Public

Issues Paper on Insurer Culture

November 2021

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 1 of 35

About the IAISThe International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) is a voluntary membershiporganisation of insurance supervisors and regulators from more than 200 jurisdictions. The
mission of the IAIS is to promote effective and globally consistent supervision of the insurance
industry in order to develop and maintain fair, safe and stable insurance markets for the benefit
and protection of policyholders and to contribute to global financial stability.
Established in 1994, the IAIS is the international standard setting body responsible fordeveloping principles, standards and other supporting material for the supervision of theinsurance sector and assisting in their implementation. The IAIS also provides a forum forMembers to share their experiences and understanding of insurance supervision andinsurance markets.
The IAIS coordinates its work with other international financial policymakers and associationsof supervisors or regulators, and assists in shaping financial systems globally. In particular,
the IAIS is a member of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), member of the Standards Advisory
Council of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and partner in the Access to
Insurance Initiative (A2ii). In recognition of its collective expertise, the IAIS also is routinely
called upon by the G20 leaders and other international standard setting bodies for input on
insurance issues as well as on issues related to the regulation and supervision of the global
financial sector.
Issue Papers provide background on particular topics, describe current practices, actual
examples or case studies pertaining to a particular topic and/or identify related regulatory andsupervisory issues and challenges. Issues Papers are primarily descriptive and not meant tocreate expectations on how supervisors should implement supervisory material. Issues
Papers often form part of the preparatory work for developing standards and may containrecommendations for future work by the IAIS.
International Association of Insurance Supervisors
c/o Bank for International Settlements
CH-4002 Basel
Switzerland
Tel: +41 61 280 8090 Fax: +41 61 280 9151
www.iaisweb.org
This document was prepared by the Market Conduct Working Group and Governance Working
Group in consultation with IAIS Members.
This document is available on the IAIS website (www.iaisweb.org).
© International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), 2021.
All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced or translated provided the source isstated.

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 2 of 35

Contents
Acronyms .............................................................................................................................. 4
1

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 6
1.1

Objectives and scope of paper ................................................................................ 6

1.2

Background............................................................................................................. 7

1.2.1

What is meant by “culture” in a corporate context? .......................................... 7

1.2.2

Why does culture matter for insurers and supervisors?.................................... 9

2 The relationship between insurer culture, the management of prudential and conduct risks
and the mitigation of misconduct ......................................................................................... 14
2.1

The role of culture as a linkage between prudential and conduct risks .................. 14

2.2

The role of culture in mitigating misconduct .......................................................... 15

3 Illustrations of how cultural drivers can influence certain prudential and conduct outcomes
within an insurer .................................................................................................................. 21
3.1

4

Insurer’s values, business objectives and strategies ............................................. 21

3.1.1

Values............................................................................................................ 21

3.1.2

Business objectives and strategies ................................................................ 23

3.2

Leadership accountability...................................................................................... 26

3.3

Communication within the insurer ......................................................................... 29

3.4

Internal remuneration and performance management structures .......................... 30

3.4.1

Remuneration ................................................................................................ 31

3.4.2

Performance management............................................................................. 33

Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 35

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 3 of 35

Acronyms
ACPR

Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (France)

AFM

De Autoriteit Financiële Markten (Netherlands)

AMF

Autorité des marchés financiers (Québec)APRA

Australian Prudential Regulation Authority

ASIC

Australian Securities and Investments Commission

BNM

Bank Negara Malaysia

BSC

Balanced scorecard

CBA

Commonwealth Bank of Australia

CBR

Central Bank of Russia

CCI

Consumer Credit Insurance

CCO

Chief Compliance Officer

CCIR

Canadian Council of Insurance Regulators

CFF

Customer Fact Find

CISRO

Canadian Insurance Services Regulatory Organisations

DNB

De Nederlandsche Bank (Netherlands)

FCA

Financial Conduct Authority (UK)FRBNY

Federal Reserve Bank of New YorkFSA

Financial Services Agency (Japan)

FSB

Financial Stability BoardFI

Financial institution

FTC

Fair treatment of customers

FSCA

Financial Sector Conduct Authority (South Africa)

FSRC

Financial Services Royal Commission/ Royal Commission into Misconduct
in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry (Australia)

G30Group of Thirty

GCRA

Governance, culture, remuneration and accountability

HKMA

Hong Kong Monetary Authority

IAIS

International Association of Insurance Supervisors

ICPs

Insurance Core Principles

KPI

Key performance indicatorMAS

Monetary Authority of Singapore

MBManagement Board

MPI

Mobile Phone Insurance

MRC

Mandatory Reference Checking

OIREQ

Own Initiative Requirement

OMTPL

Obligatory Motor Third Party Liability Insurance

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 4 of 35

PARP

Product Approval and Review Process

PRA

Prudential Regulation Authority (UK)

RGSAs

Risk Governance Self-Assessments

SB

Supervisory Board

SM&CR

Senior Managers and Certification Regime

TPD

Total and Permanent Disability Insurance

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 5 of 35

1

Introduction

1.1

Objectives and scope of paper

1.
The IAIS’ 2020-2024 Strategic Plan identifies culture as a key trend in insurance
markets and insurance supervision that is likely to affect the IAIS’ mission in the upcoming
years. 1 Inputs from IAIS Members and stakeholders during the strategic review process
undertaken in 2017-2018 highlighted that issues relating to conduct and culture are ofincreasing importance to both conduct and prudential supervisors, particularly in light of rapidlychanging financial markets driven by innovation, shifts in consumer expectations and broader
societal challenges. This has been further reinforced since 2020 as demonstrated by global
insurer and supervisory responses to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on policyholders.
2.
This calls for stronger recognition that conduct risks can lead to considerable financial
soundness concerns for the sector and vice versa. Moreover, the IAIS appreciates that
effective insurer cultures are pivotal to strengthening and maintaining public trust andconfidence in the sector as a whole. Insurers, therefore, find themselves under increasingpressure to demonstrate a solid leadership and cultural commitment to embedding principles
relating to both sound prudential management and the fair treatment of customers across all
aspects of their business.
3.
Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to explore the concept of insurer culture asa point of intersection for prudential and conduct risks, with a few selected examples toillustrate the broader role of culture in this regard.
4.
Given the complexity of “culture” as a concept and the multi-dimensional elements that
influence the cultural make-up of individual insurance businesses, this paper is not intended
to provide an exhaustive analysis of the topic or to develop detailed supervisory guidance.
5.
Instead, as a first step, the scope of the paper is limited to exploratory observations on
the importance of insurer culture for insurers and supervisors, with the aim of advancing theseobservations through further engagement and the possible development of additional IAIS
material, as required. Some aspects relevant to this topic have also been addressed to acertain extent in previously published IAIS material, as highlighted throughout the paper. 2
Such previous material should be considered as complementary to the issues described inthis paper, where relevant.
6.
Just as any community or organisation’s culture is unique to itself, it does not seemappropriate to ascribe one “right” or “good” culture to insurers. However, an insurer’s culture
may be viewed through a variety of lenses to understand whether it appears healthy,
sustainable, purposeful and safe. For supervisors, this would entail understanding whether
the culture of a particular insurer effectively promotes positive outcomes related to its overall
safety and soundness, the interests of its policyholders and other stakeholders, and the fairtreatment of customers. 3

1 See 2020-2024 Strategic Plan.

See for example IAIS Issues Paper on Conduct of Business Risk and its Management (2015);
Application Paper on the Composition and the Role of the Board (2018); Issues Paper on Corporate
Governance (2009); Application Paper on Proactive Supervision of Corporate Governance (2018).
3 See ICP 7.2.1.
2

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 6 of 35

7.
The Insurance Core Principles (ICPs) serve as a natural starting point to help identify
the various elements required to achieve a sound culture within insurers. The ICPs describe
clear roles and responsibilities for setting the cultural tone of the insurer as well as for thepractical embedment of this tone across the various levels and functional areas of the insurer.
8.
Understanding the various elements that make up insurer culture, which in turn inform
certain decisions, behaviours and practices across the insurer’s business, can be critical in
helping supervisors identify and address prudential and conduct issues in a more timely andeffective manner. This could mitigate the potential for widespread misconduct and possible
financial and consumer harm, leading to improved public confidence in the overall integrity ofthe sector.
9.
It is also important to recognise that managing culture is not a one-off event for insurers
but needs ongoing reinforcement to yield permanent and meaningful outcomes. 4
Consequently, identifying shortcomings in an insurer's culture may prove less challenging thanactually correcting them, which will require a demonstrable long-term commitment on the partof the insurer.
10.
Various ICPs make explicit reference to supervisory expectations regarding insurer
culture, for example:•

ICP 7.2 states that “[t]he supervisor requires the insurer’s Board to set and oversee
the implementation of the insurer’s corporate culture, business objectives andstrategies for achieving those objectives, in line with the insurer’s long term interestsand viability”.

•

ICP 8.4 states that “[t]he supervisor requires the insurer to have an effective risk
management function capable of assisting the insurer to•oidentify, assess, monitor, mitigate and report on its key risks in a timely way;andopromote and sustain a sound risk culture”.

ICP 19.2 states that “[t]he supervisor requires insurers and intermediaries to establish
and implement policies and procedures on the fair treatment of customers, as anintegral part of their business culture”.

1.2

Background

1.2.1

What is meant by “culture” in a corporate context?

