Policy Brief

June
1, 20232018
Aug 7,

Dr. Monika Cha nsor ia is a
Tok yo -based Senior Fellow
at T he Japa n I nst it ute
of I nter nat iona l A f f a irs.
P r e v i o u s l y, s h e h a s h e l d

Bhutan–China Boundar y Issues:
The Complexities of Colonial Histor y
and Its Aftermath in Himalayan Asia
Dr. Monika Chansoria

appointments at the Sandia
National Laboratories (U.S.),
Hokkaido University (Sapporo,
Japan), and Fondation Maisondes S c ienc es de l ’ Hom me( Pa r is). Dr. Cha nsor ia has
authored five books including
her latest work, China, Japan,
and Senkaku Islands: Conf lictin the East China Sea Amid an
American Shadow (Routledge© 2018).

Disclaimer :The views expressed in thispublication are those of the authorand do not necessarily reflect thepolicy or position of The Japan
Institute of International Affairs or
any other organization with which
the author is affiliated.

“Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended
the modern issues of war and peace, of life or death of nations” stated
Lord George Nathaniel Curzon of Kedleston, who served as Viceroyof India from 1899 to 1905.1 Contextually speaking, the motivations
behind China’s diverse campaigns to expand its influence acrossthe Himalayan states is well a manifestation of the aforesaid. The
mountain passes of Nepal and Bhutan are critical to gain access tothe fertile Himalayan valleys and the Gangetic plains.2 The principal
approach taken by China to fulfill its strategic objectives in the
Himalayan neighborhood has been its ‘mapmanship’ or, in otherwords, its ‘cartographic aggression.’3
Expansionism as a strategy adopted by China in Asia conformed to
Mao’s ideas regarding pan-China tendencies.4 Be it in Southeast Asia
or Southern Asia, the operative logic and method to mobilize millions
for action remained similar to establishing Chinese hegemony
across Asia.5 In a 1968 opinion piece published in New Times, China’s
attempts to label Bhutan as Chinese territory amounted to grossly
falsifying history and displaying an expansionist appetite.6 Moreover,it also became known that Chinese communists considered all
adjacent border areas critical to mainland China’s own security. 7
Recall that in the 1930s Mao disparaged the imperialist powers for
1
2
3

4
5
6
7

 ord George Nathaniel Curzon of Kedleston, Frontiers , The Romanes Lecture,
L(Oxford, 1907).
Tibor Mende, China, and Her Shadow (Coward-McCann, New York: 1962), p.
21.
T he Hindu Weekly , September 8, 1958; also see, The Times (London) January l,
1955; and see, Mark C. Feer, “India’s Himalayan Frontier,” cited in Far Eastern
Survey , vol. 22, October 1953, pp. 137-141.
M an, God, or Sphinx , cited in Hindustan Times , July 13, 1968.
Mende, n. 2, p. 19.
“Chinese Great Power Chauvinism” quoted in Hindustan Times, July 6, 1968.
AD Barnett, Communist China, and Asia: Challenge to American Policy , (Oxford
University Press, London: 1960), p. 79.

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Policy Brief

taking away many Chinese-dependent states,
crucially mentioning Bhutan as well.8

matter, through the supposed “inheritance ofTibetan treaty rights.”11 Traditional religious
Tibet-Bhutan ties were ruptured with the exileof the 14th Dalai Lama from Tibet in 1959 and thevictory of the communists in China. The deeply
religious ruling elite of Bhutan, especially theroyal family, were not favorably disposed either
to communism, or to China for that matter.12

Bhutan’s geographic and historical isolationfrom the rest of the world gave the countr ynatural protection from the international falloutof the Cold War. While China became Bhutan’s
neighbor only by vir tue of its occupation of
Tibet, there is no historical evidence of any
direct Chinese treaty relations with Bhutan.
Beijing’s assertions of past authority over the
Buddhist kingdom are based on a ‘supposed
inheritance of rather vaguely defined Tibetan
suzerain rights’ 9 whereas there have beenstrong reser vations and questions regarding
their applicability.

