Policy Brief

June15,2024
1, 2018
MayVa l é r i e N i q u e t i s s e n i o r
fellow at the Japan Instituteof International A f fairs andhead of the Asia department
at Foundation for Strategic

The ter ritorialization of maritime
space 2: The mobilization of nonmilitar y capabilities
Valérie Niquet

Research. She writes
extensively on Asia -Pacif ic
strategic affairs and security.
Her latest book include Taiwanf ace à la C hine, demain laguerre? publication date : 2023.
You can follow her on twitter@V.Niquet

Disclaimer :The views expressed in thispublication are those of the authorand do not necessarily reflect thepolicy or position of The Japan
Institute of International Affairs or
any other organization with which
the author is affiliated.

Since the mid-1990s, China has considerably developed its
previously non-existent naval capabilities. In terms of the numberof surface vessels, the PLAN is the leader in Asia, with 370 ships
equipped with increasingly sophisticated communications andweapons systems. China has two aircraft carriers, and its shipyards
are building a third, as well as dozens of submarines, lending
credibility to its ambitions in the China Sea and beyond. Apart fromthe fact that the Chinese navy has no combat experience, however,the use of the PLAN in operations to exert pressure and change
the status quo in the China Sea presents a major risk of escalation,
particularly with Japan and its American ally.
Chinese strategic thinking - from Sun Zi’s The Ar t of War
onwards - has always favored the combined use of “ordinary” and“extraordinary” forces, complementary in their action. Similarly, MaoZedong theorized the use of militias and popular warfare. Even today,
the PRC claims to fight only “defensive” wars, which means placing
the responsibility for the use of armed forces, including naval forces,on the adversary. Beijing thus prefers to use officially “non-military”
means to exert constant pressure, the aim being to bring about agradual change in the status quo. This strategy also requires potential
adversaries to acquire substantial “non-military” means of retaliation,
which can duplicate efforts to strengthen naval capabilities and which
mobilize substantial resources that are difficult for states such as thePhilippines to deploy.
Alongside the PLAN, China has developed two other forces thatare fully integrated into its coercive strategy. These are the Chinese
Coast Guard (CCG; 海警 ) and the People’s Maritime Militia (PMM;海上民军 ). This is yet another example of the fusion of civilian andmilitary capabilities in the service of a single objective defined by theCommunist Party.

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to the CCG, where they were integrated as
Zhaoduan-class patrol cutters. In 2021, 22
PLAN T056 1340-ton stealth cor vettes will betransferred to the CCG4.

Considerable resourcesAs the US Depar tment of Defense points
out, China does not officially communicate thenumber of vessels assigned to the CCG, which,like the PLAN, has changed dimension since the2000s1. It has moved on from a coastal force tobecome a veritable armada capable of operations
on the high seas, throughout the area that thePRC claims - wrongly - as its own and evenbeyond. According to open sources, the CCG’snaval arsenal comprises over 200 vessels. In the10 years since Xi Jinping came to power, theCCG fleet has become the largest in the world,
thanks to the allocation of substantial funds andthe acquisition of new large-tonnage vessels aswell as vessels transferred from the PLAN2. By
2023, the CCG had 140 vessels over 900 tons,
120 vessels between 450 and 900 tons and 450
coastal patrol vessels between 90 and 450 tons,
which for a long time made up the bulk of thefleet of the security agencies that preceded thecreation of the CCG3.

CCG and PMM organization
Another indication of the growing integration
between the CCG and the PLAN is that allcommanders of CCG regional commands
are former naval officers, and numerous joint
training courses are held with the PLAN toenhance interoperability between militar yand civilian capabilities. Similarly, the PMM,
made up of fishing vessels, is trained withthe help of the PLAN and the CCG, although
the chain of command between militar y andcivilian contingents remains unclear 5 . The
CCG was created in 2018 by bringing together
all the maritime police agencies to rationalize
capabilities and resources. The CCG is part of
the People’s Armed Police (PAP), whose control
and public security missions also apply at sea.
The PAP was placed under the authority of theCentral Militar y Commission (CMC) in 2018,the year in which the CCG was restructured.
According to Article 83 of the CCG Law, theCCG performs defense operations in accordancewith orders from the CMC6. The PMM, whose
status is less defined, is also placed under theauthority of the CMC through the National
Defense Mobilization Department. As we haveseen, it can benefit from the suppor t of theCCG and the PLAN, coordinated by the CMC,
for access to resources and enhanced training
capabilities.

