Miya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.9.6 3:24 PM ページ 237

The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 15 (2004)

Little Tokyo Reconsidered: Transformationof Japanese American Community throughthe Early Redevelopment Projects
Miya SHICHINOHE SUGA*INTRODUCTION
In the early 1960s, Little Tokyo, one of the oldest Japanese American
communities in the mainland U.S., showed serious signs of decay. Manyof the buildings in Little Tokyo were built at the turn of the century anddevastated during the Second World War. In 1969, 32.6 percent of thetotal 138 buildings were categorized as “deﬁcient/rehabilitation questionable” and 43.5 percent as “structurally substandard.”1 Among 600 to
622 individuals and 41 families living there in 1969, those who were 62
or older composed more than 30 percent of the total population.2 Facedwith the expansion of the City Hall nearby, this area was about to lose
its function as a viable “ethnic community.” At this point, the people ofLittle Tokyo started to advocate its redevelopment and the Community
Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles (CRA) decided tolaunch the Little Tokyo Redevelopment project in 1970.3
Thus far, transformation of Japanese American ethnicity in the domestic context has attracted wide scholarly attention. On the resilience of theJapanese American “ethnic community,” Fugita and O’Brien stress thesigniﬁcance of “a formal organizational base—a critical factor in thepreservation of ethnic community life as individuals have moved from
Copyright © 2004 Miya Shichinohe Suga. All rights reserved. This work may be used,with this notice included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work may be
distributed, electronically or otherwise, in whole or in part, without permission from theauthor.
*Lecturer, Tokyo Gakugei University237

Miya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 238

238

MIYA SHICHINOHE SUGA

concentrated ethnic ghettos, sections of small towns and farming enclaves to predominantly white suburbs.”4 As Yasuko Takezawa has revealed, Japanese American ethnicity was re-articulated and reinforced
while being more Americanized in the redress/repatriation movement.5
In addition, Lon Kurashige explores the dynamics of intra-ethnic reconciliation and conﬂict within this community by tracing the transformation of the Nisei Week Annual Summer Festival. Kurashige asserts thatconﬂicts occurred where “ethnic orthodoxy concealed the opinions andexperiences of those who did not (or could not) conform to the leadership’s sanguine image of Japanese Americans.”6 He then examines thevoices of “internal others” such as “women, workers, radicals, and juvenile delinquents”7 in the intra-ethnic conﬂict.
On the other hand, recent historical studies have shed light on thetransnationalism of Japanese Americans. Refuting a polarized position
between Japan and the U.S., a more dynamic narrative has emerged. The
pre-war dualistic/transnational history-telling by Issei intellectuals ispresented as a strategy for survival under harsh social and legal discrimination.8 Masako Iino complicates the images of Japanese Americans’
all-out denial of “Japanese-ness” after WWII by drawing an example oftheir extensive contribution to assist war-devastated Japan.9 Albeit in different historical settings, these studies present a new perspective by
exploring Japanese Americans’ active and strategic involvement in U.S.Japan relations.
This paper will scrutinize the process of the Little Tokyo Redevelopment projects from the 1960s to the early 1980s.10 Little Tokyo redevelopment involved not only Japanese Americans, but also many Japanesebusiness people. With the inception of the projects, fear, misunderstanding and different interests among them made anti-Japanese protest
hover in this area in the 1970s. Hence, studies have depicted the Little
Tokyo redevelopment in its early phase as a contested arena of JapaneseAmericans versus Japanese corporations.11 Kurashige’s above-mentioned book gives a comprehensive, persuasive overview of Little Tokyo
redevelopment: “the phenomenal growth of foreign businesses in Little
Tokyo introduced new constituents to the Japanese American community and consequently restructured its indigenous power relations andethnic construction.”12 He devotes one chapter to examining conﬂicts of“nationalism” versus “internationalism” in the redevelopment process.
However, while admitting that redevelopment projects such as construction of the Japanese American Culture and Community Center (JACCC)

Miya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 239

LITTLE TOKYO RECONSIDERED

239“would not have been possible without Japanese money,”13 his description of conﬂicts in terms of “nationalism” versus “internationalism” or“community” versus “outsiders”/“foreigners” seems dichotomous anddoes not pay enough attention to efforts by the Nisei generation to reachout to Japanese businesses in trying to save Little Tokyo.
However, did the “anti-Japanese” sentiment really represent the voices of the “community”? Was the “community” totally against “outsiders”? Was the boundary of “community” versus “outsiders”/“foreigners”
clear and ﬁxed? To answer what the question of redevelopment meant
to Japanese Americans and how they reacted in the transnational context throughout the 1970s, this study aims to reveal the complexities ofthe process of Little Tokyo Redevelopment. It will examine both successful and controversial projects undertaken throughout the 1970s, andtheir impact on “ethnic resurgence.”14 Through an examination of antiJapanese sentiment and the diversiﬁed community response toward it,
this paper will shed light on the non-passive, strategic involvement ofvarious community members and explore how they rearticulated thefunctions and signiﬁcance of Little Tokyo.
THE LAUNCH OF THE REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT AND “SUCCESSFUL”
CASES
In the early 1960s, many Japanese Americans were doubtful about theredevelopment plan, posing questions like “Why do we need Little
Tokyo?” or “It’s an anachronism and the future is in the suburbs.”15 As
Gloria Uchida, long-time CRA ofﬁcer says, “there were 15 areas inSouthern California where Japanese Americans were concentrated.
[Moreover,] they didn’t interact with each other much.”16 However, others who felt the urgency of responding to the growing concern over the
eastward expansion of the Civic Center into Little Tokyo and the physical and economic blight of the area formed the Little Tokyo Redevelopment Association (LTRA). Believing that there was “a sentimental
attachment toward Little Tokyo as their natural and historical ‘hometown,’ ”17 the LTRA sought to bring Japanese Americans in the suburb
back to this area. Given the fact that the majority of those living in thisarea were 45 years or older, LTRA was also keenly aware of the everyday needs of “ethnic clientele” since Little Tokyo was in fact the “onlyplace . . . where all kinds of Japanese goods and services are available.”18
Emphasized also was the possibility of Little Tokyo’s becoming aMiya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 240

