The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 27 (2016)
Copyright © 2016 Yuji Oniki. All rights reserved. This work may be used, with this noticeincluded, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work may be distributed,
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Through the Eyes of Ancient Egyptians:
Franz Boas and Tanizaki Junichirô on Modern Japan

Yuji Oniki*

I. Placing Japan in The Mind of Primitive Man
What are we to do with the modernity of a nation whose distinguishingfeature lies in its aptitude to assimilate modernity itself ? It is along the linesof such speculation that Japan is noted in both editions of Franz Boas’s
landmark study of American anthropology, The Mind of Primitive Man.
Originally published in 1911, The Mind of Primitive Man provides less an
overview of fieldwork on “primitive” societies than a general theory inwhich the very concept of primitiveness is overturned. Lest his intent be
misunderstood, in the revised edition, published over twenty years later,
Boas went so far as to declare in his preface, “There is no fundamental
difference in the ways of thinking of primitive and civilized man” (v), a
strange point to make in a book that purportedly sets out to expound on suchdifferences. As it turns out, any essential contrast drawn between primitiveand civilized society is reducible to a matter of perception, that is, how “themind of modern man” regards its society above all others. Boas argues thatmodern civilization appears more advanced only to the extent that thepatterns inherent in its evolution are measured in terms of their rate ofdevelopment. To the extent that this rapidity validates a nation’s modernity,*Professor, Chuo University

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its civility may turn out to be a matter of speed. In anthropological terms,
any crucial distinction, whether made between primitive and civilizedsociety, colored or white people, or the “West” and “East,” can hardly bemade without referring to this standard of time. In both editions, Boas
immediately underscores this distinction: “What, then, is the difference
between the civilization of the Old World and that of the New World? It isessentially a difference in time. The one reached a certain stage three
thousand or four thousand years sooner than the other” (8). It is thearbitrariness of this standard Boas addresses in a reference he makes tomodern Japan, one which only appears later in the revised edition of The
Mind of Primitive Man, published in 1938:
If the achievements of a people were a measure of their aptitude, thismethod of estimating innate ability would hold good not only for ourtime but would be applicable under all conditions. The Egyptians of2000 or 3000 B.C. might have applied the argument in their judgmentof the people of northwestern Europe who lived in the Stone Age, had
no architecture and a very primitive agriculture. They were “backward
people” like many so-called primitive people of our time. These were
our ancestors, and the judgment of the ancient Egyptians would now
have to be reversed. Precisely in the same way must the customary
estimate of the Japanese of one hundred years ago be reversed on
account of their adoption of the economic, industrial and scientificmethods of the western world. (10; emphasis added)
While in the original edition of The Mind of Primitive Man Boas alreadyanticipates the sense that the standards of expediency by which “the westernworld” defines itself may be undermined by the emergence of Japan as amodern state, most emphatically in his reference to the Russo-JapaneseWar, Japan at the turn of the century only concerns him to the extent that its
rising geopolitical status may demythologize racialist theories of “western”
superiority. The modernity of Japan turns out to be not a matter ofphysiological traits as aptitude for technology, discernible in its efficiency
to conduct warfare. Insofar as they provide an occasion to reverse thestandard by which modernity and civility have been claimed, the terms ofsuch conduct must by necessity be defined as retaliatory:
After we have thus found that the alleged specific differences between
civilized and primitive man, so far as they are inferred from complex

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psychic responses, can be reduced to the same fundamental psychicalforms, we have the right to decline as unprofitable a discussion of thehereditary mental traits of various branches of the white race. . . . An
apparently excellent discussion of external influences upon thecharacter of a people has been given by A. Wernich in his descriptionof the character of the Japanese. He finds some of their peculiarities
caused by the lack of vigor of the muscular and alimentary systems,
which in their turn are due to improper nutrition; while he recognizes
as hereditary other physiological traits which influence the mind. And
still, how weak appear his conclusions, after the energy and endurance
exhibited by the Japanese in their modern development and in theirconflict with Russia! (116–17)
Boas, of course, is hardly unique in evaluating Japan’s modernity
according to its aptitude to assimilate technology. What is striking, however,is how this estimate shifts in the revised edition in which the modernity ofan Asian nation has been reassessed. Boas replaces his reference to the
Russo-Japanese War with a broader account of the nation whose modernity,
in its assimilation of institutional forms from “western civilization” and thestandards of such institutions, now rivals that of “western civilization” tosuch an extent that Wernich’s analysis of the Japanese race in terms of its
physiognomic deficiencies must be called into question: “And still, how
weak appear his conclusions, in view of the modern economic, political andscientific development of Japan which has adopted to the fullest extent all
the best and worst traits of western civilization” (139).
What I wish to address in this article is not so much the anthropologicalissues involved in providing such “snapshots” of recently modernizedcultures, but the peculiar impatience Boas exhibits in his evaluation ofJapan’s modernity as being complete by the late 1930s. While Japan’s rapid
assimilation provides him with the example that dispels the notion thatmodernity is inherently a province of “western civilization,” the imperativewith which this modernity must be under constant watch to be reevaluatedpresents a further problem: How do we grasp modernity when it occurs
beyond those geographical boundaries hitherto assigned to it? If we are tounderstand the process of how modernity gets assimilated beyond “thewestern world,” then its trajectory must be realigned along the directions ofdevelopment emerging elsewhere. Boas’s revisions on Japan, however,reveal the difficulty involved in assessing such adjustments. Whether, as heargues in the 1911 edition, its military performance at the beginning of the

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twentieth century provides the exception to the rule, or the same nation’s
assimilation is considered complete almost thirty years later, it is only inaccordance with the standard of the “western world” that the terms ofJapan’s success in having caught up become apparent. While the legitimacyof standards based on “western” superiority may be called into question,such claims may end up glossing over the difficulty involved in coming up
with a universal standard for modernity. Worse yet, in practice they may end
up dissolving the need to abide by any standard at all.1 It could be said that
The Mind of Primitive Man anticipates in certain ways the advent of cultural
relativism, yet its author would hardly have welcomed the prospect of doing
away entirely with the premise that certain values must be universal. While
taking note of the inherent positivism that underlies Boas’s work, in“Anthropology as Kulturkampf: Science and Politics in the Career of Franz
Boas,” George W. Stocking Jr. underscores the difficulty involved invalidating universal categories in anthropological terms. If, in postulating
the categorical imperative of “culture,” Boas succeeds in recognizing thesignificance of “marginal” societies based on alternative value systems, thisrecognition of other systems is fed back into the reinforcement of systemic
values on which the modernity of civilization is based:
Certain values deeply embedded in his own enculturative experience—scientific knowledge, human fellowship, and individual freedom—hadin fact been cumulatively realized in human history, not merely in a
generalized sense, but in the specific form of “modern” civilization,
which Boas’ language often made clear was “our own.” Boas was far
from satisfied with that civilization, and his alienation was ultimately
expressed in his contribution to the modern pluralistic concept“culture,” which was founded on the legitimacy of alternative value
systems. But anthropology, for Boas, did not lead to a “generalrelativistic attitude.” Quite the contrary, not only were there generalvalues that were cumulatively realized in the history of humancivilization, there were also general values that were variously
realized in different human cultures—“fundamental truths” that,
notwithstanding their form in “particular societies,” were “common to
mankind.” Boas did not himself undertake the systematic comparison
that might have revealed these values empirically, however, and his
occasional specific references to them suggest that they, too, wererooted in his own enculturative experience. Thus the common moral
ideas he saw underlying the varied ethical behavior of mankind turn

