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From “Resource Wars”
to “Resources in Wars”
D D. S
The geopolitical perspective on “resource conflicts” focuses on the way inwhich key assets, such as oil, serve as a motivation for war when governments
struggle over their control. This article argues that this particular approach isoften too narrow-minded to accurately explain interstate conflict, since there areusually other key factors associated with war. Instead, it is necessary to shift thefocus inward, on where the resources are located, and outward, to the places towhich they are connected. In this way, we can consider resource-related interstate
conflicts in terms of the resulting supply-chain disruptions that they cause. Using
the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine as a case study, this paper concludes thatwhile Russia likely included control over natural resources within a broader
rationale for invasion, now a major resource-related concern related is widespread disturbance in global commodities, including food systems. Therefore,
what we now see in eastern Europe is not so much about war caused by desire forresources, but rather the effect on access to resources that the war creates. In short,the implication is that the framework of resource conflicts needs to be expanded.
INTRODUCTION

While there are clear geopolitical and humanitarian consequences tothe ongoing war in Ukraine, the conflict also leads to significant implications for natural resources. The literature on “resource wars” goes back a few
David D. Sussman is an Associate Professor in the Department of International
Studies at Tokai University in Toyko, Japan, and a Fellow at the Institute for Global
Environmental Strategies (IGES). As a scholar-practitioner, his research examines global
interconnectivity and conflicts over natural resources, linking use of material resources
to the environmental and social impacts in communities where they are sourced. At
Tufts University, David served as a Visiting Scholar at the Global Development And
Environment Institute (GDAE) and taught undergraduate courses on natural resource
conflicts and forced migration. David earned his B.A from Dartmouth College, and
M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from The Fletcher School at Tufts University.

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decades, and mainly focuses on the way that resources, whether abundant or
scarce, serve as the impetus for deepening conflict. Often it concentrates oninternal conflicts and civil wars, which in recent times account for the vast
majority of conflicts. In addition, the literature pays much greater attention to the onset and continuance of a war. However, since late February
this major conflict between Russia and Ukraine, two natural resource-richstates, reveals broader knock-on effects for supply chains and commodities
markets connected to food. The theory of natural resource conflicts, largely
inward focused, should be flipped to consider its outward reverberations.
UNDERSTANDING RESOURCE WARSThe “resource wars” concept primarily characterizes the interaction
between natural resources and conflict. In further detail, they are defined
as follows: “Resource wars are violent conflicts that are largely driven bycompetition for control over vital or valuable natural materials, such as oil,water, land, timber, animals (or animal products), gold, silver, gems, andother key minerals.”1 These confrontations can be intrastate or interstate innature. Notably, “a desire to gain control over a valuable resource supply, or
the wealth it generates, is a dominant factor leading to war,” though there
are other elements too, such as ethnic differences and historical injustices.2
Past research largely focused on the connection between natural
resources and internal conflicts, rather than those involving two or morestates.3 Part of this may be the reality that in recent decades, intrastate (noninternational) conflicts are most closely associated with natural resources.
The United Nations Environment Programme states that “since 1990 at
least eighteen violent conflicts have been ignited by the exploitation ofnatural resources.”4 And the relevance of natural resources is so great that“over the past sixty years at least forty percent of all intrastate conflicts canbe associated with natural resources.”5 This situation, in which internal
wars receive the greatest attention, serves as an opportunity for further
scholarship, with Koubi et al. noting that “the nexus of resources and international conflict is a fruitful area for future research.”6
What historical cases exist of interstate resource wars (or at least
conflicts where access to resources played a major part)? Centuries ago,colonial expansion could be seen as resource wars—consider, for example,
Spain’s conquest of the Incan empire or subjugation of the Maya peoples.
The Spaniards plundered gold and silver and brought it to Europe to funddevelopment and conflicts on that continent. The 19th century “scramble
for Africa” by European powers is another example—“Africa was full of raw
.:   “ ”  “  ”materials that could be exploited to fuel the industrial revolution”.7 Other
lesser-known interstate resource conflicts include the war between Peru,
Chile, and Bolivia from 1879–1884 over land area rich in minerals such as
sodium nitrate (used in explosives),8 and the Chaco War from 1932–1935,
in which Bolivia and Paraguay fought for territory containing oil reserves.9
Further, Japan’s expansion prior to World War II centered around resource
considerations. Japan annexed Korea in 1910 for strategic reasons, as well
as for its wealth of coal and iron,10 while the invasion of the Chinese province of Manchuria in 1931 was in part based on “seeking materials to fuelits growing industries.”11 A burgeoning population “propel[ed] the country’s leaders to look beyond the nation’s shores to meet domestic needs,
including raw materials and space to settle for the growing populace.”12More recently, we see Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 as largely basedon the acquisition of oil reserves. In the early 2000s, civil war and anabundance of mineral resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo(DRC) attracted neighboring states seeking spoils. All of this is to say that,while cases do exist, history is not teeming with interstate examples ofconflicts focused on resources.
Turning to the most recent case of the war in Ukraine, we can seethat natural resources are relevant, not just in terms of access (that is too
unidimensional); instead, we need to consider the global disruption causedby diminished access to these resources.
Commodities and the Russia-Ukraine War

