Discussion Papers In Economics
And BusinessTechnology transfer with requisitioned material from Germany:
The impact of “PB reports” on Japanese postwar technological development

Yuki NAKAJIMA

Discussion Paper 10-25

Graduate School of Economics andOsaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP)
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPANTechnology transfer with requisitioned material from Germany:
The impact of “PB reports” on Japanese postwar technological development

Yuki NAKAJIMA

Discussion Paper 10-25

October 2010

Graduate School of Economics andOsaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP)
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPANTechnology transfer with requisitioned material from Germany:
The impact of “PB reports” on Japanese postwar technological development
Yuki NAKAJIMA†

Abstract
Toward the end of World War 2, British and U.S. governments created a joint program toinvestigate German technology and requisitioned numerous technical documentations, some ofwhich were opened to public as technical reports. Japanese industries, refereeing them to as the “PB
reports”, tried to obtain and utilize them for their postwar recovery until they started enthusiastic
technology introduction by technology licensing in 1950’s. This study describes the dissemination
process of PB reports in Japan and evaluates their impact.
A few engineers mainly in chemical industry who were belonged to companies, universities
and national research institutes recognized the great value of PB reports, and then pressed Japanese
government to introduce them with a State budged. Not only the individuals, but also thegovernmental organs established in the postwar democratization process of science and technology
played important roles for policy making of package purchase of PB reports from U.S. government
in 1952.
In the case of dyestuff and caustic soda, some joint R&D groups were organized in academic
circles and industrial associations to share the information from PB reports which containedclassified factory data of IG Farben, Bayer and so on. Japanese companies utilized them todomesticate German chemical products and develop their original technologies. On the other hand,the case of electronics parts shows that small companies which could not afford to introduce
technology from foreign companies by their own received benefit by the reports and got an
opportunity for their development. As a result, a technology gap between Japan and advanced
countries which had widened during the war were reduced till the end of 1950’s.

Key Words: Japanese business history, technology transfer, PB reports, chemical industry
JEL: N45, N65, N75†

Corresponding Author: Associate Professor, Faculty of Business Administration, Toyo University
Address: 5-28-20,Hakusan, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo,112-8606 Japan, E-mail: ynakajima@toyo.jp

1. Introduction
One of the main reasons for Japan’s technological development after WWII is believed to be
the enthusiastic introduction of technology from advanced countries. During the war, given thesituation that Japan was isolated from the international scientific and technological exchange network,
it fell far behind advanced countries. After its defeat in the war, Japan attempted to re-introduce
technology into the country. Many studies have focused on technology licensing between foreign andJapanese companies and its crucial role in improving product quality and production efficiency invarious industries such as iron and steel, electronics, chemicals, etc., especially from the 1950s to the
1960s.
In order to successfully acquire these technologies, Japanese companies first had to findtechnology that was appropriate for introduction into the country. Technology historian Tetsuro
Nakaoka emphasizes the importance of previous studies conducted by Japanese companies. Japanesecompanies did not search aimlessly for foreign technology. The research activities of these companies
were well developed, and helped them to understand the specific technological problems that they
faced before they made license agreements. As a result, they were able to accurately apply thetechnologies that they introduced, resulting in a dramatic and immediate improvement in theirtechnology１. Therefore, R&D activities in Japan during wartime and the rehabilitation period should
not be ignored when studying Japanese postwar technological development.
Immediately after the war, when they could hardly come by the latest technical journals thatwere published in foreign countries, Japanese engineers in various fields took every possible measure
to obtain technology information from abroad. A precious source for them was “PB reports.” PB
reports were technological documents published by the U.S. government from 1946 onwards, most ofwhich had been requisitioned from factories based in Nazi Germany. American historian, John
Gimbel, who comprehensively studied the process, claimed that these technologies were a blessing
for not only the military but also the private sector in postwar America２. This forced technology
transfer from Germany to the U.S. was peculiar to the occupation period. Moreover, these documents
were not intended for exclusive American use and were scattered all over the world. Therefore,
through these PB reports, German technology was first transferred to the U.S. and then to othercountries, including Japan. In this “two-step” technology transfer process, the latter step seems to nothave received much attention in previous studies that have dealt with technology transfer. As
mentioned above, Japan was one of the countries that tried to obtain PB reports and apply them totheir postwar industrial recovery and development. Although science historian Shigeru Nakayama has
already mentioned PB reports３, no research has precisely estimated the value of these reports inJapan’s postwar technological development. This study describes the dissemination process of thereports in Japan and evaluates their impact.
It is not sufficient to focus only on a company’s business activities. There were other relatedparties involved in the process, such as politicians, scientists, engineers, academic societies, publicand governmental institutions, and business associations. Some of these parties had been conducting1

