法学研究 95 巻 10 号（2022：10）“Generalizing” the Economic Voting
Framework? (Part II)IZUOKA, Naoya
I. Defining Economic Voting
II. Studies on the Nature of Economic Voting in Context
III. Reviewing Economic Voting Studiesʼ Interpretations of Their Findings (Vol. 95, No. 9)
IV. Reviewing the Plausibility of Varied Assumptions of Economic Voting Studies: In Favorof the Heuristics Assumption
V. A Possible Inconsistency of the Framework of Existing Economic Voting Studies
VI. Empirical Findings of the Effects of Redistributive Policies on Economic Voting
VII. Concluding Remarks (in this part)

IV. Reviewing the Plausibility of Varied Assumptions of Economic Voting
Studies: In Favor of the Heuristics Assumption
Having mapped the voter models in economic voting studies, I examine
them in this section. I argue that the assumption that voters are principally egooriented and prospective in motivation who base their choices on heuristics (in aloose sense) is the most plausible by the criterion of theoretical consistency andgiven the existing findings, the most important tendency of which shows that asregards information for their vote choices, voters are principally retrospective
and national-economy-based, but otherwise based under certain conditions.
First, the model that supposes that voters look to past economic conditions
because they are important as themselves (or for democratic accountability itself ?)might be incompatible with empirical findings, which show that voters look notinfrequently to the future and, as will be shown below, are sensitive to thepolicies that benefit them economically, even in the same countries where51）

retrospective voting is the rule, which denies the culturalist interpretation.

Inaddition, arguably, the assumption that what matters for voters is past economic(1)138

“Generalizing” the Economic Voting Framework? (Part II)

performance in itself can be theoretically possible but cannot be reasonably
sustained. This model confuses the result of votersʼ reference to the incumbentʼs
performances for information with their motivation.
Second, regarding the signaling explanation of retrospective voting, it must
be pointed out that, although voters give the same signal to all potential
incumbents―that is, the current and all potential oppositions―it is arguablethat signaling is rather low-level in rationality, which is a severe shortcoming asa rational-choice formalization. Substantially, it means that comparison of
future performances that voters must do is not included in this modelʼs logic.

52）

On the latter point, it is similar to the purely retrospective heuristics-employing
voter model.
Third, the purely retrospective heuristics assumption is logicallyinconsistent because if voters are interested in the future economic conditions,they must compare an explored performance of the incumbent with alternatives,
and, as Lockerbie (2008: 4) suggests, exploration by itself is not sufficient for this53）

comparison.

The hypothesis that what voters expect is future economic

conditions that are better than satisfactory at first seems consistent, but when
the incumbentʼs past performance is below the threshold, its logicalinconsistency becomes apparent. Substantially, the fact that sometimes voterschoose parties or candidates that have never been in charge of government, andeven sheer “outsiders,” suggests that retrospective evaluation is just a part of
information, though frequently being central, for prospective comparison.

54）

In

51） This argument (and similar ones in the following paragraphs) is rather weak, but combined with the arguments about survey data analyses presented later, it should be moreconvincing.
52） For another type of critique of this thesis, see Grafstein (2009: 452).
53） The findings that validate the hypothesis that “when there is a clear opposition to replace the government, voters will be more willing to punish the incumbents [while i]f there
are a number of possible replacements, and consequently it is unclear who the replacement
might be, voters will tend to reserve judgement” (Evans 2004: 130) suggest both the importance of comparison in economic voting behavior and the significance of alternative candidates in votersʼ comparisons.
54） It is also important that logically the pure retrospection thesis cannot specify where thevotes go when voters do not vote for the incumbent.
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general, if voters are interested in future economic conditions, what they domust be a potential comparison of the situation under the incumbent with the55）

one under the competing options.

Then, the third model, and by extension the second model, are wrong to theextent that they assume that voters only look to the incumbentʼs past
performance (i.e. do not conduct any comparison). I would like to add, however,that many authors with the retrospective heuristics-employing voter assumption,in spite of many reviewsʼ (and their own?) simplification, assume that voters do acertain comparison, perhaps unconsciously when the incumbentʼs performancehas been satisfactory or, if not, the expected performance of the opposition(s)(already established in their countryʼs party system and limited in number) must be ina certain range, which is naturally deemed to be better when the incumbentʼs
performance has been under the threshold set by voters. That is why I consider
that this model assumes that voters employ heuristics.
Finally, the rational retrospective voting model, in its purest form, tends
not to be compatible with the substantial number of findings that point to thedetermining power of informationally prospective economic voting. The varied
findings in themselves must be incompatible with any rational-choice
assumption

56）

if it is not accompanied by a certain theory that can explain theconditions under which four types of economic voting (retrospective/prospective
× national-economy-based/pocketbook) have been found by empirical studies. As

far as I know, there is no formal model that includes any plausible theory to dothat. More generally, we must think that rational choice models are notplausible, given, for example, the popularity of behavioral economics even in57）

economics.

Thus, if a certain model of economic voting assumes that voters are55） This is so even in stable party systems (even in especially stable two-party systems, as in
the USA), because potential new oppositions are always possible, especially when economic conditions are extremely bad.
56） According to Bendor et al. (2010: 28), “RRVʼs success was more theoretical than empirical (Franzese, 2002).” It might be suggested that this thesis is inconsistent in trusting
survey data regarding votersʼ retrospective orientation literally and considering the data
regarding their national-economy/pocketbook orientation not reflecting the reality.
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prospective in motivation, the more it assumes that votersʼ focus is exclusively
oriented to past economic conditions as information, the less consistent it istheoretically. Some studies with that assumption can be read as supposing that
voters principally, or almost exclusively look to the past for their expectations of
the future because they lack rationality or information. The existing literature,
however, seems to refute this interpretation. As mentioned before, studies havepredominantly found that retrospective (as regards information) voters can takedifferent degrees of the governmentʼs responsibility for economic conditions into
58）

consideration.

