The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 11 (2000)

The First Integrated Wave of Regionalism and
Democratization in the Americas: A Comparisonof NAFTA and MERCOSUR
Hiroshi MATSUSHITAINTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the 1980s, many Latin American countries haveentered the process of democratization or “redemocratization,” playing
a part in the third wave of democratization, as mentioned by Samuel P.
Huntington.1 But, in Latin America this was not the ﬁrst wave of democratization, because during the second half of the 1950s there was a movement toward democracy and by 1960 Paraguay was the only Latin
American country that remained under military rule. During that period
what was interesting from the present point of view is the fact that many
Latin American governments had intended to form some kind of regional economic integration, evidently inﬂuenced by the formation of the
EEC in 1958. The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) andthe Central American Common Market (CACM), both formed in 1961
and the Andes Common Market, formed in 1968, were all examples ofsuch a regional integration. This suggests that during the second half ofthe 1950s and in the decade of the 1960s, there was a considerable interest in a regional economic integration all over Latin America along withthe movement toward democracy.
What I should like to stress here is the fact that this concomitant
process of economic integration and democratization has been repeatedCopyright © 2000 Hiroshi Matsushita. All rights reserved. This work may be
used, with this notice included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of thiswork may be distributed, electronically or otherwise, in whole or in part, without
permission from the author.
25

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HIROSHI MATSUSHITA

during the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America. In fact, from the 1980s on
we have observed the rebirth of a keen interest in economic integration
all over Latin America, this time again partially inﬂuenced by theadvance of economic integration in Europe. If this new globally increasing interest in economic regionalism can be thought of as the ‘second
wave of regionalism,’2 following the ﬁrst wave that occurred in the
1950s, it is safe to say that the Latin American countries are now undergoing democratization together with the second wave of regionalism.
However, the relation between integration and democratization was
to some extent different in the ﬁrst and second waves. For example, whilein the ﬁrst wave there was no explicit connection between regionalismand democratization, in the second wave, the intention to connect these
two was much more evident. In other words, as Latin American leaders
intended to create a regional integration irrespective of the type of political regime in the ﬁrst wave, even a military government could participate in an integration program, as was the case of the Andean Pact. But,in the second wave, the relation between the two became clearer, or, inother words, there was a tendency to create an economic bloc only among
democratic countries. In this sense, we can say that an integrated waveof regionalism and democratization appeared in Latin America for theﬁrst time in the 1980s. This implies that the combination occurred almost
two decades later than in the EEC, which had begun to apply a democratic principle as a condition for membership in the 1960s, as shown in
its rejection of Spain’s entry in 1962.3
Accordingly, how did this combination in Latin America occur in the
1980s? And what are the prospects of democracy in this region, if one
takes into account this new combination of democracy and integration?
To analyze these questions, a comparison will made here between
NAFTA and MERCOSUR. There are several reasons for this. First ofall, it is needless to say that these two are much more important regional entities than others within the Western Hemisphere. Secondly, eachhas a different attitude toward democracy in the sense that while MERCOSUR acquired a clear-cut principle of democracy in 1996, which
rejects all forms of military rule by member countries, NAFTA avoided
such an explicit principle of democracy. Thirdly, there is a substantial
difference between the two types of economic integration, because
NAFTA is a free trade agreement, while MERCOSUR is practically acustoms union, although it won’t become a complete customs union until
2006.4 Accordingly, the question for us is if there is any relation between

THE FIRST INTEGRATED WAVE OF REGIONALISM

27

the types of integration and their effect on democracy. Or to be more precise, does a free trade agreement lead the member countries to avoid
interfering in political matters such as democracy? And conversely, does
a customs union type of agreement tend to intervene in the internal politics of other member countries? In our attempt to compare NAFTA and
MERCOSUR, this relationship between the type of integration and its
attitude toward democracy will be an important topic to be analyzed.
But, before entering the analysis, it is necessary to explain what ismeant by democracy. Obviously, it is not easy to deﬁne democracy
but here following Huntington we deﬁne it as procedural democracy.
According to Huntington, “the central procedure of democracy is theselection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they
govern.” For elections to be competitive there must be freedom of
expression and respect for human rights. So, Huntington understands “atwentieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its
most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which virtually all the adult population iseligible to vote.”5 Probably this deﬁnition tends to minimize the difference between a political system like that of Mexico, where no military
coup has occurred during several decades, though it maintains many
authoritarian characteristics, and a system like Argentina, where thearmed forces have often taken power by force since 1930. In other words,
such a deﬁnition tends to blur the difference between military rule anda civilian regime with authoritarian tendencies. However, in comparing
Mexico with the Southern Cone countries, Huntington’s deﬁnition isuseful, because it allows us to compare them with the same criteria of aprocedural democracy. Putting it in another way, although Mexico did
not experience military rule for such a long time, there was no substantial difference between Mexico and MERCOSUR countries at the levelof democracy. Given this situation, why was there a difference in regard
to democracy between NAFTA and MERCOSUR? One hypothesis of
this paper is that the type of integration scheme to some extent can
explain the difference in the degree of importance attached to democracy.
1.

Types of integration and their political effects

Since the ﬁrst wave of regionalism, several kinds of regional programs
have appeared in the world. For example, both a free trade agreement as
a program with a low level of integration and a political union with the

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HIROSHI MATSUSHITA

highest level of integration can be observed. According to Yoshinobu
Yamamoto, since the 1950s there has been a unilateral or new functional interpretation of regionalism, which traces the evolution of regionalism from a free trade agreement to customs union, common market,
economic alliance and political union.6 This unilateral evolutionarymodel was criticized in the 1970s because of the fact that European integration did not advance so smoothly at that time as this model had supposed.7 However this model seems useful for distinguishing a free trade
agreement from other integration schemes. According to this model, theﬁrst step for economic integration is a free trade agreement, in which
several countries of a certain region agree on the free transfer of goods,
under the condition that each country maintains its own external commercial barriers against extra-regional countries. But, one characteristicof a free trade agreement in the second wave of regionalism is that itallows the free transfer of capital from the beginning.8 Therefore, in thisarticle a free trade agreement includes a type of integration which permits not only free transfer of goods but also of capital. The second typeis a customs union, which is an agreement not only on the freedom totransfer goods among the member countries, like a free trade agreement,
but also includes a common external tariff against third countries. The
customs union tends to impose more severe constraints on member countries than a free trade agreement. The third type is a common market,
which is a more advanced regional system than a customs union in thesense that the former admits not only the external common tariff but also
the free transfer of capital and labor. In this stage, freedom of transfer
includes goods, capital and labor so that member countries intensify theircooperation on economic policy, forming an economic union. If this economic union progresses, it can be converted into a political union.9
Therefore, it is evident that there is a distance between a free trade
agreement on one hand and a customs union and a common market on
the other with respect to the level of institutionalization. Accordingly,
does the difference between a free trade agreement and a customs union
have any political implications?
Although it is not easy to establish any relation between the level ofintegration and its political implications, one can suppose that a more
institutionalized integration will have a more effective political inﬂuencethan a less institutionalized one. What Yamamoto shows using the four
ideal types of integration, as summarized in chart I, will help us to conﬁrm this hypothesis.

