The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 11 (2000)

Cold War Perspectives on U.S. Commitment
in Vietnam

Hiroshi MATSUOKAINTRODUCTION
The massive involvement of American forces in Vietnam was preceded by two previous crises in which the United States almost started
military intervention. The ﬁrst crucial moment was spring of 1954, when
the French asked for help in defending their garrison at Dien Bien Phu,a basin in northwestern Vietnam near the Laotian border, under siege by
the Viet Minh forces led by General Vo Nguyen Giap.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s hesitation in sending American
soldiers was counter-balanced by his determination to maintain an antiCommunist stronghold in Indochina. He had established Ngo Dinh
Diem’s regime in South Vietnam in July 1954, shortly before the Geneva
Conference agreed on a cease-ﬁre. “This was the basic decision,”recalled W. Averell Harriman, an experienced diplomat and politician,“which unwisely got us directly involved in South Vietnam.”1
In September, the Manila Treaty was concluded, creating theSoutheast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). Eisenhower’s letter toDiem in the following month pledged American full support to South
Vietnam’s survival as a nation. According to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., ahistorian and an aide to President John F. Kennedy, that letter createdCopyright © 2000 Hiroshi Matsuoka. All rights reserved. This work may be used,with this notice included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work
may be distributed, electronically or otherwise, in whole or in part, without permission from the author.
49

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American “vital interests” in this newly born country. The CIA analyst
Chester Cooper believed that American involvement had been “concreteand substantial enough” by the end of the 1950s.2
The second occasion for possible American military involvement
came in 1961. While avoiding the dispatch of U.S. combat troops, theUnited States took on “almost unilateral responsibility” in defending
South Vietnam, as Kennedy indicated to Pakistani President Mohammed
Ayub Kahn.3
American military advisers were sent beyond the limits of the 1954
Geneva Accords and allowed to participate in operations side-by-side
with the Vietnamese Army. The decision to transform American Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) into Military AssistanceCommand, Vietnam (MACV) was also made during this crucial year.
In early 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara felt that
Vietnam was already “the one place where Americans were in a shooting war.” Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., portrayed the situation when hearrived at Saigon in August 1963 as a new American Ambassador as one
in which “regardless of how they got there, Americans were in Vietnam
and were in combat.”4John Mecklin, a senior ofﬁcer of the U.S. Mission in Saigon, admitted that the word “advice” changed to “something close to a form of warfare” under Kennedy’s presidency. “President Eisenhower made our ﬁrst
commitment there in 1954,” President Lyndon B. Johnson justiﬁed his
escalation policy in 1965, “That was reafﬁrmed by President Kennedy
many times in different ways.”5
Why, then, did Eisenhower and Kennedy act in ways leading toAmerica’s long and agonizing war in Vietnam? The following analysis
will show the three-dimensional Cold War diplomacy behind their decisions respectively in 1954 and in 1961: global struggle with the Russian
and Chinese Communists; regional undertakings for security and integration in Southeast Asia; and local endeavors to build a strong andviable society within South Vietnam.
I.
1

GLOBAL THREAT, WORLDWIDE RESPONSESCountering Revolutions in the Developing Areas

In 1961, the forces of democracy seemed “on the defensive” everywhere on earth, and even in space. One of Kennedy’s ﬁrst diplomatic
initiatives was to announce in a televised press conference that the United

COLD WAR PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM

51

States would intervene in Laos militarily if necessary. After less than one
hundred days in ofﬁce, he approved covert operations by the Cuban
exiles against Fidel Castro. The goal of putting men on the moon within a decade was set. Among his decisions was the expansion of Americancommitment in Vietnam.6
According to Walt Rostow, an economist who joined in Kennedy’s
White House, the new administration was faced with “the second greatCommunist offensive of the postwar years.” It was only two weeks
before Kennedy’s inauguration that Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev
had declared Russian support for national liberation movements all overthe developing world. His announcement, as Kennedy told Ayub Kahn
several months later, “had sounded as if it could lead only to war.”7
Rostow recollected that the so-called Third World was already “in aferment.” Kennedy once called it “the great battleground for the defense
and expansion of freedom today.” Especially important was the “vulnerable arc from Southeast Asia through the Middle East,” as former
Secretary of State George Marshall emphasized to the senior membersof the administration, which was not only “adjacent to the Sino-Soviet
heartland” but also under dual threat of domestic difﬁculties and national liberation wars.8
As a young Senator from Massachusetts, Kennedy had advocated his
own remedy: the United States should offer the developing world “apolitical, economic and social revolution” far superior to—and far morepeaceful and democratic than—what the Communists could provide. It
was quite natural for him to commence such ambitious programs as thePeace Corps and the Alliance for Progress. The key was the aspirationsof “those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to
break the bonds of mass misery.”9
Senator Kennedy had criticized the Eisenhower Administration for its
failure to appreciate the dynamics of nationalism which had been“rewriting the geopolitical map of the world.” Now, as president, hecomplained to Mohammed Shoaib, Financial Minister of Pakistan, that
it was “curious” that the United States should be grouped with the colonial powers by the people in the developing areas.10
2

In the Midst of Peaceful Coexistence“Whether we should have drawn the line where we did,” Schlesinger
later said, referring to the 17th parallel dividing North and South
Vietnam, “once it was drawn we became every succeeding year more

