The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 29 (2018)
Copyright © 2018 Yoshie Takamitsu. All rights reserved. This work may be used, with thisnotice included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work may be distributed,
electronically or otherwise, in whole or in part, without permission from the author.

Improving US–Japanese Relations throughthe News Media:
Roy W. Howard, Dentsu, and the Osaka Mainichi

Yoshie Takamitsu*

Introduction
After the First World War, the importance of public opinion increased
within the field of diplomacy.1 Even in the Far East, China and Japan
competed to improve their status in global public opinion, especially how
they were viewed by the United States and the United Kingdom. Chinese
diplomats who were educated in the West, such as Wellington Koo, worked
actively at the Paris Peace Conference to gain assistance from the powers
with regard to the Shandong problem related to returning former German
holdings in China from Japan.2 By the late 1930s, Chinese propaganda, or
public diplomacy, was influencing US policy toward Japan,3 whereas
Japanese propaganda was less effective and did not engage the American
public successfully.4
What was wrong with Japanese information policy? The Japanesepolitical elite understood the importance of propaganda. Masayoshi
Matsumura described Japan’s public diplomacy efforts during the RussoJapanese War (1904–5).5 Although this operation was temporary, Japandiligently pursued a strategy of disseminating information after the Paris
Peace Conference.6 Fumimaro Konoe, who become prime minister in 1937,*Associate Professor, Chiba University

113

114    Yoshie Takamitsu

advocated consistently from the early years of his career for using
intellectuals to deliver effective public diplomacy or propaganda.7 Peter
O’Connor in his 2010 book The English-Language Press Networks of East
Asia, 1918–1945 described the efforts of the Japanese Foreign Ministry totake control of its own news dissemination and manage its own image
beginning in the 1920s. The Japanese Foreign Ministry established its
Information Division, which dealt with overseas news propaganda, in 1921.
Further, with the creation of the Rengo News Agency in 1926, the Foreign
Ministry enlarged its share of the news market. The ministry’s network
consisted of Rengo, the Japan Times, the Far East, and the Herald of Asia.
As can be seen, the Japanese Foreign Ministry had already introduced news
propaganda in the early 1920s.8
The quantity of propaganda was, moreover, substantial. In the mid-1930s,
the Japanese Foreign Ministry intensified its activity in both news
propaganda and cultural diplomacy by reorganizing its foreign ministry’s
structure. The Domei News Agency was established at the end of 1935 by
the merger of Rengo and the news agency Dentsu, which had been incompetition with Rengo since the late 1920s, and the Kokusai Bunka
Shinkokai (International Culture Promotion Association) was set up in
1934.9 The direction of Japanese information policy, however, does not seemto have been very sophisticated. Especially after the mid-1930s, the foregin
ministry’s activities became inflexible and could not adapt to changing
situations.
The problem was not the quantity of propaganda but its quality.
According to historian Atsushi Shibazaki, by the time the Kokusai Bunka
Shinkokai was established, Japanese cultural policy was based mostly on
explanation, or rikaiseshimuru, which unyieldingly backed the Japanesecause.10 As I will show, the same pattern prevailed in news propaganda.
One of the primary causes of the poor quality of Japanese propaganda
was related to the centralization of news transmission resulting from themerger of Dentsu and Rengo. This centralization had both positive andnegative effects. On the one hand, it enabled the Domei News Agency toplay a significant role in domestic thought control after the outbreak of theSino–Japanese War in 1937.11 On the other hand, Domei’s monopoly
position was not so effective in foreign propaganda.
To analyze the adverse effect of Domei on foreign propaganda, I will
focus on Dentsu and its network. Most historians have not focused on
Dentsu, even though it was a strong competitor of Rengo in the early 1930s,
whereas Domei has received more attention since the late 1990s.12 Before its

Improving US–Japanese Relations through the News Media  115

1935 consolidation with Rengo, Dentsu had a valuable resource for Japanesepublic diplomacy toward the United States: Roy W. Howard.
Howard was an influential American journalist and publisher who
controlled many newspapers and a news agency in the United States. Bornin 1883 in Ohio, he became president of the United Press (UP) news agency
in 1912. In 1933, he headed the Scripps-Howard syndicate, which
comprised about twenty newspapers, including the San Francisco News andthe World Telegram.13 In August 1930, the New York Times described him as
one of the” 59 leaders . . . ‘who rule America’.” Howard convinced Herbert
Hoover to enter the Ohio presidential primaries and supported Hoover’s
1928 presidential campaign, although he transferred his backing to Franklin
D. Roosevelt in 1932.14
The UP, headed by Howard, had a contract with Dentsu and the Osaka
Mainichi in Japan and was also a competitor of the Associated Press (AP)news agency, which was a partner of Rengo. This partnership with the UP,
competing with the Rengo-Domei network, offered great potential for
Japanese public diplomacy. Howard was a prominent American who
genuinely wanted to ease tensions between the United States and Japan. He
tried to deliver a pro-Japan message to the US public through his
publications and also sought to influence President Roosevelt throughpersonal connections. If the experts in the Japanese Foreign Ministry had
pursued an adequate information policy, this collaboration with Howardmight have resulted in successful public diplomacy in the United States.
In this article, I describe how Howard and Japanese news media such as
Dentsu and the Osaka Mainichi attempted to cooperate with the goal of
improving US–Japan relations during the 1930s. This will provide insight
into why Japan’s public diplomacy failed during these years.
There exist few academic studies of Howard’s involvement in Japanesepublic diplomacy. Historian, David Lu has examined Japanese foreign
minister Yosuke Matsuoka’s visit to the United States, which occurred at
Howard’s invitation, but his focus was mainly on Matsuoka, not Howard.15
Izumi Hirobe described Howard’s support of the pro-quota movement in1933 in his book about the Japanese immigrant problem. However, he did
not pay attention to Howard’s political activities other than those related tothe immigration issue.16 In 2016, Patricia Beard published a biography ofHoward that includes valuable citations from Howard’s diary (not available
to most researchers), but she did not focus on his role in US–Japaneserelations.17
The most insightful research on Howard’s involvement in Japanese public