THE FIRST INTEGRATED WAVE OF REGIONALISM

Chart I.

1.

29

Levels of Integration and their characteristics

Anarchy(intergovernmentalism)

2. regime

Norms andrules to solvecommonproblems

Institutions togovern(organization)

Integration of
security andforeign policy

None

None

None

Yes

None

None

3. government

Yes

Yes

None

4. state

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yoshinobu Yamamoto, “Political Economy of Regional Integration: An Overview,” (in Japanese,)
Kokusai Mondai, No. 452 (November, 1997), p. 6

In this chart Yamamoto supposes four levels of integration or international cooperation. The lowest level of integration is inter-governmentalism, an example of which could be APEC at its initial stage.10 The
second type is a regime that has its own rule and norms concerning somespeciﬁc issues such as the environment. At a higher level than this is agovernment which can decide collectively regarding some speciﬁc problems and carry out those decisions. But unlike the common usage of theword, the government in this case can not exert any inﬂuence overdefense and diplomacy, according to Yamamoto. The fourth and themost complete integration is the state in which all the member countries
cooperate including with regard to the issues of defense and diplomacy.11
What matters for us in this chart is that to the extent that the level of integration rises, it tends to include not only norms and rules but also political elements such as organization and cooperation about security andforeign policy. It implies that the higher the level of integration, the morepolitical elements will be included in the agenda of integration.
Of course, this chart can not be applied to our analysis directly, because according to that chart, NAFTA and MERCOSUR belong to thesame category of regime. But as Yamamoto insists, even within the samelevel of the chart there are many kinds of institutionalization.12 Therefore
our hypothesis here is that the difference of institutionalization between
a customs union and a free trade agreement will have some political implications for democracy.
Surely an integration scheme may bring different inﬂuences to bearon the democracy of member countries. One inﬂuence will be an internal
effect within each country, which stimulates democratic values among

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HIROSHI MATSUSHITA

the people as a consequence of sharing the same democratic principles
with other member countries. Another type of inﬂuence will be a crossborder effect or interventionist effect, because as the integration itself
enhances the sprit of cooperation among member countries, it necessarily encourages them to intervene to protect democracy in other member
countries.
However, these kinds of political inﬂuences on democracy do notalways exist. As we pointed out before, the common market type of integration in the 1960s such as the CACM did not have any such effects.
One important reason for this failure was that there was no idea at thattime that the integration would be useful for democracy’s sake. In otherwords, whether the integration can have political effects on democracy
depends to some extent on the desires of the policy-makers or the people to stress the value of democracy.
Regarding the relation between the democratic thrust of the decisionmakers and the type of integration, it will be safe to say that a customs
union will have stronger political effects than a free trade agreement if
both share the same democratic idea. However, this does not imply thata free trade agreement will not have political effects. On the contrary, if
there is a clear-cut desire for democratic values, it will have politicaleffects as well.
All this means that to compare NAFTA and MERCOSUR with respect
to their democratic dimension it is also necessary to focus on the attitudes of policy-makers toward democracy, in addition to the type of integration.
2. NAFTA and its concerns regarding democracy in its formative
period1) NAFTA, Enterprise for the America’s Initiative and the exclusionof democratic principles from the negotiation agenda
The United States and Mexico ofﬁcially manifested their intentions toform a free trade area for the ﬁrst time on June 11, 1990, with the joint
declaration of President George Bush and President Carlos Salinas deGortari. More than two weeks later, on June 27, President Bush announced the Enterprise for the America’s Initiative (hereafter written as
EAI), which had several basic policies for the Western Hemisphere.
These were “(a) to build a stronger and more comprehensive economic
partnership in order to support the process of democratic change and economic liberalization in Latin America, (b) to foment free trade (withTHE FIRST INTEGRATED WAVE OF REGIONALISM

31

Mexico and later with all the Western countries). (c) to reduce external
debt of the Latin American countries to more manageable levels and (d)to support the preservation of the environment.”13
The fact that NAFTA was thus included as one of the main objectives
of EAI permits us to suppose that NAFTA was also inspired by the same
spirit as the EAI, especially, with respect to democracy. In effect, when
President Bush explained EAI, he exhibited his strong conﬁdence indemocracy as a consequence of the victory of the democratic world over
the Socialist world and he even expected Cuba’s return to the democratic world in the near future.14 In other words, NAFTA, from the beginning, was expected to contribute to democracy in Mexico and in Latin
America as well. Accordingly, how was this interest reﬂected in the
NAFTA negotiation?
The negotiation for NAFTA among the three countries began after
Canada had declared on February 5, 1991 her intention to participate in
the negotiation. It ﬁnished ofﬁcially on August 12, 1992 and the agreement for free trade was signed by the three governments on December
17, 1992.
During various periods of negotiation, the problem of democracy wasalmost completely set apart from the negotiation agenda, chieﬂy because
the Bush administration did not want to jeopardize the position of theSalinas government by referring to Mexico’s deﬁciencies in democracy.
The Mexican political system was notorious for the anti-democratic
practices of the ruling PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional), which
included violations of human rights, electoral fraud and suppression of
the freedom of the press. In other words, Mexico was far from the idealof democracy deﬁned by Huntington, as we noted. More than a few
criticized the Salinas government for these practices both within andoutside the county. In Mexico, opposition parties in particular began toattack the Salinas government soon after the intention to enter a new economic agreement with the US was known. As early as 1990, Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas, leader of the PRD (Partido de Revolución Democrática), criticized the Salinas government for its plan to rely on US ﬁnancing to modernize the Mexican economy. According to Cárdenas, “the economic
modernization that Mexico needs cannot be carried out without a thorough democratization of the country’s politics and society.”15 In short,the plan to create NAFTA encouraged an anti-PRI movement and one
Senator of the same PRD, Porﬁrio Muñoz Ledo, made a series of visits
to Washington to encourage opposition in the US Congress, meeting

