Policy Brief

June30,1, 2018
Sep
2019

Dr. Monika Cha nsor ia is a
Tok yo -based Senior Fellow
at T he Japa n I nst it ute
of I nter nat iona l A f f a irs.
P r e v i o u s l y, s h e h a s h e l dappointments at the Sandia

British India, Russia, and the Futureof Neighborhood Diplomacy:
Ek a i K awa g uch i’s Not es on 20 t hCentury Tibet*

National Laboratories (U.S.),

Dr. Monika Chansoria

Hokkaido University (Sapporo,
Japan), and Fondation Maisondes S c ienc es de l ’ Hom me( Pa r is). Dr. Cha nsor ia has
authored five books including
her latest work, China, Japan,
and Senkaku Islands: Conf lictin the East China Sea Amid an
American Shadow (Routledge© 2018).

Disclaimer :The views expressed in thispublication are those of the authorand do not necessarily reflect thepolicy or position of The Japan
Institute of International Affairs or
any other organization with which
the author is affiliated.

Tibet and British India
Around the decade of 1880s, a substantial number of native
Indians (usually pilgrims and priests visiting sacred places) werepermitted to enter Tibet. Ekai Kawaguchi recalled his experienceand understanding of the Tibetans and described them as inherently
hospitable people, by and large. Assessing the relationship existing
formerly between British India and Tibet, Kawaguchi acknowledgedthat British India was closely connected with Tibet since long. In theinitial phase, Tibet’s attitude towards the British Indian Government
could not be termed resentful or hostile.
The English East India Company’s relation with Tibet was initiatedby Warren Hastings. During the last quarter of the 18th centur y,
the first de facto Governor-General of India, Hastings, sent George
Bogle to establish commercial trade arrangements between the twocountries. The first contact in this regard was made by the Tibetans.
Upon hearing the news of the defeat of Bhutan’s King Desi Shidariva1
by the British forces in the battle for Cooch Behar (1772-1774),
Palden Yeshe (the third Panchen Lama) addressed a historic letter of
mediation to the Governor General.2 Hastings seized the opportunity,
and while replying, proposed a general treaty of amity and peaceThis is the fourth paper in a continuing series tracing the travels and journeyof Japanʼs ﬁrst successful explorer inside Tibet in 1900, Ekai Kawaguchi. The
narrative, citations, and arguments of this paper are primarily excerpted andbased on Kawaguchiʼs personal memoir published in 1909, titled Three Yearsin Tibet , [Theosophist Oﬃce, Vasanta Press, Adyar (Madras) British India.]
1 A. Deb, Bhutan and India: A Study in Frontier Political Relations, 1772-1865 ,(Calcutta Publication, 1976), pp. 72-74.
2 Panchen Lamaʼs Letter, received March 29, 1774, cited in, Arabinda Deb, Tibet
and Bengal: A Study in Trade Policy and Trade Pattern 1775-1875 , available athttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/id/636937/bot̲1984̲03̲03.pdf/
*

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Policy Brief

between Bengal and Tibet. Hastings wrote a
letter for George Bogle to proceed to Tibet fornegotiation of a treaty. Bogle’s mission was toestablish a mutual and equal communicationof trade between the inhabitants of Bhutan(Bhote=Tibet) and Bengal.3

only English explorer to have reached Lhasa in
1811 from India was Thomas Manning.9 Aroundthis time, trade between British India and Tibet
had actively grown, but with the termination of
Hasting’s viceroyalty and subsequent return toEngland, trade began to register a steep decline,
and ultimately ceased altogether. All channelsof communications had since become almost
closed between the two countries. Meanwhile,
the movement and activities of Christian
missionaries and other foreign propagandists
put the Grand Lama’s Gover nment on its
guard.10

Apar t from this, Hastings also sought
information regarding the trade between Tibet
and Siberia, Tibet and China, and, Kashmir andTibet. Bogle, armed with a memorandum on
the histor y, religion, and hierarchy of Tibet,
ventured out for the first British mission to Tibet
and Bhutan (I774-1775) making it an exercise
in commercial diplomacy.4 Bogle, accompanied
by his wife, failed to reach Lhasa, but remainedat Shigatze in 1774. With his limited experienceand reach in Tibet, he managed to record agraphic summar y of the scope and pattern ofTibet’s trade with other countries.5 The Tibetanstraded with the Chinese, the Mongols, andthe Kalmuks in the north, and Bengal, Assam,
Nepal, and Bhutan bordering Tibet on thesouth.6 Bogle noted that no duties were leviedon goods and trade was protected and free fromexactions.7 This was a major reason for a large
number of foreign merchants including the
Kashmiris and the Nepalese to settle in Tibet.