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out to be respect for “life, well-being, and property” within the rangeof the recognized social group. (45–46; emphasis added)
We can see then how Boas seeks to evaluate Japan’s modernity according
to a compressed trajectory of time that fluctuates between terms of successand failure defined by the categorical imperatives of “life, well-being, andproperty” and how, in the event of war, these Lockean terms end up being
converted into the currency of casualties, appropriation of resources, andterritorial expansion. While, as in the case of the Russo-Japanese War, a
recently modernized nation may suddenly measure up to the geopoliticalstandards of “western civilization,” such progress also runs the risk of being
invalidated no less precariously several decades later with its defeat in
World War II. As exemplified in his revisions, the geopolitical status ofJapan ends up presenting a conundrum for Boas insofar as its modernity
must be evaluated retroactively, but with the utmost urgency, and hence berevised. The vigilance with which one’s interpretations must be monitored,
rewritten, and sorted out ends up informing Boas’s critical endeavor itself.
Hardly a matter of scholarly accuracy, disregarding the task of constantrevision would threaten the enterprise of human sciences. In the preface tothe revised edition of The Mind of Primitive Man, Boas makes clear how
science itself is subject to the vicissitudes of critical inquiry:
Since 1911, when the first edition of The Mind of Primitive Man was
published much work has been done in all the branches of science thathave to be considered in the problem with which the book deals. The
study of heredity has made important strides and has helped to clear up
the concept of race. The influence of environment upon bodily formand behavior has been the subject of many investigations and themental attitudes of “primitive” man have been studied from new pointsof view. For this reason a large part of the book had to be rewritten andrearranged.
As we have seen, part of this rearrangement includes understanding
Japan’s modernity. But if the estimation of non-Western nations in the midstof modernizing is reversed through hindsight, then it may be said that suchreevaluation occurs at an unexpected, if not alarming, rate. The kind of
backwardness once associated with a nation like “the Japan of one hundredyears ago” must be constantly reevaluated and revised. The abruptness withwhich such revisions are made is all the more apparent when Boas resorts

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to suspending the linearity of modern history in order to articulate the recent
emergence of Japan as a global power, asking his readers instead to associate
its development with the time-travel scenario of assuming the perspectiveof ancient Egyptians and imagining how “we” (Europeans) must haveappeared in their eyes: “. . . the judgment of the ancient Egyptians would
now have to be reversed. Precisely in the same way must the customary
estimate of the Japanese of one hundred years ago be reversed on accountof their adoption of the economic, industrial and scientific methods of thewestern world” (emphasis added). By what standards then can modernity bemeasured other than those that do not have to be reversed? The argument for
the “legitimacy of alternative value systems” leads to the more complicatedissue of how, instead of the notion of legitimacy itself, the actual contoursof such systems can be grasped in practice, one that Boas himself admits in
his note on Japan that he is hardly prepared to resolve: “The claim that
achievement and aptitude go hand in hand is not convincing. It must be
subjected to an exhaustive analysis” (10).

II. “In Praise of Shadows” and Ethnic Simulations
While by no means exhaustive nor analytical, Tanizaki Junichirô’s essay“In Praise of Shadows” [Inei Raisan] provides a provocative vantage pointfrom which the experience of modernity is explored according to a standard
that need not be reversed. If Japan’s aptitude to modernize serves in The
Mind of Primitive Man as a prime example to show how little technologicalprogress has to do with racial heredity, then “In Praise of Shadows” seems
to expound on the ineptitude with which such modernization pervaded
everyday life in the 1930s. While, as Boas argues throughout The Mind of
Primitive Man, modernity may transpire regardless of one’s ethnicity,
Tanizaki insists that modernity, at least in the case of Japan, threatens to
extinguish ethnic integrity. Published in Keizai Ôrai magazine between
1933 and 1934, Tanizaki’s essay on the nature of Japanese culture seems at
first glance to follow the same logic of racialist theories flourishing inEurope and the United States during the early twentieth century, ones that
Boas takes pains to critique throughout the revised edition of The Mind of
Primitive Man. It would not be difficult to read the essay in terms of racialist
tropes, whereby modernization presents a menacing threat to one’s ethnic
integrity. But the polemics of “In Praise of Shadows” are unique insofar as
its author, while repudiating the terms of progress by which modernity isgauged, articulates a different set of standards, one that, instead of adheringThrough the Eyes of Ancient Egyptians

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to the pseudoscience of racialism, as we shall see, revolves around thenotion of taste. The kind of breakdown of ethnicity portended throughout
this essay has little to do with racialist theories that conjure the biologicalthreat against the integrity of a social body defined in terms of racialinheritance. Instead of presenting the reader with the pseudoscientific ideasof a social body under the biological threat of racial integration, the sense of
threat evoked throughout “In Praise of Shadows” revolves around thedeterioration of the body itself, not in terms of science, but as a matter oftaste. As he himself admits near the beginning of the essay, when he writes“I know nothing of science” (16), Tanizaki sidesteps the debate on race
simply by refraining from any discussion of science with regard to ethnicity.
This disinclination toward coupling ethnicity with science is in marked
contrast with early twentieth-century American fiction in which the sciencebehind human endeavors cannot help but be addressed. In The Great Gatsby(1925), for example, Tom Buchanan can only claim the integrity of his“civilization” in the name of science: “The idea is if we don’t look out thewhite race will be—will be utterly submerged. It’s all scientific stuff; it’s
been proved” (18; emphasis added).
In sharp contrast, if “In Praise of Shadows” has anything to say about
race, it has nothing to prove about it. The criteria the essay presents withregard to ethnicity adhere little to those terms of science that Boas demandsin the analysis of culture, nor do they adhere to the imperative of addressing
race in “scientific” terms, as Tom Buchanan does in The Great Gatsby.2 The
theoretical validity in defining culture, whether postulated along the lines ofrace or technological assimilation, is utterly inconsequential to the terms oftaste that Tanizaki stakes out for claiming one’s ethnic integrity. My purposein this article is to examine how “In Praise of Shadows” situates Japan’s
modernity in terms of taste and how its polemics anticipate a kind of terrorof tastelessness.
Before addressing the nature of taste itself, Tanizaki begins his essay bymapping out the purity of one’s ethnicity in spatial terms, asking his readers
to imagine constructing a house in “pure Japanese style.” From the outset,
defining culture has less to do with tracing its genealogy as grasping its
present style in spatial terms. By analogizing the problem of cultural
integrity as an architectural matter, Tanizaki attempts to situate a space ofautonomy beyond the reach of modern temporality. Insofar as this space ofstylistic “purity” can only be attained when situated outside the normativeof time prescribed by foreign technology, Tanizaki evaluates its nature as amatter of simulation. Throughout “In Praise of Shadows,” Tanizaki insists

