APAN

Vol.6 No.2
2023
ISSN 2433-4456

REVIEW
The Process of Heroizing the Holdout
Japanese Soldiers in Indonesia
Hayashi Eiichi

Reshaping the Cultural Heritage Regime:
How Japan and China Engage
in UNESCO’s Heritage Programs
Ryoko Nakano

Defense Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool:
Understanding the Evolving Curveof Japan-India Joint Military Exercises
Monika Chansoria

Issues of Memory and History:
UNESCO and the Politicization of World Heritage Site
Nominations
THE J A P A N

Valérie Niquet

I NS T I T UTE O F
IN T E R NA TI O NA L
A F FA I R S

How to Ensure the Safety of the Japan Coast Guard
While Maintaining Its Nature as a Police Organ
When It Conducts Missions in Collaboration
with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forceunder the Control Guidelines
Atsuko Kanehara

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Published by the Japan Institute of International Affairs
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APAN

Vol.6 No.2
2023

REVIEW

1 The Process of Heroizing the Holdout Japanese Soldiers in Indonesia����03

Hayashi Eiichi
Born in Mie Prefecture in 1984, he graduated from Keio University ʼ s Faculty of Policy
Management. After receiving credits, he withdrew from the doctoral program at the Keio
Universityʼs Graduate School of Economics. Dr. Hayashi gained his PhD in Sociology from
Hitotsubashi University, and is currently an Associate Professor at the Department of History
and Culture in Nishogakusha Universityʼs Faculty of Literature. He received the Japan Society
for the Promotion of Scienceʼs Ikushi Prize for research on the social history of the holdout
Japanese soldiers in Indonesia. Books include Soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army and theIndonesian War of Independence (Yoshikawakobunkan), Japanese Soldiers Who Stayed Behind(Chuokoron-ShinSha), and Groups of Soldiers Who Stayed Behind (Shinyosha).

2 Reshaping the Cultural Heritage Regime: How Japan and China Engage in
UNESCO’s Heritage Programs������������������������19

Ryoko Nakano
Ryoko Nakano is a professor of International Relations and the Faculty Chair of International
Studies at Kanazawa University. Her research interests include security and foreign policy,
identity politics, and global governance. She is the editor of a special issue titled “Mobilizing
Nostalgia in Asia” (International Journal of Asian Studies 18:1, 2021) and the author of thebook Beyond the Western Liberal Order: Yanaihara Tadao and Empire as Society (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013). Her scholarly articles have been published in journals such as International
Affairs, The Pacific Review, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Contemporary Politics,
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, GR2P, and International Relations.

3 Defense Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool: Understanding the Evolving
Curve of Japan-India Joint Military Exercises����������������29

Monika Chansoria
Dr. Monika Chansoria is a Tokyo-based Senior Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Af
fairs (JIIA) since 2017. Previously, Dr. Chansoria has held many senior research appointments,
including, at the Fondation Maison des Sciences de lʼHomme (FMSH, Paris); at the Cooperative1

Monitoring Centre, Sandia National Laboratories (Albuquerque, U.S.); and, at the Hokkaido
University (Sapporo, Japan). She has solely authored five books on Asiaʼs security affairs,
including China, Japan, and Senkaku Islands: Conflict in the East China Sea Amid an American
Shadow (Routledge © 2018) and Nuclear China: A Veiled Secret (© 2014) among others. Dr.
Chansoria is also a Senior Contributing Author & Analyst at Japan Forward Inc., Tokyo, where
she writes a regular column on Asiaʼs geopolitics and history.

4 I ssues of Memory and History: UNESCO and the Politicization of World
Heritage Site Nominations��������������������������39

Valérie Niquet
Valérie Niquet, Ph.D. (Sorbonne University) is Head of the Asia department at FRS (Fondation
pour la recherche stratégique), and senior fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA). She was a lecturer at Keio University (Tokyo) on Sino-Japanese relations from 2014 to
2021. She has published extensively on strategic issues in Asia, Japanʼs foreign policy as well as
the evolutions of the Chinese political system. Valérie Niquet is also a consultant for the French
ministry of Foreign Affairs Center for prospective and strategy (CAPS). Her latest publications
include Le Japon en 100 questions, Tallandier, 2021 and Taiwan face à la Chine, Tallandier,2022. Her latest media contributions include AFP, Le Monde, The Diplomat, the Japan Times
as well as Radio programs such as Radio France Internationale, France Culture or the Voice ofAmerica. Valérie Niquet is Chevaier de lʼordre national du mérite.

5 How to Ensure the Safety of the Japan Coast Guard While Maintaining Its
Nature as a Police Organ When It Conducts Missions in Collaboration with theJapan Maritime Self-Defense Force under the Control Guidelines ������47

Atsuko Kanehara
Research Director for the Cannon Institute for Global Studies. Policy Adviser for the Japan
Coast Guard. Former President of the Japanese Society of International Law. Former
Councilor of the Headquarters for Ocean Policy of Japan, Government of Japan. Member of theGoverning Board of IMO International Maritime Law Institute. Advocate for the Governmentof Japan in “Southern Bluefin Tuna” Cases. Counsel for the Government of Japan in “Whaling
in the Antarctic” Case. Member of the Committee on Submarine Cables and Pipelines underthe International Law Association. She delivered a course of lectures at The Hague Academy ofInternational Law in 2017.

2

Hayashi Eiichi

The Process of Heroizing the Holdout Japanese Soldiersin Indonesia
Hayashi Eiichi*
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the process by which holdout Japanese soldiersin Indonesia have become heroes since the 1980s. The majority of the holdout Japanesesoldiers were young, low-ranking soldiers who were mobilized to the occupied territoriesof the Empire of Japan in World War II and did not return to their homeland after losing
the war. Some 903 holdout Japanese soldiers par ticipated in the Indonesian War of
Independence (1945 to 1949), mainly in western Java and northern Sumatra. This paperclassifies the reasons why they remained in Indonesia into 15 categories, based on the 47
cases confirmed by documents. It also points out that 324 of them wished to live there after
the War of Independence, but the local government was hesitant to grant them nationality.
When Fukushi Tomo no Kai (Yayasan Warga Persahabatan), a benevolent society, wasestablished in 1979, led by some of the successful who had achieved economic prosperity
through the re-entry of Japanese companies to Indonesia, they revealed that the holdout
Japanese soldiers were opposed to being identified as war victims by the Japanese people
over their “homecoming” to Japan, and instead represented themselves as “heroes of
independence.” After tracing such backgrounds surrounding the holdout Japanese soldiers,
the author examines the case of Ono Sakari, a holdout Japanese soldier who was called
the “last hero,” based on description in his “battlefield diary” written during the War of
Independence and the authorʼs interview with Ono and suggests that the reasons for the
holdout Japanese soldiers for remaining behind were not uniform.

T

Introduction
he year 2023 marks the 50th year of ASEAN-Japan friendship and cooperation as wellas the 65th anniversary of Japan-Indonesia diplomatic relations, and the first official
visit to the Republic of Indonesia by Their Majesties the Emperor and Empress ofJapan since 1991. The first “Imperial Diplomacy” by the Emperor and Empress ofJapan since ascending the throne attracted the attention of the Japanese public, and their every
move was reported by the mass media. Among them, the fact that Their Majesties met with thedescendants of the holdout Japanese soldiers and offered flowers at the capital Jakartaʼs National
Main Heroes Cemetery in Kalibata, where the holdout Japanese soldiers are also laid to rest, was*

Dr. Hayashi Eiichi is an Associate Professor at the Department of Histor y and Culture, Faculty of
Literature, Nishogakusha University.

3
Japan Review Vol.6 No.2 2023

The Process of Heroizing the Holdout Japanese Soldiers in Indonesia

particularly emphasized.1 Why did the holdout Japanese soldiers, who had largely been neglectedduring the Emperorʼs visit in 1991, come to attract such attention? Hereafter, using notes,
memoirs, relevant documents, documentaries, films, and oral histories of the holdout Japanesesoldiers, this paper will examine the changes in the environment of the holdout Japanese soldiers
over the past 30 years or so, from an intrinsic perspective based on their narratives.

Classification of reasons for remaining
Holdout Japanese soldiers are those who were mobilized to various parts of Asia during WorldWar II and remained there after the collapse of the Empire of Japan, and their total number isestimated to be in the 10,000s.2 They are called “holdout Japanese soldiers” because many of themwere young, low-ranking soldiers. In reality, however, there were military officers and military
civilians as well as civilians.3
The reasons why they did not return to Japan vary greatly, from staying voluntarily to being
coerced to remain. In the case of the holdout Japanese soldiers in Indonesia, the following 47
cases were identified through documents and videos.
(a) Army Lieutenant Komatsu Takashi,4 Army Lieutenant Maeda Hiroshi,5 Army Sergeant

1

The authorʼs stor y was featured in the June 18, 2023 society page of the Sankei Shimbun morning
edition, “Indoneshia zanryū Nipponhei no shison: Heika ni ʻchichi no kokoroʼ tsutaetai―Ryōkoku yūkōno negai, jisedai ni [Descendants of holdout Japanese soldiers in Indonesia: Wishing to convey ʻmyfatherʼs spiritʼ to the Emperor―Passing on the wish for friendship between the two countries to the next
generation],” the June 21, 2023 society page of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, “Ryōheika, zanryū Nipponhei
nisei ra to menkai: Kunan no rekishi ni hikari keiki ni / Indoneshia―Kenkyūsha ʻkanshin takamari kitaiʼ
[Their Majesties meet with second-generation holdout Japanese soldiers, shedding light on their historyof hardships / Indonesia―Researchers ʻexpect increase in interestʼ],” and in “Rekishi: Shirarezaru
ʻzanryū Nipponheiʼ―Indoneshia dokuritsu sensō ni sanka [History: The unknown ʻholdout Japanesesoldiersʼ―Their participation in the Indonesian War of Independence]” in Yomiuri TVʼs news program“Wake Up” broadcast on June 24, 2023. Additionally, an editorial article written by the author “Ryōheikano Indoneshia hōmon: Zanryū Nipponhei kunan no rekishi―Bidan ni kakureta jitsuzō chokushi wo[Their Majestiesʼ visit to Indonesia: The history of hardship of the holdout Japanese soldiers―Facing
the reality behind the moving tales]” was distributed by Kyodo News, and was published in the July 6,2023 culture page of the Tokyo Shimbun evening edition, etc.

2

Hayashi Eiichi. Zanryū Nipponhei [Holdout Japanese soldiers]. Chuokoron-Shinsha. 2012. pp. 32–37.

3

Some researchers call them “holdout Japanese,” taking into account the civilians.

4

Komatsu Takashi was born in 1922 in Oita Prefecture. He graduated from Waseda University after
attending a commercial school. Following his graduation from a reser ve officersʼ cadet school in
Kurume and the Air Communication Corps, he was assigned to the 35th Anti-Aircraft Radio Squadron
and was in Palembang in southern Sumatra when the war ended in defeat. Oku Genzō. Dassō Nihonhei[Japanese deserters]. The Mainichi Newspapers. 1980. pp. 83–95.

5

Maeda Hiroshi was born in 1920 in Kobe City, Hyogo Prefecture. He graduated from Osaka
Pharmaceutical College and began working for Tanabe Seiyaku in 1941 but joined the 66th Central
Unit the following year. After graduating from reserve officersʼ cadet school in Kumamoto, he was
assigned to the Southern Expeditionary Army Group. He served in the 15th Independent Garrison in
North Sumatra in 1943 with the 57th independent infantry battalion and was stationed in Aceh as thecommander of the 1st Company of the Volunteer Army with the 25th Army Headquarters when the war
ended in defeat. Maeda Hiroshi Sufian. Sumatora, waga funbo no chi [Sumatra, the land of my grave].
Maeda Hiroshi kun shuki kankōkai. 1986. pp. 1–59.

4
Japan Review Vol.6 No.2 2023

Hayashi Eiichi

Ono Sakari,6 Army Superior Private Miyayama Shigeo,7 Navy Commissioned Officer
Yoshizumi Tomegorō,8 Army Commissioned Officer Ichiki Tatsuo,9 Army civilian Suzuki
Hideo,10 and trading company employee Shirakawa Masao11 wanted to “make Indonesia
independent.”(b) Army Superior Private Yoshinaga Hayao12 “wanted to make a name for himself and clear
the stigma of being a ʻfugitive soldier.ʼ”6

Ono Sakari was born in 1919 in Minamifurano, Hokkaido. He joined the 28th regiment of the 7th
Division. He volunteered to be a replacement personnel for the Southern Expeditionary Army Groupand went to Java. He was then transferred to the 27th Independent Mixed Brigade Headquarters of
the 16th Army. He was further transferred to the General Staff Department, where he was in charge ofhandling classified documents, etc. when the war ended in defeat. Hayashi Eiichi. Zanryū Nipponhei noshinjitsu [Truth about the holdout Japanese soldiers]. Sakuhinsha. 2007. pp. 34–64.

7

Miyayama Shigeo was born in 1914 in Dalian and raised in Tokyo. After graduating early from Tokyo
Imperial University, he joined the Imperial Guards Search Regiment. After going to Berastagi innorthern Sumatra, he moved to Aceh to guard the coastline when the war ended in defeat. Kinoshita
Michisuke. Miyayama Shigeo kun den [Biography of Miyayama Shigeo]. Private edition. 1995. pp. 2–18.

8

Yoshizumi Tomegorō was born in 1911 in Yamagata Prefecture. He went to Sumatra with the help of
distant relatives, but work did not go well and he returned to Japan. The following year, he went toJava and became a reporter for the Nichi-Ran Shōgyō Shinbun [Japan-Dutch Journal of Commerce] but
returned to Japan again due to deportation. He smuggled into Bangka Island on the day the war started
but was arrested and sent to Australia on a detained ship. Upon returning to Japan through detainee
exchange, he led southern personnel from the navyʼs Special Service Agency and landed on Celebes(present-day Sulawesi) Island. After the Special Service Agency was disbanded, he was appointed as theChief of Section 3 of the Jakarta Naval Office when the war ended in defeat. Hayashi Eiichi. Tōbu Jawa
no Nipponjin butai [Troops made of Japanese soldiers in East Java]. Sakuhinsha. 2009. pp. 56–85.

9Ichiki Tatsuo was born in 1906 in Kumamoto Prefecture. After working for a local bank in southern
Kyushu, he went to Palembang in southern Sumatra to become a photographer. He then moved toBandung in western Java and changed jobs before landing a job at the Nichi-Ran Shōgyō Shinbun. He
was denied re-entry after returning to Japan temporarily, and transferred to the South Seas Bureauof the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commissioned Officer of Section 6, Department 2 of the General
Staff Department. He returned to Jakarta as a member of the 16th Army Propaganda Team when the
war began and was commissioned as an officer for the Translation Office (later, Leadership) of PETA
(Pembela Tanah Air, Defenders of the Fatherland) when the war ended in defeat. Ibid. Tōbu Jawa no
Nipponjin butai [Troops made of Japanese soldiers in East Java]. pp. 92–113.

10

Suzuki Hideo was born in 1916 in Akita Prefecture. The war ended in defeat while he was working as
an army civilian at the North Sumatra Fuel Arsenal. Hayashi Eiichi. Zanryū heishi no gunzō [Groups ofsoldiers who stayed behind]. Shinyosha. 2023. p. 103.

11

Shirakawa Masao (real name: Konno Hisashi) was born in 1923 in Lüshun. He became an army special
apprentice officer, but was discharged locally due to paralysis from a torpedo attack by a submarine
on the ship transporting him to the south. He later was employed locally by the Singapore branch ofa Japanese trading company and was transferred to the Medan office where he faced defeat one week
later. Honda Tadahisa. Paran to bakuyaku [Parang and explosives]. Nishida Shoten. 1990. pp. 5–7.

12

Yoshinaga Hayao was born in 1920 in Kochi Prefecture. He went to the mainland as a member of theSpecial Advance Team of the Youth Volunteer Corps for Manchuria-Mongolia. He was called into the44th Infantry Regiment and assigned to the Southern Territory Support Unit of the Kwantung Army. He
then moved to Cimahi in Bandung in western Java and was digging holes in the mountains in the 27th
Independent Mixed Brigade Artillery when the war ended in defeat. Ibid. Zanryū heishi no gunzō [Groupsof soldiers who stayed behind]. p. 27.

5Japan Review Vol.6 No.2 2023

The Process of Heroizing the Holdout Japanese Soldiers in Indonesia(c) Army Captain Inoue Tetsurō13 had “a wife and children” there.
(d) Army Second Lieutenant Otsuto Noboru,14 Army Superior Private Narita Genshirō,15 ArmyFirst Class Private Hirooka Isamu,16 and Tanaka Yukitoshi,17 Commissioned Officer of theSouthern Territory Scrap Metal Control Association “thought it was better to remain thanreturn to Japan.”(e) Navy Chief Warrant Officer Chiyomori Michiharu18 “sought a place to die.”

13

Inoue Tetsurō was born in 1903 in Fukuoka Prefecture. After graduating from Hokkaido Imperial
Universityʼs Faculty of Agriculture, he enlisted in the 12th Cavalry Regiment of the 12th Division in
Kokura and became an army lieutenant. He then went to Brazil to establish a farmerʼs dojo to develop
agricultural leaders. Returning to Japan after moving from one place to another in South America, heworked at a textile equipment manufacturing factory in Osaka before running a farm in Aichi in failure.
He was drafted into a cavalry regiment and experienced front-line combat in Shanghai and Hangzhou.
He then went to southern China and served in the Divisional General Staff Department in Guangdong.
He was involved in political maneuvering in the local Special Service Agency. After entering Singapore
as a member of the Yamashita Corps headquarters, he transferred to eastern Sumatra as militar yadministration personnel and served as the general-affairs manager of Sumatra East Coast Province,
then as secretary to the governor, police chief, and assistant-resident. He was later appointed to thegovernor and then to director of a farmer training institute. At the time the war ended in defeat, he wasmobilizing the Indonesians to organize a nation-founding volunteer corps to prevent the Allied Forcesfrom landing. Hayashi Eiichi. Indonesia zanryū Nipponhei no shakaishiteki kenkyū 1942–2014 [Researchon the social history of the holdout Japanese soldiers in Indonesia: 1942–2014]. Doctoral dissertation,
Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hitotsubashi University. 2016. pp. 103–112.

14

Otsuto Noboru was born in 1918 in Tokyo. After graduating from the Specialty Division Commercial
Course, Waseda University, he joined Showa Aircraft Industry. He enlisted in the 3rd Infantry Regimentof the Imperial Guards and went to Medan in northern Sumatra. When the war ended in defeat, he wasguarding the west coast of Sumatra as a machine gun platoon leader. Ibid. Dassō Nihonhei [Japanesedeserters]. pp. 111–120.

15

Narita Genshirō was born in 1918 in Aomori Prefecture. He joined the 5th Infantry Regiment of theImperial Guards and went to Sumatra, which is where he was when the war ended in defeat. Ibid.
Zanryū heishi no gunzō [Groups of soldiers who stayed behind]. p. 104.

16

Hirooka Isamu was born in 1921 in Oshima, Yamaguchi Prefecture. He relied on his brother who
ran an iron factory in Java, and took over the factory after his death, but returned to Japan due to theworsening relationship between Japan and the Netherlands. He later went to Jakarta as a commissioned
officer for the Java Military Administratorʼs Department and joined the 20th Field Air Repair Depot
in Bandung as a local conscript, his position when the war ended in defeat. Hayashi Eiichi. “Ran-In
hikiagesha no raifu hisutori [Life History of Dutch India Repatriates].” In Ajia yūgaku: Teikoku hōkai tohito no sai-idō [Asian studies: Collapse of the empire and the re-migration of people] No. 145, edited by
Araragi Shinzo. Bensei Publishing. September 2011. pp. 150–157.

17

Tanaka Yukitoshi was born in 1907 in Hokkaido and raised in Tokyo. He was employed at the Osakabranch of Arima Yōkō, which had its headquarters in Java. He went to Bandung in western Java asa Commissioned Officer of the Southern Territory Scrap Metal Control Association, which was set
up by the Vital Commodities Corporationʼs War Preparation Division. The war ended in defeat while
he was there. Oku Genzō. Indoneshia dokuritsu sensō wo ikinuite [Surviving the Indonesian War of
Independence]. Sanshintosho. 1987. pp. 120–122.

18

Chiyomori Michiharu was born in 1917 in Kagoshima Prefecture. He volunteered for the navy andjoined the marines in Sasebo. He later became a crew member of the Shōnan Maru No. 17, a patrol boat
converted from a small whaling ship. He was attacked by U.S. aircraft off the coast of Ambon Island andthrown overboard, and was hospitalized in Java when the war ended in defeat. Ibid. Zanryū heishi no
gunzō [Groups of soldiers who stayed behind]. p. 58.

6
Japan Review Vol.6 No.2 2023

Hayashi Eiichi(f) Army Sergeant Taira Teizō19 was solicited by an Indonesian who said he would be “treatedas an officer and given a house and a woman.”(g) Army Second Lieutenant Koga Masayoshi20 and Army Corporal Nakamura Tsunegorō21“grew tired of the military.”(h) Kempei (military police) civilian Iwamoto Tomio,22 Army employee Kumazaki Shōzō,23 andNavy civilian Ueda Kaneo24 “did not want to be a prisoner of war.”(i) Army Paymaster Sergeant Yamanashi Shigeru,25 Army Corporal Fujiyama Hideo,26 Army

19

Taira Teizō was born in 1920 on Miyako-jima, Okinawa Prefecture. After working at various small town
factories in Osaka, he was invited by his younger brother to work at a sake factory in Taipei. Later, he
was assigned to the 1st Infantry Regiment in Taiwan and went to Manila, Philippines, Tarakan Island innortheastern Borneo (present-day Kalimantan), and then to guard Palembang, Sumatra. The war ended
in defeat while he was stationed on Sumbawa Island. Sakano Narutaka. Samurai, Bari ni junzu [Samurai,
martyred in Bali]. Kodansha. 2008. pp. 16–35, 46–59.

20

Koga Masayoshi was born in 1920 in Tokyo. After graduating from Meiji Universityʼs Specialty Division,
he enlisted in the 3rd Infantry Regiment of the Imperial Guards. He was sent to northern Sumatra andassigned to a machine gun company, and was positioned on the coast in Langsa when the war ended in
defeat. Murakami Hyōe. Ajia ni makareta tane [Seeds sown in Asia]. Bungeishunju. 1988. pp. 101–123.

21

Nakamura Tsunegorō was born in 1924 in Tokyo. The war ended in defeat while he was serving as adetachment leader of the 6th Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment of the Imperial Guard in Aceh,
Sumatra. Aonuma Yōichirō. Kikan sezu [No return]. 2014. Shogakukan (paperback). pp. 242–245.

22

Iwamoto Tomio was born in 1917 in Kagoshima Prefecture. After working as a peasant, he went toManchuria and became a military civilian for the Kempei Training Corps. He was then transferred tothe 3rd Field Kempeitai (military police) and was in Java when the war ended in defeat. Fukushi Tomono Kai (Yayasan Warga Persahabatan, a foundation that unites Japanese descendants in Indonesia).
Geppo [Monthly bulletin]. May 1985. pp. 1–4.

23

Kumazaki Shōzō was born in 1918 in Gifu Prefecture. He was in the 7th Company of the Air Brigade
Headquarters when the war ended in defeat. Fukushi Tomo no Kai. Geppo [Monthly bulletin]. August
1986. pp. 1–4; Geppo. September 1986. pp. 1–3.

24

Ueda Kaneo was born in 1915 in Okayama Prefecture. Having worked as a taxi driver in Kobe, he wasrecruited as an automobile technician in the Kure Naval Munitions Department and went to Davao,
Philippines to drive trucks. Later, he moved to Surabaya and worked as a driver for the South-WestArea Fleet Headquarters, and then was an automobile deliver y section chief for the 2nd Southern
Expeditionar y Fleet Headquarters in Bandung when the war ended in defeat. Chō Yōhiro. RonsōNonfikushon 12: Kaeranakatta Nipponhei (Zōho kaitei-ban) [Ronso Nonfiction 12: Japanese soldiers who
did not return home (Expanded and revised edition)]. Ronsosha. 2021. pp. 182–188.

25

Yamanashi Shigeru was born in 1920 in Tokyo. After graduating from Chuo University, he worked for
Mitsui Trust. He then joined the 3rd Infantry Regiment of the Imperial Guards. He was dispatched
to Manchuria. He was stationed in Berastagi, a summer resort in Sumatra, and was assigned to
procurement of supplies when the war ended in defeat. Ibid. Indoneshia dokuritsu sensō wo ikinuite[Surviving the Indonesian War of Independence]. pp. 105–108.

26

Fujiyama Hideo was born in 1922 in Saga Prefecture. After working as an electrician at a coal mine
power plant, at Yahata Steel Works, and at Sasebo Heavy Industriesʼ airplane factory, he volunteered
for the Japanese Army and fought for two years in various parts of Burma, but was wounded in combat
and transferred to Solo, central Java. He was then transferred to Malang in eastern Java and then to
Gorda Airport in Banten Province in western Java, serving as a weekly noncommissioned officer in themaintenance group of the 35th Training Squadron at the time Japan was defeated in the war. Hayashi
Eiichi. Kōgun heishi to Indoneshia dokuritsu sensō [Soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army and theIndonesian War of Independence]. Yoshikawakobunkan. 2011. pp. 18–44.

7Japan Review Vol.6 No.2 2023

The Process of Heroizing the Holdout Japanese Soldiers in Indonesia

Lance Corporal Ikegami Naruto,27 Army Lance Corporal Motobō Takatoshi, 28 Army
Corporal Takasu Shigeo,29 Army Superior Private Akaiwa Hideyoshi,30 and Army civilian
Tachikawa Shōzō31 “believed groundless rumors.”(j) Army Lance Corporal Shida Yasuo32 struck a superior officer and “feared detention.”(k) Army Second Lieutenant Itami Hideo 33 felt “ responsible for handing weapons ” toIndonesian soldiers. Kempei Corporal Tsutsumi Kiyokatsu34 “tried to persuade the peopleof Aceh to avoid confrontation over weapons.”

27

Ikegami Naruto was born in 1919 in Kagoshima Prefecture and raised in Korea. He transferred fromthe preparatory course at Meiji University to Nihon Universityʼs College of Economics. After graduating
early, he joined the 45th Regiment Replacement Depot in Kagoshima. He served in Burma before being
sent to Seram Island, Indonesia by the Airport Security Battalion. He was in the Independent Battalion
in Magelang, central Java, when the war ended in defeat. Oku Genzō. Kaeranakatta Nipponhei [Japanesesoldiers who did not return home]. Seikaioraisha. 1987. pp. 29–31, 63–78.

28

Motobō Takatoshi was born in 1920 in Miyazaki Prefecture. After serving in the Kwantung Army, thewar ended in defeat while he was in Cimahi, near Bandung. Fukushi Tomo no Kai. Geppo [Monthly
bulletin]. May 1987. pp. 1–3.

29

Takasu Shigeo was born in 1924 in Kanagawa Prefecture. While working as a temporary clerk at thefirst-class post office in front of Yokohama Station, he volunteered for the army and enlisted in the 5th
Regiment of the Imperial Guard, Depot Division, East 8th Unit. Later, he was sent as a replacement
soldier to Medan, Sumatra where the main unit was located. The war ended in defeat while he wasthere. Ibid. Kikan sezu [No return]. pp. 337–355.

30

Akaiwa Hideyoshi was born in 1921 in Kagoshima Prefecture. He was called up as a mechanic in the
Army Air Corps and was in Sumatra when the war ended in defeat. Ibid. Zanryū heishi no gunzō [Groupsof soldiers who stayed behind]. p. 57.

31

Tachikawa Shōzō was born in 1918 in Tochigi Prefecture. After his honorable discharge in Sumatra, he
was working as a military civilian in the Training Section of the Military Administration Department in
the east coast province of Medan when the war ended in defeat. Fukushi Tomo no Kai. Geppo [Monthly
bulletin]. September 1985. pp. 1–3.

32

Shida Yasuo was born in 1921 in Miyazaki Prefecture. He joined the West 99th Unit in Kumamoto. He
was then transferred to Burma, where he drove trucks as a mechanic, moving from place to place.
He was then transferred to the 34th Training Squadron in Java, where he was when the war ended in
defeat. Ibid. Dassō Nihonhei [Japanese deserters]. pp. 15–29.

33

Itami Hideo was born in 1923 in Osaka. He was called up while working at an ironworks, and went toAceh, Sumatra after training with the 3rd Air Army Training Corps. He belonged to a airborne battalion
and was leading local volunteer troops to guard the area around the airfield when the war ended in
defeat. Fukushi Tomo no Kai. YWP dayori [YWP newsletter]. June 1980. pp. 8–9; Geppo [Monthly
bulletin]. June 1989. pp. 1–4.

34

Tsutsumi Kiyokatsu was born in 1919 in Hokkaido. He joined the 4th Infantry Regiment of the Imperial
Guards and was wounded while participating in the Malay Operation. He returned after the Singapore
Operation, going to northern Sumatra. Later, after ser ving in the Kempei Training Corps of theSouthern Expeditionary Army Group in Kuala Lumpur, he was sent to Kutaraja, the capital of Aceh
Province, as a corporal in the 25th Army Kempei, and was studying at the Kempeitai headquarters in
Bukittinggi as a Malay language specialist when the war ended in defeat. Fukushi Tomo no Kai. Geppo[Monthly bulletin]. February 1990. pp. 1–6; Geppo. January 1991. pp. 1–4.

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Hayashi Eiichi(l) Army Warrant Officer Kioka Naoyuki,35 Kempei Sergeant Major Onodera Tadao,36 Kempei
Sergeant Major Sugiyama Nagamoto, 37 Kempei Sergeant Tanaka Toshio, 38 Kempei
Sergeant Hasegawa Toyoki,39 and Army civilian Kage Hitoshi40 “feared becoming war
criminals.”

35

Kioka Naoyuki was born in 1917 in Kagawa Prefecture. He joined the 5th Infantry Regiment of theImperial Guards and was in Sumatra after serving in Manchuria and the southern front when the war
ended in defeat. Ibid. Zanryū heishi no gunzō [Groups of soldiers who stayed behind]. p. 64.

36

Onodera Tadao was born in 1916 in Iwate Prefecture. After working at a silk mill in Sendai, he joined
the Independent Garrison of the Kwantung Army. He then passed the non-commissioned officer
examination and the kempei examination. He was assigned to the headquar ters of the Sun Wu
Kempeitai and participated in the Nomonhan Incident. After transferring to the 2nd Field Army, he wastransferred to the 16th Army and went to Java. He was chief of the Jakarta Pier Kempei Detachment
Special Higher Police when the war ended in defeat. Onodera Tadao (edited by Sasaki Taka). Ojiisan
wa Nipponjin datta [Grandfather was Japanese]. Private edition. 1990. pp. 21–36.

37

Sugiyama Nagamoto was born in 1918 in Niigata Prefecture. He enlisted in the 16th Infantry Regimentof Shibata and was on guard duty at the Soviet-Manchurian border when he passed the kempei
examination. He was assigned to the border area between South Manchuria and Korea. He participatedin the Dutch East Indies Operation and landed in Rembang in central Java, and was stationed in Malang.
Later, he was transferred to Jakarta, where he was preparing for a guerilla warfare in anticipation of theAllied Forces landing when the war ended in defeat. Ibid. Tōbu Jawa no Nipponjin butai [Troops madeof Japanese soldiers in East Java]. pp. 117–131.

38

Tanaka Toshio was born in 1917 in Fukuoka Prefecture. After working as a craftsman at Yahata SteelWorks, he joined the 3rd Railway Regiment in Harbin, Manchuria. He volunteered to become a kempei
there and was sent to the Mukden Kempeitai. Later, he was transferred to the 3rd Field Kempeitai andparticipated in the 16th Armyʼs Java Operation. Later, he was sent to the Semarang Kempei Detachment
in central Java, where he was in charge of Indonesians in the Special Higher Police Unit when the war
ended in defeat. Tochikubo Hiroo. Nikkei Indoneshia jin [Japanese-Indonesians]. Simul Shuppan-kai.
1979. pp. 3–119.

39

Hasegawa Toyoki was born in 1917 in Fukushima Prefecture. After enlisting in Ranam, Korea, hevolunteered to become a kempei. He par ticipated in the Malay Operation and traveled throughSingapore and Penang to Sumatra, and worked in the General Af fairs Section of the Kempeitai
headquarters in Bukittinggi. The war ended in defeat while he was on special dispatch for the Medan
Detachment. Hasegawa Toyoki. Sumatora mushuku [Homeless in Sumatra]. Soubunsha. 1982. pp. 9–88.

