Policy Brief

June23,2024
1, 2018
JulyVa l é r i e N i q u e t i s s e n i o r
fellow at the Japan Instituteof International A f fairs andhead of the Asia department
at Foundation for Strategic

Power plays and foreign interference:the case of the French territor y ofNew Caledonia
Valérie Niquet

Research. She writes
extensively on Asia -Pacif ic
strategic affairs and security.
Her latest book include Taiwanf ace à la C hine, demain laguerre? publication date : 2023.
You can follow her on twitter@V.Niquet

Disclaimer :The views expressed in thispublication are those of the authorand do not necessarily reflect thepolicy or position of The Japan
Institute of International Affairs or
any other organization with which
the author is affiliated.

Since May 13, 2024, New Caledonia has been shaken by violent
clashes accompanied by looting. For a long time confined to thecapital Noumea, the clashes spread throughout the main island andhad caused eight deaths by June 8, 2024. More than 800 shops andbusinesses as well as hospitals and health ser vices were affected.
The airport was closed and a state of emergency was declared bythe president of the government of the Republic on May 16.1 The
demonstrations took place at the call of the Kanak and Socialist
National Liberation Front (French: Front de libération nationale
kanak et socialiste; FLNKS) and in par ticular the Field Action
Coordination Cell (French: Cellule de Coordination des Actions deTerrain; CCAT), eleven of whose activists were arrested on June 28
and transferred to mainland France to face trial, causing an upsurge
in violence. This is not the first time that New Caledonia has been
threatened by riots. New Caledonia became a French colony in 1853,a penal colony in 1860, and then an overseas territory in 1945. Aftera first referendum in 1987 saw more than 98% of residents vote infavor of remaining in France, very serious riots with hostage-taking
left 23 dead, including four gendarmes, in 1988. After these riots,
the Matignon Accords were signed, providing for gradual evolution
towards autonomy.
According to the separatists, the riots were provoked by theSenate’s approval of an electoral reform law that would restore theright to vote in local elections to 20% of the electorate who have livedin New Caledonia for less than 10 years. To satisfy the demands of theKanak separatists, the Noumea Accords (1998) provided for the rightto vote to be granted only to the original inhabitants (the Kanaks) andto those mainly but not exclusively from mainland France who had
1 aroline Antic-Martin, « Emeutes en Nouvelle Calédonie, chronologie de 15C
jours de violence », https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/nouvellecaledonie/emeutesen-nouvelle-caledonie-chronologie-de-15-jours-de-violences-1491446.html,
27-05-2024.

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July 23,2024Policy Brief

lived in New Caledonia for more than 10 years.
The draft constitutional law that led to thischange was approved by the National Assemblyon May 16. However, President EmmanuelMacron suspended the proceedings on June 12
without easing tensions.

for more than 10 years can vote - within aprovincial framework. Finally, New Caledonia
has a president of the gover nment electedby the executive. In 2024, the President is anindependentist.
Apar t from its legal specificities, NewCaledonia also has specific rights. Since January
1, 2000, transfers of power have concerned fourareas: labor law, foreign trade, regulation ofhydrocarbons, chrome and nickel and public
primary education. The State (France) remains
competent in sovereign areas such as defense,
maintenance of order, justice, currency andimmigration.3 France also finances 18% of New
Caledonia’s GNP. The rest of the territor y’s
financial resources mainly come from nickel.
The French state no longer has any jurisdiction
over the extraction, processing or expor t ofnickel, which now fall under the purview of thelocal authorities, but it is the French State whichassumes the losses of the nickel industry. Since
2016, this contribution has reached 700 million
euros.4

To the surprise of many obser vers, manyAzerbaijani flags were waved during the riots inaddition to the Kanak independence flag.
On May 16, after three days of rioting, French
Interior Minister Gerald Darmanin declared:“Interference is not a fantasy; it is a reality.”2
A special status
Among all the French overseas territories,
New Caledonia has a special status known as“sui generis.” This special status is enshrinedin the constitution and grants New Caledoniaver y broad autonomy. In 1998, the Noumea
Accords were approved by all loyalist and proindependence parties. These agreements led tothe constitutional revision of July 20, 1998. The
resulting law of March 19, 1999 recognized thespecificity of this overseas territory.

The next elections for the Congress of New
Caledonia must take place in December 2024,with an enlarged electoral body which could
put the separatists in the minority with theintegration of voters who have not lived in New
Caledonia for more than 10 years and who could
represent 20% of the new electorate. This was
one of the causes of the riots in spring 2024:
the Kanaks, who in fact only represent 41.2% of
the population of the overseas territory, fear nolonger winning local elections.