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he has no wish to repudiate the convenience attained through Japan’s
assimilation of foreign technology. Foreign technology, marked by its
superior functionality, he says, pervades everyday life in modern Japan sooverwhelmingly that he dismisses any sincere attempt to attain a “pure”
Japanese-style autonomy as being no more realistic than the life of anaesthete or tea master (chajin).3 Unmediated authenticity is hardly an option,according to the polemics of “In Praise of Shadows,” and Tanizaki values
ethnicity only to the extent that it can be simulated. Such simulations,instead of rejecting foreign technology, permit its presence only to theextent that it can be concealed:
For the solitary man with refined taste (chajin) it is another matter, he
can ignore the blessings of scientific civilization and retreat to [athatched hut in] some forsaken corner of the countryside; but a man
who has a family and lives in the city cannot turn his back on thenecessities of modern life—heating, electric lights, sanitary facilities—
merely for the sake of doing things the Japanese way. Even installing aphone could be a nightmare for the purist who must deliberate overwhether to hide it behind the staircase or at the end of the hallway
where it will least offend the eye. On top of this, he must deliberateover how the electrical wires can be buried underneath his garden, howlight switches can be hidden in the closet or cupboard, and how theelectric cords need to be tucked behind the folding screens. It may be
only after toiling over these measures that he realizes how extreme
they are, and how he had resorted to them out of sheer anxiety. The
resulting structure then would hardly provide the model of tranquility.
(7–8; trans. mine)
If this kind of “authenticity” can only be approximated at the cost ofconcealing the artifice involved in its simulation, then attaining the purity ofa Japanese-style house in modern times ends up encompassing a twofold
process whereby every gesture made to signal its authenticity must also be
accompanied by an equal effort to conceal any trace that might betray thesame gesture’s inauthenticity. In this sense, authenticity becomes a matterof performance. But if the grace evoked by the effortlessness of aperformance signifies its authenticity, then this simulation of Japanese space
falls apart under the strain of effort it requires to appear effortless. Indeed,on completion of Tanizaki’s ideal house, any commendation for its“naturalness” of style could only be issued from visitors who are mostThrough the Eyes of Ancient Egyptians

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oblivious to those technological efforts made to render the space habitablein the practical terms of modern times. The ideal visitor, ironically enough,would turn out to be the foreigner who, in seeking the “model of tranquility,”
would deemphasize those traits that might undermine its authenticity.
Conversely, the inauthentic nature of this simulacra would be most apparent
to its creator who, in seeking to emulate authenticity, ends up increasingly
aware of the fiction involved in its construction and must do everything toconceal its traces. Each gesture contributing to the simulation, rather thanrevealing the purity of intent behind it, ends up yielding to the prerogativesof another intent, one in which the attempt to construct a “pure Japanese”
space cannot help but underscore the bad faith demanded in its construction,
which can only lead to a state of neurosis. Any satisfaction found inconcealing the “impure” presence of foreign objects must induce a kind ofcounterhysteria for having succumbed to the imperative of having to conceal
them in the first place, as if authenticity were derived only through screeningout those elements that taint it: “It may be only after toiling over thesemeasures that he realizes how extreme they are, and how he had resorted tothem out of sheer anxiety. The resulting structure then would hardly provide
the model of tranquility.” The state of anxiety Tanizaki projects here, ofcourse, is induced none other than by the pressure of having to competewith the prevalence of modern technology for the sole purpose of concealing
its presence. The attempt to conceal any traces of new technology onlyshows how the time standard of “western civilization,” instead of being
repudiated, must course through the simulation all the more in having to beconcealed in its application. Yet, strangely enough, the author himself seems
hardly surprised by this discouraging conclusion. If anything, Tanizaki
seems to have anticipated the shortcomings of this scenario in order to bringup another kind of simulation, one that may not require constructing any
space at all. Simplified, the terms of this experience revolve this time, notaround space, but the body itself.

III. In and Out of the Realm of Taste
To discuss ethnicity in a way is to invoke the desire for such identity, and,in this sense, the attempt to define one’s ethnicity may be accompanied by
the vague suspicion that it is missing or, more succinctly, not entirely there.
If the inherent qualities of one’s culture cannot be provided through thespatial forms of architecture, how tangible can they be? By limiting thediscussion of one’s ethnicity to the province of bodily experience, Tanizaki

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measures the terms of modernity according to the faculty of taste.
Perhaps the most curious aspect in Tanizaki’s discussion of the Japanese
confection, yôkan, is how little its actual quality matters. Refinement,
instead of indicating an ability to evaluate an object of taste according to its
constitutive elements, revolves around one’s capacity to experience it in a
multisensory context. Tasting yôkan, less a matter of determining thesuperiority of one particular kind or brand of yôkan over another, signals theoccasion to expand one’s faculty of taste: “Once it’s in your mouth, you feel
as if the entire darkness of the room has been crystallized into this coolsmooth delicacy, its sweetness melting away at the tip of your tongue somuch so that yôkan, even when it is in fact bland, seems to evoke amysterious deep flavor” (29; trans. mine, emphasis added). Any deficiency
in actual palliative taste is easily compensated by the willingness withwhich one can load it through a kind of “cross-pollination” of the senses.
Such an experience can only be described in synesthetic terms in which
one’s sense of taste, sight, sound, smell, and touch end up spilling over into
each other’s realms. The act of swallowing initiates a chain of synesthesia
in which the visual-spatial spectrum of the “darkness of the room” isminiaturized into palliative dimensions and relayed back into one’s mouth.
Absent from this notion of taste is any inclination to treat the experience asan aggregate of discrete evaluations ascribed to each sense. If the concept oftaste entails that one abide by a certain set of categorical standards held
against the specificity of an object, it is the absence of such standards that
seems to distinguish the experience of refinement upheld throughout “In
Praise of Shadows.” The nebula of synesthesia ends up being bothtranscendental and native precisely to the extent that it overwhelms thesenses, its other-worldly, spiritual dimensions measured according to theplethora of associations to be channeled through one’s faculty of taste:
Whenever I have a bowl of soup, the faint sound from the lacqueredwood bowl tickles my inner ear like a distant chirp, and as I contemplate
how it will taste, I always fall into a meditative trance. It must be
similar to the experience of a tea master (chajin) who, on hearing thesound of his kettle, loses himself in contemplating the winds of thelegendary pines of Onoe. It is said that Japanese food is meant to belooked at rather than eaten, but rather than provide a display, thewordless musical interplay of the candlelit flicker and luminous glowof lacquer ware simply induces the occasion to meditate. Natsume
Sôseki praises the color of yôkan in Pillow of Grass, and, come toThrough the Eyes of Ancient Egyptians

