Islam and the State in Indonesia
from a Legal Perspective
Muchamad Ali Safa’atColonial Roots of the Relationship between Islam and the
Nation-State
The population of the Sunda Islands is traditionally extremely heterogeneous, both in terms of ethnicity and religion. In addition to indigenous Malay religious traditions, Hinduism and Buddhism, Christians and Muslims have also lived on the islands since the 15th century and many ethnic groups therefore practice syncretic beliefs. Today,Indonesia is the country with the largest Muslim population in theworld with around 200 million Muslims.
In political terms, the various independence movements against
Dutch colonial rule revealed two dominant camps: supporters of an
Islamic state and advocates of nationalist ideas, for which the religious orientation of the future state played a subordinate role or forwhich a religiously neutral state based on a Western model was envisioned.
In the Dutch colonial era (1800–1942), the government declared itself neutral and did not interfere with religious affairs but
prohibited religious organisations from engaging in political activity(Government Regulation Number 119 Year 1854).1 The Dutch government policy was influenced by Snouck Hurgronje, a government
advisor, who proposed modernisation, secularisation, and Westernisation. From his point of view, a modern Indonesian society could
not have been realised either on the basis of Islam or local traditions,but had to follow the model of European history. Therefore, the roleof religion was to be limited by local institutions along with a pro1

Islamist vs. nationalist
independence movements

Tedi Kholiludin, Kuasa Negara Atas Agama (Politik Pengakuan, Diskursus “Agama Resmi”, dan Diskriminasi Hak Sipil) (Jakarta: RaSAIL Media Group, 2009),
141–42.
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1Companion to the Study of Secularity – Muchamad Ali Safa’at: Islam and the State in Indonesia from a Legal Perspective

cess of modernisation through Western education.2 Thus, the Dutchcolonial government established the Office of Indigenous Affairs (Het
Kantoor voor Inlandsche zaken), an early incarnation of the Ministryof Religious Affairs, to supervise the marriage, education, and political activity of Muslims.3 This kind of supervision of religion continued during the Japanese occupation (1942–1945) with the establishment of the Office of Religious Affairs (shumubu).4

1945: Discussions on
the Pancasila as
founding principle

Islam and Politics during the Formation of the Indonesian
Nation-State
Islamist and nationalist groups articulated their different views evenduring the Dutch colonial period through articles written in the
media.5 These debates continued within the Preparation Council ofIndonesian Independence (BPUPKI) in 1945. On the one hand, theIslamist camp proposed Islam as the basis of the state as well as theofficial religion of the state, arguing that the state should be obliged
to implement Sharia law, and that the president should be Muslim.
On the other hand, the nationalist group promoted the principles
and ideals of national unity, kinship, democracy, just and civilised
humanity, and the Divine, not a particular religion, as the future national principles of Indonesia.6 On 1 June 1945, Sukarno, the leaderof the nationalist camp and later the first president of Indonesia,
proclaimed five principles as the foundation for the new nation-statein his speech “The Birth of Pancasila”: (1) nationality of Indonesia,(2) internationalism or humanity, (3) consensus or democracy, (4) social welfare, and (5) Divinity.7 These principles, Sukarno argued, wererooted in the philosophical traditions of the Indonesian archipelago,
2
3
4
5
6
7

2

Dietrich Jung, “ ‘Islam as a Problem’: Dutch Religious Politics in the East Indies,”
Review of Religious Research 51, no. 3 (2010): 293–94.
Robert W. Hefner, “Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization,” in “Religion and Globalization at the Turn of the Millennium,” ed. José Casanova, special
issue, Sociology of Religion 62, no. 4 (2001): 501.
Harry J. Benda, Bulan Sabit dan Matahari Terbit (The Crescent and the RisingSun, Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945) (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1980), 152, 273.
Budiyono, “Hubungan Negara dan Agama Dalam Negara Pancasila,” Fiat Justicia 8,
no. 3 (2014): 419.
Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante: Islam dan
Masalah Keagamaan (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), 103.
RM. A.B. Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2009), 300.

