Policy Brief

June
1, 20242018
Jan 9,

Dr. Monika Cha nsor ia is a
Tok yo -based Senior Fellow
a t T he Ja p a n I ns t i t ut e ofInternational A f fairs. She isalso a Senior Cont r ibut ing
A ut hor a nd A nalyst on
A s i a ’s ge op ol it ic s f or t he

Nepal’s Border Negotiations with
Tibet and Later China:
Key Milestones in the Delineation and
Demarcation of the Land Boundar yLineJapan Forward Association

Dr. Monika ChansoriaInc., Tok yo. Previously, Dr.
Cha nsor ia has held seniorresearch appoint ments
at t he Sa ndia Nat ional
Laboratories (U.S.), Hokkaido
University (Sapporo, Japan),a nd Fondat ion Ma ison desSciences de l’Homme (Paris).
She has solely authored fivebook s on A s i a ’s s e c u r it y,including, China, Japan, andSenkaku Islands: Conf lict inthe East China Sea Amid an
American Shadow (Routledge© 2018), and Nuclear China:
A Veiled Secret (2014) among
others.

Disclaimer :The views expressed in thispublication are those of the authorand do not necessarily reflect thepolicy or position of The Japan
Institute of International Affairs or
any other organization with which
the author is affiliated.

Nepal shares a 1,414km-long border in the Himalayan ranges on
its northern side with the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) of China.
Most parts of this boundary comprise the rugged and uncongenial
Himalayan terrain. This paper traces the major milestones in Nepal’s
centuries-old historical borderland link with Tibet, and thereafter
from 1949-50 onwards with China. The paper examines the long
journey of Nepal’s mountainous border with Tibet beginning fromthe 17 th and 18 th centur y, when there was not much traditional
apprehension in Tibet, or Nepal, over a delimited border owing totheir close monastic, cultural, and trading ties. Following Tibet’s
annexation by China, the latter began signing a series of boundary
agreements and protocols with Nepal from 1960 onwards to delineate
and demarcate their land boundary line. In the contemporary setting,
Nepal’s approach to its northern frontier remains critical when readand analyzed in the context of studying the historical borderland links
between Nepal, Tibet, and China and its geopolitical implications forthe region.
Boundary and territorial disputes often stem from material and/or
cultural claims. At times, they also emerge as a result of fundamental
changes in domestic and international environments. In cer tain
circumstances, boundary and territorial disputes may even evolve
into geopolitical games of big-power rivalr y and competition1 inspecified regions. Apparently, China’s approach to its land boundary
issues with its Himalayan neighbors encompasses all the abovementioned factors. Specifically, Nepal remains a curious case study ofresource scarcity, locational features, domestic politics, geopoliticalcompetition, and cultural linkages that decisively influence cross1 Rongxing Guo, Cross-Border Resource Management , (Elsevier Publications)
July 2021.

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Policy Brief—more like a commercial reconnaissance. 4
Hastings’ letter invited the Tashi Lama for a final
arrangement of the disputes on the frontier thatwould render the country accessible,5 thereby
seizing the occasion to send a British mission to
open relations with Tibet.

border issues in disputed territories.
Historical Connections and the Vitalityof Tibet’s Cross-Border Trading Ties withNepal
D u r i n g t h e 1 7 t h c e n t u r y, T i b e t w a s
destabilized by internal disputes among thedifferent Buddhist sects. Taking advantage ofTibet’s internal strife, the King of Kathmandu(in Nepal) attacked Tibet in the 1630s and again
between 1645-1650.2 Tibet agreed not to impose
tax duties on the Nepalese traders based in
Tibet, and permitted the merchant communityof Nepal to establish 32 trading houses in Lhasa.
Resultantly, Nepalese settlements and tradespread across Tibet. Following its unification,
Nepal fought three more wars with Tibet, in
1788, 1791, and 1855, all of which primarily
stemmed from trade disagreements and borderdisputes.

