F

Research Title: Britain’s Policy Towards The Kurdish Question,

1915-1923
Research Student: Saad Basheer Eskander
Thesis Degree: PhD
Institute:The London School Of Economics And Political Science
The end of the First World War in 1918 signalled the downfall of the old order in the Middle
East by the virtual death of the Ottoman Empire, with its ancient social, economic and politicalsystem. The consolidation of Britain’s strategic, economic and political position in that region
was bound to affect Kurdistan’s political future, given its determination to re-construct a new
regional order. Indeed, by virtue of its control over most of the former Ottoman territories, Bri­
tain was able to play a leading part in the formation process of the modern Middle East, which
witnessed the emergence of the so-called national states in Mesopotamia and Palestine. The
main objective of this thesis is to understand Britain’s role in the re-partitioning of Kurdistan
between Mesopotamia, Syria and Turkey by examining the evolution of its Kurdish policy andthe various factors that re-shaped it.
Three major conclusions can be derived from the evolution of Britain’s position on the
Kurdish question. The first conclusion is the supremacy of strategic considerations over eco­nomic ones as the principal driving force behind Britain’s policy towards Kurdistan’s future.
The second conclusion is that certain British officials on the ground played an important part in
influencing the future of Kurdistan after the war. Between 1918 and 1920, Colon*J Wilson, in
his capacity as the Civil Commissioner, and Major Noel, in his capacity as the most important
British expert on Kurdish affairs, played a crucial part not only in colouring London’s views on
the Kurdish question, but also in influencing the direction of political developments in South­
ern Kurdistan. In the following period, 1921-1923, Percy Cox, the new High Commissioner,
played a crucial part in Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Iraq. Lastly, examination of Brit­ish policy reveals that in none of its historical phases were Britain’s strategic interests compatible with the nationalist aspirations of the Kurds, unlike those of the ZionistySharifian national­
ist movements. There was always a clear contradiction between the requirements of a suc­cessful British policy towards Turkey and Persia, and the political objectives of the Kurdish
nationalist movement.

1

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Maps

5

A Note On Transliteration

6

Glossary Of Political & Administrative Terms

6

Guide To Abbreviations In Citations

7

Introduction

8

Chapter One
From British Wartime Partition Schemes To British Occupation
Of Southern Parts Of Ottoman Kurdistan

23-Historical Background: The Position Of Kurdistan In Britain’s Ottoman And Persian
Policies Before The First World War

24-The Position Of Kurdistan In Britain’s Imperial Schemes: From The 1915 Bunsen
Committee To The 1916 Sykes-Picot (Tripartite) Agreement

31-The British Occupation Of Southern Kurdistan, 1917-1918

43-Conclusion

53

Chapter Two
British Policy In Southern Kurdistan: October 1918 - August 1920

55

-Indirect British Control And The Establishment Of An Autonomous Kurdish StateIn Southern Kurdistan: Circumstances And Objectives

55-The End Of The Autonomous Kurdish State: Circumstance And Objectives

61-The Imposition Of Direct British Rule And Its Impact On The Political Situation
In Southern Kurdistan

69- London’s Attitudes Towards The Affairs Of Southern Kurdistan

74-The Consequences Of The Imposition Of Direct British Rule In Southern Kurdistan
I For The Kurdish Question

78-Conclusion

81

Chapter Three
The Attitudes Of British Officials On The Ground Towards The Kurdish
Question Between 1918 And 1920: Effects And Reactions

84-Colonel Wilson’s Attitudes Towards The Kurdish Question Between 1918 and 1920

84

-Major Noel’s Approach To The Kurdish Question, 1918-1920

91-The Reactions Of British Authorities In The Middle East To The Views Of Wilson
And Noel On Kurdistan’s Future

101

2

106

-Conclusion
Chapter Four
Regional Dimensions Of Britain’s Kurdish Policy, 1918>1920

108-Kurdish Nationalists, Britain And The Turkish Peace Settlement, 1919-1920

108-The Development Of Britain’s Kurdish Policy In Light Of The Political
Aspirations Of The Armenians And Other Christians, 1918-1920

115-The Sharifian-Mesopotamian Factor And The British Policy Towards Southern
Kurdistan, 1918-1920

129-Conclusion

13 7

Chapter Five
British Policy Towards Kurdistan At The San Remo Peace Conf­
erence: The Terms Of The Sevres Treaty (August 1920)

139-Kurdistan’s Geopolitical And Economic Value And The Limits Of Britain’s Direct
And Indirect Interest

13 9-The Crystallisation Of British Objectives in Kurdistan

14 2-The Implications Of The Sevres Terms In Light Of British Motives

14 8-French Imperial Interests And Britain’s Kurdish Policy

15 2-Persian Territorial Ambitions And Britain’s Kurdish Policy

15 7-Conclusion

161

Chapter Six
Southern Kurdistan Under Britain’s Mesopotamian Mandate:
From Separation To Incorporation, Autumn 1920- Autumn 1923

163

| -The Emergence Of Two British Policy Alternatives At The 1921 Cairo| Conference: Separate Entities Versus Unitary State

164-Cox’s Kurdish Policy In The Wake of The Cairo Conference

167-Churchill’s Approach To The Question Of Southern Kurdistan’s Future

171-The Establishment Of The Second Kurdish Government In Autumn 1922:
Circumstances And Objectives

17 4-Cox And The Formation Of The Second Kurdish Government

17 8-The Reversal Of The British Policy From Separation To Incorporation

18 2-Conclusion

188

Chapter Seven
The Formation Of The Arab State In Mesopotamia And Its Effects
On Britain’s Post-Sevres Policy Towards Southern Kurdistan

19 0-Arab Territorial Ambitions Versus Kurdish Nationalist Aspirations

190-The Establishment Of The Iraqi State And Its Political Implications For The
Future Of Southern Kurdistan

19 6-The Incorporation Of Southern Kurdistan Into The Newly Established Iraqi

3

State: Oil-Economic Considerations

204-The Incorporation Of Southern Kurdistan Into The Newly Established Iraqi
State: Strategic Considerations

208-Conclusion

213

Chapter Eight
British Kurdish Policy: Post-Sevres & The Lausanne Conference

215-Kurdish Nationalists, Britain And The Kurdish Situation Immediately After Sevres 2 1 5-Defensive Versus Offensive Approach To Northern Kurdistan: Britain And The
Containment Of The Kemalist Threat

221-International And Regional Considerations Influencing British Attitudes Towards
The Kurdish Question, 1921-1923

231-Conclusion

24 0

Concluding Remarks

24 2

Bibliography

24 8

4

Introduction
I - The Administrative Division Of Ottoman & Qajar Kurdistan.

18

Chapter One
2- Baghdad Railway Line.
3- Bunsen Committee: First Scheme Of Annexation In Ottoman Kurdistan.
4- Bunsen Committee: Second Scheme Of Annexation In Ottoman Kurdistan.
5- Bunsen Committee: Zones Of Interest In Ottoman Kurdistan.
6- Bunsen Committee: Devolutionary Scheme For The Ottoman Empire.
7- Sharif Hussein Territorial Claims In Ottoman Kurdistan, 1915-1916.
8- Partition Of Ottoman Kurdistan Among The Allies According To The Sykes-Picot (Tripartite)
Agreement Of 1916.

30
34
35
36
38
39
41

Chapter Two
9- The Advance Of British Forces In Southern Kurdistan During The War.
10- The Autonomous Kurdish State.

56
58

Chapter Three
I I - Noel’s Map Of Ottoman And Qajar Kurdistan, 1919.
12- Noel’s Scheme For The Future Of The Six Non-Turkish Wilayets, 1919.

92
100

Chapter Four
13- Kurdish Nationalists’ Definition Of Kurdistan’s Frontiers in 1919.

"

111

14- Armenians’ Claims To Kurdish Areas According To Their Proposed Map Of Armenia At
The Paris Peace Conference In 1919.
15- Assyrians’ Claimed National Homeland In Kurdistan After The First World War.
16- Kurdish Areas Included In The British Proposed Boundaries Of Armenia In 1919.

117
119
120

17- Kurdish Areas Included In The American Proposed Boundaries Of Armenia In 1919.

121

Chapter Five
18- The Partition Of Ottoman Kurdistan Under The Terms Of The 1920 Sevres Treaty.

5

151

A

© o n T m in )@ 9 9 !d m 3 9 ® ffi

With as much consistency as possible, I have used the system of transliteration adopted by the Inter­national Journal of Middle East Studies for Arabic and Turkish. The only exceptions are those words
which have become standard, such is ‘Sheikh’ and ‘Hussein’. The plural of Arabic words has beenmarked by an additional ‘s’ to the singular.

Eastern Kurdistan

Iran’s Kurdistan

Northern Kurdistan

Turkey’s Kurdistan

Southern Kurdistan

Iraq’s Kurdistan

Western Kurdistan

Syria’s Kurdistan

Amir:Prince (An Arab Term)

Hakim-i-Shar’In charge Of Qadha (A Kurdish Term)

Hukmdar:Governor (A Kurdish Term)

Levies:Troops Of Assyrian Soldiers Led By British Officers (Later Included Arabs And Kurds)

Liwa:

Largest Unit Of Local Administration In Iraq (Division)

Mudirliq:

Sub-district

Mudir:

Administrator Of A Mudirliq (Nahiah)

Mutassarif:

Administrator Of A Liwa

Nahiya:Smallest Unit In Local Administration In Iraq (Mudirliq=Sub-district)

Qada:

An Administrative Unit Between A Nahiah And A Liwa (District)

Qaimmaqam:

Administrator Of A Qada

Senjaq:Largest Administrative Unit within A Wilayet (Liwa)

Wilayet:Main Administrative Unit In The Ottoman Empire (Province)

Wali:

Administrator Of A Wilayet6M d li> T© AlbforevHafflQns lira OM n©©!
CAB

Cabinet Records, Public Record Office, (PRO)Capt.

CaptainCO

Colonial Office Records, PRO

Col.

Colonel

DBFP

Documents On British Foreign Policy

Egy. Ex. Force

Egypt Expeditionary ForceFO

Foreign Office Records, PROGHQ

General Headquarters

GOC

General Officer Commanding

HMSO

His Majesty’s Stationery Office

IDCM

Interdepartmental Conference On Middle Eastern Affairs

HR

Iraq Intelligence Report10

India Office

L/P & s/Political And Secret Files Of The India Office, Commonwealth Relations Office,London

Maj.

Major

Mes.Ex.ForceMesopotamia Expeditionary Force

MIR

Mesopotamia Intelligence ReportPRO

Public Record Office (Kew)

S/SSecretary Of StateTPC

Turkish Petroleum Company

WO

War Office Records, PRO7

KewSpanning nine eventful years, from the formation of the Bunsen Committee in April 1915 tothe conclusion of the Lausanne agreement in July 1923, this thesis focuses on Britain’s
secret diplomacy and its official policies towards British-controlled Kurdistan. These years arearguably the most fateful period in modern Kurdish history. They witnessed dramatic politicaldevelopments that initially raised and then dashed Kurdish hopes for unity and indepen­
dence. Given its control of Southern Kurdistan and its leading role in the formation of themodern national states of the Middle East, the examination of Britain’s policy is central to any
understanding of the Kurdish question in the period '1915-1923. Indeed, at the post-war
peace conferences in Paris (1919-1920), San Remo (1920) and Lausanne (1922-1923), Bri­
tain was the most influential power in determining the outcome of the Turkish political and ter­ritorial settlements, with which Kurdistan’s future was closely linked. For the first time, suchinternational meetings considered the political future of the non-Turkish nationalities, such as
the Kurds, the Arabs and the Armenians.
The central argument of this thesis is that Britain both explicitly and implicitly played amajor part in the post-war re-partitioning of Kurdistan. Moreover, it will be argued that in the
period 1918-1923, British officials on the ground played a critical part in influencing the direc­
tion of British Kurdish policy, as they not only prevented the evolution of an autonomous
entity in British-controlled Kurdistan, but also paved the way for its incorporation into the Iraqi
state in 1923. Throughout this thesis, emphasis is placed on identifying and examining theconsiderations that influenced Britain’s short and long-term objectives in all parts of Kurdistan
during and after the First World War. These British considerations were of a strategic, econo­
mic and political nature, but as this thesis argues, the strategic considerations -notably the
security of the sea and land-routes to the British Empire in the east- were of paramount impor­tance. They influenced the nature of the different political schemes which were advocated by
British policy makers for Kurdistan’s future.
British policy is analysed from three different perspectives: local, regional and interna­
tional. The first perspective illuminates the interactive relations between Britain’s imperial inter­
ests and the political aspirations of the Kurdish nationalist movement, particularly in the period
1918-1923. These matters are the focus of chapters two and six, where British motives for theestablishment and the destruction of the first and second Kurdish self-governments are ana­
lysed in depth. Secondly, like other nationality questions that surfaced in the post-war Middle

East -such as those of the Palestinians and the Jews- the Kurdish question was interconnec­
ted with both the Armenian and the Sharifian questions. Chapters four and seven focus on
the effects of the separate political desires pf the Armenians and the Sharifian Arabs for theformation of their own national states on British policy towards Kurdish nationalist aspirations.
Indeed, after the end of the First World War, the British became increasingly aware of theclose connection between deciding Kurdistan’s future and the solution of both the Armenian
question in the period 1918-1921 and the Mesopotamian question in the period 1921-1923.
Thirdly, as a great power, Britain was determined to consolidate its position v/s-3-ws other rival
powers in the post-war Middle East. Examination of the objectives of Britain’s Kurdish policy inchapters five and eight shows that they were partly defined in response to the policy objec­
tives of the other powers, especially France. This thesis explains how Kurdistan’s future wasaffected by the rivalry between Britain and France from 1918 to 1923, which manifested itself
both in their agreement on directly controlling southern and western parts of Kurdistan, and intheir disagreement over the future of the remainder of Kurdistan.
Indirect control, direct control, buffer state and unitary state represent different
courses in British Kurdish policy between 1918 and 1923. These constitute the conceptual
framework of the thesis. The concept of indirect control is used to describe the way in which
the British exercised and consolidated their influence in Kurdistan through local Kurdish
nationalists without making military, financial or political commitments. This indirect control took
the shape of forming an autonomous Kurdish entity under the supervision of British officials inlate October and early November 1918. The concept of direct control is used to describe theway in which British officials conducted the political, economic and security affairs of Southern
Kurdistan after June 1919, without paying any attention to the wishes of local Kurds. The useof the concepts of direct and indirect control is essential to explaining the development ofBritish policy in Southern Kurdistan in the period 1918-1920, while the concepts of buffer
state and unitary state guide the analysis of British Kurdish policy in the mandate period 19211923. According to the concept of the buffer state -which was developed by Winston
Churchill, the Colonial Secretary- Southern Kurdistan was to be formed as a separate entity
from Mesopotamia in order to consolidate the security of the British position in the latter. The
unitary state concept was advocated by Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner for Meso­
potamia, who advocated Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Mesopotamia in order tostrengthen Britain’s positions in the newly-emerging Iraqi state.

The existing literature on modern Kurdish history is very limited in comparison to thaton the history of other Middle Eastern nations. Most of the studies that have been carried out
in the past seven years are mainly concerned with the present Kurdish question and its
increasing effects on political stability in the Middle East following the end of the Cold War.
Having said that, the historical debate among Kurdish and foreign scholars on Britain’s role in
influencing Kurdistan’s post-war political future has traditionally been dominated by two con­tentious issues. The first is concerned with the way in which Britain became interested in
Kurdish affairs and the reasons for that interest. The second deals with the extent to which
Britain and Kurdish nationalists were responsible for the non-materialisation of a Kurdish natio­
nal state after the end of the First World War.
The first British contacts with the Kurds go back to the Eighteenth Century, when Brit­ish travellers and officials of the East India Company began to make journeys to various partsof Ottoman and Qajar Kurdistan. From the political point of view, Britain’s interest in Kurdish
affairs began in the mid-Nineteenth Century and was manifest in several political develop­
ments which reflected the rise of Kurdish nationalism and its subsequent embodiment in theoutbreak of several revolts. The same period witnessed, as Kemal Madhar Ahmad’s book Kur­
distan during the First World War demonstrates, 1 the evolution of Czarist Russia’s interest in
the political, social and economic conditions in Kurdistan. The interferences of European
Powers in Kurdistan’s affairs from the mid-Nineteenth Century onwards became “a permanent
factor” in the modern Kurdish history.? In his examination of the Nineteenth Century Kurdish
nationalist revolts, Nezan Kendal, a Kurdish scholar, speaks of British and French opposition
to the Kurdish revolt of 1855 and underlines their fears concerning an independent Kurdistan
under Russian influence . 3 Similarly, in his assessment of the Kurdish revolt of 1880-1881,
Robert Olson, an American historian, underlines the antagonistic British attitude towards it.4
Britain’s involvement in Kurdish affairs and its opposition towards the insurgent Kurds was pri­marily based on strategic considerations, namely the maintenance of the unity of Ottoman
Turkey and Qajar Persia. Britain feared that such revolts at the heart of Asia Minor and north1* Kamal Madhar Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War, Translated by Ali Maher Ibrahim(London: Saqi Books, 1994).
2* Nezan Kendal, The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background’ -in- Kurdish Culture and
Identity, [ed.] Philip G. Kreyenbroek & Christine Allison (London: Zed Books, 1996), p. 13.
3* Nezan Kendal, The Kurds under the Ottoman Empire’ -in- A People without a Country, the Kurds andKurdistan, (ed.) Gerard Chaliand, Translated by Michael Pallis (London: Zed Books, 1993), p.22.
4* Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989) p.7.

10

west Persia would cause the collapse of Ottoman Turkey and Qajar Persia or, at least, give
Russia an opportunity to extend its influence southwards to the Persian Gulf, India and theMediterranean Sea. Indeed, British records reveal that through senior diplomatic contacts, theBritish Foreign Office relentlessly endeavoured to bring about a modus vivendi between Con­
stantinople and Tehran in order to put down the Kurdish revolt of 1880-1881.5 The principal
objective of British diplomacy was to pre-empt any direct Russian intervention in the affairs of
Persia.
By the early Twentieth Century, British interest in Kurdistan entered a new phasewhen it acquired economic and political influence in what was perceived to be the most impor­tant Kurdish area: the Mosul Wilayet (province). This noteworthy development was a conse­
quence of the steady decline in the power of the central Governments in Constantinople andTehran. This intensified the rivalry among European powers over economic and politicalspheres of influence. The construction of the Baghdad Railway was a symbol of German politi­
cal and economic control over Ottoman Turkey which threatened British strategic and com­
mercial interests in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. It was this development that gave stra­tegic and economic importance to Southern Kurdistan by virtue of its overlooking the Meso­
potamian plain and containing potential oil sources. In his book British Policy in Mesopotamia,
1903-1914, which gives a thorough examination of British interests in Mesopotamia before
the First World War, Stuart Cohen illustrates how Southern Kurdistan (the Mosul Wilayet)
became one of the regions where the British endeavoured to consolidate their position in theface of the threat posed by their German rival. 6 The outbreak of the First World War in 1914
presented Britain with an opportunity to devise more direct means of expanding and consoli­
dating its future influence in Southern Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. Kemal Madhar Ahmad, aKurdish historian, considers British interests in Kurdistan during the war to be primarily of an
economic nature, namely controlling Kurdish oil.7 However, the recommendations of the1915 Bunsen Committee and the terms of the 1916 Sykes-Picot (Tripartite) agreement, inparticular, illustrate that Britain’s interest in Southern Kurdistan was primarily strategic, and only
secondarily economic, as seen in the consolidation of British control over the Persian Gulf andpotential Kurdish oil fields. Such interests were clearly embodied in Britain’s acquisition of a

5* See ‘Correspondence Respecting the Kurdish Invasion of Persia^ No.s 1,2,3 and 4,Parliamentary
Papers, Vol.C, Year 1881.
6* Stuart A. Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia, 1903-1914 {London: Ithaca Press, 1976).
7* Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War, p.189.
11

sphere of influence in Southern Kurdistan under the Sykes-Picot agreement.s

The existing interpretations of the reasons why Britain extended its control to South­
ern Kurdistan at the end of the First World War and immediately after the signing of the
Mudros armistice (30 October 1918) are contradictory. In his analysis of the British advancetowards Southern Kurdistan, David McDowall suggests that Britain’s interest in that area was
accidental, resulting from its occupation of Arab Mesopotamia. 9 By contrast, Ahmad, whoargues that Britain had “long-term plans” in Kurdistan before the war, considers the British
occupation of Southern Kurdistan to be a response to the outbreak of the October Revolu­tion in Russia in 1917.1 0 In his view, “ the most important result of the October Revolution was
to increase Britain’s interest in Kurdistan, now viewing it as a strategic buffer. 11
Central to any debate of the reasons why Britain decided to bring Southern Kurdistan
under its control is the political impact of the dramatic changes that occurred before the end of
the war, notably the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The subsequent Russian
withdrawal from the war and the entry of America into the war against Germany affected theSykes-Picot agreement to the extent that it could no longer serve as a basis for a post-war
Middle Eastern order without undergoing considerable modifications. The disappearance ofRussia as a major player in that important region awakened the old rivalry between Britain andFrance over strategic, political and economic spheres of influence. In the short term, British
control of Southern Kurdistan was dictated by the need to drive the Turks out of the area.The
sudden Russian withdrawal left such a dangerous vacuum in Kurdistan that the British posi­tion in Mesopotamia became increasingly vulnerable to Turkish counter-attacks. At the sametime, the war conditions, as McDowall states, offered the British an ideal opportunity to extend
their control to the French sphere in Southern Kurdistan, 12 which was now perceived to be
strategically and economically important to the short and long term security of Mesopotamia.
When the war ended, Britain found itself in a strong position to determine Kurdistan’s
future because it had under its control large Kurdish areas in Southern and Western Kurdi­
stan. Now Britain needed to frame a well-defined policy in accordance with the strategic, politi-

8* Political Department, India Office, Note on Kurdistan, 14 December 1918, F0371/3386, Public
Record Office (PRO). This Note refers to the Lesser Zab River as the boundary between the British andFrench spheres of influence in Southern Kurdistan.
9* David McDowall, A Modem History of the Kurds, ( London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996) pp.117-118.
10* Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War, pp. 105 & 187.
11* Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War, p. 101.
12* McDowall, A Modem History of the Kurds, p.118.

12

cal and economic realities on the ground. The extension of British control to southern andwestern parts of Kurdistan was welcomed by the majority of local Kurds, whpse towns and vil­lages had been devastated by the war. The Allies’ wartime propaganda generated great
expectations among the Kurds. Some Kurdish nationalists took the Russian side, such as
Abdul Razaq Bedirkhan, a Kurdish prince, while some others attempted to establish politicalcontacts with the British, such as General Cherif Pasha, a high-ranking Ottoman diplomat.
Kurdish nationalists genuinely believed that if they persuaded the Allies, and particularly Bri­tain, of their nationalist cause and the compatibility between British interests and Kurdish poli­tical aspirations, an independent Kurdish state might emerge. Early British measures in Bri­tish-controlled Kurdistan reinforced such Kurdish optimism, notably the establishment of anautonomous Kurdish entity in the British sphere of influence. The immediate aim was toassign local Kurdish leaders the task of restoring normal economic, social and administrative
life under the supervision of British officials. In the absence of a clearly-defined policy towards
Kurdistan’s post-war future and in view of London’s growing anxiety about military, politicaland financial commitments, the British authorities in Baghdad decided to experiment with theidea of Kurdish autonomy.
The co-operation of the Kurdish nationalist leaders with Britain has been subjected tosome criticism. In his| article The Kurds under the Ottoman Empire, Kendal argues that theKurds lost a unique opportunity to achieve a united Kurdistan, largely because their leaderspinned their hopes entirely on Britain and France. In his view, had Kurdish nationalists taken
the initiative to establish a “national Kurdish state” and imposed it as a faitaccompii, the Allies
would have been unable to reverse this development. 13 Given the weakness of the Kurdish
nationalist movement and the inter-connection between the Kurdish question and the Turk­
ish political and territorial settlement, one can argue that without the material support of Britain,
the nationalist Kurds were not capable of taking any major initiative to establish an indepen­
dent Kurdistan as a faitaccompii, as the failure of several Kurdish revolts in the period 19191925 illustrated. The issue, however, was further complicated by the fact that the settlementof the Kurdish question not only affected the Kurds but also the Armenians, the Turks, theArabs and, above all, the imperial interests of Britain and France. Therefore, the establishmentof an independent Kurdistan would have required appropriate internal, regional and interna­
tional conditions. In the case of the Arab territories, for instance, Britain, to some extent, was

13* Kendal, A People without a Country, pp.30-31.

13able to reconcile its strategic and economic interests with Arab nationalist aspirations throughthe establishment of several Arab states. But, the geopolitical position of Kurdistan and Bri­tain’s acute financial problems at home -which made it unwilling to commit itself militarily or poli­tically in Kurdistan- stood in the way of such reconciliation between British strategic interests
and Kurdish nationalist aspirations. Moreover, Major Edward Noel, the British advisor to the
Kurdish Government in 1918, was the only British official who considered such reconciliation
to be viable, and he ultimately failed to persuade London.
It is widely accepted by Kurdish and foreign scholars, such as Ahmad, McDowall andOlson, that the Kurds lost an unprecedented opportunity to establish a state (or several
states) prior to the Sevres treaty. They, however, disagree on the reasons why the Kurds
failed to realise their aspirations. At the centre of this historical debate is Britain’s role in the
post-war partition of Kurdistan. The main conclusion one draws from the writings of Kurdish
scholars is that the “imperialist objectives of Britain’s policy towards Kurdistan had devasta­ting effects on the future of Kurdistan and the Kurdish nationalist movement. It must, how­ever, be remembered that Kurdish historical interpretation of British policy towards Kurdistan
was, to a considerable extent, influenced by the Soviet point of view in that every politicaldevelopment or step taken by the Allies, particularly Britain, has been interpreted in the con­text of the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution and the formation of the Soviet Union. The
containment of Bolshevik Russia, in Ahmad’s view, was the reason why the Allies decided toturn part of Kurdistan into a buffer zone under the terms of the Sevres treaty (August 1 9 2 0 ) . 1 4
Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, a Kurdish scholar, believes that Britain sought the creation of a“reactionary’ Kurdish state ruled by Kurdish feudalists. This would be in the form of a British
protectorate and directed against Bolshevik Russia. 15
As the existing Kurdish approach to Britain’s Kurdish policy is ideological in nature, it
tends to simplify the historical events of the period 1915-1923. One cannot deny the fact thatthe growing Bolshevik threat to British imperial interests in the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar
Kingdom was an important factor that influenced Britain’s post-war Middle Eastern policy. Hav­
ing said that, evidence used in this thesis demonstrates that there were other interactive fac­
tors which particularly influenced Britain’s Kurdish policy, such as the post-war British-French

14* Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War, p. 197.
15* Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, Kurdistan and the Kurds Translated by Miriam JellinkovS (Prague:
Publishing House of the Czechoslovakia Academy of Science, 1965) pp.47-8. It is worth noting that
Ahmad finished his higher education in Moscow, while Ghassemlou lectured in Eastern Europe.

14

rivalry, the revival of the Kurdish nationalist movement, the future of Armenia and the solutionof the Sharifian-Mesopotamian question.
A totally different interpretation of British Kurdish policy from that of the Kurdish scho­lars has been produced by McDowall. He shifts the blame for the failure of the Kurds to estab­lish their own national state onto the Kurdish nationalist leaders. McDowall’s book A Modern
History of the Kurds, portrays Britain’s partition of Kurdistan as a reflection of the existing eco­nomic realities: “trade routes and grain-producing hinter lands” .1 6 According to this interpreta­tion, Britain acted realistically when it modified the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement bybringing Southern Kurdistan under its mandate in order to create a viable economic andadministrative unit in Mesopotamia. McDowall agrees with the logic of the British authorities in
Mesopotamia, that adopting ethnic boundaries between a separate Mesopotamia and aseparate Kurdistan was “strategic and economic nonsense”.17 At the same time, he holds thenationalist Kurds -and their disunity- responsible for the non-materialisation of a Kurdish state.
In his view, Britain searched for one Kurdish leader in order to reach a solution for Northern
Kurdistan’s future. But, “the failure o f the Kurds to produce a credible leadership wasundoubtedly a blow to British hopes”.is
The striking fact about McDowall’s interpretation of the relation between British policy
and Kurdistan’s future is its close resemblance to Colonel Arnold Wilson’s account of theevents given in his own book Mesopotamia 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties. This book has
been described by Peter Sluglett as giving “a vivid picture of the working of the imperial
mind'. 19 McDowall stops short of explaining the effects that British actions had on the deve­
lopment of the Kurdish nationalist movement, especially in Southern Kurdistan. He also
makes no distinction between those Kurdish areas which were of prime importance to Britain,
notably Southern Kurdistan, and those which were not, such as Northern Kurdistan. This the­sis will, therefore, identify the Kurdish areas where British strategic, political and economic
interests were located, and then highlight their interactive relations with the political aspira­tions of the Kurdish nationalist movement.
Generally, in spite of its evident importance, the international aspect of the Kurdish
question has received very little scholarly attention. Writers on the history of the Middle East

16* McDowall, A Modem History of the Kurds, pp.119,121.
17* Ibid, p. 121.
18* Ibid, p. 134.
19* Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932, (London: Ithaca Press, 1976) p.333.

15

have briefly examined the Kurdish question as a pawn in the game of power-politics played
among the Great Powers in the aftermath of the First World War. There is, however, no sys­
tematic and comprehensive study in the existing literature of the international dimension of
the Kurdish question and its place within the context of the British endeavours to establish a
new regional order in the post-war Middle East. By undertaking such a task, this thesis aims tofill this distinct and explicit gap in the existing literature. This thesis, while underlining theimportance of this critical period in modern Kurdish history, intends to contribute to the cur­rent understanding of the historical roots of the Kurdish question, which has, from the late1980's and early 1990’s, once again unequivocally imposed itself upon the stage of interna­
tional politics.

K urdistan A n d <T#te Kurds: P a s t A n d P re s e n t
The origin of Kurds has been a source of controversy as Arabs, Turks and Persians continu­
ally seek to prove that they are of Arab, Turkish and Iranian origins respectively. The Kurds,
however, trace their origin to the Medes, an Indo-European tribe descended from Central
Asia into Kurdistan, where they established a pre-lslamic dynasty between 614 and 550
B.C.2 0 Most Kurds converted to Islam In the Seventh Century. In the following four centuries
the Kurds played a prominent political part in the history of the Middle East. Sultan Saladin was
one of those Kurds who has been renowned for his outstanding rule during the Mediaeval
Crusades, when he led the Muslims against Richard Lion-Heart’s Christian forces. From theearly Sixteenth Century onwards, the importance of Kurdistan’s geopolitical position as anatural buffer zone came to the fore, following the establishment of the Safavid Empire in Per­sia, which entered into a long and a bloody struggle with the Ottoman Empire for control of
the Middle East. Kurdistan is situated at the crossroads between the routes linking Asia to
Europe and the Caucasus to Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean Sea, which make it one of
the world’s most strategically sensitive region. Kendal convincingly argues that these factors
helped facilitate “a series of great invasions which, across the centuries, destroyed the inter­
nal social and political process which would have led to the emergence of a united Kurdish
political entity .*21

Moreover, Kurdistan is a country of extremely rugged mountains andenclosing valleys, descending to foothills and plains. Its inaccessibility has always made it a
20* Nader Entessar, Kurdish Ethonationalism, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 3.
21* Kendal, The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background’, -in- Kurdish Culture and Identity,[ed.] Philip G. Kreyenbroek & Christine Allison (London: Zed Books, 1996), p. 12.

16

natural strategic buffer for the states of the region able to protect their heartland from outside
invasions.
The first major partition of Kurdistan took place in 1515 following the defeat of the
Safavids at the hands of the Ottomans. The latter extended their control to two thirds of Kurdi­
stan. However, the mountainous nature of most Kurdish areas made it extremely difficult for
the Ottomans and Persians to directly control them. This factor, and the need of the Ottomans
and Persians to enlist Kurdish support for their war efforts against each other, enabled several
autonomous Emirates to emerge. In Ottoman Kurdistan, sixteen sovereign Kurdish Emirates
were established which were recognised by Constantinople. For more than four centuries
these Emirates had made the most of the irreconcilable differences between the Turks andthe Persians in order to maintain their autonomous status.2 2 Yet, the very geopolitical positionof Kurdistan, notably its being squeezed between two powerful states, eventually prevented
these Kurdish Emirates from being transformed into much larger political entities, and by the
mid-Nineteenth Century they had disappeared altogether. Kurdish nationalism began to takeshape in reaction to the destruction of these autonomous Emirates by the Ottoman and Per­
sian authorities, who both perceived them as a major threat to their territorial unity. It expres­sed itself in several bloody revolts led by the ousted Kurdish princes and influential religious
leaders. Thus, the Kurdish nationalist movement came into being long before the emergenceof the so-called national states in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, and not after (contrary to theargument of a Persian scholar, Nader Entessar).23 At present, the Kurds are fully aware thatthey form the third most populous nationality in the Middle East behind the Arabs and theTurks, and that they are the largest nationality in the world without a national state. These facts
have made them even more determined to establish an autonomous or independent Kurdi­
stan.
It is not only ancient and modern Kurdish history that is controversial, but also Kurdish
society, land and culture. The term ‘Kurdistan’, which means the land of the Kurds, has beenused since the Twelfth Century, when a large province of that name was established during
the Seljuk period. 24 This was, in Kendal’s view, early evidence of "the distinctive personality”

22* Maria T. O'Shea, The Question of Kurdistan and Iran’s International Borders’, -in- The Boundaries
of Modem Iraq, [ed.] Keith McLachlan, (London: UCL Press, 1994), p. 15.
23* Entessar, Kurdish Ethonationalism, p. 1.
24* See entry on Kurds’ in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol.V, [ed.] W.C. Brice (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981),
pp.438-485.

17

Map One: The Administrative
Division Of Ottoman And Qajar
Kurdistan Before The First WorldWar:rzenjanLake Van(Persian) Azerbijan
Kharput
Ottoman-Persian Frontier

Lake Urmia

Sivas
Limits Of Kurdistan

Van
DiyarbekirL Bitlis

Provincial Boundaries
Source: PRO, F0925/17149& FO371/9021

Kurdistan
Aleppo
The/Mosul Wilayet\ Kermanshah

The Baghdad Wilayetof the Kurds ,25 which Sanjar, the Seljuk ruler of Persia, recognised. At that time, the provinceof Kurdistan comprised the present Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan. Under Ottoman rule, the Diyarbekir Wilayet was called Kurdistan, while in Persia, Kurdistan was (and still is) a province, com­prising one quarter of Eastern Kurdistan. Prince Sharaf Khan Badlisi, the famous Kurdish his­
torian of the Sixteenth Century, was the first person to define the geographical limits of agreater Kurdistan in his book Sharafname.26 There are several maps of Kurdistan in the Public
Record Office (Kew Gardens), the oldest one going back to 1854. The existence of such spe­cific maps, which were sketched by western travellers and scholars in the Nineteenth Century,
demonstrates that Kurdistan had been recognised as being a distinctive geographical, cul­tural and social concept long before the Allies would officially use it as such at the Paris peace
conference (1919-1920). At present, Kurdistan consists of east and south-east Turkey(Northern Kurdistan), northern Iraq (Southern Kurdistan), north and north-west Iran (Eastern
Kurdistan) and northern Syria (Western Kurdistan). In other words, Kurdish areas are directly
contiguous with each other and stretch from the Taurus mountains in the west to the Persian
plateau in the east, from Armenia in the north to the Mesopotamian plain in the south. Having
25* Nezan Kendal, The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background’, p. 10.
26* Amir Sharaf Khan Bedlisi, Sharafname, [ed ] M. Abbasi (Tehran).

18

said that, there is no official or approved demarcation of Kurdistan. The Turks and the Syrians
not only refuse to use Kurdistan as a term, but also deny the existence of the Kurdish people,
whereas Iran and Iraq have considerably reduced the size of the Kurdish areas under theircontrol.
As in the case of Kurdistan’s geographical extent, the exact number of Kurds is very
difficult to specify since Turkey, Syria and Persia do not separate the Kurds from the rest of
the population in their official censuses. In Iraq, where the Government has to indicate thesize of its Kurdish population because of its recognition of nominal Kurdish autonomy, thenumber of Kurds is considerably under-counted. Such Kurds as the Yazidis have been regis­
tered as Arabs, and the same criterion has been applied to all Kurds who live outside the socalled autonomous region. Martin Van Bruinessen calculates the number of Kurds to havebeen between 1 3 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 to 1 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in the m id -19 70 ’s.27 Kendal, who estimates thenumber of Kurds at 3 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in the mid-1990’s, states that Turkish sources admitted theexistence of around 1 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 Kurds in Turkey in 1992. He estimates the numbers of
Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Syria at 8,000,000, 5 ,20 0,00 0, and 1,50 0,00 0 respectively. 28 It must
be remembered that large Kurdish communities live outside Kurdistan. The Kurdish popula­tion in Istanbul is estimated at 2,500,000.29 The Iraqi Government acknowledged the exis­
tence of 800 ,00 0 Kurds in Baghdad during its 1991 negotiations with the Kurdish nationalist
leaders. There are sizable Kurdish communities in Western Europe, in places such as Swe­den, Denmark, Norway, Britain, France, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland. The German
authorities recently estimated the number of Kurds resident there to be 5 00 ,00 0 , mostly
immigrants from Northern Kurdistan.
The vast majority of those Kurds who have left Kurdistan were forced to do so. The
economic and social policies of the central Governments have kept all parts of Kurdistan
grossly under-developed, with high-level of unemployment and poverty, despite it being
exceptionally wealthy in minerals and agriculture. This factor, and the continuing anti-Kurdish
oppression and ongoing armed conflicts between the Kurdish nationalist movement and thestates of the region, has forced many Kurds to leave their towns and villages and seek jobs ora new life in non-Kurdish regions as well as in Western Europe. Through these calculated

27* Martin Van Bruinessen, Agha, Sheikh and State, the Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan,(London& New Jersey: Zed Books, 1992), p. 15.
28* Nezan Kendal, The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background’, pp.7-9.
29* Kendal, The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background’.

19economic social and political policies, the central Governments of the region have been seekdL

ing to de-populate Kurdistan and de-ethnicise the Kurds, so as to createliomogeneous state
where the Kurds would lose their own cultural identity and thus be assimilated by the domi­
nant nationality, i.e. Arabs, Persian or Turks. Having said that, there are still about 25,000,000
Kurds living in partitioned Kurdistan .30 (Map one illustrates the area where the Kurds form thelarge majority of the population and also the administrative division of Kurdistan before 1914).
In spite of the on-going assimilation and integration policies consistently adopted by
the central Governments, the Kurds still enjoy a distinctive national identity and national con­sciousness which make them a nationality per se. Furthermore, Kurdistan asserts itself as a
distinct social, cultural and political concept against the wishes of the central Governments.
The most crucial component of Kurdish identity is Kurdish culture, even though it has notundergone striking development, given the absence of a national Kurdish state and the exis­
tence of an anti-Kurdish environment in the Middle East. As Philip Kreyenbroek and Christine
Allison point out, the Kurds have, in general, "a valid and mature identity of their own”,31 con­trary to the claims of the states where they live. It is remarkable that Kurdish culture has beenable to survive decades of fanatic nationalist policies adopted by the central Governments,
successive civil wars, large-scale deportations of the Kurdish population, massacres of civil­
ians and the premeditated destruction of the Kurdish countryside, especially in Southern Kur­
distan, where more than 4,000 villages and small towns were destroyed and more than
180,000 civilians lives lost. Kendal argues that the lack of freedom of expression and the per­secution of Northern Kurds in the towns under Turkish rule have made Kurdish culture takerefuge in the privacy of family life and in the countryside, where Kurdish music, language,
habits and customs have continued.3 2 This partly explain why many aspects of Kurdish culture
are not in written form. Kreyenbroek and Allison list material culture, such as costume and arte­facts, as an “essential element" of Kurdish cultural identity.3 3
Kurdish language is a vital part of Kurdish identity, and has survived the relentlessanti-Kurdish cultural policies of the ultra-nationalist Governments of the region. Like the Per­
sian and Urdu languages, the Kurdish language belongs to the Indo-European family of lan­
guages, but has a distinct grammar, syntax and vocabulary of its own. It consists of different
30* Kendal, The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background’, p.9.
31* Philip Kreyenbroek & Christine Allison, ‘Introduction’ -in- Kurdish Culture and Identity, op. cit., p.1.
See also David McDowall, The Kurds, (London: Minority Rights Group, Report No.23,1982), p.7.
32* Kendal, The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background’, p.17.
33* Kreyenbroek & Allison, ‘Introduction’, p.4.

20

Kurdish dialects, a fact which applies to many other languages such as Arabic and Persian.
Generally speaking, the Kurdish language has developed little, and never become standar­
dised because the Kurds have not been given the opportunity for this by the states in which
they live. However, there are two main literary languages in Kurdistan which have developedout of the two main Kurdish dialects: Kurmanji and Sorani. The first dialect is spoken by thegreater number of Kurds in Northern and Western Kurdistan, the former Soviet Union, Leba­
non and Israel as well as by a substantial number of Kurds in Southern and Eastern Kurdistan.
The second dialect is spoken by the majority of Kurds in Southern and Eastern Kurdistan.
There are other much smaller dialects such as Gurani and Zaza. At present, Kurdish scholars
are seeking to create a united written language based on the rich profusion of Kurdish dia­
lects. This being said, the absence of a united written language has not been a major obstaclein the way of the development of Kurdish culture or the evolution of a Kurdish national con­sciousness. The rigorousness of the anti-Kurdish policies at cultural, political and economic
levels by the central Governments have helped strengthen Kurdish national consciousness,and have motivated the Kurds more than ever to assert their autonomous cultural identity.
In terms of religion, the overwhelming majority of the Kurds are Sunni Muslims, while
the Shi’i Kurds form a minority. Apart from the non-Muslim Kurds, such as the Yazidis,
Christians and Jews, there are smaller religious groupings, notably the Alevis, Ahl-e Haqqs
and Kakais, that combine features of ancient non-lslamic beliefs with some Shi’i beliefs. 3 4 The
existence of these pre-lslamic elements in Kurdish culture, and most importantly, the fact that
the Sunni Kurds belong to the Shafi'i school of Law (madhab) -which clearly separates themfrom their Turkish and Arab counterparts who are mostly Hanafi- has caused religion, as
Kreyenbroek illustrates, to contribute to “a sense of Kurdish culture”.35

In the last five

decades, religious and sectarian beliefs have not hindered the development of either the
Kurdish nationalist movement or the Kurdish nationalist consciousness. In Eastern Kurdistan,where the Kurds are subjected to Shi’i-Persian rule, Sunni and Shi’i Kurds have exhibited noreligious hostility towards each other.36 in Southern Kurdistan, many Christians, Yazidis andShi’is are members of several Kurdish nationalist parties at leadership and rank and file levels.
What all the Kurds have in common is the social, economic and political inequalities
they have experienced throughout this century. Such inequalities have given rise to a condi34* Philip G. Kreyenbroek, ‘Religion in Kurdistan’ -in- Kurdish Culture and Identity, op. cit., p.95.
35* Ibid, p.93.
36* Entessar, Kurdish Ethonationalism, p. 5.

21

tion akin to internal colonialism. The annual income of a Kurd has always been far less thanthat of his Arab, Persian and Turkish counterparts. Illiteracy, poverty and unemployment arevery high in Kurdistan compared with non-Kurdish regions. The same inequality applies tomany other public services such as health, drinking water and electricity. While Kurdistan has
an abundance of natural resources, such as oil, iron ore and fertile land, all industries are situa­
ted outside it.The policies of the central Governments have been designed to keep parti­
tioned Kurdistan economically and socially backward and totally dependent on the centre,with a view to consolidating their control over the Kurds, and thus, incapacitating the Kurdish
nationalist movement. The Government of President Saddam Hussein has gone so far as todestroy the entire Kurdish countryside, annihilating tens of thousands of civilian Kurds, so as
to resolve Iraq’s Kurdish problem once and for all. From the mid-1980's, the Turkish authori­ties have started a similar process in Northern Kurdistan, where more than 1200 villages havebeen destroyed and hundreds of thousands of people have been force to leave their lands.
The ceaseless endeavours of the Turkish, Iraqi, Syrian and Iranian states to demon­
strate the non-existence of a distinctive Kurdish culture, so as to deny the existence of theKurdish question, explains why asserting Kurdish cultural identity and developing Kurdish
culture both lie at the heart of the political programmes of the Kurdish nationalist movement inall parts of Kurdistan. In the liberated areas of Southern Kurdistan, where a Kurdish administra­tion has been established since 1991, there is an unprecedented cultural revival led by Kurd­
ish intellectuals, including writers, poets, artists, musicians and journals, who have been
engaged in studying all aspects of Kurdish society and history. The operating educational
system is based on the Kurdish language, and has created a Kurdish cultural life not subjec­
ted to the censorship of the pan-Arab Government in Baghdad. This cultural revival has also
taken the form of re-building the Kurdish countryside, which is the most important source ofKurdish culture. Special emphasis is placed on the pre-lslamic aspects of Kurdish cultural
identity, such as by re-integrating the Yazidi Kurds into Kurdish society. In Europe, where sev­
eral Kurdish cultural centres have been established, Kurdish intellectuals have begun “arenaissance”of Kurmanji literature'^ (as well as Sorani literature) through the publication ofjournals, magazines, books, the holding of art exhibitions and the founding of Kurdish radio
and television satellite stations.

37* Joyce Blue, ‘Kurdish Written Literature’, -in- Kurdish Culture and Identity, op. cit., p.25.

22

The term ‘Eastern Question’ has often been used to describe the problem of filling up thepolitical vacuum created by the gradual disappearance of the Ottoman Empire not only from
Europe, but also from North Africa and the modern Middle East. 1 In the decades before 1914,
apart from Lord Salisbury who contemplated a large-scale partition of the Ottoman Empire dur­ing his Premiership (1886-1892 and 1895-1902) , 2 British statesmen were consistent in pur­suing the same policy towards the Eastern Question. This consisted of preserving the territor­
ial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar Kingdom insofar as their heartland was con­cerned, and using them as bulwarks against Russian, and later German, expansionism. Cen­
tral to the British approach to Middle Eastern affairs was the security of India. Lord Curzon
described the Suez Canal, Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf as “part of the maritime frontierof India" .3 To consolidate its control over the strategic sea-route to India, Britain made themost of the power vacuum resulting from the steady decline in the power of both the Ottoman
Empire and the Qajar Kingdom by creating, and then consolidating, its strategic position along
their coasts, notably the Persian Gulf and Sinai Peninsula. The outbreak of the First World War
in 1914 forced Britain to re-consider its Middle Eastern policy in response to Turkey’s entry
into the war in support of the Central Powers, i.e. Germany and Austria-Hungary. Britain and its
main Allies, France and Russia, concluded several agreements to partition the Ottoman terri­
tories according to their own interests. Kurdistan was at the heart of such territorial re­arrangements of the Ottoman Empire.
This chapter explores the historical background of Britain’s interest in the affairs of
Ottoman and Qajar Kurdistan in the context of its Middle Eastern policy. It focuses on the Brit­ish reaction to early Kurdish nationalist revolts as well as the policies of other Powers in theregion. This chapter then proceeds to examine the effects of the outbreak of the First WorldWar on British attitudes towards Kurdistan by focusing on the recommendations of the 1915
Bunsen Committee and, most importantly, on the 1916 Sykes-Picpt (Tripartite) agreement.
1* J.A.R. Marriott, The Eastern Question, an Historical Study in European Diplomacy, (London: Oxford
University Press, 1958), pp.1-3.
2* Keith M. Wilson, Empire and Continent: Studies in British Foreign Policy from the 1880’s to the FirstWorld War, (London & New York: Mansell Publishing, 1982), p.18.
3* Marian Kent, Moguls and Mandarins: Oil, Imperialism and the Middle East in British Foreign Policy,
1900-1940, (London: Frank Cass, 1993) p.11.

23

These two developments reflected Britain’s pressing need to re-define its post-war strategic,
political and economic interests in Ottoman Asia. Finally, this chapter analyses the military andpolitical circumstances surrounding the extension of British control to the southern parts ofOttoman Kurdistan and how this set the stage for subsequent political developments.

Historical Background: The Position Of Kurdistan In Britain’s Ottoman And
Persian Policies Before The First World War
i- <Che Nineteenth Century: tfritain And *ihe Rise O f Kurdish Rationalism
Britain’s views and reaction to the affairs of Kurdistan between the 1830's and 1914 were pri­marily conditioned by strategic considerations, namely the preservation of the territorial integr­
ity of Turkey and Persia insofar as their heartland was concerned. In other words, the British
Government was always in favour of consolidating the authority of the central governments inConstantinople and Tehran over Kurdish regions in east and south-east Turkey and north­west Persia. The prevalence of political stability in these regions, Britain hoped, would thwart
Russia’s attempts to extend its influence southwards by interfering in the internal affairs ofTurkey and Persia. Britain’s desire for the maintenance of the status quo in the heartland of
Turkey and Persia manifested itself in its hostile reaction to several Kurdish revolts and theexisting autonomous Kurdish Emirates, for posing a serious threat to Ottoman and Qajar terri­torial unity.
In 1826, Muhammad Pasha of Rowanduz, a Kurdish notable, declared the Kurdish
regions of Mosul, Mardin and Jezirah-ibn-Omar independent of Ottoman rule. During his
revolt, which lasted until 1837, Muhammad Pasha established contacts with Ibrahim Pasha,
the son of Muhammad Ali, the Viceroy of Egypt, who threatened the very existence of Otto­
man rule. At the time, Britain took the diplomatic initiative by forming a common European
stance in favour of maintaining Ottoman rule and against any such threats from within. In 1842,
Prince Bedirkhan established the autonomous Kurdish Emirate of Botan in Jezirah-ibn-Omar
and then extended his control to large parts of Kurdistan. Fearing for the disintegration of the
Ottoman Empire, Britain as well as France exerted direct pressure on Constantinople todestroy the Kurdish Emirate. They used the issue of the Christian communities’ interests as
an excuse to interfere in internal Ottoman affairs. Local Christians’ opposition to the Kurdish
Emirate was, in Kendal’s view, a result of the anti-Kurdish activities of American and English

24

missionaries. 4 Eventually, the combination of both British and French pressure and growing
Ottoman fears led to the destruction of the Kurdish Emirate in 1847 in the interest of maintain­
ing the authority of the central government. During the Ottoman-Russian War of 1853-1856, agreat Kurdish revolt broke out against the Ottomans with the support of local Christian com­munities. Yazdan Shir, the leader of this revolt, attempted to co-ordinate his military efforts
with the Russian armies. But he failed to establish a direct communication line with Russianforces. According to Ahmad, the Ottoman forces succeeded, with direct British support, insuppressing this revolt.s
The importance of the international factor in Kurdish affairs was first felt by Sheikh
Ubeidullah of Neri, who was the most prominent religious and nationalist leader of his gener­
ation. The political events of 1880-1881 in Kurdistan show that he was well aware of the Eur­
opean and British suspicion of Kurdish nationalism, and how this could jeopardise his efforts
to establish an independent Kurdistan. As soon as Ubeidullah declared his revolt in Septem­
ber 1880, he attempted to establish direct contacts with the European Powers, especially Bri­tain, hoping to avoid incurring their hostility towards his nationalist aims. In one of his letters to
the British General-Consul at Tabriz, Ubeidullah stated thatthe object of his son being sent to Persia was in order to obtain redress for Kurdish grie­vances; the Kurds, having been subjected to ill-usage at the hand of both Turkey and Persia;
he and the other Chiefs of Kurdish tribes are now desirous of establishing Kurdistan upon aunited and [an] independent basisfi
Ubeidullah’s intention was first to defeat the weaker side, Persia, and then turn against thestronger side, Turkey. The execution of these objectives also entailed the achievement of analliance with the Christian communities living on both sides of the Ottoman-Persian frontiers. 7
Ubeidullah continually reassured the European Powers of his political and religious inclina­tion, emphasising that he was not anti-Christian or anti-European and that in an independent
Kurdish state, he would “place Christians and Muslims on a footing of equality".e His emissary
explained to the British Consul-General, William G. Abbott, in October 1880 that all he asked
for wasthe moral support of the European Powers, especially of England, for whom he had the great­
est friendship and regard. The Sheikh asked to be put on trial. If he failed to organise [an inde­
pendent and stable] Kurdistan, he then was prepared to be judged by the Tribunal of Europe
4* Kendal, A People Without A Country, p.21.
5* Ahmad, Kurdistan During The First World War, p.70.
6* Thomson to Granville, 30 October 1880, Inclosure No.22, Correspondence Respecting the Kurdish
Invasion of Persia, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. C, No.5 Year 1881, p. 16.
7* Maj. Trotter to Mr. Goscher, 20 October 1880, ibid, p. 16.
8*lbid.

25

and to abide by the consequences .9
Influenced by the success of the Armenian nationalists in obtaining the sympathy of the Eur­
opean governments, Ubeidullah sought to internationalise the Kurdish question by putting iton the agenda of international conferences. He particularly appealed to Britain to look into thereasons for the Kurdish revolt in order to find a solutiomo. At the same time, he attempted to
involve British officials on the ground in his contacts with the Persian governors in Eastern
Kurdistan. 11
Despite all his efforts, Ubeidullah failed to get anything out of his contacts with, andappeals, to Britain. In his replay to Ubeidullah, Abbott stated that the British Government wasin no way concerned in his dispute with Persia. He therefore declined to discuss the disputewith Ubeidullah, but stated that Britain was “ most anxious that peace and security should bemaintained" within the Ottoman-Qajar borders. 12 The significance of Britain’s attitude towards
the Kurdish revolt lay not so much in its unwillingness to study the Kurdish grievances as in its
relentless efforts to bring the Ottoman and the Qajar governments together against the Kurd­
ish insurgency. British diplomacy focused on urging -and even pressurising- the Turks, via the
British Ambassador at Constantinople, to reach an urgent understanding with the Shah(K\r\g)of Persia to suppress the Kurds by co-ordinating military campaigns on both sides of the Ottoman-Persian frontier. 13 in one of his telegrams, following the early manifestions of the British
failure to bring the Turkish and Persian governments together, Ronald F. Thomson, the Brit­
ish Minister in Tehran, informed Earl Granville, the British Foreign Secretary, that he“continued to urge the Persian Government to co-operate with the Turkish authorities in main­taining order amongst the Kurdish tribes residing in proximity to the Persian border”.1 4
Although there was no Russian complicity in the Kurdish revolt, Britain seemed tobelieve that any internal disturbance in the Kurdish areas in Turkey or Persia would give Rus­
sia a golden opportunity to weaken the two states. Such a prospect would enable Russia to
expand its influence southwards and thus form a serious blow against British strategic inter­ests. Ironically, the Kurdish revolt alarmed Russia even more than Britain. The former went so
far as to accept the Shah's appeal for military assistance and to intervene directly against therevolt. Russia informed Britain that the Kurdish revolt also posed a direct threat to its own terri9* Extracts from Consul-General Abbott’s Diary, Enclosure 1, ibid, p.39.
10* Sheikh Ubeidullah to Dr. Cohran, Inclosure 2, ibid, p.47.
11* Ibid, p.38.
12* Ibid, p39.
13* Mr. Thomson to Earl Granville, 14 May 1880 & Earl Granville to Mr. Goschen, 1 July 1880, ibid, p.1.
14* Mr. Thomson to Earl Granville, Tehran, 24 August 1880, ibid, p. 10.
26tory, where more than 44,000 Russian Kurds lived close to the Russian-Ottoman and Russian-Persian frontiers, and to the Armenians, its local a llie s .1 5 Russian military preparations tointervene in support of the Persian Government against the Kurdish revolt, in turn, increased
the anxiety of the British, who failed to persuade the Turkish and Persian governments to nor­malise their bilateral relations or to co-ordinate temporarily their military efforts against theKurds. Eventually, as soon as it became clear that the Persian forces were gaining the upper
hand in the war with the Kurdish insurgents, Russia reassured Britain that it would not inter­vene.^ However, to forestall “the recurrence of these disorders” in Kurdistan, Russia pro­
posed co-ordinated British-Russian efforts in the future, 17 but, Britain was not interested inany proposal that gave Russia the right to intervene in the internal affairs of Turkey and Persia.
The Ubeidullah revolt underlines the point that Britain adopted a less favourable
approach to Kurdish aspirations than to those of the Armenians. Britain encouraged the Otto­
man and Qajar governments to deal with the Kurdish grievances by force, rather than byadopting political and administrative changes to alleviate Kurdish suffering. The British posi­tion on the issue of reforms in Kurdistan was clearly expressed by the British Vice-Consul at
Van, Emilius Clayton:
It seems unquestionable that autonomy or representative government would be at present tot­
ally out of place in these parts [i.e.Kurdish areas] and what is required is a strong executive inthe hands of a capable man [i.e. Turkish governor] possessing the confidence of Europe. But,
I feel sure also that he will require to be assisted by European subordinates to some extent. 1 8
However, the outbreak of the Kurdish revolt in September 1880 brought to the attention ofsome British officials on the ground, such as Maj. H. Trotter, the British Consul at Erzeraum,
the need to understand Kurdish suffering under Ottoman rule:
There is no doubt that in very many places the Kurds suffer more from misgovernment than theChristians do. They have no Consuls to look up to as their special protectors, no Bishops totelegraph sensational and often exaggerated accounts of their woes; in fact no one to look for[sic] for redress or protection... I can see no reason whatsoever why the sedentary Kurds
should not be subjected to the same laws and institutions as the Christians. 1 9This call for some modification of the British position on Kurdish affairs, through extending
British and European protection of the Kurds under Ottoman rule, passed unheeded by the
British Government. The latter still seemed to believe that any move in the direction of devolu­tion was a step towards dismembering the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar Kingdom, thus giv15* Mr. Plunkett to Earl Granville, 8 November 1880 & I 7 November 1880, ibid, pp.18-19.
16* Earl Granville to Mr. Plunkett. 16 November 1880, ibid, p.24.
17* Earl Granville to the Earl of Dufferin, Foreign Office, 28 January 1881, ibid, p.75.
18* Vice-Consul at Van, Clayton to Maj. Troter, 11 July 1880, ibid, p.7.
19* Maj. Trotter to Mr. Goschen, 14 September 1880, ibid, p. 162.

27

ing the Russians the sought-for opportunity to expand their strategic, political and economic
influence southwards. The British encouraged those political and administrative reforms thatprincipally strengthened the authority of central rule, while offering some improvements as far
as the Christian subjects were concerned. The latter measures were designed to deprive
Russia the opportunity of using Christians as an instrument of its expansionist foreign policy.

ii- T/te Early ^Twentieth Century: *£he in te n sificatio n O f European Pow ers'
Rivalry j for Political And Economic Spheres O f influence
In the early Twentieth Century, the Kurdish nationalist movement in Qajar Kurdistan, like thatof Ottoman Kurdistan, confronted unfriendly British attitudes. During the Constitutional Revo­lution of 1906, the Eastern Kurds played a notable part in supporting the Persian democratic
movement. Like the remainder of the country, Kurdish cities and towns, such as Kermanshah,
Saujbulaq, Senna and Saqiz, established their own Popular Councils (Anjumans) to take over
the running of their own affairs from the representatives of the central government. 2 0 Many
armed Kurds defended the Constitutional movement both against Russian and Turkish inter­
ventions. The disregard of Kurdish political aspirations by the leaders of the Constitutional
movement disappointed the Kurds, who intensified their agitation for self-rule. The growing
strength of the Kurdish nationalist movement that turned East Kurdistan into a state of con­stant disorder and rebellion, and the explicit threat to foreign control over Persia by the Con­
stitutional movement, were the background against which Britain and Russia decided to trans­
form their relations from rivalry to rapprochement over Persian affairs. As a result, Britain andRussia concluded the agreement of 1907 to reconcile their respective interests in various
parts of Persia. It was important, as Keith Robbins points out, that the India Office and the Gov­
ernment of India approved of the agreement since it directly affected India’s security.21
The agreement stated that both countries hadfor geographical and economic reason, a special interest in the maintenance of peace andorder in certain provinces adjoining or in the neighbourhood of the Russian frontier... and thefrontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan. [Both sides seek to avoid] all causes of conflict
between their respective interests in the above-mentioned provinces of Persia.22
Britain and Russia divided Persia into three spheres of influence. Northern Persia, including
20* Ghassemlou, Kurdistan And The Kurds, p.43.
21* Keith Robbins, Politicians, Diplomacy and War in Modern British History, (London: the Hambledon
Press, 1994), p.106
22* Convection between the UK and Russia, Relating to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, Signed at St.
Petersburg, 31 August 1907, Treaty Series, No.34,1907, His Majesty’s Stationary Office (HMSO).

28

most of Eastern Kurdistan, formed the Russian zone. Central Persia became a neutral zone,
while southern Persia, which overlooked the Persian Gulf and adjoined the Indian frontier,
was the British zone. Both sides undertook to respect each others strategic, political and eco­nomic interests in their own respective spheres of influence. Four years later, in the face ofthe continuing political instability in Eastern Kurdistan and Persian Azerbaijan, coupled withfrequent Turkish military incursions across the frontiers, Britain and Russia signed a new pro­
tocol on the Ottoman-Persian frontiers in 1911. Consequently, the Russians superseded theTurks as the occupying force in some unstable Kurdish and Azari areas. Noel Buxton, a British
scholar and a liberal politician who closely observed the policies of the Great Powers towards
the Kurdish and Armenian situation, wrote in 1913 that the 1907 agreement between Britain
and Russia helped restore“public order” to North-West Persia, an aim which they shared with
the Persian Government. He hoped that the Powers would take a similar step towards Otto­
man Kurdistan and Ottoman Armenia to restore political stability.2 3
The British-Russian agreement of 1907 was also aimed against Germany, the new
powerful rival on the political stage of the Middle East. The growing German political and eco­nomic influence in Ottoman Asia, especially after the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, caused
the British to relegate to the background their rivalry with the Russians and to pay special
attention to certain areas that linked with, or were close to, their strategic areas in the Middle
East, such as the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Ottoman Kurdistan and Mesopotamia wereamong the areas that took on new strategic, political and economic stature. Strategically,
Southern Kurdistan became increasingly valuable to Britain because of it being both part ofthe land-route to India and overlooking Mesopotamia. This was clearly manifest in British reac­tion to the construction of the Baghdad Railway, which was to cross Kurdistan. Britain was also
alarmed by Russia’s agreement with Germany at Potsdam in 1910, whereby Russia was tobuild a railway line from Tehran to Khanaqin across Eastern Kurdistan, while Germany under­
took to link this line with the main Baghdad Railway Line. In response to these unwelcome
developments for the British, calls were made for establishing British control over part of theBaghdad Railway Line, which linked Kirkuk to Kifri in Southern Kurdistan (see maptwo).24
There was also growing concern in official British circles, especially the Admiralty and

23* Noel Buxton, The Russians in Armenia’ The Nineteenth Century And After, Vol.IXXIV, JulyDecember 1913, p. 1362. Noel was particularly interested in the affairs of the non-Turkish ethnic andreligious minorities.
24* The 1907 Baghdad Railway Committee, 20 March 1907, F0371/12, PRO, p.10.

29

Map Two: The Baghdad Railway
Line & Other Proposed Railway
Lines In Kurdistan In 1914.

MushCompleted Part Of The
Baghdad Railway Line

Kharput =Van_Malatiya

Lake Urmia

BitlisThe Proposed Baghdad
Railway LineThe Proposed RussianRailway Line' Hakari
Nisibin

The Proposed French
Railway Line
Mosul i.L .. i .-Arbil
Source: Enlarged Extract,
Wolf, J.B., The Diplomatic History of
The Baghdad Railroad, P.6

Senna
Tuz

&

Kifri

British Documents On The Origins
Of The War, 1898-1914(Ed) Gooch, G.P. & Temperley, H.
Facing Page 796

Qasr-i-Shirin■rw*'"

Kermanshah

iani
llam_

the Foreign Office, about the future destination of the oil concessions in Southern Kurdistan
and Mesopotamia, stemming from the construction of the Baghdad Railway Line. British inter­
est in oil was principally motivated by strategic rather than commercial considerations, eventhough private British companies pressed London for official support for their efforts toacquire oil concessions in the Middle East. In the early years of the Twentieth Century, mostof the world’s oil supplies came from the United States and Mexico, the latter being under
American domination. With the increasing use of oil by the British navy, the Admiralty per­ceived as essential to Britain the need to secure its own access to oil sources away from for­eign domination. Oil was becoming central to the Admiralty’s efforts to modernise the navy
simply because it was far more economical and efficient than coal.25 Moreover, the Germannavy emerged as a major rival to the British navy and therefore it was vital for Britain to prevent
Germany from monopolising all oil-related concessions in the Ottoman territories. Indeed, theGerman Baghdad Railway concession contained a close link between the construction of that
railway and the right to carry out oil inspection in the surrounding areas. Against this back­ground, and as the British were alive to the geological similarity between Southern Kurdistan

25* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, pp.35-36.

30

and the oil-bearing zone in neighbouring Persia, which was strong evidence of the existenceof oil fields in the former, they began to exert pressure on Constantinople to grant British com­panies oil concessions in the Mosul and Baghdad Wilayets. However, the only important Brit­ish achievement in the oil sphere by 1914 was to secure 75% of the Turkish Petroleum Com­pany, which searched for oil in Southern Kurdistan and the Baghdad Wilayet, leaving a mere
25% of the shares to the Germans, who had obtained the original oil concession from the
Ottoman authorities in 1903. By 1914, as a result of economic imperialism and the impositionof indirect political control by the European Powers, the Asiatic parts of the Ottoman Empire
were practically turned into various economic and (implicitly) strategic-political zones of inter­ests. In June, Britain and Germany temporarily reconciled their conflicting interests by signingan agreement to draw the boundaries of their commercial zones. Under this agreement, thesouthern part of Kurdistan fell into the German zone, whereas most of Mesopotamia camewithin the British zone. The agreement was short-lived as the First World War broke out twomonths later.
One of the important consequences of the construction of the Baghdad Railway
Line, and the intense rivalry it created among the Powers, was to lend to Southern Kurdistan a
new strategic and economic importance. The British policy of acquiring economic and politicalinfluence was in response to the policies of other Powers, and was still based on the idea of
maintaining the territorial unity of Ottoman Turkey insofar as its heartland was concerned. Dur­ing this period of European rivalry, the British had been engaged both secretly and publicly ingathering information, through missionaries, agents, travellers, scholars and diplomats, about
Kurdistan’s social, economic and political conditions. This is not, however, to suggest that Bri­
tain was planning for -or thinking of- directly controlling the most important part of Kurdistan,but to emphasise the point that by the time the First World War broke out, Britain could notafford to adopt an indifferent position on Kurdish affairs, and that the direction of its imperial
policy was bound to affect Kurdistan’s future.

The Position Of Kurdistan In Britain’s Imperial Schemes: From The Bunsen
Committee To The Sykes-Picot (Tripartite) Agreementi- <1he Recommendations Of<£he 1915 tfunsen Committee
The outbreak of the First World War and Turkey’s subsequent decision to enter the war
against the Allies did not immediately alter the British stance on the issue of preserving Otto­

31

man territorial integrity. J.C. Hurewitz points out how Britain did not yet consider the prospectof partitioning the Ottoman Empire, even though the war entered its tenth month.2 6 The
reversal in British policy towards the Ottoman Empire took place a few months later, when Bri­
tain realised that its imperial strategy no longer depended on the territorial unity of the Otto­
man Empire or even Qajar Persia. This reversal manifested itself in the Constantinople agree­
ment (4 March-10 April 1915), the Hussein-McMahon understanding (July 1915- March 1916)
and, most importantly, the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement. It became clear beyond doubt thatthe aim of Britain and its main Allies, France and Russia, was to dismember the Ottoman
enemy, especially its non-Turkish Wilayets'm Mesopotamia, Greater Syria, Kurdistan and Arm­enia. These striking developments stemmed from the war, and had direct and long term impli­
cations for Kurdistan’s future, as will be explored later.
The Constantinople agreement was initiated by Sergey Sazonov, the RussianForeign
Minister.27 and contained diplomatic exchanges among Russia, Britain and France. Under theagreement, Britain recognised Russian claims to Constantinople and the Straits in exchange
for extending its influence to the neutral zone in Persia and keeping the Muslim Holy Places
and Arabia “independent Mussulman dominion” 2 8 France was to be compensated in Greater
Syria, the Gulf of Alexandretta and Cilicia up to the Taurus mountain range. The Constantino­
ple agreement was an incomplete partition scheme for the Ottoman Empire and made noreference to the future of Anatolia, Kurdistan, Armenia ? and Mesopotamia. Moreover, Britain
was under pressure from its Allies to formulate quickly its war aims and territorial ambitions in
the Middle East .29 Against this background, Herbert Henry Asquith, the British Prime Mini­
ster, appointed an interdepartmental Committee in April 1915, so as to define post-war British
interests in the Ottoman Empire, and to identify necessary measures to consolidate them bypolitical means. Maurice de Bunsen, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign
Office, chaired the Committee which included representatives from the Foreign, War and India
Offices, the Board of Trade and the Admiralty. Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Sykes was the perso­
nal representative of Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, at the Committee. The

26* J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. I, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co.,
1965), p.26.
27* Howard M. Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East, 1914-1924, (New York: Alfred A Knopf,1969), p. 153.
28* Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, pp. 18-19.
29* Aaron S. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: the Cairo Conference of 1921,(London: the Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p.4.

32

outbreak of war in the Middle East drew the India and War Offices into the policy-making pro­
cess insofar as it affected the future of the Ottoman territories. The main reason for this deve­
lopment was that the India Government provided and controlled the expeditionary force that
invaded southern Mesopotamia in November 1914,3 0 with a view to consolidating British con­trol over the Gulf region. By contrast, the War Office under Lord Kitchener was anxious overcreating political conditions in the Middle East that would prevent a Turkish-Arab Coalition,and thus, help the Egyptian expeditionary force to defeat the Turks in Arabia and Greater
Syria.
Having held thirteen meetings in the period between 12 April and 28 May 1915, theBunsen Committee submitted its final report on 30 June. Its recommendations were neverofficially approved pr fully applied by the British Government. Nevertheless, apart from provi­
ding useful insights into British foreign policy thinking, the recommendations influenced, in
one way or another, British post-war policy towards the Middle East and Kurdistan in particular.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine its four proposed alternatives for the political and admin­
istrative future of Ottoman Wifayets and its implications for Ottoman Kurdistan. The report
identified two main factors that imposed limitations on any future British policy towards Otto­
man Asia. Firstly, Britain had to take into consideration the aims and interests of its Allies,
especially France and Russia, in post-war Ottoman territories. 31 Secondly, the British Govern­
ment had to strike a balance between imperial advantages, resulting from any re-drawing or
modification of the political and economic conditions in Ottoman Asia, and imperial responsibi­
litie s ^ The latter factor was too great to ignore due to the huge size of the British Empire.
Based on Alternative A, which entailed the partition of the Ottoman Empire among
Britain, France and Russia, the first scheme of the Bunsen Committee included British
annexation of the largest part of Ottoman Kurdistan (see map three). The second largest part
would be under “Special Administration”, i.e. not under the control of a single Power. The
Baghdad Railway Line passed through these would-be British controlled areas of Kurdistan.
Strategically, the British motive was to secure firm control over the Basra Wilayet, vital to thesecurity of the Persian Gulf. In other words, to prevent other Powers from threatening its inter­
ests in the Basra Wilayet, Britain had to control the Baghdad Wilayet. Similarly, to establish firm
control over the Baghdad Wilayet, Britain had to extend its direct control northwards where
30* Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East, p.54.
31* Cabinet, Ad Hoc Committee (Secret) Report, Proceedings and Appendices of a Committee Appoin­ted by the Prime Minister, 1915, British Desiderata in Turkey and in Asia’, CAB 27/1, PRO, Paragraph 7.
32* Ibid, Paragraph 10.

