Discussion Papers In Economics
And Business

What caused the failure of nationalisation of the railway system
in Germany? : Malfunction of the German Imperial Railway Office(Reichseisenbahnamt) in the 1870s and 1880s
Ayumu Banzawa

Discussion Paper 12-18

Graduate School of Economics andOsaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP)
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPANWhat caused the failure of nationalisation of the railway system
in Germany? : Malfunction of the German Imperial Railway Office(Reichseisenbahnamt) in the 1870s and 1880s
Ayumu Banzawa

Discussion Paper 12-18
October 2012

Graduate School of Economics andOsaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP)
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPANWhat caused the failure of nationalisation of the railway system in Germany? : Malfunction of theGerman Imperial Railway Office (Reichseisenbahnamt) in the 1870s and 1880s. *Ayumu Banzawa †Abstract
This paper identifies the causes of failure of the nationalisation of the German railway system by
the Imperial Railway Office (das Reichseisenbahnamt; REA) that was established during 1873–1874 under
the order of Otto v. Bismarck, the first Imperial Chancellor (Reichskanzler). The REA was not able to keep
railways in the Reich (unified Germany) under its perfect control as provided by the German Imperial
Constitution. What impeded the REA’s mission? We must pay attention to the REA’s problems as anorganisation. As the official documents of the REA suggested, the organisation was not free frombureaucratic inflexibility in both structural and personal matters. Furthermore, compared with the otherrailway administration bodies in Germany in the 19th century, I point out the REA’s incapability incollecting regional information. The REA, the central bureau in the German-Prussian capital, had noregional unit. Its top-heavy structure and the higher-ups in the bureaucracy did not collect the non-lettering
information from those who were doing the actual work at each railway, and this caused a criticized‘disproportionate emphasis on documents’. To illustrate this point, I focus on the failure by the REA in
playing the leading role in compiling the first German national railway statistics.

JEL：

N43, N73, N83

Key Words：

railways, Germany,nationalisation,

statistics,

the19th century* A first draft of this paper was given at the conference of EBHA – BHSJ on ‘Business enterprises and thetensions between local and global’, Paris, 30 Aug-1 Sep., 2012. I would like to thank all the participants for theirhelpful comments and suggestions. I am particularly indebted to François Caron, the Chairman of our session‘Nationalisation of the railways reconsidered”.
†

Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
banzawa@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp0Introduction

This paper identifies the causes of failure of German railway nationalisation by the Imperial
Railway Office (das Reichseisenbahnamt; REA) that was established during 1873–1874 under the order of
Otto v. Bismarck, the first Imperial Chancellor (Reichskanzler). In the beginning of German unification, theReich (the so-called second German Empire), Bismarck designed a national unified railway system.
However, the REA that he founded was unsuccessful in creating a German national railway system; that is,nationalisation. This paper examines the details of the REA’s malfunctioning as a superintendent of railway
nationalisation in this sense.1
Much ink has been spent on German railway nationalisation in the 19th century. Too many studies
on traditional railway history narrate institutional development.2 In Japan, scholars who analysed German
research have made many attempts to show the similarity of Japanese railway nationalisation with theGerman experience in the third-quarter of the 19th century. Japanese Marxist historians have often
expressed ‘Bismarckian Nationalisation’ as a cliché to describe railway nationalisation, in which agovernment gave the military the highest priority. According to F. Engels, they considered that theauthoritarian bureaucracy led Japanese nationalisation, which was, therefore, economically unnecessary
such as the Prussian-German case.3
Over the past few decades, a renewed interest in railway nationalisation4 occurred and historiansin Germany shed new light on the subject. From the angle of economic history that considered theimportance of the effects of the leading sector of German industrialisation, the periodical work by
Fremdling (1975) on German railway history pointed out the vitality of private railway companies
alongside the insignificance of state ownership for the development of German railways in the 19th century.
‘The state-ownership (Verstaatlichung) reproduced merely this inefficient traffic performance, only on
another level’.5 Fremdling also referred to a nationalisation and stated that, ‘(f)irst a state-ownership on the
Reich level, like the one planned by Bismarck, could have prevented this (inefficiency)’. 6 In contrast,
Kocka (1987) stressed the influence of German state bureaucracy on railway management. This remark
represented feedback on the evaluation of the American railroad company as the model of the organisationof a modern enterprise by Chandler Jr. Then (1997), who examined the organisation of German railways indetail and pointed out that the transition to state ownership was ‘the last entrepreneur’s decision’. Ziegler(1996) followed the development of railway policy of German land states and concluded the birth of theGerman intervention state in the process from the predominance of private companies over state railways tostate ownership. In a Japanese study on German railway history, Yamada (2001) investigated the regional
structure of German railway development and reviewed the research on Japanese railway nationalisationthat referenced the German experience and criticized the notion of ‘Bismarckian Nationalisation’ from thestandpoint that regional diversity (that is, not a national convergence) was essential to German
industrialisation.7
However, those studies paid little attention to the REA, the incomplete headquarters of railway
1

nationalisation (nationwide unification of railway system and nation-state ownership) that was planned by
Bismarck. To date, only a few studies have been conducted on the bureau, partly because Bismarck’s
attempt was not successful in the end. The REA itself published no jubilee issues8 and the official
documents on its organizational and personnel matters have been examined only fragmentarily.
One of a few exceptions is Kunz (1996), who offered the first historical grasp of the developmentof the imperial bureau. Kunz (1996) took a fresh look at the development of the REA, investigated its
activities and evaluated its achievements. Research on the direction of examination of the REA as anorganization has taken important steps, but closer study of the organisation is lacking. The question that has
yet to be explored is what was lacking in the REA as superintendent of railway nationalisation. Even recent
studies that referred to the REA, including Ziegler (1996), Mitchell (2000) and Yamada (2001), considered
the failure of the nationalisation plan of Bismarck primarily in the political context; that is, theparticularisms of Imperial Germany. Certainly, the problem of German particularism cannot be
overemphasized in gaining a good grasp of the political and institutional development of German railway
nationalisation. However, little is known about the role of the REA as an organization with a mission.
Therefore, whether (and how) the bureau itself caused the failure of German railway nationalisation
remains unsettled.
Therefore, this study considers the organisational problems of the REA. We focus on the early
REA in the 1870s and in the beginning of the 1880s when it actively attempted to formulate railway policy.
This paper falls into three sections. Describing the political development of railway
nationalisation by Bismarck and a legislative examination of the REA is desirable before addressing the
primary objective of this paper, which is attempted in Chapter I through a discussion of a chronological listof events between the 1870s and 1880s. We then point out the necessity of analysing the organizational
aspects of the REA, which started as an executive organ of the railway nationalisation laws submitted by
Bismarck. Chapter II attempts to illustrate the defects of the REA’s organizational structure. A comparison
with other organizations that administered German railways (the Association of German Railway
Administration (Verein für Deutschen Eisenbahn Verwaltungen; VDEV) and the Prussian State Railways) is
helpful in illuminating the problems of the REA. Chapter III focuses on the process of obtaining the firstnational railway statistics to analyse the reasons for the REA’s organisational incapability as presented in
the last chapter. To end this section, we illustrate territorial conflicts between the REA and other official
bodies (the Prussian Ministry of Public Works (Kgl. Ministerium für Oeffentlichen Arbeiten) and theImperial Statistical Office (Reichs Statistisches Amt). In the last chapters, summing-up of examinations, we
present an outlook on the background of the REA’s organizational problem, which was the precarious
position of the Reich as an economic unit between regions and Europe.

