Russia’s War in Ukraine:
Ballistic andCruise Trajectories
William Alberque, Douglas Barrie, Zuzanna Gwadera,
Timothy Wright
September 2023

The International Institutefor Strategic Studies

Contents

Executive Summary3

Introduction4
Section 1: History and Doctrine of Russian Use of Precision-Strikes

5

Section 2: Cruise Missile Use in the Russo-Ukrainian War7

Speed and Mass 8

Section 3: Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile Use in the Russo–Ukrainian War

11

Russia’s Use of Ground-Launched Ballistic Missiles in Ukraine 11
Russia’s Utilisation of Old Systems 13
Ukraine’s Use of Ballistic Missiles 14
Ukrainian SRBM Capabilities 14
Western Hesitancy Regarding SRBM Deliveries to Ukraine 15
Western Rocket Deliveries 16

Section 4: Implications for Non-Proliferation Policy and Frameworks18
Increased Perceived Utility 18
Decreased Cost of Certain Higher-level Capabilities 19
Adaptable Designs and Target Types 19

Conclusion22
Notes23
Cover
Exhibition of destroyed Russian missiles shot down over Ukraine on August 23, 2023 in Kyiv, Ukraine. (Andriy Zhyhaylo/Obozrevatel/Global Images
Ukraine via Getty Images)

2 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Executive Summary
Russia’s war on Ukraine has been calamitous for its

long-range land-attack capability, or as an adjunct to anland forces, and an unnecessary tragedy for Ukraine’s

existing cruise missile inventory.

people. It has also provided a further proving ground

Alongside the lesson of ‘quantity having a quality of its

for a variety of ‘ballistic’ and cruise missile types, atown’, the comparative success of Ukrainian ground-based

once illustrating the utility and sometimes the limita-

air defence in engaging Russian cruise missiles, even if thetions of such classes of weaponry. The war has for theclaims are considerably exaggerated, will propel interest

first time seen the limited use of an air-launched aero-in greater survivability. Options include greater numbers,

ballistic missile and the large-scale operation of direct

greater stealth, and greater speed, alongside supplement-

attack munitions, or one-way uninhabited aerial vehi-

ing cruise missiles with lower-cost higher-volume decoys

cles. Cooperation on the latter is drawing Moscow andor direct attack munitions to try to overcome ground-

Tehran closer together, with uncomfortable implica-

based air defence. Moscow may well redouble its own

tions for many countries concerned as to the destabilis-

efforts to develop high-supersonic or hypersonic (Maching behaviour of the two states.

5+) cruise missiles for the land attack role. In turn thisMoscow’s war will almost certainly further fuel the

may encourage other states to follow suite, or to try to

demand for long-range conventionally armed land-

access Russian technology or systems. Tehran has alreadyattack cruise missiles and pique greater interest in direct

claimed it is pursuing supersonic missile technology, andattack munitions among state and non-state actors. This

Moscow could offer a path to expediting this.

is at a time when the arms control architecture for man-

The development of long-range single role-weapons,

aging ballistic and cruise missile acquisition has alreadybe it for land-attack against fixed targets or for the anti-

been greatly eroded. The remaining mechanisms forship mission will be replaced increasingly by multi-role

managing the spread of such systems have never been

weapons capable of being used to engage a broad target

more ill-suited for the task.

set. This poses an additional challenge not only to the

Irrespective of the abject failure of Russia’s initial

defender, but also for any arms control architecture that

campaign aims, and its now more often sporadic use ofwill need to capture such multi-role weapons. Besides

land-attack cruise missiles, there is no indication there

turning to Tehran, Moscow has used some of long-range

is any lessening of interest in such systems. Rather,surface-to-air missile inventory in a secondary surface-states that already have similar systems, alongside

to-surface role to supplement its own short-range ballis-

nations that are looking to acquire such capabilities,

tic missiles (SRBM). It also re-introduced into service an

may draw conclusions that support the development of

SRBM it had withdrawn, again to bolster its inventory.

more capable land-attack cruise missiles, with greater

Managing emerging demands and technology devel-

numbers to be held in inventories. Moscow’s use of theopments in the long-range precision land-attack realm

Iranian Shahed-136 (Geran-2) direct attack munition,

was a demanding enough task prior to Russia’s full-

furthermore, will almost certainly encourage others

blown invasion of Ukraine. It is a task now made dou-

to seek similar weapons, either as an entry-point for a

bly more difficult by Moscow’s naked aggression.

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ballistic and Cruise Trajectories 3

Introduction
Russia’s use of ballistic and cruise missiles as well as

trends in the development and acquisition of precision-

direct-attack munitions in its full-scale invasion of

strike munitions, which have proved detrimental to

Ukraine has not just shed light on the effectiveness andthe already-eroded global framework for controlling

limitations of those systems. It also has highlighted thethe spread of certain types of missile technology. The

tactics Moscow chooses to employ, and the relation-

conflict has demonstrated the military utility of certain

ships it is willing to utilise to maintain a steady influx

types of missiles and direct-attack munitions, some ofof equipment.

which may become cheaper to produce as designers

Some lessons from the war are already apparent.

rapidly innovate using battlefield lessons. Against the

While Russia has not prosecuted many key Ukrainian

backdrop of growing geopolitical tensions and somemilitary targets sufficiently to achieve its desired objec-

state and non-state actors’ demand for such systems,

tives, from a technical perspective, short-range ballistic

greater licit and illicit procurement and domestic pro-

missiles (SRBMs) have performed relatively successfully

duction of these weapons is likely.

against land targets and ground-based air defences.

This paper considers the types of ballistic and cruise

Subsonic land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) have had

missiles Russia and Ukraine have used in the con-a patchier record. The use of ageing anti-ship missile

flict, the tactics they have employed and why these

designs in the land-attack role has also highlighted theirhave, and have not, been successful. It also considers

lack of accuracy.

the lessons that Russia is drawing from its experience

As Ukraine’s Western-supplied ground-based airin Ukraine for its future missile force development, as

defence has become increasingly capable, Russia has

well as the future proliferation trends of certain types

turned to the large-scale use of low-cost direct-attackof systems. The paper is divided into five sections. The

munitions to overwhelm those defences and improvefirst describes the evolution of Moscow’s thinking on

the survivability of more costly systems. However,precision-strike systems and the role of such systems as

the mixed record of subsonic LACMs may mean that

described in Russian military doctrine. The second andRussia will further invest in the development of high-third sections discuss Russia’s (and to a more limited

supersonic or Mach 5-plus LACMs into its inventory

extent, Ukraine’s) employment of cruise and ground-alongside slower and cheaper cruise missiles and direct-

launched ballistic missiles in its war on Ukraine andattack munitions.

Western equipment transfers. Lastly, we conclude with

The ramifications of Russia’s use of ballistic andan assessment of the implications of the use of thesecruise missiles in Ukraine extend beyond the cur-missiles in Ukraine on procurement trends and non-rent conflict. Russia’s war has reinforced pre-existing

proliferation policy.

4 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

1. History and Doctrine of Russian Use ofPrecision-Strikes
Russia’s interest in long-range precision-strike systems
is rooted in the Soviet Union’s ‘revolution in military

Russian President Vladimir Putin chairs a Security Council
meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow on 26 December 2014, where
he signed into law the country’s new military doctrine

affairs’ thinking of the 1970s and 1980s, when Moscow
started considering a conventional war option after
a period of sole reliance on nuclear deterrence.1 Early
Soviet writings on long-range precision-strike focusedon the concept of a ‘reconnaissance-strike complex’(razvedyvatel’no-udarnnyy kompleks), combining the useof precision munitions, wide-area surveillance andautomated command and control (C2).2 Strategists postulated that the potential destructive power of precise
conventional weapons could make them as useful as
nuclear weapons to destroy certain key targets.3(Alexei Druzhinin/RIA Novosti/AFP via Getty Images)

The United States’ development of precision weapons
and their successful employment in Operations Desert

short war with Georgia at that time.7 Conventional

Storm in 1990-1991 and the Kosovo War in 1999 pro-precision-strike subsequently became embedded invided further impetus for Moscow to introduce analo-

Russian doctrine. The term ‘non-nuclear deterrence’gous capabilities.4 Moscow pursued the development of(pred’iadernoe sderzhivaniya) first appeared in Russia’s

what Russia calls ‘high-precision weapons’ (vysokotoch-2014 Military Doctrine.8 It assigned ‘high-precisionnoye oruzhiye) throughout the tumultuous 1990s and into

weapons’ a similar role to nuclear weapons in threaten-

the 2000s. Russia’s struggling economy caused delays

ing to inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary toin development and production that drove the intro-

deter them or drive them to de-escalate from conflict on

duction of stopgap designs such as the air-launchedterms favourable to Moscow.

Kh-555 (RS-AS-22 Kluge) cruise missile until more

Russia devised its strategy recognizing it lacked

advanced designs, such as the stealthier air-launchedsufficient conventional precision-strike capabilities

Raduga Kh-101 (RS-AS-23a Kodiak) land-attack cruise

to credibly threaten NATO’s analogous capabili-

missile entered production.5 Russia has also introduced

ties. Russian strategists, therefore, advocated that in

into service a new short-range ballistic missile (SRBM),

a conflict, their armed forces should limit strikes onan air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) and multiple

vital NATO military targets to demonstrate resolve

types of air-, ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles

and generate symbolic or political impact.9 If limited(ALCM, GLCM and SLCM, respectively).6 Technologicalstrikes were unsuccessful, targeting could be scaled

advances in guidance and precision systems were cru-

up to inflict varying levels of damage on an opponent

cial to building a viable conventional strike capability.

to terminate a conflict on terms favourable to Russia.10

In the 2000s, Russia’s military thinking on the roleIn such a scenario, Russian military thinking calls forof high-precision weapons to reinforce its strategic

destroying critically important economic, political anddeterrent continued in parallel with research and devel-

military infrastructure with conventional and possi-

opment efforts. As a result, the development of these

bly nuclear weapons. Russia’s 2020 nuclear doctrine

systems was incorporated into Moscow’s 2008 ‘New

outlines scenarios in which Russia could use nuclear

Look’ military reforms, a sweeping effort to revitalize

weapons, with an emphasis on when the ‘existence of

the armed forces after the poor performance in Russia’s

the state’ is threatened, but it is left deliberately vague

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ballistic and Cruise Trajectories 5

as to what such a threat may look like.11 While someand nuclear weapons means that Moscow views theanalysts have argued that a growing role of conven-distinction between nuclear and conventional weap-

tional precision-strike in Russia’s military operations

ons as insignificant, and that Russia could there-

makes nuclear weapons use by Moscow less likely,

fore use nuclear weapons early in a conflict withothers say that Russia’s integration of conventional

minimal consequences. 12

6 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

2. Cruise Missile Use in the
Russo-Ukrainian War
Land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) are now a ubiquitous element of modern warfare, and Russia’s war of

The Storm Shadow/SCALP EG LACM is almost certainly thelongest-range weapon that Western states have so far provided
to Ukraine

aggression against Ukraine is proving to be no different.
Russia has employed LACMs launched by air, maritime, and land forces in attacks on Ukraine.13 What isless certain is the efficacy of these cruise missile attacks
in the face of credible, if thinly spread, ground-based
air defences. The effectiveness of Russia’s LACMs use
also may have suffered from poor mission planningand execution, limited inventory depth and a lackof variety of tactical systems to employ. Russian targets have included fixed Ukrainian military installations and critical national infrastructure but given the(Ben Stansall/AFP via Getty Images)