R&D activities since the prewar period or had established themselves during wartime mobilization.
Although a comprehensive examination of these players is beyond the scope of this study, theiractivities will be referred to only to the extent that they relate to the PB reports. In the next section,
based on John Gimbel’s work, the outline of the PB reports is described briefly. The process of theintroduction of these reports into Japan is described in Section 3. Case studies in Section 4 illustrate
the impact of PB reports on technological development, mainly in the chemical industry around the1950s.
２．PB reports
According to Gimbel, Britain and America created a special military unit in 1944, the “T-forces,”to gather German technological information. They also created a “Combined Intelligence Objective
Subcommittee (CIOS),” whose duty was to select targets for the T-Forces with the support of the“Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee (TIIC)” on the American side. TIIC consisted of morethan 10 subcommittees that represented various industries. A large number of people from thebusiness field became members and recommended numerous targets to investigate and capture４.
After the War, many technologists who had joined these investigation programs were discharged
from military service. However, they enthusiastically claimed that the technologies they had found in
occupied German areas were much superior to those of American industry. They recommended, as aresult, that the U.S. government continue and expand its investigation programs. Meanwhile, inAugust 1945, President Truman ordered the disclosure of scientific and technical information that had
been developed with governmental funds. The newly established interdepartmental “Publication
Board” screened the investigations to be released and then put reference numbers on them with theinitials “PB,” to publish. In contrast to the Army, which was reluctant to disclose information, theDepartment of Commerce was the most enthusiastic to disclose information in order to promote
postwar industrial recovery. The department created an “Office of Technical Service (OTS)” toinvestigate German technology themselves. The OTS selected and recruited specialists from various
industries in America through “Technical Industrial Intelligence Branches (TIIB)”; these specialists
were then dispatched to Europe. In Europe, the “Filed Information Agency Technical (FIAT)”
supplied equipment for transportation and communication and helped in the interrogation of German
engineers５.
FIAT and OTS together analyzed the excavated material. In order to promote the use of PB
reports, the Publication Board and its successor, the OTS, offered this information to the generalpublic through the weekly “Bibliography of Scientific and Industrial Research Reports.” Even after
the investigation in Germany was completed and FIAT was closed in July 1947, the Department ofCommerce carried such activities on till the end of July 1948, when the OTS drastically downsized
their operations. The government, however, decided to make the documents and microfilms available
to the public６. The U.S. government maintains till date the policy of disclosing research results
developed with governmental funds and continues to issue technical report series and bibliographies,2

as shown in Table 1.
By the early 1950s, the volume of reports was over 100,000, comprising 7.4 billion pages. The
documents requisitioned in Germany accounted for an overwhelming majority (Table 2). The releaseof reports on German technology peaked in 1948 and drastically decreased from 1949 onwards７.
Even after FIAT closed in 1947 and the OTS’ operations were downsized, there remained a large
volume of material to be analyzed. To complete their mission, the OTS gave up checking all thereports one-by-one and assigned PB numbers not to each report, but to “microfilms” that contained
about a 100 reports each. The total volume of microfilm was over 5000 reels, which contained
numerous reports to be disposed of without complete analysis or detailed abstracts. Therefore thebibliography issued around this period was also useless and caused engineers inconvenience inlocating the appropriate reports８. In Japan, however, persons and organizations cooperated to solve
this problem.
The reports dealt with a variety of technological subjects, mainly chemistry, electricity,
aeronautical engineering, and mechanical engineering. Moreover, the reports contained not only
abstract or scientific knowledge but also concrete industrial technology such as descriptions of
manufacturing methods that contained precise designs of equipment. For example, the German
engineers at IG Farben, who were interrogated by a U.S. investigation team, had served the company
in important positions (Table 3). The information they provided was received with surprise not onlyby the Americans but also by the Japanese.
３. Introducing PB reports to Japan
A series of bibliographies, not original reports, were distributed by the U.S. government andsent to Japan in 1948. The National Diet Library (NDL) in Japan received and stored thesebibliographies, which were not made public right away ９ . It is unclear why they were kept
unpublicized or who first received the reports in Japan. Masamitsu Yoshimura, a chemical consulting
engineer, claimed that Mitsubishi Chemical Company accidentally received information about thebibliographies from NDL in the summer of 1949. A researcher from the company recognized the valueof these bibliographies on the first reading; the researcher then transcribed these bibliographies at the
research institute. After the bibliographies were explored, some PB reports were selected and purchaseorders for copies were made directly to the U.S. government in the winter of 1949. The company
utilized the purchased reports to reduce the production cost of sulfadiazine, an effective medicine forbacterial diseases such as pneumonia, gonorrhea, and suppuration１０.
Meanwhile a few Japanese engineers were becoming aware of the existence of American
documents that were technologically important. They frequently visited the CIE library, which wasestablished in Tokyo in November 1945 by the Civil Information and Education section, GHQ/SCAP.
The main purpose of this library was to make foreign magazine back issues available to Japanesecitizens. After the war, engineers could access foreign journals only here１１. Among the engineersfrom the chemical industry, Eiji Nakabachi, a technical official at the Tokyo Industrial Research3

