Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea:1
A case study of Japan and Vietnam
Do Mai Lan2————————————————————————————————
Abstract
This paper examines the marine cooperation between Vietnam and Japan, with a specificemphasis on three key issues: (i) the basis for the two countries' maritime cooperation; (ii)previous cooperation Vietnam and Japan have pursued in the maritime domain; and (iii)suggestions for the two countries to further leverage their maritime cooperation. The present
study argues that, although marine security cooperation continues to be of utmost importance,
an unexplored opportunity exists for enhancing maritime cooperation on other fronts. By
examining the historical and geopolitical settings, this paper demonstrates how Vietnam andJapan have successfully developed significant maritime synergy. Nevertheless, it is essential tonote that the focus of these efforts has primarily been on the enhancement of maritime security,
while advancements in other prospective domains have been very modest. The paper highlights
notable possibilities for Vietnam and Japan to enhance and broaden their collaboration,
specifically on non-security marine cooperation. This entails maximizing the use of collective
resources, improving the quality of trade connections, and investigating potential cooperationin marine sciences for research and development purposes. This paper suggests how bothcountries might effectively utilize this potential to strengthen their bilateral relations andpositively contribute to regional peace and development.
Keywords: Vietnam-Japan, maritime cooperation————————————————————————————————The South China Sea is called the “East Sea” in Vietnam. For the sake of convenience (to distinguishit from the East China Sea), the author will use the term “South China Sea” throughout this paper.
2
Do Mai Lan is a visiting fellow at The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). She is also a
researcher at The Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and a PhD candidate in International Relations at
the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s own and do
not reflect those of any institutions with which she is affiliated. She can be reached at
domailan@dav.edu.vn.
1

Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea
Introduction
In 2023, Vietnam and Japan celebrate the 50th anniversary of establishing diplomatic
relations. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations on September 21, 1973, the friendshipand cooperation between the two countries have continuously developed in many fields. The
two countries have repeatedly upgraded their bilateral relations to meet the need for stronger
mutual cooperation in adapting to the region’s geopolitical dynamics. Bilateral relations
between the two countries are currently flourishing in many fields, including maritime
cooperation. Both Vietnam and Japan are coastal countries with interests in the South China
Sea. With the situation in the South China Sea becoming more and more complicated withchanges in the balance of power among superpowers in the region, China's increasingly
assertive policy in the disputes in the South China Sea and the absence of effective multilateralframeworks for resolving disputes in the region push Vietnam and Japan to strengthen theirmaritime cooperation.

1.

Basis for maritime cooperation between Vietnam and Japan
Considered “the Century of the Ocean”, the 21st century is characterized by themaritime interests of nations and the development of marine policies and strategies. Manynations have implemented marine strategies to protect their sovereignty, manage resources, andensure territorial security. International relations are currently dominated by a trend ofinternational cooperation, which no country can avoid in the context of intense globalizationand international integration. Specifically, coastal nations are increasingly interested ininternational maritime cooperation. The maritime cooperation between Vietnam and Japan is
not unusual and is based on strong foundations.
1.1. Legal basis
Part IX on "Enclosed or Semi-Enclosed Seas" of the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) outlines the obligations of states that border semi-enclosed
seas such as the East China Sea and South China Sea. Article 123 states that "States bordering
an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights

2

Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea
and performance of their duties under this Convention." 3 These responsibilities include
coordinating “the management, conservation, exploration, and exploitation of living resources”
in the marine environment,4 as well as clarifying the relevant parties' rights and responsibilities
for protecting and preserving the marine environment. States should also seek support andcooperation from "other interested states or international organizations" in carrying out these
responsibilities.5
The "duty to cooperate" of all state signatories to the UNCLOS is also stated multiple
times throughout the Convention. For example, Articles 63 and 64 stipulate cooperation
between coastal states and other fishing states for the conservation and "optimal utilization" offish stocks found within the exclusive economic zones of coastal states and adjacent areas.6
Additionally, Articles 192, 194, 197, 198, 199, and 200 require all state parties to work together
to prevent marine pollution and protect the marine environment.7
Importantly, in the context of the South China Sea and the East China Sea, states are
obligated to cooperate in disputed areas, specifically where their EEZs and continental shelves
overlap. The obligations are outlined in the following language in paragraphs 3 of Articles 74
and 83: "Pending agreement on the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone/continental
shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts, the states concerned, in a spirit ofunderstanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangementsof a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reachingof the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation.”8Paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 commonly outlines two obligations of state parties
that are widely acknowledged. The first obligation is to exercise restraint, while the second
obligation is to negotiate sincerely in order to reach "provisional arrangements of a practical

United Nations (1982). The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Pp. 67.
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
4
United Nations (1982). The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Pp. 67.
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
5
United Nations (1982). The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Pp. 67.
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
6
United Nations (1982). The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Pp. 47-48.
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
7
United Nations (1982). The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Pp. 100, 102.
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
8
United Nations (1982). The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Pp. 52, 56.
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
33Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea
nature."9 Initiating negotiations in a trustworthy manner and with the aim of achieving tangible
results is also an indication of cooperation at the beginning of these responsibilities.
The Convention barely provides any information regarding the contents and proceduresof maritime cooperation initiatives. In fact, paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 does not specify
the type of "provisional arrangements of a practical nature" that the involved states should
consider. This allows for ample capacity for experimentation, as demonstrated by existing
maritime cooperation practices.
Participating regional countries have undertaken a variety of cooperation initiatives,
including security and defense, maritime scientific research, marine environmental surveys andconservation, resource exploitation and development, and search and rescue operations.
Vietnam and Japan, as parties to UNCLOS 1982, have demonstrated their dedication toadhering to the fundamental principles and provisions of UNCLOS. In accordance with thestipulations set forth in UNCLOS 1982, Vietnam enacted the Law of the Sea of Vietnam in2012. 10 As one of the initial signatories to UNCLOS 1982, Vietnam has consistently
demonstrated its commitment to adhering to the Convention's obligations. Over time, Vietnam
has continuously improved its domestic legal frameworks and policies concerning thedelineation of maritime boundaries with neighboring nations, as well as the utilization of marine
resources and collaboration with other countries in relevant maritime domains. These effortsalign with the principles outlined in UNCLOS, emphasizing the preservation and sustainableutilization of marine resources to support long-term development objectives. For its part, Japan
has made significant contributions to the establishment and maintenance of a rules-based
maritime order through its active participation in norm-making processes such as embracing
the formal proclamation of the Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea in 2014, which affirmsthat states need to ground their claims on international law, refrain from resorting to force or
coercion in the pursuit of their claims, and instead strive for the resolution of disputes bypeaceful methods.11 The pledges made by both nations to UNCLOS 1982 form the legal basis
for their collaborative endeavors in the marine sphere.

