61

Fragmentation of International Low-Carbon Technology Governance:
An Assessment in terms of Barriers to Technology Development
Norichika KANIE*1,2 Masachika SUZUKI3 and Masahiko IGUCHI1
1

Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology
2-12-1-W9-43, Ookayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan
2
International Organizations Center, The United Nations University Institute of Advanced Studies (UNU/IAS)
1-1-1, Minato Mirai, Nishi-ku, Yokohama 220-8502, Japan
3
Faculty of Commerce, Kansai University.
3-3-35, Yamate-machi, Suita-shi, Osaka 564-8680, Japan*e-mail: kanie@valdes.titech.ac.jp

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to understand the degree of fragmentation of low-carbon technology
institutions by examining different functions of existing institutions to remove barriers to technology development. In order to understand the functions of existing institutions, we first identify barriers of technology
development for making low-carbon society in the world, with particular consideration to Asia. We do this byextensive literature review on low-carbon technology, technology innovation as well as insights from theresult of case studies. After identifying barriers, we then analyze institutional characteristics of the existing
institutions working on low-carbon technology, by looking into their main purposes and actor configurations
and by investigating whether and how each institution is working to overcome identified barriers totechnology development. Through this analysis, we identify the directions we should follow in order to makemore cooperative fragmentation regime in low-carbon technology. We argue that low-carbon technology
governance may be best served through a fragmentation of governance architecture, but coordinated by a hubthat is capable of quickly accessing usable information and transmitting it to the appropriate institutional
nodes in the network.
Key words: beyond 2012, governance architecture, institutional fragmentation, low-carbon technology

1. Introduction
In recent years, a growing number of international
fora have been addressing post-2012 institutional architecture relating to climate change. To name a few, they
include different kinds of ad-hoc working groups (AWG)
under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol(KP), the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security
and Climate Change (MEM), and the Asia PacificPartnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP).
There are also political fora that address climate change
as part of the issues they have frequently discussed. They
include Group of Eight Summit (G8) and Group of
Twenty (G20), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) and ASEAN. International organizations such as
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Energy Agency (IEA) andFood and Agriculture Organization (FAO), as well as theWorld Bank and other regional banks also discuss andconduct research on issues related to climate change, orGlobal Environmental Research
17/2013: 61-70
printed in Japanare working on climate issues as part of their operations.
Since 2009, the International Renewable Energy Agency(IRENA) has been added to the list. Looking beyond
inter-governmental organizations, there are even morefora and initiatives. To point to a few, the Renewable
Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP),
Global Sustainable Electricity Partnership, Carbon
Sequestration Leadership Forum, Global Bioenergy
Partnership, and so on, are all related to the issue of climate change.
The profusion of diffuse institutions that deal withclimate change and low-carbon issues has been examinedby a growing number of global governance studies.
Recently it has been termed in different ways such aspolycentricity, fragmentation of regimes, or a regime
complex (Ostrom, 2010; Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006;
Folke et al., 2005; Biermann et al., 2009; Keohane &Victor, 2010; Abbott, 2011). However it may be termed,
the important point here is that no nation-state-based
international institution centered on a single international
regime, such as the UNFCCC, has been able to solve the©2013 AIRIES

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N. KANIE et al.

complex issue of climate change on its own. For various
reasons, there have emerged many institutions that deal
with climate change in one way or another. Many, andsometimes inter-related, issues have resulted in thisphenomenon. A frequently mentioned reason is the lackof the US engagement in the Kyoto framework. Even
though the US agreed on the deal made at the Kyoto
Conference in 1997, it refused to ratify the protocol.
Refusal to ratify the protocol on the side of the largest
emitter in the industrialized world resulted in emergenceof different approaches to engage them in a different
manner.
Other reasons include the malign nature of the climatechange issue (Miles et al., 2001), changes in political
dynamics in the 21st century (such as the growing
political and economic power of emerging economies) on
energy and climate issues (Biermann et al., 2012a,
2012b; Kanie, 2010), or the emerging political influenceexerted by various kinds of non-state actors (Kanie &Haas, 2004).
Diffusion of international institutions is also being
applied to the area of low-carbon technology. To put it
differently, many of the emerging initiatives, as describedabove, deal with technology in one way or another. These
initiatives have been established on an ad-hoc and rather
fragmented basis.
Biermann et al. (2009) categorized types of fragmentation as synergistic, cooperative, and conflictive fragmentation in relative terms. Synergistic fragmentation
involves a core institution that includes (almost) all countries, and provides effective and detailed norms throughout different yet substantially integrated institutions.
Cooperative fragmentation involves a core institutionthat does not comprise all key countries in the given issuearea, but exists with other institutions that are loosely
integrated. Its core norms and principles are ambiguous,
but not conflicting. Conflictive fragmentation involves
different and largely unrelated institutions with different
sets of decision-making procedures and memberships,
and diverse norms and principles in conflict with eachother. Biemann et al. (2009) concluded that “conflictive
fragmentation of global governance architectures appears
to bring more harm than positive effects, and can generally be seen as a burden on the overall performance of thesystem”.
At first glance, low-carbon technology initiatives, sofar, seem to have come under conflictive fragmentationin this typology. Although the UNFCCC and the KP are
unifying initiatives, technology has not been their central
concern, and not only are their ad-hoc initiatives hardlyconnected with each other, their decision-making procedures also differ from each other. They have independent
sets of principles and norms that are not coordinated.
Their memberships and the actors involved in theirrespective activities are different. Therefore, efforts areneeded to transform their institutional fragmentation
away from conflictive to a more cooperative and ideallysynergistic one.
Two approaches may be envisaged for complying