116    Yoshie Takamitsu

diplomacy has been conducted by Teruo Ariyama and Shigeki Mori.
Ariyama analyzed Howard’s interview with the Japanese emperor and theinvitation extended to American journalists to visit Japan. I agree with
Ariyama that this was an instance of effective Japanese public diplomacy,
carried out with Howard’s active cooperation. However, Ariyama did not
fully examine Howard’s intentions, because he consulted only Japanese
documents and thus focused mainly on the intentions on the Japanese side.18
Mori, meanwhile, analyzed Howard’s maneuvering to invite Foreign
Minister Matsuoka to the United States in spring 1941. He pointed out that
Howard hoped for an improvement in US–Japanese relations based on
Matsuoka’s realism but that Matsuoka tried to force US acceptance of theJapanese cause, backed by the Tripartite Alliance concluded among
Germany, Italy, and Japan in September 1940.19 Clearly, there was not muchcommon ground between Howard and Matsuoka at that time.
Howard’s involvement in Japanese public diplomacy began much earlier,
however, and the possibilities for success were greater in the early 1930s, as
Ariyama has argued. My examination of Howard’s efforts during the 1930s
draws from the Roy W. Howard Papers at the Library of Congress and theJoseph C. Grew Papers at the Houghton Library of Harvard University. The
Howard Papers include many letters between Howard and representatives ofJapanese media, such as Dentsu and the Osaka Mainichi, and JapaneseForeign Ministry officials. By analyzing these letters, I will elucidate theattempts to ease tensions between the United States and Japan in which
Howard participated.
I. Matsuoka’s Visit to the United States
What caused Howard to become interested in Japan? The UP began toenlarge its business in the Far East in the early 1920s. Dentsu, competingwith Rengo, which was reorganized out of the Kokusai news agency in
1926, and the Osaka Mainichi concluded a contract with the UP in Japan.20
Howard’s first trip to the Far East occurred in the mid-1920s. He focused on
Far Eastern political affairs and visited the Philippines, China, and Japan tocollect hot news there.21
Beginning in the mid-1920s, close personal connections graduallydeveloped between the UP correspondents in Japan and staff at Dentsu andthe Osaka Mainichi. Shingoro Takaishi of the Osaka Mainichi, who had been
responsible for concluding the contract in 1923,22 and Dentsu personnel suchas Hoshiro Mitsunaga and Sekizo Ueda helped the UP’s staff becomeImproving US–Japanese Relations through the News Media  

117

acclimated to Japan and became close friends with Howard.23
However, the Manchurian Incident, in which the Japanese military
invaded China on the pretext of an explosion outside Mukden, occurred in
September 1931. Supporting the peace-keeping machinery of internationallaw was important to Howard because he opposed the US naval buildup.24
The Scripps-Howard papers’ condemnation of Japan was quite overt.
Although American newspaper editors were generally critical of Japan’s
behavior in the Manchurian Incident, they were divided concerning theactual extent of Japanese actions.25
Until early 1933, the Far Eastern situation remained deadlocked. Clearly,
the Stimson doctrine, in which the United States refused to recognizechanges made in China that would interfere with American treaty rights, was
not sufficient to expel the Japanese Army from Manchuria. Therefore,
Howard turned his attention to Matsuoka’s active approach to the foreignpress in Geneva.26 This involvement led Howard to his first contact withJapanese public diplomacy, which occurred when he invited Matsuoka tovisit the United States on the Japanese official’s return from the general
assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva. On February 24, 1933, theJapanese delegation, headed by Matsuoka, walked out of the general
assembly after voting for a resolution based on the Lytton Report that
rejected Japan’s argument of Manchukuo as an “independent” state. The
Lytton Commission was appointed by the League of Nations to investigate
the state of affairs in China, Manchuria, and Japan. Howard asked Matsuoka
to visit the United States to explain Japan’s position to the American
public.27
Matsuoka initially had no desire to visit the United States because heviewed the Japanese withdrawal from the League as a total failure of his
diplomatic efforts. Seijiro Yoshizawa and Hiroshi Saito, however, persuaded
him to accept the invitation.28 Yoshizawa, born in 1893, was a diplomat who
had returned from Italy just before the Manchurian Incident and worked on
the report that the Japanese government submitted to the Lytton
Commission. He then accompanied Matsuoka to Geneva. Saito, born in
1886, was deeply involved in the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s information
policy. He attended the Paris Peace Conference with Matsuoka, where they
worked as press attachés (shinbun keihatsu gakari).29 He was one of the“reformist” group called Kakushin-ha and assumed the position of directorof the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Information Division in 1929. Under his
tenure, the so-called Carnegie Mission visited Japan to promote US–
Japanese understanding, and this interaction had a positive effect on

118    Yoshie Takamitsu

American intellectuals. The decision to call this project the Carnegie
Mission, even though it was a Japanese propaganda initiative funded by
Japan, was significant; using the Carnegie name could help to conceal the
project’s actual purpose.30 When Matsuoka was sent to Geneva, Saito was
the Japanese ambassador to the Netherlands and assisted the Japanesedelegation, including Matsuoka.
Moved by Yoshizawa and Saito’s persuasion, Matsuoka changed his mind
about taking a detour to the United States and arrived in New York on
March 24. He visited various cities, including Boston and Chicago, andspoke to the American public about the Japanese position on the Manchurian
Incident. Howard also arranged for Matsuoka to meet with President
Roosevelt.31 According to Yoshizawa, Howard’s arrangements were quite
adequate, and the American public paid considerable attention to
Matsuoka’s remarks.32
What was Howard’s purpose in assisting this campaign? Certainly, hewanted publicity to help him sell newspapers, but this was not his only
motivation. Howard believed that Americans paid far less attention to Far
Eastern politics than to the maintenance of world peace-keeping machinery.
Moreover, he believed that a “new deal” involving a united renunciation of
the Nine-Power and Four-Power treaties in the Pacific might be better thanthe current instability. Under the Four-Power Treaty, the United States, theUnited Kingdom, France, and Japan agreed to maintain the status quo in the
Pacific by respecting the Pacific holdings of their fellow signatories, notseeking further territorial expansion, and consulting with one another in theevent of a dispute over territorial possessions. Howard’s reference to doubts
about the Four-Power Treaty indicated his adoption of a positive attitude
toward the US naval buildup, which he had initially opposed.33
Howard did not always agree with Matsuoka’s cause, but he appreciatedthe Japanese envoy’s frankness. Matsuoka displayed this frankness
intentionally, believing like Howard that the public wanted to hear open,
straightforward expression of views rather than sophisticated, boringstatements couched in diplomatic terms. Howard and Matsuoka foundcommon ground in that both sought to speak directly to the American
public.34 This experience also influenced Saito’s future career, as he became
Japan’s ambassador to the United States in December 1933. He initiated anenergetic press campaign even before arriving in the United States andbecame a popular figure during his tenure through his frankness with thepress and the public alike.35

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II. Howard’s Interview with the Japanese Emperor
Pleased with the results of Matsuoka’s visit to the United States, Howard
next planned to visit Japan for an interview with the Japanese emperor as thesecond major initiative in his focus on US–Japanese relations.36
The inspiration for this interview came from a hint that Matsuoka dropped
unintentionally while he and Howard were drinking together. Howardpicked up on the idea immediately and sailed for Japan on April 30, 1933,
only two weeks after Matsuoka left San Francisco.37
On his arrival on May 17, Howard requested Matsuoka’s assistance ingetting to see the emperor.38 Howard left on May 25 for a trip to Manchuria
and China proper and returned to Japan on June 18. Yasuya Uchida, theforeign minister, requested that Manchukuo and the South Manchurian
Railway Company welcome him, and the Kwantung Army even provided
him with an airplane.39
While Howard was in China, Matsuoka asked Yoshizawa to arrange ameeting with the emperor. Yoshizawa consulted the lord keeper of the privy
seal, Nobuaki Makino, who coordinated the meeting on June 22.40 Actually,
from Japan’s perspective, this was not an interview but a formal meeting(ekken) with a particular purpose. The Japanese Foreign Ministry persuaded
Howard not to cite the emperor’s remarks directly.41 Howard cooperated
with this scheme by agreeing to the ekken procedure.42
The US ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, believed that this meeting
was carefully arranged to promote Japan’s prestige in international society.
He considered the emperor’s reference to easing tensions between the
United States and Japan quite intentional and part of the Japanese
government’s public diplomacy.43
On June 23, many American newspapers, including the World Telegram
and the San Francisco News, which published a front-page article on
Howard’s interview with the emperor (fig. 1).44 This article highlighted theJapanese emperor’s desire for cordial US–Japanese relations and for world
peace, along with his belief that Manchukuo would not be a menace to theOpen Door Policy in the Far East. Kensuke Horinouchi, the Japanese
consulate general in New York, reported to the Foreign Ministry positively
that the article emphasized the Open Door Policy on Manchukuo. Actually,
Howard had had a conversation on May 27 with Kuniaki Koiso, chief ofstaff of the Kwantung Army at Changchun, who told him that if Americans
were hesitant to invest in Manchukuo because of their government’s
nonrecognition policy, the Japanese Empire would serve as guarantor.45 The

