Discussion Papers In Economics
And Business

The Restructuring of Cotton Spinning Companies in Postwar Japan

Takeshi Abe

Discussion Paper 05-19

Graduate School of Economics andOsaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP)
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPANThe Restructuring of Cotton Spinning Companies in Postwar Japan

Takeshi Abe

Discussion Paper 05-19

June 2005
この研究は「大学院経済学研究科・経済学部記念事業」
基金より援助を受けた、記して感謝する。
Graduate School of Economics andOsaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP)
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPANThe Restructuring of Cotton Spinning Companies in Postwar Japan1

Takeshi Abe

Graduate School of Economics
Osaka University2

Abstract
Since the mid-1960s, the Japanese cotton spinning industry has experienced steadydecline. However, the whole process of this decline was the synthesis of several
different firm strategies within the industry. If we look at this process, three types offirm strategies can be found; (1) positive restructuring from textiles to non-textiles(Kanebo, Nittobo, and Nisshinbo), (2) adherence to textile manufacturing (threeshinbo: Kondobo, Tsuzukibo and Omikenshi), and (3) inactive restructuring in somelarge companies (such as Toyobo).

JEL Classification: N65, N85
Keywords: cotton spinning companies, postwar Japan, restructuring, Nisshinbo,

shinbo, Toyobo

1 An early version of this article was presented at the 27th Fuji Conference,‘Restructuring of Firms in Mature Industries’ held by Business History Society ofJapan at Fuji Kyoiku Kenshu-jo in Susono-shi, Shizuoka Prefecture, Japan, on
5th-7th January, 2003. The author would like to thank Dr.Annette C.Wright for her
valuable comments. Needless to say, the author is solely responsible for any
remaining errors.
2 Address: 1-7, Machikaneyama-cho, Toyonaka-shi, Osaka Prefecture, 560-0043
Japan. E-mail: abe@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp1

The Restructuring of Cotton Spinning Companies in Postwar Japan
Takeshi Abe

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the process of restructuring of Japanese cotton spinningcompanies after the Second World War. This research is divided into three stages to consider thefeatures of this particular sector; that is, the High-Growth Era (1955-1973); the long depression fromthe first Oil Crisis in 1973 to the mid-1980s; and the Bubble Economy (1987-1990) and its aftermath.
This article will focus especially on the first and second stages.

According to the ranking lists of the total assets of Japan’s top one hundred companies in 1955,
sixteen companies belonged to the textile industry; and of those, ten were cotton spinning companies.
Toyobo, Kanebo, and Dai Nihonbo ranked, respectively, the eighth, eleventh and twelfth in this list.
However, in 1990 only three firms in the textile industry were left on the list, and among the cotton
spinners only Kanebo (at 88th) was found there1. Although Japanese textile firms, particularly cotton
spinners, were proud of their strong competitive advantage in the world market until the early 1960s,
after this period they lost that advantage and began to decline. But the decline of Japanese cotton
textiles was a mild, slow and long-term process, which signified that the industry had persistent
countervailing power against the developed countries.
Japan’s industrialization started in the early 20th century led by such labor-intensive industries as
textiles and mining. But the remarkable development of the heavy industries, such as metals,
machinery, and chemicals had to wait until the 1960s, though it had begun to develop during and after
the First World War. On the other hand, the textile industry in the pre-First World War period mainly
consisted of cotton and silk. Silk reeling and sericulture were heavily damaged during the Great
Depression after 1929. However, in contrast to this sector, cotton spinning and weaving maintained
their top position in the world and even in 1933 surpassed the cloth exports of Lancashire (UK) involume2. And in spite of its total destruction after the Second World War, the Japanese cotton industry
was miraculously reconstructed in about 1950 and retained its powerful position in production andexports until the early 1960s3.
In pre-war days, the Japanese cotton industry was composed of several different firm groups. The
first group was the large spinning companies. Each company had modern machinery in many factories,
and the larger companies within this group integrated weaving and finishing. In particular, the big threeof Toyobo4, Kanebo, and Dai Nihonbo, became among the biggest such businesses in the world5.

The

second group was the many small- and medium-sized independent weaving firms in the local sanchi(producing centers). Most sanchi weavers, by introducing the factory system and mechanized powerlooms, could survive the cutthroat competition of the long depression after the First World War.
Consequently, they coexisted with the integrated large weaving mills in the first group through the2segmentation of cloths, and became the consumer of 60 or 70 per cent of the cotton yarn spun by the
spinning companies.

The third group was the various merchants, most of whom dealt in yarn andcloth, while some large ones imported raw cotton from countries such as India and the USA. Such afunctional industrial structure and the respective firms’ or sanchi’s’ efforts to improve the quality of
products and cost cutting, brought about the industry’s powerful competitive advantage. After theSecond World War, while these three groups still remained, the fourth group, apparel firms (including
not only manufacturers but also distributors), emerged in accordance with the downstream
development of knitting, sewing, and designing. Among these four groups, this chapter willconcentrate on the pillar of the Japanese cotton industry – the spinning companies.

1 Changes in the Japanese cotton spinning industry in wartime and the postwar occupation
periodThe Japanese cotton industry reached its zenith in the mid-1930s.

However, as the Japanese

economy was rapidly reorganized for war after 1937, the industry was put under direct government
regulations. At first, the regulations were limited within such fields as price control and theenforcement of mixed yarn spinning with raw cotton and rayon staple fibre. But in July 1938, the useof imported raw cotton was restricted for the production for export goods, and as a result only rayon
staple fibre was used for domestic textiles for daily wear. Through this process, the cotton industry
was drastically re-organized. On the one hand, spinning companies were allotted raw cotton by theJapanese government. On the other, sanchi weavers became solely sub-contractors for spinningcompanies, and trading companies were also transformed into only a part of the governmental
network of distribution. In order to allot the scarce foreign exchanges into the strategic heavy
weapons industries, the cotton industry, which had consumed much imported raw cotton, came to bedeemed a useless one. In the early 1940s, spinning companies were often horizontally integrated by
the government. And the total number of firms, which had been sixty or seventy in the interwar
period, decreased. Finally, ten large companies were established in 19436, and each of which had
respectively about one million spindles. Around the end of the war, they were obliged to deliver mostof the spindles and looms to the government as the materials for weapons, and many spinning andweaving mills became the factories producing aircrafts or ships.