Western Transfer of Stand-off Weapons
A decade ago, the notion of integrating a European-designed land-attack cruise missile (LACM) on a Soviet-era
combat aircraft would have seemed outlandish, even more so the notion that it be used to attack Russian forces.
The United Kingdom embarked on such a task, likely toward the end of 2022, looking to integrate the MBDA
Storm Shadow LACM on the Sukhoi Su-24M Fencer D ground-attack aircraft. In May 2023, the UK government said it
had ‘donated’ Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine to support Kyiv’s effort to defend itself against Moscow’s full-scaleinvasion. The provision of the Storm Shadow is almost certainly the longest-range weapon so far provided to Kyiv.
The Su-24M’s combat radius, combined with the range of the Storm Shadow, provides the Ukrainian Air Force with anotional strike range of more than 800 kilometres.
The UK has been one of the most forward-leaning Western countries providing weaponry to Ukraine, with thetransfer of LACMs arguably the most notable example. Some other nations have been more hesitant to provide longerrange weaponry over concerns that this might be ‘escalatory’. Germany, for instance, has struggled to decide whether
to provide the MBDA Taurus KEPD 350, a weapon similar to the Storm Shadow, albeit with a longer range and more
powerful warhead. France has followed the UK and provided Ukraine with its version of Storm Shadow, the SCALP EG.
In announcing the ‘donation’ on 11 May 2023, the then-secretary of state for defence Ben Wallace said the weapon
would allow Ukraine to attack Russian forces ‘within Ukrainian sovereign territory’. Ukraine has used domesticallydeveloped uninhabited aerial vehicles to strike targets inside Russia but has only fired the Storm Shadow against
targets within occupied Ukrainian territory. This constraint was likely one of the provisions of the transfer.
Integration of the Storm Shadow with the Su-24M posed several challenges. Those included developing a physicalinterface with a Soviet-era weapon pylon and finding a way to get a comparatively modern European air-launchedcruise missile to interface with Soviet-era avionics.
The missile has extended Ukraine’s ability to target Russian command and control and logistics sites. Moscow had
relocated some of those further from the front line after the United States provided Kyiv with High Mobility Artillery
Rocket Systems (HIMARS), which can launch precision strike rockets to ranges up to 80 km. Storm Shadow offers
far greater range and has allowed Ukraine to target critical infrastructure, such as bridges connecting the Crimean
Peninsula to Kherson. The missile’s range also improves the survivability of the Su-24M, allowing weapon releaseoutside of Russian medium- and long-range air-to-air and surface-to-air missile engagement zones.
The Storm Shadow experience in Ukraine reinforces the military utility of conventionally armed air launched LACMs.
Countries looking to draw lessons from the war will likely consider whether, if they presently lack a weapon in thisclass, they need to field the capability either through domestic development or acquisition from a foreign supplier.

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ballistic and Cruise Trajectories 7

The Kh-101 is integrated on the Tupolev Tu-160 Blackjack (pictured) and the Tu-95MS Bear bomber aircraft(Wojtek Laski via Getty Images)

numerous instances of cruise missiles striking residen-

initial wave of strikes in the first few weeks of the war.

tial dwellings across Ukraine, it is far from clear what

Ukraine has been able to engage at least some Kh-101s,

the intended targets sometimes were.14

even though the missile features low-observable design

Transparency of the war is limited, with the bellig-

characteristics and onboard defensive aids.

erents issuing over-stated claims about the successes of

Moscow could draw multiple lessons from this ele-

their offensive or defensive capabilities. What is appar-

ment of its air campaign. Those include that Russia

ent is that neither has secured air supremacy or evenhad an insufficient inventory of LACMs at the outset

air superiority for any length of time. Kyiv’s claims ofof the war, not prosecuting key targets sufficiently andsuccessful LACM intercepts are near certain exaggerat-

repeatedly in deviation from Russian military think-ed.15 If this is not the case, it would likely be the first war

ing, that subsonic LACMs face increasing challenges

involving the air domain where such figures were notfrom ground-based air defence, and that this class of

inflated. But Ukraine’s ground-based air defence is veri-

missiles benefits from being supplemented by high-fiably shooting down some number of the air-launchedvolume lower-cost weapons with a complementary

Raduga Kh-101 (RS-AS-23a Kodiak) and naval Novator

range performance of the very long-range cruise mis-

3M14 (RS-SS-N-30a Sagaris) cruise missiles.16

siles to divert missile defences.

The roughly 18 months of fighting have raised mul-

Development of the conventionally armed Kh-101

tiple questions about the use of LACMs. One is how

and its nuclear variant, the Kh-102 (RS-AS-23b Kodiak)many Russian systems are falling to Ukrainian air

began toward the end of the 1980s.18 The Kh-102 wasdefence rather than failing to reach their targets because

developed to replace the Raduga Kh-55 (RS-AS-15 Kent).

of technical malfunctions.17 Another is how Moscow is

The conventional variant may have entered production

responding, both in the short- and medium-term, to rec-around 2010.19 First used operationally in Syria in 2015,

tify these issues. More broadly still, what, if any, are thethe Kh-101 appeared to perform relatively well.20 This,wider implications of Russia’s experience in Ukraine for

however, was in a permissive air environment, where

its cruise missile development plans.

there was no credible ground-based air defence. Russia

Speed and Mass

also encountered reliability issues in the early stages of
the Syria operation.21

Since the outset of the war, Russia’s Aerospace Forces

Despite Moscow displaying the capability to conduct

has principally deployed the Kh-101 land-attack weapon

precision-strikes on a limited scale, Russia’s LACM per-from Tupolev Tu-95MS Bear mod and Tu-160 Blackjack

formance in Syria may have been patchier than initiallymod bomber aircraft. Recently, LACMs use has becomethought. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoygu noted

sporadic, with the number of missiles employed inthat during the Syrian operation the Kh-101 targetingany one attack often fewer than numbers seen in thecycle was too time-consuming. He also said there were

8 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Russian officials visit the Raduga missile manufacturer outside
Moscow in February 2023. Raduga produces several LACM
systems, including the Kh-101

Similarly, Russia has also used its K-300P Bastion(RS-SSC-5 Stooge) coastal-defence cruise missile on occasion in a secondary land-attack mode. Its accuracy, orotherwise, in this role has yet to become clear, but it too
has been reportedly difficult to engage successfully.29
The Kh-22/Kh-32 and the K-300P are all medium tohigh supersonic missiles, while some also fly low flight
profiles. The high speed partly suggests why these weapons have been more difficult for Ukrainian air defences
to engage than the subsonic Kh-101 or 3M14. Russia
also on occasion has used another high-speed weapon,
the 9-S-7760 Kinzhal (RS-AS-24a Killjoy), an air-launched(Yekaterina Shtukina/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images)

version of the 9M723 (RS-SS-26 Stone) surface-to-surface
short-range ballistic missile. Kyiv, perhaps curiously, hasother problems, without elaborating, except to indicatethat those had been resolved.22

claimed more success in engaging successfully Kinzhal.30
Recent Russian military writing highlights interest

Moscow’s intervention in Syria also saw the firstin achieving yet greater missile speed, as illustrated byoperational use of the Raduga Kh-555 (RS-AS-22

a March 2023 essay in the Defence Ministry’s in-house

Kluge).23 This missile uses the Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B)

purportedly academic journal Military Thought.31 The

airframe with a conventional rather than nuclear war-

paper, ‘The Use of the Aerospace Forces Strike Aviation

head and features a modified guidance system to pro-in Future Military Conflicts’, notionally considers

vide greater accuracy than the nuclear variant. The use

Moscow’s future air-warfare needs, but also looks toof the heavier conventional warhead also drove some

identify shortcomings and draw lessons from the air

airframe changes. The Kh-555 was an interim capabil-

campaign in Ukraine. The authors urge Moscow to

ity developed as a stopgap until the Kh-101 was avail-

expedite the acquisition of Mach 5-plus cruise missiles.

able. Despite repeated reports that the VVS has used

Russia’s air-launched weapons manufacturers have at

this missile in Ukraine, no imagery has yet emerged

least two publicly known high-speed cruise missiles into support this claim.24 It is possible that Russia only

development. The Tactical Missile Corporation (KTRV)

converted a limited number of Kh-55s and expended

is working on a project associated with the names

most during operations in Syria.25 Russia has also

Gremlin and Lichinka, the generic designator Kh-MT andmodified a limited number of Kh-55SM missiles by

Kh-41.32 KTRV’s Zvezda-Strela is likely working on theremoving the nuclear warhead and replacing this with

Kh-41, while the Raduga branch is linked to the Ostrota

ballast, with the likely intention to use these as decoys

project. The latter may deliver a ramjet-powered cruise

to divert Ukrainian air defences.26

missile for delivery by Russian Tu-22M3 Backfire andRussia has supplemented its more modern LACMs

Su-34 Fullback aircraft.33 Raduga is also working on thewith the Raduga Kh-22 (RS-AS-4 Kitchen) and a lim-

Kh-69, a shorter-range air-launched LACM likely akinited number of the Raduga Kh-32 (RS-AS-4 mod 4), an

to the European Storm Shadow or Taurus KEPD 350K

upgraded version of the Kh-22.27 Originally an anti-ship

missiles.34 The Kh-69 is undergoing flight testing.35

weapon, the Kh-22MA variant was designed for land

One potential effect of the war in Ukraine is to reinforce

attack. It is unclear which version, or versions, of theRussia’s goal of introducing Mach 5-plus LACMs into

Kh-22 Russia has used in Ukraine. It also has employed,

its inventory to improve weapon survivability against

though in smaller numbers, the Kh-32. They all appear

increasingly capable air defence. Whether this will result

to lack the accuracy required for precision land attack.

in a reduced emphasis within its inventory on subsonic

Despite its age, press reports suggest Ukrainian ground-

LACMs over time remains unknown. But given the costbased air defence has struggled to down the Kh-22.28

of developing and producing high-speed weapons, these

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ballistic and Cruise Trajectories 9

will likely continue to be supplemented by subsonic systems, at least in certain roles and target sets.

Remains of an Iranian-designed Shahed-136 UAV exhibited in
Ukraine. Russia procured Iranian UAVs in the second or third
quarter of 2022

Russia appears to be addressing some of its missile
survivability and inventory depth issues also at thelower end of the technology spectrum by introducing
more direct attack munitions – sometimes called oneway uninhabited aerial vehicles – into service. Moscow
acquired the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 from Iran in
the second or third quarter of 2022.36 These have beenused not only to engage targets but also to try to deplete
Ukraine’s inventory of ground-based air-defence interceptors. The Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 are known in
Russian service as the Geran-1 and Geran-2 respectively.
Russia is reportedly working toward manufacturing theGeran domestically.37

10 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(Oleksii Samsonov /Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)

3. Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile Use in
the Russo–Ukrainian War
Russia has used various types of ballistic missiles

vehicles, hardened structures), including cluster muni-

throughout its war against Ukraine. However, thetions, unitary high explosive and nuclear payloads.