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HIROSHI MATSUOKA

imprisoned by it.” It is ironic that Eisenhower’s commitment in 1954
was, in contrast to his successor’s, made at one of the lowest ebb of Cold
War tensions, following the death of Russian dictator Joseph Stalin.11
Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles emphasized thatthe recent Soviet move was hardly a change in their basic strategy andthat it should rather be regarded as another “offensive weapon against theWest” to isolate the United States from its allies. His press conferencein December 1954 reminded the Americans and their friends that “thestrength and direction of the current cannot be judged by whether thesurface appears to be completely calm or whether there is a rufﬂe on it.”12
Peaceful coexistence between the East and the West, as advocated by
the Russians, would, however, as Dulles remarked at a NATO Council
Meeting, provide the West with a “breathing spell” for strengthening
their unity. In the Far East as well, the Americans were ready to accept“cessation of hostilities and stabilization of the situation in the area onterms acceptable to the United States,” in spite of its reluctance on thesurface to accept any negotiated settlement short of military victory
either in Korea or in Indochina.13
In April 1954, according to Cooper, the United States “crept like asnail unwillingly” into the Geneva Conference. There Dulles refused toshake hands with Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai. He ﬂew back to
Washington as soon as negotiations started. And he instructed Under
Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, head of the United States delegation, to limit the American role to merely that of “an interested nation”
in the conference.14
Smith took great pains for more than two months only to “cheer theplayers,” not to “pitch.” He did not sign the Final Declaration of the conference since the agreements were unsatisfactory to the American public. That was an anticipated result, since French Foreign Minister
Georges Bidaut “had hardly a card in his hand,” as he complained toDulles and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, “perhaps just a twoof clubs and a three of diamonds.”15
Disappointment at the loss of northern Vietnam did not prevent Dulles
from feeling some optimism over “a chance of building a dike” in its
southern half to stop further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia.
Neither the Soviet Union nor the Communist China, nor the Western
powers, challenged the American effort to save something out of theFrench defeat. There remained only one dissident: North Vietnam.16

COLD WAR PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM

3

53

A Truce Line of the Cold War

Ho Chi Minh’s government in Hanoi decided in May 1959 to step up
its support of armed struggle against Ngo Dinh Diem in the south. In
December 1960 the National Liberation Front (NLF, the so-called Viet
Cong) was created under Communist leadership. The Americans wereincreasingly aware of an urgent need to reestablish a “Common Law for
the Cold War in the Underdeveloped Areas.”17
Kennedy emphasized to Khrushchev when they met at Vienna in June
1961 that both the United States and the Soviet Union should “avoid getting involved in direct contact” in supporting the South Vietnamese
Government and the Viet Cong guerrillas respectively. Before reaching
any agreement with the United States on any subject, such as Berlin andthe nuclear test ban, Khrushchev’s sincerity first had to be proven by,
for instance, terminating “a planned and consistent effort” by North
Vietnam “to overthrow by violence the legitimate government of South
Vietnam.”18
A reuniﬁed Vietnam was desirable, Rostow remarked, only if it took
place by negotiation among the Vietnamese themselves “without a pistol pointed at Diem’s head.” The Americans could not accept the“destruction of Diem via inﬁltration” any more than the Russians could
accept the “destruction of Ulbricht [East German leader] via the Berlin
ﬂow of refugees.” The “gut issue” was, accordingly, whether to allow“the systematic inﬁltration of men from outside and the operation fromoutside of a guerrilla war” in Vietnam or anywhere else.19
The Sudden construction of wall between East and West Berlin in
August 1961 must have been shocking, but nonetheless something of arelief to Kennedy, because it showed Khrushchev’s willingness to keep
the status quo in Europe untouched. Contrastingly, no neat line of demarcation among conﬂicting groups could be found in Laos and in Congo.
Kennedy tried hard to oust Castro from power in Cuba, because his existence infringed the line dividing the East and the West.
Rostow advocated military intervention in Vietnam because hethought it was a great mistake to “inhibit U.S. action on our side of thetruce lines of the Cold War for fear of enemy escalation.” Kennedy
frankly told Indian Defense Minister Krishna Menon that “the best thing”
was “for Vietnam to remain divided.” Always essential were holding theline and making the Russians do likewise.20
The trouble in Vietnam was that it appeared a “more obscure and lessﬂagrant” battleground than Korea, as Kennedy complained at a National

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HIROSHI MATSUOKA

Security Coucil(NSC) meeting. The ﬁghting was caused by inﬁltration,
subversion, and terrorism. Neither combat troops nor clear fronts could
be seen. The Americans were increasingly irritated by the incapabilityof world opinion to fully recognize the truth of what Rostow called a“muted warfare.”21
4

To Prevent Dominoes from Falling

McNamara later admitted that the expansion of war efforts was justiﬁed by the sense of “danger of Vietnam’s loss and, through falling dominoes, the loss of all Southeast Asia.” William Bundy, another architectof Vietnam policy in the 1960s, recalled that it was “clear and unmistakable” to top-level ofﬁcials in the Kennedy Administration that thisparticular struggle was linked to the security of Southeast Asia as awhole.22
This doctrine had been articulated by Eisenhower when he explained
why the Americans should support the French colonial war:Now let us assume that we lose Indochina. If Indochina goes, several things
happen right away. The Malayan peninsula, the last little bit of the end hanging on down there, would be scarcely defensible—and tin and tungsten that
we so greatly value from that area would cease coming. But all India would
be outﬂanked. Burma would certainly, in its weakened condition, be no
defense. Now, India is surrounded on that side by the Communist empire.
Iran on its left is in a weakened condition. . . . All of that weakening position
around there is very ominous for the United States, because ﬁnally if we lost
all that, how would the free world hold the rich empire of Indonesia? So yousee, somewhere along the line, this must be blocked. It must be blocked now.
That is what the French are doing.23

Indochina was “the keystone of the arch” of Southeast Asia. Especially
Tonkin, the northern part of Vietnam adjacent to southern China, formed“the corridor between China and Southeast Asia” just as Korea was “thebridge between China and Japan,” as Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affaris Walter Robertson stated.24
The defense of Vietnam was inseparable from the safety of the Paciﬁc
for the United States. “Today, the vast Paciﬁc is a friendly ocean,” said
Dulles, “only because the West Paciﬁc islands and two peninsular positions are in friendly hands.” He was particularly concerned that “closebehind this island and peninsular screen” was located Communist
China.25
The Paciﬁc had to be kept as “a friendly body of water,” or it would

COLD WAR PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM

55

sooner or later become “a Communist lake,” according to Dulles. He wasterribly fearful of this disastrous possibility, because both in the AsianContinent and in the Paciﬁc there could be found “no strong bulwark
against the Soviet Communist offensive.” Indochina, and later South
Vietnam, was to be one of such strongholds, possibly even with the helpof the U.S. troops.26
Most essential in any American military enterprise was, as one NSC
staff member in the Kennedy Administration explained, “how we tell theother side that we mean business.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961
believed that American forces either in Vietnam or in Thailand would“demonstrate US intentions to fulﬁll our commitments to countries in
the area.”27
II.
1