The defeat of Japan in August 1945 did not change the situation of the Japanese cotton industry ina favourable direction. The spinning companies had lost four-fifths of ten million spindles through thedelivery of machinery to the government. They were worried about the shortage of raw cotton,
electricity and workers, most of whom returned to their homeland in order to secure food.
Hyperinflation was also a heavy blow for the companies. Consequently, they faced severe difficulties
in producing yarn and cloth during the postwar period.

However, the US government, which had amassed huge surpluses of raw cotton under the New
Deal in the Great Depression, was seeking a market and noticed that the Japanese cotton industry was3

potentially a good consumer. The US government started to ship old raw cotton to Japan in June 1946.
In addition, between December 1946 and February 1947 the General Headquarters of Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) publicly permitted that the former ten large spinningcompanies could have spinning and weaving machines. About four million spindles were permitted, of
which the ten companies had 3,680,000, with the difference (340,000 spindles) being allotted totwenty-five newly-founded companies (shinbo7). Amongst these were such dynamic companies as
Kondobo, Tsuzukibo and Omikenshi. Nevertheless, it was not until 1950 that Japanese cotton spinningfirms began enlarging their facilities. After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the upper
limit of four million spindles was immediately removed. The industry dramatically developed within ayear, adding many new entrants called shin-shinbo8 during this itohen (textile-related) boom.

The Japanese cotton industry was, however, thrown into turmoil earlier than any other industry, as
overproduction and excess equipment became a serious problem. The Ministry of International Tradeand Industry (MITI), established in 1949, tried to solve this problem by allowing the cotton spinners torefrain from expanding their investment into fixed capital through the allotment system of foreignexchanges relating to the import of raw cotton. In addition, MITI began to adopt the method of
Kankoku Sotan, by which the ministry ‘recommended’ the curtailment of operation not to the whole
cotton spinning industry (via the Japan Spinners’ Association) but to each of the spinning companies.
This encouraged the spread of cartel activity that evaded the regulation of Anti-Trust Act in 1947, andwas later to appear in other industries besides spinning. The first Kankoku Sotan continued between
April 1952 and May 1953, indicating that the problem of overproduction or excess capacity became
apparent in the early 1950s. In this period, the Japanese cotton spinning industry became a genuinely
mature industry.9

2 Decline in the Japanese cotton spinning industry
Japan’s cotton industry soon recovered from the slump of the early 1950s, and increased productionand exports. Between 1955 and 1970, the volume of cotton fabric production was kept at over 2.5
billion square meters. Although Japanese cotton spinning companies were often worried about the
short depressions in the High-Growth Era, the cartel activities led by MITI eased their minds. Kankoku
Sotan was instituted twice; first between May 1955 and June 1956, and second between April 1958 andJuly 1960. Additional curtailment of operation was conducted twice; first between August 1960 andMarch 1962, and then between April 1962 and September 1964. Because of these interventions, theJapanese cotton industry was able to survive until 1964.

The real crisis of the industry appeared in the depression of 1965. Kankoku Sotan, by which
MITI could regulate the supply of raw cotton to cotton spinners, had already lost its impact after the
deregulation on raw cotton imports in 1961. Nevertheless, after the promulgation of the Revised
Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment Law in 1964, a ‘depression cartel’ actuallyoperated in cotton spinning as an exception to the Anti-Trust Act; first between October 1965 and4March 1966,

second between April and December 1966, and finally between January and March

1967. After 1971, when the appreciation of the yen started under the pressure of US President Nixon’s‘New Economic Policy’, the volume of cotton fabric production decreased. In addition, the first Oil
Crisis further aggravated the situation, and a ‘depression cartel’ was again organized between January
and April 1975, and between April 1977 and June 1978. Finally, in 1985, when the Plaza Agreement
was signed and the yen drastically appreciated, cotton fabric production became less than 2 billion
square metres, and dwindled quickly thereafter. In 1995, only 1 billion square metres was produced.

In 1955, in the initial stage of the High-Growth Era, Japan’s exports of textiles also prospered.
The data shows that although the largest export item was iron/steel (12.9%), it was followed by cotton
cloth (11.5%), and third was rayon filament and rayon staple (7.2%). The volume of exported cotton
fabric from Japan remained at 1 billion square metres between 1956 and 1963. But after the depression
around 1965, the volume quickly reduced. In contrast, imports, which were negligible in the 1950s,
increased remarkably after the 1960s. The years when Japan became a net importer in volume forcertain textile goods are as follows; silk yarn in 1966, cotton yarn in 1967, natural fibre yarn including
cotton, silk, hemp and wool in 1970, silk fabric in 1970, total of natural fibre fabric in 1978, cotton
fabric in 1984, and total of yarn including man-made fibre in 1987. Therefore, before the end of theHigh-Growth Era, the Japanese cotton industry had already lost its competitive advantage.

In this contraction, most Japanese cotton spinning and weaving firms were obliged to reduce theirfacilities and workers. The number of workers is shown on Figure 1, and the number of cotton
spinning companies also diminished as follows: 134 in 1955, 93 in 1973, 84 in 1980, and 72 in 1985.

The textile industry of the Asian countries, which used to be the largest export market for Japan’s
cotton industry in the prewar years, developed spectacularly after the Second World War and soon
accomplished import substitution. Consequently, as shown in Table 1, Japan’s textile industry
gradually shifted its export markets from Asian to advanced countries, such as the US and the Western
European countries.

However, harsh criticism from the US government with regard to the inflow of Japan’s cheap
garments (‘one dollar blouses’) was already apparent in 1955 and MITI ordered the Japanese cotton
firms to accept ‘spontaneous restraint’ (Jishu Kisei) on cotton goods exports to the US, with the firms
finally agreeing to the proposition within a year. This measure prevented the expansion of Japan’s
exports of cotton goods to the US. In contrast to exports, which rapidly increased from 28 million
square metres [m.s.ms.] in 1953 to 117 m.s.ms. in 1955, the volume of exports of Japanese cotton
fabrics to the US dropped to 102 m.s.ms in 1956 and to 68 m.s.ms. in 1957. After the introduction ofthis policy, only in 1962 and between 1965 and 1969 did exports surpass 100 m.s.ms. before 198510.
Between 1969 and 1972 the US again attacked the Japanese textile industry, because it was concerned
about the inflow of woolen and synthetic textiles (not cotton goods). To solve this conflict, MITI and5the Japanese textile industry finally accepted further Jishu Kisei 11 . On the other hand, the US
government succeeded in enforcing a Short-term Arrangement (STA) and a Long-term Arrangement(LTA) at the international conferences on cotton products organized by GATT in 1961, which aimed toregulate strictly the imports of cotton goods from the advanced countries to the US, while the US
government helped the developing areas to export cotton products. In 1974, with political assistancefrom the EC countries, the US government also succeeded in enforcing a Multifiber Arrangement(MFA) at GATT, which related not only to cotton products but also to woolen and man-made fibre
goods12. Although these arrangements were apparently against the spirit of GATT and free trade, the
MFA in particular became a measure for the protection of advanced countries’ textile markets from the
inflow of cheap goods made in the developing countries13.