Russian Ground Forces’ only sporadic use of this capa-

Most analysts estimate the missile has a range nearbility at the war’s outset was surprisingly unaligned

the upper end of its roughly 350–600 km capability.40

with Russian military thought and was therefore una-

The 9M723 missile travels along an aero-ballistic tra-ble to achieve the desired effect. While Russia’s Groundjectory below an altitude of 50 km and at speeds of up

Forces increased the pace of short-range ballistic mis-to Mach 7.41 The missile can perform in-flight horizon-

sile launches once it became clear that the initial efforts

tal and vertical manoeuvres, providing it with somewere inadequate, that did not compensate for the earlier

capability to evade ballistic missile defences. It is also

underperformance.38 What drove Russia’s inability toequipped with up to six penetration aids to spoof mis-

attack key Ukrainian targets sufficiently and frequently

sile defences.42 The Iskander’s 9P78-1 transporter erec-

enough at the outset of the conflict were weaknesses in

tor launcher (TEL) is capable of carrying two 9M723

Russia’s kill chain (especially of its intelligence, surveil-

missiles that can be launched within one minute oflance and reconnaissance [ISR] capabilities), its slow andeach other.

formulaic targeting cycle, its limited reload capacity as

Iskander was designed to fill a capability gap that waswell as Ukrainian active and passive countermeasures.

created after the Soviet Union eliminated the 9K714 Oka

While this might suggest to some observers that

(RS-SS-23 Spider) SRBM under the 1987 Intermediate-conventionally armed ballistic missiles have limited

Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Some Soviet andmilitary utility in modern warfare, Russia’s use oflater Russian officials viewed the elimination of the Oka

short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) should instead

missile as a ‘betrayal’ by then Soviet premier Mikhail

provide states with a lesson on how not to use thisGorbachev and welcomed the design work on Iskander.43

capability. Ballistic missiles have been effectively used

With Oka’s unexpected early retirement removal fromat scale by other countries in the post-Cold War era

the Soviet arsenal, Iskander instead became a replace-– most notably the United States’ use of the MGM-ment for the Soviet-designed 9K79 Tochka-U (RS-SS-21

140/168 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) in

Scarab B) SRBM which began service with the Soviet

2003 – to achieve tactical effects. Military planners try-

Ground Forces in 1989.

ing to draw lessons from Russia’s ballistic missile use

The Iskander appears to have reached initial opera-

in the Ukraine conflict have to recognize the wrong as

tional capability by 2008 when it was used in very

well as right lessons to better use and defend against

small numbers by Russian Ground Forces during

this capability in the future.

the Russian–Georgian War.44 The missile appears

Russia’s Use of Ground-Launched
Ballistic Missiles in Ukraine

to have reached full operational capability in 2011
when – according to the Russian Ministry of Defence– the 26th Missile Brigade in Luga, in the Leningrad

The principal SRBM used by Russia’s Ground Forces

Military District, became the first brigade of the Russianis the 9K720 Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone) weapons com-

Army to receive its full complement of 12 launchers.45

plex. The missile, known by its GRAU index as 9M723,

Modernising Russia’s tactical missile forces was an

is a single-stage, solid-fuel, road-mobile ballistic missile

essential part of Russia’s 2011–2020 State Armamentsthat can carry a 480–700 kilogram warhead.39 An 9M723

Programme, the intention of which was to implement

can be equipped with a variety of different warhead‘modernisation’ across all branches of Russia’s armed

types depending on the target type (e.g., soft-skinned

services.46 By 2017, the Russian Ground Forces’ then ten

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ballistic and Cruise Trajectories 11

Russia’s 9K720 Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone) short-range
ballistic missile

deployed in Belarus.52 At the outset of the war, 9M723
missiles were used to strike high-value Ukrainian targets from Belarus and Russia.53 Russia’s military doctrine calls for intensive use of precision fires against
high-value military, political and economic targets
within a short timeframe. However, data collected from
Ukrainian and US defence sources suggest the actual
employment strayed from that philosophy. Ukraine’s
National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), forinstance, states that 124 9M723 missiles were used in aroughly five-month period between 24 February and 21
July 2022.54 Although such data should be treated cautiously, the number of accumulated missile launches
recorded by the NSDC broadly aligns with figures provided by the US Department of Defense, suggestingsome credibility.55
The apparent limited use of the 7M23 missile suggests that, as with Russia’s use of land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), Moscow did not attack key Ukrainiantargets with the intensity its own doctrine called forin the opening stages of the conflict. US intelligenceassesses that Russia probably planned for a quick mili-(Sefa Karacan/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

tary victory.56 This deficiency becomes apparent whencomparing data of US SRBM launches during Operation

tactical missile brigades appeared to have replaced their

Iraqi Freedom in 2003 against Russian missile launches

Tochka missiles with the Iskander SRBM.47 The Russianin 2022. On the first day of US operations in Iraq, for

Ground Forces activated three more Iskander brigades

example, a single US Army unit launched 102 ATACMS

between 2017 and 2020.48 The IISS estimates that Russia

SRBMs against Iraqi targets, including corps and divi-

possesses roughly 150 Iskander launchers organised

sion command and control posts, air defences, artillery

into 13 brigades, with a planned strength of 12 9K720

and ground forces.57 US fire plans were typically organ-

Iskander-M launchers per brigade.49

ised with salvos of at least 20 missiles for each target. As

Russia used the Iskander complex for a second time ina result of these launches, the opposing Iraqi divisiona conflict in its intervention in Syria, with an apparently

had ‘ceased to exist as a coherent fighting force’ withinsmall number of launchers deployed to Hmeimim air-a single day.58 Comparatively, towards the beginning ofbase in Latakia in March 2016.50 Details on the purpose

Russia’s invasion, footage on social media shows thatand use of Iskander in Syria is limited, although Russia

Iskander SRBMs were typically launched in salvos of 3–4

officials claim that they were ‘effective’.51 As with themissiles for each fire plan, for an estimated total of 124

Russian Aerospace Forces and Russian Navy’s use of

SRBM launches in a five-month period.59 Within one-land-attack cruise missiles against Syrian opposition

tenth of the time period, the US Army launched moretargets, Russia’s intervention in Syria likely provided

than three times the number of SRBMs.60

the Ground Forces with useful operational experience
using Iskander in battlefield conditions.

Russia’s relatively limited use of ballistic missiles,
coupled with a seemingly restrained use of otherIn preparation for its 2022 invasion of Ukraine,

precision-guided missiles – especially LACMs – left

Russia appears to have deployed at least three bri-key Ukrainian command and control nodes, assembly

gades to support its operations. At least one unit waspoints, storage and equipment sites largely unscathed

12 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

in the early phases of the conflict. Satellite imagery

given that figures released by the Ukrainian Ministry ofanalysis of the Mirgorod airbase in Poltava oblast, forDefence are sometimes inconsistent and contradictory.

instance, shows that although Russia targeted the air-Given the lack of evidence for subsequent Russian tar-field within the first month of the war, the amount ofgeting of some important Ukrainian military facilities, it

destruction was limited to four craters along the run-is likely that large numbers of these missiles were used

way and main apron and three destroyed unhardened

to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure and smaller

aircraft shelters. Multiple other shelters, revetments

military formations and equipment.

and maintenance areas were apparently not successfully targeted, and several craters near the taxiway

Russia’s Utilisation of Old Systems

indicate misses. The limited amount of damage andAs well as the 9M723 ground-launched ballistic mis-apparent lack of subsequent successful targeting by

sile, the Russian Aerospace Forces have also employed

Russian precision-strike capabilities has meant thaton a few occasions the 9-S-7760 Kinzhal (RS-AS-24a

the runway was subsequently repaired, allowing

Killjoy) air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). Kinzhal

Ukrainian Air Force’s Su-24 Fencer and Su-27 Flanker

is an air-launched version of the 9M723. Launching

to continue operating from the airfield judging by thethe missile from a MiG-31K Foxhound D aircraft at

frequent repositioning and relocating of aircraft inhigh altitude increases the missile’s range which issubsequent months.61 Similarly, satellite imagery anal-

assessed to be in excess of 2,000 km.64 Like the 9M723,

ysis shows that Vasylkiv Air Base in Kyiv Oblast was

Kinzhal can manoeuvre to evade missile defencestargeted in the opening phases of the war, although

and can be equipped with a nuclear or conventional

the limited amount of damage has meant that thewarhead.65 Russia is estimated to have only a limited

Ukrainian Air Force was able to initially disperse air-stockpile of Kinzhals following its entry into service

craft and then subsequently resumed operations fromin 2019, though the exact number is unknown. The

it. Other important military sites, such as command

Aerospace Forces possesses an estimated 24 MiG-31K

and control nodes, were also not attacked by Russia ataircraft launch platforms. Russia first used Kinzhal

the war’s outset. Satellite imagery analysis of Ukraine’s

on 18 March 2022 against a Ukrainian underground

Ministry of Defence building, for instance, shows that

ammunition storage facility in Delyatin, Ivano-it was apparently targeted in the first week of the war,Frankivsk Oblast.66 While ALBMs present air defenceswith at least one missile landing in the building’s

with speed and trajectory challenges, Ukrainian

interior courtyard. However, the lack of follow-up

forces have claimed to have intercepted Kinzhal-typetargeting is apparent, given the lack of damage to themissiles on several occasions using the US-designed

building or the surrounding area. By comparison, theMIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile.67

US aggressively and repeatedly targeted Iraqi command and control nodes from the beginning of its 2003
invasion.62 Even if Russia did follow up with strikes

Russia has employed the 9-S-7760 Kinzhal (RS-AS-24a Killjoy)
ALBM, seen here on a MiG-31K Foxhound D aircraft, in Ukraine on
several occasions

on subsequent dates, it is likely by then that Ukrainian
personnel would have since dispersed to moresecure locations.
Russia appears to have increased its usage of 7M23
missiles once it became clear to Moscow that its invasion would not be a quick success. Data from the
Ukrainian Ministry of Defence states that Russia hadlaunched a total of 829 7M23 missiles by 18 November
2022, a three-fold increase in the average rate of missile launches per month from the February–April period.63 This data should be treated cautiously, however,(Sefa Karacan/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ballistic and Cruise Trajectories 13

As well as using its more modern types of ballis-

the US-designed ATACMS. Discussions between Kyiv

tic missiles, Russia has also used older systems that it

and Washington on the transfer of ballistic missiles are

had retired within the last two decades as part of theongoing, although the Biden administration has repeat-

armed forces modernisation directive. For instance, theedly rejected Ukrainian requests and voiced concerns

Tochka-U was nominally retired by 2017, yet the Russianthat transferring SRBMs will escalate the war.72

Ground Forces have taken some systems out of storage

Although Washington may eventually change its

for use in Ukraine. Social media footage shows what aremind and supply Kyiv with this weapons type – as it

unmistakably several Tochka 9P129 TELs marked with ‘V’

has with several other types of equipment it had earlier

identification emblems – a symbol Russian forces havesignalled were off limits – the US continues to supply

displayed during the Ukraine war – arriving by rail into

Ukraine with a large number of other precision-guided

Melitopol on flatbeds in July 2022.68 Other ‘V’-marked

munitions that partially fill this capability gap, such

Tochka 9P129 TELs have been recorded on railway flat-as 227mm M30 rocket (more commonly known as thebeds in Belarus and filmed in Luhansk.69 Because of the

Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System or GLMRS). US

weapon’s guidance limitations, there is a risk that thedefence planners are likely to have already determined

missile may miss its intended target. One strike against

the utility of ATACMS to Ukraine and how many might

an unknown target in Kramatorsk in August 2022

be able to transfer. More uncertain, however, is whether

using two Tochka-U SRBMs, for instance, killed over 30

this could cause Russia to seek an external supplier for

Ukrainian civilians at the city’s train station.70 Despite

its own diminished ballistic and cruise missile stockpile.

