RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 65

Group 3

EFFECTIVELY TRACING THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME,
FOCUSING ON COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING

Chairperson
Co-Chairperson
Co-Chairperson
Rapporteur
Co-Rapporteur
Co-Rapporteur
Members

Mr Vilavath Thephithuck
Mr Jalalludin Bin Abu
Mr Tadayuki Sawada
Mr Esaka Deus Ndege Mugasa
Mr AsraMr Takashi Furusaki
Mr Sibounzom Bounlom
Mr Shozo Hirata(Laos)(Malaysia)(Japan)(Tanzania)(Indonesia)(Japan)(Laos)(Japan)Visiting Expert

Mr Hans G. Nilsson(EU)

Advisers

Prof. Senta KeisukeProf. Kei Someda
Prof. Tamaki Yokochi(UNAFEI)(UNAFEI)(UNAFEI)

I. SITUATION ON MONEY LAUNDERINGThe group examined the situation of money laundering in the thirteen participating countries, basedon the fact sheets prepared by the group and filled in by the participants of the 125th International Training
Course.
Out of thirteen participating countries, eleven countries have legislation criminalizing moneylaundering activities. In most cases, the predicate offences included drug offences and serious offences
listed in the legislation. The number of serious offences listed as predicate offences varied from aroundten to more than one hundred. In one country, all criminal offences are predicate offences for money
laundering.
Some countries have dealt with about sixty money laundering cases since the enactment of their antimoney laundering laws. But in many states, concrete statistics on money laundering cases are yet to beestablished, because their money laundering legislation is quite new. However, although not formallycharged, many participants stated that money laundering activities were found in their respective
countries, including those countries where money laundering is not yet a criminal offence. Someparticipants pointed out that most money movements are made not through financial institutions likebanks, but via more informal channels or by cash couriers, and thus it is very difficult to obtain
information on money laundering activities.
Some countries reported that their money laundering legislation is under review to more effectively
fight against it. Countries who have not yet criminalized money laundering are now working to introduce
new legislation or decrees, in order to criminalize money laundering and establish a Financial Intelligence
Unit (FIU).

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II. PROBLEMS IN RELATION TO CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OF
TRACING MONEY, AND ITS SOLUTION, INCLUDINGCOOPERATION WITH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
A. Problems
The group identified the following issues as problems in the criminal investigation of tracing money.
1. Procedures in Accessing Bank Data and the Issue of Bank Secrecy
It was observed that in some countries law enforcement officers are facing difficulties in obtaining thecooperation from banks and other financial institutions because these institutions decline to cooperate,
invoking bank secrecy. In obtaining bank records for the purpose of criminal investigation, somecountries have procedural requirements that could be a burden to law enforcement authorities, such as theconsent of the central bank, or long time and high degree of evidence needed to obtain a court order forthe production of bank records. Some participants stated that in practice it is not difficult to obtain theconsent from the central bank, but some participants pointed out that in some cases the requirement of theconsent or the court order would be a burden for law enforcement authorities dealing with transnationalorganized criminals, who make the best use of advanced technology and move money frequently andquickly.
2. Lack of Confidentiality among some Members of the Financial Institutions and Law Enforcement
Agencies
Even if there are legal frameworks to ensure the cooperation of the financial institutions, the fact thatthe investigation on a certain bank account is going on could be leaked to the person holding the account.
This can be done intentionally by corrupt bank officials or law enforcement officers, or inadvertently byan inappropriate processing by banks of the inquiry from investigators. For example, if a bank manager
sends a copy of the investigative inquiry to its all branch offices via facsimile without any security
measures, this inquiry can be seen by any employee and the risk of information leak would be very high.
3. Discretion of some Financial Institutions to Report Suspicious Transaction to FIUs
It was pointed out that if the rules governing the Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR) is not clear
enough, there is a danger that this could be abused by the financial institutions. Bank officials might
decide not to report a suspicious transaction by their clients by inappropriately interpreting the rules on
STRs.
4. Lack of Authority to Apply New Investigative Techniques
Investigative techniques such as the interception of electronic communication, undercover operations
and surveillance are very effective tools in the fight against money laundering. However, many countries
lack sufficient legal provisions authorizing law enforcement agencies to conduct these measures.
5. Lack of Special Skills in Accountancy or Information Technology among Law Enforcement Agencies
or FIUs
In analyzing financial documents such as bank records and accounting books of corporations, special
knowledge and skills in accountancy are essential. Many participants stated that the law enforcement
agencies and FIUs in their countries do not have enough staff members who have these skills. The samecan be said concerning the knowledge and skills in information technology, which is also essential indealing with sophisticated criminals.