Thus, Japan’s textile industry lost its last hope of penetrating the large US market. Instead, Asian
countries such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea not only accomplished import substitution but
also came to capture the foreign fabric markets in the 1960s. In the 1970s, these three areas encroachedon the domestic textile markets in the US and the Western European countries, which used to beimportant to the Japanese textile industry. Adding to the Asian Newly Industrializing Economies(NIEs) including Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Pakistan, which was separated from
India in 1947, became very strong in cotton yarn exports. Moreover, from the end of the 1970s,
mainland China’s textile industry also recovered and enjoyed an economic ‘miracle’. In the 1980s,
particularly after the mid-1980s, as a result of the drastic appreciation of the yen, China spectacularly
encroached on the Japanese domestic textile market.

Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Japan did not relinquish easily her domestic textile market to
the Asian countries, compared with the US and Western Europe, and the decline of Japan’s textile
industry was gradual and mild. Although the industry certainly became mature and contracted overall,it never resulted in heavy unemployment in a short period. During the long slump, some firms wereable to preserve their strong competitive advantage, and the others steadily succeeded in changing
from a typical labour-intensive structure to a capital intensive one, such as chemicals.

3 General conditions of the restructuring of Japanese cotton spinning companies
3.1 Condition of the labour market
One of the characteristics of Japan’s cotton spinning labour-force in the prewar period – thepreponderance of young unmarried female employees – was retained in the postwar period. As Figure
1 shows, in the decline after the 1960s, cotton-spinning companies had to reduce the numbers ofworkers. However, the feature mentioned above in addition to the inelasticity of the labour market in
the High-Growth Era, greatly favoured the companies. Most of the female workers were teenagers andusually quit after a few years of working. From 1945 to the mid-1950s, there were so many young
people who urgently required jobs soon after finishing compulsory education at the age of fifteen (after
six years in primary school and three years in junior high school).14 But in the late 1950s, many

6

Japanese firms became worried about the shortage of such young workers in the process of rapid
economic growth. While the average age of male workers rose from 31.3 in 1951 to 37.3 in 1961,
female workers’ ages, after rising from 19.8 in 1951 to 22.4 in 1955, dropped from 22.4 in 1955 to20.8 in 1961. And while male workers’ average working years experienced a steady increase from 7.3
in 1951 to 14.9 in 1961, the increase of female workers’ average working years was relatively slow
from 2.7 in 1951 to 5.3 in 1955, before falling to 4.2 in 1961.15 These data indicate that a young
female worker soon left a cotton-spinning mill, while a male worker tended to stay in a firm for a long
period. Although many Japanese companies began to look for graduates from senior high schools in
the 1960s, and soon suffered from the shortage of a well-educated labour force, the cotton spinningcompanies continued to search after young graduates from junior high schools from border areas
throughout Japan. Their intellectual level gradually deteriorated, but the companies had to do it.16 In
addition, the young female workers earnestly desired to elevate their social status in this period. Some
wanted to complete their higher education from about 1960, when many graduates of junior highschools were entering senior high schools17. Therefore, many cotton spinning companies had to let the
young workers attend senior high schools. Other female workers hoped to find interesting new jobs,
such as working as ‘transistor girls’ in the emerging electric equipment manufacturing companies (suchas Sony, Panasonic, and Sanyo). Thus, in the 1960s the cotton spinning companies were worried about
the shortage of young female workers and the costs of hiring them.

However, the shortage of young female workers was gradually becoming rather favourable to thecotton spinning companies. Figure 1 shows that from the 1960s (at the latest, the mid-1960s), thetextile industry lost its competitive advantage and was obliged to reduce the number of workers.
Certainly a contributory cause was the supply side condition of the labour market: it was too difficult
for the spinning companies to recruit easily the young workers they needed. But the companies had toresist recruiting them sooner or later because of the coming depression.

During the long slump from the end of 1973 to the mid-1980s, the unemployment problem
emerged. The unemployment rate rose from 1.1 per cent in 1970, to 1.9 per cent in 1975, 2.0 per centin 1980, and 2.6 per cent in 198518. In this situation, Japan’s cotton spinning companies had to reduce
the number of workers. However, the unemployment rates in this period were never as high as in the
recent depression caused by the collapse of the Bubble Economy, when the level reached 5.6 per centin January 2002. Before the Bubble Economy, most young females could eventually find new jobs
after a few years’ working in spinning or weaving mills.

The coal mining industry also experienced a decline after the late 1950s, but it was different from
cotton spinning industry in the degree of its impact on the regional economies. As shown in the famous
Miike dispute in Fukuoka Prefecture of Kyushu in 1960, serious conflicts between a firm and its
workers often occurred, and business uncertainty resulted in the quick decline of the regional economy.
However, such a situation did not appear in the cotton spinning firms, possibly because the collapse of7

coal industry – precipitated by a drastic change in the government’s industrial energy policy thatshifted from coal to petroleum – was too rapid. Another reason was in the labour force. While mostworkers in the cotton spinning were young unmarried female workers, the coal industry depended on
middle-aged male workers, who usually had families and could not easily change their jobs due to age.
In Table 2 we can see that, while the cotton spinning mills were dispersed in various regions, the coalmines were heavily concentrated in Hokkaido and Kyushu. This was another reason why the
restructuring of Japanese spinning companies was so gradual and mild.

3.2 Policy of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
In the restructuring of the Japanese textile industry, government policies, particularly the strategy of
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, were significant besides the labour market. Withassistance from the powerful and well-organized Japan Cotton Spinners’ Association, which provided
essential information and advice, MITI accelerated the restructuring of the textile industry. Firstly,
MITI let the government promulgate four acts:(1)Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment Law (Old Textile Act: in 1956-64). The
purpose of this act was to register all spinning machines, control their operation, abolish any excess
weaving looms through buying them, and concentrate the production of yarn into highly effective
facilities which could continue to absorb workers. Briefly, it was the regulation of facilities in
expectation of the introduction of highly effective machinery19.