A QUEST FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA

America’s Adversary in Asia

“As in Korea, Iran, Malaya, and Burma,” General Thomas Trapnell,
Chief of American MAAG, said in 1954, “the war in Indochina is not a
separate entity. It is another tentacle of the octopus, another brush ﬁreon the periphery of the iron and bamboo curtains.” The real enemies for
American diplomacy in Vietnam was located in Moscow and in Peking.28
Particularly in Asia, Communist China was more formidable than theSoviet Union. Secretary of State Dulles revealed his anxiety over a “single Chinese Communist aggressive front” extending from Korea to
Indochina. President Kennedy in his ﬁrst State of the Union message
warned that “the relentless pressures of the Chinese Communists” were
menacing entire Asia.29
Dulles once portrayed Ho Chi Minh as a man who had been “trainedin Moscow and developed as a Communist” for further aggression inSoutheast Asia. McNamara later recalled that the Americans identiﬁed
Ho Chi Minh “ﬁrst as a Communist and only second as a Vietnamese
nationalist.”30
The Americans strongly opposed the “ﬁction” that the Viet Cong wasa revolutionary movement arising spontaneously from within South
Vietnam. Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay later asserted that it was
merely “Hanoi’s creation.” In summer 1961 a group of Vietnamese andAmerican economists concluded that the Viet Cong had been “supplied,
reinforced, and centrally directed by the international Communist apparatus operating through Hanoi.”31

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HIROSHI MATSUOKA

SEATO was expected to contain the Communists’ challenge in thewhole of Southeast Asia. By 1961, according to Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, it had become “the law of the land” linking South Vietnam to “thegeneral structure of collective security.” Lyndon Johnson later noted that“President Kennedy believed in our nation’s commitment to the security of Southeast Asia, a commitment made in the SEATO Treaty andstrengthened by his predecessor, President Eisenhower.”32
Prior to the establishment of SEATO, Dulles augued before Congressional leaders that the “creation of a defense line in the Far East” wasabsolutely necessary. According to him, after the conclusion of the
Geneva Accords in July 1954, the 17th parallel dividing two Vietnams
became a line that the people in that area should be prepared to join in
defending, for the United States could not be expected “to rush in singlehandedly.”33
The Kennedy Administration was on the same track. Unless willingto allow the Paciﬁc to become “a Red sea,” Vice President Johnson
warned the president, the United States could never retreat from
Vietnam. “John Kennedy never questioned that Southeast Asia was vitalto American security,” recollected Rusk, “His only question: Where
should we ﬁght if we had to ﬁght? His decision: South Vietnam.”34
2

Mission Impossible: Seal Up the Vietnamese Borders

Kennedy’s speech writer Theodore Sorensen later wrote that the Viet
Cong guerrillas had been “bleeding South Vietnam to death” by the
beginning of 1961. By that fall, the conﬂict there was a “hot war, withcasualties averaging well over 1,000 every month.”35
Kennedy pointed out how strange it was that “a native army of
200,000” could not match up “against 16,000 guerrillas.” The reason was
plain to Rostow. He attributed this to “the horrible arithmetic of guerrilla warfare” : one guerrilla could pin down at least 10, sometimes 20, oreven 25 regular soldiers.36
In Saigon Ambassador Frederick Nolting, Jr., complained that large
scale inﬁltration from North Vietnam via Laos and Cambodia was about
to “swamp this country.” But for the enormous inﬂux of men, arms,
munitions, equipments, foods, and directions, the Americans believed,“there would be no war” in Vietnam. Immediate task was therefore tocreate a “Cordon Sanitaire” or “Firebreak” along the Vietnamese borders.37
Rostow visited South Vietnam in 1961 and found the situation dan-

COLD WAR PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM

57

gerous “not because the Viet Cong were popular, but because there wasan open frontier and safe haven and resources for the Viet Cong behindit.” Nolting believed that South Vietnam could enjoy a “better than 50–50
chance of winning” only if its border was sufﬁciently protected, though
it looked “like a sieve” to intelligence people.38
The Americans depended more and more upon “[e]xotic weapons,”
such as helicopters, short take-off and landing (STOL) airplanes, lightpropeller planes, anti-personnel mines, napalm, plastic bombs, and defoliants. Nevertheless, Schlesinger later stated before the Senate Foreign
Affairs Committee that all these efforts only showed “our incapacity todeal with a guerrilla movement.”39
The American troops, the SEATO Border Patrol Troops, the United
Nations Observer Corps, the International Control Commission (ICC),
and the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) consisting of mountainous tribes, could be utilized as a “plate glass window” along theVietnamese frontiers. Creating an “island of peace” in southern Laos, as
Rusk later described it, by military intervention by the SEATO forces,
might also deny the Viet Cong sanctuary outside South Vietnam.40
Another seemingly fundamental solution was, as General Maxwell
Taylor advocated, to “attack the source of guerrilla aggression” in North
Vietnam. Such an operation would cause little problem since, according
to William Bundy, it would be “our equivalent” of the guerrilla operations conducted within South Vietnam by Ho Chi Minh. Rostow strongly demanded that the United States “make Hanoi pay enough in the Northfor it to be worth its while to close the frontier.”41
3

A Dream Unfulﬁlled

SEATO was originally expected to be a catalyst for regional integration as well as a shield agaisnt Communist encroachment in Southeast
Asia. It had to provide the region with “a nucleus for coordinateddefense,” according to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur C.
Davis. Under Secretary of State Smith told Georges Bidault that theAmericans were conﬁdent of the need to bring about “some form ofsoutheast [sic] Asian NATO.”42
This collective security organization should also become “an ad hoc
political association” similar to NATO. Its other job was to encourage“the prompt organization of an economic grouping by the maximum
number of free Asian states,” including Japan and India. “Free nations,when they unite effectively,” said Eisenhower in his last days of presi-

