Discussion Papers In Economics
And BusinessResearch & Development in the Telecommunication Industry
in Prewar Japan－Automatic Telephone Switchboard－

Yuki Nakajima
Discussion Paper 06-23

Graduate School of Economics andOsaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP)
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPANResearch & Development in the Telecommunication Industry
in Prewar Japan－Automatic Telephone Switchboard－

Yuki Nakajima
Discussion Paper 06-23
August 2006

この研究は「大学院経済学研究科・経済学部記念事業」
基金より援助を受けた、記して感謝する。

Graduate School of Economics andOsaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP)
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPANResearch & Development in the Telecommunication Industry
in Prewar Japan−Automatic Telephone Switchboard−

Yuki Nakajima†

Abstract
The telephone system was not sufficiently developed in prewar Japan. This study examines thetechnological development of automatic telephone switchboard (ATS) to clarify the problems of telephonesystem in prewar Japan. Ministry of Communication(MOC) introduced automatic telephone system in 1923.
From the standpoint of the telephone exchange service, it was a very opportune decision; however, it wastechnologically premature. Although they had conducted research on the system before WW1, their only
choice was the primitive S × S system. Further, the dependence on import technology caused different
A-type and H-type ATS to coexist. Each local telephone exchange district independently introduced adifferent type. The MOC had to prepare the specifications and parts for repair for two different systems.
These factors hampered the improvement of the telecommunication quality. Standardizing the system byusing independent technology became the biggest issue for the MOC in the 1930s. In the 1930s, some joint
researches were organized with private enterprises. They tried to develop a “T-type” or “Electronic
Tube-type” ATS. However, the T-type ATS was merely an improvement over the outdated S × S systemwith respect to the circuit design. On the other hand, Matsumae aimed at a novel technology, an electronic
common control system. However, a suitable electronic tube was not invented. As a result, thetelecommunication industry was unable to resolve the coexistence problem in the prewar period. However,
the engineers of MOC and ATS suppliers recognized their technological backwardness and shared anawareness of the importance of standardization by independent technology. This was the starting point for
the research and development system of the telecommunication industry in “Postwar Japan.”

Key Words: Telephone system, Automatic Telephone Switchboard, Ministry of Communication, Research& Development, Joint Research
JEL: N65, N75, O33†

Corresponding Author: The Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Post Doctoral Researcher
Address: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, Machikaneyama 1-7, Osaka 560-0043, Japan.
Phone: +81-6-6850-5258. e-mail: nyuki@ha.bekkoame.ne.jp

Introduction
Telephone system has been used to exchange important information on numerous business
transactions. However in Japan, some historical studies pointed out that telephone was in remarkable short
supply in prewar period. Moreover, automation on telephone exchange, which was indispensable for rapid
expansion of telephone network, did not become widespread enough. To explain such a backwardness of
telephone system, these studies focused mainly on the government policy because it was under control by
Ministry of Communications (MOC) in prewar period. MOC did not allocated their budged for telephoneservice sufficiently since they started telephone exchange in 1890. So they had to expand telephone system
within the severe austerity budget and to prioritized cities to allocate them. It caused regional unbalanced
expansion of telephone network.1 MOC’s budged allocation was a fundamental problem.
On the other hand, MOC depended on private companies in regard to supply of telephoneequipment such as telephone set, cable and switchboard. Domestic manufacturers in prewar days were in
the process of acquiring technologies from advanced countries by licensed production and patent contract.2
Therefore, we should consider not only the government policy but also the technological problem which
was involved in Japanese telephone industry. This study examines the introduction of the automatic
telephone system as well as the technological development of Automatic Telephone Switchboard (ATS) toclarify the problems of telephone system in prewar Japan.
Some studies that dealt with the technological development of the telecommunication industry in“postwar” Japan give us the point at issue. These studies

indicate that the joint research between

Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTTpc) and private companies—called the“Den-Den Family”—played a crucial role in the establishment of an independent technology.3 However,the prewar history of ATS technology was described only as an outline. Several studies have recently
indicated that after the 1930s, private companies, government offices, universities, and military institutes
were organized to conduct joint research in various fields.4 ATS was no exception. This study investigates
the type of joint researches established with regard to ATS in prewar Japan and estimates their role.
The process of introduction of the automatic telephone system in Japan is described in Section 1 ofthis paper. MOC engineers had begun to investigate the system before WW1 and took an initiative toautomate the telephone exchange system. However, because of the immediate introduction of the system
without waiting for the domestication of ATS, MOC had to depend on imports from advanced countries,
such as the United States, Britain, and Germany. Hence, this resulted in a situation in which different
systematized techniques existed simultaneously in Japan.
In Section 2, the domestication process of ATS by the Japanese companies is described. The
promotion of domestic production [Kokusan Shorei] led by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
1

Ishii (1994: Ch. 3); Fujii (1998: Ch.4); Fujii (2005: Ch.3); Fujii(2006).
The following studies dealt with the introduction of foreign techniques by patents, contracts, and researchand development activities in prewar Japan, especially in the electronics industry.: Hasegawa (1995);
Nishimura (2002); Nishimura(2003).
3
Denki Tsushin Seisaku Sougou Kenkyusyo (1994); Anchordoguy (2001); Nemoto(1992).
4
Hiroshige (1973); Sawai (2004); Aoki and Hiramoto (2003); Aoki (2004).
2

1

affected the procurement policy of MOC. Only four companies, Nippon Electric Company., Ltd. (NEC),Oki Electric Industry Company., Ltd. (OKI), Toa Electric Co.（TOA）, and Fuji Electric Company, Ltd.
(FUJI) could become the domestic suppliers of ATS.
In 1930s, a crucial matter for MOC and ATS suppliers was to eliminate or at least considerably
reduce the drawbacks caused by disunited ATS system. Some joint research groups were organized todevelop independent Japanese technology, which is examined in Section 3. By the experience of these
R&D activities in prewar day, many engineers were aware of the necessity to standardize ATS and to nurse
their original technology. In the conclusion, I briefly mention this impact for postwar days.