United Nations (1982). The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Pp. 52, 56.
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
10Bộ Ngoại giao Việt Nam (2019). “Việt Nam tích cực đóng góp trong xây dựng, thực thi Công ướcLuật Biển”. Báo Điện tử Chính phủ. https://baochinhphu.vn/viet-nam-tich-cuc-dong-gop-trong-xaydung-thuc-thi-cong-uoc-luat-bien-102259303.htm
11
Ishii, Yurika (2022). “Cooperation, challenges and charms: The UNCLOS for Japan”. FULCRUM.
https://fulcrum.sg/cooperation-challenges-and-charms-the-unclos-for-japan/
94Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea
1.2. Practical basis
The current state of affairs has a significant effect on the demand for cooperation
between Vietnam and Japan in general and maritime cooperation between the two countries inparticular.
1.2.1. Current states of the world and the Asia-Pacific region
As the twenty-first century commenced, the United States retained its position as theforemost global superpower; however, its power has become increasingly fragmented. The
United States has been compelled to allocate additional resources towards countering theactions of Russia and China due to the latter's pursuit of the "Chinese dream" and the former's
initiation of a military offensive against Ukraine. The aggregate capabilities of the United States
have consequently experienced a relative decline in comparison to other nations, posing achallenge to America's position of global leadership. The contemporary international systemhas witnessed significant shifts in relative power and influence due to the emergence of China
and India, as well as the relative decline of Russia and the stagnation of the European Union.
The existing global order exhibits a fluctuation between a "bipolar" and "multipolar"
configuration, with a tendency towards the latter. As a result of this trend, nations, particularly
those that are medium-sized and larger, can acquire a reasonably ample "strategic space" toestablish themselves as an autonomous "pole," despite their overall capabilities remaining far
inferior to those of the United States and China. They actively promote strategic autonomy toadvance an international multipolar world order based on established laws, aiming to maximize
their own national interests. The enhancement of multilateral and bilateral cooperation isfacilitated by both formal and informal channels.
The Asia-Pacific region is experiencing significant and ongoing development, resulting
in a growing significance in geo-economic, political, and strategic terms. Prominent nations
develop their competitive strategies within the region, resulting in intense friction and conflicts
between the United States and its allies on one side, and China on the other. The nascent global
power aspires to augment its sphere of influence and attain regional leadership. The strategic
tension between the United States and China is evident in the respective initiatives andstrategies pursued by both nations, exemplified by the United States' Free and Open IndoPacific Strategy (IPS) and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite the continued
dominance of the United States in the region, the ascent of China poses a formidable challenge
5Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea
to American leadership and influence. The regional order is progressively approaching a statecharacterized as “bipolars, multipowers”. 12 The intensification of competition between the
United States and China has resulted in increased instability of the regional architecture relative
to other regions. The region also encompasses several areas of potential geopolitical tension,
including Taiwan (China), the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula, among others.
Nevertheless, the region currently lacks a comprehensive mechanism that possesses thecapability to effectively manage and address conflicts. Conflicts can be addressed solely
through the employment of dialogue-based mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and the Shangri-La Dialogue.
In light of the prevailing circumstances, nations within the region are actively enhancing
collaboration and affiliation with one another in order to advance their strategic independence
and optimize their respective national interests within the volatile and intricate regionallandscape. Vietnam and Japan are not exempt from this phenomenon.
1.2.2. Importance of the South China Sea to Vietnam
As one among the claimants in the South China Sea, Vietnam has vital interests in theSouth China Sea.
The South China Sea holds significant economic, sociopolitical, defense and overall
security importance for Vietnam. The South China Sea serves as a crucial conduit for facilitating
Vietnam's connectivity with both the regional and global spheres. Vietnam possesses a coastline
spanning approximately 3,260 km in a north-to-south direction. 13 This extensive coastal
expanse has facilitated the establishment of a highly interconnected sea traffic network within
the country's continental shelf. Consequently, seaports have been effectively linked with coastal
areas and inland regions, thereby fostering the facilitation of trade and commerce between
various regions within Vietnam. This network has significantly contributed to the expeditious
and convenient transportation of commercial goods throughout the nation.
Furthermore, the South China Sea possesses a significant abundance of diverse andeconomically valuable natural resources, particularly marine plants and minerals. In the

The concept of "bipolars, multipowers" refers to the prevailing notion that the United States andChina persist as the primary poles in the region, while other nations within the region also holdsignificant influence.
13
TS. Nguyễn Anh Dũng (2007). “Việt Nam sẽ trở thành quốc gia mạnh về biển, làm giàu từ biển”.
Nhân dân. https://nhandan.vn/viet-nam-se-tro-thanh-quoc-gia-manh-ve-bien-lam-giau-tu-bienpost439272.html
126

Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea
waters of Vietnam, numerous sedimentary basins containing oil and gas have been identified,exhibiting anticipated reserves of approximately 10 billion tons of oil equivalent. Among thesereserves, the exploitable portion amounts to roughly two billion tons, with the volume of naturalgas, which possesses significant potential, estimated to be approximately 1,000 billion cubic
meters.14 Vietnam has presently identified numerous oil and gas fields possessing substantial
reserves, with approximately ten fields already operational. These fields collectively yield
millions of tons of oil and billions of cubic meters of gas on an annual basis. This significant
output has played a constructive role in the country's development, facilitating economic growthand serving the people of Vietnam.
The marine resources found in Vietnam's sea area are characterized by their abundance,
diversity, and economic value, particularly in relation to seafood commodities such as shrimp,
crab, squid, sea cucumber, and seaweed. Marine ichthyologists have documented the discovery
of over 2,000 species of fish, with more than 100 of these species being of significant economic
importance. Based on data provided by the Vietnamese Ministry of Fisheries in 2003, it wasreported that Vietnam's aquatic resources encompassed a seafood reserve estimated to be within
the range of 3-4 million tons. This reserve facilitated an annual exploitation capacity of
approximately 1.6 to 1.7 million tons. Moreover, the waters of Vietnam boast a diverse array ofmarine life, including approximately 2,500 species of mollusks, 1,647 species of crustaceans,
700 species of sea worms, and 300 species of corals, among others. Notably, these waters arehome to numerous rare and unique animal species.15
Vietnam's geography, characterized by an elongated shape stretching from north to southwith a narrow width (ranging from approximately 50 km to 600 km), imposes limitations on its
defense capabilities in the context of the South China Sea. Hence, the South China Sea assumes
a pivotal role in the nation's defense and security strategy, serving as a significant maritime
barrier to safeguard against potential incursions by external forces. In addition, Vietnam iscompelled to allocate additional resources due to the presence of non-traditional maritime
security challenges, including piracy, illegal fishing, smuggling, natural disasters, and climatechange.16 Hence, the imperative for Vietnam to seek cooperation in the South China Sea is of
considerable magnitude.

ThS. Nguyễn Thị Thơm (2015). “Tiềm năng kinh tế biển Việt Nam”. Cổng thông tin tỉnh Cà Mau.
PGS. TS. Nguyễn Thị Quế (2017). “Vai trò của biển Đông đối với các nước có tuyên bố chủ quyền,khu vực và thế giới hiện nay”. Cảnh sát biển Việt Nam. https://canhsatbien.vn/portal/nghien-cuu-traodoi/vai-tro-cua-bien-dong-doi-voi-cac-nuoc-co-tuyen-bo-chu-quyen-khu-vuc-va-the-gioi-hien-nay
16
Anh Duc Ton (2018). “Vietnam’s maritime security challenges and regional defense and security
cooperation”. Sea Power Centre. March
14
15

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Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea

1.2.3. Importance of the South China Sea to Japan
Even though Japan has no direct involvement in any conflicts nor any territorial claimsin the South China Sea, Japan does have significant interests here and is “an important
stakeholder” in the South China Sea.17
Japan is a nation comprised of more than 6,800 islets in Northeast Asia,18 adjacent to
the East China Sea and in proximity to the South China Sea. Japan is geographically situatedwithin the Asia-Pacific region, thereby establishing a significant stake in various dimensions of
this area. These dimensions encompass economic activity, trade, prosperity, political stability,
security concerns, and adherence to the global order founded upon international legal
frameworks. The South China Sea holds great importance as a crucial shipping route for Japan.
The South China Sea serves as a crucial conduit for Japan, facilitating the transportation of over
80% of its oil supply and approximately 70% of its trade. 19 The presence of any issues within
the South China Sea region would hinder the established shipping route in this area,
necessitating a diversion of Japanese vessels around the Indonesian archipelago and throughthe Pacific Ocean. Opting for such an alternative pathway would incur higher expenses andrequire a greater investment of time. 20 Based on a study conducted by a team of Japaneseexperts, in the event of a conflict arising in the South China Sea leading to disruptions inshipping routes, Japan would incur an augmented expenditure of 50% in transportation costs as
it seeks to navigate alternative maritime pathways.
The imperative for stability in Japan arises from the potential ramifications of any
instability in the South China Sea, which could have adverse effects on Japan's stability and2018, https://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/CMDR_Anh_Duc_Ton_Vietnams_Marit
ime_Security_Challenges_0.pdf
17Sato, Yoichiro (2016). “Japan and the South China Sea Dispute: A Stakeholder’s Perspective”. In Ian
Storey and Lin Cheng-yi, eds, The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic
Tensions, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, pp. 272-290.
18
Ishii, Yurika (2022). “Cooperation, challenges and charms: The UNCLOS for Japan”. FULCRUM.
https://fulcrum.sg/cooperation-challenges-and-charms-the-unclos-for-japan/
19
Celine Pajon (2013). “Japan and the South China Sea: Forging strategic partnerships in a divided
region”. Asie. Visions 60, p. 7.
20
TS. Nguyen Thanh Minh (2022). “Lợi ích chiến lược của một số nước lớn ở biển Đông”. Tạp chíDiễn đàn Doanh nghiệp. https://diendandoanhnghiep.vn/loi-ich-chien-luoc-cua-mot-so-nuoc-lon-obien-dong-233606.html
Dr. Nguyen Thanh Minh (2022). “Strategic interests of some major countries in the South China Sea”.
Business Forum Magazine. https://diendandoanhnghiep.vn/loi-ich-chien-luoc-cua-mot-so-nuoc-lon-obien-dong-233606.html