Then, as Lockerbie (2008: 3―4) argues, it is unreasonable tosuppose that voters who can be sensitive to the degree of responsibility cannot
compare the expected performance of the future government of the current
incumbency and the one to be formed by challenger candidates/parties. It is very
probable that they look to information other than past economic conditions,
including the oppositionsʼ capabilities and policies. This inconsistency of themodel can be corroborated by the existence of not infrequent prospective voting(to more detailed interpretations of these findings, I return later).

The arguments hitherto presented can be indifferent to the relative validityof the ego-orientation hypothesis and the socially-orientation hypothesis
regarding votersʼ motivation. Moreover, given the conditional nature of theprincipal argument that tries to explain why pocketbook variables are not foundto be determining in many cases (the argument that voters consider a substantial
part of their pocketbook situation not the results of the government policies) , theexistence of the minoritarian but not so infrequent findings of the pocketbook
variableʼs predominant determining power in itself does not refute any
assumption. However, I have already argued that in terms of theoreticalconsistency, to the extent that the models of voters who use heuristics for future
economic conditions assume that voters are rational, these models must supposethat voters are oriented to (motivated by) expected utility that is personal. A57） According to Bendor et al. (2010: 29 [n.8]), “the rise of behavioral economics, with its
tighter experimental demonstrations that subjects often do not solve problems optimally―
even taking their information into account―poses yet another empirical hurdle for RRV.”
58） For a review of the studies that corroborate this point, see, among others, Lewis-Beckand Stegmaier (2000: 207―10).
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study (Gomez and Wilson 2006) on the direction of heuristics presents anempirical evidence for this assumption.

59）

It shows, with the cases of Canada,

Hungary, Mexico, and Taiwan, that “higher, not lower, levels of politicalsophistication prompt citizens to ʻvote their pocketbook.ʼ” Gomez and Wilson
present this finding refuting the dominant trend of studies that had found thecontrasting correlation. I find theirs more convincing because of their
methodological sophistication and their explicitly comparative perspective. In
addition, previewing my argument to be presented below, it is possible thatexisting literatureʼs findings are due to the fact that low-income voters, who arevery probably characterized by low-level sophistication, are pocketbook votersbecause of redistributive policies. These findings support the motivationally egooriented voter thesisʼ corollary that voters employ macroeconomic conditions inheuristics for evaluation of their (future) personal financial conditions. Grafstein(2009: 453) theoretically criticizes the logic that individual “noises” make voters

employ the (past) national-economy situation as their principal material forheuristics by pointing out that those individual noises also render invisible theeffects of government policies, thus applying to national-economy-evaluation
variables as well. However, I consider plausible the hypothesis that votersgenerally treat their idiosyncratic situation as a given and think that, all things
being equal, their economic conditions largely depend on macroeconomic
conditions.
Although these considerations suggest that the ego-oriented motivation
assumption is more affinitive with the heuristics-employing prospective
motivation model, both it and the socially oriented motivation assumption canbe compatible with the general tendency of findings in a theoretically consistentmanner. Discussions of this point require a review of the existing empiricalstudies in more detail, especially at the intersection of the retrospective/
prospective debate and the national-economy-based/pocketbook debate, because
the discussion is closely related to the technical issues of regression analyses,
which I will address in the latter part of this section. However, it can be inferredthat the fact that there are occasions in which pocketbook variables are shown59） On this point, see also Bernard (2022: 113).
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to be determining, especially given that these variables tend not to show real
pocketbook perception (as will be shown later) , suggests that ego-oriented
motivation counts, at least to a certain extent. It is also important to add that, asshown in the previous section, the majority of economic voting studies, if
implicitly, tend to consider voters ego-oriented in motivation.
In summation, the examinations hitherto show that the assumption that a
principal part of voters are prospective and perhaps ego-oriented in motivation
who employs heuristics is theoretically consistent given the general tendency of
the findings. However, existing studies with this heuristics assumption have notpresented sufficient explanation as to why the predominant findings (frequentlyof their own) show the determining power of the retrospective national-economy

perception variable despite votersʼ motivation (which is totally otherwise oriented).
More specifically, a puzzle must be solved empirically: Given the heuristics
argument, even if we suppose (as many economic voting studies seem to do) thatheuristics-employing voters almost exclusively use the evaluation of pasteconomic conditions as a shortcut to make predictions for the future,prospective pocketbook evaluation must be at least as important as retrospective
national-economy evaluation, which has not been found in the majority ofstandard economic voting analyses. Closely related to this question is theaforementioned finding that informationally prospective and/or pocketbook
voting is the predominant pattern in a substantial number of cases. Thus, thepredominance of an informationally retrospective, national-economy perception
variableʼs determining power in survey data analyses must be explained in such a
way that it specifies the conditions under which the potential determining powerof motivationally prospective ego-oriented voting can manifest itself.
Some studies, though not many, explicitly present explanations that others
implicitly recognize as to why votersʼ rationality is rarely detected in survey data
analyses. In addition, some of the minoritarian studies and some criticisms of
economic voting studies can be interpreted as explanations for those “spurious”
findings, which do not show the explanatory power of prospective and/or
pocketbook variables. I will review them in the following paragraphs, thus
showing that convincing explanations can be integrated into a plausible causal
model of economic voting.
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Before reviewing them, one caveat might be in order. It is evident thatsurvey data are full of problems (for example, see Hibbs 2006: 583―84). And, there
are some attempts to include objective economic indices―most notably Brug etal. (2007) and Healy et al. (2017). However, there are at least two problems withthis procedure. It is inconsistent because it accepts as true the results of weak
pocketbook voting of empirical analyses on the one hand, and explains thereason not by perceptions but by objective conditions on the other. It is also
unconvincing because what determines votersʼ choices must be perception. In
the current academic conditions, the most accepted way to measure perceptions
are answers to questions, and if you do not use experimental methods, the mostaccepted way to get that type of data is by observational surveys, on theconditions that the question-answer alternatives are adequate to test the
hypothesis at hand. I cannot find the reasons why this is not the case with voting
behavior. It is my belief that survey data are important materials to analyze ineconomic voting studies (see, e.g., Evans 2004: 31―33). That belief is shared by the
60）

majority of economic voting studies.