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Companion to the Study of Secularity – Muchamad Ali Safa’at: Islam and the State in Indonesia from a Legal Perspective

thus integrating indigenous, Hindu, Christian, and Islamic traditions. This was the first time the word “Pancasila” (Javanese pañca(five) and sīla (principles)) was used. This term refers to Indonesia’s
five national principles. The phrasing of said principles varies in different documents.
Only three weeks later, a compromise between the two groups
was reached through the Committee of Nine (which included Sukarno) who formulated the ‘Jakarta Charter’ as the Preamble to the Indonesian Constitution.8 In this document, the divinity principle now
read “Belief in God, with the obligation to implement the Sharia ofIslam for its adherents” and was placed in the first position of Pancasila.9 With this first principle, Indonesia would have become an
Islamic nation-state with the obligation to ensure that Sharia law was
implemented for Muslims.
However, on 18 August 1945, the day after the declaration of Indonesia’s independence, the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (PPKI) promulgated the Constitution withsome changes from the formulation in the Jakarta Charter. The new
formulation removed the phrase “... with the obligation to implement
the Sharia of Islam for its adherents” and expanded the first part of
the first principle to “Belief in One Almighty God”. This second formulation of the first principle of Pancasila is still in use today. The
1945 Constitution does not mention the word “Islam” at all, and thereference to “Belief in One Almighty God” is said to be a recognitionof the religious character of the Indonesian nation, based on the religions that have been embraced by the people.

“Jakarta Charter”:
Religious freedom with
implementation ofIslamic law for Muslims

Declaration of Independence: “Belief in
One Almighty God” firstprinciple of Pancasila

Religion and Politics in Post-colonial Indonesia
The socio-political conditions of Indonesia under President Sukarno
from Indonesia’s independence until 1966 (termed the “Old Order”
by his successor Suharto) still involved the same divide between Islamist and nationalist groups. The Islamist camp was affiliated with
Islamic parties, especially the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations Masyumi and the traditionalist Sunni Islam movement, the NU(after it broke away from Masyumi in 1952). The nationalist camp89Kaelan, Negara Kebangsaan Pancasila: Kultural, Historis, Filosofis, Yuridis, dan
Aktualisasinya (Yogyakarta: Paradigma, 2013), 166.
See Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, 472.
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Companion to the Study of Secularity – Muchamad Ali Safa’at: Islam and the State in Indonesia from a Legal Perspective

Islamist and nationalist
groups balanced during
Sukarno’s rule

1960s: Decline ofIslamist and Communist
groups’ political power4

was affiliated with the nationalist parties and socialism, especiallywith the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and the IndonesianCommunist Party (PKI).10 In the national elections in 1955 underthe Interim Constitution of 1950, votes were relatively balanced between Islamist and nationalist groups. The nationalist group gained
253 seats (52.8% of the votes) and the Islamic group won 226 seats(47.2% of the votes).11
Nevertheless, the debate surrounding the state’s founding principles as well as regarding relations between the state and religion
arose again in the Constitutional Assembly which was charged withforming a new constitution. As the Constitutional Assembly wasonce again unable to agree on the question of the religious foundation of the Indonesian state, it was ultimately dissolved by President
Sukarno with the Decree of July 5, 1959 and he re-enacted the 1945
Constitution.
On 17 August 1960, President Sukarno issued Decree No. 200of 1960, which dissolved Masyumi because of its involvement in the
PRRI Permesta Rebellion.12 This moment was the beginning of thedecline of the Islamist camp’s political power. Within the nationalist camp, in 1965 a conflict arose between the military and theIndonesian Communist Party (PKI). On 1 October 1965, six Indonesian army generals were assassinated in a failed coup d’état by theso-called Thirtieth of September Movement (G30S).13 In the following
weeks, the army as well as religious groups accused the PKI of being
responsible for and involved in the coup d’état. General Suharto conducted a campaign to purge Indonesian society of the PKI. Aroundhalf a million of members and sympathisers of the PKI were killed

