

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processing, transport, distribution and use of oil, gas, coal, electricity andother sources of energy”. This list also contained information and statistics,
energy R & D, and other energy areas to which the parties would agree. The
forms of co-operation included the review and analysis of policies andissues, programmes and projects, joint seminars and conferences,
information and data exchange, and others to which they would agree. The
stated modalities of the parties’ co-operation are agreements on proposals
for concrete activities, reviews of the IEA’s active and proposed energy
R & D Implementing Agreements in order to facilitate Russianparticipation, periodic progress reviews, and participation of each in theactivities of the other. Moreover, IEA Standing Groups and Committees
would consider inviting Russian attendance at relevant meetings. The
Declaration recognized that “in the increasingly globalised energy market,
co-operation with other energy market participants can strengthen theirbilateral co-operation, and that their bilateral contribution can benefit thefunctioning of the market”. There was also reference to each party bearing
its own costs of the co-operation, and to the extension by the Russian side ofsatisfactory privileges and immunities. It was agreed that thesearrangements would continue for an initial period of one year and would be
automatically renewed thereafter on a yearly basis until terminated on
notice by either party to the other.
In the Asia-Pacific region, the IEA also further expanded its contacts
and activities during this period. After some years of contact between the
Agency and Korea, in May 1993 the Government of Korea expressed its
intention to seek IEA membership in parallel with proceedings formembership in the OECD [See Section F below]. Though formal IEA
membership proceedings were not to be commenced immediately, theAgency and Korea consulted on interim ways in which co-operation could
be augmented between them while Korea was still a non-Member. One
event was the IEA/Korea Conference on Demand-Side Management held in
Seoul in November 1993; another was the direct participation by Korea asan Associate in a number of IEA energy R & D Implementing Agreements[See Chapter V, Section C-5]. The IEA carried out a second energy surveyof Korea in 1994, taking up key issues of energy pricing, emergency
preparedness and oil stocks, energy efficiency and conservation, and energy
and the environment. The IEA also examined the structure, ownership, andregulation of the electricity and gas sectors in Korea. The IEA publishedthis work in 1994 under the title Energy Policies of the Republic of Korea 1994 Survey. Meanwhile, the Agency maintained bilateral contacts in the
Asian area, initiated preliminary contacts with the Government of China,
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Page 360and maintained relations with the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation(APEC), with a view to possible joint activities in the future, particularly
with APEC.
The IEA also enlarged its energy co-operation and contacts in the
Latin America region. In 1994, shortly before Mexico became a Member of
the OECD, it formally sought membership in the IEA. In April 1994 theSecretary of Energy, Mines, and State Owned Industry of Mexico wrote to
the Executive Director expressing the wish to enter into discussions with the
Agency on this subject, and the Governing Board asked the Executive
Director to examine the terms and conditions of membership withrepresentatives of Mexico [IEA/GB(94)25, Item 8(b)]. These discussions
began in mid-1994 and they were not yet been completed at the time ofwriting.
As part of its development of broader relations with Latin America,
early in 1994 the IEA organized jointly with Mexico a “Conference on Energy
Efficiency in Latin America” held in Cancún. The Agency was also
represented at a growing number of conferences in Latin America, including
the 28th Ministerial meeting of OLADE and the Energy Conference of Latin
America and the Caribbean (ENERLAC 93) in 1993, and this IEA conference
activity is expected to continue not only in Latin America, but also worldwide.

