助成Institute forInternational Policy Studies
・Tokyo・IIPS International Conference“The IT Revolution and Security Challenges”
TokyoDecember 10-11, 2002

“Changes and Challenges
in the Cyber-Terrorism Environment”
byRaisuke Miyawaki
Former Adviser
to the Prime Minister for Public Affairs

Changes and Challenges in the Cyber-Terrorism Environment
Raisuke Miyawaki
10 December 2002

There is presently great upheaval surrounding cyber-terrorism, which is seemingly on theverge of entering a new stage of development.
During the year 2001, three highly symbolic events took place that involved hackers andvirus writers. In addition, there is a noticeable trend towards collaboration between terroristgroups, nations that realize the military value of cyber-attacks, and politically motivatedhacker groups.
The first of these three events took place on 21 May 2001, when the Attrition website,which mirrors website defacement activities, was closed. This site was a forum where
hackers could boast about the websites that they had defaced. Attrition’s owner Brian Martin
noted that: “we were receiving more traffic in one day than we had in the first two years ofoperation. We couldn’t process it all.” In fact, defacing websites has now become so
commonplace that it is hardly worth bragging about anymore.
The second event was the crash of the CERT Coordination Center site at Carnegie Mellon
University, which was taken down by a DDoS attack. The CERT group represents theforemost authority on hacker attacks, and the ease with which their site was crippled
illustrates just how powerful such attacks have become.
The third event was the appearance of powerful and highly virulent worms and viruses,
such as Sircom, Code Red, and Nimda.
In addition, concern has increased over the activities of cyber-rogue nations and terroristgroups with a high interest in cyber-activities, who are actively targeting important
infrastructure in the US and Japan. After the attacks of 9/11, Chinese president Jiang Zeminlauded the foresight of the two senior air force colonels from the Chinese People's Liberation
Army who authored Unrestricted Warfare, a paper predicting the future of war and “anythinggoes” attacks, including cyber-terrorism. Patriotic Chinese hacker groups, such as the Hacker
Union of China and the China Eagle Union, have mounted concentrated attacks as a form ofprotest, for example against the content of Japanese textbooks and the emergency landing ofa US spy plane on Hainan Island.
During the Kosovo conflict, a global consortium of volunteer hackers mounted a cyberattack against government institutions in the US and the UK, the two countries that took thelead in NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia. This heralded the arrival of politically motivatedcyber-NGOs or “hacktivists,” and such groups are becoming even more politically active in
the arena of anti-globalization protest. It would be a natural development if these movements
developed links with terrorist groups that were targeting the US and other developed nations.
Hence, on the brink of this new era of cyber-terrorism, we are confronted with thefollowing: an advanced, sophisticated level of technology for hacking and virus creation (onethat has become commonplace); certain countries that have become cyber-rogue or cyberterrorist nations; patriotic hacker groups and cyber-NGOs who are ready to team up withthese nations; and various other potential cyber-terrorists who are ripe for recruitment. In1

other words, the pranksters have grown up and now represent a more politicized and more
professional threat with which we must contend.
What we must be mindful of is the fact that the objective of the individuals and nations
who are engaging in cyber-terrorism is not terrorism itself, but rather to strike at enemy
nations by paralyzing their critical infrastructure and inspiring fear in their citizens. In otherwords, unless cyber-terrorism is properly regarded as a means of attacking important
infrastructure, the countermeasures that are developed may prove ineffective.
From this perspective, I would like to emphasize three facets of international cooperationin the struggle against cyber-terrorism, and discuss how they relate to Japan.
The first of these is the personal ability of those in the leadership strata in those countries
that are cooperating internationally. In particular, Japan’s leadership stratum (that is, those inleadership roles in politics, business, and the media) suffers from a lack of leadership brought
about by an inability to properly understand the IT revolution and the lack of a national
security perspective.
On 31 March 2001, six websites—including those of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
headquarters and the Sankei Shimbun—were attacked five times over the course of the day,in what warnings which had appeared several days earlier on a Korean government website
termed a “cyber-demonstration.” The LDP site was shut down completely, and the Sankei
Shimbun experienced interruptions to some of its operations. Yet, other than a few minor
references in the Sankei Shimbun and other newspapers, there was no widespreadacknowledgement of the fact that Korean hackers had brought down the website of the LDP
headquarters—the official site for LDP members of the Diet. In contrast, reports of—andopinions on—the attack and the damage that it had caused were circulated widely on theInternet. Thus, it appears that if one were to rely solely on the traditional news media, one
might well remain uninformed about this kind of critically important event.
In contrast to China’s leadership stratum, which is comprised predominantly of individuals
with a background in the hard sciences, Japan’s leadership stratum—including its leaders in
the manufacturing industry—consists predominantly of people with a background in thesocial sciences; this has been the case for many years. After the Meiji Restoration, efforts
were made to foster potential leaders who had a background in law with a view to building amodern nation. The effects of those efforts are still with us today. The resulting absence ofscientific and technological savvy renders cyberspace and the like an invisible hazard, and—worst of all—engenders a kind of rejection. In the business sector, the non-technical ownertends to leave everything in the hands of his technically oriented executives; withincompanies, responsibility is further delegated to network specialists.
In addition, Japan’s leadership stratum lacks a national security perspective. This is thelegacy of Japan’s total reliance on the US in military and intelligence matters during the Cold
War era. Japan’s peculiar linguistic environment reflects this by regarding the terms“military” and “intelligence” as taboo. Military and intelligence activities hinge on cuttingedge science and technology; hence, the clueless leadership stratum falls behind in the ITrevolution and has a hard time understanding cyber-terrorism.
What will be the result? There is an obvious gap between Japanese and US
countermeasures for cyber-terrorism.
First of all, both countries approach the problem from different angles—the US from theperspective of national security, and Japan from the perspective of technology. Thus, at thecore of investigations, research, and countermeasures in the US are to be found ex-2

