© 2019 Journal of International and Advanced Japanese Studies
Vol. 11, February 2019, pp. 1-21
Master’s and Doctoral Programs in International and Advanced
Japanese Studies
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
University of Tsukuba

Article“Central Asia Plus Japan”Dialogue:
From Idea to Implementation
Almas DISSYUKOV
University of Tsukuba, Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Ph.D. Student
To date, the issue of multilateral cooperation between Japan and Central Asian countries has not been
widely covered by the international academic community. Indeed, the absence of this particular researchcasts doubt on the existence of initial publications about the presence of a full-ﬂedged Japanese foreign
policy strategy in Central Asia. Nowadays, in a narrow sense, the“Central Asia plus Japan”dialogue isthe only dialogue platform between Japan and Central Asia. The dialogue is also a unique example of how
Japan and the Central Asian republics cooperate on critical issues of the regional and international agenda.
The present article is aimed at evaluating the current role of the“Central Asia plus Japan”dialogue
from the Japanese perspective. The goal is to examine the activities of the dialogue from 2004 to 2018,
starting with key stages in the formation of Japanese strategy towards Central Asia (1991–2018), including
those that led to the creation of the dialogue.
Constructivism is the primary theoretical framework used in this thesis, drawing on the sub-theory of“conference diplomacy”for a more in-depth analysis of the dialogue as a communication mechanism.
The research questions were answered by the author using discourse analysis and desk research of
relevant documents belonging to the dialogue, including speeches, presentations and outcome documents.
In addition, the author conducted several interviews with former officials and scholars who directly
participated in the dialogue’s formation.
The uniqueness of the present work lies in the fact that the case of the“Central Asia plus Japan”
dialogue has not been considered before in such detail. This study helps reveal the essence of the dialogue,
including its principles and modus operandi. The author also could trace the process of the transformationof the dialogue and its perception from the Japanese perspective. Through this, the author found speciﬁc“norms”which guide the multilateral nature of Central Asia–Japan cooperation.
Keywords:“Central Asia+Japan”Dialogue, Central Asia, Japanese Diplomacy, Japanese Foreign Policy, Conference
Diplomacy

Introduction.
Currently, Japan’s foreign policy is undergoing a noticeable upsurge. After 2012, the incumbent Prime
Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe has primarily revived the political and academic debate on the further role of theJapanese foreign strategy. Even though Abe mainly focused on Japan’s closest allies and neighbors, including
the United States (US), China (PRC), Russia, North and South Korea, and Southeast Asia, his efforts led to the
expansion of Japanese diplomacy in other essential directions. Central Asia, which is located between Russia
and the PRC, is not the last in this process. In October 2015, Abe became the ﬁrst Prime Minister in the modern
history of Japan, who visited all ﬁve countries of the region. During his speech at the Nazarbayev University,
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in Kazakhstan, Abe proclaimed new messages that aimed at further development of Central Asia–Japan
cooperation, i.e.: (1)“drastic”strengthening of relations; (2) Japan’s active involvement in efforts to address
universal for the region challenges; (3) deepening partnership in the global arena (2015). At the same time,speaking about the role of Japanese initiative–the“Central Asia plus Japan”dialogue (after this–dialogue)–
Abe pointed out that Tokyo would continue to play the role of a catalyst in this process. However, it must be
admitted that the assessment and forecasts regarding the further role of Japan in the region are impossible
without a comprehensive analysis of the current volume of multilateral cooperation.
The ﬁrst ofﬁcial strategy of Japan on Central Asia appeared in 1997 under the administration of Ryutaro
Hashimoto, who initiated the launch of so-called Eurasian diplomacy. Moreover, Hashimoto (1997) also dubbed
the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus as the“Silk Road region”and identiﬁed three key pillars ofJapan’
s cooperation with the region, namely: (1) development of a political dialogue; (2) economic cooperation;(3) interaction for peace. Despite the serious differences in assessing the goals and objectives of the strategy,
this step helped to consolidate the importance of the Central Asian effect in Japan’s foreign policy.
The new strategic direction was further developed under the administration of Junichiro Koizumi, mainly
thanks to the efforts of his Foreign Ministers, Yoriko Kawaguchi and Taro Aso; the Minister of Economy,
Trade and Industry Akira Amari; and other politicians. During her visit to Central Asia in the summer of 2004,
Kawaguchi initiated the creation of the“Central Asia plus Japan”dialogue, which is still viewed by many
experts as an important element of Japanese engagement into regional affairs. In August 2019, this initiative
will celebrate its ﬁfteenth anniversary, which demonstrates its important role and longevity in the process ofbuilding Central Asia–Japan partnership. Moreover, a number of experts (Tanaka, 2018; Kawato, 2018; Starr2017) believe that the dialogue had played a unique historical role for Central Asia as a prototype for posterior
dialogue platforms with the Republic of Korea (ROK), the European Union (EU), and other international
partners. Accordingly, the dialogue acts as“knowledge,”which Central Asian countries use today in theirdiplomatic craft.
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that many of the works devoted to the dialogue are related to its
initial stage. There were signiﬁcant changes in Japanese domestic politics, namely the change of the rulingparties in 2009 and 2012, which to some extent affected Japan’s foreign policy. Despite such peripeteia, thedialogue continued to function and produce informative documents that have not been completely studied until
now. From time to time, independent authors have used fragments of the dialogue-related activities in their
publications, which, by-turn, only lead to a limited and sometimes subjective evaluation of the process.
With this article, the author intends to demonstrate an important facet of Japan’s relations with Central
Asia, i.e. to reveal the essence of Tokyo’s multilateral approach. In fact, the author scrutinizes the content of
the multilateral cooperation between Japan and Central Asia and already existing outcomes. As a result, theauthor attempts to assess activities and transformation of the dialogue since its inception in 2004. Based on
Kaufman’s“Conference diplomacy”(1996), the author has attempted to understand the structural changes in
the framework of the dialogue and relate it to relevant domestic and international events, while clearly deﬁning
the principles, norms, and identities that determine and inﬂuence Japan’s multilateral stance on Central Asia.
The study is built on the following research questions: 1) What lies behind the idea of creating a dialogue? 2)
What is the role of the dialogue in the Japanese foreign policy? 3) What are the unique features of the dialogue?
Is the dialogue a capable platform for communication between Japan and the region?
Further, after reviewing all previously published documents about the dialogue, the author analyses theformation and launch of the dialogue, based on multilateral cooperation between Japan and Central Asia. Next,
comes a detailed overview of dialogue’s structure and its content. After receiving speciﬁc empirical data, theauthor proceeds to an analysis of the dialogue and its strengths and weaknesses.