E. Producer and Consumer Relations:
New Ministerial Conferences and
IEA Meetings of Experts (Beginningin 1991)
As noted above in the description of IEA Ministerial actions in 1991, in theaftermath of the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis the IEA sensed an opportunity toresume constructive discussions with oil producers. Ministers expressed anearly view that the discussions should be as informal and as broadly based
as possible. This led to the establishment of a pattern of Ministerial orpolitical level meetings of producers and consumers, convened bygovernments (and attended by the IEA) on the one hand, and expert
meetings of the two groups convened by the IEA on the other hand. Thispattern of meetings, begun in 1991, has continued through the time ofwriting at the close of 1994, and will doubtless continue in the near future
pursuant to plans already being developed.
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The first of these new meetings of oil producers and consumers was the
French/Venezuelan “Seminar for Oil Producing and Consuming Countries”
conducted at Ministerial level in Paris on 1-2 July 1991. This Seminarbrought producers and consumers together for the first time since thedisappointing CIEC dialogue meetings held in Paris in 1976-1977.
Reflecting the attitudinal changes favouring the French initiative in 1991,
the oil producer and consumer participants agreed in advance of the meetingthat price management and production questions were to be avoided.
“Indeed, participants agreed that the market itself was the best allocator ofresources” [IEA/NMC(91)9, paragraphs 8 and 9; see IEA/GB(91)56,
paragraph 23]. This Seminar was thus conducted in an atmosphere andunder guidelines altogether different from those of the earlier CIEC meetings[See Section B on the early producer-consumer dialogue]. Following
diplomatic considerations at the time, the IEA Secretariat was represented at
the Paris Seminar by Ambassador G. Quincey Lumsden, Director of the IEA
Office of Oil Market Developments and Non-Member Countries. The main
topics of discussion included Oil Markets and Energy Policies, Industrial Cooperation, Futures Markets, and Energy and the Environment. In his
statement to the Seminar, Ambassador Lumsden noted the “co-operative,
relaxed and non-polemic atmosphere of this Conference arranged by our
French and Venezuelan hosts which signals an end to those several
confrontational aspects that have marked gatherings such as these in thepast” [Intervention of Ambassador Lumsden, 2 July 1991, IEA archives]. He
spoke specifically on the subject of “industrial co-operation”, in outliningsome of the specific elements this co-operation would necessarily involve,
particularly in relation to conditions of competition.
The IEA also put forward at this time an initiative for a meeting ofexperts from energy importing and exporting countries on “energy
developments and policies” under IEA auspices as soon as arrangements
could be made. This meeting would cover, in addition to petroleum and thecentral role it plays, “the related roles of gas, coal, nuclear, hydro andunconventional energy sources, and their inter-relationship with ourenvironmental objectives” [IEA/NMC(91)9, paragraph 9]. It would become
the IEA’s first technical Experts Meeting in the series of new dialogue
meetings, and Norway also at this time expressed its willingness to host aworkshop at political level between producers and consumers, thus
continuing the work at that level. Each of these initiatives found favour
among the Seminar participants, which led to the convening of two moremeetings in a new and strengthened atmosphere of producer-consumer cooperation.
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The IEA hosted the next meeting in this series. After the Governing
Board approved the format and proposed agenda [IEA/GB(91)65, Item 4(d)],this meeting took place in Paris on 24-26 February 1992. This was the firstof two meetings so far, under IEA auspices, of high-level technical experts
from oil exporting and importing countries (the second took place in 1993,
and a third is planned for 1995). The 1992 meeting was convened for expert
technical exchanges on substantive issues other than price and production
targeting, the two major issues on which agreement could not be reached - oreven approached - at the CIEC. Over 200 technical experts from forty-fourcountries, eight international organizations, and eighteen energy and othercompanies attended, and IEA Executive Director Helga Steeg opened andclosed the meeting. The organization of the meeting was sharply focused on
business-like questions of energy, without being encumbered with the broader
economic and political issues that had complicated and troubled the earlier
CIEC.
The 1992 IEA meeting was organized in four sections: Energy
Information Exchange, Energy Efficiency and Environment, Industrial Cooperation, and Market Mechanisms. On the subject of information, thefollowing proposals and ideas emerged from the meeting: the IEA could act asan “information clearing house” for energy statistics; various groups could
develop a statistical gathering system for the Republics of the Former Soviet
Union; a new independent body, charged with worldwide data collection,
could be created; and the IEA could make available the Agency’s regularstatistics to countries and institutions prepared in return to share theirstatistics. On Industrial Co-operation, there were proposals and ideas toreinforce efforts to bring non-Members into the IEA’s energy R & D
Implementing Agreements on projects, information sharing, anddissemination, and to develop a comparative survey and analysis ofinvestment requirements in the energy sector over the next 10-15 years. For
Energy Efficiency and Environment, the IEA was prepared to consider cooperation on specific data and analysis with interested parties; and theintroduction of the IEA GREENTIE information system should be accelerated
to assist non-Member countries. Finally, on Market Mechanisms, there were
proposals and ideas to carry out a study of structural changes on oil demand,
to examine “price volatility” elements, and to monitor key oil markets todetermine whether they were subject to “any form of manipulation”.
The informal structure of the meeting, without communiqué or otherformal record, helped foster an atmosphere in which all participants could
speak fully and freely. The meeting engendered many new and worthwhile
personal contacts among the representatives of producer and consumer
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countries and other participants. The widely appreciated utility of suchmeetings made a convincing case for continuing them [See “Report on the
Energy Experts Meeting — 24th-26th February 1992”, contained in IEACommittee on Non-Member Countries Room Document No. 1,
10 May 1993], and indeed a second IEA-hosted meeting of the experts took
place in 1993, following the second political level meeting held in July 1992
at Bergen, Norway.
At the Bergen Ministerial Workshop of oil producers and consumers,
the participants took up the subject of energy co-operation under a broad
foreign policy and economic perspective. Like the Paris Seminar, the Bergen
Workshop did not seek to bring about agreements or the establishment of
new institutions. There was no official communiqué. In the keynote
address, Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland called for “a global energy
policy inter-relationship”. In addition to energy co-operation amongproducers and consumers, the workshop considered links among energy,
the environment and economic development, energy supply, investment,
and the “common energy future”. Questions of a possible “carbon tax”
attracted a great deal of attention. The IEA was represented by Executive
Director Helga Steeg who confirmed her view that in this period following
the end of the Gulf crisis, opportunities for greater co-operation are in part
dependent on workshops of this kind to sort out the interests of producers
and consumers, and to develop the requisite understanding between them.
Mrs. Steeg also suggested the possibility of a second technical workshop on
producer-consumer relations as a follow-up to the February 1992 meeting
hosted by the IEA in Paris. Following the 1991 precedent in the
French/Venezuelan Seminar, the Spanish authorities also offered to hold thenext political level meeting.
In the meantime, on 29-30 November 1993 the IEA hosted in Paris thesecond Meeting of Experts from producer and consumer countries, under the
Chairmanship of Executive Director Helga Steeg. The participants in thismeeting included all twenty-three IEA Member countries, the European
Union, twenty-two non-Member countries, eight international institutions,and twenty-five private companies and other organizations. Principal agenda
sessions were devoted to Long-Term Energy Outlooks; Efficiency, Technology
and Environment; and Investment Requirements; throughout, the emphasis
was placed on analysis and understanding rather than the production of
proposals and ideas identified as such. In her summary at the close of thismeeting, Mrs. Steeg cited energy’s twin responsibilities to support economic
growth and to enhance the environment. If the two days of discussion showedthat a matrix of solutions has not yet been found, she observed that363

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nevertheless “it is through exchanges of experts’ views at technical sessions
such as these that different mixes of policy measures can be considered as
potential elements in advising governments and companies”. The interests ofbuyers and sellers are obviously different in many respects. However, she
noted the advantages of the absence of a politicized dialogue, and theusefulness of examining “framework conditions” through which producers
and consumers could better “assure companies and financial institutions that
reliable and predictable ground rules will govern investment decisions”. She
highlighted the need for investments to be deployed to open energy resource
reserves and the general desirability of international co-operation. Although
the IEA is not a “technical transfer agency”, it does facilitate technology
transfer by means of its energy R & D Implementing Agreements [SeeChapter V, Section C above]. She concluded that the Agency was prepared tocontinue these technical meetings of experts from oil exporting andconsuming countries, and that “the timing and substance of a future meeting
would be worked out in consensus with the parties concerned” [See
IEA/NMC(94)3, pp. 1-2].
The most recent meeting in this series was the third Ministerial levelmeeting conducted in Cartagena, Spain on 19-20 September 1994 under
the auspices of the Government of Spain in collaboration with theGovernments of Algeria and Mexico. This conference was attended bymore than thirty countries and a number of international organizations,
including the IEA, OPEC, the European Union, and the United Nations.
The IEA delegation was again led by Executive Director Helga Steeg. The
Conference devoted one session each to the following topics: Energy andthe Environment, the Outlook for Oil and Other Energy Markets, andNatural Gas in the Present and Future Energy Context. Mrs. Steeg madestatements on energy and the environment and on the IEA’s energy R & D
programmes and projects. Like its predecessor, this Conference did not
adopt a communiqué or other formal meeting record. However, theConference did note the willingness of the Governments to continue thisforum of producing and consuming countries, and it was proposed that the
fourth political level conference take place in Venezuela. Planning is now
proceeding for the conference to take place in that country in September
1995. Moreover, at Cartagena Mrs. Steeg announced plans for the next
IEA Meeting of Experts, the third technical level meeting, which took placein Paris, on 12-13 April 1995. On 18 November 1994 Mr. Robert Priddle,
appointed as IEA Executive Director on the previous day, stated that he“would continue the ‘technical dialogue’ initiated by the IEA underMrs. Steeg, among producing and consuming countries”. He also364

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differentiated “between a ‘technical dialogue’ among experts and a‘political dialogue with Ministers’” [See Platt’s Global Alert, 18 November
1994, Item 59]. At the close of 1994, the stage was thus being set for thisseries of meetings to be continued essentially according to the patternwhich had been developed in the period 1991-1994.