240

MIYA SHICHINOHE SUGA

“tourist attraction.” LTRA believed that “a thoughtfully designed community with a high quality oriental atmosphere in its architecture andlandscaping could be an asset to all of Southern California.”19 Thoughvery little happened during the next seven years, this redevelopment
blueprint remained thereafter: to attract both Japanese Americans inSouthern California and tourists and to facilitate Japanese services forthe people of this community.
In 1969, the Little Tokyo Community Development Advisory Committee (LTCDAC) was organized. The LTCDAC was the ofﬁcial citizens’ committee for the Little Tokyo redevelopment project, appointed
by the Mayor of the City of Los Angeles. Together with the CRA, theCommittee was expected to “act as a responsible, objective, and knowledgeable conductor of information from the CRA and the City to the people of the area, and vice versa.”20 The Committee endeavored to serve
as a “bridge” between community members and Japanese ﬁrms. In orderto fulﬁll this difﬁcult task, the 50-member committee held monthly
general meetings “supplemented by additional meetings of standing
subcommittees and task forces to discuss issues at hand.”21 Katsuyo
Kunitsugu, recalling those days said, “my husband [Kango Kunitsugu]
and I literally went to meeting after meeting every night.”22
The 67-acre Little Tokyo project was formally adopted by City Council on February 24, 1970. The CRA put projects into four categories:
housing, commercial, cultural/institutional, and special, and concrete
projects included the construction of housing units for residents of all
incomes, improvement of parking spaces and transportation, and development of commercial facilities. Nevertheless, as CRA itself announced,
the overriding goal for this redevelopment project was to “reconstructand preserve a comprehensive community which will continue to serveas the cultural, religious, social and commercial center of the JapaneseAmerican community in Southern California.”23 In sum, what wassought was a restoration of Little Tokyo’s various functions as a community for Japanese Americans.
At the time of the adoption of the Little Tokyo Redevelopment Projectin 1970, two speciﬁc and one general source of funds were identiﬁed.
The Neighborhood Development Program (NDP) along with conventional federal loans and grants were the ﬁrst speciﬁc sources. Tax increments generated by the project itself was the second. Due to theamendment of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,
which enlarged the rights of cities in pursuing CRA’s general goals, theMiya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 241

LITTLE TOKYO RECONSIDERED

241

NDP was replaced by the Housing and Community Development Block
Grant (CDBG) program in 1975. Since the ﬁnancial orientation waschanged, the budget for the development projects had been tightened,
being inﬂuenced more by the respective local governments. This alsomeant that CRA needed more “outside” money to implement the original blueprints. Thereafter, ﬁnancial difﬁculties delayed the constructionof some key projects, including Little Tokyo Towers, a 300-unit housing project for senior citizens. From around 1973, frustration among citizens began to surface primarily because they felt a “serious inadequacyof public information.”24
In 1975 the long-awaited Little Tokyo Towers was completed. In
1976, Higashi Honganji Temple returned to Little Tokyo.25 Among “cultural/institutional” projects in this ﬁrst phase, the JA Community Centerand the adjacent Japan-America Theater were largest in their original
development values. These were also the cases in which both local people and Japanese businesses collaborated, which led to a strengtheningof the cultural signiﬁcance of the community. These became “successful” projects in which Japanese involvement did not create major controversy.
The construction of the JA Community Center was completed in 1980
by Kajima International, a subsidiary of Kajima Construction Company.
The total budget of $12 million to build the center was raised from ﬁve
major sources: 1) the US Government through Housing and Urban Development funds (HUD); 2) American corporations and foundations; 3)
the Japanese government; 4) business under the aegis of the Keidanren(Japan Federation of Economic Organization); and 5) other sources inJapan and Japanese corporations in the United States.26 Among these,sources from Japan became the integral part.
JACCC Chairman of the Board Katsuma Mukaeda and President
George Doizaki received valuable support from Japanese Consul General of Los Angeles Yukio Takamastu for fund-raising trips to Japan.
Takamatsu not only “personally contacted Foreign Ministry ofﬁcials toconvince them of the need for the cultural/community center in Los
Angeles, but took every opportunity to introduce JACCC leaders to visiting ofﬁcials from Japan.”27 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs then contacted Keidanren as well as the Nihon Shoko Kaigisho (Japan Chamberof Commerce and Industry). Delighted by the news of an initial $50,000
donation by the Government of Japan, Mukaeda commented, “This is
the ofﬁcial Japanese government recognition of our efforts to build aMiya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 242