Russia’s Ministry of Defence rejecting that it carried out
the strike, evidence of two SRBM launches taking place

Ukrainian SRBM Capabilities

from the Russian-occupied town of Shakhtars’k at the

The only SRBM currently available in the US’s inven-time of the attack suggests that it, or Russian-backed

tory is the ATACMS. The M57 variant of the missile isseparatists, are very likely responsible.71

a single-stage, solid-fuel SRBM that has a maximum

Despite the retirement of Tochka from the Russianrange of 300 km and is equipped with a 227 kg war-

Ground Forces system, it is likely that Russia still retains

head.73 The M57 can be equipped with a unitary or clus-

a large number of those missiles and launchers that are

ter warhead, depending on the target type.

awaiting dismantlement. There are multiple overlap-

Ukraine first requested ATACMS from the US aroundping reasons why Russia would choose to use the older

May 2022.74 Other NATO members possessing the mis-

Tochka, including reducing pressure on the available

sile besides the US are Greece, Romania and Turkey.75

remaining inventory depth of more modern systems

Considering that a third-party transfer would require

such as the 9M723, the availability of large numbers ofWashington’s approval under the US’s Arms Export

Tochka missiles and launchers, the higher than expected

Control Act, it is very unlikely that any of these coun-

number of Ukrainian targets beyond what capabilities

tries will supply Ukraine with ATACMS.76

are available to Russia’s Ground Forces, attempting

Kyiv has been eager to acquire ATACMS to augment

to offset the effectiveness of Ukrainian air and missile

the Ukrainian armed forces’ limited (although growing)

defences and, at a more basic level, using these weapons

capability to conduct precision strikes against targets

negates the need for dismantling them.

inside Russian-occupied territory and to make up for its

Ukraine’s Use of Ballistic Missiles

diminished capability to launch surface-to-surface ballistic missiles due to inventory shortages. Before Russia’s

While Russia has used SRBMs throughout the con-2022 invasion, Ukraine was assessed to possess around

flict, Ukraine’s use of this type of weaponry has been

90 9K79 Tochka-U (RS-SS-21 Scarab B) launchers organ-

more limited, likely reflecting the dearth of launch-ised into one missile brigade.77 The Tochka-U is a Soviet-

ers and missiles available to the Ukrainian armed

designed single-stage, solid-fuel, road-mobile SRBM

forces. To compensate for the shortage, Ukraine hasthat has a maximum range of 120 km and is equipped

requested SRBMs from its Western supporters, notably

with a 480 kg conventional warhead.78 The missile has

14 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

An ATACMS missile being launched from the White Sands Missile
Range, New Mexico, 1990. Kyiv has been eager to acquire
ATACMS

Western Hesitancy Regarding
SRBM Deliveries to Ukraine
Western states have provided Ukraine with certain
types of long-range guided weaponry, most notably
LACMs, but have been reluctant to provide Kyiv with a
SRBM. Washington has said transferring these systems
to Kyiv might escalate the conflict, fearing a transfer
would cross a red line for Moscow. The US also may bereluctant to diminish its own ATACMS inventory. The
US Army is developing a follow-on weapon to replace
ATACMS, the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), but it will

(Corbis via Getty Images)

not be fielded until 2024.
US President Joe Biden has said that because SRBMs

an estimated circular error probable (CEP) of roughly

could be used to strike targets inside Russia, their trans-

95 metres.79 Although Ukraine has successfully used its

fer might escalate the war.85 However, as ATACMS has

Tochka SRBMs against large Russian targets, including

a shorter range and a smaller payload than other stand-sinking the Tapir-class (Alligator) landing ship Saratov

off weapons that some NATO members have donatedwhile it was docked in Berdyansk port in March 2022,

to Ukraine, such as the British-French Storm Shadow/

the weapon’s CEP means that it lacks the same level of

SCALP EG LACM, it is unclear why ATACMS’s smalleraccuracy of more modern SRBMs to strike small targets

range and payload are an impediment to US decision-

with a high level of certainty.80 The Tochka’s 120 km-

making and why Russia would view this transfer withrange also means that important Russian aerospace andgreater hostility. While Moscow expressed its displeas-

naval sites in occupied Crimea are beyond the range ofure at London’s and Paris’s transfer of LACMs to Kyiv,

Ukrainian ballistic missiles (although Ukraine has used

it did not take any substantive action in response.86

British/French supplied LACMs to successfully target

US officials are apparently worried an ATACMS

these sites).81 Compared with the Tochka-U, ATACMS

transfer could spur Russia to intensify strikes against

is able to strike targets twice as distant and roughly

Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure, pursue

nine times as accurately. It is also likely that Ukraine

decapitation strikes against Ukraine’s leadership andhas diminished its stockpile of Tochka missiles, withpotentially target NATO logistics nodes from which

limited options for replenishment as the missile’s origi-

Western equipment is being delivered.87 Whether

nal design bureau, KB Mashinostroyeniya, is based in

Russia has the capability to organise such attacks, how-

Russia. Ukraine may, however, have some indigenous

ever, is doubtful considering its own limitations andcapacity to produce new missiles.

Ukraine’s growing air and missile defence capabili-

To improve its self-sufficiency in ballistic missile pro-ties. For instance, Russia’s earlier attacks were unableduction, Ukraine’s KB Pivdenne design bureau began

to destroy Ukraine’s energy network.88 Moreover, as

developing an indigenous SRBM known as Grom-2

some of Russia’s intelligence, surveillance and recon-in 2013. The missile has been described as analogous

naissance (ISR) capabilities appear to be insufficientto Russia’s 9K720 SRBM and was similarly planned

for near real-time targeting, it is unlikely that Moscow

to eventually replace Ukraine’s Tochka arsenal.82

could reliably use its limited technical means to track

Development work on the missile was purportedly

and target Ukraine’s leadership or supply convoys withhalted for several years in the 2010s, but was recently

the necessary level of accuracy needed for these types

restarted.83 The Russian Ministry of Defence claims toof strikes.

have intercepted Grom-2 missiles on several occasions

Washington’s hesitancy may actually stem fromin 2023 however, it has not provided any evidence andconcerns Russia could seek similar transfers from its

it appears that the missile had not entered service.84

own providers, especially Iran. Tehran has supplied

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ballistic and Cruise Trajectories 15

Moscow with large numbers of uninhabited aerial vehicles since Russia’s invasion and reportedlyplanned to supply Russia with Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar
SRBMs, which Iran can produce in large quantities.89
International pressure on Iran, however, apparently prevented Tehran from following through on
this proposal.90 While Tehran is currently restrictedfrom exporting ballistic and cruise missiles under
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, thisembargo will expire in October 2023, potentially providing Iran with an opportunity to supply Russia with

Table 1: Western equipment delivery of 270mm MLRS variants
to Ukraine
Country

Equipment

Number ofplatforms
pledged

Status ofdeliveryFrance

M270A1 MLRS

2

Completed

Germany

M270A1 MLRS (MARS II)

5Completed

Italy

M270A1 MLRS

2

Completed

UnitedKingdom

M270B1 MLRS

14

Ongoing

United States

M142 HIMARS

38

Completed

HIMARS High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System; MARS Mittleres Artillerieraketensystem (Medium Rocket Artillery System); MLRS Multiple LaunchRocket System.
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2023

these systems without fear of international sanctions.91
Russia has already had to lean on outside suppliersalso pledged to send Ukraine at least 23 M270 Multipleof military equipment to make up for its own short-

Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) of different designs

falls and to circumvent export controls that have made(see Table 1).98 The M270 is a tracked vehicle that can beproducing some military equipment difficult, given

equipped with two pods or 12 rockets.

the heavy reliance in some Russian weapons systems

While the M30 is typically described as a ‘rocket’o Western electronics and components.92 Russia may

rather than a ‘missile’, the system’s range, warheadalso seek other suppliers to shore up its own dimin-

and accuracy blurs the distinction between the two

ishing capabilities. During North Korean leader Kim

types of equipment. Although there is by no means a

Jong-un’s visit to Russia in September 2023, media

consensus among analysts of this difference, rockets

reported that arms sales were a topic of discussion.93

are typically understood as being unguided projec-

Like Iran, North Korea possesses a large number oftiles, while missiles have some capability to be con-

SRBMs and an established defence-industrial base fortrolled during their flightpath. The M30 is equipped

their production.94

with an inertial measurement unit and GPS guidance,

Beyond any action-reaction dynamics, other possible

providing it with an estimated CEP of less than 10 m.

reasons for Washinton’s reluctance to supply Kyiv with

The system’s 70 km-range also places it into the lower

ATACMs include the possibility that the US stockpile

threshold of close-range ballistic missiles, classed as

may be insufficient to provide Ukraine with a number

having a 60–300 km-range.99 An extended-range vari-without diminishing US readiness.95 US officials have

ant is under development with the ambition to double

refused to disclose how many ATACMS the US Army

its range to 150 km.100

possesses, but the US Department of Defense has budgeted for 2,121 missiles to be updated between 2017 and2024 with a new warhead, electronics and propulsion

The M142 HIMARS (pictured) has allowed Ukraine tosuccessfully target Russian command and control nodes, troop
concentrations, and individual pieces of equipment

unit, suggesting a possible stockpile number.96

Western Rocket Deliveries
Despite Washington’s hesitancy to supply Ukraine with
ATACMS, the US and other NATO members recognise
the important role of stand-off weaponry in the conflict. The US has supplied Ukraine with 38 M142 High
Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) as wellas an unknown number of precision-guided rockets.97
HIMARS is a wheeled launcher that can carry a pod
containing six M30 rockets. Other NATO members have

16 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(Serhii Mykhalchuk/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)

The transfer of MLRS’s has allowed Ukraine to suc-

ISR capabilities of its armed forces and the contested air

cessfully target Russian command and control nodes,

environment that restricts Russian aircraft from operating

troop concentrations, and individual pieces of equip-

deep inside Ukrainian airspace. Despite Russian claims ofment. Russia has struggled in efforts to target MLRS

destroying multiple HIMARS launchers, Moscow has not

and HIMARS launchers, largely reflecting the limited

released any credible evidence to support these claims.101

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ballistic and Cruise Trajectories 17

4. Implications for Non-Proliferation Policy
and Frameworks
The war in Ukraine has accelerated existing trends in

between October 2022 and January 2023 have been

the development, sale, manufacture and employment ofintercepted by Ukrainian air and missile defences.103 In

precision-strike munitions. These trends were alreadytotal, Kyiv claims to have intercepted 1,447 cruise mis-eroding the existing global framework to account forsiles since the war began in February 2023.104 In compar-

and limit or control these systems and their relatedison, Ukrainian military officials have stated that theirtechnology.102 The acceleration of these developments

air defences have been less successful in intercepting

and accompanying erosion of the global framework areshort-range ballistic missiles and certain types of anti-

resulting in increased access to precision-strike muni-

ship missiles.105 Although this data should be treatedtions of greater range and lethality by state and non-cautiously, potential reasons for the disparity between

state actors worldwide.

successful engagement rates are that ballistic missiles

The relevant existing trends in the development

and some types of Russian anti-ship missiles are moreand employment of precision-strike munitions are

difficult to intercept than land-attack cruise missiles

the following:(LACMs) because of their high speed and trajectory.

