In Ayana Whitmal, Mariam Asatryan, and Yixiao Song (eds.)
Proceedings of NELS 50, 2020
pages 227–236

Counterexpectation, concession, and free choice in Tibetan*

Michael Yoshitaka Erlewine
National University of Singapore

1.

Introduction

This paper investigates the uses of the Tibetan expression yin.na’ang and its compositional
syntax/semantics, with data from original fieldwork.1 Descriptively, yin.na’ang has three
distinct uses: it is a counterexpectational discourse particle, translated as ‘but’ or ‘however,’as in (1); it is a concessive scalar focus particle (CSP; see e.g., Lahiri 2010, Crnič 2011) asin (2); and it forms universal free choice items (∀-FCI) from wh-words, as in (3).
(1) Counterexpectational ‘but/however’:bKra.shis dge.rgan red.
Yin.na’ang spyang.po mi-’dug.
Tashi
teacher AUX
YIN . NA’ ANG clever
NEG - AUX
‘Tashi is a teacher. However, [he] isn’t smart.’(2) Concessive scalar particle (CSP):[Dep [gcig]F yin.na’ang klog-na]
yig.tshad mthar.’khyol-gi-red.
book one
YIN . NA’ ANG read- COND exam
succeed-IMPF-AUX‘[If [you] read even/at least [one]F book], [you] will pass the exam.’∀-FCI):(3) Wh universal free choice item (∀Nor.bu [(kha.lag) ga.re yin.na’ang] za-gi-red.
Norbu food
what YIN . NA’ ANG eat-IMPF-AUX‘Norbu eats anything / any food.’* For earlier comments and discussion, I thank Maayan Abenina-Adar, Rahul Balusu, Kenyon Branan,James Collins, Chris Davis, Kai von Fintel, Danny Fox, Hadas Kotek, Elin McCready, Keely New, Ryan
Walter Smith, as well as audiences at NELS 50, the 2020 LSA, and the National University of Singapore.
1 My description here reflects the judgments of three speakers in the Tibetan community of Dharamsala,India. All three grew up with Tibetan as their first language, in Tibet and/or in India. I thank my speakers,
Kunga Choedon, Pema Yonden, and Tenzin Kunsang, for their patience and support.
Tibetan data is reported in the Wylie orthography. Periods mark syllable boundaries where there are notmorpheme boundaries, following the practice in Garrett 2001.

Michael Yoshitaka Erlewine
Yin.na’ang is transparently composed of three ingredients: the copula yin,2 conditional
ending na, and scalar focus particle ‘even’ yang (4).
(4) yin
COPULA+ na+ yang = yin.na.yang > yin.na’ang > yin.na’i

COND

EVEN

Yin.na’ang is a contraction of yin.na.yang, which is also used. In speech, yin.na’ang also
appears as yin.na’i, reflecting the general reduction of yang to ya’i in speech (Tournadre andSangda Dorje 2003:409). I follow Goldstein (2001:1000) in generally referring to yin.na’ang
as the expression’s canonical form.
Here I pursue the hypothesis that all three of these uses of Tibetan yin.na’ang derivetransparently from the independent semantics of these three ingredients in (4). That is,
yin.na’ang can be thought of as, literally, “even if it’s...” Indirect evidence for this decompositional approach comes from the fact that this same basic phenomenon—the combinationof a copula, conditional, and scalar ‘even’ particle being used together to form a counterexpectational particle, CSP, and wh-FCIs—is also attested in a number of unrelated languages,
although with minor differences in the range of uses:(5)
TibetanKannadaJapanese

COP - COND - EVEN

particle

focus particle

yin-na-yang
aad-ar-uu
de--mo3

‘but’
‘but’
‘but’

CSP
∀-FCI
CSP
∀-FCI, ∃-FCI, NPI
CSP, ‘for example’ ∀-FCI

wh-quantification

See especially Balusu (this volume) for discussion of Kannada aad-ar-uu. See Watanabe
2013 on the additional use of Japanese demo as a focus particle, translated as ‘for example.’
For recent discussion of Japanese wh-FCI with demo, see Hiraiwa and Nakanishi To appear.
Here I concentrate on describing and explaining the semantics of Tibetan yin.na’ang andleave the extensions of my analysis to these other languages for future work.
2.

