法学研究 93 巻 12 号（2020：12）

Chinese Gang Warsin the Netherlands Indies:
A Colonial War on Terror in the Age of the League of Nations

YAMAMOTO Nobuto

1）

1. INTRODUCTION: The question of historiography
2. BUREAUCRATIC POLITY
3. DEPORTATION
4. GANG WARS
5. POLITICIZATION OF TERRORISM
6. CONCLUSION

1.

INTRODUCTION: The question of historiography

The historian Harry J. Benda opened his 1966 article to Journal of Asian Studies
thusly, “The history of Indonesia in the last two or three decades of Dutchcolonial rule still has to be written, and it can only be written when theabundant archival materials for this period, both in Indonesia and in the
Netherlands, come to be opened up for scholarly investigation” (Benda 1966:589). A half-century later, it is unfortunate to say that there are still many parts

and aspects of the history of colonial Indonesia from the 1910s through the1940s which remain to be written. Over the last fifty years, archival materials
have become well cataloged and preserved, and been made available forresearchers to use. It cannot be denied, however, that some materials have been
intentionally destroyed by governments, while others once available have gone
missing for unclear reasons. The historical research about colonial Indonesia has
not been improved as much as Benda expected.

1） The original version was prepared for the Regional Conference, the International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas held at Nagasaki University, Nagasaki, Japan on 17―19 November 2017.
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Chinese Gang Wars in the Netherlands Indies

Writing history, however, does not always rely on the availability of thearchival materials; it is also a matter of the researcherʼs perspectives andinvestigative efforts. A particular history will not be written if, for instance,
researchers do not find anything significant, or if they subscribe to aconventional view (Paul 2011). The history of the Chinese in colonial Indonesia
is a case in point of this kind of unwritten history. There are of course many
works on the Chinese in colonial Indonesia, and yet many focus on the so-called
peranakan (creole) Chinese in Java. In fact, when writing the history of theChinese in colonial Java, researchers tend to start their description bydifferentiating peranakan and totok (newcomer) Chinese as if there were twoclearly distinguished and independent Chinese communities (for instance,
Suryadinata 1976) . This practice, or framing, reflects the long-establishednational-oriented or nationalistic history writing. It situates the so-called
Chinese in the longue durée of Java-centric Indonesian history; because
peranakan leaders and intellectuals were closely interwoven into the Indonesiananti-colonial nationalist movement, their activities have been relatively wellrecorded and retold. But the history of other Chinese (totok) – those that do not
fit into the narrative of the nation – or the Chinese in the Outer Islands, is2）

relatively neglected.

Archival materials concerning the Chinese in colonial Indonesia may belimited, and in particular many Chinese Malay and Chinese language
newspapers and magazines remain inaccessible to the researchers. Nevertheless,many aspects of the history of the Chinese in Indonesia can be gleaned andtherefore written by closely consulting colonial documents – classified orotherwise. One particular case that I gleaned from classified colonial documents
and subsequently analyzed in this article indicates the kind of people (including
Chinese) the Netherlands Indies government paid attention to, and how it

treated such people in a particular context.
2） Departing from peranakan Chinese-oriented studies, two exceptional works deserve to
be mentioned. Mary Somers Heidhues (2003) presents a detailed description and analysisof the Chinese social history in West Kalimantan, whereas Peck Yang Twang (1998) examines the role of the Chinese commercial bourgeoisie, and the emergence of partnerships
between Chinese businessmen and Indonesian revolutionaries.
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The case features six Chinese (totok) gangsters and their related gang
conflicts in the 1930s in a small village located in East Java. It was closely
recorded by the Indies authorities in classified colonial documents. It revealed
partially the social history of the local Chinese. It is an extraordinary case in
two folds: as I will detail later, the authorities deported Chinese individuals evenwhen their activities were not related to politics; and they justified thedeportation by charging the six Chinese with “terrorist acts.” I argue that thiscase demonstrates how in the 1930s the authorities, or the Indies state,
attempted to stabilize and regain the law and order in the colonial society; thatthe authorities “politicized” terrorism in the age of the League of Nations, andapplied it to this case involving Chinese gang members. For the sake of
discussion, I will first explain what kind of colonial state the Indies state wasand how it operated, then elaborate how the state dealt with and expelled radical
political activists from the 1910s, and finally describe and examine the case. My
description heavily draws from the classified colonial documents, and my
explanation demonstrates how the colonial state monitored and dealt with thecase. It confirms how the so-called bureaucratic polity worked in the colonial
setting, and reveals a partial history of the (totok) Chinese life in the Indies.