Hastings thus formally nominated George
Bogle as his of ficial envoy on May 13, 1774,
to proceed to Tibet for negotiating a mutual
treaty and establishing commercial tradearrangements between Tibet and Bengal bymeans of obtaining a passport for a European toproceed to Tibet.6 Bogle became the first British
envoy to Tibet, and was merely 28 years oldat the time. Bogle was the only Englishman tohave crossed the Tsanpu (Tsang po) in its uppercourse and was fully conscious that the accountof his jour ney would become a reference
milestone for decades and centuries to come.
In fact, among the many objectives of Bogle’s
Tibet mission was to become informed of thecourse and navigation of the Burramputra (River
Brahmaputra) and of the state of the countries
through which it ran.7 By this time, in 1775,
Nepal had signed a significant trade agreementwith Tibet to strengthen border relations at
Khasa.

In the last quar ter of the 18 th centur y,
Warren Hastings, the first de facto GovernorGeneral of India from 1774 to 1785, initiatedand set up the English East India Company’s
relations with Tibet. In March 1774, Warren
Hastings informed the Board at Calcutta that
he had proposed a general treaty of amity andcommerce between Bengal and Bhot [Tibet]3

2
3

4

5
6

7

I n p a r t i c u l a r, H a s t i n g s w a s s e e k i n g

 or details see, Samar Sjb Rana, “Considering the Nepal-China border,” The Record , November 3, 2020, available atFhttps://www.recordnepal.com/considering-the-nepal-china-border Francis Younghusband, India and Tibet: A History of Relations ... From the Time of Warren Hastings to 1910 witha Particular Account of the 1904 Mission to Lhasa , (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1910); and for related
reading and reference see, L. Petech, “The Missions of Bogle and Turner According to the Tibetan Texts,” T’oung Pao(International Journal of Chinese Studies ), vol. 39, no. 1, January 1950, p. 338.
Once British paramountcy was ensured over Cooch Behar (by the Anglo-Cooch Behar Treaty of 1772), Warren
Hastings went out of his way to win the good disposition of the Bhutanese. His treaty with Bhutan in 1774
illustrates this; for more details see, Arabinda Deb, “Cooch Behar and Bhutan in the Context of the Tibetan Trade”
Kailash , vol. 1, no. 1, 1973, p. 83.
Younghusband, n. 3.
For more details see, Monika Chansoria, “George Bogle’s1774 Mission to Tibet: Establishing English Trade andReach beyond Northern Borders of Bengal,” Policy Brief , The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), March
26, 2020, available at https://shorturl.at/oILOQ
For related references and reading see, G.R. Gleig, Memoirs of Warren Hastings 1841, vol. I, p. 413.

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information regarding Tibet’s existing tradewith Siberia, China, Kashmir, and Nepal.8 Bogle
was informed that trade in Tibet9 was principally
carried out through Nepal and Patna (an ancient
city along the south bank of the Ganges Riverin nor theast India), with both becoming themain transit points.10 Tibet’s foreign trade wasconsiderable around the 18 th centur y. Being
mountainous, naturally bar ren, and thinly
populated, it required large supplies from othercountries. Major Tibetan yields were gold,musk, cowtails, wool, and salt.11 Coarse woolen
cloth and narrow serge were almost its only
manufactures as it produced no iron, nor fruit,or spices.12 Besides, no duties were levied on
goods, and trade was protected and free fromexactions. Many foreign merchants, encouragedby these indulgences or allured by the prospectof gain, settled in Tibet.13 Agents were stationedon the coast of Coromandel, in Bengal, Benares,
Nepal, and Kashmir to fur nish them with
commodities from these places, which they
traded in Tibet or forwarded to their associates
stationed at Seling (Sining), a town that lay on
the border with China.14