F. The IEA Review of Relations with
Non-Members 1992-1994
By early 1992 the international relations of the IEA had evolved to the point
where Members and the Secretariat concluded that a comprehensive reviewof the Agency’s non-Member policies would be a timely and worthwhiledevelopment. The policy evolution towards globalisation and concerns
about the environment, taken up in Sections D and E above, had resulted
from the underlying changes which were taking place throughout the energy
world. These were summarized by Executive Director Helga Steeg to theGoverning Board on 11 May 1992:
Clearly, the world has changed since the establishment of the
IEA in 1974, in almost every aspect of the energy sector. I
mention only a few changes: the globalisation of energy markets,the evolving position of oil producers, the increasing role of[developing countries] in energy demand, the political andeconomic changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS,
and, last but not least, the growing focus on the relationshipbetween energy and environmental policies [IEA/GB(92)25,
Annex].
These developments had been leading to increased contacts between the
Agency and those non-Member countries that wished to draw closer to the
Agency, in order to participate in IEA activities (conferences, workshops,
information exchange, and energy R & D projects), attend IEA meetings, or
eventually establish permanent relations with the Agency or indeed full
membership in it. The IEA had already enlarged the scope of its activities
with non-Member countries as described above, and in 1990 it changed thename of the responsible Ad Hoc Group in this sector to the “Committee on
Non-Member Countries”, which better describes the widening scope andpermanence of its activities.
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Responding further to these developments, the IEA conducted an
informal “IEA Brainstorming Session” in Rueil-Malmaison outside of Paris in
March 1992 on the subject of non-Member questions of current interest. Oneof the outcomes of that session was the recognition that the IEA needed to
refocus energy security concerns to reflect the growing importance of nonMember countries (NMCs), and this led to the Board’s adoption, in May 1992
on an interim basis, of a new and elaborate “IEA General Policy Guidance”
and of new “Guidelines for Areas of NMC Co-operation” [IEA/GB(92)25,
Item 5]. At that time the Board broadened the Committee’s formal mandates
to reflect the evolving policies. In reaching these decisions, the Board acted on
the basis of a Secretariat document entitled “Participation by Non-Member
Countries in the Activities of the IEA” [See IEA/GB(92)18/FINAL] and of the
Executive Director’s Introduction to this subject, quoted above [Annex to
IEA/GB(92)25]. The Board’s actions overall called for greater flexibility andthe capacity for quick decisions on international energy relations questions,
without revising the I.E.P. Agreement (which already contained the essential
mandates) and without reducing the Agency’s priorities in the area of energy
security (which was expanding in this process).
The May 1992 Governing Board meeting adopted not only its“Guidelines for Non-Member Country Relations” which are set forth below as
amended in 1994, but also two further decisions on the mandate of the CNMC:(i) the Committee on Non-Member Countries shall, taking
into account the views of the Standing Groups and othercommittees of the Agency, advise the Secretariat and advise
the Standing Groups and other committees of the Agency
with regard to non-Member country activities;(ii) overall policy guidance and decisions shall continue to be
the responsibility of the Governing Board [IEA/GB(92)25,
Item 5(d)].
In paragraph (e) of these Conclusions the Board requested the Committee toensure that information on the Agency’s activities in this sector becommunicated to Members and that Members’ views be communicated to theSecretariat. The Committee reports regularly on this subject to the Board.
Moreover, the operative Secretariat document entitled “Participation by
Non-Member Countries in the Activities of the IEA” contained a Part IV on“Expanded Role of the NMC Committee”, which proposed a recommendationthat the Committee’s role be expanded to enable it to serve better as aconsultation point, entailing more frequent Committee meetings and more366

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far-reaching functions [IEA/GB(92)18/FINAL]. The Committee would also
receive more direct reporting of deliberations and recommendations from theother Standing Groups and Committees; the Delegates meeting in theCommittee would need the authority of their governments to make decisions
in order for this role of the Committee to be effective. The Committee would
enjoy wider review and recommendation responsibilities, and report to theBoard as appropriate. Although at its May 1992 meeting the Governing Board
did not reach final Conclusions on Part IV, the Board did note that the role of
the CNMC “needs to be further developed over time, bearing in mind thatspecific areas of co-operation with non-Member countries must be integrated
into the work of other Standing Groups” [IEA/GB(92)25, Item 5(c)]. Finally,in paragraph (f) of those Conclusions the Board noted that the 1992 Decision
was an “interim Decision, which the Governing Board will review in a future
meeting”. [See “Policy Review: The IEA in a Changing World”
IEA/GB(92)27; “Assessment of IEA Activities on Non-Member Countries”
IEA/NMC(93)10].
In enlarging the IEA’s policy of openness to non-Member countries,
the “General Policy Guidance” called for increasing “energy security byinitiating or enhancing relations with significant energy consumers and/or
producers”, and it asked the IEA to develop a case-by-case approach tonon-Member countries that would not limit co-operation solely to thosecountries which were likely to become OECD Members (and thus draw stillcloser to the IEA). It recommended that non-Member country activities befunded within the IEA’s annual budget allocations and that special
contributions for specific, unforeseen activities should continue pursuant to
IEA rules; and it stated that the Executive Director would report to theBoard as these non-Member country activities were undertaken.
As adopted in 1992, the comprehensive Guidelines contain mixed
elements of policy and mandate. IEA Ministers recognized in 1993 that the
Agency’s energy security efforts encompass “more intensive contacts with
non-Member countries to assist them in developing energy strategies andadopting energy policies that will contribute to their development andenhance global energy security” [IEA/GB(93)41, paragraph 26], andMinisters promoted “a balanced approach” for the IEA in its growing
relations with those countries. Following these Ministerial declarations, the
IEA continued to assess the nature and scope of these relations with nonMember countries, as the Agency received formal requests for the membershipof six new countries (Mexico, Korea, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary,and the Slovak Republic), and there were signs that the number of new
membership requests could grow in the future. In 1994 the Guidelines were367

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reviewed on the basis of the Agency’s experience in applying them during theintervening two year period. The amended Guidelines as adopted by theGoverning Board on 14 December 1994 [IEA/GB(95)1] are set forth below
together with the text of a 1994 “Comment” on it as endorsed by theGoverning Board or with a brief summary of the “Comment”:
A.

