Policy Brief

June25,
1, 2018
June
2019

Jonathan Berkshire Miller is
a Tokyo-based Senior Fellow
at The Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs. He is alsoa Distinguished Fellow with
the Asia-Pacific Foundationof Canada and regularly
contributes to a range of
media, journals and magazines
on East Asian security matters.
Follow him on Twitter @jbmllr
Dr T homas S. Wilkins iscurrently a Senior Fellow at theJapan Institute for International
Affairs in Tokyo. He is normallybased as a Senior Lecturer inInternational Security at the
University of Sydney, Australia.
He specializes in securit yissues in t he A sia Pacif ic
region and has published on
this subject in journals such as
Review of International Studies,International Relations of the
Asia Pacific and the Australian

The Role for Middle Powers in theFree and Open Indo-Pacific: Looking
at Oppor tunities for Canada andAustralia
1

Jonathan Berkshire Miller & Thomas S. Wilkins
The Indo-Pacific, as a geographic concept that connects the vast
oceans of Pacific and the Indian along with the states in between, is
not a new idea. Indeed, the idea of a broader geographic region –rather than more traditional subsets such as East Asia, South Asia,
or the more expansive Asia-Pacific – has been used for more than adecade by scholars and practitioners in the region. An Indian naval
captain began using the concept in geopolitical terms more than adecade ago, but the terminology has not been limited to scholars
in Delhi. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, back during his firststint as Prime Minister in 2007, spoke to India’s parliament about his
country’s vision for Indo-Pacific noting a “confluence of the two seas”2and pressed for a need to transcend beyond traditional frameworks
that often separated or minimized the geopolitical connections
between South Asian and the Indian Ocean region with that of East
Asia and the Pacific.
But, while not new, the Indo-Pacific framing has been quickly
gaining currency by actors in the region, with Japan and the UnitedStates declaring Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategies orvisions, in addition to other regional approaches by India, Australia

Journal of International Affairs,
among others.

Disclaimer :The views expressed in thispublication are those of the authorand do not necessarily reflect thepolicy or position of The Japan
Institute of International Affairs or
any other organization with which
the author is affiliated.

1 This policy brief is based off a range of discussions, meetings andpresentations that the authors had during an academic outreach trip to California
in May 2019. The authors engaged with a number of scholars, officials and policy
makers on the Indo-Pacific and the role of middle powers, such as Canada andAustralia. Some of these stakeholders included: the RAND Corporation, the Milken
Institute, the Korean Consulate in Los Angeles, the Japanese Consulate in Los
Angeles, the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, the Japan
Society of Northern California and Stanford University.
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Confluence of the Seas: Speech by H.E.Mr.
Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India,”
August 2007.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html

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June
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Policy Briefand Indonesia. According to Washington, ina recent Repor t released by the Depar tmentof Defence (DOD), the FOIP is based upon
the principles of (i) respect for sovereign
independence, (ii) peaceful resolution of
disputes, (iii) free, fair and reciprocal trade
based on open investment, transparent
a g r e e m e n t s , a n d c o n n e c t i v i t y, a n d ( i v )adherence to international rules and norms,(including those of freedom of navigation andoverflight).3

To be sure, the Indo-Pacific is facing a hostof shared security challenges, from maritime
piracy and crime, to heated territorial disputes
and a pressing need to enhance regional
capacity and r eadiness for humanitarianassistance and disaster relief to mitigate theimpact of natural disasters. In the vast maritime
space of the region – stretching from East Africa
to the Pacific island chains – the foundations ofregional commerce and security are secured
through the freedom of navigation and securesea lines of communication. These areas are
crucial for all states in the region – including
middle powers such as Canada and Australia– as they are both deeply invested in securesupply chains through its economic integration
with the CPTPP.

