International Journal ofEnvironmental Researchand Public Health

ArticleDisasters without Borders: The Coronavirus Pandemic,
Global Climate Change and the Ascendancy of Gradual
Onset Disasters
Katsuya Yamori 1

and James D. Goltz 2, *12*

Citation: Yamori, K.; Goltz, J.D.
Disasters without Borders: The
Coronavirus Pandemic, Global
Climate Change and the Ascendancyof Gradual Onset Disasters. Int. J.
Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18,3299. https://doi.org/10.3390/
ijerph18063299
Academic Editor: Rajib Shaw

Disaster Reductions Systems, Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, Gokasho,
Kyoto Prefecture, Uji-City 611-0011, Japan; yamori@drs.dpri.kyoto-u.ac.jp
Research Affiliate, Natural Hazards Center 483UCB, Institute for Behavioral Science, University of Colorado,
Boulder, CO 80309, USA
Correspondence: jamesgoltz@gmail.com

Abstract: Throughout much of its history, the sociological study of human communities in disasterhas been based on events that occur rapidly, are limited in geographic scope, and their management
understood as phased stages of response, recovery, mitigation and preparedness. More recent literature has questioned these concepts, arguing that gradual-onset phenomena like droughts, faminesand epidemics merit consideration as disasters and that their exclusion has negative consequences
for the communities impacted, public policy in terms of urgency and visibility and for the discipline
itself as the analytical tools of sociological research are not brought to bear on these events. We
agree that gradual-onset disasters merit greater attention from social scientists and in this paper haveaddressed the two most significant ongoing disasters that are gradual in onset, global in scope andhave caused profound impacts on lives, livelihoods, communities and the governments that must
cope with their effects. These disasters are the coronavirus pandemic and global climate change bothof which include dimensions that challenge the prevailing definition of disaster. We begin with an
examination of the foundational work in the sociological study of a disaster that established a conceptual framework based solely on rapidly occurring disasters. Our focus is on several components ofthe existing framework for defining and studying disasters, which we term “borders.” These borders
are temporal, spatial, phasing and positioning, which, in our view, must be reexamined, and to somedegree expanded or redefined to accommodate the full range of disasters to which our globalized
world is vulnerable. To do so will expand or redefine these borders to incorporate and promote anunderstanding of significant risks associated with disaster agents that are gradual and potentiallycatastrophic, global in scope and require international cooperation to manage.

Received: 19 February 2021
Accepted: 19 March 2021

Keywords: borders; gradual-onset disasters; coronavirus; global climate change

Published: 23 March 2021

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1. Introduction

published maps and institutional affil-

Prior to the current daily news reports on the impacts of the coronavirus pandemic, few
Americans would have identified the 1918–1920 “Spanish” flu, a gradual-onset disaster thatclaimed the lives of 550,000 [1] to 675,000 [2] Americans and caused significant and lasting
economic impacts [3] as the worst disaster in American history. Similarly, a resident of Japanmight say that the worst disaster suffered in that country was the 1923 Tokyo-Yokohama
earthquake, but the risk from the increasing frequency of typhoons and weather-related
damage and fatalities due to global climate change will likely outstrip other disasters indamage, disruption and possibly fatalities in the not very distant future. In the broader
context of public perceptions, it is not surprising that gradually occurring disasters receive
less attention. The rapidly occurring major earthquake, typhoon, flood or fire will dominate
headlines in the various news media where one will see vivid images of damage tobuildings and infrastructure and read or hear eyewitness accounts of the unfolding disasteriations.

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Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 3299

2 of 21and reports of response efforts. The high visibility of these rapidly occurring disasters will
inevitably result in calls for changes in public policy, particularly if there is an identifiable
failure like a particular type of structure that performed poorly in an earthquake. In
contrast, slowly evolving disasters may receive only sporadic media attention or, more
likely, attention to rapidly occurring manifestations of an underlying gradual-onset disaster(e.g., a particularly violent storm exacerbated by global climate change). Lest we overstate
our case, gradually occurring disasters like the current coronavirus pandemic do indeedreceive media and public attention when their effects become acute, but whether they result
in lasting policy change and achieve cultural salience is questionable. Thus, gradual-onset
disasters may not receive the public policy attention necessary to mitigate the impacts thatwill inevitably follow.
Paralleling the low visibility of gradual-onset disasters among the public is the lackof adequate attention to these disasters among social scientists, mainly sociologists. The
low salience of gradual-onset disasters in sociological disaster research lies in a conceptual
framework in which rapidly occurring disasters like earthquakes, hurricanes, wildfires andother hazard events that unfold in seconds to a few hours have served as a paradigm inwhich disasters are assessed and to which a significant amount of public policy attention is
directed. Anthropologists, by contrast, have been more expansive in scope, emphasizing
disasters as processes rather than events and thus are less constrained by definitional
limitations that have tended to exclude slowly evolving disasters [4–6]. Nor do we argue
that sociologists alone shoulder the responsibility for policy change in regard to disasters, but as sociologists, we must contribute as other disciplines have in addressing thesocietal implications of gradually occurring disasters. Further, we recognize that there isdiversity within the category of gradual-onset disasters and that global climate change
and the current pandemic differ in a number of ways. Nevertheless, we have focusedon their commonalities; both would be defined as “nondisasters” according to prevailingconcepts in sociology; that is, neither is rapidly occurring, spatially limited, conform to
the prevailing phased occurrence of a disaster and disaster response and fall within thebounds of prevailing protocols for disaster management.
In this paper, our objective is to explore the manner in which slowly occurring disasters deviate from this paradigm, drawing on observations from the current coronavirus
pandemic and global climate change. We will first explore the history of sociologicalthought regarding natural disasters and how such events have been defined, and the framework for their study has been established. Next, we will explore how two gradual-onset
disasters, the current and ongoing coronavirus pandemic and global climate change havechallenged the existing conceptual framework in the context of four “borders”, which aretemporal, spatial, phasing and political, or positioning. We will also examine the concept ofvulnerability, whether it transcends these borders or whether it too requires modification.
Finally, we will discuss the implications for future disaster research and for public policy.
As a caveat, both the coronavirus pandemic and global climate change are ongoing andevolving, so the views we express about the specifics of these disasters must be considered
tentative.
2. Concepts, Frameworks and Borders in Sociological Disaster Research:
The Literature
Social science and particularly sociological studies of disaster date back at least one
hundred years, but the development of a consistent and conceptually coherent frameworkthat has guided the most focused work can be traced to the late 1940’s, particularly to theestablishment of the Disaster Research Center at Ohio State University in 1963 by E. L.
Quarantelli, Russell Dynes and J. Eugene Haas. The Disaster Research Center conductedboth laboratory and field studies of various types of disasters, challenged the prevailingmyths of post-disaster social break down, documented the emergence of community
groups that responded to the many needs of the post-disaster community and producedcase studies of the major events of the era [7]. Disaster research pioneer Charles Fritz
provided one of the earliest definitions of disaster, which delimited the concept as: “anInt. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 3299