40

Kage Hitoshi was born in 1913 in Fukuoka Prefecture. He applied for a position with the Southern
Territor y Militar y Administration of the Army Ministr y and worked in the Enemy Proper tyManagement Section of the Medan Military Administration Department, where he was assigned to
manage the property of prisoners of war when the war ended in defeat. Ibid. Dassō Nihonhei [Japanesedeserters]. pp. 57–69.

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The Process of Heroizing the Holdout Japanese Soldiers in Indonesia(m) Navy civilian Isomura Seitoku,41 Army civilian Chō Juntatsu,42 and Miyahara Eiji43 wereTaiwanese Japanese soldiers and “feared persecution in Taiwan, which became part of the
Republic of China.”(n) Technical Captain Murakami Junjirō44 was “left behind” at the Army hospital where he wasadmitted for mental illness.
(o) Army Paymaster Warrant Officer Ishii Masaharu,45 Army Corporal Doki Tokiji,46 Army
Sergeant Hayakawa Kiyoshi,47 Army Engineer Corps Sergeant Higuchi Osamu,48 Army
Second Class Private Nanri Isamu,49 and Army First Class Private Shimooka Zenji50 were“abducted and confined” by Indonesians.

41

Taiwanese Isomura Seitoku (real name: Kē Shēngdé) was born in 1921. He volunteered at the Takunan
Industrial Warriors Training Center of the Imperial Subjectsʼ Public Service Association. He changed
his surname to a Japanese name and became a military civilian at the 101st Naval Fuel Depot and went
to the northwestern part of New Guinea. Later, he was transferred to the 104th Naval Facility Squadronin Borneo, where he was when the war ended in defeat. Isomura Seitoku. Ware ni kaeru sokoku naku [Nomotherland to return to]. Jiji Press. 1981. pp. 3–162.

42

Taiwanese Chō Juntatsu was born in 1922. He was assigned to the 25th Army Headquarters, Unit Tomi
8991, in Bukittinggi, Sumatra. The war ended in defeat while he was on a business trip to Palembang.
Fukushi Tomo no Kai. Geppo [Monthly bulletin]. August 1988. pp. 1–3.

43

Taiwanese Miyahara Eiji (real name Lǐ Bóqīng) was born in 1922. He served at the Chinese front as aninterpreter for the Japanese Army. He then went to the Philippines and landed in Java as a member ofthe 48th Division. Returning to Taiwan, he assisted in research on malaria at the Epidemic Prevention
and Water Purification Department, Southern Territory Personnel Training Center, Taihoku Imperial
University. Later, he was assigned to the Unit Oka 9420, an Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification
Unit under the direct control of the Southern Expeditionary Army Group, and moved to Singapore.
There, he saw the exclusion of Chinese and left the Army, fleeing to Indonesia when the war ended in
defeat. Kamisaka Fuyuko. Minami no sokoku ni ikite [Living in the Southern Homeland]. Bungeishunju.
1997. pp. 24–25.

44

Murakami Junjirō was born in 1918 in Wakayama Prefecture. The war ended in defeat while he washospitalized in Padang, Sumatra. Mitome Tadao. Bōkyō [Nostalgia] reprinted edition in 2005. pp. 101–
103.

45

Ishii Masaharu was born in 1916 in Hokkaido. After enlisting in the Imperial Guards Cavalry Regiment,
he was transferred to the Accounting Department and went to Aceh in Sumatra, and was in themerchant port of Meulaboh on the west coast of Sumatra when the war ended in defeat. Ishii Masaharu.
Minami kara [From the South]. Nishida Shoten. 1984. pp. 9–135.

46

Doki Tokiji was born in 1910 in Ishikawa Prefecture. He worked for Daishōjigawa Suiden Gaisha. He
then joined the 1st Telegraph Regiment in Sagamihara, Kanagawa Prefecture, participated in the Malay
Operation, traveled to Palembang, Sumatra, and was stationed in Lahat, where he was preparing to set
up a communications station, when the war ended in defeat. Ibid. Kaeranakatta Nipponhei (Zōho kaiteiban) [Japanese soldiers who did not return home (Expanded and revised edition)]. pp. 117–127.

47

Hayakawa Kiyoshi was born in 1915 in Gunma Prefecture. The war ended in defeat while he was in
Sumatra. Hayakawa Kiyoshi. Indoneshia dokuritsu senki: Batakaro Gerira [Chronicle of the Indonesian
War of Independence: Batak Karo guerrilla]. Tokyo Bungeisha. 1987. pp. 2–3.

48

Higuchi Osamu was born in 1919 in Gunma Prefecture. He was in Aceh, Sumatra, when the war ended
in defeat. Ibid. Indoneshia dokuritsu sensō wo ikinuite [Surviving the Indonesian War of Independence].
pp. 49–55.

49

Nanri Isamu was born in 1924 in Chinnampʼo, Korea and raised in Saga Prefecture. He was in Medan,
Sumatra, when the war ended in defeat. Ibid. Kaeranakatta Nipponhei (Zōho kaitei-ban) [Japanesesoldiers who did not return home (Expanded and revised edition)]. pp. 239–243.

50

Shimooka Zenji was born in 1926 in Kyoto. Three months after switching from militar y civilian tosoldier, the war ended in defeat while he was in western Java. Ibid. Kikan sezu [No return]. pp. 321–329.

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Of these, (a) through (e) were highly voluntary, (n) and (o) were forced, and (f) through (m)fell somewhere between the two. Although the individual reasons must have been complicatedand compounded, and are not easy to categorize, it is certain that the holdout Japanese soldiersthemselves remembered the past as described above and were represented by the people
concerned.

Response by the Indonesian government
With the declaration of independence on August 17, 1945, a republic-type government wasestablished in Indonesia. Nevertheless, in the ensuing month, British troops advanced into
Indonesia on behalf of the Allies, triggering armed conflicts in various locations. These conflicts
culminated in a War of Independence. What the Indonesian side sought at that time were theweapons and human resources of the remaining Japanese forces. This resulted in 90351 holdout
Japanese soldiers, mainly in western Java and northern Sumatra.
They were involved in the War of Independence by providing militar y training to theIndonesian army and village youth, repairing and modifying weapons from the Japanese military,and serving on the front lines of the guerrilla war.
On the other hand, being an informal presence, the holdout Japanese soldiers foundthemselves in a predicament, having to go into hiding during the truce negotiations with theDutch and being forced out of their units during the reorganization and rationalization of the
new republicʼs army. Even after the Indonesian War of Independence, the republicʼs government
forced the holdout Japanese soldiers in Aceh in northern Sumatra to move,52 fearing they would
become tied to rebel groups. Furthermore, the Indonesian government passed a cabinet decisionin March 1953 requesting all holdout Japanese soldiers to leave, and the Director of the Ministryof Foreign Affairsʼ Pacific Department lodged a request53 with the Consulate-General of Japan,
which indicated that the soldiers were not welcomed with open arms by Indonesia as a nation.
A majority of the 324,54 excluding the 45 who temporarily returned to Japan after the War of
Independence, were discharged from the Indonesian army and blended into local communities
through “rites of passage” such as marrying local women and converting to Islam. However,their status was insecure, being separated from the military in exchange for a simple certificate.
Since Indonesiaʼs Ministr y of Justice made a move to deport those who did not have local
citizenship as “illegal immigrants,” many of the holdout Japanese soldiers applied for Indonesian
citizenship to the Ministry of Veteransʼ Affairs in 1957, and were issued provisional ID cards andbecame “associate Indonesians,” but only a few were able to obtain the nationality determination
certificates that were issued several times between 1961 and the following year, leaving many
without citizenship recognition. The March 4, 1958 edition of the Indonesian-language newspaper
Tempo reported that “ more than 350 holdout Japanese soldiers hope to obtain Indonesian
citizenship (naturalization) when the peace agreement between Japan and Indonesia takes effect.”
The issue of the nationality of the holdout Japanese soldiers was subsequently solved when all re51

Fukushi Tomo no Kai, ed. Indoneshia dokuritsu sensō ni sanka shita “Kaeranakatta Nipponhei” issen-mei
no koe [Voices of 1,000 Japanese soldiers who participated in the Indonesian War of Independence anddid not return home] (Privately printed book). 2005. p. 382.

52

Ibid. Tōbu Jawa no Nipponjin butai [Troops made of Japanese soldiers in East Java]. pp. 290–291.

53

Goto Kenichi. “Zanr yū Nipponhei no sengoshi: Kunpuru Otsudo no ashiato [Postwar journal of aholdout Japanese soldier: Footsteps of Kumpul Otsudo].” In Tōnan ajia kara mita kingendai Nippon[Modern Japan from the perspective of Southeast Asia]. Chapter 8. Iwanami Shoten. 2012. pp. 255–259.

54

Ibid. Indoneshia dokuritsu sensō ni sanka shita “Kaeranakatta Nipponhei” issen-mei no koe [Voices of 1,000
Japanese soldiers who participated in the Indonesian War of Independence and did not return home]. p.
382.

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The Process of Heroizing the Holdout Japanese Soldiers in Indonesia

applicants were granted nationality under the special presidential exception in 1963.55 However,the fact that they could not obtain nationality for nearly 17 years meant that, for the holdout
Japanese soldiers, Indonesiaʼs independence was not synonymous with their own success.

Organization
Rather, what proved to be a turning point in their lives was the presence of Japanese companies
that were looking to re-enter Indonesia. Led by the “successful” who had achieved economic
uplift through being employed locally by Japanese companies due to the growing demand for
trade between the two countries until the diplomatic relations between Japan and Indonesia were
restored in 1958, a friendship and benevolent society called Fukushi Tomo no Kai (Yayasan Warga
Persahabatan) was formed in Jakarta in 1979. The existence of Fukushi Tomo no Kai served as anopportunity to change the situation surrounding the holdout Japanese soldiers.
On December 3, 1981, the Osaka evening edition of the Yomiuri Shimbun listed 583 deceased
or unaccounted for, and 172 survivors of the holdout Japanese soldiers under the headline, “Listof former Japanese soldiers who participated in the Indonesian War of Independence completed.”
The ar ticle said, “ The number of those deceased or unaccounted for during the War of
Independence was 226 killed in action, 238 missing, and 119 deceased after independence. There
were many who were known only by their surnames, such as ʻSuzuki,ʼ ʻKawada,ʼ and ʻOsaki,ʼ orby their local names, such as ʻUsman,ʼ ʻSimin,ʼ and ʻSuroto.ʼ There were also those who remained
known only by their nicknames such as ʻAkachin.ʼ These were people who were afraid of being
identified as war criminals or fugitives and decided to live as locals ( ) Although many of thedeceased were buried in heroes cemeteries, it is believed that many of those killed or missing inaction were left to perish in the fields or were buried without any known surviving relatives.”
In May of the following year, Fukushi Tomo no Kai Kyoryoku Kai, a sister organization of theJapan-Indonesia Friendship Group Council, was formed at the Kensei Kinen Kaikan in Nagatacho, Tokyo. Inamine Ichiro, then chair of the Japan-Indonesia Friendship Group Council, wasa member of the House of Councilors from Okinawa who had ser ved in the Jakarta Naval
Office during the war. He was also chair of the Japan-Indonesia Parliamentar y Friendship
League, which was inaugurated in March. Taniguchi Shigeki, Executive Director of the JapanIndonesia Friendship Council, also served as both the Secretary General of the Japan-Indonesia
Parliamentary Friendship League and Executive Director of Fukushi Tomo no Kai Kyoryoku Kai.
Fukushi Tomo no Kai Kyoryoku Kai played the role of bringing the holdout Japanese soldierscloser to the comradesʼ associations in Japan as well as to politics.

“Homecoming”

In response to the “homecoming” of the holdout Japanese soldiers, which Fukushi Tomo no
Kai Kyoryoku Kai set as its objective, 10 holdout Japanese soldiers were able to return to Japan
temporarily in October 1982 and June of the following year under the Ministry of Health andWelfare ʼ s special suppor t measures for unrepatriated persons. Osaka Asahi Broadcasting
Corporationʼs program “Big News Show: Holdout Japanese soldiers in Indonesia meet theirrelatives after 37 years ” (broadcast on August 20, 1982) and “Japindo II: Holdout Japanesesoldiers in Indonesia 1982” (broadcast in November 1982, awarded the 20th Galaxy Award Grand
Prize by the Association of Broadcast Critics, the Excellence Award in the TV Documentar y
Division of the 37th ACA National Arts Festival, and Encouragement Prize of the ABU [Asia-PacificBroadcasting Union] Prize), which covered this closely and portrayed old holdout Japanesesoldiers struggling with nostalgia, reminded the Japanese people of “abandoned people” deserted
55

Ibid. Kōgun heishi to Indoneshia dokuritsu sensō [Soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army and theIndonesian War of Independence]. pp. 134–139.

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Hayashi Eiichi

by their motherland, and touched their hearts. Japan had become a major economy at the time,and self-affirming theories of Japanese culture and the Japanese people were popular, thus many
viewers may have viewed the holdout Japanese soldiers struggling in “impoverished” Indonesia
as “pitiful.”
However, there was opposition to this from within Fukushi Tomo no Kai, which fully
cooperated with the interview. Fukushi Tomo no Kai initially prepared and submitted a list ofinterview subjects based on the TV stationʼs request to feature holdout Japanese soldiers who had
never returned to Japan after the war and were at that time suffering from poverty and illness.
However, Fukushi Tomo no Kaiʼs Deputy Director Tanaka Toshio, who watched the program,leveled the criticism that “claiming that the ʻwar is to blameʼ without making efforts to have theholdout Japanese soldiers themselves, who left their wives and children in Japan to go to war
and who fled of their own will without fulfilling their responsibilities as husbands (fathers) after
the defeat, and who also gave up Japanese citizenship, explain the reasons for their flight andconvince the audience, is a sales pitch on the part of the interviewers. I believe that ʻthese wereconsequences of their own actions, and not the responsibility of war.ʼ”56 He asked Mr. Okihara,
Executive Director of Fukushi Tomo no Kai Kyoryoku Kai, who visited Jakarta in March 1983, that
“TV and other mass media coverage should be selected based on the impact on the members,
and any coverage that would damage the image of the members should be rejected for the sakeof their honor. It should be noted when dealing with them that the members are not Japanese but
Indonesian nationals.57
Due in part to these developments, the “homecoming” did not attract as many applicants
as expected and ended after only two rounds. Ishii Masaharu, Chief Director of Fukushi Tomono Kai, who had promoted the “homecoming,” expressed his regret at the time, saying, “It
was selfish of us to abandon our hometowns and our country, but the people back home neverthought of us as such. The parents, siblings, wives, and children must have been longing to see
us and were waiting for us to come home one day. Even if their nationality is different and family
registers deleted, the connection between them cannot be cut. When will they return? Whatshould they say to neighbors who ask? With the passage of time, there may be no one left to ask
questions, but what could be said against stories spreading in the background that they cannot
return home because they are fugitives? I can only imagine how uncomfortable and vexing
the people of our hometowns must have felt each time, not knowing the reason why we stayedbehind. I wonder if the unrepatriated brothers have ever thought about their feelings.”58 Ishii ran
a konnyaku and sandal company, and was one of the most successful.

Self-representation as “heroes of independence”

After the “homecoming” efforts stalled, Ishii turned his attention to requesting a military pension
from the Japanese government, which was also one of the objectives of Fukushi Tomo no Kai
Kyoryoku Kai. He was told by Taniguchi Shigeki, Executive Director of Fukushi Tomo no Kai
Kyoryoku Kai, that it had been recognized in Japan that the holdout Japanese soldiers were awareof their legal status and were prepared to give up their pension and other welfare benefits, but
the temporary homecoming brought attention to the new fact that they had remained in a stateof confusion. However, since there was still a big gap between the understanding of those who
remained and the people in Japan, Taniguchi advised Ishii that first of all, “it is necessary toemphasize the explanation that, at the time, the Japanese soldiers participated in the Indonesian
War of Independence out of genuine intentions in a climate that valued trust with Indonesia and56

Fukushi Tomo no Kai. Geppo [Monthly bulletin]. October 1982. p. 1.

57

Fukushi Tomo no Kai. Geppo [Monthly bulletin]. April 1983. p. 1.

58

Fukushi Tomo no Kai. Geppo [Monthly bulletin]. January 1983. p. 2.

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The Process of Heroizing the Holdout Japanese Soldiers in Indonesia

supported independence.”59 Ishii then proposed to the members of Fukushi Tomo no Kai that
he intended to carr y out “awareness-raising activities” focusing on Liberal Democratic Party
politicians, as soon as materials explaining this were available. Ishii believed that the greatest“memorial” for the more than 400 victims of the Indonesian War of Independence would be to
document the role of those who remained behind in the history of the founding of Indonesia,
and that “the most meaningful work” for Fukushi Tomo no Kai would be to have this information
recorded in Japan and translated into Indonesian. As if to make good on his promise, he planned
to publish his autobiography and called on members to write or tape-record their own memoirs.60
On this, some said, “Indonesia, as an independent country, would not like to say that it became
independent with assistance from foreigners, and worse, would not like to write it down as ahistorical fact and leave it for later generations (...) They might think without saying, ʻWhy do they
have to submit it to the Japanese cooperative association now, and speak as if they participated in
the War of Independence as Japanese and provided assistance?ʼ If that were to happen, it would
be another odd relationship.”61 In recording the historical facts of the fight for independence, Ishii
stated that “it is safe to announce that we proudly picked up our guns and fought as Japanese,”and expressed his strong concern that although the Indonesian public equally recognized theexistence of “holdouts” at the time of independence, more than 40 years have passed sincethen, and with public memory fading and impatience growing, the more than 400 victims who
were killed will be buried forever in the darkness of history if their names are not recorded ashistorical facts now.62
Later, the issue of recording of history was settled by Fukushi Tomo no Kai itself keeping
a collection of records rather than taking advantage of Fukushi Tomo no Kai Kyoryoku Kai.63
Otsuto, the editor of Geppo (monthly bulletin), who intended to keep a record of life rather thanwar experiences, often called for contributions of articles about life after the war, but naturally
the contributions tended to be war stories, and Fukushi Tomo no Kai members shared eachotherʼs memories of the war by reading the memoirs of the War of Independence published in
Geppo. As a result, Fukushi Tomo no Kai shifted from a mutual support group to a community ofmemory tied to the experience of the War of Independence, transforming itself into a “comradesʼ
association.” However, while Japanʼs comradesʼ associations were formed by people who had
served in the same unit during World War II and shared the same experiences, the people whogathered at Fukushi Tomo no Kai meetings were from different backgrounds and belonged todifferent units, and had different circumstances that led them to stay behind. That proved to be asetback, and in the end, Fukushi Tomo no Kaiʼs collection of records of the War of Independence
was never published.

Representation on the Japanese side and “restoration of honor”

Even so, the significance of self-representation as “heroes of independence” by the holdout
Japanese soldiers themselves in the 1980s as an opposition to the perception in postwar Japan,
which viewed them as victims of the war, was not small.
For example, in Kagoshima Televisionʼs “No return: Postwar for the Japanese soldiers who
remained in Indonesia” (broadcast on May 31, 1994), Chiyomori Michiharu said, “We must
liberate the people of Greater East Asia, this is a fight for national liberation. We accepted what
our superiors told us and set out in high spirits. However, nearly 50 years after the end of the59

Fukushi Tomo no Kai. Geppo [Monthly bulletin]. April 1983. p. 2.

60

Fukushi Tomo no Kai. Geppo [Monthly bulletin]. April 1983. p. 3.

61

Fukushi Tomo no Kai. Geppo [Monthly bulletin]. May 1983. p. 2.

62

Fukushi Tomo no Kai. Geppo [Monthly bulletin]. August 1983. p. 6.

63

Fukushi Tomo no Kai. Geppo [Monthly bulletin]. January 1986. pp. 5–6.

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Hayashi Eiichi

Greater East Asia War, we are now hearing for the first time that Japan engaged in a war ofinvasion, and it is truly shameful. That is not the way we felt when we went to war.” The program
also showed a Fukushi Tomo no Kai executive stating, “The amount of money was not the issue
when we insisted on a pension. Rather, it was the significance of the fact that the image of thesoldiers as fugitives and deserters has been cleared and that the government recognized them asholdout soldiers,” indicating that they viewed the Japanese governmentʼs granting of temporary
soldierʼs pension to 21 sur vivors in 1991 as a “restoration of honor” from being labeled as“fugitives” and “deserters.”
Additionally, in the documentar y video “ The Light of Independent Asia: Histor y and
the Present of Southeast Asia ”64 (1995), organized by the National Committee for the 50th
Anniversary of the End of the War, the National Main Heroes Cemetery in Kalibata is shown withthe following statement: “It is said that after the defeat of Japan, there were about 2,000 Japanesesoldiers who remained in Indonesia and fought in the War of Independence. (...) The Japanese
who gave their lives in the War of Independence are now respectfully honored in this cemeteryas heroes of independent Indonesia. Ono Sakari, who was wounded fighting against the Dutch
forces, was one of them.” Ono then appears and says, “When the war started, many people whowanted to get support from the Japanese army came to us, from the Indonesian side. I was also
persuaded and joined in Indonesia. (How many people were killed in the war?) About half. At
least 1,000 were killed in the war. That is because we provided guidance in the war and were on
the front lines. We were easily detected by the enemy. That is why there were so many casualties
in the end,” explaining the sacrificial contribution made. In 1995, the year this documentary was
released, the Japanese government awarded certificates of commendation to 69 holdout Japanesesoldiers in the name of the Japanese ambassador to Indonesia.
Furthermore, Yamaguchi Broadcastingʼs “NNN Document 96: Japanese soldiers who did
not return home―Current situation of the soldiers who remained in Indonesia” (broadcast on
January 29, 1996, winner of the Japan Commercial Broadcasters Association Award [44th Award
for Excellence, News Programs Division]), while focusing on the difficult retired lives of DokiTokiji, the main character in “Japindo II and III,” and Kioka Naoyuki, also mentioned that there
were people like Fujiyama Hideo, who “never doubted the liberation of the Asian colonies.” Theprogram quoted Fujiyamaʼs statement, “We are going to decolonize ourselves from the colonies,
they said. We felt their enthusiasm. Why did we fight the war? The Japanese army said theywould bring independence. So why not support that?”Thus, in the documentaries produced in the 1990s, representations of the holdout Japanesesoldiers were no longer focused solely on the image of “abandoned people,” but rather reflect
the voices of those who remained voluntarily, such as Chiyomori Michiharu, Ono Sakari, andFujiyama Hideo. This may be due to the fact that the number of survivors was decreasing as theholdout Japanese soldiers aged and the interviewee became more diverse. As a result, however,the previously dominant image of holdout Japanese soldiers as victims of the war was revised.

“Commendation” by the Japanese government

During this period, the Japanese government, which granted a temporary soldierʼs pension andpresented ambassadorʼs awards to the holdout Japanese soldiers, presented the Order of the
Sacred Treasure, Fifth Class, to four, and the Order of the Rising Sun, Silver Rays (Sixth Class), to
one of the executives of Fukushi Tomo no Kai from 1991 to 1996, promoting their “commendation.”
64

Preceding studies have described “The Light of Independent Asia” as “work based on a typicalʻliberation view of history.ʼ” Goto Kenichi. “ʻKaihō sensōʼ shikan/ʻdokuritsu kōkenʼ shikan no kyomōsei[Deceptiveness of ʻliberation warʼ and ʻcontribution to independenceʼ views of history].” In ibid. Tōnanajia kara mita kingendai Nippon [Modern Japan from the perspective of Southeast Asia]. Chapter 10. p.
333.

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The Process of Heroizing the Holdout Japanese Soldiers in Indonesia

In 2001, the Toho film “Merdeka 17805” was released, depicting the Japanese who contributed
to Indonesiaʼs independence. In the film, Japanese instructors who provided military training
to Indonesian youths during the Japanese occupation are asked to become holdout Japanesesoldiers after the war ended in defeat, and fight in the Indonesian War of Independence against
the Netherlands. In the same year, former Defense Agency Director Nakatani Gen, and Prime
Minister Koizumi Junichiro the following year, visited the National Main Heroes Cemetery in
Kalibata.
When Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro visited the National Main Heroes Cemeter y in
Kalibata in 2004, he laid a wreath with the words “In honor of the heroes, Governor of Tokyo,”
before meeting with Miyahara Eiji, advisor to Fukushi Tomo no Kai, and others. He spoke toreporters, saying, “I came here and was able to meet some of the survivors. They fought theguerrilla war with hardly any weapons. They must have been heroes to the Indonesians at thattime.”65 That year, Fukushi Tomo no Kai received the Foreign Minister ʼs Commendation, andMiyahara personally received the Order of the Rising Sun, Silver Rays 2009.
In 2007 and 2015, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo visited the National Main Heroes Cemeteryin Kalibata. On those occasions, Prime Minister Abe poured sake and offered flowers at thegravestone of Eto Shichio, who lies in the Heroes Cemetery. The “ceremony” of joining hands
in prayer at the individual gravestones of the holdout Japanese soldiers in addition to offering
flowers at the central cenotaph was later followed by Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide in 2020 andPrime Minister Kishida Fumio in 2022 when they visited the National Main Heroes Cemetery in
Kalibata.66
The Emperor and Empressʼs visit to the National Main Heroes Cemetery in Kalibata in 2023
was limited to offering flowers at the central cenotaph and signing the visitorʼs book, and did notinclude a visit to the individual holdout Japanese soldiersʼ cemeteries. However, it was reported
that at a meeting with people with ties to Japan the night before, they met with four second- andthird-generation Japanese descendants who were executives of Fukushi Tomo no Kai where65“Ishihara chiji ga eiyū bochi ni kenka: Fukushi Tomo no Kai kanbu ra to kondan [Governor Ishihara
offers flowers at the heroes cemetery, meets with Fukushi Tomo no Kai executives].” The Daily Jakarta
Shimbun, November 22, 2004. p. 1.

66

Not all of the soldiers who died in the War of Independence against the Netherlands in the late 1940s
are buried in the heroes cemetery where the “patriots” are laid to rest. Many were buried in a typeof general cemeter y called a national cemeter y, for a variety of reasons. Such reasons include nothaving been in the regular militar y and not having documentation to prove their participation in
the War of Independence, bereaved family members not wishing to have a national military funeral
after their death, etc. In interviews I conducted in 2007 with 21 bereaved families of fallen soldiers in
Malang Province, eastern Java, I heard stories such as, even though they participated in the War of
Independence, “I was too lazy to apply for the guerrilla medal” in the confusion of the reorganization
and rationalization of the Indonesian army, and “I was not given the recognition corresponding to
my militar y achievements due to my low educational background” after the War of Independence.
Additionally, there were cases where soldiers were eligible to be buried in the heroes cemetery but
left a will to be buried in a national cemetery for reasons such as “it is too far from the family grave
and it is difficult to visit the grave,” “I do not want to be with my war comrades even in the grave,” “I
was requested to make a monetary contribution to be buried in the heroes cemetery,” “I was too poor
to afford burial in a heroes cemetery,” and “It was difficult to prepare the certificate both financiallyand effort-wise.” In some cases, the bereaved family members decided not to bury the deceased in theheroes cemetery. A comparison of the number of holdout Japanese soldiers buried in a heroes cemeteryand a national cemetery by region shows that the number of those buried in a heroes cemetery exceeds
the number buried in a national cemetery in the metropolitan area, but in western Java, central Java,eastern Java and Bali, and Sumatra, the number buried in heroes cemeteries is less than that buried innational cemeteries. Especially in Sumatra, the number buried in a national cemetery is high. Ibid. Tōbu
Jawa no Nipponjin butai [Troops made of Japanese soldiers in East Java]. p. 45.

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Hayashi Eiichi

the Emperor said, “You have suffered greatly,” and the Empress said, “Tomorrow, we will offer
flowers with all our hearts.”67
The meeting between the Emperor and the descendants of holdout Japanese soldiers was
not seen during the former Emperorʼs visit to Indonesia in 1991.68 What this means is that theenvironment surrounding the holdout Japanese soldiers has changed over the past 30 years,
and what triggered this change was the self-representation of the holdout Japanese soldiersthemselves, which was amplified as a result of the mutual interaction between the parties
concerned and the Japanese side.69
In the process, the holdout Japanese soldiers in Indonesia gradually became heroes. For
example, journalist Inoue Kazuhiko praised Ono Sakari, who passed away in 2014 and was buried
in a national military funeral at the heroes cemetery in Batu City, East Java, as the “last hero.”70

The reality of the “last hero”

In the NHK-produced “The Century in Moving Images Butterfly Effect: 3 Years and 8 Months of
the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” (broadcast on April 24, 2023), following the narration
stating that “2,000 Japanese soldiers who remained fought alongside them [authorʼs note: theDefenders of the Fatherland organized during the Japanese occupation],” the following captions
were read: “From the words of a holdout Japanese soldier: The Greater East Asia War was a war
to liberate Greater East Asia, and Japan lost without achieving that goal. However, Indonesia
is trying to become independent. We fought to show them what Japan could not achieve, eventhough we were a small force.” These words were spoken in 2004 when the author interviewed
Ono Sakari, who was 85 years old at the time. He continued, “So, to say that I tried to succeed inwhat Japan could not accomplish would be a bit of an exaggeration.”71
However, Ono ʼ s belief that he remained in the area, considering it to be a “ crusade toliberate Asia,” is merely a “memory created” after the fact. In fact, Ono remained in Bandung,
western Java, for a combination of reasons including the following. He was ordered to fly back to
Hiroshima with the brigadeʼs military register immediately after the defeat, but was begged by his
predecessor, a warrant officer, and switched places out of “kindness”; he felt that unconditionalsurrender was unacceptable; he was proud to be an active soldier; as a person he was serious
and responsible at best, and inefficient and stubborn at worst; and was the third son of a farming
family in Hokkaido and had no prospect of getting any farmland to support himself even if he did
return to Japan.72
Ono became inspired by the “crusade to liberate Asia,” after leaving the Japanese militaryand meeting Ichiki Tatsuo, an advocate of Pan-Asianism in Yogyakarta, central Java. He wrote
in his “battlefield diary” on March 12, 1946, that “Japan, which liberated Indonesia from Dutch
67“Ryō heika, zanryū Nipponhei no shison ra to gomenkai [Their Majesties meet descendants of holdout
Japanese soldiers].” The Sankei News. June 20, 2023.

68

Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko met with the families of former holdout Japanese soldiers when
they visited Vietnam in 2017, and in 2023, Crown Prince Akishino and Crown Princess Kiko also met
with the families of former holdout Japanese soldiers.

69

Previous studies tended to downplay this process of intrinsic heroization and simply relate the Asianliberation war theory to the holdout Japanese soldiers. Ibid. “ʻKaihō sensōʼ shikan/ʻdokuritsu kōkenʼshikan no kyomōsei [Deceptiveness of ʻliberation warʼ and ʻcontribution to independenceʼ views ofhistory].” pp. 327–329.

70

Inoue Kazuhiko. Nippon ga tatakatte kurete kansha shite imasu 2: Ano sensō de Nipponjin ga sonkei
sareta riyū [We are grateful that Japan fought for us 2: The reason why the Japanese were respected inthat war]. Sankei Shimbun Publications. 2015. pp. 150–155.

71

Ibid. Zanryū Nipponhei no shinjitsu [Truth about the holdout Japanese soldiers]. pp. 75–76.

72

Ibid. Zanryū Nipponhei no shinjitsu [Truth about the holdout Japanese soldiers]. pp. 86–89.

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The Process of Heroizing the Holdout Japanese Soldiers in Indonesia

oppression, is a nation of the yellow race. We are brothers belonging to the same Asian race. In
order to bring peace to Asia, I hereto pledge to wholeheartedly fight together and die together
hand in hand with my Indonesian brothers.”73 and positioned his reason for remaining as a“crusade to liberate Asia” for the first time. On the other hand, in his battlefield diary for May
1946, he mentions that there were holdout Japanese soldiers who had “left the military due torelations with women or for other reasons such as personal success,”74 and he encourages themto return to it, fearing that “this will be known by the people of Indonesia in the future or eventoday, and when the people of Indonesia find themselves in a difficult fight or in social disorder inthe future, these Japanese who will not be able to directly participate in the fight for independence
may encounter unforeseen disasters.”75
Onoʼs battlefield diar y, a valuable historical document from that period,76 shows that hewas negative about not fighting for a cause and staying behind to live. However, for many of
the holdout Japanese soldiers, it is inferred that their participation in the Indonesian War of
Independence was not an ideological decision, but a decision for survival.