The United States emphasized theimpor tance of this change by r enaming
its former US Pacific Command – militar yheadquarters for the region based in Hawaii –to the US Indo-Pacific Command last year.4 The
concept has also sparked interest of likemindedstates in Europe – with France, the United
Kingdom both demonstrating a keen interest inpromoting their own engagement in the IndoPacific. Earlier this year, the French aircraft
carrier – the Charles de Gaulle – set course
for its journey from the Mediterranean Sea to
Singapore, traversing through the Indian Ocean
region and working with regional partners on
its way. The British have also made similar
deployments in recent years. Last year, the Royal
Navy dispatched three ships that traversed theSouth China Sea alongside a contingent from
France’s navy. During the trip, the UK vessels
conducted a freedom of navigation patrol in thewaters near the Paracel islands in the disputed
South China Sea.5

There is great economic oppor tunity inthe region for both Canada and Australia
with large economies and diverse fast-paced
growth in many middle-size economies. Thatsaid, alongside this economic growth is a large
demand for infrastructure development in theregion – with the ADB estimating that there is aneed for more than $25 trillion in infrastructure
by 2030. 6 To fill this void, several regional
powers have the ability to work with states in
the region for a sustainable way forward basedon fair-lending, transparent institutions and longterm growth. This is an area that middle powers,
such as Canada and Australia, can join otherstates – such as the US, Japan, and states from
Europe – to push forward on and make uniquecontributions.

3 US Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked
Region,” June 1, 2019, p. 4.
https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATEGY_REPORT_
JUNE_2019.PDF
4 US Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Holds Change of Command Ceremony,” May 2018.
https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1535776/us-indo-pacific-command-holds-change-ofcommand-ceremony/
5 Tim Kelly, “British Navy warship sails near South China Sea islands, angering Beijing,” Reuters, September 6, 2018.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-china-southchinasea-exclusive/exclusive-british-navy-warship-sails-nearsouth-china-sea-islands-angering-beijing-idUSKCN1LM017
6 Asian Development Bank, “Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs,” February 2017.
https://www.adb.org/publications/asia-infrastructure-needs

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Yet, alongside these economic opportunities
are a number of key challenges to the rules
and order in the region that have underpinned
security and prosperity for the littoral states.
China continues to favour coercive actions
rather than adherence to international law withregard to its salami-slicing tactics in Southand East China Seas.7 These concerns in themaritime realm are not limited to the Eastand South China Seas. In the Indian Ocean
region, there has been a build-up of Chinese
infrastructure development in critical areas suchas deep ports in Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Thesemoves continue to draw anxiety from states in
the region, who are wary of China’s long-term
geopolitical motivations through its signature
Belt and Road Initiative.

shared views on the region through its jointstatement with India last year – where the twosides agreed to “reaf firm the impor tance of
lawful commerce and the freedom of navigationand over-flight throughout the Indo-Pacificregion, in accordance with international law”.9
Despite this however, Canada has been
hesitant to embrace the FOIP concept.
The traditional lens for Ottawa to look at
engagement has been through the Asia-Pacificframing – defining the region largely throughour experience in the multilateral architecturesuch as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) on the trade side, and the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional
Forum on the political-security side. Canada wasa founding member of APEC in 1990 and has
been a dialogue partner in the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) since its formation in 1994. Asidefrom these two main vehicles, Canada has been
active in the international development spaceover the years through and is member of the
Asian Development Bank, and more recently
joined – while not before considerable internal
debate – the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank in 2017.10

Canada’s Approach to the Free and Open
Indo-PacificCanada has shown an interest in being moreengaged in the Indo-Pacific region. During thevisit of Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to
Ottawa in late April, Canadian Prime Minister
Justin Tr udeau noted a “shared vision formaintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region
based on the rule of law”.8 The statement was
Canada’s first high-level endorsement of theimportance of Indo-Pacific strategies, of which
many key regional players like the US, Japan,
Australia, India and Indonesia have alreadyadopted. But, while the visit with Japan was
the first upfront embrace of the Indo-Pacificconcept, Ottawa has in fact already outlined its

This multilateral underpinning is ofcourse complemented by a range of diverse
bilateral relations in the region, with different
opportunities and challenges. China and Japan– the second and third largest economies– are the two most critical relationships interms of trade value, but there are growing

7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding
the Senkaku Islands, and Japan’s Response – Records of Intrusions of Chinese Government and Other Vessels into
Japan’s Territorial Sea,” June 2019.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html
8 Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister of Canada Announces Closer Cooperation with Japan,” April 2019.
https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2019/04/28/prime-minister-canada-announces-closer-collaboration-japan
9 Prime Minister of Canada, “India-Canada Joint Statement: Partnership for Security and Growth,” February 2018.
https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2018/02/23/india-canada-joint-statement-partnership-security-and-growth
10 Philip Calvert, “Canada’s Decision to Join the AIIB is Smart Politics and Economics,” Nikkei Asian Review, September
to 2016.
https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Philip-Calvert-Canada-s-move-to-join-the-AIIB-is-smart-politics-and-economics

