MMRCDISCUSSION PAPER SERIES
No. 292

Korean Firm’s Competitive Advantage: Localization Strategy of LG Electronics
Youngwon Park, Junjiro Shintaku and Tomofumi Amano
Manufacturing Management Research Center
Faculty of Economics, the University of Tokyo
March 2010

東京大学ものづくり経営研究センター
Manufacturing Management Research Center (MMRC)
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Korean Firm’s Competitive Advantage: Localization Strategy of LG Electronics

Youngwon Park, Junjiro Shintaku and Tomofumi Amano

Abstract (100 words)
This paper examines how firms that adopt a modular architecture sustain their competitive advantages
in the global market. Several Korean electronics firms have outperformed Japanese counterparts in thisglobal environment. In view of the fragile nature of competition in electronics industry with easily
imitable modular product architecture, Korean global firms have adopted a different competitive
strategy. First of all, they have moved out of their narrow domestic market. Instead, they have focusedon global market which is vastly large and therefore the effective management needs the local
empowerment which is the essence of a localization strategy. We focus on LG Electronics (i.e., a
successful Korean global electronics firm) from a business strategy standpoint. We then explore how it
has attained the global competitiveness with the electronics products that apply modular architecture.
We examine how LG Electronics has pursued a localization strategy, particularly its implementation ofstrategic management processes in two different countries—LG India and LG Poland.

Keywords (five words)
Product Architecture, Global Competitive Advantages, Localization, Learning Effect, LG Electronics

Korean Firm’s Competitive Advantage: Localization Strategy of LG Electronics

Youngwon Park, Junjiro Shintaku and Tomofumi Amano
Manufacturing Management Research Center
Faculty of Economics, the University of Tokyo

This paper examines how firms that adopt a modular architecture sustain theircompetitive advantages in the global market. Several Korean electronics firms haveoutperformed Japanese counterparts in this global environment. In view of the fragile
nature of competition in electronics industry with easily imitable modular productarchitecture, Korean global firms have adopted a different competitive strategy. First ofall, they have moved out of their narrow domestic market. Instead, they have focusedon global market which is vastly large and therefore the effective management needs
the local empowerment which is the essence of a localization strategy. We focus on LG
Electronics (i.e., a successful Korean global electronics firm) from a business strategy
standpoint. We then explore how it has attained the global competitiveness with theelectronics products that apply modular architecture. We examine how LG Electronics
has pursued a localization strategy, particularly its implementation of strategic
management processes in two different countries—LG India and LG Poland.

Keywords (five words) Product Architecture, Global Competitive Advantages,
Localization, Learning Effect, LG Electronics

11. Introduction
As the world moves fast toward globalization, increasingly firms experience intensecompetition worldwide. The scope of competition is enlarged from domestic markets to theborderless world. It is quite challenging for the leading firms to sustain their premium value
advantages in this global environment. In particular, with digitalization of electronic products,
the various changes are coming to the surface such as (1) miniaturization of products (2) highintensification, (3) reduction of product life cycle (3) changes in component parts structure, (4)changes in value added structure of supply chain (Joo et al., 2003). The power dynamics ofthis global competition are quite evident from product architecture perspective—either integral
or modular. Products that use an integral architecture are interrelated with a great deal ofcomplexity. Therefore, knowing about only some component parts may not be useful to
produce products with quality, integrity and performance values. Such firms maintain theircompetitive product advantages because the competitors may not so easily comprehend thesecret aspects of the products for a rapid catch-up. However, products that apply modular
architecture are easily divisible by modules. Competitors from less developed nations may
also achieve a rapid catch-up if the process-, functionality- and performance-details ofcomponents and manufacturing equipment are available in the form of embedded knowledge
in software. Thus, products that adopt a modular architecture require maintaining the sourcesof their competitive advantages not from superb functionality of the product, but from theproduct design, marketing strategies and effective global supply chain.
This study examines how firms with modular product architecture sustain their competitive
advantages in their global management. Currently, a few Korean firms are holding strategiccompetitive positions which Japanese firms once used to occupy. Some of Korean global firms
get out of their narrow domestic market and focus on global market with the localization
strategy. This paper is a case study of LG Electronics, one of successful Korean global firms,
which sells modular-type of products in the global market. Particularly, this paper examines
the localization strategy of LG Electronics and the transfer of the initial successful models to
Korean headquarters, India and Poland subsidiary.
This case is unique in that many of the multi-national corporations (MNCs) implement theirglobal strategies from their headquarters. However, the patterns of localization are quite2different from the traditional practices of MNCs. This paper provides success factors of
localization strategy. In this paper we present a research model that depicts the nature of
localization strategy and its vital processes. As an illustration of this research model we thenpresent case studies of two LG Electronics—LG India and LG Poland. This in-depth casestudy presents the story of an LG executive who learned from empowerment management in
Korea and India, then implemented in Poland. The lessons from the localization successes inthese two countries have already provided an excellent learning effect in Korea. Besides, themiddle manager that learned the principles of localization from a senior executive in India
moved to Poland and there he applied the same principles of localization so successfully.
Lessons from this case study are summarized and managerial implications are discussed.