33

Map Three: The Bunsen Com­mittee’s First Scheme Of
Annexation In Kurdistan
Lake Van

IB Britain

F France

IR Russia

SA Special
Administration

Lake Urmia

Diyarbekir
Hakari
MardinSource: Enlarged Extract,
CAB 37/1, PRO

Nisibij

Mosul
Sulaimaniy^J Senna
KirkukKermanshah

the rough mountains of Kurdistan could serve as natural strategic barriers against southwards
expansionism by rival powers .33 Kurdistan, the report explained, offered both favourable
weather conditions for “white British troops", and an “excellent source for recruits" from thenative K u r d s . 3 4 it is worth noting that the argument concerning the strategic value of Kurdistan
reemerged following the war, when Col. Arnold Wilson, the future Acting Civil Commissioner,
presented it as his rationale for replacing indirect British control with direct British administra­tion in Southern Kurdistan. Between 1921 and 1923, the strategic argument was once moreused to justify the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into the newly-established Iraqi state.
Although the above mentioned Kurdish areas had less economic value
in comparison with its strategic importance, the report pointed out that:
oil again makes it desirable for us to carry our control on to Mosul, in the vicinity of whichplace, there are valuable wells, possession of which by another Power would be prejudicial to
our interests. 3 5
British control of the Kurdish areas was also necessary for the irrigation of Arab Mesopotamia
and the existing river navigation system. Moreover, Kurdistan was considered by the India

33* Ibid, Paragraphs 21-22.
34* Ibid, Paragraph 22.
35* Ibid, Paragraph 26.

34

Map Four: The Bunsen Com­mittee’s Second Scheme Of
Annexation In Kurdistan
Lake VanMush

B Britain
IR Russia

F France
SA Special
Administration

Lake Urmia

Diyarbekir
MardinHakari

Source: Enlarged Extract,
CAB 37/1 PRO
Mosul

Sulaimaniya»-3 Senna
KirkukKermanshah

Government as being an essential part of any British scheme to revive the agriculture of Meso­
potamia and make it the granary of the Empire. In irrigation and river navigation, the British not
only had pre-war concessionaires, but also inaugurated some schemes which made themeven more concerned about consolidating their position in the country. 36 Following the war,
the potential oil wealth of Southern Kurdistan and its economic value for British interests in
Mesopotamia become one of the reasons for its inclusion in the British mandate over Meso­
potamia and its later incorporation into the Iraqi state. According to these strategic and econo­
mic considerations, Ottoman Kurdistan had to be partitioned. To achieve its strategic and eco­nomic aims, Britain, the report remarked, should be prepared to adopt a second partition
scheme (see map four). This would enable France to extend its territories from the Mediterra­nean coast in the west to Urmia (East Kurdistan), with Britain giving up part of its share in Kurdi­
stan .37 Russia also had to be compensated by incorporating northern Persia and East Kurdi­
stan, which were already within its sphere of influence before the war.38 The latter conces­sion, the report underlined, would make it more significant to Britain to establish firm control

36* Ibid, Paragraphs 24, 27-29.
37* Ibid, Paragraph 34.
38* Ibid, Paragraph 41.

35

Map Five: The Bunsen Commit­
tee’s Zones Of Interest In Kur­
distanLake VanMush!B Britain
IR Russia

F French
SA Special
Administration

Lake Urmia

Diyarbekir
Hakari
MardinSource: Enlarged Extract,
CAB 37/1 PRO
Mosul
Sulaimaniya

KirkukKermanshah

over Southern Kurdistan, with a view to preventing future Russian expansion southwards to
Baghdad and B a s ra . 39
Alternative B consisted of dividing Ottoman Asian territories into zones of interests
under the domination of the European Powers (see map five ) .40 Apart from giving Constanti­
nople to Russia, the Basra Wilayet to Britain and, perhaps, Smyrna to Greece, the rest of the
Ottoman Empire was not to be dismembered. The British zone would include, as in the sec­
ond scheme of Alternative A, Southern Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. 41 British motives were
the same as those in Alternative A. The French zone would include a sizable part of Northern
Kurdistan. Britain and other European Powers might contemplate the idea of implementing
certain social and administrative reforms within their respective zones in order to put an end to
Ottoman maladministration. Such reforms might require the establishment of a “permanentinternational board’1.42 However, applying Alternative B, the report warned, might “easily leadto a condition o f anarchy1' in Kurdistan and Asia Minor, as a direct consequence of undermin-

39* Ibid, Paragraph 43.
40* Ibid, Paragraph 48.
41* Ibid, Paragraph 52.
42* Ibid, Paragraphs 62-64.

36

ing the authority of the Ottoman Sultan.43
Alternative C was based on *the maintenance of an independent Ottoman Empire" as
it existed. Under this scheme, Turkey would only cede the same above mentioned territories
to Britain, Russia and Greece. It would have to apply an Armenian reform scheme on the lines
adopted in 1914. The report did not recommend this alternative, fearing certain conse­
quences, such as consolidating the political and economic influences of Russia and France
respectively, as well as the outbreak of rebellions within the unreformed Turkey. The latterdevelopment would practically result in unplanned partitions of the Ottoman Empire, which
Britain had to avoid. 4 4 in other words, Britain opposed any spontaneous partition of Ottoman
Asia and the emergence of new political and administrative entities, without giving prior con­siderations to its implications for British strategic, political and economic interests.
Alternative D was based on the maintenance of an independent Ottoman Empire witha de-centralised system of administration. As “Turkey in Asia falls ethnically and historically into
five great provinces- Anatolia, Armenia, Syria, Palestine and Ira q -J e z ira h ",^ the report conclu­
ded, the Ottoman Government should adopt “ a measure of devolution, which would satisfy
the aspirations of the Arabs and Armenians to have a voice in the administration o f their
immediateaffaird .46 In case it failed, this scheme left the way open for the creation of “ several
autonomous states": Turkey proper in Anatolia, an Armenian and an Arab federation under anominal suzerainty of the Sultan (see map six) . 47 Furthermore, if the Ottoman Empire disinte­
grated, Britain would still be able to pursue its policy with regard to the Syria and Iraq-Jezirah
Wilayets. Britain could declare them “independent states" under its protection, “annex" them,or declare them to be part of its “sphere of influence" according to the circumstances.48
While dismissing the first three alternatives, the report eventually recommended thelast one because it would not compel Britain to assume any immediate or direct militaryresponsibilities in the region. It also offered the ideal way to control the prospective disintegra­
tion of the Ottoman Empire in a manner that served to consolidated British strategic, politicaland economic interests. This alternative was seemingly based on the idea of self-rule for nonTurkish nationalities. Yet, it overlooked political aspirations of the Kurds, who, in Mark Sykes’

43* Ibid, Paragraph 67.
44* Ibid, Paragraphs 73-73.
45* Ibid, Paragraph 81.
46* Ibid, Paragraph 85.
47* Ibid, Paragraph 87.
48* Ibid, Paragraph 88.

37Map Six: The Bunsen Commit­
tee’s Devolutionary Scheme For
The Ottoman Empire

An
Lake Van

Source: Enlarged Extract,
CAB 37/1, PRO

Lake Urmia

Mosui ySenna

Kermanshah

view, had no “sense of nationality" of any kind whatsoever:A consolidated Kurdistan is an impossibility. There is no reason why the distribution of
the Kurds should dictate frontiers or why [the] Kurds should be regarded as a people
who required consolidation. 49
Thus, Alternative D meant a partition of Ottoman Kurdistan among new ethnic entities. North­ern Kurdistan would be part of Armenia, while Southern Kurdistan would be within IraqJezirah. Following the war, British officials in Mesopotamia advocated similar schemes byreiterating Mark Sykes’ argument.

ii- T fie Hussein-JVlcJVlahon C o rres p o n d e n ce A n d T h e S y k e s -P ic o t A g re e m e n t

Official contacts with Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca, were jointly initiated by the Foreign Officeand the War Office in July 1915.50 Their immediate objective was to detach the Asian Arabs
from their allegiance to the Sublime Porte, and enlist their support for British war efforts
against Ottoman forces, whereas Hussein’s principal objective was to establish a great Arabstate with Britain’s assistance. The India Office opposed the idea of enlisting Arab support
49* Ibid, Appendix IX, Remarks on Sir A. Hirtzel’s Note by Lieut.-Col. Sir M. Sykes, 15 March 1915,
pp.100-101
50* Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. I, p.47.
38

Map Seven: The HusseinMcMahon Correspondence,
1915-1916
Lake Van
Kharput

MushMalatiya

Van

Lake Urmia

BitlisDiyarbekir

Hussein’s Territorial
Claims In Kurdistan

Hakari
Urfa

Mardin:NisibinJezirahMosul■ Sulaimaniya
Kirkuk —

jH

Senna

Kifri

Kermanshah

because it feared that the ensuing political commitments might diametrically contradict post­
war British imperial interests, 51 notably the colonisation of Mesopotamia for the benefit of theGovernment of India. The formal correspondence between Henry McMahon, the British HighCommissioner for Egypt, and Hussein, stretched out over an eight months period (14 July
1915-10 March 1916) and consisted of ten letters. The first striking point in these letters is Bri­tain’s abandonment of the principle of preserving Ottoman territorial integrity. At another level,
it formed the beginning of Arab claims to a large segment of Ottoman Kurdistan. In this corre­
spondence, Sharif Hussein demanded the inclusion of a large portion of Ottoman Kurdistan
into his future Arab state after the war (see map seven). The opening letter of the formal corre­
spondence contains Hussein’s proposal:
England [is] to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by
Mersina and Adana up to the 37 latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Mardin, Jezirah [ibnOmar], Amadia up to the border of Persian
Initially, Britain viewed the question of the limits and boundaries of the would-be Arab state as

51* Ibid.
52* Letter No.1, From Amir Abdullah to Ronald Storrs, The Correspondence between Sir Henry
McMahon, His Majesty’s High Commissioner at Cairo, and the Sharif Hussein of Mecca, July 1915March 1916, Cmd 5957.

39

“p re m a tu re ”,53 whereas Hussein insisted on discussing it first, arguing that “within theselimits” he had not included places inhabited by "a foreign race”. 5 4 After accepting Hussein’s
demands in principle, McMahon excluded such Arab areas as Alexandretta from the future
Arab state, while not objecting to the inclusion of a large portion of Kurdistan into that state . 55
Hussein based his demands for the inclusion of the Mosul Wilayet within his future state on
the historical and sentimental grounds that in the middle ages it had been part of the ArabIslamic Empire and therefore had a special value for the Arabs. 56 The issue of the boundariesof the Arab state was significant because it was used later by Sharif Feisal (as King of Syria in
1919 and as King of Iraq in 1921) as British acknowledgement of his legitimate demands forincluding Western Kurdistan in Syria and then Southern Kurdistan into Iraq.
Just one month before Hussein declared his revolt against Turkey, the Foreign Mini­
sters of Britain, France and Russia entered into a secret agreement, governing their own parti­
tion of the Ottoman Empire. Unlike the Constantinople agreement, the Sykes-Picot agree­
ment (26 April-23 October 1916), which is also known as the Tripartite agreement (following
Russia’s entry into the negotiations between France and Britain), formed the most compre­
hensive scheme for the partition of the Ottoman Empire and represented a radical change in
Britain’s interest in Kurdistan. It not only aimed to bring under British influence part of Kurdi­
stan but also to directly determine the future of the remainder of the region. These agree­ments were the outcome of the exchange of eleven letters among the principal Allies: Britain,
France and Russia. It constituted an urgent plan for the post-war political and territorial futureof the Ottoman Empire. It was Britain that took the initiative, after the war lingered on in spite ofAllied initial optimism about its early conclusion. In contrast to the Bunsen Committee’s recom­
mendations in favour of adopting the decentralisation option, the Sykes-Picot agreement was
based on the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The territorial unity of the latter was no longer
the cornerstone of British imperial strategy, which now focused on establishing direct andindirect British control in Mesopotamia and Southern Kurdistan with the aim of consolidating
British authority over the important sea and land routes to

India.

Points One, Two, Four and Nine in the French-British agreement particularly affected
Kurdistan’s future. Point One consisted of a British-French undertaking to recognise and pro­tect an independent Arab state or a confederation of Arab states under an Arab Chief in the
53* Letter No.2, From Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein, 30 August 1915, ibid.
54* Letter No.3, From Sharif Hussein, 9 September 1915, ibid.
55* Letter No.4, From Sir Henry McMahon, 24 October 1915, ibid.
56* Letter No.5, From Sharif Hussein, 5 November 1915, ibid.

40

Map Eight: The Partition Of Kurdi­
stan Among The Allies Under The
Terms Of The 1916 Sykes-Picot(Tripartite) Agreement

French Sphere Of Influ­
ence (Blue Area)

Lake Urmia

British Sphere Of
Influence (Red Area)
Direct Russian Control
Mosul
Senna

Direct French Control

Kermanshah

areas A and B. Point Two allowed France and Britain to create a "direct or indirect administra­tion or control” . Point Four granted Britain, apart from the port of Haifa and Acre, "a given sup­ply o f water from the Tigris and Euphrates in the area A for area B ”. In Point Nine France
agreed not to enter any negotiation or cede its rights in the blue area to any third party, apartfrom the Arab state or confederation of Arab states. 57 Under the Tripartite agreement Russia
was to "annex“the regions of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis up to a point subsequently
to be determined on the littoral of the Black Sea to the west of Trebizond. Russia would also
bring under its control "the region o f Kurdistan to the south o f Van and Bitlis between Mush,
Sert, the course of the Tigris, Jezirah-ibn-Omar, the crest-line o f the mountains which domina­
ted Amadia and the region o f Merga Van” (see map eight). Britain and Russia also agreed that“the frontier of the Arab state” would start from the region of Merga Van and follow the crestline of the mountains, which divided the Ottoman and Persian Dominions.58 Britain andFrance in particular hoped that the spirit of their co-operation and consultation, which charac-

57* Grey to Cambon, 16 May 1916, Tripartite (Sykes-Picot) Agreement on the Partition of the Ottoman
Empire: Britain, France and Russia, 26 April-23 October 1916, Documents on British Foreign Policy(DBFP), 1st series, Vol. IV, (ed) Woodward & Butler, p.24151.
58* Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, 23 October 1916, ibid.

41

terised their agreement, would continue to govern their post-war bilateral relations.59

The main feature of these secret agreements was not only its disregard of the Kurdish
question, but also its aim of further partitioning Kurdistan. Moreover, through turning South­
ern Kurdistan into French and British spheres of influence under nominal Arab rule, Mark
Sykes sought to reconcile the claims of the French, the British and the Sharifians to thearea 6 0 in light of this, it can be said that Sykes-Picot underlined direct British interest in south­
ern parts of Kurdistan, contrary to what McDowall assumes. 61 In Point One of the FrenchBritish understanding, Area A, which belonged to the French sphere of influence, included
the area west of the Lesser Zab River in Southern Kurdistan, whereas Area B, which
belonged to the British sphere of influence, extended from the area east of the Lesser Zab
River to the old Ottoman-Persian frontier. In Point Two, the French blue area of direct control
included the western part of Northern Kurdistan. In Points One and Two of the British-Russian
understanding, Russia was to annex the eastern part of Northern Kurdistan and a small strip ofland in Southern Kurdistan. This and Point Nine of the French-British understanding revealed
how the War Office was anxious, on military grounds, to avoid any direct contact with Russian
territories. In this respect, the Bunsen Committee’s final report pointed out earlier that, if Rus­
sia became Britain’s neighbour in Mesopotamia, Britain should take into consideration, when
making defensive arrangements for the new annexed territory, that Russia put“in the field in
Manchuria an army exceeding three quarters of a million men”. 6 2 it clearly implied that Britain
should avoid the prospect of creating a common British-Russian boundary when making new
territorial arrangements in the Ottoman Empire. It was hoped, from the British viewpoint, thatby turning Area A into a French sphere of influence and the blue area into French direct con­trol, a barrier would be created against any future Russian expansion towards the south,
where direct and indirect zones of British control existed.
Even though Britain included in its sphere of influence (i.e. Area B) the Kurdish areaof Kirkuk, where oil was strongly suspected to exist, the Admiralty was still critical of the parti­
tion of the Mosul Wilayet between Britain and France. It wanted Britain to exclusively control
the potential oil sources to the north and the south of the Lesser Zab River. In a Cabinet mem­orandum, Admiral Edmond Slade reiterated the importance of oil to the Admiralty’s plans to

59* Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World, p.13.
60* Secret Memorandum for the War Department No.2522,5 January 1916, F0371/2767, PRO.
61 * McDowall, A Modem History of the Kurds, p.117.
62* The Bunsen Committee.., op. cit., Paragraph 43.

42modernise its navy and the need to secure all oil rights in Mesopotamia and elsewhere.63 Afterall, oil considerations were what motivated the Admiralty, under Winston Churchill, to encour­
age the Indian Government to organise the Mesopotamian campaign at the start, so as to pro­tect the oil fields of southern Persia.64 As the war dragged on, the Admiralty’s argument
found support among other official circles in London, such as the Air Ministry and, mostimportantly, the Foreign Office. The war was a new factor that accentuated Britain’s need toobtain secure oil supplies under war conditions, and this could not be achieved unless Britain
imposed its direct and indirect control over those areas which had potential oil sources, suchas the Mosul Wilayet.

The British Occupation Of Southern Kurdistan, 1917-1918
i- tfrita in And Kurdish A ffairs On <Che Eve o f the J irs t World W ar
By the late Nineteenth Century, Kurdish nationalists became convinced that the way to realise
their political aspirations was to internationalise their cause by acquiring the support of Eur­
opean Powers. As previously mentioned, Ubeidullah unsuccessfully attempted to establish
contacts with the existing Powers, especially Britain. The outward orientation of the Kurdish
nationalist movement was influenced by two factors. The first factor was that it encountered
two powerful enemies: the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar Kingdom. The second factor was
the very unfavourable geopolitical position of Kurdistan as a land-locked country, surroundedby its adversaries on all sides. In order for Kurdish nationalists to succeed in their struggle fornational rights, they realised that outside help was needed. As far as this eventuality was con­cerned, the Kurds had two options, reflecting the existing political and geographical circum­
stances: to seek the assistance of either Great Britain, the most liberal Power, or of Czarist
Russia, the nearest geographical Power to Kurdistan. This is not, however, to suggest that
Kurdish nationalists had a clear strategy towards the Powers, but to emphasise the point that
there was general realisation among Kurdish nationalists that they needed to prevent any
clash between Kurdish national aspirations and whatever interests the Powers might have inKurdistan, and that they should make the most of any deterioration in international and regio­
nal relations.
In spite of many Kurdish efforts to obtain some form of outside support, none of the
63* Vice Admiral Edmond Slade, Memorandum on The Political Position in the Persian Gulf at end of the
War (Cabinet Paper, G118) 31 October 1916, CAB21/119, PRO.
64* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, p.24.

43

Powers was willing to support the Kurds prior to the outbreak of the First World War, apart from
Russia, whose geographical closeness to Kurdistan made it an important player in Kurdish
affairs. With Russian assistance -in the form of arms and money- Prince Abdul Razaq Bedirkhan, a Kurdish nationalist and a former Ottoman diplomat, secretly organised an anti-Turkish
movement, which included Kurdish officers of the Ottoman army and the tribes of the Bitlis,
Van and Botan regions. His aim was the establishment of Kurdish rule under direct Russian
protection.65 Buxton argued, after visiting Armenia in 1913, that Russia’s aim in sponsoring
the Kurdish movement was to keep the Kurds from “making terms with the Turks or with theChristians so as to to keep up the excuse for possible intervention"66 in April 1913, an orga­
nised Kurdish revolt broke out in Northern Kurdistan under Abdul Razaq and spread toSouthern Kurdistan. Other principal Kurdish nationalists of Eastern Kurdistan, such as Ismail
Agha Simko (the head of the Shikak Kurds) and Said Taha (the grandson of Ubeidullah), took
part in this revolt. It seems that the Kurdish nationalists hoped that the present Turkish military
retreat in the Balkans in 1912-1913 and Kurdish appeals to the Armenians and other
Christians to join the armed revolt -a step which also aimed to reassure the European Powersof their political intentions- would bring broader international support for the Kurdish cause.
The British Consul in Mosul, who closely watched these developments, dismissed Turkish
claim that the revolt was a Russian plot, emphasising its internal origin, which stemmed fromthe anti-Kurdish policies of the Young Turk Government.67 Following the failure of the Abdul
Razaq movement, an unsuccessful revolt took place in Bitlis in Northern Kurdistan, which
spread to Southern Kurdistan. The latter was the scene of another revolt by the Barzani Kurds
which broke out in spring 1914. According to Madhar Ahmad, the leader of the Barzans,
Abdul Salam asked for British and Russian assistance's in other parts of Southern Kurdistan,the Hamawands were in a state of continuous rebellion, while the Bajlan of the Khanaqin
region and the Jaf tribes had serious friction with the Turkish Government.69
On the eve of the First World War, Sheikh Mahmud, the most influential nationalist fig­
ure in Southern Kurdistan, made his first contacts with European Powers via the Mixed Boun­dary Commission, which attempted to resolve the outstanding boundary dispute between the

65* G. Lowther to Edward Grey, Pera, 9 December 1911, Enclosure 2 in No.1, from Acting Vice Consul
Safrastian to Consul McGregor Bitlis, 17 November 1911, F0371/1263, PRO.
66* Noel Buxton, The Russians in Armenia’, pp.1362-1363.
67* G. Lowther to Edward Grey, Constantinople, 22 May & 8 August 1913, F0371/1773, PRO.
68* Ahmad, Kurdistan DyrlpgThe First World War, p.67.
69* Cox, Memorandum, 7 p^cqrp^ef 1918, FO371/3407, PRO.

44

representatives. Mahmud hoped that with European aid he could drive the Turks out ofSouthern Kurdistan by force. 7 0 Only the Russians showed some interest in Mahmud’s propo­
sal and established contacts with him through their Consuls in Turkey and Persia. Yet nothing
concrete came out of these contacts. A similar orientation was displayed by such principal
Kurdish tribes in Southern Kurdistan as the Hamawand, Jaf and Dizai, who were prepared tocall in Russian aid against the Turks. 71 In Eastern Kurdistan, political disorder was the prevail­ing feature, as the power of the central government was rapidly declining. Thus, on the eve of
the First World War, the opposition of the Kurdish nationalist movement to Turkish and Per­
sian rule was reaching an unprecedented degree throughout partitioned Kurdistan.

11- <Tfte Outbreak O f ‘The Jirst World W ar
It was not until the outbreak of the war that the Kurds believed the new conditions offered an
ideal opportunity to realise their national aspirations with the aid of the Allies, who were at war
with the Turks. In spring 1915, a Kurdish revolt broke out in Botan, while the Kurds of Dersim
drove the Turks out of their region for a year. In summer 1917, Botan and Dersim revolted
again, as well as Kharput. In August of the same year, Mardin and Diyarbekir revolted, followed
by Bitlis. The common feature of these Kurdish revolts is the non-existence of outside sup­port, apart from the revolt of August 1917, which enjoyed limited Russian support. The
absence of outside support partly explained why these revolts failed, and this deepened thebelief that Kurdish efforts would not succeed, unless outside support was secured for the
Kurdish cause. The war offered such a prospect for those nationalist Kurds who lived in exile,
such as Surreya Bedirkhan in Egypt and Cherif Pasha in Europe, both of whom establishedcontacts with the British. Indeed, Cherif Pasha, who was a former Ottoman ambassador, wasrenowned for his opposition to the rule of the Young Turks.
The military necessity of weakening the Turkish enemy made the Russians resort to
the Kurds’ support. Their action was also dictated by their territorial ambitions under the
Sykes-Picot (Tripartite) agreement, whose terms placed the largest portion of Ottoman Kurdi­
stan under Russian control. However, Russian occupation policies of destroying, looting,mass killing and creating total anarchy in Kurdish towns and villages in all parts of Kurdistan

70* M.R. Hawar.The Leader Sheikh Mahmud and Southern State of Kurdistan, Vol.I, (London: Jaf
Press, 1990) p. 184.
71* Cox, Memorandum, 7 December 1918, F0371 /3407, PRO.

45

alienated the Kurds. The British watched very closely all developments in Kurdistan becauseof both their growing interest in the fate of the Turkish and Persian territories and theiradvance northward in Mesopotamia. Nevertheless, they displayed no interest whatsoever inmaking political arrangements with Kurdish leaders that would satisfy the immediate interestsof both parties, as they did in Arabia, where the British materially supported the Arab revolt.
British actions were confined to seeking the loyalty of certain Kurdish regions in Eastern Kur­
distan and were dictated by the need to maintain the security of British interests in the Persian
Gulf and Persian oil fields, and to further keep open a direct land communication line with theRussian Allies in Eastern Kurdistan. The British were alarmed by a certain degree of successachieved by German agents, who turned some Kurds, such as the Sanjabi tribe, against theRussians. These Kurds were temporarily able to prevent the meeting of Russian forces with
their British counterpart in Mesopotamia. The British thus remained uninvolved in Kurdish
affairs in the first three years of the war:
Up until this period [the capture of Baghdad in March 1917} the [British] civil administration had
little need to interest themselves in Kurdish affairs. It had been recognised, indeed, as early
as 1914 that an eventual advance to Baghdad or even to Mosul might finally bring us into con­tact with the Kurds, but so remote did this contingency appear that in December 1914, when
General Cherif Pasha offered his services to the [British] force, in spite of being a man ofstanding and a bitter opponent of the new regime in Turkey, it was found necessary to refuse
his offer, for even were there possibility of an advance to Baghdad at this period, there could
be no chance of an extension of the movement beyond and such Kurdish communities whichmight be met with between Amarah and Baghdad were utterly insignificant.72
While stimulating leading Kurdish families in and around the city of Baghdad to ask for
British protection of the Kurds in the manner of the French protection of Christian communi­ties in Ottoman Asia, and for the establishment of a Kurdish confederation ,73 the British occu­
pation of Baghdad had the effect of changing the attitudes of British officials on the groundtowards the military and political value of Southern Kurdistan for the security of Mesopotamia:
With our occupation of Baghdad, followed by our advance up the [River] Diyala, problems con­nected with Kurdistan assumed a new and vital interest for us, not only in connection with thewants of the immediate military situation, but owing to the increasing certainty that the Kurds
would not only be neighbours during the period of the War but some of them permanent sub­jects after it. The importance of securing their support and trust at this juncture could, there­
fore, scarcely be over-estimatedJa
British authorities on the ground became increasingly anxious about the negative
effects of the brutal Russian policies in Eastern and Southern Kurdistan, which enormously
72* ibid.
73* Political, Baghdad, to Secretary of State (S/S) for India (No.9915) 16 November 1918, AIR20/512,
PRO.
74* Precis of Affairs in Southern Kurdistan during the First World War, Office of The Civil Commission,
Baghdad, 1919, F0371/4192, PRO, p.3.

46

benefited the Turks. The policies of Britain’s close ally, Russia, even seemed to affect its own
prestige among the Kurds 7 5 who had made it clear earlier that they would not only welcome
any Allied advance towards their regions, but would also rise against the Turks. 76 Percy Cox,
the Chief Political Officer in Mesopotamia, who underlined the considerable value of the"good will" of Kurds to the British in Mesopotamia, 7 7 recommended the establishment of a
Kurdish Bureau, so as to influence Southern Kurds with propaganda and money with a view
to winning them over against the Turks. 78 Nevertheless, the British were unable to interfere in
the affairs of those Kurdish areas which were under Russian military occupation. The military
aspects of the Allied wartime agreements prohibited the British from interfering in the affairs of
those areas which were occupied by the Russians, even though they were within the British
spheres of influence. 7 9 Indeed, the British Government feared the prospect of having“serious frictions with the Russians” during the war, while it still needed them to continue thefight against the Turks in Kurdistan, so Therefore, the British Government rejected the idea ofextending British control to certain important Kurdish areas, such as Badrah, Mandali, Qizil
Robat and the Hamrin mountain range. The subsequent Russian evacuation of the Kurdish
areas close to Baghdad and the return of the Turkish forces compelled the British to enter
Southern Kurdistan in late 1917, hoping to maintain the security of Mesopotamia. Further­more, the Bolshevik takeover and the subsequent Russian withdrawal from the war left a dan­gerous military and political vacuum in Eastern and Southern Kurdistan and thus exposed theBritish presence in neighbouring areas. In other words, it was not in Britain’s initial plans toadvance into Southern Kurdistan.
As soon as British forces began to advance northwards, prominent Kurds in mostparts of Southern Kurdistan such as Khanaqin, Kifri, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya, expressed theirreadiness to co-operate against the Turkish forces. Indeed, Col. Wilson , Cox’s successor,
reported on 15 October 1918 that the majority of Kurdish tribes to the east of the Lesser Zab
were “actively anti-Turk" and “anxious to throw off their allegiance to Turkey and to come under
British influence" 8 1 The manner in which the British advanced northwards and captured key
Kurdish towns such as Khanaqin, Kifri and Kirkuk, without confronting any real resistance, was
75* Cox, Baghdad, 18 May 1917, AIR20/504, PRO.
76* Precis of Affairs .., op. cit., p.3.
77* Cox, Memorandum, 7 December 1918, FO371/3407, PRO, p.6.
78* Cox, Baghdad, 18 May 1917, AIR20/504, PRO.
79* Precis of Affairs .., op. cit., p.2.
80* Ibid, pp.3 & 5.
81* Political, Baghdad, 15 October 1918, FO371/3407, PRO.

47

partly due to the refusal of the Kurds to give any help to the Turks, either in terms of men or
food supplies. Such locally powerful Kurdish tribes as the Dawadi and Talabani resisted all
Turkish attempts to force them to hand over their supplies of food or to provide new recruits
for the Turkish war efforts. The Hamawand Kurds, while denying the Turks, offered the British
forces food supplies. To avoid Turkish pressure to supply food stuff, smaller and weaker
Kurdish tribes such as those of Kifri, left the Turkish-controlled areas for British-controlled
o n e s .82 A British memorandum attributed the failure of Turkish propaganda to mobilise theKurds against the advancing British forces to the anti-Turkish attitudes of Kurdish religious
leaders, who unanimously refused to preach “the Jihad” (a holy war), as demanded by theTurks. They proclaimed the war to be one of “ self-aggrandisemenf, and stated that the Turks
were “ the hereditary enemies of the Kurds? .83 The general anti-Turkish attitudes of the Kurds
played some part in forcing the Turks to retreat hastily from Southern Kurdistan, without put­ting up any real resistance, as they had done in Mesopotamia.
Despite Russia’s brutal policies, the Kurds had not lost faith that the British would
allow them to establish a form of Kurdish autonomy free of Turkish hegemony. Such Kurdish
expectation was considerably stimulated by British war propaganda after the capture of Bagh­dad in 1917. The British newspaper TigeyshteniRasti (Understanding The Truth), which was
published in Kurdish, stated in its first issue on 12 January 1918, thatas soon as Great Britain wins the war... it will save all the nations of the World without excep­
tion, especially the Arab and Kurds of Mesopotamia and its neighbours, from unhappiness andbring them the joy of liberation, freedom and unity. The realisation of such sacred demands
would be impossible without assistance from a just and [an] equitable government like that ofGreat Britain.84
Indeed, in their attempts to extend their political control to the remainder of Southern Kurdi­
stan, the British did not have to send any military force to occupy Kurdish towns and the coun­tryside, where the Kurds had already taken the initiative by expelling the Turks, as was thecase in Sulaimaniya, Keuisenjaq, Rania and Rowanduz.ss

Hi- Sheikh Jfiahmud And *€he British Advance to w a rd s Southern Kurdistan
In the context of explaining the extension of British influence to Southern Kurdistan, it isimportant to shed some light on Sheikh Mahmud, who played a considerable part in shaping
82* Precis of Affairs .., op. cit., p5.
83* Cox, Memorandum, 7 December 1918, FO371/3407, PRO, p.6.
84* Quoted by Ahmad, Kurdistan During The First World War, p. 107.
85* Political, Sulaimaniya, to Political, Baghdad, 19 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.

48

early British-Kurdish relations. By virtue of his outstanding religious position, his social posi­tion as a landed aristocrat, and his outstanding role during the war, Mahmud was by far themost influential Kurdish figure in Southern Kurdistan during and after the war. 86 Mahmud’s
efforts during this time turned the town of Sulaimaniya into an important centre for the Kurdish
nationalist movement (a status which it still occupies). As previously mentioned, he approa­
ched the Russians before the war, hoping to mobilise the Kurds against the Turks. His disap­
pointment with the general attitudes of the Allies and his faith in the Young Turks’ promise of
Kurdish autonomy made him mobilise some Kurdish forces to fight alongside the Turks at theearly stages of the war.
It was not long before he withdrew his Kurdish forces from the war, having lost his faith
in the Turks and their promises. However, he mobilised some Kurdish forces against the Rus­
sians in Eastern Kurdistan, where Russians had committed atrocities against local Kurdish
population. This nationalist stance helped to create a notable popularity for Mahmud among
the local Kurds in Eastern and Southern Kurdistan. 87 Like other Kurdish nationalists, Mahmud
was well-informed of the important implications of the international developments associatedwith President Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the outbreak of the October Revolution in Rus­sia, both of which had a great impact on the national aspirations of the non-Turkish nationali­
ties under the Ottoman Empire. After the Russian evacuation of areas in Southern Kurdistan,
Mahmud, like other Kurdish notables, contacted the British authorities, with a view to expel­
ling the Turks from Kurdistan. He hoped to set up a Kurdish government under British supervision.88 For this purpose, Mahmud dispatched two Kurdish notables to the British authorities,
carrying a letter, in which he appealed to the British Government unot to exclude Kurdistanfrom the list of liberated peoples’’ .89 He also asked for British views on the expulsion of Turk­
ish forces from Southern Kurdistan.9 0 Without even awaiting the British advance, Mahmud
took the initiative by holding a meeting -which was attended by all the notables of the Sulaima­niya region- to determine the Kurdish future in light of the Turkish retreat. As a consequence,a Kurdish government came into being, and Mahmud was elected as its head.91
After the British occupation of Baghdad, the political and military value of winning the
86* Rafik Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.I, (Publication of Culture and Young, Baghdad, 1988), pp.35-6.
87* Ibid, p.50.
88* Ibid, p.5t.
89* Political, Baghdad, 1 November 1918, F0371/3407, PRO.
90* Ibid.
91* Precis Affairs.., op. cit., pp. 5-6.

49

Kurds over to the British or Turkish sides increased rapidly. The Kurds could not only provide
fighters, but also supplies of food and information for the armies. This state of affairs, in turn,increased Mahmud’s stature and importance because of his being the most politically influen­
tial Kurdish figure in Southern Kurdistan. This also explains why the Turks, after their reoccu­
pation of Kirkuk and arrest of Mahmud for his contacts with the British, released him, hopingthat he could again mobilise the Kurds against the British. 92 For this purpose, the Turks eveninstalled him as the mayor of Sulaimaniya. Meanwhile, the British were alarmed by the newTurkish approach to the Kurdish situation, while the Turks were making considerable militaryadvances in Eastern Kurdistan, where the pro-British forces of the Armenians and other
Christians were retreating. All this, as British authorities in Mesopotamia noted, coincided withnegative military developments in Europe:
The Turks, at this time, were able to make great poiiticai capital out of the German successes
and the Allied retirement on the western front. The Turkish Commander, too, adopted a conci­
liatory attitude towards [Kurdish] tribes which bore good fruit... All this coupled with the dis­trust engendered by our evacuation of Kirkuk... turned the political scales for the time being
against us$ 3
Despite everything, Mahmud kept pinning his hopes on the British and as soon as the British
reoccupied Kirkuk he not only resumed his direct contacts with them, but captured Turkish
troops present in his district and declared the termination of Turkish rule. Other Kurdish
regions followed suit, such as Rania and Keuisenjaq. At the same time, Kurdish notables invi­
ted the British authorities in Baghdad to send their political representatives to Southern Kurdi­
stan, so that an arrangement could be worked out to run the country. The fact that British
penetration had barely begun in Southern Kurdistan when the Mudros armistice was signed
on 30 October 1918, made Kurdish initiatives in expelling the remaining Turkish military andcivilian officials, and declaring Kurdish allegiance to Britain, politically significant. By leaving a
few Kurdish figures as their civilian representatives, backed by a small Turkish force in most of
the unconquered Southern Kurdistan, the Turks sought to demonstrate that the region was
legally under Turkish rule, unaffected by the armistice terms. By taking the British side andinviting British representatives to their own areas, the Kurds in effect brought most of South­
ern Kurdistan under British political control without resorting to military occupation.
The initial advance of British forces into Southern Kurdistan during the last stages of
the war coincided with significant political and military developments, which immediately influ-

92* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.I, pp.52-3.
93* Precis Affairs .., op. cit., p.6.

50

enced the course of the events in the Middle East. One of these developments was the Rus­
sian withdrawal from the war and the subsequent Bolshevik publication and denunciation^
the Allies’ secret schemes to partition the Ottoman Empire and divide the Persian\Kingdom
into spheres of influence. This unforeseen development had immediate and profoundeffects on the attitudes of British policy makers towards the political future of the Ottoman
Empire. As previously mentioned, Britain had agreed to divide the Mosul IM/ayefwith France,
so as to create "a wedge of French territory3’ between its own zone in Kurdistan and that of
Russia.9 4 The temporary disappearance of Russia as a major player from the regional scene
following the Bolshevik Revolution meant that the consolidation of Britain’s strategic interests
no longer required the division of the Mosul Wilayet. Thus the idea of reconciling British andFrench interests in that Wilayet was abandoned in favour of sole British control. The modifica­tion of the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement on the Mosul Wilayet seemed to be the ideal
way to maintain the British position in Mesopotamia in the long term. Having entered Southern
Kurdistan in the wake of the Russian departure, the British were in a very strong position to
deprive the French of their sphere in the Mosul Wilayet.
The decision of the British Government to capture the town of Mosul, which would
symbolise British control over all the Mosul Wilayet, was also motivated by oil considerations.
At a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, just two months before the conclusion of the war
with Turkey, Arthur Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, drew the attention of those present to thebright prospect for the development of oil in Mesopotamia, and called for a political settlementin Mesopotamia that would enable the British Empire to have secure oil sources. 9 5 Thus there
was an urgent need to modify the Sykes-Picot agreement in a way that would enable Britain toestablish its control over the Mosul Wilayet as a whole. Partly against this background, both
Balfour and Lord Curzon stated in August 1918 that the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement
were “out of date”, a position accepted by the Eastern Committee.9eThe latter was organisedby the War Cabinet to specifically deal with issues relative to territories extending from India’s
western frontier to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Lord Curzon chaired thisCommittee, whose principal members were, apart from Balfour, Edwin Montagu, the Secretaryof State for India, and Henry Hughes Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. It was at

94* Macdonogh to Nicholson, 6 January 1916, F0371/2767, PRO.
95* Imperial War Cabinet, 13 August 1918, CAB23/7, PRO.
96* War Cabinet Minute No.457,13 August 1918, CAB23/7 & Eastern Committee Minute No.34,3 Octo­
ber 1918, CAB27/24, PRO.

51

this point that the idea of a British advance towards the town of Mosul was raised and received
the backing of Lloyd George, the new British Prime Minister. 9 7 To achieve this aim, it was deci­
ded that Britain should control Mosul before the end of the war. Despite all their militaryefforts, the British were unable to achieve their aim as Turkey signed the Mudros armistice on
30 October. But the armistice did not prevent the British forces from capturing the town ofMosul one week later. Examination of the terms of the Mudros armistice between Turkey and
Britain shows that, while unequivocally providing for Turkish withdrawal from Eastern Kurdi­
stan, they said nothing about a similar step in Southern Kurdistan. 98 The term ‘Mesopotamia’,
which was used in the text of the armistice agreement, was ambiguous. In other words, theagreement did not make clear whether Southern Kurdistan was part of Mesopotamia. This
explains why the Turks continually insisted, following the war, that the British illegally con­trolled the Mosul Wilayet and should therefore be returned to their control. Indeed, the ques­tion of Mosul’s future became the main reason why Turkey refused to recognise the state of
Iraq during the period 1921-1926.
The change in British attitudes towards the Sykes-Picot agreement could also be attri­
buted to other important political and military developments. The late entry of the UnitedStates into the war against Germany was also a factor that Britain could not overlook in its post­
war policy owing to American dislike of European colonialism, which prevented free trade andinvestment. With the absence of Russia from the regional scene, Britain found France repla­cing Germany as its main challenger in its efforts to consolidate its political and economic inter­
ests in the newly emerging Middle East. It therefore needed to take urgent steps to contain
expansion of French influence. At another level, the long duration of the war imposed unpre­
cedented economic, financial and political pressure on the British Government to cut down its
military responsibilities and financial commitments, as well as putting into effect rapid demobili­
sation of its forces. As further expansion of the British Empire became an inconceivable
option among British policy makers as well as the British public, Britain needed to review its
wartime vision for the new Middle Eastern order.

97* War Cabinet Minute No.457,13 August 1918, CAB23/43 & War Cabinet Minute No.482A, 3 October
1918, CAB23/14, PRO.
98* British And Foreign Papers, 1917-1918, V. CXI, (HMSO), pp. 611-613.

52

Conclusion
Examination of Kurdistan’s position in Britain’s Ottoman and Persian policies before and dur­ing the First World War shows that Britain looked upon Kurdish affairs principally from a strate­
gic perspective and, secondly, from an oil perspective. As Britain’s strategic interests depen­ded on maintaining the territorial unity of both the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar Kingdom, it
opposed any internal force that sought to alter the status quo. Therefore, Kurdish nationalist
agitation was in disharmony with British strategic and economic interests, as the Kurdish revoltof 1880-1881 illustrated. By the end of the first decade of the Twentieth Century, the British
began to think of extending their political and economic influence to the heartland of the Otto­
man Empire, including southern parts of Kurdistan. This new orientation reflected both Bri­tain’s intensive rivalry with other European Powers, especially Germany, and the steady decaythat the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar Kingdom had undergone for the past six decades.
When the First World War broke out, Britain worked towards re-drawing the political map of the
Middle East, with a view to extending and consolidating its political and economic influence invital areas of Ottoman Asia. The report of the Bunsen Committee, the Hussein-McMahon Cor­
respondence and the Sykes-Picot (Tripartite) agreement illustrated how Britain intended topartition Kurdistan.
At the end of the war, new strategic, political and economic considerations combined
to force Britain to re-evaluate its post-war policy towards the future of the former Ottoman terri­
tories, such as Armenia, Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. With the Allied war-time agreements
being out of date and in the wake of their unplanned occupation of Southern Kurdistan, theBritish did not have a concrete scheme for running the area, let alone deciding the long term
future of Kurdistan in the context of a hew regional order in the Middle East. While awaiting
the holding of the peace conference and the crystallisation of a definite policy towards Kurdi­
stan’s future, London authorised Col. Wilson to take administrative and political measures toensure political stability, the consolidation of order and peace and the resumption of econo­
mic activities in British-controlled Kurdistan. London, however, made it clear that British offi­
cials on the ground should avoid taking measures that would increase or create new military,financial or political commitments in the area. As the following chapter will explain, the condi­
tions under which the British extended their control to Southern Kurdistan had immediate
implications for their Kurdish policy on the ground. This policy played an important part in influ­
encing subsequent political developments in Southern Kurdistan between 1918 and 1923.

53

Moreover, British control over Southern Kurdistan dragged Britain into the affairs of Northernand Bastern Kurdistan, as the security of its interests in Mesopotamia depended on politicalstability and order in the bordering areas outside its control.

54

The administration of the new British acquisitions in Kurdistan and Mesopotamia was the
responsibility of the India Office, while the Foreign Office retained overall supervision of policy
until the time when the forthcoming peace conference would determine the future of theseregions within the framework of the Turkish peace settlement. In the meantime, British policyon the ground, which played an important part in influencing the course of events in theabsence of a well-defined British position on the Kurdish question, was conducted by Col.
Wilson, in his capacity as the Acting Civil Commissioner and the Chief Political Officer. He wasassisted in administrative and political matters by a number of political officers who not only
conducted the local affairs in their divisions, but also put forward their own proposals regard­
ing the way in which their divisions should ideally be run. Local military authorities expressed
their views insofar as they concerned internal security and strategic issues.
The primary task of the British authorities in Baghdad was to restore normal administra­
tive, economic and social life to Southern Kurdistan after the end of the First World War. This
chapter explores the prevailing military and political conditions that influenced the decision tocreate an autonomous Kurdish entity under British political supervision in late October andearly November 1918. British officials in London and the Middle East often referred to theautonomous entity as the Kurdish state, even though it was not fully independent. In summer
1919, this state was disposed of, after the British suppressed a Kurdish rebellion. The politicalcauses and consequences of this reversal in British policy towards Southern Kurdistan will beanalysed in detail.

Indirect British Control And The Formation Of An Autonomous State In
Southern Kurdistan: Circumstances And Objectives
In the initial stages of the British presence in Southern Kurdistan, British policy-making on the
ground was conditioned by the lack of a sufficient army of occupation and adequate civilian
administrators. 1 Britain’s political and military position was far from secure in an area that strate­
gically over looked the Mesopotamian plain to the south. Before the armistice of Mudros of 30
October 1918, British penetration of Southern Kurdistan had hardly begun (see map nine). It
was, therefore, necessary for the British authorities in Mesopotamia to seek continuity in the
1* W.R. Hay, Two Years In Kurdistan (London: Sifgwick & Jackson Ltd, 1921), p.6.

55

Map Nine: The Advance
Of British Forces In South­
ern Kurdistan During The
War

Dohuk

AmadiaRowanduz

SenjarArbil

Kurdish Areas Under
British Control

Rania
Keuisenjaq
Sulaimaniya

Ottoman-Persian
Frontierv Kirkuk
:Tuz
Kifri

Khanaqin

goodwill of the Southern Kurds, who took the lead in liberating many of their towns from theTurks and simultaneously inviting British representatives to these free areas in order to help
establish new political and administrative arrangements. This anti-Turkish and pro-British atti­
tude of the Southern Kurds facilitated the immediate British aim of re-establishing stability,
without the need for expensive military or civilian administration.
It was also important for the British to maintain a favourable Kurdish attitude in order torapidly reduce their existing military and financial commitments, while consolidating their politi­
cal influence throughout Southern Kurdistan. Initially, the British had no intention of expand­ing their military occupation, when invited by Mahmud to enter important Kurdish areas:

Military occupation of [Southern Kurdistan] was quite out of the question, for, even after the
defeat of the Turks, supply and other difficulties combined to make it impossible even to
occupy with a garrison a point so near at hand and so important politically to us as Sulaima­niya. The alternative of adopting purely political methods had, therefore, to be adopted, and it
was realised that the best means to that end was the exploiting of the perfectly legitimate feel­ing of Kurdish nationality which had long been making itself evident amongst the Southern
Kurdish tribes.2
It was thus a logical option not to intervene directly, thereby confining the British role to provi­
ding political and administrative advice to the Kurds, who were allowed to conduct their own

2* Precis of Affair.., op. cit. p.9.

56

administrative, economic and security affairs.
The existence of strong nationalist aspirations among the Kurds was the most impor­tant factor influencing British policy making on the ground in its early stages. The advent ofBritish forces in Southern Kurdistan was seen by the local Kurds as liberation from Turkish ruleand an opportunity to have a say in the running of their own affairs. According to Percy Cox:
The idea of Kurdish autonomy, which had taken shape under the Constitutional Regime, wasrevived and greatly stimulated by the terms of our Baghdad Proclamation to the Arabs whichshowed a different attitude towards racial susceptibilities and aspirations from that which had
been adopted by the Turks.z
Kurdish high expectations of what the British would do explains the warm reception given to
Maj. Edward Noel by assembled Kurdish representatives from the countryside and towns at
Sulaimaniya. 4 Noel was a British intelligence agent, who served in the Caucasus during the
war and in north Persia in 1919. Col. Arnold Wilson appointed him Political Officer responsible
for the supervision of Kurdish affairs on the spot.5
The decision of the British authorities in Baghdad to experiment with the idea of indir­
ect British control in the Kurdish part of Area B was based on advice from Noel, who saw it as alogical solution in the light of the state of affairs in Southern Kurdistan. In other words, the Brit­ish authorities in Mesopotamia were not in a position either militarily or politically, to ignore theexistence of nationalistic sentiments and Kurdish expectations of the Allies, particularly Bri­tain. Mahmud and the nationalist circle in the Sulaimaniya region had started the process of
forming a Kurdish government before the end of the war. They aimed to secure British
respect for Kurdish wishes in the wake of the expulsion of the Turks. Apart from having faith inBritish promises, the crux of Mahmud’s approach was pragmatic. He Showed tangible willing­ness to honour whatever interests Britain had in Southern Kurdistan, so that the Kurds, inreturn, could enjoy self-government. Unlike the Mesopotamian Arabs, the Southern Kurds
sought to reconcile their interests with those of Britain in order to fill the political vacuum
resulting from the Turkish departure.
Noel played a significant role in convincing British authorities in Mesopotamia of theviability of employing a political approach to consolidating British interests in the Kurdish
areas. This political approach was based on respecting Kurdish nationalist aspirations. After
his first visit to Sulaimaniya, he reported to Baghdad that the Kurdish nationalist movement “is3* Ibid, p.4.
4* Political Officer, Sulaimaniya, to Political, Baghdad,16 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
5* Political, Baghdad, to Political, Mosul, 20 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.

57

Am adia

Map Ten: The Autonomous
Kurdish State

Dohuk
)su!

/> * * * * '* RowanduzrSenjar
Arbil

Autonomous Kurdish
State

„

_

Keufeenjift
Greater Z a b /
River

Kupri
Sulaimaniya

KirkukLesser Zab ‘NRiver£ * * Kurdish Areas To Be
ih i Incorporated Into The
Kurdish State

^
y

Kifri

Khanaqir

so virile that I do not foresee much difficulty in creating [a] Kurdish state under our protection
and with control by political officers over general policy, provided we take prompt and vigorous
action now".6 Against this background, Noel was instructed to inform the Kurds that it was not
Britain’s intention to impose upon them "an adm inistration foreign to their habits anddesires"J The outcome of both Noel’s understanding of Kurdish national aspirations, andMahmud’s willingness to co-operate in such a way, formed the basis of British influence inSouthern Kurdistan (see map ten). This took the shape of an autonomous Kurdish state:
Kurdish government, judiciary, revenue and Levi (local military force). Mahmud was appointed
by the British as Governor of the Kurdish Area B, extending from south of the Lesser Zab
River to the old Ottoman-Persian frontier. He was assisted by two senior British officials, apartfrom Noel: Maj. Denials, who supervised the formation and the training of the Kurdish Levis
and Col. Gordon Walker, who oversaw the revenue and the taxes. Later on, British officials in
the Middle East and London associated this system of indirect control with Maj. Noel, as
opposed to Col. Wilson’s policy of direct control. This British recognition of Mahmud’s author-

6* Political, Baghdad, 17 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
7* political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 31 October 1918, AIR20/512,PRO.

58

ity took place just before the end of the war with the TUrkss and was in harmony with the elec­tion of Mahmud by the Kurds as head of their government when the Turks had left Sulaima­niya.
Noel’s choice of indirect British control offered several political and strategic advant­ages. It was vital in keeping the Kurds on the British side and as a starting point for the pos­sible expansion of British control to other Kurdish districts after the armistice. An unsympathe­
tic and hostile Southern Kurdistan could enable the Turks to return to these areas, either poli­tically or militarily. Indeed, Noel’s initial task was to enlist “the sympathies of the Kurds by anencouragement to nationalist as opposed to Pan-lslamic sentiment”$ The return of Turkish
rule would constitute a direct threat to British control in Mesopotamia, where the Turks werestill plotting by inciting local people to expel the anti-Muslim enemy. British authorities thus
had to avoid confronting both the Kurds and the Turks simultaneously. To achieve this, they
had to restore political stability and facilitate the resumption of economic activity in Southern
Kurdistan. In addition, indirect rule was politically useful for the containment of anti-British pro­paganda by the Bolsheviks, whose ideological effects seemed to pose a real threat to British
influence in Persia, Turkey and elsewhere in the Middle East. Under such circumstances, anautonomous Kurdish government was a commendable idea. It also portrayed Britain as beingin line with President Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the basis of the Kurdish petition for national
self-determination. Moreover, this respectable image also helped the British maintain good
relations with Kurdish nationalist circles both in other parts of Kurdistan and in exile.
On a different level, British policy towards Southern Kurdistan was affected by thechange in the international alignment of forces as a result of the war. The 1917 October Revo­lution, and the Bolshevik denunciation of the secret agreements regarding the Ottoman
Empire and the division of Persia into various spheres of influence between Britain and Czarist Russia, made the British dispense with the idea of establishing a French zone between
their sphere and the Russians in Kurdistan. As soon as the war ended, the British worked
quickly to bring the area they occupied under their political control. Whilst wanting the imposi­tion of British political and military control simultaneously in Area A, London informed Wilson
that it was hopeful of persuading Paris to "renounce its claims in the Mosul area”, strongly
advising him that Paris should not feel that Britain had violated the terms of the Sykes-Picot

8* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit. p6.
9* E.W.L. Noel, Note -in- Colonial Office Minute No.4958, 22 July 1922, CO730/13, PRO.

59

agreement.io This was just an early manifestation of a change in British views on the post-war
political map of the former Ottoman territories. Excluding the French from Southern Kurdistan
was mainly based on strategic considerations of British control in Mesopotamia, vital for boththe security of the sea and land routes to India. In addition, international recognition of British
control over the whole of the Mosul Wilayet would be required to exploit its economic poten­
tial. Therefore, it was necessary to revise or to drop the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreementby convincing the French to give up their political sphere of influence in Area A.
By virtue of the apparently open-minded policy of an autonomous Kurdish govern­
ment under its political supervision, Britain was in a far stronger position to win over the sup­port of local Kurds in Area A, who mistrusted the French because of their support for Christiancommunities. The Kurds did not desire to be under French control, at a time when being
under British protection seemed to offer them a more promising future. Indeed, London wascontemplating the adoption of indirect control in Area A in order to be part of an autonomous
Kurdish state in Southern Kurdistan, while the much smaller Arab areas (i.e. the town of Mosul
and the areas to the south) would be included in Mesopotamia. British authorities in Baghdad
seemingly advocated a similar line, namely uniting Southern Kurdistan by eliminating the
French zone. They went so far as to suggest the establishment of "a central Council of chiefs
for Southern Kurdistan under British auspices* 11
As Far as Wilson was concerned, the adoption of the idea of self-determination for theKurds seemed to offer him and the India Office a suitable means of thwarting any project toestablish or to extend Arab rule to Southern Kurdistan as contained in the 1915 SharifMcMahon Correspondence. This entailed the creation of de facto political and administrative
arrangements with the help of local Kurds, the legitimacy of which neither the French nor
Sharif Hussein could question. A memorandum by the India Office highlights the existence ofsuch intentions:
it is clear that; as far, at least, as Southern Kurdistan was concerned, the people have exer­
cised the right o f“self-determination” and have elected (with certain exceptions) to form them­selves into a separate “Confederation" under British guidance. This pronouncement and its for­mal acceptance by the Civil Commissioner appear to rule out (at any rate, as regards theSouthern Kurds) Col. Lawrence’s suggestion of central Arabo-Kurdish Kingdom. But, the diffi­
culty with France remains; and the recent developments in Kurdistan emphasise the necessityof securing revision, at least, of that part of the Sykes-Picot agreement, which relates to the
Mosul district and the Upper Tigris Valley. The desire for unity manifested by the Kurds at
Sulaimaniya renders it more than ever indefensible to partition their territory into three arbitrary
zones. 12
10* S/S to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, Confidential, (undated) F0371/3386, PRO.
11* Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 30 October 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
12* J.E. Shuckburgh, India Office, Memorandum, 14 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.

60

The establishment of an autonomous Kurdish entity in Southern Kurdistan was a product of anumber of factors. Firstly, Britain was not in a position to make new military or financial commit­
ments following the war when there was a pressing need to demobilise its forces and cut
down its military expenditure. Secondly, the consolidation of its position in Mesopotamia,
whose strategic importance was closely linked with the security of the land and sea routes to
India, required a peaceful and British-orientated Southern Kurdistan. Thirdly, Kurdish politicalaspirations could not be over looked in the early stages of British control over Southern Kurdi­
stan. Fourthly, such a policy could foil any anti-British propaganda war waged by the Turks andthe Bolsheviks. Finally, an autonomous Southern Kurdistan, according to Wilson’s political
calculations, could be a means, in the short-run, to thwart the attempts of the Sharifian follow­
ers to establish an Arab state by merging the three Wilayetsot Baghdad, Basra and Mosul.

The End Of The Autonomous Kurdish State: Circumstances And Objectives
i- <FJte A ttitu d e s O f g ritis h O fficials On *€he g ro u n d

Wilson was known among British circles in London and the Middle East as a traditionalist
imperial official, 13 who firmly believed in turning the new conquered territories in Mesopotamia
and Kurdistan into outright colonies. His early desire for tight British political and economic
controls was evidently manifest in his first evaluation of the Kurdish areas, when demanding
their inclusion into British-administered Mesopotamia:
Politically as well as strategically, there is much to be said for adopting the line of Lesser Zab
as the frontier of Iraq state including in the latter Altun Kupri, Sulaimaniya and Penjwin: the rich
districts of Sulaimaniya and Halabjah are susceptible to great development and their products
are essential to industries and general well-being of Iraq, viz. petroleum, coal, seed-wheat,gall nuts and tanned material and tobacco. The first two in particular, as HMG were aware, ofgreat potential value.1 4During his presence in Mesopotamia between 1918 and 1920, Wilson never expressed any
sympathy towards Kurdish demands for self-government nor did he acknowledge the exis­
tence of Kurdish nationalist aspirations. Kurdish nationalists did not fail to see the difference
between Wilson’s position and Noel’s regarding the Kurdish situation. In his memoirs, Rafik
Helmi, who worked with the British as an interpreter, points out that Wilson did not hide his
opposition to both the autonomous Kurdish state and the Mahmud leadership. 1 5 From Wil13* See, for instance, Foreign Office Minute on “the Administration Report on the Sulaimaniya division
for Year 1919’, 23 July 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
14* Political, Baghdad, 15 October 1918, F0371/3407, PRO:
15* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.I, p.71.

61

son’s viewpoint, as the Kurds were divided like the Arabs and could not rule themselves, Bri­
tain should impose a protectorate, where British officials would be responsible for the formula­tion and implementation of policies.ie It is not surprising then that, once established, Wilson
spared no time in discrediting the idea of Kurdish autonomy in his reports to London, and in
arguing that British interests could be best served by bringing back the old Ottoman admin­
istrative arrangements. 17
Noel was the exception among the principal British officials in Southern Kurdistan, inthat he strongly defended the policy of indirect rule, despite its defects. The remaining British
officials were opposed to the scheme of an autonomous Southern Kurdistan. Such attitudes
reflected their desire to have total control over the conduct of Kurdish affairs, as well as theirpersonalities and beliefs. Moreover, all these officials and their assistants were recruited fromthe British army because of lack of civilian administrators. 1 8 This may explain the rigidity withwhich these officials approached Southern Kurdistan’s affairs. Helmi, for instance, describes
Maj. E.B. Soane, Noel’s successor, as being very arrogant and rough in his treatment of local
Kurds.1 9 As soon as Soane became the Political Officer of the Sulaimaniya division in 1919,
he replaced most Kurdish officials with Indians, Persians and Arabs in order to get rid of theKurdish characteristic of the administration.2 0 The Political Officer of the Mosul division, Col.
G.E. Leachman, was also extremely suspicious of the Kurds because of his firm belief thatthey had committed atrocities against Christians during the war. His suspicion manifested itself
in his heavy-handed treatment of the local Kurds and in his desire to displace them from his
division.21 In his memoirs, Humphrey Bowman, who worked as a Director of Education in
Mesopotamia, shows how Leachman’s sympathy with the Christian “plight” earned him a repu­
tation for severity towards local Kurds.2 2 Leachman was also renowned for his drastic mea­sures among the Shi'i Arabs, who murdered him during the bloody uprising in Mesopotamia in
1920. Col. J.H. Bill, Leachman’s successor, warned the British authorities that the use of
Christian refugees against the local Kurds, as a means of consolidating British rule, would

16* Political, Baghdad, to Political, Sulaimaniya, 26 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
17* Political, Baghdad, 7 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
18* Hay, Two Years In Kurdistan, pp.5-6.
19* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.I, p. 108.
20* Ibid, pp.77, 84-88.
21* Political, Mosul, to Noel, Rowanduz, 11 January 1919 & Political, Mosul, to Political, Baghdad, 18
January 1919, AIR20/12, PRO.
22* Humphrey Bowman, Middie East Window (London & Toronto: Longmans & Green Co., 1942), p.241.

62

result In unpleasant consequences. 2 3 Indeed, the first local Kurdish revolts against the British
in the Mosul division were of a religious nature, and were mainly provoked by the resettlementof Christian refugees in Kurdish lands.
Given Leachman’s above attitudes towards the local Kurds in his division, it is not sur­prising that he would firmly oppose the policy of indirect British control with which the autono­
mous Kurdish entity was associated. His opposition to Kurdish autonomy manifested itself
during the Khushnaw affairs, which started in early January 1919, when Noel informed Wilsonof the desire of the Khushnaw notables, who lived in the Mosul division, to merge their region
with the autonomous Kurdish entity. 24 Having heard of Wilson’s initial approval of this propo­
sal, Leachman expressed his opposition and asked him to reverse his decision. 25 On learningof Leachman’s position, Noel sent a telegram to Wilson, protesting against the reversal of his
early decision to expand the autonomous Kurdish entity to the Khushnaw region:
I see no reason why you should reverse your decision. Firstly, there is no strong reason[whyjwe should be bound by Turkish division of districts and even if we were, the tribe in ques­tion was under Rowanduz from 1896 to 1914. Secondly, representatives of [the] tribe, which is
On this side of [the] Zab, have come to see me and to express their desire to accept Sheikh
Mahmud. Thirdly, [the] national movement, we [have started] is growing daily in strength. It
contains [seeds] of natural and healthy development and., it may., attract and absorb all
purely Kurdish elements, [which] will naturally prefer it to the hybrid form of administration at
Mosul.zz
The Khushnaw affair constituted the first manifestation of the emerging division among British
officials on the ground over the ideal system of control for the consolidation of British position
in Southern Kurdistan.
Other British officials also expressed their opposition to the establishment of theautonomous Kurdish state and its enlargement. Capt. Stephen Longrigg,27 the Assistant
Political Officer at Kirkuk, asked Wilson to remove the Kirkuk district from the control of theKurdish authority in Sulaimaniya .28 On the eve of Mahmud’s revolt on 3 May 1919, the British
Assistant Political Officer at Arbil warned against the dangerous effects of autonomous Kurd­
ish districts alongside the Arbil district. He even saw danger in establishing a looser form of dir­ect control in Southern Kurdistan, such as giving Kurdish officials’ a nominal role in the admin23* J. H. Bill to Civil Commissioner, Memorandum on the Future of the Qaza of Amadia, 21 October
1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
24* Noel, Rowanduz, to Political, Baghdad, 10 January 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
25* Political, Mosul, to Political, Baghdad, 11 January 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
26* Noel, Rowanduz, to Political, Baghdad, 12 January 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
27* Later, S.H. Longrigg compiled two books on Iraq’s history based on the official British interpretationof events.
28* Administration Report of the Sulaimaniya Division for the Year 1919, FO371/5069, PRO, p.3.

63

istration. He called for the rapid unification of all systems of control before it was too late to pre­vent any demand for similar treatment, i.e. local autonomy. 2 9 This overwhelming support for
direct British administration among British officials and the military authorities in Mesopotamia
would considerably facilitate Wilson’s task of preventing the emergence of an autonomousSouthern Kurdistan and erasing any sign of Kurdish self-government.
The imposition of direct control was a step by step process. It highlighted the contra­
diction between the British Government’s preference for an autonomous Southern Kurdi­
stan, either as one Kurdish state or as a group of states, and Wilson’s actual steps on the
ground, which were aimed at bringing the country under direct British control. The timing of
the reversal in the Kurdish policy is significant in that it came after Paris’s acceptance, in princi­
ple, of revising the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement (December 1918) by merging Area A
with the British sphere in Southern Kurdistan. Soon Wilson retreated from the idea of uniting
the administration of Southern Kurdistan on an indirect basis. Instead, he proposed the“partition" of Southern Kurdistan between the existing Kurdish autonomous entity and the
directly-administered Mesopotamia. The lowland of Southern Kurdistan was to be attached to
the British administration in Mesopotamia and the remaining high-land to the autonomous
entity .3 0 His immediate step was to prevent Area A from being divided between the Kurdish
autonomous state and a future Arab state, as London recommended. He reported that
despite the absence of ethnic and religious homogeneity, public opinion in the Mosul division
was in favour of "a single state” under direct British administration that would include Southern
Kurdistan and the two Arab Wilayets, Baghdad and Basra.31
Wilson entrusted the task of re-organising the Mosul division on a direct control basis
to Col. Leachman. As a result, during a period of six to seven months, two systems of control
existed in Southern Kurdistan. The first was autonomous Kurdish government, situatedbetween the Greater Zab and the old Ottoman-Persian frontier. The second was direct British
administration that included Jabal Sinjar in the west and the Greater Zab River in the east. Hav­
ing created direct British administration in one part of Southern Kurdistan, Wilson’s next step
was to extend direct British control over all Southern Kurdistan. Bowman’s visit to Sulaimaniya
in April 1919 illustrates how Wilson’s decision to wind up the Kurdish Government was anopen secret among British officials, and that the implementation of the new policy was a matter
29* Assistant Political Officer, Arbil, to Political Officer, Mosul, 3 May 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
30* A.J.Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No.207981, 21 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
31* Ibid.

64

of time .3 2 This took the form of preventing the expansion of the autonomous Kurdish entity toinclude other Kurdish areas, such as Rowanduz and Khushnawati. At the same time, thepolicy of divide and rule was used to undermine the authority of the Kurdish Government.
Certain tribes, especially those who had outstanding differences with Mahmud’s ancestors,
were encouraged to express their dissatisfaction with his governorship in order to remove
their areas from the autonomous entity. 3 3 in his memoirs, Helmi points out how Capt. H. Bill with whom he worked as an interpreter in Keuisenjaq- recorded all the details of tribal rivalry
and personal enmity, especially those which concerned Mahmud.3 4
At the administrative level, Wilson appointed political officers and assistant political
officers who were staunch advocates of direct control in Southern Kurdistan, such as Maj.
Soane in Sulaimaniya, Maj. W.R. Hay35 in Arbil, and Capt. A.G. Rundle in Keuisenjaq. All ofthem worked quickly to increase their powers at the expense of the Kurdish Government.
They explained their actions as having been forced on them by the unjust policies of therepresentatives of Kurdish rule. In the Keuisenjaq Qada [district], the Assistant Political Officer
reported that he was "compelled to intervene” and administer its affairs in order to “prevent
friction or injustice”. ^ In February 1919, the districts of Kirkuk and Kifri were separated fromthe Sulaimaniya division and were no longer included within the Kurdish autonomous entity.
As a direct consequence of adopting such steps, the power of the Kurdish autonomous
entity steadily declined, and the jurisdiction of the Kurdish Government was gradually restric­
ted, except at the heart of Kurdish nationalism: Sulaimaniya and its immediate neighbour­
hood. Later, this process continued to include the separation of the Rowanduz district fromthe Sulaimaniya division in June 1919, while Keuisenjaq was transferred to the newly-formed
division of Arbil.3 7 This process of the political and administrative dismemberment of Southern
Kurdistan was aimed at the further dispersal of the Southern Kurds, the forestalling of one
central core in Sulaimaniya -which could have formed a basis for a larger national state- as wellas pre-empting the emergence of a legitimate political leadership for the Southern Kurds.

32* Bowman, Middle East Window, p.228.
33* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.I, p.78.
34* Ibid, pp.80-81.
35* See his diary: Two Years in Kurdistan op. cit.
36* Administration Report on Keuisenjaq.., op. cit.
37* The Administration Report on the Sulaimaniya division for Year 1919, F0371/5069, PRO, p.3.

65ii- g ritis h Versus Kurdish in te rp re ta tio n s O f *Che Kurdish S ta te
The reasons for the establishment of the Kurdish state and its destruction were interpreted
differently by Kurdish and British contemporaries. After the overthrow of the first Kurdish Gov­
ernment, Wilson downgraded its importance and distorted it as no more than a feudal system
under the direct control of British officials. 38 He consistently used the term ‘confederation’ todefine the autonomous Kurdish entity in his communications, implying that it was nothing
more than a union among Kurdish tribes based on the willingness of all parties, and not anagreed political-administrative arrangement between the British and Mahmud. Maj. Soane
described the Kurdish Government as a retrograde tribal system. Such descriptions of Kurd­
ish autonomy sought to pre-empt any criticism of the overthrow of the Kurdish Government,
and avoid any responsibility for the subsequent political instability. Closer examination of theperiod contradicts Wilson and Soane’s claims. Mahmud was not a figurehead in the existing
administration and did not want to be one as desired by Wilson. As governor of the autono­
mous Kurdish entity, he had the authority to run local affairs and to appoint Kurdish officials in
different areas under his control. British officials, including Noel, had an advisory role andtherefore did not control the government. In other words, the British exercised their influence
through Mahmud, and Kurdish officials were directly responsible to him. For example,theadministration report on the Qada of Keuisenjaq highlighted the fact that the Hakim-i-SharJ(local governor) in charge of this Qada was directly responsible to Mahmud, while a British
assistant political officer was his adviser, not his superior, in terms of administrative issues. 3 9
All the administration’s personnel were Kurdish. The Kurdish Government had its own militaryforce (i.e. Kurdish levies), which was organised under Kurdish officers, who were totally loyal
to Mahmud.4 0 Kurdish was the official language of the autonomous entity. Laws were mod­ified in line with Kurdish custom. The Kurdish entity had its own budget and was based on a
newly-established system of revenue collection and taxation, aimed at developing the area
and improve the welfare of the Kurdish people, though the surplus was sent to the British
authorities in Baghdad.
From the Kurdish point of view, the establishment of the Kurdish administration was
not only a permanent arrangement, but also the nucleus of an independent Kurdish state thatwould ultimately include the whole of Southern Kurdistan. Moreover, it was not only a recogni38* Ibid, p9.
39* Administration Report on Keuisenjaq.., op. cit., p31.
40* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p16.

66

tion of Mahmud’s authority as a national leader, but, most importantly, a recognition of South­
ern Kurdistan as having a different political and administrative status from British-controlled
Mesopotamia. It is difficult to establish whether Noel informed the Kurdish side of the provi­
sional nature of the political and administrative arrangements relating to the establishment of
the autonomous Kurdish entity. Kurdish contemporaries, such as Helmi and Mahmud’s bro­
ther, Sheikh Qadir, not only rejected this claim but also believed they had been promised an
expansion of Kurdish self-government. What encouraged such an interpretation was British
approval for merging new Kurdish areas, situated between the Greater and the Lesser Zab
Rivers, with the Kurdish autonomous entity. Noel himself asked for Baghdad’s approval for
uniting the remainder of Southern Kurdistan with the autonomous Kurdish entity. Certain
areas in Eastern Kurdistan across the Persian frontier presented similar requests. The British
authorities themselves admitted that they had suggested a “Kurdistan for the Kurds” under
their protection leading to the establishment of a Kurdish entity. This proposal had
attracted “real popularity”, and “all the neighbouring tribes had shown evident signs of theirwish to join the Kurdish confederation".41 According to this state of affairs, the British agreed
that
any Kurdish tribes from the Greater Zab to the Dyalah (other than those in Persian territory)
who, of their [own] free will, accepted the leadership of Sheikh Mahmud, would be allowed to doso and the latter would have our moral support in controlling the above areas on behalf of the
British Government.^
Southern Kurdistan was, according to Noel, “quiet and contented”43 during the few
months of the Kurdish Government. Yet, it was this rapid consolidation of the Kurdish entity
and the extension of the Mahmud Government’s influence to other Kurdish areas thatappeared to precipitate Wilson’s action to put an end to this unwelcome, albeit successful,experiment. From December 1918 onward, Southern Kurdistan witnessed a gradual deter­
ioration in British-Kurdish relations. On the one hand, Wilson and his like-minded subordi­
nates saw it as necessary to contain the influence of the Kurdish Government and, on theother, Mahmud persistently asked for the expansion of his entity to include other Kurdish
areas. Mahmud considered what he asked for as legitimate, given its compatibility with thedesires of local Kurds and with British policy. On 1 December 1918, Wilson visited Sulaima­niya, where he held a meeting with the Kurdish Government in the presence of 60 Kurdish

41* Ibid, p10
42* Ibid.
43* E.W.L. Noel, Note -in- Colonial Office Minute No.4958,22 July 1922, CO730/13, PRO.