Beginning my consideration with the weakness of pocketbook variablesʼ
determining power, although, as far as I know, it has not been frequently argued
systematically, a predominant explanation of the economic voting studies is a
substantial argument that pocketbook evaluation does not affect votersʼ votechoice when the governmentʼs competence and policies are perceived asirrelevant to personal economic conditions.

61）

Although it is a plausible

explanation and a crucial point, it can be integrated into a more general andmore technical one.
An extremely important, though not as frequently referred to as it deserves,
problem of pocketbook variables must be the aforementioned “noises” ofindividual voter situations. Naturally, specifically personal changes are vital topersonal economic conditions as well (perhaps past and expected job change might60） It is shared by many RRV-school scholars, including Duch and Stevenson (2008).
61） Sigelman et al. (1991: 130―31) sum up this view succinctly in their enumeration of thereasons presented by economic voting studies for weakness of pocketbook voting, citing
representative studies. For other arguments of this feature, see Nannestad and Paldam(1997: 35) and Singer (2016: 52), among others. See also Lockerbie (2008: 8).
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“Generalizing” the Economic Voting Framework? (Part II)be typical), and answers to the question of past and future financial change in62）

surveys include these elements.

It seems evident that these noises are aprincipal reason why the standard pocketbook variable is not related with vote63）

choices.

Second, regarding the prospective variables, it is adequate to point out that,as shown above, the determining power of the prospective national-economybased variable has been much more commonly found than that of pocketbook
variables. The general weakness of prospective variables, however, must be
explained if we take heuristics (or full rationality) assumptions. A common
explanation of the prospective variablesʼ weak determining power is the
hypothesis of a lack of sophistication, which I have criticized before. It is also
logically inconsistent, because it cannot solve the aforementioned puzzle. Whatshould be presented are the reasons why prospective motivation is not shown inthe variables generally employed in survey data analyses.
It has been pointed out that prospective perceptions of economic
conditions, especially those expressed in standard survey answers, are highly
ambiguous. For example, Michelitch et al. (2012: 839―40) point out that theanswers to the standard prospective questions in surveys mentioned before
cannot be specified as to which “future” respondents mean, which can be with
the incumbent, with the government of their vote choice, with the candidate/party with the highest prospect of winning, and so on.

64）

Although the

ambiguity thus underlined is less conspicuous regarding the surveys conductedin the periods well before elections, it shows a typical case of the general featureof survey respondentsʼ answers on future economic conditions, which are highly
contingent. Expectations and concerns that are independent of the perceptionsof competence and policies of the incumbent or the other candidates/parties
must play a more significant part in prospective perceptions than in retrospective
65）

ones.

However, I argue, with Kramer, among others, that the most important62） See Lockerbie (2008: 8), among others.
63） According to Erikson et al. (2002: 88), “[j]udgments whether the economy will improveor falter [...] may be too noisy for worthwhile analysis at the individual level.”64） See also Lockerbie (2008: 11).
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element of the problems of the prospective perception variables employed in thestandard analyses is the aforementioned noises, which must be more
conspicuous in prospect than in retrospection. If prospective perception
variables include varied types of (expected) experiences and perceptions, it isnatural that they would not be statistically significant in determining vote choice
in regressions.
These points are crucial because the prospective pocketbook variable must
be the most determining if votersʼ motivation, supposed by the heuristics (andrational-choice) assumption(s), can be shown in survey data analyses. In thisregard, the discussions and findings concerning the banker model of voters are
extremely relevant. One reason for this is the following logic. If the heuristics(and rational-choice) assumption(s) is right, when the given survey was conductedin a context in which many of the detracting or disturbing factors referred toabove do not work, not only the prospective perception variables but also thepocketbook variables should increase their capacity to show votersʼ real
perception of economic conditions related to the incumbentʼs policies. Then,
when the prospective perception variables are shown to be more determining insurvey data analyses, the prospective pocketbook variable is expected to be moredetermining than the prospective national-economy perception variable. The
banker debate is centered precisely on that question.
It must be underlined in the first place that the well known thesis by
MacKuen et al. (1992) that voters are sophisticated (that they are “bankers,” not“peasants”) is based on aggregate-level analysis. Apparently, MacKuen et al. are

not conscious of this feature in their widely cited works, and they can be read as
66）

Later, in the book The Macro Polity

saying that a typical voter is a banker.

(Erikson et al. 2002) , they underline that the majority of voters are notsophisticated at all, and posit that it is minoritarian sophisticated voters who
67）

determine the election on the macro-level.

It has been evident from the outset65） Although it sounds circular, the fact that the prospective perception variables tend to
be insignificant in multiple regression to explain vote choices might be supporting evidenceof this.
66） As an important critique of the article in other aspects, see Clarke and Stewart (1994).
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that their model is about the prospective electorate, not the prospective voter,but they talked about voters and citizens and locate their thesis in contrast with68）

the retrospective voter model of the literature cited frequently in this essay.

The tone is very different in their 2002 book regarding the representative voter.
However, MacKuen et al. might have overreacted; they presented no evidence,
though they cited other works on that point in other contexts, that a typical
voter lacks sophistication and information to be prospective in information.
Given that, the existing findings might be interpreted as showing that a typical
voter, who is prospective in motivation and is informationally retrospective intheir heuristics in “normal” situations, is sophisticated enough to be prospective
in information under certain conditions. Thus, those studies that examine thebanker thesis regarding voters by aggregate-level analyses might be justified.
MacKuen et al. found that voters (though in the aggregate) are prospective
and national-economy-based. There are at least two important studies whosefindings differ from theirs. One is Weyland (1998) , which “duplicates,” inWeylandʼs expression, MacKuen and othersʼ analysis with the Venezuelan caseand finds that voters are prospective and pocketbook-based in information inthat country in the period from 1989 to 1993. Another is Carlin and Hunt(2015), according to whom a typical citizen in Uruguay from 2007 to 2013 had

the same feature. In Section VI, I will present the hypothesis that thisdiscrepancy is due to the different economic contexts. Here, I would like topreview that the weak determining power of the prospective pocketbook
variable might be explained by specific contexts.
Finally, there are lines of arguments and empirical research that criticize
the survey-data-analysis-based economic voting studiesʼ findings as endogenous,
and their critiques are most relevant to national-economy perceptions (see,among others, Murillo and Visconti 2017: 183 (note 13)). That is, it is rather widely

supposed that votersʼ support for or opposition to the incumbent, candidate or67） See especially the third chapter (esp. pp.78―79, 82―84), in which their previous essays
are cited.
68） Erikson et al. (2000) had the same tone, arguing, for example, that, “This paper argues
that when voters evaluate the president in terms of the economy, they do so using rational
expectations” (p.293).
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party, as a vote choice substantially affects, or even determines, their perceptionof current or past economic conditions or their expectation thereof, which is an
endogeneity or a reverse causality.

