Discussion Papers In Economics
And Business

The End of Import-Led Growth? North Korean Evidence

Sumie Sato

Mototsugu Fukushige

Discussion Paper 07-38

Graduate School of Economics andOsaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP)
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPANThe End of Import-Led Growth? North Korean Evidence

Sumie Sato

Mototsugu Fukushige

Discussion Paper 07-38

October 2007

この研究は「大学院経済学研究科・経済学部記念事業」
基金より援助を受けた、記して感謝する。

Graduate School of Economics andOsaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP)
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPANThe End of Import-Led Growth? North Korean Evidence

Sumie Sato
Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University,
1-2, Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku, Kobe, Hyogo, 655-8501, Japan

Mototsugu Fukushige
Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
1-7, Machikaneyama-cho, Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043, Japan

Abstract
In this paper, we investigate causal relationships among exports, imports, and economic
growth in North Korea by using time series data for the period between 1964 and 2004. The
empirical results show that there was Granger causality from imports to GNP in the first half ofthe period. However, there was a causal relationship from GNP to imports in the second half ofthe period. This implies that economic growth stimulates imports in North Korea. The North
Korean economy escaped its import-led growth situation, which some socialist economies had
experienced.
JEL Classification: P27, O11, E10
Keywords: North Korea, import-led growth, export-led growth, causality test.

11. Introduction
Many researchers have conducted studies of the North Korean economy. Comprehensive
analyses have been undertaken by Kimura (1999), Yang (2000), Jeffries (2006), and Eberstadt(2007). Studies of food shortages have been undertaken by Kim, Lee, and Sumner (1998) andNoland, Robinson, and Wang (2000a, 2001). Economic crises have been studied by Lee (1997)and studies of the recent economic reform have been conducted by Noland, Robinson andScatasta (1997), Eberstadt (2001), Lee (2002), Hong (2002), Frank (2005), and Noland (2006).
In addition, studies of the cost of economic integration between North and South Korea include
those of Chang (1997), Lim (1997), and Noland, Robinson, and Wang (2000b). However, moststudies are based on the descriptive statistics of economic data. There are few attempts to apply
econometric analysis to the data. Exceptions are Lim and Kim (2002), who estimated an importdemand function, Kim, Kim, and Lee (2007), who estimated a production function and thenapplied growth accounting to the estimated results, and Jin (2003), who applied time series
analysis to GNP, exports, and imports.
Because of a lack of official statistics, there are few econometric analyses of North Korea.
Researchers are limited to conducting empirical work by using the estimates of macroeconomic
and trade variables produced by the South Korean government and other institutions.
Estimated per capita GNP implies that North Korea is a developing country. North Korea
can be expected to remain in a similar situation to that of other developing countries. In
particular, with regard to economic growth, many developing countries depend on exports,
which gives rise to the ‘export-led growth’ hypothesis.

This problem is not limited todeveloping countries; see, for example, Jin and Yu (1996), Shan and Sun (1999), and Awokuse(2006). However, in most studies, the hypothesis is tested for developing countries. For
example, studies have been conducted for Asian newly industrialized countries by Kwan,
Cotsomitis, and Kwok (1999) and Thangavelu and Rajaguru (2004), for India by Dhawan andBiswal (1999), for Korea by Awokuse (2005), for Taiwan by Kwan, Cotsomitis and Kwok

2

(1996) and Biswal and Dhawan (1998), for China by Shan and Sun (1998b), for Malaysia by
Ghatak, Milner, and Utkulu (1997) and Khalafalla and Webb (2001), for Mexico by Thornton(1996), and for Chile by Siliverstovs and Herzer (2006). The export-led growth hypothesis
implies pursuing policies to promote exports to acquire foreign currency reserves and achieving
economic growth by importing high-technology goods.
Since its independence, North Korea has been run as a socialist country under the leadershipof Kim Il Sung and, following his death, under the leadership of his son, Kim Jong Il. North
Korea is likely to have faced the same economic problems experienced by many socialist
economies. Chen, Jefferson, and Singh (1992) and Woo (1994) have studied empirically thetransition to a market economy. The import-led growth hypothesis advanced by Hanson (1982)
suggests an important source of economic growth. According to the model that generates thishypothesis, a socialist economy first imports capital goods and develops industrial infrastructure,and then promotes economic growth. That is, the amount of capital goods that a socialist
country can import limits its achievable rate of economic growth.
We investigate two hypotheses relating to North Korea’s economic growth: the export-led
growth hypothesis and the import-led growth hypothesis. We use time series techniques to
identify causal relationships among GNP, exports, and imports.1 Following previous studies,
we use annual estimates from the South Korean government, the Korea Development Institute(KDI) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Because of our small sample size, testingfor unit roots and cointegrating relationships is inappropriate. Therefore, we test for Granger
causality between variables. To test for causality, we use the method developed by Toda andYamamoto (1995), which is applicable whether or not there are unit roots or cointegrating