 An increased perception among current and pro-In addition to the widespread use by Russia (and tospective operators of the increased military utility

a much more limited extent by Ukraine) of ballistic andof inexpensive precision-guided munitions.

cruise missiles in the conflict, newer and non-traditional A decrease in the cost of some missile designs

systems have been used to tactical effect by both sides.

that is congruent with the expansion of capa-

This includes Ukraine’s use of US-supplied precision-bilities in terms of payload, precision, range andguided artillery shells as well as both sides’ use of modi-

survivability.

fied uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and dedicated The adaptability of missile designs, including

direct-attack munitions.106 Ukraine’s use of asymmetricmultiple launch modes and the increasing capa-

capabilities against Russia, which was assessed to pos-bility of these systems for secondary attack modes

sess greater military capabilities across all domains

against air, sea and land targets.

at the war’s outset is particularly striking, and will
likely reinforce thinking in states pursuing asymmetricThis section will discuss why each of these trends

defence doctrines of the shrewdness of this approach.107

erodes the ability of national authorities, multilateral

The apparent success of non-traditional systems mightexport control regimes and norm-setting frameworks toalso prompt other states to seek inexpensive systems

prevent the proliferation of such systems globally.

of proven utility to be used alongside or potentiallyreplace more traditional capabilities and equipment.

Increased Perceived Utility

At the other end of the technology spectrum, the mostandadvanced types of missile technology, including so-

supersonic anti-ship missiles against land targets rela-called ‘hypersonic missiles’, have garnered interna-

tively successfully in the conflict (although the lattertional attention even though they have not been used

are much less accurate than dedicated land-attack mis-

on a large scale. Their reputation as highly accurate andsiles), while subsonic land-attack cruise missiles havesurvivable weapons may have benefited simply fromperformed comparatively poorly. Data released bytheir absence, as well as a lack of analysis and assess-

Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence, for instance, states thatment of their effectiveness.108

Russia has used short-range ballistic missilesaround 70% to 80% of Russian land-attack cruise mis-

Considering these developments, it is likely thatsiles launched in large salvos of 20 or more missilesinterest among states and non-state actors in acquiring

18 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

new types of precision-guided munitions will increase,

Quds LACM, have demonstrated their utility against

depending on the buyer’s budget and operational

adversary infrastructure or equipment even whenrequirements. Global production of these systems istheir targets are well defended.113 Russia, in response

also likely to rise in response and the opportunity toto improved Ukrainian air defences around importantfield-test equipment on the battlefield will drive inno-

political, economic or military sites, has sometimes

vation among designers, resulting in new systems

instead struck less heavily defended targets. When con-being developed in increasingly shorter timeframes.109

sidering lessons from this conflict, more countries andStates might also prioritise access to a reliable and high-non-state actors are likely to build low-cost systems andvolume supply of established and non-traditional sys-

adapt their employment techniques to take account oftems, especially because lean defence supply chains

their demonstrated utility in Ukraine.

have been demonstrated to be insufficient when
responding to potential confrontations.110

What’s more, state and non-state actors alike, driven
by the perceived utility and lower cost of less complex

The effect of all these lessons is that, in the future,but ‘good enough’ capabilities, may seek to acquire such

equipment orders will likely be of higher volume thansystems at scale or manufacture their components on

those before Russia’s invasion. Poland’s request to pur-their own. Iran’s large-scale supply of one-way UAVs tochase up to 500 M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket

Russia is a pertinent example, as Moscow has sought toSystem (HIMARS) and associated precision-guided

manufacture licensed versions of Iranian direct-attack

rockets is an example of how significant this upscal-

munitions such as the Shahed-136 to increase production

ing might be for states that wish to better deter theirand shorten supply chains.114

adversaries.111 Additionally, in the past, states struggled

Like Russia, other states are unlikely to rely on otherto acquire certain weapons systems, because they werecountries for manufacture of such systems, relying

considered too complex to manufacture or off-limits

instead on domestic production. The spread of the tech-

because of export controls. Now, countries that wish to

nology, the ubiquity of the components and the low costacquire such systems are more likely to believe that theyof assembly and employment likely will drive a boom

can domestically design and manufacture the equip-in ‘cheap and cheerful’ systems across the globe withment if they choose.

little prospect for international controls.

Decreased Cost of Certain
Higher-level Capabilities

Adaptable Designs andTarget Types

Low-observable cruise missiles and so-called ‘hyper-

The existing frameworks for limiting the spread andsonic missiles’ have not widely proliferated because ofholdings of ballistic and cruise missiles and uninhab-

their high cost and difficulty of manufacture. However,ited aerial vehicles are dependent on outdated defi-

the reduced cost of developing some classes of precisionnitions that have been challenged, if not obviated, bycapabilities, along with corresponding improvements intrends in technology.115 This problem is apparent acrossrange, reliability, mobility, survivability and increased

many of the different aspects of the existing definitions

payload capacities of less complex precision-guided

key to identifying specific types.

munitions, has dangerous implications for the proliferation of related systems.112 Current conflicts, includ-

Ballistic Missiles

ing those in Ukraine and Yemen, have demonstrated

Ballistic missile control in international agreements isthat the manufacture of accurate, long-range precision-

predicated on the idea that such missiles are so inaccu-

guided munitions is relatively easy and inexpensive

rate that they must be purpose-built to deliver weapons

given enough pressure to technologically innovateof mass destruction since they are not precise enough toat speed. Systems that rely on dual-capable technolo-

destroy their target with a conventional warhead. Thus,

gies available through civilian markets – the so-called

the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) defines‘Radio Shack cruise missile’ – such as the Iranian 351/

Category I missiles, the export of which are subject toRussia’s War in Ukraine: Ballistic and Cruise Trajectories 19

a strong presumption of denial, as those systems that(or absence) of specialised guidance technology, more

can travel more than 300 kilometres with a payload ofmodern designs have adopted improved seeker tech-more than 500 kilograms.116 When the MTCR’s guide-

nology, enabling the missile to be used for primary andlines were drawn up in the late 1980s, they were based

secondary attack modes. The Harpoon, for instance, wason contemporary Soviet missile designs, particularly

modified to attack land targets, resulting in the creation

the R-300 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud B) SRBM that the Sovietof the AGM-84E Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM).

Union had widely exported. The Scud B has a range ofWhile adapting missile designs for different purposes

300km, a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of 900 metresis not new, the war in Ukraine has amply illustrated

and can be equipped with a payload of up to 985kg.117

how rapidly that can happen. Both Ukraine and Russia

The missile’s poor accuracy was not seen as an impedi-

have adapted air-defence and anti-ship missiles forment for it to damage or destroy the intended target if

land-attack missions with varying degrees of success.121

it were equipped with a nuclear warhead which would

Russia also has made the ability to adapt missiles acrosscause widescale destruction. However, if an operator

platforms a feature of its development programme.

tried to use the missile against small targets with a con-

The multi-use nature of some types of missiles today

ventional warhead, the missile’s inaccuracy would mean

means that the traditional arms control approach of lim-that it would very likely miss and not achieve the desired

iting ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles ofeffect.118 Some newer ballistic missile designs have CEPsa certain range while excluding air- and sea-launchedas small as ten metres and are thus capable of deliveringsystems – as was the case in the Intermediate-Range

significant damage to small targets with a high degree

Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty – would be impossible inof precision. Even some types of older ballistic missiles

current circumstances. If any air- or sea-launched missile

can be modified with and retrofitted with improved,

can be adapted for ground launch mode and vice-versa,

relatively inexpensive internal and external guidance toand the air- and sea-launched versions are excluded

greatly improve their accuracy.119 Thus, the definition of

from the treaty, the possibility of signatories violating

controllable ballistic missiles – defined as being capable

the agreement will be unlimited and verification willof delivering a nuclear payload at distance – is becoming

become impossible. The same holds true if an anti-air

increasingly irrelevant to limiting the spread of short-or an anti-ship missile can be used to accurately strike

range, highly-accurate conventional missiles.

ground targets. At the same time, the mobility of air- andsea-launched cruise missiles would greatly complicate

Launch and Attack Modes

any effort to verify the number and location of these sys-

The other major definitional challenges posed by evolving

tems, given that inspections on airbases and ports would

trends in missile technology is the adaptability of designs,

be considered highly intrusive to the everyday runningincluding multiple launch modes and the increasing useof these facilities and because platforms can quickly andof such systems for secondary attack modes. Missiles

easily be moved ahead of inspections. A future treaty

that were originally designed to be launched from one

aiming to restrict certain categories of guided weapons

type of platform (aircraft, maritime vessels or groundwould therefore need to address a much wider range oflaunchers) have frequently been adapted to be launchedsystems than the original INF agreement.

from other platforms to improve the equipment’s utility
and increase commonality across service branches. The

Ramifications

US-designed AGM-84A Harpoon anti-ship missile, for

The confluence of factors described above create a bleak

instance, was originally designed in the early 1970s to

outlook for the future control of such missile systems.

be launched from surface vessels, but it has since been

Indeed, it appears that an increasing number of states

adapted for launch from multiple different types of air-and non-state actors alike will be able to acquire orcraft, ground launchers and submarines.120

manufacture their own precision-guided munitions of

While many types of missiles are only capable ofincreasing effectiveness (whether through better tech-striking a single type of target due to the inclusion

nology or sheer numbers) over time. Adapting existing

20 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

agreements, such as the Missile Technology Control

war. This challenge does not even take into account that

Regime (MTCR) and norm-setting frameworks such as

many of the countries of highest proliferation concern,

the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) would be both tech-including China, Iran and North Korea, are outside ofnically complex and politically difficult (if not impossi-

the MTCR and the HCoC while some members, such asble) considering the broader context of Russia and theRussia, ignore its obligations.122

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ballistic and Cruise Trajectories 21

Conclusion
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has provided

missile designs for use as decoys highlight the impor-

Moscow with an opportunity to field test multiple types

tance of mass as a means of survivability.  

of ballistic and cruise missile systems, building on some

Other states are also carefully examining both sides’of the lessons it likely learned during its intervention

performance in Ukraine for lessons on the employment

in Syria in 2015. The war has also served as a test forof long-rang strike capabilities. Despite their mixed suc-the Russian forces’ adherence to the State’s official mili-cess rate, Russia’s use of missiles and non-traditionaltary doctrine, which they appear to have strayed from.

systems as well as Ukraine’s employment of asymmetric

Most glaringly, Moscow has not prosecuted high-value

capabilities will likely increase their perceived military

targets with the intensity required to achieve the quick

utility in the eyes of many state- and non-state actors.

military victory that their doctrine envisions and that

The falling cost of developing some classes of preci-

Moscow appears to have planned for.  

sion capabilities, especially less-complex systems that

While Russian short-range ballistic missiles have per-rely on dual-use technologies available through civilian

formed relatively well against Ukrainian air defences,markets, suggests an easy possibility of proliferation,

the limited use of these type of systems at the outset of

dependent on user’s requirements and resources. Statethe war left key Ukrainian military and command andand non-state actors may seek to acquire such systems

control targets largely unscathed. Land-attack cruiseat scale, but likely pursue domestic production capabil-

missiles (LACMs) – especially subsonic systems –ity in the future.  

appear to have suffered from high failure rates but have

Ultimately, Russia’s war in Ukraine will have wide

benefitted from being supplemented by large numbers

ramifications for existing arms- and export-controlof relatively inexpensive direct-attack munitions which

regimes. As certain types of guided weapons become

Moscow acquired from Iran. Newer and non-traditional

both more attractive and increasingly available, cur-systems have also been employed with tactical effects

rent agreements such as the Missile Technology

by both sides, highlighting the adaptability and versa-

Control Regime and the Hague Code of Conducttility of some designs.  

against Ballistic Missile Proliferation may increas-

Moscow could draw multiple lessons from the use

ingly face technical and political obstacles that chal-of ballistic and cruise missiles in Ukraine. For one, that

lenge their usefulness. Likewise, the multi-use nature

its antebellum inventory of LACMs was insufficient andof some types of missiles means that traditional arms-

this shortfall proved detrimental in the early stages ofcontrol approaches, such as limiting ground-launched

the war. Moscow has since made efforts to increase mis-systems of a certain range while excluding air- andsile production rates. The war will also almost certainly

sea-based systems, will become increasingly untena-further fuel Russia’s drive to develop additional high-ble. A future treaty aiming to restrict certain categories

supersonic LACMs that have performed better againstof guided weapons would therefore need to address a

air defences as well as Mach-5 plus systems. Russia’smuch wider range of systems than in the past which

procurement and production of large numbers of slow

would prove a challenge even in a much healthierand cheap direct-attack munitions and adaption ofpolitical environment.  

