Policy BriefJune2018
Aug 1,4,2022

Va l é r i e N i q u e t i s s e n i o r
fellow at the Japan Instituteof International A f fairs andHistor y in China: A tool at the ser viceof the Party narrative

head of the Asia department

Valérie Niquet

at Foundation for Strategic
Research. She writes
extensively on Asia -Pacif ic
strategic affairs and security.
Her latest book, La puissancec hinoi se en 10 0 que stion s,
Tallandier, has been publishedin 2017. You can follow her on
twitter @V.Niquet

Disclaimer :The views expressed in thispublication are those of the authorand do not necessarily reflect thepolicy or position of The Japan
Institute of International Affairs or
any other organization with which
the author is affiliated.

“Who controls the past, controls the future; who controls thepresent, controls the past”
George Orwell, 1984
Historical issues and the interpretation of the past are often
presented as the most important, if not the only, obstacle to any
real reconciliation between China and Japan. According to Beijing,
it is Japan’s inability to consider its own past actions and express
genuine repentance that makes reconciliation almost impossible.
This Chinese narrative is often repeated in the Western media, as if
geographical distance erases critical attitudes. While in France thelegitimate debate on the responsibility of Algerian authorities is aconstant reminder of the painful past of the Algerian War, the same
media still often contend, as Beijing does, that the responsibility
for the tensions between China and Japan lies essentially in Japan’s
inability to “apologize” and become more conscious of its imperialist
past.
However, while questioning the past and the role of Japan during
the first part of the 20th centur y can be legitimate, it cannot be
dissociated from the way the Chinese regime uses histor y. In thePeople’s Republic of China, as in all totalitarian regimes, histor yhas a function, that of legitimizing the regime and ensuring its
sur vival. There is no independent histor y in China, and even lessso since Xi Jinping came to power. The only authorized histor yis the one controlled by the ruling Communist Party. In this typeof regime, histor y is not a science but an instrument, and one of
the most significant, of power. In this context, any real debate on
history and its teaching as well as criticism thereof is prohibited. Anyreconciliation based on joint historical work is by nature impossible
in the long run. Positive developments are only cyclical, based on
the Chinese Communist Party’s analysis of its current interests. All
positive developments are by nature reversible.

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power with an emphasis on “patriotic educationcampaigns” since the early 1990s, but it has
increased since then, gradually closing of f
all access to outside sources of informationand critical thinking. This has been fur therenhanced by the Covid-19 pandemic and theclosing of borders that prohibit travel andexchanges among academics and experts.

Increased Ideological Control
Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012 coincidedwith the increase of the ideological control
already noticeable since the early 2000s andthe transition from the concept of peacefulemergence ( 和平崛起 ) to a more pronounced
affirmation of Chinese power. Under Xi Jinping,
the cult of personality and thought management
have been strengthened in a dual processof legitimizing the Communist Par ty and its“core,” Xi Jinping. Published as early as 2013,Document 9 advocates the unification of thought
and the strengthening of propaganda to regain
control of society and avoid liberal evolutions
that could threaten the regime.1

This increased ideological control reflects a
sense of vulnerability behind the regime’s façadeof power and self-confidence. China’s reputationon the international stage has deteriorated,
especially in the major liberal democracies
where the measure of public opinion is reliable.
The low degree of support for the Olympics isa testament to this: while in 2008 the Beijing
Olympics were seen globally as a positiveevent, in 2021 calls for a boycott because of theregime’s human rights abuses multiplied. ForChina, the fear of “regime change” and “colorrevolutions” has not disappeared. In 2022, it was
awakened by the riots that broke out for several
days in Kazakhstan and the unexpected natureof these riots.

In 2017, an editorial in the People’s Daily
offered an analysis of the “Xi Jinping Thought
for a New Era” that focuses on these same
objectives of reinforced ideological control,
which have characterized the leadership of Xi
Jinping since his arrival in power. For Xi Jinping,ideological struggle is worsening and, to avoid arisk of collapse like that of the USSR, the control
and “orientation” of public opinion, including on
the Internet, must be reinforced.2
This stress on ideological control affects all
sectors: education, culture, film production, theInternet and social networks and, of course,
social science, research and histor y. Released
in 2021, the historical film “The Battle at LakeChangjin” ( 长 津 湖 ), which recounts thevictor y of “Chinese volunteers” against an
American unit during the Korean War, is a good
example of the use of manipulated history as an
ideological tool.

One of Xi Jinping’s strategies has been
to strengthen the ideological purity of theCommunist Par ty and its cadres by fighting
corruption. Reaching millions of Communist
Par ty members, these anti-cor r uption
campaigns have also allowed Xi Jinping toimpose his authority over the party apparatus
at all levels. However, these campaigns - whichhave also affected powerful economic interests- have generated discontent that also threatens
the regime from within, even if the critics do not
speak out openly.