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HIROSHI MATSUOKA

dency, “can defeat speciﬁc efforts at economic penetration and politicalsubversion in newly developing areas.”43
However, Southeast Asia was, as former Ambassador to Thailand U.
Alexis Johnson complained in 1961, always “much more a geographic
expression than a political reality.” Under Secretary of State Chester
Bowles admitted to South Vietnamese Ambassador Tran Van Chuongthat it was far from easy to “bring the people of Southeast Asia together so that they would have a sense of common destiny.”44
The difﬁculty of regional integration in Southeast Asia was symbolized by the antagonism between South Vietnam and Cambodia. South
Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem refused American calls for a rapprochement with this western neighbor. Cambodian leader Norodom
Sihanouk called Vietnam and Thailand “the wolf and the tiger” threatening Cambodian survival as a nation.45
Asian members of the SEATO alliance—Thailand, Pakistan, andPhilippines—were divided among themselves, despite their common
anti-Communist sentiments. SEATO also witnessed conﬂict of interests
between the British and the French on the one hand and the Asians on
the other. According to Paul Kattenburg, a Vietnam Desk ofﬁcer in theState Department, SEATO was nothing more than “a paper tiger, anempty gesture, from its creation.” Watching its inability to act in an efﬁcient way in the Laotian crisis in spring of 1961, Chiang Kai-shek in
Taipei stated that it was “not much more than empty shell.”46
4

Two Strongholds in Asia

In 1954 Dulles told Anthony Eden that the American “desire to cooperate with Britain and France in Asia, in North Africa and in the Nearand Middle East” prevented their support of nationalism in the developing world. Dulles confessed to one of his aides that American diplomacy was “squeezed” between its opposition to colonialism and its ties tothe colonial powers in Western Europe.47
In fact, the Americans judged as early as in 1954 that without theirsupport “the British and French would not be in Asia at all.” The imminent issue was who should ﬁll the military and political vacuum, andhow. One solution might be American unilateral involvement, because
it seemed evident to Dulles that “the United States Government alone
was able to face up to these hard decisions in Asia.”48
In 1961 the South Vietnamese demanded the dispatch of American
troops. Meanwhile the Thais wanted bilateral defense agreement with

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59

the United States. They urged the Americans to act militarily to defend
Laos even without the British and the French, threatening to leave
SEATO otherwise, since, as Thai Ambassador Vistr Arthayukuti told
Kennedy, Thailand would be the “next target” of the Communists.49
Instead of fortifying SEATO, the United States increasingly depended upon a less formal alliance of three anti-Communist Asian leaders:
Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, Sarit Thanarat in Thailand, and Ngo Dinh
Diem in South Vietnam. A new form of regional grouping was also pursued. Rusk told British Foreign Secretary Alex Douglas-Home that even“the demise of SEATO” might be permissible if “a regional organization which countries like India could support” was to be established bynations such as Burma, Thailand, and South Vietnam.50
The Americans thought that they could count on India, Chairman of
the ICC in Indochina since 1954 and a strong leader of the non-aligned
nations. It was, as Kennedy insisted in the 1960 presidential campaign,
one of “the two greatest poles of power in Asia.” Its victory overCommunist China “for the economic and political leadership of the East”
as well as “for the respcet of all Asia” would be signiﬁcant for the UnitedStates, too.51
Indian hostility toward the United States increased the importance ofJapan in American diplomacy in Asia. It was “the heart and soul of thesituation in the Far East,” as Dulles expressed it at an NSC meeting insummer of 1954. It was the “only industrial power in Asia,” and it would
require “little imagination” to visualize what would happen if it wasallied with Russia and China against the West.52
Southeast Asia would be the key to prevent such an ominous possibility, providing Japan with natural resources and purchasing its industrial products. Japan would in its turn contribute to economic prosperity
and political stability in the region. “If we don’t assist Japan, gentlemen,”said Eisenhower to Congressional leaders, “Japan is going Communist.
Then instead of the Paciﬁc being an American lake, believe me it is going
to be a Communist lake.”53
III.
1

NATION-BUILDING AND ANTI-GUERRILLA WARFARE

Wanted: Fortress Vietnam

Kennedy’s speech writer Theodore Sorensen remarked in his memoirs of the Kennedy years that Vietnam was a “cockpit” in the Cold War
struggle. It had been so for a long time—since the days of successful rev-

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HIROSHI MATSUOKA

olution of the Communists in mainland China and the invasion by theNorth Koreans across the 38th parallel.54
In 1951, the French had established indigenous armed forces inVietnam. They were relatively well-armed, well-equipped and withsuperior manpower, though Dulles could ﬁnd “no capacity to ﬁght” inthem. In contrast, Ho Chi Minh had a “well-organized, disciplined formidable military force” controlling a considerable portion of the country, according to a press brieﬁng made by Bedell Smith in Geneva.55
The Americans believed that they knew what was really wrong: poor
training given by the French. Ambassador to Saigon Donald Heath wastold by Dulles that the American experience of successfully converting
the once shaky anti-Communist Korean Army into a “ﬁrst-class ﬁghting
machine” could be transplanted into Vietnam.56
The French called the American way of military training a “troop factory” method, and insisted that it would never function in Vietnam. They
were afraid that they would “lose face in the eyes of the Vietnamese” if
American training personnel were introduced. French Chief of Staff Paul
Ely told Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
that American participation in training “would cause political repercussions in Paris.”57
In Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were fearful that it would be
difﬁcult to build up and train the native forces “in the absence of a stable government in South Vietnam.” However, their opposition was overridden by the State Department. “If adequately trained and equipped,”
Dulles told Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, the Vietnamese Armywould bring “some assurance of internal security” and “an increased
sense of stability.”58
The French agreed to give up the responsibilities of training and organizing of the Vietnamese Army to the Americans by the end of 1954.
Withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps in 1956 further contributed to the creation of an “autonomous FVA [Free Vietnamese Army]along US lines,” in the words of Ambassador Heath.59
Although, as Schlesinger recalled, it seemed “rather easy to teach thegovernment troops a few tricks” so that they could take care of themselves, training of the Vietnamese forces remained insufﬁcient. Theirmorale was low. Commanders lacked initiative. Their operations werealways ineffective. Intelligence systems hardly functioned. Finally, there
existed substantially no workable command structure.60

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61

General Lionel McGarr, Chief of the MAAG, complained to Diem insummer 1961 that “37 miniature campaigns” in many provinces werebeing executed by the Vietnamese Army without any coordinated strategy. “The only thing wrong was that the war was not being won,” according to David Halberstam, a young New York Times correspondent andlater Pulitzer Prize winner, “it was, in fact, not even being fought.”61
By early 1961 nearly two-thirds of the South Vietnamese territory was
under the control of the Viet Cong forces. Darkness belonged to guerrillas in many areas. “The symbol of South Vietnam,” one Vietnamese
reportedly said in the fall, “is not its ﬂag but the vultures wheeling over
the National Assembly building.”62
2

Military or Non-Military Prescriptions?