I

Before possibly entering into a detailed examination, we must first attempt to clarify thechronological development of the REA. The results primarily from the foregoing research are presented in2

Table 1. This abbreviated chronological table indicates that (1) the REA was originally designed to be theexecutive office for the Imperial Railway Law (Reichseisenbahngesetz) that aimed to place German
railways under the control of the Imperial government, (2) the bills of the Imperial Railway Law were notrealized as they were voted down in the Upper House (Bundesrat) in the mid-1870s, (3) especially after therejection of the second bill and A. Maybach’s resignation as the President in 1877, the REA’s impotence inrailway policy was obvious when compared with that of the Prussian Ministry for Public Works, (4) theheads of the bureau of the REA (given the vacancy of the President) repeated requests for an increase in thenumber of personnel at least in 1879 and 1885, but the government rejected these proposals and (5) by themid-1880s, the significance of the REA’s existence was in doubt and the government and the Reichstag
considered whether to continue or abolish the REA.
In sum, in the 1870s, the REA fell short of the Bismarck government’s expectations.
The question now arises: why was the REA incompetent in establishing a German national
railway system?
That other German land states (Länder) and their governments claimed a degree of autonomy
with respect to railway policy and held their position to the end, which is commonly accepted and seems tohold much truth. As Mitchell (2000) showed in full detail, ‘(i)n the German railway industry, particularismand not nationalism was triumphant before 1890’.9
However, one thing is certain; the REA itself was frequently criticized for being impotent as aconcerned authority. The second president of the REA, A. Maybach, who devoted himself to German
railway nationalisation in compliance with Bismarck’s wish, decided to leave the post and moved to thePrussian Ministry of Public Works to pursue railway nationalisation through another channel, that ofPrussian state possession of railways. What made Maybach forsake the newly established Imperial office?
Reflecting on the development in the 1870s and the early 1880s makes clear that central to thefailure to create a national railway system was not only the problem of German particularism but also theinability of the REA as the executive. Even the Reich’s ownership of all German railways, as Bismarck firstwished, was objected to and rejected by the German land state governments, the Reich-wide supervision ofrailways should have at least partially been realized, as the Imperial Constitution determined so au fond.
As previously noted in (4), the parties concerned (and contemporaries of those days) pointed outthat the REA was too small with respect to finances and personnel. However, these characteristics failed toaccount for Bismarck’s rejection of the request for an increase in personnel. It is likely that Bismarck foundother factors in REA that were responsible for the failure of railway nationalisation.
A general view of the organisation and a close examination of the personnel affairs of the REA in
II provides the key to understanding the failure of the REA.

II

3

Kunz (1996) paid attention to the personnel aspects of the REA and made an important statementon the ability of President Scheele, the first president of the REA and who was censured for failing to start
the organisation as a supervising bureau of the national railway system. His failure was not the result of his
inexperience, as the retired Prussian finance official and ex-executive of Diskontgesellschaft was also thespecialist of the railway as the director of the Berlin-Anhalt Railway Company. The efforts of the German
land states stood in the way of the REA.10 Despite his (and Maybach’s, the second president) leadershipand zeal, the REA made no satisfactory progress since its establishment in 1873. After all, the problem was
not just lack of a top leader’s talent.
The argument that the incompetence of the REA brought about its unclear legal status11 becauseof failure to pass the law of nationalisation was convincing. Yet, was it impossible for the REA to adopt
itself to the unfavourable institutional circumstance and pursue its original goal? Kunz (1996) evaluatedthat ‘the specialist competence of the office was undisputed’ in the 1870s.12 Why did such a competent
office need to consider its abolishment after 10 years of existence?
One must extend the examination and focus attention on the human composition of the REA.
According to ‘The Handbook of German Empire (Handbuch für das Deutche Reich)’ from 1882,
the organisational structure of REA in 1881 was as follows. At the top of the bureau was the president(Präsident), but the post remained vacant since Maybach’s resignation in 1877. After he abandoned theactivities

of

the

REA,

the

leadership

of

the

officewas

entrustedtotheCouncillors(Presentation-Councillors; Vorträgende Rate). There were the seven Councillors (Körte, Kraefft, Gerstner,
Streckert, Wiebe, Crause and Gimbel) and, among them, three were administrative officials and four
technicians. As the tasks were divided by field, they built the two departments in the office with eachleader.13 Their titles were Privy Upper Governmental Councillor (Geheimes Ober Regierungs Rath) (5)and Privy Governmental Councillor (Geheimes Regierungs Rath) (2). The Emperor directly appointed thechairman and other councillors. In addition, at most two assistants (Hülfsarbeiter) could be appointed andGovernmental Councillor (Regierungs Rat) Emmerich worked as the Permanent Assistant (Stänfiger
Hulfsarbeiter) in 1881. In the secretariat, under the chairman were the Calculation Councillor (Rechnungs
Rath) Ende, 14 secretaries and calculators, four registrars and six clerks. The Reichstag permitted almost 20
established posts. Added to these, the three Legal Members (Richtlicher Mitgliede) and three Deputy Legal
Members (Stellvertredende richtlicher Mitgliede) were appointed from the governmental jurists fromPrussia (2), Stuttgart (Württemberg), Darmstadt (Hessen), Mecklenburg and Bremen. They all wereNebenamt; that is, actively related to each governmental office. They were appointed for the so-called
Augmented (verstärkte) REA, which was originally designed to be a kind of court of justice for German
railways. However, this expected early function of the REA was unrealized.14
What organisational problem can we identify in this, one of the highest Imperial bureaus?
First, we must point out the small-scale of the REA.
The REA located at Linkstrasse in Berlin has responsibilities of the German Empire as provided
by the Constitution:
1. carry out the correct supervision of the railway system;42. take care of the execution of the regulations contained in the Imperial Constitution, especially the laws
concerning the railway system and constitutional instructions; and3. resolve the disconnection of the emerging defects and evils with regard to the railway system.
To fulfil these national tasks, the approximately 20 established posts in the capital seemed
insufficient. As Table 1 shows, the eldest Councillor Körte called for an increase in personnel to ensure thesuccessful passage of the bill for railway nationalisation; however, Bismarck rejected his request in 1879.15
Some press comments also criticized the shortage in personnel and argued for an increase in the labour
force, especially for the statistical work.16
As we examine the organizational problem of the REA, keeping in mind the composition of thepersonnel is useful. As previously noted, among the seven Councillors, three were administrative officials(Körte, Kraefft and Gerstner) and four technicians (Gimbel, Streckert, Wiebe and Crause).17 Whether thisratio of technicians was reasonable is an important and difficult question. While the REA’s main activity
was considered about technical matters by the persons considered18 and the technicians held a majority ofthe board of executive positions, the chair during the vacancy of the President (1877–1890) was always
held by administrative officials Körte and Kraefft, the eldest Councillors. After the retirement of Körte in1887, Kraefft was promoted to the chairman of the board of Councillors through seniority. He immediately
had to submit a request for time off of three–four months because of his poor health,19 but he maintained
the position after returning to the office under Friedrich Schultz, who was the acting President (from 1887,
seemingly as a result of the absence of Kraefft). Schultz became the third president of the REA in 1890.
Before being appointed as the acting President of the REA, Shultz, who was born in 1840, was a jurist andworked in the directions of the Braunschweig Railway and the Alsace-Lorraine (Elsass-Lothringen)
Railway.20 During the third-quarter of the 19th century, loud cries of discontent over the advantage that theadministrative officials had over technical personnel in promotions and lifelong earnings were voiced
among technical officials in the Prussian State Railway.21 We can safely state that such predominance ofjurists in the Prussian State Railways was about the same in the REA.
However, the more crucial point is whether the arrangement of work in the REA was proper. We
consider whether a ‘small scale’ or ‘shortage of personnel’ existed in the REA, which was deplored by theinsider and the bystander only in this sense. A headquarters need not be large scaled. Because theaugmented REA was not realized as of the beginning of 1883, Körte did not request Bismarck to make up
for a complement of the Deputy Legal Members in the REA when von Monroya, a jurist sent on loan fromthe Duchy of Mecklenburg, was transferred to the High District Court in Rostock. Whether a supplement ofa vacancy itself was to be realized was left in the hands of the Duchy.22
In other words, the efficiency of the organisation depended on whether excessively heavy work
was to be done by administrative or technical officials in line of organisational order. 23 From thisviewpoint, we can guess whether the task of technical officials on the councillor-board was excessive or
inclined to the particular person(s). In 1883, after the death of Councillor Wiebe, a Prussian railway
technician, the REA requested the promotion of Hülfsarbeiter Emmerich, a technical official in the PrussianState Railways, to councillor.24 Because A. Maybach, ex-president of the REA and Minister of Public
5Works,25 interrupted this request to Bismarck, Körte refuted his claim that no need existed to fill a vacancy
of technicians by listing the diversity of the technical tasks by the late Wiebe. The tasks were as follows:
1. handling overall timetable;
2. handling reports of the railway administrations and other presentations concerning railway
accidents;
3. handling reports of railway administrations concerning late train arrivals;
4. handling matters concerning calling railway officers regarding the light railway formation;and5. managing transactions to prepare the railway for military use of railways in the event of war.
Adding to these tasks, Körte suggested the significance of Emmerich’s task in connection withcompiling annual statistics on railways for Germany. Meanwhile, he reminded the Chancellor on 3 August,1881 of his former request to fill the vacancy for another assistant.26
Evaluating the ability of the staff of the REA is difficult. Certainly, as indicated in Table 2, theCouncillors were expert and veteran state officials. However, they sometimes brought criticism into thecircle of state bureaucracy and on themselves through their achievements. The Councillor, Dr Gerstner,
made an official report as representative of the REA, and suggested a form for statistics on railway
transportation. However, his plan was almost ignored by the Imperial Statistic Office and the Prussian
Minister of Public Works.27 Even by starting to compile statistics on railways, Scheele first asked theAustrian railway engineer, M.M. Weber, for a view on the introduction of the forms of Prussian railway
statistics. 28
The criticism of the REA by A. Maybach is suggestive. When he was asked an opinion about
promoting Emmerich to take over Wiebe’s tasks, as was previously discussed, he answered in the negative.
I do not know personally the Permanent Assistant in Imperial Railway Office andGovernment Councillor Emmerich. … From the enquiry into his earlier bureau works,
Emmerich is a qualified and efficient technical official with apparently some too strong
self emotion and pigheadness. … I do not know if he has corrected himself in thesepoints by now. … Thanking your Excellency for considering my opinion, I think,therefore, that it would be better if the promotion of Emmerich to the Presentation
Councillor in the REA will be called off, and one will monitor him for a fixed period oftime—at least six month—to prove himself, because he has never held leadership as amember of railway managing bureau (direction). … By a cancel of his promotion hecannot feel neglected incidentally with reason, as in his position he has alreadyoutshined a great number of the longer-serviced and almost equally qualified technicalofficials in the Prussian State Railway Administration.
Maybach devalued the ability and achievement of one of the leading technicians in the REA andbegan to criticize the REA’s present situation. His remark on the REA’s organisational problems deserves
more than passing notice.
If one does not fill the Wiebe’s post temporarily, as long as I consider, it will not be an
6official disadvantage. The right field is not found at present as a supposed far-reachingeffectiveness of the REA, especially in the pure technical field. I must regard as a great,
important thing that the REA will keep in closer contact with the Prussian Ministry thatgrasps all action and will try its best to avoid an unnecessary over production of
documents (überflussige Vielschreiberei) that was the results of insufficient activity.29
The lack of contact with the Prussian Ministry of Public Works and the ‘overproduction of
documents’ must constantly be borne in mind in our further arguments.
Against Maybach’s opinion, Körte insisted again on supplementing Wiebe’s tasks in the REA bypromoting Emmerich; however, the promotion was realized at length on 6 October 1884 as Maybach
insisted. The realisation was the consequence of a petition by Körte on 10 September 1884, stressing that
‘Mr Minister of Public Works, as I can add on the basis of explicit authorisation, has no objection against
the promotion of Emmerich’.30 The Prussian Minister of Public Works had a significant influence on
decisions made related to the personnel affairs of the REA.
The REA’s personnel matters were not completely independent because of the promotion of highofficials through the organization and the appointment of Legal Members and Deputy Legal Members. By