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6. Non-Bank Financial Institutions, Alternative Remittance System (ARS) and Cash Transactions
It was noted that some countries do not have appropriate regulations to control non bank financial
institutions. Furthermore, the group agreed that there are many methods used to move money other thanusing the financial institutions, such as by using professionals (lawyers, notaries public, accountants etc.),
resorting to ARS including hawala, hundi or other types of underground banks, or simply moving
cash by cash couriers. This is eminent in countries without developed financial systems, but it is also
popular in countries which have a sophisticated network of financial institutions.
7. Absence of Anti Money Laundering Laws or FIUs
Above all, it was noted that some countries do not have FIUs and/or anti-money laundering laws,
although they are the essential tools in the fight against money laundering. Lack of political will was
identified as one of the reasons.
B. Solutions
The group discussed how to solve the above mentioned problems and came to a conclusion that thefollowing measures should be considered by countries to effectively cope with money laundering. It
should be noted that these measures are closely related, depending on each other.
1. Introduction of New Laws or Revision of the Existing Laws
First of all, countries without anti-money laundering laws should take steps to enact such laws as soon
as possible, and countries which do not have FIUs should have laws or regulations establishing them(problem (g)).
Countries which already have anti-money laundering laws and FIUs should consider introducing orrevising laws with a view to:(i) expanding the scope of the predicate offences (general);(ii) introducing new offences, criminalizing such conduct as the leakage of information or dishonest
STR reporting by bank officials (problem (b) and (c)), or illegal ARS (problem (f)) ;(iii) providing a legal framework for the cooperation between agencies and financial institutions
related to anti-money laundering activities (general);(iv) introducing clear standards for STRs (problem (c))(v) providing a legal basis which allows law enforcement officials to utilize new investigativetechniques (problem (d))(vi) establishing supervisory systems for non-banking financial institutions, professionals, legal ARS
and cash transactions (problem (f))(vii) providing fair and effective measures for investigation authorities to obtain bank records
promptly (problem (a))
2. Awareness Raising
In order to have the necessary laws or regulations mentioned in (a) above approved by the legislature,
it is essential to obtain understanding of ministers and high ranking officials, law makers, interested
groups such as lawyers and financial communities, and public in general. Thus it is very important tolaunch an active awareness raising campaign to promote the common understanding that anti-money
laundering measures are necessary (related to solution (a))The understanding of the public and thefinancial institutions will also be essential to enhance the cooperation of the financial institutions to thelaw enforcement authorities, as well as efficient STRs (problem (b), (c)).
3. Capacity Building
Training of law enforcement and judicial officers and staff of FIUs to provide them with skills andknowledge in the investigation of money laundering, accounting and information technology is very200

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important to enhance their capacity. Measures should also be taken to provide them with sufficientequipment, especially Information Technology (IT) tools (problem (e)).
4. Establishment of a Regime for Cooperation and Coordination between Law Enforcement Officials andOther Relevant Agencies, Including the Financial Institutions
Having laws on paper is not enough to ensure the cooperation and coordination of activities in thefight against money laundering, including the investigation to trace the money. An effective regime toenhance the cooperation and coordination between law enforcement officials and other relevant agencies,
including the financial institutions, should be established. This could be realized, for example, by
establishing a coordination committee of agencies concerned.
5. Ratification of the UN Conventions
The United Nations Conventions, especially the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna Convention) and 2000 United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention), are very useful
instruments in combating money laundering. In order to ratify these Conventions, countries have to enact
laws to implement their obligations. They will serve as guidelines in drafting laws (solution (a)), and canbe used in awareness raising campaigns to enlighten the public, officials, lawmakers and interested
groups that these Conventions are adopted by the General Assembly, thus the de facto global consensus(solution (b)).