67

notables from Southern and Eastern Kurdistan. At this meeting, the Kurdish side sought toobtain a promise from the British regarding the political future not only of Southern Kurdistan,
but all parts of Kurdistan, i.e. a united and an independent Kurdistan under British
protection. 44
In Helmi’s view, the demands for political unity under Mahmud, by both Eastern andSouthern Kurdish notables, persuaded Wilson to overthrow him .45 in contrast, the British
authorities in Baghdad regarded Mahmud’s actions and demands as a deviation from theirpast agreement. 46 Mahmud was now described as a tyrant, who had an unreliable and rebel­
lious background. His ambitions to extend his rule to undesirable areas, such as Arbil and theMosul division and anti-Allies Kurds, turned Mahmud into a menace to the future peace of thecountry .47 Consequently, according to Wilson, steps had to be taken to prevent Mahmud’s

influence from spreading to “regions where it was unnecessary or objectionable and where it
offered a possible menace to peace in the fu tu re ”a s To sum up Wilson’s attitudes towards
Mahmud, it can be said that he agreed to the establishment of Kurdish self-government
because of the relative vulnerability of the British position in Mesopotamia. He had, however,considered it to be no more than a temporary arrangement:
Without the full measure of co-operation and assistance which he [i.e. Mahmud] was then giv­
ing us, it would have been necessary to bring in a strong garrison which at the time was out of
the question. From the political point of view, too, it was of great importance that we should
maintain order in the area and, at the same time, [we] should avoid the appearance of using
force for this purpose.49
As soon as it was realised that the Kurdish Government no longer needed to renderservice to the British, following the consolidation of their influence in Southern Kurdistan, Wil­son not only removed Mahmud, but also wound up the whole autonomous entity. Wilson’s
fears grew when indirect British control proved to be successful in achieving its aims in South­
ern Kurdistan, namely the establishment of peace and order, without entailing any military or
financial commitments. He feared that, apart from encouraging London to expand indirect ruleto the rest of the Kurdish area, a similar policy would be adopted towards the Arabs in Mesopo­
tamia. 5 0 Therefore, as soon as he had the military and political means to administer Southern
44* India Office, Political Department, 27 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO, p.2.
45* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.I, p.94.
46* Administration Report of the Sulaimaniya division.., op. cit.
47* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p15.
48*lbid.
49* Ibid, p. 12.
50* E.W.L. Noel, Note -in- Colonial Office Minute, No.4958,22 July 1922, C0730/13, PRO.

68

Kurdistan on a direct basis, Wilson wasted no time in taking measures designed to overthrow
the autonomous Kurdish Government. According to Noel, the decision to end the Kurdish
Government was taken by Wilson alone, and implemented by his successor, Maj. Soane, with­out prior consultations with the British officers who served in that govemment.51
The Imposition Of Direct British Rule And Its Impact On The Political Situa­tion In Southern Kurdistan
Wilson’s step by step policy to undermine the Kurdish Government left Mahmud and thenationalist circle around him with no option but to revolt against the British authorities in Bagh­dad, accusing them not only of going back on their previous promises, but of also destroying
what the Kurds had achieved so far. His revolt was a spontaneous reaction against Wilson’s
new policy of direct rule and had nothing to do with the anti-British activities of the Young
Turks, as Briton C. Busch suggests.5 2 Wilson’s new policy was symbolised by the change inthe British personnel who worked as advisers to the Kurdish Government. The revolt sought a
restoration of the status quo ante, without aiming to terminate British influence or threaten
their interests. Mahmud was aware that the defeat of the British was out of question, andhoped that the peace conference would recognise Kurdish nationalist aspirations. The revolt
started on 22 May 1919, with the arrest of all British political and military officials in Sulaimaniya.
It received support from certain Kurds from Eastern Kurdistan, who jointly captured the Halabjah region, including the town itself. In spite of Mahmud’s apparent hope of negotiation andthe absence of bloodshed by this point, Wilson adopted a military response, hoping to put anend, once and for all, to the autonomous Kurdish entity. He wanted to make sure that thebreach between both sides would be permanent.
In spite of the suppression of the revolt and the arrest of its leader, Kurdish resistanceto British direct rule did not die. The followers and sympathisers of Mahmud in Southern andEastern Kurdistan continued their sporadic military activities. 5 3 Wilson’s policy of ending theautonomous Kurdish entity, and paving the way for the amalgamation of Southern Kurdistan
and the directly-administered British Mesopotamia, received no support from the Kurdish
51* Ibid.
52* Briton C. Busch, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain’s Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923 (New York: State
University of New York Press, Albany, 1976), p.186.
53* In their first armed confrontation with Mahmud’s forces, the British were defeated. Soon, they orga­
nised a much stronger military campaign .which succeeded in suppressing the Kurdish revolt. Sheikh
Mahmud was arrested injured. He was put on trial and ultimately sent to India where he served his sen­tence.

69

population, apart from what the British authorities described as “a few of the more enlightened
members of the community” 5 4 The predominant political characteristic of the period afterJune 1919 was the prevalence instability and disorder, especially in the most mountainous
areas .55 The policy of direct British control not only failed in Southern Kurdistan, but also in

Arab Mesopotamia, where a bloody revolt broke out in 1920. As a result, some 426 British
soldiers were killed, 615 were reported missing, prisoners or presumed dead, in addition to1,228 wounded.
Kurdish opposition to and resentment of direct British control was not confined tothose areas which had been controlled by, or supported Mahmud’s Government, but also
included other areas of Southern Kurdistan. In Arbil, the Dizai Kurds demanded political andadministrative arrangements similar to those made south of the Lesser Zab River. The conse­
quent British cosmetic changes that left the structure of direct control intact, such as giving
the Kurdish notables honorary ranks and some consultation on administrative matters,did notstop the unrest from spreading. In the Mosul division, the dispatched British officers foundthe local Kurds in such areas as Zakho and Aqra far more difficult to deal with than those in thesouthern districts near Sulaimaniya, when attempting to organise districts on a direct rulebasis.se in early April 1919, the disturbances in Zakho culminated in the murder of its British

Assistant Political Officer, Capt. C. Pearson. 5 7 An extract from the diary of the Political Officer
at Arbil showed that the Surchis and the Barzans were actively anti-British. 58 Earlier, the Barzans sided with the Zibars in their anti-British revolt. It resulted in the murder of Col. Bill, Leach­man’s successor as the Political Officer of the Mosul division, and Capt. K. Scott, the Assistant
Political Officer at Aqra.5 9What multiplied Kurdish anger against the British in the Mosul division was the latter’s
support for the Christian minority at the expense of local Kurds, by resettling Christian refu­
gees from Persia in Kurdish territory and using them as a British instrument of control. Thismethod of consolidating direct control through divide and rule was epitomised in Leachman’s
actions in the Kurdish area in his division in Mosul. Indeed, there were very few British officials

54* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p.12.
55* Sulaimaniya Monthly Progress Report for the Month of August 1919, F0371/5070 & Administration
Report of the Kirkuk division for Period January 1st 1919-December 31st 1919, F0371/5069, PRO.
56* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p.10.
57* G.L.Bell, Northern Kurdistan, 8 March 1920, AIR20/513, PRO.
58* Extract from the Dairy of Political Officer, Arbil, for Month of January 1920, F0371/5068, PRO.
59* Political, Baghdad, 4 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.

70

on the ground who did not believe in the viability of such methods to control the Southern
Kurds. For instance, on the eve of the Amadia uprising, Col. Bill expressed his apprehension
at implementing the Assyrian repatriation proposal,6o just days before his murder at the handsof Kurdish rebels:
The only consideration, which would drive the [Kurdish] tribes into irreconcilable opposition, is
the idea that we are going to support the Christians against the Muslims in every way... at thevery moment, when we are trying to work out modus vivendi with the Muslims.01
Wilson argued differently in that the question of Christian repatriation had nothing to do withthe outbreak of the Amadia uprising, which forced his subordinates to evacuate A qra .6 2 He
dismissed the idea that a Kurdish nationalist reaction was the main source of British troubles.63
By contrast, Helmi attributed the widespread Kurdish resentment to the British heavy-handed
policy, following Mahmud’s departure to lndia.64
Other British officials on the ground attributed unwelcome events, such as the Ama­
dia uprising in November 1919, to Turkish anti-Christian propaganda and to French proChristian propaganda, which raised enormous fears among the local Kurds. 65 Generally, they
ascribed the change in Kurdish attitudes towards Britain to two factors. The first factor was theKurds themselves: their “ordinary dislike of law", the “personal ambitions of their local leaders”
and their internal differences. The second factor was external: the Kemalists’ activities among
the Kurds such as exploiting their religious feelings and inter-tribal jealousy, ee the widespread
Bolshevik doctrines imported from Persia and Turkey,67 and the return of Kurdish prisoners
from India, who brought with them stories of how the British oppressed the Indians. 68 Kurdish
opposition to the British -in the form of hit and run attacks as well as local rebellions- was notconfined to Mosul and Sulaimaniya, but also western parts of Kurdistan, such as Jezirah-ibnOmar. As the British authorities on the ground were unable to put an end to political instability
in Southern Kurdistan, fears began to arise in London. The prospect of a general anti-British
uprising among the Kurds would call into question the nature of all British commitments in Kur60* Foreign Office Minute No. 168555,8 January 1920, F0371/4193, PRO.
61 * H. Bill to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, Memorandum on the future of the Qaza of Amadia, 21 Octo­
ber 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
62* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 9 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
63* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 20 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
64* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.i, pp.14-8.
65* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p.11.
66* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, Priority, 11 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
67* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 27 March 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.
68* Administration Report Of the Sulaimaniya Division.., op. cit.

71

distan.69 Partly because of this, there were calls in various official circles to formulate a clear-cut British policy towards Kurdistan’s future as quickly as possible.
The growing tension between the Southern Kurds and the British aroused the fears
of Kurdish nationalist circles in Northern Kurdistan. They must have feared that this state ofaffairs in British-occupied Kurdistan might lead Britain to react unfavourably towards the Kurd­
ish question at the peace conference, and refuse to take a mandate for the whole of Kurdi­
stan. They probably feared that the Turks would benefit from the situation by winning over the
resentful Kurds. However, they believed that the source of Britain’s troubles in occupied Kur­
distan lay in its policy on the ground. In the wake of the Aqra Incident, the Kurdish Indepen­
dence Committee in Northern Kurdistan informed the British Government of its opinion
regarding the causes of the current disturbances in British occupied-Kurdistan, emphasising
its Kurdish origins. It reminded the British that the same Kurdish tribes which had welcomed
them now rebelled against them. The Committee attributed this largely to the behaviour ofBritish officials, who ignored Kurdish nationalist feelings and customs, warning against thegrowing Kurdish enmity towards Britain and calling on the British to improve the situation. It
recommended as a short term solution, while awaiting the independence of Kurdistan, theappointment of those British officials who were *well acquainted with the psychoiogy andcharacter of the tribes” jo Similarly, Noel agreed that the reversal of British policy on the
ground from sponsoring Kurdish nationalism to undermining it, as a method of maintaining
British influence in Ottoman Kurdistan, was the main reason for the consequent British trou­
bles in Southern Kurdistan.71
Calls began to be made both by British officials on the ground and Kurdish notables
for the return of indirect control via the establishment of a form of Kurdish autonomy. These
stemmed from the growing realisation that there was an urgent need to contain the rapidly
growing Kurdish resentment of British rule. Despite his firm belief in direct British rule, andhaving previously expressed strong reservations about Kurdish autonomy, 7 2 Maj. Soane
regarded the re-establishment of a Kurdish governorship under Hamdi Beg Baban, a Britishorientated Kurd, as the “most reasonabie” suggestion, and that “such a step is advisable soo­ner or later to disarm propagandists”, namely, Mahmud's’ followers, who claimed that the Brit-

69* Parliamentary Question, No. 151967,14 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
70* Residence, Cairo, to Curzon, 9 December 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
71* E.W.L. Noel, Note -in- Colonial Office Minute No.4958, 22 July 1922, CO730/13, PRO.
72* Soane, Sulaimaniya, to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 11 January 1920, F0371/5068> PRO.

72ish had backed down on their promises. 7 3 Other British assistant officers in Southern Kurdi­
stan, such as Capt. C.T. Beale, called on Wilson to consider the idea of introducing indirect
British control in the Rowanduz region through the creation of a tiny Kurdish “state" to re­establish peace and order, after the British failure to control it directly.7 4 This latter area wasstrategically important by virtue of its overlooking one of the main roads between Southernand Eastern Kurdistan. They nominated Said Taha as Kurdish Governor of that tiny Kurdish
entity because of his influence in the area. Even Leachman endorsed the idea of installing
Said Taha as Governor of such a tiny state in the Rowanduz district.75
The calls for the re-establishment of an autonomous Kurdish government in South­
ern Kurdistan were not confined to the nationalist circles in Sulaimaniya. Soon Wilson foundthat even those Kurdish notables whom he encouraged to turn against Mahmud’s Govern­
ment or to adopt a neutral stand, wanted Kurdish autonomy as a guarantee against Southern
Kurdistan’s incorporation into a Mesopotamian state. In July 1920, a memorandum was signedby sixty two leading tribal leaders, as well as townsmen, in the Arbil and Sulaimaniya regions, inwhich they demanded that Kurdistan should be constituted as an independent state under
British mandate7e in line with the British Government’s earlier promises. They also asked that
Southern Kurdistan should have its own representative at the peace conference. 7 7 in March
Capt C.A. Rundle reported that at his meetings with two pro-British notables, Mullah Mohmod
Effendi, the Hakim-i-Shar1, and his deputy, Jamil Agha, the former “was very emphatic... in theopinion that Kurdish Hukmdar should be appointed" and that “the Hukmdar must have British
support and advice”.™ They suggested that the proposed autonomous state should include“ail Kurdistan within the British mandatory area".™ Apart from bringing political stability back to
Southern Kurdistan following the overthrow of Mahmud’s Government, the motives of theseand other Kurdish notables seemed to be the growing Kurdish anxiety about the return of

73* Confidential Memorandum From Political Officer, Sulaimaniya, to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 4August 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
74* Beale, Rowanduz, to Political, Baghdad, 29 May 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
75* Beale, Mosul, to Political, Baghdad, 6 June 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
76* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 3 July 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
77* Translation of [an] Undated Persian Document, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 17 August 1920,
FO371/5069, PRO.
78* Confidential Memorandum From Capt. A.G. Rudly, Arbil, to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, March
1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
79* Confidential Memorandum From Political Officer, Arbil, to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 17 July
1920, F0371/5069, PRO.

73

Turkish rule to Southern Kurdistan, or its inclusion in an Arab state in Mesopotamia.so These
examples demonstrate that, despite increasing British political difficulties -such as the pro­
spect of military and financial commitments, and the dilemma of not being able to withdraw or
to station troops permanently in Southern Kurdistan- Wilson remained adamant in his belief
that direct control should continue, and that any autonomous Kurdish state, however limited
its size and authority, should not be countenanced.

London’s Attitudes Towards The Affairs Of Southern Kurdistan
The most striking aspect of Wilson’s position on Kurdish affairs was his ability to pursue apolicy remarkably different from what he suggested to the British Government. At one of themeetings of the Interdepartmental Conference of Middle Eastern affairs -which was held
under the chairmanship of Lord Curzon to discuss the future administration of Mesopotamia(17 April 1919)- Wilson suggested that instead of establishing a united and autonomous Kur­
distan in the British-occupied Kurdish areas, Britain should set up a number of smaller autono­
mous Kurdish states: one in the Sulaimaniya region, the second in the Rowanduz region, thethird in Amadia and the fourth in Jezirah-ibn-Omar, etc.si These autonomous states would begoverned by local Kurdish notables, who would have as their advisers British officials sent by
the British authorities of Mesopotamia. The conference agreed in principle that:
Wilson should be authorised to take steps for the creation of five provinces [as] suggested byCol. [Evelyn] Howell for Iraq.., and for an Arab province of Mosul, surrounded by a fringe ofautonomous Kurdish states under Kurdish chiefs, with British political advisers.82
But Wilson never initiated such steps and instead, he set out to reorganise the administrationof Southern Kurdistan on a direct control basis, and gave the destruction of the autonomous
Kurdish entity an exceptional priority.
The following examination of the structure of British control in Southern Kurdistan
undoubtedly shows that the area was being organised by Wlson on a direct control basis.
Since December 1918, when it became clear that Area A would be transferred to a British
sphere of influence, Wilson had devoted his efforts and time to the establishment of direct
British control in Southern Kurdistan. This took two forms. The first was a tribal system, accord80* Ibid.
81* Wilson excluded large Kurdish areas from the proposed autonomous Kurdish states, such as Arbil,
Zakho and Aqra. These areas were to be part of the Arab province of Mosul, which was to be within the
British administration of Mesopotamia.
82* Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs (IDCM), Minute No.16,17 April 1919,
F0371/4149, PRO.

74

ing to which each Kurdish tribe was viewed as a “political formation" under the nominal author­
ity of its chief (or chiefs), who w a r selected by the British authorities according to his loyalty.
British assistant political officers closely supervised these chiefs and through them British
orders were put into practice. This form of direct administration was applied mostly to themountainous sub-districts, such as Qala Diza, and certain powerful tribes, such as the Jaf andPizhder, as well as remote Kurdish areas. The second form was more outright control via Brit­ish officials. According to this administrative system, the Sulaimaniya division was divided into
five districts: Sulaimaniya, Sharbezher, Chemchemal, Halabjah and Rania. Every district wasunder an assistant political officer. Their districts were subdivided into Mudirliqs (sub-districts)
and administered by mudirs, who might be Kurdish. This system was applied mostly to theplain areas and towns, where the British could deploy their forces quickly in an emergency.
In May 1919, the Kurds also lost control over the Kurdish Levies, when they werebrought under the command of British officers. The number of Kurdish officers decreased
from thirty six under Kurdish self-government to nine. Moreover, Kurdish conscripts were for­ced to take service under the British Government. 83 The Kirkuk division, which had been partof the Sulaimaniya division until February 1919, had closer British control. 84 Wilson began toestablish the newly-created division of Arbil on a direct control line.es All Kurdish divisions
were supposed to have a division council under close British control. Wilson and his subordi­
nates’ ultimate objective was to incorporate Southern Kurdistan, as a whole, into the British
administration of Mesopotamia. In his comments on the administration report of the Sulaima­niya division for the year 1919, Hubert Young of the Foreign Office describes Wilson’s above
mentioned administrative steps as “a very illuminating account of the destruction of the steps
originally taken to form an autonomous Kurdistan and the establishment of direct administra­tion in its place”.ae it should be borne in mind that the structure of direct British rule in South­
ern Kurdistan was different from that of Mesopotamia due to the differences between the tworegions in terms of British political control and geographical features. Moreover, whereas Lon­don was far more directly involved in any decision regarding the political and administrative
arrangements for Arab Mesopotamia, it allowed the British authorities in Baghdad to make
83* Administration Report of the Sulaimaniya division.., op. cit.
84* Administration Report of the Kirkuk division for Period January 1st, 1919 to December 31st 1919,
FO371/5069, PRO.
85* Administration Report of the Arbil division for the Year 1919, F0371/5069, PRO.
86* H.W. Young, Foreign Office Minute on the Administration Report on the Sulaimaniya division forYear 1919, No.4958,23 July 1920, F0371/5069, PRO.

75

decisions on the ground insofar as Southern Kurdistan was concerned. This state of affairs
reflected the fact that London knew what would be the political future of Mesopotamia, unlike
Southern Kurdistan, whose fate was still undecided upon.
As previously mentioned, Wilson’s reversal of Kurdish policy on the ground caused
widespread political instability, and the British were forced to take punitive military operations
and aerial bombardments of Kurdish villages. Far from consolidating British control, theseactions resulted in the restoration of some Turkish influence in the Kurdish areas. These poli­tical and military developments were naturally unwelcomed by the British Government. Apartfrom its opposition to new military and financial commitments, London was worried that Wil­
son’s policy of denying Kurdish national aspirations might turn Southern Kurdistan into a per­manent threat to British interests in Mesopotamia as well as in Persia. Even the India Office,which up to this point favoured Southern Kurdistan’s subjection, questioned the advantagesof Wilson’s attempts to impose direct control in such remote areas as Amadia, where British
officers were being killed. 87 in August 1919, the India Office telegraphed Wilson regarding
London’s general anxiety about the Kurdish situation. Apart from acute financial difficulties,
and despite the uncertainty about Kurdistan’s future, Britain should establish neither direct
administration nor effective military occupation, but loose political supervision, as the main
method of securing its strategic interests in Kurdistan. The telegram reminded Wilson that the
British Government:
hitherto supported policy of extending British influence to Southern Kurdistan because they
believed that inhabitants themselves welcomed it. It was on this understanding that they sanc­tioned your proposai to create., autonomous Kurdish States under Kurdish Chiefs with British
political advisers.. It would now appear that belief was misplaced and that [the] inhabitants, farfrom welcoming British influence, are so actively hostile that strategic railway[s] are required
to keep them in check. In these circumstances, might it not be [a] better course to withdraw
our political officers, &c., and leave Kurds to their own devices? [The] alternative of maintain­
ing order by force among reluctant mountain tribesmen opens up [a] prospect of military com­mitments, which HMG contemplates with gravest apprehension. Last thing they desire is tocreate a new North-West Frontier problem [as in India] on the north-eastern borders of Iraq.*8
This telegram highlights the degree to which the British Government had mistakenly assumed
that Wilson was reorganising Southern Kurdistan’s administration on the basis of autonomous
Kurdish states. The reason for London’s confusion seemed to be the information he sent
regarding the real nature of his steps on the ground. The British troubles in Southern Kurdi­
stan, as in Mesopotamia, exposed the shortcomings of direct rule: financially expensive, mili­tarily hazardous and politically harmful.
87* India Office, Political Department, 27 August, 1919, F0371/4192, PRO, p.2.
88* ibid.

76

Yet British authorities in Mesopotamia attributed the reversal of their Kurdish policy to
the fact that their original task of establishing "an independent Southern Kurdistan” under
their auspices was impractical owing to “the backward and undeveloped state of the country,
the lack of communications and the dissensions of the tribes”. Therefore, the administrative
partition of Southern Kurdistan, and then its amalgamation with British-administered Mesopo­
tamia, was presented as a necessary and justifiable course of actions. 89 In the ensuingexchange of telegrams between Wilson and the India Office regarding Southern Kurdistan,
the former continued to defend his Kurdish policy by disputing the claim that the Kurdish selfgovernment was a viable alternative. He even argued that the Mahmud Government should
not have been established in the first place:[The] idea, embodied in President Wilson’s 14 points and confirmed in [the] Anglo-Frenchdeclaration of 8 November, of substituting nationality, religion or race as [a] basis of govern­
ment in the Middle East in lieu of ‘ability and power to govern', has aroused [the] dormant ani­mosities of [the] past hundred years. Coming, as it did, on top of acute misery arising out ofwar, it was eagerly adopted by every race and sect and interpreted according to their racial
idiosyncrasies.so
The existence of widespread anti-British activities in Southern Kurdistan was reported
in the British press at home9i and raised questions in the British parliament about the long­term British policy in that region. 9 2 Wilson, however, continued to argue that the majority ofthe population welcomed the policy of direct rule, based not on “force but consent”. Kurdish
people, according to Wilson, even demanded more British supervision after "a brief test ofnationalist anarchy” under Mahmud. 9 3 To mitigate London’s fears of an increase in financial
expenditure, Wilson argued that the economic wealth of Southern Kurdistan would not leadto increased British financial commitments, and that the prospects for the British administra­tion would be even brighter because of the existence of oil fields and fertile wheat-growing
land. He stressed that the overthrow of the Kurdish Government was the only way to foil theattempts of the “disorderly element” to control Southern Kurdistan; otherwise, Britain would
be forced to make more military commitments to protect Kirkuk, Kifri and Arbil. Wilson wanted
London’s proposal for an autonomous Southern Kurdistan to be submitted to strategic con­siderations, and these should alone define the degree of British supervision. According tosuch considerations, Sulaimaniya, the core of Kurdish nationalism, had to come under far clo89* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p. 12.
90* Political, Baghdad, Priority, 29 August 1919, F0371/4192.
91* Extract from Glasgow Herald, No.153000,13 November 1919, F0371/4193.
92* Parliamentary Question, 14 November 1919, F0371/4193.
93* Ibid.

77

ser British supervision than other Kurdish areas because of its geographical and military impor­tance. Furthermore, Wilson argued that an autonomous Southern Kurdistan would have one
consequence: total abandonment of the country. This policy would undermine British strate­
gic positions in the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets, incurring grave political instability.94 As a con­sequence, Britain would be forced to make a far greater military and financial commitment thandirect British control would require in Southern Kurdistan. Despite its failure, direct British con­trol in Southern Kurdistan continued as a result of the influence of British officials on the
ground. In this respect, a Foreign Office minute reveals how Soane could resist, in his capa­
city as a Political Officer, the application of a new British approach to Kurdish affairs by prevent­ing the appointment of a Kurdish governor.95
One of the consequences of Wilson’s failure was the rejection by the British Govern­
ment of his proposal for the construction of a railway from Qizil Robat towards Kifri and Kirkuk.
There were strong suspicions among British policy makers that Wilson wanted to use the rail­
way to consolidate direct British control and to suppress Kurdish revolts. Although Edwin
Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, initially accepted Wilson’s scheme for the incorpora­tion of Southern Kurdistan into British Mesopotamia on strategic grounds, 96 most of those
British military and civilian officials who attended a meeting held at the India Office recommen­
ded the establishment of tiny Kurdish states: one in Sulaimaniya and one in Jezirah-ibnOmar.9 7 But nothing along these lines materialised, as British official circles could not decideupon Southern Kurdistan’s long-term future beyond its inclusion in the British mandate for
Mesopotamia.

The Consequences Of The Imposition Of Direct British Rule In Southern Kur­
distan For The Kurdish Question
The destruction of the Kurdish autonomous entity by the British authorities in Mesopotamia
was not due to its failure to fulfil the tasks expected of it, namely establishing political stability,
the re-activation of economic life, and above all, obtaining the friendship of the local Kurds.
On all these levels, the Kurdish Government led by Mahmud was successful, without entailing

94* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad 13 February 1920, F0371/5070, PRO.
95* Foreign Office Minute No. 15161,3 December 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
96* A. Hirtzel, India Office, 25 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
97* The meeting was chaired by Arthur Hirtzel, India Office Under Secretary, to discuss Wilson’ propo­
sals for the boundaries between Mesopotamia and Kurdistan, dated 27 November, No.14269. Minute ofa Meeting Held at the India Office, 6 December 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.

78

military, political or financial commitments from Britain. Furthermore, it helped to consolidate
British influence in an area that was growing in importance due to its geographical location. It
connected the British to northern and north-west Persia, where the Bolshevik threat was
growing, and it adjoined the French sphere of influence and areas where Britain could influ­
ence the course of political events, such as Armenia, Northern Kurdistan and Anatolia. In thelight of this, the overthrow of Kurdish Government should be attributed not to its failure, but toits success and its immediate political implications. Wilson, who directly took charge of Kurdish
affairs in June 1919, feared that the success of the Kurdish experiment would likely lead tothe establishment of an autonomous state of Southern Kurdistan. At the same time, hefeared that the two Arab Wilayets of Baghdad and Basra would follow suit, thereby terminating
the direct control system overall Mesopotamia. His views were shared by the majority of local
British military and civilian officials, and this explains why it was impossible to re-establish Kurd­
ish autonomy in British-controlled areas up until the formation of the second Mahmud Govern­
ment in the autumn of 1922.
The period 1919-20 was exceptionally important because direct British rule had direconsequences for the Kurds in terms of their subjection to new methods of control and losing
an unprecedented opportunity to achieve their nationalist aspirations. Wilson and his likeminded civil and military officials set an example for the future, by developing the methods bywhich Southern Kurdistan could be kept under control, and be part of a Mesopotamian admin­
istration. Consequently, his successors would find it much easier to incorporate Southern
Kurdistan into Mesopotamia, rather than establishing it as an autonomous or independent
state. Examination of his reports between 1918 and 1920 shows that Wilson and his subordi­
nates distorted information regarding the actual size of Southern Kurdistan, the demographical distribution of the Kurds, their political aspirations and economic links. For example, such
Kurdish towns as Arbil and Kirkuk were not, Wilson reported, Kurdish but Turkish.98 The
Kurds lived only in the mountainous areas and were commercially dependent upon their links
with Arab Mesopotamia. They were divided into groups, one of which was ethnically Kurdish(i.e. tribes), the other of which was not Kurdish (i.e. those who belonged to no tribe at all). In
addition, Wilson did not consider the Christian, Jewish and Yazidi Kurds to be Kurdish. To
contain the Kurdish nationalist movement, Wilson and his subordinates revived old Turkishmethods of divide and rule by encouraging localism and tribalism, which were institutionalised
98* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 8 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.lt should be said many of theKurdish population of Arbil spoke (and still speak) Turkish alongside Kurdish.

79

within the system of direct rule.
From a military point of view, British military and civilian authorities in Mesopotamia
were in agreement that such strategic Kurdish places as Amadia should be turned into settle­
ments for Assyrians, who had fled Persia. These Assyrians could be organised and used as aforce to suppress Kurdish revolts. 9 9 The military authorities in Mesopotamia had for some time
been planning to both use and urge the Assyrians to suppress the Kurdish revolts and tomaintain British influence in Southern Kurdistan:
For generations the Assyrians had been fighting the Kurds... It will be much better to allow thecommandant of the [ Assyrian] refugees at the camp at Baqubah to invite Malik Khoshaba...
and other officers... to form three Drogin battalions or three thousand men to [serve]under a
British commander for a while [in] Amadia.^0 0
Among other low-cost military measures that Wilson and the military called for to consolidate
British positions in the mountainous parts of Southern Kurdistan, was the air force. 101 Fromthen onward, the use of the Royal Air Force began to emerge as the ideal way of keeping
Southern Kurdistan under British control. All these methods of control, used or advocated by
Wilson and other like-minded officials in Mesopotamia, were incorporated into future British
policy towards Southern Kurdistan, especially after the establishment of the Iraqi state.
The imposition of direct British rule and the disappearance of the autonomous entity
had far reaching political effects on the Kurdish question. The suppression of Sheikh Mah­
mud and the nationalist circle that rallied around him resulted in the considerable underminingof the Kurdish nationalist movement in Southern Kurdistan. The importance of Sheikh Mah­
mud’s leadership for Southern Kurds was even conceded by the British authorities in Bagh­dad:with all his faults, he was at the time a considerable political asset. In Southern Kurdistan, for
one who opposed his appointment, there were four others who welcomed it and this is a low
proportion of dissent in a country where family ties and internecine feuds play so large a part...
The salient factor remained that Sheikh Mahmud was a power in the land and as such his
appointment was a distinct asset in our dealings with the bulk of the tribes. 1 02

99* For example, Wilson suggested to Curzon that Britain should take advantage of the murder of a Brit­ish official by local Kurds in order to settle Assyrian refugees within the armistice Line. This suggestionsought to create a pro-British basis among population. Letter From Young to Kidston, 15 September
1919. F0371/4192, PRO.
100* Ex. Commander-in-Chief to General Officer Commanding, 5 August 1919, AIR20/513, PRO.
101* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, February 1920, F0371/5067, PRO. British aerial bombardments ofKurdish civilian centres during 1919 were probably the first of their kind in modern history when theyused to suppress local rebellions. For details on the role of the British air force in Kurdistan see David C.
Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: the Royal Air Force, 1919-1939, (Manchester: 1990)
102* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p.13.

80

In Eastern Kurdistan a number of Kurdish regions expressed their readiness to come underautonomous Kurdish rule and recognise Mahmud’s leadership. The absence of a Kurdish lea­
dership, as a political alternative to the rule of British officials, made the continuation of directcontrol inevitable in Southern Kurdistan, despite London’s uneasiness. This also had twoother political implications. The first was that it paved the way for the incorporation of Southern
Kurdistan into the British mandate over Mesopotamia, which represented a de facto partitionof Ottoman Kurdistan. Secondly, when the state of Iraq was created by the British throughmerging the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets, Southern Kurdistan was, in comparison, fallingbehind in terms of political status, lacking both the bureaucracy and leadership to rally local
Kurds. These factors made it easier for the British to concentrate on the success of one
experiment, namely Arab rule in Baghdad and Basra, at the expense of other issues, includ­ing the future of Southern Kurdistan.

Conclusion
The Allied victory in the First World War and the disintegration of the ancient Ottoman Empire
symbolised the end of the old regional order in the Middle East. The process of re-drawing a
new political map for the post-war Middle East seemed to offer the new nationalities, such as
the Kurds, Arabs and Armenians, an unprecedented opportunity to realise their long-heldpolitical aspirations. The impact of the war re-vitalised the Kurdish nationalist movement in
Ottoman and Qajar Kurdistan.British control of the southern parts of Kurdistan made theKurds feel even more optimistic, as they perceived the British, in particular, to be theirsaviours from the Ottoman Turks. Indeed, the slogan of “Kurdistan for the Kurds", which wasused to guide immediate British political and administrative measures in Southern Kurdistan
after the war, was a very promising start.
The subsequent change in British policy, from indirect to direct control after June
1919, illustrated how premature Kurdish optimism was. In the absence of a defined British
policy towards Kurdistan’s future, British officials’ measures on the ground became an impor­tant factor in influencing the subsequent political developments and the way London approa­
ched the Kurdish situation at the peace conference. By providing all the strategic, economic
and political arguments for the need to consolidate British position in Mesopotamia, British
officials, especially Wilson, influenced London’s decision to place Southern Kurdistan under81the Mesopotamian mandate. In other words, Southern Kurdistan was not only prevented frombecoming an autonomous entity, but politically detached from the remainder of Kurdistan.
Ttuis was an early indication that the thinking of British policy makers was directed against theidea of a united Kurdistan, which Kurdish nationalists demanded.
The effects of suppressing Southern Kurdish nationalists and the winding up of theirgovernment transcended the boundaries of the British-controlled Southern Kurdistan. Such
British actions helped to impede the development of Kurdish nationalist movement by dis­
rupting all attempts to co-ordinate Kurdish political efforts on a Kurdistan-wide basis. The
absence of the nationalist leadership of Mahmud from the Kurdish political scene after June
1919 partly explains the lack of political co-ordination between the efforts of the Southern andNorthern Kurds at a very sensitive time, namely the deliberation of Kurdistan’s future at thepeace conference. While In Southern Kurdistan Mahmud had engaged in preparing the way
for an active role for the Southern Kurds at that conference. To this end, he worked towards
granting General Cherif Pasha, the Kurdish representative at the peace conference, a man­date in the form of a petition signed by influential Southern Kurds so that he could speak forboth Southern and Northern Kurdistan. 103 Mahmud’s other efforts in the direction of a Kur­
distan-wide co-operation were frustrated, such as his endeavour to bring many parts of East­
ern Kurdistan under Kurdish rule. The British were determined to prevent any political cohe­sion between Southern and Eastern Kurdistan in order not to undermine Persia’s territorial
unity. In his memoirs, Rafik Helmi explains how the attempts of the British authorities in Bagh­dad prevented a Kurdish delegation -sent by the Kurdish Government- from reaching Paris tojoin Cherif Pasha. 1 04 Mahmud himself could be partly blamed for the worsening of BritishKurdish relations in Southern Kurdistan, which culminated in his exile. He was over-optimistic,
impatient and, in Helmi’s words, politically inexperienced when dealing with the British authori­ties in Baghdad. 105 These characteristics manifested themselves in Mahmud’s unceasingpressure on the British to act swiftly to fulfil their promises about expanding Kurdish rule,
before gaining full British confidence in his leadership and political intentions.
One of the main consequences of the above mentioned developments was that theKurds had much less political weight, and were placed in a weaker position than they desiredat the start of the peace conference’s deliberations on the future of Kurdistan. The Sheikh
103* Helmi, Memoirs,Vo\.\, pp. 19 & 65-66.
104* Ibid, pp.65-66.
105* Ibid, p.67.

82

Mahmud affair made the British Government look less favourably upon the Kurds, whom it per­ceived as troublesome people, who lacked reliable leaders. The termination of the experi­
ment of Kurdish autonomy undermined Noel’s efforts to secure London’s support for Kurdish
nationalist aspirations at the peace conference, as the establishment of that government was
associated with his approach to the Kurdish question. Perhaps the most negative conse­
quence of the disappearance of the autonomous Kurdish Government was that nationalist
Kurdish circles in Kurdistan as well as those in exile could no longer refer to it as a symbol of
their political and moral strength, nor as proof of their ability to operate an indigenous admin­
istration. In other words, they were no longer capable of using that government as an impor­tant argument to support their claim for an independent Kurdistan under foreign supervisionat the peace conference.

83Clhiiipftsr TGwtg
Tfn® A lfflllM iss O f BirllttDilh) OffPOGllSLO® Offn H ® Oir®(yiinidl T@wnird© Tffo© 5Cyrd5®!hi

Q yd ilita Mw(l<iy HSUS A M Hit®: El?l?®©ii© A M IR©a<gftfi®[fi)iWhen the Paris peace conference started its debate on the Turkish peace settlement in
1919, the British Government had little knowledge about the Kurds, their affairs and aspira­tions. In most Kurdish areas outside British-controlled Southern Kurdistan a dangerous politi­
cal vacuum emerged as a result of the steady decline in the power of the central governments
in Constantinople and Tehran.This state of affairs enabled certain British officials serving in
Kurdistan or in its neighbouring areas, notably Maj. Noel and Col. Wilson, to play an importantpart in influencing the attitudes of the British Government towards Kurdistan’s political future
through their views and political schemes. Noel was the first British official who took charge of
Kurdish affairs on the ground between November 1918 and June 1919, before being
replaced by Wilson, who conducted Kurdish affairs in consultation with the British High Com­missioner in Constantinople until December 1920. Their suggestions and views on the Kurd­
ish question were circulated among the Foreign, India and War Offices. They not only promp­
ted the contradictory comments and observations of the British High Commissions in Con­
stantinople and Cairo, but also formed the starting point for any debate on the Kurdish ques­tion at the meetings of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affair, a bodywhich was chaired by Lord Curzon and concerned with the future of the Ottoman Empire,
especially its non-Turkish territories. Thus the analysis of Wilson’s and Noel’s perceptions of
the Kurdish question helps to illuminate why the British Government began to pay more atten­
tion to the Kurds, and how the objectives of its Kurdish policy were defined within the Turkish
peace settlement.

Colonel Wilson’s Attitudes Towards The Kurdish Question Between 1918
And 1920/- T/te genesis O f Wilson's th in kin g
Wilson was renowned among British officials in the Foreign and India Offices as an imperialistorientated official, who considered the imposition of outright British control over local affairs as
the only viable option to consolidate whatever British interests were at stake in Mesopotamia
and Kurdistan. Indeed, during his three years, as the Acting Civil Commissioner for Mesopo­
tamia, he never attempted to prepare the foundation for an autonomous Southern Kurdistan,84

as London wished. Instead, he established direct British administration through eliminating
the existing autonomous Kurdish entity, and blocking all attempts to establish others. Thiswas contrary to what was generally assumed by some scholars, such as Liora Lukitz, that theformula of indirect control was Wilson’s brain-child. 1 At a broader level, Wilson persistently
endeavoured to sever all political links between the Southern Kurds and the rest of theKurds, aiming at permanently detaching Southern Kurdistan from Ottoman Kurdistan. Initially,
Wilson considered the Kurdish question as only relevant to Northern Kurdistan. Insofar as
Southern Kurdistan was concerned, Wilson advocated its incorporation into Britishadministrated Mesopotamia, hoping that Britain would present the incorporation arrangement
to the peace conference as a fait accompli. Wilson argued the case for Southern Kurdistan’s
incorporation into British-administrated Mesopotamia in the following terms:
For economic and for strategic reasons, and in order to secure to Iraqi's] state the advant­age of a mountain tract, well wooded and capable of great development, it is desirable toinclude Sulaimaniya, Rania and Keuisenjaq within [the] limits of Mesopotamians] administra­
tions
Wilson asserted, when doubts were raised about the impracticability of direct control, thatwhile indirect control could serve British interests with much less military and financial commit­
ment, the re-imposition of indirect control in Southern Kurdistan would endanger the British
position throughout Mesopotamia:
The abandonment of Mosul, Erbil and Sulaimaniya divisions would so unfavourably affectour position in [the] Baghdad and Basra Wilayets as to render our position before longuntenable without considerable reinforcement. These three Wilayets form an indivisible
whole. The Mosul Wilayet has no natural economic connection with Turkey or Syria., anddistrust and objections arising from our abandonment of Sulaimaniya, Erbil and Mosul divi­
sions and inevitable anarchy resulting from removal of external control in these, would havethe gravest effect throughout the rest of Mesopotamia.3
In other words, Wilson considered Southern Kurdistan’s future as politically irrelevant to theremainder of Kurdistan. His viewpoint enjoyed the warmest support of the military authorities
in Mesopotamia, 4 where he spent the period 1918-1920 urging London to accept his imple­
mented political and administrative measures in Southern Kurdistan as a permanent British
policy, rather than a temporary one.
The centrality of Mesopotamia thus formed the cornerstone of Wilson’s approach tothe political future of the Kurdish people. Whatever formula was adopted, Britain would parti1* Liora Lukitz, Iraq, the Research for National Identity, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p.21.
2* Political, Baghdad, Secret No.6666,13 June 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
3* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 13 February 1920, F0371/5070, PRO.
4* Ibid.

85

tion the Kurdish Wilayets of the Ottoman Empire, while keeping Eastern Kurdistan, as before,
within the Qajar Kingdom. Wilson’s argument rested on the premise that, though the Kurds
formed a nationality with strong nationalist feelings and separate identity, they were incapableof ruling themselves owing to their lack of “ leaderd, and their being “ widely scattered' anddivided into a “hundred warring tribes. Given the Northern Kurds’ opposition to Turkish ruleand their respect for and trust of Britain, Wilson argued that the introduction of some form of
British rule in Northern Kurdistan offered “the best chance of a settled and prosperous coun­try in the future” . Under the scheme, the Northern Kurds would have an “autonomous state"under close British protection and supervision. This solution was both “ feasible and in accor­
dance with justice and the aspirations of the people” .s Wilson’s scheme would have required
Britain to either accept a separate British mandate for Northern Kurdistan or to territoriallyextend its Mesopotamian mandate. The structure of the proposed Kurdish state would be aconfederation, consisting of several tiny entities under different nominal local rulers. These
entities would be under a central administration, which might have a “ Kurdish figurehead1.
The boundaries of this state would run as follows:a little north of Jezirah-ibn-Omar, north of Nisibin, south of Mardin, north of Ras-al-Ain, along
latitude 37 to Biridjik, thence north up the Euphrates and finally bending eastward and follow­
ing the boundaries of the Wilayets of Kharput (Mamuer-ul-Aziz) Bitlis and Van, thus exclud­ing Erzinjan and Erzeraum, to the Persian frontier.6
In reality, Wilson’s scheme excluded vast Kurdish areas from the would-be Kurdish state, apartfrom Southern Kurdistan, which would be annexed by British-administrated Mesopotamia.
Wilson, as Arnold Toynbee of the Foreign Office remarked, advocated from the very begin­ning the idea of partitioning Ottoman Kurdistan between “a Kurdish federation and Iraq” j andthat the former should also come under some form of British controU One of the principal rea­sons behind Wilson’s scheme for carving up Ottoman Kurdistan was strategic, i.e. turning
Northern Kurdistan into a strong buffer to consolidate the security of Mesopotamia. The India
Office and the Foreign Office did not support Wilson’s scheme because of the enormous mili­tary, financial and political commitments it required. The partition of Kurdistan, however,remained an alternative proposal, especially if it was implemented in a way that strengthened
the security of British position in Mesopotamia.

5* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p. 18.
6* Ibid, p. 19.
7* Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No.207981,21 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
8* J.E. Shuckburgh, Note on Kurdistan, India Office, 14 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.

86

if- Wilson's Conduct O f Kurdish A ffa irs Outside tfritish-controlled Kurdistan
An examination of Wilson’s actual steps in Kurdish areas outside British control reveals that heendeavoured to transform his views into reality, especially after taking charge of Kurdish affairs
in June 1919. The absence of a defined British policy towards Kurdistan, which could be attri­
buted to disagreement between Britain and France on many aspects of the Turkish peace
settlement, and more importantly, the concentration of their diplomacy on much more vital
European problems, made it possible for British officials on the ground to play a greater part in
influencing the course of events in Kurdistan than they could under ordinary conditions. Wil­
son’s initiatives aimed at expanding British political influence in the western and central partsof Kurdistan, especially Jezirah-ibn-Omar and Rowanduz and its neighbouring areas, all ofwhich were situated to the north of British-controlled Southern Kurdistan. 9 These initiatives
were characterised by the non-existence of prior consultation with the British High Commis­
sion in Constantinople, as London had asked him to do. The foregoing Kurdish areas proved
militarily difficult for the British to control directly, while simultaneously taking on growing stra­tegic and political importance because they linked British-controlled Kurdistan with Northernand Eastern Kurdistan, 10 where Kemalist and Bolshevik threats were looming on the horizon.
Moreover, Eastern Kurdistan was a continuing source of anxiety to the British authorities in
Baghdad because of the ongoing bloody Kurdish revolt there led by Simko. This state ofaffairs, the British authorities in Mesopotamia feared, would help to increase political instability
in Sulaimaniya and in Kurdish areas as far as Amadia.1 1 Wilson was anxious about the effectsof the situation in Eastern Kurdistan on Southern Kurdistan and vice versa, if Britain was
involved in the affairs of the former. When Noel sent his personal assistant to Eastern Kurdi­
stan on a fact-finding mission, Wilson criticised this initiative as “an Hl-advised adventure” , andordered its conclusion. 1 2 However, Wilson was advised by Soane that he should exploit con­tacts with Said Taha, Simko’s ally, so as to consolidate the security of the northern frontier ofthe British sphere in Southern Kurdistan. As a result, the aim of the discussion with Said Tahabecame not so much the stabilisation of the political situation in Eastern Kurdistan as extend­ing British political control deeper into Ottoman Kurdistan. Having received the consent of
9* Simultaneously, his Political Officer, Leachman, sought to transfer the Jezirah District from the Diabekirtothe Mosul Wilayet. Diary of Maj. Noel On Special Duty, Nisibin, 17 April 1919, F0371/4192,
PRO.
10* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p. 14.
11 * Cox, Tehran, 26 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
12* Memorandum From the Office of Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to CGS.18 April, AIR20/512, PRO.

87

Percy Cox, the temporary British Minister at Tehran, Wilson began to negotiate with Said Tahain the summer of 1919, with a view to countering what he called 41 Turkish propaganda. Said
Taha, who commanded notable influence, was asked to undertake, on behalf of the British
Government, the administration of a region that included Rowanduz, Shamsdinan and otherareas to the north.13
Creating a Kurdish state deep into Kurdistan clearly suggests that Wilson intended touse this wouid-be Kurdish state as a vehicle to expand British control at the expense of the
Ottoman authorities. He urged the British High Commission in Constantinople to press the
Ottoman Government to evacuate its garrison from Bashkala, Dize and Neri in July 1919.14
This was a preliminary step towards demanding that the Turkish authorities should recognisethese areas as under British control. Capt. C.T. Beale, the Assistant Political Officer for
Rowanduz, had no doubt that this Kurdish state would be extended northwards to include
such Kurdish area as Orman and Julamark. 1 5 Wilson’s failure to consult British officials in Con­
stantinople about his initiative in Kurdish areas outside British control was anxiously commen­
ted on by the Acting High Commissioner in Constantinople:
My inability to understand how far HMG have really got, is increased by discovery that
authorities in Mesopotamia were in June [1919] within ace of conducting formal agreementwith Sheikh Taha, [the] effect of which would have been to carve out of what as still Turkish
territory small state ruled by that chieftain under British protection. 16
Eventually, the whole Said Taha affair came to nothing as Wilson wanted him to be no morethan a figurehead, with all powers resting with his British advisers.
On another level, Wilson sought to exploit the vagueness of the term ‘Mesopotamia’
to push the northern boundary of British-administrated Mesopotamia deeper into Kurdistan.
In response to the Secretary of State’s inquiry about the issue of defining the northern front­
ier of Mesopotamia, Wilson advocated the adoption of the “ watershecf of the Tigris and the
Euphrates in Kurdistan as far as possible. This would grant Mesopotamia “ natural frontier
which were politically “impossible to dispute” and practically “easy to delimit'm Here, Wilson
took another independent initiative to turn his suggested northern frontier into a fait accompli.
The opportunity presented itself when Col. Khurshid Bey, a former Kurdish commander of a
13* G.L.Bell, Northern Kurdistan, 8 March 1920, AIR20/512, PRO.
14* Political, Baghdad, to Political Rowanduz , 3 July 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
15* Political, Rowanduz, to Political, Baghdad, 3 July 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
16* Acting High Commissioner, Constantinople, to Prodrom, London, 8 September 1919, F0371/4192,
PRO.
17* Political, Baghdad, 8 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.

88

Hamidiah force and a Hakari chief, requested official British recognition of his acceptance ofBritish instead of Turkish suzerainty.is Wilson promptly sent his approval, which included thefollowing declaration:
Khurshid Bey has accepted the British Government in place of the former Turkish Govern­
ment.. If other Kurdish Chiefs and tribes living in the mountains of Kurdistan, the waters ofwhich drain towards the Tigris and its tributaries, the Khabour and the two Zabs, wish to do
likewise they should inform the political officer nearest to them. They may rest assured that
their request will be favourably considered and transmitted to government. By this means, if
God wills, the Kurds will be united under a just and benevolent government.1 9
Wilson’s justification for granting British protection to all local Kurdish chiefs and tribes was
based both on geopolitical necessity and the desire of the local people. The Said Taha andKhurshid Bey affairs were a true expression of Wilson’s early desire for bringing new Kurdish
areas under British control, and his determination to work independently of other concerned
authorities to put into effect his views.

iii- Wilson's Scheme J o r Kurdistan's Jutu re W ithin ‘The Jram ew ork O f The Turk­
ish Peace Settlem ent
Given London’s decision to minimise its military, financial and political commitments as muchas possible, and its desire not to precipitate French counter-measures in the form of creating
their own political zone in Kurdistan, Wilson’s initiatives for expanding British influence in Kur­
distan were doomed to failure. In the face of the existing military and financial restrictions,which underlined the outdated nature of his approach to the Kurdish situation, Wilson aban­
doned the idea of forming tiny Kurdish entities under British supervision in favour of anotherscheme, the essence of which was to partition Ottoman Kurdistan. The southern parts would
be attached to Mesopotamia, whereas the northern parts would remain, as before, under
Turkish rule. The re-establishment of Turkish rule, Wilson hoped, would turn his original aim ofpartitioning Ottoman Kurdistan into a permanent reality. By contrast, the establishment of an
independent state in Kurdistan, without close British supervision, would encourage theSouthern Kurds to either join the new Kurdish state or to demand the establishment of theirown state. In either case, British strategic and political positions would be undermined, notonly in Arab Mesopotamia, but also in northern Persia, where the British-backed Persian Gov­
ernment encountered serious Bolshevik and local nationalist threats. All of this, in Wilson’s

18* Poldist, Keu, to Political, Baghdad, Priority, 1 February 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
19* Political, Baghdad, to Civil Commissioner on tour at Mosul, Priority, 1 February 1919, AIR20/512,
PRO.

89

eyes, would result in huge increases in British military and financial commitments. Against thisbackground, Wilson recommended in April 1919 that Britain should recognise the continua­tion of Turkish rule in the six Kurdish-Armenian W ila y e ts s in June, he stated that, if the North­ern Kurdish state was not formed under British auspices, he would prefer the Armenians or
Turks to be in control of the four Kurdish Wilayets,.i.e. Diyarbekir, Bitlis, Van and Kharput.2 1 In
November, when replying to Curzon’s five recommendations for the British position on the
future of the Kurdish question, Wilson disagreed with recommendation number five, whichcalled for preventing the Turks from returning to Northern Kurdistan. He pointed out that the
British were unable to drive the Turks out and that Noel’s opposition to the partitioning of
Ottoman Kurdistan contradicted various British interests in Mesopotamia and Persia. He evenwent so far as to question Noel's belief that the Kurds would remain loyal to Britain in the
future .2 2
Wilson’s criticism of Noel’s perceptions of, and recommendations for, Kurdish affairs
culminated in his opposition to the suggestion of the Foreign Office’s nomination of Noel as amember to one of the two proposed international commissions at the Paris peace confer­ence, which would deal with the nationality questions, including the Kurdish one:
/ regard Noel as being too deeply committed to individual Kurds [and] generally to a particu­
lar line of policy, to be entirely satisfactory representative of British interest in [the] pro­
posed commission.. I consider British representative on International Commission should, if
possible, be foremost of wider experience and more judicial temperament. Liet. Col. Cunliffe
Own, at present Director of Repatriation in Mesopotamia and formerly Military attache at
Constantinople, who has acquired recently a close practical knowledge of questions con­cerned with Assyrians, Chaldean and Armenian communities, would I venture to suggest, bea suitable British representative. He would have my entire co nfid en ces
It is self-evident from Wilson’s words that he feared Noel’s influence on the British position on
the future of the Kurdish question at the peace conference. In spite of Wilson’s opposition to
Noel’s appointment, and the request of the Viceroy of India to send Noel to Shiraz in Persia,
neither Curzon,24 nor his subordinates at the Foreign Office such as Herbert Young andRobert Vansittart,25 were willing to dispense with the services of Noel because he was consid­
ered to be the only British official who had deep knowledge of Kurdish affairs. In evaluating
Noel’s importance, Young admitted that he was "badly misjudged’, and had he remained in
20* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 22 October 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
21* Political, Baghdad, 13 June 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
22* Political, Baghdad, 27 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
23* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 19 May 1920, F0371/5068, PRO.
24* Curzon, Foreign Office, 27 May 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.
25* Young, Foreign Office Minute No.4123,26 May 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.

90

Southern Kurdistan in 1919, the Mahmud rising would not have happened in Southern Kurdi­
stan. In spite of this and other failures, and because of his responsibility for Kurdish affairs on
the ground during a very sensitive period insofar as Kurdistan’s future was concerned, Wilson
remained an important factor. He left behind a profound political and administrative legacy,
which both directly and indirectly affected the future of the Kurdish question in the medium
and long-run. His strategic argument about Southern Kurdistan’s importance to Mesopotamia
played some part in influencing the British decision to partition Ottoman Kurdistan. His mea­sures on the ground eliminated all traces of Kurdish autonomy, while paving the way for bring­ing Southern Kurdistan under the British mandate over Mesopotamia. This development
practically separated the fate of the Southern Kurds from that of the Northern and Eastern
Kurds.

Major Noel's Approach To The Kurdish Question, 1918-1920/- <r/ie genesis O f J o e l’s th in kingDespite being a sufficiently remote country, Kurdistan was still able, in Busch’s words, to“attract those imperial servants who always managed to appear on a troubled frontier to play an
independent and important role ” .2 6 One such outstanding British officials was Noel, whose
approach and views on the Kurdish question were the exact antithesis to Wilson’s. In contrast
to Wilson’s imperialist thinking and practices, Noel believed that the ideal method to safeguard
British interests was to work with the rising Kurdish nationalist movement. In his view, Kurdi­
stan was important for Britain per se and not just a secondary concern subordinated to thesecurity issue of Mesopotamia. Instead of separate solutions for each part of Kurdistan, Noeladvocated an all-embracing British policy. In other words, the Kurdish question was, in Noel’sview, indivisible, and that Britain should not adopt contradictory solutions for each part of Kur­
distan, but a comprehensive solution (see map eleven). As soon as he took charge of Kurdish
affairs in early November 1918, Noel put forward his first comprehensive scheme for the for­mation of a separate and an autonomous Kurdistan. Under the scheme, a Kurdish confeder­
acy would be established, consisting of three Kurdish entities under British supervision andprotection. Sulaimaniya would be the administrative centre of Southern Kurdistan, whereas
Mosul and Diyarbekir would be the administrative centres of Western and Central Kurdistan
respectively. Influential local Kurdish leaders, such as Sheikh Mahmud and Said Taha, would
26* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p. 183.

91

Map Eleven, Major Noel’s Map
Of Ottoman And Qajar Kurdi­
stan

Mush

Predominately Kurdish
Areas Claimed By The
Armenians
Kurdish Areas So Far
Niether Claimed By
Mesopotamia Nor By
Armenia
Kurdish Districts At Pre­sent Included In Meso­
potamia

Lake Urmia

MalatiyaDiyarbekir

MardinJezirahHakari

Nisibin
Rowanduz"]

Arbil
j S u l a i m a n h
i t ' .
.
-■ -j Kirkuk

Ottoman-Persian
Frontier

lanaqin I
Kermanshah

Source. F0371/4192

be expected to have political roles within the confederated Kurdish entities.27
B rita in , N o e l e m p h a s is e d , c o u ld n o t b e in d iffe re n t to th e f a t e o f K u rd is ta n b e c a u s e o f
its e ff e c ts o n B ritis h s tra te g ic a n d p o litic a l in te re s ts in th e fo r m e r O tto m a n

Wilayets as w e ll a s

P e r s ia . T h e re tu rn o f T u rk is h ru le , o r t h e fo rm a tio n o f a g r e a te r A r m e n ia n s ta te a t t h e e x p e n s eof t h e K u rd s , w a s b o u n d to c r e a t e a n u n s ta b le K u rd is ta n th a t it w o u ld u n d e r m in e th e p o s t-w a r
te rrito ria l a n d p olitical r e a r r a n g e m e n ts o f O tto m a n A s ia . W h ile th a t w a s th e c a s e , B rita in h a d a n
u n p r e c e d e n te d o p p o rtu n ity to e x p a n d its p o litic a l in flu e n c e a n d m a in ta in its s tra te g ic in te re s ts
th ro u g h e n c o u r a g in g th e ris in g K u rd is h n a tio n a lis t m o v e m e n t to a c h ie v e its le g itim a te p o litic a l
a s p ira tio n s . N o e l e m p h a tic a lly s ta te d th a t:

[Kurdish] national movement is so virile that I do not foresee much difficulty in creating a Kurd­
ish state under our protection and with control by political officers over general policy, provi­
ded we take prompt and vigorous action now. [The Kurdish] movement is so strong (at all
events here at Sulaimaniya) that I strongly advise immediate dispatch of qualified officers toassume direct charge of principal administrative services.
T h e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a c o n fe d e r a te d K u rd is ta n u n d e r B ritish s u p e rv is io n w a s , in N o e l’s e y e s ,a n id e a l s o lu tio n in th e w a k e of t h e d is in te g ra tio n of th e O tto m a n E m p ire . A p a rt fro m e s ta b lis h -27* Mesopotamia: Future Constitution, Enclosure N0 .8 , Political Officer, Sulaimaniya, Note on the Poli­tical Status of Kurdistan, November 1918, F0371/4147, PRO.
28* Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 17 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.

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ing the sought-after political stability in a very volatile Kurdistan, the establishment of a Kurdish
state would keep other rival powers at bay, as well as facilitating the formation of a united Arm­enia. Noel’s novel approach required an active British role without entailing heavy military andfinancial commitments. His views on Kurdish affairs contain a tangible moral dimension. To
realise Britain’s vital strategic and political interests in the former Ottoman Wilayets, Noel advo­
cated methods that would mean Britain not abandoning its moral duties before the new natio­
nalities, such as the Kurds:
It should... be possible to find some formula which would assure the economic and strategicinterests of Mesopotamia in these areas, without, however, irrevocably shutting the door on
the legitimate Kurdish aspirations.29
Apart from his idealism and probable personal ambition to play a distinctive role matching thatof T.E. Lawrence of Arabia during the war, Noel’s approach to the Kurdish question was
mainly based on impersonal considerations. Firstly, following the war, Britain found itself
incapable of committing itself militarily and financially in the newly-conquered areas, especiallyin the Middle East, due to the long duration of the war. The war had been costly for Britain in
men and money, and led to popular opposition to new territorial annexations and colonial
adventures. Secondly, Noel’s approach was a true reflection of profound changes on theinternational scene, resulting from the outbreak of the October Revolution and the declara­tion of Wilson’s Fourteen Points in 1918, both of which had a direct impact on the politicalaspirations of the non-Turkish nationalities. Lastly, Noel relied on his experience as a British
representative to the Government of the North-West Province, which operated as a buffer
state to British India. Kurdistan could play a similar strategic role towards British Mesopotamia.
Noel also built on his experiences in Persia and the Caucasus, where he witnessed how local
nationalism was rapidly emerging as an important factor, influencing the shape of the region. It
must be remembered that Noel’s views also took shape against the background of a success­ful British experiment with the Sharifian Arabs during the war.
Noel, like Wilson, not only preached his views on the Kurdish question, but also
attempted to put them into practice when he was in charge of Kurdish affairs on the groundbetween November 1918 and June 1919. In spite of the reservations of Wilson, who pre­ferred Kurdistan to be a "British protectorate” ,30 Noel, as soon as he became an adviser to
Mahmud, fully backed and facilitated the application of indirect rule in the form of Kurdish auto-

29* E.W.C. Noel, Note on the Kurdish Situation, July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO, p.19.
30* Political, Baghdad, to Political, Sulaimaniya , 26 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.

93

nomy under close British supervision. This formula, while satisfying Kurdish aspirations, would
also consolidate British influence. Accordingly, Noel embarked on expanding the control of
the Mahmud Government in Southern Kurdistan, and started with such remote Kurdish areas
as Rowanduz and its surroundings.31 Noel justified his actions by the argument that the Kurds
would achieve their independence anyway. Thus, Britain and the Powers would face Kurdish
independence as "a fait accompli" which would be “very difficult to reverse".& Noel probably
exaggerated the intensity of Kurdish nationalist feelings, so as to persuade London to commit
itself quickly to the Kurdish question. Prompt British action would prevent other Powers from
exploiting Kurdish aspirations for their own ends, while Britain could guide the formation of aseparate Kurdistan according to its interests.
Noel, while endeavouring to gather official support for his ideas, played some part instimulating Kurdish nationalist feelings and encouraging Kurdish leaders to take political initia­
tives. He hoped to draw British attention to the Kurdish problem. For instance, he encour­
aged the Southern Kurds, led by Mahmud, to sign a declaration, the provisions of which hehelped to formulate. The declaration requested the British Government to act as an“intermediary on behalf of the Kurds in order to obtain a seat for a Kurdish representative at
the forthcoming peace conference. 3 3 Noel thought of Cherif Pasha as a suitable Kurdish can­didate to represent the Kurds at the peace conference. He described him as “ very well spo­
ken of in Southern Kurdistan" .3 4 Mahmud accepted Cherif Pasha as the Kurdish representa­
tive at the peace conference. To this end, he prepared, in Noel’s presence, a petition signed
by Kurdish notables authorising him to speak to the Allies on behalf of the Southern Kurds. 3 5This Kurdistan-wide co-ordination, which Noel helped to initiate, came to an abrupt end, when
Wilson carried out his reversal of Kurdish policy by terminating the experiment of Kurdish
autonomy. London itself was suspicious of Kurdish intellectuals, especially those who lived in
exile. Instead, it preferred to deal with local Kurdish leaders, probably because they had limi­
ted political ambitions, and could closely monitor their movements on the ground. Moreover,on the idea of giving a seat to a Kurdish representative, Toynbee commented, that it would“create a sharp precedent for Armenians, Zionists and other nationalities”.36
31* Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 17 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
32* Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 28 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
33* Political, Baghdad, 7 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
34* Political, Baghdad, 12 November 41918, AIR20/512, PRO.
35* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.I, pp.65-66.
36* Toynbee, Foreign Office Mirtute No.204299,14 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.

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As Noel viewed Kurdistan’s future as an indivisible question, he paid special attention
to the deteriorating situation in Eastern Kurdistan, considering it as symptomatic of a general
Kurdish problem. He hoped to initiate, as Wilson suspected, another movement in Eastern
Kurdistan similar to that of Southern Kurdistan. The prospect of a “ radical solution” for the
Kurdish question, to which Noel made emphatic reference, was intended to illustrate how
London’s long-held principle of preserving Persian territorial integrity had become outdated.
Political developments in Eastern Kurdistan at the end of the First World War illustrated that
Kurdish notables were influenced by the Allied wartime propaganda in regard to liberating theoppressed nationalities. The Mukri Kurds of Saujbulaq placed before the British Consul at
Kermanshah the idea of an “independent Kurdistan under British auspices” 37 in May 1918,
Said Taha, who started to politically mobilise the Kurds living on both sides of the OttomanQajar frontier, visited Wilson in Baghdad, where he pressed for British sponsorship of a united
Kurdistan, including its Eastern part.38
The subsequent establishment of the Mahmud Government in Southern Kurdistan
immediately after the end of the war created a strong impression among the Eastern Kurds
that Britain sponsored Kurdish nationalist aspirations. Indeed, a number of Southern Kurds
left Sulaimaniya for Eastern Kurdistan to propagate the idea of a united Kurdistan .39 Dele­
gates from Mariwan, Saqiz and Banah arrived at Sulaimaniya, where Noel waged an “active
campaign for an independent Kurdistan” ,40 to express their wish to bring Eastern Kurdistan
under both Kurdish rule and British protection. Against this background, Noel advised that:it should be possible to get all [Eastern] Kurdish tribes to throw in their lot with us. From reli­gious, racial and geographical standpoints, this would offer a radical solution of general pro­blem in this area, and it would be much better to seize [the] bull by the horns now, when
everything is in a state of flux, than to leave it simmering for future settlement.41
Meanwhile, Noel asserted that any British attempt to bolster up the authority of the Persian
Government would have harmful effects on British relations with Southern Kurdistan .42
Noel took an unprecedented initiative by sending his assistant, Sher Jang, to Urmia,
on a mission to Said T a h a ,4 3 hoping to initiate political arrangements similar to those he had
made in Southern Kurdistan. In other words, Noel sought an active British role in Eastern Kur37* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p.7.
38* E.W.C. Noel, Note on the Kurdish Situation, July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO, p. 18.
39* Ibid.
40* Political, Baghdad, to Political, Mosul, 20 November 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
41* Political, Baghdad, 12 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
42* E.W.C. Noel, Note on the Kurdish Situation, July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO, p.18.
43* Noel, Rowanduz, to Political, Baghdad, 21 February 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
95

distan and along the Ottoman-Qajar frontiers, outside British-controlled Southern Kurdistan.
In his report on Urmia, Sher Jang spoke of the existence of “ terrible famine and disorder" andstated that any British or American intervention would be welcomed as the only solution for re­establishing order and peace. He revealed that pro-British feelings were generally strong.44
Other British reports confirmed that the Kurdish rebellion in Urmia threatened to turn into “ageneral rising1, embracing the rest of Eastern Kurdistan.45 Simko, the leader of the Kurdish
revolt, sought to re-establish close relations with the British authorities in Baghdad. 46 in early
July, Simko and Said Taha expressed their desire to co-operate with the British regarding theprotection and the repatriation of the Christians in north west Persia in return for British politi­
cal support.47 Largely because of the opposition of Wilson and British officials in Persia to any
fostering of Eastern Kurds’ aspirations, their attempts to reach an understanding with Britain
bore no fruit. Fearing anti-British reactions by the Persian authorities, neither London nor Brit­ish officials in Persia were willing to even contemplate the establishment of direct contacts
with Simko.
Maj. M.J. Ross, a Political Officer, expressed similar views to those of Noel on thesituation in Eastern Kurdistan. Ross investigated on the spot the existing instability in Urmia
and its surroundings. He concluded that the frontier, which separated Eastern from Northern
Kurdistan, was of an “arbitrary1nature and it did not reflect the existing economic, ethnic andgeographical realities. Like Noel, he supported the idea of self-determination, not only
because Britain should morally respect this principle, but because
any attempt to coerce the Kurd to remain under the Persian Government, from which he istrying to free himself, will shake the core of our influence throughout those parts of Kurdi­
stan, where we are not prepared to support our authority with troops. 48
Unlike all other British officials in Persia and Mesopotamia, Ross argued that Britain should
refrain from intervening against the efforts of the Eastern Kurds to join a united Kurdish state,a position which he did not consider as a breach of British pledges to Persia’s territorial unity.
The following comment by Toynbee sheds light on the Persian dimension in Britain’s Kurdish
policy:This is a very serious problem. The Persian Kurds are inaccessible and beyond the control
either of [British officials at] Tehran or Baghdad. We may prevent them from joining formally
44* General Headquarter, Mes.Ex. Force, to Political, Baghdad, 16 April 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
45* Assistant Political Officer, Sennah, to Political, Baghdad, 16 April 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
46* Political, Baghdad, to Prodrom, Tehran, 25 May 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
47* Political, Baghdad, Addressed to Constantinople, 3 July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
48* Maj. M.J. Ross, Note on Kurdish Claims to the Urmia District of Persia 8/9 July 1919, AIR20/512,
PRO.

96

the Ottoman-Kurdish confederation, but we cannot prevent them from seizing this occasion[i.e. formation of Kurdish autonomy] to throw off their allegiance to Persia. If they carry out
their present intentions, we shall be placed in a very awkward position in regard to Persian
integrity. We have virtually undertaken to respect it; yet action by us on the Turkish side 'of
the frontier will have led to the breaking away from Persia of a considerable province.49
Ross’s above argument, apart from being opposed by the British officials in Mesopo­
tamia and Persia, was treated cautiously in London, where the prevailing orthodox
approach was based on preserving Persian territorial integrity from both internal andexternal threats.
if- /Joel's / Jew Solution J o t The Kurdish Question W ithin The Jram ew ork O f The
Turkish Peace S ettlem ent
Several developments affected Britain’s positive image among the Kurds. The delays of thepeace conference, of which the Kurds had high hopes, left a negative impact on Kurdish poli­tical inclinations.5o British policy on the ground particularly raised Kurdish fears. Kurdish natio­
nalists seemed to be confused by Britain’s real intentions in Kurdistan. On the one hand, Brit­ish officials told Kurdish nationalist circles that Britain would not overlook Kurdish interests at
the peace conference and should await its results. On the other hand, the implemented Brit­ish policy on the ground enormously undermined the Kurdish nationalist movement by repla­cing Kurdish autonomy with direct British control in Southern Kurdistan and adopting heavyhanded measures against those local Kurds who wanted autonomy. Signs of change in local
Kurdish attitudes towards Britain were expressed in British officials’ telegrams. In Eastern Kur­
distan, the link between Kurdish nationalists and the anti-Christian movement in north-west
Persia became closer than ever before.51 Percy Cox attributed the change in Kurdish atti­
tudes from pro-British to anti-British to the Eastern Kurds’ disappointment with the reversal of
British policy in Southern Kurdistan, and the subsequent Mahmud revolt. 5 2 Similarly, the Brit­
ish Consul at Urmia noted that the Mahmud revolt, and its subsequent suppression by the
British, began to orientate the Eastern Kurds towards the Turks for support, rather than the
British.5 3 Noel himself repeatedly drew attention to the occurrence of developments, whichwere independent of -and not inspired by British officials. He had earlier warned that the

49* Foreign Office Minute No.206918,21 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
50* Political Department, India Office, Mesopotamia: British Relations with Kurdistan, 27 August 1919,
F0371/4192, PRO.
51 ‘ Political, Baghdad, 6 January 1919, F0371/4147, PRO.
52* Cox, Tehran, 26 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
53* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 25 August 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.

