Asian and African Area Studies, 5 (1): 46-71, 2005

Regional Autonomy in Process: A Case Study in Bali 2001-2003
Kagami Haruya*

Abstract
The collapse of Suharto’s New Order regime led to vast socio-political changes inIndonesia, and the political slogan of “regional autonomy” became, and remains, one of
the most important keywords characterizing the post-Suharto era.
This paper analyzes some provisional results of the ongoing decentralization policiesof the domestic government system and the accompanying changes at the provincial, district and village levels. The first section summarizes the structural and financial changes
in provincial and district government which took place in the first year of the enforcementof the two laws formulated under the new regional autonomy plan, presenting and analyzing data from the Bali provincial office and the Gianyar district office. The second section
presents a comparison of the national and district regulations (of Gianyar in Bali and of
Agam in West Sumatra) on the new village government system, and discusses the expected
progress in village level democracy. The third section focuses on the Balinese traditional
village system, which needs to be restructured in accordance with the newly establishedvillage government. The final section discusses the ongoing process of democratization of
traditional village administration in the broader context of modernization.

Introduction
Regional autonomy (otonomi daerah) is without doubt one of the most important keywords
characterizing the political scene in post-Suharto Indonesia.1) The term captures the liberal andanti-authoritarian atmosphere of the period, and has won the acclaim of the people demanding andyearning for a reform, or even dismantling, of the highly centralized government system of Suharto’s
New Order regime. If the word “reformation” (reformasi) was and still is the most popular
political slogan in this transitional period, “regional autonomy” continues to indicate the desirable
direction for the political reform.
The term “regional autonomy” in this context covers a wide range of current topics. Because
it relates to the national governmental structure, it was often referred to and advocated in the* ᫦٢໠ϓ㧘Faculty of Letters & Graduate School of Letters, Kanazawa University
Accepted July 11, 2005
1) There have already been many academic publications on this subject. Schulte Nordholt has surveyed this trend
and has briefly commented on some of them [Schulte Nordholt 2003a].

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Kagami: Regional Autonomy in Process

debates concerning federalism that flourished in the President Habibie era. These debates ended ina moderate consensus among political leaders that a unitary government had to be maintained while
the extent of regional autonomy needed to be broadened.
The increase of regional autonomy was first given concrete shape in the form of two newlaws concerning the decentralization of the domestic government system. Law No. 22 1999 on
the devolution of governmental authority, and Law No. 25 1999 on fiscal decentralization, wereboth enacted in 1999, and have been in force since 2001. These new laws obviously reflected
the political climate of the period and have served as cornerstones for the subsequent policies on
domestic governance.
Along with this structural change of the domestic government system, a portion of the central
government staff was transferred to provincial or district (kabupaten) governments. Most of thetransferred staff had been working at provincial or district branches of state ministries, so one might
conclude that the policy merely led to an administrative change in the affiliation of the transferredworkers. Nevertheless, it created a significant structural change in regional government, especiallyat the district level.
While the reform of the fiscal system and the transfer of some national government staff toregional governments were enforced in 2001, the implementation of some policies prescribed in the
newly enacted laws was delayed because the laws had to be supplemented in detail by a series of government regulations (peraturan pemerintah), which themselves took considerable time to prepare.
This was the case for the renewal of the village government system, which was only briefly outlinedin Law No. 22. The related articles in the law can be read as an official recognition of traditional
local institutions as alternative governing bodies in the newly planned village governments. This,
however, was a highly sensitive issue, as the legal status of these local customary institutions had
been neglected in the entire period since the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. Government regulations prescribing the new village government structure were not enacted until 2001. As
a result, some district governments delayed the preparation of district regulations, waiting for theenactment of government regulations, while others quickly enacted regulations without making
reference to the prescriptions of the national regulations which had not yet been formulated.
Thus, the three years from 2001 to 2003, the period of my research on this subject, constituted the very beginning and trial stage for the realization of the regional autonomy plan in the
post-Suharto era. The way had already been paved by the two laws, and some policies had been
enforced, but some others were yet to be fully operative. During my three research visits to Bali
between 2001 and 2003, I collected data from several sections of the Bali provincial government
47

Asian and African Area Studies, 5 (1)office and Gianyar district government office, as well as from some village government offices inthe district of Gianyar. In addition, in 2002 I made a short visit to West Sumatra province to collectdata concerning the policies on the new village government system, hoping to compare themwith the Balinese data. Throughout this research period, I made frequent visits to several villages
including one where I had once stayed for a year conducting anthropological field research, andobtained various information and opinions on the current policies on regional autonomy throughconversations with the villagers.
This paper analyzes some provisional results of the ongoing decentralization policies of thedomestic government system and the accompanying changes at the provincial, district and village
levels. The first section summarizes the structural and financial changes in provincial and district
government which took place in the first year of the enforcement of the two laws of the new regional
autonomy plan by presenting and analyzing the data from the Bali provincial office and the Gianyar
district office.
The second section presents a comparison between the national regulation and district regulations (of Gianyar in Bali and Agam in West Sumatra) governing the new village government system,and discusses the expected progress in village level democracy.
The third section focuses on the Balinese traditional village system, which had to be
restructured in accordance with the newly established village governments. In this era of Regional
Autonomy, the centuries-old traditional village system is highly valued by the Balinese people themselves, who see it as the fundamental base of their culture, and it is hoped to play a supplementary
yet indispensable role in village administration. Under this pressure the structure and function of
the traditional local village system also needs to be reformed.
Thus, at least in Bali, regional autonomy policies following the two newly enacted laws havebrought about fundamental changes in the administrative, budgetary and social system at theprovincial, district and village levels.
The final section discusses the significance of these political reforms for local people in termsof “democratization,” “modernization,” and “civil society.” Decentralization policies and village
government system reforms obviously highlight an important part of the vast and rapid ongoingsocial changes in Indonesia. The influences of these reforms are far-reaching and fundamental
because they not only follow the political urge of the current Reformation Era, but also concern
some principal matters of the nation-state: the imagined unity of an uneven populace and regions,
integration and distribution of power, and the domestication of indigenous social systems into amodern bureaucracy.
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Kagami: Regional Autonomy in Process