(2)Revised Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment Law (New Textile Act: in 1964-1970).
By this act, a textile firm was obliged to dispose of two old machines if it introduced a new one. In
other words, it aimed at a combination of scrapping and modernization. If the firm introduced a newmachine, the Japan Development Bank guaranteed funding at low interest rates, and with a low tax rate
for special depreciation.

(3)Temporary Measures for Structural Improvement of Specified Textile Industries Law (in1967-2001). In order to improve the structure of textle industry, this aimed at the modernization offacilities, adjustment of scale of production or administration, and planned disposal of excess
equipment.

(4)Temporary Measures for Stabilizing Specified Depressed Industries Law (in 1978-1983).

It

ordered the industries which suffered from structual depression, including synthetics manufacturing
and textiles spinning, to take various actions for the disposal of excess facilities, curtailment ofoperation and delivery as a premise of disposal. This act also prescribed security of funding,stabilization of employment, the guaranteeing of loans from a special fund, and cooperative actions
instructed by MITI. Under this act, the spinning industry was obliged to dispose of about 60 million
spindles by October 1979.

8

To some extent, these acts were effective in the elimination of excess capacity. But MITI often
resorted to enforced cartel activities, which risked the positive effects of eliminating surplus textile
capacity. In the prewar period the Japanese cotton spinning industry often curtailed operations. But
such activities were spontaneously conducted at the behest of the Japan Spinners’ Association, whichskillfully adjusted various interests among many companies20. In contrast, the postwar kankoku sotanand ‘depression cartel’ were led by MITI, and the ministry did not pay sufficient attention to eachfirm’s interests. The number of cotton spinning companies was 134 both in 1955 and in 1964, when
the Old Textile Act was valid. This suggests that the excessive and bureaucratic protection by kankoku
sotan helped the weak firms survive in this period.

Secondly and conversely, MITI did not object to the free trade policy operating in the textile
industry. It is well known that MITI adopted many policies to restrict imports and to accelerate exports
especially in the period of the 1950s and 1960s21. But the ministry’s aim was consistently to foster
the emerging heavy industries, and its attitude to the textile industry may have been rather unique.
MITI certainly recognized that the industry generally tended to decline because of the catching-up by
developed countries. However, the ministry firmly believed that Japan’s industrial growth was mainly
dependent on the development of heavy industries. Thus in spite of several requests from the Japanesecotton spinners, MITI never asked GATT to apply the MFA to Japan against the inflow of textiles
from some Asian countries. Although, in general, the Japanese government was obedient to the US
government in the postwar days, MITI seems to have dared to expose Japanese textiles to the worldcompetition.

It seems that MITI’s cartel policy let the weak firms survive. But the measures promoted by theministry for eliminating excess capacity were effective and MITI’s free trade policy in textile products
also contributed to the decrease of weak firms. As a whole, one can say that MITI’s policies towards
Japanese textile industry would have accelerated its restructuring22.

4 Strategies of cotton spinning companies
4.1 Outlook of the leading companies
Although the favourable condition of labour market and MITI’s policy supported the restructuring of
postwar Japanese cotton spinning companies, strategies of the respective companies were importantand some patterns are found in their activities.

Table 3 displays the transition of the main Japanese cotton spinners in the postwar years. Most of
the former ten large companies, which held the highest rank until 1964, gradually declined after thisperiod. However, Nisshinbo was apparently the exception. Although Nisshinbo finally decreased thenumber of spindles in 1985, it continued to move up the ranking and to increase the number of spindles
until 1980.

In contrast, three shinbo, Tsuzukibo, Kondobo and Omikenshi, constantly increased

their facilities and developed remarkably, especially after the end of the High-Growth Era. In 1985,

9Tsuzukibo (and also Kondobo if the subsidiaries’ spindles were included) surpassed Toyobo withregard to size, and was proud of its performance. Since these Shinbo are typical family firms, only
scattered information of these firms is available. Nevertheless, it is impressive that in the case ofJapanese cotton spinning companies, aggressive firms were not rare even if their businesses werestagnating generally.

Ten large spinning firms had already vertically integrated weaving and finishingcotton, andthey further diversified into manufacturing various textiles such as silk, wool and rayon. Although they
expanded in those businesses in the postwar period, a new feature is found in the case of firms engaged
in synthetic fibre manufacturing. While this industry was deemed as ‘chemicals’ rather than ‘textiles’
in countries such as the US and Germany, it was treated as a textile industry in Japan (and in the UK)
because many cotton spinners had added rayon manufacturing to their businesses in the interwar
period23. Six of the former ten large companies (that is, Toyobo, Kanebo, Dai Nihonbo, Kurehabo,
Daiwabo and Nittobo) were eager to participate in the fierce competition in this new business andinvested heavily in new facilities around the 1960s. However, the other four never entered the business.
Nisshinbo and Kurabo are examples. And three shinbo also did not enter synthetic fibre manufacturing.

Diversification of cotton spinning firms in postwar Japan was not limited to the entry into
synthetic fibre manufacturing. In the High-Growth Era (as Table 4 shows) Kanebo, Nisshinbo, andNittobo conspicuously diversified into the non-textile sector. Kanebo had already experienced
non-textile diversification and Nittobo had diversified into special textiles before the war.

4.2 Positive promoters of restructuring: Kanebo, Nittobo and Nisshinbo
Kanebo, which was established in Tokyo in 1887,24 was quickly transformed from a textile firm to alarge arsenal under the strong leadership of the president Shingo Tsuda between the 1930s and the endof the war. It collapsed after the war, 25 but restarted as a company engaged in the integrated
manufacture of cotton, silk, wool, and rayon textiles. With the saturation of textile markets in the late
1950s, Kanebo started a radical diversification of its business. Firstly, Kanebo integrated backwards
into apparels; secondly it engaged in the production of synthetics (nylon in 1963, polyester in 1969,
and acrylic in 1970); and thirdly again began diversifying into non-textile products. In 1962, Kanebo
re-purchased its former toiletry manufacturing business and developed a network of stores to market its
goods. The company also moved into food processing through the purchase of the Harisu Company.
Cosmetics became a famous example of diversification, and Kanebo gradually became recognized as achemical company rather than as a textile manufacturer26.

