The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 11 (2000)

Reexamining the “American Century”

Hideyo NAGANUMAI
As the twentieth century comes to an end, we ﬁnd many books on thehistory of the century published, some of which are titled “American
Century.” They are written by American authors, and most of them do
not doubt the phrase itself, while I have reservations about using thisphrase. To the majority of American people it seems almost self-evident
that the twentieth century was the “American Century,” as America’s
economic strength has been preeminent and its military power incomparable. Japanese people usually accept the idea, some without serious
consideration, some others with reservation, though I do not ﬁnd any
serious studies on this theme in Japan. I do not think the phrase would
be universally accepted, and it would not be welcomed by most people
in Iran or Iraq. A reader of the Newsweek magazine in London, probably an Englishman, wrote to the editor that “it is arrogant to say, ‘It was
the American Century’.”1
The phrase, “American Century,” became famous after Henry Luceused the phrase in his editorial in the February 17, 1941 issue of Life,
when World War II had already entered the third year and the UnitedStates was preparing for the war. Luce boastfully declared this century
to be the “American Century,” since the United States was the dominant
Copyright © 2000 Hideyo Naganuma. All rights reserved. This work may be
used, with this notice included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of thiswork may be distributed, electronically or otherwise, in whole or in part, without
permission from the author.
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HIDEYO NAGANUMA

power in the world, because of its excellent industries and economy ingeneral and its superb system of freedom, justice, and democracy.
Though he did not mention its military power, I believe it was implicitly included in his idea.2
Luce’s opinion suggests that the concept of “American Century”
resembles the idea of “American hegemony.” This phrase is usuallyapplied to the American status and leadership in the world after WorldWar II. This idea is shared by many Americans, including SamuelHuntington and Immanuel Wallerstein, though they differ as to what canbe deduced from the idea and as to the period of this hegemony.
However, they both applied the idea to the postwar period, and did notextend it back to the ﬁrst half of this century. In this point, the phrase of“America’s Half-Century,” used by Thomas McCormick, sounds more
appropriate.3
In his book, The American Century, Donald White says that “TheAmerican Century overestimated the nature of unilateral power,” and“The United States was preeminent for only a moment of history.” Also
he writes that “The misrepresentations of a preeminent state in the world
reﬂected the unconscious bias of an American-centered worldview. Even
if unintentional, the bias was an error of balance and proportion, . . .
reproduced from . . . ethnocentrism.”4
The phrase, “Pax Americana” is also used almost synonymously with“American hegemony.” Oliver Zunz, author of Why the American
Century? says that the concepts of the “American Century” and the “PaxAmericana” are often conﬂated, and that the former concept is an ideological construction and the latter means its actual execution.5
For the time span of the “American Century,” there are some differences of opinions. Donald White writes that the “American Century” isan idea of American leadership as a preeminent power in the postwar
era, namely, a half century in reality. On the other hand, Richard Bulliet,
editor of The Columbia History of the 20th Century, says that “Historians
long maintained that the so-called American Century lasted from 1914.”
In the book titled The American Century, Harold Evans begins his narration from 1889, simply because that year is the beginning of America’s
second century.6

REEXAMINING THE “AMERICAN CENTURY”

7

II
With the above-mentioned understanding of the “American Century,”
I would like to reexamine the reality of America’s economic and military strength in this century compared with those of other leading countries. The United States was already the biggest industrialized country
in the world at the beginning of the century. Its gross national product(GNP) in 1900 was $18.7 billion, while that of the United Kingdom was$10 billion. The share of the former’s industrial production in the thenworld was 23.6 percent, ﬁve percent bigger than that of the latter.
However, American and British per capita GNPs were almost the sameat $246 and $243, and the index of industrial production of the former
was lower than that of the latter by thirty-one percent.7
These ﬁgures show that the United States was the biggest country economically, but it did not surpass other countries by much. Also, the country was not a great military power at that time. Paul Kennedy indicatesthe small size of America’s military personnel (96,000), which was
roughly one-tenth of Russia, one-seventh of France, one-sixth of theUnited Kingdom, and one-ﬁfth of Germany. It was even smaller thanthose of Italy and Japan. The warship tonnage of the United States thenwas 333,000 tons, after Britain, France, and Russia. These facts showthat the United States was not a major power in the military sphere in
1900. Hence, that year does not indicate the beginning of the “American
Century.”8
The focus is now being changed to the time of the outbreak of WorldWar I. The U.S. economy became far bigger than those of any other countries, and its GNP was three times that of the United Kingdom andGermany, and its per capita GNP ($407) was forty percent larger thanthat of Britain, and twice that of Germany. America’s share of industrial productions in the world was thirty-two percent, more than twice thoseof the United Kingdom and Germany. However, America’s industrial
structure was not so modern as that of Britain around 1910: 18.9 percentof the former’s national income came from the ﬁeld of agriculture, and27.5 percent from the secondary industries. On the other hand, the latter’s agriculture produced only six percent of its GNP, and the secondary
industries, thirty-eight percent.9
In the ﬁeld of the international economy, America’s share in world
trade was smaller than those of the United Kingdom and Germany. In