1. Regional Government Reform
In view of the explosion of antagonistic sentiments towards the highly centralized statesystem of Suharto’s New Order, decentralization clearly became an urgent political task. President
Habibie’s government quickly prepared two basic laws on decentralization, and set their enforcement for 2001. The change in regional politics and governance system thus came decisively andrather abruptly.
The main issues of the reform were the restructuring of the relationship between the regional
chief and assembly, establishment of autonomous government bodies at the district level, and thechange of the state subsidy system to regional governments.2)
Politically the most drastic change brought about by Law No. 22 concerned the power relationship between the regional chief and assembly. The law gave regional assemblies full authority toelect regional chiefs and to request their dismissal to the Minister of Home Affairs. The balanceof power between regional chiefs and assemblies thus came to parallel that between the president
and the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) at the center.
Another aim of this arrangement was to prevent the central government’s intervention into regional
politics, which had been a dominant feature of the regional political scene in the New Order Era.
While these prescriptions gave decisive power to the regional assemblies, the chiefs were notgiven the right to dissolve the assemblies. This condition placed regional chiefs in a quite vulnerable position, as they became subject to the will of the dominant political parties in their regional
assembly. These national political parties still have a highly centralized structure. Consequently,
the central political leaders still have a strong voice in regional political matters and have preserved
channels of access to regional economic resources through party organizations.
Since the enforcement of Law No. 22, some regional assemblies have asked for the dismissal ofregional chiefs nominated during the Suharto Era, but in many cases these requests have not been
accepted, for various reasons. Meanwhile, in some recent elections for regional chiefs, candidates
nominated by the regional branch of the dominant party have been rejected by the central bodyof the party, with candidates favored by the center being appointed as the sole candidates of theparty. The recent election of the governor of Bali province in 2002 was such a case. This shows that

2) The state of the Republic of Indonesia is administratively divided into provinces (propinsi), which are
sub-divided into districts (kabupaten) and municipalities (kotamadia). These districts and municipalities arefurther sub-divided into sub-districts (kecamatan), which supervise villages (desa) and wards (kelurahan) within
them.

49

Asian and African Area Studies, 5 (1)regional politics are still controlled by the center to a considerable degree. Under these conditions, it
is understandable that money politics have become prevalent in many regions.
The impact of the new law governing administrative affairs, at least in Bali, was not very
drastic, because Bali had been chosen as one of the model provinces in the pilot project of theadministrative decentralization (Proyek Percontohan Otonomi Daerah pada Daerah Tingkat II)
implemented in the 1990s, and the establishment and operation of regional government agencies(dinas) at both the provincial and district levels had already been partly realized at the time of theenforcement of the new law.3) This does not mean, however, that there were no structural changes in
the regional government body. The Bali provincial government did not set up any new agencies, but
the secretariat, composed of four sections, was restructured into three in 2001.4) The Gianyar district government set up five new agencies, and the three sections of the secretariat were reorganized
into two in the same year.5)
A more troublesome issue was the transfer of a considerable number of central government staff
to provincial and district governments, enforced in the same year. Most of the transferred employees had worked at regional branches of state ministries or were school teachers and administrators.
Table 1 shows the increase of government personnel in the Gianyar district between 2000 and 2001.
The total number of staff increased by more than 50%. While the transfer of the schoolteachers
and administrators was only a change of status, most of those who had worked at the state ministrybranches were absorbed into newly set up district agencies. At the provincial level, the transferred
ministry staff members were posted in the existing provincial secretariat and agencies. Thesetransfers caused not only a structural change of the regional government body but also resulted instrong competition for high-ranking positions because of the decrease of secretariat sections.
The most remarkable result of the regional government reform was in the financial domain.
Law No. 25 prescribed a new tax distribution system and state subsidy system for regional governments. In the first area, it increased the share of tax revenue going to regional governments, while in

3) The aim of the pilot project of administrative decentralization was realize the establishment of autonomous
regional government as prescribed in the former Law No. 5 1974 on the basic principles of regional governance.
The aim of the plan, however, was not to give more independence to regional governments but rather to build asolid and effective administrative unit at the regional level under the control of the center.
4) The former secretariat, composed of governance, development, social welfare and administration sections was
restructured into a new one composed of governance, development and social welfare, and administration
sections.
5) The newly established agencies were information and communication, social welfare, residential affairs,
corporation, and industry and commerce agencies. The former secretariat composed of governance, development
and administration sections was restructured into a new one composed of governance and development sections.

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Kagami: Regional Autonomy in Process

Table 1. Increase of Government Personnel in Gianyar District
2000
District secretariat
District agencies (12)District units (Bappeda, DPRD, etc.)
Subdistrict offices
Ward offices
Public health offices
Primary school teachers
Religion teachers
Sports teachers
Primary school guards

198
588
390
144
26
375
2146
385
201
145

Total

4598

added in 2001
District agencies
Kindergarten teachers
Junior high school teachers
Senior high school teachers
Administration staff of JHS
Administration staff of SHS
School inspectors

503
83
1008
674
208
176
9

Sub-total

2661

Source: Gianyar district office and Gianyar district agency of education

the latter it rearranged the various state subsidies to regional governments and integrated them into
two kinds: freely used general funds (Dana Alokasi Umum, DAU) and use-specified special funds(Dana Alokasi Khusus, DAK). Furthermore, the new domestic government policy, which places
importance on district level autonomy, caused financial flows from the central government to the
district governments to rise above those to the provincial governments.
Tables 2 and 3 show the Bali provincial government budget and Gianyar district government
budget in 2000 and 2001. Since the new fiscal year system (January-December), which replaced
the old one (April-March), was adopted in 2001, the figures for 2000 in these tables cover only athree-quarter period. Even considering this, the change in the regional government budget wasconspicuous.
With the exception of the balance from the previous year, the receipts of the Bali provincial
government show a slight increase, but in reality there was a substantial decrease in both theprovince’s own receipts and the state subsidies if we take into account the different length of these
periods. 6) The new tax distribution system, which may have contributed to the increase in theprovince’s own receipts in regions with rich natural resources, brought no benefits to resource-poor

6) Jayasuriya and I Ketut Nehen [1991: 335] cited the Bali provincial budget 1971/2 and 1984/5. If we compare
these figures with those in Table 2 above, we notice the following financial changes at the provincial level during
these thirty years: (1) In 2000, the province’s own receipts increased enormously to the extent that they exceeded
the subsidies from the central government; (2) The development funds also increased, coming to exceed theroutine funds in the 2000 receipts; (3) The expenditures for personnel and materials increased only slightly from1984/5 to 2000; (4) While the expenditures for economic development have risen sharply since 1971/2, those forsocial development continued to decrease in proportion during the same period.

