The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 27 (2016)
Copyright © 2016 Tosh Minohara. All rights reserved. This work may be used, with thisnotice included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work may be distributed,
electronically or otherwise, in whole or in part, without permission from the author.

The Russo-Japanese War and the Transformation of
US-Japan Relations:Examining the Geopolitical Ramifications

Tosh Minohara*

The Western powers, which had the distinct advantage of being able toindustrialize and modernize before East Asia, unleashed their fury on theregion from the early 1800s. By the late nineteenth century, the imperial
powers of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia had divided most of
East Asia, excluding Japan, into their respective spheres of influence.1 To be
sure, Japan would certainly have encountered a similar fate had it not chosen
to depart from its traditional closed-door (sakoku) policy and instead
embarked on a path of emulating and learning from the West. Of course, thisnew path was not without difficulties, as Japan had no recourse but to accept
the burden of the so-called unequal treaties—extraterritoriality and the lackof tariff autonomy—as a late comer to the global stage. That being said,
Japan was, by and large, mostly successful in facing the challenges ofmodernizing both nation and society. As a result, Japan was largely able todeflect the more serious consequences of Western imperialism.
This alone did not assure Japan’s continued existence as a sovereignstate. The struggle for primacy in East Asia was actively contested among
the European powers, but Russia— because of its proximity to the region—
gradually began to emerge as the most expansionist force in Northeast Asia.
This Russian ambition became readily apparent by May 1891 with the*Professor, Kobe University

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construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which not only provided thenation with the impetus and momentum, but also the means to extend its
influence eastward. From the Japanese perspective, this move was a serious
threat to its national security. Russian expansion had the result of greatly
altering the geostrategic importance of the Korean Peninsula, as it now wastransformed into a critical buffer against further Russian expansion into theregion.2
In hindsight, it can be concluded that it was this control over the crucial
peninsula—the dagger poised to strike at the heart of Japan—that led toJapan’s preemptive strike on Qing China, which culminated in the 1894
Sino-Japanese War. This was undeniably a crucial first step in the series of
events that would eventually result in a power shift in the region. In otherwords, the conflict, which ended with the decisive defeat of China, was thecatalyst for geopolitical transformation.3 In the aftermath of the war, Japan
was able to secure a solid foothold on the Korean Peninsula, but such a
drastic change in the status quo also brought about serious repercussions.
This blowback came in the actions taken by Russia, Germany, and France
following Japan’s victory in the 1895 Triple Intervention. The three powers
coordinated to pressure Japan, through the threat of military action, torelinquish the recently acquired territories on the Liaotung Peninsula inNortheast China (South Manchuria) that had been ceded to Japan in thetreaty that resulted from the Shimonoseki Peace Conference. Japan was
powerless to resist such demands. Adding further embarrassment to Japan
was that the relinquished possession was later leased to Russia, contrary to
the original agreement. This traumatic experience—though not unique inthe power politics of the day—forced Japan’s leaders to become ever morecognizant that in a dog-eat-dog world Japan could not be aloof to thenational interests of the European powers. It was also clear that Japan was
in no position to resist their demands; that is, until such time as Japan could
become a powerful nation in its own right. There is no doubt that Japan’s
predicament instilled a strong sense of urgency in the Meiji government’s
goal of “wealthy nation, strong military (fukoku kyōhei).”
Meanwhile, Russia increased its pace of expansion and moved quickly tosecure deepwater ports that remained unfrozen even during the coldest
periods of winter.4 Ports that were accessible all year round were essential
for Russia’s quest to control the vital sea lanes, as steamships of the period
had limited range. Maintaining a chain of coaling stations south of theRussian border was seen as critical to Russian national interest. Japanneeded to tread cautiously in trying to counter Russian ambitions, and its

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47

first realpolitik instinct was to accommodate Russian expansion in South
Manchuria in order to avoid a direct confrontation with its powerfulneighbor. It was in this spirit that the Komura-Weber memorandum wasagreed on by Japan and Russia in May 1896. In the following month, thiswas further reinforced by the Yamagata-Lobanov agreement. The purposeof these diplomatic agreements was ostensibly to maintain an independent
Korea, but their true intent was to ensure that neither side would establish adominant position on the Korean Peninsula. In negotiating the second
agreement, Japan floated the idea of drawing a line of demarcation acrossthe 39th parallel as a way of diffusing tensions that were gradually building
up. Unfortunately, Russia had no interest in this compromise, as it firmly
believed that its dominant position did not necessitate any such concession
to a second-rate power.
Of course, international relations seldom remain static. A mere two years
passed before the Russians were forced to reconsider their position. Now
much more enmeshed in the affairs of Manchuria, Russia revised its posture
toward Japan, and for the first time entertained the idea of accepting acompromise on the Korea issue. This new stance was made apparent in the1898 Nishi-Rosen agreement that acknowledged Japan’s superior
commercial status on the Korean Peninsula. This sudden policy reversal by
Russia stirred Japan’s leaders into seeking a new agreement that would
carve out separate spheres of influences. Japan hoped that in exchange forallowing Russia a dominant position in Manchuria, it would be allowed asimilar position in Korea. But things did not proceed as the Japanese had
hoped, since Russia, as the greater power, did not see the need to concede
more to the Japanese.
St. Petersburg’s stubborn stance toward Tokyo, along with its convenient
ignoring of its previous promise to Japan of withdrawing its remaining
troops from Northeast China after the Boxer Rebellion, put Japan’s leaders
in a quandary. What policy should Japan implement toward a recalcitrant
Russia? Two distinct lines of Japanese foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia
emerged.5 The first line, supported by the Itō-Yamagata genrō (elder
statesmen) camp, held steadfastly that any actions that might lead to war
with such a large and formidable nation would be self-defeating. Thus, it
was purely rational for Japan to pursue a policy of avoiding conflict byappeasing Russia.. In contrast, the younger Japanese statesmen, led by the
Katsura-Komura camp, firmly believed that the most prudent way of dealing
with Russia and thwarting its ambitions in the Korea Peninsula—a sine qua
non for maintaining Japan’s national security—was to remain steadfast in

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its position, even at the risk of war. The hard-line policy advocated by thisgroup became much more viable with the signing of the 1902 AngloJapanese treaty.6 This was the first time that Japan had entered into a formal
alliance with a formidable European power. It was this major change in theregional power paradigm that finally allowed Japan’s decision makers toconsider a military option in dealing with a recalcitrant Russia.
After attempting a final and diplomatic solution to the problem throughthe Komura-Rosen negotiations of February 1904, the decision was made topursue the Katsura-Komura line. After convincing the genrōs of the wisdomof this policy change during the Ogikubo meeting, the final hurdle to waging
war against Russia was effectively removed. With war now looming on thehorizon the crucial issue was which nation would eventually come todominate the Korean Peninsula: the outcome would undeniably shape
Japan’s destiny.
With this as the historical backdrop, this essay will first trace thediplomatic process that led to the Portsmouth Peace Conference of August
1905. It will then examine the various motives and objectives of the Japanese
government. And in conclusion it will examine the transformation that took
place in US-Japan relations in the context of the realignment of international
relations in East Asia in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War.