32

HIROSHI MATSUSHITA

most notably with Congressmen Christopher Dodd and Robert
Torricelli.16 Under such conditions, it was wise for the Bush administration not to touch on the problem of the deﬁciency of Mexican democracy. In effect, President Bush in November, 1990 expressed his desire
to push forward with the Free Trade Agreement, declaring at the sametime that it was not the US intention to “export the democratic model of
the United States.’17 Also in 1990, Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs Bernard Aronson noted that “the negotiation agendaof the Free Trade Agreement had already been established and would
not address political issues.”18 The top ofﬁcials within the Salinas government, who were well aware of the attitude taken by the US, thoughtthat progress on democratization was of minimal concern for the US andthat it was by no means a prerequisite for economic integration.19 Also,
they were of the opinion that economic liberalization and political reform
were impossible to realize at the same time and that “political liberalization would have to wait till after economic goals had been taken” in
Mexico.20 In spite of the opposition raised by the PRD, the majority of
the Mexican people welcomed NAFTA, expecting better economic conditions, job increases and more opportunities to work in the US. Thisfacilitated the Salinas government’s decision to follow such a policy.21
In light of a virtually tacit agreement between the two countries on
democracy or the exclusion of democracy from the negotiation agenda,
it was inevitable that the treaty signed in December 1992 did not mention the word ‘democracy’ at all. This exclusion was partly the result of
the attitude of the two governments, and especially the Bush administration’s retreat from the original EAI plan to integrate free trade withdemocracy. But at the same time, the declining importance of democracy was probably reinforced by the negotiation process itself in which“rules are set and disputes are settled in an entirely anti-democratic fashion by unelected, unaccountable trade bureaucrats lobbied heavily byindustry interests.”22
However, at the legislative level in the United States, the deﬁciency
of democracy was severely attacked by many Congressmen. This debate
inserted a somewhat democratic spirit into the treaty.
2) The problem of democracy in the Congressional debates
In the United States, as early as autumn 1990, labor-led opposition, inparticular the AFL-CIO, began lobbying Congress against fast-track,“long before the pro-NAFTA coalition began its push.”23 The proNAFTA coalition was composed principally of business groups, andTHE FIRST INTEGRATED WAVE OF REGIONALISM

33

according to a survey, 72 percent of business executives supported
NAFTA after the agreement was signed.24 Although we will not enter
into the details of the internal politics of the United States concerning
NAFTA, the main issues were agriculture, low labor costs in Mexico,and the deterioration of the environment.25 The deﬁciency of democracy in Mexico was also one important topic, because it was related to the
problem of low labor costs in Mexico and its depressive effect on US
wages.
With respect to the deﬁciency of democracy in Mexico, there seemed
to be a consensus among US Congressmen. As some pointed out, theMexican people endured serious human rights violations including“abuses in a criminal justice system laced with corruption, electoral
fraud, and election related violence, harassment, intimidation, and evenviolence against independent journalists, human rights monitors, environmentalists, workers and indigenous people.”26 Taking into accountthese aspects, one Congressman stated, “Although President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari has opened the Mexican economy, Mexico remains
the most authoritarian state in Latin America outside of Cuba andPeru.”27
These statements show that there was severe criticism in the Congresswith regard to Mexico’s political system. Accordingly, should the US
enter into NAFTA with Mexico? A bitter battle developed concerning
this problem between NAFTA’s supporters and the opposition.
Some supporters in Congress were of the opinion that NAFTA would
improve the Mexican economic and political systems. It is true that there
were many Congressmen in favor of NAFTA who avoided the problemsof Mexican democracy, insisting only on the beneﬁts which NAFTA
would produce for the United States. For example, the possible increaseof export-led employment, which was calculated as 200,000 or 300,000
jobs, was frequently cited. But other Congressmen emphasized the merits of the agreement not only in terms of the beneﬁts toward Mexican
democracy but also in terms of positive effects on the other Latin
American countries as well.
One example was Senator Christopher J. Dodd, who understood
NAFTA as the “very ﬁrst step in the construction of a Western Hemisphere of democracy and prosperity.”28 Congresswoman Anna G. Eshoo
also stressed that “NAFTA makes sense for America. It allows us to dowhat we have always done best—export our products and our democratic principles.”29 On the other hand, some Congressmen stressed its

34

HIROSHI MATSUSHITA

importance for Mexican democracy, putting aside its effects on thewhole hemisphere. Another member of the House of Representatives,
Tim Hutchinson, pointed out that the rejection of NAFTA would “be akick in the teeth to the economic and political reforms that have occurredin Mexico.”30
These arguments all had two common defects in the sense that theyfailed to explain concretely not only how NAFTA would promote
democracy in the hemisphere but also how its rejection would deal a serious blow to political reforms in Mexico. However, these arguments
showed that some Congressmen had acquired a more interventionist attitude toward Mexico, stimulated by NAFTA as one of the political effects
of integration. We suggested that such an effect will depend to someextent not only on the type of integration but on the desire to impose
democratic values in the integration. NAFTA tells us that even a free
trade agreement can produce some interventionist effects from a country’s partners. In this case, the particular nature of the long-maintained
relationship of “dominance-dependence” between the US and Mexico
probably induced some Congressmen to take a more interventionist attitude.
Against the pro-NAFTA position, various objections were raised,
including opposition related to democracy. There were several types of
opposition. One type denied the democratizing effects of NAFTA and,on the contrary, emphasized the anti-democratic effect of the treaty. For
example, Congressman Marcy Kaptur criticized the agreement for its
lack of principles of democracy and its neglect of the need to establish
free elections in Mexico. According to Kaptur, that meant that thepresented agreement would not stop the abuses and electoral irregularities. 31 In short, as there was a contradiction between NAFTA and democratic principles, he urged his colleagues, “Vote ‘no’ on NAFTA. Votefor democracy-building and prosperity for ordinary people of this continent.”32
Another type of opposition stressed the deﬁciency of democracy in
Mexico as a factor which affected the interests of US labor. For example, some Congressmen pointed out that the deﬁciency of democracy
permitted abuses against labor rights to continue in Mexico. So NAFTA
remained a threat to American labor because the low labor costs in
Mexico, equivalent to one seventh of the US labor costs, would accelerate the US capital rush to Mexico, which, in turn, would diminish jobs
and impose lower wages on workers in the United States. Therefore,

