Policy Brief

June12,
1, 20222018
Dec

Dr. Monika Cha nsor ia is a
Tok yo -based Senior Fellow
at T he Japa n I nst it ute
of I nter nat iona l A f f a irs.
P r e v i o u s l y, s h e h a s h e l dappointments at the Sandia

Blending Japan’s Robust Economics
with Foreign Policy Pro-activism in
the 1960s:
The Hayato Ikeda Years

National Laboratories (U.S.),

Dr. Monika Chansoria

Hokkaido University (Sapporo,
Japan), and Fondation Maisondes S c ienc es de l ’ Hom me( Pa r is). Dr. Cha nsor ia has
authored five books including
her latest work, China, Japan,
and Senkaku Islands: Conf lictin the East China Sea Amid an
American Shadow (Routledge© 2018).

Disclaimer :The views expressed in thispublication are those of the authorand do not necessarily reflect thepolicy or position of The Japan
Institute of International Affairs or
any other organization with which
the author is affiliated.

Hayato Ikeda ( 池田 勇人 ) was a Japanese bureaucrat, and later
politician, who served as prime minister of Japan from July 1960 toNovember 1964, and he is remembered for being instrumental to
the nation’s phenomenal economic growth in the post-war years.
Coming from a humble family of sake brewers, Ikeda graduated inlaw from Kyōto Imperial University in 1925 and held many prominent
economic positions in post-war cabinets. He began his career inthe Ministry of Finance, where he sought to stabilize an economy
wrecked by inflation by means of a strong deflationar y policy. He
became closely associated with Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida,
becoming the finance minister in the third Yoshida cabinet. Premier
Yoshida had brought Ikeda into his cabinet in 1949 as a trustworthy
fellow bureaucrat who possessed outstanding ability in economic
policy and statistics. At that stage Ikeda ser ved primarily as atechnocratic minister having no prominent political constituency.
Along with future prime minister Eisaku Satō, Ikeda came to be
known as a leading exponent of the ‘Yoshida School’ of conservative
politics. Ikeda also served terms as Secretary-General of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) and as the Chairman of the LDP’s Political
Affairs Research Committee. 1 Ikeda’s role in the cabinet became
politicized, with his taking on the role of a political advisor in planning
the surprise Diet and electoral strategies of 1953 and 1954.2 A few
years later, while delivering a speech at Hibiya Park in January 1957,
Ikeda stated that the Japanese economy had recovered from post-war
confusion, and was ready to be moderately stimulated without fear of
inflation or balance of payments problems.
 or further details see, Masaya Ito, Ikeda Hayato, sono sei to shi [Hayato
F
Ikeda, His Life and Death] (Tokyo: Shiseido, 1966).
2 George W. Waldner, Japanese Foreign Policy and Economic Growth: Ikeda
Hayato’s Approach to the Liberalization Issue , Department of Politics,
Princeton University, March 1975, pp. 136-137.
1

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Policy Brief

thinking on policy af fairs star ted from his
conviction that rapid economic growth wasa kind of all-purpose remedy – a policy thatwould provide solutions to nearly all of Japan’sinternal and external problems. None of Ikeda’s
positions on foreign policy can be understoodunless one comprehends his desire to achievea high rate of economic growth. 5 In Ikeda’s
mind, domestic economic objectives and generalforeign policy strategy were interlinked by aclose causal connection. Foreign policy wasconceptualized as a means to realize goals
for the domestic economy, rather than viceversa. It was this linkage between domestic
economic policy and foreign policy that pulled
Ikeda into the debate on trade and investment
liberalization policy in 1959 and 1960.6 Ikeda
urged that a new view of Japan’s viability as an
economic unit serve as the guiding light for thenation’s domestic and foreign economic policies,
wherein Japan could prosper domestically andparticipate positively in the creation of an open
international economic order.7