with this purpose. The first approach would be to startwith an analysis of the existing institutions to identify
what elements of the different institutions, be it norms,
principles, or decision-making procedures, could belinked. Another approach would be to start with technologies and an examination of elements that are
required by low-carbon technology institutions. After
identifying the elements, they can be compared with theexisting institutions and an effort made to figure out what
is missing and what the required changes should be.
We take the latter approach here. The modest purposeof this paper is to understand the degree of fragmentationof low-carbon technology institutions by examining
different functions of existing institutions to remove
barriers to technology development. We first identify
barriers to technology development for making lowcarbon societies around the world, with particular consideration of Asia. This inevitably requires consideration
into international cooperation and transfer of technology.
We do this by an extensive review of literature on lowcarbon technology, technology innovation and insightsfrom the results of case studies. After identifying barriers,
we then analyze the institutional characteristics of theexisting institutions working on low-carbon technology,
by looking into their main purposes and involved actors
briefly and by investigating whether and how each institution is working to overcome the identified barriers totechnology development. We chose the institutions thatare included in the database developed by Abbot (2011).
Through this analysis, we identify the directions thatshould be followed in order to make a more cooperativefragmentation regime in low-carbon technology.

2. Identifying Barriers to Technology
Development
The purpose of this section is to identify barriers totechnology development. The first part of this section
reviews the results of several key research initiatives onbarriers. The results indicate that there are a variety ofbarriers in technology development including economic,
technological, regulatory, social and others. In the second
part, we attempt to pinpoint some of these barriers at
different stages of technology development. In the earlystage of technology development, technological barriers
are dominant, but as the stages of technology development progress, financial as well as institutional barriers
are identified as major barriers to diffusing technologies.
In the third part, we demonstrate the results of several
studies examining barriers on a case study basis. In ourview, the case study approach is useful and effective in
identifying technology-specific as well as country- or
region-specific barriers, especially since these barriers
are often overlooked by other studies looking at
developing countries or renewable energy as a whole.
2.1 Review of literature on barriers to technology
development
Several different research initiatives have identified

Fragmentation of International Low-Carbon Technology Governancea variety of barriers to innovation and transfer of
low-carbon technologies in developing countries(Painuly, 2001; OECD/IEA, 2001; Painuly & Fenhann,
2002; Raddy & Painuly, 2004; Doukas et al., 2009;
Balachandra et al., 2010).
The OECD/IEA conducted a comprehensive study
and identified major barriers to technology developmentin general (OECD/IEA, 2001). They identified ninebroad categories of barriers. The first barrier is institutional. This includes inappropriate frameworks of laws
and regulations, and insufficient levels of assessment oftechnology needs and implementation. Political barriers
follow, which include political instability and corruption.
Then come technological barriers, including inappropriate infrastructure and lack of technology standards, supporting frameworks, capacity and knowledge. The fourth
barrier is economic. Economic instability, inappropriate
subsidies, a poor macro-economic situation, and untransparent market are included here. The fifth barrier
regards information, and includes inappropriate access to
information on technology and finance, as well as insufficient information for technology users. Finance is another barrier. In addition to a lack of funding, a tendency
to prioritize large-scale projects is considered a barrier,and this is especially the case for low-carbon technology.
Another problem identified is high risks for foreign
investors. There are also cultural barriers. Cultural influences on consumer preferences and social biases regarding imported goods and technologies are considered oneof the barriers to technology transfer. Laws and regulations also constitute part of the barriers. Uncertain
property rights or lack thereof coupled with uncertain
arbitration schemes hinder technology transfer. Finally, alack of participation by local people and of understandingof local needs are also considered barriers.
Other literature also points to similar barriers to technology development. Doukas et al. (2009) address economic, technological, regulatory and social barriers.
Other studies describing similar barriers include
UNFCCC (2003), Worrell et al. (2001), Kathurina (2002),
Luken and Rompaey (2008), Schneider et al. (2008),
Thorne (2008), Fedrizzi et al. (2009), Ölz and Beerepoot(2010) and IEA (2011b).
While OECD/IEA’s study indicates economic barriers
at the macro level, according to these studies, there areeven more micro- or project-level economic barriers,
including relatively expensive implementation and energy costs, and limited access to local and regional
financial sources. These barriers can be translated as“lack of potential for commercial validity” (Schneider
et al., 2008; Karakosta et al., 2010; Ravindranath &Balachandra, 2009; Guerin, 2001). Transferred technologies are efficient, but generally more expensive, andrequire higher initial costs. In addition, they involve
higher risk.
Similar to OECD/IEA’s study, there are studies thatrecognize un-transparent investment environments, andlack of knowledge on technology management, implementation, spare parts and maintenance as technological63