Section 1
Introduction of automatic telephone system in Japan
1.1

Preliminary research of automatic telephone system

Although the automatic telephone system was introduced in Japan in 1926, preliminary research had begun
from early 20th century. One of the earliest reports was submitted by Ryuji Nakayama. Two years after
joining MOC, he observed the telecommunication industry in European countries and the United States in
1896; subsequently, in 1904, he studied again in these countries.5 In 1913, at a conference held by Instituteof Electrical Engineers of Japan (IEEJ), he reported on mechanical switching that was about to be
introduced in advanced western countries.6
Morisaburo Tonegawa conducted a detailed comparison research between the manual and automatic
exchange systems on a full scale. Tonegawa graduated from the department of Electrical Engineering inTokyo Imperial University in 1897, and entered

MOC.7 In 1907, he went to the United States and Britain

to research the telephone business; after returning to Japan in November the following year, he worked for
the Electro-Technical Laboratory under MOC as an engineer and was appointed as the chief of theLaboratory from 1914 to 1920. Tonegawa compared the two systems on the assumption that the number ofsubscribers was 100, 200, 300, 500, 2000, and 10000. The foundation costs and the yearly running costs foreach number were estimated by calculating factors such as the necessary number of switchboards, wages ofmanual operators and assistant engineers, prices of telephone sets, etc. As listed in Table 1, the automatic
telephone system was more expensive than the manual exchange system for all number of subscribers.
However, he calculated the foundation cost assuming that the ATS was imported while the manualexchange equipments were produced in Japan. He pointed out that by domesticating ATS in Japan, thedisparity in foundation costs would greatly reduce. He argued that if operating costs for both the systems
were almost identical, ATS should be introduced even if its foundation cost is more expensive.8
Yukitomo Yamane was the first engineer who visited foreign countries with the aim of surveillance5

Musen Denpo Tsusinsya (1921: 118).
Nakayama (1913: 533–594).
7Electro-Technical Laboratory (1944: no page number).
8
Tonegawa (1914: 65–149).
62

study of the telephone exchange. He was an assistant section manager at Temporary Bureau forConstructing Telegraph and Telephone (TBCTT) of MOC that was established in October 1920 as a part of
the third telephone expansion program.9 He reported that WE had developed a fully-automatic telephoneswitchboard, which was about to be practically implemented in the United States. Yamane insisted on theabsolute superiority of the automatic telephone system over the manual exchange system with regard to
speed of operation and confidentiality of telephone calls. Moreover, the wage increase after WW1 would
reduce the advantage of lower operational cost of the manual exchange system. Yamane also pointed thatthe adoption of the fully-automatic switching system in the United States was inevitable, even if thefoundation cost was considerably higher than that for the manual exchange system.10
Having been based on the above investigations, MOC finally began experimenting with ATS from
1922, using a 300-line switchboard imported from a British company, Automatic Telephone Manufacturing
Co. (ATM). The second division of the Electro-Technical Laboratory took charge of the mission.11
By the middle of the 1920s, the telephone subscriber had increased beyond the capacity of manualexchange. Moreover, the service quality of telephone exchange had been getting worse because of short
supply and unskilled operators.12 MOC engineers considered that a gradual conversion to the automatic
telephone system was inevitable. However, as shown by Tonegawa, the foundation and running cost were
expected to be more expensive. They were forced to make a difficult choice.13

1.2

Introduction of automatic telephone system

The Great Kanto Earthquake occurred in September 1923 did considerable damage to the telephone
network. Thirteen of nineteen manual exchange offices in Tokyo, and two of all offices in Yokohama werecompletely demolished. However this disaster provided an opportunity for MOC to adopt an automatic
telephone system.14
Sannosuke Inada significantly contributed to the introduction of the system. Inada graduated from the
Department of Electrical Engineering, Tokyo Imperial University, in 1900 and became an assistant engineer
in MOC. After he promoted to the post of an engineer, he studied in the United States, British, France, andGermany for two years from 1908. When TBCTT was founded in 1920, he was appointed as a chiefengineer of the bureau.15
Inada visited London in 1922, where an automatic telephone system was being introduced into the
British telephone network. His subordinate, Iwase Tetsujiro, who also visited Europe to investigate thesame issue, supported Inada. Moreover, the British government, especially General Post Office (GPO)
supplied him with important information. The chief engineer of GPO who was in charge of the introduction
9

NTTpc (1953 Vol.3: 31); Dohi (1951: 23).
Yamane (1921: 5–29).
11
NTTpc (1953 Vol.3: 17).
12
NTTpc (1960:4).
13
In Kwantung Leased Territory, the telecommunication bureau of the Kwantung governor-general had
investigated the ATS at Lüshun Engineering College from 1917. Automatic telephone exchange had begun
at the Dalian telephone exchange office from April 1923. NTTpc (1953 Vol.1: 17).
14
Ibid.
15
Musen Denpo Tsusinsya (1921: 119).
10

3

the system in Britain strongly influenced Inada’s decision to introduce the system.16
Immediately after Inada returned to Japan, the Great Kanto Earthquake occurred; he regarded it as agood opportunity to introduce the automatic telephone system. The month following the earthquake, Inada
gathered engineers of the TBCTT and ordered further investigation of the system.17
However, the administrative vice-minister of MOC opposed Inada’s proposal to introduce theautomatic telephone system because importing and setting ATS would take a long time, and the restorationof the manual exchange system could be easier and faster. 18 This opinion is very reasonable inconsideration of the situation that they couldn’t purchase domestic ATS. But Inada strongly insisted on theautomatic telephone system and tried to persuade his supervisor. Finally, he succeeded to introduce thesystem as departmental decision.19 Minister of Communications at that time, Tsuyoshi Inukai, stated that if
this system was capable of performing effectively and could be profitable in the future, it should be
introduced immediately even if the foundation cost was high.20 Inada gave top priority to improve
telephone exchange service. In spite of the expensive cost, he decided to introduce the automatic telephoneexchange before domestication of ATS was achieved in Japan.