2. Literature Review
2.1 Product Architecture and Korean Firm’s Global Strategy
The behavioral practices of Asian multi-national corporations (MNCs) reflect the catch-up
patterns of industrial structure of these nations. In general, many Western MNCs havesufficient management resources and establish sustainable competitive positions.

Asian

MNCs, on the contrary, are not so secure in their competitive strengths simply because they
arrived somewhat late in the global stage. To overcome their relative weaknesses, many Asian
MNCs have formed strategic partnership with other MNCs, facilitated technology transfersand built production bases in key market areas (Masuyama, 2002).
Much of research has focused on how Korean MNCs successfully achieved catch-up withmore advanced MNCs of USA/European origin. However, little is known about how Korean
global firms have made transitions from regional MNCs to global leading firms through theireffective development of global business capabilities in a relatively short period of time.
Korean IT industries (component parts of semi-conductor industry, mobile communicationindustry, LCD industry, Digital and TV Contents Industry) provide successful catch-up modelsof USA, European, and Japanese counterparts (Park and Hong, 2006; Park et al., 2008).
Particularly, these products are Korean MNCs strategic global products and at the same timethe modes of design and production are increasingly adopting modular product architecture.
Therefore, a comprehensive evaluation of the global strategy of Korean MNCs might well bebetter served from product architecture perspective. As electronic products become moredigitized, some trends are quite obvious such as (1) miniaturization and intensification of3

products, (2) reduction of product life cycle time, (3) changes in component parts structure, (4)structural changes in value chains (Joo et al., 2003). Thus, many electronic products, in spiteof the IT industry’s outstanding support competencies, may quickly lose their competitive
advantages with changing market conditions which require increasingly shorter life cycles. It
is worthy to examine the global strategy of Korean firms from product architecture perspective
while considering Korean IT industry’s growth model. Product architecture is product design
framework by which a product is defined in terms of its component parts and work processes.
It also proposes design methods which may maximize the functionalities of the products
through balancing the interfaces between components parts and processes (Fujimoto, 2003).
Two representative classification parameters are (1) modular or integral; (2) closed or open
(Ulrich, 1995; Fine, 1998; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Fujimoto, 2003). The type of productarchitecture does impact the extent of a firm’s competiveness through its vital relationship todevelopment of the organizational innovation capabilities (Henderson and Clark, 1990；
Fujimoto, 2003；Park et al., 2007).
A careful examination between product architecture and country-industry fit suggests thatJapanese firms focus on products with integral architecture while emerging economies
including Korea possess organizational capabilities that fit modular products (Fujimoto,2006a).

The rapid catch-up of emerging economies, Korea in particular, was possible

through the increase of products with modular product architecture. For example, products like
CD-ROM and mobile phones are close to modular architecture.

Intense price competitionand short product lifecycle characterize these products and therefore it is not easy for thesefirms to sustain competitive advantages (Shintaku et al., 2006). In this sense, productarchitecture impacts the catch-up patterns of these emerging economies.

Samsung and LG,

two of Korea’s global multi-national firms, are the producers of electronic products that havestrong elements of modular product architecture. These products evolved from analogue todigital product development and their adoption of modular architecture accelerated the speedof catch-up (Shintaku, 2006). Thus, the value chain structure of the products, with strong
elements of modular architecture, is evolving from production to R & D, marketing anddistribution network capabilities. The source of premium value creation and delivery of theseproducts lies in innovative R & D and marketing capabilities through strengthening the
distribution network (Joo et al., 2003).

In this sense, global strategy of Korean multi-nationalfirms increasingly emphasizes development of premium value products, operational4effectiveness for cost and time reduction and localization initiatives.