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establishment of direct British control in Southern Kurdistan could alienate the Northern
Kurds, who viewed it “ as a prelude to British penetration at their expense” .5 4 He also attribu­
ted the emergence of anti-Christian and anti-British movements to the British policy of favour­
ing Christians on the ground .55
The speedy deterioration of the political situation in the Kurdish areas outside British
control in spring and summer of 1919 was largely due to growing Kurdish fears of the impos­
ing of Armenian rule in Northern Kurdistan. The Turkish propaganda machine played somepart in agitating the Kurds against the Europeans, who were thought to be conspiring against
the Muslims. It was against this background that Noel was charged with an official mission toparts of Northern Kurdistan to prepare a final report on “ the political situation as between
Kurds and Turkd' and regarding “the economic conditions” .56 But he was not charged withthe task of establishing “a North Kurdish state” , similar to the one he had set up in Britishcontrolled Southern Kurdistan, as Olson suggests.5 7 it was hoped that in light of Noel’s con­clusions, important official circles, notably the Foreign Office and the India Office, would
define their position on Kurdistan’s political future. The combined efforts of the Turkish Gov­
ernment, which was informed about Noel’s mission, 58 and Turkish nationalists led by Kemal,
forced Noel to end his mission prematurely. The Noel mission was also affected by negative
attitudes from British officials in Turkey, who refused to provide it with necessary political back­ing. Adm. John De Robeck, Gough-Calthorpe’s successor as the High Commissioner, fearedthat the Noel mission, which included two Kurds who represented Kurdish nationalist circles
in Constantinople, might give the Ottoman Government and the Kemalists “serious reasons
to suspect that HMG were encouraging Kurds to act against the Turks'’ . 5 9 A British Political
Officer in the Northern Area reported that Noel was “ conducting a dangerous form of proKurdish and anti-Turkish propaganda .60
In a memorandum, Noel'defended himself against accusations that his activities stimu54* Political, Baghdad, to Egyptian Force, Cairo, 28 April 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
55* Noel, Aleppo, to Political, Baghdad, 2 August 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
56*Political, Baghdad, to Egypt Force, 11 March 1919, AIR20/714, PRO. Noel made a short preliminary
tour and then started on a more extended tour in such ares as Diyarbekir and Nisibin. He was accompa­
nied, with Foreign Office’s approval, by two Kurdish representatives to facilitate his task. IDCM, Secre­tary’s Note, 6 September 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
57* Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, p.53.
58* De Robeck to Curzon, confidential, 20 December 1919, Enclosure No. 1, Mr. Ryan, Memorandum,
F0371/4193, PRO.
59* High Commissioner, Constantinople, to General, Baghdad, 18 September 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
60* General Headquarter, Egypt, 27 September 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.

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lated the anti-British propaganda of Turkish nationalists. He argued that the anti-British atti­
tudes of the Turks already existed when he started his mission and attributed them to several
reasons. Firstly, the establishment of Kurdish autonomy immediately after the war must havealarmed the Turks. Secondly, the British had recognised the Kurdish language and encour­
aged the tribal system in the British-controlled Kurdistan. Finally, there were frequent state­ments made by the British Government to the Kurds, which emphasised that Britain would notlose sight of Kurdish interests at the peace conference. Noel mentioned, as concrete evi­
dence, the proclamation published by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, which referred to
the “ Armenian and Kurdish interests as the two main factors in the country known as Kurdi­
stan and Armenia”. ei Evidence shows that the Turks were greatly alarmed by the Noel mission
to Northern Kurdistan. Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the Turkish insurgents, considered thesending and subsequent failure of the mission as “a very important incident” in the Turkish
national struggle, when he defeated ail British intrigues “under the cover of the indepen­
dence of the Kurds".62
For fear of invoking undesirable Turkish animosity, the Foreign Office ordered Noel toend his tour. However, Noel was able to put forward his conclusions regarding the politicalsituation in Kurdistan. They emphasised the existence of “ a very lively sense of Kurdish natio­
nality, antipathy to Turks, [and] great hatred of Government" in every area the mission visited.
Noel dismissed the existence of any “ anti-British or pan-Islamic movement” among the Kurds
east of Dterbekir. Being a British representative, Noel was met with “ most cordial
friendliness?& Having failed to win London’s support for the establishment of a separate
Kurdish confederacy, Noel seized the opportunity, which his mission gave him, to directly pre­sent the Foreign Office his new scheme for Kurdistan’s future within the framework of theTurkish peace settlement. His scheme brought to their attention the hidden interconnection
between the affairs of Armenia and Kurdistan. Accordingly, it endeavoured to reconcile Kurd­
ish and Armenian nationalist aspirations (see map twelve):
The collection of six Eastern Wilayets under one mandatory power and their sub-division into
provinces or zones, of which the southern would be exclusively Kurdish, the northern exclus­
ively Armenian and the central zone mixed. Each zone would have its own local administrationand self-government, which would be subject to some independent centre, either outside thesix Wilayets or in the central zone.64
61* Maj. Noel, Memorandum, December 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
62* Mustafa Kemal, A Speech Delivered by G. Mustafa Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, Octo­
ber 1927(Leipzig: K.F. Koehler Publisher, 1929), pp.101-120 & 220.
63* Political, Baghdad, 26 September 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
64* IDCM, Secretary’s Note, 6 September 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.

99

Map Twelve: Noel’sScheme
For The Non-Turkish Wilayets

Treblzond
Erzerum

Sivas

Northern Zone

7 7 7 7
\

\

s

\

\

\

s s s sCentral Zone

Southern Zone

Kharput

Dyiarbekir
Source: F0371/4192 &F0371/7149

EleppoMosul

N o e l’s s c h e m e p ro v id e d a u n ifo rm s y s te m o f a d m in is tra tio n fo r th e t h r e e z o n e s , w h ic h w o u ld
b e lia b le fo r m o d ific a tio n in a c c o r d a n c e w ith th e n a tio n a l c h a r a c te ris tic s o f e a c h n a tio n . K u rd ­ish a n d A r m e n ia n w o u ld b e th e o ffic ia l la n g u a g e of g o v e r n m e n t in th e s o u th e rn a n d n o rth e rn
z o n e s r e s p e c t iv e ly a n d w o u ld b e ta u g h t in s c h o o ls . B o th K u rd s a n d A r m e n ia n s w o u ld b e
re c r u ite d fo r t h e g e n d a r m e r ie a n d civil s e r v ic e in t h e c e n tra l z o n e . N o e l h o p e d th a t, a fte r
a p p ly in g th is s c h e m e fo r tw e n ty to th irty y e a rs , it w o u ld b e p o s s ib le to t a k e a d e c is io n o n “ thefuture political status of the various nationalities" . H e d id , h o w e v e r, e m p h a s is e t h e n e e d fo r “asingle mandatory, backed by an arm y o f occupation” .65 in o t h e r w o r d s ,N o e l ’s s c h e m ere q u ire d B rita in to b e d ire c tly a n d e ffe c tiv e ly in v o lv e d in its im p le m e n ta tio n .
In th e m e a n tim e , N o e l a d v is e d L o n d o n to t a k e into c o n s id e r a tio n th r e e e s s e n tia l c o n ­d itio n s , w h e n fr a m in g its fin a l p o s itio n o n th e K u rd is h q u e s tio n . F irs tly , K u rd is ta n s h o u ld b e
f r e e fro m T u r k is h ru le . S e c o n d ly , K u rd is ta n s h o u ld u n d e r g o n o p a rtitio n a n d fin a lly , th e s o u th ­e rn fro n tie rs o f K u rd is ta n"should follow, as nearly as possible, the ethnological line between

Kurds and Arabs" .66 N o e l’s la s t p o in t w a s th e e x a c t a n tith e s is o f W ils o n ’s, w h o w a n t e d th es tra te g ic a n d e c o n o m ic in te re s ts o f h is a d m in is tra tio n in M e s o p o t a m ia to b e t h e o n ly c rite rio n

65* E.W.C. Noel, Note on the Kurdish Situation, July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO, p. 18.
6 6 * Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 22 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.

100

for defining what territory belonged to Kurdistan and what territory belonged to Mesopotamia.
To overcome London’s fears about unwanted military and financial commitments and theoccurrence of anti-British political developments in Kurdistan, Noel sought to show that theKurds were strongly pro-British and that, even without British assistance and encouragement,
they could keep Turkish rule out of Kurdistan. He, however, warned that:the partitioning of the country by [the] attachment of the richest part of it, viz., Southern
Kurdistan to Mesopotamia, would afford an opportunity for anti-British nationalist agitation,
which would result in [the] revival of Turkish influence and consequent insecurity on our bor­ders, possibly reacting on the Persian roadfir
To contain Kemalist propaganda and thwart their attempts to win over the Kurds, Noel sug­gested the adoption of urgent steps, consisting of installing one of the Bedirkhans as gov­
ernor of Diarbekir, General Hamdi Pasha as General Officer Commanding the Tenth Corps andanother Kurdish nationalist as Mutessarif (head of a division) of Mardin.68 Although failing todirectly involve Britain in the affairs of Northern Kurdistan, Noel was able to highlight the impor­tant point that the Kurds formed a nationality per se -as much as the Armenians did- and thatin pursuing its own interests, Britain could not totally ignore the Kurds as a political factor in
any Turkish peace settlement. Indeed, he demonstrated that the establishment of a united
Armenian state would be very difficult to achieve, unless Britain satisfied Kurdish nationalist
aspirations. In retrospective, Noel’s views and efforts played some part in internationalising
the Kurdish question, as it was embodied in the terms of the 1920 Sevres Treaty.

The Reactions Of British Authorities In The Middle East To The Views Of Wil­
son And Noel On The Future Of Kurdistan
i-'th e g ritis h High Commission S7n Cairo And Kurdish A ffa irs
As a consequence of its growing realisation that the Kurdish question could no longer beignored, London needed to define British interests in Kurdistan and devise a means of secur­
ing them within the general framework of the Turkish peace settlement. For these reasons,the contradictory views of Wilson and Noel on Kurdistan’s future became the focal point of aserious debate among British officials in the Middle East, notably the British High Commis­
sions in Cairo and Constantinople. British civilian and military authorities in Cairo became
involved in the debate on the Kurdish question due to the occupation of some areas in West­ern Kurdistan by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. These Kurdish areas were far smaller than
67* Ibid
68* Political, Baghdad, 29 September 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.

101

those which came under the control of the British Indian Army in Mesopotamia. Two centres
emerged to conduct British military and administrative affairs in occupied Kurdistan: one in
Baghdad and the other in Cairo. As a consequence, competition between the two centres toinfluence British policy towards the political future of Kurdistan surfaced. Even when Wilson
was finally charged with the task of running Kurdish affairs on the ground in consultation with
British officials at Constantinople, British Qfficials in Cairo continued to oppose Wilson’s views
on Kurdish affairs. It must be remembered that the gap between Cairo and Baghdad alreadyexisted before the issue of Kurdistan’s future was under consideration. The High Commission
in Cairo represented the so-called Native School, which advocated the policy of indirect Brit­ish control through establishing a native administration under close British supervision. British
authorities in Baghdad represented the so-called Imperial School,& which firmly believed indirect British control as the ideal way to consolidate British position in Mesopotamia. Under
these conditions, it was natural that the differences between Cairo and Baghdad extended tothe issue of Kurdistan’s future.
The withdrawal of the Egyptian Expeditionary Forces from western Kurdish areas -a
step aimed to bring these areas under French control- did not stop British officials in Cairo
from their attempts to have some say insofar as Kurdistan’s future was concerned. Thus, thedifferences between Cairo and Baghdad over Kurdish affairs continued as before. Edmund
Allenby, the British High Commissioner for Egypt, and his subordinates objected to Wilson’splans for the partition of Kurdistan between British Mesopotamia and Turkey. Instead, they
supported Noel’s scheme for ethnically defining clear-cut frontiers for a future Kurdistan.
Noel’s views on Kurdish affairs were compatible with those of the High Commission in Cairo,
which stated that the Kurds should have self-determination and Kurdistan should undergo no
partition. In his telegram to the War Office, Allenby warned that Wilson’s idea of ignoring theethnic boundaries between Kurdistan and Mesopotamia might precipitate some kind of trou­ble:
The inclusion of Southern Kurdistan... in Mesopotamia would... mean friction with Kurds andmight create a frontier country, which would necessitate permanent military expense. I,
therefore, recommend that they be included in a Kurdish-Armenian provisional state as envi­
saged by Noel. I consider... that recognition of Kurdish nationality should be urged and that
Kurds should be freed from fear of Armenian domination. They might be driven by this fear
into the arms of GUP [i.e.Turkish nationalists], whereas they might prove strong bulwark
against Jihad, if they are satisfied. If they combine with Armenians, they will strengthen
Armenian positionjo
69* These terms were used by the Interdepartmental Conference of Middle Eastern Affairs (IDCM).
IDCM, minute 37,13 April 1920, F0371/5068, PRO.
70* Commander-in-Chief, Egypt, to War Office, 12 September 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.

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Col. Arthur French, at the General Headquarter of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, held asimilar view, namely that British Kurdish policy at the peace conference should focus on therecognition of Kurdish nationality in line with the idea of self-determination, and that Turkish
rule should not be re-established in the Kurdish and Armenian Wilayets. French thus indir­
ectly opposed Wilson’s scheme for the partitioning of Ottoman Kurdistan and Southern Kurdi­
stan’s inclusion into Mesopotamia. He concluded that:the more homogeneous the population of the future Mesopotamia, the simpler and moresatisfactory will be the task of mandatory. Although the inclusion of these Kurdish districts[i.e. Southern Kurdistan] might add to the revenue, they would prove a source of weakness
in every other wayji
In Persia, British officials held contradictory views to those of Cairo insofar as Eastern
Kurdistan was concerned. They were opposed to any step that would undermine Persian ter­ritorial unity. Their reports on Eastern Kurdistan’s affairs contained explicit opposition to theaims of Kurdish nationalists and tangible suspicion of the ongoing Kurdish revolt, especially
its leader, Simko, whom they accused of murdering Mar Sham'un, the leader of the Assyriansin the Urmia region. Simko’s attempts to establish direct contacts with the British authorities in
Mesopotamia met with opposition by these officials, who not only advised against negotia­
tions with him, but also called for British support for the Persian military efforts to establish
peace and order by suppressing his revolt. The British consul in Tabriz, for instance, advised
Cox not to respond to Simko’s attempts to establish contacts with Britain, warning that he wasan opportunist, and that any British arrangement with the murderer of the religious leader ofthe Assyrians, Mar| Sham'un would be morally “wrong".72 In April 1919, when the Persian
governor of Senna asked for British aeroplanes to defend the town against the attacks of theKurdish rebels, 7 3 the British were not in a position to provide such help, as their aeroplanes
were already occupied in north-west Persia.7 4 However, by February 1920, Britain and Persia
were simultaneously conducting co-ordinated air and ground operations against the Kurdish
revolt, with a view to forestalling “a recrudescence of grave disorder” in Eastern Kurdistan.7 5
British and Persian co-operation was extended to include the suppression of those Kurds

71* Col. French, Cairo, Directory of Military Intelligence, 2 October 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
72* Tabriz to Tehran, April 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
73* Assistant Political Officer, Sennah, to Political, Baghdad, 16 April 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
74* General Headquarter, Mes.Ex.Force, to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 20 April 1919, AIR20/512,
PRO.
75* Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, February 1920, F0371/5070, PRO.

103

who continued their resistance to British rule in Southern Kurdistanje The importance of theviews of these officials serving in Persia lay in their converging with, and reinforcement of, thelong-held imperial belief that British strategic interests could be best served by preserving theterritorial unity of a British orientated Persia. Therefore, it was necessary that the terms of theTurkish peace treaty on the Kurdish question should avoid any clause that might indirectly
affect Eastern Kurdistan’s existing relations with Persia.

<7- T lie B ritish High Commission

Constantinople

The views of the British High Commission in Constantinople varied from one official to anotherand also from one period to another. However, there was a general realisation among British
officials that Britain could not afford to ignore the Kurdish question when negotiating the Turk­
ish peace treaty. Adm. Somerset Gough-Calthorpe, the British High Commissioner until Sep­
tember 1919, agreed with Noel that Kurdish national aspirations did not contradict the British
strategic interests of securing proper frontiers in Mesopotamia. 7 7 He, like Noel, preferred aswift British response to Northern Kurdistan’s political developments. Gough-Calthorpe
informed the Foreign Office about the sincerity of the Kurdish nationalists’ desire for thesuzerainty of the British, emphasising that this:matter is one which has a very large political importance...[and] must be faced... It is mostessential that the circumstances should be turned to the best advantage possible, and I
cannot imagine any possible solution by which Mesopotamia will not be confided to a British
mandate, while it is essential for the general prosperity and peace of Mesopotamia to havegood relations with the Kurds.7*
Gough-Calthorpe, while considering the re-establishment of Turkish suzerainty over Kurdi­
stan as an “impracticable” solution, advised against British support for Armenian demands atthe expense of the Kurds. 7 9 Although wanting Mesopotamia to have strategically important
mountains in Kurdistan, he made it clear that Kurdish national aspirations should not be disre­garded if Britain sought to consolidate both its strategic position and permanent political stabi­lity along its Mesopotamian frontier. Thus, the Kurds could be valued in terms of being the fac­
tor that would thwart any future Turkish intrigues against Mesopotamia.so Rear-Adm. Richard
76* For example, two Kurdish nationalists were arrested by the Persian authorities and handed over to
British authorities in Baghdad. Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 11 April 1920, F0371/5068, PRO.
77* Young, Foreign Office Minute No.101503,14 July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
78* High Commissioner, Constantinople, to Foreign Office, Repeated to Political, Baghdad, 10 July
1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
79* IDCM, 6 September 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
80* High Commissioner, Constantinople, to Political, Baghdad, 3 & 13 April 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.

104

Webb, Gough-Calthorpe’s Assistant, went so far as to express unreserved endorsement ofNoel’s scheme for the future of Kurdistan and Armenia, while rejecting Wilson’s stance. The
observation of Capt. C.C. Woolley, a British officer on the ground, also confirmed Noel’s con­clusions that Kurdish nationalism, which expressed itself in the form of a desire for separationfrom Turkish rule and for a British mandate, could not be easily ignored as a political factor.81
Adm. John De Robeck and his subordinates at the High Commission held different
views from the British High Commission in Cairo. They all agreed that Britain should not iden­
tify itself with Kurdish national aspirations. While not wanting to lose Kurdish nationalist lea­ders as a political card in case of emergency, they hoped to prevent the alienation of the Turk­
ish Government in Constantinople and further deterioration in British relations with the Kemalist forces. De Robeck, though acknowledging the depth and sincerity of the Kurdish national­
ist movement,8 2 did not consider the establishment of an independent Kurdistan as having
any advantage to Britain. Therefore, he, while wishing to see no British interference, sug­gested that uit should be left to the Kurds themselves to work out their own salvation and todisentangle themselves from the Turkd'.w Similarly, Thomas Hohler, a Political Officer who cri­ticised Adm. Webb for preferring Noel’s scheme for the future of Kurdistan and Armenia to
Wilson’s, opposed any British interference in Turkish internal affairs in support of the Kurds
and Armenians for humanitarian or other reasons. Britain, according to him, "must deal with
the Kurdish question almost exclusively from the Mesopotamian frontier” point of view.84 Hoh­ler hoped that his approach would serve to put an end to the anti-British stance of the Kemalists, and enable Britain to have the Kurdish mountains as “a sound defensible frontier” forMesopotamia.85 Hohler’s views were appreciated by Lord Curzon,se who did not want British
policy to drive the Kemalists towards the Bolshevik side. Andrew Ryan, another Political Offi­cer, offered a compromise scheme based on the establishment of a large Turkey in which
Northern Kurdistan would enjoy autonomous status. The implementation of his scheme
depended on bringing moderate Turks and Kurds together.87
81* Capt. Woolley, Note on Kurdish National Movement -in- Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 29 July 1919,
AIR20/512, PRO.
82* De Robeck to Curzon, Confidential, 9 December 1919, F0371/93, PRO.
83* High Commissioner, Constantinople, 12 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
84* Hohler, Constantinople, to Clerk Kerr, 27 August 1919, DBFP, p.742.
85* An Account of a Conversation between Hohler and Brigadier-General McCoy, 14 October 1919,
DBFP, pp.821-23:.
86* Ibid, Footnote 3, p.823.
87* De Robeck to Curzon, Confidential, 2 March 1920, FO371/5067, PRO.

105

Conclusion
The Bolshevik Revolution and the entry of the United States into the First World War against
Germany made it necessary to considerably modify the Sykes-Picot agreement, if it were toserve as the basis for the post-war territorial and political re-arrangements of Ottoman Asia.
Consequently, London began to search for a new territorial and political settlement which
would have to take into consideration new developments, such as the threat of Bolshevism
and the rise of various nationalist movements in Turkey and Persia. Delay and indecision char­acterised the way Britain identified its objectives in Kurdistan, and was largely due to its unpre­
paredness to deal with new issues, such as that of the Kurds. Furthermore, Kurdish affairs
were mysterious to the British Government, as there were very little contacts with the Kurds
before and during the First World War. When the war ended, Britain found itself unexpectedly
in control of large Kurdish areas, whose importance for Mesopotamia’s security were steadily
increasing. The contradictory views of Wilson and Noel on whether the Kurdish factor waspolitically important or not, initially caused a noticeable hesitation inside the Foreign Office andIndia Office. A Foreign Office minute, which was written a few weeks before the Allied negotia­
tion of the Turkish peace settlement, illustrates the continuing confusion about Kurdish
affairs:/ am not sure about Major Noel, for, after he had come and talked to us at length about Kurdi­
stan, his views and proposals were contradicted in every respect by Colonel Wilson(Baghdad), who said he was wrong all round.88
Neither Noel nor Wilson were able to persuade London to adopt their schemes for adefined policy towards Kurdistan ahead of the Paris peace conference’s discussion of theTurkish settlement. Having said that, the contradictory views of Wilson and Noel, and the var­ious comments and reactions they provoked among British officials in London and the Middle
East, helped London to formulate a general line, according to which the British delegation in
Paris was to negotiate Kurdistan’s future within the Turkish peace treaty. The general line
itself reflected an amalgamation of the different views advocated by British officials in the Mid­dle East, as the following points illustrate. Firstly, to protect its interests, Britain would notresort to force beyond its existing frontiers in Southern Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. These
frontiers would be “as short as possible”. This meant that, apart from Southern Kurdistan, Bri­
tain would not commit itself militarily to implementing the terms of the Turkish peace treaty
88* Foreign Office Minute, Bolshevik Propaganda in the East, 7 January 1920, Reports and Papers
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part One, From the Mid Nineteenth Century to the First World
War, DBFP, p.20.

106regarding Northern Kurdistan and Armenia. Thus Northern Kurdistan, which was outside Brit­ish political control, would be left to its own devices. Secondly, apart from Southern Kurdistan-which would be under the Mesopotamian mandate- Britain would not accept a Kurdistan-wide
mandate for itself or for its Allies. This practically meant that Britain decided both to partition
Ottoman Kurdistan as a means of protecting its strategic and economic interests, and to con­fine the relevancy of the Kurdish question to Northern Kurdistan. Thirdly, the restoration of
Turkish sovereignty over Kurdistan would not be allowed.89
Points One and Two met the wishes of British civilian and military authorities in Bagh­dad, in that Southern Kurdistan should be kept under British control and mandate on strategicand economic grounds. The principle of non-interference in Turkish internal affairs throughNorthern Kurdistan, as the British High Commission in Constantinople advocated, was taken
into account, especially when it converged with the views of Lord Curzon and Winston
Churchill, the Secretary of State for War. The limited recognition of the Kurdish people as anationality per se, and of limited Kurdish political aspirations, as implied in Point Three, reflec­
ted, to some degree, the views of Noel and the British authorities in Cairo. The most importantprinciple emphasised by the general line was that of subordinating the solution of the Kurdish
question to the requirements of British interests in Mesopotamia, Turkey and Persia. The
foregoing analysis showed that British officials on the ground influenced not only the direc­
tion of political developments in the Kurdish areas, but also the course of debate on Kurdi­
stan’s future among British decision-makers. The role of British officials on the ground, insofar
as they affected Kurdish affairs, became even more evident and decisive in the period 19211923, when Percy Cox, the new High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, thwarted all attempts
to establish a separate Southern Kurdistan in favour of incorporating it into the Iraqi state.

89* S/S to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 22 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.

107

The secret agreements tor the partition of Ottoman Asia, which Britain and the Allies conclu­
ded during the First World War, completely ignored the interests of the non-Turkish nationali­
ties such as the Kurds and the Armenians. However, the sensational publication of the termsof these secret agreements by the Bolsheviks in 1917, and President Wilson’s announce­
ment of his Fourteen Points, which made a direct reference to the principle of selfdetermination for the non-Turkish nationalities, compelled Britain to re-consider its position on
the future of the non-Turkish Wilayets. As Britain discovered after the war, deciding the politi­
cal future of the new nationalities was a complicated issue. One of the main reasons for thiswas that Armenian, Arab and Kurdish nationalists laid conflicting claims to the same Wilayetsas
part of their future national states. For instance, Kurdish and Arab nationalists laid the same
claims to the Mosul Wilayet, whereas Kurdish and Armenian nationalists laid equal claims to
the Van, Bitlis and Diyarbekir Wilayets. These conflicting claims particularly came to light whenthe Allies began to discuss the future of Kurdistan, Armenia and Mesopotamia. Moreover, Bri­
tain needed to settle the question of the new nationalities in such a way that it could consoli­
date its strategic and economic interests in the (new) Middle East.This chapter examines how
the search for a solution to the Armenian question, and the issue of fulfilling its wartime pro­mises to the Sharifian Arabs, made Britain realise the extent to which the political and territorial
settlement of the future of the non-Turkish territories in Kurdistan, Armenia and Mesopotamia
were interconnected. This chapter assesses the conflicting political and territorial aspirationsof the Kurds, Armenians and Arabs insofar as they affected British policy on the Kurdish ques­tion.

Kurdish Nationalists, Britain And The Turkish Peace Settlement, 1919-1920
When the First World War ended there was no Kurdistan-wide nationalist organisation that
could represent all the Kurds of Turkey and Persia. The pre-war political contacts, which were
initiated by some Kurdish nationalists, such as Sheikh Salam of Barzan, the Bedirkhans,
Sheikh Abdul Qadir (the son of Ubeidullah), Cherif Pasha and Sheikh Mahmud, 1 were inter­
rupted by the outbreak of the war. The absence of a united Kurdish front after the war wea­
kened the political efforts of Kurdish nationalists to effectively present the Kurdish cause at
1* Ahmad, Kurdistan During The First World War, pp.63 & 67.

108

the forthcoming peace conference. Having said that, the majority of Kurdish nationalist lea­ders were united on the issue of securing Britain’s support for their political cause. Kurdish
expectations of a positive British role in determining Kurdistan’s post-war future reflected two
factors. Firstly, apart from having the strongest military presence in the Middle East close to
Kurdistan, Britain, as a great power, had strategic, political and economic interests in the politi­
cal settlement of the non-Turkish territories. Accordingly, Kurdish nationalists sought to per­suade Britain that their nationalist aspirations did not contradict its interests. In his early con­tacts with British officials, Cherif Pasha sought to demonstrate that, if an autonomous Kurdi­
stan was established under British protection, it would perform “ the same function towards
Mesopotamia as the North-West Frontier Province performed towards India” .2 Qadir told theBritish that an independent Kurdistan, under their protection, could be a formidable buffer
against both the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks.3 In Cairo, other exiled Kurdish nationalists led
by Surreya Bedirkhan, presented British authorities in Egypt with similar views. Secondly, Brit­ish political propaganda during and after the war regarding the right to self-determination andthe establishment of an autonomous Kurdish entity under British supervision in Southern
Kurdistan roused high expectations among Kurdish political elites, and were interpreted as
evidence of Britain’s willingness to support the political aspirations of the subjected nationali­ties, including the Kurds.
These factors explain why Kurdish nationalists focused their political efforts in the per­iod 1919-1920 on securing British support for the immediate establishment of an indepen­
dent Kurdish state under its protection. Their objective was to go to the peace conferencewith a fait accompli, rather than awaiting its final decision. The origin of such thinking among
Kurdish nationalists went back to the war period when Cherif Pasha held talks with Percy Cox,
the temporary British Minister in Tehran. The former urged the British to take the initiative inturning Southern Kurdistan into a working autonomous administration under their protection
as well as announcing their intended policy towards the Kurdish question.4 Soon Cherif
Pasha broadened his proposal to include the whole of Ottoman Kurdistan.s Other Kurdish
leaders and political organisations, such as the Kurdish Committee in Cairo and Uplifting Kur­
distan, held more or less similar views. They, while welcoming any development that indicated
2* A.J. Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No.174037,22 November 1918, FO 371/3407, PRO.
3* De Robeck to Curzon, 2 March 1920, Enclosure Noil, A. Ryan, Memorandum, 24 February 1920,
FO371/5067, PRO.
4* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p.8.
5* Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No.174037, 22 November 1918, FO 371/3407, PRO.

109

British support for the Kurdish cause, persistently urged Britain to adopt a defined policy
towards the Kurdish question before the peace conference could take its final decision.6
On a number of separate occasions and through various initiatives, Kurdish leaderssought to test out the real attitudes of the British towards the Kurdish question. Asking for
British sponsorship of the Kurdish-Armenian agreement in December 1919 was one suchinitiative (as will be examined later). Qadir, in his conversation with T.B. Hohler, expressed his
apprehension that in the absence of a defined British policy, certain Turkish political group­
ings might try to win over the Kurds through promising an autonomous Kurdistan under Turk­
ish protection. The price that the Kurds were expected to pay was to fight the Kemalists.
Qadir, while showing his mistrust of the Turks and their promises, sought, in Hohler’s word, toform his course absolutely in accord with Allies, but especially with England, for he consideredthat the fate of Kurdistan was intimately linked with the policy of Great Britain, much more sothan with that of any other of the Allies, and he was anxious to do nothing which not have [sic]our entire assent and approvals
Cherif Pasha informed Britain that he was elected as the *head of the future Kurdish state”*
and asked for the dispatch of a mixed commission to Kurdistan to confirm his claims.9 During
the peace conference, he asked for British approval of his initiative in submitting a memoran­
dum on the Kurdish question, in which he asked for a British mandate for Kurdistan (see map
thirteen) . 10
On all of these occasions, the British continually avoided any reaction that might leadto deep involvement in Kurdish affairs. It was not until late 1919 that Britain began to formulate
several principles guiding its approach to the Kurdish question, such as rejecting any British
or foreign mandate for Kurdistan and separating Eastern Kurdistan from Persia. On more dir­
ect issues concerning Kurdistan’s future, Britain waited on the course of debate at the peace
conference before adopting its final position. It sought a Kurdish policy that took into consid­
eration the new political developments in the region, such as the rise of Kemalism and theaims of its former allies in the Turkish peace settlement. France, Britain’s strongest imperial

6* Policy, Cairo, to General, 6 August 1919, AIR 20/714 & the letter by the Kurdish Democratic Party to
British High Commissioner, 31 August 1919, FO 371/4192 & Letters by the Kurdish Communities at Con­
stantinople and the Association for Uplifting Kurdistan to Lloyd George, March 1920, FO 371/5068,
PRO.
7* De Robeck to Curzon, Confidential, 9 December 1919, Enclosure No.1, T.B. Hohler, Memorandum, 8
December 1919, FO 371/4193, PRO.
8* IDCM, Secretary’s Note, 6 September 1919, FO 371/4193, PRO.
9* Hubert Young, Foreign Office Minute No.111245,4 August 1919, FO 371/ 4192, PRO.
10* British Delegation, Paris, 12 October 1919, FO 371/93, PRO.

110

Map Thirteen: Kurdish
Nationalists’ Definition Of
Kurdistan's Frontiers In
1919
Lake Van

MalatiyaMushLake Urmia

Kurdistan’s Frontier
BitlisDiyarbekir

UrmialMardinirfa

JezirahHakari

Ottoman-Persian Frontier
Nisibin

Rowanduz
iul Arbil
Sulaimaniya

Senna

KirkukAccess To The Sea
Kifri
Kermanshah[hanaqii

Source: F0371/5968

riv a l, d e m a n d e d te rrito ria l a n d e c o n o m ic c o m p e n s a tio n s in K u rd is ta n fo r t h e lo s s o f M o s u l,
w h e r e a s A m e r ic a w a s p a rtic u la rly in te re s te d in th e A rm e n ia n m a n d a te .
O n t h e is s u e o f e s ta b lis h in g c lo s e p o litic a l re la tio n s w ith K u rd is h n a tio n a lis ts , B ritisho ffic ia ls in C o n s t a n t in o p le a n d B a g h d a d e x p r e s s e d s tro n g re s e r v a tio n s . T h e y p a r tic u la rly
o p p o s e d a n y B ritis h e n c o u r a g e m e n t o f K u rd is h p o litic a l e ffo rts o r a B ritish re c o g n itio n o f a
u n ite d K u rd is ta n . S a tis fy in g K u rd is h n a tio n a lis t a s p ira tio n s , t h e y b e lie v e d , w a s o f no u s e to
B rita in ’s s tra te g ic in te re s ts , a s K u rd is h n a tio n a lis ts w e r e a m in o r p o litic a l fo rc e . In th e ir re p o rts
to t h e F o r e ig n O ffic e a n d t h e In d ia O ffic e ,th e s e o ffic ia ls in c r e a s in g ly c ritic is e d t h e K u rd is hn a tio n a lis t m o v e m e n t a n d its p rin c ip a l e x p o n e n ts , u n d e r s c o r in g th e ir d is u n ity , la c k o f in flu ­e n c e a n d le g itim a c y , a s w e ll a s s u g g e s tin g th e y w e r e o u t o f to u c h w ith th e re a lity in K u rd is ta n .
S o m e o f th e ir re p o r ts d e s c r ib e d K u rd is h n a tio n a lis ts a s o p p o r tu n is ts u a n d th e K u rd is h n a tio ­n a lis t m o v e m e n t a s n o m o r e th a n trib a l a g ita tio n s , m o tiv a te d b y K u rd is h c h ie f s ’ f e a r o f E u r ­o p e a n re ta lia tio n fo r th e a lle g e d w a r - tim e m a s s a c r e s a g a in s t C h ris tia n s . R y a n a n d H o h le r o f
th e B ritish H ig h C o m m is s io n in C o n s ta n tin o p le r e p e a te d ly m a d e it c le a r to th e K u rd is h n a tio ­n a lis ts t h a t B rita in o p p o s e d a n y a tte m p t to p o litic a lly m o b ilis e t h e K u rd s, h o w e v e r p e a c e fu l

11* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., p.17.

111

and lawful the methods. Taking independent political initiatives in Kurdistan, in British eyes,
was bound to have dangerous effects on British Interests, as the Mahmud affair in Southern
Kurdistan had demonstrated earlier. A politically flammable Kurdistan could also draw theattention of hostile Powers to the Kurdish situation, especially Bolshevik Russia. Against thisbackground, the British High Commission in Constantinople explicitly warned Kurdish leadersthat political instability in Kurdistan would negatively influence Britain’s position on the Kurdish
question at the peace conference. Thus, Kurdish leaders faced a dilemma. On the one hand,
they felt that Britain questioned their political influence in Kurdistan and the strength of Kurd­
ish nationalist sentiment. On the other, when endeavouring to demonstrate the extent of
their influence and the magnitude of the Kurdish nationalist movement, they were warned by
British officials of dire consequences “ if they were found preparing a movement against Turksor any thing of that kintf. In other words, Kurdish nationalists should not arouse Turkish suspi­
cions through their political activities in Kurdistan. They should await the results of the peace
conference.1 2
While that was the British position, the Turkish authorities, over whom Britain had firm
control, began suppressive campaigns against Kurdish nationalists by dissolving their organi­sations and committees, arresting Kurdish activists and breaking up their political meetings inConstantinople and throughout Kurdistan. The difference in the initial British position on
Kurdish and Armenian affairs reflected three important factors: humane, strategic and political.
Firstly, the Armenian question had a clear humane dimension, stemming from the Armenian
massacres at the hands of the Ottoman authorities before and during the First World War. The
massacres caused such public moral reaction in Europe and America that it was not possible
to ignore Armenian nationalist aspirations. It was perceived that the creation of an indepen­
dent state was the only guarantee for the long-term safety of the Armenians. In this respect,
the Armenian question was almost identical to the Jewish one. Here, the same moral consid­
erations stood behind Western support for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.
Secondly, because of the geopolitical position of Armenia between the old Russian Empire
and the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian question was of more strategic importance to Britain
than the Kurdish one. In other words, Britain considered useful the creation of an indepen­
dent Armenian state as a strategic buffer against Bolshevik Russia. Lastly, there was no Kurd­
ish lobby to back or explain Kurdish political aspirations either in Europe or in America, as in

12* High Commission, Constantinople, 21 July 1919, FO 371/4192, PRO.

112

the case of the Jews and the Armenians.
The last factor was an important one, given the unfamiliarity of the British Government
with the complexity of the Kurdish question. Indeed, when the British Government asked for
information about a suitable nationalist leader to talk to regarding Kurdish aspirations at thepeace conference, British officials in Constantinople and Baghdad dismissed the existence of
any acceptable Kurdish leader. They emphasised that there was neither a Kurdish question
nor a Kurdish nationalist movement, and that the influence of those who claimed to represent
the Kurdish cause was minimal among the Kurds. The reality of the Kurdish nationalist move­
ment was remarkably different from what was portrayed by these British officials. Apart from
Simko, whose influence was mainly restricted to his own tribal confederation, the influence ofsuch nationalist leaders as Qadir, the Bedirkhans and Mahmud, cut across many Kurdish
regions. It was by no means confined to one tribe or confederation of tribes. These leaders,
therefore, cannot be considered as tribal chiefs. Moreover, the Kurdish nationalist movement
contained senior military and civilian figures as well as students, intellectuals and artisans. The
main Kurdish nationalist organisation, the Kurdish Committee, which waged a political propa­
ganda campaign and mobilised Kurdish public opinion for a separate Kurdistan, had branches
all over Northern and Western Kurdistan, such as those at Diyarbekir, Sairt, Saur, Mardin,
Jezirah and Botan. It attracted to its ranks Kurdish civil servants, artisans and officers from the
Ottoman army and the police. 13
The continuation of what seemed to the Kurds as undefined British policy towards
Kurdistan’s future, especially after December 1919, was interpreted by Kurdish nationalists asa negative omen, th e y suspected a large scale re-partition of Kurdistan through secret arran­gements. C.C. Garbett of the India Office, following his conversation with Kurdish leaders, sta­
ted that:they understand not only that neither Great Britain nor France will accept the responsibility [forthe mandate over Kurdistan], but that these Allies are contemplating such a partition of Kurd­
ish territory as will destroy the possibility of a united Kurdistan. 14

These nationalists, according to Garbett, had no option but to turn to the Young Turks
because they preferred the prospect of “a united Kurdistan’' under the protection of a weak
Turkey to a “permanent division” , with which they believed themselves threatened. 1 5 The two
13* Nasser Effendi, Notes on the Present Kurdish Situation, Mes.Ex.Force, 5 August 1919, AIR20/513,
PRO.
14* C. Garbett, Memorandum on Kurdistan, 29 January 1920, FO 371/4193, PRO.
15*lbid.

113

prospects of incurring anti-Kurdish reaction in London and the re-partitioning of Kurdistan
were new factors which helped to divide Kurdish nationalists in Northern Kurdistan. Indeed,
Cherif Pasha’s report of the rumours of the peace conference’s decision to divide Kurdistan
between Britain and France caused, according to De Robeck, a political polarisation among
Kurdish nationalist circles. On the one side, there were those Kurds who believed in the cap­ability of the Kurdish nationalist movement to expel the Turks from Kurdistan and then makethe peace conference recognise the liberated Kurdistan as a fait accompli. On the other side,
Cherif Pasha, who did not believe that Kurdish nationalists were sufficiently strong, sought toforestall the imminent partition by reaching an agreement with the Ottoman authorities thatwould grant “autonomy for the whole of Kurdistan under Turkish sovere/gnf/ .1 6 Similarly,
Qadir, while expressing his fears of French plans to partition Kurdistan, made it clear that hewanted a united Ottoman Kurdistan, even if this would entail the restriction of Kurdish politicalambitions to local autonomy within Turkey.1 7
The sudden moderation in the political aims of Qadir, Cherif Pasha and some other
Kurds expressed, firstly, their loss of faith in the peace conference as a means of achieving
Kurdish nationalist aspirations, 1 8 and secondly, their opposition to re-partition of Kurdistan,which meant that the Kurds would emerge empty handed from the Turkish peace settlement.
They, therefore, judged it necessary to reach -in advance- political arrangements with theTurkish authorities, before the peace conference could reach its decision on Kurdistan’s
future. This would, at least, secure an autonomous and united Kurdistan within Turkey. In
other words, it was the fear of the dismemberment of Kurdistan that was the reason for themoderate attitudes of certain Kurdish nationalists, rather than any religious loyalty to the Otto­
man Sultan, as British officials in Constantinople argued. After meeting a deputation from thenationalist Kurdish Club, Admiral Webb reported that the apparent manifestations of Kurdish“loyalty to the Turks were either fictitious or the result of direct pressure or, in some case, ofuncertainty as to what support the Kurds could count on in their struggle to escape from theTurkish yoke". 19
Both British measures on the ground and the uncertainty about London’s real inten16* De Robeck, Constantinople, 27 February 1920, FO371/5067, PRO.
17* De Robeck to Curzon, 2 March 1920, Enclosure No.1, A. Ryan, Memorandum, 24 February 1920,
FO371/5067, PRO.
18* De Robeck to Curzon, Confidential, 9 December 1919, Enclosure No.1, T. B. Hohler, Memorandum,
8 December 1919, FO 371/4193, PRO.
19* Commission, Constantinople, 3 February 1920, FO371/5067, PRO.

114

tion in Kurdistan in the period 1919-1920 had a negative impact on the political efforts ofKurdish nationalists. They exacerbated divisions and disunity inside the Kurdish nationalist
movement. Gradually, pessimism replaced optimism, as the British stopped the process of theemergence of an autonomous Southern Kurdistan and prevented a direct political connec­
tion between Eastern and Southern Kurdistan. While warning Kurdish nationalists in Northern
Kurdistan against unwarranted political activities, they tolerated the Ottoman authorities’ antiKurdish measures, such as the closing down of Kurdish newspapers and political organisa­
tions, as well as arresting their members.
Having said that, Britain could not completely ignore the Kurdish question owing tothree factors. Firstly, the existence of the Kurdish nationalist movement could not be over­looked as an important factor when settling the future of non-Turkish territories such as Arm­enia, Mesopotamia and Syria. Secondly, by occupying the southern parts of Ottoman Kurdi­
stan, Britain faced the issue of how to deal with Kurdish nationalists. In other words, Britain
had no choice but to be involved in the future of the Kurdish question within the framework of
the Turkish peace settlement. Thirdly, the upsurge of Kurdish nationalism coincided with thegrowing threat posed by both the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks to British imperial interests in
India, Persia and Mesopotamia. These anti-British forces would very likely make the most of
the Kurdish situation if Britain ignored the Kurds. Britain, therefore, had to find a formula thatwhile realising its own main objectives in Kurdistan, would not go beyond satisfying limited
political aspirations in the form of granting local autonomy to part of Kurdistan.

The Development Of Britain’s Kurdish Policy In The Light Of The Political
Aspirations Of The Armenians And Other Christians, 1918-1920
i- Early g ritis h A ttitudes
Ever since the Nineteenth Century, the Great Powers had influenced the shaping of KurdishArmenian relations through their interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. On
the one side, Russia used the Ottomans’ maltreatment of their Armenian subjects as an
excuse to interfere in the affairs of the eastern Wilayets, whereas Muslim Kurds were consid­
ered an obstacle in the way of expanding Russian influence. It was in Russia’s interest that
Armenian-Kurdish confrontation continued, as this would give it an opportunity to directlyintervene in the matter. On the other side, the Ottomans sought, through the policy of divide
and rule, and through stirring pan-lslamic sentiments in the eastern Wilayets, to turn the Kurds

115

against the Armenians. This was the ideal way to stifle the growing Kurdish and Armenian
nationalist movements simultaneously. In a sense, the Kurds and the Armenians fought eachother on behalf of the Turks and the Russians. In the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century,
Britain began to intervene directly in the affairs of the eastern Wilayets on moral and politicalgrounds, through the protection of Christian Armenians against Muslim Kurds. This was done
by pressuring the Turks to implement administrative reforms, and via the containment of Rus­
sian interference in Ottoman internal affairs through the Armenian question.
As the Kurdish revolt of 1880-1881 demonstrated, Kurdish nationalists becameaware of the need to avoid the trap of fighting the Armenian Christians in the interest of the
Muslim Turks, and of identifying Turkish rule as the real enemy of the Kurds. Although a similar
realisation emerged among Armenian nationalists, they failed in their efforts to ally with Kurd­
ish nationalists largely because of strong Russian opposition. The failure of the Kurds andArmenians to bury their differences had considerable negative effects on the development of
Kurdish and Armenian nationalist movements until 1919. When the First World War broke out,
both Turkey and Russia were able to mobilise many Kurds and Christians respectively, caus­
ing atrocities throughout Ottoman Kurdistan, Ottoman Armenia and Eastern Kurdistan, where
the main battlefields were situated. As a direct result of the war, tens of thousands of Kurds
and Armenians died. In Southern Kurdistan, according to Amin Zaki, 300,000 Kurds lost theirlives.2 0 According to W.R. Hay, only 20% of the original population of Rowanduz survived
after the war.21 Robert Olson estimates total Kurdish deaths to be around 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 . 2 2 Given
that, according to British estimations during the war, there were around 3,000,000

Kurds, 2 3

Kurdistan must have lost 20% of its population.
The Allied victory and British occupation of large Kurdish areas caused considerable
alarm in several Kurdish areas, lest the Allies adopt a retribution policy against the Kurds. From
the Kurdish viewpoint, the Allies were, after all, Christians, and bound to help their co­
religionists, as they had done in the past. The post-war public support of Europe and America
for the Armenian cause was also interpreted by the Kurds as a prelude to the incorporation of

20* Muhammad Amin Zaki, Tarikh Al Kord We Kordstan Min Aqdam Al Osur Hatta Alan, (Cairo: Al Saateh
Press, 1939), pp.274-275.
21* Hay, Two Years In Kurdistan, p. 192.
22* Olson, The Emergence Of Kurdish Nationalism, p.21.
23* British Desiderate in Turkey, op. cit., Appendix VI, Note by the Secretary, Political and Secret
Department, India Office: “The Future Settlement of Eastern Turkey in Asia and Arabia”, 14 March 1915,
p.83.

116

Map Fourteen: Armenians’
Claims to Kurdish Areas
According To Their Proposed
Map Of Armenia At The Paris
Peace Conference In 1919

Lake VanMush
VanMalatiya
Bitlis

Ottoman-Persian
Frontier

Lake Urmia

Diyarbekir
Irmii
MardinJezirahHakari

Urfa

Armenian Territorial
Claims In Kurdistan

Mosul

Rowanduz L Arbil
Sulaimanh

Senna

KirkukKifri
Kermanshah
lanaqii

Ottoman Kurdistan into a Greater Armenian state. What intensified Kurdish fears even more
was the propaganda campaign waged by some Armenian nationalists, claiming that theChristian Allies would bring the Kurds to justice for their wartime crimes against the Armenians.
This anti-Kurdish propaganda campaign, which was supported by some Western missionaries-such as Reverent W.A. Wigram ,2 4 an Anglican British priest who lived in Urmia before and dur­ing the war- succeeded in portraying the Kurds in Europe and America as murderers. The
major motive behind the Armenians’ attempts to incriminate the Kurds as a whole was to per­suade the Allies to incorporate Northern Kurdistan into the would-be Greater Armenian state(see map fourteen). Noel warned against any British involvement in "hostilities in Asia Minor”,
which he attributed to “the fear cleverly fostered by the Armenians that the Allies are intent on
supporting the domination o f one Armenian over Muslims’'.2 5 Indeed, the project of creating a
Greater Armenia was initially supported by the Allies, including Britain and America, between
1914 and 1919.
Towards the end of the First World War, certain Kurds took the initiative and tried to
24* Reverend Wigram, Notes Regarding Kurds, Baghdad, 20 February 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
25* Dairy of Maj. Noel, On Special Duty in Kurdistan, from June 14th to September 21st 1919,
FO371/5068, PRO.

117

improve Kurdish-Christian relations, while also inviting British officials to intervene in the mat­ter. The Mukri Kurds, for instance, offered the British Consul at Kermanshah their solution for
the Kurdish-Christian problem in Urmia, where the Kurds, on the one hand, and the Arm­enians and Assyrians, on the other, bitterly fought each other. It involved two elements: aseparate Eastern Kurdistan and direct British intervention to restore stability.2 6 Just before theend of the war, Cherif Pasha drew British attention to Turkish sponsorship of the hatred
between Armenians and Kurds, arguing that:the task now was to reconcile the two races, the Mohammedans in a large majority and the
Armenians in a strong minority, both having an equal right to inhabit the same country. For
establishing a basis of reconciliation, he considered a committee should be set up in London,and he suggested its immediate formation under the auspices of the British Government, firstin Mesopotamia and, afterwards, in Kurdistan.27
Other Kurdish nationalists, such as Said Taha, asked for a British guarantee that Kurdistan
would not come under Armenian or Assyrian rule.2 8 Taha and Simko kept the British informedof their willingness to co-operate regarding the Christian problem, if they would intervene poli­tically to reconcile the views of all parties.
Initially, British officials on the ground paid no serious attention to either Kurdish fears
or Kurdish factors in the settlement of the Armenian and Assyrian problems. In this respect,
Wilson expressed his doubts about Cherif Pasha, whom he considered to be in no position toplay any part in the Kurdish-Armenian question. 2 9 The pro-Christian measures adopted bycertain British officials, such as Col. Leachman, were motivated by political as well as moral
considerations. It was calculated that the cheapest way to consolidate British rule in some diffi­
cult Kurdish areas was to use the Christians as an instrument to control local Kurds. This policy
was counterproductive. Instead of stability, it caused anti-British feelings and eventually led tothe outbreak of local Kurdish revolts in the Mosul area and beyond, such as in Amadia, Jezirah
and Nisibin. To suppress these revolts, British aeroplanes carried out bombing raids on a large
scale against Kurdish villages, inflicting heavy casualties .30 All these developments helped toincrease Kurdish suspicion of British intentions in Kurdistan. Noel criticised the pro-Christianorientation among some British officials: “our allowing ourselves to be used as a tool of Arm­enian religious fanaticism and vindictiveness is greatly responsible for the anti-Christian and

26* Precis of Affairs.., op. cit., pp.7-8.
27* Ibid, p.8.
28* War Office, No.0152/5146,11 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
29* Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 30 October 1918, AIR20/512, PRO.
30* Precis of Affairs..,op. cit., p. 14.

118

Map Fifteen: Assyians’ Claimed
National Homeland In Kurdistan
After The First World War
Lake Van

Ottoman-Persian
Frontier

Lake Urmia
MalatiyaDiyarbekir

Mardinirah ;: Hakari

Nisibin

Assyrians’ Territorial
Claims In Kurdistan:Rowandi
Mosul tArbil
Sulaimarii;
KirkukKermanshahAnti-British movement in Kurdistan ".31 Earlier, he warned that the adoption of a retaliatory
policy against Kurdish civilians would lead to the formation of an anti-British front among theMuslims, which would involve London in “ serious military responsibilities”.3 2 The political ambi­
tions of the Assyrians posed another danger to the Kurds because, like the Armenians, theAssyrians wanted the British to support and protect the unification of their nation and home­land, i.e. the region Mosul-Jezirah-Bashkala-Urmia (see map f i f t e e n ) . 33
The unsympathetic attitudes of British officials on the ground were in harmony withearly British schemes for the future of the Armenians and the Assyrians. Examination of theseschemes shows that the existing Kurdish fears were justifiable and well-founded. According
to Toynbee, Mark Sykes was thinking of establishing an entity similar to Lebanon in Hakari inNorthern Kurdistan for the Ottoman Assyrians, who could forge a political and territorial unionwith their brothers in Urmia in Eastern Kurdistan. As for the Armenians, Sykes proposed toestablish one independent Armenian state in Cilicia and another one in the eastern Wilayets.
The latter would be based on equal status for all nationalities. The two states would eventually
31* Noel, Aleppo, to Political, Baghdad, 2 August 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
32* Political, Baghdad, to Egyptian, Cairo, 24 April 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
33* Headquarter Jelus Refugee Camp, to Political, Baghdad, 21 February 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.

119

Map Sixteen: Kurdish Areas
Included In The British Proposed
Boundaries Of Armenia In 1919
Lake Van
Mush

Ottoman-Persian
Frontier

Lake Urmia
Malatiya
BitlisDiyarbekir
Irm ii

MardinUrfa

Kurdish Areas Inclu­
ded in Armenia

HakariJezirahNisibin
Rowanduz
Mosul LArbil
Sulaimani]

Senna

KirkukKifri
Kermanshah
lanaqinbe amalgamated into one entity, including Northern Kurdistan. In his comment on Sykes’
scheme, Toynbee said that it would “give the Armenians immediate national self-government.,
but this might be unfortunate for the very large Turkish and Kurdish element in the population
there".34 The origin of this scheme goes back to 1915 when Sykes suggested the creation of“Armenian buffer states" as well as an Assyrian entity in Asia Minor. 35 Sykes’ scheme was cir­
culated as a Foreign Office memorandum and was studied by the Eastern Committee of the
British War Cabinet.36 Up until 1919, Britain, like America, was strongly inclined towards theestablishment of a Greater Armenian state, 37 considering it -apart from being a moral duty- as ameans of containing Pan-Tg^iranism, and as a barrier against Bolshevik aggression in the Mid­dle East38 (see map sixteen). America wanted a large Armenian state largely on moral
grounds, that is to protect Armenians from future massacre .39

It accepted, in principle, a

34* A.J. Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No.174037, 25 November 1918, FO371/3407, PRO.
35* British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, Appendix XV, Armenian Buffer States, Note by Lieut. Col. Mark
Sykes, 15 March 1915, CAB27/1, PRO, pp. 114-115.
36* Eastern Committee, No.2525, November 1918, Cab 27/37, PRO.
37* Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia: From Versailles to London, 1919-1920, Vol.II,(London & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 265-266.
38* Eastern Committee, 40th & 43d Minutes (Annex), December 1918, Cab 27/24, PRO.
39* Hovannisian,The Republic of Armenia: From Versailles to London, 1919-1920, Vol.ll, pp.261-264.

120

Map Seventeen: Kurdish Areas
Included In The American Pro­
posed Boundaries Of Armenia In
1919

VanLakeMalatiyaMushLake Urmia

Ottoman- Persian
Frontier
Diyarbekir
MardinJezirahHakari

Mosi

RowandiArbil
Sulaimani;

Nisibii

Kurdish Areas Included
In Armenia

Senna

KirkukKifri

Kermanshah
lanaqin1

mandate for Armenia, and was directly involved in the delimitation of the future Armenian
sta te s (see map seventeen). This British and American thinking converged with that of the
Armenian nationalists, who advocated the establishment of a Greater Armenia from the Cau­
cuses to the Mediterranean^ by incorporating most of Ottoman Kurdistan.
On another level, the Foreign Office and the India Office were thinking of making themost of Assyrian political aspirations through the formation of an Assyrian entity, as suggested
earlier by Sykes, and based on uniting the Bashkala district in Northern Kurdistan with the
Urmia district in Eastern K u r d i s t a n . 42 This would benefit Britain in several ways. As Southern
Kurdistan proved to be an unsuitable place to resettle the Assyrian refugees because of firm
Kurdish resistance, Montagu found the solution in repatriating them to the Urmia district. Apartfrom removing a heavy financial burden, which these refugees created for the Mesopotamian
administration, he hoped that:
the Persian Government might welcome a strong Christian settlement in this area as a bulwark
against Kurdish aggression and that [it] might be prepared to grant a measure of local selfgovernment to the Assyrians in return for some guarantee of military service.43
40* Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East, 1914-1924, pp.265, 353-356, 362.
41* Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia: From Versailles to London, 1919-1920, Vol.II, pp.261-264.
42* Foreign Office Comment on Telegram No.1939,18 October 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
43* Hirtzel, India Office, 20 December 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.

121

Montagu’s proposal received the support of Hubert Young of the Foreign Office. 44 Having
said that, there was a totally different approach to Montagu’s, presented by Maj. Ross, a Politi­
cal Officer. His views on the Kurdish-Assyrian problem were almost identical to those of Noelon the Kurdish-Armenian one, and the two officials deviated from the mainstream of official
thinking. To Ross, the ideal approach to the Assyrian-Kurdish problem was to be based on
the existing realities on the ground, rather than religious considerations. He therefore advoca­
ted the unification of the Kurdish districts of Bashkala and Urmia under Kurdish rule on demo­
graphic, economic, political and geographical grounds. To him, the Christians formed a minor­
ity in these districts, whereas satisfying the aspirations of the Kurdish majority would restore
political stability, as Britain desired .45 But, as preserving Persian territorial integrity was vital to
British strategic interests in India, such unorthodox views found no support among British offi­
cial either in Persia and Mesopotamia or in London. Instead, Britain sought through the treatyof Sevres to unite the above mentioned districts in order to establish an autonomous
Christian entity under Persian sovereignty.

1/- T fie Resolution o f T lie Arm enian Question And *€he fle w g ritis h Position On
Kurdistan's Juture
It did not take long for Britain to come face to face with the realities on the ground. Firstly, theKurds formed the majority of the population in many areas claimed by the Christians. Secondly
and most importantly, the establishment of a Greater Armenian state was not a politically viableoption and was even a dangerous one due to the instability it would inevitably cause in Kurdi­
stan. To overcome the Kurdish obstacle, the Allies would either have to intervene militarily inorder to establish the proposed Armenian state or satisfy some Kurdish political aspirations.
Richard Hovannisian, an Armenian historian, argues that “the so-called Kurdish question” wasinvented by the Ottomans in order to prevent the solution of the Armenian question, andsoon was sponsored by Britain in order to retreat from its promises to the Armenians. 46 By
contrast, evidence shows that Britain became increasingly interested in the Kurdish situation
because it wanted to facilitate the formation of an Armenian national state. Indeed, Britain,
44* Young, Memorandum No. 16443,10 January 1920, F0371/4193, PRO.
45* Maj. Ross, Note on Kurdish Claims to the Urmia District of Persia, Kurdish Bureau, 8/9 July 1919,
AIR20/512, PRO.
46* Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia: From Versailles to London, 1919-1920, Vol.II,
pp.442-447 & The Republic of Armenia: From London to Sevres, February-August 1920, Vol.II I, op. cit.,
pp. 61-71.

122

while being unwilling to commit itself militarily to a Greater Armenia, observed with some appre­
hension continuing Turkish attempts to win the Kurds over by exploiting their growing fears ofAllied-backed Armenian domination. 4 7 The prospect of a united Turkish-Kurdish front would
place the Turks in a strong position to obstruct the implementation of the forthcoming Turkish
peace settlement. To a certain degree, the Turks succeeded in playing on Kurdish fears of
Armenian domination and this was due not to their encouragement of Kurdish nationalistic
feelings, as Hovannisian argues, but to their appeal to the Islamic sentiment of all non-Turkish
Muslims in the wake of the Greek occupation of Smyrna.
The change in British approach to the Kurdish situation was influenced by those Brit­ish officials who provided first-hand information. They highlighted the real st^te of affairs in
Ottoman Kurdistan and the implicit interconnections between the Armenian and Kurdish
questions in any political scheme for the eastern Wilayets. In his tour of some Kurdish areas,
Capt. C. Woolley of the British Military Intelligence reported how the local Kurds were extre­
mely apprehensive about the prospect of facing Armenian domination and Allied retribution.48
Nasir Effendi, a British intelligence agent and himself Christian, warned that the formation of
any Armenian state at the expense of the Kurds would result in an immediate Kurdish upris­
ing .4 9 Most importantly, Noel brought to London’s attention the fact that Kurds formed an
overwhelming majority in many areas claimed by Armenian nationalists. In his opinion:
The chief difficulty of the [Kurdish-ArmenianJ problem lies in the fact that Armenian claims
have gained such a hearing and hold on public opinion in Europe and more especially in Eng­
land and America, that it is now exceedingly difficult to reconcile the practical recognition ofthese claims with inexorable logic of facts. In other words, the alternative to facing the indigna­tion of Lord Bryce and the Cocoa Press is to attempt to govern 10 Kurds with one Armenian.5 0
The signs of change in British attitudes towards the Kurds manifested itself in Britishcontrolled Kurdish areas. It became vital to adopt conciliatory measures on the ground to con­tain the alarming anti-British propaganda activities of the Kemalists and the Ottoman authori­ties among the Kurds.51 In accordance with Noel’s recommendations, which received Lon­don’s approval, Wilson issued a general amnesty to those Kurds who feared retribution for
alleged wartime crimes. In addition, some Kurdish leaders were encouraged to visit the volatile

47* Calthorpe, Constantinople, to Curzon, 30 July 1919, DBFP, pp.704-705.
48* Woolley, the Kurdish National Movement, F0371/4192, PRO, pp.5-6.
49* Nasir Effendi, Notes on the Present Kurdish Situation, 5 August 1919, AIR20/513, PRO.
50* Noel, Note on the Kurdish Situation, July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
51* Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, London (No.5353) 12 May 1919, AIR20/714 & S/S to QCr, Bagh­dad, Priority, 5 June 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.

123

Kurdish areas in order to reassure their population of British good intentions.52

In his recommendations, Noel went further than adopting short term measures. He
urged that to “undo the effects of the recent Turkish pan-lslamic propaganda”, Britain should
give assurances to Kurdish leaders that areas where the Kurdish element was predominant
would not come under Armenian domination. 53 The essence of Noel’s report from Northern
Kurdistan, which he highlighted to official circles in London and the Middle East, was the inter­
connection between the solution of the Kurdish and the Armenian questions. In other words,
meeting the national aspirations of the Kurds was essential for the successful realisation of
the Allies’ principal aim of creating a national Armenian state. In June 1919, Noel reported from
Diyarbekirthat:
here and in the adjacent parts of Kurdistan, Kurdish leaders are feeling very keenly the full
publicity, which is being given in Europe to Armenian national claims while their case is com­paratively a closed book. A restlessness also possesses them because decisions are being
arrived at in Paris which vitally affect their future, while they themselves are idly sitting here.
This all tends to create a natural desire to cause local demonstrations with a view of bringing
the Kurdistan question into the limelight and confronting the peace conference with a fait
accompli.54
By late 1919, the settlement of the Armenian question thus looked increasingly more compli­
cated to the British Government than it had earlier anticipated.
As Britain was interested in devising a solution for the Armenian question, the viewsof Noel in particular prompted a new political debate among various departments within the
Government and British officials in the Middle East, as a result of which Britain began to pay far
more attention to the Kurdish question. Arthur Hirtzel of the India Office recognised that Eur­
opean support for the creation of an independent Armenian state contradicted -as actual facts
showed- the very principle of national self-determination on which it based its argument.
Ignoring the Kurdish right to self-determination for the sake of Armenia, in his eyes, would jus­tify any Kurdish resistance to future Armenian domination. 5 5 Montagu, the Secretary of State
for India, acknowledged that “ the ultimate solution of the Kurdish problem must depend on avariety of factors, some of which” [such as the question of the extent and character of the pro­
posed Armenian state] “are still indeterminate" .56 Hirtzel further elaborated the position of the
India Office on the Kurdish-Armenian problem. He did not, however, consider the formation of
52* Calthorpe, Constantinople, to Political, Baghdad, 1 May 1919 & Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India,(No.5353) 12 May 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
53* Noel, Constantinople, to Political, Baghdad, 10 July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
54* Fivecav, Cairo, to Political. Baghdad , 14 June 1919, AIR20/512, PRO.
55* Hirtzel, Note, 7 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
56* Shuckburgh, India Office, 1 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.

124

Kurdish and Armenian states to be an ideal option and, instead, advocated a solution basedon the British experience in India, i.e. adopting the lines of the Morley-Minto treatment ofIndian Muslims. In other words, the Armenians would receive, like the Indian Muslims, a mea­
sure of political influence that was greater than that their number.57
Compared with Hirtzel’s, Noel’s solution of the Kurdish and Armenian questionswas
based on equal British acknowledgement of both Kurdish and Armenian nationalist aspira­tions. As it was very problematic to define the limits of Kurdistan and Armenia, owing to “ thedispersion of the populations” and "the ravaged state of the country”, the geographical rela­tionship between the two countries should be determined by the two sides after restoring
normality.58 Noel’s views received support from several British officials in the Middle East.
Rear-Adm. Richard Webb -who rejected Wilson’s scheme for re-establishing Turkish authority
over the non-Turkish Wilayets under some European supervision- backed Noel’s solution,
viewing it as "the only way out of difficulty”.5 9 Col. French of the Egyptian Expeditionary
Force, also endorsed Noel’s scheme for reflecting the ethnographical and political realities on
the ground. Accordingly, he asked London to recognise Kurdish nationality and to do its
utmost to avert a decision at the peace conference that would give Armenians unrestricted
domination over areas where Kurds were predominant.6 0111- The Term s O /T lie Sevres tr e a ty On *Che Juture O f Kurdistan And Arm enia
Examination of British attitudes at the peace conference leading up to the formulation of the
Sevres terms reveals that they were characterised by unequal support for Kurdish and Arm­enian nationalist aspirations. In terms of freedom from Turkish control, Kurdish interests wereinferior to Armenian ones. This can partly be attributed to the sympathetic reaction of theChristian Powers to what they perceived to be the Armenian genocide under Ottoman rule,and to the fact that the Armenians fought on the Allied side against Turkey. The Armenians
would enjoy the establishment of their independent state straight off, whereas the Northern
Kurds would enjoy an ambiguous local autonomy, pending the proposed Allied commission’s
final decision one year later. Moreover, in terms of the geographical size of their future enti­
ties, the Armenian state would include almost half of Northern Kurdistan, whereas the Kurdish
57* Hirtzel, Note, 7 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
58* Noel, Note on the Kurdish Question, 18 July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
59* Webb, Constantinople, Very Urgent, 19 August 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
60* French, Egy.Ex.Force, Cairo, 2 October, F0371/4192, PRO.
125

areas amounted to less than 20% of Ottoman Kurdistan’s actual size.
The need for positive British attitudes towards Kurdish nationalist aspirations can also
toe attributed to independent developments, most notably the Kurdish-Armenian agreementof December 1919. The agreement was the culmination of Kurdish leaders’ efforts to improve
Kurdish-Ohristian relations. They hoped to erase the long-held negative image of the Kurds in
the Christian world and obtain more sympathetic European attitudes towards Kurdish national
aspirations. Most importantly, they sought to prevent Turkish nationalists from using religion
as an instrument of mobilising the Kurds against the Allies and local Christians. From Constan­tinople, Noel reported that the heads of the Christian communities of Diyarbekir acknow­
ledged Kurdish leaders’ statements that they sought friendly relations with them. Kurdish
nationalist circles in Constantinople also sought to get in touch with Said Taha and Simko, witha view to establishing the same friendly Kurdish-Christian relations in Eastern Kurdistan, espe­
cially in Urmia.6i In Cairo, the Kurdish Committee expressed the desire of the Kurds to live inharmony with those Armenians who might live in an independent Kurdistan, and also their will­
ingness to give them a share in the future government in proportion to their numbers. 6 2 As forthe complicated issue of Kurdish and Armenian atrocities during the war, Kurdish nationalists
welcomed a proposal at the peace conference to investigate both Kurdish and Armenian
claims. Once Turkish rule was removed, Kurdish nationalists believed, peaceful coexistence
could be easily achieved between the Kurds and Armenians. To cement such coexistence,
they suggested the idea of a government according to the wishes of the majority in the nonTurkish Wilayets.M
The most important development in bilateral Kurdish-Armenian relations was theattempts of Kurdish nationalists to reach a political agreement with their Armenian counter­parts on their conflicting territorial claims. They hoped to demonstrate to the Allies that the twonationalities could help solve their common problems and that they were not an impediment
to re-shaping the future of the non-Turkish Wilayets. In December 1919, Kurdish and Arm­enian nationalists presented a memorandum to the peace conference, signed by Boghos
Nubar for Ottoman Armenia, Ohandjanian for the Armeniah Republic and Cherif Pasha for theKurds. While emphasising the “identical interests and aspirations” of Kurdish and Armenian
nations, the two parties demanded freedom from Turkey and asked the Allies for united and
61* Noel, Constantinople, to Political, Baghdad, 10 July 1919, F0371/4192, PRO.
62* Policy, Cairo, to General, Baghdad, 6 August 1919, AIR20/714, PRO.
63* Woolley, the Kurdish National Movement, F0371/4192, PRO, p.6.

126

independent states for Armenia and Kurdistan under one mandatory power. Both sides
agreed that they would respept the conference’s decision on the delimitation of the KurdishArmenian frontier, while respecting the rights of minorities within the would-be states.64The
wording of the agreement suggests that there was a mutual Kurdish-Armenian desire to pre­vent Turkish nationalists from using religious differences as an instrument of hindering theimplementation of a new Turkish peace settlement, and also of securing strong Allied support
for Kurdish and Armenian political aspirations.

iv- g ritis h Reaction To T he Kurdish-Arm enian Agreem ent
The most important aspect of the Kurdish-Armenian agreement was the Allies’ reaction, espe­
cially that of Britain. Unlike France, Britain was initially in favour of any improvement in KurdishArmenian relations in the non-Turkish Wilayets. Indeed, Lord Curzon had earlier instructed
British officials on the ground to encourage Kurdish-Armenian rapprochement.65 This would
make it much easier for Britain to settle the future of the non-Turkish Wilayets. Having said
that, Britain was not in favour of a Kurdish-Armenian agreement that had political and territorial
dimensions. In other words, Britain did not want to lose its control over the re-shaping processof the new political map of the region. Indeed, the Kurdish-Armenian agreement had farreaching implications for British political and strategic interests, not only in Armenia and Kurdi­
stan but also in the Middle East as a whole. Firstly, the implementation of the agreement
would have meant that the representatives of the new nations, not the Powers, determined
the political geography of an independent Kurdistan and Armenia according to the principle ofethnic distribution and, most importantly, self-determination. By contrast, Britain sought toestablish strong strategic buffer states in Armenia and the remainder of Turkey against Bol­shevik Russia. In addition, the implementation of the agreement would encourage Eastern
Kurdistan to join an independent Kurdistan. This prospect meant the weakening of Persian
territorial unity, which was the cornerstone of the British policy to pre-empt any expansion of
Bolshevik influence southwards towards the Indian frontier, Mesopotamia and the Persian
Gulf. Secondly, the application of the agreement would probably put an end to British control
over Southern Kurdistan as a result of its re-unification with the remainder of Kurdistan. The
growing strategic and economic value of this part of Kurdistan to British influence in Mesopo-

64* Political, to De Robeck, Constantinople, 10 December 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
65* Ibid.

