Policy Brief

June 2,
1, 20232018
June

Dr. Monika Cha nsor ia is a
Tok yo -based Senior Fellow
at T he Japa n I nst it ute
of I nter nat iona l A f f a irs.
P r e v i o u s l y, s h e h a s h e l dappointments at the Sandia
National Laboratories (U.S.),

India’s Refusal to Sign the 1951
San Francisco Peace Treaty:
Revisiting the Motivations of
the Decision and of Historical
Reconciliation towards Japan

Hokkaido University (Sapporo,

Dr. Monika Chansoria

Japan), and Fondation Maisondes S c ienc es de l ’ Hom me( Pa r is). Dr. Cha nsor ia has
authored five books including
her latest work, China, Japan,
and Senkaku Islands: Conf lictin the East China Sea Amid an
American Shadow (Routledge© 2018).

Disclaimer :The views expressed in thispublication are those of the authorand do not necessarily reflect thepolicy or position of The Japan
Institute of International Affairs or
any other organization with which
the author is affiliated.

When India declared its independence from British colonial ruleand governance in August 1947, Japan was among the first nations
to recognize India’s sovereignty. India, for its part, declined to attend
the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference between the UnitedStates and Japan. India was against the limitations being placed onJapan’s sovereignty by the proposed draft provisions of the 1951 San
Francisco Peace Treaty and argued that the US was failing to givedue recognition to the wishes of the Japanese people.1 Instead, India
chose to enter a separate bilateral peace treaty with Japan in 1952,
as part of which Delhi waived all reparation claims against Tokyo.
In addition, India was one of the first Asian nations to establish
diplomatic ties with Tokyo in 1952. This paper focuses on reviewing
primary archival documents of the year 1951 through which India
developed and formed its case and position on the 1951 Japanesepeace treaty.2
Choosing to view the whole question of the Japanese peace
treaty more on basic grounds, the Government of India by 1951
was maintaining that the terms of the treaty should concede Japan aposition of honor, equality, and contentment among the community of1

 or more details on this, see Monika Chansoria, “Japan-India at 70: The EarlyF
Origins of a Relationship that Defines Asia’s Future,” Japan Review , vol. 5,2022; and for added references and reading see, Monika Chansoria, “Japan’s
Relations with South Asia,” in Šumit Ganguly and Frank O’Donnell, eds.,
Routledge Handbook of the International Relations of South Asia (London:
Routledge, 2022).
2 As cited in Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series , vol. 16, Part II,
01 July 1951-31 October 1951 (S. Gopal ed.) [Archives at the Nehru Memorial
Museum and Library, Teen Murti House, New Delhi]; hereafter referred to as
Selected Works of Nehru (1951).

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Policy Brief

free nations, and that they should be so framed
as to enable all countries specially interested
in the maintenance of stable peace in the Far
East to subscribe to the treaty sooner or later.
In a letter dated July 23, 1951 written to India’s
Ambassador to Bur ma M.A. Rauf, India’s
Prime Minister (PM) Jawaharlal Nehru said
that for India to sign the proposed Japanesepeace treaty would practically mean giving up
the position that India had theretofore taken inforeign policy. Nehru wrote, “It means lining
up with the USA in world politics... It means
accepting American troops and bases in Japan.”3
India found it dif ficult to sign this par ticulartreaty 4 and preferred to sign a separate andindependent bilateral treaty with Japan featuringsimple terms that called for ending the stateof war without any qualifications and othercommitments.

