Understanding Chinese maritime behaviour:
Opportunities for Malaysia-Japan cooperation in theSouth China Sea
Angeline Tan1—————————————————————————————————————
Abstract: In the East and South China Seas, actions undertaken by both claimants and nonclaimants in the disputed waters have cultivated an environment of distrust, erecting morebarriers to make progress diplomatically. China’s increasing assertiveness over the years isoften blamed for the deteriorating situation in both seas, but what motivates Beijing’s maritime
behaviour? This paper provides a historical analysis to China’s maritime outlook andbehaviour in both the East and South China Seas as an attempt to form a more comprehensive
understanding of China’s behaviour in order to guide a better response from claimant states,
especially in the South China Sea disputes. This paper concludes with four policy
recommendations aimed at enhancing Malaysia’s and ASEAN’s ability to respond to
provocations and manage tensions in the South China Sea. It focuses on how Japan and
Malaysia can cooperate to promote a more stable regional environment.
Keywords: China, Japan, Malaysia Foreign Policy, South China Sea, East China Sea—————————————————————————————————————The South China Sea has consistently featured as a flashpoint in regional security overthe past decade and more, yet tensions show no signs of abating. China has even been accusedof exploiting the vulnerabilities arising from the Covid-19 crisis to further its expansion in the

Angeline Tan is a Researcher at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia.
Her research covers East Asia’s international relations, with a particular focus on China. She is alsointerested in the Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia and Japan’s strategic approach in ASEAN.
She can be reached at angeline@isis.org.my.
1Understanding Chinese maritime behaviour
disputed waters. A similar situation exists in the East China Sea, where China’s claims over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have clashed with Japan’s for decades. Although both the East andSouth China Seas are often analysed separately, there are similarities in the way China behavesin both areas. With growing distrust on all sides, there should be greater urgency in building
understanding and consensus in order to find feasible solutions in managing the territorial
disputes.
This essay seeks to understand the factors which motivate China’s behaviour in thedisputed waters of both the East and South China Seas as an effort to draw links in China’s
overall maritime behaviour. A true effort to understand China’s maritime behaviour should bedone through a Chinese perspective, which this essay seeks to pursue. As diplomacy is thepreferred course of action by claimant states, this essay also seeks to analyse when and why
diplomacy has not been able to make progress in managing the territorial disputes. Considering
the large and complex history of both the East and South China Seas, this essay aims tohighlight only key events and turning points in China’s maritime behaviour in both seas. After
forming a comprehensive understanding of China’s maritime behaviour, this paper concludes
with four suggestions for Japan-Malaysia cooperation that aim to bolster ASEAN’s and its
claimant states’ ability to better respond to the growing uncertainty in the South China Sea.

1. The role of history in China’s territorial claims
It is pertinent to first understand why China claims these territories as its own before
analysing the changes and continuities of its behaviour in the disputed territories. China’s
maritime behaviour in the East and South China Seas are strongly motivated by Beijing’s
understanding of its own history. This historical understanding is deeply rooted in its feelingof entitlement to the territories, partially due to China’s experience during the period it callsthe ‘Century of Humiliation’ at the hands of the nineteenth-century imperialists. The historicalmemory of the ‘Century of Humiliation’ evokes a sense of shame and victimhood from the fallof what was once a great empire. Therefore, in China’s perspective, its recovery from thisperiod of invasions and humiliation towards regaining its great power status necessarily entails
reclaiming what it had lost, including territory.
History, or at least historical narrative, is the core to China’s sense of entitlement in all
its territorial claims. However, the way in which historical narrative is employed in territorial
disputes varies, suggesting inconsistencies in China’s approach. An example of inconsistency

2

Understanding Chinese maritime behaviouris the historic right of China’s nine-dash line, which was first used formally in its legal claims
in 2009 but for which it has yet to provide an explicit explanation. China also utilizes historicalnarrative more frequently in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island disputes than those in the South China
Sea, not because it is strategically pragmatic but because of historical sensitivity in the SinoJapanese relationship.
Another inconsistency is how China uses history in the disputes between China and thevarious claimant states. In the East China Sea, the historical narrative in China evokes Japan’s
past as a military aggressor and imperialist. This narrative is frequently used against Japan todemonstrate the historical sensitivity in China and to suggest that any provocation from Japan
will be considered neo-imperialist behaviour, essentially framing the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
issue as one between former aggressor and former victim. On the other hand, South China Sea
claimant states were all formerly colonized countries, and therefore the dichotomy of victimvictor does not apply. As all South China Sea claimant states including China are formerly
victims of imperialism, the disputes are instead approached as misunderstandings of historical
record. This is further complicated by the multiplicity of colonial administrations, such as the
French in Indochina, the British in Malaya, and the Americans in the Philippines. Therefore,
China initially pursued diplomacy to resolve the conflicting territorial claims, as exemplified
by efforts to participate in multilateral processes such as ASEAN’s Declaration of Conduct.
However, as diplomacy has progressed slowly while China’s economic and military power has
grown rapidly in recent decades, Beijing has become emboldened to act on its territorial claimsin the South China Sea more assertively.
This begs the question: why does China continue to use historical claims if they havenot proven to be strategically effective? Domestically, nationalism and censorship have
impeded the Chinese public’s awareness that Beijing’s handling in the disputed waters haveplayed a critical role in destabilizing the region (Yang & Li 2016). Moreover, historicalsensitivity makes the disputes a nationally emotional issue that frames China as the victim(Kim 1998), thereby encouraging a hardline and assertive approach from the Beijing
government. Within China, the assertive attitude and behaviour over these territories
demonstrate the continued exercise of jurisdiction and effective control, reflecting their rightful
governance. China does not need to be strategically effective for a domestic audience that views
the disputed areas as their rightful and sovereign territory. From a broader international view,
Beijing firmly believes that there is a legal and internationally recognized basis to citing
historic rights to disputed waters. Beijing maintains the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam
Proclamation as the legal bases for its territorial claims, especially in the Senkaku/Diaoyu
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Islands. Although the declarations were signed by the Republic of China, Beijing contends thatthe agreements extend to the People’s Republic of China under the One-China Policy.