8

HIDEYO NAGANUMA1913 America’s amounts of trade were $4.28 billion, or eleven percent
of world trade, while Britain had seventeen percent and Germany, thirteen percent. The data of overseas investment also show the comparatively underdeveloped condition of the American economy. Its overseas
investment by that time was $3.5 billion, while foreign countries invested double the amount of money to the United States. It was, in reality,
not a creditor but a debtor country.10
The comparative status of American military power in this period
somewhat resembles its international economic position. The number of
its soldiers (164,000) was still only one-eighth of Russia, one-ﬁfth or
one-sixth of of France and Germany, one-third of the United Kingdom,
and a half of Italy and Japan. As for naval power, even though the UnitedStates increased its warship tonnage threefold into 985,000 tons, its comparative strength was still in third place after Britain and Germany.11
These economic and military statistics show that the United States
became one of the Great Powers before the outbreak of World War I, but
still was not the strongest. It is difﬁcult to say that the “American century” started in 1914, though it was probable that some American people thought that their country would be the strongest power in the near
future.
III
The situation changed dramatically after the end of World War I. After
America’s entry into the war, its economy was fully mobilized, andresulted in its GNP becoming twice that of the prewar year ($84 billion
in 1919). Its huge production brought a big increase of exports to Europe,
which means that the United States developed a huge trade surplus
against European countries. The trade was mainly paid by their credit to
the United States, resulted in the change of its international investment
position. The debt of $3.7 billion in 1914 turned into the credit of $3.6
billion ﬁve years later, excluding the ofﬁcial credit of $9.6 billion.12
In the military ﬁeld, America’s military manpower increased almost
twenty times from that of the prewar years (2.9 million in 1918), andmost of the troops were sent to Europe. As Soviet Russia left the stagein March, 1918, America’s contribution to the war effort, not only its
manpower but also its material such as airplanes and tanks, meant much.
These changes as well as Wilson’s efforts in concluding the Treaty of
Versailles elevated America’s status in the world.13

REEXAMINING THE “AMERICAN CENTURY”

9

During the 1920s the United States enjoyed strong economic development. After the short but severe postwar depression, the American
economy grew at an annual rate of six percent in the decade. Its GNP
during that period increased ﬁfty percent, and this development brought“mass-consumption society.” American people’s car ownershipincreased greatly to the number of twenty-seven million, which meant
one car per ﬁve persons. Ford Motor Company produced ﬁfteen millionof the famous Model T without changing its style, and its price was
reduced to one-third of the original. The Model T played the leading rolein popularizing automobile use in American society.14
The development of electriﬁcation also symbolized America’s
entrance into “mass-consumption society” ahead of other industrializedcountries. Almost seventy percent of households had electricity, andradios were used by one-third of families in 1929. Refrigerators, electricvacuum cleaners, washers, and other appliances were beginning to be
used in ordinary households. As a result, America’s per capita generation of electricity became two or three times bigger than that of European
countries.15
Furthermore, the United States became a top-class export country
alongside the United Kingdom by the end of the 1920s. Its exports
excluding re-exports were now bigger than those of the latter, and theshare in the world exports became sixteen percent, in imports, twelve
percent. America’s overseas investment also exceeded that of Britain in
the decade. The net investment of the United States totaled $8.9 billion,
more than twice that of Britain, though the accumulated long-term
investment of the former country (about $15 billion) was smaller thanthat of the latter one.16
From these facts I would say that the United States by 1929 was thestrongest power in the international economy, but not so in the politicalor diplomatic ﬁeld. Therefore, I still cannot say that the country was theﬁrst leading power of the world, nor declare that the “American Century”
was the reality in the 1920s.
On October 24, 1929, stock prices on the New York Stock Exchange
suddenly fell sharply and the Great Depression started. Next to the fallof stock prices, industrial production began to decline, and unemployment started to rise. This process continued until March, 1933, when the
Roosevelt Administration began a series of new policies called the New
Deal. Economic recovery did not come quickly, however, and the