3 of 21

event concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a relatively self-sufficientsubdivision of a society, undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses . . . that the social
structure is disrupted . . . ,” [8] (p. 655). This foundational definition limited the range ofinquiry to rapidly occurring hazard events that occur in a limited geographical space andcause disruption to an identifiable social system. Although this definition left open the typesof hazard events or processes that could cause disasters, later refinements distinguishedbetween human caused (e.g., war, terrorism, collective violence and climate change),technological (e.g., explosions, nuclear accidents, chemical releases into the atmosphere)
and natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, floods, tornados) [9].
The nearly sixty-year-old definition of a disaster by Fritz begs the question of conceptual clarification during the intervening years and indeed there have been important newideas, but the temporal and geographical limitations on the concept of a disaster have persisted. In a more recent examination of concepts, Quarantelli and Perry [10] argue against
an expansion of the disaster definition to include epidemics (in this case the AIDS epidemic)
saying “we are inclined to exclude from the concept of “disaster” all very diffused events,
including traditional droughts and famines and certain kinds of epidemics . . . it is best to
think of the concept of a disaster as an occasion involving an immediate crisis or emergency”(p. 335). In justifying a narrow definition of disasters, these same authors suggest thatslowly occurring disasters like droughts and famines (and presumably, epidemics) create“murkiness”, which concise definitions of a disaster and empirical generalizations basedon such concepts of a disaster are ill equipped to analyze. Quarantelli and Perry further
argue that “we should stop trying to squeeze relatively heterogeneous phenomena under
one label (which would) improve not only our theoretical understanding of a disaster phenomena, but create knowledge useful for planning and managing purposes.” (p. 334). In
summarizing the distinction between rapid and gradual-onset disasters, Dynes [11] statesthat the existing research is “predominantly Western, community-based, urban, and deals
with sudden onset agents from ‘natural’ causes.” Disasters involving slow-onset hazards,
in contrast, “involve displaced populations, are predominantly rural, deal with conflict . . .
(and) might represent new, previously unseen types of disaster” (p.2). Dynes comparison
suggests that slow-onset disasters have mainly occurred in the developing world where
famines, droughts and epidemics have been more common than in the developed world,but climate change and the coronavirus are global in scope impacting both developing anddeveloped nations and should be addressed with social scientific concepts that expand toincorporate these disasters.
Closely related to the temporal confinement in conceptions of disaster is the spatial limitation or zoning aspect. While our principal focus will be on the questionable geographic
confinement of disasters to sub-global regions, we must acknowledge that zoning is one of
the most ubiquitous tools of academic disaster social science and disaster countermeasures
for multiple hazards [12]. The zones printed on various types of hazard maps, such as
red and yellow zone designations for landslides, maps of flood districts around particularrivers, tsunami hazard maps, and fire perimeter maps, are literal expressions of zoning. The
various districts created in response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, such as the“difficult-to-return zone” and “evacuation order cancellation preparation zone,” are also, ofcourse, examples of zoning. We may also view geographic designations aimed at disasterprevention and relief, such as the “special zone for reconstruction in response to the Great
East Japan earthquake,” “Nankai Trough earthquake disaster prevention districts,” and“tsunami evacuation plan special reinforcement districts”, as examples of zoning more
broadly defined. Disaster studies have both affirmed the efficacy of disaster zoning andidentified its limits and numerous failures.
Both the efficacy and limitations of zoning to prevent or respond to natural disasters
are currently attracting attention from scholars. Research demonstrating efficacy includes aseries of studies by Ushiyama [13] and Ushiyama et al. [14], who comprehensively examined the locations where deaths occurred during recent heavy rainfall disasters in Japan.
They found that over eighty percent of deaths from flooding and related causes occurred inInt. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 3299

4 of 21

low-lying areas where flooding was possible due to topographic features, pointing out that“such incidents can by no means be considered ‘unforeseen’ if a geomorphological map
is consulted” [13] (p. 76). These same authors concluded that ninety percent of landslide
deaths in the 2018 rains occurred in or near landslide hazard areas, and other recent disasters showed a similar locational trend for landslides. These data suggest that measures toreduce storm and flood deaths based on zoning, while not perfect, are reasonably effective.
On the other hand, certain facts also suggest a downside to zoning. In the well-known
warning by Katada (2012) to “not be misled by expectations,” one of his three principles oftsunami evacuation is one such example. Tsunami inundation zones on hazard maps arenaturally uncertain, and if people mistakenly feel safe because they are in a location outside
the map’s hazard zone, this can be viewed as a negative result of uncertainties in zoning.
In fact, according to Katada, [14] during the Great East Japan Earthquake, 65% of thosekilled or missing in Kamaishi, Iwate Prefecture, lived outside of tsunami inundation hazard
zones. Yamori [15] notes that in many communities—especially those in mountainous
regions with challenging topographic conditions—it is impossible to establish a public
evacuation site that is not located in a landslide hazard zone, flooding or tsunami hazard
zone. Another example is Geller’s [16] observation that most of the earthquakes in Japan
since 1979 that have caused 10 or more deaths were in areas designated as lower in seismic
vulnerability. Area specification of higher earthquake risk has not been so successful.
In another conceptual development consistent with the preferred narrow definition ofa disaster is the “disaster cycle”, a two-dimensional taxonomy that is both temporal andstructural [17,18]. The temporal dimension identifies the sequential phases of a disasteras-preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation. Preparedness includes planning andwarning; response is conceptualized as both pre-impact mobilization and post-impact
emergency response; recovery is divided into early recovery (6 months or less) and restoration (6 months or more), and mitigation consists of actions and attitudes toward andadoption of adjustments designed to eliminate or reduce the impact of a disaster. The
structural dimensions, essentially levels of analysis, are ordered in terms of increased
structural complexity to include the individual, group, organization, community, society
and global or international levels. The disaster cycle has become a standard paradigm forboth the academic study of disasters and a template for emergency management planningfor multiple rapid-onset disasters [9]. See Figure 1. The disaster cycle framework has
found a receptive audience among disaster planners in that specific actions as well as
programs of disaster management are assigned to each phase. Training manuals used by
all levels of government, disaster-oriented non-governmental organizations and private
sector emergency management divisions often begin with this typology.
Recent papers by Staupe-Delgado [19], Hsu [20] and Fiske and Marino [21] that address the concept of disasters have questioned the validity of a definition that limits disasterto rapidly occurring events. All three of these studies argue for a conceptual reconsideration of the temporal aspect of disasters and advocate greater academic and public policy
attention to slowly occurring disasters. The Hsu and Staupe-Delgado articles summarize
earlier literature, and point to the disadvantages of narrowly defining disaster temporally
in terms of both knowledge production and public policy. Hsu’s study is specifically sociological and addresses the need for an expanded typology by addressing slowly occurringor developing disasters. Staupe-Delgado offers a broader multidisciplinary examinationof disaster definitions with a focus on rapidly and gradually occurring disasters. The
Fiske and Marino study is both a critique of the rapid occurring disaster paradigm and ananalysis of climate change as a slowly occurring disaster.

Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 3299
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5 of 21

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Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 3299