2. Historical overview of China’s maritime behaviour
A historical overview of China’s maritime policy helps illustrate the continuities andevolution in China’s maritime outlook and behaviour, providing a more holistic understanding
as to why China behaves assertively in certain situations. Better understanding of China’s
outlook and behaviour could inspire more constructive solutions to the escalating tensions inboth the East and South China Seas. This paper identifies three phases to China’s maritime
policy: the early years between 1949 and 1970, a shift in approach to maritime security fromthe 1970s to the 2000s, and growing assertiveness starting in the late 2000s.
2.1 The Early Years
In the early years (1949 to 1970), China’s maritime policy was in its infancy. The
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was officially founded in 1950, after the army’s
victory which led the Chinese Communist Party to establish the People’s Republic of China.
However, this does not mean that Beijing was ignorant of the importance of the maritime
domain. In the past, China’s maritime vulnerability had been exploited by imperialist
aggressors to invade China, leading to the ‘Century of Humiliation’. This threat awarenesscarried through post-independence, when the Chinese Communist Party recognized the needto defend its coastline against possible threats from the Kuomintang regime that fled to Taiwan
and the US presence in the Asia Pacific as well as the by-products of Cold War superpower
rivalry (Cole 2000; Kim 1998).
Recognizing the need for greater maritime capabilities, Chairman Mao Zedong
proclaimed in a 1953 Politburo meeting that China “must build a strong navy” to deter
imperialist aggression and prepare for the recovery of Taiwan. 2 This suggests that China’s

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was formed to bolster the People’s Liberation Army’s
overall military capabilities with the goal of recapturing Taiwan across the strait. Chairman Mao Zedong
was also acutely aware of the need to build a powerful coastal defence to deter foreign invasion, toprevent history from repeating itself. However, Mao also noted that the navy should be built according
to the developmental and financial capabilities of the People’s Republic of China, which did not have astrong economy at the time. http://www.commonprogram.science/art22.html
24Understanding Chinese maritime behaviour
maritime strategic thinking at this point centred on defence, while issues related to maritime
sovereignty mainly targeted Taiwan. There is a lack of evidence that China had strategic focus
on the East or South China Seas during this period.
Although there were efforts to modernize the PLAN following Chairman’s Mao
statement in 1953, the pace of progress was limited as the military’s priority continued to becontinental defence. This can be explained by certain geopolitical factors, such as the SinoIndian border dispute in 1962 as well as the escalating situation in Vietnam. Therefore, despite
efforts to modernize, the PLAN was limited in the early years to brown-water capabilities suchas coastal defence. At this point, the PLAN did not resemble a modern navy that could project
power beyond its coastal regions (Huang 1994).

2.2 Modernisation of the PLAN and shift in maritime thinking
The second phase covers the modernisation of the PLAN and China’s integration
into the international regime in the 1970s to the 2000s. There was a shift in strategic
awareness of the maritime space during this period, and China began to learn and adopt thenorms of the international regime as Beijing was socialised into multilateralism.
2.2.1 Shift in China’s maritime strategic thinking
From the late 1970s Chinese political elites and military leaders began recognising theadvancement of military technologies and the need to develop the PLAN towards blue-watercapabilities. This highlighted the maritime domain as an increasingly important aspect ofnational security. There is an economic element to bolstering maritime power as well. This
period is characterised by China’s rapid economic development under the Reform and Opening
Up policy, which had a maritime orientation. Bernard Cole articulates that “China historicallyhas viewed the sea as an invasion route for foreign aggressors, rather than as a medium forachieving national goals. This attitude appears to have changed in the post-Cold War years, as
it focuses on offshore sovereignty, economic, and resource issues” (2000). Therefore, a strong
PLAN was necessary to protect the flourishing coastal economy as well as offshore resources.
China’s fast-growing economy also provided the financial resources necessary to modernise
the PLAN.

