Nuclear Power Generationin Asia-Pacific- Current Policies and Future Perspectives

August 2017
Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre

Nuclear Power Generationin Asia-Pacific- Current Policies and Future Perspectives

August 2017

Published by:

Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre
The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan
Inui Building Kachidoki 11F, 1-13-1 Kachidoki
Chuo-ku, Tokyo 104-0054 Japan
Tel:(813) 5144-8551

Fax:(813) 5144-8555

Email:

master@aperc.ieej.or.jp (administration)

Website: http://aperc.ieej.or.jp/© Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, 2017
ISBN: 978-4-931482-56-2

Foreword
In May 2016, the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC) launched the 6th
Edition of APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook to help inform policy makers about the
major trends and challenges facing the energy sector in the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) region. According to our projection, energy demand in APEC
significantly grows in the next decades, with China and Southeast Asia being the main drivers,
and the region remains reliant on fossil fuels. Secure, low-emission as well as cost-efficientenergy sources become more important for sustainable development in the APEC region.
Nuclear power generation, which has been contributing to the electricity sector in the
APEC region since the 1950s, is one of the key technologies to realize low-emission
electricity supply. However, after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident in 2011, theattitude towards nuclear power significantly varies by economy in the APEC region. Several
economies has decided to reduce their reliance on nuclear power or abandoned constructionplans for new reactors, while some others maintain their policy to expand nuclear generation.
This study attempts to summarize these recent policy updates and assess the effects ofdifferent nuclear development scenarios on the future APEC generation mix.
This report is published by APERC as an independent study and does not reflect theviews or policies of the APEC Energy Working Group or individual APEC member economies.
APERC recognizes and respects the position of some APEC member economies that do notconsider nuclear power an option for their energy systems.
We hope this report contributes to the ongoing discussion about the future of nuclear
power generation in the APEC region.

Takato OJIMI
President
Asia Pacific Energy Research CentreiAcknowledgement
This study could not have been completed without the invaluable contributions of many
individuals who provided insightful comments and suggestions, as well as other informationneeded. Specifically, we are grateful for the following experts:

Lead authors
Hao Jia (Chapter 1, Chapter 2, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5), Takashi Otsuki (Japan section in
Chapter 2, and Chapter 3)

Contributors to Chapter 2 “Current nuclear policies in the APEC region”
Wanhar (Indonesia), Choong Jong Oh (Korea), Muhamad Izham Abd. Shukor (Malaysia),
Juan Roberto Lozano Maya (Mexico), Michael Ochoada Sinocruz (The Philippines), FangChia Lee (Chinese Taipei), Atit Tippichai (Thailand), Tran Thi Lien Phuong (Viet Nam)

Other contributors
Cecilia Tam, Kazutomo Irie, Kei Shimogori, Atsuhiko Suzuki, Koshi Taguchi, James Michael
Kendell

LayoutTakashi OTSUKI

Editors
Urban Connections, Takashi Otsuki

ii

External experts
The Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC) appreciates the helpful comments,
observations and suggestions from the following reviewers to improve the quality of thisresearch projects.
Daniel Patrick Brady (Natural Resources Canada), Darren Bradley Hempel (Natural
Resources Canada), Nicole McLellan (Natural Resources Canada), Donato D. Marcos(Department of Energy, The Philippines), Mauro L. Marcelo (National Power Corporation,
The Philippines), Henri Paillere (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency), Norio Terada (WANO
Tokyo Centre Inc.).

This projects are significantly benefited by the workshop held in November 2016 in TokyoJapan. We would like to thank the following experts for their participation in the workshop
and insightful contributions.
John Michael Kalish (Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office), Daniel Patrick
Brady (Natural Resources Canada), Darren Bradley Hempel (Natural Resources Canada),
Yu Zhang (National Energy Administration, China), Xiaomeng Li (National Energy
Administration, China), Ida Nuryatin Finahari (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Indonesia), I Made Agus Dharma Susila (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Republicof Indonesia), Futoshi Sadoshima (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan),Hansang Kim (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, Korea), Jong ho Lee (Ministry of Trade,Industry and Energy, Korea), Mohd Zam Zam Jaafar (Malaysia Nuclear Power Corporation),
Abang Othman bin Abang Yusof (Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, Malaysia),
Donato D. Marcos (Department of Energy, The Philippines), Mauro L. Marcelo (National
Power Corporation, The Philippines), Nikolay Borisov (Rosatom International Netwark,
Russia), Phanupong Sathorn (Ministry of Energy, Thailand), Nateekool Kriangchaiporn(Electricity Generation Aothority of Thailand), Ross Matzkin-Bridger (US Department ofEnergy), Henri Paillere (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency), Norio Terada (WANO Tokyo CentreInc.), Min-Hwan Chang (WANO Tokyo Centre).

iii

Table of contents
Foreword................................................................................................................................... i
Acknowledgement ................................................................................................................... ii
Table of contents .................................................................................................................... iv
List of figures ........................................................................................................................... v
List of tables........................................................................................................................... vii
Glossary and abbreviations .................................................................................................. viii
Executive summary ................................................................................................................ 1
Chapter 1

Introduction ....................................................................................................... 2

1.1

Background ................................................................................................. 2

1.2

Objective and outline of this report.............................................................. 3

Chapter 2

Current nuclear policies in the APEC region .................................................... 4

2.1

Nuclear power in the world and APEC ........................................................ 4

2.2

Economy overview ...................................................................................... 7

2.3

Uranium resources and production ........................................................... 39

Chapter 3

Future perspectives—A scenario analysis ..................................................... 43

3.1

Scenarios and assumptions ...................................................................... 43

3.2

Methods: long-term electricity supply model ............................................. 55

3.3

Results and discussion.............................................................................. 56

3.4

Conclusion ................................................................................................. 61

Chapter 4

Challenges for nuclear development .............................................................. 63

4.1

Challenges for nuclear power development in the APEC region .............. 63

4.2

Conclusion ................................................................................................. 78

Chapter 5Conclusion: potential for collaboration among the APEC economies ........... 79

5.1

Collaboration possibilities in the APEC region .......................................... 79

References ........................................................................................................................... 84iv

List of figures
Figure 1 Number of reactors in operation and under construction, as of November 2016 ... 3
Figure 2 Nuclear generation by regional grouping, from 1970 to 2015 ................................. 5
Figure 3 IAEA’s assessment system for nuclear power deployment ..................................... 5
Figure 4 CANDU nuclear power reactor schematic diagram ................................................. 9
Figure 5 China nuclear reactors by the end of March 2016................................................. 11
Figure 6 China nuclear reactor construction statistics between 2000 and 2015 ................. 11
Figure 7 Nuclear power reactors in Japan, as of June 2016 ............................................... 16
Figure 8 Comparison of regulatory requirements before and after the Fukushima accident............................................................................................................................... 18
Figure 9 Trends in public opinion on nuclear power in Japan ............................................. 19
Figure 10 Nuclear power reactors in Korea ......................................................................... 20
Figure 11 Target milestones for Malaysia nuclear power development .............................. 24
Figure 12 Nuclear power reactors in Mexico. ...................................................................... 25
Figure 13 Russian reactors’ planned additions and retirements to 2035. ........................... 29
Figure 14 Nuclear power plants in Chinese Taipei .............................................................. 30
Figure 15 Nuclear power plants in the United States .......................................................... 33
Figure 16 Projected power generation, the United States ................................................... 33
Figure 17 Distribution of reasonably assured resources, selected economies, as of January
2015 ....................................................................................................................... 40
Figure 18 Share of global uranium production, 2014 ........................................................... 41
Figure 19 Global uranium production from 2004 to 2014 .................................................... 42
Figure 20 Nuclear capacity projection for APEC, 2013 to 2040 .......................................... 44
Figure 21 Nuclear capacity by economy, 2013 and 2040.................................................... 44
Figure 22 Nuclear capacity assumptions for Canada, 2013 to 2040 ................................... 45
Figure 23 Nuclear capacity assumptions for China, 2013 to 2040 ...................................... 46
Figure 24 Nuclear capacity assumptions for Japan, 2013 to 2040...................................... 47v

Figure 25 Nuclear capacity assumptions for Korea, 2013 to 2040 ...................................... 48
Figure 26 Nuclear capacity assumptions for Chinese Taipei, 2013 to 2040 ....................... 49
Figure 27 Nuclear capacity assumptions for Mexico, 2013 to 2040 .................................... 49
Figure 28 Nuclear capacity assumptions for Russia, 2013 to 2040 .................................... 50
Figure 29 Nuclear capacity assumptions for the United States, 2013 to 2040.................... 51
Figure 30 Nuclear capacity assumptions for Southeast Asian economies, 2013 to 2040 .. 53
Figure 31 Electricity supply model structure ........................................................................ 55
Figure 32 Power generation in the BAU Scenario and fuel share in 2040 by Scenario, APEC............................................................................................................................... 56
Figure 33 “3E” results—Emissions, energy self-sufficiency and cost .................................. 57
Figure 34 Generation costs changes relative to the BAU in 2040, selected economies..... 58
Figure 35 Front-end model for the fuel cycle (take LWR for example) ................................ 60
Figure 36 Global uranium production capability and APEC’s uranium demand.................. 60
Figure 37 Spent fuel generation from NPPs in the APEC region, cumulative from 2013 ... 61
Figure 38 Age distribution of nuclear power fleet in the APEC region................................. 64
Figure 39 SMRs developed by different economies ............................................................ 67
Figure 40 Example of nuclear power plant decommissioning process in Japan ................. 71
Figure 41 Estimated costs for decommissioning BWR and PWR (1.1 GW model-plant) inJapan ..................................................................................................................... 72
Figure 42 Levelized cost of electricity with different discount rate, selected technologies.. 73
Figure 43 Public perception towards nuclear power in selected economies ....................... 74
Figure 44 Favorability to nuclear power in the United States .............................................. 75
Figure 45 A survey on public acceptance for nuclear power in Japan ................................ 76vi

List of tables
Table 1 Selected statements related to nuclear generation in NDCs (Nationally Determined
Contributions) submitted to the UNFCCC ............................................................... 6
Table 2 Scenario definition ................................................................................................... 43
Table 3 Fossil fuel assumption ............................................................................................. 54
Table 4 Selected Generation III reactors in APEC economies ............................................ 66
Table 5 Waste management policies, selected APEC economies ...................................... 69

vii

Glossary and abbreviations
ABWR

Advanced Boiling Water Reactor, a Generation III boiling water reactor
designed by GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) and Toshiba

AFCR

Advanced Fuel CANDU Reactors

AP1000

Advanced Passive Power Reactor, a Generation III nuclear power reactor
designed by Westinghouse Electric Company, the United States

APEC

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

APERC

Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre

APR1400

Advanced Pressurized Reactor, a Generation III pressurized water reactor
designed by Korea

BATAN

The National Nuclear Energy Agency, Indonesia

BWR

Boiling water reactor

CANDU

Canadian Deuterium Uranium. Registered trade name for the Canadiandesigned power reactor developed by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited andusing natural uranium as fuel and deuterium oxide (heavy water) as moderator.

CNEN

National Commission of Nuclear Energy, Mexico

COL

Construction and operating license

EAR

Estimated additional resources

EPR

European Pressurized Reactor, a Generation III pressurized water reactor
designed and developed mainly by Framatome (now Areva NP) and Électricitéde France (EDF) in France

ESBWR

Economic Simplified BWR designed by GE Hitachi

FBR

Fast breeder reactor

FEC

Final Energy Consumption

FOAKE

First-of-a-kind-engineering costs

FY

Fiscal YearGDP

Gross domestic product

GHG

Greenhouse gases

GIF

Generation IV International Forum. International organization collaborating on
the development of six innovative reactor and fuel cycle system designs for
deployment in

the period 2030-2040

HTGR

High temperature gas-cooled reactor

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

ICRP

International Commission on Radiological Protection

IEA

International Energy Agency

viii

IEEJ

Institute of Energy Economics, Japan

INDC

Intended Nationally Determined Contribution

INPO

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

LCOE

Levelized cost of electricity

LILW

Low and intermediate level radioactive waste

LLW

Low level radioactive waste

LNG

Liquefied natural gas

MNPC

Malaysia Nuclear Power Corporation

MOX

Mixed oxide fuels, nuclear fuels manufactured from a mix of uranium andplutonium oxides

Mtoe

Million tonnes of oil equivalent

MTR

Materials testing reactor

NDC

Nationally Determined Contributions

NEA

Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD

NPP

Nuclear power plant

NRA

The Nuclear Regulation Authority, Japan

NRC

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the United States

NSSS

Nuclear steam supply system

PHWR

Pressurized heavy water reactor

PWR

Pressurized water reactor

RAR

Reasonably assured resources

R&D

Research and development activities

SMR

Small modular reactor

SR

Speculative resources

TEPCO

Tokyo Electric Power Company

TPES

Total primary energy supply

UNFCCC

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

VVER

Water-cooled, water-moderated vessel-type pressurized power reactor, aRussian designed pressurized water reactor

WANO

The World Association of Nuclear Operators

WNA

World Nuclear Associationix

Executive summary
Nuclear power generation, which has been contributing to the electricity sector in the
APEC region since the 1950s, is one of the key technologies to realize low-emission
electricity supply. However, after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident in 2011, theattitudes toward nuclear power significantly vary by economy. Some economies havedecided to reduce their reliance on nuclear power, while other economies maintain theirpolicies to expand nuclear generation.
“How will these recent nuclear policies affect the APEC region? What is the role ofnuclear power in the future?”—they are the main research questions of this study. This report,
therefore, aims to summarize recent nuclear policies (Chapter 2), quantify their impacts on
the APEC generation mix (Chapter 3), as well as discuss the major challenges for nuclear
power generation (Chapter 4). The quantitative assessment in Chapter 3 examines three
nuclear scenarios (the BAU = Business-as-Usual, the Low Nuclear and the High Nuclear
Scenarios), employing a long-term electricity supply model.
The modeling analysis suggests that, in any scenario, China becomes the main driverin terms of new reactor additions, increasing its presence in nuclear generation in the APEC
region. Nuclear contributes from the 3E—Environment, Energy security and Economic
efficiency—perspective, although economic benefits for the region, as a whole, are estimatedto be modest. Stronger emissions policies, such as a higher level of carbon prices, would be
important to improve the economics of nuclear power. Our analysis also implies that a large
amount of spent fuel is generated even in the Low Nuclear Scenario. Economies need to
implement policies to construct sufficient facilities for storage and final disposal.
Nuclear power development is surrounded by large uncertainties due to various
challenges, including waste management and public acceptance. The accident in Fukushima
negatively impacted on these challenges in most of the economies, according to several
surveys (Chapter 4). Sustained efforts for transparency, public communications, as well as
trust building become more important to continue to utilize nuclear power in the future.

1

Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1

Background
With 21 economies individually and collectively facing the energy challenges of the early

21st century, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has an opportunity to influence
global trends. Currently, APEC represents nearly 60% of the world’s primary energy demand
and more than half of the real gross domestic product (GDP); the region also includes majorenergy exporters (such as Australia, Canada, Russia and United States), as well as
consumers that import nearly all of their energy supply (such as Chile, Japan, Korea andSingapore.) The drivers of energy use differ significantly among the economies, reflecting
the wide range of climates, geographical conditions, population and economic structures.
Despite these differences, APEC economies share many energy goals, including a strong
focus on enhancing energy security and environmental sustainability while supporting
economic growth.
In May 2016, APERC published APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook, 6th Edition,
which presents the latest energy trends and evaluates major energy challenges andopportunities through 2040 for the APEC region (APERC, 2016a). Targeting policy makers,
the report aims to foster understanding among APEC economies of the key drivers of both
domestic and regional energy demand and supply, the need for energy infrastructuredevelopment and related policy issues. The Outlook indicates that energy demand in APEC
significantly grows in the next decades, with China and Southeast Asia being the main driver,and the region remains reliant on fossil fuels. Secure, low-emission as well as cost-efficientenergy sources become more important for sustainable development in the APEC region.
Since the 1950s, nuclear power generation has contributed to electricity supply in the
APEC region as one of major options of low-carbon electricity. APEC economies include
major nuclear utilizing economies as well as nuclear expanding economies. As of November
2016, approximately 60% of reactors in operation (265 reactors out of 449 globally) andunder construction (39 out of 61 globally) are in the region (Figure 1). However, after the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident in 2011, nuclear power development is surrounded bylarge uncertainties. In the APEC, the attitude toward nuclear significantly vary by economy.
Some economies, such as Japan and Chinese Taipei, have decided to shift their policies toreducing nuclear dependencies, while some others, such as China, maintain their policy to2expand nuclear generation. These policy changes may significantly impact the middle- tolong-term electricity supply in the APEC region.

Number of reactors in operation (as of Nov 2016)
US
FranceJapan 1
China
RussiaKorea
India
CanadaUK
UkraineSwedenGermany
Spain
Belgium
Chinese Taipei
Czech
Switzerland
Slovakia
Pakistan
Hungary
FinlandArgentina
South Africa
Romania
MexicoBulgaria
BrazilSlovenia
Netherlands
Iran
Armenia
UAE
Belarus

Under construction
99

4

58

1

42

3

36
36

20
7

25
22
19

3

5

15
15

2

10
8
7
7
6
6
5
4
4
4
4
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
0
0

2

2

3
1
1

1

APEC: 265
World: 449

4

APEC: 39
World: 61

2

Figure 1 Number of reactors in operation and under construction, as of November 2016
Sources: IAEA PRIS system and APERC1.