very moderate duty was levied on goods. Nepal
was populous and well cultivated and could
easily furnish means of transportation, making
way for many merchants to settle in Nepal.15
The traders brought their merchandise to Lhasa
from China and Mongolia, Kam and Szechuan,
up the passes from Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal,
and from Kashmir and Ladakh.16 From Nepal
was brought in broadcloth, silk, indigo, coral,
pearls, sugar, spices, and Indian manufactures.17
Mercantile operations were centered on
Lhasa and Shigatze with merchants coming inaround December ever y year and leaving inMarch, before the Tibetan rivers flooded. The
people in the direction of Szechuan were clothedin Tibetan blankets that were also much indemand in Sikkim and Nepal. The supply of salt
across Szechuan, Yunnan, the lands of all theother wild tribes north of Burma, Nepal, Sikkim,
and Bhutan was done from Tibet.18 Through the
Nepal and Ladakh routes, Tibet exported large
quantities of yaks’ tails, borax, gold, silver, andponies.19
The only document relating to the trade ofTibet as per Bogle’s mission was preser ved
among the archived records at Calcutta andin the India of fice. 20 Upon the retirement ofWarren Hastings, his style of Trans-Himalayan

Nepal was divided among the different statesof Kathmandu, Patan, Bhatgaon, and Gurkha,
and remained under the government of Rajas(Kings) independent of each other’s authority. A

8 P
 anchen Lama’s letter received March 29, 1774, cited in, Arabinda Deb, Tibet and Bengal: A Study in Trade
Policy and Trade Pattern 1775-1875, available at https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/id/636937/
bot_1984_03_03.pdf/
9 A copy of the document was in the archives at Calcutta and appeared to be the only one that was preserved there
relating to Bogle’s mission.
10 As per Bogle’s journal dated August 20, 1774, cited in Clements Markham, Narratives of the Mission of George
Bogle to Tibet and of the Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa , (London: Trubner and Co., Ludgate Hill, 1879).
11 Ibid., Chapter XIII, Trade of Tibet , p. 124.
12 Markham, n. 10, p. 124.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. cxxii.
17 Ibid., p. cxxiii.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., p. cxxiv.
20 Ibid., Preservation of the Bogle Manuscripts , p. clviii.

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diplomacy was rejected, and the Sino-Nepalese
war of 1792 closed the doors of Tibet to thesouth 21 and to the Indo-Tibetan borderland.
Decades later, John Claude White, a civil servant
in British India who originally worked in Bengal,
Nepal, and Darjeeling was sent to Yatong at thefoot of the Chumbi Valley in Tibet to assess thetrade situation at the new outpost. Following the1890 Convention of Calcutta, White reported on
his Tibet journey and stated that the Chinese“had no authority whatever” and were unable
to control the Tibetans. White concluded that
“China was suzerain over Tibet only in name.”22

Gurkha troops nor th of the Bhairab Langar
range were to be withdrawn, hence hinting at ade facto border. A few of the vital articles (as per
the translated Tibetan text) to which the Gurkha
and Tibetan gover nments mutually agreed
before concluding the treaty24 by affixing theirseals were as follows:•T he T ibetan Gover nment would pay asum of ten thousand rupees annually as apresent to the Gurkha Government.
•T ibet would not henceforth levy taxes on
trade, or taxes on roads, or taxes of any
other kind on the merchants or othersubjects of the Gurkha Government.
•T he Gover nment of T ibet agr eed toretur n to the Gurkha Gover nment the
Sikh soldiers captured by Tibet, and all
the Gurkha soldiers, of ficers, ser vants,
women, and cannons captured in the war.
The Gurkha Government agreed to returnto the Tibetan Government the Tibetan
troops, weapons, yaks, and whateverarticles may have been left behind by the
T ibetan subjects residing at Kyi-rong,
Nya-nang, Dzong-ga, Pu-rang and Rongshar. Upon conclusion of the Treaty, all the
Gurkha troops in Pu-rang, Rong-shar, Kyirong, Dzong-ga, Nya-nang, Tar-ling, and Latse would be withdrawn and the countr yevacuated.
•Henceforth the Gurkha Government would
keep a high officer (a Bahadur), and not a
Newar, to hold charge at Lhasa.
•The Gurkha Government would open shops
at Lhasa, where they can freely trade ingems, jewelry, clothing, food, and different