10 Daniel S. Lev, Peradilan Agama Islam di Indonesia (Islamic Courts in Indonesia)(Jakarta: Intermasa, 1980), 303.
11 Miriam Budiardjo, Partisipasi dan Partai Politik: Sebuah Bunga Rampai (Jakarta:
Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1998), 234–56.
12 Amry Vandenbosch, “Nationalism and Religion in Indonesia,” Far Eastern Survey
21, no. 18 (1952): 183. The PRRI rebellion and the Permesta rebellion occurredin 1957 in the east (Permesta) and west (PRRI) of Indonesia. Both rebellions weredirected against the central government’s policy towards ethnic groups and the
suppression of their regional autonomy. In February 1958, both rebellions unified.
The central government’s troops beat the revolutionary troops in June 1958. However, Permesta guerrilla fighters remained active until an amnesty in 1961.
13 Hefner, “Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization,” 502.
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Companion to the Study of Secularity – Muchamad Ali Safa’at: Islam and the State in Indonesia from a Legal Perspectiveby the army, countless were arrested.14 This moment marked the endof the political power of communism in Indonesia and the start ofefforts to ban the spread of communism (and atheism) as a movement as well as an ideology.15
Following the suppression of the coup d’état and the military
massacres of (supposed) communists, General Suharto led the traditionally conservative armed forces in a successful coup against
President Sukarno. Suharto acted as head of government from 1966and officially became president in 1968. To underline the rejection of
Sukarno’s left-nationalist policies, Suharto proclaimed the beginningof a “New Order”. This New Order effected mass de-politicisation,socio-political stabilisation, state corporatism, and ideological hegemony.16 The Islamists initially hoped for a better political positionin the New Order era but were instead suppressed and marginalised
because of their involvement in the 1960s’ PRRI Permesta Rebellion.17
The New Order maintained a policy of removing ideology from political parties and establishing Pancasila as the sole ideology that allpolitical parties should adopt. Political parties were simplified into
only three, namely the Golkar18, the United Development Party (PPP)and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).19 This policy is a tangible
form of political secularisation since the state forced the political parties to remove religious symbols and arguments from their platforms
and banners. This political change was paralleled by changes in Muslim communities that no longer perceived religion as the sole determining factor when making political choices. Their political choicein general elections was now more influenced by the state hegemonythan religious identification. Both NU, which ran for election, and1966/68: “New Order”
under Suharto enforced
secularisation

14 To this day, there is public and scholarly debate regarding who was responsible forthe coup and whether it was supported by foreign secret services.
15 See Olle Törnquist, “Muslim Politics and Democracy: The Case of Indonesia,”
Journal of Indonesian Islam 1, no. 1 (2007): 8.
16 Marzuki Wahid, Fiqh Indonesia: Kompilasi Hukum Islam dan Counter Legal Draft
Kompilasi Hukum Islam dalam Bingkai Politik Hukum Indonesia (Cirebon: Institut
Studi Islam Fahmina, 2014), 149.
17 R. William Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation,” The
Journal of Asian Studies 55, no. 3 (1996): 621.
18 Utrecht, “Religion and Social Protest in Indonesia,” 405; Liddle, “The Islamic Turnin Indonesia,” 627.
19 Daniel Dhakidae, “Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia: Saksi Pasang Naik dan Surut
Partai Politik,” Prisma 9 (1981): 34.
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5Companion to the Study of Secularity – Muchamad Ali Safa’at: Islam and the State in Indonesia from a Legal Perspective

Muhammadiyah, which politically identified as part of Masyumi in
1955’s general election, stated that their organisation did not participate in practical politics in the New Order era.20 Members of the NU
and Muhammadiyah were free to make their political choice without
being directed to affiliate with certain political parties.