Institute (TIRI), visited the CIE library almost daily to check the latest technological articles. He
noticed that a lot of the research published in America quoted PB reports. At first, he could not figureout what “PB reports” were or how to get them in Japan. One day in 1950, however, he accidentally
got hold of a copy of a PB report; he was surprised to discover that the report contained importantfactory data from IG Farben and precise production know-how of an organic dye. He made several
copies to distribute to Japanese chemical companies１２. However, there was still no way for him tocheck other PB reports. In February 1952, he heard that a department in GHQ/SCAP that wasconcerned with patent management had presented the bibliographies to the Japan Patent Office (JPO).
He immediately visited the JPO to check the bibliographies and discovered that there were manyother reports that contained top German manufacturing secrets. For example, he recognized theexistence of 60 microfilms on operating procedures in the IG Farben factory; the original documents
contained over 50,000 pages. He also found some reports that had the seal “Streng Vertraulig (strictsecrecy),” which dealt with an important analytical method. TIRI decided to import a copy of over
10,000 pages１３. TIRI was Japan’s foremost national research institute and had a long R&D traditionin the chemical field, dating back to prewar days. Under Nakabachi’s instructions, the dyestuffs
laboratory at TIRI imported several hundred reports and issued reference summaries for the Japanesechemical industry１４.
Some engineers got the chance to go to America on a technology inspection tour. A technicalofficial at the chemical department in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) went to
America in 1950 and brought back several PB reports related to plastic technology. He did his official
duty by distributing them widely in the Japanese plastic industry; the information was received withsurprise１５. In the soda industry, Tatsuzo Okada, a professor at Kyoto University, visited America
between September and December in 1950 and returned to Japan with PB reports. The Japan Soda
Industry Association (JSIA) delivered copies of these reports to member companies and organized ajoint-research group to study them１６.
These cases are probably the earliest encounters of Japanese engineers with PB reports. The
existence of PB reports gradually became known in the society of Japanese engineers and scientists.
However, it was still not easy for individual Japanese to purchase reports in foreign currency.
Therefore the package purchase of all PB reports was suggested. Masamitsu Yoshimura was the key
person behind this initiative. Yoshimura had visited the JPO at the same time as Nakabachi and had
also recognized the importance of the PB reports. He was a column writer of scientific andtechnological topics for NIKKEI news. His article in May 1952, which introduced PB reports, caused
a sensation. As a result of his petition to purchase all the reports from the U.S. government, NDL
organized a committee to investigate and evaluate the reports１７.
There were two organizations that were related to this process, the Science Council of Japan(SCJ) and the Scientific and Technical Administration Commission (STAC), both were established in1949. According to science historian Tetsu Hiroshige１８, Japan’s scientific system was severely
criticized as the main cause of Japan's defeat: the confrontation of Japan’s administrative organ, the4inconsiderate bureaucracy for science, the factional strife by scientist themselves and so on. On theother hand, it was also pointed out that the newly postwar science system should be the main
contributor for postwar economic recovery and the birth to a cultured nation.