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Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea
economic progress. It is probable that numerous nations would become entangled in any
conflict arising in the South China Sea, thereby causing destabilization throughout the region.
This would impede maritime traffic, while also exerting an impact on the security environment
and impeding the economic development of Japan.
Moreover, the actions exhibited by China in both the South China Sea and the East
China Sea demonstrate numerous parallels. Japan identifies the links between events occurringin the East and South China Seas. China's "historical claims" in both disputes, its efforts toisolate and target individual claimants in the South China Sea, its military buildup in the region,and its utilization of “gray zone” operations are all perceived as components of a comprehensive
strategy employed by China that aims to undermine the territorial claims and influence of otherstates in the area while establishing its dominance in reality.21 Japan is confronted with similar
gray zone tactics and China's increasing assertiveness in the East China Sea, particularly about
the ongoing territorial dispute between the two nations concerning the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
Hence, to safeguard its interests, Japan is willing to contribute to the ongoing disputes
in the South China Sea as a broader regional security concern for all countries in the region.
Japanese leaders have consistently emphasized their commitment to establishing a peacefulorder and containing the escalation of conflicts within the region.
Japan's South China Sea policy encompasses four primary tenets, as evidenced by the
pronouncements of Japanese leaders and official policy documents:(i) Japan maintains a neutral stance in relation to the territorial and maritime disputes
in the South China Sea,(ii) Japan promotes the peaceful resolution of disputes, emphasizing the adherence tointernational laws and the maintenance of a rules-based global order,(iii) Japan is committed to safeguarding a free and open Indo-Pacific region, which
encompasses the South China Sea, and ensuring that the freedom of navigation,
overflight, and sea commerce remain unimpeded, thereby fostering Japan's
economic well-being, and(iv) Japan provides assistance in enhancing the capabilities of nations involved in
territorial disputes within the South China Sea.
Concurrently, the circumstances pertaining to the South China Sea are progressively
evolving into a more intricate state. China asserts sovereignty over a significant portion of the

S. Takahashi (2018). “Development of gray-zone deterrence: concept building and lessons fromJapan’s experience”. Pacific Review 31 (6), pp. 787-810.
21

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Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea
maritime territory in the South China Sea. China is currently experiencing notable growth invarious domains, including the construction, enhancement, and reclamation of geographicalstructures that it is occupying illegally in the South China Sea. China has also deployed antiship missiles in this region. China's actions are directed at altering the existing state of affairs
by the exertion of force. Furthermore, the South China Sea is confronted with various nontraditional maritime security challenges, including piracy, terrorism, and marine environmental
pollution. These challenges have detrimental effects on the security and stability of the region
and have thus prompted Vietnam and Japan to enhance their overall strategic partnership andmaritime collaboration in order to safeguard their security, political, and economic interests andexert influence within the region. The enhancement of maritime cooperation between Vietnam
and Japan expands the opportunities and resources available to both countries for the executionof diplomatic and security endeavors.
2.

Maritime cooperation between Vietnam and Japan

2.1. Relations between Vietnam and JapanFirst, it is noteworthy that the two countries demonstrate a very high level of mutual
trust and maintain an extensive strategic partnership devoid of any major issues. The politicalsystems of the two countries exhibit notable differences; however, these disparities have notposed any obstacles to their bilateral relations. Japan is among the nations that forged diplomatic
ties with Vietnam in its nascent stages. Over the course of several generations, the collaboration
and amicable bonds between Vietnam and Japan have experienced noteworthy growth andconsolidation across diverse domains. This progress has been particularly pronounced since theestablishment of the Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia in 2014.
Throughout history, Japan has consistently remained a crucial strategic partner for Vietnam.
Regular exchanges of delegations at all levels are a common occurrence.
Second, the two countries complement one another in their respective primary
disciplines. Vietnam and Japan have engaged in close collaboration, providing one another withpractical and invaluable assistance in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic. Japan is one ofVietnam's primary economic partners, playing a crucial role in various aspects of their bilateralrelationship. In 2022, Japan stood as the foremost provider of Official Development Assistance(ODA) to Vietnam, contributing $29.3 billion or approximately 30% of all foreign capital. Thisaid included $1.8 billion in non-refundable assistance, as well as a substantial sum of 2.7 trillion
10Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea
yen in loan capital, nearly 100 billion yen in non-refundable aid, and 180 billion yen in support
for technical cooperation. 22 Furthermore, Japan has ranked for years as Vietnam’s secondlargest collaborator in labor cooperation, its third-largest investor, a significant partner in its
tourism sector and its fourth-largest trading partner. These collaborations have made anoteworthy impact on Vietnam's socioeconomic development, as well as its endeavors towardindustrialization and modernization. Japan is an advanced maritime nation that possesses
advanced technological capabilities for the exploration and preservation of marine resources.
Hence, Vietnam stands to gain from Japan's assistance in enhancing its maritime awareness andcapacity. Vietnam regards Japan as a nation of weighty stature and influence in the realms of
economy, politics, military, and diplomacy. Hence, by engaging in cooperation with Japan
regarding matters in the South China Sea, Vietnam can effectively mitigate the risk of unilateral
actions undertaken by regional powers that contravene established principles of internationallaws.
In recent years, Vietnam has consistently held an important strategic position within
Japan's policy as a Southeast Asian nation. Vietnam is a participating member of the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and it has emerged as a favorable choice for Japanesecompanies seeking to further diversify their supply chains. This preference is primarily driven
by the country's advantages such as cost-effective inputs, affordable labor, and a politicallystable environment. This observation is supported by a recent (2021) survey conducted by theJapan External Trade Organization (JETRO) of 700 Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI)
enterprises operating in Vietnam. Additionally, it is worth noting that Vietnam's market is
experiencing significant growth. Vietnam is among the nations that Japan prioritizes in terms
of providing support for the development of maritime law enforcement capabilities, with theaim of enhancing the latter's capacity in this domain. Vietnam, alongside the Philippines, holds
a key position within Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy in Southeast Asia. The primary objective of
this strategy is to uphold peace and stability in the South China Sea, consequently fosteringstability in the East China Sea.
2.2. Vietnam-Japan maritime cooperation relationshipHải Minh (2022). “Việt Nam, Nhật Bản tăng cường trao đổi để cùng thúc đẩy tiến độ các dự án
ODA”. Báo Điện tử Chính phủ. https://baochinhphu.vn/viet-nam-nhat-ban-tang-cuong-trao-doi-decung-thuc-day-tien-do-cac-du-an-oda-102220823123807642.htm
Hai Minh (2022). “Vietnam, Japan to promote exchanges to boost the progress of ODA projects”. The
Vietnamese Government Digital Newspaper. https://baochinhphu.vn/viet-nam-nhat-ban-tang-cuongtrao-doi-de-cung-thuc-day-tien-do-cac-du-an-oda-102220823123807642.htm
22

