© 2019 Journal of International and Advanced Japanese Studies
Vol. 11, February 2019, pp. 89-98
Master’s and Doctoral Programs in International and Advanced
Japanese Studies
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
University of Tsukuba

Research Note

Representing Japanese Hospitality: Takigawa Christelʼs1
Speech for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics
Elisa Ivana PELLICANÒ
Hokkaido University, Graduate School of International Media, Communication andTourism Studies, Ph.D. Student

Abstract
Up until recently, Japan has been widely regarded as a mono-cultural/mono-racial country, populated
by a single ethnic group (tan’itsu minzoku). Minority groups were made invisible in public discourse until
as recently as the 1990s, where discourses about multiculturalism (tabunka kyōsei) started to surface (Willisand Murphy-Shigematsu, 2008).
Yet, in 2013, the biracial announcer Takigawa Christel was chosen as an ambassador for the 2020
Tokyo Olympics. The speech she delivered in front of the IOC (International Olympic Committee) was
widely reported on Japanese media, becoming one of the most popular news items of the year andspawning the buzzword omotenashi.
Throughout this paper I will analyze the politics behind Takigawa’s apparition in front of the IOC. By
analyzing her speech, I will argue that her hāfu body served as the perfect vessel for an ideological stancethat Japanese institutions have been trying to propagate domestically and abroad. Through the intersectionof familiar discourses such as“Cool Japan,”multiculturalism and nihonjinron-style cultural nationalism,
the announcer’s speech recreates a (self)-orientalistic (Iwabuchi, 1994) image meant to captivate the heartsof the global public. Japan as embodied by the biracial body of Takigawa Christel is a nation whose
driving force is a tension between the“old”and the“new”, the“oriental traditions”and“newfangled
modernity”. It is a nation of hybridity, much like the speaker herself. It is my intention to show the ways inwhich the announcer became the vessel for a new type of nationalism, one that is incredibly well matchedwith the desire for consumption of national images in an incredibly globalized world.
Keywords: Hāfu, Mixed-race, Nationalism, 2020 Tokyo Olympics, Orientalism

In the days between the 6th and the 10th of September, 2013, representatives from Japan, Spain and Turkey
assembled in Buenos Aires, Argentina, for the 125th session of the International Olympics Committee (hereafter
IOC). The three states were competing to host the 2020 Summer Olympics.
Among the Japanese representatives ﬁgured a well-known media ﬁgure: former Fuji Television Announcer
Takigawa Christel, who was invited to participate as“Cool Tokyo”Ambassador. Viewers from Japan had thechance to see the newscaster, born from a French father and a Japanese mother, deliver her speech in perfect
1 This manuscript uses last name-ﬁrst name order for Japanese names.
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French.
Takigawa’s presentation received considerable media exposure, and it popularized the buzzword
omotenashi (hospitality), which won the Buzzword award of that year (Hufﬁngton Post Japan, 2013). Not only
that: the speech is also widely credited by prominent businessmen such as Sony former president Chūbachi
Ryūji for helping Japan win the bid for hosting the 2020 Olympics (Nikkei Business Online, 2017; Sankei Biz,2013).
Since she has no relation with either sports or politics, one might have found it surprising to see her on thestage. I will argue that the announcer’s hāfu body was used as a powerful ideological tool in the race for the
Olympics – one that was arguably more powerful domestically than internationally.
Nationalism, Globalization and the hybrid body
Questions of inter/nationalism have been a staple feature of Japan’s post-war political discourses. In thissection I will brieﬂy summarize how nationalism (and inter-nationalism) have intersected with and participatedin the construction of discourses about ethnic-racial hybridity.
Following the loss of the overseas territories in China, Korea and Taiwan, redefining the nation’sboundaries was considered a major task during the period that succeeded the Second World War. It was once
again necessary to ﬁnd a convincing answer to the question“what is Japan”, and this was logically followed byan intellectual quest to deﬁne the qualities of the Japanese people.
It is in this period that the topoi of Japanese insularity and Japanese mono-ethnicity started to emerge.
Crafted as an antidote to the“multiethnic”(ta-minzoku) expansionism of the Japanese empire, the discourse ofJapan as an ethnically homogeneous (tan’itsu minzoku) nation began to take hold on society (Kawai, 2015).
Postwar Japan wasn’t, of course, an ethnically homogenous society. Many internal boundaries existed (andstill do), ranging from the Ainu minorities in the northern regions of Hokkaido to the marginalized burakumin,
and the communities of zainichi Koreans that decided to remain in the country well after 1945. Nevertheless, theethnic-racial homogeneity of its inhabitants was a powerful rhetorical device during the postwar reconstructionof the national image2.
It is no wonder that in the ﬁrst 20 years following the war,“mixed race”
3 was perceived as a pressing social
issue. Up until the sixties mixophobia (Taguieff, 2001) characterized the discourses surrounding inter-racial
mixing. The picture painted in the media was that of children born out of illicit relationships with men in the
US army, if not from violence (Horiguchi and Imoto, 2014). Thus, the images of konketsuji (literally“mixedblood”children) were intertwined to that of defeat in the war and of subjugation, through Japanese women’sbodies, from an external enemy.“Mixed race”as a social problem was debated through questions such as the
position of these children in Japanese society, as well as the (im)possibility of integration (Horiguchi and Imoto,2014; Shimoji, 2018) .
The ﬁrst major shift in the perception of mixed race happened in the 1970s, with the transition from what
Ifekwunigwe (2004) deﬁnes as an“Age of Pathology”to something more akin to an“Age of Celebration”. It
was during this period that the more positive sounding English loanword hāfu started to replace konketsuji.
Originating in media discourses, the term initially referred to individuals of white origin, most often
women (Iwabuchi, 2014: 11-12), who were associated with characteristics such as beauty and desirableness4.
2 For an overview to the individual contestations to national discourse of homogeneity, cfr. Murphy-Shigematsu 2000.
3 The question of how to refer to racial hybridity is a hotly debated one. I will here follow Ifekwunigwe (2004) and use