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HIDEYO NAGANUMA

Depression continued until the end of the decade, when the Second
World War broke out.
Stock prices hit the bottom in the middle of 1932 for the United States,
the United Kingdom and Germany. America’s decline was the worst,
reaching one-sixth of the peak year, while that of Britain was only a half,
and Germany, one-fourth. Also, the indices of industrial production
reached the bottom in the same year for these countries. The unemployment rate in the United States was the second highest at 24.9 percent,after that of Germany.17
The ﬂuctuation of total economic activities from peak to bottom year
was worst in the United States: its GNP in 1933 was 69.5 percent that offour years before. Even at the bottom of the Depression, however, theAmerican economy in real size was still the largest: the country produced
thirty percent of the world production.18
At the end of the 1930s the United states recoverd from the Great
Depression. Its nominal GNP in 1939 was still smaller than that of ten
years before, though its real GNP was three percent greater ($209.4 billion in 1958 prices). Yet the per capita GNP ($1598) was four percent
smaller than a decade before. The index of industrial production was also
two points behind, and the number of unemployed persons totaled 9.84
million, or 17.2 percent, in that year. The United States had not fully
recovered at the end of the 1930s.19
Yet the United States was the largest in economy in those days. In real
dollar terms, its gross domestic product (GDP) in 1938 was $562.9 billion (1980 prices), three times that of the United Kingdom, and four times
that of Germany. In per capita base, America’s GDP was also the biggest($4314), twenty percent larger that of Britain, and 1.5 times that ofGermany.20
The United States also experienced a fairly complicated change in theﬁeld of the international economy. After the devaluation of the dollar
from $20.67 to $35 per ounce of gold in 1934, a large amount of gold
was poured into the country from abroad, almost one-half from theUnited Kingdom. At the end of the decade the United States held $17.8
billion, about seventy percent of the total gold reserve in the world.21
Such an inﬂow also occurred in the capital movement. During the period of recovery, the United States received $2.53 billion in long-term capital, which resulted in a huge decline of America’s balance; the balanceof long-term capital was only $4.5 billion, one-third that of 1929, andone-fourth that of Britain. As the United States had the net deﬁcit of $2.7

REEXAMINING THE “AMERICAN CENTURY”

11billion for short-term capital, the total balance being only $1.8 billion in
1939, a quarter of a decade before.22
Diplomatically the United States played a relatively small role in the
1930s. When Japan established the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932,
the United States declared the Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition, but
did not put real pressure on Japan. Three years later, when Nazi Germany
started rearmament, the United States enacted its ﬁrst Neutrality Act. In
the following years the international situation deteriorated more andmore, leading to the outbreak of World War II.
America’s military power in those days was fairly small in comparison to other countries and with its economic power. The number ofAmerican soldiers was only 533,000 including National Guards, while
those of Germany and Japan were over two million. Their aircraft production also indicates the difference. At the end of the decade the UnitedStates produced 5,856 aircraft, about one-half of the numbers producedby Germany and Japan combined. The expenditures for military use also
show the difference: the United States spent $1.13 billion for national
defense in 1938, one-ﬁfth of the amount spent by Germany and smaller
than that of Japan.23
However, the United States had the bigger potential power for war.
One study indicates that the country had 41.7 percent of the total war
potential of the world in 1937, almost three times larger than that ofGermany, and twelve times that of Japan. These differences are also
shown in the fact that the United States spent only 1.5 percent of its
national income for national defense, while Germany spent ﬁfteen times
more, and Japan, twenty-eight times more. The United States spent avery small part of its productive power, which meant that it had huge
potential to increase its defence efforts.24
It would be reasonable to say that the United States was not really thegreatest power of the world at the end of the 1930s, though having thepotential to be. The “American Century” was not the reality then.
IV
With the outbreak of World War II the United States began to realize
its huge potential of economic and military power. The expenditures formilitary activities multiplied almost eighty times in the war years ($81.6
billion in 1945, almost forty percent of the nation’s GNP). The production of military aircraft in 1944 (95,272) was more than forty times that

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HIDEYO NAGANUMA

of six years before. America’s aircraft production surpassed that ofGermany from 1940, and exceeded the total of the Axis countries in thefollowing year. In other words, the total American production of aircraft
reached to the level of 300,000, almost twice that of the latter countries.25
With production of other military supplies, the United States truly
became the “Arsenal of Democracy.” The Lend-Lease Act was enacted
in March, 1941, and the country began to offer munitions and other supplies to the Allies. Since this assistance took the form of exports,
America’s export amount reached $14.3 billion three years later (eighty
percent by the Lend-Lease Act), and the country became the biggest
country in the international trade. The payment for those exports under
the act was supposed to be made after the war ended, and the transaction
was made in the form of unilateral transfer by the government, totalling
almost $40 billion for the war years.26
As there was not much private international investment during the war
and ofﬁcial credit of $2 billion was given overseas, America’s accumulated amount of international investment reached $16.8 billion, whichsurpassed that of the United Kingdom for the ﬁrst time in history. On theother hand, considerable overseas capital was poured into the UnitedStates in order to take refuge from Europe, and it surpassed America’s
total overseas investment, which resulted in America’s becoming adebtor country in the amount of $200 million. Still the United States was
holding almost seventy percent of the gold in the world, which led to theadoption of the American dollar as the key currency in the conference
held at Bretton Woods in 1944.27
America’s huge economic size at that time might be shown in a comparison of the GNP of two countries. America’s GNP in 1945 was $155.9
billion (1938 prices), six times larger than that of the United Kingdom,
and the former’s per capita GNP was $1,114, more than twice that of thelatter. America’s economic superiority can be found in almost all aspects
in those days.28
The same was true in the military ﬁeld: the number of its soldiers multiplied almost forty times, reaching 12.1 million, one of the largest militaries in the world then. With its atomic bombs and other weapons,
America’s military power was the strongest. This fact means that the endof World War II is the start of the so-called “American hegemony” andthe “American Century”.29
The United States enjoyed its overwhelmingly strong status in theworld for about two decades after World War II, though its relative supe-