The political histor y of Bhutan’s ties with
Tibet can be traced back to the beginningof the eighth centur y, when Tibet was at thezenith of its military might. Its armies entered
Bhutan with little resistance and subjected
it to Tibetan rule. Close on the heels of the
T ibetan ar mies came the Lamas and thecommon people. They settled down in Bhutan,
and there were widespread inter-marriages.
The western regions of Bhutan came to be
inhabited, predominantly by people of Tibetan
and mixed Tibetan-Bhutanese origin. By theninth centur y, Tibet’s militar y might was on
the decline, and the Tibetan armies withdrew
from Bhutan. The central authority the native
Bhutanese themselves sought to establish
also lost hold over the countr y. Consequently,
Bhutan relapsed into a state of fragmented subregions, with no centralized control whatsoever.
Topographical peculiarities led to the growth ofnumerous linguistic and cultural sub-regions.13

Bhutan shares deep cultural, familial, andreligious ties established via Buddhism, withlinks to the seat of His Holiness the Dalai
Lama through a tributar y relationship sincethe 17 th centur y. Among the many outcomesof the Dalai Lama’s victor y in Tibet was theinauguration of tributary relations between the
Lhasa pontiff and Bhutan’s authorities. What
this signified also was Bhutan’s recognition of
the Dalai Lama’s ultimate spiritual authority andof the preeminent position of the Lama’s sectover all other Tibetan Buddhist sects. Whilecer tainly not devoid of political significance,
this preeminence did not signify in any way
Bhutan’s political subordination to Lhasa – a factwhich is amply borne out by the history of therelationships among these countries.10 Thereis thus no substantial evidence in history uponwhich China could base a legal or historicalclaim to any of the Himalayan border states,
either through direct treaty relations or, for that

Political History of Bhutan in the Early
20th Century
A t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e 2 0 t h c e n t u r y,following the withdrawal of the British from
Tibet in 1908, China tried to impose its politicalauthority on Tibet and marched into Lhasa. As a

Mao Tse-tung, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” (December 15, 1939 version), Current
Background , no. 135, November 10, 1951.
9 Ibid.
10 Leo E. Rose, “Sino-Indian Rivalry and the Himalayan Border States,” Orbis , vol. 5, no. 2, p. 203.
11 VP Gupta, “Expansionist Bases of China’s Policy: A Legal and Political Case Study in Relation to Sikkim and Bhutan,”
The Indian Journal of Political Science , vol. 29, no. 3, July-September 1968, p. 264.
12 For related reading see, Dorothy Woodman, Himalayan Frontiers , (London: Cresset Press, 1969), p. 314.
13 RC Misra, “Bhutan-China Relations,” China Report , vol. 17, no. 2, March-April 1981, pp. 44-45.
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Policy Brief

consequence, the 13th Dalai Lama fled Lhasa andcame to India, followed there by a number ofTibetans passing through Bhutanese territory.
The Chinese Amban at Lhasa wrote to the Kingof Bhutan addressing him still as ‘Deb Raja’(Holy King) even while accusing him of having
allowed the Dalai Lama’s men into India through
Bhutanese territory with goods that were meant
for the Dalai Lama. 14 The Bhutanese of ficer
at Phari was fined for having helped the Dalai
Lama’s men. The Chinese Amban’s letter carrieddetails about the passage of these men.15

repeating its claims in future, or of preventing
Bhutan from being lured into Chinese designs.18
Checkmating foreign influence, par ticularlythat of the Chinese in the southern Himalayas,
was a key objective for the British at that point,
and for that they followed a legalistic approach,realizing that Chinese intrigues in Bhutan could
be thwar ted only if the British had a legally
recognized right. This alone would give them
the authority to intervene on behalf of Bhutan.
The 1910 treaty, which revised a few key articles
in the earlier 1865 agreement, was thus signedwith Bhutan.19