Under the initiative of

scientists who had close connections with Harry C. Kelly at the Scientific and Technical Division,
Economic and Scientific Section (ESS/ST), GHQ/SCAP, the Committee for Reform of Science
Research Structure decided to establish SCJ１９. SCJ aimed to discuss important matter on scienceand technology and recommend desirable policy to government on behalf of scientists of the country.
STAC was established under the Prime Minister’s Office to strengthen administrative cooperation
between ministries in the field of science. Some scientists include physicist Seiji Kaya, Ryokichi
Sagane and chemist Naoto Kameyama who were the professors of Tokyo Imperial University andenthusiastic to reform Japan’s science system argued that they should enter the policy-making of thegovernment and claimed a powerful scientific administrative agency which scientist could participate
as a principal. But as a result of heated discussion with an opposition group who emphasized thatscientist should try to distance themselves from politics, SCJ and STAC couldn’t get biding force togovernment and became only a consultative agency２０.
However in the case of PB reports, SCJ and STAC could be influential to the government. SCJ,
at an administration committee held in June 1952, resolved to recommend that the Japanese
government purchase all the PB reports. It then filed a petition with the Prime Minister, Shigeru
Yoshida. This idea had been suggested by the Chemical Society of Japan headed by Kameyama who
was mentioned above and also the President of the SCJ２１.
On the other hand at STAC meeting, Kaya, represented the SCJ, submitted a request to the
Ministry of Finance for a budget to purchase all the PB reports２２. He emphasized that the PB reports
contained so much important technical information that he was worried that the U.S. government
would stop issuing them before the Japanese government’s decision to purchase them came through.
The Ministry of Finance replied that they would consider this subject and would shortly come to aconclusion２３.
The National Diet responded quickly to the request from the SCJ. Before the discussion onpurchasing the reports began, Hideo Maki, a professor in the Faculty of Engineering at Tokyo
University, had mentioned the PB reports about vat dye at the House of Councilors, which was heldin March 1952. He explained that research on vat dye had progressed dramatically in recent years
because PB reports had revealed all the secrets of German chemical technology, which Japanesecompanies could apply domestically２４. In July, just after Yoshimura’s article had received muchattention, the House of Representatives passed a resolution to request the government to purchase all
the PB reports immediately２５. A few days later, the Librarian of the NDL mentioned that he wasaware that many concerned parties—such as MITI, JPO, and SCJ—had been enthusiasticallystudying the bibliographies. He said that the NDL had also been considering importing all the PB
reports２６. A proposal for their budget was presented to Parliament at the end of the month２７. As aresult, by the end of the year, over 69 million yen from a supplementary national budget for fiscal
5year 1952 was assigned for the import of the PB reports. This political measure enabled all Japanesecitizens—that is, those from both big chemical companies and small companies in various
industries—to utilize PB reports for their R&D activities.
４．Case Studies
Although it is a nearly impossible to comprehensively investigate the usage pattern of thereports in Japan at the time, according to research conducted by NDL in 1955, 60% of users
comprised scientists and engineers in the field of chemical technology２８. The following cases show
how PB reports were applied in postwar technological development.
In the dyestuffs industry, TIRI continued reviewing many reports, especially those related to IG
Farben’s products. Among the 149 kinds of acetate rayon dye sold by the company under the tradename “Celiton,” TIRI analyzed 140 kinds for their chemical structure, mixture of dispersant, andproduction techniques２９. The PB reports were indispensable to other researchers in the Japanesechemical industry in their R&D activities. A researcher in a major chemical company, Nippon
Kayaku Company, recollected that his main job at the time had been to decipher German chemical
technology through the PB reports３０.
In the prewar days, Japanese companies had only been able to produce low-quality direct
dyestuffs. The German company Bayer was the lone supplier of high-quality products, under thebrand name “Sirius.” However, after the war, Nippon Kayaku Company began to develop
high-quality dyestuffs. PB reports helped the company to understand the chemical structure of Sirius
dyestuffs and to develop effectively new dyestuffs. The company continued to collect reports andother foreign patents about dyestuffs. They recognized the usability of an intermediate product thatwas stocked in their factories for improving light fastness. On the other hand, the black direct dyethat was then used for machine-sewing-cotton did not have enough color fastness for washing, and it
easily ran color on shirts. Having obtained technological information from the PB reports, they began
to develop a new black dye with high washing fastness. They consequently expanded their market tothe spinning industry. Their domestication of “Sirius” class high-quality dyestuff rapidly progressed
after the 1950s. Due to their R&D activities, the company was awarded the Okochi prize in 1964,
which is given for distinguished achievement based on excellent inventions and ideas３１. In anothercase, by referring to PB reports, a new production technology for dye intermediate was introduced
into Japanese companies. This technology contributed to reducing the consumption of sulfuric acid,
which led to a reduction of production costs３２.
The caustic soda industry recovered rapidly after 1950 from wartime damage３３. As shown in
Table 4, their manufacturing plants were converted from an ammonia soda process to an electrolytic
soda process in the 1950s. The electrolytic process generated chlorine as a by-product, which could
be used as a raw material in producing vinyl chloride. The industry was growing very fast during
this period. Although caustic soda had mainly been used to produce rayon, the scale of production
was not as large as that of vinyl chloride. As a result, the sales of chlorine products became more
6