From War to Peace: In Pursuit of a Diplomatic Solution
At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese military scoredseveral stunning victories on the battlefield, although this came at atremendous sacrifice in lives.7 The Battle of Mukden was a powerful blow
to Russia, but Tsar Nicholas II still had a potent card up his sleeve; theformidable Baltic Fleet. If this mighty fleet could annihilate the Imperial
Japanese Navy, the tide could be turned decisively against Japan, as it would
be essentially prevented from resupplying its land forces fighting in
Manchuria.
Despite a string of key victories, and while hidden from the public, Japanwas near exhaustion in terms of both material and financial resources. The
nation’s ability to sustain the conflict was seriously crippled.8 Munitions
plants across Japan were on overtime production, yet the enormous demand
could not be filled. Faced with this harsh reality, Japan’s leaders realizedthat concluding the war was a matter of utmost importance. But to end thewar on terms that were favorable to Japan, a crushing blow was needed todash the hopes of the tsar in achieving victory. This opportunity presented

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itself in a showdown between the two navies on May 27, 1905, in the
Tsushima Straits. Since a Japanese victory at sea was a prerequisite forpeace, the fate of the nation now rested entirely with Admiral Tōgō
Heihachirō.
Japan’s quest to end the war gained much needed traction on July 29.
When the last shots had been fired, the Japanese fleet had completely
crushed the Baltic Fleet, and sinking with the fleet was the tsar’s hope for areversal of fortune in the war.9 The tsar now, however grudgingly, had nochoice but to acknowledge defeat and consider a diplomatic resolution to
the war. The military phase of the war was fast approaching its terminus,
and the next round would be contested among diplomats sitting at thenegotiating table. Yet only by achieving additional victory in the diplomatic
phase would Japan be able to secure the fruits of the war.
Japan’s peace overture actually began much earlier than the Portsmouth
conference. Early attempts can be traced back to July 1904 when Tokyo
contemplated a meeting between the Japanese ambassador to Britain,
Hayashi Tadasu, and the Russian finance minister, Sergei I. Witte, in aneutral county such as Belgium, with Germany acting as intermediary.10
The plan fell through when it became evident that St. Petersburg had nointerest in peace. From the tsar’s perspective, the military situation did notpose a serious enough threat to necessitate a diplomatic compromise withan inferior power such as Japan. Although some of his advisers had concerns
about the financial toll of the war and the swelling social unrest in Russia,
the tsar did not share these concerns and instead interpreted Tokyo’s
eagerness to negotiate as a sign of weakness.
As the tsar’s confidence in his military was what supported his position,
it was only natural that after each Japanese victory on the battlefield, seeking
peace would become that much more attractive. In the end, it was the fall ofPort Arthur to the Japanese in August 1904 that provided the impetus for
Russia in considering peace, which was also supported by the US president,
Theodore Roosevelt. Once more, Tokyo tried to prod St. Petersburg to sit at
the negotiating table. Despite this effort, however, the Russians were still
not ready to seek peace. No doubt, maintaining prestige was an importantconcern for imperial Russia as it could not bear the idea of being humiliatedby this nonwhite and still developing nation.
There was another reason why the early peace initiatives failed. The
German kaiser, Wilhelm II, was urging Tsar Nicholas II to persist in his
struggle against the “yellow peril.”11 Nevertheless, despite this pressure, theRussians were forced to reassess their posture in the aftermath of Japan’s

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Tosh Minoharahuge victory at Mukden in March 1905. The bleak outlook for their situationon the battlefield, combined with further swelling of domestic unrest, finallymade peace a palatable alternative for Russia.
The mood in Tokyo was also rapidly changing. Prime Minister KatsuraTarō and Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, who were both initially opposed
to an early peace, now believed that the time was ripe for ending the war.
Although Japan had been successful in obtaining additional loans from its
allies that were necessary for continuing the war, they clearly were notadequate to allow for a prolonged conflict. With financial and military
resources rapidly dwindling, Japan’s war-fighting capabilities were stretchedto the breaking point. Moreover, considering that Russia’s imperialistic
ambitions toward South Manchuria and Korea had been successfully
thwarted, seeking peace at this juncture was a pragmatic and prudent moveon Japan’s part.

The United States Enters the Fray
By late April 1905 the decision was made by Japan’s leaders that Japan
would seek the good offices of President Roosevelt in brokering a peacedeal with the Russians. Although Roosevelt ostensibly maintained a positionof not taking a side in the conflict, it was readily apparent that he was in fact
a friend of Japan. Once the formal Japanese request for American assistance
was made, the president strove earnestly to bring the Russians to the peacetable. At one point, an international conference that included other European
powers was also considered, but this was quickly withdrawn, as it was
realized that mutual distrust would surely doom such a conference from theonset. Japan also objected to this plan out of concern that the European
powers, excluding Britain, would create a united front against it.
Once Japan had agreed to a bilateral peace conference, it was tasked to
Roosevelt to persuade the Russians to acquiesce. There were two new
weapons in his arsenal to accomplish this: the capable US ambassador,
George von Lengerke Myer, in St. Petersburg, who had just been transferredfrom Rome, and the German kaiser, who now felt a sudden and urgent needfor Russia to reach peace lest domestic unrest in that country spread toGermany. In the end, Roosevelt was successful in convincing the tsar of thewisdom of seeking peace. Thus, on June 9, the convening of a peace
conference was formally announced.
Of particular interest is the following episode. The tsar was adamant that
his decision to accept Roosevelt’s mediation be kept under wraps until theThe Russo-Japanese War and the Transformation of US-Japan Relations