III. ESTABLISHMENT OF LEGAL FRAMEWORKS (IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
RELEVANT UN CONVENTIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS) AND ITS PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
A. Expansion of Predicate Offences for Money Laundering
1. Four Approaches to Define Predicate Offences
On this item the group deliberated on what are the predicate offences. As per the Palermo Convention
the term is defined as follows:
Predicate offences shall mean any offences as a result of which proceeds have been generated may
become the subject of an offence as defined in article 6 of this Convention1.
The Convention further defines and obligates States Parties to the convention to criminalize
laundering of proceeds of crime2. The offences are extended to criminalization of participation in an
organized criminal group3, corruption4 and obstruction of justice5 respectively, and also to all serious
crime which conduct constitute an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least
four years or a more serious penalty6. Transnationality or involvement of an organized criminal groupmust not be made elements of these offences in domestic laws7.

1
2
3
4

Article 2 (h) the Palermo Convention.
Article 6, ibid.
Article 4, ibid.
Article 8, ibid.

5
6
7

Article 23, ibid.
Article 2 (b), ibid.
Article 34 (2), ibid.

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The group in their discussion came to the conclusion that there are four approaches which states apply
as far as predicate offences are concerned namely:(i) All crimes Approach(ii) List Approach(iii) Threshold Approach(iv) Mixed Approach meaning both list and threshold approaches
On the other hand the FATF 40 Recommendations (Financial Action Task Force Recommendations) 8
on the scope of the criminal offences of Money Laundering stipulate that:・ Countries should criminalize money laundering on the basis of the Vienna Convention and the Palermo
Convention.
・ Countries should apply the crime of money laundering to all serious offences with a view to including
the widest range of predicate offences. Predicate offences may be described by reference to all
offences or to a threshold linked either to a category of serious offences or to a penalty of
imprisonment applicable to the predicate offence (threshold approach) or to a list of predicate offences
or a combination of these approaches.
・ Where countries apply a threshold approach, predicate offences should at a minimum comprise alloffences that fall within the category of serious offences under their national law or should include
offences which are punishable by a maximum penalty of more than one years imprisonment or for
those countries that have a minimum threshold for offences in their legal system, predicate offences
should comprise all offences, which are punishable by a minimum penalty of more than six months
imprisonment.
・ Whichever approach is adopted, each country should at a minimum include a range of offences withineach of the designated category of offences9. Predicate offences for money laundering should extend to
conduct that occurred in another countries, which constitute an offence in that country, and which
would have constituted a predicate offence had it occurred domestically. Countries may provide thatthe only prerequisite is that the conduct would have constituted a predicate offence had it occurreddomestically.
・ Countries may provide that the offence of money laundering does not apply to a person who
committed the predicate offence where this is required by domestic law10.
Afterwards the discussion geared on the difficulties and the group earmarked the following:
The list approach seems to be more practical, since it is limited in scope hence making it easier for thelegislature to approve the bill.
On the threshold approach it was noted that if the minimum period of the deprivation of liberty is low,
this might cause difficulties for the legislature to approve the bill.

8

All FATF recommendations quoted in this paper are those which were revised in June 2003.

9

Designated categories of offences are listed in the Glossary to the newly revised FATF 40 Recommendations.

10

Last paragraph of FATF 40 Recommendation 1.