During the years when Kawaguchi was inLhasa (Tibet) and following his departure, theofficial relationship between Tibet and British
India ceased. England’s approach towards Tibet
in the early phases could best be described ascoercive. Kawaguchi attributed the oscillating
cur ve of relations to the hasty policy adopted
by England towards Tibet in the early years ofthe 20th centur y.11 Moreover, he ascribed it toEngland’s ignorance of the temper of Tibetans,and to the general state of af fairs in theircountry. Kawaguchi argued in his memoir that if
the British Indian Government had made someadvances acceptable to Tibet, the former could
well have succeeded in establishing cordial
relations with the latter.

Few years later, in 1781, Hastings once again
dispatched a commissioner, Captain Turner,
who stayed in Tibet for two years, although
not necessarily in Lhasa. Subsequently, British
India did not send more such commissioners.8
Kawaguchi refers to Bogle’s account of his
journey being extant in print, and notes that the

The causes that completely altered Tibet’s
attitude towards British India and the outerworld leading to the estrangement of the
T ibetan Gover nment from England were:
1) Sarat Chandra Das being disguised as a

3
4
5
6
7

Deb, n. 2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Clements Markham, The Mission of George Bogle to Tibet and the Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa , (London
1876), p. 124.
8 Chapter LXXII, Tibet and British India , p. 515.
9 Chapter LVIII, Foreign Explorers and the Policy of Seclusion , p. 401.
10 Ibid.
11 Chapter LXXII, Tibet and British India , p. 509.

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Sikkimese priest only to be revealed later; 2) the
agitation that occurred within Tibet thereafter;and 3) the frontier trouble that followed thesedevelopments. 12 Tibet’s adoption of the strict
policy of exclusion and absolute seclusion werein fact direct fallout of the above. On the other
hand, these developments directed the attentionof the British Indian Government to the questionof delimiting the boundary between Sikkim (itsprotectorate) and Tibet.13

lying beyond the legitimate boundar y line of
Tibet. The crumbled stone walls standing ona hill about 20 miles on the side of Nyatong(which marked the boundar y between Sikkim
and Tibet) indicated the short-lived stronghold
built by the Tibetan Government 16 – one, inwhich, the Tibetans suffered heavy casualties.17
Following this short skirmish, the frontier line
was drawn through Nyatong. England’s decision
to send its forces changed the attitude of Tibet
towards the former greatly. Tibet, resultantly,
was closed up entirely since that time, notonly for British India, but even for Russia andPersia.18

According to Kawaguchi, it was at this stage
that the Tibetan Government adopted a recklessmeasure, perhaps at the behest of a Nechungand proceeded to build a for t at a frontier
position that distinctly belonged to Sikkim.
Nechung priests–the oracle-mongers of Tibet,
were regarded as guardian angels of the Lama
Hierarchy. They were placed under the direct
patronage of the Hierarchy. The Nechungs
were not confined in their operations to mattersof incarnation only, but exercised power evenin small affairs. Nechung priests wielded real
power in the Hierarchical administration.
Rejecting the Nechung’s words was considered
contrary to the traditions of the country.14 The
Tibetan Government was reportedly hesitant
initially to follow the insidious advice, but the
Nechung declared that his presence in the fort
would disarm any troops that the British Indian
Government might potentially send. He further
argued that the presence of a fort would go far
towards promoting Tibet’s cause in settling
the boundar y dispute and that the fort would
become a permanent boundary mark.15

England, however, did take calculated
measures thereafter to win a favorable opinion
among Tibetans. The British Indian Viceroy
endeavored to convey friendly impressions
whenever Tibetans arrived in frontier towns
such as Darjeeling and Sikkim. The childrenof these T ibetans were at liber ty to enter
Government schools without paying tuition fees,
while deser ving boys who displayed potential
were sent at Government expense to higher
educational institutions. It was well known
that a number of Tibetan boys were employedby the Indian Government as sur veyors, Post
Of fice clerks and teachers, upon completing
graduation.19 The Tibetans would often marvel
seeing the roads in British India when they
arrived for the first time. Public facilities suchas hospitals, asylums, educational institutions,railways, telegraphs and telephones–were
objects of awe to the Tibetans.20 All the above
notwithstanding, Kawaguchi noted that thepolicy and ef for ts of indirectly winning theConsequently, the fort was built at a point
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Ibid., p. 516.
Ibid., pp. 515-516.
Chapter LXI, The Tibetan Hierarchy , pp. 422-424.
Chapter LXXII, Tibet and British India , p. 516.
Ibid., p. 517.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 509.
Ibid., p. 510.
Ibid., p. 511.