6 of 21and climate change. The author argues that this more traditional view of disasters provides
little insight into the nature and unique challenges of gradual-onset disasters and meager
guidance for disaster risk reduction policy and practice. In an extensive literature review
focusing on the temporal aspect of disasters, Staupe-Delgado found that the few studies
addressing slowly occurring disasters focused mainly on adverse impacts but failed togeneralize findings to gradual-onset disasters and their unique challenges. The lack ofhigher-order generalization has resulted in low visibility and neglect of gradually occurring
disasters both empirically and theoretically, under prioritization as a research and public
policy priority, and fragmented and delayed response or response to rapidly occurring
manifestations of underlying gradual processes. In addition, significant in terms of delayed
response is the observation of Wisner et al. [26] that gradual-onset disasters like droughts,
famines and epidemics often occur in the least developed regions where they are neglectedby developed nations until the disaster has become acute.
Fiske and Marino [21] present a cogent critique of disaster defined as rapid in timeand geographically concentrated in their paper on global climate change and public policy. Acknowledging that the prototype for both disaster scholarship and public policy
has been the rapidly occurring disaster, they describe climate change as “global, gradual,
and cumulative over time, and alters the underlying environmental baselines on which
disasters occur” (p.139). The baseline referred to in this quote has two aspects derived fromthe nature of slow-onset disasters: first, the underlying gradual environmental changes
that characterize global climate change (e.g., higher sea levels, a warmer atmosphere, etc.)
exacerbate the incidence and severity of rapid-onset disasters, and second, the invisibilityof climate change and the ever-present possibility that belief systems among the public willbe altered toward normalization of increased disaster events, allowing decision-makers
to continue to regard slow-onset processes as non-disasters. The impacts of slow-onset
disasters, which in addition to global climate change include drought, famine and pandemics, are “death and diaspora, loss of property and community, loss of cultural icons andway of life, and loss of livelihoods” (p. 141). These impacts do not fall upon populations
equally, but differentially based on social class, ethnicity, demographic category and certain
geographic locations. This observation raises the issue of environmental justice and thevulnerability of marginalized groups in the context of gradual-onset disasters.
The political dimension of disaster, including gradual-onset disasters, is taken up in
an older but still relevant paper by Olson [26]. Olson first affirms the political nature ofdisasters saying, “government officials are confronted with the need to not only manage
the situation, but to explain it (that is): what happened, why the losses were so high and/or
the response so inadequate, and what will happen now?” (p. 155). Thus, disasters increasedemands on the political system and decisions must be made at each of the phases ofdisaster, which, as modified for slow-onset disasters include pre-recognition, recognition,
response, recovery and reconstruction. How decisions are made, and the effectiveness ofprograms can impact the level of approval of elected or appointed officials and in extreme
cases the legitimacy of the political leadership. An extreme example often cited by those
who have studied the politics of disaster is the fall of the Samoza regime in Nicaragua fueledby a corrupt and ineffective response to the 1972 earthquake. Olson speaks of “agenda
control”, which broadly includes the issues, or subset of issues with which governments
must deal at a given time. Since not all issues can be addressed, agendas necessarily
include a zone or “screen” of non-decision. The author applies these concepts to disasters
in declaring that “disasters are political crises because they puncture, at least temporarily,
the non-decision-making screens on all the political agendas and thereby place a large
number of new, complex and conflictual items on all of the agendas simultaneously – hence
the temptation to suppress issues or to define the disaster event in other terms” (p. 162).
Agenda control is one aspect of the politics of disaster and the second is what Olson refers
to as “constructing meaning, causal stories and blame management” (p. 162–167), processes
that seek to control narratives about the significance of events, their causes, the assignment

Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 3299

7 of 21of responsibility and blame, provide excuses for the occurrence of the event or how it wasaddressed, and justifications for actions taken or not taken during the course of the disaster.
Closely related to the political dimension of disasters is the expertise that is brought
to bear when a disaster occurs, that is, what roles are played by disciplinary experts andhow do these experts emerge and claim the authority to define the parameters of thedisaster and how well managed is the “hand-off” between those who provide authoritative
commentary on the disaster and those who formulate decisions on how the disaster will be
managed? Further, a third category of actors must be identified that includes communities
either actually or potentially impacted by disaster and the local knowledge that may beconsistent with or diverge from that of experts and political decision-makers. The literaturein this area is not extensive, but the relationship between these groups can seriously
affect the way disasters are understood and the measures taken in response and recovery.
More recent work has focused on the importance of local knowledge and engagementby community-based organizations with outside experts and officials in the context ofnatural and technological hazards [27–29]. This emphasis on community engagement inpromoting resilience has been a theme of three generations of “frameworks,” the mostrecent, of which is the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 [30].
While most of the available literature focuses on rapid-onset disasters, we will explore
the dynamic of interaction among disciplinary experts, government decision-makers andcommunity-based groups in the context of slowly occurring disasters.
One of the most significant contributions of sociology to the study of disasters is theconcept of vulnerability and the many insightful studies that have highlighted the differential impact of disasters, both rapid and gradual based on class, race and ethnicity [31],geographic location and the built environment [32,33], disability [34–36] and various demographic categories, particularly gender [37] and age [7,38]. There is a sense in which theconcept of vulnerability contributes to our argument that the temporal and spatial aspects
of disaster should be broadened because vulnerability is often a product of long-term social
processes that preceded disaster, are exacerbated by it and continue to be present when
the acute phase or phases of the disaster have passed. Scholarly assessments of disaster
vulnerability rarely consider the temporal dimension, and since disaster agents like global
climate change trigger rapid-onset disasters and pandemics have acute phases, we must
consider all possible factors that produce differential vulnerability. Tierney [7] provides athorough summary of studies that address disaster vulnerability, which she defines as “acombination of long-term disadvantages, such as those typically associated with race andsocial class and situational conditions that vary over time and across communities” (p. 126)
and include three dimensions: the hazardousness of place, the built environment andinfrastructure, and social vulnerability. The main contribution of sociology and the social
sciences, in general, has been this last factor. Tierney, citing Fordham [39], emphasizes
the importance of “intersectionality” or the fact that vulnerability is an “amalgamationof factors in place and time that dictates that some groups will be harder hit and lessable to recover” (p. 128). Intersectionality implies that vulnerability is not an “intrinsic
characteristic of members of particular groups” (p. 127) and acknowledges the fact thatvulnerability factors are likely to be multiple and cumulative.
In this brief review of the literature, we have called into question the prevailingconceptual framework that disasters are exclusively rapidly occurring events confinedin time and space and proceed predictably and reliably from a discreet hazard eventto disaster response followed by recovery and an inter-emergency phase of mitigationand preparedness. Drawing on the insights of three recent papers and the literature theysummarize, which challenge this conceptual framework, we will provide observations fromthe two major slow-onset disasters that are currently impacting our world, global climatechange and the coronavirus pandemic. These observations will emphasize, in addition to
the need for conceptual clarification of disaster, the implications of these two graduallyoccurring disasters for public policy and vulnerability. It is important to mention that ourintention in this paper is not to reject the important work that has been accomplished by

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8 of 21social science disaster research historically but to expand the concepts to incorporate themost important disasters of our generation and the generations to come.
3. The Dilemma of Gradual Onset Disasters: Discussion
Since the beginning of the 21st century, there have been rapid-onset disasters thathave caused devastating impacts. Those, which stand out include the 2004 Indonesia
earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Hurricane Katrina and the 2011 Great
East Japan earthquake and tsunami. These events fell reasonably well within the existing
conceptual paradigm of disasters, but the two major disasters that are now ongoing, falloutside the borders of this paradigm and defy easy conceptualization with our current
analytical tools are the coronavirus pandemic and global climate change. In this section,
we will describe the manner in which current concepts of a disaster fall short in adequately
describing and understanding these disasters, which occur in a protracted time frame overmonths and years and are spatially variable from localized to global. We will point to some
aspects of gradually occurring disasters that stretch our understanding of their politicalmanagement and highlight aspects of a vulnerability that vary from the existing paradigm.
Our plan is to examine what is currently known about the coronavirus pandemic andglobal climate change in the context of four conceptual “borders” in disaster research: thetemporal, spatial or zoning, phasing and positioning (status and roles of communities,
experts and government decision-makers). We will also address the issues of vulnerability
associated with these two slowly occurring disasters.
3.1. Temporal Borders
The temporal dimension of disaster as a concept in disaster sociology has been debatedover the last 60 years or so, and the notion of rapidity has won out over attempts to broaden
the definition and, over this same period, social scientists have documented and analyzed
the prevailing disasters of their generation, which were mostly rapidly occurring. However,current and subsequent generations will face global climate change, a slowly evolving
disaster, which will require a long-term coordinated global response, will transpire overdecades and may result in some level of adaptation rather than “recovery.” One of thedownsides of considering slowly occurring disasters as social or environmental problems,as Quarantelli and Perry [10] have argued is that social problems may lack the urgencyof disasters and, like racism or economic inequality, which actually are social problems,be treated episodically as the most egregious manifestations of these systemic problems
emerge. The episodic nature of the response to global climate change will likely be in theform of response to the most frequent and severe meteorological hazards, the impacts ofsea level rise and coastal erosion and other changes that are generated by climate change
but occur more rapidly and can be responded to in a more familiar and planned manner.
Although global climate change has received considerable attention among “climate”
scientists, it has received inadequate attention from social scientists, who could bring theinsights of sociology to bear on this issue of existential importance.
Among social scientists who have addressed climate change the recent paper by Fiske
and Marino [21] provides several points regarding temporal aspects of global climatechange. The prevailing paradigm for scientific understanding of disasters holds thatdisasters occur rapidly; climate changes are gradual and are “almost imperceptible at any
given moment, but lead to permanent changes in the ecology and landscape that willrender some homes, communities, and cities uninhabitable” (p. 139). The authors notethat there are both public perception and public policy implications of the “invisibility”
of global climate change. As the perceived risks of increased and more severe flooding,coastal erosion, and hurricanes (also typhoons in Asia) are accepted by the public over time,they become a new normal, allowing decision-makers to side-step the issues regardingslow-onset processes like climate change as non-disasters.
Like climate change, global pandemics are also slow-onset disasters. According to theWorld Health Organization (WHO), as of 22 March, 2021, there have been approximately

Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 3299

9 of 21123 million confirmed cases and 2.7 million fatalities due to the coronavirus pandemic in
223 countries [40]. The exact date of origin in Hubei Province, China, where the coronavirus
is believed to have originated, is unknown, but the disease was first reported to the WHO on
31 December 2019, based on cases in Wuhan, Peoples Republic of China. Since that time, thedisease has spread throughout the world. Some nations took measures to contain the virus
with considerable success (e.g., South Korea, New Zealand and China (including Taiwan))and others did very poorly (e.g., the United States, Brazil, Italy and India). Successful
strategies included isolation of those infected, testing and contact tracing, mask wearing,social distancing, frequent hand washing and shutting down venues where large numbersof people congregate and on a national level, closing borders and restricting travel into andout of the country. Currently, we are 15 months into the pandemic with the resurgence ofthe virus in regions and nations where precautions have not been rigorously followed. The
most analogous previous pandemic disaster was the “Spanish” Flu that began in the fallof 1918 and resurged in three distinct phases until the spring of 1920. The advantage of acentury of medical science progress is that the current pandemic is likely to be thwarted
by a vaccine that was not possible in the earlier outbreak, and as of this writing, multiple
vaccines have been developed, thoroughly vetted and are now available for immunizations
on a prioritized basis. The current projection is that multiple independently developed
vaccines will be available for general distribution by mid-2021.
One additional aspect of the temporal dimension of disasters deserves mention, andthat is that slow-onset disasters are similar to, but not identical with, compound/complex
disasters, which may be rapidly occurring but extended by hazards secondary to an
initial event. For example, following the 2004 Chuetsu earthquakes, heavy rain triggeredlandslides extending a disaster that began with a rapid-onset event. The Fukushima
Nuclear Power Station accident triggered by the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami isalso categorized as a compound/complex disaster. The two current disasters addressed inthis paper present a far greater challenge than those, which are rapidly occurring, confinedin space with readily identifiable experts and fall more into the phases of a disaster that arecharacterized by clearly defined borders with predictable beginning and end states. Having
neither established social science concepts to define them nor well-defined plans basedon established public policy to combat them, nations are struggling with the long-term
prospect of heavy death tolls and social and economic disruption from the pandemic. In
the background, while nations struggle to address the pandemic, the relentless evolutionof global climate change will continue unabated and manifest itself in more frequent andsevere meteorological, atmospheric and hydrological disasters.
3.2. Spatial Borders or “Zoning”
Recall that one component of Fritz’s [8] early definition of a disaster was that disasters
were events concentrated in time and space. Disasters, as narrowly defined, can vary froma relatively small geographic area to multiple nations. Compare, for example, the Great
Hanshin-Awaji earthquake of 1995 or the Northridge California earthquake of 1994, whichwere of limited geographic impact to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that caused casualties
and damage in 14 nations. Like rapid-onset disasters, slowly occurring disasters may be
confined in space as well. The examples we have cited as slow-onset disasters, droughts,
famines and epidemics can be confined to a particular locality or region, but the two majordisasters we now confront are global in scope and fall outside the narrow definition established in the early days of social science disaster research. In this section, we will explore
the spatial dimension of a disaster as it has been applied and offer some observations andjustifications for expanding the definition of a disaster to events, or rather processes, which
are global in scope.
The word “pandemic”—the outbreak of a disease affecting many people around theworld—is a combination of the Greek words pan (all) and demos (people). The term itself
thus refers to the nullification of spatial borders (universal, to all people in the world).
Saeki [41] uses the keyword of political and economic “globalism” to point out that inInt. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 3299

10 of 21the case of the coronavirus, this essential characteristic of infectious diseases becomesremarkably apparent. Indeed, even without mentioning the rapid global spread of thevirus, the fact that China and the United States—the two countries at the center of the global
economy—are, respectively, its point of origin and current epicenter speaks powerfully
to the inseparability of the coronavirus pandemic and globalism. Could we not havesealed off the disease before it became a pandemic? Today, that question is merely empty
counterfactual thinking. Yet, the fact that the phrase “sealed off” is rooted precisely inzoning-based ways of thinking deserves attention. The risk originates in nature and iscaused by humans, while our sense of safety and security is founded in “zoning.” As longas the risk is being controlled through zoning—or rather, as long as it is perceived as being
managed in that way—people will not have a strong sense of impending crisis.
This sense of risk confinement through zoning is immediately apparent if we examine
the progression of the coronavirus outbreak in Japan. Phrases, such as: “It is something
happening in Wuhan,” “It is a domestic problem for China,” “It is limited to certain typesof places like houseboats and cruise ships,” and “As long as you do not go downtown . . . ”
all indicate that zoning lies at the foundation of the public’s sense of safety and security.
The same can be said of those in infectious disease management positions. Protective
measures at airports, the prohibition of travel to or from a certain country, requests for
citizens to refrain from frequenting business districts, emergency declarations limited
to certain well defined regions, and requests for citizens to refrain from visiting certain
jurisdictions are all based on the concept of zoning. Above all, the currently trending term
“hot spot” or “cluster” is deeply reflective of the zoning concept. However, it appears that
under globalization, this societal trump card has lost its power to solve our most difficult
problems.
Climate change is inherently global in that the gradual warming of the planet affects
the ocean and atmosphere, causing environmental changes that threaten every nation
around the world. It is gradual in that the changes occur incrementally and have been
taking place since the early industrial era (see Figure 2). It is also cumulative, and many ofthe environmental changes caused by climate change will be permanent. Though global inscope, its current negative impacts and the secondary disasters it generates are regional
and local. Fiske and Marino [21] note that “climate change is unique (among slow-onset
disasters) in that it continuously shifts the ecological baselines through subtle and insidioussea rise, warming oceans and land areas, increasing erosion, and declining sea ice andsnowpack” (p. 139). In the context of zoning, some nations, regions and localities will
experience acute changes. Japan has experienced more frequent and severe meteorologicalhazards, including rainfall and typhoons, flooding and landslides. California in the U.S. has
experienced climate change-related drought and larger, more frequent fires. Eastern U.S.
coastal areas and Alaska face sea-level rise, causing erosion, loss of wetlands, and habitaton islands, peninsulas and low-lying coastal lands. Globally, climate change includes
impacts on water resources (e.g., water supplies, water quality, irrigation, hydroelectric
generation, and fish habitat); agricultural production (e.g., crop yields, infestations, plantdiseases, salt water intrusion); loss of forests due to cutting, disease, fire and drought, andimpacts on human health due to food scarcity, thermal stress, degradation of air and water
quality and vector-borne infectious diseases [42,43].