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relationships with a host of other partners in
the region too – including South Korea (withwhich Canada inked a Free Trade Agreement in2014), Taiwan, India and the individual member
states of ASEAN. Underscoring these growing
relationships – at least in economic terms – isthe Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
for the Trans-Pacific Par tnership, a megaregional free trade pact that Canada ratified,along with 10 other states in the region, lastyear.11Harjit Sajjan visited the Shangri-la Dialogue in
Singapore for the fourth consecutive year. The
Dialogue, hosted under the stewardship of theInternational Institute of Strategic Studies in
the UK, is the premier security and defense
summit in Asia and has become a “must-attend”
event for officials, policy makers and scholars
focused on the region’s wide range of emerging
security issues – of which strategic competition
between the United States and China is top ofmind in recent years. Immediately following theShangri-la Dialogue, Sajjan visited Japan for an
important bilateral visit which was hosted by
Japan’s Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya. During
Sajjan’s visit, Canada and Japan agreed to work
cooperatively to advance a “free and open IndoPacific”.12 Indeed, when thinking about Canada’s
engagement in the region, our relations withJapan must be first of mind.

But yet, despite a long histor y ofengagement, the consistency of Canada’s roleoften appears unmoored and not fully alignedwith our interests and stakes in the significant
geopolitical shifts taking place in the region. A
frequent critique from stakeholders and officials
in the region is that Canada must make a moreconsistent and comprehensive approach that
demonstrates an investment of time and capitalthat goes beyond merely trade and investment.
Specifically, there is a need and desire – atleast from most states – for a strong Canadianvoice on political-security developments in theregion, be it on maritime security, nuclear nonproliferation or humanitarian assistance anddisaster relief (HADR). This is where the tenets,
r ules and values that form the basis of theemerging growth of Indo-Pacific frameworks
will help Canada better serve its interests andpromote its role.

As Canada’s looks to reorient its defense
posture to be more active in the Indo-Pacific,
Japan should be the logical cor nerstone ofsuch efforts. During the visit of Sajjan to Tokyoin June, Canada and Japan underscored theimportance of the Acquisition of Cross Servicing
Agreement (ACSA) signed last year. Thisagreement will strengthen cooperation between
the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and theJapanese Self-Defense Forces and will allow bothcountries to make efficient use of each other’s
militar y equipment during operations andexercises in Canada, Japan and other locations.
The agreement will also advance cooperation
between the two countries in response tohumanitarian and disaster crises, peacekeeping

The role for Canada in the Indo-Pacific
In June 2019, Canada’s Defense Minister

11 Global Affairs Canada, “CPTPP Explainer,” June 2019.
https://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/index.
aspx?lang=eng
12 Department of National Defence of Canada, “Joint Statement of the Ministry of Defense of Japan and theDepartment of National Defence of Canada on Defense Cooperation,” June 2019.
https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2019/06/joint-statement-of-the-ministry-of-defense-ofjapan-and-the-department-of-national-defence-of-canada-on-defense-cooperation.html

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initiatives, and allow greater collaboration withthird-partners, including the US.13

of course draws a stark contrast to China’s
increasingly hostile posture in the region,
marked by its militarization of man-made islandsin the South China Sea and its unfair and nontransparent lending practices through its Beltand Road Initiative. Not to mention its coercive
attempts – through the arbitrar y detention of
two of our citizens and sealing off much of themarket for our exporters of canola and soybeans– to force Canada to relent on the sensitive
extradition case of Huawei chief financial
officer Meng Wanzhou. Going forward Canada
should continue to enhance our ties with Japan– a natural partner in the region – and otherkey middle powers such as Australia, states in
ASEAN and South Korea, to work closely andpursue our interests in the Indo-Pacific.

In addition to the ACSA agreement,
both sides are moving towards greaterinteroperability between their militaries witha growth in joint exercises and high-levelexchanges. In 2017, the two sides commenced
bilateral naval drills dubbed “Kaedex” (“kaede
meaning maple leaf in Japanese) and theCanadian navy also participated as a trilateral
par ticipant last year in the US-Japan “KeenSword” naval exercises. Canada has also beenworking with Japan, and other allies in the Five
Eyes intelligence network, to help monitor
and disrupt attempts by North Korea to evadesanctions over its nuclear and missiles programs– through surveillance of ship-to-ship transfersin the East China Sea. 14 Moreover, in 2018
Canadian General Wayne Eyre was appointed as
Deputy Commander of the UN Command on the
Korean peninsula – marking the first time a nonUS general assumed the role.