51

Japanese had publicly announced their intention of participating in thepeace conference. Myer thus gave his assurances that this information
would not be divulged to the Japanese. At the same time, however, Myer
was keenly aware that he needed to somehow convey the tsar’s decision to
Tokyo so that Japan would indeed take the first step and make its intention
publicly known. To this effect, Myer devised a clever a plan whereby hediscreetly leaked the information to the foreign offices of both Britain andGermany. This assured that Japan would learn of Russia’s decision via athird party while Myer would, in a strict sense, be able to keep his promise
to the tsar.12
Getting the two sides to agree to talk was just one of many obstacles thatneeded to be resolved before peace could be achieved. For example, Japanand Russia haggled over such details as where the conference should be
held, the former requesting Chefoo in China and the latter a European venue
such as Paris, The Hague, or Geneva.13 Japan held steadfast in its position
that any European location was untenable. In this way, both countries were
desperately attempting to somehow secure a sort of home court advantage
in a foreign country. After a few weeks of quibbling, Washington, DC,
finally emerged as an acceptable venue for both parties, although Roosevelt
was not terribly enthusiastic about the idea of hosting the conference on
American soil.14 Moreover, a serious drawback with hosting the conferencein Washington was that the city became notoriously hot and humid during
the summer. In the days before air-conditioning, convening a conference
under these harsh conditions was untenable. Therefore, a more suitable
alternative was considered from among the many towns on the Easternseaboard. In the end, it was determined that Portsmouth, New Hampshire,
which was nice and cool in the summer but not overly crowded with tourists,would be an ideal location.15 The existence of a naval base nearby made it asecure location while allowing for convenient access by water. Both Japanand Russia agreed to the site, and thus it was now finally possible to address
the finer details of the upcoming peace conference.
Once the venue of the conference was determined, the Japanese
government needed to decide who would lead the delegation in what wassurely to become an arduous mission. Prime Minister Katsura’s first choice
was former prime minister, Itō Hirobumi, since he had consistently
advocated a pro-Russian policy.16 Furthermore, Itō had many high-levelcontacts in St. Petersburg, which made him an ideal candidate. Ito politely
declined, however, claiming that because he had been a vocal opponent of
the war from the beginning it made more sense for the onerous task to fall

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on an individual who had actually advocated for war.
Encountering stiff resistance, Katsura realized that it would be futile toattempt to convince Ito to accept the task. At the same time, Katsura thoughtthat it was imperative for himself to remain in Japan so that he could send
instructions to the delegation from Tokyo. Who, then, would be the next
most suitable candidate? The natural choice was of course his foreign
minister, who had been avid in pressing for war against Russia. Komura,then fifty years old, embraced this opportunity to become the Japaneseplenipotentiary to the conference. It was also decided that Takahira Kogorō,ambassador to the United States, would act as his right-hand man.17 In
Komura’s absence, Katsura would also assume the position of acting foreign
minister, strategically placing himself where he could coordinate and assist
with the diplomatic maneuverings in Portsmouth.

Pursuing Peace in Portsmouth:
Getting America into Japan’s Corner
On July 3, 1905, the names of the members of the Japanese delegation
were made public. In addition to Komura and Takahira from the Japanese
foreign ministry (Gaimushō), the diplomats Satō Aimaro, Yamaza Enjiro,
Adachi Mineichiro, Honda Kumatarō, Ochiai Kentarō, Hanihara Masanao,
and Konishi Kōtaro were chosen to participate in the delegation. Also sentfrom the Gaimushō was the capable American adviser, Henry W. Denison,
who earned a handsome salary that was nearly twice that of the foreign
minister’s. From the Imperial Navy, Commander Takeshita Isamu, and fromthe Imperial Army, Colonel Tachibana Shōichirō consituted the militarycomponent of the delegation.18
All the delegates were aware of the difficulty of their mission. The
Russians were one thing, but what loomed heavily on their minds was theunrealistically high expectation held by the Japanese public. In order toconceal Japan’s dire military situation from the Russians, the Japanesepublic had been intentionally misled into believing that their nation had
dealt a crushing blow against the enemy. In reality, however, Japan was not
only burdened by a serious shortage of munitions and other critical military
supplies, but it also critically lacked the necessary manpower and financial
means to remain engaged in the war. Therefore, unbeknownst to the Japanesepublic, peace at almost any price was the prevailing attitude of Japan’s
leaders.19
One cannot deny that the Shimonoseki conference had set an important

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53

precedent as to what was expected in a peace negotiation for the victor:
territorial concessions and an indemnity. The government was keenly aware,
however, that it would be next to impossible to extract such concessions
from Russia, as it had been defeated on the battlefield but not yet the war
itself. Thus, these two items had lower priority among Japan’s peacedemands. On July 8, 1905, as the Japanese delegation was preparing todepart Yokohama onboard the steamliner SS Minnesota—one of the largest
American passenger ships of the day—Komura observed from the deck thecrowd below had gathered to see him off and who were proudly waving thenational Hinomaru flag of Japan. He gloomily commented to his colleagues
that on his return to Japan, this patriotic fervor might very well cost him hislife.20
Despite a few early days of rough seas, the voyage from Yokohama to
Tacoma, Washington, was generally a pleasant one. They arrived on July
19. Komura had been out of contact with Tokyo throughout this transPacific journey, so he immediately immersed himself in the Gaimusho
cables that were awaiting his arrival at the Japanese consulate in Seattle. It
was at this time that Komura learned that his counterpart at the conference
would be Witte.21 Komura assessed this positively as he knew that Witte had
been opposed to the war. Also contained in the cable was a vital piece of
information that stated that Witte would be arriving in New York on August
1. This meant that Komura would be able to meet with President Roosevelt
first and keep a step ahead of the Russians.22 Without further delay, Komura
departed for Washington, DC, on the first transcontinental train from Seattle,
arriving in New York via Chicago on the morning of July 25. He was met atthe station by Ambassador Takahira, who had just arrived from the Japanese
legation in the capital. The headquarters of the Japanese delegation was aroom in the luxurious Waldorf Astoria Hotel, and the group’s first diplomatic
priority was to reaffirm the “good offices” of Roosevelt. This also coincidedwith the final phase of the war, which was taking place just north of
Hokkaido in the Sakhalin Islands.23
Prior to Komura’s arrival in America, Roosevelt had casually suggested
to Takahira that occupying Russian territory would undoubtedly improve
Japan’s position in the upcoming peace negotiations. Although the Imperial
Army had independently reached the same conclusion, albeit much earlier,under the suggestion of army chief of staff Nagaoka Gaishi, the operation
had been shelved because the Imperial Navy was unwilling to spare any
vessels for the operation due to the impending arrival of the Baltic Fleet.
Thus, victory in the Battle of Tsushima Straits had finally freed up the

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necessary resources required for proceeding with the invasion of Sakhalin.
With the gentle prodding of Roosevelt and the blessing of Yamagata
Aritomo, what had previously been a low-priority operation now became amission with huge diplomatic ramifications. Sakhalin was secured just intime before the convening of the conference, and with sovereign Russian
territory now in Japanese possession for the first time, the fate of the islands
would become an important card at the negotiation table.