1.2

Objective and outline of this report
The objective of this study is to summarize the current nuclear policies in APEC member

economies, and to analyze their impacts on long-term electricity supply in the APEC region
in a quantitative manner. This study first conducts a survey on the current policies as well asplans for the future development (Chapter 2). Then, with that information in hand, we develop
three nuclear scenarios with the projection period to 2040, and quantify the potential impactsof the scenarios on the APEC generation mix (Chapter 3). Then, we discuss the important
issues for nuclear power development in APEC, including nuclear safety, technology
progress and nuclear waste disposal (Chapter 4). Lastly, we explore the potential for regional
cooperation, including, for example, information sharing network, under the APEC frameworkand offer suggestions for policy makers and stake holders in the APEC region (Chapter 5).

1

We refer to IAEA PRIS, but adjusted data in several economies; for example, in Japan, Ikata unit 1 is
excluded from the figure in operation, and the number of reactors under construction is revised from 2 to 3.

3

Chapter 2 Current nuclear policies in the APEC region
Asia-Pacific is the most important regions in the world where there has been significant
growth of nuclear power in the past and that has sizeable plans for the construction of more
NPPs (Figure 1). To better understand the current situation, this chapter aims to summarize
the current policy in each relevant APEC economy that has nuclear power or is considering
nuclear power as an option for electricity supply.

2.1

Nuclear power in the world and APEC
Nuclear power is one of the largest sources of low-carbon electricity in the world. As of

November 2016, there were 449 reactors operable around the world and 61 underconstruction; and Asia-Pacific is considered to be the key driver for nuclear expansion in thenext decades, with about 60% of operating reactors as well as under construction in the world
located in this region. Nuclear power has experienced a setback after the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant accident in March 2011, though changes in nuclear energy policies
were limited to a few countries.2 Generated electricity from nuclear dropped mainly due tosubsequent shutdown of the nuclear fleet in Japan after the accident, as well as the closureof eight reactors in Germany the same year (Figure 2); yet, nuclear generation is gradually
reviving driven by the growth in East Asia, in particular in China.
Nuclear policies and situations after the Fukushima accident significantly differ by
economy. For example, China remains committed to nuclear power and has restarted new
construction projects. Eight new nuclear reactors were approved in 2015, and additional
projects are under evaluation and will seek approval in the near future. Whereas Chinese
Taipei has decided to phase out all nuclear capacity by 2025. Nuclear reactors in the UnitedStates, both operating and under construction, suffer from economic-competitivenesschallenges due to low-cost fossil fuel resources. Southeast Asian economies are still
considering their first nuclear power project, and the preparatory works are ongoing. However,uncertainties still remain due to political issues and public decision. In November 2016, Viet
Nam recently cancelled a nuclear project. According to the IAEA milestone standard, all the
APEC newcomer economies are in the process of Phase 1 (see Figure 3). Challenges for2

https://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2017/7212-impacts-fukushima-policies.pdf

4newcomers include public acceptance, legal and regulatory system building, human resource
development, as well as financial issues.

Figure 2 Nuclear generation by regional grouping, from 1970 to 2015
Source: World Nuclear Association 3.

Figure 3 IAEA’s assessment system for nuclear power deployment
Figure from IAEA (2007).

3

http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library.aspx

5

The Paris Agreement, adopted in December 2015, is an important milestone toward asustainable society. Among the thirteen economies covered in the next Section (Section 2.2),
three economies—China, Japan and Korea—explicitly mention nuclear generation in their
NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions) submitted to the UNFCCC (United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change). China and Japan show their intention tocontinue utilizing nuclear generation (Table 1). China aims to develop nuclear power in asafe and efficient manner, as well as to strengthen research and development for advanced
nuclear technologies. Although Japan aims to reduce its dependency on nuclear, theeconomy plans to utilize nuclear power over the long-term (20-22% in fiscal year 2030), as
long as nuclear safety is confirmed. Whereas, Korea highlighted public acceptance issues
following the nuclear accident in Fukushima.

Table 1 Selected statements related to nuclear generation in NDCs (Nationally
Determined Contributions) submitted to the UNFCCC
EconomyStatement

China



“to develop nuclear power in a safe and efficient manner”

“to strengthen research and development (R&D) andcommercialization demonstration for low-carbon technologies, such as… advanced nuclear technologies”

Japan



“Utilizing nuclear power generations whose safety is confirmed”

The share of nuclear power in total power generation: approximately
20-22% in fiscal year 2030. Assumed total power generation isapproximately 1 065 billion kWh.

Korea



“Given the decreased level of public acceptance following the
Fukushima accident, there are now limits to the extent that Korea canmake use of nuclear energy, one of the major mitigation measuresavailable to it”

Source: UNFCCC.

Pressurized water reactors (PWRs) account for about 60% of the total number of nuclear
reactors, while boiling water reactors (BWRs), located mainly in the United States, Japanand Chinese Taipei, for about a quarter. Pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs), or
Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors, which were first developed in Canada in6the late 1950s, are the third most popular reactor type in the APEC region, with reactors in
Canada, China, and South Korea. Three fast breeder reactors (FBRs) are currently operatingin the APEC region; the Russian designed BN-600 at Beloyarsk 3 has achieved a lifetime
capacity factor to date of 74.1%, a promising result for this design and future fast reactors.
In addition to the reactors commercially operated, there are a total of 165 research reactors
in 16 APEC member economies. Those economies without commercial reactors that operate
research reactors include Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, the Philippines,
Thailand and Viet Nam. Research reactors are used for nuclear research in a number offields such as health, agriculture, materials research and radiation research; note that having
a research reactor does not necessarily indicate that the host economy has an interest in
pursuing nuclear power electricity generation.

2.2

Economy overview

2.2.1

CanadaHighlights
Canada is the sixth largest economy in the APEC region in terms of the number ofoperating commercial reactors.



There are 19 commercially operating reactors, mostly in Ontario, accounting for about
15% of the economy’s electricity generation mix.



Canada is a leader in nuclear technology research and development, specifically withrespect to the CANDU technology.

Canada was the world's largest uranium producer prior to 2009. It currently ranks
second following Kazakhstan.

Nuclear is an important component of Canada’s energy mix. Canada generated some
635 TWh in 2015, of which 96 TWh (15%) was from nuclear, compared with 373 TWh (59%)
from hydro, 61 TWh from coal and 59 TWh from gas. Annual electricity use is about
15 000 kWh per person, one of the highest levels in the world. Net exports in 2015 were
60 TWh to the US. Total generating capacity in 2014 was 137 GW, more than half of thisbeing hydro.
The Canadian nuclear sector consists of a mixture of private sector firms and public
sector organizations at both the federal and provincial levels, and covers the entire nuclear
7

energy fuel cycle, including research and development activities (R&D), uranium mining, fuelfabrication, nuclear reactor design, NPP construction, maintenance, waste management,
and decommissioning. The Canadian nuclear energy industry is concentrated in a few
provinces: nuclear power generation occurs in Ontario and New Brunswick, uranium is mined
and milled in Saskatchewan, and uranium is refined, converted and fabricated into fuel in
Ontario. Of the 24 nuclear power reactors built in Canada, 19 reactors are currently in fullcommercial operation. Eighteen of the operating reactors are in Ontario, and one is in New
Brunswick. Quebec decided to shut down their NPP in December 2012.
Unlike other energy sources, nuclear energy falls under federal jurisdiction in Canada.
The federal government is responsible for all regulation of nuclear materials and activities,
along with supporting nuclear R&D. Concerned with the impact of nuclear activities on health,safety, security and the environment, the federal government has put in place acomprehensive nuclear legislation framework. The latter is comprised of the Nuclear Safety
and Control Act 1997, the Nuclear Energy Act 1985, the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act 2002 andthe Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act 2015. They provide the framework for developing
nuclear energy in Canada.
While nuclear legislation and regulation take place at the federal level, the decision toinvest in NPPs for electricity generation rests with the provinces (in concert with relevant
provincial energy utilities). While rising fossil fuel prices, aging reactors, and climate change
concerns stirred discussion of new reactors throughout Canada during the early 2000s, given
the current context and the outlook of each provincial electricity utility, no new nuclear
capacity is projected in the near-term. However, a number of existing operational plants will
undergo refurbishment. Ontario will invest more than CAD 25 billion between 2016 and 2031
to refurbish and extend the lives of 10 nuclear reactors: four at the Darlington Nuclear
Generating Station and six at the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station. These refurbishments
will maintain the province’s nuclear power capacity at 9.9 GW and add about 25–30 years to
the operational life of each unit. Refurbishment at Darlington started in 2016 with one reactor,
and commitments on subsequent reactors will take into account the cost and timing ofpreceding refurbishments, with appropriate off-ramps in place. Refurbishment at Bruce is tostart in 2020. The New Brunswick reactor, as well as two units (units 1 and 2) at the Bruce
nuclear power plant, were refurbished and brought back online in 2012.

8

The continued use of nuclear energy in Ontario will displace approximately 30 million
tonnes per year of CO2 or 3.8% of expected emissions in 2030 (as compared with naturalgas) (WNA, 2017).

CANDU Technology
Canada has developed a successful nuclear energy sector based on the unique heavy
water natural uranium reactor system (well known as ‘Canadian Deuterium Uranium’, or
CANDU), which uses pressurized fuel channels instead of a pressure vessel, natural insteadof enriched uranium, and heavy water as coolant/moderator instead of light water, as foundin PWR designs (Figure 4). By the end of 2016, there were 31 CANDU nuclear powerreactors in seven economies worldwide, with more being built and new variations of CANDU
technology being developed. For example, SNC-Lavalin (a private company that purchased
the CANDU Reactor Division from Atomic Energy of Canada Limited in 2011) and Chinese
partners led by China National Nuclear Corporation are currently working to develop andbuild the Advanced Fuel CANDU Reactor (AFCR) in China and abroad. The AFCR is
designed to use recycled uranium from light water reactors (LWRs), and would thus
complement, rather than compete with, fleets with PWR and BWR designs.

Figure 4 CANDU nuclear power reactor schematic diagram

Canada has exported 12 CANDU units to date to Korea (4 units), Romania (2 units),
India (2 units), Pakistan (1 unit), Argentina (1 unit) and China (2 units), along with the9engineering expertise to build and operate them. Three of the exported units are undergoing
major refurbishment. In Canada in 2015, CANDU reactors supply approximately 60% of
Ontario’s electricity and 15% of Canada’s overall electricity requirements.

2.2.2

People's Republic of China

Highlights
China is the third largest economy in terms of the number of reactors in operation.
Nuclear contributed about 3% of the economy’s electricity supply in 2015.

The economy drives the growth of future nuclear capacity in the world, with more than
20 reactors under construction representing 40% of the world.



China has a plan to increase its nuclear power capacity to 58 GW by 2020.

China started nuclear power research in the late 1970s. Its first nuclear reactor, a 30MW
reactor at the Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant, was connected to the grid in 1991. China also
imported the French nuclear technology M310, and built the first commercial NPP - Daya
Bay Nuclear Power Plant, of which the first unit was connected to the grid in 1993.
China is aiming to construct more NPPs, as the economy is striving to reduce air
pollution from coal-fired power plants. By the end of March 2016, 30 nuclear power reactors
are in operation with 24 under construction and more to be constructed (Figure 5)4. In 2015,
the electricity generation output of nuclear was 169 TWh, which was approximately 3% of
total power generation. The installed capacity was 26 GW. The year of 2015 also saw the
beginning of the greatest number of nuclear power projects in a single year in China sincethe 2011 crisis, with eight new units being approved for construction (Figure 6).
Following Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi crisis in early 2011, China reviewed its NPP safety
requirements, and required that all the newly built reactors meet the Generation III safety
criteria. Now, all of the NPPs are located in the coastal provinces. China has approved threeinland NPP sites along Yangtze River, and was to begin the construction using AP1000
technology in 2011. However after Fukushima, all the inland projects were suspended, andthe restart date is still unclear.

4

As of November 2016, 36 nuclear power reactors are in operation with 20 under construction (Figure 1).

10Figure 5 China nuclear reactors by the end of March 2016
The fast reactor is excluded. Data from IAEA. Figure by APERC.

Figure 6 China nuclear reactor construction statistics between 2000 and 2015
The fast reactor is excluded. Data from IAEA. Figure by APERC.

China is seeking more advanced nuclear technology, some of which were provided byforeign companies. In September 2004, the State Council approved plans for four new
nuclear reactors in eastern China, with the requirement that participants bid using 1 GW to11

1.5 GW reactors of Generation III or higher technology. China’s State Nuclear PowerTechnology Corp. (SNPTC) was tapped to select the foreign technology to use at theseplants. During an open bidding process, three foreign companies submitted bids: US-based
Westinghouse Corp. (AP1000 reactors); AREVA (European pressurized reactor [EPR]
reactors); and AtomStroyExport (water-cooled, water-moderated vessel-type pressurized
power reactor [VVER]-1000 reactors). In December 2006, after months of bidding andtechnical exchanges, Westinghouse’s AP1000 design was selected for four plants in Sanmen,
Zhejiang; and Haiyang, Shandong. AREVA was later selected to build two separate units inTaishan, Guangdong, using its latest EPR design.
With rapid development in nuclear R&D, there is a strong desire among Chinese leaders
to become a global supplier of nuclear power “created in China”. On the basis of imported
technology, China has developed its own Generation III technology. The advanced reactors
Hualong-one (also called HPR-1000 in China), CAP1400, and a high-temperature gascooled reactor design (HTGR) are supposed to conquer international markets.

Future perspectives and development plan
China aims to expand its nuclear power industry to reduce air pollution and meet risingdemand for electricity. The China nuclear power policy has moved from “moderate
development” of nuclear power to “positive development” since 2004, and in 2011-12 to“steady development with safety”. In 2007, the Chinese central government approved the“Nuclear Power Medium- and Long-Term Development Plan (2005-2020)”, which wasdrafted by the National Development and Reforms Commission (NDRC). The plan set atarget of more than 40 GW capacity for the year of 2020, which would account for about 3%of electricity generation in the economy.
After the Fukushima accident, China started to inspect and review its NPPs and revise
its development plan. In October 2012, based on the inspections and reviews, the StateCouncil issued a new development plan that represents a serious and cautious revaluationof safety issues and the pace of development. It is called the Medium- and Long-term Nuclear
Power Development Plan (2011-2020), which prioritizes safety and quality in Chinese
regulations and set the target of 58 GW of nuclear capacity by 2020.

12In April 2016, China signed the Paris Agreement on climate change, giving a strong push
to the international efforts against global warming. To fulfill its commitment, China need toincrease non-fossil fuel sources in primary energy consumption to about 20%, and peak its
carbon emissions by 2030. China recognizes nuclear power and renewables as an important
way to achieve these targets, and drafted a plan to expand these capacities.
However, there are still some challenges and uncertainties for China’s nuclear power
development. The growth rate of the Chinese economy has seen a slowdown in recent years,
which has been referred to as the “new normal”. The slowing economic growth will further
contract energy demand in heavy industries, and for the first time the Chinese government
worries about the issue of excess capacity. Nuclear now has to compete against low-costcoal-fired generation. Furthermore, nuclear has a lower priority for dispatch in the winter than
combined heat and power plants, which are typically coal-fired or gas-fired.

2.2.3

Indonesia

Highlights


Uncertainties exist in the future nuclear power utilization. The government has statedthat nuclear power will be the last option to meet the economy’s demand.



Three research reactors were installed and a fourth is being planned.

With an industrial production growth rate of 10.5%, electricity demand is estimated toreach 450 TWh in 2026. More than one-third of Indonesia's electricity is generated by oil andgas. Therefore, as well as catering for growth in demand in its most populous region, themove to nuclear power will free up oil for export. However, in mid-2012, the National Energy
Council (DEN) stated that nuclear power was an unlikely last resort in the economy.
In 2007, the government of Indonesia established the Nuclear Power Development
Preparatory Team, whose task is to take the necessary preparatory measures and createplans to build Indonesia’s initial NPPs; however, to date the team has not conducted any
significant activities or performed relevant tasks. The legal basis of Indonesia’s nuclear power
development includes Law 17/2007 on Long Term Development, Years 2005–15 andGovernment Regulation 43/2006 on the Licensing of Nuclear Reactors.

13

Indonesia has developed an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle, although certain stages arestill at the laboratory stage. The economy has a well-established nuclear research program,which spans nearly five decades. The National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) currently
operates three nuclear research reactors, specifically: the GA Siwabessy 30MW materials
testing reactor (MTR), pool-type reactor in Serpong; the Kartini-PPNY 100kW Triga Mark-II
reactor in Yogyakarta; and the Bandung 1 000 kW Triga Mark-II reactor in Bandung. A fourth
10MW pool-type research reactor is being planned for development in the near future.
A 2014 review of laws and regulations confirmed that BATAN had the authority todevelop and operate the RDNK/RDE reactor in accordance with the Nuclear Energy andGovernment Regulation Law 1997 and the License of Nuclear Installation and Utilization of
Nuclear Materials Law 2014.
In March 2015 the government issued a white paper on national energy development
policy to 2050. According to the white paper, nuclear power is expected to provide 5 GW by2025, alongside other new and renewable sources providing 12 GW. In September 2015
Rusatom Overseas signed an agreement with BATAN on the construction of large NPPs in
Indonesia. However, in December the National Energy Council completed the nationalenergy plan to 2050 which awaited presidential signature. This is reported to exclude major
nuclear capacity, but has major increases in oil, gas and renewables. In January 2016
BATAN announced that a nuclear energy program implementation organization (NEPIO) wasplanned for launch in 2016, to move towards having up to four large reactors online by 2025.
In 2017, the Directorate General of New, Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation
will set up a roadmap of NPPs as mandated also by the national energy master plan. The
roadmap includes: Preparing the technological aspects of NPP; Fuel type; Location; Safety;
Legal system (regulation, standard, etc.); and Readiness funding and human resources.