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think of it, there is something meditative about that color. The halftransparent jade-like skin, as if absorbing the natural light to its core, issuffused with a faint dreamlike glow; the depth and complexity of suchshades could never be found in delicacies from the West. Look at howutterly silly and superficial the whole notion of cream is by comparison.
(28; trans. mine)
If the reverie of being unequivocally “Japanese” is crystallized in thesynesthetic experience of consuming such delicacies, the coherence of suchstates largely depends, as his reference to Sôseki’s sense of taste pointedly
suggests, on a discursive tradition. It is hardly surprising then that the senseof harmony in this state of reverie should collapse with the mere mention of
the foreign signifier “cream” (“kureemu”). Rather than contrast yôkan withanother European dessert, Tanizaki brings up the quintessential ingredientin European and American desserts, “cream.”4 The awkwardness of theanalogy only underscores how “cream” merely disorients the senses to thepoint where the very idea of analogizing cultural practices is ridiculed. The
significance of a foreign dessert, like the rationale for importing foreigntechnology, is purely a matter of its content, as in, “cream.” Its substance
may be consumed, but what form or shape it should assume as a dessert is amatter of utter indifference. What becomes apparent instead is how thediscursivity of taste remains untranslatable.
Conversely, insofar as the synesthetic pleasure largely depends on one’s
cultivated ability to extract it from the delicacy, even the substantive taste ofmediocre yôkan, “even when it is in fact bland,” cannot take away from thepleasure of eating it. Such pleasures cannot be derived from consuming“cream,” not because it is lacking in taste, but because any depth behind the“western” experience would end up being claimed not in the mystery it
evokes but in its actual substance. The repugnance Tanizaki feels towards“cream” has less to do with its actual taste as it does with its overwhelming
power of signification. In merely being mentioned, the signifier “kureemu”
manages to intrude on the pleasure of consuming yôkan, overturning thediscursive flow of one’s reverie in “all things Japanese.”5 The lingering bad
aftertaste of such foreign signifiers serves as a reminder for Tanizaki, whoin turn reminds his readers, that the rapidity with which Japan modernizes
may threaten to extinguish not so much taste itself as the discursivity
involved in refining such taste. Tanizaki calls attention not so much to thenovelty of appliances as to the way their usage invokes the appearance of
newer forms of discourse that threaten to extinguish those forms of taste

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that have been cultivated until now. While, as Boas stipulates, a nation’s
modernity may be measured according to the institutional standards it
assimilates from “western civilization,” Tanizaki seems more interested in
exploring how this assimilation threatens to straighten out the discursive
bent of one’s native faculty of taste. The good things in life may proliferate
as a result of importing technology, but their use may obliterate the discursive
terrain on which one’s ethnicity can be mapped out. It goes without sayingthat the desire to extrapolate the ethnic dimensions of a nation is often, if notalways, equal to the degree of success or failure attributed to its modernity,
but what I am interested in is how the polemics of “In Praise of Shadows”
ends up subverting the standards of such success in terms of taste. If, as
Tanizaki claims, the assimilation of “western civilization” is accomplishedto the detriment of one’s refinement of taste, then the acquisition may comeat the stiff price of having to be paid twice, first, with the waning of the
discursive faculty cultivated before modernization, and then later with theelimination of the imperative to have any taste at all.

IV. Boas on Breaches of Etiquette
The polymorphic sensuality Tanizaki attributes to the experience of
eating yôkan bears a remarkable resemblance to what Boas defines as“emotional associations” in The Mind of Primitive Man. Boas introduces
the term in order to underscore how the emotional affect involved in social
customs, far from being personal and subjective, ends up taking on auniversal significance. It is this emotional register, with all its power to bind
one’s activities into a purposeful yet transcendental unity, that baffles themodern observer:
A trait of primitive life that early attracted the attention of investigators
is the occurrence of close associations between mental activities thatappear to us as entirely disparate. In primitive life, religion and science;music, poetry and dance; myth and history; fashion and ethics—appear
inextricably interwoven. We may express this general observation also
by saying that primitive man views every action not only as adapted toits main object, every thought related to its main end, as we should
perceive them, but that he associates them with other ideas, often of areligious or at least of a symbolic nature. Thus he gives them a higher
significance than they deserve. Every taboo is an example of such
associations of apparently trifling actions with ideas that are so sacredThrough the Eyes of Ancient Egyptians

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that a deviation from the customary mode of performance creates thestrongest emotions of abhorrence. The interpretation of ornaments ascharms, the symbolism of decorative art, are other examples ofassociation of aspects of behavior that, on the whole, are foreign to ourmode of thought. (226)
As nonsensical as the elaborate network of associations made between
the variety of practices, occurrences, and interpretations practiced inprimitive society may appear to the modern eye, Boas is careful to note how
this strangeness is a matter of modal differences. He quickly points out how
analogous modes of behavior prevail, in fact, in modern society: “In orderto make clear the point of view from which these phenomena seem to fall
into an orderly array, we will investigate whether all vestiges of similar
forms of thought have disappeared from our civilization” (226–27). It turns
out that modern society is hardly exempt from the “irrational” holdemotional associations have on its citizens. Far from being extinguished,
the register of emotional associations initially attributed to “primitive life”
prevails in the everyday life of modern citizens.
But the remarkable aspect of emotions in civilized society, particularly
when they are unpleasant, turns out not to be their occurrence but thedifficulty with which they can be rationally explicated. The modern
equivalent of the primitive “emotions of abhorrence” is to be found in theway etiquette is breached in civilized society. It is precisely to the extent
that there is little, if any, scientific basis to justify a code of conduct that its
infraction provokes reactions that can only be rendered in emotional terms:“Most important for the purpose of our investigation is the observation that
all of us who live in the same society react to certain stimuli in the same way
without being able to express the reason for our actions. A good example ofwhat I refer to are breaches of social etiquette. A mode of behavior that does
not conform to the customary manners, but differs from them in a striking
way, creates on the whole, unpleasant emotions (227).”
Before we proceed to examine such breaches, it is well worth noting how
most of them are related to the consumption of food, that is, how we areaccustomed to consuming food. In both “In Praise of Shadows” and The
Mind of Primitive Man, the criteria of taste provide a contrast to the standardsof objectivity that support science. The terms of taste in a culture areoperative only to the extent that they demand an emotional investment, onethat its members can hardly explicate on rational grounds. Instead ofproviding a normative standard for taste, both texts convincingly emphasize

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the difficulty involved in divesting the emotional terms of this investment,
as if the universality of culture were reducible to one’s distaste when being
subjected to the standards of other cultures. That both authors repeatedly
cite such instances instead of those of pleasure seems to suggest that the
only way to define one’s taste would be to explore the terms of its repulsion.
Boas emphasizes the resilience with which social customs are upheld inmodern society to the point where, on their being transgressed, one’s mostimmediate and deep-seated emotions are unleashed with no room forrational analysis. One’s response to an offensive act is not to be rational but
to simply assert the correctness of one’s own etiquette on grounds that turnout to be no less arbitrary than the ritual conduct of “primitive” tribes. The
degree of rationalization that ensues in explaining one’s repugnance is only
equal to the emotional value invested in it in the first place. More important,the value of such resilience only surfaces the moment the etiquette is
stripped of its worth in the form of an infraction: “A close introspective
analysis shows these reasons to be only attempts to interpret our feelings ofdispleasure; that our opposition to a change is not by any means dictated byconscious reasoning, but primarily by the emotional effect of the new idea
which creates dissonance with the habitual” (232). If breaches of etiquettethreaten to rupture the naturalness with which conduct is formalized, theimmediate impulse is to rationalize such forms without much conscious
speculation. It is precisely to the extent that one’s reaction to a breach of
conduct is “irrational” that the futility of explicating it beyond the immediacyof emotions it provokes becomes apparent. Processing reactions of disgust
through rational inquiry offers little relief insofar as such emotions are, “bynature,” irrational. The immediacy of such displeasure reveals how standardsof taste are measured according to an emotional register, regardless ofwhether they prevail in modern civilization or “primitive” society:
It will be readily recognized that most of our table manners are purely
traditional, and cannot be given any adequate explanation. To smack
one’s lips is considered bad style, and may excite feelings of disgust;while among some Indian tribes it would be considered bad taste not tosmack one’s lips when invited to dinner, because it would suggest thatthe guest does not enjoy his meal. Both for the Indian and for ourselves
the constant performance of these actions which constitute good tablemanners make it practically impossible to act otherwise. An attempt to
act differently would not only be difficult on account of the lack ofadjustment of muscular motions, but also on account of the strong