Domestic Economic Objectives andForeign Policy Strategy:
The Causal Connection
Upon the resignation of Prime Minister
Nobusuke Kishi in July 1960, Ikeda became
President of the LDP and began his tenure as
Japan’s prime minister. With a stated goal of
doubling Japan’s national income in a period of
10 years, Ikeda launched a high-rate economic
growth policy based on expanded public-sector
spending, reduced taxes, and efforts to keep
both inflation and interest rates on the lower
side. Moreover, he made determined ef for ts
to break down trade bar riers to Japanese
goods in foreign markets. Ikeda announced his
famous Gekkyu Nibai Ron (Income DoublingPlan) during a speech in his native Hiroshima
Prefecture in March 1959. The following month,
he laid out the idea in detail in the Kochikai’smonthly publication Shinro. Ikeda began
the ar ticle by proclaiming, “… the economic
vitality of the Japanese people is over taking
that of the advanced Western nations.”3 Ikeda’s
Income Doubling Plan catered to national
development and individual success among
the Japanese elite and masses. He articulated
that the proper solution to Japan’s less-thanoptimum economic per formance would be a
new version of his ‘positive economics’ policy.
Ikeda’s revised version of positive economics
extended it beyond the sphere of budgetar ypolicies and included in it the broader notionthat the ultimate goal of national economic
development should not be export surpluses or
national power, but rather the greatest good forthe greatest number. In concrete terms, Ikeda
stated, the goal should be phrased as “Income
Doubling Plan”.4

The outcomes of foreign policy debates inpost-war Japan can be explained in terms of theorganizational and ideological characteristics
of Japan’s politics. The approaches contrast
in the conceptualization of Japan’s economic
capabilities. In particular, the Sanbon bashira(or “Three Pillars”) theor y can be considereda cor nerstone of Ikeda’s vision concer ning
Japanese diplomatic relations with great powers.
According to the Sanbon bashira theor y, only
Japan among Asian countries could ser ve thecause of the “free world” alongside the US andWestern Europe. The basic principle on which
this theor y was based was that any division
among the “Three Pillars” was to be carefully
avoided, given the constant Soviet threatthat Moscow could take advantage of any rift

It needs to be emphasized that Ikeda’s
3
4
5
6
7

I bid., p. 130.
Ibid., p. 132.
Ibid., p. 182.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 264.

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Policy Brief

between Western countries and drive a wedge
in the Western bloc in order to destabilize it.8
Perhaps Tokyo’s main concern was linked to
the wedge that could be driven between Japanand the North Atlantic axis, with the consequentisolation of the former. Although the theory of
the Sanbon bashira was definitely based on thecontingencies determined by the Cold War, it
drew support from Japan’s noteworthy economic
success of those years. In a way, it provided
Japan with a new identity, turning it into anadvanced countr y with a solid international
reputation, marching in the steps of the UnitedStates and Europe.9

world dominance expressed by Kennedy at his
inauguration, the six-month-old government of
Hayato Ikeda announced that Japan had a grandvision for the 1960s as well. Ikeda sought fullrecognition of Japan’s potential and real positionin the world economy, 12 and stressed a plan
to double Japan’s national income by 1970 bymeans of exports to the US.13
Ikeda was among the first foreign leaders
to visit the new Kennedy White House inearly 1961. Even though Ikeda arrived with acomplicated agenda stressing foreign tradeissues, Kennedy and his New Frontier ‘cando’ philosophy welcomed the challenge. In
fact, Kennedy’s welcoming of Ikeda’s 1961
economic mission represented a shift in
US policy. At that time, the discussions in
Washington centered on the Communist threatthat was materializing in two different forms:
pacific subversive penetration in Indonesia,
and “proxy” guerrilla insurgencies in Laos andVietnam.14 For Kennedy, the priority was clear:engineer success for Ikeda’s cause and thereby
strengthen conservative anti-Communist forces
in Japan.15