51

Asian and African Area Studies, 5 (1)Table 2. Bali Provincial Budget, 2000 and 2001 (Rp. million)[Receipts]
Balance from previous year
Province’s own receipts
Subsidies from central government
Tax distribution
Routine funds
Development funds
Others2000
100,261
237,915
102,550
12,17830,69957,982
1,691

2001
171,123
268,875
103,105
10,135(DAU) 91,170

Total receipts[Expenditure]

440,726
2000

543,103
2001

RoutinePersonnel
Materials
Subsidies for districts
OthersDevelopment
Economic
SocialGeneralSubsidies for districts

131,371
30,77015,65355,371
29,577
120,600
42,321
26,31031,841
20,128354,349
110,100
20,599160,926
62,724
193,506
85,42645,61548,471
13,994

Total expenditure

251,971

547,855

1,800

Source: Bali provincial office
Table 3. Gianyar District Budget, 2000 and 2001(Rp. million)[Receipts]
Balance from previous year
Province’s own receipts
Subsidies from central government
Tax distribution
Routine funds
Development funds
Others2000
6,024
25,14592,714
4,376
38,18946,252
3,897

2001
10,021
38,519233,981
8,529(DAU) 182,460(DAK) 42,992
0

Total receipts[Expenditure]

123,883
2000

282,521
2001

RoutinePersonnel
Materials
Subsidies for sub-districts/villages
OthersDevelopment
Economic
SocialGeneral62,244
41,837
10,497
5,487
4,423
65,264
48,594
5,357
11,313142,090
99,288
10,78912,896
19,117
153,788
116,063
15,84921,876

Total expenditure

127,508

295,878

Source: Gianyar district office52

Kagami: Regional Autonomy in Processprovinces such as Bali. The amount of newly invested general funds (DAU) roughly corresponded tothe total amount of routine funds and development funds of the previous year, while the provincial
government did not receive any special funds (DAK) from the central government.
The expenditures of the Bali provincial government nearly doubled between 2000 and 2001,
due mainly to a swelling of routine expenditures, especially personnel costs and of subsidies for
districts. The rise in personnel expenditures can be partly explained by the increase in provincial
government employees caused by the transfer of state staff. The expansion of subsidies for districts
includes a bigger share of the motor vehicle tax and the re-distribution of a part (30% in 2001) of
hotel and restaurant taxes collected in the Badung district and Denpasar city to other districts in
Bali.7)The budget of Gianyar district shows a much bigger change between 2000 and 2001. Bothreceipts and expenditures grew by more than 100% from 2000 to 2001, even adjusting for thedifference in the length of these fiscal years.
The main contribution to the swelling of receipts came from the enormous increase in statesubsidies. The freely used general funds (DAU) alone came to almost twice the total amount ofroutine funds and development funds of the previous year. In addition, the district government
received use-specified special funds (DAK), which covered nearly three-quarters of the development
funds of the previous year.
The extra receipts were used for both routine and development expenditures. Among them,routine expenditures for personnel, subsidies for sub-districts and villages, and expenditures for
economic, social and general development almost doubled, and in some cases more than doubled.
The increased expenditures for personnel included those for the newly transferred staff. Mostof the subsidies for sub-districts and village governments were staff salaries. The increase in thedevelopment expenditures shows a direct effect from the new domestic policy, which put priority on
autonomous management at the district level.
Looking at village government budgets, we find that the level of government finance was very
low. Table 4 shows the Bona village government budget in 2001, 2002 and 2003. As data on the2000 budget could not be obtained, we cannot trace budgetary changes from the beginning of the
new autonomy policy. Nevertheless, the figures in the table show the current financial conditions ofvillage governments in Gianyar district, Bali.

7) The redistribution of hotel and restaurant tax revenues among the districts is a policy for averaging out thebenefits of tourism within the province, and has been carried out by Bali province since 1998.

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Asian and African Area Studies, 5 (1)Table 4. Bona Village Budget, 2001, 2002 and 2003

(Rp. thousands)[Receipts]
Administration fees
Interest
Subsidies from central government
Personnel
Development
Subsidies from provincial government
Personnel
Tax distribution
Subsidies from district government
Personnel
Tax distribution
Donation

2001
1,162
1,200
11,920
1,920
10,00014,767
13,557
1,210
16,856
9,423
7,433
1,545

2002
1,421
2,143
11,920
1,920
10,00030,46325,167
5,296
35,722
24,573
11,149
1,984

2003
1,907
1,977
11,920
1,920
10,00025,50025,167332
41,42735,8535,575
2,091

Total receipts[Expenditure]
RoutinePersonnel
Materials
Equipments
Travel expenses
Activities
Subsidies for villagers’ activities
Development
Infusion to village economic assets
Renovation of village head officeArrangement of public health center
Others47,450
2001
38,554
25,110
4,120
4,664
650
3,610
400
9,002
1,200
5,659
1,500
643

83,653
2002
72,614
51,660
2,354
6,700
850
5,450
5,600
11,039
1,393
9,646
0
0

84,822
2003
80,332
63,660
1,450
7,800
550
5,750
1,122
4,490
1,227
3,263
0
0

Total expenditure

47,556

83,65384,822

Source: Bona village head officeMore than 90% of the receipts in the village came from state and regional government
subsidies. While the amount of state subsidies remained unchanged during the three years, thosefrom both the provincial and district government doubled from 2001 to 2002. This, however, wasmainly due to the increase in village government staff salaries. The only source of revenues for thismedium-sized (781 households in 2001) farm village was administration fees, which accounted forless than 3% of the total receipts.
As indicated by the composition of the subsidies, the bulk of routine expenditures was for staff
salaries. A relatively large portion of the expenditures for equipment, such as desks by the routine
section, and for renovations of the village head office by the development section, can be explainedby the recent establishment of this administrative village, which seceded from the village of Belega in54

Kagami: Regional Autonomy in Process

1999. The actual development expenditure is an annual deposit into village funds, and accounts forjust a few percent of total expenditures. These figures demonstrate that while the economic conditions of village government staff have improved moderately thanks to financial support from therelatively rich provincial and district governments, village development is still limited to providing
public needs.8)

2. The New Village Government System
The reform of the administrative village government system was another controversial part of
the new regional autonomy policy. Under Law No. 5 1979 on village governance, enacted under theSuharto regime, village government was a highly centralized system within which the village head
held monopolistic power. Village governments were composed of an executive body, consisting of avillage head and administration staff, and a village deliberation council (lembaga musyawarah desa,
LMD), but the latter was headed by the village chief and was supposed to play a purely consultativerole in village governance. Later it was supplemented by another administrative body called the
LKMD (lembaga ketahanan masyarakat desa or village society’s maintenance council), which
was also headed by the village chief and was established to support village development planning.
This centralized structure was suited to (and was planned exactly as such) the top-down style ofSuharto’s regime. It functioned effectively in spreading his development programs at the grassroots
level throughout the country. After the fall of the regime, however, the centralized structure itself
became a target of criticism by “reformist” politicians.
Another point of debate in the revision of village governance was the uniformly imposed
village administrative system under the former law. Before the enactment of Law No. 5 1979, eachregion in the country had its own local administrative units based on local customs and tradition, as
rearranged under Dutch colonial rule. The model system and names of functional bodies prescribedin Law No. 5 1979 were taken from Central and East Java, and thus were fundamentally different interms of name, structure and composition of the village administrative unit from those in the outerislands. As the New Order government imposed a Javanese style of village government in all regionsof the country, the policy created serious confusion, especially in some regions.9) The establishment

8) In 2003, the monthly salary of a village head in the Gianyar district amounted to 650,000 (approximately
US$80 at the time) rupiah and that of village secretary to 575,000 rupiah. This amount is still low incomparison with that of other government workers, but higher than the average earnings of a non-skilledlaborer.
9) On the negative impact of the implementation of Law No. 5 1979, see for example Kato [1989].