127

tamia made it necessary that Britain should keep the area under its control. Thirdly, the agree­
ment would set an example tor other new nationalities, who might demand a similar treatment
from the Allies. Indeed, to pressurise the Allies, the Sharifians organised a Fertile Crescentwide political campaign to mobilise the local Arabs in Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan and Arab
Mesopotamia for the establishment of a united Arab state under Sharif Hussein. Finally,
France would oppose any territorial re-arrangements of the Ottoman Empire that overlooked
its political and economic interests. France particularly demanded territorial and economic
compensations for the loss of its share in the Mosul Wilayet and was in no way willing toemerge empty-handed from the Turkish peace settlement.
For all the foregoing reasons, Britain did not support the Kurdish-Armenian agree­
ment. As soon as its terms became known, the Foreign Office and other British authorities
shed doubts on the importance of the agreement, arguing that Cherif Pasha was “a selfappointed representative” with no authority to voice Kurdish opinion.66 in addition to Wilson,
De Robeck -who had earlier voiced appreciation of the agreement as having a potentially greatvalue-67 told Curzon that the agreement did not bring together the interests of the populationof the eastern Wilayets.68 For him, Cherif Pasha represented no one but himself. 69 Before theArmenians, Britain made the issue of Cherif Pasha’s legitimacy as the spokesman of the Kurds
the reason why it did not support the terms of the Kurdish-Armenian agreement. Ironically,
British records show that all principal Kurdish nationalist circles recognised both Cherif Pasha
as their representative and the agreement he made with the Armenians. Qadir, who suppor­
ted the agreement, told De Robeck that Cherif Pasha was the only representative for theKurds .70 The deputation of the Kurdish Club told Admiral Webb, who himself questioned

Cherif Pasha’s representative capacity, that he had been representing “the Kurds in Paris fornine or ten months and that no attempt had been made to disavow him by any section of theKurdish nation at home" .71
Winning the support of the powers, especially Britain, was vital to the successful appli­
cation of the agreement. Hubert Young acknowledged that the application of the agreement
terms required foreign interference in order to get the Turks out of Kurdish and Armenian
66* Ibid.
67* De Robeck to Curzon, Confidential, 9 December 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
68* High Commissioner, Constantinople, to Curzon, 8 January 1920, F0371/4193, PRO.
69. High Commissioner, Constantinople, 15 March 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.
70* De Robeck, Constantinople, 11 December 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
71* De Robeck, Constantinople, 3 February 1920, FO371/5067, PRO.

128

areas, and that financial support from thd Allies was also required to realise its terms. 7 2 Britain’s
rejection of the agreement, despite Kurdish appeals for effective British intervention in thematter, meant that it became merely a scrap of paper. But, it can be argued that had Britain
supported the implementation of the Kurdish-Armenian agreement, and made it a basis forthe settlement of the non-Turkish Wilayets at the peace conference, the Armenians and theKurds would have established their own national state and relied on a united front to defeat
any potential attack by the Kemalists. Unfortunately for both the Kurds and the Armenians,
Britain and the Allies did not have the slightest intention of applying the idea of selfdetermination, as their strategic and economic interests conflicted with Kurdish and Armenian
nationalist aspirations.

The Sharifian-Mesopotamian Factor And The British Policy Towards Southern
Kurdistan, 1918-1920
i- B ritish Occupation And <Zhe SJssue O f Defining Southern KurdistanJAesopotamia Relations
As in the Armenian case, the issues of geographically defining Ottoman Kurdistan and politic­
ally determining its future were interconnected with that of Mesopotamia. The awareness of
British officials in London and the Middle East of the interconnection between Mesopotamia’s
future and the Kurdish question was a result of continuous Sharifian claims to significant partsof Kurdistan as part of a future Arab state. The Sharifians justified their territorial demands byarguing that the claimed Kurdish areas were geographically, administratively and historicallypart of Mesopotamia, and therefore, demanded Britain recognised them as being Arab. By
contrast, Kurdish nationalists, while rejecting any political or cultural association between Kur­
distan and Arab lands, paid no serious attention to the Sharifians, probably because they
thought the latter were an insignificant factor. Perhaps the best way to understand whether
the Sharifian claims were legitimate is through examining the economic, cultural and politicalcharacteristics of the three Wilayets'. Mosul, Baghdad and Basra.
As an ancient Greek term, ‘Mesopotamia’ literally means the land between the Rivers
Euphrates and the Tigris, and was arbitrarily used by European orientalists, travellers anddiplomats, when referring to Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. Administratively speaking, the Otto­mans did not use the term Mesopotamia -or any other term- to collectively describe thesethree Wilayets. Indeed, while considering Mosul and Southern Kurdistan as a province within
72* Young, Foreign Office Minute No. 156272,29 November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.

129

“ Turkey propet', the Turks viewed Baghdad and Basra as mere provinces of their Empire. 7 3 In
1915, the India Office excluded Ottoman Kurdistan from the term ‘Mesopotamia’ because it
possessed special ethnic and geographical characteristics, and defined the Hamrin moun­tains and Jabal Sinjar as its southern and western boundaries respectively. 7 4 Having said that,after their occupation of these three Ottoman Wilayets, the British found the term
‘Mesopotamia’ to be, in practice, too ambiguous. They found it particularly difficult to agree on
identifying Mesopotamia’s geographical limits, especially in the north and the north-west, as
well as its political and cultural identity. For instance, the Naval Staff Intelligence Department
produced a handbook on Mesopotamia’s geopolitical, economic, cultural and administrative
characteristics. It gave a very broad definition of the term ‘Mesopotamia’, which included thecentral, western and southern parts of Ottoman Kurdistan.7 5 it also defined the term ‘Iraq’ as
including the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets.76 Arthur Balfour defined Mesopotamia as"essentially the region watered by the Tigris and the Euphrates".77 Such a definition, placing
most of Ottoman Kurdistan within Mesopotamia, was not adopted by Britain because it
entailed extra military and political commitments far beyond its capabilities. Eventually, the solecriterion -according to which the British defined Mesopotamia- was the limits of British strategicand economic interests. In other words, to justify Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Arab
Iraq in 1923, the British extended the geographical and political limits of Mesopotamia in anarbitrary manner and contrary to the existing economic, political and social realities in theseWilayets. The Americans, who initially sought to put forward their recommendations regarding
the future of the non-Turkish Wilayets, excluded all Kurdish areas from the term

73* Garbett of the India Office drew the attention to the fact that distinction between the three Wilayets
existed in the Ottoman law relating to land tenure. IDCM, Minute No.37, Secret, 13 April 1920, FO
371/5068, PRO.
74* British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, Appendix VI, the Future of Settlement of Eastern Turkey in
Asia and in Arabia, Note by the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, 14 March 1915, CAB27/1,
PRO, pp.83 & 86.
75* Naval Staff Intelligence Department, A Handbook of Mesopotamia, No.1, London, November 1918,
pp. 9-30.
76* Ibid, pp.87-100.
77* Memorandum on Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia: Reflections of Foreign Secretary Arthur James
Balfour, DBFP, vol.I, pp.340-349.

130

‘Mesopotamia’.78 On the other hand, to the Ottomans79 and the Kurds the term ‘Iraq’ or ‘Arab
Iraq’ meant Mesopotamia, where the Arabs lived. Following its formation in 1920-1921, theArab Government and British qfficials on the ground extended the new political term ‘Iraq’ toinclude Southern Kurdistan, so it is worth noting that the final physical shape of the new Iraqi
state, as it is at present, remained undecided until 1926, when Iraq and Turkey signed a boun­dary agreement that finally placed Southern Kurdistan within Iraq by defining its northern bor­
ders.
Examination of the issue of political and geographical definition of Mesopotamia or
the relations between the Baghdad, Basra and Mosul Wilayets is relevant to any understand­ing of the evolution of the British position on Southern Kurdistan’s future. Under the Otto­mans, the three Wilayets of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, were distinct in terms of their ethnic
and religious composition as well as their political, economic and cultural orientations. Fromthe economic viewpoint, Southern Kurdistan had close relations with the heartland of the
Ottoman Empire, Syria, Eastern Kurdistan and even Persian Azerbijan.si According to the
Handbook of Mesopotamia, Mosul was "the chief collecting and distributing centre for thecommerce with central Kurdistan" where raw goods were imported.8 2 Baghdad and the Shi'iholy towns of Karbala and Najaf had close economic relations with Persia. In contrast to theabove areas, Basra had strong commercial relations, not with the neighbouring areas, but with
India and overseas. The economic diversity of the three Wilayets was further accentuated by
the use of Turkish, Persian and Indian coinage concurrently. Moreover, the Mosul Wilayet had
a different valuation of Turkish currency from either Baghdad or Basra The weights and mea­sures standards varied from one Wilayet to another. 83 From the sectarian viewpoint, the popu­
lation of the Mosul Wilayet were Sunni Muslims84 and that of Basra were mostly Shi'i. The
78* See for example (1) the recommendations of the American delegation at the peace conference,
D.H. Miller My Diary at the Paris Peace Conference, 1918-1919, Vol.Ill, (New York: 1928) & (2) the KingCrane Commission’s report on Mesopotamia, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relatbns of the UnitedStates: Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Vol.IV, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1948),
pp.800-802. Having said that, the American wanted the surrounding Kurdish areas to be part of the Brit­ish mandate over Mesopotamia on the grounds of irrigation and agriculture.
79* See for instance the Ottoman memorandum to the supreme council of the Paris peace conference,
D.H. Miller, 16:479-84, op. cit.
80* Iraq replaced Mesopotamia as a term in the official British correspondence in the period 1921-1922.
81* Naval Staff Intelligence Department, A Handbook of Mesopotamia.. op. cit. p.93.
82* Ibid.
83* Ibid, p. 143.
84* Sunni Kurds were different from their Arab counterparts in terms of their religious practices and Sufist rituals.

Baghdad Wilayet had a mixed population in which the | Shi'is; formed the majority. In terms ofcultural orientation, the Sunni population was under Turkish influence, whereas the Shi'i
population was influenced by Persian values and traditions. By contrast, the distinctive geo­
graphical features of the Kurdish areas made the Kurds less susceptible to Turkish or Persian
culture. In terms of administrative arrangements, Constantinople conducted the affairs ofthese Wilayets separately through Walis [Governors], who were appointed by the Sultan as
his political representatives.
Perhaps the political inclinations of the local elites are the most important criterion inattempting to unfold the real relations between the three Wilayets. The Kurdish nationalist
movement never had any link with its Arab counterpart and, historically, it emerged both inde­
pendently and earlier. The Southern Kurds had totally different political aspirations from thoseof the Arabs in that they desired Kurdish independence. Among the Arabs, the Sunnis had
different political aspirations from the| Shi'is . The former began to embrace Arab nationalism
during the war, whereas the latter remained far more inclined towards religion. This may
explain why many| Shi'is refused to become Ottoman subjects and, later, Iraqi subjects after
the establishment of the Iraqi state in 1920-1921. The tiny Turkoman minority, which was also
divided into Sunni and Shi'i sections, linked its interests with Turkish rule, under which they
formed a privileged grouping. The Christian and Jewish communities were in favour of a formof European protection to end Ottoman-Muslim maltreatment. In other words, Mesopotamia
lacked a united political, cultural and economic centre which could form a basis for a Mesopo­
tamia-wide nationalist movement, let alone a national state.
The issue of defining various relations between the areas where the Kurds lived andthe areas where the Arabs lived is politically significant as British records of the period 19161923 show. In the period 1916-1920, for instance, official circles in London generally used
the term Mesopotamia to mean the areas where the Arabs lived, from which Southern Kurdi­
stan was excluded. This definition had a clear political implication, in that the future of South­
ern Kurdistan was considered to be unconnected with that of Arab Mesopotamia, and there­
fore, would be determined independently. Meanwhile, by resorting to various economic, stra­tegic and political arguments, British officials on the ground such as Wilson and Cox, kept
seeking London’s approval for extending the term ‘Mesopotamia-lraq’ to include Southern
Kurdistan. At the 1921 Cairo conference, for example, Cox insisted that Southern Kurdistan132was an integral part of Iraq. 85 The political implication of this was also clear, namely that the
future of Southern Kurdistan was inseparable from that of Mesopotamia. After the impositionof the British mandate, especially in the period 1920-1923, British officials on the groundwere able to impose their definition of Mesopotamia by extending it to include Southern Kur­
distan. The main reason for this was the occupation policies of the British authorities that
focused on making the three Wilayets politically and economically as homogeneous as pos­sible.

ii-

P o s t-w a r S h arifians* A tte m p ts 'to 'tra n s la te 'th e ir Claims Snto R e a lity

To legitimise their claim to Southern Kurdistan and other Kurdish areas in the period 19141920, the Sharifians argued that the Wilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra were, and should
remain, part of one political and historical unit. Apart from the revival of Kurdish nationalism in
Kurdistan itself, the continuing Sharifian claims to Southern Kurdistan helped to highlight its
fate, especially in relation to the future of Mesopotamia. Moreover, the Sharifian movement fora greater Arab state was one of the factors that steadily influenced the shaping of British policy
from 1918. Immediately after the end of the war, Allenby, the commander of the Egyptian
Expeditionary Force, allowed Faisal, Sharif Hussein’s son, to set up a provisional Arab govern­
ment in Damascus, while awaiting the peace conference’s final decision on the future of nonTurkish Wilayets. Whereas the objective of the British in initiating this step was -apart frombeing in line with British promises to Sharif Hussein- to preempt French attempts to establish
their own sphere of influence, Feisal sought to expand Sharifian rule as much as possible inthe direction of Arab and non-Arab areas, the Fertile Crescent and Western and Southern
Kurdistan. Despite the continuing efforts of Feisal and Sharif Hussein, neither London nor
the British authorities in Baghdad wanted any Sharifian interference in Kurdish affairs, especi­
ally those of Southern Kurdistan. Sharif Hussein, who was accordingly informed of the British
decision, promised in his statement to Mark Sykes not to concern himself with British plans forSouthern Kurdistan’s future.86
Despite his undertaking, Sharif Hussein and his followers were determined to realise
their claims on many Kurdish areas. For this purpose they continually worked to influence theAllies’ views on Kurdistan’s future both inside and outside of the Paris peace conference. In
85* Report on Middle East Conference Held in Cairo and Jerusalem, 12-30 March 1921, F0371/6343,
PRO.
86* Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No.174037, 22 November 1918, FO 371/3407, PRO.

133

January 1919, Amir Faisal stated in his appeal to the Allies that the northern limits of the Arabcountry was the Alexandretta-Persia line, in accordance with the content of his father’s war­time correspondence with the British.87 This meant that the proposed Arab state would
include both Southern and Western Kurdistan. Immediately after being installed as ruler of
Syria, Feisal asked the peace conference for the inclusion of the same Kurdish area into his
country. At the same time as appealing to the peace conference, the Sharifians employed dif­ferent tactics, such as reaching a bilateral arrangement with Britain, which would include
Southern and Western Kurdistan in a British-sponsored Arab state. Between 1918 and early
1919, Feisal, who was then the ruler of Syria, constantly attempted to persuade Britain to con­clude a bilateral agreement, with a view to settling the political future of the three Wilayets of
Baghdad, Basra and Mosul before the peace conference could make its decision. In otherwords, while using the peace conference as a means of obtaining Allied support for Arab terri­torial claims, Feisal also sought to achieve them through a bilateral agreement with Britain, andpresent this to the conference as a fait accompli. In his efforts to establish as large an Arabstate as possible, Feisal went so far as to play off Britain against France and vice versa. In April
1921, the French told the British that Feisal sought their assistance to drive them out of the
Mosul Wilayet,88 at the same time as he incited the British to contain French influence in theregion.
The other method the Sharifians used to achieve their territorial objectives in Ottoman
Kurdistan was to engage in secret activities among the Kurds. Their intention was to create an
unbridgeable gap between the Kurds and British officials on the ground. By this, they hoped
to forestall the emergence of an independent Kurdish state under British protection. The
establishment of the first Kurdish Government in Sulaimaniya seemed to be the catalyst for
Sharifian activities in Kurdistan. As soon as the First World War ended, Sharif Hussein sent his
emissaries to different parts of Kurdistan, hoping to turn the Kurds against Britain by playing
on their religious sentiments. His secret activities in Kurdistan were confirmed by Leachman,
who referred to Sharif Hussein’s growing interest in Kurdish matters under his jurisdiction89
and by Noel, who informed Baghdad of the activities of Sharifian agents among the Northern
Kurds, with a view to turning them against Britain.9 0 The interferences of Sharif Hussein and
87* Amir Faisal’s Memorandum to the Supreme Council at the Paris Peace Conference, 1 January. Mill­er, My Diary, Vol. IV, 297-9.
88* Lawrence to Colonial Office, 13 April 1921, C0730/18, PRO.
89* Memorandum from SSO, Mosul, to GHQ, 26 April 1919, AIR 20/512, PRO.
90* Political, Baghdad, to Egypt Force, Cairo, 29 April 1919, AIR 20/512, PRO.
134

Feisal in Kurdish affairs extended to Eastern Kurdistan, where the British Consul in Urmia
reported the arrival of “ emissaries from Damascus" in the Urmia district, with a view to stirring
up local Kurds against Britain. The secret activities of Hussein and Feisal culminated in theestablishment of covert contacts with the Young Turks, their former bitter enemy.
Sharif Hussein and Feisal were also behind the political programme of a Sunni Meso­
potamian clique, who advocated the establishment of Sharifian rule in Mesopotamia. Throughthe Syrian Congress and the Aleppo Committee, these Sunnis put forwards demands for theestablishment of an Arab state in Mesopotamia, which would include not only Southern Kurdi­
stan but also the Kurdish Wilayet of Diyarbekir.91 They were also engaged in concerted politi­
cal and propaganda activities aiming at convincing both the British and the Southern Kurds ofthe viability of the Sharifian solution. In his conversation with Hubert Young, Nuri al-Sa'id, aSunni figure and a future Prime Minister of Iraq, tried to convince his counterpart that:
not only the people of Mosul and Baghdad, but also the Kurds of Southern Kurdistan were
anxious for Abdullah [Hussein’s eldest son] to be their Amir, provided that the British did notwithdraw their advice and assistance.
In return for bringing Southern Kurdistan under Arab rule, he expressed the willingness of the“Baghdadis” in Damascus, who were Sunni followers of Feisal, to keep the Basra Wilayet
under "a special administration and special British occupation" .92 In other words, Nuri al-Said
was willing to leave an overwhelmingly Arab Wilayet under direct British control in exchange
for placing Southern Kurdistan under Arab rule. While in London, Nuri al-Sa'id became quite
aware of Britain’s growing dilemma of maintaining its influence without making any additional
military and financial commitments. He seized the opportunity to put forward his own solution
before the Inter-Departmental Conference of Middle Eastern Affairs (IDCM). It included South­
ern Kurdistan’s inclusion into Mesopotamia under a Sharifian ruler as a means of ending all
British “troubles”. He tried to convince those present that the Southern Kurds would be“quite willing” to come under the rule of Sharif Abdullah, Feisal’s older brother, if Britain
installed him as the head of an Arab government in Baghdad. 9 3 The Sharifians enjoyed the
support of two British officials: Gertrude Bell and T.E. Lawrence, who were two strong advo­
cates of a Sharifian solution for Mesopotamia. The only noticeable difference between the

91 * The American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey, the King-Crane
Report, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States, pp.780 & 782.
92* Young, Foreign Office Minute No. E2571,3 April 1920, FO 371/5068, PRO. Curzon read the Minuteand approved of its inclusion in the agenda of IDCM.
93* IDCM, Minute 37,13 April 1920, FO 371/5068, PRO.

135

two officials was that Lawrence recognised the distinction between the Mosul Wilayet, which
was mainly Kurdish, and the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets, which were mainly Arab. He, unlike
Bell, who advocated a united Mesopotamia under a Sharifian ruler,94 called for the formation of
two separate Sharifian states in Mesopotamia, one of which would be a mixed Arab-Kurdish
state.9 5
On another level, the Sunni Mesopotamians, who must have been alarmed by theprospect of the establishment of a Kurdish state by the forthcoming peace conference,attempted to dissuade the Southern Kurdish delegation of Sulaimaniya from going to Paris.
Ja’afer Pasha and Naji Bey, the advocates of a united Mesopotamia under Sharifian rule, told
the Kurdish delegation that:
Kurdish independence would not go down at all in Paris and that in view of the proximity of
Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk to Baghdad and Mosul, the Kurds had far better throw in their lot with
the Mesopotamian Arabs, who would certainly gain their independence very shortly#*
Having failed to persuade Britain to establish a united Syrian-Mesopotamian state under Fei­sal, these Sunni officers declared Abdullah as king of Mesopotamia in March 1920, hoping toagitate the Arab Mesopotamians against the British administration. Generally speaking, thepolitical and propaganda efforts of the Sharifians and their Sunni followers in Baghdad failed
to convert London to the Sharifian solution for the Wilayets of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul
within the framework of the Turkish peace settlement. This could be attributed to three impor­tant factors. Firstly, the India Office and the Foreign Office believed that Southern Kurdistan
was too important both in strategic and economic terms to the British presence in Mesopota­
mia and Persia to be abandoned either to the French or the Sharifians. Secondly, Col. Wilson,
who was responsible for the Mesopotamian policy on the ground, firmly opposed any plan for
Arab or Kurdish self-government. Thirdly, there was no popular support for the Sharifiancause among the Mesopotamian Arabs, let alone the Southern Kurds. But, the 1920 rising in
Mesopotamia -which costed Britain huge losses in men and money- proved that direct British
rule was a failure. One of its direct consequences was to bring the Sharifian solution to thefore as an ideal option to end existing British political, financial and military troubles in Mesopo­
tamia. Britain’s decision to establish an Arab government in Baghdad and its search foranother kingdom for Feisal, whom the French expelled from Syria, enabled the Sharifians tobecame an increasingly important factor in influencing British policy towards Southern Kurdi94* Policy in Arabia, 20 November 1918, L.O.L/P. S/18/B297.
95* India Office, Political Department, Note on Kurdistan, 14 December 1918, FO 371/3386, PRO.
96* GSI, Mesopotamia, GHQ,17 May 1919, AIR 20/512, PRO.

136

stan in the following years. As soon as the British installed him king of Arab Iraq in 1921, Feisaland his Sunni entourage resolutely resumed their campaign for a united Iraq including South­
ern Kurdistan.

C onclusion
Three main conclusions can be derived from examining British Kurdish policy in light of thedevelopment of the Kurdish nationalist movement, the Armenian question and the SharifianMesopotamian factor. Firstly, despite the unquestioned supremacy of its own strategic, eco­nomic and political interests, Britain’s Kurdish policy at the peace conference was to someextent conditioned by its attitudes towards the nationalist aspirations of the Kurds, Armenians
and Sharifians. In other words, one cannot separate the evolution of British policy towards
Kurdistan from its regional context. The search for a viable solution for the Armenian question,
the impossibility of overlooking Kurdish nationalism as a sizable political force and the Shari­fians’ territorial aspirations all put Kurdistan’s political future into the limelight. All these factors
played an important part in elevating the Kurdish question to an international level, by releas­
ing it from its old local and narrow framework and then building it into the Turkish peace settle­
ment. Secondly, Britain unequally evaluated the territorial claims and political aspirations ofthese new nationalities according to its own strategic, economic and political calculations and,to some degree, its religious-moral concerns. Indeed, when the First World War ended, Britain
was only thinking of solving the Armenian question, which received enormous public support
in reaction to the Armenian massacres at the hands of the Ottoman authorities. In comparison
with the Armenian question, the Kurdish one received no British attention either officially or
unofficially.
The course of subsequent events in Kurdistan raised British policy makers’ aware­ness that the solution of the new nationality question within the former Ottoman Empire was
far more complicated than they had anticipated before-hand in terms of the strength of local
nationalist movements, the existence of conflicting territorial claims and political aspirations aswell as the demographic distribution of different ethnic communities. Thus, it became clearthat the solution of one question could not be achieved in isolation of the other. For instance,
Britain’s Armenian policy affected its policy towards Northern Kurdistan and vice versa,
whereas Britain’s Sharifian-Mesopotamian policy particularly affected British attitudes towards

137Southern Kurdistan. The terms of the 1920 Servres treaty reflected all these interconnectedissues, as will be examined in the next chapter. Finally, unlike the Sharifian-Mesopotamia fac­
tor, which had limited effects on British policy towards Southern Kurdistan in the period 19181920, the Armenian factor had considerable influence on British Kurdish policy at the peace
conference, and thus, indirectly helped elevate the Kurdish question to a unprecedented
international level. However, in the following period, 1921-1923, the effects of the Armenian
question on British Kurdish policy evaporated, whereas the Sharifian-Mesopotamian factor
became increasingly important in this period, which witnessed the establishment of the Iraqi
state and then the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into it.

138

When the final session of the Paris peace conference ended on 21 January 1920, the futureof the Ottoman Empire still remained unresolved because the Allies concentrated their diplo­
matic efforts largely on the European settlement and disagreed with each over the new Mid­dle Eastern order. The Allies only agreed to the imposition of the mandate system as the poli­tical means by which they would achieve their strategic and economic interests in the Middle
East. However they could not settle important aspects of the mandate system such as thedesignation of the actual mandatories and the delimitation of the boundaries for the mandated
territories.i This chapter discusses the strategic and economic factors that influenced the deli­mitation of Britain’s direct and indirect interests in Kurdistan in relation to the boundaries of its
Mesopotamian mandate, as well as the position of the Foreign, India and War Offices on thesettlement of the Kurdish question as a whole.
The contradiction in British and French interests during the Allied discussion of var­ious European and Middle Eastern issues in Paris produced acrimony rather than accord. In
the meantime, the Allies consigned the entire question of the Middle East’s future to further
consultation between the interested parties. Accordingly, the San Remo conference of April
1920 was held amidst disagreement over such issues as the future of Constantinople, theStraits, Kurdistan, Greater Syria and Armenia. This chapter places its focus on the effects of
the imperial rivalry between Britain and France on the Kurdish question that resulted in thepartition of Kurdistan. It also interprets the terms of the Sevres treaty (August 1920) from a
regional perspective, by shedding light on new factors that came into play in the post-war Mid­dle East, such as the threat of Bolshevism and the rise of nationalism in Turkey and Persia.

Kurdistan’s Geopolitical And Economic Value And The Limits Of British Dir­
ect And Indirect Interest
Being a mountainous region, situated between the Ottoman Empire, Czarist Russia and Qajar
Persia, Kurdistan enjoyed distinct geopolitical importance. In other words, Kurdish areas
could be used both as natural strategic buffers to defend the heartland of Turkey and Persia
and as bridges through which they could extend their territorial control to other areas. The

1* Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World, p. 2.

139

Turkish-Persian conflicts in the Seventeenth, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries illustrate
how holding Kurdistan was crucial to the maintenance of the security of the Ottoman Empire
and the Persian Kingdom. The apparently tolerant attitudes by Constantinople and Tehran
towards the existence of autonomous Kurdish Emirates within their respective parts of Kurdi­
stan largely reflected their desire to consolidate the security of their frontiers, and simultan­
eously, extend their rule to other Kurdish areas outside their control. To Russia, as the India
Office observed in March 1915, Kurdistan was "the only pass” through which it could reachthe Mediterranean Sea. To any Power that was in control of the Mesopotamian plains, Kurdi­
stan would be "a standing menace” if it came under the influence of another hostile Power.2
Kurdistan’s strategic importance was accentuated by the unstable political conditions result­ing from the First World War: the rise of local nationalism, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire,the decay of the Qajar Kingdom, British-French rivalry for direct and indirect spheres of influ­
ence and the growing threat of Bolshevism. As soon the war ended, various attempts weremade by the French, Arabs, Turks, Armenians and Persians to acquire as much strategic
Kurdish territory as possible.The British did not lose sight of the fact that the peculiarity of Kur­
distan lay in its geopolitical position:
The Kurdish question was of great interest to HMG and was the object of close study. We wereinterested in it, in the present, because the Kurds were an important element on both sides ofour military frontier north of Baghdad, and one of the most important, if not the most important,just beyond the territories occupied by us.. We should have a permanent interest in the Kurds
in the future also because whatever else happened, we had a future in Mesopotamia.3
Britain became particularly interested in the fate of Southern Kurdistan, perceiving it
as being as strategically important to Mesopotamia as the North-West Frontier Province was to
the Indian Empire. In addition, Southern Kurdistan contained potential oil sources vital for the
British navy. Following its capture of Mosul, Britain focused its early diplomatic efforts on mod­ifying the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement by transforming the ensuing de facto British
control over the region into a permanent one. By virtue of its military control over the Mosul
Wilayet, and France’s need for its support against Germany in Europe, Britain was in a verystrong position to press France to agree to a boundary revision of the terms of the SykesPicot agreement. On 1 December 1918, Lloyd George persuaded George Clemenceau, the2* British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, Appendix VI, The Future of Settlement of Eastern Turkey in Asia
and Arabia, Note by the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, 14 March, CAB27/1,
PRO, p.86.
3* De Robeck to Curzon, Confidential, 20 December 1919, Enclosure No.1, Ryan, Memorandum, 27
November 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.

140

French Premier, to give up France’s territorial share in the Mosul Wilayet in exchange for oil.
This oral agreement was built into the 1919 Long-Berenger agreement that gave France 50%
share in the TPC. However, Lloyd George annulled this agreement because of his disagree­
ment with the French over the size of Syria. Now he wanted -as Lord Curzon had advocatedfrom the start- the territorial delimitation of French and British spheres by the peace confer­ence and the placing of the Mosul Wilayet under a British mandate, before discussing oil mat­ters. Eventually, the Long-Berenger agreement was modified and, consequently, France
obtained a 25% share in TPC.4
Apart from its strategic importance and the potential oil and other mineral wealth, Kur­
distan had the water-heads of two important rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates. These rivers
were vital fpr the revival of agriculture in Mesopotamia. Realising such a project was one of themain reasons why the India Office and the Government of India supported the idea of coloniz­ing the country during the war. The importance of water also partly explains why Balfour was
anxious about defining the geographical limits of Britain’s Mesopotamian mandate in such a
way that London could avoid unnecessary political complications over water issues; other­wise, it might be forced to reluctantly interfere in areas outside its existing spheres of control.
Thus, soon after the British occupation of Mesopotamia and Southern Kurdistan, two early
British considerations in Kurdistan took shape: the need to avoid making any river a political
frontier for British spheres of control and to prevent rival Powers from extending their control
to the water sources:[In the conquered areas] fertility is in proportion to irrigation. If, therefore, for other reasons ariver is anywhere taken as frontier, elaborate provisions will have to be made by treaty for divi­
ding the water between the cultivators on its two banks who (by supposition) are under differ­ent mandatories.5
By extending its control to the whole of the Mosul Wilayet, Britain partly achieved its aim of notturning rivers into political frontiers. Instead, it sought to use the old Ottoman provincial boun­daries of the Mosul Witayetto define its sphere of control. The attainment of the second aim of
securing the water sources was out of Britain’s reach due to military and financial restrictions
imposed by the First World War. Britain thus confined its control to the strategically and econo­
mically vital part of Kurdistan: Southern Kurdistan.
Having identified the boundaries of its sphere of control, Britain now proceeded to
4* Joshua C. BayIson, Territorial Allocations by Imperial Rivalry: The Humane Legacy in the Near East,[University of Chicago, Department of Geography, Research Paper No. 22,1987], p.93.
5* Memorandum on Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia: Reflections of Foreign Secretary Arthur James
Balfour, 11 August 1919, DBFP, Vol.I, pp.340-349.

141define, firstly, its position on the political future of the remainder of the Kurdish areas outside
its control, i.e. Northern and Eastern Kurdistan. Secondly, Britain needed to define its strate­
gic, political and economic interests in Kurdistan in light of both the territorial and politicalaspirations of the Armenians, Persians and Arabs and the growing threat of Bolshevism andFrench rivalry in the Middle East. In other words, Britain sought to incorporate its objectives in
Kurdistan into its broader Middle Eastern policy. Initially, Britain had two options, either toimpose its own political arrangements for Kurdistan and then to go to the peace conferencewith a fait accompli or await the peace conference’s debates on the issue. Having said that,the absence of a well-defined Kurdish policy during and after the Paris peace conference did
not prevent British officials on the ground from adopting a number of political and administra­
tive measures in British-controlled Southern Kurdistan. Although these were carried out on
an initially temporary basis, they were built into both the Sevres terms on Kurdistan’s futureand into the provisions of the British Mesopotamian mandate.

The Crystallisation Of British Objectives In Kurdistan
British policy on the future of the Middle East was worked out at the meeting of the Eastern
Committee, which concluded its works in December 1918. Lloyd George, who headed a coali­tion Government of Liberals and Conservatives, dominated the early British-French negotia­
tions on the Middle East and was in a broad agreement with the Eastern Committee and theForeign Office.e This resulted in Britain’s acquisition of the French share of the Mosul Wilayet.
From 1919 onwords, the meetings of the IDCM -chaired by Lord Curzon- extensively discus­
sed the future of Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. At these meetings representatives from theForeign, India and War Offices, and the Air Ministry, the Treasury and the Board of Trade were
present. From time to time, British officials who served in the Middle East, such as Col. Wilson,
Gen. Allenby and Maj. Noel, also attended the IDCM meetings, offering their views and recom­
mendations.
When the war between the Allies and Turkey ended in October 1918, neither theForeign Office nor the India Office paid any attention to the Kurds. However, the rise of theKurdish nationalist movement and the reports of certain British officials, notably Maj. Noel andCapt. Woolley, shed light on the existence of the Kurdish question and underlined the need
6* Christopher M. Andrew, ‘France, Britain and the Peace Settlement: A Reconsideration’, -in- The
Great Powers in the Middle east, 1919-1939, (Ed) Uriel Dann, (London & New York: Holmes & Meir,
1988), pp. 158-159.

142

to settle it within the framework of the Turkish peace settlement. Thus, it was necessary, fromthe British Government’s viewpoint, tp formulate a clear policy towards the future of Kurdistan.
The Foreign Office and India Office, which were directly involved in Kurdish affairs, studied all
the views and the proposals that came from British official circles in the Middle East, such as
the British High Commissions in Constantinople and Cairo, the Civil Commission in Baghdad
and the British Embassy in Tehran, so as to define Britain’s ultimate position on the Kurdish
question.
Apart from being united on the issue of keeping Eastern Kurdistan within Persia, thestriking point about the attitudes of the Foreign and India Offices towards the Kurdish ques­tion was their changeability. As the records of the meetings of the IDCM reveal, these atti­
tudes were altered by the passage of time and in accordance with new developments in Turk­ey, Persia and the Caucasus. Curzon highlighted the difficulty of reaching a definite British
position on the Kurdish question at the meetings of the IDCM. He pointed out that the IDCM
arrived at “ diametrically opposite conclusions at each of its meetings: the establishment ofautonomous Kurdish states around the borders otthe Mosul Wilayet, the division of Ottoman
Kurdistan between Britain and France, and the leaving of the Kurds to their own devices.7 In
terms of motivations, the India Office was primarily concerned with the security of India, which
required the protection of Persian territorial integrity and the consolidation of the British posi­tion in Mesopotamia. The Foreign Office viewed Kurdistan’s future from a wider perspective,
including its concern for the political future of Armenia, the growing Bolshevik menace,French territorial ambitions and the rise of nationalist movements in Persia and Turkey. The
existence of these diverse concerns among British official circles and the state of flux in thepolitical situation in the Middle East were partly responsible for London’s hesitation in defining
the objectives of its Kurdish policy until April 1920.
In terms of defining the limits of British influence, the India Office initially confined its
concerns primarily to Southern Kurdistan, which was considered to be of strategic, economic
and political importance for the viability of the Mesopotamian administration:
The importance to Great Britain of Kurdistan lay in the fact that the power paramount in thiscountry will command the strategic approaches to Mesopotamia and control the water supplyof the eastern affluent of the Tigris, on which the irrigation of Mesopotamia largely depends.
Moreover, a settled and friendly Kurdistan is essential to the peace of upper Mesopotamia,
while the country will be a valuable recruiting ground for military purposes. The low-lying
regions bordering on Mesopotamia contain oil-fields and other natural resources. The districtsof Sulaimaniya and Halabjah are reported to be susceptible of great development; their pro­ducts include petroleum, coal and tobacco. Oil is also found in the neighbourhood of Tuz Khurmatu on the road between Kifri and Kirkuk and at Chia Surkh in the extreme south-east corner
7* Ibid.

143

of the areafi
During the existence of the first Kurdish Government under Mahmud, the India Office desired
an autonomous Southern Kurdistan in the form of several small states under British direction^as an ideal arrangement, if Britain was unable -for financial reasons- to commit itself militarily.
Arthur Hirtzel, the India Office Under-Secretary, who suggested the establishment of an“independent Southern Kurdistan” with its own separate administration and revenue, fearedthat the return of Turkish rule to the remainder of Kurdistan would make it an “unpleasantneighbour” to both the new Iraqi state and the Armenian Kingdom.10 This probably explains
why the India Office showed some interest in the idea of extending British mandatory control
to those Kurdish areas which were situated to the south of Armenia, 11 if the latter came underthe American mandate.
America’s refusal to take the Armenian mandate forced British policy makers to recon­sider their attitudes towards all aspects of the Turkish peace settlement. Now, Montagu sup­ported, with some reservations, Wilson’s proposals for the partition of Ottoman Kurdistan
between Turkey and Mesopotamia. Montagu also called for the establishment of a tiny Kurd­
ish state in Botan (Jezirah) under British protection, with a view to strengthening Mosul’s stra­tegic defences. 12 He opposed any British withdrawal from strategically and economicallyimportant areas in Southern Kurdistan, such as Khaniqin, Kirkuk and Z a k h o . 1 3 However, at themeeting of the IDCM in April 1920, Montagu returned to the idea of transforming Southern
Kurdistan into an independent frontier region on the lines of the North-West Province ofIndia. 14 He even accepted the idea of allowing Southern Kurdistan to join Northern Kurdistan

at some time in the future, if the Kurds so wanted.
Like the India Office, the Foreign Office initially evaluated Kurdistan’s future from theangle of consolidating Britain’s strategic and economic position in Mesopotamia. It also con­templated the establishment of a separate Southern Kurdistan. But unlike the India Office,the Foreign Office desired very little British involvement in the Kurdish areas, from which Brit­ish forces should be evacuated. The separate Southern Kurdistan would include all areas to
8* Political Department, India Office, Note on Kurdistan, 14 December 1918, F0371/3386, PRO.
9* Briton Cooper Busch, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain’s Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923, (New York:State University of New York Press, 1976), p.370.
10* Shuckburgh, 1 August 1919, F0371/4192.
11* British Delegation, Paris, 12 October 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
12* A. Hirtzel, India Office Recommendations on Kurdistan, 8 April 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.
13* Ibid.
14* IDCM , Minute No.3713 April 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.

144

the east of the Tigris, whereas other areas to the west of the Tigris, which formed the smallest
part of the Mosul Wilayet, would be incorporated into a future Arab state. 15 in the light of thedesires of the Foreign Office and the India Office, the British authorities in Baghdad were
instructed to treat Southern Kurdistan as an autonomous and a separate country from Meso­
potamia. The idea of an autonomous Southern Kurdistan with loose British control reflected
the anxiety of the Foreign Office about stretching Britain’s military and financial commitments.
Hubert Young of the Foreign Office even suggested restricting British interference to theestablishment of a line of posts in certain Kurdish areas to protect the strategic land route tonorthern Persia, i.e. a line of communications between Baghdad and Hamadan across South­
ern and Eastern Kurdistan. His suggestion included the appointment of political liaison offi­
cers responsible to the British authorities in Baghdad, is Young’s scheme represented a mid­dle course between total British withdrawal and undertaking a political responsibility for South­
ern Kurdistan. It would enable Britain to both assist Persia and protect the northern frontier ofMesopotamia from any potential Bolshevik threat
In late 1919, however the Foreign Office under the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Cur­zon, moved in the opposite direction from the idea of establishing an autonomous Southern
Kurdistan before the peace conference took its final decision. Curzon now considered retain­
ing British control over Southern Kurdistan (through incorporating it into the Mesopotamian
mandate) to be necessary on both strategic and economic grounds. Indeed, by the late 1919,
a general consensus emerged among British circles in London and the Middle East that
Southern Kurdistan should be under British control. Britain’s first major step in that direction
was taken when France agreed in principle to transfer its territorial share of the Mosul Wilayet
to Britain. This step, and subsequent French acquisition of Jezirah-ibn-Omar and the basin of
the River Khabour one year later, practically marked the first post-war partition of Ottoman Kur­
distan. This partition was built into the formula of the mandate system to administer the former
Ottoman Wilayets in the Middle East. The League of Nations placed the southern parts of Kur­
distan under Britain’s Mesopotamian mandate and the western parts of Kurdistan underFrance’s Syrian mandate. In other words, a de facto partition of Kurdistan took place long
before becoming the cornerstone of the Sevres terms on Kurdistan’s future. Having said that,
it was not yet decided what would be the nature of the political relations between Southern
15* Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No.174037,22 November 1918, FO371/3407 & No. 146, 7 January
1919, F0371/4147, PRO.
16* Young, Foreign Office Memorandum No. 164430,10 January 1920, F0371/4193, PRO.

145

Kurdistan and Mesopotamia in the long run. Britain could not decide whether the establish­
ment of a separate Southern Kurdistan was the best solution, and thus, preferred to wait andsee.
As to the remainder of Ottoman Kurdistan, the Foreign Office initially contemplated
the idea of forming a Kurdish state or confederation of Kurdish states. Against the back­ground of acute financial problems and strong domestic opposition to new military involve­
ments, the IDCM decided in November 1919 that Britain would not accept a mandate for Kur­
distan or carry out military activities beyond the frontier of the British sphere in Mesopotamia
and Southern Kurdistan. The imperative of not turning Northern Kurdistan into a British politi­
cal responsibility became stronger in the wake of America’s refusal to be directly involved in
the Turkish peace settlement through the acceptance of an Armenian mandate. The principleof no British political or military commitments in Northern Kurdistan considerably influenced
the British position on the Kurdish question at the San Remo conference. Having said that,
the Foreign Office did not agree that Britain should leave Northern Kurdistan to its own
devices, as Robeck suggested. 1 7 George J. Kidston of the Foreign Office highlighted Bri­tain’s need for the friendship of the Kurds in light of the growing Bolshevik threat.1 8 To win the
Kurds over, he and Eyre Crowe advocated the recognition of Kurdish nationality and indepen­
dence. 1 9 Britain, although agreeing in principle that the Northern Kurds should work out theirown salvation, could not afford to see instability in Northern Kurdistan, which posed a con­stant threat to its position in Mesopotamia, given the growing Kemalist and Bolshevik menace
from the north. Therefore, it became desirable to influence the Kurdish situation in theimmediate future by satisfying some Kurdish aspirations for autonomy.
When the San Remo conference started, Britain still had no clear cut position on
Northern Kurdistan’s future, apart from reaching the conclusion that the acceptance of a man­date for Kurdistan was inconceivable. Between February and April 1920, a series of extraordi­
nary changes took place in the British position on Northern Kurdistan’s future. On 20 Febr­uary 1920, Curzon, who headed the British delegation at the conference, stated that bothFrance and Britain agreed that Northern Kurdistan would be independent, either as a single
state or as a federation of autonomous states. He even rejected “a provisional statement to

17* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p.371.
18* Letter From Kidston to Crowe, Paris, 28 November 1919, DBFP, Vol. IV, P.909.
19* Letter From Crowe, Paris, to Kidston, 1 December 1919, DBFP, Vol.IV, p.913.

146

the effect that Kurdistan should remain under the sovereignty of Turkef .2 0 On 26 February,
Lloyd George referred to Northern Kurdistan as part of those non-Turkish regions which
would be separated from the Ottoman Empire. He described this as one of the principles
which guided the negotiations inside the Allied Council. On 6 March, Curzon informed De
Robeck that it was contemplated that Northern Kurdistan should be severed from the Otto­
man Empire and secure its independence. However, he highlighted the need for full exami­
nation of the means of achieving this aim. 2 1 Twenty days later, Curzon again talked of a separ­
ate autonomous Kurdistan:
The policy at which we are aiming in the [Turkish] peace treaty., with regard to Kurdistan, isneither a single protectorate for England or France, nor a divided protectorate, nor a group ofstates under European protection, but an autonomous Kurdistan severed from Turkey and noteven under Turkish suzerainty.2 2
Nevertheless, Britain eventually decided not to grant Northern Kurdistan its immediate inde­
pendence, but temporary local autonomy within Turkey.
The sudden change of heart among British policy makers in the short period MarchApril 1920 must have reflected Britain’s fear of unwanted military and political involvement inNorthern Kurdistan, or even the loosening of control over Southern Kurdistan. Moreover, as
Curzon remarked, leaving the Northern Kurds under Turkish protection was an ideal option,
given the British desire to forestall French attempts to extend their political control to Northern
Kurdistan.2 3 Young quickly noticed the change in the British position and how the Turkish
peace treaty confined itself to the severance of “ liberated area?, which were occupied by Bri­
tain and France, and the treatment of what was left as part of Turkey.2 4 At the meeting of the
IDCM on 13 April, the last meeting before the conclusion of Sevres,2 5 Curzon pointed out thatthe conference had swung round to the idea of leaving the Northern Kurds under Turkish
rule. On 19 April 1920, he stated that it was no longer desirable, as had been thought before,
to detach the remainder of Kurdistan from Turkey, but rather it should be made autonomous
20* British Secretary’s Note Of Allied conference, London, 20 February 1920, DBFP, Vol. VII, p. 159.
21* Foreign Office Telegram to De Robeck, Constantinople, Very Urgent, 6 March 1920, F0371/5067,
PRO.
22* Curzon to de Robeck, Constantinople, Confidential, 26 March 1920, FO371/5067, PRO.
23* British Secretary’s Note Of Allied Conference, San Remo, 19 April 1920, DBFP, Vol. VIII, p.43.
24* Young, Foreign Office Minute No.2432,30 March 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.
25* This meeting was perhaps the most important one in defining the final British position on the Kurdish
question at the peace conference. The meeting was chaired by Curzon, the Foreign Secretary. In addi­
tion to Montagu, the State Secretary for India, high-level representatives of all concerned British cir­cles, such as the Foreign, India, War Offices, the Treasury and the Air ministry, attended the meeting.
IDCM, Minute No.3713 April 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.

147

on a local basis. He attributed this change to the disunity of the Kurds and their inability tomaintain what they would obtain from the peace conference in the absence of the backing ofa Great Power. Such was the position of the British Government when the Sevres terms on
the Kurdish question were formulated in April 1920. In light of this, one should distinguish when interpreting the Sevres terms On Kurdistan- the intention of the Allies, notably Britain,from the wordihg of these terms, as the following jpageswill illustrate.

The Implications Of The Sevres Terms In Light Of British Objectives
A few aspects of the Sevres treaty, such as those regarding Armenia and Kurdistan, were not
implemented because of the growing strength of Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal, aformer army Commander. Nevertheless, two principal conclusions can be derived from the
SOvres terms on the Kurdish question. Firstly, these terms were formulated by the British andlargely expressed their short and long-term objectives in Kurdistan. The French efforts wereconfined to extracting as many economic and territorial concessions as possible. Secondly,
the Sevres treaty contained articles neither the British nor the French were willing to imple­
ment, notably Articles 62 and 64. These articles granted autonomy to those Kurds who lived
in the Diyarbekir Wilayet and in part of the Bitlis and Van Wilayets. This local autonomy would
be elevated to independence one year later, if an Allied commission agreed that the Kurds
were qualified to have their own state. These articles also referred to possible partial reunifica­tion of Ottoman Kurdistan, i.e. British-controlled Southern Kurdistan and the would-be auto­
nomous Kurdistan. The course of discussion at various interdepartmental meetings in Lon­don and the bilateral negotiations between British and French policy-makers illustrates thatthe British Government did not ever really believe that Articles 62 or 64 were feasible. Mon­tagu questioned Britain's ability to create a Kurdish zone free of Turkish rule to the north of
British-controlled Southern Kurdistan, in view of its unwillingness to commit itself militarily tothe maintenance of Mesopotamia’s security .26 Curzon doubted the viability of creating anautonomous Kurdistan, given Britain’s decision not to intervene or to take direct responsibility
for the implementation of the Sevres terms on Kurdistan. He told the French that the Kurds
themselves felt “they could not maintain their existence without the backing of a GreatPower", and that in the absence of British and French protection, they preferred the idea ofleaving themselves “under the protection of the Turks” .27 Olson holds that by 1920, it was
26* IDCM , Minute No.3713 April 1920, F0371/5068, PRO.
27* British Secretary Note.., San Remo, 19 April 1920, DBFP, Vol. VIII, p.43.

148highly unlikely that Britain would push for the implementation of Article 62, given the growing
strength of Kemalist forces .28 in other words, Britain did not expect to see the emergence of a
Kurdish state in Northern Kurdistan. It was not accidental that Britain opposed any League of
Nations’ role in Kurdish affairs and made sure that no Kurdish representative could speak onbehalf of the Kurds at the San Remo conference, unlike other nationalities such as the Arm­enians.
It is true that the last paragraph of Article 64 provided for a possible reunification of thewould-be Kurdish state and Southern Kurdistan. However, the evidence clearly shows thatthe British were not really willing to let Southern Kurdistan join a future Kurdish state. During
the Allied negotiations, Curzon was emphatic in his views that the Southern Kurds did notwant to be removed from the Mosul WilayeU9 and, by implication, from the British Mesopota­
mian mandate. As Ghassemlou asserts, Britain sought through Sevres to turn Southern Kur­
distan into a special British domain. 3 0 Southern Kurdistan increasingly became strategicallytoo important to the British position in Mesopotamia to be allowed to go its own way. Other­wise, Britain would not have resorted to diplomatic efforts and the making of territorial and eco­nomic bargains, so that it could persuade France to accept the inclusion of Southern Kurdi­
stan in its Mesopotamian mandate some time before the determination of the Kurdish ques­tion. Indeed, the inclusion of Southern Kurdistan in the British Mesopotamian mandate waslater built into Sections I and VII of the Sevres Treaty. The question is why did the British insert
this paragraph into Article 64, if they had no intention of implementing it? The likely explana­tion is that the British sought to give the impression that their control over Southern Kurdistan
was of a temporary nature and thus there would be no need to adopt a Kurdistan-wide territor­
ial, economic and political partition, as the French persistently demanded. The minute of oneof the IDCM’s meetings illustrates how Curzon
had been doing his best to fend Mr. Berthelot [the French representative] off this area [i.e.
Western Kurdistan], and the argument he had employed was that we were ourselves [the British] proposing to clear out of Southern Kurdistan. He feared that we would awaken opposition,
if we now went to San Remo and said that we had abandoned this intention.31
In other words, by arguing that Southern Kurdistan had the right to join a future Kurdish state,
Britain endeavoured to contain the expansion of French political influence deeper into Kurdi­
stan, i.e. Kurdish areas situated between Armenia, Syria, Persia and British-controlled South28* Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, p.54.
29* British Secretary’s Note.., San Remo, 19 & 23 April 1920, DBFP, Vol. VIII, pp.44 & 133.
30* Ghassemlou, Kurdistan and the Kurds, p.48.
31* IDCM, Minute No.3713 April 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.

149

ern Kurdistan, In his analysis of British-French imperial rivalry, Christopher M. Andrew high­lights how Britain disguised its imperial ambition in the Middle East beneath what he calls “thenewly fashionable cloak of self-determination".32 Indeed, in one post-war memorandum, Bal­
four stated that the Sykes-Picot agreement disregarded “the modern notions of nationality"and how to deal with the new nationalities such as the Kurds, the Arabs and the Jew s .33
Moreover, Britain hoped to avoid the alienation of Kurdish nationalists in Northern
Kurdistan at a time when the political situation seemed in a state of flux. The rise of Turkish
and Persian nationalist movements, coupled with the steady Bolshevik advance towards the
Caucasus and north Persia, formed a serious threat to British strategic positions from India to
the Mediterranean Sea. Under such conditions, Britain did not want to face political instability
in Southern Kurdistan, especially when the Kemalists were determined to recover as much
Ottoman territory as possible, particularly in Kurdistan and Armenia. Therefore, Britain madesure that the Southern Kurds understood that bringing Southern Kurdistan under the Meso­
potamian mandate would not contradict their interests. Examination of the terms of the Meso­
potamian mandate and post-Sevres British policy illustrates that Britain still had not decided on
the long-term future of Southern Kurdistan, that is to say, whether it would be established as
an autonomous Kurdish state (or a states) or as a permanent part of British Mesopotamia.
Nevertheless, what can be safely deduced is that it was not in the British plan to allow South­
ern Kurdistan to join a Kurdish state.
Close examination of Articles 62 and 64 also reveals further striking implications. The
Kurdistan that the Sevres treaty referred to formed no more that 20% of the actual size of
Ottoman Kurdistan, and less than 15% if Eastern Kurdistan was taken into consideration (seesee map eighteen). In other words, these articles, which were concerned with Kurdish auto­
nomy and independence, did not affect the majority of the Kurdish areas.The Sevres treaty
symbolised, in practice, the pre-war partition and the post-war partition of Kurdistan between
Anatolia, French Syria, British Mesopotamia, Persia and the proposed Armenian state. It is lit­
tle wonder that the content of the Sevres treaty on the Kurdish question, which was madepublic in August 1920, was unwelcome in Kurdish nationalist circles both in Kurdistan and in
exile. Pessimistic rather than optimistic feelings spread among nationalists as the Kurdish

32* Andrew, ‘France, Britain and the Peace Settlement’, p. 159.
33* Memorandum On Syria, Palestine And Mesopotamia: Reflections Of Foreign Secretary A. J. Bal­four, 11 August 1919, DBFP, Vol.IV, pp.340-349.

150

Map Eighteen: The Partition Of
Ottoman Kurdistan Under The
1920 Sevres Treaty

Kurdish Areas Included in
President Wilson’s Proposed
Armenia

Kharput

MushMalatiya

The Autonomous Kurdish
Areas, (Recognised As PartOf French Special Interests)
Kurdish Areas Under
France’s Syrian Mandate

Lake Urmia

Diyarbekir
MarcJirT

Kurdish Areas Under
Britain’s Mesopotamian
Mandate■‘Dezirah!

j £ - ftowanciuz
Mosul t AAA r b i l » > M r
j T * AAV - Sulaimani;

Kurdish Areas Expected To
Be Part Of Persia

Source: Treaty Of Peace With
Turkey, No.s 11 & 12,10 August
1920, Treaty Series, Cmd 963 &
964 (HMSO)

Kermanshah

question became more complicated because of the new large-scale partition.

It seems that the British Government preferred the existence of a tiny autonomous
Kurdish entity within a British-orientated Turkey, an alternative which Busch considerd to be
based on interdepartmental consideration. 34 Such a Turkey, along with an independent Arm­enia, could serve as buffer states against Bolshevik Russia following British military withdrawal
from the Caucasus. On the eve of the San Remo conference, De Robeck warned against aBolshevik advance in northern Persia and the Caucasus as well as the prospect of an antiBritish alliance between the Bolsheviks and the Kemalists . 35 Churchill himself shared suchapprehensions and therefore opposed the adoption of any harsh Turkish peace settlementby the peace conference.36 He and Curzon recommended no severance of non-Turkish
Wilayets of the Ottoman Empire, other than the Arab ones. They also drew attention to thefact that other Powers, especially France and America would benefit both politically and eco­nomically from any Turkish resistance to the imposition of a harsh peace settlement. Montagu
opposed harsh treatment of the defeated Turks, fearing its likely negative effects on the atti-

34* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p.371.
35* J. De Robeck to the Secretary of State of Admiralty, 18 March 1920, F0371/5046, PRO.
36* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, p. 101.

151

tudes of Indian Muslims towards Britain. 3 7 He, therefore, recommended the soft treatment ofTurkey by adopting a peace settlement similar to the Bulgarian one.

French Imperial Interests And Britain’s Kurdish Policy
It was with France that Britain largely conducted the first phase of its post-war diplomacy on the
future of the Ottoman Empire. 38 According to Andrew, France’s initial strategy under Georges
Clemenceau was to make concessions to Britain outside Europe, so as to gain “ leverage “
when the peace conference turned to discuss the future of the Rhineland.3 9 in other words,
Clemenceau was prepared to sacrifice the Middle East to Britain in return for maintaining
French security vis-a-vis Germany. This explains why Clemenceau was willing to give up
France’s share of the Mosul Wilayet and accept British control over Palestine. In contrast, Brit­ish policy makers, as L.C.B. Seaman points out, were in agreement that Britain’s responsibili­ties to its Empire and Commonwealth, which had been increased as a result of the war, mademilitary involvement in Europe totally unpalatable.4 0 The consolidation of the British position in
the Middle East and the containment of Bolshevik threat were now Britain’s two mainpriorities.41 Moreover, Britain did not trust France in Europe, and was in favour of a balance ofpower that ensured that no power, including France, dominated the Continent. 4 2 With Ameri­
ca’s support, Britain ensured that Germany was not dismembered as much as France desired,
and that the strategic Rhineland, though demilitarised by the Versailles treaty, remained Ger­man contrary to France’s wishes. Thus the European settlement at the Paris peace confer­ence poisoned the bilateral relations between Britain and France and had considerable influ­
ence over the subsequent settlement of the future of the Ottoman Empire at the San Remoconference.
The Ottoman Empire was already divided into various economic spheres of influenceamong the European Powers when the First World War broke out in 1914. The war offered
France an unprecedented opportunity to consolidate its interests and influence in these

37* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, pp.79 & 84.
38* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, p. 100.
39* Andrew, ‘France, Britain and the Peace Settlement’, p. 159.
40* L.C.B. Seaman, Post-Victorian Britain, 1902-1951, (London: University Paperbacks, 1967),
pp.127-129.
41* Ibid.
42* Sally Marks, The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918-1933, (London:
MacMillan,1976), p2.

152

Ottoman territories. Indeed, France became a key player in concluding several secret agree­ments, one of which was particularly concerned with Ottoman Kurdistan’s post-war future, i.e.
the Sykes-Picot agreement. With the disappearance of Czarist Russia as a major player indetermining the future of the Ottoman Empire, France pressed Britain for a large scale parti­
tion of Ottoman Kurdistan, based on their wartime agreements. Similarly, in the absence ofGerman rivalry, Britain increasingly perceived France as a serious obstacle in the way of con­structing a post-war Middle Eastern order. In the Eastern Committee, Curzon identified France
as the power whom Britain had most to fear in the future. 4 3 This then was the setting for thecontradictory British and French policies towards Kurdistan after the war.
One of the earliest British attempts to hold back French territorial ambitions in Kurdi­
stan was Mark Sykes’ proposal for the establishment of a Kurdish Emirate, which would
include Mosul. Frangois Georges-Picot, the representative of the French Government, rejec­
ted the plan on the grounds that it was "contrary to French interests” and sacrificed people
such as the Chaldeans and Nestorians, who were “traditionally protected by the French"m Heemphasised that the French Government wanted Mosul to be in its sphere of influenceaccording to the Sykes-Picot agreement. 4 5 One of Britain’s early manoeuvres to prevent the
emergence of political vacuums in Kurdistan and Armenia, where France could step in, was topersuade America to accept a mandate for Armenia.46 Unlike France, America was not a rival
colonial power, and therefore, constituted a far lesser threat to British imperial interests in the
Middle East. In other words, Britain sought to replace France with America as its “junior” part­ner in redrawing the new political map of the Middle East. 47 Resorting to American power was
also necessitated by the over-extension of British imperial responsibilities as well as the Bol­shevik takeover in Russia. The British Government hoped that, if America took the Armenian
mandate and Britain brought under its mandate Kurdish areas situated between Armenia andMesopotamia, France’s ambitions to extend its political and economic control deeper into Kur­
distan would be frustrated. 48 Indeed, the British delegation at the Paris peace conference
confirmed France’s intention to bring under its mandate Kurdish areas situated between Arm43* Eastern Committee Minute 40,2 December 1918, CAB27/14.
44* IDCM, Secretary Note: Situation in Kurdistan, 6 September 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
45* G.L. Bell, Northern Kurdistan. 8 March 1920, AIR 20/513, PRO.
46* War Cabinet Minutes No.457 & 459,13 & 15 August 1918, CAB23/43, PRO.
47* Barry Rubin, ‘America as Junior Partner: Anglo-American Relations in the Middle East, 1919-1939’, in- The Great Powers in the Middle east, 1919-1939, op. cit., pp.241 -242.
48* Ibid & William Stivers, Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey and the Anglo-American World Order, 19181930, (London& Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), p.30.

153enia and Mesopotamia.4 9 America’s rejection of the League of Nations’ covenant, and its sub­sequent refusal to take the Armenian mandate in late 1919 as a result of the opposition of theCongress, 5 0 changed the political landscape. These developments brought France to thefore as a major player in determining the future of the non-Turkish Wilayets.
Unable now to extend its Mesopotamian mandate to Northern Kurdistan, Britain was
in no position to resist France’s persistent demand for territorial re-arrangements in Kurdistan.
Stephen Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, told Curzon that
America having disappeared from the scene as a factor in the settlement of the East, and all
chances of an American mandate for any portion of the Turkish Empire having., vanished,
there remained only two parties [France and Britain], whose interests had seriously to be com
sidered and reconciled.51
Pichon made clear that he was authorised by his Government to enter into confidential discus­
sion with the British as soon as possible to determine the future of non-Turkish Wilayets.sz Bri­
tain had three options for the future of the Kurdish areas to the north of British-controlled
Southern Kurdistan. The first option was to partition these Kurdish areas between Britain andFrance. This was inconceivable to Britain for it entailed extra military and financial commit­
ments. The second option was to immediately declare these areas an independent state. This
option would certainly meet French opposition, as was the case in the past. France always
suspected that Britain Would benefit politically and economically from establishing a Kurdish
state, as the Kurdish nationalists were clearly British-orientated in their political outlook. The
final option was to re-establish Turkish rule over those Kurdish areas which might enjoy local
autonomy in order to satisfy some Kurdish political aspirations.
In contrast, the French approach to the future of Kurdistan was very straightforward
and revolved around one idea: its partition between France and Britain. France displayed amore notable consistency in its attitudes towards the Kurdish situation than Britain, probably
because it knew what economic and political benefits could be gained from the partition of
Kurdistan. Indeed, since the end of the First World War, France had pressed for territorial re­arrangements in Ottoman Kurdistan, based on the Sykes-Picot agreement. As Britain conti­
nued to resist the implementation of that agreement, France presented a new partition plan in

49* Crowe, British Delegation, Paris, to Curzon, 12 October 1919, F0371/4193, PRO.
50* Stivers, Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey and the Anglo-American World Order, 1918-1930, pp.4445.
51* Curzon, Memorandum, 12 November 1919, FO406/41, PRO.
52* Curzon’s Record of a Conversation with the French Foreign Minister, 12 November 1919, DBFP, Vol.
IV, pp.879-81.

154late 1919. Philippe Berthelot, the Chief Secretary for Political and Commercial Affairs in the
French Foreign Office, argued that, as the Kurds were “ divided into tribes and clans” and as
they, like the Arabs, had “hardly ever been united into a national state”, France and Britain
should divide Ottoman Kurdistan among themselves. This solution, he stated, was temporary,necessitated by the “geographical situation” and “natural wealth” of the country and pending
the peace conference’s final decision on the Kurdish question. Berthelot’s plan provided forthe establishment of a federal organisation in Kurdistan under French and British control. The
authority of the Turkish Sultan would be nominal, while a number of local elective councils
would be established under French and British supervision. The French plan confined thepolitical geography of Kurdistan to the Diyarbekir Wilayet and the southern portion of the Bitlis
and Van Wilayets. The British felt that Berthelot’s plan was not temporary, but a permanent ter­ritorial and political division of Ottoman Kurdistan, with a view to granting France considerable
political and economic spheres of control. Accordingly, Curzon rejected the French plan,arguing its unfeasibility on political and technical grounds. Firstly, the Kurds would oppose it.
Secondly, apart from the boundaries of Southern Kurdistan, it would be difficult, Curzon
argued, to define the boundaries of the remainder of Kurdistan. 5 3
On the other hand, France too was anxious about the extent of Britain's imperial ambi­
tions in Kurdistan. As it was clear that Kurdish nationalists were British-orientated, France wassuspicious of any scheme that provided for a separate Kurdistan. Such French fears surfaced
when Curzon put forward what he called “the outlines of a general policy which would sup­posedly guide British and French approaches to Kurdish affairs, pending the peace confer­ence’s final decision. The most important points were the following: firstly, there would be no
British or French or British-French mandate for Kurdistan as a whole, except those parts whichcame under British and French mandates over Mesopotamia and Syria respectively. Second­ly, Turkish rule should not continue in Kurdistan “even in a nominal form” . Thirdly, the Kurdish
question could not be considered in isolation of the issue of Armenia, as the Kurds were cap­able of making “a workable arrangement with both the Armenians and Assyrians. Fourthly,
the Kurds should be allowed to decide whether they would form “a single state or a number ofsmall loosely-knit aread'. Fifthly, it was preferable not to have British or French advisers in Kur­
distan, though the Kurds would be given a guarantee against “ Turkish aggression” . Finally, it
was desirable not to create “a frontier problenf for Mesopotamia in Kurdistan akin to the one

53* Ibid.

155

which Britain confronted in lndia .5 4 These outlines partly reflected the military and financial
restrictions that prevented Britain from accepting a separate mandate for Ottoman Kurdistan
or partitioning it with France. In other words, these outlines sought to restrain France fromextending its mandatory control to additional Kurdish areas. It seems that Britain raised theissue of an independent Kurdistan, so as to make France abandon the idea of a large-scalepartition. Indeed, France, suspecting ulterior British motives behind the establishment of aseparate Kurdistan, changed its position, when Berthelot insisted on amending the synopsis
of the Turkish peace treaty so that the remainder of Kurdistan would come under Ottoman
sovereignty.5 5
In the end, leaving the Northern Kurds to their own devices -as to whether they wan­
ted to separate from or remain within Turkey- emerged as the ideal solution under the circum­
stances. On the one side, the French vetoed a separate Kurdistan and, on the other, the Brit­ish vetoed a Kurdistan-wide partition. It also became necessary that Britain should relegate to
the background the idea of an autonomous state in Southern Kurdistan lest France demand
the establishment of a parallel Kurdish state in Northern Kurdistan under its control. Curzon
highlighted this latter point at the IDCM meeting of 13 April 1920, when making reference tothe interconnection between political developments in Southern Kurdistan and those of
Northern Kurdistan.se
Having failed to persuade the British to jointly partition Northern Kurdistan, the French
insisted on obtaining some economic and territorial compensations. Berthelot explained to
the British how their zone in Kurdistan had “mineral resources o f much greater value" thanthat of the French zone in Cilicia. 5 7 The French sought British assurance that their economic
interests would be secured in the settlement of the Kurdish question, and this eventuallybecame their precondition for accepting the British draft terms on the Kurdish settlement.ss
Accordingly the Sevres terms on Kurdistan satisfied some French economic ambitions whenrecognising their special interests in those Kurdish areas situated between Anatolia andSouthern Kurdistan, on the one side, and Armenia and Syria, on the other (see mafJj Eighteen )France also sought to bring new Kurdish areas under its control, in addition to Jezirah-ibnOmar. Berthelot belatedly raised the issue of Kurdistan’s boundaries in the Turkish peace set54* IDCM, Second Additional Note on the Situation in Kurdistan, 10 January 1920, F0371/ 4193, PRO.
55* British Secretary’s Note.., London, 20 February 1920, DBFP, Vol. VII, p. 159.
56* IDCM, Minute No.3713 April 1920, F0371/5068, PRO.
57* British Secretary Note.., London, 26 February 1920, DBFP, Vol. VII, p.258.
58* British Secretary’s Note.., San Remo, 21 & 23 April 1920, DBFP, Vol. VIII, pp.77 &133.

156

tlement when criticising the British decision to place them to the east of the Euphrates. 59 This
was a clear indication that he wanted to extend French mandatory control to some Kurdish
areas in that direction. Eventually, a bilateral French-British agreement at San Remo satisfied
the minimum of France’s territorial ambitions. The Sevres treaty finalised the partition of Kurdi­
stan by giving France Urfa, Mardin and Nisibin.
To avoid future inter-Allied rivalries in Kurdistan, be they of a political or economic
nature, the Allies also concluded on 23 April 1920 what is known as the Tripartite
agreement.eo
In the event of the Imperial Ottoman Government, or, in the circumstances provided for inparagraph 3 of the preamble, the Kurdish Government, being desirous of obtaining external
assistance in the local administration, or police of the areas, in which the special interests ofGreat Britain, France and Italy are respectively recognised, the contracting Powers will not
dispute the preferential claim of the Power, whose speciai interests in such areas are recog­
nised, to supply such assistance. This assistance shall be specially directed towards enhan­cing the protection offered to racial, religious or linguistic minorities in such areas.61
Examination of post-Sevres relations among the Allies illustrates that, in spite of all these
agreements to reconcile differences in their strategic, economic and political interests, neither
France nor Britain stopped in its attempts to undermine the position of each other in Kurdi­
stan. This rivalry was intensified when the Kemalists forced France to give up about half of its
territorial gains in Kurdistan to Turkey. This development was interpreted by many civilian andmilitary officials in Mesopotamia as a deliberate French attempt to encourage the Kemalists toinvade Southern Kurdistan.

Persian Territorial Ambitions And Britain’s Kurdish Policy
The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution ended a ten year understanding between Russia and Britain
over Persian affairs, and revived the old rivalry between the two Powers over this question.
Such a rivalry now took on an additional ideological dimension, i.e. the struggle between com­munism and capitalism. From 1919 onwards, British Persian policy suffered from serious set­
backs. In May 1920, the Bolsheviks occupied north Persia, and with their help, the anti-British
Persian nationalists established the Soviet Republic of Gilan. Apart from the ongoing Kurdish
revolt in Eastern Kurdistan, other nationalist movements emerged that posed a threat to Per59* British Secretary’s Note.., San Remo, 21 April 1920, DBFP, Vol. VIII: No. 8 , p.77.
60* This agreement and the Sevres treaty were simultaneously signed by Turkey and the Allies in Parison 10 August 1920.
61* DBFP, Vol. VIII:Appendix A, to No.13, Draft of Tripartite Agreement, 23 April 1920, DBFP, Vol. VIII,
pp. 141.

157

sian territorial unity. One of these nationalist movements appeared in Persian Azerbijan, andwas as much anti-British as it was anti-central Government.6 2 These internal and external
threats to Persian territorial unity greatly alarmed Britain, whose strategic interests were closely
linked with the unity of Persia. Curzon once defined Britain’s task in Persia as assisting it inremaining united so that it “should not be left to herself and allowed to rot into picturesqued e c a f .63 in other words, through containing internal and external threats and strengthening
Persian unity and the power of the central Government in Tehran, Britain could consolidate
the security of its positions in India, the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia. 64 Britain’s opposition
to a separate Eastern Kurdistan stemmed from its fears that it would lead to the disintegrationof the Qajar Kingdom.
The complications in post-war Middle Eastern affairs were not only caused by the con­tradiction between the political, economic and strategic interests of the Great Powers, but also
by the territorial claims of the new nationalities as well as the existing states in the region. Qajar
Persia, for instance, had its own territorial ambitions, even though it was itself facing the pro­
spect of territorial disintegration. Its territorial ambitions consisted of annexing vast territories mainly from the Ottoman Empire and Russia- as compensation for the alleged damages
caused by the Ottoman and Russian armies in Persia during the war.es The Persian Govern­
ment hoped that, with the help of Britain and America, it could get a seat at the peace confer­ence, so as to persuade the Allies to radically rectify Persia’s western, northern and eastern
frontiers in its favour.ee Insofar as Kurdistan was concerned, the Shah of Persia demanded theunification of its Ottoman and Persian parts under his rule. 67 Interestingly enough, Persian
nationalist opposition pronounced similar territorial demands. Britain, while refusing to allow
Persia to attend the peace conference or support its “preposterous territorial claims, was will­
ing to back “moderate Persian demands for rectifying its western frontier,ee i.e. the old Ottoman-Persian frontiers in Kurdistan.

62* Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923: Anglo-Russia Politics in Iran(New York: Russell F. Moore, 1952), pp.144-254.
63* Ibid.
64* Curzon, Memorandum on the Persian agreement, 9 August 1919, DBFP, Vol. IV: No.710, p.1121.
65* Ishtiaq Ahmad, Anglo-lranian Relations, 1905-1919, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1974),
pp.314-318.
66* Curzon to Cox, Tehran, 28 November 1919, DBFP, Vol. IV, pp.1245-9.
67* Curzon to Earl of Derby, Paris, 25 October 1919, DBFP, Vol. IV, p.1214.
68* Curzon to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 19 December 1919 & 5 January 1920, DBFP, Vol.
IV, pp. 1273-4.