barriers. Using unfamiliar chemical products and/or resources as well as new process technology may be added
here (Luken & Rompaey, 2008). When it comes torenewables, grid integration may become a technologicalproblem as well (IEA, 2011a). As for regulatory barriers,
the studies indicate barriers associated with domestic
regulatory frameworks, especially fossil fuel subsidies,strong bureaucracies (including embedded interests inthe existing energy resources), existence of a large national company, and preferences for cheap but relatively
environmentally harmful technology (Ravindranath &Balachandra, 2009; Kathuria, 2002).
There are additional barriers that OECD/IEA did notindicate but have been discussed among other studies. A
government’s lack of areas of specific focus is sometimes
considered part of an institutional barrier (Guerin, 2001;
Reddy & Painuly, 2004; Painuly, 2001; Kathurina, 2002).
Others point to a high number of bureaucratic stakeholders involved in the sustainable energy sector as part of the
problem (Flamos et al., 2008). This can apply not only tothe horizontal level of the government (such as national
level government), but also to vertical levels (such as
national, provincial, prefectural and local levels). The
implication of this is a delay in investment, as receiving
permission requires a long period of time (such as 2 to 7
years before starting a project). Another barrier torenewable energy is that it is often not included in urban
planning in developing countries (Ölz & Beerepoot,2010). In addition, a negative impact of transferred technology on the existing social structure of the community
is considered a social barrier.
2.2 Barriers in different stages of technology
development
Innovation of a new technology and transference ofan existing technology from developed countries todeveloping countries have usually been discussed in a
separate policy forum. Since technology innovation andtransfer were not central issues in (UNFCCC) negotiations for a long time, there was a lack of communication
between experts working on future innovative lowcarbon technologies, such as clean coal, carbon captureand storage (CCS) and solar thermal, and experts working on transferable technologies such as wind power,
solar photovoltaic (PV) and mini-hydro. Recently, however, innovation and transfer of technologies are being
discussed as part of the same flow of technology development under the framework of the UNFCCC. The
UNFCCC has published a paper in which it addresses its“integrated strategy” to cope with technology transfer
and innovation at the same time (UNFCCC, 2009a). The
mandate of the Climate Technology Center (CTC) proposed under the UNFCCC covers both elements (Expert
Group on Technology Transfer, 2010). In addition, there
have been discussions on how to provide financing
effectively in both innovation and transfer of technologies (Camody, 2007; Doornbosch & Knight, 2008;
World Economic Forum, 2010). According to the IEA(2012), an additional US$36 trillion in clean energy

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N. KANIE et al.