120    Yoshie Takamitsu

Figure 1. The San Francisco News, June 23, 1933

Open Door Policy on Manchukuo was one of the most important ideas that
the Japanese government wanted to disseminate.
On June 25, the Tokyo Nichinichi, which had a close connection with the
Osaka Mainichi, contained an article on Howard’s ekken under the title“Cooperation between the United States and Japan: Japanese Emperor’s
Hope Published in 1,200 American Newspapers.”46
Howard had clearly changed his policy toward Japan, but he did not
become a Japanese publicist. Although he cooperated with the Japanese
government’s public diplomacy, he felt some discomfort with Japan’s
understanding of US policy. He insisted for years that the United States
preferred disarmament, and his newspapers proclaimed the US
government’s intention to delay building its navy to the upper limit
permitted by the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. Howard realized,
however, that this policy had been misunderstood by the Japanese when hevisited Manchukuo and China. He found that the US reluctance tostrengthen its naval presence in the region had been interpreted as
indifference to Japanese violations of international law such as the
Manchurian Incident.47 Howard wrote Yakichiro Suma, a Japanese diplomat

Improving US–Japanese Relations through the News Media  121

in Shanghai:
I am not in the least disposed to set myself up in criticism of Japan’scourse of action, for the reason that while I firmly believe that it was an
ill-advised course that in the long run will prove to Japan’s
disadvantage, I have, nevertheless, been privileged to see enough of theJapanese point of view to realize the high sense of patriotism which
motivated those of her leaders who effected the conquest ofManchuria.48
Howard wrote in a letter to the president of the UP, Karl Bickel:[Koiso] confirmed in a most positive fashion, my growing impressionof the menace of Japanese militarism. . . . Without saying so in so many
words, Koiso made it manifest that Japan intends to write the program
for the shaping of Orient history from this time forward and that any
nation displeased with that program as written, will have to accept it orfight.49
On July 7, the day of Howard’s return to San Francisco, a second article
referring to the interview with the Japanese emperor was published innewspapers of the Scripps-Howard syndicate, urging improvement of US–
Japanese relations. The article also advocated a continued US naval buildup
and, at the same time, a revision of the anti-Japanese Immigration Act of1924 to improve Japanese feelings toward the United States.50 The Japan
Advertiser, an English-language newspaper in Japan, reprinted this article(fig. 2).51
After his interview with the emperor, Howard started a campaign topromote cordial US–Japanese relations, insisting that the emperor wasseeking America’s friendship. He decided to set aside concerns over
Manchukuo, even though he did not agree with the Japanese attitude toward
international law concerning Manchuria. Thus, he adopted two different
approaches simultaneously. While backing an increased US naval presence
to counter Japanese military activities in China, he also advocated forrevision of the Immigration Act to improve US relations with Japan.52
Howard was conscious of the need to contain Japanese military power, so he
was surprised that the editorial reaction of the Japanese press to hisstatement of July 7 was extremely favorable. From this response, he
concluded that the Japanese did not object to a further US naval buildup and,122    Yoshie Takamitsu

Figure 2. The Japan Advertiser, July 8, 1933

therefore, that they did not intend further aggression in China.53
What moved Howard to change his policy toward Japan? According to
Hirobe, one influence was Wallace M. Alexander, the Hawaiian-born
president of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, who was working
diligently in support of the pro-quota movement rather than exclusion forJapanese immigrants.54 That assessment is accurate, but Howard viewed theJapanese immigrant issue in conjunction with another political issue,
namely, strengthening the US naval presence to restrain Japan.
Howard’s Japanese connections, such as Shingoro Takaishi of the Osaka
Mainichi, also had an impact. Takaishi, born in 1878 and a graduate of Keio

Improving US–Japanese Relations through the News Media  123

University, joined the Osaka Mainichi in 1901. After further study in the
United Kingdom, he became director of the foreign news department andthen of the political department.55 Howard told Takaishi that he wasreturning to the United States with a new conception of the situation in the
Far East, which he would attempt to describe in such a way as to bring
Japan and the United States closer together. Howard urged Takaishi to workwith him in an intentional collaboration.56
Takaishi expected Howard to help in solving the Japanese immigrantproblem as part of this cooperation.57 Howard had this purpose in mind
when he met with President Roosevelt in September 1933 and encouraged
him to apply a quota to Japanese immigrants beginning in December.
Howard wrote to Grew on July 26 that the article of July 7 seemed to havebeen fairly well received and that he planned to visit Washington relatively
soon.58 His approach to the president was based on a Japanese agreement not
to engage in further aggression in China. Howard and the president talked
from 7:45 p.m. to 12:15 a.m. because Roosevelt wanted a full report on the
Far East. Whereas Roosevelt wanted to get the United States out of thePhilippines, Howard told him that an American withdrawal would lead toJapanese domination of the Pacific. During Roosevelt’s first term, Howard
was one of his most enthusiastic supporters, and the president invited him to
the White House again in 1934 and 1935.59 Although sharp disagreement
arose between them after Howard opposed Roosevelt’s proposed reform of
the Supreme Court in 1937, Roosevelt could not ignore Howard during his
tenure.60
Around the same time, Takaishi established a new administrative
organization at his paper. The Osaka Mainichi, with a circulation of morethan one million, was Japan’s second-largest newspaper in the 1930s, behind
only the Osaka Asahi. Until the Manchurian Incident, the Osaka Asahi
opposed the army, whereas the Osaka Mainichi supported the army with
Soho Tokutomi, an ultraconservative figure, serving as a senior adviser tothe newspaper. Hikoichi Motoyama, president of the Osaka Mainichi,
released to twenty-eight American newspapers a statement describing theManchurian Incident as a legitimate exercise of Japanese self-defense.61
Takaishi, who disliked Soho, established his dominant position at the Osaka
Mainichi by expelling Motosuke Kido, the successor to Motoyama, in
October 1933.62 Howard celebrated this change at the Osaka Mainichi andtold Takaishi that he was satisfied with it, believing that it could foster
improved US–Japanese relations.63
Howard, though by no means simply a Japanese tool, aimed to help in124    Yoshie Takamitsu