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Theoretically, both the all crime approach and threshold approach have some questions, i.e., there areother offences such as infanticide, rape, grievous harm, which don t generate profit. There is a possibilityof public concern that authorities abuse their powers, leading to some criticism from the pressure groups.
In addition, it might increase the workload of law enforcement agencies and judicial officials as well;hence the need for more personnel and equipment, especially in countries where the legality principle isapplied.
2. Degree of Mens Rea Required in Money Laundering Offences
The group noted that this is also one of the difficulties. This notion has a different interpretation andpenalty as far as states are concerned. In some countries, such as the USA, where they use the list
approach, they have a special provision in law which mitigates the burden of proof of the mental elementof the launderer: the prosecution is required to prove that the defendant knew the proceeds came from afelony, but not from a specific offence. Indonesia also has provisions on the mitigation of mens rea. In
Japan, there is no such special provision and the issue of the mental element is dealt with by theinterpretation of the general provisions on mens rea in the Penal Code.
3. Proof of the Predicate Offences
In some countries prosecutors have to prove predicate offences beyond a reasonable doubt, and insome other countries a lower degree of proof is enough, such as a balance of probabilities. In somecountries the conviction of the predicate offence must precede the indictment of the money launderingcase. On the contrary in other countries such as Japan and Indonesia conviction for a predicate offence is
not a pre-condition for instituting a money laundering case.
4. Measures to Solve the Difficulties
One component is the revision of the law but since the concept of money laundering is technical, we
need to train legal drafters overseas. Also law enforcement, judicial and financial institution personnel
need capacity building assistance.
In order to speed up the adoption of the bill in parliament, the awareness raising campaign, or someenlightenment activities targeting lawmakers, interested groups such as human rights activists or financial
institutions, and members of the public would be needed to obtain their understanding on the urgency intaking anti- money laundering measures. In this context, the existence of international instruments suchas UN Conventions can present a good argument in adopting relevant legislation.In addition to the
expansion of the predicate offence, the new law could also deal with the mitigation of the degree of proof,
which was mentioned above.
B. Confiscation, Freezing, Collection of the Value of the Proceeds of Crime, and Asset Sharing
At the outset, the group reviewed the relevant provisions in the Palermo Convention (Article 2 (g) and
Article 12), and in the Vienna Convention (Article 5), as well as recommendation 3 of the FATF 40
Recommendations.
The group discussed the scope of the proceeds of crime. It was introduced that Japan needed newlegislation to implement the confiscation provisions of the Vienna Convention and the Palermo
Convention, because the existing Article 19 did not sufficiently cover the scope of obligations under these
Conventions. Thus, in ratifying the Conventions other countries may need a thorough comparison ofthese Convention provisions and the confiscation provisions in their respective domestic laws.

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Also, there was a discussion whether the confiscation should be mandatory, or judges should havediscretion on this matter, and there was a general agreement that in drug offences and serious offences
involving organized criminal groups, the confiscation should be mandatory.
The meeting also discussed the difference between confiscation and forfeiture , since in Article
2(g) of the Palermo Convention and Article 1 (f) of the Vienna Convention, which states that
Confiscation , which includes forfeiture where applicable, means the permanent deprivation of property
by order of a court or other competent authority . The group noted that the Commentary on the Vienna
Convention, prepared by the United Nations, has an explanation on this issue, stating that the reference toforfeiture is made in order to meet the needs of some national legal systems, in which this was a more
appropriate term than confiscation and that the French and Spanish versions do not have the phrase
which includes forfeiture where applicable , since the term confiscation in French or decosimo in
Spanish were deemed to be the only appropriate ones.11
The group noted that the shifting of the burden of proof concerning the legitimate origin of assets,
dealt with by Group II, also needs attention.
The meeting also discussed the issue of civil and administrative forfeiture. It recalled the explanation
made by the visiting expert from the United States, as well as recommendation 3 of the FATF 40
Recommendations, which stipulates that states may consider adopting civil forfeiture.
Some participants expressed concern that this process (especially administrative forfeiture) could beabused to evade the criminal procedure, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but otherparticipants considered that civil forfeiture is an effective way to control the proceeds of crime, especiallywhen the offender cannot be convicted due to certain reasons, such as his/her absconding or death.
All participants of the group said that their countries have provisions on freezing of proceeds of crime(and as for the participants of the 125th course, only Bhutan and the Maldives do not have the freezing
provisions). It was noted that there are two possibilities in initiating the freeze procedure: one system
may only accept court orders as a basis for freezing, and the other system may authorize prosecutors or
law enforcement officers of a certain level to issue a freeze order.
As for the asset sharing, attention of the group was drawn to Article 5 paragraph 5 (b)(ii) of theVienna Convention and Article 14 paragraph 3(b) of the Palermo Convention which states may give
special consideration to concluding agreements concerning asset sharing. Views were expressed that
asset sharing was a very useful tool in the fight against transnational crime, which generate a large
amount of proceeds, helping to enhance cooperation between investigative agencies of the statesconcerned, and providing a fair compensation to the effort made by each agency. Some participantsquoted a saying that money makes enemies , and expressed views that a fight for money could
deteriorate a once friendly relationship between the agencies concerned. However, the meeting agreed
that the adoption of a legal framework to allow asset sharing merits serious consideration so as to enhanceinternational cooperation.