important than those of caustic soda. Therefore, Japanese chemical companies expanded theirproduction capacity by introducing the electrolytic process３４.
The most important equipment used in this method was the electrolytic cell. There arebasically two types of cells, the mercury process cell and the diaphragm process cell. Professor
Okada pointed out that the diaphragm process cell had developed mainly in America and accounted
for over 95% of their production capacity just after the War. On the other hand, the lower price of
mercury prompted the development of the mercury process cell in Germany. IG Farben had
enthusiastically developed these cells in response to the growing demand for chlorine during
wartime３５. Table 4 indicates that the mercury process cell became popular in Japan. Although themercury process cell created less impurities and an exceedingly better product, this technology
consumed more electric energy, which could have been reduced by expanding its electric
capacity３６. As mentioned earlier, Professor Okada had visited the U.S. in 1950 and brought back
PB reports on soda technology. He had visited Dr. W. C. Gardiner at the Mathieson Alkali Company
and chemical consultant, Robert B. MacMullin, who had worked for the U.S. Chlorine Industry
Team (which had been dispatched to Germany under TIIB) ３７. Okada had been studying IG
Farben’s mercury process cell since 1946. Then some soda companies, such as Ajinomoto and
Mitsui Chemical Company, cooperated with Okada under the auspices of JSIA. In prewar days,
domestic soda companies kept their technology secret, and few technology disclosure and exchange
between them was allowed. However as the wartime economy got deepened, soda companies had tomake use of domestic highest technology in order to increase the production of soda with lessmaterial and some technological research council and informal gatherings started in April 1941.
After defeat of the war, as soon as JSIA was established in 1948, technological expert committees
were founded in the field of ammonia soda process and electrolytic soda process which wererenamed and expanded in 1950３８. JSIA became a base of technological exchange for domestic soda
companies which longed to get foreign newest technology information such as PB reports. An
engineer at Ajinomoto recollected that the PB reports were full of originality in the operation data,
the design specifications and the improvement technology. He gleaned most of the ideas andknowledge in the field of electrolytic techniques from them ３９ . On the basis of technology
developed by IG Farben and Mathieson Alkali Company, Japanese companies improved themercury process cell and their technology came to be regarded as the world's highest level around
1955４０.
In addition to the chemical industry, a case of electronics industry proves that PB reports
contributed to the development of Japanese small firms. A German company, Bosch Corporation
had developed “Metalized Paper (MP) Condenser” during the war. MP condenser was smaller thanexisting one by 70%, and had a “Self Healing Action”, an innovative recovery mechanism fromdamage. In Japan, captain Ito Yôji of the Naval Technical Research Institute ordered to investigate
them in 1944. Professor Saitou Yukio of Tokyo Institute of Technology and some big electronics
companies such as Hitachi also started investigating them４１. Despite of their effort, the condenser
7couldn’t be in practical use before the end of the war.
On the other hand, there were a lot of small firms which produced electronics components as
subcontractors of big companies which produced electric wave weapons. After the war, with risingdemand for components assembled in radio receivers, not a few companies began developing their
original technology４２. Among such small companies, Matsuo Electronics Company founded in1949 with only 7 members started their business by producing condensers for radio receivers. They
sold their product to merchants in Osaka prefecture then expanded customers to big electric andelectronics companies such as Yokogawa Electric and Sony. The company recognized that MP
condenser would have had high potential demand because reduced size components were suitable
for assembling more a precision electronics instrument such as television set. However the PB
number can’t be identified, the company’s history describes that PB report was only information
they could obtain about MP condenser and they tried to develop just by following it. The company
started to produce the condenser from January 1954. Just two month later, Sony ordered them andrequired to deliver 30 thousands condensers within one month for assembling their transistor radios.
As a result, Matsuo Electronics Company expanded product facility and customers rapidly４３. Thisepisode implies that even the small company could get a chance to develop and keep up with larger
electronics company by utilizing PB reports.
5. Conclusion
The technology gap between Japan and other advanced countries had widened during WWII.
As we saw in the case of the chemical industry, the PB reports supplied important information to
Japanese engineers. On the contrary in Germany, the dyestuff industry was unable to develop new
products and remained at the same technology level as that in the PB reports even at the end of the
1950s４４. PB reports reduced the technology gap between Japan and Germany４５.
It should be noted that the U.S. investigation team requisitioned not only documents but also
numerous machines and equipment. Moreover, they took many German technologists back to the
U.S. ４６ . The U.S. government and industries could comprehensively utilize this technology
information. On the other hand, all the information Japan could obtain was in document form. With
these constraints, Japan made its best effort to utilize the PB reports.
First of all, a few engineers in various fields, such as universities, public and national institutes,
and consulting businesses, recognized the importance of the reports. Some technical officials andacademicians especially played an important role by never trying to withhold information. On thecontrary, they actively delivered PB reports to the concerned people. Such openness seems to havebeen a result of their official positions. To understand their quick response to the reports, theirresearch experience during wartime should be investigated. The following questions have yet to beanswered: On what subjects was research conducted? How did they recognize the limits of theirresearch capabilities during wartime science and technology mobilization?
In addition to the individuals, SCJ and STAC requested the Japanese Government to purchase8

