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The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 15 (2004)

Strategic Innovation or Strategic Nonsense?
Assessing the Bush Administration’s
National Security Strategy
Yasuhiro IZUMIKAWA*I INTRODUCTION
In a speech at the West Point military academy graduation on June 1,
2002, US President George W. Bush laid out what seemed to be a drastic departure from the previous US military strategy: the concept of preventive war. This idea that a state can attack a potential enemy before
the threat from the latter fully develops goes beyond the establishednorms for use of force. In defending this new military doctrine, President
Bush argued that the United States “faces a threat with no precedent,”
and that “deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations–means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks.”1
Partly because of the West Point speech, and partly because of the war
against Iraq, most commentators focused on the concept of preemption
when the Bush Administration released the National Security Strategyof the United States of America (hereafter the NSS) in September 2003.2
Many of them doubted the morality or legality of preemption.3 Others
regarded the logic of preemption as the surest way to worsen US security.4
While the concept of preemption is surely the most controversial element of the new US strategy, it is not the only notable issue in the NSS.
Copyright © 2004 Yasuhiro Izumikawa. All rights reserved. This work may be used, withthis notice included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work may be distributed, electronically or otherwise, in whole or in part, without permission from the author.
*Assistant Professor, Miyazaki International College

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Indeed, some foreign policy analysts have recognized the high level oflogical integrity of the NSS. Ivo Daalder, a senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution, stated that “this (document) is much more than preemption,”calling it “the most comprehensive statement of this administration’sview of the world and America’s role in it.”5 Renowned historian John
Lewis Gaddis says, “There’s coherence in the Bush strategy that the
Clinton national security team . . . never achieved.”6 In fact, comparedwith the two NSS documents by the Clinton Administrations, the Bush
NSS is much shorter but better organized along main principles that run
throughout the whole strategy.
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, this article attempts to
identify the underlying logic of the Bush NSS by examining its threemain components: the new defense strategy, the new vision about great
power relations and the promotion of free-market democracy. In sodoing, I compare the Bush NSS with the two NSS documents by the
Clinton Administration to highlight the differences between them andthe logical parsimony of the Bush NSS. Furthermore, this article showsthat the Bush NSS envisions a type of international system different fromwhat the previous administration had sought.
Second, this article seeks not simply to describe the Bush NSS but also
to address its weaknesses by utilizing theories of International Relations.
So far, many works on the Bush NSS purport either to describe its contents or to critique legal and moral aspects of preemptive war doctrine.
After analyzing the NSS in its totality, this article points out its ﬂaws
based on theoretical knowledge accumulated through IR scholars. By
doing so, I argue that the Bush strategy may undermine its own efforts
to realize the international system that it envisions.
In the following, I ﬁrst explain the underlying assumptions of the BushNSS and how the three components stated above are integrated into a
coherent strategy. Then, I point out potential problems that the Bushstrategy may encounter. Lastly, I conclude this paper by pointing out thatthe fundamental problem of the NSS is the Bush Administration’s belief
that simply possessing vast material power (military and economic
resources) enables the US to exert political inﬂuence.
II THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE
In general, there is an interesting contrast between the Clinton andBush strategies: while the Clinton Administration tried to preserve theYasuhiro IZUMIKAWA(p257)6/2 04.7.18 0:05 PM ページ 259