THE FIRST INTEGRATED WAVE OF REGIONALISM

35

Kaptur insisted that the “effect of NAFTA—inhibiting justice andaccountability, preventing Mexican citizens from enjoying the protection of their own laws—will not only hurt Mexicans, but will place U.S.
citizens at a comparative disadvantage.”33
Another type of opposition was presented by Senator Ernest F.
Hollings, who was generally believed to be representing the interests ofthe textile sector, which was considered to be the most seriously affected among the US industries by NAFTA.34 The Senator proposed a plan
for a Common Market for the Americas to promote democracy in
Mexico, as an alternative to NAFTA.
According to Hollings, NAFTA was a kind of program based upon apurely economic approach like previous ones such as Franklin
Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for
Progress, and Reagan’s Caribbean Basin Initiative. These programs wereintended to “generate development that would build up a middle class,which in turn would develop democratic institution.”35 However, these
programs had failed to realize their original purposes. Therefore, political and social reforms should be made ﬁrst, to promote democracy, andto do so Hollings insisted on the necessity of creating a Common Market
for the Americas whose membership should be limited to countries
which could share “the basic principle of a democratic society.”36
Holling’s proposal is very important for us, because he recognized
clearly the difference between a common market and NAFTA withrespect to their respective political effects. In other words, he thoughtthat the purely economic-oriented NAFTA or similar projects would failto introduce changes to promote democracy in Mexico. But, his proposal was criticized for being too idealistic. As one Senator noted,
establishing an EU-styled integration scheme in the Americas was
unthinkable, because the US, which had suffered big ﬁscal deﬁcits at thattime, could not afford to assist the less developed countries as the EU
had done. Besides, many people in the US did not want the free transferof the labor force.37 Therefore, it was not surprising that his proposal was
rejected when ﬁnally NAFTA was ratiﬁed in November 1993, and
NAFTA did not include any democratic clause. The Clinton administration did not include any democratic clause in the treaty, though as it
had been put on a fast-track, it was impossible to modify it and his government only added the two side agreements on labor and the environment. Besides, Clinton, like the Bush administration, probably did notwant to raise the question of the deﬁciency of democracy with the Salinas

36

HIROSHI MATSUSHITA

administration in order to give more priority to the ratiﬁcation of thetreaty. In his speech to the Congress delivered just before the ratiﬁcation, Clinton stressed its importance to the US economy and the beneﬁts
of trade with Latin America. But, he referred to democracy only once,saying that “Our commitment to more free and fair world trade has
encouraged democracy and human rights in nations that trade with us.”38
In summary, given the deﬁciency of democracy in Mexico, the US
government toned down and eliminated the democratic thrust of its
approach initially included in NAFTA. The fact that it was a free trade
agreement and not a common market probably facilitated the exclusionof the democratic principle. Surely, the Congressional debate gave somedemocratic traits to the treaty, but before analyzing its political effects
we should like to examine MERCOSUR, principally concentrating on
the relation between the type of integration and the concept of democracy.
3.

MERCOSUR and democracy

1) PICEAB and democracy
In comparison with NAFTA, which has constantly remained a free
trade agreement, MERCOSUR was born as a result of the evolution of
the integration scheme from a free trade agreement to a more solid formof integration. The ﬁrst free trade agreement, which was later to be converted into MERCOSUR, was the PICEAB (Programa de Integración yCooperación Económica Argentina-Brasil), created in July 1986. Thisin turn was a product of the declaration announced by the presidents ofboth countries after their meeting held on November 30, 1985 in Pozode Iguazú, Brazil.
Before this, both countries had begun to talk about the possibility ofcloser economic cooperation, around 1980, when the LAFTA was replaced by the ALADI (la Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración).
Although there was not much difference between the two schemes, thelatter permitted the member countries to negotiate partial agreements.
This meant that “a pair of countries could negotiate reciprocal preferential access to domestic markets without implying any obligation to granta similar preference to other countries.”39 In short, the inclusion of thisnew provision made it easier for both countries to enter into a negotiation for economic cooperation. In fact, some negotiations for economic
cooperation between Brazil and Argentina had begun before 1985. It is
worth pointing out, therefore, that the second wave of integration inTHE FIRST INTEGRATED WAVE OF REGIONALISM

37

South America had already begun under military rule. Surely it is truethat the process of integration was much more accelerated after the
democratization that took place in Argentina in December 1983 andBrazil in March 1985. The meeting held in Pozo de Iguazú between Raúl
Alfonsín of Argentina and José Sarney of Brazil became to some extent
possible because of the democratization of both countries. On that occasion, the two presidents not only agreed to cooperate on debt problems
but also promised to promote the integration of Latin America. They also
pointed out the importance of democracy, indicating that the process of
democratization in the continent should lead to much more integration
among the people of the region.40 To realize these objectives, both presidents agreed to establish a commission to draft a plan for integration
between the two countries. The commission, presided over by theForeign Ministers and the business representatives of the two countries,
prepared an act (el Acta para Integración Argentine-Brasileña) which
was signed by both Presidents on July 29, 1986, thus ofﬁcially launching the program of integration (PICEAB). PICEAB had a clause whichstated that “this program constitutes a renewed impulse for the integration of Latin America and the consolidation of peace, democracy security and development of the region.”41 Thus, PICEAB became the ﬁrst
integration scheme with an explicitly democratic objective in Latin
America. The question then is how this combination was possible.
The most important factor was that both presidents of the two countries, which had recently restored democracy, shared a strong willingness to defend democratic principles. At the same time, both countries
had serious debt problems, which prompted them to cooperate in theirnegotiations with creditors. Such a situation led the two presidents tothink of a new cooperation scheme not only for economic purposes but
also for democracy. In other words, they wanted a bilateral mechanism
to strengthen democracy or even to prevent another military coupd’état.42 Or we can say that in the decade of the 1980s there was a situation in the Southern Cone countries to which ‘the democratic integration theory’ can be applied as an analogy of the “democratic peace.”43
However, it is to be noted that the democratic thrust in PICEAB was also
encouraged by the initiatives of the presidents, as were the EAI and theoriginal NAFTA.
Besides, in light of our hypothesis that a more institutionalized schemeof integration will have more political effects, it is worth pointing outthat PICEAB was not a simple free trade agreement, for it was intended