Par ticularly impressive are the new shipsbuilt for the CCG or transferred from the PLAN.
The most recent cutters (Zhaotou class) are
12,000 tons helicopter carriers over 165 meters
long, the largest in the world, equipped withwater cannons and 30mm and 76mm guns. By
comparison, the largest Japanese cutter weighs
just 7,000 tons. By 2023, the CCG will have twosuch vessels.
The CCG was also equipped with frigatesthat were part of the PLAN’s arsenal. In 2016,
the PLAN transferred six 3600-ton T054 frigates1

 S Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the PeopleʼsU
Republic of China”, 2023.
2 Tim Fish, “Has the China Coast Guard reached its limit?”, Asian Military Review , 23-01-2024.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 I dem and https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/JanuaryFebruary-2021/Panter-Maritime-Militia/
6 h ttps://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/bjhysws_674671/bhflfg/hyfxzhxfl/202303/
P020230313590000926661.pdf

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With the PAP under the CMC’s pur view
since 2018, China’s National People’s Congressapproved a 2020 revision of the People’s Armed
Police Law that added “executing maritime law
enforcement and rescue” to the PAP’s missions.
The Coast Guard Law was passed in 2021 andimplemented on February 1st of that year. Thislaw defines the CCG’s perimeter of action, with
Beijing’s unilateral claims as its only legitimacy.
Ar ticle 3 states that the CCG Law applies to“maritime areas under Chinese jurisdiction” andthe airspace above them. The definition of theseareas under Chinese jurisdiction is extensive andincludes all the territories claimed by Beijing. In
its imprecision, this definition also enables theChinese authorities to adapt the scope of theiractions in line with the development of theircapabilities and any resistance encountered 7.
The Coast Guard Law’s purpose is to “regulateand ensure the performance of maritime police
agencies, safeguard national sovereignty,security and maritime rights and interests” 8.
Even more worryingly, Article 22 authorizes theCCG “to take all measures necessary, including
using weapons, to stop foreign organizations
and individuals from illegally infringing China’s
national sovereignty, sovereign rights andjurisdiction at sea”9.

strategy of changing the status quo by force
or threat of force. The CCG, which is part of
the PAP, maintains order in the China Sea as if
this were an internal security issue. It enables
constant pressure to be maintained, imposing
a permanent ef for t to mobilize resources on
the target states without having to resort to thePLA and limiting the level of response of the“adversary” on pain of being responsible for apossible escalation10. The PLAN usually remains
on the sidelines, monitoring or inter vening in
the event of escalation. Incursions by PLAN
vessels into Japan’s territorial waters remain
relatively rare, much rarer than those by
the CCG, par ticularly around the Senkaku
archipelago. Within the first chain of islands,
from the Northern Territories to Indonesia, theCCG and PMM are deployed in accordance withChinese claims and - to a certain extent - givethem credibility. They regularly enter areas notrecognized internationally as part of the PRC’sterritorial waters or EEZ but which Beijing
declares to be part of its territory11. The missionof the CCG is to enforce the law as defined by
China as well as the “rights” (right enforcement)
claimed by Beijing. It is tasked with going
into disputed ar eas on Beijing’s or ders,maintaining a visible presence, enforcing laws
applicable to Chinese territory (domestic laws)
and challenging the administration of thesemaritime territories by other states, creatinga “fait accompli” if possible12. Since 1999, thePRC has been attempting to impose a unilateralsummer fishing ban in a zone stretching northand south of the 12th parallel, and has mobilized
the CCG, escorted by PLAN vessels, to enforce

Regular and irregular warfare: theimportance of the CCG and maritime
malice in Chinese strategy
Because of their ability to be mobilized
below the level of militar y action, the CCG
and PMM occupy an essential place in China’s
7

 lex P. Dela Cruz, “Marching Towards Exception: The Chinese Coast Guard Law and the Military Activities Exception
A
Clause of the Law of the Sea Convention”, The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies , Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer/Fall2021.
8 h ttps://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/bjhysws_674671/bhflfg/hyfxzhxfl/202303/
P020230313590000926661.pdf
9 Ibid.
10 US Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China”, 2023.
11 Tim Fish, op.cit.
12 Idem.