11.
The IAIS defines corporate culture as “[t]he set of norms, values, attitudes andbehaviours of an insurer that characterises the way in which the insurer conducts its
activities”. 5
12.
Similar to the complex structural components of a human being, organisations are
typically made up of physiological and psychological components. Like the human psyche,corporate culture is also composed of at least two layers, one visible and in this sense working
on a conscious or surface level, and another existing on a much deeper or subliminal level.
4 See G30 Steering Committee and Working Group on Banking Conduct and Culture, Banking Conduct

and Culture, A Permanent Mindset Change, November 2018, p. 30.
5 See IAIS Glossary.
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 7 of 35

13.
Corporate culture is broadly influenced by various formal and informal governance andstructural factors as well as certain behavioural characteristics that underpin the organisation.
For example, on the surface, an organisation’s formal governance arrangements, policies andprocesses may be indicators of the organisation’s transparency and credibility. Similarly
factors that may sometimes be perceived as more informal, such as the organisation’s styleof communication, or office layout (where relevant), could also be signifiers of overall corporate
culture. More fundamentally, beyond this surface level, corporate culture describes thecollective principles, philosophies, goals and standards as well basic assumptions that
influence decisions, actions and behaviour of members of the organisation. These can be
dynamic and variable and, at individual level, may be influenced by personal backgrounds,
prior professional experiences and other pre-existing beliefs and attitudes. 6
Examples:Group of 30 (G30) Steering Committee and Working Group on Banking Conduct and Culture
The G30, writing in the context of bank culture, breaks down culture as, first, a delivery mechanism– processes, policies, organisation and technology - for values and behaviours. Second, thesevalues and behaviours – including ethics, norms, expectations and beliefs - shape the institution’s
conduct. Each institution’s culture is unique and has to be right for that organisation. 7
The G30 noted that institutions faced with conduct issues or scandals do not necessarily have a bad
culture overall - elements of their culture are misaligned with the outcomes sought by these
institutions and these drive undesirable or inappropriate behaviour. The delivery mechanism maywork, for example, but the values or behaviours fail at one or more critical points, such as middle
management.
Netherlands
The De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) uses an iceberg metaphor to visualise culture at three levels
within an organisation, showing observable “behaviour” at the surface while showing “groupdynamics” and “mindset” as indirectly observable beneath the surface: 8

6 See for example Cambridge English Dictionary;

Investopedia; Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon.

7 See G30 Steering Committee and Working Group on Banking Conduct and Culture, Banking Conduct

and Culture, A Permanent Mindset Change, November 2018.
8 See DNB, Supervision of Behaviour and Culture, 2015.
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 8 of 35

In DNB’s model, behaviour is everything that people do that can be perceived by others. DNB’s
model focuses on group behaviour and the interaction between certain individual roles – such as
the CEO – and the group. As such, DNB’s supervision on behaviour and culture does not focus on
the individual competencies of Board members, as is the case in assessing suitability.
DNB pays special attention to behaviours related to decision-making, leadership andcommunication, because these behaviours are considered important for groups that work together
and depend on each other to achieve goals and results.
“Group dynamics” is defined as the interaction between different positions and patterns within agroup or between groups, which affects overall group effectiveness.
The deepest level of organisational culture is mindset: these are the deeply held beliefs and values
that often guide group dynamics and behaviour.
United Kingdom
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has described culture as “the habitual behaviours and mindsets that characterise an organisation, its key drivers being the organisation’s leadership, purpose,governance and approach to managing and rewarding people”. 9

1.2.2

Why does culture matter for insurers and supervisors?

14.
It is important for insurers and supervisors to understand the key components ofcorporate culture because these can significantly influence the achievement of various
outcomes for insurers, policyholders and other stakeholders.
15.
Insurers are primarily responsible for embedding an organisational culture thatconsistently promotes sound prudential and conduct outcomes. The focus of insurance
supervisors, on the other hand, is to assess the effectiveness of an insurer’s culture in actually
delivering on these outcomes.
16.
An effective or “sound” culture can help, amongst others, prevent excessive risk-taking
leading to more prudent and fair outcomes generally. An ineffective or “unsound” culture can
9 See FCA, Transforming Culture in Financial Services Discussion Paper DP 18/2, March 2018.

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 9 of 35

serve as a stimulant for risky behaviour that could potentially lead to adverse outcomes notjust for the insurer and policyholders, but more broadly for the insurance sector and thefinancial system as a whole.
17.
Assessing an insurer’s culture can be highly subjective and may require the thoughtful
exercise of supervisory judgment on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, applying a closer andmore critical eye on the culture of an insurer may help supervisors gain valuable insights into
the driving forces behind certain decisions and practices within the insurer. These insights on
risky behavioural patterns can lead to more accurate and earlier identification of root causes
underlying certain recurring issues. This can, in turn, facilitate more proactive supervisoryinterventions that prevent specific prudential and conduct risks from materialising.
18.
Complexities may arise when trying to pinpoint a singular or overarching culture within
an insurer, particularly if “sub-cultures” form within different levels or functional areas of thebusiness (eg between the underwriting, sales and claims functions etc), or in cases where theinsurance legal entity forms part of a broader group. In the latter, it is recognised that different
cultures may exist within the various entities of that broader group. Assessing how behaviours
and practices filter through the different group structures, management and staff levels of theinsurer as well as across its various functional areas, and geographical locations if applicable 10
may provide better understanding of the depth and consistency of cultural embedment acrossthe insurer.
19.
Starting at the top, the Board has a responsibility to promote a culture of openness anddebate within the Board, with proper involvement of Senior Management and Key Persons inControl Functions. 11
20.
As part of the Board’s responsibility for the effective oversight of Senior Management,
the Board oversees the implementation of the insurer’s corporate culture, business objectives
and strategies for achieving those objectives, including oversight of the implementation ofnorms for responsible and ethical behaviour. 12 Promoting sound risk management,compliance and fair treatment of customers is also the responsibility of Senior Management. 13
21.
Supervisory assessments of culture often place significant focus on the tone set by the
Board and Senior Management. However, decision-making and behaviours at the middle andlower levels of an insurer are critical to evaluating how deeply embedded this cultural tone isacross the insurer. 14
22.
A positive tone at the top, including promoting a sound culture of openness and debate
at all levels of the organisation, can help set norms for responsible and ethical behaviour down
through middle management and front-line employees. This can be achieved by, for example,
promoting employee well-being and good performance, and discouraging financial
misreporting, fraud and money laundering. It can also encourage compliance with laws,
regulations and internal policies and generally promote behaviours that preserve thereputation of the insurer and foster public confidence in the sector.
10 See also G30 Steering Committee and Working Group on Banking Conduct and Culture, Banking

Conduct and Culture, A Permanent Mindset Change, November 2018 at page 30.
11 See IAIS Application Paper on the Composition and the Role of the Board (2018).
12 See ICP 7.2 and ICP 7.2.5.
13 See ICP 7.10.
14 See for example speech by Martin Wheatley (Chief Executive, FCA), Debating trust and confidence
in banking, May 2015.
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 10 of 35

23.
Consistent embedment of a sound culture within individual insurers may significantly
reduce the potential for widespread misconduct and significantly increase the potential forgood prudential and conduct outcomes which can result in enhanced financial soundness,stability and fair customer treatment across the sector. 15
24.
Leadership accountability, transparent internal communication, appropriate
remuneration and performance structures, and effective consequence management for
misconduct are key in facilitating the desired behaviours and entrench a sound culture within
all levels and functional areas of an insurer. This is further strengthened in an insurer whose
overall values, business objectives and strategies are aligned accordingly.
25.
The desired behaviours alluded to above, when reinforced by an effective culture, canhelp facilitate the smooth day-to-day operations and functions of an insurer, and are also
important when new circumstances or stress situations occur. For example, Covid-19 has had
wide ranging impacts, including on personal health, lifestyle habits and work locations, whichhave affected insurers’ interactions with policyholders as well as their own internal operations.
Many of the attributes of an effective culture described above can help when dealing withchange or responding to stress situations such as the Covid-19 pandemic. A sound, effective
culture should contribute to the ability and willingness of insurers to adapt swiftly to events as
significant as the pandemic. For insurers with an ineffective culture, the challenges andoperational changes brought about by an event like Covid-19 could further exacerbate issues
such as misconduct, non-compliance or risky behaviour potentially leading to adverse
outcomes. 16
Examples:Australia
Insurers’ staff have generally had to work remotely from March 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
At the same time insurers in Australia have had to deal with claims arising from multiple natural
disasters including bushfires, hailstorms and floods.
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) found that insurers have adopted
various practices to adapt to the situation while also demonstrating a positive customer-centricculture by, for example:•

Using data to identify policyholders located in areas affected by the disasters and proactively
contacting them to remind them who their insurer is, and to start the claims process.

•Setting up pop-up hubs for claims lodgement in affected, often rural and isolated areas,
including in evacuation centres, and providing information directly to customers, to make iteasier to initiate claims.

•

Proactively communicating through different channels to ensure that customers understandthe claims process and how their claim is progressing. This has been particularly important

15 See for example Monetary Authority of Singapore Information Paper: Culture and Conduct Practices

of Financial Institutions (FIs), September 2020; Australian Royal Commission Report into Misconduct
in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry, February 2019; Financial Markets
Authority and Reserve Bank of New Zealand Thematic Review of Bank Conduct and Culture, November
2018; Central Bank of Ireland Review of Behaviour and Culture of the Irish Retail Banks, July 2018.
16 See for example MAS and the Association of Banks in Singapore, Risk Management and Operational
Resilience in a Remote Working Environment, March 2021; IOSCO, Initial Findings and Observations
About the Impact of COVID-19 on Retail Market Conduct, December 2020;
https://www.fca.org.uk/insight/conduct-culture-and-covid-19.
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 11 of 35

during the pandemic as it has added further challenges in managing the increased claims
arising from natural disasters. In previous natural disasters insurers had been able to call in
extra claims assessors and traders for repairs from across the country or overseas. This has
not been possible in light of travel restrictions due to the pandemic, leading to delays in someinstances.
•

Having centralised claims management for natural disaster claims, giving customers
continuity, where possible, through the claims process.