all the reports immediately. These institutions were established in the democratization process ofJapanese science and technology, which was promoted by GHQ/SCAP after Japan’s defeat in WWII.
Such process was motivated by Japanese scientists’ wish for the modernization of science system.
However as Hiroshige claimed, their wish and criticism for Japanese science system can go back towartime science mobilization which also required to modernize science and technology for thedevelopment of weapons４７.
Joint research in JSIA also goes way back to wartime. Some recent studies have pointed outthat a number of joint research studies—not only between companies but also between companies
and universities and between military and other governmental institutes—played a very importantrole in technological development, especially in postwar Japan; many of these research studies had
been organized during wartime４８. The social changes between wartime and the reform period or thesystemization of science and technology should not be ignored in an understanding of Japanese
postwar technology development.
Having been available all over the world, PB reports must have been used in various countries
and areas. This study only concerns Japan. To identify the impact of PB reports, the cases of othercountries should be studied. In this way, the patterns of technology transfer in various countries canbecome more discernable.
Note
１

Tetsuro Nakaoka, “Gijyutsu Donyu [Technology Introduction]” in Nihon Sangyo Gijyutushi Jiten[The Encyclopedia of Japanese History of Industrial Technology], Japan Society of Industrial
Technological History ed. (Kyoto, 2007), 24–25.
２
John Gimbel, Science, technology, and reparations: exploitation and plunder in postwar Germany(Stanford, 1990).

３

Sigeru Nakayana, “Kagaku Jouhou no Kokusai Kouryu [The International Exchange of Scientific
Information],” in Tsu-shi Nihon no Kagaku Gijyutsu [The Social History of Science andTechnology in Contemporary Japan], Sigeru. Nakayama et al. eds., Vol.1 (Tokyo, 1995), 161–169.
Gimbel, op. cit., Chap. 1.
５Gimbel, op. cit., Chap. 2.
６ibid. Chap. 4.
７
Morio Uehara, “PB ripoto ka Beikoku Seifu Kenkyu ripoto ka [PB reports or U.S. government
research reports],” Saiensu Laiburary [Science Library], 5/4–5 (1959, May), 55.
８Sigeharu Isobe, “PB Ripoto ni Tsuite [An introduction to PB reports],” Gakuto, 49/11 (1952, Nov.),
４

57–58.
９

Masamitsu Yoshimura, Kin no Tou [A Tower of Gold] (Tokyo, 1953), 322.

１０

Masamitsu Yoshimura, “PB Ripoto ni Himitsu ha Nai [There is no secret in PB reports],” Cyuo

Kouron, 67/10 (1952, Sep.).
Nakayama, op. cit., 162.
１２
Eiji Koike, “PB Ripoto Tono Deai [My encounter with PB reports],” Jouhou Kanri [Journal of
１１

Information and Processing and Management], 33/2 (1990, May), 174–177.
9

１３

Eiji Nakabachi, “PB Repoto no Tebiki [A guide to PB reports],” Kagaku Kogyo Shiryo [Chemicalengineer’s digest], 20/3 (1952, Jul.) 33–34.
１４

TIRI, PB (BIOS, FIAT, CIOS) Kagaku Kogyo Bunken Syoroku [The bibliography of Chemicalindustry in PB reports] (Tokyo, 1953).
Yoshimura, op. cit., 1952, 98.
１６JSIA, Nihon Soda Kogyo 100-nen shi [A 100-years History of Soda Industry] (Tokyo, 1982),
１５

718–729.
Yoshimura, op. cit., 1952, 99.
１８
Tetsu Hiroshige, Kagaku no Syakai shi: Kindai Nihon no Kagaku Taisei [The Social History of
Science: The Scientific Structure of Modern Japan], (Tokyo, 1973), Chap. 10.
１９
For further details about the relationship between Japanese scientists and ESS/ST and theestablishment process of SCJ, see, Bowen C. Dees, The Allied Occupation and Japan’s Economic
Miracle Building the Foundation of Japanese Science and Technology
1945-1952,( Richmond,Surrey,1997), chap. 6, 8.
２０
Hiroshige, op. cit., 266-269.
２１
SCJ, “PB Ripoto ni Tsuite Youbou [A request on PB reports],” Nihon Gakujyutsu Kaigi Geppou
１７[The monthly journal of SCJ], 2/6 (1952, Jun.), 9.
２２