2Almas DISSYUKOV,“Central Asia Plus Japan”Dialogue

1. Theoretical framework and literature review
At present, there are many academic and analytical publications devoted to political, economic, military andeven ideological aspects of Japan’s foreign policy. Thanks to the efforts of individual authors, Central Asia
occupies its unique place in the study of Japanese diplomacy and its basic approaches and values. The main
ﬂow of these publications related to the perception of the Central Asian vector through the prism of Japan’srelations with Russia, the PRC, the US and the EU. In this context, the reader can imagine the role of Central
Asia in Japan’s foreign policy strategy, as well as learn about further cooperation opportunities. Thanks tosuch authors as Dadabaev (2014, 2016), Kawato (2008), Komatsu (2004), Len (2008), Uyama (2008), Tsunozaki(2007), Yuasa (2007, 2008), and others, readers can become well informed about Japanese political and economic
interests in the Central Asian region and familiarize themselves with those unique strategies and methods thatTokyo employs to achieve its goals in Central Asia.
Almost all authors stressed the role of the“Central Asia plus Japan”dialogue, which was created three years
after the 9/11 events. At the same time, the analysis of these publications shows that the detailed assessment of
the dialogue’s activities was carried out only at the initial stage of the forum’s creation. The authors were mostinterested in the transformation of Japanese foreign policy in Central Asia in the early 2000s, as well as the
choice of the current form of the dialogue. Such authors also make frequent comparisons between the dialogue
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which, unfortunately, do not consider such critical criteria as
their legal status, membership, founding documents, and organizational structure.
Yuasa (2007) indicates in his work several unique factors that significantly contributed to the formationof the dialogue’s ideas through early attempts of the Hashimoto administration to develop a multilateralapproach towards Central Asia. Former Japanese Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Kawato (2008), also contributed
to the description of the dialogue’s creation based on his memories. In addition, he identiﬁed several importantfactors, e.g. the lack of support from the side of the Prime Minister’s Office and the National Diet, which
resulted in the dialogue’s low proﬁle. Contrariwise, the former Japanese Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Toshio
Tsunozaki (2007), gives an exceptionally positive impression of his participation in the launch of the dialogue.
Another author, Len (2008), identiﬁed a year of dialogue’s establishment as a starting point for a new period inCentral Asia-Japan relationship. At the same time, Len raises critical issues in front of readers that can indicate
the dialogue’s possible politicization and its deliberate inefﬁciency. On the other hand, Uyama (2008) highlights
the importance of the dialogue and the non-confrontational efforts of the Government of Japan towards Central
Asia. Dadabaev (2014) also pays considerable attention to the process of the dialogue’s formation. He is oneof those rare authors, who argue about the direct link between the dialogue and other multilateral dialoguemechanisms in Japanese diplomatic practice. However, he avoided detailed comparison or in-depth studyof such platforms. In his other work, on the foreign policy of the Central Asian countries, Dadabaev (2016)provides a detailed analysis of numerous strategies and initiatives that Japan successfully use in the region.
Curiously, this time the author mentions the dialogue less frequently; brieﬂy covering it during the comparisonof China/Japan foreign policy approaches and Japanese assessments of possible water-related inter-action inCentral Asia. Among young researchers, who showed great interest in this initiative, it is worth to mention the
doctoral thesis of Mahmudov (2017) that covers the dialogue analysis in a broader sense, based on interviews
with direct participants of the dialogue meetings. At the same time, the author takes a critical stance on the
dialogue’s expediency.
The use of constructivism as a theoretical framework makes it possible to reveal behavior, beliefs, practices
and values of Japan and the Central Asian nations in the framework of a specific initiative with highgeopolitical contour. Therefore, the academic community obtain additional data on the identities of Japanand the Central Asian countries, as well as norms that identify their behavior in the framework of a joint
multilateral platform.
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During the interviews with numerous participants of the dialogue’s creation, including Kawaguchi, Tanaka,
Kawato and others, the Japanese speakers repeatedly noted that the idea of the dialogue was built on the basisof Japan’s fruitful cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a model close to
ASEAN Plus Three (after this–APT) format. The author was also interested to know how Japanese experts see
the Japanese role in the framework of the APT and Japan’s relations with the Association.
A concept of the conference diplomacy regime for ASEAN was ﬁrst proposed in 2003 by the Japanese author
Sato in his book,“The ASEAN Regime: Development and Challenges of the ASEAN Foreign Policies.”Other
scholars of ASEAN–Japan relations also supported this approach. This new approach, based on the originalidea of“conference diplomacy”(Kaufman, 1996) and its posterior applications, was applied for Central Asia–
Japan studies for the ﬁrst time. To avoid inaccuracies during the research process, the author relied exclusively
on original Japanese documents, using English and Russian texts for comparison only. The author also used theopportunities provided by the Foreign Ministry of Japan (MOFA) to participate in the meetings of the TokyoIntellectual Dialogue (TID) and Working Group (WGM) in 2018.
2. The way to the dialogueʼs creation
Twenty-eight years have passed since Japan recognized the independence of the Central Asian countries.
During this period, the countries of the region and Japan were able to establish close relations and create
various mechanisms of bilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, the“Central Asia plus Japan”dialogue is the ﬁrst
and so far the only instrument of their multilateral cooperation in a narrow format.
The author believes that the prerequisites for the formation of this tool appeared long before its actual
emergence, and that it marched in step to the development of Japan’s bilateral relations with Central Asia. As
it turned out, prior to 2004, Japan had initiated large-scale international conferences that were directly related todifferent challenges for Central Asia’s sustainable development.
In October 1992, Japan organized the Tokyo Conference on Assistance to the New(ly) Independent States,
which brought together representatives of 70 countries and 20 international/regional organizations (IO/
ROs). This meeting was held eight months after a similar conference in the United States. As a result of thesemeetings, Japan began to provide technical assistance, humanitarian aid, and to promote economic relations
with the countries of the former USSR on the“help for self-help”basis (Miyazawa, 1992). In September 1999,
two years after the launch of the Eurasian Diplomacy, Japan organized the Tokyo International Conference
on Semipalatinsk, which brought together representatives of 24 countries and 12 IOs, and was designed tohelp Kazakhstan in its efforts to deal with the consequences of nuclear testing on the territory of former
Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site, located in eastern part of Kazakhstan. In January 2002, one of the firstfor Japanese conferences on Afghan issues–The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance toAfghanistan–was hosted by Tokyo.
In 1999, a group of well-known Japanese scholars submitted the report“Challenge 2001–Japan’s Foreign
Policy Toward the 21st Century”to the leadership of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. This report highlighted
the importance of strengthening the mechanisms of diplomatic frameworks, including the creation of new
frameworks for building a safe and prosperous world.
In 2002, the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Foreign Relations recommended the Japanese Government
include Central Asia and the Caspian Sea countries in the priority list of it’s Official Development
Assistance (ODA) in order to support projects aimed at the regional integration. The task force also pointed out
the importance of pursuing Japan’s foreign policy in accordance with national interests based on such notions
as: (1) the maintenance of the peace and security of Japan; (2) the maintenance of the free trade system; (3)protection of democratic values; (4) people-to-people exchanges and (5) the development of human resources.
Until 2004 before the dialogue was actually established, the Japanese Government initiated numerous4