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goodwill of Tibetans pursued by British India
did not succeed grandly, since it failed tochange the perception of England in Tibet’s
Government circles.21

Shata, the eldest of Tibet’s Premiers wasa close friend of Tsan-ni Kenbo. Belonging to
one of the most illustrious families in Tibet,
the Shata’s house stood in hereditar y feudwith the great monaster y Tangye-ling whose
head, Lama Temo Rinpoche, acted as a Regent
before the 13th Dalai Lama had been installed.
Kawaguchi describes that phase as one in which
Shata’s star was on a decline. He had to leave
the country on a voluntary exile. As a wanderer
he lived at times in Darjeeling, and, on otheroccasions, in Sikkim. It was during the periodof his wandering existence that he obser ved
the administration of British India by England,
and learnt in detail as to how India came to be
subjugated by the former. By those counts,
Shata went on to becoming the most regarded
authority in Tibet in reference to England’s
India policy.

Russia’s Tibetan Policy
Russia’s Tibetan policy went back (at least
thirty years) from the time of Ekai Kawaguchi’s
memoir. It was the time when Russia’s activity
towards T ibet began attracting attention.
Kawaguchi noted that Russia had selected aneffective instrument in promoting its interests
over Tibet. This was a Mongolian tribe named
Buriat, whose people came from a district
far away to the nor th-east of Tibet towards
Mongolia. The Buriat tribe was originallyfeudator y to China, but over a period of time,came under the control of Russia.22 It came tobe known later that many young priests fromthis tribe were sent to Tibet to pursue Lamaist
studies.

It could be argued that to a far extent,
Shata was overawed by Britain’s power andwas equally apprehensive of the possibility of
it crossing the Himalayas and entering Tibet.
He knew fully well that Tibet would hardly
be able to resist the nor thward march of
England. 25 Kawaguchi argues in his memoirthat it could have well been during the years of
his exile during which Shata thought that there
might come a point when Tibet would have tochoose between Russia and China in seeking
foreign assistance against a possible territorial
aggression by England.26 When Tibet’s internal
political affairs became conducive enough for
his return, and the supreme power was restored
back to the Dalai Lama, Shata was nominated as
the Premier.27 At that time, Shata was the best
informed man in Tibet, comparatively speaking,be it diplomatic affairs, or foreign policy. His

Kawaguchi noticed that the young
Mongolians mentioned above were found at thereligious centers of Ganden, Rebon, Sera, andTashi Lhunpo among others.23 It was estimatedthat there were around 200 such students at
those seats of learning. One of these priests,
named Dorje became a high tutor to the 13th
Dalai Lama while he was a minor. Dorje obtained
the honorable priestly title, “Tsan-ni Kenbo”
meaning “instructor in the Lamaist Catechism”
from the Hierarchical Government.24 When the
13th Dalai Lama became a major, Tsan-ni Kenbo
returned home, only to return to Lhasa a few
years later, and was regarded highly in the eyesof the Tibetans.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Ibid.
Chapter LXXI, Russiaʼs Tibetan Policy , p. 495.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 496.
Ibid., pp. 501-502.
Ibid., p. 503.
Ibid.

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pro-Russian tendency could be attributed tothe close association he shared with Tsan-ni
Kenbo.28

against them and realized that China could nolonger be depended upon.
As events unfolded, T ibet’s prejudicesagainst England grew. It was seen to be turning
naturally towards Russia, whom they knew was
England’s bitter foe.33 The Tibetan Government
looked hopefully towar ds St. Petersburg
essentially for its spectacular expansion in
the 19th centur y. That notwithstanding, Russia
remained a distant power. The nearest stationon the Trans-Siberian Railway was a five to six
months’ march through an extremely hostile
terrain. This made supply lines for an occupying
force virtually impossible to maintain. Despite
the close connect between the Shata and Tsanni Kenbo, there were few inside the Tibetan
Government who continued to remain cautious
about Russian motives. For that matter, Russia’s
influence in the ruling circles of Tibet failed tomake deep roots beyond the Dalai Lama andShata.34 However, according to other accounts,
the real advantage and edge that Russia enjoyed
was that Russian goods found in Tibet were of afar higher quality than those which came from
British India, whose products were cheap in
quality and mass-produced.

