The 8th Japan–Australia
Track 1.5 Dialogue
Tokyo
June 20 –21, 2013

Co-Hosted by:
The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Supported by:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

Contents

Preface ................................................................................... 3
Agenda ................................................................................... 5
List of Participants ................................................................ 7
Biographies of Participants .................................................. 9Japan ............................................................................... 9
Australia ........................................................................ 16
Summary .............................................................................. 21
Talking Points ...................................................................... 57
Session 1 ....................................................................... 58
Session 2 ....................................................................... 62
Session 3 ....................................................................... 66

PrefaceThis report is the product of the 8th Japan-Australia Track 1.5 Dialogue held in Tokyoin June 2012, consigned to the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. This Dialogue was organized with the aim of
producing policy recommendations to enhance Japan-Australia security cooperation.
As reported in the last year, remarkable developments in the bilateral security
relationship between Japan and Australia have been observed and both countries areseen as natural strategic partners that share basic values and interests in the
Asia-Pacific, represented by the issuing of the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on
Security Cooperation in March 2007 and of the Memorandum on Defense Cooperationin December 2008. The Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement(ACSA) was signed in May 2010 and entered into force in January 2013. The
Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement (ISA) was signed in May 2012 andentered into force in March 2013. The Japanese and Australian Foreign and Defence
Ministers 2+2 meeting issued the Common Vision and Objectives to achieve greater
cooperation in security and defence in September 2012.
Considering the aforementioned recent developments, a group of security and regional
experts from Japan and Australia discussed in this Dialogue possible measures toenhance security cooperation between the two countries on the following three points:
1) security trends and environments surrounding Japan and Australia, 2) defence andsecurity policy developments in Japan and Australia, and 3) Japan-Australia security
and defence cooperation.
We hope that this report will make a valuable contribution to policy-making on
Japan-Australia security cooperation, and we would like to express our deepest
appreciation to the Oceania Division, Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Japan, and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) for theircooperation in holding this Dialogue.
(As the Discussion part of this Dialogue is based upon the Chatham House Rules, thisreport does not identify the speaker for any records of statements made throughout thecourse of the Dialogue.)
Yoshiji Nogami
President
The Japan Institute of International Affairs
3The 8th JAPAN-AUSTRALIA TRACK 1.5 DIALOGUE
June 20 – 21, 2013
Tokyo, JapanAGENDA
Thursday, June 20, 2013
10:00 - 10:10

Opening Remarks
Japan: Amb. Yoshiji NOGAMI, President, Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA)
Australia: Mr. Peter JENNINGS, Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy
Institute (ASPI)

10:10 - 11:00

Session 1: Security Trends and Environment Surrounding Japan andAustralia
Moderator: Amb. Yoshiji NOGAMI, JIIA
- Presentation
Japan: Mr. Sugio TAKAHASHI, Senior Fellow, National Institute for Defense
Studies
Australia: Dr. Tanya OGILVIE-WHITE, Senior Analyst, ASPI
- Discussion

11:00 - 11:10

Coffee Break

11:10 - 12:20

Session 1 Continuation

12:30 - 13:50

Lunch
Venue: Restaurant Iwaen<Address> Tokyo Club Bldg. 3F
3-2-6 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo

14:00 - 14:50

Session 2: Defence and Security Policy Developments in Japan andAustralia
Moderator: Dr. Ben SCHREER, Senior Analyst, ASPI
- Presentation
Australia: Mr. Michael SHOEBRIDGE, First Assistant Secretary, Strategic
Policy, Department of Defence
Japan: LTG (ret.) Noboru YAMAGUCHI, Professor, National Defense
Academy of Japan- Discussion

14:50 - 15:00

Coffee Break

15:00 - 16:10

Session 2 Continuation

5

Friday, June 21, 2013
10:00 - 10:50

Session 3: Japan – Australia Security and Defence Cooperation
Moderator: Mr. Hideki ASARI, Deputy Director General, JIIA
- Presentation
Japan: Dr. Eiichi KATAHARA, Professor / Director, Regional Studies
Department, National Institute for Defense Studies
Australia: Mr. Peter JENNINGS, Executive Director, ASPI
- Discussion

10:50 - 11:00

Coffee Break

11:00 - 12:10

Session 3 Continuation

12:10 - 12:20

Closing Remarks
Australia: Mr. Peter JENNINGS, ASPI
Japan: Amb. Yoshiji NOGAMI, JIIA

12:30 - 14:00

Farewell Lunch
Venue: “Suwa,” The Tokai University Club
<Address> Kasumigaseki Bldg. 35F
3-2-5 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo

6

The 8th Japan - Australia Track 1.5 Dialogue
June 20 - 21, 2013
Tokyo, Japan

List of Participants*Alphabetical order based on last name.

Japan
Name

Title

Organization

Mr. Hideki ASARI

Deputy Director General

Japan Institute of International Affairs

Mr. Yosuke HAYASHIDA

Researcher, Oceania Division,
Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Yasuyuki ISHIDA

Research Fellow

Japan Institute of International Affairs

Mr. Kenji KANASUGIDeputy Director‐General,
Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Director

Okazaki InstituteAdjunct Fellow

Japan Institute of International Affairs

VADM (ret.)
Hideaki KANEDA
Mr. Takehiro KANO
Dr. Eiichi KATAHARA

Director, National Security Policy
Division, Foreign Policy Bureau
Professor / Director,
Regional Studies Department

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
National Institute for Defense Studies

Professor

Aoyama Gakuin University

Adjunct Fellow

Japan Institute of International Affairs

Dr. Yoshinori KODAMA

Director, Oceania Division,
Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Tetsuo KOTANI

Research Fellow

Japan Institute of International Affairs

Dr. Tsutomu KIKUCHI

Ms. Megumi MAEKAWA
Mr. Ryo NAKAMURA
Amb. Yoshiji NOGAMI
Mr. Takashi NONOGUCHI
Mr. Atsuo SUZUKI
Dr. Seiichiro TAKAGI
Mr. Sugio TAKAHASHI

Officer, National Security Policy
Division, Foreign Policy Bureau
Director, Policy Planning Division,
Foreign Policy Bureau
President

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Japan Institute of International Affairs

Deputy Director, International Policy
Division, Bureau of Defense Policy
Defense Councilor (Deputy Director
General), Minister’s Secretariat

Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Defense

Senior Associate Fellow

Japan Institute of International Affairs

Senior Fellow

National Institute for Defense Studies

Deputy Director,
Office of Strategic Planning

Ministry of Defense

7Mr. Shinichiro TOKUMASU

Officer, Oceania Division,
Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

LTG (ret.)
Noboru YAMAGUCHI

Professor

National Defense Academy of Japan

Name

Title

Organization

Mr. Aldo BORGU

Senior Analyst,
Strategic Analysis Branch

Office of National Assessments

Mr. David GLASS

Counsellor (Political/Strategic)

Australian Embassy

Ms. Louise HARRIS

Second Secretary (Political/Strategic)

Australian Embassy

Mr. Peter JENNINGS

Executive Director

Australian Strategic Policy Institute

Mr. Nicholas KAY

Second Secretary (Political/Strategic)

Australian Embassy

Dr. Tanya OGILVIE‐WHITE

Senior Analyst

Australian Strategic Policy Institute

Dr. Benjamin SCHREER

Senior Analyst

Australian Strategic Policy Institute

Mr. Michael SHOEBRIDGEFirst Assistant Secretary, Strategic Policy

Department of Defence

Ms. Dara WILLIAMSMinister‐ Counsellor

Australian Embassy

Australia

8The 8th Japan - Australia Track 1.5 Dialogue
Biographies of Participants*Alphabetical order by surname.

JAPAN
Hideki ASARI
Hideki Asari is Deputy Director General of The Japan Institute of International Affairs. He
was Minister at the Embassy of Japan in the US before assuming his current position. After
graduating from Waseda University he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in1986. He earned M.A. in the University of Oxford. At MOFA he served as Counsel for
Trade Negotiations in the International Legal Affairs Bureau (2004) and as Director of the
Oceania Division of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau (2005-2007). His overseas
posts include Political Counselor at the Japanese Embassy in the Republic of Korea (2003)
and Economic Counselor, and later Minister at the Japanese Embassy in the US(2008-2011). He was also Cabinet Counselor in the Office of the Assistant Cabinet
Secretary (2007-2009).

Yasuyuki ISHIDA
Yasuyuki ISHIDA is a research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA).
Currently, he works on various projects including “Japanese Foreign Policy in the
Indo-Pacific” and “Southeast Asia and the Japan-US alliance”. His areas of interests
include multilateral and regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific security.
He completed his B.A. and M.A. from Keio University, Tokyo. He also received a Diploma(International Politics) from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, U.K., and a Ph.D
(International Politics) from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His working
experience includes a visiting fellow in the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses(IDSA), New Delhi, and two postings in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to deal with
Asia-Pacific security and national security policy.

Kenji KANASUGIDeputy Director-General
Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Education:
1983
Professional Career:
1983
1984
1988

Hitotsubashi University (Faculty of Law)

Enter Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Embassy of Japan in Australia (Second Secretary)
Overseas Public Relations DivisionFirst North America Division
Second Africa Division

9

1994
1995
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013

Office of Deputy DG for Economic Affairs Bureau
Deputy Director, Second North America Division
Embassy of Japan in Malaysia (First Secretary)
Deputy Director, Policy Planning Division
Senior Assistant for Policy Coordination
Executive Assistant for Vice Foreign Minister
Director, Second North America Division
Chief of Staff to Foreign Minister, Yoriko KAWAGUCHI
Embassy of Japan in the U.S.A (Counselor, Economic Affairs)
Director, Personnel Division
Director, Management and Coordination Division
Deputy Director-General, Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau
Executive Assistant to the Prime Minister, Yoshihiko Noda
Deputy Director-General, Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau

Hideaki KANEDA
Vice Admiral Hideaki Kaneda, JMSDF (ret.) is a Director for The Okazaki Institute, an
adjunct fellow of JIIA (Japan Institute of International Affairs) and a trusty of RIPS
(Research Institute of Peace and Security). He was a Senior Fellow of Asia Center and J.
F. Kennedy School of Government of the Harvard and a Guest Professor of Faculty of
Policy Management of Keio University.
He is the author of published books and articles about security, including “Proposal for
Maritime Coalition in East Asia”, IMDEX, Germany, Nov. 2000, “Changing situation ofChina’s and Japan’s security”, World and Japan, Tokyo, Sep. 2001, “US/China Power
Game in Maritime Hegemony”, JIIA, Tokyo, Mar. 2003, “BMD for Japan”, Kaya-Books,
Tokyo, Mar. 2003, “Multilateral Multi-Agencies Cooperation for Maritime Order
Maintenance”, CSCAP, Apr. 2005, “US and Japan’s Policy toward North Korea”, World andJapan, Tokyo, Sep. 2005, “Japan’s Missile Defense”, JIIA, Tokyo, Dec. 2006, “Collective
Defense Right and Japan’s Security, Naigai News, Tokyo, Aug. 2007, “Aspects of the War(Sea Battle)”, Naigai Publishing Company, Tokyo, July. 2008, “Understanding BMD”,
Ikaros-Books, Tokyo, Oct. 2008, “Japan’s Diplomacy and Total Security”, Wedge, Tokyo,
Sep. 2011.
He is a graduate of the National Defense Academy in 1968, the Maritime War College in
1983, and the U.S. Naval War College in 1988. He served in the JMSDF from 1968 to
1999, primarily in Naval Surface Warfare at sea, while in Naval & Joint Plans and Policy
Making on shore.

Takehiro KANO
Director, National Security Policy Division,
Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JapanMr Takehiro KANO, since he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1989, has served avariety of posts within the Government of Japan as follows:-Director, National Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy Bureau (2012-)

10

-Director, Climate Change Division, International Cooperation Bureau, engaged in UN
climate change negotiations from COP15 to COP 17 as well as regional and bilateral
cooperation in environment and energy area. (2010-2012)-Senior Foreign Policy Coordinator, Policy Coordination Division, Foreign Policy Bureau,
coordinating Japan’s major foreign policy agenda such as Afghanistan/Pakistan, North
Korea’s missile/nuclear tests, peace building matters including UNPKO, and nuclear
disarmament and non proliferation. (2008-2010)-Senior Coordinator, Global Issues Cooperation Division, International Cooperation Bureau,
coordinating Japan’s ODA policy on major sectors, particularly on global health andeducation. (2007-2008)-Executive Assistant to Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Prime Minister’s Official
Residence, providing advice to one of the three Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries on major
foreign and security policy matters. (2005-2007)-Principal Deputy Director, Economic Policy Division, Economic Affairs Bureau, internal
policy coordination in economic and trade area and administrative matters, including
preparation for G8 summit, APEC and ASEM. (2004-2005)-First Secretary, Economic Section, Embassy of Japan, USA, working on US-Japanbilateral economic and trade issues as well as US-Japan policy coordination onreconstruction assistance to Iraq. (2001-2004)-Principal Deputy Director, Loan Aid Division, Economic Cooperation Bureau, working on
Japan’s “Yen Loan” policy to major recipient countries such as China, India and Indonesia,
as well as on debt alleviation of highly indebted poor countries mainly in Africa.
(1999-2001)-Deputy Director, US-Japan Security Treaty Division, North American Affairs Bureau,
working on passage of the new US-Japan Defense Guideline legislations, as well as on the
US base issues in Okinawa and other regions in Japan. (1998-1999)-Deputy Director, Overseas Establishment Division, Foreign Minister’s Secretariat, working
on budgetary matters related to overseas Embassies/Consulates facilities and staffs.
(1997-1998)-Deputy Director, First Southeast Asia Division, Asian Affairs Bureau, serving as country
officer for Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. (1995-1997)-Chief Researcher, Bank Supervision Bureau, Ministry of Finance, working on Japan’s
Financial System Reform. (1993-1995)
Education:
1986-1989 the University of Tokyo (Law Faculty)
1990-1993 Selwyn College, Cambridge University (Master of Economics)

Eiichi KATAHARA
Eiichi KATAHARA is Professor and Director, Regional Studies Department at the National
Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) of the Japanese Ministry of Defense. Prior to joining
NIDS, he was Professor of International Relations at Kobe Gakuin University; a visiting
fellow at Stanford University’s Asia-Pacific Research Center; a postdoctoral fellow at the
University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC); lecturer inthe Department of Political Science and research fellow at the Australia-Japan ResearchCenter both at the Australian National University. He is Editor-in-Chief of the East Asian
Strategic Review 2013 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2013) and the East
Asian Strategic Review 2012 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2012). His

11

publications include “Japan: From Containment to Normalization,” in Muthiah Alagappa(ed.) Coercion and Governance (Stanford University Press, 2001); Chapter on the USA,
East Asian Strategic Review 2010 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2010);“Japan’s Concept of Comprehensive Security in the Post-Cold War World,” in Susan Shirk& Christopher P. Twomey (eds.) Power and Prosperity: Economics and Security Linkages
in Asia-Pacific (Transaction Publishers, 1996) and other articles and book chapters. He
earned a Ph.D. in Asian and International Studies from Griffith University, an MA in
International Relations from The Australian National University, and a BA in Economics
from Keio University.