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Understanding Chinese maritime behaviour
China then began to integrate into the global maritime regime. Beijing’s first
involvement started with the negotiations at the third United Nations Conference on the Lawof the Sea (UNCLOS III), which concluded in 1982. Prior to this, the international maritime
regime existed in the form of the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, in which
Beijing did not participate and with which it had limited interactions. Therefore, China was notfamiliar with the norms and laws of the prevailing maritime regime. China’s integration into
UNCLOS in 1982 exposed Beijing to the legal issues and technicalities necessary for modern
maritime governance, and this has shaped and reshaped its understanding and approach to themaritime domain (Li 2018).
According to Li Lingqun, in the initial years of China’s participation in the UNCLOS
III negotiations, “the Chinese delegation often used the debate floor for political purposes,
condemning maritime hegemony and proclaiming China an integral part of the Third World”(p. 53, 2018). This indicates that Beijing did not see UNCLOS as an opportunity for shaping
the rules of the international regime, but instead as a platform to rally the Third World against
Cold War rivalry (Kim 1994). By 1978, China’s socialisation into UNCLOS-led maritime
governance saw its statements shift from condemning superpower rivalry towards more
selective and specific issues. For example, the Chinese delegation objected to a compulsory
dispute mechanism, preferring consensus and further consultations between the parties
involved (Li 2018). This demonstrates China’s socialisation into global governance, as well as
Beijing’s growing awareness that its national interests were not limited to its coastline.
2.2.2 Shift in China’s maritime posturing
Other than a shift in maritime strategic awareness, the 1970s-2000s period also
demonstrated a change in Beijing’s posturing in the East and South China Seas, marking theinitial stages of maritime territorial disputes. Despite both involving maritime territorial issues,
developments and historical narratives in the two seas are distinct from each other. Therefore,
analyses of developments will be detailed separately.
2.2.2.a East China Sea
Tensions in the East China Sea began in the 1970s, though Japan and China hold adifferent perspective of the turning point due to different interpretations of history. According
to Japan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands had been under Japanese administration following the6Understanding Chinese maritime behaviour
formal incorporation of the islands into the territory of Japan on 14 January 1895. This occurredin the midst of the Sino-Japanese War and predates the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed in April
1895. Tokyo further iterates that the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco which detailed Japan’s
territory did not indicate that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would be renounced. It is worth
noting that neither the People’s Republic of China nor the Republic of China are signatories of
the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. In the Japanese view, China began encroaching on the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands after the 1969 report by the United Nations Economic Commission
for Asia and the Far East which indicated possible large energy deposits near the islands. Soon
after the report, China released a note through the state-run Xinhua News Agency in December
1970 criticising foreign exploration in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands where Beijing claims
sovereignty. This represents the first instance in which China publicly asserted sovereignty
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Chansoria 2018; Watts 2019). Japan hence criticises China’s
claims in the East China Sea as economically motivated, with poor evidence of administrationand legal claims over the islands.
In contrast, China views the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as an unresolved issue ofsovereignty left over from the ‘Century of Humiliation’. In particular, the question ofsovereignty over the islands is directly linked to Japan’s invasion of China and Greater East
Asia. While Tokyo views the incorporation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as separate from theTreaty of Shimonoseki, Beijing perceives the two as interrelated and inseparable as it
represents Japan’s imperialistic aggrandisement in China. Consequently, Beijing interprets that
the Treaty of Shimonoseki detailed the cession of “the island of Formosa, together with allislands appertaining or belonging to it”, which presumes the inclusion of the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands.3 Therefore, in Beijing’s perspective, Japan effectively lost legal administrative rights
over the islands when the Treaty of Shimonoseki became null.
Following this logic, the turning point of the East China Sea issue in Beijing’s
perspective was triggered by the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement which saw the US
transferring administrative rights to Japan, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Beijing
protested this move and issued a statement in December 1971 stating that “it is completely
illegal for the government of the United States and Japan to include China’s Diaoyu Dao Islands

The Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) concluded the First Sino-Japanese War by setting out the termsof China’s surrender to the Empire of Japan. Article II of the treaty called for the cession of the islandof Formosa (better known as Taiwan) to Japan, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to
Formosa, but it does not explicitly identify which islands these are.
https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/pw/18950417.T1E.html
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into the territories to be returned to Japan in the Okinawa Reversion Agreement and it can by
no means change the People’s Republic of China’s territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu Dao
Islands.” 4 Tensions further rose when Japan erected a lighthouse on the largest of the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in March 1978, to which Beijing responded by sending over 80 armed
fishing boats to circle the islands. It is also reported that a PLAN commander had planned amajor naval exercise near the islands as a show of force; this was overruled, however, as Deng
Xiaoping was working towards the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship which wassigned in August later that year (van Kemenade 2006).
Despite the difference in historical narratives and interpretations of legal positions, theSenkaku/Diaoyu islands issue was managed diplomatically during this period by ‘shelving’ it,although this was never a formal or legal policy. When China and Japan normalised diplomatic
relations in 1972, the issue of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands arose with disagreements between
the two sides. However, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Chinese Premier Zhou
Enlai decided not to discuss the issue then, preferring to focus on the status of Taiwan (Drifte2013). Instead, the disputed area was managed through back-channel diplomacy among highlevel officials, allowing for discussions of sensitive issues without public pressure (Hafeez2015). During the negotiations for the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Deng Xiaoping
and Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda similarly chose to ‘shelve’ the sensitive issue ofthe Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in order to focus on joint development. In a 1978 press conference
during Deng’s visit to Tokyo, he claimed that “our generation is not wise enough to findcommon language on this [Diaoyu/Senkaku] question. The next generation will certainly bewiser. They will surely find a solution acceptable to all.” (Drifte 2014). Deng’s successors
followed suit on the unofficial policy of ‘shelving disputes and carrying out joint development’,and China did not take any concrete actions to challenge Japan’s control of the islands for the
next few decades (Yang & Li 2016). By doing so, the status quo of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
was essentially preserved even though disagreements remained. Nevertheless, it was clear thatfrom the 1970s China made a shift in its posturing through more public assertions and clearer
articulations of its claims in the East China Sea.
2.2.2.b South China Sea

The Okinawa Reversion Agreement (1971) returned all powers of administration over the Okinawa
and Daito islands, including the Senkaku Islands, to Japan after the United States Civil Administrationof the Ryukyu Islands that began in 1950.
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/diaodao_665718/201209/t20120926_701830.html
48Understanding Chinese maritime behaviour