T h e 1 8 5 6 N e p a l - Ti b e t P e a c e Tr e a t y(Treaty of Thapathali)
By the beginning of the 19 th centur y the
Gurkha Kingdom had become the dominant
force in Nepal. It began with a period of active
expansion which pulled it into conflict with the
British and Tibetan powers. The period climaxedwith the Nepal-Tibet War of 1854–56, following
which the Treaty of 1856 forced the cession ofcertain territories to Nepal and required Tibet
to pay an annual sum to the Gurkha monarch.23
Following the Nepal-Tibet War, in Januar y1856, a delegation of T ibetans came toKathmandu for discussions on a peace treaty
and thus the Treaty of Thapathali was signed
between the Tibetan government of Ganden
Phodrang and the Gurkha Kingdom of Nepal
in Thapathali Durbar, Kathmandu (capital of
Nepal). Through this treaty, the final settlementof Nepal’s nor ther n border with Tibet wasreached. This March 24, 1856 treaty stated that
21
22
23

Deb, n. 4, p. 83.
As cited in, Younghusband, n. 3.
“China-Nepal Boundary,” International Boundary Study , no. 50, May 30, 1965, [Office of the Geographer, Bureau ofIntelligence and Research, Department of State, Washington D.C.]
24 N
 epal-Tibet Peace Treaty , [dated the 18th day of the 2nd month of the Fire-Dragon Year] as cited in C.A. Bell, Tibet:
Past and Present , (Oxford: 1968), pp. 278 280; Translated from the original was shown to him by the Dalai Lamain 1920, (for further reference see, L/P&s/10/718, Lhasa Mission, Nov 1920 to Oct 1921, Final Report ; and see,Michael C. van Walt van Praag, The Status of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law , (Boulder,Colo.: Westview Press, 1987).

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Policy Brief

articles.
•The Gurkha officer would not be allowed totry any case arising from quarrels amongst
Lhasa subjects and merchants, and the
Tibetan Government would not be allowed
to tr y any case arising from quar rels
amongst the Gurkha subjects, traders …
of Kathmandu who may be residing in
the jurisdiction of Lhasa. In the event ofquar rels between Tibetan and Gurkha
subjects, the high of ficials of the two
Governments would sit together and jointly
try the cases.
•I f the proper ty of a Gurkha merchant ofother subject were plundered by a Tibetan
subject, the Tibetan officials after inquir ywould compel the restoration of suchproperty to the owner. Should the plunderer
not be able to restore such proper ty, hewould be compelled by the Tibetan official
to draw up an agreement to make goodsuch property within an extended time, andvice versa.
•A fter conclusion of the Treaty, neither
Gover nment would take vengeance on
the persons or proper ty of the Tibetan
subjects who may have joined the Gurkha
Government during the recent war, or on
the persons or property of Gurkha subjects
who may have so joined the T ibetan
Government.

Thapathali was the last treaty signed between
Nepal and Tibet.
Much like elsewhere in Asia, there was notmuch traditional concern in Tibet or Nepal
over a delimited border. Rather, the focus wason negotiations over trading rights, control of
trade routes, and territorial taxation privileges.
The British Sur vey of India maps showed aborder between Nepal and Tibet which served
as an acceptable de facto border in the absenceof control of the Himalayan area by either
power. However, rising nationalism in the 20th
century and increasing awareness of the valueof well-defined borders to eliminate sourcesof friction led to serious consideration of theneed to legally define the Nepal-Tibet border.
In addition, questions of trans-frontier crimes,
ownership of disputed areas, and occasionalarmed clashes in the border regions stimulated
formal consideration of the points of dispute.
The 1950 Agreement to Maintain Friendly
Relations between Nepal and the People’s
Republic of China
Following the signing of the 17-Point
Agreement between China and Tibet after
the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1949-50, thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC) under Mao
annexed Tibet in 1951. The PRC establisheddiplomatic ties with Nepal in 1955, and thepolitical transition abrogated the Treaty of
Thapathali and all the previous treaties that
Nepal had signed with Tibet. On September 20,
1950, an agreement to maintain friendly relations
between the Kingdom of Nepal and the PRC
was signed which primarily concerned tradeand interactions between Nepal and China’s‘Tibet Autonomous Region.’ Article III of theagreement stated, “All treaties and documents
which existed in the past between Nepal andChina, including those between Nepal and the‘Tibet Region of China’, are hereby abrogated.”25

