Policy Brief

June14,2023
1, 2018
April

Va l é r i e N i q u e t i s s e n i o r
fellow at the Japan Instituteof International A f fairs andhead of the Asia department
at Foundation for Strategic

History and Information Warfare: The
Importance of Okinawa in Chinese
Strategy
Valérie Niquet

Research. She writes
extensively on Asia -Pacif ic
strategic affairs and security.
Her latest book, La puissancec hinoi se en 10 0 que stion s,Tallandier, has been publishedin 2017. You can follow her on
twitter @V.Niquet

Disclaimer :The views expressed in thispublication are those of the authorand do not necessarily reflect thepolicy or position of The Japan
Institute of International Affairs or
any other organization with which
the author is affiliated.

Introduction
In 2012, in order to avoid new tensions over the Senkaku
Islands, the Japanese government purchased the islands of thisarchipelago, which were still held by a private owner. The Chinese
authorities decided to turn this decision into a casus belli, multiplying
denunciations and anti-Japanese demonstrations. It was also after
2012 that we witnessed in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) aproliferation of articles and statements questioning the status ofOkinawa (Ryukyu Islands).1 Far beyond historical questions, thisoffensive, marked by periods of more or less intense activity, has
several objectives that are essentially geostrategic in a complex
game. They touch on the power rivalry with Japan and the desire to
put pressure on the archipelago in connection with the Senkakus, butalso on the role of the United States in the region.
The Geostrategic Importance of Okinawa
The Ryukyu archipelago, one of whose islands, Yonaguni, is only
111 kilometers from Taiwan, occupies an important strategic position
for Japan and its American ally, of course, but also for the PRC.
While Xi Jinping, upon coming to power in 2012, called for the PLA
to be combat-ready and then envisioned “reunification” with Taiwan
in the context of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” thestrategic environment around Taiwan is of considerable importancein all conflict scenarios. Okinawa closes access, through the island
chain that extends from Hokkaido to the Philippines, into the western
Pacific. This limits the Chinese navy’s freedom of maneuver in the1 n op-ed was published in the Global Times in 2010, following an incident
Ainvolving the captain of a Chinese boat, Chen Degong, Jin Dexiong, 日本对琉球无合法主权（Japan has no legal rights over the Senkakus）, 环球时报（GlobalTimes），2010-10-09.

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Policy Brief

event of a conflict, despite the progress made.2
By firing nine missiles into Japan’s exclusive
economic zone off Okinawa during maneuversorganized by the PLA in August 2022, Beijing
also wanted to demonstrate to Tokyo that thearchipelago would not be safe in the event of aconflict in the Strait.3

regional stability and security.5
In December 2022, prior to the release of theNational Security Strategy, an article publishedon the official English-language website of thePeople’s Liberation Army (PLA), citing a Kyodo
Agency dispatch, mentioned the ambition ofJapan’s ruling coalition to build a “OkinawaDefense Unit,” increasing the strength of the15th Brigade of the Ground Self-Defense Force(GSDF) from 2,000 to 3,000 men by 2027. 6 This
strengthening of Japan’s defense capabilities
is clearly a matter of concern for the PRC thatmust be addressed and denounced, including
with info-war operations targeted at Okinawa.

In the East China Sea, as Beijing increases
pressure around the Senkaku Islands, the useof the “Okinawa issue” is openly claimed bysome in Beijing to be a useful tool to pressure
Japanese authorities. This is the position ofZhong Haipeng and Li Guoqiang, two scholars
from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
who in a 2013 op-ed published in the official
People’s Daily called for a re-examination of theRyukyu issue in the context of the Senkakus.
The Global Times, for its part, took up thesame theme in an editorial that states, “IfJapan ultimately chooses to antagonize China,
Beijing should reconsider its current stanceon the Okinawa issue.” 4 Beyond that, China
questions the strategic importance of Okinawa
to Japan and the United States, while the latteris the main obstacle to Chinese ambitions forhegemony in Asia.