Nittobo was established in Fukushima Prefecture of Tohoku in 1923 for silk spinning. The
founding Katakura family was world famous for its silk reeling business. But it began to worry about
its rapid decline during the Great Depression after 1929. Restructuring the Nittobo business became a
big challenge for the family and in 1933 it initiated the first and full-scale production of rayon staple

10fibre in Japan. In 1937 the company merged with Nagoyabo and started cotton spinning and weaving.
In the following year, it entered the production of rock wool and glass fibre, further diversifying
throughout the wartime into hosiery, machinery, lumber and bricks, and mining.27 Although Nittobo
succeeded in non-textile diversification in the postwar period, the basis of this had already been
established before the war. In the case of Nittobo, most of the wartime businesses were sold andclosed, but rock wool and glass fibre were kept and became important products. In 1949, the company
started researching acrylic, and then fibre-reinforced plastic (FRP) in 1952. In 1959, the new president
Eiichi Shimada launched a Five-Year Plan, in which he insisted on diversification based on threepillars – textiles, rock wool for fire-resistance and sound absorption, and glass fibre insulation.
Although it is difficult to determine whether or not the entry into synthetics (acrylic in 1956 andpolypropylene in 1964) was successful, these diversifications – in addition to fine chemicals and thebusiness of protection from environmental pollution – and the withdrawal from textiles continued after
the Oil Crisis28.

We would like to pay particular attention here to Nisshinbo, which had much less historicalexperience of non-textile diversification. If the real meaning of ‘restructuring’ is the transformation ofa business into a completely different one, Kanebo, which energetically conducted non-textile
diversification, may be the best example of restructuring. But in this article we prefer to selectNisshinbo (established in 1907), as a very important example of a firm, which recognized thesignificance of restructuring in the High-Growth Era.

Nisshinbo continued to produce cotton yarn and cloth as its main products within textiles,
maintaining since the prewar days high profits through its sales of the highest quality goods atcompetitive prices. On the other hand, in the postwar period, this company came to promote
non-textile manufactures, such as automobile brakes, machine tools, polyurethane foams, paper
products, and so on. Table 5 shows that Nisshinbo exceptionally increased the number of male workers
a few years after the first Oil Crisis, though it reduced the number of female workers from the end of
the High-Growth Era. The executives of Nisshinbo, including its renowned president Takeshi Sakurada,
expected even in the High-Growth Era that Japanese textiles might lose their competitive advantage
and so the future of Nisshinbo depended on developing non-textile businesses. Its Five-Year Plan of1960 projected that between 1959 and 1965 the percentage of textiles sales would fall from 93 per centto 81 per cent and that cotton products in particular would decline from 74 per cent to 51 per cent, butthat the percentage of non-textiles would increase from 7 per cent to 19 per cent29. This perfectly
illustrates the strong intention to shift from textiles to non-textiles. Table 5 confirms an excellent
performance in financial ratios: fixed assets to capital remained at less than 100 per cent after the first
Oil Crisis. It indicates that the investment in facilities did not depend on loans but was funded fromcompany capital. The ratios of capital to total assets were around 40 per cent in the High-Growth Era,and even after that continued to rise to about 60 per cent. The profit rates rose after the Oil Crisis.
Although in 1975 the company was in the red, it kept stable figures thereafter. Yonekawa pointed out

11that Nisshinbo, as well as Kurabo, did not integrate synthetic fibre manufacturing, but purchased nylon
and polyester from another company (Teijin30) and spun good yarns by blending them with cotton
yarn31. This is surely an important reason why Nisshinbo avoided excessive investment relating tosynthetic fibre manufacturing. In addition to promoting non-textile diversification, Nisshinbo
continued to cut costs and avoid excessive investment in textile manufacturing. The cost cutting
strategy was common among the prewar Japanese cotton spinning companies32, and some shinbo alsoadhered to it.

4.3 Profit seekers in textiles: three shinbo
Three shinbo were reluctant to adopt the strategy of the non-textile diversification and clung to textiles.
In particular, Kondobo persisted in specializing in cotton spinning and weaving. First, let us look at ashort history of Kondobo.

In 1877 Shigehachi Kondo, a cotton cloth weaver and trader, established Kondo Shoten in thecity of Nagoya, Aichi Prefecture. In 1914, he established at Nagoya, Kondo Bosekijo (Kondobo),
which had 4,000 spindles and 60 power looms. When Shigehachi died in 1929, his son Nobuo Kondo(1903-1973), who was a student of Keio Gijuku University, inherited the Kondobo business. Despite
the serious depression, in 1931 Nobuo reaped an enormous profit through speculation in American raw
cotton, and thus rebuilt the business of declining Kondobo. Although Nobuo once closed Kondobo inprotest at militarism in 1943, he secretly kept the spindles and looms and energetically bought
subsistence commodities during the wartime.

In 1946, Nobuo purchased the Tsushima Mill of Howa Kogyo Company, an established textile
machinery maker in Aichi Prefecture, and started weaving with 480 newly-installed power looms. In
1948, Kondobo was re-established in Nagoya with 10,000 spindles and 400 power looms by Nobuo as
shinbo. Since Nobuo actively purchased the shares of Toyoda Automatic Power Loom Company – thecore company of Toyoda Group and of Howa Kogyo – he could secure many spinning and weaving
machines from those companies. In 1949, Kondobo increased the capital from 1 million yen to 12
million yen. In the following year, Nobuo acquired Toyohashi Mill of Hiyoshi Boshoku Company, andestablished Toyohashibo Company, which became a subsidiary of Kondobo with a capital of 30
million yen and 44,400 spindles. In 1951, Nobuo established Otsubo in Nagoya with 83,840 spindles,
and acquired Okada Mill of Nakashichi Momen Company in Chita-gun of Aichi Prefecture andinstalled there 434 automatic power looms made by Enshu Power Loom Company. This mill later
became Okada Mill of Kondobo. In 1952, Kondobo founded Sakurai Mill at Anjo, Aichi Prefecture,with 90,720 spindles. In that year, Tsushima Mill and Toyohashibo respectively increased spindles: theformer had 62,936 spindles and the latter 60,780 spindles. In 1954, Nobuo acquired the land andbuildings of Kato Bussan Company at Handa, Aichi Prefecture, and installed 219 power looms. In thesame year, Tsushima Mill increased its spindles to 72,440. In 1955, Nobuo purchased Osaka Spinning
Company, and established Ishizubo with 140 million yen and 84,800 spindles. In 1956, Sakurai Mill

12

and Tsushima Mill, respectively, increased spindles to 115,920 and to 83,780. In that year at
Toyohashi, a second mill with 40,800 spindles was founded. And Kondobo purchased Nishiharu Millof Daito Boshoku Company, installed 31,426 spindles and named it Nishiharu Mill. In 1962, Kondobo
further purchased Sanyo Spinning Company with 53,800 spindles at Tamashima, Okayama Prefecture.
In 1967, Kondobo established Hamamatsu Mill with 64,000 spindles, and founded Hamamatsu Second
Mill with 48,000 spindles in the following year. In 1969, Kondobo further expanded Hamamatsu Third
Mill with 64,000 spindles. In 1970, Nobuo again speculated on American raw cotton with over 20,000
million yen, and received a 10 per cent profit.