supplementing Legal Members in another bureau (Nebenamten) with personnel reshuffle in their main
workplace, the choice of a new member was always entrusted to the governmental offices from which theycame.31
These aforementioned organisational problems of the REA that contemporaries pointed out werevalid in these ways. However, the question remains unanswered on the essential factors that caused thefailure of the REA as the headquarters of railway nationalisation.
Let us now examine the REA organisation in comparison with the other railway administrative
bodies, including the VDEV and German regional state railway offices, especially Prussian State Railways.
The VDEV was the international association of railway administrations in Germany and other western andcentral European states, and the ‘veteran champion of a mixed system of railroad governments’ in the1870s. Maybach took umbrage at the VDEV’s achievement of technical standardisation and its generally
admitted internationality.32
First, the high-ranked officials in the REA and the executive members of the VDEV did not differ
much in their careers. Table 3 shows the careers of the eight executive members of the VDEV from Prussia,
who were conferred the decoration to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Association by the Prussian
government in 1896. A comparison of Tables 2 and 3 shows that almost all of the men of both bodies were
bureaucrats. This is not just because the progress of Prussian state-purchase of private railway companies
after 1879 and especially since 1884, but when the Berlin-Stettin Railway in charge of the secretary of the
Association was state owned, the direction was grasped by the Prussian Royal Railway Direction in
Berlin.33 Clearly, as Kocka (1987) emphasized, the German bureaucracy in the 19th century was one of themost important personnel sources of railway managers. 34 They had in common a highly qualified
educational background and passed official certifying examinations for administrator, jurist or technician
without exception. When a railway officer was a technician, his engagement in the railway industry began7

just after the start of his career. All of them were entitled to ‘Councillor (Rath)’, ‘Privy Councillor(Geheimes Rath)’ or ‘Upper Privy Councillor (Geheimes Ober Rath)’ by the government. These characters
were given based on seniority. In REA, a Performed Councillor with the title of Regierungs Rat was
promoted automatically after six years to Ober-Regierungs Rat in the same position.35 For a VDEV
administrative member, the period of his engagement in the railway industry averaged (only) a little longer
than an administrative Councillor of the REA.
If no great (and probably no essential) difference existed in the quality of the personnel between
the bodies, problems can be found by comparing the structure of the organizations.
In the mid-1870s, the German state railway administrations had organisations with layers divided
into two categories—the central administration (Central-Verwaltungen) and the special administrative
branches (Specialle-Verwaltungenzweige). The Prussian State Railways with the most complicatedadministrative structure concerning the preliminary works (Vorarbeiten), concession (Konzessionswesen),organisation (Organisation) and building and operation institution (Bau- und Betriebs-Einrichtungen) had
eight strata from the Ministry of Public Works and Railway-Directions to the civil servants on site (railway
maintenance persons, brakemen, porters and so forth). The administration of the Wurttemberger State
Railway had a seven-layer organisation, and the Saxon and the Baden had six layers.36 The REA lacked
such a vertical structure and the line from the top to the bottom on site and it had no regional unit. Certainly,
this was often the case with a central bureau in the capital. However, the REA was not designed just to be
an advisory board for the government. For the purpose of this paper, is it unnecessary to pursue a closer
examination?
A comparison with the structures and personnel customs of the state railways and other railway
companies in Prussia may be helpful. To point out the existence of an internal labour market (ILM) and thecustom of ‘exceptional’ appointment of non-qualified persons to state officials in the Prussian (State)railways before the Prussian railway nationalisation goes to the very heart of our problem; what the REA
organisation lacked.
A comparison with some conditions related to the existence of an ILM (lifetime employment,
vertically divided structured career path (Laufbahn), non-wage befits and so forth) confirmed whether sucha market was formed in the Prussian State Railways (containing the private railways that were state ownedin the 1880s). Analysis of the personnel records allowed us to state that the employment relationship in the
Prussian State railways had some features of ILM. 37 Evidence of the establishment of long-time
employment and a promotion process was found in each railway line from the relatively early phase of thestate railways (since the 1850s). Each line likely had ILM before the progress of Prussian nationalisation.
One explanation for the results may be that the Prussian state railways from the 1850s operated a promotion
system with a job ladder that was rational and came from the view of introducing, securing and improving
general skills and region- and firm-specific employee skills. If each private company and line operated its
respectively peculiar ILM, the establishment of ILMs in the state railways was not an institutional decal orimitation of the Prussian state bureaucracy. The existence of plural ILMs fit in the regional-divided railway
lines with each non-uniform organisation structure with the view of accumulating region- and8company-specific skills. Workers had to earn such skills during OJT in the Prussian railways for which
off-JT was not sufficiently systematized before the 1880s.38
In the earlier phase of German railway development, during the line construction period in the
1850s and 1860s, cases of ‘irregular’ employment of non-qualified persons as government officials with thestate railway existed. According to the basic regulation for the employment of civil servants in the state
railways from 1850, only retired military men had the official capability of employment(Anstellungsfähigkeit) of low- and middle-ranking employees in the Prussian State Railways. The official
record of employment in the state railway 39 showed 74 ‘exceptional’ appointments of non-qualified
persons to the Prussian official railway sector, in other words, people who gained appointment to thegovernment office without authorisation. In the case of exceptional adoption, ‘the knowledge on the district’(‘genaue Lokal- und Sachkentniss’)40 and ‘the merchant negotiation’ were often treated as the basis,coinciding with one aspect of the circumstances in railway construction: to have knowledge of the regional
price difference for materials bought in the case that railway construction was recognized as the causa sinequa non of the railway engineer who ordered the construction work.41
One may point out the function of ‘exceptional’ appointment in the Prussian State Railways
during the ‘mixed system’ period before the nationalisation of the railways in the Prussian Kingdom. Thisappointment was a device to introduce and stabilize the necessary labour force that had regional and often
tacit knowledge. The ILMs were also considered such a device.42
For the early state railway system, some feedback between part of the work scene and theadministration nucleus was indispensable for the development of management skills. 43 The earlier
established railway administrations developed the structure for this purpose. The VDEV, the association ofrailway companies and administrations, also comprised such a structure related to feedback between layers.
In contrast, the REA, the central bureau in the German–Prussian capital, had no regional unit. Its
top-heavy structure and the higher-ups in the bureaucracy did not collect the tacit knowledge that came as
non-lettering information from those who were doing the actual work in each railway vertically.
This defect offers the key to understanding the criticism by Maybach, as previously noted. Aslong as collecting (regional) information onsite was necessary for (national) administration, the absence of
information suppliers at the relatively lower layers made it necessary for the REA to have a close
connection with an organisation that had branches semi-nationwide, such as the Prussian State Railways, asMaybach insisted. When these connections were insufficient, as Maybach severely commented, thedisproportionate emphasis on documents in the bureau was unavoidable. This organisational defect caused
a bureaucratic demerit when attempting to collect the information.
Here, we may safely assume that the REA had a defect in its personnel device for collecting
information, which was the essential organisational problem that caused the failure of administration inGerman railways.
However, room for further investigation exists. To possess actual proof for the argument, we must
focus on the compilation of the first set of statistics by the REA from the mid-1870s to the early 1880s. One
can compensate for lack of collection of individual embodied information by obtaining statistical data. If
9one may state that the REA succeeded in compensating for its lack of data in this manner, the core of its
organizational problem must be sought in other directions. An examination of the process of compilingrailway statistics provides the key to understanding this matter.