the hyphenated term“mixed race”as an umbrella term that refers to individuals born from parents belonging todifferent racial groups.
4 These discourses are not completely new:“mixed-race”marriages with white women to better the Japanese race
were advocated as a minority opinion in the pre-war eugenics debate. (See also Robertson 2002).

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Hāfu is nowadays the most common way to refer to“mixed race”
5, and is increasingly used to refer to people
who, racial background notwithstanding, have a foreign parent. However, the cultural history of the term is still
very much alive. With a few notable exceptions, media representation is still skewed towards people who havewhite origin6, and as the controversies surrounding Miss Universe Japan 2015 Miyamoto Ariana demonstrated,“mixed-race”people with black ancestry at times prove much more difﬁcult to accept.
Throughout the last decade the hāfu body has acquired further signiﬁcance as a symbol of an increasingly
globalized country.“Mixed race”citizens of Japan are often represented as a bridge to the“outside world”,aprecious asset to have in an age in which global interconnectivity has taken the spotlight. Paradoxically enough,this fascination with the“mixed race”body is not at all unrelated to the often self-orientalistic (Iwabuchi,
1994) insistence on particularism that characterizes most Japanese discourses on the nation. The insistence
on a Japanese cultural hybridity that mixes modernity and tradition, of which some hāfu bodies become acomplex symbol, is, as Friedman (1997) theorized, almost completely dependent on the widespread perceptionof essentialistic boundaries between the self and the other. White heritage becomes a symbol of modern“other”
which is non-problematically fused with the Japanese“traditional”self.
Tokyo 2020 Ambassador Takigawa Christel, can be considered a suture point between the discourses of“mixed race”, nationalism and globalization. Her elite biracial body was the perfect symbol for an emerging
national rhetoric that oscillates between particularism and universalism, that has also been instrumental in theideological imagining of the upcoming Olympic tournament.
Becoming the Metropolis of Harmony: Tokyo 2020
In 2020, Tokyo will host the Olympics for the second time since 1964, becoming the first Asian city to
do so. The bid for hosting the sports mega-event in 2020 was not the ﬁrst: in 2009, Japan raced for hosting
the 2016 Olympics. The candidacy was strongly wanted by the then mayor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintarō, who
saw the event as a catalyst for tackling“the‘adaptation to an aging and welfare society’,‘consideration forenvironmental problems’and‘sustainable city development’”(Shimizu, 2014). Japan eventually lost to Brazil,
but Ishihara came back to charge just two years after the proposal failed.
On June 11, 2011, just a few months after the disastrous Great Tōhoku Earthquake, Ishihara announced
that Tokyo would make its bid to host the Olympics once again. On that same day, the diet passed a proposal tochange the Fundamental Law on Sport: the new act emphasized a national responsibility of sport promotion.
As worded by Kōno Ichirō, the director of the Japan Sport Council until September 2015, athletic disciplines
were considered“an important strategic tool to show the existence of a nation”(Shimizu, 2014). Thus, the bid
for the 2020 Olympics would have full governmental support, as it was now clear that it could have been used
as a strategic tool to present a positive image of the country to the rest of the world (Roche, 2000).
It has been argued that mega-events such as the Olympics have an explicit political nature. Studying thedevelopment of mega-events in the 1800s and early 1900s, Roche argued that due to their“inter-national”
nature they:“helped to create a fragile space, something of an‘international public culture’, in which‘official’
versions of collective identities, particularly but not exclusively national identities, were asserted and recognisedin an […] international‘world of nations’”(Roche, 2000: 22).
The historical situation has been deeply changed since the 1800s, and nationalism now co-exists with
globalization in a relationship that is at times complicit, whilst at other times conflictual. Nevertheless, the
5 The term has also been the object of criticism: some members of the mixed-race community claim that since theoriginal English word“half”implies incompleteness, the use of the word is discriminatory. Nonetheless, it still
remains the most widely-used term to refer to mixed-race on the national level.
6 This is especially true of fashion and those sectors in the media that focus on beauty practices.