which would provide India the opportunity of
discussing the Japanese peace treaty in addition
to other matters.5 While India had considered
the question of reparations from its own pointof view, Nehru in his letter to Nu (dated July24, 1951) conveyed with regard to the Japanesepeace treaty that India entirely agreed Burma’s
claim for compensation/reparations was ver ystrong.6
By July 1951, India had decided that it should
not press and demand reparations from Japan,
primarily because the damages to India wererelatively minor and so India had not been
particularly affected. The history of reparations
in Europe, for instance, had also demonstrated
that it was hardly possible to realize them, even
if grand promises were made. Following WorldWar I, enormous reparations were imposed onGermany, though barely any payment was made,and ultimately Hitler repudiated them as they
had become a source of continuous irritation.7
India’s position had gradually cr ystallized toargue that any stress on reparations would haveno meaning in pure economic terms. In addition,
India had paid compensation in the sum of $4-5
million (approximately 40-50 lakh Indian rupees)in war damages to the people of the Northeast
region out of its own resources. These damages
had been caused par tly by the Japanese andpartly by the Anglo-American forces.

On the Burmese Demand for Reparations
India was also pleased that the Burmese
gover nment was more or less of the same
opinion regarding the Japanese peace treaty.
Beginning with the question of reparations,India clarified its stand that it would not insist on
any reparations from Japan. However, Burma did
claim reparations to compensate for the losses
it suffered during the war-time occupation by
Japan. Burma’s first prime minister Thakin Nu(also known by the name U Nu) wrote a letter
to PM Nehru on July 20, 1951. In his reply to
Nu, Nehru acknowledged that Burma’s foreign
minister was about to visit Delhi in a day or two,
3
4
5

6
7

When the draft of the Japanese treaty wasshared with India, the latter stressed that thistreaty should aim at lessening the existing etter to M.A. Rauf (India’s Ambassador to Burma), New Delhi, July 23, 1951, cited in Selected Works of Nehru , n. 2,
L
p. 603.
The terms of the treaty circulated on July 3, 1951 to all countries as a memorandum envisaged the signing by “anyor all nations at war with Japan who are willing to make peace on the basis proposed.”
The Government of India were notably critical of the seven-point memorandum the US circulated to members of
the Far Eastern Commission in October 1950. India desired that the Bonin and Ryukyu islands be left under thesovereignty of Japan. It was against any treaty provision to retain Allied troops on Japanese territory. It did not
object to Japan’s entering into security arrangements with the US or any other power after the treaty came into
force and was willing to waive reparations. India wanted the treaty to be drafted by a conference of all States
belonging to the Far Eastern Commission.
Letter to Thakin Nu, New Delhi, July 24, 1951, cited in the Selected Works of Nehru , n. 2, p. 604.
Ibid., p. 605.

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Policy Brief

tensions in the Far East, help towards peaceful
future settlement, and not make matters worse.
From an Indian standpoint, the draft would
likely lead to a considerable worsening of thesituation. The draft also permitted American
troops and bases inside Japan, which wasseen as a derogation of Japanese sovereignty.8
Furthermore, India’s prime minister wrote tohis Burmese counterpar t that, in addition to
Formosa (Taiwan), Japan would become a stillbigger and more vital issue in the future. The
prospect of achieving real peace in the Far East
was bleak. Nehru further shared with Nu his
input on the Japanese government being anxious
about whether India, Burma, and Indonesia
would sign the treaty at San Francisco, giventhat the positions of India, Burma, and Indonesia
were roughly similar.

that government, which would create anotherdif ficulty in that it would practically mean acontinuing state of near-war between China andJapan. Nehru wrote that, although India was notin a position to prevent this, it should consider
avoiding becoming a party to such a clash.10
Conveying India’s intention of not going to
San Francisco and signing the treaty, PM Nehru
then shared with PM Nu that New Delhi had
pointed out to the US the minimum changes
necessary in the draft. That said, though, Nehru
was equally certain that Washington would not
accept these changes, as the US had alreadyrejected them in the past. Upon receiving anegative response this time around, India had
decided to inform them of its decision not to sign
the treaty.11