38

HIROSHI MATSUSHITA

to establish a common “preferential treatment against third countries,”
and to harmonize the economic policies of both countries, especiallyconcerning industrial sectors, which would mean a kind of customs
union.44 Therefore, it is safe to say that PICEAB was an integration program much more ambitious than a free trade agreement such as NAFTA,
and that it was also expected to play a political role as a defender of
democracy.
2) From the treaty of integration to MERCOSUR and the gradualdisappearance of a democratic principle
Although the PICEAB was very important from a political point ofview, it was a failure for Argentina from an economic point of view.
While Brazilian exports to Argentina increased from 617 million dollars
to 819 million between 1985 and 1987, Argentine exports merely increased from 496 to 539 million dollars during the same period.45 As thiscommercial imbalance increased, Argentina’s complaints rose and a newtreaty was signed on November 29 to remedy the imbalance between thetwo countries.
This treaty, which was the Treaty of Integration, went further topromote integration, proposing a more ambitious plan of integration
between the two countries. First of all, the treaty declared more explicitly the goal of realizing a common market within 10 years. In otherwords, it sought to eliminate all tariff and non-tariff barriers within 10
years. Secondly, the structure of the Executive Commission was modiﬁed. Previously, it had been presided over by the Foreign Ministers ofboth governments but from then it was to be co-presided by the two presidents. Also, the participation of the business representatives was eliminated, which meant that decision-making was entrusted to bureaucrats.
At the same time, the Joint Parliamentary Commission was established
to which each country could send 6 Congressmen. Thirdly, the mentionof ‘democracy’ almost disappeared from the text of the treaty. It is truethat the text refers to the Declaration of Iguazú of 1985 and the Act ofIntegration of 1986 as the precedents of the treaty. Thus, the democratic principles inserted into these documents can be regarded as having
been maintained in the treaty but the treaty itself did not use the word at
all.46
However, in the parliamentary debates that developed in Argentina inAugust 1989, some Congressmen thought that the treaty was based upona democratic principle and that bilateral economic cooperation was possible because of the existence of democracies in both countries. For

THE FIRST INTEGRATED WAVE OF REGIONALISM

39

example, one member of the Lower House said that “many people thinkthat without democracy the integration process would be much more difﬁcult.”47 Therefore, it is safe to say that although the treaty itself did not
mention the word ‘democracy’ directly, the treaty was considered tohave been guided by democratic principle at least at the legislative level.
After the treaty was ratiﬁed by the two countries in August 1989, thenegotiation for the creation of a common market became more accelerated by the new presidents in both countries, Carlos Saúl Menem inArgentina and Collor de Melo in Brazil, who assumed the presidency in
July 1989 and March 1990 respectively. As early as July 6, 1990 bothgovernments agreed on the Act of Buenos Aires, by which it was decided to create a common market through the “generalized, lineal and automatic” reduction of tariffs by December 31, 1994. In addition, theydecided to establish an organization, called the Common Market Group,
which was to elaborate various methods to realize the objectives of the
new organization.48 This new agreement surprised neighboring countries, because it showed that a Common Market was imminent, shortening the preparatory period from 10 years (stipulated in the treaty ofintegration) to 5 years. In particular, Uruguay, which had long maintained close economic relations with Argentina and Brazil, soon began
negotiations to enter the Common Market as an original member. She
was formally accepted as a member of the planned Common Market on
August 1 and, soon after, Paraguay also decided to enter, responding toan invitation put forth by the three countries.49 Thus, the negotiation was
carried out among the four countries and the deﬁnitive treaty was at lastsigned on March 26, 1991 in Asunción.
One important change that occurred in the course of this negotiation
during 1989 and 1991 was the disappearance of a democratic principle
from both the Act of Buenos Aires and the Treaty of Asunción. How canthis omission be explained?
There seem to have been several reasons. One was that the negotiation became more technical in order to decide, for example, the timeschedule for the reduction of tariffs and the quantity of the products
excluded from the tariff reduction lists. To the extent that the integration
mechanism became much more complicated and technical, a politicalproblem like democracy naturally tended to attract less atttention.
Secondly, the inﬂuence of the technocrats tended to grow as the negotiation became more technical. In the case of MERCOSUR, the abovementioned Common Market Group was composed of the representatives

40

HIROSHI MATSUSHITA

and appointees of the Ministries of Economy and Foreign Affairs. Those
who were later to be “mercocrats,” tended to represent local or bureaucratic interests more than the technocratic elites in the European
Community did.50
The inﬂuence of the technocratic group was much greater in MERCOSUR than in NAFTA, partly because other social forces were lessinﬂuential in the former. The business elite in Argentina in general welcomed the integration process initiated in the 1980s and 1990s, changing the more protectionist attitudes they had taken in the 1960s.51
However, they could not exert their inﬂuence through congressionallobbyings due to the institutional vulnerability of the Congress. So theirlobbying activities were much more limited in MERCOSUR than in
NAFTA. The inﬂuence of labor also became much more curtailed in thenegotiations as early as the middle of the 1980s, when PICEAB was
launched.52 Besides, the fact that MERCOSUR had its own, albeit small
executive headquarters gave the mercocrats more power than in the caseof NAFTA which did not possess such an organization.
A third reason, which explains the declining importance of democracy, was the fact that Menem and Collor de Melo were the second democratically elected Presidents in both countries. Their electoral victories
marked a huge advance in the democratization in each country, which
reduced the necessity to refer to democracy in the trade treaty in the
1990s.
Lastly, it is possible that some special consideration was given to
Paraguay, as she restored democracy as late as 1989. As we stated previouly, consideration by the United States regarding Mexico’s antidemocratic practices explains to no small degree why the criteria of
democracy was dropped from the text of NAFTA. However, this factor
did not matter much in MERCOSUR, because the Act of Buenos Aires,
which had prepared the base of MERCOSUR, did not mention democracy at all, at the moment when Paraguay had not been invited to thecommon market discussion. So, although MERCOSUR underwent asimilar process in regard to the declining importance of democratic criteria, the cause of that decline was very different in the two cases.
However, in the MERCOSUR countries too, Congresssional debates
demonstrated the keen interest of their members in democracy as it related to integration. Among the four member countries, we could only
obtain the Congressional records of Argentina and Uruguay, and therefore, our analysis here is limited to those two countries. In the Argentine