This ideological control, which includes
social networks, preceded Xi Jinping’s rise toUnder these conditions, constantly
reaffirming the supremacy of the Communist

12“ Document 9, A China File Translation,” Chinafile.com , November 8, 2013, https://www.chinafile.com/document-9chinafile-translation
“ 习 近 平 决 胜 全 面 建 成 小 康 社 会 夺 取 新 时 代 中 国 特 色 社 会 主 义 伟 大 胜 利 ” (Secure a Decisive Victory in Building
a Moderately Prosperous Society in all Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era), 人民日报 (People’s Daily ), October 28, 2017.

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Par ty and its leadership at all levels, fromideology to economics, has become thenew mantra: only the Communist Par ty candefend China’s honor, its national interests
and accomplish the “great rejuvenation of theChinese nation” as Xi Jinping proclaimed to theParty in 2021.3

have recently expressed concern about theoverly “nationalistic” orientation of Chineseyouth, the liberal ideology represented by theUnited States is losing its appeal and influence,
particularly in developing countries. Attempting
to theorize this ideological shift, Yan Xuetong,a Communist Par ty theorist close to thegovernment, suggests that “Chinese values”
are imposing their norms based on a mixture of
Marxist principles, economic pragmatism andrevisited Confucian principles. Whatever thecontent of the discourse, the main point is toimpose thought control, control of the historicalnarrative and autocratic principles as morelegitimate than the liberal democratic valueswhose universal character the Chinese regimecontests.5

Therefore, China, following the Communist
Party, must assert itself as “rich and powerful”( 富 强 ) according to the slogan that was also
the slogan of the Legalists (3 rd centur y BCE)
and then of imperial Japan from the Meiji era to1945.
In this agenda, histor y, and the control ofideology at the heart of “historical science” intotalitarian regimes, plays a primar y role in
imposing and perpetuating the authority of theCommunist Party. The text of the “Resolutionof the Chinese Communist Par ty CentralCommittee on the Major Achievements andHistorical Experience of the Par ty Over the
Past Centur y” of November 16, 2021 reflects
these principles. The role of the Par ty is “tolead the Chinese people united in unremitting
efforts to realize the Chinese dream of great
rejuvenation.” The permanent nature of thestruggle (reminiscent of Mao Zedong’s conceptof permanent revolution) in turn guarantees aconstant mobilization of opinion that prohibits
any contest. The resolution also states that “ourfaith in Marxism, the great ideal of communism
and the common ideal of socialism with Chinesecharacteristics, is our source of power.”4Document 9, the name given to a directivefrom the General Of fice of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party issued inApril 2013, outlines the “seven political perils”
that the Party must face in order to remain inpower. Among these “seven political perils” areall that constitutes the basis of liberal democracy:
constitutionalism, civil society, universal values,
a “Western” vision of press freedom and, above
all, what the Communist Party denounces as a“nihilistic vision” of history.6 The watchword ofthe 2013 directive is to call for a more committed
fight against “external” ideas that threaten theone-par ty principle that governs China, andthe rectification of histor y, in the ser vice ofthe par ty, occupies an essential place in theCommunist Party’s control strategy.

Chinese values versus liberal values

What is the purpose of history?

For many analysts in China, even those who

One of the most important points is, through3“ In 2035, China as a Great Modern Socialist Country and the Chinese Nation will Stand Taller and Prouder Among
the Nations of the World”.
4 https://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latestreleases/202111/16/content_WS6193a935c6d0df57f98e50b0.html
5 Yan Xuetong, “Chinese Values Versus Liberalism, What Ideology will Shape the International Normative Order,” The
Chinese Journal of International Politics , vol. 11, issue 1, Spring 2018, 8 February 2018.
6 “Document 9, A China File Translation,” Chinafile.com , 8 November 2013, https://www.chinafile.com/document-9chinafile-translation

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the control of the historical nar rative, tostrengthen the image of the Communist Party
and its legitimacy by using a rewritten past toserve the present.

preserve national security and “social stability”.
The “totalitarian” conception of national
security is indeed ver y broad, and includes
militar y, political, economic, cultural, social,technological, ecological and other dimensions.
The control of histor y, at the intersection ofculture, ideology and politics, is at the heart ofthis mission.

Accor ding to Document 9, “historicalnihilism,” which relativizes or criticizes the roleof the Party and its representatives by “distorting
history,” is denounced as helping to underminethe dominance of the Communist Party and its
leading role in founding the new China. The
only authorized historical narrative is the onethat corresponds to the official discourse of theCommunist Party, which cannot be challenged.
History is an instrument, serving the interests of
the Communist Party and the official narrative,
and this is especially true of the Second World
War and relations with Japan.

