PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS

CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO CORRUPTION: A CASE STUDY OF
SIERRA LEONE’S LEGAL REGIME FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
IN COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL CORRUPTION
Amara Lansana, Esq.*

I. INTRODUCTION
The fight against corruption in Sierra Leone has been one of the fiercest in Africa in recent years,
especially from 2018 to date. With visionary leadership and the requisite political will, Sierra Leone has
succeeded in crafting a legal regime with a view to combating corruption in ways that will make corruption
a non-profitable venture. The current gains in the fight against corruption in Sierra Leone have been recorded
in both regional and international corruption perception indexes such as those published by Transparency
Internal1 and Afrobarometer.2
However, in leading the fight against corruption, we are also aware of the fact that Sierra Leone is partof the global village where transnational law enforcement cooperation is critical to ensuring that perpetratorsof transnational crimes, especially economic crimes, do not avoid investigations and escape justice. This is
why Sierra Leone has tailored its laws in ways that give effect to some of the key articles in Chapter Fourof the United Nations Convention against Corruption dealing with combating transnational corruption andmoney-laundering offences. Part Seven of the Sierra Leone Anti-Corruption Act,3 as amended,4 creates a legal
regime that provides an opportunity for mutual legal assistance between Sierra Leone and its counterparts
across the globe. There is a sufficient legal framework for international cooperation and assistance throughthe formal channels. This cooperation broadly covers freezing, seizure, extradition, locating persons, enforcing
a final order of a foreign jurisdiction and other proceedings on criminal matters. Sierra Leone also engages
in other forms of international cooperation with foreign counterparts.

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AMONG STATE
INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Section 103 of the Anti-Corruption Act5 (as amended) provides as follows:
Subject to section 108, where a foreign State makes a request for assistance in the investigationor prosecution of a corruption offence, the Commissioner shall, after consultation with the
Minister responsible for Foreign Affairs and the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice(a) execute the request; or(b) inform the foreign State making the request of any reason(i) for not executing the request forthwith; or(ii) for delaying the execution of the request.

* State Counsel, Civil and Commercial Division, Office of the Attorney-General and Ministry of Justice, Sierra Leone.
1
https://anticorruption.gov.sl/blog/anti-corruption-commission-sl-news-room-1/post/sierra-leone-again-jumps-high-intransparency-internationals-corruption-perception-index-cpi-2022-962
2https://www.anticorruption.gov.sl/blog/anti-corruption-commission-sl-news-room-1?date_begin=2019-0701+00%3A00%3A00&date_end=2019-08-01+00%3A00%3A00
3
Act No. 12 of 2008.
4
Amended in 2019.
5
Ibid.

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Similarly, Section 109 (1) states that:[T]he Commissioner may, after consultation with the Minister responsible for Foreign Affairs
and the Attorney- General and Minister of Justice, make a request to a foreign State(a) which he considers may be able to provide evidence or information relating to a corruption offence;or(b) for the freezing and forfeiture of property located in that State and which is liable to be forfeitedby reason of it being the proceeds of a corruption offence.
As clearly seen in Sections 103 and 109 of the Anti-Corruption Act,6 the Commissioner of the AntiCorruption Commission, working in consultation with both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation and the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, can receive and act upon a request forassistance in the investigations or prosecution of a corruption offence that has a transnational connotation or
implication, and he can also make the same request for assistance where necessary. However, Section 108
provides that the Commissioner may refuse to comply with a request from another State if the request iscontrary to the Constitution of Sierra Leone or it is likely to prejudice national interest, or where the grounds
for refusing to comply with such a request as provided under the laws of the requesting State are substantiallydifferent in terms of constitutionality and national interest considerations. Similar international cooperationin the forms of legal mechanisms are also provided in Sections 100 to 104 of the Anti-Money Laundering andCombatting of Terrorism Act.7
A legal provision in our legal regime that is central to issues of mutual legal assistance and international
cooperation in Sierra Leone’s fight against corruption is Section 137 of the Anti-Corruption Act8 (as amended)
which criminalizes acts of corruption committed in a foreign State. It provides as follows: “Conduct by acitizen of Sierra Leone that takes place outside Sierra Leone constitutes an offence under this Act if the
conduct would constitute an offence under this Act if it took place in Sierra Leone.”
Sierra Leone is generally poised to respond to formal requests for combating transnational corruption andinterdicting the corrupt from benefiting from the proceeds of crime. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs andInternational Cooperation (MOFA) is the central authority for processing international cooperation andextradition requests. The MOFA transmits the requests to Attorney General’s Office at the AttorneyGeneral and Ministry of Justice, where the International Division at the Attorney General’s Office thenreviews and transfers the requests to the appropriate authority for processing. Even though in recent years,
Sierra Leone has received a limited number of enforcement cooperation, mutual legal assistance andextradition requests, issues and requests involving effective transnational cooperation are treated withutmost importance.