73

Ono Sakari (edited and commented by Hayashi Eiichi). Nampō gunsei kankei shiryō 42: Indoneshia
zanryū Nipponhei no shakaishi [Documents related to military administration in the southern territories#42: Social history of the holdout Japanese soldiers in Indonesia]. Ryuukeishosha. 2010. p. 48.

74

Ibid. Indoneshia zanryū Nipponhei no shakaishi [Social histor y of the holdout Japanese soldiers inIndonesia]. p. 58.

75

Ibid. Indoneshia zanryū Nipponhei no shakaishi [Social histor y of the holdout Japanese soldiers inIndonesia]. p. 58.

76“Kyū nipponhei no nikki wo hakken: Indoneshia dokuritsu sensō ni sansen [Diary of former Japanesesoldier discovered: Joining the Indonesian War of Independence].” Society page of The Asahi Shimbun
morning edition. November 2, 2005. “Ikita akashi: Indoneshia dokuritsu sensō no nikki, jō―Kesshi nohibi, kokumei ni [Proof of his life: Diary of the Indonesian War of Independence, part 1―Clear recordof the desperate days].” General culture page of The Asahi Shimbun morning edition. November 2,
2005. “Ikita akashi: Indoneshia dokuritsu sensō no nikki, ge―ʻTsutaetaiʼ hikitsugu negai [Proof of his
life: Diary of the Indonesian War of Independence, part 2―Taking over their wish to ʻpass onʼ].” Generalculture page of The Asahi Shimbun morning edition. November 3, 2005.

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Ryoko Nakano

Reshaping the Cultural Heritage Regime:
How Japan and China Engage in UNESCO’s Heritage Programs
Ryoko Nakano
Abstract
Non-Western rising powers wield significant influence in reshaping the direction of theUnited Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), ensuring itsalignment with the dynamic global landscape and meeting the expectations of both risingstates and those in the Global South. This article closely examines how Japan and China,
as rising powers in the past and present, have actively engaged with UNESCO to exhibit
their rich cultural legacies and histories while harnessing their influence to challenge
Eurocentric heritage paradigms and assert their distinct Asian leadership positions. The
article also underscores apprehensions regarding Chinaʼs approach, rooted in a discourseof civilization and transregional connectivity, which might be intricately linked to global
geopolitical ambitions and economic interests.

T

Introduction
he United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
has long been recognized as a vital cultural organization whose mission is to fostera culture of peace, eradicate poverty, and facilitate intercultural dialogue througheducation, science, culture, communication, and information.1 The main architectsof UNESCO primarily hailed from Western countries, predominantly Europeans, British, andAmericans. They played a pivotal role in shaping the organization, following in the footsteps of its
forerunners, the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation and the International Bureauof Education. From standard-setting to social, cultural, and educational campaigning, a wide rangeof UNESCOʼs activities underscore the universal ideal of peace, reflecting the norms, values, andpractices of Western enlightenment and humanist traditions.2
However, as multipolarity and pluralism gain prominence in global governance, UNESCO
must reflect the new global geopolitical dynamics by working in line with the expectations ofdeveloping and emerging states that comprise the Global South.3 This is inevitable for ethical andfinancial reasons. UNESCOʼs moral and expert authorities have so much relied on the support
from its member states (as of 2023, 194 member states and 12 associate members). Financially,
UNESCO severely suffered the loss of funding after the United States decided to halt a planned
payment to UNESCO for the recognition of Palestine as a new member in 2011.4 Although the1

UNESCO, Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, https://www.unesco.org/en/legal-affairs/constitution

2

J.P. Singh, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): Creating
Norms for a Complex World (London and New York: Routledge, 2010).

3

Willem J. H. Willems, “The Future of World Heritage and the Emergence of Transnational Heritage
Regimes,” Heritage & Society, vol. 7, no. 2, 2014, pp. 105–120.

4

The US also made an of ficial withdrawal from UNESCO in 2019 due to the alleged bias of
UNESCO against Israel. Joe Hernandez, “The U.S. Says It Wants to Rejoin UNESCO after Exiting
during the Tr ump Administration,” National Public Radio, June 12, 2023, https://www.npr.
org/2023/06/12/1181687608/united-states-unesco-return-membership-funding

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Reshaping the Cultural Heritage Regime: How Japan and China Engage in UNESCO’s Heritage Programs

US declared its return to UNESCO in June 2023, the relative decline of the Western economic
powers makes it imperative for UNESCO to cultivate partnerships outside the West to secure its
funds for operation. In particular, non-Western rising powers that have gained more resources andadvanced technologies hold strategically important positions that no international organizations
can ignore.
Likewise, rising powers also care about international organizations like UNESCO to enhancetheir position in the global hierarchy. As they accumulate economic power, they strive for prestige
and respect in the international arena.5 Culture is a significant platform for those states that want
to showcase their rich history, traditions, civilization, creativity, and achievement. Consequently,
it is not surprising that rising powers are increasingly engaging UNESCO and participating in its
flagship heritage platforms, such as World Heritage and Intangible Cultural Heritage.6
Against this background, this article examines the endeavors of Japan and China to (re-)
establish themselves as culturally and historically prominent nations within UNESCO while
reshaping the international heritage regime in favor of their interests and perspectives. Japan
was the first Asian country to become a major financial contributor to this Western-dominatedorganization, but China swiftly emerged as an influential actor in the twenty-first centur y,leveraging its financial power to the fullest extent. Both countries have actively preserved andpromoted cultural heritage, challenging the Eurocentric view of heritage by emphasizing Asianor non-Western (Global South) perspectives. However, this article contends that Chinaʼs recent
emphasis on a civilizational discourse in the construction of its transregional cultural heritage israising significant concerns due to its apparent connection with the countryʼs political ambitions
to establish itself as a central player in the global order. Moreover, this discourse is seen as ameans to achieve its economic goals, including gaining access to resources and markets on a
global scale. In response to the growing dominance of a Sinocentric historical narrative, major
powers need to ensure UNESCOʼs transparency, accountability, and multilateral decision-making
to better serve the interests of its diverse membership and the broader global community.
The remainder of this ar ticle is organized as follows. First, I will explain the generalcharacteristics of UNESCOʼs World Heritage, the international platform for safeguarding naturaland cultural heritage worldwide. Second, I will examine the efforts made by Japan to expand
the Eurocentric concept of cultural heritage. As one of the main contributors to UNESCO, Japan
has used its economic leverage to instill non-Western perspectives into World Heritage criteria.
Following the changes of UNESCOʼs heritage concept, the third section focuses on China, the
new emerging power that aims to exhibit its presence in UNESCO. Using its financial power,
China has contributed to the emergence of new norms regarding heritage conser vation andinternational cultural cooperation. I conclude that those efforts serve to diversify the cultural
heritage concept per the needs and perspectives of non-Western nations; however, it is necessary
not to confuse cultural diversity with cultural multicentricity. Japan, for its part, should play a rolein deterring forces to eliminate diversity and create another cultural hierarchy.

UNESCO’s World Heritage and Eurocentrism
World Heritage is the most recognized international platform that UNESCO has developed,
gaining in global popularity since its inception in 1972. As of 2023, 195 state parties have signed
the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (known
as World Heritage Convention). World Heritage is the largest international cultural framework
5

Rohan Mukherjee, Ascending Order: Rising Powers and the Politics of Status in International Institutions(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022). Steven Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

6

Ryoko Nakano and Yujie Zhu, “Heritage as Soft Power: Japan and China in International Politics,”
International Journal of Cultural Policy, vol. 26, no. 7, 2020, pp. 869–881.

20Japan Review Vol.6 No.2 2023

Ryoko Nakano

uniting diverse state and non-state entities in the mission to safeguard and preserve natural andcultural heritage worldwide.
European countries dominate the World Heritage List, with one notable exception: China. Asof 2023, Italy, China, Germany, France, and Spain were the top five countries with World Heritage
properties. Europe and North America account for 47.12% of the total properties, followed by Asiaand the Pacific (24.1%), Latin America and the Caribbean (12.43%), Africa (8.59%), and the Arabstates (7.76%).7
It would be hasty to conclude that African and Arab states lack significant heritage comparedto Europe and North America. Whether or not one country has a culturally significant heritage is
not solely determined by the number of properties listed on the World Heritage List. African andArab states have rich and diverse cultural and natural heritage that may not have been extensively
recognized or included on the list. The underrepresentation of certain regions could reflect
systemic biases in the nomination and evaluation processes rather than the lack of outstanding
heritage sites and landscapes.
One perspective for explaining the small number of World Heritage sites in African andArab states is that the criteria of the Outstanding Universal Value (OUV) to be recognized as
World Heritage are biased.8 Those who explore heritage as an area of critical inquiry argue that
European heritage experts have shaped UNESCOʼs charters and recommendations.9 As a result,
Eurocentrism within World Heritage criteria accounts for the overrepresentation of European
countries. For instance, if “authenticity” is linked to material and substance based on European
heritage examples, such as brick and stone buildings, wooden buildings may not be authentic
because their materials are usually replaced with new ones over decades and centuries.
Due to differing perspectives, interests, and priorities among member states regarding
World Heritage, the North-South contestation has marked the discussions in the World Heritage
Committee, comprising 21 states that make final decisions on World Heritage inscriptions.10
Developed countries, primarily from the Global North, often have greater financial and technicalresources, which enable them to select sites and to submit more nominations for a World
Heritage status. With the notion that the preservation of high standards, rigorous evaluation
processes, and adherence to technical criteria to maintain the integrity and universal value ofthe World Heritage List, European states may emphasize the importance of expert evaluations
and the need for stringent criteria to protect the credibility and authenticity of the list. However,developing countries, primarily in the Global South, often face challenges due to their limited
resources, capacity, and infrastructure. Some developing countries advocate for greater
inclusivity, fairness, and recognition of their cultural and natural heritage, calling for reforms in
the nomination process, evaluation criteria, and allocation of resources to ensure a more equitable
representation of sites from diverse regions and cultures. Nevertheless, non-Western countries,
joining the platform relatively later, feel compelled to conform to the norms and practices ofWestern heritage conservation and management.
Ultimately, the North-South contestation within the World Heritage Committee represents thecurrent changing global power dynamics in the twenty-first century. In some areas, efforts have
7

UNESCO, “World Heritage List Statistics,” https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/stat

8

OUV means cultural and/or natural significance which is so exceptional as to transcend nationalboundaries and to be of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity.

9

Laurajane Smith, Uses of Heritage (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). Denis Byrne, “Western
Hegemony in Archaeological Heritage Management,” History and Anthropology, vol. 5, no. 2, 1991, pp.
269–276.

10

Christoph Brumann, “Slag Heaps and Time Lags: Undermining Southern Solidarity in the UNESCOWorld Heritage Committee,” Ethnos, vol. 84, no. 4, 2019, pp. 719–738.

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Reshaping the Cultural Heritage Regime: How Japan and China Engage in UNESCO’s Heritage Programs

been made to bridge this divide through dialogue, capacity-building initiatives, and collaborative
projects to address the concerns of developing countries and promote a more balanced andinclusive representation of World Heritage. A noteworthy example of this is the increasing
influence of the Global South within UNESCO, prompting UNESCO ʼs secretariat to prioritize
the development of a sustainable development framework, given that development is a primaryconcern of the Global South.11
In this context, the engagement of rising powers in UNESCO has become key. In particular,
the emergence of Japan and China as major economic powers has significantly influenced themodifications of UNESCOʼs heritage concept and institutions. In the following sections, I will
examine those two cases as essential steps for diversifying UNESCOʼs heritage platforms.

Japan and the expanding scope of cultural heritage
Japan joined UNESCO in 1951, before signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty to formally end
World War II.12 At that time, Japan faced limited opportunities for membership in internationalorganizations due to its role as an aggressor during the war. However, UNESCO emerged as
the first organization to approach Japan under the US occupation (1945–1952), initiating “reeducation activities” aimed at eliminating the causes of war and aggression.13 A group of Japanese
professors and educators welcomed UNESCO ʼ s initiatives and created a mass educational
movement to promote the understanding of peace, human rights, and justice, as advocated by
UNESCO. Consequently, UNESCO played a pivotal role in Japanʼs re-entry into the international
arena during the postwar era.
As time progressed, Japan actively participated in UNESCO ʼ s initiatives, leveraging its
expertise, sharing its cultural resources, and contributing to numerous programs and projects led
by the organization. As early as 1954, a group of Japanese archeological experts and historians
prepared an extensive report on the Silk Roads as part of the contribution to UNESCOʼs “Major
Project for Mutual Appreciation of Cultural Values of East and West. ”14 At the ascendance ofJapanese economic power, the Silk Roads captured the Japanese imagination when NHK, asemi-governmental television network, produced and aired a documentar y series about the
Silk Roads in the 1980s. The program ignited the Japanese peopleʼs romantic fascination withancient regional history.15 With significant interest by society, the Japanese government decided
to participate in UNESCOʼs ten-year project of the “Integral Study of the Silk Roads: Roads of
Dialogue” in 1988. Japan supported the expedition known as “the Maritime Route from Venice
to Osaka,” involving Japanese scientists, researchers, and journalists. As a result, Japan has
emerged as one of the proactive participants in UNESCOʼs endeavor to rekindle the Silk Roads
memories and heritage during the 1990s.
11

Dobrosława Wiktor-Mach, “Cultural Heritage and Development: UNESCOʼs New Paradigm in a
Changing Geopolitical Context,” Third World Quarterly, vol.40, no.9, 2019, pp. 1593–1612.

12

Takashi Saikawa, “Returning to the International Community: UNESCO and Post-War Japan, 1945–
1951,” in Poul Duedahl, ed., A History of UNESCO: Global Actions and Impacts (Basingstoke and New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 116–130.

13

Aigul Kulnazarova and Poul Duedahl, “UNESCOʼs Re-education Activities in Postwar Japan andGermany: Changing Minds and Shifting Attitudes towards Peace and International Understanding,”
in Aigul Kulnazarova and Christian Ydesen, eds., UNESCO without Borders (London and New York:
Routledge, 2016), pp. 52–75.

14Japanese National Commission for UNESCO, Research in Japan in History of Eastern and Western
Cultural Contacts: Its Development and Present Situation, Japanese National Commission for UNESCO,
1957.

15

Marie Thorsten, “Silk Road Nostalgia and Imagined Global Community,” Comparative American Studies:
An International Journal, vol. 3, no. 3, 2005, pp. 301–317.

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Ryoko Nakano

Japanʼs support for UNESCOʼs efforts to preserve World Heritage predates its ratification of
the World Heritage Convention. In 1989, Japan financed the establishment of UNESCO/Japanʼs
Funds-in-Trust for the Preservation of the World Cultural Heritage. This was consistent withJapanʼs interest in international cultural cooperation, which came to be a dominant theme foran economically developed Japan.16 After the ministerial discussion and coordination over thedifference between the codes and discourse of the World Heritage Convention and Japanese
domestic law on cultural property, Japan finally ratified the World Heritage Convention in 1992.
Since then, as a major financial contributor to UNESCO, Japan has significantly challenged theorganizationʼs Eurocentric heritage concepts and norms. As mentioned earlier, World Heritageand its related discourse were predominantly shaped by European scholars and practitioners
in heritage conser vation and management and European-based organizations in the field.
Japan encountered such European-dominated discourse when the Hor yuji temple and other
Buddhist monuments were assessed for World Heritage inscription in the early 1990s. While the“authenticity” of the wooden temple was questioned due to the view that replaced materials were
not original, Japan started exploring the meaning of authenticity.17 Consequently, Japan supported
expertsʼ initiatives for acknowledging non-Western heritage concepts in relation to the OUVcriteria. The Nara Document on Authenticity (1994), the outcome document of this meeting,had a major impact on UNESCOʼs understanding of heritage, as it emphasized cultural contexts
in determining authenticity.18 The document also legitimized the Japanese claim that wooden
monuments and buildings whose materials are replaced with new ones also should be consideredauthentic.
Another milestone for Japan in UNESCO was the election of Koichiro Matsuura, a Japanesediplomat who ser ved earlier as the Chair of the World Heritage Committee, as the DirectorGeneral of UNESCO in 1999. By that time, UNESCO had adopted a nonbinding Recommendationon the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore (1989), a Living Human Treasures
System (1993), and a Proclamation of Masterpieces of the Oral Heritage of Humanity Program(1998). These documents reflect the interest of non-Western countries that have rich nonmaterial cultural assets and resources. However, Matsuuraʼs leadership, backed by Japanʼsfinancial and diplomatic support, made it possible to upgrade the Masterpieces program to
the Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) Convention (2003) and institutionalize a non-Westernconcept of intangible cultural heritage.19 Having Natsuko Aikawa from Japan as a developer of theintangible cultural heritage program, Japan further reinforced its commitment to UNESCO byactively shaping and influencing the organizationʼs agenda.20 Given Japanʼs rich cultural traditions,foods, cultural practices, and handicraft skills, creating a new international heritage platform in
UNESCO made sense. The launch of the ICH program was also timely as UNESCO adopted the
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity in 2002, which defines “culture” broadly and urges
all nations and institutions to preserve culture in all forms. Although this achievement was notentirely Japanʼs success, having involved a bottom-up initiative, Japanʼs financial and diplomatic
16

Natsuko Akagawa, Heritage Conservation and Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy: Heritage, National Identity
and National Interest (London: Routledge, 2014).

17

Aurélie Élisa Gfeller, “The Authenticity of Heritage: Global Norm-Making at the Crossroads ofCultures,” The American Historical Review, vol. 122, no. 3, 2017, pp. 758–791.

18

Ibid.

19

Aurélie Élisa Gfeller and Jaci Eisenberg, “UNESCO and the Shaping of Global Heritage,” in Poul
Duedahl, ed., A History of UNESCO (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 279–299.

20

Natsuko Akagawa, “Intangible Heritage and Embodiment: Japanʼs Influence on Global Heritage
Discourse,” in William Logan, Máiréad Nic Craith, and Ullrich Kockel, eds., A Companion to Heritage
Studies (Chichester, United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016), pp. 69–86.

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Reshaping the Cultural Heritage Regime: How Japan and China Engage in UNESCO’s Heritage Programs

contribution made a significant impact, enhancing greater inclusivity in UNESCO.21
These initiatives highlight Japan ʼ s proactive approach to reshaping the discourse on
heritage and promoting its own cultural perspectives. For non-Western powers engaging with
UNESCO, the Eurocentric discourse creates a pressing need to assert their national and regional
characteristics in heritage conser vation and management. It also presents an opportunity topotentially revise existing platforms to better ser ve their own interests. Japan has sought tobridge the gap and ensure that its unique heritage perspectives and practices are duly recognized
and incorporated into the global heritage discourse. By doing so, it aims to contribute to a more
inclusive and balanced approach to heritage conservation that acknowledges the diverse culturallandscapes and traditions of non-Western societies. The scope of UNESCOʼs cultural heritage has
expanded following the new voices of non-Western countries, particularly Asian.

China and the creation of a new cultural platform

Chinaʼs engagement with UNESCOʼs heritage regime can be traced back to its ratification of the1972 World Heritage Convention in 1985. Initially, China concentrated on its domestic agenda,
including capacity-building and raising peopleʼs awareness of World Heritage. Unlike Japan, whichaccumulated knowledge and experiences regarding heritage conservation and restoration overdecades, China experienced a social and educational disruption during the Cultural Revolution(1966–1976), which destroyed material cultural properties and the persecution of “intellectuals”
in various cultural, professional, and educational domains. China therefore pursued expertise in
the field of heritage conservation. With the successful outcomes of Chinaʼs reform and openingup policies in spurring economic development, the Chinese government also participated in three
Advisory Bodies of the World Heritage Committee: International Council on Monuments andSites in 1993, the International Union for Conservation of Nature in 1996, and the International
Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property in 2000.
China gradually accepted the concept of World Heritage while actively learning the languageof the World Heritage nomination.22 This is a top-down process in which government bodies, suchas the State Administration for Cultural Heritage, the Ministry of Construction, and the Ministryof Education, have participated. This integration of various government bodies and expertise
underscores Chinaʼs commitment to actively participate in the World Heritage Committee andengage with heritage-related matters on a national and international level. It demonstrates acoordinated effort to combine diplomatic and cultural heritage perspectives within Chinaʼsdelegations, emphasizing the importance the country places on heritage preservation and its
recognition by international organizations like UNESCO.
As China ʼ s economic ascendance has gained prominence, and tourism became popular
activities among Chinese citizens, Chinaʼs heritage policy entered a new era. Like many otherdeveloping countries, the Chinese government was keen to increase the number of World
Heritage sites both for inbound and domestic tourists. As has been called “heritage fever,”even Chinese local officials made restless efforts to obtain World Heritage recognition in theircorresponding sites.23
After Xi Jinping came in power, China reinvigorated its commitment to UNESCO and the21

J.P. Singh, “Cultural Networks and UNESCO: Fostering Heritage Preservation betwixt Idealism andParticipation,” Heritage & Society, vol. 7, no. 1, 2014, pp. 18–31.

22

Rouran Zhang, “World Heritage Listing and Changes of Political Values: A Case Study in West Lake
Cultural Landscape in Hongzhou, China,” International Journal of Heritage Studies, vol. 23, no. 3, 2017,
pp. 215–233.

23

Celine Lai, “UNESCO and Chinese Heritage: An Ongoing Campaign to Achieve World-Class Standards,”
in Poul Duedahl, ed., A History of UNESCO: Global Actions and Impacts (Basingstoke and New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 313–324.

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Japan Review Vol.6 No.2 2023

Ryoko Nakanopreservation of cultural heritage. Xiʼs profound dedication to UNESCO was evident, with his initial
visit to a UN organization being to UNESCO. Embracing the “China Dream” as the cornerstone ofhis policy, President Xi directed his attention toward the renaissance of Chinese heritage, culture,and civilization. Together with the Belt and Road Initiative, a massive infrastructure development
assistance project that Xi launched, China began to express its willingness to promote not only its
economic relationship but cultural and social relationships with other countries.
During Xiʼs period, China transformed itself from a passive observer to an active contributor
within UNESCO. Chinaʼs financial contribution to the UNESCO annual budget overtook theamount of Japanʼs contribution, making China the biggest contributor to UNESCO after the US
withdrawal from the organization in 2019.24 In the World Heritage Committee, China has become
one of the most vocal and influential countries in decision-making.25 China has also managed tohave placed its own officials in top management positions: Xing Qu as Deputy Director-General
and Qian Tang as President of the UNESCO International Bureau of Education.26 Viewed throughthe lens of shifting power dynamics, these developments signify the culmination of Chinaʼswillingness to take a lead in UNESCOʼs programs.
One of the themes over which China actively aligns itself with UNESCO is the linkage
between culture and development in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Building on its previous emphasis on UNESCOʼs role in development and its own domestic
experiences, China backed Director-General Bokovaʼs agenda to enhance UNESCOʼs involvementin the UNʼs Post-2015 Development Agenda. This support had already appeared when China
hosted the International Congress “Culture: Key to Sustainable Development” convened by
UNESCO in Hangzhou in 2013, marking the initiation of the agenda to connect culture with
development.27 Chinaʼs engagement in this agenda serves its domestic interests in developmentfocused approaches to culture. While some warn that such a policy has destroyed local cultural
heritage in Xinjiang, Tibet, and other regions of ethnic communities, this initiative has legitimized
the stateʼs utilization of cultural heritage in the name of development. The ultimate outcome ofthis endeavor was dependent on a broader international network. By connecting the multilateral
culture–development agenda and Chinaʼs own domestic cultural development, China exhibited its
central role in promoting the interest of the Global South to the international audience.
Moreover, Chinaʼs promotion of the Silk Roads heritage in UNESCO has indicated Chinaʼsdesire to champion the field of international cultural cooperation. Notably, Chinaʼs involvement
is comprehensive, with both the central government and regional entities actively participatingin the promotion of Silk Roads narratives, resulting in increased recognition and reputation.
The Municipality of Xiʼan, recognizing its historical role as the “east terminus of the historic
Silk Roads,” has actively used its historical legacy and aligned its urban development plansaccordingly.28 Additionally, Xiʼan has hosted several subregional meetings and ceremonial events
related to the Silk Roads. At the launch of the collaborative “Silk Roads programme” in UNESCO
in 2015, it was not only the Chinese National Commission for UNESCO, but commercial actors,
24

This might change as the US decided to return to UNESCO in 2023.

25

Enrico Bertacchini, Claudia Liuzza, and Lynn Meskell, “Shifting the Balance of Power in the UNESCOWorld Heritage Committee: An Empirical Assessment,” International Journal of Cultural Policy, vol. 23,
no. 3, 2017, pp. 331–351.

26

Grace Guo, “Should China Now Lead UNESCO?” The Diplomat, September 22, 2017. Hwa Young
Nam, “The UNESCO Unveiled,” Investigative Journalism Reportika, 2023. https://ij-reportika.com/
download/9308/?tmstv=1694065301

27

Wiktor-Mach, 2019, p. 1594.

28

Yang Yang, “Producing Multiple Imaginations of the Silk Road in Xiʼan, Chinaʼs Urban Development,”
International Journal of Cultural Policy, vol. 26, no. 6, 2020, pp. 854–866.

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Reshaping the Cultural Heritage Regime: How Japan and China Engage in UNESCO’s Heritage Programs

such as the Tang West Market Cultural Industry Investment Group of China, and local agents
such as the Provincial Government of Shanxi Province, were also involved.29 Chinaʼs National
Commission for UNESCO has provided support for initiatives such as the Silk Roads YouthResearch Grant scheme, while the Beijing International Peace Culture Foundation has funded
projects such as the development of an Interactive Atlas of Cultural Interactions along the Silk
Roads and the Youth Eyes on the Silk Roads Photo Contest.30
Chinaʼs wide-ranging activities in the Silk Roads heritage field has broader geopolitical
implications. China positions itself as the focal point of civilization, with multifaceted connections
to the Middle East, Europe, and Africa, entails Chinaʼs active involvement in constructing a
heritage discourse aligns with its geopolitical and economic agenda. 31 In contrast to Japanʼs
promotion of the Nara Convention and its initiative for establishing the Intangible Cultural
Heritage, Chinaʼs emphasis on its pivotal role in development and culture, and its promotionof a new Silk Roads heritage platform, is directly related to the discursive construction of
the Sinocentric national narrative that China aims to spread across the globe. Fearing such adominant historical narrative, voices in Southeast Asia are advocating for the acknowledgment
and reclamation of their regionʼs historical contributions to the maritime Silk Roads.32 Japan andSouth Korea also share concerns that their historical ties to the Silk Roads may be overshadowedby Chinese initiatives, leading to potential oblivion.33
In the aftermath of the zero-COVID policy in 2023, China organized the Alliance for Cultural
Heritage in Asia, reviving the ambition to develop “ Asian approaches ” to conser ving andpreser ving cultural heritage.34 Closely obser ving Chinaʼs Silk Roads diplomacy and heritage
promotion, Tim Winter, the author of Geocultural Power (2019), warned that Chinaʼs grandinitiative for creating a matrix of cultural cooperation, or what Xi Jinping calls a new Global
Civilization Initiative, could be a disaster for communities and cultures throughout Asia. 35
Mistakes have been made in the past, with the excesses related to the promotion of cultural
heritage and development destroying peopleʼs livelihoods and natural and cultural environment.
For China to be a champion of both development and cultural heritage conser vation andpreservation in Asia, communities, cultures, and people in the Silk Roads corridors should not
be sacrificed for being commodified and commercialized for tourism and state-led infrastructuredevelopment projects.
29

UNESCO, “The First Meeting of the International Network for the Silk Road Online Platform: A New
Phase in UNESCOʼs Silk Roads Initiative,” https://en.unesco.org/silkroad/content/first-meetinginternational-network-silk-road-online-platform-new-phase-unescos-silk-roads

30

UNESCO, “Youth Eyes on the Silk Roads: Beijing International Peace Culture Foundation,” https://
unescosilkroadphotocontest.org/en/node/41

31

Giulia Sciorati, “ʻConstructingʼ heritage diplomacy in Central Asia: Chinaʼs Sinocentric historicisationof transnational World Heritage Sites,” International Journal of Cultural Policy, vol. 29, no. 1, 2023, pp.
94–112.

32

Kwa Chong Guan and Han Fook Kwang, “Southeast Asia in the Forgotten History of the Maritime Silk
Road?” RSIS Commentary, October 13, 2023, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/southeastasia-in-the-forgotten-history-of-the-maritime-silk-road/?doing_wp_cron=1697589997.59777402877807617
18750

33

Ryoko Nakano, “A Geocultural Power Competition in UNESCOʼs Silk Roads Project: Chinaʼs Initiatives
and the Responses from Japan and South Korea,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, vol. 52, no. 2, 2023,
pp. 185–206.

34

Xinhua, “Xi Greets Conference of Alliance for Asian Cultural Heritage,” China Daily, April 25, 2023,
https://www.chinadailyhk.com/article/327459

35

Tim Winter, “Whatʼs behind Chinaʼs New Alliance for Cultural Heritage in Asia?” The Diplomat, May 4,2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/whats-behind-chinas-new-alliance-for-cultural-heritage-in-asia/

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Ryoko Nakano

Concluding thoughts
The history of international cultural cooperation in UNESCO reflects the aspirations of countries
seeking to bolster their international standing. By actively engaging in UNESCO, these nations
aim to contribute to shaping the international cultural landscape, exert influence, and establish
narratives of their national histor y and culture, and contributions within the organizationʼsframework. Through UNESCO, rising powers in particular aim to leverage their cultural heritage
and resources to enhance their soft power and assert their presence on the global stage. Japanʼs
aspiration to become a cultured nation is no exception, as it seeks to overcome WWIIʼs negative
legacy and move beyond economic power to cultivate its moral standing. Similarly, China
launched an endeavor to work within the Western-dominated international order in the 1970s.
As its economic power grew, it also aimed to cultivate a new terrain of cultural cooperation andpresent its national legacy and historical connectivity with the world.
For UNESCO, ensuring a fair and equitable approach to the recognition and preservationof diverse culture and heritage worldwide remains an ongoing challenge. Greater transparency
ensures that decisions and actions are accountable and open to scrutiny, reducing the potential
for favoritism or biased decision-making. Efforts have been made to address the imbalances inheritage lists/registers and promote a more inclusive representation of heritage from different
regions. These measures need to be upgraded to reshape international cultural cooperation tocater not only to the interests of a select few but to many without power.
However, there is a risk that UNESCO will become a platform for specific countries topromote and legitimize their historical narratives and expand their influence beyond the cultural
terrain. In particular, China apparently uses UNESCO and its cultural programs to promote its
agenda and influence. China combines heritage with development. The inclusion of development
attracts developing countries that prioritize economic growth rather than cultural conservation.
Under the name of culture and people-to-people connections, Chinaʼs initiatives can create majorsocial and physical upheavals and destructions, justifying infrastructure projects that may benefit
the tourism industry but displace populations.
For those who want to retain their cultural distinctiveness and historical significance, thegrowing dominance of a Sinocentric historical narrative regarding the Silk Roads is a source ofapprehension. Other major powers, including Japan, may be responsible for further enhancing
UNESCOʼs improvement by ensuring transparency, accountability, and multilateral decisionmaking in the organization. It is also important to support the capacity-building for heritage
conservation and protection in other countries, like Japanʼs recent assistance to the Silk Roads
heritage nomination by Central Asian countries.36 By encouraging other UNESCO members
to focus on cultural heritage matters, Japan should contribute to creating a more inclusive anddemocratic environment within the organization, enhancing fairness, inclusivity, and equal
representation in UNESCO. By doing so, Japan may serve the original mission of UNESCO andthe broader global community.
The recent news of the US rejoining UNESCO is potentially positive.37 Having the US actively
participate in UNESCO discussions could help counterbalance Chinaʼs influence and its pressureson other UNESCO member states. However, the US must assume a constructive role to gain the36

For example, see UNESCO, “Silk Roads World Heritage Serial and Transnational Nomination in Central
Asia: A UNESCO/Japanese Funds-in-Trust Project,” https://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/825/.
UNESCO, “Expert Meeting launches Phase III of the UNESCO/Japan Funds-in-Trust Project: Support
Silk Roads World Heritage Nomination(s) process,” February 23, 2022, https://whc.unesco.org/en/
news/2416

37

UNESCO, “The United Statesʼ Return to UNESCO Celebrated with a Flag-Raising Ceremony,” July26, 2023, https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/united-states-return-unesco-celebrated-flag-raisingceremony

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Reshaping the Cultural Heritage Regime: How Japan and China Engage in UNESCO’s Heritage Programs

trust and backing of countries in the Global South. This involves offering timely and proficientassistance to developing nations regarding culture and development and advocating for essential
reforms within UNESCO. Without these efforts, the journey toward a more diverse and inclusive
global community may result in the establishment of a multipolar hierarchy instead.