The Americans were afraid that failure of the South Vietnamese would
be identiﬁed with American military doctrine. In 1961, Kennedy had
only “a military policy which had left us wholly unprepared to ﬁght—oreven to train others to ﬁght—a war against local guerrillas.” Robert
Komer, an NSC staff member, felt the need to establish “a new doctrineof deterrence” in Southeast Asia.63
General Taylor judged that Vietnam was “a going laboratory” of guerrilla warfare. It was, according to Robert Kennedy, the president’s brother and Attorney General, the “most troublesome to the world today.” Itwas, as Genral Trapnell had called in 1954, a “politico-military chessgame” which needed special treatment.64
Admiral Radford’s view of the war in Indochina was that its military
end was “probably 50 percent,” while its political end was “probably
the other half.” He believed that success in any military operation there
depended upon “creating a political atmosphere and effective
Vietnamese Government.”65
Kennedy instructed General Taylor before he left for Saigon in
October 1961 that the “political, social, and economic elements” of thewar were as signiﬁcant as its military part. John K. Galbraith, an economist and Ambassador to India, summarized Taylor’s recommendation
to dispatch a ﬂood relief task force as having the soldiers “use a shovel
with one hand and deal with the guerrillas with the other.”66
Nevertheless, the Americans had a strong tendency to look to militaryprescription. Philip W. Bonsal, Director of Philippines and Southeast
Asian Affairs in the State Department, maintained that political support

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could never be anticipated “short of real military progress.” Dulles insisted that “in the absence of a stronger military posture in Free Vietnam,
there could be no political stability.”67
The military task became important than any other subject year by
year. In fall of 1961, Jim Howe, a program ofﬁcer in the U.S. Operations
Mission (USOM) in Saigon, remarked that the position of South
Vietnamese people was “analogous to that of businessmen in a city like
Chicago or New York,” who would refuse to cooperate with the police
only because it could not provide them adequate protection.68
3

Vulnerability in a Political Game

One week before the conclusion of the Geneva Accords in 1954,
Dulles told Eden and French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France that
the United States “could not be in the position of assisting a French colonial war in Indochina.” He added that there was “no chance of holding
Vietnam unless they were granted real independence.” Independence
given in June 1954 proved to be too little, too late.69
Dulles’ fear that the indigenous people were “neither ready nor willing to make an effort to preserve their independence,” as he expressed it
to French Foreign Minister Bidault, weakened American pressure upon
the French. “I’m not convinced,” he told one of his aides, “that everycolonial people should automatically receive independence simply
because they clamor for it. Along the desire for independence should go
the capacity to assume the burdens and responsibilities that accompany
independence.”70
South Vietnam after the Geneva Conference was in essence, as the
young Senator Kennedy said in 1956, America’s “offspring.” It was not
long, however, before weakness of its leader Ngo Dinh Diem became
more than evident to many observers. He could depend only on his own
family, refugees from the north in fear of Communism, the Catholic
minority. His rule was paralyzed by his justiﬁable fear of being overthrown from power at any time.71
Seven years of Diem’s rule convinced British Foreign Secretary Alex
Douglas-Home that this dictator was “hopeless.” Vice President Johnson
predicted to Kennedy that the day might come when the Americans
would be faced with the “grave dilemma” that their aid to the South
Vietnamese Government would be directed against its own people.72
Secretary of State Rusk portrayed El Salvador as “one place where a
DDT gun would be more effective than a Tommy gun.” In Vietnam, too,

COLD WAR PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM

63“the ﬁrst priority must be political,” as Chief of CIA Station in Saigon
William Colby recollected. According to Ambassador Nolting, theAmericans ﬁrst needed “an infrastructure of democratic institutions.”73
4

Deeper and Deeper into the Paddies

The American effort to create a viable and enduring society in South
Vietnam came to “a virtual standstill by unexpected resistance” from theSouth Vietnamese. President Ngo Dinh Diem was uneasy over “[w]howould be responsible for running the show,” as Nolting later described
it, and refused every American demand for democratic reform.74
Most troublesome was his “basic impatience with democratic processes,” which he considered dangerous to stability and security. “Noamount of window dressing,” he said to Nolting, “could substitute forthe hard measures of self-sacriﬁce” required for truimph over Communism. “If we open the window,” said Tran Le Xuan, Diem’s sister-inlaw and substantially the First Lady of the Republic of Vietnam, “notonly sunlight but many bad things will ﬂy in.”75
It was less than three months after Diem’s rise to power in 1954 thatAmbassador Heath telegrammed the State Department that the UnitedStates must look for “a relief pitcher” and “get him warming up in [the]bullpen.” Yet, the United States had to “stick by Diem at this moment”
because he was the “only man now in sight with character enough toform and head an enduring government.”76
Seven years later, McNamara concluded that Diem still remained “theonly man we had.” The United States had to accept the fact that he andhis regime were “100 percent anti-Communists,” as South Vietnamese
Secretary of State Nguyen Dinh Thuan remarked to Rusk at a SEATO
Council meeting that spring.77
Kennedy once itemized American alternatives in the crisis of the
Dominican Republic in descending preference: ﬁrst, “a decent democratic regime” ; second, “a continuation of the Trujillo regime” ; theworst, “a Castro regime.” “We ought to aim at the ﬁrst,” admitted
Kennedy, “but we really can’t renounce the second until we are sure that
we can avoid the third.” In Vietnam as well, the United States had to“back Diem to the hilt,” as General McGarr advised.78“Like Nasser and Nehru he is there,” American Ambassador to
Djakarta Henry Jones once remarked about Indonesian leader Sukarno,“and we must learn to live with him as [a] fact of life.” Harriman complained that it was “fantastic” that General Phoumi Nosavan, the right-