Muslim majority
supported a civildemocratic Islam

6

Islamic Reform Movements
Under pressure from the New Order, Muslim society diverged fromthe positions of the established Islamist groups, and a reform movement that supported civil-democratic Islam arose. This movement
explicitly distanced itself from existing political parties and Islamistgroups, even calling the idea of an Islamic state a myth.21 This reformmovement and the strengthening of Indonesian civil society in general were primarily influenced by young Muslim scholars, including
Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid.22
Nurcholish Madjid used the idea of secularisation in the senseof de-sacralisation of everything different from the truly Divine. For
him, secularisation does not mean the removal of religious orientation from the norms and values of (Indonesian) society, but a radical
devaluation of matters which are considered part of the religious domain.23 The state is secular in the sense that it develops dynamicallywith reference to religious and ethical values, but is not legitimised by
the divine truth. Consequently, Muslims should explore the ethicalvalues of Islamic teachings for and within the state, but should not
identify the state with religion because this would lead to the state’ssacralisation.24
Abdurrahman Wahid, a member of the NU, stated that Islam asa way of life (Sharia) does not have a clear concept of the state.25 In
his interpretation, Islamic teachings consist mainly of basic values
20 Robin Bush, Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics
in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 2, 67.
21 Hefner, “Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization,” 503–04.
22 Greg Barton, “Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and Islam,” Politics &Policy 38, no. 3 (2010): 471, 473.
23 Nurcholish Madjid, “Keharusan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah Integrasi Umat,” in Islam Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan, ed. Nurcholish Madjid(Bandung: Mizan, 1993), 208.
24 Azyumardi Azra, Islam Substantif (Bandung: Mizan, 2000), 313.
25 Abdurrahman Wahid, Islamu Islam Anda Islam Kita: Agama Masyarakat Negara
Demokrasi (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 81–84.

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Companion to the Study of Secularity – Muchamad Ali Safa’at: Islam and the State in Indonesia from a Legal Perspectivethat underlie people’s lives – justice, equality and democracy – andan operational framework, such as the notion that “the actions of thepeople’s leaders are determined by the welfare and prosperity of thepeople” (tasharruf al-imam ‘ala ra’iyyatihi manuth bi al-mashlahah).
Islam accommodates social practices as long as these are to the benefit of the people.26 Consequently, according to Wahid, leadershipthat is not oriented towards justice and welfare is at odds with theIslamic view. According to Wahid, Pancasila and religion have to bepositioned functionally and clearly within their mutual relationship.
Pancasila should be understood as the rule of the game that should
connect all religions and beliefs in Indonesia. It has to treat all religions and beliefs equally in law and society.27
The socio-political changes within the Muslim community were
not only the result of the state’s social and political policies but also
influenced by modernisation and urbanisation in the New Order era.
Modernisation tends to increase the purification process in the senseof distinction between religious and non-religious areas and theabandonment of syncretic practices.28 The process of education andurbanisation also resulted in the emergence of autonomous politicaland religious orientations that did not necessarily refer to establisheddenominations.29
From Islamic vs. Nationalist to Islamic and Nationalist:
the Era Reformasi
In 1998, after long-lasting student protests and against the backdrop of Indonesia’s desolate economic situation following the 1997
Asian financial crisis, Suharto had to resign. The New Order era wasfollowed by a phase of democratic reforms, the so-called Reformation Era (Era Reformasi). The strict divide between the nationalist
and Islamist camps no longer applied. Based on the principles andcharacter of each political party in the Reformation Era, the political landscape can be classified into three main positions: nationalist

Muslim reform movement influenced bothby secularisation policy
and modernisation andurbanisation

Era Reformasi: Divide
between Islamist andnationalist camps fell

26 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Pribumisasi Islam,” in Islam Nusantara: dari Ushul Fiqh
Hingga Konsep Historis, ed. Akhmad Sahal and Munawir Azis (Bandung: Mizan,2016), 44.
27 Wahid, Islamu Islam Anda Islam Kita, 96–99.
28 Tamney, “Modernization and Religious Purification: Islam in Indonesia,” 207.
29 Joseph Tamney, “Established Religiosity in Modern Society: Islam in Indonesia,”
Sociological Analysis 40, no. 2 (1979): 126.
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Companion to the Study of Secularity – Muchamad Ali Safa’at: Islam and the State in Indonesia from a Legal Perspective