stabilizing US–Japanese relations by cooperating with his Japanese friends.
His shift in attitude was influenced by his judgment of the Far Eastern
situation. Howard initially supported the Stimson doctrine, but by early
1933, many American intellectuals, including Howard, began to doubt
whether the Stimson doctrine could bring a practical solution to the
Manchurian problem.64 He defined American interests in the Far East as
including the stabilization of US–Japanese relations and decided to put the
Manchukuo problem on hold for a while. The Japanese government’s use of
the opportunity to promote its international prestige by welcoming Howard
was a wise decision on the part of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, although
Howard’s interview with the emperor was not initially a Japanese project.
III. The Invitation to American Journalists to Visit Japan
Around late 1933, Howard changed his policy toward Japan and began topromote US–Japanese understanding through his news reporting and his
personal connection with the president. Meanwhile, he was also aware of thecreeping danger presented by the planned merger of Rengo and Dentsu,
which he considered undesirable for two reasons. First, with Japanese news
reports emanating largely from a single source, the media’s tendency tocome under government control would be intensified. Second, theconsolidated Japanese news organization might keep its contract with the AP
and cut off the UP. Howard was thus concerned for both his own businessinterests and freedom of the press. He also believed that this move would
damage US–Japanese relations because if UP lost its contract with Japan the
UP would lose interest in Japan.65
The merger of these two news agencies was initiated by Yukichi Iwanaga
of Rengo and supported by Japanese government officials who weredissatisfied with the difference between the two entities’ reporting.
Regarding the Manchurian Incident, Rengo and Dentsu often reported
differently. For example, Rengo projected that the Japanese Army would notbomb Chinchow (Jinzhou) in October 1931, whereas Dentsu indicated thatthe army could attack if necessary. Concerning the Japanese withdrawal
from the League of Nations, Rengo argued that Japan should not withdraw;
Dentsu insisted that it must withdraw. In both cases, Dentsu’s perspective
proved to be correct. It was argued that this situation had resulted from thetwo agencies’ dependence on different sources—Rengo on the Foreign
Ministry and Dentsu on the army. Hoshiro Mitsunaga, president of Dentsu,
was very dissatisfied with the proposed merger because Dentsu was healthyImproving US–Japanese Relations through the News Media  

125

and profitable whereas Rengo was heavily subsidized by the Foreign
Ministry.66
Howard shared Mitsunaga’s view on this issue. In 1934, Howard
cooperated with his Japanese connections in two media events aligned withhis desire to promote favorable US–Japanese relations: a visit to Japan byAmerican journalists and a roundtable press conference on the occasion of
Fumimaro Konoe’s visit to the United States.67 The former was associatedwith Mitsunaga’s efforts to avoid an undesirable merger and strengthen his
position with respect to the Japanese government.
Although Mitsunaga formally asked Howard on February 24, 1934, to
help with the arrangements to bring American journalists to Japan, the plan
had been discussed during Howard’s time in Japan the previous year.
Howard had already begun preparations, such as creating a list ofprospective journalists, before the formal request arrived.68
Shortly after Mitsunaga’s request, Eiji Amou made an importantdeclaration. On April 17, Amou, the director of the Japanese Foreign
Ministry’s Information Division, stated in a press conference that Japan had
a special responsibility for maintaining peace in Asia and opposed theextending of any foreign aid to China. This declaration, which has been
analyzed by many historians,69 deeply influenced public opinion all over theworld, especially in the United States. On May 21, Howard asked Mitsunaga
to postpone the proposed visit because of the unfavorable mood in the
United States following the Amou declaration.70 Howard forwarded a copyof this letter to Ambassador Grew on June 23.71
Mitsunaga, however, insisted on proceeding with the project. He believedthat the Amou declaration’s negative effect on US–Japanese relations madethe proposed visit to Japan by American journalists even more urgently
needed.72 He had already collected the funds,73 and that may have been one
reason why he wanted to continue with the project; but in addition, theJapanese, including Mitsunaga, were generally not sensitive to the impact of
the Amou declaration. The content of the declaration had already beenreleased by Rengo nine months earlier, on July 25, 1933: “The Japanese
Government must needs express their opposition to the Powers’ policy
assisting China in this manner. Should they maintain such attitude towards
China, the Japanese Government would be compelled to take suitablemeasures to prevent it.”74 This message and the lack of immediate reaction
to it indicate two important facts. First, the Japanese Foreign Ministry andRengo believed that their position on foreign assistance to China would bereadily accepted by foreign governments and the general global public

126    Yoshie Takamitsu

without serious objections. Second, Rengo’s earlier statement did not
provoke an adverse response as the Amou declaration would. That is anothersign that the Japanese Foreign Ministry network described in O’Connor’s
work was not sufficiently robust to influence global public opinion in the
mid-1930s.
Even after the Amou declaration grabbed the world’s attention, theJapanese media sources helping to carry out Japanese public diplomacy
continued to pursue their project. Konoe visited the United States from May
to July 1934 as originally planned, and Mitsunaga’s project with American
journalists continued as well. On June 28, the Osaka Mainichi with Konoe
held a press conference in New York, titled “Listening to American Public
Opinion,” with several journalists from UP and the Scripps-Howardsyndicate participating.75
Konoe’s visit complemented Ambassador Saito’s proposal for a US–Japan
joint resolution. Saito was in the second phase of his endeavors asambassador to the United States. His ultimate goal was to secure US
recognition of Manchukuo, but he took a gradual approach. Although he hadalready succeeded in his first stage, which resulted in an exchange of cordial
messages between the US secretary of state Cordell Hull and the Japanese
foreign minister Koki Hirota, promoting the official proposal for therecognition of Manchukuo was not easy. That was Konoe’s task as a private
envoy. However, most Americans who spoke with Konoe did not respondfavorably to the idea of recognizing Manchukuo, not even in private
exchanges.76
Mitsunaga pursued his project during Konoe’s visit to the United States.
On June 8, he and Sekizo Ueda of Dentsu sent a letter to Howard containing
a list of the twenty newspapers whose correspondents they intended to invite(table 1). They wanted to have all parts of the United States represented,
including journalists from Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Atlanta or
New Orleans. They were planning a stay of about three weeks for the group,of which seven to ten days would be devoted to an inspection trip to
Manchukuo. The Japanese press association, Nihon Shinbun Kyokai,
intended to cover all the trip’s expenses.77
Howard believed that it might be difficult to organize the precise
contingent that the Japanese wanted to attract because of the relatively
limited interest in the Far Eastern situation within the United States. He
believed that the objectives Mitsunaga and Ueda sought to achieve would bebetter advanced if the group were invited during cherry blossom season in
1935, rather than during chrysanthemum season in 1934, despite theImproving US–Japanese Relations through the News Media  

127

disarmament conference planned for 1935.78
Howard, nevertheless, actively cooperated with the project. He made his
own list of about thirty American journalists in response to Dentsu’s initiallist. Mitsunaga and Ueda could not have realized their plan without
Howard’s help. The Japanese wish list contained only the names ofnewspapers, not specific journalists to be invited. The Japanese principals
apparently lacked sufficient knowledge and personal connections todetermine exactly whom to invite. In contrast, Howard identified specificpeople who had influence over editorial boards or were interested in Japan.
Even when he was unable to recommend a particular name, he could offer
guidance on how to approach the paper. For example, he wrote thefollowing about the Los Angeles Times:
The Los Angeles Times is the outstanding conservative newspaper ofthe western United States, and its editorial expressions carryconsiderable weight with conservative people all over the UnitedStates. Mr. Norman Chandler, a young man in his early thirties, is the
son and potential successor of the present owner of the paper, Mr.
Harry Chandler. I am not certain that young Mr. Chandler would be
able to make the trip, but anyone he would nominate from his staff
would be a creditable representative.79
The final list of August 14 named fifteen members of the press, including
Edmund Gilligan of the New York Sun. Many candidates declined theinvitation, but Howard did the best he could in this challenging effort. The
group of American journalists sailed on the Chichibu Maru on September 4.
Howard accompanied the contingent to Honolulu, providing onboard
lectures on Japanese affairs, to give them a better picture of the Japanesestate of mind and the Japanese journalists’ sincere desire to learn from
American newspapers’ point of view. He desired earnestly to make thisproject more than a mere Japanese propaganda outreach to American
journalists.80
Despite these efforts, the Americans had rather gloomy hopes for the
project. Howard wrote to Mitsunaga that he was not fully satisfied with thegroup of participating journalists.81 Ambassador Grew did not expect muchfrom the exchange either. On September 19, the day after the American
journalists arrived at Yokohama, the US Embassy held a reception for them,as the Grews were planning a private trip to China that was to begin thatevening. Grew wrote in his diary:128    Yoshie Takamitsu
Table 1.
New York

New York

Washington, D.C.