While Vladimir Putin provided a litany of cultural and historicalreasons to justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there is reason to believethat resource-related elements also motivated his decision, similar to theannexation of Crimea.13 There is disagreement as to the relevance of natural
resources. On the one hand, a RAND blog article notes that “Ukrainiangas fields appear too small to justify the costs of the invasion, too hard tokeep, and almost impossible for Russia to exploit.”14 Due to the massive
amounts of fossil fuels Russia possesses, the addition of Ukraine’s resources
would not be as significant as one would think. And what degree of reliance
did Russia have on Ukraine for some of its resources? Only 1.35 percent (invalue) of Russia’s imports came from Ukraine in 2020, and it exported only
1.91 percent. The two countries are more integrated and vital to global
commodities markets than they are to each other. Writing in The Guardian,Harvey agrees, stating that the war is about territory and the old Soviet
empire rather than resources.15 On the other hand, it is hard to completely
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discount the role of strategic calculations based on natural resources. As
Kirby points out, Ukraine is a “strategic commodities powerhouse.”16 Fromthe perspective of Ukraine, the loss of gas reserves around Crimea wassignificant, affecting Ukraine’s potential to achieve greater energy independence from Russia.17 Now, the contested eastern regions of the country also
contain more than 45 percent of Ukraine’s coal.18 And there is no doubt
that, as Muggah writes in Foreign Policy, “Ukraine’s extraordinary riches inenergy, minerals, and agriculture are a prize for the Kremlin.”19 Overall,while Russia does not really need Ukraine in terms of resources, control of
Crimea and Ukraine blocks a rival that could supply energy to Europe.20
Regardless of Putin’s motivations, the spillover effects in commodities markets need to be considered. The Russia-Ukraine war lays bare someof the intricate ways that distant countries rely on resources and products.
The conflict, for example, exposes how dependent Europe is on Russia forenergy; it receives over a third of its natural gas from Russia.21 Althoughmost trade between Europe and Asia takes places by sea, Russian rail also
links the two regions and will be disrupted;22 this means that over a million
product-filled containers may need to be rerouted.23 Furthermore, half theworld’s supply of neon gas is sourced from Ukraine, and it is an essential input for semiconductor chip manufacturing.24 Car companies suchas VW and BMW are impacted too, with shortages of Ukrainian-madewire harnesses (used in the miles of cables and lines in each car) leading to
shutdowns of major manufacturing plants in Germany.25
Globally, the current shock to the commodities markets represents
the industry’s largest disruption since the oil crisis in the early 1970s.26
Considered in aggregate, commodity prices have risen 26 percent thisyear.27 This is due to the size and importance of the conflict (a groundwar in Europe), the deep interconnection of national economies, and theimportance of the key actors involved: Ukraine and Russia. In addition,
the current situation demonstrates humanity’s deep dependence on mined
and farmed resources. Economic appetite for resources is not on pause, andthough “a world facing a physical shortage of raw materials dug up fromthe ground, seems like a throwback to an earlier age…that is exactly thepredicament that lies ahead.”28
Further complications exist: with the complex web of global supply
chains, it is not just resources or product availability, but their movement
and transportation over long distances that is important. Immediately after
the outbreak of war, Bloomberg noted that “the risk of logistical turmoil
is also increasing.”29 This hazard has turned into a full-blown reality. In
many cases, the inputs necessary to create products are missing because.:   “ ”  “  ”of supply chain disruptions. For example, to produce all types of food,fertilizer is essential (and part of humankind’s ongoing—and unsustainable—dependence on fossil fuel-driven agriculture). Globally, Russia ranks
first in nitrogen-based fertilizers, and second in those using potassium andphosphorus.30 The reduction in fertilizer on the markets led to increased
prices, even rising two times or more in some cases.31
The ongoing conflict in mainland Europe demonstrates that we mayneed to expand the types of materials considered to be conflict-relatedresources. Minerals that are typically recognized and monitored during
times of conflict include tungsten, tantalum, tin, and gold—referred toas 3TG. Other valuable point-source assets are associated with conflict,including oil, diamonds, and even timber. Previous scholarship considered
how these materials served as a motivation for conflict, or their use as asource of income deepened human suffering. However, the outward ripplesof the war in Europe also reveal other commodities’ relation to conflict,from nickel to wheat. The disruption of supply chains reverberates in such a
way that more people are affected in more places. Beyond extensive coveragein the news, the price of bread at the store, and gas for our cars makes thisconflict all too real. The following section considers this in detail.
Commodities and Other Recent Conflicts