New Caledonia is divided into three semiautonomous provinces, as provided for in theprevious Matignon agreements of 1988. Each ofthese provinces has its own provincial assemblyand has representatives in the Ter ritorial
Congress, which in turn elects an 11-member
executive. The members of these two bodies
are elected in the same election by restricted
suf frage - only residents of New Caledonia
234« Gerald Darmanin accuse l’Azerbaïdjan d’ingérence en Nouvelle Calédonie », Le Figaro, https://www.
lefigaro.fr/politique/nouvelle-caledonie-darmanin-accuse-l-azerbaidjan-d-ingerence-dans-les-emeutes20240516#:~:text=les%20autres%20articles-,Nouvelle%2DCal%C3%A9donie%3A%20Darmanin%20accuse%20l’Azerba%C3%AFdjan%20d’ing%C3%A9rence,Bakou%20d%C3%A9nonce%20les%20accusations%20%C2%A
Binfond%C3%A9es%C2%BB&text=Le%20ministre%20de%20l’Int%C3%A9rieur,des%20%C3%A9meutes%20
in%C3%A9dites%20depuis%201988, 16-05-2024.
https://www.collectivites-locales.gouv.fr/institutions/collectivites-doutre-mer#:~:text=Le%20statut%20de%20la%20
Nouvelle,titre%20XIII%20de%20la%20Constitution.
Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, “Understanding the Caledonian Crisis”, Daily Post, 06-27-2024.

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Policy Brief

The Noumea Accords also provided forthe organization of three referendums in2018, 2020 and 2021. It was the loyalists,
hostile to independence, who won these threereferendums with ver y high turnouts, morethan 81% for the first two. In 2021, this stancewas once again confirmed but with a lower
par ticipation rate of 43.87% due to Covid. In
2018, 56.4% were hostile to independence, in2020, 53.6% and in 2021, 96.5%.

an important element of French diplomacy andcooperation in the Pacific, including with Japan.
Thus, the ver y impor tant Br unet-Takamori
land force exercises took place in 2023 in New
Caledonia. From September 10-30, 2023, a400-strong force – 350 French and 50 Japanesesoldiers – jointly trained to control a force of160 men in a tropical zone with amphibiousoperations.8 This involved improving
interoperability as well as enhancing Japan’sability to defend remote islands, one of thepriorities of the archipelago’s defense strategy.
Likewise, the Franco-Japanese Oguri-Vernymaritime exercises take place off the coast ofNew Caledonia.

A n i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t o f F r a n c e ’scommitment in the Pacific
New Caledonia, a French overseas territory
in the South Pacific, is an essential part of theFrench presence in the Pacific, the importanceof which was highlighted in France’s IndoPacific strategy launched in 2018.5 This territory
was populated by 271,000 inhabitants in 2021.
The Melanesians, mainly Kanaks, represent
41% of the population, the Europeans, either
descendants of former convicts or settlers (theCaldoches) or more recent arrivals, represent
29% of the population. 19% of this population isWallis and Futunan or Asian (including Japaneseand other ethnic groups), and 8% declarethemselves mixed race or refuse to define
themselves.6

In addition, New Caledonia, like French
Polynesia, has been a member of the Pacificislands For um (PIF) since 2016. Created in
1971, this for um brings together 18 Pacificstates and territories. France is also active with
its territories within the Secretariat of the PacificCommunity, and regards its overseas territories
in the Pacific as essential for strengthening
regional cooperation due to their strategic
location, the size of their maritime domain andthe resources at their disposal.
The pre-positioned forces also make itpossible to participate in relief operations in theevent of natural disasters as part of the FRANZ
system. The FRANZ partnership, which brings
together France, Australia, and New Zealand,
was set up in 1992 to unite in helping disasterstricken populations in the Pacific. It organizes
cooperation in emergency relief for the benefit

New Caledonia, which contributes to making
France the second maritime power in the world
due to its ver y important EEZ, is at the heartof the deployment of France’s power projection
capabilities in the area with a sovereignty forceof 1,450 soldiers.7 This presence also constitutes
5 ttps://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/strategies-regionales/indopacifique/indopacifique-8-questionshpour-comprendre-la-strategie-de-la-france-dans-la-65258/#:˜:text=La%20strat%C3%A9gie%20fran%C3%A7aise%20
en%20Indopacifique,Indien%20et%20le%20Pacifique%20Sud.
6 Pauline Verge, “New Caledonia: four indicators of population fractures”, Les Echos, 05-17-2024.
7 Christophe Kerdode, Dylan Martin, “Why do Middle Powers Project Forces in Distant Regions? The Case of France inthe Indo-Pacific”, International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies, vol.20, n°1, 01-31-2024.
8 “FANC: unprecedented Franco-Japanese land training during the Brunet-Takamori 2023 exercise”, https://www.
defense.gouv.fr/operations/actualites/fanc-entrainement-terrestre-franco-japonais-inedit-lors- exercise-brunettakamori-23#:~:text=This%20exercise%20land%20in%C3%A9dit%20s,reached%20the%20Japan%20cet%20%C3%A9t%C3%A9 ., 03-10- 2023.