22 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Notes1

Mary C. FitzGerald, ‘Marshal Ogarkov on the Modern

Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds’, pp.

Theater Operation’, Naval War College Review, vol. 39, no. 4,

48-49, Precision-Strike-Capabilities-report-v5.indd (llnl.gov)

Autumn 1986, pp. 6-25.
2

3‘Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), August

on Nuclear Deterrence’, 8 June 2020, https://archive.mid.

2013, p.6, csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Evolution-of-

ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/

Precision-Strike-final-v15.pdf.

disarmament/-/asset_publisher/rp0fiUBmANaH/content/

Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, ‘The Defense of Socialism:id/4152094.

6

annex no. 054, May 1984, p. R19.

https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-russias-

Dave Johnson, ‘Russia’s Conventional Precision Strikelowered-nuclear-threshold/; Dave Johnson, ‘Russia’s

Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds’,

Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises,

Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), 2018, p. 38,

and Nuclear Thresholds’, pp.81-92
13

Missile System Crews Continue Launching Attacks at AFU

Deterrence: Modern Priorities’, Vestnik Rossiiskoi Akademii

military Infrastructure Facilities Within Special Military

Nauk [Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences], vol. 84,

Operation’, 18 July 2022, https://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/no.3, May 2014, p. 62.

country/more.htm?id=12429487@egNews.

This includes the 9K720 Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone) SRBM,

14

Hits Apartments in Central Ukraine’, 31 January 2023,

23a Kodiak) and 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30a Sagaris) LACM, 3M22https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/07/31/world/

Tsirkon (RS-SS-X-33) aeroballistic missile and 9M727

russia-ukraine-news.
15

Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, ‘The Total Combat Losses

GLCM. See: IISS, ‘Missile Technology: Acceleratingof the Enemy From 24.02.2022 to 30.08.2023’, 30 August

Challenges’, December 2022, pp. 75 – 93, https://www.iiss.

2023, https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2023/08/30/the-total-org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/

combat-losses-of-the-enemy-from-24-02-2022-to-30-08-2023/.
16

Telegraph, ‘Russian Cruise Missile Intercepted and Destroyed

accelerating-challenges.pdf.

by Ukraine in Zaporizhzhia’, YouTube, 21 October 2022,

Anya Fink and Michael Kofman, ‘Russian Strategy for

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HRf5nvZ2BDE.
17

U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Senior Defense Official Holds

Military Thought’, CNA, dim-2020-u-026101-final.pdf (cna.

a Background Briefing’, 21 March 2022, https://www.

org).

defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2973395/

Rossiyskaya Gazeta, ’Военная доктрина Российской

senior-defense-official-holds-a-background-briefing/.

Федерации’ [’Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’],18

30 December 2014, https://rg.ru/documents/2014/12/30/
doktrina-dok.html.

Piotr Butowski, Russia’s Air-launched Weapons, (Houston, TX,
Harpia, 2017) p.16.

19

President of Russia, ‘Excerpts From the Speech of Defence

Anya Fink, ‘The Evolving Russian Concept of Strategic

Minister Anatoly Serdyukov at the Expanded Meeting of theDeterrence: Risks and Responses’, Arms Control Today, Vol.

Defence Ministry Board’, 18 March 2011, http://en.kremlin.

47, no.6, July/August 2017, The Evolving Russian Concept ofru/supplement/4847.

Strategic Deterrence: Risks and Responses | Arms Control

10

The New York Times, ‘Deadly Russian Missile Strike

S-7760 Kinzhal (RS-AS-24a Killjoy) ALBM, Kh-101 (RS-AS-

Escalation Management: Key Debates and Players in

9

Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, ‘Iskander

Andrei A. Kokoshin, ‘Strategic Nuclear and Nonnuclear

publications/strategic-dossier-delta/mdi/missile-technology-

8

Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘The Myth of Russia’s Lowered
Nuclear Threshold’, War on the Rocks, 22 September 2017,(RS-SSC-7 Southpaw) and 9M729 (RS-SSC-8 Screwdriver)7

12

1984, trans. FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, vol. 3, no. 091,

Precision-Strike-Capabilities-report-v5.indd (llnl.gov).
5

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,

Barry Wats, ‘Evolution of Precision Strike’, Center for

Experience of History and the Present Day’, Red Star, 9 May

4

11

20

Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, ‘In the

Association.

Course of the Last 24 hours, Aircraft of the Russian

Dave Johnson, ‘Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike

Aerospace Forces have Performed 82 combat Sorties

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ballistic and Cruise Trajectories 23

Engaging 204 Terrorist Objects in Syria’, 9 December

21

22

24

25

N.P. Zubov, Doctor of Military Sciences (Ret.) and Col. M.V.

htm?id=12071355@egNews.

Fomin, Doctor of Technical Sciences (Ret.), ‘ПРИМЕНЕНИЕUS Department of Defense, ‘Senior Defense Official Holds

УДАРНОЙ АВИАЦИИ ВОЗДУШНО-КОСМИЧЕСКИХ

a Background Briefing,’ 21 March 2022, https://www.

СИЛ В ВОЕННЫХ КОНФЛИКТАХ БУДУЩЕГО’, [‘Thedefense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2973395/

Use of Aerospace Forces’ Strike Aviation in Future Military

senior-defense-official-holds-a-background-briefing/.

Conflicts’], ВОЕННАЯ МЫСЛЬ [Military Thought], vol. 32,

Московский комсомолец, ‘Сергей Шойгу рассказал, как

no. 2, pp. 81 – 93, 3 March 2023, https://vm.ric.mil.ru/Stati/спасали российскую армию’, [‘Sergei Shoigu Told How

item/472452/.

27

sergey-shoygu-rasskazal-kak-spasali-rossiyskuyu-armiyu.

[‘Hypersound “Su”: the Russian Military Will Receive

html.

a Compact Missile’], Izvestiya, 7 October 2021, https://

Piotr Butowski, Russia’s Air-launched Weapons (Houston, TX:

iz.ru/1231901/anton-lavrov-aleksei-ramm/giperzvuki-su-

Harpia, 2017) p.16.

rossiiskie-voennye-poluchat-kompaktnuiu-raketu.

Yevhen Kizilov, ‘Ukraine’s Air Defence Shoots Down 36

Anton Lavrov and Anna Cherepanova, ‘’Острота’ момента:завершается разработка новой гиперзвуковой ракеты’www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/26/7413015/; Roman[‘The “Sharpness” of The Moment: The Development of a

Petrenko, ‘Four Cruise Missiles Shot Down Over Ukraine

New Hypersonic Missile is Being Completed’], Izvestia,

Overnight’, Ukrainska Pravda, 27 August 2023, https://www.

20 May 2021, https://iz.ru/1166898/anton-lavrov-anna-pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/27/7417260/.

cherepanova/ostrota-momenta-zavershaetsia-razrabotka-

Piotr Butowski, Russia’s Air Force, (Stamford: Keynovoi-giperzvukovoi-rakety.
34

Douglas Barrie and Timonthy Wright, ‘ Russian Cruise-

Ministry of Defence, ‘Latest Defence Intelligence update

Missile Champions New Build and New Buildings,’

on the situation in Ukraine - 26 November 2022’, Twitter,

Military Balance blog, 17 February 2023, https://www.iiss.

26 November 2022, https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/

org/online-analysis/military-balance/2023/02/russian-cruise-

status/1596389927733927937.

missile-champions-new-build-and-new-buildings/.

Douglas Barrie and Joseph Dempsey, ‘Russia’s Missile

35

Leonid Nersisyan, ‘Army-2022: Russia Unveils Kh-69

Inventories: KITCHEN Use Points to Dwindling Stocks,’

Stealth Cruise Missile’, Shephard Media, 22 August 2022,

Military Balance blog, 12 July,2022, https://www.iiss.org/

https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/air-warfare/

online-analysis/military-balance/2022/07/russias-missile-russia-unveils-kh-69-stealth-cruise-missile/.
36

US Defence Intelligence Agency, ‘Iranian UAVs in Ukraine:

Ivana Kottasová, Olga Voitovich, Mick Krever, Alex

A Visual Comparison,’ August 2023, https://www.dia.mil/

Marquardt, ‘Ukrainian Air Defenses in Odesa Outgunned

Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/as Russia Targets Global Grain Supply’, CNN, 21 July 2023,

UAV_Book.pdf.
37

Conflict Armament Research, ‘Documenting thedefenses-odesa-russia-strikes-grain-intl/index.html.

Domestic Russian Variant of the Shahed UAV’,

The New Voice of Ukraine, ’Ukraine Unable to Shoot Down

August 2023, https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/

Kh-22 Missiles, Says Air Force,’ 15 January 2023, https://

d3be20c31acd4112b0aecece5b2a283c.

english.nv.ua/nation/air-defense-cannot-shoot-down-

30

33

Russian Missiles’, Ukrainska Pravda, 26 July 2023, https://

https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/20/europe/ukraine-air-

29

Anton Lavrov and Alexy Ramm, ‘Гиперзвуки «Су»:российские военные получат компактную ракету’,inventories-kitchen-use-points-to-dwindling-stocks/.
28

32

22 September 2019, https://www.mk.ru/politics/2019/09/22/

Publishing, 2023), p.16.
26

Col. O.V. Yermolin, Candidate of Technical Sciences, Col.

2015, https://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.

the Russian Army was Saved’], Moskovskij Komsomolets,

23

31

38

Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence estimates that Russia fired

russian-kh-22-missiles-ukraine-war-50297621.html.

a total of 829 9M723 SRBMs between 23 February and 18

Roman Petrenko, Ukraine’s Air Force Announces Downing

November 2022. The Staff of Ukraine’s National Securityof Kinzhal Missile Using Patriot Air-Defence System,’and Defense Council estimates that 124 9M723 SRBMs wereUkrainska Pravda, 6 May, 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/

launched in an estimated five-month period between

eng/news/2023/05/6/7400941/.

24 February and 21 July 2022, an average rate of roughly

24 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

25 missiles per month. This suggests that about 705 SRBMs

Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Did Russia Fire SS-26s at Georgia?’,

were launched by Russia between July and November, orArms Control Wonk, 17 August 2008, https://roughly 176 missiles per month. For further information,www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/201998/

see: David Gauthier-Villars et al., ‘As Russian Missiles Struck

did-russia-fire-ss-26s-at-georgia/.

Ukraine, Western Tech Still Flowed’, Reuters, 8 August

39

STONE - Структура комплекса и хронология’, [‘Complex

ukraine-crisis-russia-missiles-chips/; and, Oleksii Reznikov

9K720 Iskander - SS-26 STONE - Complex structure and(@oleksiireznikov), tweet, 22 November 2022 https://twitter.

chronology’], 1 October 2015, http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/

com/oleksiireznikov/status/1594998365170896896/photo/1.

topic-832.html .