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Maritime collaboration between Vietnam and Japan has involved wide-ranging
engagement across various domains, aligning with the bilateral strategic partnership establishedbetween the two nations. The establishment of maritime cooperation between Vietnam andJapan has been progressively solidified through mutual commitments made during the visits ofleaders from both nations.
2.2.1. Cooperation commitments
Following the establishment of a strategic partnership between the two countries in 2006,
the bilateral relations experienced a meaningful elevation. There exists a tradition of annual
reciprocal visits by the leaders of the respective states in both countries. Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe conducted an official visit to Vietnam in November 2006, during which
Vietnam and Japan released a Joint Statement titled "Towards a Strategic Partnership for Peaceand Prosperity in Asia."
In November 2007, a momentous event took place in Japan involving the visit ofVietnamese President Nguyen Minh Triet. During this visit, the leaders of both countries signeda Joint Statement focused on the enhancement of relations between Japan and Vietnam, as wellas the establishment of an agenda aimed at fostering a strategic partnership between the twonations. The agenda covered a comprehensive range of areas, spanning policy dialogue, security,
defense, and international cooperation. Notably, it consisted of 44 items across various fields
of collaboration. 23 In 2013, a bilateral agreement was reached between the two nations on
marine research and capacity building, aimed at fostering mutual support. In March 2014,
Vietnamese president Truong Tan Sang embarked on an official visit to Japan. During thisspecific occasion, the two nations released the Vietnam-Japan Joint Statement on the
Establishment of the Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia. Notably,
this statement included a clause wherein Japan committed to enhancing its assistance tostrengthen Vietnam's maritime law enforcement capabilities. 24 In November 2021, Prime
Minister Pham Minh Chinh of Vietnam undertook a visit to Japan. The two nations officiallyagreed upon a Joint Statement titled "Towards opening a new phase of the Vietnam-JapanHồ Việt Mạnh (2008). “Quan hệ Việt Nam – Nhật Bản thông qua một số cuộc gặp quan trọng”.
Nghiên cứu Đông Bắc Á. Số 11 (93). tr. 19-22.
24
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2014). Japan-Vietnam joint statement on the establishment of
the Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000034408.pdf
23

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Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea
Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia." The Joint Statement
represented the mutual consensus reached by the parties regarding significant avenues forfurther enhancing political relations, fostering defense-security collaboration, facilitating
economic recuperation in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, promoting sustainable
development, addressing the challenges posed by the pandemic and climate change, andtransitioning towards renewable energy sources.
2.2.2. The practical implementation of commitments to maritime cooperation(i) Maritime security
The initiation of cooperation in maritime security between Vietnam and Japan can betraced back to 2007, when the two countries reached an agreement to station military attachésat their respective embassies. This collaborative effort aimed to facilitate the exchange of
information pertaining to defense relations. Regular meetings were held between the
Vietnamese Ministry of Defense and the Japanese Defense Agency at various levels, with a
specific focus on matters of coastal defense.
Japan has consistently expressed its stance on the South China Sea, emphasizing theimportance of establishing shared regulations and standards regarding maritime security. Japanissued a distinct and unequivocal reaction in response to China's deployment of the oil rig HD
981 within Vietnam's exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in May 2014. During avisit to NATO headquarters, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed his stance on theSouth China Sea issue, highlighting his country's firm opposition to any alterations brought
about through the use of force or coercion. The issue at hand was one global in scope having
significant implications for the Asian region. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House ofRepresentatives of Japan released a statement regarding the South China Sea on June 11, 2014.
The committee urged all relevant parties to exercise restraint, refrain from employing force toalter the status quo and avoid unilaterally asserting sovereignty over the South China Sea.25
Japan has been actively involved in enhancing its influence by providing support to theVietnam Coast Guard. This support includes facilitating the participation of the Vietnam Coast
Guard in international conferences organized by Japan. The objective of these conferences is toNguyễn Vũ Tùng và Nguyễn Thùy Anh (2017). “Những điều chỉnh chính sách của Nhật Bản đối với
khu vực Đông Nam Á trong nhiệm kỳ 2 của Thủ tướng Shinzo Abe”. Nghiên cứu quốc tế. Số 2 (109).
tr.12-14.
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Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea
establish a regional cooperation agreement focused on addressing the issues of piracy andarmed robbery against ships in the Asian region. This collaboration between Japan and Vietnam
in combating maritime security threats has been ongoing since 2006. Additionally, Japan
extends its assistance to Vietnam in the areas of defense research and training. Japan has
furthermore dispatched a considerable number of naval vessels to Vietnam's seaports as ademonstration of its commitment to fostering maritime security cooperation.
The inaugural visit of Kojima, a training vessel operated by the Japanese Coast Guard,
to Da Nang, Vietnam took place in July 2013. In May 2015, the Japanese government
dispatched a pair of O-3C maritime patrol aircraft to the city of Da Nang. In November 2015,
a mutual agreement was established between the two countries, allowing for the docking ofJapanese warships at Cam Ranh Port, located in Khanh Hoa, Vietnam. In April 2016, a pair ofwarships and a submarine from the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force arrived at Cam Ranh
Port subsequent to a visit to Subic Bay in the Philippines. The Japanese destroyer Sazanami(DD-113), equipped with air defense, anti-submarine warfare, and surface combat capabilities,
arrived at Cam Ranh Port on May 20, 2017, to take part in the Pacific Partnership program. 26
In June 2017, the two nations engaged in a collaborative exercise for the inaugural occasion
with the objective of addressing illegal fishing endeavors within the South China Sea. In
September 2018, the submarine Kuroshio of Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force arrived at
Cam Ranh International Port for docking purposes. In March 2019, Japan dispatched two
training vessels, namely Setoyuki and Shimayuki, along with a contingent of 390 officers andsailors, to Tien Sa Port located in Da Nang.27 In October 2019, a memorandum on "defense
cooperation and exchange" was signed between Vietnam and Japan, which outlined theestablishment of regular vice-ministerial level talks and facilitated increased Japanese port
visits to Vietnam. Subsequently, in February 2023, the Japanese patrol vessel Settsu made a visit
to Vietnam. During the visits, the Japan Coast Guard and the Vietnam Coast Guard engaged in
exchanges of knowledge related to crime prevention at sea, while also conducting practical
exercises to enhance their search and rescue capabilities.