Even more than these significant changes inJapan’s defense posture, however, it is the US
presence and the strength of the alliance thatare at stake. Okinawa is home to the largest US
military presence in Asia, and about 40 percentof US forces in Japan are based on the mainisland. They are spread across 32 bases in thearchipelago housing 47,300 personnel, including
26,000 service members. In January 2023, it
was announced that the US would establish a
1,800- to 2,000-man Marine Littoral Regimentin Okinawa that should be operational by2025 to help defend the archipelago’s outlyingislands. 7 For China, addressing the status ofOkinawa is thus an important element of its
indirect interdiction strategy toolbox within an
asymmetric context.

Japan’s National Security Strategy (NSS)
and National Defense Strategy (NDS), releasedin December 2022, emphasize the need forJapan to upgrade its own defense capabilities ina world of increasing threats by, for example,
acquiring longer-range missile capacity, but also
to further strengthen ties with the United States
based on an alliance that remains the core of2

 hong Haipeng, Li Guoqiang, 论 马 关 条 约 与 钓 鱼 岛 问 题（Discussing the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Diaoyu
Z
Islands issue, 人民日报 (People’s Daily), 2013-05-08.  
3 https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/08/a901e23a7695-urgent-chinese-fired-ballistic-missiles-fall-intojapans-eez-govt.html
4 “Ryukyu Issues Offers Leverage to China”, Global Times , 10-05-2013
5 https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/strategy/pdf/strategy_en.pdf
6 Liu Gang, “Let the People of Okinawa Decide the Future of Okinawa,” eng.chinamil.com.cn, 2022-12-05. The project
is not mentioned in the new NDS. However, the United States will dispatch a Marine Corps regiment to Okinawa by2025.
7 "US Marines to Set Up Unit in Okinawa for Defense of Remote Japanese Islands,” Japan Times , 2023-01-10.

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Policy Briefa political line, was echoed by two experts fromthe Academy of Social Sciences, Zhong Haipengand Li Guoqiang, who equated the integration ofOkinawa into the Japanese empire in 1879 withan “invasion”. Like Luo Yuan, they point out that
the Ryukyu Kingdom, which was independent
from 1429 to 1879, paid tribute to the Ming
Empire as early as 1372, long before tribute wasalso paid to the daimyo of Satsuma from 1609.13
In fact, from 1429 to 1879, the Ryukyu Kingdom
played a historically significant trading role as
an intermediary among Edo Japan, which wasofficially closed to the outside world, Taiwan
and the mainland. 14 They also state that the US
unilaterally transferred the Ryukyu Islands toTokyo in 1971.

Mobilizing History to Serve ChineseInterests
In order to achieve these goals of weakening
the legitimacy of the central authorities in
Okinawa and the posture of American forces in
the archipelago, the Chinese regime is usingmeans that are, in various forms, those of
information warfare. 8This three-step strategy was clearly outlined
in an article published in the Global Times in2013.9 The first step is to open public discussionof the Ryukyu issue and establish relatedorganizations without the official involvementof the authorities. The second step is to bring
the Ryukyu issue to the international stage inline with the op-ed: “If Japan tries to sabotage
China’s efforts to raise the issue, China canpromote forces in Okinawa that seek therestoration of independence.”10

In 2019, a new article mentioned that the US
had imposed colonial rule in Okinawa before“returning” the archipelago to Japan in 1971.15
Contrary to the PRC’s claims on the Senkaku
Islands, though, the two experts from theAcademy of Social Sciences contend that “China
does not want to recover the Ryukyu Islands,the Ryukyu Islands were not historically part ofChina, and they were an independent kingdom
paying tribute to China”.16

This first step was implemented in 2012 byquestioning the history of Japan’s legitimacy
in Okinawa, publishing articles denying thelegality of Japan’s jurisdiction over Okinawa, andorganizing academic seminars. 11 In an article
published in the People’s Daily, General LuoYuan, an ideological expert at the Academy ofMilitary Sciences, asked “Do the Ryukyu Islands
belong to Japan?12 His article, intended to define