Small scale nuclear power projectAt the same time, Indonesia is also seeking the opportunity to deploy small reactors. In
April 2015 Rusatom announced that a consortium of Russian and Indonesian companies led
by NUKEM Technologies had won a contract for the preliminary design of the multi-purpose
10MW high temperature reactor (HTR) in Indonesia, which would be “a flagship project in the
future of Indonesia’s nuclear program”, to deploy a pebble-bed HTR at Serpong.
14

In August 2016 China Nuclear Engineering Corporation (CNEC) signed a cooperationagreement with BATAN to develop HTRs in Indonesia. CNEC reported that Indonesia aimed
to construct small HTRs on Kalimantan and Sulawesi from 2027.
Despite the above developments, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in 2011
generated negative perceptions discouraging prospects for building NPPs in Indonesia. At
the same time, people resisted development on candidate sites, thereby making
development uncertain. Hence, the government has stated that nuclear power will be the last
option used to achieve Indonesia’s energy demand, which implies that the government
prioritizes renewable energy sources.

2.2.4

Japan

Highlights


In 2010, before the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, nuclear power accounted formore than one-fourth in the generation mix.

The year 2014 was the first year without nuclear generation since 1966, when the firstcommercial nuclear operation started.



In July 2015, the government decided the Long-Term Energy Supply and Demand
Outlook where nuclear accounts for 20-22% in generation mix in FY2030. This energy
mix is the basis for Japan’s NDC (Nationally Determined Contributions)

Despite being the third largest economy in terms of GDP and fifth largest energy
consumer in the world, Japan imports nearly all of its fossil fuels and uranium due to modest
indigenous energy resources. Since the two oil crises in the 1970s, diversifying fuel sources
has been the economy’s main strategy for improving energy security. Nuclear generation, as
quasi-domestic energy, has expanded in this context. Japan had 42 commercial nuclear
reactors as of November 2016. While the government reaffirmed the importance of nuclear
in the future generation mix, nuclear generation faces mounting public pressure to retire after
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in 2011.
The nuclear program in Japan started in the mid-1950s. The Atomic Energy Basic Law,
which outlines the basics of nuclear utilization in Japan, was passed in 1955. Tokai Power
Station, which has a gas-cooled reactor, is Japan’s first commercial nuclear power station,connected to the grid in 1966 and operated until 1998. The commercial reactors, installed
15

after Tokai, are all LWRs, either BWR or PWR. Tsuruga I, installed in 1970, is the firstcommercial LWR in Japan.
During the two oil crises of the 1970s, the government realized the vulnerability of its
energy supply structure. Since then, the economy has been putting strong efforts into fueldiversification and energy conservation. In 2010, the year before the earthquake, the numberof reactors reached 54, with a total capacity of 48.8 GW. Nuclear generation accounted for
27% in the generation mix. After the Fukushima accident, the number of reactors declined to
42 in June 2016 (41.5 GW; see Figure 7), due to the decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant and six other reactors: Tsuruga unit 1, Mihama units 1 and 2, Shimane
unit 1, Genkai unit 1 and Ikata unit 1. The decommissioning of these six reactors is mainly
because of huge investments required for additional safety measures under the new
regulatory requirements from July 2013. The electricity generated from nuclear has
significantly declined after the earthquake. The year 2014 was the first year without nuclear
generation since 1966, when the first commercial nuclear operation started.

Higashidori, Tohoku Electric Power Company
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, Tokyo Electric Power Company
1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

Tomari, Hokkaido Electric Power Company
1

2

3

7

Ohma, Japan Power
Development Company

Higashidori, Tokyo Electric Power Company
Shika, Hokuriku Electric Power Company
1

1

2

2

Tsuruga, The Japan Atomic Power Company
1

3

2

Onagawa, Tohoku Electric Power Company

4

1

2

Mihama, Kansai Electric Power Company
3

Fukushima Daini, Tokyo Electric Power Company

Ohi, Kansai Electric Power Company
1

2

3

1

2

3

3

4

Shimane, Chugoku Electric Power Company

Hamaoka, Chubu Electric Power Company

3

2

3

4

5

Kaminoseki, Chugoku Electric Power Company
1

Sendai, Kyushu Electric Power Company

2

Genkai, Kyushu Electric Power Company
2

4Tokai Daini, The Japan Atomic Power Company

Takahama, Kansai Electric Power Company

1

2

4

3

Ikata, Shikoku Electric Power Company
2

1

2

3

4

In operation

Capacity

Under construction
500MW or less

1000MW or lessmore than 1000MW

Planning

Figure 7 Nuclear power reactors in Japan, as of June 2016
Figure by APERC and IEEJ.

16

3

6

3

To provide medium- and long-term policy directions after the accident, the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) revised its Strategic Energy Plan in April 2014. This is
the fourth plan based on the 2002 Basic Law on Energy Policy. The latest plan mentions thatJapan will lower nuclear dependence to the extent possible, while the plan reaffirms theimportance of nuclear as a low carbon and quasi-domestic energy source.
Accordingly, in July 2015, the Long-Term Energy Supply and Demand Subcommittee ofthe Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy of METI approved Japan’s LongTerm Energy Supply and Demand Outlook. The government’s outlook aims to ensure the“3E+S” policy, and shows a well-balanced generation mix where nuclear accounts for 2022% in FY 2030. The projected share is lower than the level before the accident(approximately 30%); yet, nuclear still holds a certain share, implying that nuclear will remain
one of the important options for Japan’s energy policy. This energy mix is the basis forJapan’s NDC.
In October 2012 the new Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), which had taken overfrom the Nuclear & Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) and the Nuclear Safety Commission(NSC), announced that henceforth reviews on restarting NPPs would comprise both a safetyassessment by NRA and a briefing of affected local governments by the operators. The
assessment would be based on the safety guidelines in the New Regulatory Requirements
formulated by NRA in July 2013 after public consultation. In rulemaking, NRA commissioners
referred to the guidelines of the IAEA, Finland, France and the US, as well as former NISA’s
July 2011 stress test rules and provisional 30-point measures, issued in April 2012, that wereapplied to the restarts of Ohi 3 & 4.
Since NRA’s establishment, legislation on the regulation of reactors has been
consolidated (see Figure 8). The regulatory authority has developed stringent new
regulations, incorporated associated agencies to centralize regulatory functions andprepared a plan for emergency responses. The authority also reviews applications forassessing conformity of reactors and fuel cycle facilities to the new regulatory regime.
In the fuel cycle area, Japan has devoted considerable effort to localizing fuel production
and closing the nuclear fuel cycle, as well as fuel cycle R&D, including fast reactors. Japan
has no domestic uranium production or conversion capabilities. However, Japan Nuclear
Fuel Ltd (JNFL) operates a commercial enrichment facility at Rokkasho, and capacity has
been built up towards the goal of 1 500 ton separated work units (SWU) per year by 2022. In
17

2010, installed capacity of 1 150 ton SWU/yr is less than 20% of the annual requirements inthe economy; thus, the economy relies on imports to meet nuclear fuel demand. On the other
hand, fuel fabrication services are mainly sourced domestically.

Figure 8 Comparison of regulatory requirements before and after the Fukushima accident
Source: NRA.

As for waste management, low-level radioactive wastes are currently sent in cemented
drums for disposal in a shallow underground pit at the low-level radioactive waste disposal
facility in Rokkasho operated by JNFL. Geological disposal is a necessity given theaccumulation of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) in Japan. The fourth Strategic Energy
Plan in 2014 stated that the government “will take the initiative in dealing with high-level
radioactive waste and proceed with measures toward final disposal”; “reinforce its efforts toincrease the capacity of storing spent fuels”; as well as “promote development oftechnologies for reducing the volume and harmfulness of radioactive waste in order to securea wide range of options in the future”. In 2014, the Nuclear Waste Management Organizationof Japan (NUMO) re-started public outreach activities on an economy-wide scale in 2014;
yet, since no host facilities had volunteered by early 2015, the government decided to help
siting activities and conducted economy-wide scientific screening for geological disposal.

18Challenges
Nuclear power faces various types of challenges in Japan, such as social, technical,
institutional and financial. This subsection points out two major challenges. The firstchallenge concerns waste management, in particular, siting of final disposal facilities for HLW.
As mentioned above, despite the efforts over the last decade, NUMO could not even reachthe first step of siting procedure. The government partly revised the process after theearthquake, and will increase its involvement. Yet, given that the share of “anti-nuclear” hasbeen increasing year by year in Japan (Figure 9), waste management issues will remaindifficult issues, posing significant challenges for long-term utilization of nuclear energy.
Another challenge concerns financing to NPPs. Japanese electricity markets were
deregulated in April 2016. In general, market liberalization leads utilities to pursue short-term
gains. Without mechanisms to recover capital costs, utilities are less inclined to make longterm investments in capital-intensive infrastructures, including nuclear power. In addition,
future integration of renewables would lower wholesale prices, reducing the profitability ofother types of generation facilities and creating a further disincentive for investment. These
market situations would make it difficult to construct new reactors in Japan.
2011/6/24 - 2011/6/26
2011/9/30 - 2011/10/02
2012/03/23 - 2012/03/25
2012/05/25 - 2012/05/27
2013/5/24 - 2013/5/26
2013/7/22 - 2013/7/23

2014/7/25 - 2014/7/27
2014/9/26 - 2014/9/28
2014/11/21 - 2014/11/23

2015/1/23 - 2015/1/25
2015/3/20 - 2015/3/22
2015/5/22 - 2015/5/24

Agree2015/7/24 - 2015/7/26

Disagree

2015/9/19 - 2015/9/20

NeutralUnknown

2016/2/26 - 2016/2/28
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Figure 9 Trends in public opinion on nuclear power in Japan
Survey by Nikkei. Figure by IEEJ.

19

100%

2.2.5

Korea

Highlights


Nuclear is one of the important source for electricity accounting for more than onefourth in 2013.



Nuclear energy remains a strategic priority for Korea; the plan is to increase capacityfrom 21.7 GW in 2015 to 38 GW by 2029.

However, the Moon administration from May 2017 “pledged” nuclear phase out;
uncertainties exist in terms of new reactor additions.

Korea is an APEC economy with one of the highest percentages of electricity comingfrom nuclear power (26% in 2013). It generated 138 TWh by nuclear means in 2013 andcurrently has an installed nuclear capacity of 21.7 GW coming from 24 reactors, the last ofwhich began commercial operation only recently at Wolsung in July 2015 (Figure 10) (WNA,
2017). Currently four reactors are under construction and six more are scheduled forconstruction.

Figure 10 Nuclear power reactors in Korea
5

Figure from WNA .

5

http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/south-korea.aspx

20

The reactors, along with the hydro plants in Korea, are owned and operated by Korea
Hydro and Nuclear Power Company (KHNP), a state owned utility. Korea embarked in theconstruction of Kori Unit 1, its first commercial nuclear reactor, in 1971. Eight reactors
followed in the 1980s, seven in the 1990s and eight more after the year 2000.
The First Energy Master Plan in 2008 suggested that NPPs should supply energy up to
the minimum load point in order to maximize the use of low-carbon nuclear energy. However,in the Second Energy Master Plan in 2014, the government revised the nuclear energy sharein the total power generation downward from 41% by 2030 in the first Plan to 29% by 2035
in view of the changes in the conditions of electricity demand, public acceptance and gridstability. A total of 43 GW of installed capacity will be required to raise the share of nuclear
energy to 29% by 2035.
In July 2015, the government’s seventh basic long-term power development plan ofelectricity supply and demand was released by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy(MOTIE), which set forth that 12 new reactors would be in operation by 2029 and Kori 1
closed by then. Electricity demand is expected to increase 2.2% annually to 2029, reaching
657 TWh/yr, with peak demand at 112 GW. Nuclear capacity would increase to 38.3 GW,
23.4% of total, up from 21.7 GW in 2015.
However, the Moon administration (from May 2017) “pledged” nuclear phase out on 19th
June 2017. Uncertainties exist in terms of new reactor additions in Korea.

Nuclear power technology development – APR 1400
The APR1400 (Advanced Power Reactor 1400) is an advanced pressurized water
nuclear reactor designed by the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), originally known
as the Korean Next Generation Reactor (KNGR). This Generation III reactor was developed
from the earlier OPR-1000 design and also incorporates features from the US Combustion
Engineering (C-E) System 80+ design. Currently there is one unit in operation (Shin Kori unit
3) and seven units under construction, four of which are in the UAE at Barakah and three in
Korea: one at Shin Kori and two at Shin Hanul. The construction of two more units is planned
but has yet to commence at Shin Kori (WNA, 2017). In June 2010 Doosan signed a USD 3.9billion contract to supply heavy reactor components and turbines to KEPCO for four
APR1400 reactors in UAE.
21

The APR1400 has been further developed into the APR+ design, which received its
official type certification on August 14, 2014. The reactor design features improved safety
and among others "a core damage frequency an entire order of magnitude lower than that
calculated for the APR1400 design that it supplants". The APR+ core uses 257 fuelassemblies (16 more than APR1400) to increase output to 1550 MW.

Nuclear power technology development – SMART reactors
The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing the SMART(System Integrated Modular Advanced Reactor) – a 330 MWt PWR with integral steam
generators and advanced passive safety features. It is designed for generating electricity (upto 100 MW) and/or thermal applications such as seawater desalination – up to 40 000m3/day.
Design life is 60 years, with a three-year refueling cycle. In mid-2010 a consortium of 13
Korean companies led by KEPCO pledged KRW 100 billion (USD 83 million) to complete thedesign work. US-based engineering company URS provided technical services to KAERI.
Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) licensed the design (standard design
approval) in 2012 and KAERI incorporated post-Fukushima modifications in 2016, making
cooling fully passive. Cost is expected to be about 5 000 USD/kW. It has 57 fuel assemblies
very similar to normal PWR ones but shorter, and it operates with a 36-month fuel cycle.

2.2.6

Malaysia

Highlights


Malaysia has developed a research reactor since 1982.



Malaysia has established the Nuclear Power Development Steering Committee andNuclear Agency; current preparatory activities focus on detailed studies to identify
issues and to assess the economy’s capability for nuclear development

Malaysia is currently exploring the option of deploying nuclear energy in order to meet
future energy supply demand, and is also seeking to provide for a diversified energy mix for
Peninsular Malaysia. Historically Malaysia is not a newcomer to the nuclear industry. The
history of nuclear technology in Malaysia started in 1970 when, following a visit to the Nuclear
Research Centre in Indonesia, Malaysia's former Deputy Prime Minister mooted a nuclear
22

power program for the economy. He proposed to the government that Malaysia should playa role in the development of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes. The
proposal was accepted, leading to the establishment of the Centre for Application of Nuclear
Energy (CRANE) in the same year. CRANE focused on manpower development for various
nuclear isotope applications in medicine, agriculture and industry, eventually expecting tolead to a nuclear power program as a future energy resource.
In 1972 CRANE was renamed the Atomic Research Centre (PUSPATI—Pusat
Penyelidikan Atom). Towards the realization of the nuclear power program a 1 MW swimming
pool-type research reactor was purchased, with technical assistance provided by IAEA.
Feasibility studies and site evaluation started in 1978 and construction began in 1979. The
reactor was commissioned in 1982. When oil and gas was discovered, the priority for anuclear power program subsequently diminished, and research and training for the nuclear
power program slowly shifted to other areas of technology. In addition to the nuclear power
program, PUSPATI (now re-established as the Malaysia Nuclear Agency [MNA]) focused its
efforts on research and applications in the agriculture, food, medicine and industry sectors.
To fulfill the new energy policy objectives, nuclear energy was reconsidered as analternative energy source in the Tenth Malaysia Plan, seeking to diversify its energy mix for
future sustainability. A Nuclear Power Development Steering Committee, headed by the
Ministry of Energy, Green Technology and Water, was set up in June 2009 to plan andcoordinate the preparatory efforts for deploying a nuclear power program for electricity
generation (Figure 11). The committee was tasked with conducting various studies towards
preparing a Nuclear Power Infrastructure Development Plan (NPIDP), targeted to be readyby 2013. Prior to conducting these studies, a nuclear power pre-feasibility study and initialsite selection study were already under way.
In accordance with a tentative timeline, the pre-project activities are being spearheadedby the Malaysia Nuclear Power Corporation (MNPC) and the Nuclear Energy Programme
Implementing Organization (NEPIO), with MNA as the Technical Support Organization (TSO).
MNPC is a fully government-owned company under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's
Department, and was officially launched by the Prime Minister under the Economic
Transformation Programme (ETP) on 11 January 2011. Current preparatory activities in
MNPC and MNA focus on detailed studies to identify issues and to list considerations to
objectively determine and assess the current level of national capability and state-of23

preparedness pertaining to the development of a national nuclear power program.

Figure 11 Target milestones for Malaysia nuclear power development
Figure from MNPC.

2.2.7

MexicoHighlights
Mexico has two reactors in operation, contributing 4% of generation mix.



Upgrades for both reactors are finished in 2015, resulting in additional capacity of
110 MW each. Total nuclear capacity increase from 1400 MW to 1620 MW.

