The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 33 (2022)

Copyright © 2022 The Japanese Association for American Studies. All rights reserved.

“A Must for Atlanta’s Future”: Metropolitan Atlanta
and the Rapid Transit Idea, 1963–65

Ichiro MIYATA*INTRODUCTION
The idea of building a rapid transit system in Atlanta was long thought
to be too ambitious. However, in 1964, when Atlanta mayor Ivan Allen Jr.
took the call from Georgia congressman Charles L. Weltner, who was amember of the House Banking and Currency Committee, Allen learned that
Washington was preparing “a measure . . . to provide for design money [forrapid transit], and that Atlanta had better do something for it” if they wished
to realize the dream of rapid transit. Allen replied, “My God, is that thing
really going to pass?” His comment was hardly unusual, since, according
to Weltner’s recollection, “nobody [in Atlanta] much thought about it [rapidtransit] at the time.”1
The rumor of a national bill appeared less than a decade after
Atlanta’s urban planners declared their interest in rapid transit, but few,
including Allen, believed that Uncle Sam would actually take a hand in
the construction or operation of local mass transit. In the era of John F.
Kennedy’s New Frontier, however, the prospect of federal funding was nolonger merely a dream. As the first urban Democrat in the White House
since Franklin Delano Roosevelt, JFK was willing to provide national
assistance for cities to restore or create their own mass transit systems.2*Professor, Saitama University

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Following Kennedy’s assassination, his successor, Lyndon Johnson, finally
signed the Urban Mass Transportation Act (hereafter UMTA) of 1964,
which provided federal matching grants to design, build, or improve rapidtransit systems. Atlanta was one of the cities that welcomed such legislation.
At that point, Atlanta’s publicly funded, pro-rapid transit group gained
new momentum. To bring such a system to Atlanta, the advocates of rapidtransit in Georgia had to make the case for the necessity of rapid transit inAtlanta, which they proceeded to do in a series of congressional hearingson the mass transit bill. At the same time, they tried to persuade statelawmakers, who had long disdained federal support for a series of civilrights bills, to change their minds and welcome the federal rapid transit
bill. In addition, they had to convince state politicians and, more important,citizens to support a legal environment that would make Atlanta eligible forthe installation of a rapid transit system. In short, the construction of a rapidtransit system in such a short period of time was impossible without forging
a favorable consensus toward it among politicians in Congress, lawmakers
in Georgia, and, of course, the public.
In this article I investigate how Atlanta’s advocates of rapid transit
used the idea of transportation technology and argue that the new modeof mobility technology they promoted created an imagined community
in an age of urban disintegration, one that culminated in white flight anda consequent decline in inner cities. In particular, I examine the effort
by champions of rapid transit to persuade Georgia lawmakers—senatorsand congressmen—to back the passage of the UMTA of 1964 and toeducate the public to support passage of Amendment 16 to the state
constitution in November 1964, which enabled the state of Georgia to set
up a “public transit corporation” that could receive federal grants and plan
the construction of the sixty-six-mile rail transit covering five counties inmetropolitan Atlanta.
The objective of this essay is to suggest the possibility that the bold
efforts of public transit advocates to meet this challenge fell short ofcreating an inclusive public transit system. Their attempt to make a transit
system connecting the heart of the city of Atlanta to suburban counties waseminently rational, and, indeed, Atlanta was successful in setting up the
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (hereafter MARTA) in 1965;
but subsequent referenda regarding the county’s participation, financing,routing, and construction plans limited the reach of its innovative sixtysix-mile rail system, which ended up being restricted to the two central
counties—Fulton and DeKalb—in which the city of Atlanta was located.

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The three suburban counties of Cobb, Clayton, and Gwinnett, then in themetropolitan area, voted not to join the system in 1965 and 1971; therefore,
the actual route does not extend to those three counties. (See map.) As
much research and many reports have shown, the refusal of these three(at the time) white-majority counties to join the system was the result of
three deeply intertwined factors: racism, antitax sentiment, and dislike
for increasing federal intervention in local affairs.3 In this article I look atthese first attempts in the early sixties, especially from 1963 to 1964, andexamine the reasons why they overshadowed the future development of
an equitable public transit network. I do so by illuminating the ways inwhich the rapid transit advocates advertised the original plan by creatinga narrative persuasive enough to get support from the majority of theresidents to legalize a rapid transit system. I argue that, despite success