1.3

Coexistence of Different Systems: the A-Type and the H-type

ATS is a mechanical telephone switching device that is operated by an interrupted electric current, i.e., an
impulse current. In the early years, the Strowger system developed by Almon B.Strowger in 1891 wasmainstream of ATS. This system is technologically belong to the Step by Step (S×S) system used a simple
method that was operated directly in accordance with the impulse current transmitted from the subscriber’s
telephone. Strowger system was developed by Automatic Electric Inc. (AEI) in the United States and ATM
in Britain. And Siemens & Halske Aktien Gesellschaft (SH) in Germany also developed their original S×S
system that was called the Siemens Halske System.
On the other hand, new system which used more sophisticated technology was developed by othercompany like WE. This was the Power Driven (PD) system, which used an indirect drive method controlled
by a common control circuit in which the connecting and talking processes were operated separately. Whena subscriber dials a certain telephone number, the connecting circuit begins to search for the caller andstores the impulses into a register once; then, it attempts to identify the receiver. Once the subscribers areconnected, the circuit begins to revert to its original state to prepare for another call; meanwhile, the talking
circuit continues to connect to the talking subscribers. Since the connecting process was operated
independently, this system was superior to the S×S system with regard to avoiding wrong connections andwas suitable for a large number of subscribers.
According to Yamane’s above mentioned study, in America, WE started developing this system by
1910’s, and succeeded to put them for practical use around early 1920’s. The PD system was introduced

16

Dohi (1951: 24).
NTTpc Engineering Bureau (1976: 73).
18
Yonezawa (1988: 123).
19
Publishing Committee for The Biography of Inada Sannosuke (1965: 585).
20
Dohi (1951: 22).
17

4

into the metropolis, such as New York, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, etc.21 Not only American company,
but also Sweden, France, and Belgium also introduced various versions of the PD system.22
Inada and the engineers in Telecommunication Engineering Bureau (TEB)23 compared the systems
to determine the most suitable one for Japan. It was considered extremely important to obtain a simple
mechanism that was practicable for large-scale production and easy to repair. Inada received informationfrom a chief engineer from GPO in Britain that they were planning to introduce the Strowger system in
London instead of the PD system because the latter was more expensive.24 As mentioned above, reductionof the foundation costs was also a serious problem in Japan. An issue of greater importance, which was
discussed, was the ease in domestication of ATS. It was judged that the domestication of the PD system byJapanese companies would be difficult in the near future. Hence, they decided to introduce the Strowger
system. For the first stage of construction, ATM supplied equipment for the Tokyo telephone exchange
office, and AEI supplied it for the second stage. Since both ATM and AEI were subsidiary companies of
WE, NEC imported the equipment through Standard Telephone and Cables (STC) and delivered to MOC.25
As mentioned above, cost reduction was a top priority. Nevertheless the total cost, which included aconsultation fee for engineering guidance, amounted to over 8 million yen for only the first stage. MOC
had never paid for imports such an enormous sum previously. Even the S×S system which was expectedmuch cheaper than the PD system imposed a severe burden to MOC. So they had to try reducing ATS
prices as much as possible.
To begin with, TEB engineers lacked sufficient knowledge on the market prices of ATS; hence, they
were at a disadvantage with regard to price negotiation. Therefore they began to investigate the prices of
ATS in detail and used the data for the subsequent negotiation with NEC. They succeeded to reduce theprice of ATS for 12 percent at the second stage.
Secondly, MOC decided to purchase from not only ATM and AEI but also SH and Siemens Brothers(SB), and open the bidding on contracts. MOC intend to induce price competition by bidders for every time
ATS was introduced. As a result, the Strowger system of ATM and AEI was introduced into Tokyo, Nagoya,
Kyoto, and Kitakyusyu, while the Siemens Halske System of SH was introduced into Yokohama, Osaka,and Kobe. SB also produced the Siemens Halske System, which was introduced into Ashiya in Hyogo
prefecture. In this manner, MOC succeeded in reducing the purchase price. For 7 contracts, the imports of
ATS declined from over 9.9 million yen in 1925 to 889 thousand yen in 1929.26
However, the introduction of these two systems caused the coexistence of different systems in Japan.
The engineers referred to the Strowger system as “the A-Type” and the Siemens Halske System as “theH-type”. Although both types used the S×S system, each had their distinctive features. They are completely
different with regard to circuit design, production technique, operation system, maintenance procedure,21

NTTpc (1953 Vol.3: 493).
Publishing Committee for The Biography of Inada Sannosuke (1965: 144).
23
TEB was established to take charge of the TBCTT mission in 1925. Inada was appointed as the chief ofthe bureau.(Publishing Committee for The Biography of Inada Sannosuke (1965: 604).
24
Ibid. 145.
25
NEC (1972: 117).
26
NTTpc (1953 Vol.1: 36–42).
22

5

material management, and engineer training.27Hence, mechanical adjustments were required to connect
them. Each telephone exchange office selected one side of the two types to avoid confusion in local
exchanges. However, the problem remained unsolved in toll exchanges that connected the lines outside the
district.
MOC engineers were also confused because they had to manage ATS using two methods. A period of
intensive training for engineers was inevitable to master their management and repair. As a result, theengineers were divided into two groups for the A-type and the H-type systems. Both these groups insistedon the superiority of theirs, worsening the conflict pertaining to the introduction of them. An engineer of
TEB had to leave as a result of such conflicts.28 Some engineers complained to Inada about this problem.
Inada had recognized this problem earlier; however, competitive bidding was inevitable to reduce thefoundation cost.29
Such a problem was caused by MOC’s decision to introduce an automatic telephone switchingsystem although it was neither an indigenously built system nor a domesticated ATS. In order to further
improve the telephone service, domestication and standardization of telephones were the most importanttasks to be achieved in prewar Japan.