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US role in a drastically altered international order, the Bush Administration seeks to alter the existing international order to suit US interests.
With the end of the Cold War, foreign policy experts feared the riseof isolationism in US public sentiment. As a result, foreign policy debates tended to be centered on whether or not the United States could
afford to continue enduring the cost of world leadership.7 Under suchcircumstances, the Clinton Administration’s main concern was to maintain US commitments to world affairs. Reﬂecting such a concern, theﬁrst Clinton NSS published in 1996 claimed that US foreign policy goals
could be achieved “by ensuring America remains engaged (italic added)in the world” and that a purpose of “this report is to help foster thebroad . . . understanding and support necessary to sustain our international engagement.”8 This so-called strategy of engagement remained
evident in the second Clinton NSS published in 1999, which stated that
US strategy is “founded on continued (italic added) U.S. engagement.”9
In contrast, the Bush NSS envisions to alter the existing international
order based on two assumptions. One is the self-recognition of US hegemony. The very ﬁrst sentence of the NSS states that “the United States
possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and inﬂuence in theworld” (p.1). Although conventional International Relations theories
point out that a concentration of power in the hands of one state will trigger power balancing against it, the Bush Administration is conﬁdent thata challenge to US hegemony will not arise in the near future.
The other assumption is that the most serious security problems today
are asymmetric threats from rogue states and terrorists. The NSS is clear
on this point, stating that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones” (p.1). Furthermore, since the diffusion of technology enables “shadowy networks of individuals” to“bring great chaos and suffering to our (US) shores” (the preface to theBush NSS), how to contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction(WMD) is a serious problem.
Although the Clinton NSS documents also pointed out asymmetricthreats, they were just a part of the whole list of threats.10 They also recognized US hegemony, but instead of regarding its maintenance as a
strategic goal, it emphasized the aspect of responsibility for taking leads,
stating that “the American leadership will remain indispensable.”(Preface to the Clinton NSS) In contrast, the Bush NSS enhances theseto make them the core assumptions based on which its strategy isfounded, and addresses how to apply US hegemonic power to deal with

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asymmetric threats. In the following, I will explain the three major components of the Bush strategy.
(1) Military strategy: the shift from deterrence to preemption anddefenseIn general, the Bush NSS is underscored by the Bush Administration’s
resolve to act unilaterally if necessary. It declares that the United States“will be prepared to act apart when our interests . . . require,” and that it“will not allow disagreement [among allies] to obscure our determination to secure . . . our shared fundamental interests and values” (p.31).
According to classic and structural realists, who regard international politics as an endless competition among states, unilateralism is a logicalresult of US hegemony. In the world of anarchy, states have no choice
but to rely only on themselves (self-help), and seek to maximize theirsecurity. Since a hegemon is the least constrained by international system, it acts without worrying about how other states might respond.11
This emphasis on unilateralism is distinct from the Clinton NSS.
Although the Clinton NSS recognized the necessity of unilateral actions,its preference for multilateral actions was evident. Its statement that
“international cooperation will be vital for building security in the next
century because many of the challenges we face cannot be addressed bya single nation” reﬂected this preference for multilateralism.12
Aside from the emphasis on unilateralism, there are three elements ofthe military strategy noteworthy in the Bush NSS. The ﬁrst is the assumption that rogue states and terrorists cannot be deterred (pp.13–14). As
proponents of deterrence argued during the Cold War, successful deterrence requires rationality on the side of an enemy.13 However, the NSS
assumes that leaders of rogue states are “more willing to take risks”
unlike “status quo, risk-averse adversar[ies]” (p.15), and cannot be
deterred. Deterrence will not work against terrorists, either, because they
are determined to “seek martyrdom in death” (p.15). In a nutshell, rogue
states and terrorists do not act rationally, and are too risk-prone to be
deterred.
This leads to the second element: the declining importance of deterrence and the increasing signiﬁcance of preemption and defense(pp.13–14). Preemptive strategy, or striking enemies even before threats
fully materialize, becomes a viable option when enemies cannot be
deterred. In particular, the Bush NSS reasons, since today’s enemies see
WMD as weapons of choice, the United States “cannot let our enemies
strike ﬁrst” (p.15), and that “the only path to peace and security is theYasuhiro IZUMIKAWA(p257)6/2 04.7.18 0:05 PM ページ 261