242

MIYA SHICHINOHE SUGA

‘Japan House’ of the West.”28 It was reported that the Foreign Ministry
endorsed the plans with high expectations that it would “contribute greatly to mutual understanding between Japan and the United States andwould promote greater cultural inter-change between the two nations.”29
George Doizaki was Kibei, an American-born citizen who had beentaken to Japan at an early age by his parents and did not return to theUnited States until he was 16 years old. He was “more comfortable expressing himself in Japanese than in English.”30 His background gave
him a great advantage in promoting the cultural center as an ideal “cultural bridge between the two nations.” Aside from $2 million generated
through the Redevelopment Agency, fund-raising efforts got $3 million
from American corporations and foundations. As for the contribution
from Japan, over $4 million was donated from 245 corporations.
Mukaeda and Doizaki continued their fund-raising trips to Japan, andgiven the CRA’s tight budgets, the Committee encouraged and endorsed
their efforts.31 The Japan America Theater, completed in 1982, was also
funded by hundreds of Japanese companies, organizations and individuals. Among the total budget of $6.4 million, the Japanese donation
amounted to $4.4 million, while $75,000 was from HUD and the restcame from local organizations. The successful fund-raising spearheadedby Mukaeda and Doizaki was clearly a case of joint efforts across national borders: it was continually negotiated through dialogue between theleaders of various American and Japanese organizations, including theJapan Foundation, the Koenkai (support group), and the JACCC.32
In this phase of Little Tokyo redevelopment, centered on the construction of the Community Center and Japan-America Theater, the considerable involvement of Japanese business and government did not
create sharp angry voices from the community. The Center became ahighly symbolic entity, which could serve people’s different hopes andinterests. As outlined in the initial blueprints of redevelopment, community members thought the Center would fulﬁll the Issei’s dream oftransmitting their culture to younger generations. A Japanese cultural
center in Little Tokyo was “one that the Issei immigrants from Japan had
cherished and dreamed about as they struggled to establish themselvesin the new land, where language and customs were so different from their
homeland.”33 In addition, many Nisei thought that a “cultural center wasnecessary” because they were concerned that “the younger generation ofJapanese Americans was getting farther and farther away from theirroots.”34 This comment symbolizes a hope for the resurgence ofMiya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 243

LITTLE TOKYO RECONSIDERED

243“Japanese American ethnicity” among younger generations through a“Japanese cultural center.” In other words, founders of the JA Community Center hoped that younger generations would be exposed more to
Japanese traditions and culture. Furthermore, the Center was expected
to serve as a “cultural bridge” between the U.S. and Japan. Faced with
the CRA’s tight budget, people like Doizaki, who was Kibei, played acrucial role as “cultural bridges” themselves by implementing fund-raising activities in Japan. It can be construed that founders of the Center
chose to be pragmatic in presenting it as a “Japan House of the West,”
knowing it would boost donations from Japan. In the end, although
Japanese Americans, the Japanese government, and Japanese businesses had somewhat different interests at stake in these redevelopment projects, each group’s interests were served by completion of the projects,
which thus became “successful” examples of Little Tokyo’s redevelopment.
SPURRING CONTROVERSY AND CONFLICT: THE CASE OF THE NEWOTANI HOTEL
As noted before, when the CRA’s ﬁnancial orientation changed in
1975, more community members became concerned that small businessmen would have problems if too many large companies came into
Little Tokyo. A concern over massive development and fear of “outsiders” was typically expressed as follows: “It would be almost impossible to continue business, especially for older people. They would justbe forced out.”35 The visible “outsider” in the early redevelopment phase
was Kajima International, which had built a 15-story structure in Little
Tokyo in 1960. Some thought the construction of this building was
intended to make “local people get their conﬁdence back” in the heart of
the “dying ghetto.”36
However, fears deepened and were transformed into mistrust as community activists interacted more with them. In 1973, they were upset by
the following comment by a public relations representative of Kajima
International: “Many of the local Japanese business people still operatewith a Meiji-Taisho business mentality. We must now instill the expanding business philosophy of today’s generation. So long as they live fearing the competition from large enterprises, the whole town must suffer
in this age of competition. . . . Besides, at this time, the reality is thatJapanese corporations have been hesitant to join in the redevelopment

Miya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 244

244

MIYA SHICHINOHE SUGA

of Little Tokyo.”37 A Honolulu-based Japanese business monthly magazine echoed this view that Little Tokyo “is an old, shabby place withan atmosphere far from the modern mammoth Tokyo. . . . It is after all,almost like an exhibition place for Japan in America; Japanese corporations and Government ought to assist in redevelopment by constructing
new buildings. Though Little Tokyo is said to be the largest Japanese
town overseas . . . all visitors from Japan ﬁnd the place rather humbling. . . [U]rgent moves are required to redevelop the area.”38 The involvement of Kajima and other Japanese corporations in the redevelopment
project was seen as a way for Japanese corporations to realize their imageof Japan’s expanding economy.
Many of the activists also felt that the philosophy of “survival of the
ﬁttest” that Japanese companies expressed did not appreciate the history of Japanese Americans. “Long and arduous struggles of our forefathers are about to be cast aside brutally by the proﬁt-seeking newcomers
from Japan.”39 According to the Little Tokyo Redevelopment Taskforce,“Issei people who have continually resided in Little Tokyo, once again,
are faced with the distinct possibility of mass evacuation without any
guarantee for acceptable resettlement in Little Tokyo. The encroachment
by both expanding government through a massive redevelopment of thewhole downtown area and expanding ﬁrms from Japan is threatening to
remove our heritage.”40
Naturally, the Kajima representative denied the fear of a takeover asfollows: “We don’t consider our involvement as a takeover of Little
Tokyo. This redevelopment is an effort of the local people. We are here
merely to assist [with] what’s not available locally. This is deﬁnitely nota takeover by Japanese capital. We are conﬁdent that the total will of thelocal community is accurately reﬂected in the present plans and redevelopment.”41 When asked about delayed citizen housing projects,
though, the same Kajima representative answered, “Their problem is not
ours. It is an issue that the Government (CRA) must resolve in accordance with the local needs and situation. We are really concerned to provide services that are beneﬁcial for both parties.”42 He denied Kajima’s
responsibility for the designing and executing process.
According to Joe S. Fukuhara, a Sansei businessman working forUnion Bank, what Kajima lacked was awareness as a member of the“community.”43 Fukuhara had been involved in the CRA projects
through the Union Church. When referring to the relationship between
the Japanese businesses and Japanese Americans, he said, “once theMiya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 245