2.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITY

Ever since Benda described the Dutch colonial state as beamtenstaat(bureaucratic state; Benda 1966), it is assumed that the Indies state had a strong

bureaucracy. Indeed, the Indies state institutionalized modernity in the colony,
and controlled societyʼs peace and prosperity with organizational, technical, andeconomic expertise. Once it was introduced, the concept of beamtenstaat waswell accepted among scholars, and also became a point of discussion for many
years.
By revisiting and criticizing the concept, Ruth McVey puts forward theconcept of “bureaucratic polity,” which accentuates the interests of the elites(McVey 1982). McVey describes the nature and function of the bureaucratic

polity as follows:(3)434

Chinese Gang Wars in the Netherlands Indies

The bureaucracy modernizes enough to rout any traditional rivals andsecure a firm grip on the state. It then, however, ceases to move in amodernizing direction… Moreover, because it is the locus of power and ofwealth (through its control of licenses and permissions, secured by a carefully
nurtured statism), it becomes the arena for all meaningful political action.

Real politics takes place not in parliament or whatever organs may exist
outside the bureaucracy, but in the government apparatus itself… Because
the bureaucracy is the arena for politics, it cannot function effectively as an

executive arm; it cannot be battlefield, commander, and soldier all at once.
Because positions and criteria for advancement are not what they formallyseem, an officialʼs real status depends not on his formal title but on securing
wealth, clients, and favor; and (quite aside from display requirements in achanging and increasingly materialistic society) this means utilizing the

economic possibilities of oneʼs position to the full. Hence the“commercialization of office” that is now a chronic Indonesian complaint(McVey 1982: 88).
This picture of the bureaucratic polity reveals the nature of the Indies state. Real
politics took place in the bureaucracy, which essentially functioned to secure
wealth, clients, and favor. In order to keep functioning as it did, the Indies stateneeded to avoid any risks and insecure factors that destabilized society.
A major threat to societyʼs peace and prosperity was the radical politicalmovements that started to take form from the early 1910s. After the Great War
was over, the Indies state installed a police system that included a secret police
division. Its main aim was to watch over the “natives” – meaning politicallyradical individuals, organizations, and movements – and as a matter of fact it
3）worked relatively well.

When the so-called Communist revolts occurred inWest Sumatra and West Java in 1926 and 1927, the police captured thousands ofCommunists and sympathizers of the Communist Party, and interned them to a3） Simultaneously, the Netherlands installed the secret police after the Great War, in particular paying attention to the rise of Communism in the country (Hijzen 2013). The impact of the War on the Indies, see Kees Van Dijk (2007).
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法学研究 93 巻 12 号（2020：12）

remote part of the colony (Shiraishi 1997; 2003). Some Communist suspects were
put in the trial, while many were just sent to concentration camps without trials.
The logic of securing wealth, clients, and favor contributed to the power of
the Indies state. The power was utilized when top bureaucrats felt the logic wasin danger. They had the right to make the final political decision, especially inconnection to cases that had to do with radicalism and revolutionary. Becauseof the nature, the decision was not necessarily legal, in fact, it was often
arbitrary. A typical case of such arbitrary decision was the case I will discuss inthis article, though the case itself was quite exceptional.

3.