While the East China Sea was managed through diplomacy between the 1970s and the2000s, Beijing was far more willing to flex military power in the South China Sea. Scholars
have described Beijing’s behaviour in the South China Sea as relatively restrained and driven
by opportunistic gains, especially when opponents are either distracted or not likely to respondstrongly (Ang 1999; Li, 2015; Raditio 2015; Yang & Li 2016). It is also important to recognisethat, while China’s military capabilities were growing quickly, the PLAN at this point had
limited resources for projecting sustained power throughout the South China Sea (Cole 2000).
Therefore, from the mid-1970s through the 1980s, China’s actions in the South China Sea weredirected against the more proximate Vietnam.
It began in the Paracel Islands, when a naval clash between China and South Vietnam
in 1974 resulted in China’s total control of Woody Island. China’s military campaign in the
Paracels took place shortly after the signing of the 1973 Paris Agreement to conclude theVietnam War, when the US was not likely to intervene after its failed war. Later in 1988, China
and Vietnam clashed again in the Spratly Islands, which led to Chinese occupation over several
features. Despite geopolitical tensions during this period, China was not constrained by Cold
War dynamics, as the Soviet Union began shifting its attention away from Vietnam while the
US prioritised rapprochement with China. Hence, Beijing rightly calculated that its militaryconfrontations in the Paracel and Spratly Islands would not attract external intervention in
Vietnam’s defence (Ang 1999).
At this point, China’s activities in the South China Sea were perceived as a bilateralissue with Vietnam. Li Lingqun notes that there was a “tacit belief among ASEAN membersthat China would not take on claimants other than Vietnam” (2018, p. 101). ASEAN thencomprised six members: Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Brunei.
Thus, while China’s territorial disputes with Vietnam in the South China Sea were flashpoints
for regional instability, they did not interfere with ASEAN Centrality.
In the 1990s, developments in the South China Sea took a turn. Following UNCLOS
1982, China adopted the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1992 and theLaw on the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 1998. Firstly, the enactment of these laws
reflects China’s embrace of the international maritime regime. Second, these laws shifted
China’s approach towards a growing emphasis on historical claims instead of traditional
international law and territorial acquisition (Li 2018). On the military front, the PLAN grewsignificantly in the 1990s. In 1993, China announced that it had developed an airstrip on Woody
Island, suggesting that China had begun building structures on the islands that it claims. This
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prompted concerns in Southeast Asia, with the Malaysian defence minister warning against the
militarisation of the South China Sea (Koga 2022).
China’s activities in the South China Sea also quickly expanded beyond its disputes
with Vietnam. In February 1995, the Philippines discovered that China had been building
structures on Mischief Reef, where both parties are claimants. This came after the US withdrew
from Subic Base in 1993. Numerous scholars interpret China’s occupation of Mischief Reef as
the start of growing instability and China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea(Kim 1998; Storey 1999; Fravel 2011; Raditio 2015).
In response, President Fidel V. Ramos issued a statement that the Philippines would“prepare for the worst” and deployed warships and fighter planes to Mischief Reef. Given its
limited military capabilities, the Philippines pursued diplomacy multilaterally by rallying
support in ASEAN, culminating in the March 1995 Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers
on the Recent Developments in the South China Sea expressing “serious concern” over thedevelopments on Mischief Reef. A month later, the first meeting of ASEAN and Chinese seniorforeign-ministry officials convened in Hangzhou, where the Mischief Reef incident and other
South China Sea concerns were raised. By July, Vietnam had formally joined ASEAN andparticipated in the 28th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting that month, which further complicatedChina’s territorial disputes in Southeast Asia (Cheng 1999). The foreign ministers at thatmeeting issued a joint statement which expressed concerns over the South China Sea. This
demonstrated a strong ASEAN consensus on the South China Sea issue. It also highlighted theregion’s turn towards multilateralism, a concept to which China was still adapting.
While China may have been prepared for a strong response from the Philippines,
Beijing did not expect a unified and multilateral effort from ASEAN. Hoping to avoid theinternationalisation of the South China Sea and feeling the pressure of a united ASEAN
response, China shifted its diplomatic posture slightly at the second ASEAN Regional Forumin August 1995. Although Beijing maintained its rejection of multilateral negotiations, China
agreed to shelve the territorial dispute in favour of joint development (Koga 2022). This mirrors
Beijing’s approach to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with Japan from the 1970s to the
2000s. China also indicated that it would comply with international law in managing theterritorial disputes in the South China Sea, signalling a move away from Beijing’s previous
insistence on its sovereignty over the islands (Cheng 1999; Li 2018; Koga 2022). China’s
willingness to manage the Mischief Reef incident diplomatically with ASEAN illustrates
Beijing’s priority in maintaining good and stable relations with its neighbours. Regional
stability was instrumental for China’s continued economic development (Kim 1998; Yang &10Understanding Chinese maritime behaviour
Li 2016). Moreover, strong relations with ASEAN would also enable Beijing to play a moresignificant role in the Asia Pacific (Cheng 1999).
Overall, China’s behaviour in the South China Sea during this phase can becharacterised as “confrontation, cooperation, and compromise” (Li 2018). While skirmishes in
the Spratly Islands continued to occur, diplomacy prevailed and the status quo was generally
unchanged. Although there was no change in the basic positions of the disputing parties, regularmultilateral exchanges between China and ASEAN member states had gradually transformed
the atmosphere of negotiations “into a more relaxed and constructive space” (Cheng 1999; Li2018). In August 1996, the Philippines and China agreed to a non-binding code of conduct
which aimed to promote confidence-building measures and avoid future incidents in the South
China Sea (Cheng 1999). Such discussions were soon adopted into ASEAN-China dialogues
which lead to the signing of the non-binding Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea in
2002. The changes in China’s outlook on the South China Sea by the end of the 1990s reflecta growing multilateral awareness in China’s policymaking.
In this second phase extending from the 1970s to the early 2000s, Beijing developed anincreased strategic awareness of its maritime space beyond its coastlines and into the East andSouth China Seas. This follows China’s assimilation into the international maritime regime,
which has shaped Beijing’s understanding and behaviour of its maritime interests (Li 2018).
Acting on these expanded interests, China consequently increased incidences in the maritime
space. This led to disagreements in both the East and South China Seas, where diplomacy had
been prioritised in the management of disputes. In the East China Sea, the unofficial policy of‘shelving’ in favour of cooperation was followed, reflecting Beijing’s low-profile dictum in its
foreign policy. In the South China Sea, though, China became more assertive, calculative andmilitaristic, as seen on Woody Island and Mischief Reef. As there were more parties concerned,
Beijing was forced to adapt to multilateralism as ASEAN confronted China with a strong
unified stance.
2.3 Growing maritime assertiveness
The third phase corresponds to China’s growing assertiveness beginning in the late
2000s. After its accession into the World Trade Organisation, China’s economy flourished andgrew rapidly. As a rising power, Beijing grew emboldened to act more assertively on its
sovereignty claims in the East and South China Seas, especially when it felt that the status quo