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path to action” (the preface to the NSS). As many critics point out, thisshift from deterrence to preemption is the most signiﬁcant change fromthe previous US defense policy.
For the same reason why preemption is justiﬁed, passive defense has
also become more important than during the Cold War. In this context,
it makes sense that the NSS justiﬁes missile defense to defend against
missile attacks by rogue states. In terms of protecting the US homeland,measures taken by the Department of Homeland Security play key roles.
These requirements need drastic improvements in intelligence capabilities and military technology. The Bush Administration’s commitment tothe so-called military transformation—technological innovation andrevision in force structure of the US military—is premised on this thinking.14
The third characteristic is the skepticism toward the existing arms control regimes. Although the NSS does not explicitly discuss how the Bush
Administration views the existing arms control regimes, its classiﬁed
version states that traditional nonproliferation has failed.15 Instead, theNSS emphasizes the enforcement of “strengthened nonproliferation”(p.14), consisting of such measures as active interdiction.16 This attitude
is in a sharp contrast with the Clinton NSS, which expressed strong US
commitments to such arms control regimes as Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).17(2) Peaceful competition among great powers
The second main component of the Bush NSS is its emphasis on great
power politics. Previously, the Clinton Administration simply soughtcooperative relations with great powers based on the strategy of engagement: it regarded NATO and bilateral alliances in Asia as the linchpinof US security in Europe and Asia respectively, while expanding an areaof cooperation with such countries as Russia and China to prevent themfrom becoming enemies.18
On the other hand, the Bush NSS emphasizes peaceful competition
among great powers, as the Bush NSS envisions a world in which “great
powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare[ing] for war”
(the preface to the NSS). This phrase indicates two things. On one hand,the phrase reﬂects the Bush Administration’s awareness that competition among great powers will persist, as realism considers the world tobe a continuous struggle for power. On the other hand, the phrase signals
US willingness to cooperate with its potential adversaries on issues inwhich they share common interests. As explained, the NSS views notYasuhiro IZUMIKAWA(p257)6/2 04.7.18 0:05 PM ページ 262

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great powers but rogue states and terrorists as today’s main enemies, andcooperation with potential adversaries is possible because they ﬁndthemselves united by common dangers of terrorist violence.
It is noteworthy that the NSS envisions improved US relations withpotential adversaries—Russia, China and India. Among them, Russia istreated most favorably. The NSS proclaims that Russia is no longer astrategic adversary (p.26), boasting such achievements as the Moscow
Treaty on Strategic Reductions and the creation of the NATO-Russia
Council. India also receives somewhat favorable treatment: the fact that
it is categorized as a potential competitor suggests that the United States
acknowledges India’s status as “a growing world power” (p.27). Probably causing some bitterness to Chinese leaders, China appears on thislist after India, and the NSS is very articulate in its disagreement with
China on human rights violations, Taiwan and democratization. Nonetheless, the NSS argues that the United States “seeks a constructive relationship with a changing China” (p.27), dropping the phrase strategiccompetitor, which used to describe the Bush Administration’s attitude
toward China. Overall, the NSS indicates that while the United States
sees China as a more likely challenger than the other two, it is prepared
to cooperate with it on issues of mutual interest.19
With regard to relations with US allies, the NSS states that “America
will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions” (p.25). This is a
subtle difference from its predecessors’ emphasis on formal alliances,because it shows a US intention to value informal coalitions, or the socalled “coalition of the willing,” more than formal alliances. In fact, theemphasis on coalitions is consistent with US hegemony: since the UnitedStates possesses the military ability to accomplish its goals without relying on allies, it is reluctant to allow them to constrain US freedom ofaction, which will be instead maximized by case-by-case coalitions.
Although the NSS still values bilateral alliances in East Asia (p.26),
the decreasing value of NATO is evident. While referring to NATO as
one of “the strongest and most able international institutions,” the BushNSS expresses US support for European allies’ efforts to strengthen theirown defense identity and US commitments to further NATO expansion(p.26). What this implies is that the United States may be willing to tradea more independent Europe for more freedom of action, as long as NATO
serves as a venue for the United States to maintain inﬂuence in Europe.
It is also important to note that none of Arab nations, such as Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, are referred to as US allies.