Section 2
Domestication of ATS
2.1

The Promotion Policy for Domestic Production in the 1920s

The biggest obstacle to the introduction of the automatic telephone system was the cost of installation.
Since the Japanese suppliers were not sufficiently experienced to produce ATS, MOC was forced to importthem at a considerable expense. Despite that MOC’s efforts gradually reduced the cost, as mentioned
previously, transportation fees and customs duty that fluctuated with the foreign exchange rate wereunavoidable. Moreover, there still existed another problem—late delivery and inconvenience with regard to
repairs.30
The promotion of domestic production was not an issue for just one department or agency, but amatter of priority for the entire government; this was especially so in the 1920s when Japan’s trade balancefell in the red again. In order to restrict imports, Ministry of Commerce and Industry established theDomestication Promotion Committee [Kokusan Shinko Iinkai] in June 1926. Its primary purpose was toencourage the use of domestic products, and to deliberate a policy to promote Japanese industries.31
Particularly, in the case of government procurement, a method of substituting a domestic product forimports was a very important subject of discussion. Hence the committee demanded all governmentorganizations to submit a list of articles procured from foreign countries to the Ministry of Finance every
27

Yonezawa (1988: 444).
Yonezawa (1988: 229).
29
Publishing Committee for The Biography of Inada Sannosuke (1965: 546).
30
NTTpc (1953 Vol.1: 52).
31
“Cyugai Syogyo Sinpo” Jun., 20th, 1926.
28

6

three months. And Ministry of Finance reported them to the committee. The committee then classified theminto two categories—one that was approved for import because no domestic company could produce themand another that was disapproved because the domestication had been achieved.32
In November that year, the range of disapproval category was widened. If an item existed whose
domestication was in progress but not achieved, the related domestic product would be prioritized overimports for government procurement.33 Ministry of Commerce and Industry formed a list of items thatshould be prioritized. Moreover a law which allow the government to procure the above mentioned items
by private tenders or voluntary contracts instead of competitive bidding was proclaimed in April 1927.
Based on this law, the government was able to nominate Japanese companies as exclusive subcontractors
for procurement, even if their price or quality was not satisfactory to compete with imports from advanced
countries.34
In response to the committee’s decision, MOC began investigating all their procurements to specify
the items that must be domesticated.35 In January 1929, the committee authorized NEC as a preferential
supplier of ATS for MOC procurement.36 However, the foreign suppliers such as AEI, ATM, and SH were
not excluded from the Japanese market at that time, because NEC was unable to meet MOC’s demands.
The committee decided to apply the law to ATS at the meeting held in May 1931. ATS supplier was
limited to only Japanese companies with some exceptions such as the Siemens Halske system.37 In thepreceding year, MOC had defined “domestic product” as commodities manufactured in Japanese territory
by a company that has more than half of its capital held by Japanese citizens utilizing Japanese technology
and labor.38 Table 2 lists the ATS suppliers for the newly established telephone exchange office. From 1931,
the domestic market was protected by policies for Japanese companies such as NEC, OKI, FUJI, and TOA.
As mentioned in the previous section, the reduction of foundation cost was a major issue for MOC.
Therefore the domestic ATS should be improved to a level that met the demand of MOC in terms of priceand quality, even if not to the same level of imports before the exclusion of foreign companies. Seiichi
Shindo, an MOC official who was concerned with the policy making, in retrospect, commented that thedomesticated items were not extremely expensive, and their financial burden on MOC’s budget did notincrease after the market protection policy in 1931.39 This implies that the domestication of ATS by
Japanese companies had developed considerably by the end of the 1920s. In the remainder of this section, I
will examine the domestication of ATS by Japanese companies.

2.2

Domestication of ATS by Japanese Companies

Nippon Electric Company., Ltd. (NEC) was founded in 1898 as a subsidiary company of WE; it first
32“Jiji Shinpo” Oct., 1st, 1926.
“Osaka Asahi Shinbun” Nov., 11th, 1926.
34“Osaka Asahi Shinbun” Jan., 10th, 1928.
35
NTTpc (1953 Vol.2: 41).
36
Shimazu (1980: 84).
37
Kokumin Shinbun May, 8th, 1931.
38
NEC (1972: 150); NTTpc (1953 Vol.2: 41).
39
Publishing Committee for The Biography of Inada Sannosuke (1965: 580).
33

7

succeeded in the domestic production of ATS. NEC had been an importer of ATS before it began
indigenous production. When the telephone exchange office in Dalian, Kwantung Leased Territory, planned
to introduce ATS in 1922, NEC delivered a semi-automatic telephone system manufactured by WE to the
Kwantung governor-general. When MOC decided to introduce the automatic telephone system in 1923, an
inquiry on the domestic production of ATS was made to NEC first.40
The focal points in the production of ATS were sets of tools, machine tools, and materials. ATS in the
prewar days was a mechanical system comprising a number of relays and other parts. Therefore, it was
extremely important to standardize the parts and improve their compatibility. In order to achieve this, a setof tools was required to precisely improve processing accuracy. Further, a high-quality machine tools wereindispensable to make good tools. WE sent all blueprints and tools to NEC.41 However, they were found to
be inadequate for use in the production line. Primary materials such as phosphor bronze and nickel silver
rusted quickly in Japan because Japan has higher humidity than western countries and the material quality
was not at par with the advanced countries. The engineers in NEC attempted to overcome this problem byplating. On occasions, they had to indigenously change the materials and devise new tools different fromthose supplied by WE.42 MOC procurement had to be approved by the Electro-Technical Laboratory thatwas first established under MOC in 1891 and had become an independent organization in 1918. All theATS parts produced by NEC, such as dials, switches, and selectors, were accepted one by one from 1926 to
1927. The Electro-Technical Laboratory commented that their quality was not inferior to that manufactured
by WE.43
NEC delivered the first domesticated ATS to the Mitsukoshi Department Store in July 1927, thenmade a bid for MOC’s ATS procurement which had been to introduced into Tokyo-Nakano telephoneexchange office in 1929. At the competitive bidding, despite that the cheapest estimate was 160 thousand
Yen by AEI, while NEC offered 170 thousand Yen, NEC became a successful bidder.44 This result was not
only because of the promotion policy by MOC. NEC had improved the price competitiveness to a levelcomparable with that of foreign companies.
Oki Electric Industry Co. (OKI), the oldest telephone equipment company, was founded in 1881;
they developed a manual exchange switchboard without any support from foreign companies.45 However,
MOC adopted OKI’s ATS only 10 years after telephone system had begun in 1890. It appeared that thedomestication of the ATS without technical support by OKI would be more difficult, and that a technical tie
up with a foreign company was inevitable. Therefore, OKI signed a contract with the General ElectricCompany (GEC) in Britain, as its exclusive supplier of ATS in Japan. OKI dispatched some engineers to
Britain, one of whom, Cyuichi Yoshino, entered a training school for ATS engineer in GPO and received
training. In 1926, OKI and GEC signed a contract to establish a technical tie up. GEC supplied OKI with40