III. CASE STUDIES OF TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION
Sierra Leone, over the years, has had a limited number of enforcements both as a requesting State orotherwise. The key factor to this limited number of enforcements was essentially the absence of a legal
framework upon which enforcing institutions could rely. In practice, however, extradition requests, forexample, are channelled through diplomatic channels (MOFA9) and forwarded to the Attorney-General and
Minister of Justice. The Attorney-General is able to give effect to extradition requests from commonwealthcountries or other foreign States, and the length of the process will depend on how soon the fugitive criminal
is found. Sierra Leone is also in a position to provide uncomplicated extradition on the basis of the Agreement
on Cooperation on Criminal Matters between the Police of member States of Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), which permits the handing over of suspects or fugitives to another member statebased on warrants of arrest or court judgments. The Interpol Sierra Leone had collaborated with member
states on a number of occasions and have executed arrest warrants efficiently and speedily.
6

Supra, notes 3 and 4.
Act No.2 of 2012.
8
Act No 12 of 2008.
9
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.
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For example, one of the extradition cases was in connection with tax fraud between 2016 and 2017. On
12 October 2016, correspondence was received from the Embassy of the United States of America in
Freetown in respect of an Interpol Red Notice issued against fugitive MBT, an American National of Sierra
Leone origin wanted for participating in a tax fraud scheme by filing fictitious tax returns and defrauding
the Internal Revenue Services of the US as an employee at X Financial Services, a tax preparation businessowned by one of the conspirators. On 3 November 2016, a team of personnel of NCB-Freetown located andarrested fugitive MBT. On 10 March 2017, extradition proceedings commenced at the High Court, Sierra
Leone, and an order was granted to extradite the fugitive to Pennsylvania in the United States of America.
NCB-Freetown successfully conveyed the fugitive to US special agents for the purpose of conveying the
fugitive to the United States.
Within the region, similar cooperation was seen in State v Solomon Katta and Others. The facts are that
the National Revenue Authority’s (NRA) cheques were converted and sent to the Katta Account. Seven
persons were indicted and one of them, Elizabeth King, a dual citizen, absconded to the Gambia. A red alert
was placed on her. She was spotted in the Gambia. A letter was sent to Interpol and attached to the letter
were, to wit: The indictment and warrant of arrest. Through networking with Interpol and the Gambia
authorities, she was arrested and handed over to the ACC in Sierra Leone. She was eventually tried andconvicted.
Another example is also seen in the recent EAP (a Company) case which involved a Nigerian withdifferent pseudonyms. He had been convicted of corruption in Nigeria but fled to Sierra Leone as a businessman
and investor in real estate. Properties were transferred to his name and monies were paid to his account bypeople in Sierra Leone who were interested in purchasing houses from his company. His criminal enterprise
was eventually exposed and investigated by the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission sent a request to our Anti-Corruption Commission for his extradition. The Sierra Leone
Anti-Corruption Commission investigated the matter with a view to prosecute, but the outcome of theinvestigations revealed that the transaction between the EAP company and the individuals concerned were
purely private arrangements that were not within the mandate of the Commission. The matter was eventually
forwarded to the Sierra Leone Police for necessary actions to be taken.  The matter is presently under police
custody. But something interesting and revealing about this case is that the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission of Nigeria requested extradition and even submitted a judgment to the ACC. The said judgment
was delivered in Nigeria, but the name on the judgement was not the name on the Sierra Leonean passport
he was carrying – Olufumulade Adeyeme was the name on passport. In fact, initially, his status as a Nigerian
was only on the internet until when the EFCC intervened. Investigation is ongoing.