Following the Nepal-Tibet War and the signingof the 1856 treaty, the Gurkha Kingdom adopted
a policy of isolation, and the relationshipbetween Nepal and Tibet remained relatively
peaceful. By then the region had gained
considerable impor tance by becoming a key
transit trade route between India and Nepal
on the one hand, and Tibet on the other. For
countless centuries, the contrasting economiesof the areas have been loosely integrated.
Traditionally, salt, wool, and hides flowed fromnor th to south while cereals, tea, and spices
were sent to Tibet. However, the 1856 Treaty of
25 International Boundary Stud y, n. 23.

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Policy Brief

The two countries negotiated a series oftreaties after 1955, and this diplomatic reset had
a major impact along Nepal’s northern frontier
and trans-border movements. The nor thernborder of Nepal receives far less attention
than the southern one. Nepal’s approach to its
northern frontier undermined the importance ofits mountainous regions, especially when readand analyzed in the context of studying historicalborderland links between Nepal, Tibet, and later,
China. Understanding the geopolitical histor yof Nepal’s northern border is vital in corelating
the histor y and current dynamics of NepalChina border issues. The failed Tibetan national
uprising of 1959 led many Tibetans to flee Tibet
and either head to India through Nepal or settle
in Nepal itself. Many such Tibetans settled in
Mustang, a Nepalese district bordering China
with close monastic, cultural, and trading ties
to Tibet. Notably, Mustang had been a central
corridor for the salt trade between Nepal andthe north.26

all privileges and rights granted by the oldtreaty.28 The boundary agreement stipulated thatthe “traditional customary line” would serve as
the basis for a boundary treaty.29 The boundary
was to be determined and demarcated i) wheremaps of both sides agree; and ii) according tolocal jurisdiction or administration where they
did not.
Accordingly, a Joint China-Nepal Boundar yCommission was created to examine theevidence and delimit the entire boundar y.
A great deal of confusion has existed on thenumber of places in dispute and their exact
locations. Almost ever y discussion on theboundar y lists three or four points of dispute;
however, the places are rarely the same. In any
event, no substantial area of territor y on the
ground was involved. The Joint China-Nepal
Boundar y Commission held the following
sessions:a) F irst: August 12 to October 26, 1960 in
Kathmandub) Second: January 1 to February 15, 1961 in
Peking [Beijing]c) T hird: July 31 to August 24, 1961 in
Kathmandud) Fourth: October 1 to October 5, 1961 in
Peking

The 1960 Nepal-China Boundary
Agreement: Delineation and Demarcationof a Land Boundary LineOn Mar ch 21, 1960, Nepal and China
delineated and demarcated their land boundaryline thr ough the Nepal-China Boundar y
A g r e e m e n t . 27 T h e b o u n d a r y a g r e e m e n tsigned between the Gover nment of thePeople’s Republic of China and His Majesty’s
Government of Nepal essentially replaced theTreaty of Thapathali and recognized China’s
sovereignty over Tibet, agreeing to surrender

During these periods, the Commission andits subsidiar y Joint Sur vey Teams produced
detailed delimitation plans based upon a common
agreement for the entire frontier. The position of
Mt. Everest was regarded as special and fell to

26 For details see, Rana, n. 2.
27 International Boundary Study , n. 23; the full text of the Nepal-China Boundary Agreement of March 21, 1960
was not available to the Office of the Geographer at that time; however, excerpts were cited from Padma Bahadur
Khatri, “Nepal-China Sima Sandhi” (Nepal-China Border Treaty) Gorkhapatra , vol. 63, no. 313, March 1962,
pp. 2–3. This International Boundary Study was among a series of specific boundary papers prepared by the
Geographer at the Office of Research in Economics and Science, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Departmentof State, in accordance with the provisions of Bureau of the Budget Circular no. A-16.
28 For further details see, Khatri, ibid.
29 International Boundary Study , n. 23.