55

Asian and African Area Studies, 5 (1)of effective village government bodies in a way that fit customary local village organizations was anurgent requirement of the Reformation Era.
The speedily enacted Law No. 22 1999 includes only a brief outline of village governance, anddoes not touch upon the key points of reform as noted above. Under it, village government consistsof an executive body (a village head and administration staff) and a village representative council(badan perwakilan desa, BPD), replacing the former LMD and LKMD (Article 94). While theword desa is used as the official term for administrative village, the name of the village head canvary according to local tradition (Article 95(1)). The village head is elected by the villagers as in theprevious era (Article 95(2)), but the term of office is shortened from 8 to 5 years (Article 96). The
required qualifications for village head are nearly the same as in the former Law No. 5 1979, exceptthat the new law prescribes a minimum age of 25 for a village head (Article 97) while the old law
stipulated an age between 25 and 60 years.
The crucial change in the position of the village head is that while the former law located theposition within the regional government official rank system and made the village head responsible
to the district head, the new law requires that the elected village head be appointed by the BPD andonly be confirmed by the district head (Article 95(3)), and makes the village head responsible to thevillage residents (Article 102a). Furthermore, the new law includes the possibility of dismissing thevillage head, not only by the district head who appoints him or her officially, but also by the BPD via
a proposal to the district head (Article 103(2)). This change of power balance between the village
head and the village council obviously reflects the antagonistic mood of the early Reformation Era
toward the centralized New Order regime.
Another important point regarding the new village government plan is the establishment of thevillage representative council (BPD) as a fully autonomous legislative body. The council’s functions
are to protect local customs, issue village regulations, represent villagers’ aspirations and supervise
the village executive body’s activities (Article 104). To realize these tasks, the council is separated
from the executive body consisting of the village head and administration staff. Law No. 22 does
not offer any further prescriptions, but leaves it up to the district government to determine thedetailed regulations (Article 111(1)).
To supplement the general plan of the new village governments, outlined in Law No. 22, Minister of Home Affairs Decision No. 64 1999 on the guidelines for village government regulations wasannounced in the same year. This decision offers more concrete and detailed stipulations for thedesirable form of village government. The size of a village is stipulated as more than 1,500 residents
or 300 households (Article 6b). The setting up of village subunits can be freely decided by regional
56

Kagami: Regional Autonomy in Process

governments in accordance with local tradition (Article 4(1)). With regard to the possible dismissalof the village head by the village council (BPD), the Decision specifies that if the council twice rejects
the head’s annual report of activities it can propose his or her dismissal to the district head (Article
19(2)). The village head and administration staff cannot be members of the village council (Article41). Village regulations, prepared by the village council and enacted by the village head, need not
be confirmed by the district head (Article 50(2)), and the district government can cancel them only
if they are in conflict with the public interest or national laws (Article 70(1)). These instructions
clearly reflect the spirit of the government reform and the effort to establish autonomous village
governments adapted to each local situation.
Under these circumstances, provincial and district governments started to prepare regional
regulations of their own. As a general legal procedure, a national law is supplemented by government regulations before its implementation. In this case, however, the enactment of the related
government regulations was delayed until November 2001. Some provincial governments quickly
responded to the promulgation of the law, enacting regional regulations on new village governments
in advance of the government regulations.
This was the case in West Sumatra province. The province is the heartland of the
Minangkabau people, who traditionally used the nagari system as their local political and economic unit. The nagari corresponds roughly to a Javanese village in size but has its own traditional
structure and composition. It was used as the smallest governmental unit in the province from theDutch colonial period until the implementation of Law No. 5 1979 by the New Order government[Mohammad Hasbi et al. 1990].
When the new uniform village government system, as prescribed in Law No. 5, was implemented in the province in 1983, the provincial government did not choose nagari but rather its subdivision (called jorong and other terms) as the “village” (desa) unit. Some say that this was intended
to maximize national government subsidies to the region. The subdivision of nagari, however, wasneither autonomous nor functional in the area of local affairs, and did not work adequately as aneffective village government body through this period.10)
This unsuccessful trial of an “enforced” national village government system under the Suharto
regime perhaps explains the quick response of the province to the newly enacted Law No. 22 1999.11)
The provincial government adopted the slogan, “Return to the 543 nagari,” meaning that the New
10) See, for example, some articles in the local journal Genta Budaya No. 3, especially those by Andrinof and Edy
Utama [1996], Emeraldy [1996].
11) The early phase of West Sumatran responses to the regional autonomy policy is briefly sketched by Ismet [2003].

57

Asian and African Area Studies, 5 (1)Order’s Javanized village governments would be replaced again by the indigenous nagari of which
543 units existed at the time of the enforcement of the New Order village system. Soon afterward,
the provincial government issued West Sumatra Provincial Regulation No. 9 2000, giving general
stipulations for the nagari government. The Regulation does not use the word desa at all, adopting
instead the word nagari. In addition, the village head is called wali nagari and the village council
badan perwakilan anak nagari. The use of these local terms, together with the references to thecustomary and Islamic council (badan musyawarah adat dan syarak nagari) and customary law
organization (lembaga adat nagari), obviously demonstrate the eager aspiration to restore thetraditional local government system. It was decided that this Regulation would be applied to theentire region, with the exception of town areas and the Mentawai Islands.
District governments then followed the provincial decision, preparing district regulations of
their own. Agam District Regulation No. 31 2001 on nagari government is one such regulation.
The new village government, as outlined in the regulation, mostly follows the provincial government’s plan and the above-mentioned Minister of Home Affairs Decision No. 64 1999 (the comparison between the Agam regulation and the Minister of Home Affairs Decision is summarizedin Table 5). A village is called nagari and its subdivision jorong. The size of a village is set at morethan 1,500 residents or 300 households. The village head, called wali nagari, should be more than
25 years old, have at least a junior high school education, and should be elected by the residents.
The term of office is five years, and reappointment is allowed only once. The head is responsible
to village residents and can be dismissed by a proposal of the village council to the district head.
Members of the administration staff should be between 20 and 60 years of age, have at least a juniorhigh school education and be selected from among applicants by the village head. Village subdivision heads are elected by the residents and have a five-year term of office. They compose the village
executive body and cannot be members of the village council.
The village council is called badan perwakilan anak nagari (nagari people’s representative
council). The members should be more than 25 years old and have at least a junior high school
education. The term of office is five years. The members may be elected or appointed. In the latter
case, they should be nominated from among the various traditional officials or functional groups
such as ninik mamak (lineage seniors), alim ulama (religious teachers), cadiak pandai (learned men),bundo kanduang (senior women) and village youth.
The customary and Islamic council (majelis musyawarah adat dan syara’ nagari) supervises
customary and Islamic affairs, and the members are lineage seniors, religious teachers, learned men,senior women and representatives of other social groups. The customary council (kerapatan adat
58