investments will be required from now until 2050 inorder to limit the long-term global temperature increase
to 2 degrees Celsius. In this context, not only does therole of the Green Climate Fund (CGF) under the
UNFCCC hold significant importance but so do those ofother institutions that mobilize private finance for
mitigation and adaptation projects.
The reports submitted to the UNFCCC use the
RDD&D chain (research, development, demonstration,
deployment & diffusion, and commercial maturity) toindicate the flow from innovation to transfer of technologies (UNFCCC, 2009a; UNFCCC, 2009b; UNFCCC,
2009c). The chain consists of several stages of technology development. Figure 1 shows the stages of technology development with several examples of technologies
at each stage.*1
According to the definition by the UNFCCC, thedemonstration stage involves full-scale implementationof a limited number of installations by a small number ofcompanies or research facilities (UNFCCC, 2009b).
Prior to the demonstration stage, there is the research anddevelopment stage where the basic science is clarified
and the technology is at the stage of conceptual design or
testing at the laboratory or bench scale (UNFCCC,
2009b). In our view, the technologies both in the R&D
and demonstration stages can be seen as at the innovation
stage since there is no prospect for the private sector to beengaged on a business basis at either stage. Therefore, we
combined these two stages together as the demonstration
stage.
The stage of deployment is where technologies areavailable for selected commercial applications but are
more costly than the established technology (UNFCCC,
2009b). As discussed later, there must be strong initiativeand support from the public side to advance the technologies forward to the next stage. The diffusion stage iswhere technologies are available more widely but there
are many generic as well as country- or technology-specific barriers to diffusion. The next section illustrates these barriers in detail. The commercial stage iswhere technologies are available even without any funding support or economic incentives from the public side
(UNFCCC, 2009b).
In the very early stages of technology development,

technological barriers typically dominate until the technologies are proven to be feasible. At this stage, public
national institutions and funding sources mainly provide
financial resources for the R&D, since for the private
sector, the future prospects of the technologies are too
uncertain to invest in (UNFCCC, 2009b). Railway
transport, nuclear power plants, the Internet and GPS
were all developed by research projects funded bygovernments (IEA, 2011b). However, funding for clean
energy technology innovation and countermeasures tothe risks associated with investment into clean energy
technology are not reflected in priority areas of overseas
development agencies (Ölz & Beerepoot, 2010). Anotherincentive is anticipation by entrepreneurs and investors
for markets, technology and policies. Prospects for market behavior are now considered one of the largest incentives for innovation of a new technology, and more
importantly, it has become key information on the direction of technology development (Philibert, 2011). It is
often shared, explicitly or implicitly, by different companies in the same sector (Foxon & Pearson, 2008). In thelater stages of technology development, financial barriers
emerge as a major obstacle, since public funding becomes less available than at the earlier stages (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2010; Clean Energy Group,
2010; UNFCCC, 2009b). In reality, however, private
funding is still difficult to bring in at this stage due to thehigh risks perceived or involved in such investments.
This stage of technology development is known as the“valley of death,” as a metaphor for the gap in financial
resources available at this stage of technology development (see, for example, UNFCCC, 2009b.)
In the later stages of technology development, together with financial barriers, institutional barriers are
identified as major obstacles to diffusing technologies(UNFCCC, 2009b). Institutional barriers include a lackof regulatory support or incentive programs for investment into clean energy technologies. When the return on
investment into a clean energy project is lower than thatof other investment opportunities, regulatory support
such as feed-in-tariff programs is crucial in improving
such investment conditions (DB Climate Change Advisor,
2011; ECOFYS, 2009). Institutional barriers also include
a lack of information on appropriate technologies as wellFig. 1 Stages of technology development and examples of technologies at each stage.

Fragmentation of International Low-Carbon Technology Governanceas a lack of knowledge and expertise on imported
technologies, and a lack of skills and know-how for
operations and maintenance. These barriers are often
observed even after technologies are widely available
and the return on investment in the technologies seems
promising for the private sector.
2.3 Barriers identified through a case study
approachThis part of the section addresses barriers through acase study approach. As noted earlier, the case study
approach is useful and effective in identifying technology-specific as well as country- or region-specific barriers that are often overlooked when considering developing countries or renewable energy as a whole. Thereis also an accumulation of knowledge in the lessons
drawn by various case studies (Dalhammar et al., 2009;
Gerstetter & Marcellino, 2009; Haselip et al., 2011;
Ockwell et al., 2007; 2009). The results of these casestudies indicate lack of information and local knowledge
as one of the major institutional barriers to introducing
technologies at the diffusion and even at the commercial
stage of technology development.
A collaborator to the current project conducted a casestudy on large-size biogas plants in India, and the team
identified the following twenty-one barriers (Schmidt &Dabur, 2011): 1) lack of market openness, 2) lack ofawareness among market participants (customers, financers, etc.), 3) limited access to technology, 4) favors(such as subsidies) to conventional energy and non- consideration of externalities, 5) lack of access to capital andhigh capital cost, 6) capital-expenditure intensity of renewables 7) high hidden costs, such as operation andmanagement costs, and costs associated with gatheringand analyzing information, 8) problematic buyer-supplier
relationship, 9) lack of trusted institutions for disseminating information, 10) lack of long-term legal
regulatory frameworks, 11) lack of policy instruments forcommercialization, 12) lack of involvement of stakeholders in decision making, 13) high level of bureaucracy,14) difficulty in mainstreaming environment into development plans, 15) lack of standards, codes and verification, which negatively affects product quality and product acceptability, 16) lack of technical knowledge inIndia, 17) lack of reliable technology, 18) lack of coordination among research groups, academic institutions andprivate industry, 19) lack of complimentary infrastructure,20) lack of consumer acceptance of the product and highrisk perception, and 21) improper profitability indicators.
A case study on biogas power generation projects in
Thailand conducted by our project confirmed many of
the aforementioned points. The case also demonstrated
that limited access to information and expertise is a major
barrier in implementing projects (Jain et al., 2011;
Suzuki et al., 2010). In Thailand, many biogas projects
have experienced failures to secure sufficient amounts ofbiogas for power generation. The study revealed that the
problems were largely due to a lack of know-how inmaintenance and training of local employees for operat-