•

Waiving some claims documentation requirements once a claim has been accepted, suchas accepting total loss home insurance claims without requiring itemisation of contents. Thishas helped to make the claims process simpler for claimants as it is extremely difficult for aclaimant who has experienced total loss from a fire or flood to provide evidence of contents
and their value.

•

Having passed on the benefit of government funding of debris removal from affected
properties, despite no contractual requirement to do so, which means that policyholders
receive higher payments to help them rebuild their homes.

Netherlands
DNB has executed several change effectiveness reviews to determine what the success factors and
impediments are for financial institutions (including insurers) to successfully implement organisationaland cultural change programmes. This has been found to be a prerequisite for financial institutions’reactions to Covid-19.
The two most common success factors for change effectiveness were found to be:
1. Large sense of urgency for the required change and willingness to change by employees(insurance).
2. High execution power and energy to start the change.
The three main problematic patterns that were found to impede effective change were:
1. Lack of (attention for) reflective learning.
2. Lack of attention for translating change vision into behaviour and embedding the changes.
3. Ineffective top-down leadership of changes.
The failure to deliver sustainable change is caused by similar problematic behavioural patterns andcultural root causes present throughout the organisation, but these patterns particularly manifest at
the top.
Root causes differ per situation, task group and financial institution, however the following
commonalities were found (not an exhaustive list):
Group dynamics:•

Constructive challenge versus not dealing well with differences of opinion.

•

Conflicts within or between the Management Board (MB) and Supervisory Board (SB).

Mindset:•Differences in values and convictions that are not explicitly discussed.

•

Action orientation (banks) versus analytical approach (insurers).

•

Strong convictions that behaviour cannot change.

•

Lack of importance attributed to behavioural risks (compared to financial risks).

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 12 of 35

26.
It is recognised that a multitude of other internal and external factors may also play arole in influencing an insurer’s culture by driving specific decisions and behaviours withindifferent aspects of its business. Similarly, some supervisors may consider additional factors
beyond those highlighted in this paper as key components in their assessments of insurer
culture, depending on their individual supervisory contexts. For exploratory purposes, thescope of this paper is limited to the factors mentioned in the preceding paragraphs (assummarised in Figure 1 below) due to their foundational role in informing decisions andbehaviours in vitually every aspect of an insurer’s business, and their correlation with the
expectations set out in the ICPs. Additional factors not covered in this paper or in other existing
IAIS material may be explored as part of future work on this topic.
Figure 1

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 13 of 35

2

The relationship between insurer culture, the management ofprudential and conduct risks and the mitigation of misconduct

2.1

The role of culture as a linkage between prudential and conduct risks 17

27.
To a large extent, prudential and conduct risks have traditionally been assessed
separately by supervisors. Prudential risks, being more quantifiable and generally resulting in
impacts that are more clearly evident in the shorter-term, have customarily received greater
scrutiny by insurers and supervisors. However, prudential and conduct risks can often mirror
two sides of the same coin, the likelihood and impact of both types of risks being rooted inoverlapping elements that make up the overall culture of the insurer.
28.
While prudential risk management ostensibly focuses on the mitigation of adverse
consequences for insurers themselves, conduct risk management is primarily concerned withthe alleviation of potentially unfair treatment or harm to customers 18. Conduct risks may notalways appear to constitute immediate or direct threats to the soundness or stability of
insurers, and consequently may not initially attract the attention of prudential supervisors.
Nevertheless, it is increasingly being recognised that the poor management of conduct risks
can lead to significant prudential concerns and vice versa. 19
29.
In an insurance context, both prudential and conduct risk management are, at theircore, ultimately concerned with the overall protection of policyholders. It therefore follows thatan integrated approach to assessing these risks could naturally result in more desirable
outcomes for insurers, customers and the sector as a whole.
30.
The collective set of norms, practices, decision-making and behavioural elements thatmake up an insurer’s culture directly influences how that insurer manages both types of risks. 20
This makes the issue of culture a critical intersection point to help prudential and conduct
supervisors gain a more universal or “integrated” view of vulnerabilities across an insurer’sbusiness, thereby identifying and addressing potential blindspots that may not otherwise bepicked up through a fragmented or singular supervisory lens.
31.
The cultural tone of an insurer, set at the highest level by the Board, can be an early
indicator for certain prudential and conduct outcomes across the business. For example, aninsurer led by a Board that demonstrates ethical and transparent decision-making (culture)
can help reinforce the implementation of strong governance, risk management and internal
control systems (prudential) resulting in lowered instances of unfair business practices andbetter outcomes for customers (conduct). On the other hand, a Board whose decisions are
driven solely by interests of short-term-profit-oriented shareholders (culture) may set
aggressive profitability targets (prudential) that could incentivise unfair product design, sales
and claims handling practices by management and staff (conduct), which could in turn lead to

17 See also IAIS Issues Paper on Conduct of Business Risk and its Management (2015).

See IAIS Glossary. Conduct risk is defined as “[t]he risk of financial loss or other adverse
consequences that arises from insurers and/or intermediaries conducting their business in a way thattreats customers unfairly or results in harm to customers”.
19 See for example Australian Royal Commission Report into Misconduct in the Banking,Superannuation and Financial Services Industry, February 2019.
20 See for example Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Information Paper on Transforming
governance, culture, remuneration and accountability, November 2019.
18

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 14 of 35

large scale consumer complaints, litigation, reputational damage and significant longer-termlosses for the insurer (prudential and conduct).
2.2

The role of culture in mitigating misconduct

32.
Misconduct is generally understood as behaviour that falls short of expected
standards, including legal, professional, internal conduct and ethical requirements. 21
33.
In the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the risk of financial sector
misconduct and its associated impact has attracted much regulatory and public scrutiny. Manyof the incidences of misconduct that emerged during and since the crisis reflected, at theircore, significant deficiencies in organisational culture, demonstrated through poor
governance, remuneration and risk management frameworks, often driven by an unhealthy“tone at the top”. 22
34.
The impact of misconduct can extend beyond individual employees or institutions andcan be detrimental for consumers and the sector as a whole. This is evident in the legacy ofpoor outcomes, both prudential and conduct, produced by various financial scandals reported
in recent years. Over time, the poor management of misconduct risk by financial institutions
can lead to significant reputational damage and an erosion in market confidence. 23
35.
Traditionally, supervisors have addressed misconduct risk by assessing theeffectiveness of insurers’ risk management and internal control functions (eg anti-money
laundering, compliance and audit processes), often focusing on isolated process breakdowns.
However, as demonstrated in the examples below, some supervisors recognise that pervasive
misconduct could be the result of deeper organisational deficiencies, characterised by anunsound culture, that trigger certain harmful decisions, behaviours and practices.
36.
Some supervisors are therefore developing enhanced tools and approaches for
identifying, assessing and managing misconduct risk that focus on assessing the underlying
cultural factors that help enable or deter misconduct from occurring within financial institutions.
Examples: 24
Financial Stability Board (FSB)
The FSB has published a toolkit to help supervisors and financial institutions mitigate misconductrisk, utilising a multi-faceted approach. 25
The toolkit identifies 19 tools that can be used to address three overarching issues identified by the
FSB as part of its earlier work on misconduct, namely:

21 See Financial Stability Board (FSB), Strengthening Governance Frameworks to Mitigate Misconduct

Risk: A Toolkit for Firms and Supervisors, April 2018.
22 See for example speech by Andrew Bailey (Chief Executive Officer, PRA), Culture in ﬁnancial
services – a regulator’s perspective, May 2016.
23 See Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), White Paper on Misconduct Risk, Culture, andSupervision, Stephanie Chaly, James Hennessy, Lev Menand, Kevin Stiroh, and Joseph Tracy,
December 2017.
24 For additional examples also see previous footnote.
25 See FSB, Strengthening Governance Frameworks to Mitigate Misconduct Risk: A Toolkit for Firms
and Supervisors, April 2018.
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 15 of 35

•

Mitigating cultural drivers of misconduct – including tools to effectively develop andcommunicate strategies for reducing misconduct in financial institutions and for authorities
to effectively supervise such approaches.

•

Strengthening individual responsibility and accountability – including tools that seek to
identify key responsibilities and functions in a financial institution and assign them toindividuals to promote accountability and increase transparency.

•

Addressing the “rolling bad apples” phenomenon – including tools to improve interview
processes and onboarding of new employees and for regular updates to background checks
to avoid hiring individuals with a history of misconduct.

United Kingdom
The FCA seeks to identify risks of harm in an insurer’s business model and assess how effective
the insurer’s culture is in mitigating these risks. The business model assessment drives the culture
assessment. If the insurer’s culture is ineffective in mitigating the risks, the FCA engages with theinsurer to mitigate these risks. This applies even if the insurer meets the threshold conditions so that
it is, and remains capable of, effective supervision, it is properly resourced and employs suitablestaff, and uses a suitable business model.
The FCA assesses potential harm from an insurer’s business model using three business model
assessment groups and assesses the effectiveness of culture in mitigating these harms using thesix culture assessment groups, namely, the insurer’s purpose, leadership, people policies,
governance, systems and controls, and oversight.
This model is used to assess insurers and other individual institutions, as well as portfolios of smaller
institutions assessed as a collective. 26
The FCA expects all institutions to contact their supervisor when things go wrong. Those with aculture of wanting to do the right thing see complaints and other identified issues as opportunities
to make systematic improvements.
Netherlands
The Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) conducts investigations into behaviour and culture at majorbanks, insurers and other financial providers. 27 The investigations are triggered by AFM’s
observations of risks either at specific entities or across the market.
These investigations seek to obtain better insights into what drives people to put the customer’sinterest or public interest first and make it possible to identify high risk behaviour before this resultsin harm. 28
Australia
The Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) focuses on the risk culture of insurers, rather
than looking at culture more broadly. According to APRA, risk culture refers to “the norms of
behaviour for individuals and groups that shape the ability to identify, understand, openly discuss,escalate and act on an entity’s current and future challenges and risks.”
Risk culture is not separate to organisational culture but reflects the influence of organisational
culture on how risks are managed. APRA’s Risk Culture 10 Dimensions is a consistent frameworkused by its frontline supervisors to assess cultural issues of regulated entities, including insurers,
26 See FCA, FCA Mission: Approach to Supervision, April 2019.