Ikeda, Kennedy, and the New Frontier –New Japan Summit
During his four-year tenure as prime minister,Ikeda maintained a comparatively low profile in
the realm of foreign affairs, though he did makequite a few high-profile speeches, including at
the US Congress in 1961, which consequently
set important goals10 for the US-Japan bilateralrelationship providing direction to policymakers.
This was a time when, sweeping away ‘the tired,
old ideas’ of the Eisenhower administration,
Kennedy announced his administration’s ‘firststep’ policies in early 1961 that would eliminate‘Republican protectionism’ in order to meetthe economic expansionist plans of ‘New
Japan’.11 Responding to the vision of American

In the US view, the problems of the Far
East, and of Asia generically, were not only
linked to the spread of the “Red Threat” butalso to the region’s economic, and socioeconomic conditions and progress – issues

Oliviero Frattolillo, Reassessing Japan’s Cold War: Ikeda Hayato’s Foreign Politics and Proactivism During the
1960s , (London: Routledge, 2019), p. 122.
9 Ibid.
10 For more details see, Midori Yoshii, “Reducing the American Burden? U.S. Mediation between South Korea andJapan, 1961–1965,” The Japanese Journal of American Studies , no. 20, 2009, pp. 47 – 65.
11 As cited in, “The US-Japan Relationship, January-June 1961,” State Department Briefing Material to Kennedy, forthe visit of Prime Minister Ikeda, US State Department, June 23, 1961, (Boston, MA: JFK Library).
12 Reischauer to Rusk and Rusk to Frederick P. Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations,
October 12, 1961, WHCF/Box 141, (Boston, MA: JFK Library).
13 Timothy P. Maga, “The new frontier and the new Japan: Kennedy, Ikeda, and the ‘end of US protectionism’ 1961–
63,” Diplomacy & Statecraft , vol. 5, no. 2, 1994, p. 373.
14 Frattolillo, n. 8, p. 40.
15 For further background on the subject of Japanese political factions in the early 1960s, see Robert Scalapino and
Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley, 1962); also see, Nathaniel B. Thayer,
How the Conservatives Rule Japan (Princeton, 1962).
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Policy Brief

that would require an enormous ef for t ininternational aid programs, even in the absenceof a Communist threat. The White House’splan was to be articulated by means of threemain points: 1) preser ving and protecting
individual and collective defense capabilities; 2)providing assistance to countries threatened by
Communist forces directly or indirectly; and 3)
strengthening development and aid programsin order to improve material standards of living.
The last point in particular was to be an “essential
ingredient in any ef for t to resist Communistpressures, whether peaceful or militar y”. 16
In the course of the meeting between Ikeda
and Kennedy, Laos emerged as a particularly
alarming case. Both the US and Japan hoped thatthe work of the Geneva Conference would soon
lead to the birth of an independent and neutral
Laos. To this end, Washington committed toa broad American presence in the countr ythrough the establishment of a Commission tomonitor its neutrality, a technical and economic
aid agency supported by concerned countries,
and a militar y advisor y mission to train local
armed forces and maintain internal security.17

initiative that could promote its retur n to
Communist China was to be seen as a threat
to the peace and prosperity of Japan.18 Ikeda
went to the extent of saying that the main
reason for Japan welcoming more imports from
America than from any other nation was theneed to prove Japan’s worthiness as a reliableeconomic partner.19 By June 1961, Japan stoodsecond among the trading par tners of theUnited States.20 The June 1961 Kennedy-Ikeda
meeting was referred to as the New Frontier/
New Japan summit that set the tone and tenorof US-Japanese economic relations for many
years to come,21 and resulted in both leaders
making their ‘first steps’ in their respective ‘new
beginnings’ policies.
Talking briefly at the US House ofRepresentatives in 1961, Ikeda outlined Japan’splans for economic revival and its commitment
to democracy and human rights. What remained
notable in Ikeda’s speech was a pledge
that Japan would “play a more positive andpurposeful role in the international community”
to contribute to “world peace and humanprogress.” True to his word, Japan became thesecond largest contributor to the United Nations
and a consistent top-five provider of overseasde v e l opme nt a s s i s t a nc e a nd c o-f oun d e dthe Asian Development Bank, among othereconomic and foreign policy contributions. 22
Expanding on Ikeda’s 1961 pledge, thecontemporar y US-Japan alliance seeks tocooperate more comprehensively in a mannerthat adds a substantive security component