In 1973 when Nobuo died, his son-in-law, Sadao Kondo, succeeded to Nobuo's business. In
1981, Kondobo began to spin synthetic fibre, and established an unmanned spinning mill in Nagano
Prefecture in 1982. In 1983, Kondobo officially declared itself to be ‘the department store of various
yarns’, and completed a high-technology mill with the most advanced labour-saving automation. In
1987, Kondobo first merged with a foreign mill in Europe, and then acquired two spinning mills in the
US in the following year33.

A significant feature of the prewar Japanese cotton spinning companies was the strategy ofpurchasing raw cotton as cheaply as possible. Prices fluctuated violently largely due to unstableforeign exchange rates and also changes in raw cotton supply, because it was an agricultural product.
Therefore buying up lots of raw cotton was risky and speculative. Nevertheless, it often brought
enormous profits to the cotton spinning companies. Expertise in the speculation of raw cotton, such asthat shown by Keizo Seki in Toyobo and Gengo Kodera in Dai Nihonbo, was applauded as a businesssuccess34.

Seki, the chairman of Toyobo, insisted that:‘The Japanese cotton industry since its inception has borne the risks of market fluctuations
almost in their entirety. Because of this factor, many Japanese firms were abandoned
businesses from the Meiji period to this time and day. Since most of these mills weretransferred to new owners their facilities remained intact, but the fact remains that they
were forced into bankruptcy or, if not bankruptcy, at least were transferred to the hands of
new management. Because of these reasons, cotton spinning was considered an extremely
risky industry until the time of the First World War.
Unlike the British or American cotton industries, the Japanese counterpart is amanufacturing industry, which has the misfortune of bearing huge commercial risks. It is
not only a major manufacturing industry but it also has features and characteristics offinancial trading. Since the industry has had to bear these enormous commercial risks, it isreadily understandable that it was important not to remain in simple trembling fear of thesecrises, but to exploit negative economic situations, such as price fluctuations, to gain
commercial profits. The Japanese cotton spinning industry, therefore, gave much more
importance to the business of purchasing raw cotton. In every firm, managing executives

13

spent all their energies in studying and investigating raw cotton market conditions, inevolving ways, for purchasing cotton effectively and profitably.
During the early years of the industry’s development, these research studies had not yet
been pursued, and the mills had no knowledge of what reasons laid behind the worldwide
market fluctuations. Naturally, management was unavoidably carried out in atrial-and-error fashion on information, furnished by foreign traders; consequently,
fluctuations in the raw cotton market also led to the failure of uncountable companies.
Eventually, however, along with the advancing research in this field and the amassing of
capital funds after the First World War, many of the powerful firms earned enormous
commercial profits. And some firms actually earned greater profits from commercial
trading rather than from manufacturing.
Criticisms have been lodged, it is true, that it is both improper and going too far astrayfor a manufacturing industry to aim at commercial profits. If, however, commercial risks
are actually being borne by the mills, simply waiting in idle inaction for these dangers to
befall would only result in the industry’s losing out in international competition. Therefore,
it is but natural and realistic for management to exert itself to attain commercial profits.
The important thing is that these efforts be carried out on a rational, well-laid plan, andessentially not be speculative. Personally, I am firmly convinced that these commercial
profits have made enormous contributions to the growth of the Japanese cotton industry,along with the many practical rationalization measures carried out in the mills.35’

After the Second World War, it was said that the opportunities to reap enormous profits throughspeculative purchases of raw cotton diminished. But the case of Nobuo Kondo is an excellent
illustration that this tradition survived even into the postwar period.

Tsuzukibo’s history shows the significance of another legacy of the prewar days. In 1928 Ryohei
Tzuzuki (1908-1982) succeeded to a weaving mill in Chita in Aichi Prefecture, which was founded in1909 by his father, Kichitaro Tsuzuki. The mill had only 96 looms in 1927, but Ryohei increased thewide power looms for exports in 1936, becoming one of the largest weavers in Chita with 904 looms in
1939, and establishing Tsuzuki Weaving Company with 1 million yen capital in 1940. Although he wasobliged to lend Nakajima Aircraft Company his mill until 1945, Ryohei changed the company’s nameto Tsuzukibo in 1948 and started cotton spinning with a capital of 30 million yen as shinbo. The
growth of Tsuzukibo was remarkable. In 1959 the capital increased to 100 million yen. The number ofspindles also increased from 10,000 at the beginning to 213,088 in 1955, 356,000 in 1965, 530,120 in1975 and 812,032 in 1982. Apparently Ryohei avoided speculation and instead pursued technologicalimprovement. He developed the innovative Tsuzuki New Spinning (TNS) system, a type of super-highdraft spinning system, and succeeded in saving labour and in automating cotton spinning. In 1972,
Tsuzuki’s 20-count yarn spun at Izumo Mill with the TNS system was praised by Osaka Cotton
Exchange (Osaka Sanpin Torihikijo) as equal to the products of the large spinning companies. Ryohei

14was eager to have foreign subsidiaries, purchasing a mill in Brazil in 1960 and then six mills in the US.
In 1979, Tsuzukibo had eleven mills in Japan and introduced air-jet looms into its weaving mills. In
those days Tsuzukibo was proud to hold the strongest competitive advantage in the world. Tsuzukibo’s
success seems to have been based on technological innovation and offshore production, while utilizing
the low costs of raw cotton and labour in the USA. Cost cutting through high technology, especially,
was an important aspect of the prewar Japanese cotton spinning. When Ryohei died in 1982, theTsuzuki family inherited his business.36 Some financial data about Tsuzukibo is shown in Table 6.
Although the assets and sales expanded remarkably, the ratios of fixed assets to capital wereextraordinarily high, and those of capital to total assets extremely low. Tsuzukibo depended greatly on
loans, and this may be a new feature of the postwar Japanese firms.