DEPORTATION
deportation /ˌdiːpɔːˈteɪʃən/noun
1. the act of expelling an alien from a country; expulsion
2. the act of transporting someone from his country; banishment[Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 2012 Digital Edition]

In the Netherlands Indies, local political activism took shape and intensified in
the 1910s. At the turn of the twentieth century, new political ideas reached theIndies; not only from Europe as such liberalism and nationalism, but also from
the Middle East such as Islamic modernism. It was the time when the Dutchcolonial policy became more liberal than in the previous era. The government
introduced the so-called Ethical Policy (Ethische Politiek) in 1901 that promoted
the welfare of the colonial subjects and modernized the society, primarily by
way of proliferating secular school education. Under the new socio-politicalcircumstances, new political ideas and discourses attracted local Eurasians,
leftist activists, and Islam activists – most of which propagated through printed
materials in the Malay language.
The Indies authorities dealt with radical political activism in largely three
ways. First, faced by the rise of political and social movements, some of which
unexpectedly turned radical and violent, the Indies authorities were baffled asthey had never dealt with such matters. One easy way to treat troubling persons(5)432

Chinese Gang Wars in the Netherlands Indies

was to get rid of them. In fact, as early as 1913, the Indies authorities “exiled”
three local political activists from the Indies to the Netherlands. They were
E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, and Soewardi Soerjaningrat;
they were the ones who in 1912 established the Indische Partij (Indies Party), thevery first political organization pioneering Indonesian nationalism. The similar
response continued in the Indies; for instance, the Dutch leftist Henk Sneevliet
who were “exiled” to the Indies, was “exiled” again (this time) to the Netherlands
in 1918; and Indonesian Communists leaders Semaoen and Darsono were
expelled in 1923 and 1924 respectively. After the so-called Communist uprisingsin West Java and West Sumatra in 1926 and 1927, thousands of people wereinterned in a remote region in the Indies. The Indies authorities considered theiractivities as terrorist actions (McVey 1965). These cases illustrate how the Indies
authorities took care of troublesome activists; none included the so-called4）

foreigners.

Second, around the middle of the 1920s, political circumstances in and outof the Indies began to change. A new political tide rose from mainland China.
In 1911 the Republic of China emerged out of the ashes of the Chʼing Dynasty.
The first president of the new state was Sun Yat-sen, who had traveled Southeast
Asia in the 1890s to garner financial support from local ethnic Chinese for the
republican campaign. As the Kuomintang (KMT) was founded in China in
1912, dissolved in 1913 and reformed in 1919, the KMTʼs branches came to beestablished and propagated in many parts of Southeast Asia. British Malaya
including the Straits Settlements had the greatest number of KMTʼs branches,
followed by the Indies and Thailand, and elsewhere. This regional politicaldevelopment was closely followed and monitored by the British. From 1918 to1933 the British intelligence monitored such China-related political activities
such as the Bolshevik agents in China and Siam and their contacts with Chinese
Communists (CCP) and nationalists (KMT), anti-British strikes and boycotts
sponsored by the CCP and the KMT, the KMT attempts at national unification,
growing CCP military strength, the KMT and the CCP infiltration in Malaya,4） In the Dutch colonial context, “foreigners” mean non-Dutch and non-native Indonesianresidents in the Indies.
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法学研究 93 巻 12 号（2020：12）

and increasingly active Communist parties in Malaya, Vietnam, Thailand, andBurma (Goscha 2000; Best 2002) . All of these developments compelled thecolonial powers in Southeast Asia to form an intelligence collaboration against
KMT and the Comintern (the Communist International) activities (Yamamoto
2014; Foster 2010).

With this backdrop, transborder political activities became an emerging
and urgent political issue in the region. Among others, the Indies government
with a suzerain state Netherlands as a small power in Europe sounded earlier
warnings – as early as in 1923 – to counteract against the political activities ofthe mainland Chinese. Nevertheless, Britain as a major colonial power in theregion did not take the Dutch request for collaboration seriously, anddomestically monitored and controlled the Chinese political activists (Yamamoto2014). As the KMT political activities in its territories turned radical, it finallyclosed down all KMT branches in October 1925 (Yong and McKenna 1990).
Without any collaborative support from the neighboring colonial powers, theIndies authorities devised an independent measure to deal with domestic
political issues. From the middle of the 1920s, the Indies authorities introduced
a new measure – that is, to give any Chinese from abroad a particular number
when they entered the territoryʼs port city by the sea. This numbering systemallowed the authorities to track Chinese immigrantsʼ footsteps in case they
committed a crime. This procedure remained in place until 1940 when the
Netherlands was occupied by the Nazis.
The third strategy emerged in the 1930s when domestic political situations
intensified. In 1931 the Indies authorities introduced persbreidel (press curbing
ordinance) as an administrative measure to restrain “wild” newspapers