Map

Current MARTA Stations in the 1965 Metropolitan Atlanta Counties

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in eliciting this support, the seeds of the eventual failure to create a
metropolitan community using a new mode of transportation were planted
because the boosters did not address the demands of the people but, instead,prioritized their own vision rather than solving the racial and class divisions
in their city.
The essay charts the development of the advocates’ efforts to obtainfederal assistance for rapid transit. First, I attempt to uncover the ways
in which Atlanta’s pro-rapid transit faction continued their endeavors byforming such organizations as the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Committee of 100 (hereafter the Committee of 100). I then examine how
the boosters chose Georgia’s former governor, S. Ernest Vandiver Jr., aschairman of the organization and how their choice proved successful in (1)persuading Georgia lawmakers to support the federal act encouraging rapidtransit and (2) achieving the ratification of state constitutional Amendment
16 in a statewide election, which enabled five metropolitan counties to havea public transit authority. Finally, I examine the limit of the idea of unity
and its legacy to the future development of metropolitan Atlanta’s public
transit system.
ERNEST VANDIVER AND THE METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSITCOMMITTEE OF 100
Beginning in the late 1950s, Atlanta’s rapid transit advocates—themajority of whom were chamber of commerce–type boosters desiring
federal investment and more development in general—worked diligently tobring such a system to the state capitol. Those who supported installing a
rapid transit system faced many difficulties. First and foremost was that theidea was not a favorite of Democratic politicians in Georgia, most of whom
represented rural Georgia and had difficulty accepting the unprecedented
rise of urban interests—particularly Atlanta’s; thus, it was necessary for the
rapid transit supporters to find a person who was able to connect membersof Atlanta’s business community to those rural Georgians who disfavoredthe focus on urban interests. In November 1962, the advocates had alreadytried to enact “amendment No. 9” in the general election, a measure aimed
at providing the Georgia General Assembly with the authority to have thecounties “build and operate public transportation systems.” Rural counties,
however, including suburban Cobb County in metropolitan Atlanta, did not
approve the amendment and thus it failed.4
Following this turn of events, in 1963, the research organization

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Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Study Committee formed what came tobe known as the Committee of 100. Comprising “representatives ofAtlanta and the five counties,” the committee’s objective was to “carryout an extensive informational and promotional program to expedite
the installation of some form of rapid transit to serve our metropolitan
area.”5 Therefore, when exercising his authority to appoint members of
the Committee of 100, Atlanta’s mayor Ivan Allen Jr., who was a former
president of Atlanta’s chamber of commerce, took great care in considering
who would serve as the leader.6 He ultimately chose S. Ernest Vandiver Jr.,
who had only just completed his governorship of the state.7
Vandiver’s affinity for the business and financial community in Atlanta
made him the best candidate for leading the rapid transit educational
campaign. But this was not the only reason for the decision. Despite
his urban and refined image, Vandiver, originally from rural Franklin
County, still represented the voices of the rural South that demanded thepreservation of the so-called Southern way of life through a blending of the“old” and the “new.”8
Vandiver’s closeness to the “old” implied tolerance of traditional racial
thinking, and it was expected that this ambiguity in his attitude on racial
matters would go a long way in eliciting rural support. Although Vandiveris remembered for ending school segregation in Georgia, he did not accept
this change out of personal conviction. Rather, his motivation in permitting
desegregation was that Atlanta’s business elites desired it. From the pointof view of the business community, to close schools in order to resist
the federal order to desegregate was simply unacceptable; the business
community believed, in the words of one historian, that “such action would
be disastrous for their city’s economic future.”9Moreover, this happened when Atlanta business leaders were happily
welcoming the end of the county unit system that they viewed as
detrimental to Atlanta’s economic progress.10 This was because the systemgave more political power to the less-populated rural counties, which urban
business interests found to be unreasonable because cities, particularly
Atlanta, were underrepresented in the general assembly. The end of thecounty unit system, as a consequence of the Baker v. Carr decision in 1962,both symbolized the ascendance of the state’s—and especially Atlanta’s—urban business elite and ensured that this ascendance would be more thansymbolic.11 Ironically, Vandiver happened to be the last governor chosen
in the county unit system, yet he accomplished this while forging close ties
with Atlanta’s business elites. On March 5, 1963, when the Atlanta mayor

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solicited Vandiver to assume the chairmanship of the Committee of 100 tocarry out “an extensive informational and promotional program” for rapidtransit, the former governor pleased Allen by quickly responding that it
would be his “privilege” to work on this “very important matter.”12
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE GEORGIA CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION
TO THE URBAN MASS TRANSIT ACT OF 1964
Indeed, as soon as Vandiver accepted the Committee of 100’schairmanship, the former governor started working toward that objective.
On April 1, 1963, he telegrammed his uncle-in-law, Richard Russell,
who was the chairman of the US Senate’s Southern Caucus, and Herman
Talmadge, son of the segregationist Eugene Talmadge, and urged the two
senators and staunch southern Democrats to “support . . . rapid transit as amust for Atlanta’s future.”13
Vandiver’s effort was successful. The bill passed the Senate on April4, 1963, by a vote of 52 to 41. Russell admitted his eventual support forthe bill was a consequence of the strong push from Vandiver and Atlanta
mayor Ivan Allen Jr. According to Russell, Vandiver and Allen “presented
it [the bill] forcefully to me this time,” leading him to think that the traffic
problem “was probably practically incapable of solution without somefederal assistance.”14 This was a significant development. Talmadge andRussell were not expected to favor the bill for the very reason that itallowed for more governmental spending and hence an increase of federal
control in Georgia. Neither of these was desirable in their view, especiallythe latter, for the Kennedy administration was just then preparing the Civil
Rights Act. The Georgia senators feared and fervently opposed federal
intervention with regard to racial segregation in the South; indeed, only
1 of 22 senators from the South endorsed the Civil Rights Act in 1963.
Nevertheless, 10 out of 22 senators from the eleven Southern states voted
for the UMTA in 1963.15
Despite Talmadge and Russell’s endorsement, the bill encountereddifficulties in the House, where congressmen from rural counties in Georgia
opposed the bill. As soon as voting in the House was announced, in April
1964, Vandiver urged Georgia’s members to vote for it. For instance, in his
letter to five such representatives, he encouraged them to seriously consider
the bill, but not all responses were favorable, and rural congressmen
continued expressing doubts about the bill. For example, one lawmakerrepresenting rural countries said he was “not sure what is going to be