Between December 1901 and January 1902,
Kawaguchi went on a short trip on horseback toa place about 50 miles northeast of Lhasa. Herehe noticed the arrival of around two hundred
camels, fully loaded. The loads consisted ofsmall boxes, two packed on each camel. After
Kawaguchi returned to the house of his host,the Minister of Finance arrived and during thecourse of the conversation shared that a heavy
load had arrived from Russia, unwilling to reveal
anymore beyond that.29 Later on, a Governmentof ficer known to Kawaguchi shared that theload consisted of small fire-arms and bullets. It
was, in fact, the first time that Tibet appeared
to be suf ficiently armed to resist a potential
attack which England might launch against it.
Kawaguchi admitted inspecting one of the guns
dispatched by Russia of which the stock bore
an inscription attesting that it was made in the
United States of America. Though, the Tibetans,being ignorant of Roman letters and English
firmly believed that all the weapons were madein Russia.30
Seeing all these developments, China wasmor tified. Tibet was gradually endeavoring
to break of f its traditional ties with China,
and lean towards Russia.31 Having suffered agreat loss of prestige in Tibet since the SinoJapanese war, China was no longer respected,
much less feared, by the Tibetans. Previous to
the war, China had the penchant to interfere in
Tibet’s internal affairs, but was helpless now.32
The Tibetans, on their part, were fully aware of
the powerlessness of China to take any action
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

The Future of Tibetan Diplomacy
Early years of the 20 th centur y primarily
witnessed three countries affecting the territorial
and political future of Tibet from a security
perspective. These were England, Russia, and
Nepal. In this reference, China, as explained
earlier, did not count to be of much significance.
The prospect of an Anglo-Nepal combination
was at variance with Russia’s purported objectiveof bringing Tibet under its control and making

Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 505-506.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 506-507.
Ibid., p. 504.
Ibid.
Ibid.

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it a base of operation in Himalayas’ southernside. The circumstantial and political realities
of Nepal seemingly confined it to push for its
interests alone in Tibet, peacefully, irrespectiveof Tibet’s future vis-à-vis England or Russia.35
Kawaguchi described then ruler of Nepal as ‘too
intelligent a statesman’ who perceived that it
would be England that would stand to gain witha lion’s share of victor y in case of any future
trouble between Tibet and Nepal.36 The rulerof Nepal seemingly confined himself to making
arrangements with Tibet by means of which
the Nepalese could enter and settle in Tibet tocarry on profitable economic and trade-related
undertakings and establish their influence. This
would also result in countering any potential
advances of Russian influence in Tibet.37 Nepal’s
own inter nal political mess kept it deeply
absorbed and it could not spare either energy
or money for pursuing any consistent policy
towards Tibet.38

attributed by a few to Tibet’s conclusion of
a secret treaty with Russia. 40 It soon star ted
becoming visible that with the passage of time,
Tibet was sure to be absorbed by a strong
Power sooner or later. There, indeed, was nohope of it continuing to exist as an independent
country.41
Of not much significant consequence was
Bhutan, an independent countr y under thenominal rule of its King, whose power did not
go beyond the various tribes of his Kingdom.
Kawaguchi mentioned that each tribe directly
paid a tribute to Tibet, and not through theKing’s Government. In return, the tribe received
a present from the Tibetan authorities.42 Further,
the natives of Tibet, Bhutan, and Sikkim wereallowed to travel in neighboring Nepal, as longas they possessed a passpor t issued by theCommander-in-Chief of Beelganji–a Regent
acting authority in the absence of the Nepalese
King. No other for eigners wer e allowed
admission into Nepal unless armed with theKing’s own pass. Nepal possessed two Kings, ade jure King and a de facto King (named PanchSarkar and Tin Sarkar in the Nepali language).
The de facto King was the real Ruler of Nepal
exercising actual sovereignty of the nation,
while the de jure King was a mere figure-head,
who maintained his court by means of a civil list,
along with a pension granted by the former.43