According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokesman this proliferation of articles on
the Ryukyu Islands only reflected “China’s eng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., The Science of Military Strategy , Military Science Publishing House, Beijing,
P2005; Emiliano Lasiello, “China’s Three Warfare Strategy Mitigates Fallout from Cyber Espionage Activities”,
Journal of Strategic Securities , Vol. 9, Number 2, Summer 2016 https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1489&context=jss9 “Ryukyu Issues Offers Leverage to China”, Global Times , 10-05-2013
10 Idem.
11 Jane Perlez, “Calls Grow in China to Press Claims for Okinawa,” New York Times , 2013-06-13.
12 Luo Yuan, “Do the Ryukyu Islands Belong to Japan?”, People’s Daily Online , 2012-07-22.
13 Zhong Haipeng, Li Guoqiang, op.cit.
14 Robert K. Sakai, “The Satsuma Ryukyu Trade and the Tokugawa Seclusion Policy,” The Journal of Asian Studies ,2011-03-23.
15 陈 静静 Chen Jinjing, “ 美军统治琉球群岛的历史考察 ,” (“Study of the History of United States Rule over the RyukyuArchipelago”), Military History Research , Issue 4, 2019.
16 Zhong Haipeng, Li Guoqiang, op.cit.
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Policy Brief

renewed interest in the islands in light of Japan’s
provocative actions over the Senkaku Islands”.17

they have always been tools employed by
Leninist regimes and political parties associatedwith totalitarian states. Today, as in the past,
it is a matter of manipulating public opinion,
including by means of fake news, and of waging
psychological warfare aimed at demoralizing theopponent and sowing divisions. What is new,however, and what expands the possibilities ofinfluence is the use of the cyber domain, social
media and artificial intelligence. The Japanese
Public Security Intelligence Agency (公安調査庁) report published in 2017 mentions anincrease in influence activities, including cyberbased efforts, from China to Okinawa.21

In fact, China’s strategy is to play on thefrustration of a part of Okinawa’s population
against the central government in Tokyo by
reminding and supporting independentist
opinions that may exist in the archipelago.
This is the third step mentioned in theGlobal Times article published in 2013, which
also suggests promoting exchanges withJapanese organizations that support Okinawan
independence.18In 2022, Okinawa University professor
emeritus Liu Gang, who is presented on theuniversity’s website as a specialist in ChinaJapan relations and the Okinawa issue,
published an article on the official websiteof the People’s Liberation Army titled: “Letthe People of Okinawa Decide the Future ofOkinawa”. 19 A mobilization of activists basedin Hong Kong or Taiwan is also apparent. In2016, an article published by Zhao Dong, whofounded a “Preparatory Committee of theRyukyu Autonomous Region” in Hong Kong in2010, questioned the legality of the Japanese“occupation” of the Ryukyu archipelago.20

In the context of a possible conflict in theTaiwan Strait, China is also using the weapon offear to widen divisions between the Okinawan
people and the central government, as well asbetween Japan and its American ally, hyping
the risks of being drawn into a war. This is oneof the meaning of the Chinese live-fire missile
launches into Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone
off Okinawa in August 2022: to better underscore
the risks Tokyo is taking by getting involved ina conflict in the Taiwan Strait. This increased
pressure aimed at attacking the enemy’s moraleand resolve is intended as a response to Japan’s
increased commitment to defense since the mid2010s, which continued with the new National
Security Strategy in December 2022.