Nguyễn Thanh Minh (2017). “Chuyển động mới của Nhật Bản tại Biển Đông và hàm ý đối vớichiến lược của Trung Quốc”, Nghiên cứu biển Đông. http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/y-kien-va-binhluan/6618-chuyen-dong-moi-cua-nhat-ban-doi-voi-bien-dong-va-ham-y-doi-voi-chien-luoc-cua-trungquoc27Đức Hoàng (2019). “Hình ảnh hai tàu khu trục Nhật Bản cập cảng Tiên Sa – Đà Nẵng”. Báo điện tửTổ quốc. https://toquoc.vn/hinh-anh-hai-tau-khu-truc-nhat-ban-cap-cang-tien-sa-da-nang20190306113100921.htm
26

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Additionally, both parties have scheduled collaborative military exercises. Nevertheless, there
remain several unresolved technical challenges that must be addressed prior to theimplementation of these drills. These include language barriers, regulatory constraints
pertaining to cryptography, and the management of electronic wave interference.
In relation to capacity-building assistance, Japan is presently providing support toVietnam primarily in three domains.
Concerning the provision of supporting equipment and facilities for Vietnam's maritime
forces, it is noteworthy that on July 31, 2014, the Japanese government decided to extend
assistance to Vietnam by offering six vessels. This assistance package included two surveillance
fisheries ships from the Japanese Fisheries Agency, as well as four commercial fishing boats,
which were provided as a grant. In addition, Japan furnished Vietnam with lifeboats and various
equipment valued at 500 million yen. Furthermore, Japan engaged in negotiations aimed at
facilitating the transfer of newly constructed vessels to the Vietnamese Navy. In August 2015,
Japan facilitated the transfer of six pre-owned patrol vessels valued at a total of US$5 million
to Vietnam. In September 2015, a bilateral agreement was established between the two nations
that served as a basis for Tokyo to expand its naval vessel exports to Vietnam. In January 2017,
Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe made a public declaration of his intention to provide
further assistance to Vietnam by supplying an additional six patrol boats, with a monetary valueof approximately US$338 million.28 In July 2020, the Japan International Cooperation Agency(JICA) extended a loan of 36.626 billion yen (equivalent to approximately US$350 million) to
Vietnam for the purpose of constructing six additional patrol vessels.29
Furthermore, Japan possesses the capability to manufacture military products ofexceptional quality. Japan boasts a substantial number of military product manufacturers, witha total of more than 1,500 companies employing approximately 70,000 individuals. 30 The
defense science and technology research budget of Japan experienced a significant increase,with an average annual growth rate ranging from 3.58% to 4%. In April 2014, the Japanese Diet
granted official approval for the removal of the prohibition on arms exports by Japaneseindustrial corporations. Consequently, Japan gained the ability to engage in the exportation of
weaponry, as well as the transfer of military technology to its allies or partners. This includes

Le Hong Hiep (2017). “The strategic significance of Vietnam-Japan ties”. ISEAS Perspective.
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2017_23.pdf
29Linh Pham (2020), “Japan helps Vietnam improve maritime capacity with US$347 million loan”.
Hanoi Times. https://hanoitimes.vn/japan-helps-vietnam-improve-maritime-capacity-in-us347m-loan313517.html
30
The numbers are collected from many different resources.
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countries situated near sea lanes that are closely linked to and vital for the Japanese economy.
This particular factor has the capacity to enhance the likelihood of collaboration within the
defense industry between the two nations. During the visit of Yoshida Masakazu, DirectorGeneral, Ministry of Defense of Japan, , a commitment was made to provide support to Vietnam
in various areas, including joint production of dual-use products, training of research staff,
production and manufacturing assistance, and technology transfer. Emphasis was placed on the
shipbuilding industry, particularly for law enforcement forces operating at sea.31 In March 2020,
an agreement was reached between Japan and Vietnam regarding the transfer of military
shipbuilding technology as well as the continuation of high-level defense contacts.
During the visit of Vietnamese prime minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc to Japan on June 6,
2017, both nations reached a consensus to enhance their security cooperation. This
collaboration entails the implementation of various initiatives financed by Japan, such as thedevelopment of coast patrol capabilities, the procurement of defense equipment, and the transfer
of technology. The two nations entered into more than ten agreements, encompassing a total aid
package of 38 billion yen ($350 million) allocated towards enhancing Vietnam's coast guard
vessels and bolstering its patrol capabilities. The upgrading of maritime security is a componentof a 100-billion-yen credit line that has been established for projects related to science,technology, and water management.
Furthermore, it is imperative to provide assistance in training programs aimed atboosting awareness among the Vietnamese population and bolstering the capabilities of law
enforcement personnel. Japan has implemented numerous exchange and training initiatives
targeting Vietnamese defense officers. The Japanese short-term training course for Vietnam
holds particular significance for the practical objectives of the Vietnamese military. This isexemplified by the arrangement of a four-month seminar on underwater medicine forVietnamese submarine officers at a Japanese facility in 2013. The provision of support promptly
addressed Vietnam's requirements for human resources in the fields of underwater medicine
and submarines, specifically in relation to the country's acquisition of Kilo-class submarines in
2014. 32 Japan has actively engaged in numerous collaborative maritime exercises aimed at
improving the operational capabilities of Vietnam's law enforcement personnel. In
February 2016, a squadron from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force equipped with two PNhân dân điện tử (2018). “Tuyên bố chung về việc làm sâu sắc hơn quan hệ Đối tác chiến lược sâurộng giữa Việt Nam và Nhật Bản”. http://www.nhandan.com.vn/chinhtri/item/33088302-tuyen-bochung-ve-viec-lam-sau-sac-hon-quan-he-doi-tac-chien-luoc-sau-rong-viet-nam-nhat-ban.html
32
Le Hong Hiep (2017). “The strategic significance of Vietnam-Japan ties”. ISEAS Perspective.
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2017_23.pdf
31