THE FIRST INTEGRATED WAVE OF REGIONALISM

41

Congress, a Senator of the Radical Party, Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen, criticized the treaty on the basis of its lack of any democratic principle.53
With respect to the relation of democracy to integration, there were two
types of opinions. One was that the recent return of democracy in theSouthern Cone countries made it possible to form MERCOSUR. As one
Congressman of the Lower House said, “This treaty exists because there
is democracy.”54 The other opinion was that the economic integration
should contribute to the development of democracy of the region.
Another member of the Lower House pointed out that “the stability
and develoment of democracy of the region is one of the fundamental
objectives of the process of integration.”55 In Uruguay also several
Congressmen pointed out the importance of the fact that all the countriesof the region had been democratized as a providing base for economic
integration.56
However, there was a great difference between the two countries
regarding the character of the integration, especially as it related to its
character as a customs union. In Argentina, there was no opposition
against it, probably because not a few Congressman expected that thetreaty would strengthen the bargaining power of the Southern Conecountries in the world. One member of the Lower House said that MERCOSUR should struggle so that advanced countries would eliminate
their protectionist barriers.57 Undoubtedly, a stronger integration, suchas a customs union or a common market, had greater potential to provide such kind of power than a free trade agreement.
However in Uruguay, which represents a very small portion of thetotal economic output of MERCOSUR,58 serious concerns about thestrong integration scheme were expressed in Congress. In the Senate,some feared that the inclusion of Uruguay in the common tariff would
mean a higher level of external tariff against third countries because
Brazil wanted to maintain high tariffs. This, in turn, would mean moreisolation from the rest of the world.59 The same type of opinion was also
expressed by one member of the Lower House, who, though in favor ofincreasing economic cooperation within the region of the Southern Cone,was opposed to the external common tariff, claiming that the tariff would
close Uruguay off from the rest of the world.60
Probably, this difference between Uruguay and Argentina shows thatthe weaker countries worried about the negative effect of closer integration, while the stronger countries anticipated its beneﬁts.
In summary, as was the case with NAFTA, the integration scheme in

42

HIROSHI MATSUSHITA

the Southern Cone was combined with a democratic thrust through presidential initiative, but the interest in democracy gradually diminished andthe treaty of Asunción did not mention democracy at all. But, at the legislative level in Argentina and Uruguay, as in the United States, there
was a consensus that integration was related directly or indirectly to the
problem of democracy. In this sense, although they represented different types of integration, NAFTA and MERCOSUR had some similarities. However, the political effects after the creation of the integration
scheme were considerably different.
4.

Political effects of the two integration schemes after their creation

As mentioned earlier, it is possible to think, hypothetically, that themore institutionalized an integration scheme is, the more diverse are theaspects that it tends to include within what it regards as its proper sphere.
Therefore, a customs union type of integration such as MERCOSUR
tends to cooperate in political ﬁelds more than a free trade agreement.
In reality, MERCOSUR intensiﬁed itself as a democratic institution asa measure against several anti-democratic movements within and outside the region.
For example, when President Fujimori of Peru attempted a so-called“autogolpe,” closing the congress by force in April 1992, all the MERCOSUR countries and many other Latin American countries took a very
critical attitude toward the Fujimori Government. The attempt wasthought of as a threat to the democratic process, which had been occurring all over the region. Therefore, when a summit of the presidentsof the four countries was held in June 1992 at Las Leñas, San Luis,
Argentina (with the presidents of Chile and Bolivia also present), they
enunciated a declaration which insisted on “the importance of strengthening the connection among all the countries of the continent to defend
representative democracies.”61
Although there were two non-member countries (future associate
members) that signed the declaration, it was evident that such a declaration was only possible thanks to MERCOSUR. So the integration
served as a vehicle to reafﬁrm the democratic institutions of the member countries. In this sense, the reaction against Fujimori’s policy was akind of internal effect stimulated by MERCOSUR.
But it is worth mentioning that this declaration was made as the resultof the meeting of the presidents and it was not assimilated into the organof the integration. Therefore, although the Joint Parliamentary Com-

THE FIRST INTEGRATED WAVE OF REGIONALISM

43

mision recommended that “members of MERCOSUR should havedemocratic institutions and satisfy all the agreements relative to humanrights,”62 that did not materialize in the Ouro Preto Protocolo, agreed on
December 17, 1994, which was the second important document of MERCOSUR. One reason for this omission was that the Protocolo was elaborated to establish the institutional mechanism of MERCOSUR, but notits principle. Another reason was probably that any reference to humanrights would provoke a degree of opposition in one or more member
countries.
However, in the middle of the 1990s there were two occasions whichgave the MERCOSUR countries opportunities to reafﬁrm their democratic pledges, including respects for human rights. One was theAgreement for Interregional Cooperation Framework signed between
MERCOSUR and the EU in December 1995. Through this agreement,
the MERCOSUR countries consented that the economic cooperation between the two areas should be realized with a respect for the democratic principles and human rights. Besides, it was agreed that in the case inwhich these principles are violated, some consultation mechanism would
come into play, including suspension of the treaty.63 Probably, the MERCOSUR countries accepted these principles and procedures, responding
to the requests of the European countries on these issues in order to promote their investments in MERCOSUR.
The other occasion was the military uprising in Paraguay which
occurred in April 1996. On that occasion, not only the United States but
also the EU countries in accordance with the above-mentioned agreement, together with the Foreign Ministers of Brazil and Argentina, exerted high-level diplomatic pressure on Paraguay, responding so intenselythat the military, led by general Lino Oviedo, refrained from overthrowing the government by force.64 In other words, in the member
acountries of MERCOSUR surrounding Paraguay, the integration fomented interventionist tendencies to prevent a coup d’etát in Paraguay.
Based upon this experience, the presidents of the four countries and thetwo future associate members (Chile and Bolivia), met at Potrero de Los
Funes, San Luis, Argentina in June 1996, and decided not only on the
inclusion of a democratic principle in its international agreements but
also on the consultation mechanism and sanctions in the case in whicha member state was in danger of falling into a rupture of democracy. Insuch a case, sanctions would include virtual expulsion from the organization.65 This declaration has an enormous importance for us, because it