GRAU indices are used by the Russian military to identify

46Досье’, [‘State Armament Programs of Russia. Dossier’], 26

function and designation are similar in some respects to the

February 2018, https://tass.ru/info/4987920.
47

Roger McDermott, ‘Russia’s Military Precision Strike

designation system. For further information, see: Russian

Capability Prioritizes Iskander-M Publication’, Eurasia Daily

Ministry of Defence, ‘Главное ракетно-артиллерийское

Monitor, vol. 14, no. 82, 20 June 2017, https://jamestown.

управление Министерства обороны Российской

org/program/russias-military-precision-strike-capability-Федерации’, [‘Main Missile and Artillery Directorate

prioritizes-iskander-m/.
48

IISS, ‘Russia’s Military Modernisation: An Assessment’,

undated, https://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_

Strategic Dossier, September 2020, p. 76, https://www.

of_defence/details.htm?id=9743@egOrganization; and,iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/russias-military-

Konstruktorskoye Byuro Mashynostroyeniya, ‘Iskander-E

modernisation/#:~:text=Russia’s%20Military%20

tactical ballistic missile system’, undated, https://www.kbm.

Modernisation%20examines%20Moscow’s,decade%20of%20

ru/en/production/otrk/352.html.

investment%20and%20reform.

Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee,

49‘Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat: 2020’, January 2020,
p. 21, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/11/2002563190/-

Military Balance+ database, accessed 13 September 2023,
https://milbalplus.iiss.org/.

50

Aviation Week, ‘Russia Deploys SS-26 In Syria’, 18 April

1/-1/0/2020%20BALLISTIC%20AND%20CRUISE%20

2018, https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/russia-

MISSILE%20THREAT_FINAL_2OCT_REDUCEDFILE.PDF;

deploys-ss-26-syria; Dylan Malyasov, ‘Russian Officials

Roger McDermott, ‘Russia’s Iskander Missile System andConfirm Use of Iskander-M Short-Range Ballistic Missile in

the Collapse of the INF Treaty’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol.

Syria’, Defence blog, 17 December 2018, https://defence-blog.

17, no.7, 22 January 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/com/russian-officials-confirm-use-of-iskander-m-short-russias-iskander-missile-system-and-the-collapse-of-the-inf-range-ballistic-missile-in-syria/.

treaty/.

51

Mikhail Barabanov, ‘Iskander the Great’, Moscow Defense
Brief, vol. 14, no. 4, 2008, p. 2, https://www.files.ethz.ch/

John Ismay, ‘Russia Deploys a Mystery Munition in52

Rob Lee (@RALee85), tweet, 26 February 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1497510232356003850.

53

Ukraine’, New York Times, 14 March 2022, https://www.
nytimes.com/2022/03/14/us/russia-ukraine-weapons-decoy.

Dylan Malyasov, ‘Russian Officials Confirm Use of
Iskander-M Short-Range Ballistic Missile in Syria’

isn/94687/2008_4.pdf.
42

TASS, ‘Государственные программы вооружения России.

Russian armed forces munitions and equipment. Itsof the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation’],41

Military Russia, ‘Комплекс 9К720 Искандер - SS-26

2022, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/

1963 United States Tri-Service rocket and guided missile

40

45

Rob Lee (@RALee85), tweet, 1 March 2022, https://twitter.
com/RALee85/status/1498580468895293440?lang=en.

54

html.

Gauthier-Villars et al., ‘As Russian Missiles Struck Ukraine,
Western Tech Still Flowed’.

43

Ibid.

44

Michael Kofman, ‘Russian Performance in The Russo-

Holds a Background Briefing’, 2 May 2022, https://www.

Georgian War Revisited’, War on the Rocks, 4 September

defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3017053/

2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/russian-senior-defense-official-holds-a-background-briefing/.

performance-in-the-russo-georgian-war-revisited/;

55

56

U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Senior Defense Official

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘Avril Haines,

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ballistic and Cruise Trajectories 25

Director of National Intelligence Congressional Testimony

Council of Ukraine, ‘Oleksiy Danilov: Ukrainian Air

Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence

Defense Brilliantly Fulfilled the Task of Protecting Against

Community March 08, 2022’, 8 March 2022, p. 3, https://

Aeroballistic Missiles’, 17 May 2023, https://www.rnbo.gov.

www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2022-03-08-ATA-

ua/en/Diialnist/6341.html.

Opening-Statement-As-Delivered.pdf.

68

VK, ‘В рамках усиления Южного направления в

Theodore J. Janosko and Robert G. Cheatham, Jr., ‘TheМелитополь также прибыли машины из состава

Sound of Thunder: VCA in Operation Iraqi Freedom’,ТРК “Точка-У”. Ранее аналогичный комплекс был

Field Artillery, September-October 2003, p. 35, https://замечен в ЛНР’, [‘As Part of the Strengthening oftradocfcoeccafcoepfwprod.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/

the Southern Direction, Vehicles From the Tochka-Ufires-bulletin-archive/2003/SEP_OCT_2003/SEP_OCT_2003_

Shopping and Entertainment Complex Also Arrived in

FULL_EDITION.pdf.

Melitopol. Previously, a Similar Complex Was Spotted

58

Ibid, p. 35.

in the LPR.’], Военный Осведомитель [‘Military

59

Rob Lee (@RALee85), tweet, 1 March 2022, https://

Informant’], 13 July 2022, https://vk.com/milinfolive?w=w

twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498580468895293440?lang

all-123538639_2796846.

57=en; Telegram, ‘Массовый залп ОТРК «Искандер» по

61March 2022, https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/of the Iskander OTRK at Ukrainian Armed Forces Facilities

status/1509559727096803337; @The DeadDistrict, tweet, 10

in the Kharkov Region’], Military Informant, 1 April 2022,

July 2022, https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/15460565244

https://t.me/milinfolive/80153; Gauthier-Villars et al., ‘As

13517825?s=20.

63

64

66

Gauthier-Villars et al., ‘As Russian Missiles Struck Ukraine,

Carried Out From Occupied Donetsk Region (video)’, 21Western Tech Still Flowed’.

May 2022, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/novyny/ekspertyza-sbu-

Analysis of Mirgorod airbase conducted by author using

pokazala-shcho-raketnyi-obstril-zaliznychnoho-vokzalu-u-

Maxar satellite imagery over multiple dates in February,

kramatorsku-zdiisnyly-z-okupovanoi-donechchyny-video.
71

Telegram, ‘Шахтерск сейчас’, [‘Shakhtersk now’]’,

The White House, ‘DoD News Briefing - 3/31/2003’, 31Типичный Донецк [Typical Donetsk], 8 April 2022, https://t.

March 2003, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/

me/itsdonetsk/11816; Telegram, ‘Шахтерск’, [‘Shakhtersk’],news/releases/2003/03/20030331-8.html.

8 April 2022, https://t.me/itsdonetsk/11817

Oleksii Reznikov (@oleksiireznikov), tweet, 22

72

David E. Sanger et al., ‘Ukraine Wants the U.S. to Send MoreNovember 2022, https://twitter.com/oleksiireznikov/

Powerful Weapons. Biden Is Not So Sure’, New York Times,

status/1594998365170896896/photo/1.

17 September 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/17/us/

UK Ministry of Defence (@DefenceHQ ), tweet, 1

politics/ukraine-biden-weapons.html.
73

United States Army Acquisition Support Center, ‘Armystatus/1587325946985684993/photo/1.

Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)’, undated, https://asc.

TASS, ‘Kinzhal Complex Substantially Boosts Russia’sarmy.mil/web/portfolio-item/atacms/; US Army Missile andAerospace Force Capabilities — Commander’, 1 March 2018,

Space Program Executive Office, ‘Precision Guided Missiles

https://tass.com/defense/992375.

and Rockets Program Review’, April 2008, p. 16, https://

Russian Ministry of Defence, ‘Briefing by Russian Defence’,ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/2008/psa_apr/

19 March 2023, https://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/

pincoski.pdf.

more.htm?id=12413602@egNews.
67

Security Service of Ukraine, ‘SSU Expert Examination Shows
That Missile Attack on Kramatorsk Railway Station Was

November 2022, https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/

65

70

Still Flowed’.

March and April 2022.
62‘Гомель’, [‘Gomel’], @GirkinGirkin,tweet, 31объектам ВСУ в Харьковской области’, [‘A Massive Salvo

Russian Missiles Struck Ukraine, Western Tech

60

69

74

Felicia Schwartz, ‘US to Provide Ukraine With Longer-Range

National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, ‘OleksiyRocket Systems’, Financial Times, 1 June 2022, https://www.

Danilov: The Downing of the Kinzhal Missile Was a Shockft.com/content/45a705fc-6e38-4652-a0a6-5d6783c503c7.

for the Russians’, 11 May 2023, https://www.rnbo.gov.
ua/en/Diialnist/6320.html; National Security and Defense

26 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

75

Military Balance+ database, accessed 13 September 2023,
https://milbalplus.iiss.org/.

76

U.S. State Department, ‘Key Topics – Office of Regional

New York Times, 17 September 2022, https://www.nytimes.

Security and Arms Transfers’, undated, https://www.

com/2022/09/17/us/politics/ukraine-biden-weapons.html.

state.gov/key-topics-office-of-regional-security-and-arms-

77

86transfers/#tpt.

‘Foreign Ministry Statement on the UK’s Decision to

IISS, The Military Balance 2022, Routledge for IISS, p. 212;

Transfer the Storm Shadow Missile System to Ukraine’, 12

UATV English, ‘Military Parade in Kyiv Marks 27 Years of

May 2023, https://mid.ru/en/maps/gb/1870021/.

Independence’, 24 August 2018, YouTube, https://youtu.

87

be/9SIhVWt--xc?feature=shared&t=6034.
78

National Air and Space Intelligence Center, ‘Ballistic and

80

81

83

Andrian Prokip, ‘How Will Ukraine’s Energy Sector

September 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/

Byuro Mashynostroyeniya, ‘Tochka-U High-Precision

how-will-ukraines-energy-sector-fare-upcoming-winter.
89

Reuters, ‘Iran Agrees to Ship Missiles, More Drones to

kbm.ru/en/production/otrk/351.html.

Russia’, 18 October 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/

EP is a simple measure of a weapon system’s accuracy.

exclusive-iran-agrees-ship-missiles-more-drones-russia-

It is defined as the radius of a circle into which a missile,

defying-west-sources-2022-10-18/; IISS, ‘Open-Source

projectile or bomb will land at least half the time.

Analysis of Iran’s Missile and UAV Capabilities and

BBC News, ‘Russia sSalvages Landing Ship Hit by Ukraine

Proliferation’, April 2021, pp. 8 – 9 and 15 – 16, https://www.

Missile Fire’, 2 July 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/

iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/world-europe-62022476.

files/research-papers/open-source-analysis-of-irans-missile-

Paul Adams and Megan Fisher, ‘Ukraine Launches MIssile

and-uav-capabilities-and-proliferation.pdf.
90Julian Borger, Peter Beaumont and Dan Sabbagh, ‘Iran Has

bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66793900.