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Policy Brief

the heads of government for decision.30

cease to be in force.32

Formal Settlement of the 1961 Boundary
TreatyThe Joint Commission met for the Fifthand Sixth sessions to complete its work. The
boundar y was divided into six divisions and a
joint team was dispatched to each to performthe demarcation work. Upon completing thedemarcation, a total of 99 boundar y pillars –79 major pillars numbered 1 to 79 as well as 20
sub-pillars – were installed on the boundar y.
The numbering ran from west to east; however,pillars 33, 37, and 38 could not be placed due togeographic challenges on the ground.33

Nepal and China concluded the first-everboundary talks in 1961 leading to the Boundary
Treaty between the People’s Republic of China
and the Kingdom of Nepal signed on October 5,
1961. The complete delimitation of the boundary
created by the Joint Commission became
Article I. Article II defined the boundary in all
streams as the median line and provided for thecontinuation of that line in the event of a changeof river course. Ar ticle III directed the Joint
Commission to draft a demarcation protocol
to be incorporated into the treaty.31 After thesigning of the treaty, the Joint China-Nepal
Boundary Commission constituted in pursuanceof the March 1960 agreement on the questionof the boundar y between the two countries
decided that permanent boundar y markers
should be set up as necessary on the boundaryline between the two countries. Then a protocol
would be drafted, setting for th in detail thealignment of the entire boundar y line and thelocation of the permanent boundar y markers,
with detailed maps attached showing theboundary line and the location of the permanent
boundar y markers. The above-mentioned
protocol, upon being signed by the governmentsof the two countries, would become an annex tothe treaty, with its detailed maps replacing theprevious version of the maps. Upon the signingof the above-mentioned protocol, the tasks of the
Joint China-Nepal Boundary Commission would
be terminated, and the agreement of March
1960 between the two parties on the question of
the boundary between the two countries would

During a field survey conducted by the Joint
China-Nepal Boundar y Commission in 1961,
both countries initially put forward competingclaims to Mt. Everest in addition to 31 otherdisputed border claims.34 These border disputes
were later resolved amicably by November
1962. Thereafter, Nepal and China signed aborder protocol in 1963 requiring a joint surveyof the entire borderline by teams consistingof representatives from both countries. Thisboundar y protocol was renewed in November
1979, and then in December 1988. The joint
inspection of May 2005 identified two disputes–
first, over the location of a boundary marker in
Lamabagar (Dolakha District), and the second,over the height of Mt. Everest. China continues
to showcase Mt. Everest’s height as 8,844.43
meters, four meters less than Nepal’s figure.
It needs to be highlighted here that no joint
boundary inspection has taken place since 2006.
The 1963 Protocol to the Nepal-China
Boundary Treaty
A Protocol to the Nepal-China Boundar y

30
31
32

Ibid.
Ibid.
Signed in duplicate in Peking (Beijing) on October 5, 1961, in the Chinese, Nepalese, and English languages; allthree texts being equally authentic; signed by Chairman of the People’s Republic of China Liu Shaoqi (1959–68)
and His Majesty the King of Nepal Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva.
33 International Boundary Study , n. 23.
34 Rana, n. 2.