Denki Tsushin Editorial Office (1940: 132).
NEC (1972: 126).
42
Denki Tsushin Editorial Office (1940: 135).
43
Ministry of Communication (1927).
44
Editorial Committee for The Photo Album of Tozuka Factory (1987: 236).
45
The story of OKI is based on the following study.: Oki Electric Industry Co. (1981: 122–131); Japan
Business History Institute (2001: 49–57).
41

8

the blueprints and tools, while the former paid the latter a royalty of 3% of their sales.
At that time, the workers were still indirectly managed by OKI. In the factories, masters [Oyakata]used indigenous tools. However, ATS requires standardized parts, and these tools were inadequate for its
mass production. Moreover, since each work group independently proceeded with their operation at
different speeds, the assembling process for the parts was not uniform. Experts in toolmaking and machine
production were dispatched from GEC to OKI, and they built new section to produce ATS without
depending on masters. Their products—dial and switches—were approved by the Electro-TechnicalLaboratory from 1927. The Nakano telephone exchange office decided to adopt OKI’s ATS in 1929 and it
was delivered in the subsequent year.
The third ATS supplier in Japan was Toa Electric Co. (TOA), which was founded in 1918 thenbecame an affiliate company of Tobata Casting Ltd in 1923. In 1934, both these companies were mergedwith two other companies to form the Kokusan Industrial Company; they were merged into Hitachi Ltd. in1937 as Tozuka factory. TOA, which had produced manual exchange switchboards from the time of its
establishment, undertook the domestication of ATS from 1927. TOA did not enter into any technical tie up
with a foreign company. They borrowed the ATS manufactured by AEI from the Tokyo central telephone
office and imitated them. However, they were unable to easily understand its mechanism. A trial productmanufactured on a small scale worked satisfactorily; however, achieving good results with large-scale
production took a long time. The test of durability was repeated many times. Their first delivery to MOC
was a tentative introduction into the Shizuoka-Atami telephone exchange office in 1934. After their ATS
produced good results, it was adopted formally.46
These three Japanese companies developed and produced the A-type ATS. In contrast, Fuji ElectricCo. (FUJI) promoted the domestic production of the H-type ATS. Its parent company, Furukawa ElectricCo., planned manual exchange switchboard production and hired over 10 engineers like Morisaburo
Tonegawa, from MOC and the Electro-Technical Laboratory. Subsequently, in 1923, The company
established FUJI as a joint collaboration with a German company, Siemens Schckert. From 1925, FUJI
assumed responsibility for the functioning of the Tokyo branch of the company; it also became an agencyof Siemens Halske for importing ATS and telephone sets.47 In addition, SH and FUJI signed a contract
according to which the former supplied parts and semifinished goods to the latter to assemble electric
appliances in Japan.48 At that time, MOC formulated a plan to introduce an automatic telephone system
into the area that includes the Osaka and Hyogo prefectures. FUJI sent the data necessary for design of ATS
to SH. SH offered the cheapest estimate and became a successful bidder.
FUJI and Furukawa Electric Co. set up a committee to discuss the domestication of ATS and decided
not to domesticate it immediately. However, MOC clarified their policy to restrain imports, and in 1932,
informed FUJI that MOC would never adopt imported ATS in the Osaka area; they further stated that if
FUJI would not domesticate the H-type ATS, MOC would abolish them and shift to the A-type ATS. In
response to this, FUJI obtained a license from SH to produce the H-type ATS and began domestication. In
46

NTTpc (1953 Vol.3: 376).
Ibid. 384.
48
Takeuchi (1966: 122).
47

9April 1933, FUJI established a telephone department and hired engineers from MOC. These engineers werethen sent to Germany for acquiring the production technology. In the beginning, all parts were imported
from SH, and FUJI merely assembled them. However, the blueprints sent from SH had to be adapted for
the Japanese environment such as the requirements of NEC. Then, they attempted to indigenously produce
parts and raise their production technology to the level of Deutsche Industrie Norm (DIN), which was thestandard specification in Germany. In 1934, FUJI was nominated by MOC as a supplier of the H-type ATS,and they delivered their products to the telephone exchange offices in Osaka and Yokohama in thesubsequent year. In 1935, the telephone department of the company was spun off and was founded as Fuji
Tsushinki Seizo Co. (FUJITSU).49
Since FUJI was the only Japanese supplier of the H-type ATS, MOC planned to increase the numberof suppliers, and they requested NEC to produce them. In May 1934, NEC received permission to produce
the H-type ATS from SH. Mix und Genest A.E. (MG) which was a German subsidiary company of theInternational Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) supplied tools and blueprints of the H-type
ATS.50 In 1936, NEC completed their first H-type ATS.51
Four companies became ATS suppliers—NEC in cooperation with WE and MG, OKI with GEC,
FUJI with SH, and TOA. With the exception of TOA, these companies introduced production technology
obtained from foreign companies and immediately achieved domestic production. In contrast, it was a longtime before TOA acquired the manufacturing technique and it delivered the smallest number of ATS to
MOC. In their domestication process, they not only imitated the foreign products but also rewrote
blueprints and devised tools that were suitable for Japan.
However, these companies did not develop original systems like the Strowger system, the Siemens
Halske system, and the PD system. They simply introduced existing technologies and adapted them toJapanese environment. Therefore, each company domesticated a system that was previously developed bytheir partner, such as AEI, ATM, GEC, and SH. Hence, different exchange systems, namely the A type andthe H type, coexisted in Japan. Both the mechanical design and technological features were completely
different, and it was impossible to unify them into one single type.
Moreover, even the same type ATS were not compatible with each other because the parts andcomponents differed depending on the manufacturer. For example, for the A type, the parts of ATS
manufactured by NEC could not be assembled with those manufactured by OKI or TOA. Similarly for the
H type, NEC and FUJI, which introduced the technology from MG and SH respectively, the parts andcomponents were not compatible. As long as each ATS was used independently, the problem was not sosignificant for suppliers. However, MOC had to bear the burden of managing an enormous variety of parts.
Domesticating foreign technology was not sufficient to improve the telephone exchange service;
standardizing the systems and mechanical parts was an essential problem. However, the existing S×S
systems such as the A type and the H type could not be a choice for a future standard because its technology
was outdated and on the decline. In contrast, the PD system, which was in use in the U.S. and other49