LITTLE TOKYO RECONSIDERED

245

Japanese ﬁrms start their business, they have to be a part of the Little
Tokyo Business Association, and they are expected to take part in the
Nisei Week donation. In essence, the important thing in the relationshipis ‘When in Rome, do as the Romans do.’ ”44 Fukuhara recalled, “People
living here for a long time had pride because they built Little Tokyo, they
don’t like strangers (yosomono) to move in. Little Tokyo is a Japanese
town, and Japanese corporations may have a certain priority in this project, but those Japanese should know the rules (Kimari) of Little Tokyo.”45
In late 1976, mistrust and fear surfaced in a heated controversy overthe construction of the New Otani Hotel and Garden. To provide accessto the New Otani Hotel and its parking, the 62-room Sun Hotel and Sun
Building, which housed many Japanese American community and cultural ofﬁces, were scheduled for demolition. When the CRA originallypurchased the Sun Hotel, the majority of the residents were JapaneseAmericans, but since 1972, they had come to be replaced by Latinos.
The angry citizen’s group, Little Tokyo’s People’s Rights Organization(LTPRO), directed much of its anti-eviction campaign against the CRA
as well as the New Otani. The LTPRO, “backed by various community
groups, churches, student organizations and some residents of otherLittle Tokyo hotels,” asked the council for a “ ‘fair and just’ solution for
the remaining tenants of the Sun Hotel asking for assurance of adequate
relocation of the residents.”46
The LTPRO called on the redevelopment agency to stop all evictions
and to halt the “dispersal and destruction” of Little Tokyo. The Rafu
Shimpo of December 2, 1976, reported that Sun Hotel tenants “had noplace to relocate and living conditions in the hotel have steadily deteriorated. Many of the residents do not have hot water or adequate lighting.”47 In contrast, the CRA contended that only nine of the hotel
residents were eligible for Housing and Urban Development assistance,
federally funded relocation beneﬁts. According to the CRA, “tenants
must have resided in the hotel at least 90 days prior to the date of the
CRA’s ﬁrst offer to purchase the site.”48 In this case, when the CRA
bought the Sun Hotel and Sun Building, the agency ofﬁcials decided toallow tenants of the two structures to continue living or working there
until demolition time neared. The agency also contracted with the former owner of the Sun to run the hotel. Thus, tenants legally qualiﬁed forbeneﬁts must have resided in the hotel before May 1972.49 The Los
Angeles Times of January 18, 1977, reported that the issue in this casewas “whether 30 tenants, those still living in the old structure, will remainMiya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 246

246

MIYA SHICHINOHE SUGA

there or be forced out by Feb. 28, the target set by the CRA to take overthe four-story Sun Hotel.”50
While the LTPRO charged that the CRA was doing nothing about theeviction problem, Ed Helfeld, then CRA administrator, admitted that theissue was “both a moral and legal one,” and that they were trying to do
everything possible to relocate the Sun Hotel residents.51 The CRA infact hired a full-time staff, Bernardo Medina, who himself was a Latino,
to take care of the Sun residents who only spoke Spanish. According to
Helfeld, LTPRO’s charges about evictions were “unfair since we havebeen doing everything to avoid any kind of forced eviction, and putting
a moratorium on that would be unfair and unreasonable.”52 Angered by
the adverse publicity being created by the LTPRO, he accused them of“seeking to make political capital out of a situation that is not what they
say it is.”53
Indeed, younger activists presented the New Otani case and the demolition of the Sun Hotel and Sun Building as a minority issue, using therhetoric of racial/class oppression. In the case of the Sun Hotel, the residents were not of Japanese descent, but Latinos who worked in nearby
factories and Japanese, Chinese, and Mexican restaurants. At the sametime, activists also protested on behalf of Issei who would feel uneasy ifthey had to leave Little Tokyo. In fact, at that time there were still manyelderly Issei living in various hotels. It was repeatedly claimed that those
who were evacuated during WWII once again faced eviction from theirhome.
As younger activists stressed the symbolic historical signiﬁcance ofLittle Tokyo through the anti-redevelopment and anti-Japanese movement, they rediscovered Little Tokyo as an “indigenous base of JapaneseAmerican ethnicity”54 and realized the need to preserve their nationalroots while the Issei were still alive. They also became more consciousthat minority issues were not conﬁned to Japanese Americans. The discourse of the anti-redevelopment movement and the dichotomy of “community” versus “outsider” reinforced their consciousness of JapaneseAmerican ethnicity as a minority identity. As an embodiment of minority
issues within Little Tokyo, the dichotomy of “community” vs. “outsider”
symbolized the activists’ roots as a minority in America and underscoredthe ethnic signiﬁcance of the Issei’s history.