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HIROSHI MATSUSHITA

means that MERCOSUR formally acquired some political characteristics, probably due to the fact that MERCOSUR had become practicallya customs union.
Nevertheless, what was meant by democracy in MERCOSUR wasvery limited, implying only a situation in which there was no military
coup d’état. Therefore, for example, MERCOSUR has never raised theissue of violations of human rights. Besides, the problem of democracy
was dealt with almost entirely through the meetings of the presidents,
due to the lack of any speciﬁc low-level organization to defend democracy. In other words, the problem of democracy was discussed only at
the presidential level, without involving the people directly. This can bethought of as one example of “democratic deﬁcit” in MERCOSUR.
On the other hand, although NAFTA has not yet formed any kind ofpolitical union, some cooperation for democracy beyond the nationalboundaries already existed before the creation of NAFTA and that kindof cooperation has intensiﬁed after its creation, and has served to promote democracy in Mexico.
With respect to the NAFTA effect on Mexican democracy, there wasa heated debate in the US Congress, as we saw. If one adds academic
opinion, there were at least three positions. One position maintained that
it would promote democracy in Mexico, the second one thought conversely that it would contribute to the consolidation of authoritarianism,
and a third position was that it would have no meaningful impact on
democratization.66 Even after NAFTA had been created on January 1,
1994, two contrasting views were presented. For example, Poitras andRobinson thought that Mexican authoritarianism could assimilate
neoliberal reforms “without immediately jeopardizing central politicalcontrol,” though they recognized that economic liberalization would“usher in a far more profound transformation of Mexican politics thanhas been the case so far.”67 On the other hand, Baer and Weintraubstressed the positive effect of NAFTA on Mexican democracy in several respects. For example, they point out that “the increase of the numberof nongovernmental and social alliances across the border,” which
resulted from NAFTA, led to elevated Mexican sentivity to outside concern over electoral fraud.68 Dresser also recognizes the fact that the US
press and human-rights organizations were playing a “critical role in the
discovery and disclosure of corruption, money laundering, and humanrights violations in Mexico.”69
Although it is currently too early to understand fully the political

THE FIRST INTEGRATED WAVE OF REGIONALISM

45

implications that NAFTA will have for Mexican democracy, it is evident that it has been producing some positive effects. In particular, as aconsequence of NAFTA, US governmental and non-governmental monitoring of Mexican politics has been much more intense. The recent introduction of primary elections in the PRI in November 1999 should beconsidered as a democratic response by the Mexican ruling circle.
What is interesting for us is that such democratic effects, expressed in
the form of reduction of electoral fraud and joint monitoring of humanrights violations have been realized to some extent in the framework of
NAFTA. On the other hand, in the case of MERCOSUR, the importanceof democracy is recognized only in the sense that it is opposed to military coups d’état, in spite of the fact that it is a more institutionalized
integration scheme. How can we understand this difference?
Probably one reason is that although the type of integration is important, the kind of democratic concepts which were inserted into the integration scheme contribute to the strength of democratic values shared by
the member countries. Therefore, NAFTA has been producing somedemocratic effects such as constraints against human-rights violations
and electoral fraud. In the case of MERCOSUR, what was intended was
to avoid another coup d’etát among the member countries, but it did nottouch on the problems of corruption and violation of human rights or
freedom. Our comparative analysis shows clearly this kind of limitationof democracy in the MERCOSUR.
Some concluding remarks:
The combination of regionalism with democratization has been taking place for the ﬁrst time in the Western Hemisphere since the 1980s.
So, this combination can be deﬁned as the ﬁrst integrated wave of democracy with regionalism in the Americas, with NAFTA and MERCOSUR
being the most typical cases.
These two integration schemes are different in nature, because while
NAFTA is a free trade agreement, MERCOSUR is a kind of custom
union. However, with respect to the process of decline in terms of democratic criteria in the integration scheme, both showed some similarities
in the sense that the presidential initiative for democracy was graduallyreplaced by the more technical criteria of the bureaucrats.
Nevertheless, some democratic criteria were restored in both schemes.
It was realized in MERCOSUR through presidential meetings to defend
representative democracy, but without touching on human rights

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HIROSHI MATSUSHITA

violations. In NAFTA, on the other hand, through cooperation of nongovernmental organizations between the US and Mexico, some improvements have been achieved with respect to human rights and electoral
practices, though its effects have been thus far limited.
Here we have limited our analysis to the comparison of the two integration schemes. But currently there is an ongoing program of the FTAA
that is scheduled to begin by 2005 as part of the agreements in the Miami
Summit in December 1994. At the summit the topic of democracy was
one of the three main themes, together with the hemispheric economic
integration and sustainable development.70 So, the FTAA, which implies
closer relations between the two integration schemes, will have positiveeffects on Latin American democracy. In particular, as the two have different mechanisms for the promotion of democracy, their adroit combination will surely contribute to the development of democracy in theAmericas.
NOTES
1Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in The Late TwentiethCentury, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman and London, 1991. According to
Huntington, the ﬁrst long wave of democratization occurred between 1828 and 1926.
The second short wave took place between 1943 and 1962. The third wave began in
Portugal with the democratic revolution which took place on April 25, 1974.
2
Yoshinobu Yamamoto, “Chiiki Togo no Seijikeizaigaku: Sobyo (Political Economy
of Regional Integration: An Overview)” Kokusai Mondai, No. 452, November, 1997,
p.3. He also distinguishes the “new regionalism” from the “old” one in his“Regionalization in Contemporary International Relations,” in Van R. Whiting, ed.,Regionalism in the World Economy, Macmillan, India, 1996, pp. 28–30.
3
Laurence Whitehead, “International Aspects of Democratization,” in Guillermo
O’Donnell, et al eds., Transition from Authoritarian Rule; Comparative Perspectives,
The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1986, p. 21.
4
Lía Valls Pereira, “Hacia un Mercado Común del Sur: Orígenes, Evolución yDesafíos de Mercosur,” in Riordan Roett, comp. Mercosur: Integración Regional y
Mercados Mundiales, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, Buenos Aires, 1999, p. 25.
5
Huntington, op.cit., pp. 6–7.
6
Yamamoto, “Political Economy,” op.cit., p. 3.
7
Ibid., p. 4. Robert O’Brien, “North American Integration and International Relations
Theory,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, XXVIII, No. 4 (December, 1995), p.
698.
8
Yamamoto, “Political Economy,” op.cit., p. 4.
9Ibid., p. 4.
10
Yamamoto, “Regionalization,” op.cit., p. 20.
11
Yamamoto, “Political Economy,” op.cit., p. 5.
12Ibid., p. 6.
13
Susan Kaufman Purcell and Robert M. Immerman, eds., Japan and Latin America
in the New Global Order, Lynn Rienner Publishers, Boulder and London, 1992, p. 147.