Almas DISSYUKOV,“Central Asia Plus Japan”Dialogue

diplomatic frameworks for various organizations and countries, including the EU (1991), the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) (1993), the Central American states (1995), the Southern Common Market(MERCOSUR) (1996), ASEAN (1997), China and the ROK (1999), the Organization for Security and Cooperationin Europe (OSCE) (2000), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (2000), countries of the Islamic world (2002),
the Andean Community (2002), and Arab States (2003).
The presence of such a colorful set of frameworks suggests that Japan had a substantial experience ofinteracting with these groups in a more extended format. The choice of dialogue partners was determinedby the political (e.g., NATO, OSCE) and economic interests (e.g., MERCOSUR, CARICOM) of Japan. Moreover,given the fact that Japan has observer status among a large number of IOs and ROs, these frameworks allowing
Tokyo to monitor and analyze speciﬁc developments in various parts of the world. An analysis of the internal
content of these mechanisms suggests that Japan does not have the“one-size-ﬁts-all”model that Tokyo applies
to its partners. It indicates that Japan is ﬂexible in this matter, although this can also be dictated by the speciﬁc
interests of Japan and possible restrictions for external partners. For example, in 1981, Japan and ASEAN
established a new international organization in Tokyo–the ASEAN Promotion Center for Trade, Investment andTourism (ASEAN–Japan Center) –in order to jointly solve different economic issues. In 2011, Japan, China, andthe ROK launched the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul (South Korea).
According to Kawato (2008; 2018), the dialogue’s idea was ﬁrst presented during a joint meeting of Japanese
Ambassadors accredited in Central Asia and the leadership of the MOFA’s European Bureau in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan in September 2003. Tsunozaki, the Japanese Ambassador to Kazakhstan, and Kenji Shinoda, thenDeputy Director General of the European Bureau, presented this idea together. At that time, Japanese Foreign
Ministry ofﬁcials considered several options that included the possible participation of Japan in the activitiesof the SCO or the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (CACO). The ﬁrst option was unlikely due to theabsence of other Western powers in the SCO. In 2004, during the CACO business forum in the city of Almaty,in Kazakhstan, Tsunozaki announced Japanese interest in establishing direct contact and cooperation programswith the CACO, i.e. in water, energy and transport sectors. However, this option lost its attractiveness after
Russia’s accession to the CACO in the same year. Finally, the“Central Asia plus Japan”dialogue on the APTmodel turned out to be the most acceptable solution for Japan. Apparently, the launch of a new initiative could
not take place at all, which again indicates the uniqueness of the decision made by Japan.
Yuasa (2008) indicates that the process of the dialogue’s formation was connected with numerous messages
from the so-called“epistemic community,”especially academic circles, as well as representatives of the Central
Asian countries to create an interactive platform for Central Asia–Japan communication. In March 2003, theJapan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) published a report,“Development of New State of Affairs inCentral Asia.”In the document, Japanese scholars mentioned the necessity in a new strategy for Central Asia,
e.g. during a possible visit of the Prime Minister of Japan to Central Asia. According to Sudo (1998), who is aprominent scholar on ASEAN–Japan relations, the Fukuda doctrine, which was indicated in the aforementioned
report as a model concept, in fact, was“the ﬁrst Japanese policy initiative that identiﬁed ASEAN as the mostimportant direction (of its foreign policy).”
Yuasa also notes that the Foreign Ministry ofﬁcials played the central role in this process. However, the chiefauthor of the dialogue idea, former Japanese Foreign Minister Kawaguchi (2017) pointed out that the originalidea was born after her meeting with Tetsuji Tanaka in the summer of 2003. As a result of their meeting, thequestion arose about the appropriate form of new Central Asia–Japan cooperation dialogue. As a result, the
MOFA staff was responsible for the practical implementation of the new task.
Kawaguchi’s choice in favour of Tanaka as a main interlocutor for discussing the Central Asian theme wassurprising. However, this step could be related to Tanaka’s professional background, i.e. his former afﬁliation
to the Bank of Japan and his personal contacts with the Central Asian government ofﬁcials as their personal
advisor. Before taking up the post of the foreign minister, Kawaguchi had extensive working experience in the5Journal of International and Advanced Japanese Studies

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Ministry of International Trade and Industry (now the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), the World
Bank, and the private sector. During the interviews, Kawaguchi and Tanaka focused mostly on economic issues
that led to the dialogue’s creation. Tanaka (2018) also designated Kawaguchi’s work history as an essential
element in the dialogue’s success at the initial stage. Kawaguchi also noted that the dialogue’s formation waslean on two notions, i.e. regional cooperation and economic development. Such emphasis was related to thedesire to promote the development of projects that would advance intra-regional cooperation and economic
prosperity of the region. In this connection, the author is convinced that the“economic”factor was one of themain pillars behind the dialogue’s creation.
According to Kawato (2008; 2018), the final idea was first presented to the Uzbek Foreign Minister Sodiq
Safoyev during his visit to Japan in December 2003. After that, Japanese plans was also discussed withrepresentatives of other Central Asian countries. In March 2004, the MOFA hosted a symposium,“The Current
State and Future of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia.”During the event, Parliamentary Vice Minister Isao
Matsumiya stressed the importance of reviewing the Japanese strategy in Central Asia. He also hinted about
the formation of a new strategic approach towards Central Asia.
According to Kawaguchi, the timing of the meeting was chosen as a result of her informal conversation
with the then Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the Asian Cooperation Dialogue’s(ACD) meeting in China in 2004. Tokayev proposed to organize the meeting around the time of the CACO
Foreign Ministers’gathering in Astana in August 2004. Tokayev also promised Kawaguchi to discuss the datewith his Central Asian colleagues. Dadabaev notes (2016:22) that Japan has decided to present the initiative in
Uzbekistan before the ﬁrst ofﬁcial meeting in Astana, taking into account the competition between Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan for regional dominance. These facts also indicate that the Japanese side treats their reputation
and attitude towards the Central Asian countries very carefully.
During her visit to Uzbekistan in 2004, Kawaguchi issued a statement on the Japanese strategy in Central
Asia at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy. She highlighted the importance of the Central
Asian region for global security, as well as lack of“selﬁsh goals”in Japanese attitude to Central Asia. Since
the adoption of Eurasian diplomacy, Japan and the Central Asian countries have been able to demonstratesigniﬁcant changes in the nature and scope of their cooperation and in their level of cultural understanding. As
was mentioned by Mme. Kawaguchi, Japan is a“natural partner”for Central Asia.
In addition, Kawaguchi noted significant prospects for collaboration in the field of social and economic
cooperation, including in the area of human resources development, energy, environment, etc. As a result,
Kawaguchi proposed the creation of a dialogue as a“new dimension”and an“option for cooperation”basedon principles such as“respecting diversity, competition, and coordination, and open cooperation.”The author’sanalysis of bilateral mechanisms shows that in 2004 not all countries had a current set of bilateral dialoguemechanisms like the Parliamentary Friendship League or the Joint Economic Cooperation Commission. At thattime, these facts gave the dialogue a deeper meaning in the eyes of the Central Asian politicians and diplomats.
The emphasis in Kawaguchi’s speech was focused on the development of intra-regional economic integrationin Central Asia on the ASEAN-based experience. Thus, Japan demonstrated its interest in maintaining theprinciples of intra-regional cooperation close to the CACO spirit, as well as their perception of Central Asia
as an integral region. In addition, Kawaguchi expressed hopes that one day Afghanistan could also join theprocess.
The ﬁrst ofﬁcial meeting of Central Asia–Japan foreign ministers (ﬁrst FMM) was held on August 28, 2004
in Astana. However, the Turkmenistan delegation was presented at the level of Ambassador. Later, it becomes
clear that Japan would negatively react on the low level of Central Asian participation. Nevertheless, according
to the former Director General of the European Bureau Komatsu (2004), participation of the Turkmen side wasconsidered as demonstration of support to the initiative.
Japanese Ambassador to Kazakhstan Tsunozaki (2007) notes in his memoirs that all participants of the ﬁrst
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Almas DISSYUKOV,“Central Asia Plus Japan”Dialogue