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3C patrol aircraft participated in maritime exercises alongside Vietnam. One of the operational
exercises involved collaboration between Japanese P-3C aircraft and Vietnamese naval vessels
in providing assistance to civilian ships encountering distress situations in maritime
environments. In March 2016, a pair of Japanese destroyers made their inaugural visit to Cam
Ranh Port in Vietnam. In June 2017, a collaborative exercise was carried out between theJapanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and Vietnam in the city of Da Nang. The exercise
involved the participation of the patrol vessel Echigo, which has a carrying capacity of 3,100
tons and is equipped to transport Japanese helicopters. Vietnam, on the other hand, utilized
patrol boats that were supplied by Japan to engage in activities aimed at addressing the issue ofillicit fishing vessels in maritime environments.
The two nations have expressed their commitment to enhancing collaboration in thedomain of maritime security and safety. This includes areas such as search and rescue operations
and efforts to combat piracy. The proposed measures involve the sharing of information
between coast guard agencies and active participation within the Regional Cooperation
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). The
cooperation between Vietnam and Japan encompasses various dimensions, with both countries
engaging in collaborative efforts through mechanisms and forums under the leadership of
ASEAN.
The assistance and endeavors provided by Japan in enhancing Vietnam's maritime law
enforcement capabilities hold great importance for the recently established Vietnam Coast
Guard and Vietnam Fisheries Surveillance. This enables Vietnamese law enforcement
authorities to promptly and effectively manage high-pressure situations encountered at sea.
(ii) Maritime scientific research and marine environmental conservation
Japan provides assistance to Vietnam in enhancing its capacity in the marine environment,
specifically by aiding Vietnam in improving its ability to forecast and respond promptly tonatural disasters, climate change, and rising sea levels. This assistance includes resources,
equipment, technology, and training for the fundamental investigation of marine resources andenvironment and marine scientific research. In 2021, Japan made a contribution to ocean
science research by providing Vietnam with a research vessel and funding the necessaryrenovations. This support was carried out within the cooperative non-repayable aid program
known as the “Socio-economic Development Program”. The total value of this generous

17Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea
donation amounted to 900 million Japanese yen.33 Simultaneously, Japan has allocated survey
equipment to examine the issue of plastic pollution in the ocean as part of the Socio-Economic
Development Program. The total value of this donation came to 500 million Japanese yen.34(iii) Resource exploitation and development
The exploration and extraction of oil and gas resources hold considerable importancefor Vietnam in both the economic and security dimensions. Consequently, Vietnam has
proactively solicited proposals from multinational oil and gas corporations to engage in theextraction of oil and gas resources within its territory. Vietnam has effectively solicited bids
from PJSC Rosneft of Russia, OVL of India, BP of the UK, and Exxon Mobil and Murphy Oilof the US, as well as engaged in joint development initiatives with several Southeast Asian
nations. 35 Vietnam has conducted research and facilitated collaboration with Japanesecounterparts in the domain of gas seal investigation, exploration, and refinement. Notablepartners in this endeavor include JX Nippon, Idemitsu Kosan, MOECO, Mitsui Chemical, and
JGC. The objective is to advance ongoing collaborative initiatives and enhance cooperation in
the foreseeable future. JVPC, a subsidiary of JX Nippon Oil & Gas Exploration Corporation(JX NOEX), has been successfully conducting oil and gas operations since 1992. Furthermore,
the company has demonstrated a commendable commitment to ensuring the utmost safety in
its operations, particularly in the management of the Rang Dong-Phuong Dong field. From its
inception through March 2021, the project demonstrated noteworthy productivity, yielding asubstantial output of 285.85 million barrels of oil, 92.03 million cubic feet of gas, and 1349
million barrels of condensate. 36 This notable achievement has made a substantial andmeaningful contribution to Vietnam, PetroVietnam, and the contractors involved. In July 2015,
PetroVietnam, along with Japanese contractors Idemitsu Kosan and Sumitomo Corporation,

Xuân Long (2021). “Nhật Bản viện trợ tàu nghiên cứu khoa học biển cho Việt Nam”. Tuổi trẻ.
https://tuoitre.vn/nhat-ban-vien-tro-tau-nghien-cuu-khoa-hoc-bien-cho-viet-nam20210423161256832.htm
34
Xuân Long (2021). “Nhật Bản viện trợ tàu nghiên cứu khoa học biển cho Việt Nam”. Tuổi trẻ.
https://tuoitre.vn/nhat-ban-vien-tro-tau-nghien-cuu-khoa-hoc-bien-cho-viet-nam20210423161256832.htm
35
Đất Việt (2013). “Dàn đối tác dầu khí hung mạnh của Việt Nam trên biển Đông”.
http://baodatviet.vn/chinh-tri-xa-hoi/tin-tuc-thoi-su/dan-doi-tac-dau-khi-hung-manh-cua-vn-tren-biendong-2360869/
36Việt Thắng (2021). “Petrovietnam và PVEP tăng cường hợp tác với các đối tác Nhật Bản”. Tập đoàndầu khí Việt Nam. https://www.pvn.vn/Pages/detail.aspx?NewsID=bbe5e802-3a28-4239-9f80e40854939183
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entered into an agreement outlining the intention to sign and implement a contract for the oiland gas production division of Block 39 & 40/02 located on the continental shelf of Vietnam.
In August 2019, JX NOEX put forth a proposition for collaboration with PetroVietnam in thedomains of oil and gas prospecting, exploration, and production.37
Regarding fishery cooperation, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in
November 2015 facilitated the transfer of Japanese technology and fishing equipment for tunafishing to fishermen in Vietnam’s Binh Dinh Province. This initiative was carried out as part ofa JICA-funded project titled "Survey to validate the diffusion of fishing techniques andequipment to enhance the modernization of tuna fishing in Vietnam."38
Over the course of time, the maritime collaboration between Vietnam and Japan has
exhibited favorable progress and yielded significant outcomes, thereby fortifying the bilateralties between the two nations and upholding tranquility, stability, and prosperity in the South
China Sea. Vietnam ranks among the countries that receive a substantial amount of support
from Japan. The level of maritime security cooperation between the two nations remains
steadfast and is currently undergoing progressive advancement. Nevertheless, the primaryemphasis of maritime collaboration between the two nations has predominantly centered on
maritime security cooperation. There remains substantial untapped potential and ample
opportunity for further development in the realm of maritime cooperation across various
domains.
3.