David and Goliath:
The Diplomatic Struggle between Komura and Witte
With both plenipotentiaries now sitting across the table from each other,
the stage was set for the final phase of the Russo-Japanese War.24 Although
Japan had achieved a stunning victory in the military phase of the war, thereal fruits of this victory could only be sealed through the peace negotiation.
Defeated Russia in 1905 was very different than the utterly devastated Japanof 1945; it still possessed the ability to continue the war in the event theconference failed. The leading voice representing the diehard hawks in St.
Petersburg was the tsar himself. Under these circumstances, Japan’s only
realistic option was to seek a “soft peace” that did not require a substantial
sacrifice on Russia’s part.
Japan’s bottom-line peace terms fell into three categories. In the firstcategory were those terms of the highest importance over which the Japanese
government would not make any concessions. These demands embodied
the very national security interests that had prompted Japan to go to war
with Russia in the first place. In the event that any of these demands were
not met, Tokyo was determined to continue the war. Thus Komura had strict
instructions not to deviate from following non-negotiable demands,25 whichwere first, removing all Russian influence from Korea as well as Russianacquiescence to placing Korea under sole Japanese control; second,
complete withdrawal of both Russian and Japanese troops from Manchuria;
and third, obtaining the leasing rights to the territories of Lushun, Dairen,and several other portions of the Liaodong Peninsula in addition to thetransfer of all railways and mines south of Harbin to Japan.
At the same time, the Japanese government provided Komura with someleeway in negotiating the precise terms of the second category of demands:(a) payment of an indemnity, the sum not to exceed 15 billion yen; (b) the
surrender of all warships that were interred in neutral ports; (c) cessation of
Sakhalin and other outlying islands; and (d) the concession of coastal fishing

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55

rights.
The final group of Japanese demands consisted of nonessential terms
which the Russians would most likely to reject outright. These demands
were not critical for Japan, and they were intended to be used as bargaining
chips by Komura in order to obtain key Russian concessions in the othermore crucial demands; namely, limiting Russian naval presence in East
Asia and demilitarizing Vladivostok by converting it into a commercial
port.
Under the precondition that the first set of demands would be definitely
incorporated in the final peace treaty, Komura was given the authority to
discuss and negotiate the finer points of the peace settlement as he saw fit.
In this way, Japanese demands were set as low as realistically possible,
which clearly reflected Japan’s eagerness to reach an agreement. Despite
this, the negotiations did not progress smoothly, in part because Komura
stubbornly bargained for territorial concessions as well as an indemnity.
These were the two demands that Russia could not consider lest it beperceived as suffering a humiliating defeat by a lesser power. At the sametime, Komura could not also sidestep his second-tier demands as he knew
very well that the Japanese public, with its bloated expectations of the peace
conference, would be content with nothing less. It was only after Americanpressure that Komura was forced to accept a peace without reparations andonly the southern half of Sakhalin as a territorial concession.

Ending a Controversy: Did Roosevelt Betray Japan?
Roosevelt has long been viewed as a friend of Japan since he spared noeffort in advancing Japanese interests during his term in office. Before thewar, he had enthusiastically supported Japan’s opposition to Russian
influence in Manchuria and Korea, and during the Portsmouth conference
he eagerly lent his hand so that Japan could achieve a diplomatic victory.
Roosevelt skillfully advised Japan to the point of even suggesting theoccupation of Sakhalin as a way to improve Japan’s bargaining position.
But Roosevelt was no Japanophile; his policy was firmly grounded onpragmatism and the preservation of American national interests.
This traditional image of Roosevelt as sympathetic to Japan has recently
come into question. This view, which is based on a misconstrued
interpretation of a comment found in the Japanese foreign ministry’s historyof the conference, portrays Roosevelt as betraying Japan by not divulging a
key piece of information at the Portsmouth conference.26 The basis for the

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argument hinges on a telegram Ambassador Meyer sent to the president
which contained a startling revelation. Per the ambassador, the tsar had achange of heart and was now finally willing to concede the southern half of
Sakhalin to Japan. With this fact, the revisionists argue that it was Roosevelt’s
intent to sabotage the conference so that he could bring the parties together
again in New York where a treaty would be successfully concluded under
his direct supervision. In other words, Roosevelt supposedly wanted to gain
domestic political capital that he could use in the upcoming presidential
election.27
Does this theory about Roosevelt’s behavior hold any water? It is truethat neither the Japanese government nor Komura were initially aware of
the tsar’s dramatic volte-face. Because Nicholas had hitherto been staunchly
opposed to accepting a humiliating peace, even the Japanese elder statesmen
and the influential army leader, Yamagata Aritomo, had become reconciled
to the idea of a peace without indemnity and/or territory. This policy shift
was grounded in the stark reality that Japan did not possess the capability of
prolonging the fight, particularly since the Russian army had been given
ample time to regroup and resupply.
The final decision to accept a peace treaty that did not insist on both anindemnity and territory was reached by the cabinet on the afternoon ofAugust 28 and immediately conveyed to the emperor. The specificinstructions based on this cabinet decision were sent to the delegation andencoded and transmitted at precisely 20:35,29 but because of the timedifference Komura received the telegram only at 13:00 on August 28. He
read the telegram with a heavy heart, but he also clearly he understood thelogic behind the government’s decision. Following his instructions, Komura
placed the last touches on the final Japanese peace proposal, which wasnearly identical to Witte’s final offer.
It is at this time that a series of remarkable developments altered theoutcome of the peace conference. After the instructions had been sent off toKomura, the Gaimushō finally given a reprieve from the frantic pace of thepast few weeks. The head of the commerce bureau, Ishii Kikujirō, felt that
this would be the time to meet with the British ambassador, Sir Claude
MacDonald, who had requested an appointment the night before. Because
Ishii had been exhausted from a long day at the ministry he had been
annoyed by how late into the night the request had been made and was not
at all looking forward to meeting the Scotsman.30
Ishii was in for a huge shock when he heard MacDonald’s startlingrevelation. According to confidential information that the ambassador had