How can Canada become more involved in
the emerging Indo-Pacific framework? First,
Canada must assertively and unapologeticallypromote its interests and values in the region –most of which align closely to its key partners
there such as the US, Japan, Australia, andmember states in ASEAN. For example, if
one closely inspects the FOIP policies by
Washington and Tokyo, they will find moreconvergence than divergence with regard to
Canadian interests. The US strategy stresses
the need to “promote transparency, openness,rule of law, and the protection of human rights
and fundamental freedom”.15 Tokyo meanwhilestresses the importance of peace and stability
in the region through common r ules, open
investment and the provision of international
public goods. Most would agree these are rules
and norms the Canada also subscribes too. A

But there are more steps to go in this nascentsecurity relationship. This past April, during thevisit of Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to
Ottawa, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau madethe first high-level Canadian endorsement ofa “free and open Indo-Pacific” – a vision thatis shared by other like-minded states, suchas the US, Australia and Japan. This vision
fundamentally rests on the maintenance of arules-based international order premised oncommon norms, laws and practices, with anaim at reducing the potential for conflict andpromoting sustainable development. This

13 Global Affairs Canada, “Canada and Japan sign Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement to strengthen military
cooperation,” April 2018.
https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/04/canada-and-japan-sign-acquisition-and-cross-servicingagreement-to-strengthen-military-cooperation.html
14 Department of National Defence, “Operation NEON,” June 2019.
https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-neon.html
15 US Department of State, “Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, “ November 2018.
https://www.state.gov/advancing-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-region/

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corollary to this is that greater engagement with
the Indo-Pacific would help us further national
areas of excellence desperately need in theregion’s approach to preventive diplomacy, suchas women, peace and security.

officially adopted the moniker “Free and OpenIndo Pacific” like its American and Japanese
partners to badge its regional strategy, with the
cognate term “open, inclusive and prosperous
Indo–Pacific” featuring instead in the 2017
Foreign Policy White Paper.16 Some variations
on the term naturally appear in surrounding
discourses – “a free, open, inclusive andprosperous Indo-Pacific” – has been used injoint statements with the US and Japan – but
this slight distinction does not amount to any
tangible difference from the core precepts of theFOIP (described in the introduction).

Second, Canada can manage both an effective
and pragmatic relationship with China, andsimultaneously enhance its engagement with
Indo-Pacific region. Beijing may be wary of theframing of Indo-Pacific, because of its tense
relations with Washington under the Trumpadministration, but it would incorrect to label thedifferent national approaches as a containment
strategy aimed at China. Rather than alliancepolitics, this is a loose grouping of likeminded
and progressive states that are standing up for aprosperous and stable region that follows rules
and maintains a sustainable trajectory – not tobenefit one, but for the region as a whole. Thisis something Canada should stand up for, andit should not let its recent bilateral difficulties
with Beijing distract it from the larger strategic
dynamics playing out in the region.

So, what form does Canberra’s participationin the FOIP take, in the context of a broader
Australian Indo Pacific strategy (IPs)? There isno one specific policy document or declarationthat embodies Australia’s IPs, but rather it isrepresents a compound of individual and joint
policies and initiatives which sync with the FOIP
concept. In this shor t briefing it is useful to
unpack its ideological, security and economic
dimensions, all of which are intertwined.
Behind the Australian “vision” of an “IndoPacific Century”, destined to bring regional andnational prosperity, there are three premises.17
First among these is the “r elocation” ofAustralia’s strategic frame of reference to the
newly identified “Indo Pacific” region itself.
The recent Defence and Foreign Policy White
papers codified a shift in the locus and scopeof regional interaction to the “Indo Pacific” asgeopolitical construct. Influential Australian
figures had long advocated for a refocusing on
the Indo Pacific, aside from the extant “Asia
Pacific”, as recognition not only of India’s riseto economic and strategic prominence, but as abetter reflection of the actual region Australia

Finally, just as engaging China and the IndoPacific framework are not mutually exclusive,
so ar e the fundamentals of our existingengagements in the region. Ottawa will continue
to be a key part of APEC, the ARF, ADB andother multilateral fora – with ASEAN at the core
– but it need not pursue this road in isolationfrom cooperation that makes sense with regional
partners and allies.
Australia’s Indo Pacific Vision
The first thing to note with r egar d toAustralia’s appr oach to the FOIP is thenomenclature employed. Canber ra has not

16 Australian Government, “Overview”, in 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Barton ACT: Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, 2017), pp. 1-10.
17 Cameron Hill, “Australia in the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Century: Rewards, Risks, Relationships,” in Parliamentary Library
Briefing Book (Canberra ACT: Parliamentary Library, 2013), pp. 144-145.