27 See AFM, Investigating behaviour and culture: How is this conducted in practice?, 2016.

See also AFM, Building a healthy organisational culture in the financial sector: inspiration forcompliance officers with guts, Céline Christensen, Tessa Coffeng, Elianne van Steenbergen, Leanne
Wiegman,Tijdschrift voor Compliance number 3, June 2018.
28

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 16 of 35

as part of their day-to-day supervisory activities. Some of the dimensions covered include factors
relating to leadership, decision-making and challenge, alignment with purpose and values, andresponsibility and accountability.

37.
Many insurers implement frameworks that focus on negative consequences for
employee infractions to deter, and ensure accountability for, misconduct (eg warnings,
lowered performance ratings, financial penalties, termination etc.). Consistent and transparent
disciplinary action in response to breaches of ethics, laws and other internal codes of conduct
signal a culture that does not tolerate misconduct.
38.
Similarly, positive reinforcement as well as reasonable financial and non-financial
incentives for good behaviour may also be effective in driving behavioural changes that
promote a desirable culture, thereby reducing the risk of misconduct within the insurer (egemployee reward programmes, publicising examples of good ethical conduct by individual
employees, appointing culture champions etc.).
Examples:Singapore
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has published an information paper that sets out several
desired outcomes relating to incentive structures that MAS expects to see in banks. One of theoutcomes is “[e]thical behaviour that considers customers’ interests and demonstrates prudent-risktaking are actively promoted and celebrated. At the same time, there are clear frameworks andprocesses to deter staff from, and hold them accountable for, misconduct through disciplinary actions
and compensation adjustments”. 29
Several banks inspected have implemented formal penalty structures setting out the minimum levelsof disciplinary actions for each category or severity level of misconduct. Disciplinary actions taken
include verbal and written warnings (which could result in downward adjustments of performance
ratings and remuneration, and restrictions on promotion opportunities), and for highly severe cases,
termination of employment.
Examples of positive reinforcement found include rewarding exemplary staff behaviour, having senior
management share at town halls about cases where staff have chosen to uphold the financial
institution’s values when faced with moral dilemmas in business.
On a related note, some banks had softened the impact of disciplinary actions for staff withmisconduct due to business considerations. For example, they reduced the downward adjustment invariable compensation for staff who had repeatedly breached internal policies on account of goodfinancial performance, paid-out significant one-off financial rewards soon after financial penalties
were imposed. Such actions undermined the effectiveness of the disciplinary actions and signalled
to staff that financial performance and business considerations were more important than conduct
and ethical issues. If such actions were allowed to persist, it would result in a culture that does notincentivise, and is not conducive to, good conduct and ethics.

29 See MAS, Incentive Structures in the Banking Industry: Fostering Sound Behaviour and Conduct,

March 2019. While this paper was based on MAS’ thematic inspection of incentive structures in banks,
the desired outcomes and good practices expected of banks have subsequently been extended toinsurers.
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 17 of 35

Australia
In 2018 ASIC published a report on its review of the sale of direct life insurance including term life,
trauma, accidental death, income protection and total and permanent disability (TPD) insurance. 30
Life insurance is sold direct to customers when it is not sold by an adviser with personal advice or
through a customer’s retirement fund.
The review found that sales of direct life insurance were associated with poor customer outcomes,
unfair sales practices and pressure selling. One of the root causes for the persistence of these poor
practices was the lack of proper consequence and performance management for misconduct.
ASIC found that insurers’ and distributors’ quality assurance frameworks did not consistently test for
behaviours that were likely to increase the risk of poor customer outcomes and were not effective at
detecting such conduct.
ASIC also found that some insurers’ training and scripts prescribed concerning sales practices, suchas inappropriate handling of customer objections. In some cases, expectations about appropriate
sales conduct were not clearly articulated or appeared conflicted. For example, while sales staff weretold not to engage in pressure selling, they were also trained in how to handle customers’ objections
and on sale ‘closing’ techniques.

39.
The influence of improper consequence management for misconduct is not limited tothe culture of individual institutions but can spread across the sector. Recent scandals in thebanking industry, such as interest rate and currency benchmark rigging, have drawn attention
to the problem of “rolling bad apples”. This refers to individuals, sometimes at senior level,
who are not held accountable for their misconduct at one institution and then resurface atanother institution (or another division of the same institution), only to repeat theirmisbehaviour and possibly influence those around them to behave in a similar way. 31
40.
Individuals who are not held accountable for misconduct at one insurer may be more
likely to repeat poor patterns of behaviour at other insurers. This could heighten financial andoperational risks for insurers, and potentially increase the risk of certain types of consumer
harm being perpetuated from one insurer to the next thereby undermining confidence in the
sector as a whole. This concern may also raise specific supervisory considerations regarding
appropriate punitive and remediation frameworks for misconduct by financial advisors andintermediaries, as well as other key distribution channel partners, who act on behalf of multiple
insurers. 32
41.
It may be helpful for supervisors to consider the rigour with which insurers assess theintegrity of individuals through interview and on-boarding processes as well as ongoingbackground checks to avoid retaining employees, advisors and intermediaries with apropensity to engage in, or encourage, misconduct.

30 See ASIC, Report 587: The sale of direct life insurance, August 2018.

31 See FSB, Strengthening Governance Frameworks to Mitigate Misconduct Risk: A Toolkit for Firms

and Supervisors, April 2018.
32 See Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Misconduct under the Microscope: Examining
Bad Behavior by Financial Advisers, March 2018.
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 18 of 35

Examples:
United Kingdom
The FCA’s assessment of a financial institution’s culture includes considering its leadership, purpose,governance and approach to managing and rewarding its employees. As part of the Senior
Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR), the FCA expects financial institutions to takeresponsibility for certifying the competence and integrity of employees with the potential to causesignificant harm.
The FCA has also introduced detailed requirements for the provision of references relating to thosein senior management functions or with certified functions, including a requirement to revise thosereferences where, for example, the provider of the reference is now aware of the circumstances
which would have required drafting a different reference.
Hong Kong
In 2020, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) issued a consultation paper to solicit comments
on a proposed Mandatory Reference Checking (MRC) scheme designed to address “rolling badapples” in the banking sector. 33
Based on preliminary industry engagements, the HKMA reports that many banks favour the
introduction of a MRC scheme. Under a typical MRC scheme, recruiting banks must obtain areference from the applicant’s current and former employers using a standard template containing
conduct-related information. Current and former employer banks must respond to MRC requests
within a specified timeframe, and all banks are required to have internal controls, policies, andprocedures to support the MRC scheme.
Singapore
In 2018, the MAS issued a consultation paper on Revisions to Misconduct Reporting Requirements
and Proposals to Mandate Reference Checks for Representatives. The paper proposed mandating
financial institutions to conduct and respond to reference checks on representatives providing
financial advisory services. 34
The paper also mentions that MAS is considering extending this reference check requirement to abroader segment of the financial industry beyond representatives to address the issue of “rolling badapples”. The MAS issued a separate public consultation on this proposal in May 2021. 35Malaysia
In 2018, the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) issued requirements for mandatory employee screening

as part of enhanced recruitment practices. Financial institutions are required to request employment
references from current and past employees, and to furnish the same upon request. Prospective
employees are also required to provide a statutory declaration on past criminal convictions and any
ongoing investigations or proceedings. 36

42.
Insurers may face practical challenges in conducting detailed background checks oncertain individuals, eg where their previous employment was outside the financial sector or inanother country. Nevertheless, an insurer whose culture promotes ethical decision-making
33 See HKMA, Consultation Paper on Implementation of Mandatory Reference Checking Scheme to

Address the “Rolling Bad Apples” Phenomenon, May 2020.
34 See MAS, Consultation Paper P012-2018: Public Consultation on Revisions to Misconduct Reporting
Requirements and Proposals to Mandate Reference Checks for Representatives, July 2018.
35 See MAS, Consultation Paper on Proposals to Mandate Reference Checks, May 2021.
36 See BNM, Employee Screening, March 2018.
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 19 of 35

and good conduct would be expected to take reasonable care and, on a best effort basis,
obtain the relevant information, to satisfy itself of the competence and integrity of its
employees at all levels, including advisors and intermediaries. This would be regardless of theindividual’s previous employment in another sector or country.
43.
Misconduct can create or amplify a range of risks, from poor customer outcomes andfinancial loss to damaging the reputation and resilience of individual insurers and possibly thesector as a whole. Robust preventive and detective controls and processes go a long way tohelp alleviate these risks. It is important that these controls and processes operate within an
overarching culture that promotes integrity, accountability and transparency to effectively
mitigate potential root causes of misconduct at an institutional level.
44.
It is therefore beneficial for both supervisors and insurers to understand how certain
cultural drivers may reinforce specific behaviours and practices that either increase or alleviate
the risk of widespread misconduct from occurring.