U.S. coastal areas and Alaska face sea-level rise, causing erosion, loss of wetlands, andhabitat on islands, peninsulas and low-lying coastal lands. Globally, climate change includes impacts on water resources (e.g., water supplies, water quality, irrigation, hydroelectric generation, and fish habitat); agricultural production (e.g., crop yields, infestations,Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021,plant
18, 3299
of 21
diseases, salt water intrusion); loss of forests due to cutting, disease, fire11 anddrought, and impacts on human health due to food scarcity, thermal stress, degradationof air and water quality and vector-borne infectious diseases [42,43].

Figure 2. History of global surface temperature since 1880. The five warmest years in the 1880–2019 graph have all occurredsince 2015;
nine ofofthe
10 warmest
have occurredsinceThe
2005.
Source:NOAA
Climate.gov(authors
RebeccaFigure2. History
globalsurfaceyears
temperaturesince 1880.
five
warmestyears
in the 1880–2019
graph
haveLindsey
all ocand LuAnn
curredsinceDahlman)
2015; nine[44].
of the 10 warmest years have occurred since 2005. Source: NOAA Climate.gov (authors Rebecca
Lindsey and LuAnn Dahlman) [44].

3.3. The Disaster Cycle: PhasingOneof the Cycle:
mainstaysof both social science disaster research and disaster planning is3.3. The
DisasterPhasing
the assumptionofphasedstagespreparedness,
response,
recoveryand mitigation(see
One of the mainstays of both ofsocialscience disaster
researchand disasterplanningisFigure
1)
as
a
cycle
with
more-or-lessidentifiable
beginnings
andendstates.
The
secondthe assumption of phased stages of preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation (seeauthor spent his career in emergency management and planning for various rapid-onset
Figure 1) as a cycle with more-or-less identifiable beginnings and end states. The second
disasters was based on this assumption, and to some significant degree, the agency inauthor spent his career in emergency management and planning for various rapid-onset
which he worked was broken into divisions dedicated to managing and administering
disasters was based on this assumption, and to some significant degree, the agency inthese phases. As we noted previously, the assumed phased cycle has served both the social
which he worked was broken into divisions dedicated to managing and administeringscientist and disaster planner as a template for rapidly occurring disasters like earthquakes,
these phases. As we noted previously, the assumed phased cycle has served both the sofires, hurricanes and volcanic eruptions. If we are to define disaster more broadly to include
cial scientist and disaster planner as a template for rapidly occurring disasters like earthslowly occurring disasters, however, the assumption of phased stages becomes opaquequakes, fires, hurricanes and volcanic eruptions. If we are to define disaster more broadly
and breaks down at several points. We will address this poor fit between the disaster cycle
to include slowly occurring disasters, however, the assumption of phased stages becomes
concept and slowly occurring disasters as applied to the coronavirus and global climate
opaque and breaks down at several points. We will address this poor fit between the dischange.
aster cycle concept and slowly occurring disasters as applied to the coronavirus and global
Global pandemics like the current coronavirus are rare, though infectious diseases
climateare not,change.
and there have been many epidemics that affected large regions (e.g., Ebola) andGlobalpandemics
likethe current
coronavirus
are rare,infectious
diseases
specific
populations(e.g.,
HIV-AIDS),
andsome pandemicsof thoughlesser lethality(1957,
1968),
areand there
have been many
epidemics
thatlargeseverity
regionssince(e.g., theEbola)
andbutnot,we havenot experienced
a globalpandemic
ofaffectedcomparable
1918–20
specific
populations(e.g.,
HIV-AIDS),
andsomepandemicsoflesserlethality(1957,
1968),“Spanish” flu. The flu pandemic of a century ago occurred in a world that could hardly
but
we havenot experienced
a globalof Warcomparable
severity
since the1918–20be labeled“globalized”,
but theGreatpandemic
War (WorldI) simulated
globalized
conditions“Spanish”
flu.
The
flu
pandemicofacenturyagooccurred
in
a
world
that
could
hardlyas soldiers moved from country to country, facilitating the spread of disease. Sincethebelabeled of“globalized”,
the GreatatWar
WarI) simulated
globalized
existenceviruses wasbut
unknown
the (World
time, theonly
defense was
the useconditionsof masks,
assoldiers moved
from country
to country,
facilitating
thetospreadof disease.
thedistancing,and isolation,
strategies
difficult or
impossible
implement
duringSince
wartimeor during the repatriation of soldiers and displaced populations in its aftermath. Thatpandemic persisted for approximately two years and had three surges, or acute phases,
the second of which occurred in late 1918 and was the deadliest. We digress on theearlier pandemic because we are in the midst of the coronavirus, and much regarding
its persistence is not known. In terms of phasing, which is the subject of this section, we
can say the following: despite the precedent of epidemics having occurred in the recent
past, warnings of a global pandemic and preparedness in advance of its arrival were few
and inadequate; response, while in some nations timely, failed to stop the rapid spread ofor during the repatriation of soldiers and displaced populations in its aftermath. That pandemic persisted for approximately two years and had three surges, or acute phases, thesecond of which occurred in late 1918 and was the deadliest. We digress on the earlier
pandemic because we are in the midst of the coronavirus, and much regarding its persisis not known. In terms of phasing, which is the subject of this section, we cansayInt. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021,tence
18, 3299
12 of
21
the following: despite the precedent of epidemics having occurred in the recent past,warnings of a global pandemic and preparedness in advance of its arrival were few andinadequate; response, while in some nations timely, failed to stop the rapid spread of ininfections
andgiventhethenature
natureofofperiodic
periodicsurges,
surges,itithas
hasnevernever been
been entirely
entirely clear
clear whether
whether
fections
and
given
we
are
responding
toorattempting
torecoverfromthedisease.
Perhapswe
havewitnessed
we are responding to or attempting to recover from the disease. Perhaps we have wita relatively
new phenomenon
in disaster evolution
could be thattermed“response-recovery
nesseda relatively
new phenomenon
in disasterthat
evolution
could
be termed “recycles”
inwhichmeasuresassumedtoreduceinfectionsareimplemented,
to besponse-recovery cycles” in which measures assumed to reduce infectionsappear
are impleworking, and recovery is being achieved only to witness renewed surges in infections,mented, appear to be working, and recovery is being achieved only to witness renewed
prompting a return to response measures (See Figure 3). Clearly, we have observed
surges in infections, prompting a return to response measures (See Figure 3). Clearly, weambiguity in the length of response and recovery phases and a lack of clarity as to what
have observed ambiguity in the length of response and recovery phases and a lack of clarphase prevails at any given point.
ity as to what phase prevails at any given point.

Figure 3.
3. Complex
Complex nature
nature ofofaapandemic
pandemicmanagement
managementcycle
cycleinvolves
involves“transitioning“transitioningfrom
frompandemic
response
recoveryFigurepandemic
response
to torecoveryininaspiralfashion”[45].
Reproduced
unmodified
withpermissionoftheauthor.
a spiral fashion” [45]. Reproduced unmodified with permission of the author.