The position expressed by Ikeda, however,
was unequivocal: Japan’s then policy of nonrecognition of the People’s Republic of China
represented a core interest and had to bepreser ved. Any unilateral action that could
jeopardize the balance of power in the region
or risk removing Tokyo from the US orbit andthe Western bloc was to be avoided. Moreover,as far as Taiwan was concerned, any diplomatic
16

17
18
19
20
21
22

For further details see, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères Français, Compte rendu de l’entretien entre Monsieur
Georges Pompidou et Monsieur Hayato Ikeda, Tokyo, Avril 7, 1964, Ohira_Ikeda_Pompidou 1964, MAEF, vol. 6,
no. 32; also see, Frattolillo, n. 8, p. 40.
Ibid., p. 41.
Ibid., p. 43.
For details see, Ikeda to Kennedy , October 25, 1962, and July 31, 1963, POF/Box 120, (Boston, MA: JFK Library).
Maga, n. 13, pp. 378-379.
Ibid.
For details see, James L. Schoff, “The Historic Part of Prime Minister Abe’s U.S. Visit,” U.S. News & World Report ,April 21, 2015, available at https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/21/historic-part-of-prime-minister-abes-u.s.-visit-pub-59874; and for related literature on the late 1950s US-Japan defence ties see, George Packard III,
Protest in Tokyo (Princeton, 1966).

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to its already robust economic and foreign
policy coordination.23 Talks with the US went
for ward, as in the Joint Trade and Economic
Committee established in 1961, to bring abouta closer integration of the economic policies of
the two countries in the region. In May 1961,
an Asian Productivity Organ was set up in
Tokyo. Subsequently, in September 1961, Japan
became a member of the OECD’s Development
Assistance Committee.24

Japan’s economic problems: the incomplete
state of its own development. Consequently,
Ikeda put his greatest efforts into his “10-year
income-doubling” and trade liberalization plan,by means of which he hoped to restructure theJapanese economy for equal competition withthe most advanced economies in the world.26
Given that aid was vital in promoting Japan’s
export-based growth, its Official Development
Assistance (ODA) loans were closely linked
to Ikeda’s Income Doubling Plan. This planencouraged exports of Japan’s heavy industrial
products to Asia, envisaging a 10 percent
annual increase in the total volume of Japanese
exports and a 13 percent annual increase in theexports of heavy industrial products. The goalof this export-oriented policy was to redirect
Japan’s industrial structure from light to heavy
industry.27 Led primarily by the then Ministry ofInternational Trade and Industry (MITI), ODA
became an impor tant tool to assist Japanese
heavy industry firms in finding large markets in
Asia. As a result of strong governmental support
and backing, Japanese aid within and beyond
Asia increased rapidly in the 1960s. Japan’sbilateral loans grew from US $48 million in 1960
to US $191.3 million in 1968. During the same
period, Japan’s bilateral grants and grant-likeflows (including reparations) expanded from US$67 million to US $117 million, and multilateral
aid increased from US $30 million to US $48
million.28