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Japan Review Vol.6 No.2 2023

Monika Chansoria

Defense Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool:
Understanding the Evolving Curve of Japan-India Joint
Military Exercises
Monika Chansoria*
Abstract
This paper delves into evaluating defense diplomacy as a foreign policy tool by exclusively
discussing the nature and scope of the Japan-India bilateral joint military exercises (JMEs).
While defense diplomacy and defense cooperation are concepts rooted in cooperative
security, the latter took shape as an overarching concept comprising defense partnerships
and collaboration via JMEs. It further highlights how the JMEs collaboration between
Japan and India impacts three distinct sub-regions in Asia; namely, South Asia, Southeast
Asia, and East Asia; along with the Indian Ocean Region and the Persian Gulf. The paper
traces the evolving course and debates on Japanʼs defense diplomacy and security policy,
highlighting Japanʼs implementation of a new proactive diplomatic policy tool – namely,
the official security assistance (OSA) framework to grant financial aid to the militaries oflike-minded countries. With the evolution of their respective security policies transiting toa phase wherein centrality of the Indo-Pacific is the focus, the paper provides an in-depth
understanding of the Japan-India defense cooperation [JMEs] graph. The paper concludes
by arguing that the Japan-India bilateral JMEs graph across Asia has proved instrumental intheir expanding acceptance as key regional strategic actors, and how the JMEs constitute asa key confidence-building measure (CBM) to enhance a securitized regional order, which
directly reflects upon the Indo-Pacificʼs balance-of-power politics.

S

ince the end of the Cold War, the term cooperative security has primarily been used todescribe a peaceful approach to security through increased international cooperation.
Its vitality got further pronounced, a decade later, following the 9/11 terror attacks on
the US in September 2001, which redefined terrorism, along with the need to strengtheninternational cooperation to combat it in a comprehensive and sustained manner. Largely,
cooperative security became a corresponding principle for international security, more so, in
terms of being an understanding/commitment among a group of nations with commonality ofinterests and values to protect the security of individual members within their joint spheres ofinterest.1 Resultantly, the role of international defense cooperation in meeting foreign policy goals
and supplementing diplomatic initiatives gained critical consequence and momentum. Whiledefense diplomacy and defense cooperation are concepts rooted in cooperative security, the latter
took shape as an overarching concept comprising defense partnerships and collaboration via joint
military exercises (JMEs), both bilaterally and multilaterally.

*

Dr. Monika Chansoria is a Senior Fellow at The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo,
and a Senior Contributing Author on Asiaʼs geopolitics for the JAPAN Forward Association, Inc., Tokyo.

1

For more details see, Monika Chansoria, “Regional Cooperative Security in the Indo-Pacific: Synergizing
Consultative Mechanisms across the Indian Ocean, East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Western
Pacific,” Japan Review, vol. 1, no. 2, Winter 2017.

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Defense Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool:
Understanding the Evolving Curve of Japan-India Joint Military Exercises

Militar y Diplomacy, Defense Cooperation, and JMEs:
Offshoots of the Contemporar y Cooperative Security Paradigm
The overarching need for cooperative security provided defense cooperation with a new roleand broadened scope. Based essentially on the realist understanding of state behavior, andtraditionally employed for realpolitik purposes by liberal democratic states, defense cooperation is
the sum of many defense-related actions, collectively aimed at furthering oneʼs national interests
through active cooperation with friendly nations. Defense cooperation and military diplomacy
are critical pillars of the cooperative security agenda, which, over time, have emerged as ideal
tools to advance vital macro level foreign policy objectives with strategically important countries
and regions. The post-9/11 world witnessed the scope of defense cooperation widening more
towards a security-motivated-cooperative approach, with JMEs constituting as its most visible
and predominant component in peacetime. As bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs)
assumed shape of becoming the most common form of institutionalized defense cooperation,2JMEs constituted their core. DCA formation saw states cooperating to obtain joint gains.3 Facedwith an increasingly complex security environment, states began to use DCAs4 to improvecoordinated responses to common security threats, and align themselves with communities oflike-minded collaborators. JMEs serve multiple political dimensions, with reassuring allies andpartners serving as one of the most crucial political aims.
In the post-9/11 world, confidence-building measures (CBMs), defense cooperation, andmilitary [defense] diplomacy and engagement became not only possible, but highly desirable,
given that they reduced transaction costs and made interstate relations more predictable.
Participation in international level militar y exercises, bilaterally and multilaterally, became
the highest CBM undertaken by a nation, or a group of nations. Operationally, JMEs enable
militaries to understand each otherʼs drills and procedures, and facilitate familiarization withequipment capabilities, and emerging technologies. This is particularly useful in the event ofjoint operations, whether in war, or, in military operations other than war (MOOTW). The gamutof defense cooperation ranges from JMEs and military-to-military training, strategic dialogues,
peacekeeping, deterring war, promoting peace, humanitarian aid and assistance, disaster relief,
and anti-piracy.
Above all, the most significant facet of JMEs, perhaps remains “strategic signaling” – beit bilaterally, or multilaterally. Strategic signaling in turn bolsters regional deterrence – in thecontext of understanding a nationʼs security policy, and the surrounding power politics in its
region. As such, there are revisionist states that attempt to achieve their goals through coercion,
which relies on the “threat of future military force to influence an adversaryʼs decision-making.”5
Coercion, or any stage short of actual war, is, thus, the optimal use of military as an instrument offoreign policy.6 Recall what John F. Kennedy stated on defense and diplomacy, “ the two are notsubstitutes for one another either alone would fail.”
Ranging from signaling militar y capability and resolve, to reinforcing the credibility of2

Brandon J. Kinne, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security
Network,” International Organization, vol. 72, no. 4, Fall 2018, pp. 799–837.

3

For additional reading see, Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security
Affairs,” World Politics, vol. 37, no. 1, 1984, pp. 1–23.

4

Kinne, n. 2.

5

Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 3.

6

Sushant K. Singh, “Militar y as an instrument of Indiaʼs foreign policy: An expanding footprint,” in
Handbook of Indian Defence Policy: Themes, structures, and doctrines (ed.) (London: Routledge, 2016), p.
164.

30Japan Review Vol.6 No.2 2023

Monika Chansoria

joint defense commitments, JMEs contribute towards deterrence7 driven by factors, such as
geographic proximity, and/or a belief that an adversary is violating the “rules of the game” –either of which contribute to the perception of being “under threat.”8 Moreover, the geographicallocation of the JMEs is often read as an indication of engagement and trust within partner nations,especially in reference to the current and underlying territorial and sovereignty issues acrossAsia. It has been observed that to employ JMEs as a geopolitical messaging tool that signals
commitment, and/or deterrence, the visibility of JMEs remains essential.
Being the operation extended arm of defense diplomacy, defense cooperation aims at
sharing operational and doctrinal expertise between the armed forces in training and capability
enhancement of oneʼs own militar y. It also allows for the examination and imbibing of “bestpractices,” creating ability to operate alongside and enhance maritime domain awareness, througha variety of information sharing mechanisms. Additionally, defense cooperation activities signal
political commitment to develop cooperative relations, promote military transparency, reduce
misperception, and promote perception of common interests. Consequently, institutionalized
defense cooperation becomes instrumental in helping to prevent conflict, and being an ideal toolin advancing vital common foreign policy objectives9 with strategically important countries. When
governments create DCAs, they reveal information about their trustworthiness and preferredinstitutional designs,10 thereby providing transparency to mutual foreign policy initiatives andcommonality in approaches.

The Evolving Course in Japan’s Defense Diplomacy and Security Policy
The series of security policy announcements in and around the Indo-Pacific between 2011 and2014, including the US “rebalance” towards the Asia-Pacific (2011); Japanʼs reorientation to the
Indo-Pacific (2012); and Indiaʼs upgrade of its 1992 “Look East” Policy to the “Act East” Policy(2014) resulted in promotion of bilateral JMEs with regional stakeholders. Moreover, Japanʼsannouncement of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy found near overlap with therevival of the Quadrilateral Initiative (Quad) ahead of the East Asia Summit in 2017. Coining of
the term Indo-Pacific brought the Indian context to the fore as it links the Indian Ocean with theWestern Pacific, across the Malacca Straits, to form a seamless economic and security continuum.
The subsequent period witnessed purposeful redefining of the “Asia-Pacific” as the “Indo-Pacific”– succinctly identifying the geographic space and geostrategic significance between the Indianand Pacific Oceans. “Indo-Pacific” gained traction in the political lexicon and strategic thinking notjust among the Quad members, but also the ASEAN states. Accordingly, the rising scope in JapanIndiaʼs bilateral JMEs discussed in the later sub-section of this paper, indicates strategic realism11that simultaneously has contributed to their national security interests, as well as broader regional
security goals. Beyond its immediate neighborhood, India has adopted a maritime strategy with7

Jordan Bernhardt and Lauren Sukin, “Joint Military Exercises and Crisis Dynamics on the Korean
Peninsula,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 20, no. 10, 2020, p. 5.

8Raymond Cohen, “Threat Perception in International Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 93, no. 1,
pp. 93–107.

9

Monika Chansoria, “Institutionalizing Defense Cooperation Agreements: A Contextual Study of India& Japanʼs First 2+2 Foreign & Defense Ministerial Meet,” Policy Brief, Japan Institute of International
Af fairs, March 30, 2020, available at https://www.jiia-jic.jp/en/policybrief/pdf/PolicyBrief_
Chansoria_200330.pdf

10

Ibid.

11

Thomas Schellingʼs idea of realism, termed Strategic Realism mainly focuses on foreign policy decisionmaking; Schelling argued that when state leaders face diplomatic and military challenges, they must
think strategically in the interest of their state.

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Defense Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool:
Understanding the Evolving Curve of Japan-India Joint Military Exercises

an interesting amalgamation of hard and soft power stretching from the Indian Ocean to theSouth China Sea.12
The changing geopolitical situation in an overcrowded Indo-Pacific – the new economic andpolitical center of gravity of the world has paved way for rapid shifts in the regional balance ofpower.13 The world is multipolar economically, broadly unipolar in military terms, and muddled
politically – i.e., a world that is in between orders, and adrift.14 Moreover, Chinaʼs growing
belligerence stemming out of its economic and military rise is challenging the existing rulesbased order. Beijingʼs relentless unilateral actions in the East and South China Seas, and quest
for distant Indian Ocean footholds have drawn sharp attention to the regionʼs maritime security.15
The new National Security Strategy document along with two other key defense-related strategic
documents announced by Japan in 2022 reflects upon the evolution of Japanese security policy inthe past decades. The National Security Strategy document identifies that Japan is facing the “mostsevere and complex security environment” since the end of World War II – labeling China as theunprecedented “greatest strategic challenge” and further predicting that a similar development
could occur in the Indo-Pacific or East Asia.
The centrality of the Indo-Pacific in the 21st century augurs a naval century wherein geography
illuminates and sets priorities for geostrategic vitality in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and theSouth and East China Seas. Making the Indo-Pacific space a larger regional objective enhances
the centrality of the Indian Ocean.16 In this reference, the January 2015 Joint Strategic Vision
for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean identified bridging the Asia-Pacific with the Indian
Ocean Region. Of this, Japan, and India, increasingly, are key players and drivers of regional andglobal growth, from Africa to East Asia, covering the sub-regions, South, Southeast, and Central
Asia. Importantly, the Joint Strategic Vision clearly suggested a shift in Indiaʼs strategic thinking
towards adopting a more public position against revisionist maritime threats, given its focus topromote partnerships in the region17 -- as does the latterʼs expanding JME graph in this region
suggests.
Countries that recognize the role defense can play in forging international relations actively
use their militar y capabilities to cooperate with other nations to enhance their influence andbuild a desirable security environment. It was only after the end of the Cold War that Japanbegan international peace cooperation activities and started defense exchanges with countries
other than the United States, but it now regards strengthening security cooperation as a pillar of
its basic defense policy.18 Japanese security scholars have come to define defense diplomacy as“the use of assets of the national defense authorities and armed forces to cooperate with othercountries mainly in peacetime to create an environment conducive to the achievement of foreign
policy and security objectives.” Among the activities that fall into this category include not only
“security cooperation,” “defense exchange,” and “defense cooperation” but also the dispatch of
12James R. Holmes, Andrew C. Winner, and Toshi Yoshihara, Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first
Century, (New York: Routledge, 2009).

13

Shivshankar Menon, “Indiaʼs Foreign Affairs Strategy,” Brookings India Impact Series, May 2020, p. 10.

14

Ibid.

15

Ar un Prakash, “East meets east,” The Indian Express, October 27, 2018, available at https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/east-meets-east-5420476/

16

S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers,2020), p. 161.

17

 S-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, Office of the Press
U
Secretary, The White House, January 25, 2015.

18

For more details see, Strengthening Japan’s Defense Diplomacy, Sasakawa Peace Foundationʼs Policy
Proposal, Tokyo, March 2022, p. vi.

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Monika Chansoria

troops and personnel for international peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance anddisaster relief.19 It has also been suggested to build a framework for cross-decking and officer
exchanges during JMEs, which have proliferated in recent years among the major countries.20 To
date, Japanʼs involvement in cross-decking has largely been limited to the landing of shipboard
helicopters on the naval vessels of other countries, although the United States, Europe, andAustralia regularly dispatch helicopters and related personnel for joint maneuvers to foreign
ships for extended periods at a time.21 Cross-decking is seen on a larger, more expanded scale,for example, during the Pacific Partnership, a multinational preparedness mission led by the US
Indo-Pacific Command.
Unlike conventional diplomacy, defense diplomacy employs hard, militar y power as a
diplomatic tool to communicate and advance its strategic interests. More specifically, defense
diplomacy enables cooperation with other countries in crisis management and areas of common
interest by fostering friendly relations built on mutual understanding and trust. With countries
that share strategic interests, from a Japanese point of view, defense diplomacy can enhance
operational capability and deterrence, as coordination is strengthened through militar ycooperation frameworks and improved interoperability of forces.22 It is further argued fromJapanʼs side that joint military activities in politically disputed regions, such as the South China
Sea can be a powerful form of strategic communication, sending a message to China and thelittoral countries alike. The armed forces in many emerging and developing countries are often
powerful enough to exert an influence on both external relations and domestic politics. Defense
diplomacy can thus provide a direct diplomatic channel for military-to-military relations, withcapacity building assistance and the transfer of equipment ser ving as important means ofdeepening relations.23
Japan acknowledges that India is increasing its influence with its population (the worldʼssecond largest), its high economic growth, and its latent economic power. Located in thecenter of sea lanes that connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa, India is an extremely
important country for Japan,24 that is reflected in Tokyo and New Delhiʼs cooperation in maritime
security and various other areas, while utilizing some frameworks including the “2+2” meeting.
In September 2022, the Defense Ministers of the two countries held a meeting to improve
interoperability between the two and confirmed that they would continue to work together on
defense equipment and technology cooperation. They also participated in the 2nd Japan-India“2+2” in Tokyo, during which it was confirmed that Japan and India would cooperate towards
the common goal of realizing FOIP. Furthermore, the importance of cooperation with ASEAN,
continued support for ASEANʼs unity and centrality, and providing concrete cooperation for FOIP,
Indiaʼs Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)
was underlined.25 In addition, there is shared recognition to realize concrete cooperation in theareas of defense equipment and technology cooperation, coordination to launch the Joint Service
Staff Talks to strengthen cooperation between the Japan Joint Staff and the Indian Integrated
Defense Staff.
In the field of security affairs, Japan has introduced a new proactive diplomatic policy tool –19

Ibid., p. v.

20

For details see, Michito Tsuruoka, “Promptly Build a Framework for Joint Exercises and Collective
Action,” cited in Sasakawa Peace Foundationʼs Policy Proposal, n. 18, p. 4.

21

Ibid.

22

Strengthening Japan’s Defense Diplomacy, n. 18, p. v.

23

Ibid., pp. v–vi.

24

Defense of Japan 2023, Annual Report, Japanʼs Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, p. 410.

25

Ibid., p. 411.

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Defense Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool:
Understanding the Evolving Curve of Japan-India Joint Military Exercises

namely, implementing its new official security assistance (OSA) framework to grant financial aid
to the militaries of like-minded countries. The OSA is aimed at raising the security capabilitiesof developing countries, and provides assistance in areas such as intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance activities, counterpiracy operations, and international peacekeeping. Defense andother equipment to be used by militaries, including satellite communication systems and radars,
as well as materials necessary to build military infrastructure such as ports, could be offered aswell.26 While the OSAʼs potential strategic benefits for diplomacy include enhanced engagementand deterrence, it is primarily likely to be focused on covering logistics such as infrastructurebuilding, and material support to like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region and helping
them improve their sur veillance capabilities to strengthen deterrence. In fiscal year 2023,
feasibility studies are likely to be conducted for plans to provide assistance to the Philippines,
Malaysia, Bangladesh and Fiji – four strategically key nations spread across the Indo-Pacific.

The Indo-Pacific in India’s Doctrinal Thinking and Statecraft
Post-independence in 1947, India, beginning essentially as a reluctant player, has emerged inbeing a significant stakeholder in the remodeled multipolar architecture of the 21st centur y.
India ʼ s geography is open on three sides, with a histor y of the Indus and Gangetic valley.
According to Indiaʼs ancient and traditional theor y “circle of states” or rajamandala theor y,adversarial states border the rulerʼs state by forming a circle around it. As a reactive strategy inresponse, another set of states surround this set of hostile states to form an outer concentric circle
ring. The second circle of states are described as the natural allies of the rulerʼs state against thehostile states placed between them.27 Flowing from the above construct, Indiaʼs foreign policy
thinking and strategy in the 21st century places critical significance to its geographical spaces,
envisaging its neighborhood in the form of three concentric circles. The first encompasses the“immediate neighborhood” in the form of southern Asia; the second circle includes the “extended
neighborhood” stretching across Asia and the Indian Ocean Littoral; and, the third and final circle
covers the entire global stage – with India being a key player in every successive circle, reflecting
the Arthashastraʼs realist vision of geopolitics and statecraft.28
In the intricate and multifaceted interplay between all these three circles, India has sought tobalance the influence of other powers and prevent them from undercutting its interests, whilst
register its presence as one of the prominent powers and player in regional and international
peace and security, in line with its core national security and strategic interests. Since its
independence, what remained constant was Indiaʼs adoption of an independent strategic course
while adjusting tactically to the realism of world politics. In managing its relations with major
26

For more details see, Hirohito Ogi, “How Japan can make the most of its latest diplomatic tool,” The
Japan Times, August 27, 2023, available at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2023/08/27/
japan/new-security-policy-tool/

27

The theory of the “circle of states” entails that every ruler within the international system will find astate at the centre of its own circle of states – and this ruler is described as vijigishu; For more details
on the subject see, Akhilesh Pillalamarri, “Chanakya: Indiaʼs Truly Radical Machiavelli,” The National
Interest, January 29, 2015; also see, C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power,” Foreign Affairs,
vol. 85, no. 4, 2006, p. 18.

28

In the context of historical influences and motivations, the foundational premise and conceptual
underpinning of Indian diplomacy can be traced back to the end of fourth century BC. Arthashastra
delineates theories of statecraft, diplomacy, strategy, and prerequisites of politics and power, and restson the fundamental notion of pragmatism and utility to justify state actions; for more details and further
reading on this see, Monika Chansoria, “From Reluctance to Readiness: Indiaʼs Foreign Policy andStrategy for the 21st Century,” in Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, ed., Diplomatic Strategies of Nationsin the Global South: The Search for Leadership (City University of New York and Palgrave Macmillan,2016).

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Monika Chansoria

and rising powers, India has opted for calibrated balancing behavior over band-wagoning and,also demonstrated a penchant for pragmatic issue-based partnerships on a case-to-case basis.29
Even though India now stands ready to assume a greater international role, it is only beginning to
break out of the bounds of a regional power.30
Commensurate with its “Act East” Policy announcement, Indiaʼs JMEs framework establishedand sustained across Southeast and East Asia has aided in improving regional security andcapacity-building, and created key linkages at the regional and global levels. Additionally, defense
cooperation executed through JMEs has facilitated demonstration of Indiaʼs commitment toregional stability, and showcased its defense/defense-industrial capabilities.31 While its coreinterests may be in the Indian Ocean Region, but a presence beyond also ensures a peacefulperiphery, and therefore, Indiaʼs participation in JMEs with Japan and other Southeast Asian
nations contributes to broader stability goals in Asia. Besides, the geopolitical realities in theregion called for Japan and India to adjust the thinking and formulation of their respective
security strategies in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, especially as territorial
and maritime disputes return to center stage.32 Consequently, India began institutionalizedmechanisms for bilateral army and naval JMEs with Japan and various other Southeast nations
including Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia.
The evolutionary enhancement of JMEs conducted by India post 9/11 in its immediate andextended neighborhood manifests a calibrated shift in its foreign policy orientation. The 1991
“Look East” policy which aimed primarily at promoting Indiaʼs integration with East and Southeast
Asia, was transformed into an “Act East” policy in 2014.33 Even though it would not ideally want
to be drawn into the ongoing power rivalries in the region, given its central location in the Indian
Ocean, India can ill-afford to ignore issues in its own strategic backyard. The peninsular shapeprovides India a coastline of about 7,600 kms, 1200 islands, and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
of over 2.4 million sq. kms. Further, its island territories in the east are 1,300 kms away from themainland, with closer physical proximity to Southeast Asia.34 In the said reference, the expanse ofIndiaʼs JMEs, most significantly, with Japan highlights the relative importance of regional security
architectures and dialogues in strengthening defense cooperation across its eastern, far eastern,
and south-eastern Asian neighbors.35
In the economic realm, the Indo-Pacific is one of the worldʼs most dynamic regions accounting
for more than 60 percent of the global GDP.36 Further, more than half of Indiaʼs GDP depends on
its dealings with the rest of the world. This expanded definition of interests perfectly is in sync
with Japanʼs security and foreign policy agenda evident in its vision of a Free and Open Indo29

P.R. Chari and Vyjayanti Raghavan, Sino-Indian and Sino-South Korean Relations: Compulsions,Comparisons and Contrasts. (New Delhi: Routledge, 2015).

30

Aseema Sinha and Jon P. Dorschner, “India: Rising Power or a Mere Revolution of Rising Expectations?”
Polity, vol. 42, no. 1, 2010, p. 90.

31

For more details and further reading see, Monika Chansoria, “Joint Military Exercises and ConfidenceBuilding: Theoretical and Applied Features,” CLAWS Journal, Summer 2015, pp. 59–69; and see,Chansoria, “Institutionalizing Defense Cooperation Agreements ” Policy Brief, n. 9.

32

For related details and further reading see, Menon, n. 13, p. 12.

33

The “Look East” Policy was first formulated under then-PM, P.V. Narasimha Rao in 1991 and sought tostrengthen Indiaʼs relationships with Southeast Asia specifically, and East Asia more generally.

34

Government of India, MoD, Annual Report 2002-2003, New Delhi.

35Bernhardt et al., n. 7, p. 7.

36

As cited in “The What, How and Why of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework,” The Wire, May 27,
2022, available at https://thewire.in/economy/the-what-how-and-why-of-the-indo-pacific-economicframework

35
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Defense Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool:
Understanding the Evolving Curve of Japan-India Joint Military Exercises

Pacific, based on free sea lanes and navigation, open markets, international law, and common
rules. Indiaʼs maritime trade flowing east through these waters account for 55 percent of Indiaʼs
total trade.37 As far as Japan is concerned, the Indo-Pacific houses three of the world ʼs largest
economies, i.e., the US, China, and Japan, with 60 percent of global maritime trade occurring
through its waters.

Japan-India Bilateral JMEs38
JMEs aid in safeguarding not just the individual maritime security interests of the nation inquestion, but also that of its littoral region – thereby enhancing the entire regionʼs net security
via enhanced interoperability and confidence building. By managing, conserving, sustaining, andsecuring the regional maritime domain, JMEs ensure regional security and stability by means ofa non-treaty-based, cooperative, and collaborative approach.39 In the contemporary context, India
and Japanʼs bilateral JMEs have become an instrumental tool in shaping a favorable and positiveenvironment for enhancing regional net security and maritime domain awareness across the IndoPacific by means of identifying cooperative activities, including, joint patrols, port visits, personnel
and information exchanges, staff talks and interactions, exercises with foreign navies, maritime
assistance, operational interactions, and high-level maritime strategic interactions.40
India and Japan signed a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2008, and this bilateralrelationship has witnessed significant progress in the realm of defense cooperation and security
affairs. Apart from operationalization of the Agreement Concerning Reciprocal Provision of
Supplies and Services between Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the Indian Armed Forces,
New Delhi and Tokyo signed up for the inaugural fighter exercise between the Japan Air SelfDefense Force (JASDF) and the Indian Air Force. In the realm of institutionalized bilateral JMEs,
the Dharma Guardian is an annual bilateral JME conducted between the Indian and JapaneseArmy since 2018, sharing experiences of counter-terrorism operations. The Dharma Guardian
2019 was held at the Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School situated in Vairengte (northeastern state of Mizoram, India). Dharma Guardian is a platoon-level JME focusing on training
for counter-terrorism operations in the jungle and urban scenarios, enhancing interoperability
and practicing tactical drills.
Furthermore, bilateral naval cooperation between India and Japan has increased in scopeand complexity over the recent years and taken shape in the form of Japan-India Maritime
Bilateral Exercise (JIMEX) which commenced in 2012. With a special focus on maritime security
cooperation, the fifth edition of JIMEX between the Indian Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force (JMSDF) was held in the Arabian Sea in 2021. In addition to the indigenously built Guided
Missile Stealth Destroyer Kochi and Guided Missile Frigate Teg, representing the Indian Navy,
the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force was represented by JMSDF ships Kaga, an Izumo-Class
Helicopter Carrier and Murasame, a Guided Missile Destroyer. In addition to these ships, P-8I
Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft, Dornier Maritime Patrol Aircraft, integral helicopters,and MiG 29K fighter aircraft also participated in this edition of the JIMEX. The primary aim of
37

Ministry of External Affairs (India) (hereafter MEA), Rajya Sabha, Parliamentary Question no. 808,
“Trade through South China Sea,” February 9, 2017, available at https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.
htm?dtl/28041/QUESTION+NO808+TRADE+THROUGH+SOUTH+CHINA+SEA

38

For details cited in this section, further see, Government of India, MoD, “Defence Cooperation with
Foreign Countries,” Annual Reports 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12, 2012-13, 2016-17, 2018-19, 2019-20, 202021, New Delhi.

39

Vice Admiral MP Muralidharan, “Significance of Joint Maritime Exercises,” Indian Defence Review, vol.
37, no. 4, Oct-Dec 2022, available at https://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/significance-of-jointmaritime-exercises/

40

Ibid.

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Monika Chansoria

this JME was developing a common understanding of operational procedures and enhancing
interoperability through conduct of a multitude of advanced exercises, across the entire spectrumof maritime operations, and tactical exercises involving weapon firings, cross-deck helicopter
operations and complex surface, anti-submarine, and air warfare drills.
More recently, in February–March 2023, the Japanese Army（Ground Self-Defense Force）
conducted the first bilateral field training exercise Dharma Guardian in Japan with the Indian
Army to further strengthen cooperation. Earlier, in July 2022, the Chief of Staff（Maritime SelfDefense Force）held a video teleconference with Indiaʼs Chief of the Naval Staff to confirm thedirection of strengthening future cooperation between the MSDF and Indian Navy. In fact, in
2022, the MSDF conducted a total of four Japan-India bilateral exercises, including JIMEX 2022.
In May of the same year, the Chief of Staff（Air Self-Defense Force）held a meeting with Indiaʼs
Chief of Air Staff during his visit to Japan, in which they agreed to further activate Japan-India
defense cooperation and exchanges. The Japan-India bilateral air exercise Veer Guardian 23 aswell as the Japan-India bilateral transport aircraft training Shinyuu Maitri 23 each was conducted
for the first time in Japan, in January, and March 2023 respectively.41
Further, India and Japan attach growing importance to nations in and around the Persian Gulf,
which could directly be attributed to the geostrategic significance and linkage of the Persian Gulf
region to maritime security in the western Indian Ocean. Peninsular India is adjacent to one of themost vital sea-lanes stretching from the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits
through which much of the oil from the Gulf region transits. The stability of the international oil
market renders the Persian Gulf vital for international security. Moreover, the lack of any regional
security architecture, and missing regional balance of power, given deep-rooted frictions among
regional states, render the region dependent on external military presence.42 In this reference,
Japan and India have deployed their naval ships to ensure security of international oil and cargoshipping passing through the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman.
India ʼ s bilateral JMEs graph with Japan has brought out the expanding presence andfrequency of New Delhiʼs naval engagement with Tokyo, thereby improving capacity-building,and regional security linkages. Together, they augment a much-needed regional balance of powerin the Indian Ocean – the pivot of the Indo-Pacific region. While its core interests may be in the
Indian Ocean Region, but a presence beyond ensures a peaceful periphery, and therefore, Indiaʼsparticipation in JMEs with Japan and other Southeast Asian nations has contributed to Asiaʼsbroader stability goals.

Conclusion and Implications for the Regional Order

India and Japanʼs bilateral JMEs graph across Asia has proved instrumental in their expanding
acceptance as key regional strategic actors, be it within South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia,and the Indian Ocean Region and the Persian Gulf. Enhanced defense cooperation via the JMEs
is provenly a key foundation for strengthening regional diplomacy based on the bilateral JMEs
initiatives undertaken. JMEs directly reflect regional balance-of-power politics. In this case, there
is a visible coherence in the collective like-minded approach for a Free and Open Indo-Pacificstrategy, especially around its maritime rim.
An overcrowded Indo-Pacific has become ner ve center of geopolitical, geoeconomic, andgeostrategic activity of the world – thereby making way for rapid shifts in the regional balance of41

Defense of Japan 2023, n. 24, p. 411.

42

Md. Muddassir Quamar, “India and the Persian Gulf: Bilateralism, Regional Security and the China
Factor,” Issue Brief, May 10, 2022, The Institute for Security and Development Policy (Sweden), p. 2.

37
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Defense Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool:
Understanding the Evolving Curve of Japan-India Joint Military Exercises

power.43 Tokyo and New Delhi are indispensable players in the Indo-Pacific at a time when theregion is confronting stark shifts in its geopolitical reality. Given such uncertainties, proactive
defense diplomacy initiatives and other peacetime efforts including an expanding web of JMEs
are essential to ensure a secure strategic future for Japan and India.
As India and Japan work towards striving to secure and consolidate their maritime peripheries,
and play a greater proactive role in Asiaʼs regional balancing, the JMEsʼ formulation and policy
implementation is only beginning to be utilized and leveraged as a vital instrument of defense
diplomacy, and a promising micro-foundation of securing regional security priorities and order.
Tokyo and New Delhiʼs JMEs have contributed substantially in enhancing the net security of the
Indo-Pacific region, by means of leveraging cooperation via cooperative and collaborative bilateraland multilateral JMEs to augment interoperability and confidence-building, which, in turn, has
contributed in enhancing the Indo-Pacificʼs overall regional net security.

43

Menon, n. 13, p. 10; additionally, also see, James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,”International Organization, vol. 49, no. 3, 1995, pp. 379–414.

38
Japan Review Vol.6 No.2 2023

Valérie Niquet

Issues of Memory and History:
UNESCO and the Politicization of World Heritage Site
Nominations
Valérie Niquet
Abstract
Since its adoption in 1972, the Convention concerning the protection of the world culturaland nature heritage has come under increasing pressure. It is no longer enough to choose
sites “of outstanding universal values,” but also to respond to increasingly complex
objectives such as development, diversity, inclusiveness and the fight against climatechange. Choices are also increasingly politicized, and the World Heritage Committee
has become the arena for rivalry between the most influent States parties, who see thenumber of sites nominated as a demonstration of their power and clout. Local economic
and development interests are also related to these choices. In this context, the nominationof industrial sites with complex pasts occupies a specific place, raising several questions,
including that of the use of history for contemporary geopolitical stakes.