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Policy Brief

Treaty was signed on Januar y 23, 1963
embodying the final demarcation work of the
Joint Commission. Par t I concerned generalar rangements; Par t II contained the final
detailed delimitation; Part III provided detailsof the laying of pillars; Par t IV was on themaintenance of the pillars; and Part V was its
concluding section. The protocol apparently has
not been made public as is often typical withtechnical demarcation documents.35 While, as
per this protocol, no side can install or put up afence or wire around border pillars unilaterally
because this would constitute a sovereignty
issue, China has unilaterally placed fencing andwiring around pillars 6 (2) and 9 (2) along the
Nepal-China border.

China’s ter ritorial claims have consistently
arisen. Building on the earlier treaties from1960 onwards, China and Nepal signed anagreement in 2002 allowing Nepalese who live
within 30 kms of the border to enter cer tain
Chinese border-towns using ‘special citizen’cards without the need for a passport or any
other formal travel document. This system
has enabled many borderland residents to findwork through trade. The system, however, is
not applicable at all border crossings between
Nepal and China. There are six major ports ofentry along the Nepal-China border. Of these,
only two, namely, Rasuwagadhi and Tatopani,are situated at elevations making them passable
during the harsh winters (1,983 meters and2,300 meters, respectively) and they are thus
the most-used border passes between Nepal andChina.37

The 1960, 1961, and 1963 boundar yagreements as well as the border treaty andborder protocol between Nepal and China were
aimed at addressing, and potentially removing,
the causes of friction on the alignment of
the common boundar y in order for it to beconsidered an international boundary, i.e., onethat is delimited and demarcated, and so shownin official maps. It has been noted that the maps
show a considerable positional shift of places
along the frontiers from the representations
depicted on official British and American maps.
There have been instances wherein the quality
and accuracy of the base line and survey were
not known, and thus the grid references on thetreaty maps needed to be treated with caution.36

All the above bilateral agreements andprotocols notwithstanding, a 2021 repor t
submitted by the study panel constituted by
Nepal’s Ministr y of Home Affairs highlighted
a host of issues identified along the NepalChina border in the Humla district. The panel,
led by a Joint Secretar y, submitted its report
after conducting an on-field study to Nepal’sHome Minister in September 2021.38 As a follow
up, the Ministr y of Home Affairs wrote to the
Ministr y of Foreign Af fairs to take the issue
up with Beijing. The study panel repor tedly
has identified problems along the Nepal-China
border in Humla, specifically from border pillars
4–13. Apar t from this, several other media
repor ts have indicated that at least seven of
Nepal’s fifteen districts bordering China havebeen experiencing ter ritorial intr usions by
Beijing. In the Humla district itself, China hasconstructed 11 buildings in the far outskirts.

C h i n a ’s N e w “ L a n d B o r d e r s L a w ”(October 2021) and Its Impact on
Himalayan Borderlands
Despite all the above-mentioned treaties,
agreements and protocols, questions regarding

35 International Boundary Study , n. 23.
36 Ibid.
37 Rana, n. 2.
38 Report titled, “Study panel says ‘there are issues’ along Nepal-China border in Humla,” The Kathmandu Post,
October 23, 2021, available at https://kathmandupost.com/national/2021/10/23/study-panel-says-there-areissues-along-nepal-china-border-in-humla

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While the 1963 Boundar y Protocol marked
the boundary line from pillar 5 (2) all the way
to the middle of Kit Khola, it has been foundthat the Chinese side has put up wires andfencing well inside Nepalese territor y, as per
the panel’s repor t cited in The Kathmandu
Post.39 Moreover, “…[the] Chinese side was also
tr ying to build a permanent canal 145 metersinside the Nepalese territor y… it wanted tobuild a road. After Nepal’s Armed Police Force’s
objections, the structures were destroyed andthe covered rubble was visible.” The Chineseside has fenced and wired pillar 6 (1), which liesin Nepalese territory, and “attempted to show”
its presence in the areas between pillar 6 (1)and pillar 5 (2). The Kathmandu Post report also
stated that “… it was learnt that pillar 7 (2), on
the Chinese side, was not visible and it could not
be found when local security officials from Nepal
searched for it.”40 These revelations, according
to the study panel, point to breaches of the 1963
Nepal-China Boundar y Protocol, given that
the Chinese side has put up fences towards
pillar 10, which is 32 meters from the NepalChina common pillar 9 (2). The Kathmandu Post
report further stated, “As per the 1963 protocol,
boundary demarcation was made on the basisof passes, watersheds, and peaks in the Limi
Lapcha area.” The presence of Chinese security
forces in the Lalung area, which falls within
Nepalese territor y through which religious
pilgrims trek towards the Kailash Mansarovar in
Tibet, has affected Nepal’s religious activities.41