Tsutomu KIKUCHI
Tsutomu Kikuchi is Professor at the Department of International Politics, Aoyama-Gakuin
University, Tokyo, Japan. He has been an adjunct fellow at the Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs (JIIA) since 1987. He is specializing in international political economy
in the Asia-Pacific.
He was a visiting fellow at the Australian National University (ANU: Canberra) and theInstitute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS: Singapore), a visiting professor at the
University of British Columbia (UBC, Vancouver), and consultant of the Asian Development
Bank (ADB). He has been engaged in various track 2 activities and international research
projects conducted under such regional institutions as PECC (Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council) and CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific).
He has published many books and articles on international political economy (especiallyregional institution-building) of the Asia-Pacific. He obtained his doctoral degree from
Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan.

Yoshinori KODAMAEDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND:
1990 Bachelor of Law, University of Tokyo, Japan.
1992 Master of Laws, University of Cambridge, England.
1999 Doctor of Philosophy (Law), University of London, England.
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:
1990 Joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
1990- First International Organisations (GATT) Division.
1991- Treaties Division.
1993- Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan, United Kingdom.
1995- UN Law of the Sea Convention Ratification Office.
1996- Deputy Director, Second International Organisations (OECD) Division.
Vice-Chair, OECD Joint Expert Group on Trade and Environment.
1998- Head of Legal Unit, Foreign Ministry’s Secretariat.
2002- First Secretary, Permanent Delegation of Japan to the OECD, France.
International Energy Agency Emergency Energy Policy Inspector for the UK &Portugal.
2005- Counsellor, Embassy of Japan, Kingdom of Cambodia.
Co-Chairman of the Inter-governmental Support Group for the Khmer Rouge Trials.
Coordinator of the Supervisory Team for the 2006 Municipal Election of Cambodia.

12

2007- Executive Assistant to the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Prime Minister’s Office.
2009- Director, Japan-Korea Economic Affairs Division,
Senior Policy Coordinator for the Korean Peninsula.
2011- Director, European Union Economic Affairs Division.
2012- Director, Oceania Division.
Author of “Asia Pacific Economic Integration and the GATT-WTO Regime (1999, Kluwar).”Tetsuo KOTANIMr. Tetsuo KOTANI is a research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
and teaches at Hosei University in Tokyo. His research focus is the US-Japan alliance andmaritime security. He is also a senior research fellow at the Research Institute for Peaceand Security (RIPS) in Tokyo, and a member of the International Advisory Board at the
Project 2049 Institute in Washington. He received a security studies fellowship from the
RIPS in 2006-2008. He won the 2003 Japanese Defense Minister Prize. He has
published numerous articles both in English and Japanese, and his recent English
publications include "The Senkaku Islands and the US-Japan Alliance" (Project 2049
Institute, March 2013), and "China's Fortress Fleet-in-Being and Its Implications for Japan's
Security" (Institut Français des Relations Internationales, February 2013). He is preparing
his first book on maritime security.

Ryo NAKAMURA
Education:
1994
1992
Occupation:
August 2011 to present

July 2009 to July 2011
September 2006 to July 2009
January 2004 to August 2006
February 2002 to January 2004

August 1999 to February 2002

June 1997 to July 1999

Magister Legum, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität
Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
Bachelor of Law, University of Tokyo, Japan

Director, Policy Planning Division, and concurrently
Director, Division for Promotion of Emerging
Countries Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Executive Assistant to the Deputy Chief
Cabinet Secretary, Office of the Prime Minister
First Secretary, later Counselor (Political),Embassy of Japan in Germany
Principal Deputy Director, International Peace
Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Deputy Director, United Nations Administration
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs(Global issues, human security)
Deputy Director, Office of the Deputy DirectorGeneral for General Affairs of the Economic Affairs
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs(G7/G8-Affairs; September 2001 to February 2002:
Acting Head of the G8 Sherpa Office)
Official, later Deputy Director, Second Southeast
Asia Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

13

May 1995 to June 1997
April 1992

Third Secretary, later Second Secretary (Economic),
Embassy of Japan in Bonn, Germany
Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Languages:
Japanese (native), German, English, French (basic), Korean (basic)

Yoshiji NOGAMI
Yoshiji Nogami is President of The Japan Institute of International Affairs and Executive
Advisor of the Mizuho Corporate Bank, Limited. His current responsibilities include Advisor
to the Cabinet, Advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He is former Japanese
Ambassador to the U.K. and a Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan. After graduatingfrom the University of Tokyo he entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1966. He was
Deputy Director-General of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau and the Foreign
Policy Bureau, Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau, Deputy Minister for
Foreign Affairs. His overseas posts include Economic Counsellor at the embassy in the
U.S. and Consul-General in Hong Kong. Mr. Nogami was also Ambassador to the OECD in
Paris in 1997-99. He was Senior Visiting Fellow at the Royal Institute of International
Affairs.

Atsuo SUZUKI
Present Assignment: Defense Councilor (Deputy Director General), Minister’s Secretariat
Deputy Director General, Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH)
Education:

Service Career:
April 1985
May 1993
Aug 2000
July 2001
Aug 2005
July 2006
Sep 2007
Aug 2009
Aug 2011
Sep 2012

1985 Waseda University (BA in Politics and Economics)
1990 Georgetown University (MA)Entered Japan Defense Agency
Secretariat of International Peace Cooperation HQ.
Prime Minister’s Office
Visiting Fellow, INSS, NDU
Director, Office of Defense Studies, Defense Policy Div, BODP,
among others
Director, Defense Operations Div, Bureau of Operational Policy
Director, International Operations Div, BOOP
Director, Defense Intelligence Div, BODP
Director, Defense Policy Div, BOD
Deputy Director General for Realignment Initiatives, Minister’s
Secretariat
Present Assignment

Seiichiro TAKAGI
Seiichiro Takagi is a senior associate fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA). He obtained Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University. Before moving to hiscurrent position in April 2011, he was an associate professor and professor at Saitama

14

University (1979-97), a professor at National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies(1997-99), a Director of the Second Research Department at The National Institute for
Defense Studies, and a professor at the School of International Politics (1999-2003),
Economics, and Business, The Aoyama Gakuin University (2003-2011). He is a specialist
on Chinese foreign relations and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. He is a memberof the Japan Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific(CSCAP), and a board member of the Program for International Studies in Asia (PISA), aninternational academic NGO based in the George Washington University. His recent
publications in English include China Watching: Perspectives from Europe, Japan and theUnited States (co-edited with Robert Ash and David Shambaugh, with contribution,
Routledge, 2007); “The Taiwan factor in Japan-China relations,” in Lm Peng Er, ed.,Japan’s Relations with China (Routledge, 2006); “The Asia-Pacific Nations: Searching for
Leverage,” in Ramon H. Meyers, Michel C. Oksenberg and David Shambaugh (eds.),
Making China Policy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); and “In Search of a Sustainable Equal
Partnership: Japan-China Relations in the Post-Cold-War Era,” in Japan Review ofInternational Affairs, Vol.13, No.1 (Spring 1999).

Sugio TAKAHASHI
Sugio Takahashi is Senior Fellow of the National Institute for Defense Studies and currently
with Deputy Director of the Office of Strategic Planning of Ministry of Defense in Tokyo,
Japan. In that capacity, he contributed drafting process of the National Defense Program
Guidelines released by the Government of Japan in December 2010. He received MA and
BA from the Waseda University and MA from George Washington University. Mr. Takahashi
has published extensively in the areas of nuclear strategy, the Japan-U.S. alliance, andEast Asian regional security including “Counter A2/AD in Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation:
Toward Allied Air-Sea Battle,” Futuregram 12-3, (Project 2049, 2012), ”Transformation ofJapan’s Defense Industry? Assessing the Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs,”
Security Challenges, Vol.4, No.4 (Summer 2008); “Dealing with the Ballistic Missile Threat:
Whether Japan Should Have a Strike Capability under its Exclusively Defense-Oriented
Policy,” NIDS Security Reports, No.7 (December 2006), pp.79-94.

Noboru YAMAGUCHI
Lieutenant General YAMAGUCHI (Ret.) is now professor and Director for International
Programs of the National Defense Academy of Japan. He was graduated from the NDA
majoring applied physics in 1974 and trained as an army aviator mainly flying helicopters.
He received his MA from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University in1988 and was a National Security Fellow at John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies,
Harvard University 1991-1992. LTG YAMAGUCHI’s major assignments include Senior
Defense Attaché at the Japanese Embassy in the United States (1999-2001), Deputy
Commandant of GSDF Aviation School (2001-2003), Director for Research of the GSDF
Research and Development Command (2003-2005), Vice President of the National
Institute for Defense Studies (2005-2006) and Commanding General of the GSDF
Research and .Development Command (2006-2008). After retiring from active duty inDecember 2008, LTG YAMAGUCHI started teaching military history and strategy in April
2009. After the East Japan Great Earthquake, he served at the Prime Minister’s Official
Residence as Special Adviser to the Cabinet on Crisis Management from March to
September, 2011.

15

AUSTRALIA
Aldo BORGU
Aldo joined the Office of National Assessments (ONA) as a Senior Strategic Analyst in April
2007. There he is responsible for assessing the interactions between major powers in the
Indo-Pacific and broad military-political issues. Prior to joining ONA, he was the Principal
Adviser to the Australian Minister of Defence, responsible for strategic, international,
operational and intelligence issues.
From Feb 2002 to March 2006 he was the Program Director, Operations and Capability, at
the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) where he managed ASPI’s research
programme on military operations, defence capability and terrorism/counter-terrorism
issues. From 1998 to 2002 he served as Senior Adviser to the Minister for Defence andwas Senior Adviser to the Minister for Defence Industry, Science and Personnel from
1996-1998. Aldo started his career in Canberra as a strategic analyst in the DefenceIntelligence Organisation from 1991-1994 and then in the International Policy Division in
the Department of Defence from 1994-1996.

David GLASSActing Minister-Counsellor (Political-Strategic)
Australian Embassy-Tokyo
Experience:
2012-12 Acting Minister-Counsellor, Australian Embassy Tokyo
2012-7Counsellor (Political-Strategic), Australian Embassy Tokyo
2009-10 Director, Speechwriting, Global Issues Branch,
Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade (DFAT)
2007-09 Director, Business and Communications, Shanghai World Expo Unit,
DFAT
2007
Director, Post Evaluation Report Section, Executive and Ministerial
Branch, DFAT
2005-06 Director, Latin America and Caribbean Section, DFAT
2004-05 A/g Consul General, Australian Consulate-General, Chicago
2002-03 Counsellor, APEC, Australian Embassy, Mexico City
1999-01 Deputy Representative, Australian Commerce and Industry Office
Taipei
1998-99 Executive Officer, North Asia Division, DFAT
1994-98 First Secretary (Political), Australian Embassy, Beijing
1994
Desk Officer, North Asia Division, DFAT
1992
North Asia Advisor, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
1991-92 Analyst and Senior Analyst (China)
1993-94 Office of National Assessments
Education:
1989-90
1988

Thomas J Watson Research Fellow
Bachelor of Arts, Pomona College

16Peter JENNINGSPeter Jennings commenced as ASPI Executive Director on 30 April 2012. Prior to that hewas the Deputy Secretary for Strategy in the Australian Department of Defence.
Peter’s career has included extensive experience advising Government at senior levels;
developing major strategic policy documents; conducting crisis management, andresearching, writing and teaching international security.
Peter has previously held a number First Assistant Secretary positions in Defence
including First Assistant Secretary International Policy Division, First Assistant Secretary
Coordination and Public Affairs and Secretary of the Defence Audit and Risk Committee.
Peter was for a number of years the Director of Programs at ASPI. He wrote andcommentated widely on defence policy and international security, and taught postgraduate
studies on terrorism at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA).
In 2002–03 Peter was a Senior Adviser in the Prime Minister’s office responsible fordeveloping a strategic policy framework for Cabinet. Peter had previously been Chief ofStaff to the Minister for Defence (1996–1998) and Defence adviser to the Federal
Opposition (1990–1993).
In the Defence Department, Peter has also been the Deputy Director of the Defence
Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (2002) and as head of the Strategic Policy Branch(1998–1999). In late 1999 Peter was co-director of the East Timor Policy Unit, responsiblefor developing Australia’s policy approaches to the international peacekeeping operation in
East Timor. Following that, as an acting First Assistant Secretary, Peter was closely
involved in developing the 2000 Defence White Paper.
Peter studied at the London Business School in 2000–2001 as a Sloan Fellow and wasawarded a Masters of Science (Management) with Distinction. He has a Master of Arts
Degree in International Relations from the Australian National University (1987) and a BA
(Honours) in History from the University of Tasmania (1980–1984). He has been a
Fulbright Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1985). Peter taught politics
and international relations at the University of New South Wales/ADFA (1987–1990). He
has written and published widely on defence and security issues.
Peter was awarded the Public Service Medal in the Australia Day 2013 Honours List foroutstanding public service through the development of Australia's strategic and defence
policy, particularly in the areas of Australian Defence Force operations in East Timor, Iraq
and Afghanistan.