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HIROSHI MATSUOKA

wing leader in Laos, had been “permitted to continue to dictate American
policy,” though he was an “entirely US creation.”79
That was also the case in Vietnam. The experiment “to put a Ford
engine into a Vietnamese ox-cart,” as Nolting later described it, wasdoomed to failure. The United States became the “satellite” of its own
satellites not only in Vietnam but also in many other places. As Galbraith
had predicted, the “bright promise” of Kennedy’s New Frontier was day
by day “being sunk under the rice ﬁelds” of South Vietnam.80
CONCLUSION
In spring of 1954 the French Government demanded American air andnaval intervention as “the only one of many possible course [courses]
which might provide a solution to the Indochina impasse.” As Admiral
Radford insisted, it was also “the only ace” for the West in the Geneva
Conference.81
Seven years later the Vietnam Task Force under the Kennedy
Administration urged the dispatch of “U.S. ﬂag forces.” In the fall once
again, the mission led by General Taylor concluded that American military intervention was “the best means” of saving Southeast Asia.82
First, Eisenhower in 1954 as well as Kennedy in 1961 had to win a
global Cold War game with the Russians and the Chinese. Eisenhower
undertook direct commitment to the defense of South Vietnam, which
ultimately forced Kennedy to decide whether to help Southeast Asia,
including South Vietnam, to the best of America’s ability or to “throw
in the towel” there and retreat to “Fortress America.”83
Rusk recalled that Kennedy “did not want to Americanize the war” inVietnam. He only wanted to provide the South Vietnamese with economic aid and advisory support so that they could win the war for themselves. However, he started ﬁghting a substantially American war there,
while still insisting that this was “their war.”84
Secondly, both presidents promoted collective security in Southeast
Asia. “Free Vietnam’s ultimate security,” said General J. Lawton
Collins, who visited South Vietnam as Eisenhower’s personal emissary,“would lie in the military and moral support” of SEATO. Rusk believedthat the integrity of American commitment to collective security
involved “the life and death of our nation.”85
SEATO was supposed to offer an integrated defense and prosperity to
the region. However, there was almost nothing within Southeast Asia

COLD WAR PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM

65

that could substitute for American leadership. The only solution left was,as Ambassador to Thailand Kenneth Young advocated, that the UnitedStates “pitch a hard ball into this catcher’s mit [mitt] of Asia.”86
Finally, Eisenhower and Kennedy wanted a democratic government,a self-sustained economy, and powerful indigenous military forces within South Vietnam. But their demand for any reform by the South
Vietnamese was neutralized since the United States remained merely “alimited partner in the war.” Kennedy told Korean leader General Park
Chung Hee that there was “a limit, as the French found out, on what an
occidental could do in a situation like this.”87
To McNamara Vietnam was a “terra incognita.” His Deputy Secretary
Roswell Gilpatric confessed that the Americans never understood “whatmade the Vietnamese tick.” With Diem always being “an engima [enigma],” as Ambassador Nolting put it, the Americans followed what New
York Times correspondent Homer Bigart called a “sink or swim with
Ngo Dinh Diem” policy, which ﬁnally led to an expanded war in the mid1960s.88
NOTES
1
W. Averell Harriman, America and Russia in a Changing World (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1971), 109.
2
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin,1965), 537;
Chester L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970), 167.
3
Memorandum of Conversation, 11 July 1961, U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relationsof the United States, 1961–1963, 19 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Ofﬁce, 1996): 71.
4
Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect (New York: Times Books, 1995), 41; Henry
Cabot Lodge, The Storm Has Many Eyes (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973), 205.
5John Mecklin, Mission in Torment (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), 21; News
Conference, 13 July 1965, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1965
(USGPO, 1966), 738.
6
Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 229.
7
Walt W. Rostow, “The Third Round,” Foreign Affairs 42, no. 1 (October 1963): 5;
Memorandum of Conversation, 11 July 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1961–1963, 19: 66.
8Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 134;
Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs, 25 May 1961, Public Papersof the Presidents, 1961 (USGPO, 1962), 397; Memorandum of Conference, 26 May
1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, 9 (USGPO, 1995): 251.
9John F. Kennedy, “America’s Stake in Vietnam,” in Vietnam: Anatomy of a Conﬂict,
ed. Wesley R. Fishel (Itasca, Ill.: F.E. Peacock, 1968), 146; Inaugural Address, 20
January 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1961, 1.
10John F. Kennedy, “A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 36, no.1
(October 1957): 44; Memorandum of Conversation, 7 March 1961, Foreign Relations