Thus, after the repression of the democratic
movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989 andthen the collapse of the Soviet Union, which
demonstrated that communist regimes could
disappear and that the “direction of histor y”
could be reversed, contrar y to what Mar xistLeninist theor y proclaims, Deng Xiaoping
inaugurated an ideological revival basedon histor y with the political and ideologicaleducation movement.

In November 2021, the Central Committeeof the Communist Party headed by Xi Jinping
adopted a resolution on the histor y of theCommunist Par ty, the third in the Par ty’s
histor y after those of Mao Zedong (1945) and
Deng Xiaoping (1981).7 The resolution recallsthat the Chinese nation is “a great nation with ahistory of more than 5,000 years” and that theCommunist Party, which unites and leads thepeople, is the culmination of this history. In the20th century, the rise to glory of the Communist
Par ty is presented as the conclusion of aprocess that includes the Northern Expedition(under the leadership of the Kuomintang), the“war against Japan’s aggression”, and the “warof liberation” (civil war) until the victor y of
the CCP and the proclamation of the People’s
Republic of China on October 1, 1949.

In the 1970s, after Mao Zedong’s deathand the end of the Cultural Revolution, China
had experienced a kind of “boom” in more
independent historical research in areas suchas urban histor y, social histor y, women’s
status, and 20th centur y family histor y thatwere strongly inspired by the West. After 1992,
though, the acceleration of economic reforms
and the encouragement of personal enrichmentwith the slogan “to get rich is glorious”（致富光荣）led to a collapse of the last “moral” values on
which the Communist Party was trying to rely,
including the emergence of massive corruption.
Again the need to strengthen the legitimacyof the Communist Party by drawing on history
and national studies（ 国 学 ） was expressed
through patriotic education campaigns. The
first directive on patriotic education was issued
in 1994. The aim was to strengthen nationalconsciousness, cohesion, and a sense ofnational pride. It was a question of redirecting
the fr ustrations against the authorities that
had been expressed in the Tiananmen Square

Histor y is thus an essential instrument for
ensuring this domination of the Communist
Party and has been constantly mobilized to relegitimize the Party under many tensions. The
fundamental task defined by the resolution
on the histor y of the Communist Par ty is to7“ Xi’s Explanation of Resolution on Major Achievements and Historical Experience of CCP Over Past Century,” 16-112021, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2021-11/16/content_77876030.htm

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demonstrations against external enemies andreminders of a painful past under the themeof the “century of humiliation”.8 This theme ofhumiliation was new; under Mao Zedong, on
the contrar y, any victimization was rejected,
the responsibility for the sufferings of the pastwas attributed to feudalism and the impotenceof the Kuomintang, the Communist Party only
celebrating victories.9

In 2019, the Central Committee issued a new
directive, “Outline on Implementing Patriotic
Education in a New Era,” 11 which extends
the first document of 1994. As in 1994, in thisprogram aimed at realizing the “Chinese dreamof a great renaissance,” the place of history iscentral to both mobilizing youth and justifying
the power of the Communist Party. Loyalty tothe Communist Party is the central point for
judging and evaluating the degree of patriotism.

For the Communist Party in search of a newsource of legitimacy, the manipulation of history
became the hard core of controlling the national
narrative beginning in the early 1990s.10 Since
2012, when he became General Secretary of theCommunist Party, Xi Jinping has accelerated
and deepened this movement, which aims tobolster the argument that the Communist Party
is the “savior of the nation,” its only legitimate
leader. At the same time, the discourse has
moved away from the theme of humiliation toemphasize the assertion of resurgent Chinese
power.

In an address made on the occasion of theestablishment of the Institute of History at theChinese Academy of Social Sciences, Xi Jinping
again emphasized the role of historical science“with Chinese characteristics,” which should
be “a mirror that should reflect the positive
contributions of the par ty to the countr y’sdevelopment.”12 As Huang Kunming, in chargeof propaganda, stated at a symposium on
Chinese history “for a new era” held in 2019, thekey principles of historical science should be“adherence to a just political guiding principle
and contribution to the rejuvenation of theChinese nation.”

Xi Jinping’s objective in launching almost
permanent anti-corruption campaigns was toeliminate rival factions as well as to consolidate
the power of the Par ty in an increasingly
uncer tain world. Thus, beyond the anticorruption campaigns, the control of public
opinion and the economy, history is at the heartof the process of glorifying the Communist
Party, consolidating national identity around theparty, and justifying the one-party system.

Ideological control of historical studies in
China has thus increased dramatically, in acontinuum worsening from the 1990s to the2010s and, as long as Xi Jinping and the moreradical factions remain in power in China, thismovement is likely to continue, prohibiting
any long-term progress on resolving historicalissues with Japan.