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itself inhabits at the intersection of these two
great Oceans.18

close Special Strategic Partnership with Japan,
as the best way to uphold or enforce the RBO
and secure the Indo Pacific in accord with its
national interests. In cor respondence withthe recently released American Indo PacificStrategy Repor t, which outlines replacement
US grand strategy for the Pivot, Canberra isseeking deeper partnerships with Japan, India,
and key SEA states in a bid to uphold the RBO
semi-independently and collectively, alongside
the central role expected of the US.20

Second is the oft-repeated gover nment
commitment to a “Rule-based International
Or der” (RBO) which the FOIP str ongly
advocates. This has long been an identifiable
theme for a “middle power” countr y like
Australia, which, based solely upon its own
national capabilities, cannot afford to engage
in a no-holds barred struggle of power politics,
but rather seeks a “liberal internationalist”
posture which emphasizes international norms
and institutions, sovereignty, rule-of-law, noncoercion and all-round “good inter national
citizenship”.19 The RBO concept has become anincreasingly prolific mantra in Canberra’s policy
declarations as the best method to achieve
regional stability and prosperity. Not so implicitin the RBO concept is a resistance to Chinese
revisionist attempts to expand its strategic
space and influence across the region in ways
viewed as detrimental to the existing order, as
evidenced through the Belt and Road Initiative(BRI, Shanghai Cooperation organisation,
and Asian Infrastructure Development Bank(AIIB), for example. Instead, Australia alongsideits close US and Japanese par tners seeks toprovide an alternative to a future regional order
dominated by China in contradiction with theseliberal internationalist principles.

Security Considerations for Australia
The primar y drivers behind Australia’sinterest in the FOIP are security concerns.
While broader “Non-Traditional Security” (NTS)
issues remain prominent in Australian thinking,for example: terrorism, irregular populations
movements, climate change, or financial or
humanitarian crises, it is the newly arrived eraof great power competition that is most vexes
strategic planners in Canberra. Based upon its
growing economic and strategic weight in theregion, China has moved from “biding its timeand hiding its capabilities” to a newfound policyof “assertiveness” pushing out its strategic spaceand regional influence by a variety of meansthat have set alarm bells ringing in Canberra as
portents of a “new Cold War”.
Chinese militarisation of the contested South
China Sea (in violation of international law
and prior agreements with the US), the use of
economic coercion against Canada, Japan andSouth Korea, among others, and its attempts
to establish a regional foothold in Australia’s“patch” of the South Pacific have shifted

Third, participation in FOIP-related activities
is grounded in Australia’s deep attachment to
American regional primacy. Australia – like
Japan and many others – sees its bilateral
security alliance with the US anchored in the
broader “hub-and-spokes” network, and its

18 Rory Medcalf, “In Defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia’s New Strategic Map,” Australian Journal of International
Affairs , 68:4 (2014), pp. 470-483.
19 Allan Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment : Australia in the World since 1942 (Carlton, Vic.: La Trobe University Press,
2017).
20 US Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked
Region,” June 1, 2019, p. 4.
https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATEGY_REPORT_
JUNE_2019.PDF

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perceptions in Canberra. But in addition tothese demonstrations of Chinese “sharp power”,
nothing so upset the political equilibrium inCanberra as much as the recent revelation of
the extent of Chinese espionage and “influence
operations” discovered inside Australia itself.21
On this basis, Australia has tightened its security
measures and readily complied with US wishes
to ban the Chinese state-owned telecom giant
Huawei from providing its 5G network, drawing
economic retaliation – an interruption in coal
imports – from Beijing.