III
Kunz (1996) summed up an examination of the REA and listed the ‘the achievements of the REA’.
According to his evaluation, these achievements included ‘the introduction of unified instructions forrailway building, management and traffic; the regulation of connection with military, post and telegraphadministrations; the military organisation of railways during wartime;44 and the compilation of a unified
statistic for all German railways’.45 Even a critic of those days said that the REA’s activities did not go
beyond the statistical survey and recognized these statistics as the only achievement of the REA.46
However, a close examination of the process of compilation of the German national statistics of railways
shakes this general belief and provides a good example that supports our argument in II on theorganisational problems of the REA.
We will begin by gaining perspective of how the compilation of the national statistic progressedto the first issue in 1882. As shown in Table 4, before the foundation of the REA, the necessity of compiling
statistics on the national railway was fully recognized by the Reichstag. In the beginning, Dr Hammacher, amember of the Reichstag, pointed out the necessity of clarifying the actual situation of the newly acquired
Alsace-Loraine Railway in real numbers. He then referred more generally to the value of the publication of‘official, reliable, comparable statistical numbers about management and situation of railways for the all
German Empire, as have been made in the Prussian Kingdom for many years’. Ending his interpellation,
Hammacher stated that great value for such a statistic for the German Reichstag was plausible. Herzog, theFederal Commissioner (Bundeskommissarius), consented to the request and the Reichstag decided to ask
the Imperial Chancellor the annual publishing of the statistical survey of all railways in the German Empire
based on a uniform foundation, as well as a yearly report on the administration, management and buildingof Alsace-Loraine Railway.47
The compilation of railway statistics was one of the most counted tasks of the REA from themid-1870s, almost at the start of the REA. On 22 September 1873, the President of the newly established
REA (on 27 June of 1873), Scheele, was entrusted by the Chancellery. 48
This order was not fulfilled immediately. The first publication of German railway statistics for thebusiness year 1880–1881 was in 1882. From the very beginning, the complicated work needed significant
time, and the work was also suspended in the latter half of the 1870s. In 1877, for example, a French
advocate referred German railway statistics to the REA, but the REA replied that it was not able to comply
with his request to send statistics on German railways, because ‘such a thing on our part has not been set up
yet’. The REA recommended that the French apply either to each railway directions or the executive officeof the VDEV for this matter, ‘because the latter has published a statistic of the German and non-German
10railways that belong to the association for many years’.49 First, on April 1878, a plan for the standard
forms of booking and statistics on receipts and disbursements by German Railway administrations wasprovided and, in February 1879, after detailed revisions, the ‘Booking-Form of German Railways’ wascompleted. However, even the introduction of this form to all German railway administrations since
January or April 1880 resulted in the establishment of only a uniform base (gleichförmige Grundlage) of acompilation of national statistics.50 In fact, the complicated task of using table forms still existed, andfinishing the forms took six months and a total of 42 meetings in the REA.51
What caused this delay?
The REA explained that the delay was caused by the difficulty of the tasks, which resulted from
German particularism. Among German railways, the booking forms were full of variety and a collection ofnecessary records for the compilation of a uniform statistic from many land states was laborious. From 9
June 1874, when the REA inquired with all railways regarding introduction of the Prussian form of railway
statistics into future German statistics, a seesaw battle of arguments for and against the Prussian forms
continued to 1875. To investigate all calculation patterns of German railways and their opinions, and thenadjust individual needs with developing uniformity, the REA wasted too much time relying on the delegatesfrom the Prussian Ministry of Trade.52 The Elberfelder Zeitung pointed out the lack of cooperation fromeach land state administration in the presentation of the necessary materials, although the REA denied thateach government presented their materials ‘only in hesitation and with protest’, with the unsigned
marginalia ‘?!’.53
A shortage of personnel can also be noted. In 1880, with the prospect of publishing the firststatistics on German railways, the Buhren Zeitung commented on the necessity of increasing REA
personnel. Accordingly, an increase by 12 posts was to be requested in the next budget bill because ‘one
can now safely recognize that the current labour-forces in the REA were not enough to cope with the task’.
The newspaper said that everyone who knew the preceding Information Papers of Prussian Railways(Nachrichten über die Preussisichen Eisenbahnen), which were edited by the technician department of thePrussian Ministry of Public Works, would not be surprised that a great increase in the labour force of the
REA was needed to regularly publish new railway statistics, such as the ‘Nachrichten’. 54 Almost
simultaneously, the Berliner Zeitung criticized the shortage of personnel using the compilation of thestatistic and perfectly the same points.55
Directing our attention to the measures that both of these newspapers insisted on is helpful for
our understanding. The comments stressed that Maybach, Minister of Public Works, should lend the formsof ‘Nachrichten’ and should transfer a few officials in the technical department of his Ministry to the REA.
The remarks shed light on the essence of the personnel problem, which was a delay in the compilation of
statistics by the REA. We must focus on the REA’s lack of cooperation with the administration of thePrussian State Railway.
From the beginning, the REA depended on the Prussian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Public
Works (the forerunner of the Ministry of Public Works), especially to make the forms of the railway
statistics. Based on the advice from the Austrian railway engineer, M.M. Weber, who was chairman of the11Austrian imperial and royal commission, to work out a new Austrian railway statistics,56 the first President
Scheele asked the Ministry of Trade to inform the REA if reasons existed to alter the orders andcolumn-patterns of the Statistical Information Papers of the Prussian Railways.57
However, a communication gap existed between the REA and the Ministry.
To clarify, we use an example from the negotiations between these government offices on thecompilation of the statistics. From 1874 to 1879, the Prussian Ministry gave notices of 21 regulations used
to make the Statistical Information Papers for the Prussian Railway administrations. Among theseregulations, the REA was informed of eight. In 1874, three of all five regulations that were noticed from1872 to 1874 were informed to the REA. From 1875 to 1878, almost none were informed; none in 1875,
none of three in 1876, one of four in 1877 and none of three in 1878. However, three of five were informedin 1879.58 The promise of the Prussian Ministry of Trade in response to Scheele’s request in 187459 was
broken from August 1875 to May 1879. In the autumn of 1878, the newly separated Ministry of Public
Works was led by Maybach, the ex-President of the REA, but two regulations were not informed even in
1879.
Certainly, the contribution of Maybach’s Ministry was decisive. In the previously described case,one must pay attention to the dates of the issue of regulations by the Prussian Ministry and their notices to
the REA, in addition to the number of correspondences. The two regulations of 21 October 1872 and 28
February 1873, before the establishment of the REA, were informed to the REA on 20 March 1874. On 8
April 1873, a notice of completion of the forms of 23 March 1873 was provided. From 1875, two were
informed on the same day of notices of the regulation and one was informed in three weeks. The regulationon the alteration of the form of the tables that was noticed on the Prussian railway directions on 2 July 1879
was informed on 2 June 1879, before the Prussian notice. The Prussian Ministry noticed the REA of theregulation in advance,60 illustrating the re-start of the statistic compilation at the REA at the end of the1870s with the help of the Ministry of Public Works.
During that final state of compilation for the first national railway statistics at the turn of thedecades, lively discussions occurred between the offices. Detailed investigations on the plan of table forms
were held intensively by cooperating with the Prussian Ministry of Public Works. From 1 December 1879
to 10 May 1880, the Commission had 42 meetings at the REA. The Commission consisted of five members
from the Prussian Ministry of Public Works, one (Schultz, the future President of the REA) from theImperial Office of Administration of the Imperial Railways (Reichsamt für die Verwaltung derReichseisenbahnen) and two (Gerstner and Streckert) from the REA. After approval by the Commission at
the last meeting, the REA ‘immediately’ sent 141 copies of the form to the Prussian Minister of Public
Works (and other German railway administrations, including the Bavarian State Railways) on 30 May
1880.61
However, immediately after the forms were sent to the railway administrations in the German
Empire, the press criticized Maybach’s lack of cooperation, as previously noted. Because their argument for
the need for an increase in personnel to compile statistics coincided clearly with the request for
maintenance of special directions for creating statistical tables in the REA by Körte,62 we suppose that the12press comments reflected the REA’s intention. However, in 1879, the government rejected the request forincreased personnel, as shown in Table 1.
Here, we recollect the critical comment regarding the performance of the REA in the 1883 by
Maybach, as cited in II of this paper. The criticism of the REA’s lack of cooperation with the Prussian State
Railway accorded with Bismarck’s reconsideration in 1877, after the second bill of law for nationalisation
was discarded. Bismarck’s remark that the leadership of the REA was identified with that of the PrussianRailways63 implied his regret over the essential failure of the organisation of the REA.
Maybach stressed that the REA would maintain closer contact with his Ministry but did not
expect that the two entities were on equal footing, especially after his transfer to the Prussian Ministry.
What Maybach meant by keeping close contact with the REA was to subordinate it to his Ministry. Under
Maybach, the Prussian State Railway administration was the perfect working bureaucratic organization,
where the objectives of the central leadership were implemented at the lowest regional levels and thenecessary information was absorbed from each level (that is, each official rank) through various paths.
Maybach did not have a good opinion of the REA, because it was not possible for an office without such awell-functioned organisational structure to fulfil a complicated and nationwide task independently.
As the Imperial office under the ‘President’, the high officer directly appointed by the Emperor,
the REA was not able to renounce its independence. From the start, the linkage with the Prussian Ministryof Public Works was inevitable for the national office without regional units, but perfect identification with
the Prussian Ministry was impossible for a national office consisting of non-Prussian officials. The
relationship with the Prussian Ministry had to be very delicate. The vacancy of the presidency after the
resignation of Maybach was considered the symbol of the REA’s impotence. This impotence was reflectedin the bureaucratic inflexibility of personnel affairs not only in the REA but also around the Imperial
government. However, in a sense, it could help relieve the strained situation. For the eldest Councillor
Körte, as the de-facto acting President, Maybach was his ex-superior in the REA. The activity’s dependence
on the Prussian Minister of Public Works pretended to be very personal. However, Körte, who was unable
to be promoted to the presidency, was a little older than Maybach and his career had no contact point with
the Prussian railway office before entering the Imperial offices (see Table 2).
Nevertheless, Maybach did not consider such a delicacy. When the REA and the Prussian
Ministry of Public Works became successful through a large part of the compilation of statistics on the firstnational railway, Maybach began to compile these distribution statistics (transportation of goods;
Güterbewegung) on German railways without consulting the REA.
Since then, the REA has never been unconcerned with the compilation of national distribution
statistics. These statistics were originally part of its task to compile railway statistics. At the latest, in 1876,
Councillor Gerstner sent to the President (Maybach) the plan with reference to the former research andprimarily after the trial products by the VDEV. This plan was transferred to the Imperial Statistics Office,but they returned it on 16 May 1877, replying that it had made the ‘Promemoria’ for recording the
distribution by the German Railway and the plan for such recording and its necessary regulations, and sent
them on 26 April to the REA. Beek, the Statistic Office, gave notice that a commission to compile the13distribution statistics would be called in the near future and recommended the REA wait for the progress on
its results of the commission.64 The notice of regulation of goods transportation in the Prussian Railway
Directions was not informed by the Ministry of Trade in 1876, because it believed that the REA was notcompiling such a type of statistic.65 In this field, the REA tended to be criticized by the colleague offices
and was not expected to succeed.
Meanwhile, on 15 July 1881, the Imperial Home Office (Kaiseramt des Innern) warned the REA
that the Prussian Ministry of Public Works would collaborate with the Imperial Statistic Office in compiling
distribution statistics.66 Boetticher of the Home Office informed the REA of the development in 1880
through a copy of a petition letter to Bismarck,67 and the list of members of the commission in the
Ministry.68 After hearing the news that Maybach called a meeting of the representatives of the PrussianRailway Directions in the Ministry, the REA remained tranquil as it was criticized and claimed to demand
an explanation of ignoring the REA from the Minister. According to the reply to the Home Office, the belief
in the value of cooperating to compile such a statistic was expressed, ‘taking into consideration thecompilation of general railway statistic that arose here’.69 Maybach responded curtly to the inquiry from
Bismarck, as follows:…The Director of Imperial Statistic Office, Imperial Privy Upper Governmental
Councillor, Dr Becker, is given a special invitation to the conference. Giving consent to
the wish expressed in the letter of the 11th August of this year, R.E.A. 8414, I have let
the REA attend the conference of commission as it likes.70
The experience of cooperation with the REA for the compilation of the first set of national
railway statistics after many twists and turns confirmed the conviction of the Prussian Minister of Public
Works that the REA had limited organizational ability and deserved no further cooperative task for thenational unification of German railways.