Tanya OGILVIE-WHITEDr Tanya Ogilvie-White is a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
specializing in international security, non-proliferation and disarmament. She is a trustee of
the New Zealand Centre for Global Studies, a member of the Council on Security
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, an international partner of the Fissile Material Working
Group, and associate editor of the US-based academic journal, Asian Security. Before
joining ASPI in October 2012, she was a research fellow at the International Institute for17Strategic Studies, London, senior lecturer at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand,
research fellow at the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University ofSouthampton and teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy. Her recent books include:
Slaying the Nuclear Dragon: Disarmament Dynamics in the Twenty-First Century(University of Georgia Press, 2012), and On Nuclear Deterrence: The Correspondence of
Sir Michael Quinlan (Routledge, 2011).

Benjamin SCHREER
Dr Ben Schreer joined the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) as Senior Analyst for
defence strategy in January 2013. His primary research interest is in the area of Australian
defence strategy and Asian defence developments. He is also working on the future of US
military strategy in Asia and its implications for Australia. Previously, Ben was the deputy
head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at the ANU where he taught
strategy at the graduate level, including in the Military Studies Program at the AustralianCommand and Staff College (ACSC). Before coming to Australia, he held positions as thedeputy director of the Aspen Institute in Berlin, leader of a research group at Konstanz
University, and deputy head of research unit at the German Institute for International andSecurity Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin.

Michael SHOEBRIDGE
Michael Shoebridge has been First Assistant Secretary Strategic Policy in Defence since
May 2011. Previously to this he was the First Assistant Secretary Defence, Intelligence andResearch Coordination in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Prior to thishe was the Deputy Director of the Defence Intelligence Organisation, and he was theCounsellor Defence Policy at the Australian Embassy in Washington D.C., from February2005 to July 2007. He has experience across a range of policy areas within the AustralianGovernment, within the Department of Defence, the Department of Finance andAdministration and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. He has worked in
two Australian Commonwealth Ministers’ offices and also on secondment with the United
Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence.
Mr Shoebridge has a Bachelor of Economics and a Bachelor of Laws from the University ofSydney and also a Graduate Diploma in Legal Practice from the University of Technology
in Sydney. He joined the Department of Defence as a Graduate in 1993.
Promoted to the Senior Executive Service in 2002, Mr Shoebridge was the Director- Generalof Minor War Vessels in the Defence Materiel Organisation, with responsibilities including
running the selection of, and then contract negotiation for, the Navy’s new Armidale Classpatrol boats. He moved to the Department of Finance and Administration in 2004 to set
up the new function of Defence Capability Assessment. Mr Shoebridge has also worked as
Chief Executive Assistant to the Secretary of the Department of Defence, Dr. Allan Hawke(2001), and on secondment as Director Civilian Personnel Policy (IIP) in the UK Ministry of
Defence, London (2000).
Prior to that, in 1998 and 1999, Mr Shoebridge served as Defence Adviser to the Hon
Bruce Scott MP the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs and Minister Assisting the Minister for
Defence. From 1996 to 1998, Mr Shoebridge worked as Departmental Liaison Officer in the18Office of the Hon Ian McLachlan AO MP, Minister for Defence. From 1994 to 1995, Mr
Shoebridge worked in the Department of Defence’s International Policy Division where heserved as Papua New Guinea Section Executive Officer and Senior Research Officer.
Mr Shoebridge was born in Hornsby, Sydney, Australia in 1968. He is married to Margaret
Deerain and they have three children, Gabrielle, Dominic and Leah.

Dara WILLIAMS
Dara Williams was appointed Minister-Counsellor (Political) to the Australian Embassy,
Tokyo, in August 2012.
She previously served in a number of positions in the Department of Foreign Affairs andTrade (DFAT), both in Australia and overseas. In Canberra, before taking up her current
position, she was head of the Financial Management Branch (2009-2011). Prior to that,
she held the positions of Branch Head of the Information Resources Branch (2007-2008)
and Director of the Consular Information Section (2004-2006). She served for two and ahalf years as Departmental Liaison Officer in the Office of the Minister for Trade(2002-2004), after returning to Canberra from a posting in Geneva as Second Secretary toAustralia’s Permanent Delegation to the World Trade Organisation (1999-2002). Ms
Williams speaks Japanese, which she studied as part of a Bachelor of Economics degree.
She furthered her Japanese language studies in Japan at Keio University (1993) andOsaka International Women’s University (1992). Ms Williams also holds a degree in law
with honours from the University of Adelaide and is admitted as a Barrister and Solicitor in
one of the Australian jurisdictions. She has a Master of Arts (Foreign Affairs and Trade)from Monash University. Ms Williams is married and has two children. Her hobbies include
exercise, travel and gourmet food.

19

Summary
Opening Remarks
Session 1
Session 2
Session 3
Closing Remarks

S UMMARY

Opening Remarks
Japan: Amb. Yoshiji NOGAMI, President, Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA)
Ambassador Yoshiji Nogami opened the 8th Japan-Australia Track 1.5 Dialogue,
noting that in spite of political changes in Japan and Australia, defense and security
dialogue between the two countries has continued smoothly. He underlined theimportance of sharing understandings on the security landscape between the twocountries through the Track 1.5 Dialogue.
Australia: Mr. Peter JENNINGS, Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy
Institute (ASPI)
Mr. Peter Jennings thanked the JIIA for hosting the meeting, noting that this has been atime of big strategic change for the region, with not all of it favorable, which forms the
backdrop to the day’s discussions. He also commented that it has been a time oftremendous progress in the bilateral defense relationship as well as the bilateralrelationship more broadly.

Session 1
Security Trends and Environment Surrounding Japan and Australia
Moderator
Amb. Yoshiji NOGAMI, JIIA
For the past couple of years, the security landscape surrounding Japan has notnecessarily been very calm, with the issue of North Korea and the problems with ourlarge neighbor China. We had a discussion last time on where the US rebalancing
strategy is going, and given the difficult domestic situation in the US we do not often
hear from US policymakers about this. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel spoke in
Singapore, but the general global environment is crowding out the development of the22rebalancing.
Meanwhile, Japan has achieved a policy transition, and should benefit from a relatively
stable political situation for the next few years.

Presentation
Japan: Mr. Sugio TAKAHASHI, Senior Fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies
Looking at long-term security trends, there are three major uncertainties. The first is
China's future, especially whether they can overcome the middle income trap. The
second is the future of Japan, as whether current Japanese policies succeed or not will
have major regional implications. The third is how long the US Asia-Pacific policy ofrebalancing will continue. Focusing today on the short-term trends, however, we needto consider 1) Japan-China relations, or more specifically the East China Sea, 2) North
Korea, 3) the defense budget trend line in countries in the region, and 4) the US-Japan
alliance.
Since last year, the region is paying great attention to the showdown between Japanand China over the Senkaku Islands. However, this grey zone crisis between Japan and
China has been a concern since at least 2010 when the first Senkaku incident occurred.
In December 2010, the Japanese government released the National Defense Program
Guidelines, which clearly outlined Japanese concerns about Chinese creeping
expansion in the East China Sea, and invented the notion of dynamic deterrence toincrease the Japanese deterrence capability in the grey zone area. In both the East
China Sea and the South China Sea, China is making major efforts to change the status
quo through paramilitary base creeping expansion rather than military activities. How
to treat such paramilitary activities has been a major question for Japan. Having been
unable to deter such activities, risk management of the ongoing showdown is a major
agenda item for Japanese security policy. How Japan controls the situation and how the
US commits to the situation remain big questions.
The Senkaku Islands issue is not a separate issue from the other maritime issues
surrounding China. From the US-Japan perspective, the domino effect of the end gameof the current crisis should not be underestimated. There are multiple maritime issues
23

in both the East China Sea and the South China Sea, but the Senkaku Islands issue ismuch simpler for the US. The US controlled the islands from 1945 to 1972, and as anally of Japan, the US position is not perfectly neutral. However, Japan is capable oftaking care of the situation by itself, unlike the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, andIndonesia. Unlike the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands are very close to US
military facilities in Okinawa. So this is the simple case for the U.S. and the Japan-U.S.
alliance. Success in the East China Sea cannot guarantee success in stopping the
Chinese creeping expansion in the South China Sea, but failure in the Senkaku Islands
will guarantee failure in the South China Sea. In that sense, the Senkaku Islands issue
should not be treated as a separate issue.
In overall regional power balance issues, China's highest priority policy goal isstability of domestic affairs, so now Chinese foreign policy and security policy issubject to domestic considerations. In some sense their foreign policy is an extensionof their domestic politics. The conventional wisdom on policy towards China is “shape”
and “hedge,” encouraging China to be responsible and deterring aggressive behavior.
However, if Chinese behavior is truly domestically driven, efforts by external powers
might not work. The natural tendency of domestic driven foreign policy will beaggressiveness. In this case in the short to mid-term external powers China policy
might need to have much greater deterrence rather than encouragement.
North Korea is also a big question. Since 2011, there have been multiple provocations.
It is estimated that North Korea will complete the development of an ICBM, and will
be able to launch a nuclear warhead. Therefore the credibility of US deterrence is of
critical importance. However, the US has repeatedly committed to the security of theregion and defense of their allies. If the US is deterred by just a handful of unreliablenuclear warheads by North Korea, then how can regional countries rely US deterrence
against China. NATO countries, especially newcomers to NATO, are looking very
cautiously at US extended deterrence. If the US does not improve their security
guarantee, this will cause severe damage to NATO, which the US cannot afford. Even
though the US extended deterrence is credible, the North Korean perception cannot be
controlled. Once they complete the nuclear tipped ICBM, they may have someoverconfidence about their strategic deterrence toward the US, and may escalate theirprovocation against South Korea and Japan. In that sense, we need to increase ourdeterrence efforts in a much more operational way. This is one of the policy challenges
for the security of North East Asia.
24

Regarding the Defense budget trendline, the big issue is the US defense budget. One
year ago I was cautiously optimistic, and today I have still cautious optimism. The US
budget is very big in absolute terms – they purchased 183 F-22 fighters in the past
decade, 170 C-17s, and more than 50 Aegis destroyers, which should be enough todeter regional issues in the coming decade or two decades. However, caution is stillneeded because the trendline does matter, and budgets in relative terms can shapecountries' perspectives. If the dominant perception is that US defense budget will
decline, that could have a negative effect on the regional security environment.
Another reason for caution is uncertainty about the F-35. The F-35 is a main pillar for
air warfare capabilities in the near future for US allies, however uncertainty over the
program poses a question for regional security.
The latest version of the US-Japan Defense Guidelines covering operational
cooperation was agreed in 1997, at which time the world was very different to today.
At that time, the main concern was North Korean invasion against South Korea, andthe threat of a potential Taiwan crisis. Now, North Korean provocation or North
Korean collapse is a much more serious concern than a North Korean invasion against
South Korea. The Taiwan situation is relatively stable, but we have the South China
Sea and East China Sea problems with China. From the Japanese perspective, in 1997,
the main theme of the defense guidelines review process was how to assist the US in
the Korean peninsula. Now the main theme is how we are assisted by the US. In
addition, there are new areas of cooperation, like missile defense, because in 1997 thetwo countries had not yet deployed missile defense. There are also space and cyberissues. The US and Japan therefore need to fundamentally revisit the framework for
defense cooperation and, if necessary, revise the defense guidelines.
The implications for Japan and Australia of this short-term regional security situation,is that compared to the past decade we may have more intensified security challenges
in the grey zone, between peacetime and wartime, where a paramilitary showdown isgoing on. In the case of China domestic driven foreign policy behaviors may intensify
the challenges for surrounding countries. In the case of North Korea complacency may
escalate their provocation against regional countries. Japan clearly recognizes that weneed to upgrade the deterrence in a more visible operational way, andJapan-Australia-US trilateral cooperation may have such characteristics. Although we
do not wish to entrap Australia into the Northeast Asian security situation, theintensified security challenge does matter for Japanese security policy. With regard to25