158

The problem of delimitating the Ottoman-Persian frontiers in Kurdish areas was an old
one. On the eve of the First World War, the problem was under the consideration of an inter­national commission, consisting of British and Russian representatives. The outbreak of thewar prevented the implementations of its recommendations for a moderate modification of the
Ottoman-Persian frontier. Following the war, the British -because of their concern for the
security of their position in Southern Kurdistan and Persia- paid attention to these unstable
frontiers, over which neither the Turks nor Persians had effective control. Mark Sykes soughta radical solution to end the existing instability in Urmia in Eastern Kurdistan, where the proAllied Christian communities lived. His solution was not to detach the area from Persia, but totransfer Turkish Kurdistan to Persian sovereignty on the condition that the Urmia district
should be united with it administratively, and that the whole should form an autonomous province with foreign assistance in its administration. This would (a) secure an effective recon­
struction of the Urmia (b) unite the Nestorians on both sides of the frontier (c) satisfy long­standing Persian claims on the former Turko-Persian frontier., and (d) safeguard our position
strategically in Mesopotamia.69
The application of this solution was not practical due to the strength of Kurdish nationalist
movement on both sides of the Ottoman-Persian frontier and Britain’s unwillingness to com­mit itself either politically or militarily. But, one main aspect of Sykes’ approach, which linked
the issue of the Assyrians and other Christian minorities with that of rectifying the OttomanPersian frontiers in Kurdistan, drew the attention of the British Government.
When many Assyrians and other Christians were made to leave Persian territory dur­ing the war and enter Mesopotamia, the British military authorities suggested their resettle­
ment in Southern Kurdistan by displacing anti-British Kurds from their villages. This solution
seemed undesirable because of its financial cost and the fact it helped intensify local troubles.
In early 1920, Wilson suggested another solution to the question of the Christian refugees,
whom he described as a financial burden on his Mesopotamian administration. It entailed theirrepatriation to an area in Ottoman Kurdistan close to the Persian frontier. Then Persia’s control
would be extended to that area by means of rectifying the existing frontier in its favour. In thismanner, Wilson argued, these Christians would be freed from Turkish rule and cease to be aheavy financial burden on the British administration in M esopotam ia .70 Such a view was also
backed by the India Office and the Foreign Office. Curzon stated that the British were all“ anxioud to repatriate the Christians, and searched for the appropriate means to achieve it ina manner that would not incur political complications. In his view, it was the Kurds with whom
69* Toynbee, Foreign Office Minute No. 174037,22 November 1918, FO371/3407, PRO.
70* IDCM, Minute No.3713 April 1920, FO371/5068, PRO.

159

the Persian Government should discuss the issue of rectifying the frontier in Kurdistan. His
motive was to sidestep any Turkish opposition to the rectification of the frontiers. Accordingly,
the Sevres terms provided that the Persian Government would negotiate with the Kurds, not
the Turks, with a view to securing the rectification of the frontier. The striking thing about the
Sevres terms on the issue of defining the southern frontiers of Armenia with Kurdistan wasthat the Armenians would negotiate with the Turks, not the Kurds, even though that issue
concerned the would-be autonomous Kurdish entity.
On the other hand, the issue of Persian territorial claims presented Britain with anopportunity to realise several objectives. Article 62 of the Sevres treaty stated thatthe scheme [of autonomy] shall contain full safeguards for the protection of the AssyroChaldeans and other racial or religious minorities within these areas, and with this object a
commission composed of British, French, Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives shallvisit the spot to examine and decide what rectifications, if any, should be made in the the Turk­
ish frontier where, under the provisions of the present Treaty, that frontier coincided with thatof Persia.
The implementation of Article 62 would have far-reaching political and strategic implications
insofar as Britain and Persia were concerned. Firstly, it had the effect of perpetuating TurkishPersian frontier problems. This meant the pre-empting of any attempt to form an anti-British
and a pan-lslamic movement by the Kemalists. It is worth noting that the Kemalists still used
Islamic sentiment to mobilise the Muslims of different ethnic background for their cause and toforge regional allies against Western domination. Moreover, the Kemalists’ efforts convergedwith those of the Bolsheviks, who waged a comprehensive anti-British propaganda campaign
among Muslim nationalities. British officials in London and on the ground were greatly alarmed
by the ongoing anti-British and pan-lslamic propaganda in Persia, 71 where the Muslims formed
an absolute majority. Secondly, the rectification of the frontiers in Persia’s favour, the British
hoped, would encourage the Persian Government to effectively extend its authority to theseareas where Kurdish rebels threatened its territorial unity.7 2 Thirdly, on moral ground, Britain
found it difficult to escape from its responsibility towards these Christian communities, who
had supported the Allies during the war. Yet it wished to solve the Assyrian problem ascheaply as possible,7 3 without making any political commitment. Like the British authorities in
Baghdad, Curzon, who constantly referred to the Assyrians as a heavy financial burden on the
71* Commander Luke to Admiral Webb, 25 December 1919, Enclosure 1, DBFP, Vol. IV, pp.1001-1003.
& Ryan, Memorandum, Constantinople, 29 December 1919, Enclosure 2 in No.647, DBFP, Vol. IV,
pp.1003-1005.
72* Curzon to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 5 January 1920, DBFP, Vol. IV, p.1248.
73* British Secretary’s Note.., San Remo, 19 April 1920, DBFP, Vol. VIII, p.44.
160

Mesopotamian administration, viewed the re-adjustment of the Ottoman-Persian frontier as apractical solution. Lastly, the construction of the Assyrian settlement and the extension of
Persian rule to the mutinous Kurdish areas would create a stable zone close to the northern
frontiers of the British sphere in Southern Kurdistan. In other words, the readjustment of the
Ottoman-Persian frontier would simultaneously strengthen and shorten Britain’s strategic
defensive line vis-it-vis future Turkish and Bolshevik attacks across Kurdistan. These various
considerations demonstrate that Britain’s willingness to support the Persian claim in the direc­
tion of Kurdistan was calculated, and was not coincidental or done out of sympathy.

Conclusion
Both Britain’s diplomacy and the Kurdish policy on the ground considerably influenced thedevelopment of the Kurdish question and its settlement at the San Remo conference in
1920. Indeed, when the First World War ended, the British were in control of vital Turkish
areas, notably the Bosphorus and Constantinople. Their forces -and those of their Allies,
such as France, Italy and Greece- directly or indirectly controlled most of the Turkish and nonTurkish Wilayets. British forces were also present in southern and northern Persia. The Otto­
man army was in the process of rapid disintegration and the Qajar army was suffering from thesame fate. The authorities of the central Governments in Constantinople and Tehran were soweak that they lost control over remote regions, especially in Kurdistan. In various parts of Kur­
distan, Kurdish nationalists, who emerged to fill the existing political vacuum, were politically or
militarily engaged in activities aimed at realising Kurdish nationalist aspirations. Under suchconditions, Britain was in a strong position to create a Kurdish state, if it so wanted. It was
unfortunate for the Kurdish nationalists that British strategic, economic and political interests
did not require the establishment of a Kurdish national state in the period 1918-1920. Thisdisharmony between British interests and Kurdish nationalist aspirations can, to a consider­able degree, explain why the Kurds emerged stateless in the wake of the collapse of the Otto­
man Empire, and also why Kurdistan was re-partitioned. The one positive aspect of the
Sevres treaty, from a Kurdish viewpoint, as Ghassemlou points out, was that Kurdish rights
had been mentioned by an international treaty for the first tim e .74
The forgoing survey of the evolution of Britain’s Kurdish policy and the crystallisationof its various Objectives in Kurdistan after the First World War highlighted two main points.
74* Ghassemlou, Kurdistan and the Kurds, p.42.

161

Firstly, there was a pressing need for Britain to define its interests and the limits of its politicalinfluence in Kurdistan. Such a definition was conditioned by Britain military and financial capa­
bilities, which became severely restricted as a result of the First World War. Priority was given
to the security of the British strategic position in Mesopotamia, and this considerably influ­
enced the direction of British policy towards Kurdistan. One of its important consequences
was to bring Southern Kurdistan under the British mandate of Mesopotamia, which represen­
ted the de facto partition of Ottoman Kurdistan even before the peace conference could takeits final decision on the settlement of the Kurdish question. Secondly, Britain also approa­
ched the settlement of the Kurdish question from regional and international perspectives.
The revival of imperial rivalry with France, the growing threat of Bolshevism, the uncertainty
about the future of both Turkey proper and Armenia and the importance of Persian territorial
unity influenced, in various degrees, British Kurdish policy and ultimately the terms of the
Sevres treaty on Kurdistan.

162

An urgent need emerged in late 1920 for the winding up of the system of divided control
between the Foreign, India and War Offices in the Middle East. This was a direct conse­
quence of both the failure of direct British control in the mandated regions such as Mesopota­mia, where a bloody rising broke out in mid-1920, and the huge financial cost of the admin­
istration and the defence of the mandated regions in the Middle East. These two factors were
the focus of Britain’s newspapers criticisms. Soon these criticisms were carried over into parlia­
mentary debate, in which the entire Mesopotamian policy came under severe attack. The par­liamentary debate provided, in Klieman’s words, “the final stimulus” for phange in policy mak­ing process and policy direction. 1 Eventually, the British Cabinet decided on entrusting theColonial Office -through the newly-formed Middle East Department- with the responsibility forpolicy making and administration, as well as all civil and military expenditure. 2 Central to the
new changes was the policy of indirect control based on the formation of a native administra­tion under British supervision in Mesopotamia, with a view to ending its huge financial bur­dens on Britain.
These changes in both the policy making process and policy direction insofar as theyaffected the Middle East, had great a impact on Southern Kurdistan’s future. The analysis of
this chapter is primarily focused on the role of Percy Cox, the new High Commissioner for
Mesopotamia, and Winston Churchill, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, with whom
the two contradictory alternatives of the incorporation and the separation of Southern Kurdi­
stan were associated respectively. Crucial to their approaches to the Kurdish situation was Bri­tain’s need for a new political formula that would accommodate two important objectives: first­
ly, the consolidation of the British position in Mesopotamia and Southern Kurdistan in thelong-term, and secondly, the containment of the growing Kemalist threat to Mesopotamia at
the same time as withdrawing the British imperial garrison from the latter.

1* Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World, pp.84-85 & 87.
2* Recommendations of the Prime Minister’s Interdepartmental Committee, C.P.2545,7 February 1921,
CAB21/186, PRO.

163

The Emergence Of Two British Policy Alternatives At The 1921 Cairo Confer­ence: Separate Entities Versus Unitary StateThe Cairo conference opened on 12 March 1921 and lasted until the end of the same month.
Forty civilian and military experts on British policy in Middle East attended its meetings. The
participants were divided into groups to conduct the agenda of the conference: a Political
Committee and a Military and Financial Committee. The Political Committee, headed by
Chufchill, discussed three interconnected issues: the political future of Mesopotamia, theimmediate reduction of military commitments and Britain’s future relations with Mesopotamia
under the mandate. The discussion of these issues brought to the fore the future of South­
ern Kurdistan, which came under special consideration at the final meeting of the Political
Committee. From the very beginning two distinct and contradictory political alternatives forSouthern Kurdistan’s future came to the surface among the members of the Political Commit­
tee. On the one side, Cox with the support of his Oriental Secretary, Gertrude Bell, approa­
ched the issue of Southern Kurdistan’s future from an Arab viewpoint by supporting the terri­torial claims of the Sharifian family and their Sunni followers in Mesopotamia. Cox asserted that
Southern Kurdistan was an integral part of Iraq and that the Southern Kurds were aware ofbeing economically linked with Iraq. Apart from Sulaimaniya, both Cox and Bell argued that all
Southern Kurds wanted to join Iraq. To reinforce his point, Cox advocated that the revenue,
which came from the Kurdish areas, was not enough to cover the cost of their administration. 3
Before the Cairo conference, Cox had opposed Montagu’s idea for the appointment of a
Kurdish governor for Southern Kurdistan.4
Cox and Bell’s argument that the Southern Kurds would accept Arab rule, and that
Southern Kurdistan could not economically sustain itself, diametrically contradicted the pre­vious information that both Wilson and Noel had provided. Despite their differences on Kurd­
ish affairs, Wilson and Noel agreed that the Southern Kurds would unanimously reject theidea of Arab rule. Moreover, the evidence that Wilson always represented as a justification for
his attempt to incorporate the Kurdish areas into British-administered Mesopotamia was the
economic richness of Southern Kurdistan in comparison with Arab Mesopotamia. He had
always emphatically referred to the latter as having considerable surplus in wheat production,
lumber, fruits, tobacco and most importantly, potential oil wealth. Indeed, Southern Kurdistan,
3* Report on Middle East Conference Held in Cairo and Jerusalem, 12-30 March 1921, F0371/6343,
PRO.
4* S/S for India to High Commissioner, Baghdad, 27 October 1920 & High Commissioner, Mesopotamia,
17 November 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.

164

unlike British-administrated Mesopotamia, had not been a heavy financial burden on Britain.
Most British expenditure focused on the construction of railways, roads, ports, dams, bridges
and other facilities in Mesopotamia, rather than Southern Kurdistan.
In contrast to Cox and Bell’s views, Hubert Young, who became the Assistant Secre­tary to the newly-established Middle East Department, argued that Southern Kurdistan
should be immediately established as a separate state, so as to function as a strategic buffer
against any future Kemalist threat to Iraq. He was supported not only by Noel, who attended
the conference as the only expert on Kurdish affairs, but also by Churchill, who expressed hisfears about ignoring Kurdish sentiment and the oppression of the Kurdish minority by a Sharifian ruler with the support of his Arab army.5 He underlined the principle that London would
not force the Southern Kurds into joining Arab Iraq or overlook their nationalist aspirations.
Moreover, Churchill, like Noel, did not wish to see a strong Arab state that might encourage
Feisal to weaken the British hold over Mesopotamia. When the conference ended, it became
clear that four out of the seven British officials who attended the conference were in favour of
the alternative of a separate Southern Kurdistan not subordinate to Arab rule. They were
Churchill, Young, Noel and T. E. Lawrence, who acted as the Political Adviser to the Middle
East Department. By contrast, Cox and Bell were the only two officials who favoured the alter­
native of Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Iraq. Thus the conference did not abandon
the idea of a separate Southern Kurdistan, as McDowall believes, e On the contrary, it empha­
tically rejected the incorporation alternative, unless the Southern Kurds were to ask for it.
The Cairo conference laid down a clear-cut principle not to force Southern Kurdistan
to join the Iraqi state. Most importantly, it decided to keep Southern Kurdistan a separate
country in order to function as a strategic buffer for Mesopotamia, until such a time when theSouthern Kurds or their representatives would determine their own political future. In the lightof the Cairo decisions, Churchill raised an important question as to whether Britain needed toinsert a special provision into its draft mandate over Mesopotamia. Against this background,the Legal Adviser to the Colonial Office entered into informal consultation with the AssistantLegal Adviser to the Foreign Office. Their final recommendation resulted in modifying theterms of the Mesopotamian mandate, in spite of Cox’s opposition:
Article 16 of the Mesopotamian mandate would read thereafter:
Nothing in this mandate shall prevent the mandatory from establishing such an autonomous
5* Report on Middle East Conference Held in Cairo and Jerusalem, 12-30 March 1921, F0371/6343,
PRO.
6* McDowall, A Modem History of the Kurds, p. 151.

165

system of administration for the predominantly Kurdish areas in the northern portion of Meso­
potamia, as may consider suitable. 7
The position of the Colonial Office was mainly dictated by its fears that the impositionof Arab rule over reluctant Southern Kurds might increase political instability and thus force
Britain to make undesirable political and military commitments towards the security of Mesopo­
tamia. These British fears were steadily growing due to what seemed to be a Kemalist drive
southwards towards Mesopotamia. In these circumstances, any Kurdish resistance to theincorporation of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq would most likely result in a Kemalist-Kurdish
alliance against Britain and Arab Iraq. As a result, Britain would have to stop the withdrawal of
its imperial garrison to protect Iraq, which was the central objective of the new policy of indirectcontrol. By contrast, as the records of the conference show, the alternative of keeping South­
ern Kurdistan out of Iraq would enable Britain to put into effect its plans for the withdrawal of its
forces and end its heavy financial responsibilities in Mesopotamia. Churchill hoped that British
officers would supervise the formation of inexpensive Kurdish military units to replace theexisting British garrison, with a view to taking a full responsibility for the defence of Mesopotamias He had no faith in the Arab army’s ability to defend Mesopotamia from the Kemalists, andreiterated to Cox the military value of the Kurdish military units for the defence of Mesopotamia9 Moreover, the reinforcement of a Kurdish sense of nationality by the establishment of
Kurdish autonomous rule would help restore stability to Southern Kurdistan.
In light of these considerations, Churchill informed the British Prime Minister, Lloyd
George, of a general line that would temporarily guide the Colonial Office’s Kurdish policy,
which was that while awaiting the expiration of the year allowed by Article 5 of the Sevres trea­
ty, the affairs of Southern Kurdistan would continue to be directly conducted by the HighCommissioner, not by the provisional Arab Government in Baghdad. Lloyd George, who was
anxious about the Kemalist activities in Kurdistan, approved of what the Cairo conference
recommended. 10 It became clear that the British Government favoured the concept of a buffer
state, and expected it to be central to British policy towards Southern Kurdistan after the Cairoconference .11
7* Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World, p. 123.
8* Report on Middle East Conference Held in Cairo and Jerusalem, 12-30 March 1921, F0371/6343,
PRO.
9* Churchill to Cox, 18 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
10* Message from Prime Minister to Churchill, 22 March 1921, F0371/6342, PRO.
11* Young, Colonial Office Minute of 20 June 1923 & H. Read, Colonial Office Minute of 21 June 1923,
C0730/40, PRO.

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Cox’s Kurdish Policy In the Wake of The Cairo Conference
Although the Cairo conference recommended a separate Southern Kurdistan in the shape ofa buffer zone, the Colonial Office did not instruct the British authorities in Mesopotamia toimplement it immediately, as was the case with the formation of the Arab state in Mesopotamia.
The reason for this lack of concrete instructions could be attributed to the fact that the Colo­nial Office focused much of its attention and time on the organisation process of the Arabstate and Feisal’s candidature for the Iraqi throne. This state of affairs enabled Cox to ignore
the initiation of any step towards Kurdish autonomy. Instead, he suggested various schemes
for Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into the Iraqi state based on several economic, finan­cial and political arguments. No sooner had the Cairo conference ended than Cox criticised
the economic implications of Southern Kurdistan’s separation for the future of Mesopotamia.
He and his subordinates argued that the economic links between the Kurdish districts of the
Mosul division and the Arab town of Mosul were so close that the local Kurds would not wel­come any administrative separation that would lead to the erection of "a customs barrier”.
Instead of separation, they preferred to turn these Kurdish districts into a subliwa(subdivision), that would be politically, financially and judicially subjected to Baghdad. 12 Cox
extended the economic aspect of his argument to other Kurdish districts, arguing that "theleaders of Kurdish opinion” were fully aware of Southern Kurdistan’s economic and industrial
connection with Arab Iraq, and of the inconveniences which its separation from Iraq might
involve.1 3 Having said that, the British authorities acknowledged that the people of Sulaimaniya wanted nothing to do with Arab rule whatever the economic consequences might be.1 4
Apart from the economic factor, Cox sought to prove to Churchill that Southern Kurdi­
stan’s incorporation into Iraq was the only viable political and administrative option. He devised
a complicated scheme for Kurdish autonomy within the Arab Iraqi state in May 1921, a stepwhich clearly contradicted Cairo’s general line. The Kurdish districts of the Mosul division
would form a subliwa under a British assistant Mutassarif, the existing British Qaimmaqam
would be replaced by a Kurd or a Kurdish-speaking Arab. The division would be financially andjudicially subjected to the national Government at Baghdad and would send its representa­
tives to the National Assembly. The High Commissioner would appoint their administrators in
12* Mesopotamian Intelligence Report (MIR), No.12,1 May 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
13* MIR, No. 13,15 May 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
14* High Commissioner’s Communique No.13 to the Provisional Majlis of the Mosul Wilayet -in- MIR,
No. 14,1 June 1921, F0371/6352, PRO.

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consultation with local authorities. In other words, the Kurdish districts of Dohuk, Zakho, Aqra,
Zibar and Amadia would come under mixed British-lraqi control and be officially part of Iraq. As
for Arbil, Rowanduz and Keuisenjaq, British officials would control their administration,
whereas the appointment of junior officials would be made according to Kurdish wishes.
Thus, these Kurdish areas, though being part of Iraq, would remain under British control. Cox
left out of his scheme other important Kurdish areas in the Kirkuk division^ which would be dir­
ectly ruled by the Arab Government in Baghdad. The remainder of Southern Kurdistan, not­ably Sulaimaniya and its surrounding areas, would have a mixed British-Kurdish administrative
control. The High Commissioner would appoint the Mutassarif, whose right was to appeal dir­
ectly to him, while the Qaimmaqam would be Kurdish .15
The existence of superficial safeguards against any Arab oppression -such as the pre­sence of British officials in local administration in Southern Kurdistan- failed to moderate thefears of the Kurds about the prospect of being under Arab rule. British official reports on Kurd­
ish reactions to Cox’s scheme suggested limited successes even among the local councils,
which were formed by the British in the districts of Aqra and Zakho. In other Kurdish areas,
where many Kurds were given an opportunity to freely express their opinion, the vast majority
opposed any form of subordination to Arab rule. The people of the Sulaimaniya division over­whelmingly rejected Arab rule through a plebiscite taken on Cox’s communique. In Sulaima­niya town, where the right to vote rested on property qualification and therefore was limited,
only 32 out of 190 people were in favour of inclusion into Iraq. In other areas, where the rightto vote was unrestricted, people were decisively opposed to inclusion in Iraq. In Sulaimaniya
district, only 32 out of 6,000 people voted for inclusion. In Sharbezher, people unanimously
voted against Arab rule, and only one section of the Jaf among the Kurdish tribes was infavour of inclusion. ie Cox reported to the Colonial Office that the reactions of the leaders of
Kurdish communities to his communique was positive, except in Sulaimaniya. But the resultsof the subsequent election of Feisal to Iraq’s throne contradicted Cox’s report of the Kurdish
situation, when the majority of the Kurds rejected the extension of Arab rule to Southern Kur­
distan (detailed in the following chapter).
What really mattered for the success of the new British policy, in Cox’s view, was Arabpublic opinion . 17 The Kurds had neither a sense of nationality nor political reliability. As he
15* MIR, No.13,15 May 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
16* MIR, No. 14,1 June 1921, F0371/6352, PRO.
17* High Commissioner For Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, 20 April, C0730/1, PRO.

168

found no sizable support among Kurdish notables for his incorporation alternative, Cox exclu­
ded them from any discussion concerning their future, in marked contrast to his treatment of
the Arabs. Instead of negotiating with the Southern Kurds, whose fate was under considera­tion, Cox discussed with the Arab Council of State in Baghdad the solution for the Kurdish
problem. Meanwhile, he purged the British personnel in Southern Kurdistan of those officials
who advocated a separate Southern Kurdistan, notably Soane, who turned into a protagonistof Southern Kurdistan’s political separation. Although he was replaced by Goldsmith immedia­
tely after the Cairo conference, Soane continued to provide the Colonial Office with a pictureof Kurdish attitudes towards Arab rule contrary to the one drawn by Cox. In this way, Cox cre­ated unanimous support among his subordinates for his position on Kurdish affairs. Indeed,
when arguing the case against the establishment of a separate Southern Kurdistan, Cox con­stantly made references to the absolute agreement among his Kurdish experts on the groundthat Southern Kurdistan, including Sulaimaniya, should be made part of Iraq on political andfinancial grounds.is
The most revealing aspect of Cox’s scheme was its political and administrative dis­memberment of Southern Kurdistan. Like his predecessor, Wilson, Cox was never willing toconsider the Kurdish areas as constituting one concrete unit even within the Iraqi state. Keep­ing an autonomous Sulaimaniya outside Iraq was, in Cox’s views, an encouragement to theremainder of the Kurdish areas to demand the same treatment. Thus, his whole scheme forthe incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq would collapse. Cox feared that as soon as
the Kurds witnessed the re-emergence of a nationalist leader and a nationalist stronghold,they would turn against the authority of Baghdad. It was precisely this prospect that Cox was
to face in the autumn of 1922, when Mahmud formed his second Government (as will be
examined later). Cox justified to Churchill his desire to bring Sulaimaniya under Arab rule,
despite the unquestionable opposition of its population, by underlining the dangers it posedto the unity of Mesopotamia itself:
It will be realised by you that the picture would be somewhat spoilt if Sulaimaniya alone wasto stand out. Customs barrier involved by that solution would be a chronic source of diffi­
culty and if Sulaimaniya was allowed to separate, Basra and other communities [i.e. Turko­man, Jewish and Christian] would want to follow suit and it would be difficult to argue withthem. 19
To reassure Churchill of the success of his incorporation alternative, Cox argued that some
18* High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, 5 June 1921 & MIR, No.13,15 May
1921, C0730/2, PRO.
19* High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, 5 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.

169

formal British insurance to Sulaimaniya, such as a three-year joint British-Kurdish administra­tion, would make the latter change its attitude towards rejecting Iraqi rule .20
Having been informed of the incompatibility of his approach to the future of Southern
Kurdistan with the general line formulated by the Cairo conference, Cox stated that he hadcome back from the conference with the impression that the Colonial Office favoured his
incorporation alternative.21 But the records of the conference show that the balance of opi­
nion was clearly in favour of the separation alternative, and that its recommendations were notambiguous or open to contradictory interpretation. On the one side, there would be an Arabstate created by merging the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets under a Sharifian ruler, and on theother, there would be a separate Southern Kurdistan. The latter would function as a buffer
entity to protect Iraq from Kemalist Turkey. It is difficult to imagine that Cox misinterpreted the
Cairo recommendations, especially when he himself was entrusted with the implementation of
British policy on the ground. Young’s Colonial Office minutes of 20/21 June 1923 clearly sug­gest that Cox consciously “turned down” Cairo’s recommendations for the establishment of a
Kurdish buffer state.2 2 Cox’s subsequent actions clearly indicate that he was determined toprepare the ground for the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq regardless of Kurdish
wishes. Indeed, after being informed of the incompatibility of his suggestions with the Colo­nial Office’s position on Kurdish affairs, Cox went on to propose another complicated scheme
for the future of Southern Kurdistan; the essence of which was its political and administrative
dismemberment with the view to bringing it under Arab rule. Firstly, while the Kurdish areas tothe north of the two Zabs (the five Kurdish districts of Amadia, Dohuk, Aqra, Zakho and Sinjar)
would be, for the time being, within Iraq, they would have the right to reconsider their fatesometime in the future. Secondly, the sub-mountainous areas situated between the two ZabRivers, including Arbil, would be within Iraq. Thirdly, the mountainous districts that were situa­
ted between the two Zab Rivers such as Rowanduz and Rania, would be under Cox’s control.
These districts might be united with the Sulaimaniya division to form a separate province out­side Iraq. Finally, the remainder of the Kurdish areas, which would be temporarily incorporated
into Iraq, might join the Kurdish province after the expiration of three years.2 3

20* Ibid.
21 * High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, 21 June 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.
22* Young, Colonial Office Minute of 20 June 1923 & H. Read, Colonial Office Minute of 21 June 1923,
C0730/40, PRO.
23* High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, 21 June 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.

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Churchill’s Approach To The Question Of Southern Kurdistan’s Future
The most important evidence suggesting that the Cairo recommendations became a guide for
Britain’s policy towards Southern Kurdistan was Churchill’s statements in the House of Com­mons, where he shed light on Britain’s future relationship with both Southern Kurdistan and
Iraq. As the Kurds did not *appreciate the prospect of being ruled by an Arab government",
Churchill asserted, Cox would continue to directly administer the affairs of Southern Kurdi­
stan. In his capacity as the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, Cox would perform "a dual
function"towards Southern Kurdistan and Iraq.2 4 Churchill was optimistic that under British
supervision and intervention, the Southern Kurds would accept union with Arab Iraq in the
future. Yet, the word “union”, in this case, meant a type of confederated relationship between
Southern Kurdistan and Iraq. Therefore, it should not be equated with such concepts asincorporation or unitary state:
I want to make it quite clear that we are developing, as it were, a principle of home rule forSouthern Kurdistan within the general area of Mesopotamia, at the same time that we aredeveloping the general self-government of Mesopotamia.25
In other words, there would be two entities with differing political status, which would be uni­
ted in terms of their economic and strategic interests but politically and administratively separ­
ate. With British advice and support and under the High Commissioner’s supervision, theSouthern Kurds would conduct their own political-administrative affairs, local policing anddefence, without being under Feisal’s rule. Just four days after his speech in the House ofCommons, Churchill asserted to Cox that the aim was to keep Southern Kurdistan “just as dis­tinct from Arab countries as Nepal from India”.26
Up until October 1922, when Churchill lost his position as the Colonial Secretary in
the wake of the collapse of Lloyd George’s coalition Government, he continued to repeat his
commitment to the principle that London would not force the Southern Kurds to join the Iraqi
state against their wishes. Meanwhile, none of Cox’s proposals for a partial and temporary
incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq received the approval of Churchill, who continu­
ally recommended a clear-cut political and administrative distinction between Southern Kurdi­
stan and lraq .27 The former would be under the British High Commissioner’s direct supervi24* Middle East, Government Policy, 14 June, House of Commons. Robert Rhodes James, Winston S.
Churchill, His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963, Vol.lll, 1914-22. (Chelsea House Publishers, London &New York 1974), pp.3104-3105.
25* Ibid.
26* Churchill to Cox, 18 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
27* Colonial Office Minute No.31558,23 June 1921, C0730/2, PRO.
17 1

sion, while the latter would be under Arab rule. 28 Churchill also questioned all the strategic,
political and economic aspects of Cox’s argument. In terms of ethnic distribution, which Cox
used as proof of the impracticability of the separation alternative, Churchill -with the help ofNoel, Soane and Young- was able to point out that there was no serious difficulty in drawing
the boundaries between Southern Kurdistan and Arab Mesopotamia. Moreover, Churchill
included all the areas which Cox claimed to be non-Kurdish -such as Kirkuk, Kifri and Arbil- in
his Kurdish buffer scheme. Churchill resorted to Maj. Soane and Capt. Longrigg when draw­
ing the ethnic boundaries of Southern Kurdistan. The ethnic factor had a central position in
Churchill’s strategic argument, insofar as he believed the creation of a separate Kurdish entity
was the best way of containing the Kemalist threat. Cox’s argument that the ethnic separation
would give Iraq strategically inferior and indefensible frontiers, 29 would lose its value as South­
ern Kurdistan and Iraq would remain under the British mandate. Moreover, with British help
and supervision, Southern Kurdistan would function as a strategic buffer for Iraq against
future Kemalist threats. In other words, the Southern Kurds and the Arabs had the same stra­tegic interests, i.e. the containment of Kemalist territorial ambitions. It was then in Iraq’s inter­est that Southern Kurdistan stayed separate.
As for the economic aspect of Cox’s argument that the incorporation of Southern Kur­
distan was a necessity, the political and administrative separation suggested by Churchill
would not prevent the Arabs and the Southern Kurds from making a close economic union in
the same way that they had similar strategic interests. Unlike Cox, who considered the separa­tion alternative as harmful for British influence in Iraq because the Arabs would resent the ideaof a separate Southern Kurdistan, Churchill believed that the incorporation of Southern Kurdi­
stan into Iraq would excessively strengthen the Arabs. A separate Southern Kurdistan wasthen, in Churchill’s view, a useful political move, if Britain was to retain a strong hold over Iraq.
For all these strategic and political reasons, he insisted that the British policy of setting up a
separate Southern Kurdistan should never “be deflected either by Arab pressure of by othercauses”.30
As previously examined, Churchill’s position was to keep separate the political andadministrative affairs of Southern Kurdistan from those of Arab Iraq before Feisal’s arrival in

28* S/S for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, 24 June 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.
29* High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, Part One: 24 June & Part Two: 5 July
1921, F0371/6346, PRO.
30* S/S for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, 13 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.

172

Baghdad, and that British officials would remain the only link between the two countries.
Churchill thought this step would ensure that Britain would be able to prevent the Arabs frominterfering in Kurdish affairs.31 However, the arrival of Feisal and the issue of his election to the
Iraqi throne changed the political situation. The exchange of views on the political future ofSouthern Kurdistan between the Colonial Office and the British authorities in Mesopotamia
was suspended. To prevent the Kurdish issue from becoming an obstacle in the way of instal­ling Feisal as king of Iraq, the Colonial Office postponed not only the drawing of the ethnic
boundaries between Southern Kurdistan and Arab Mesopotamia, but also the political futureof the fo rm er .32 Moreover, Churchill, who had so far rejected all of Cox’s incorporation
schemes, moderated his position when agreeing to the participation of the Southern Kurds inthe forthcoming referendum on Feisal’s candidature for the Iraqi throne. He, however, re­emphasised his adherence to "the principle of not putting the Arabs over the Kurds”3 3 andthat the latter should be informed that they were free to take part in the referendum, withoutcompromising their interests. As can be seen, a paradox emerged as a result of the Colonial
Office’s adherence to the principle of not placing the Southern Kurds under Arab rule and theidea of allowing them to take part in the referendum. The probable explanation of this paradox
is that Churchill hoped that the referendum would help clarify the real attitudes of the Kurds
towards Feisal and Arab rule.
For Cox, the participation of the Southern Kurds in the referendum offered an ideal
opportunity to demonstrate that Southern Kurdistan would definitely vote in favour of his
incorporation scheme, and thus the issue of its future would be decided once and for all. Cox
and Feisal were optimistic that they would be able to persuade the Southern Kurds to vote infavour of inclusion in Iraq. Helmi perceived the business of Feisal’s election as a British
attempt to settle the Kurdish problem by bringing Southern Kurdistan under Arab rule. 3 4 inspite of all Cox’s efforts and those of his subordinates in the Kurdish areas, the vast majority ofSouthern Kurds refused to vote in favour of Feisal as their King and Iraq as their state (seechapter seven for the details on Feisal’s election). Cox’s failure to persuade Southern Kurdi­
stan to join Iraq, coupled with the growing political instability in the Kurdish areas, brought to
31 * S/S for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, 9 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.
32* Colonial Office Minute No.31558,23 June 1921, CO730/2 & S/S for the Colonies to High Commissio­
ner, Priority, 9 July 1921, F0371/6552, PRO.
33* Churchill to Cox, 9 July 1921 -in- Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol.IV: Companion Part 3,
Documents, April 1921-November 1922, (London: Heinman, 1977), p. 1548.
34* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.ll, pp.345-6.

173

the fore the separation alternative. After the referendum, the Colonial Office directly inter­
fered in Kurdish policy, when it decided to allow the Kurdish nationalists to re-establish a sec­
ond Kurdish government. Despite Cox’s firm opposition, Mahmud was brought back from his
exile in India. On his return to Kurdistan Mahmud was accompanied by Maj. Noel, whom
Churchill sent so as to facilitate the implementation of the new measures.

The Establishment Of The Second Kurdish Government In Autumn 1922: Cir­cumstances And Objectives
Neither the declaration of the Sevres terms nor the subsequent British policy on the groundhelped to stabilise the political situation in Southern Kurdistan. The mountainous regions ofRowanduz, Sulaimaniya, Barzan and Aqra in particular were the scene of growing disorder.
The British authorities in Mesopotamia were constantly engaged in carrying out ground and air
operations to suppress local rebellions among the Barzani, Surchi, Zibar and Khushnaw
Kurds.ss To recover former Ottoman territories, the Kemalists made the most of the existing
instability by providing arms and officers to the Kurdish insurgents and by organising politicalsocieties to wage an anti-British propaganda campaign throughout Southern Kurdistan andArab Mesopotamia. Meanwhile, a broad political movement took shape in Sulaimaniya, andthis spread to other Kurdish areas such as Halabjah, Kifri and Kirkuk. It demanded that the Brit­ish release and bring back Mahmud to Southern Kurdistan. 36 At the same time, some of Mah­
mud’s followers were still engaged in military activities directed against the British. The
description given by Kurdish contemporaries, such as Rafik Helmi, of the British position inSouthern Kurdistan in that period was far worse than the reports of the British authorities in
Mesopotamia,3 7 which suggested that the change in British policy on the ground was
unavoidable.
Cox confined the reasons for British troubles in Southern Kurdistan to Kemalist pro­paganda activities among the Kurds,38 rather than Kurdish resentment of, and opposition to,his policy. Political unrest and Kurdish uneasiness were especially intensified by the formationof an Arab state in the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets. A Kurdish notable told the British Assis­
tant Political Officer for Chemchemal, where demands for the return of Mahmud to Southern
35* MIR, No. 16,1 July 1921 F0371/6352 & NO.20,1 September 1921 F0371/6353 & No.9,1 May 1922
& No.11,1 June 1922, F0371/7771,PR0.
36* MIR, No.23,15 October 1921, F0371/6353 & No.8,15 April 1922, F0371/7771.PR0.
37* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.ll, pp.565-80.
38* High Commissioner for Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 1 February 1922, FO371/7780.PRO.

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Kurdistan were made, that:the policy of the British Government had been dangerously inconsistent. The British haddenied to the Kurds their racial aspirations and, while carrying Feisal and the Iraqi Govern­
ment on their shoulders, showed no inclination to do the same for Sheikh Mahmud and Kurdi­
stan. If HBMG was not ready to play the part expected of it, the Kurds must bring peacefullypressure to bear; otherwise, there would be no alternative but anarchy fostered by Turkish
propaganda.39
Broadly speaking, Southern Kurdistan’s political instability stemmed from various worries andreflected different wishes. Firstly, there were those Kurds who were afraid of the imposition of
Arab rule over Southern Kurdistan. To forestall such a prospect they sought concrete British
guarantees that the status quo would not change, i.e. British administration. Secondly, there
were those Kurds who were suspicious of Britain’s political intentions in Southern Kurdistan
and therefore wanted to keep both the British and Arabs out of their locality. They perceived
their co-operation with the Kemalists as no more than a means to achieve that end. As a last
option, they preferred Turkish rule rather than Arab rule, believing that the devil you know isbetter than the devil you do not know. Thirdly, and most importantly, there were those Kurd­
ish nationalists who wanted nothing but the establishment of a separate Kurdish administra­tion, with or without British supervision.
The existing political instability and the prospect of its development into a generalanti-British revolt in Southern Kurdistan alarmed the Colonial Office, especially as Britain wasdetermined to withdraw its imperial garrison from Mesopotamia as soon as possible. Whatintensified British fears even more was the Kemalists’ absolute determination to undo theterms of the Sevres treaty on Kurdistan and Armenia. Having scored important victories
against both the Greeks and the Armenians, the Kemalists were now able to focus their politi­
cal and military efforts on Southern Kurdistan, where they provided some Kurdish insurgentswith arms and officers. 4 0 This enabled the Kemalists to penetrate deeply into Southern Kurdi­
stan, to such an extent that their officers, who accompanied the Kurdish rebels, were seen in
many important Kurdish districts such as Rowanduz, Rania and Keuisenjaq. Moreover, theKemalists seemed to be in a far stronger political position than the British to win over theSouthern Kurds, given the recognition of their National Pact on Kurdish autonomy. The Great
National Assembly of the Kemalists undertook to establish an autonomous administration for*the dignitaries of the Kurdish nation“ in harmony with their national custom. The Kurds would
choose a Governor General, Assistant Governor-General and an Inspector, and they would
39* Iraq Intelligence Report (HR), No.12,15 June 1922, F0371/7771, PRO.
40* High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, 26 August 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.

175

freely elect a Kurdish National Assembly for the eastern Wilayets.u
Naturally, the Kemalists’ Kurdish policy alarmed the British because of its politicaleffects on the Southern Kurds. Lloyd George was alive to the danger, and had earlier drawn
Churchill’s attention to the fact that any British decision on Southern Kurdistan’s future shouldtake into account the Kemalists’ attempts to “seduce Southern Kurds into co-operation with
their northerly brethren with a view to incorporation in Anatolia’s state ”.42 British reports on the
Kemalist activities in Southern Kurdistan increasingly contained unwelcome news:
The Kurdish situation is extremely delicate. It is, at least, a possible, if not probable theory
that the Turks, still intending to attack Iraq in the spring, are deliberately working to drive
wedge between the Kurds and ourselves. We know that Turkey is prepared to grant consid­
erable local autonomy to [Northern] Kurdistan. We know that the Kurds themselves areworking for some independence under the protection of some powera *Against this background, the Colonial Office repeatedly instructed Cox about the need toreassure the Southern Kurds that London would not place them under Arab rule against theirwill, and that he should conduct Kurdish affairs according to local wishes. This explains why
the administration of Southern Kurdistan remained separate and unaffected by the rapid poli­tical developments taking place in Arab Mesopotamian. Moreover, Kurdish bodies were for­med by the Southern Kurds to conduct their own local affairs, and in such Kurdish districts as
Kifri and Keuisenjaq councils were set up to run local affairs.4 4 in December 1921, the Sulai­
maniya division formed its own elective council, presided over by Maj. Goldsmith and contain­
ing Kurdish representatives from four Kurdish districts: Halabjah, Sharbezher, Chemchemal
and Rania. The council was responsible for the conduct of financial, economic, educationaland other local affairs .45
Nevertheless, the British needed to adopt further measures if they were to turn thesituation in Southern Kurdistan in their favour. The nationalist followers of Mahmud, who werestill unsatisfied by the modest administrative changes in Sulaimaniya, were very active, andfocused their efforts on two fronts: the political and the military. Firstly, they organised a broadpolitical movement as well as a propaganda campaign for the return of Mahmud to Southern
Kurdistan. Three Kurdish petitions for the return of Mahmud were signed by Kurdish notablesfrom the Sulaimaniya division. 46 Similar petitions were signed by other Kurdish notables from
41* Rumbold to Curzon, 29 March 1922, F0371/7781, PRO.
42* Message From Prime Minister to Mr. Churchill, No.193,22 March 1921, F0371/6342, PRO.
43* Baghdad, News Summary For Period Ended 21 December 1921, CO730/8, PRO.
44* MIR, No.23 15 October 1921, F0371/6353, PRO.
45* Residency, Baghdad, 7 December 1921, CO730/8, PRO.
46* High Commissioner to S/S for the Colonies, 5 July 1922, F0371/7781, PRO.

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Kirkuk and Kifri. These petitions conveyed a clear message to the British authorities that, if thelatter sought Kurdish support and wished to restore Kurdish confidence, they should bringback Mahmud and Kurdish self-government. Secondly, the followers of Mahmud intensified
their military activities. The Hamawand Kurds killed Capt. S.S. Bond, the Assistant Political
Officer at Chemchemal, and Capt. R.K. Makant.4 7 Mahmud Dizli’s attacks in the Halabjah
region resulted in the murder of Capt. Fitzgibbon, as well as the killing and the disappearanceof twenty other officers.48 These developments indirectly enhanced the political position ofcertain Kurdish nationalists, whose brand of nationalism was essentially anti-Kemalist. Given
the increasing deterioration in the political and military situation in Southern Kurdistan, theBritish could not afford to lose these Kurdish nationalists as a means of containing the grow­ing Kemalist threat. These nationalists, led by General Kurd Mustafa Pasha, established theirown organisation, the Independent Kurdistan Society, and published their own newspaper,
the Call of Kurdistan, to mobilise the Kurds for an independent Southern Kurdistan. At thesame time, they worked towards persuading the British to support their political efforts as theideal way of containing the growing political influence of the Kemalists, and o f further pre­empting a general anti-British revolt in Southern Kurdistan.4 9
By the middle of 1922, the Colonial Office realised the difficulty of ignoring the grow­ing demand for the return of Mahmud, given the absence of peace with Kemalist Turkey andthe failure of Cox to persuade the Southern Kurds to join Iraq. Under such circumstances,
Mahmud emerged once again as the only person who could mobilise the Southern Kurds
under a nationalist banner against the Kemalists and restore stability, as he had done
between the autumn of 1918 and the spring of 1919. In the House of Commons, Churchillreassured British parliamentarians, who expressed their opposition to any military commitment
in Southern Kurdistan, that the British Government did not have “the slightest intention” ofgetting itself entangled in any serious way in that country. He simultaneously re-emphasised
not only his position that the Southern Kurds would not be forced to come under Feisal’s rule,
but also his great anxiety to study Kurdish wishes and “to develop any local variant of the selfgovernment, which has been given to Iraq, that may command itself to them”.so Initially, Curzon supported the idea of encouraging Kurdish nationalism in Southern Kurdistan as a barrier
47* High Commissioner of Iraq to Colonial Office, 22 June 1922, F0371/7781, PRO.
48* High Commissioner to S/S for the Colonies, 14 January 1922, FO371/7780, PRO.
49* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.II, pp.331-2, 351-2 & 506.
50* British Policy In Iraq, 11 July 1922, House of Commons -in- Robert Rhodes James, Winston S.
Churchill, His Complete Speeches.

177

against Kemalist intrigues.51 Noel’s testimony was important as he emphasised that the pre­vious experiment of Kurdish self-government under Mahmud was successful in providing
political stability, without making military and financial commitments. 5 2 Maj. Soane and otherformer officers acknowledged that the Southern Kurds did not wish to be under Arab rule,and that their separation from the Arabs was a logical option. Ultimately, the Colonial Officeoverlooked Cox’s firm opposition, and Mahmud returned to Sulaimaniya, where he formed asecond Kurdish Government. Thus by the middle of 1922, British fear of further deteriorationin the Kurdish situation helped to tip the balance in favour of Churchill’s separation alternative.

Cox And The Formation Of The Second Kurdish Government
The return of Mahmud to Sulaimaniya did not mean that London finally adopted the separa­tion alternative. Southern Kurdistan’s future still depended on whether the idea of satisfying
Kurdish nationalist aspirations through the re-establishment of a Kurdish government was theideal way to thwart Kemalist threats, maintain stability in the Kurdish areas and facilitate thewithdrawal of the Imperial garrison. In practice, as it turned out later, the Kurdish situation pri­marily depended on the attitudes of Cox and like-minded subordinates towards the Kurdish
Government. Cox acknowledged, according to Young, that "the Cairo policy was the best
after all“.53 Yet, the evidence suggests otherwise. On the eve of Mahmud’s return, Coxendeavoured to dissuade the Colonial Office from the idea of re-introducing Kurdish selfgovernment in Southern Kurdistan, warning against the dire consequences of such a policy:
In contrast with [the] Iraqis, whose objects generally were patriotic and constitutional,
Sheikh Mahmud was actuated mainly by personal and dynastic considerations. Of this,
there is sufficient proof in the fact that in spite of his pan-lslamic preaching of Jihad, his
supporters were only the few hirelings he could attract by pay... I think, it would be unwise togive Sheikh Mahmud his liberty until political future is more assured. It may not be fully real­ised that our policy is more truly in interest of Kurdish nationalism that Sheikh Mahmud’s for,whereas we are working with some success for a constitution, which though oligarchical in
its present stage, is developing towards democracy. Sheikh Mahmud is identified with apolicy of absolutism and he himself is feared as a feudal baron of the worst type. Even if hewere only set at large in India, I think, it would have an unsettling effect just now. 54
In his examination of Cox’s position on the Kurdish situation, Olson shows how he delibera­
tely delayed his response to Churchill for two months, when the latter queried Mahmud’s
return to Southern Kurdistan.5 5
51* Shuckburgh to Foreign Office, No.55849,11 September 1922, F0371/7781, PRO.
52* E.W.L. Noel, Note -in- Colonial Office Minute No.4958,22 July 1922, PRO.
53* Maj. Young, Colonial Office Minute, 20 June 1923, C0730/40, PRO.
54* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S the Colonies, 26 August 1921, C0730/4, PRO.
55* Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, p.61.
178

Cox also argued that despite the existence of strong Kurdish feelings against incor­
poration in the Iraqi state and "a general desire for a national ruler”, it was "impossible” toselect a Kurd because not all the Kurds would recognise him as ruler. Furthermore, without
granting him strong British protection, Southern Kurdistan would sink into a state of chaos.56
He described the attitudes of those Kurds who demanded Mahmud’s return as not reflectingof the wishes of the Kurdish people. The latter, he argued, were e\Xher“definitely opposed to
Sheikh Mahmud or... indifferent”.& in other words, although Cox was forced by the results of
the referendum of 1921 to acknowledge the Kurdish rejection of Arab rule, he still believedthat the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq was the only option, given the non­existence of an eligible Kurdish leader. Cox focused his efforts on hindering Mahmud’s
endeavours to establish a workable Kurdish administration in Sulaimaniya and extend its juris­
diction to other Kurdish areas, hoping that he might dissuade the Colonial Office from its posi­tion. As a High Commissioner, Cox was in a position to take ad hoc decisions if the Kurdish
situation so required. Therefore, he remained the most important factor in determining the fail­ure or success of the new experiment in Kurdish autonomy. In other words, this new experi­
ment was carried out by the very people who opposed it. The way in which Cox expressed his
opposition to the return of Mahmud and Noel and his determination to incorporate Southern
Kurdistan into Iraq in their absence is perceived by Olson as the beginning of the dominationof the policies o f "the officials on the spot” over those o f "the distant capital”.58
One of Cox’s measures to obstruct the formation process of the second Kurdish Gov­
ernment was his introduction of the Said Taha scheme. Initially and before Mahmud’s return,this scheme was based on the creation of an autonomous entity in Sulaimaniya and Rowanduz under a Kurdish governor.59 These two regions had been the scene of continuing antiBritish activities and never ceased to be a constant source of irritation to the British authorities
in Mesopotamia after June 1919. By projecting Said Taha as the ideal alternative, Cox sought
not so much the containment of the growing Kemalist threat as preventing Mahmud fromreturning as governor. The lack of support for Said Taha as ruler of a new Kurdish province,
while Mahmud was on his way to Southern Kurdistan, forced Cox to modify his scheme byconfining it to Rowanduz and its surroundings. Cox asked London to grant Said Taha -who

56* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 2 July 1922, F0371 /7781, PRO.
57* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 5 July 1922, F0371/7781, PRO.
58* Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, p.61.
59*IIR, No. 14, 15 July 1922, F0371/7771, PRO.

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arrived on 6 November 1922- money, ammunition and Kurdish volunteers to suppress the
Kemalist-instigated troubles. The strengthening of Said Taha’s position would give Cox con­siderable advantages with regard to his foiling of the experiment in Kurdish autonomy. Firstly,
by ending British troubles in Rowanduz, Cox would be in a strong position to resist any politi­
cal concession asked for by the Kurdish nationalists, led by Mahmud. Secondly, Said Tahawould be used as a rival nationalist figure to undermine Mahmud’s influence, thus generally
dividing the Kurdish nationalists and the Southern Kurds. C.J. Edmonds, who served as the
Political Officer in Southern Kurdistan, revealed that the Said Taha scheme aimed principallyat undermining Mahmud’s position.6o Cox himself admitted that one of the main reasons forthe scheme was to counter the ”pretensions” of Mahmud,ei namely that he was indispens­able. Mahmud was also aware of the British authorities’ motive behind the Said Taha scheme
and was probably confused by this contradiction in British policy. On the one hand, he wasbrought back to Southern Kurdistan to form a second Kurdish government, with a view tocontaining the Kemalist threat and re-establishing peace and order. On the other, the British
authorities used Said Taha to undermine his position among the Southern Kurds. It was
natural then that Mahmud’s confusion was transformed into utter disillusionment, given his
negative past experience with Col. Wilson during the time of his first Government.
The formation of the second Kurdish Government was a gradual process, dictated by
the course of events. Before Mahmud’s return, the British authorities in Mesopotamia were in
disarray as the growing deterioration in the Kurdish situation forced British officials to leave theSulaimaniya division, Rowanduz and other Kurdish areas. To fill the ensuing power vacuum,
the Kurdish nationalists took over the local administration in the Sulaimaniya division. Whereas
Cox and his officials reported to the Colonial Office that they had made this arrangement,
Helmi states that it was the Kurds who took the initiative in forming the Kurdish National Coun­c ils Given the hasty way in which British officials left Sulaimaniya, the domination of the natio­
nalists over the Council and Mahmud’s decision to turn it into a Kurdish government, the latterversion seems to be more accurate. Being Mahmud’s representative, Sheikh Qadir was elec­
ted by the Kurds as the president of the Kurdish National Council, which appointed heads ofpolice, treasury, customs, etc. The Kurdish nationalists expressed their willingness to contain

60* C.l. Edmonds, Note on the Kurdish Situation, 4 January 1923, -in- Shuckburgh, Colonial Office, toOsborne, Foreign Office, 25 January 1923, F0371/9004, PRO.
61* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, December 1922, F0371/7782, PRO.
62* Helmi. Memoirs, Vol.II, pp.331-2 & 351-52.

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Kemalist influence by arresting three pro-Turkish notables and asking for the maintenance ofa close link with the British High Commission in Baghdad. 63 According to British reports, theKurdish Council was successful in its main tasks of providing stability in the Kurdish areas both
inside and outside of its direct control, such as Pizhder and Khushnawati.64 All these develop­
ments reduced the influence of the Kemalists, who tended to capitalise on instability. The Iraq
Intelligence Report highlighted the favourable changed in the Kurdish situation:a reign of licence under Kurdish Sheikhs or Aghas makes a stronger appeal than the Kemalists can rival, unless they can back propaganda with force... In [the] Kirkuk division, eventsin Sulaimaniya have aroused no demonstration of hostility to [the British] Government
among the Kurdish tribes, many of whom are supporters of [the] Sheikhans [i.e. Mahmud’s
relatives] and will presumably be gratified by the return of Sheikh Mahmud.es
Following his return in early October, Mahmud capitalised on these political developments tocreate an autonomous Kurdish entity under his rule. His rejection of a new title as the head of
the Kurdish National Council in favour of his old title as governor of Kurdistan, 66 his creation ofa Kurdish army with the help of Kurdish officers and adoption of a national flag illustrate that
Mahmud’s main ambition was to be a national ruler rather than a local chief.
These measures, which encountered no British opposition, created a strong impres­sion among the Kurdish nationalists that Britain, at last, accepted the idea of a separate South­
ern Kurdistan under Kurdish rule. Noel described how Mahmud’s arrival in Sulaimaniya led to anationalist upsurge, and how Kurdish support for his Government exceeded the boundariesof the Sulaimaniya division to include Arbil. All Kurdish tribal leaders of the Kifri district were
present at Sulaimaniya, where they asked for an early date for the holding of elections "so thatthey may give publicity to their intention of declaring for Sheikh M a h m u d The Zanganah andTalabani Kurds all declared their support for the Kurdish Government led by Mahmud. In thespace of a few days, other Kurdish tribes in Kirkuk and Arbil professed similar inclinations. For
his part, Mahmud sent deputations to Kirkuk, Kifri and Arbil to mobilise the Kurds for the causeof an independent Southern Kurdistan.
The rapid developments in Southern Kurdistan following Mahmud’s return did notplease the British authorities in Mesopotamia. They interpreted the declaration of Kifri’s popu­
lation of their allegiance to the Mahmud leadership as a manifestation of disorder, 67 and similar

63* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 9 September 1922, F0371/7781, PRO.
64* HR, No. 18,15 September 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
65* Ibid.
66* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.II, p.535.
67* MR, No.1,1 January 1923, F0371/7772, PRO.

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criticisms were levelled at Kurdish support for the Kurdish Government in Arbil. Edmonds,
who reported that the Kurds of Kirkuk were won over to Mahmud, feared that the Dizai Kurds
in Arbil would demand unification with the autonomous Kurdish region. 68 He warned against
the “increasing” influence of Mahmud, who represented extreme Kurdish nationalism .69
Kurdish support for the autonomous movement was also rapidly increasing in Rania, Halabjah,
Khushnawati and other Kurdish areas. Encouraged by the overwhelming Kurdish support for
an independent Southern Kurdistan, Mahmud asked Cox to hold a referendum similar to thatof Mesopotamia in 1921. In retrospect one can see that what Mahmud asked for did not con­tradict the Colonial Office’s original position, namely that the Southern Kurds should beallowed to freely decide their own future.

The Reversal Of The British Policy From Separation to Incorporation
Given the considerable popularity which autonomous Kurdish rule enjoyed among the Kurds
and its success in restoring stability to many Kurdish areas in a very short period, Britain’s deci­sion to incorporate Southern Kurdistan into Iraq seemed incompatible with its desire for astable Southern Kurdistan. There were three main reasons why Britain eventually decided toextend Arab rule to the Kurdish areas against the wishes of the population. Firstly, from thevery beginning, the Kurdish Government of Mahmud faced hostile attitudes from Cox andHenry Dobbs, the Acting High Commissioner, who were determined to end the experiment of
Kurdish autonomy. Secondly, in October 1922 Winston Churchill was no longer the Colonial
Secretary in the wake of the collapse of the coalition Government of Lloyd George. The newColonial Secretary, Leo Amery, was unfamiliar with Kurdish affairs and he therefore had noconcrete approach to Southern Kurdistan’s situation, unlike his predecessor. Thirdly, the startof the Lausanne conference in November 1922 did not help the cause of the Southern
Kurds as the new Conservative Government of Bonar Law in Britain was determined to reach apeace agreement with Kemalist Turkey by offering some concessions. It was necessary that
Britain should not make Kemalist Turkey feel that Southern Kurdistan might pose a serious
threat to its security and territorial unity. Under these circumstances, the incorporation ofSouthern Kurdistan into Iraq and the containment of Kurdish nationalist aspirations emerged
as the only option to reassure the Kemalists of British intentions.
68* C.l. Edmonds, Note on the Kurdish Situation, 4 January 1923, -in- Shuckburgh, Colonial Office, toOsborne, Foreign Office, 25 January 1923, F0371/9004, PRO.
69* HR, No.1,1 January 1923, F0371/7772, PRO.

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Mahmud’s initial success in mobilising the Kurds for an independent Southern Kurdi­
stan was unwelcome news for Cox, who Intensified his efforts to contain the Kurdish national­
ist movement. To achieve this objective, he was active on two fronts: London and Southern
Kurdistan. Apart from the Said Taha scheme, Cox and his subordinates castigated doubt on
the reasons why the Kurdish Government of Mahmud was popular among the Southern
Kurds. The desire of Kurdish tribes to avoid paying taxes and Kurdish antipathy to the exis­
tence of a real government were, in the view of the British Divisional Adviser in Kirkuk, the only
reason why Mahmud was popular.70 in his reports to London, Cox emphasised Mahmud’s co­operation with the anti-British Kurds and his increasing contacts with the Kemalists, whobrought him under their control. There is no evidence to suggest that Mahmud established
his contacts with the Kemalists before the deterioration in relations between the Kurdish Gov­
ernment and the British High Commission in Baghdad. Mahmud’s contacts with the Kemalists,
as Helmi shows, started after Cox rejected the demands of the Kurds for the holding of a refer­endum to decide Southern Kurdistan’s future in the manner of Mesopotamia, and after it
became clear that Cox was determined to bring the Southern Kurds under Arab rule against
their will. British records show that Cox promised to send Mahmud arms, ammunition and pos­sibly aerial assistance as well as 200 levies, but nothing of this promise materialised. More­over, Cox ordered the return of those Kurdish officers who had accompanied Mahmud whenreturning to Sulaimaniya. These Kurdish officers were helping Mahmud to create a Kurdish
army. Helmi asserts that Mahmud wanted to fight the Kemalists, but he was not in a position to
do so because of the lack of material aid from the British.71
Several developments were responsible, in Helmi's view, for the deterioration in Mah­
mud’s relations with the British. Firstly, the British offered Mahmud no military or financial assis­
tance necessary for the expulsion of the Kemalist elements from Southern Kurdistan. Sec­
ondly, after its liberation from the Kemalists, the British refused to hand over Keuisenjaq to
the Kurdish Government unless Mahmud drove the Kemalists out of Rowanduz.7 2 Thirdly,
Mahmud interpreted the reluctance of the British to be directly involved in the fighting against
the Kemalists as a sign of their willingness to give up Southern Kurdistan, if they were placed
under more Kemalist pressure. By contrast, the Kemalists intensified their military and propa­
ganda activities and seemed far more determined than the British to get hold of Southern Kur70* HR, No.20,15 October 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
71* Helmi, Memoirs, Vol.ll, p.565.
72* Ibid, pp.582-3.

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distan.73 For all these reasons, and given British unwillingness to support an independent
Southern Kurdistan, Mahmud contacted the Kemalists, who at that time promised generous
Kurdish autonomy within Turkey, but the Kemalists never trusted Mahmud because he was a
Kurdish nationalist. As soon as the Kurdish Government was established, the Kemalists orga­
nised a propaganda campaign against Mahmud. 7 4 When Mahmud contacted the Kemalists,
Euzdemir, the commander of Turkish irregulars in Southern Kurdistan, did not trust his
motives and refused to support his rebellion.7 5
What appears from Helmi’s interpretation of these developments is that Mahmud
sought to keep open his options, unless the British showed strong willingness to accept aseparate Southern Kurdistan under his rule. Accordingly, he sought to prove that he held thebalance of power in Southern Kurdistan. Mahmud was reported to have said “in terms scarcely
veiled that he could at any time have turned out the Turks, if he had chosen to do so, but hedeliberately refrainedVe But in the absence of concrete British guarantees for an indepen­
dent Southern Kurdistan, if the Kemalist threat was defeated, Mahmud saw no point in fight­
ing the Kemalists on behalf of the British or the Arabs. Instead, he endeavoured to make themost of British troubles in Southern Kurdistan to achieve his nationalist aims. The British offi­
cials were aware of his tactics, Edmonds highlighting how Mahmud used the Kemalist pre­sence in Rania as a lever to “extort concessions” from the British.77
On the other hand, Cox focused his efforts on winning Kurdish support for Feisal’srule. From the very beginning, Cox closely co-ordinated his policy in Southern Kurdistan with
Feisal and his Arab Government. The main objectives were to politically isolate Sulaimaniya
from other Kurdish areas by registering primary electors for the Arab Constituent Assembly78
and to economically stifle the Kurdish Government by making the Kurdish areas pay taxes to
the Arab Government in Baghdad. The registration for the proposed elections included Kurd­
ish areas (such as Kirkuk and Kifri) that voted against Feisal in the referendum of 1921, andexpressed their clear desire to come under Kurdish rule. It was Cox’s pro-Arab measures
which alienated Mahmud, who began to take independent political initiatives without consult-

73* Ibid, pp.582-3.
74* Ibid, p.522.
75* Foreign Office Minute No.3020,11 April 1923, F0371/9004, PRO.
76* HR, No.1,1 January 1923, F0371/7772, PRO.
77* C.l. Edmonds, Note On Kurdish Situation, 4 January 1923 -in- Shuckburgh, Colonial Office, toOsborne, Foreign Office, 25 January 1923, F0371/9004, PRO.
78* HR, No.21,1 November 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.

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ing the British authorities in Baghdad. On hearing that the elections for the Arab Assembly
would include Southern Kurdistan, and that a Kurdish referendum would not be held, Mah­
mud declared himself king of Southern Kurdistan in late October:
From today, I have taken in my hands the tiller of the state and assured responsibility for theprotection of of the independence of Kurdistan. It is my hope that you will all work and strive
for the perpetuation of this glorious day and for the welfare of the progress of the nation.
KurdsI Now is your opportunity to labour unitedly as one family for the consolidation and pro­tection of the national rights which we have won.79
Through this step, Mahmud probably sought to step up pressure on the British to meet Kurd­
ish demands for an independent and a separate Southern Kurdistan. In November 1922,
Mahmud sent a Kurdish deputation to Baghdad to ask Cox to hold an election for the second­ary electors in order to form ' the nucleus of a Kurdish National Assembly to settle the ques­tion of the future of the Kurdish state and the form of government best suited to the Kurds”.so
The deputation also asked for official and public British recognition of the Kurdish Govern­
ment and the independence of Southern Kurdistan.si Cox refused to hold any free electionsin the Kurdish areas, 02 and instead of a free election he demanded that the Kurdish national­
ists moderate their demands, while promising that he would recommend to London and theGovernment of Iraq that “the right of Kurds within Iraq to set up a national government should
be officially recognised”.* Cox must have remembered how the majority of Southern Kurds
had rejected Feisal and Arab rule in the 1921 referendum, and that the holding of anotherreferendum or elections would most likely result in overwhelming Kurdish support for Mah­
mud and his Government. Indeed, Cox’s subordinates in Southern Kurdistan advised against
asking public opinion in areas, such as Kifri, as to their attitudes towards Feisal.84
Given the contradiction between Kurdish political aspirations and Cox’s plans for an
incorporated Southern Kurdistan, a clash between the Kurdish nationalists and the British
authorities in Baghdad was inevitable. In response to Cox’s rejection of his demand for theextension of Kurdish rule to Rania and Keuisenjaq, which were administratively part of Sulai­
maniya, 85 Mahmud purged all Kurdish officials who were suspected of being loyal to the Brit-

79* Ibid, Extract From Bank-i-Kurdistan, the official newspaper of the Kurdish Government.
80* Ibid.
81* HR, No.22,15 November 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
82* HR, No.21, 1 November 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
83* HR, No.22,15 November 1922, F0371J7772, PRO.
84* HR, No.23,1 December 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
85* HR, No.23,1 December 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.

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ish.se On 20 November, the Kurdish Government asked the British to prevent the officials of

the Arab Government from taking taxes from Kurdish areas until the boundary between thetwo countries had been settled. At the same time, Kurdish officials began to collect taxes fromthe Kurdish areas in spite of Cox’s opposition.87 The Kurdish Government in particular resis­
ted Arab attempts to impose taxes, especially on Kurdish tobacco, which was the most impor­tant source of revenue.
The turning point came in October 1922, in the wake of the disintegration of Lloyd
George’s coalition Government and Churchill’s losing his position as Colonial Secretary. Curzon, who retained his position as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the new Conser­
vative Government, considered Cox’s incorporation alternative as an ideal means of keeping
British control over Southern Kurdistan’s potential oil fields. At the Lausanne conference,
Curzon repeated all Cox’s political, economic and strategic justifications for the need to incor­
porate Southern Kurdistan into Iraq, warning the Kemalists against holding a referendum
because “the Kurds would doubtless vote for an independent Kurdistan ”.88 Moreover, unlike
his predecessor, the new Colonial Secretary, Leo Amery, did not possess strong views on
Kurdish affairs. Thus, with the disappearance of Churchill from the picture, the alternative ofSouthern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Iraq came to the fore. The first action of the new Brit­
ish Government was to sanction Cox’s scheme for an autonomous Southern Kurdistan within
Iraq.
The timing of the confrontation between the British authorities in Baghdad and theKurdish nationalists was not favourable to the latter because it coincided with the inaugurationof the Lausanne conference. It must be remembered that one of the reasons the Kemalists
laid their claim to Southern Kurdistan stemmed from the fear that Britain would establish it as
an independent entity, which would pose a serious threat to the territorial integrity of the newTurkey, where the Northern Kurds formed the second largest ethnic grouping. As Ernest
Main points out, the British were aware that Southern Kurdistan was crucial to the security ofboth new state of Kemalist Turkey and Arab Iraq. 89 Given these Kemalist fears, Curzon musthave considered the adoption of Cox’s incorporation alternative as a clear message to the
Kemalists that it would not threaten Turkey’s security through the establishment of a separate

86* Ibid.
87* Ibid.
88* Curzon’s Reply to Ismet Pasha, Respecting Mosul, No.1, 23 January 1923,371/9058, PRO.
89* Ernest Main, Iraq from Mandate to Independence (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1935), p. 133.

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Southern Kurdistan. Moreover, it became easier to argue that Southern Kurdistan should bepart of Iraq by referring to the Mesopotamian mandate as evidence of the fact that the three
Wilayets of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul had always been treated both politically and admin­
istratively as one unit by Britain. As soon as the Lausanne conference started, it was importantthat Britain should settle Southern Kurdistan’s future. Accordingly, a joint British-Feisal
declaration was issued which granted the Kurds living within “the boundaries” of Iraq the rightto form a local government as they desired .90
Ironically, Cox described the announcement of his scheme as a consolidation of
Kurdish nationalism, even though his scheme merely covered the Sulaimaniya region. He
hoped that the declaration of local autonomy would split the Kurdish nationalists into twogroups: “the more enlightened Kurds" and “the more ignorant and fanatical elements“ led by
Mahmud.91 Granting local autonomous status to Sulaimaniya became, as Mahmud was duly
informed, the only basis for any negotiation with the Kurdish nationalists. Beyond this issue,
Cox was not willing to negotiate with Mahmud, who quickly rejected the scheme of local auto­
nomy. In the face of both Cox’s determination and refusal to negotiate with the Kurdish Gov­
ernment’s delegates, Mahmud and his supporters revolted for the second time against the
British authorities, hoping to achieve their political objectives by force. The prospect of an
unstable Southern Kurdistan, while Britain and Turkey could not settle its future, was probably
the reason why Leo Amery expressed some hesitations about the inclusion of Southern Kur­
distan in Iraq’s forthcoming elections, as proposed by Henry Dobbs, the new High Commissio­
ner:Case of [thejlraqi Government in [the] event of Mosul’s boundary question being referredhereafter to arbitration, may be to some extent weakened by Kurdish vote against participa­tion in [the] elections. It is essential., in view of explicit assurance given in Parliament on 11
July last [year] by my predecessor., that we should give Kurds [a] real opportunity of deci­ding for themselves what is to be their attitude. 9 2
Dobbs, who followed in his predecessor’s footsteps, dismissed any danger that might result
from Kurdish participation in the elections, and went ahead with the implementation of theincorporation alternative. 93 He also refused to talk with Kurdish nationalists -led by Mahmudon major political issues such as granting the Southern Kurds an opportunity to decide their

90* HR, No.1,1 January 1923, F0371/7772, PRO.
91* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 16 November 1922, F0371/7782, PRO.
92* S/S to Acting High Commissioner, 7 June 1923, FO371/9014, PRO.
93* Acting High Commissioner to S/S, 16 July 1923, F0371/9014, PRO.

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future freely.9 4 Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Iraq was symbolised by including mostof Southern Kurdistan in the Iraqi elections in the autumn of 1923.

Conclusion
The deliberate use of gas bombs and air raids against civilian targets in the period 1922-1925
were clear indications of British desperation to quickly restore stability to Southern Kurdistan.
Britain needed to create the impression -when negotiating with the Kemalists over the issueof the Mosul Wilayet- that the situation in Southern Kurdistan was quiet, and that the South­
ern Kurds were content with Arab rule. Violent methods were the only way to decisively
defeat Kurdish insurgents led by Mahmud, and to prepare the way for the imposition of Arabrule over Southern Kurdistan. Reaching peace with Kemalist Turkey as soon as possible atthe Lausanne conference was an important factor in influencing Britain’s decision on the
future of Southern Kurdistan. With the disappearance of the prospect of a Kemalist invasion
from the north, there was no longer any need to turn Southern Kurdistan into a strategic buf­
fer to protect Mesopotamia from Kemalist Turkey. With the decline in strength of the Kurdish
nationalist movements in Northern and Eastern Kurdistan, the presence of a Kurdish Govern­
ment in Southern Kurdistan became an obstacle to Britain concluding a new peace treaty with
Kemalist Turkey, as the latter firmly opposed any form of Kurdish self-government.
The prevalence of Cox’s incorporation alternative over that of a separate Southern
Kurdistan between late 1922 and mid-1923 can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, Cox
was an important element in influencing the course of events in Southern Kurdistan. He , inhis capacity as High Commissioner, was the channel through which the Colonial Office had to
implement its Kurdish policy and receive information on the Kurdish situation. Cox, who had
long experience in imperial affairs, having served in India, Persia, the Persian Gulf and Meso­
potamia, built on what his predecessor, Wilson, bequeathed to him in terms of political andadministrative arrangements in Southern Kurdistan. He also adopted Wilson’s tactics, and pre­sented similar political, economic and strategic arguments to support his position. It is reason­
able to assume that it was not in Cox’s interest to accurately report anything that might weaken
the basis of his views on Kurdish affairs or to eagerly implement Churchill’s recommendations.
By virtue of his position as the High Commissioner responsible for the implementation of the
new British policy of indirect control and with the help of his like-minded civilian subordinates
94* Acting High Commissioner to S/S, 15 June 1923, FO371/9014, PRO.