Omikenshi was established as a peigne (a sort of silk goods) manufacturing company, Omikenmen, in
Hikone, Shiga Prefecture,37 in 1917 by the Natsukawa family. The latter changed the name to
Omikenshi and began silk spinning in 1919. In 1936, the company started to manufacture rayon staple
fibre yarn, and the founder’s son, Tetsunosuke Natsukawa, began to manage the company in thefollowing year. In 1941 and 1943, Omikenshi merged with four spinning or weaving firms. In 1948,
Omikenshi restarted as shinbo and engaged in cotton spinning. After its entry into worsted yarn
spinning in 1953, the company experienced a notorious industrial dispute in 1954. In 1956, it founded
a rayon staple manufacturing mill at Kakogawa, Hyogo Prefecture, and had eight mills by 1965. In
1969, Omikenshi separated the apparel division as Micalady Company, and constructed a mill at Iidain Nagano Prefecture in 1971. Furthermore, Omikenshi began to construct a cotton spinning mill in
Brazil in 1973, and started another cotton spinning mill in the US in 1978. After the first Oil Crisis,
Omikenshi reduced the number of workers and diversified into non-textiles: housing in 1976, printedbase board manufacturing in 1983, employment agencies in 1985, though these were not so well
promoted (see Table 4)38. Table 7 shows that the ratios of fixed assets to capital were always over 100
per cent, and those of capital to total assets were less than 20 per cent compared with the end of theHigh-Growth Era. Omikenshi, besides Tsuzukibo, could only continue its operations through loans.
Although the assets and sales tended to increase, Omikenshi did not expand so quickly as Tsuzukibo.

As a result, three shinbo succeeded in rapid expansion even in the period of depression after the
Oil Crises. Kondobo’s case shows the importance of skillful speculation in textile materials. The
significance of technological innovation can be found in Tsuzikibo’s case. Their successes depended on
the heritage of prewar Japanese cotton spinning companies and the pursuit of cost cutting throughtechnological improvement (as seen also in the case of Nisshinbo). It is certainly apparent that there
was no restructuring in the shinbo case, and company strategies were based on the historical heritageof the Japanese cotton industry.

4.4 Inactive restructuring: Toyobo
Some of the former top ten spinning companies seem to have been typical mature firms of the15

High-Growth Era. Certainly Toyobo and Unitika experienced slow or inactive restructuring. One of
their strategies was the diversification from textiles to non-textiles, especially to chemicals39. However,Fujibo and Diwabo hardly changed their fully integrated production of textiles, and Shikibo clungalone to manufacturing rayon and cotton textiles. Nevertheless, before the High-Growth Era, all ofthem had diversified within textiles. Most of them produced not only cotton goods but also woolen andrayon products. In the High-Growth Era Nichibo (later Unitika), Toyobo and Daiwabo invested in
facilities to integrate backwards into synthetic fibres such as nylon, acrylic, and polyester. Finally, atabout the time of the first Oil Crisis, Toyobo and Unitika slowly entered such new fields as plastics andbiotechnology. But in contrast, the remaining three companies never pursued the same strategy. The
restructuring of these large companies was generally slow, and it might be difficult to find the proof ofrestructuring in Fujibo, Daiwabo and Shikibo. However, these large firms seem to have set the trend
for the Japanese cotton spinning – that is, gradual decline since the 1960s.

The characteristic of inactive restructuring is well shown in the case of Toyobo. The company
was established in 1914 through the amalgamation of Osakabo and Miebo, was world famous as one of
the largest companies before the Second World War, and was proud of manufacturing various textile
products with high quality and value-added before and after the war. In October 1965, Toyobo was
operating 22 domestic mills with 19,329 workers, had 32 affiliated or subsidiary companies in Japan,
in addition to the management of three overseas companies (Toyobo New York, Daito Boshoku
Company in Hong Kong, and Toyobo Brazil).40 Toyobo developed such excellent technologies as
CAS (Continuous Automated Spinning System). CAS, invented by Howa Kogyo in 1960, was the firstsystem in the world which made ginned cotton directly into yarn. This technology was further diffused
into the other Japanese spinners: NASS of Nittobo, DAS of Daiwabo, KMS of Kurehabo, KATS of
Kurabo, and KAPS of Kanebo. Labour relations at Toyobo were excellent, partly because of sufficient
welfare provision.41 Toyobo’s assets were plentiful (see Table 8). In short, Toyobo seems not to have
had any problems in the early 1960s. However, this situation changed when the company started to
produce synthetic fibres (acrylic in 1956, spandex in 1960, polypropylene in 1961 and polyester in1962), which needed heavy investment. In addition, in 1966 Toyobo merged with the large company
Kurehabo, which had suffered from the depression after its entry into nylon manufacturing in 1964.
This merger meant that Toyobo was deeply involved in the financial burden of synthetics production(as Table 8 suggests), although Toyobo acquired ten mills with 10,471 workers from this merger.

Toyobo‘s business of synthetics was the first step for manufacturing chemicals and the sign offurther diversification into non-textiles. One new business was the manufacture of film for wrappingand of plastics. Although the introduction of polypropylene as a material for textiles in 1961 resulted in
failure, the production of film after 1963 was successful. In 1965, polyester plastics began to be
produced, followed by nylon in 1970. In 1968, a plastics division was established in Toyobo. The
company had a biotechnology division in 1972, built on the site of the old pulp manufacturing
Inuyama Mill (demolished in 1968) in Aichi Prefecture. These new businesses gradually developed in16

Toyobo after the first Oil Shock, but the result was not dramatic. The main interest of Toyobo was stillin high-quality textile products.42 According to Table 8, Toyobo’s profit rates after the Oil Crises were
not too bad, but the other financial ratios worsened during the period.

The restructuring strategy of large cotton spinning companies, such as Toyobo, also explains how
their historical legacy exercised a significant influence on their business. With the confidence borne of
their memories of their great successes in textile manufacturing, their restructuring from textiles to
non-textiles consequently became very lethargic.

Concluding remarks
Since the mid-1960s, the Japanese cotton spinning industry has experienced steady decline. However,
the whole process of this decline was the synthesis of several different firm strategies within theindustry. If we look at this process, three types of firm strategies can be found; (1) positive
restructuring from textiles to non-textiles (Kanebo, Nittobo, and Nisshinbo); (2) adherence to textile
manufacturing (three shinbo: Kondobo, Tsuzukibo and Omikenshi), and (3) inactive restructuring insome large companies (such as Toyobo).