Later, both Nepal and Bhutan were claimed as‘vassal states of China.’16 By 1910, General Chao
Erh-feng of Sichuan province occupied Lhasa
and laid claim to the five Himalayan kingdoms,
including Bhutan, on behalf of China’s Qing
dynasty. The British colonial rulers of India saw
the Himalayan kingdoms as an inner defenseline for India protected by a Tibetan buf ferzone and summarized China’s view of themas an ‘outer line of defense necessar y for theprotection of Tibet… irredentist regions to beregained as soon as possible…’17 Meanwhile,
Bhutan’s first hereditar y monarch, Ugyen
Wangchuk, signed the Treaty of Punakha with
the British gover nment of India in 1910 atPunakha Dzong. The Treaty of Punakha was
not a stand-alone document, but represented amodification of the Treaty of Sinchula of 1865,
the prior working agreement between Bhutan
and British India.

The 1865 working agreement signed
between Bhutan and British India was formallycr ystalized almost half a centur y later in theform of the 1910 Treaty of Punakha. Under theTreaty of 1910, Britain guaranteed Bhutan’s
independence and took control of Bhutanese
foreign relations. It also af firmed Bhutanese
independence as one of the few Asian kingdoms
never conquered by a regional or colonial power.
Crucially, Article VIII in the 1865 agreement,
as revised in the Treaty of 1910, stated: “… theBhutanese government agrees to be guided by
the advice of the British government in regard
to its external relations.” In the same article,
it was explicitly laid down that the British
government undertook not to interfere in theinternal administration of Bhutan.
Following the conclusion of the Treaty of1910, Chinese attempts to claim suzerainty overBhutan and to assert that it was China’s ‘vassal’
found expression in letters addressed by the
Chinese Amban at Lhasa to the ruler of Bhutan,
requiring him to comply with sundr y orders

The British Indian government had perceived
that the so-called traditional claims of Beijing in
Bhutan had no historical or legal basis. However,this was no guarantee of China desisting from
14
15
16
17
18
19

 oreign Secret (E) Proceedings, August 1910, no. 272, NAI.
F
Manorama Kohli, “Chinese Interest in Bhutan: Evolution of the British Indian Perspective,” China Report , vol. 19,
no. 4, July-August, 1983, p. 42.
Sub-enclosure to Foreign Secret (E) Proceedings, January 1911, no. 204, National Archives of India (hereafter NAI),
New Delhi.
John Rowland, “A History of Sino-Indian Relations,” cited in Woodman, n. 12, p. 215.
Foreign Secret (E) Proceedings, October 1908, no. 125, NAI.
Kohli, n. 15, p. 42.

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Policy Briefsuch as circulation of Chinese-Tibetan rupees in
Bhutan. China’s attempts to enforce circulationof Chinese cur rency in Bhutan 20 indicatedits intention of establishing an independentand direct relationship with Bhutan, ignoring
altogether the consequences of the Treaty of
1910.

Although the Chinese authorities at Lhasa
had been informed of the Treaty of 1910 that
Bhutan had signed, the Chinese of ficials
were not deterred. The British Indian officers
attributed the change in the attitude of theChinese to the strong position which they
had come to assume in Tibet by 1910. As longas af fairs in Tibet remained in a precarious
condition, Beijing did not try to exert any kindof pressure on Bhutan. No sooner than affairsin Tibet were settled to the satisfaction of theChinese, though, they star ted extending all
kinds of claims towards Bhutan as well as
Nepal.23 However, the firm stand taken by the
British Indian government placed a check on
all Chinese attempts, and there was no fresh
attempt by China to inter fere in the internalaffairs of Bhutan.24 Though not an Indian state,
Bhutan continued to be a protectorate of the
British government in India for all practical
purposes until 1947, when the British withdrew
and India achieved its independence fromcolonial rule.25 The geo-political realities of theHimalayan region coupled with security needs
made the British realize that the people of
Bhutan, Nepal, and India’s north-eastern region
were of the same ethnic stock as Tibet, sharing
cultural and religious ties.26