69）

There are attempts to remove the problem,

especially by Lewis-Beck and his collaborators, with the statistical techniques(Lewis-Beck et al. 2013; Nadeau et al. 2013), and I consider G. Lenzʼs analysis

employing panel data convincing.

70）

Lenz (2012: esp. Chapter 2) shows that inthree US presidential elections where the campaigns and the news media
dramatically raised the salience of the economy, peopleʼs presidential approvalchanged to reflect their prior perceptions of the national economy after the issueof the economy became prominent.

71）

However, critiques still abound, and thedebate is still open (e.g., Hansford and Gomez 2015; Murillo and Visconti 2017: 183(note 13)). Given these findings, it seems evident that both directions of causality(and endogeneity) exist, that is, while the importance of economic voting (that is,the causality from perception of economic conditions to the vote choice in a
substantial part of votersʼ voting behavior) is undeniable, the endogeneity exists aswell. Then, national-economy perceptions in survey answers must be discounted
72）

substantially.

Adding to that the fact that votersʼ personal economic conditions depend
largely on national economic conditions, it follows that variables of nationaleconomy perception, especially the retrospective one given the aforementioned69） For a review of this line, see Hansford and Gomez (2015: 16); Lewis-Beck, Stubager,
and Nadeau (2013: 500―01); Stewart and Clarke (2018: 199―200), among others. The last
includes their own critical arguments. See also note 14.
70） Achen and Bartels (2017) deny, at least partially, the validity of the endogeneity critique referring to the findings on the ME nexus, which employ objective economic indicesof the macro-level studies.
71） Lenzʼs another principal conclusion by the same method is that the reverse causality
exists regarding the policy position, suggesting that economic voting tends to prevail overpolicy-voting.
72） Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck (2011: 310), implicitly admitting the endogeneity, posit thatthe effects of partisanship on perception are weaker when the economic conditions arevery bad or very good. My study (出岡 [Izuoka] 2022) on the case of Venezuela under
Chávez, however, shows that partisanship influences votersʼ perceptions of the national
economy in a sharp economic recession.
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73）

feature of prospective variables, are evidently overrated.

It is important to point out that most factors referred to in this section are
negative in the sense that they work to keep the prospective pocketbook variable
usually utilized in regressions from showing the prospective pocketbook
perception that economic voting studies try to test. Thus, these considerations,combined with the fact that some analyses have found the determining power ofthe prospective pocketbook variable, suggest the correctness of the predominant74）

premise on voter motivation of economic voting studies.

On the other hand,

my inference that the findings showing the determining power of prospective
perception variables might be interpreted as the ones that tend to show theactual determining power of prospective perceptions could be counted as
positive evidence. There are other studies which find the determining power ofredistributive policiesʼ outcomes. I examine these studies in Section VI. Once weassume that the effects of redistributive policies can be a part of〈economic
voting〉, they are also the findings that can be counted as evidence of thedetermining power of prospective pocketbook perception.
Summing up the considerations hitherto presented, we are likely to land on
two important points from the existing studies. First, the scholars who assume
that voters are basically retrospective in information but employ that
information in heuristics for their (potential) future-oriented comparison and thesurvey-analyzing scholars who consider representative voters prospective and/or
pocketbook-based should be considered to have the same assumptions about
motivation. I call their at least similar assumptions the “heuristics (in a broad
sense) assumption.” Second, this majoritarian assumption seems far moreplausible than other voter motivation assumptions.
It is also important to point out that, particularly given that the featuresand findings of existing survey data analyses show that the representative voter
is much more prospective and pocketbook-oriented (even in information) than the73） Acknowledging the aforementioned endogeneity, I have a polemical opinion on thispoint, which I have presented in another essay (出岡 [Izuoka] 2022: esp. 22).
74） At the same time, they suggest an inadequateness of these studiesʼ interpretations ofregression findings.
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法学研究 95 巻 10 号（2022：10）“heuristics-employing retrospective voter” model tends to assume, the difference
between this model, the informationally prospective, sophisticated voter model,
and the rational choice schoolʼs models might be considered a question ofdegree, not of kind. Among these voter models assuming different degrees ofvotersʼ rationality, empirically the most plausible is the loosely defined heuristics
model (heuristics-employing, retrospective national-economy-based voting model and75）

the models assuming not “fully rational” prospective and/or pocketbook voting).

However, what is also important in the context of this review article is theaforementioned common feature of the majority of “economic voting” studies.
Granted that a motivationally prospective ego-oriented voter model, invarious versions, is plausible, the ego-oriented motivation side must be morequalified than the prospective motivation side. It is plausible, given the findingsin psychology, to assume that the people are not wholly selfish utilitymaximizers but take othersʼ utility into consideration, as well.

76）

However, it is

impossible to suppose that ego-oriented motivation does not play a role of atleast a certain importance. If the economic conditions are important in votersʼ
choice, the expectations of their future personal economic conditions must
count (although community orientation must play some part and votersʼ sharing of
the same macroeconomic conditions in the polity economically governed by the same
incumbent would make the macroeconomic conditions in that polity an important
determinant of their voting). In this respect, the dominant trend of findings in a

subfield of voting studies, shown later, regarding the effects of targeted transfer
complements the studies that find pocketbook economic voting dominant. It is
no wonder, then, that scholars who adopt the socially oriented motivation
premise seem to belong to the minority in economic voting studies, as shown
before.
Also, even if the assumption is correct that the national economy in itself isvotersʼ predominant concern, it is difficult to think that voters are indifferent tothose outcomes of the policies that conspicuously affect them or the social

75） Perhaps the fact that the majority of scholars assume that position might also be supporting evidence of its plausibility.
76） On this point, see especially the discussions in Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck (2011).
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“Generalizing” the Economic Voting Framework? (Part II)groups to which they belong. Those assumptions must be interpreted asmeaning that perception of the national economy is predominantly determining
in a balance that includes it and the perception of personal economic conditions.
Then, the following arguments apply to economic voting studies with thoseassumptions as well, with a difference of degree. In other words, the argumentsin the following sections might be valid to the extent that ego-oriented
77）

rationality assumptions represent the reality.