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and military officials, Cox was in a stronger position than anybody else to influence politicaldevelopments in Southern Kurdistan. Just as Wilson destroyed the first Kurdish Government
and pre-empted the emergence of a separate and autonomous Southern Kurdistan in 191820, so Cox destroyed the second Kurdish Government and pre-empted the emergence of aseparate and an autonomous Southern Kurdistan in 1921-23.

189

The formation of the Iraqi state in place of the old British administration was not a straight for­ward process, given the fact that the British had not experienced a similar situation before, atleast, not in the Middle East. Firstly, the Iraqi state still had no well-defined international boun­daries -especially in the north and north-west- when the British appointed Feisal king of Iraq in
1921. The delimitation of these boundaries was not purely a political matter, but also financial
and strategic. In other words, the delimitation of Iraq’s boundaries was to be executed in sucha way that Britain would be in a position to withdraw its imperial forces, with a view to ending its
military expenditures in Mesopotamia. Secondly, to end all its other financial commitments,
Britain wanted the young Iraqi state to be economically self-sufficient in developing its own
institutions, such as the army and the police. Finally, the Sunni Arabs, on whom the successof the new experiment of indirect control depended, were numerically inferior in comparison
with the Shi'is, and therefore, it was crucial for Britain and Feisal to find a means to redress thiscritical sectarian imbalance. Given all these British strategic, economic and political concerns,
this chapter shows how Southern Kurdistan took on a new importance after the establishmentof the Iraqi state and how it decisively influenced Britain’s decision to incorporate it into the
Arab state. Emphasis will be placed on the way in which Britain’s own strategic, economic andpolitical interests converged with those of its client state in Mesopotamia

Arab Territorial Ambitions Versus Kurdish Nationalist Aspirations
i- Jeisal, <Che boundaries O f <the Sfraqi S ta te And T fic P o litical Status O f South­
ern Kurdistan
The territorial claims of the Sharifians and their Sunni Mesopotamian followers to Kurdistan
paralleled those of the Kemalists in Turkey and the ultra-nationalists in Persia. Each force
aimed to consolidate and expand its control in Kurdish areas at the expense of the nationalist
aspirations of the Kurds, as well as each other. When the British established an Arab Councilof Ministers in late 1920 with a view to its functioning as the nucleus of the Iraqi state, one ofits first decisions was to include in the Iraqi electoral law all the Kurdish divisions of the old Brit­ish administration. 1 The Council adopted a calculated step in restoring the old Ottoman admin1* MIR, No.4, 31 December 1920, F0371/6348, PRO.

190

istrative system instead of the fourteen divisions of the British civil administration, which had
been drawn on ethnical and tribal lines.2 The Kurdish division of Sulaimaniya would be relega­
ted to the status of a district. The report of the Ministry of Defence, under Ja'fer Pasha, a Sharifian follower, considered Southern Kurdistan as falling within the ‘natural boundaries”of Iraq,
whose defence should be guaranteed by Britain against foreign aggression.3 The Arab Coun­cil took it for granted that Southern Kurdistan was an integral part of the Arab state, regardlessof Kurdish wishes and the terms of the 1920 Sevres treaty. As Southern Kurdistan’s future
was an unresolved issue, London did not support the Arab Council’s unilateral decision. This
uncertainty about Southern Kurdistan’s ultimate future continued, even when London deci­
ded to appoint Feisal as king of the new Arab state in Mesopotamia. London informed Feisal,
before his departure to Iraq, that it had not defined the boundaries of his new Arab state, andhe accepted this situation without expressing any objection.4 From the British viewpoint,
defining the Mesopotamian boundaries -especially to the north and west- was very prematureand should depend on the clarification of the situation in the region, including the future of
the Sevres treaty and the geographical size of both French Syria and the new Turkey. The
determination of Iraq’s northern, southern and western boundaries was one of the main tasksof the newly-formed Middle East Departments
As soon as it became evident that he would be installed as king of Arab Iraq, Feisal
raised the issue of Iraq’s northern frontiers by pressing Britain to immediately bring Southern
Kurdistan under his rule. He even laid claims to several western Kurdish areas which he had
previously considered to be Arab when he had been the ruler of Syria. Feisal’s territorial claims
on Ottoman Kurdistan, which dated back to his father’s wartime correspondence with Britain,
went far beyond what the Arab Council had demanded. These claims are clearly illustrated by
the way Feisal defined the north-west boundaries of the new Iraq:
First North of Euphrates: Jezirah-ibn-Omar and Nisibin should... both [be] included in Iraq
and that frontier following central course of that river to its junction with Euphrates, should
run from Jezirah to Nisibin thence south-ward to [the] bank of Khabour.e
The cornerstone of Feisal’s approach was that Britain should consider the Kurdish situation inlight of the fulfilment of Iraq’s military, economic and political needs, as well as the mainte2* Philip Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1937), p.296.
3* MIR, No.9,15 March 1921, F0371/6348, PRO.
4* Minute of the Meeting of the Eastern Committee On November 3, Regarding Policy in Kurdistan,
F0371/6347, PRO.
5* Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World, p.93
6* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 12 February 1922, F0371/7781, PRO.

191

nance of local Arabs’ good will towards him and his British patrons. Moreover, he presented
British interests as being identical with Arab territorial ambitions in Ottoman Kurdistan, whenthe British-Turkish dispute oyer Southern Kurdistan’s future came to a head after 1920. To
contain the Kemalist threat, Feisal and his Sunni entourage in Baghdad went so far as to sug­gest the luring of the “ Northern Kurds to join an autonomous Kurdistan under suzerainty of
Iraq ”! At the same time, Feisal warned the British against the danger that a united Kurdistan

would pose to their interests in Mesopotamia. To pre-empt that development, Feisal invited
the British to immediately determine the status of Southern Kurdistan by its inclusion into his
Arab state.s London, which lacked the necessary military and financial resources to consoli­
date its own influence (let alone satisfy Feisal’s excessive ambitions), refused to take any
expansionist step in Kurdistan. The Colonial Office continued to oppose Feisal and his Sunnientourage’s demands for Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation until the end of 1922, on the
grounds that they contradicted its policy of encouraging “Arab nationalism not Arab imperial­
ism ".9

ii- The 1921 Referendum On M esopotam ia
The holding of a referendum on his candidature for the newly-created Iraqi throne in the sum­mer of 1921 presented the ideal opportunity for Feisal to bring Southern Kurdistan under his
rule. He was able, with the tacit support of the British authorities in Baghdad, to persuade theColonial Office to allow the participation of the Southern Kurds in that referendum, hoping toobtain convenient results that might be used as justification for Southern Kurdistan’s incor­
poration into Iraq. The referendum was a fraudulent experiment, as British advisers and proBritish Mutassarifs made every effort to ensure Feisal’s victory. It was these officials who
expressed the opinion of most divisions, summoned meetings and declared results. The
referendum rules were very simple and took the form of a petition (Madhbata):
We, the undersigned, resident of Nahiya/Mahala, in Qada/Town of, in the Liwa of/73ye heard, understood and fully considered the above Resolution of the Council ofState, and it results thatexpress themselves in agreement therewith, and profess their
allegiance to Amir Feisal, while have signified their dissent.1 0
Given the British decision to install Feisal as king -regardless of local wishes- and the boycott

7* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 15 August 1922, F0371/7800, PRO.
8* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 23 September 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
9* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 25 October 1921. F0371/6347, PRO.
10* MIR No.18,1 August 1921, C0730/4, PRO.

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of the Shi'is and their traditional leaders, the results of the referendum cannot not be consid­
ered as a true expression of the people’s wishes/either in Southern Kurdistan or in Mesopo­
tamia. As Philip Ireland shows in his examination of the way in which the referendum was car­ried out that in the Basra division, "selected representatives" of the local people were called ingroups to make their declarations in the presence of an Election Committee. 1 1 Local notables
often presented British officials with two petitions on behalf of one area: one was against Fei­sal, the other in favour. It was up to British officials to choose the petition they wanted.
Originally, the referendum served two political purposes. Firstly, it was an attempt togive some legitimacy to Feisal’s ascendancy to the Iraqi throne. Secondly, the British Govern­
ment sought to convince the British Parliament that the Mesopotamian situation was undercontrol, and therefore, there was no need for Britain to disassociate itself politically from thecountry in the wake of the bloody 1920 rising. Feisal, like Cox, sought to use the referendum
for another purpose, namely, as a means of bringing Southern Kurdistan under direct Arab
control. Initially, the referendum concerned only the Mesopotamian Arabs and not the South­
ern Kurds. By extending the referendum to Southern Kurdistan, however, Feisal hoped toobtain convenient results that would enable h im to incorporate the Kurdish areas into the
Iraqi state. Thus the desired results of the referendum would not only disarm the Kurdish
nationalists in a political sense, but would also forestall any development towards the forma­tion of a separate Southern Kurdistan. Despite an early decision to keep Kurdish affairs separ­
ate from those of Mesopotamia, the Colonial Office agreed to allow the three predominantly
Kurdish divisions of Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk and Mosul to take part in the referendum, if the local
Kurds so wished.
In the Sulaimaniya division, where the Kurdish nationalists were able to make local
Kurds understand the real purpose of the referendum, the Kurds unanimously rejected theidea of participation, let alone voting in favour of Feisal’s Arab rule. Thus, one third of South­
ern Kurds did not take part in the referendum. In the Kurdish divisions of Kirkuk and Mosul,
where the activities of the Kurdish nationalists were restricted, British sources reported that
local Kurds took part in the referendum. Despite the crudity of the referendum, important
points can be derived from its results insofar as they concerned Kurdish attitudes towards
Arab rule. The local Kurds living within the districts of the Mosul division such as Amadia, Sinjar, Aqra, Dohuk and Zakho, were reported to have voted in favour of Feisal and Iraq. The 68

11* Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development, p.332.

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petitions that represented this division, however, showed that these Kurds wanted -apartfrom the protection of their rights regarding education, government, the law an so on- to retain
the right to join Northern Kurdistan in case it became an independent state. This reveals, atthe very least, how ill-informed these Kurds were about the political implications of the refer­endum. Once they accepted Feisal as their ruler, there was no way that they could join any
Kurdish state in the future. These Kurds seemed to consider Feisal’s rule as a temporary
arrangement pending other developments in Kurdistan. Moreover, given the existence of
local Kurdish rebellions in most of the above mentioned Kurdish districts, one can dispute theidea that the majority of local Kurds participated in the referendum. The political disorder andlocal rebellions against the British in these Kurdish districts were incompatible with the British
reports that the Kurds of the Mosul division were unanimously in favour of Feisal, or that thesubmitted Madhabatas reflected the opinion of the majority. These Kurdish districts did notdesire British control, let alone Arab rule. Indeed, when Co. Wilson held a plebiscite in 19181919, the local Kurds in the Mosul division voted overwhelmingly against Arab rule.1 2
The population of the Kirkuk division were reported to have voted against both Feisal
and the incorporation into Iraq. There were 21 petitions against and 20 in favour of Feisal,though a number of petitions were not completed. The anti-Feisal petitions mostly stated thatthey were signed by people who were “not Arabs”, and therefore, they “prefer[edj to wait and
see what independent Kurdistan is going to be like”.13 At unofficial meetings in Kirkuk, theparticipants decided that if Feisal became king they would “demand union with Kurdistan”.1 4
Kurdish (and even some Arab) notables told a British adviser in a private conversation that“they did not want Feisal or an Arab government".15 The Turkoman community wanted noth­
ing but inclusion in Turkey, whereas all the Kurdish areas, which formed the majority of thedivision, asked for a Kurdish government. ie The very fact that only 261 out of 31,269 people
in this division were in favour of Feisal and the inclusion into Iraq, demonstrates how British
officials on the ground could manipulate the results by declaring that the difference between
those who were in favour of Feisal’s Iraq and those who were not, was just one petition. In his
analysis of the referendum results, Ireland shows that British officials arbitrarily declared

12* Ireland, Iraq: A Study In Political Development, p. 168.
13* HR, No. 19,15 August 1921, F0371/6353, PRO.
14* Ibid.
15* Ibid.
16* Ibid.

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unanimity instead of “ majority' when announcing the results in a town or a district. 17 What canbe safely deduced from this referendum is that, despite all Cox’s political efforts in support of
Feisal, the vast majority of the Southern Kurds rejected Feisal and Arab rule. The results of
the referendum in Southern Kurdistan clearly disappointed Feisal, who intended to use themas evidence of unanimous Kurdish support for Arab rule and the incorporation of Southern
Kurdistan into Iraq.
Following the referendum and the establishment of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq,
Feisal continued to dissuade London from the idea of holding a separate referendum inSouthern Kurdistan so that the local Kurds could directly decide their political future. His argu­
ment was that the holding of another referendum would cast huge doubt upon the "validity”
of the first referendum in Mesopotamia. 1 8 Feisal closely co-ordinated his efforts with Cox ingetting the inclusion of Southern Kurdistan into the electoral law for the Arab National
Assembly.i9This step was taken at a time when tension was reaching a peak in Kurdish areas,accompanied by unceasing Kurdish demands for the return of Mahmud and Kurdish Govern­
ment. When the Colonial Office finally decided to bring Mahmud back to Sulaimaniya in orderto calm the situation, Feisal strongly opposed the move. He apparently feared that Mahmud
might be able to fill the existing political and military vacuum resulting from imminent British
withdrawal by establishing a workable Kurdish administration. While Mahmud was on his way toSulaimaniya, Cox arranged a meeting between him and Feisal. Although British sources said
nothing about the reasons for the meeting, it is very likely that Feisal hoped to persuade Mah­
mud to declare his allegiance to him and thus accept Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into
Iraq. The absence of any statement suggests that nothing came out of the meeting; Mahmud
would not recognise Feisal and Arab rule, nor would Feisal accept a separate Southern Kurdi­
stan.
The formation of the Conservative Government in London in October 1922 led (asexplained in chapter six) to the relegation of the alternative of a separate Southern Kurdistan
to the background and the coming to the fore of the incorporation alternative. Against thisbackground, Feisal worked closely with the British High Commission in Baghdad in December
1922 towards producing the so called British-Feisal declaration for local Kurdish autonomy:
HBMG and the Government of Iraq recognise the rights of the Kurds living within the boun­daries of Iraq to set up a Kurdish government within these boundaries and hope that the dif17* Ireland, Iraq; A Study In Political Development, p.332.
18* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 5 January 1922, F0371/7780, PRO.
19* HR, N0 .8 , 15 April 1922, F0371/7771, PRO.

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ferent Kurdish elements will, as soon as possible, arrive at an agreement between them­selves as to the form which they wish that that Government should take and will send
responsible delegates to Baghdad to discuss their relations with HBMG and the Governmentof Iraq.20
Feisal hoped through this declaration to undermine Mahmud’s position among Kurdish natio­
nalists by dividing them into moderates -who would accept local autonomy- and the extremists-who wanted a separate Southern Kurdistan. The abandonment of the project of Kurdish
autonomy a few weeks later reveals that the British-Feisal declaration was nothing more than atactical manoeuvre by Feisal, who, like Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, had no intention of imple­
menting it.

The Establishment Of The Iraqi State And Its Political Implications For The
Future Of Southern Kurdistan
T h e R eq u irem en t O f Successful T ra n s itio n Jro m D ire c t To in d ire c t tfritis h
C o n tro li-

The British policy of indirect control depended on the successful implementation of two inter­
connected political measures: the establishment of an Arab state in Mesopotamia and Feisal’s
candidacy for the Iraqi throne. In view of its acute financial problems and internal political pres­sure for British withdrawal from Mesopotamia, London could not afford any delay in imple­
menting its new policy. In Churchill’s words, Feisal offered London the “cheapest solution" to
its Mesopotamian problem.21 Other political questions, which London was supposed to deal
with, were postponed in order to devote all attention to the establishment of the Mesopota­
mian state under Feisal. One of these important questions was the fate of Southern Kurdi­
stan, whose ethnic boundaries with Mesopotamia were on the verge of being defined. The
following Colonial Office minute illustrates the inter-connection between the political affairs of
Mesopotamia and Southern Kurdistan:no final decision should be taken on our Kurdish policy [i.e. demarcation of Arab-Kurdish
boundary] until... Cox had an opportunity of discussing the matter with Feisal... A step in thewrong direction might have disastrous results, which would not be confined to Kurdistan. We
are engaged in a very delicate political transaction in Mesopotamia and cannot afford to takeany unnecessary risks and it is most important that, when we arrive at a decision on our
Kurdish policy, it should be the right one.22
Against this background, Churchill informed Cox that the political priority was to “make certainof the early choice of Feisal" as king of the new Arab state, and that “other questions should
20* HR, No. 1,1 January 1923, F0371/7772, PRO.
21* Report on the Middle East Conference Held in Cairo and Jerusalem, F0371/6342, PRO, p.36.
22* Colonial Office Minute No.31558, 23 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.

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come after”, 2 3 including Southern Kurdistan’s future. The immediate effect of this postpone­
ment of fresh British measures in Southern Kurdistan was to create a new source of pressurethat was to influence the direction of British Kurdish policy. In other words, Britain’s need tocarry out a smooth and speedy transition from direct to indirect control placed Feisal and his
Sunni entourage in such a position that they would become an effective player in Kurdish
affairs. The latter were quite aware of London’s pressing need to end its financial burdens in
the Middle East and made the most of its sensitivities about issues relating to the security,
economic viability and political stability of the new state, so as to persuade the British policy
makers that, for a number of reasons, Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Arab Iraq was anecessity. The emergence of Feisal and his Sunni entourage as a political force in favour of anincorporated Southern Kurdistan also helped to strengthen Cox’s hands vis-£-vis the Colonial
Office.
The issue of Southern Kurdistan’s fate was deliberately incorporated by Feisal and his
Sunni entourage into the internal politics of the new Arab state as soon as it came into exis­
tence. As Feisal was a foreign ruler, who had neither a legitimate ground for ruling the country
nor a mandate from local Arabs, he depended on the support of a number of Sunni Arab offi­
cers. Apart from having long-held territorial ambitions in Ottoman Kurdistan, Feisal wanted toturn himself into a champion of the issue of Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Arab Iraq
in order to cement his alliance with these Sunni Arabs. He, simultaneously, sought to create apersonal popularity among the Arab population by projecting himself as a true Iraqi, who was
unwilling to let part of his country break away. The common stand on the issue of Southern
Kurdistan’s future made the bond between Feisal and the newly-emerging Sunni politicalmilitary caucus in the new state much stronger, and it became a new political factor that -tosome degree- influenced the direction of Britain’s Kurdish policy by hindering any real progr­
ess towards the establishment of an autonomous and a separate Southern Kurdistan. Cox
warned against the outlining of the ethnic boundary between a separate Southern Kurdistan
and the Arab state, which the Colonial Office contemplated thus:More extreme Arab nationalist elements would greatly resent our action, and, it will be
opposed and apdTonly accepted under protest by Council of State... [The] Arab kingdom,which one day will have to stand alone, from a strategic point of view, is being given inde­
fensible frontier. Arab nationalists are very much alive to this points
Feisal focused on questioning Britain’s long-term commitments to the defence of
23* S/S for the Colonies to High Commissioner of Iraq, Priority, 9 July 1921, F0371/6552, PRO.
24* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/St for the Colonies, Part One, 24 June 1921, F0371 /6346, PRO.

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Southern Kurdistan from outside aggression, to guarantee Iraq’s security from Turkish attack
via that area, and to take responsibility for preventing disorder in Southern Kurdistan, which
he described as posing a danger to Iraq. 25 Feisal implied that the alternative of Southern Kur­
distan’s incorporation into his Arab Kingdom would solve British anxieties about using an inex­
pensive means to protect its interests in Mesopotamia. Whether it was imaginary or real, Feisal
wasted no time in presenting any political or military development as a threat to his infant king­dom, and therefore ultimately, to British interests. He defined, for example, the sole objectiveof the 1921 French-Kemalist treaty as being to defeat both British policies and Arab nationalist
aspirations.2 e He referred to the danger the treaty presented to Iraq’s security by highlighting

the fact that it had given the Kemalists a strong impetus to continue their intrigues and hostile
propaganda against Iraq. To counter the Kemalist danger, he pressed London for "a definite
pronouncement” and "a clear reply” on the problem of Iraq’s defence. 27 in other words, if Bri­
tain was not prepared to accept full military responsibility for the preservation of Iraq’s borders,Feisal demanded that he had to have "a determining voice in the decision as to what theseborders are to be”,28 i.e. the northern edges of the Mosul Wilayet. His anxiety about the threatthat the Kemalists posed to Iraq through Southern Kurdistan was shared by Cox and British
military personnel in Mesopotamia.29
Another political consideration used by Feisal and his Sunni entourage to justify theirclaims to Southern Kurdistan was that the establishment of an independent Southern Kurdi­
stan would encourage Arab areas in Mesopotamia, especially Basra, to demand similar politicalstatus from the British Government. Cox, who voiced Feisal’s fears, warned Churchill against
the idea of establishing a separate Kurdish entity in Southern Kurdistan because it would set
an example for other communities, such as the Turkoman and Assyrian-Chaldeans, to follow.
He argued that “if Sulaimaniya was allowed to separate, Basra and other communities would
want to follow suit and it would be difficult to argue with them”. 30 The existence of this state ofaffairs in Mesopotamia highlights the fragility of the foundations on which the British werebuilding a national state in that country. As British records show, when local Arab notables in
Basra were asked by the British to express their views on the establishment of a united Arab
25* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 25 October 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
26* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 18 November 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
27* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 12 November 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
28* News Summary For The Period Ended 11th November 1921, CO730/7, PRO.
29* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 21 November 1921, CO730/7, PRO.
30* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 5 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO.

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state by merging the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets, they initially opposed the scheme. These
notables had no desire to be ruled from Baghdad by Feisal and his “Baghdadi officers". Even
when they were finally persuaded by the British to accept the scheme, they insisted on enjoy­
ing “special treatment" in the form of a local autonomy. This would entail the formation of a
special legislative assembly, an army and a police force for Basra.31 Initially, Churchill contem­
plated the idea of local autonomy for Basra within Iraq. But the British authorities in Baghdad
showed no interest in the idea of a federal Mesopotamian state and it was therefore ignored.
The importance of the use of force in building an Arab state is clearly illustrated by the insis­
tence of British officials in Baghdad on retaining British imperial forces in the country. They
feared that the premature withdrawal of British forces would not only encourage a Kemalist
invasion, but also be interpreted throughout Mesopotamia as “a sign of weakness and proofof indecision on London’s part”.3 2 Consequently, Mesopotamia would move towards further
disintegration rather than political unity.
Britain’s urgent need to conclude a bilateral political-military treaty with Feisal to finalise
the basis of the relations between London and Baghdad was used by the latter as a means ofexerting pressure on the former. In other words, in return for Britain’s acceptance of Southern
Kurdistan’s incorporation into Iraq, Feisal would work towards the successful conclusion ofthat treaty. At the same time, he sought to persuade London that if this treaty recognised
Southern Kurdistan as part of Arab Iraq and thus satisfied Arab public opinion, it would have adeterrent effects on the Kemalists .33 Cox reported Feisal’s views to Churchill as being that:
Turkey will see the gamble is up so far as Iraq is concerned, once she realises that the coun­
try has become an independent and united people hostile to Turkey and in treaty with us...
[Accordingly] Feisal urges speedy conclusion of [the] Treaty on [the] above g ro u n d s
To mobilise Arab public opinion behind their demand for the inclusion of Southern Kurdistan
in Iraq, Feisal and his supporters waged a propaganda campaign throughout the duration of
the Allied talks with Kemalist Turkey on the conclusion of a new Turkish peace treaty. They
made clear that the results of these talks would have fateful effects on present and future British-lraqi relations and general Arab attitudes towards Britain, al-lraq, a pro-Feisal newspaper,
wrote that:
the Arabs are convinced that there is no other nation so sympathetic to Arab aspirations as
Great Britain.., There is no doubt that His Excellency [i.e.Cox] will strive for the consolidation of the relations between Iraq and Great Britain. Iraq al-Arabi is, before all things, the
31 * High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 29 June 1921, CO730/2, PRO
32* S/S for Air, Memorandum,16 November 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
33* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 1 February 1922, FO371/7780, PRO.
34* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 4 February 1922, FO371/7780, PRO.

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friend of Britain but also a nation with a deep love of freedom and believes that mutualadvantage is the basis on which to protect her relations with Iraq and respect for for the opi­
nion of the Iraqi people and the encouragement of national feeling within [the] country. 35
While the Colonial Office desired to see Southern Kurdistan outside Arab rule, its principal aimof not hampering Feisal’s candidature and the transitional process of from direct to indirect
British control in Mesopotamia made it extremely difficult to ignore Arab opposition to the ideaof a separate Southern Kurdistan. This state of affairs, coupled with the holding of the Lau­sanne conference, ultimately tipped the balance in favour of Cox and Feisal’s incorporation
alternative.

ii- S e c ta ria n P o litic s A n d S outhern K u rd istan 's in c o rp o ra tio n in t o *Che ir a q i
S ta te

The three Ottoman Wilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul shared no common political, eco­nomic or cultural identity under Turkish rule. All these three Wilayets (as chapter four illustra­ted) were distinct in terms of their ethnic-religious composition as well as their political, econo­
mic and cultural orientations. The effects of the First World War were to accentuate -rather
than weaken- these contradictory economic, cultural, ethnic and religious features among thecommunities of the three Wilayets by the crystallisation of contradictory political aspirations. In
Southern Kurdistan, for instance, the Kurdish nationalists opted for a separate Kurdish entity
and were politically orientated towards their brethren in Eastern and Northern Kurdistan. In
Arab Mesopotamia, the situation was totally different. On the one hand, sectarian-religious
affiliations counted more for the Shi'i Arabs than their ethnic origins. The members of Shi'i
elite, unlike the Sunnis, played no part in the so called Arab revolt led by Sharif Hussein. As
Ireland argues, to the Shi'i clergy the term ‘nationalism’ meant the establishment of an Islamicstate.36 As a whole, the Shi'is put up notable resistance to the British invasion of Mesopota­

mia. Afterwards, they played a major part in opposing the imposed British rule, which led to thebloody 1920 rising. Other tiny ethnic-religious communities adopted a different position on
the issue of their future. The Jewish community was suspicious of the establishment of an
Arab state under a Sharifian ruler, whereas the Turkomans and Assyrian-Chaldeans opposed
the establishment of both Kurdish and Arab states. The former desired absolutely the returnof Turkish rule, while the latter sought British help to establish their own national state in Kurdi-

35* Al Iraq, No.89,12 January 1923 -in- II R, No.3,1 February 1923, F0371/7772, PRO.
36*lreland, Iraq: A Study in Political Devebpment, p.246.

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stan.
For their part, Sunni representatives in Baghdad and Basra did not want any politicalarrangement that would place them under the rule of the Shi'i majority. Instead, they preferred
either the continuation of the British administration or the establishment of an Arab state
under a Sunni ruler, regardless of his ethnic identity, such as Burhan al-Din, the son of Abdul
Hamid.37The Naqib (Sunni religious leader) of Baghdad, Abdul Rahman al-Gaylani, represen­
ted the first alternative, whereas Said Talib of Basra represented the latter. Initially, these Sun­
nis were afraid of Sharifian rule because they mistakenly thought that the Sharifian family
would tolerate Shi'i hegemony over the would-be Arab state.38 According to Gertrude Bell,
the Naqib of Baghdad said that
I would never consent to the appointment of the Sharif or of his son as Amir. The Hejaz is one
and Iraq is one; there is no connection but that of the faith... I would rather a thousand times
have the Turks back in Iraq than see the Sharif or his sons installed here.39
It was only a few Sunni officers, mostly Baghdadis, who helped to forge the pragmatic politicallink between the interests of the Sunnis and those of the Sharifians, on the one hand, andbetween the Feisal-Sunni bloc and British authorities in Baghdad, on the other. These Meso­
potamian Sunnis had joined the Sharifian forces during and after the war and accompanied
Feisal during his short-lived rule in Syria. 4 0 Henceforth, they had been advocating the Shari­fian cause through the establishment of an Arab state under a Sharifian ruler. For them such aruler enjoyed two essential virtues, firstly being Arab, and secondly, being Sunni. He would,
therefore, maintain the continuation of the long Turkish tradition of Sunni domination over thecountry’s destiny. Subsequent political developments in Mesopotamia from 1920 onward ver­ified these conclusions, as the Sunni elite controlled all Iraqi Governments, the army and thecivil service.
Such a promising prospect of continuing their old domination was the reason why theSunni notables of Mesopotamia and those of the town of Mosul, in particular, embraced the
Sharifian cause. Consequently, a political alliance emerged, which was based on mutual inter-

37* R.W. Bullard, Colonial Office Minute No.14659,4 April 1921, Notes on MIR, N0 .6 , 31 January 1921,
CO730/1, PRO.
38* Ibid.
39* Elizabeth Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, From Her Personal Papers, 1914-1926, (London: Ernest Benn,
1958), p. 10.
40* Ironically, apart from Nuri al-Sa'id, all Baghdadi officers fought alongside the Turks in the earlystages of the war. For instance, Jafer Pasha joined the Sharifian side after being captured by the Brit­
ish.

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ests between the British authorities, Feisal and the Sunnis. On the one hand, Feisal, who was
not Mesopotamian and lacked a legitimate claim to the Iraqi throne, desperately needed -apartfrom the British- an internal political force through which he could maintain his rule. The Sunni
Arabs assumed this role. They, in return for their loyalty and support, expected total domina­tion over the new state’s institutions, such as the government, the civil service and the army.
The enthusiasm of the Sunni Arabs in Mesopotamia and in exile to participate in the trans­
itional process from direct British control (which was characterised by the existence of British
administration and the presence of imperial forces) to indirect control (which was characterisedby the establishment of the Iraqi state under a British mandate) stemmed from their desire to
influence British Mesopotamian policy in terms of filling the existing vacancies in the newnative administration. Ja'fer Pasha, the first Acting Defence Minister after the establishment of
the Iraqi state, looked on the issue of filling new posts created by the establishment of thenative administration from a purely sectarian perspective. He called on the British to exclude
the tribal Sheikhs (who were mostly Shi'is) from taking administrative posts in their localities,
except in the holy towns of Najaf and Karbala, arguing that they were unqualified.41 Most
importantly, the Sunnis resisted the idea of establishing a separate representation for thetribes in the would-be National Assembly, for it would inevitably turn the Shi'is into a strong
political force. Ireland reveals how the Shi'i politicians criticised the Arab Council of Statebecause it contained no Shi'is among its members. Only after Cox’s interference did theSunni dominated Council allowed one Shi'i to act as Minister for Education.4 2 Ironically, thisoutright sectarian position on the political life of the new state by the Sunnis sharply contradic­
ted their pan-Iraqi rhetoric, which they used to justify their demand for Southern Kurdistan’s
incorporation into Arab Iraq.
Apart from some help, which was rendered by a few Sunni military and civilian ele­ments, the establishment of the Iraqi state was exclusively a British undertaking and was car­ried out in the absence of any Mesopotamian-wide political movement or a solid material infra­
structures This Sunni help coupled with the Shi’i resistance to the British during and follow-

41* Note on Mesopotamia.., op. cit. This was the origin of the myth that Shi'is were unsuitable to enter
the most sensitive spheres such as the state bureaucracy, government and army, which has become
the point of departure for some researches, such as Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development, andHanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutbnary Movements of Iraq, Vol.I, (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1978).
42* Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Devebpment, pp.297-298.
43* See for example Liora Lukitz, Iraq, the Search for National Identity, (London: Frank Cass, 1995).

202

ing their occupation of the country, made the British authorities in Baghdad desire the estab­lishment of a covert sectarian state by excluding the Shi'is from holding key governmental,
civilian and military positions in line with the old Turkish tradition of Sunni domination over the
Shi'is. Given this sectarian nature of the newly-established Iraqi state, the incorporation ofSouthern Kurdistan into Iraq, with its substantial Sunni population, had additional politicalvalue, which was to redress the numerical balance between the Shi'is, who formed the major­
ity of the population, and the Sunnis, who were the minority (See| thispage for the

Sectarian-religious distribution in the three Wilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra).
(The population of Mesopotamia (including Southern Kurdistan)
The population of Mesopotamia was 2,849,282, according to a British census taken in 1920
and,in terms of religious and sectarian composition was made up as follows:
Sunni

Shi'i

JewishChristian Other Religion Total

42,558721,414

10,088

2,551

8,989

785,600

Baghdad 524,414

750,42162,565

20,7712,133

1,360,304

Mosul

579,713

22,18014,83555,47031,180703,378

Total

1,146,685 1,494,015

87,48878,79242,302

2,849,282

Basra

The Figures for Mosul include the population of the Kurdish area of Sulaimaniya, viz., 155,000of whom all but 1,100 are Sunnis.44

It suited Feisal to play the sectarian card in order to strengthen his position in the
country where he lacked popular support, especially among the Shi'i majority, who were far
more loyal to their traditional religious leaders than to the Effendis (intellectuals). He also usedsectarianism as another argument for the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into his state.
Cox reported that Feisal:emphasised that the question of Kurdistan had further aspect for him as king of Iraq, which
had probably not been fully considered by us [the British], This was the question of prepon­
derance of Sunnis or Shi'is with special reference to the question of constitutional assembly
shortly to be convoked. As we aware, there was already technical and numerical preponder­ance of Shi'is and excision of a large slice of Sunni districts of Iraq out of state and exclu­
sion of their representatives from national assembly, would place Shi'is In a very strong
position and filled him with misgivings.4 5
In reporting Feisal’s views, Cox, who shared the idea of the importance of sectarian politics to
44* Colonial Office List (London: Waterlow & Sons Limited, 1921).
45* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 23 September 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.

203

British political interests, urged Churchill to look into the political implications of any Kurdish
participation in the future Iraqi National Assembly, which he considered as vital:
It would be a reasonable course to work for the inclusion of the Kurdish districts [i.e. in
Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya division] and their participation in [the] National Assemblyon conditions of local assent and special supervision by [the] British officers and, if
necessary, by [the] High Commissioner.46
The sectarian Importance of Southern Kurdistan to Iraqi politics coincided with sharp tension
between the Feisal-Sunni bloc and the traditional Shi'i leaders .47 it resulted in the expulsionof the latter from the country, probably to weaken their influence during the coming elections
for the new National Assembly. Ultimately, the British authorities and the Sunni elite played
the same card in the game of maintaining their influence. On the one side, the British used
the sectarian instrument to rule the country through the Sunni minority, who, because of theirnumerical weakness vis-a-vis the Shi'i majority, would depend on British support and thus
would remain loyal. On the other side, the Sunnis would keep unchallenged their hegemony
over the state and its institutions by playing off the Shi'is against the Kurds.

The Incorporation Of Southern Kurdistan Into The Newly Established Iraqi
State: Oil-Economic Considerations
For mainly strategic reasons, Britain began to expand its political and economic influence toterritories, where oil was known or believed to exist and, if possible, to exclude other Powers
from having any political or economic influence in such areas. Between 1900 and 1914, as
chapter one showed, Britain was deeply involved in intensifying international rivalries withother Powers in order to obtain oil-related concessions in the Asiatic territories of the Ottoman
Empire. The effect of the outbreak of the First World War was to underline more then ever Bri­tain’s need to obtain oil, by controlling either the sources or suppliers of oil. In order to haveformal control over the whole of the Mosul Wilayet, where oil was known to exist, British forces
occupied Mosul. From then onward, the British Government worked diplomatically towards
preparing conditions for turning their de facto control over Mosul into a de jure one. The firststep in the direction of finalising British control over the Mosul Wilayet, as chapter five illustra­ted, was the success of the British Government in altering the terms of the 1916 Sykes-Picot
agreement. This enabled Britain to take over the French sphere of influence in the Mosul
Wilayet in return for a 25% French share in the TPC. To forestall any American support for
46* Ibid.
47* It is worth noting that the same Shi’i leaders were mobilising the Persian people against Britain’s
growing political and economic control over Persia following the First World War.

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Turkish claims to Mosul, Britain also granted America a 25% share in the TPC. Allowing theAmericans and the French to have a share in the TPC would help Iraq to exploit the oil fields ofthe Mosul Wilayet as early as possible, without facing international complications.
The issue of oil took on another important dimension after 1918 as a consequence ofthe need to create a financially self-sufficient British -and later native- administration in Meso­
potamia. Col. Wilson first raised the issue of the importance of oil when seeking to persuade
the British Government to immediately deal with the issue of oil concessions in the Wilayets ofMosul and Baghdad. He was particularly concerned with the prosperity of the existing British
administration. As oil resources were Mesopotamia’s main asset, he argued, they should betreated as its only guarantee for obtaining the loans necessary to materially develop the country.48 Therefore, he wanted his administration, rather than commercial companies, to control
this asset. The creation of a solid material infrastructure, while establishing an Arab state in
Mesopotamia, was still an important issue faced by the British Government. In the absence ofother material resources, and due to the prevailing economic backwardness of Mesopotamia,
oil became important politically for the viability and long-term survival of the newly emerging
Iraq state. The establishment of this state once more brought to the fore the question ofdeveloping the potential oil resources of the Mosul and Baghdad Wilayets for the benefit of
the native Government in Baghdad.
The material security of the Iraqi state was of special concern for British officials in
Mesopotamia, notably Cox, who, like Col. Wilson, linked the survival of the local administration
to a speedy exploitation of the potential oil wealth of the country:
An Iraqi Government has been established, which though not yet able to stand alone, israpidly consolidating and requires that the resources of that country be developed... Oil has
been struck at Naft Khanh*9 and though not yet in paying quantity, prospects are bright. If
this oil could be worked to the benefit of the Iraqi state, the effect would be excellent politic­
ally and economically... The provision of cheap fuel would undoubtedly change the face ofthe railway problem and give a great impetus to agricultural development and the purchaseof machinery.so
The need for the speedy strengthening of the new state so as to enable it to stand on its own
feet added a new economic dimension to Cox’s and his subordinates’ argument that theincorporation of Southern Kurdistan, with its potential oil resources, was an economic necess­ity for Iraq. The concerns of British officials on the ground about the need to make Iraq into a
48* India Office Conference, No.56571 & 27792, 8 April 1919, F0371/2095, PRO.
49* Naft Khanh was a Kurdish area, which had been part ofjjart'dfPersia, before being transferred to
British administered-Mesopotamia after the end of the War.
50* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 25 December 1921, CO730/8, PRO.

205

self-sufficient new state was shared by the Colonial Office, as it became unmistakable that theentire policy of indirect British control depended on the ability of the new state to maintain astrong and a viable material infrastructure. Shuckburgh, for instance, recognised the impor­tance of finding new sources of revenue for the Iraqi state, which were, unlike land taxes, “theleast likely to be affected by political changes and disorder”, such as customs and tobacco
excise.51
It should be remembered that the policy of replacing direct British control with indirectcontrol, as it was embodied in the establishment of an Arab state, did not only aim to end Brit­ish financial commitments, but also to retrieve as much of Britain’s expenses to date in Meso­
potamia as was possible. In other words, the British hoped that the Iraqis would pay for thecost of railways, ports, roads, bridges, telegraphs and other modern facilities, which they had
constructed during and after the First World War. The terms of the 1924 British-lraqi financial
agreement, which were based on the October 1922 agreement, required the Iraqi Govern­
ment to pay by instalment the cost of public improvements undertaken by the British occupa­tion authorities during the period 1914-1921. This amounted to about £7,000,000. London
refused to turn these facilities over to the Iraqi Government without payment, though it waived
its claims to 94,009,540 Indian Rupees due in payment for public works and utilities. In thiscontext, William Stivers highlights the paradox in British policy towards the financial affairs of
the new Iraqi state. 5 2 On the one hand, Britain wanted the Iraqi Government to pay the cost ofvarious projects undertaken by the British, which formed a heavy financial burden, while, on
the other, Britain wanted Iraq to be an economically self-sustaining unit, which was the corner­stone of the new policy of indirect control. According to these considerations, the incorpora­tion of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq would help the latter to sustain itself without dependingon any British financial assistance. Britain even helped the Iraqi Government to obtain satisfac­
tory deals from the issue of oil concessions in the autumn of 1923. The new Colonial Secre­tary, Leo Amery, referred to Britain’s dual concern, namely to maintain both the private oilinterests of the British and to make the Iraqi state benefit adequately from the oilconcessions.5 3
The need to pay the British for the public works and the need to finance the Iraqi state

51* Shuckburgh, Colonial Office, 15 July 1921, C0730/2, PRO.
52* Stivers, Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey and the Anglo-American World Order, 1918-1930, p.88.
53* Colonial Office to High Commissioner, Baghdad, 4 August 1923 & Memorandum of Meeting Held at
the Colonial Office 7 September 1923, in Stivers, p.88.

206

without depending on British financial assistance were the early heavy tasks facing Feisal andhis Arab Government. The 1922 agreement between Britain and Feisal stated that the Iraqi
Government should accept full responsibility for the maintenance of internal order and thedefence of the country from foreign a g g r e s s i o n . 5 4 The Iraqi Government was required to
devote 25% of its annual revenue to the maintenance of the native army and reserves. Fromthe start, Feisal and his Arab Government urgently needed to find new financial sources toincrease the young state’s revenue so that it could adequately develop its principal institu­
tions, such as the army and the police. In these circumstances, it was natural that they focused
their attention on the exploitation of the potential oil wealth of Southern Kurdistan. As early as
December 1922, the Iraqi Council of Ministers began to discuss the question of the Mesopo­
tamian oil fields and the disposition of oil shares. It eventually adopted a resolution, which sta­
ted with implicit reference to the oil of Southern Kurdistan that:
the Iraq Government is unable to agree to any ex parte negotiations, which may take placein connection with the natural resources of the country, or to recognise any decision taken
without its consents
Feisal and his Government informed London of their intention to seize the existing opportun­ity for an early development of the potential oil fields to secure for Iraq "a substantial
revenue".56 In his response to the issue of exploiting oil resources, Churchill made clear that
he did not object to the granting of concessions by the Iraqi Government, except for thosewhich were based on “p re -w a r claims". S7 This meant that Iraq could not count on the oil of the
Mosul Wilayet. The growing need for money forced the Ministry of Finance to urge the Iraqi
Government to allow the development of the oil bearing regions of the country by the TPC. 58
Against this background, Feisal endeavoured to persuade Britain to open a discussion on thequestion of the old and new oil concessions in the Mosul Wilayet. But Britain viewed the pre­sent time as inappropriate, given the uncertainty of the future of the Mosul Wilayet. 5 9 It fearedthat any British exploitation of the oil of the Mosul Wilayet might give America and France theimpression that its rejection of the Turkish territorial claims was motivated by oil considerations.
It was clear to Feisal and his Arab Government, on the one side, and Cox and other
British officials on the other side, that the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan would bring
54* Ernest Main, Iraq from Mandate to Independence, p.60.
55* HR, No.24,13 December 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
56* Weakley, Minute No. 12708,13 December 1921, F0371/6364, PRO.
57* S/S for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Iraq, 30 January 1922, F0371/7782, PRO.
58* HR, No.3,1 February 1923, F0371/7772.PR0.
59* Ibid.

207

economic advantages for the Iraqi state. Cox supported the Iraqi Government’s position on
the imposition of excise on Kurdish tobacco, which he considered to be a “staple crop" and“an important source of revenue capable of expansion". 6 0 Accordingly, Cox asked London toprotect Kurdish tobacco by prohibiting the import of foreign tobacco. He hoped that thiswould lead to the creation of a local tobacco industry and bring in “large revenue” to the Iraqi
Government. His successor, Henry Dobbs, who was described by Bell as having a “matureexperience in fiscal matters" due to his involvement in the financial affairs of the new state,ei
re-asserted the importance of Southern Kurdistan’s tobacco for the Iraqi economy. The
necessity of finding new financial sources for the Iraqi treasury was clearly demonstrated by
the short-lived rivalry between the Kurdish Government of Mahmud and the Arab Government
for control of the land revenue in Southern Kurdistan, as well as the excise on Kurdish tobac­
co. Many Kurdish regions refused to pay taxes to the Iraqi Government, as they rejected Arabrule. The question of exploiting oil and taxation gave the incorporation argument anotherimportant dimension, in that the inclusion of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq was an economic
necessity if Britain sought an economically stable Iraqi state in the long run. Indeed, from 1927
onward, the Iraqi economy increasingly depended on the oil of Southern Kurdistan as thecountry’s main source of income.

The Incorporation Of Southern Kurdistan Into The Newly Established Iraqi
State: Strategic Considerations
The British occupation of the three Wilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul in the period 19141918 was largely motivated by two strategic considerations. Firstly, in order to maintain the
security of the sea-route to India against hostile Powers, Britain needed to further consolidate
its position in the Gulf region by controlling Mesopotamia. Secondly, the occupation of thethree Wilayets would enable Britain to control the strategic land-route to India, i.e. London,
Constantinople, Mosul Baghdad, Kum or Isfahan to Quette. Following the First World War, by
virtue of becoming part of the Empire air-route:

It is understood that Baghdad is regarded as a vital point in the air route to the East.
Already, a regular air service runs between Baghdad and Egypt. The fortnight air mail, which
has been in existence for over a year, has reduced the distance between Baghdad and Lon­don to 10 or 11 days.62
The air force was gradually becoming another effective method of protecting India. The impor60* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 2 2 June 1921, C0730/2, PRO.
61* Lady Gertrude, The Letters of Gertrude Bell, Vol.l, (London: Ernest Benn, 1927) pp.508-509.
62* Cabinet Committee On Iraq, No. I.R.O. 3,11 December 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.

208

tance of strategy insofar as Mesopotamia was concerned was repeatedly emphasised by the
British military and civilian circles in London and Baghdad when the Iraqi state was formed.
Now British strategic interests became inevitably interconnected with the military viability of
the new Iraqi state. Furthermore, new factors came into play to underline that interconnection,
most notably the Kemalist accession to power in Turkey. The question of the growing Kemal­
ist threat and unceasing Turkish claims to Southern Kurdistan constantly raised the issue of
re-defining British objectives in Mesopotamia and the ideal way to achieve them under the cir­
cumstances. The ultimate aim of Britain was to find a political formula which would enable it tofortify its long-term position in Mesopotamia, without entailing unwanted financial and militarycommitments. The subsequent replacement of direct British control by an Arab administration
depended on how Britain would provide for the security of its client state in Iraq.
Under these conditions, the need to consolidate Iraq’s security vis-&-vis a revisionist
Turkey helped to accentuate the strategic importance of Southern Kurdistan. The latter for­med, with its high mountains and deep valleys, a natural defensive zone that was inexpensive
to defend. These distinctive features would dramatically minimise Britain’s military commit­
ments as well as Iraq’s defence cost. Southern Kurdistan could also offer other facilities, not­ably the replacement of the imperial forces with local Kurdish recruits to defend the country.
The strategic dimension of the British problem in Mesopotamia, as chapter six illustrated, wasthe driving force behind Churchill’s idea of establishing Southern Kurdistan as a separatezone, with a view to consolidating the security of the Iraqi state. At his meeting with Feisal,
Hubert Young expressed the Colonial Office’s views in relation to the way in which the secur­
ity and interests of Iraq could be maintained, without bringing Southern Kurdistan under Arabrule:
To Iraq, friendly Kurdistan was vital as being potential shield against Turkey and partner with
Iraq in common interest or, alternatively, only menace in itself but screen for the channel ofexternal aggression. To Kurdistan, the friendship of Iraq was vital as containing chief, if not
only outside market and being only outlet to the sea. Without considering outside factor,
community of interests alone should lead to close cooperation and friendly relations
between these two areas, each of which was at the mercy of the others
By the time the Lausanne conference was under way, it became clear that the optionof Southern Kurdistan’s separation should be abandoned, not only because of Feisal’s oppo­
sition, but most importantly, because of its unwelcome political effects on Britain’s long-term
relations with Turkey and Persia (detailed in chapter eight). This brought to the fore otheralternatives, such as giving all Southern Kurdistan to Turkey, partitioning it between Arab Iraq
63* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 25 October 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.

209

and Turkey or incorporating it as a whole into the Arab state of Iraq. The decisions of the 1921
Cairo Conference in relation to the transitional process from direct British administration to
Arab government were based on the assumption that Mesopotamia would not encounter any
external threat during and immediately after this period. It was thought that neither the RoyalAir Force (RAF) nor the remaining British garrison in Mesopotamia would be in a position todeal effectively with any external attack.64 in view of its urgent need to cut down its military
expenditure, London was, every time Feisal raised this question, extremely reluctant to guar­antee Iraq’s security from external attack. The task of the remaining British garrison was themaintenance of internal order in Arab Mesopotamia, whereas the RAF, with the help of Assyr­
ian and possibly Kurdish levies, was entrusted with the same task in the Kurdish areas. The
levies were expected to replace the evacuated British posts in Southern Kurdistan. The per­iod after the Cairo conference, however, showed no sign which might suggest that Mesopo­
tamia was free from external threat as the Kemalists zealously continued their military and pro­paganda activities in Southern Kurdistan. The implementation of the withdrawal decision,
before making a peace treaty with Kemalist Turkey, caused considerable uneasiness among
the British military and civilian personnel in Mesopotamia.65 Cox argued that *the evacuation of
Tel Afar, Aqra and Zakho would render impossible the retention of Mosul and the rest of theW ilayef.ee Hence, the military vulnerability of Iraq could only be eliminated if Southern Kurdi­

stan was incorporated into Iraq. Thus, Cox, like Feisal who wanted Britain to establish a strate­
gic frontier for his state in the north, added a strategic dimension to his argument that theincorporation of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq was vital.
As Britain was not in a military position to make Turkey accept a peace agreement, andbecause it also lacked diplomatic leverage (such as the support of its Allies for its position),
Curzon raised among British civil and military circles the idea of a compromise with Kemalist
Turkey. This would entail a modest rectification of the old boundaries of the Mosul Wilayet infavour of Kemalist Turkey. It was hoped that the resulting peace with that country would be an
ideal means to maintain Iraq’s long-term security while evacuating the British garrison. The
trouble with this alternative was that territorial concessions in Southern Kurdistan (apart frominviting the Kemalist Turks to press for more territorial concessions) would place Turkey in a
64* Colonial Office, Middle Eastern Committee, Fourth Minute by Shuckburgh, 4 November 1921,
F0371/6347, PRO.
65* Colonial Office, Middle Eastern Committee, First Minute by Shuckburgh, 5 May 1921, F0371/6344,
PRO.
66* Ibid.

210

strategically strong position ws-ei-ws Iraq. In other words, if Britain returned the Zakho andAmadia districts to the Turks, the latter would always pose a direct threat to the remainder ofSouthern Kurdistan where oil existed. If it was decided to surrender the whole of Southern
Kurdistan, with its considerable size of 88,000 Sq. Km. and population of 700,000, theKemalist Turks would be placed within 150 miles of Baghdad. The Chief of the Air Staff poin­ted to several potential military and political consequences if Britain gave up the Mosul
Wilayet. Firstly, the Arabs would consider the surrender of that Wilayet as a "British defeat”
and thus Britain’s political credibility in Mesopotamia as a whole would be weakened. Second­ly, Feisal would feel that his position was compromised by the British in proportion to theundermining of the security of his state. Thirdly, the British would be forced into increasing
their garrison in Baghdad,67 as Turkish control over Southern Kurdistan and Mosul meantdepriving Iraq of "a portion of the buffer zone”. 68 Like the Chief of Air Staff, the Chief of theImperial General Staff and the Colonial Office were unanimously against withdrawal fromSouthern Kurdistan before making peace with Kemalist Turkey:
Sooner or later, we should be bound to admit Turkish influence up to edge of plains andshould, thus, be cut off from national line of communications between Mosul and Baghdad,
which runs via Kifri-Kirkuk-Altun Kupri and Arbil.. IA/hole length of our Baghdad-Mosul com­munications for some 200 Miles, would be flanked by turbulent hill country. Our Communica­
tions could be out at any time and in fact retention of Mosul from a military point of view,
would be rendered impossible.. Cession of Kurdish country would similarly endanger impor­tant line of communication between Baghdad and Persia via Qizi! Robat and Khaniqin.. Con­siderable reinforcements to existing garrison would become necessary, if position was to be
maintained.. If accepted by the Turks, it would be merely as a first step towards further
expansion, which would inevitably lead to our abandonment of the whole of Mosul with all theconsequences which that would entailfis
The failure of the Mesopotamian policy, the British feared, might lead to other consequences,such as ending a British presence at the head of the Gulf, which in turn would represent a
threat to India and imperial trade,70 as well as incurring Arab hostility and strengthening Bol­shevik influence in Persia.71
The new Turkish peace settlement at Lausanne in 1923 ended all British worries
about a Kemalist invasion of Mesopotamia, at least in the foreseeable future. What remainedunresolved was the way in which Britain could keep a stable Southern Kurdistan within Iraq.
67* Cabinet Committee On Iraq, No. I.R.0.1 st, 8 December 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
6 8 * Annexure i, Lord Curzon’s Tentative Proposals Regarding Cession of Portion of Kurdistan, Lau­sanne, 6 December 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
69* Annexure ii, Lord Curzon, Lausanne, 8 December, F0371/7772, PRO.
70* Cabinet Committee On Iraq, No. I.R.0.2nd Conclusion, 12 December 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.
71* Foreign Office Memorandum on the Political Consequences of British Withdrawal from Iraq, 15
December 19220, F0371/7772, PRO.

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British experiences in Kurdish areas showed that resorting to ground action was very costly,
both in terms of men and money. The intensive use of the RAF through what was known as
the Scheme of Air Control, emerged as the most effective way to pacify Southern Kurdistan.
The air force, as Ernest Main points out, represented the cheapest and quickest means of reimposing British or Iraqi control over Southern Kurdistan, 72 which suited its geographical real­ities and social characteristics, i.e. being mountainous country and having a population that
was accustomed to guerrilla warfare. It also allowed Britain to dispense with the stationing of alarge garrison in Mesopotamia to maintain internal order. The Scheme of Air Control was
based on previous British experiences in the period 1919-1920, when the RAF had raided
several rebellious Kurdish areas. Under this scheme the general practice was to constantly
bomb civilian targets such as villages and towns. The ensuing disruption to social and econo­
mic life would break Kurdish resistance. In 1921, the Air Ministry representative reminded theColonial Office that “the suppression of disorder, in conjunction with levies, was already oneof the functions of the Air Force in Kurdistan, as in Iraq proper".73 After 1922, the role of the
RAF took on an important political aspect during the process of implementing the incorpora­tion of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq against Kurdish w ill. 7 4 At one point, Churchill had
opposed the bombardment of civilian Kurdish targets by the RAF. Yet, such actions not only
continued but actually escalated, when the RAF resorted to gas bombs. Such bombs had
never been used before by any Power against local rebellions, let alone civilian targets. The
history of the Kurdish question in Iraq between 1923 and 1943 shows that without the use of
RAF in suppressing Kurdish rebellions, Southern Kurdistan’s incorporation into Iraq would
have not been imposed nor could it have lasted, as Britain was determined not to use its
ground forces to keep order. Even though the effective use of the RAF against Kurdish
rebellions gave the Iraqi state time to build its own ground and air forces, it remained incapableof controlling Sguthern Kurdistan on its own. Thus, the emerging dual British-Arab militarycontrol -in the form of an Arab ground force and a British air force- was the only arrangement
capable of keeping political stability in Southern Kurdistan after 1923.

72* Ernest Main, Iraq from Mandate to Independence, 114.
73* Shuckburgh, Middle Eastern Committee, Fourth Minute, 4 November 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
74* David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: the Royal Air Force, 1919-1939, (Manchester:1990). This work thoroughly examines the role of the RAF in keeping Southern Kurdistan under British
and Iraqi control by suppressing successive Kurdish revolts in the Twenties and the Thirties.

212

Conclusion
When the British Government decided to establish an Arab state in 1920, it was not in its plans
to incorporate Southern Kurdistan into Iraq. The forrhation process of the Iraqi state, whichstarted in late 1920 and continued for the next three years, was not as straightforward andsmooth as the British initially thought it would be. From the very beginning, it raised issues
vital to the military, economic and political viability of the new Iraqi state. The growing Kemalist
threat to the British position in Mesopotamia compellingly drew Britain’s attention to the neednot to overlook the necessity of constructing Iraq as a viable military unit. By underlining theissue of Iraq’s short and long-term security among British officials in London and Mesopota­mia, the Kemalist threat was the most important factor influencing the ultimate decision toplace Southern Kurdistan under direct Arab rule, rather than establishing it as a separate politi­
cal entity. In other words, in view of Britain’s irrevocable decision to withdraw its imperial garri­son and the frailty of the newly-established Arab army, the inclusion of Southern Kurdistan
into Iraq became necessary, as the former constituted a natural defensive belt for the latter
against foreign invasion.
Southern Kurdistan was as important to Britain as it was to its client state of Iraq. Fromthe economic point of view, the value of Southern Kurdistan was two fold. Firstly, Britain
sought to impose its control through its client state over the potential oil fields of Southern
Kurdistan. This would enable Britain to secure valuable oil supplies for the British navy, espe­
cially under war conditions. A separate Southern Kurdistan or its return to Turkish control
would probably mean that Britain could no longer control the oil fields on a secure and long­term basis. Secondly, the British were aware of the vital importance of establishing an Arabstate that would be financially self-sufficient, if they were to realise their main aim of ending
their heavy financial burdens in Mesopotamia. Feisal and his Arab Government were also alive
to the importance of potential Kurdish oil as a valuable and reliable source of income to the
Iraqi state which could pay for the rapid development of its military and civilian institutions. It
was natural then that British economic concerns converged with those of Feisal and his Gov­
ernment, which were to merge Southern Kurdistan’s economic life with Iraq’s.
The political importance of Southern Kurdistan to the newly-established Iraqi state
reflected, in the eyes of British officials in Mesopotamia, their desire to perpetuate the tradi­tional policy of divide and rule. Such a desire was a direct consequence of past British exper­
ience in Mesopotamia between 1918 and 1923, when the Shi'is under their religious leader­213

ship resisted British direct rule and refused to participate in the formation process of the Iraqi
state under British supervision. Therefore, it did not suit British interests to see the Shi'is for­ming the overwhelming majority in the new Iraqi state, while the Sunni Arabs constituted asmall minority. From the British point of view, placing the Sunni Kurds under Arab rule would
help to reduce this critical sectarian imbalance in the political life of the new Iraqi state. More­over, it was in the British interest to have social and cultural diversity and the emergence of adisharmonious society based on powerful communal identities, which would prevent the
emergence of an Iraq-wide nationalist movement capable of challenging British influence inthe country. At the same time, Feisal, who lacked popular support and only enjoyed the back­ing of the Sunni military and political elites, also valued the Southern Kurds as an importantmeans of reducing considerably the Shi'i majority which did not support him. It was naturalthen that the political concerns of Feisal and his Sunni entourage converged with those of the
British officials in Baghdad. In retrospect, the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into the
Iraqi state was imposed on the Southern Kurds, who refused to participate in the formation
process of the Iraqi state or consent to Feisal’s rule. The Kurdish opposition to the impositionof Arab rule over Southern Kurdistan never ceased, and expressed itself in a number ofarmed revolts during the twenties, thirties and forties.

214

The Sevres treaty was a still born. It terms were not implemented largely, because of the grow­ing strength of the Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal who firmly opposed the imposed
Turkish peace settlement. Their on-going revolt in Anatolia against foreign control overTurkey offered an opening for the spread of Bolshevik influence in the Middle East, especiallywhen Russian Armenia was Sovietised by the Red Army in December 1920. In the meantime,
France and Italy, Britain’s principal Allies, gradually changed their attitudes towards the Kemal­
ists and began to advocate accommodation with them instead of confrontation.
This chapter focuses on these regional and international developments and analyses
the extent to which they affected Britain’s Kurdish policy between summer 1920 and summer
1923. It must be remembered that without reaching a peace agreement with Kemalist Turkey,
either by force or by peaceful means, a successful implementation of the new policy of indir­
ect control was widely judged as unrealistic by British policy-makers at the Foreign Office andat the Colonial Office. As this chapter explains, resorting to peaceful means or force by the
British would have direct effects on their approach to the Kurdish situation, given the exis­
tence of political instability in Northern and Southern Kurdistan. This chapter illustrates how
Britain and Kemalist Turkey took into consideration the existence of this state of affairs in Kur­
distan, when attempting to achieve their main objective, i.e. controlling Southern Kurdistan.
Meanwhile, the Kurdish nationalists unsuccessfully endeavoured to exploit the unresolved
difference between the British and the Kemalists to achieve their political aspirations.

Kurdish Nationalists, Britain And The Kurdish Situation Immediately AfterS&vres*- post-Sevres A ctivities O f The Kurdish R atio n alist M ovem ent
The Kurdish nationalists expressed unfavourable reactions to the Sevres treaty because they
did not consider its terms on Kurdistan to be either satisfactory or applicable. Said Taha was
one of those Kurds who was "sceptical* about a successful implementation of the Sevres
terms, especially when the proposed Allied commission was not supported with force to do its
task in Kurdistan.i Instead of awaiting the application of the Sevres treaty, the Kurdish natio­
nalists took several initiatives to achieve their political aspirations. Apart from a minority that did

1* Shuckburgh, India Office, Urgent, 15 December 1920, F0371/5069, PRO.

215

not trust the Allies and believed that the safest option was to co-operate with the Kemalists toobtain local autonomy for the Kurds, the majority of Kurdish nationalists still considered British
support, either material or moral, to be an important factor in the success of their efforts. The
latter believed that British support could be obtained only if the Kurds were capable of exploit­
ing the differences between Britain and Kemalist Turkey.
In Diyarbekir, Kurdish notables, former army officers and civil servants were engaged
in organising an armed movement for an independent Kurdistan. They established connec­
tions among Kurdish nationalist circles in Constantinople, Kharput, Bitlis and Diyarbekir. The
organisers of the movement were very anxious to establish direct contacts with the British
authorities in Mesopotamia.2 To approach London with a united front, the two Kurdish natio­
nalist factions in Constantinople, the moderates and the extremists, came together and estab­lished a new political organisation, with Abdul Qadir as President and Emin Bey Bedirkhan asVice President.3 At the same time, Said Taha, Simko and other Kurdish leaders decided, aftera series of meetings, to establish a Kurdish confederation along the old Ottoman-Persian
frontier, while soliciting British support.4 The idea of establishing a Kurdish confederation, so
it was thought, would be appealing to Britain, given its concern about future Kemalist and Bol­shevik offensives against Mesopotamia through Northern, Eastern and Southern Kurdistan. 5
Similar suggestions were presented by other Kurds such as Hamdi Pasha, the former Otto­
man Minister of Marine.e What encouraged such hopes among these Kurdish nationalists
seems to have been the Bolsheviks’ occupation of Baku and their advance towards the Turkish-Persian frontiers. Indeed, in the wake of these developments, Simko approached the Brit­ish in Mesopotamia, arguing again that because Persia was powerless in Eastern Kurdistan,
British support for his movement would help to contain any Bolshevik advance and Kemalist
threat to Southern Kurdistan.7
Little is known about the attitudes of the Bolsheviks towards the Kurdish question forthe period 1920-1923. It can, however, be said that they paid some attention to Kurdish
2* High Commission, Mesopotamia, 17 November 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
3* Ryan, Memorandum, Constantinople, 23 December 1920, F0371/6346, PRO.
4* Kurdish tribal confederations and tribes involved in this scheme were from Northern and Eastern Kur­
distan such as Shikak, Hakari, Haidarani, Herki, Begzadah, Atrushi. Memorandum from Civil Commis­
sion, Baghdad, to Under S/S for India, 8 October 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
5* Shuckburgh, IO (No.8580, Urgent) 15 December 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
6 * Ryan, Memorandum, Constantinople,23 December 1920, F0371/6346, PRO.
7* Memorandum from Assistant Political Officer, Rania, to Political Officer, 20 July 1921, F0371/6347,
PRO.

216

affairs in line with their Middle Eastern strategy of influencing the political movements of the
new nationalities, with a view to using them against British imperial interests in the region.
Despite the fact that British sources made direct references to the constant Bolshevik propa­
ganda against Britain in Kurdistan, no pro-Bolshevik grouping or Bolshevik-orientated leadersemerged inside the Kurdish nationalist movement. This might be attributed to the antireligious stance of the Bolsheviks, which the British extensively publicised in Persia and theformer Ottoman Wilayets. It is known that at the First Conference of Peoples of the East,
which the Bolsheviks organised in Baku on 1 September 1920, eight Kurdish delegates
attended.e However, there is no information recorded about these Kurds, that is to say, whe­ther they were mere nationalists or pro-Bolsheviks. Given the existence of Kurdish communi­ties in Russian Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, these Kurds probably came from theseregions.The Bolsheviks probably thought of turning such Kurds into a socialist or a proBolshevik nationalist party if circumstances required, as they did in Persia and Turkey. Afterthe Sevres treaty, an autonomous Kurdish entity was established in the Caucasus in accor­
dance with Lenin’s instructions. But, the most important means through which the Bolsheviks
attempted to influence the Kurdish situation was by their encouragement of the Kemalists togrant the right of self-determination to the non-Turkish nationalities, such as the Kurds andthe Arabs. They hoped to pre-empt British attempts to use the nationality question as ameans of consolidating their position in regions surrounding Russia’s southern frontiers. Gen­erally, the Kurdish nationalist movement remained politically and ideologically unsusceptible
to Bolshevism.
Western -and especially British support- whether it was material or moral, was stillviewed by the Kurdish nationalists as essential for the success of their efforts to mobilise theKurds around the idea of Kurdish independence and to defeat stronger opponents, i.e. theTurks and the Persians. Despite that, many Kurdish revolts, varying in scale and intensity,
broke out without receiving outside material or moral support. An anti-Kemalist revolt brokeout in the Kurdish areas to the east of Sivas.9 In Dersim, local Kurds had openly been in a stateof revolt for a year. Other local revolts had occurred in Diyarbekir, Nisibin, Hakari and Mardin forsome time, while the Kurds of Mush controlled their town .10 The most important development
was the Kurdish uprising in the autumn of 1921, which embraced Diyarbekir, Dersim, Van and
8* Edward H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol.lll [London: Penguin Books, 1971], p.262.
9* Rumbold to Curzon, Confidential, 18 May 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.
10* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 8 August 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.

217

Bitlis. Apart from asking for a British mandate, the leaders of the uprising informed Britain that if
they were assisted, they would turn Northern Kurdistan into a buffer against Bolshevism and
Kemalism. Beside needing one or two British officers such as Maj. Noel, the Kurds asked fortwo mountain guns, a few machine guns, 5,000 rifles, some ammunition and most importantly,
a passage for supplies through Southern Kurdistan.
In the same period, Greece promised the nationalist Kurds military aid, if Britain
allowed its passage through Mesopotamia.11 According to Olson, the Greek High Commissio­
ner in Constantinople provided Emin Ali Bedirkhan and Abdul al-Rahman with fund when thetwo visited Cairo, and that Emin’s son drafted proclamations in Kurdish in collaboration with
the Greeks. Olson also names Kurd Mustafa Pasha as one of those Kurdish nationalists whoestablished contacts with the Greeks and the Armenian nationalists. 12 Kurd Mustafa Pasha
sought to win British support for an independent Southern Kurdistan that could help mobilise
local Kurds against the Kemalists. The Kurdish nationalists increasingly paid attention to the
Greeks, who seemed to be serious in their intention to support all efforts as a means of wea­
kening their Kemalist enemy. Probably the Kurdish nationalists hoped that their action would
persuade Britain to give aid and political support, once its ally, Greece, was involved in Kurdish
affairs. This could be the reason why Emin Ali Bedirkhan informed the British of the existing
Kurdish contacts with the Greeks, with a view to organising a Kurdish movement against the
Kemalists. Andrew Ryan of the British High Commission in Constantinople reported that Emin
Ali asked if Britain would allow him and other Kurds to go to Mosul in order to set up a Kurdishorganisation in the British-controlled Southern Kurdistan as a prelude to the Kurdish revolt.
As London still hoped that it could make peace with Kemalist Turkey, it not only refused to
grant either military assistance or to allow the Greeks to send their aid to the Kurdish national­
ists through Southern Kurdistan, but also hoped that the Kurds would not submit to such sug­gestions.^ Yet Kurdish appeals for British help did not stop, and continued until the conclu­
sion of the 1923 Lausanne treaty. These appeals often warned against future Kemalist mas­sacres of the Kurds, if the latter were left to their own devices.
After Sevres, the intention of British officials in London, as in Mesopotamia and Con­
stantinople, focused on the growing Kemalist and Bolshevik threats. These threats made itvery difficult for Britain not to reconsider their Kurdish policy, especially in Southern Kurdistan;
11* Cox to Churchill, Very Secret, 28 October 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
12* Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, p. 64.
13* RumtX)ld to Curzon, 31 May 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.

218

otherwise, it would face the prospect of losing not only Southern Kurdistan but also Mesopo­
tamia. The need to take new initiatives in Kurdistan was first felt by the India Office, whichraised the question of the appointment of a Kurdish governor for Southern Kurdistan, in
response to what was perceived as an anti-British alliance between the Kemalists and the Bol­sheviks. 1 4 As the political situation became more alarming, the India Office raised the questionof undertaking a new, broader initiative, based on the formation of a British-sponsored Kurd­
ish confederation in the Kurdish areas along the old Ottoman-Persian frontier in Northern andEastern Kurdistan. 15 Montagu urged London to respond to Said Taha’s overtures for theestablishment of a Kurdish confederation under its auspices, and to ignore the unfeasible
terms of the Sevres treaty. He suggested thatas a preliminary step, Major Noel should be instructed to proceed at once to Mesopotamia andplace himself at the disposal of the High Commissioner, with a view to open communication withthe leading Kurdish chieftains on the Northern frontiers of the occupied territory and reporting at
once to Mesopotamia on the general trend of local feeling in these regions and, in particular, theprospect of carrying to a successful issue the policy advocated by Said Taha of forming a Kurd­
ish confederation under British auspices.is
This did not mean, however, that Montagu was willing to involve Britain in serious military com­mitments, which was why he rejected the idea of giving British ammunition to Said Taha. 17 His
idea of using Maj. Noel was preconditioned by the degree of intimacy in Kemalist-Bolshevik
relations and the Armenian situation, both of which considerably affected the British strategic
position in Southern Kurdistan and Mesopotamia.1 8 The only voices in favour of the Said Taha
project and all that it entailed were those British officials serving in the Kurdish areas. 19

ii- B rita in 's A ttem p ts ‘to im p lem en t A M o d ified Version O f ‘the ‘term s O f cth e
Sevres ‘tre a ty On Kurdistan
The idea of reaching an agreement with Kemalist Turkey on implementing the Sevres terms
on Kurdistan to the letter -as Hubert Young once suggested- was inconceivable to London
because the prospects of an independent or an autonomous Kurdistan would considerably
undermine Britain’s position in Mesopotamia. Young’s suggestion consisted of one year tem­porary Turkish rule over Northern and Southern Kurdistan, during which the Kurds would

14*S/S [for India] to High Commission, Baghdad, 27 October 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
15* S/S to High Commission, Baghdad, 26 November 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
16* Shuckburgh, India Office, Urgent, 15 December 1920, FO371/5069, PRO.
17* Ibid.
18* Ibid.
19* Political Officer, Mosul, to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, Confidential, 21 September 1920,
FO371/5069, PRO.

