February 19, 2024

Press Conference:
On Shaky Ground: Japan’s Nuclear
Power Policy and the Noto Peninsula
https://www.chunichi.co.jp/article/239836(Chunichi Shimbun)

Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE)
Chief Secretary, Shoko MURAKAMI
murakami@takagifund.org

“Regardless of ranking,in any place in Japan,
there may be strong shaking
due to earthquakes”
Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion

Probability of seismic intensity ≧ 6 Lower, occurring in 2020-2050

Report: 'National Seismic Hazard Maps for Japan (2020)
https://www.jishin.go.jp/main/chousa/20_yosokuchizu/yoso
kuchizu2020_mm.pdf

Earthquakes exceeding the design basis seismic motion
Nuclear regulators have been rather slow to respond to earthquake danger toNPPs. Power companies were asked to reassess the design basis seismic motions
for NPPs after regulatory authority revised its guideline in 2006.
Still, earthquakes exceeding the upgraded design basis occur repeatedly.
MONTH
YEAR

EARTHQUAKE

Nuclear Power Plants (NPP)

August 2005 Miyagi ken Offshore Earthquake (M7.2)

Onagawa

March 2007 Noto Peninsula Earthquake (M6.9)

Shika

July 2007 Niigata ken Chuetsu Offshore
Earthquake (M6.8)

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa

March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake (M9.0)

Onagawa, Fukushima Daiichi,Fukushima Daini, Tokai Daini

January 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake (M7.6)

Shika※ The 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake had an unexpected sequence of M6.5 and M7.3 shocks in theregion adjacent to Sendai NPP.

Optimistic underestimation continued evenafter the 2011 Fukushima Disaster
Some earthquake countermeasures have been tightened, such as forced
decommissioning once an active fault is confirmed under the reactor/turbine
buildings area. But measures are limited to the extent so as to allow operation ofmost of the existing reactors.
Kunihiko Shimazaki, seismologist and former Acting Chairman of the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA),
pointed out that “the method of calculating standard ground motion that power companies use could lead tounderestimated figures and is inappropriate.” (https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160725/p2a/00m/0na/006000c)
Katsuhiko Ishibashi, seismologist and professor emeritus at Kobe University: "Earthquake motions set without
specifying the epicenter are arbitrarily set low as approx. M6.6. (Noto Peninsula earthquake was M7.6)

Moreover, is it even possible to design NPPs based on the largest scale of natural
disasters?
The Noto Peninsula earthquake caused ground uplift along the coast, spanning about 85 kilometers and with
200 meters of new coastline exposed. 150 km of the linkage of active faults on the sea floor were “out of scope.”

Problematic change of nuclear regulation after
the Fukushima disaster
The premise has changed from "nuclear accidents will never happen"(safety myth) to "nuclear accidents can happen.”
The “Nuclear Reactor Siting Requirements”, the highest-order regulationsof NPP siting to ensure public safety, were repealed.
Shunichi Tanaka, a former chair of the NRA, said: “An order of such radioactive release as in
Fukushima would no longer be compatible with the site requirements.”(https://www.ccnejapan.com/20140412_CCNE.pdf ,p145)

No mechanism to ensure viability of local disastermanagement and evacuation plans
Local governments are responsible for formulating the local disaster management
plan and evacuation plan based on the "Nuclear Emergency Response Guideline"
issued by the NRA.
However, the NRA has no uniform review criteria. Effectiveness and feasibility ofthe disaster management and evacuation plans are not legal requirements when
the NRA reviews for the construction or operation of nuclear power plants.
The Cabinet's “Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Council” approves the plansprior to restarting NPPs, but this is just a formality and not a professionalverification.
In the US, off-site emergency evacuation plans are prepared by state and local governments andreviewed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); the NRC then checks
consistency with on-site emergency measures and issues permission for operation.

Failing to learn lessons from the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster
Mito District Court ordered the suspension of Tokai Daini NPP, just 110 km
northeast of Tokyo (March, 2021)
Judge ruled that "it is far from the preparedness necessary, and we must say the emergency
response is extremely inadequate."
Chair of NRA, Shinsuke Yamanaka:“The current guidelines and regional disaster management plans developed by local
governments can respond to the situation.” (January 17, 2024)“Responding to natural disasters is out of our scope.” (February 14, 2024)
Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida;“If the NRA finds that the system complies with the new regulatory standards, it will notchange its policy for resuming operation with local understanding.”

Is it ever possible to respond to ‘complex disasters’?
NPPIkata (Ehime)

Isolated at the tip of Cape Sata Peninsula. Evacuation by boat orplane depends on roads and weather conditions. The port may
not function.

Hamaoka (Shizuoka)

Located in the assumed epicenter area of the Nankai TroughMegaquake. How many coaches to evacuate 800,000 people
from a 30km radius? What about drivers’ exposure?

Wakasa Bay NPPs (Fukui)

The road over the mountains is narrow, and the only road isalong the coast. Evacuation must go through the vicinity of theNPPs one after another.

Tomari, (Hokkaido)
Kashiwazaki-kariwa(Niigata)

Evacuation in heavy snowfall?
https://beguredenega.com/archives/131
11MedianTectonicLine
Hypocenterof TokaiEarthquake
https://www.asahi.com/photonews/gallery/infographics4/0514_hamaoka.html
https://digital.asahi.com/articles/photo/AS20200118000323.html

https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASR1J7KC1R1FUOHB
001.html