2.2 Localization of MNCs human resources
MNCs need to achieve organizational integration for the strategic focus in global operation.
At the same time, it is essential for local business units to have responsive flexibility to deal
with the local needs. It is quite challenging to balance the conflicting demands between theneeds of integration or independence in view of diverse cultural, product and local differences(Prahalado and Doz, 1987).

In the context of MNCs’ complex organizational structures

managing human resources requires careful balance of the dualities such as freedom and order,
dispersion and integration, empowerment and control (Evans and Doz, 1992).

Effective

global organizations need careful consideration of dimensions of management requirements
and at the same time delicate balance among the seemingly contradictory natures oforganizational dynamics (Shiraki, 2002).

From the standpoint of localization of humanresources Korea-based MNCs usually maintains average 69.2%, very high percentages, of
Korean mangers for the key positions even in the overseas operational units (Sue et al., 2004).
Korean electronics firms tend to delegate to local management who assumes responsibility
over local employment, wages level, production and marketing to local management decisions
while Korean headquarters handle major capital expansion and financing decisions (Ha, 2004;
Sue et al., 2004).

However, enhancement of global competitive capabilities requires furthertransfer of decision making authorities to local management. It is critical to secure high qualityof local professionals, develop marketing and distribution network capabilities.
In this paper we examine how firms that adopt modular product architecture secure theircompetitive advantages through global management practices. Several Korean MNCs display
successful management practices in the global market in which Japanese electronics firms had
once sustained comparative advantages. Some of these Korean firms have moved beyond theirnarrow domestic market, focused on global market and successfully pursued localization
strategy. This paper explores how LG Electronics, in spite of modular product architecture
products, has developed global competitive capabilities through successful implementation of
localization policies.

53. Case Studies
3.1 LG’s Global Strategy
Since its inception in 1958, LG expands its global operations through the historical patternsof growth in the form of (1)import substitution, (2)export to advanced nations, (3)productionin advanced nations, (4)production in developing nations, (5)global production and marketing(Lee, 2000; Sue et al., 2004).

In its very first few years LG received loans and technology

assistance from Germany and Japan. It produced electronic products that reached the maturity
stage, took the role of providing inexpensive import substitute products to Korean domestic
market. In this way, LG laid the ground work for the further growth.

In 1970s LG was

benefited from Korean government’s export drive and built the major export centers in Gumi
and Changwon area of Korea and established massive scale of export production system. By
the late 1970s LG engaged in vigorous expansion strategy of the oversea market—particularly
targeting USA and Western European markets.
However, in the 1980s the growing protectionist move in USA and Western European
countries stifled its export volumes. In response to these market changes LG targeted theseadvanced markets by building color TV factory at Huntsville, USA in 1981, establishedanother TV and VCR factory at Bromes, Germany in 1986 and microwave oven factory inGreat Britain in 1988.
Starting from 1988, with the wages increases in Korea, LG secured color TV andrefrigerator manufacturing facilities in Thailand and Indonesia and started localization policies.
From the middle of 1990s LG expanded its manufacturing facilities in Eastern Europe andSouth American regions in keeping up with the growing market opportunities in Eastern
European and South American counties. At the same time period LG actively positioned itself
for global competitive system structure. From 1993 LG implemented strategic initiatives forthe emerging markets in China, CIS and India. In 1995 LG changed its existing Gold Starbrand to LG brand and based on sports marketing, it expanded to FPD TV/ Monitor market.
As of 2009, LG Electronics have four business units that include Digital appliance, Digital
display, digital media, Mobile communications. Its global operations has the total 114 overseas
business units including many manufacturing units, marketing units, research anddevelopment centers and logistics and service units. In Europe and China LG maintains
regional business headquarters. However, 70% of manufacturing units are in Asia including
China and India. 70% of marketing units are in North America and Europe. Based on
6marketing organizations that cover the whole world LG engages in global strategic
management. Its major products are TV, VCR, refrigerators, air conditioners, home appliances,display such as CPT/CDT, monitor, LCD/PDP TV, multi-media products such as CD-ROM
drive and PC, information communication products such as handsets and IMT-2000.
Particularly, after the middle of 2000s LG rapidly moving toward the position of one of the
global top three. Within three years after announcing its goals to become a producer of highpremium products with its own unique global brands, LG successfully penetrated North
America and European markets. LG is also marketing the emerging markets in South America,
China and India with high premium product strategy. Thus, LG Electronics dare to battle inglobal premium markets because of its blue ocean technologies and differentiated design
capabilities (Maeil, 2006.04.11).