Islamic politics seeking
for positivisation ofIslamic Law

8parties, nationalist parties rooted in the Muslim community, and Islamic parties.30
The nationalist parties are much stronger than the Islamic parties and the nationalist parties rooted in Muslim organisations. In
the 1999 election, nationalist parties won a combined 285 seats in
the Indonesian Parliament, nationalist parties rooted in Muslim organisations won 85 seats, and Islamic parties won 83 seats. In the2014 election, nationalist parties won 385 seats, nationalist parties
rooted in Muslim communities won 96 seats, and the Islamic parties
won 79 seats. In the 2014 election, nationalist parties won 385 seats,
nationalist parties rooted in Muslim communities won 96 seats, andthe Islamic parties won 79 seats.
When it came to the formation of coalitions backing the candidates for President and Vice President, the distinction between nationalist parties, nationalist parties rooted in Muslim organisations,and Islamic parties did not apply. Coalitions were formed acrossparty groups with the main competition being between the candidates from the nationalist parties.
In the Reformation Era, the meaning of Pancasila, and especiallythe first principle of the “Belief in One Almighty God” has again been
the subject of debate, resulting in debate on the relationship between
state and religion. In 2002, the debate regarding the amendment ofarticle 29 paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution
without any fundamental change to Pancasila reflects a shift in the
direction of Islamic politics away from efforts to make Islam thestate’s foundation towards efforts to implement Islamic law in theConstitution. The proposals were rejected by both houses of the Indonesian Parliament (MPR).31

30 Anies R. Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory,”
Asian Survey 44, no. 5 (2004). See Sunny Tanuwidjaja, “Political Islam and Islamic
Parties in Indonesia: Critically Assessing the Evidence of Islam’s Political Decline,”
Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no. 1 (2010): 42.
31 Nadirsyah Hosen, “Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate,”
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 36, no. 3 (2005): 420. See also R. E. Elson, “TwoFailed Attempts to Islamize the Indonesian Constitution,” Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 28, no. 3 (2013).
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Companion to the Study of Secularity – Muchamad Ali Safa’at: Islam and the State in Indonesia from a Legal Perspective

Conclusion
The relationship between Islam and the state has altered with regimechanges in Indonesia. During the Old Order period, especially during
the period of guided democracy, there was a separation between state
and religion and state authorities even opposed Islamists.32 During
the New Order period, religion was confined to the private realm
and efforts were made to eliminate political religious movements andremove religious values and symbols from political life. During theReformation Era, all groups have had the same space to grow and develop. But religious parties, including Islamic ones, have not gained asignificant number of votes. This shows that there has been a major
shift in the socio-political configuration of Indonesian society, namely,that political choice no longer relates to personal religiosity.33
At various points from the Old Order until the Reformation Era,several state laws related to Islamic law have been enacted. Examples
include the Marriage Registration Law,34 the Marriage Law,35 theCompilation of Islamic Law (KHI),36 the Zakat Management Law,37
the Hajj Law,38 the Waqf Law,39 the Sharia Banking Law,40 and State
Sharia Securities Law (SBSN).41 These laws have three objectives:(1) unifying the laws that apply to Muslims; (2) maximising the economic potential of Muslims, and (3) protecting and facilitating religious life within public life. Since these objectives are defined by thestate as a secular institution, they have to be understood as secularthemselves.
The three periods of Indonesia’s history show that, at least in thiscase, democratic political regimes seem to be more responsive toIslamic law than authoritarian regimes. The authoritarian regimes

Political choice does
not relate to personal
religiosity

32 Yüksel Sezgin and Mirjam Künkler, “Regulation of ‘Religion’ and the ‘Religious’:
The Politics of Judicialization and Bureaucration in India and Indonesia,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 56, no. 2 (2014): 451.
33 Robin Bush, “Regional ‘Sharia’ Regulations in Indonesia,” 178.
34 Law No. 22 of 1946.
35 Law No. 1 of 1974.
36 Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 1991.
37 Law No. 23 of 2011.
38 Law No. 13 of 2008.
39 Law No. 41 of 2004.
40 Law No. 21 of 2008.
41 Law No. 19 of 2008.
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9Companion to the Study of Secularity – Muchamad Ali Safa’at: Islam and the State in Indonesia from a Legal Perspective