Chinese diplomacy between 1908-1910
reveals that, as the withdrawal of the British
from the Chumbi Valley was completed, Chinese
overtures towards Bhutan and, for that matter,towards all the Himalayan territories acquired
an expansionist character. The unfolding of theChinese project in Bhutan became discernible
towards the opening of the year 1908. The
Chinese Amban once again wrote to the King of
Bhutan, informing him of the forthcoming visitof a Chinese officer to ‘report on the conditionsof the countr y, its climate, its crops and its
people.’ The letter stated:
The Bhutanese are the subjects of China,
who is the Lord of Heavens. You, Deb Raja
(Holy King), and two Penlops think thatyou are great. But you cannot continue
without paying attention to the orders ofyour rulers… The Popon will inspect yourclimate distances of places, crops, etc… The
Deb Raja must try to improve the trade of thecountry and the condition of the tenantry. If
any assistance is wanted, let me know.21

Bhutan–China Relations in the PostColonial Period
Bhutan’s border with India remains clearly
identified and demarcated. When signing theTreaty of 1949, India returned about 32 squaremiles of land territor y in the area known as
Dewangiri to Bhutan to accommodate its claims.
China, on the other hand, following the victoryof the communist revolution, described Bhutan

The Chinese of ficer who finally visited
Bhutan did not go beyond Paro and, moresignificantly, was not extended much welcome
in Bhutan. The King of Bhutan, in fact, rejected
all Chinese claims in clear and unequivocal
terms.22
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

 oreign Secret (E) Proceedings, August 1910, nos. 266 & 268, NAI.
F
Foreign Secret (E) Proceedings, October 1908, no. 129, NAI.
Foreign Secret (E) Proceedings, October 1908, no. 119, NAI.
Foreign Secret (E) Proceedings, August 1911, no. 596, NAI.
Misra, n. 13, p. 49.
Ibid., p. 48.
Kohli, n. 15, p. 43.

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Policy Brief

as one of the ‘five fingers’ of its ‘Tibetan palm.’
China had had no relations with Bhutan since
1947, with historians and analysts attributing thisto the Treaties of 1910 and later 1949. The treaty
which the Republic of India signed with Bhutan
in 1949 is largely said to be a continuation of
the Treaty of 1910. 27 Following the Treaty of
1949, China tacitly recognized the special treaty
relationship between India and Bhutan, though
it had grave reser vations, par ticularly about
Article 2 of the Treaty which empowered thegovernment of India to guide Bhutan’s externalaffairs upon the latter’s request.

nor thward to Shigatse and Lhasa from Paro,
Punakha, and Tashigong as well as the brisk
trade route via Yatung in the Chumbi Valley
to the west. The Royal Government of Bhutan
adopted a cautious policy towards Tibet andoffered asylum to hundreds of Tibetan refugees
in 1959-1960, asking them later, however, either
to accept Bhutanese citizenship or leave thecountry.29
Historically, Bhutan maintained checkposts
all along its boundary with Tibet and exercised
effective administrative jurisdiction up to thisboundar y. The Bhutanese officials conducted
official tours and collected taxes from the land
areas extending up to it. Moreover, Bhutanesecitizens regularly utilized the lands up to
their border, with the local Tibetan officials inareas adjacent to the border respecting thisboundary.30 The discrepancy existing in this area
was confirmed when the Chinese side handed
over the coordinates of the most strategic
southeast corner of Bhutan to India, which
viewed the coordinates as being incorrectly
shown in Chinese unofficial and official maps.

Par ticularly after 1959, China began
reasserting its supposed ‘claims’ over Bhutan.
Maps were published in which Bhutan wasshown inside the domain of China. Even though
there have been instances where Bhutaneseelite have softened their attitude towards China,
the latter’s policy in Tibet continued to arouse
hostility in traditional Bhutanese society, which
remains culturally tied to Tibet. Bhutan’s policy
towards China is circumscribed by numerous
political and economic considerations. Moreover,Bhutan’s apprehensions over the ultimate
politico-strategic objectives of Chinese policy in
the Himalayan region have not disappeared.