Counterexpectational yin.na’ang

I begin by describing and deriving the discourse particle use of yin.na’ang. The contrast in(6) shows that yin.na’ang marks the following proposition ((6a) and (6b) below) as counterto our expectations, given the preceding information.
(6) Counterexpectation is required:
Kho kha.lag mang.po za-gi-red.
he fooda.lot
eat-IMPF-AUX‘He eats a lot of food.

Yin.na’ang...
YIN . NA’ ANG
But...’

2 In root clauses, the copula yin indexes ego evidentiality, in contrast to indirect evidential copula red.

However, as Garrett (2001) shows, these evidentiality distinctions are neutralized in non-root clauses such as
in conditional clauses, where yin is always used; see Garrett 2001:254.
3 Hiraiwa and Nakanishi (to appear) propose that the Japanese surface form demo is a conventionalized
contraction of dear-te-mo, which is transparently COP - COND - EVEN.

Counterexpectation, concession, and free choice in Tibetana. rgyags.pa chags-gi-ma-red.
fatbecome-IMPF-NEG-AUX‘[he] doesn’t gain weight.’

b. #rgyags.pa chags-gi-red.
fatbecome-IMPF-AUX‘[he] gains weight.’

The use of yin.na’ang must make reference to a salient proposition p, which has beenasserted prior by the same speaker or another speaker, and not denied. The expression“Yin.na’ang q” then commits the speaker to q, while reflecting an attitude that q is counter totheir expectations given p. Following Ippolito (2007) on English still and Balusu (this volume) on Kannada aad-ar-uu, I propose that yin.na’ang takes an unpronounced propositional
anaphor as an argument, to refer to this preceding proposition p:(7) [[pro=p ]F yin-na]=yang qCOP - COND EVEN
Literal LF: EVEN ( if it’s [p]F , q )Now let us consider the interpretation of (7). I take P to be a set of relevant alternatives
to p: propositions p0 where the conditional propositions “if p0 , q” are relevant to consider.
The scalar particle EVEN will require that the prejacent conditional “if p, q” be less likely
than “if p0 , q,” for all p0 ∈ P. This scalar condition requires very low credence in “if p, q,”which is supported by an expectation that “if p, likely not q.” In this way, the utterance of(7) signals and reinforces the expectation that “if p, likely not q.” What we’ve done here is
to use the scalar particle EVEN to build a concessive ‘although/even though’ relation from acausal one, as is cross-linguistically common; see especially König 1991:82–83.
Finally, we note that the at-issue content of (7) is the conditional claim “if p, q,” butthe speaker of (7) becomes committed to q. First, consider the case where p is a public
commitment of the speaker’s. By asserting “if p, q,” we reason by Modus Ponens that the
speaker is also committed to q. Alternatively, consider the case where p is not a public
commitment of the speaker’s. This is possible if another speaker proffers p and it is still on
the table, but the speaker has not yet committed to it, and may not believe it. In this case,
suppose that the set P exhausts all relevant possibilities worth considering, for what would
lead to q. This results in what Bennett (1982) calls an “introduced” even if conditional; inthis case, the assertion of “EVEN if [p]F , q” will also implicate the truth of the consequent q.
See von Fintel 1994:§5.3.3 for discussion.
Yin.na’ang can also be used in cases of semantic opposition, as in (8). English but isalso used in such cases, as in the translation for (8); see Toosarvandani 2014 and citations
there. Here, pace Toosarvandani on English but, I suggest that we can reduce the scalar
opposition use in (8) to the counterexpectational use above by assuming a local homogeneity
expectation: in (8), because Tenzin is tall, we expect Tashi to also be tall, licensing the useof yin.na’ang.
(8) Yin.na’ang reflecting semantic opposition:
bsTan.dzin gzugs.po ring.po ’dug. Yin.na’ang bKra.shis chung-chung ’dug.
Tenzin
body
long
AUX
YIN . NA’ ANG Tashi
small-RED
AUX‘Tenzin is tall. But Tashi is short.’