Democratic regime
more responsive toreligion thanauthoritarian onesof the Old Order and the New Order made clear delineations between state and religious affairs. In the democratic Reformation Era,
the boundary is more dynamic, and influenced by different politicalforces. As a consequence, one may argue that the state agenda of secularisation can be applied more readily to the authoritarian periods
than to the democratic Reformation Era, which is not only more
open to religion but has even created a space of religious revivalism.
Islamic law is generally incorporated into state law in periods
where there are good political relations between Islamic groups andthe state. This is generally the case where the following conditions
are met: (1) the political power of the Islamist and nationalist groups’
political power is relatively balanced and (2) the state needs support
or legitimacy from Islamist groups, as was the case in the second halfof the New Order period. At this point, the state law was mainly tomaintain unity, in particular to accommodate the Islamist group.
On the basis of the secularity of Pancasila and the development ofstate law related to religious life, the boundaries between the domainof the state and the religious domain in contemporary Indonesia canbe identified:• First, there is a clear distinction between state institutions, state
law and religions. The state remains in a profane or worldly realm
with all its rules and devices, which are also established and carried out in a secular manner. Nevertheless, state laws and policies continue to be influenced by reasons derived from religious
teachings. Governance is in state’s domain but religion can playa role by strengthening social ethics and influencing state policy
and law through political mechanisms.
• Second, the state does not create laws that either require the implementation of certain religious teachings or interfere with religious freedom and worship. The state guarantees and facilitates
religious freedom and freedom of worship with the only restriction being that religious actors should not endanger public orderand security.

10
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Companion to the Study of Secularity – Muchamad Ali Safa’at: Islam and the State in Indonesia from a Legal Perspective• Third, Islamic law can influence and be incorporated into statelaw. When it becomes state law, it becomes part of the secular andmay be limited by the state.42 This can be seen for example in thedecisions of the Constitutional Court43 regarding the limitation ofreligious courts’ authority,44 the limitation of polygamy within thejuridical review of the Marriage Law,45 and the regulation of zakat
in the Zakat Management Law.46• Fourth, the religious life that can be governed by the state law isrelated to the forum externum,47 that is the social aspects of worship, human relationships, and especially aspects related to familylaw. When it comes to worship, the state only regulates the facilities, not the rituals of worship, such as in the Hajj Law.
• Fifth, public law (constitutional, administrative, and criminal) is
the domain of state law alone, Islamic law never becomes publiclaw. Public law must promote equality before the law, must notdiscriminate against any individual or group and thus cannot incorporate any specific religious laws.48
To summarise, it can be said that Islamic law is limited in two ways
when it comes to its possible incorporation into state law: (1) it may
only deal with the forum externum; and (2) it may never be incorporated into public law. These two limitations on Islamic law are an
expression of secularity for the sake of balancing or accommodating
the diversity of Indonesian society.

Secularisation of Islamic
law through positivisation
as state law

Public law free fromreligious influence toguarantee equality
before the law for all
Indonesians