One might wonder why recent interstate wars sometimes involved
a superpower but did not result in such massive effects on commodities.
Looking back at these other conflicts, why were they not as disruptive? At
least one of the countries involved was smaller or not as highly integrated
into the global economy. Take Ethiopia and Eritrea, for example, which
fought each other from 1998 to 2000. Their economies were not large
enough to make a difference on a global scale, today accounting for .1%
and .01% of the world economy respectively.32, 33 While the United States,
a superpower, invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, each of these countries were
not as integrated into the global economy. Afghanistan’s total exports in2002 totaled USD 1.76 billion, and while Iraq may have had “the second
biggest known oil reserves in the world” according to a 2003 Guardianarticle,34 its 2002 exports accounted for only 2.44% of all crude petroleum.35 Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, currently ranked 113th in theworld by GDP,36 did not result in the international condemnation that
Putin faces today for similar reasons.
Why is the Ukraine-Russia war wreaking havoc with the availability
and prices of commodities? Ukraine is sometimes referred to as the “bread.:  

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basket of Europe,”37 exports critical “metals such as nickel, copper, andiron,” and is “largely involved in the export and manufacture of otheressential raw materials like neon, palladium, and platinum.”38 Meanwhile,
although Russia is the largest nuclear state it is, at its core, really an exporterof natural resources—one of the leading exporters of commodities worldwide.39 In 2020, petroleum and minerals made up 48.7 percent of exports,
and precious metals and gems another 10.1 percent.40 Of Russia’s cereals
exports, 28.1 percent (valued at USD 3.2 billion) went to Egypt, 16.3
percent to Turkey (USD 1.9 billion), and 5.1 percent to Saudi Arabia, and
4.8 percent to Nigeria.41 Beyond this, “Russia is a key supplier of a typeof nickel used to make steel and electric-vehicle batteries” and possesses
notable supplies of aluminum, and its palladium and platinum are essential
for catalytic converters.42 Russia’s choice or inability to export some of its
products is only compounded by the political and moral imperative of theinternational community (in most cases) to sanction the country.
Food and Environment