meeting welcomed the initiative. One of the main outcomes of the meeting was determination of the forum’sgoals in such dimensions as security, democratic development, socio-economic growth, and close cooperation in
addressing regional and global issues.
The review of Central Asia–Japan membership in various IO/ROs prior to 2004 shows that the opportunities
for their multilateral cooperation were noticeably limited. For example, some countries were less presented invarious organizations such as the ACD, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL), the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), and the World Trade
Organization (WTO). These facts could also indicate a desire of the Japanese side to promote Central Asia–
Japan multilateral contacts and projects in a more systematic way.
In December 2004, Kawaguchi, as the Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of Japan, took part in the twelfth
Ministerial Council (MC) of the OSCE in Soﬁa, Bulgaria. An additional meeting among the representatives ofJapan and the Central Asian countries was held on the MC margins to discuss the working moments of the ﬁrst
FMM. This meeting was also the ﬁrst and only meeting among the dialogue participants in the framework ofmajor international forums.
During her speech at the OSCE event, Kawaguchi presented the“Central Asia plus Japan”dialogue andurged her European colleagues to jointly assist Central Asian efforts in such ﬁelds as combating international
terrorism, drug trafﬁcking, water issues, environmental problems, development of transport communications,and energy. This message could be also linked with previous Japan–OSCE experience, including based on theirjoint conference“Comprehensive Security in Central Asia–Sharing OSCE and Asian Experiences,”which washeld in Tokyo in December 2000. It is noteworthy that two years after the launch of the dialogue, in April 2006,
the ﬁfteenth Japan–EU Summit led to the launch of a separate dialogue on Central Asia, based on a similar
Japan–EU framework vis-à-vis the East Asia region. In addition, Kawaguchi (2018) mentioned that she also
made a similar appeal during her working meetings with representatives of the U.S. Department of State. Thisapproach also mirrors the ideas of Ambassador Kawato, who, during the process of the dialogue’s creation,
believed that Japan could initiate the creation of a multilateral platform in Central Asia close to the example of
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
One notable feature of this period was the lack of proper attention among Japanese media to the outcomeof the first FMM. Analysis of publications and interviews relates it to the fact that Kawaguchi refused touse such a traditional tool for Japanese diplomacy as the“chequebook diplomacy”during her trip to Central
Asia. Nevertheless, Tanaka, Kawato, and others (2018), who wished to remain anonymous, pointed out that theJapanese Foreign Ministry was impressed by the overestimation of the results of Kawaguchi’s visit by Russian
and Chinese media.
3. Transformation of the dialogue
During the fourteen years of its existence, the dialogue was able both to achieve signiﬁcant results and missseveral unique opportunities for its further development. In order to understand this process more precisely, theauthor has divided it into several stages, selecting FMMs as the starting point of each stage.
(1) Step one
According to Figure 1, the first structural elements of the dialogue appeared in the interval between thefirst and second ministerial meetings. They include the meetings of Senior Officials (SOM) and the TokyoIntellectual Dialogue (TID). The intermediate meeting that was held in Bulgaria in 2004, after the ﬁrst FMM, is
not included in the timeframe due to the low level of reference to it.
According to the Diplomatic Bluebook of the Japanese Foreign Ministry (2006:101), the ﬁrst SOM was held in
Tashkent, Uzbekistan in 2005. At that event, the participants agreed on the main areas of cooperation, namely:(1) politics; (2) intra-regional issues (counterterrorism, drugs, mines, poverty eradication, medical assistance7

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Figure 1. Timeline of the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialogue-related events
1 FMM

2 FMM

3 FMM

4 FMM

5 FMM

6 FMM

(28.08.2004, KZ)(05.06.2006, JP)(07.08.2010, UZ)(09.11.2012, JP)(17.07.2014, KG)(01.05.2017, TM)

1 SOM

3 SOM

6 SOM

7 SOM

9 SOM

12 SOM(04.03.2005, UZ)(13.12.2007, TJ)(01.12.2011, JP)(22.10.2013, KG)(04.03.2015, JP)(26.01.2018, TJ)

2 SOM

4 SOM

8 SOM

10 SOM

13 SOM(08.02.2006, KZ)(07.2008, UZ)(18.03.2014, JP)(24.11.2015, TM)(26.11.2018, JP)

5 SOM

11 SOM(07.2010, UZ)(25.03.2016, JP)

1 TID

2 TID

5 TID

7 TID

11 TID(30.03.2006, JP)(30.01.2007, JP)(15.03.2013, JP)(27.03.2015, JP)(03.07.2018, JP)

3 TID

6 TID

8 TID

(20.02.2009, JP)(18.03.2014, JP)(02.03.2016, JP)

4 TID

9 TID

(25.02.2010, JP)(28.09.2016, JP)

10 TID(31.03.2017, JP)

1 EF

1 BD

2 BD

(26.07.2011, JP)(28.02.2017, JP)(23.03.2018, JP)

1 WGM

2 WGM

4 WGM

(13.02.2014, JP)(19.12.2014, JP)(20.02.2018, JP)

3 WGM(04.02.2016, JP)

FMEP

FMEP

(12.2013, JP)(13-20.11.2014, JP)

FMEP(21-28.01.2016, JP)(Note: FMM–Foreign Ministers Meeting, SOM–Senior Ofﬁcials Meeting,
TID–Tokyo Intellectual Dialogue, EF–Economic Forum, WGM–Working Group Meeting,
FMEP–Foreign Ministries’Exchange Program, BD–Business Dialogue;
KZ–Kazakhstan, UZ–Uzbekistan, TJ–Tajikistan, KG–Kyrgyzstan, TM–Turkmenistan, JP–Japan).

and healthcare, environment, water, energy, trade and investment, transportation); (3) business promotion; (4)intellectual dialogue; and (5) socio-cultural exchanges. The ﬁrst meeting of the TID was held in Tokyo in 2006
with support from the Nippon Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), an organization that also helped
the government to host the Japan-OSCE Conference in 2000. At the ﬁrst TID, it was suggested that the Track II
meetings should be held once a year.
The meeting made it possible to identify new areas for multilateral cooperation, e.g. cross-borderinfrastructure and tourism. In addition, the participants were able to discover initial limitations in the dialogue’sactivities. According to Akiko Fukushima (2006), the ﬁrst TID was focused on the importance of systematic andrealistic cooperation, i.e. based on the limited participation of the Central Asian states in promising projects. In
2007, during the second TID, participants also highlighted the importance of in-depth discussions of regional
problems and possible projects with pronounced regional effect.
In order to strengthen economic cooperation, it was also proposed to establish a Joint Committee on business8