markers along all China’s land boundaries. Moresignificantly, it calls upon the state to develop
border towns vis-à-vis connectivity, ser vices,and civilian and defense infrastructure, and toencourage civilians to protect their homelands
and provide assistance to the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA). This push for strengthening civilmilitar y coordination is an extension of the
deep-rooted ideological agenda of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), according to which,“… a strong border is a political responsibility.”
Given that the scope of Nepal’s exchangewith China has witnessed a multifold
increase economically and broadened toextensive cooperation, particularly in terms ofinfrastructure development via Belt & Road
Initiative (BRI) projects, Beijing’s deep leverage
inside Kathmandu cannot be ignored or set
aside easily. In this regard, China is all too likely
to use the platform provided by its land borders
law to maximize its connectivity projects (bothcivilian and militar y), settlements, and village
construction all along its border with Nepal,
although China has stated that the law will haveno ef fect on current border accords. In thename of safeguarding China’s sovereignty andintegrity, the latest land borders law could well
be another legislative tool for China’s territorial
expansion across the Himalayan Borderlands
region.
The past few years have witnessed an
unprecedented outpouring of politico-militar y
activity in the entire Tibet Autonomous Region
by senior officials of the CCP. A minute analysisof these developments suggests greater politicalreadiness for “any border situation” that Beijing
could be preparing for. During the repor ted

Amid all the above developments, China
introduced a new “Land Borders Law” in
October 2021 ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 陆 地 国 界 法 )that went into effect from January 2022.42 The
law primarily seeks to establish boundar y
39
40
41
42

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
As cited in, Shuxian Luo, “China’s Land Border Law: A Preliminary Assessment,” Commentary , Brookings Institution,
November 4, 2021, available at https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-land-border-law-a-preliminaryassessment/ ; related also see, Galen Murton, “Roads to China and infrastructural relations in Nepal,” Environment
and Planning C: Politics and Space , vol. 38, no. 5, 2020.

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Policy Brief

examination of the border counties of Lhoka andShigatze by the Deputy Secretary and Executive
Vice Chairman of the TAR People’s Government,
plans for constr ucting a South Asian GrandCor ridor – widely viewed as perhaps a
subsidiary project of the greater Belt and Road
Initiative – were repor tedly discussed. 43 The
BRI seeks to revive and expand historical tradeconnections with countries neighbouring China,
especially by means of restoring the Ancient Silk
Road that was initiated and spread by China’s
Han dynasty. For China, Nepal constitutes acore priority in its neighbourhood diplomacy
in South Asia, especially when it comes tospreading connectivity through ports, roads,
railways, and aviation networks via the BRI. All
these initiatives are likely to have a cumulative
impact on China’s geopolitical and geostrategic
roadmap for the region, and par ticularly for
Nepal, a small landlocked Himalayan nation
bordering Tibet.

43 F
 or more details see, Monika Chansoria, “Tibet Sees Surge of Chinese Interference, Focus on Border Regions,”
Japan Forward , August 1, 2023, available at https://japan-forward.com/all-politics-is-global-tibet-sees-surge-ofchinese-interference-focus-on-border-regions/ ; for additional reading and references on the subject see, Uddhab
Prasad Pyakurel, “The BRI, Nepal’s Expectations, and Limitations on Nepal-China Border Relations,” Issues &Studies , vol. 55, no. 3, 2019.

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