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emotional resistance we should have to overcome. The emotional
displeasure is also released when we see others act contrary to custom.
To eat with people having table manners different from our own excites
feelings of displeasure which may rise to such an intensity as to cause
qualmishness. (229)

V. Disassociation of the Senses
In the sense that it intrudes on the observer’s sense of propriety, the crude,
uncalled for appearance of the “cream” that threatens to dissolve thesynesthetic reverie of eating a Japanese delicacy in “In Praise of Shadows”
may serve as another example of the kind of emotional association Boas
examines in the breach of social etiquette. Yet Tanizaki’s polemics on thenature of taste and Boas’s analysis of etiquette diverge in important ways.
First, the sense of intrusion brought on by foreign objects in “In Praise of
Shadows,” instead of being gauged specifically in “emotionally loaded”
instances, seems overwhelmingly symbolic, with no point of reference.
Instead of being distasteful in a particular way, foreign things embody theentire process of assimilation so much so that the particularity of theoffensive nature of an object such as “cream” is all but lost. If the concretesound and gesture of “smacking one’s lips” disgusts the modern civilized
person in Boas’s analysis, then it is the nebulousness of “cream” as a mere
signifier that seems to threaten the particular integrity of Tanizaki’s reverie
of tasting yôkan. Furthermore, while the “smack” signals theinstantaneousness with which an etiquette is breached, the amorphousnessof “cream” also may, in indicating the pervasiveness of assimilating the“West,” represent the stickiness of such intrusions as they coagulate beyond
the fleeting and nearly unconscious instantaneity of outrage elicited, asBoas notes, by the infraction of an etiquette: “The antagonism against it is areflex action accompanied by emotions not due to conscious speculation”(233). Last, whereas one’s adherence to the various forms of conduct in theexamples Boas provides results in a cohesion that is essentially social, thedynamic flow of tasteful experience Tanizaki seeks is strictly bound within
the individual’s body ensconced in an asocial environment. The cohesivenessguaranteed by refinement in the world of “In Praise of Shadows” takes
place beyond the realm of everyday society. The plentitude offered throughtaste, instead of being confirmed through social interaction, is mapped onto
the visceral realm of one’s body and the amalgamative experience it conjuresthrough its five senses. In this sense, Tanizaki’s sense of refinement has

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little to gain in adhering to those social bonds offered in the name of
etiquette. The kind of propriety underscored by Boas is largely a matter ofindifference in “In Praise of Shadows” insofar as the refinement of taste iscontingent on one’s withdrawal from those realms of societal cohesion
offered through the exchange of politesse. Whether public morality suffers
as a result of the importation of foreign norms is of little concern to Tanizaki,
compared to the damage it might inflict on the sense of autonomy gained
through one’s taste.
All of these factors contribute to the most important point that differentiates
the polemics of “In Praise of Shadows” from the dynamics involved insocietal infractions: the repugnance elicited in assimilating “western
civilization,” instead of calling forth the specificity and network of emotions
that tacitly sustain an etiquette, invokes an absence of associations, andTanizaki’s contempt for “cream” may be said to revolve around this lack.
The frustration centers not so much on the specificity of a gesture or object
as the sense that the associative field within which the emotional register of
one’s taste resonates in all its complexity has been cleared out in the nameof assimilating the technology of science:
I end up being preoccupied with the thought that if only there had beena scientific civilization unique to the East, one that was distinct fromthe West, we would have been in a much different social predicament.
For example, had we any claim to our own distinct physics or chemistry,then the different technologies and industries emerging from themmight have also developed into a variety of unique forms, and everyday
appliances, medicine, as well as crafts might all have been in keepingwith our ethnicity. In fact, our perception of the very foundations ofphysics or chemistry might have differed entirely from those conceived
by the West. The nature and quality attributed to various phenomena
such as light, electricity, or atoms might have been explored in amanner entirely at odds with how they are currently taught to us. (15–16; trans. mine)
Nothing short of an alternate history of science could provide the depth
and variety of associations that are available in the modern society of“western civilization,” where science flourishes as the foundation of its
culture. In the same way that the builder, in the attempt to simulate anauthentic Japanese house, must be excluded from experiencing its
authenticity, the modernity of Japan, while succeeding in its assimilation ofThrough the Eyes of Ancient Egyptians

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foreign technology, also ends up foundering in disengaging itself from theflow of acculturative associations emerging from a civilization based on
science.
More important for Tanizaki, however, is how this drive to simply apply
science, while eliding any gaps between its practice and theory, may unmoor
the associative principles on which one’s ethnic integrity and faculty of
taste have been based until now. Any attempt to incorporate the standards ofEurope or the United States would result, not only in disabling the bodily
synesthesia invested in one’s refinement, but constricting the discursive
space hitherto reserved for embellishing one’s refined taste, in essence“whiting” it out. Even the transparent medium of discourse, paper, is subject
to this neutralization of the senses:
It has been said that paper was invented by the Chinese. For us, Western
paper only serves a practical purpose, but the grain of Chinese andJapanese paper evokes a warmth that soothes the mind. While they
may share the same color, they differ in terms of their whiteness.
Whereas the skin of Western paper tends to repel light, the light on theskin of Japanese and Chinese paper is absorbed and enveloped with thecalmness of the first snow falling on the ground. Soft and pliant as aleaf, soothing to the touch, our paper hardly makes a sound whenfolded or wrapped. It is no wonder that shiny, glittering objects makeus uncomfortable. (19–20; trans. mine, emphasis added)
Strictly limited to its use value, “Western paper” evokes little in the realmof taste. It negates any attempt to experience the polymorphous sensualityof taste no less than it “tends to repel” light itself. In sharp contrast to thisconstriction in refinement, the abundance of associations accompanying thetouch of Eastern paper provides Tanizaki with the opportunity to project an
Other of the East (Tôyô) whose discursive and bodily traits (paper as “skin”)
are intertwined and grafted onto one’s nativity in terms of “nature,” one thattranscends the techno-artificial dimensions encompassed by the West. One’s
refinement, at first defined as Japanese, is now shared by Japan and China
to the point where the collective that Tanizaki refers to as “us” at the end of
the passage now exceeds the boundaries of one’s nationality. The ease withwhich this aestheticization is linked to China may provide us with a glimpseof the geopolitical undercurrent at work against the association Boas makes
between science and “western civilization.” As already mentioned, thesense of repugnance Tanizaki evinces has little to do with the particularity