42 Similar processes of secularisation through positivisation of Islamic law havebeen shown also by Saïd Amir Arjomand, “Secularisation through Legal Modernisation in the MENA-Region,” in Companion to the Study of Secularity, ed.
HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” (Leipzig
University, 2019), www.multiple-secularities.de/publications/companion/css_arjomand_legal-modernisation.pdf for Syria and Tunisia.
43 Alfitri, “Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Sebagai Tafsiran Resmi Hukum Islam diIndonesia,” Jurnal Konstitusi 11, no. 2 (2014): 313.
44 The Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 19/PUU-VI/2008.
45 The Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 12/PUU-V/2007.
46 The Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 86/PUU-X/2012.
47 The Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 140/PUU-VII/2009.
48 There are exceptions in Aceh where Islamic law can enter public law, which inpractice is still limited to minor criminal violations.
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Quoted and Further Reading
Alfitri. “Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Sebagai Tafsiran Resmi Hukum Islam diIndonesia.” Jurnal Konstitusi 11, no. 2 (2014): 296–314.
Arjomand, Saïd Amir. “Secularisation through Legal Modernisation in the
MENA-Region.” In Companion to the Study of Secularity. Edited by HCAS
“Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities.” Leipzig University, 2019. www.multiple-secularities.de/publications/companion/css_arjomand_legal-modernisation.pdf.
Azra, Azyumardi. Islam Substantif. Bandung: Mizan, 2000.
Barton, Greg. “Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and Islam.” Politic &Policy 38, no. 3 (2010): 471–85.
Baswedan, Anies R. “Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory.”
Asian Survey 44, no. 5 (2004): 669–90.
Benda, Harry J. Bulan Sabit dan Matahari Terbit (The Crescent and the Rising Sun,
Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945). Jakarta: Pustaka
Jaya, 1980.
Budiardjo, Miriam. Partisipasi dan Partai Politik: Sebuah Bunga Rampai. Jakarta:
Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1998.
Budiyono. “Hubungan Negara dan Agama Dalam Negara Pancasila.” Fiat Justicia
8, no. 3 (2014): 410–23.
Burhani, Ahmad N. “Geertz’s Trichotomy of abangan, santri, and priyayi: Controversy and Continuity.” Journal of Indonesian Islam 11, no. 2 (2017): 329–49.
Bush, Robin. Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics
in Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.
Deliar Noer. Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900–1942. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1980.
Dhakidae, Daniel. “Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia: Saksi Pasang Naik dan Surut
Partai Politik.” Prisma 9 (1981): 23–27.
Elson, R. E. “Two Failed Attempts to Islamize the Indonesian Constitution.” Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 28, no. 3 (2013): 379–437.
Geertz, Clifford. The Religion of Java. Glencoe, IL: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960.
Hefner, Robert W. “Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization.” In:“Religion and Globalization at the Turn of the Millennium.” Edited by José
Casanova, special issue. Sociology of Religion 62, no. 4 (2001): 491–514.
Hosen, Nadirsyah. “Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate.”
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 36, no. 3. (2005): 1–11.
Jung, Dietrich “‘Islam as a Problem’: Dutch Religious Politics in the East Indies.”
Review of Religious Research 51, no. 3 (2010): 288–301.
Kaelan. Negara Kebangsaan Pancasila: Kultural, Historis, Filosofis, Yuridis, dan
Aktualisasinya. Yogyakarta: Paradigma, 2013.
Kholiludin, Tedi. Kuasa Negara Atas Agama (Politik Pengakuan, Diskursus “Agama
Resmi”, dan Diskriminasi Hak Sipil). Jakarta: RaSAIL Media Group, 2009.
Kusuma, RM. A.B. Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. Jakarta: Badan Penerbit
Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2009.
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This text is part of the Companion to the Study of Secularity. The intent of the Companion is to give scholars interested in the concept of Multiple Secularities, who are
not themselves specialists in particular (historical) regions, an insight into different
regions in which formations of secularity can be observed, as well as into the key
concepts and notions with respect to the study of secularity.
It is published by the Humanities Centre for Advanced Studies “Multiple
Secularities − Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities”. For as long as the HCAS
continues to exist, the Companion will be published and further expanded on the
HCAS’ website. Towards the end of Multiple Secularities project, all entries will
be systematised and edited in order to transform the Companion into a completed
Open Access publication.
Please cite as:
Safa’at, Muchamad Ali. “Islam and the State in Indonesia from a Legal Perspective.” In Companion to the Study of Secularity. Edited by HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities.” Leipzig University, 2019. www.multiple-secularities.de/media/css_ safaat_islamstateindonesia.pdf

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Leipzig University – HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities”, 2019www.multiple-secularities.de/publications/companion