While nuclear-based generation formally started in Mexico in 1990, the economy’s plansfor nuclear development date back to at least the late 1950s. At the time, the federal
government decided to embark on the development of nuclear energy largely because of theAtoms for Peace Program fostered by the United States; although the much smaller
estimates of domestic oil/gas resources back then and the desire to join the growing groupof economies pursuing the nuclear path might have also played a significant role in thisdecision.
In 1956 Mexico’s interest in nuclear energy was made official with the creation of its
National Commission of Nuclear Energy (CNEN), which became responsible for the peacefulapplication of nuclear power for energy and non-energy uses and the research on these24

subjects. By 1968, CNEN had acquired the first nuclear reactor in Mexico, a TRIGA Mark IIIof small capacity specifically designed for training and research purposes. To hasten
Mexico’s progress in nuclear development, in 1972 CNEN became the National Institute of
Nuclear Energy (INEN), and in 1979 a new Law for Nuclear Energy split INEN’s functions
into several bodies: the National Institute for Nuclear Research (ININ), the National
Commission for Nuclear Safety and Safeguards (CNSNS), and Mexican Uranium (Uramex).
In 1985 Uramex was absorbed by the Ministry of Energy. It was also in 1972 that Mexico
approved the installation of its first and thus far only NPP, amid substantial operational delays.
In fact, the construction of the Laguna Verde nuclear power plant started in 1976 and it cameonline only in 1990. Laguna Verde has two reactors, both are BWR with a capacity of 810 MW
currently.
The operation licenses for Laguna Verde’s units are valid for 30 years and wereapproved in July 1990 for Unit 1 and in April 1995 for Unit 2. The plant is owned and operated
by the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), Mexico’s state-owned and largest electricity
utility. As shown in Figure 12, it is located in the southern state of Veracruz, which borders
the Gulf of Mexico. While upgrades and maintenance could extend Laguna Verde’s lifespan,unless further time extensions are requested by CFE to CNSNS beyond the current licenses,
Unit 1 will stop operation by 2020 and Unit 2 by 2025.

Laguna Verdepower plant

Figure 12 Nuclear power reactors in Mexico.
Figure from APERC.

25

With a total capacity of 1 510MW and an output of 11.6 TWh/yr in 2015, the Laguna
Verde nuclear power plant accounted for little more than 2% of Mexico’s electricity generation
capacity and over 4% of its electricity production.
Prior to the 2013 energy reform, Mexico passed the Law for the Use of Renewable
Energy and Financing of Energy Transition in 2008, in order to reduce the dominance offossil fuels in the economy-wide electricity mix through renewable and environmentally
sustainable energy solutions. To that end, the Law mandated the maximum share of fossil
energy in Mexico’s total electricity generation at 65% by 2024, 60% by 2035 and 50% by
2050. This Law was overridden by the Law for Energy Transition passed in December 2015
which largely preserved these goals, and mandates the minimum share of economy-wide
electricity generation based on clean energy (renewables and nuclear) at 25% by 2018, 30%
by 2021 and 35% by 2024. Against this background of legal instruments and mandates, theMexican government has not put forward any actions suggestive of a large expansion of its
nuclear-based electricity generation, although the upgrade of both reactors finished in 2015
resulted in 110 MW of additional capacity each.

2.2.8

The Philippines

Highlights


Nuclear power was considered as a solution to the 1973 oil crisis in the Philippines.



The Bataan Nuclear Power Plant was finished in 1984, but did not start operation.



Whether or not to go nuclear is still being discussed, but last October 2016, theeconomy’s Nuclear Energy Program Implementing Organization (NEPIO) was
created.

In 1973, the Philippine economy was under a lot of pressure due to the oil crisis. With
the intention of finding an alternative energy source, President Marcos decided to construct
an NPP. Workers started building the power plant in 1976. Construction was put on hold in
1979 because of the Three Mile Island accident that happened in the United States. The
President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No.539 creating a Presidential
Commission (Puno Commission) to conduct an inquiry on the safety of the Bataan Nuclear
Power Plant (BNPP). The results of the Commission’s inquiry were outlined in the Puno
Commission Report whereby added safety features and procedures were recommended to26

be installed at BNPP. Hence, BNPP was upgraded to incorporate post TMI recommendations.
The BNPP was completed in 1984. Upon payment of its loan by the Philippine Governmentin April 2017, the plant costs rose from its original figure of USD 1.9 Billion to USD 2.3 billion.
With its Westinghouse PWR, BNPP was supposed to generate 621 MW of electric energy.
It took 10 years to build but it has been on "preservation mode" or mothballed since 1986
when a new government took over the reign from then President Marcos. Despite never
having been commissioned, the plant has remained intact, including the nuclear reactor, andhas continued to be maintained.
On 29 January 2008, Energy Secretary Angelo Reyes announced that an IAEA teaminspected the BNPP on rehabilitation prospects. In preparing their report, the IAEA made two
primary recommendations. First, it advised that the power plant's status be thoroughly
evaluated by technical inspections and economic evaluations conducted by a committed
group of nuclear power experts with experience in preservation management. Second, the
IAEA mission advised the Philippines government on the general requirements for starting
its nuclear power program, stressing that the proper infrastructure, safety standards andknowledge be implemented. The IAEA's role did not extend to assessing whether the power
plant is usable or how much the plant may cost to rehabilitate. On 1 February 2010, theNational Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) started evaluating the financial plan of KEPCO
which assessed that it may cost USD 1 billion to rehabilitate the NPP. In October 2016, again
upon takeover of the new government, interest in BNPP rehabilitation was renewed, as wellas consideration for new additions emerged. The Department of Energy (DOE) formallyestablished the NEPIO that composed of officials initially all came from various bureaus of
the DOE. The organization currently considers various proposals for the possible
rehabilitation of BNPP as well as cooperation initiatives for new reactor additions.
The Philippines has one research reactor built by General Electric of the US in August1963 with a rating of 1 MW thermal. It was converted to TRIGA reactor in 1988 but due toleaks detected at the pool, the reactor’s full capacity of 3 MW cannot be attained. It can only
be used at low power operation (250 kW), and the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, theoperator/owner of the reactor, decided to decommission it. The country is now looking atconstructing a new research reactor with a rating of 10 MW.

27

2.2.9RussiaHighlights


In 2015, nuclear power contributed 19% of electricity supply in Russia. As of
November 2016, the economy has 36 reactors with 27 GW capacity in operation.



According to Rosatom’s plan, nuclear is expected to expand in the mid- to long-term.

The economy is also carrying out research on fast neutron reactor technology.

Nuclear power plays an important role in Russia’s energy mix, accounting for about 19%of the total power generation in 2015, according to data from Rosenergoatom (WNA, 2017).
There are 36 reactors as of November 2016, including Generation I VVER-440-similar PWRs,
Generation II VVER-440 PWRs, Generation III VVER-1000 PWRs with a full containment
structure, RBMK light water graphite reactors, as well as small graphite-moderated BWR
reactors in eastern Siberia constructed in the 1970s for cogeneration.
In November 2009, the government's Energy Strategy 2030 was published, projecting
investments for the next two decades. It envisaged a possible doubling of generation capacityfrom 225 GW6 in 2008 to 355-445 GW in 2030. A revised scheme in mid-2010 projecteddemand of 1 288 TWh in 2020 and 1 553 TWh in 2030, requiring 78 GW from new plants by2020 and building a total of 178 GW new capacity by 2030, including 43.4 GW nuclear. The
scheme also included decommissioning 67.7 GW of capacity by 2030, including 16.5 GW of
NPP (about 70% of present capacity). New investment by 2030 was estimated to be RUR
9 800 billion for power plants and RUR 10 200 billion for transmission (WNA, 2017).
In July 2012 the Energy Ministry (Minenergo) published draft plans to commission
83 GW of new capacity by 2020, including 10 GW nuclear, to total 30.5 GW producing
238 TWh/yr. A year later Minenergo reduced the projection to 28.2 GW in 2019. Total
investment envisaged was RUR 8 230 billion, including RUR 4 950 billion on upgrading
power plants, RUR 3 280 billion on new grid capacity and RUR 1 320 billion on nuclear.
According to WNA (2017), in January 2015, Rosatom published the plan for new reactor
additions and retirements of existing reactors (Figure 13).

6This figure indicates total generation capacity, including nuclear, fossil fuels as well as renewables.

28

Figure 13 Russian reactors’ planned additions and retirements to 2035.
Figure from Country Profiles - WNA.

After the Fukushima accident, safety reviews were conducted for NPPs in Russia.
Following these, in June 2011 Rosenergoatom announced a RUR 15 billion (USD 530
million) safety upgrade program for additional power and water supply back-up. By the endof 2015, Rosenergoatom has spent RUR 2.6 billion on 66 mobile diesel generator sets, 35
mobile pumping units and 80 other pumps, to enhance nuclear safety, especially emergency
preparedness.

2.2.10Chinese Taipei

Highlights


Nuclear power has six reactors, contributing 19% of generation mix in 2015.

After the accident in Fukushima, the government decided to phase out all nuclear
capacity by 2025.

Chinese Taipei has six nuclear reactors, totaling 5 GW and representing 19% of its
electricity generation as of 2015. Taipower, Chinese Taipei’s state-owned power utility,29

accounts for approximately 80% of the electricity supply in the economy, and IPPs for theremaining. The control over nuclear and hydro plants is maintained by Taipower. Six reactors
in operation were commissioned in between 1977 and 1985, consisting of four BWRs and
two PWRs (Figure 14). Construction of the Lungmen Nuclear Power Plant using the ABWR
design has encountered public opposition and a host of delays, and in April 2014 thegovernment decided to suspend construction.
In response to the Fukushima accident in 2011, Chinese Taipei released the New
Energy Policy on 3 November 2011 to “ensure nuclear security, steadily reduce nuclear
dependence, create a low-carbon green energy environment and gradually move towards a
nuclear-free homeland”. This policy aims to steadily reduce nuclear dependence by lowering
electricity demand and peak loads, and by promoting alternative energy sources to ensure astable power supply. The new policy prohibits lifetime extensions for existing NPPs andoutlines decommissioning plans as follows: Units 1 and 2 of the first plant will be
decommissioned in 2018 and 2019; Units 1 and 2 of the second plant, in 2021 and 2023;
and Units 1 and 2 of the third plant, in 2024 and 2025.

Figure 14 Nuclear power plants in Chinese Taipei
Figure from Taipower. Note: Lungmen 1&2 has not yet commissioned, and constructionof the reactors are suspended.

30

In June 2016, the new leader of Chinese Taipei stressed again that the administration’s
goal to phase out nuclear power by 2025 "has never changed and will never change".
However, the administration also admitted that many challenges remain on the road towardthat goal, as evidenced by the tight electricity supply situation in the preceding weeks due tohigh demand caused by high temperatures.

2.2.11ThailandHighlights
Thailand is considering to embark on nuclear power as an option in their energy mix,
to reduce its natural gas consumption.

Public acceptance remains the key challenge for nuclear power installation.

In 2007, The National Energy Policy Council (NEPC) appointed the Nuclear PowerInfrastructure Preparation Committee (NPIPC) and the Nuclear Power Programme
Development Office (NPPDO) to prepare Nuclear Power Infrastructure Establishment Plans(NPIEP) and a nuclear utility plan. During 2008-2010, the appointed organizations
collaborated and completed the pre-project activities in phase 1 in line with IAEA milestones.
The activities included the setup of NPPDO, the preparation of infrastructure work, thedissemination of nuclear information to gain public acceptance, the feasibility study and thesite selection evaluation of the NPPs. Self-assessment on 19 issues of the economy’s
nuclear infrastructure was also conducted, and in December 2010, the IAEA accomplishedthe Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) Mission in Thailand. Based on the resultsfrom the self-assessment and IAEA’s INIR, Thailand was ready to make a knowledgeablecommitment to install NPPs in the economy. According to IAEA, however, there are several
major gaps to be addressed in developing the nuclear power infrastructure. In the short term,
the government should make a concrete commitment for safe and secure implementation of
nuclear power. The national nuclear legislations and regulations are needed to be
standardized in order to comply with the international legal instruments. Also, the details ofhuman resource development plan (HRDP) are required to support the nuclear power project.
In early 2011, a “readiness report” was submitted for the government to make the decision
to “Go Nuclear.”31

After the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant incident caused by the earthquake andtsunami in March 2011, the Second Revision Power Development Plan (PDP) 2010
postponed the scheduled commercial operation date (SCOD) of the first unit of the nuclear
power project by three years (from 2020 to 2023). Subsequently, the Third Revision PDP
2010 further shifted the SCOD of the first unit out to 2026 and revised the commencementof the second unit operation to 2027. However, in 2014, NEPC reformulated a PDP 2015
with a new framework and assumptions of power generation consistent with the newly
developed Thailand Integrated Energy Blueprint (TIEB). The latest PDP 2015, which
encompasses the timeline of 2015-36, includes 1 GW of nuclear power to the grid in 2035
and another 1 GW in 2036. By 2036, nuclear power would comprise approximately 5% of
total generation capacity in Thailand.

2.2.12The United States

Highlights


The US is the largest nuclear power economy in the world, with 99 commercial nuclear
reactors accounting for more than 30% of global nuclear generation, as of 2016.



Nuclear power is expected to remain as the important source for electricity in the midto long-term, but decreasing its share due to gradual demand growth.

Once-through fuel cycle is current policy for spent fuel management.

Nuclear power plays a major role in the US power supply. As of November 2016, theUnited States had 99 nuclear power reactors, which contributed about 20% of its electricity
supply in 2015. These plants have achieved an average capacity factor of 90% since 2001.
The industry invests about USD 7.5 billion per year in maintenance and upgrades of theplants. Existing reactors are mainly located around north-east, south and mid-west part ofthe economy (Figure 15). According to the Reference case in EIA (2017), nuclear remains
as the important source for electricity in the mid- to long-term, but decreasing the share, from
20% in 2015 to 16% by 2040, due to gradual demand growth (Figure 16).
Currently, there are 65 PWRs with combined capacity of about 64 GW, and 34 BWRs
with combined capacity of about 35 GW. Almost all the US nuclear generating capacity
comes from reactors built between 1967 and 1990. Until 2013 there had been no new
construction starts since 1977, largely because for a number of years gas generation was
32

considered more economically attractive and because construction schedules during the1970s and 1980s had frequently been extended by opposition, compounded by heightenedsafety fears following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 (WNA, 2017).

Figure 15 Nuclear power plants in the United States
Figure from World Nuclear Association.

Figure 16 Projected power generation, the United States
Figure from Annual Energy Outlook 2017 (EIA, 2017).

33

Despite a near halt in new construction of more than 30 years, US reliance on nuclear
power has grown. In 1980, NPPs produced 250 TWh, accounting for 11% of the economy's
generation. In 2008, that output had risen to 809 TWh and nearly 20% of electricity, providing
more than 30% of the electricity generated from nuclear power worldwide. Much of theincrease came from 47 reactors, all approved for construction before 1977, which came online in the late 1970s and 1980s, more than doubling US nuclear generation capacity. The
US nuclear industry has also achieved remarkable gains in power plant utilization throughimproved refueling, maintenance and safety systems at existing plants.
The future of nuclear power in the United States will depend on several factors including
reduction of nuclear construction costs, greater regulatory certainty, development offavorable government policies, and the relative costs of other energy options as well as
resolution of nuclear waste disposal issues. Recently, the greatest commercial challenges tothe continued operation of the nuclear power industry include:The low price and relatively high availability of natural gas from shale deposits;

Slow economic growth; and

Slow growth in overall electricity demand.
Although nuclear power faces various challenges in the United States, it is expected toremain an important element of the present government’s “All-of-the-Above” strategy forenergy – helping to advance a sustainable, clean energy future. Accordingly, the DOE is
pursuing five strategic goals:7Extend the useful life, improve the performance, and maintain the safety of the current
fleet of NPPs. This is the objective of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program;Enable new NPPs to be built for electricity production and improve the affordability of
nuclear energy. The Nuclear Plant 2010 (NP2010) Program 8 is a joint government/
industry cost-shared effort to identify sites for new NPPs, develop and bring to market
advanced NPP technologies, evaluate the business case for building new NPPs anddemonstrate untested regulatory processes. Two project areas are active: GE Hitachi

7

Statement of Dr Peter Lyons, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, US Department of Energy:
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/01/f19/12-11-14_Peter%20Lyons%20FT%20HSST.pdf
8

https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Presentation%20-%202010%20Program%20
Overview%20-%20Presentation%20to%20the%20NEAC.pdf

34

Nuclear Energy detailed design work, and Nustart construction and operating licenses(COL) application development;

Reduce the carbon footprint of transportation and industry. The heat generated by
nuclear energy can be harnessed for process heat, thus reducing or eliminating the needto burn fossil fuels for this purpose. Developing this capability is one objective of the
Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) initiative;

Develop a sustainable fuel cycle. The Fuel Cycle Research and Development Programis developing ways to make used fuel less radiotoxic, recycle it and create widely
acceptable solutions to the challenges of nuclear waste; andPrevent proliferation. Developing techniques and materials to prevent proliferation are
objectives of the Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program.

Advanced nuclear technology development
The United States is leading the world’s advanced nuclear technology development,
especially in the Generations III and IV reactor design. The Generation III reactor designs
now having US design certification include:

The GE Hitachi ABWR of 1 300-1 500 MW. Several ABWRs are now in operation in
Japan, with more under construction there and in Chinese Taipei. Some of these have
had Toshiba involved in the construction, and more recently it has been Toshiba that
promoted the design most strongly in the US;



The Westinghouse AP1000 is the first Generation III+ reactor to receive certification. It
is a scaled-up version of the Westinghouse AP600 which was certified earlier. It has amodular design to reduce construction time to 36 months. The first four of many arebeing built in China, and four more in the US (two units at the Vogtle nuclear station and
two units at the V.C. Summer). Note that there still exist uncertainties regarding theconstruction at the V.C. Summer. On 31st July 2017, South Carolina Electric & Gas(SCE&G), one of the utilities that owns the new units, announced that “it will cease
construction of the two new nuclear units” and will promptly file a petition seeking
approval of its abandonment plan after considering the additional costs, as well as the35amount of anticipated guaranty settlement payments from Toshiba Corporation. 9
However, on 15th August 2017, the company announced that “it will voluntarily withdraw
its Abandonment Petition” in response to the concerns from various stakeholders andmembers of the South Carolina General Assembly, and to allow for adequate time forgovernmental officials to conduct their reviews10; andGE Hitachi's Economic Simplified BWR (ESBWR) of 1 600 MW gross, developed fromthe ABWR. The ESBWR has passive safety features and is currently included in the
COL applications of two companies in the US. GE Hitachi submitted the application in
August 2005, was notified of design approval in March 2011 and received design
certification in September 2014. The first COL with it was approved in May 2015.
In addition, several designs of small modular reactors (SMRs) are proceeding towards

NRC design certification application, including the Holtec SMR-160 PWR, the NuScale multiapplication small reactor and the X-energy’s Xe-100 pebble-bed SMR.