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 20 of 35

3

Illustrations of how cultural drivers can influence certain prudential
and conduct outcomes within an insurer

3.1

Insurer’s values, business objectives and strategies

45.
The ICPs clearly outline the foundational dimensions of an insurer’s culture, reflected
through its values, business objectives and strategies.
46.
ICP 7.2.3 states that “[a] corporate culture reflects the fundamental corporate values
and includes norms for responsible and ethical behaviour applicable to all employees of theinsurer. The Board should take the lead in setting the appropriate tone at the top. This includes
adherence to the corporate values by the Board and a strong risk culture avoiding excessive
risk taking. The corporate values, norms and supporting policies should be communicatedthroughout the insurer. These are also reflected in the insurer’s business objectives andstrategies and supported by professional standards and codes of ethics that set out what theinsurer considers acceptable and unacceptable conduct. In this regard, the Board should takeaccount of the interests of policyholders and other relevant stakeholders. In setting the toneat the top, the Board should ensure that employees are aware that appropriate disciplinary orother actions will follow unacceptable behaviours”.
3.1.1

Values47.
An insurer’s values frame how things are done internally by management and staff
towards achieving an overarching common purpose. In this context, “purpose” is used todescribe what the insurer wants to achieve, what constitutes its success or the reason why itdoes what it does. It may be seen as creating meaning for employees, influencing their
behaviour and steering them in a common direction. An insurer that is truly purpose led allows
its employees to understand their contribution towards achieving that purpose. 37
48.
It is not the role of supervisors to define a specific set of values for insurers. However,in assessing whether an insurer’s values point to a desirable overall culture, it may be
instructive for supervisors to consider the extent to which its values and underlying purposealign with expectations set out in applicable regulatory requirements.
49.
For example, maximising shareholder value by focusing narrowly on short-term
profitability as a primary purpose may undermine an insurer’s ability to deliver on broader
objectives, such as preserving its long-term viability, considering the interests of policyholders
and other stakeholders and ensuring the fair treatment of customers, all of which are
expectations that underpin the ICPs. 38
50.
On the other hand if, for example, an insurer’s stated purpose is “to serve customers
with integrity”, it signals a clear commitment to aligning its culture with the principle of treating
customers fairly, and by extension sound prudential management for the protection ofpolicyholders in the long term. This broader purpose can help frame the insurer’s values,
ethics, standards and attitudes relating to how things are done across the business fromproduct development and distribution decisions to dealing with sales, claims and complaints.

37 See Deloitte, Culture, Customer, Purpose: Key recommendations and impacts of the Hayne Royal

Commission and Australian Royal Commission Report into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation
and Financial Services Industry, February 2019.
38 See for example ICP 7, ICP 7.2 and ICP 7.2.1.
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 21 of 35

Examples:
United Kingdom
The FCA sees purposeful direction as part of a broader societal expectation on financial institutions
and their leadership to act on climate change, on social diversity and inclusion, on environmental,social and governance issues, on the ethical use of data as well as acting in the best interests ofcustomers.
The FCA has found that setting an insurer’s purpose purely in terms of maximising short-term profit
is unlikely to create positive outcomes for all its existing customers or attract new potential
customers in the long run.
The practice of ‘price walking’, for example, maximises profits by using “complex pricing practices
that allow (insurers) to raise prices for consumers that renew with them year on year”. This has
been found to erode public trust in insurers. 39
South Africa
At the start of the Covid-19 pandemic the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA) wasapproached by a number of insurers that indicated they would like to provide premium relief topolicyholders to help alleviate the financial impact of the pandemic.
At the same time, the Financial Intermediaries Association of Southern Africa (FIA) alerted the
FSCA that the granting of premium relief to policyholders may have an unintended negative impact
on the liquidity of intermediaries many of whom are small businesses and may be unable to sustain
a reduction in their core income streams for a prolonged period. This potential reduction in income
was due to regulation precluding insurers from paying intermediary commission prior to the receipt
of policyholder premiums.
As a result, the FSCA granted regulatory exemptions to insurers and intermediaries, that provided
premium relief to policyholders, but at the same time allowed insurers to continue paying
commission to intermediaries and for intermediaries to accept the same, subject to specificconditions. This proactive approach collectively by insurers and intermediaries resulted in a solution
aimed at protecting both the interests of customers as well as the sustainability of the intermediary
sector. This was recognised by the FSCA as a positive reflection of the values of the industry as awhole.

51.
However, a meaningful set of values and a strong underlying purpose are notnecessarily enough to ensure the consistent delivery of positive prudential and conduct
outcomes. It is important that these values are practically embedded across all levels andaspects of the insurer’s business through steady reinforcement by other cultural factors suchas leadership accountability, appropriate performance metrics and effective consequence
management.
Example:Australia
In the previously mentioned review of the sale of direct life insurance in Australia, ASIC found that
another root cause for the persistence of poor customer outcomes and unfair selling practices was a
39 See FCA, Transforming culture in financial services: Driving purposeful cultures Discussion Paper

DP 20/1, March 2020.

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 22 of 35

misalignment between an insurer’s “target culture” (eg corporate goals) and its “observed culture” (iewhat actually happened in practice). 40
All insurers had one or more corporate values that focused on the customer. However, when it cameto translating these values into concrete and measurable outcomes, many insurers focused on fairly
limited or short-term metrics, such as customer service measures.
Other examples of cultural disconnect included differences between explicit messages (eg in training
materials) and implicit messages (eg compliance tests).
RussiaFor the majority of Russian insurers, meeting customer needs is a key value embedded in theircorporate culture. During the Covid-19 pandemic, providing the standard high level of service proved
to be a challenge, which forced many insurers to shift their business processes towards becoming
more digitalised, entrepreneurial and innovative.
In this regard, Russian insurers upgraded their websites and the features of customers’ personal
online accounts to expand their online product offerings and enable online settlement of claims.
Another innovation was to provide free courier services to collect documents from customers' homes
and deliver them to insurers, thus facilitating remote claims settlement. This was done toaccommodate digitally-challenged customers and to ensure business continuity in compliance withlocal regulatory requirements. 41

52.
Through consistent practical reinforcement, a clear and meaningful set of values canhelp create long-term yields for the insurer, policyholders and other stakeholders, and canhelp maintain a culture of trust, reciprocity and integrity. It can also directly influence thedevelopment of the insurer’s business objectives and strategies, and alleviate any potential
harm arising therefrom.
3.1.2

Business objectives and strategies

53.
Alongside an insurer’s set of values, its business objectives and strategies form thebasis for shaping its overall culture.
54.
The business objectives and strategies of an insurer refer to specific courses of action,delivery channels, product developments and resource allocations adopted by the insurer toachieve its basic long-term goals (or fulfil its underlying purpose), ie formulation of its businessmodel.
55.
This could include factors such as developing the insurer’s unique value proposition,
determining how to respond to external competitive and other pressures, optimising methods
to reach targeted customer segments and leveraging potential growth and expansion
opportunities.
56.
It is important that an insurer’s business objectives and strategies, and by extension
its business model, align with its values and underlying purpose to drive a culture that
promotes sound prudential management and the fair treatment of customers.
57.
The way an insurer’s business objectives and strategies are operationalised across its
business can be a direct reflection of the overall culture of that insurer. The lack of coherent
40 See ASIC, Report 587: The sale of direct life insurance, August 2018.
41 See also KPMG, Russian Insurance Market Survey, 2020.

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 23 of 35

and meaningful objectives and strategies, together with failure by the insurer’s leadership totranslate those objectives and strategies into clear behavioural expectations (desired andundesired behaviour) for middle management and frontline staff as part of their day-to-day
roles could result in significant operational failures, financial and customer harm, andreputational damage for the insurer.
Examples:United Kingdom
The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) found several deficiencies in an insurer’s strategic
decision-making and operationalisation processes. These deficiencies pointed to elements of an“unhealthy” culture, such as an extensive strategic change in a challenging timeframe, combinedwith strategic cost reduction targets, which resulted in significant resource stretch across the control
and finance function. In addition, there was limited tolerance of challenge to the strategic vision,
resulting in reluctance to speak out.
The combination of these resulted in a mindset of achieving strategic targets “at all costs”, which inturn led to a failure to fully address/ revisit areas of inadequate controls. In addition, there was anincrease in operational control failures due to opaque governance underpinning risk acceptancelevels.
Netherlands
In recent years the AFM’s Behaviour and Culture team has examined the Product Approval andReview Process (PARP) of large insurers.
The supervision of PARPs consists of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ elements. Hard elements are moretangible and therefore easier to review, for example whether or not there is a clearly defined(negative) target group for the product or a distribution strategy.
Soft elements are intangible and take more effort to review, for example the way in which decisions
are made, what perspectives are talked about and the level of self-reflectiveness amongst
employees. Taking notice of these softer elements helps to get a better understanding of the practicewithin insurers and provides a fruitful basis for dialogue on potential areas for improvement relating
to the insurer’s overall culture.
Examples of findings from the PARP include the following:•

The customer’s interest (customer perspective) is not always taken into account in (proposal)
documents or is not formally represented by product committee members when making(important) decisions.

•

A more self-reflective culture among employees stimulates the level of attention for thecustomer’s interest and the development of products and services that are beneficial tocustomers.

•

Timely reflection on both content and process helps to improve the quality and speed ofdecision-making.

These findings have led to several remedial measures by insurers, for example:•

Embedment of customers’ interests within decision documents and formal representationof the customer perspective within product committees.

•

Dialogue amongst insurers on the negative effects of first mover (dis)advantage for productdevelopment and collective responsibility.

