PLEA BARGAINING, COOPERATION AGREEM ENTS,
AND IMMUNITY ORDERS
Robert R. Strang

The term “plea bargaining”has become a label often used to describe a series of disparate
mechanisms to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate criminal liability. For some, plea bargaining is
the indispensable tool to address criminal conduct,while for others it has become a symbol of coercion
and injustice. The purpose of this Article will be to distinguish the very different mechanisms that areoften grouped under the plea bargaining concept,to examine their key characteristics,and to analyze
some of the benefits and costs that come with each approach.

I. PLEA BARGAINING
From the payment of wergeld to the victimʼ
s family by the accused among Germanic tribes inRoman times, the consensual resolution of criminal liability is an ancient practice. Today, different
forms of plea bargaining practices are growing around the world. Jurisdictions from both theadversarial and the inquisitorial traditions provide alternatives to the full criminal trial.
At its essence,the plea bargain is an admission ofguilt in return for,or in hope of,a shorter sentenceor alternative disposition. It does not necessarily require cooperation, just acceptance of personal
responsibility in return for mercy. While plea bargaining is sometimes thought of as an innovation of
the United States and contrary to the search for the truth obtained during a full trial and the principleof legality (mandatory, rather than discretionary, prosecution decisions)observed by civil traditions,consensual resolution and abbreviated trial procedures in criminal cases follow a long tradition
existing in both common law and civil law jurisdictions.
Plea bargaining can serve multiple purposes. The expedited procedures allow for more efficient
resolution of cases,which promotes judicial and prosecutorial efficiency. As full blown trial with thefull panoplyofrights takes substantial judicial resources,manycountries have adopted plea bargaining
to reduce court congestion. The consensual resolution of simpler or minor offenses is seen as needed
to ensure that the right to a speedy trial in more serious cases can be protected.
There are additional motivations for adopting plea bargaining. Trials are inherently uncertain;insome countries, prosecutors see plea bargaining as a way to ensure that defendants who they believe
have engaged in criminal activity receive some punishment, even if the length of sentence is reduced.
In addition,in cases where witnesses have been traumatized by the underlying criminal activity,a plea
bargain allows the victims to avoid having to face the very same individuals who harmed them. In
cases where investigative or other confidential information (or possibly illegal investigative action)is
involved, a plea bargain may avoid the need to disclose such information during a public trial.
Finally,a plea bargain can be seen as serving a valuable penological purpose. Defendants in mostplea bargains must acknowledge their own guilt in open court. Such public acceptance ofresponsibility
can be an important first step on the defendantʼ
s road to rehabilitation. In the context of international
criminal tribunals and crimes against humanity, such acceptance of responsibility may have evenlarger societal benefits as a step toward national or international reconciliation.
There is a variety of plea bargaining and other consensual resolution systems employed in different
Resident Legal Advisor to the Philippines, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training(OPDAT), United States Department of Justice.