Following his letter dated July 24, PM Nehru
once again wrote to PM Nu on July 27 upon
the conclusion of the visit of Burmese Foreign
Minister Sao Hkun Hkio to New Delhi. The
talks between Hkio and Nehru largely revolved
around the proposed Japanese peace treaty.
India shared its approach to the draft treaty
as one that considered whether it would leadto a peaceful settlement in the Far East. It was
acknowledged that future peace in the Far Eastdepended greatly on the relationship between
China and Japan. A peace treaty was thus
desirable, even though some countries had beenleft out, allowing those nations enough room toconclude separate bilateral treaties with Japan.9
Nehru was also confident that the new treaty
would later be signed by Chiang Kai-shek’s
government and that Japan would recognize

Fur ther, in his meeting with India’s PM,
Burmese Foreign Minister Sao Hkun Hkio
mentioned an idea floated by Thakin Nu: a
conference of the foreign ministers of Burma,
India, and Indonesia in New Delhi. 12 Nehr uwelcomed the idea, and suggested that the ideal
timing for such a meeting/conference would beafter the signing of the treaty in San Francisco.
This would enable the three ministers toconsider their positions and perhaps makea joint suggestion to Japan to sign simple
individual treaties of peace with Burma, India,
and Indonesia without any other commitments.13
India’s Reply to the US Government
While replying to the US government on
the draft of the treaty on July 28, 1951, India

8 Ibid.
9 Letter to Thakin Nu, New Delhi, July 27, 1951, cited in Selected Works of Nehru , n. 2, pp. 606-607.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 608.
12 Thakin Nu sent a cable on July 27, 1951 stating that, after his foreign minister’s departure, he had received an
important message from Burmese sources in Pakistan that the border situation was becoming dangerous. He
proposed that the prime ministers of Burma and Indonesia meet with Nehru and the prime minister of Pakistan to
discuss measures for relieving the tension.
13 Ibid.

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Policy Brief

conveyed harmony with the underlying objectof terminating the state of war with Japan andadmitting it to the community of free sovereign
nations. The Government of India also wasglad that, unlike similar treaties in the past, theproposed treaty with Japan was not punitive. It
shared with Washington that the government
and the people of India had friendly sentiments
towards the people of Japan and would welcome
closer relations with an independent Japan.
According to India, the terms of the treaty
should not give just cause for offence to otherinterested powers in the Far East and thus
imperil the prospects of a stable and enduring
peace.14

the Japanese peace treaty and therefore could
not sign the same. In an August 13, 1951 letterto India’s Ambassador in Burma M.A. Rauf,
Prime Minister Nehru conveyed India’s decision
not to go to San Francisco and participate in
the proceedings. 16 Before making a formal
announcement, however, Nehr u wanted tohave a copy of the final draft and give it due
consideration. Significantly, in his letter toRauf, PM Nehru shared an interesting piece of
information that he had received from Tokyo.
India’s attitude, though not publicly stated, had
become fairly well-known by then in Japan, andstirred into action many quarters of Japanesesociety that had been acquiescent. Moreover,the editor of one of the biggest newspapers inTokyo expressed his appreciation privately andsaid that he wished he had started a campaign
on these lines previously. Based on this input
among others, it was becoming far more certainthat India’s decision of not signing the treaty
would be approved by a majority of the Japanesepeople.17

India thereby reiterated its desire that thedraft provisions be reconsidered with a view toremoving certain objections, one being Article
6(a) of the revised draft that, while providing for
the withdrawal of occupation forces, envisaged
the possibility of foreign armed forces being
stationed or retained in Japanese territory underbilateral or multilateral agreements with Japan.
India stated that it did not see the need for sucha provision as Ar ticle 5(c) stated that Japan
could voluntarily enter into collective security
arrangements, which India believed should bemade later with an independent Japan rather
than as a condition of independence.15

Correspondence with Indonesia and Cable
to A. Soekarno
Nehr u wanted to act collectively on thismatter and, if possible, bring the Indonesian
government on board as well. However, he
was quick to share his doubts about Indonesia
following suit.18 Subsequently, in a cable sent toIndonesia’s President A. Soekarno, PM Nehru
wrote that India had shared its views with theformer’s government, informing them about
various steps taken by New Delhi in regard to
the proposed Japanese peace treaty. India feltthat cer tain clauses in this treaty were such