The Post-Communist-Revolution
Annexation of Tibet (1950) and Bhutan’s
Developing Strategic Relevance

When activity in Tibet gained momentum
in 1958-1959, Chinese maps began showing
almost the entire eastern district of Tashigong
and pockets of north-eastern and north-western
Bhutan as parts of China.28 All normal travel andtrade between Bhutan and Tibet came to an end
after China suppressed the Tibetan uprisingand the 14th Dalai Lama and his followers fled
Lhasa and sought refuge in India in 1959. The
following year, 1960, Bhutan sealed its borders
with Tibet, closing the traditional trade routes

T wo successive political developments,
namely the communist revolution in China in
1949 and China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950,
further underlined bordering Bhutan’s politicaland strategic vitality. Sur veying the political
histor y and geographic location of Bhutan
provides a strong rationale for studying theconsequences of its relationship with Beijing.
The ‘for ward’ element of China’s foreign anddefense policy remained visible in its policy

 anorama Kohli, “Dragon Kingdom’s Urge for an International Role,” India Quarterly , vol. 37, no. 2, April-June
M
1981, p. 229.
28 #5 of China Pictorial , published July 1958, protested by India, cited in Surjit Mansingh, “China-Bhutan Relations,”
China Report , vol. 30, no. 2, 1994, p. 177.
29 Gupta, n. 11, p. 265.
30 Ibid.
27

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Policy Briefof extending its sway and influence over thepeoples and territories of peripheral regions
such as Mongolia, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, partsof India’s nor thern and nor theast frontiersand, to an extent, even Burma. Having clearly
defined its area of immediate influence, theAmban of China in Lhasa famously drew ananalogy and proclaimed that Nepal, Tibet, andDruk Yul (Bhutan) were like the ‘molar teeth’
in the mouth of China. The Chinese Amban
also stated, “China, Nepal, Tibet, Bhutan andSikkim might be compared to the five principal
colors, viz., yellow, red, blue, black and green...
if we would cooperate with one another, we may
presumably promote the interests of all.”31

taxes, and administered justice. T ibetan
authorities consistently recognized that thesevillages belonged to Bhutan. More importantly,
these eight villages were not subjected toTibetan law, nor did they pay any tax to Tibet. By
annexing these villages, China violated Bhutan’s
legitimate authority over these villages. Thiswas officially conveyed by India at the request of
the state of Bhutan to China in its official notesof 19th and 20th August 1959. The official notes
represented to the Chinese government that therightful authority of the Bhutanese government
over these enclaves needs to be restored.
Moreover, Bhutan’s National Assembly passed a
special resolution specifically drawing attention
to the errors in Bhutan’s boundary depicted in
the Chinese maps. These maps included about
300 square miles of territory which, according
to the McMahon Line and Indian maps, belongs
to Bhutan.33 India argued:

Given that the traditional boundary between
India and T ibet lies along the Himalayanwatershed, Bhutan’s easter n boundar y iscontiguous with Indian ter ritor y. To many,
Chinese moves and claims lacking any legal orpolitical merit amounted to political maneuvering
aimed at gaining further access to the southern
territor y of Bhutan. In 1959, Chinese officials
illegally dispossessed the designated authoritiesof the government of Bhutan of eight villages/
enclaves32 situated in western Tibet over which
Bhutan had been exercising administrative
jurisdiction for more than 300 years, namely,
Khangri, Tarchen, Tsekhor, Diraphu, Dzung
Tuphu, Jangehe, Chakip, and Kocha. There is
ample traditional and customar y evidence tosubstantiate Bhutan’s claims in this regard.