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Yuji Onikiof offense provoked by an infraction. The outrage brought on by a breachcan be defused immediately to the extent that it ends up reinforcing the
propriety of one’s conduct. But the sense of intrusion addressed throughout“In Praise of Shadows” proves to be too overwhelming to be dissolved inany form whatsoever. The outrage here lasts, and Tanizaki gauges his
resentment according to an economy that perseveres, parsed out bysuspicions that if the loss in capacity to make such native associations is theprice to pay for assimilation, there is little prospect of any return. The mostquotidian realms, such as speech, in being curtailed to the exigencies offoreign technology, will end up incurring losses as irretrievable as they are
gradual, escaping notice as long as this economy prevails:
Even with regard to speech, we speak more quietly, with fewer words,
and, most important, we value the “space” between phrases; but thatkind of space, of course, is destroyed the moment it has been recorded
by a machine. And so we end up modifying our art, distorting it so it
will fulfill the requirements of a machine. Of course, because thismachine has been developed by Westerners, it works in tandem with
their art. The fact that we lose so much in so many ways must give us
pause. (19; trans. mine)
Instead of presenting a threat against a particular style or form of taste
prior to modernization, the specter of modernity simply portends thedissolution of one’s faculty of taste. As if to preempt such loss, Tanizaki
projects his native refinement as a collective trait to be shared between
China and Japan by grafting the faculty of taste onto the body politic of an
East Asian alliance, one that, unsurprisingly, historically coincides with thedimensions of territorial expansion claimed by Japan in the name of “theGreater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” While it might be compelling toanalyze the political aesthetics of complicity involved in the writing andpublication of “In Praise of Shadows,” I am interested here in how Tanizaki
measures the deterioration of taste with one’s ethnicity by coupling them
together against the success Boas attributes to Japan in its assimilation of“western civilization.” Contrary to Boas’s assessment of Japan’s complete
assimilation of “all the best and worst traits of western civilization,” Tanizaki
underscores how, in the midst of such profuse application, those associative
traits that are part and parcel of “western civilization” may prove not to be
so adoptable in practice.
Ironically enough, this disjunction becomes apparent, not in the realm ofThrough the Eyes of Ancient Egyptians

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incorporating specific etiquettes from abroad, but in the process ofcultivating science. Tanizaki’s desire to project an ethnicity based on tastethat encompasses East Asia is equal to the sense that the rapid success withwhich technology or institutions from Europe and the United States havebeen emulated is gained only through a collective neglect in imbibing those
associations inherent in the practice of science. The associative nature of“western civilization,” in Tanizaki’s eyes, far from being emotional, turns
out to be unrelentingly scientific. If science were valued strictly in terms of
its application, assimilating it would hardly be problematic. The problem,
which Tanizaki intuits but hardly analyzes, is that science constitutes aculture in and of itself, one whose associative nature prevails with as muchforce as does the practice of etiquette in civilized societies or of rituals
among primitive peoples. Boas is quick to distinguish the culture of sciencefrom a culture based on the mores of etiquette or taboos, insofar as thenature of its associations is constantly subject to speculation and revision.
Such prerogatives not only inform the methodology of scientific researchbut, more important, constitute the basic elements of civilized society:“Thus an important change from primitive culture to civilization seems toconsist in the gradual elimination of what might be called the emotional,socially determined associations of sense-impressions and of activities, forwhich intellectual associations are gradually substituted” (252). It would bein the best interests of such a society then to have its participants not be
entirely committed to those associations that, while supported “traditionally,”
are nonetheless proven to be false. As Boas himself makes clear, the analysis
of human behavior requires a certain lack of commitment or “agnosticism”
toward those standards that cannot withstand the rigors of scientific inquiry.
In this sense, the human sciences, whether examining etiquettes or taboos,
must break down the immediacy of experience that traditional practices aremeant to ensure and, subsequently, inform us of their systemic significance,
one that is as unknown as it is unconscious. While the human species isanalyzed according to the variety of cultures it assumes, this diversity can
only be viewed comprehensively from a vantage point of scientificobservation. The certainty of such analysis is always held at bay, yet
proposed as in all likelihood true. Always regarded as tentative, these
conclusions, unlike norms of tradition, may be questioned, modified, or incertain cases even rejected. Boas empathically warns against the mistaken
impulse to embrace science as if it constituted a tradition. In such cases,
science turns into a culture no less susceptible to error than the superstitionsof primitive society. The “cure” advocated by science against such

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Yuji Onikisusceptibility is not to be immune to those questions cast on its discoveries
but to welcome them:
In scientific inquiries we should always be clear in our own minds ofthe fact that we always embody a number of hypotheses and theories
in our explanations, and that we do not carry the analysis of any given
phenomenon to completion. If we were to do so, progress would hardly
be possible, because every phenomenon would require an endlessamount of time for thorough treatment. We are only too apt, however,to forget entirely the general, and for most of us purely traditional,
theoretical basis which is the foundation of our reasoning, and toassume that the result of our reasoning is absolute truth. In this wecommit the same error that is being committed, and has always beencommitted, by all the less educated, including members of primitive
tribes. They are more easily satisfied than we are at the present time;
but they also assume as true the traditional element which enters into
their explanations, and therefore accept as absolute truth the conclusions
based on it. It is evident that the fewer the number of traditional
elements that enter into our reasoning, and the clearer we endeavor to
be in regard to the hypothetical part of our reasoning, the more logicalwill be our conclusions. There is an undoubted tendency in the advanceof civilization to eliminate traditional elements, and to gain a clearer
and clearer insight into the hypothetical basis of our reasoning. It istherefore not surprising, that, in the history of civilization, reasoning
becomes more and more logical, not because each individual carries
out his thought in a more logical manner, but because the traditional
material which is handed down to each individual has been thought
out and worked out more thoroughly and more carefully. While inprimitive civilization the traditional material is doubted and examinedby only a very few individuals, the number of thinkers who try to freethemselves from the fetters of tradition increases as civilization
advances. (222–23; emphasis added)
With its power to question and filter out any bias tradition promotes on
irrational grounds, the positivistic spirit Boas invests in science would havebeen undoubtedly dismissed Tanizaki, not so much because of its
intrusiveness, but precisely the reverse—the spirit of such inquiry can only
skirt around the premise of refined experiences, which by definition escapescientific observation.