By mid-August 1951, India had received the
US’ reply to its inputs and comments. That reply
did not take things far since the US did not
accept any of the suggestions put for ward by
India. In fact, it left things much as they were.
By this time, it had become amply clear to India
that it could not possibly accept the terms of

14
15
16
17
18

 n the Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan ; see the note drafted by Nehru sent to the United States Government, NewO
Delhi, July 28, 1951, cited in n. 2, pp. 608-609.
Ibid.
Letter to M.A. Rauf, New Delhi, August 13, 1951, cited in Selected Works of Nehru , n. 2, pp. 614-615.
Ibid.
Ibid.

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Policy Brief

that they would increase tensions and not bringpeace to the Far East. 19 India had suggested
some important changes to the US government
but regrettably the US government had been
unable to accept them. Having considered
this matter, India thereafter had decided thatit should not participate in the San Francisco
Conference and consequently not sign thepeace treaty. Nehru informed Soekarno thatthe decision was to be placed before the Indian
cabinet for formal approval soon, and that New
Delhi intended sending a note to this effect tothe US government by around August 25, 1951.20

that peace would enable Japan to be free fromoccupation forces but, according to the draft
treaty, US armed forces were to remain in Japanand the rearming of Japan had been permitted
in the name of Japan’s unrestricted sovereignty.
Nehr u also shared with India’s envoy thatthe Burmese government were on the same
page as India on this matter, as were probably
the Indonesian government despite immensepressure from the US.23
Interestingly, India’s Ambassador to theUnited States and Mexico V ijayalakshmi
Pandit, who was also the sister of PM Nehru,
had advised the Indian government to sign
the Japanese peace tr eaty, although theIndian ambassadors in London, Moscow, andPeking (Beijing) had advised ver y strongly
against this, providing plenty of reasons fortheir view. Moreover, K.P.S. Menon (India’s
foreign secretary at that time) was also against
signing the treaty, as were most members of thegovernment’s Foreign Affairs Committee. After
carefully noting all these inputs, PM Nehru
obser ved that moderate tendencies and real
democratic ways and policies find less scope,
while fascists and communists hold the field
against each other, perhaps ultimately leading
to war. As far as India was concerned, it wanted
to keep out of this and, while it was “certainly
not lining up with the communist countries,[we] have an equal distaste for the fascists”24,
and therefore India would not be in a position
to sign the treaty. Moreover, PM Nehru wascertain that accepting the Japanese treaty as it
was would have put an end to India’s policy at
the time and, in fact, would constitute a political

Fur ther, India informed Indonesia that
Burma, too, had decided not to attend the San
Francisco Conference. New Delhi was hopefulof coordinating its activities as far as possible
with Burma on this matter. Nehru hoped that
Soekarno’s government would adopt a similar
attitude on the issue so that there might be fullcooperation among the three governments. 21
India intended to declare an end to the state ofwar between India and Japan soon after the latterattained independent status as a consequence of
the San Francisco treaty. Later, New Delhi wasto consider the question of signing a separate
bilateral treaty with Japan.
Diplomatic Correspondence throughAugust 1951
In a letter written to India’s ambassador to
the Soviet Union on August 1, 1951, PM Nehru
highlighted that, in the proposed conference,
many issues had been kept vague in the clauses
listed under ‘territorial’. 22 India had thought
19
20
21
22
23
24

 able to Indonesian President, A. Soekarno, New Delhi, August 18, 1951, cited in Selected Works of Nehru , n. 2, p.
C
616.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Letter to S. Radhakrishnan (India’s ambassador to the Soviet Union), New Delhi, August 1, 1951, cited in Selected
Works of Nehru , n. 2, pp. 610-611.
Ibid.
Letter to Vijayalakshmi Pandit (India’s ambassador to the United States and Mexico), New Delhi, August 6, 1951,
cited in Selected Works of Nehru , p. 612.