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263(3) Promoting Democracy and Prosperity
While the other two pillars of the new strategy are products of realism, the third pillar—expansion of liberal democracy—seems to reﬂect
America’s liberal tradition. The NSS states that expanding a circle ofdemocracy is “a moral imperative,” and promises to increase US foreign
aid by ﬁfty percent through the Millennium Challenge Account (p.21).
This emphasis on morality and fairness sounds similar to the ﬁrst Clinton
Administration’s declaratory policy of democratic enlargement.20
Nevertheless, there exists realism underlying this policy. The Bush
Administration considers that the root causes of terrorism are the lack of
democratic institutions and economic underdevelopment in terrorists’home countries, in the Islamic world in particular. It states that terrorism results not from “a clash of civilizations,” but “the clash inside a
civilization” (p.31).21 That is, oppressed citizens in Arab states turn toanti-American terrorism because they perceive that the United States
upholds authoritarian but pro-US governments such as Saudi Arabia. In
this light, promoting democracy in the Islamic world will create legitimate means for frustrated Arab citizens to voice opposition to their governments instead of resorting to terrorism. At the same time, alleviating
economic suffering in developing countries helps mitigate the problemof failed states, which provide safe havens for terrorists. In other words,
expanding liberal democracy through foreign aid is not just a moral issue,
but is linked to the overall goal of defeating terrorism.
There are two characteristics to be noted regarding how the Bush
Administration seeks to promote liberal democracy. First, while sharing
a strong belief in free trade and market mechanisms, the NSS emphasizes the importance of economic and social institutions, such as tax collection systems, investments in education and health and enforcement ofanti-corruption rules (pp.17, 19).22 This awareness of the importance ofmarket institutions may reﬂect a learning effect from the last decade of
economic transitions by the former communist states and the miracle of
the East Asian economies.23 At the same time, it may be also a reﬂectionof strong conﬁdence in American political and economic systems: the
NSS states that US values and institutions are “right and true for all people everywhere” (p.3), and that US “principles will guide . . . the character of our foreign assistance and allocation of resources” (p.4).
Second, just as apparent in arms control issues, the new strategy shows
the Bush Administration’s negative attitude toward the existing development policies and international institutions. “Decades of massive

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development assistance have failed” (p.21), the NSS argues, and it evendismisses conventional assistance as a means to “prop up failed policies,
relieving the pressure for reform and perpetuating misery” (p.21). In
order to improve the efﬁcacy of foreign aid, the NSS calls for judging
the efﬁcacy by measurable results and linking aid to recipient states’ performances (p.22). Therefore, although the NSS makes clear US commitments to increasing foreign aid, it is a responsibility of a recipient
state to pursue “the right national policies” (p.21), which will beneﬁt
those states which follow US aid guidelines.
*
Even aside from the concept of preemptive war, the Bush NSS contains many characteristics distinct from the previous administration’s
strategy. Unlike the Clinton Administration’s strategy of engagement, itemphasizes the need for unilateral actions. At the same time, the BushNSS considers formal alliances less important than the Clinton NSS. In
addition, the Bush NSS pursues the expansion of democracy not just as
a liberal goal but also as a means of resolving the root causes of asymmetric threats.
What characterizes the Bush NSS in particular is its high degree of
logical sophistication. It presents a logically coherent national security
strategy, the three main components of which are highly integrated toachieve today’s overriding national goal: defeating terrorism and preventing the spread of WMD.
Since US hegemony is overwhelming, it is unlikely that any state will
challenge US leadership in the near future. Instead, the most serious challenges to US security today will be asymmetric: threats and actual useof WMD by rogue states and terrorist groups. To deal with such threats,
the United States must continue investing its resources in renovating its
military power. Doing so will also prolong US hegemony by dissuading
potential competitors from challenging US leadership. Furthermore, inorder to eradicate the sources of terrorism and rogue states, the UnitedStates will promote democracy and economic prosperity. In pursuing thecourse of this action, the United States is determined to act unilaterally
if necessary and not allow others to block US actions.
III PROBLEMS IN THE BUSH STRATEGY
The fact that the Bush strategy shows logical consistency does notguarantee that the strategy is ﬂawless. In fact, each of the strategy’s threeYasuhiro IZUMIKAWA(p257)6/2 04.7.18 0:05 PM ページ 265