The war in Ukraine reveals the outward environmental effects ofcontemporary armed conflict, when considered through the supply chainof food and resources necessary for agricultural production. As explainedin the Harvard Business Review, “Russia and Ukraine are also big exportersof grains such as corn, barley, and wheat, as well as fertilizer.”43 Food is amajor humanitarian concern. The effect of the war on food security andhumanitarian aid provided around the world is striking. In just over three
and a half weeks, “wheat prices…increased by 21 percent, barley by 33
percent and some fertilizers by 40 percent.”44 Beyond wheat, soybeans are
just under their peak price set in August 2012. And for “sunflower oil, theclosure of Ukrainian ports cuts off flows from a country that accounts forroughly a half of all exports of the key cooking oil.”45 More than half of
the World Food Programme’s (WFP) stocks of wheat come from Ukraine.
The world’s food situation is already dire, and in 2019, 820 million, or
more than ten percent, of the world’s population were food insecure.46
Now, as a New York Times reporter explained, the head of WFP told himthat the organization is “taking from the hungry to give to the starving.”47
The countries that will be most affected are 1) those that are the poorest—
their governments and citizens do not have the economic strength to easilypurchase more expensive food—and 2) those that, in regions like North
Africa and the Middle East, rely heavily on a country like Ukraine.48
We will also likely see environmental implications. In the same way
.:   “ ”  “  ”that eco-oriented concerns played second fiddle to issues surrounding
COVID-19, so too will they become subordinate in terms of war andfood security. In the United States, President Biden already tapped thecountry’s strategic petroleum reserve and hopes to allow—even require—more oil production by petroleum companies on federal lands to reduce
domestic gas prices.49 Another relatively quick response by governments
may be their shift of financial resources. WFP refers to food insecurity
being increased when governments divert spending towards war.50 In thesame vein, to support or purchase food security, governments may needto take from other programs, whether those for education, health, or theenvironment. Over the longer-term, it would likewise be understandable if countries currently facing food shortages found other ways to growproduce at home by expanding agriculture, even into previously protectedareas. In some cases, greater pressure on sourcing foodstuffs may lead toreliance on countries with more harmful agricultural practices or greater
production inefficiencies; for example, if Turkey replaces Ukrainian wheatby growing its own, there would be a drop from 3.72 tons per hectare to
2.74.51 Or certain products may need to travel longer distances, resulting
in a greater transportation-related environmental footprint. While the war
reduces imports of Russian fossil fuels to Europe and the United States—and on the surface, this now appears better for the environment—thesefossil fuels are not all being replaced by renewables. Over the longer-term
countries like Germany may increase its use of solar, but global energy
markets cannot react that quickly. Thus, at present, petroleum from Russia
may be made up, where possible, by reactivated coal plants or gas from
Qatar or Algeria.52
It is even possible that there will be conflict spillover related to food,though this relationship may be indirect, or secondary to other factors.
Analysis shows that social unrest is sometimes tied to food insecurity
resulting from higher prices.53 As the Economist points out, “in poorer
countries where food and fuel are a larger part of people’s spending, thebacklash could be even more violent: food-price spikes in 2007-08 led
to riots in 48 countries, and there are already signs of panic and unrest
today.”54 The Global Conflict Risk Index looks at key structural conditions
within countries to determine the risk of violent conflict over the next few
years. For 2014, the index provided a “food insecurity indicator” based on“combining price level, price volatility, dietary requirements, and nourishment.” The highest-ranked countries were Haiti, Zambia, Tanzania,
Central African Republic, Chad, and Rwanda.55 WFP listed current emergencies in Ukraine, Afghanistan, northern Ethiopia, Yemen, South Sudan,
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northeastern Nigeria, Syria, the DRC, and the Sahel.56 Meanwhile, theEconomist Impact’s annual “Global Food Security Index” rankings accountfor food’s affordability, availability, quality and safety, and climate andnatural resources, and as of 2021, the countries most likely to be affectedby diminished grain exports from Ukraine (e.g. Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi
Arabia) are all included in the category of “good performance”.57 All in all,the lack of an overlap among these countries leads to the interpretationthat food might play an ancillary role in conflict within them.
Implications for Future Conflicts

What does the current war in Ukraine reveal about future conflicts’
ramifications for supply chain disturbances, including for the global foodsupply? In the International Crisis Group’s “10 Conflicts to Watch in 2022”
list, published in December 2021, it rightly placed Ukraine at the top,followed by Ethiopia and Afghanistan, but then highlighted tensions between
the United States and China and the United States and Iran. Admittedly,as The Economist notes, “full-scale interstate warfare between great powers
remains improbable.”58 And yet in its article, “The growing danger of greatpower conflict,” the magazine warns that “China…and Russia are entering
into a renewal of great-power competition with the West.”59
What would the consequences of a conflict between Pakistan andIndia be? Pakistan’s most lucrative exports are cotton and apparel, while
India is a major exporter of pharmaceuticals. In comparison, hostilities
between China and Taiwan—should the U.S. respond with force—would
probably lead to costs unimaginably large. Taiwan is best known for
producing microchips and semiconductors, with over sixty-four percent of
its 2020 exports in electronics and machinery and appliances.60 We haveseen how shortages in these items have caused manufacturing complications through the COVID-19 era. The disruption due to broken supply
chains for these components during a war would likely be far greater, andthe domino effects for other commodities and products, including food,are difficult to foresee. China’s peacetime impact on food security canalready be dramatic; as of December 2021, it had “managed to stockpile
more than half of the globe’s maize and other grains, leading to steep priceincreases across the planet and dropping more countries into famine.”61 It
is no doubt conceivable that there would be an even greater effect in a timeof conflict.