Conclusion and Outlook

Therefore, we conclude the following. (1) Because of the discarding of the Nationalisation Law,
the REA, as headquarters of unification of German railways, faced an organisational problem that it had no
vertical structure with its own regional units. Its top-heavy organisational structure and the higher-ups in
the bureaucracy did not collect non-lettering information from those who were doing the actual work at
each railway. This defect caused bureaucratic inflexibility, including the criticized disproportionate
emphasis on documents. (2) To supplement the organisational problem, the REA was linked with a perfectworking bureaucratic organization that engaged in interactive information feedback in a vertical structure,that is, the Prussian State Railways under the Ministry of Public Works. (3) The failure in the linkage with
the Prussian State Railway and ambiguous jurisdiction in railway administration led to the malfunctioningof the REA and unsatisfactory achievement of its activity to promote national unification of German
railways.
14

From these observations, we determine the outlook that this failure reflected the precarious
position of the Reich (Empire) itself. The Reich was unstable as an economic unit. More recently, Wolf
(2006) showed the regional segmentation of the German market on its way to national unification in the
19th century. 71 Viewed from this, the ‘German nation state’ in the 19th century was economicallyincorporeal. Therefore, we can say that the German national economy was left dangling between theeconomy of each region and the European sphere. The Reich economy was not a place where innumerable
market information assembled automatically, and its central government had no tool for collecting such
numberless information, with exception to the case of institutional compulsion. Such a compulsion had alimit, as was noted in one case of German particularism in the railway policy. In this sense, the miscarriage
in the German railway nationalisation by the Reich governmental bureau was unavoidable.

15

<Table 1>

Abbreviated chronological table of the REA and German railway nationalisationYear
the REA: Organisation and Personeel

Law/Oridinance

1871 The new Reich's railway policy belonged to the Reichskanzleramt.

Reich Constitution (Reichsverfassung) Art.4142.43.44
45, 47 provide the authority of railway nationalisation.

1872
10.May"A Reich-Railway Auuthority(eine Reichs-OberaufsichtsInstanz f. d. Eisenbahnwesen)" was planned and introduced.
= not passed in the Reichstag.
1873
26.Apr.

7.MarchElben(Wurtt. Reichstagsabgeordnete)

Plan for establishmentof an Imperial bureauof minitoring Railways

27.JuneBisnarck
as Forein Minister

Bill for the law concerning reimbursement of railway officials
introduced in Reichstag.

Rundschreiben an d. Deutsch. Missionen

Bismarckto the Emperor

8.JulyF.W.Scheele

16.Sep.

Activity began(budget: 59100 Mark)Law of the Establishment of Imperial RailwayOffice( Gesetz ueber die Einrichtung desReichseisenbahnamtes )1.President ( Prasident ) (-9.5.1874)

1874
May
9.May

1.Bill for Imperial Railway Law ( 1. Entwurf eines Reuchseisenbahngesetzes )……withdrawal
Scheele resigned.