STAC, “Dai 41 kai Kagaku Gijyutsu Gyosei Kyougikai Youshi [The official record of theproceedings of STAC 41st meeting],” (1952, Jun.).
STAC, “Dai 42 kai Kagaku Gijyutsu Gyosei Kyougikai Youshi [The official record of theproceedings of STAC 42nd meeting],” (1952, Jul.).
２４“Sangiin Okura Iinkai 27 gou [The Japan House of Councilors, 27th committee on finance],”２３(March 20th, 1952). All minutes of the National Diet were cited from the website “On-line Search
System (http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/)”.
“Syugiin Toshokan Unei Iinkai 3 gou [The Japan House of Representatives, 3rd LibraryManagement Committee],” (June 18th, 1952).
２６“Sangiin Toshokan Unei Iinkai 4 gou [The Japan House of Councilors, 4th Library Management
Committee],” (June 20th, 1952).
２７“Syugiin Hon-Kaigi 63 gou [The Japan House of Representatives, 63rd Plenary Session],” (June30th, 1952).
２８
JDICA, Kaseihin Kogyo Kyokai 50-nen shi [A fifty-year History of Japan Dyestuff and Industrial
２５

Chemical Association] (Tokyo, 1998), 155-157.
２９

Yoshie Bansho, “IG sha Yuki Gousei Kagaku no Gaikyou [A situation of organic synthetic

chemistry in IG Farben],” Yuki Gousei Kagaku [Journal of Synthetic Organic Chemistry, Japan], 13(1956, Oct.), 33.
JDICA, Gousei Seni Gijyutu no Rekishi [A history of synthetic fiber technology] (Tokyo, 1997),
9.
３１
Nihon Kayaku, Kayaku kara Kayaku made Hara Yasuzaburo to Nihon Kayaku no 50-nen [From３０

gunpowder to chemical agent, A fifty-year History of Nihon Kayaku] (Tokyo, 1967), 206-222.
３２

Sirou Yamaguchi, “Senryo Kogyo no Saikin no Shinpo [The progress of the dye industry in recent

years],” Nikka kyo Geppou [Japan Chemical Industry Association monthly], 7/7 (1954, Jun.), 26.
３３JCIA, Nihon no Kagaku Kogyo Sengo 30-nen no Ayumi [A thirty-year History of Japan Chemical
10Industry after the war] (Tokyo, 1979), 63.
３４Touru Takamatsu, “San and Arukari [acid and alkali],” in Japan Society of Industrial

Technological History, op. cit., 132.
３５

Tatsuzo Okada, “Tategata Kaitenshiki Suiginhou Denkaisou ni tuite [An introduction to Vertical

Rotary Mercury process cell],” Nichikakyo Geppou [Japan Chemical Industry Association monthly],
45 (1952, Feb.), 27–29.
JCIA, op. cit., 65.
３７JSIA, op. cit., 724–725.
３８
JSIA, op. cit., 423–426.
３９Toshiyuki Sugino, “Soda Kogyo Gijyutu no Hensen -Kako kara Mirai e- Sono1 PB Repoto to
３６

Suiginhou no Kindaika [A change of soda technology: from the past to the future Vol.1, amodernization of mercury process and PB reports],” Soda to Enso [Soda & chlorine], 42/6 (1991,
Jun.), 10–17.
JCIA, op. cit., 66, 240.
４１
MP condensers were carried to Japan from Germany by submaline. Saburo Hayashi, “Condenser
no Ayumi 2 [The development of condenser part 2],” Denshi Zairyou [Electronic material], 1962
Nov., 76.
４２
Yuki Nakajima, “Sengo Nihon niokeru Senmon Buhin Meka no Hatten -1945~60: Denshi Buhin
Sangyou no Jirei [The Progress of Specialty Components Makers after Wold War 2 inJapan:Electronic Components Industry from 1945 to 1960],” Keiei-shi Gaku [Japan BusinessHistory Review], 33/3 (1998, Dec.).
４３
Sanjyu-Go Nenshi Hensan Incai [35 years history editorial committee], Matsuo Denki Sanjyu-Go
Nenshi [A thirty-five year history of Matuo Denki](Osaka,1985), 48-52.
４４
Eiji Koike, “Sekai no Senryo Kogyo (1) [The dyestuff industry in the World Part 1],” Senryo to
４０Yakuhin [Dyestuffs & chemicals], 4/12 (1959, Dec.), 697.
４５

To estimate the significance of PB reports more precisely, more case studies in various industries

should be gathered. In some technology fields that progressed rapidly after WWII, such as electronics
and petro-chemistry, PB reports seem less reliable.
Gimbel, op. cit., Chap. 3, Chap. 6.
４７
Hiroshige, op. cit., 252-253.
４８See, Hiroshige, op. cit., 204-206; Hiroshi Aoki and Atsushi Hiramoto, “Kagaku Gijyutsu Douin to
４６