Perhaps based on all these pressing geopolitical r ealities, the futur e of T ibetan
independence as a nation was perennially
under question. In his analysis, Kawaguchi
refrained from providing a definitive andreassuring answer to the above. Although, he
did state that “…during the long period of morethan a thousand years, the Tibetan people…
maintained the idea of relying upon one or
another great power, placing itself under theprotection of one suzerain State or another…”39
According to Kawaguchi’s notes, the 13th Dalai
Lama maintained an oscillating posture towards
England, which, at times, was favorable, andhostile, on other occasions. The hostility was
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Kawaguchi–widely refer red to as Serai
Amchi (the doctor of Sera) began his departurefrom Lhasa (situated 12,000 feet above sea level)
by foot in the summer of 1901 passing throughCalcutta by rail and arriving at Kathmandu,

Chapter LXXIV, The Future of Tibetan Diplomacy , p. 526.
Chapter LXXIII, China, Nepal and Tibet , p. 523.
Ibid., p. 524.
Ibid., p. 525.
Chapter LXXIV, The Future of Tibetan Diplomacy , p. 528.
Ibid., p. 529.
Ibid., pp. 529-530.
Chapter LXXXIV, Five Gates to Pass , p. 619.
Chapter XCIV, The Two Kings of Nepal , pp. 683-684.

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covering a distance of more than 2,490 miles.44
Reaching the boundary of Tibet, or Tsarang, inthe Himalayan ranges, Kawaguchi stopped at the
town of Boetong. This town was located in thecenter of the rich and fertile Himalayan plain.
Many people from Nepal had immigrated to thetown’s neighborhood. Though it was under thedominion of England with taxes being paid to
the Government of British India, most people
residing here were Nepalese, alongside a small
number of Sikkimese people.45 Further, uponreaching Kalimpong - a thriving town situatedaround 30 miles east of Darjeeling across a large
valley, Kawaguchi noted that the total amountof trade carried out in Kalimpong exceededthat of Darjeeling. The merchants from Tibet,
Sikkim, and Bhutan generally exchanged goodsin Kalimpong, and Tibetans, Hindus, Sikkimese,
Bhutanese, Nepalese, and Europeans were
found to be residing here.46 Characteristically,
Kawaguchi was prodded by the local English
of ficers posted in these districts regarding
details on T ibet in general, and Lhasa, inparticular.47

to know about Tibet’s equation with Russia,
especially whether Tsan-ni Kenbo enjoyed theconfidence of the Dalai Lama, and that of otherhigh officials. Kawaguchi replied that the Shata
along with the Dalai Lama seemed to place
infinite confidence in Russia, however, this wasmuch to the distrust and dislike of others in the
Government.49
During the course of an interaction with theacting Prime Minister of Nepal, Kawaguchi
was asked what had induced Tibet to conclude
a treaty with Russia, and, if there was any
evidence of the same. To this, Kawaguchi
responded that since the return of a Tibetan
envoy from a mission in the cour t of St.
Petersburg, the T ibetan Gover nment had
begun to display greater resolve and firmness
in dealing with any countr y. This could havebeen a pointer to the Russo-Tibetan treaty inquestion. He fur ther elaborated that China’s
ending credit and power stature in Tibet alongwith the maneuvers of Tsan-ni Kenbo inside
Lhasa, had become major drivers for Tibet’schanging stance towards British India. However,Kawaguchi simultaneously clarified that there
was not any definite proof50 of this, and that his
analyses and assessments were premised on hislong stay, close observations, and multiple vital
conversations in Lhasa.

On his return journey to Japan from Tibet,
Kawaguchi arrived at Raxaul, a border stationin Nepal in January 1902.48 In his meeting with
Kawaguchi, His Majesty Chandra Shamsher(de facto King of Nepal) enquired about thepower ful personage in Tibet. In response,
Kawaguchi identified them as the Dalai Lamahimself, and, Shata (Paljor Dorji Shata, whom
Kawaguchi believed to be the most powerfulamong the Dalai Lama’s ministers). The Kingfurther asked about the position of the Chinese
representative in Tibet in relation to the Lama
Hierarchy. Kawaguchi confirmed the decadenceof that influence. Nepal’s King also wanted
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Chapter LXXXIX, Good Bye Tibet , p. 652.
Ibid., pp. 656-657.
Chapter XC, The Labche Tribe , p. 660.
Chapter XCII, My Tibetan Friends in Trouble , p. 672.
Chapter XCIV, The Two Kings of Nepal , p. 682.
Chapter XCV, Audience of the Two Kings , p. 686.
Chapter XCVIII, Interview with the Acting Prime Minister , p. 698.

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