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done” with this act.16 To make matters worse, the Area Redevelopment Act,
despite the then president Kennedy having strongly favored the bill, wasdefeated in the House by a margin of only five votes (209 to 204). That bill
had been prepared to help solve urban poverty, an issue that resurrected an
old political alliance of those united against an expansion of federal power.
This failure foreshadowed the fate of smooth enactment of the urban masstransit legislation.
The worries of the rapid transit supporters, however, ended up being
unnecessary. When the UMTA bill’s vote was finally scheduled for floor
action on June 24, advocates urged Vandiver to come up to Washington
and join in last-minute lobbying activities.17 His efforts appear to havehelped, for the long-stalled bill was finally approved by a close vote of
212 to 189 on June 26, 1964.18 President Johnson then signed the bill anddeclared that big cities should “no longer be a stepchild . . . neglectedby their government in Washington.”19 Atlanta congressman Charles L.
Weltner, an ardent supporter of civil rights legislation, certainly believed soand expressed his gratitude to Vandiver for his interest and work in supportof the bill, writing that “our ‘win’ and that Georgia delegation’s vote arecertainly the result of your leadership of the Committee of 100 and yourpersonal concern.”20 The chairperson of the Committee of 100 thus played avital role in passing the UMTA bill that would eventually authorize federal
matching grants for two-thirds of public transportation costs throughout thenation.
TO WIN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIONS:PERSUADING THE PUBLIC
It should be noted that to get support from Southern Democrats, Vandiverand the Committee of 100 members had to build a narrative that presented
rapid transit as something extremely beneficial to the economy of thestate of Georgia. In the case of senators Russell and Talmadge, Vandivercontended that current traffic congestion “chokes our city, [and] postpones
the time when workers in the eighteen-county area depending on the central
city are denied easy access to the jobs and convenience markers on which
they depend.” Solving the problem, he continued, would be “extremely
difficult . . . without federal assistance.”21 In the case of the House,knowing that three of the congressmen were from outside the metropolitan
Atlanta area, he emphasized Atlanta’s responsibility for the developmentof Georgia’s overall welfare, arguing that “people from 29 counties in

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Georgia come to work in the Atlanta metropolitan area,” and it “represents
43 percent of the state’s population, so you can see how much good thiswould bring to the State of Georgia.”22 Clearly, when making their casein Washington, the advocates did not view rapid transit as a means ofpromoting of social mobility inside the metro area; for them, it was aprecondition for future economic growth.
While persuading lawmakers in Washington, the Committee of 100 was
also appealing to the citizens in Greater Atlanta. Of course, the way they
won the support from Southern Democrats appeared in newspapers andthereby constituted a strong public appeal for rapid transit. Simultaneously,
however, the champions of mass transit had to explain how this rapidtransportation system would improve life for people in metropolitan
Atlanta. Indeed, they still had a long way to go if they wished to see
ground broken on a rapid transit construction in the city. To begin with, thecommittee members had to have Amendment 16 added to the Georgia State
Constitution, and they had not forgotten their bitter experience in 1962,
when a similar statewide referendum failed to pass. The Atlanta Journal
attributed this previous defeat to “public apathy,” and supporters did notintend to repeat their failure to rally public enthusiasm.23
After—or even before—Vandiver and others succeeded in passing thefederal bill, the objective of the advocates and the Committee of 100 was
now to “educate” Atlanta citizens and citizens all over the state and secure
their vote for the amendment.24 Even before Vandiver and others succeededin attaining passage of the federal bill, they already understood the need to“educate” metropolitan Atlanta citizens about the benefits of voting for theamendment. In other words, they had to first highlight the problems thatcurrently plagued metropolitan Atlanta and then illustrate how rapid transit
would resolve them and pave the way to building a new community best
suited for life in an age of urban expansion.
The Committee of 100 hired the public relations consulting firm
Infoplan, and the company proceeded to set up an education program tohelp prepare speeches and produced a documentary film. All these efforts
were directed toward the immediate objective of winning public support
for passage of Amendment 16.25 The amendment would “authorize theGeneral Assembly to create a ‘public corporation or authority’” that would“empower” the counties of metropolitan Atlanta to “finance, develop andoperate the $300 million rapid transit system which has been proposed forthe community.”26
The new referendum should not be as difficult as the challenge in 1962,

