エネルギーの今－ CSIS より

Paris Pullout and BeijingConundrum―― 米パリ協定離脱と中国の抱える難問 ――
Jane Nakano
Senior Fellow, Energy and National Security Program, CSIS
米国戦略国際問題研究所（CSIS）エネルギー・国家安全保障部シニアフェロー Jane Nakano 氏による連載第４回のテーマは「米パリ協定離脱と中国の抱える難問」。トランプ政権によるパリ協定離脱後も、中国は、パリ協定での約束を維持し続ける姿勢である一方、国内では石炭火力発電所の設備過剰や、鉄鋼・セメント等の製造業の生産能力過剰問題を抱えている。今後、中国は気候変動対策と国内の経済構造調整をどのようにバランスしていくのか。

he long-awaited decision by U.S. President
Donald Trump regarding U.S. future
involvement in the Paris climate agreement came onJune 1, 2017. Much can be written about implicationsof the decision. Among the most interesting questions
arising from the decision is how the future of energy
system in the Asia-Pacific region may be shaped by
the absence of the United States as a de-carbonization
advocate on the world stage. For example, will China
remain committed to its emissions reduction pledge
under the Paris Agreement? Or, will there be an
unabridged drive for coal usage throughout theregion?

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consequence. Yet, Beijing is unlikely to waive its
Paris pledge. One reason is a matter of timing.
Following Xi’s commitment, the Chinese government
in spring 2016 issued a number of policy targets
under the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016 to 2020) that
aim to reign in its carbon emissions, such as thereduction in carbon intensity by 18%, increase of thenon-fossil fuel share to 15% in its total energy
consumption, capping the share of coal at 58% in its
total energy consumption, and increase of the service
sector share to 56% in its total GDP. In other words,
this strong show of official vision preceded the majorchange of political tide in Washington.

ATs climate change became increasingly importantto the United States under the leadership ofBarak Obama, climate cooperation also becameelevated in importance within the bilateralrelationship between the United States and China.
For example, at a joint press conference in Beijing, inNovember 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping
announced Chinese commitment to peaking its
emissions by 2030 while U.S. President Obamaannounced U.S. commitment to reducing its
emissions by 26-28% by 2025. It is no overstatementthat the two leaders paved the way for the successful
conclusion of the Paris climate agreement inDecember 2015.

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he election victory of Donald Trump last fall
has significantly reshuffled priorities for theU.S. government, and the Paris pullout is one

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2017.7he other and more important reason is thatenvironmental degradation has become a major
source of social discontent and a possible threat toregime stability in China. China’s strong economic
growth has come at the expense of severe air
pollution, turning the country into the largest carbon
dioxide emitter in 2007. Outdoor and household air
pollution are responsible for over 2 million premature
deaths (International Energy Agency) and costing
the country roughly 3 to 10% of its gross national
income. As the public has become more consciousof the quality of life, and increasingly dissatisfied
with the level of environmental degradation,environmental protests in urban and rural areas are
increasing in frequency. Simply put, the political costof backtracking on the climate pledge and on therelated goals under the five-year plan has become toohigh. Insofar as capping carbon emissions helps theエネルギー 特集

Chinese government address both air pollution andclimate change concern, China will remaincommitted to its pledge under the Paris agreement.

Emissions reduction will warrant some toughbalancing acts and it may portend somechallenge to emissions control in Asia-Pacific,
however. The recent slow-down in Chinese economy
has led to excess capacity in power generation andindustrial manufacturing. For example, the averageutilization rates for China’s predominantly coal based
thermal power fleet fell by 4.6% in 2016, year-overyear, to 4,165 hours. The issue of excess manufacturing
capacity seems particularly pronounced in the sectors
with strong influence of state-owned enterprises,
such as cement, steel and iron, leading to thegovernment decision to reduce steel and ironovercapacity by 50 million tons, as well as to relocate
half a million steel and coal workers this year.

As China seeks to minimize the economic andsocial impact of this structural adjustment, theexport of coal power equipment and components isaccelerating. One recent study shows that China’s
energy infrastructure export portfolio is more coalintensive than the global capacity trend. The study
also shows that about 62% of the power capacity
addition supported by Chinese firms outside of theOECD and China since 2010 has been for coal
[Hannam, et al., 2015].
Moreover, the Chinese effort to ship its excess
capacity abroad entails public financing. The
official figure is hard to come by as China, as nonmember of the OECD, has no obligation to reporton the volume or purpose of its public financing.
However, China is estimated to have spent $21-38
billion for coal plants currently under construction
outside China.

The obvious implication of the endogenous
desire to reduce carbon emissions while
addressing excess manufacturing capacity is that
China is exporting emissions along with coal power
equipment and components. To the extent that manyof its neighbor countries lack the universal access toelectricity, and some—such as Indonesia andPakistan—have high level of indigenous coalresources, coal power generation will likely be an
attractive area for Chinese export and investment.

China committed under the U.S.-China Joint
Presidential Statement on Climate Change in
September 2015 that the country would “strengthen
green and low-carbon policies and regulations with aview to strictly controlling public investment flowinginto projects with high pollution and carbon
emissions both domestically and internationally.”
Much has been speculated as to what Xi Jinping
meant by “high pollution and carbon emissions
projects” and, specifically, whether coal power plants
fall under this category.

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he United States under President Obama strove
to bring China into a mix of countries that use
public financing for coal exports, not only togenerally discourage such practice, but also toeliminate the loophole China had become. For
example, as non-party to the OECD, China remains
unconstrained by the OECD decision to phase-out
the provision of export credit towards low efficiencyhigh emissions coal power projects abroad. As China
seeks a soft landing for its struggling state-owned
industrial sectors, its September 2015 commitment
to control public investment into high pollution
projects is highly vulnerable to the U.S. government
retreat on climate change efforts. Bringing China
into the fold is a major task that remains unfinishedand no other government seems likely in theimmediate future to take over the task that clearly is
no longer a priority for the United States under
President Trump.

※著者略歴：Jane Nakano is a senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. Her areas of expertise
include U.S. energy policy, energy security issues in Asia,global gas market dynamics, and global nuclear energy trends.
She frequently writes and speaks on these issues at conferences
and to the media. Also, she has testified before Congress onenergy issues in Asia. Prior to joining CSIS in 2010, Ms. Nakano
was with the U.S. Department of Energy and served as the lead
staff on energy engagements with China and Japan.
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