17.May10.Aug,Bismarck

A.MaybachDecree concerning "the Getting of a statistic surveyof the complaint about railways".

2. President (-26.2.1877)

1875
April

2.Bill for Imperial Railway Law ( 2. Entwurf eines Reuchseisenbahngesetzes )……withdrawal
1876 "The REA revealed its impotence"(Kunz(1996)) .
1877

Feb.

Maybach resigned.

May

Bismarck regret the organisational failure that there was no identification of the REA with the Prussian State Railways.

Dec.

Bismarck remarked "Nationalisation has failed".
Influence of the REA in the railway policy was deminishing.

1879
March
Maybach assumed the office of the Ministry of Public Works.
May

Bill for prussian railway "Verstaatlichung"(making railways state-owned) to the Bundesrat="Prussia could go it alone."= the acquisition of private firams by Prussian State
A bill permitting an "Verstaatlichung" of Prussian railways was passed into the law.
Request of increase of personnel in the REA was not agreed by Bismarck

Dec.

1880
Feb.

Prussia: Law empowered the Prussian State to proceedwith the purchase of private companies.
1884

Dez.

Considering whether to continue or abolish the REA in the Reichstag

1885
Juni

Bismarck ordered not to present a memorandom for post increase.
1887 Korte resigned and Kraeffet took over the heading of the bureau.
Schultz became "temporary leader ( komissarischer Leiter )"1888
Schultz complained the ignorance by the Bureau of the Majo-Domo and its decreasing significance.
1889
Problem of the mobilising the army
;Bismarck und Maybach rejected the military request.

1890
18.Dez.
F.Schultz

Sources

3. President (-31.12.1909)

Kunz, Wolfgang (1996) „Vom Reichseisenbahnmat (1830-1919) zur Gegenwart“, Jahrbuch für Eisenbahngeshichte 28, pp.5-26.
Mitchell, Allan (2000) The Great Train Race. Railways and the Franco-German Raivalry , New York/Oxford.

16

17
1830

1830

1819

Careerborn in1861 Prussian municipal service

1846 holder of lawyer-post (Assessor)
1848 military service
1848 councillor by apperception judgement
1852 military service
1870 lawer and notary by Prussian judgement
1872 "Kammergerichtrath"1873 Imperial state official

occupational careeryear

R43/1448, pp.26-28.

R43/1448 pp.26-28, 47.

R43/1447 pp.37-38, 41-42.

Sources

1863 Prussian private railway company
1867 into Prussian officials
Railway-Building and Management Inspectoryin the Prussian State Railway
1881 into Imperial officials; REA
1884 Councillor of REA

1881 Councillor of REA

1880 Councillor of REA

R43/1447 pp.7-8;
R43/1448. p.1. pp.15-18.

R43/1448, pp.26-28.

R43/1447 pp.80-81

by many Kurf.Hesse officialbodies
R43/1448 pp.26-28
1852-53 Study in Poltech. And Uni. In Munich-65 by railways on Hesse, Prussia, Russia and Bavaria,
1865 Railway Inspector by ex-Hesse State Railway
1868 Buiding-Foreman by the Railway Technical Bureau
in the Pruss. Ministy of Commerce
1869 Railway-Building-Inspector
1872 teacher at gl.Bau-Akademie
1872 Buiding-Director in the German Railway Building Company
1873 into Imperial officials;REA
1875

1868 Chancellery (Kanzleramt) 1850 into official service
as Railway expert

1877 REA

enter in railway sector
year1848 Building Trainee of Kurf.Hess

1842 Kgl.Oberlandesgericht
in Glogenfirst job
year

Bundesarchiv Berlin, 1447-1448, Akten betreffend die Mitglieder und hoehren Beamten des Reichseisenbahnamtes, Bd.1-2.

* "Admin"; administrative official, Tech.; technical officials

Source1890 Councillor

Tech.

1881 Permanent Assistant

Emmerich

Tech.

Admin.

1896 Deputy of President Admin.

Tech.

dead

1886 Deputy of President Admin.

field

Tech.

1873 Permanent Assistant1875 Councillor

1877 Deputy of President

Reitring REA
year

GimbelHermann

Entering REA
year

Cruse

Streckelt

Gerstner

Kraefft

Körte

Name

<Table 2> Careers of the Councillors of the Imperial Railway Office (Reichseisenbahnamt) in the 1870s and 1880s.

<Table 3>Prussian recipient of order in VDEV in the beginning of 1890s.
Name

Entering VDEV
year
position

Title / Orden Present Occupation

Adress

Careerborn infirst job

Entering of railway sector
year

from

1 Kranold

Chair of theadministration
office1893 (Vorsitzenden d.
Geschaefts
fuehrenden
Verwaltun g)

WGORPresident of
the royal
direction ofrailways in
Berlin2 Magnus

at the same time
1882 of entering
GRR
officials

Upper Privy
councillourof
the royal
direction ofrailways in
Berlin1893 Berlin

1838

1865

probationary of
judical courtin theadministra
1867 tion of
the staterailways

Berlin1839

1867

probationary of
judical court

1870 Railway

job careerother orders

President of theroyal1884 direction ofrailways in
Breslau

BerlinHamburger-

1873

Company

Privatecompany(Firmen F.Mart.
Magnus)(…
dissolution）

RAO 4.cl, 2.cl

RAO 4.cl., KO ３.ｃｌ.

1879 assistant worker of Berlin-Anhalt Railway Company
1880 member of the direction of the B-A- railway vompany
1882 Railway Director (by the state-ownisation of the railway)
1886 Govermental Councillour
1891 Upper Governmental Councillour
1891 director of the department in royal direction of railways in Berlin
1895 retired of his official post(by the Law of Railway officers in 1894)
in the committee
of works of use
of wagons(Anschluss fur GRR
Angelegenheiten
derWagenbenutzung)

3 Brecht

Railway Director

1878 Lubeck

1841

1870

probationary of
judical courtin theadministra
1872 tion of
the staterailways1872 probationay of governmental office

1876 member of railway direction
1878 administave member of Lubeck Buchen Railway Company(after the retirement of state railways)

Chair of the direction of Lubeck-Buchen Railway Company

member of manykinds of
Privy
committees
ROA 3.cl Counting
1896？ Berlin(Mitglied
Councillour
verschiedener
Ausschusse)
direktor of Breslauer Diskontbank(after the retirement of civi service)

4 Schubart

many kinds ofworks of VDEV

5 Kruger

ROA 3.cl Railway Director("Er hat in seiner
Stellung vielfach
Gelegenheit
gehabt, Interesse
fuer dieAngelegenheiten
des Vereins zu
bekunden.").

6 Koch7 Schubert

Dr. juri.

1873

probationary of
judical courtin theadministra
1873 tion of
the staterailwaysprobationary ofcounting
1874 office(Rechnungs
Assesor)?

1846 1871?

probationary of
judical court(1894?)

in 185860 publishof studies Berlinof German
railwaysim

ROA 3.cl

1825

Berlin(18581860)

probationary ofHessiangovernment
officein Magdeburg

1861

1871 probationary of judical courtin the state govermental office

chiefeditor ofthe organ
of VDEV

civilian
additional
employerin thedirectionof Lower
Schilesia
Railway(Civil1868 Supernum
erar beiderDirektion
derNiedersch
lesischMarkisch
Eisenbahn)

1847

RAO 4.cl

1882 Counting Councillour
member of railway directions
Privy Counting
Councillour andmember of the1894 General
direction of
Seehandlung
Society(after the retirement of state railways)

judical andmanagemental
memberof thedirectionof thecompany

chair of thedirection of
East
PrussianSouth
RailwayCompany

chief editor of theorgan of VDEV(Zeitung deschief editor
Vereins
ROA 3.cl of the organ
Deutscherof VDEV
Eisenbahnverwalt
ungen)

secretary of
VDEV
administration(Sekretaer des
VDEVverwaltungen )1845

1895 Ko:nigsberg

EK, RAO

1874

Railway
management
secretary(EisenbahnBetriebs
Sekretaer )1875 railway traffic inspector ( Eisenbahn Verkehrs Kontroleur )1890 secretary of VDEV

8 Iblitzchair of office of
VDEV(BureauROA 3.clVorsitzender
des VDEV )Berlin?

?
?
*deputationof thedistrict
court
in
Ruegenwalde
by special committee
in the office of a lawyer

WGOR: Real Privy Upper Governmental Councillour (Wirkl. Geheim. Regierungsrath)
GRR: Privy Governmental Councillour (Geheim. Regierungsrath)
RAO: Red Adler Decoration (Roten Adler Orden)
EK: Iron Cross (Eisernes Kreuz)
KO: Cross Decortation (Kreuz Orden)cl, ; classsourcePreuss. Kultur Besitz Geheimes Staatsarchiv Berlin-Dahlem
Rep.89 Geh.Zivilkabinett, juengere Periode,Nr.29497, pp.47-48.