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jurisdictions. The particular approach adopted reflects past historical experience, different legal
cultures, distinct criminal systems, and particular motivations for change.1
In countries with civil law traditions where plea bargaining was not historically considered
acceptable, the diversion of minor criminal offenses where the punishment did not involve detention
was still considered appropriate.There is the possibility of bargaining by the parties in such cases,but
without the possibility of imprisonment,such bargaining is not seen as unduly coercive to the accused.
Depending on the system,a confession may be required. In other countries,judges are not involved in
the diversion.
Another form of consensual resolution of cases is victim accused reconciliation. This approach,which has always existed in traditional criminal justice systems,is enjoying an intellectual renaissanceelsewhere under the concept of “
restorative justice”. Typically involving some type of payment fromthe accused to the victim or the victimʼ
s family, this type of victim-centered resolution is more often
applied where the injury is of a more private nature, such as petty assaults, and for offenses where
private prosecutors on behalf of the victim,rather than public prosecutors of the state,were empowered to bring charges. It often involves direct bargaining to reach a compromise between the accused andthe victimʼ
s representatives and therefore is seen as not violating the civil law “principle of legality”
as it exists outside the framework of state prosecution. Such reconciliation is seen as a tool to restore
community peace and avoid ongoing blood feuds. It faces criticism, however, because it can permit
particularly wealthy and powerful defendants to avoid criminal liability.
Pioneered in Prussia in the nineteenth century, penal orders are another form of consensual
resolution of cases.2 Prosecutors offer defendants a specific punishment on a take it or leave it basis
prior to the initiation of criminal proceedings, although in some countries additional bargaining
remains a possibility. Penal orders face criticism as they are often implemented without the assistanceof defense counsel or judicial oversight.
Other countries, such as Italy and Russia, provide for a fixed statutory discount, typically a one
third reduction in sentence,for agreeing to plead guilty and forego a criminal trial. Some jurisdictions
have limited this option to more minor cases, although once a legal system begins to experience thesignificant reduction in caseload, the range of cases often has been statutorily expanded.3 Somecountries such as France set a minimum discount of one third, but judges remain free to sentence
defendants to shorter term,while in other jurisdictions there is a maximum discount,such as in Croatia
which limits the actual sentence to at most two thirds of the sentence provided by statute. Admissionof guilt is not always a prerequisite ― sometimes a plea of nolo contendere,such as in Spain and Italy,
is sufficient. As the sentence reduction is determined by statute,there is little bargaining. In jurisdictions where there is a high degree of corruption, such a statutorily-determined plea bargain system
reduces a suspicious publicʼ
s perception that a plea agreement was arrived at corruptly.
Yet other countries,such as Bulgaria and Argentina,still have a trial,but use expedited procedures.
The defendant agrees to a trial on the investigative file, waiving some procedural rights to confront
witnesses,for example,in return for a lighter punishment. Such forms of abbreviated trials may help
with court congestion, but do less to contribute to reconciliation as the defendant does not admit hisor her guilt and can even be acquitted.
On the far end of spectrum is the U.S. system of plea bargaining, where all cases are subject to
1A comprehensive description with specific citations of the different approaches to plea bargaining throughout the worldis contained in Stephen C. Thaman, Plea-Bargaining, Negotiating Confessions and Consensual Resolution of Criminal
Cases, Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 11.3 (Dec. 2007).
2D. T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining in Japan, in M . M. Feeley & S. Miyazawa (eds.), The Japanese Adversary System inContext 142-45 (2002). There is some academic dispute as to whether plea bargaining exists in Japan ― some observethat the apparent fact that a Japanese defendant in pretrial custody who admits to his crime is often then released andlater sentenced to time served is a form of plea bargaining.
3For example, in 2001, Russia first introduced plea bargaining for cases involving punishment less than five years, andthen expanded it to ten years only two years later. Similarly,in Italy,the system expanded plea bargaining from cases
punishable by three yearsʼimprisonment to those punishable by five.

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bargaining both over the charges and the punishment. Given the wide range of punishment for specificoffenses,some critics see the plea bargaining system in the U.S.--which has grown from approximately
half of all U.S. criminal cases in the 1920s to around ninety-five percent of criminal cases today --ashighly coercive. Even within such a system, there are potential protections, including increased
discovery to the defense prior to the guilty plea,procedural safeguards to the defendant at the time ofplea,and judicial control over sentencing. In federal U.S.prosecutions,the plea bargain is memorialized in a written agreement where the benefits of leniency in return for the guilty plea are defined
through the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which provide for a specific reduction of the defendantʼ
s applicable offense level, and corresponding sentence range, in return for such “
acceptance of
responsibility.”
There has been a significant wave of expansion in the growth of plea bargaining mechanisms
throughout the world. Beginning twenty-five years ago with the introduction of the patteggiamento in
Italy, countries in the former Soviet Union,South America,Europe,and elsewhere have adopted new
systems of consensual resolution of cases. These laws more than changed the law books; plea
bargaining has rapidly been used to resolve an increasingly significant portion (often more than fifty
percent in some countries)of new criminal cases.
This increase in the spread of plea bargaining has not been without its critics. Adversarial systems
more readily adopt plea bargaining,finding that if the adversarial parties reach agreement,no trial isneeded. Civil law countries hold closer to the idea of the search for the material truth,and therefore
legal commentators believed that such plea bargains prevent that truth from being found. Many critics
believe that the absence of equality of arms during the investigative stage makes plea bargaining
inherently unfair, while others believe that lack of procedural and substantive protections to theaccused during the plea bargaining process and the overall lack of judicial supervision increase thepossibility that the innocent will increasingly be coerced into pleading guilty to avoid potentiallydraconian punishment if they go to trial. Some commentators lament the introduction of plea
bargaining as part of an “Americanization”of criminal procedures,without appropriate considerationof whether such “transplanted”ideas are appropriate within the existing traditions of the receiving
country.4 Others see plea bargaining as a return to the show trials of the past, while a few see theprocess of plea bargaining to obtain confessions of guilt as almost the modern form of torture.5
With the expansion of different forms of consensual case resolution expanding to many civil law
jurisdictions, it appears that plea bargaining, in whatever form, is likely to continue. Whatever
particular form that prevails,it would seem that some protections,such as providing the accused somebasic understanding of the evidence against them, as well as ensuring that any plea is knowing,
intelligent,and supported by a factual basis through a judicially-controlled process with the participation of a defense attorney are emerging as potential international “best practices”.

II. COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
By comparison to traditional plea agreements,cooperation agreements are investigatorytools. The
cooperating defendantʼ
s admission of personal guilt is not the primary goal;the point is to use thiscooperating defendant,proactively or historically,to develop evidence to prosecute other individuals,
usually co-conspirators. Often seen proverbially as using “
the little fish to catch the big fish,”in somejurisdictions, such as the U.S., it can involve using the big fish to catch some of the little ones too.
The use of witnesses, sometimes called “crown witnesses,”6 who themselves are participants in

4See, e.g., M. Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations:The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and theAmericanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, Harv. Intʼl L. J. 1 (2004);Cynthia J. Alkon, Plea Bargaining as a Legal
Transplant, A Good Idea for Troubled Criminal Justice Systems, 19 Transnatʼ
l L. & Contemp. Problems 356 (2010.
5J. H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3 (1978).
6In this Article,such witnesses with their own criminal exposure will be referred to as cooperating defendants when suchdefendants face criminal prosecution for their own conduct, and immunized witnesses when excused from criminal
prosecution. Often provisions for such cooperating witnesses are contained in newer witness protection laws,rather thanin the traditional criminal procedure.

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criminal activity is an increasingly accepted international practice. For example, Article 37 of theUnited Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)provides:
1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to encourage persons who participate or who
have participated in the commission ofan offence established in accordance with this Convention
to supply information useful to competent authorities for investigative and evidentiary purposes
and to provide factual, specific help to competent authorities that may contribute to depriving
offenders of the proceeds of crime and to recovering such proceeds.
2. Each State Party shall consider providing for the possibility,in appropriate cases,of mitigating
punishment of an accused person who provides substantial cooperation in the investigation orprosecution of an offence established in accordance with this Convention.7
The driving motivation for the use of cooperating defendants is the need to combat organizedcriminal groups more effectively. Often operating under a code of silence, these criminal enterprises
are tightly knit and hierarchical. The criminal bosses are often several steps removed from thestreet-level criminal activity,making their criminal prosecution without the cooperation of lower-levelparticipants unrealistic.
In a case where multiple defendants are arrested,the accused might collectively benefit by remaining silent, but each knows that if one of the other defendants cooperates in the hopes of obtaining
leniency, they might be left behind if they hold out. This “prisonerʼs dilemma”encourages eachdefendant to consider pursuing cooperation at the earliest moment in the hopes of moving into thecooperating defendant status as quickly as possible before other defendants pursue that option and thedoor is closed.
While the concept of using cooperating defendants is straightforward,the mechanics can be trickier.
Cooperation can take place at different stages of the case. Cooperation with the police, particularly
at the time of the arrest or when the investigation first becomes known to that individual can be of
substantial value as the cooperating defendant may be able to surreptitiously elicit incriminatingstatements from co-defendants prior to their learning that the cooperating defendant has been arrested
and before the co-defendants have obtained counsel. Such proactive cooperation can also be extended
to cooperation in other unrelated cases,where the cooperating defendantʼ
s knowledge of how particular criminal activity transpires, such as in the narcotics area,makes them potentially ideal to engage
in controlled purchases.8
While such early cooperation can be of particular benefit to the investigation,in the U.S.,only theprosecutor can formally move a defendant into the cooperating status. An investigator may promisea defendant that they can bring the cooperation of the defendant to the attention of the prosecutor,butthey lack the legal capacity to do so unilaterally.9
Naturally defendants approach the idea of cooperation with trepidation. There is of course thephysical danger that cooperation may place them or their family in for betraying their former partners
in crime. Witness protection can help address this problem to varying degrees. Indeed,most individuals in the United States M arshals Serviceʼs “Federal Witness Protection Program”are criminal
defendants who are cooperating against their co-conspirators, not innocent citizens who happened to
7Article 26 of the United Nationʼ
s Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) provides similar

encouragement.
8Proactive cooperation can potentially take place throughout the process or even after the trial, although its potential
for success substantially diminishes over time and such street work may raise problematic bail and liability issues
particularly for violent criminals once a cooperating defendant has been charged or after s/he pleads guilty. As time
passes from the moment for arrest, historical cooperation in the form of information and testimony regarding pastcriminal activities become more the normal form of cooperation.
9 In many jurisdictions around the world, the police may offer to “look the other way”regarding a defendantʼs criminal
exposure and never bring that activity to the attention of prosecutors in return for information on the criminal activitiesof others. Such “
informal”cooperation arrangements are more similar to immunization as the criminal informant will
not face any criminal prosecution, although s/he will lack the legal protections of a formally immunized witness.