China, if domestic stability continues to be prioritized in Chinese policy-making, theexternal behavior will have much more aggressive characteristics compared to 10 years
ago. We want to continue to encourage China to be a responsible power, but at thesame time we need to prepare for uncontrollable events between regional countries andChina. Reconciling this regional challenge and political correctness is a big question.
Australia: Dr. Tanya OGILVIE-WHITE, Senior Analyst, ASPI
It is questionable whether nuclear deterrence is really as stabilizing as many scholars
and officials choose to believe. It is also questionable how objective the assessments
are regarding the risks and costs of relying on nuclear deterrence in a multipolar Asia –there is a certain amount of complacency in how these questions are addressed.
Disarmament advocates are often scorned because they fail to consider the full picture
when they advocate global zero, and many of those criticisms are valid. But there isblinkered thinking on all sides of the nuclear deterrence debates, including among
those who assert that nuclear weapons can and will prevent major conventional war
into the future, and those who argue that nuclear use is unlikely.
A number of strategic scholars worry about the application of nuclear deterrence in
East Asia, but there are different ideas about what should be done about it. The current
nuclear order is quite obviously unstable, as seen in the North Korean provocations,but thinking about the challenges of nuclear deterrence in the context of broader
regional territorial disputes is also a useful exercise. On the one hand, looking from anextended deterrence and extended assurance perspective, the US signals to China not
to occupy various islands. On the other, it doesn't threaten to block it from doing so,even while it assures allies that it is treaty-bound to defend them. Some analysts in the
US and Australia consider this to be a dangerous practice, because it projects strength
and weakness at the same time. The major concern is that this undermines US
credibility, inviting Chinese leaders to see the US as weak and prone to back down inan escalating crisis. There's a risk of major miscalculation here, as, when faced withsuch a crisis, the US might surprise China by NOT backing down.
In response, analysts have suggested two more clearly defined deterrence strategies.
One is a clear commitment from the US to contain China, meaning that Washington
would leave Beijing in no doubt that it will block it from expanding its territory
through military action or political coercion. In my opinion, this approach would be26

equally unwise, because China sees containment as an aggressive threat. Even if
Washington emphasized the defensive aim of securing the status quo, relations would
certainly deteriorate. But despite the risks, some argue that the benefits of a clear
containment strategy would outweigh the risks, making deterrence harder to mistakeand thus more effective, allowing for clearer red lines, and reducing the odds of an
unanticipated war.
The other strategy that has been suggested is one of accommodation. The argument isthat this would make sense if Beijing's ambitions are limited and likely to remain so. In
accommodating Beijing, Washington would recognize that as China becomes more
powerful, it will naturally feel entitled to the prerogatives of a superpower. Washington
would have to accept that disputes over minor issues would be settled on China's terms
rather than those of its neighbors. Deterrence red lines would still be set down, but theywould be limited to guarding against behavior that poses an existential threat to the US
or its allies.
The US hasn't chosen either of these options. Instead, it's responding to developments
on a case by case basis, trying to feel its way through the shifts that are taking place,reflects an awareness among US decision-makers that the Asian deterrence
environment is far more complex than the US-Soviet one was. It also reflects thenature of its relationship with Beijing, which is more positive than its relationship with
the Soviet Union was. While China's power is rapidly growing and some of its
behavior has heightened regional tensions, nobody seriously believes Chinese leaders
are pursuing an aggressive campaign for global dominance. Moreover, China is
integrated into the global economy to an extent that Soviet officials wouldn't haveimagined possible, creating pressures and constraints that didn't exist during the Cold
War. The vast geography of East Asia and the Pacific shapes security dynamics in waysthat are fundamentally different from what took place last century. Asia's nuclear order
is a maritime, multipolar, asymmetric one, in an environment of ballistic missile
defense and multiplying non-traditional security challenges. All of this makes nuclear
deterrence more difficult, more complex, more risky - and less relevant.
The most pressing problem for East Asia today is how to respond to activities thatthreaten to destabilize the region. Many behaviors can't be reliably prevented throughnuclear extended deterrence. This is worrying in the context of growing resourcecompetition, rising nationalism, and the absence of crisis management systems.
27

Preventing low intensity incidents from escalating is a huge challenge. Nuclear
weapons are part of the problem and should not be relied on as a solution.
Last century's hub-and-spoke bilateral alliance system is no longer as relevant as it was.
We need to put far more emphasis on developing more inclusive, cooperative security
frameworks that reflect our interdependence and which build amity rather thanreinforcing enmity. Thankfully, some of this changing in thinking and approach tosecurity is happening, but adversarial approaches continue to undermine cooperative
ones. We need to stop thinking of security as a military game, and start thinking about
it as a safety net for everyone. One of the biggest costs of nuclear deterrence is that it
perpetuates cycles of threat and counter-threat that feeds insecurity and hostility. We
need to put much more effort into breaking that cycle rather than reshaping it for a new
era.

Discussion
A Participant expressed shock at President Obama's speech outlining a comprehensive
strategy for reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles, suggesting that US decision-makers
cannot understand that the Asian deterrence environment is far more complex than the
US-Soviet one, or the European situation. The 2010 NPR states that strategic stability
between the US and Russia and the US and China is of key importance, but it viewed
them differently, stating that US-China stability is based on mutual confidence building
and transparency without mentioning mutual vulnerability. However, the most recent
impression is that the US treats Russia and China in the same way, as a peer nuclear
actor, which is a big shock. Regarding the effect of nuclear weapons on regional
security, we should separate the effects of nuclear deterrence and conventional
deterrence on regional security. Current concerns are over maritime conflicts, which
are more of a grey zone than a conflict. It is unimaginable that the Chinese would use
nuclear weapons in the Senkaku Islands. However, the nuclear balance can shape thestrategic perspective for regional countries. Currently there is mutual vulnerability
between the US and China, and stability in the strategic nuclear domain cannot
guarantee the stability in the regional domain. Nuclear deterrence can have a positive
implication for regional security and mutual vulnerability based deterrence between the
US and China will have a negative implication, and therefore the US should maintainsome ambiguity. In that sense, President Obama's announcement raised some concern.
28

A Participant noted that the Chinese have a great sense of optimism about therelationship with the US, which may in some respects be an overoptimistic reading of
the prospects for the bilateral relationship, but which is shaped around the sense that
the Americans have signed up to some kind of new great power relationship between
the two countries. In both countries there is a certain amount of reluctance to get into
deep cooperation with the other. If it is true that the US has formally accepted adeterrence based relationship with China similar to the relationship that they had with
the Soviet Union, that adds another element of confidence to the Chinese impressionthat what the US is doing is making a move towards a more managed cooperative
relationship. But the real question is what concessions will either side be prepared tomake to shift from the current state of relations they have. Will the US be prepared toreduce their surveillance activities off the Chinese coast? If you speak to PacificCommand individuals, they would say "absolutely not", but the Americans probably
will be prepared to reduce at least the frequency of flights on the coast. Will they makeconcessions on how to deal with each other on cyber issues? At this stage they have atleast conceded that they are prepared to talk to each other on cyber issues. Will China
make concessions on its sovereignty claims? That is not a likely short-term prospect.
There are a number of areas where the US-China relationship remains unresolved, but
we are going to move into a period where we will have one of two outcomes. We will
potentially have disappointment in raised Chinese expectations when they realize that
the US is not prepared to make a broad series of concessions, or indeed this is a trend
in which case the key issue for us is to make sure that they think of this as a
“Washington and the allies” rather than a G-2 type arrangement.
Another factor which came out of the dialogue was the deeply unhappy state ofrelations between China and Japan, where the vehemence of the Chinese opinion on
this issue was surprising. So much of what we see about China is really how it
manages its own expressions of insecurity. It seems that is a very deep fear within the
Chinese psyche. If a new kind of great power relationship between China and the US
in some way helps to overcome that sense of insecurity there is potentially a benefit
here, because it may give China a sense of greater confidence in how it can deal with
its relations with Japan. However, there is almost no prospect in the short term for
China and Japan to move out of the very unhappy nationalistic position that China has
allowed itself to get into.
On US policy, essentially the rebalancing or pivot has worked quite well in South East
29

Asia. It has given almost all of the South East Asian countries an opportunity to deepen
their own defense and strategic relations with the US. It has given a sense ofconfidence to Myanmar that it can distance itself to some degree from the Chineseorbit. It is given the opportunity for Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines,
Malaysia and Thailand to renew and invigorate their defense relations with the US. My
concern about the US is second term drift. After the election, one may have expectedthat Obama would have a sense that finally there is an opportunity to do the things that
he wants to do as president, but on the contrary, there is a lack of real focus about
where the administration should go. Obama is committed to the rebalance but he is anintellectual president and less of a tough-edged policy fighter. Nowhere is that moreclear than on nuclear security policy. It will not be long before he moves from being a
victorious second term president to being a lame duck.
In Asia, there is a deep sense of concern about cohesion within ASEAN, that goesbeyond the usual worries about their effectiveness. We see some structural issues
creating an incapacity for ASEAN to move effectively on strategic and security issues.
At the same time. Indonesia is beginning to think beyond the confines of ASEAN with
its G-20 role, to potentially play a regional great power role. Singapore, in turn, isgetting more paranoid about its neighbors. It is worried that if ASEAN starts to lose its
grip the country that pays the biggest price is Singapore. For Singapore it is essentialthat ASEAN is in the driving seat of regional security cooperation, which means that
regional security cooperation does not move forward.
Australia is going into an election, and opinion polls suggest there will be a change ofgovernment to the center-right coalition party. However, on foreign and defense policy
there is a broad bipartisanship between the two sides of politics. A new government
will face a difficult challenge in terms of defense spending, as the flat defense budget
will make it very difficult to acquire the equipment that are planned according to recent
defense statements. Government has only two choices, to reduce the size of the force
or to increase defense expenditure. My instinct is that the government will tend toward
increasing expenditure, and that will then raise complicated questions around thenumber of submarines and joint strike fighters they choose to buy.
Finally, on cyber security, there has been a step change in the US thinking on how todeal with cyber security issues internationally. The Americans have decided that they
can no longer not talk about cyber, and that as the nature of Chinese attacks in the30

business and economic area is intolerable, it is necessary to start a more open anddiplomatic discussion about managing cyber in the international environment. In asense, cyber is growing beyond its origins in defense and intelligence which werehighly classified. We need to move now to a world where the diplomats can talk aboutcyber. In terms of the bilateral relationship, we need to be thinking about a cyberdialogue at a government level, and at a 1.5 track level, as well as about cyber securityin South East Asia, where, with the exception of Singapore, there is a very limited
cyber capability, and where we all have an interest in helping Southeast Asian
countries to have at least a basic standard of cyber defense skills. China and the US
will now probably have quite a good dialogue on cyber. There have now been eightrounds of discussions between Washington's CSIS and CICIR, one of the best Beijing
think tanks on cyber security. The big issue that has to be debated in the international
community is between the Chinese and Russian view which would regulate cyber, andthe US and Australian view, which is reluctant to create too many external mechanisms
to control cyberspace. We have to be very careful not to lose that debate.
A Participant shared the concerns about the US and ASEAN, noting that tea party
criticism of Marco Rubio received greater prominence in the New York Times thanPresident Obama’s speech.
A Participant questioned what more the Americans were expected to do, in terms ofassistance in a crisis, that they have not already done. At the same time, it seems that
the Americans are also asking the Japanese side how they can assist them beyond what
they are already doing.
In terms of nuclear deterrence, one positive for Japan is the future relationship between
nuclear deterrence and conventional strategic strike, because this is something the
Chinese side is really worried about, that the Americans have a huge conventional
advantage. There will be lots of discussions about the US-China conventional balance
to come up with steps to increase stability. In that context the US could talk with Japan
about how to deter these conflicts in the Senkaku Islands which do not warrant anuclear response but will warrant a conventional response.
A Participant noted that Chinese optimism with regard to the US signing on to theirconcept of a new great power relationship would suggest that the Chinese are
reemphasizing their “low profile” approach only vis-à-vis the US, while retaining their31

assertiveness vis-à-vis other countries. If the Chinese are convinced that the Americans
are signed on to their concept it is quite understandable that they continue to bevehement about Japan over the Senkaku Islands.
Regarding extended deterrence, the nuclear aspect is only part of the US extended
deterrence, and the non-nuclear aspect of extended deterrence should work for the
Senkaku Islands issue.
On Chinese domestic factors determining their external behavior, this does not always
make the Chinese more assertive or aggressive. This is influenced by the domestic
power balance between moderates and hard-liners, so we have to think of ways tostrengthen the hand of the moderates. Another aspect is the theory of displacement, andtrends toward domestic instability, where the leadership is often tempted to divert
domestic frustrations toward external objects by enhancing conflict. In this case Japanis a very convenient object because of history and the existing conflict over the islands,
which are closely connected. We have to cope with this while not giving in to theircreeping expansion and not being provoked.
A Participant noted the importance of the normalization of Japan as a security actor
among the rise of other regional powers. The US rebalance has also had a positiveeffect in the region, causing China to recognize US economic and military resilience.
Some of China’s lack of confidence is based on the fact that they are not certain of
their continued rise. This all makes the region’s security more positive that justthinking in classic security terms.
The importance of domestic factors influencing China’s foreign policy also relies on
the economy, which is influenced by the regional and global economy. This gives
leverage over leadership behavior in China, because if they realize that nationalistic
actions disturb regional security which undermines their own economy it will start tomatter to the leadership, so the linkage between prosperity and security is important toemphasize in discussions with China.
Regarding the F-35, it is now possible to have confidence in the technical maturity and
US commitment to that program. On the Australian defense budget, it has continued to
grow in real terms. The cuts discussed are only cuts in the level of projected growth.