11

Commentary on the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988,
p30 (United Nations publication Sales No. E.98 XI.5, E/CN.7/590).

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C. Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) System and Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)
The group reviewed the legal framework on STRs and FIUs in the international instruments, such as
FATF 40 recommendations and its adoption by the FATF Style Regional Bodies (FSRB), as well as
paragraphs 1(b) and 3 of Article 7 of the Palermo Convention.
It was confirmed that the minimum requirement for the FIU is for receiving, [... ],analysis anddissemination of STRs and other information regarding potential money laundering or terrorist financing 12.
The group also reviewed three options concerning the scope of the STRs. One approach is a genericapproach, where financial institutions are required to report all transactions, which they suspect or havereasonable grounds to suspect that the funds are the proceeds of criminal activities. The second approachis a threshold approach, where reports should be made on transactions exceeding a certain amount ofmoney. The third approach is a combination of these two.
As for the generic approach, it could increase the workload of the financial institutions, as they haveto make judgments in each transaction whether it is suspicious or not. This judgment is not of a nature to
be clearly stipulated in law. By each case, the customer s nationality, vocation, past transactions,transaction value, transaction form, and other factors should be comprehensively considered. However, it
is essential to establish certain guidelines for the financial institutions to help them in making a decision
to ensure the smooth operation of this system. In Japan, through FIU, Japan Financial Intelligence Office(JAFIO), Reference of STR is distributed, and revisions are made when necessary.
The threshold approach is easier for the banks to apply. However, there is a danger that the criminals
may evade the STR by dividing their transactions to several transfers below the threshold. That means, if
the transaction exceeding US$ 10,000 is subject to report, criminals may divide their transactions into
small lots such as US$ 9,900. In countries, which adopt the mixed type system such as Thailand, they
may not face these issues, but this will be a concern to countries which adopt the threshold approach.
There could also be a problem that the FIUs would be flooded by many reports.
The meeting discussed whether the FIUs should be equipped with any authorities concerninginvestigation and confiscation. It was noted that if the FIU is to have investigative authority, there should
be many personnel who have sufficient experience in the investigation field. Some participants suggested
that law enforcement authorities, with many experienced staff members, are more suitable for conducting
investigation based on the STR from the FIUs. It was also noted that even the mandate of the AntiMoney Laundering Office (AMLO) of Thailand, which have an investigative authority, is limited to a listof offences, and they transfer the case involving other offences not listed to appropriate investigative
agencies.
On the other hand, in case the FIU does not have investigative authority, such as Japan, it is important
to enhance function to collect and analyze adequate information, and to manage collaboration among
investigative agencies well. Especially, in case of the latter, we must say that the effectiveness of the FIU
function is poor, if the information the investigative agencies consider important is totally different fromthe information sent from the FIU. To address these issues, a framework for the enhancement ofcooperation and coordination among FIUs and other investigative agencies should be established, forexample by holding periodical meetings, so as to promote a common understanding of the problems
related to the information sharing.

