Policy Brief

June1, 2018
Feb 20,2023

Va l é r i e N i q u e t i s s e n i o r
fellow at the Japan Instituteof International A f fairs andhead of the Asia department
at Foundation for Strategic

Democratization and Inter national
Relations:
The Case of Japan-Taiwan Relations
Valérie Niquet

Research. She writes
extensively on Asia -Pacif ic
strategic affairs and security.
Her latest book, La puissancec hinoi se en 10 0 que stion s,
Tallandier, has been publishedin 2017. You can follow her on
twitter @V.Niquet

Disclaimer :The views expressed in thispublication are those of the authorand do not necessarily reflect thepolicy or position of The Japan
Institute of International Affairs or
any other organization with which
the author is affiliated.

In the new national security document released by Japan in
December 2022, Tokyo states that Japan’s basic position on theRepublic of China (Taiwan) remains unchanged. However, it alsodeclares that “Taiwan is an extremely impor tant par tner and a
precious friend of Japan, with whom Japan shares fundamental
values, including democracy.” 1 In a context of growing global
tensions between countries that share a set of common values,
including a commitment to the fundamental principles of democracy,
and autocracies grouped around Russia and the People’s Republicof China (PRC), relations with Taiwan have thus deepened beyond
common strategic interests. The remarkable development sincethe 1980s of Taiwan’s democracy, which now ranks 11th among
the world’s democracies and first in Asia, has implications for thenature of relations between Japan and Taiwan.2 The issue of trust,often raised by the PRC authorities to explain the recurrent tensions
between Beijing and Tokyo, is in fact an essential element in themanagement of relations between Tokyo and Taipei. This trust isalso based on Taiwan’s democratic specificity unique in the Chineseworld. Indeed, the nature of the political systems and their degreeof openness weigh on the positive or negative evolution of relations
between two states formerly bound by ties of colonial subordinationor occupation.
Japan’s Role in Taiwan’s Democratization Process
The history of Japanese-Taiwanese relations is often considered
only from the perspective of the long history of colonization of theisland between 1895 and 1945.3 The relative absence of resentment on1
2
3

https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html
https://atlasocio.com/classements/politique/democratie/classement-etatspar-indice-de-democratie-monde.php
Taiwan became the first Japanese colony after the signing of the Treaty ofShimonoseki with the Qing Empire in 1895.

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Policy Brief

the part of the Taiwanese population, in contrast
to the situation in the People’s Republic ofChina and the Republic of Korea, with nuances
depending on the political majorities in the latter
case, is sometimes noted with wonder. While
Japanese colonization of Taiwan was not without
its tensions and repression, it also allowed
a relatively large faction of Taiwan’s elites,
through a significant higher education programand other means, to come into contact with ademocratic mode of operation, especially during
the period known as Taisho democracy in Japan.
In this respect, Japan offered opportunities that
the Republic of China, mired in civil war andwarlordism, could not. As for Chiang Kai-shek’s
Kuomintang (KMT), which came to power inNanjing in the 1920s, its inspiration was more
Leninist than democratic.

and the emergence of a pluralistic society
thus came to Taiwan through the Japanesecolonizer, which represented a model of nonWestern modernity in Asia for Sun Yat-sen andothers.4 The role of Taiwanese students in Japanbetween 1915 and 1935 is impor tant in thisregard: they published a newspaper in Chinese,
the Shinminpo 新 民 报 , as early as 1920 andinvited Sun Yat-sen to visit Taiwan to talk about
the “new China”.5 Culturally, Japan’s influenceat the time could be felt not only in the social
sciences, but also in the arts, cinema, popular
music and lifestyles.
Today, it is rather the “positive”, idealized
aspect of the Japanese colonial period thatis presented in Taiwan by pro-independence
spheres, provoking regular condemnations
from Beijing, whose “united front” operations
are, on the contrar y, aimed at strengthening
pro-Chinese, nationalist currents on the island,including the Kuomintang, which has long
dominated political life on the island. 6 This
perception is reinforced by the fact that Japan
also allowed pro-independence movements toestablish themselves on its territory during theimposition of martial law (1949-1987) in Taiwan
by the Kuomintang nationalist authorities whotook refuge on the island after the Communist
Party seized power on the mainland on October
1, 1949. The Taiwan Youth Society 台灣青年年社，which supported Taiwan independence, wasestablished in the archipelago in 1960. It became
the 台 灣 親 年 圖 利 聯 盟 (Taiwan IndependenceAlliance) in 1965.