Michael Yoshitaka Erlewine
3.

Aside: The syntax of yin.na’ang in argument position

Before we turn to the use of yin.na’ang to form FCIs and as a CSP, I will briefly discuss theexternal syntax of these expressions. In both of these uses, yin.na’ang appears to encliticize
to a nominal expression: a wh-word for FCIs and a focused or focus-containing phrase in
the CSP use. The resulting structure may occupy an argument position, as is especially clearin (9), where the whole wh-yin.na’ang FCI bears a dative case marker or postposition.
(9) Wh-yin.na’ang FCI with dative case:
Pad.ma [(phru.gu) su yin.na’ang]=laskad.cha bshad-kyi-red.
Pema
who YIN . NA’ ANG=DAT speech talk-IMPF-AUX
child‘Pema talks to anyone / any child.’
Such structures are at first glance problematic for the hypothesis I pursue here, that all these
expressions of the form X=yin.na’ang are in fact concessive conditional clauses.
I propose that such a X=yin.na’ang structure in argument positions is interpreted at LF
as adjoined to the containing clause, with its surface position interpreted as a pronoun. The
LF structure for the two versions of (9) above, with and without the nominal ‘child,’ aregiven in (10) below:(10) a. Literal (9): Pema talks to [even if {it/the child} is who] ⇒b. LF: [even if {it/the child}7 is who], Pema talks to them7 ⇒EVEN [if {it/the child}7 is who, Pema talks to them7 ]The pronoun in the X=yin.na’ang position at LF (‘them’ in (10)) is coreferential with anull pronoun (‘it’) or definite description (‘the child’) which is the first argument of the
copular relation in the conditional clause. This coreference relationship is encoded here ascoindexation (the shared index 7), the effects of which we will observe in the following
sections.4 In this way, the X=yin.na’ang structure can be thought of as a clause that occupies
an argument position and describes that argument, similar to a head-internal relative clauseor amalgam (Lakoff 1974). Similar analyses have been developed by Shimoyama (1999) for
the syntax and interpretation of Japanese head-internal relatives and by Hirsch (2016) for
English ever free relatives in argument position.
4 As the study of donkey pronouns has made clear (see e.g., Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991), conditionals

lead us to consider different possible dynamic updates or referential assignments. Intuitively, I take theconditional to quantify over different assignments which vary the referent of index 7 in both the antecedentand consequent clauses.
I furthermore follow Lewis (1975), Kratzer (1979), and others in taking conditionals to encode a restriction
on the set of possible worlds or situations that a modal/temporal operator in the consequent clause quantifies
over. To unify these two intuitions, concretely, here we can model modal/temporal operators—and thus theirconditional restrictors—as quantifying over pairs of worlds/situations and assignment functions.
See also Erlewine 2020 for another approach, where both nominals share their nominal restrictor rather
than a referential index, and referential variance is introduced by situation binding.

Counterexpectation, concession, and free choice in Tibetan
4.