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witness criminal activity.10
In addition,the process of cooperation can be a complicated. Seeking to cooperate,the accused may
have to waive his or her right against self-incrimination and admit guilt prior to knowing whether the
proposed cooperation will ultimately be accepted by the prosecutor and they will receive the benefitsof cooperation. Some defendants may face such overwhelming evidence of their guilt that confession
without any form of limitation against its future use may be their only option. For others, the U.S.
prosecutor offers a “proffer agreement”a short term written agreement to govern a meeting between
the defendant,the defense attorney,the prosecutor and law enforcement agent at which the defendants
can offer his or her potential cooperation to law enforcement law enforcement without those admissions being directly usable against the defendant in court so long as their statement are truthful.
Indeed,in some jurisdictions,the potential cooperating witness must not only admit their culpability to
the crime under investigation, but also must describe their entire past criminal history to allow theprosecutor to evaluate them as a potential trial witness, thereby increasing their potential criminal
exposure if their cooperation does not work out.
In some countries,such cooperation in return for leniency can only be offered to the least culpabledefendant. In the U.S.,it is not so limited based on the idea that since the cooperating defendant will
still be pleading guilty, they will face punishment consistent with their role in the criminal activity,
minus whatever reduction their cooperation earns them. Thus,serious criminals are not getting a “freepass”for their cooperation, but rather only a reduction.
If the potential cooperation looks promising,the U.S.prosecutor then negotiates a written cooperation agreement with defense counsel which provides that the defendant will plead guilty to specificcriminal charges and provide cooperation under the direction of law enforcement. In return, theprosecution agrees that should the defendantʼ
s cooperation be determined to be both truthful and11 the prosecutor will submit a motion to the defendantʼ“substantial,”s sentencing judge detailing thecooperation and attendant circumstances. While the paradigmatic form of cooperation is testimony
against co-conspirators, cooperation can come in different forms: in could be both proactive andhistorical,testimony and information (particularly if that intelligence or possibility of testimony led toguilty pleas of co-defendants), and could apply to cases before that court or in a court in a different
jurisdiction, including a different country.
At trial,the cooperating defendant may be in an unusual procedural posture. In some jurisdictions,such as Russia,the defendant remains part of the same case as the defendants against which s/he will
testify. This causes some concern, when the defense attorneys for the remaining defendants seek todiscredit the cooperating defendant and the court criticizes them for playing the role of prosecutor. In
the U.S., by contrast, severance is the approach. The cooperating defendant separately pleads guilty
earlier in a separate and generally closed courtroom proceeding, and then testifies against the coconspirators as a government witness. While the cooperating defendant has pled guilty prior to
testifying against their co-conspirators, they typically have not yet been sentenced, allowing theprosecutor and later the judge an opportunity to assess their full cooperation before determining what
reduction in sentence,if any,their cooperation has earned.12 Thus the U.S.prosecutor must determine
whether the cooperating defendant will prove to be a productive witness and sufficiently corroborated
by other evidence despite the fact that they will be aggressively cross-examined by the remaining
defendants regarding the cooperation agreement that they have entered into with the government andtheir motivation to blame their co-defendants in an effort to gain the favor of the prosecutor in orderto receive a reduced sentence.
Under the U.S. system, the judge maintains discretion over the sentencing of the cooperating
defendant. The United States Sentencing Guidelines gives the sentencing judge the authority to reduce
the sentence of the cooperating defendant as follows:
10 Robert E. Courtney III, Insiders as Cooperating Witnesses: Overcoming Fear and Offering Hope (2010).
11 As noted above, the UNCAC also makes use of the “substantial”standard to measure cooperation.
12 Rule 35 of the U.S. Rules of Criminal Procedure permits postsentencing reductions under limited circumstances, somost cooperating defendants hope to have their sentencing delayed while they cooperate.