irrespective of language, therefore including those published in Dutch, Malay
and Chinese languages. It provided the administrative power to the authorities
to temporarily shut down publishers and printers. Initially persbreidel targeted
either Dutch and Malay language newspapers that published radical contents,
but later the target shifted to Chinese-owned newspapers which carried antiJapanese sentiment or discourses in their contents. In fact, from 1936 onwards,
only such newspapers – both in Chinese and in Malay – were targeted by theauthorities. Due to persbreidel, a number of Chinese editors and journalists(7)430Chinese Gang Wars in the Netherlands Indies

stationed in Batavia, Medan, and Soerabaja were expelled from the Indies,mainly to Singapore. As far as I know, these were the first cases of deportation
by persbreidel – thus all were in connection with their writings or publishingworks (Yamamoto 2019). It was their political activities in a wider sense thatrankled the Indies authorities.
However, the gang war in East Java had nothing to do with politicalorientations, because these gangs did not have a political motivation. Instead,they mainly aimed to expand their social and economic influences in certain
communities, hoping and/or planning to plunder the forerunnerʼs fortune. If thegangs were mainly interested in economic activities, then, why were the Indies
authorities so concerned about their activities? Moreover, why did they perceive
such activities as “terrorist acts”?

4. GANG WARS
An incident occurred in the village of Kalibaroe, Banjoewangi residency in East
Java, some 246 kilometers away from Soerabaja, the largest port city in East
Java. It was a village surrounded by mountainous and forest areas, amid coffee,cocoa, and rubber plantations. These plantations attracted people from outside
including laborers, merchants, and unwanted crooks.
A contemporary Dutch source describes the changing socio-economic
circumstances in and around Kalibaroe (presently “Kalibaru”) in the 1920s and1930s as follows:
According to the Nieuwe Soerabaja Courant dated September 1924, a
number of Chinese ex-carpenters from one family were settled near
Kalibaru (in Banyuwangi regency) as coffee growers on a piece of land ofaround 160 bouws [114 hectares]. The annual rent for the land was f3,000.
Six family members formed a kongsi, and five of them cultivated coffee
while the sixth worked as the kongsi agent in Surabaya. They also rented apiece of land near Kalisat, about 85 bouws [60 hectares], on which rubber aswell as coffee was planted. [...]
As well as this kongsi, there are a number of small Chinese coffee growers
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法学研究 93 巻 12 号（2020：12）

Figure1
Ambuntentimur
M A D U R A
Sumenep
Blega

Probolinggo
Bromo

MalangKepanjen

Kalibaru

INDONESIA

Pasuruan
Singosari

Pamekasan

Sampang

Surabaya

Batuputihkenek

BesukiLumajang
Turen

Kawah ljen
vulkaanSitubond
Bondowoso

KlakahJemberKencong

Banyuwangi
Genteng

Laut Bali

LESSER SUNDA ISLANDS
Kubu
BALI
Susut Culik
MuncarKarangasem

Meru Betiri(reuzeschildpadden)

Denpasar
BALI

INDIAN OCEAN[Source: http://www.rumahkita.info/elocationmap.htm. Retrieved on 16 July 2020]

near Kalibaru (Fernando and Bulbeck 1992: 184).
Kalibaroe and the surrounding regions appeared to be developed from the
1920s mainly by Chinese families from outside. As the coffee, cocoa and rubber
plantations were set up, stabilized, and made some profits in the 1930s, thevillage began to attract plenty of newcomers – including undesirable ones. It
attracted among others a powerful Chinese group that was searching for a new
business opportunity in the region.
In 1933, one Chinese newcomer changed the local atmosphere. In that year,
a certain Chinese named Gwie Boen Liong came to the village of Kalibaroe (Mr.
5）

1075x/1936).