NTTpc (1953 Vol.3: 385–386).
NEC (1972: 175).
51
NTTpc (1953 Vol.3: 175).
50

10

countries, was suitable for large cities. However, it was not introduced in Japan. Therefore, MOC had noalternative but to create a new system by themselves.

Section 3
Research and Development Activities for the New Systems
3.1

Independent ATS Technology

The domestication process has displayed a growing tendency toward the development of independent
technology in the 1930s. All technical specifications written by MOC at that time included a phrase, “Allparts, materials, and patents for this procurement must be Japanese”. 52 In particular, patents wereconsidered to be very important. From 1924, the number of patents concerning ATS increased, immediately
after the decision to introduce the automatic telephone system; by 1945, it reached over 700. 53 Japanesecompanies and individuals obtained 233 patents. NEC obtained 104 patents, 62 of which were invented byforeign companies such as WE, and NEC engineers procured 42 patents for inventions. MOC had 51
patents; FUJI, 33; OKI, 12; all of these were Japanese inventions.54 While the Japanese telecommunicationindustry generally depended on foreign technology, they began research and development activities.
In the 1920s, TEB in MOC began research activities, particularly with regard to the circuit design ofATS. NEC and FUJI supported TEB, manufacturing a trial product on the basis of its design. In 1928, TEB
established a small laboratory for ATS research and performed simple tests on the trial product.55 The
Electro-Technical Laboratory conducted more advanced tests that required larger equipment andfundamental research on telephones in the second division, sometimes on the request of TEB.56
In order to further improve the telecommunication technology, MOC cooperated with someuniversities, and in 1933, established a Telecommunication Technology Committee as an advisorycommittee to Minister of Communications. The committee was primarily constituted by the engineers of
the MOC, especially the TEB and the Electro-Technical Laboratory, and a scientist who belonged to the
Research Institute of Electrical Communication in Tohoku Imperial University and the Department ofElectrical Engineering in Tokyo Imperial University joined this committee. The committee established four
research divisions. The second division, which dealt with wire-telephone and telephony, discussed ATS.
MOC allocated a budget greater than 201 thousand yen in 1935, and 185 thousand yen in 1936 for thecommittee. With respect to the ATS, 11 thousand yen were allocated in 1935, 9.8 thousand yen in 1936,
respectively, for the research of circuit design and mechanical technology.57
NEC had also established its own research department to invent original technology. In 1924, the52

NTTpc Engineering Bureau (1976: 74).
Patent specifications; Japanese Patent Office (1958:797-799).
54
No patent obtained by HITACHI was found. However, it is possible that some individuals belonging to
the company obtained patents.
55
Yonezawa (1988: 26–27).
56
Electro-Technical Laboratory (1944: 398–400).
57
Ministry of Communication (1935: 1).
53

11

company hired Yasujiro Niwa from the Electro-Technical Laboratory. He joined the Electro-TechnicalLaboratory in 1916 after he graduated from the Department of Electrical Engineering in Tokyo Imperial
University and became a lecturer in the department. After joining NEC, Niwa was promoted to chiefengineer in 1927, and he added two laboratories—the Equipment Laboratory and the Transmission
Laboratory.58 The chief of the Equipment Laboratory, Yasujiro Shimazu, who entered NEC in 1925 after
graduating from the Department of Electrical Engineering in Tokyo Imperial University, devoted himself to
ATS research.59 His subordinate, Akira Nakajima who joined NEC in 1930, and Harisawa Masao whojoined in 1934, designed a relay circuit. Designing a relay circuit at that time was a tedious task; they wererequired to confirm circuit functions by checking how each relay worked in the circuit individually. Thisjob depended on experienced engineers, and there were few academic researches on the relay circuit.
Nakajima and Harisawa believed that an appropriate theory was indispensable for an advanced technology
and created a mathematical technique to express the connecting pattern in the circuit. They presented theirresearches at the Institute of Electrical Communication Engineers of Japan and received international
acclaim.60

3.2

The T-type ATS

On the basis of these research activities, the MOC began to standardize ATS by developing new systems
from the mid-1930s. TEB engineers who assumed responsibility emphasized on an independent technology
from foreign patents.61 Hiroshi Origasa, an TEB engineer, created a new circuit design and obtained threepatents on ATS from 1937 to 1938; he then devised a new system, “the T-type” ATS, which was named
after Teishin-sho (MOC).62 Since the research on relay circuits had progressed considerably in Japan, theT-type ATS had a more simplified circuit design than the existing S×S system. For example, the T-type ATS
was assembled by 19,521 relays, whereas the H-type ATS required 29,411 relays, at the same processing
capacity.63 It was highly regarded as the first original Japanese ATS. MOC decided to formally introduce
the T-type ATS in 1940 to commemorate the “2600th anniversary” of the mythological foundation of Japan.
The Nara Telephone exchange office in Nara prefecture, the ancient capital of Japan, first introduced theT-type ATS.64
Although the circuit design was an original technology invented by a Japanese engineer, the T-type
ATS did not have any original parts.65 All the relays, switches, and dials were borrowed from the H-type
ATS produced by FUJISTU. From the beginning, FUJITSU collaborated with MOC to develop the T-type
trial product. Therefore, the development of its parts became the next objective. Since the standardizationof the ATS was an essential objective, not only FUJITSU but also other suppliers were required to58