REEXAMINING THE “AMERICAN CENTURY”

13riority was gradually declining. After experiencing another post-war
depression for a few years, its economy indicated renewed growth when
the Korean War broke out. In the 1950s, America’s economic growthrate was 3.2 percent, a little higher than that of the United Kingdom. The
defeated countries, West Germany and Japan, began to recover from thebottom of their devastated economies and started speedier growth.30
Yet America’s economic superiority was being maintained, and its
size in 1960 ($511.7 billion) was six or seven times larger than that ofBritain and West Germany, and eleven times that of Japan. For the percapita GDP, America”s ﬁgure ($2,832) was twice that of major European
countries, and six times that of Japan. American people enjoyed an abundant life in comparison to other peoples, supposing the per capita ﬁgures
show the average level of living standard.31
With this economic superiority, the United States provided a hugeamount of economic and military assistance to many Western countries.
The Marshall Plan and the assistance related to several security treaties
totaled $78.6 billion by 1960, a half of which was economic grants, athird, military aid.32
In addition, the country invested overseas heavily in the post-war period. The amount totaled $39.6 billion, though a quarter of the investment
should be discounted, since it was credit given to foreign countries by
the government and counted as a part of assistance. The accumulated
investment in the same year was $67.8 billion, four times larger than thatof 1945, and the amount of long-term investment was 2.4 times larger
that of the United Kingdom, twelve times that of France, and ﬁfty-threetimes that of West Germany.33
These capital outﬂows by assistance and investment, however,brought the problem of “dollar anxiety” or “dollar crisis” around 1960.
As the dollar then was based on the standard of $35 per ounce of goldand supported by America’s huge gold reserves, other countries willingly received the dollar. During the course of time, its reserve assets
began to decrease, eventually declining to $19.4 billion, which was
almost equal to the total short-term debt in liquid form. Since the dollar
was the most reliable currency and most countries desired to keep it,
there was little real demand for repayment at that time, but it was theoretically possible that the United States could have been in the positionof bankruptcy.34
Yet its reserve assets then were far bigger than those of other countries. Also, it was the largest trading country in the world (exports, $19.7

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HIDEYO NAGANUMA

billion, imports, $14.7 billion), holding the share of sixteen percent andeleven percent. The country enjoyed a large trade surplus, which meantthat the balance of payments would be easily improved if foreign assistance and investment were reduced to certain amounts. In the same year
its unilateral transfer was the outﬂow of $2.3 billion, and the net balanceof capital movement was in the red at $2.9 billion.35
In the military aspect, America’s superiority also declined to a certain
degree as the monopoly of nuclear arms was lost because of the progressof the Soviet Union in that ﬁeld. The latter developed its ﬁrst atomic
bomb in 1949, and succeeded in developing hydrogen bombs four years
later, one year after the former’s success. However, the superiority inquality and quantity of America’s nuclear arms as well as aircraft andwarships was maintained in those days. It also deployed its military
power to many points surrounding the Soviet Union with the help ofmany security treaties. America’s military expenditures in 1960 were$45.3 billion, twenty percent more that of the latter, though the Soviet
data are difﬁcult to estimate and not so reliable.36
It is natural to say that America’s superiority in both economic andmilitary spheres was being maintained, and the “American Century” aswell as the “American hegemony” continued at that time.
V
With the beginning of the 1960s, the United States began to enjoy the“Kennedy economy” with a growth rate of 4.5 percent. Then, the country escalated the Vietnam War and kept its economic growth rate of ﬁve
percent until 1968. At the same time, the Johnson Administration madethe ambitious plan of the “Great Society” and the “War Against
Poverty.” The following Nixon administration reluctantly continued
these programs, and aggressively continued the war. American economic performance deteriorated to a low growth rate of 2.9 percent,while both the price index and unemployment rate rose to a level of ﬁve
percent in those days. In order to improve these conditions, theAdministration announced the “New Economic Policy” in August, 1971,
which stopped the convertibility of the dollar to gold.37
At the end of that year, the value of the dollar depreciated to $38 perounce of gold, and other major currencies appreciated. However, theﬂuctuation of currencies continued, and two years later, further devaluation of the dollar to the rate of $42.22 was decided with the simultane-

REEXAMINING THE “AMERICAN CENTURY”