Nuclear fuel cycle and waste management
It is important to mention the activities of nuclear fuel cycle in the United States. Currently,
most of the commercial nuclear fuel cycle activities are conducted in the United States,
except reprocessing. Spent fuel reprocessing for waste management in the United Stateshas been discouraged by public policy, and the once-through fuel cycle is the present policy
along with an active research and development program on advanced fuel cycle alternatives.
Each fuel cycle stage is subject to competition and supply from international sources, which
in many cases dominate the industry segment. At present, the US nuclear fuel supply ishighly dependent on imports for mined uranium concentrates, uranium conversion andenrichment. Virtually all fuel fabrication requirements are met by domestic sources. The EIASCANA (2017): “South Carolina Electric & Gas Company to cease construction and will file plan ofabandonment of the new nuclear project”, https://www.scana.com/docs/librariesprovider15/pdfs/pressreleases/07312017-sce-amp-g-to-cease-construction-and-will-pursue-abandonment-of-the-new-nuclearproject---scana-reaffirms-earnings-guidance.pdf?sfvrsn=09SCANA (2017): “South Carolina Electric & Gas Company to voluntarily withdraw its new nuclear
abandonment petition to accommodate the legislative review process”,
https://www.scana.com/docs/librariesprovider15/pdfs/press-releases/08152017-sce-amp-g-to-voluntarilywithdraw-its-new-nuclear-abandonment-petition-to-accommodate-the-legislative-reviewprocess.pdf?sfvrsn=010

36

publishes data on the nuclear fuel cycle in its Domestic Uranium Production Report and its
Uranium Marketing Annual Report.
Since the beginnings of the commercial use of nuclear power in the US, spent fuelassemblies have been stored under water in pools (and later in dry casks as well) at reactor
sites, and remained the responsibility of the plant owners. The prohibition of spent fuelreprocessing in 1977, combined with the continued accumulation, brought the question of
permanent underground disposal to the forefront. The 2012 spent fuel inventory in the UnitedStates was approximately 70 000 metric tonnes of uranium, with around 2 800 tonnes stored
at sites that have shutdown reactors. Approximately one-third of this material is stored in dry
casks with the remainder in hardened pools; the share of fuel in dry storage will continue togrow as pools reach their capacities. The NRC licenses dry storage containers for 20 years
and has said that fuel can safely be stored at reactor sites for at least 100 years.

2.2.13

Viet Nam

HighlightsViet Nam was considered to become the first Southeast Asian economy to embark on
nuclear power.

However, in November 2016, Viet Nam’s National Assembly abandoned the plan tobuild NPPs, considering the decreasing electricity demand and rising financial costs.

Viet Nam was considered to be the first Southeast Asian economy that would embark
on nuclear power. In the early 1980s, two preliminary nuclear power studies were undertaken
in Viet Nam. In 2006, firm proposals surfaced and the Vietnamese government announced
that a 2 GW NPP should be on line by 2020. This general target was confirmed in a nuclear
power development plan approved by the government in August 2007, with the target being
raised to a total of 8 GW nuclear by 2025. A general law on nuclear energy was passed in
the middle of 2008, and plans for developing a comprehensive legal and regulatory
framework were envisaged (APERC, 2016b).
In October 2008, two major locations in Ninh Thuan Province, namely Phuoc Dinh andVinh Hai, were confirmed by the Vietnamese government as the sites to implement its firstever nuclear power projects, with two reactors with a capacity of 1 GW on each site, totalingnearly 4 GW of power output. In June 2010, Viet Nam announced that it plans to build 14
37

nuclear reactors at eight sites in five provinces by 2030, to satisfy at least 10% of the power
generation of the economy.
In October 2010, Viet Nam signed an intergovernmental agreement with Russia for theconstruction of the economy's first NPP - Ninh Thuan 1 at Phuoc Dinh, using the VVER-1000
or 1200 technologies. Also, an intergovernmental agreement with Japan was signed forconstruction of a second NPP using Japanese technology. However, in January 2014 it wasreported that Viet Nam decided to delay construction by six years, to permit improved safety
and efficiency in the plants.
In January 2006, the Prime Minister approved the Strategy for Peaceful Applications ofAtomic Energy to 2020 with the overall objective to gradually build and develop the atomic
technology industry to increasingly and effectively contribute to socioeconomic development
and strengthen the economy’s scientific and technological capacity. The subsequent Prime
Minister's Decisions No. 114/2007/QD-TTg (issued in July 2007) and No. 957/QD-TTg(issued in June 2010) detailed the government’s action plans for the implementation of thisstrategy. In regard to nuclear power investment, the government stipulates to selectproven/accredited safe and modern nuclear technologies. The Ministry of Industry and Trade(MOIT) is responsible for formulating a detailed policy and road map for acquiring, masteringand developing nuclear power technologies.
The Viet Nam Power Development Master Plan for the period 2010–20, with aperspective to 2030 (PDP7) (for both approved versions in 2011 and its revision in 2016 by
the Prime Minister), promotes nuclear power development to ensure Viet Nam’s electricity
supply security in the future, when domestic primary resources becomes exhausted. The
government of Viet Nam has been actively cooperating with other governments andinternational organizations to accelerate nuclear power construction and development
programs. According to the PDP7 issued in 2011, the first introduction of 2 GW of nuclear
power was scheduled in 2020; the capacity would gradually increase to 10.7 GW in 2030, sothat the nuclear power source could produce annually about 70.5 TWh, accounting for 10.1%of total power generation.
Since October 2008, two reactors totaling 2 GW have been planned at Phuoc Dinh inthe southern Ninh Thuan province. A further 2 GW was planned at Vinh Hai nearby, followed
by a further 6 GW by 2030. Both locations are based particularly on geological suitability.
38

In July 2011 the government issued a master plan specifying Ninh Thuan 1&2 NPPs
with a total of eight 1GW-class reactors, one coming on line each year between 2020-27,
followed by two larger ones to 2029 at a central location. MOIT is responsible for the actual
projects, while the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) supports the program,developing a master plan and regulation.
However, in November 2016, Viet Nam's National Assembly voted to abandon plans tobuild the NPPs, considering the decreasing demand for nuclear power and rising costs. They
will be replaced with 6GW of LNG and coal by 2030, based on short-term cost considerations;and imports of power mainly from Laos and renewables will also supplement this.

2.3

Uranium resources and production
Uranium resources are classified according to the degree of their geological assurance

and the economic feasibility of their recovery. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
together with IAEA in their biennial report on the world’s uranium reserves, define four
categories according to the confidence levels of occurrence. Reasonably assured resources(RAR) occur in known mineral deposits of delineated size, grade and configuration and canbe recovered within given cost ranges with currently existing mining and processing
technology (NEA, 2014; 2016).
Estimated additional resources-Category I (EAR-I) are resources that are inferred tooccur based on direct geological evidence in extensions of well-explored deposits or indeposits where geological continuity has been established. Category II of estimatedadditional resources (EAR-II) are expected to occur in deposits for which the evidence ismainly indirect and which are believed to exist in well-defined geological trends or areas ofmineralization with known deposits. Speculative resources (SR) are resources that arethought to exist mostly based on indirect evidence and geological extrapolations in deposits
discoverable with existing exploration techniques. Their location can only be characterized
as being somewhere within a given region or geological trend. In general terms, while RAR
and EAR-I include known or delineated resources, EAR-II and speculative resources have
yet to be discovered. A further categorization is required to reflect differences in the recovery
costs of resources. The cost of recovery depends on both the quality of the resource and on
mine-operating costs.
39

By the beginning of 2015, the economies in the world with the largest proven reserves
are, in order: Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Niger and Namibia (Figure 17). APEC
economies that reported resources to this survey own over 2 million tonnes of these proved
reserves. APEC economies Australia, Canada, Russia and China account respectively for
29%, 9%, 9%, and 5% of the world’s total (RAR plus Inferred Recoverable Resources, to 130
USD/kg U) (NEA, 2016).
According to the OECD NEA report, global uranium production in 2014 has decreased
by 4% since 2013, yet still above 2011 levels. Kazakhstan, the world’s leading producer,
continues to increase production, but at a slower pace. APEC produced more than 30% of
the uranium in the world. More detailed information could be found in Figure 18.

Figure 17 Distribution of reasonably assured resources, selected economies,
as of January 2015
Estimated by OECD NEA and IAEA. Figure from OECD NEA. 1111

http://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2016/7301-uranium-2016.pdf

40

Figure 18 Share of global uranium production, 2014
Estimated by OECD NEA and IAEA. Figure from OECD NEA.

Uranium production in APEC economies
Although uranium production in the APEC region has decreased slowly since 2004
(Figure 19), it still accounts for one-third of the global production. Kazakhstan has expanded
uranium production in recent years, and has exceeded Canada, which ranked first in theworld. Among the 21 APEC economies, Canada and Australia are the main uranium
producers, and the US, Russia and China also contribute to the uranium production as
described below:
Canada has lost its standing as the world’s largest producer since 2009 as a result of
production increases in Kazakhstan. However, it remains the dominant North American
producer, the second largest producer in the world, and of course the largest in the
APEC region. Production at the McArthur River mine, the world’s largest high-grade
uranium mine, was 7 684tU and 7 312tU in 2013 and 2014, respectively.

Australia is the second largest uranium producer in APEC. Production decreased
dramatically from 7 009tU in 2012 to 6 432tU in 2013, and further decreased to 4 975tU
in 2014. The Four Mile mine started production in 2014 with uranium processed at theBeverley plant. However, this new start-up was not enough to offset the decreases in
production for this reporting period. Decreases were a result of completion of the Ranger41

3 pit in December 2012, and though stockpiled ore was still being processed, the failureof a leach tank late in 2013 at the Ranger mine stopped operations several months.
Further decreases were a result of production halting at the Honeymoon mine in 2013
and the Beverley/Beverly North mines in 2014;
The United States produced 1 881tU in 2014, 13% more than in 2012 and 5% more thanin 2013. Production in 2014 was from 10 mines: two underground mines and eight ISR
mines. The main difference since the last production period is the increase in ISR
facilities. Uranium ore from underground mines is stockpiled and shipped to the White
Mesa Mill, to be milled into uranium concentrate;



Russia’s production amounted to 2 991tU in 2014, of which 1 970tU were produced
using conventional underground mining methods and 1 021tU were produced using thein situ leach method;

China, as the only producing economy in East Asia, reported a small but steady increasein production from 1 450tU in 2012 to 1 500tU in 2013 and 1 550tU in 2014 with six
production centers in operation.
The next chapter discusses the long-term demand for uranium and nuclear fuels in the

APEC region, and future uranium production is derived from OECD NEA’s Uranium 2014.
According to the production projection, with the largest uranium reserves in the world,
Australia is expected to overtake Canada by 2040 as the lead producer in the APEC region.

Figure 19 Global uranium production from 2004 to 2014
Data from World Nuclear Association. Figure by APERC.

42

Chapter 3 Future perspectives—A scenario analysis
This chapter aims to discuss the effects of future nuclear developments on the long-term
APEC power mix. Nuclear power has contributed to the region’s energy supply for more thanseveral decades; yet, after the accident in Fukushima in 2011, nuclear has been experiencing
a setback, and large uncertainties exist regarding the degree of future nuclear generation insome economies. Therefore, we designed three scenarios to explore the impacts of different
development paths from economic and environmental viewpoints. Section 3.1 overviews
methods and scenarios, then sections 3.3-3.4 summarize results and policy implications.

3.1

Scenarios and assumptions

3.1.1

Scenario settings

We designed three scenarios, including a Business-as-Usual Scenario (BAU), a Low
Nuclear Scenario (Low) and a High Nuclear Scenario (High), considering recent energy
policies (Table 2). The BAU acts as the reference scenario, and follows the current
development

plans

and

energypolicies

inAPEC

economies.

Recentnuclearconstruction/retirement plants are taken into consideration, The Low Scenario assumes aslowdown of future nuclear expansion, with accelerated retirements of existing reactors. The
High Scenario on the other hand embodies optimistic nuclear development plans andincludes nuclear development in some other currently non-nuclear economies as well.

Table 2 Scenario definition
Scenario summary
Business-as-Usual (BAU)

Current policies exist over the projection period. Recent nuclear
construction and retirement trends are included, but proposed
projects are not considered.

Low Nuclear (Low)

Proposed projects are included on top of the BAU. License
extensions are applied to most of the existing reactors.

High Nuclear (High)

Slowdown of nuclear developments as well as accelerated
retirements of existing reactors are assumed. South-East Asian
economies do not deploy any reactors.

Source: APERC.

43

Nuclear capacity in the APEC region grows from about 230 GW in 2013 to 330 GW in
the BAU and 480 GW in the High by 2040, while peaking out and declining to 220 GW under
the Low (Figure 20). Note that nuclear capacities are expressed in gross capacities in thischapter. China and Korea, in particular, are assumed to expand their nuclear under the BAU,
and, in the High Scenario, in addition to these two economies, Russia and Southeast Asian
economies accelerate the capacity growth. In the Low Scenario, retirements of the existing
reactors in Japan and the US as well as limited capacity additions result in the decreasing
trend (See section 3.1.2 for more detailed assumptions). In any scenario, China increases
its presence in nuclear capacity in the region (Figure 21).
GW
500

400

300

200

100

High
Low
BAU

0
1990

2000

2013

2020

2030

2040

Figure 20 Nuclear capacity projection for APEC, 2013 to 2040
Figure by APERC.

Figure 21 Nuclear capacity by economy, 2013 and 2040
Figure by APERC.

44

3.1.2

Economy assumptions

CanadaConsidering that its provincial government and utilities have relatively clear nuclear
refurbishment12 and retirement plans, only one capacity projection was applied for Canada(Figure 22). Based on current NPPs, we assume that Bruce Power plans a 15-year projectfrom 2020 to refurbish six nuclear reactor units in Bruce Nuclear Generating Station. OPG
will refurbish four CANDU nuclear power units at Darlington Nuclear Generating Station,
which will allow the reactors to operate for another 30 years. OPG also has a plan to retire
Pickering Nuclear Power Generating Station; two reactors by 2022 and the remaining four
reactors by 2024.

GW
20
BAU, High, Low
15

10

5

2040

2035

2030

2025

2020

2013

2005

2000

1995

1990

0

Figure 22 Nuclear capacity assumptions for Canada, 2013 to 2040
Figure by APERC.

China
Being the key driver for APEC nuclear power expansion, all the three scenarios wereapplied to China. The number of nuclear power reactors under construction in China reaches
20, which is the largest in the world. In the near future, all of the 20 nuclear power reactors
will be connected to the grid. Also, China has prepared many nuclear power projects for
future development. According to the economy’s plan, China has a target of 58 GW capacityin operation and 30 GW under construction by 2020. The 58 GW operational target, which

WNN: “OPG gets go-ahead for Darlington refurbishment”,
http://www.worldnuclearnews.org/COPGgetsgoaheadforDarlingtonrefurbishment1201167.html;
1245

requires new additions of 5-6 reactors per year on average in the late 2010s, is assumed tobe achieved in the all three scenarios. After 2020, the trend of new additions continues in theHigh Scenario (5-6 reactors per year), and moderated in the BAU (3-4 reactors per year).
The Low Nuclear Scenario assumes a slowdown of nuclear capacity growth, with 1 or 2
additional nuclear power unit per year, as shown in Figure 23. By 2040, the nuclear capacity
assumptions in the Low, BAU and High Nuclear Scenarios are 95 GW, 128 GW and 171 GW,
respectively. The High Nuclear Scenario includes inland nuclear power projects, due to thelimitation of coastal site capacity.

GW
200

150

100
High

50

Low

2035

2030

2025

2020

2013

2005

2000

1995

1990

2040

BAU

0

Figure 23 Nuclear capacity assumptions for China, 2013 to 2040
Figure by APERC.

Japan
The license expiration plan has significant impacts on the scenarios’ design. The Nuclear
Reactor Regulation Act13, amended in 2012, limits the reactor lifetime to 40 years and allows
an extension of a maximum of 20 years. The BAU Scenario follows the 40-year lifetime rule
for all of the existing reactors, except for the three reactors whose lifetime extensions havebeen already approved (Takahama Unit 1-2 and Mihama Unit 3). The BAU also includes new
additions of three reactors—Shimane Unit 3, Oma and Higashidori Unit1—whose
construction was started before the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. The High Nuclear
Scenario assumes the 20-year lifetime extension for most of the existing reactors, while the13

http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S32/S32HO166.html

46

Low Nuclear Scenario follows the 40-year retirement rule without any new additions.
Capacities in the three scenarios are shown in Figure 24.

GW
60
50

40
30

20

2040

2035

2030

2020

2013

2005

2000

1995

1990

0

2025

High
Low
BAU

10

Figure 24 Nuclear capacity assumptions for Japan, 2013 to 2040
Figure by APERC.