Under treaty relations with Bhutan,34 thegovernment of India is the only competentauthority to take up with other governments
matters concer ning Bhutan’s exter nal
relations. The rectification of er rors in
Chinese maps regarding the boundar y of
Bhutan and Tibet is, therefore, a matter
which must be discussed along with theboundar y of India with the Tibet region ofChina in the same sector (emphasis added).35
The official response to this was a Chinese
note: “Concerning the boundary between China
and Bhutan, there is only a certain discrepancy(emphasis added) between the delineation on

For centuries, Bhutan appointed the local
officers who governed these villages, collected

31 E xcerpts from a letter from the British Representative in Nepal to the Government of India , January 20, 1907,
Foreign Secret (E) Proceedings, June 1907, no. 638, NAI.
32 SD Muni, “Bhutan Steps Out,” The World Today (Royal Institute of International Affairs), vol. 40, no. 12, December
1984, p. 516.
33 Government of India’s Note, August 21, 1958, drawing attention to the erroneous depiction of the boundary in
Chinese maps.
34 Lok Sabha Secretariat, Foreign Policy of India: Text of Documents , 1959, pp. 15-20.
35 Gupta, n. 11, p. 264.

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Policy Brief

the maps of the two sides in the sector south of
the so-called McMahon Line.”36

such areas as Chinese. Having found successin systematically capturing strategic locations,the most extensive encroachments were known
to have taken place in 1967, 1979, and 1983. 38
Bhutan registered strong protests over these
Chinese encroachments and faulty maps.
China’s standard reply to India since 1958 hadbeen that it did not recognize India’s right (under
Article II of the 1949 Indo-Bhutanese Treaty) tonegotiate on behalf of Bhutan. Instead, China
insisted on dealing with Bhutan directly.39

The boundar y dispute between Bhutan
and China originated following the Chinese
occupation of Tibet when China refused torecognize the traditional watershed principle
which had been the dividing line between
Bhutan and its nor ther n neighbor T ibet.
Because of this, an area of about 500 square
kilometers in northeastern Bhutan was shownas falling within Chinese jurisdiction. In 1959,
in the wake of the brutal suppression of the
Tibetan revolt by China, as many as eight
Bhutanese enclaves near Mount Kailash wereseized by Beijing. They have ever since beentreated as parts of western Tibet. Because of
the disputed boundary, Bhutan has persistently
been lodging protests with Beijing against
intrusions from across the border, especiallyin the rainy season, when Tibetan graziers
were noticed venturing well inside Bhutanese
territory.37

Himalayan Borders during the 1962
China-India War
At Bhutan’s request, India dealt on Bhutan’s
behalf with China with the matter of the latter’s
territorial claims through the decade of the
1960s, though China did not concede India’s
right to do so.40 In the several meetings held
before 1961 between government of ficials of
the People’s Republic of China on the questionof the extent of the boundary to be considered,
the Indian side suggested that the boundaries
between China and Bhutan must be included.
The Chinese side expressed its disagreementwith this assertion, and asserted its own claimon the border of Bhutan.41 The original Bhutan–
Tibet boundar y, which eventually came tobecome the Bhutan–China boundar y, is anatural, traditional, and customar y one which
follows the crest of the Himalayan range forming
the main watershed between the Amo Chu andthe waters flowing into Ram Tso, Yu Tso, Nyang
Chu and Kuru Chu in Tibet and the Paro Chu,
Punakha, Thimbu Tongsa and Bumtang rivers in
Bhutan. This natural alignment has significantly
been the traditional and customar y boundar y

The question of the boundary first became anissue between Bhutan and China in 1959. Whilepursuing its policy of integrating Tibet, China
in July 1959 seized control of the Bhutaneseadministered enclaves in wester n Tibet in
the vicinity of Mount Kailash and the Gartok
region. A Chinese map in 1961 showed partsof eastern, northern, and western Bhutan as
Chinese. Since the mid-1960s, there have been
many Chinese encroachments on Bhutanese
territory. The methodology applied was having
armed Chinese graziers regularly penetrate wellinside unpatrolled Bhutanese areas and creating
permanent settlements thereafter to claim
36
37
38
39
40
41

 hinese Note, December 26, 1959; also see India-China Border Problem, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India,
C
November 26, 1962.
Manorama Kohli, “Bhutan-China Border Talks,” China Report , vol. 20, no. 3, May-June 1984, p. 3.
Muni, n. 32, p. 515.
Ibid.
The respective positions of India and China on Bhutan’s frontier with Tibet, stated in MEA, Report of the Officialsof the Government of India, and the People’s Republic of China on the Boundary Question (New Delhi: 1961).
Note sent by the MEA (New Delhi) to the Embassy of China in India, September 19, 1963.