Cyber and Information WarfareThis questioning of the history and legitimacyof the Japanese presence in Okinawa is part ofa strategy of information warfare, integrated
into the united-front operations that are at theheart of China’s strategic thinking. Informationwarfare and propaganda are not new elements;
1718192021

In his article “Let the People of Okinawa
Decide the Future of Okinawa,” Liu Gang points
out that “by adopting a more active defense
strategy, certain places in Japan become focal
points for improving and implementing these oreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying press briefing, 2013-04-26 in Justin McCurry, “China Lays Claim toF
Okinawa as Territory Dispute with Japan Escalates,” The Guardian , 15-05-2013
"Ryukyu Issues Offers Leverage to China,” Global Times , 10-05-2013
Liu Gang, op.cit.
促日归还琉球中国人你告上国际法庭，(Chinese Go to International Court to Urge Japan to Give Back the Ryukyus)
自由时报 (Liberty Times)，https://www.ltn.com.tw/, 02-08-2016
内外情勢の回顧と展望、(Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situation), 公安調査庁、平成２９年１月
and Dylan Buck, “China in the Asia Pacific Cyber Domain: Okinawa and the South China Sea Case Studies,” Marine
Corps Gazette , December 2021

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military plans...This is the case in Okinawa
and the Ryukyu Islands.” Supporting the peace
movement by recalling the past, he writes:“The local people in Okinawa all feel that theatmosphere of preparation for war is getting
closer. Public opinion in Okinawa is more antiwar than in mainland Japan”. 22

Finally, China supports and encourages
people-to-people contacts between Okinawa andthe mainland, notably through the establishmentof a sister province relationship between
Fujian Province and Okinawa, recalling thesix centuries of friendly contacts between theRyukyu Kingdom and the mainland. Economic
interests are also leveraged, highlighting theimportance of Chinese tourists with direct links
to the mainland, who accounted for more than
25% of tourists to the island before the Covid-19
pandemic.

This mobilization of fear and pacifist
sentiment, which is particularly strong in Japan,
is not new. In the 1960s and 1970s, there weremuch more violent mobilizations against therenewal of the defense treaty between Japan andthe United States. The aim of weakening the USJapan alliance and interfering with the freedomof maneuver and decision of American forces
stationed in the region remains a constant but
the PRC has now replaced the Soviet Union as
the main player.

Conclusion
One of the objectives of China’s informationoperations in Okinawa after 2012 has been to
support its territorial claims over the Senkaku
Islands by putting pressure on Tokyo. Beyond
this objective, China’s information operations
in Okinawa are also part of its broader efforts to
influence public opinion and shape perceptionsin the region in order to improve its status
and strategic advantages by weakening US
influence and the Japan-US defense alliance andundermining the legitimacy of the US militarypresence in the region. In order to achieve theseobjectives, China uses historical disinformation,
propaganda, and influence operations targeting
local populations, economic and politicalinterests as well as public opinion leaders.
China’s information operations in Okinawa
are thus a part of its broader efforts to shapeperceptions and advance its strategic interests
by targeting what is perceived in the PRC asa “weak link” in a region of major strategic
importance.

Liu Gang asserts: “Japanese politicians
have hyped Taiwan’s emergency as Japan’s
emergency and regard Okinawa as a naturalbarrier to protect the Japanese mainland”.23 It
is a matter of mobilizing the tragic memory ofWorld War II and the civilian casualties in thearchipelago to declare, as Governor Denny
Tamaki does, that “war must never happen
again” and to refuse to see Okinawa becomea “target” by being involved against its will ina possible conflict. This theme is taken up by
associations such as the Association for the
Study of the Question of the Independenceo f t h e R y u k y u N a t i o n , 24 t h e O k i n a w a
Environmental Justice Project, whose director,
Hideki Yoshikawa, declares “China will hit
bases in Okinawa if Japan is involved by planor accident”,25 and the “No More Okinawa-Sen”
movement, created in March 2022. 262223242526

 iu Gang, op.cit.
LXing Xiaojing, “Reelected Okinawa Governor Wishes to Inject Hope, Transition Prefecture from a Conflict-Ridden
US Military Base Hub to a Cultural and Tourist Region,” Global Times , 06-11-2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202211/1278815.shtml
Eiichiro Ishiyama, “Ryukyu Pro-Independence Group Quietly Gathering Momentum”, Japan Times , 2015-01-26.
http://okinawaejp.blogspot.com/p/about-project.html
nomore-okinawasen.org

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