32

A Participant explained that there is no easy way out of the Senkaku Islands issue,
and although Japan’s door is open for dialogue China has not responded. Therefore
strategic endurance is required. At the same time China is very sensitive tointernational opinion and how they are perceived. Since the “nationalization” of the
Senkaku Islands by Japan in September last year, there were 47 intrusions of Chinese
vessels into the territorial waters surrounding the islands, but in the two weeks leading
up to the summit meeting between the two leaders there was no case of intrusion,compared to an average rate of over one intrusion per week. Therefore Japan should
attract more international attention to the Senkaku Islands issue.
After Prime Minister Abe returned to office Japan started to reevaluate the importantroles played by ASEAN countries, and to try to strengthen the unity of ASEAN to giveit a stronger voice. China is actively exacerbating the internal divisions in ASEAN, butthere is an underlying mistrust between ASEAN countries and China. From a security
standpoint island countries have benefited more from US military presence in theregion compared with inland ASEAN countries, and inland countries are more
susceptible to China’s economic advancement, so higher priority needs to be given todevelopment of inland ASEAN countries in the Mekong region.
A Participant noted that domestic economic development in China is a greater factor
than nationalism in influencing foreign policy, with the need to maintain a stableinternational environment conducive to its economic development. When Chinese
growth slows, this will be a test of what becomes the more important driver for China.
China is a very reactive foreign policy actor, and as its economy slows down and it isfaced with a foreign policy crisis it will be interesting to see if it still focuses on
economic development as the primary factor, or fall back on the easier option ofnationalism.
The issue of North Korea raises the question of US thresholds for action in a practicalsense, where expectations have been increased to a level that the US cannot meet. US
reliability has been damaged by a number of issues, the first of which was ScarboroughShoal, soon after the rebalancing announcements, and in which China’s major target
was probably not the Philippines but the US’s reliability. Another problem area is Syria.
China is becoming smarter about how to use the tools it has to advance its strategicinterests. The US believes that China’s assertion creates allies for the US in the region,
but China’s creeping coercion is becoming an important factor, as China realizes that33

the US ability to coerce China is far less that China’s ability to coerce its regional allies.
China is making small tactical gains which may become a strategic gain as thiscontinues.
Defense cooperation on regional security mechanisms is an important part ofAustralia’s policy responses in the Defence White Paper, but everyone needs to think
about what is the practical achievement of this cooperation in the event of a major
crisis.
A Participant agreed that nuclear deterrence is still relevant because it shapes theconventional capability competition. Since the nuclear balance favors the US, Chinaneeds to be strategically defensive. Domestic dynamics in China shape China’s
behavior but the regional nuclear balance also plays a role. The question is when China
may shift its strategic posture from defensive to offensive. China is now becoming
assertive in the context of the US rebalancing, and so China may try to challenge the
US dominance in this region.
A Participant noted the necessity to prevent nuclear escalation, and stay at theconventional level as much as possible. In this regard, rather than the air/sea battle
concept which is potentially escalatory, there are those that advocate the offshore
control concept.
A Participant stated that the Americans had done a good job with the rebalance, withmarine deployments steadily growing. The Philippines is a difficult area for the US, as
they have to figure out how to respond to anything that the Philippines might
unilaterally do in the South China Sea. American engagement in the South Pacific isstrong, but continuity is the issue. Much depends on how friends and allies in region
react, as if they are serious about security they also have to face up to issues
themselves. At the same time, the US needs to create an East Asia strategy to clarify
and broaden their purpose in the region.
A Participant noted that while some are skeptical about the effect of the rebalancing,
the Chinese believe in the effects of the rebalance. The rebalance can almost be seen asa demobilization process of troops from Afghanistan and Iraq.
A Participant commented that people underestimate the difficulty of separating34

conventional and nuclear deterrence, pointing out that having nuclear weapons in theequation means that a situation could escalate, and so a high alert state is reached very
quickly simply because of the presence of nuclear weapons.
In terms of the practical achievements of security cooperation, it is also about themindset with regard to security, in terms of becoming more invested in our mutualinterdependencies and common security, so there will be less crises. There needs to be
more women in security and strategic studies around the world, because this will bringsome fresh thinking, opening up different questions and challenging conventional
wisdom.
Regarding the regional implications of President Obama’s speech, a Participant
pointed out that reducing the number of nuclear warheads without transparency ofChina’s nuclear force could have unintended effects. Obama’s speech also spoke of
reducing the deployed nuclear warheads, which would return to the US nuclear
stockpile, while they request Russia to reduce their tactical nuclear warheads, which isunfair and cannot work.
Regarding Chinese domestic drivers, governments cannot shape their own domestic
public opinion, so it is impossible to influence Chinese domestic public opinion fromthe outside.
Regarding the offshore control concept, it may not be appropriate for the emerging
grey zone crisis.
A Participant pointed out that when China comes to the ARF they will start sayingthat they have established a very good communications channel with the US, and theother countries need to consider how to respond to that.
Regarding ASEAN centrality, the cost is that everything is based on the lowest
common denominator, especially in terms of economic trade. Also there is nobody
really pushing RCEP except perhaps Brunei, and there is a built-in dilemma between
pushing ASEAN forward and maintaining ASEAN centrality.
A Participant stated that it was unlikely that anything would come out of Brunei’s
involvement, and Singapore would be happy to see its control of the ASEAN agenda
35

left unaffected.
Regarding US engagement with China, it is a positive that there is an intent to engage,
but there may be a problem with expectations that may be unmet. As the two key alliesof the US in the region, Australia and Japan are failing to use their bilateral alliancedialogues effectively to express to the Americans their expectations with regard to
China.
Session 1 was brought to a close with a Participant commenting on a recent
US-Japan-India trilateral meeting where Japan and India spoke jointly to theAmericans as an interesting new situation.

36

S UMMARY

Session 2
Defence and Security Policy Developments in Japan and Australia

Moderator
Dr. Ben SCHREER, Senior Analyst, ASPI

Presentation
Australia: Mr. Michael SHOEBRIDGE, First Assistant Secretary, Strategic Policy,
Department of Defence
Assuming much of the strategic environment as a given, it is nevertheless important tomention that there are some other factors beyond those discussed today shaping ourstrategic environment, including the uncertainty over further implications of the global
financial crisis. The Indo-Pacific is an important foundational idea for our Defence
White Paper, which comes out of the national security strategy and Australia in the
Asian Century White Paper. The central idea of the Australia in the Asian Century
White Paper is that Australia’s future prosperity and security lie with Asia, and it
discusses the definitions of Asia, Asia-Pacific, and the Indo-Pacific. A lot of the publiccommentary around this publication was about the economic prosperity potential offurther engagement in Asia, but from a defense point of view, the idea that our security
is tied to the region, and also requires investment, time and effort was recognized. A
key element of Australian national security is a capable Australian defense force withhigh-end capabilities, both for deterrence and for regional influence and engagement.
Another big factor in Australia’s defense environment is that we are coming to the endof a period of high operational activity, including East Timor, the Solomon Islands,
Iraq, and Afghanistan. The most likely future deployment is for security andstabilization operations, and disaster relief. The emerging Indo-Pacific strategic arc
joins the energy and supply shipping routes that run from the Middle East through theSouth East Asian archipelago and into North Asia and across the Pacific. Whereas the37

Asia-Pacific is a vertical view, the Indo-Pacific is a horizontal view with South East
Asia in the geographic center.
National security will always be a core priority for Australian governments, however
there are competing demands including investment in education, infrastructure,
healthcare, and around aging population issues. Together with broader structural andbudget issues, this signals an era of austerity. With a move away from operations, there
is a shift toward greater thinking about defense partnerships and their purposes.
Broad-based military modernization funded by regional economic prosperity allows
countries to exert greater power in the EEZs than with previous generation equipment,
which will have an effect on territorial disputes, with some latent historical disputes
becoming more active due to increasing ability to project power. Also modernization ofwhite-hulled quasi-military forces allows greater comfort in using them in ways thatwould be entirely provocative for grey-hulled forces.
Australia’s policy response could be to think very locally, but its interests are toointertwined with the rest of the region to be able to do that, as 48% of Australia’s
merchandize trade goes through the South China Sea. Australia has historically had atechnological edge over its near region and has compensated for its smaller population
with a higher technology force, but with the trend for regional military modernization
Australia is getting relatively smaller, although it will still retain its capability edge forsome time.
There are also real opportunities for Australia’s security in this regional environment.
The rising regional capability of Australia’s partners in the region gives it an increasing
capacity to have meaningful defense partnerships, which includes interoperability,
exercises, defense attachés in embassies, but this can also extend to institutional
interoperability along the lines of the US-Australia defense alliance, with a broad set oflinks between ministries on national interests and values as well as strategic policy andintelligence. There are also constraints, such as Australia seeking peaceful resolution of
disputes that it is not party to. Institutional interoperability involves building working
relationships between counterpart defense organizations and other relevant ministries
on functional elements and capability priorities. It is possible to start collaboration withsome demonstration areas and then expand based on that. There is potential forcapability development engagement, for instance Indonesia has a weakness in logistics
and sustainment activities that Australia has strengths in, which could be of great38

practical benefit to Indonesia. In Japan there has been good progress with the common
servicing arrangement and the information security agreement which provide a goodfoundation for a closer relationship. There has also been more practical experience ofworking together. Science and technology engagement has also increased. There is areal opportunity around policy engagement too, as what we do in the next five years
will really help to shape the long-term future.
Japan: LTG (ret.) Noboru YAMAGUCHI, Professor, National Defense Academy
The National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 introduced the concept of Dynamic
Defense, which came from Dynamic Deterrence which is a kind of flexible deterrent
option to demonstrate commitment to defense. This was a departure from the Basic
Defense Force Concept which existed since the 1970s.
As a peace building country, Japan needs to look at the threat situations surrounding
Japan, including North Korea and the rise of China, while making a greater
contribution to international peace missions.
Japan used to have a very strict arms export policy with almost no exports except fortechnology transfer to the US, but there were some urgent incentives for easing of thearms export policy including the completion of the SM3 missile, which may be
exported to allies, and also the desire to join fighter programs, as sole development is
too expensive. A further incentive is capacity building for other countries in the region
for peace building.
Under the LDP administration these national defense guidelines are now being revised,with an effort to increase defense spending, which is currently almost the same as itwas 20 years ago. The LDP is proposing a review of the current interpretation of theconstitution with regard to the right of collective self-defense. There is also a proposal
to add offensive capabilities to current defensive capabilities. Keidanren, the Japan
Business Federation, has a very strong interest in maintaining the industrial base, andhave made proposals to this end. The US-Japan Defense Guidelines need to berevisited to include coverage of grey zone issues, which are not covered by the current
guidelines.
The key issues for Japan’s Defense Policy include management of the alliance with the39US, the policy towards a rising China using a combination of engagement and hedging,and managing Japan’s relations with its neighbors, particularly Korea, as if Japan fails
on this front Japan may look isolated which is not good for many aspects of defense
policy and strategy.

Discussion
A Participant asked for further elaboration on the concept of offensive capabilities, as
this could have an effect on China’s perception.
In response, a Participant stated that Japan has active ballistic missile defense
capabilities, and also passive ballistic missile defense capabilities, but Japan has been
dependent on the US for the offensive part. Some of the LDP leadership think thatJapan may need to have offensive capabilities. However, offensive capabilities require
additional capabilities including surveillance and command and control. This has been
discussed in the Diet in the past, but it is not a simple issue.
A Participant noted that Japan needs a 5-D capacity, meaning dissuasion policy,
deterrence posture, denial capability, defense capacity, and damage confinement.
Among these, denial capability is very important, which refers to offensive defense.
The purpose of the denial capability is only for defense. Unfortunately Japan has
maintained a defense-oriented posture, but the constitution does not exclude denial
capability, and in the current security situation Japan needs to the ability to dissuade
any intention to attack the Japanese territory.
A Participant asked whether Australia has a grand strategy, or whether its focus on
the Indo-Pacific is a component of America’s grand strategy. The Participant also
asked about China’s reaction to Australia’s white paper. Next, the Participant asked
how different Australia’s defense, security and foreign policy would be if there is achange of government as expected in the September elections, particularly with regard
to Indonesia. Next, the Participant asked about Australia’s ASW capability and its
interest in improving ASW and amphibious capabilities. Next, the Participant asked
what role Australia would envisage in North East Asian contingencies. Finally, theParticipant asked whether the role of US-Australia joint facilities would be moresignificant if strategic competition intensifies in the future.
40

On Australia’s grand strategy, a Participant explained that Australia is absolutely
committed to global governance and institutions, which explains its UN and coalition
contributions. Part of that strategy is to ensure global prosperity and security.
The white paper has been well received in the US, India, China, Singapore, Indonesia,
Malaysia, South Korea and Japan, and the most common message was that it is a very
similar assessment of the strategic environment. The US particularly agreed with thewording used around the comprehensive US-China relationship with neither making adefining choice between economic and strategic interests, meaning that no othercountry in the region will be forced to make that choice. The Chinese compared thewhite paper favorably with the 2009 white paper, liking the clear statement that
Australian government policy does not approach China as an adversary. Indonesia
welcomed the white paper and in particular liked the recognition of the increasing
value of the Indonesia-Australia defense relationship. Singapore has a very common
strategic assessment and likes the policy directions. Those are the main reactions.
If there is a change of government in September, the opposition has said that theyagree with the strategic environment assessment and the policy direction, but that there
will be a greater focus on Indonesia.
In terms of ASW capability, Australia has not invested as much as it needs to, and its
future frigate program focuses on ASW capability, but there are also complementary
investments planned. For amphibious capabilities, the two landing helicopter dockships that Australia will take delivery of in the coming years will be optimized forstabilization and humanitarian operations at least for the first ten years. However theseships are much more complex to operate than existing frigates, so it makes sense to
optimize them for security and stabilization during development. Australia’s interest in
missile defense is technology driven, as the threat to deployed forces from missiles ispalpable, so missile defense is a necessity, although a decision has not been made toacquire ballistic missile defense capability.
Regarding Australia’s role in a North East Asian contingency, Australia’s forces’
principal task is to deter and defeat armed attack on Australia, and contribute to its
near-region security, and then to use it to contribute to broader regional and global
stability.