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Olympics have remained a site for the display of“inter-nationalism”: it is in this light that seemingly“apolitical”
mega-events such as the 1964 Tokyo Olympics have been recently re-analyzed. In his 2011 essay, Tagsold
described how the event offered the opportunity to recuperate the war-tainted nationalistic symbols of theemperor and the national ﬂag in a benign, peaceful light, thus contributing greatly to the reconstruction ofa nationalistic sentiment (Tagsold, 2011). Similarly, the 2020 Olympic games are animated by a deeply selfconscious Japanese“brand nationalism”(Iwabuchi, 2007), this time centered on discourses of“western-eastern”
hybridity.
The desire to show the“inter-national”aesthetic of the“Japanese national character”in the best possible
way was evident in the discourse centered around the word omotenashi, that has been translated in the IOC
speech as“hospitality”. The word omotenashi, popularly associated with Takigawa as it was one of the key
points in her speech, has a distinctly nationalistic feel to it. It is implied to be a distinctive trait of a Japaneseculture that is essentially different from its“western”counterpart. Omotenashi has been deﬁned in the Japanesebusiness world as the mindset that people in the service industry employ towards their clients – one that implies
emotional tuning with the customer in order to make him or her feel at ease. Nagao and Umemuro (2012) imply
in their deﬁnition a clear distinction between the strictly materially oriented“western”concept of hospitality
and the feeling-oriented omotenashi, whose origins they trace back to tea ceremony, ryokan and geisha districts.
The announcer’s take on hospitality, presupposes a Japanese actor and a foreign receiver, taking the mirror
games of self and other to the international level, making explicit the connection between the intersecting local
and the global dimensions of nationalism.
Roche also recognizes a globalist aspect of mega-events which appeal to the global, touristic consumer
in three distinctive ways: the“speciﬁcity of when they occur, […] the speciﬁcity of what uniquely dramaticand memorable activities and experiences occur when people attend them in person, and […] the speciﬁcity ofwhere they occur, namely the city that staged and‘hosted’them”(Roche, 2000: 26-27). Indeed, the potential
global appeal is very highlighted in discourses surrounding the 2020 Olympics: the public is being presented
with many innovations which are being developed in order to better accommodate the prospective tourists,such as foreign-language speaking robots (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 2017), free wi-fi services (Nihon Keizai
Shinbun, 2017) and so on. The citizens are also being invited to take part in the“internationalization”processof the Prefectureof Tokyo through volunteer activities such as translator or guide services (Tokyo Volunteer
Navigator, n.d.).
What is surprising about the 2020 Olympic discourse is that the international discussion about it wasradically different from the discussion nationally, as it was mostly focused on environmental problems
and possibilities. Whereas it is not rare in Japan to hear that Takigawa’s internationalist contribution was
signiﬁcant in winning the race to the Olympics (Uotani, 2017), overseas commentary was more focused on prime
minister Abe Shinzo’s speech about the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster and the narrative of a“safe capital city”
which would not be affected in the slightest (BBC Sport, 2013; Longman, Fackler, 2013).
The national narrative surrounding the Olympic Games is consistent with Roche’s interpretation thatmega-events“project the image and status of the local power elite which produced the event for the city’spublic”(Roche, 2000: 10). In a time in which Japan’s elite is rushing to globalize, it is perfectly understandable
that they would insist on the multiculturalism-globalism-internationalization triad, making the words“Unity inDiversity”one of the ideological pillars of the 2020 Tokyo Olympics (The Tokyo Organizing Committee of the
Olympic and Paralympic Games, n.d.).