Gwie Boen Liong alias Gwie Tjwan Sing was born in Chancou,

Fujian, China. He had criminal records in China, and by way of Singapore hadarrived in Soerabaja in 1926. Somehow, he obtained a certificate of residence in5） Unless otherwise mentioned, the below description is drawn from Mr. 1075x/1936.
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April 1926, issued by the Head of Local Government in Soerabaja. Since 1927
he became a distinguished member of an infamous Chinese mafia named “Tjap
Pik Beng” (Eighteen Heroes). According to the classified record, in East Java
Gwie Boen Liong also committed various crimes. In 1927 alone he allegedly
committed five offenses – real and alleged: a robbery on 9 February 1927 – forwhich he was not tried; violent conduct on 14 May 1927, after which he was set
free due to lack of evidence; he was charged again on 5 December 1927, but was
not tried; extortion on 18 May 1927, which lacked evidence; and illegal
6）

possession of firearms on 14 May 1927, for which he paid a ƒ5 fine.

Between

1929 and 1933 he lived in four different cities and committed crimes in each one.
In Modjokerto he was suspected to have been involved in a homicide case of apoliceman; in Loemadjang he was involved in robbery and dissensions among
pig butchers; in Sidoardjo he committed extortion; and in Tanggoel he disrupted
a wedding with aggressive behavior.
By 1933 Gwie Boen Liong had become the leader of Tjap Pik Bing. There
was a reason for his relocation to Kalibaroe – he attempted to control the village
7）

and its economic interest. He established a secret “terrorist” association

called“Topie Poetieh” (White Hat) consisting of 15 members under his leadership. This
association conducted extortion and other activities that were disruptive to
public peace,8）

and started war against another Chinese gang called the Kio

Ngo, which had been dominant in the village.
The origin of the hostility cited in the colonial document was unknown.
But it appeared that “business” competitions between Chinese gangs had given
way to local gang wars in Kalibaroe, and later on, these gang wars extended tothe city of Soerabaja. Since the document mentions that both the Tjap Pik Bingand the Kio Ngo were involved in the opium trade, it is quite possible that
6） “Onderwerp: Inlichtingen nopens Goei Boen Liong,” Algemeene Politie Soerabaja, Afdeeling Politieke inlichtingen Dienst, No. 114/P.I.D./Ch.Z., November 25, 1936 (hereafter,
Onderwerp).
7） This is how Dutch classified documents describe the association. Dutch classified documents from 1936 onwards kept using the word “terrorist” and “terrorism” regarding Chinese gang wars in East Java.
8） “Onderwerp,” op.cit.
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rivalry in illegal opium trafficking and selling was a factor in the conflict. Opium
was a popular commodity for consumption among the laborers who toiled in
the plantations due to its recreational effect. In the middle of the nineteenth
century the Indies state had introduced the opium farm system, in which opium
was sold by licensed retailers, and the Chinese farmers (pachter) operated as the
middlemen. Farms demanded a series of patronage links with the indigenous
and colonial officials at all levels of the governmental structure. This linkestablished a wide range of patronage arrangements between local officials andChinese opium farmers. Thus (by way of connections) the opium farmers had
become men of influence in the indigenous communities. The situation came tobe seen as a threat to the governing order and became a reason why the Indies
government decided to eliminate the farm system. Starting from 1904 thegovernment simply monopolized the opium sale in Java and Madoera, and thenthis new system was gradually introduced in other islands.

9）

On the one hand, the abolition of the opium farm system weakened theChinese social status in the Indies. It forced these peranakan Chinese to seek new
channels of influence and wealth within the colonial social structure. This was
the reason why the peranakan Chinese began to commit to the Chinese-Malay
print business from the turn of the century. On the other hand, after thegovernment monopolized opium sales, newcomer Chinese immigrants called“Singkeh” or “totok” (full-blooded) appeared to be involved in the illegal opium
trade in the twentieth century. It was for this illegal business that Chinesecriminal organizations often competed with each other.
In late 1933 the situation in Kalibaroe became increasingly grave. This wasafter the Kio Ngo gang gained a new leader, Tan Ping Mo. The background of
Tan Ping Mo alias Tan Tjwie Sing was little known. He held a foreignerʼscertificate card No. 1167, issued in Soerabaja on 23 July 1928, and somecriminal records in East Java. After Tan Ping Mo came to Kalibaroe, the tension9） Another reason to abolish opium farms was the rise of the moralist concern of the
Dutch people. They raised voices to protect and develop the welfare of the indigenous
people. In Java, most consumers of opium were indigenous and the Indies government
blamed the Chinese to exploit them by selling opium. For the social history of opium
farms, see Rush (1990).
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Chinese Gang Wars in the Netherlands Indies