I.HA

18

1861 office of the VEDV

head of the1879 office of the
VDEV

19

Date

M.M.Weber, the Austrian railway engineer, advised the REA about the use of Prussian forms.(*2)

27.Dec.

Sources

1882

The press comments stressed the significance of increase of personnel for ongoing and future compilation of statistic in the REA, criticising Maybach. (*6)

AugustBundesarchiv Berlin, R4101 Reichseisenbahnamt, 476-478, Aufstellung einer Eisenbahnstatistik für das Deutsche Reich, Band 1-3.
Kunz, Wolfgang (1996) „Vom Reichseisenbahnmat (1830-1919) zur Gegenwart“, Jahrbuch für Eisenbahngeshichte 28, pp.5-26.

"Vorwort" in:Statistik im Betriebe befindlichen Eisenbahen Deutschlands nach den Angaben der Eisenbahn-Verwaltungen bearbeiter im Reichs-Eisenbahn-Amt , Band.1.
pp.I-VII.

The publishing of the first Germany railway statistic (“Statistik im Betriebe befindlichen Eisenbahen Deutschlands nachden Angaben der Eisenbahn-Verwaltungen bearbeitet im Reichs-Eisenbahn-Amt Band.1”)

The REA sent "immediately" the copies of the form to the Prussian Ministry of Public Works and other German railway administrations
and asked them the fulfullment and send-back of the tables in 3-5 months. (*5)

The 42nd and last meeting about making of the table forms was held and finished the form.

30.May1880 10.May

The first commisionary meeting about making of the table forms was held.

The closing conferrence in the REA provided "Standard Bokking form of German Railways".

1879 25.Feb.27.Feb.

1.Dec.

The negotiations with representatives of land governments and the VDP for thecommisionary advices in the REA.
…… The result was a plan for "Standard Form of the Booking and Statistic of Receipts and Disbursements of German Railway Administrations".
…… The plan was was discussed article by article and was revised by the commissionary advices.

1878 4.Apr.9.Apr.

The Prussian Ministry of Public Works sent the list of 21 regulations on the Prussian railway administrations (1872-1879) to the REA. (*4)

The Association of German Private Railways (Verein der Deutschen Privatbahnen;VDP) sent its opponent plan and the REA tested it.

1877 Jan.

6.Sept.

In accordance with the commissionary advices from the delegates of Prussian Ministry of Trade the REA made the form of calculation and referred to
all German railways to the introduction of it.
…… The drift of opinion in German railway administrations was toward the introduction of the form.

German railways expressed the opinions about the form of REA. ; with strong oppsition from the railways that had not introduced
the Prussian forms.

The REA made a form of budget pattern on the basis of Prussian State Railways and referred to all German railways to the possibility of
introduction.

1876 May

9.JuneThe REA asked the Prussian Ministry of Trade to inform of the needs of revisions in the foregoing orders and colum-pattern in theStatistical Information Paper of Prussian Railways. (*3)

The Chancellery entrusted the REA with the task of compilation of the railway statistic. (*1)

22.Sept.

1874 24.Jan.

The Law of Establishment of the Imperial Railway Office (Gesetz u:ber die Einrichtung desReichseisenbahnamtes)

The resolution of the Reichstag; calling upon the Chancellery "the yearly publishig of statistical survey in the uniform basis."27.June1873 11.June

-1875

Year

<Table 4> The progress of compilation of the first German railway statistic by the Imperial Railway Office (the REA).

Bibliography
Manuscript Sources

Bundesarchiv Berlin
R43

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Reichskanzlei
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dieMitglieder

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Eisenbahn, Band 1.
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Geheimes Staatsarciv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin-Dahlem
I. HA Rep.89(GstA)

Geheimes Zivilkabinett, Jüngere Periode

29419-452 Eisenbahnbeamte: (29423: Eisenbahnpersonal; no. 29449: Ordens- und
Titelverleihungen im Bereich der preußischen Eisenbahnverwaltungen, 1845-1918.
29497 Verein deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen. Internationale Eisenbahnkongresse.
Verein für Eisenbahnkunde. 1850-1912.

Periodicals

Eisenbahn Zeitung
Handbuch für das Deutsche Reich 1882
Statistik im Betriebe befindlichen Eisenbahen Deutschlands nach den Angaben derEisenbahn-Verwaltungen bearbeiter im Reichs-Eisenbahn-Amt , Band.1.
Stenograph Deutscher Reichstages
Schmedding (1884), Das Unterrichtswesen für die mittleren und niederen Bematen der
Staatseisenbahverwaltung in Eisenbahn Archiv 7.Jg(1884), pp.441-448.

Publications

Banzawa, Ayumu (2006), Doitsu-Kogyoka-ni-okeru-Tetsdogyo (The Railways in German
20Industrialisation), (In Japanese), Yuhikaku;Tokyo,.
Bogart, Dan (2009), Nationalizations and the Development of Transport Systems: Cross-Country
Evidence from Railroad Networks, 1860-1912, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 69, pp.202-237.
Brophy, James M. (1998), Capitalism, Politics, and Railroads in Prussia 1830-1870, Columbus,
1998.
Fremdling, Rainer (1975), Eisenbahnen und deutsches Wirtschaftswachstum, 1840-1879. Ein
Beitrag zur Entwicklungstheorie und zur Thorie der Infrastructur, Dortmund, 1975.
Kech, Edwin (1911 ), Geshichte der deutschen Eisenbahnpolitik, Leipzig.
Kocka, Jürgen (1997), Eisenbahnverwaltung in der industriellen Revolution ： Deutsch
Amerikanische Vergleiche. Historia Sociallis et Oeconomica. Festschrift für W. Zorn zum 65. Geburtstag,
VSWG, Beiheft 84, Ed. H. Kellenbenz u. H. Pohl, Wiesbaden/Stuttgart 1987: pp.259-277.
Kunz, Wolfgang (1996), Vom Reichseisenbahnmat (1830-1919) zur Gegenwart’, Jahrbuch fürEisenbahngeshichte 28, pp.5-26.
Mitchell, Allan (2000), The Great Train Race. Railways and the Franco-German Raivalry, New
York/Oxford.
Then, Volker (1997), Eisenbahnen und Eisenbahnunternehmer in der Industriellen Revolution.
Ein preussisch/deutsch - englischer Vergleich, Göttingen.
Tooze, J. Adam (2001), Statistics and the German State 1900-1945, Cambridge.
Wolf, Nick (2009), Was Germany ever united? Evidence from Intra- and International Trade,
1885-1933, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 69, pp. 846-881.
Yamada, Tetsuo (2001), Doitsu-Shihonsyugi to Tetsudo (German Capitalism and Railways), (InJapanese), Nihon-Hyoron-Sya:Tokyo.
Ziegler, Dieter (1996), Eisenbahnen und Staat im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung. Die
Eisenbahnpolitik der deutschen Staaten im Vergleich, Stüttgart, 1995 ;1

As Mitchell (2000) correctly noted, the establishment of state ownership (‘Verstaatlichung’) of therailways was often a different concept from the nationalisation (‘Nationalisierung’) that occurred inGermany in the 19th century. In the divided German Federation (Deutsches Bund) and its successor, theGerman Empire (Reich), many regional land state (Länder) governments made railways in each of thestates their own properties (‘verstaatlichen’), but state-owned railways were split into regional systems anda newly established German nation state (Reich) owned almost no railways (except the newly captured
Elsas-Lothoringen Railway). ‘To speak of “the nationalisation of the Prussian railways from 1879 onwards”
is perfectly oxymoronic’ (p.129). The ‘railway nationalisation’ that Bismarck planned was the unification of
those regional railway systems into the German national system, and his goal was for the Reich to own
almost all German railways. In this sense, the railway nationalisation that Bismarck attempted in the 1870s
was about consolidating railways under the Reich, that is, the ‘Verreichung’ of railways. He and his
comrade, Prussian Minister A. Maybach, progressed the Prussian state-owned railways with a view tocompensate for the error of this Reich-wide unification of railways (Mitchell 2000, pp.127-129). In thispaper, we need to restrict the phrase ‘German railway nationalisation’ to its original use.
2
For example, Kech (1911).
3
Yamada (2001), pp.181-190.
21