1

Our approach is similar to that of Jin (2003), but he focused on the relationships between economic

openness and economic growth, and did not analyze the export-led or import-led growth hypotheses.
From the methodological viewpoint, his analysis is limited to the standard Granger causality test. Our
approach, proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995), considers the existence of cointegrating relationships.

3relationships between the time series. This procedure has been applied to data on China by
Shan and Sun (1998a) and to data on Greece, India, and other countries by Hatemi-J and
Irandoust (2000).
To summarize our results, having split the sample at 1984 to reflect the pre- and postGorbachev periods in Soviet Russia and the inception of North Korea’s ‘Third Seven Year Plan’in 1987, we found evidence to support the import-led growth hypothesis for the first subperiod,and found that there was a causal relationship from GNP to imports for the second subperiod.
This represents evidence that North Korea no longer depends on import-led growth.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain data sources and definitions. In
Section 3, we conduct our empirical analysis and describe the results of our causality tests. In
Section 4, we summarize the empirical results and discuss limitations.

2. Data
Because there are no data on the consumer price index or the GNP deflator for North Korea,
we analyze nominal data. To investigate causal relationships, we require time series data on
GNP, exports, and imports covering a sufficiently long period. GNP is estimated by the South
Korean government and by the KDI. The former covers the period from 1960 to 2004, and thelatter is available for only 14 years: 1970, 1975, and from 1980 to 1994. Therefore, we use thedata from the South Korean government to lengthen the sample period and thereby facilitate
investigation of the time series properties of the data. For data on exports and imports, we use
estimates produced by the South Korean government, the KDI, and the IMF. South Korean
government estimates are available for the period from 1965 to 2004; KDI estimates areavailable for the period between 1970 and 1994; those produced by the IMF are available for theperiod between 1965 and 2005. Although the period covered by the KDI estimates is too short
to analyze structural change during the sample period, we use these data in the first step as areference point.

4Because there is one set of estimates for GNP and two for exports and imports, we can
combine the GNP estimates and the pairs of estimates for exports and imports to generate
empirical results in three ways. Data sources and sample periods are reported in Table 1.

3. Empirical results
We investigate the causal relationships among GNP, exports, and imports by estimating avector autoregression (VAR) model. Many empirical studies have been used to test the exportled growth hypothesis, but most of them estimate univariate time series models of GNP or a
VAR model of GNP and exports; see, for example, Thornton (1996), Biswal and Dhawan(1998) and Hatemi-J and Irandoust (2000). We estimate a VAR model of GNP, exports, andimports to investigate the export-led and import-led growth hypotheses, as identified
simultaneously by Hanson (1982). Shan and Sun (1998b), Jin and Yu (1996), and Thangavelu
and Rajaguru (2004) used this approach to investigate the export-led growth hypothesis forother countries, but ignored the import-led growth hypothesis.
We apply the causality test proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). This test can be used
to investigate causal relationships whether or not cointegrating relationships exist. This method
uses a standard F-test on the estimated VAR model with additional lags. By ‘additional’ ismeant the correct lag length plus the number of cointegrating relationships. First, we select thelag length of the VAR model by using the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion. Then, we
estimate a VAR model with an additional lag. Table 2 reports the results for lag-length
selection for each combination. Because the optimum lag length is one in every case, in thesecond step we perform causality tests based on models with two lags.
Next, we estimate VAR models by using all the available data and perform the Granger
causality test proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). The test statistics are reported in Table
3, and the corresponding diagrams are reported in Figure 1. We found no evidence of causal
relationships among GNP, exports, and imports when using the KDI data (case (B)) or the IMF

5

data (case (C)). However, we found evidence of causality from imports to GNP when using theSouth Korean government estimates (case (A)). This finding indicates that the North Korean
economy experienced import-led growth as had Soviet Russia, Poland, and Hungary previously.
Using the South Korean government estimates (case (A)) or the IMF data (case (C)) yields asample period of more than 40 years. We cannot neglect the possibility that structural changes
occurred in North Korea in this period, given changing international conditions and, inparticular, the economic environment that the socialist economies were in during this period.
Therefore, we split the sample period at around 1984 and performed the causality test by using
the South Korean government data (case (A)) and the IMF data (case (C)). Not only does 1985
represent approximately the middle of the sample period, it was also a year of profound changethat marked the inception of the Gorbachev era in the Soviet Union and came shortly before theinception of North Korea’s ‘Third Seven Year Plan’ in 1987. Test statistics are reported inTable 4, and the corresponding diagrams are in Figure 2. Comparing these results with those in
Table 3 and Figure 1 reveals evidence of at least one structural break between the first andsecond subperiods.