sought to augment its regional naval presence
through Indo Pacific Endeavour – a task force
engaging in a series of engagement activities
and military training exercises during port visits– in addition to low profile maritime patrol andsur veillance activities Indian Ocean, Strait ofMalacca and South China Sea under Operation
Gateway.
Australia is also backing the FOIP with hard
power through a sustained program to improveits defence capabilities with a projected defence
budget increase of 2% of GDP, (currently AUD
22$36.4bn for 2018). It is seeking to augment
existing capabilities, which are being ever-more
attuned to combined operations with the US(and potentially Japan) and acquiring new ones.
Chief among these is the future submarine
project which will double the its flotilla by 2030,
giving it some of the most potent undersea naval
capabilities. In addition, it seeks to increase its
reconnaissance capabilities to enforce Maritime
Domain Awareness (MDA) in the vast Oceanic
spaces to the north of the Australian continent
through acquisition of US hardware such as the
8A Poseidon maritime sur veillance/response
aircraft and MQ-4C Triton UAV.

Indeed, the Chinese challenge is seen acrossthe Indo Pacific region, and which the FOIP
concept seeks to address. It includes the use of
economic statecraft to achieve strategic gains
as well as “hybrid” techniques to challenge thestrategic situation on the ground – or more
appositely – on the sea. By seeking to exploit“gray zone areas” in the maritime space, forexample the use of fishing fleets and maritime
militias to harass competitor states in disputed
territories in the South China and East China
Seas, Beijing is seeking to break out of theconfines of its so-called series of “island chains”
and ultimately extend a degree of control overkey maritime trade ar teries. The security ofthese Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS),
and the rights of free navigation and overflight ininternational waters are increasingly challenged
by naval and air intr usions, and patr ols
attempting to assert Chinese sovereignty. The
controversial Freedom of Navigation Operations(FONOPS) conducted by the US Navy
consistently meet harassment from Chinese
forces. This strikes at the heart of the FOIP andRBO concepts that Australia seeks to defend
and exemplify Chinese attempts to revise theregional order to its preference. Australia has

Australia is also upgrading its 70-year-old
defence alliance with the US.23 Under the US
Force Posture Initiatives in Northern Australia,
agreement has been made as early as 2016 tostation a US Marine Task Force in Dar win,while defence, intelligence and militar y ties
have all been strengthened. The 2018 AUSMIN
consultations listed a prolific range of areas
for cooperation including upholding therules-based international order (through theFOIP), coordination against foreign domestic
inter ference, regional maritime capacity-

21 John Garnaut, “Australia’s China Reset,” The Monthly , August 2018.
22 Australian Government, Department of Defence, “A Safer Australia – Budget 2018–19 Defence Overview,” May 8,
2018.
https://www.minister.defence.gov.au [Accessed March 3, 2019]23 Thomas Wilkins, “Re-assessing Australia’s Intra-Alliance Bargaining Power in the Age of Trump,” Security
Challenges [Forthcoming].

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Policy Briefbuilding, economic and infrastructure support,
space, cyber and energy security issues, missile
defence, counter terrorism, and a stronger role
for the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) withJapan.24

its principles, in reality it is a values-loaded
concept – perhaps with the intent of “socialising”
China (in echoes of the earlier “responsible
stakeholder” notion). Indeed, since the Quadpartners are all democratic states, and the FOIP
itself inherently represents an alternative to
the Chinese-led regional order, there is a large
contradiction in this proposition.

Plans have also been unveiled to establish
a joint naval base with the US at Lombrum on
Manus Island in Papua New Guinea (PNG).25
As the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper affirms–‘Our alliance with the United States is central
to Australia’s approach to the Indo-Pacific. 26
And additionally, Australia has sought to keep
advancing its security relations with Japanthrough its decade-old Strategic Par tnershipwith Tokyo, another advocate of FOIP and
the RBO. 27 This process is unified with the
US through means of the reinvigorated
Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) process justmentioned.

Lastly, Australia has been keen to attract
additional adher ents to the br oad FOIP
vision, both through other enhanced security
partnerships, such as with Singapore, but also
through the “Quad-plus” process that brings
extra-regional powers such as France and the
UK into the FOIP enterprise (noted in the
introduction). The final layer of this cooperationis the desire to maintain a place for ASEAN in
the FOIP vision – Canberra has been quick toreassure members that “ASEAN centrality”
will not be undermined, but polls among SEA
experts indicate a great degree of scepticism
over the FOIP.29 Indonesia, Australia’s emerging
neighbour to the nor th has made attempts
to frame its own IPS (the “global maritime
fulcrum”), but appears tepid towards the FOIP
itself.