IV. CHALLENGES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Sierra Leone is generally leveraging international networks such as the Asset Recovery Inter-Agency
Network for West Africa (ARINWA), the West African Network of Central Authorities and Prosecutors(WACAP) and various arrangements with foreign counterparts to facilitate international cooperation. Most
African states, Sierra Leone inclusive, have domesticated UNCAC, but mutual legal assistance has not been
operative especially in circumstances where African states make requests to the West. Where it involves a
non-African, compliance with mutual legal assistance becomes extremely difficult and, in most cases,
impossible. Take for instance a pending case in the High Court of Sierra Leone touching and concerning theSierra Leone’s Chancery Building in the United States. The contractor for the said renovation is an American.
A whooping sum of Four Million dollars amounting to 85 per cent of the contract price was paid, and notmuch was done with regards the renovation, and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) wants to know if
the Government lost money. The matter is ongoing and the American contractor is being tried in absentia.
As recently as in April instant, there was a locus visit, and the American contractor was invited, but failed
and/or neglected to honour the invitation. Most cooperation seems to exist only in legislation, but it has notbeen effectively utilized, and where it has been, it is mostly on the basis of reciprocity or comity.
Quite obviously, collaboration between and among state institutions has not been equally effective. This
makes prosecutorial processes cumbersome. There is too much bureaucracy in the process of ascertaining
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evidence, and where collaboration is impeded, the quick flow of justice is hindered. In instances where
evidence is obtained informally, its admissibility becomes questionable. In most cases, law enforcement
institutions like the police, Law Officers’ Department, FIU,10 ACC,11 etc. will commence investigations andhalf-way through, they make a referral especially with cases not within their remits, as happened in the
Nigerian’s case, supra. Where these cases are transferred, investigations are mostly commenced afresh,
thereby prolonging prosecutorial procedures. It is also expected that where collaboration is required,classified documents ought to be transferred on demand and on time, but this is mostly not the case.
With extradition, it becomes more complex to observe mutual assistance. This is so because extradition
comes with its own laws. That apart, every country has its own format for mutual legal assistance even
where the procedure is formally complied with, especially from the West. Quite recently, the Polish
Government requested the consent of the Sierra Leone Government to cross-examine a Polish national
through videoconference. When asked about the nature of the offence committed, they responded a year
later with a request for extradition.
Non-compliance with formality in the application for administrative assistance is another bottleneck.
Connections among investigating institutions are mostly established on personal networks, which are built
in conferences, seminars, etc. It is observed that requests among these institutions for international
cooperation and exchanges among the heads of these institutions are mostly informal: Sometimes throughphone calls by the head of the requesting State to his/her counterpart. The short- and long-term implications,
respectively, are thus: It is difficult to trace among these institutions official correspondence requesting
mutual legal assistance. Over and above this, when once the head of one institution is replaced, cooperation
becomes moribund because it was one built on personal basis – between friends – and not institutions.
Arguably, the practice tends to yield more dividends and seems to be faster and more civil/friendly in termsof obtaining information or documents, but the downside of it is that, adducing such evidence becomes
contentious when its admissibility is challenged.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE CURRENT
COOPERATION FRAMEWORKInternational cooperation the world over has its challenges, and these challenges are more conspicuous indeveloping countries. For instance, among the bottlenecks for international cooperation in developing statesis lack of experienced personnel with the requisite networks and tools to facilitate the global fight against
corruption. This could best be tackled by creating opportunities that can capacitate young and brilliant
minds from developing countries. A case in point is this sort of training provided by JICA. Developing states
in turn have to open their doors and make use of these opportunities. Quite recently, a similar opportunity
has availed itself to the Commissioner of the Anti-Corruption Commission, a young fellow in his late thirties.
He has been offered a huge scholarship package to pursue an LLM at Harvard Law School. We are hopefulthat he will be empowered with connections and the tools in combating corruption globally. We are forward
looking, as JICA’s international cooperation trajectory to the rest of the world, and especially Sierra Leone,
gives a beacon of hope.

VI. CONCLUSION
Sierra Leone is poised to fight corruption fiercely, and it is a fight we must win in collaboration with therest of the world. Over the years, we have struggled with the legal frameworks and law enforcement
institutions. Thankfully, the stage is now set with appropriate legal tools, institutions and the like. Ourcontemporary challenge in the fight against corruption is insufficient; experienced personnel with the required
tools and connections are needed to fight corruption at the global stage. It is imperative, therefore, that we
extend our quest to international cooperation thereby exploring the opportunities made available by countries
10
11

Financial Intelligent Unit.
Anti-Corruption Commission.

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considered to be the paradigm in the successful fight against corruption. In the light of this, I consider thisprogramme to be timely and I am hopeful of making the best out of it.

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