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pillars entails potential problems. Combined, these problems may produce the very outcome that the strategy is designed to avoid: shortening
the longevity of US hegemony and engendering more terrorist threats.
(1) The false premise of preemption
The ﬁrst problem concerns the logic underlying the principle of preemptive war. As explained, the Bush NSS assumes that rogue states andterrorists cannot be deterred. Generally speaking, successful deterrence
requires three factors: second strike capabilities to inﬂict sufﬁcient damage against an aggressor, a clear signal of strong resolve to use such capabilities, and an enemy’s rationality in calculating the costs and beneﬁts
of its action. Deterrence does not work against today’s enemies, according to the Bush NSS, because the third factor is missing.
However, it is questionable whether or not this assumption is valid forrogue states. Isolated from the rest of the world and threatened by thesole superpower, rogue states do not have a lot to gain in maintaining
the status quo, and their capitulation to US threats would endanger thesurvival of their regimes. Their aggressive behavior may worsen the status quo and prompt US retaliation, but potential gains may still outweigh
the risks involved because rogue states have little to lose in the statusquo anyway. Under such circumstances, it is not necessarily irrational
to choose risky but possibly successful use of threats.24 If rogue states
act rationally as these analysts suggest, deterrence against them is by nomeans impossible.
Moreover, using coercive strategies against rogue states may even be
counterproductive if rogue state behavior derives from the motivation ofloss aversion. According to prospect theory, an actor seeking to avoid
losses is more willing to take a risky option than an actor seeking to makegains.25 Applying this logic to North Korea, Victor Cha argues that what
drives it toward risky behavior is its desire to avoid further losses of security.26 If this is the case, trying to punish rogue states with threats may
actually force them to take an extreme measure, including development
and use of WMD. The accelerated quest for nuclear weapons by North
Korea and Iran validates this fear.
It is true that terrorists are difﬁcult to deter, because they can reasonably expect to avoid retaliation by changing their whereabouts.27
However, whether preemption is effective or not is a different question.
Since terrorists present very few suitable military targets whose destruction would undermine their resolve and capabilities, damaging terrorists’abilities sufﬁciently to give up terrorism militarily is extremely difﬁcult,Yasuhiro IZUMIKAWA(p257)6/2 04.7.18 0:05 PM ページ 266

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even when preemption is possible. Furthermore, more preemptive attacks may simply lead to more terrorist retaliations in the future, thus experts on terrorism argue that “the overt preemptive use of military force
is unwise.”28 Robert Jervis explains this succinctly, saying that “anadversary who believes the United States is certain to attack will havenothing to lose by resorting to WMD.”29
Furthermore, combined with the principle of preemptive war, the BushNSS’s skepticism of the existing arms control regimes may damage thestability of today’s international order without creating a new order.
Judging from the analysis stated above, it is quite possible that threatsof preemptive war rather increase a danger of WMD proliferation andits use. In addition, the Bush NSS’s emphasis on containing the spreadof WMD can entice other actors to disobey the existing arms control
agreements, because they consider that US policy operates under a double-standard. On one hand, the US government advocates strengthening
safeguards under the NPT.30 However, it continues to reject key components of the CTBT, and even calls for the development of new nuclear
weapons.31 These US policies could be construed as a systematic challenge by the United States to bend the established international system
in its favor, and will intensify other states’ resistance to US efforts.
(2) Treating foes as friends while treating friends as foes
The second problem concerns great power relations. For potential
adversaries, the fact that the United States conceives of peaceful competition with them is not bad news. In fact, with moderately improved
relations with adversaries and reduced importance of alliances, the NSS
seems to envision a global system similar to the Concert of Europe, or
the 19th century European security system in which major powers often
competed politically but not militarily.
However, more serious problems lie in US relations with its allies. As
already explained, the NSS emphasizes informal coalitions instead offormal alliances in order to maximize US freedom of action. Behind thispolicy exists an assumption that many US allies will choose to join US
coalitions anyway: since the United States has an ability to bring about
its favored outcomes even when its allies are opposed, the allies will
acquiesce in US policies and will not dare to face US ire by challenging
its leadership. In other words, for US allies, gains from bandwagoning
with the United States would outweigh gains from challenging it, no matter how reluctant they may be.
However, the United States may be overestimating its allies’ willing-Yasuhiro IZUMIKAWA(p257)6/2 04.7.18 0:05 PM ページ 267