T

Introduction
he Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and nature heritage wasadopted in 1972 and came into force in 1975. In 2023, 195 State parties are signatoriesof the Convention and participate to the election of the World Heritage Committee.
It reflected at the time of its adoption a preoccupation for the preservation of past
heritage, for the education of future generations, that dated back to the League of Nations in
1919.1 The World Heritage Center, established in 1992 to act as Secretariat, plays the role ofcoordinator for matter related to the Convention and organizes the annual session of the World
Heritage Committee that decides the sites nomination and the reporting on the conditions of thesites.2 Its 21 members are elected by the State Parties signatories to the Convention. When thefirst World Heritage List was drawn up at the first session held from June 27 to July 1st 1977 by
the then 15-states committee,3 a number of principles were defined with 10 criteria.4 The list was
to be exclusive, so that places chosen with “extreme care” would remain remarkable and balanced
not only geographically but also between cultural and natural sites.5 Concerns have since thenbeen expressed about the impact of Western conceptions, Eurocentric bias and differences inperception between cultures. The global study carried out by ICOMOS (International Council
on Monuments and Sites) from 1987 to 1993 revealed that “Europe, historic towns and religious
1

Jens Boel, “The League of Nations: A Universal Dream that has Stood the Test of Time,” https://courier.unesco.org/en/articles/league-nations-universal-dream-has-stood-test-time, 27-01-2020.

2

L ynn Meskell, “States of Conser vation: Protection, Politics and Pacting Within UNESCOʼs World
Heritage Committee,” Current Anthropology, vol 54, n°4, 08-2013.

3

Australia, Canada, Ecuador, Egypt, France, West Germany, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Poland, Senegal,
Tunisia, USA, Yugoslavia

4

Six for cultural sites and four for natural sites. In 2005, the criteria were merged into one list of ten
criteria.

5“Establishment of the World Heritage List,” Decision 1 COM VI. A, whc.unesco.org

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Issues of Memory and History: UNESCO and the Politicization of World Heritage Site Nominations

monuments, Christianity, historical periods and ʻelitistʼ architecture were all over-represented
on the World Heritage List; whereas, all living cultures, and especially ʻtraditional cultures,ʼ were
underrepresented.”
However, in 2023, the balance is still not fully respected despite an evolution since the mid2010s, with Europe representing 47.12% of sites, Asia-Pacific 24.10%, Latin America 12.4%, theArab world 8.59% and Africa 7.76%. Cultural sites (35%) far outweigh natural sites (1%). 6 By
country, we find heavyweights such as the Peopleʼs Republic of China (57 sites) and France (52sites). Japan has 25 registered sites and the Republic of Korea 16.

The initial objective: Strict principles based on widely recognized criteria
The principle of exclusivity in the selection of sites is one of the major points taken into accountby the first award committee. The Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World
Heritage Convention (1977) specifies that, to be considered for inclusion in the World Heritage
List, proposed sites must have “outstanding universal value.”7 Cultural or natural sites must beof universal or at least widespread importance, or of exceptional interest to the peoples of theworld. The text specifies that “only a select list of the most outstanding from a world view point”
will be chosen. The criterion of universality, which refers to an “important or significant” part ofhumanity, far outweighs national interests or interpretations of what constitutes an “outstanding”
site.
As far as cultural sites are concerned, the examples chosen in the Guidelines as representing“ masterpieces of human creativity, ” which have had a lasting influence on ar t and humandevelopment, are particularly representative of a cultural, intellectual, social, artistic but also
technological and industrial development, are associated with par ticularly ancient forms
threatened with extinction or are sites of great historical importance in relation to personalities,
philosophical schools of thought, events or religions meet this then relatively consensual
definition of “world heritage site.” Examples given include Borobudur in Indonesia, Angkor Wat
in Cambodia, the Valley of the Kings in Egypt, the Pantheon in Rome, the Plaza de Puebla in
Mexico, the Château de Vaux le Vicomte in France, the Mayan pyramids, downtown Leningrad,
the walled city of Avila in Spain, the longhouses in Indonesia, the Dogon villages in Mali, theMachu Picchu, the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, Mecca and the Cape Kennedy site
in the USA. The list of indicative examples is intended to be both relatively diversified andgeographically balanced, choosing only places recognized as exceptional.8
However, the nomination issue has become progressively more complex–and expensive toconstitute a dossier with a sufficient degree of expertise–with the inclusion of proposals thatare less consensual or raise problems of definition and interpretation. There are six criteria for
selection to be included in the World Heritage List but the relative importance of these criteria
seems to have evolved in recent years. In particular criterion six led to questions expressed by
the World Heritage Committee in its definition: “Criterion Ⅵ concerns sites to be directly or
tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic andliterary works of outstanding universal significance. (The Committee considers that this criterion
should preferably be used in conjunction with other criteria)”9

A more complex selection process since the 2000s and the risk of politicization
Progressively, the conditions for nominating UNESCO heritage sites have become more complex
6

whc.unesco.org

7

https://whc.unesco.org/archive/1977/cc-77-conf001-8reve.pdf

8“Establishment of the World Heritage List,” Decision 1 COM VI. A, whc.unesco.org

9

whc.unesco.org

40Japan Review Vol.6 No.2 2023

Valérie Niquet

and less consensual, with an evolution in the concept of “world heritage”: the sites chosen can
no longer simply be the expression of “outstanding universal values,” but must also ser ve a
cause.10 Choices can also serve the more direct economic or political interests of a particularstate or interest group. To some experts, it should be noted that every decision taken by theWorld Heritage Committee is increasingly politicized, and that recommendations made to theCommittee by ICOMOS or IUCN (International Union for Conser vation of Nature) are notsystematically taken into account.11 In 2003 the convergence factor between ICOMOS and
IUCN recommendations and decisions by the Committee was 90 %. It felled to 40 % in 2012. 12
Increasingly, members of the World Heritage Committee, composed now of 21 members,
are not experts such as archaeologists or naturalists but ambassadors or politicians sent torepresent the State parties leading to backstage bargaining to obtain nominations.13 An UNESCO
audit published in 2011 concludes that the approach is increasingly more “political” rather
than “heritage” oriented.14 Some principles reflect the concerns and urgencies defined by theUnited Nations at a more global level. This is for example the case for the goal of sustainable
development 2030. In 2021, the World Heritage Convention and sustainable development
adopted a policy document for the integration of a sustainable development perspective into theprocess of the World Heritage Convention.15 Nomination criteria must now also take accountnatural disasters, contribute to poverty reduction and promote a sustainable way of life for ruralcommunities.
Allocation must also take account social inclusion issues and strengthen the influenceof local communities, including young people, women and indigenous peoples. Finally, thenomination of sites must promote peace and security and facilitate cooperation.16 These are major
challenges, which make the nomination of world heritage sites more complex and potentiallymore controversial, and can also pave the way for a “nomination race” designed to legitimize–or
denounce–historical episodes that do not meet with consensus.17
Some consider that UNESCO has strayed from the objectives of the 1972 World Heritage
Convention, which was to protect sites perceived as the common property of mankind, totransform into a political approach to get more sites accepted as a way to bolster prestige andsovereign interests.18 For instance, the Peopleʼs Republic of China (PRC), who ratified theConvention in 1985, proudly proclaims on the website of one of its embassies, that “China ranks
second in the world” in the number of sites.19 China has 57 sites, and Italy, ranking first, 59.
But requests for nominations also have a performative function when sites are chosen for
their symbolic value. In Europe, for example, the aim of the European Heritage Label, different
from World Heritage but with connections to the UNESCO world heritage sites, launched in 2011,10

Simon C. Woodward, Louise Cooke, World Heritage: Concepts, Management and Conservation,
Routledge, 2023.

11

Idem

12

Lynn Meskell, op.cit.

13

Lynn Meskell, op.cit.

14

Lynn Meskell, op.cit.

15“World Heritage Convention and Sustainable Development,” Decision 44 COM 5 D, whc.unesco.org

16

Idem

17

Enrico Bertacchini et al, “The Politicization of UNESCO World Heritage Decision Making,” Public
Choice, April 2016.

18

Anna Somers Cocks, “How the War in Ukraine Reveals the Heightened Politics of UNESCO,” The Art
Newspaper, 09-12-2022.

19

http://no.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zngx_1/whjl/zx/201704/t20170411_3072435.htm

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Issues of Memory and History: UNESCO and the Politicization of World Heritage Site Nominations

is to “revive European heritage” and thus promote European integration. The label conveys anideological belief, with emphasis on the values of “peace,” diversity, mobility and inclusion.20
Finally, one of the challenges is the race for numbers, and the fact that commitment toconservation, the original objective of the World Heritage List, has been too often replaced byan acquisitive practice of inscriptions, with pressure exerted on commission members.21 China,
again, is particularly active in this field, with 13 of its 57 sites nominated since 2014, when thecomposition of the 21 committee was changed to become more inclusive of the “Global south.”22

The question of sites associated with memories of recent conflicts and othernegative divisive memories.
In 1979, Auschwitz-Birkenau was designated a world heritage site, but the nomination committee
stressed the exceptional nature of this type of nomination, recommending an “ extremely
selective” approach for the future.23 Auschwitz occupies a symbolic place representing othersimilar sites. However, from the 1980s onwards, and even more so after the end of the Cold
War, we saw the global emergence of a trend in favor of gestures of remembrance, focusing
on the duty to remember mass crimes in order to avoid their repetition.24 This “global cultureof memor y” emphasizes the importance of memorial activities to remember the victims ofrecent conflicts or other negative and divisive memories. This “duty to remember” is supposed
to facilitate reconciliation. However, there are also risks of reviving divisions or exploiting thisduty to remember for contemporary political or geopolitical ends. 25 Faced with an increasing
number of requests for the nomination of controversial sites, in 2018, the World Heritage Center
commissioned a report from a group of experts.26 This group of experts defines the term “conflict”
very broadly, including wars, battles, but also massacres, genocides, torture or massive violationsof human rights. The second point addressed is that of extreme selectivity, so as not to diminish
the exemplary value of the sites, and also to take account of the “political difficulties” potentiallyraised.27 The expert committee points out that certain nominations concerning historical events
could be strongly influenced by nationalism, “in contradiction with the objectives of WHC.”28
The creation of “Sites of Conscience” in 1999, for educational purposes, was intended to take
into account difficult or divisive places of remembrance, but the list of “Sites of Conscience”
does not coincide with the sites designated as World Heritage. Moreover, some of these sites ofconscience, such as the “Womenʼs Active Museum on War and Peace” set up in Tokyo in 2005,20

Alessandra Quar ta, “The European Approach to Culture: the European Heritage Label” in
Forever Young : Celebrating 50 years of the World Heritage Convention, 2023, https://cris.unibo.it/
handle/11585/923051.

21

Lynn Meskell, Claudia Liuzza, “The World is Not Enough: New Diplomacy and Dilemmas for the World
Heritage Convention at 50,” International Journal of Cultural Property, vol29 (2022).

22

Tom Seymour, “Worried about Chinese Influence, the US Agrees to rejoin UNESCO,” The Ar t
Newspaper, 12-06-2023.

23

The worry expressed by ICOMOS was that this would lead to a reduction in the value of the sites. whc.
unesco.org.

24

Olwen Beazley, Christina Cameron, “Study on Sites Associated with Recent Conflicts and Other
Negative and Divisive Memories,” https://whc.unesco.org/archive/2021/whc21-44com-inf8.2-en.pdf,
02-05-2020

25

Idem

26

“Expert Meeting on Sites Associated with Recent Conflicts and Other Negative and Divisive Memories
Report,” whc.unesco.org.

27

Idem

28

Idem

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Valérie Niquet

whose main objective is to make the Japanese government “accountable for sexual slavery during
the war,” are open to question.29
Among the 18 World Heritage Sites of negative memories, some are not controversial, such
as Gorée Island in Senegal, nominated in 1978, linked to the slave trade, or the other sites related
to slavery, or Auschwitz, in 1979. But the nomination of Hiroshima in 1996 was opposed by boththe Peopleʼs Republic of China (PRC) and the United States, for different reasons. China wasconcerned that some would try to “whitewash” Japan for its role in the Second World War byemphasizing its victim status. The United States criticized the lack of contextualization of theatomic bombings, and demanded that all war sites be excluded from the scope of the Convention,
so as not to see themselves singled out for their actions in Japan, but also in Vietnam or France
during the deadly Allied bombings at the end of the Second World War.30 It should be noted thatthe majority of the sites chosen in that category are related to slavery or the predatory role of theWest on non-Western and indigenous populations.31
However, sites associated to recent conflicts or difficult memories can reveal or awaken very
different historical narratives, so their nomination risks going against UNESCOʼs objectivesof peace and reconciliation, by themselves being sources of reactivated conflicts.32 In 2014, theUnited Nations Commission on Human Rights considered that post-conflict societies produce
parallel interpretations that limit the possibilities of reconciliation and are detrimental to peacefulinternational relations.33 If a State attempts to put a site of this type on the World Heritage List, therisk of tensions may increase. The fear of political recuperation is thus one of the major issue.34
Among the sites listed, some make no mention of human rights abuses that occurred at thesesites, such as forced labor, slavery or confinement. For example, when the German Rammelsberg
and Goslar mining site was nominated in 1992, it referred only to the exceptional industrial pastof this region of Germany, which dates back over a thousand years. However, more recently,
work on forced labor in the Rammelsberg mines during the 1939–1945 second world war, and theorganization of an exhibition, were carried out, in cooperation with the World Heritage List.35 Alsoin Germany, although not a world heritage site, celebrations to mark the fiftieth anniversary of
the first launch of a missile into space at Peenemünde in 1942, which focused solely on the aspectof technological prowess, had to be cancelled due to international protests.36
In view of all these issues, and the potential tensions involved, the world heritage site
committee is not in favor of listing sites linked to a conflict-ridden past or difficult memories.

The case of Japan’s world heritage Sites

Japan ʼ s bid for the Sado mining site, submitted in 2022 and then 2023, which follows theinscription on the World Heritage List of the Meiji era industrial sites in 2015, is one example
29

Olwen Beazley, Christina Cameron, op.cit.

30

Simon C. Woodward, Louise Cooke, op.cit.; “ICOMOS Second Discussion Paper on Sites Associatedwith Memories of Recent Conflicts and the World Heritage Convention,” whc.unesco.org.

31“Appendix E, World Heritage Sites Associated with Recent Conflicts and Other Negative and Divisive
Memories Inscribed under Criteria VI,” whc.unesco.org.

32

Idem

33

https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session27/regular-session

34“Expert meeting on Sites Associated with Recent Conflicts and other Negative and Divisive Memories
Report,” op.cit.

35

https://www.rammelsberg.de/en/exhibition/living-and-working-under-duress-forced-laborers-at-therammelsberg-ore-mine-1939-1945

36

Leilei Li, Dietrich Soyez, “Transnationalizing Industrial Heritage Valorizations in Germany and China–
and Addressing Inherent Dark sides”, Journal of Heritage Tourism, 2016.

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Issues of Memory and History: UNESCO and the Politicization of World Heritage Site Nominations

that lies at the crossroads of these social and geopolitical issues, opening the way to obstruction
strategies developed by other countries, but also to a necessar y reflection on this type ofcandidacy and the way it must be dealt with in a mature, model democracy. As at the global level,
there has been an evolution in the sites nominated in Japan, from cultural sites that bear witness
to a very ancient and culturally rich history (Kyoto 1994, Nara 1998, Nikko 1999), to more recent
sites linked in particular to the industrialization and development of the country under Edo andinsertion into the world system under Meiji (Iwami Ginzan silver mine 2007, Tomioka Silk mill in
2014, Meiji industrial sites in 2015). There is also a desire to cover the whole geographical scopeof Japan, from Hokkaido (Shiretoko 2005) to Okinawa (2000 and 2021) to the archipelago of the
Ogasawara Islands (2011).37 The world heritage site of the Hidden Christians in the Nagasaki
Region, nominated in 2018, refers to a painful memory, shared with the West, however, there areno sites or references to sites that share that kind of memories with neighbors with whom Japan
has more complex relations, such as the Peopleʼs Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic ofKorea.
As early as 2010, Japan included the Sado mining complex on its tentative list of places
that could be nominated to the World Heritage List, acting upon a proposal coming from theprefectural level of Niigata dating back to 2006. In its presentation, it is the dimension of industrial
history and innovation in the Edo period (1603–1868) of the mines presented as “an outstanding
example of Asian mining heritage,” as well as the role of gold extracted from the Sado mines
in world trade, that is put forward to justify a possible nomination. The Sado Gold Mine has along and rich history of gold and silver mining dating back to the 17th century. The site played acrucial role in Japanʼs economic and cultural development during the Edo period. These sites arealso considered to have outstanding cultural value, representing the technological advancements
in mining, smelting, and refining during the Edo period. The preservation of traditional mining
techniques and infrastructure contributes to the cultural heritage of the region. The Sado Gold
Mine also features a distinctive and well-preserved mining landscape, including tunnels, water
channels, and processing facilities. The nomination also emphasizes the importance of the
Sado Gold Mine in enhancing the global understanding of mining history, technology, and theeconomic significance of precious metal extraction lending the site its universal value criteria.
The nomination also emphasizes the cultural and social significance of the Sado Gold Mine for
local communities. And of course, the economic benefits from tourism for the island and theregion are also taken into account. The contemporar y period is mentioned only in reference
to the nationalization of the gold mines under Meiji, then their sale to the Mitsubishi Limited
Partnership Company at the beginning of the 20th century.38 The Sado mines site, presented in
2022 for nomination by Japan, with additional documents presented in 2023, focusing on gold
mine history under Edo, like the Meiji era industrial sites, nominated in 2015, is thus not related
to a conflict or a difficult memory under the criteria defined by the World Heritage Committee.39
However, these sites, and particularly the sites of the gold mines in Sado can also be rememberedin relation with the harshness of the working condition, for Japanese as well as foreign contracted
laborers. In Ancient times, under the Shogunate, Sado island was also known as a place ofrelegation. This dimension is also part of the history of Sado island, the main theme of the greatmovie by Mizoguchi Kenji, Sansho dayū (1954). In 2022, in relation with the Sado Gold Mines
proposal, the Republic of Koreaʼs Ministry of Foreign Affairs, focusing on the situation of Korean
workers in Japan under the colonial rule, protested, demanding that Japan mentions “the full
37

Japan has 25 World heritage sites. whc.unesco.org

38

Idem

39

Importantly, in 2022–2023, Japan will be part of the 21-member World Heritage Committee. In 2014–2015, the Republic of Korea was a member of the committee.

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Valérie Niquet

history which contains the painful history of people who were forced to work during wartime.”40
Like all industrial sites in Japan until 1945, working conditions in the mines were particularly
difficult, both for the Japanese and the Korean people employed there and the issue of “forcedlabor” versus “contract labor” is controversial.41 The fate of Korean workers, from a countr ycolonized by the Japanese Empire, can indeed be examined and considered from a historical andscientific point of view.42 However, beyond these legitimate historical questions, South Koreaʼscontestation also–or mostly–answers to domestic Korean political issues and prevents thisnecessary neutral historical analysis.
For Tokyo, the choice of these sites also corresponds to Japanʼs legitimate desire to retakethe control of its own Histor y, prior to the Second World War, by highlighting periods, suchas the Meiji era, during which Japan opened up to the world and joined the concert of nations
by laying the foundations of a liberal international order of which it was an important part. In
2018, in a speech to the Diet, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared: “Countless human resourceswere fostered in the new Meiji era for the modernization of Japan.”43 2018 marked the 150th
anniversary of the founding of the Meiji era, during which, “Japan amazed the world as the first
non-western country to ride the wave of an industrial revolution, to transform into a modern
state without becoming a colony.”44 In that context, world heritage sites are indeed important soft
power sources in public diplomacy strategies, provided they do not generate controversy andopposition that can be counterproductive.45
However, in 2017, following Japanʼs challenge of Chinaʼs application for inclusion of socalled “Nanjing Massacre” documents in the international memor y of the world register in
2015, UNESCO rejected this inscription and adopted a principle that excludes any recognition
or inscription by one countr y if another countr y challenges it. This position has been tacitly
extended to the nomination of world heritage sites, which is decided by consensus.
This is further proof of the risks involved in politicizing these issues, far removed from theinitial principles established in 1972. Another example of the more or less open politicizationof these issues is the debate concerning the inclusion of the Loire Valley (France) as a world
heritage site in 2000. It was initially rejected and required a secret ballot because of the site
proximity to a nuclear power station. In that case, one wonders whether only the landscape issue
was at stake, or whether we were faced with a principled opposition to nuclear energy, which
France, for its part, firmly defends.46
In the case of the Sado Gold Mine, the opposition of the Republic of Korea could also lead to a
non-decision.47 In Japan, some made it a matter of national honor, with the desire to claim Japanʼs
40“National Assembly Adopts Resolution Urging Japan to Withdraw UNESCO Bid for Sado Mine,” Korea
JoongAng Daily, 28-2-2023.

41

Nikolai Johnsen, “The Sado Gold Mine and Japanʼs ʻHistory warʼ Versus the Memory of Korean Forced
Laborers,” The Asia Pacific Journal,vol 20, issue 5, N°1, 04-03-2022.

42“Japan Refiles Request to List Divisive Gold Mine on Unesco,” The Associated Press, 21-01-2023.

43th“Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 196 Session of the Diet,” 22-01-2018. See also:
Ryoko Nakano, “Mobilizing Meiji Nostalgia and Intentional Forgetting in Japanʼs World Heritage
Promotion,” International Journal of Asian Studies, 2020 1-18, 12_07_2020.

44th“Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 196 Session of the Diet,” op.cit.

45“In this respect, Japan could have responded more enthusiastically to the condition placed by Germany,
which acted as mediator between Tokyo and Seoul, on the listing of Meiji-era industrial sites in 2015 by
explaining the issues related to the conditions of Korean workers from the colonies during the Second
World War” in Leilei Li, Dietrich Soyez, op. cit.

46

https://www.worldheritagesite.org/connection/Controversial+at+inscription

47

Idem

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Issues of Memory and History: UNESCO and the Politicization of World Heritage Site Nominations

right to its own history, which must not remain forever a hostage to a past instrumentalized byhostile parties. This position is legitimate. Others however, perhaps more aware of the rules ofcomplex international diplomatic game, and the reputational risks attached to the politicization of
the World Heritage List nomination process, tend to show greater caution.48 This debate reflects
the difficulties and the risks of a paralysis or of deviation of its principles the World Heritage
Convention is increasingly facing by taking into account more criteria that question the conceptof “outstanding universal value” as defined by the initiator of the Convention.

Conclusion
The debates and diplomatic games surrounding the work of the World Heritage Committee andthe selection of sites for inscription on the World Heritage List reveal growing difficulties. Thesedifficulties concern the definition of criteria: what does “universal value” mean, for whom, in
whose name? In the case of industrial sites that represent an important development in humanhistory, such as the Sado or Rammelsberg mines in Germany, where does industrial history end
and social history begin? Should places where work under duress happened for nationals andforeigners alike be only remembered as places of industrial interest, or of a “darker” history ?
Increasingly, the nomination or inscription of sites on the list of world heritage in danger such as
the Old City of Jerusalem and its walls presented by Jordan, becomes hostage to contemporary
tensions from which it is difficult to escape.49 For some countries, such as the Peopleʼs Republicof China (PRC), history is mainly a weapon that can be used to achieve geopolitical gains andJapan has often been the target of political campaigns that tend to deny the legitimacy of acountry considered as an adversary, by constantly using the past. In this context, the tentative
list of sites proposed for nomination should, as far as possible, avoid the risks of controversies
that are difficult to combat. Faced with the majority principle and the diplomatic games played
within the World Heritage Committee and the United Nations, it is difficult for States to distancethemselves from decisions, however unfair they may be perceived. To do so is to risk evenharsher criticism and the ostracism of the responsible nations. In this respect, the Committeeʼsrecommendations on nominations and the list of endangered sites cannot be lightly dismissed,
including recommendations concerning the explanations related to sites. And therein lies thedifficulty: satisfying vested interests that see in certain nominations the possibility of serving
local political, tourist or economic interests, while at the same time meeting the requirementsof the World Heritage Committee and its critics. Many States have had to make these choices,which also reflect the difficulties that the World Heritage Convention is increasingly facing in
its very principles. Today, geopolitics often prevails over conservation, and number over quality,
further undermining the original principles. States are trying to impose their supremacy at alllevels of the UN, including within the World Heritage Committee, which cannot escape thesepower strategies, at the risk of rendering the original objectives unrealistic. And it is the most
responsible States parties that have the charge to preserve these original principles as best they
can by freeing themselves from harmful power strategies, and focusing on the more elevatedoriginal principles of preserving the past for the benefit of the future.

48“Japan Should Proudly Push for Sado Gold Mineʼs UNESCO Listing,” Sankei Shimbun, 31-01-2022.
According to Sanae Takaichi: “If the recommendation had been differed it would have lent credibility toSouth Korea unjustified claims.”

49

https://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/5284/

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Atsuko Kanehara

How to Ensure the Safety of the Japan Coast Guard While
Maintaining Its Nature as a Police Organ When It Conducts
Missions in Collaboration with the Japan Maritime
Self-Defense Force under the Control Guidelines
Atsuko Kanehara*
Abstract
This article will examine how to ensure the safety of the Japan Coast Guard when it
conducts missions designated in the Control Guidelines that Japan adopted on the 28th ofApril 2023. For that purpose, this contribution will conclude with some proposals.
Under Article 80 of the Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954, the Minister of Defense mayplace the Japan Coast Guard under its control when there are armed attacks against Japan.
The Japan Coast Guard has been ceaselessly conducting monitoring and sur veillanceof Chinese vessels that have periodically entered Japanʼs territorial sea surrounding the
Senkaku Islands for more than two decades, over which both China and Japan have claimed
territorial sovereignty. Due to the provocative conduct of such Chinese vessels, the tension
in the sea area has been seriously heightened. Against this background and other factors,
the Japanese government adopted three strategic documents on Japanʼs security on the 16thof December 2022. In line with this, for the implementation of the control of the Minister ofDefense over the Japan Coast Guard under Article 80 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, theJapanese government adopted the said Control Guidelines. The said Control Guidelines
designate various missions which the Japan Coast Guard will conduct in collaboration with
the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.
A key characteristic of the Japan Coast Guard is that it must maintain its nature as a police
organ or law enforcement organ under Article 25 of the Japan Coast Guard Law. Without
specific legal grounds, any “interchangeability or duplication,” either between defense
missions and police ones, or defense organs and police ones, is strictly prohibited by
Japanese law. As a result, the use of weapons by the Japan Coast Guard, as a police organ,
is rigidly limited to the extent that is needed for the purpose of accomplishing its police
function. The Japan Coast Guard is not allowed to use weapons for defense or militar y
operations. Such situation is very different from the State practice of other countries aroundthe world in terms of the relationship between military organs and coast guards including
their missions.
The critical issue is how, when the Japan Coast Guard conducts missions under the Control
Guidelines in collaboration with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, it can ensure its
safety. When an armed conflict is taking place, can operating in the battlefield or in thesea areas near to it, with significantly limited use of weapons, be safe? If so, how would thesafety be ensured?
This paper will consider this confounding issue that is inherent to the Japan Coast Guard
from various aspects. It will conclude with this authorʼs proposals to ensure the Japan Coast
Guardʼs safety.
*

Atsuko Kanehara is Research Director for the Canon Institute for Global Studies, and Policy Adviser for
the Japan Coast Guard.
** All URLs were last accessed on the 12th of January, 2024.

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How to Ensure the Safety of the Japan Coast Guard While Maintaining Its Nature as a Police Organ When It Conducts Missions in
Collaboration with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force under the Control Guidelines

T

Introduction

he Japanese government finalized the three official documents on Japanʼs security1 by
a Cabinet decision on the 16th of December 2022. Part of the background to this lies inthe serious consideration that the tense situation has been significantly exacerbatedin recent years, particularly in relation to China in the East China Sea.2 Based upon
the same consideration, on the 28th of April 2023, the Japanese government adopted the Control
Guidelines for the Japan Coast Guard (Guidelines)3 under Article 80 of the Self-Defense Forces
Law.4
Article 80 reads:5
1. In the event the whole or part of the Self-Defense Forces is ordered into operation under
the provisions of Paragraph l, Article 76 (limited to No. 1), or Paragraph l, Article 78, thePrime Minister may, if deemed especially necessary, place the whole or part of the Coast
Guard under the control of the Minister of Defense (slightly corrected).6
2. In the event, the whole or part of the Coast Guard has been placed under control according
to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Prime Minister shall place it under thecommand of the Minister of Defense as prescribed by Cabinet Order.
3. When the control under the provisions of Paragraph I has been deemed no longer
necessary, the Prime Minister shall immediately remove such control.
After the Self-Defense Forces Law was enacted in 1954, for almost 70 years, concrete ways for
how the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) areto take collaborative measures under the control by the Minister of Defense have not been
designated. Against the background of the heightened tension in the East China Sea, theimplementation of the Guidelines has become reality.
The most important factor to be emphasized is that, under domestic law, 7 the JCG must
maintain its nature as a law enforcement organ or a police organ with strict limitation on its use
of weapons to the extent that allows it to accomplish its police function.8 The Guidelines will be
issued in accordance with a decision under Japanʼs domestic law that an armed attack against

1

These are the National Security Strategy of Japan, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense
Buildup Program.

2

Atsuko Kanehara, “Refining Japanʼs Integrative Position on the Territorial Sovereignty of the Senkaku
Islands,” International Law Studies, Vol. 97 (2021), 1597–1600,1625–1630.

3

https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2023/04/28b_02.pdf (in Japanese).

4

Law No. 165 of 1954.

5

An unofficial translation is given in Robert D. Eldridge and Musashi Katsuhiro eds., The Japan SelfDefense Forces Law: Translation, History, and Analysis, (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2019).

6

Article 76 prescribes defense operations and Article 78 does so for public security operations.

7

The relevant domestic laws will be introduced later.

8Regarding the difficult distinction between the use of force prohibited by international law, particularly
by Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter, on the one hand, and the use of weapons
allowed by international law for the purpose of law enforcement, on the other hand, see Atsuko
Kanehara, “Reconsideration of the Distinction between the Use of Arms in Law Enforcement and theUse of Force Prohibited by International Law̶With an Analysis of the Inherent Significance of This
Issue to Japan̶,” Japan Review, Vol. 5 (2022), 13–48.

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Atsuko Kanehara

Japan is occurring and that it has occurred.9 In that case, under international law, an armed
conflict is very likely taking place. In facing such a situation, the JCG must be a law enforcement
or police organ and is strictly prohibited from using weapons as explained here. It cannot use
weapons to respond to an armed attack, namely, to combat enemies.
Then, is it possible for the JCG to protect itself from being attacked? How can the safety of the
JCG be ensured when it is discharging the designated missions in collaboration with the JMSDF
under the Guidelines ?
This paper will look for possible ways to ensure the safety of the JCG in such a situation
and will strongly propose safety as an issue of critical importance. In proceeding with thisexamination, it is assumed that under domestic law, an armed attack against Japan is defined,
and that under international law, there exists an armed conflict to which Japan is a party. In
accordance with the Guidelines, in an armed attack against Japan under Japanese domestic
law, and with the existence of an armed conflict between China and Japan under internationallaw, the JCG will discharge the duties designated by the Guidelines. In order to conduct a
substantial examination of the Guidelines, it is useful to put them into these concrete contexts.
This contribution will look for a way to ensure the safety of the JCG when it operates under the
Guidelines in accordance with the applicable laws.
This paper, after the Introduction, will proceed as follows. First, it will provide a succinct
explanation of the background for the Guidelines. Second, the relevant domestic law rules
regarding the nature of the JCG as a law enforcement or a police organ, and its strictly limited use
of weapons will be explained. Third, as the basis for finding the most effective way to ensure thesafety of the JCG vessels and its personnel, considering the duties that the Guidelines expect the
JCG to discharge, this paper will put the Guidelines into two concrete contexts: first, the context
of coast guard activities in Japanʼs territorial sea as a duty of the JCG; second, the context of theduties of protecting nationals and conducting rescue operations for mass evacuations. Fourth,while limited from the perspective of this contribution, it will analyze the applicable laws ofinternational law to the situation that is assumed in this paper. Fifth, a separate section will focus
upon the principle of distinction as a fundamental limitation on hostile acts. Some concluding
remarks with proposals will follow to emphasize the critical importance of the safety of the
JCG which could be achieved by thorough research and prudent consideration of the relevantinternational law rules.