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 24 of 35

CanadaExample 1
The Autorité des marchés financiers (Québec) (AMF) conducted a Group Disability Insurance crosssectional analysis and published a report in March 2019 that highlights some elements to improve
culture relating to fair treatment of customers (FTC). 42 This includes that FTC objectives should beestablished for group disability insurance and indicators developed to assess the extent to whichthose objectives are being met.
The AMF also concluded that a quality assurance programme, which helps ensure that the criteria
set for the examination of group disability claims are satisfied, should be put in place. Quality
assurance checklists that are used to assess whether the criteria are met should contain FTC-related
items, enabling insurers to ascertain whether participants have been treated fairly throughout thedisability claims process. Incorporating such criteria into the quality assurance programme is avaluable means of strengthening the corporate FTC culture in group disability insurance files,
especially with regards to mental health disabilities.
Example 2
The Canadian Council of Insurance Regulators (CCIR) and Canadian Insurance Services Regulatory
Organisations (CISRO) have published guidance on conduct of insurance business and fairtreatment of customers. The guidance highlights, amongst other things, that a customer-centricculture fosters consumer confidence and long-term customer relationships. This is preferred over aculture that focuses on short-term financial goals that could cause customer harm and potentiallydamage the organisation’s reputation to the point of having an adverse impact on profitability. 43

58.
The insurer’s Board, as part of its responsibility to set and oversee the insurer’sbusiness objectives and strategies, is expected to consider potential risks that could arise fromthese objectives and strategies, and whether the insurer’s overall culture promotes decisionmaking, behaviours and practices aimed at mitigating or preventing those risks frommaterialising.
59.
It is important for middle management and frontline staff to take ownership of theirroles in order to implement the insurer’s business objectives and strategies in line with thecultural tone set by the Board and Senior Management.
60.
Involving employees at all levels and across all areas of the business, including staff
in control functions, points toward a deep-rooted culture of open communication, transparency
and accountability. This can be done, for example, by ensuring that the insurer’s risk appetite
is aligned with the insurer’s business strategy and is embedded in its day-to-day activities. 44
Such involvement can then translate more directly into positive outcomes for the insurer andcustomers across the insurance value chain through improved product design processes, fair
and transparent pricing and selling practices, better claims and complaints handling, and evenselection of more sustainable business opportunities.

42 See AMF, Group disability insurance cross-sectional analysis report, March 2019.

43 See CCIR /CISRO, Guidance Conduct of Insurance Business and Fair Treatment of Customers, atpage 9.
44 See ICP 8.1.2.

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 25 of 35

Examples:Japan
Example 1
In 2018, the Financial Services Agency (FSA) published a discussion paper on its approach tocompliance risk management. It highlights that "compliance risk is closely related to businessmodel/strategy and corporate culture". 45
Example 2
The FSA found that in a certain case, top management put corporate goals ahead of internal rules.
This resulted in reducing claims payment and reserves, and delayed claims payment with no rational
reasons. In addition, the top management did not allocate adequate human resources to internal
controls. For example, the top management assigned the CCO (Chief Compliance Officer) with other
responsibilities. As the CCO was too busy with these other responsibilities, the CCO was not able toconduct thorough investigations of misconduct.
United Kingdom
The FCA wants financial institutions to see the benefits of elevating culture to the same level ofimportance as business strategy, in terms of better outcomes for employees and consumers, butalso in terms of contributing to sustainable growth and creating an environment better equipped tocope with uncertainty.
The FCA has the power to move quickly to stop harm occurring, eg through imposing an Own
Initiative Requirement (OIREQ) on an insurer and to work with that insurer to address the drivers ofculture and its business model and strategy to prevent a recurrence of harm in the future. 46

3.2

Leadership accountability

61.
Clear lines of accountability for the senior leaders in an insurer encourage them to takeownership of risks and issues across the business, and to take steps to prevent misconduct,
including by promoting a sound culture.
62.
Leadership accountability that is consistently demonstrated across the insurer fosters
a culture of trust and confidence internally amongst employees, and creates a positive external
impression with consumers, supervisors and other stakeholders, about the management of
the business. This includes ensuring actions that are taken for breaches of internal policies
and processes and non-adherence to the insurer’s codes of conduct are applied in a fair,timely and consistent manner across the insurer and to all employees at all levels.
63.
Conversely, an absence of clear accountability for discharging these responsibilities
can create frustration, mistrust and low morale amongst employees, which may in turnnegatively impact their behaviour, potentially leading to operational failures, financial losses
and poor customer outcomes.

45 See JFSA’s Approach to Compliance Risk Management, September 2019.
46 See FCA, FCA Mission: Approach to Supervision, April 2019.

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 26 of 35

Examples:
Australia
In 2018, APRA announced a prudential inquiry into the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) (oneof Australia’s four largest retail banking groups) to examine the frameworks and practices in relation
to the governance, culture and accountability within the CBA group. 47
The overarching conclusion from the inquiry was that "CBA’s continued financial success dulled thesenses of the institution", particularly in relation to the management of non-financial risks.
The inquiry identified a number of key shortcomings, including the following: 48•

Lack of senior leadership and Board oversight on issues of conduct and culture;•

Inadequate oversight and challenge by the Board and its gatekeeper committees of
emerging nonfinancial risks;•

Unclear accountabilities, starting with a lack of ownership of key risks at the Executive
Committee level;•

Paucity or nonexistence of sufficient internal controls; and•Lack of alignment between banking remuneration practices and frameworks and indicatorsof good conduct.

Following the inquiry, Risk Governance Self-Assessments (RGSAs) were requested from 36
additional entities. The RGSAs focused those entities on governance, culture, remuneration andaccountability (GCRA) related issues and provided APRA with additional information on theseimportant areas. 49
United Kingdom
A UK insurer entered into a relationship with a Third Party to enable the Third Party to provide mobile
phone insurance (MPI) to retail customers in the UK, underwritten by the insurer. The Third Party
agreed to undertake all administrative functions on behalf of the insurer, including all claims andcomplaints handling functions, with the insurer being responsible for oversight of the Third Party andcompliance of these functions.
There was a lack of oversight from the Board and senior management on development of conduct
risk controls, and the design and implementation of a conduct risk framework did not progress with
sufficient speed. As a result of this, a significant number of customers were exposed to unfair
treatment in respect of MPI claims and complaints.
Subsequently a financial penalty was imposed on the insurer for its failure to exercise appropriate
oversight of its Third Party.
United States
Since 2016, there have been various regulatory, congressional and other oversight investigations
into widespread consumer abuses, risk management deficiencies and regulatory compliancebreakdowns at Wells Fargo, one of the largest financial institutions in the United States (US). 50
47 See APRA, Prudential Inquiry Into The Commonwealth Bank of Australia, April 2018.

48 See also G30 Steering Committee and Working Group on Banking Conduct and Culture, Banking

Conduct and Culture, A Permanent Mindset Change, November 2018 at page 6.
49 See APRA, Information Paper: Self-assessments of governance, accountability and culture, May
2019.
50 See US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, The Real Wells Fargo: Board& Management Failures, Consumer Abuses, and Ineffective Regulatory Oversight, March 2020.
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 27 of 35

A common finding across these investigations was the long-standing failure of the Board and otherleadership to prioritise ethical decision-making, sound risk management and consumer protection
throughout the bank. The lack of institutional accountability for toxic selling practices and generalenterprise-wide control weaknesses was identified as a key factor that enabled widespread
misconduct at all levels.

64.
As mentioned earlier, the strengthening of individual responsibility and accountability
has been recognised by the FSB as one of the overarching tools for strengthening governanceframeworks aimed at mitigating misconduct risk. 51 The importance of Board accountability has
also been highlighted by the IAIS in previously published material. 52
65.
There are two major accountability relationships within an insurer. The Senior
Management is accountable to the Board. The Board is ultimately accountable to a potentiallywide range of stakeholders, namely shareholders, policyholders, members, supervisors andthe marketplace. The boundaries of the Board’s accountability depend on the nature of theinsurer (eg publicly listed) and may vary by jurisdiction. 53
66.
Various tools may be used by insurers and prudential and conduct supervisors to
identify key responsibilities and functions across an insurer and implement measures to holdspecific individuals accountable for the outcomes generated by discharging these
responsibilities and performing these functions. 54
Examples:Singapore
In 2020, MAS issued guidelines for individual accountability and conduct across financial
institutions. 55 The guidelines focus on measures that financial institutions (FI) should put in place topromote the individual accountability of senior managers, strengthen oversight over material risk
personnel, and reinforce standards of proper conduct amongst all employees. In this regard, theguidelines set out five accountability and conduct outcomes:
1.

Senior managers responsible for managing and conducting the FI’s core functions areclearly identified;2.

Senior managers are fit and proper for their roles, and held responsible for the actionsof their employees and the conduct of the business under their purview;

3.

The FI’s governance framework supports senior managers’ performance of their roles
and responsibilities, with a clear and transparent management structure and reporting
relationships;

4.

Material risk personnel are fit and proper for their roles, and subject to effective risk
governance, and appropriate incentive structures and standards of conduct; and

51 See FSB, Strengthening Governance Frameworks to Mitigate Misconduct Risk: A Toolkit for Firms

and Supervisors, April 2018 at page 22.
52 See IAIS Application Paper on the Composition and the Role of the Board (2018).
53 See IAIS Issues Paper on Corporate Governance (2009) at pages 25-27.
54 See ICP 7.10.2 and FSB, Strengthening Governance Frameworks to Mitigate Misconduct Risk: A
Toolkit for Firms and Supervisors, April 2018 at pages 29 to 31. See also IAIS Application Paper on the
Composition and the Role of the Board (2018), which proposes good supervisory practices to address
challenges related to, among other things, diversity of the Board, allocation of roles and responsibilities
and behavioural aspects of the Board’s functioning, such as overly dominant Board Chairs or CEOs.
55 See MAS, Guidelines on Individual Accountability and Conduct, September 2020.
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 28 of 35

5.