Participation in IEA Meetings:
For an experimental period, the Standing Groups should decideon the level, frequency, and subjects for NMC participation,subject to the right of any Member country to refer such a
decision to the Governing Board. However, participation by a
new non-Member country would be a matter for Governing
Board consideration. The NMC Committee should be regularly
informed. Participation by NMCs in IEA meetings should be ad
hoc and informal. NMCs do not participate in Governing Board
or Budget Committee meetings, unless the Governing Board were
to decide otherwise. To the extent possible, the number of NMCs
invited to an IEA meeting should be kept to the minimum
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the meeting.

The Comment on this Guideline confirms that it “should remain as it is . . .”.
B.

Participation in IEA Conferences, Workshops, etc.:
Participation of NMC representatives as both participants andspeakers should continue to be on an ad hoc basis, in the context
of the subject to be discussed. Periodically, speakers from NMCs
may be invited to participate or make presentations at an IEA
Conference, subject to the existing rule requiring approval by the
Executive Director and the Governing Board Chairman.

The operative part of the Comment on this Guideline provides that. . . the standing rule . . . should be relaxed, so that theGoverning Board Chairman’s prior consent will, in principle,
not be sought, unless it concerns a country with which the
Agency has not previously had any contact. The Executive
Director will, however, report to the Governing Board on suchparticipation.
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Review of Energy Policies:
Energy reviews of NMCs are an important element in assistingthem to adopt sound energy policies. Such reviews would be
conducted only if they were included in the Programme of Work,or the Governing Board had otherwise expressly authorised
them. The scope of NMC reviews will be adjusted, as necessary,
to reflect changed circumstances or resource constraints.

The Comment confirms that the above Guideline shall continue to apply
and indicates some priorities.
D.

Co-operation in the Area of Emergency Preparedness:
NMCs will not participate in emergency response systems.
However, briefing and advising NMCs, as was done withselected Asian, Central and Eastern European countries during
the Gulf crisis, should be considered, as appropriate. In
addition, the impact of the change of relative weight of NMCs inenergy markets in the long run should be examined by therelevant Standing Groups. The NMC Committee and the SEQ
will be regularly informed and consulted.

The Comment states that:
The standing guideline provides that NMCs will not participate
directly in the IEA’s emergency response systems. However, theAgency will make available its expertise in emergency response
strategies to selected NMCs and/or regional organisations andwhere appropriate explore ways to co-operate with them on
related activities. Given the successful experience with anumber of NMCs participating in an IEA Workshop on
Emergency Oil Stockdraw, such participation will continue tobe explored on a selective basis . . . .
E.

Participation in Implementing Agreements:
NMCs may participate in Implementing Agreements as
Associate Contracting Parties, subject to Governing Board
approval.
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The Comment confirms the continuation of this Guideline and states thatparticipation by non-Member regional organizations may also be
considered. The CNMC, in consultation with the CERT, will be requested toadvise on participation by non-Members not previously participating in any
Implementing Agreement. The following Guidelines are also continued:
F.

Statistical Exchange and Co-operation:
IEA statistical services will be intensified. Exchange of statistics
with NMCs should take place as appropriate, if possible on aquid pro quo basis. In addition, the IEA will continue to cooperate with NMCs in the adaptation of their statisticalmethodology to Western models for collection and presentation.

The Comment states that for the purpose of comprehensive global coverage,
the Agency’s efforts will continue to extend beyond the groups of countries
identified in the document.
G.

Training:
As a general rule, the IEA should not take any NMC trainees
into the Secretariat. However, two specific trainees wereapproved by the Board as one-time actions, not to be seen as
precedents for future training requests.

The Comment states that any future cases should be judged by theGoverning Board on their specific merits.

In 1994 the Agency’s receipt of formal requests for membership froma number of non-Member countries focused the Agency’s attention on
membership procedures, criteria for membership and relations withapplicants in the context of the wider review of membership questions,discussed above. This led to the inclusion in the Governing Board’s
December 1994 Conclusions of the two following elements on membership.
The Board:(iv) approved the procedures for accession to the Agreement on
an International Energy Program, [and] the criteria formembership in the Agency . . .
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Page 371(v) noted that the ability of an applicant for membership in the
Agency to meet the emergency response requirements underthe IEP Agreement should be reviewed in the Standing
Group on Emergency Questions [IEA/GB(95)1, Item 6(a)].
The procedures for accession to the I.E.P. Agreement and for membership aredescribed generally in Volume I, Chapter IV, Section A. In addition to thecriteria for membership set forth in Article 71 of the I.E.P. Agreement, thefollowing are the specific criteria adopted by the Governing Board: acceptanceof the IEA Goals and Objectives, including such Governing Board decisions as
the Long-Term Co-operation Programme and the IEA Shared Goals as well as
participation in the Emergency Sharing System, and willingness of theprospective Member to leave “organizations whose objectives are opposed tothose of the Agency”. For countries which have formally requested that themembership process begin and for which the Governing Board has authorized
the Executive Director to begin negotiations, the documentation, informationand discussion stage would begin. IEA policy on relations with applicantsduring this stage and until completion of the procedures for accession is underconsideration in the Agency at the time of writing.

This Chapter has outlined the history of the IEA’s non-Member
policies and actions on non-Member country relations through the early
period when the dominant activity was the exchange of information, theNorth-South early dialogue period which could not be as productive as
Members envisaged, later work with developing countries, and the more
recent processes of globalisation and of organized discussions between
energy producers and energy consumers. Perhaps the key to the Agency’s
future may be seen in this globalisation process, for the economic andpolitical basis of globalisation is continuing to expand, as energy needs growand increasing environmental impacts are produced by the developing
countries as well as by the industrial world and others. More energy
producers and consumers worldwide are expected to join the process ofinternational energy management. The IEA experience over its first twenty
years has prepared the way for further co-operation in managing theresulting policy issues with non-Members as well as Members, as thediscussion in Chapter VII clearly demonstrates.
The IEA’s major policies and actions outlined throughout this History
show how productive the co-operative process may be, and this confirms thevalue of the Agency as the institutional base for future co-operation on
371

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energy policy questions. While the first twenty years of the IEA haveproduced a remarkable panorama of accomplishments as seen in Volume I of
this work as well as in the present Volume, perhaps the most tellingconclusion to be drawn is that the past twenty years are but prologue. If the
Agency has performed its tasks well over this period, the best measure ofaccomplishment will be its readiness to manage the energy policy andinstitutional questions which it is bound to confront in the years ahead.
End of Volume II.