41

On whether the role of US-Australia joint facilities would be more significant in thecase of contingencies, Australia recognizes this potential, but does not underestimate
the significance of their role already in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. We areinvesting in joint space capabilities with the Americans beyond the current joint
facilities including C-band radar and the space surveillance telescope.
A Participant asked about the role of public opinion in Japan related to changes in therole and purpose of the SDF. The Participant also observed that the US had left thefield of military weapons systems development for many years apart from operational
requirements in the Middle East. In this context it makes sense to start long termplanning to develop forces in coalition with like-minded countries, such as maritime
systems for Australia and Japan. Increasingly it is almost impossible to think aboutdeveloping weapons systems independently and therefore the ability to do itcollectively will be critical to the success of coalition operations, and it is not possible
to rely on the Americans.
A Participant stated that in Japan there is a gradual increase in support for
constitutional change to update Article 9, regarding the role of the SDF, but lesssupport for changing Article 96, which outlines provisions for changing theconstitution. The major issue for Article 9 is the issue of collective self-defense. Thereis a working group appointed by the Prime Minister looking at collective self-defense,
but we don’t know yet whether this will require constitutional change. Article 9 is notreally well balanced, but the problems are gradually being understood, particularly inthe context of potential incidents involving US Forces around Japan. We don’t know
yet whether the government will try for a change of the constitution or a change ofinterpretation of the constitution.
A Participant asked what Australia’s highest priority is after the end of the operations
as highest priority period.
A Participant asked the priorities of Australia’s capacity building program, especiallyfor South East Asia, as there may be opportunities for greater coordination of capacity
building programs. The Participant also asked how the deployment of US Marines in
Darwin affects Australia’s defense posture.
A Participant asked what historical shifts in ASEAN countries affected Australian42defense strategy, and whether there are any historical shifts in China that affectAustralian defense strategy. The Participant also asked how Australia assesses theforcible Chinese maritime advancement toward the western Pacific Ocean which is
closer to the Oceania and South Pacific area. The Participant asked Australia’s
opinion on Chinese violation of the East China Sea and their anti-access/area denial(A2AD) strategy between the first island chain and the second island chain.
In response, a Participant explained that the end of the high level of deployment on
operations referred to the end of active military combat operations, and not to UN
deployments or border protection operations. The active defense posture will be similar
to Japan’s dynamic defense, but different to deployment on combat operations. The
priorities for capability development is the most difficult question, because after a long
period of combat deployments, allowance needs to be made in budgeting formodernization of the force, so there is a balance between posture and capability
development.
With regard to capacity building in South East Asia, Indonesia is the largest priority,
but there is also the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) with Singapore andMalaysia. Australia may focus on maritime capabilities, logistics and sustainment,
which has the potential to greatly benefit the Indonesians. Regarding the effect of the
deployment of 2,500 US Marines in Darwin, Australia is considering how to work with
US Marine deployments and South East Asian partners to provide assurance about US
presence and build capacity. It could also be useful for disaster relief in the South
Pacific.
The historical shift that Minister Smith talked about is about the rise in economic
weight of Asia, of which China is the most prominent but not the only country. If the
US-China bilateral relationship is the dominant factor in Australia’s strategic
relationship, this means a lot to Australia. The US Alliance is the cornerstone ofAustralia’s security, and there is no deeper relationship, but that does not mean that
Australia will not engage as closely as possible with China.
A Participant stated that if there was an opportunity for Japan and Australia to do one
thing in the capability development space for friends and neighbors it would be in theSouth Pacific in maritime surveillance, and perhaps the island states in the Indian
Ocean. In the coming 3-4 years the existing maritime security surveillance system of
43

the region will break down, and so Australia is looking at its options to reinvest in thatcapability. Because this is a period of cost-consciousness, Australia won’t be able to do
this by itself. Therefore Australia will look to countries with a stake in the security of
the region to be involved, which includes New Zealand, the US, France to some extent,
but there is also a great opportunity for Japan, because it is largely civil capability anda region that needs assistance.
A Participant explained that the US has relied for too long on its past build ups andsuperiority, but this has more to do with the lack of existence of a peer competitor andthe fact that the US has fought its wars against low quality state opponents. Australia
and Japan have not only relied on the US nuclear umbrella, but have also relied on the
US to provide long-range conventional strike capabilities, rather than having thatcapability within their own forces. However, the US is also out of the business ofballistic missile systems, whereas both China and Russia have very good ballistic
missile capabilities, and also long-range anti-ship systems. This raises the question ofwhether Australia and Japan can work on this challenge together. While manyemphasize the future role of unmanned systems, there is a lot of debate required about
the survivability of UCAVs in a modern combat environment.
A Participant asked what it means for the level of strategy if Australia and Japan can
no longer rely on the US for weapons systems, when Japan’s strategy is so closely
linked to that of the US, and what kind of strategy Japan could develop that would be alittle bit more independent of US strategy.
A Participant explained that Japan is currently thinking about its strategy, where
Japan’s national defense might serve as a better tool for US deployment in Japan. The
US has been concerned about A2AD capabilities of China, and Japan’s own A2AD
capabilities serve for defense of Japan’s southwest island chain, which means thatJapan can protect the US Forces deployed in this region. Japan also deployed Patriot
batteries and Aegis destroyers in response to North Korea missile launches, so there
may be some overlap in strategic interests between the US and Japan, which may resultin greater commitment from the US.
A Participant stated that keeping the interoperability between the US Forces and the
SDF is very important for the protection of Japan. There has been some relaxation of
the three principles on exports, but the SDF may welcome multilateral industrial44

cooperation for defense design, development, production or even maintenance. This is
an issue that can be discussed further.
A Participant noted that during the 1990s there were a number of discussions with
Americans, Europeans and perhaps also Australia on basic missile defense, and at thattime there was a consensus that BMD is about more than active defense, to shoot down
incoming missiles, but also offensive strategic capability to deter opponents andremove physical threats by attacking enemy bases. Some of the LDP want to have theability to remove imminent threats by having tactical mid or long-range conventional
offensive capabilities.
Japan used to think in terms of three categories of Japan’s solo efforts, bilateral efforts
with the US, and then efforts with the international community. Now a fourth category
is mentioned in the NDPG, which is cooperation with like-minded countries like
Australia or South Korea. Discussions around having more independence from the US
are nothing new, but with a real existing threat from North Korea the discussions thistime around may be even more heated.
A Participant expressed surprise at the mention of any early acquisition by Japan of along-range missile capability, because that seems to be a huge leap rather than a step,and questioned if this really is a likely step.
Session 2 was brought to a close by the moderator.

45

S UMMARY

Session 3
Japan – Australia Security and Defence Cooperation
Moderator
Mr. Hideki ASARI, Deputy Director General, JIIA
It is already more than six years since Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Howard
signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, and steady progress has been
made in bilateral cooperation including the entry into force of an ACSA and an
information security agreement. There is also active strategic dialogue trilaterally
among Australia, the US, and Japan. However, there are further areas of cooperation to
be explored and this session is an opportunity to come up with novel ideas.

Presentation
Japan:Dr. Eiichi KATAHARA, Professor/ Director, Regional Studies Department,
National Institute for Defense Studies
The shifting balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, which is primarily driven by
the rise of China and India, and the emerging centrality of the US-China relationshipwill make the traditional US-centered alliance network including the Japan-US allianceand the Australia-US alliance even more important, not only because of the strategic
imperative of maintaining an equilibrium of forces, but also due to the need to meetregional and global security challenges. In this context the evolving Japan-Australia
security relationship is increasingly important, as well as US-Japan-Australia trilateral
security cooperation.
Japan and Australia are maritime democracies with shared values and common
security issues. As US allies, Japan and Australia can significantly contribute to the US
presence and capabilities in the region. Both countries can play a stabilizing andenabling role in support of US global strategy, especially securing access to global
commons. Japan and Australia can work together in tackling regional and global
46

security challenges, and this cooperation encourages both countries to assume regionaland global security roles.
Japan-Australia security cooperation predates this recent period. During the FirstWorld War, the Imperial Japanese Navy escorted the Australian and New Zealandarmy corps in the Indian Ocean on their way to the Battle of Gallipoli. For many years
after the end of the Second World War the Japan-Australia relationship has long been
focused on economic matters, and yet cooperation between Tokyo and Canberra forexchange of intelligence began in the mid-1970s, as an Australian initiative. This
would suggest a substantial potential for deepening Japan-Australia bilateral security
and defense cooperation, even independent of the US alliance network.
Major recent developments in Japan-Australia security and defense cooperation
include active participation in international peace cooperation activities, intensifying
defense exchange activities since the mid-1990s, including high-level exchanges andjoint exercises, and also success in consolidating the framework for policy
coordination and collaboration. The most recent of these are the 2+2 document“Japan-Australia Cooperating for Peace and Stability: Common Vision andObjectives”, and the achievement of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement(ACSA).
Regarding new challenges and opportunities, it is important to implement the Joint
Declaration on Security Cooperation among other documents, by prioritizing the items
of prime importance. Emphasis should be placed on cooperation in maritime security
including Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) in the East China Sea, South China
Sea and the Indian Ocean, strengthening of amphibious capabilities, crisis management
mechanism, and promotion of Confidence building measures (CBM) and Code of
Conduct (COC). New technologies such as satellite automatic identification system(AIS) for enhanced awareness of the maritime domain can be applied in this regard.
Japan and Australia have been active in capacity building in regional countries and in
expanding multilateral exercises for non-traditional security issues. Australia and Japan
can also work together for traditional security issues in the context of American
regional and global strategy.
Australia and Japan can work together in terms of defense equipment and technology
47

cooperation, including submarines, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), missile defense,and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), on intelligence sharing in support ofinteroperability, and on space, cyber security and electric warfare. Other areas that canbe pursued include a Japan-Australia 2+2 and a trilateral security dialogue on air-sea
battles. Trilateral discussion on extended deterrence, North Korea, and China could
also be considered to increase focused and robust strategic dialogue on these questions.
Regional security architecture building is also an important area for cooperation,
including ASEAN-centered institutions. We already work together in many areas, but
we should strengthen the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus)process and expand working group areas. We should also continue to strengthen
security and defense cooperation with our partners such as South Korea, Southeast
Asian countries and India.
We should establish a whole of government approach to security issues, especially incrisis management and humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief (HA/DR). In reality thisis very difficult, for instance during the aftermath of the triple disasters of 11 March2011 there were tremendous difficulties in coordinating response, particularly to the
nuclear accident, and despite the US and Japan being long-term allies there was a lackof mutual awareness of intentions and capabilities in response to the unprecedented
nuclear disaster. It is therefore important for Japan and Australia to get to know eachother in many areas of mutual interest.
Joint research on strategic, regional and demographic issues should also be pursued.
Australia has been active in increasing the numbers of females and foreign nationals
among military officers, which Japan could learn from. The Japanese population isaging and shrinking rapidly, and this can be considered a national security challengethat Japan has failed to come to grips with. Perhaps Japan could learn much from
Australia’s experience and policy expertise in immigration policy and its implications
for national security.
Australia: Mr. Peter JENNINGS, Executive Director, ASPI
There is an unusual degree of optimism about our prospects for increasing cooperation
over the next few years, based on a lot of hard work done over a long period of time.
There is a feeling that the momentum is increasing, and we are starting to think in new48

and quite radical ways about where the relationship should go. One of the reasons thisis happening is because of the nature of our shared alliance relationship with the US,
which makes it possible to do much more together due to intelligence work, militarycapabilities, and strategic outlook shared with the Americans. There are limits to how
far relationships can be developed with other countries due to the absence of that
American relationship.
At the same time, both countries have a hugely important set of relations with China,
including economic and trade integration, and a common interest in preventing conflictand hostilities. In one sense the Chinese will discuss Japan-Australia defense
cooperation as being directed against them, and diplomacy therefore needs to beconsidered in terms of the impact on China.
In terms of future priorities, there is an immediate need to work on maritime
confidence building measures. There is a risk that conflict at sea could lead to a serious
breakdown of diplomatic relations in the region if incidents are not handled correctly.
There is a lot of work that Japan and Australia could do together to strengthen
ASEAN’s capacity to respond to incidents at sea. If Japan and Australia demonstrateskills and operational techniques when operating together it could become abest-practice model for operations in the region. The Philippines could be the first
country to offer training to in this field, as there is a need to ensure that no ASEAN
states blunder into a conflict with China. In August 2013 ASPI will be holding aninternational dialogue on confidence building measures at sea, as a starting point for
discussion on the concept.
There is a need to develop shared approaches to strategic policy work between Japanand Australia, which could be accomplished through cross-posting of intelligence
officers and policy officers.
Army engagement has seen the least progress in recent years in terms of building
cooperation, and this should now be accelerated. Practical and demanding exercises
should be examined at company and battalion level. Trilateral training together with
the US Marines in Northern Australia could also be considered.
Personnel exchanges need to become a feature of work exchanges at officer and seniornon-commissioned officer level, as well as at training institutions. While language has
49been a barrier, if exchanges are a priority, ways can be found to make it happen.
On cyber security, not enough progress has been made in the bilateral relationship.
This is a difficult area, because the organizational structures differ between countries,
and therefore points of connection can be hard to make. There will be a majorinternational conference on cyber security in Seoul in October 2013, and Australia andJapan should share and develop approaches to the meeting together. ASPI is launchinga new International Cyber Policy Center in the coming weeks with government andprivate sector support. This should help to facilitate a Track 1.5 dialogue on cybersecurity with key friends and allies, including China.
Both the Japanese and Australian governments have been looking at options for closer
industrial cooperation. Collaboration on maritime systems, including submarine
technologies, should be thought of as a five to ten year journey due to the time required
to come to an agreement and start building, but there is great potential for mutual
benefit from the collaboration. Australia considers that it has much to offer, including
sonar technology, and is interested in particular in Japan’s propulsion technology.
There is also ongoing discussion in the area of over-the-horizon radar technology,
where Australia is a world leader in some respects.
There are opportunities for Japan and Australia to contribute together to a wider global
framework, including peacekeeping training with African countries, and on de-mining
and counter-IED training. Working together in these areas would help to raise theprofile of both Japan and Australia with a wide range of countries.
There is a lot of interest in Australia in having dialogue with Japan around air-sea
battle extended deterrence, North Korea, and other areas, but there is some reservationin not wanting to turn it into a public expression of unity against China. It is therefore
better to focus defense and security cooperation on military and strategic points ofcooperation rather than around contingencies.
As has already been mentioned, Australia is looking to broaden its engagement with abroad range of countries in the region, which includes Indonesia, Papua New Guinea,
and all the way through South East Asia and into North Asia with Japan and South
Korea, but Japan will be at the top of the list in terms of priorities.