Almas DISSYUKOV,“Central Asia Plus Japan”Dialogue

matters between Japan and Central Asia under the aegis of the dialogue. Moreover, the Senior Vice Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Japan Yasuhisa Shiozaki used the term“catalyst”for the ﬁrst time to describe the Japaneserole in the dialogue. This fact demonstrates the transformation of Japan’s role from being the“natural (equal)
partner”(Kawaguchi) to being a catalyst (Shiozaki), which is closer to such concepts as“intermediary”or“conductor”.
(2) Step two
The second FMM was held in June 2006 in Tokyo. This meeting became significant due to a detailed
discussion of the further role of the dialogue.
First, the foreign minister of Afghanistan attended the meeting for the ﬁrst time as a guest/observer. Thishas been the case when the ofﬁcial representative of a third country participated in the dialogue. In addition,in the 2007 Diplomatic Bluebook, the possibility of the dialogue expansion at the expense of Afghanistan andPakistan was noted. As we can see later, the Afghan issue would be raised regularly in agendas and outcome
documents of the subsequent meetings.
Next, following the second FMM, a comprehensive Action plan was adopted, and it determined the main
direction of the dialogue activities. Despite the absence of a well-deﬁned timeframe, the action plan continues
to be one of the most signiﬁcant documents of the dialogue. It covers ﬁve basic tenets of the dialogue and ten
most promising areas of cooperation that were agreed during the first SOM. Despite the several importantfor Japan-Central Asia cooperation dates, e.g. the tenth anniversary of the dialogue (2014), the twentiethanniversary and the twenty-ﬁfth anniversaries of the establishment of Central Asia–Japan diplomatic relations(2012 and 2017), the dialogue participants missed these unique opportunities to strengthen the basic principles
and goals of the dialogue.
In addition, the second meeting gave signiﬁcant impetus to the institutionalization of the dialogue. However,many of these achievements remain on paper only. For example, the Action Plan includes an appeal to consider
the possibility of holding the ﬁrst Summit. Traces of this issue can be found later, in the 2009 parliamentarystatements of the Japanese Foreign Ministry ofﬁcials, but most of them merely conﬁrm Tokyo’s interest in thisspeciﬁc event. During the interviews, many of speakers excluded the possibility of holding such a meeting
under the current geopolitical conditions.
Participants have also proposed the establishment of a Working Group on Economics (WGM) to study
regional projects and the participation of public and private institutions. It could be said that the WGM has
become the counterpoint solution to the previous ideas on a joint economic structure within the dialogue.
However, it is evident that the WGM could not advocate for the development and implementation of highprofile economic projects due to limited status of the Group as a structural unit. Moreover, the first WGM
was organized in 2014, and up to this day only four meetings have been held. The Action Plan supported the
proposal to hold annual meetings of the TID.
Finally, this meeting shed light on an updated vision of Japanese diplomacy in Central Asia, following
statements by Hashimoto (1997), Koizumi (2002) and Kawaguchi (2004). On the eve of the second FMM, Asogave an extraordinary speech on Japanese policy in the region. Aso designated Central Asia as the object of the“New Great Game,”which, by-turn, gave Kawaguchi’s initiative a robust political connotation and increased
the doubts of Russian and Chinese media about Tokyo’s real intentions. Aso also updated the basic concepts in
describing the importance of Central Asia to Japan: leaving security, economic potential and the developmentof multilateral relations, and breaking them with an“afﬁnity”(interest to Japan). Moreover, he updated theguidelines of the Japanese diplomacy in the region, incorporating: (1) a broad-based perspective; (2) regional
cooperation; and (3) partnerships based on common universal values.
Five months later at the JIIA event, Aso presented his vision of so-called“Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”
for the Eurasian continent. The message also called for closer cooperation with NATO on the Afghan issue. At
the same time, the Arc’s key countries, including the countries of Central Asia, were presented as“marathon
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runners”and Japan was depicted as an“escort runner,”which can also be compared with the attempt of Aso
to give a new meaning to the concept of“catalyst.”(3) Step three
The third FMM was held in 2010 in Uzbekistan during the reign of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).
Despite the plain results of the ministerial meeting, including adoption of a Joint Press release–a low-level
political document–Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada was able to achieve some progress. For example,
according to data from Okada’s personal blog (2010), he returned to the issue of having regularly scheduled
ministerial meetings, and as a result, participants agreed to hold follow-up ministerial meetings in Japan andKyrgyzstan two and four years later, respectively. It was also suggested that SOMs should be held at least oncea year.
According to Kitagawa Katsuro (2010), who was the Head of Central Asia and the Caucasus Division at
the Japanese Foreign Ministry at that time, this meeting was an important for the DPJ to prove their desire forfriendly relations with Central Asia. Same time, he expressed disappointment that Turkmenistan was presented
at the level of Ambassador. The author also used this instrument–participation criterion–to improve theanalysis of the dialogue’s events.
The third FMM was also preceded by the fourth TID (2010), during which DPJ representative returnedto the notion of“catalyst.”At the same time, they were able to enforce the catalyst’s meaning by inviting
representatives from the Asian Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
to a meeting. In 2005, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura spoke about the importance of ADB andother international ﬁnancial institution’s participation in the dialogue. However, neither he nor his successors
from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) followed up on this important suggestion. The DPJ was able togo further, proposing to hold the first“Economic Forum”in Japan, which, in fact, continued to function as
Business dialogues and helped to enhance the WGM activities.
In addition, under Okada, the ﬁrst and only review of national reports on the implementation of the Action
plan was made. The dialogue participants no longer use this method. This fact demonstrates the absence of
mechanisms for monitoring the process of implementation of multilateral agreements.
(4) Step four
The fourth FMM took place in 2012 in Japan. It coincided with the twentieth anniversary of the establishmentof diplomatic relations between Japan and the Central Asian nations. The peculiarity of this meeting was
related with the full-ﬂedged participation of the delegation of Turkmenistan in the event.
In addition, all parties agreed to include the Foreign Ministries’Exchange Program in the dialogue activities.
In fact, this initiative was based on the previously existent exchange program established by the JapaneseForeign Ministry for young diplomats from the Newly Independent States. Meeting participants also stressed
the importance of inviting new guests to participate in the dialogue meetings, such as representatives of the UN
agencies. Moreover, the participants supported the proposal of the Kyrgyz side to create a dialogue’s website:
http://www.ca-jp.org/index.php/ja/ (out-of-operation).
The main result of this phase was the launching of multilateral consultations on cooperation in the ﬁeld ofagriculture. The sixth TID and the ﬁrst WGM were devoted to this topic. At the same time, the Japanese side
indicated a new criteria–“Japanese speciﬁcity”–for projects to be discussed in the framework of the dialogue.