12

FATF Recommendation 26.

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This issue is also related to where the FIU should be located whether under the central bank, orministry of finance, or ministry of justice or interior, or it should be an independent body. It was observedthat as far as the FIUs are vested with the minimum authorities mentioned above, countries may choose
any of the above options, depending on their policies.
To ensure the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of STRs, there should be some sanctions in casethe financial institutions do not abide by the STR rules.
We are seeing an increasing number of cases in which legal professions such as lawyers, certified
accountants and real estate agencies lend hand to money laundering by offering consultancy on financial
matters. This is the so called Gatekeeper issue and is becoming apparent, so measures should be put inplace as per Recommendation 12 of FATF 40 Recommendations.
It will be beneficial to oblige the legal professional to report to the FIU to some extent, but on theother hand, trust between the customer is crucial for the lawyer to execute his/her duty.
Unlike Financial Institutions that deal in a large number of transactions, lawyers provide service on an
individual basis. Thus it is relatively easy for the source of information to be revealed. There are somecountries that oblige lawyers to make a report, but sufficient safeguards will be important.
On the co-operation of FIUs, the group observed that where they exist they should be encouraged to
exchange information between each other and they should develop procedures to that effect. Where they
do not exist informal channels such as Interpol, should be used.
Also, the capacity building of relevant bodies, such as training of the FIU officials and the employeesof financial institutions, judicial personnel, as well as law enforcement officials, is of great importance inorder to maximize the STR system.
D. Customer Due Diligence (CDD) and other Measures Required by the FATF 40 Recommendations
1. Issues Faced
On this aspect the group centred their discussion on Recommendation 12 of the FATF which
stipulates: the CDD and the record keeping set out in Recommendation 5, 6 and 8 to apply to designatednon-financial businesses and professions such as casinos, real estate agents, dealers in precious metals
and precious stones, lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, accountants and trust andcompany service providers.
Some participants observed that the issues of CDD measures such as financial institutions identify andverify the identities of the customers13 normally annoys customers who may decide to go to other banks
where the conditions on this aspect are less stringent.
The Group noted that it is especially difficult to identify customers when they conceal the person towhom the transactions actually effects, making use of another person appearing as an owner .
Identification of this issue of beneficial owners is one of the most challenging tasks in CDD.
On the professionals such as lawyers and accountants the group recalled the presentation of one
expert at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Seminar on counter-terrorism Conventions for the purpose ofencouraging the accession to the Conventions by Southeast Asian countries, where he said lawyers in his
13

FATF Recommendation 5.

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country have gone to court to file for injunctions against the STR obligation by the legal professions.
All participants were of the view that in preparing a bill to require these professionals to exercise
STRs, they might face the same problems faced by the country of the expert above, especially challenges
from the professional associations.
2. Measures to Address the Situations
On the issue of verifying the identities of customers by financial institutions, participants observedthat the regulatory bodies especially central or reserve banks should enforce compliance to all financial
institutions by making sure they maintain the same standard and procedures. For those who default
sanction should be put in place to reprimand them. Also regulatory bodies should sensitize public that theissue has to be adhered to by customers hence they have to cooperate with financial institutions in theirbusiness transactions by giving correct details of their identities and documentation.
On identifying beneficial owners the group was of the view that special forms should be used withcomprehensive details and face to face business relationships or transactions should be used.
The group on professionals to report STRs, was of the view that they have to be encouraged to do it.
To start with their association should be asked to include the compliance in their regulations. Further theyshould be enlightened that they are supposed to report their suspicious transactions but not relevant
information obtained in circumstances whereby it is subject to professional secrecy or legal professional
privileges 14.