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for the advocates only had to win a majority in Atlanta’s five metropolitan
counties—at that time Fulton, DeKalb, Cobb, Gwinnett, and Clayton.27 This
freed supporters from having to discuss issues unrelated to metropolitan
Atlanta. Moreover, that counties could leave the system through futurereferenda if they ended up not liking the final plan was thought to increase
yes votes. In speeches, lectures, and pamphlets prepared with the assistanceof Infoplan, Vandiver and others from the Committee of 100 worked
to demonstrate why Atlanta needed rapid transit as part of a balanced
transportation system. The Committee of 100 urged its audience to accept
that Atlanta was involved in a stiff competition with other big cities such as
San Francisco, Chicago, and Los Angeles over federal money and, perhaps
even more important, national reputation. Indeed, this discourse of urban
competition appeared persistently in the advocates’ major arguments. When
the US House was about to vote on the UMTA in June 1963, Infoplan had
already prepared two kinds of speech drafts for the press—one for if it
passed and one for if it did not. If the vote was successful, the press releasewould stress how federal assistance “will help us build our rapid transit
system” and claim that “Atlanta is now in the position to be one of first
cities to benefit from the new legislation [emphasis in original].” If theHouse were to kill the bill, the plan was for Vandiver to comment in upbeat
fashion, “This is not to say . . . that we are discouraged.” The chairman
admired San Francisco, which had already made a decision to build its
own rapid transit system, and he planned to contend that “the Atlanta area
is not far behind” the Golden Gate City and that “[w]e, too, have a steady
population growth, vast business and industrial potential . . . and assuredly,
we too, have the ability to solve our problems.”28 In short, the languageof competition prevailed in speech drafts and clearly underscores how theadvocates saw the importance of rapid transit in metropolitan Atlanta.
Moreover, the protransit faction stressed the competition as aninternational one. Atlanta, they insisted, was the one city in the UnitedStates that had to catch up with foreign counterparts. In this manner, theCommittee of 100 and Infoplan cleverly played on Cold War anxieties bypraising Soviet rail transit plans. For instance, in their monthly newsletter“Rapid Transit Gram,” references to mass transit systems in non-US cities
frequently appeared, implicitly serving as rebukes for supposedly modern
US cities that lacked such systems. The newsletter warned that it “hasbeen reported that Soviet engineers are working on several schemes tobuild monorail in Russia.”29 This point was supported by reference to rapidtransit planning in the Kamchatka Peninsula, Magnitogorsk, and Moscow.

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Closer to home and on this side of the Iron Curtain, references to the public
transit systems in Toronto and Montreal also appeared frequently. Vandiverand the Committee of 100 then used these reports as sources for theirspeeches. In particular, the praise of foreign experimentations was used togive the impression that rapid transit was a mark of progress that could, if
properly supported and realized, represent a victory for the US in the global
competition over development.30“HOUSEWIVES AND SHOPPERS”: IDENTIFYING SUPPORTERS
FOR THE RAPID TRANSIT REFERENDUM
While emphasizing mass transit’s role in Atlanta’s economic growth,
the champions of mass transit attempted to identify the possible users of
the proposed system and sell them the idea of the new mode of public
transportation. As part of its basic strategic planning, Infoplan undertook
concise market research to gauge public thinking on rapid transit. An
opinion survey they undertook in major “sections of the city” produced
encouraging results.31 The surveyors learned that 94 percent of the
respondents were in favor of the rapid transit system, even though 68
percent of the respondents commuted to Atlanta by car. The investigation in
downtown Atlanta and suburban sites revealed, however, that “housewives
and shoppers in outlying shopping areas were found to be poorly informed
if at all on the subject.” Therefore, Infoplan argued that “a far more basic
approach will have to be taken in speeches before garden clubs, P.T.A.
and other strictly women’s day-time groups.” The author stressed that“both groups vote, one is as equally important as the other, in so far as thecommunication campaign is concerned.”32
Along with these multifarious community efforts, Infoplan sought
to take advantage of the power of “press, radio, [and] television” in its
campaign for rapid transit public education. For instance, the company’splan listed radio stations to which the Committee of 100 could send
lecturers to participate in the airing of favorable discussion and called
for the distribution of fifty thousand copies of “What You Should Know
about Rapid Transit,” a 1961 pamphlet produced by the Atlanta Region
Metropolitan Planning Committee (hereafter ARMPC), a regional planningadvisory organization.
Infoplan also proposed the production of a documentary film, viewingsof which were accompanied by an “information booth” equipped with“telephone service” and “printed information” that visitors could pick up

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at their leisure, along with “handbills, bumper stickers, and billboards.”33
The scenario proposed for the film clearly demonstrated the ways in which
the Committee of 100 and Infoplan attempted to reach, in the words of thecompany, “directly to the people.” The documentary’s footage supported
the following three points: “1) traffic is beginning to strangle us; 2) traffic
will indeed have strangled us by 1980 unless something is done; and 3)
rapid transit is that something.” The company also indicated that the footage
should contain “artwork and animation, depicting how much worse thesituation will be in 1980, unless something is done about it.” Moreover,
the audiovisual presentation was expected to make a powerful impression
through using “graphs, charts, and animation which projects the future
traffic jams that will occur unless rapid transit is implemented.”34
Another advantage of having a documentary film over, for instance, aseries of speeches, was that it would not be limited by time and place but,rather, could be viewed in numerous locations at any time. Indeed, Infoplan
stressed that the film was “ready to roll anytime” at “scores of civic andprofessional organizations,” including the American Legion, Civitan Club,and Rotary Club.35 Infoplan also called on WSB-TV to run the film on
their news program while the Georgia General Assembly was in session,
believing that this would be indispensable for “putting public opinion
behind this project.”36
As accorded with their printed materials, the completed Committee of
100 documentary portrayed traffic jams as a problem that directly affected
people on the street and promoted this argument for maximum effect. To
highlight this point, the film opened with self-described “scenes of story
book Atlanta . . . all peaceful and picturesque” until suddenly the city morphs
into a gloomy and grotesque landscape with “scenes of traffic jams . . . [and]carbon monoxide atmosphere.”37 Thereupon a census bureau worker appears
and discusses Atlanta’s rapid population growth, and a highway department
official states that Atlanta would need “more expressways.” These “man-onthe-Street interviews” underscored the views of the professionals. Ultimately,
everything led to the desired conclusion: “Yes, we need rapid transit.”38“A GREAT VICTORY” FOR THE URBAN CORE
Promises of broad-based economic gains, victory in a Cold War–tinged
global competition, and the prospect of preventing endless future traffic
jams were not the only arguments made by rapid transit advocates. Carefulreading of their views reveals that they also considered the unbalanced