At
level ofof public
public perceptions,perceptions, recent
recent survey
survey researchresearch inin JapanJapan revealed
revealed anxiety
anxiety
At thethe level
regardingwhether
respondents
could
maintainrecommended
coronavirus
response
regarding whether respondents could maintain recommended coronavirus response acactions, including handwashing, use of alcohol-based disinfectants, proper etiquette whencoughing, use of masks and ventilation of indoor spaces until the situation is resolved? ReRepeated administration
administration of the survey over a two-week interval in April 2020 identified adecline in perceived resolve to continue these measures despite a surge in infections overthis same two-week period [46,47]. These results reflect growing anxiety over not knowing
when the crisis will end or how long preventive measures will be necessary. Another way
to describe anxiety felt during the coronavirus pandemic is to say that it arises from being
unable to determine which temporal phase of this disaster we are currently in, even though
we believe it will end at some point. Are we right now at the peak of the calamity, are wealready entering the recovery phase, or are we still merely in the run-up to a long periodof suffering? This uncertainty regarding “phasing” is a consistent background note in
the coronavirus pandemic. As a result, anxiety over being too late in our response to thecoronavirus pandemic coexists with anxiety and concern over being too early. We believe
the former concern is clear in criticisms, such as “Why did Japan’s government take solong to declare a state of emergency?” While arguments for a slower response are currently

Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 3299

13 of 21

rare, it is quite possible that in the future, critics will point to the negative impacts of the
shutdown and reduced social and economic activity resulting from corporate bankruptcies;
a rapid rise in unemployment numbers; the collapse of welfare, health, or educational
services; devastating impacts on cultural activities; related psychological devastation; andincreasing crime, domestic violence, and divorces. If these negative outcomes reach a levelcomparable to the direct impacts of the virus, then people may begin to question whether
certain prefectural emergency declarations should have been issued or whether requests
for self-isolation or school closures were made too early. The inability to fully dispel
anxiety over unclear phasing—that is, the uncertainty regarding whether actions weretaken too soon or too late, which is the defining temporal characteristic of the coronavirus
pandemic—is closely linked to problems in the management of natural disasters according
to the prevailing “disaster cycle.”
Phasing as applied to global climate change is perhaps more problematic than it
is to the pandemic. The impacts of global climate change are profound, universal, andcumulative and pose an existential threat that traditional notions of phased response andrecovery fail to address either conceptually or in terms of public policy. Conceptually,
climate change has not been readily identified as a disaster per se; rather, it has remainedlargely uncategorized as an ongoing process that has exacerbated the frequency andseverity of rapid-onset disasters. Having no definitional association with a disaster has had
the effect of walling off climate change from the analytical tools of social science disaster
research and numbing it as an urgent issue of public policy. Being global in scope, it
must be addressed in a coordinated international manner, which the Paris (climate change)
Agreement was established to facilitate. The accord includes 197 nations with the objectiveof reducing global greenhouse gas emissions to limit the global temperature increase thiscentury to 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels. The U.S. was a participant in
the Paris Agreement until 2017 when the administration of Donald Trump withdrew thenation, denying that climate change was a problem, or even a reality, which obviously
made response and mitigation a low priority for the U.S. While it is not defined as a disaster,
applying the disaster management paradigm to global climate change is not particularly
useful, though there have been efforts to mitigate its effect at a sub-national level in the U.S.
Fiske and Marino [21] point out that hazard mitigation policy in the US is poorly adapted
to climate change in that it focuses on individual property owners rather than community
viability, which climate change mitigation requires.
3.4. Disaster Politics: Positioning
Olson [26] observes that “in any disaster, government officials are confronted with theneed to not only manage the situation but also to explain it” (p. 154). Since few political officials are disaster subject matter experts, additional actors become involved depending on
the type of expertise required to explain the hazard or disaster agent. Sometimes, multiple
experts must play roles. For example, if a major earthquake occurs, seismologists will becalled upon to provide the magnitude, location, focal mechanism and other parameters of
the earthquake. If a particular class of buildings did poorly in the earthquake, structural
engineers might be relied upon to diagnose the failure mechanism. In some cases, therequired expertise will be unclear or conflicting. A third set of actors are the emergency
managers, members of public agencies, who respond to the earthquake and will typicallybe mobilized under the authority of political officials, who must be at least titular headsof the response and recovery effort. Finally, there is the public that will be either directly
impacted by the event or outside of the impact zone, but close enough to be interested
and engaged, and through various organizations, including the news media, assume theimportant role of observers and potential critics of the progress, or lack thereof, in thegovernment’s management of the disaster.
As we have pointed out in previous sections of this paper, slowly occurring disasters
are typically defined as something other than disasters and may fall outside the protocols forresponse to “normal” rapidly occurring events. When slow-onset disasters are recognized,

Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 3299

14 of 21the disaster cycle, as Olsen points out, must be modified with “pre-recognition” replacing“pre-impact” and “post-recognition” replacing “impact” though response, recovery andreconstruction remain the same [26] (p. 156). While we applaud Olson’s recognition that thedisaster cycle paradigm must be modified for slow-onset disasters, we feel that response,
recovery and reconstruction must be modified as well, particularly the assumption thatthese phases occur in some systematic manner and have clearly defined beginning and end
states. Further, political leaders may or may not acknowledge responsibility for managing
and explaining a slow-onset disaster and, to the extent that they do, manage poorly, failto identify the most appropriate experts, provide inaccurate or inconsistent direction to
emergency managers and misinform the public. Unlike most rapidly occurring disasters,
slow-onset disasters often involve “tradeoffs” in which preventive measures may havesignificant negative social and economic consequences making management complex andpotentially “no-win” situations for political leaders. Both slow-onset disasters we havedealt with in this paper have required such tradeoffs.
The coronavirus pandemic and global climate change represent complex gradual-onset
disasters that have been intensely political in that government officials have struggled, in
Olsen’s [26] terms, to explain and manage them. As we pointed out earlier, government
officials must rely on experts to explain complex hazards. With some hazards, particularly
frequently occurring ones like floods, fires, earthquakes and storms, the knowledgeable
experts are easily identified and have typically been relied upon in the past. In many cases,
these experts are themselves government officials, who are members of science-oriented
agencies and provide ongoing advice to government leaders. Slow-onset disasters likethe coronavirus pandemic and global climate change present challenges in explaining
these complex hazards in that experts may not be readily identifiable, key elements inunderstanding the hazards may be unknown and clear pathways to effective response
may be unavailable. Such disasters may also be rare or sufficiently complex that expertise
requires the contributions of multiple disciplines. Both disasters have been difficult for
officials to manage and highlight the fact that painful tradeoffs have been necessary for
effective response and mitigation. An adequate response has required major changes
in large-scale social and economic processes—isolation at home, closure of school andsuspension of business activity for the coronavirus and a large-scale transition from fossil
fuel energy generation for global climate change.
The coronavirus has proven to be extremely difficult for many political leaders toboth explain and manage. Despite warnings from the World Health Organization andawareness of the lethal nature of the disease in January of 2020, US President Donald
Trump downplayed the seriousness of the disease, was slow to mobilize a response andconstantly questioned and undermined the advice of his own infectious disease experts.
Trump had just weathered an aggressive campaign to remove him from office throughimpeachment, faced a contentious re-election campaign with the election only months away,
and the dilemma of a fast-spreading disease with no vaccine and options that meant socialand economic disruption through business closures and self-isolation of individuals andfamilies. His response was to deny responsibility and shift the burden of response to thecoronavirus to individual states and local governments. State and local responsibility forcoronavirus response in the absence of federal government leadership lacked uniformity,
put states in competition for vital medical protective gear and equipment and varied fromaggressive measures to almost no measures at all. Consequently, the U.S. has experienced
the highest death toll in the world, repeated surges of infection and given both poor
government response in some regions and a culture of individualism in which many
people defied admonitions to wear masks, remain at home to the extent possible, andavoid large gatherings, the development of a vaccine was seemingly the only option forcontrolling the pandemic. For cases of the coronavirus in selected countries over time, see
Figure 4.

experienced the highest death toll in the world, repeated surges of infection and given
both poor government response in some regions and a culture of individualism in which
many people defied admonitions to wear masks, remain at home to the extent possible,
and avoid large gatherings, the development of a vaccine was seemingly the only option
for controlling the pandemic. For cases of the coronavirus in selected countries over time,
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 3299
15 of 21see Figure 4.