6/8 Japanese list

7/5 Howard’s proposal

AmericanHerald Tribune
Sun
Times
World-Telegram
Evening Post

Unnable to determine name (American)
Ogden Reid (Herald Tribune)
William T. Dewart, Jr. or Keats Speed (Sun)
Arthur Sulzberger (Vice President, Times)
Marlen E. Pew (Times)
Reuben Maury or Fred D. Pasley (Daily News)
Henry R. Luce (Time)
Wm. Chenery (Collier’s Weekly)

Post
Star

Felix Morley (Post)
Oliver Owen Kuhn (Star)
Lowell Mellett (News)Hal O’Flaherty or Paul Scott Mowrer (Daily News)
Edward S. Beck (Tribune)

ChicagoIllinois

Daily News
TribuneSan Francisco

California

Chronicle

Los Angeles

California

Times

Norman Chandler (Times)

Philadelphia

Pennsylvania

Bulletin
Public Ledger

Robert MacLean (Bulletin)

BostonMassachusetts Christian Science Monitor Very recently the Editor died (Christian Science Monitor)
Post

SeattleWashington

Post Intelligencer
Times

Jamese G. Scripps (Star)

Baltimore

MarylandSun

John W. Owens or Hamilton Owen (Sun)AtlantaGeorgia

Constitution

Major John S. Cohen (Journal)

Portland

OregonPhillip Jackson or Donald Sterling (Journal)

Rochester

New YorkFrank E. Gannett (Times-Union)

St. Louis

Missouri

Elzey Roberts or Frank Taylor (Star)New Orleans

Texas

L. K. Nicholson (Times-Picayune)

Kansas City

KansasHenry J. Haekell or Roy Roberts (Star)

Des Moines

Iowa

Gardner Cowles, Jr (Register-Tribune)

NewarkNew Jersey

Arthur Sinnott (News)

Richmond

Virginia

John Stewart Bryan (News-Leader)

Detroit

Michigan

W. S. Gilmor (News)

Emporia

KansasMemphisTennessee

Honolulu

Hawaii
Washington

William N. Burkhardt (News)Improving US–Japanese Relations through the News Media  

final invitations

8/14 final acceptances

Grafton Wilcox (Herald Tribune)
Edmund Gilligan (Sun)
Arthur Sulzberger (Times)

Edmund Gilligan (Sun)Colonel Patterson (Daily News)
William Lydgate (Time)
Jim Scripps

William Lydgate (Time)

Eugen Meyers (Post)
Lowell Mollett (News)

Lowell Mollett (News)

Carroll Binder (Daily News)
Edward S. Beck (Tribune)

Carroll Binder (Daily News)

George T. Cameron (Chronicle)
William N. Burkhardt (News)

George T. Cameron (Chronicle)
William N. Burkhardt (News)

B. Millard (Times)

B. Millard (Times)

Robert MacLean (Bulletin)
J. Roscoe Drummond (Christian Science Monitor)

J. Roscoe Drummond (Christian Science Monitor)

Paul Patterson (Sun)
Major John S. Cohen (Journal)
Phillip L. Jackson (Portland Journal)

Phillip L. Jackson (Portland Journal)Frank E. Tripp (Times-Union)

Frank E. Tripp (Times-Union)

Elzey Roberts (St. Louis Star)

Elzey Roberts (St. Louis Star)

L. K. Nicholson (Times-Picayune)
Roy Roberts (Star)
Gardner Cowles, Jr (Register-Tribune)
Arthur J. Sinnott (Newark Evening News)

Arthur J. Sinnott (Newark Evening News)John Stewart Bryan (News-Leader)W. S. Gilmor (News)W. A. White
Georege T. Hammond (Commercial Appeal)

Georege T. Hammond (Commercial Appeal)

Lorrin P. Thurston (Honolulu Advertiser)

Lorrin P. Thurston (Honolulu Advertiser)

James T. Williams (Hearst)

James T. Williams (Hearst)129130    Yoshie Takamitsu

Their Japanese hosts, with singular tactlessness, will probably defeat
their own object in bringing the delegation over here. . . . Where they
make their big mistake lies in the fact that the whole two months
schedule is an appalling and unbroken round of sightseeing, luncheons,
receptions, banquets, and speeches, speeches, speeches, day in and dayout.82
As we have already seen, the Japanese side appears to have made an
inadequate effort to understand the American public, despite Howard’s
involvement. Before long, Howard became very critical of Amou, thedirector of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Information Division. Howardvisited Japan in fall 1935 and proposed an interview with Foreign Minister
Hirota, which he thought would go a long way toward improving theAmerican understanding of certain aspects of the Far Eastern situation.
According to Howard, Hirota and the vice minister, Mamoru Shigemitsu,
supported this proposal, but Amou’s opposition helped to defeat it. Howardwrote to Kensuke Horinouchi, director of the American bureau of theJapanese Foreign Ministry, that Amou appeared to have something closely
approaching genius when it came to misinterpreting American psychology
and the relationship between the American press and public.83 On anotheroccasion, Howard wrote directly to Amou that any lengthy discussion of thepoints Amou had raised would be futile, as it was obvious that Amou was
unable to take Howard’s understanding of American psychology seriously.
With regard to what type of article would best promote warmer Japanese–
American relations, Howard and Amou had a wide difference of opinion.84
Howard thought that both US leaders and the American public had arealistic sense of the international implications of the Manchurian situation.
Their perspective was not pro-Chinese or anti-Japanese. It was difficult forJapanese leaders, however, to acknowledge that US interests were focusedsolely on possible international repercussions and on the peace-preserving
efficacy of international instruments such as the Kellogg-Briand Pactrenouncing war, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Four-Power andNine-Power treaties proclaiming open door in China, and the Washington
Naval Treaty limiting naval construction. Howard found that Japaneseopinion had become a little more tolerant than in 1933. Amou had neverlistened to Howard’s explanations about American public opinion, however,and simply requested him to disseminate what the Japanese government
wanted said.85
After Amou left his post as director of the Information Division in April