372

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APPENDIX I

Officers of the Governing Board
at Ministerial and Official Level,
Standing Groups and Committees,
and Senior Membersof the IEA Secretariat(Updates Volume I, Appendix II to April 1995)
Name

Country

Dates of Service

GOVERNING BOARD AT OFFICIAL LEVEL
Chairmen
Mr. E. Becker
Mr. Y. Sato
Mr. C. W. M. Dessens

GermanyJapan
The Netherlands

Feb. 1995 - present
Feb. 1994 - Feb. 1995
Dec. 1992 - Feb. 1994

Italy
United Kingdom
United States
FranceNorwayJapan

Oct. 1994 - present
Jun. 1994 - present
Oct. 1993 - present
Feb. 1994 - Jun. 1994
Jan. 1992 - Oct. 1994
Dec. 1992 - Feb. 1994

Vice-Chairmen
Mr. A. Puri Purini
Mr. C. Henderson
Ms. S. Fallows Tierney
Mr. C. Mandil
Mr. A. Walther
Mr. Y. Sato

STANDING GROUP ON EMERGENCY QUESTIONS (SEQ)
Chairmen
Mr. L. Knegt
Mr. H. E. Leyser

The Netherlands
Germany

Apr. 1995 - present
Jan. 1992 - Apr. 1995

United States
United States

Feb. 1994 - present
Mar. 1989 - Feb. 1994

Vice-Chairmen
Mr. J. Hart
Mr. F. Nielsen373Appendix

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Name

Country

Dates of Service

STANDING GROUP ON LONG-TERM CO-OPERATION (SLT)
Chairmen
Mr. S. Donnelly
Mr. R. E. Hecklinger

United States
United States

Oct. 1994 - present
Oct. 1993 - Oct. 1994

Japan
Belgium

Oct. 1993 - present
Mar. 1989 - present

Vice-Chairmen
Mr. H. Saeki
Mr. P. Gerresch

STANDING GROUP ON THE OIL MARKET (SOM)
Chairmen
Mr. M. Cleland

CanadaMar. 1993 - present

United States
Japan
Japan
United States

Oct. 1994 - present
Apr. 1994 - present
Mar. 1993 - Apr. 1994
Jan. 1983 - Jun. 1994

Vice-Chairmen
Mr. D. Pumphrey
Mr. N. Nikai
Mr. S. Endo
Mr. J. Brodman

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY (CERT)
Chairmen
Mr. C. Mandil
Mr. H. Koch

FranceDenmarkJun. 1994 - present
Mar. 1991 - Mar. 1994

United States
Japan
United States

Jun. 1994 - present
May 1993 - present
Apr. 1993 - Jun. 1994

Vice-Chairmen
Mr. J. Brodman
Mr. T. Murayama
Mr. R. Bradley

COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND EXPENDITURE (BC)
Chairmen
Mr. R. Knorreck
Mr. A. H. F. van Aggelen
374

Austria
The Netherlands

Jun. 1994 - present
Oct. 1992 - Jun. 1994

Appendix

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Name

Page 375

Country

Dates of Service

COMMITTEE ON NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES (CNMC)
Chairmen
Mr. R. Jeker
Mr. A. Walther

Switzerland
NorwayApr. 1995 - present
May 1992 - Apr. 1995

United Kingdom
The Netherlands
United Kingdom

Jun. 1994 - present
Jun. 1994 - present
Mar. 1993 - Jun. 1994

Vice-Chairmen
Mr. G. Boyce
Mr. E. Denekamp
Mr. M. Atkinson375

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Senior Membersof the IEA Secretariat

NameCountry

Dates of Service

United Kingdom
Germany
Germany

1994 - present
1984 - 1994
1975 - 1984

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Robert Priddle
Helga Steeg
Ulf Lantzke

ACTING EXECUTIVE DIRECTORJohn P. Ferriter
J. Wallace Hopkins

United States
United States

Oct. - Nov. 1994
Apr. - Jun. 1984

DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTORJohn P. Ferriter
J. Wallace Hopkins

United States
United States

1989 - present
1975 - 1989

United States
United States

1992 - present
1975 - 1991

LEGAL COUNSEL
Craig S. Bamberger
Richard F. Scott

SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION
Joyce Heard
Lionel WalshPeter Daniel
John Mowinckle

376

United States
United Kingdom
CanadaUnited States

1991 - present
1983 - 1990
1980 - 1983
1977 - 1980

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Name

Country

Dates of Service

OFFICE OF LONG-TERM CO-OPERATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS
Robert SkinnerDavid le B. JonesFred Gorbet
Peter Kelly

CanadaUnited Kingdom
CanadaUnited Kingdom

1988 - present
1982 - 1988
1979 - 1982
1975 - 1979

OFFICE OF OIL MARKETS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESSTomihiro Taniguchi
Nobuyoshi Yokoe

Japan
Japan

1993 - present
1992 - 1993

OFFICE OF NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES
Guy Caruso

United States

1993 - present

OFFICE OF OIL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS *Quincey Lumsden
Bjørn Barth
Vittorio Ristagno

United States
NorwayItaly

1986 - 1992
1983 - 1985
1975 - 1979

OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS OPERATIONS *Nobuyoshi Yokoe
Toshikazu Nasu
Keiichi Yokobori
Tatsu Sunami
Kazuo Mishima

Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan

1990 - 1992
1989 - 1990
1985 - 1989
1982 - 1985
1979 - 1982

OFFICE OF ENERGY TECHNOLOGY AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
This Office was called “Energy Research, Development and Technology
Application” from 1977 to 1989. Before 1977, it was simply known as“Energy R & D”.
Hans Jørgen Koch

Denmark

1994 - present377

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Name

Country

Dates of Service

Sergio Garribba
Pietro Capriolgio
Eric Willis
Milton Klein

Italy
Italy
United States
United States

1987 - 1994
1985 - 1987
1980 - 1985
1976 - 1980

OFFICE OF ECONOMICS, STATISTICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Sean O’Dell

Canada1993 - present

ENERGY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS DIVISION *Sean O’Dell
George Kowolski
Herman Franssen
James Reddington

CanadaCanadaUnited States
United States

1991 - 1992
1985 - 1991
1980 - 1985
1975 - 1980

* In January 1993, these three areas were re-organized. The Emergency Planningand Preparation Division was combined with the Oil Industry Division (of Oil
Market Developments) to form the Office of Oil Markets and Emergency
Preparedness. The Office of Non-Member Countries was created at that time.
The Energy Statistics and Information Systems Divisions, formerly part of the
Office of Information and Emergency Systems Operations, were amalgated with
the Energy Economic Analysis Division to form the Office of Economics,
Statistics and Information Systems.