Analysis of the statements shows that the Japanese side understands under this term those projects that are“based on or aimed at the transfer/acquisition of Japanese technologies and expertise.”(5) Step ﬁve
The ﬁfth FMM was held in Kyrgyzstan in 2014. Then, for the ﬁrst time in the history of the dialogue, allmembers were represented at the ministerial level. It had taken ten years for Japan and the Central Asian
countries to give the dialogue a ﬁnished look.
Nevertheless, the parties reﬂected the importance of“new decade”in the work of the dialogue and giving it
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practical content. As evidence, the participants adopted the ﬁrst in the framework of the dialogue Roadmap on
agriculture (e.g., ﬁght against pests, silkworm breeding, livestock, and processing of fruits and vegetables). It
is noteworthy that one year later, in 2015, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) adopted
a new strategy titled,“The Global Food Value Chain Strategy: Promote“Made with Japan”through PublicPrivate Partnership,”which supports ideas to create regional food supply chains in Central Asia and Russia.
In addition, this phase was further stimulated by the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Abe to Central Asia
in October 2015. Undoubtedly, the visit had tremendous value for the further development of Japanese foreign
policy towards Central Asia and vice-versa. Many of Step five events were devoted to the implementationof results of the visit. In addition, creation of a new instrument of Kantei diplomacy–Japan-Russia-Central
Asia Exchange Promotion Council, whose ﬁrst meeting was held on November 9, 2015 can also serve as clear
evidence of this fact.
Another important result of this phase was the seventh TID. During the event, representatives of theJapanese Foreign Ministry introduced the dialogue as a“public good”that contributing to the stability anddevelopment of Central Asia. Moreover, the President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
made his first appearance at the dialogue’s event. In his speech, Akihiko Tanaka pointed out that the JICA
has long been using the dialogue meetings as a basis for its activities in the region. Same time, he pointed out
the small number of regional projects in the Agency’s portfolio. Tanaka also referred to the challenges andopportunities faced by the region and particular points for Central Asia to focus on: (1) challenges: sanctions
against Russia over the situation in Ukraine; incursions by the ISIL; withdrawal of the ISAF from Afghanistan;(2) needs: employment opportunities; diversiﬁcation of industries in non-resources areas; ﬁnancial support andprivate sector investment; improvement of deteriorated infrastructure; achievement of SDGs; (3) opportunities:
CAREC Program, SCO, and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).
Apparently, for the Japanese Agency, it seemed more sensible and effective to use the existing mechanisms
in the region to support projects and initiatives. Given China’s role in CAREC and the SCO, and Russia’
s rolein the EEU, it can be assumed that JICA is clearly realize the possibility of cooperation with both PRC andRussia, rather than in competition with them. Besides, Tanaka pointed out the three tasks to be implemented:(1) intra-regional and extra-regional cooperative relationships as an open region; (2) increasing connectivity withneighboring countries and developing domestic systems; (3) equal distribution of economic growth universallyto the people by strengthening the capacity of the public sector.
(6) Step six
The sixth FMM and last meeting for today was held in May 2017, in Turkmenistan. Foreign Minister Fumio
Kishida became the ﬁrst head of the Japanese Foreign Ofﬁce, who visited the region twice and took part in two
ministerial meetings. Following the outcome of the sixth FMM, parties adopted a new regional cooperation
Roadmap, on Transport and Logistics.
Kishida also came out with the“Initiative for Cooperation in Transport and Logistics”that would be
supported by the additional assistance of the Japanese Government to the region worth 24 billion yen. This sum
could be considered as the ﬁrst form of ﬁnancial assistance, to be given to the region in the framework of the
dialogue. Indeed, it also could mean that Japan ﬁnally decided to employ the“chequebook diplomacy”in orderto give its initiative the“practical”nature.
Moreover, based on the outcome of the eleventh TID, which was held under the title,“Regional Cooperationin Central Asia and Strategic Outlook for Regional Security,”it might be assumed that Japanese scholars andofﬁcials are interested in the discussion of Central Asian–Japan cooperation for reconstruction of and peacebuilding in Afghanistan.
Speaking about the last two phases, it could be observed that the dialogue members started to“consistently”
study the“practical”forms of intra-regional cooperation in agriculture, transport and logistics, and recently
in the ﬁeld of tourism, which was chosen as another promising area of cooperation during the last dialogue
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meetings.
(7) Step seven
The next FMM would be held in Tajikistan for the ﬁrst time. On the one hand, this once again demonstrates
Japan’
s readiness to negotiate with its Central Asian partners in their domain. At the same time, it is not clear
what exactly a new Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono could bring to the dialogue.
4. Analysis and discussion(1) Structural features of the Dialogue
1. To date, FMM is the highest possible level for meetings in the framework of the dialogue. The analysisof the dialogue’s activities shows that the primary documents are usually adopted at the ministerial meetings.
In this regard, it can be argued that the FMM is the chief political body of the forum that responsible for the
adoption of political decisions, outcome documents and the approval of new initiatives. The dialogue has no
any clear schedule for the ministerial meetings. Same time, it can be assumed that participants still try to adhere
to a particular algorithm, i.e. to meet once every two years (third FMM). However, as was learned earlier, thedialogue’s calendar is strongly affected by large-scale domestic and international events, e.g. general elections
and cabinet reshufﬂes in Japan. Moreover, as was mentioned above, the ﬁrst full-ﬂedged meeting of the FMM
with the participation of all Central Asian delegations took place only in 2012 (fourth FMM), and at the foreign
ministers’level two years later, in 2014 (ﬁfth FMM).
Moreover, all meetings are traditionally held in Japan or Central Asia, but not on the margins of international
forums. As a result, the Central Asian countries receive two significant benefits. First, unlike international
events, they have enough time to discuss their own agenda in the framework of the dialogue. Secondly, theCentral Asian countries form a regular basis for the organization of visits by Japanese Foreign Minister to theregion.
It also seems unusual that a representative of only one nation, namely Afghanistan, took part in the FMM
as a guest (second FMM). Despite the existing recommendations (fourth FMM), there is an evident absence ofrepresentatives of IO/ROs and ﬁnancial institutions, which also indicates the desire of the parties to give thedialogue an“exclusive”format of Central Asia–Japan communications. This could be considered as a desire of
the Central Asian countries to increase ﬁnancial and technical assistance from Japan.
2. In general, the SOM is the most regular and“closed”event in the framework of the dialogue. It is clear that
SOMs are important elements in the preparation of the FMMs and in their“follow-up.”Also, SOMs became
an important mechanism in maintaining the dialogue’s activities during the absence of ministerial meetings in
2007–9. Moreover, following the sixth FMM results, SOMs were also given additional functions to monitor joint
projects between Japan and Central Asia in the framework of the dialogue. Based on this fact, the SOM could
Figure 2. Organizational chart of the dialogue(Note: *–declined proposals or non-functional mechanisms)