15

ous adoption of the ﬂoating exchange rate system among major currencies. This decision brought the end of the “de facto dollar standard,” andled to the new “dollar-centered system” (my coinage), which naturally
reduced America’s status in the international economy to that of a strong
but not the sole holder of the key currency.
The necessity of changing the international currency exchange system
was based on the impossiblity of America’s debt payment. In 1973 thecountry held only $14.4 billion in reserve assets, while its debt in liquid
form was seven times larger, two-thirds of which were short-term loans.
Other currencies like the German mark and the Japanese yen were not
so strong as the American dollar, and holding reserve assets fully in gold
was already impossible and impractical at that time.38
In spite of these changes the dollar was well received by other countries, which is shown in the growth of America’s international investment in the 1960s. In 1973 its cumulative investment was $222.5 billion,
three times larger than that of 1960, while other countries also invested
in the United States to the amount of $174.9 billion. Its total direct investment was far bigger than those of other countries in the same year: it was$80.7 billion, eight or nine times larger than those of the United Kingdom
and Japan.39
America’s domestic economy continued to be the strongest in theworld. Its GDP in 1973 was $1,348.3 billion, three times larger than thoseof Japan and West Germany, ﬁve times that of France, and seven times
that of Britain. The per capita GDP of the United States ($6,363) also
exceeded those of other countries, though the difference with the otheradvanced capitalist countries was narrowed to the level of thirty to seventy percent.40
America’s top position in international trade was still being maintained, though its lead was rather small. Its share in world exports was
13.6 percent, just 0.7 percent greater than that of West Germany, while
America’s share in imports was 3.5 percent higher than Germany’s. The
actual amount of both exports and imports was about $70.8 billion, andits trade balance turned to the red in the 1970s for the ﬁrst time in thetwentieth century. Also the amount of both exports and imports reachedthe ﬁve percent line of GNP in 1973 for the ﬁrst time, which meant that
the American economy began to depend on international markets much
more than before.41
In the military ﬁeld, the superiority of the United States also declined
to a certain degree, as the Soviet Union started its armament reinforce-

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HIDEYO NAGANUMA

ment. One study says that the latter increased its military expenditures
after it suffered the humiliation of the Cuban Crisis in 1962, which surpassed that of the United States next year, and the trend continued in thesecond half of the 1960s. The difference grew wider, and in 1974 theSoviet Union spent $109 billion, twenty-eight percent more than the
United States. The Military Balance also says that America’s possessionof nuclear delivery missiles and bombers (2,213) was only sixty percentof the Soviet Union’s.42
Yet the overall military power of the former at that time exceeded thatof the latter, because the level of introducing electronics to the weaponssystem could not have been so high in the Soviet Union as in the UnitedStates. In addition, the military burden of the United States was lessened
with the conclusion of the cease-ﬁre agreement with North Vietnam in
1973.
Consequently, the situation of “American hegemony” and the“American Century” still continued at that time, though its strength wasconsiderably lower than it had been a decade before. In relation to thisjudgement, I would like to add the opinion of Immanuel Wallerstein, oneof the leading proponents of the concept of the “American hegemony.”He says that the period of the “American hegemony” is 1945–1990, themiddle of which, namely around 1970, is the peak and turning point, andthen is followed by a process of decline.43
The dozen years from 1973 were economically a period of heavy ﬂuctuation. A half year after the change of the currency exchange system,
the ﬁrst “oil shock” came with the start of the fourth Middle East War,and a terrible inﬂation followed. In 1979, with the outbreak of the Iranian
Revolution, the world had to experience another “oil shock,” which again
brought several more years of inﬂation and economic decline. The
United States experienced inﬂation of more than ten percent seven times,
four minus growth years, and eight years of over seven percent unemployment rates for within those dozen years.44
These ﬂuctuations brought some change in America’s status in theinternational economy. Nominally, the threefold growth of its economy
in that period was almost equivalent to that of Japan, and surpassed thoseof the major European countries, which means that the United States did
fairly well in the time of uncertainty. However, at a ﬁxed price level andexchange rate of 1990, the country achieved only 1.3 times growth during the same period, not so different from that of other countries.45
In 1985 the size of America’s GDP ($4048.2 billion) was still threeREEXAMINING THE “AMERICAN CENTURY”

17times larger than that of Japan, and six to nine times larger than those of
the major European countries. In other words, the American economy
was thirty-four percent larger than the total of Britain, France, Japan, andWest Germany combined. These differences of economy become smaller with the use of per capita ﬁgures. America’s per capita GDP in theyear was $16,976, 1.5 times larger than that of Japan, and about twice
larger than those of major European countries. The comparison made byusing the purchasing power price shows even smaller differences.
America’s ﬁgure was only forty percent larger than those of Japan andWest Germany, thirty percent more than France, and ﬁfty percent morethan Britain.46
The declining trend of American trade has continued since 1973, andits share a dozen years later was as follows: 12.1 percent of exports (1.5
percent decline), and 18.7 percent of imports (ﬁve percent increase). Yet
the United States kept its position as the largest trading country in theworld. The biggest problem for American trade was its huge deﬁcit: itjumped to $31.1 billion in 1977, more than three times that of the former year, and seven years later it increased to the huge amount of $112.5
billion.47
In addition to this undesirable trade situation, a much more dramaticchange happened in the capital investment. America’s net balance ofaccumulated investment turned to the red in 1985 after seven decades of
surplus. The cumulative overseas investment in that year totaled $950.3
billion, while the net investment showed a deﬁcit of $110.7 billion.
America’s international investment position went back to that of the preWorld War I years.48
Yet its international investment was still the largest in the world, andthe amount was ten percent larger than that of the United Kingdom, andtwice those of Japan and West Germany. America’s direct investment
totaled $229.7 billion in that year, twice that of Britain, four times thatof West Germany, and ﬁve times that of Japan.49
In the military ﬁeld, the United States probably regained its superiority over the Soviet Union. The Military Balance estimates that the former held 12,846 strategic nuclear warheads, about two thousand morethan the latter around 1985, though the same source says that the latterhad more carriers or systems (ICBM, SLBM, etc.): the United States held
1,910 carriers in total, about six hundred less than the Soviet Union. Also,
America’s military expenditures estimated by the same source were18