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5K1.1. Substantial Assistance to Authorities Upon motion of the government stating that thedefendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution ofanother person who
has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.
(a)The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include,
but are not limited to, consideration of the following:(1)the courtʼ
s evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendantʼ
s assistance,taking
into consideration the governmentʼs evaluation of the assistance rendered;(2)the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by
the defendant;(3)the nature and extent of the defendantʼ
s assistance;(4)any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting
from his assistance;(5)the timeliness of the defendantʼ
s assistance.13

III. IMMUNITY ORDERS
Immunized witnesses are a close cousin of the cooperating defendant, but for the immunizedwitness, the result is even better. So long as they provide truthful testimony, they typically face nocriminal liability at all.
There are two broad categories of immunity. First a witness could receive the broader “transactional immunity”, which precludes the Government from prosecuting a witness for any offense (or“transaction”) related to their compelled testimony. Alternatively, a witness could receive “useimmunity,”which precludes the Government from using,directly or indirectly,the witnessʼcompelled
testimony in a later prosecution of that witness. As a practical matter,the limitations on indirect useof compelled testimony make use immunity the near functional equivalent of transactional immunity.
The concept of immunity enjoys some international sanction. Section 37(3)of the UNCAC specifically encourages the state parties to consider such provisions:
Each State Party shall consider providing for the possibility, in accordance with fundamental
principles of its domestic law,of granting immunity from prosecution to a person who provides
substantial cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of an offence established in accordance with this Convention.14
Given that the immunized witness receives immunity from prosecution, in many countries, theimmunized witness is limited to the individual in the conspiracy with the least culpability.
Why provide such an attractive offer to the witness? Generally speaking, there are two reasons.
The first is that the witness has a minor role with little criminal exposure,but until the threat of that
limited exposure is legally removed,the witness can still exercise their right against self-incrimination
to testify. In order to secure their testimony,an immunity order or a non-prosecution agreement15 canbe negotiated removing the possibility that their testimony can be used directly or indirectly againstthem so long as it is truthful (perjury by a witness following the grant of immunity still remains a basis
for criminal liability). This tool can be particularly useful in the area of corporate criminal liability,
13 See United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines M anual (Nov. 2012).
14 Similarly, Article 26(3)of the UNTOC provides similar encouragement.
15 Immunity orders and nonprosecution agreements serve the same purpose,but are slightlydifferent in form and process.

An immunity order is entered before the court whereas a non-prosecution agreement is an agreement, much a plea
agreement, between the prosecutor and witness.

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where lower-level employees engage in criminal activity at the instruction and for the benefit of senior
management.
The second type of immunized witness is where there is suspicion of serious wrongdoing by thewitness but insufficient evidence against them in order to pressure him or her to be a cooperating
defendant. Therefore, the offer of immunity is the only means to gather sufficient evidence in orderto bring a criminal case against the co-defendants. Indeed, if all the co-defendants could enforce anagreement to remain collectively silent, there might be no criminal convictions at all. At least in the
U.S.,the grant of immunity allows the government to compel testimony from a defendant,like it could
from any other person under its jurisdiction, because the right against self-incrimination no longer
exists when the possibility of criminal prosecution against the testifying witness has been removed.
This second category of immunized witness presents a more significant problem ― a potentially verysignificant criminal may be avoiding prosecution and the prosecutor may not have a full sense of theircriminal exposure. The general public may be outraged that an admittedly guilty individual is facing
no criminal sanctions at all because theyreceived immunity. It is therefore more ofa tool oflast resort.
Because immunity will generally allow a guilty person to avoid criminal liability,there need to beadequate safeguards to ensure that it is not misused. In the U.S.federal system,the grant of immunity
can only be obtained from a centralized office, the Department of Justiceʼs Office of Enforcement
Operations,to ensure that the grants of immunity are used only in appropriate cases and to ensure thatone prosecuting office does not inadvertently grant immunity to a witness who was subject to an active
criminal investigation in another office without proper consultation.
As a result of these concerns, immunity must be granted only after careful deliberation. Some
criteria in making this decision could include:a. The seriousness of the offense,and the importance of the case in achieving effective enforcementof the criminal laws;b. The value of the potential witnessʼtestimony or information to the investigation or prosecution;c. The likelihood of the witness providing useful testimony;d. The personʼ
s culpability relative to other possible defendants;
e. The possibility of successfully prosecuting the witness without immunizing him;andf. The possibility of adverse harm to the witness if he testifies pursuant to a compulsion order.
While thought of as primarily a tool in criminal prosecutions, immunity can be used outside thecriminal law context. For example, under U.S. law, an immunity order is potentially available:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify orprovide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to―(1)a court or grand jury of the United States,(2)an agency of the United States, or(3)either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee or a
subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under
this title, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination;but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (orany information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)may
be used against the witness in any criminal case,except a prosecution for perjury,giving a false

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statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.”16
In short, the grant of immunity is a significant tool in investigating criminal enterprises. Becauseof the substantial concern in allowing the truly guilty to go free, it must be used carefully.

16 Title 18, United States Code, Section 6002.

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