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ness to cooperate, while underestimating the negative impacts of its unilateralism on its allies. As Randall Schweller argues, states tend to jumpon the bandwagon with stronger states when they seek gains, but are
more inclined to balance against them when seeking to avoid losses.32 If
this is correct, bandwagoning may not necessarily result because the NSS
is unclear on what kinds of gains or rewards US allies can expect fromcooperating with the United States. Rather, US allies have a lot to losein encouraging US unilateralism, which undermines the existing international order in which they have moderate but important inﬂuence overUS actions through alliances and multilateral institutions. Considering
these factors, the Bush Administration’s failure to obtain French,
German and even Turkish support for the war against Iraq may not be
isolated incidents.
Proponents of the NSS may argue, perhaps correctly, that US allies
are unlikely and unable to balance against the United States given the
gap in material power. However, US allies can still increase the political and economic cost of US actions, which may accelerate the declineof US hegemony rather than perpetuate it. As Stephen Walt argues, “Theability of the United States to achieve its foreign policy objectives at relatively low cost will depend in large part on whether other powers are
inclined to support or oppose US policies, and whether others ﬁnd it easy
or difﬁcult to coordinate joint opposition to US initiatives.”33 US unilateralism may be creating the very situation in which other great powers
ﬁnd it easy to unite against US initiatives.
(3) Friendly tyrants, mission contradiction, and democratic instability
The third problem concerns promotion of democracy in the Arabworld as a means of removing the root causes of terrorism. The fundamental objective of US policy toward the Middle East used to be
maintaining stability in the region by keeping good relations with nondemocratic but pro-American regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
However, David Frum, a former speech writer for President Bush, points
out that the Bush Administration believes that the previous US Middle
East policy is no longer adequate.34 As the September 11 incident showed,
US accommodations of the non-democratic Islamic states is creating ananimosity against the United States. To alleviate this problem, the Bush
Administration has decided to change the “policy of stability” to a policy of promoting democracy, even at the expense of instability in theregion.35
The United States has long been plagued by this so-called friendly

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tyrant dilemma.36 This problem results from a dilemma between thegeopolitical necessity to maintain good relations with pro-US authoritarian regimes and the US tendency to criticize violations of human rights
by those regimes. This is a practical problem as well, because friendly
tyrants are often replaced by radical anti-US regimes supported by popular anti-US sentiments, as the cases of Iran and Cuba show. In fact, this
explains why anti-US sentiment in Saudi Arabia has been rising: because
Saudi citizens view the United States as patron of the undemocratic Saudi
royal family, their hostility toward the latter has been translated into antiUS sentiment. The fact that many of the September 11 terrorists were
citizens of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both quasi-US allies, prompted theBush Administration to realize the magnitude of this problem. This is
why it has decided to alter its Middle East policy, so that the United States
may play a more assertive role in promoting democracy in the region.
Although the Bush Administration’s intention to deal with the friendly tyrant dilemma is commendable, implementing policies for that purpose is a more complex task. First, promoting democracy in the Islamic
world is already contradicting another US national security imperative:
the war on terrorism.37 In the pursuit of Al-Qaeda, the US governmenthas been soliciting cooperation from such non-democratic Islamic statesas Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Yemen and Pakistan. As the Bush Administration emphasizes, the war on terrorism is going to require ongoing andrelentless pursuit of terrorist groups in the medium and long term. If thisis the case, the United States will continue to need cooperation fromfriendly tyrants in the Islamic world.
Moreover, promoting democracy is in itself a dangerous and extremely difﬁcult task, and the Bush NSS seems to underestimate the negative
impact that such a policy may have on the stability of the Islamic world.
Some scholars argue that states in democratic transition are more likely
to be war-prone than either stable democracies or authoritarian regimes.38 This may be the case because democratization creates a weakcentral authority incapable of resolving clashes among diverse interest
groups, which end up ﬁghting each other. If this is the case, states in democratic transition may gravely threaten the regional order in the Middle
East and Central Asia.
In order to avoid such an ominous scenario, the United States must
devote signiﬁcant resources to make democratic transitions smooth.
However, the record of US efforts to promote democracy in other countries is not encouraging. As the cases of Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and more

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recently Afghanistan and Iraq show, US ability and its public’s willingness to bear the costs of promoting democracy may be more limited thanthe Bush NSS assumes.39 Therefore, a suspicion cannot be erased that
US efforts to promote democracy fall short of what is actually required
to achieve the goal.
IV