Despite its limitations, which can be foundin other Western countries at the same time,
the process of gradual democratization thatbegan in Japan in the Meiji era (1868-1912) andaccelerated under the Taisho era (1912-1926)
is real. It has long served as a model for otheraspirational nationalist movements in Asia. It
was in Japan that Kuomintang figures such as
Sun Yat-sen, the first president of the Republic ofChina after the overthrow of the Manchu (Qing)
dynasty in 1912, found refuge. Many conceptsof Western political philosophy were introduced
into China from Japan, where they had beentranslated at the end of the 19th century.
Colonization thus introduced to Taiwan
a political culture that had developed in thearchipelago since the Meiji period, which
experienced a period of relative liberalization
during the 1920s before militarism took controlof Japanese democratic life. Political modernity
456Japan is also a model for soft power. Since
democratization and the end of the rule of aKuomintang that insisted almost exclusively on
the influence of classical Chinese culture and hilippe Chevalerian, “Taiwan from the 1930s to the 1950s: the birth of a pluralist society,” Chinese World, 2019/2,P
no. 58.
Liao Ping-Hui, David De-Wei Wang, eds, Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule: History, Culture, Memory, New York,
Columbia University press, 2006.
“ 赴 陸 倡「 認 識 對 日 抗 戰 史 」 退 將 鄭 旗 生： 因 為 台 灣 不 講 了 ,” 20-08-2019 in https://www.ettoday.net/
news/20190820/1517136.htm

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Policy Brief

Sinicization, cross-cultural relations with Japan
have become an impor tant dimension. The
Taiwan Design Center, for example, organizes
numerous collaborations with Japanesedesigners. In this field, as in fashion, references
to Japan, a non-Western model of contemporary
creativity, are omnipresent, as if to better reflect
the island’s specificity against the exclusivereferences to Chinese culture. On the other
hand, contrar y to China, Taiwan is perceived
positively by more than 80% of the Japanesepublic.7

pressure and gray zone strategies used by thePRC against Taiwan are also used against Japan.
As tensions between the two sides of the
Taiwan Strait have increased, relations with
Taiwan have taken center stage in the strategic
debate in Japan, with increasing consideration
being given to the question of a possible incident
in the Strait. Tokyo’s new national strategy,
released in December 2022, identifies China as
the main “unprecedented” challenge to security
and stability. The joint communique from theJune 2021 meeting between President Biden andPrime Minister Suga mentioned a commitment
to “peace and security in the Taiwan Strait”, thefirst such mention in more than 50 years. This
formula will be repeated when President Bidenand Prime Minister Kishida meet in Januar y2023.8 The issue of Taiwan is now at the heartof the security alliance between Tokyo andWashington, and one of the main reasons forJapan’s increased military budgetary efforts andredeployment of capacities.

Common values and strategic interests
Because of this dual ideological and strategic
dimension, Taiwan occupies an increasingly
impor tant place in Japan’s foreign strategy
in the face of a China that is not abandoning
its aggressive posture despite the health andeconomic uncer tainties facing the regime.
In 2022, China’s growth rate did not exceed
3%, according to official figures, and after anabrupt change of policy following three yearsof complete closure, the Covid epidemic has
affected several hundred million people and thefuture remains uncertain.

Par t of the strategic community in Tokyo
is now making relations with Taiwan a central
point of its positioning, yesterday against thespread of communism in Asia, today in support
of a democratic “community of values”, the mostimportant of which, at the crossroads between
the strategic and ideological dimensions, is therefusal to use force to impose a change in thestatus quo, be it in Ukraine or in the Taiwan
Strait.