IV. PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
A. Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition
The group agreed that the measures were essential tools in fighting transnational organized crime. It
was agreed that articles 6 and 7 of the Vienna Convention, article 18 and 19 of the Palermo Convention,
Recommendation 35-40 of FATF 40 Recommendations should be the basis of the International
cooperation on these aspects.
Participants noted that they were implementing the measures but some countries when asked to
extradite criminals they invoke principle of dual criminality as provided in article 18 paragraph 9 of thePalermo Convention. Some countries exercise strict application of dual criminality while others are
flexible in applying it by taking into account the overall conduct of an offender, rather than simply
comparing the text of laws. Again there are other countries, which don t require dual criminality aspects
in non-coercive measures.
Some participants observed that the mutual legal assistance requests are costly and time consuming to
the requested countries and sometimes there is lack of trust and confidence. There is no room for dual
criminality in the Vienna Convention and the 1999 Suppression of Financing of Terrorism Convention.
But in the Palermo Convention, which covers a wide range of offences there can be room for a country to
invoke the dual criminality requirement, especially for serious crime.

14

FATF Recommendation 16.

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Political offences, capital punishment and the integrity of some central authorities were mentioned bysome participants as a stumbling block to extradition. Experiences were mentioned by Japan, Laos,
Indonesia and Tanzania, where they failed to obtain extradition of defendants or offenders. The meeting
noted the aut dedere aut judicare principle adopted by several UN Conventions under which the requested
country has to prosecute the person for whom extradition is sought if it refuses extradition solely on the
ground that the person sought is its national. Despite the problems participants agreed that states should
encourage to ratify the UN Conventions, especially the Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention andadopt the FATF 40 Recommendations and join the body. Countries should enact domestic laws, which
will be an indicator of political will on the state concerned. The advantages of ratifying the conventions
and enacting domestic laws is that the states can benefit from the international technical assistanceprogrammes like training and equipment.
B. Exchange of Information among Law Enforcement Agencies
On this item, the group was in consensus that this is the most effective way of combatingtransnational organized crime because criminals have no geographical boundaries. So law enforcement
agencies should cooperate in exchanging information with one another, consistent with their respective
domestic legal and administrative systems as stipulated in article 27 of the Palermo Convention. Statesshould use the following fora as established channels of communication:(i) Interpol through the National Central Bureaux (NCBs)(ii) WCO through Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices (RILOs)(iii) Egmont Group through the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)(iv) Universal Postal Union through National Post Agencies
The group noted that the informal forum was faster than the diplomatic channels, which take a longtime. However, for the judicial trial formal channels have to be pursued for admissibility of evidence in acourt of law.
Japan gave an example of a case where the exchange of information with the law enforcement
agencies in the United States, followed by a prompt mutual legal assistance request, led to a successfulprosecution of a drug trafficking case.
Tanzania also cited three cases whereby an exchange of information was carried out among three
Anti-Narcotic Units in East Africa through the auspices of the East African Operational Meetings on
Drugs for the Directors of Criminal Investigation and the Heads of the Anti-Narcotic Units and big
seizures of heroine where recorded.
On the other hand, inter-agency cooperation of law enforcement agencies at the state level should be
encouraged to boost international cooperation. However, some countries pointed out the exchange of
information is hampered by lack of equipment and training.
C. Joint Investigation and Border Control
This issue was deliberated in depth and the group unanimously agreed that this is a very usefulmeasure to tackle cross-border crimes on condition that there should be bilateral, multilateral agreements
or arrangement in matters of investigation, prosecution and judicial proceedings in one or more states.
Sometimes it can be conducted on a case by case basis. This is stipulated in article 19 of the Palermo
Convention.

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It was introduced that Indonesia had a successful joint investigation with USA. And Laos also had ajoint investigation with Thailand especially along the borders. Tanzania via Southern Africa Regional
Police Chiefs Conference Organization (SARPCCO) and Eastern African Police Chiefs Conference
Organization (EAPCCO) has also conducted very successful joint investigations and operations.
The Group noted that the experience of Tanzania merits attention, where foreign investigators areinvited to participate in the joint operations and investigations as observers, South Africa offering
equipment with wide database especially on stolen motor vehicles. The participant of Tanzania introduced
that these joint operations and investigations are conducted on the basis of the various protocols. He also
noted that in the negotiation of certain protocols, it was difficult to reach consensus on certain articles.

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