50

Discussion
A Participant agreed with the need to strengthen marine confidence building efforts,
with joint exercises focused against traditional threats. Also intelligence and strategic
policy exchange should be increased, such as from the Pine Gap, Alice Springs facility.
Regarding joint exercises, not only combined exercises of the ground forces, but also
joint operations on amphibious capacity should be conducted. On industrial
cooperation, Japan needs to maintain interoperability with the US forces, and therefore
trilateral cooperation including the US might be more beneficial. The Participant alsosuggested that partnership on anti-piracy operations would be a good opportunity tostrengthen the relationship. There is also a need for more discussion on defense
cooperation against A2AD.
A Participant noted that Japan has strong historical working arrangements with India
and asked if Australia already had any concrete programs in place with India.
A Participant stated that due to a lack of shooting ranges in Japan, long-range artillery
are dispatched to Fort Lewis in the US for training. There may therefore be
opportunities for cooperation with Australia on long-range artillery training areas. The
Participant also noted that with regard to China, in addition to hedging, engagementwith the PLA is necessary, and information sharing and joint engagement events ofJapan and Australia with China could be considered.
In response, a Participant noted that there is an opportunity to collaborate on
traditional navy roles, including anti-air defense and ballistic missile defense,
particularly if the Australian government chooses to adopt SM-3 ballistic missile
defense capability in the future. There is also more to be done on ASW. In terms ofsharing strategic intelligence a certain amount is already in place, and increasing
efforts in that area should be considered as a trilateral activity. Joint operations on
amphibious operations also makes a lot of sense. With regard to A2AD, if all of theother joint aims are achieved, this constitutes A2AD capability, so there is no need toannounce it separately. Toward building a defense relationship with India, Australia
would benefit from the help of Japan to increase the level of cooperation.
In terms of building personnel exchange, Australia has created an alumni organization
with Indonesia for defense officials that have engaged with Indonesia in the past,51

which has been very successful. If a similar system does not already exist with Japan,
this should be created as a new mechanism for exchange.
In Australia there are good facilities for artillery training which Australia would be
happy to make available to Japan.
Regarding the US, it is in the interests of Australia and Japan to share information onwhat is wanted from America. It would also make sense to share information on
engagement with the PLA in China.
A Participant stated that there is a very rich menu of potential cooperation, which isvery timely, as Australia is keen to do more with key security partners in the region.
Collaboration with Japan must be focused on building institutional interoperability, andoutcomes from that may include professionalism in management of incidents of sea
and common understanding of protocols, which may be more useful than codes ofconduct as a practical reduction of potential for escalation, and to ensure that decisions
are made in capitals, not by ship’s captains and pilots.
Australia expressed interest in cooperation on Automated Satellite-based Identification.
While submarines is an area of extremely high priority for Australia, the limits toimmediate two-way technological cooperation before settling political bureaucracies
was questioned.
A Participant commented that there is already significant work underway on cyber at
the Track 1 level which could set out guidance in the coming years on rules of behavior
and capacity building. Efforts will be continued in the lead up to the meeting in Seoul.
Regarding space, Japan appreciates the initiative to take this issue up in the context of
the ARF, and hopes to continue this activity.
Japan and the UK have agreed on a framework agreement on defense equipment
cooperation, which will allow bilateral transfer of technology with the UK. This could
be a good model for a similar agreement with Australia.
Policy dialogue is considered particularly important and no efforts should be spared in
keeping national security policies as transparent as possible to avoid any
52misunderstanding.
A Participant inquired as to whether Japan has an overall strategic objective in its
engagement policy with countries like India, Vietnam, Australia, and other regionalcountries, or different objectives for each country. On submarine cooperation, theParticipant asked if there was a limit to how far Japan can go in cooperating with
Australia within the next ten years.
In response, a Participant stated that Japan’s approach to partners in the region isarticulated in the National Defense Program Guidelines. In terms of capacity building
support the focus is to improve the ability of South East Asian and regional countries
to deal with non-traditional security issues. Regarding India, their aim is to focus on
expanding bilateral cooperation, rather than multilateral cooperation.
A Participant asked how useful it would be to have US-Japan-Australia-India
quadrilateral cooperation, as all of the countries already have bilateral security
cooperation with all of the others. It is possible that the six separate bilateralrelationships could be made more efficient, even without official labeling as aquadrilateral cooperation. Regarding maritime confidence building, the question of
how to involve China was raised.
A Participant asked about the engagement of China and other countries in the region
for countries outside the ASEAN and EAS mechanisms. Sri Lanka turned to China due
to lack of help from western countries in the domestic conflict against the LTTE. Sri
Lanka was also denied membership of ASEAN. There is a need to engage withcountries, as if there are no multilateral systems including them the Chinese willapproach them bilaterally.
A Participant noted that in an environment of mutual multi-country A2AD
development, the question is raised of how to develop a new deterrent framework in an
Indo-Pacific environment characterized by mutual no-go zones.
A Participant pointed out that Japan’s active engagement in bilateral security anddefense cooperation in recent years is similar to other countries in the region, withsome common understanding that the global commons face severe challenges. While53

the role of the major powers is critically important, the Indo-Pacific regional ordercould be sustained also by second-tier countries that could play more important roles.
Regarding maritime confidence building, the Japanese MOD has been promoting theterm “good seamanship” to avoid accidents at sea. CSCAP China denied theimportance of the regional INCSEA agreement because they believe that the crisis
communication mechanism assumes that either side is provoking the other, but they
showed interest in the promotion of “good seamanship” which sounds more neutral.
Therefore if confidence building is promoted under the name of “good seamanship”
this may be more acceptable to China.
On joint cooperation, given the US Navy’s limitations in terms of transport capabilities,
Japan and Australia could provide support with additional transport capabilities inorder to contribute to regional security.
A Participant noted that Australia is progressing with its submarine refurbishment, butthat through discussion there may be opportunities for assistance, although there might
be questions around intellectual property rights and the three principles of arms
exports.
While India has returned to largely bilateral-based cooperation, a recent joint statement
on Japan-India cooperation validated the results of the Japan-US-India security
dialogue, which can be seen as a positive sign for broader cooperation.
A Participant stated that the Indo-Pacific is an emerging system, with graduallystrengthening linkages, but the intention was not to launch another security architecturearound this concept as there are other security frameworks in the region that are
relatively immature. Given this background, it is important to work bilaterally inregion, and Australia has been making efforts in this regard.
A Participant commented that the concept of “good seamanship” could be very
important for traditionally land-based powers, due to a possible different understandingof maritime governance.
A Participant noted that the discussions had demonstrated a shift in perception overrecent years, and that concrete areas of cooperation had been advanced.
54

A Participant commented that quadrilateral cooperation was better in concept than incontent, but that virtual quadrilateral cooperation was close to being a reality.
Regarding confidence building, the PLA sees all attempts to engage them as attempts
to distract them from what they want to do, so the challenge for cooperation is to getpast the sense that the PLA has that they are stronger if they remain isolated from therest of the region. One way to approach this is to be careful in the language used to
discuss the purpose of engagement, and also to build the framework among othercountries so that the Chinese decide that they would rather be involved than notinvited.
There is an agenda on maritime security that could be pursued with island states,
including intelligence sharing and capacity building.
Having built confidence over the period of growing cooperation between Japan andAustralia, it is now a natural extension to move toward hard cooperation.
A Participant noted that when Japan and India signed a joint declaration on security
cooperation three topics were taboo in the negotiations: China, the US strategy, andquadrilateral cooperation. However, quadrilateral cooperation can be pursued without
mentioning it.
Other areas of strategic importance to Japan that may be shared with Australia include
Africa and the Antarctic.

55

Closing Remarks
Japan: Amb. Yoshiji NOGAMI, JIIA
Ambassador Nogami reflected upon the intensive discussion during the sessions,which have built upon efforts over the last six years between the two countries which
are now bearing tangible fruits. He expressed his hope for a continuous process ofcooperation on research and through electronic communication exchanges, and to thenext session of the Track 1.5 Dialogue.
Australia: Mr. Peter JENNINGS, ASPI
Mr. Jennings thanked the Japanese side for hosting the meeting, noting that the highquality of the discussion matched the quality of the bilateral relationship, andexpressed confidence that cooperation would advance at an increasing pace between
the two governments. He also looked forward to welcoming the Japanese side toAustralia for the next round of the Track 1.5 Dialogue. Mr. Jennings proposed thatafter digesting the ideas and lessons from the current session, a shared research agenda
could be drawn up to consider over the next 12 months.

56

Talking Points
Session 1
Session 2
Session 3

T ALKING P OINTS

Session 1
Security Trends and Environment Surrounding Japan and Australia
Sugio Takahashi
National Institute for Defense Studies

 East China Sea
₋

China’s opportunistic creeping expansion has been a serious concern

₋2010 version of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG)

₋

China’s efforts to change the status quo by paramilitary‐based creeping expansion₋

The way of endgame of the current crisis and the future trend line of regional security

₋

Implication of domestic factors in China

 North Korea nuclear/missile development
₋Series of related events since 2012

₋

U.S. credibility of extended deterrence₋

Risks from North Korea’s complacency

 Defense Budget Trend Line₋

Cautiously optimistic?

₋Japan’s defense budget?

 U.S.‐Japan Defense Guidelines
₋Development since 1997

₋

New Challenges and areas of cooperation

 Implications for Japan and Australia₋Potential of intensified security challenges in “gray zone”

₋China Question58

Challenges for Nuclear Deterrence in East Asia
Tanya Ogilvie‐White
Australian Strategic Policy Institute

I should start by saying up front that I'm a nuclear deterrence skeptic, at least in the context ofEast Asia. I don't agree with the official Australian government position on this issue ‐ I'm
expressing my own personal views here. You'll find I have quite different ideas to my ASPI
colleagues on this issue, too. Fundamentally, I question whether nuclear deterrence is really as
stabilizing as many scholars and officials choose to believe. I also question how objective theassessments are regarding the risks and costs of relying on nuclear deterrence in a multipolar Asia
‐ I think there's a certain amount of complacency in how these questions are addressed.
Disarmament advocates are often scorned because they fail to consider the full picture when they
advocate global zero. I agree with those criticisms. I'm not an unquestioning disarmer ‐ far from it.
But I also believe there's blinkered thinking on all sides of the nuclear deterrence debates,
including among those who assert that nuclear weapons can and will prevent major conventional
war into the future, and those who argue that nuclear use is unlikely.
So why the skepticism? I find myself agreeing with a number of strategic scholars who worry
about the application of nuclear deterrence in East Asia, although I have different ideas about
what should be done about it. Where I agree is over the concern that the current nuclear order isunstable. I think this is quite obvious in the case of North Korean provocations, but thinking about
the challenges of nuclear deterrence in the context of broader regional territorial disputes is also
a useful exercise. There's a lot of concern about this at the moment. On the one hand, the US
signals to China not to occupy various islands. On the other, it doesn't threaten to block it fromdoing so, even while it assures allies that it is treaty‐bound to defend them. Some analysts in the
US and Australia consider this to be a dangerous practice, because it projects strength andweakness at the same time. The major concern is that it undermines US credibility, inviting
Chinese leaders to see the US as weak and prone to back down in an escalating crisis. There's arisk of major miscalculation here, as, when faced with such a crisis, the US might surprise China by
NOT backing down.
In response, analysts have suggested two more clearly defined deterrence strategies. One is aclear commitment from the US to contain China, meaning that Washington would leave Beijing in
no doubt that it will block it from expanding its territory through military action or political
coercion. In my opinion, this approach would be equally unwise, because China sees containment
as an aggressive threat. Even if Washington emphasized the defensive aim of securing the status59

quo, relations would certainly deteriorate. But despite the risks, some argue that the benefits of aclear containment strategy would outweigh the risks, making deterrence harder to mistake andthus more effective, allowing for clearer red lines, and reducing the odds of an unanticipated war.
The other strategy that has been suggested is one of accommodation. The argument is that thiswould make sense if Beijing's ambitions are limited and likely to remain so. In accommodating
Beijing, Washington would recognize that as China becomes more powerful, it will naturally feelentitled to the prerogatives of a superpower. Washington would have to accept that disputes overminor issues would be settled on China's terms rather than those of its neighbors. Deterrence redlines would still be set down, but they would be limited to guarding against behavior that poses anexistential threat to the US or its allies.
The US hasn't chosen either of these options. Instead, it's responding to developments on a caseby case basis, trying to feel its way through the shifts that are taking place. This reflects theawareness among US decision makers that the Asian deterrence environment is far more complex
than the US‐Soviet one was. It also reflects the nature of its relationship with Beijing, which ismore positive than its relationship with the Soviet Union was. It's true that China's power is
rapidly growing and that some of its behavior has heightened regional tensions. But no one
seriously believes Chinese leaders are pursuing an aggressive campaign for global dominance.
Moreover, China is integrated into the global economy to an extent that Soviet officials wouldn't
have imagined possible, and in a way that creates pressures and constraints that didn't exist
during the Cold War. The vast geography of East Asia and the Pacific also shapes security
dynamics in ways that are fundamentally different from what took place last century. As you
know, Asia's nuclear order is a maritime, multipolar, asymmetric one, in an environment ofballistic missile defense and multiplying non‐traditional security challenges. All of this makes
nuclear deterrence more difficult, more complex, more risky ‐ and I would argue, less relevant.
The most pressing problem for East Asia today is how to respond to activities that threaten todestabilize the region. There are many behaviors that can't be reliably prevented through nuclear
extended deterrence. This is worrying in the context of growing resource competition, risingnationalism, and the absence of crisis management systems. I think the most significant of thesebehaviors are maritime provocations and other low intensity incidents. Preventing these fromescalating is a huge challenge. Nuclear weapons are definitely part of the problem but may not be
part of the solution.
Personally, I doubt that last century's hub‐and‐spoke bilateral alliance system, of which extended
deterrence and assurance are a key part, is really relevant to the emerging strategic environment.
Instead, I think we need to put far more emphasis on developing more inclusive, cooperative60

security networks that reflect our interdependence and which build amity rather than reinforcing
enmity. Thankfully, some of this is happening, but it's not happening fast enough, because
adversarial approaches undermine cooperative ones. I agree with Robert Green, the former
British naval commander, who has argued that we need to conceive of security as a safety net for
all and stop treating it as a military game. Unfortunately, one of the biggest costs of nuclear
deterrence is that it perpetuates the cycle of threat and counter threat that feeds insecurity andhostility. We all need to put more effort into breaking that cycle rather than reshaping it for a new
era.