Miya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 247

LITTLE TOKYO RECONSIDERED

247

COMMUNITY DIVIDED AND RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPANESE
BUSINESSESIn the process of the anti-eviction movement by younger, mainly
Sansei activists, conﬂicts within the community surfaced. The Sansei
activists charged that the construction of the New Otani Hotel and Garden would turn Little Tokyo into a giant tourist trap. Labeling the New
Otani Hotel a symbol of “imperialist land-grabbers,” they showed up at
City Council with picket signs and leaﬂets, and published leaﬂets andnewsletters. On the other hand, most of the local business people favoredthe construction of the hotel. As Archie Miyatake commented, “the hotel
will generate more business for the small businessmen here, deﬁnitely
increase the foot trafﬁc. Just its being there will help the community.”55
In the midst of the anti-eviction campaign, as activists became more
visible and vocal, elders got “so angry, in fact, that they went public, athing they do not often do for they like to maintain a low proﬁle and workout their problems among themselves.”56 On Feb. 28, 1977, responding
to a demand by LTPRO, a public hearing was held before the City Council where representatives of both sides presented conﬂicting views on theredevelopment. From the elders’ side, Edward Matsuda, president of theJapanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC), spoke on behalf of JCC and the
Little Tokyo Businessmen’s Association. Matsuda read his statement asfollows: “If the CRA made an honest error of judgment in selecting thedeveloper of the Weller Triangle, LTPRO’s protest comes too little andtoo late. . . . Any attempt to turn the clock back may jeopardize theprogress of the entire Little Tokyo revitalization program.”57 Other members of Little Tokyo’s business community denounced younger activists’vocal protests as “a disgrace to the community.”58 For example, an article in the Los Angeles Times quoted an elderly shopkeeper as saying that“you can’t throw people out on the street. But these young people with
the LTPRO don’t understand. The only thing they have succeeded indoing is getting publicity. They haven’t helped the people at the Sun.”59
This shopkeeper added that, “what they don’t realize is that their noise
has actually caused other people, not in those in the Sun, to be deprivedof housing. But you can’t blame the CRA. At least this way, people aren’t
going to end up being evicted.”60 Howard Nishimura, who was the headof the LTCDAC, denounced the activist group, insisting that Sansei
activists did not represent the true feelings of the community. Nishimura,
who had been working as a certiﬁed public accountant in Little Tokyo

Miya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 248

248

MIYA SHICHINOHE SUGA

for ten years, was critical about Sansei activists. He said, “I have tried
to tell them they aren’t helping anybody, [and] that they could really offersome constructive criticism and input to the community. But they didn’t
listen.”61
Other Nisei elders or local business people were less angry, butnonetheless expressed their disagreement with the activists. Katsumi
Kunitsugu said, “It was much easier to raise protest papers [signs] and say‘big government is stepping on little guy’ and it just happened to be thatthe protest was very popular at that time. It was a way of life.”62 Harry
Honda, editor emeritus of the Paciﬁc Citizen and a long time witness ofLittle Tokyo’s transformation, also remained unsympathetic toward theanti-redevelopment movement and evaluated it as “a common problem
whenever you have redevelopment. If I were there, I don’t see it [moving out] as a sacriﬁce. It was just a relocation to other hotels or apartments. The CRA is not a hotel business.”63 Honda then added that“maybe there were some fears because they thought they might be takenover . . . [I]t was not a real fear, though, we Nisei experienced a real fear
before WWII.”64 Even Joe Fukuhara, a Sansei, admitted that “although
the process of the development might be somewhat problematic, I appreciate the redevelopment. Without the redevelopment, Little Tokyo wasembarrassing (hazukashii) to the Japanese Americans.”65
It can be argued that those who knew Little Tokyo was a “dying andembarrassing ghetto” and were deeply involved in the redevelopment
process chose a realistic option for the survival of the Japanese American
community. For that reason, business owners and other community
members thought the injection of “outside” expertise and money would
be needed anyway. Unlike the Sansei activists’ symbolic anti-eviction/
redevelopment campaign, they took a more practical standpoint towards
the inﬂux of Japanese resources. They hoped that an infusion of “Japan”
in various forms—money, culture, food, and people—would rejuvenate
the commercial and cultural functions of Little Tokyo.
Meanwhile, the New Otani and its developer, East-West Development, maintained a low proﬁle throughout the anti-eviction demonstration. East-West Development, a consortium of 30 Japan-based ﬁrms, wasformed in September 1973 with Kajima International Inc. One of theexecutives of the New Otani said that they would “try to blend the two
cultures, taking the best from both the Japanese and the American.”66
Thus, according to the New Otani, the “mixture of two cultures” was thebiggest feature of the hotel. However, it was clear that the hotel’s appear-Miya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 249