219

decide on whether to establish an independent Kurdistan or an autonomous Kurdistan within
Turkey.2 0 Instead, London sought to finalise the partition of Kurdistan, whose basis was laid
down in 1920 when Southern Kurdistan was included in Britain’s Mesopotamian mandate andWestern Kurdistan in France’s Syrian mandate. At the London conference (21 February-12
March 1921), apart from Britain and its Allies, two Turkish delegations participated, one repre­
senting the Ottoman Government, the other the Turkish rebels led by Mustafa Kemal. At thisfirst post-Sevres conference, which dealt with the Turkish settlement, Britain made the firstadjustment in the Sevres terms concerning the idea of Kurdish self-determination. The
Kemalists were presented with a compromise scheme, which stated thatin regard to Kurdistan, the Allies will be prepared on condition of facilities for local autonomies
and adequate protection of Kurdish and Assyrian-Chaldean interests, to consider a modifica­tion of the Treaty in a sense in conformity with the existing facts of the situations

This meant the abandonment of Kurdish self-determination, unlike the position of the Arm­enians, who would still have such a right to establish their own national state. 22 The idea of
involving the League of Nations and an Allied High Commissioner to supervise the implemen­tation of Kurdish autonomy was dropped because of French and Italian opposition. 23 More­over, as the Kurdish proposals applied only to the Kurdish territory to the north of Britishcontrolled Southern Kurdistan, 2 4 the idea of a united Ottoman Kurdistan, whether under Brit­ish or Turkish control, was disregarded altogether. These sudden concessions reflected not­able political changes in the regional situation, stemming from firstly the growing strength of
the Kemalists; secondly, disagreement among the Allies over the question of how to deal with
the Kemalists; thirdly, the pressing need to prevent the formation of a Kemalist-Bolshevik
alliance against British interests; and finally, the failure of the scheme for a united Armenianstate.
The compromise scheme, which was eventually rejected by the Kemalist delegation,
meant that Britain would lose its political influence in Northern Kurdistan, an area which was
still of some importance for the security of its position in Southern Kurdistan. This might
explain why Montagu criticised the London conference’s position on the nationality question.
He demanded a declaration that would show the Kemalists and the concerned nationalities
20* Young, Colonial Office Minute No.21102,29 April 1921, CO730/1, PRO.
21 * Shuckburgh to Churchill, Cairo, 15 March 1921, CO730/1, PRO.
22* Foreign Office to Rumbold, Constantinople, 11 March 1921, F0371/6467, PRO.
23* Curzon, Paris, 23 March 1922, F0371/7858, PRO.
24* S/S for the Colonies to Cox, Cairo & Acting High Commissioner, Baghdad, 17 March 1921, CO730/1,
PRO.

220

the determination of the Allies to do what was in their power to implement the minority provi­s io n s ^ in spite of the Foreign Office’s acceptance of Montagu’s views on the need for an

Allied declaration on the execution of the new scheme’s provisions concerning the national
minorities -such as the Northern Kurds -2 6 nothing of the sort materialised. Neither the Leagueof Nations nor Britain’s former Allies were willing to take any political responsibility. The effectof the failure of the London conference was to make the British approach to the Kurdish situa­tion even more cautious and defensive, and it did not result in greater British support for theefforts of the Kurdish nationalists in Northern Kurdistan, contrary to Olson’s argum ent. 27
Thus, from 1921 onwards, the Kurdish question began to lose its international dimension andtake on an ever more internal one.

Defensive Versus Offensive Approach To Northern Kurdistan: Britain And
The Containment Of The Kemaiist Threat1-

he A ttitu d e s O f

he B ritis h High Commissions 9 # t

A n d C onstantino­p leFollowing the Cairo conference of March 1921, the protracted and covert military activities of
the Kemalists against Mesopotamia, coupled with political instability in Southern Kurdistan,caused considerable anxiety among British civilian and military personnel in Baghdad. They
feared that any British withdrawal under such conditions would encourage the Kemalists toinvade Mesopotamia through Southern Kurdistan. Accordingly, while asking London to inten­
sify its efforts to make peace with Kemalist Turkey as early as possible, Cox advocated that if
Britain failed in its efforts, it should resort to an offensive approach to force the Kemalists tostop their hostilities, and agree to a new peace treaty that would recognise Southern Kurdi­
stan as part of the new Iraq. Cox’s offensive approach, which enjoyed the backing of British
civilian and military personnel in Mesopotamia as well as Feisal,28 was largely based on the ideaof giving British support to Northern Kurdish nationalists in their struggle with the Kemalists.
Cox reminded the Colonial Office that in autumn 1920, the British Government carefully con­sidered the idea of an8active stimulation” of a Kurdish revolt in Northern Kurdistan.2 9 Thisidea, Cox pointed out, was abandoned because of the non-existence of vital preconditions
25* Memorandum from Montagu to Curzon, 23 April 1921, F0371/6469.PR0.
26* Adam, Foreign Office Minute on Montagu’s Memorandum, 26 April & Foreign Office to Montagu, 29
April 1921, F0371/6469.PR0.
27* Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, p.65.
28* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 21 November 1921, CO730/7.PRO.
29* High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to S/S for the Colonies, 21 June 1921, F0371/6346,PR0.

221

for a successful Kurdish revolt such as a temporary British occupation of Jezirah-ibn-Omar.
Moreover, the India Office opposed the idea of arming the Kurds, fearing far deeper British
involvement in Kurdish affairs. The conditions seemed different in Cox’s eyes in June 1921.
He argued that if the London conference led to the outbreak of “ open hostility with Kemalist
Turkey, Britain would be in a position to support the Kurds, who should be informed about thenature and the extent of British help.3 0 He did not elaborate, however, on how Britain could
help the Kurds.
In August, Cox seemed more determined to persuade London to take the initiative as
the movement for Kurdish independence, which was favourably disposed towards Britain,
was gathering momentum:
If proposition develops along these lines, it must sooner or later involve a breaking away of
Kurdish districts from Persia and Turkey respectively. Altered attitude[s] of the Persian Gov­
ernment towards Great Britain and recent Turkish defeats in Anatolia suggest that considera­
tions, which would formerly have prompted us to discourage such a movement, have lost for
the time being much of their importance... Unless instructed to contrary, therefore, I propose,
while refusing formal intercourse with Kurdish chiefs beyond our borders to use opportunities
of ascertaining their intentions and to take promptly such actions [as] may be necessary toensure the safety of frontier of Iraq. 31
To reinforce his argument for an active British role in the affairs of Northern Kurdistan, Coxargued that, whether Britain intervened or not, it would be accused of “complicity”, in any antiKemalist revolt among the Kurds. 3 2 The increasing toughness of Cox’s line was in proportion
to the intensity of the Kemalist threat. The more the Kemalists seemed to increase their threat
to the British position in Southern Kurdistan and Mesopotamia, the more Cox favoured an
offensive approach. It should be emphasised that Cox presented his idea of using Northern
Kurdish nationalists as an alternative to Churchill’s idea of using Southern Kurdish nationalists
as a means of defeating any potential Kemalist advance across Southern Kurdistan. Cox also
wanted to use Simko to check Kemalist influence in Eastern Kurdistan, and to carry throughthe repatriation of Christians to Urmia.3 3 A number of British officials serving in Southern Kurdi­
stan shared Cox’s opinion. The Political Officer of Sulaimaniya, H.A. Goldsmith, considered
Simko’s influence “an effective barrier” between Kemalist-controlled areas in Northern Kurdi­
stan and British-controlled Southern Kurdistan. He thus advocated a British agreement or

30* Ibid.
31* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 26 August 1921, F0371/6347.PR0.
32* Ibid.
33* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 26 August 1921, F0371/6347.PR0.

222

alliance with Simko.34 as the latter established his control over vast Kurdish areas along the
Old Ottoman-Persian frontiers.
Against the background of Greece’s willingness to offer the Kurdish nationalists
material support and the outbreak of Kurdish revolts in Diyarbekir, Dersim, Van and Bitlis inautumn 1921, Cox suggested to Churchill the dispatch of British volunteers and free passage
of supplies -other than weapons- to the Kurds. London rejected Cox’s suggestion, emphasis­
ing the need to avoid any British involvement in Northern Kurdistan’s affairs which might
aggravate an already tense situation. Accordingly, the British High Commission in Baghdad
informed the Kurdish nationalist leaders that Britain would not support their revolt because itsought peace with the Kemalists. Khalil Bedirkhan, one of the Kurdish nationalists, was told toleave Baghdad, lest his presence roused the suspicion of the Kemalists about British involve­
ment in Northern Kurdistan’s affairs .35 in the face of continuing intransigence from the Kemal­
ists, and the prospect of a backlash which might result from Kurdish disillusionment with Brit­ish attitudes, Cox again asked Churchill in December to re-examine the idea of giving British
support to the Northern Kurds. He feared that if Britain continued to adopt a neutral stancetowards the Kurdish situation while the Kemalists had no desire to stop their hostile activities
in Southern Kurdistan, it would not only lose its prestige among the Kurds, but also incur theiranger:
While we are, thus, restrained by [the] prospect of negotiations for peace from taking active
measures to combat the Kemalist menace, [the] same cause is producing an entirety opposite
effect on [the] Kemalist policy, with [the] result that at a time when our attitude of passivity
offered them every opportunity of successfully so doing, [the] Kemalists are redoubling theirefforts against us. It is my duty, I feel, to draw attention to danger, lest our present policy ofwithholding all encouragement from Kurds, at a time when [the] Kemalists are making a strong
bid to win them over, may notwithstanding all our efforts result in antagonising Kurds and virtu­
ally throwing them into arms of Kemalists.36
In Cox’s view, as long as that peace treaty was out of Britain’s reach, then it could not afford tolose the Northern Kurds to the Kemalists, who would definitely use them as a means ofachieving their original aim of controlling Southern Kurdistan and possibly Mesopotamia.
Cox’s attempts to persuade London to exploit the anti-Kemalist attitudes among Northern
Kurdish nationalists continued until early 1923, when the Lausanne conference was wellunderway.

34* Secret Memorandum from Political Officer, Sulaimaniya, to High Commissioner, 29 July 1921,
F0371 /6347, PRO.
35* News Summary, Baghdad for Period Ended 25th November 1921, CO730.PRO
36*High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 20 December 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.

223

In contrast to its counterpart in Baghdad, the British High Commission in Constantino­
ple supported the conciliatory approach of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office towards
the Kemalists, hoping to achieve peace as soon as possible. It, therefore, opposed any esca­
lation in British-Kemalist tension through British involvement in the affairs of Northern Kurdi­
stan. Like his predecessor De Robeck, Adm. H. Rumbold and the British General Staff Intelli­gence in Constantinople were in agreement that in order to use the Kemalist forces as an
instrument for containing the growing Bolshevik influence, Britain should be willing to adopt a
conciliatory policy towards Turkey by radically modifying the terms of the Sevres treaty .3 7
Otherwise, it was argued, any change in Britain’s neutral stance towards the Kurdish-Kemalist
conflict would pre-empt successful British-Kemalist negotiations. 38 Rumbold, who reported
the excitement that the holding of the London conference created among Kurdish nationalist
circles, discouraged requests made by Kurdish leaders to forward their telegram to the confer­ence in order to explain their position on the Kurdish question. 3 9 Having said that, the British
officials in Constantinople did not totally ignore the Kurds as a potential political card. If Britain
continued to face intransigent Kemalist attitudes or was forced to respond to the anti-British
activities of the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks in Kurdistan, it would still be able to use theKurdish nationalists as a means of containment.4 0 This policy would be executed without com­mitting Britain either politically or militarily to the Kurdish cause.

/* - ChurchiU's D efensive A pproach T o T f ic A ffa irs O f flo rth e rn K u rd istan

In contrast to Cox, Winston Churchill, the Colonial Secretary, was in favour of a conciliatory
policy towards the Kemalists. His approach required no British support for, or association with,
the Kurdish nationalists and their anti-Kemalist efforts to end Turkish rule in Northern Kurdi­
stan. Churchill feared that the adoption of hostile attitudes towards the Kemalists in support ofnational minorities such as the Kurds, would have unfavourable strategic consequences for
Britain in the Middle East. He warned that the idea of supporting the Kurds or the Greeksagainst the Kemalist forces would result in a Kemaiist-Bolshevik alliance directed against Bri­tain. Churchill’s position on the affairs of Northern Kurdistan, which can be termed as defen­
sive, should be considered as an extension of his views on the future of Southern Kurdistan.
37* Rumbold, Constantinople, 4 January 1921 & Cabinet Meeting, 20 January 1921, F0371/6464, PRO.
38* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 20 December 1921, F0371/6481, PRO.
39* Rumbold, Constantinople, 2 March 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.
40* Rumbold, to Curzon, 29 December 1920 & Ryan, Constantinople, 23 December 1920, F0371/6346,
PRO

224

Here, he advocated a separate Kurdish entity to protect the newly-emerging Iraqi state from
Kemalist and possibly Bolshevik threats. By contrast, Cox’s offensive approach sought totransfer the sphere of containment of the Kemalist threat from Southern Kurdistan to North­ern Kurdistan. The former approach would expose Kemalist Turkey, not Britain, as the aggres­sor for violating the terms of the 1918 Mudros armistice, which had placed the Mosul Wilayet
under British control. Moreover, it would prevent Britain from risking both a major military invol­
vement outside its mandatory areas in Kurdistan and turning Kemalist Turkey into a perma­
nent threat to the British position in Mesopotamia.
The origins of Churchill’s views on the rising Kemalist movement go back to the per­iod when he had been the Secretary of State for War (until February 1921). As far back as
October 1919 he had argued that the anti-Turkish policy would lead to the spread of panIslamic feelings in India, fresh disturbances in Egypt, an increase in Arab unrest and a newround of Armenian massacres. Moreover/Britain would not be able to use" Mustafa K em alan da reconciled Turkey as a barrier against the Bolsheviks”. 41 The War Office under Churchill’s

leadership considered Bolshevism the greatest danger in the Middle East and felt that Britain
should therefore forestall any development that might lead to a Kemalist-Bolshevik alliancedirected against British imperial interests in the region. The Kemalist nationalists, he stated,were not hostile to Britain, but to the partition of Turkey. So why should Britain antagonise
them “solely for the benefit of alien and predatory races? ”. 42 After becoming the Colonial
Secretary and, therefore, responsible for administrating mandated territories in the Middle
East, Churchill pronounced the same views, which he shared with Lord Curzon and Edwin
Montagu. Both Churchill and Curzon consistently opposed Lloyd George’s policy of support­
ing the Greeks at the expense of the Kemalist Turks. Lloyd George’s policy, they and theGeneral Staff feared,4 3 would throw the Kemalists into the arms of the Bolsheviks. Neither thegrowing signs of moderation in France’s Turkish policy nor the arguments of his Cabinet col­leagues persuaded Lloyd George to change his anti-Kemalist stance.
The existence of these contradictory views after the Cairo conference expressed an
uncertainty common among the British officials at home and abroad as to the way in which Bri­
tain could fit in its attitudes towards the Kurdish situation with its broader policy in the Middie
East,where the peace with Turkey and the containment of Bolshevism occupied a central
41* Martin Gilbert, Winston Churchill, Vol.IV, 1917-1922, (London: Heinmann, 1977), p.501.
42* Churchill, Memorandum on Military Policy In Asia Minor, 9 October 1919, CAB24/89, PRO.
43* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, p. 103.

225

place. At the Foreign Office, C.J. Edmonds advocated a “ m odus vivendr with Turkey,
whereas Forbes Adam argued in favour of a policy of physical force towards the Kemalists. 4 4The staff of the Colonial Office were generally in favour of Churchill’s position of non­intervention in the affairs of Northern Kurdistan. Some officials at the Colonial Office evensuggested a rectification of the frontier between Southern and Northern Kurdistan “as an
inducement" to the Kemalists to stop their anti-British attitudes, 4 5 which hindered the imple­

mentation of the new policy of indirect British control in Mesopotamia. Shuckburgh criticised
Cox’s suggestion that Britain should back the anti-Kemalist efforts of the Northern Kurdish
nationalists for fear that it would turn Turkey into an "eternal enem y" of Britain, while the suc­cess of the new British policy towards Iraq required “a friendly T u rk e f. He argued that an antiKemalist revolt in Northern Kurdistan would be a “a fiasco” and consequently worsen the Iraqi
situation, rather than improving it.46 To him, Britain was neither in a position to adequately sup­port the revolt of the Northern Kurds, nor able to accommodate Kurdish refugees if it failed.
The political situation in Northern Kurdistan and the state of the Kurdish nationalist
movement were among the reasons why the British Government was unwilling to become
embroiled in the affairs of Northern Kurdistan. It was convinced that the Kurdish nationalists
were incapable of successfully leading an anti-Turkish revolt. A Colonial Office minute notedthat "the lessons of the last few years are overwhelmingly against employing w eak friends
against powerful enemies, when we are not in a position to give them adequate support ”.47

Any British involvement in Kurdish revolts was considered a dangerous gamble, and should
only be adopted reluctantly and as a last resort, when other diplomatic options were totally
exhausted. The idea of using the Kurds as a last resort was contained in Shuckburgh’s com­ments on Churchill’s reply to Cox on the issue of supporting the Northern Kurds. He madeclear that the Lausanne conference was the last chance for Britain to persuade the Kemalists
to sign a new peace treaty. Otherwise, Britain would have to consider"whether advantage
should be taken of the opportunity offered by the present tem per o f the [Northern] Kurds toobtain their co-operation against possible Turkish aggression ”.48 The success of the Lau­sanne conference in achieving a new Turkish peace agreement ruled out the question of Brit­ish sponsorship of anti-Kemalist revolts in Northern Kurdistan, even though Southern Kurdi44* Edmonds & Adam, Foreign Office minutes No.4766,25/26 April 1921, F0371/6346, PRO.
45* Second Minute Middle Eastern Committee, Colonial Office, 12 May 1921, F0371/6344, PRO.
46* Shuckburgh, Colonial Office Minute of 10 November 1921, CO730/6, PRO.
47* Colonial Office Minute, 11 November 1921, CO730/6, PRO.
48* Shuckburgh, 21 February 1922, F0371/7781, PRO.

226

stan’s future remained an unresolved matter between the two concerned parties: Britain andTurkey.

iii- <Tfte Conclusion O f *Che Causanne A g re e m e n t A n d 9 ? s im p lic a tio n s J o r
Kurdish Q uestionhe

The history of the British position on the Kurdish question following Sevres is one of a steadyretreat from both the principle of self-determination and the consideration of the question as
an international one. The 1921 London conference was the first step towards relegating theKurdish question to the background. A year later, the Kurdish question was again ignored
during the course of the Allies’ negotiations on the Turkish settlement. Britain complained
about the lack of Allied support for its position on the question of non-Turkish minorities. 4 9 At
the second meeting, the Allies agreed, insofar as the position of minorities was concerned,
that the League should appoint Commissioners to visit regions where ethnic and religious
tensions were at their peak, such as Smyrna, Potus, Angora and Cilicia, so In none of the nine
Allies’ meetings was there any direct or indirect reference to the Kurdish regions or the Kurd­
ish question. Curzon’s idea of extending the Commissioners’ power of supervision to nonTurkish Muslims, which would include the Northern Kurds, was not adopted.51 His speech in
the House of Lords confirmed the Allies’ intention to exclude the Kurds from their discussionof the minorities question in Asiatic Turkey. 5 2 Soon after, Christian minorities such as the
Assyrian-Chaldeans were also excluded from Point 6 of the final draft on the minorities ques­tion because of French objections:
They [Allies] desire to provide for the protection and security of the various minorities whether
Muslim or Christian or other races and creeds, who whether in Europe or Asia, find themselves
placed in the midst of larger political or ethnic aggressions.53
What the Allies agreed on in their meetings became the basis for their approach to the ques­tion of the national minorities at the forthcoming peace conference in Lausanne.
Lausanne was chosen for being a town in a neutral country, i.e. Switzerland. The con­ference was, as Busch points out, the only post-war one in which the victorious Allies met with
49* Hardinge, Paris, 24 March 1922, F0371/7858, PRO.
50* A high commissioner was already appointed by the League Council, which passed a resolution inearly 1922 in which it drew the Allies’ attention to the urgent need to secure the protection of minorities.
It expressed its readiness to co-operate with the Powers to secure the objects of Sevres.
51* Curzon to Foreign Office, Paris, 23 March 1922, F0371/7858, PRO.
52* Parliamentary Debate in the House of the Lords, 30 March 1922, F0371/7859, PRO.
53* Foreign Office Minute of the 9th Meeting of Allied Foreign Ministers in Paris, 26 March 1922,
F0371/7858, PRO.

22 7

the defeated Turks on almost equal terms. 5 4 The agenda of the conference revolved aroundthree major issues: the future of Thrace, Mosul and capitulations. Three Commissions wereformed, and Curzon assumed charge of the important Territorial and Military Commission.
Apart from the conciliatory attitudes of its former Allies towards Kemalist Turkey, Britain’s diplo­
matic activities at Lausanne were influenced by several ominous developments. September
1922 witnessed the collapse of the Greek front in Asia Minor, which was followed by theadvance of the Kemalist forces into Smyrna and the neutral zone around the Straits. The latterdevelopment was of special importance because the Kemalists directly challenged Britain.
The ensuing Chanak crisis exposed the diplomatic and military weakness of Britain, when nei­
ther its former Allies nor its white Dominions wanted to fight the Turks . 55 This crisis evenplayed some part in the fall of Lloyd George’s coalition Government on 19 October 1922. The
accession of the Conservatives to power on 23 October had immediate effects on the Kurd­
ish question, as they were in favour of a conciliatory policy towards Kemalist Turkey and had atotally indifferent attitudes towards the issue of the non-Turkish minorities. Lloyd George
accused the Conservatives of having always been pro-Turk. Indeed, the new Conservative
Government was determined to normalise British relations with Kemalist Turkey, hoping to dir­
ect the latter, if possible, against Bolshevik Russia. One of the ways to improve bilateral rela­tions with the Kemalists was to put no emphasis on the problematic question of the nonTurkish minorities. In the new Government, Curzon was the only British policy-maker who
retained his old job as Foreign Secretary. This was important because, as previously men­tioned, he firmly supported the policy of improving relations with the Kemalists. In theabsence of Lloyd George, who used to take independent initiatives behind his Foreign
Secretary’s babk.se Curzon was freely able to pursue the new policy, which required Britain to
pay much less attention to Greek interests, and most importantly, to the minority question in
Asiatic Turkey. Indeed, Curzon, who favoured the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into
Iraq, conducted the most important rounds of the talks on the new Turkish peace settlement.
In the very early stages of the Lausanne conference in December 1922, the Allies
granted the Kemalist delegation, according to Curzon, "a great concession" insofar as theKurdish question was concerned. From then onward, it was to be considered as an internal
question and not as a political or international one:
54* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p.365.
55* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, p. 100.
56* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p.360.

228

Departing from precedent of all European minority treaties... to the extent of excluding Muslim
minorities from all articles of minority section of treaty, including that article, which places
guarantee for execution in [the] hands of [the] League of Nations.57
The Allies expected Kemalist Turkey to adhere to a general declaration regarding the protec­
tion and freedom of all non-Turkish nationalities without distinction of birth, race, language orreligion. There was no direct reference to the minorities, apart from the Armenians. No role
would be played by the League of Nations in implementing th e "protection of minorities”
terms, which entirely depended on the Kemalists’ good will. These concessions were accep­
ted immediately by the Kemalist delegation. It is important to point out that the terms of the
Lausanne agreement on the protection of the national minorities were only concerned with
Christian minorities, 58 and did not really affect the Northern Kurds. The inclusion of the natio­
nal minorities terms in the new Turkish peace settlement had, in effect, no real value, given
the Kemalists’ determination to impose pan-Turkish cultural and political hegemony over all
non-Turkish nationalities. These terms were little more than a sly attempt by the British andtheir former Allies to save face, having failed to force the Kemalists to accept a modified ver­sion of the Sevres treaty. One of the most important aspects of the Lausanne negotiations
was the agreement between Britain and Kemalist Turkey that the Turkish-Mesopotamian
frontier should be determined by "friendly” talks within a period of nine months. If both parties
failed to reach a frontier agreement, the dispute would be referred to the League Council.
Meanwhile, Britain and Kemalist Turkey undertook not to use force or other means to change
the existing status of the concerned territories, i.e. the Mosul Wilayet.59
From the very outset, the Lausanne conference had immediate effects on British
Kurdish policy. With the inauguration of peace negotiations between the Allies and Kemalist
Turkey, British policy makers -such as Curzon- began to question the wisdom behind the ideaof sponsoring Kurdish nationalism in Southern Kurdistan as a way of containing the Kemalist
threat. Supporting the Kurdish nationalists in Southern Kurdistan, let alone in Northern Kurdi­
stan, became a dangerous card to play, since it would rouse Turkish fears about British inten­
tions and thus jeopardise the course of the peace negotiations:
Is it advisable at the moment, when we are negotiating with the Turks [at Lausanne] and when
the position of the Mosul Wilayet may come into question, to take action such as is suggestedby the Colonial Office in the direction of consolidating a Kurdish national movement? In view of
57* Curzon, Lausanne, 30 December 1922, FO371/9058, PRO.
58* See Appendix: Section III: Lausanne Treaty of Peace with Turkey and Accompanying Straits Con­vention and Declaration on the Administration of Justice, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1923,
Treaty Series No. 16, Cmd, 1929.
59* Section 1, Article 3, ibid.

229

this situation and of the fact that the situation at Lausanne changes from day to day, it israther difficult for the [Foreign Office] department to make any definite recommendations on
the question.eo
The political conditions surrounding the Lausanne conference turned Mahmud and his natio­
nalist followers into a political liability for the British in Southern Kurdistan. Encouraging Kurd­
ish nationalism, the British found out, would weaken their efforts in keeping Southern Kurdi­
stan out of Turkish control, since it would make the Kemalists even more determined to pre­empt the emergence of a separate Kurdish entity, which would always pose a serious threat totheir territorial unity. By contrast, the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq would makeit politically much easier for the British to dismiss Kemalist accusations that keeping Southern
Kurdistan outside Turkish control would endanger the security and territorial integrity of Turk­ey. It was far easier for Curzon to present the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into the
newly-emerging Iraqi state as a logical outcome, given the inclusion of Southern Kurdistan in
Britain’s Mesopotamian mandate. Indeed, to support his argument that Southern Kurdistan
formed a natural part of Iraq, Curzon always maintained that the British occupied a “judicial
position° in Iraq “qua mandatory*.ei In other words, as Southern Kurdistan was part of the
Mesopotamian mandate, the British had a moral obligation to ensure its inclusion in the suc­cessor state, i.e. Iraq. According to Rumbold, Lord Curzon stated at the Lausanne confer­ence that:the whole of [the] Mosul Wilayet should properly be included in [the] Iraqi state and ever since
the armistice, HMG have regarded the northern frontier of the Wilayet as the de facto admin­
istrative frontier of the Iraqi stated
In these circumstances, the temporary withholding of British withdrawal from Southern Kurdi­
stan pending the conclusion of peace with Turkey, was designed, in Dobbs’ words, to provide
Britain with a “valuable diplomatic weapon of fait accompli”.63 This was fundamental to theimplementation of the merging process of Southern Kurdistan with the Iraqi state.

60* R.C. Lindsay, Foreign Office Minute No.130941,24 November 1922, F0371/7782, PRO.
61* Curzon to Foreign Office, 19 January 1923, F0371/9060, PRO.
62* Rumbold, Lausanne, 2 May 1923, F0371/9005, PRO.
63* Acting High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 14 May 1923, F0371/9005, PRO.

230

International And Regional Considerations Influencing British Attitudes
Towards The Kurdish Question, 1921-1923
i- <Che A ttitu d es O f B ritain 's Jorm er Allies
From the early 1921 onwards, the Middle Eastern situation witnessed a series of develop­
ments that posed direct threats to the British position in Southern Kurdistan and Mesopota­
mia. In the space of one week, Kemalist Turkey concluded two agreements with Britain’s for­mer Allies, Italy and France, on 13 and 17 March 1921 respectively, coupled with a treaty with
Bolshevik Russia on 16 March 1921. The importance of the first two agreements, from the
British perspective, lay in the fact that France and Italy violated the terms of the Allied Tripartite
agreement of 10 August 1920. The latter was an arrangement for facilitating the re­organisation of the defeated Ottoman Empire by eliminating international rivalries. It providedfor (1) international commissions on control, (2) obtaining commercial and transport facilities
and concessions, (3) diplomatic assistance, (4) supervising railways, (5) defining the boundar­
ies of French and Italian zones of interest, (6) mandatory powers of territories detached fromTurkey, (7) the Heracles coal-field, (8) the withdrawal of French and Italian forces and (9) the
protection of minorities. The implementation or the non-implementation of the first six points
and Point 9 affected both Britain’s position in Southern Kurdistan and its attitudes towards theremainder of the Kurdish areas.
Given direct French involvement in all post-war political and territorial rearrangementsof the former Ottoman Wilayets, the Kemalist-French agreement was bound to have politicaland military implications for the British position in Southern Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. First­
ly, by unilaterally ending the state of war between France and Kemalist Turkey, the agreement
amounted to a French recognition of the Angora Government, with whom Britain was still tech­nically at war. Thus, Britain felt isolated and defensive vis-a-vis Kemalist Turkey, a country thatwas determined to restore Turkish rule to as many Ottoman territories as it could. Secondly, by
giving back to Turkey certain Kurdish areas such as Jezirah and Nisibin, France practicallyabdicated from its responsibilities towards the protection of the non-Turkish minorities under
the terms of the 1920 Sevres treaty.64 Finally, France abandoned its old obligations under thesame agreement of 10 August 1920 -namely, to maintain troops in its zone of interests until
the peace terms were executed by Turkey. 65 in other words, Britain sensed that it had
become both militarily and diplomatically weaker vis-a-vis Kemalist Turkey. This meant that an
64* Curzon to the Count de Saint-Aulain, 5 November 1921, CO730f7, PRO.
65* Ibid.

231

early peace with Kemalist Turkey became much harder to achieve, given the intransigent atti­
tudes of the Kemalists, whose confidence was boosted enormously by their diplomatic suc­cesses in March 1921.
British military personnel in Mesopotamia quickly voiced their concern about theunforeseen Kemalist-French agreement. They, when interpreting the effects of that agree­
ment on the British position in Mesopotamia, went so far as to suspect an anti-British conspir­acy. According to them, the French, with Kemalist help, were plotting to expand their influ­
ence among the Kurds by establishing a great Kurdish confederacy under their patronage:
To begin with, the members are to be Barazi, between the Belikh and the Euphrates, the Mili,
between the Belikh and the Jajjagahg Su. Later, the Kocher, Hajan. Miran and Kurds of Mardin
are to be roped in and the final object to be aimed at is to extend French influence as far as
Sulaimaniya. The movement is... directed against the British.ee
This explained, according to this interpretation, why the French “deliberately abandoned”
most of their obligations towards Turkey under the terms of the Sevres treaty. This interpreta­tion was inaccurate insofar as France’s intentions in Ottoman Kurdistan were concerned.
France showed on every occasion its opposition to Kurdish nationalist aspirations, mistakenly
believing that Britain sought a British-orientated Kurdistan in the form of an independent orautonomous state. Through its good relations with the Kemalists, France sought to consoli­
date its economic influence, and to weaken what it perceived as Britain’s national minorities
card as a means of maintaining its influence. Accordingly, during the London conference in
1921, France opposed League of Nations’ intervention in the question of the national minori­ties and proposals to appoint a High Commissioner to supervise the interests of minorities
such as the Kurds. 67 France suspected British involvement in all anti-Kemalist efforts by the
Kurdish nationalists. This might explain, for example, why the French authorities refused per­mission for Akram Bey, a Kurdish nationalist leader who was involved in the preparation of ananti-Kemalist revolt, to go to Diyarbekir via Beirut.68
The British thought that, from the strategic viewpoint, the transfer of the Kurdish
areas of Nisibin and Jezirah-ibn-Omar from French to Kemalist control had immediate implica­
tions. These two Kurdish areas were of “great strategic importance in relation to Mosul andMesopotamia” and that similar strategic importance applied to “the handing back to Turkey ofthe track of the Baghdad Railway between Tchoban-Bey and Nisibin”.w Against this back66* General Headquarter, Mes. EX.Force, 26 September 1921, F0371/6369, PRO.
67* Curzon, Paris, 23 March 1922, F0371/7858, PRO.
68* Rumbold, Constantinople, to High Commissioner, Baghdad, November 1920, F0371/6346, PRO.
69* Ibid.

232

ground, Curzon informed the French, that, because of the threat to their position in Mesopota­mia, the British would not remain indifferent towards the handing over of the track of the Bagh­dad railway and the Kurdish areas of Jezirah-ibn-Omar and Nisibin to Turkey. 7 0 Indeed, both ofthese developments strengthened the military position of the Kemalists in areas cldse to thefrontiers and thus made an imminent Turkish invasion of Southern Kurdistan an ever more
likely prospect. In these circumstances, Britain understandably decided to keep its imperial
forces in the out-posts in Southern Kurdistan, and to retain its responsibility for the defenceof Mesopotamia, until peace with Turkey was established. The French-Kemalist agreement
had, in the British view, other political implications for Southern Kurdistan. The British fearedthat French territorial concessions in Western Kurdistan would encourage the Kemalists tobring more pressure on them to give similar territorial concessions in Southern Kurdistan.71
Furthermore, French recognition of Turkish rule over the Kurdish areas of Jezirah and Nisibinwould lend legitimacy to Turkish claims to all Kurdish areas under British control. Despite all
Paris’s assurances to London that no facilities would be given to Kemalist designs against
Mesopotamia, and that there would be no war materials suppled to the Kemalists, 7 2 the impactof the Kemalist-French agreement evidently accentuated the cautious British approach to the
Kurdish situation.
The period immediately before the holding of the Lausanne conference, from Sep­
tember to October 1922, witnessed increasing Kemalist determination to undo all the national
minorities’ terms for Kurdistan and Armenia under the Sevres treaty. There were increasing
rumours about a bilateral Kemalist-French understanding, involving French encouragementof the Kemalists in their efforts to control the Mosul Wilayet. The early Lausanne meetings
between the Allies and Kemalist Turkey were held concurrently with the Paris negotiations
over the question of German reparations. As Marian Kent points out, the ensuing sharp differ­ences between British and French policies over that question -which subsequently led to the
French-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923- had enormous repercussions at the
Lausanne conference, where the French (and the Italians) expressed conciliatory attitudes
towards the Kemalist delegation. 73 This virtually put an end to Curzon’s strategy at the confer­ence, which was mainly based on confronting the Kemalist delegation with a united Allied

70* Curzon to M. de Montille, 25 November 1921, C0730/7, PRO.
71* Curzon to the Count de Saint-Aulain, 5 November 1921, CO730/7, PRO.
72* S/S for the Colonies to High Commissioner, 30 November 1921, CO730/7, PRO.
73* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, p113.

233

fro n t.74

Against the background of potential French (and even American) support for the
Kemalist position on Mosul, and an urgent need to implement the new policy of indirect British
control, Curzon raised the question of granting the Kemalist side some territorial concessions
during the Lausanne negotiations. In his view, if Britain decided to give territorial concessions,
it had to choose between firstly, the cession of the whole or part of the Mosul Wilayet, includ­ing Southern Kurdistan, and secondly, the cession of part or whole of Southern Kurdistan. 7 5
It must be remembered that Curzon’s definition of Southern Kurdistan in this context was con­fined to a portion of it. This territorial concession would arguably not affect Britain’s strategic
position in Mesopotamia because it was “a long narrow strip of country, which would be mostdifficult for Turks to administer and [of] little value to them ".76 The idea of granting the Kemal­
ists limited territorial concessions was unanimously rejected by the Colonial Office Committee,
as well as the Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the Air Staff. They feared that from themilitary viewpoint, the Kemalist threat to Mesopotamia would be enormously increased by the
weakening the latter’s strategic defences in Southern Kurdistan. From the political viewpoint,
the Kurds and Arabs alike would oppose this idea, and consequently, turn against Britain. Fur­thermore, Turkish interests were concentrated in areas situated on the southern edges ofSouthern Kurdistan, where the Turkoman elements lived, such as Arbil, Kifri and Kirkuk.
Therefore, limited territorial concessions by Britain would not satisfy the Kemalists. 7 7 Thisdebate shows how increasingly vulnerable the British position was in the post-Sevres period,
and that even limited French territorial concessions in Kurdistan to Kemalist Turkey forced
British civilian and military circles to re-examine their entire policy in Southern Kurdistan andMesopotamia.

<7- Kem alist Turkey, g rita in And hChe Kurdish Situation
As previously mentioned, Kemalist diplomatic victories in signing agreements with France and
Italy, and a treaty with Bolshevik Russia, had immediate military implications for the British posi­tion in Southern Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. It led to the growing belief among British military
74* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p. 121.
75* Annexure i, 7 December 1922 -in- Cabinet Committee On Iraq (I.R.0.1st) 8 December 1922,
F0371/7772, PRO.
76*lbid.
77* Annexure ii, Curzon, Lausanne, 8 December 1922 -in- Cabinet Committee On Iraq (I.R.0.1st) 8
December 1922, F0371/7772, PRO.

234

officials both in London and Baghdad that a Kemalist invasion across the northern frontiers of
Mesopotamia was a strong possibility. This belief was reinforced by the Greeks’ defeat at thehands of the Kemalists. Now that the forces of the Kemalists were no longer distracted by the
Greeks and the Bolsheviks, they were in a far stronger position to devote their military efforts
outwards to projects such as regaining the Mosul Wilayet. The Kemalists, according to a War
Office memorandum, were emboldened by “the process of reducing" British forces in Iraq, fol­lowing the ending of a British military presence in neighbouring Persia. 78 Britain was awarethat all its former Allies, let alone Bolshevik Russia, desired a British defeat over the Mosul
question because of their belief that if the Turks recovered Mosul -or preferably the whole ofMesopotamia- they would stand a good chance of exploiting the valuable oil-bearing potentialof the country.7 9 To forestall any French and American support for the Turkish position on the
Mosul issue during the Lausanne negotiations, Britain generously offered them each a 25%
share in TPC. Curzon offered the Kemalists a similar share during the Lausanne negotiations.This offer was, according to Busch, part of Curzon’s strategy of trading off oil for Mosul.so
The Kemalists rejected the offer and, as part of their strategy at the conference, attempted topersuade Britain to accept their control over Mosul, in return for breaking relations with theBolsheviks.8i Mustafa Kemal used his close relations with the Bolsheviks as a lever against
the Allies, particularly Britain. 8 2 He also made the most of the inter-Allied disagreement both
before and during the Lausanne conference, 83 with the aim of strengthening Turkey’s diplo­
matic position.
The Kemalists’ own approach to the Kurdish situation also influenced Britain’s Kurd­
ish policy. The creation of pro-Turkish societies for co-ordinating anti-British propaganda, andthe dispatch of Turkish irregulars to co-operate with Southern Kurdish rebels in their fightagainst the British presence were the principal tactics the Kemalists used to demonstrate that
Britain was incapable of providing either a workable government or political stability in South­
ern Kurdistan. For this reason, and as the Southern Kurds had no desire to be ruled by the
Arabs, the Kemalists would argue that their demand for the re-establishment of Turkish rule inSouthern Kurdistan was justifiable. Apart from this argument, the Kemalists laid claim to
78* S/S for War, Memorandum, 21 November 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
79* Cabinet (No. C.P.3566), 13 December 1921, F0371/6347, PRO.
80* Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p.244.
81* Ibid,
82* Kent, Moguls and Mandarins, p. 103.
83* Ibid, pp.114-115.

235

Southern Kurdistan on the grounds of the illegality of British control over Mosul. It must be
remembered that the British forces captured Mosul a few days after the conclusion of the
Mudros armistice on 31 October 1918, which ended the war between Turkey and the Allies.
Clause 16 of the Mudros armistice provided for the surrender of the Turkish garrisons in
Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied commander. From the Turkish viewpoint, this clause did
not apply to the Mosul Wilayet, but to the Baghdad and Basra Wilayets. Turkish claims to
Mosul were repeatedly made public whenever the Kemalists negotiated with the Allies. For
instance, Jamil Bey, a senior member of the Kemalist delegation at the London conference,emphatically told Feisal that Turkey had no designs on its former Arab Wilayets and that it was
willing to make a treaty on “the most generous terms*.m
Promising the Kurds local autonomy within Turkey was one of the Kemalists’ main tac­
tics in consolidating their political influence in Kurdistan. This would also help them to mobilise
the Kurds in Northern and Southern Kurdistan against the British. In other words, the Kurds southerners and northerners alike- would have every reason to support Turkish territorial
claims to the Mosul Wilayet, as this meant the re-unification of Ottoman Kurdistan in the formof an autonomous entity. London was aware of, and alarmed by, the Kemalists’ Kurdish policy
and, therefore, sought such a policy towards Southern Kurdistan that would foil all Kemalist
attempts to win over the Southern Kurds.85 Thus, in spite of Cox and Feisal’s opposition, theColonial Office decided on the re-establishment of another Kurdish government under theleadership of Mahmud in early autumn 1922, a step which was designed to frustrate theKemalist efforts to consolidate their influence in Southern Kurdistan.
The Kemalists’ rejection of partial British concessions in Kurdistan in 1921 reflected
their firm belief that Britain would become increasingly amenable to their pressure, following
their considerable diplomatic and political achievements at both the international and domes­
tic levels. Indeed, in late 1921, the British told the Kemalists that they were willing to recog­
nise their control over Northern Kurdistan in return for the protection of Christian minorities.
Even though this constituted a major departure from the terms of the Sevres treaty, theKemalists rejected the proposal because it clearly implied that Southern Kurdistan would
remain under the British mandate. The Kemalists optimistically awaited the right moment whenthe British would be forced to leave Southern Kurdistan, either due to financial problems or
through Kurdish resistance, which they helped to stiffen by providing arms and officers. The
84* Cornwallis, 24 February 1921, F0371/6467, PRO.
85* Message from Prime Minister to Mr. Churchill, 22 March 1921, F0371/6342, PRO236

Kemalists also drew their confidence from the opposition of the Southern Kurds to the impo­
sition of Arab rule over Southern Kurdistan. Given the inability of the Arabs to incorporate
Southern Kurdistan into Iraq on their own, the Kemalists believed that they could easily stepin to fill the political vacuum which would result from the withdrawal of both the British garrison
and administration from the Kurdish areas.
Although the Kemalists were heartened by several military developments, such as
their defeat of the Greeks and later the Armenians, they eventually signed a peace treaty with
the British at Lausanne, without succeeding in extending their control to Southern Kurdistan.
The future of the latter was to be settled through peaceful means, such as the intervention of
the League of Nations. The question is why the Kemalists resorted to peaceful means to set­tle Southern Kurdistan’s future, rather then forcing the British to go. There are two explana­tions. Firstly, the Kemalists feared that the continuation of instability in Southern Kurdistan
might worsen further the political situation in the Kurdish areas under their control. Indeed, aseries of local Kurdish revolts between 1920 and 1923 showed that the Northern Kurds for­med the most difficult internal obstacle to the Kemalist consolidation of their authority. In viewof the continuing British-Kemalist confrontation and political instability in both Southern andNorthern Kurdistan, the Kemalists feared that a different solution for the Kurdish question
might come to the fore by turning Ottoman Kurdistan into an independent state. At least, theKemalists probably thought that Britain was in a position to declare an independent Southern
Kurdistan as a means of permanently weakening the security of the young Kemalist state -aprospect which would inevitably encourage the Northern Kurds to free themselves from Turk­
ish rule.
Under such conditions, it was natural that the return of Mahmud and the re­establishment of his autonomous Government considerably alarmed the Kemalists, who inter­
preted these developments as a dear massage from Britain that if they did not end their hos­tile activities, Southern Kurdistan would be eventually established as an independent state.
These Turkish fears were expressed in an intercepted telegram from the Kemalist Govern­
ment to its representative at the Lausanne conference. The telegram drew the attention of
the Kemalist representative, Ismet Pasha, to British plans to financially and politicallystrengthen the Kurds and to establish an independent Kurdistan, which would threaten Turk­
ey’s security.86 Mustafa Kemal’s five-day long speech in 1927 included details of Kurdish col-86* Reof, Angora, to Ismet, Lausanne, 3 May 1923, F0371/9005, PRO.

237

laboration with the British to establish an independent Kurdistan, with a view to undermining
his movement. 87 The seriousness of the Kemalists’ fears manifested itself both in their deci­sion to resort to peaceful means, immediately after the establishment of an autonomous Kurd­
ish government in Sulaimaniya, and in their refusal to support Mahmud’s subsequent revolt
against Britain. Secondly, when a British counter offensive successfully began in Rowanduz which was accompanied by heavy air bombardments of Kurdish rebellious areas- the Kurdish
insurgents, who up to this point played an essential part in the Kemalist policy of destabilisingSouthern Kurdistan, stopped their activities and withheld their military co-operation with theKemalists. As a consequence, the Kemalists lost their main instrument designed to exhaust
the British militarily and financially, as well as undermining their political credibility not only inSouthern Kurdistan but also in Iraq. In their interpretation of the British counter offensive, theKemalists even suspected that the limited British offensive in Rowanduz was a prelude to along-term policy of aggression in support of Kurdish nationalist aspirations. British reports
from Constantinople show how the Kemalists were “greatly preoccupied" over the recent Brit­ish military activities in the Rowanduz area, which was perceived to be “calculated to renderacute the whole question of Kurdistan”.88

ill- P e rs ia , g rita in A n d e€he Kurdish S itu a tio n

The Kemalist menace to Southern Kurdistan coincided with a tangible change in Persian atti­
tudes towards British influence in their country. The new nationalist Persian Government ofSiphdar, which was formed following Gen. Riza Shah’s military coup on 21 February, wanted
to end British political influence in Persia, especially in the south, where the British backed asemi-independent Arab entity in the province of Khuzistan. In the post-Sevres period, Bri­tain’s political influence was considerably weakened by the withdrawal of its imperial forcesfrom Persian territories under financial pressure and by the rejection of the Majlis (the Persian
Parliament) of the British-Persian draft agreement, which would have granted Britain virtual
political and economic control over Persia.89 Britain became even more amenable to Persia’spressure as the latter concluded a friendship treaty with Bolshevik Russia on 26 February, fivedays after the military coup. Not only did this considerably improve the economic and diplo-

87* Mustafa Kemal, A Speech Delivered by G. Mustafa Kemal. op. cit.
88* Mr. Henderson, Constantinople, 6 May 1923, F0371/9005, PRO.
89* Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs, 15001941, (The University Press of Virginia, 1966), pp. 164-165.

238

matic relations between the two countries, but it also led to the withdrawal of Russian forcesfrom northern Persia.90 The Persian Government also dramatically improved its bilateral rela­tions with its counterpart in Turkey, Persia’s historical enemy. Britain was increasing anxious
about the prospect of an alliance between Persia and Kemalist Turkey, or even between Per­sia and Bolshevik Russia, which would pose a direct threat to its position in India and the Mid­dle East. Under these new circumstances, Britain could not run the risk of turning Southern
Kurdistan into an autonomous entity because of the serious threat it would pose to Persian
territorial integrity, especially Persian control over Eastern Kurdistan.
It was this Persian factor that always prevented Britain from entering into formal rela­tions with Simko in Eastern Kurdistan. When, for instance, British officials in Mesopotamia
contemplated the idea of using Simko’s influence as a barrier against both the Kemalists andthe Bolsheviks, Churchill instructed Cox not to make any political arrangements with Simko,
apart from those which were connected with the question of the repatriation of the Christianrefugees to Urmia. 91 The Persian Government, which had earlier protested against British
contacts with Simko, was informed of Churchill’s instruction.9 2 Even the project of repatriating
the Christian refugees to their own lands in Urmia became impossible for the British to carryout in co-operation with Simko because of Persian opposition. The Persians perceived any
political deals between Simko and the British as amounting to recognition by the latter of theauthority of the former in the mutinous parts of Eastern Kurdistan. These examples show how
the political developments in the post-S£vres Middle East made the British amenable to thepolitical pressure of such a weak country as Persia.
At another level, Britain was aware that the Persian Government had its own expan­
sionist agenda in Southern Kurdistan, especially in the Sulaimaniya, Rowanduz and Auraman
regions. Like Kemalist Turkey, Persia considered the British decision to withdraw from Meso­
potamia as an opportunity to obtain territory in Southern Kurdistan. This motive, along with
Persian fears over the emergence of a separate Southern Kurdistan, could explain why the
Persian Government granted logistical support for the military operations of the Kemalist irreg­
ulars in Southern Kurdistan. Cox frequently reported Persian complicity in Kemalist intrigues
in Southern Kurdistan by providing Euzdemir, a local Kemalist commander, with officers and
90* Ibid, pp.186-188.
91* S/S for the Colonies to High Commissioner of Iraq, 22 November 1922, F0371 f7782, PRO. Said
Taha was a Turkish subject and therefore Persia had no basis to complain about his dealing with Britain
in Rowanduz.
92* Shuckburgh to Foreign Office, 11 December 1922, F0371/7782, PRO.

239

ammunition to re-capture Southern Kurdistan from the British.9 3 Through this co-operation,
Persia hoped to grab a share in Southern Kurdistan. Indeed, there was information on a Persian-Turkish understanding that, in return for its support for Turkey, Persia would be territori­
ally rewarded by the rectification of the Auraman frontier in its favour. 94 Although Persia statedthat its co-operation with Turkey was limited to the suppression of the Simko movement, andthat it was neutral in the existing Turkish-British conflict in Rowanduz, 9 5 the British were awarethat Persian interest in the issue stemmed from territorial ambitions. In light of this Britain
refused to allow the representatives of the Persian Government to attend the Lausanne con­ference, where the Persians hoped to achieve some territorial gains in Southern Kurdistan. 90
Ironically, the Kemalists had earlier supported Simko’s anti-Persian revolt, hoping to extend
their political control to Eastern Kurdistan. The Persians were aware of the Kemalists’ desire tounite all parts of Kurdistan into one nominal autonomous entity under their rule. 9 7 British offi­
cials also reported that the Kemalists encouraged Eastern Kurds to declare independence
from Mako to Kermanshah.98 Kemalist policy in Eastern Kurdistan also sought to pressurise
Persia into not co-operating with Britain, and to foil its plans for the annexation of certain Kurd­
ish areas in Northern Kurdistan along the Turkish-Persian frontiers. It was under such condi­
tions of intrigue and counter-intrigue and contradictory territorial ambitions that the British had
to cautiously conduct their Kurdish policy in the post-S6vres period.

Conclusion
Several developments influenced Britain’s position on Kurdish affairs after the conclusion of
the Sevres treaty in August 1920. Militarily, Britain’s acute financial problems restricted theextent of its commitments in areas such as Mesopotamia and Southern Kurdistan. This con­straint on military commitments had a direct political impact as Britain was no longer in a posi­tion to force Turkey to end either its territorial claims and its threat to Southern Kurdistan, or
respect the political and cultural rights of the non-Turkish nationalities under the terms of the
S&vres treaty. Resorting to diplomacy was Britain’s main option for bringing peace with Turk-

93* Foreign Office Minute No.3020,11 April 1923, F0371/9004, PRO.
94* S/S, 1 February 1923, F0371/9004, PRO.
95* High Commissioner of Iraq to S/S for the Colonies, 12 January 1923, FO371/9039, PRO.
96* RCC, Foreign Office Minute No.1,26 January 1923, FO371/9061, PRO.
97* According to the Persian Foreign Minister, the Kemalists aimed at establishing an independent Kur­
distan out of Eastern and Northern Kurdistan. Norman to Curzon, 1 April 1921, F0371/6442, PRO.
98* Britmilat, Tehran, to DMI, Baghdad & India, 24 August 1921, F0371/6442, PRO.

240

ey. This state of affairs and Britain’s desire to pre-empt a Kemalist-Bolshevik alliance renderedinsignificant, in the eyes of the new Conservative Government, such issues as those of the
future of the non-Turkish nationalities. Thus at the Lausanne conference, Britain gave com­plete concessions to the Kemalists on the issue of the future of Armenia and Kurdistan for thesake of improving bilateral relations with Turkey. Pressures on Britain also came from other dir­ections, such as the conflict of its interests with former Allies, the new disposition of the Per­
sian Government to end British influence in Persia and the political, economic and strategic
requirements of establishing a viable Arab state in Iraq.
During the period 1920-1923, British policy was characterised by a gradual shift fromthe concept of Kurdish autonomy to that of maintaining the status quo by turning the de facto
partition of Ottoman Kurdistan into de jure one. In other words, any modification or substitu­
tion of the Sevres treaty with a new peace settlement would have to provide for the retentionof British control over Southern Kurdistan in return for recognising Northern Kurdistan’s sta­
tus as part of the new Kemalist Turkey. In parallel with this, Britain changed its early position on
the Kurdish question, in that it no longer considered the Kurdish situation as having an inter­national dimension, and maintained further that the treatment of the Kurds was the concern of
the states of the region. This dramatic change can be seen when contrasting the terms of the1920 SSvres treaty with those of the 1923 Lausanne agreement. The former had elevatedthe Kurdish question to an unprecedented international level whereas the latter, by delibera­
tely omitting it, demoted it to an internal level.
The Lausanne conference constituted a watershed in British policy for the above
mentioned reasons, and also tipped the balance in favour of the incorporation of Southern
Kurdistan into the newly-emerging Iraqi state. The terms of the Lausanne agreement, insofar
as they frustrated the political aspirations of the Kurdish nationalist movement, placed Britain
in the same position as Turkey, Persia, Syria and Iraq. Prom then onward, these countries
were to share similar worries about political instability in their respective Kurdish regions.
Indeed, following the Lausanne conference, an explicit understanding emerged among
these states, including Britain, that no party would take any step in its own respective Kurdish
region, which might undermine the political stability or territorial integrity of other states. After
settling the outstanding problem of the Iraqi-Turkish frontiers in 1926, Britain, Iraq, Turkey andPersia explicitly joined forces to vigorously contain the Kurdish nationalist movement when­ever it manifested itself in armed revolts or secret political activities.

241

One of the key points which this study has sought to underline is that owing to Kurdistan’s
distinctive geopolitical position as a land-locked country situated among the Ottoman Empire,
the Russian Empire and the Qajar Persia, the Kurdish question had an exceptionally importantinternational aspect when compared with other contemporary questions such as the Arabone. The historical emergence of Kurdish nationalism, and its development as a new politicalforce that sought to change the status quo, was not only conditioned by internal develop­
ments within Ottoman Turkey and Qajar Persia, but also by the Great Powers’ policies andinterests in these two countries. Indeed, as this study has illustrated, the reactions of British
policy makers to the Kurdish situation were subjected to a general imperial strategy that cov­
ered a vast area stretching from the frontiers of India in the east to Egypt and the Mediterra­nean Sea in the west. Central to the success of that strategy was the maintenance of the Brit­ish position in areas overlooking the sea and land routes to India. Every time Britain modified
its general strategy, its position on the future of Kurdistan was accordingly affected. By divi­
ding it into several historical phases, this study has made it possible to chart the evolution of
Britain’s interest in Kurdish affairs in line with its general imperial strategy in the Middle East
between the middle of the Nineteenth Century and the early 1920’s.
The first phase covered the Nineteenth Century, and was characterised by the incom­
patibility of the political aspirations of the Kurdish nationalists for a separate and an indepen­
dent Kurdistan with Britain’s strategic interests. In this phase, Britain became interested in
Kurdish affairs because of its concern for the territorial unity of the Ottoman Empire and Qajar
Persia. These two countries were perceived by Britain as bulwarks against Russian southward
expansionism towards the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf. In these circumstances, it
was natural that Britain watched closely the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the serious threatthat it posed to the heartland of the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar Persia. Given this danger
to its strategic interests, Britain reacted negatively to the outbreak of armed revolts in various
parts of Kurdistan in the Nineteenth Century, and backed the endeavours of the Ottoman
and Qajar authorities to defend their heartland from internal and external threats.
The second phase covered the period between the end of the Nineteenth Century
and the outbreak of the First World War. During this time, Britain regarded the growing Ger­man political and economic influence in the Middle East, especially after the 1908 Young

242

Turks revolt, as the main threat to its strategic, political and economic interests in the Ottoman
Empire, Qajar Persia and the Gulf region. This phase was characterised, insofar as British
interests in Kurdistan were concerned, by efforts to extend British political and economic
influence to Southern Kurdistan, and by agreeing to place the volatile area of Eastern Kurdi­
stan under Russian political influence from 1907 onward, with a view to restoring political sta­bility to the border areas that separated the Ottoman Empire from the Qajar Kingdom. In otherwords, Britain’s interest in Kurdistan became more direct and explicit, and its decision toestablish -in the manner of other Powers- several consulates in Ottoman and Qajar Kurdistanreflected the extent of its growing interest in Kurdish affairs. In spite of the fact that the Young
Turk Government was generally well disposed towards Germany, British policy makers still
adhered firmly to the principle of preserving the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, andaccordingly opposed the political aspirations of any internal force that sought to alter the sta­tus quo, such as the Kurdish and the Armenian nationalist movements.
The third phase covered the first three years of the First World War, and witnessed an
unprecedented shift in the British position on the future of the Ottoman Empire and particu­
larly its non-Turkish Wilayets in Kurdistan, Mesopotamia and Greater Syria. This shift manifes­
ted itself in Britain’s abandonment of its long-held principle of preserving the territorial unity of
the Ottoman Empire. The secret terms of the 1916 Sykes-Picot (Tripartite) agreement, inwhich Britain played a leading role, divided Ottoman Kurdistan politically and economically into
various spheres of influence and control among the Allied Powers: Britain, Russia andFrance. There was also a strong possibility that Russia would bring Eastern Kurdistan under
its direct political and economic control. The outbreak of the war offered Britain unpreceden­
ted opportunity to establish and consolidate strategically, economically and politically its posi­tion in Southern Kurdistan, with a view to protecting the security of Mesopotamia and the Per­
sian Gulf. These two areas were vital to the security of India. Britain, however, remained, as
before, unfavourably disposed towards the political aspirations of the Kurdish nationalists.
The fourth phase was characterised by the realisation by the British Government thatmany of the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement were no longer feasible as a basis for the
new postwar order for the Middle East. Such British realisations reflected -apart from acute
financial problems resulting from the long duration of the war- the changes in the internationalsituation stemming from the Russian withdrawal from the war following the Bolshevik takeoverin November 1917, and the entry of the United States into the war against Germany in April

243

1917. One of the principal ramifications of these unforeseen developments was the decisionof the British Government to control the whole of Southern Kurdistan by preventing the
French from having a share in that area. The British decision to control Southern Kurdistan
was largely motivated by strategic considerations, and aimed to consolidate the security of the
British position in Mesopotamia, the Persian Gulf and to command the strategic land-routes tonorthern Persia across Southern and Eastern Kurdistan. Economic considerations played a
far smaller part in influencing the British decision, even though Britain was aware of the poten­
tial oil wealth of Southern Kurdistan.
The fifth phase covered the years between the end of the First World War in Novem­
ber 1918 and the conclusion of the August 1920 Sevres treaty. Britain took the initiative inmodifying the outdated terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement. As a result, Britain broughtSouthern Kurdistan into its Mesopotamian mandate, while France took Western Kurdistan.
The would-be Armenian state was also to control a large portion of Ottoman Kurdistan. The
remainder of the Kurdish areas were supposed to obtain autonomy, and then independence,
if the Allies considered the local Kurds to be sufficiently qualified. Thus the main feature ofthis phase was that, although Britain partially recognised Kurdish nationalist aspirations, it still
considered its interests to lie in the repartition of Kurdistan between British Mesopotamia,
French Syria, and the would-be Armenian state. The most important factors influencing the
British approach to the settlement of the Kurdish question at the Paris peace conference,
were the containment of the growing Bolshevik threat, the holding back of France’s politicaland economic influence in Ottoman Kurdistan, the consolidation of the British position in
Mesopotamia and the safety of Persian territorial unity.
The final phase coincided with the formation process of the Iraqi state under Feisal’srule from 1920 to 1923, and was characterised by Britain’s efforts to turn the partition of Otto­
man Kurdistan into a de jure reality. Britain, even though it brought Southern Kurdistan under
its mandate in 1920, did not decide whether to establish it as a separate entity from Arab
Mesopotamia or to incorporate both countries into one state. This phase was ended with Bri­tain’s decision to incorporate Southern Kurdistan into the Iraqi state against the Kurds’ will.
This decision reflected a combination of British concerns for the strategic, political and econo­
mic viability of the young Iraqi state. The British, particularly those who served on the ground,
were convinced that without the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan, the Iraqi state would
not survive. From then on, Britain became explicitly opposed to the Kurdish nationalist move­244

ment and worked alongside Persia, Turkey and Iraq -the countries which partitioned Kurdi­
stan- towards frustrating Kurdish nationalist aspirations in favour of preserving the status quo.
Three major conclusions can be derived from the evolution of Britain’s interest in
Kurdish affairs and its position on the Kurdish question, especially in the period 1918-1923.
The first is the supremacy of strategic considerations over economic ones as the principal
driving force behind Britain’s policy towards Kurdistan’s future. Kurdistan enjoyed a distinctive
geopolitical position, and this was always the most influential factor conditioning Britain’s
approach to the Kurdish situation. British reactions to the rising Kurdish nationalist movement
must be seen within the context of a general strategy in the Middle East. This strategy
revolved around Britain’s concern for the security of its Indian Empire, which was perceived todepend on the preservation of political stability in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Persia and Per­
sian Gulf. Kurdistan’s economic value was always of secondary importance to British policy­
makers in comparison to its strategic value. The historical roots of Britain’s interest in Kurdish
oil go back to the turn of the Twentieth Century, when oil began to be increasingly used by
the navies of the Great Powers. Ultimately, it became vital for important sea Powers such as
Britain to have free and direct access to oil supplies and reserves at all times.
The evolution of British interests in Kurdistan was largely a response to the changes
in the regional situation in the Middle East, resulting from the decay of the Ottoman Empire
and the Qajar Kingdom, which in turn brought about growing external interferences in theirpolitical and economic affairs. From the mid-Nineteenth Century onwards, the Middle East
had become the scene of a steady intensification in the rivalry among the main European
Powers for the imposition of their political and economic control. Insofar as Kurdistan was con­cerned, Britain perceived Czarist Russia as the main danger that needed to be contained in
the Nineteenth Century and the early Twentieth Century. Thereafter, Germany replaced Rus­
sia as the main political and economic rival to Britain in the heartland of the Ottoman Empire
and Persia. Following the First World War, apart from France’s imperial ambitions, the new Bol­shevik Russia posed the most serious political and ideological threat to the British position in
the Middle East, and accordingly, British policy makers reviewed British interests and objec­
tives in the Turkish peace settlements of 1920 and 1923.
Secondly, the lack of a well-defined policy on the part of the British Government, andits noticeable unfamiliarity with the Kurdish situation after the end of the First World War,enabled certain British officials on the ground to play a far more important part in influencing

245

the future of Kurdistan than they could under ordinary conditions. Between 1918 and 1920,
Col. Wilson, in his capacity as the Civil Commissioner, and Maj. Noel, in his capacity as themost important British expert on Kurdish affairs, played a crucial part in providing the British
Government with much needed details about post-war Kurdish affairs. They not only coloured
the views of the British Government on the Kurdish question, but also influenced the direc­
tion of political developments in British-controlled Southern Kurdistan between 1918 and
1920. In the period 1921-1923, Percy Cox, the new High Commissioner, played a similar -if
not more crucial- political part in determining the future of British-controlled Southern Kurdi­
stan when paving the way for its incorporation into the newly-emerging Iraqi state.
Lastly, this review of the evolution of British policy towards Kurdistan also reveals thatin none of its historical phases were Britain’s strategic interests partially compatible with thenationalist aspirations of the Kurds, unlike those of the Zionist, Sharifian or Armenian national­
ist movements. There was always a clear contradiction between the requirements of a suc­cessful British policy towards the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Persia and the political objectivesof the Kurdish nationalist movement in all parts of Kurdistan. In the Nineteenth Century andup until the outbreak of the First World War, Britain supported the territorial integrity of the
Ottoman Empire and Qajar Persia and was, therefore, opposed to Kurdish nationalism, which
was perceived to as being a destabilising force. Britain was unwilling to deal with the maltreat­ment of the Ottoman Kurds by the Turks at an international level, unlike the Armenians. When
the war broke out Britain took the lead in the formulation of the secret terms of the SykesPicot (Tripartite) agreement, at the heart of which was the partitioning of Kurdistan between
the principal European Allies: France, Russia and Britain. In the post-war period, Britain once
more played an important part in translating the partitioning of Kurdistan into a reality under
the terms of the 1920 Sevres treaty and the 1923 Lausanne agreement. Britain’s strategicand economic interests always concentrated on Southern Kurdistan because of its impor­tance to Mesopotamia’s security and also its potential oil fields.
Given the last conclusion and the extraordinary circumstances that surrounded theemergence of the modern Middle East, it seems logical to raise the following question: can
one hold the Kurdish nationalists responsible for the non-materialisation of an independent
Kurdistan or the policies of the Great Powers, particularly Britain? To answer this difficult ques­tion one must concentrate on the new political conditions resulting from the First World War.
The end of the war marked the dawn of a new era in the history of the Middle East because of246

the collapse of the old-fashioned Ottoman Empire and Qajar Kingdom, with their multi-ethnic
structures. On one side, the victorious Allied Powers -notably Britain- began to re-draw the
new political map of the Middle East, so as to consolidate their strategic and economic posi­tion in most of the former Ottoman territories such as Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia and Ottoman
Kurdistan, as well as Persia. On the other side, the political elites of the new nationalities suchas the Kurds, the Arabs, the Zionist Jews and the Armenians, emerged to work towards thecreation of national states for their respective nationalities by soliciting the support of theAllies.
In these exceptional circumstances, it was inevitable that the imperial interests of theAllied Powers, notably Britain, would have a decisive role in the political future of the newnationalities. Insofar as Kurdistan was concerned, Britain not only extended its control tosouthern Kurdish regions, but was also directly involved in all the treaties that led to the parti­
tion of Kurdistan among French Syria, British Mesopotamia and Turkey between 1920 and
1923. In other words, had the upholding of British interests required the the formation of a
Kurdish state in the period 1918-1923, Britain would have been in a very strong position totake such a step, at least, in British-controlled Southern Kurdistan. There are a few notable
examples, when the consolidation of British interests demanded the establishment of newstates in the newly-emerging Middle East, such as Mesopotamia, Arabia and Trans-Jordan.
Having said that, one cannot overlook the role of the Kurdish nationalist movement in theissue of the non-materialisation of a Kurdish state. This movement was politically divided lar­gely because of the predominant tribal structure of the Kurdish society. Kurdistan, a countryof mainly rough mountainous areas with a lack of sufficient roads, railways and other means ofcommunications, tends itself to isolation and localism. What made matters worse was theimplemented British policies on the ground, which focused on severing -rather than consoli­
dating- all political links between British-controlled Southern Kurdistan and the remainder ofthe Kurdish areas. Under such social, geographical and political conditions, it was extremely
difficult to politically organise a Kurdistan-wide nationalist organisation with a united leadershipand a clear strategy and programme. Consequently, the Kurdish nationalists were unable toinfluence as much as they would have desired the course of political developments that affec­
ted Kurdistan’s future.

247

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India Office (10)Letters, Political and Secret, File 10 (LP & S 10/345, 652,781,745,781-782,815,818)
Letters, Political and Secret, File 11 (LP & S 11/3,8,18,36, 74,84,115)
Public Record Office (Kew Garden)
1- Air Ministry /AIR)
Unregistered Papers (A IR2 0/512,513, 714)

2- Cabinet Office (CAEO
Cabinet Registered Files, 1917-1920 (CAB21/186,119)
War Cabinet Minutes, 1916-1919 (CAB23/7,14, 43, 45)
War Cabinet Memoranda, 1915-1920 (CAB24/1, 3, 89,133,139,140)
Cabinet Committees (Eastern Committee Minutes), CAB27/1,14,24, 206)
Allied & International Conferences on the Terms of Peace and Related Subjects, 1920-1921(CAB29/90, 91, 92)
Miscellaneous Cabinet Papers, 1912-1916 (CAB37/118,119,120,121,122)
3- Colonial Office fCO)
Mesopotamia, Original Correspondence, (C0730/1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10,11,12,13,19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 133/6, 150/6, 157/6-7-8, 161/1-2, 161/4)
4- Foreign Office (FQ1
Embassy & Consular, 1900-1914 (F0 195/2276)
Confidential Print (F04 24/254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259)
Turkey& Persia, Diplomatic 1900-1923 (F0371/12, 345, 496, 767, 956,1010,1263,1466,1713,1714,
1715,1773, 1773, 2062, 2130, 2140, 2737, 2767, 2991, 3381, 3384, 3385, 3386, 3404,3407, 3858,
4122, 4141, 4147, 4149, 4157, 4162, 4192, 4193, 5046, 5067, 5068, 5069, 5070, 5073, 5085, 5232,
6340, 6342, 6343, 6344, 6346, 6347, 6348, 6349, 6353, 6360, 6364, 6367, 6369, 6442, 6467, 6469,
6481, 6526, 6560, 7771, 7772, 7780, 7781, 7782, 7797, 7800, 7801, 7805, 7808, 7824, 7826, 7835,
7844,7858, 7859, 7948, 7964, 7966, 7967, 7968, 9004, 9005, 9006, 9007, 9009-9010, 9013, 9014,
9016, 9017, 9018, 9021, 9039, 9058, 9060, 9061, 9062, 9063, 9109, 9021, 9149, 10097, 10833, 10835,
10868,11458-11460, 11464,11468,11478, 12255, 12265, 13027,13032, 13759, 13821,13827,
14521,14523, 15310,15311,16038,16917,17874,18948, 18949, 40219, 61678,
Others:(FO248/1246) (F0331/1431,1432) (F04 0 6/40, 41) (F0925/1714)

5- Foreign Office: Private Papers /FQ8001
Papers of Balfour, Arthur J.
Papers of Sir Oliphant, L.
Papers of Sir Sykes, MarkPapers of Toynbee, Arnold

248

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Correspondence & Papers, (W01 06/195,196,197,198,199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207,
208, 209, 210)
WO 7 8 (Maps & Plans)
Private Papers
Balfour, Arthur. J. British Museum
Edmonds, C.J. (Private Paper Collection, Middle East Centre, Oxford University)
Wilson, Arnold. T. (Wilson Papers, Add. Mss. 52455, British Library)
Young, Herbert. (Private Paper Collection, Middle East Centre, Oxford University)(ll)Published Documents
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Woodward & Rohan Butler-British Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-39,1st series. Vol.s iv (1952), viii, viii (1952 &1958), xiii (1963) (ed.) J.P.T. Bury & Rohan Buttler
Admiralty:
A Handbook of Mesopotamia, Four Vol.s, (London: 1918 & 1920)-British & Foreign State Papers, 1917-1918 Vol.cxi (1912) (Compiled by E. Parkes)
Colonial Office:Report of Iraq Administration, October 1920-March 1922 (Undated)
Foreign Office:Mesopotamia (Peace Handbook No.63,1920
Great Britain. Parliamentary & Command Papers I Cd & Cmd):-Parliamentary Papers: Corresponding respecting the Kurdish Invasion of Persia,\fol.100, No.5, Year1881
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Cmd.675: Memorandum Signed at San Remo on April 24th 1920, between M. Philippe., and Sir John
Cadman, (San Remo Agreement 1920)-Cmd.964: Treaty of Peace with Turkey (signed at Sevres on August 10th 1920)-Cmd.1061: Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia From 1914 to the Summer of 1920, ( by
G.L. Bell 1920)-Cmd. 1070: Memorandum of the State Secretary for War Relating to the Army Supplementary Estimate
for 1920-1921, (1920)-Cmd. 1176: Draft Mandate for Mesopotamia and Palestine as Submitted to the Approval of the Leagueof Nations, (1921)-Cmd.1500: Final Draft of Mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine, (1921)-Cmd.1757: Treaty with H.M. King Feisal, October 10th 1922, (1922)-Cmd. 1929: (Lausanne) Treaty of Peace with Turkey and Accompanying Straits Convention and
Declaration on the Administration of Justice, (July 24th 1923)

249

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