65

ing the plants. The result of the study in Thailand, together with the case studies illustrated above, suggests a
strong need for institutional support for accessing information and enhancing local capacity to handle technologies at the diffusion stage of technology development.
The barriers identified here are summarized inTable 1.
Table 1 Barriers to technology development.
Code Description of barriers
Institutional Barriers
Lack of regulatory support /incentives for investment into
I-1
clean energy technology
Lack of long-term legal regulatory frameworks
Lack of policy instruments for commercialization
Lack of government interest and capability to promoteI-2
renewable energy technology
Not reflected in priority areas of overseas development
agencies
High number of bureaucratic stakeholder involvements insustainable energy sector
Political instability and corruption
I-3 Uncertainty or lack of property rights
I-4 Limited access to information and expertise
Lack of trusted institutions for disseminating information
Lack of consumer acceptance of the product and high risk
I-5
perception
I-6 Lack of social interest in the projectI-7 Lack of involvement of stakeholders in decision-making
Lack of participation by local people
Preference for conventional energy and non-consideration of
I-8
externalities
Fossil fuel subsidies
I-9 Lack of infrastructure
Financial/Economic Barriers
F-1 Lack of financial resources and high production costs
Lack of awareness and interest among financial institutions
F-2
in the projects
High risks for investors
F-3 Lack of commercial viability
Technology imported from industrialized countries more
efficient but also more expensive
Lack of financial institutions to support renewable energy
F-4
technologies, lack of instruments
F-5 Inappropriate access to information on finances
F-6 Limited size of markets
F-7 Lack of market liberalization and transparency
F-8 Prioritization of large-scale projects
Technological/ Technical Barriers
T-1 Limited access to technology
T-2 Lack of capacity and knowledge
Lack of knowledge and expertise on imported technologies
Lack of skills and know-how for operations, spare parts andmaintenance
Inappropriate access to information on technology
Insufficient information for technology users
Unfamiliarity with products and/or resources
Unfamiliarity with process technology
Lack of technical knowledge on the target country
Lack of coordination among research groups, academic
T-3
institutions and private industry
Lack of standards, codes and verification, which negatively
affects product quality and product acceptability
Lack of consistency in quality of the productT-4 Lack of ownership

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N. KANIE et al.

3. Existing Institutions in Low-Carbon
Technology
This section reviews the existing institutions dealing
with low-carbon technology, and identifies which of thebarriers respective institutions are addressing. We look at
the purposes, principles, activities and participants of theinstitutions, but pay closest attention to their (planned)
activities, as purposes and principles sometimes fail toresult in actual activities and behaviors. The institutions
we are taking up here are 17 technology institutions thatare included in the “Governance Triangle” presented by
Abbott (2011). The Governance Triangle is a mapping of
the emerging system of transnational climate change
governance produced by focusing on organizations as theunit of analysis. Organizations are categorized according
to the identity of their constituent actors that are centeredon state, civil society organizations (CSOs) and business
firms. Various types of public and private combinations
are configured somewhere in the triangle. By focusing on
actors, the Governance Triangle has been able to capture
many emerging initiatives, even though their function isjust information sharing.
The 17 institutions are, the APP (Asia-PacificPartnership on Clean Development and Climate), Carbon
Sequestration Leadership Forum, GEN IV Nuclear
Energy Systems, GBEP (Global Bioenergy Partnership),
The Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFR),