378

14.0
19.3
22.3
21.7
19.0
20.6
21.7
21.3
23.7
26.4
31.6

3.81
46.07
109.77124.04146.85169.78197.28233.05250.98267.47308.533.50
45.56
108.71122.78145.01167.07194.31223.30235.30250.76287.72

91.9
98.9
99.0
99.0
98.7
98.4
98.5
95.8
93.8
93.8
93.3

61.48
211.74394.68437.89472.69524.86576.45649.80677.33709.81764.0257.50
196.84374.19417.54451.91503.95555.30628.78657.24689.10743.25

93.5
93.0
94.8
95.4
95.6
96.0
96.3
96.8
97.0
97.1
97.3

Import dependence is calculated as net oil imports / oil supply.
Oil Supply in this table is defined as Production + Imports - Exports.
For comparability purposes, this table includes for each year data for all countries which were OECD Members in 1973.
Data for the new Federal states of Germany are not included.

44.91
98.45
136.07140.28126.79146.50159.94165.51190.00223.36286.63385.60 105.91
768.38 340.84
1115.89 618.97
1209.04 680.59
1286.60 723.71
1404.31 817.52
1510.47 909.55
1660.09 1018.04
1729.50 1082.55
1822.00 1163.13
1979.74 1317.60

27.5
44.4
55.5
56.3
56.2
58.2
60.2
61.3
62.6
63.8
66.6

320.31510.57611.44647.12667.06709.67736.75777.24801.19844.73907.19

1950
1960
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973

OECD Total

Oil
Net Oil ImportOil
Net Oil ImportOil
Net Oil ImportOil
Net Oil Import
Supply Imports Depend. Supply Imports Depend. Supply Imports Depend. Supply Imports Depend.
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)

OECD Europe

14:50

Year

Pacific

5/03/02

North America

Mtoe (million tonnes of oil equivalent)

Oil Import Dependence of OECD Countries 1950-1973

Appendix
Page 379

APPENDIX II

379

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Appendix

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APPENDIX III

1977 IEA Principles for Energy Policy
Adopted by the Governing Board at Ministerial Levelon 5 October 1977, IEA/GB(77)52 (1st Revision) Annex

1.
Further development by each Participating Country of nationalenergy programmes and/or policies which include the objective, formulated
as specifically as possible, of reducing in absolute terms or limiting future
oil imports through conservation of energy, expansion of indigenous energy
sources and oil substitution.
2.
Constant and careful attention to important environmental, safety,
regional and security concerns to which the production, transportation anduse of energy give rise, and improvement of the speed and consistency of
public procedures for resolving conflicts which may exist between theseconcerns and energy requirements.
3.
Allowing domestic energy prices to reach a level which encourages
energy conservation and development of alternative sources of energy.
4.
Strong reinforcement of energy conservation, on a high priority
basis with increased resources, for the purpose of limiting growth in energy
demand relative to economic growth, eliminating inefficient energy use,
especially of rapidly depleting fuels, and encouraging substitution for fuelsin shortest supply, by implementing vigorous conservation measures invarious sectors along lines which include the following elements:–

pricing policies (including fiscal measures) which give
incentives to conservation;–

minimum energy efficiency standards;–

encouragement and increase of investment in energy saving
equipment and techniques.
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5.
Progressive replacement of oil in electricity generation, district
heating, industries and other sectors by:–discouraging the construction of new exclusively oil-fired
power stations;–encouraging the conversion of existing oil-fired capacity tomore plentiful fuels in electricity, industrial and other sectors;–

encouraging the necessary structural adjustments in therefinery sector in order to avoid an excess of heavy fuel oil;–directing efforts to the reduction of the use of heavy fuel oil as a
primary energy source in those sectors where efficiency is low.

6.
Application of a strong steam coal utilization strategy and active
promotion of an expanded and reliable international trade in steam coal,composed of the following elements:–

rapid phasing-in of steam coal as a major fuel for electrical
power generation and in industrial sectors;–

further development of steam coal policies within producing,
exporting and consuming IEA countries to support increased
utilization by enhancing market stability through reliable andincreased export and import market flows under reasonable
commercial terms;–

development of policies to remedy anticipated infrastructure
bottlenecks.

7.
Concentration of the use of natural gas on premium users’
requirements, and development of the infrastructure necessary to expand
the availability of natural gas.
8.
Steady expansion of nuclear generating capacity as a main andindispensable element in attaining the group objectives, consistent withsafety, environmental and security standards satisfactory to the countries
concerned and with the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. In order to provide for this expansion, it will be necessary
through co-operation to assure reliable availability of:–382

adequate supplies of nuclear fuel (uranium and enrichment
capacity) at equitable prices;Appendix

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adequate facilities and techniques for development of nuclear
electricity generation, for dealing with spent fuel, for waste
management, and for overall handling of the back end of thenuclear fuel cycle.

9.
Stronger emphasis on energy research, development anddemonstration, including collaborative programmes, more intensive
national efforts and greater co-ordination of national efforts, in order tomake energy use more efficient and to meet future energy requirements.
Each Participating Country should contribute to energy technology
development, with emphasis on (a) technologies which can have relatively
near-term impact, (b) policies which facilitate the transition of new energy
technologies from the research and development phase to the point ofutilization, (c) technologies for broadly applicable renewable energy
sources, and (d) investigation of whether there are technological possibilities
for significant contributions from other renewable resources, through:–providing the fullest possible financial support for energy
research, development and demonstration;–

increasing participation in international collaborative projects
to extend the effectiveness of funds available;–encouraging investment in energy technology development byappropriate incentives;–

ensuring that R & D policies remain consistent with andsupportive of the objectives of ongoing energy policy.

10.
Establishment of a favourable investment climate which
encourages the flow of public and private capital to develop energy
resources by appropriate pricing policies, by minimizing uncertainties about
the general directions of energy and other policies such as mentioned in
Principle 2, and by providing government incentives where necessary, inorder to:–give priority to exploration activities including those in
offshore and frontier areas;–

encourage rates of exploration and development of available
capacities which are consistent with the optimum economic
development of resources.
383

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11.
Providing in energy policy planning for alternative means, otherthan increased oil consumption, for meeting any development of supply
shortfall or failure to attain conservation objectives, taking into account theappropriate requirements of economic development and social progress.
12.
Appropriate co-operation in the field of energy, including
evaluation of the world energy situation, energy research and development
and technical and financial requirements, with developed or developing
countries or international organizations.