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just received from London, the tsar had grudgingly agreed to cede thesouthern half of Sakhalin to Japan on the grounds that it had only been partof Russia for the past thirty years. On learning this stunning information,
Ishii hurried back to the Gaimushō to inform Vice Foreign Minister Chinda
Sutemi. Chinda in turn rushed to Prime Minister Katsura’s residence toapprise him of the sudden turn of events. After several frantic meetings with
key government leaders, just after dawn on the nest day, the emperor was
informed of the situation, after which a new set of instructions was sent toKomura. He was now to include in his demands, the cessation of the southernhalf of Sakhalin.31 Unaware of the reason behind this sudden position
reversal, Komura was skeptical that Witte would agree to a proposal thatsignificantly departed from his earlier proposal. But to Komura’s utter
astonishment, Witte accepted Japan’s offer, and at this very moment peace
was had been achieved. On learning of this news, Roosevelt exclaimed,“Magnificent! Nothing for years has pleased me so much.”32
Nevertheless, there is not a single shred of evidence that supports thenotion that Roosevelt intentionally withheld this crucial piece of informationfrom the Japanese for political gain. Besides, there was absolutely no
assurance that Japan and Russia would agree to a second conference at alater date. Furthermore, it was obvious that if an agreement could not bereached in Portsmouth, the fighting would surely resume. This would be apolitical liability for Roosevelt as it would signify that his mediation had
been a failure. As mediator, he had indeed devoted himself in earnest so thatthe two adversaries could come to terms. These reasons all suggest that
Roosevelt’s omission of information was by no means deliberate.33 But thegreatest inherent weakness of the notion that Roosevelt acted for politicalreasons, however, is that the presidential election had already taken place inNovember 1904.
When the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was concluded in September 1905,
Roosevelt had been in office for less than six months. Moveover, Roosevelt
had publicly announced his intention not to run for a second term.34 Thus,
the idea that Roosevelt intended to sabotage the peace conference for his
own personal gain is untenable. The precise reason why he did not inform
Komura about the tsar’s changing his position over Sakhalin has long
puzzled historians. Yet if Roosevelt had not acted based on personal
interests, then how can his perplexing action be explained?
In reality, there was a less cynical reasoning behind the president’s
motive. Ambassador Meyer had informed Roosevelt of the tsar’s decision
to cede the southern half of Sakhalin on August 23.35 However, the president

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wanted reassurance that Meyer had conveyed his plan to Nicholas in toto.
Roosevelt was particularly anxious to clarify if Nicholas had been informed
about the proviso that the Russians would relinquish all of Sakhalin to Japanafter which a payment would be made to Japan for the return of northern
portion of Sakhalin. The exact amount of the payment was to be left for a
future negotiation. It was important that the tsar provide assurance that heagreed, in principle, to the idea of paying for the return of part of the island.36
Because the tsar’s position still remained ambiguous, Roosevelt had
instructed Meyer to confirm that the tsar had acquiesced. However, before
receiving a reply from his ambassador, Roosevelt took the matter into his
own hands and sent a direct letter to the tsar on August 25 that described his
proposal in detail. Two days later, on August 27, Russia replied that it would
refuse to make any form of payment as it would essentially amount to anindemnity.37 On the following day, the tsar’s attitude further hardened, andhe ordered his foreign minister Vladimir Lamsdorf to send instructions to
Witte that Russia would reject outright the Japanese proposal and that thepeace negotiations were to be broken off immediately.38
Under these circumstances, Roosevelt was not yet prepared to inform theJapanese of the content of the August 23 telegram from Meyer. The tsar wasnotoriously indecisive about important issues and thus frequently changed
his mind about them. As far as Roosevelt was concerned, Nicholas’s
concession of August 23 still needed to be verified. If he were to pass along
this unconfirmed piece of information over the territorial concession to theJapanese and this turned out to be false, he would be placed in a very
embarrassing situation. This was a risk that he wanted to avoid. Of course
there was also the possibility that the tsar would remain true to his initialpromise, and in that case, it would be prudent to share this crucial piece of
information with the Japanese. It is therefore reasonable to believe that
Roosevelt leveraged his position and utilized an indirect channel to informTokyo, namely, by divulging the information to Japan’s ally, the British.
After all, a precedent existed for this sort of diplomatic maneuver. As wehave seen earlier, the tsar had agreed to negotiate peace under the condition
that Japan would make the announcement first. This “confidential”
information had been quietly leaked to the British so that it could be secretly
conveyed to the Japanese without any involvement of the Americans.
By using the British as intermediaries, Roosevelt was also avoiding any
responsibility for the veracity of the information regarding to the verbal
concessions made the tsar. That being said, the Japanese would be privy tothis new development and thereby be given the opportunity to respond how

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59

it saw fit. However, this information only became critically important due
to an unforeseen development of events. Witte had decided to disregard the
instructions from the foreign minister and instead accepted peace treaty
along the terms submitted on August 24. This was the precise moment when
peace had been attained. In light of this big picture, the issue of southern
Sakhalin should not be overblown as it was merely icing on the cake forJapan. Moreover, as the concession by the tsar had come at such a latejuncture in the conference, it had not impacted the negotiations in asignificant way: Tokyo had already committed itself to accepting “peace
without an indemnity or territory.”

Peace at Portsmouth:
Accommodating Japan as an Emerging Powerand Ensuing US-Japan Relations
Securing peace at Portsmouth allowed Japan to shift its attention toward
its postwar diplomacy. The decisive outcome of the Russo-Japanese War
enabled Japan to vastly strengthen and expand its sphere of influence inboth Northeast China and Korea. Thus, it was only logical that Japan’s new
foreign policy trajectory would place more emphasis on how to maintainand manage the expansion of its empire. Emerging from this new reality
were three distinct lines for the possible future course of Japanese foreign
policy.39
The first, supported by the Imperial Army, advocated direct military ruleover the newly acquired Japanese possessions as well as greater involvementin the affairs of China. In addition, the army supported outright annexationof Manchuria. Wary of any further Japanese territorial expansion, the British
steadfastly objected to this policy, informing Japan that it would be an
imprudent move to take further action on the continent. The United States
also made its concerns known, conveying to Tokyo its “great disappointment”
if Japan were to embark on an overly imperialistic path. Fortunately, in theend, pragmatism prevailed, and the plan was withdrawn after intensepressure from Itō, who firmly believed that that the pursuit of such a policy
would spell disaster for Japan.
The second policy line found its most outspoken proponent in Hayashi.
This policy was grounded firmly in the ideals of internationalism thatenvisioned Japan as a nation working in concert with the other great powers.
It embraced the concept of enlightened self-interest and emphasizedcooperation over conflict. It was a very radical approach, however,60