3.2 Localization Strategy in India
3.2.1 Initial Business Operation in India
LG India is established in 1997 as a 100% subsidiary of LG. It currently positions as theglobal No. 1 market share firm in the areas of color TV, microwave oven, washer, airconditioner (Park, 2009). LG India operates new manufacturing facilities in Noida, New Delhi
and Pune in the region of Mumbai. LG aligned with an Indian company and supply 70% of its
total component parts. Particularly, the second factory in the Pune region around Mumbai
produces GSM mobile phones, TV, refrigerators, air conditioners and washers. With its
increasing production capabilities LG now expands its target market areas to Southwest
Region beyond the current North East Region market. Noida factory at the India’s northernarea of New Delhi produces TV, refrigerator, air conditioners and microwave oven. Besides,
LG operates software R & D Center in Bangalore from 1998 to utilize excellent pools of
research resources. LG’s strategic vision is to make India with 1.1 billion people as the second
global production base and achieve 10 billion ($) by 2010 (Maeil Business Newspaper,2008.3.24).

LG also plans to produce 20 million mobile phones by 2010 through utilizing

production base in Pune (SERI, 2007a). LG occupies #1 market position in home appliances
including color TV, refrigerator, washer, air-conditioner, microwave oven, DVD players. LG
also ranks # 3 in PC, monitor and mobile phones. In 2005 LG’s PC market share was fifth but
customer preference rank was #1. Indian customers’ trust and preference of LG products arequite absolute.
7

Table1: LG India’s major products and market share in India
Products

2005
Sales

2006
Volume Market(Unit; in 1,000s)(Rank)

Share Sales

Volume Market(Unit; in 1,000s)

Share(Rank)

Color TV

2,365

24(1)

2643

27(1)

Refrigerator

1,030

26(1)

1100

29(1)

Washer

485

35(1)

680

36(1)

Air-conditioner

370

33(1)

460

34(1)

Microwave oven

145

40(1)

250

38(1)

Monitor

660

11(2)

1000

20(2)

PC

44

2(5)

120

3(3)

Cellular Phone

5100

30(3)

6500

35(2)

Within seven years after LG India started its operation the total sales of household
electronic goods reached up to one billion dollars. The 2005 sales figure was 1.8 billion ($)
and its employees are 2,800. As of 2008, its employees are 3,000. The number of its branches
is 125. All the dealerships are 18,200 and service centers are 1,100. In this way, LGestablished sales and service network throughout India. By 2010 LG will increase sales by 6
billion ($) and the amount of additional investment is 150 million ($).

3.2.2 Presidential Leadership of LG India
Mr. Kim started LG India (Chosun, 2006.6.7). His career advancement details include
operation manager of electronic division of Changwon LG, Korea (1994~1996). Since then,his mostly oversea work experiences include Chicago, USA (1981~1984), Germany (1996),
Dubai (1977~1980), Central America (e.g., Panama 1988~1994). In November 1996 he agreed
to work for LG India, and after one month of preparation and training he arrived in January
9th, 1997. He assumed the position of the president of LG India in 1997 and since then hemade it grow to be No 1 global firm of home appliances market. In recognition of his
outstanding performance in LG India he was promoted to the senior executive president ofSoutheast Asia Division in 2005. In January 2008 he concluded his work at LG after
completing his work as the president of LG India. Since 1997 the annual growth rate of LG
8

India was 25-30%, which is the result of continuous innovative thinking for localization, brandbuilding with new product ideas and ever changing marketing strategy including sports
marketing. Some of his leadership elements are summarized as below (Kim, 2009).

(1) Openness and Transparent Management
Mr. Kim asserts importance of openness in localization. This openness is based onunderstanding of local workers and beliefs on them. Without transparent management,
however, this openness is not attained. Mr. Kim really tried to make management transparent
in localization of LG. For example, he had corporate meeting with more than 150 mangers at
9:00 A.M. of every 2nd Saturday of each month. Here, all the cost information, profit and loss
statements are disclosed to all the participating managers. In this way all the mangers
understand the overall operational status. Outsiders are allowed to visit and observe the factory
operations. Mr. Kim says, “Positive thinking enhances the meaning of this life. If you havesuch positive view of work and India, then you will experience quite different resultscompared to those who regard India as a place of endless sufferings. Positive thinking,
optimistic perspective and open management are quite important.” Such mindset also relates
to the motivation of employees in India.