Furthermore, Australia is seeking to extend
this into a Quadrilateral process – the “Quad”– with New Delhi in order to gain India’s
adherence to the overall FOIP vision as partof its Indo-centric strategy. However, much
confusion reigns as to the exact relationshipbetween the Quad and the FOIP that hashindered the understanding of both (as I haveillustrated elsewhere), but in par ticular it
seems that Quad members are divided overtheir interpretation of how “inclusive” the latter
is to be presented. 28 Whilst, all par ties havestressed that FOIP is open to all that abide by

Yet there limits to Canberra’s willingness to
support and enforce the FOIP and US primacy
in defiance of Beijing, especially if it emerges asa “hard-balancing” or “containment” mechanism.
It is well known that not only is the PRC by far
Australia’s biggest trading partner, upon whom

24 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “2018 Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations(AUSMIN),” July 24, 2018.
https://dfat.gov.au/news/news/Pages/2018-ausmin.aspx [Accessed March 1, 2019]25 Joanne Wallis, “Australia Steps Up Its Pacific Pivot,” East Asia Forum, October 20, 2018.
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/10/20/australia-steps-up-its-pacific-pivot
26 Australian Government, “Overview”, in 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Barton ACT: Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, 2017), p. 4.
27 Thomas Wilkins, “Australia and Japan Facing ‘Disruptive’ Challenges to the Rules Based Order in the Indo-Pacific,”
Policy Brief , September 26, 2018.
28 Thomas Wilkins, “Australia and the ‘Indo Pacific’ Concept – Disambiguating the ‘Idea’ and the ‘Region’ from
Quadrilateral ‘Strategy’,” Policy Brief , July 19, 2018.
29 Tang Siew Mun (et al.), The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 - Survey Report (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute,2019).

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continued prosperity is assumed to depend,
but the possibility that the US may gradually
withdraw from the region and leave China as
regional hegemon also raise the “shadow of
the future” in Australian calculations.30 Indeed,
the current US Administration has sent mixed
signals as to its engagement with the region.
On the one hand Trump’s disparagement ofallies, trade disruptions, withdrawal from TPP,
and disregard for the liberal international order
have seriously undercut Australia’s position.
Yet, more recent championship of the FOIP
combined with determined efforts to push backagainst Chinese challenges are more positive
signals, welcomed in Canberra. Nevertheless,Medcalf argues ‘Australia’s preference isfor a U.S. response to China that competes
rather than confronts, that deters rather thanprovokes.’31

this respect it again runs counter to Chinese
methods that have been criticized for being
opaque, corrupt, bringing few local employment
benefits, and entrapping aid beneficiaries withunsustainable debt for projects of questionableviability (“debt-trap diplomacy”). The antithesisof the FOIP.
Australia’s economic centre of gravity has
shifted over the past two decades towards its
Western Indian-Ocean-facing and Nor therncoasts as result of its massive minerals exports
trade Australia itself is a major trading partnerwith South East Asia, the Pacific Island Countries(PICS), and seeks to expand its opportunities
with India (as detailed in the recent Varghese
repor t). 33 Ideally, the FOIP would have also
included the economic showpiece of the TPP,
but since the US withdrawal this has left agaping hole in US geo-economic influence thathas yet to be convincingly filled. That Australia
along with Japan has championed the CPTTP in
the absence of Washington’s leadership testifies
to the impor tance these secondar y powers
ascribe to the economic dimension of regional
order. On a smaller scale, Australia has joined
its TSD par tners in a Trilateral Investment
Fund ($133ml) designed to of fer economic
assistance with pressing regional infrastructuredevelopment in the Indo Pacific.

Economic Drivers
To be ef fective and appealing to regional
interlocutor states across the Indo pacific, andto compete with the economic challenges raisedby China, Australia’s de facto participation in the
FOIP also has a strong economic component.
Given the maritime/security emphasis that
the FOIP has acquired, it is important to notethe economic aspects in which Australia isa par ticipant, seeking to tap into emerging
markets and benefit from the “blue water
economy” concept.32 Integral to the FOIP vision
is the desire to promote increased regional
connectivity through free-market, transparent
and high-quality programs that will meet theregion’s growing infrastr ucture needs. In