Table 5. Comparison of Village Government Systems
Law No. 5/1979

Law No. 22/1999

M. of Home Affairs Gov. Regulation
Decision No. 64/1999 No. 76/2001

Agam district
regulation
No. 31/2001

Gianyar district
regulations
No. 6-17/2002
Desa

59

Desa

Desa

Desa

Desa

Nagari

Subdivision

Dusun

free

free

free

JorongBanjar Dinas

Village head

Kepala Desa

freely named

Kepala Desa

freely named

Wali Nagari

Perbekel

8 years office

5 years office

5 years office

5 years office

5 years office

5 years office25-60 years oldover 25 years oldover 25 years oldover 25 years oldover 25 years old
muslim25-60 years old

responsible to district
head

responsible to village
residents

responsible to village
residents

responsible to village
residents

responsible to village
residents

responsible to village
residents

dismissal by districthead

dismissal by district
head based on village
council proposal

dismissal by district
dismissal by district
head based on village head based on village
council proposal after council proposal
rejecting the annual
report twice

dismissal by district
head based on village
council proposal

dismissal by district
head based on village
council proposal after
rejecting the annual
report twice

Sekretariat Desa

Perangkat Desa

Perangkat Desa

Perangkat Desa

Perangkat Nagari

Perangkat Desa

Kepala Dusun

subdivision heads

subdivision heads

subdivision heads

Kepala Jorong

Kelihan Banjar Dinas

Lembaga Masyarakat Badan Perwakilan
Desa headed by village Desa
head

BPD

BPD

Badan Perwakilan
Rakyat Nagari

BPDmembers representing
customary/religious/
social/vocationalgroupsvillage head and staff village head and staff
not allowed to be
not allowed to bemembers; members
members; members
representing customary/ elected amongresidents
religious/social/vocational groups

Staff
Village council

Supplementary body LKMD

Village regulations

legalized by district
head

freely organizedcustomary/socialorganizations freelyorganized

social organizations
freely organizedvillage head and staff village head and staff
not allowed to be
not allowed to bemembers; members
members; members
representing customary/ elected among eachBanjar Dinas
religious/social/vocational groups
MMASN, KAN,
MUN

Desa Pakraman

need not be confirmed need not be confirmed need not be confirmed need not be confirmed
by district head but
by district headby district head but
by district head but
can be cancelled bycan be cancelled bycan be cancelled by
district government
district government
district government

Kagami: Regional Autonomy in Process

VillageAsian and African Area Studies, 5 (1)nagari), composed of lineage seniors and customary officials, arbitrates matters of inheritance. The
religious teachers council (majelis ulama nagari), consisting of religious teachers and experts in thevillage, rules on religious matters.
A rather extraordinary stipulation in the regulation states that the candidates for village headas well as for village council members must be Muslims. Although this may be suitable in the West
Sumatran social situation and its local tradition, it seems quite odd when considered in terms ofWestern democracy. This may be seen as one of the results of the hasty entrustment of governmental tasks to customary organizations.
The issue of the integration of the administrative and traditional villages also became a sourceof debate in Bali in the early stages of preparation for the new village government system. Unlike theWest Sumatran nagari, the Balinese traditional village is smaller than the average (Javanese model)
administrative village in size, and its organization is based on Hindu principles. Beginning withthe establishment of Dutch colonial rule at the beginning of the 20th century, a new administrative
village system was set up to govern the Balinese people, while the traditional village system was left
to function only in the religious domain [Warren 1993]. This double-village system continued after
independence, and the New Order government’s Law No. 5 1979 did not lead to any drastic changes
in village administration. This does not mean, however, that Balinese people were satisfied withthe double-village system. For them, the traditional village still offers communal norms and is thesocio-cultural field in which their daily activities take place. Thus, during the New Order period,
the provincial government made great efforts to revitalize customary organizations by legalizing theexistence of traditional villages under Bali Provincial Government Regulation No. 6 1986 [Kagami
2003].
With the coming of the Reformation Era and the enactment of Law No. 22 1999, there
were serious debates on the plan to reorganize the village government system among politicians,bureaucrats and opinion leaders. Some argued that administrative villages should be abolished andreplaced by traditional villages, while others feared that traditional villages would become politicized if placed within the regional government structure. The debates led the provincial government
to revise the regulations on traditional villages, making them more adapted to the modern situation,
but no consensus was reached that the double-village system should be integrated into traditional
villages.
Accordingly, the district governments in Bali began to draft district regulations on the newadministrative village governments. Since they waited for the enactment of government regulations,the procedure took more time than in West Sumatra. A series of Gianyar district government regu60

Kagami: Regional Autonomy in Process

lations concerning the new village government system, for example, was enacted as late as 2002.12)
The prescriptions of the Gianyar district regulations are very similar to the above-mentioned
Agam district regulations except for some points noted below (the Agam and Gianyar regulations
are compared in Table 5). Villages are still called desa and village heads perbekel, reviving the titlesof the colonial period. The age of village heads is limited to between 25 and 60 years old, as was
the case during the previous New Order period. Administration staff should be between 21 and 40
years old and have an education above senior high school. Village subdivisions are called banjar
dinas and their head (kelihan banjar) should be between 21 and 50 years old and be elected fromamong the banjar members. The village council is named badan perwakilan desa and its members
are representatives elected by each banjar. The age of the members is limited to between 25 and 60,
and village executives as well as all other public officials are not allowed to be members.
As the new administrative village structure is separated from the traditional village, there are
no prescriptions on the religion of the village head. This is also why the village council compositionis based on the village subdivision (banjar). As a result, this new village government system does notsubstantially differ from that in the former period, except for the independence of the village council
from the control of the village head and the resultant change in the balance of power between thevillage head and the village council as promoted by Law No. 22 1999.
Following the district regulations, the existing administrative villages in the Gianyar district
were automatically transformed into the new village government bodies. Former village heads
continued to hold their posts until the end of their term of office. So, too, did the administration
staff.
The main change was the replacement of the former village council (LMD) by the new one(BPD), with members being elected at all the villages of the district in the summer of 2003. Some
villages conducted an actual election following almost the same procedure as that used for thegeneral election. The election committees were composed of the former village council and banjar
heads, and the committees asked the residents of each banjar to nominate candidates. Polling places
were set up at each banjar meeting hall. On the day of polling, banjar residents came to the pollingplace, registered, received their ballots and voted. After the polling was closed, the polling box was

12) These are: Gianyar District Government Regulation No. 6 2002 on the election of village heads; No. 7 oncooperation among villages; No. 8 on village social organizations; No. 9 on village subdivisions; No. 10 on village
government; No. 11 on village finance; No. 12 on administration staff recruitment; No. 13 on the establishment,elimination and merger of villages; No. 14 on the village council; No. 15 on village resources; No. 16 on village
regulations; No. 17 on the rewards for village heads and administration staff.