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Policy Brief

difficult, holding the views it did.28 Bajpai in an
earlier note to Nehru had written that, since thesigning of the treaty by India was impossible,
the right course would be “to communicate ourobjections to the treaty and not to attend theConference at San Francisco... There would besubstantial differences in that we should not be
parties to the day-to-day debate and, as such,
victims of day-to-day criticism in the westernpress…”29

somersault, leaving no logic in any policy that
it would pursue.25 Advising India’s Ambassador
to the United States and Mexico Vijayalakshmi
Pandit on the far-reaching consequences ofIndia signing the treaty, PM Nehru wrote:
It means a reversal of what we have been
saying and acting upon thus far. It meansa submission, under pressure or fear, toAmerican policy in the Far East and Asia. The
consequence of not signing it means greater
ill will in the United States. My mind is clearthat we cannot sign this treaty. No doubt thetreaty will be signed without us and will takeeffect. We cannot stop it and do not come in
the way. But I see no reason whatever why
we should be, in a sense, guarantors of thetreaty and of the many provisions in it which
we utterly dislike. We would prefer to signa simple bilateral treaty with Japan. 26 It is
possible that we might be rather isolated
in the business, except perhaps for Burma.
Indonesia will probably not hold out forlong.27

Subsequently, in a reply to the telegram 30
dispatched by the High Commissioner of India
to the United Kingdom V.K. Krishna Menon,
PM Nehr u sent him a cable on August 16,
1951 conveying India’s provisional decision
to dispatch its criticisms of the draft treaty to
the US and, if no major changes were made in
the draft, then not to attend the San Francisco
Conference. The US by that time had sent anelaborate reply to India’s proposals but had notagreed to any substantial changes. Nehru once
again confirmed here that Burma’s attitude wasmore or less in line with India’s, except for the
reparation claims.31

Additionally, in a note to Girija Shankar
Bajpai, secretar y-general at the Ministr y ofExternal Affairs (MEA), PM Nehru stated that
he was inclined to agree with the former’s view
about India’s attending, or rather not attending,the San Francisco Conference. The Conference
was likely to become a major factor for wordy
warfare and mutual recrimination, and India’s
position would become very embarrassing and
25
26
27

28
29
30
31
32

By this time, the Soviet Union had
announced its decision to go to the San
Francisco Conference. This came in as asurprise to many, including India. 32 It wasevident that Moscow was not going to sign thetreaty, but to use the platform of the Conference
for stating its objections on record. Related
was a telegram dated August 19, 1951, sentI bid.
Ibid., p. 613.
Indonesia had suffered the loss of about four million lives and material damages amounting to billions of dollars
under Japan’s occupation. It participated in the San Francisco Conference and signed the peace treaty but declined
to ratify the treaty until the reparations issue had been settled.
On the San Francisco Conference , Note to Secretary-General (MEA), New Delhi, August 15, 1951, cited in Selected
Works of Nehru , n. 2, p. 615.
Ibid.
Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon (citing Menon’s telegram no. 10256 on the Japanese peace treaty), New Delhi, August
16, 1951, p. 615.
Ibid.
The USSR decided to attend the San Francisco Conference despite its opposition to the US-sponsored treaty, August
13, 1951.