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Tanizaki’s skepticism about this scientific prerogative, of course, ishardly unique to the literary polemics of early modern Japan. We find, forexample, similar misgivings held in the name of refinement depicted inMarcel Proust’s Swann’s Way. In observing Doctor Cottard’s gracelessness,
Madame Verdurin remarks, “He’s a man of science, out of touch with thepractical side of life, he has no idea of the value of things and relies on what
we tell him” (209; emphasis added). As far as she is concerned, the doctor’s
medical knowledge only takes away from his capacity to engage in polite
conversation. As the narrator notes, “[s]ince he completely lacked thecritical faculty which he thought he exercised on everything, that refinementof politeness which consists in declaring to a person to whom you are doinga favor, without however expecting to be believed, that you are in factindebted to him, was a waste of effort with the doctor, who took everything
literally” (208). Refined speech, far from providing a transparent mode ofcommunication, operates on an economic basis whereby one’s net worth isconstantly reassessed according to the various rates at which utterances areexchanged. The modest statement, while proposing to deflate its speaker’s
worth, in fact signals the occasion by which exponential gains are made outof the listener’s tacit approval. One’s worth, instead of being stated, isderived through the social currency of politesse. If refinement “consists indeclaring to a person to whom you are doing a favor, without however
expecting to be believed, that you are in fact indebted to him,” the things
one says hold up insofar as they do not have to measure up to the facts.
Nothing could be more inappropriate in such cases than to treat suchexchanges, as Doctor Cottard does, either at face value or as a complete
farce. He proves himself to be inept at navigating his way through the mostelementary form of politesse, reinforcing the sense that in the eyes of a“man of science” the way etiquettes are exchanged might just as well be as
incomprehensible as it would be in the mind of Boas’s primitive man.
At the same time, if the procurement of refinement remains precious to
Verdurin’s little “circle,” it is constantly tinged with an irony that anticipates
its demise, one that paves the way to the opening sentence of the subsequent
volume In the Shadow of Young Girls in Flower, whereby the terms ofrefinement have been reversed by the turn of the century in Paris: “. . . myfather replied that although a guest as eminent as Cottard, a scientific manof some renown, would always be an asset at one’s dinner table, the Marquis
de Norpois would be bound to see Swann, with his showing off and his
name-dropping, as nothing but a vulgar swank, ‘a rank outsider,’ as hewould put it” (3; emphasis added). If the relentlessness with which the

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passing of time ruins the standards of social standing and etiquette depicted
in Proust’s novel, it also indicates its authenticity, gained only at the cost ofdivesting those values imbued in nineteenth-century etiquette of theirauthority. In this sense, both Boas and Proust, in their early twentiethcentury writings, treat taste as if it is beyond restoration. Etiquettes andmatters of taste are always in a constant state of transition, and those of thepast can no longer be experienced in their proper terms. This kind of resolveand consolation in tracing the extinction of such terms is almost entirely
absent in the nature of refinement explored throughout “In Praise of
Shadows.”
We may return here to the question of what constitutes the modernity ofa nation whose distinguishing feature lies in its aptitude to assimilate
modernity itself. While modernity may provide the gauge by which theprogress of a nation is monitored, one has to wonder what constitutes theexact nature of the nation itself. While it is the exact nature of “society” thatis constantly probed throughout In Search of Lost Time, one in which thenationhood of France requires only a passing thought, the polemics of “InPraise of Shadows” cannot help but revolve around the threat that science
presents in extinguishing it in ethnic terms. If Proust’s characters cannot
help but be drawn to those interactions within society that define their senseof taste, the refinement of “In Praise of Shadows” works inversely. As
mentioned earlier, the refined experiences Tanizaki advocates depend on
one’s willingness to withdraw from the realm of etiquettes exchanged forthe sake of maintaining societal cohesion. Any form of social interaction
based on proper conduct only gets in the way of the transcendence Tanizaki
seeks out of one’s bodily taste. Tanizaki cannot do without the pleasure ofisolated refinement any more than Proust’s protagonists can divest
themselves of the socioeconomy of etiquettes. Indeed, in terms of Tanizaki’s
polemics, the Proustian narrative might even be considered scientific insofar
as the exteriority of conduct it depicts is rendered palpable only to thedegree that the critical analysis of such conduct remains both distant andexact. It is almost as if the critical vantage point, offered first by the narrator
at the beginning of the novel, is gradually handed over through its meticulous
precision to the reader. If Proust’s novel allows readers to gain a perspectivefrom which its space can be viewed precisely because it is beyond the realmof their lived experiences, then we can see how this kind of exteriority
overlaps with the anthropological aims Boas advocates throughout The
Mind of Primitive Man. Like the past depicted in In Search of Lost Time,any glimpse into the “world of primitive man” is made available only to theThrough the Eyes of Ancient Egyptians

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extent that its observers cannot inhabit it. The perspective on such spaces
can only be gained by making them uninhabitable. According to thepolemics of “In Praise of Shadows,” then, science is only an extension ofthis kind of exteriority whereby the impenetrability of taste and all that it
embodies must be eliminated for the sake of a discourse based on observation
and analysis. Whether an etiquette or scientific protocol is being observed
hardly matters insofar as the propriety of their exchange is justified by theobservable exteriority of one’s conduct. Any vantage point afforded byscience only comes at the cost of giving up one’s capacity to experience aninteriority cultivated through taste.
It is important, however, to recognize how Tanizaki’s polemics on
ethnicity depend on a sequential leap no less drastic than the one Boas
makes in asking us to see “primitive” Europe through the eyes of ancient
Egyptians in order to reevaluate the currency of Japan’s modernity. When
Tanizaki associates ethnicity with taste, one cannot help but ask, Since
when did the faculty of taste shed its role of ranking social groups
circumscribed within a national polity and assume the dimensions of
ethnicity instead? Given how class and regional distinctions are meticulously
described in Tanizaki’s fiction, most notably in The Makioka Sisters, theirabsence in “In Praise of Shadows” is all the more conspicuous, yet also
telling. While the stakes of refinement in The Makioka Sisters are depicted
as provincial and realistic, those pursued throughout “In Praise of Shadows”
are driven by the need to define refinement as a transcendental ideal. The
most provocative aspect of this ideal, however, is how it seems to haveemerged as a result of being aborted with the same fluidity that Tanizaki
introduces, yet abandons, the notion of constructing a house in “pureJapanese style” at the beginning of the essay. In fact, the terms of suchtranscendence almost seem to hinge on the idea of its dissolution, as if its
contours can only emerge with the threat of its extinction. Any terms basedon the nature of taste and ethnicity then could only be claimed in retrospect,in anticipation of their demise. If, as in the case of Boas’s revised commentaryon Japan, the success by which a nation modernizes demands a kind ofreversal in time so much so that previous assumptions and associations
must undergo “corrections,” then the measure of criticism inveighed against
such success depends on a leap forward in the prediction of a disastrous
future. Insofar as the discursive capacity for taste embodies one’s
transcendental nativity, Tanizaki anticipates how such loss would
necessarily give way to a crisis over ethnicity, one that in its extremity could
eventually lead to a crisis of spiritual proportions.