Therefore, results from the whole sample period are affected by thisstructural change.
In the first subperiod, both the South Korean government data and the IMF data indicate
causality from GNP to exports and from imports to GNP. Causality from GNP to exports
reflects North Korea’s exports promotion policy based on its economic growth. Causality fromimports to GNP supports the import-led growth hypothesis in North Korea and is consistent
with the estimation results for the whole period. Arguably, North Korea needed imports,
perhaps capital goods, to achieve economic growth and promote exports.
In the second subperiod, evidence of causality from GNP to imports is indicated by both theSouth Korean government data and the IMF data. This result suggests that the North Korean
economy escaped its dependence on import-led growth through economic development.
Following this structural change, the North Korean economy may develop into an autonomous

6economy in which economic growth raises imports. As Hanson (1982) has pointed out, this has
been the experience of other socialist economies. However, there is no evidence of causality
from GNP to exports. This means that economic growth raises only imports. As Figure 3
shows, the recent historical trends for imports and exports estimated by the South Korean
government indicate that North Korea’s imports have exceeded its exports. 2 There are two
possible explanations for this: one is the existence of large amounts of accumulated trade
deficits in North Korea; the other is that North Korea finances its trade deficits by using aid andtransfers from foreign countries. If the former applies, North Korea’s economy might be indanger of collapsing, as predicted by, for example, Noland (2006) and Noland, Robinson, andWang (2000a). Alternatively, there exist several unreported transfers from other countries,
particularly Japan. Empirical work by Eberstadt (1996) indicates this possibility.

4. Conclusions
In this study, we have examined causal relationships by constructing a vector autoregression
model of GNP, exports, and imports for North Korea. Having split the sample at around 1985,
we found evidence of import-led growth for the first subperiod, but not for the second subperiod.
This indicates that although North Korea is a developing country, it has not remained dependent
on export-led growth, as have many other developing countries. Moreover, as have othersocialist economies, North Korea had escaped its dependence on import-led growth by the
middle of the 1980s.
However, problems remain. First, the most serious is the lack of official macroeconomic
statistics for North Korea. Hence, we had to use estimates produced by the South Korean
government and other institutions. This casts doubt on the reliability of the empirical results.
Second, the sample time period is short. Recent advances in time series analysis can be used to

2

The IMF data produce a similar graph.

7detect the stationarity of a series (its unit root) and the stationarity of combinations of timeseries (cointegration). However, we only had access to annual data that cover a short time
period. Hopefully, sufficient data will be accumulated over time. Third, we must consider
North Korea’s continuing trade deficits.

How North Korea finances its trade deficits isimportant for the future of the North Korean economy. In further research, we hope to clarify
what awaits.

Acknowledgments
This research was partly supported by the Murata Science Foundation, which we thank forfinancial assistance. For letting us use their IMF data, we also thank the Research Institute for
Economics and Business Administration at Kobe University.

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11

Table 1 Data definitions and sources

Data

Institution

PeriodSourceGNP

South Korean Government

1960-1989
1990-2004

Yang （2000） p.39 （original source: National Unification Board）
Bank of Korea, Major Indicators Comparison (South Korea/North Korea)

South Korean Government

1965-1989
1990-2004

Yang （2000) p.321 （original sources: National Unification Board）
Bank of Korea, Major Indicators Comparison (South Korea/North Korea)

Korea Development Institute (KDI)

1970-1994

Korea Development Institute (1996) p.148

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

1964-2004

IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various years

Exports and imports

12

Table 2 Lag length selection based on the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion

Lag length kcase (A)case (B)case (C)1-45.7477-32.1653-6.88672-33.5695-23.8196
9.15603-20.0188-8.1880
22.8298
4-7.06932.072433.1766
Note: Bold font indicates the selected lag length in the VAR model.
Data sources: case (A): GNP: South Korean government; exports and imports: South Korean government
case (B): GNP: South Korean government; exports and imports: KDI
case (C): GNP: South Korean government; exports and imports: IMF