4

See Bogart (2009).
Fremdling (1975), p.60.
6Fremdling (1975), p.60, fn.210.
7
Yamada (2001), pp.165-190.
8
Mitchell (2000), p.84.
9Mitchell (2000), p.129.
10
Kunz (1996), p.9.
11
Kunz (1996), p.22.
12
Kunz (1996), p.9.
13
From (Schutz) to N.N. 17.02.1895, BA R43/1448, pp.26-28:26.
14
Handbuch für das Deutsche Reich 1882, pp.166-167.
15
Kunz (1996), p.15.
16
See fn 54 and fn 55.
17
From (Schutz) to N.N. 17.02.1895, BA R43/1448, pp.26-28.
18
From Maybach to Bismarck, 07.02.1883, BA R43/1447, p.10 (1-3): (3); From (Schutz) to N.N.
17.02.1895, BA R43/1448, pp.26-28; 26-27.
19
From Körte to Bismarck, 28.02.1887, BA R43/1447, p.75; From Kräfft to Bismark, 01/05.1887,
R43/1447, p.76; From Kräfft to Bismark, 01/05.1887, BA R43/1447, p.82.
20
Kunz (1996), p.9.; BA R43/1448, p.29.
21
Gottgetreu, W., Zur Sozialen Frage der höhere Staatsbahn-Beamten in Preussen, GStA, I.HA Rep.89(2.2.1), 29428, pp.289-290.
22
From Körte to Bismarck, 12.01.1883, BA R43/1447. pp.3-5.
23
As was previously noted, Körte once made a very negative comment on the need to replace a Deputy
Legal Member and maintain the number of personnel because the Augmented REA had not realized by
1883. From Körte to Bismarck, 12.01.1883, BA R43/1447, pp.3-5.
24
From Körte to Bismarck, 30.01.1883, BA R43/1447, pp.7-9.
25
From Maybach to Bismarck, 07.02.1883, BA R43/1447, p.10 (1-3).
26
From Körte to Bismarck, 10.02.1883. R43/1447, pp.12-14.
27
From Gerstner to Maybach, 30.07.1876, BA R4101/137, pp.2-4, pp.5-59; From Beeke to the REA,
16.05.1876, BA R4101/137, p.68, pp.69-84.
28
From Weber to Scheele, Wien 27.12.1873, BA R4101/476. unpaged
29
From Maybach to Bismarck, 07.02.1883, BA R43/1447, p.10 (1-3).
30
From Körte to Bismarck,18.09.1884, BA R43/1447, p.28.
31
For example, Schmalz, the Councillor of the Prussian Supreme Court and a Deputy Legal Member (from27 October 1884) was transferred to the Councillor of the Imperial Court (Reichsgerichtsrath), and Körteof the REA asked Bismarck for permission to request the Prussian Ministry of Justice to indicate a suitableperson to fill the vacancy with a Prussian judiciary (From Körte to Bismark, 14.05.1886, BA R43/1447,
p.33 ). About one and a half months later, Kraefft asked for the appointment of Roehsel to the post, who
was a councillor from the Prussian Supreme Court. He was nominated by the Justice Minister (FromKraefft to Bismarck, 27.06.1886, BA R43/1447, p.35-36.)
32
Mitchell (2000), pp.127, 138-139.
33
From Theilen (Minister of Public Works) to the German Emperor (Wilhelm II), Berlin, 02.02.1896,
5

GstA I.HA Rep.89, 29497, pp.39-43: 41.
34
Kocka (1987), pp.264―272.
35
For example, about the case of Gimbel, see From Kraefft to Bismarck, 14.04.1887, BA R43/1447,
pp.80-81.
36‘Schematische Zusammenstellung der Organisation der Staatseisenbahn-Verwaltungen sowie d. Bauund Betriebseinrichtungen derselben in Preussen, Krg. Sachsen, Wüttembern, Baden, Oldenberg’, in Kinke(ed.),’Generelle Anordnungen über Vorarbeiten, Konzessionswesen, Organisation sowie Bau- und
Betriebseinrichtungen, von dem deutschen Landesregierungen erlassen sind: Bemerk: Zusammenstellung
der auf das Schreiben des Reichs-Eisenbahn-Amts No. 6432 vom 6. October 1874 eingenommen Berichte’,
09.1880, BA R4101/1, pp.64-74: 69-74.
22

37

Banzawa (2006) used as a data source the examination of personnel documents of state railway
employees primarily in the mid-1870s and 1880s; GstA, I.HA. Rep.89 (2.2.1),.29 419-452(Eisenbahnbeamte). They are part of the official records of the Royal Cabinet (Zivilkabinett), including
petitions to the King. These official documents on railway civil servants were sent from each line andcompany to the Prussian Ministry of the Trade, Industry and Public Works (the Ministry of Trade), andwere then brought up to the Prussian Privy Civil Cabinet (the Royal Cabinet).
38
The ex-private railway employees had to be re-educated to adopt the state bureaucratic institutions (inparticular, accounting methods) after nationalisation of the railways in the 1880s (Schmedding (1884),
p.448). This also suggested the existence of firm-specific knowledge of the office work process.
39
GstA I.HA, Rep.89 (2.2.1), 29419-452 (Eisenbahnbeamte: 29423 : Eisenbahnpersonal; 29449 : Ordensund Titelverleihungen im Bereich der preußischen Eisenbahnverwaltungen 1845-1918).
40
See GstA I. HA., Rep.89 (2.2.1) 29421, pp.154,189.
41
Engelhardt, Betrachtungen über den Eisenbahnbau in: Eisenbahn Zeitung 24 Aug.; 31 Aug.; 7 Sep.
1845:pp.288-89; 295-297;303-306, p.288.
42
See Banzawa (2006), Chapter 8 (Dai-8-Syo).
43
Then (1997), pp.353-354.
44
Mitchell (2000) had a similar view on this point. ‘Though scorned at the time and sometimes ridiculedsince, the REA was in reality an active agent in representing military interests in the minutiae of planningand preparation’ (p.24).
45
Kunz (1996), p. 23.
46
Kunz (1996), p.15.
47
Stenograph Deutscher Reichstag－50 Sitzung am 11. Juni 1873, P.1093.
48
From the Chancellery to Körte, 22.11.1873, BA R 4101/476, unpaged.
49
From Körte to Antonu Noulliet (Advocate, Paris Rue Faitbout 49), 08.04.1877, BAR 4101/476,
unpaged.
50‘Vorwort’ in: Statistik im Betriebe befindlichen Eisenbahen Deutschlands nach den Angaben derEisenbahn-Verwaltungen bearbeiter im Reichs-Eisenbahn-Amt Band.1, 1882, p.I-UII: VI.
51‘Zur Beratung des im Reichs-Eisenbahn-Amt angestallten Entwurfs von Tabellen-Formen’ (10.05.1880),
BA R/4101/477, unpaged.
52‘Vorwort’ in: Statistik im Betriebe befindlichen Eisenbahen Deutschlands , p.V.
53
Elberfelder Zeitung (04.02.1879), 07.02.1879, BA R 4101/476, unpaged.
54
Bühren Zeitung, 380, in: 01.08.1880, BA R4101/478, unpaged.
55
Berliner Zeitung, 178, in; 03.08.1880, BA R4101/478, unpaged.
56
From Weber to (Körte), 27.12.1873, BA R 4101/476, unpaged.
57
From Scheele to Aschenbach, 24.01.1874, BA R4101/476. unpaged.
58‘Uebersicht der fürdie Aufstellung der statistischen Nachrichten von den Preussisichen Eisenbahnen an
die Bahn-Verwaltungen ergangenen Bestimmungen’ (From the Ministry of Public Works to the REA,
12.09.1879), BA R/4101/477, unpaged.
59
See fn.57.
60
See fn.58.
61
From (Körte) to Maybach, 30.05.1880, BA R/4101/478, unpaged.
62
See fn. 61.
63
Kunz (1996), p.15.
64
See fn.27.
65
See fn.58.
66
From Boettiche to ‘the President of the REA’, 15.97.1881, BA R4101/137, pp.87-101:87.; The
ambitious self-consciousness of the Reich’s statisticians in the Imperial Statistical Office as pointed out inTooze (2001), p.21, is worth a passing mention.
67
From (Maybach) to Bismarck, 25.06.1881, BA R4101/137,pp.87-101:88-89.
68
BA R4101/137, pp.87-101:90-96.
69
From (Körte) to Boetticher, 11.08.1881,R4101/137. p.101.
70
From Maybach to Bismarck, 14.10. 1881, R4101/137, p.104.
71
Wolf (2009).
23