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development happening in metropolitan Atlanta. Toward this end, Vandiverargued that the rapid transit system would not only benefit the downtown
area but also benefit “the farthest corners of the metropolitan region
because people can live wherever they like” and still “get quickly andconveniently to any other parts of the region.”39 In sum, they argued that
rapid transit would work better for suburbanites than other available options.
Nevertheless, the main mission of rapid transit was to prevent thesuburbs from surpassing downtown Atlanta in importance, rather thanto enhance social mobility. An Atlanta Journal editorial right before theNovember 3 election claimed that “a rapid transit system” would be “a vital
factor in the metropolitan area’s survival.” Under the title “First Step,” theeditors urged readers to cast a yes vote for the amendment because it would
revive the downtown district of the city of Atlanta, which they identified as“the keystone for metropolitan structure.” Continuing this line of reasoning,they wrote, “Let Atlanta falter economically and the five counties will
feel it quickly and to the same degree as does the downtown section”; toavoid such a fate, “rapid transit is needed.”40 The Atlanta Journal further
bolstered their case by reporting that ARMPC chairman Glenn C. Bennett
declared that metropolitan Atlanta was “the ‘unquestioned’ economic
capital of the Southeast” but that to keep that status required “maintain[ing]a good, lively downtown area.” According to Bennett, “It would be lopsidedof the community to allow outlying portions of the metropolitan area tocontinue to grow while the central city stands still.”41 For Bennett and theeditors, rapid transit offered the ideal solution to that possible problem.
Wherever their emphasis resided, the result of the education campaign
mounted by the advocates of rapid transit was victory. That these masstransit supporters saw suburban commuters as the major beneficiaries of the
proposed system was visible in the way they celebrated the news of theirsuccess. A political cartoon that appeared after the 1964 general election
alongside an article celebrating “an overwhelming victory” for the rapidtransit plan illustrates this point well. The drawing portrays how such
suburban cities as Marietta in Cobb County, Norcross in Gwinnett County,
and Forest Park in Clayton County (on map) would be connected to thedowntown via rapid transit and shows a white-collar man with a suit, tie,and eyeglasses identified as “Atlanta Commuters” watering a tree. Inscribedon the can is “Amendment 16,” and the branches of the tree lead to andsupport suburban towns. Of particular importance was that, in the image,
metropolitan Atlanta was depicted as a collection of towns connected tothe city center, with the city’s growth relying on the commuters who would

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utilize the new mass transit system.
The cartoonist would likely have agreed with Bennett that the victory
was a watershed moment and one that was entirely positive. The ARMPC
chairman declared that “the vote was a great victory for intergovernmental
cooperation” and further stated:[This] was the first time a regional plan had been presented to all thepeople of the [metropolitan] region for implementation. The habit ofthinking and acting as a region will soon become common, for in thisurban age metropolitan areas such as ours are definite large economic
and social units, regardless of the number of political jurisdictions
involved. Our problems are regional; their solutions require regional
action. . . . But we are on our way!42
Meanwhile, despite sending a thank-you letter to the members of theCommittee of 100 for their effort, Vandiver continued to play a role beyond
the 1964 victory.43 In June 1965, when another referendum was held
for five counties to decide if they would participate in the Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, Vandiver became involved. The new plan,
approved by the general assembly in March 1965, was covered by the
Atlanta Journal-Constitution on May 20 in a multiple-page article.44 In this,Vandiver once again emphasized how the new rail system would contributeto the city’s competitiveness and to the growth of the metropolitan area
as a whole, saying, “We’re growing amazingly fast” and that, once rapidtransit was in operation, “the more solid our economy can become.”45
Here, mobility was valuable as long as it was expected to create wealth; theidea was that rapid transit would enable the city of Atlanta to rise, and theprosperity would eventually trickle down to the suburban counties, leading
to overall growth of metropolitan Atlanta and the state of Georgia.
MOBILITY FOR WHOM?: PUBLIC TRANSIT IN THE AGE OF WHITE FLIGHT
Although at the outset of the 1960s few Georgians had a clear idea ofwhat rapid transit was, by the middle of the decade things had changed
dramatically. The efforts of Vandiver’s Committee of 100 played a majorrole in bringing about passage of the UMTA of 1964, which enabled cities
like Atlanta to gain federal two-thirds matching grants to construct public
transportation systems. Moreover, the endorsement by the five metropolitan
counties of Amendment 16 in November 1964, which allowed for80