V. A Possible Inconsistency of the Framework of Existing Economic Voting
StudiesI have argued that the majority of economic voting studies

78）

have similarassumptions that voters are principally prospective and ego-oriented inmotivation. Then, theoretically, consistency of their framework of analysis can79）

be questioned.

What is crucial is that, if we consider voters rational (either

heuristically or “fully”)―that is, if we suppose that what matters must be votersʼ

expectation of their personal economic conditions under the government of
their vote choice―it is evident that votersʼ future economic conditions must be
80）

affected by various government policies related to the economy.

And, what isof particular importance among these policies, given the nature of “economic
81）

voting” studies, are those policies with redistributive effects

or “redistributive―

policies.”77） The findings presented in Section VI can be supporting evidences of the plausibility ofthe ego-oriented motivation assumption.
78） Here I include the rational choice schools.
79） Since the previous section shows that these assumptions are plausible, this theoreticalshortcoming must be reflected in an empirical weakness of the existing economic voting
studies, part of which is a theme of the next section. This essay is double-headed to pointout theoretical inconsistency and empirical shortcomings, which I formulate mainly as areview of the theoretical frameworks of the literature.
80） As Lockerbieʼs (2008: 5―6) examples show, it is difficult to suppose that voters wholook to the future are not sensitive to the policy proposals (and the incumbentʼs future
policy change if it is probable) that are clearly positive or negative for their and their nationʼs future economic conditions.
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Criticism of the heuristics-employing voter model centers on its focusing on
the incumbent, which is convincing, and I base my considerations in theprevious sections on these critiques. However, the more essential problem of themodel might be its virtually exclusive focus on macroeconomic performance andpolicies of a valence nature, which it shares with most rational choice schools of
economic voting studies.
Characteristically, the prospective (regarding information) voter models tend
to share this shortcoming. For example, Elinder et al. (2015: 178) characterizethat “[a]s for prospective voting, the political science literature typically asks how
voters expect the incumbent to perform in terms of managing the economy [...].”
This characterization is an overstatement in one aspect: exclusive focus on theincumbent. The heuristics-employing retrospective (in information) voter modelʼspractical neglect of potential comparison with the oppositionʼs future
performance, which logically must be part of its assumption, is clearlyattenuated in the prospective (in information) voter theses. Lockerbie (2008: 4, 7)
takes this comparison as the most important and apparently definition-relateddifference between the two retrospective voting models and the prospective
voting model in his typology.
However, Elinder and othersʼ criticism seems correct in another aspect:exclusive focus on valence issues. Almost by definition, prospective (ininformation) model voters must be more sensitive to the contents of the policy

proposals of the competing candidates/parties than the heuristics-employing
retrospective (in information) model voters. The former model frequently assumes
that voters are sophisticated in evaluation and more eager to gather information,
as is clear in the banker metaphor of MacKuen and others. Lockerbie explicitlyemphasizes that voters include policies in their calculations. However, despite
this difference, the prospective voter models share virtually exclusive focus onvalence issues of the typical heuristics-employing retrospective (in information)
voter model.

82）

For example, Lockerbie (2008: 5―7) argues that a prospectivemodel like his asserts that voters look at candidatesʼ and partiesʼ policy81） On variety of policies with redistributive effects, including social policies and progressive taxation, see, for example, Fairfield and Garay (2017).
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proposals, but all his examples are those policies which affect macroeconomic
conditions or very specifically targeted policies, which are not bases of〈economic voting〉(see below).
Thus, we can consider this a feature of the economic voting literature as a
83）

Whether or not they explicitly consider their models offering micro-

whole.

foundation to the macro-level ME nexus, which is affinitive with focus on
macroeconomic conditions, one of the important features of micro-level
economic voting studies is their almost exclusive focus on macroeconomic
management of the past or future government, which is valence issue. This focus
might be a legacy of the studies that began as part of the studies on the ME
nexus.
It must be recognized that some studies have shown that under thoseconditions that make voters conscious of government policiesʼ responsibility for
deterioration of their personal economic condition, voters punish the incumbent
for it, and show it in survey analyses. One of the most important works of this
84）

line

is Singerʼs study on the voting of Latin American informal sector workers
85）(Singer 2016).

Characteristically, these studies analyze the situations in which

the policies affect votersʼ economic conditions negatively. In contrast, theoccasions when the policies affect them positively (the most typical of which are
the effects of redistributive policies on the low-income population) are not82） This feature is shared by the voter models that explicitly focus on votersʼ selection between the candidates/parties, which, as shown above, are frequently grouped as “the selection model/approach” and include many rational-choice versions. Bernard (2022: 96) characterizes the selection approach in that it “holds that the electorate selects leaders who theyjudge are the most competent in handling the economy.”83） Although I do not examine them in detail here, the rational choice schools of economic voting tend to share this feature. See the previous note.
84） See also other studies cited in note 61.
85） It deserves mentioning that in his former study of the same theme (Singer 2013), Singer
hypothesized that informal work makes the impact of worsening macroeconomic conditions much more damaging, and “sociotropic” evaluation is more determining among informal workers, presenting the analyses that corroborated the hypothesis. In his 2016
study, Singer continues to underline this difference of the “sociotropic” element as well. It
should be added that Singerʼs study is also important in showing heterogeneity among voters in terms of economic voting (a point that I will examine later).
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systematically integrated into the economic voting framework. The difference isthat while economic management capabilities of the incumbents tend to be themain issue in the cases of personal economic conditionsʼ deterioration (if the86）

policies are not explicitly damaging to certain kinds of voters) ,redistributive

policies are position issues by definition, enriching some pocketbooks andreducing other pocketbooks at the same time. And, the outcomes ofredistributive policies occupy a substantial part of votersʼ perception of personaleconomic conditions―especially among low-income populations.