I. The Background for the Guidelines for the Japan Coast Guard Based on
Article 80 of the Self-Defense Forces Law
1. The Tense Situation in the East China Sea in Relation to China

The Japanese government finalized the three official documents on Japanʼs security on the 16th ofDecember 2022. One of the main background factors to this is the serious consideration that thetense situation has been significantly exacerbated in recent years, particularly in relation to China
in the East China Sea. Based upon the same consideration, on the 28th of April 2023, the Japanese9

The precise definition of such a situation is given under Article 76 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. The
former part of Paragraph 1 of the provision reads:
When considered necessary from the standpoint of defending the nation
against Armed Attack from the outside (including the case wherearmed attack from the outside is imminent), the Prime Minister mayorder part or the whole of the Self-Defense Forces into operations (slightly corrected).
Unofficial English translation, supra n. 5.

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How to Ensure the Safety of the Japan Coast Guard While Maintaining Its Nature as a Police Organ When It Conducts Missions in
Collaboration with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force under the Control Guidelines

government adopted the Guidelines to reflect Article 80 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.10
The issue of the Senkaku Islands11 is closely related to this tense situation. Japanʼs position is:
There is no doubt that the Senkaku Islands are clearly an inherent part of the territory ofJapan, in light of historical facts and based upon international law. Indeed, the Senkaku
Islands are under the valid control of Japan. There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to
be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands.12
Thus, Japan does not admit any existence of a dispute with China on the sovereignty of the
Senkaku Islands.13 Nonetheless, as a matter of fact, there is a difference of opinions between
China and Japan, since China also has claimed its sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has dispatched government vessels, warships,
and fishing boats to the sea areas surrounding the Senkaku Islands.14 These sea areas are Japanʼsterritorial sea and contiguous zone. Particularly from 2012, when the Japanese government
acquired ownership of the Senkaku Islands, such provocative entries by Chinese vessels
into Japanese sea areas has become rampant.15 In this regard, the JCG has made public, in aperiodical manner, information on such activities by Chinese vessels. 16 Far beyond the simple
entr y of Chinese vessels into Japanʼs territorial sea, recently, cases have occurred in which
Chinese government vessels persistently pursued Japanese fishing boats in the sea areas. On
the Chinese side, in arguendo, such behavior is justified as the exercising of its law enforcement
jurisdiction, because the sea areas concerned, as well as the Senkaku Islands, are under Chinese
sovereignty.17

2. The Chinese Coast Guard Law of 2021

In addition, the event that really exacerbated the tense situation was Chinaʼs enaction of theChinese Coast Guard Law (CCGL) in Januar y of 202118 and its entr y into force on the 1st of
Februar y of the same year. The CCGL astounded not only the Japanese authorities but also
others across the world. Experts on international law and the law of the sea in particular have10

As to the specific provision, see the Introduction.

11

The islands are called “Diaoyu Dao” in Chinese.

12

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, About the Senkaku Islands (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.mofa.
go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/index.html.

13Here, the concept of a dispute under international law is not discussed. Regarding it and Japanʼs
position, see Kanehara, op. cit., supra n. 2, 1591, and footnote 6.

14

For an overview of the situation, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Status of Activities by Chinese
Government Vessels and Chinese Fishing Vessels in Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands (Aug. 26,
2016), https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000180283.pdf.

15

As for the details of such Chinese conduct, see Atsuko Kanehara, “Maritime Security in the East
China Sea: Japanʼs Perspective,” Issues & Insights, Vol. 21 (2021), https://pacforum.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/07/Issues-and-Insights-Vol-21-SR2-ver-3.pdf, 16–17; and Atsuko Kanehara, “International
Law as a Tool to Combat China,” Japan Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2020), 18.

16

https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/mission/senkaku/senkaku.html.

17

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peopleʼs Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang
Wenbinʼs Regular Press Conference on June 4, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/
s2510_665401/2511_665403/202106/t20210604_9170759.html; Ministr y of Foreign Af fairs of thePeopleʼs Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijianʼs Regular Press Conference on
July 13, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202107/
t20210713_9170784.html.

18

An unofficial English translation of the Chinese Coast Guard Law is available on the U.S. Air University
web site: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2021-02-11%20
China_Coast_Guard_Law_FINAL_English_Changes%20from%20draft. pdf.

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Atsuko Kanehara

repeatedly criticized several points in the CCGL.19 However, for Japan, which is actually facing
the tense situation with China, and from the viewpoint of this paper, the most important provision
therein is Article 83.20
Under the CCGL, law enforcement and defense really seem to be “interchangeable.” Article 83
provides that coast guard organizations perform defense operations and other tasks in accordancewith the “National Defense Law of the Peopleʼs Republic of China,” the “Peopleʼs Armed Police
Law of the Peopleʼs Republic of China” and other relevant laws, military regulations, and orders of
the Central Military Commission.21
In the sea areas surrounding the Senkaku Islands, periodically and almost permanently,
Chinese vessels and JCG vessels are confronting each other.22 The JCG has taken measuresagainst Chinese vessels that are entering Japanʼs contiguous zone and territorial sea surrounding
the Senkaku Islands in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS). The JCG has repeatedly required Chinese government vessels to leave Japan ʼsterritorial sea.23
In such an actual confrontation between Chinese government vessels and JCG vessels, when
Chinese vessels immediately change their mission from law enforcement to defense operation onsite in accordance with Article 83 of the CCGL, that would doubtlessly realize the circumstance
where JCG vessels come to stand face to face with Chinese “warships.” As the interchangeability
given under the CCGL between law enforcement and defense operation enables Chinese
government vessels to actually turn into “warships,”24 at least in terms of their function,25 theywould confront JCG vessels as warships.
Here is where the issue of rigid non-interchangeability between law enforcement anddefense26 for the JCG arises, which will be examined in Section II.

19

For instance, see Brig Vinod Anand, “Implications of Chinaʼs New Coast Guard Law,” Vivekananda
International Foundation (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.vifindia.org/2021/february/26/implicationsof-chinas-new-coast-guard-law; and Tomohisa Takei, “How Japan Should Deal with Chinaʼs New Coast
Guard Law,” Asia Pacific Initiative (Apr. 8, 2021), https://apinitiative.org/en/2021/04/08/23360/.

20

As to the impacts of the CCGL on Japanʼs coast guard activities, see Atsuko Kanehara, “The Impact
on Japanʼs Coast Guard and Maritime Security Caused by Chinaʼs Coast Guard Law of 2021,” Japanese
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 65 (2022), 320–335.

21

For an unofficial English translation of the CCGL, see supra n. 18.

22

As to the measures that the JCG has taken toward Chinese vessels, see supra n. 14 and 15.

23

As, according to the law of the sea, Chinese government vessels enjoy immunity from the enforcement
jurisdiction of foreign countries, the JCG cannot take law enforcement measures against them, andso it repeatedly requests Chinese government vessels to leave Japanʼs territorial sea. Regarding such
immunity, see Article 32 of UNCLOS. Relating to warshipsʼ refusal to comply with such requests, Article
30 provides for a request to leave by a coastal State of the territorial sea.

24

Under UNCLOS, Article 29 sets a definition of warships. Therefore, Chinese law enforcement vesselsthat change their function from law enforcement to defense operation under Article 83 of the CCGL
need to satisfy the requirements given by the provision of UNCLOS in order to enjoy rights andprivileges under international law. Here, it is enough to recognize that, as a matter of fact, Chinese
vessels may immediately change their function from law enforcement to defense, such as becoming
warships.

25

Regarding warships in armed conflicts, see Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, “Warships,” Max Planck
Encyclopedias of International Law, https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/
law-9780199231690-e443?rskey=Q0ctQU&result=1&prd=MPIL, article last updated: October 2015.

26

Unless otherwise explained, in this paper, “defense” means that under international law, different from“defense” or self-protection under domestic criminal law.

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How to Ensure the Safety of the Japan Coast Guard While Maintaining Its Nature as a Police Organ When It Conducts Missions in
Collaboration with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force under the Control Guidelines

II. The JCG as a Law Enforcement or a Police Organ under Article 25 of theJapan Coast Guard Law
1. Article 25 of the Japan Coast Guard Law

Even if standing face to face with Chinese warships in Japanʼs territorial sea around the Senkaku
Islands, the JCG is strictly obliged to maintain its nature as a law enforcement organ or a police
organ. Article 25 of the Japan Coast Guard Law27 prescribes for that. It reads:
Nothing contained in this Law shall be construed to permit the Japan Coast Guard or its
personnel to be trained or organized as a military establishment or to function as such.28
To this rigid non-interchangeability between law enforcement and defense, or military operations,both the background for enacting the law and Japanʼs inherent history after World War II areclosely related.29 This is also the case with Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan,30 in which
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation.31 Here it is enough topoint out this fact without going into the details. This background and Japanʼs history impose so
severe a prohibition on such an interchangeability without specific legal grounds between a law
enforcement or police organ, on the one hand, and a defense organ, on the other hand.32 This
non-interchangeability is not only a matter of organizational demarcation between them, but alsoa matter of the missions and function that each of them discharges. In any case, the JCG must
maintain its being a police organ, and must not take any roles of defense.

2. The Strict Limits Placed on the Use of Weapons by the JCG as a Police Organ
As the JCG is a police organ, its use of weapons is strictly limited to the extent that allows it toaccomplish its police function. The former part of Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act
provides for this. It reads:
In the event that there is probable cause to deem it necessary for the arrest of a criminal or
the prevention of a criminalʼs escape, for self-protection or the protection of others, or for
suppression of resistance to the performance of public duty, a police official may use a weapon
within the limits judged reasonably necessary in the situation.33
27

Law No. 28 of 1948.

28

An unofficial English translation of the Japan Coast Guard Law is given at https://nippon.zaidan.info/
seikabutsu/2001/00500/contents/00021.htm.

29

Rekizo Murakami and Masato Mori, “Kaijohoanchoho no Seiritsu to Gaikoku Hosei no Keiju (Enactmentof the Coast Guard Law and Reception of Foreign Laws),” Soji Yamamoto et al. eds., Kaijohoan Hosei—
Kaiyoho to Kokunaiho no Kosaku (Legal System on Coast Guard—Interplay between the Law of the Sea
and Domestic Law), (Sanseido, 2009), 26–33.

30

The Constitution of Japan, November 3, 1946.

31

Article 9 reads:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settlinginternational disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other
war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
For an unofficial English translation of this provision, see https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/ja/
laws/view/174.

32

Hereinafter, this paper will use the term “police organ,” which can also mean “law enforcement organ,”unless the term “law enforcement organ” is more appropriate depending on the context. JMSDF, which
is a defense organ, may discharge police function in accordance with the Sel-Defense Force Law. For
instance, its Article 82 provides for the maritime police action conducted by JMSDF.

33

For an unofficial English translation of this provision, see https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/ja/
laws/view/4043/tb.

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Thus, as a police organ, the JCG and its personnel may only use weapons when it deems this to benecessary for the arrest of a criminal or the prevention of a criminalʼs escape, for self-protection or
for the protection of others. In other words, even when Chinese vessels that come to be warships,
at least in terms of their function, in accordance with Article 83 of the CCGL, are conducting
armed attacks against the JCG vessels in Japanʼs territorial sea around the Senkaku Islands, theJCG can only respond to them strictly within the limit placed on its use of weapons by the Japanʼs
Police Duties Execution Act. Even though international law permits the JCG, as a Japanese
governmental organ, to respond by exercising the right of self-defense, while issues under jus in
bello are remaining, this legal fact of Japanese domestic law would never release the JCG from theduty of compliance with the limitation on its use of weapons and the responsibility for a violation
thereof under Japanʼs domestic law. Or, even if there exists an armed conflict under internationallaw, the JCG could never conduct a hostile act with the use of weapons. Broadly speaking, it could
not fight an armed conflict.
In addition, the JCG vessels have a lightweight construction such that they can discharge theJCGʼs principal mission of maritime search and rescue in a speedy manner. They are not durable
at all against an armed attack.
Thus, the JCG is, when operating according to the Guidelines under the situation that thispaper assumes, a police organ with strict limitation on its use of weapons. Its vessel structure
does not fit armed conflicts. Bearing this in mind, next, the duties that the guidelines expect
the JCG to discharge will be confirmed. This forms a useful presupposition for finding the mosteffective way, in concrete contexts, to ensure the safety of the JCG under international law.

III. The Duties That the Guidelines Expect the JCG to Discharge
1. The Contents of the Guidelines(1) The Guidelines read:
For the JCG to exercise its abilities, its main roles under contingency are taking measures toprotect nationals and to protect lives at sea, particularly being able to play to its strength as apolice organ. Such a discharge of the JCGʼs roles of saving lives and evacuating residents at a
maximum is useful for the JMSDF as it allows the JMSDF to further concentrate on its frontal
strategy.34
As concrete missions that both the JCG and the JMSDF may conduct in collaboration, theGuidelines indicate, for instance, the following: evacuation and rescue of residents, providing
information and support for rescue to vessels, search and rescue and saving lives, monitoringand surveillance to protect port facilities from terrorist attacks, and response measures for massevacuations.
(2) The Guidelines confirm the non-military nature of the JCG. They read:
Under the control of the Minister of Defense, there may be no changes in the duties,functions, competences, and non-military nature of the JCG. Such control over the JCG does
not amount to “incorporation of the JCG into the JMSDF” and “para-militarization of the
JCG.”35(3) While the Guidelines purport to clarify the meaning of the cooperation and collaboration
between the JCG and the JMSDF when the Guidelines are issued under Article 80 of the Self34

Supra n. 3.

35

Ibid.

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How to Ensure the Safety of the Japan Coast Guard While Maintaining Its Nature as a Police Organ When It Conducts Missions in
Collaboration with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force under the Control Guidelines

Defense Forces Law, and while the Guidelines designate the concrete missions with suchcooperation and collaboration, still, ambiguity remains to a significant degree. It is ambiguous, forinstance, as to where, in what sea areas, the JCG will operate, and as to how the JCG will precisely
discharge its function that the Guidelines expect.
This paper is putting the Guidelines into context, for the sake of seeking the most effective
way to ensure the safety of the JCG under international law when it is discharging its duties under
the Guidelines. By doing so, it may also form a useful basis for the examination of the applicablelaws of international law to the situation that this paper assumes.

2. Putting the Guidelines into Concrete Contexts
Two concrete situations as the contexts into which the Guidelines are put may be practicallypresupposed based upon the actual duties that the JCG is discharging.
In the first context, when the JCG is conducting its guarding of Japan ʼ s territorial sea
surrounding the Senkaku Islands, an armed conflict takes place between China and Japan.
Such a context is not mentioned in the Guidelines. However, this is the situation that will
most likely happen considering Article 83 of the CCGL as explained above. Chinese coast guard
vessels entering Japanʼs territorial sea around the Senkaku Islands may immediately change
their missions from law enforcement to defense operation. Chinese coast guard vessels maychange themselves into “warships” at least in terms of function.36 To cope with the growing tense
situation in the sea area, the JCG has ceaselessly continued its monitoring and sur veillance
activities. Therefore, realistically, it is most predictable that JCG vessels that are conducting suchmonitoring and surveillance of Chinese coast guard vessels in the sea area will immediately cometo confront the Chinese warships. The safety of the JCG in this situation is doubtlessly the mostpressing agenda.
Second, there might be a large number of evacuees coming toward Japan via the sea fromneighboring countries, such as Taiwan.37 In fact, the JCG and the JMSDF have conducted ajoint drill assuming an issue envisaged by the Guidelines, on the 22nd of June 2023.38 While thedetails have not been publicly released, according to the media, 39 the joint drill supposed thatthe patrol ships were evacuating Japanese residents. In such an evacuation operation, evacuees
from neighboring countries may also be included. Therefore, this second situation is also likely tocome true.40
Bearing in mind these concrete contexts into which the Guidelines are put, the next section
will examine the applicable international laws to the situation that this paper assumes, namely,
one when an armed conflict under international law is taking place, and when, under Japaneselaws, an armed attack is being conducted against Japan. After giving an overview of some issues
36This nature as a warship is not necessarily a legal one. Vessels must satisfy the requirements under
Article 29 of UNCLOS to legally become warships. See supra n. 24.

37

Japan has not given recognition to Taiwan as a sovereign State. Therefore, here, this paper does notintend to define Taiwan as a sovereign State.

38

https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2023/06/22a.html, (in Japanese).

39

Jiji Press News, Japan Holds 1st Drill Based on SDF-JCG Emergency Manual, 2023.06.22 https://
sp.m.jiji.com/english/show/26979; The Japan Times, MSDF and coast guard hold joint drill under
defense minister control scenario, June 23, 2023 https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/06/23/
national/coast-guard-msdf/.

40

As for a thorough examination of this issue, see, for instance, Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “Duty to Render
Assistance to Mariners in Distress During Armed Conflict at Sea: A U.S. Perspective,” International Law
Studies, Vol. 94 (2018), 102–126; and Natalie Klein, “Assessing Australiaʼs Push Back the Boats Policy
under International Law: Legality and Accountability for Maritime Interceptions of Irregular Migrants,”
Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2014), 414–443.

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relating to the applicability of “the laws of war” in the next section, the subsequent section will
focus mainly upon the principle of distinction.

IV. Applicable Laws to the Situation That This Paper Assumes
1. The Applicability of “the Laws of War” under the Prohibition of the Use or
Threats of Force(1) Regarding the applicable laws to the situation which this paper assumes, there are two criticalissues that require examination: the applicability of “the laws of war” under the prohibition of
the use or threats of force by Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the United Nations (UN) Charter; andthe relationship between the laws of war, if applicable, and the law of the sea.41 Such a generalconsideration of the issue of the applicable laws is meaningful before a detailed examination of
the principle of distinction in the next section.
(2) To avoid any confusion, some clarification of the terminology is useful. There are “laws ofwar,” “laws of armed conflicts,” and international humanitarian law. Depending on the period
concerned, that is to say before or after the UN Charter came into force, there may or may notexist a distinction between the laws of war and the laws of armed conflicts. By the prohibition of
the use of force and the threat of force under Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, “legal”
wars ceased to exist. Here, it is not necessar y to discuss in detail the requirements for the
existence of a war, such as the declaration of a war. Whatever the requirements may be, it isenough to presuppose the existence of war.42 When every violent act is falling within the use offorce, and when the laws of “war” presuppose the existence of a war, after the UN Charter cameinto force, there would be no room, at least theoretically, for any application of the laws of “war”
that were valid before it. After the UN Charter came into force, in place of the laws of war, theterm “armed conflicts,” “the laws of armed conflicts” began to be used to designate the body oflaws that regulate violent acts.43
Nonetheless, this distinction between the laws of war and the laws of armed conflicts
depending on the time of application is not necessarily so meaningful.44 This is because after the41

It is necessary to examine the relationship between the laws of armed conflicts, or the laws of war, andthe law of the sea. Later, this paper will succinctly outline this issue.

42

On this issue, particularly from the perspective of the application of the laws of war as a legal effect of
the concept of war, see Christopher Greenwood, “The Concept of War in Modern International Law,”
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 36 (1987), 283–306.

43

While many treaty provisions which this section will introduce provide for “armed conflicts,” there
is no established legal definition for the term, and it is an expression that describes a certain factual
situation. Article 1, Paragraph 4 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
mentions armed conflicts, but it does not give any definition thereof. Hans-Peter Gasser, “HumanitarianLaw, International,” Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law, https://opil.ouplaw.com/
display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e488?rskey=Dk4m8X&result=1&prd=M
PIL, article last updated: December 2015, para. 5; James Kraska et al., “Newport Manual on the Law ofNaval Warfare,” International Law Studies, Vol. 101 (2023), 2.1.2.1. Even when there was a distinction
between wartime and peacetime, there was not an established concept of war. Greenwood, op. cit., supra
n. 42, 284–287.

44

For an analysis of this issue from the view point of the right of self-defense, see Akira Mayama, “Jieiken
Koshi ni Okeru Buryokuhunsoho no Tekiyo—Senjikokusaiho to Buryoku Hunsoho no Renzokusei・Hirenzokusei (Application of the Laws of Armed Conflicts in Exercise of the Right of Self Defense—
Continuity and Discontinuity between the Laws of War and the Laws of Armed Conflicts),” Kokusai
Mondai (International Affairs), No. 556 (2006), 33–34, 42–43.

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Collaboration with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force under the Control Guidelines

UN Charter came into force, many treaties regulating violent acts by force have been concluded.
They are called the laws of armed conflicts. They incorporate the content of the laws of war thatwere applied before the UN Charterʼs existence, albeit partially rather than totally, and they do
not necessarily abolish such laws of war. In other words, even if the development and changes ofthe laws of war that were applied before the UN Charter in this course of time are significant, thedistinction between the laws of war and the laws of armed conflicts may not be so significant, as
the latter has incorporated into it the former with the development and changes.
Bearing this in mind, this paper will hereinafter use the term “the laws of war” and will do so
without excluding development and changes thereto, particularly after the UN Charter came into
force.
In addition, there is a distinction between “the Hague Law ” and “the Geneva Law, ” andbetween the laws of war and international humanitarian law. In this regard too, unless confusion
would occur, this paper will use the term “ the laws of war ” and do so without necessarily
excluding from it the meaning of international humanitarian law.
(3) Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter prohibits the use or threats of force.45 The focus isplaced on the use of force not the threat of force.46 Under this prohibition, therefore, legally, or,if it might be said, theoretically, there must not exist a “war”47 if any violent act that amounts toa war is to fall under the use of force. Contrary to such a theoretical conclusion, from a practicalstandpoint, there have, as a matter of fact, been “wars” or, in other words, instances of the use offorce in the world after the UN Charter came into force.
If legally, or theoretically, a war must not exist, there would be no room for “the traditionallaws of war,” which presuppose the distinction between peacetime and wartime, to apply.48 To
this, the traditional distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello relates.49 As far as the rulesin the laws of war regulate the means and method of operations in armed conflicts, they may
have applicability to the use of force after the UN Charter came into force. In that case, however,the prohibition of the use of force by the UN Charter, which means prohibition in jus ad bellum,
should have some impact on jus in bello, the laws of war. A complete analysis of this difficult issue

45

It reads:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations.

46

There are opposing views on whether the phrase in Article 2, Paragraph 4 “against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State” sets some limits on the prohibition of the use of force
by the provision. The important point here is to confirm that, under the situation that the provisionprohibits, regardless of whether “the use of force” is qualified by the phrase or not, a war must not exist.

47

Supra n. 42, 287–288.

48

A.V. Lowe, “The Laws of War at Sea and the 1958 and 1982 Conventions,” Marine Policy, Vol. 12, Issue
3 (1988), 286. Lowe wisely uses the term “traditional laws of war” to designate the laws that were valid
when, before the UN Charter came into force, there was a distinction between wartime and peacetime.
This paper, according to the terminology mentioned above, uses the term “the laws of war,” which
embodies both the traditional laws of war that Lowe refers to, and the modern laws of armed conflicts
after the UN Charter came into force, unless any confusion were to occur from such use.

49

For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Christopher Greenwood, “The Relationship between Jus ad
Bellum and Jus in Bello,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1983), 221–234.

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is far beyond the examination of this paper.50
For the examination in this paper, it is enough to presuppose the applicability of the laws of
war after the UN Charter came into force. This is because this paper adopts the term “the laws ofwar” without making a distinction between the laws of war that applied prior to and after the UN
Charterʼs existence for the reason explained above. As far as presupposing such applicability, thenext issue would be raised, namely the issue of the relationship between the laws of war and thelaw of the sea. The law of the sea consists of the 1958 Four Geneva Conventions, UNCLOS, andcustomary law. While it is not only the law of the sea but also other fields of law, such as humanrights law, that require a relationship with the laws of war, this paper, from its perspective, willconcentrate on the relationship between the laws of war and the law of the sea.51

2. The Relationship between the Laws of War and the Law of the Sea

Regarding the relationship between the laws of war and the law of the sea, 52 as a generalconsideration, for instance, there is an argument that “international law” in the phrase “subject to50

One authority makes a detailed examination of the applicability of the “traditional” (i.e., pre-UN Charter)
laws of war following the coming into force of the UN Charter. Lowe, op. cit., supra n. 48, 287–288.
According to him, there are persuasive arguments for the continued applicability of the traditionallaws of war. First, under the prohibition of the use of force by Article 2, Paragraph 4, the use of force isallowed as an exercise of the right of self-defense. The principles of the traditional laws of war, such as
the duty to avoid casualties among non-combatants and belligerent rights of visit and search on the highseas, might remain applicable as rules mediating or setting the limits on the proper exercise of the rightof self-defense. Second, as Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter is interpreted as allowing the use offorce such as that in self-defense and that under the authorization by the UN, these types of the use offorce may both in fact and in law amount to a war. Thus, the traditional laws of war would apply to thesetypes of the use of force. Considering these arguments and an examination of the Falklands conflict, theauthority referred to here came to the conclusion that there remains a role for the traditional laws ofwar, and he sought to re-establish their role. Ibid., 287–288.

51

Lowe describes this effort of consideration as looking for “a new law of war.” Ibid., 289.

52

There are many works on this issue. Horace B. Robertson, Jr., “The ʻNewʼ Law of the Sea and The Law
of Armed Conflict at Sea,” The Newport Papers, Third in the Series (1992); Rüdiger Wolfrum, “Military
Activities on the High Seas: What Are the Impacts of the U. N. Convention on the Law of the Sea?,”International Law Studies, Vol. 71 (1998), 501–513; A.V. Lowe, “The Commanderʼs Handbook on the Law
of Naval Operations and the Contemporary Law of the Sea,” International Law Studies, Vol. 64, Horace B.
Robertson, Jr. ed., The Law of Naval Operations, Chapter V (Naval War College Press, 1991), 109–147;
A.V. Lowe, “Some Legal Problems Arising from the Use of the Seas for Military Purposes,” Marine
Policy, Vol. 10, Issue 3 (1986), 171–184; Lowe, op. cit., supra n. 48; “Straight Baselines in International
Law: A Call for Reconsideration,” A Seminar with Its Moderator, W. Michael Reisman, Proceedings of theAnnual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Vol. 82 (1988), 260–277; Wolff Heintschelvon Heinegg, “Current Legal Issues in Maritime Operations: Maritime Interception Operations in the
Global War on Terrorism, Exclusion Zones, Hospital Ships and Maritime Neutrality,” Israel Yearbook
on Human Rights, Vol. 34 (2004), 151–178; Dale G. Stephens, “The Impact of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention on the Conduct of Peacetime Naval/Military Operations,” California Western International
Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1999), 283–312; Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, The Law of theSea, Third ed., (Manchester University Press, 1999), 421–432; Tullio Treves, “Military Installations,
Structures, and Devices on the Seabed,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 74, No. 4(1980), 808–857; D.P. OʼConnell, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. II (Clarendon Press, 1984),
Chapter 29: D.P. OʼConnell, “International Law and Contemporary Naval Operations,” British Year Book
of International Law, Vol. 44 (1970), 19–86. Regarding the relationship between the laws of war, theright of self-defense, and interventions against a foreign vessel on the high seas from the perspective ofthe law of the sea, see Laurent Lucchini, “Un aspect des mesures de surveillance maritime au cours desopérations dʼAlgérie,” Annuaire français de droit international, Vol. 8 (1962), 920–928.

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Collaboration with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force under the Control Guidelines

other rules of international law” of Article 87, Paragraph 1 of UNCLOS refers to the laws of war.53
While not specifically concerning the relationship between the laws of war and the law of thesea, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared a “special law” status of the laws of war in
relation to human rights law in the particular context of a case before it.54
In addition, as a certain general argument on the relationship between the laws of war and thelaw of the sea, attention has been paid to the significance of the legal zone system, particularlythat of exclusive economic zones (EEZs), under UNCLOS due to its inherent meaning to the lawsof war.
The coastal States of EEZs have sovereign rights and jurisdiction solely on the mattersdesignated by UNCLOS under its Article 56. In relation to other matters, the freedom of the useof the high seas is applied to EEZs in accordance with Article 58. For the latter matters, the legal
status of the sea zones within 200 nautical miles from coasts maybe interpreted as either EEZs
or the high seas while Article 58 mentions EEZ.55 This may have an inherent significance to thelaws of war. When the laws of war apply, the military operations of the naval forces of the parties
to armed conflicts are permitted in limited sea areas. In this context, whether the sea areas within
200 nautical miles from coasts are EEZs or the high seas has some importance.56
However, these general considerations on the relationship between the laws of war and otherfields of international law have not solidified an established understanding. Rather, special issues
with respect to the relationship between the laws of war and the law of the sea have developed toa certain degree. In this regard, there are discussions on the issues relating to, for instance, theconcept of “peaceful use” of the sea, seabed, structures, installations and other devices, innocent
passage of foreign warships, rights of navigation in relation to territorial seas,57 internationallyused straits, high seas, and militar y activities in EEZs. In addition, there are issues relating

53

United States Naval War College, International Law Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies,
Maritime Operational Zones, Chapter 4, https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/por tals/0/
NWCDepartments/Stockton%20Center%20International%20Law/2013-Zones-Manual.pdf?sr=b&si=DN
NFileManagerPolicy&sig=sWrSUKeqZaEKhaVvWPx0bCSByt6FQnC6k3YHkszLx9I%3D, (2013), 4-16;
George K. Walker, “The Tanker War, 1980–88: Law and Policy,” International Law Studies, Vol. 74 (2000),
487–489.

54

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July, 1996, ICJ Reports 1996,
para. 25. The same opinion is voiced by James Kraska et al., op. cit., supra n. 43, 1.1.

55

This issue occurs also for the matters under Article 59 of UNCLOS, which are not attributed to coastal
States or foreign States by UNCLOS. Lowe, op. cit., supra n. 52 “The Commanderʼs Handbook ,” 113–
114.

56

W.J. Fenrick, “The Exclusion Zone Device in the Law of Naval War fare,” Canadian Yearbook ofInternational Law, Vol. 24 (1986), 93 and footnote 5; Robertson, Jr., op. cit., supra n. 52, 23–25. See also
J. Ashley Roach, “The Law of Naval Warfare at the Turn of Two Centuries,” The American Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 94, No. 1 (2000), 67–68. In the context of naval warfare, one authority deals
with all contiguous zones, EEZs, and the high seas under the same category of “international waters”,
see United States of America Department of Defense, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR
MANUAL, June 2015 (Updated December 2016), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/
pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.
pdf#page=921, 13.2.3.

57

Depending on the legal regimes of sea zones under UNCLOS, States have the rights of navigation or
passage.

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to maritime zones.58 Nonetheless, even for these special issues, too, the arguments have notnecessarily reached an accord.
Considering the state of the arguments on the relationship between the laws of war andthe law of the sea, it is ver y difficult to find a definitive answer regarding the question of
the relationship. For the analysis in this contribution, it is not necessary to do so. From thiscontributionʼs perspective, it is enough to recognize such an issue regarding the relationship. The
most important point is to emphasize that it would place a heavy burden on the JCG to have toprove the applicability of the rules of the laws of war and its relationship with the rules of the lawof the sea, in terms of needing to convincingly justify its position for ensuring its safety. Thus, it
may not be inappropriate for this paper to examine the safety of the JCG under the Guidelines bypresupposing the application of some rules of the laws of war without excluding the application of
the law of the sea at the same time, as has been argued by a number of authorities.
Based upon this principle of examination, this section and section V below will conduct thefollowing analysis. However, before moving onto section V, it is first necessar y to succinctly
consider the applicability of the laws of war to naval warfare.59 More precisely, the question as towhich rules of the laws of war are to apply to naval warfare must be clarified as much as possible.