Improving US–Japanese Relations through the News Media  131

1937, Howard attempted to participate in Sino–Japanese mediation in
November 1937 through Takaishi; Wang Chengting, who was the Chinese
ambassador to the United States and former foreign minister; Hu Shin, who
was a famous Chinese philosopher and future ambassador to the UnitedStates in 1938; and W. H. Donald, who was an adviser to Chang Kai-shek.
He also helped to arrange an interview between President Roosevelt andYoshitaro Kusuyama, a journalist at the Osaka Mainichi in May 1939. In thisinterview, Roosevelt told Kusuyama that Japan had won on the battlefield
but that it did not have enough power to continue the war. His opinion wasthat there was no need to intervene in the Sino–Japanese War because China
would have an advantage in a long, drawn-out conflict.86 At that time, it was
extraordinarily difficult to obtain an interview with President Roosevelt, andKusuyama could never have secured one without Howard’s help.
Conclusion
The Manchurian Incident was an explicit violation of international laws,
such as the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. However, theUnited States remained open to hearing Japan’s position. Roy W. Howard
tried to communicate the Japanese reasoning to the US public through his
publications and to influence President Roosevelt through his private
connections. Howard could have played a significant role in helping Japan to
improve its relations with the United States had the Japanese Foreign
Ministry more accurately understood his importance to Japanese public
diplomacy.
In this article, I have examined three key incidents in US–Japaneserelations concerning public diplomacy during the 1930s: Matsuoka’s visit to
the United States in 1933, Howard’s interview with the Japanese emperor in
1933, and the invitation for American journalists to visit Japan in 1934. The
first two interactions were initiated by Howard, whereas the last one was led
by Mitsunaga and Ueda of Dentsu. Among these, the most effective
Japanese public diplomacy took place surrounding Howard’s interview with
the Japanese emperor. In this case, even though the Japanese Foreign
Ministry simply responded favorably to Howard’s suggestion, theinteraction delivered to the American public a significant message ofJapanese hopes for improving US–Japanese relations. Howard’s timing was
also excellent because some Americans began to wonder whether theStimson doctrine could provide a practical solution to the Manchurian
problem.

132    Yoshie Takamitsu

When the Manchurian Incident happened, Howard supported the peacekeeping machinery of international law and opposed the US arms buildup.
Thus, he was critical of Japanese violations of the Nine-Power Treaty and
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, supporting the Stimson doctrine. Around late 1933,
however, he changed his policy toward Japan and began to promote
improved US–Japan understanding through Scripps-Howard news reporting
and through his personal connection with Roosevelt. He arrived at thisposition through his efforts to understand Japan. Howard was searching for ameans to stabilize the Far Eastern situation after he recognized that theStimson doctrine could not be effective in forcing Japan out of Manchuria.
Based on Matsuoka’s speeches in the United States and Howard’s own visit
to Japan in 1933, he reached the conclusion that Japan was not satisfied withthe status quo. He therefore sought to address this Japanese dissatisfaction
by explaining it to the American public and at the same time tried toalleviate Japanese aggression. In the first article about his interview with theJapanese emperor, Howard disseminated the Japanese message of promoting
cordial US–Japanese relations and the Japanese Open Door Policy regarding
Manchukuo. Then, in his second article, he expressed his sympathy withrevising the anti-Japanese Immigration Act while also insisting that theUnited States should build up its naval forces to counter potential Japanese
armed aggression.
The inadequate information policy of the Japanese Foreign Ministry
experts, however, obstructed effective cooperation with Howard after the
mid-1930s. The period examined in this article was a time of transition
during which the Japanese Foreign Ministry intensified its control of
information policy by establishing the Domei News Agency through amerger between Rengo and Dentsu. Howard anticipated that this merger ofJapanese news agencies would have a negative effect on world public
opinion because the impression of tighter governmental control of
information would cause the Japanese media to lose credibility. He told
Takaishi that “a merger of the two press associations would prove areactionary step fatal to the journalistic enterprise within Japan, anddepreciating and casting doubt and suspicion on even honest news ofJapanese enterprise and endeavor, when offered to the outside world.”87
Eiji Amou appears not to have been the best person to lead a public
diplomacy effort. He was so inflexible that he could not stop assuming a
unilateral stance. Thus, the relationship between Howard and Amou soon
became strained. Nancy Snow, associate professor of public diplomacy at
Syracuse University, has pointed out that public diplomacy beforeImproving US–Japanese Relations through the News Media  