Figure 4. Confirmed cases of the coronavirus in selected nations over time. Source: Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus
Resource Center [48].
Figure 4. Confirmed cases of the coronavirus in selected nations over time. Source: Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus
Resource Center [48].
In contrast, many nations, particularly island nations, including Japan, have fared

better in dealing with the coronavirus based on national leadership, clear and enforceable
In contrast,
many
nations, particularly
islandincludingJapan,
mandates
regardingthe suspensionof businessand nations,in-person
educationand have
have fared
morebetter in dealing
on national
leadership,and enforceable
collectivist
cultureswith
thatthearecoronavirus
less inclinedbased
to demand
the right
to defy clear
the adviceof experts,
mandates
regardingand
theotherssuspensionof businessand in-person
education
have more
exposing
themselves
to infection
and possible
death. Earlyin theandprogressionofcollectivist
cultures
that
are
less
inclinedtodemand
the
right
to
defy
the
adviceexperts,
the coronavirus, a program on NHK Japan featured Nobel Laureate Prof. Shinya of
Yamanaka
themselveswho
andwasothersto infection
possible
Early in theas
progressionof exposing
Kyoto University,
tappedfor theandprogramondeath.
the coronavirus
a medicalofthecoronavirus,aprogram
on
NHK
Japan
featured
Nobel
LaureateProf.
ShinyaYaexpert. However, Yamanaka spoke, not as an expert on infectious diseases, which
he wasmanakaKyoto University,
who wastappedforseriousness
the programon thecoronavirus
as a
not,
but as aoflayperson,
who conveyed
a senseof theof thediseaseand deferredexpert.
Yamanaka
spoke, notleaders
as an expert
onpublic,
infectious
to medical
those who
wereHowever,true experts.
For government
and thethisdiseases,
steppingwhichdown
he wasnot,status
but asbya layperson,a senseofregarding
the seriousnessof the disease
andfromexpertYamanaka whoraisesconveyed
importantpointsthe interaction
betweendeferred
to
those
who
were
true
experts.
For
government
leaders
andthepublic,this
steppolitical leaders and subject matter experts. First, it is not always clear in rare slow-onset
ping down
expert status
Yamanakaraisesimportantpointsregardingdisasters
as to from
who constitutes
anbyexpertand even
those
who possess
expertisemaythenotinterhave
actionbetweenpolitical
leadersandsubject
matterexperts.
First,
itisnotalwaysclear inall the information necessary to make definitive analyses and recommendations regarding
rare slow-onset
disasters
as towho
constitutes
expert andeven those
who possess
exappropriate
coursesof action.
The
importanceof anappropriate
expertisein advising
political
leaders and the public is also reflected in the fact that rumor and misinformation emerge inambiguous crisis situations to fill any vacuum of authoritative information.
Like the coronavirus, global climate change presents various dilemmas as a politicalissue. Fundamentally, climate change has not been defined as a disaster, and though it has
not on that account become invisible, it has not been treated with the urgency and resolvethat characterize hazards, which are so acknowledged. Thus, for political leaders, climatechange and the impacts that it has brought about stand as simply one issue among manyand may not be of front burner importance. Because climate change has not, at least yet,caused significant impacts in all regions of most countries, it may appear to political leaders
as an issue that can be addressed in less than a holistic manner. Management may also be
hampered by the necessary sacrifices and economically unattractive tradeoffs associatedwith major reductions in carbon emissions and conversion from reliance on fossil fuels tocleaner forms of energy. In many nations, including the United States, protecting the fossil
fuels industry has prevailed over an aggressive movement to usher in alternate forms of

Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 3299

16 of 21energy, and the U.S. in 2017 withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement. For politicalleaders, identifying experts may also be a challenge since the climate and the changes
taking place as a result of global climate change require a multidisciplinary set of specialists.
The designation “climate scientist” is nonspecific and, to political leaders, begs the questionof who is qualified to make authoritative statements about changes taking place in specificregions and jurisdictions.
Slow-onset events, since they are not regarded as disasters, may be only marginallyvisible to the public, and their urgency blunted as communities that have not been significantly impacted by them can regard their occurrence as someone else’s problem. Evenin regions where the frequency and severity of seasonal or other anticipated rapid-onset
disasters occur due to global climate change, the gradual ratcheting up of local disasters
becomes the new normal. From an emergency management perspective, the contrast between rapid and gradually occurring disasters is even more stark and consequential. In the
United States, rapid-onset disasters, once declared as disasters by governmental authorities
are met with a wealth of processes and resources to respond and recover. A “declared”
disaster that is beyond the response and recovery capability of a local jurisdiction will
trigger the implementation of mutual aid pacts, and resources of unaffected jurisdictions
will flow to the disaster area. If a disaster is large enough to receive a federal disasterdeclaration, federal agencies will provide assistance for recovery. In between disasters, jurisdictions from local to federal develop plans, model potential disasters, conduct exercises
and provide disaster education to the public. In the United States, state-level emergency
management organizations typically have sections or divisions dedicated to the mostfrequently occurring disasters with specialists, who manage programs and plans, conduct
drills and provide educational programs for local jurisdictions and the public. Slowly
occurring “non-disasters” like epidemics fall outside the realm of emergency management
and are handled by departments of public health or simply not addressed.
3.5. Disaster Victims: Vulnerability
Perhaps the most significant contribution to the study of disasters by social scientists
is the detailed understanding of how hazards affect human communities or as Tierney [7]succinctly observes, social scientists, have “focused on disasters, not as physical phenomena, but as social ones” (p. 120). The most consequential bi-product of these analyses over
the years has been the knowledge that some categories of people fare significantly worse
than others when extreme events occur. While there are many definitions of vulnerability,
in our opinion, the most straightforward is that vulnerability consists of “the characteristics
of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope
with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard” [49] (p.11). The capacity
to cope, resist and recover from a disaster varies based on factors, including social class,ethnicity, age and gender, as well as non-social factors of geographic location and thebuilt environment. More specifically, disaster vulnerability is often associated with poor
people, women, members of racial, ethnic or religious minorities, the elderly and young
children, and people with disabilities or chronic health conditions. Lest we assume thatvulnerability is an “inherent or intrinsic” characteristic of these groups, Tierney warns thata more nuanced approach is needed in which status disadvantages in disaster situations
intersect, with some more salient than others in the specific contexts of disaster [7]. The
question that guides our discussion in this section is whether vulnerability in rapid-onset
disasters, which constitute the subjects of the bulk of social science disaster research, differs
in significant ways from slowly occurring disasters.
Recall that earlier, we quoted Dynes [11], who, in comparing rapid and graduallyoccurring disasters, observed that slow-onset disasters “involve displaced populations, arepredominantly rural, deal with conflict . . . (and) might represent new, previously unseen
types of disaster” (p.2). What Dynes had in mind were famines, droughts, epidemics, civil
unrest or warfare in predominantly developing nations of the global south. Our emphasisin the quote by Dynes might be better directed at the phrase “and represent new, previously