(2) Emphasis on Empowerment
For localization, beliefs in local workers have connection to empowerment. Mr. Kim always
puts this credo into practice. For example, he says, “The great power is in entrusting others”.
Many Korean executives ask, “Are Indian managers trustworthy?”

Mr. Kim always replies,“Yes, I trust them. To the extent I trust them, they display their loyalty. Ordinary people trust
others no more than 50%. However, we expect others to trust ourselves 100%.

99% ofpeople want that. Empowerment transforms people. If you cannot trust others, then don’t
demand their loyalty, either. Although you may experience undesirable results later, it is betterto trust people first. “For example, at nine o’clock there is no Korean manager and yet many
Indians work here and there. Indian managers work on their own initiatives. Compared to
India LG, Mr. Kim comments on a factory of LG China, “At night many Korean mangers stayin the factory and supervise Chinese workers. This is not effective. If so, they do not regard it
as their own company. They only regard it as Korean company and instead keep resentful
feelings inside.”9(3) Systematic Discipline of Management
Mr. Kim implemented empowerment and at the same time strengthened organizational
disciplines. Mr. Kim used the term, “discipline”. Noida factory director said, “Mr. Kim nevercancels any meeting that he chairs. He hardly misses work because of sickness.”
Empowerment requires systematic construction of work structures. Mr. Kim closes the booktwice a month. At that time, CFO of LG Korea even did not understand the rationale of suchpractice. With empowerment based on trust Mr. Kim successfully implemented systematicmanagement structures. As the result, LG India mangers took every 15th of each month sameas the last day of the month for performance evaluations of each functional units.

(4) Innovation based on localization of R&D and customer-focused strategy
For the success of localization, Mr. Kim emphasizes continuous innovation based on
localization of R&D and customer-focused strategy. Through localization of R&D, products
which fit local customers come into existence. This credo relates to customer-focused strategy,
as localization of R&D is necessary for satisfaction of local customer. For example, the total
number of R & D personnel of LG India is 150, which is the largest among MNCs. India LG
has the large number of R & D personnel comparing with ration of total employees. Mr. Kim
comments, “Localization is about independence from the Korea Head Offices. This must
include R & D’s independence as well.”(5) Market and Field-Based Leadership
Mr. Kim visited almost all parts of India on foot. In the course of building nation-wide
marketing network he visited all the important places of India. LG India has 46 marketing
centers and 70 other remote area offices are in operation as well.

(6) Rapid Decision Making
Mr. Kim’s speed of decision making is very fast. The style of his decision making is, “clear,simple and precise”.

He rarely says, “Let me think over and talk about this later”.

3.2.3 Localization Strategy in India
This section summarizes localization strategy and a few success factors of LG India (Park,10