13

Table 3 Results of Granger causality tests＜case (A): 1965-2004＞
Optimal lag(VAR order)
Imp. does not cause Exp.
1(2)
GNP does not cause Exp.
1(2)Imp. does not cause GNP
1(2)Exp. does not cause GNP
1(2)GNP does not cause Imp.
1(2)Exp. does not cause Imp.
1(2)
H0 :

F-statistic

p-values

2.85650.85094.2365*2.38322.24762.5014

0.073
0.437
0.024
0.109
0.123
0.098

F-statistic

p-values

0.88240.50793.22302.07970.74910.3640

0.433
0.611
0.067
0.157
0.489
0.700

＜case (B): 1970-1994＞
Optimal lag(VAR order)
Imp. does not cause Exp.
1(2)
GNP does not cause Exp.
1(2)Imp. does not cause GNP
1(2)Exp. does not cause GNP
1(2)GNP does not cause Imp.
1(2)Exp. does not cause Imp.
1(2)
H0 :

＜case (C): 1964-2004＞
Optimal lag
F-statistic(VAR order)
Imp. does not cause Exp.
1(2)2.4605
GNP does not cause Exp.
1(2)1.3819Imp. does not cause GNP
1(2)0.9411
Exp. does not cause GNP
1(2)0.1777
GNP does not cause Imp.
1(2)2.3103
Exp. does not cause Imp.
1(2)0.8044
Notes : Imp. = Imports; Exp. = Exports*
Statistically significant at 5% level of significance.
H0 :

14

p-values
0.101
0.266
0.401
0.838
0.116
0.456

Table 4 Results of Granger causality tests＜case (A): 1965-1984＞
Optimal lag(VAR order)
Imp. does not cause Exp.
1(2)
GNP does not cause Exp.
1(2)Imp. does not cause GNP
1(2)Exp. does not cause GNP
1(2)GNP does not cause Imp.
1(2)Exp. does not cause Imp.
1(2)
H0 :

F-statistic

p-values

3.75347.027
9.8027**6.35442.7233
1.0425

0.057
0.011
0.004
0.015
0.109
0.385

F-statistic

p-values

1.2337
0.33881.21490.59704.2855*1.1485

0.329
0.720
0.334
0.567
0.042
0.352

F-statistic

p-values

3.5817

0.060
0.016
0.049
0.777
0.012
0.394

*

＜case (A): 1985-2004＞
Optimal lag(VAR order)
Imp. does not cause Exp.
1(2)
GNP does not cause Exp.
1(2)Imp. does not cause GNP
1(2)Exp. does not cause GNP
1(2)GNP does not cause Imp.
1(2)Exp. does not cause Imp.
1(2)
H0 :

＜case (C): 1964-1984＞
Optimal lag(VAR order)
Imp. does not cause Exp.
1(2)
GNP does not cause Exp.
1(2)Imp. does not cause GNP
1(2)Exp. does not cause GNP
1(2)GNP does not cause Imp.
1(2)Exp. does not cause Imp.
1(2)
H0 :

*

5.97273.9243*0.2582*6.62011.0067＜case (C): 1985-2004＞
Optimal lag
F-statistic(VAR order)
Imp. does not cause Exp.
1(2)1.3521
GNP does not cause Exp.
1(2)0.4344
Imp. does not cause GNP
1(2)0.1756
Exp. does not cause GNP
1(2)0.1217
GNP does not cause Imp.
1(2)4.3767*
Exp. does not cause Imp.
1(2)0.0159Notes : Imp. = Imports; Exp. = Exports*
Statistically significant at 5% level of significance.
H0 :

15

p-values
0.299
0.658
0.841
0.887
0.040
0.984

case (A): 1965-2004
GNP

Exports

Importscase (B): 1970-1994
GNP
no-causality
Exports

Importscase (C): 1964-2004
GNP
no-causality
Exports

Imports

Figure 1. Results of Granger causality tests

16

case (A): 1965-1984

case (A): 1985-2004
GNP

Exports

GNP

Imports

Exportscase (C): 1964-1984

case (C): 1985-2004
GNP

Exports

Imports

GNP

Imports

Exports

Figure 2. Results of Granger causality tests

17

Imports

(millions of US dollars)
3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

exports

imports

Figure 3. Comparison of exports and imports (Source: South Korean government estimates)

18

03
20

01
20

99
19

97
19

95
19

93
19

91
19

89
19

87
19

85
19

83
19

81
19

79
19

77
19

75
19

73
19

71
19

69
19

67
19

19

65

0

(year)