Takigawa Christel between “East” and “West”
According to Eriksen, globalization as a modern phenomenon exists in the acceleration of multiple pre92

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existing processes (Eriksen 2014), among which figure communication processes, economic flows and the
movement of people. This last process is of particular interest to this article, as it could be considered the main
factor behind two very important concepts that form its theoretical background, namely what Eriksen dubs
“mixing”and“identity politics”.
Mixing has been one of the theoretical keywords of the last 30 years, gaining the spotlight in disciplines
such as postcolonial studies and anthropology. Eriksen understands mixing as a complex phenomenon that
can take multiple different forms whilst being able to elude strong identities and ﬁxed boundaries. It is not anecessarily new phenomenon, as it could be said that the cultures that are being mixed now are, to a bigger or
lesser degree, the products of prior cultural mixing (which might have taken place at a slower pace). However,
it is undeniable that we are assisting an acceleration of these processes, which is in turn generating thereaction that Eriksen refers to as identity politics. Identity politics seek to ﬁx identities and re-establish often
nationalistic boundaries, whose erasure are perceived by the members of the group as a threat (Eriksen 2014:
158-160).
Japan might be seen as a case in point for Eriksen’s argument that“globalization does not create global
people”(Eriksen 2014: 154). As Iwabuchi (1994) has pointed out in one of his earlier articles, the increase ofinternational exchanges mostly had the effect of reinforcing the images of a particularistic national identity
constructed through dialectical relations with the“Western”and the Asian other. Iwabuchi’s main argument
consists in the fact that Japan’s self-image is not, as one might think, a tool in the battle against Western culturalimperialism. It is in fact complicit with western ideologies of domination (thus the term“self-orientalism”) andit has been employed as a strategy to suppress the country’s minorities as well as to ideologically ground thecountry’s culturally imperialistic expansionist tactics in Asia. In other words, Japan’s complicit self-orientalism
is often utilized as an ideological tool, especially in those arenas in which the warfare tools of soft power takecenter stage.
Discourses of Japanese self-orientalist cultural nationalism, often based on the presupposition ofuniqueness, have been significantly challenged by the narratives of internal diversity and multiculturalism
which have emerged in the last 30 years. Furthermore, ﬁgures such as the kikoku shijo and hāfu have madevisible the presence of individuals who cannot easily be labeled as either Japanese or“foreign”. However, someof these identities have been subsumed into a newly emerging national ideology, who found in them a powerfultool to reimagine the nation as a hybrid between“western”modernity and“Japanese”tradition. Paradoxically,
this ideological construction is reminiscent of the two orientalist gazes of traditionalism (here understood as thecondition of being“stuck”in a pre-modern past) and the often dehumanizing hyper-futurism (Wagenaar 2016).
In this, we can see a continuity with the mirror-games of self-image construction that Iwabuchi refers to.
This newly emerging discourse surrounding the nation is embodied in the selection of the hāfu newscasterTakigawa Christel as Olympic ambassador – an ambassador to the nation in an extremely inter-national
context. Takigawa stands out among the 10 Olympic ambassadors as the only one who has no direct relations tothe sports event. There is an undeniably globalist reasoning behind her selection, that would arguably be basedon her status as an individual who is“global”in virtue of her“mixed-race”. Her proﬁciency in French is further
proof of this“international”status.
Takigawa Christel became famous as a female newscaster for Fuji Television, where she worked until 2013
(Suzuki, 2013)7. Viewers of Japanese television might also be familiar with her presence in commercials. Herline of work blurs the boundaries between journalist and that of the celebrity; she could be considered as atarento (TV personality) that is endowed with a high cultural capital. Thus, their image, consumable in various
merchandising such as yearly released calendars, puts together physical beauty with the added element ofintelligence and social status.
7 Takigawa is now an independent newscaster and animal-rights activist.
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Takigawa nowadays is perhaps more famous for her persona than her work as a broadcaste. Her image,which is built around her hāfu identity, her high education8 and prestigious line of work, are tied to her
multicultural background. Japanese individuals with white mixed-race backgrounds became increasingly well
represented in the media since the 1970s. The word hāfu started being associated with characteristics such as
beauty and cosmopolitanism (Iwabuchi, 2014). Contemporary discourses about hāfu are heavily inﬂuenced bydiscourses about globalization; Iwabuchi ironically remarks on how they are perceived“global not only in theirlooks but also in their way of thought”(Iwabuchi, 2014: 12).
Especially relevant to the construction of her persona is her father’s country of birth, France, often
idealized and imbued with a high symbolic capital (Wyatt, 2017) and thus occupying a very special place in the
network of shared meanings of the Japanese9. These elite connotations have landed her roles in commercials forhigh-end products such as Ebisu Beer and Shiseido make-up products, and at the same time her appearance insuch advertisements are further reinforcing her image of prestige.
Takigawa’s multiculturalism plays its role into positioning her among the cultured, highly sophisticatedupper-middle class, she is a perfect example of the ideal global jinzai (global human resource)10. Physically,
with her black hair and very light-coloured skin, she is the ideal proxy for an elite class who is nationalisticallylooking outwards, who aspires to be modern (and thus“westernized”) while retaining some kind of“traditional
Japaneseness”.
This perfectly balanced mixture between“Japanese”and foreign that allows her to be chosen as the proxy
for a“new Japaneseness”is only possible because the physical characteristics inherited from the white sideof her family are tame enough to allow her to exist in the middle ground of a spectrum that goes from“junnihonjin”to foreigner. As Iwabuchi pointed out (2014), advancement in plastic surgery and make-up techniques
has made it possible for non-mixed Japanese to obtain the semblance of a facial structure that is raciallyambiguous. It is hard to imagine an ambassador with no relation to sports and whose foreign looks were more
visible than Takigawa taking center stage to culturally represent Japan as she did11. Her white heritage, uppersocio-economical status and gender made her the perfect candidate.
Because of her inherently“global”hāfu status and her linguistic proﬁciency, Takigawa is perceived asa“bridge”between the all-Japanese panel speakers and the international audience of the IOC. She assumes
the role of the“internationally-oriented national economic power elite”that serves to“internationalize”thenationalistic endeavor of bidding to host the 2020 Olympics (Roche, 2000); her elite status granted in virtue ofboth her profession and her biracialism. These tensions between national and international clearly emerge fromher ambassador speech, that I will analyze in the following section.