During the massive militar y exercisesorganized by Beijing in August 2022 to tr yand influence Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit toTaiwan and to demoralize Taiwan with a showof force unprecedented since the 1990s, several
missiles landed in Japan’s exclusive economic
zone of f the coast of Okinawa in an obvious
attempt to put pressure on Japan and Japanesepublic opinion. Japan, which hosts the largest
US bases in Asia and whose Yonaguni Island at
the southwestern tip of the archipelago is 111
km from Taiwan, will be on the front line in theevent of a crisis between Beijing and Taipei. The
78The intensity and public nature of thedebate in Japan on the Taiwan question, fueledby growing public concer n over Beijing’s
aggressive strategy, demonstrates a change inattitudes and orientations in favor of Taiwan,
whose image is increasingly positive. In the uring the colonial period, Japan was also inspired by Taiwanese folk art production, which was integrated intoD
the reflections on “folk art” (mingei ) close to the Arts and Crafts movement in the United Kingdom. In 1927, anexhibition in Tokyo highlighted the creativity of Taiwanese artists and visual artists.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/01/13/remarks-by-president-biden-andprime-minister-kishida-of-japan-before-bilateral-meeting/3Feb 20,2023

Policy Brief

media and public opinion as well as at thehighest levels of government, more and more
people are expressing positions favorable toTaiwanese democracy. In that domain, thecounter example of the Ukraine war also plays asignificant role.

by Taiwan. Today, the website of the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Taiwan reiterates the positionof the Republic of China on the “Diaoyutai
Islands dispute”, reaffirming that these islets
are part of the territory of the Republic of China(Taiwan), but the tone remains moderate. 10
This is a far cr y from the aggressive attitude
that characterizes Beijing’s positions on theissue. For instance, the Chinese (PRC) ForeignMinistr y’s website refers to “Japan’s frequent
provocations on Diaoyu Dao and its affiliatedislands and on historical issues”.11

Conclusion: The Senkaku Islands
The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai) question
provides an example of the positive factor of
democracy in the management of bilateralrelations, despite the persistence of a disputein the eyes of the Republic of China (Taiwan).
Since the early 1970s, after the publication of asurvey on oil and gaz potential resources in thevicinity, both Taiwan and the People’s Republicof China have officially claimed these Japaneseterritories.9 In 2012, at the height of tensions
between the Chinese regime and Japan after
Tokyo bought the islands from their private
owner, which did not change the territorial
status of the islets, President Ma Ying-jeou(KMT) sent coast guard ships to suppor t
Taiwanese activists operating near the islets.
In this matter, the Taiwanese KMT authorities
followed the position of Beijing, which hassince increased naval pressure around thearchipelago, sending hundreds of ships ever yyear to try to change the status quo by force andcoercion.

Moreover, the PRC is increasing its naval
incursions near or in the territorial waters of
the Senkakus, using a “gray zone” strategy
with Japan as with Taiwan. Japan nonethelesssigned a fisheries agreement with Taiwan in2013 that allows Taiwanese vessels to fish in a
7,400-square-kilometer area near the claimed
area but excluding the territorial waters aroundthe Senkakus. The agreement stipulates thatfishermen will be subject only to their own laws.
For Tokyo, this was a strategic step forward inthat Prime Minister Abe sought to avoid Beijing
and Taipei sharing a common position on theissue when the KMT was in power on the island.
Whatever its limitations, this agreement, whichis regularly amended, demonstrates that anarrangement based on dialogue and the refusal
to use force is possible with a par tner that
respects the values of international law and that,like West Germany and France during the ColdWar, shares common strategic interests.12In contrast however, Taiwan’s proposal foran “East China Sea Peace Initiative,” presentedby President Ma on August 9, 2012, called for a“shelving” of the controversy and did not impose
any sovereignty preconditions on possibletalks. This initiative was addressed to both thePeople’s Republic of China and Japan, while in2013 Beijing defined an ADIZ that included theSenkakus administered by Tokyo and claimed
9 onika Chansoria, “1969 Report by the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East : A Turning Point in theMHistorical debate over Senkaku Islands”, Japan Review, vol.2 n°3, Winter 2018.
10 https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1331&s=34199
11 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2721_663446/
12 Tetsuo Kotani, “Japan Taiwan Fishery Agreement, Strategic Success Tactical Failure”, AMTI.CSIS.org

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