CONCLUSION

With the war against Iraq ofﬁcially over, the signiﬁcance of the NSS
may start to be overlooked. As explained in this paper, however, the NSS
is not just a written justiﬁcation for the war: instead, it eloquently reﬂects
a type of international order which the Bush Administration envisions.
The new US strategy is based on an articulated view of US power andnew security challenges, and its various components are highly integrated into a coherent package of policies. At the same time, it suffersfrom various ﬂaws, which may actually worsen the very problems thatit purports to resolve.
The fundamental problem in the Bush strategy is confusion between
material and political power. Political power by deﬁnition is an ability
to achieve political goals, or to get others to do what they would not dootherwise.40 In world politics, states with great material capabilities often
fail to achieve their goals because material capabilities may be necessary but not sufﬁcient to exert political power. Classic realist Hans
Morgenthau argues that material power is simply “the raw material outof which the (political) power of a nation is fashioned.” According tohim, the most important element of political power is political skills totranslate military and economic resources that the US possesses into
political inﬂuence.41
The Bush strategy relies too much on US military and economic power
and lacks a serious consideration about how to translate such material
capabilities into political power. Although US military power was sufﬁcient to defeat Saddam Hussein’s regime, it is hardly adequate forbuilding democracy in Iraq. And although the Bush strategy expects
cooperation from US allies to be forthcoming or to be unnecessary, thestruggle to restore order in Iraq shows that this may not be the case. It is
indicative that a former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski
warned, “while the US military power has been never respected like it
is today, US political credibility in the world has never been lower.”42
Furthermore, unlike the Clinton NSS, which put the United States inYasuhiro IZUMIKAWA(p257)6/2 04.7.18 0:05 PM ページ 270

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the position of defending the existing international order, the Bush
Administration’s strategy puts it in a revisionist position, or what SamuelHuntington dubbed a “rogue superpower.”43 Aside from the principle ofpreemption, the Bush NSS’s vision of altered great power relations, its
challenge to the existing international institutions and radical policy
toward the Islamic world constitute systematic US efforts to redesign theinternational order in its favor. Because other states prefer the status quo
in which they can constrain US actions through alliances and institutions,they will resist such US efforts. Therefore, unless the Bush Administration devises an additional strategy of alleviating the concerns of otheractors, its national security strategy may replace the existing international system with a less secure, instable world.
NOTES
1George W. Bush, Speech at West Point, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html, retrieved on February 20, 2003.
2
The United States Government, National Security Strategy of the United States ofAmerica (September 2002), at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, retrieved on January
21, 2003.
3
Richard Falk, “The New Bush Doctrine: Fighting Terrorism Requires New Thinking
but not a US Imperial Role,” Nation, 15 July 2002, 9–11; G. John Ikenberry, “America’s
Imperial Ambition,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (Sept./Oct. 2002): 44–60; “Drums of War,Calls for Peace,” Dissent 50, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 5–17.
4
Stanley Hoffman, “America Alone in the World,” The American Prospect, 23 September 2002, 20–21; John Mearsheimer, “Hearts and Minds,” National Interest no. 69(Fall 2002): 13–16.
5
Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg, “The Bush National
Security Strategy: An Evaluation,” The Brookings Policy Brief, 4 October 2002, atwww.brookings.edu, retrieved on October 15, 2002.
6
John Lewis Gaddis, “Grand Strategy of Transformation,” Foreign Policy no. 133(Nov./Dec. 2002): 54. Also, see Joshua Muravchik, “The Bush Manifesto,” Commentary
115, no. 5 (December 2002): 23–30.
7
Robert W. Tucker, “One Year On: Power, Purpose and Strategy in American
Foreign Policy,” National Interest, no. 69 (Fall 2002): 5.
8
The United States of America, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1996), 1, 3. Although
the word enlargement was also used in this document, much more emphasis was put on
the word engagement as the quoted phrases indicate.
9
The United States of America, A National Security Strategy for a New Century(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1999), 3.
10
The United States of America, A National Security Strategy for a New Century(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1999), 2–3. Here, threats from terrorists are treated as equal to traditional state-centered threats and even environmental
and health threats.