66

HIROSHI MATSUOKAof the United States, 1961–1963, 19: 16.
11
Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 537–8.
12
Telegram, Dept. of State to Paris Topol 51, 14 July 1953, Foreign Relations of theUnited States, 1952–1954, 5(USGPO, 1983): 1707; Dulles’ Press Conference, 21
December 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 88, Firestone Library, Princeton
University, Princeton, N.J.
13
Telegram, Paris to Dept. of State Secto 4, 15 December 1953, Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1952–1954, 5: 459; Draft Statement of Policy on United States Policies
in the Far East, 6 April 1953, Declassiﬁed Documents Reference System (Arlington, Va.:
University Publications of America) microﬁsche, 1978–377B.
14
Cooper, The Lost Crusade, 75; Telegram, Dept. of State to Geneva Tosec 138, 12
May 1954, U.S. Dept. of Defense, The United States-Vietnam Relations (USGPO, 1971)
9: 458.
15
Memorandum by Bonesteel, 10 May 1954, ibid., 9: 449; Anthony Eden, Full Circle(London: Cassell, 1960), 110.
16
U.S. House of Representatives, Selected Executive Session Hearings of theCommittee, 1951–56 (USGPO, 1980), 18: 169.
17
Memorandum, Rostow to Rusk, 6 January 1961(emphasis original), Presidential
Ofﬁce Files, Staff and Memoranda Series, Box 64a [sic], John F. Kennedy Library,
Boston.
18
Memorandum of Conversation, 3 June 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1961–1963, 24 (USGPO, 1994): 229; Letter, Kennedy to Khrushchev, 16 November
1961, ibid., 1 (USGPO, 1988): 636–7.
19
Memorandum, Rostow to Kennedy, 5 October 1961, National Security Files,
Regional Series, Box 231A, Kennedy Library; Memorandum, Rostow to Kennedy, 14
November 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, 1: 602.
20
Memorandum, Rostow to Kennedy, 11 November 1961, ibid., 1: 574–5;
Memorandum of Conversation, 21 November 1961, ibid., 19: 141.
21
Notes on NSC Meeting, 15 November 1961, ibid., 1: 607-8; Rostow, The Diffusionof Power, 283.
22
McNamara, In Retrospect, 32; William P. Bundy, “The Path to Viet Nam: Ten
Decisions,” Orbis 11, no.3 (Fall 1967): 655.
23
Remarks at the Governors’ Conference at Seattle, 4 August 1953, Public Papers of
the Presidents, 1953 (USGPO, 1960), 541.
24
Report by President’s Special Committee on Indochina, 2 March 1954, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, 13 (USGPO, 1982): 1109; Department ofState Bulletin, 2 November 1953, 593.
25
Dulles’ Speech at Los Angeles, 11 June 1954, Dulles Papers, Subject Series, Box
8, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans.
26
Discussion Paper regarding U.S. China Policy, n.d., Ann Whitman File, DullesHarter Series, Box 3, Eisenhower Library; James C. Hagerty Diary, 23 June 1954,
Eisenhower Library; John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1950),
224.
27
Memorandum, Komer to Rostow, 28 April 1961, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, 1961–1963, 1: 86; Memorandum, JCS to McNamara JCSM-311–61, 9 May 1961,
ibid., 23 (USGPO, 1994): 852.
28
Comments by Trapnell, 3 May 1954, File of Chairman, JCS, 1953–57, National
Archives, Washington, D.C.
29
Dulles’ Address before American Legion, 2 September 1953, United States-Vietnam
Relations, 9-I: 142; State of the Union Message, 30 January 1961, Public Papers of the
Presidents, 1961, 23.

COLD WAR PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM

67

30
U.S. Senate, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,(USGPO, 1977) 6: 161; McNamara, In Retrospect, 33.
31
Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Dell, 1967), 428; Curtis E. LeMay,
America Is in Danger (New Yok: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), 247; Letter, Special
Financial Group to Kennedy & Diem, 14 July 1961, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, 1961–1963, 1: 221.
32
Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), 427. Lyndon Johnson,
The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), 42.
33
Hagerty Diary, 28 June 1954, Eisenhower Library; Memorandum, Minnich to
Eisenhower, 28 June 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, 13: 1754;
Bipartisanship Legislative Meeting, 28 June 1954, Whitman File, Legislative Meetings
Series, Box 1, Eisenhower Library.
34
Memorandum, Lyndon Johnson to Kennedy, 23 May 1961, United States-Vietnam
Relations, 11: 162; Rusk, As I Saw It, 430.
35
Sorensen, Kennedy, 651; Telegram, Dept. of State to New Delhi 1347, 17 October
1961, National Security Files, Country Series, Box 194, Kennedy Library.
36
Notes on NSC Meeting, 15 November 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1961–1963, 1: 608; Rostow, Oral History, Kennedy Library.
37
Telegram, Saigon to Dept. of State 373, 18 September 1961, Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1961–1963, 1: 302; Telegram, Dept. of State to New Delhi 1347, 17
October 1961, National Security Files, Country Series, Box 194, Kennedy Library;“Concept of Border Control,” n.d., Declassiﬁed Documents Reference System, R75A.
38
Rostow, Oral History, Kennedy Library; Telegram, Saigon to Dept. of State 445, 6
October 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, 1: 328; Minutes ofIntelligence Discussion, 20 October 1961, ibid., 1: 406.
39
Memorandum, R. H. Johnson to Rostow, 14 October 1961(emphasis original), ibid.,
1: 369; Schlesinger’s Comment in Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,
Causes, Origins, and Lessons of the Vietnam War (USGPO, 1973), 138.
40
Draft Memorandum by Komer, 9 May 1961, National Security Files, Regional
Series, Box 231, Kennedy Library; Rusk, As I Saw It, 429.
41
Letter, Taylor to Kennedy, 3 November 1961, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, 1961–1963, 1: 478; Memorandum, W. Bundy to Lemnitzer, July 19, 1961, ibid.,
1: 234; Rostow, Oral History, Kennedy Library.
42
Congressional Research Service, U. S. Library of Congress, The U. S. Government
and the Vietnam War (USGPO, 1984), 1: 276; Telegram, Geneva to Dept. of State Dulte
54, 8 May 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, 16 (USGPO, 1981):
713.
43
Memorandum of Conversation, 7 April 1954(emphasis original), ibid., 13: 1276;
Statement of Policy by NSC, n.d., United States-Vietnam Relations, 10: 845; Address
at Rice University in Houston, 24 October 1960, Public Papers of the Presidents,
1960–61 (USGPO, 1961), 800.
44
Memorandum, U. A. Johnson to Bowles, 24 June 1961, Foreign Relations of theUnited States, 1961–1963, 23: 9; Memorandum of Conversation, 13 February 1961,
ibid., 1: 33.
45
Sihanouk quoted in The Indochina Story, ed. the Committee of Concerned Asian
Scholars (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), 56.
46
Paul M. Kattenburg, The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy, 1945–75(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980), 49; Telegram, Taipei to Hong Kong
134, 15 May 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, 22 (USGPO,
1996): 60.