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Policy Brief

between Tibet and Bhutan. The watershedprinciple is firmly rooted in international law
and, in mountainous regions, no other generalprinciple is in existence.42

Dr uk Gyalpo (King) said in 1979 that “toleave the border undemarcated would be to
the disadvantage of Bhutan in the long run.”
A historical question lingering to this day is
whether Bhutan will be willing to sacrifice itself
for China’s regional territorial ambitions andstrategy. Can Bhutan’s leadership afford risking
its unique identity to be reduced to the status ofTibet? In 1972, India surveyed Bhutan’s borderwith the Tibetan region occupied by China,
and assisted Thimphu in establishing its own
Sur vey Department. The establishment of theBoundary Commission followed in 1981, which,based on the survey reports and historical data
and documents, formulated definite Bhutanese
claims on its boundar y with Tibet (China).
Following this, Bhutan established informal
contacts with the Chinese when a diplomaticnote was sent to the Chinese Embassy in New
Delhi in March 1981, followed by informal
contacts in New York and New Delhi.

On the Bhutanese side, the br utal
suppression of Tibet and the developments of1959 generated fear and suspicion. Moreover,the 1962 China-India border war made Bhutaneven more war y of Chinese intentions andstrategy for the entire Himalayan border region.
Resultantly, it turned down several Chinese
offers. Among other things, the border conflictin 1962 was also a struggle for security andsupremacy in the entire Himalayan region.
Apart from the strategic advantage which thecontrol of the Himalayan heights would havegiven to either, each had at stake historicand cultural links with the region. Even theirstrategic interests evolved out of the centuriesold ethnic, religious, economic, and cultural ties
which existed between the peoples and tribes ofthis region.43

Be g inning of For m a l Bhut a n-Ch i n a
Boundary Talks in 1984

The year 1971 was an important one in which
China voted in favor of Bhutan’s membershipin the United Nations, thereby explicitly
recognizing it as an independent countr y;
the King of Bhutan made a strong statement
supporting Indian policy – of which China wasver y critical – on the newly emerging stateof Bangladesh. 44 Despite the enlargement of
Bhutan’s external dealings in the 1970s throughthe United Nations, direct talks between
Chinese and Bhutanese officials on the borderissue only began in the mid-1980s.

The first formal Sino-Bhutanese meeting took
place in Beijing in April 1984 when Beijing andThimphu held their first direct discussion on thequestion of boundary settlement.45 The Chinese
insisted upon three claim lines in the western
sector. One was Bhutan’s, maintained since
1956-58 and supported by historical documents,
traditional practices, and surveys. The second
was China’s, based on Chinese maps and earlier
claims and lying inside Bhutan’s Ha, Dukye andBumthang areas close to the Chumbi Valley.
The third lay between these two, still inside
Bhutanese territor y but marking the physicalpresence of Chinese inhabitants secured
through the numerous periodic encroachments

From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s,
Bhutan took a stand which did not conformto the interpretation of earlier decades. The
42

43
44
45

 tephen B. Jones, Boundary Making (Washington, 1945) pp. 101-104; for related reading and reference also see,S
Elizabeth Kolsky, “The Colonial Rule of Law and the Legal Regime of Exception: Frontier “Fanaticism” and State
Violence in British India, American Historical Review ,” vol. 120, no. 4, October 2015.
Kohli, n. 15, p. 37.
Mansingh, n. 28, p. 176.
Muni, n. 32, p. 516.

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Policy Brief

highlighted earlier in this paper.46

repor t on the Beyul-Pasamlung regions, andsubsequently agreed that the next joint technicalfield sur vey should focus on the wester nregions.