61

Asian and African Area Studies, 5 (1)opened on the spot and the ballots were publicly counted by the committee members. I had theopportunity to observe such ballot counting in a village in Gianyar district; I was impressed by thehighly democratic and transparent procedure.
In some villages, however, the village council election was not so transparent. Some informantsfrom one such village told me that only one candidate had been nominated from each banjar, andthat the voting had been conducted through a meeting rather than through polling. They evensuspected that the nomination process had been manipulated by the village head. The elected
members were all young and highly educated men, but they had little experience in village affairs
and had scarcely shown any leadership at village meetings. The village head himself tried to justify
the lack of polling, saying that the shortage of village funds made it impossible. Though this sounds
fairly plausible considering the financial condition of villages, as discussed above, financial reasonscannot be used to allay doubts about the new village council’s legitimacy. Whether or not the newvillage government system proves to be trustworthy will depend on the newly established village
councils’ activities.
Two years after the enactment of Law No. 22, the central government announced theenactment of Government Regulation No. 76 2001, setting guidelines for the village government
regulations. While as a whole it confirms the guidelines drawn up by the Minister of Home Affairs
Decision No. 64 1999, it includes some minor differences.
The most important revision is the elimination of the article giving village councils the right topropose the dismissal of the village head to the district head if a council twice rejects the head’s annual report of activities. Although the right to petition for dismissal is retained, the revision clearly
exhibits a small retreat from the Minister’s Decision. In fact, many actual confrontations between
village heads and village councils have taken place since the enactment of Law No. 22 and theMinister of Home Affairs Decision No. 64. It is plausible that the central government was concerned
about a possible destabilization of village governance caused by the potential dismissal of village
heads as prescribed by the Minister’s Decision. Although this does not mean that district governments may not include this prescription in their own regulations, the elimination of the prescription
nevertheless places some pressure on regional governments when making such decisions. One
official of the governance section of the Gianyar district office expressed his disappointment overthis point, saying he was worried that it might be necessary to revise the newly enacted district
regulations.
Another important revision found in Government Regulation No. 76 is the elimination of
the article allowing district heads to annul village regulations. This accords well with the current
62Kagami: Regional Autonomy in Process

regional autonomy policy, which negates the vertical relationship between district governments andvillage governments.
These revisions may indicate that the central government’s resolve to promote regional
autonomy has been weakening. It is true that many troublesome cases, such as confrontations
between village heads and councils and the uncontrolled spread of village regulations, have occurredin various regions since the implementation of the new autonomy policies. These cases, however,
do not invalidate the importance of regional autonomy itself. Many staff members of the Agam andGianyar district government whom I interviewed, especially those in the younger generation, did nothide their eagerness to prepare and establish a new village government system. This indicates thatthe new policy is highly welcomed by the regional governments.

3. Modification of the Balinese Traditional Village System
Unlike in West Sumatra province, where the administrative function of the village government
was entrusted to the traditional nagari system, the Bali provincial government decided to keep thetraditional and administrative village systems separate. This does not mean, however, that thetraditional village system was left untouched. In response to critical opinions of the remaining institutions of the previous period, the provincial government prepared to revise its policy on Balinese
traditional villages, and enacted Bali Provincial Regulation No. 3 2001 on traditional villages (called
desa pakraman) to replace Provincial Regulation No. 6 1986 on the status, function and roles of
traditional villages (called desa adat at the time).
The new regulation introduced some significant changes into traditional village organizationand management. First, the term for traditional villages was changed from desa adat to desa
pakraman. Since the colonial period, Balinese traditional villages had been referred to as desa adatin both official and ordinary use to differentiate them from administrative villages (desa dinas). Not
only the term dinas, originating from the Dutch dienst (service), but also adat (of Arabic origin),were borrowed words for the Balinese. In daily conversation, villagers referred to, and still refer to,
traditional villages simply as desa.
The desire to use the term desa pakraman to refer to Balinese traditional villages had alreadybeen voiced by Hindu intellectuals in the 1990s. For example, I Ketut Wiana, a senior official of theIndonesian Hindu Council, in an op-ed piece in the local newspaper Bali Post, explained the historical origin of the word pakraman and proposed replacing the term desa adat by desa pakraman.
According to Wiana, the word pakraman can be found in Balinese palm leaf documents and means“works” or “behaviour” [Wiana 1997]. Though the word is seldom used in daily conversation
63

Asian and African Area Studies, 5 (1)nowadays, its root word krama is a very common word meaning “member” and is generally used torefer to members of traditional villages. Historical analyses and ordinary use (or lack of use) aside,
the word pakraman sounds more familiar and indigenous for the Balinese than the word adat.
During the provincial council’s preparatory session for the revision of the provincial
regulations, a member of the dominant party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) proposed
an amendment including a change of the term for traditional village, with the support of a professorof law from the state Udayana University in Bali. The debate during the session naturally reflected
the political dynamics of the time. The result was the new Regulation No. 3 2001 which aimed toeliminate the top-down style of government intervention in customary affairs, typical of the former
period, and to establish Balinese traditional villages as fully independent local indigenous organizations.
Although the former provincial regulation recognized the autonomous status of traditional
villages, it still stressed the coordinative role of the regional government. In 1979, the provincial
government set up a supervisory committee for local customary organizations (majelis pembina
lembaga adat), headed by the chairman of the provincial council, and developed guidelines for the
management of customary organizations and the arbitration of customary conflicts [Kagami 2003].
This top-down style policy obviously did not fit well with the political situation of the Reformation
Era.
The new regulation includes provisions abolishing supervisory committees and replacing themby coordinating committees (majelis desa pakraman) at the provincial, district and sub-districtlevels in order to coordinate inter-village affairs. These committees are composed of representativesof each traditional village. A similar kind of organization was once tried in the 1990s in Gianyar
on the advice of the district head. In some sub-districts, committees called “traditional village head
forums” (forum bendesa adat) were actually set up. Under the centralized power system of the time,
however, these forums existed only as nominal consultative bodies, and did not function effectively
in handling inter-village problems.
The organizing procedure for the new committees was clearly a bottom-up style. In the
Gianyar district, for example, the district government arranged the first meetings at the sub-districtlevel and asked each traditional village to send the traditional village head (bendesa) and one more
representative. At these meetings, the chairman and managing staff were elected from among theparticipants. Then, each sub-district committee sent representatives to the district level meeting,electing a chairman and managing staff of the district committee. These procedures were conducted
outside of the supervision of the regional government. The old supervising committees and their64