Korea
Korea is projected to expand nuclear generation steadily, according to the latest
government plan. In the short- to mid-term, the 7th Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity Supply
and Demand14, published in July 2015, listed new addition projects totaling 18.2 GW by 2029
and retirements of Kori Unit 1 by 2017. In regard to the long-term prospects, the 2nd Energy
Master Plan15 in January 2014 targeted having 42.7 GW by 2035. Korea does not have alegal limit for license extension, and the design life of existing reactors is as follows: 30 years
for Kori Unit 1 and Wolseong Units 1-4; 50 years for Shin-Kori Units 3-4; and 50 years forother reactors.
New capacity additions in the BAU Scenario follow the 7th plan by 2029, and we assume
the same expansion trend after 2030 (Figure 25). The BAU Scenario assumes the reactors
will retire after design life. The High Nuclear Scenario considers a lifetime extension of 20
years for existing reactors, except for Kori Unit 1; whereas, the Low Nuclear Scenario
assumes delays of new reactor additions by half compared to the BAU. The 20-year lifetime

14

MOTIE (2015): “The 7th Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity Supply and Demand”.

15

MOTIE (2014): “Korea Energy Master Plan outlook and policies to 2035”.

47

extension, which is assumed in the High Nuclear Scenario, allows Korea to reach the leveltargeted in the 2nd Master Plan.

GW
60
50
40
30
20

2040

2030

2025

2020

2013

2005

2000

1995

1990

0

2035

High
Low
BAU

10

Figure 25 Nuclear capacity assumptions for Korea, 2013 to 2040
Figure by APERC.

Chinese Taipei
The current government has a nuclear phase-out policy by 2025, which is included in
the BAU (Figure 26). The fourth nuclear power station, whose construction is suspended asof now, is assumed to be cancelled in the BAU. The High Nuclear Scenario hypotheticallyassumes the situation where the government and utility change their decisions and try toutilize existing as well as new reactors to the extent possible. This study assumes a lifetime
extension of 20 years for existing reactors in the High Nuclear Scenario, which considers thatthe current policy would be changed, nuclear power would be maintained at the current level
and the operation of No. 4 nuclear power plants would be restarted. The High Nuclear
Scenario is the most optimistic case for nuclear power development in Chinese Taipei.

MexicoTotal nuclear capacity in the BAU remains constant after the NPP modernization in 2015,
assuming further lifetime extensions for Laguna Verde nuclear power station by more than
10 years (Figure 27). The reactors retire at the current license expiration in the Low Scenario,
resulting in nuclear phase-out in the 2030s. In contrast, the High Scenario includes the48

indicative projects16 as well as lifetime extension of existing reactors; total capacity grows toabout 5.7 GW by 2040.

GW
10
High

BAU, Low

5

2040

2035

2030

2025

2020

2013

2005

2000

1995

1990

0

Figure 26 Nuclear capacity assumptions for Chinese Taipei, 2013 to 2040
Figure by APERC.

GW
6
High
Low
BAU
4

2

2040

2035

2030

2025

2020

2013

2005

2000

1995

1990

0

Figure 27 Nuclear capacity assumptions for Mexico, 2013 to 2040
Figure by APERC.

16

Secretaría de Energía (2016): “Programa de Desarrollo del Sistema Eléctrico Nacional”.

49

Russia
Russia has developed and plans to install NPPs mainly in the west part to curb domesticgas consumption for power generation. According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA)17,
in January 2015, Rosatom published a long-term nuclear development plan towards 2035.
The BAU is based on Rosatom’s plan for new additions and retirements by 2035. It
assumes that the trend of reactor additions will continue and existing reactors will retire after
50-year operation. The High Scenario includes proposed projects on top of the BAU, whiledevelopment slows down by half in the Low Scenario. Total nuclear capacity drops in around2025 in each scenario (Figure 28) are due to planned retirements of eight reactors. Total
nuclear capacity in Russia grows to more than 40 GW and 60 GW in the BAU and HighScenarios. The Low Scenario maintains around 20-25 GW over the projection period.

GW
70

High

60

Low

50

BAU

40
30
20

10
2040

2035

2030

2025

2020

2013

2005

2000

1995

1990

0

Figure 28 Nuclear capacity assumptions for Russia, 2013 to 2040
Figure by APERC.

The United States
Considering the energy situation and the future plan, only two projections are applied to
the United States (Figure 29). We assume that the nuclear capacity will remain stable in the
BAU Scenario, while it will significantly decline in the Low Nuclear Scenario. The difference
between these scenarios is due to license expirations. As of November 2016, a 40-year

WNA (2016): “Nuclear Power in Russia”, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/countryprofiles/countries-o-s/russia-nuclear-power.aspx.
1750

license and an additional extension of 20 years are allowed under the regulations. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is preparing guidance for an 80-year lifetime(“Subsequent License Renewal”)18. The BAU assumes that the 80-year operation would bepermitted for all the operational reactors, except for those whose retirements are alreadyannounced, including Pilgrim, Oyster Creek and Diable Canyon Units 1-2. The BAU Scenario
also includes new additions of four reactors which are currently under construction, such as
Vogtle Units 3-4 and V.C. Summer Units 2-319. The Low Nuclear Scenario, by contrast, isbased on the current limit for license extension (60 years), resulting in a sharp decline in the2030s.

GW
120
100
80
60
40
20

Low

BAU, High

2040

2035

2030

2025

2020

2013

2005

2000

1995

1990

0

Figure 29 Nuclear capacity assumptions for the United States, 2013 to 2040
Figure by APERC.

Southeast Asian economies
This study assumes the following five “new comers” in Southeast Asia: Indonesia,
Malaysia, The Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam. Assumptions for these economies are
summarized as below (Figure 30):
Indonesia: In March 2015, the government issued a white paper projecting that nuclear
power would be 5 GW by 2025. However, in December 2015, the Minister of Energy and

NRC: “Subsequent License Renewal”,
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/subsequent-license-renewal.html
18

19

As summarized in the Section 2.2.12, there exist uncertainties and discussions are ongoing regarding
the construction of the new units at the V.C. Summer nuclear station (see also the references listed infootnote 9 and 10).

51

Mineral Resources announced that the economy would not install NPPs until 2050.
Based on these recent updates, this study includes nuclear power not in the BAU but inthe High with a delay of 10 years. Nuclear capacity in the High Scenario reaches 5 GW
by 2035, and the installation trend is assumed to continue over the outlook, reaching
10 GW by 2040.


Malaysia: According to the energy commission’s outlook 20, Malaysia plans to install
2 GW by 2024, although there does not exist concrete projects. However, the plan was
delayed due to reasons introduced in the previous chapter. This study assumes no new
installation in the BAU; instead, the High Scenario discusses the effects of that level of
installation with a 10-year delay from the plan (2 GW by 2034). The High Scenario also
assumes an accelerated situation, where additional 2 GW is installed in the late 2030s.

The Philippines: The BAU Scenario does not include any nuclear power generation,
while the High Nuclear Scenario assumes the revival of BNPP (600 MW) by 2030. The
construction of BNPP was almost completed in 1984 but never fueled, partially due tothe nuclear accident in Chernobyl. KEPCO conducted a feasibility study on the revivalof the plant and estimated the cost for rehabilitation at 1 billion USD21.



Thailand: The BAU follows the PDP201522, which plans to newly install 2 GW nuclear
capacity by 2036. The High Nuclear Scenario assumes accelerated developments,
totaling 4 GW over the projection period: 2 GW by 2030 and additional 2 GW by 2040.
The Low Nuclear Scenario assumes no nuclear power would be deployed by 2040.



Viet Nam: Viet Nam has planned to deploy nuclear power for a long time. However, inNovember 2016, the National Assembly passed a resolution to cancel plans for two
nuclear power stations, due to financing issues and lower electricity demand projections.
The economy plans to replace the capacity by gas-fired, coal-fired, power imports from
Laos and renewables. The BAU Scenario does not include any reactors, whereas theHigh Scenario assumes the revival of nuclear development policies, including not only

20

Energy commission (2014): “Peninsular Malaysia Electricity Supply Industry Outlook 2014”.

21

CNN Philippines (2016): “Nuclear power: A go or no?”22

MOE (2015): “Thailand Power Development Plan 2015-2036 (PDP2015)”.

52

two Russian and two Japanese reactors but also further installation (total 10 reactors by2040).

Figure 30 Nuclear capacity assumptions for Southeast Asian economies, 2013 to 2040
Figure by APERC.

3.1.3

Other assumptions

Assumptions for electricity demand in each economy is obtained from the BAU Scenario
in the APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook, 6th Edition (APERC, 2016a). The Outlook
projects a 70% growth from 2013 to 2040 in APEC total, driven by China and Southeast
Asian economies. Fossil fuel prices (Table 3) and costs are from Table 1 of Annex I in APERC(2016a). Nuclear fuel costs are assumed to be around 15 USD/MWh. As for capital cost for
53

nuclear power plants, which is the major cost-component for the technology, we assume asfollows: 2 800 USD/kW for China, 4 500 USD/kW for Japan, 3 500 USD/kW for Korea andRussia, and 5 400 USD/kW for the United States.
Assumptions of a carbon price in each economy are based on existing policies and plans.
Among the thirteen economies covered in Section 3.1.2, this study takes into account an
economy-wide carbon price in the following economies: Canada23, China24, Japan25, Korea26
and Mexico27. Current or planned tax level is assumed to remain over the projection period.
These assumptions allow us to discuss the economics of nuclear development under existing
emissions policies; yet, analyzing the impacts of accelerated policies, such as a higher levelof carbon prices, would also be an interesting research agenda and should be considered infuture work.

Table 3 Fossil fuel assumption

2013

2020

2030

2040

Crude oil
[USD/bbl]

108

73

97

121

Natural gas in Japan[USD/Mmbtu]

15.9

10.4

12.4

13.7

Natural gas in the US[USD/Mmbtu]

3.6

4.4

5.4

6.6

Steam coal
[USD/tonne]

110

86

103

128

Sources: APERC (2016a).

23

The government of Canada plans to implement a carbon tax or a cap and trade scheme in all provinces
and territories from 2018. The government plans a price of 10 CAD/t-CO2 from 2018, rising to 50 CAD/tCO2 by 2022 (Canada, 2016).
24

China plans to introduce an economy-wide emission trading system in 2017. Although uncertainties still
remain regarding the timing of implementation and the level of carbon price, this study assume a price of
30 CNY/t-CO2 (about 4.7 USD/t-CO2) referring to the average level in the economy’s pilot projects since
2013.
25

The Tax for Climate Change Mitigation. This tax was introduced in October 2012, and raised in phases
in April 2014 and 2016. The tax value, after April 2016, is 289 JPY/t-CO2 (about 2.7 USD/t-CO2).
26

Korea established an emission trading system since 2015. Although the amount of emission transaction
remains at the modest level, this study assume a price of 15 USD/t-CO2 over the projection period.
27

5 USD/t-CO2 from 2014 (excluding emissions from natural gas).

54

3.2

Methods: long-term electricity supply model
In this study we use a bottom-up, least-cost electricity supply model, which was also

used in the APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook, 6th Edition. The model determines
capacity expansion and the operation of each technology under technical and politicalconstraints. Nuclear capacity is exogenously given in the scenarios, and renewable capacity
in power sector is subject to government policies and recent development trends. The modeltakes into account the middle- and long-term energy policies to determine the future shareof fossil fuel. The renewable capacity projection for the three Scenarios is the same as theBAU Scenario in the Outlook (APERC, 2016a). Electricity demand is modeled as
representative yearly or daily load duration curves, depending on data availability for eacheconomy. The model dispatches generation and storage technologies to balance demandand supply based on cost optimization. The cost of each technology includes capital costs(such as annual payments to recover initial investments and decommissioning costs),
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, fuel costs and carbon penalties (Figure 31). Moredetailed introductions about the model can be found in APERC (2016a).

DemandmodelsYearly demand
Capacity additions

Load curves

Investment needs

Prices and costs• Energy and CO2 prices• Initial/O&M costs

Existing capacity
Operational info.

• Plant availability• Capacity credit• Efficiencies• Minimum output level• Reserve margin target

Policy information• Power development
plans/policies• Renewables/nuclear
policies

Generation byplant type

Electricity
SupplyModel‘Least cost’ approach

Capacity addition and generation volume isdetermined based on costs (initial, O&M,
fuel and carbon costs) under various
technical and political constraints.

Figure 31 Electricity supply model structure
Figure by APERC.

55

Plant dispatch andcapacity factor
Fuel consumption
Emissions andemission intensity
Total and average
power generation costs

3.3

Results and discussion

3.3.1

Generation

Under the BAU Scenario, low-carbon electricity is expected to grow in the APEC region,
yet fossil fuels still dominate the APEC generation mix due to growing electricity demand(Figure 32), accounting for almost 70% in 2040. Although its share declines, coal remains as
the largest energy sources for power generation. Renewables together show the strongest
growth, more than doubling in absolute terms thanks to current environmental policies.
Although nuclear capacity grows under the BAU Scenario with net-additional 100 GW by
2040, the share of nuclear remains around the current level due to rapid growth of total
electricity demand in the APEC region. Accelerated nuclear development as well as lifetime
extension of existing reactors would be necessary to expand the nuclear power’s contribution
as shown in the High Scenario.

Figure 32 Power generation in the BAU Scenario
and fuel share in 2040 by Scenario, APEC
Figure by APERC.

Fossil fuels still hold the major share in APEC even in the High Scenario, althoughaccelerated nuclear development contributes to reducing fossil fuels. The incremental shareof nuclear (Figure 32) contribute to replacing coal-fired generation, resulting in theenvironmental benefits as depicted later in Section 3.3.2. On the other hand, nuclear power’s
share drops to 6% due to the slowdown of nuclear expanding economies, such as China,
Korea and Russia, as well as due to accelerated retirements of existing reactors, in particular,56

in United States. It’s important to note again that nuclear and renewable capacity are
exogenously given in this studies; future research needs to consider economic and technicalcompatibility considering cost-competition in power generation mix.

3.3.2

3E analysis

Balancing the 3E—Environment, Energy security and Economic efficiency—perspectiveis important to realize sustainable society. As a low-emission and non-fossil fuel electricity,
nuclear is expected to play an important role in mitigating climate change and securing
energy supply.
Although CO2 emissions from electricity sector grow in the APEC region as a whole
under the three scenario, nuclear power contribute to curbing the emission increase (Figure33a). With higher shares of nuclear generation, annual emissions from power generation canbe reduced, for example, by 7% in 2040 from the BAU to High Scenario by displacing coaland gas. The cumulative avoided CO2 emissions amount to 7Gt-CO2 by 2040 in the HighScenario, whereas the cumulative emissions increase by 5Gt-CO2 in the Low Scenario.

12

100%

GtCO2

USD/MWh
USD/MWhLow nuclear

82

BAU
10

High
High nuclear

81

95%

Low
80

8

BAU

BAU

Low

90%

79

High

6
78
High

High

Low
BAU

4
2013

2020

2030

2040

(a) Annual CO2 Emissions
from power generation

Low
BAU

85%
1990

2000

2013

2020

2030

2040

(b) Energy self-sufficiency
rate

77
Low

BAU

(c) Average generation
cost in 2040

Figure 33 “3E” results—Emissions, energy self-sufficiency and cost
Figure by APERC.

57

High

Reducing fossil fuel dependencies is one of the important challenges for the economies
not only from the environmental but also the security perspective to construct a resilient
energy system against volatile fossil fuel markets/prices and resource depletion. Nuclear
power, which is regarded as a “quasi-domestic” energy source, would contribute to improving
energy self-sufficiency rate in the APEC region (Figure 33b), while the rate remains at thesimilar level or decrease in the BAU and Low Scenario, respectively.
Our results also imply economic benefits in the form of generation cost savings in the
APEC region (Figure 33c); yet, the estimated saving is relatively modest, for example,
1.4 cent USD/kWh (a saving of 1.7%) from the BAU to the High Scenario, due to various
factors, including recent fossil fuel price drop (= improving the economics of fossil fuel plants)
and expensive capital investments required for nuclear plants. As mentioned in Section 3.1.3,
the level of emissions policies assumed in the scenarios, such as carbon prices, are basedon existing policies and plans. Accelerated emissions policies would be necessary to largely
improve the economic benefits of nuclear generation for the APEC region as a whole.

10%

China
Japan
Korea
US

5%

0%

-5%

Cost saving in the High scenario from BAU
Japan: 4%
Korea: 6%

High

Low

BAU

-10%

Figure 34 Generation costs changes relative to the BAU in 2040, selected economies
Figure by APERC.

However, it’s important to note that economic benefits of nuclear vary by economy,reflecting its energy situation. In general, energy importing economies may enjoy larger cost
reduction benefits with higher share of nuclear, by reducing high-cost energy imports. For
example, our analysis suggests that average generation cost would decrease under the High58

Scenario in Japan and Korea by 4% and 6%, respectively (Figure 34). Nuclear power would
remain as a preferable option from the “3E” perspective for these energy importing
economies. On the other hand, cost benefits are relatively limited in China and rather
negative in the US, where low-cost fossil fuels are available. Economic supports, including
stronger emissions policies, may need to improve the competitiveness of nuclear in these
economies.