133

September 11, 2001, “has been about governments talking to global publics
in support of national objectives and foreign policies.”88 As she suggested,
the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s information policy as represented by Amou
embodied a one-way exchange of information. Amou had not taken the timeto understand his audience when Howard tried to advise him about theAmerican public.
Howard’s Japanese connections were mostly with Dentsu, Rengo’scompetitor, and it lost its influence with the formation of Domei at the endof 1935. The establishment of Domei as a national news agency
representing Japan was a long-time goal of Yukichi Iwanaga, president of
Rengo. Tomoko Akami has analyzed Iwanaga’s role in these extended
efforts.89 Iwanaga, who initially joined the Kokusai news agency in 1921
and who became president of Rengo in 1926 and then of the Domei News
Agency in 1936, recognized that the credibility of a news source issignificant for communicating effective propaganda. Therefore, he believedthat news agencies should not be a government’s fully controlled
mouthpieces.90 Iwanaga’s success as president of Domei also entailed a lossof his former ideals regarding information policy. Influenced by the Foreign
Ministry’s policy of one-way information dissemination and by militarypressure, Domei soon became in effect a government mouthpiece.
Contrary to the general belief that Japan lacked a vigorous propaganda
effort, Japan engaged extensively in propaganda during this period, but it
was not effective because the consolidation of the news propaganda
enterprise resulted in a one-way approach to imparting information.
Notes
This work was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of
Science Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research(Kakenhi)numbers 26370756
and 15H03320.
1
E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (1939; repr., London: Papermac, 1991),
132–45.
2
Ian Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism (London: Kegan Paul International,
1993), 16–18.
3
Akio Tsuchida, “China’s ‘Public Diplomacy’ toward the United States before Pearl
Harbor,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 17, no. 1 (October 2010): 35–55. Key
Japanese unofficial contributors to their country’s diplomatic efforts, such as Yukichi
Iwanaga and Shigeharu Matsumoto, argued that Japan needed to counter Chinese
propaganda. Shigeharu Matsumoto, Shanhai Jidai (Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 1977), 52–57.
4
Peter O’Connor, The English-Language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918–1945(Leiden: Global Oriental, 2010), 72–73. Although the term “public diplomacy” was coined in134    Yoshie Takamitsu
1965 by Edmund Gullion, a retired US foreign service officer, Nicholas J. Cull has revealed
that Gullion used this as an alternative for the term “propaganda” because of the latter’s
negative connotations. I use the terms “public diplomacy” and “propaganda” as synonyms inthis article. Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy before Gullion” Routledge Handbook of
Public Diplomacy, ed. Nancy Snow and Phillip M. Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2009), 19.
5
Masayoshi Matsumura, Nichiro Senso to Kaneko Kentaro (Tokyo: Shinyusha, 1980) andPortsmouth eno Michi (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1987).
6
Tomoko Akami, Japan’s News Propaganda and Reuters News Empire in Northeast Asia,
1870–1934 (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters, 2012). Parallel with these developments inJapanese information policy, the Japanese Foreign Ministry began to establish its cultural
policy in the early 1920s. Young diplomats such as Kinichi Komura who were influenced by
US cultural diplomacy toward China proposed introducing a similar policy within Japanesediplomacy. Fumio Kumamoto, Taisenkannki no Chugoku Bunka Gaiko (Tokyo: Yoshikawa
Koubunkan, 2013), 44–58.
7
Teiji Yabe, Konoye Fumimaro, Jou (Tokyo: Koubundo, 1952), 90–91.
8
O’Connor, English-Language Press, 55–91. Teruo Ariyama has published three volumes
about Japanese news history and its empire, Joho Haken to Teikoku Nihon, vols. 1 (Kaitei
Keburu to Tushinsha no Tanjo), 2 (Tsushingijutsu no Kakudai to Sendensen), 3 (Higashi Azia
Denshinmou to Chousen Tsushin Shihai) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Koubunkan, 2013, 2013, 2016).
9
Shu Satomi, News Agency (Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 2000), 60–139. Ariyama, Joho Haken
to Teikoku Nihon, vol. 2, 313–51. Tomoko Akami, Soft Power of Japan’s Total War State: The
Board of Information and Domei News Agency in Foreign Policy, 1934–45, (Dordrecht:
Republic of Letters, 2014), 49–84. Atsushi Shibazaki, Kindainihon to Kokusai Bunka Kouryu,(Tokyo: Yushindo, 1999).
10
Shibazaki, Kindainihon, 40–48.
11
Therefore, most works concerning Domei focused on domestic control. Takesuke
Nishiyama, “Tsusinsha ni taisuru seifu no josei kin,” Media Shi Kenkyu 6 (May 1997): 69–87.
Shu Satomi, Shinbun Togo (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 2011).
12
Nishiyama, “Tsusinsha ni taisuru seifu no josei kin.” Junko Sato, “Manshukoku
Tsushinsha no Setsuritsu to Joho Seisaku,” Mediashikenkyu 9 (March 2000): 24–43; “Domei
Tsushinsha no Kaigai Johomou,” Mediashikenkyu 16 (April 2004): 74–91; and “Taigai
Hasshin no Jiyuka to Tsushinsha,” Mediashikenkyu 23 (2007): 61–75. Akami, News
Propaganda, 101–292. Akami, Soft Power. Ariyama, Joho Haken to Teikoku Nihon, vol.1,
319–86; vol. 2, 120–64, 352–95.
13
Patricia Beard, Newsmaker: Roy W. Howard, The Mastermind behind the Scripps-Howard
News Empire from the Gilded Age to the Atomic Age (Guilford, CT: Roman and Littlefield,2016), 1–20, 89–96.
14
Ibid., 149–57.
15
David J. Lu, Matsuoka Yousuke to Sono Jidai (Tokyo: TBS-Britannica, 1981). David J.
Lu, Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yosuke and the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880–
1946 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002).
16
Izumi Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice: Modifying the Exclusion Clause of
the 1924 Immigration Act (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
17
Beard, Newsmaker.
18
Teruo Ariyama, “Manshujihenki Nihon no Taibei Senden Katsudo,” in Nihon no Kokusai
Johou Hasshin, ed. Tokyo Keizai Daigaku Daigakuin Communication-gaku Kenkyuuka(Tokyo: Husou Syobou, 2004), 146–58.
19
Shigeki Mori, “Taiheiyou Senso Zenya no Taibei Gaikou to Yoron Kousaku,” Nihonshi
Kenkyu 559 (March 2009): 49–74.
20“Kikitori de Tsuzuru Shinbunshi: Takaishi Shingoro,” Bessatasu Shinbun Kenkyu 1Improving US–Japanese Relations through the News Media  

135(1975): 38.
21
Beard, Newsmaker, 97.
22“Kikitori de Tsuzuru Shinbunshi: Takaishi Shingoro,” 38.
23
Howard to Takaishi; Howard to Uyeda; Howard to Mitsunaga, 1933/6/23, box 86, Roy
Howard Papers, Library of Congress; hereafter, Roy Howard Papers.
24
Howard to Grew, 1933/7/26, box 86, Roy Howard Papers. Betty Houchin Winfield, FDR
and the News Media (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 85.
25
Eleanor Tupper, Japan in American Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan, 1937), 295–
97.
26
Lu, Matsuoka Yousuke, 137–38.
27
Lu, Agony of Choice, 91.
28
Takashi Itoh, Naiseishi Kenkyukai Sokkiroku: Yoshizawa Seijiro (Tokyo: Gendai Shiryo
Shuppan, 2008), 37. This is the record of an oral history project of the Naiseishi Kenkyukai
research group, completed in 1973.
29
Itoh, Yoshizawa Seijiro, 106–22. O’Connor, English-Language Press, 72–73. Matsumura,“Washington Kaigi to Nihon no Koho Gaiko,” Gaimusho Chosa Gappou (2002): 55–59.
30
The Carnegie Mission visited Japan in May 1929 and stayed for twenty-six days, after
which it continued on to Chosen for five days, Manchuria for twenty days, and China fortwenty-five days. The project sought to present a favorable impression of Japan incomparison to China and to exhibit Japan’s “civilized” and stable colonial governance.
Ariyama, “Manshujihenki Nihon,” 141–46. Somei Kobayashi, “Teikoku Nihon no Kouhou
Bunka Gaikou to Higashi Asia,” Intelligence 13 (March 2013): 30–44. According to Ariyama,
the planners of this project were Jotaro Yamamoto, president of the South Manchurian
Railway Company, and Shigeru Yoshida, vice minister of the Foreign Ministry. Although
Ariyama did not mention it, the main reason for this initiative was a media campaign topromote a conference planned by the Institute of Pacific Relations for fall 1929, with the
Manchurian problem as the primary agenda item. The initiative was certainly effective, andGeorge Blakeslee recognized that the American delegation attending the IPR conference thatfall was critical of China. Blakeslee to Hornbeck, 1929/12/05, box 30, Hornbeck Papers,
Hoover Institute Archives, Stanford University.
31
Lu, Matsuoka Yousuke, 151–56.
32
Matsuoka to Howard, 1933/4/13, box 86, Roy Howard Papers. Itoh, Naiseishi Kenkyukai
Sokkiroku: Yoshizawa Seijiro, 139.
33
Howard to Matsuoka, 1933/3/24, box 86, Roy Howard Papers.
34
Ibid.
35
Yoshie Takamitsu, “Prince Fumimaro Konoe and the Institute of Pacific Relations during
His Visit to the United States in 1934,” Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences [Chiba
University] 29 (September 2014): 10–11.
36
Howard to Matsuoka, 1933/3/29, box 86, Roy Howard Papers.
37
Howard to Mrs. Charles Laval, 1933/5/14, box 85, Roy Howard Papers. Itoh, Naiseishi
Kenkyukai Sokkiroku: Yoshizawa Seijiro, 139.
38
1933 Diary, 1933/6/22, book 65, Joseph Grew Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard
University; hereafter, Joseph Grew Papers.
39
JACAR (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records) Ref. B02030975200 (3rd picture),
1933/5/29, Muto to Uchida, Gaikoku Shinbunkisha, Tuushinin Kankei Zakken/Beikokuzin
no Bu (Miscellaneous Documents relating to Foreign News Reporters and Correspondents:
Americans), vol. 2 (A–3–5–0–2), Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
hereafter, Diplomatic Archives. Ariyama, “Manshujihenki Nihon,” 148.
40
Itoh, Naiseishi Kenkyukai Sokkiroku: Yoshizawa Seijiro, 139. Ariyama, “Manshujihenki
Nihon,” 148–49.