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Policy Brief

by India’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union S.
Radhakrishnan to PM Nehr u, in which theformer asked: “Gromyko wishes to see me
tomorrow 21 hours... May be about Japanesepeace tr eaty… Anything you wish me toascer tain?” 33 Upon receiving the telegram,
Nehru replied a day later via a cable message:

the appreciation of the situation by theUnited States Government.
(2) I n d i s c u s s i n g t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f
I ndi a ’ s v i e ws r e ga r di ng de f e n s i vear rangements to be made by Japan,
the Government of the United States
describe them as tantamount to leaving
Japan defenseless against proved
aggressors. The Government of India
fail to find any war rant for such a
conclusion from anything that they havesaid. The draft treaty recognizes thatJapan as a sovereign nation possesses
the inher ent right of individual orcollective self-defense and that Japan may
voluntarily enter into collective security
arrangements. Adequate provision is thus
made for Japan independently to makewhatever arrangement she considers
necessar y for her self-defense as soon
as she has signed the peace treaty and it
is not clear to the Government of India
why there should be “any period of total
defenselessness” for Japan.

You might ascer tain what procedures
the Soviet delegation intend adopting at
San Francisco Conference in view of US
declaration that no change can be made in
final draft of Japanese treaty and fixed time
table for signing. There is general impressionthat Soviet relations with China are not very
cordial and there is growing rivalr y. Have
you noticed any such development. For yourpersonal information we have decided not
to participate in San Francisco Conference.
Burma will also not participate. Our decision
will be finalized soon in full Cabinet andconveyed to US about 25th August. After thatpublicity will be given to it.34
The Gover nment of India replied to theAugust 23, 1951 note received by the US.
Welcoming the assurance that the overriding
desire of the US government was peace in Asiaand that the US did not want to be a party tocolonialism or imperialism, India underlined
opposition to colonialism and imperialism as thebasis of its struggle. That said, the Governmentof India made many significant observations, aselect few35 of which are cited below:

Statement in the Indian Parliament on theJapanese Peace Treaty
Finally, as things were coming to culminationon this subject, the Parliament of India on
August 27, 1951 was apprised of the latest
developments regarding the proposed peace
treaty with Japan, and of the Government ofIndia’s decision thereon. The statement noted:(1) T he Government of the United States
have expressed the belief that their viewof the proposed treaty is shared by theGovernment and the people of Japan.
The Government of India regret that theycannot share this view; such information
as they have received does not confirm
33
34
35

The war against Japan ended six years ago.
This was followed by a military occupation ofJapan which has continued till now. India, in
common with other powers, was interested in
putting an end to this unsatisfactory state ofaffairs and terminating it by a treaty of peace.

 elegram dated August 19, 1951, dispatched by India’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union S. Radhakrishnan.
TCable to S. Radhakrishnan, New Delhi, August 20, 1951, cited in Selected Works of Nehru , n. 2, p. 617.
India’s Reply to the U.S. drafted by Nehru, New Delhi, August 27, 1951, cited in Selected Works of Nehru , n. 2, pp.
620-622.

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Policy Brief

Owing to differences in the approach to thisquestion between dif ferent powers, little
progress could be made. The Governmentsof the United States of America and theUnited Kingdom thereupon took the leadin drafting a peace treaty with Japan. There
were originally two separate drafts which
differed materially from each other. Finally,some minor changes were incorporated in
the United States draft and the Governmentof the United Kingdom accepted it. The
United States and the United Kingdom thenbecame joint sponsors of the revised draft
treaty and this was communicated to us on
July 20, 1951.36

Some minor variations were made in
the original draft, but none of the major
suggestions put forward by the Governmentof India was accepted. The Gover nment
thereupon, after careful consideration,
came to the conclusion that India should notsign the peace treaty or par ticipate in the
San Francisco Conference. It was fur ther
decided that immediately after Japan attained
independent status, the Government of India
would make a declaration terminating thestate of war between India and Japan and,later, a simple bilateral treaty with Japan
should be negotiated.38
In accor dance with this decision, thefollowing communication was sent on August23, 1951 to the Government of the United States
through the Indian Embassy in Washington:

On the issue of considering the draft treaty
and the revised draft treaty, the Government ofIndia further informed Parliament:
The Government gave carefulconsideration to this revised draft andcommunicated their views on July 28 to the
US Government in regard to it. In this reply it
was stated that the Government of India werein full sympathy with the underlying objectof terminating war with Japan as soon as
possible and admitting her to the communityof free sovereign nations. It was pointed outthat the other objective of the peace treaty
with Japan should be to lessen the existingtension in the Far East and help towards apeaceful settlement of the problems affectingthat area. In order to satisfy these objectives,attention was drawn to some provisions in thedraft treaty and certain proposals were madeon behalf of the Government of India.37

The Government of India have the honor
to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of the
reply of the Government of the United Statesof America to the representations which
they had made on the Japanese peace treaty
in their communication dated July 30, 1951.
They fully appreciate the consideration given
to their views by the US Government andwish to assure them that the present reply
is conceived in a spirit of frank and sincere
friendship for the Government and peopleof the US. Throughout the negotiations
that have taken place between the two
Governments on the subject of the treaty,
the Government of India have laid emphasis
upon two fundamental objectives:i) t h e t e r m s o f t h e t r e a t y s h o u l dconcede to Japan a position of honor,
equality, and contentment among thecommunity of free nations; andii) they should be so framed as to enable

The Parliament of India was apprised of the
US government’s reply to the Government ofIndia received on August 12, 1951:

36 India and the Japanese Peace Treaty , Statement made in Parliament, August 27, 1951; Parliamentary Debates(Official Report), vol. 14, Part II, columns 1357–1362, (August 06–29, 1951), p. 617.
37 Ibid., p. 618.
38 Ibid.

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Policy Brief

all countries specially interested in
the maintenance of a stable peace in
the Far East to subscribe to the treaty,
sooner or later.39

defensive agreement is bound to give rise to
the impression that the agreement does not
represent a decision taken by Japan in thefull enjoyment of her freedom as a sovereign
nation. The ef fect of this, not only on thepeople of Japan but upon large sectionsof people in Asia, is bound to be mostunfortunate.41

Having stated the above, the Governmentof India said on record in Parliament that, after
careful thought, it had concluded that the treaty
did not, in material respects, satisfy either of theabove two criteria. More significantly, on thequestion of the Ryukyu and Bonin islands, theGovernment of India added:

By this time, it had already been announced
that the Conference convened at San Francisco
to consider the draft peace treaty with Japan
would not be open to negotiation, thoughattending governments were free to state theirviews on the treaty. The Government of India
felt that the statement of its views on the treaty
had already been put forth in its reply, and wereadequate to clarify its position to the Conference
and its attendees.

It is only natural to expect that Japan
should desire the restoration, in full, of her
sovereignty, over ter ritor y of which the
inhabitants have a historical affinity with her
own people and which she has not acquiredby aggression from any other countr y. The
Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands fully satisfy
this description. Never theless, the treaty
proposes that until the US Government seek
and obtain trusteeship over these Islands,
they should continue to be subject to thelegislative and administrative control of the
US. It is apparent to the Government of India
that such an arrangement cannot but be asource of dissatisfaction to large sectionsof the Japanese people and must carr y theseed of future dispute and, possibly, conflictin the Far East.40 The Government of India
recognized that, as a sovereign nation, Japan
should have the right to make arrangements
for her defense as provided in Ar ticle 5of the treaty. If, in exercise of this right,
Japan should decide to enter into defensive
agreements with a friendly power, no one
could reasonably object to this. But the rightshould be exercised by the Governmentof Japan when Japan has become tr uly
sovereign. A provision in the treaty whichsuggests that the present occupation forces
may stay on in Japan as par t of such a
39
40
41

It was against the backdrop of all thesepreceding reasons and archived arguments that
the Government of India ultimately decided
not to become parties to the 1951 San Francisco
Peace Treaty. It was India’s hope, however, thatlasting peace would consistently prevail in the
Far East in keeping with the principles on which
its foreign policy was based. As a first step, India
intended, as soon as this might be practicable, toput an end to the state of war and establish full
diplomatic relations with Japan.

I bid.
Ibid., p. 619.
Ibid., p. 620.

9