Ikeda and Japan’s Outward-looking
Policy towards Southeast and South Asia
The various stages of Japan’s post-war Asianpolicy characterized during the Kishi period
saw Japan as a middle power whose goal wasto establish an economic base in Asia. Under
Ikeda, Japan began to consider itself, at least in
economic terms, as a great power whose goal
was to integrate its economy as an equal partnerwith the advanced industrial economies of the
Pacific beyond Asia. 25 Never theless, Ikeda’s
Asia diplomacy did not find as much success asperhaps his administration would have hopedfor. Although regional trade expansion had
occurred, the rate of increase was less thanJapan’s trade in general.
The rethinking of Japan’s position in Asia wasstimulated to a large extent by the formationof the European Economic Community (EEC),
and the apprehension in Japan that its goods
might be at an even greater competitive
disadvantage in European markets and markets
elsewhere, including underdeveloped Asia.
It was against this backdrop that the Ikeda
Administration began addressing the root of
23
24

25
26
27
28

The core of Japanese foreign aid restedon three primar y policies: 1) war reparations
from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s; 2) aid
to promote Prime Minister Ikeda’s IncomeI bid.
James W. Morley, “Japan’s Position in Asia,” Journal of International Affairs , vol. 17, no. 2, 1963, p. 151; also see,
Visit of Prime Minister Ikeda to Washington, June 20–23, 1961; Japanese Desire for Membership in the OECD ,(Declassified E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4, NLK-92-138, (Boston, MA: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library).
Ibid., p. 154.
Ibid., p. 153.
For more details see, I.M.D. Little and J.M. Clifford, International Aid , (Chicago: Aldine, 1966).
A. Rix, Japan’s Economic Aid: Policy-making and Politics , (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980).

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the 1960s.32

Doubling Plan; and 3) “resource diplomacy”
in the 1970s. These policies, including war
reparations, were designed to promote Japanese
economic development in the post-World War
II era. By the 1960s, Japan had achieved postwar recovery and double-digit economic growth
rates. Economic assistance to developing
countries was by then no longer limited to thereparations programs. In 1958, Japan distributed
its first bilateral loan aid as part of the WorldBank Consor tium for India. Subsequently,
Japanese bilateral loans began in othercountries, such as South Vietnam and Brazil inthe late 1950s and the early 1960s.29

Japan under Ikeda sought cooperation withfree Asia and partnership with the free world.
Towards the beginning of his tenure as PM,
Ikeda continued to execute a for thcoming
approach towards Asia. The Ikeda Government
continued the policy of close cooperation
with various international efforts in Asia, withJapanese representatives being par ticularly
active in the UN Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East [ECAFE]. Following his
November 1961 tour of India, Burma, Pakistan,
and Thailand, Ikeda turned focus and worked
hard to resolve two outstanding issues that had
refused to stay settled: the Thai special yen
account, and Burmese reparations.33 Ikeda also
continued the policy of modestly expanding theoverseas loan program beyond the requirementsof reparations. In November 1960, a year before
his South Asia and Southeast Asia tour, Japan
extended a credit of $20 million to Pakistan; in
December that year it added $10 million more to
its loans to India and donated 2 million yen forrelief to Laos. At home, an Overseas Economic
Cooperation Fund of 10.4 billion yen was set
up in March 1961 to offer long-term financing
to development projects which had dif ficulty
securing loans on a commercial basis.34

Although becoming an economicallyadvanced country was a post-war achievement,
Japan’s ‘new reality’ had yet to be definedand confirmed by the decade of the 1960s. It
would therefore perhaps have been premature
to expect an outwar d-looking attitude ininternational affairs from Japan, which opted for“low-posture diplomacy”. However, once Ikeda
became prime minister, Japan began to adopt
a slightly “higher posture”.30 The process wascertainly easier in places that were not too close
to the homeland, since in fairly remote areas
there need seldom be any serious contradiction
between Japan as “the third pillar of the Free
World” and Japan as “the dynamic leader ofan economically-awakening Asia”.31 As an allyof the United States, and as the most highlyindustrialized Asian power, Japan had achieved
the potential to exer t a considerable degreeof influence in the region. During the 1950s,
however, it did not adopt a positive, consistent,
or particularly outward-looking policy towards
Southeast Asia, at least until the beginning of
29