The FI has a framework that promotes and sustains among all employees the desired
conduct.

United Kingdom
The UK Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR) was introduced for insurers in
December 2018, to create a system and a new standard of personal conduct in financial services,
as senior leaders recognise the benefits of a sound culture and lead culture change in theirbusinesses. 56
It is key that the senior manager takes responsibility as a cultural leader. The SM&CR has two
Prescribed Responsibilities that relate to culture and which underpin the expectation that financial
institutions should have a culture that supports their prudent management. The Prescribed
Responsibilities are expected to be allocated to the CEO and Chair respectively.
The SM&CR aims to:•encourage staff to take personal responsibility for their actions and to improve conduct at alllevels; and•make sure insurers and their staff clearly understand, and can show, who does what.

The SM&CR has three key elements, namely a Senior Managers Regime, a Certification Regime
and 5 Conduct Rules. Under the Senior Managers Regime, the most senior people (senior managers)
who perform key roles (senior management functions) need the PRA’s and/or FCA’s approval before
starting their roles. A senior manager will need to have a “statement of responsibilities” that clearlystates what the senior manager is accountable for at the insurer. A senior manager will be expected
to take appropriate responsibility for managing behaviours within their areas of responsibility.
Individual employees are also subject to responsibilities. In this regard, the five Conduct Rules set
minimum standards of individual behaviour for all employees who work in roles relating to financial
services. 57

3.3

Communication within the insurer

67.
Clear and frank communication between the Board and Senior Management andbetween Senior Management, middle management and the rest of the insurer’s staff helps tofoster a culture of openness and transparency. 58
68.
Senior and middle management play a crucial role in creating and communicating theinsurer’s culture. An honest, open and supportive insurer culture could be demonstrated in avariety of ways. Examples include, having an internal forum for staff to speak openly about
challenges within their jobs without fear of recrimination, an effective whistle-blowing
mechanism that preserves staff confidentiality, and management who proactively engage indialogue and take steps to make necessary adjustments. Such approaches may also
contribute to promoting an effective culture of reporting misconduct.
69.
On the other hand, the lack of clear and open communication between different job
roles and positions, for example, relating to key strategic and business decisions, dealing withlosses and failures, or bonus and incentive structures, can result in mistrust among staff.
56 See FCA, The Senior Manager and Certification Regime: Guide for insurers, February 2019.

57 Additionally, under the Certification Regime, insurers will need to identify employees who perform“certification functions” - those roles which can cause particular harm to the insurer, its consumers or
the market more generally – and check and certify that they are fit and proper to perform their roles atleast once a year. See additional details under paragraph 41 of this Paper.
58 See also ICP 7.2.4 and IAIS Application Paper on the Composition and the Role of the Board (2018).
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 29 of 35

Mistrust between staff and leadership can impact the overall culture of the insurer by lowering
staff morale and shifting the focus away from productive outcomes and good service delivery.
70.
Fostering an open workplace culture, including a psychologically safe environment,
where employees are encouraged to speak-up, report and discuss incidents and dilemmas
produces important benefits for the insurer, policyholders and other stakeholders. It provides
a catalyst for continuous improvement and stimulates the learning ability of the insurer. This
contributes to positive decision-making and risk behaviours that help enhance the quality of
products and services to customers and improve overall business performance.
Example:United Kingdom
In recent years, a UK-based insurer had recurring issues regarding overdue Internal Audit actions on
cyber and poor change management and there had been a failure to address this. The UK-regulator
monitored this situation and, during regular discussions with the insurer, encouraged them to tackle
these issues. The insurer hired a new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in 2018, and since then has:
hired a new Chief Operating Officer; established a new change management function; begun
developing a new change management committee structure; and is working on addressing its cyber
weaknesses.
Since implementing these changes, it has been noted by both the CEO and the Head of Internal
Audit that the culture in the insurer has shifted and is now one in which challenge and escalation ofissues is welcomed. For example, where business leads see an issue in other business areas, they
are seeking opportunities to determine if that issue is also relevant to their own area.

3.4

Internal remuneration and performance management structures71.
An insurer’s approach to managing purportedly competing interests, both internallyand with its external stakeholders, is a key driver for a myriad of collective and individual
decisions, behaviours and practices at all levels across its business.
72.
The management of actual and perceived conflicts of interests by insurers is a broad
and multi-faceted topic, many aspects of which are described in existing IAIS material. 59 Whilethese aspects all contribute to the overall culture of the insurer, a detailed exposition of the
topic falls beyond the scope of this Issues Paper.
73.
Accordingly, this section focuses on two specific aspects of conflicts of interest
management that play a vital role in informing decisions, behaviours and practices within every
component of the insurer’s business from senior leadership down to frontline staff, namelyinternal remuneration 60 and performance management 61.
74.
An insurer’s approach to remuneration and performance management, specifically the
degree of balance it adopts in rewarding both quantitative and qualitative outcomes, can help
59 For example see ICPs 7.1, 7.3, 7.4, 7.6, 8.2, 8.3, 8.6, 15.3, 16.6, 18.1, 18.5, 18.7, 19.2, 19.3 and19.10. Also see IAIS Issues Paper on Corporate Governance (2009), Application Paper on Approaches
to Conduct of Business Supervision (2014), Issues Paper on Conduct of Business Risk and Its
Management (2015), Application Paper on Approaches to Supervising the Conduct of Intermediaries(2016), Application Paper on the Composition and the Role of the Board (2018).
60 See ICP 19.3.2 which states that “[c]onflicts of interest can arise from compensation structures aswell as other financial and non-financial incentives”.
61 See ICP 19.3.4 which states that “[o]ther incentives that may create a conflict of interest include
performance targets or performance management criteria that are insufficiently linked to customer
outcomes”.
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 30 of 35

fortify an effective culture that properly serves its own long-term financial interests as well as
the interests of its policyholders and other key stakeholders. 62 Conversely, an insurer whose
remuneration and performance mechanisms lean disproportionately to incentivising shortterm profitability can potentially enable undesirable decisions, behaviours and practices that
may result in adverse outcomes for customers and longer term reputational damage for the
insurer and the sector.
3.4.1

Remuneration

75.
A remuneration policy that aligns performance-based incentives with long-term value
creation and the time horizon of risks to which the insurer may be exposed, as well as the fairtreatment of customers, can be a strong indicator of a sound overall culture within the insurer.
76.
ICP 7.6 states that “[t]he supervisor requires the insurer’s Board to adopt and oversee
the effective implementation of a written remuneration policy for the insurer, which does not
induce excessive or inappropriate risk taking, is in line with the corporate culture, objectives,
strategies, identified risk appetite, and long-term interests of the insurer, and has proper regard
to the interests of its policyholders and other stakeholders”.
77.
ICP 19.2.4 states further that “[r]emuneration and reward strategies should takeaccount of the fair treatment of customers. Reward structures need to reflect quality issues
and not encourage or reward the unfair treatment of customers. Remuneration structures thatcreate conflicts of interest may lead to poor customer outcomes”.
78.
For example, promotional programmes for Senior Management that are based
exclusively on short-term profitability targets, without proper consideration of customer-related
outcomes, can lead to pressures being exerted on middle management and frontline staff toengage in poor sales and claims practices and other unethical behaviour. Similarly, incentives(both financial and non-financial) for middle management and frontline staff that are based
solely on quantitative “hard targets” can be viewed as encouragement for poor conduct andthe unfair treatment of customers. The way in which employees experience remuneration andrecognition incentives are likely to influence their daily work behaviours, depending on whattypes of behaviours or targets are seen to be more highly valued by the insurer, eg level ofreward or recognition for meeting hard profitability targets versus improving customer
experience levels. 63
Examples:FranceIn 2017, a French mutual insurer received, for the 15th time in a row, a prize for maintaining the best
customer relationships in its category. Facing competition from “BigTech” companies, the insurer
claimed to maintain its competitiveness based on customer relationships and corporate responsibility.

62 See FSB, Supplementary Guidance to the FSB Principles and Standards on Sound Compensation

Practices: The use of compensation tools to address misconduct risk, March 2018 at page 4 whichstates that “[c]ompensation and related performance management mechanisms help signal theimportance that financial institutions place on prudent management of risk and acceptable standards of
behaviour, including compliance with related laws, regulations and supervisory expectations”.
63 See AFM, Rethinking remuneration and recognition: A call to the sector based on research at banks,
insurers and financial services providers, June 2020.
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 31 of 35

More than half the criteria used for variable remuneration of the insurer’s customer-facing employees
is based on customer satisfaction rather than commercial results. Traditional indicators assessing
performance such as time spent on the phone are not the only indicators used: additional indicators
on customer satisfaction and well-being of employees enter into play, and no variable remuneration
is granted according to the volume of sales or the nature of contracts.
It was found that new methods of management based on trust and delegation are favoured, giving
more autonomy to employees, who in turn demonstrate more situational intelligence. The insurer
indicated that it spends 1.5 times more on claims handling than its competitors, at a cost to the insurer.
However, only 1% of customers leave the insurer voluntarily so these costs are recovered throughsavings of approximately 100million EUR that would have been spent on customer acquisitions.
Australia
Example 1
In the previously mentioned review of the sale of direct life insurance in Australia, ASIC found that
another root cause for the persistence of poor customer outcomes and unfair selling practices was
the existence of conflicted incentive schemes. 64
ASIC identified a link between incentive schemes and conduct at point of sale. With one exception,
those insurers with the incentive schemes that had the most significant conflicts of interest were also
the insurers that engaged in pressure selling and other practices where a sale was prioritised aheadof the needs of the consumer.
Example 2
In another review focused on the sale of consumer credit insurance (CCI), ASIC found that somelenders used third-party telephone marketers to sell policies and motivated them to maximise sales
by providing volume bonuses and sales targets. 65
Lenders reinforced these incentives by concentrating their limited monitoring on telemarketers’ sales
performance, rather than on detecting and preventing misconduct. This resulted in significant misselling of CCI with telemarketers’ staff engaging in various unfair tactics, eg not informing customers
about exclusions that would make them ineligible for cover, using ambiguous language to obtaincustomer consent and downplaying customer concerns by playing using practiced sales techniques.
These practices resulted in large numbers of policy cancellations and consumer complaints.
United States
In the previously mentioned investigations into Wells Fargo, it was found that improper financial
incentives were a key driver for widespread consumer abuse. 66
The bank allegedly had a practice of setting daily sales targets that put excessive pressure on
employees. Branch managers were assigned quotas for the number and types of products sold. If the
branch did not hit its targets, the shortfall was added to the next day’s goals. Branch employees were
provided financial incentives to meet cross-selling and customer service targets, with personalbankers receiving bonuses up to 15 to 20 percent of their salary and tellers receiving up to 3 percent.