384

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APPENDIX IV

1993 IEA Shared Goals
Adopted by the Governing Board at Ministerial Levelon 4 June 1993, IEA/GB(93)41, Annex I

Member countries of the IEA seek to create the conditions in which
the energy sectors of their economies can make the fullest possible
contribution to sustainable economic development and the well-being of
their people and of the environment. In formulating energy policies, theestablishment of free and open markets is a fundamental point of departure,
though energy security and environmental protection need to be given
particular emphasis by governments. IEA countries recognise thesignificance of increasing global interdependence in energy. They therefore
seek to promote the effective operation of international energy markets andencourage dialogue with all participants.
In order to secure their objectives they therefore aim to create a policy
framework consistent with the following goals:
1.
Diversity, efficiency and flexibility within the energy sector are basic
conditions for longer-term energy security: the fuels used within andacross sectors and the sources of those fuels should be as diverse aspracticable. Non-fossil fuels, particularly nuclear and hydro power, make a
substantial contribution to the energy supply diversity of IEA countries asa group.
2.
Energy systems should have the ability to respond promptly andflexibly to energy emergencies. In some cases this requires collective
mechanisms and action — IEA countries co-operate through the Agency inresponding jointly to oil supply emergencies.
3.
The environmentally sustainable provision and use of energy iscentral to the achievement of these shared goals. Decision-makers shouldseek to minimise the adverse environmental impacts of energy activities,
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just as environmental decisions should take account of the energy
consequences. Government interventions should where practicable haveregard to the Polluter Pays Principle.
4.
More environmentally acceptable energy sources need to be
encouraged and developed. Clean and efficient use of fossil fuels isessential. The development of economic non-fossil sources is also a priority.
A number of IEA members wish to retain and improve the nuclear option
for the future, at the highest available safety standards, because nuclear
energy does not emit carbon dioxide. Renewable sources will also have an
increasingly important contribution to make.
5.
Improved energy efficiency can promote both environmental protectionand energy security in a cost-effective manner. There are significant
opportunities for greater energy efficiency at all stages of the energy cyclefrom production to consumption. Strong efforts by Governments and allenergy users are needed to realise these opportunities.
6.
Continued research, development and market deployment of new andimproved energy technologies make a critical contribution to achieving theobjectives outlined above. Energy technology policies should complement
broader energy policies. International co-operation in the development anddissemination of energy technologies, including industry participation and cooperation with non-Member countries, should be encouraged.
7.
Undistorted energy prices enable markets to work efficiently. Energy
prices should not be held artificially below the costs of supply to promotesocial or industrial goals. To the extent necessary and practicable, theenvironmental costs of energy production and use should be reflected in prices.
8.
Free and open trade and a secure framework for investment
contribute to efficient energy markets and energy security. Distortions toenergy trade and investment should be avoided.
9.
Co-operation among all energy market participants helps to improveinformation and understanding, and encourage the development of efficient,environmentally acceptable and flexible energy systems and markets
worldwide. These are needed to help promote the investment, trade andconfidence necessary to achieve global energy security and environmental
objectives.
386

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APPENDIX V

IEA Energy RD & D Implementing
Agreements and Other Instruments
1975 - 1994

ENERGY TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION CENTRES
Centre for the Analysis and Disseminationof Demonstrated Energy Technologies (CADDET)
Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDE)
Energy Technology Systems Analysis Programme (ETSAP)
Greenhouse Gas Technology Information Exchange (GREENTIE)IEA Coal ResearchInternational Centre for Gas Technology Information (ICGTI)

activeactiveactiveactiveactiveactiveFOSSIL FUELS TECHNOLOGIES
Coal Combustion Sciences
Coal Hydrogenation Technology
Coal-Liquid Mixtures
Coal Pyrolysis
Coal Technology
Enhanced Oil Recovery
Feeding of Dry Solid Fuels into Pressure Reactors
for Coal Processing
Fluidised Bed Conversion (formerly Fluidised Bed Combustion)
Fluidised Combustion of Coal (Grimethorpe)
Fossil Fuel Multiphase-Flow Sciences
Greenhouse Gases from Fossil Fuel Use
Low Nitrogen Oxides Coal Burner (LONOX)
Testing of High-Temperature High-Pressure Filters
Coal Gasifier Effluent Liquors

activecompletedactivecompletedcompletedactivecompletedactivecompletedactiveactivecompletedcompletedcompleted387

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RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
Bioenergy (formerly Forestry Energy)
activeBiomass Conversion Technical Information Service
completed(now in ETDE)
Geothermal Equipment
completed
Hot Dry Rock Technology
completed
Hydropower Technologies
activeMan-Made Geothermal Energy Systems (MAGES)
completed
Peat Production and Utilisation
completed
Photovoltaic Power Systems
activeProduction and Utilisation of Hydrogen
active(formerly Hydrogen from Water)
Solar Heating and Cooling
activeSolar Power and Chemical Energy Systems
active(SolarPACES)(formerly Small Solar Power Systems)
Wave Power
completedWind Turbine Systems
active(merger of former Large Scale Wind Energy Conversion Systems
and Wind Energy Conversion Systems)

EFFICIENT ENERGY END-USE TECHNOLOGIESAdvanced Fuel Cells(formerly Alcohol and Alcohol Blends)
Alternative Motor Fuels
Buildings and Community Systems
Cement Manufacture
Demand-Side Management
District Heating and CoolingElectric Vehicles
Energy Cascading
Energy Conservation Applications to Building Complexes
Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction in Combustion(formerly Energy Conservation in Combustion)
Energy Storage
Heat Pump Systems
Heat Pumping Technologies
Heat Transfer and Heat Exchangers
388

activeactiveactivecompletedactiveactiveactivecompletedcompletedactiveactivecompletedactiveactiveAppendix

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High Temperature Materials for Automotive Engines
High-Temperature Superconductivity
Iron and SteelProcess Integration Technologies
Pulp and Paper

activeactivecompletedin preparation
activeNUCLEAR FUSION AND FISSION TECHNOLOGY
Environmental, Safety and Economic Aspects of Fusion Power
activeFusion Materials (formerly Radiation Damage in Fusion Materials)
activeIntense Neutron Source (INS)completed
Reactor Safetycompleted
Nuclear Technology of Fusion Reactors
activePlasma Wall Interaction in TEXTOR
activeReversed Field Pinches
activeStellarator
activeSuperconducting Magnets
activeThree Large Tokamaks
activeToroidal Physics and Plasma Technologies (ASDEX-Upgrade)
active389