30
31
32
33
34

Following his Asia visit, a semi-governmental
Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency (Kaigai
gijutsu kyō ryoku jigyō dan) was formed in June
1962 to conduct an expanded program oftechnical cooperation, formerly entrusted to the
Asian Society (Asia kyō kai). In particular, theexpanding political interactions between India
and Japan through the 1960s was highlighted

 or further details and reading see, T. Yanagihara and A. Emig, “An Overview of Japan’s Foreign Aid,” in S. Islam,Fed., Yen for Development: Japanese foreign aid and the politics of burden sharing , (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations Press, 1991), pp. 37–69.
As cited from, Frattolillo, n. 8, p. 115.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Morley, n. 24, p. 150.
Ibid., p. 151.

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Policy Briefby the state visit of Premier Ikeda, in addition
to the November-December 1960 visit ofJapan’s Crown Prince and Princess to India and
Nepal and the royal couple’s visit a year later,in Januar y-Febr uar y 1962, to Pakistan andIndonesia.35

monarch-in-waiting to visit India in 1960 as
Crown Prince, welcomed there by the first ringof independent India’s leadership. 37 Besides
their 1960 visit, Their Imperial Highnesses also
stopped over in India twice—in 1962 enrouteto Pakistan, and in 1975 enroute to Indonesia.
The decade of the 1960s was also significant
for Japan in that it was this decade in which
Japan celebrated the 100th anniversar y of theaccession of the Meiji emperor, who granteda modern constitution to the Japanese people
in 1889. The Imperial (or Meiji) Constitutionof 1889, which declared the sovereignty of theemperor, also provided that the emperor would
rule “according to the provisions of the present
Constitution.” Because the 1889 Constitution
was flexible enough to permit the emergence ofparliamentar y democracy in the 1920s, Prime
Minister Shidehara had said in 1945 that it
would be possible to democratize Japan without
amending the Imperial Constitution. 38 Statebuilding is an essential component of politicalmoder nization, and the impor tance of theJapanese imperial institution in this connectionis undeniable. In Japanese tradition, the imperial
dynasty preceded and established the state, andthere is no hard historical evidence to disprove
this theory.39 Though Crown Prince Akihito andCrown Princess Michiko played a role in helping
define the monarchy as though it were “natural”,
the fact remains that, for the most part, socialchange was pushing the monarchy rather thanthe monarchy driving social change.40

Premier Ikeda’s 1961 State Visit to India
The decade of the 1960s saw a transformationin the way Japan perceived India. The post-war
era played out in the shadow of a new kind ofimperial development – the Cold War.36 Indiasought to remain independent and avoided
joining either power bloc during the Cold
War, favoring neither the US nor the Soviet
Union. Against this backdrop, the visit of Prime
Minister Hayato Ikeda to India and that offormer Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
to Japan became touchstones highlighting theinherent changes and continuity in the IndiaJapan relationship during the tumultuous decadeof the 1960s in Asia. Significantly, two successive
Japanese prime ministers, Nobusuke Kishi and
Hayato Ikeda, visited India in 1957 and 1961,
each within three months of taking office.
In 1958, the first president of the Republicof India, Rajendra Prasad, visited Japan. Crown
Prince Akihito returned the of ficial visit anda mutual climate of amiability was created.
Premier Ikeda’s visit happened following
the historic first-ever visit of Japan’s Crown
Prince Akihito and Princess Michiko. Notably,
former Emperor Akihito was the first Japanese
35

36
37
38
39
40

The rhetoric of Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda

 or details on this see, Monika Chansoria, “Role of the Monarchy in Expanding Japan’s Diplomatic Reach: Tracing
F
Emperor Akihito’s visits to India in 1960 and 2013,” Policy Brief , Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo,
September 12, 2022, available at https://www.jiia-jic.jp/en/policybrief/pdf/PolicyBrief_Chansoria_220912.pdf
K. Hara, Cold War Frontier in the Asia-Pacific: Divided Territories in the San Francisco System , (New York:
Routledge, 2007).
Chansoria, n. 35.
Theodore McNelly, “The Role of Monarchy in the Political Modernization of Japan,” Comparative Politics , vol. 1, no.
3, April 1969, p. 372.
Ibid., p. 368.
Kenneth J. Ruoff, Japan’s Imperial House in the Postwar Era, 1945–2019 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 2020), p. 352.