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was threatened. China’s increasingly assertive behaviour also raised suspicion internationallyabout Chinese ambitions.
2.3.1 East China Sea
The situation in the East China Sea since the 2000s must be understood through thebroader prism of the Sino-Japanese relationship, which had taken a turn in 2005 with the largescale anti-Japanese demonstrations in China. Triggered by a mix of factors – such as therevision of Japanese history textbooks, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s statement of intent
to visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, and Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council – mass demonstrations took place in over 30 cities for over three weeks across
China. The violent protests illustrated the underlying tensions in Sino-Japanese relations, with
the Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Dawei acknowledging that bilateral relations had reachedtheir lowest point since the normalisation of relations in 1972 (Chan & Bridges 2006). Whilethe 2005 protests had no immediate consequences for the East China Sea, the strong antiJapanese sentiment had implications for subsequent developments around the disputed islands
in 2010 and 2012.
In September 2010, the Japan Coast Guard arrested the crew of a Chinese fishing boat
near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and remanded them to a Japanese court in Ishigaki City forprosecution. This “illegal detention” sparked anti-Japanese protests in China, while Beijing
also responded swiftly with a hard-line stance by demanding the immediate and unconditional
release of the Chinese fishing crew, suspending high-level talks with Japan, discouraging
Chinese citizens from traveling to Japan, and taking retaliatory measures such as halting rareearth mineral exports and arresting four Japanese employees (Zhao 2013; Liff 2019). Beijing’s
strong response was partially motivated by the perception of its rising power vis-à-vis the Westand Japan’s declining power in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, as well as China’s
overtaking Japan as the second largest economy in 2010 (Johnston 2013). Tensions subsided
after Japan released the Chinese boat captain, with a Tokyo official commenting that thecontinued detention would inappropriately damage relations with China.
Tensions flared again in 2012 when the Tokyo government purchased the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private Japanese individual, a move which China interpreted
as an attempt by Japan to nationalise the islands and effectively alter the status quo. Evoking
Japan’s imperialistic past, the incident sparked another wave of violent anti-Japanese protests.
In responding diplomatically, Beijing once again froze high-level diplomatic exchanges, a12Understanding Chinese maritime behaviour
pause which lasted for two years, and issued a formal declaration of territorial baselines in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to the UN Secretary-General. To assert its sovereignty over the newly
declared territorial baselines, China began regularly dispatching China Marine Surveillance
vessels around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Hafeez 2015). In November 2013, Beijing
announced an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) to further assert its jurisdiction in the
East China Sea. During this time, China Marine Surveillance was merged with other agencies
to form the China Coast Guard (CCG) as a civilian agency. Subsequent reforms in 2018 placed
the CCG under the command of the Central Military Commission, demonstrating theincreasing militarisation of the agency as well as creating closer institutional links to the PLAN.
This has enabled China to more effectively deploy grey zone tactics in both the East and South
China Seas. Overall, according to Adam Liff, four trends were seen in the East China Sea: (1)a quantitative surge in China’s activity in the waters and airspace, (2) increasing grey zone
operations, (3) the deepening of ties between the CCG and the military, and (4) an expansionof the PLA’s capabilities and the geographical scope of its operations (2019).
The 2012 incident ushered in the era of a precarious instability in the East China Sea.
The growing tensions and distrust between China and Japan aggravated uncertainty and therisk of a possible clash. When high-level talks resumed in 2014, Beijing and Tokyo issued aFour Point Agreement to restore the bilateral relationship. The agreement recognised thedifferent views or positions of both sides on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, refraining fromlabelling it a ‘territorial dispute’. It also agreed to establish crisis management mechanisms to
avoid future incidences. This led to the 2018 establishment of a defence liaison hotline toprevent accidents at sea and in the air, but progress on this stalled. The hotline was eventuallycompleted five years later in 2023, with the first call held in May between the two defence
ministers (Wang 2023).
To summarise, while the East China Sea largely remained a bilateral issue, it must be
understood through the broader prism of the bilateral relationship. In particular, anti-Japanesesentiment and rising popular nationalism in China has positioned the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
issue as inherently a historical question. The skirmishes in the East China Sea means that‘shelving’ the issue is no longer a viable diplomatic option, while the sensitive nature of SinoJapanese history has left little room for diplomatic progress.
2.3.2 South China Sea