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VI. Anticipating the Terror of Tastelessness
If the polemics on taste and science in “In Praise of Shadows” seem
quaint in the context of contemporary Japan, it would be well worth
reminding ourselves how they have continued to resonate into its postwar
period, most disturbingly perhaps at the end of the twentieth century. By
then, the disjunction between taste and science that Tanizaki addressed in
the 1930s is hardly a literary affair, nor is there any room to imagine or
simulate any space in keeping with the “pure” style of Japanese architectureor art of tea. Instead, I would argue the sense of threat portended in “In
Praise of Shadows” gets played out in the realm of everyday life in the formof terror of tastelessness. To the extent that Tanizaki’s polemics anticipate adecline in the faculty of taste, the trajectory of such loss may parallel anational agenda to assimilate science as utterly technical. Confined to its
application, those associative realms, that is, the culture of science claimed
to encompass everyday life in “western civilization,” may prove to beunnecessary. At the same time, one’s faculty of taste, at least the kind that
Tanizaki insists on preserving, may no longer be deemed necessary either.
In a society increasingly based on the accumulation of technological capital,
any role the faculty of taste can play in allocating the significance of one’s
body may have no other option but to evaporate. While the scope of thisarticle is limited to the origins of this disintegration, the outrage laden
throughout “In Praise of Shadows,” along with the desire to simulate
ethnicity through discourses through bodily interventions, far from being
extinguished, ends up amalgamating into an apocalyptic vision of terror,
one that can only be articulated first by tracing its origins. While theproportions of this vision are far from anything Tanizaki would haveimagined in his fiction and essays, its apocalyptic terms are hardly out ofalignment with those anticipated throughout “In Praise of Shadows.” For
now, a mere quotation will have to suffice. In his memoir, Aum and I [Ômuto watashi], Ikuo Hayashi, traces the origins of his commitment to the Aum
Shinrikyô sect and how it culminated in his role as one of the key assailants
in the Tokyo subway sarin attack incident. These origins, instead ofstemming from the teachings of the sect or its leaders, turn out to be rooted
in his disillusionment as a doctor practicing “Western medicine,” one that isfinally ameliorated through the discovery of a “native science,” a practicethat uncannily resembles the alternative science projected as an ideal
throughout “In Praise of Shadows” (if only there had been a scientificcivilization unique to the East”). In a nation whose technological prowess

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seems unsurpassable, what Tanizaki writes off as a flight of his imaginationends up being explored with the utmost sincerity and executed in its mostextreme form. Unencumbered by the kind of debt of assimilation of Westernscience that haunts Tanizaki’s essay, in the eyes of Hayashi, this alternative
science promises a freer flow of associations as dynamic as the synesthesiaof refinement advocated throughout “In Praise of Shadows”:
At the time [1987], Hirakawa published a book by Ishida Hidemi
called Kinagareru shintai [The body flowing with qi]. Filled withreferences to studies on the Zhuangzi, Taoism, Xian Dao meditation,
the book offered an overview of a “science of the body” (shintaikan)
as it was understood traditionally in the East. It emphasized the conceptof the energy flow—how energy entered, circulated, and exited the
body. It was in sharp contrast to the static nature of Western medicine,which evolved out of practicing the “cadaverous” methodology ofdissection. The ideas in this book overlapped with Indian concepts ofkundalini and chakra, and it made me realize that Eastern medicine
revolved around a medical system as well, but one that was more
flexible in its concept of the body as based on the flow of “qi.” (69;trans. mine)
The difference between Tanizaki’s conjectures and Hayashi’s account,
while by no means superficial, as Boas would say, requires exhaustive
analysis, but for now it may be worth pointing out how, according toHayashi’s account, the appeal of this alternative science resides, not in theparticularity of experience it offers, but in the abstraction of the signifier“flow” itself. If “cream,” in all its heaviness, disrupts Tanizaki’s reverie ofrefinement, then the chain of associations based on the signifier “qi”
constitutes a flow in itself that is entirely ethereal. And if the word “cream”
for Tanizaki represents the racial “whiteness” inherent in assimilation, thenthe preponderance of signifiers of ethereality based around “qi” and “flow”(ryûnyû, ryûshutsu, nagare, ryûdô) convey or, perhaps more cryptically,enshroud ethnicity in terms of imperceptibility and tastelessness. Suchterms are inscribed in the very form of terror expressed through its means ofdestruction: an invisible gas whose sole purpose is the obliteration of thesenses.

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Notes
F. Scott Fitzgerald’s “Echoes of the Jazz Age” (1931) and “My Lost City” (1932)
offer controversial ruminations on the dissolution of standards in taste. While an analysisof these essays is beyond the scope of this article, I plan on incorporating them into mywork in progress on what I have termed the “terror of tastelessness.”
2 Exasperated by the tenacious popularity of racialist theories that purport to be“scientific,” Boas explicitly states his conclusion at the beginning of the revised editionof The Mind of Primitive Man: “A close connection between race and personality has
never been established. The concept of racial type as commonly used even in scientific
literature is misleading and requires a logical as well as a biological redefinition. While
it would seem that a great number of American students of biology, psychology andanthropology concur with these views, popular prejudice, based on earlier scientific andpopular tradition, has certainly not diminished, for race prejudice is still an importantfactor in our life” (v–vi).
3 While chajin can mean a tea master as well as an aesthete, and Tanizaki interchanges
the two meanings throughout this essay, I have translated the word accordingly, but it isworth noting how the way Tanizaki overlaps its meanings provides further illustration of
how the polymorphous nature of taste is embedded discursively in his style of writing.
4 In Harper and Seidensticker’s translation of “In Praise of Shadows” kureemu is
mistranslated as “cream-filled chocolates” (20) By referring to another delicacy theanalogy may be smoother than it is in the original text, but it ends up undermining thesimplicity with which Tanizaki attempts to convey kureemu as being merely heavy andwhite and nothing more in substance.
5 In a similar way, at the beginning of Naomi [Chijin no ai] the narrator readily admits
that he was enthralled less by the titular character in person as by the way her nameappears in English: “I found it remarkable how her name spelled in English was ‘Naomi’and how this made her seem utterly western. That’s how it all started” (6; trans. mine).
1

Works Cited
Boas, Franz. The Mind of Primitive Man. New York: Macmillan, 1911.
——. The Mind of Primitive Man. Rev. ed. New York: Macmillan, 1938.
Fitzgerald, F. Scott. The Great Gatsby. 1925. New York: Penguin, 1950.
Hayashi, Ikuo. Aum and I [Ômu to watashi]. Tokyo: Bungei Shunjû, 2001.
Proust, Marcel, Swann’s Way. 1913. Translated by Lydia Davis. New York: Penguin,2003.
——. In the Shadow of Young Girls in Flower. 1919. Trans. James Grieve. New York:Through the Eyes of Ancient Egyptians

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Penguin, 2004.
Stocking, George W., Jr. “Anthropology as Kulturkampf: Science and Politics in the
Career of Franz Boas.” In The Uses of Anthropology. Ed. Walter Goldschmidt. New
York: American Anthropological Association, 1979.
Tanizaki, Junichirô, Naomi [Chijin no ai]. 1925. Tokyo: Shinchô, 1947.
——. Inei raisan. 1933–34. Tokyo: Chuô Kôron, 1975.
——. In Praise of Shadows. Trans. Thomas J. Harper and Edward G. Seidensticker. New
Haven: Leete’s Island Books, 1977.
——. Sasame yuki [The Makioka Sisters]. 1943–48. Tokyo: Chuô Kôron, 1983.