64 See ASIC, Report 587: The sale of direct life insurance, August 2018.

65 See ASIC, Report 622 Consumer credit insurance: Poor value products and harmful sales

practices, July 2019.
66 See US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, The Real Wells Fargo: Board& Management Failures, Consumer Abuses, and Ineffective Regulatory Oversight, March 2020.
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 32 of 35

3.4.2

Performance management

79.
Clear performance goals and measurable criteria for management and staff at all levels
that appropriately balance expectations to deliver on both financial and customer outcomes
are important factors in shaping an effective culture for the insurer.
80.
ICP 7.2.2 states that “[t]he effective implementation of objectives and strategies should
be supported by the corporate culture and by clear and objective performance goals andmeasures, taking due account of, among other things, the insurer’s long-term interests andviability and the interests of policyholders and other stakeholders”.
81.
In addition, ICP 19.2.4 states that “[a]ppropriate attention should be paid to therecruitment of staff and agents who meet high standards of ethics and integrity. Relevant staff
should be trained to deliver appropriate outcomes in terms of fair treatment of customers.
Evaluation of performance should include the contribution made to achieving these outcomes.
There should be appropriate performance management consequences for staff who fail tomeet these standards”.
82.
This is further reinforced in ICP 7.6.12 which states that “[t]he performance criteria
applicable to the variable components of remuneration should promote a complete
assessment of risk-adjusted performance. For this purpose, due consideration should begiven to the need for performance criteria to be clearly defined and be objectively measurable;
be based not only on financial but also on non-financial criteria as appropriate, such ascompliance with regulation and internal rules, achievement of risk management goals,
adequate and timely follow up of internal audit recommendations as well as compliance withmarket conduct standards and fair treatment of customers … and not treat growth or volume
as a criterion in isolation from other performance criteria”.
83.
The above considerations envisage a shift in insurer performance criteria away frompure profitability metrics towards a more balanced approach to financial and non-financial
factors, including increased focus on behavioural considerations and or customer-oriented
outcomes. 67 While this approach could result in initial declines to sales 68, it demonstrates abroader cultural commitment by insurers to promote the good ethical conduct of theiremployees and increase their focus on maintaining their long-term viability and customer
confidence in the sector.
84.
It is worth noting that this move from a largely financial results-based performanceframework to one that is more balanced would likely have a limited impact on the overall
culture of the insurer if it is done in isolation of the other cultural factors described in this paper.
In cases of misconduct, it would be useful to consider whether the incentives themselves were
the driver for the undesirable behaviour or whether the incentives are an indicator of a broader
unhealthy mindset, which is ultimately responsible for the bad behaviour. 69

See FSB, FSB workshop on compensation practices 2021: Summary of discussion - Financial
Stability Board, August 2021
68 See G30 Steering Committee and Working Group on Banking Conduct and Culture, Banking Conduct
and Culture, A Permanent Mindset Change, November 2018 at page 21.
69 See previous footnote.
67

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 33 of 35

Examples:
Singapore
The previously mentioned MAS information paper on incentive structures in the banking industry,highlighted that performance goals that are overly focused on financial targets could put undue
pressure on staff to achieve such targets without consideration of ethics or risks. 70
An example of how this can negatively influence culture would be where excess pressure is placedon sales staff to meet sales targets and/or where sales targets dominate criteria for rewards. Somebanks place more importance on staff’s ability to meet financial targets, for instance, by assigninghigher weights to staff’s ability to meet financial key performance indicators. This could signal to staff
that behavioural and conduct factors, such as focusing on clients’ interests and compliance with laws
and guidelines, are subordinated to financial objectives.
Banks usually use a balanced scorecard framework (which typically comprises both financial andnon-financial components) to assess staff’s performance against non-financial goals. The nonfinancial components would consider the results of the various transactional and compliance checks
on staff performed by control functions and in-business control units within the front office.
The extensiveness and rigour of such checks, and the ways in which scorecard results were used,varied from bank to bank:•

One bank had a formalised process to roll-up staff’s balanced scorecard results up the chainof command to their supervisors. This practice sent a strong signal that supervisors were
responsible, and would be held accountable, for their staff’s risk and compliance behaviour.

•

Most banks required some form of input from independent control functions (such as risk
management, compliance, and internal audit), on staff performance evaluations. For
example, they obtained input from control functions on specific groups of staff such as
material risk takers, promotion candidates and certain frontline staff. The input was obtained
through a dedicated review process where feedback from control functions (including internal
audit, compliance, finance, legal and risk) were recorded in the performance management
system and considered for compensation decisions.

Malaysia
To foster behaviour that is consistent with the fair treatment of customers, in 2018 BNM introduceda Balanced Scorecard (BSC) framework for insurance agents.
The BSC framework is designed to capture qualitative performance indicators related to sales andafter-sales processes such as persistency rate, comprehensiveness/completeness of Customer Fact
Find (CFF) forms submitted on each new policyholder, complaints received and professional
development hours as a basis to remunerate insurance agents.
The framework better aligns sales incentives with the quality of advice provided to consumers bylinking a portion (ie 25%) of total commission paid to agents at the end of the year to these qualitative
outcomes.
The initiative has resulted in incremental but steady improvements in the quality of advice provided
by insurance agents, as indicated by the improving persistency rates and level of completeness of
CFF forms. Continued improvements in sales practices driven by the BSC are expected to lend
support to premium growth while reducing mis selling risks.

70 See MAS, Incentive Structures in the Banking Industry: Fostering Sound Behaviour and Conduct,

March 2019. While this paper was based on MAS’ thematic inspection of incentive structures in banks,
the desired outcomes and good practices expected of banks have subsequently been extended toinsurers.
PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 34 of 35

Russia
Example 1
The CBR found that “average claim amounts” is the main key performance indicator (KPI) of claims
settlement departments at Russian insurers. For this reason, employees in these departments often
make every possible effort to keep these numbers at a certain level.
This can lead to artificial underestimations of claim amounts at primary claims settlement stage. This
has resulted in customers lodging complaints with the CBR and initiating court actions against
insurers, negatively impacting the reputation of the sector, and exposing insurers to potentially
increased claims levels that were not previously anticipated.
Example 2
A few years ago, Obligatory Motor Third Party Liability (OMTPL) products were unprofitable in the
Russian insurance market. During this time, the CBR found that insurers were pressuring customers
into buying linked add-on products to meet their primary performance targets based on volume sales.
These volume selling targets were attached to the add-on products rather than the primary/ obligatory
product. This resulted in certain customers not being able to purchase the much-needed obligatory
product unless they also paid for the linked add-on product, irrespective of whether they required the
additional cover.

4

Conclusion

85.
The culture of an insurer is influential in determining how effectively it delivers on
critical outcomes related to its overall financial soundness, the interests of policyholders andother stakeholders, and the fair treatment of customers. Understanding the various elementsthat make up an insurer’s culture, and how these inform key decisions, practices andbehaviours, is therefore of increasing importance to both insurers and supervisors.
86.
As an exploratory first step, this paper acknowledges the role of insurer culture as animportant intersection point for managing prudential and conduct risks and reducing thepotential for widespread misconduct. Sound, effective insurer cultures are essential for
maintaining public trust and confidence in the insurance sector’s overall ability to deliver on its
commitment to policyholder protection. Building on the relevant ICPs, the paper highlights thatan insurer’s values, business objectives and strategies, clear leadership accountability andcommunication, as well as positive reinforcement and incentive structures for good behaviour
may be effective in promoting a desirable culture leading to good outcomes for insurers andpolicyholders alike.
87.
Recognising that an insurer’s culture consists of various dynamic elements that often
require subjective assessment over time, as a next step the IAIS will consider how best toadvance the observations outlined in this paper in greater depth. This could include moretargeted exploration of, or practical supervisory guidance on, specific cultural drivers such as
remuneration practices and conflicts of interest management by insurers.
88.
Besides those cultural factors specifically mentioned in this paper, supervisors are also
increasingly focusing their attention on the role of diversity and inclusion in the insurance
sector. The IAIS has signalled this as an important focus area in its 2021-2022 Roadmap. 71
This will include consideration of potential follow up work to this paper exploring how insurers’
approaches to issues of diversity and inclusion can influence their overall culture, and viceversa.
71 See Project 37 in Table 2 of the 2021-2022 IAIS Public Roadmap (22 February 2021).

PublicIssues Paper on Insurer Culture
Adopted by the Executive Committee on 9 November 2021

Page 35 of 35