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Unlike the East China Sea, the situation in the South China Sea in the early 2000s was
relatively stable. The signing of the Declaration of Conduct and the reduced US presence inthe region allowed for a stabilised geostrategic environment and progressive developments on
the territorial disputes (Li 2018). However, Chinese perceptions of an attempt to change thestatus quo in the South China Sea in the late 2000s triggered more assertive behaviour.
The turning point is what Nguyen Hong Thao coins the ‘Battle of the Diplomatic Notes’(2020). It started with the 2009 joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam to the UN
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to extend their continental shelves,followed by a separate submission by Vietnam. The submissions aimed to meet the deadline
for declaring territorial baselines under UNCLOS 1982 (Li 2018; Koga 2022). China
responded immediately with a Note Verbale to the UN Secretary-General rejecting the joint
submission as an infringement of Chinese sovereignty. Attached to the Note Verbale was a mapof the nine-dash line, representing the first official use of the nine-dash line in China’s claims.
Between 2009 and 2011, a total of twelve diplomatic notes were issued by China, Vietnam,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. These exchanges demonstrate the various
interpretations of international law in the South China Sea. There have also been calls for China
to clarify its legal position in the South China Sea, but Beijing has not provided an explicit
explanation of the nine-dash line (Yang & Li 2016). Sensing a possible change to the statusquo, China began increasing its maritime activities in disputed waters as a show of effective
control to support its legal position conveyed through its UN Note Verbales (Li 2018). Beijing
also pursued confidence-building initiatives, such as launching the China-ASEAN Maritime
Cooperation Fund in November 2011 with a fund of RMB 3 billion (Cook 2012). Nevertheless,
China continued to insist that the South China Sea disputes were bilateral issues between
claimant states and rejected multilateral approaches.
During this time, the PLAN significantly increased its militarisation in the South China
Sea by building up its South Sea Fleet and its surrounding military bases. There was also an
increase in the number of incidents, such as arrests of fishermen by the CCG and harassmentof survey vessels (Emmers 2014). Tensions reached a peak with the Scarborough Shoal
standoff in April 2012 after China blocked an attempt by the Philippines to arrest Chinese
fishermen accused of illegal fishing (Cook 2012). In response, both China and the Philippines
deployed maritime vessels to Scarborough Shoal to demonstrate effective control. The standoff
lasted two months, and diplomatic relations suffered. Although the standoff ended peacefully
when both Chinese and Philippine vessels withdrew from the area, CCG ships remained,
enabling Beijing to maintain its presence in the disputed area (Koga 2022). In addition, Beijing
14