Kenkyu Tonarigumi: Dainiji Taisen Ka Nihon no Kyodo Kenkyu [The Mobilization of Science andTechnology and ‘The Research Neighborhood Groups’: Research Collaboration in Japan During
World War II],” Shakai-Keizaishi Gaku [Socio-Economics History], 68/5 (2003, Jan.); Minoru
Sawai, “Senjiki Nihon no Kenkyu Kaihatsu Taisei: Kagaku Gijyutsu Doin to Kyodo Kenkyu no
Shinka [Research and Development in Wartime Japan: Mobilization of Science and Intensificationof Joint Research],” Osaka Daigaku Keizaigaku [Osaka Economic Papers], 54/3 (2004, Dec.).

11

Tables
Table 1: Bibliographies of technical reports issued by the U.S. government
The data of first issue
1946, January
1947, January
1954, October
1965, January
1971, March
1975, April

Title
Bibliography of Scientific and Industrial Reports
Bibliography of Technical Reports
U.S. Government Research Reports
U.S. Government Research & Development Reports
Government Reports Announcement
Government Reports Announcement & Index

Sorce: National Diet Library OPAC (http://opac.ndl.go.jp/index.html)

Table 2： The total number of PB reports and its pages
from January 1946 to January 1952
Country
Germany
United States
Japan
Great Britain
Others
Total

Reports
Pages
Number%Number
%55,772
52.2
5,255
70.3
44,629
41.8
1,762
23.6
3,262
3.1
322
4.3
1,600
1.5
47
0.6
1,582
1.5
91
1.2
106,845
100
7,477
100

Source: Morio Uehara, “PB ripoto ka Beikoku Seifu
Kenkyu ripoto ka [PB reports or U.S.
government research reports?]”, Saiensu
Laiburary [Science Library], 5/4-5 (1959, May),
56.

12

Table 3. German engineers interrogated by the investigation teamCompany and Factory
Anorgana G.m.b.H. Gendorf
Ｉ.Ｇ. Farben Höechst

I.G. Farben Rheinfelden

I.G. Farben Ludwigsahfen

I.G. Farben Huels(chlorine operation)
I.G. Farben Leverkusen

Person's name
Dr. Tapperman
Dr. Spiker
Dr. Otto Wegwitz
Dr. Fritz BachranDr. Rothweiler
Dr. Eggert
Dr. Huber
Dr. Carl Liebich
Dr. A. Hermann
Dr. H. Heres
Dr. E. Renshler
Dr. J. Jung
Dr. Pfannmuller
Dr. Honsberg
Dr. Hans Retschy
Dr. W. Huhn
Dr. Paul Bauman
Dr. Oswin Nitzchke
Dr. Ing. Erich Buttgenbach
Dr. August Wingler
Dr. Bencker
Dr. Klebert

Position
Chemist in the Division of Technical Applications
Head, Electrolytic plant, Inorganic Division
Chief, Inorganic Division
Head, Methyl plant.
Assistant, the Methyl plantHead,Caustic Dehydration
Plant Manager
Superintendent, Elrctrolysis
Superintendent, Caustic Concentration
Superintendent, Liquid Chlorine and bleachSuperintendent, Organic division
Director, Inorganic Division Ludwigshafen
Superintendent, Chlorine Electrolysis
Superintendent, Liquid Chlorine and Caustic Soda
Superintendent, Alcl electrolysis
Plant Manager
Division head
Superintendent, Cl2 and NaOH
Head, Azo department
Superintendent, Chlorine electrolysis
Head, Inorganic Division

Source: Joint Intelligence Objective Agency ,FIAT Final Report No.431 Survey of The Chlorine and caustic plants inwestern and southern germany (PB 7747), (Washington D.C. 1945), 1,15,18,28,40, 43,45,48.

Table4: Production Capacity of caustic soda

Year-end
1939
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957

Ammonia
415.8

Total
236.9

261.0
261.0
301.0
301.0
301.0
301.0
301.0
390.6
390.6

199.0
226.0
261.0
297.2
327.5
361.1
389.1
492.6
626.5

(1000t)Electrolytic
Mercury Diaphragm

85.8
92.7
112.9
134.3
164.5
197.9
220.3
299.9
418.0

113.2
133.3
148.1
162.9
163.0
163.1
168.7
192.7
208.5

Source: JCIA, Nihon no Kagaku Kogyo Sengo 30-nen no Ayumi[A 30-years History of Japan Chemical Industry after
the war](Tokyo 1979), 63.

13