3.3.3

Uranium demand and spent fuelWith the growth of nuclear power capacity, demand for uranium is expected to continue
to rise during the outlook period in the High Nuclear and BAU Scenarios, with the strongest
expansion expected in China, Korea and Russia, as well as potential Southeast Asian
economies. To estimate future uranium consumption, we constructed two front-end models,
one for LWRs and another for HWRs. Figure 35 shows the model for LWRs. We conducteda backward calculation: first, we estimated UO2 consumption for the projected nuclear
generation (Figure 32), then enriched UF6, natural UF6 and U3O8. Assumptions forconversion losses, product/tail assay of enrichment process, conversion losses and fuelburnups are expressed in Figure 35. While the parameters may vary by economy, we simply
used these assumptions for all economies due to data availability issues. Enrichment process
is excluded in the HWR front-end model.
The APEC annual reactor-related uranium requirements are projected to rise from36 000 tonnes of uranium metal (tU) at the end of 2013 to 53 000tU and 76 000tU by 2040
in the BAU and High Nuclear Scenarios respectively (as shown in Figure 36). APEC’s
uranium demand may tighten the global uranium market in the long-term under the “lower
production capability” case. OECD NEA estimated two cases with regard to uranium
production capability by 2035: “A-II category” which only includes production capability ofexisting and committed centers with reasonably assured and inferred resources recoverable
at cheaper than 130 USD/kgU; and “B-II category” which includes planned and prospective
centers as well. Under the A-II categories, APEC’s uranium consumption exceeds global
capability by 2035 in the High Nuclear Scenario, and reaches 75% of global capability in the
BAU. The supply-demand balance would loosen with the planned and prospective resources.
Uranium producing economies would need to ensure the feasibility of the “planned and59

prospective” resources well in advance to avoid the tightening situation and realize sufficient
supply.

Uranium Mine
Uranium ore
Uranium MillU3O8
Conversion plant• Losses: 0.5%

UF6 (natural)

Enrichment plant
UF6 (enriched)
Fuel fabrication plant• Product assay: 4wt-% U235
(BWR/PWR/ABWR/APWR), 2.4% (LWGR)• Tail assay: 0.3wt-% U235 (all LWR reactors)• Losses: 1%

UO2
Nuclear power plant• Fuel burnup: 45MWd/tU (BWR/PWR/ABWR/APWR), 15MWd/tU (LWGR)• Efficiency: 34.5% (BWR/PWR/ABWR/APWR), 33.3% (LWGR)

Electricity

Figure 35 Front-end model for the fuel cycle (take LWR for example)
Figure by APERC.

Figure 36 Global uranium production capability and APEC’s uranium demand
Uranium production capability data from NEA (2014). Figure by APERC.

60

Waste management has been and will be one of the major challenges for economies
using nuclear power. According to our estimation assuming a once-through fuel cycle for all
economies (Figure 37), the estimated amount of spent fuel reaches 130 000 to 180 000t-U.
Even the Low Scenario reaches 70% of the level in the High Scenario implying that, even if
nuclear developments slow down (like the Low Scenario), spent fuel issues remain to beaddressed by the economies. Given that the capacity of Onkalo, the final disposal facility in
Finland, is 9 000t-U, the APEC region may need to construct large-scale intermediate or final
disposal facilities to manage future spent fuel by 2040. However, it is important to note againthat this estimation is based on a once-through fuel cycle system, and that future nuclear fuelcycle policies and reprocessing activities may affect the amount of nuclear waste.

thousand-tU

200

180

150
150

130
100

50
BAU
Low
High

0
2013

2020

2030

2040

Figure 37 Spent fuel generation from NPPs in the APEC region, cumulative from 2013
Figure by APERC.

3.4

Conclusion
This chapter examined the impacts of three nuclear scenarios—the BAU, the Low and

the High Scenario—on the APEC generation mix. In any Scenario, China becomes the main
driver for new capacity installation, increasing its presence in the long-term. Although the
BAU assumes a growth of nuclear capacity from about 230 GW to 330 GW, the share of
nuclear power remains around the current level due to growing demand. Accelerated
installation as well as lifetime extension of existing reactors (like the High Scenario) would
be necessary to increase the share of nuclear in generation mix. According to our analysis,
61

nuclear power contributes to the APEC region from the “3E” perspective, although economic
benefits are estimated to be modest under the assumed fossil fuel and carbon prices (Section
3.1.3). Stronger emissions policies, such as a higher level of carbon prices, would be
important to improve the economics of nuclear. A large amount of spent fuel is estimatedeven in the Low Scenario. Economies need to implement policies to construct sufficientfacilities for storage and final disposal.

62Chapter 4 Challenges for nuclear development
The modeling study in the previous chapter showed the contribution from nuclear power,
especially to CO2 reduction and energy security enhancement in the APEC region. However,after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, uncertainties remain regarding the way forward
for nuclear power development. Many factors such as nuclear safety, technical constraints
economic competitiveness, as well as public acceptance will be challenges for nuclear power
development in this region. This chapter try to summarize an discuss these important issues
for the future development of nuclear power

4.1

Challenges for nuclear power development in the APEC region

4.1.1

Nuclear safety

Highlights


The aging nuclear power fleets in the APEC region pose challenges.

After the nuclear accident in Fukushima, nuclear safety has been reviewed andenhanced by various measures.

According to the definition of IAEA, nuclear safety refers to “achievement of proper
operating conditions, prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences,resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment from undue radiation
hazards”. After more than 60 years of development, nuclear power has achieved a relatively
high level of safety. However, currently concerns about safety still pose a major challenge
for nuclear power in the APEC region.
One of the uncertainties with nuclear safety is the aging nuclear power fleet, most ofwhich were designed and built in the 1960s and 1970s. Figure 38 shows the age distributionof the nuclear power fleet in the APEC region. Among the operational reactors, 159 reactors
are more than 30 years old and account for more than 60%. And 212 reactors are more than
20 years old and account for more than 80%. It is noteworthy that in the 1980s, 97 powerreactors started operations in the APEC region. These included 47 in the US, 18 in Japanand 14 in Russia. All the current operational nuclear reactors in the APEC region are
Generation II or II+, which need safety improvements to address extreme external hazards
such as tsunami and earthquake.
63

Figure 38 Age distribution of nuclear power fleet in the APEC region
Data source: IAEA PRIS system. Figure by APERC.

For newcomers to nuclear power in the APEC region, nuclear safety is one of the mostimportant issues they need to consider. There are various barriers need to be overcome
before they decide to deploy an NPP, including establishing an effective regulation system,
conducting technology evaluations, implementing radioactive material control, ensuring
environment protection and building up emergency response capability.
After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, APEC economies have been reviewing
nuclear safety in each economy, and taking measures to enhance the safety, mainly in thefollowing aspects:
Safety Assessments – All the APEC economies that have NPPs undertook a safetyassessment of the design of NPPs against site specific extreme natural hazards andimplemented the necessary corrective actions in a timely manner.

Emergency Preparedness and Response – All the APEC economies that have NPPs
strengthened their emergency preparedness and response, in order to avoid a manmade catastrophe like Fukushima and regulatory capture that was its root cause. In 2011
the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre launched a new secure web-based
communications platform to unify and simplify information exchange during nuclear orradiological emergencies. The Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and64

Emergencies 28 (USIE) has been under development since 2009 and was actually
launched during the emergency response to the accident at Fukushima.
Equipment, Facility and Operational Improvements – One of the lessons learned from

the Fukushima accident is that the loss of power to maintain effective cooling represents
a major challenge for existing NPPs. To address this issue, a power station's sea wall
must be adequately tall and robust as the first defense line for the plant. In addition, theequipment ranges from diesel-driven pumps and electric generators to ventilation fans,hoses, fittings, cables and satellite communications gear, which have been deployed inmost of the plants in the APEC region.

4.1.2

Technology development

Highlights

Several APEC economies lead research and development in advanced technologies;
Generation III reactors are expected to play an important role in the next decade;Generation IV and Small Modular Reactors also gain attention and are being
researched for commercial applications.

The APEC region include economies leading research and development in advanced
nuclear technologies, such as Generation III, Generation IV and Small Modular Reactors.
This sub-section overviews current status of these technology developments.

Generation III Reactors
Generation III reactor designs feature improved fuel technology, superior thermal
efficiency, a combination of active and passive nuclear safety systems and standardized
design for reduced maintenance and capital costs. The core damage frequencies for thesereactors are designed to be lower than for Generation II reactors – 60 core damage events
per 100 million reactor-years for the EPR and 3 core damage events per 100 million reactoryears for the ESBWR, significantly lower than the 1 000 core damage events per 100 million
reactor-years for BWR/4 Generation II reactors. Table 4 summarizes Generation III reactor

28

https://iec.iaea.org/usie/actual/LandingPage.aspx

65technologies in the selected APEC economies. The first Generation III reactors were built inJapan, in the form of ABWR designed by GE, while several others are under construction in
Europe, including the EPR designed by Areva. The next Generation III reactor predicted tocome on line is a Westinghouse AP1000 reactor, located at Sanmen Nuclear Power Stationin China. The first AP1000 reactor unit is planned to be commissioned in early 2017, after athree-year construction delay. The world’s first EPR reactor will be commissioned in
Guangdong, China in around the middle of 2017, after a construction delay of 2.5 years.
Cost reduction of Generation III reactors is an objective shared by all vendors andoperators which can be achieved through a number of options including design simplification,
standardization, improved constructability, modularity and supply chain optimization, as well
as by taking full advantage of the lessons learnt during the first-of-a-kind (FOAK) projects.

Table 4 Selected Generation III reactors in APEC economies
EconomyReactor type

CanadaAdvanced Fuel CANDU Reactor (AFCR)

China

CAP1400, HRP1000

Japan

ABWR (co-design with US), APWR

Korea

APR1400

RussiaVVER-1200, BN800

The United States

AP1000 (Westinghouse/Toshiba)

Sources: IAEA and APERC.

Generation IV Reactors29
Generation IV technology includes a set of nuclear reactor designs currently being
researched for commercial applications by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF), withtechnology readiness levels varying between the levels requiring a demonstration, toeconomical competitive implementation. They are motivated by a variety of goals including
improved safety, sustainability, efficiency and cost. An international collective representing
governments of 13 countries and one international organization (Euratom), GIF was initiated29

http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power- reactors/generationiv-nuclear-reactors.aspx

66

in 2000 and formally chartered in 2001. In 2002, GIF published the roadmap for the next
generation reactors, and selected six systems which they believe represent the future shapeof nuclear energy, including Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor System (GFR), Lead-Cooled Fast
Reactor System (LFR), Molten Salt Reactor System (MSR), Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor
System (FSR), Supercritical-Water-Cooled Reactor System (SCWR) and Very-HighTemperature Reactor System (VHTR). The roadmap was updated in 2014 and confirmed the
choice of six Generation IV concepts. Seven APEC economies are participants in GIF,
including Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Russia, Korea and the United States.

Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)
SMRs are generally 300 MW equivalent or less, which may provide alternative lowcarbon option for the economies with relatively small-scale power grids, such as Southeast
Asian economies. In APEC economies, more than 20 types of SMRs have been designed(Figure 39). Its passive safety, adequate flexibility, modular production and less upfront
investment make SMRs attractive; yet, the biggest challenge is that the economics have yet
to be proven.

Figure 39 SMRs developed by different economies
Data source: IAEA
3030

IAEA: https://aris.iaea.org/Publications/SMR-Book_2016.pdf

674.1.3

Waste management

Highlights


APEC accounts for about two-thirds of the total nuclear waste in the world.



Different strategies were implemented in APEC economies for nuclear waste andspent fuel disposal.



For the newcomer economies, while it is not so critical at the beginning to deploy
nuclear power, they should pay attention to and draft a long-term plan for this issue.

According to IAEA’s estimation31, spent fuel from nuclear reactors in storage amounted
to around 266 000t HM (Heavy Metal) and is accumulating at a rate of around
7 000t HM/year. Spent fuel reprocessing from commercial reactors continued to be carriedout at 10 facilities in five member economies of IAEA. The APEC region roughly accounts for
two-thirds of the total amount in the world. Final disposal in Deep Geological Repositories(DGRs) is the recognized solution for all high level waste, whether it is spent fuel (direct
disposal) or waste from reprocessing. Currently in the world, Finland is leading the way withthe construction of the first DGR, which is expected to enter operation in the early 2020s (fordirect disposal of spent fuel from the Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power plants).
There are currently no operating disposal facilities for HLW in the APEC region, and thespent fuel inventories are therefore growing. All spent fuel is initially stored under water forcooling in storage pools at reactor facilities for between nine months and several decades,
depending on the storage capacities of the pools. This is usually followed by a period ofintermediate dry storage. Then, in a few economies, such as France, Russia and Japan32,
spent fuel is transported to a reprocessing facility and stored there in buffer storage pools
before being fed into the process. And the spent fuel not destined for reprocessing remains
stored in the original reactor storage pools or is transported to separate “away from reactor”(AFR) fuel storage facilities. Despite their name, the AFR facilities may be either on a part of
the reactor site or at other dedicated sites. Currently there are around 120 operating
commercial AFR spent fuel storage facilities around the world, most of them being dry
storage facilities at reactor sites. The challenge is to accelerate progress on building HLW

31

IAEA, Nuclear Technology Review 2016,
https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC60/GC60InfDocuments/English/gc60inf-2_en.pdf
32

Spent fuel in Japan has been reprocessed in France and the United Kingdom. A reprocessing plant(800 t/yr) is under construction at Rokkasho in Aomori prefecture.

68disposal facilities and expand AFR storage to accommodate the increased spent fuelinventories and extended storage times.

Table 5 Waste management policies, selected APEC economies
EconomyPolicyFacilities and progress towards final repositories

CanadaDirect disposal

 Nuclear Waste Management Organization set up 2002
 Deep geological repository confirmed as policy, retrievable Repository site search from 2009, planned for use 2025

China

Reprocessing

 Central spent fuel storage at LanZhou
 Repository site selection to be completed by 2020
 Underground research lab. from 2020, disposal from 2050

Japan

Reprocessing

 Underground laboratory at Mizunami in granite since 1996
 Spent fuel and HLW storage facility at Rokkasho since 1995
 Spent fuel storage constructed at Mutsu in 2013
 NUMO set up 2000, site selection for deep geologicalrepository under way to 2025, operation from 2035

Korea

RussiaDirect disposal,

 Waste program confirmed 1998, KRWM set up 2009

wants to change Central interim storage planned from 2016

Reprocessing

 Underground laboratory in granite or gneiss in Krasnoyarsk
region from 2015, may evolve into repository
 Final repository sites under investigation on Kola peninsula Pool storage for VVER-1000 spent fuel at Zheleznogorsk
since 1985
 Dry storage for RBMK and other spent fuel at Zheleznogorsk
from 2012 Various interim storage facilities in operation

The US

Direct disposal,
but reconsidering DOE responsible for used fuel from 1998, accumulated
USD 32 billion waste fund Considerable research and development on repository inwelded tuffs at Yucca Mountain, Nevada
 The 2002 Congress decision that geological repository be at
Yucca Mountain was countered politically in 2009
 Central interim storage for used fuel now likely

Sources: World Nuclear Association and APERC.

69

Among the APEC economies, the US and Canada have currently opted for direct
disposal (Table 5). Spent fuel is currently stored in dry cask systems at a growing number of
power plant sites33. Dry cask storage is more limited in heat dissipation capability than wet
storage34, but has the advantage of being modular, which spreads capital investments overtime, and, in the longer term, the simpler passive cooling systems used in dry storage reduce
operation and maintenance requirements and costs. In the US, by the end of 2009, 13 856
metric tons of commercial spent fuel in dry casks. In Canada, some above-ground dry storagesites have been used and some are under construction. For the economies which have
deployed NPPs for a relatively long time, such as the US, Russia, Korea and Japan, nuclear
waste disposal and storage becomes a serious problem to be addressed, as storage space
grows tight at plant sites and more storage sites are needed. However, for the newcomer
economies, it is not so critical for the nuclear power development at the beginning, yet theyshould pay attention and draft a long-term plan to this issue before nuclear power deployment.

4.1.4

Decommissioning

As illustrated in Figure 38, majority of the nuclear reactors in the APEC region have been
operated for more than 30 years. Therefore, decommissioning will become an increasingly
important part of the nuclear power activity in the coming decades, as dozens of reactors are
expected to be shut down in APEC. There are essentially two main strategies fordecommissioning: immediate dismantling, where after the nuclear facility closes, equipment,
structures, and radioactive materials are removed or decontaminated to a level that permits
release of the property and termination of the operating license within a period of about 10
to 15 years; and deferred dismantling, where a nuclear facility is maintained and monitored
in a condition that allows the radioactivity to decay – typically for about 30 to 40 years, after
which the plant is dismantled and the property decontaminated. A third strategy exists called
entombment, where all or part of the facility is encased in a structurally long-lived material. It
is not a recommended option, although it may be a solution under exceptional circumstances(such as after a severe accident).

33

https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/dry-cask-storage.html

34

Therefore, spent fuel assemblies are moved from reactor vessel to the spent fuel pool (wet storage)
first, then the spent fuel that have already been cooled are stored in dry cask systems.

70

Case study: Nuclear power decommissioning in Japan
In order to better understand the decommissioning, this report takes Japan’s experienceand methodology as an example. The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) defines thedecommissioning of NPPs in Japan according to the following four activities: dismantling of
the relevant reactor facilities, transfer of nuclear fuel, removal of irradiated material, and thedisposal of radioactive waste (Figure 40). Within these boundaries designed by NRA, nuclear
operators can design their own decommissioning strategies.

Figure 40 Example of nuclear power plant decommissioning process in Japan
Information from the report of JAPCO and University of Fukui 35. Figure by APERC.

Based on the report of JAPCO and University of Fukui, the decommissioning of PWRtype reactors is expected to be less costly than BWR-type reactors (Figure 41). However, themajority of the current projects, including the reactors of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, are
BWRs. Expenses related to waste management make up around one-third of the total
decommissioning costs, yet uncertainties exist in this part largely due to the unresolved
question of radioactive waste disposal and spent fuel management. PWRs produce a smaller
total volume of radioactive waste, but the quantity of highly irradiated material is higher. This
makes the clearance system less effective for a PWR-type reactor.

35

http://cdnsite.eu-japan.eu/sites/default/files/publications/docs/2016-03-nuclear-decommissioning-japanschmittem-min_0.pdf

71Figure 41 Estimated costs for decommissioning
BWR and PWR (1.1 GW model-plant) in Japan
Data and introduction from the report of JAPCO and University of Fukui. Figure by
APERC.