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Policy Brief

during his visit to India in 1961– that Tokyoand Delhi were the ‘natural pegs’ of a security
system in Asia – spoke volumes about India’s
evolving diplomatic and strategic importanceto Japan at the time, 41 even though Ikeda
regarded India as part of undeveloped Asia.42
Never theless, while the two nations werestrategically inclined to each other, the reasonsfor their mutual inclination remained somewhat
out of sync, which soon became apparent post1961. Hiroshi Sato obser ved that India wasphased out of the Japanese diplomatic horizon
after the 1950s, as Tokyo began to shift its focus
increasingly towards Southeast Asia. However,
Sato simultaneously argued that India’s goodwill
never dissipated, and was invoked wheneverJapan wanted to revitalize relations with India toextend its diplomatic horizon beyond Southeast
Asia.43

record of $58 million in 1957. Post that, however,Japan’s imports rose rapidly, soaring up to $72
million in 1960. For that matter, even in themost unfavorable year, 1958, the two-way IndoJapanese trade surpassed the $150 million mark,thereby proving that Japan and India would
remain important to each other as markets.45 In
1960, India ranked ninth as an importer fromJapan and 11th as an exporter to Japan. On theother hand, Japan was the third-largest buyer ofIndian products and the fourth biggest supplier
to India.46
Economic Aid
Apart from the $50 million loan extended in
1958, Japan, as a member of the Consortiumof Governments and Institutions interested indevelopment assistance to India, made its firstextension of a $10 million credit to India in 1958,
and its second extension of a credit of an equalamount in 1959. 47 In 1961, an additional $11
million credit was provided. In the successive
years of 1959 and 1960, Japan pledged to extend
loans of $8 million and $21 million to India and,in August 1961, Japan again pledged to grant a$80 million loan to India in order to cover the
first two years of India’s third five-year plan as amember of the Washington Consortium.48

Economic Relations
During the periods when Kishi and Ikeda
visited India, the economic relations between
Japan and India were expanding on a stablebasis. While Japan’s exports to India came to atemporar y standstill after reaching their peakof $144 million in 1957, they recovered to the$112 million mark in 1960, aided by the progressof economic cooperation between the twocountries.44 Japan’s imports from India dropped
to $54 million in 1958 after reaching a post-war
41
42
43

44

45
46
47
48

At the political/diplomatic level, there was agap of 23 years between the 1961 state visit ofSourabh Gupta, “Article 9 Reinterpreted: Can Japan and India collaborate in a ‘Broader Asia,’” in Shihoko Goto, ed.,The Rebalance within Asia: The Evolution of Japan-India Relations, (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2014), p. 47.
For further details see, Purnendra Jain, “Twin Peaks: Japan’s Economic Aid to India in the 1950s and 2010s,” JICARI Working Paper , no. 139, February 2017, (Tokyo: JICA Research Institute), p. 14.
Hiroshi Sato, “India Japan Peace Treaty in Japan’s Postwar Asian Diplomacy.” Journal of the Japanese Associationfor South Asia 17, 2005, p. 14; and see, R. Das Gupta and L.M. Lüthi, eds., The Sino-Indian War of 1962: New
Perspectives , (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).
S tate Visit to India: Hayato Ikeda, Prime Minister of Japan, Dispatch by Embassy of Japan, (National Archives ofIndia, New Delhi: Digitized Document), November 1, 1961, available athttps://indianculture.gov.in/archives/pamphlet-containing-details-hayate-ikeda-japanese-prime-ministers-visitindia
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