LITTLE TOKYO RECONSIDERED

249

ance was intended to be “international” rather than a “mixture of two
cultures.” It was reported that “personal touches are unmistakably
Japanese in origin, but the emphasis will be on the international,” andonly “three of the hotel’s 448 rooms” were Japanese style. This was donein order to “draw 70% of the hotel’s guests from the international market
and 30% from Japan, and to limit the hiring of Japanese employees to
one concierge and one corporate staff.”67 Located in the heart of Little
Tokyo, erasing “Japanese-ness” was regarded as somewhat odd, but the
New Otani chose to be ethnically neutral, or “international.”
In addition, the East-West Development president and manager of the
project stressed the “harmonious coexistence of local businesses withthose from Japan”68 to spur business in Little Tokyo. Another executiveof the East-West commented: “[W]e were pessimistic over the project.
The hotel business is very competitive and the area was not the mostdesirable.”69 An invitation to join the consortium was also extended toAmerican companies, but they did not accept because of the declining
business in Little Tokyo. As Kunitsugu recalls, the East-West “had a
hard time convincing twenty-four Japanese companies to invest funds todevelop a hotel there. There were local people who were interested intrying their hand at the development bid. [However,] they had no development background, no experience, which was a scary thing.”70
Kunitsugu’s sympathetic comment about Kajima was in line with thefollowing comment by East-West: “East-West does not expect to makea proﬁt on its investment for seven to ten years. . . . The Japanesecompanies look at the investment in Little Tokyo as a contribution. That
is why they will wait for a future return on the investment. But we’rerepresentative of large companies in Japan. People think of a takeoverof the Japanese American community, which is not our interest.”71
Kunitsugu thought the construction of the hotel “was sort of out of thegoodness of their hearts because they didn’t see much future for Little
Tokyo.”72 She continued, “There were some criticisms because the job
went to a Japanese company rather than [to] local people. But at the time,
it was probably a good decision because they wanted it built by people
with experience. And they have kept it up as a ﬁrst class hotel all theseyears whereas [the] track record of local people keeping up the building
has not been that good. . . . It is much easier to raise protest papers[signs]
and say ‘big government is stepping onto little guy’.”73
In the midst of the controversy, it was the LTCDAC which was indeed
caught between the East-West and the community activists. AsMiya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 250

250

MIYA SHICHINOHE SUGA

mentioned earlier, the Committee had to respond to the various interestsof the community members. Here, their primary role to “promote understanding by the CRA, the City, and the community itself, the general andspeciﬁc desires, hopes, interests, and needs of the property owners, residents, business and professional men and all persons affected directly
or indirectly by the Little Tokyo Redevelopment project,”74 faced themost difﬁcult challenge. Their efforts to serve as a “bridge” were directed ﬁrst toward the younger activists. At the meeting prior to the rally
before the City Council, Eddie Wong of the Little Tokyo People’s Rights
Organization announced their plan for the rally and asked the Committee
for support. The Committee decided that they could not support thedemands of the LTPRO. However, they agreed to pressure CRA to provide more support for the tenants of the Sun.75
The Committee also tried to put pressure on the East-West. To theEast-West, the delay because of “snarls in relocating businesses and tenants from the Sun” was nothing but a frustration. They did not hesitate
to complain: “We’re telling CRA that this is our last concession. Timeis money and this is costing us money.”76 While all the parties were frustrated and angered, the Committee was aware that practically the only
channel between activists and business representatives from Japan was
the Committee’s meetings. Article XXII of the Committee designatedthat “all LTCDAC meetings shall be open to the public,”77 but at ﬁrst
regular “guest” participants seldom included those from Japanese corporations. Later, on March 3, 1977, the Committee decided to “send a
letter of request to East-West Corporation to have an authorized representative attend further LTCDAC meetings.”78 Thereafter, representatives from the East-West showed up at the Committee meetings alongwith community members including LTPRO. The Committee thus tried
to treat Japanese businesses as part of the “community”.
Nonetheless, the LTCDAC’s efforts as a “bridge” between Japanese
corporations and younger activists were not always successful. Opportunities for direct communication were limited, and the Japanese businesses never fully transmitted the “goodness of their hearts” to theyounger activists. As Fukuhara recalled, many activists thought that theissues involved the decision-making process. He said: “When the city
began the projects’ design, they [young activists] weren’t against them”
and “the sentiment against Japanese business came after the decisionmaking process. They might have asked how and why the decision was
made.”79 He then added: “The attitudes must be different depending on

Miya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 251

LITTLE TOKYO RECONSIDERED

251

whether or not they live in the community. The city government planned
the projects and these companies only joined after plans were prepared.”
And the suspicion among the activists—“After all, Kajima does not livein this community”80—could not be easily diluted.
CONCLUSION
As exempliﬁed in this paper, in the early years of the redevelopment,
there were successful projects made possible by the efforts of both
Japanese Americans and Japanese. In order to save Little Tokyo, community members, mainly of the Nisei generation, took an active part in
the redevelopment process. Their efforts to have the Japanese government and businesses substantially involved in the early redevelopment
projects negates the conventional narrative of conﬂict between “outsiders” and the “community.” Although the fear of “Japanization” wascommonly heard, the Japanese American community showed diverse
interests and sentiments instead of being all-out hostile against “outsiders.”
This active involvement of the older generation reinforced the significance of Little Tokyo as both “Japan-town” and a “bridge between two
cultures.” Seeing Little Tokyo as a “dying ghetto,” they sought to revive
the community and rejuvenate Little Tokyo by injecting new waves ofJapan in various forms: money, culture and people. As Kurashige argues,
putting “economic power as the baseline for Japanese American ethnicity”81 was surely promoted by the City and Japanese business. At thesame time, it was also in accordance with Japanese Americans’ pragmatism to save Little Tokyo.
Therefore, Kurashige’s observation that “the wave of foreign investment associated with Little Tokyo redevelopment began to erode theindigenous base of Japanese American ethnicity” can be argued from adifferent perspective.82 With no massive immigration after World War
II, Little Tokyo redevelopment was a continuous process of rearticulating what kind of “indigenous” culture Little Tokyo possessed. It also
rearticulated the boundary of community and its members, who carryand transmit Japanese American culture. The early redevelopment process revealed that the minorities in Little Tokyo in fact included members
who were not Japanese Americans, people such as Latino residents andshin-Issei. In other words, in the midst of the larger structural change ofJapanese American ethnicity, various functions of the community—Miya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 252