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Policy Briefof the region’s island states. The last major
operation took place in 2023, following a cyclonein Vanuatu.

the fourth time on February 7, 2024, chose tosuppor t independence movements in France
as a means of retaliating against France andPresident Macron’s strategic choices in theCaucasus. While chairing the Non-Aligned
Movement in 2023, Azerbaijan suppor ted
the Baku Initiative Group formed by proindependence personalities from Frenchoverseas ter ritories and depar tments –Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyana, and French
Polynesia, in addition to New Caledonia –calling for “decolonization.” The inauguralconference, organized by the Center for
Analysis of International Relations, took placeon July 6 during the Baku Non-Aligned Summit.
The round table was dedicated to the Frenchcolonies. The Non-Aligned Movement wascalled upon to define new objectives to “supportthe people fighting against colonial domination.”
Three representatives of the New Caledonian
independence party FLNKS were present, as
were representatives of other French overseas
departments and territories.

The role of Azerbaijan
The crisis in New Caledonia is of course notexclusively due to external inter vention. The
first Kanak revolt took place in 1878 and led toa severe repression of the Kanak population,with 1,500 dead and as many deported to Tahiti
and other territories. Today, the nickel crisis
triggered by collapsing prices and remaining
social inequalities are fueling the frustrations ofsome Kanak separatists.
However, Azerbaijan’s suppor t for these
movements cannot be denied. This suppor tis par t of a process of escalating tensions
with France since 2020. After his election in2003, President Ilham Aliyev followed in his
father’s footsteps by opening to Europe andFrance through a strategy of influence: “caviardiplomacy.” Azerbaijan, then consider ed
stable, allowed Europe to diversify its energy
supply from Russia thanks to the Southern GasCorridor.

Continuing this strategy of suppor tingindependence movements, a memorandumof cooperation was signed in April 2024, afew weeks before the outbreak of the riots
in New Caledonia, between the Congress of
New Caledonia and the National Assemblyof Azerbaijan to “make the inter national
community aware of the right of the peopleof New Caledonia to self-deter mination.”
Azerbaijan’s support has also been manifested
on social networks thr ough anti-Fr enchpropaganda publications.

France was a member of the OSCE Minsk
Gr oup, which was tasked with finding a
diplomatic solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh
ter ritorial conflict between Azerbaijan andAr menia. In September 2020, Azerbaijan
occupied a third of the Armenian enclave on its
territory. In 2022, Emmanuel Macron declaredthat he would “never abandon Ar menia.”
In October 2023, during a visit to Armenia,
French foreign minister Catherine Colonna
signed a defense agreement on supplying arms
to Armenia. Relations between France andAzerbaijan deteriorated considerably as a result.
In December of the same year, a Frenchman
was arrested for spying in Azerbaijan and twoAzerbaijani diplomats were expelled fromFrance.

This suppor t from Azerbaijan can beexplained by a desire to destabilize the Frenchpresence in New Caledonia, motivated bymutual resentment between Paris and Baku
over the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. We canalso imagine that Russia is not hostile to thisstrategy, which weakens France’s legitimacy
in the Pacific, while Emmanuel Macron, as on
the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, has taken very
forward positions against autocracies and on thePresident Aliyev, who was reelected for4

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Policy Brief

war in Ukraine.

Azerbaijan has chosen to suppor t theindependentist movement. China has more
direct strategic interests in the region but,
despite being increasingly assertive in the South
Pacific, it adopted a more prudent attitude by
not demonstrating very visible or strong support
for the most recent demonstrations.

China: interested and cautious
The case of China, which is increasinglyactive in the Pacific, is different from that ofAzerbaijan. Beijing is continuing its strategy of
diplomatic, economic and strategic influencewith the island states and territories of theregion, relying on the concept of the PacificSilk Road. Economically, New Caledonia is thefourth largest producer of nickel in the world,
after Indonesia, the Philippines and Russia.
However, operating costs are high and mining
conditions are difficult, while the price of nickel
on world markets is low. Beijing has therefore
chosen to step up its investment in Indonesia,
which has become the world’s first competitive
nickel producer. Today, China is no longer New
Caledonia’s main market for nickel.

Beyond the ter ritorial question in New
Caledonia, the political instability that hasprevailed in France since the dissolution of theNational Assembly on June 9, 2024, and theuncertainties about the future of France’s IndoPacific strategy can only reinforce the fragilitiesof the only sovereign European country in theregion.

However, a New Caledonia without a Frenchpresence would potentially be of strategicinterest to China by increasing its influence inthe Pacific, especially in the face of groups suchas AUKUS. An independent New Caledonia, likeother states in the region, would need substantial
funding, which the PRC could potentiallyprovide, at the risk of falling into a debt trap likeother states in the region, from Fiji to Vanuatu
and the Solomon Islands. Since 2016, the SinoCaledonian Friendship Association has been led
by two chiefs of staff to the pro-independence
president of New Caledonia. Unlike Azerbaijan,
however, China did not openly suppor t theunrest in the spring of 2024. On the other hand,a weakening of France’s image in the region
could ser ve China’s interests. We note that in
Vanuatu, very close to the PRC, several hundred
people demonstrated in front of the Frenchembassy on June 7, 2023, to denounce France’s“colonialism” in New Caledonia.
The causes of the turmoil in New Caledonia
are multifactorial and related to long-term
issues. However, for reasons with limited
connection to the situation in the territor y,5