Priorities should be:
1. Finding ways to genuinely reduce the role of nuclear deterrence in security and defense
doctrines, including among US allies that rely on nuclear assurance. An important step would
be a sole purpose declaration by members of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Initiative.
2. Deepening all forms of political and military cooperation, but especially in the maritime
sphere.
3. Investing in regional security mechanisms.
4. Upholding international law and bolstering inclusive global security mechanisms.
5. Encouraging new thinking about security that challenges established wisdom.

61

T ALKING P OINTS

Session 2
Defence and Security Developments in Japan and Australia
Michael Shoebridge
Department of Defence, Australia

Strategic and economic rise of Asia (not just China's rise but rise of region)
Decrease in op tempo from last 15 years (since ET)– different to force posture, which willcontinue to be active.
Policy and fiscal environment:

National security still a core priority for Govt, but competing demands have strengthened ‐notably health, education, infrastructure and ageing population.

Combine this with pressure on govt finances from continued GFC risks And govt focus onunderlying structure of economy and budget and era of austerity exists.

But, recognition that national security requires both prosperity and security.

Within this, some important shifts in defence policy and posture:End of "operations are our highest priority"

Big institutional adjustment



Shift from ops to defence part of shaping our security environment as part of broader
National Security Strategy (NSS) and Australia in the Asian Century White Paper(ACWP) directions.

Broad based mil modernisation funded by economic growth is creating more capable regional
militaries:
Greater power projection

Territorial disputes

Immature security architecture, limited history in resolving security issues multilaterally, but62developing ‐EAS and ADMM+
Lack of escalation control, proliferation of grey and white hulls
Policy response:
Australia's prosperity and security are with the region ‐ security is not a free public goodIndo Pacific arc shows economic and security interdependencies


SEA at geographic centre (contrast to A‐P)

600m peopleAust has growing mil capability relative to itself, but capability advantage challenged overtime as regional modernisation proceeds

As the NSS says Australian national security requires as a key element a credible, capable
Australian Defence Force. This is necessary to deter and defeat armed attack on Australia.
It is also required so we can use the current Australian Defence Force as an active part ofour engagement in the region to build regional security tie. We will have an activist
defence posture.

Regional mil mod more of an opportunity than risk for Australia

Move key partnerships from focus on senior level meetings and service level interoperability to"functional or institutional" interoperability

US benchmark:

InterestsValues

Limitations or constraints
But where these allow, building institutional interoperability means creating counterpart
and working level connections much broader than senior level meetings and Service toService links



Functional approach: org structures ‐ strategic and international policy, capability development,
personnel management, logistics and sustainment, procurement, Intelligence63Capability priorities:

Undersea domainAdvanced air combat

Amphibious (hadr focus)

UAV potentialForce protection (CIED)Cyber, space, BMD

Whether to develop broadly or focus on priority areas for demonstration of value

Different approaches depending on mutual interests

Japan:ACSA and Information Sharing Arrangement good steps

Shared deployment experienceStrong senior leadership framework and directions (eg 2+2)

Regional HADR and PKO contributions
Leadership priorities:Community of interest in region that promotes peaceful resolution of disputes inaccordance with international law

Promote freedom of navigation

Strengthen regional capacity to respond to national disasters and challenges



Improve regional defence capacities to support long term peace and stability



JSDF and relevant ministries and industry sophisticatedConstraints on coop easing but therePotential for deeper policy engagement on US‐China relations and, including on priorities
for capacity building and partnerships in SEAsia and agenda in EAS and ADMM+

Potential for technology cooperation ‐ eg science and technology organisations ‐identification and start to practical egs to demonstrate benefit

UnderseaAdvanced processing and fusionJapanese views on areas of opportunity, constraints, speed and scope

64

Recent Development in Japan’s Defense Policy
Noboru Yamaguchi
National Defense Academy of Japan

1. Discussions over the NDPG2010(1) Dynamic Defense
a. Dynamic Deterrence: Japanese version of Flexible Deterrent Option (FDO)
b. Departure from “Basic Defense Force Concept.”(2) Peace Building Country
a. NDPG 2010 adds a new pillar, pure contribution to the international community (missions
with no direct/indirect relations to Japan's security)b. "Peace Building Country" proposed by the advisory group was not in the NDPG, but PM
Naoto Kan mentioned this in his policy speech in Jan 2011.
(3) Easing Arms Export Policy:a. DPJ had consensus over the issue that was not materialized due to SDP factor
b. Incentives include: a) cooperation for more economic weapon R&D for various programs
such as SM3, F‐X, etc., b) capacity building for peace keeping//building
2. Policies under the LDP Administration(1) Increasing Defense Budget: Repercussion to DPJ reduction (Departure from continuous
decrease for the last decade)(2) New NDPG
a. LDP Proposal: a) Reviewing the current interpretation on collective defense right, b)
Deterrence through employment of SDF rather than pure presence, c) Offensive capabilities
in the context of Ballistic Missile Defense…
b. Keidanren Proposal: For healthy defense industrial base, a) revision of arms export policy, b)
acquisition reform, c) policies related to use of outer space and cyber space.
(3) Revising the Guidelines for US‐Japan Defense Cooperationa. 1997 Guidelines were drafted based on two countries’ post‐Cold War defense policy. In apost GWOT era, policy coordination between the two countries is needed.
b. One of the missing points in 1997 Guidelines could be bilateral cooperation for so‐called“gray zone” cases (a little short of MST Article 5‐events).
3. Key Issues(1) Alliance Management with USG: FRF, V‐22, Guidelines,(2) Policy towards “Rising China”: Engagement and Hedge(3) Managing Japan’s relations with the neighbors such as Korea, ASEAN countries

65T ALKING P OINTS

Session 3[personal views only]

Towards a `Dynamic’ Japan‐Australia Security and Defence Cooperation
Eiichi Katahara
National Institute for Defense Studies

1. Why Japan‐Australia Security and Defence Cooperation Matters(1) Japan and Australia are maritime democracies with shared values and common security
interests, and can help maintain the liberal, rule‐based international order.
(2) As US allies, Japan and Australia can significantly contribute to the US presence andcapabilities in the region; both can play stabilizing and enabling roles in support of US global
strategy (for protecting and ensuring access to the global commons).
(3) Japan and Australia can work together in tackling regional and global security challenges; J‐A
cooperation encourages both counties’ (esp. Japan’s) larger and pro‐active security roles forregional and global security
2. Recent Developments in Japan‐Australia Security and Defence Cooperation(1) Participation in international peace cooperation activities (Cambodia, East Timor, HA/DR after
the Indian Ocean Tsunami, Iraq, 3.11 Earthquake, South Sudan)(2) Intensifying defense exchange activities (since the mid‐90s): High level and working levelexchanges, joint exercises, etc.
(3) Consolidating the framework for policy coordination and collaboration‐

Memorandum on Defence Cooperation between the Ministry of Defense, Japan and
Department of Defence, Australia (December 2008)‐

J‐A Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (13 March, 2007)‐

Major Elements of the Action Plan to implement the J‐A Joint Declaration on Security
Cooperation (9 September, 2007)‐

Japan‐Australia‐US Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) (2006‐)‐

J‐A Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”)‐International Commission on Nuclear Non‐proliferation and Disarmament‐

Agreement on the Security of Information (signed in May, 2012)‐“J‐A – Cooperating for peace and stability: Common Vision and Objectives”(September,
2012, “2+2”)‐

J‐A Acquisition and Cross‐Servicing Agreement (ACSA) came into force (January, 2013)66

3. The Way Forward : New Challenges and Opportunities(1) Implement the “J‐A Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation” (+ “Major Elements of the
Action Plan”) and “Common Vision and Objectives”(2) Maritime security (SLOCs in East China Sea & South China Sea, the Western Pacific Ocean andthe Indian Ocean), strengthening amphibious capability, crisis‐management mechanism,promoting CBM and COC(3) Capacity‐building and multilateral exercises for non‐traditional security issues (peace‐keeping& peace‐building activities, HA/DR, PSI, etc.)(4) Defense equipment and technology cooperation (submarines? ASW? MD? UAV?)(5) Intelligence‐sharing (ISR) and information exchanges in support of interoperability(6) Space and cyber security(7) J‐A “2+2” and TSD on AirSea Battle(ASB)?, “extended deterrence”?, North Korea?, China?
(8) Regional security architecture building: ASEAN‐centered institutions: ARF, EAS, ADMM Plus,etc.; strengthening security and defense cooperation with South Korea and India (J‐A‐K
trilateral? J‐A‐I trilateral?), Indonesia?
(9) Establish a whole‐of‐government approach to security issues (especially crisis‐managementand HA/DR) including JICA, Japan Coast Guard, NGO(10) Encourage joint research on strategic issues, regional issues and demographic issues (the rolesof female military officers and soldiers and/or foreign nationals, lessons that can be learned
from Australia’s experience and policy expertise in immigration policy?)

67

Japan ‐ Australia Security and Defence Cooperation
Peter Jennings
Australian Strategic Policy InstituteLadies and gentleman, my thanks to Ambassador Nogami and the team of JIIA for hosting this
dialogue.
ASPI very much values the opportunity for us to exchange views on strategic issues of interest toAustralia and Japan.

I can say that I have been a regular visitor to Japan over quite a few years

now and, in different positions in Government, I have been involved in discussions about ourbilateral defence and security relationship.
I am an optimist about the prospects for our relationship, and I will outline my thinking now about
opportunities for enhancing our cooperation.

As I explained yesterday, ASPI is funded in part by

the Australian government, but we are independent in terms of what our analysts write and say.
So my comments represent my own thoughts and do not necessarily reflect government policy.
Having said that I most certainly endorse the direct of government policy on our defence
relationship.

My starting point for that is that we have similar ( but not identical) strategic

outlooks.
Our shared alliance relationship with the United States is a vital enabling capacity for our militaryforces.

We are also like minded democracies, with shared values and approaches to the rule oflaw and international norms of behaviour.

And we have shared experiences of military

operations in Iraq, where our forces worked closely together in Al Muthunna province.

Our

strategic geography is different, but we both share an interest in the stability of the Asia Pacific.
We both have an extremely important economic and trade relationship with China, and we bothshare concerns about aspects of Chinese military policies.
regional peace and security.

We are both interested in building

So these things create an opportunity for us to work more closely

together in the defence and security field.

And of course, that is exactly what we have been

doing for the last decade.
In some respects this has been a slow journey as we worked out how to engage together.

We

have also invested considerable effort in creating the legal and organisational frameworks to make68

cooperation easier and more smooth.
We have expanded our maritime security cooperation through exercises, and work closely on
HADR, peacekeeping and maintain good quality senior level exchanges.

I do know that

Australia's early response to the March 2011 triple crisis was appreciated by the Japanese people.
Out of that tragedy came one small benefit ‐‐ a break through moment in our cooperation.
From this promising outlook I would like to share with you my personal views about what forms
our cooperation could take into the future.

My starting point is to say that I think there is an

important strategic need for us to work at making our cooperation even closer.
and separately, make a positive contribution to regional stability.

We can together,

We should not lose the recent

momentum of our engagement, in fact I would like to see steps taken to deepen and speed out
our thinking about defence cooperation.
Let me suggest six areas where I think potential new opportunities exist.

First, we should

develop a plan for closer cooperation in maritime confidence building measures.

I'm sure I don't

need to set out the reasons why this is emerging as a serious and current problem in Asia.

I see adesperate need to strengthen the professional maritime skills needed to prevent incidents at sea,
and also in air space above the seas.

Australia and Japan might think about opportunities tostrengthen our approach to ASEAN countries to offer skills and training.

If our two navies candemonstrate the skills and operational techniques when we operate together, this could offer abest practice model for the region.
Second, I would like to see us deepen our intelligence and strategic policy exchanges.
potential to do this because we have started on the practice already.

I see good

But there is scope to do

more in the form of sharing assessments and looking to opportunities for joint work.
Third, at a pace that is comfortable to both parties we should look to broaden our Army
engagement. In limited ways this is happening.

I look forward to the day when we might havea SDF land exercise in northern Australia.
Fourth, we need to develop a new mechanism for cooperation on cyber security.

Governments

all around the world are only beginning to think about how to engage and cooperate on cyber.
This is challenging but very important work.

I believe this will rapidly come on to the agenda of

the Australian government ‐‐ not least because of the major international conference on cybersecurity which will take place in Seoul in October 2013. Australia and Japan should start by69

agreeing to share our thinking in the lead up to the Seoul meeting.

My message is to say that we

can't afford to take a decade to design a good quality cyber cooperation model.
cyber is that we will have to move faster.

The nature of

Let me make a short advertisement here to say thatASPI will be launching a new International Cyber Policy Centre in a couple of weeks.
strong backing of my government as well as private sector involvement.

This has the

One of the aims of thecentre will be to advise and help shape Australia's international approach on cyber matters. I
also hope that we can help to facilitate a 1.5 track dialogue on cyber security with key friends andallies.
Fifth , industry cooperation.
on industry matters.

Both our governments are looking at options for closer cooperation

I have been making the case for a few years now for us to develop options

for collaboration on maritime systems, including on Submarine related technologies.
think about this as a five to ten year journey.

We should

But is it a journey we should take because we canboth benefit from the collaboration.
Sixth and finally, I see good opportunities for us to take our efforts to a wider global framework.
We are sharing peacekeeping experiences in the Sudan at the moment.

There is more we could

do together on things like peacekeeping training with African countries.

Africa will be the central

operating environment for PKOs in coming years. We should align our approaches and work to
support each other's efforts.

There are similar opportunities for us to work together onde‐mining and counter Improvised Explosive Device training, in areas as diverse as Thailand andthe Solomon Islands.
Ladies and gentlemen I have tried to set out a broad agenda for defence cooperation.

Some ofthese are well in development between our two countries, others are only just coming on theradar screen.
Michael Shoebridge yesterday explained the broader context of Australia's approach in the region.
It is worth saying that Australia is looking to boost cooperation with a number of countries in theregion.

This includes China.

I don't see any of the activities I have set out today as being

directed against Chinese interests.

On the contrary this is all about building a form of security

which benefits all countries.
I will be happy to take any questions or comment you may have.

70