.:   “ ”  “  ”Redefining Resource Wars

What broader conclusions can be drawn from this example that would
apply to other interstate conflicts in the future? First, it is the high level of
unpredictability, in that we do not really know all that will happen; there
are uncertainties and unpredictable chain reactions in creating and distributing products. Second, the larger the economies involved in conflict, andthe more integrated they are in the global economy, the more people will
be affected around the world. Third, those who are more vulnerable are
more likely to be harmed, since price shocks and shortages are difficult
to overcome with coping strategies. Fourth, these issues will take time toresolve. Supply chains take a long time to build—and therefore are complicated to unwind and recreate. Take the example of a medical gown supplierin the United States who took one whole year just to figure out the necessary materials and sourcing.62
It is also worth expanding the scope of what conflicts are considered
to be resource-related. It is less about “resource wars” in terms of causing
conflict, and more the “resources in wars,” or “war and resources.” Inother words, while scholars typically think of resource wars as the causeof conflict, or at least a contributing or deepening factor. We can shift
and broaden the definition to include the downstream effects of conflict.
While resource wars are in part fought over access to materials, the war
in Ukraine shows even more how wide-ranging is the influence on all
types of commodities. A war of this type, though concentrated in eastern
Europe, is truly global in its range of consequences. From wheat, to oil, to
fertilizers—food and agriculture around the planet is impacted. Instead ofresources being acquired and sold to fund conflict, which is the basis forthe dominant understanding of resource wars, future explanations should
account for concerns about the loss of access to resources when supply
chains are disrupted; this is the way that the vast majority of countries
experience resource-related wars.
What can be done to mitigate food supply chain disruptions fromarmed conflict moving forward? Firstly, it is important to have a deeper
recognition of this vulnerability—conflict’s indirect consequences on foodworldwide can be significant and sometimes unpredictable. Secondly, it isnecessary to build redundancy in supply chains. Although this might not
be as efficient given reliance on “just-in-time” inventory and shipping andwill create superfluous lines of resources, it may become increasingly necessary for the sake of security. Looking ahead, there is a deepening global
division in values between societies that are oriented towards democracy.:  

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with fundamental values of openness and those that are more authoritarian
in nature.63 Therefore, each side will need to create its own parallel chainsfor resources. If these opposing ideologies are not in a hot war, the best way
to remain insulated from parallel conflict-related shocks is to guaranteethat they have their own access to reliable supplies of commodities. f
ENDNOTES
1 Michael T. Klare, Barry S. Levy, and Victor W. Sidel, “The Public Health Implicationsof Resource Wars,” American Journal of Public Health 101 (9) (2011): 1615–1619.
2 Ibid.
3 Vally Koubi, Gabriele Spilker, Tobias Bohmelt, and Thomas Bernauer, “Do natural
resources matter for interstate and intrastate armed conflict?” Journal of Peace Research
51 (11) (2015): 239.
4 United Nations Environment Programme, From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Roleof Natural Resources and the Environment (Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP, 2009), 5.
5 Ibid, 8.
6 Koubi, “Do Natural Resources Matter,” 239.
7 “The Scramble for Africa,” St. John’s College, University of Cambridge, https://www.
joh.cam.ac.uk/library/library_exhibitions/schoolresources/exploration/scramble_for_
africa (accessed April 30, 2022).
8 “War of the Pacific,” Britannica, March 29, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/event/War-of-the-Pacific. For more on the value of sodium nitrate, see Daniel A. Gross,“Caliche: the conflict mineral that fuelled the first world war,” The Guardian, June 2,
2014, https://www.theguardian.com/science/the-h-word/2014/jun/02/caliche-greatwar-first-world-war-conflict-mineral.
9 Michael Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York, NY:
Metropolitan Books, 2001), https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781429900560/
resourcewars.
10 Harold Kingsberg, “What Sparked Japan’s Aggression During World War II?” Slate,
July 7, 2014, https://slate.com/human-interest/2014/07/what-prompted-japan-saggression-before-and-during-world-war-ii.html.
11 “Invasion of Manchuria,” https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/education/presidentialinquiries/invasion-manchuria (accessed May 1, 2022).
12 “Japanese Imperialism and the Road to War,” Facing History and Ourselves, https://www.facinghistory.org/resource-library/teaching-nanjing-atrocities/japanese-imperialism-and-road-war (accessed April 30, 2022).
13 David Knight Legg, “Putin’s Ukraine Invasion Is About Energy and Natural
Resources,” Wall Street Journal, April 5, 2022; Robert Muggah, “Russia’s Resource
Grab in Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, April 28, 2022.
14 Krystyna Marcinek, “Russia Does Not Seem to Be After Ukraine’s Gas Reserves,” The
RAND Blog, April 11, 2022.
15 Fiona Harvey, “Is Putin’s Ukraine invasion about fossil fuels?” The Guardian, February
24, 2022.
16 Jason Kirby, “In taking Ukraine, Putin would gain a strategic commodities powerhouse,” The Globe and Mail, February 26, 2022.
17 William Broad, “In Taking Crimea, Putin Gains a Sea of Fuel Reserves,” The New YorkTimes, May 17, 2014; Frank Umbach, “The energy dimensions of Russia’s annexationof Crimea,” The NATO Review, May 27, 2014.