Concessive scalar yin.na’ang

I now turn to the use of yin.na’ang as a focus particle. Specifically, I argue that yin.na’ang
expresses what has been described as “concessive scalar” semantics. Concessive scalarparticles (CSPs) are licensed in a range of non-veridical environments, associate with afocus which is low on a contextual scale, and signal that that point on the scale should be (orhave been) easy to attain—a quality that Kadmon and Landman (1993) describe as a “settle
for less” (p. 385) interpretation, also attested with English even in some cases. CSPs may betranslated as (scale-reversed) ‘even’ in some environments, but are better translated as ‘atleast’ in some environments. Here I offer a first look at the distribution and interpretation ofconcessive scalar yin.na’ang and sketch an analysis for its behavior.
First, we observe that CSP yin.na’ang is licensed by negation in (11). Note that, without
negation, example (11) is judged as unacceptable.In this case, yin.na’ang behaves akin toscale-reversed ‘even.’(11) CSP yin.na’ang licensed by negation:bKra.shis ang[gsum]F -pa yin.na’i
len-*(mi)-’dug.
Tashi
number three-ORD YIN . NA’ ANG receive-NEG-AUX‘He didn’t even get [third]F place.’
CSP yin.na’ang is also licensed in conditionals, as in (12), based on example (2) above.
Here we observe the CSP’s “settle for less” quality more clearly: reading just one book—theeasiest to satisfy, although perhaps not idealis an appropriate focus associate for yin.na’ang,
but reading three books is not. Yin.na’ang in (12) can be translated by ‘at least,’ although at
least is not similarly limited to the weakest element on the scale. Crnič (2011:106) gives atranslation of Slovenian magari in a conditional as ‘even (just).’ Such a translation may also
be appropriate here.
(12) CSP yin.na’ang licensed by a conditional:[Dep [gcig/#gsum]F yin.na’ang klog-na]
yig.tshad mthar.’khyol-gi-red.
book one/three
YIN . NA’ ANG read- COND exam
succeed-IMPF-AUX‘[If [you] read at least [one/three]F book(s)], [you] will pass the exam.’
Finally, yin.na’ang is also licensed in imperatives, as in example (13), imagined as aplea to a difficult child. Here too, the “settle for less” quality is quite clear—eating more
would be good, but the speaker is willing to accept the addressee eating just a little—andtranslations with ‘at least’ or ‘even just’ are both appropriate.
(13) CSP yin.na’ang licensed in an imperative:
Kha.lag [tis]F yin.na’iza-(dang)!
fooda little YIN . NA’ ANG eat-IMP‘Eat at least [a little]F food!’Michael Yoshitaka Erlewine
I propose that treating yin.na’ang as the transparent combination of a copula, conditional
ending, and EVEN scalar particle—with the syntax presented in section 3—allows us toexplain the distribution and interpretation of this CSP use. Again, such a decompositionis also independently motivated for CSPs in Kannada and a number of other dravidian
languages (Balusu, this volume) and Japanese. In addition, Lahiri (2010) notes that the
Spanish CSP aunque sea is literally a concessive conditional marker aunque ‘even if’ withthe subjunctive form of the copular verb sea. The analysis I sketch here is informed by the
discussion in Lahiri 2010.
I begin with discussion of example (11), where yin.na’ang is licensed by negation.
Following my syntactic proposal in section 3, the LF for (11) will schematically be as in(14a). I assume that the relevant places are limited to first, second, and third. This is reflectedin the ordinary semantic value and alternative set denotation (a.k.a. focus-semantic value) of
α in (14b). See footnote 4 above on the interpretation of the indexed pronouns in (14b).
(14) a. LF: EVEN [α if it6 ’s [third]F place, NEG [Tashi got it6 ] ]b. JαKo = ∧ if it6 ’s third place, NEG [Tashi got it6 ]JαKalt = {∧ if it6 ’s n-th place, NEG [Tashi got it6 ] : n ∈ {1, 2, 3}}
Assuming that getting first place is less likely—or more noteworthy; see Herburger 2000—
than second, and second place is in turn less likely than third, it stands to reason that notgetting third place in JαKo is the least likely of the propositions in JαKalt . We thus predictthat the scalar inference of EVEN will be satisfied in (14).
In contrast, without the negation in (14), the prejacent will be the most likely or least
noteworthy alternative, and thus the scalar inference of EVEN cannot be satisfied. In effect,
the scalar particle EVEN serves to explain both the association of yin.na’ang with the weakest
element on a scale (the “settling for less” quality) and the need for a licensing operator, suchas negation, which reverses orderings by likelihood and noteworthiness.
Next, consider the grammatical variant of example (12), with focus ‘one.’ Here, yin.na’ang is itself inside a conditional clause. Assuming that the conditional clause in yin.na’ang
will adjoin to the higher clause at LF, outside of the containing conditional clause, the LF
for (12) will be as in (15a).
(15) a. LF: EVEN [α if it4 ’s [one]F book, [if you read it4 , you will pass the exam] ]b. JαKo = ∧ if it4 ’s one book, [if you read it4 , you will pass the exam]
JαKalt = {∧ if it4 ’s n books, [if you read them4 , you will pass the exam] : n ≥ 1}
The prejacent JαKo claims that, whatever its precise identity, if g(4) is one book and you
read it, you will pass the exam. This is a very weak claim—if you read any book, youwill pass the exam—and it asymmetrically entails and thus is less likely than every otheralternative in JαKalt . The scalar inference of EVEN will thus be satisfied, explaining the
felicity of this structure. Reading more books is fine too, explaining the availability of an ‘atleast’ translation in (12). If instead, the focus ‘one’ in (15) were changed to another numeral,
not the weakest on the scale, the scalar inference of EVEN cannot be satisfied. This explains
the unacceptability of example (12) above with ‘three’ in place of ‘one.’