Not Sent Ballistic Missiles to Russia So Far, says Ukrainian

UATV English, ‘Military Parade in Kyiv Marks 27 Years ofofficial’, 6 December 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/

Independence’, 24 August 2018, YouTube, https://youtu.

world/2022/dec/06/mikhailo-podolyak-iran-has-not-sent-

be/9SIhVWt--xc?feature=shared&t=6186.

ballistic-missiles-to-russia-so-far-says-ukrainian-official.

Ukrainian Military Center, ‘Law enforcers Detained a KB

91

United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 2231 (2015)’,

Pivdenne Employee, Accused of Espionage’, 16 September

pp. 98 – 103, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/

2022, https://mil.in.ua/en/news/law-enforcers-detained-a-kb-

GEN/N15/225/27/PDF/N1522527.pdf?OpenElement.
92

James Byrne et al., ‘Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at

Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, ‘Russian

The Heart of Russia’s War Machine’, RUSI, 8 August 2022,

Defence Ministry Report on the Progress of the Special

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-

Operation (30 March 2023)’, 30 March 2023, https://eng.mil.

resources/silicon-lifeline-western-electronics-heart-russias-

ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12462371@egNews;

war-machine.

Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, ‘Russian

85

88

nukestrat.com/us/afn/NAIC2003rev.pdf; Konstruktorskoye

pivdenne-employee-accused-of-espionage/.
84

More Powerful Weapons. Biden Is Not So Sure’.

Fare in the Upcoming Winter?’ Wilson Center, 5Attack on Crimea’, BBC, 14 September 2023, https://www.

82

David E. Sanger et al., ‘Ukraine Wants the U.S. to Send

Cruise Missile Threat’, August 2003, p. 6, http://www.

Tactical Ballistic Missile System’, undated, https://www.

79

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,

93

U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Deputy Pentagon Press

Defence Ministry Report on the Progress of the Special

Secretary Sabrina Singh Holds a Press Briefing’, 14

Military Operation (9 April 2023)’, 9 April 2023, https://

September 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/

eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12463470@

Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3526595/deputy-

egNews; Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation,

pentagon-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-holds-a-press-‘Russian Defence Ministry Report on the Progress of thebriefing/; Christian Davies and Song Jung-a, ‘NorthSpecial Military Operation’, 23 April 2023, https://eng.

Korea Leans on Russia to Bolster Weapons Trade’,mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12465062@

Financial Times, 6 September 2023, https://www.ft.com/

egNews.

content/75b53954-f78e-4aba-bedc-453b7886ac52.

David E. Sanger et al., ‘Ukraine Wants the U.S. to Send
More Powerful Weapons. Biden Is Not So Sure’,94

Hyonhee Shin and Joyce Lee, ‘North Korea’s Kim Orders
Making More Missiles Ahead of South Korea, US Drills’,

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ballistic and Cruise Trajectories 27

Reuters, 14 August 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/

95

96

asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-jong-un-visits-military-російських загарбників становлять 265,6 тис. осіб,factories-including-missile-plant-kcna-2023-08-13/.

знищено понад 4500 БПЛА ворога ‒ Генеральний

U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Brigadier General Pat Ryder,штаб ЗСУ’, [‘The Total Losses of the Russian Invaders

Pentagon Press Secretary, Holds an Off-Camera, On-the-Amount to 265,600 People, More Than 4,500 Enemy UAVs

Record Press Briefing for Resident Media’, 11 September

Were Destroyed ‒ General Staff of the Armed Forces’], 52023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/

September 2023, https://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2023/09/05/

Transcript/Article/3521998/brigadier-general-pat-ryder-zagalni-vtrati-rosijskih-zagarbnikiv-stanovlyat-265-6-tis-

pentagon-press-secretary-holds-an-off-camera-on-the/.

osib-znishheno-ponad-4500-bpla-voroga-%E2%80%92-

U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Exhibit P-3a, Individual

generalnij-shtab-zsu/.

Modification: PB 2019 Army’, February 2018, p. 4, https://

97

98

99

104 Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, ‘Загальні втрати

105 Ukrainska Pravda, ‘Air Force Specifies Which Missiles Can

www.dacis.com/budget/budget_pdf/FY19/PROC/

and Cannot be Shot Down by Ukrainian Air Defence

A/1823CA6700_16.pdf

Systems’, 16 March 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/

U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Fact Sheet on U.S. Security

news/2023/03/16/7393704/.

Assistance to Ukraine’, 6 September, 2023, https://media.

106 Ukrainian Military Centre, ‘Ukrainian M982 Excalibur Hit

defense.gov/2023/Sep/06/2003295126/-1/-1/1/UKRAINE_

Two Msta-S Self-propelled Guns’, 24 May 2023, https://mil.

FACT_SHEET_PDA_46.PDF.

in.ua/en/news/ukrainian-m982-excalibur-hit-two-msta-

Oryx, ‘Answering The Call: Heavy Weaponry Supplieds-self-propelledguns/; David Hambling, ‘Russia Boosts

To Ukraine’, 11 April 2022, https://www.oryxspioenkop.

Production And Displays New ‘Swarming’ Version Of

com/2022/04/answering-call-heavy-weaponry-supplied.

Lancet-3 Kamikaze Drone’, Forbes, 18 July 2023, https://html.

www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2023/07/18/russia-

Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee,

boosts-production-and-displays-new-swarming-version-‘Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat: 2020’, January 2020,of-lancet-3-kamikaze-drone/; David Hambling, ‘Russia

pp. 8 and pp. 14 – 15, https://media.defense.gov/2021/

Boosts Production And Displays New ‘Swarming’ Version

Jan/11/2002563190/-1/-1/0/2020%20BALLISTIC%20AND%20

Of Lancet-3 Kamikaze Drone’, Forbes, 18 July 2023, https://CRUISE%20MISSILE%20THREAT_FINAL_2OCT_

www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2023/07/18/russia-

REDUCEDFILE.PDF.

boosts-production-and-displays-new-swarming-version-of-

100 Lockheed Martin, ‘Lockheed Martin’s Extended-Range

Rocket Excels In Long Range Flight’, 1 September 2023,

lancet-3-kamikaze-drone/.
107 Gabriel Dominguez, ‘Opposing a Larger Force: What

https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2023-09-01-lockheed-

Taiwan’s Military is Learning from Ukraine’, Japan Times, 9martins-extended-range-rocket-excels-in-long-range-flight.

April 2023, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/04/09/

101 Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, ‘Statement

by First Deputy Chief of Main Military-Political Directorate

asia-pacific/taiwan-ukraine-conflict-lessons/.
108 ‘Hypersonic missiles’ can generally be divided into twoof Russian Armed Forces Lieutenant General Sergei

different types of system: Hypersonic-boost glide vehicles

Sevryukov’, 4 January 2023, https://eng.mil.ru/en/news_(HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs). Russia has

page/country/more.htm?id=12450398@egNews.

one HGV in service, which is armed with a nuclear warhead.

102 William Alberque, ‘Revitalizing Arms Control:

A broader but less accurate taxonomy would also include

the MTCR and the HCoC’, IISS, 2 November 2021,

Russia’s 9-S-7760 Kinzhal (RS-AS-24a Killjoy) air-launchedhttps://www.iiss.org/research-paper//2021/11/

ballistic missiles, which the Russian Air Force has used on

revitalising-arms-control-the-mtcr-and-the-hcoc.

several occasions. See: Reuters, ‘Russia Recognises First

103 Ian Williams, ‘Putin’s Missile War: Russia’s Strike Campaign

Crew to Use Hypersonic Missile in Ukraine, TASS reports’,in Ukraine’, Center for Strategic and International Studies,

4 September 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/

May 2023, p. 22, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.

russia-recognises-first-crew-use-hypersonic-missile-ukraine-

com/s3fs-public/2023-05/230505_Williams_Putin_Missile.

tass-2023-09-04/.

pdf?VersionId=0rahER.P81oo5ispb8.UGcT_90DmLoSb.

28 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

109 Valerie Insinna, ‘Meet “Phoenix Ghost”, the US Air Force’s

New Drone Perfect for Ukraine’s War with Russia’, Breaking

MTCR-TEM-Technical_Annex_2023-06-15-PDF.pdf.

Defense, 21 April 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/

116 The MTCR seeks to limit the spread of cruise and ballistic

meet-phoenix-ghost-the-us-air-forces-new-drone-designed-

missiles that fall within its definitions, as well as uncrewed

for-ukraines-war-with-russia/.

aerial vehicles – however, the Hague Code of Conduct

110 Robert Wall, ‘Defence production: is just-in-time justagainst Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) by definition

too late?’ IISS Military Balance blog, 9 June 2023, https://

excludes cruise missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles fromwww.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2023/06/

its transparency and confidence building measures.

defence-production-is-just-in-time-just-too-late/.
111 Ministry of National Defence Republic of Poland, ‘The

117 CEP is a simple measure of a weapon system’s accuracy.

It is defined as the radius of a circle into which a missile,First Himars are Already in Poland. They will go to theprojectile or bomb will land at least half the time. For further

16th Mechanized Division’, 15 May 2023, https://www.gov.

information on the Scud B’s characteristics, see: Federation of

pl/web/national-defence/the-first-himars-are-already-in-

American Scientists, ‘R-11 / Ss-1b Scud-A R-300 9k72 Elbrus

poland-they-will-go-to-the-16th-mechanized-division.

/ Ss-1c Scud-B’. 9 September 2000, https://nuke.fas.org/guide/

112 Amy Nelson and T.X. Hammes, ‘Inevitable Bedfellows?

Cooperation on Military Technology for the Developmentof UAVs and Cruise Missiles in the Asia-Pacific’, IISS, 28
July 2020, https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2020/07/

russia/theater/r-11.htm.
118 International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, United

Nations, available at https://unsaferguard.org/.
119 International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Open-Sourcecooperation-military-technology-development-uavs-cruise-

Analysis of Iran’s Missile and UAV Capabilities andmissiles--asia-pacific/.

Proliferation’, 20 April 2021, p. 15, https://www.iiss.org/

113 Douglas Barrie and Timothy Wright, ‘Cruise Missiles

globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/

Continue to Make Their Mark in the Middle East’, Militaryresearch-papers/open-source-analysis-of-irans-missile-and-Balance blog, 5 December 2020, https://www.iiss.org/

uav-capabilities-and-proliferation.pdf.

online-analysis//military-balance/2020/12/cruise-missiles-inthe-middle-east; Conflict Armament Research, ‘Dissecting
Iranian drones employed by Russia in Ukraine’, November

120 Janes, Janes Weapons: Naval, 2018-2019 (London: IHS Janes),

p. 33.
121 William Alberque, ‘What Has the War on Ukraine

2022, https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/7a394153c87947d8

Revealed About Russia’s Non-strategic Missiles?’, IISS, 6

a602c3927609f572.

March 2023, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-

114 Patsy Widakuswara, ‘Russia Receiving Hundreds of IranianDrones, Plans to Produce Them: White House’ Voice ofAmerica, 9 June 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/7130137.
html.
115 Terminology as defined in the Missile Technology

analysis/2023/03/what-has-the-war-revealed-about-russiasnon-strategic-missiles/.
122 Timothy Wright and William Alberque, ‘The Credibility

and Implications of Russia’s Missile and Nuclear Proposal
to Belarus’, IISS, 21 July 2022, https://www.iiss.org/

Control Regime. See: Missile Technology Control Regime,

online-analysis/online-analysis/2022/07/the-credibility-‘Equipment, Software And Technology Annex’, 15 June 2023,

and-implications-of-russias-missile-and-nuclear-proposal-

https://mtcr.info/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/

to-belarus/.

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ballistic and Cruise Trajectories 29© The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023

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