8 ing Kuang, “How China Patriotic Education Became One of the Longest Successful Propaganda Campaigns,” 5 JulyW
2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-05/ccp-patriotic-education-young-people-in-australia/100260298
9 Denton, Kirk A. “Heroic Resistance and Victims of Atrocity: Negotiating the Memory of Japanese Imperialism
in Chinese Museums”, The Asia-Pacific Journal , 1 October 2007, vol. 5, Issue 10, https://apjjf.org/-Kirk-A.Denton/2547/article.html
10 Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memories in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations ,New York, Columbia University Press, 2012.
11 新时代爱国主义教育实施纲要, (Presentation of Patriotic Education for a New Era ), 人民网，12-11-2019，http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-11/12/content_5451352.htm
12 习 近 平 致 信 祝 贺 中 国 社 会 科 学 院 中 国 历 史 研 究 院 成 立（Xi Jinping Sends a Letter of Congratulations on theEstablishment of the Chinese Institute of History at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences , 03-01-2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2019-01/03/c_1123942643.htm

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Free and Open Indo-Pacific, this challenge has
been considerably strengthened.

Japan at the heart of the historical
discourse of legitimization of theCommunist Party

Strategically, Japan is also the closest ally ofthe United States in Asia, and it is on Japanese
territor y that the most important US bases in
Asia are located, bases that play a leading rolein deterring Chinese destabilizing actions in theTaiwan Strait. This dimension was reinforced by
Japan’s new defense laws in 2015.

Whether in the period when China posed
as a victim or in the cur rent period, Japanoccupies a central place in the Party’s narrativeof national assertion based on the manipulationof histor y. A former tributar y state according
to Beijing, Japan defeated the Qing Empire in1895, a particularly humiliating defeat. Todaya “small countr y”, Japan remains the world’s
third economic power and its democratic model
fully integrates it into the concer t of major
democratic powers. The war against Japanbetween 1937 to 1945 was also overexploited by
the Communist Party, despite the minor role
played by the Communist forces compared tothe Nationalist government, to strengthen theposition of Communist China in the war against
fascism and thus increase the legitimacy of
the CCP on the global stage. According to theresolution on the histor y of the Communist
Par ty issued in 2021, “the Communist Par ty
has acted for the peace and development of all
mankind by opening the world’s main battlefieldin the anti-fascist war.”13 This was also the main
objective of the grand parade held in Beijing
on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of thevictory on September 3, 2015.14

Finally, Japan can be used to help rekindle thenationalist flame in China by putting pressure
on Japan with constant activities by Chinese
coast guard vessels around the Senkaku Islands.
For Beijing, anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment,sustained by a historical discourse that in reality
does not wish to see the historical tensions withTokyo resolved, also allows the consolidationof united front operations aimed at uniting all
Chinese, wherever they may be, overseas or inTaiwan, around the nationalist themes defended
by the Communist Party.
By the end of the 1980s, Chinese school
textbooks were once again emphasizing Japan’s
crimes during the war.15 In addition, a society forthe history of the anti-Japanese war was founded
in 1991, its mission being, among other things,
to denounce Japanese revisionism” and tocriticize Japan’s “historiographical relativism”.16

Indeed, Japan is a key target of the historical
ideological discourse of the Communist Party inmore than one way. Ideologically, Japan posesa challenge to the Chinese regime, which for atime relied on the concept of “Asian values” tobetter oppose the Western world. With Japan
today putting for ward the concept of “sharedvalues” as the core of its external strategy for aIn 2015, 70 years after the end of WorldWar II, two new holidays were introduced inChina: September 3 to commemorate “VictoryDay of the War of Resistance Against JapaneseAggression”, and September 13 as a day ofremembrance for the victims of the “NanjingMassacre”. 17 Instead of improving relations,13141516

中国共产党的历史使命与行动价值，op.cit.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34125418
https://ir.cas.lehigh.edu/sites/ir.cas2.lehigh.edu/files/YinanHe_HistoryChineseNationalism.pdf
Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memories in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations ,New York, Columbia University Press, 2012.
17 A
 lexandre Dor, “China’s WWII Remembrance: Patriotic Education in Action,” The Diplomat , 15-08-2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/chinas-ww2-remembrance-patriotic-education-in-action/

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China’s historical posturing focused on Japanis causing them to deteriorate. Other examples
include the constr uction or renovation ofmuseums or memorials related to the war that
accelerated from the 1990s.
Thus, it is an illusion to consider that a true
resolution of the historical conflicts between
the People’s Republic of China and Japan can beachieved. The constant reminder of Japan’s “pastcrimes” is too useful for the ruling Communist
Par ty in Beijing, the sole controller of thehistorical narrative and history education, to beabandoned. Only a change of regime in Beijing
could bring about a real change towards amore dispassionate debate on historical issues.
This is the evolution undergone by all Asiancountries (except South Korea), which, despite
the sufferings endured during the Second WorldWar, have chosen to consider post-war Japan asa partner and no longer as an “eternal enemy”.

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