intelligence agents, ex-military personnel, and specialists on organized crime and terrorism;in Japan, however, one finds network specialists, and cryptographers are made to run theshow. The difference can also be seen in the policies themselves—the US is focusing closelyon critical infrastructure, while Japan’s “security policy” is little more than a manual oftechnological solutions for businesses. This policy talks of viruses and Trojan horses but
never leaves the technological plane and never broaches the key questions: “which targets
will be attacked by whom, using which methods, and for what purpose?”
Before we talk of “international cooperation,” we must first address the questions
surrounding the ability of those in the leadership stratum to discuss international cooperation
on cyber-terrorism.
The second issue relates to the type of organization which is required for dealing withcyber-terrorism. This problem can be seen in all countries, not just in Japan. In most countries
cyber-terrorism constitutes a criminal act in violation of existing laws—that is, a cyber-crime.
However, cyber-terrorism might also represent one stage in a cyber-war and be based on thenational strategy of a state. Thus, it is vital that the threat of cyber-attacks—whether posed bycyber-crime, cyber-terrorism, or cyber-war—against critical infrastructure (as distinct fromon-going, more general crimes, such as Internet fraud or pornography) be addressed rapidlyand effectively.
Yet, in all countries law enforcement institutions’ levels of awareness, ways of assigningduties, and organizational methods remain largely unchanged, clearly indicating that theproblem is still regarded as one simply of criminality. The Council of Europe’s Convention
on Cyber-Crime was drafted with child pornography in mind, and the core concept ofinternational cooperation which it embodies amounts in practice to nothing more thanextradition. Even the final communiqué of the G7 Lyon Summit employed the term “hi-techcrime,” thereby endowing a criminal activity with a rather prestigious-sounding title—
somewhat surprising given that the context of the debate was law enforcement! The Japanesepolice too continue to use the term “hi-tech crime.”
Cyber-terrorism is a trans-national security issue. The US Department of Homeland
Security will doubtless be perceived as a powerful model. Japan’s cyber-terrorism policy—aninitiative of the prime minister—is on the right track, and, given its momentum, there is hopethat it will become a model for an organizational reshuffle and redistribution of authority thatcan enable a smooth transition to international cooperation.
The third and final point is the creation of an international scheme for deterring andcontrolling cyber-terrorism and cyber-war.
A cyber-war could start in tandem with conventional weapons as part of a conventional
war with a clear national strategy, but would be more likely to start in the form of cyberterrorism, with a concealed national strategy. Yet, before the hostilities began there would
probably be sufficiently thorough cyber-surveillance. However, if the proposal for aninternational scheme proceeds to the discussion stage, there are three prohibitions that willprobably be imposed. The first is “weaponization.” This should be prohibited as an act thatwould disrupt the grand new world order which has been constructed as a tool for
comfortable life and abundant prosperity. Thus, as acts of hostility, cyber-first strikes must bebanned; however, cyber-attack could be recognized as a legitimate form of counter-attack.
The second prohibition is “attacks on civilians,” just is in the conventional rules of war.
The other prohibition is the “support of volunteer hackers.” In the heat of international
friction over national interests, patriotic hackers will want to conduct cyber-attacks against3

government institutions, critical infrastructure, and public websites in the opposing country.
This is only natural; yet, these people are viewed under the existing world order as up-andcoming cyber-terrorists, and all countries must be obligated to put a stop to such activities. Acountry that failed to do so would be treated as a cyber-rogue or cyber-terrorist nation.
Countries that violate these three prohibitions would have appropriate sanctions imposedon them by an international organization, and this arrangement would constitute theframework of the scheme.
In contrast, there is a military need for a Cyber-Defense Alliance. The CDA would
function rather like NATO and would have two absolute requirements: a shared sense ofvalues (in other words, democracy); and an adherence to absolute secrecy. It is regrettablethat Japan does not meet this latter requirement for participation in a CDA.
In addition, it is extremely important that each country protect its critical infrastructure byproviding and sharing with other nations advanced and sophisticated methods and technology
for conducting cyber-attacks, tracking down the sources of such attacks, and defending
against them. It may be assumed that this is already occurring; however, nations that alreadypossess advanced technology should insist on confidentiality agreements that prevent othercountries from acquiring the technology. Yet, even though Japan is developing highly
advanced technology, the fact that this could be leaked without warning—even without any
action on the part of foreign intelligence agencies—renders Japan ineligible for participationin any international cooperative effort based on advanced technology. Politicians and therepresentatives of the media would do well to keep this in mind.

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