2009). LG Korea points three factors for LG India’s superior performance outcomes. First,
production of high premium quality of products, Second, localization policy efforts, Third,
strong distribution network for vast rural areas. Among these three, localization policy
initiatives are the most critical of all. LG India employs unique marketing practices with rightproducts that fit to Indian market requirements (SERI, 2007b). In 1997 LG India deployed 70
product lines all together and started establishing LG brand power in Indian market. For new
product development LG India became successful to plant the brand awareness among Indiansthat LG products reflect Indian tastes with Korean technologies. For example, Indian
traditional costumes are quite thin and therefore quite sensitive for slight pressures. LG India
developed washers that do not use circulating wing in the center and accordingly they were ahuge market success (SERI, 2007a).
Initially, LG India produced products in the form of OEM through strategic alliances with
Indian local suppliers (Park, 2009). However, with slow productivity progress in Indian
suppliers, LG senior production manger started working together with Indian workers in thefactory floor. He ate with them and discovered the practical problem areas. In this way, there
was drastic change in work attitude and habits among Indian workers and accordingly
noticeable productivity improvement became a reality. Since more than ten different languages
are spoken among workers, LG India devised a system through which workers may choose
production instructions in their own languages.
The primary reason why Japanese electronics firms were unable to capture Indian market
was their failure in local accommodations. Because of unstable electric supply in India,
accidents occur in relation to uneven flows of electricity. LG India investigated the causes ofthis accident and subsequently developed condenser that is capable enough to function under
unstable electrical flows. In this way, component parts were newly developed according to the
local conditions. LG India boldly transferred almost all of decision making powers (up to99%) to local experts who would devise effective marketing campaigns to handle changing
customer requirements in India.
LG India also introduced drum washer and dish washer product lines that have direct drive
functionality. At the first year LG India sold 4,000 units of dish washers whose components
are imported from Korea and then assembled in India. The retail price range was 40,000 to
80,000 rupees. Drum washer is produced in LG-owned factory nearby of Pune area. LGemphasizes the functional advantages of its washers in terms of substantial reduction in11washing time and water usage. LG India also extends the period of free warranty of its new
products from two years to seven years. Even in mobile phone development, LG India
considered the local conditions. For example, in view of high noise level, the bell sound of the
Indian phones is much louder than that of other advanced countries (Chosun, 2008.9.25).
Even now, no more than twenty Korean managers work in LG India while the number ofIndian employees is 3,000. For the good community relations LG India built public healthcenter nearby of its manufacturing facility at Noida. It also employs doctors, pharmacists andnurses to serve the people in the community at no cost to the people. At the 2nd factory
location of Pune area LG India is also in the process of building public health center. LG is not
merely making money. Rather, it is establishing the favorable corporate image to the people inthat it creates employment opportunities for the people and contributes to the overall
wellbeing of the community. LG India also takes much effort in sports marketing. LG India
sponsored Cricket National Championship for more than ten years and accordingly enhanced
LG brand awareness (Maeil Business Newspaper, 2008.3.24).
Samsung engages in sports marketing in global scale while LG employs sports marketing in
national or regional level. For example, Samsung implements brand promotion through its
sponsorship of Chelsea Soccer Team for targeting the entire Europe. LG, on the other hand,focuses its sports marketing for particular nations. From 1999 LG has invested heavily on
Cricket World Cup which South Africa, India and Thailand hosted respectively. LG is proud ofsponsoring local and regional popular sports such as Cricket World Cup and promotes its
products through direct and relational marketing strategy. This is quite different from
Samsung’s global sports marketing based on its abundant financial resources (Park and Park,
2007). Since the most favorite sport of Indians is Cricket, LG also embedded Cricket game
functions in its TVs sold in India as well. Another reason why LG India was so successful in
India was its upper middle class strategy. LG India targeted upper 5% of Indians through highpremium product strategy. These people have purchasing power for LG products. Besides,
such brand image also allows other customers that join the upper middle classes prefer LG
brands for the status symbol effect.
Lastly, for localization strategy of LG India cobweb distribution and service strategy areimportant factors (Park, 2009). LG India from its early pioneering years poured much of its
resources to develop distribution and services networks which include 18 branches in major
regions, 1,800 logistic centers and 85 service centers throughout the nation. While other firms
12paid little attention to after services, LG India allocated almost half of its human resources forthe after-services. LG India also adopted saleswomen system that utilized India’s vast pool ofwomen workforce. LG India was the first that implemented the system of saleswomen in India.
These saleswomen certainly contributed to the sales increase of electrical household goods.

3.2.4 Localization of Human Resources Management
Another success factor of LG India is localization of human resources (Park, 2009). Table 2
shows the details of human resource practices in India. Indian mangers are in charge of sales
and human resources. Mangers from LG Korea take care of production and finance. Indianmangers assume managerial positions in all other areas that have direct contact of Indian
market. Strict incentive systems motivate Indian mangers to achieve their performance goals.
For 1999-2007, incentive bonuses were given to employees based on their performance resultsfrom 0 to 2,000%. From 2008, the rate differentials are modified from 0 to 200% of the basesalaries. LG India intends to strengthen marketing campaigns in PC and mobile phones using
GSM methods.