4.1.5

Economic competitivenessHighlights
Generally speaking, nuclear generation is cost-competitive in energy importing
economies where there is limited access to low-cost fossil fuels.

Capital costs is the major cost-component of nuclear generation; thus, lower capitalcosts, lower discount rate as well as higher capacity factor improve its economics.

Generally speaking, nuclear generation is cost competitive with other forms of electricity
generation, except where there is direct access to low-cost fossil fuels. Fuel costs for nuclear
plants are a minor proportion of total generating costs, though capital costs are greater thanthose for coal-fired plants and much greater than those for gas-fired plants. The World
Nuclear Association early in 2017 published Nuclear Power Economics and Project
Structuring 36 . The report notes that the economics of new nuclear plants are heavily
influenced by their capital costs, which accounts for at least 60% of their levelised cost ofelectricity. Therefore, the competitiveness of nuclear power heavily relies on the low-cost36

http://www.world-nuclear.org/getmedia/84082691-786c-414f-8178a26be866d8da/REPORT_Economics_Report_2017.pdf.aspx

72capital costs. However, due to the construction delay as well as the first-of-a-kindengineering costs, the capital costs of Generation III reactors are much higher than expected,
which could be a challenge for future deployment.
Other factors, including discount rate as well as capacity factor, also affect theeconomics of nuclear generation, as capital cost is the dominant cost component. According
to the OECD NEA and IEA estimations, nuclear would be cost-competitive option compared
to coal and CCGT (Combined Cycle Gas Turbine) at a 3% discount rate (Figure 42); yet, thestudy also suggested that nuclear becomes less attractive option from an economic viewpoint
at a higher rate, such as 7% and 10%. The median value of nuclear power is close to that of
the coal at a 7% discount rate, and higher than CCGT and coal at a 10% rate. Note that theseresults include a carbon tax of USD 30/tonne, as well as the regional variations in assumed
fuel costs. Higher capacity factor is important to payback the capital investments. However,growing intermittent renewables may results in lower capacity factor of other generation
technologies, including nuclear, posing challenges from an economic perspective.

Figure 42 Levelized cost of electricity with different discount rate, selected technologies
Data and figure from IEA/NEA (2015).

73

4.1.6

Public acceptanceHighlights

In general, the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi station negatively impacted
public acceptance rate in most of the economies, according to the surveys.

The existing “nuclear utilizing” economies as well as new comers need to muster asustained effort to provide the general public with transparent information.

Public concerns about reactor safety, nuclear waste disposal, and rising construction
costs have had a particularly notable impact on state policies as well as the final
determination for NPP projects, especially for the newcomer economies. Various surveys
and research have been conducted by organizations, academic institutes and nuclear powerstakeholders. However, mixed results have made it difficult to make reliable conclusions.

Australia
CanadaChina
Indonesia
Japan
Korea

MexicoRussiaUnited States
0%Strongly support

20%

40%

Somewhat support

60%
Strongly oppose

80%

100%

Somewhat oppose

Figure 43 Public perception towards nuclear power in selected economies
Survey by Ipsos 201125.

Here, we take a global survey by Ipsos Company as an example. The survey was
conducted in May 2011 and included 24 economies. Figure 43 shows the results for the
major nuclear economies in the APEC region. We can find that a majority support nuclear
power in the United States, which accounts for more than 50% of the sample. For most of74

the economies, the support rate for nuclear power is around 40%. Details of the survey canbe found in the Ipsos’ report37.

Sample results of public survey, selected APEC economies
In the United States, support for nuclear energy remains steady, according to a public
opinion survey conducted by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) in autumn. Sixty-five percentof the US public expressed support for nuclear energy, consistent with recent years where
two-thirds of the public has reported favorability to nuclear energy (Figure 44). The poll was
conducted in September and October 2016. The survey explored the role of nuclear energy
in the 2016 presidential election and found bipartisan support. Sixty percent of Clinton
supporters and 75% of Trump supporters reported support for nuclear energy. The survey
also found: 84% think nuclear should be important in the future; 82% agree we should takeadvantage of all low-carbon energy sources, including nuclear, hydro and renewable energy;
95% agree it's important to maintain diverse electricity sources. More detailed information
about this poll and the questionnaire can be found on NEI’s website.

Figure 44 Favorability to nuclear power in the United States
Survey conducted by NEI. Data and figure from NEI.38

37

https://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/ipsos-global-advisor-nuclear-power-june-2011.pdf

38

https://www.nei.org/Knowledge-Center/Public-Opinion

75

With regard to Japan, we have introduced the results of a survey conducted by Nikkei in
Section 2.2.4. Since the nuclear accident in Fukushima, various researches have been
carried out on public acceptance issues. Here we take another public poll conducted by theJapan Atomic Energy Relations Organization (JAERO) as an example. The results to thequestion “Is Nuclear Energy Necessary?” imply that the public acceptance rate for nuclear
power has decreased sharply, with only more than a quarter of the population consideringthat nuclear power was necessary for Japan (Figure 45). Before the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear accident in 2011, this rate was more than 70%.

Figure 45 A survey on public acceptance for nuclear power in Japan
Survey conducted by JAERO. Data and figure from JAERO (in Japanese). 39

As for new comer economies, such as Southeast Asian economies, there are several
existing surveys summarized by the IAEA or the government as follows:Indonesia 40 : In order to survey public perception concerning utilization of NPP, in
November 2010, a poll was conducted of 3 000 respondents, resulting in 59.7%
agreeing with utilization of NPP, 26.1% not agreeing and 14.2% abstaining. After
Fukushima’s NPP accident in 2011, a poll was conducted with the same number of39

http://www.jaero.or.jp/data/01jigyou/tyousakenkyu.html

40

https://cnpp.iaea.org/countryprofiles/Indonesia/Indonesia.htm

76respondents and the percentage agreeing decreased to 49.5%. In 2012 a poll involving
5 000 respondents was conducted, which showed that public acceptance increased to52%. A poll in 2013 showed that public acceptance for utilization of NPP in Indonesia
increased to 60.4%. In a 2014 poll, public acceptance for utilization of NPP in Indonesia
significantly increased, with 72% responding that they agreed. The newest poll in 2015
indicates that 75.3% of Indonesia's population support the construction of NPP.


Malaysia: A public survey was conducted between 14 March and 10 May 2016 focusingon public acceptance and perception towards the implementation of nuclear energy in
Malaysia. It was conducted online using social media advertisement as tools ofdissemination. Public favorability to nuclear energy was divided, with 39.8% supportingand 40.1% opposing, while 20.1% of the respondents chose to be neutral with regard tonuclear power.



The Philippines: No detailed information on public surveys in the Philippines could befound. Nuclear power is nevertheless a controversial topic, and the BNPP was a focal
point for anti-nuclear protests since the beginning of its construction.

Thailand: No clear figures were found for the public acceptance rate for nuclear power.
The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) has actively implemented anumber of activities to disseminate information on the energy situation in Thailand and“why nuclear power is a viable option for electricity generation”. The activities were
aimed at reaching not only the local community, but also students, teachers, the media,
religious leaders and others. EGAT has also collaborated with the office of non-formal
and informal education in developing the textbook and teacher’s guidebook of “Electricity
Usage in Daily Life”, which includes various types of electricity generation. Training forthe teacher program has been conducted economy-wide for a sustainable learning
process. It is expected that this program will help gain public acceptance for nuclear
power.



Viet Nam: The government’s announcement on setting up four NPPs has heated adebate amongst pundits in Viet Nam. Some agree with this policy, stating that it isnecessary for the development of the economy. However, a number of scientists,
including nuclear experts, express fear over accidents and difficulties in storing waste,
as well as concerns regarding human capacity to operate such advanced technology
and the huge capital required.
77

4.2

Conclusion
This chapter overviewed several challenges for nuclear power development in the APEC

region, including the nuclear safety, technical progress, waste management, decommission,
economic competitiveness as well as public acceptance.
After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, nuclear safety was enhanced in all APEC
economies that already embarked on nuclear power. In recent years, advanced nuclear
power technologies have developed fast. The Generation III and Generation IV nuclear
power designs saw rapid progresses, and some of the pioneer demonstration projects havebeen implemented. SMRs may attract interests in particular from Southeast Asian economies
with relatively small-scale grids. Further researches in terms of economic performance andsafety feature would be important for SMRs to be largely deployed.
Nuclear waste and spent fuel disposal is always a concern for the public. In the APEC
economies that have deployed NPPs for a relatively long time, such as the US, Russia, Korea
and Japan, nuclear waste disposal and storage has become a serious problem to beaddressed, as storage space becomes limited at plant sites and more storage sites areneeded. However, for the newcomer economies, this is not so critical for nuclear power
development at the beginning. They should nevertheless pay attention to and draft a longterm plan for this issue before nuclear power deployment. Decommission is anotherchallenge for the nuclear utilizing economies because of aging issues of existing reactors.
Economic competitiveness of nuclear generation varies by economy, reflecting its
energy situation. In general, nuclear is relatively competitive in energy importing economies
where there is limited access to low-cost fossil fuel resources, and vice versa. As capitalcosts is the major cost component for nuclear generation, capital costs, discount rate as wellas capacity factor largely affect its competitiveness.
Public acceptance remains a significant challenge for all the APEC economies to deploy
new NPPs. The nuclear accident in Fukushima negatively impacted the public acceptance
rate in most of the economies, according to the surveys. The economies which will continue
or start nuclear power generation need to muster a sustained effort to provide the generalpublic with transparent and balanced information.

78

Chapter 5 Conclusion: potential for collaboration
among the APEC economies
More than five years after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, many economies
revised their nuclear policies. In order to better discuss the opportunities and challenges fornuclear generation after the accident, this study summarized current nuclear policies(Chapter 2) as well as conducted a quantitative analysis on future nuclear scenarios (Chapter
3). The modeling study suggested that the nuclear generation has a potential to contribute
the APEC economies from the 3E—Environment, Energy security and Economic efficiency—
perspective; however, nuclear also faces significant challenges as pointed out in Chapter 4.
International cooperation can be one of the options to overcome the challenges. In order tocreate a better environment for nuclear power development in the APEC region, this chapter
discuss the future cooperation possibilities among the APEC economies, as a concluding
chapter.

5.1

Collaboration possibilities in the APEC region

5.1.1

Existing collaboration framework

Nuclear energy, embodying sophisticated and resource intensive technologies, presents
different opportunities for collaboration among different economies in the world. International
cooperation provides a forum for different stakeholders to work together to share and analyze
data and experiences, gain consensus and develop approaches that can be applied withineach economy’s energy policy making. As nuclear power attracts more and more attention
in recent years, there have been a lot of international organizations and frameworks
dedicated to enhancing nuclear safety and conducting R&D for nuclear power.

Existing global cooperation frameworks
There are several international organizations dedicating to nuclear energy, such as IAEA,
OECD NEA and WNA. They provide international cooperation frameworks in various areas,
including nuclear safety, technology, science, environment, law, as well as knowledge
sharing and management.
79One of the most influential international organizations on nuclear energy would be the
IAEA, which is responsible for implementing international agreements specific to nuclear
power, notably the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that enables international collaborationon the peaceful uses of atomic energy while providing mutual assurance.
The OECD NEA, representing 31 economies41 with 84% of the world’s nuclear capacity,
assists member countries in developing the scientific, technological and legal bases required
for the use of nuclear energy. It fosters a number of international collaborative programs, andproduces many publications arising from these.
In addition, there are a number of international collaboration initiatives which focus onreactor technology development, centralized international fuel cycle services, anddevelopment of nuclear licensing procedures and regulation. Collaboration on reactor
technology development mainly focuses on reactor designs of regional interest and is set up
along the lines of the GIF or the IAEA’s INPRO programme. GIF is a 14-member forum set
up in 2001 which has identified six reactor concepts for further investigation with a view tocommercial deployment by 2030-2040. It is focused on new reactor technology. IAEA’
INPRO is focused more on assessment methodology for developing economy needs. It
involves users as much as technology holders and has 39 member economies including
several which do not yet have nuclear power. INPRO supports economies as they develop
long-range national nuclear energy strategies using INPRO’s nuclear energy systemassessment (NESA) and the INPRO Methodology. The five Southeast Asian economies in
Chapter 2 are all INPRO members and have implemented pre-feasibility studies using
INPRO’s assessment system as a guideline.
On the industry side, there are also some international cooperation frameworks in orderto enhance the connections among the whole nuclear industry. The most significant safetyrelated cooperation internationally is through the World Association of Nuclear Operators(WANO), which was formed over a couple of years following the Chernobyl accident tomaximize the safety and reliability of NPP operation. Currently, WANO has five major
programs, including peer reviews, performance analysis, member support and corporate
communications, as well as training and development. The exchange of information (or41

As of Aug 2017. Argentina and Romania is joining from 1 st September 2017 and 15th October 2017,
respectively.

80Information sharing) on operating experience is one of the basis of WANO's various
programs. Information and event reports are submitted by each operating organization to its
regional center where they are reviewed for clarity and completeness and then distributed to
all WANO members using an international exchange system.

Existing regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region
Since 1972, 15 economies in the Asia-Pacific region have cooperated under the
Regional Cooperative Agreement (RCA) for Research, Development, and Training related to
Nuclear Science and Technology. Over the past two decades RCA activities have covered
agriculture, industry, medicine, radiation protection and basic nuclear science. In 1987, theprogram's scope was enlarged by the start of a project on energy and nuclear power planning.
The Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA) is a government-level cooperation
forum in the Asia-Pacific region, proposed and led by Japan since 1990. It is a cooperation
framework for peaceful use of nuclear technology in Asia. The cooperation consists of FNCA
meetings and the project activities with participation from 11 economies. FNCA mainly
focuses on the following fields: radiation utilization development (industrial utilization,
environmental utilization and healthcare utilization), research reactor utilization development,
nuclear safety strengthening and nuclear infrastructure strengthening.
Japan, Korea and China have agreed to form a network to cooperate on nuclear safety
and change information in nuclear emergencies, especially those rating at level 2 or aboveon the International Nuclear Event Scale. At a meeting of nuclear regulators and otherexperts in Guangdong in December 2013, a framework was agreed despite regional tensions.
In addition to exchanging information on civil nuclear accidents, the three countries will sharestandard information including safety. The agreement was signed by officials from Japan’s
NRA, Korea's NSSC and China's National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA).
There are also a wide range of bilateral cooperation agreements between APEC
economies. As Canada, China, Japan, Korea, Russia and the US all have nuclear power
projects aboard, they have signed bilateral agreements with the target commercial partners.

815.1.2

Collaboration possibilities under the APEC framework

APEC has provided a more flexible platform for its member economies. The Energy
Working Group, as a collaboration body for energy policy makers, plays an important role infostering energy cooperation. APEC uses the term “economy” to describe its member
regions; this enables the framework to include more areas, such as Chinese Taipei, than theother international organizations.

Information exchange
There are more than 260 nuclear power reactors in operation in the APEC region, andaround 40 reactors under construction as of November 2016. As the “center of the gravity”
of nuclear power generation is shifting to the Asia-Pacific, information exchange scheme,
especially to share information about emergency preparedness as well as responses during
the emergency period, becomes more important there. This scheme can also include
information about daily operation plan and mid- to long-term nuclear development plans;
sharing these plans of an economy may benefit the neighboring economies to enhance
emergency preparedness, as some of the reactors are/will be located near the border among
economies. Several international organizations such as IAEA and WANO have establishedemergency response mechanisms in order to exchange information and provide support for
its member economies. However, there are no such inter-government platform for
information exchange in the Asia-Pacific region, including Chinese Taipei; collaboration
among the interested economies under APEC framework may contribute to a geographicallycomprehensive scheme in the region.

Waste management and fuel cycle
There are cooperation possibilities in the area of waste technology, including firstly amultinational regional deep geological repository that in view of the technical, political andfinancial difficulties in their construction would make economic and practical sense to build
jointly by several member economies. However, political and legal barriers will have to be
overcome for implementation. Other cooperative projects could include collaboration on highlevel waste technology research, design and operation of LILW surface storage installations,

82

LILW processing and preparation methods, waste standards and licensing, capacity building,and even the joint construction and operation of an underground research laboratory.
Cooperation in terms of fuel services would merit a closer look; for example, centralizing
different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle would benefit non-proliferation by preventing the
spread of sensitive technologies. Also, economies with full fuel cycle technologies could
provide fuel services to other economies, including new comers which usually do not warrant
investment in such resource intensive activities.

Future perspectives
In November 2016, APERC organized a workshop on nuclear power development,
inviting representatives from 12 APEC economies and relevant international organizations.
These representatives support the idea of future cooperation on nuclear power developmentin the APEC region, as it would benefit the wide range of stakeholders in this region, not only
the current nuclear utilizing economies but also the newcomer economies.
In the short-term, we suggest relevant APEC economies establish a forum where policy
makers, researchers and stakeholders in APEC can work together to share experiences andseek solutions to common problems. The collaboration activities could include: exchanging
information on nuclear power development plans; sharing experiences with nuclear project
preparation, construction and operation; and holding workshops or conferences on specifictopics, such as public communication; financial issues and investment.
For long-term cooperation, relevant APEC economies could further the cooperation on
the following topics: emergency preparedness and nuclear accident support mechanisms;
nuclear waste and spent fuel disposal network; and financial frameworks, as well as
cooperation with relevant multilateral organizations to support new NPP projects andpreparatory works.
Nuclear power cooperation includes a sensitive and high-level political topic. Yet we
believe these cooperation schemes would benefit the region and need to be discussed
carefully but steadily.

83References
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84