Bureau of Industry and Security Compliance Note:

Trends in Voluntary Self-Disclosures Related to Academia to Inform Improvements
to Export Compliance Plans
The Bureau of Industry and Security is dedicated to partnering with U.S. academic research
institutions, both to protect national security and to help maintain U.S. leadership in innovation andcollaboration. On June 28, 2022, Export Enforcement established the Academic Outreach Initiative tohelp academic institutions protect themselves from overseas threats and protect the security of theirresearch. As part of this initiative, Export Enforcement has strongly encouraged Voluntary SelfDisclosures (VSDs) from academic institutions that believe that they may have violated the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR).
To better support academia’s compliance efforts, Export Enforcement provides the following
observations on the nature and type of conduct amounting to violations of the export control laws thathave been disclosed by academic institutions over the past ten years.
Biohazards•Conduct: At least a dozen self-disclosures involved the unauthorized export of chemicals,
microorganisms, and toxins, including vials or small quantities of biological agents such as
Dengue-2 virus; and pathogens such as pseudorabies virus strains, genetically modified
vesicular stomatitis virus, and isolates of Magnaporthe oryzae.

•Analysis: Much of this conduct occurred due to a lack of knowledge about the specificrequirements for exporting small samples or vials of hazardous biological materials.
Confusion over the classification of these items under the Commerce Control List (Part 774 ofthe EAR) (CCL) and misunderstanding of the export control requirements often contributed tothese violations.

•Remedial Actions: Institutions have implemented more rigorous training programs forresearchers and administrative staff on export control regulations, including clear guidelines
on handling and exporting biohazardous materials. Universities have also enactedorganizational changes, such as establishing new offices and working groups to administer
export compliance programs as well as increased export compliance staff and resources.
Additionally, enhanced tracking and documentation processes have been established to ensurecompliance with EAR requirements.

Entity List•1

Conduct: At least nine self-disclosures involved the unauthorized export of items to a party
listed on the Entity List. Some of the transactions involved genetic material and geneticallymodified organisms, while one transaction involved the element hafnium, which is commonlyused in nuclear reactor control rods.

August 2024•Analysis: This conduct often stemmed from a lack of awareness or confusion regarding theEntity List and the specific restrictions placed on listed organizations. Incorrect screening
procedures, such as not screening all parties to a transaction (i.e., purchaser, intermediate
consignee, ultimate consignee, and end user) and not re-screening transaction parties prior toshipment of items (e.g., only screening upon receipt of purchase order but not rescreening
prior to shipment when it is possible that the Consolidated Screening List (CSL) has been
updated in the interim) also resulted in export transactions with persons named on the Entity
List.

•

Remedial Actions: Universities have taken steps to improve their screening processes forinternational collaborations and shipments (both tangible and intangible), such as regular
updates to their internal restricted party screening lists, requiring screening against the CSL atevery step in the procurement process, including at time of export, and more thorough vettingof all parties to a transaction. Institutions also began using additional export compliancesoftware to improve screening.

Deemed Exports•

Conduct: At least nine self-disclosures involved the unauthorized release of EAR-controlled
technology to foreign national employees or students. These instances included technology
related to electronics, telecommunications and information systems, and aerospace andpropulsion. Four of the cases involved releasing EAR-controlled technology to Iraniannationals.

•Analysis: Conduct in this category was frequently due to universities’ misunderstanding of
deemed export rules and the requirement to obtain proper authorization before sharing
controlled technology with foreign nationals. A lack of effective internal controls and training
on export compliance also played a role.

•Remedial Actions: Universities have implemented mandatory training programs for staff andstudents involved in research and development. They have also established internal control
systems to track and monitor the access of foreign nationals to controlled technologies.

Temporary Imports, Exports, Reexports, and Transfers (In-Country) (TMP)•Conduct: Two self-disclosures involved exports improperly using license exception TMP,including one that involved infrared cameras that were hand-carried and exported from theUnited States. Among other things, TMP allows for the temporary export and reexport ofvarious items subject to the EAR, as long as the items are returned no later than one year after
export, reexport, or transfer if not consumed or destroyed during the period of authorized use.

•Analysis: The primary issue in these cases was the improper use of license exception TMP,often due to misunderstandings about the conditions and limitations associated with thisexception. For example, universities have failed to submit a license application for anextension beyond the one-year limit of the TMP license exception.

•Remedial Actions: Institutions have clarified and reinforced the guidelines for using TMP
license exceptions, ensuring that staff and researchers understand the specific conditions andlimitations. They have also improved tracking mechanisms for items exported under thislicense exception to ensure proper usage and compliance.

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Electronic Export Information (EEI)•Conduct: Six self-disclosures involved academic institutions that failed to file EEI in theAutomated Export System (AES) and undervalued items related to the export transaction.

•Analysis: Failures in filing EEI often resulted from insufficient knowledge about theregulatory requirements and the technical process for using AES. The absence of detailed
export control procedures and training specific to the universities’ operational needs also led
to incorrect EEI documentation.

•Remedial Actions: Universities have provided additional training on the AES filing
requirements and established more robust internal review procedures to ensure accuratevaluation and reporting of exported items.

Recordkeeping•Conduct: Three self-disclosures involved academic institutions that failed to maintainaccurate export records. Universities have failed to maintain export records for the required
five years, and in other cases, export records were either incomplete or non-existent.

•Analysis: Inadequate recordkeeping practices were generally due to insufficient training onexport regulations and the importance of maintaining comprehensive and accurate records.
Universities often lacked robust systems for tracking and documenting export transactions.

•Remedial Actions: Institutions have implemented better recordkeeping practices, including
the adoption of electronic recordkeeping systems to track export transactions and regularinternal audits to ensure reporting accuracy. They have also provided training to ensure staff
understand the importance of maintaining detailed and accurate export records.

Information about the Bureau of Industry and Security’s VSD policy can be found in Section
764.5 of the EAR, on the Export Enforcement website, or by contacting the Office of Export
Enforcement (OEE) at (202) 482-5036. Disclosures can be submitted electronically toBIS_VSD_INTAKE@bis.doc.gov. Furthermore, any person (i.e., not just a party submitting a VSD)
may notify OEE that a violation has occurred and request permission from the Office of Exporter
Services to engage in otherwise prohibited activities. These disclosures can be made through ourconfidential reporting form. You can also call the Enforcement Hotline at 1-800-424-2980 oremail EELead@bis.doc.gov.

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