GMI (Global Methane Initiative), Collaborative Labelingand Appliance Standards Program (CLASP), Climate
Works Foundation Best Practices Networks, Global
Sustainable Electricity Partnership, IEA, International
Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the Economy(IPHE), ISES (International Solar Energy Society),
REEEP, REN21 (Renewable Energy Policy Network forthe 21st Century), The Roundtable on Sustainable
Biofuels (RSB), The Climate Group, and European
Technology Platform for Zero Emission Fossil FuelPower Plants (ZEP) (Table 2).
We analyzed which of the barriers are addressed byeach institution (Table 3). This coding is rather indicative,
and not definitive, as some activities fall between two
different categories and are hard to classify. We needfurther in-depth research to identify a linear relationshipbetween the code and activities. Still, these initial results
can serve as a first step toward identifying different
activities, in terms of barriers, included in each institution
in a comparative manner.*2
Only a handful of institutions are related to funding,and some of them do not fund on their own but facilitate
funding from other sources. None of them explicitly
targets removal of risks for investors. Although someinclude development agencies and multilateral development banks, they do not have the influence to change
priority areas of those institutions .
Regulatory support is provided by many of the institu-

Table 2 Seventeen institutions to be addressed in this paper.
Name
APP

Purposes and Targeted Sectors
Technology cooperation and development over aluminum,buildings and appliances, cement, cleaner fossil energy, coalmining, power generation and transmission, renewable energy anddistributed generation, and steel
Carbon Sequestration
Technology cooperation and development over carbon capture andLeadership Forumstorage
GEN IV Nuclear Energy Technology cooperation and development over next-generation
Systems
nuclear energy system
GBEP
Cooperation to promote bioenergy
GGFR
GMI
CLASP
Climate Works
Foundation Best
Practices Networks
Global Sustainable
Electricity Partnership
IEA
IPHE
ISES
REEEP
REN21
RSB

The Climate GroupZEP

Actors
7 countries and relevant private sectors

Ministers from 21 countries and the European Commission
and United Arab Emirates
12 countries and the European Union

23 countries and 13 international organizations andinstitutions
Technology cooperation to reduce gas flaring
18 countries, 20 oil companies from the developed anddeveloping countries, and 6 organizations including theEuropean Union
Cooperation to reduce global methane emissions and promote the 40 countries and the European Commission, and members
use of methane as a clean energy sourcefrom private sectors, universities and non-governmentalorganizations
Cooperation to provide technical and policy support to governments (non-profit organization)
on energy efficiency standards and labeling for appliances, lightningand equipment(non-profit organization)
Cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions associated withbuilding energy use, through technology cooperation, providing
information to governments and the private sector, and advancing
policies and programs
Reflecting global electricity issues within the international
Comprising electric utility companies from all major regions
framework and promote sustainable energy developments
Ensuring reliable, affordable and clean energy
28 member countries
17 countries and the European Commission
Technology cooperation, development and commercialization ofhydrogen and fuel cell technologies
Promoting the development and utilization of renewable energy(non-profit organization)
Accelerating markets for renewable energy and energy efficiency, Non-governmental organization funded by 11 countries andsuch as by scaling up clean energy business models, particularly in the European Commission
emerging economies and developing countries.
Providing a forum for sharing knowledge and facilitating renewable Non-profit association comprising governments, internationalorganizations, industry associations and civil societyenergy technologies
Cooperation to ensure the sustainability of biofuels production and International initiative coordinated by the Energy Center atprocessing
EPFL in Lausanne that brings together farmers, companies,
non-governmental organizations, experts, governments, andinter-governmental agencies
Inspiring and catalyzing leadership to reduce greenhouse gas(non-profit organization)
emissions.
Promoting, developing, commercializing, and diffusing carbon
European utilities, petroleum companies, equipment suppliers,
capture and storage (CCS). ZEP serves as an advisor to thescientists, academics and environmental NGOs
European Commission on the research, demonstration anddeployment of CCS.

Fragmentation of International Low-Carbon Technology Governance

67

Table 3 Technology institutions and barriers within their scope.
Institutions
APP
Carbon Sequestration Leadership ForumCouncil on Global Financial Regulations
GBEP
GEN IV Nuclear Energy Systems
GMI
CLASP
Climate Works Foundation Best Practice Networks
Global Sustainability Electricity Partnership
IEA
IPHE
ISES
REEEP
REN21
RSB
ZEP
The Climate Group