NEC (1972: 130).
Shimazu (1980: 79).
60
Umezawa (1981: 9–20).
61
NTTpc (1953 Vol.2: 152).
62
NTTpc Engineering Bureau (1976: 77).
63
Kojima, S. (1942: 105).
64
NTTpc (1953 Vol.1: 241).
65
Yonezawa (1988: 444).
5912

cooperate with them. In January 1942, MOC established the Automatic Telephone System Standardizing
Committee.66 The committee comprised engineers of NEC, OKI, FUJITSU, HITACHI (former TOA), andMOC. In the first meeting, they discussed the design of parts suitable for the T-type ATS, and then theygathered again for another meeting held in October the same year to discuss a prototype.67
However, a serious problem was that the T type ATS could not improve on the old-fashioned S×S
system. There was no alternative other than to develop an advanced “S×S system” instead of the PD system.
At the same time in the U.S., WE succeeded in practically implementing the crossbar system, from 1938.
The crossbar system inherited the technology such as the common control system of the PD system. In fact,
in 1931, NEC had already been informed about the crossbar system by WE, and they were advised to apply
for a patent. Inada, who had retired from MOC, became a technical advisor of NEC, judged that it would be
impossible to commercialize the technology within the term of license, which was fifteen years. They
decided not to apply for patents.68 After the war began, Japanese engineers were unable to obtain detailed
information on the crossbar system. Hence, in Japan, ATS technology was considerably less developed thatthat of the U.S.
Material shortage became more serious during the war. The committee was unable to continue themeetings and was dissolved after the fourth meeting held in March 1943. MOC was forced to defer the
introduction of automatic telephone exchange; further, rural districts stopped the operation of ATS andreturned to manual exchange. For the purpose of national defense, a new telephone office was establishedin Tokyo and Osaka and the T-type ATS was adopted only there. After the end of the war, they were
replaced in the Nagano telephone exchange offices. However, the T-type ATS was never produced again.69

3.3

The Electronic Tube-type ATS

While Origasa was developing the T-type ATS, TEB established another research project. This project was
proposed by Shigeyoshi Matsumae, a section chief of TEB. He criticized the Japanese telecommunicationindustry in the 1930s stating that domestic production was achieved not by technological superiority, but by
low wages.70 He recognized that an independent technology could not be developed by improving theexisting S×S system.
Matsumae planned to develop “the Electronic Tube-type” ATS after he had developed the non-loaded
cable that made him famous.71 In this system, an electronic tube generates an electron beam controlled byelectromagnetic forces to select the telephone number. The ATS technology existing at that time, including
the latest crossbar system, was a mechanical system using a number of relays. However, if an electronic
tube was applied in ATS, a mechanical relay would not be assembled. This system would have definitely
become an epoch-making technology.
Matsumae requested NEC to cooperate with TEB. Simazu and his colleague in NEC thought it would
66

Shimazu (1980: 91).
NTTpc (1953 Vol.1: 410–414).
68
Shimazu (1980: 89).
69
Ibid. 241.
70
Matsumae and Nishizaki (1938: 146).
71
NTTpc (1953 Vol.1: 452).
67

13

never be successful in the near future; however, they accepted the request.72 In May 1939, an ad hoc
Committee on Automatic Telephone System was established. The committee comprised four engineers of
TEB including Origasa, five engineers of NEC including Niwa and Shimazu, and Yukio Okada, anassociate professor of Tohoku Imperial University.73
At the first meeting, they discussed the basic policy for their research activities and decided to pursue
technological possibilities of the system without hastening the practical implementation. Considerable
importance was attached to the development of an common control circuit operated by an electron beam. In
order to achieve this objective, it was inevitable to develop a new electronic tube that was adequate forthem. NEC attempted to develop a prototype of the electronic tube and submitted it at the third meeting
held in the subsequent month.74
However, this tube could not generate an electron beam that was sufficient for system control.
Moreover, the production technology had some problems. As a result, they had to relinquish the idea ofdeveloping a new electronic tube and decided to use the existing discharge tube, thyratron. And to makematters worse, the circuit design had to be changed for an single control which was used in the S×S system.
If they adopted the single control instead of common control, the advantages of high-speed operation byelectronic tube would be diminished drastically. This implied that they had to give up their highest priorityof the project.
At 31st meeting held in February 1941, they reaffirmed their R&D policy, that is to develop new
electronic tube for common control circuit, to pursue technological possibilities not a practical utility. Then
NEC succeeded in developing new electronic tube in October the year. It seemed as if they would reach totheir goal finally. But this electronic tube had fatal defect such as high electricity consumption, shortproduct age, and high heat generation; thus, it was not useful for ATS. The practical utility and reliability
which was outside of member’s interest were major obstacles to the goal. 75
They held meetings very frequently−at least once every month, and sometimes three times a month−and attempted to improve the quality of the electronic tube and its circuit design. However, after the T
type was introduced in the Nara telephone exchange office in 1940, the members gradually came to theconclusion that they should have developed a more practical ATS despite their earlier decision not to haste
the practical implementation. The 45th meeting held in April 1942 became the last meeting. They stopped
their project, then all members joined the T-type ATS project, which was also ended in March 1943.76
The electronic Tube-type ATS was an innovative idea and the related research and development
activities were very intensive. However, the technological level at that time was not sufficient toaccomplish the project; in particular, the electronic tube was the biggest obstacle. It can be considered that
Matsumae’s project was premature and ahead of its time.