.:   “ ”  “  ”18 Umbach, “The energy dimensions of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.”
19 Muggah, “Russia’s Resource Grab in Ukraine.”
20 Kirby, “In taking Ukraine, Putin would gain a strategic commodities powerhouse.”.
21 Anne-Sophie Corbeau, “How Deep Is Europe’s Dependence on Russian Oil?” State of
the Planet (blog), Columbia Climate School, March 14, 2022, https://news.climate.
columbia.edu/2022/03/14/qa-how-deep-is-europes-dependence-on-russian-oil/.
22 Sarah Schiffling and Nikolaos Kanellos, “Five essential commodities that will be hit by
war in Ukraine,” The Conversation, February 24, 2022, https://theconversation.com/
five-essential-commodities-that-will-be-hit-by-war-in-ukraine-177845.
23 Ann Koh and Kyunghee Park, “China-Europe Rail Lines Become Supply Chain’s
Latest Problem,” Bloomberg, March 23, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2022-03-23/china-europe-rail-routes-become-supply-chain-s-latest-problem.
24 David Simchi-Levi and Pierre Haren, “How the War in Ukraine Is Further Disrupting
Global Supply Chains,” Harvard Business Review, March 17, 2022, https://hbr.
org/2022/03/how-the-war-in-ukraine-is-further-disrupting-global-supply-chains.
25 Christina Amman and Nick Carey, “Ukraine invasion hampers wire harness supplies
for carmakers,” Reuters, March 2, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/autostransportation/ukraine-invasion-hurts-flow-wire-harnesses-carmakers-2022-03-02/.
26 “War and sanctions have caused commodities chaos,” The Economist, March 12, 2022,
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/03/12/war-and-sanctions-have-causedcommodities-chaos; World Bank, “Food and Energy Price Shocks from Ukraine War
Could Last for Years,” April 26, 2022, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2022/04/26/food-and-energy-price-shocks-from-ukraine-war.
27 “War and sanctions,” The Economist.
28 Ibid.
29 Dylan Griffiths, “Chaos in Commodities as Russia’s War on Ukraine Upends Trade,”
Bloomberg, February 28, 2022, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/international-trade/chaos-in-commodities-as-russias-war-on-ukraine-upends-trade-3.
30 “Russia-Ukraine war worsens fertilizer crunch, risking food supplies,” National PublicRadio, April 12, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/04/12/1092251401/russia-ukrainewar-worsens-fertilizer-crunch-risking-food-supplies.
31 Patti Domm, “A fertilizer shortage, worsened by war in Ukraine, is driving up global
food prices and scarcity,” CNBC, April 6, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/06/afertilizer-shortage-worsened-by-war-in-ukraine-is-driving-up-global-food-prices-andscarcity.html.
32 “Ethiopia GDP,” Trading Economics, https://tradingeconomics.com/ethiopia/gdp(accessed May 1, 2022).
33 “Eritrea GDP,” Trading Economics, https://tradingeconomics.com/eritrea/gdp(accessed May 1, 2022).
34 Terry Macalister, Ewen MacAskill, and Rory McCarthy, “A matter of life, death – andoil,” The Guardian, January 23, 2003, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/
jan/23/usa.iraq.
35 “Crude Petroleum,” Observatory of Economic Complexity, https://oec.world/en/
profile/hs/crude-petroleum?yearSelector1=tradeYear19 (accessed May 1, 2022).
36 “Percent of world GDP - Country rankings,” The Global Economy, https://www.
theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/gdp_share/ (accessed May 1, 2022).
37 “War and sanctions,” The Economist.
38 Schiffling and Kanellos, “Five essential commodities.”
39 “War and sanctions,” The Economist.