Institutional Barriers
I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4
I-1, I-3, I-5n/aI-2, I-4, I-8n/aI-2, I-4
I-2, I-4, I-5, I-7
I-4
I-1, I-2, I-4, I-7
I-1, I-4
I-1, I-6, I-9
I-2, I-4
I-1
I-1, I-4, I-6, I-7
I-1, I-4
I-4
n/ations in a different way, mainly by providing information
related to changing the regulatory framework. Many
provide information on best practices or such topics as
benefits of FIT in a different manner. Most of the institutions aim to remove capacity and knowledge barriers.
Information sharing and knowledge dissemination on
emerging low-carbon technology are the major issues
that they are working on. International institutions,however, neglect removal of bureaucratic barriers, political instability and corruption, IPR issues and eliminationof uncertainties.
As the number of partnerships grows, more and morebusiness actors have been involved in institutions, andgrowing attention has been paid to market barriers. Here,some institutions explicitly target markets. For instance,
the GBEP aims for the commercialization of renewableenergy as does the ZEP for commercialization of carbon
capture and storage. The REEP supports creation of newforms of business models to make small-sized renewableenergy economically attractive. The IEA initiates andmonitors key policy issues such as regulatory reform andmarket liberalisation.
Cooperation on technology innovation is consideredpart of lowering costs in the long run, and we alsocounted it as such. However, in reality there are many
uncertainties as to whether technology cooperation canlead to lower technology prices in the future. More policy-oriented activities would be needed. The activities ofmany institutions working on markets are related to raising awareness among market participants.
Regarding technology, some work on standardization,
while most others work on capacity and knowledge
development, as well as information sharing. Coordination among research groups, academic institutions andindustry actors is another major activity.
Overall, these institutions are highly independent, andexcept for a few cases such as the GMI, there is no
conscious linkage or nesting effort with the UNFCCC
regime. Their decision-making procedures differ, andtheir memberships are totally different – some include
nation states, while others do not, and some others
include NGOs while still others include businesses. Their
principles overlap, and they are not explicitly conflictive.
Therefore, we conclude that low- carbon technology is in

Financial/Economic Barriers Technological/Technical Barriers
F-1, F-2, F-6
T-1, T-2, T-3
n/a
T-3
F-4
n/a
F-1, F3
T-3
F-1
T-3
n/a
T-3
n/a
T-2, T-3
n/a
T-3
F-2, F-5
T-2, T-3
F-7
T-3
n/a
T-3
n/a
T-2, T-3
F-1, F-2, F-6
n/a
F-1
n/a
n/a
T-3
F-3
T-2, T-3
n/a
T-3

a situation of conflictive fragmentation, but has apotential to be cooperative.
The next question is to what direction we should beproceding from here.

4. Conclusion: the Direction Ahead
We now know that different institutions address different barriers to technology development, and some of
their areas overlap, while some others do not. According
to recent organizational literature, decentralized andinformation-rich systems are the best institutional architecture for addressing highly complex and tightly interwoven problems such as climate change (Aggarwal,
1998; Ansell & Weber, 1999; Ostrom, 2001; and Haas
et al., 2004). Thus, low-carbon technology governancemay be best served through fragmentation of governancearchitecture, but coordinated by a hub that is capable ofquickly accessing usable information and transmitting itto the appropriate institutional nodes in the network. We
should also be reminded that redundancy can become
strengths in such decentralized systems, as redundancy
amplifies the political influence of policy networks involved in governance, and also assures that the governance system persists even if one part of the system
collapses (Kanie, 2007). As for the networked institutions, such as the 17 institutions identified here, some
may need to be integrated and reshuffled to have astronger institutional backbone. Unnecessary integrationis harmful, but communicating with each other to explore
mutual benefit is helpful. This insight would gain particular importance with the adoption of the Cancun andDurban agreements at the UNCCC, where countries haveagreed to enhance international technology governancefurther via the Climate Technology Center Network(CTCN).
That said, we still need to understand which functions
would be best played by international institutions
regarding low-carbon technology that would help facilitate a low-carbon transition on the ground. As we saw
above, some of the barriers may be better addressed at the
local or national level. Only after understanding thisshould we consider the configuration and architecture of
the institutions.

68

N. KANIE et al.

Suggestions for understanding different functions
may be drawn from the existing literature. In the earlystages of technology development, the empowerment of
a network of local research groups is needed in order toencourage technologies, especially with stronger initiative from the public side (Benioff et al., 2010; Moreyet al., 2011; UNFCCC, 2009b). International institutions
can play an important role in part by facilitating networking among international and local actors (Benioff
et al., 2010; Morey et al., 2011; UNFCCC, 2009b). At thebilateral level, in fact, there have already been several
initiatives to build a network among research institutions.
For example, there are research agreements between the
EU and China as well as between the US and India in thearea of clean coal and CCS. At the multilateral level,
while there have been no remarkable efforts on the publicside, there have been several industry-based programs forseveral years, including APP as well as specific industry-based programs for technology innovation, such as
the Technology Breakthrough Program in the steel sector.
As for financial mechanisms, technology-funding
mechanisms for developing country participants, especially in R&D activities, are necessary in the early stagesof technology development. In addition, financial
mechanisms to provide strong incentives for clean energy
incubators, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs areneeded to mitigate their business risks and encourage
their participation at the deployment stage. However, as
stated above, private funding is still difficult to bring in at
the deployment stage due to the high risk involved ininvestment, as illustrated in the “valley of death.” Theroles of public national institutions in providing financial
resources for the R&D are still essential at this stage oftechnology development.
At the later stages of technology development,
providing economic incentives is recognized as an important measure for improving investment conditions andencouraging the participation of the private sector. Clean
energy finance and carbon finance vehicles, some ofwhich have already been established by multilateralfinancial institutions, are effective at introducing technologies at the diffusion stage. For example, economic