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considering that, in the early part of the twentieth century, imperialism still
was the fundamental policy of the major powers. Therefore, it naturally
encountered stiff resistance from the genrō, who viewed Hayashi’s idealistic
diplomacy not only as amateurish but also unrealistic. Moreover, thetremendous surge of Chinese nationalism that manifested itself after the
Russo-Japanese War also damaged Hayashi’s credibility, as many in Japanbegan to view his weak-kneed stance toward China as the fuel sustaining
this nationalism. Despite losing the support of the Japanese public, Hayashi,
as the foreign minister in Saionji Kinmochi’s first cabinet, was still
successful in bringing Japan closer not only to France but also to its former
adversary, Russia.
The third policy line was continent-oriented as advocated by Komura.
This policy, known as “Komura diplomacy” (Komura gaikō), eventuallybecame the guiding principle of Japan’s foreign policy until the early 1920s,
when the foreign minister during that time, Shidehara Kijūrō, embraced theprinciples of the Washington Treaty system and realigned Japan’s diplomatic
path so that it emphasized greater cooperation in East Asia with the UnitedStates and Great Britain.
After the conclusion of the Portsmouth Peace Conference, Komura’s
primary policy goal was to ensure that Japan would become a major player
in East Asian affairs.40 The essence of Komura gaikō was not merely aboutsolidifying Japan’s position on the Asian continent but also boosting its
global status and prestige. When Komura’s policy was implemented, it
therefore prompted a realignment of the existing international order of theregion, transforming the status quo into a new regional order that better
conformed to Japan’s perceived national interests and security concerns.
Japan’s rise as a new power, coming mostly at the expense of Russia, was
the key catalyst for a cascade of events that led to a shift in the existing
spheres of influence in East Asia. This drastic change became readily
apparent as the European powers took the necessary diplomatic action toaccommodate Japan’s entry as a new power—the Taft-Katsura memorandumof July 1905, the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance of August 1905, theFranco-Japanese Convention of June 1907, the Root-Takahira agreement ofNovember 1908, and the Russo-Japanese Convention of July 1907 (amended
and extended in 1910, 1912, and 1916). This string of new international
agreements were especially significant as, unlike the events that had
transpired after the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), for the first time all
the European powers now acknowledged Japan’s status as a new power
while also recognizing Japan’s vested interest in South Manchuria and theThe Russo-Japanese War and the Transformation of US-Japan Relations

61

Korean Peninsula.41
In the context of US-Japan relations, it was Japan’s rapid ascendance asa power that transformed the very nature of the relationship to one which
evolved into a strategic partnership.42 This was partially a result of the limits
to American power. At the time, the United States did not possess thenecessary naval strength to defend its recently acquired territories in the
Pacific. Thus, the Philippines, referred back then as America’s “Achilles’
heel,” was an acute security concern owing to enlarged German ambitionsin the region.43
It was Japan’s decisive victory against Russia that prompted a dynamic
shift in Japan’s position, as it now became the most ideal partner in Asia for
the United States. This partnership was forged on the principle of preserving
and respecting mutual interests in the region. In other words, as long as theOpen Door principle was respected by Japan and Tokyo took no action thatwould encroach on other American interests in the region, Japan would
have the tacit approval by Washington to establish its own sphere of
influence. It was this mutual understanding which was embodied in the1905 Taft-Katsura memorandum and the 1908 Root-Takahira agreement.
Hence, in the aftermath of the Portsmouth conference, US-Japan relations,from a strategic perspective, were now on firm ground. Despite thismutuality, the idea that US-Japan relations suddenly underwent a momentous
shift toward one of constant friction after the Russo-Japanese War still has
a powerful grip among those trying to interpret the nature of AmericanJapanese relations of the time.44
The arguments used in supporting this prevailing view are the following:
first, the fierce anti-American riots in Japan epitomized by the September
1905 Hibiya riots in which thousands of Japanese gathered in Tokyo toprotest the recent peace agreement; second, the war plans drawn up by thetwo nations that viewed the other as the hypothetical enemy; third, theensuing naval arms race; and fourth, the “war scare” instigated by the antiJapanese movement in California as well as its racist underpinnings.45 All ofthese factors seemingly point to a buildup of serious tensions in US-Japan
relations. But under closer scrutiny, each event has a rational explanationthat does not necessarily imply a deteriorating bilateral relationship. Quiteon the contrary, these events merely serve to reveal that a fundamental shift
had taken place in which US-Japan relations experienced a significant
transformation resulting in a mature power-to-power relationship paradigm
for the first time ever since the arrival of Commodore Matthew C. Perry toJapan in 1853.

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There is little doubt that public opinion was the chief instigator ofdomestic unrest in Japan after the Portsmouth conference. However, theHibiya riots cannot be conveniently explained away as merely as a sudden
upsurge in anti-American sentiment in Japan. To frame the incident in amore proper context, one needs to realize that the rioters’ anger was also
directed at the Japanese government. Furthermore, since the Japanese public
had been misled for national security reasons to believe that Japan had
soundly defeated Russia in a one-sided victory, it was only natural thatmany felt betrayed by what appeared to be Komura’s capitulation to theRussians at the negotiating table. Just as Komura had feared when heembarked on his trip to Portsmouth, this powerful feeling of disappointment
created a highly combustible atmosphere that erupted when the public
realized that, despite their huge sacrifices, there would be no indemnity andthat territorial concessions would be minimal.
Quite different in nature was the postwar naval buildup that followed in
the aftermath of the conference. This can be understood in the context of thenatural growth of both nations, as each now possessed a vastly wider sphereof influence that covered a lot of ocean. Moreover, Mahanian doctrine,
which had a powerful influence on naval strategy of the time, dictated that
securing sea-lanes was a vital component of maintaining national security.
Therefore, the naval buildup in itself did not signify any hostile intentions.
Even if one examines the war plans of each nation—War Plan Orange for
the United States and the Imperial Defense Plan (Teikoku kokubō hōshin)
for Japan—it is unrealistic to interpret either as a viable plan for actual war.
Because the United States and Japan were the dominant naval powers in the
Pacific, it made practical sense for both navies to contemplate contingencies
based on the possibility, however remote, that the other side could one day
become an adversary. Moreover, neither nation developed a detailed tacticaloperational plan but simply set forth basic guidelines in the event conflict
were to occur. As is true for any institution that seeks to sustain relevance,
this served as a convenient way for both navies to rationalize their hugebudget requests, which they claimed was absolutely necessary in order tomaintain an ideal state of military readiness.
Regarding the final issue of discriminatory practices toward Japaneseimmigrants in the United States, this can be interpreted as an isolated, albeit
unfortunate, incident that in no way reflected the policies being pursued at
the national level.46 Specifically, it was the 1906 San Francisco School
Board incident that culminated in the mini war crisis on the jingoistic West
Coast. The yellow press, eager to sell newspapers, flamed emotions by