Understanding Chinese maritime behaviour
established Sansha City on Woody Island in July 2012 to administer its territorial claims in theSouth China Sea. These actions are often read as Beijing’s “creeping assertiveness” to alter the
status quo in its favour. Ever since, China has attempted to defend its claims in the South China
Sea through a combination of military, paramilitary, legal and diplomatic measures (Yang & Li
2016).
The Philippines once again sought unified diplomatic support through ASEAN,
especially as the Scarborough Shoal incident violated the Declaration of Conduct, but Manila
met with disappointment. Soon after the standoff, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2012
failed to issue a joint communique for the first time when Cambodia as ASEAN Chair refused
to include the South China Sea on the agenda. It should be noted that China is a close economic
partner to Cambodia, and that Chinese President Hu Jintao had visited Cambodia earlier inMarch and both leaders had agreed that the South China Sea issue should not be“internationalised” at ASEAN meetings (Prak 2012).
The failure to form a consensus on the South China Sea issue created greater urgency
within ASEAN to push for progress on the Code of Conduct, to which Beijing responded
positively (Li 2018). However, such progress was complicated by the Obama administration’s‘Pivot to Asia’. An increased US presence in the region and Washington’s heightened interestin the South China Sea issue raised suspicions in Beijing of a US containment strategy and alack of respect for China’s legitimate interests (Cook 2012; Yang & Li 2016; Li 2018).
Renewed US interest also ushered in the involvement of other powers, such as Japan andAustralia, in the South China Sea. Suddenly the geopolitical theatre of the South China Sea
became crowded with claimant and non-claimant states alike. This put greater pressure on
Beijing to increase its commitment to multilateralism and the Code of Conduct negotiations(Li 2018). Although this was successful in giving the stability of the South China Sea higher
priority on ASEAN’s and China’s agendas, such geopolitical developments deepened distrustin Beijing.
The failure to issue a joint communique reflected ASEAN’s disunity and inability torespond to regional crises, in contrast to ASEAN’s effective and united response to the 1995
Mischief Reef incident. This prompted the Philippines in 2013 to file for arbitrational
proceedings against China under Annex VII to UNCLOS 1982. Beijing rejected this move,suggesting that China was not ready or confident enough to defend its legal position in its South
China Sea disputes. In 2016, the Tribunal ruled in favour of the Philippines, concluding that“there is no legal basis for any Chinese historic rights, or sovereign rights and jurisdiction
beyond those provided for in the Convention, in the waters of the South China Sea
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Understanding Chinese maritime behaviour
encompassed by the ‘nine-dash line’” (The South China Sea Arbitration, 2016, p. 255). The
Tribunal declared that Mischief Reef is within the EEZ and continental shelf of the Philippines,
thereby deeming China’s occupation of the feature in 1995 illegal, and further concluded that
Scarborough Shoal is not entitled to an EEZ or continental shelf but recognised that China had“unlawfully prevented fishermen from the Philippines from engaging in traditional fishing”
around the disputed area (The South China Sea Arbitration, 2016, p. 475). Beijing refused toacknowledge or accept the ruling. Despite the ruling being overwhelmingly in Manila’s favour,
President Rodrigo Duterte chose to shelve the award in favour of strengthened relations with
China. This dealt a further blow to ASEAN’s unity and ability to manage the South China Sea
issue.
While President Duterte chose to disregard the 2016 tribunal ruling, other South China
Sea claimants adopted its conclusions for their own respective agendas. In 2019, Malaysia
issued a new partial submission to the UNCLCS which implicitly upheld the 2016 tribunal
ruling while rejecting China’s nine-dash line claims. This marks a change from Malaysia’s
silent diplomacy on its South China Sea claims against Beijing. Malaysia’s submission sparked
the Battle of the Diplomatic Notes 2.0, in which non-claimant states such as the US andAustralia also took part, signalling growing international support on the issue (Nguyen 2020).
The mounting internationalisation of the South China Sea has induced geopoliticaldevelopments, such as the announcement of AUKUS. AUKUS has further complicated thegrowing uncertainty in the disputed seas, with China, Indonesia and Malaysia criticising themove. Moreover, ASEAN unity is increasingly fragmented by major-power rivalry, further
paralysing its ability to respond to escalating tensions in the region. Even during theunprecedented Covid-19 pandemic, China grew increasingly intimidating in the South China
Sea (Tan 2021). For example, in March 2021, the Philippines called attention to what it
described as a ‘Chinese maritime militia’ in Whitsun Reef for several weeks, illustrating
another example of China’s grey zone tactics. An analysis by the Institute of International andStrategic Studies notes that the “Whitsun Reef incident is unprecedented in scale and notablefor its duration” (Puri & Austin, 2021). China’s actions in the disputed waters have been
criticised as expansionary at a time when ASEAN states have been distracted by the Covid-19induced crisis (Tan 2021).
At the southern-most tip of China’s territorial claims, there have been several episodes
with Malaysia as well. In April 2020 a ‘standoff’ took place in territorial waters claimed by
Malaysia, Vietnam and China. The incident attracted the unwelcomed participation of the US
and Australia, illustrating the growing international interest in the South China Sea disputes.
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Understanding Chinese maritime behaviour
The incident ended a few weeks later when the Malaysian oil drilling ship left the waters after
completing its work. Traditionally, Malaysia has sought back-channel diplomacy to manage its
South China Sea disputes with Beijing. Both the Chinese and Malaysian governments denied
that it was a standoff, likely to avoid bringing attention to the incident and risk further
escalating tensions. Another incident took place a few months later in November when China
and Malaysia met at another standoff in disputed waters after a CCG ship harassed a Malaysian
drilling rig and its supply ships. The most alarming incident took place in May 2021, when 16
Chinese aircraft were detected flying in tactical formation into Malaysian airspace. Malaysia’s
Foreign Ministry immediately responded with a diplomatic note of protest, in reply to which
China claimed that it was a part of routine flight training. While none of the three incidents
triggered a crisis, instantly altered the status quo, or worsened Sino-Malaysian relations as
similar incidents had with other Southeast Asian claimants, these developments do point
towards increasing assertiveness and grey zone tactics employed by China at the southern-most
tip of its territorial claims. Evidently, China is now able to project blue-water capabilities across
East and Southeast Asia.
2.4 Characterising the current status quo
Shifting away from a unified ASEAN in the 1990s, the inability to issue a jointstatement at the 2012 Ministerial Meeting exemplified the growing weakness of ASEAN’s
multilateralism. However, this has not prevented ASEAN claimant states from pursuing
diplomacy through issuing diplomatic notes or filing for arbitration. In addition, geopoliticaldevelopments such as a renewed US interest in the region has deepened distrust. Under greaterpressure, China has become increasingly active in the disputed waters, deploying grey zone
tactics and refusing multilateral negotiations, even during the Covid-19 crisis. There are also
indications that China is not fully confident in its legal position in the South China Sea,considering its refusal to acknowledge the arbitration process and ruling. Given the lack ofprogress on diplomatic negotiations and confidence-building measures, the instability in theSouth China Sea shows no signs of abating.
Similarly, mutual distrust and animosity continues to grow in the East China Sea,
thereby increasing the risk of political miscalculation and accidents. The newly launchedhotline has the potential to manage tensions and incidents, but only if the two sides remaincommitted to open communications. In both the East and South China Seas, geopoliticalpressures have revealed the limits of diplomacy. The more China perceives that the status quo
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Understanding Chinese maritime behaviour
is being altered, the more Beijing will double down on its assertiveness. This vicious cycle
feeds on distrust, further exacerbated by intensifying major power rivalry in the region.
At present, the precarious status quo in both the East and South China Seas can becharacterised by distrust and growing power asymmetry among all claimant states, especiallythose in ASEAN. China’s maritime behaviour has been increasingly emboldened, while
claimant states are increasingly unable to respond effectively to Beijing’s assertions. As distrust
deepens, Japan and ASEAN member states will find it ever more difficult to find a diplomatic
solution with China. This challenge is further complicated by the heightened US presence inthe region, indicating that the maritime domain in the East and South China Seas could
potentially emerge as a key theatre of conflict for the US-China rivalry.
3. Moving forward: Opportunities for Malaysia-Japan cooperation
Although the East and South-China Seas differ by geography and parties involved,
recent developments indicate that the four trends identified by Adam Liff (in section 2.3.1) areapplicable to both seas, thereby moving towards a situation where the status quo is potentiallyshifting in Beijing’s favour. Considering the recent completion of the crisis-management
hotline between the defence liaisons of Beijing and Tokyo, there is optimism that unintended
incidences can be better managed in the East China Sea should both sides remain committed
to open communication. Greater transparency and enhanced communication will hopefully
deter the perception in China that Japan has intentions to alter the status quo in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands so as to ease Beijing’s concerns and assertiveness in the East China
Sea. On the other hand, the outlook for Malaysia in the South China Sea is not as optimistic.
Although Malaysia’s involvement with China in the South China Sea is not as strained as thoseof other claimants such as Vietnam and the Philippines, developments in recent years suggestthat things may take a turn for the worse. The situations with Vietnam and the Philippines offera glimpse of what is to come for Malaysia if China presses on with its claims. Therefore, it isimportant that Japan cooperate with Malaysia to strengthen maritime capabilities while alsoenhancing normative and diplomatic pressures that can positively influence China’s maritime
behaviour.
3.1 Recommendations