87）

This effectof redistributive policies is virtually excluded from economic voting studies, as
Elinder et al. (2015: 178) point out.

88）

The importance of redistributive policies isthat if voters minimally distinguish the government policiesʼ effects on theireconomic lives from those factors which are beyond the governmentʼs
responsibility, redistributive policies might be representative of those factors
other than macroeconomic management that affect votersʼ choices.
It must be added that the concept of “policy-oriented economic voting” andits theories have been important parts of “economic voting” studies. However,
the works on policy-oriented economic voting basically analyze the valence89）

issue outcomes of policies.

86） Two studies by Singer cited in the previous note and the literature referred to in thoseprincipally argue that this greater impact makes the affected voters more sensitive to theeconomic capability of the government.
87） It is evident that the redistributive policiesʼ effects on personal economic conditions areconcerns for high-income populations as well, and it might be possible to hypothesize thatthe concerns are more effective for this population due to the asymmetry in which persons
are more sensitive to the losses than to the gains. For a brief review of the asymmetry hypothesis, see Stegmaier et al. (2017: 587). However, it is reasonable to assume that the effects of redistributive policies are more determining among low-income voters because of
the smaller denominator, if the policies are not as extreme as confiscation of the assets.
88） The fact that, especially in a European context, the economic voting thesis has been an
antithesis of class voting thesis (or that a substantial part of scholars believe that economic voting became a principal element of voting after the weakening of class voting) may inpart explain this omission.
89） See my review (Izuoka, forthcoming) for this important trend in “economic voting”
studies.
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“Generalizing” the Economic Voting Framework? (Part II)

Concluding these considerations, if ecnomic voting is the vote choicedetermined by the part of expected pocketbook that is perceived to be affectedby the governmentʼs economic management and policies, and that is what mostof economic voting studies posit, then it is inconsistent to exclude the outcomeof redistributive policies.
In addition, it is not just that economic voting studies should integrate theoutcomes of redistributive policies. Once redistribution is brought in, theeconomic voting framework as a whole must be repaired. This is because
redistributive policies considerably affect macroeconomic performance.
Economic voting studies, in analyzing the effects of macroeconomic
performances, tend to focus on changes in economic growth (indicated by GDP
per capita, among others), inflation, and unemployment. However, all Latin

Americanists (and Latin Americans), for example, are well aware of the fact that,as so-called “populist” economic policies typically show (e.g., Dornbusch and
Edwards 1991), the policies that are redistributive in a narrow sense and radically

distributive affect not only economic growth, but inflation and, as a result ofother economic conditions, unemployment as well. In other words, it is evident
that macroeconomic management and redistributive policies are closely related
as the governmentsʼ economic policies.
Then, the existing economic voting studiesʼ semi-exclusive focus on valence
economic conditions is inconsistent or “incomplete” in a double sense.

VI. Empirical Findings of the Effects of Redistributive Policies on Economic
VotingIntegrating the outcomes of positional policies may not only be required
theoretically. To the extent that the majoritarian assumption of heuristics-levelor full rationality of economic voting studies is correct, this theoreticalargument must also be right empirically. In fact, there are empirical studies thatshow or suggest the substantial determining power of pocketbook perception
when voters benefit from positional policies.
In this regard, studies on the effect of targeted transfers on beneficiaries areimportant. Elinder et al. (2015: 178) cite various studies that commonly find that
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法学研究 95 巻 10 号（2022：10）
90）

these policies substantially influence targeted citizensʼ voting.

Their own

studyʼs findings on the Swedish case are more attuned to my arguments in thisessay. They found that targeted votersʼ voting is prospective―that is, responding
to promises rather than to implemented policies ― which they consider
generalizable to the countries where a majority of election promises are fulfilled.
As Elinder et al. (2015: 178) suggest, generally these studies are notconsidered “economic voting” studies,91）

legitimately because the phenomenon

as analyzed by those studies is on the effects of targeted transfer themselves, andnot votersʼ perception of their financial conditions.

92）

However, if voters votefor the incumbents as the result of improvement of their financial conditions
brought about by transfers, the phenomenon is〈economic voting〉. Therefore,
the findings of these studies might suggest that redistributive policies in general
have effects on votersʼ choices. In that sense, a study on South Korea (Choi andPark 2012) is more suggestive because it is based on the analyses that employed

the standard economic perception variables. It is, however, an aggregate-level
analysis that compares the house-owners/non-owner percentages with voting forparties by ward.
What might be the nature of targeted transfer policies is that they do nottend to affect macroeconomic conditions so much. However, that is a questionof degree, and all policies affect macroeconomic performance. Thus, the90） See also Layton and Smith (2015: 855) and Pavão (2016: 74―75, 77), who cite manystudies which show that conditional cash transfer programs have generated electoral returns for the governments in charge of them in Latin America. Layton and Smith (2015),
whose previous study is cited by Pavão, present the effects of the programs on voters in
Latin American countries by individual-level analyses. Linos (2013), not cited by Elinder
et al. (nor by Pavão 2016), presents an interesting finding. By municipal-level analyses, shefinds that the program, administered at the national level, increased the incumbent mayorsʼ
re-election probabilities by 39 % without significantly influencing presidential elections. Linos presents a possible explanation, besides the possibilities that partisanship works moreat the national level and that other issues matter in presidential elections, that a strong tradition of patronage politics in Honduras may have made voters believe that mayors played
a role in the selection process of the program.
91） It might not be coincidental that it is economists who analyze this phenomenon as
pocketbook economic voting.
92） In this sense, I do not follow Elinder et al.ʼs terminology.
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“Generalizing” the Economic Voting Framework? (Part II)

suggestion of studies on targeted transfer policiesʼ effects on vote choice might
be generalizable.
As far as I know, there is no systematic empirical study on the outcomes ofredistributive policies in general as a part of economic voting. As told above,arguably this theme has not been recognized. The difficulty of finding thephenomenon might be a factor of this neglect as well. It is difficult to test
〈economic voting based on (the incumbentʼs and/or expected) redistributive
policies as the whole〉by the standard economic-voting regression analysis
employing the survey data with the standard economic perception questions. As
Singer (2016: 52) cites, existing micro-level studies have had difficulty even in
93）

finding the class difference in economic voting.