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this ban, which also applies to foreign vessels
considered to be on Chinese territor y13. The
PMM is particularly active in the South China
Sea, attempting to deny the Philippines accessto disputed areas around Scarborough Shoaland Second Thomas Shoal, Malaysia access tothe Luconia Shoals and vicinity, and Indonesia
access to the area around Natuna, even though
this area is not part of the “nine-point line” that
Beijing is trying to impose on the international
community. The PMM, with the dispatch offlotillas of several hundred fishing vessels, hasalso been active in the vicinity of the Senkakus.
The CCG and the PMM ser ve the irredentist“Chinese dream” of conquering ter ritories
defined as lost.

safeguard China’s territorial sovereignty andmaritime rights, bolster the nation’s capability
in protecting its maritime rights and carry out
effective maritime law enforcement16. In 2023,
Chinese vessels were present 352 days a year
around the Senkakus and, in December 2022, aCCG vessel spent 72 hours in Japan’s territorial
waters around the Senkakus.
High ambitions but few results
This strategy of mobilizing non-militar ymeans to assert Beijing’s claims in the China
Sea, par ticularly vis-à-vis Japan, requires
mobilizing considerable human and material
resources in response, and this pressure canonly increase as Xi Jinping has declared hisdesire to see the CCG maintain a permanent
presence around the Senkakus. However,
several problems are limiting the results.
As in the case of the PLA, and given theresources allocated, questions of unit loyalty
and corruption arise. This is what Xi Jinping
himself seemed to imply when he asked theCCG East China Sea Command in November
2023 to “boost its par ty building to ensure
political commitment”. Despite multiple anticor r uption campaigns within the PLA, newarrests took place in 2023, up to and including
the Minister of Defense himself. In terms ofresults, the mobilization of the CCG and PMM
is heightening uncertainty, but their growing
aggressiveness has had the primar y effect ofprovoking increasingly marked opposition fromthe Philippines and Vietnam in the South China
Sea, and from Japan in the East China Sea. All
three countries are bolstering their military andcoastguard capabilities. Cooperation is being
established among Japan, the Philippines andVietnam. Despite a difficult past, Vietnam has

The use of these “civilian” capabilities is partof the “cabbage tactic” defined by Admiral Zhang
Zhaozhong in 2013. The aim is to “overwhelmand seize control of an island by surrounding
and wrapping the island in successive layers ofChinese naval ships, China Coast Guard ships
and fishing boats”.14
Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has placed
great importance on these non-military means,as par t of a “gray zone” strategy that would
enable him to complete his Chinese dreamof conquest and assertion of power. He set inmotion the reform of the CCG and its transfer
to the CMC’s authority. During a visit to theCCG’s East China Sea Command in Shanghai,
he asked the CCG to “constantly strengthen”
its efforts to safeguard the sovereignty of theSenkakus, stressed the CCG’s role and asked
the CCG to draft a plan to keep a presence
ever y day in the vicinity of the Senkakus andinspect Japanese fishing boats.15 In his speech,
Xi Jinping stressed the need to resolutely
13141516

 S Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’sURepublic of China”, 2023 and “Fishing Ban Starts in South China Sea”, 17-05-2012.
Harry Kazianis, “China’s Expanding Cabbage Strategy”, The Diplomat.com , 29-10-2013.
https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/12/eb55266c4a9f-china-plans-to-keep-ships-near-senkakus-365-daysin-2024.html
Idem.

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drawn closer to the United States, as have thePhilippines since President Marcos Junior came
to power.
Despite Beijing’s protests, freedom ofmovement in the China Sea is constantly
reaffirmed by regional powers such as Japanand external powers such as the US, France andAustralia. Tokyo for its part has successfullybanned any permanent Chinese presence in theterritorial waters of the Senkakus.
Finally, the increasing militarization of
CCG capabilities presents a new danger: thatof rendering obsolete the distinction between
civilian and militar y operations - which lies at
the heart of the gray zone strategy - and making
possible an escalation that the PRC could nolonger control17.

17Tim Fish, op.cit.

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