In ter ms of development, Australia istaking a prominent role, with high levels ofOverseas Development assistance (ODA)
targeted towards SEA (especially Indonesia)
and the PICS. Though Australia provides someassistance to Africa and other Indian Ocean

30 Hugh White, Without America: Australia in the New Asia (Carlton: Black Inc., 2017).
31 Rory Medcalf, “Toward a Shared Alliance Strategy in a Contested Indo-Pacific A View from Australia,” The National
Bureau of Asian Research, May 21, 2019.
https://www.nbr.org/publication/toward-a-shared-alliance-strategy-in-a-contested-indo-pacific-a-view-from-australia
32 The World Bank, “What is the Blue Economy?” June 6, 2017.
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2017/06/06/blue-economy
33 Peter N Varghese AO, A Report to the Australian Government: An India Economic Strategy to 2035 - Navigatingfrom Potential to Delivery (Barton ACT: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018).
https://dfat.gov.au/geo/india/ies/index.html

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Rim countries the locus is clearly in these twoformer regions of key strategic importance toCanberra. Indeed, the Pacific Islands may be thebest example of the FOIP in action for Australia
as part of its contiguous Pacific “Step-up”.34 A
new Office of the Pacific has been establishedin DFAT, to coordinate the promotion of good
gover nance, development, and maritime
capacity-building (such as the provision of
patrol boats), with a $2bn AUD now allocatedto an infrastructure financing facility.35 To thispurpose, Australia has also partnered with the
US and others to build an electrical grid for
PNG.36 The Step-Up policy is strategic as muchas economic, as it seeks to counterbalance themassive increase of Chinese economic influencein the region which threatens to render suchstates as vulnerable to untoward politicalinfluence. Australian strategists are concernedthat if China provides critical infrastructure
to these countries, they will be vulnerable tosubversion or subjection by Beijing (with the
bugging of the Organisation of African Unity by
China being a case in point). Australia is worried
that if economically and financially unviablecommitments are entered into with China, that
Canberra will be left to deal with the socioeconomic and security fall-out of these fragile
states on its doorstep.

in some cases provide likeminded alternatives– to US influence and assistance in the IndoPacific. Throughout our discussions with US
stakeholders, it was also made clear that the US
not only welcomes this engagement but also
expects it. Indeed, the Indo Pacific Strategy
Report highlights how allies such as Canada andAustralia can “play a critical role in maintaining afree and open Indo-Pacific”.37 In light of growing
US uncer tainty and credibility in the region,and rising Chinese asser tiveness – the roleof Canada and Australia can help underscore
the rules based order and bolster the need forsustainable investment and open trade. This
discussion of the ways in which Australia andCanada have sought to respond to the FOIP
vision, as championed by Japan and the US, isindicative of the actual and potential role suchself-styled middle powers can play in upholding
the r egional inter national or der against
revisionist challenges, by doing their part.
Yet, as middle powers with relatively limited
capabilities compared with leading FOIP statessuch as the US and Japan, it may be wor th
Ottawa and Canberra engaging in renewedbilateral cooperation to explore how they can
jointly coordinate their approach to FOIP andperhaps pool their capabilities more effectively
as they have done so successfully in the past,in initiatives such as the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF)in Afghanistan, andthrough other areas including disr upting
people smuggling and organized crime in SEA.
Potentially fruitful avenues of joint cooperation

Time for Middle Powers in Indo-Pacific
In sum, it is clear that there is ample spaceand demand for complementary middle powers,
such as Canada and Australia, to assist – and

34 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Stepping Up Australia’s Pacific Engagement.”
https://dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement [Accessed March 10, 2019]35 James Batley, “Australia’s New Pacific Czar,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, January 30, 2019.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-new-pacific-czar [Accessed March 1, 2019]
36 Stephen Dziedzic, “Australia Joins Multinational Bid to Improve Papua New Guinea’s Energy Infrastructure,”
November 18, 2018.
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-18/australia-joints-multinational-effort-to-improve-png-energy/10508614
37 US Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked
Region,” June 1, 2019, p. 42.
https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATEGY_REPORT_
JUNE_2019.PDF

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to explore could include HADR, joint naval
exercises, MDA and ODA/capacity-building,among others. In conclusion, this is a prime
oppor tunity for solidarity between these two
middle powers to leverage their joint reputation
for multilateralism, norm entrepreneurshipand all-round reputation for “good international
citizenship” to play a larger role in Indo Pacificaffairs.

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