Counterexpectation, concession, and free choice in Tibetan
Finally, I consider the use of yin.na’ang in the imperative (13). The analysis of such
examples will depend on one’s assumptions regarding the syntax/semantics of the imperative.
Here I sketch one particular approach. I let the conditional clause in yin.na’ang adjoin at LF
to a position within the content of the imperative speech act operator IMP, and take EVEN totake scope above this position, as in (16).
(16) LF for (13): EVEN [α IMP [if it3 is [a little]F food, you eat it3 ]]If we assume that imperatives do not have truth conditions (pace Kaufmann 2012), theycannot be ordered by likelihood or entailment. However, following Herburger’s (2000) moregeneral discussion of even, suppose we adopt a noteworthiness scale, with which we canorder possible speech acts. In a context where a stronger request is also appropriate—for
example, telling the child to eat a lot, or to eat everything—specifically choosing to requestthat they eat a little is noteworthy. The scalar inference of EVEN in (16) will accordingly besatisfied, again reflecting the “settling for less” flavor of the CSP.
5.

Universal free choice with wh + yin.na’ang

Finally, I discuss the use of yin.na’ang to form universal free choice items (FCI) with
wh-words. FCIs are licensed in the scope of certain modal/temporal operators or theirconditionals, and are prohibited from episodic descriptions. Here I will sketch a compositional semantics for these NPIs, building on my general framework for wh-quantification in
Alternative Semantics; see Erlewine 2019 for a recent introduction to this work in progress.
See Erlewine 2020 for an extended presentation of the proposal in this section.
I start by sketching my analysis using example (3) above, ‘Norbu eats anything,’ without
the nominal ‘food.’ (See Erlewine 2020 for discussion with ‘food.’) Following the proposal
in section 3, the LF for this sentence will have the basic shape in (17):(17) a. Literal (3): Norbu eats(IMPF) [even if it’s what] ⇒b. LF: EVEN [α if it5 ’s what, Norbu eats(IMPF) it5 ]I first address the interpretation of the wh-phrase ‘what’ in (17). In the two-dimensional
Alternative Semantics framework for focus semantics adopted here, wh-words have an alternative set denotation that ranges over its domain, but no defined ordinary value (Ramchand
1997, Beck 2006, Kotek 2019). JαKo in (17a) will thus also be undefined, blocking EVEN
from being computed. To repair this issue, I propose the covert ∃ operator in (19).5(18) a. Jga.re ‘what’Ko undefinedb. Jga.re ‘what’Kalt = {x : x inanimate}(19) a. J∃ αKo = JαKalt
W

b. J∃ αKalt = JαKalt

5 The effect of ∃ on the ordinary value is similar to that of the ∃ operator defined in Kratzer and Shimoyama

2002 and Alonso-Ovalle 2006, but these works employ a one-dimensional Hamblin semantics. The ∃ operatorin (19) defines an ordinary value but simply passes up its complement’s alternative set, which will be importantfor modeling this and many other cases of wh-quantification. See Erlewine 2019.