However, if the discussions hitherto developed are correct, under certain
conditions, the outcomes of more generally redistributive policies should beshown by survey data analysis methods that have been utilized as standard ineconomic voting studies. Such conditions could be inferred as corollaries of thepoints discussed above; those discussions imply that there are conditions underwhich the variables supposed to measure respondentsʼ prospective andpocketbook economic perceptions do bearably function as such.
Given that a principal reason why the pocketbook variables cannot
function as measures of perception of the pocketbook change induced by theincumbentʼs economic management and/or policies is noises of personal nature,outcomes of high-level redistribution by the incumbent and their expected
continuity (especially when the other candidates/parties make voters expect lessredistributive policies) might be shown in the pocketbook variables because theychange the economic conditions of a large part of the low-income population in
the same direction, thus overwhelming noises. This means that if thepocketbook variables (the prospective one, if the arguments presented in the previous
sections are correct) are significant with the low-income groups in the survey data

analysis in the cases where radically redistributive policies are being93） See also Evans (2004: 140). Duch and Palmer (2002; not cited by Singer because the essayʼs theme is different), however, found that differences in familial income and social classcontribute to different evaluations of national economic conditions.
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implemented, it might be inferred that the outcome of redistributive policies
94）

may be a principal part of economic voting.

This function of the pocketbook

variables tends to be neglected in economic voting studies. It should be areflection of the aforementioned theoretical inconsistency of the framework.
Just as studies tend to exclude the effects of redistributive policies (although theirframework actually includes pocketbook perception as one of its principal variables),the fact that pocketbook perception variables can show the effects ofredistributive policies has been underestimated.
A caveat is necessary in interpreting the standard economic-voting survey
data analyses in the way specified in the previous paragraph. A highly unstableeconomy also reduces the aforementioned noises because many people have
similar financial ups and downs in that situation.

95）

Then, the national-economy

perception and pocketbook variables must increase their determining power inregression analyses. In addition, as told before, macroeconomic conditions
noticeably affect low-income votersʼ choices, which reduces the determining
power of pocketbook perception variables when the economy is unstable. An
additional important point is that an unstable economy should naturally
increase the determining power of national-economy perception variables andpocketbook variables with the cases of middle- and high-income voters as well.
These points show that various variables of economic-conditions perception
must be interpreted cautiously, taking the specific contexts of each case into
consideration.
If these discussions are correct, we might understand the discrepancy of thefindings of the original banker model analyses with the US case and the findingsof its application to Venezuela and Uruguay: although both find (by aggregatelevel analyses) that voters are prospective, the former finds that voters arenational-economy-based in information, while the latter finds that voters are96）

pocketbook-based.

In Venezuela from 1989 to 1993, the incumbent was94） Admittedly, this is a working hypothesis, but if we can explain the survey data on thispremise, it would become more plausible.
95） It must be added that, given the relationship between macroeconomic conditions andredistributive policies referred to above, the cases of high-level redistribution tend to be
the ones with high levels of economic instability.
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“Generalizing” the Economic Voting Framework? (Part II)

labeled as “neoliberal” and was considered highly regressive. In Uruguay from2007 to 2013, the policy distance between the governing leftist party, Frente
Amplio (Broad Front), and the two traditional parties, each of which had been in
power in the neoliberal era, was considered great. Thus interpreted, it may not
be necessary, in explaining the discrepancy between Erikson et al.ʼs findings on
the one side and Weylandʼs and Carlin and Huntʼs on the other, as Weyland(1998: 356) does, to recur to the logic that instability and crises make voters more
97）

selfish.

If the discussions presented hitherto are correct, Venezuela under the
Chávez administration may be a good case for an analysis of the effects ofredistributive policies because of its radical redistributive policies (and discourse),
though sharp economic fluctuations, as expected, also characterized the case. I
have attempted a tentative analysis of the Venezuelan case, and results show theprospective pocketbook variableʼs determining power of the low-income
populationʼs support (and its termination) for Chávez, in contrast with the rest of
the population, for whom the retrospective national-economy-evaluation
variable is conspicuously determining (出岡 [Izuoka] 2022).
I would like to interpret the results as showing that the expectation ofredistributive policiesʼ outcome had the effect of making that part of the
population support Chávez. Thus interpreted, these empirical findings suggestthat the effects of redistributive policies are a substantial part of the base of〈economic voting〉as defined explicitly in this essay.

VII. Concluding Remarks
This review makes some tentative sub-conclusions. First, considerations of
the theoretical consistency of the existing (micro-level) studies on economic96） As shown before, these cases are important because we might assume that when theconditions are suitable for economic perception variables to show what is expected toshow, it should show that voters are heuristically or fully rational. This would mean thatwhen any prospective perception variable is determining, it should be the pocketbook one.
97） It must be added, however, that the economy was highly unstable, especially in Venezuela (Weyland: 243―45).
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voting and their findings might suggest that an assumption implicitly or
explicitly shared by a majority (to my counting) of economic voting studies, theheuristics-employing voter model(s) in a broader sense, which assumes that
voters are motivated by future personal economic conditions and employing
heuristics for that purpose, seems to be the most adequate. Second, scholars whomake that assumption and the fully rational voter assumption―that is, most of
the economic voting studies―tend to be theoretically inconsistent in that they
are insensitive to the fact that future governance- or policy-induced personaleconomic conditions include much more than the effects of macroeconomic
conditions, one of the theoretically most important of which is the outcome ofredistributive policies, and that these elements of personal economic conditions
are inseparable theoretically (that is, not only technically) . Third, existing
economic voting studies are methodologically inconsistent in that they are notsensitive to the problems of the standard survey data analyses that tend to
obscure the actual determining power of prospective pocketbook perception.
Fourth, those findings exist that suggest that the outcomes of redistributive
policies influence vote choice by way of the perception of (future) personaleconomic conditions.
These points lead to a tentative conclusion that virtually all economic
98）

voting studies

have a shortcoming of not integrating the outcome ofredistributive policies in their analytical and theoretical frameworks, which isinconsistent because they exclude the part of the vote-choice base that is
inseparable empirically and theoretically from the part that they focus.
Modification of this point means that the framework of economic voting
studies includes position issues, which are essentially different from what has
been traditionally considered the factors of “economic voting” because they99）

would create conflict among voters.