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APPENDIX VI

Highlights of Recent
IEA Developments 1994

The following Highlights provide a brief overview of the main IEA eventsof 1994 and update the 1974-1993 Highlights described in Appendix VI
of Volume I. The information for 1994 has been compiled largely fromthe IEA Annual Activities Report for 1994 [See IEA/GB(95)10]. All items
do not carry the same status and many are likely to develop further in1995 and beyond. More complete information relating to the topics
mentioned below can be found in Volume II and in the 1994 Annual
Activities Report.
The year 1994 marks the 20th anniversary of the founding of the
IEA. This is commemorated in April with a Governing Board meeting in
Kyoto, followed by a Seminar on “The IEA in the 21st Century: Challenges
and Prospects” which attracts a number of the world’s leading energy
officials and personalities. The IEA publishes the 1994 World Energy
Outlook and Volume I of the IEA History, on Origins and Structure.
After ten years of service to the IEA as its Executive Director,
Mrs. Helga Steeg of Germany resigns on 30 September. Mr. John P. Ferriter,
the Deputy Executive Director, assumes those functions on an Acting Basis,
until Mr. Robert Priddle of the United Kingdom takes up his duties as
Executive Director on 1 December.
This year’s version of Energy Policies of IEA Countries reports on thefirst round of reviews undertaken on the basis of the IEA Shared Goals,
adopted by Ministers in 1993. The Review also contains an overview ofsignificant market trends covering the past two decades.
An unprecedented Ministerial Level “brainstorming” meeting held at
Interlaken, Switzerland considers the options available to respond to climatechange concerns.
The IEA inaugurates a new series of publications, “Energy andEnvironment Policy Analyses”, which consists of analytical papers on topics
of current environment interest. Biofuels is the first title in this series.
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The IEA publishes important sectoral studies including Natural
Gas Transportation - Organisation and Regulation and Electricity
Supply Industry - Structure, Ownership and Regulation which
reports on developments in IEA countries and implications for policy
objectives.
Due to the growing importance of energy consumption in nonMember countries, the IEA broadens its work on energy efficiency policies,
and participates in the preparatory discussions on the Energy Efficiency
Protocol under the Energy Charter Treaty.
A workshop on Stockdraw and Emergency Response
Management held in Kagoshima, Japan assembles government and industry
experts to exchange views and experiences on strategic oil stock storage anddrawdown.
A major revision of the Emergency Management Manual updates theprinciples and procedures for I.E.P. emergency measures.
The IEA reviews the emergency response potential of Member countries
and publishes the results for the first time, under the title Oil Supply Security:
The Emergency Response Potential of IEA Countries.
In the R & D sector, four new projects on Photovoltaics, Electric
Vehicles, Hydropower and the International Centre for Gas Technology
Information are launched, while a project in the field of Process Integration
Technologies receives Governing Board approval.
Participation of non-Members in R & D activities continues to expand
through IEA Conferences and Workshops and Implementing Agreements.
The Governing Board approves twelve more proposals for the participation inenergy R & D Implementing Agreements of Brazil, Israel, Korea, Poland, theRussian Federation, Ukraine, and Venezuela.
A Transportation Forum was held in Valbonne, France to help
Member governments and industry work together to update priorities andsolve transport-related problems.
Following the completion of the IEA/OECD Scoping Study on Energy
and Environmental Technologies to Respond to Global Climate Change
Concerns, the IEA/OECD hold a High-Level meeting to discuss the Scoping
Study, and the Study is published.
In response to restraints on R & D budgets, the IEA establishes anExperts’ Group on Energy Technology Assessment and Methodologies for
R & D Priority Setting and Evaluation to enable Member countries to shareexperiences and enhance their national programmes.
The IEA publishes an energy survey of the Czech Republic andconducts follow-up surveys of Poland, Hungary and Korea.
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The IEA and the Russian Federation sign a Joint Declaration of Cooperation which expands their mutual relations and identifies priorities suchas the survey of Russian Energy Policies which is undertaken by the IEA.
The IEA publishes studies on Russian Energy Prices, Taxes and Costs,
and on Electricity in European Economies in Transition.
Throughout the year the IEA continues to participate in the preparationof the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Efficiency Protocol, which weresigned on 17 December in Lisbon.
In response to the request of Mexico to begin membership discussions
with the IEA, the Governing Board authorizes the Executive Director to
examine with Mexico the terms and conditions of membership.
Following receipt of formal expressions of interest in IEA membershipby Korea, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic, theGoverning Board authorizes the Executive Director to begin discussions withthese countries in parallel with their membership discussions with the OECD.
Relations strengthen with Asia-Pacific and Latin American countries
through regular contacts and participation in regional and international
conferences. The IEA publishes Energy in Developing Countries: A Sectoral
Analysis.
The IEA reviews its guidelines for relations with non-Member
countries, enlarges the possibilities for participation of these countries in
IEA events, and approves criteria and procedures for membership.

393

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Appendix

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APPENDIX VII

Table of Ministerial Communiqué
Document References

Date of Meeting

Press Reference

Governing Board Reference

27 May 1975

PRESS/A(75)20——————————

5 - 6 October 1977

IEA/PRESS(77)10

IEA/GB(77)48(2nd Revision)

21- 22 May 1979

IEA/PRESS(79)14

IEA/GB(79)35

10 December 1979

IEA/PRESS(79)28

IEA/GB(80)5

21 - 22 May 1980

IEA/PRESS(80)8IEA/GB(80)58

8 - 9 December 1980 IEA/PRESS(80)20

IEA/GB(80)85(FINAL)

15 June 1981

IEA/PRESS(81)10

IEA/GB(81)34(Final)

24 May 1982

IEA/PRESS(82)8

IEA/GB(82)54(Final)

8 May 1983

IEA/PRESS(83)6

IEA/GB(83)36(Final)

9 July 1985

IEA/PRESS(85)6

IEA/GB(85)46

11 May 1987

IEA/PRESS(87)4

IEA/GB(87)33 Annex

30 May 1989

IEA/PRESS(89)4

IEA/GB(89)36 Annex

3 June 1991

IEA/PRESS(91)7

IEA/GB(91)42/REV2

4 June 1993

IEA/PRESS(93)8

IEA/GB(93)41395

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Appendix

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