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40 Observatory of Economic Complexity, https://oec.world/en/profile/country/rus?sub
nationalDepthSelector=productHS2&depthSelector1=HS2Depth (accessed April 16,2022).
41 Ibid.
42 Bloomberg News, “How Russia’s War in Ukraine Is Choking the World’s Supply of
Natural Resources,” Bloomberg, February 28, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/
graphics/2022-russia-commodities-shortage/.
43 Simchi-Levi and Haren, “How the War in Ukraine Is Further Disrupting Global
Supply Chains.”
44 Jack Nicas, “Ukraine War Threatens to Cause a Global Food Crisis,” The New YorkTimes, March 20, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/20/world/americas/
ukraine-war-global-food-crisis.html.
45 Griffiths, “Chaos in Commodities as Russia’s War on Ukraine Upends Trade.”
46 World Health Organization, Press Release, July 15, 2019, “World hunger is still notgoing down after three years and obesity is still growing – UN report,” https://www.
who.int/news/item/15-07-2019-world-hunger-is-still-not-going-down-after-threeyears-and-obesity-is-still-growing-un-report.
47 Michael Barbaro, “How the War in Ukraine is Creating a Global Food Crisis,”
April 5, 2022, in The Daily, produced by Asthaa Chaturvedi, Rob Szypko, andRachel Quester, podcast, MP3 audio, 22:36, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/05/
podcasts/the-daily/ukraine-russia-food-supply.html.
48 Priyanka Shankar, “As global food prices soar, will the EU face food shortages?,”
Deutsche Welle (DW), April 15, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/as-global-food-pricessoar-will-the-eu-face-food-shortages/a-61473745.
49 Clifford Krauss and Michael D. Shear, “Biden will tap oil reserve, hoping to pushgasoline prices down,” The New York Times, March 31, 2022, https://nytimes.
com/2022/03/31/business/energy-environment/biden-oil-strategic-petroleumreserve.html.
50 World Food Programme, Global Report on Food Crises: Joint Analysis for Better
Decisions, 2020, 11.
51 Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser, “Crop Yields,” Our World in Data, June 2021
(accessed May 17, 2022).
52 Maeve Campbell, “What are Europe’s energy alternatives now that Russian gas is off thecards?” EuroNews, April 27, 2022, https://www.euronews.com/green/2022/04/27/
europe-scrambles-to- keep-the-lights-on-as-it-sidelines-russian-gas.
53 Marc F. Bellemare, “Rising Food Prices, Food Price Volatility, and Social Unrest,”
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 91 (1) (January 2015): 1.
54 “War and sanctions,” The Economist.
55 “Global Conflict Risk Index,” Resource Watch, https://resourcewatch.org/data/
explore/soc055-Global-Conflict-Risk-Index (accessed May 1, 2022).
56 “WFP at a Glance,” World Food Programme, April 15, 2022, https://www.wfp.org/
stories/wfp-glance (accessed May 1, 2022).
57 “Global Food Security Index,” Economist Impact, https://impact.economist.com/
sustainability/project/food-security-index/ (accessed May 1, 2022).
58 “The Future of War,” The Economist, January 25, 2018, https://www.economist.com/
special-report/2018/01/25/the-future-of-war.
59 “The growing danger of great-power conflict,” The Economist, January 27, 2018,https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/01/25/the-growing-danger-of-greatpower-conflict.

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twn?depthSelector1=HS2Depth (accessed April 16, 2022).
61 Shin Watanabe and Aiko Munakata, “China hoards over half the world’s grain,pushing up global prices,” Nikkei Asia, December 23, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/
Spotlight/Datawatch/China-hoards-over-half-the-world-s-grain-pushing-up-globalprices.
62 Sylvie Douglas and Adrian Ma, “Forging new links in a supply chain,” The Indicatorfrom Planet Money, NPR, New York, WNYC, March 22, 2022, https://www.npr.org/
transcripts/1088115414.
63 Freedom House, “Authoritarian Rule Challenging Democracy as Dominant Global
Model,” Press Release, February 24, 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/article/newreport-authoritarian-rule-challenging-democracy-dominant-global-model.

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