252

MIYA SHICHINOHE SUGA

cultural, historical, institutional, and commercial—came to be transmitted not only through Japanese Americans but Japanese and other multiethnic groups.
The signs of this transformation were already seen in the early redevelopment projects of Little Tokyo. In due course, the redevelopment
projects became touchstones for Little Tokyo to transform itself, in theeyes of Japanese Americans, into a “cultural bridge in several directions—from generation to generation of our own community, from Japanto America and from our community to the U.S. culture at large.”83 In
this sense, Little Tokyo redevelopment facilitated the transformation ofJapanese American community by rearticulating “ethnic indigenousness” and the boundary of “internal others.”84 In the early phase of theredevelopment, this rearticulation occurred in the form of developing
Little Tokyo into a “Japan-town” while reconﬁrming it as a historic/symbolic homeland of Japanese Americans.
NOTES
1Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, Fact Book/Little
Tokyo, January 1970.
2
Ibid.
3
The redevelopment project was adopted by the Los Angeles City Council on
February 24, 1970 and ended on February 24, 2000. The CRA was established in 1948
under the California Urban Development Act. The responsibilities of the CRA included the “clearance of the slum area, rehabilitation of the blight, construction of the housing for low-middle class income holders, and promotion of the economic growth andjob opportunities.” Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles,
Pamphlet 10/6/86, June 1986. (In Japanese, translated by the author.)
4
Stephen S. Fugita and David O’Brien, Japanese American Ethnicity: The Persistence of Community (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1991), 184.
5
Yasuko Takezawa, Nikkei Amerikajin no Ethnicity: Kyoseishuyo to hoshoundo
niyoru hensen (The Transformation of Japanese American Ethnicity: The Effect ofInterment and Redress) (Tokyo: Univ. of Tokyo Press, 1994).
6
Lon Kurashige, Japanese American Celebration and Conﬂict: A History of Ethnic
Identity and Festival in Los Angeles, 1934–1990 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Universityof California Press, 2002), 6.
7
Ibid.
8
Teruko Kumei, Gaikokujin o meguru Shakaishi: Kindai America to Nihonjin Imin
(Social History of Foreigners: Japanese Immigrants and Modern Japan) (Tokyo:
Yuzankaku, 1995), 220–221; and Eiichiro Azuma, “The Politics of Transnational History
Making: Japanese Immigrants on the Western ‘Frontier,’ 1927–1941,” The Journal of
American History (March 2003): 1402–1405, 1429–1430.
9On Japanese American’s involvement in Licensed Agencies for Relief in America:
LARA project, see Masako Iino, Mou hitotsu no Nichibei-Kankeishi: Funso to kyocho
no naka no Nikkei Amerikajin (Another Japan-U.S. relation: Japanese Americans inMiya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 253