68

HIROSHI MATSUOKA

47
Memorandum of Conversation, 30 April 1954, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, 1952–1954, 16: 622; Andrew H. Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.:
D. Van Nostrand, 1965), 84.
48
Memorandum, Ogburn to Allison, 21 January 1953, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, 1952–1954, 12, pt. 1 (USGPO, 1984): 261; 192nd NSC Meeting, 6 April 1954,
ibid., 13: 1263.
49
Memorandum of Conversation, 6 April 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1961–1963, 23: 847.
50
Memorandum of Conversation, 6 August 1961, ibid., 1: 268n.
51
John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 141;
Kennedy’s Campaign Speech, 7 March 1960, The John F. Kennedy 1960 Campaign(Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1987), microﬁlm reel 7.
52
210th NSC Meeting, 12 August 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952–1954, 12, pt.1: 725; Dulles’ Speech at Los Angeles, 11 June 1954, Dulles Papers,
Subject Series, Box 8, Eisenhower Library.
53
Hagerty Diary, 21 June 1954, Eisenhower Library.
54
Sorensen, Kennedy, 649.
55
Memorandum of Conversation, 2 May 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952–1954, 16: 661; Telegram, Geneva to Dept. of State Secto 319, 27 May 1954, ibid.,
16: 952.
56
Telegram, Dept. of State to Saigon 1691, 17 March 1954, ibid., 13: 1129.
57
Telegram, Paris to Dept. of State 5202, 24 March 1953, ibid., 13: 421; Discussion
between Dept. of State and JCS, 26 March 1954, ibid., 13: 1170; Telephone Conversation between Dulles and Radford, 24 March 1954, ibid., 13: 1151.
58
218th NSC Meeting, 22 October 1954, ibid., 13: 2156; Memorandum, Dulles to
Wilson, 11 October 1954, ibid., 13: 2133.
59
Telegram, Saigon to Dept. of State 668, 22 August 1954, ibid., 13: 1968.
60
Schlesinger quoted in Causes, Origins, and Lessons of the Vietnam War, 118.
61
Aide-Mémoire, McGarr to Diem, 2 August 1961, United States-Vietnam Relations,
11: 232; David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House,1972), 200–1.
62
Newsweek, 6 November 1961, 45.
63
Sorensen, Kennedy, 651; Draft Paper by Komer, 9 May 1961, National Security
Files, Regional Security Series, Box 231, Kennedy Library.
64
Taylor quoted in The Indochina Story, 93; Robert F. Kenndy, Just Friends and Brave
Enemies (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 203(emphasis original); Comments by
Trapnell, May 3, 1954, File of Chairman, JCS, 1953–57, National Archives.
65
Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1951–56, 18: 112.
66
Letter, Kennedy to Taylor, 13 October 1961, United States-Vietnam Relations, 11:327; John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal (Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin, 1969),
212.
67
Memorandum, Bonsal to Robertson, 8 December 1953, Foreign Relations of theUnited States, 1952–1954, 13: 910; 218th NSC Meeting, 22 October 1954, ibid., 13:2156.
68
Memorandum, R. H. Johnson to Rostow, 6 September 1961, National Security Files,
Country Series, Box 194, Kennedy Library.
69
Memorandum of Conversation, 14 July 1954, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, 1952–1954, 16: 1360.
70
Telegram, Paris to Dept. of State 2667, 21 April 1954, ibid., 13: 1331; Berding,Dulles on Diplomacy, 84–5.

COLD WAR PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM

69

Kennedy in Vietnam: Anatomy of a Conﬂict, 144.
Memorandum of Conversation, 6 August 1961, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, 1961–1963, 1: 268n; Paper by Lyndon Johnson, n.d., ibid., 1: 153.
73
Rusk quoted in Newsweek, 6 February 1961, 19; William Colby, Lost Victory(Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989), 57; Frederick Nolting, From Trust to Tragedy(New York: F.A. Praeger, 1988), 36 (emphasis original).
74
Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), 248;
Nolting, From Trust to Tragedy, 40.
75
Dept. of State Research Memorandum RFE-1, 29 September 1961, United StatesVietnam Relations, 11: 273; Telegram, Saigon to Dept. of State 754, 3 December 1961,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, 1: 711; Schlesinger, A ThousandDays, 538.
76
Telegram, Saigon to Dept. of State NIACT 1270, 29 September 1954, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, 13: 2093.
77
Memorandum, Martin to Cottrell, 18 December 1961, Foreign Relations of theUnited States, 1961–1963, 1: 743; Memorandum of Conversation, 27 March 1961, ibid.,
1: 53.
78
Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 769; Paramilitary Study Group Meeting, 26 April
1961, Declassiﬁed Documents Reference System, 1978–438A.
79
Telegram, Djakarta to Dept. of State 2164, 25 January 1961, Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1961–1963, 23: 305; Telegram, Geneva to Dept. of State Confe 823,
6 November 1961, ibid., 24: 501.
80
Nolting quoted in Many Reasons Why, ed. Michael Charlton & Anthony Moncrieff(New York: Hill & Wang, 1978), 82; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 137; Message,
Galbraith to Kennedy, 21 November 1961, United States-Vietnam Relations, 11: 417.
81
Telegram, Paris to Dept. of State 2502, 5 January 1954, 751G.5-MSP/1-554, Dept.
of State Decimal File 1944–1954, Record Group 59, Box 3693, National Archives;
Arthur W. Radford, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution
Press, 1980), 411.
82
Annex 2 to Task Force Report, 8 May 1961, United States-Vietnam Relations, 11:
99–100; Paper by Military Committee of Taylor Mission, n.d., Foreign Relations of theUnited States, 1961–1963, 1: 503.
83
Memorandum, Lyndon Johnson to Kennedy, 23 May 1961, United States-Vietnam
Relations, 11: 164.
84
Rusk, As I Saw It, 435; Interview in CBS Evening News, 2 September 1963, Public
Papers of the Presidents, 1963 (USGPO, 1964), 652.
85
J. Lawton Collins, Lightning Joe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1979),
395; Rusk, As I Saw It, 435.
86
Memorandum, Young to Rostow, 17 February 1961, National Security Files,
Country Series, Box 193, Kennedy Library.
87
Paper by Taylor Mission, n.d., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,
1: 493; Memorandum of Conversation, 14 November 1961, ibid., 22: 536.
88
McNamara, In Retrospect, 32; Gilpatric in “Let Us Begin Anew”: An Oral Historyof the Kennedy Presidency, ed. Gerald S. & Deborah H. Strober (New York: Harper
Perennial, 1994), 406; Nolting, From Trust to Tragedy, 16; Bigart quoted in Schlesinger,
A Thousand Days, 548.
7172