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Policy Brief

Prime Minister Ikeda, and the May 1984 visit byPrime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. The period
following Ikeda’s India visit was a difficult phasein Indo-Japan relations. The stagnation was
attributed primarily to India’s refusal in 1968 tosign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)of which Japan has been a committed supporter.
Japan held its focus during this period on Asia,
but Tokyo did not appear to regard India as partof its Asia strategy. Studies and archival recordsof Japan–India relations through this period havenoted this apathy and low-level interaction, 49
with research on Japan’s interaction with Asia
in that era not finding/including any analysis ofJapan’s relations with India.50

in place an economic growth framework anda blueprint for realizing that growth. From
managing to bring relative stability in Japanesepolitics, Ikeda’s trademark Income Doubling
Plan proved to be a landmark success that wenta long way in extending the lifecycle of Japan’s
post-war economic marvel. In fact, the Gekkyu
Nibai Ron managed to enshrine ‘economic
growth’ as Japan’s economic and foreign policy
pivot and gospel goal for nearly all post-Ikeda
gover nments and leaderships. 52 Managing
to etch his name as perhaps among the mostprominent politicians in Japan’s rapid economic
growth stor y in the post-war decades, Ikeda
brought about a circumstance that was effective,
both for the government and governance.

H o w e v e r, I n d i a n P r i m e M i n i s t e r P. V.
Narasimha Rao’s epochal economic reformsof 1991, which altered the destiny of India’s
economic health, also changed the course ofIndia’s relations with many countries, including
Japan. The economic reforms of 1991 managed
to etch India’s positioning in Japan’s Asian
diplomacy like never before. India’s high andcontinually growing economic profile and, more
impor tantly, the future prospect of a robust
and rising economic char t became a sturdy
determining factor for Japan to rethink andreposition India in its strategic thinking.51

Japan took a long time to modify theparameters of its foreign and security policies in
the post-war period. Ikeda’s economic policies
influenced Japan’s foreign policy conversations
and approach rather significantly, with Japan
successfully managing its foreign economic
policy flows across borders and becoming
predominantly influential in the global economy
scenario during the said era. The economic
success chart generated confidence, which ineffect transformed the way Japan began to craft
its re-engagement within and beyond Asia. Bymeans of Ikeda’s concept of Sanbon bashira,Tokyo sought to serve as the third pillar of theinternational political architecture, catering toboth international politics and economics.53 To
a large extent, this enabled a new lease of proactivism in Japan’s foreign policy in the 1960s

Conclusion
Though Ikeda resigned in November 1964 on
grounds of ill health, his subtle and conciliatory
posture and politics went a long way in putting
49
50
51

52

53

For further details and references on this see, Toshio Yamazaki and Mitsuru Takahashi, eds., Nihon to Indo: koryu
no rekishi [Japan and India: A History of Their Interaction], (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1993).
Akihiko Tanaka, Ajia no naka no Nihon [Japan in Asia], (Tokyo: NTT Shuppan, 2007).
T he Japan-India New Partnership, Remarks by Ambassador of Japan to India Yasukuni Enoki, cited in USI Journal,
July 2004 – September 2004, available at https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/the-japan-india-newpartnership/
Ikeda declared that Japan sought to develop its own distinctive role in foreign affairs during the 1960s. Growing
Japanese economic interest in Southeast Asia proved the point; for further reading and details on this subjectsee, Timothy P. Maga, John F. Kennedy and the New Pacific Community, 1961-63, (University of Maryland, Asian
Division), 1990.
Frattolillo, n. 8, p. 122.

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Policy Brief

with full awareness of the strategic benefits thatit could generate, including in terms of reachingout to Southeast Asia and South Asia apart fromthe US and Europe.

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