between the Kie Ngo and the Tjap Pik Bing escalated. Skirmishes andassassinations between the two gangs continuously occurred from 1933 all theway to 1935, and even spread to the neighboring villages of Glenmore andRogodjampi. Residents in these villages were undoubtedly terrified. The
authorities referred to these gang wars as “terrorist action” (terroristische actie) byimmigrant Chinese (Singkeh) but did not appear to intervene in a significant way.
In the late 1935 gang wars in Kalibaroe and Glenmore spilled into an open
clash in Soerabaja, the largest city in East Java. Militant members of both gangs
received shelters in hotels which their associations ran. The gang war thenturned into a conflict in Soerabaja between the Thay Lie Kwan Tong Hotel and
the Jang Han Kie Hotel; the former was supported by the Tjap Pik Beng gang
and the latter the Kie Ngo gang.

10）

In newspaper reports, the conflict was

described as a hotel war because militant members used these two hotels as theirbases.
Local Chinese newspapers based in Soerabaja drew attention to such gang
conflicts. On 19 September 1935, Shang Po and Tay Kong Siang Po, both were
Soerabaja-based Chinese language newspapers, carried the same controversial
article entitled “Tay Tong,” referring to the Thay Lie Kwan Tong Hotel incident.
According to the official court record (proces-verbaal) on 23 November 1936, theauthor of the piece was Go Tjin Hwa, but it was Go Soe Hin who dictated thecontent. Go Soe Hin was an infamous gang member in Soerabaja and actively
involved in the so-called “Tay Tong-Jang Han Kie” conflict (Mr. 1075x/1936). The
record continues to show that the article conveyed a message, if anyone with
malevolent feelings should harm “Tay Tong,” then the Tay Tong side would cut
off all further negotiation with “Jang Han Kie” and take effective measures todefend against such action. It appears that the authorities had read the article as
11）

a proclamation of war,and that gang war was about to break out.

At this point, the police finally decided to intervene in the gang conflictbecause public peace and order were under serious threat. At the end of 1935,
the police shut down the Tay Tong Hotel. Then a half year later on 22 June
10） “Onderwerp,” op.cit.
11） Ibid.
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1936, the Attorney General ordered all governors and residents to pay special
attention to Chinese newspapers, which had become potential targets of
persbreidel (press restriction) (Mr. 618x/1936). In that year the police detained fivegang members – Ie Wan Kiem, Go Soe Hin, Oey Tek Beng, Tjiok Ing Hie, Liem
12）

Bak Lie, and Go See Po.

All of them were born in China and were notorious

gang bosses in Soerabaja. Ie Wan Kiem was the chairman of the secret society
Ho Hap, ran an allegedly gambling club Ik Bin Siet Giap Sia, and member ofthe Kie Ngo group, in which another gangster Oey Tek Beng was also amember. Ie Wan Kiem and Liem Bak Lie were members of Giok Jong Kong
Hwee, while Go Soe Hin and Go See Bok were affiliated with the Yang Liong
Kong Hwee group. All of them – Ho Hap, Kie Ngo, Giok Jong Kong Hwee,and Yang Liong Kong Hwee – were considered criminal associations involving
in gambling operations, extortion, violent brawls, and murders. In the eye of theauthorities, the actions of the Chinese gangsters had intimidated and terrorized13）

not only the Chinese population, but also the general public in Soerabaja.

Based on the developing and urgent situations, on 26 November 1936, theResident of Soerabaja requested the Governor of East Java to deport six
Chinese to China.

14）

A half-year later in May 1937 the Governor-General madethe final decision, stating clearly that the six Chinese actions were “terrorist
acts,” and all of them were banished from the Indies (Mr. 1075x/1936).

5.