s degree in French literature from Aoyama Gakuin University.
8 Takigawa has a bachelor’
9 For the self-orientalistic construction of the European“West”see MIYAKE, Toshio, Occidentalismi, Venezia,
Cafoscarina, 2010, pp.103-107 (in Italian).

10 Chapple translates as following the deﬁnition of the term given by the MEXT and the METI:“people who, in today’s competitive and cooperative world, can—while maintaining their sense of Japanese identity—possess a broad worldview based on both general and specialized education, have communicative and cooperative
abilities to build relationships which go beyond values, cultures and different languages, and that have the ability tocreate new values and the desire to contribute to society now and in future generations”(Chapple, 2014. Cursive inoriginal.)
As it can be inferred from the institutional deﬁnition, global jinzai are expected to be the agent of globalization in
Japanese companies.
11 A comparison with the media coverage that former Miss Universe Japan Ariana Miyamoto got two years later
might be useful to illustrate this point. Her selection prompted an immediate reaction from the ultra-conservative
population of the 2chan boards, widely considered to be the underbelly of Japan. Although the extreme stancetaken by these netizens is definitely a minority opinion, the reportages of her victory mostly focused on racial
discrimination. One could see a faint continuity between the framing of (especially black) konketsuji as social
problem and Miyamoto’s media presence.