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unseen types of disasters.” While global climate change and the coronavirus pandemic are
not new or necessarily unforeseen, human-induced climate change is a relatively recent
discovery, and a global pandemic had not occurred for a century. Clearly, these gradualonset disasters are not predominantly rural, nor are they confined to developing nations.
Both the coronavirus and climate change affect urban and rural areas and developed anddeveloping nations, are unrelated to warfare or civil unrest, but in the case of climatechange, do involve displacement of populations. Keeping in mind Tierney’s caution
regarding the intersectionality of vulnerability factors, we will now turn to some examples
of differential vulnerability in our two gradual-onset disasters.
Although the coronavirus pandemic is ongoing and ultimate outcomes remain unknown, some studies of social vulnerability have been conducted. Karaye and Horney [50],using data from the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and employing quantitative
methods tested the effects of socioeconomic status (percentage below poverty, percentage
unemployed, per capita income and educational attainment), household composition (age,disability, percentage of single-parent households), minority status (percentage minority
and English language proficiency) and housing and transportation (percentages of multiunit structures, mobile homes, residential density, availability of a vehicle and percentage
of group quarters). Overall, they found that racial and ethnic minorities, limited English
language ability and lack of a high school level education predicted higher coronavirus casecounts. The authors noted, however, significant variations within the U.S. in the salienceof these factors. For example, as of May 2020, in the states of Washington and Oregon,minority status, language proficiency, household composition and disability were the mostsalient factors in coronavirus case counts. In the Gulf Coast states, housing and transportation were more predictive of case counts than minority status and language proficiency.
In a separate study focusing specifically on disability, Chakraborty [51] employed dataon disability characteristics obtained from the 2018 American Community Survey, which
define people with disabilities as members of the civilian non-institutionalized population,
who reported having serious self-care, hearing, vision, independent living, ambulatory,
and/or cognitive difficulties. The author found that people with disabilities, who are Black,
Asian, Hispanic, Native American, below the poverty line, under 18 years of age, andfemale were more likely to contract the coronavirus than people with disabilities, who are
non-Hispanic White, above the poverty level, aged 65 or older, and male, after controllingfor spatial clustering.
Vulnerability to global climate change would appear at first glance to be mainly
associated with a geographic location as the impacts appear to be related to regions
where sea level rise threatens coastal communities or areas where climate change has
exacerbated the impacts of frequent rapid-onset disasters related to meteorological andwildfire hazards. However, social scientists have noted that vulnerability is not evenly
distributed but is “likely to parse the heaviest damages on the most marginalized areas andpeople, often those who live in low lying delta areas, on small islands, at high altitudes,
and in high latitudes” [21] (p.142) [52]. While location is clearly a factor, those who
dwell in locations of high environmental hazards are frequently poor, stigmatized or
marginalized groups forced to live in hazardous locations as a result of “colonization,
housing segregation, forced relocation, isolation and enclosure” [21] (p. 142). In contrast
to rapid-onset disasters that may require short-term evacuations, global climate change
has required the far more problematic and socially disruptive process of relocation andresettlement. On this point, Oliver–Smith [53] states that “uprooted people generally
face the daunting task of rebuilding not only personal lives, but also communities—thoserelationships, networks and structures that support people as individuals” (p. 124). The
disadvantages experienced in resettlement may involve “homelessness, unemployment,
marginalization, the loss of neighborhood and community, mental and physical healthchallenges, and powerlessness” (p.127). These relocation disadvantages are likely to beexperienced by people already challenged by historic hardships imposed by class, race or
ethnic identity.

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4. Conclusions
In the formative years in which disaster sociology was being established, founders
like Fritz and Quarantelli were probably justified in conceptually delimiting the field
as a means of carving out a niche in an established discipline, which did not address
disasters. We feel that it is now time to expand the paradigm to incorporate gradual-onset
disasters, the disasters that unfold over periods of months and years and include droughts,
famines, epidemics, as well as the current coronavirus pandemic and global climate change.
These disasters have claimed millions of lives, destroyed livelihoods, disrupted national
economies and required large-scale population displacements. These slow-onset disasters,
like those that occur rapidly, have caused extensive, cumulative and permanent damage
and imposed significant disadvantages on already socially marginalized groups. The
exclusion of gradual-onset disasters from the field of sociology has had consequences interms of the public visibility of these events, the urgency of public policy to address themand the lack of adequate international frameworks to assure cooperation for those that are
global in scope.
We have argued that gradual-onset disasters challenge the conceptual “borders”
imposed on the study of disaster and attempted to demonstrate how these borders must be
expanded to accommodate a broader conception of disaster. These borders are temporal,
spatial, phasing or zoning and positioning. Concepts of social vulnerability, too, mustaccount for a broader set of disadvantages imposed by gradual-onset disasters. We havedrawn examples from the two current, gradually evolving disasters that confront our
nations and the world. The temporal border must be expanded beyond the parametersof minutes to hours to incorporate disasters that unfold over months, years and even
decades. The coronavirus has persisted for over a year at this point, and we know thatearlier epidemics have encompassed multiple years. Global climate change has beena process that has spanned more than a century, is cumulative in its effects and may
persist for decades to come. Spatial borders must be modified as disasters have become
multi-national and global, as exemplified by our two ongoing slowly occurring disasters.
The standard sociological model for both the study of disasters and the plans that are
intended to address them assume that disasters occur rapidly and pass through phases of
response, recovery, mitigation and preparedness and have relatively fixed beginning andend states. Some slowly occurring disasters, particularly epidemics, may display recurring
response/recovery cycles that are protracted and persist until treatments are available toend the cycles.
Positioning, which reflects the management of disasters and the roles of various
stakeholders, must also be considered in the context of gradually occurring disasters. As wehave pointed out, some gradual-onset disasters pose important dilemmas for government
leaders due to the difficult tradeoffs necessary to address pandemics and climate change.
For many rapid-onset disasters, legal and administrative procedures honed over the courseof many disasters and coded into law, facilitate a relatively smooth and efficient response
and recovery aided by consensus that these processes and procedures are appropriate.
Slowly occurring disasters, particularly those that are rare, lack the legally establishedfoundation for response and recovery and require painful tradeoffs that generate dissensus
and conflict, will be particularly difficult to manage. Finally, the concept of vulnerability, so
central to sociological analysis of disasters, is perhaps the border with the least requirement
for modification to accommodate the addition of gradual-onset disasters into the lexicon ofresearch. While the salience of poverty, race, age, gender, disability and other factors that
confer disadvantages vary according to the hazard, these factors also exacerbate the effects
of gradual-onset disasters as well as those that occur rapidly. Global climate change may
impose the additional burdens of permanent dislocation, resettlement and destruction of
habitat to those imposed socially.
In making this argument for expanding the conceptual borders of disaster social
science, we join the voices of others who perceive the serious consequences of excluding
gradual-onset disasters from the framework for understanding and addressing the pressing

Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 3299

19 of 21issues brought about by these phenomena. This is not to say that social science alone,or the conceptual changes we have advocated, will make these disasters infinitely moremanageable, but they will improve their visibility and perhaps stimulate public policies
that improve adaptation and formalize mitigation strategies that will more effectively
address their impacts on our communities. The hazards we now face are increasingly
global, deadly, destructive and pose ever greater challenges to our resilience as nations andas a global community. We believe it essential to develop the vocabulary to understandthem as a necessary step in our collective capacity to effectively respond to and recoverfrom them.
Author Contributions: This paper began as a brief concept paper by K.Y. identifying several “borders” that the coronavirus pandemic transcended if regarded as a disaster. J.D.G. expanded thescope of the analysis to include global climate change, provided a literature review and expanded
the analysis to both the pandemic and climate change. Both authors have read and agreed to the
published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: Not applicable.
Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank Elizabeth Reddy and Douglas Lownsberry for
initial review of the manuscript and the anonymous reviewers assigned by the editors of the IJERPH.
We appreciate the advice on formatting by academic librarians Eileen Wakiji and Khue Uong.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors have no conflict of interest to declare.

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