HIDEYO NAGANUMA$284.7 billion and exceeded those of the Soviet Union by $50 billion.
On the other hand, the estimates by an American government agency say
the reverse, namely the latter spent $9 billion more than the former($275.0 billion, $265.8 billion).50
From the above, it is possible to say that the superiority of the UnitedStates in the military and economic spheres was being maintained in the
middle of the 1980s. Consequently, the country was the strongest as awhole, and the “American hegemony” and the “American Century” still
continued at that time, though their meanings were a little different fromthose of the 1950s and 60s.
VI
In the dozen years after 1985, the American economy showed relatively mild ﬂuctuations in comparison to the preceding dozen years.
During the latter half of the 1980s the United States experienced a mild
annual growth rate of about three percent, and since 1992 it has been
showing a similar trend after suffering comparatively mild recessions in
the two preceding years. However, its performance has been sometimes
criticized as too small, and other times praised as the best. This variationin appraisal comes mainly according to the comparison of the economic performances with other industrialized countries, especially Japan,
since Japan made rather dramatic economic growth and decline.
Yet the American economy was the largest among the leading countries in 1996 as before, though its relative strength had declined to a certain degree. Its GDP was $7,388.1 billion, 1.6 times that of Japan, 3.1
times that of Germany. Another comparison of the ﬁgures, calculated by
the purchasing power price, may show the relative strength of each country better than the above-mentioned data. The results indicate the comparatively stronger economy of the United States as expected; namely
its GDP was 2.5 times that of Japan, 4.3 times that of Germany. The
American economy’s comparative strength declined only 8.4 percent
against Japan from 1985, and 3.5 percent against Germany.51
The ﬁgures reached by different scales show different aspects: the percapita GDP of the United States then was $27,821, which was thirty-one
percent smaller than that of Japan when calculated at the current
exchange rate, but, in reality, it was twenty percent larger by referringto the purchasing power price. The same things happen with the ﬁguresfor Germany. The American economy was still larger than many otherREEXAMINING THE “AMERICAN CENTURY”

19

leading countries in 1996 by the standard of purchasing power price.52
In the ﬁeld of the international economy, the United States gave asomewhat paradoxical performance. In spite of continuing huge deﬁcits
in trade, its volume of trade increased heavily, the result of which in 1997
was as follows: $689 billion in exports, and $899 billion in imports. Yet
these ﬁgures are larger than those of Germany and Japan. The hugedeﬁcits were somewhat compensated for by the surplus of service tradeand other items, and the balance of current accounts was a deﬁcit of $155
billion, a trend of which has been continuing since 1983.53
America’s international investment position also changed in theseyears. In 1997 its net position at market value was a deﬁcit of $1323 billion, while the direct investments showed a surplus. America’s direct
investment one year before was $87.8 billion, two to four times morethan other leading countries. Its remaining amount totaled $1535 billion,
three to six times more than other countries.54
The international situation in the 1990s has been changing very rapidly and severely, and it is now almost completely different from that offormer decades. One of the most radical changes was the abrupt collapseof the Soviet Union, which left the United States as the sole “super
power.” It is beyond question that the United States has unsurpassable
strength in the military ﬁeld. Its defense expenditure in 1997 was $273
billion, while that of Russia was less than one-fourth of that amount.
America’s soldiers totaled 1.45 million, while Russia’s number was
200,000 smaller.55
The United States and Russia probably have had a similar overall
capacity in strategic arms since 1991 with the start of START I. Though
the total number of missiles is a little smaller for the United States(ICBM, 680, SLBM, 432 in 1997) than Russia, the overall power mustbe at the same level as the precision and other capabilities of America’s
missiles are probably higher. Also the United States has more aircraft
carriers, and deploys military forces of 240,000 in many foreign countries; hence, America’s total military power cannot be surpassed by any
country.56
From these economic and military facts, it is easy to say that America’s
present status in the world has been elevated from that of 1985, whichmeans that the “American hegemony” did not disappear around 1990 as
Immanuel Wallerstein claimed, and the “American Century” has been
still continuing in the 1990s, but in a very limited sense.
Now the question is whether this “American hegemony” or the20