3. The Applicable Rules of the Laws of War to Naval Warfare(1) Regarding naval warfare, first, authorities frequently say that there are few treaty rules to

58

There are practices of setting maritime zones in armed conflicts, and the names are various, suchas exclusion zones and maritime defense zones. The location of these zones is in territorial seas,
contiguous zones, EEZs and high seas. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, “War Zones,” Max Planck
Encyclopedias of International Law, https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/
law-9780199231690-e436?rskey=oUiylT&result=1&prd=MPIL, ar ticle last updated: October 2015;
Fenrick, op. cit., supra n. 56, 91–126; United States Naval War College, International Law Department,
Center for Naval Warfare Studies, op. cit., supra n. 53, Chapter 4; R.P. Barston and P.W. Birnie “TheFalkland Islands/ Islas Malvinas Conflict: A Question of Zones,” Marine Policy, Vol. 7, Issue 1 (1983),
14–24. As a similar issue, blockades have also been discussed in the context of the relationshipbetween the law of the sea and the laws of war. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, “Blockade,” Max Planck
Encyclopedias of International Law, https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/
law-9780199231690-e252?rskey=P4e2sC&result=1&prd=MPIL, article last updated: October 2015;
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, “Naval Blockade,” International Law Studies, Vol. 75 (2000), Michael N.
Schmitt ed., International Law Across the Spectrum of Conflict: Essays in Honour of Professor L. C. Green,
On the Occasion of His Eightieth Birthday, Chapter VIII; James Kraska, “Rule Selection in the Case of
Israelʼs Naval Blockade of Gaza: Law of Naval Warfare or Law of the Sea?,” Yearbook of International
Humanitarian Law, Vol. 13 (2010), 367–395. For an analysis of the usage of sea zones from theperspective of combating international terrorism at sea, see Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, op. cit.,
supra n. 52, 159–162.

59

This paper follows the general definition of naval warfare, and it denotes the tactics of militar y
operations conducted on, under, or over the sea. ICRC Databases, Naval warfare, Introductory text, at
https://casebook.icrc.org/law/naval-warfare#footnote1_1813h2o, 1, and footnote [1]. Regarding naval
roles, see, for instance, Steven Haines, “War at Sea: Nineteenth-Century Laws for Twenty-First Century
Wars?,” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 98, No. 2 (2016), 421–426.

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apply to naval warfare.60 As the other side of the coin, one frequently voiced opinion is that theapplicable laws to naval warfare are mainly based upon customary international law.61
The Second 1949 Geneva Convention (GCII) on naval warfare is certainly applicable to naval
warfare. In comparison to this, the First 1949 Geneva Convention (GCI) does not apply to naval
warfare. Regarding the Third and Fourth 1949 Geneva Conventions (GCIII and GCIV) and the1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (API),62 it is not always an easy task toidentify the provisions that are applicable to naval warfare.63 On this, the opinion mentioned aboveis frequently heard, namely that there are few treaty rules to apply to naval warfare, and that theapplicable laws to naval warfare are mainly based upon customary international law.64
There is, second, another opinion that the regulation by the laws of naval warfare is decided
depending on the place of targets of attacks or objects of protection from attacks, and when they60

W. Michael Reisman and William K. Leitzau, “Moving International Law from Theory to Practice: The
Role of Military Manuals in Effectuating the Law of Armed Conflict,” International Law Studies, Vol. 64,
Horace B. Robertson, Jr. ed., The Law of Naval Operations, (Naval War College Press, 1991), Chapter I, 8;
San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, Prepared by International
Lawyers and Naval Experts. Convened by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law. Adopted inJune 1994 (hereinafter referred to as “the San Remo Manual”), Introductory Note. For an analysis of the
San Remo Manual, see Louise Doswald-Beck, “The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable
to Armed Conflicts at Sea,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 1 (1995), 192–208.
Yasuyuki Yoshida, “Gendai no Kaijo Sakusen kara Mita Kaisenhoki no Kadai (Agenda of the Laws
of Naval Warfare from the Perspective of Modern Naval Operations),” Kokka Anzenhosho (National
Security), Vol. 34, No. 2 (2006), 81; Manabu Oginome, “Kaisen ni Okeru Bunminhogo nado no Koryo(Some Consideration of Civilian Protection and Others in Naval Warfare),” Kaikanko Senryaku Kenkyu(JMSDF Command and Staff College Strategic Studies), Vol. 4, No. 1 (2014), 105–106; Kaijo Buryoku
Hunsoho—Sanremo Manyuaru Kaisetsusho (The Law on Naval Warfare—Explanation Book on the San
Remo Manual), Translated by Masayuki Takemoto, Akira Mayama et al., (Toshindo, 1997), iii.

61

For such a position and similar ones, see Natalino Ronzitti, “Naval Warfare,” Max Planck Encyclopediasof International Law, https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law9780199231690-e342?rskey=uBaeSM&result=1&prd=MPIL, article last updated: June 2009, para. 2;
and W.J. Fenrick, “Legal Aspects of Targeting in the Law of Naval Warfare,” Canadian Yearbook ofInternational Law, Vol. 29 (1992), 239–241.

62

For a detailed analysis of the applicability of API to naval warfare, see ibid., 264–267. It is clear that theprovisions under API that reflect GCII, which is Part II, are to apply to naval warfare. However, Article
49, Paragraph 3, which is in Section One of Part IV and not in Part II, confounds the determination of
the applicability of Section One of Part IV (from Article 48 to Article 67) of API. The title of Article 49 is“Definition of Attacks and Scope of Application.” Paragraph 3 reads:
The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect the civilian
population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They further apply to all attacks from thesea or from the air against objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air (Emphasis added).
For one interpretation of Article 49 that Article 52 applies to naval bombardment through Article 49, seeRonzitti, op. cit., supra n. 61, para. 21.

63

Considering the assumed situation of this paper, the 1977 Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions is not within the coverage of this paperʼs examination.

64

There are treaties concluded prior to World War II that apply to naval warfare. This paper will focus
mainly upon the 1949 Geneva Conventions (GCI can be omitted) and API.

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exist at sea, the laws to regulate them are the laws of naval warfare.65 According to this opinion,66
it is necessar y to decide whether the rules concerned designate the place of the targets of
the attacks or the objects of protection from the attacks as the sea, and whether the operation
concerned has its targets of attacks at sea and its objects of protection at sea.
Among the authorities mentioned first, one authority clearly writes that naval bombardment
is subject to API, since Ar ticle 49 renders Ar ticle 52 applicable to naval war fare. 67 Naval
bombardment can include bombardment from sea against targets on land. According to thesecond type of opinion, as long as the target of bombardment exists on land, such bombardment
is not subject to the laws of naval warfare. This is because the targets of bombardment do notexist at sea. Therefore, the first and second opinions differ from each other.
(2) However, it is not necessary to fully examine the applicable laws to naval warfare and consider
the difference of opinions regarding them. From the perspective of this paper, the most important
point is that if the JCG, to ensure its safety, were to rely on some rules of the laws of war andadopt a certain interpretation thereof, the burden placed on it would become very heavy. Thisis because, as shown by the abovementioned authorities, there remains a certain flexibility as
to the applicability of the rules to naval warfare, whether treaty rules or customary rules, andtheir interpretation needs to be truly well grounded for them to be convincing. Otherwise, theconflicting party to Japan would have enough room to apply different rules from those that the
JCG does, and a different interpretation of the same rules as those the JCG presupposes areapplicable.
The result is that the JCG would run a serious risk of being in danger, such as being a targetof attacks by the conflicting party to the armed conflict, as the latter could choose different
applicable rules and a different interpretation as explained here. To firmly ensure its safety,
the JCG would need to prepare flawless and perfect arguments on the applicable laws and theinterpretation thereof.
Bearing in mind this legal situation of the applicable laws to the situation that this paper
assumes, in the next section, an examination of the relevant rules on the principle of distinction
will be given. The principle of distinction should be the most important principle in considering
the safety of the JCG when it discharges its missions under the Guidelines.

V. The Principle of Distinction68
1. Basic Rules for Methods and Means of Warfare(1) As a basic rule for the methods and means of warfare, Paragraph 1 of Article 35 of API
prescribes the principle that the methods or means of warfare are not unlimited. It reads:
In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of65

Akira Mayama, “Junevu Shojoyaku to Tsuika Giteisho (Geneva Conventions and the Additional
Protocols),” in the Japanese Society of International Law ed., Nihon to Kokusaiho no Hyakunen (100Years for Japan and International Law), (Sanseido, 2001), Vol. 10, 177.

66

While there is some ambiguity, in focusing on the place of the targets as being at sea, a similar opinion
may be voiced by an authority as saying “(a)s a matter of convenience, if Additional Protocol I is notapplicable to attacks directed against objects on, under, or over the seas, Article 48 of that document
may be used as a statement of the principle of distinction,” Fenrick, op. cit., supra n. 61, 263.

67

Ronzitti, op. cit., supra n. 61, para. 21 and paras. 7–8.

68

This is also called “the principle of identification” and “the principle of discrimination.” Michael N.
Schmitt, “The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare,” Yale Human Rights and Development
Law Journal, Vol. 2 (1999), 143–182. This paper will use the term “the principle of distinction.”

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warfare is not unlimited.
Article 48 further clarifies such limits in relation to the protection of civilians as follows:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects,
the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population andcombatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct
their operations only against military objectives.
This is the principle of distinction. The distinction should be made between civilians andcombatants, and also between civilian objects and military objectives. It is required to make thedistinction between objects or persons that may be attacked and those that may not be attacked.
Paragraph 3, Paragraph 4, and Paragraph 5 of Article 51 provide for the details of the principle ofdistinction. They read:
Paragraph 3
Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as theytake a direct part in hostilities.
Paragraph 4
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specificmilitary objective; or(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited
as required by this Protocol;and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians
or civilian objects without distinction.
Paragraph 5
Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate:(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military
objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town,
village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
These provisions belong to Part IV of API. As far as Part II of API reflects GCII and applies tonaval warfare, it is not totally clear which provisions from Parts other than Part II of API apply tonaval warfare. As a confounding provision, Article 49, in its Part IV, contains the phrase that theprovisions of this section apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives onland but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at sea orin the air (Emphasis added).69
Nonetheless, as long as the principle of distinction has customar y law status in relation
to naval war fare, 70 the applicability of the provisions of API would not require a detailed
examination.71 It remains to identify the detailed contents of the principle and examine their
possible status as customary law based upon State practice.
(2) It may be said that the principle of distinction is not only a treaty rule but also a customary69

Supra n. 62.

70

Yoram Dinstein, “Legitimate Military Objectives under the Current Jus In Bello,” Israel Yearbook on
Human Rights, Vol. 31 (2001), 1. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of
8 July, 1996, op. cit., supra n. 54, 257.

71

For a detailed analysis, see Mayama, op. cit., supra n. 65, 178–181.

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law rule. This is the case with naval warfare.72 As relevant State practice,73 the military manualsof States have confirmed the principle.74 If the relevant treaty rules that apply to naval warfare are
few in number, then customary international law and State practice take on greater significance.75
As will be explained later, in terms of the concrete application of the principle, there is some
dif ference of opinion regarding the standard for making the distinction between militar yobjectives and others.76 The critical issue is how to define military objectives.

2. The Standard for Determining Militar y Objectives(1) Even if the principle of distinction is solidly established, the remaining and daunting issue
is how to define military objectives. For the JCG, it is indispensable for its safety to completely
prove that its vessels and personnel are not military objectives.77
There are two ways of determining militar y objectives. One is to make a list of militar yobjectives depending on categories of objects. The other is to provide a general definition of
military objectives by describing the functions of objects.78 In the treaty practice relating to naval
warfare, the former way, involving the making of a list, was adopted.79
For naval warfare, in the past, the former method was dominant, and, principally, warships,
auxiliar y vessels and merchant vessels were considered. This histor y of the development of
the standard for identifying military objectives is different from that for land warfare, where thestandard for identifying military objectives depending on function was adopted earlier than for
naval warfare.80(2) By the State practice in place through two world wars and the present day, the way ofidentifying military objectives by a list of categories, in relation to naval warfare, has become
72

In addition to the authority cited at supra n. 70, see Robert W. Tucker, “The Law of War and Neutrality at
Sea,” International Law Studies, Vol. 50 (1955), 365. For a very prudent attitude toward customary rulesin this regard, see Lowe, op. cit., supra n. 52 “The Commanderʼs Handbook ,” 130.

73

On the significance of military manuals as State practice and various types of manual, see, for instance,
Earle A. Partington, “Manuals on the Law of Armed Conflict,” Max Planck Encyclopedias of InternationalLaw, https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e326?rske
y=a8hA9D&result=1&prd=MPIL, article last updated: August 2016. It has been pointed out that States
prefer not to stand alone on the law of armed conflict, para. 25. See also Reisman and Leitzau, op. cit.,
supra n.60.

74

For instance, the San Remo Manual, Part III, Section I; United States of America Department of
Defense, op. cit., supra n. 56, 5.5. and 5.6.; and James Kraska et al., op. cit., supra n. 43, 5.4.

75

Ronzitti, op. cit., supra n. 61, para. 42.

76

Mayama, op. cit., supra n. 65, 178–181; Akira Mayama, “Kaisenhoki ni Okeru Mokuhyo Kubetsu
Gensoku no Shintenkai (New Development of the Principle of Distinction in the Laws of Naval
Warfare),” (1), Kokusaiho Gaiko Zasshi, (The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy), Vol. 95, No.
5 (1996), 539–578, (2) in the same journal, Vol. 96, No. 1 (1997), 25–57, particularly (1) 540–541, 546–
552.

77

The following part of this paper will give an analysis based upon the Guidelines being put into concrete
contexts. Before that, here, the legal arguments on the principle of distinction and related issues will be
examined.

78

In this regard, including several types of ways to explain military objectives, see Fenrick, op. cit., supra n.
61, 242–243.

79

For instance, the 1936 London Submarine Protocol indicates that a merchant vessel may not be sunk onsight. Article 4 of the 1907 Hague Convention XI suggests that vessels charged with religious, scientific,
or philanthropic missions are exempt from capture. Ibid., 243.

80

Mayama, op. cit., supra n. 76, (1) 546–552.

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useless. In applying the standard for identifying military objectives depending on categories, themost confounding issue has been when merchant vessels, enemy or neutral, become military
objectives, while in principle, they are not so.81 The requirements for merchant vessels to amountto military targets have been discussed for a long time.
This is not the place to examine the development of State practice in detail. Here, it suffices
to outline that, irrespective of great efforts to set forth the requirements for merchant vessels
to become militar y objectives, in practice, the distinction between merchant vessels that are
immune from attacks and those that may be the targets of attacks has become seriously blurred.
The standard for the distinction is not reliable. As far as this is the reality with respect to themost critical matters, namely, the inviolability of merchant vessels, the way of identifying military
objectives depending on categories loses its usefulness.82
As recent international rules on this issue, Article 52 of API of 1977 is interpreted as adopting
the way of identifying military objectives by providing a general definition, which means a generaldefinition depending on the function of the objectives concerned.83 It describes such function as“their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,offers a definite military advantage.” As for the civilian population that Article 51 of API deals
with,84 in terms of the requirements for civilian populations to become military objectives, an
important factor is taking a direct part in hostilities.85 It could be said that Article 51, too, defines
the civilian population as being immune from attack by its type of function.
Considering the development of State practice in this way, as mentioned here, and as far as
Article 51 and Article 52 of API apply to naval warfare as well as land warfare, these provisions, as
treaty rules, have brought into the principle of distinction for naval warfare the way of identifying
military objectives by a general definition, which means definition depending on the function of
the objectives concerned.86 If this is the case, the remaining and further difficult question is how
to identify military objectives depending on their function, not category. From the perspectiveof this paper, it is necessary to examine how to prove that JCG vessels and personnel should be
immune from attacks.
While for naval warfare, as well as for land warfare, the way of identifying military objectives
according to their function is said to be important, still, there may be significance in considering
the possibility for JCG vessels to become militar y objectives in accordance with the way ofidentifying such objectives depending on their category. Thus, in the following, examinations will
be given both from the perspective of the category of JCG vessels and from that of their function.
81

On this issue, there are many works. Including examination of State practice in the past and the moderntime, see, for instance, Fenrick, op. cit., supra n. 61, 244 et seq.; Mayama, op. cit., supra n. 65, 179–181;
Mayama, op. cit., supra n. 76, (1) 548–578, (2) 25–42; Laurie R. Blank, “Taking Distinction to the Next
Level: Accountability for Fightersʼ Failure to Distinguish Themselves from Civilians,” Valparaiso
University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2012), 765–777; and Yoram Dinstein, op. cit., supra n. 70, 1–26.

82

For a detailed analysis, see Mayama, op. cit., supra n. 76, (1) 556–571, (2) 26–31.

83

Paragraph 2 of Article 52 reads:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military
objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use makean effective contribution to militar y action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

84

Article 51 provides for the protection of the civilian population. Paragraph 3 of it reads:
Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take adirect part in hostilities.

85

This factor will be examined later in this section.

86

Mayama, op. cit., supra n. 65, 179–181.

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In such examinations, a concrete analysis is useful in the context of the duties that the JCG willdischarge under the Guidelines, which were confirmed above in Section III of this paper.

3. Categories under Which JCG Vessels May Fall
(1) When considering the categories under which JCG vessels fall, the important element is the“control” by the Minister of Defense over the JCG under the Guidelines. This is in accordancewith Article 80 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.87 Based upon this provision, the Guidelines88 read:
Under an integrative and unitary command that is issued based upon information aggregatedin the Ministry of Defense and the JMSDF, the JMSDF and the JCG should cope with thesituation concerned by swift and accurate allocation of roles in a more cooperative mannerthan usual.
As confirmed in Section III, the Guidelines make clear that such control does not mean theincorporation of the JCG into the JMSDF, nor does it make the JCG a paramilitary organ, either.
This position is based upon Japanʼs domestic laws and a domestic document, and therefore,
they have their validity within Japan. However, it is a totally different issue whether Japan ʼsposition is comprehensible and convincing to international society, particularly to the conflicting
party, China. For that to be the case, it is, above all, indispensable for Japan ʼs position to be inaccordance with international law.
(2) According to the way of identifying militar y objectives by their categor y, it goes without
saying that warships are military objectives. As far as JCG vessels do not satisfy the requirements
for warships, such as Article 29 of UNCLOS, Japan might be able to prove that they are notwarships. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also confirms the definition
given by Article 29 of UNCLOS.89 In addition, regarding incorporation into armed forces, there is
the notification requirement under Article 43, Paragraph 3 of API.90(3) As related consideration, it is significant to recognize the recent tendency to understand“military” with a wider scope. This is of critical importance for the JCG in proving that it does not
fall under armed forces. This is because they are State vessels as well as warships and auxiliary
vessels in many cases, and their police function can be discharged by warships and auxiliary
vessels.

87

Introduction.

88

Supra n. 3.

89

International Commission of the Red Cross, Commentary of 2017 to Article 14 of the Convention (II)for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gcii-1949/article-14/comme
ntary/2017?activeTab=undefined, para. 1520, [30] reads:
Article 29 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which reflects customary internationallaw on this point, defines ʻwarshipʼ as a ʻship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing theexternal marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly
commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service
list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces disciplineʼ.

90

Article 43, Paragraph 3 reads:
Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into
its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to the conflict.

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In this regard, in relation to a State vessel serving a police function,91 the distinction between
military activities and police operations has been blurred.92 Furthermore, the category of vessels,
whether military ships or police vessels, does not always reflect the nature of their activities.
Military ships may conduct police activities, as police vessels do military operations.93 These
discussions demonstrate that, in relation to the standard for the distinction under the principle ofdistinction, the issue of category of vessels and that of their function may substantially overlap.
The same may hold true with the consideration of the factors and function that merchant vessels
hold, when they lose their immunity from attacks, which will be later examined.
The ICRC points out the wide scope of the term “military.” In relation to “military hospital
ship,” it adopts a wide definition of the term “military.”
Its commentary on Article 22 of GCII reads:
Positively defined, the term ʻmilitaryʼ means that the hospital ships must be operated by, or
under the exclusive control of, the armed forces of a State Party. This requirement is met if
they qualify as either ʻwarshipsʼ or ʻauxiliary vesselsʼ as defined in international treaty law
and customary law. ʻMilitaryʼ is to be understood as ʻrelating toarmed forcesʼ. This termis broad enough to apply equally to ʻwarshipsʼ and to ʻauxiliary vesselsʼ, as long as they arein fact operated by, or under the exclusive control of, the armed forces (reference numbers
omitted).94
In addition, recent jurisprudence has repeatedly recognized that the distinction has been blurred
between military activities and law enforcement. The Ukraine Naval Vessels Detention Case,(Provisional Measures,95 and Preliminary Objections96), the Coastal Rights Case (Preliminary
Objections)97 are examples of such jurisprudence. In these instances, the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the Arbitral Tribunal considered Article 298, Paragraph 1 (1)91

Regarding a State vessel under UNCLOS, see Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias, “State Ships,” Max Planck
Encyclopedias of International Law, https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/
law-9780199231690-e1224?rskey=3cfU6A&result=1&prd=MPIL, article last updated: 1989.

92

For a similar position, see A.V. Lowe, “Ships,” in N. Boschiero, T. Scovazzi, C. Pitea and C. Ragni eds.,
International Courts and the Development of International Law: Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves,(T.M.C. Asser Press, 2013), 297. From the perspective of the use of force and the use of arms for law
enforcement, this author has dealt with the issue previously. Atsuko Kanehara, op. cit., supra n. 8,
regarding the relevant jurisprudence, 28–34, and footnotes thereto.

93

This point will be touched upon again later.

94

International Commission of the Red Cross, Commentary of 2017 to Article 22 of the Convention (II)for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gcii-1949/article-22/comme
ntary/2017?activeTab=undefined, para. 1943.

95

Case Concerning the Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures, Order of 25 May 2019, https://www.itlos.org/
fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/26/published/C26_Order_20190525.pdf, paras. 64–65.

96

In the Matter of an Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, in
respect of a Dispute Concerning the Detention of Ukrainian Naval Vessels and Servicemen, Awardon the Preliminary Objections of the Russian Federation, 27 June, 2022, https://pcacases.com/web/
sendAttach/38096, paras. 107–109

97

The arbitral tribunal, in another case, too, mentioned a similar thought to that of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the Detention Case. In the Matter of an Arbitration before an Arbitral
Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, in respect of Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights
in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait, Award Concerning the Preliminary Objections of theRussian Federation, 21 February 2020, https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/9272, paras. 333–335.

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Atsuko Kanehara(b) of UNCLOS98 to determine whether they had jurisdiction to entertain the cases before them.99
Furthermore, the discussion in the drafting process of Article 43 on “armed forces” under API
is also significant. The commentary by the ICRC reads:
During the discussions on Article 43 a proposal was made by a delegation to specify thatpolice forces should be excluded from the armed forces, unless national legislation hasotherwise provided and the other Parties to the conflict have been notified accordingly. A
long discussion followed, relating on the one hand to the meaning of the term “police force”(which can cover uniformed units as well as plain clothes policemen) and, on the other, tothe incompatibility of any possible duplication of the function of internal lawkeeping and thatof combatant; even the relevance of the proposed notification procedure and whether there
should be any provisions on this subject were discussed. Finally the terms “para-military”
and “armed law enforcement agency” were substituted for the expression “police forces”,
particularly to take into account the differences in internal organization in many States. The
problem of any possible duplication of functions referred to above was not explicitly solved,
though some may consider that such duplication is impossible (emphasis added, and notenumber omitted.)100
While the relationship between militar y forces and police organs differs depending on the
country, as a matter of fact, it is true that there is duplication between the two organs.101 Thisis the same understanding as the ICJ and the Arbitral Tribunal have indicated, namely that thedistinction between military acts and law enforcement and that between the military forces andlaw enforcement organs has been blurred.102

98

Article 298, Paragraph 1 (1) (b) reads:
1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a State may,without prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1, declare in writing that it does not
accept any one or more of the procedures provided for in section 2 with respect to one or more of
the following categories of disputes:(b) disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by government vessels andaircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and disputes concerning law enforcement activities inregard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3;

99

For a detailed examination of the jurisprudence, see Kanehara, op. cit., supra n. 8, 29–34.

100

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection ofVictims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Commentary of 1987, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-43/commentary/1987?activeTab=undefined, para.
1682.

101

In this regard, the US experience on Posse Comitatus is interesting. It demonstrates a dif ferent
consideration from that of Japan in making a distinction between military forces and police organs.
Captain (N) Laurence M. Hickey, “Enhancing the Naval Mandate for Law Enforcement: Hot Pursuit or
Hot Potato?,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2006), 47. For an introduction to the US practice,see Murakami and Mori, op. cit., supra n. 29, 38–40. As to Posse Comitatus, see, for instance, Major
Craig T. Trebilcock, U.S. Army Reserve, “The Myth of Posse Comitatus,” October 2000, https://aldeilis.
net/english/the-myth-of-posse-comitatus/; and Rutherford B. Hayes, “The Posse Comitatus Act andUsing Military as a Police Force,” https://www.rbhayes.org/scholarlyworks/the-posse-comitatus-actand-using-military-as-a-police-force/.

102

ITLOS and the Arbitral Tribunal recognized that the question of which organ, a military or a police one,is acting is not decisive in determining the nature of the act concerned, i.e., whether it is a military act
or one of law enforcement.

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How to Ensure the Safety of the Japan Coast Guard While Maintaining Its Nature as a Police Organ When It Conducts Missions in
Collaboration with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force under the Control Guidelines(4) State practice 103 also endorses the tendency that both the jurisprudence and the ICRC
demonstrate. 104 For instance, US Coast Guard Vessels designated as “ USCGC ” under thecommand of a commissioned officer are warships.105 Ships belonging to the French Gendarmerie,
the Spanish Guardia Civil, or the Italian Carabinieri are also qualified as warships if under
the command of a commissioned officer.106 When the JCG is to prove its vesselsʼ non-militarynature as police vessels under the control of the Minister of Defense, it should recognize thatinternational society has such a history of having no strict distinction between military forces andpolice organs. In other words, the burden of proof that is placed on the JCG is very heavy indeed.
(5) It is possible for JCG vessels to fall under the category of auxiliary vessels.107 Auxiliary vessels
are also military objectives.108 It has been pointed out that there are various definitions of an
auxiliary vessel.109 In the context of the limitation of armament, treaties such as the 1930 Treaty
for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, in a different way, deals with auxiliar yvessels.110 The ICRC also gives a definition of an auxiliary vessel with comparison to a merchant

103

Regarding State practice with some focus upon Canadian practice, see Hickey, op. cit., supra n. 101,
41–47.

104

From a different perspective, the existence of some relationship between police acts and the exerciseof the right of self-defense on the high seas has been discussed. Lucchini, op. cit. supra n. 52, 923–926;
Vaughan Lowe and Antonios Tzanakopoulos, “Ships, Visit and Search,” Max Planck Encyclopediasof International Law, https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law9780199231690-e406?rskey=IgPTAy&result=1&prd=MPIL, article last updated: March 2013, para. 20.

105

There is substantial duplication of function between military forces and police organs in European
countries. It is sufficient to note the explanation of one authority that, “Fisheries protection has long
been a traditional role for European naval and coast guard forces. Britainʼs naval experience in this roledates back to the 16th century. At present, the Royal Navy undertakes quarantine enforcement, fisheryprotection, contraband operations, drug interdiction, oil and gas field patrols, anti-piracy operations,
support for counterinsurgency operations and maritime counter-terrorism. Moreover, the Royal Navy
maintains a Fishery Protections Squadron, equipped with six offshore patrol vessels and four minecounter-measures vessels. Looking at other parts of Europe, the French Navy, for example, acquired
patrol vessels several years ago for policing duties. Farther north, the Norwegian Coast Guard forms
part of the Royal Norwegian Navy, whereas Denmark has no coast guard. However, the Danish Navy
exercises police authority for enforcement of sovereignty issues. European navies generally furnish
law enforcement services directly to national authorities through MOUs. Usually what these navies
provide are naval platforms and facilities. In some cases, such as the Danish model, the navy carries
out constabulary and traffic-police duties, whereas the appropriate civil authority conducts the criminal
investigations. From a European perspective, naval participation in law enforcement is a significant
contribution to good governance at sea.” Hickey, op. cit., supra n. 101, 46–47.

106

Von Heinegg, op. cit., supra n. 25, para. 9.

107

As for the meaning of “an auxiliary vessel” in past State practice in the former part of the 20th century,see “Auxiliary Vessels,” Digest of International Law, Vol. 11 (1968), 299–301.

108

Mayama, op. cit., supra n. 76, (1) 548; Ronzitti, op. cit., supra n. 61. para. 7.

109

Mayama, op. cit., supra n. 76, (1) footnote 20. Kraska et al., op. cit., supra n. 43, 2.1.2.2. and 3.4. Article
236 of UNCLOS is interpreted as adopting the same definition. It reads:
The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and preser vation of the marine
environment do not apply to any warship, naval auxiliar y, other vessels or aircraft owned or
operated by a State and used, for the time being only on government non-commercial ser vice.
However, each State shall ensure, by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing operations
or operational capabilities of such vessels or aircraft owned or operated by it, that such vessels or
aircraft act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with this Convention.

110

The treaty limited the tonnage of auxiliary ships.

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vessel.111 It reads:
An ʻauxiliary vesselʼ is a ʻvessel, other than a warship [i.e. non-commissioned], that is owned
or under the exclusive control of the armed forces of a State and used for the time being on
government non-commercial serviceʼ and a ʻmerchant vesselʼ is a ʻvessel, other than a warship,
an auxiliary vessel, or a State vessel such as a customs or police vessel, that is engaged incommercial or private service ʼ
According to this definition, on the one hand, an auxiliary vessel is owned or under the exclusive
control of the armed forces of a State and used for the time being on government non-commercial
service. On the other hand, a State vessel such as a customs or police vessel is different from awarship, an auxiliary vessel, and a merchant vessel.112
As confirmed above, under the Guidelines, JCG vessels are “under an integrative and unitarycommand” by the Minister of Defense, and therefore, with strong provability, they amountto auxiliar y vessels.113 However, as far as JCG vessels are State police vessels under Japan ʼsdomestic laws, the possibility that they are not regarded as auxiliary vessels cannot be totallydenied. However, this should be a very narrow case. In addition, as examined above, the concept
of “militar y” now has a wider scope and the distinction between militar y vessels and police
vessels has been blurred in both the jurisprudence and international practice.114 This should havean impact on the identification of auxiliary vessels.
Furthermore, from a different point of view, several doubts have been raised against theargument that under the Guidelines, JCG vessels are not auxiliary vessels but police vessels.
It is understandable that there is a category of customs or police vessels that function evenduring an armed conflict, and the ICRC discusses, in its commentary to GCII, such a categoryof vessels.115 Nonetheless, in considering the situation assumed by this paper, namely, a situation
when there is an armed attack against Japan, and when there is an armed conflict between China
and Japan, it is difficult to understand and even not convincing that, in an abstract way, Statevessels, such as JCG vessels, “under an integrative and unitary command” of the Minister ofDefense in accordance with the Guidelines and Article 80 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, should
be discharging a customs or police function. It might be said that in the sea areas far enough fromthose of the theater of the armed conflict, if it is taking place in a limited sea area, JCG vessels
might conduct customs or police missions. In such a case, it is not actually useful to regard those
JCG vessels, as auxiliary vessels, to be military objectives, since there is rarely necessity and111

Supra n. 89.

112

The San Remo Manual also adopts this definition, 13. (g), (h), (i).

113

As a useful discussion regarding the definition of an auxiliary vessel, one opinion is that in a generalor total war, it is very difficult to find “merchant vessels” in a pure sense. This is because, in a generalor total war, all merchant vessels are likely to be under the national/militar y control of their own
States, and therefore, they are at least converted to de facto auxiliary vessels. William J. Fenrick, “TheMerchant Vessel as Legitimate Target in the Law of Naval Warfare,” in Astrid J.M. Delissen and Gerard
J. Tanja eds., Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict Challenges Ahead, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1991), 437–438; Fenrick, op. cit., supra n. 56, 106; Fenrick, op. cit., supra n. 61, 246, 253–254.

114

Sub-section 3. (4).

115

There are no concrete rules for determining the status of police organs at sea. This is because in many
countries, the navy also discharges coast guard activities, and because, as in the case of US Coast Guard
Vessels, the designated “USCGC” under the command of a commissioned officer is a warship with aduty to conduct coast guard activities. Thus, there has not been much necessity to discuss the status ofpolice organs at sea during armed conflicts. Akira Mayama, “Kaijo Hoancho to Buryoku Hunsoho (TheJapan Coast Guard and the Laws of Armed Conflict),” Ocean Newsletter, Vol. 77 (20 October, 2003). As
for the State practice of the duplication of duties between military organs and police organs at sea, seesupra n. 105.