policy instruments such as CDMs may play an instrumental role at this stage of technology development,
while it is not realistic to regard them as a universal policy instrument for diffusing technologies across all stagesof technology development. If they are designed well,bilateral carbon crediting mechanisms as well as expansion of project-based CDMs into sectoral or programbased mechanisms can be also a good policy candidate
for technology transfer in the post-Kyoto regime.
Figure 2 illustrates several examples of policy options(highlighted in green) and financial mechanisms for thelater stages of technology development (highlighted inorange):By mapping existing institutions combined withfunctions of international institutions for low-carbon
technology and associated with removal of barriers, we
may gain a clearer idea of low-carbon technology governance architecture towards cooperative fragmentation.

Acknowledgements
This research was supported by the Environment
Research and Technology Development Fund (S-6-3
Research into the medium to long-term international anddomestic institutional design options and their formation
processes, as a part of the S6 Research project toEstablish a Methodology to Evaluate Mid to Long Term
Environmental Policy Options toward Asian LowCarbon Societies) of the Ministry of the Environment,
Japan.
Notes*1

The original version of this figure is contained in UNFCCC(2009b). The authors modified the figure by simplifying thestages of technological development from six stages to four andadding several examples of technologies along the chain. This
figure should be treated only as a conceptual flow of technological development. The actual mapping of the technologies
depends upon various conditions of a country or region. It isalso noted that the stages are not as clearly separated in reality
as shown in the figure.
*2
As our primary concern regards developing countries, a project
primarily focusing on a developed country was excluded fromthe assessment. This applies, for example, to some projects
under a task force (i.e., coal) of the APP.

Fig. 2 Policy options and financial mechanisms for the later stages of technology development.

Fragmentation of International Low-Carbon Technology Governance

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Norichika KANIE
Norichika KANIE is an Associate Professor at theGraduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan. He
is also a Senior Research Fellow at the United
Nations University Institute of Advanced Studies(UNU-IAS). His research focuses on international environmental governance. Among otherpositions, he serves as a Scientific Steering Committee member for the
Earth Systems Governance project of the IHDP, and a Co-Chair of theWorking Party on Climate, Investment and Development (WPCID) at theOECD. From August 2009 to July 2010 he was a Marie Curie Incoming
International Fellow of the European Commission and Visiting Professor
at SciencesPo, Paris. His recent publications include: “A Charter Moment:
Restructuring Governance for Sustainability,” published in Public and
Administration and Development in 2012, for which he was the leadauthor; and Navigating the Anthropocene: Improving Earth System
Governance,” published in Science in March 2012, which he co-authored.
He received his Ph.D. in Media and Governance from Keio University.

Masachika SUZUKI
Masachika SUZUKI is an Associate Professor at
Kansai University, Japan. Prior to this position, he
was an Assistant Professor and Associate Dean at
the Graduate School of International Management,International University of Japan. His areas ofresearch include 1) corporate environmental andenergy strategy, 2) technology transfer and innovation in clean energy, 3) effectiveness of economic policy instruments
and 4) environmental and social indicators for sustainable development.
His previous positions include Senior Analyst positions at Mitsubishi
Securities in Tokyo and Innovest Strategic Value Advisors in New York as
well as consultant positions at the UN Headquarters in New York and the
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) in
Bonn. He has Ph.D. from Erasmus University Rotterdam in the
Netherlands and M.A.s from Columbia University in the US and Keio
University in Japan.

Masahiko IGUCHI
Masahiko IGUCHI is a researcher at the Graduate
School of Decision Science and Technology at theTokyo Institute of Technology. Prior to his research activities, he worked as a Research Fellow
at the Graduate School of Law at Keio University.
His areas of expertise include climate policy,
regulation and innovation, and international governance. He received his B.A. (with honours) in Politics and International
Relations from the University of Essex, and his M.Sc. in International
Relations (Research) from the London School of Economics and Political
Science, UK.

(Received 15 June 2012, Accepted 13 January 2013)