THE FIRST INTEGRATED WAVE OF REGIONALISM

47

14
Weekly Compilations of President Documents, July. 2, 1990 (Administration ofGeorge Bush, 1990, June 27), pp. 1009–1013.
15
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, “Misunderstanding Mexico.” Foreign Policy, No. 78(Spring, 1990), p. 114.
16
M. Delal Baer and Sidney Weintraub, “The Pressure for Political Reform in
Mexico,” in Baer and Weintraub, eds., The NAFTA Debate: Grappling with Unconventional Trade Issues, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, p. 177.
17
Judith Gentleman and Voytek Zubek, “International Integration and Democratic
Development: The Cases of Poland and Mexico,” Journal of Interamerican Studies andWorld Affairs, Vol. 34, No.1 (Spring, 1992), p. 85.
18
Ibid., p. 81.
19
Ibid., p. 85.
20
Ibid., p. 79.
21
Regarding Mexico’s reaction to NAFTA, see Eduardo Huchim, TLC, Hacia un país
distinto, Editorial Patria, Mexico, 1992 and Strom C. Thacker, “NAFTA Coalitions andthe Political Viability of Neoliberalism in Mexico,” Journal of Interamerican Studies
and World Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Summer, 1999) and Guy Poitras and RaymondRobinson, The Politics of NAFTA in Mexico,” The Journal of Interamerican Studies
and World Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring, 1994).
22
William P. Avery, “Domestic Interests in NAFTA,” Political Science Quarterly,Vol. 113, No. 2 (Summer, 1998), p. 289.
23
Ibid., p. 288.
24
Ibid., p. 284.
25
Ibid., p. 282.
26
The United States, Congressional Records, House of Representatives, November
16, 1993, p. 9826.
27
Ibid., Senate, November 18, 1993, p. 16032.
28
Ibid., Senate, November 19, 1993, p. 16374.
29
Ibid., House of Representatives, November 17, 1993, p. 9897.
30
Ibid., House of Representatives, November 17, 1993, p. 9912.
31
Ibid., House of Representatives, November 16, 1993, p. 9825.
32
Ibid., House of Representatives, November 17, 1993, p. 9864.
33
Ibid., House of Representatives, November 16. 1993, p. 9826.
34
Michael E. Conroy and Amy K. Glasmeier, “Unprecedented Disparities, Unparalled
Adjustment Needs: Winners and Losers on the NAFTA ‘Fast Track,’” Journal ofInteramerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 4, (Winter, 1992–93), p. 20.
35
The United States, op.cit., Senate, November 18, 1993, p. 16023.
36
Ibid., Senate, November 18, 1993, p. 16050.
37
Ibid., p. 16046.
38
Ibid., Senate, November 4, 1993, p. 15087.
39
Jaime Behar, “Economic Integration and Intra-Industry Trade: The Case of theArgentine-Brazilian Free Trade Agreement,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.
XXIX, No. 4 (June, 1991), p. 529.
40
La Nación, edición internacional, diciembre 2, 1985, p. 5.
41
Ibid., edición internacional, agosto 4, 1986, p. 5.
42
Jorge Schvarzer, “Un bloque exitoso en crisis: un socio demasiado grande,” Nueva
Sociedad, No. 162 (Julio-Agosto, 1999), p. 95.
43
Karen Remmer, “Does Democracy Promote Interstate Cooperation? Lessons from
MERCOSUR Region,” International Studeis Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1 (March, 1998).
44
La Nación, edición internacional, agosto 4, 1986, p. 5.
45
Luigi Manzetti, “Argentine-Brazilian Economic Integration: An Early Appraisal,”

48

HIROSHI MATSUSHITA

Latin American Research Review, Vol. XXV, No. 3 (1990), p 126.
46
The text of the treaty can be seen in República Argentina, Anales de la Legislación
Argentina, Tomo C, 1991, pp. 2443–4.
47
República Argentina, Diario de Sesiones de Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, 3
de agosto, 1989. p. 1761.
48
Actas de Buenos Aires, 1990.
49
Informe del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores del Uruguay a la Asamblea
General, abril 1°, 1991, cited in República Oriental del Uruguay, Diario de Sesiones dela Cámara de Representantes, Tomo 659 (julio, 1991), p. 67.
50
Mónica Hirst, “La dimensión política del Mercosur: Actores, politización e ideología,” Nueva Sociedad, 146 (noviembre-diciembre), p. 30.
51
Peter Birle, Los Empresarios y la Democracia en la Argentina, Conﬂictos y
Coincidencias, Editorial de Belgrano, Buenos Aires, 1997, p. 270.
52
Hiroshi Matsushita, “El Mercosur y sus implicaciones sociopolíticas,” Cuadernosde Nueva Sociedad, segundo semestre, 1998, p. 277.
53
República Argentina, Diarios de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores de la Nación,
24 y 25 de julio, 1991, p. 1281.
54
Ibid., Diarios de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados, 14 y 15 de julio, 191, p. 2425.
55
Ibid., p. 2434.
56
República Oriental del Uruguay, Diarios de Sesiones de la Cámara deRepresentantes, Tomo 659, 9 de julio, 1991, p. 113.
57
República Argentina , Diarios de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados, 14 y 15 dejulio. 1991, p. 2429.
58
In the year 1995, the distribution of the GDP among the four countries was following: Brazil 72.3%, Argentina 25.0%, Uruguay 1.8% and Paraguay, 0.9%. (Calculated
from the data in the Panorama del Mercosur, No. 4 (Noviembre, 1999), Anexo
Estadístico.
59
República Oriental del Uruguay, Diarios de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores,
Tomo 339, 9 de mayo, 1991, p. 9.
60
República Oriental del Uruguay, Diarios de Sesiones de la Cámara de Representantes, 9 de Julio, 1991, p. 150.
61
“Declaración de Los Países del Cono Sur,” 26 de junio, 1992, p. 1.
62
Cited in Carlos Galeano Perrone, Ordenamiento Jurídico del Mercosur,Intercontinental Editora, Asunción, 1995, p. 536.
63
The whole text of the agreement can be seen in Diario Oﬁcial de las Comunidades
Europeas, 16 de marzo, 1996, pp. 1–15.
64
With respect to the importance of the EU countries on that occasion, Matsushita,
op.cit., pp. 284–5.
65“Declaración presidencial sobre compromiso democrático en el MERCOSUR,” 25de junio, 1996. pp. 1–2.
66
Peter Smith, “The Political Impact of Free Trade On Mexico,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spring, 1992), pp. 1–25.
67
Poitras and Robinson, op.cit., pp. 28-29.
68
Baer and Weintraub, op.cit., p. 175.
69
Denise Dresser, “Post-NAFTA Politics in Mexico: Uneasy, Uncertain, Unpredictable,” in Carol Wise, ed., The Post-NAFTA political economy: Mexico and theWestern Hemisphere, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1998, p. 251.
70
Richard L. Millett, “Beyond Sovereignty: International Efforts to Support Latin
American Democracy,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 36,
No. 3 (Fall, 1994), p. 1.