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63

stirring up sensationalistic stories of an “impending war with Japan.”47 The
crisis escalated to the point that it was only diffused through the directintervention of President Roosevelt, who was wholly unsympathetic to theposition taken by the local politicians. Although this was an unpopular
move with those who valued states’ rights, his firm commitment of notallowing domestic politics to hinder foreign relations served to further
strengthen US-Japan relations. This hands-on policy toward the immigration
problem reflected not only the high level of friendship and mutual trust
between the two nations, but also the value that Roosevelt himself placed on
fostering and maintaining a strategic partnership with Japan.
William H. Taft, who followed Roosevelt in the presidency, also did not
depart from the fundamental policy established by his predecessor in regard
to the immigration problem. As a result, it never resurfaced as a diplomatic
issue during his tenure as president. The basic groundwork of US-Japan
relations during the two Republican administrations was firmly based on
mutual cooperation, not confrontation. To be sure, Taft’s “dollar diplomacy”
toward Manchuria, a term which was actrally only enunciated at the end of
his presidency, raised some concerns in Japan. Komura was particularly
troubled by the railroad magnate E. H. Harriman’s plans to neutralize andown the railways in Manchuria, as this blatantly disregarded Japan’s national
interests and was an unwelcome encroachment upon its sphere of influence.
However, this too never became a serious issue that stirred strong national
sentiments. Harriman soon passed away, and his ambitious plans died withhim. In the end, diplomatic pragmatism prevailed. Even though Taft’s
policies in regard to East Asia were of a slightly different shade than
Roosevelt’s, the tune still remained the same. Bilateral ties with Japan, evenif tested at times, were never in serious danger of being strained. It was
Taft’s unwavering belief that as long as Japan respected the Open Door
Policy in Manchuria, and harbored no designs on the Philippines or Hawaii,then American interests in the region were safe. Conversely, the president
was clearly cognizant that US interests could only be maintained if
Washington extended the same respect and courtesy toward Japan’s sphereof influence in Taiwan, Korea, and South Manchuria. It was in this light thatboth countries signed the 1911 US-Japan Treaty of Commerce and Amity
that finally dispensed with most unequal provisions it the previous treaty.
Japan was now a strategic partner in its own right and a power that theUnited States would depend upon on in preserving its interests in the region.
Unfortunately, this amicable arrangement was not to last. The unexpectedvictory of the Democrats in the 1912 presidential election, brought about by

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a split in the Republican Party, caused this informal accord to come underincreasing pressure. President Woodrow Wilson and his “New Diplomacy”
espoused idealistic principles that altered the underpinnings of US-Japan
relations in a way that friction and tensions increased. Wilson and his
adherents in the State Department placed emphasis on undoing the realismbased East Asian policy embodied in the Root-Takahira agreement.48 Thus,in retrospect, it can be understood that it was actually Wilson who brought
about a fundamental shift in US-Japan relations. His new policy disregarded
Japan’s interests in East Asia while also failing to address Japanesesensitivities over race and immigration. Thus, it was not a coincidence thatthe immigration issue in California flared up twice during Wilson’s tenure
as president, in 1913 and 1920. Faced with these new norms, Japan reacted
by implementing policies that would further solidify its position on the
Asian continent. This, in turn, would have a boomerang effect on American
public opinion, leading to an eventual deterioration of mutual perceptions.
The longer events of the Great War led to a momentarily lapse in tensions
as witnessed by the 1917 Ishii-Lansing agreement, but this was merely atemporary accommodation that emerged due to the existence of a morepressing issue. Thus, Japan and the United States quickly came head to headin the aftermath of the war during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Bythen, a latent undercurrent had developed in both countries, and they now
increasingly viewed each other as lacking a common strategic objective.
The adjustments made during the 1920s under the Republican Warren
G. Harding administration—the Washington Treaty System, and more
specifically the Nine-Power Treaty—momentarily realigned the two nations
once again. However, their difference would become even starker during
the tumultuous decade of the1930s which in turn culminate in the rupture of
relations in December 1941.
As present-day events in East Asia indicate, another regional dynamic
power shift is taking place as relative US primacy in the region wanes as
becomes increasingly challenged on multiple fronts by China. Surely, there
are ample lessons to be garnered from the power shift that took place over a
century ago in this region.

Notes
The Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal also had maintained spheres of influence atvarious times, but by the nineteenth century these powers had declined significantly ininfluence. See William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–1902 (New1

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65

York: Knopf, 1965).
2 For further details, see Seung-Young Kim, “Russo-Japanese Rivalry over Korean
Buffer at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century and Its Implications,” Diplomacy andStatecraft 16 (2005): 619–50. The Japanese viewed Russia as the greatest national
security threat from March 1890. Ibid, 621.
3 A classic study is Seizaburo Shinobu’s Nishinsensō [The Sino-Japanese War]
(Tokyo: Nansōsha , 1970).
4 In 1899, Port Arthur partially froze, making the search for an ice-free port anincreasingly urgent matter. Seung-Young Kim, “Managing the Korea Buffer: GreatPower Competition over China, from the Late Nineteenth Century until Today,”
Stockholm Journal of East Asian Studies 15 (2005), 3. One should also note thatsteamships of the day could not travel long distances without frequent access to coaling
stations. This made the possession of numerous ice-free ports a critical matter of national
security.
5 For a detailed study, see Yastutoshi Teramoto, Nichirosensōigo no nihongaikō[Japanese foreign policy after the Russo-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Shinzansha Shuppan,
1999); and Yukio Ito, Rikkenkokka to nichirosensō, 1898–1905 [The constitutional
government and the Russo-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 2000).
6 For an overview of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, see Shigeru Kurobane, Nicheidōmei
no kenkyū [A study of the Anglo-Japanese alliance] (Sendai: Tōhoku Kyouikutosho,1968); and Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island
Empires, 1894–1907 (London: Athlone Press, 1966).
7 For a thorough account of the military dimension of the war, see the classic study by
Toshio Tani, Kimitsu nichirosenshi [Classified military history of the Russo-JapaneseWar] (Tokyo: Harashobo, 2004). A detailed examination of the prelude to the war can befound in Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (London: Longman, 1985).
The standard work on the subject from the Japanese perspective still remains Seizaburo
Shinobu and Jiichi Nakayama, Nichirosensoshi no kenkyu [A study of the military historyof the Russo-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Kawadeshobō Shinsha, 1959).
8 For a general overview of the situation, see Tetsuo Furuya, Nichirosensō [TheRusso-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Chuōkōronshinsha, 1966), 161–65.
9 Shinobu Oe, Baluchiku kantai [The Baltic Fleet] (Tokyo: Chuōkōronshinsha, 1999),
169–78, provides a detailed account of the naval aspect of the war, including a wealth of
information on the Baltic Fleet.
10 John A. White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (Princeton University
Press, 1964), 198. This excellent study provides tremendous detail regarding the prePortsmouth diplomacy of the two nations. Classic works on the subject are Tyler Dennet,
Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page, 1925) andRaymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan (Seattle: University of Washington