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establishing a “public corporation” to oversee rapid transit in Georgia, wasalso a product of the committee’s endeavors. These advocates believed thatbringing rapid transit to Atlanta would trigger a statewide economic boom,
which would be the major ingredient in future economic progress in a statetransitioning from a largely rural to mostly urban population. They argued
that getting rid of traffic congestion was a must to enhance the growththey desired. Furthermore, reflecting midcentury Cold War anxieties, theCommittee of 100 placed their project in the context of national and eveninternational competition among cities over technological progress andeconomic expansion.
In this context and as demonstrated in their comments and actions, these
men and women envisioned a future metropolitan Atlanta as imaginedcommunity. Despite there remaining important differences in terms of raceand class in the five counties, the advocates nevertheless viewed the future
metropolitan Atlanta as one intertwined community made up of suburban
middle-class workers benefitting from a much easier commute. The goalof rapid transit advocates was to maintain the prestige of the central city byconnecting it to the booming communities in the peripheries. They believedthat rapid transit would enable the downtown to triumph over those rising
towns.
When conjuring up the image, one aspect to which the white boosters andpolitical elites did not pay much attention was that metropolitan Atlanta wasexperiencing a demographic change. Especially racial and probably classcomposition was changing because of white flight: the Committee of 100,
however, did not articulate it, even though they clearly acknowledged thephenomenon.46 As discussed previously, they found it useful to advertise
rapid transit to “housewives and shoppers” in suburban shopping malls, butthey did not acknowledge the plight of African Americans, most of whom
commuted by the private Atlanta Transit System (ATS) bus service.
The attempt by rapid transit supporters to empower the downtown
reflected their desire to reverse the decline in the number of white property
owners in Atlanta. For the city’s political and economic leaders, restoring
the white population and their property ownership was vital for the city’s
healthy growth. They saw rapid transit as the way to meet that goal.
Indeed, the membership of the Rapid Transit Committee of 100, originally
recommended by political and economic leaders including Mayor Allen,
did not represent the demography of metropolitan Atlanta. For instance, of
the twenty-five recommendations sent to Vandiver for the Atlanta area’s
representatives, only two were African Americans and only four were“A MUST FOR ATLANTA’S FUTURE”

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female. This representation was far from fair given that African Americans
would make up more than half of the population by 1970.47
This optimistic vision of one community united by a transit system soon
faced challenges. Suburban white counties did not favor the idea. Those
forces, armed with anti–big government rhetoric, had gradually begun to
rally in suburban counties. Indeed, even before the 1964 election, a rapidtransit advocate discovered that “it was perfectly evident from the start that
Cobb County was going to be our problem.”48 Vandiver agreed with him,
confessing that he “had a few nervous moments before the results of Cobb
County” in the 1964 referendum victory.49
By 1965, the suburban rebellion became evident. Aside from rosy
campaigns in newspapers, Vandiver gave talks on behalf of the 1965
referendum, which was for the metropolitan five counties to decide if theywould join the newly formed public transit authority, MARTA. The rapidtransit advocates, including Vandiver, knew that people in Cobb County
had an “‘Anti-Atlanta’ feeling.” They believed that rapid transit would take“their trade” away from Cobb and promote “encroachment by Atlanta into
Cobb’s political affairs.” “Negroes will settle along rapid transit routes,”
they also feared, along with predicting that Atlanta’s demands for public
service would bring a heavier tax burden.50
Vandiver tried to justify the rapid transit project. At a meeting held at
the chamber of commerce in affluent white-majority north Dekalb, theformer governor contended that rapid transit represented democracy.
According to him, publicly funded rapid transit was necessary because a“mass transit system of the size needed to serve Metropolitan Atlanta” wasregarded as “beyond the means of private capital.” For him, this “follows
the Jeffersonian principle of government doing only things which thepeople cannot do so well, or do at all, for themselves.”51 Despite his
efforts, suburban Cobb County declined to join MARTA in the June 1965
referendum. The heart of the rising antigovernment impulse resided in suchgrowing suburban counties, and Cobb County in particular saw a growth inseparatism in their confrontation with an expanding Atlanta.
Indeed, Vandiver recognized the very danger of white flight; however,
he understood it in the context of the physical and economic decline of
the urban core. After the election, the committee chair had a talk withyoung people at the meeting titled, “Emphasis—The City,” held at Holy
Innocents’ Episcopal Church in Atlanta. According to him, white flight was
problem, saying that “with such shifts in population and the accompanying
trade districts, many of our once flourishing and prosperous city districts