POLITICIZATION OF TERRORISM

The Chinese gang wars brought a complex and sensitive governance problem tothe Indies state. In theory, conflicts among residents are supposed to be resolved
using the law. If it turned out to be a criminal case, then suspects would havebeen put on trial. In the case presented here, however, the authorities applied a12） “Verwijdering uit Ned.Indie van eenige deelnemers aan de terroristische actie onder deChineezen te Soerabaja,” Resident van Soerabaja aan Governeur van Oost Java, No. 3009/
Geheim, on November 26, 1936 (hereafter, Verwijdering).
13） “Uittreksel uit het Besluit van den Governeur-Generaal van Nederlandsch-Indië,” Bij
de aanhaling van dit Besluit datum en nummer vermelden. May 24, 1937.
14） “Verwijdering,” op.cit.
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Chinese Gang Wars in the Netherlands Indies

different approach and did not leave the issue to the judicial body. Instead, they
dealt with the problem themselves as a part of administrative matters. The odd
thing about this case is that the authorities arbitrarily interpreted the Indies law.
By definition, any type of gang conflict was categorized as a part of social
issues, whereas terrorism or terrorist-related acts were considered political.
Nevertheless, when faced with an unexpected turn of the event, the Indies
authorities disregarded the social aspect and argument of the case in favor of apolitical solution. In other words, the Indies authorities “politicized” the Chinesegang acts – by defining them as terrorist acts – even when their actions had
nothing to do with politics.
This decision should not be taken as a surprise, because it reflected thecontemporary Indies changing attitude towards the Chinese in the Indies. The
question is who was in charge of this “odd” decision. The point here is thatpower lied in the bureaucratic hierarchy. The Indies authorities tried hard toregain their power and authorities after the Communist revolts in 1926 and 1927
as mentioned above. These events haunted the Indies government like a trauma,and continued to factor in decision making. In order for the authorities to rid
themselves of the trauma, they needed to rebuild their institutions and regain
the confidence to govern. One way was to strengthen the police force, inparticular the secret police that watched over radical political activists and their
movements, as well as any radical social forces.
In 1932 a major administrative reorganization took place. In terms ofdeveloping surveillance power over the Chinese, two Bureaus for Chinese Affairs
and for Japanese Affairs were merged into a new one – the Bureau for Chineseand East Asian Affairs (Dienst der Chineesche Zaken en Oost-Aziatische
Aangelegenheden, hereafter Bureau for East Asian Affairs). The newly establishedbureau had to watch over not only activities of the Indies Chinese, but also
political and military developments taking place in China and Japan. The
bureau had the responsibility to watch the Chinese and gather information
about their activity and life. It also shared information with regional authorities
which were headed by the Governors. Therefore, it became the normal
procedure that the Governor of East Java collected all necessary information
about the Chinese gangs in the region, analyzed it, made decisions on how to423(14)

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deal with them, and made proposals concerning them to the Governor-General.
Deporting foreign residents was an extraordinary practice for the Indies
authorities. It could be said that it was an odd reaction to uncontrollable
residents. To understand the peculiarity of Governor Generalʼs decision in 1937
to deport six Chinese gangsters from the Indies necessitates a further inquiry. In
the previous section, I have reconstructed the development of the Chinese gangwars in Kalibaroe and Soerabaja. For that, I have consulted the Dutch classified
colonial documents. The classified documents circulated among limited officials
in both the Indies and the Netherlands, because they were deemed to contain
political significant and sensitive information, although in reality, the gang wars
were not at all political, but rather social and economic.
In the contemporary international context, the decision to deportcontradicted the discussion in Europe about how to deal with terrorism. Whenthe issue of Chinese gang wars drew the authoritiesʼ concern in the Indies, there
was an ongoing discussion about terrorism at the League of Nations. Remarksby a Dutch delegation to the diplomatic conference revealed the Dutch position
on how to deal with terrorism, which eventually affected the Indiesʼ reaction to“international terrorism.” In order to understand it, we need to take a look at
the contemporary international debate on terrorism in the 1930s that developedon the platform of the League of Nations.
In the context of the European continent, the Marseilles assassination of1934 provoked international debates on terrorism. On 9 October 1934, King
Alexander I of Yugoslavia was assassinated in Marseilles by Croatian and
Macedonian separatists. The Marseilles incident provoked the terrorism debate
at the League of Nationsʼ Council. Based on a proposal submitted by France,
the Council decided to create a committee of experts that would prepare twoconventions; one was about the prevention and punishment of terrorism, theother about an international criminal court. It was clear that the purpose of thecommittee was to criminalize terrorism. This was the very first attempt inhistory by the international community to do so. The Committee held three
sessions from 1934 to 1936. In conclusion, in 1937 the Council convened a
diplomatic conference called the International Conference on the Repression ofTerrorism in Geneva to finalize the two draft conventions by experts. Although(15)422