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11271“. . . the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they
have to accept.” Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Penguin Classics,1972), 402; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill,1979), 125–7.
12
A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 3. It also stated, “America must be
willing to act alone when our interests demand it, but we should also support the institutions and arrangements through which other countries help us bear the burden of leadership.” (Preface to the Clinton NSS)
13
Thomas C. Schelling, Strategies of Conﬂicts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1960); Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory
and Comparative Studies” World Politics vol. XLI no. 2 (January 1989): 143–169.
14
Michael Klare, “Endless Military Superiority,” Nation 275 no. 3, 15 July 2002,
12–16; Kensuke Ebata, America no gunjiryoku [America’s military power] (Tokyo:
Kodansha, 2002).
15
Mike Allen and Barton Gellman, “Preemptive Strikes Part of U.S. Strategic Doctrine,” Washington Post, 11 December 2002, Page A1; George Perkovich, “Bush’s
Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2(March/April 2003): 3.
16
Ibid., 7–8.
17
A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 8–9.
18
Ibid., 29–30, 32, 34–8.
19
Li Bin, “The New U.S. National Security Strategy: Positives and Negatives for
China,” Center for Defense Information Report, 26 September 2002, available atwww.cdi.org/national-security-strategy/beijing.cfm, retrieved on January 20, 2003.
20
Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” speech at SAIS, Johns
Hopkins University, 21 September 1993, Foreign Policy Bulletin 4 no. 3, 39–46. Lake
was the National Security Advisor during the ﬁrst Clinton Administration.
21
Gaddis, “Grand Strategy,” 54.
22
Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
23
Michael Mandelbaum, ed., Postcommunism: Four Perspectives (Washington, DC:
The Brookings Institution Press, 1996), particularly the chapter by Robert Skidelsky;
World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993).
24
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, two prominent realists, argue that Saddam
Hussein’s record of military conduct demonstrates rationality instead of irrationality in
his decision making. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “An Unnecessary War,”
Foreign Policy no. 134 (Jan./Feb. 2002): 51–59. Experts on Korean affairs also argue
that North Korea’s foreign policy behavior exhibits rationality. Narushige Michishita,Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966–2000(dissertation: Johns Hopkins University, 2003); Denny Roy, “North Korea as an
Alienated State,” Survival 38, no.4 (Winter 1996/97): 22–36.
25
Janice Gross Stein and Louis W. Pauly, eds., Choosing to Co-operate: How States
Avoid Loss (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1993); Jack Levy, “Prospect
Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations,” International Studies Quarterly
141 (March 1997): 87–112.
26
Victor D. Cha, “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean
Peninsula,” International Security 27, no. 1 (Summer 2002): 40–78. Also, see James
Davis, Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Inﬂuence (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).

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The new US strategy implicitly recognizes this difﬁculty. It states, “One of the most
difﬁcult challenges we face is to prevent, deter and defend against the acquisition anduse of WMD by terrorists.” The US Government, National Strategy to Combat WMD,
6.
28
Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 97, 103–110.
29
Robert Jervis, “Mutual Assured Destruction,” Foreign Policy no. 133 (Nov/Dec
2002): 42.
30
National Strategy to Combat WMD, 4.
31
Darryl G. Kimball, “National Insecurity Strategy,” Arms Control Today 32, no. 2(December 2002): 2–3.
32
Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning Proﬁt,” International Security 19, no.1.
(Summer 1994): 72–107.
33
Stephen M. Walt, “Keeping the World ‘Off-Balance’: Self-Restraint and U.S.
Foreign Policy,” and Charles A. Kupchan, “Hollow Hegemony or Stable Multipolarity,”
in Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled, 141 and 79 respectively.
34
David Frum, The Right Man: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush (NewYork: Random House, 2003), 196–201.
35
Richard N. Haas, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, US Department of State,“Toward Greater Democracy in the Mulsim World,” speech at the Brookings Institution,
4 December 2002, at www.state.gov/s/p/rem/15686pf.htm, retrieved on 6 April 2003.
36
Daniel Pipes and Adam Garﬁnkle, eds., Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma(New York: St. Martin’s, 1991).
37
Daalder et al, 5.
38
Edward D. Mansﬁeld and Jack Snyder, “Incomplete Democratization and theOutbreak of Military Disputes,” International Studies Quarterly 46, no. 4 (2002):
529–549. Also, see the same authors’ article, “Democratization and the Danger of War,”International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 5–38.
39
Michael Mandelbaum, “The Inadequacy of American Power” Foreign Affairs 81,
no. 5 (Sept./Oct. 2002): 72.
40
Robert A. Dahl, “Power,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Science, XII(New York: Free Press, 1968), 405–15; David A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World
Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (1979): 161–94.
41
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1948), 105.
42
Quoted in “Sekaihatu 2003 (from the world 2003),” Asahi Newspaper, 29 July 2003.
43
Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2,(Mar/Apr 1999): 40–44.