HIDEYO NAGANUMA“American Century” will continue in the twenty-ﬁrst century. Nobody
can predict the future with conﬁdence, as the world has been changing
rapidly and violently in recent years. At present, the American economy
is very strong in comparison to those of other countries, but its relative
strength has been declining for several decades.
Also, America’s military power is unsurpassable, and no other countries would dare to challenge it, while at the same time it is losing its
power of unilateral action, as was shown in the Gulf War and the recent
Kosovo incident. Even if the United States technically has the power of
performing unilateral action, this would not be permitted by the opinions of international society and of America’s own people.
It is true that the United States is the strongest country in the overall
sense, but this does not mean that the “American hegemony” and the“American Century” will continue forever. Possibly they will continue
for some more decades in a limited sense, but it seems unlikely that they
will continue throughout the twenty-ﬁrst century.
To support this prediction, a few citations may be appropriate. SamuelHuntington says that contemporary international politics is a strange
hybrid, a uni-multipolar system with one superpower and several major
powers. He continues as follows: “global politics. . . is now passing
through one or two uni-multipolar decades before it enters a truly multipolar 21st century.” Also, Paul Krugman says that “the U.S. economy[is] larger than that of any other country, and it [seems] likely to remain
so for at least several decades.” He ﬁnally says that “future historians
will not record that the 21st century belonged to the United States.”57
NOTES
The following publications are indicated by abbreviations.
Keizai Kikaku-cho, Sekai keizai hakusho, [The World Economy Survey] (Tokyo:
Ohkura-sho, 1980): SKH.
B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750–1970, abridged ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1978): EHS.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, National Accounts,
1960–1996 (Paris: OECD, 1998): NA.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to1970 (1975): HSUS.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States: SAUS.
U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President: ERP.
1
Michael Howard and William Roger Louis, The Oxford History of the TwentiethCentury (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), xxi; and Newsweek, Aug.16, 1999, 6.

REEXAMINING THE “AMERICAN CENTURY”

21

Henry Luce, “The American Century,” Life, February.17, 1941, 61–65.
Samuel Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, 78–2
(March/April, 1999), 35–49; Thomas J. McCormick, America’s Half-Century: UnitedStates Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1995); and Immanuel Wallerstein, After Liberalism (New York: New
Press, 1995).
4
Donald W. White, The American Century: The Rise and Decline of the United States
as a World Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 432, 437.
5
Oliver Zunz, Why the American Century? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1998), xi.
6Richard W. Bulliet, “Epilogue: The Twenty-ﬁrst Century,” in The Columbia Historyof the 20th Century, ed. Bulliet (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 558;
Harold Evans, The American Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998); and White,
op.cit., 427.
7Paul Bairoch, “International Industrialization Level from 1750 to 1980,” Journal of
European Economic History, 11–2 (Fall, 1982), 296; EHS, 416; and HSUS, 224.
8
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and
Military Conﬂict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), 203.
9
Bairoch, op.cit., 294, 296; EHS, 411, 416, 433; and HSUS, 224, 240.
10EHS, 304,307; HSUS, 884; Cleona Lewis, America’s Stake in International
Investments (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1938), 447; and William
Woodruff, Impact of Western Man (London: Macmillan, 1966), 150, 274, 313.
11
Kennedy, op.cit., 203. HSUS says that the number of American soldiers was
166,000.
12
HSUS, 224, 903, 906; Hal B. Lary and Associates, The United States in the World
Economy (1943, reprint, 1975), 122, 123; and Lewis, op.cit., 447.
13
HSUS, 1141.
14
HSUS, 8, 224, 226, 716; and Keith Sward, The Legend of Henry Ford (New York:Atheneum, 1968), 167.
15
HSUS, 8, 43, 821, 827.
16
EHS, 307; HSUS, 884; Lewis, op.cit., 451, 451, 606; United Nations, Departmentof Economic Affairs, International Capital Movements during the Inter-War Period(New York: U.N., 1945, reprint, Arno Press, 1978), 10; Woodruff, op.cit., 150, 151; andW.S. Woytinsky and E.S. Woytinsky, World Commerce and Government: Trends andOutlook (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955), 39.
17
EHS,64–69, 180, 181, HSUS, 135, 667; and Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in
Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 122–123.
18
HSUS, 224; Kennedy, op.cit., 299; and Angus Maddison, The World Economy(Paris: OECD, 1989), 113, 120, 121.
19
HSUS, 126, 224; and SAUS, 1940, 804.
20
Maddison, op.cit., 113, 128.
21
HSUS, 995; and Lary, op.cit., 134.
22
HSUS, 869; Lary, op.cit., 123, 124; Cleona Lewis, Debtor and Creditor Countries,
1938, 1944 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1944, 48–51, 61; and U.N.,
op.cit., 10–11.
23
HSUS, 768, 1115, 1141; Kennedy, op.cit., 296, 307, 324; and Yano Tsuneta
Kinenkai, ed., Suuji de miru Nihon no hyakunen [100 Years of Japan in Figures] (Tokyo:
Kokusei-sha, 1986), 379.
24
HSUS, 224, 1120; Setsujiro Irie and Tetsuo Takahashi, eds., Seiyo keizaishi [AWestern Economic History], vol.4 (Kyoto: Dobunkan, 1980), 115, 195; Kennedy,
op.cit., 332; and Tokyo Daigaku Shakaikagaku Kenkyuujo, ed., Nachi Keizai to Nyuu
2
3