Suggestions for moving forward
As previously mentioned, there exist numerous shared maritime interests between

Vietnam and Japan. Hence, it is imperative to enhance maritime collaboration between the twonations, as it effectively advances the interests of both states within the region and plays asubstantial role in upholding peace, stability, and the free navigation of maritime pathways in
the South China Sea. In light of the escalating maritime rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan
and Vietnam have bolstered and expanded their maritime collaboration in recent years, mostnotably since 2007. However, there remains a need for improvements in the level, scope, andMinh Anh (2019). “Công ty dầu khí Nhật Bản muốn mở rộng đầu tư tại Việt Nam”. Báo điện tửĐảng Cộng sản Việt Nam. https://dangcongsan.vn/thoi-su/cong-ty-dau-khi-nhat-ban-muon-mo-rongdau-tu-tai-viet-nam-532515.html
38Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2015). “Nhật Bản giúp Việt Nam hiện đại hóa việc đánh bắt cá ngừ đạidương”. https://dangcongsan.vn/kinh-te/nhat-ban-giup-viet-nam-hien-dai-hoa-viec-danh-bat-ca-ngudai-duong-329113.html
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efficiency of maritime cooperation between the two nations in order to fully realize its potential
within a rapidly evolving and intricate global landscape.
The following recommendations are offered:At the nation-state level, both Vietnam and Japan should demonstrate political
determination in order to establish favorable conditions for their cooperation. This can beachieved through a synchronized approach involving the active participation of various levels,
sectors, and localities. It is crucial to swiftly and effectively address any disagreements that may
arise during this process.
At the bilateral level, it is imperative for the two nations to maintain communicationand exchange across all levels, including ministries and sectors. It is crucial to sustain andstrengthen existing dialogue mechanisms. Additionally, efforts should be made to foster
positive personal relationships between the leaders and peoples of both countries. Collaborative
strategies and approaches should also be devised to promote maritime cooperation. This willentail developing joint plans for cooperation and advancing initiatives in various maritime
domains, including but not limited to maritime security, scientific research, and surveys.
Furthermore, the establishment of bilateral maritime cooperation between Japan and Vietnam
can potentially serve as a foundation and impetus for collaborative efforts within multilateralplatforms.
At the multilateral level, it is necessary for the two countries to effectively utilize
multilateral cooperation mechanisms that encompass maritime cooperation. Both countries
should actively engage in these mechanisms as members and collaborate with each other,
particularly within the regional forums, under the leadership of ASEAN, and adeptly
disseminate information to optimize the effectiveness and caliber of collaboration while
ensuring that it does not give rise to a pretext for an exaggerated response from other nations.
In conclusion, both countries need to prioritize the enhancement of collaboration basedon the following principles: (i) implementing a systematic approach to collaboration, (ii)
gradually progressing from simpler to more complex projects to foster motivation andconfidence in the substantial cooperation between Vietnam and Japan, and (iii) adopting arational and timely strategy that involves close and reciprocal consultations customized toaddress the mutual needs and interests of both nations.
The year 2023 marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations
between Vietnam and Japan. Concurrently, this milestone also represents a pivotal moment in
the evolution of their bilateral relationship. Based on the historical cooperation between the twocountries, it is crucial to further enhance trust, foster stronger bonds of friendship, and improve20

Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea
mutual understanding between them. Vietnam and Japan are committed to maximizing thepotential of cooperation, particularly maritime collaboration, which is deemed significant
within the context of their comprehensive strategic partnership. This endeavor aims to fulfill
the shared interests and aspirations of both nations' populations, and seeks to promote peace,stability, and prosperity in the region and globally.
—————————————————————————————————————
Biography of author
Do Mai Lan has worked at the Institute for Strategic Studies, Diplomatic Academy ofVietnam, since 2009. Currently, she is a PhD student majoring in International Relations at the
Diplomatic Academy. She is interested in research and teaching on the US-China competition,
East Asian studies and Vietnam’s relations with major countries.
Acknowledgements
I would like to extend my utmost appreciation to The Japan Institute of International
Affairs (JIIA) and the Japan Information Center (JIC) for their outstanding assistancethroughout the inaugural JIIA Young Research Fellow Program 2023. I would like also to
express my gratitude to Mr. Masao Kochi, the director of the Program, for his exemplary
leadership and invaluable assistance throughout the Program’s course. Furthermore, I would
like to offer my sincere thanks to all the individuals comprising the Program team, namely Ms.
Asako Noguchi, Ms. Satoko Owada, Mr. Koji Enomoto, and Ms. Fumi Yoshimoto, for theirinvaluable contributions in terms of administrative support and logistical aid. The efficiency
and professionalism of the individuals involved have greatly contributed to a seamless research
process, thereby ensuring the provision of essential resources and an optimal setting for myproject's concentration. Additionally, I would like to extend my heartfelt appreciation to all theindividuals who took part in the interviews, contributed data, or shared their experience indiverse roles. These individuals' willingness to disseminate their expertise and personal
experiences has proven to be of immense use in fortifying the assertions and findings positedin the paper. Due to their assistance, I was able to effectively finalize this academic paper. The
assistance, materials, and support they provided have played a crucial role in shaping andrefining the quality of this project.
Additionally, I am very grateful for the opportunity provided by the Diplomatic
Academy of Vietnam and my thanks go out to my esteemed friends Mr. Jikko Alfonso Puzon,

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Maritime cooperation in the South China Sea
Ms. Angeline Tan, and Mr. Tamai Hideaki for their valuable suggestions and constantencouragement.
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Ryoko Nakano, Dr. Valerie Niquet, Dr.
Robert Eldridge, and Dr. Monika Chansoria for their guidance and insightful feedback.

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