The Bhutanese have suspected that China will
refuse to accept the Bhutanese claim line andinstead bargain toughly over its two claim lines.
This will be to eliminate the strategic advantagethat India and Bhutan enjoy over China in the
Chumbi Valley region. That is why China, while
formulating the basic criteria for the settlementof boundaries, added the principle of ‘existing
reality’ (in order to justify its physical presence)
to the traditional references to ‘watershed’and ‘traditional practices of grazing rights andcollection of local taxes.’ Archives reveal that,in 1984, the Bhutanese side did not accept the
principle of ‘existing reality’ that became a key
point of contention during the subsequent roundof talks held in Thimphu following the Beijingtalks.

In 2023, the 12 th Exper t Group Meeting(EGM) discussed a ‘three-step roadmap’ forrestarting stalled Bhutan-China boundary talks.
The EGM, which oversees the actual boundary
talks, was held in Thimphu just four months
after the 11th round of EGM talks in Kunming.
However, the meeting did not announce any
breakthrough in setting a date for the next (25th)round of boundary talks, which have not been
held since 2016. Any deal between Beijing andThimphu that accedes to a “swap arrangement”
between areas to the nor th (including the
Pasamlung Valley) with Doklam to the west
would be of concer n to India, given theproximity to India’s narrow “Siliguri Corridor”
that connects all of India’s northeastern stateswith the rest of India. In March 2023 theBhutanese prime minister disclosed during a
media interview that boundary talks in Thimphu
were expected soon, adding that the process of“demarcating territories” and “drawing a line”
could be completed “after one or two moremeetings.”47

Bhutan and China subsequently signed two
key agreements in 1988, namely, the Guiding
Principles on the Settlement of the Boundar y
Issues and the Agreement on Maintenance ofPeace and Tranquillity along the Border Areas,
to set the base for talks that basically focus
on disputed areas to Bhutan’s north and west,
abutting the Doklam plateau. In 1989, bothcountries claimed the Pasamlung and Jakarlung
valleys, with China of fering Pasamlung andJakarlung in return for Bhutan’s key western
sectors in 1990. Bhutan reasserted its claimsin the western sector in 1996, highlighting its
importance as pastureland and complaining of
the intrusion of herdsmen from China (Tibet)
in disputed regions in the north. China declined
to reduce or go back on any of its claims in
the western sector. In 2000, Bhutan extended
new claims in the western sector and proposed
technical discussions between experts. Almosta decade and a half later in 2014, Bhutan and
China endorsed the joint technical field survey
46
47

Conclusion
Bhutan’s China policy has limited objectives,at least in the shor t term. While securing acomprehensive agreement on the boundar yquestion will remain Bhutan’s priority, its
bilateral and regional initiatives have been driven
by fear and apprehension for its sovereignty,
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y, a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e .
Thimphu, like any nation state, remains intent
on confronting any form of territorial violation
to preser ve its inter nal stability, politicalindependence, and economic development.

I bid.
As cited in the report, “Bhutan-China boundary expert group talks pick up speed, officials hold second meeting thisyear,” The Hindu , May 27, 2023, available at https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/bhutan-china-boundaryexpert-group-talks-pick-up-speed-officials-hold-second-meeting-this-year/article66897804.ece

9Aug 7, 2023

Policy Brief

Since the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, theBhutanese have nursed anxieties of a Chinese
military intervention in the region. The strategy
of prolonging border-related negotiations to
extract maximum strategic concessions is awell-demonstrated tactic displayed by Beijing
across Asia. The long-feared communist threat
still looms large in Himalayan Asia. Perhaps
its manifestation has changed over time into
an aggressive economic-cartographic foreign
policy posturing. The 21 st centur y awaits tosee how Himalayan state politics, particularly
Bhutan’s statecraft as a landlocked countr y,will strive to balance out its limited assets andits longstanding friendship with India with theresolution of its decades-old boundar y issue
with China whilst ensuring that Thimphu does
not lose out territorially to China.

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