22

HIDEYO NAGANUMA

Diiru [The Nazi Economy and the New Deal] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1979),
51–53.
25
HSUS, 224, 768, 1116; and Kennedy, op.cit., 354.
26
EHS, 307; HSUS, 866–867, 884; and SAUS, 1947, 913–914, 971. The exchange rateused here is one pound to $4.035 (the average of 1941–1945).
27
HSUS, 869, 995; and Woodruff, op.cit., 150.
28
EHS, 5, 8, 416; HSUS, 197, 224; Mitchell and Dean, op.cit., 6, 7; and SAUS, 1947,
971.
29
HSUS, 1141.
30
HSUS, 225; and Saiichi Miyazaki, Shigeji Okumura, and Kiriro Morita, eds., Kindai
kokusai-keizai yoran [A Handbook of the Modern International Economy] (Tokyo:
Tokyo University Press, 1981), 138.
31
NA, 142, 146.
32
HSUS, 872–875.
33
HSUS, 869, 995; and Woodruff, op.cit., 150.
34
ERP, 1970, 277, 282.
35
HSUS, 864, 866; Miyazaki, Okumura, and Morita, op.cit., 155, 156; and United
Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1963 (New York: U. N., 1963), 450–453, 548–552.
36
Kennedy, op.cit., 384.
37
HSUS, 135, 197, 227; SAUS, 1976, 355; and SAUS, 1986, 434, 470.
38
SAUS, 1974, 780.
39
HSUS, 869, 995; SAUS, 1980, 863; and Katsumi Yanai and Akihiko Ishizaki, eds.,
Gendai kokusai-keizai [The Contemporary International Economy] (Tokyo: Tokyo
University Press, 1984), 160.
40
NA, 142, 146.
41
SKH, 1980, 298–299; SAUS, 1976, 842–845; and SAUS, 1987, 416, 789.
42
Kennedy, op.cit., 384, 395.
43
Wallerstein, op.cit., 10.
44
ERP, 1999, Table B-3, 4, 42.
45NA, 138, 139, 142, 143.
46
Ibid., 143, 147, 163.
47
SKH, 1980, 298–299; and SKH, 1988, 237–238.
48
Survey of Current Business, June, 1988, 78.
49
SKH, 1988, 101; and Nihon Boeki Shinkokai (JETRO), Sekai to Nihon no kaigai
chokusetsu-toshi, 1988 [The Foreign Direct Investment of the World and Japan] (Tokyo:
JETRO, 1988), 1.
50International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1986/87 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 19, 32, 33, 222.
51
NA, 143, 163; and ERP, 1999, Table B-1.
52
NA, 147, 163; and ERP, 1999, Table B-31.
53
Nihon Boeki Shinkokai (JETRO), Sekai to Nihon no Boeki, 1998 [The Foreign Tradeof the World and Japan] (Tokyo: JETRO, 1998), 5.
54
Nihon Boeki Shinkokai (JETRO), Sekai to Nihon no kaigai chokusetsu-toshi, 1998
[The Foreign Direct Investment of the World and Japan] (Tokyo, JETRO, 1998),5, 501.
55
Military Balance, 1998/99, 295–297.
56
Ibid., 20, 27–29; and SAUS, 1998, 366.
57
Huntington, op.cit., 36, 37; and Paul Krugman, “America the Boastful,” Foreign
Affairs, 77–3 (May/June, 1998), 45.

REEXAMINING THE “AMERICAN CENTURY”

23

Table 1 Gross Domestic Product(billions of current US dollars and current exchange rates)
Year
United States
FranceGermanyJapan
United Kingdom

1960
511.70
60.90
80.82
44.47
72.40

1973
1,348.30
253.45384.84414.05181.491985
4,048.20
523.10696.54
1,343.25
457.07

1996
7,388.10
1,536.61
2,353.52
4,595.16
1,153.37

Source: OECD, National Accounts, 1960–1996 (1998), I-142–3.

Table 2 Gross Domestic Product(billions of current US dollars and current PPPs)
Year
United States
FranceGermanyJapan
United Kingdom

1973
1,348.3
243.3
320.5
429.5
237.8

1985
4,048.2
708.3
918.5
1,467.1
647.0

1996
7,388.1
1,198.6
1,736.1
2,924.5
1,095.5

Source: OECD, National Accounts, 1960–1996 (1998), I-162–3.

Table 3 Gross Domestic Product per head(current US dollars and current exchange rates)
Year
United States
FranceGermanyJapan
United Kingdom

1960
2,832
1,333
1,112
477
1,382

1973
6,363
4,863
4,874
3,811
4,267

1985
16,976
9,462
8,968
11,124
8,063

1996
27,821
26,32328,73836,50919,621

Source: OECD, National Accounts, 1960–1996 (1998), I-146–7.

Table 4 Gross Domestic Product per head(current US dollars and current PPPs)
Year
United States
FranceGermanyJapan
United Kingdom

1973
6,363
4,669
4,060
3,953
4,229

1985
16,976
12,811
11,826
12,15011,413

Source: OECD, National Accounts, 1960–1996 (1998), I-162–3.

1996
27,821
20,533
21,20023,235
18,636