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Takigawa Christelʼs speech: the “magic word” omotenashi
Takigawa’s presentation in front of the IOC was conducted in French and lasted approximately fiveminutes long. She was preceded by former Tokyo governor Inose Naoki, who introduced her as“the one who
would communicate to the audience how will Tokyo welcome people from all the world”(Hufﬁngton Post Japan,2013). The announcer began her speech in the following way:
Tokyo will welcome you uniquely. In Japanese, we can express [the way in which Tokyo will welcome you] asomotenashi (Hufﬁngton Post Japan, 2013).
Since the beginning of her speech, Tokyo, in virtue of being the capital city of Japan, is positioned as“unique”. This references the cultural nationalist Nihonjinron discourse, that in the 70s aimed to construct aJapanese identity deﬁned by its alterity from the“West”. Similarly, omotenashi is constructed as a traditional(and thus exclusive to Japan) concept, unable to be rendered in foreign words. The alien quality of this concept
is further emphasized by Takigawa’s gestures; she spells out every syllable with a peculiar gesture of thehands, and then repeats the word once again, bowing with her hands held together as if she was praying12.
Overall the ﬁrst part of the speech is the most popular one, and it is the reason why the word omotenashi waspremiated with the“Buzzword of the Year”award (Osumi, 2013).
That is the spirit of hospitality without expecting anything in exchange, that has been transmitted to us
from our ancestors and is deeply rooted in our hyper-modern culture. The word omotenashi expresses why
Japanese people help each other and why they think that the guests they are welcoming are important.
Here, Takigawa makes a ﬁrst reference to the hybrid cultural nationalist discourse which sees Japan as a
hyper-technological, hyper-modern society that is nonetheless spiritually connected to its traditionalist roots.
Once again, the apparently deep links between omotenashi and“Japaneseness”are highlighted.
Takigawa then proceeds to give examples of omotenashi.
Here is a simple example. If by any chance you lost anything in Tokyo, you would almost certainly ﬁnd it
back. Even money. In fact, last year more than 30 million dollars were brought back to the Tokyo Police
Bureau as a lost item. According to a recent survey conducted on 75,000 people who travel the world,Tokyo is the safest city in the world. Also, according to this survey, Tokyo ranked ﬁrst even in the following
categories: trafﬁc safety, cleanliness, and the kindness of the taxi drivers.
Safety is a priority concern when organizing mega-events, and they can even become catalysts to pass
new security laws. Here Takigawa is appealing to this, describing Japan’s safe environment as directly related
to its unique culture. In what could be presented as a twist on the“futuristic”variant of Japanese nationalism,
the country is presented as an unbelievably hyper-safe environment. She then goes on to describe what in the
nihonjinron discourse is presented as the reason behind Japan’s uniqueness.
You can observe these resources in every neighborhood. The traditional oriental culture. Together with topclass occidental shopping and restaurants they are in this town, who has the most Michelin stars in thes Youtube channel at the following link. https://www.youtube.com/
12 A video of the speech is available on ANN news’
watch?v=6hggygKWwhg (accessed on ??, ??, 201?)

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world; everything is incorporated in the landscape of this futuristic city. (my emphasis).
Here Takigawa slightly changes the topic, going back to the motif of hybridity. In a (self)orientalist twist,
Japan is presented as being the perfect union between“oriental”and“occidental”cultures, providing to thevisiting tourist exotic Japanese entertainment while at the same time offering them the safety of the alreadyknown. Following the reasoning behind her presentation, it is this co-existence of exotic“oriental tradition”
and“foreign innovation”that makes Tokyo“futuristic”. It can be argued that these words have an evenmore powerful impact when pronounced by someone that is herself the union between the“oriental”and the“occidental”.
Takigawa’s hybrid, biracial image resonates with the nationalistic ideology as she is conﬂated to what isbeing constructed as the idealized“futuristic Japan”: the biracial body becomes the ﬂesh for the multicultural,
hybrid nationalist ideology tailor-made for the age of globalization. In the international space of competition
that is the Olympic bid, the physical thus becomes a mirroring representation of the ideological.
The Elite Biracial Body as Proxy for “Future Japaneseness”
Being frequently featured in television, both as a newscaster and as a tarento featured in commercials,
Takigawa is very well known to the audience of Japanese television. Her multicultural background, highproﬁle announcer career and her endorsement of high-end products mutually reinforce themselves, creating
the image of an elite superwoman. By choosing her as the ambassador for the 2020 Olympics, the JapaneseOlympics Committee, backed by the government, has chosen the“face”of Japan that it wanted to show on
an international arena. Takigawa Christel’s biracialism, far from being subversive, becomes the embodimentof the cultural strategy of blending new and old,“oriental”and“occidental”, and constructing it into a newnational(istic) self-identity. Takigawa’s presentation was incredibly successful nation-wide; it could be assumed
that part of this success derives from the fact that she herself is constructed as the perfect mirror for thenationalist discourse in the subtext of the words she was addressing to the IOC.
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