Table 2: System Management with Local Managers
Sales

HRD

Factory

Finance

Indian V.P

Indian V.P

Korean V.P

Korean V.P

Table 3: Results-based Performance Evaluation System
Results-based System Culture

Evaluation System

Performance Incentive System

Transparency―Evaluation by Quantifiable Criteria―Competitive Culture Between Business Units―Integration of Performance Outcomes and Tangible
Rewards―Monthly Evaluation (Make the Ranking Information by
Business Units and Individuals Available）―Utilization of IT-based Evaluation Package―Business + R & D：Responsible Follow-up on Monthly
Sales/Profit and Loss Outcomes (Twice a month
feedback)―Strict Incentive System (0－1600％）＜200－1600％ from 2008＞―Relative Evaluation of Annual Salary (0－30％）―Disclosure of Evaluation Results and Mutual Feedback
13

3.3 Extending the India Localization Strategy to Poland
LG founded LG Mlawa Poland for Europe market 10 years ago. Accelerating growth ofEurope market caused LG to found one more factory in Poland. LG Wroclaw Poland wasestablished in 2005. As we see extending the India Localization Strategy to Poland, we focus
on LG Wroclaw Poland. LCD TV and the assembly operations of refrigerators started from2006 and the localization initiatives became quite rapidly implemented since then. Table 4 isthe summary of production volumes of LG Wroclaw Poland.

Table 4:LG Wroclaw Poland’s TV Sales
Actual

TV

2007

Sales

Million(EU demand)(units)

Production

Volume Million(LG Wroclaw Poland)
LG’s
share

2008

2009

2010

2011

1,370

1,450

1,740

1,910

25

33

40

44

51

3.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.5

11.2%

12.5%

14.0%

15.0%

16.6%

Million($)# of production

EU market(units)Plans

To extend the India Localization Strategy to Poland, LG Korea appointed two middle
managers which experienced in LG India as presidents of LG Wroclaw Poland. As we focus
on current move of localization from LG India to Poland, we consider leadership of current
president.
Mr. S (current president of LG Wroclaw Poland) was initially sent to LG India from Korea
Gumi Business Unit. Mr. S worked under Mr. Kim as a middle manager in LG India. There Mr.
S learned Mr. Kim’s empowerment management. The total number of Korean mangers in LG
India as of 2006 was 23 (17 in Noida Facility and 5 in PUNE Facility) and 3,000 Indian
employees. LG India initiated and implemented localization policy. LG Korea did not haveany particular strategic intent about this. In fact, as LG India showed successful performanceoutcomes, senior management of LG Korea asked this question, “With a very small number of
Korean managers, how is it possible for LG India to perform so well?” Later, it is discovered
14

that Indian managers made a huge difference. LG Korea then hired 60 Indians in its operation
as well. In this way, LG as a whole adopted more open human resources practices. In this way,
LG India provided specific examples of how to implement localization policy.
Mr. S, who learned from Mr. Kim in India, further expanded this initiative based on actual
performance outcomes. Productivity of LG Wroclaw Poland exceeded that of LG Korea.
Specifically, LG Wroclaw Poland realized high speed production (Tact time：7 seconds). In
the context of global financial crisis, exchange rate differences somewhat affect a productivity
measure in monetary terms. However, the real productivity gain is due to high level of teamwork through effective communication with Polish employees and their innovative problem
solving capabilities. Mr. S enacted trust-based management. Such successful localization
policy which learned from LG India is replicated in LG Wroclaw Poland as well.
In the similar fashion, LG Wroclaw Poland also adopted localization policy in its humanresource practices. Table 5 shows the executive appointments in LG Wroclaw Poland and LG
India. Local managers are in charge of sales and human resources. Managers from LG Korea
are responsible for production and finance. Polish managers assume all other managerial
positions.

Table 5: Comparison of Executive Appointment in India and Poland
Sales

HRD

Factory

Finance

India

Indian V.P

Indian V.P

Korean V.P

Korean V.P

PolandPoland V.P

Poland V.P

Korean V.P

Korean V.P

4. Discussion
This paper explored the details of the localization strategy of LG India and the subsequent
replication of extension to LG Wroclaw Poland. We also examined the constructive
relationships between (1) LG India and LG Wroclaw Poland, (2) LG Korea Headquarters andthese two successful overseas operations (i.e., LG India and Poland).
In the past, most of globalization initiatives of MNCs were initiated by headquarters ofparent company. This LG case study suggests that successful localization initiates are quitepossible through the innovative leadership of LG India. This localization success example
provided reverse learning effect in LG Korea Headquarters. Furthermore, the middle mangers
15that learned localization practices in LG India tried in Poland with great success. These caseexamples provide somewhat different model of localization of MNCs. It remains to be seen
how these dynamic localization initiatives extend as a vital part of globalization strategy of
MNCs. Theory development and managerial implications might be useful to explore with thefurther follow-up studies.

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