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Almas DISSYUKOV,“Central Asia Plus Japan”Dialogue

be considered as the principal executive body of the dialogue. At the same time, a particular disbalance might
be seen in the SOM’s composition. For example, in comparison with other delegations that usually presented
at the level of Deputy Foreign Minister, the Kazakh side is more often represented at the level of the Directorof Department or the Embassy staff (seven times). These facts demonstrate key features of how Central
Asian countries assess the dialogue by themselves. It is enough just to compare the levels of participation of
Kazakhstani delegations in similar structures with the EU, the US and the ROK.
3. It should be noted that Track II approach was strongly recommended to the leadership of the Foreign
Ministry of Japan by the authors of“Challenge 2001.”During a telephone interview, Hakamada, one of thereport authors, noted that the interest of the Japanese academia and mass media to Central Asia is shallow. And
regular meetings in the TID format are very complex (from the organizational point of view), but, in fact, they
allow exchange information and develop new cooperation ideas.
In general, TID records usually passed to the FMMs and SOMs in the form of the Chair summaries. It isevident that experts in their assessments count on the fact that these proposals could be admitted based on theirfeasibility and acceptability.
Today, TID is one of the unique structures that hold regular meetings and produce various cooperation
proposals. Same time, the author did not discover any information about the TID meetings in Central Asia. In
addition, a limited number of experts from Central Asia participate in each meeting. In this regard, it could beconcluded that the TID serves exclusively for Japan’s own purposes. The Track II of“Central Asia plus Japan”
dialogue could be considered as a platform with a limited effect.
4. WGMs are held in the same manner as TIDs. At the same time, we should understand that WGM-related
topics usually do not correspond to the primary competence of the foreign ministries of Central Asia andJapan. It is obvious that discussions and preliminary arrangements on different possible projects, especially inthe framework of TIDs, SOMs and FMMs, require additional coordination with the specialized agencies. It is
obvious that the creation of a full-ﬂedged economic body could signiﬁcantly increase the effectiveness of the
dialogue.
In this context, it should be noted that initial proposals on the establishment of the Business Council and the
Joint Economic Committee were not implemented. Consequently, appropriate economic and business institutions
did not support these ideas due to the possible overlapping of already existed frameworks. In this regard,
WGMs could be considered as the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s“invention”to keep economic track in thecontext of the dialogue.
5. In September 2014, the Second Regional Ministerial Conference of the Central Asian Disaster Management
Authorities under the auspice of the“Central Asia plus Japan”dialogue was held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. As aresult, participants agreed to regularly convene such meetings at the level of heads of the disaster management
authorities for discussing regional cooperation. However, this event is not reﬂected in an“ofﬁcial”list of the
dialogue’s events. Therefore, it can be assumed that the dialogue started to use its name as a“banner”forregional events with the participation of the Japanese and Central Asian ofﬁcials.
6. In July 2014, on the tenth anniversary of the dialogue, the MOFA Japan presented an unofﬁcial mascot of
the dialogue, which usually used during PR activities and cultural events in the framework of the initiative.
The famous Japanese manga artist Kaoru Mori based on her romance manga books,“A Bride’s Story(Otoyomegatari),”compiled the“image”of the dialogue in the form of six ladies dressed in national clothes of
the Central Asian nations and Japan. Such action by the Japanese side could be considered as a desire to givethe dialogue attributes of the“organization.”(2) Unique trends in the dialogue’s activities
In 2015, the Foreign Ministry of Japan commissioned a survey of public opinion, which showed that 70 per
cent of respondents in the region highly appreciate the activities of the dialogue. However, the core question–
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“Last year the“Central Asia Plus Japan”dialogue celebrated its tenth anniversary. Do you think thestrengthening of the ties between Japan and Central Asia brings beneﬁt via similar commemorative events?”–
actually does not reflect the essence of the dialogue activities and apparently cannot be presented as an
assessment of its role. Based on this fact, the author suggested that the dialogue’s issue was excluded from thesecond opinion poll (after Abe’s visit to Central Asia) intentionally. However, there are some positive trends inthe dialogue activities that could be attributed as the dialogue’s effect:
1. Since the fourth FMM, there has been an increase in the number of FMMs’outcome documents. Outcomesof Mahmudov’s interview with Jun Nanazawa, former head of Central Asia and the Caucasus division, showsthat the dialogue has“revived”after the fourth ministerial meeting, from formal to practical character (2017).
2. The most popular form of outcome documents is“Joint statements”and“Roadmaps.”In this regard, it
can be concluded that the Action plan is still the main document of the dialogue, and the Joint Statements andRoadmaps serve as complementary to the Action plan documents.
3. Transformation of the dialogue’s role could also be traced in the titles of outcome documents. At the ﬁrst
FMM, there was a reference to the entrance into so-called“New Era”of relations as a starting point of the
dialogue’s process. The fourth FMM was concluded with the establishment of a“New Partnership,”which
differs from such terms as“relations”and“cooperation”in other titles. In addition, outcome documents of theﬁfth and sixth FMMs give references to the beginning of a new working timeframe of the dialogue (2014–24)
and strengthening of the“multilateral”component in its activities.
4. The level of outcome documents’signatories indicates that the full-ﬂedged activities of the dialogue withthe participation of all countries and ministers began only during the fourth FMM. Accordingly, the dialogue
started its functions as a full-ﬂedged mechanism only after the fourth ministerial meeting.
5. The text analysis of outcome documents shows a high level of references to the role and efforts of theGovernment of Japan. At the same time, a relatively low number of references to the individual countries ofCentral Asia could be found. In the texts, the term“Central Asia”is highly prevalent for the description of theCentral Asian republics.
Moreover, the texts contain sufficient references to the importance of Japan–Central Asia cooperation.
However, as in the ﬁrst case, we can also trace serious differences in the allusion of the dialogue and different
IOs and ROs. In four of six cases, references to separate IOs and ROs prevail over the use of the dialogue.
6. Despite the strong beliefs about the dialogue as a tool of geopolitical game, ﬁndings clearly show that the
dialogue countries do not mention third parties, except for some cases. In this connection, the author believes
Figure 3. Agenda for the dialogue(Note: IOs–International organizations; ROs–Regional organizations; P2P–people-to-people exchanges)

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Almas DISSYUKOV,“Central Asia Plus Japan”Dialoguethat there is also a consensus among nations on the discussion of the policies of third countries, for example,
Russia or China. In 2012, Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Deputy Press Secretary Saiki Naoko confirmed forthe ﬁrst time that the Dialogue is not aiming at any particular country. However, at that time, during severe
diplomatic contradictions between China and Japan, she did not rule out whether the issues related to the PRC
would be raised during the fourth FMM or not. Then-Foreign Minister Gemba also ignored such questions.
(3) Practical dimension
The detailed analysis of dialogue-related documents allows the identiﬁcation of a small number of initiatives
that could be attributed to the effect of the Japanese initiative, indicated as follows:
1. According to Kawaguchi, despite her promise to accept one thousand trainees from Central Asia (firstFMM), Japan received almost 1200 people at that time. Same time, Japan accepted 9,154 trainees between
1991 and 2015. In addition, Foreign Minister Kishida also declared at the sixth FMM that Japan would provide
additional training opportunities for approximately 2,000 people over the next ﬁve years.
2. In 2005, the JBIC surveyed the adjustment of water resources and electricity, one of the critical issues in theregion, to examine possible forms of cooperation with regional areas of cooperation in Central Asia.
3. Based on the outcome of the second FMM, the JICA published a paper titled“Study on Intra-Regional
Cooperation over Water and Power for Efﬁcient Resources Management in Central Asia.”The main function of
the report was to determine the role of Japan in water and electricity-related issues in Central Asia:“Japan leads in areas such as water saving, water resources management and energy saving, and can,therefore, provide Central Asian countries with its excellent technology. Technical assistance should be
expanded to reform systems including improving the management of power-related facilities such as
power generation, transmission, and distribution. It is appropriate to start with projects which will be
conducted within a country but…will have regional impacts rather than immediately venture gigantic
projects.”
The report also included the following recommendations: (1) strengthening of mutual trust throughcontinuous dialogue; (2) support based on a long-term perspective; (3) respect to the individuality, assistancein accordance with the state of progress; (4) prevention of unfairness; (5) cooperation with other donors; (6)advantage use of Japan’s expertise.
In particular, the Japanese support should be promoted based on fundamental principles, like“(give) priority
to projects producing effect…for the entire region and all countries concerned.”At the same time, theserecommendations include specific pre-conditions, namely,“a mutual agreement on the promotion of intraregional cooperation through river basin management and electric power interchange.”
4. In order to implement the decisions of the fifth FMM, in 2015 the JICA together with the Hokkaido
Intellectual Tank and the Overseas Merchandise Inspection Co., Ltd. conducted a survey on the agricultural
sectors of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The JICA also conducted point studies about the promotion of Japanesetechnologies owned by private companies in Hokkaido, in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, andUzbekistan). Moreover, based on the dialogue’s decisions, the JICA and the FAO have developed a program ofcooperation in the ﬁeld of locust control which focuses on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The project amount for
Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan totaled US$ 5 million.
5. Following the fifth FMM, the JICA together with several Japanese companies conducted a study on
emergency preparedness in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Mongolia.
6. During the sixth FMM, Foreign Minister Kishida announced that visa applications between Japan and theCentral Asian republics would be simpliﬁed, especially for people engaged in business, academic, or cultural
exchanges.
7. On 22 February 2018, in Astana, the UNDP and the Embassy of Japan signed an Exchange of Note ,15