Michael Yoshitaka Erlewine
Placing the covert ∃ in the LF (17b), we yield (20a). Following Arregui et al. 2014 andcitations there, I will model imperfective aspect as a kind of universal modal that quantifies
over a particular set of situations, S.Taking modals to quantify over situation-assignment
pairs, which are then restricted by the conditional (see footnote 4), α in (20a) will have theordinary and alternative set denotations in (20b).
(20) a. LF: EVEN [α if ∃[it5 ’s what], Norbu eats(IMPF) it5 ](revised from (17b))b. JαKo = ∧ ∀hs, gi [s ∈ S ∧ g(5) exists, inanimate → Norbu eats g(5) in s]
JαKalt = {∧ ∀hs, gi [s ∈ S ∧ g(5) = x → Norbu eats g(5) in s] : x inanimate}
Informally, the prejacent JαKo claims that, in all relevant situations with assignment g,
if g(5) exists and is inanimate, Norbu eats it in that situation. Notice that this is a reasonable
paraphrase for the ∀-FCI: whatever it is, Norbu eats it. There was no need here to stipulate
the universal force of the ∀-FCIs; universal force is the natural consequence of allowing thecoindexed referents to vary, parasitic on the modal’s universal quantification.
I furthermore claim that the scalar particle EVEN that is a part of yin.na’ang systematically ensures that the relevant quantification will always be universal. Let’s first see
how EVEN is satisfied in (20) above. We observe that each alternative in JαKalt is itself aconditional proposition, similar to JαKo , but restricted to the case of a particular inanimate individual. The prejacent JαKo is stronger than all of the propositions in JαKalt , asymmetricallyentailing them all, and thus EVEN in (20a) will be satisfied.
Now consider the case where the relevant modal operator is a possibility modal instead.
I illustrate this possibility schematically in (21), with a hypothetical variant of (20) with apossibility modal in place of the universal imperfective operator. Notice that the prejacent
JαKo in (21b) is now systematically weaker than, and asymmetrically entailed by, all of
its alternatives in JαKalt . The scalar inference of EVEN in this case can never be satisfied,leading the structure in (21a) to be judged as ungrammatical.
(21) a. LF: EVEN [α if ∃[it5 ’s what], Norbu CAN eat it5 ]b. JαKo = ∧ ∃hs, gi [s ∈ S ∧ g(5) exists, inanimate ∧ Norbu eats g(5) in s]
JαKalt = {∧ ∃hs, gi [s ∈ S ∧ g(5) = x ∧ Norbu eats g(5) in s] : x inanimate}Wh-yin.na’ang FCIs can however also cooccur with possibility modals, as in (22) below.
However, I claim that in all such cases, the conditional in yin.na’ang associates with a higher
universal operator—in this case, again an imperfective operator. If instead the conditional
restricts the modal base for the possibility modal, we would predict wh-yin.na’ang todescriptively have existential force, but lead to a configuration as in (21) where EVEN cannot
be satisfied. In reality, the interpretation of (22) is unambiguous, with wh-yin.na’ang beinga universal FCI taking scope over the possibility modal. This result is enforced by the scalarparticle in yin.na’ang.

Counterexpectation, concession, and free choice in Tibetan(22) Wh-yin.na’ang FCI with deontic possibility modal:
Nga-’i khyi [(kha.lag) ga.re yin.na’ang] za-chog-gi-red.
1sg-GEN dog food
what YIN . NA’ ANG eat-ALLOWED-IMPF-AUX‘My dog is allowed to eat anything / any food.’∀-FCI > allowed
In addition, we expect the scalar inference of EVEN to be unsatisfiable with an episodic
description, with no modal quantification at all. This explains the infelicity of the whyin.na’ang FCI in examples such as (23):(23) Wh-yin.na’ang ungrammatical in episodic descriptions:*bKra.shis da.lta [(kha.lag) ga.re yin.na’ang] bzas-tshar-song.
Tashi
now
food
what YIN . NA’ ANG eat-finish-AUX
Intended: ≈ ‘Tashi finished eating any food now.’
The proposal here represents a new approach to universal free choice, presented in greater
detail in Erlewine 2020. I claim that the universal force of wh-yin.na’ang ∀-FCIs is parasiticon the universal force of the modal operator which is restricted by yin.na’ang’s conditionalclause. The scalar particle EVEN in yin.na’ang then enforces that this quantification isuniversal, indirectly ensuring that the FCI will itself will descriptively be universal.

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Michael Yoshitaka Erlewine
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