Kagami: Regional Autonomy in Process

district branches were finally abolished in 2002 and the new district-level coordinating committees
were set up in 2003. The provincial level committee has not yet been organized (as of the beginningof 2004).
Although these committees are organized from the bottom up, there still remain doubts
whether they will be effective in arbitrating and resolving inter-village conflicts, because they haveno other authority than to discuss and advise. It will take a few more years before we can evaluate
their effectiveness.
The revised provincial regulations include some new prescriptions on the structure and composition of traditional villages. One deals with guest membership, especially for non-Hindu residents.
The Balinese traditional village essentially was, and still is, a Hindu organization based on religious
activities, with no room for non-Hindu residents. Its main activities are organizing village temple
festivals and managing the village cemetery, where only village members are allowed to bury family members and conduct funeral rituals. At present, however, an increasing number of non-Hindu
residents actually live within the boundaries of traditional villages, especially in town areas andtourist spots. The new prescription regarding guest membership was intended to adapt traditional
villages to the contemporary situation. In practice, the provincial government has urged traditional
villages to register non-Hindu residents as quasi-members (krama tamiu) who are exempted fromreligious duties but are expected to participate in communal work and to pay some portion of theannual village fee. In this way, the regional government in Bali expects traditional villages to play arole of surveillance over the increasing number of newcomers.
Another prescription concerns the setting up of village security forces called pacalang.
This measure perhaps reflected common communal responses to socio-political disturbance inother regions of the country during the early stage of the Reformation Era. In the face of decreasing
power of surveillance by the police and army, many local communities set up local forces tomaintain communal security. Under the new provincial regulation, village guards are responsible
for maintaining security and order during customary and religious events. Generally, they are in
charge of traffic control at temple festivals and customary rituals. However, I observed an unusualcase in one village where these guards not only handled traffic jams, which were common at thevillage’s main road where popular restaurants were located, but also managed the roadside parking
and collected parking fees. This arrangement was approved by the district’s transportation agency,
which has jurisdiction over public parking, in order to compensate for the shortage of official traffic
controllers. According to the traditional village head, the collected fees were given to the village
guards as reward. Whatever the reason may be, this case shows that the borderline between the65

Asian and African Area Studies, 5 (1)customary and governmental sphere has become blurred in contemporary Bali.
In addition to revising the regulations, the provincial government has offered different kindsof financial support to traditional villages in recent years. In 2001, for example, it loaned one
motorcycle at no charge and began to give a monthly reward of 75,000 rupiah to each traditional
village head throughout the province. At the same time, it decided to provide annual funds to eachtraditional village, amounting to 10 million rupiah in 2001 and 25 million rupiah in 2004.
In parallel with the new provincial government policy, some resource-rich districts also started
to offer financial support to traditional villages. The Gianyar district government, for example,
decided to distribute 15 percent of its hotel and restaurant tax revenue to traditional villages inthe district in 2000. In 2001, this percentage was raised to 25 percent, and in 2002 to 30 percent,which amounts to roughly 15-20 million rupiah for each traditional village per year.
Behind these governmental policies lies a common feeling among Balinese that the success of
tourism development depends on lively activities in the traditional villages which sustain tourist
attractions such as performing arts and rituals. From this point of view, the regional government’s
financial support of traditional villages seems quite reasonable. As a result, traditional villages havemuch larger financial funds than administrative villages. As is the case with the development fundsof administrative villages, however, traditional villages tend to use these funds for the construction
and renovation of village facilities such as temples and meeting halls. Thus, one traditional village in
Gianyar district spent the funds from the district government in 2000 for the construction of a newstorehouse at the central village temple (pura puseh), and those from both the provincial and district
governments in 2001 for the renovation of the village meeting hall (wantilan).
As indicated by these recent policies of the regional government, the Balinese traditional village
has changed significantly in response to the changing socio-political dynamics of the Reformation
Era. While the local communal organizations receive a considerable amount of financial support
from the regional government, they have to play some role in government administration. Although
they are clearly segregated from administrative villages in the ideological domain, in practice theyshare an administrative role with administrative village governments. The regional government’s
policy of maintaining the double-village system has brought a different set of problems to Balinese
local communities from those found in West Sumatra.

4. Toward a New Village Democracy?
In response to the changing socio-political circumstances, not only the structure and composition but also the management of traditional villages has gone through some striking changes. This
66

Kagami: Regional Autonomy in Process

trend seems to be related not so much with the post-Suharto reformative atmosphere as with thegeneral process of “modernization.”
The most commonly observed change in management is the taking of minutes at village
meetings and the release of financial reports. Recently, some more “modern” traditional villages
have begun to document the proceedings and decisions of village meetings and to circulate themamong the villagers. Annual or seasonal balance sheets are presented at meetings for discussion andconfirmation by the villagers. The goal of this innovation is not just procedural efficiency but also
to ensure the legitimacy of decisions and agreements. At one village meeting of a traditional village
in Gianyar district, which I observed, the seasonal balance sheet of the traditional village presented
by the traditional village head was criticized by the villagers in attendance as being too general andnot well recorded. Though the head responded by giving a detailed explanation of the items of
payment and thus avoided condemnation, he surely seemed to have lost the trust of the villagers. As
indicated in this case, documentation in traditional village management requires village officials tohandle village affairs more accurately and transparently.
Another innovational management method was adopted by the same traditional village head.
In 2000, he activated the traditional village council (sabha desa), which was mentioned in the guidelines prescribed by the former provincial regulation No. 6 1986 but had never been actually set up in
the village. He proposed the idea at a village meeting and asked each of the village subunits (banjar)
to select three or four representatives. The council was composed of these subunit representatives
as well as subunit heads (kelihan banjar) and of representatives of the village youth organization.
This composition closely resembled, and even preceded, that of the newly organized administrative
village council. Those selected were relatively young people who often voiced their opinions atvillage meetings. The village head’s idea was to manage customary affairs mainly through council
meetings in order to reduce the length and frequency of whole village meetings. The council was set
up in 2002 and remained active for almost one and a half year, but its activities declined toward thetime of the new village head election. I observed a council meeting in 2002, and was impressed by
the frank and lively atmosphere of the discussion. The decline of the council’s activities may haveresulted from the decreasing trust of the village head, caused by his opaque financial management.
These reforms, which were aimed at modernizing traditional village management, can be partly
explained by the village head’s career. The village head mentioned above was a retired government
official, and it is quite possible that he obtained his ideas on reform from his experiences at his
government office. Recruiting traditional village heads and managerial staff from among people
with experience working at modern institutions such as government offices, schools and private
67