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Volume 11 / February 2019according to which the Japanese Government committed to provide US$ 6.1 million for the regional project
titled,“Strengthening Community Resilience and Regional Cooperation for Prevention of Violent Extremismin Central Asia.”According to Japanese ofﬁcials, this project is part of Japan’s commitments under the sixth
FMM.
8. On March 6, 2018 based on the sixth FMM discussions, the Government of Japan provided US$ 6.2 million
to Kyrgyzstan for the implementation of two programs,“Strengthening the System of Maternal and Child
Health”(US$ 3.5 million) for the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and“Strengthening drug control measures”(US$ 2.7 million) for the UNODC.
9. At the fourth FMM, the Japanese officials announced that the government had already implemented
several projects worth US$ 700 million to promote cooperation in the region. The exact list of such projects was
not ofﬁcially disclosed. In this regard, the author believes that this amount covered Japanese projects that werealready implemented or were under implementation by the time of the fourth FMM.
10. At the sixth FMM, Kishida came out with the“Initiative for Cooperation in Transport and Logistics,”
which was used by the Japanese Government to undertake concrete projects involving cooperation in the ﬁeld oftransportation. It was said that the initiative would include a signiﬁcant amount of assistance, approximately
24 billion yen. According to the document, monetary resources will be allocated to projects in such areas asborder control (e.g., UNODC), air communication (e.g., airport modernization and personnel training), groundtransportation, and logistics. These projects also include yen loans, grants, and technical assistance.
(4). External effects
It is worthwhile to note that the dialogue was launched in the same year as Japanese dialogue with the
Visegrad group (V4).
Moreover, similar platforms were created with GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic
Development (2007), Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) (2013) and three former USSR Baltic states (2018). Actually, allthese dialogue platforms are supervised in Japan by the European Affairs Bureau.
Tetsuji Tanaka mentioned that the dialogue gave impetus to similar platforms between Central Asia, theEU and the U.S. Moreover, Tanaka, the current head of the Japanese Centre on Chinese studies, noted that the
Chinese“16 +1”initiative has possible roots in the dialogue (see Figure 4). According to Tanaka, the thesis
about the Japanese track in the EU-Central Asia and the C5+1 format was also recognized by the famous U.S.
scholar Starr during their occasional meetings in Tokyo and Tashkent. The same thesis was indicated in anarticle about the tenth anniversary of the dialogue in the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s online magazine“Wakaru!
Kokusai josei”“I( understand! The International Situation”), Vol. 117, on 11 July 2014. According to the article,
Figure 4. The effect of the dialogue.

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Almas DISSYUKOV,“Central Asia Plus Japan”Dialogue“This pioneering effort by Japan has attracted attention from the international community, and now the EU,
Korea, etc. have also launched a dialogue forum with a similar approach.”
However, Tanaka is convinced that Japan’s participation in regional affairs will be less active if the republics
cannot become one-piece. Amb. Kawato shares a similar opinion. According to the former diplomat, the creationof the dialogue can be viewed as Japan’s earliest attempt to develop its own“diplomatic card”in relations with
Russia and China. Leaders in Japan will be able to achieve more of their goals in the region only if all Central
Asian republics could form a single uniﬁed bloc.
5. Conclusion
As we can see, in the early 2000s Japan planned to create the“Japan-CACO”dialogue, which, based on
previous aspirations of the Japanese side in the framework of ASEAN-Japan and ASEAN+3, was bound totransform in the“CACO+5”(e.g. Russia, China, Japan, the U.S. and the EU) mechanism. Despite the dilution of
the CACO, Japan retained its interest in Central Asia and came forward with its own idea. The author realizedthat Japan had a choice–to create a dialogue or not. Again, the appointment of Kawaguchi as Foreign Minister
was accidental and possible only after the resignation of her predecessor Makiko Tanaka as a result of a major
scandal in the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Nevertheless, this initiative was developed and became an example
of a new type of multilateral diplomatic framework for Japan, based on the afﬁliation of partner countries to aparticular region, rather than regional organization.
Today, dialogue is an essential complement to the Japanese foreign policy, which allows it to compensate an
insufﬁcient level of interaction between Japan and Central Asia in the global arena. In this regard, dialogue canalso serve as an essential argument for Japan in the discussion of the Central Asian agenda with various actors.
Same time, the dialogue was able to achieve its goal, since the Central Asian countries were able to create
similar structures with other key countries and regions, and today collectively defend their common interests.
The author concluded that Japan, if the current status quo is maintained, could fall under the inﬂuence of theCentral Asian republics, which, in turn, could try to reformat the dialogue and its content. In fact, Japan could
become a“hostage”of its own initiative, as many of its early efforts have not been implemented.
However, the dialogue has essential features that allow Japan and Central Asia to discuss a wide range ofissues in the framework of FMMs, SOMs and TIDs. In this context, the dialogue participants demonstrate their
aspirations for further changes through the great focus on the real-life meaning of the dialogue. Moreover,academic interest in the dialogue might be enforced by recent political trends in Central Asia. The adventof a new leader in Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, re-launched political discussions about the intraregional
integration in Central Asia. For example, on November 10, 2017 President Mirziyoyev proposed to convene
annual meetings of the Central Asian leaders, whose ﬁrst informal meeting was hosted by President Nursultan
Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan on March 15, 2018 in Astana.
It is no doubt that this process would be accompanied by a revision of regional strategies of the Central
Asian nations in the framework of different multilateral dialogue platforms, including with Japan. As a ﬁrst
step, during their meeting on November 10, 2017 in Uzbekistan, Central Asian Foreign Ministers already agreed
to cooperate on their joint actions in the framework of ministerial meetings of“EU–Central Asia,”“C5+1(U.S.),”“Central Asia–ROK”Cooperation Forum, the US–Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement, and the“Central Asia plus Japan”dialogue.
In such situations, Japanese diplomats always love to say,“The ball’s in your court now.”However, today
the ball is in the Japanese court. Indeed, the Central Asian countries have created a unique momentum that
can help their foreign partners to demonstrate declared by them intentions and opportunities. If the dialogue
miss a chance for more radical transformation now, it is unlikely that it will be able to improve its work in theforeseeable future.
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References
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Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/97_abe/statement/2015/1027speech.html (accessed July 10, 2018).
Aso, T. (2006a, June 1). Chuoajia o heiwa to antei no kairo ni [Central Asia as a Corridor of Peace and Stability].
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