LITTLE TOKYO RECONSIDERED

253

conﬂicts and cooperation) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2000), 156–166. Iino presents the fact thatan organizing committee of LARA in NY included some Nisei members. Ibid., 163.
10
Using “Stress-Symbolization process” concept, geographer Sugiura discusses that
the Little Tokyo redevelopment was not a single, monolithic process, therefore should
be construed as cyclical and ﬂexible one. Tadashi Sugiura, “Bunka/shakai kukan no seisei henyo to symbol ka katei: Little Tokyo no kansatsu kara” (Sociocultural Space andSymbolization Process: A Case Study of Little Tokyo, Los Angeles) Geographical
Review of Japan, 71A, (December 1998): 905.
11
Steven Mori, “Little Tokyo Redevelopment; Who is it For?” (Student paper submitted to Asian American Studies Center, UCLA, 1970); Jim H. Matsuoka, “Little
Tokyo, Searching the Past and Analyzing the Future,” Amy Tachiki et al. eds., Roots:
An Asian American Reader (UCLA Asian American Studies Center, 1971), (see especially the discussion on the redevelopment and Japanese inﬂux, 329–334); and Candice
Ota, “Radical Awakening, Community Strength,” Nisei Week Festival Inc., 1990 Nisei
Week Japanese Festival 50th Anniversary 1934–1990 (Los Angeles: Nisei Week
Festival, Inc., 1990), 122–125. On Sansei’s activism in Little Tokyo redevelopment
through examining their principle of “national development,” see Tomoyasu Taketomo,
Little Tokyo Monogatari: Nikkei communist to sono shison tachi (Stories of Little Tokyo:
Nikkei Communists and their Descendents) (Osaka: Shiki Shobo, 1978), 190–229.
12Ibid., 205.
13
Kurashige, Japanese American, 193. For the demographic change including thenumber of the new immigrants from Japan in the post WWII Little Tokyo, see Ibid. 190.
14
The images of Little Tokyo with historical accounts are provided in Ichiro Mike
Murase, Little Tokyo-One Hundred Years in Pictures (Visual communication/Asian
American Studies Central), 1983. On community moral movements in the pre-WWII
Little Tokyo from a racial formation perspective, see Fuminori Minamikawa, “Ethnic
Town ni Okeru Jinshu Hensei: 1910 Nendaimatsu Los Angeles Nikkei Imin niiyoru
kyohu undo o chushin ni (Little Tokyo and Moral Reform Campaign in the Late 1910s),”
Studies of American History, No.26 (July 2003): 71–87.
15
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, Redevelopment
Project Report 1970–1980 (Los Angeles, CRA, 1980), 4.
16
Author’s interview with Gloria Uchida at CRA Little Tokyo Ofﬁce, 9 September
1993.
17
Little Tokyo Redevelopment Association, General Plan for Little Tokyo, 27 November 1963, 10.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Little Tokyo Community Development Advisory Committee, Purpose of the Little
Tokyo Community Development Advisory Committee, preface.
21
Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, Redevelopment
Project Biennial Report 1980–1990 (Los Angeles, CRA 1990), 12.
22Author’s interview with Katsumi Kunitsugu, at JACCC ofﬁce, September 9, 1993.
She served as one of the active members of the LTCDAC, and later became an executive secretary of the JACCC.
23
CRA, Pamphlet 10/6/86, June 1986, 12.
24
Little Tokyo Redevelopment Taskforce (LTRT), Little Tokyo Redevelopment,
August 1973, 2.
25
Other projects included: Union Church was moved in 1976. Japanese Village Plaza,a shopping center, built by the efforts of David Hyun, “local Korean” businessman wascompleted in 1978.

Miya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 254

254
26

MIYA SHICHINOHE SUGA

Japanese American Community Center, 10th Anniversary Commemorative Book,
1980–1990 (Los Angeles: JACCC, 1990), 8.
27
Rafu Shimpo, 23 December 1976.
28
Ibid.
29
Rafu Shimpo, 12 January 1977.
30
JACCC, 10th Anniversary Commemorative Book, 7.
31
LTCDAC, Minutes of Meeting, Thursday, 24 February 1977, 2.
32
JACCC, 10th Anniversary Commemorative Book, 91. The exact date of the creation
Koenkai is unknown. However, as of November 18, 1977, the motions had been madeto set up “a non-proﬁt organization in Japan to run the campaign of funds there.” LTCDAC, Minutes of Meeting, Thursday, 18 November 1976 2.
33
JACCC, 10th Anniversary Commemorative Book, preface.
34
Asian Week, 6 February, 1987.
35
Los Angeles Times, 6 March 1977.
36
Kajima Associates, Kajima Associates (Pamphlet), 1.
37
LTRT, Little Tokyo Redevelopment, 3.
38
Keizai Salon, Keizai Salon, Spring Special Issue, 1973.
39
LTRT, Little Tokyo Redevelopment, 6.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Author’s Interview with Joe S. Fukuhara at the Union Bank Little Tokyo Branch on
8 September 1993. (The interview was conducted in Japanese. In this paper, the authortranslated it into English.)
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
Nisei Week Festival Inc., 1990 Nisei Week Festival, 125.
47
Rafu Shimpo, 2 December 1976.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
Los Angeles Times, 18 January 1977.
51
Los Angeles Times, 27 February 1977.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Kurashige, Japanese American, 195.
55
Los Angeles Times, 6 March 1977.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
Los Angeles Times, 27 February 1977.
60
Ibid.
61
Los Angeles Times, 6 March 1977.
62
Interview with Kunitsugu.
63
Author’s Interview with Harry Honda at Paciﬁc Citizen Little Tokyo Ofﬁce, 9 September 1993.
64
Ibid.
65
Interview with Fukuhara.
66
Los Angeles Times, 6 March 1977.
67
Los Angeles Times, 27 February 1977.
68
Ibid.

Miya Suga(p237) 6/2 04.7.18 0:03 PM ページ 255

LITTLE TOKYO RECONSIDERED
69

255

Ibid.
Interview with Kunitsugu.
71
Los Angeles Times, 27 February 1977.
72
Interview with Kunitsugu.
73
Ibid.
74
LTCDAC, Purpose, preface.
75
LTCDAC, Minutes of Meeting, Thursday, 24 February 1977, 2.
76
Los Angeles Times, 6 March, 1977.
77
LTCDAC, Section 1, Article XXII of the LTCDAC BYLAWS, 6.
78
LTCDAC, Minutes of Meeting, Thursday, 3 March 1977, 2.
79Interview with Fukuhara.
80
Ibid.
81
Kurashige, Japanese American, 205.
82
Ibid, 195.
83
Los Angeles Times, 11 April 1983.
84
Closely related to the discussion of “internal others,” as the referees rightly suggested, further discussion of multi-ethnic/national relations in Little Tokyo, especiallyin the 1970s, should be explored. In writing this paper, I felt that a more articulate
description of “internal others” in Little Tokyo should especially include shin-Issei (thenew ﬁrst generation immigrants). Therefore, further examination of the involvement ofshin-Issei, Latino and other Asian workers in Little Tokyo redevelopment will be mynext research agenda.
70