Then, departing from practicalspecialization to valence economic conditions, the economic voting
framework100）

should be “generalized.” In other words, though many cases ofelections and a principal portion of voters can be understood by the framework98） I must add that if my considerations in the previous sections are right, other types ofvoter models are not plausible.
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“Generalizing” the Economic Voting Framework? (Part II)

with a virtually exclusive focus on valence economic conditions, that framework
must be “relativized.” It is worth pointing out that many existing studies havebeen analyzing the part in question without focusing on that and haveambiguously included that part in their definition of economic voting. Thus,
what is suggested in this essay is not to redefine but to “reframe” the economic
voting concept adequately (as〈economic voting〉).
This might mean that if you search for the “micro-foundation” of the
traditional theme of “economic voting” studies, you find that you should
reframe the “economic voting” concept and consider the ME nexus as part of amore general phenomenon. In other words, despite its original interest, testing
the conventional wisdom that “itʼs the economy” by (micro-level) economic voting
analyses might be rather misplaced because governance- and policy-induced
personal economic conditions include both macroeconomic conditions and theoutcome of positional policies, and they might lead to〈economic voting〉in
different directions. The nature of economic voting studies suggested here
should have the implication that they are not exactly suited to the task that they
are traditionally assigned: testing how much and when the ME nexus is strong.
At least, if we need the micro-foundation of the theories on the ME nexus, wemust be theoretically sensitive to the fact that the nexus is a part of thephenomenon that is interrelated with the effects of other policies, including
redistributive policies. Varied deter mination of election results bymacroeconomic conditions might be, in addition to the factors pointed out by
previous studies, the political and economic contexts, partly due to the fact thatmacroeconomic conditions matter as a part (though a principal part) of votersʼ
governance- and policy-induced personal economic conditions.
The characterization presented in the previous paragraph has its positive99） It might be a definition of “position issues.” Trade-off between inflation and unemployment also divides voters, but this issue is different in that it largely depends on the momentʼs economic conditions. The same voter might very well prefer expansive inflation-inducing
policies when the unemployment rate is high, and austerity measures under high-level inflation. See Izuoka (forthcoming).
100） In case, note that here I am focusing on micro-level subfield in the “economic voting”
studies.
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法学研究 95 巻 10 号（2022：10）

flipside: micro-level economic voting studies might be able to cover arepresentative positional issue, a crucial one in the economic area, as well. Also,
there should be some methods to test these aspects of〈economic voting〉, sinceeven the standard empirical method of economic voting studies―analyses ofstandard survey data―, if my preliminary attempt is valid, might be able to doit under some conditions.
I would like to add polemical and audacious comments. As shown above, asubstantial part of the literature shows that the majority of voters are notinformed and sophisticated enough to choose the vote options based on thecontent of the policies themselves (see especially Lenz 2012 and the literature citedin Erikson et al. 2002). However, it is also clear that positional economic policies

and issues do matter in elections as well, while macroeconomic conditions are
predominantly determinant in many elections.〈Economic voting〉as reframedin this essay, might partially explain both facts in a single integrated way.

101）

Voters might evaluate the policy options if they know well the outcomes of theclearly defined (types of) policies, including, evidently, expansive policies andausterity measures, by their past experiences, which are shown as〈economic
voting〉. What has been interpreted as lack of sophistication might be caused by
the fact that (or the supposed lack might mean that) the majority of voters are notso much interested in policies themselves as the outcomes of policies, and thatmight explain their level of information. If this is correct, it is clear by definition
that the “generalized” economic voting framework suggested in this essay is an
ideal approach for analyzing the mixed effects of (expected) economic
management and policies, including redistributive ones, on voting behavior. The“generalized” economic voting framework, rather than spatial theories, might bemore adequate for analyzing positional voting in economic issues as well. Given
that economic conditions matter the most for a significant portion of voters in a101） As shown by many studies, including the ones on targeted transfer policies cited inthis essay, it is also evident that typical voters count the policies that benefit them whenthose outcomes are evident. It might also be evident that not all outcomes of redistributive
policies function as〈economic voting〉. The benefits of parts of redistributive policies, especially social policies, may not be expressed or perceived as better personal financial conditions.
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“Generalizing” the Economic Voting Framework? (Part II)

significant number of elections, it could even contribute to a partial integrationof some of main voting behavior approaches.

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In Japanese
出岡 [Izuoka], 直也 [Naoya]. 2022.「チャベス政権支持増減の要因としてのマクロ経
済と再分配政策――世界資本主義の中のラテンアメリカ政治への含意の視角から」『国際政治』207: 17―32 (“Macroeconomic Conditions and Redistributive
Policies as Determinants of Support for the Chávez Administration: A Case for
Discussion about How (Much) World Capitalism Determines Latin American
Politics.” Kokusai Seiji (International Relations) 207: 17―32).

ErrataThere are several errors in the first part of this essay, published in the previous numberof this journal.
(1) On p.109(4), the sentence “For example, a standard reference book, Economic
Voting, tackles the theme without referring to other possible usages of the term
(Dorussen and Taylor, eds. 2002).” on the lines 1―3 should be deleted.
(2) On p.96(17), in the note 31, the line 3 should contain the number “2011” in place of“2012.”(3) On p.94(19), the line 16 should contain the number “2011” in place of “2012.”(29)110

“Generalizing” the Economic Voting Framework? (Part II)(4) On p.91(22), the line 19 should contain the number “2011” in place of “2012.”(5) On p.90(23), the line 8 should contain the number “2011” in place of “2012.”(6) On p.86(27), the line 7 should contain the number “2011” in place of “2012.”

109(30)