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become outmoded and obsolete.” He urged the audience to care about theplight of the central city, arguing that “the people remaining in the oldcentral city require welfare programs, job training, low rent housing andother social services.” For Vandiver, however, helping them did not meanfacing and eliminating racial discrimination, saying, “Many people believethat the effort put into keeping our cities truly livable are basic to national
security—and to our competition for men’s minds and allegiance.”52 The
advocates’ white, middle-class paternalistic view of community failed to see
the plight of African Americans and their ongoing struggle for civil rights.
Despite their belief in New Deal liberalism, the champions of mass transit
overlooked those who often needed this means of mobility the most—the
impoverished.
Subsequent elections in 1971 to determine if the four counties would
remain in the network of public transit showed that two more suburban
counties—Clayton and Gwinnett—chose not to join the new community
forged by the rapid transit network. Their attempt to make one social andeconomic unit ironically furthered disintegration. In the end, only two
counties, Fulton and DeKalb, joined the system. (See map.) In sum, themaking of rapid transit ignited the rebellion of suburbs against the city ofAtlanta.53 The attempt to construct one community united by a new modeof mobility without addressing internal changes and conflicts had paved theway to this ironic result.
NOTES
This article was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number
JP18KK0054 and JP20K12315.
1Charles Weltner, interview by Cliﬀ Kuhn, July 17, 1986, transcript, Georgia
Government Documentation Project, Special Collection & Archives, Georgia State
University Library, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia.
2
For a concise explanation of the progress of urban mass transportation legislation,
see David W. Jones, Mass Motorization+ Mass Transit: An American History and Policy
Analysis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), chap. 6; and George M. Smerk,“Development of Federal Urban Mass Transportation Policy,” Indiana Law Journal 47(Winter 1972): 249–91.
3
For scholars of urban history, demonstrating how racial and class divides have emerged
and shaped the lives of people in metropolitan areas has been an important mission. Atlanta
is no exception. For examples, see Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Makingof Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); and Matthew D.
Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2013). On the general history of twentieth-century Atlanta, see Larry

“A MUST FOR ATLANTA’S FUTURE”

83

Keating, Atlanta: Race, Class and Urban Expansion (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 2010); and Charles Rutheiser, Imagineering Atlanta: The Politics of Place in the Cityof Dreams (New York: Verso, 1996), both of which demonstrate how traﬃc constitutes oneof the keys to success of this mission. Kruse, in addition to authoring the above-mentioned
book about white ﬂight in Atlanta, has written a concise introduction in the 1619 Projectof the New York Times regarding how Atlanta’s interstate highway system built racism into
the city’s landscape (Kevin M. Kruse, “How Segregation Caused Your Traﬃc Jam, NewYork Times Magazine, August 14, 2019). These authors have also judged rapid transit to bea failure because it lacks suﬃcient stations in the suburbs. Here, I reveal that the causes ofthis eventual failure of MARTA were present in the initial proposal made before the actual
construction or operation of the rapid transit system. This argument diﬀers from that madeby Zachary M. Schrag in his detailed research on Washington Metro, which showed how the
public transit system in the nation’s capital represented Great Society liberalism (Zachary
M. Schrag, The Great Society Subway: A History of the Washington Metro (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2006). I contend that the liberalism of urban business and politicalelites in the early 1960s was severely limited by their refusal to understand the physical andeconomic decline of Atlanta in terms of race relations.
4“Big Counties Kill Rapid Transit Idea,” Atlanta Journal (hereafter AJ), November 13,
1962.
5
Ivan Allen to S. Ernest Vandiver, March 4, 1963, folder 3, box 5, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles, S.
Ernest Vandiver Jr. Papers, Richard B. Russell Library for Political Research and Studies,
University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia (hereafter SEVP); “Senate Gives Nod to Transit
Panel,” AJ, March 14, 1963.
6
For Allen’s mayorship, see Ivan Allen Jr. with Paul Hemphill, Mayor: Notes on the
Sixties (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971); and Gary M. Pomerantz, Where Peachtree
Meets Sweet Auburn: A Saga of Race and Family (New York: Penguin, 1996).
7“Summerville, Vandiver on Transit Panel,” AJ, March 6, 1963.
8
For Vandiver’s governorship of Georgia, see Harold Paulk Henderson, Ernest Vandiver,
Governor of Georgia (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2000).
9James C. Cobb, Georgia Odyssey: A Short History of the State (Athens: University ofGeorgia Press, 2008), 70.
10
By allocating more votes in less-populated areas during state primaries, Georgia’s
county unit system (1917–62) worked as a way for rural residents to maintain their politicalpower. This system considered the county, not the number of the votable citizens, as thebase unit for votes; therefore, rural areas gained more power than urban areas where mostbusiness establishments were located.
11
Ibid.
12
Ivan Allen to Ernest Vandiver, March 4, 1963, folder 3, box 5, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles, SEVP;
Ernest Vandiver to Ivan Allen, March 5, 1963, folder 3, box 6, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles, SEVP.
13
Ernest Vandiver to Herman Talmadge and Richard Russell, telegram, April 1, 1963,
folder 3, box 6, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles, SEVP.
14“Georgia Salons Talk of Capital,” AJ, April 5, 1963.
15“Transit Bill Is Passed by Senate,” Washington Post, Times Herald, April 5, 1963.
16
John Flint to Ernest Vandiver, April 16, 1964, folder 2, box 1, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles, SEVP.
17
Tom Pickett to Ernest Vandiver, telegram, June 18, 1964, folder 2 box 1, v. legal oﬃce
ﬁles, SEVP.
18“Transit Bill Is Passed by House,” Washington Post, Times Herald, June 26, 1964.
19“Some Large Cities Likely to Ask for Help under Mass Transit Act,” Washington Post,
Times Herald, July 6, 1964.
20
Charles Weltner to S. Ernest Vandiver, June 30, 1964, folder 2, box 6, v. legal oﬃce