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the League of Nations eventually failed to functionalize the conventions due tothe development of war situations in Europe, it was historically the first step by
the international community to deal with terrorism.
In the late 1920s and 1930s, international criminal jurists developed theconcept of “crimes constituting a common danger,” which provided the legal
basis for defining international terrorism (Lewis 2014: 123). Such move was inreaction to various developments of terrorism in Europe – a string of ultranationalist bombings and assassinations, a number of communist attacks, andthe post-war appearance of armed groups. All of these terrorisms were legallydefined as criminal acts. Based on this concept, international criminal law was
supposed to serve state security and jointly strengthen states against their
homegrown enemies who then fled abroad. It was designed to protect state
officials who were often the targets of terrorism. Interestingly, because it
excluded international political movements from its definition of terrorism, it
did not take either the Cominternʼs international activity or KMTʼs regional
activities as criminal actions.
In the course of the diplomatic debate about terrorism, statements from theDutch delegation, M. van Hamel, deserves examination. He called the attention
to the international delegates about the definition of terrorism. He referred to
the first draft convention which cleared two points. Firstly, the conventionʼsintention was to treat terrorism in penal law; and secondly, the convention
should stress on the deliberate nature of terrorist acts (League of Nations 1938:
73). Moreover, on a different occasion, van Hamel emphasized his personal

opinion about the sovereignty of each government to the come up with acountermeasure to terrorist acts:a Government was free to send any foreign guilty of having committed an
act of terrorism on its territory before any court which it considered to bejust and properly organised. He did not see why it should be contrary tointernational law or courtesy to send a foreigner for trial before such aninternational court, if the latter appeared to be equitable (League of Nations
1938: 121).

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This might not be the Dutch Governmentʼs official statement, nevertheless, it
was a strong statement by the Dutch delegation to the League of Nations. Whenthe international conference was held, the Indies government had alreadyreached the final decision to deport the six Chinese to China. Although theinternational criminal law on terrorist acts had not reached its conclusion at thetime, judging from the statements of the Dutch delegation, it is safe to assume
that the Netherlands government was in the position to execute its sovereign
power in dealing with terrorist acts committed by foreigners. This logic naturally
was applied to the Dutch colony, the Indies.

6.

CONCLUSION

This is how the colonial war on terror was conceived in the Indies. It happened
to be the Chinese gang wars that were threatening the local peace and order. By
the time the Governor-General reached his final decision, the war situations in
Asia and Europe had developed. In Asia, Japanʼs aggressive invasion into China
became obvious day by day, whereas in the European-related context theEthiopian crisis was deepening. Both the Netherlands government and theIndies government nervously assessed how to face developing situations in bothterritories. For them, the administrative powers needed to be strengthened andtheir judgments to be efficiently executed.
As is the case everywhere, it is the authorities that conceived and definedterrorism and/or terrorist acts. In the case discussed in this article, it was theIndies authorities that perceived terrorist acts and deal with them. Nevertheless,the oddity of the case discussed in this article is that the subject of the terrorist
acts did not have any political intention and motivation in their activities, unlike
the usual cases of terrorism. In this case, the charge of terrorism was utilized inorder to deport foreign troublemakers. It is to be noted, moreover, that theEuropean colonial authorities in Asia felt another war was forthcoming in thelatter half of the 1930s, which might pose a very serious danger to colonial law
and order. In this way, the colonial authorities substituted the police concern
with the political concern, in order to maintain the colonial state sovereignty
and underscore its control over its territories.
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PRIMARY SOURCE
Dutch Colonial documents: geheime mailrapporten (classified mail reports; in thisarticle it is mentioned as Mr. x) from The Nationaal Archief (Dutch National
Archives), The Hague, The Netherlands.
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