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Press, 1966).
11 Michael Balfour, The Kaiser and his Times (1964; repr., Harmondsworth, UK:
Penguin, 1972), 260–61.
12 Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), 253.
13 Ibid., 251 n17.
14 Ibid., 253.
15 Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt, 75.
16 Nobuo Kanayama, Komura Jutarō to Pōtsumasu [Komura Jutaro and Portsmouth](Tokyo: PHP Shuppan, 1984), 29–30.
17 Takahira’s capabilities are thoroughly assessed in Masayoshi Matsumura, “Mōhitorino Pōtsumasuzenkenkōaiinn” [The other Portsmouth conference participant], Gaimushō
Chōsageppō 1 (2006): 35–64.
18 For a brief biography of each of the participants, see Akira Yoshimura, Pōtsumasu
no hata [The flag of Portsmouth] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1979), 51–53.
19 In fact, Takahira had earlier informed Roosevelt that “peace without indemnity or
territory” was acceptable. His logic was that prolonging the war would easily exceed incost any amount of indemnity that Japan could obtain from Russia. Howard K. Beale,
Theodere Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1956), 249.
20 Shumpei Okamoto, The Japanese Oligarchy and Russo-Japanese War (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1970). This excellent English language study examines theJapanese side of the decision-making process leading to the war.
21 Prior to this, Komura believed that the former Russian foreign minister, Mikhail N.
Muraviev, would be his counterpart.
22 Eugene Trani, The Treaty of Portsmouth: An Adventure in American Diplomacy(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), 119. This excellent book examines in
depth the diplomatic phase of the Russo-Japanese War from the American perspective.
23 For the specifics of the operation, see Tani, Nichirosenshi, 302–30.
24 See also Masayoshi Matsumura, “Pōtsumasukōwakaigi to Seodoa Rūzuberuto,”[The Portsmouth conference and Theodore Roosevelt] Gaimushō Chōsageppō 2 (2005):
21–52.
25 Japanese Foreign Ministry, ed., Komura gaikōshi [History of Komura diplomacy](Tokyo: Harashobō, 1966), 491–92. This is the primary account of the Portsmouth
conference from the Japanese side.
26 Komura gaikōshi (585) implies that Roosevelt acted treacherously in not revealing
the information to the Japanese. .
27 This was the central theme of the Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai documentary, Sonotoki
rekishi ga ugoita, episode no. 182, June 16, 2004. See also NHK Coverage Group, ed.,

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67

Sonotoki rekishi ga ugoita 30 (Tokyo, 2004), 114–59.
28 Pōtsumasu no hata, 217.
29 Telegram no. 69, from Katsura to Komura, Nihon Gaikō Monjo [Japanese Diplomatic
Papers] 5, 300–302.
30 Pōtsumasu no hata, 217.
31 Komura gaikōshi, 584–86. This is the infamous “top secret telegram no. 154” thatdrastically altered the shape of the final peace agreement.
32 Ibid., 587.
33 Ishii writes in his memoirs that the president acted cordially throughout theconference and that he personally was truly grateful. Ishii Kikujirō, Gaikō yoroku(Tokyo, 1930), 90.
34 This was a decision that Roosevelt would later regret and perhaps the greatest
mistake of his presidency. Dissatisfied with Taft’s conservative domestic policies,
Roosevelt split the Republican Party and ran on the Bull Moose ticket in 1912. The
unintended consequence of this action was handing over the presidency to the Democrats.
35 Myer met Tsar Nicholas at Peterhof and persuaded him to accept this plan, which
had been preapproved by Roosevelt. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt, 86. Witte was informedof this decision via Lamsdorf on August 24.
36 Ibid.
37 Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt, 90.
38 Ibid., 92.
39 For further explanation, see Tosh Minohara and Yasutoshi Teramoto’s chapter in
Iokibe Makoto, ed., Nichibeikankei tūshi [The history of US-Japan relations] (Tokyo:
Yūhikaku, 2008).
40 For a thorough examination of Japan’s foreign policy during the 1920s, see Ryūji
Hattori, Ajiakokusaikankyō no hendō to nihongaikō, 1918–1931 [The change in theinternational environment in Asia and Japanese diplomacy] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2001).
41 See also Toshihiro Minohara, “Nichiro sensō to rekkyo eno taitō” [The RussoJapanese War and the rise to a power] Kokusaimondai 546 (2005): 7–22.
42 On US-Japan relations during this period, see Payson J. Treat, Japan and the UnitedStates, 1853–1921: Revised and Continued to 1928 (Palo Alto: Stanford University
Press, 1928); William Neumann, America Encounters Japan: From Perry to MacArthur(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963); and Charles E. Neu, An Uncertain
Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906–1909 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1967).
43 A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New Haven:
Yale University Press), 35.
44 This thesis is clearly evinced in Walter Lafeber’s, The Clash: A History of US-Japan
Relations (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).

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For example, see chap. 5 of Kazuki Iguchi, Nichiro sensō no jidai [The times of the
Russo-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Yoshikawakobunkan, 1998); and Yoichi Hirama, Nichiro
senso ga kaeta sekaishi [How world history was changed by the Russo-Japanese War]
(Tokyo: Fuyoshobo Shuppan, 2004).
46 For further details, see Toshihiro Minohara, Kariforuniashu no hainichiundou tonichibeikankei [The anti-Japanese movement in California and US-Japan relations](Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2006).
47 The incident is examined in depth in Thomas A. Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and theJapanese American Crises (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1934). For a more
contemporary treatment, see Minohara, Kariforuniashu no hainichiundou , chap. 1.
48 James C. Thomson, Jr., Peter W. Stanley, and John Curtis Perry, Sentimental
Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1981),
148–6145