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Understanding Chinese maritime behaviour
Due to the number of parties involved, asymmetry in military capabilities and growing
developments, there is more urgency to address the issues in the South China Sea. Whilepriority should be given to enhancing the capabilities of Southeast Asian claimant states, itwould not be realistic to try to match those of China’s, which possesses the world’s largest navy.
The purpose of these recommendations is not to narrow the power asymmetry, but to enhance
ASEAN claimant states’ ability to respond to provocations and manage tensions in the South
China Sea as well as foster greater regional cohesion. Therefore, the four recommendations
below focus on how Japan and Malaysia can cooperate to promote a more stable regional
environment.
First, Japan should assist Malaysia in improving its maritime capabilities, particularly
its capacity for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Air Domain Awareness (ADA). A
comprehensive understanding of how maritime threats intersect as well as inter-ministry andagency coordination on MDA and ADA are both lacking. Japan can assist Malaysia in
improving cohesiveness among its maritime agencies and approaches to maritime security.
This can be done through the framework of Japan’s recently announced Official Security
Assistance (OSA), which seeks to enhance the security and deterrence infrastructure ofrecipient countries in order to contribute to regional peace, stability and security. Further, Japanand Malaysia can pursue third-party cooperation in improving MDA and ADA with the rest of
ASEAN, especially claimant states.
Secondly, Japan and Malaysia should cooperate to ensure a common understanding ofinternational maritime law. Although all claimants in the South China Sea are signatories of
UNCLOS 1982, their different positions on the territorial disputes suggest competinginterpretations of international law. Therefore, it is important to foster an environment ofcommon understanding and interpretation of international maritime law. This can contribute toconfidence-building mechanisms in the South China Sea, as well as potentially affect thesituation in the East China Sea.
Thirdly, Japan and Malaysia should demonstrate regional leadership. In recent years,
ASEAN has suffered from a lack of leadership, which has allowed its unity to further fragment.
Japan and Malaysia should not shy away from taking central leadership roles in the region asnecessary to form consensuses and strengthen multilateralism. ASEAN and its various
platforms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum or ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus,
provide the ideal avenue to improve political coordination while also applying normative anddiplomatic pressures to prevent any party from behaving provocatively in the maritime domain.

19Understanding Chinese maritime behaviour
Finally, expanding on the third suggestion regarding taking leadership, Japan and
Malaysia should consider resolving territorial disputes among ASEAN claimant states. The
South China Sea disputes are a complex web of intersecting claims among various parties
which are often deemed too difficult to solve. Japan and Malaysia can consider minilateralism
as the first step to eliminating problems and animosities with ASEAN claimant states before
building wider consensus at the regional level. This will help bolster ASEAN unity, improvecohesion on disputed issues, and enhance coordinate responses as the region navigates rising
uncertainty.
4. Conclusion
This historical overview of China’s maritime behaviour shows that there has been ashift in China’s maritime strategic thinking. In the first phase, China did not indicate any
strategic focus on the East or South China Seas; however, this changed in the second phasewhen Beijing began to integrate into global maritime regimes. China’s socialisation into global
maritime regimes has played a role in the evolution of its maritime awareness, which has led
to an increase in maritime activities and stronger rhetoric on the disputed waters. With China
stepping up its presence and capabilities in the disputed waters, developments are also
occurring more frequently than before. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this historical
overview highlights China’s tendency to act more assertively whenever it feels that the status
quo is threatened, e.g., the 2012 ‘nationalisation’ of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The
increasing internationalisation of the South China Sea, exemplified by the US’ rebalancing
towards the region and growing international involvement through frameworks such as
AUKUS, has also further antagonised China, leading Beijing to double down on its territorial
claims. In both the East and South China Seas, measures taken by both claimants and nonclaimants in the disputed waters have cultivated an environment of distrust, erecting morebarriers to diplomatic progress.
If global maritime regimes have played a role in shaping and reshaping Beijing’s
maritime awareness, then current diplomatic and political developments have the potential toshape China’s future behaviour. This can only happen if the regimes are empowered by its
members, but this may be a challenge if the signatories of UNCLOS 1982 all hold varying
interpretations of it. It is important that claimant states remain committed to forming consensus
and are united in responding to developments around the region, whether provoked by China

20

Understanding Chinese maritime behaviouror other powers. ASEAN has the opportunity to play a leading role in this, but the union suffersfrom fragmentation.
Despite growing distrust, there is still opportunity for diplomatic progress. The recently
completed defence liaison hotline in the East China Sea highlights one such promising
approach. Although the complexity of the South China Sea issues may appear too intimidating
to address, there are ways to make progress at a smaller scale. Japan and Malaysia cancooperate towards strengthening capabilities and multilateralism in the region, as well as
encouraging more spirited diplomacy. The four recommendations detailed in this paper are
based on the hope that Japan and Malaysia can revitalise diplomacy through strengthened unityand coordination in the South China Sea.
—————————————————————————————————————
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) for hosting the
Visiting Research Fellowship, which led to the subsequent writing of this paper. Their generous
hosting of my time in Japan has been the most unique experience. I would also like to thankmy colleagues at ISIS Malaysia for their unwavering support throughout the years and inwriting this paper.
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