72

Shimazu (1980: 89).
Kojima (1971a: 23).
74
Ibid. 25.
75
Kojima (1971b: 22–26).
76
Kojima (1971a: 26–28).
73

14

Conclusion
MOC decided to introduce the automatic telephone system quickly, immediately after the Great Kanto
Earthquake in 1923. From the standpoint of the telephone exchange service, it was a very opportune
decision; however, it was technologically premature.
Their dependence on import technology caused different the A-type and the H-type ATS to coexist ina small country like Japan. Each local telephone exchange district independently introduced a different type.
MOC had to prepare the specifications and parts for repair for two different systems. The engineers also
had to be trained for both and were divided into two groups. These factors hampered the improvement of
the telecommunication quality.
Moreover MOC judged that the domestication of the PD system would be impossible in near future.
Their only choice was the primitive S×S system. As indicated in Table 3, the ratio of the telephone callwhich completed without disconnection was getting worse in 1930’s, and automatic telephone system wasinferior to manual exchange. An MOC engineer recollects that if the MOC had introduced the PD system
which used indirect drive method with a common control circuit, most problems could be avoided in large
cities such as Tokyo and Osaka.77 ATS technology didn’t develop to be alternative to manual exchange inJapan. In addition to the budget constraint as mentioned before, such a poor performance was also major
reason for low automation level in prewar Japan.
To deal with these problem, standardizing the system with independent technology became thebiggest issue for MOC in the 1930s. In the 1930s, some joint researches were organized with private
enterprises that achieved domestic production. They tried to develop a the T-type or the Electronic
Tube-type ATS. However, the T-type ATS was merely an improvement over the outdated S×S system withrespect to the circuit design. On the other hand, Matsumae aimed at a novel technology, an electronic
common control circuit. However, a suitable electronic tube was not invented. As a result, thetelecommunication industry couldn’t resolve the technological problem till the end of the war.
Many engineers considered this problem very seriously and attempted to standardize the systemagain after end of the war. MOC was divided into Ministry of Posts and Ministry of Telecommunication in1949. The latter had jurisdiction over telephone systems; it was reorganized into Nippon Telegraph andTelephone Public Corporation (NTTpc) in 1952. The first president of NTTpc was Tsuyoshi Kajii. He wasan engineer of TEB, and as the chief of the bureau in the 1930s, had been troubled with the problem ofcoexistence. As soon as NTTpc was established, he planned to introduce the crossbar system. At the
beginning of the research and development for the new system in 1953, Kajii ordered that “All suppliersmust ensure full compatibility in system and parts.”78 Their research activities have not been explained indetail in this paper; however, its process was very similar to those of the committees I have mentioned
above. At the first stage, NTTpc and NEC conducted investigation in cooperation; then OKI, HITACHI,
and FUJITSU were given access to the research results so that all suppliers could produce ATS with thesame specifications. Further, at the second stage, all companies cooperated in improving the system.

77
78

Yonezawa (1988: 52).
Ibid. 250.
15

Standardization of the telephone exchange system was accomplished in Japan for the first time79.
After having achieved the domestication of the crossbar system, NTTpc and suppliers attempted todevelop the Electronic Switching System, which took over Matsumae’s idea and utilized an integrated
circuit instead of an electronic tube. NTTpc and NEC, OKI, HITACHI, and FUJITSU established acommittee for joint research again from 1964. The Bell Laboratories had already developed this system in
1963; however, Japanese engineers created some independent technologies.80
NTTpc and four companies established a joint research system, and they formed theso-called “DEN-DEN Family” in which NTTpc nominated only these companies as a supplier.
It is pointed out that such a research system was formed during the postwar high-growthera.81 However, as discussed in the third section, MOC cooperated with FUJITSU and NEC in thedevelopment of the T-type ATS and Electronic Tube-type ATS. In addition, the Automatic Telephone
System Standardizing Committee established in 1942 was the first joint research in which all suppliers
participated; they exchanged their research results with each other.
Before the end of the war, the telecommunication industry was unable to solve problems such as
wrong connections and disconnection of the line. However, the engineers in telecommunication industry
recognized their technological backwardness and shared an awareness of the importance of standardization
by independent technology. This was the starting point for the research and development system of thetelecommunication industry in “Postwar Japan.”

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19

Table1: The Costs of Telephone Exchange Service (Trial Calculation by Morisaburo Tonegawa in 1914)
The Numberof Subscribers
10,000
2,000
500
300
200
100

Foundation Cost
ManualAutomatic
2,409,651
2,817,001
124,362
258,552
20,67665,928
11,713
41,791
7,440
29,577
4,154
15,347

Running Cost
ManualAutomatic
344,366
367,431
23,21935,553
6,222
9,426
3,275
5,953
2,242
4,184
1,242
2,222

（Yen、％）
Total
Manual(A)Automatic(B)2,754,017
3,184,432
147,581294,105
26,89875,354
14,98847,744
9,682
33,761
5,396
17,569

A÷B
86
50
36
31
29
31

Source:Tonegawa (1914: 65-149)

Table2: Number of Established Automatic Telephone Exchange Office and ATS supplier (1926-1939)
Supplier
ATM
AEI
SH
SB
NEC
OKI
TOA
FUJI
Total

1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 Total
5
1
6
4
4
2
4
14
2
5
2
1
1
11
1
1
1
4
1
4
7
1
4
3
4
1
30
1
4
3
1
3
2
2
1
17
1
3
2
2
1
9
1
3
4
3
2
1
14
7
5
9
5
6
4
1
8
12
6
15
10
10
4
102

Note: Limited to the mainland Japan.
Sources : Ministry of Communication (1940: 340-342); Nippon Electric Company Editorial Committee (NEC) (eds.) (1972:
126,174); Oki Electric Industry Co. (1981)

Table３：Ratio of the completed telephone call without disconnection

1927
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

Automatic
72.2

75.1
76.0
74.9
72.8
67.9
66.3
61.8

（％）
Manual
67.6
78.3
78.2
77.0
77.5
78.1
76.4
76.4
75.4
74.1
71.5

Sources: NTTpc (1953 Vol.3: 106,113,192,194)20