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ICHIRO MIYATA

ﬁles, SEVP.
21
Ernest Vandiver to Herman Talmadge and Richard Russell, telegram, April 1, 1963,
folder 3, box 6, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles, SEVP.
22
Ernest Vandiver to Charles Weltner, John Flynt, Eliot Hagen, and Phillip M. Landrum,
April 7, 1964, folder 2, box 6, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles, SEVP.
23“What Fire?,” AJ, November 12, 1962.
24“Rapid Transit Panels Meet, Ooze Conﬁdence,” AJ, April 11, 1963.
25
The Committee of 100’s mission was to collect funding to undertake this public
relations campaign. The letter to business leaders from Vandiver solicited donations—theamount of the donation diﬀered according to the size of the company—saying that they
were “operating under extreme diﬃculties because of our quasi-oﬃcial status.” Vandiverto Business leaders, November 3 and December 13, 1963, in folder 4, box 6, v. legal oﬃce
ﬁles, SEVP.
26“Promoters Raise Rapid Transit Fund,” AJ, July 20, 1964.
27“19 Local Amendments Face Metro Voters,” AJ, November 2, 1964.
28“Vandiver Rapid Transit Statement If Bill Does Not Pass,” and “Vandiver Rapid Transit
Statement If Bill Passes the House,” June 17, 1963, folder 1, box 6, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles,
SEVP.
29
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority of 100, “Rapid Transit Gram,” February
10, 1964, folder 1, box 6, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles, SEVP.
30
The information sources primarily came from documents published by industries
that had a vested interest in selling rapid transit systems. For example, General Electric’s
pamphlet “Going Places,” which was sent periodically to the Committee of 100’s oﬃce,
was a source of information that members relied on in constructing their rapid transit
discourse. For General Electric’s “Going Places,” see From Robert M. Cautltas, Washington
Representative, Metropolitan Transportation General Electric Company, to S. Ernest
Vandiver, August 17, 1964, folder 10, box 5, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles, SEVP.
31
Infoplan conducted the survey at the Bank of Georgia building in downtown, theBelvedere shipping area, Auburn Avenue, Lenox Shopping Plaza, the State Capitol,Rich’s Stewart-Lakewood Shopping Plaza, and the West End Shopping Plaza. “Part I:
Background,” in “A Public Relations and Publicity Recommendation Developed forMetropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Committee of 100,” developed by Infoplan, August 14,
1963, folder 5, box 6, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles, SEVP.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid. “Part II: Objective,” in “A Public Relations and Publicity Recommendation
Developed for Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Committee of 100,” developed byInfoplan, August 14, 1963, folder 5, box 6, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles, SEVP.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Meeting with WSB television, Infoplan Contact Report, January 14, 1964, folder 1, box
6, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles, SEVP.
37
Lunch Conference, WSB-Television news, January 15 and 16, 1964, Infoplan Contact
Report, folder 1, box 6, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles, SEVP.
38
Ibid.
39
“Vandiver Supports Transit Proposal,” AJ, October 7, 1964.
40
Editorials, AJ, September 23, 1964.
41“Bennett Says Rapid Transit Vital to Economic Health,” AJ, October 9, 1964.
42
Glenn Bennett, “Thoughts after Vote for Rapid Transit,” to be released Saturday,
November 21, 1964,” folder 10, box 5, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles, SEVP.
43
Ernest Vandiver to the Members of Rapid Transit Committee of 100, November 30,

“A MUST FOR ATLANTA’S FUTURE”

85

1964, folder 10, box 5, v. legal oﬃce ﬁles, SEVP.
44“Rapid Transit: How Fast?,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, May 20, 1965.
45
Ibid.
46
In 1960, the city of Atlanta’s population was 488,666, and in the next ten years the
population grew to 496,973. The ﬁve counties’ population (outside Atlanta) increased from528,522 to 893,191. As for race, the city of Atlanta’s African American population rose from
188,031 to 256,470 over the decade, while the white population decreased from 300,635 to
240,503 in the same period. Moreover, family income rose from $5,010 to $8,410 per year in
the city, while total Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (Cobb, Gwinnett, Fulton, DeKalb,
Clayton, Rockdale, and Douglass) increased from $5,758 to $10,695. City of Atlanta,
Comprehensive Development Plan, 1976 (1976), 19–21.
47“Bennett Says Rapid Transit Vital to Economic Health,” AJ, October 9, 1964.
48
Richard Rich to S. Ernest Vandiver, November 6, 1964, folder 10, box 5, v. legal oﬃce
ﬁles, SEVP.
49
Ernest Vandiver to Richard Rich, November 16, 1964, folder 10, box 5, v. legal oﬃce
ﬁles, SEVP.
50“Transit Proposal Faces Stiﬀ Opposition in Cobb,” AJ, June 3, 1965.
51
Speech Draft at a Meeting of the North DeKalb Chamber of Commerce, April 4, 1965,
folder 6, box 3, iv. speeches and press, SEVP.
52“Emphasis—The City” at Holy Innocents’ Episcopal Church in Atlanta, n.d., folder 6,
box 3, iv. speeches and press, SEVP.
53
Lassiter, Silent Majority, 113–14.