136    Yoshie Takamitsu
1933 Diary, 1933/6/22, book 65, Joseph Grew Papers.
Beard, Newsmaker, 167.
43
1933 Diary, 1933/6/22, book 65, Joseph Grew Papers.
44
JACAR Ref. B02030975300 (1st and 3rd picture), 1933/6/23, Wakasugi to Uchida,
Gaikoku Shinbunkisha, Tuushinin Kankei Zakken/Beikokuzin no Bu, vol. 2 (A–3–5–0–2),
Diplomatic Archives.
45
JACAR Ref. B02030975200 (22nd and 23rd pictures), 1933/6/23, Horinouchi to Uchida;(7th and 8th pictures), 1933/6/14, Muto to Uchida, Gaikoku Shinbunkisha, Tuushinin Kankei
Zakken/Beikokuzin no Bu, vol. 2 (A–3–5–0–2), Diplomatic Archives.
46
Ariyama, “Manshujihenki Nihon,” 150.
47
Howard to Suma, 1933/9/8, box 86, Roy Howard Papers.
48
Ibid.
49
Beard, Newsmaker, 165–75.
50
JACAR Ref. B02030975300 (16th and 17th pictures), 1933/7/8, Wakasugi to Uchida;(18th and 19th pictures), 1933/7/8, Debuchi to Uchida, Gaikoku Shinbunkisha, Tuushinin
Kankei Zakken/Beikokuzin no Bu, vol. 2 (A–3–5–0–2), Diplomatic Archives.
51
J.W.T. Mason to Howard, 1933/7/8, box 86, Roy Howard Papers.
52
Hirobe, Japanese Pride, 155, 173. Before the Manchurian Incident, Howard was
relatively favorable toward the Japanese cause regarding the immigration problem.
53
Howard to Nelson T. Johnson, 1933/7/31, box 85, Roy Howard Papers. Johnson, who was
US minister to China, wrote to Howard that he agreed with Howard’s statement. Johnson to
Howard, 1933/8/29, box 85.
54
Hirobe, Japanese Pride,173, 277n.
55“Kikitori de Tsuzuru Shinbunshi: Takaishi Shingoro,” 22–53.
56
Howard to Takaishi, 1933/6/23, box 86, Roy Howard Papers.
57
Howard to Vaughn, 1933/9/16, box 83, Roy Howard Papers.
58
Howard to Grew, 1933/7/26, box 86, Roy Howard Papers.
59
Beard, Newsmaker,176–79.
60
Ibid., 197–201. Winfield, FDR, 128–34.
61
Toshiyuki Maekawa, Taiheiyo Senso to Shinbun (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2007), 50–57, 65–79,
106.
62“Kikitori de Tsuzuru Shinbunshi: Takaishi Shingoro,” 43–47.
63
Takaishi to Howard, 1933/11/4 and Howard to Takaishi, 1933/12/8, box 86, Roy Howard
Papers.
64
Mason to Howard, 1933/7/8, box 86, Roy Howard Papers.
65
Howard to Horiguchi, 1933/12/27, box 86, Roy Howard Papers. Howard was sincere in
his belief in press freedom. He protested against the Chinese government on occasion such as
the attempted assassination of Wang Ching-wei. Howard to Madam Chiang, 1935/11/4 andHoward to Soong, 1935/11/6, box 108, Roy Howard Papers.
66
Satomi, News Agency, 71.
67
Takamitsu, “Prince Fumimaro Konoe.”
68
Mitsunaga to Howard, 1934/2/24 and Howard to Uyeda, 1934/4/2, box 97, Roy Howard
Papers.
69
Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933–1938 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1963), 46–99. Katsumi Usui, “Hirota Koki Ron,” International
Relations 33 (1967): 64. Toshikazu Inoue, Kiki no nakano Kyoutyou Gaikou (Tokyo:
Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1994), 107–42. Akami, Soft Power, 43–45.
70
Howard to Uyeda and Howard to Mitsunaga, 1934/5/21, box 97, Roy Howard Papers.
71
Grew to Secretary, 1934/6/23, 711.94/959, RG59, National Archives of the United States,
College Park, MD.
41
42

Improving US–Japanese Relations through the News Media  

137

Uyeda to Howard, 1934/6/8, box 97, Roy Howard Papers.
Marshall to Howard, 1934/6/25, box 95, Roy Howard Papers. Marshall wrote to Howard
about a donation from wealthy people that amounted to some 800,000 yen, but probably thiswas a misunderstanding. According to official Japanese documents, the total contribution was
120,000 yen. Amou asked for more assistance from other sources and obtained 40,000 yen
from the South Manchurian Railway Company, 30,000 yen each from the Mitsui and
Mitsubishi companies, and 10,000 yen each from the Foreign Ministry and War Ministry.
JACAR Ref. B02030999700 (15th picture), 1933/7/27, Gaikoku Shinbunkisha, Tuushinin
Kankei Zakken/Beikokuzin no Bu, Hounichi Koukan Kishadan Kankei, vol. 1 (A–3–5–0–2),
Diplomatic Archives.
74
Rengo Bulletin No. 1227, box 85, Roy Howard Papers.
75
Takamitsu, “Prince Fumimaro Konoe,” 9. Osaka Mainichi, 1934/6/30.
76
Takamitsu, “Prince Fumimaro Konoe,” 9–13.
77
Uyeda to Howard, 1934/6/8, box 97, Roy Howard Papers. Nihon Shinbun Kyokai was anationwide organization of newspapers, news agencies, and advertising organizations. It wasestablished in 1913, and Mitsunaga assumed the role of chief director in 1926. Dentsu 100
Nenshi Hensyu Iinkai, Dentsu 100 Nenshi (2001), 79.
78
Howard to Uyeda, 1934/7/5, box 97, Roy Howard Papers.
79
Ibid.
80
Howard to Mitsunaga, 1934/8/14, box 97; Howard to Marshall, 1934/9/4, box 97, Roy
Howard Papers.
81
Howard to Mitsunaga, 1934/11/27, box 97, Roy Howard Papers.
82
1934 Diary, 1934/9/19, book 72, Joseph Grew Papers.
83
Howard to Amau, 1935/1016 and Howard to Horinouchi, 1935/10/21, box 108, Roy
Howard Papers.
84
1935/10/21, Howard to Amau, box 108, Roy Howard Papers.
85
Mock Joya’s interview with Howard, October 1935, box 108, Roy Howard Papers.
86“Kikitori de Tsuzuru Shinbunshi: Kusuyama Yoshitaro,” Bessatsu Shinbun Kenkyu 14(1982): 32–37.
87
Howard to Takaishi, 1935/10/20, box 108, Roy Howard Papers.
88
Nancy Snow, “Rethinking Public Diplomacy,” in Routledge Handbook of Public
Diplomacy, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2009), 6.
89
Akami, News Propaganda, 143–292.
90
Yukichi Iwanaga, “Teikoku no Zenkeniin ni Taisuru Gojin no Kibou (September 1921),”in Iwanaga Yukichi kun (Tokyo: Iwanaga Yukich kun Denki Hensan Iinkai, 1941), 59–60.
7273