Asian and African Area Studies, 5 (1)companies is fairly common in contemporary Bali. This practice surely promotes the tendency
toward a modernized style of management in Balinese traditional villages.
Despite this modernization, traditional elements often remain in local communities, namely thepower relationship among residents based on social rank of birth. While this has been outspokenly
criticized as a feudal legacy in Bali and in Indonesia as a whole since the independence of the
Republic of Indonesia, hierarchical social norms still persist in the daily behavior of villagers andespecially in customary affairs. Whether and to what extent the villagers can free themselves of thishierarchical system depends on the political and economic power which traditional village lords candemonstrate.
For example, the traditional village head mentioned above is a member of a prestigious
noble family in the village, which owns about two hectares of rice land but has no other economic
resources nor socio-politically influential positions. He was nominated as a candidate for the position of traditional village head because of his career at the government office, being praised for his
efficient managing style but criticized for the lack of transparency in his financial management. In
short, he was valued as a traditional village head not because of his family background but becauseof his management ability. Nevertheless, he once told me that his duty as traditional village head
was to maintain and revitalize customary norms. He mentioned the recent trend among villagers
to have their children wear ceremonial costumes at ritual occasions, and explained it as a signof increasing religious piety among villagers, adding that in the old days, villagers used to wearsuch costumes when they went to visit the homes of nobles as well. Although he did not state thisdirectly, he seemed to think that the revitalization of customary norms would be accompanied by
one of feudalistic social norms.
The more powerful noble families still have a dominant voice in customary affairs. The mostconspicuous case is that of the former royal families in another traditional village in Gianyar district.
They have large rice land holdings and control the tourism industry, and also because of theirgenerous financial patronage of rituals, they still maintain a high prestige and social status not only
among the villagers themselves but also among the residents of the surrounding villages which wereonce ruled by the same royal family [MacRae 1999].
The post of traditional village head has been held continuously by members of the royalfamilies. The traditional village secretary, himself a nephew of the village head, once explained tome that the task of the traditional village head these days covers a wide range of matters. The daily
offerings placed by villagers on the pavement in front of the house gate, for example, may obstruct
the flow of rainwater. The head has to instruct the villagers about the proper way to place the68Kagami: Regional Autonomy in Processofferings, and also has to conduct negotiations with the government about the desirable form andshape of village pavements. In ritual matters, too, the religious requirements must be adapted tothe modern circumstances of the village. Thus, the height of a funeral tower should not exceed theheight of the electric wires that cross the village roads. These examples show that the traditional
village head functions as a kind of negotiator between customary affairs and the modern world.
The traditional village head also has the authority to carry out negotiations in inter-village
affairs. The secretary mentioned a recent case in which young men from a neighboring village had
injured a villager after a quarrel on a trivial matter. The assailant had surrendered to the police on
the spot. In order to ensure that antagonism would not spread between the villages, the village headcalled both village subdivision heads and urged them to calm their residents. He also asked the headof the assailant’s subdivision to hold a purification ritual to cleanse the ritual pollution of the villagecaused by the shedding of the blood of the victim. This kind of settlement was possible because
both villages were once ruled by the same royal family, and the villagers today still recognize theirpower in the region. “The words of the traditional village head are still respected by the villagers. If
he says ‘shut up!’ the villagers won’t dare to speak,” said the secretary.
As illustrated by these cases, the revitalization of customary norms involves a fundamental
dilemma. The more obediently they are followed, the more easily intra- and inter-village matterscan be settled properly and effectively. On the other hand, this may also lead to a revitalization ofold feudal power and prestige. While the management methods of traditional villages can be, andactually have gradually been, modernized in recent years, the power structure in local communities
may not be. To realize true autonomy and democracy at the local community level, there is a needto grapple with the inveterate habit of hierarchical social relationships that are maintained under thename of local customs.
Acknowledgement
This paper is a modified version of a paper entitledŋLocal Autonomy in Process: A Case Study in Bali
2001-2003,Ōwhich was presented at the 21st Century COE Program International Workshop in Jakarta:
The Micrology of Indonesian Local Societies, held in Jakarta on March 23, 2004. I am grateful to theparticipants for their comments. Most of the materials used in this paper were collected during the research
conducted over the three years from 2001 to 2003 under the research project entitledŋAnthropologicalStudy on Indonesian Local Societies after the Downfall of the Suharto RegimeŌ(Representative: Takashi
Sugishima), with a grant-in-aid for scientific research by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science,and under research permits from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI). I express my gratitude to these
institutions.

69

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Peraturan Daerah Propinsi Bali No. 6 Tahun 1986 tentang Kedudukan, Fungsi dan Peranan Desa Adat
sebagai Kesatuan Masyarakat Hukum Adat dalam Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Bali.
Peraturan Daerah Propinsi Bali No. 3 Tahun 2001 tentang Desa Pakraman.
Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Gianyar No. 6 Tahun 2002 tentang Tata Cara Pencalonan, Pemilihan,
Pelantikan dan Pemberhentian Perbekel.
Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Gianyar No. 7 Tahun 2002 tentang Kerja Sama antar Desa.
Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Gianyar No. 8 Tahun 2002 tentang Lembaga Kemasyarakatan di Desa.
Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Gianyar No. 9 Tahun 2002 tentang Pembentukan Banjar Dinas dalam Desa.
Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Gianyar No. 10 Tahun 2002 tentang Susunan Organisasi Pemerintah Desa.
Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Gianyar No. 11 Tahun 2002 tentang Penyusunan Anggaran Pendapatan dan
Belanja Desa.
Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Gianyar No. 12 Tahun 2002 tentang Tata Cara Pemilihan dan atau
Pengangkatan Perangkat Desa.
Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Gianyar No. 13 Tahun 2002 tentang Pembentukan, Penghapusan dan
Penggabungan Desa.
Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Gianyar No. 14 Tahun 2002 tentang Pembentukan Badan Perwakilan Desa.
Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Gianyar No. 15 Tahun 2002 tentang Sumber Pendapatan dan Kekayaan
Desa.
Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Gianyar No. 16 Tahun 2002 tentang Peraturan Desa.
Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Gianyar No. 17 Tahun 2002 tentang Kedudukan Keuangan Perbekel dan
Perangkat Desa.

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