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merit in attacking the vessels.116
Rather considering the matter in an abstract way,117 it would be much more meaningful to
examine this issue by putting it into a further concrete context, since this paper has alreadypresupposed two concrete situations118 as the contexts for its consideration: first, when the JCG isconducting its coast guard activities on Japanʼs territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands,
an armed conflict takes place between China and Japan; second, there may be a large number of
evacuees coming toward Japan via the sea from neighboring countries, such as Taiwan.
(6) Regarding the first situation presupposed, it is not understandable that the JCG should
continue its duty of territorial guarding as police function in Japanʼs territorial sea surrounding
the Senkaku Islands. While “territorial guarding” may include various measures, the critical one
is surely monitoring and surveillance of the confrontational Chinese vessels entering Japanʼsterritorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands in a tense situation that is almost shifting to anarmed conflict. When the tense situation really is on the verge of an armed conflict, and when an
armed conflict is actually taking place, could the monitoring and surveillance as police function
regarding confrontational Chinese vessels be meaningful? No positive answer is difficult to be
expected.
As a logical result, it is not meaningful, either, to discuss whether the JCG vessels enacting
their territorial guarding duties in the presupposed situation can be regarded as police vessels
rather than auxiliary vessels. It necessarily brings the conclusion that when an armed conflictis breaking out, JCG vessels should retreat from the scene. This element will be included in the
proposals in the concluding remarks of this paper.
(7) Another proposed situation is that there might be a large number of evacuees coming toward
Japan via the sea from neighboring countries, such as Taiwan. The duties that the Guidelines
expect the JCG to fulfil in collaboration with the JMSDF are, for instance, the following:evacuation and rescue of residents, providing information and support for rescue to vessels,
search and rescue and saving lives, monitoring and surveillance to protect port facilities fromterrorist attacks, and response measures for mass evacuations.119 As for the large number of
evacuees coming toward Japan via the sea from neighboring countries, the JCG should takeresponse measures for their mass evacuation.
In taking such measures for their mass evacuation, even “under an integrative and unitarycommand” of the Minister of Defense in accordance with the Guidelines and Article 80 of the
Self-Defense Forces Law, it is possible for JCG vessels to be regarded as police vessels providing
civilian protection rather than as auxiliary vessels. In that case, JCJ vessels would have immunityfrom attacks.
To examine such a possibility, it is useful to consider the following issues. One is the issueof the requirements for merchant ships to lose their immunity from attacks such that they
become militar y objectives. Another is the issue of when the civilian population constitutes
116

Under Article 80 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, mentioned above in the Introduction, control by the
Minister of Defense may cover solely part of the JCG, not its entirety. JCG vessels functioning in remotesea areas far from those of the armed conflict could be out of the scope of said control. This point will beraised again later.

117

It is recognized that even during an international armed conflict, States may conduct maritime law
enforcement operations to suppress crime, such as maritime piracy. Kraska et al, op. cit., supra n. 43,
2.3. However, this does not give any concrete suggestion as to how a vessel maintains its status as a law
enforcement vessel and how it ensures its safety during an international armed conflict.

118

Section III. 1. (3), and III. 2.

119

Section III. 1. (1).

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military objectives in accordance with the way of identifying military objectives depending on
the function of the object itself. These issues are said to be those of the function of the object
itself, irrespective of its category as a merchant vessel and the civilian population. As mentioned
above, the issue of the category of objects, namely, a merchant vessel and the civilian population,and that of their function may substantially overlap. In discussing the requirements for thesecategories to lose their immunity from attacks, focus is placed mainly on their function.
Thus, the sub-section 4 below will consider succinctly the arguments that have been madeon these issues, and move onto a consideration of the possibility for JCG vessels taking response
measures for a mass evacuation to avoid being regarded as auxiliary vessels, and to be immune
from military attacks.

4. Factors and Requirements That Make Merchant Vessels and the Civilian
Population Become Militar y Objectives(1) Merchant Vessels120
Merchant vessels, belligerent or neutral,121 are not military objectives. When they become
militar y objectives has been discussed over the long histor y of the laws of naval war.122 The
immunity of merchant ships from unwarned attack was explained with their inability to attack or
endanger a warship.123 In addition, the economic aspect of ocean trade inherently existing in naval
warfare, and the nature of a general war or total war particularly in modern wars, have formed an
important consideration in discussing the immunity of merchant ships.
This is not the place to comprehensively trace the development of the treatment of merchantvessels in naval warfare.124 Here, it is enough to find some suggestions for the JCG to ensure its
safety during the discharging of its relevant duties under the Guidelines.
The requirements for merchant vessels, enemy and neutral, to become military objectives are,for instance, as follows:
During an international armed conflict:
1. Any merchant vessel may be attacked:(a) if it engages in acts of war on behalf of the enemy; (b) if it acts as an auxiliary to theenemyʼs armed forces (c) if it is incorporated into or assists the enemyʼs intelligence system;120

As for a definition of a merchant vessel, it is said that a merchant vessel is a cargo-carrying vessel notformally incorporated as an auxiliary vessel into an enemyʼs naval fleet. Fenrick, op. cit., supra n. 113,425. The San Remo Manual defines a merchant vessel as “a vessel, other than a warship, an auxiliary
vessel, or a State vessel such as customs or police vessel, that is engaged in commercial or private
service.” The San Remo Manual, 13 (i).

121

Under the prohibition of the use or threat of force by Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, thevalidity of the terms “belligerency” and “neutral” require serious consideration. Such a consideration
is out of the scope of this paperʼs examination. This paper will use, if necessary, “belligerent” Statesand “neutral” States to describe respectively those States that are involved in an armed conflict, andthose that are not taking part in the armed conflict. Horace B. Robertson, Jr., op. cit., supra n. 52, 2–3;
Lowe, op. cit., supra n. 48, 286–289. For an analysis of the concept of war with a similar viewpoint, seeGreenwood, op. cit., supra n. 42, 283–284, 303–306.

122

Many works have dealt with this issue. Fenrick, op. cit., supra n. 61, 243; Dinstein, op. cit., supra n. 70,
24–27; Lowe and Tzanakopoulos, op. cit., supra n. 104, paras. 10–13; Fenrick, op. cit. supra n. 113, 425–
443; Ronzitti, op. cit., supra n. 61, paras. 8–11. In the context of exclusion zones, see Fenrick, op. cit.,
supra n. 56, 94 et seq.

123

For a discussion in the interwar period, see, for instance, Edwin Borchard, “Armed Merchantmen,” The
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1940), 107–112.

124

An analysis of the State practice is given by Mayama, op. cit., supra n. 76, (1) 556–578, (2) 1–43; Fenrick,op. cit., supra n. 61, 244–264.

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How to Ensure the Safety of the Japan Coast Guard While Maintaining Its Nature as a Police Organ When It Conducts Missions in
Collaboration with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force under the Control Guidelinesor (d) if it sails under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft.
2. Any enemy merchant vessel may be attacked:(a) if it is armed to an extent that it could inflict significant damage to a warship; or (b) it
refuses an order to stop or actively resists visit, search, or capture.
3. A neutral merchant vessel may be attacked if it is believed on reasonable grounds that thevessel is carrying contraband or breaching a blockade and, after prior warning, the vessel
intentionally and clearly refuses to stop or resists visit, search, and capture.125
The San Remo Manual prescribes the following126 regarding enemy merchant vessels in
Paragraphs 40, 59 and 60:
40. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects whichby their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action andwhose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at thetime, offers a definite military advantage.
59. Enemy merchant vessels may only be attacked if they meet the definition of a military
objective in paragraph 40.
60. The following activities may render enemy merchant vessels military objectives:(a) engaging in belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy, e.g., laying mines, minesweeping,
cutting undersea cables and pipelines, engaging in visit and search of neutral merchantvessels or attacking other merchant vessels;(b) acting as an auxiliary to an enemyʼs armed forces, e.g., carrying troops or replenishingwarships;(c) being incorporated into or assisting the enemy ʼs intelligence gathering system, e.g.,
engaging in reconnaissance, early war ning, sur veillance, or command, control andcommunications missions;(d) sailing under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft;(e) refusing an order to stop or actively resisting visit, search or capture;(f) being armed to an extent that they could inflict damage to a warship; this excludes lightindividual weapons for the defence of personnel, e.g., against pirates, and purely deflective
systems such as chaff; or(g) other wise making an effective contribution to militar y action, e.g., carr ying militar ymaterials.
As to neutral merchant vessels, paragraphs 67–69 of the San Remo Manual read:
67. Merchant vessels flying the flag of neutral States may not be attacked unless they:(a) are believed on reasonable grounds to be carrying contraband or breaching a blockade,and after prior warning they intentionally and clearly refuse to stop, or intentionally andclearly resist visit, search or capture;(b) engage in belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy;(c) act as auxiliaries to the enemyʼs armed forces;(d) are incorporated into or assist the enemyʼs intelligence system;(e) sail under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft; or(f) otherwise make an effective contribution to the enemyʼs military action, e.g., by carrying
military materials, and it is not feasible for the attacking forces to first place passengers andcrew in a place of safety. Unless circumstances do not permit, they are to be given a warning,
so that they can re-route, off-load, or take other precautions.
68. Any attack on these vessels is subject to the basic rules in paragraphs 38–46.
69. The mere fact that a neutral merchant vessel is armed provides no grounds for attacking it.
125

Ibid., 272.; Fenrick, op. cit., supra n. 113, 438.

126

Supra n. 60.

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In these opinions relating to merchant vessels, there are some helpful indications for the JCG to
avoid becoming military objectives.127
First, the scale of weapons that JCG vessels are equipped with is to be considered when
determining whether they become military objectives.128 In the former opinion above, any enemy
merchant vessel may be attacked, “if armed to an extent that it could inflict significant damage toa warship.” According to the San Remo Manual, enemy merchant vessels can be attacked if they
are armed to an extent that they could inflict damage to a warship. In contrast to this, in the caseof a neutral merchant vessel, the mere fact that it is armed provides no grounds for attacking it.
Second, sailing under “ convoy ” of enemy warships or militar y aircraft is also a factor
for merchant vessels to be regarded as militar y objectives. As long as the JCG vessels aredischarging their mission under the Guidelines in the sea area of or near to those where military
operations are taking place, they could be sailing under convoy of JMSDF vessels. Therefore, thisis a significant factor to be considered for the JCG to ensure its safety through immunity fromattacks.
Third, the San Remo Manual includes a similar factor of so-called “direct participation in
hostilities,” which will be examined next. Paragraph 40 of the San Remo Manual mentions “thoseobjects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstancesruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”129
Before moving onto an analysis of the concept of “direct participation in hostilities,” somepoints deser ve attention for the JCG in avoiding becoming militar y objectives. Among therequirements for merchant vessels to lose their immunity from attacks are factors such as being
130“incorporated into or assisting the enemyʼs intelligence gathering system.” It has been argued
that merchant vessels that are incorporated into war efforts are excluded from those merchantvessels with immunity from attacks.131 Also “incorporation” may include that into the militaryeffort in general and is not confined to the intelligence gathering system.132
One of the missions that the Guidelines expect the JCG to conduct is providing information tovessels.133 If such information-sharing contains information that is advantageous for the JMSDFʼsmilitary operation, it will amount to direct participation in hostilities.134
Furthermore, the factor of “incorporation into militar y effort” requires serious attention,
when, in terms of their categor y, JCG vessels deny having the status of auxiliar y vessels.
It is indispensable for the JCG to prove that the “control” by the Minister of Defense under
the Guidelines does not amount to such control as giving JCG vessels the status of auxiliary
vessels.135
The consideration here concerns merchant vessels when they satisfy the requirements
127

As for State practice, in this regard, by military manuals and other means, see Mayama, op. cit., supra
n.76, (2) 48–49.

128This is an issue that has been discussed for a long time. For instance, a distinction was consideredbetween “offensive” or “defensive” armament. Borchard, op. cit., supra n. 123, 107–112.

129

See supra n. 60.

130

According to the opinion of Fenrick introduced above, 1. (c); the San Remo Manual, 60 (c), 67 (d).

131

As to State practice in this regard, see Fenrick, op. cit., supra n. 61, 272. Regarding “war-fighting/warsustaining effort,” ibid., 274.

132This is dealt with by, for instance, Fenrick, op. cit., supra n. 56, 112, 123. With the example of the U.S.
Military Manual, see Von Heinegg, op. cit. supra n. 58, para. 54.

133

See Section III.

134

This is also an issue whereby civilians lose their protection from attacks, which will be examined next.

135

This section, sub-section 3. (5).

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for losing their immunity from attacks. It is true, at least to a cer tain degree, that such aconsideration may offer some suggestions for the JCG to avoid becoming military objectives.
Nonetheless, the JCG should carefully recognize the inherent difference between JCG vessels,
namely, police vessels, and merchant vessels. It needs to precisely understand that police vessels
may be more likely regarded as being auxiliary vessels or being incorporated into military forces,considering that they are State vessels and the tendency of State practice, as mentioned above, inthe world in this regard.136 JCG vessels are operating in collaboration with JMSDF vessels under
the Guidelines.137(2) Direct Participation in Hostilities
Under Article 51, Paragraph 3 of API,138 “direct participation in hostilities”139 has been intensely
discussed in terms of the requirements for the civilian population140 to become militar y

136

Regarding the duplication of function between military forces and police organs, see supra n. 105.

137

This careful reservation is entirely true, as will be shown with the next examination of the concept of“direct participation in hostilities” by civilians. There is also an inherent difference between civilians and
JCG vessels, which are police vessels of a State equipped with weapons under national authorization.

138

It reads:
Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take adirect part in hostilities.

139

There is a large volume of works on this issue. Akira Mayama, “Bunminhogo to Buryoku Hunsoho—
Sekijuji Iinkai Kaishaku Shishin no Kento (Protection of Civilian Population and the Laws of Armed
Conflicts—Some Analysis on the ICRC Interpretative Guidance on the Concept of Direct Participationin Hostilities),” Sekaiho Nenpo (Yearbook of World Law) No. 31 (2012), 138–151; D.A. Jeremy Telman,
st“The Geneva Conventions in 21 Century Warfare: How the Conventions Should Treat Civiliansʼ Direct
Participation in Hostilities̶Introduction: Targeting in an Asymmetrical World,” Valparaiso University
Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2012), 697–728; Michael N. Schmitt, “Deconstructing Direct Participation in
Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics,
Vol. 42, No. 3 (2010), 697–740; Michael N. Schmitt, “ʻDirect Participation in Hostilitiesʼ and 21st Century
Armed Conflict,” in Horst Fischer, Ulrike Froissart, Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, und Christian Raap,
Hrsg., Krisensicherung und Humanitärer Schutz—Crisis Management and Humanitarian Protection—
Festschrift für Dieter Fleck, (BWV・Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2004), 505–530; Emily Camins,“The Past as Prologue: the Development of the ʻDirect Participationʼ Exception to Civilian Immunity,”
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 872 (2008), 853–881; Eva Kublbeck, “The Immunity of
Civilians̶A Moral and Legal Study of Attacks on the Civilian Population,” International Humanitarian
Legal Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2013), 262–295; W. Hays Parks, “Part IX of the ICRC ʻDirect Participationin Hostilitiesʼ Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect,” New York University Journalof International Law and Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2010), 769–830; Kenji Iwata, “Guntai ni Zuihansuru
Bunmin no Tekitaikoi ni Tsuite̶Dai1 Tsuikagiteisho Dai51jo Dai3ko ni Okeru ʻTekitaikoi heno
Chokusetsu no Sankaʼ wo Chushin ni̶(Hostilities of Civilians Accompanying Military Forces̶With
Focus upon ʻDirect Participation in Hostilitiesʼ under Article 51, Paragraph 3 Additional Protocol I),”
Kokka Anzenhosho (National Security), Vol. 35, No. 2 (2007), 119–149; Oginome, op. cit., supra n. 60,
105–125; Laurie R. Blank, op. cit., supra n. 81, 765–802.

140“Civilian” has solely a negative definition under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and API. For instance,
Article 50, Paragraph 1 of API reads:
A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in
Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of
doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.

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objectives.141 While for naval warfare, vessels as units are focused upon rather than individuals, atleast to a certain degree, such arguments may offer suggestions for the JCG to prove that when
it is conducting its missions under the Guidelines, it does not directly participate in hostilities.142
The commentary of the ICRC of 1987 to the provision explains as follows.143
Paragraph 1942
Hostile acts should be understood to be acts which by their nature and purpose are intended
to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the armed forces.
Paragraph 1944
Thus “direct” participation means acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely tocause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces.144
The ICRC commentary points to two factors. First, an act that negatively impacts the enemyʼsmilitary effort or in which harm was intended usually qualifies. Second, a relatively direct nexus
between that action and the resulting harm should exist. In other words, direct participation must
be distinguishable from indirect participation.145
As to the significance of the arguments on the meaning of “direct participation” for the JCG toprove that its vessels are not taking part in hostilities under the Guidelines, the following may set
forth strong reservations to it.
First, regarding “direct participation in hostilities,” the ICRC convened several conferences tobuild some consensus among States and published the result.146 However, substantial agreement
could not be reached. Several authorities have also voiced severe criticism. 147 Second, thedetermination of “direct participation in hostilities” should ultimately be done on a case-by-casebasis.148 Before the consideration by the ICRC and the said conferences, the jurisprudence also141

The ICRC convened international conferences to discuss the issue of “direct participation of civilians
in hostilities.” The result is as follows: International Committee of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidanceon the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (May 2009),
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf. Strong criticism has been voiced on
this by, for instance, Schmitt, op. cit., supra n. 139 “Deconstructing ”; Parks, op. cit., supra n. 139.

142

One authority points out the following. Unlike the law applicable to land conflicts, the law of naval
warfare has a slightly broader interpretation of the principle of distinction. The requirements of “active”
and “direct” participation for loss of civilian status in land conflict are broadened, in the naval context,
to conduct which more generally relates to the war fighting capacity. United States Naval War College,
International Law Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, op. cit., supra n. 53, 4–23.

143

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection ofVictims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Commentary of 1987, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-51/commentary/1987?activeTab=undefined, paras.
1942 and 1944.

144

The ICRC distinguishes direct participation in hostilities from participation in the war effort. Its
commentary to Article 51, Paragraph 3 of API reads:
There should be a clear distinction between direct participation in hostilities and participation in the
war effort. The latter is often required from the population as a whole to various degrees. Without
such a distinction the efforts made to reaffirm and develop international humanitarian law could
become meaningless. In fact, in modern conflicts, many activities of the nation contribute to the
conduct of hostilities, directly or indirectly; even the morale of the population plays a role in thiscontext.
Ibid., para. 1945.

145

Schmitt, op. cit., supra n. 139 “Deconstructing ,” 712.

146

Supra n. 141.

147

Supra n. 141.

148

Schmitt, op. cit., supra n. 139 “Deconstructing ,” 705–710; Schmitt, op. cit., supra n. 139 “Direct
Participation ,” 508–509.

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How to Ensure the Safety of the Japan Coast Guard While Maintaining Its Nature as a Police Organ When It Conducts Missions in
Collaboration with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force under the Control Guidelines

demonstrated the same understanding.149
As was explained in Section II and Section III, under the Guidelines and under Article 25 of
the Japan Coast Guard Law,150 the JCG will maintain its nature as a police organ, not a militaryorgan, and thus, it must not take part in hostilities. This is an argument derived from Japanʼsdomestic law. Even if such an argument has a certain convincingness domestically, there is no
guarantee that the JCG can persuade foreign States, particularly the conflicting State, China, that
it is discharging a police function and not taking part in hostilities. For that purpose, arguments
under international law and proof that is firmly based upon State practice are indispensable.
Furthermore, also applicable here is the reservation mentioned above while seeking possible
suggestions for the JCG to have immunity from attacks that may be derived from the discussion
on the requirements for merchant vessels to lose their immunity from attacks. The JCG should
recognize the inherent difference between JCG vessels, namely, police vessels, and civilians andthe civilian population.151 It needs to precisely assume that police vessels may be more likely
regarded as auxiliar y vessels or as being incorporated into militar y forces, and taking pantin hostililies, considering that they are State vessels. They are operating in collaboration withJMSDF vessels under the Guidelines.
In this regard, while it is in the context of non-international armed conflicts, there could besome suggestions for how the JCG could prove its status of being a non-military objective fromthe fact that some armed groups consider that the police or the civil forces are targetable.152(3) The JCG May Carry an International Distinctive Sign to Indicate Its Civil Defense Missions
Under the Guidelines, the JCG will conduct missions for the evacuation and rescue of residents
and evacuees from neighboring countries, search and rescue, and saving of lives.153
The JCG and the JMSDF held a joint drill on the 22nd of June 2023, under the scenario ofcontrol by the Ministery of Defense in accordance with the Guidelines.154 During the joint drill,
the JCG vessel flew special flags that carry the international distinctive sign of an equilateral blue
triangle on an orange background. Article 66, Paragraph 4 of API prescribes the distinctive sign.
It reads:
149

Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case ICTR IT-94-I-T, Opinion and Judgement of 7 May 1997, International
Legal Materials, Vol. 36, Issue4 (1997), para. 616.

150

Section II. 1. And Section III. 1. (2).

151

As to the negative definition of civilians, see supra n. 140. As to the particular situation of civilians
in recent years, see, for instance, Camins, op. cit., supra n. 139, 154; Schmitt, op. cit., supra n. 139“Deconstructing ”, 699–700; Schmitt, op. cit., supra n. 139 “Direct Participation ”, 512–519. Separate
from this, in the case of a vessel, the vessel itself forms a fighting unit. Therefore, hostilities by vessels
include not only shooting and launching missiles which cause actual damage, but also the operationof the vessels, such as vessel operations under the captainʼs order in hostilities, which are reasonably
regarded as closely related acts to hostile acts. Iwata, op. cit., supra n. 139, 134.

152

These groups include the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias Colombianas-Ejército Publico (FARC-EP), the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacionalof Mexico, which specifically refers to the “policía política que hayan recibido cursos y que hayansido asesorados, entrenados, o pagados por extranjeros, sea dentro de nuestra nación o fuera de ella,acusados de traición a la Patria” and the Kurdistan Workers Party, which refers to “village guards” and“members of the gendarmerie.” The Kosovo Liberation Army also includes among the forces of theFormer Republic of Yugoslavia the “border police,” the “military police” and “local, special, riot and antiterrorist police.” With further examples, see Camille Marquis Bissonnette, “The Definition of Civilians
in Non-International Armed Conflicts,” Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies Vol. 7, No. 1(2016) 146–147.

153

Section III. 1. and 2.

154

The media reported on the joint drill. See supra n. 39.

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The international distinctive sign of civil defence is an equilateral blue triangle on an orange
ground when used for the protection of civil defence organizations, their personnel, buildings
and matériel and for civilian shelters.
According to the media,155 the JCG has never previously used the sign in its missions. A coast
guard official said, “If a country (attacking Japan) thinks that the coast guard has resorted toarmed force, it would give them an excuse to launch a (further) attack,” and “In order to prevent
such a situation, we need to clearly show the division of roles with the SDF156 and send out amessage to people in and outside Japan that the coast guard is not a military organization.”
Without adequately demonstrating the said division of roles and the JCGʼs non-military duties
toward international society and particularly vis-à-vis a “country attacking Japan,” such a sign
would not have any effect for ensuring the safety of JCG vessels in discharging their roles under
the Guidelines.
Actually, the flags that the said JCG vessel flew in the joint drill were in accordance with
Article 66, Paragraph 4. It is possible for the JCG, while conducting missions for the evacuation
and rescue of residents and evacuees from neighboring countries, search and rescue, and savingof lives, to be regarded as a “civil defence organization” in accordance with Article 61 of API.157
As explained above in this paper,158 the applicability of Article 66, Paragraph 4 to naval warfare
is not without dispute. This is because of Article 49, Paragraph 3, which contains the confoundingphrase “do not otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at sea
or in the air.” How this phrase is interpreted would determine the applicability of Article 66,
Paragraph 4, which prescribes the international sign. If the provision does not apply to naval
warfare, the possibility for the provision to have a customary rule status might not be denied.
Nonetheless, even the Japanese authorities have clearly demonstrated their doubt in respect tothe awareness of the sign.159
The fundamental problem is not the flexibility of the application of Article 66, Paragraph 4, nor
the possible customary status of the international sign. The critical point is that the international
distinctive sign must be truly internationally distinctive. Without a solid recognition of it ininternational society, particularly by an attacking country, the sign will never guarantee the safetyof the JCG during its missions under the Guidelines. This means that the JCG could run the riskof being militarily attacked, and its personnel could lose their lives.
155

Op. cit., supra n. 39 (Japan Times).

156

Here, “SDF” means the Japan Self-Defense Force.

157

It reads:(a) “civil defence” means the performance of some or all of the undermentioned humanitarian tasks
intended to protect the civilian population against the dangers, and to help it to recover from theimmediate effects, of hostilities or disasters and also to provide the conditions necessary for its
survival. These tasks are:(b) “civil defence organizations” means those establishments and other units which are organized
or authorized by the competent authorities of a Party to the conflict to perform any of the tasks
mentioned under sub-paragraph (a), and which are assigned and devoted exclusively to such tasks;

158

Section IV. 3.

159

Haruko Arimura, a member of the House of Councilors, who, in the said joint drill, took the roleof Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism voiced this point. “Risuku wo Keigen
Surutameni Gutaiteki ni Kentou Shitai Koto (Matters that Require Concrete Examination for Reducing
Risks),” Nihon Senryaku Kenkyu Foram (JFSS Quarterly Report), Vol. 98, Oct, 2023, 36–37. The JCG
is under the Ministr y of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. Past Chief of Staff, JMSDF,
Tomohisa Takei demonstrates the same point. “Yuji ni Okeru Hojin Yuso wa Shinan- ʻSeihu Kosenʼ
Katsuyo ni Kai wo Miidase (Usage of ʻState Vesselsʼ as a Possible Resolution for Coping with theTremendous Difficulty of Transportation of Japanese Nationals),” Wedge (Wedge), 2023, No. 11, 72.

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How to Ensure the Safety of the Japan Coast Guard While Maintaining Its Nature as a Police Organ When It Conducts Missions in
Collaboration with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force under the Control Guidelines

Conclusion
This contribution has examined how to ensure the safety of the JCG during its missions under the
Guidelines from various aspects. To achieve this goal, as far as maintaining its non-military nature
under Article 25 of the Japan Coast Guard Law, the JCG must prove that it is conducting themissions as a police organ, not as a warship or an auxiliary vessel, and that it is not taking direct
participation in hostilities. This is principally for the JCG to avoid becoming military objectives.
The JCG should recognize that such a “burden of proof” imposed on it is tremendously heavy.
Several points set forth the reasons.160
First, there still remains flexibility in the applicable laws to the situation that this contribution
assumes, namely, an armed attack is taking place against Japan and an armed conflict exists.
After the UN Charter came into force, legally, and theoretically, there should not exist the use offorce. Under this legal situation, it is necessary to identify with enough justification what part ofthe laws of war applies to the use of force, in other words, military operations in naval warfare, if
such applicability itself is approved.161 Second, there are different views on the determination of
the particular applicable rules of the laws of war to naval warfare.162 Third, even after identifying
the applicable rules on the laws of war, what relationship there is between them and the relevant
rules of the law of the sea remains unanswered question.163
Fourth, whichever argument the JCG may adopt for proving what it needs to do, under
the legal situation explained here, support by State practice is indispensable as evidence andjustification for what the JCG contends. The importance of State practice is, in general, inherent
in the field of the laws of war.164 In addition, in particular, the following situation in State practice
all over the world requires serious consideration. In many States, the “interchangeability or
duplication” between military organs and police organs, and between their missions is actually thepractice.165 The JCG presents an entirely different and remarkable example in comparison to such
State practice, as it is to keep its non-military nature during its missions under the Guidelines incollaboration with the JMSDF.166 This will inevitably bring the result that the JCG will face serious
difficulty in convincing international society, and particularly the conflicting countr y, China.
International society, considering the State practice confirmed here, likely has the tendency toregard the relationship between coast guards and military organs as having some duplicationin missions and in organizational structures. Above all, in China, Article 83 of the CCGL clearlyendorses the interchangeability between police operations and defense, or military operations.
The JCG needs to convince international society, which bears such a tendency, and China, which
has such a domestic law. This will no doubt be a highly daunting task.
Fifth, the most fundamental point is as follows. The purpose of what the JCG needs to prove
160

Atsuko Kanehara, “Jieitaiho to Tosei Yoryo no Motodeno Kaijohoancho no Ninmusuiko ni Okeru Anzen
Kakuho (Securing the Safety of the Japan Coast Guard during Its Missions under Article 80 of the SelfDefense Forces Law and the Control Guidelines),” Jurisuto (Jurist), No. 1593 (2024, February), 72–77.

161

Section IV. 1.

162

Section IV. 3.

163

Section IV. 2.

164

Section V. 3. (3) and (4). For the significance of military manuals, see, supra n. 73.

165

This fact can be also readily understood if one considers the discussion on the issues of so-called “greyzones” between law enforcement and defense, and the seamless response to the radically changing
situation from law enforcement to defense. On this issue, see Koichi Morikawa, “Gurei Zone Jitai Taisho
no Shatei to Sono Hoteki Seishitsu (Coping with Grey Zones and Its Legal Implications),” Kokusai
Mondai (International Affairs), No. 648 (2016), 29–38; and Atsuko Kanehara, “The Use of Force inMaritime Security and the Use of Arms in Law Enforcement under the Current Wide Understanding ofMaritime Security,” Japan Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2019), 51–52.

166

Section V. 3. (3), (4), and (5). Supra n. 105.

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Atsuko Kanehara

is ensuring its safety, principally by avoiding becoming military objectives. Flawless and perfectarguments are strongly required. Other wise, the conflicting countr y, China, could militarily
attack the JCG, since China could take a different position from that of the JCG such that it
regards the JCG as a military objective.
It is possible for the JCG, relying on its own interpretation of the relevant international law
rules, to criticize the illegality of such attacks and claim the State responsibility of China for theillegal attacks. Nevertheless, preliminary measures to prevent such attacks should be sought,
separate from “ex post facto relief.” This is definitely a maxim, in general, for all the legal rules.
Not only that, but there is also a special reason for the JCG to exclusively rely on preliminary
measures. This is because “ex post facto relief” could never recover the fatal and irreversible
damage, including the loss of the lives of JCG personnel, that would be caused by the armed
attacks.167 In the issue that the JCG is facing, there would never be room for “trial and error”
given the irreversible damage that would be caused.
As has already been proposed above,168 JCG vessels should retreat immediately from Japanʼsterritorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands when and even before the control by the Ministerof Defense is issued under Article 80 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. Coast guard activities would
be fatally meaningless in the situation that this paper assumes.
In place of it, the JCG may take the roles of monitoring and surveillance in the northern sea
areas of Japan.169 When the JMSDF is concentrating on the East China Sea, the northern sea
areas should become a gap of warning, thus requiring more monitoring and surveillance thanusual. The control by the Minister of Defense over the JCG may only be partial.170 JCG vessels
conducting such monitoring and sur veillance can be outside the control by the Minister ofDefense such that they are police vessels and are not regarded as warships or auxiliary vessels.
The tremendous difficulty that the JCG is facing for avoiding becoming military objectives
demonstrates the reckless risk that the JCG could run during its missions under the Guidelines.
Then, what is the justification for such a reckless risk? In this regard, the Guidelines explain theadvantage that when the JCG is in charge of missions for the rescue of lives and evacuation ofresidents at the maximum, the JMSDF can further concentrate on the operational front.171 Even
if that is the case, in reality, how and to what extent such an advantage is realized should be fully
scrutinized in a concrete manner. That might set forth some justification for the JCGʼs missions
under the Guidelines.

167

The critical importance of ensuring compliance with the laws of war on site, on the battlefields, has
precisely been pointed out in Masahiro Kurosaki, “Senjo ni Okeru Bur yoku Hunsoho no Shihai̶
Gunjiteki Hitsuyosei to Jindosei no Hikaku Koryo to Guntai Shikikan no Jizenhyoka (The Control by theLaws of Armed Conflicts on the Battlefields̶Comparative Consideration between Military Necessityand Humanity, and Prior Assessment by Military Commanders),” Hogaku Kyoshitsu (Legal Learning),
No. 509 (2023), 21–22, 24.

168

Section V. 3. (6).

169

In the northern sea areas, there are islands over which Russia and Japan have claimed territorial
sovereignty and have a dispute. There is also a tense situation in these sea areas.

170

Article 80 of the Self-Defense Forces Law clearly provides for this; see the Introduction.

171

Supra n. 3.

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