Strategy (2) shows clearly that competitive advantage is supported by continuous efforts andaspirations to improve the quality of products and to reduce the costs. The framework for this strategy
was very strong and effective by the mid-1980s. Three shinbo firmly retained speculation in raw cottonand cost-cutting through technical improvement that had been developed by the prewar cotton spinningcompanies, and could still enjoy a strong competitive advantage doing so.

However, even for such firms, it seems to have been impossible or very difficult to survive in an
era of cutthroat competition, when their businesses were faced with globalization after the Plaza
Agreement in 1985. In this new and difficult environment, strategy (1) became particularly effective,
and the farsightedness of some companies such as Nisshinbo should be praised highly.

Finally, although strategy (3) is conservative and inactive, it seems to have set the trend for theJapanese cotton spinning industry’s gradual decline since the 1960s. But it may also be a historicalinheritance of the industry. It seems that their past memory – i.e., the confidence derived from great
success in textile manufacturing – has influenced the attitude of companies to restructuring.

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1

Nakamura (1993).
After the First World War some new textile companies in wool spinning and weaving, and rayon
manufacturing rapidly emerged in Japan.
3
On the development of the Japanese cotton industry in the pre-war period, see Seki(1956); Takamura(1971) ; Abe(1992a); Yamazaki(1997).
4‘Bo’ means ‘spinning’ in Japanese.
5
Farnie and Yonekawa(1988).
6
Watanabe(1996). The ten companies are Toyobo, Dai-Nihonbo, Kanebo, Daiken Sangyo (formerly
Kurehabo), Daiwabo, Shikibo (formerly Fukushimabo), Kurabo, Fujibo (formerly Fujigasubo),
Nisshinbo and Nittobo.
7
New spinning companies.
8
Even newer spinning companies.
9
GHQ/SCAP(ed.)(c.1951); Tawa(ed.) (1962); Abe(1992b).
10
Nihon Boseki Kyokai (ed.).
11
On this political conflict, see Desler et al.(1979).
12
STA was valid for one year. LTA was abolished at the establishment of MFA.
13
Tawa (ed.)(1979); Tsutsumi(1996).
14
On the labour condition of the postwar textile industry, see Shimazu, (1953); Shindo, (1961); Kase
(1997); Ishida and Murao (2000) ; Murakami et al. (2000).
15
Tawa(ed.)(1962: 468).
16
Kataoka,(1993).
17
Ibid.
18
Research and Statistics Department, the Bank of Japan (ed.).
19
Similar acts were promulgated in fertilizer manufacturing in 1954 and coal mining in 1955.
2

20

20

Fletcher (1998; 2000).
Johnson(1982); Sumiya(ed.)(2000).
22
A similar argument is found in Sugihara (1997: 105).
23
Singleton (1997).
24
The original name was Tokyo Men Shosha, but was changed into Kanegafuchi Boseki
Kabushiki-gaisha in 1893.
25
Joung(1997).
26
Kanebo Co.(ed.)(1988).
27‘Kaiko 30 Nen’ Henshu Iinkai (ed.)(1953).
28
Shashi Henshu Iinkai & Shashi Henshu Jikko Iinkai (eds.)(1979).
29
Nisshin Boseki Kabushiki-gaisha (ed.) (1969: 793-98).
30
Ibid. Kurabo had an affiliated company, Kuraray, which supplied Kurabo with synthetic fibres.
31
Yonekawa (1991).
32
Yamazaki(1997); Abe(1995; 2004).
33
Fujino(1974); Yonekawa(1991: 112).
34
Seki Keizo-shi Tsuikai-roku Kanko-kai (ed.)(1965: 10); Kodera Gengo O Denki Kanko-kai, (1960:
283-303).
35
Seki(1956: 122-23).
36
Tsuji(1990); Yonekawa(1991, 110-12); Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha (ed.), Kaisha Sokan.
37
The headquarters moved to the city of Osaka in 1950.
38
Fujikawa(1967); Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha (ed.), Kaisha Nenkan; Omikenshi’s Homepage on
Internet.
39
The second strategy was foreign direct investment especially to Asia and Latin America in the earlydays, and later to European countries and the USA.
40
Toyobo.
41
Murakami, et al.(2002).
42
Toyo Boseki Kabushiki-gaisha Shashi Henshu-shitsu(ed.)(1986).
21

21

Figure 1
Number of Employees of Japanese Textile Industry
1,400,000

1,200,000

Spinning (Total)
Spinning (Female)
Weaving (Total)
Weaving (Female)Man-made Fiber Manufacturing (Total)
Man-made Fiber Manufacturing (Female)
Textile Total
Textile Total (Female)

800,000

600,000

400,000

200,000

0
19
59
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97

Employees

1,000,000

Year(Note) 'Spinning' includes Japanese traditional spinning.
(Source) Tsusho-sangyo Daijin Kanbo Chousa-tokeibu(ed.), Sen'I Tokei Nenpo .

Table 1 Japanese Exports of Cotton Fabric by Countries
RegionCountry
1934-36
1949
1955
1964
1973
Average
Asia
Korea
0.2%
6.6%
China
12.3%
0.0%
0.2%
0.0%
0.0%
Hong Kong
2.1%
1.5%
5.4%
9.5%
8.8%
Singapore*
2.3%
5.8%
6.4%
3.7%
2.4%
Indonesia
14.5%
11.9%
9.5%
2.2%
1.4%
Pakistan
10.8%
2.8%
0.2%
0.0%
India
4.4%
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
Total
64.3%
54.4%
53.2%
35.1%
34.0%
EuropeUnited Kingdom
0.5%
22.0%
4.5%
2.4%
1.7%
Total
2.8%
27.5%
11.6%
9.8%
12.0%
America
United States
1.8%
0.7%
12.4%
10.0%
14.1%
Total
11.4%
2.3%
19.6%
23.2%
16.9%
Africa
Total
18.2%
14.5%
9.0%
20.0%
9.9%
Oceania
Australia
2.9%
1.3%
6.2%
10.0%
23.9%
Total
3.3%
1.4%
6.6%
11.9%
27.2%
World Total
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%( a million square meter )(2,233.1) (654.9)(952.2)(991.2)(246.7)(Notes)* Data of 1964 is Malasia's figure.
Blanks are not available.
(Sources) Up to 1955, Tawa(ed.)(1962: 926-27); after 1964, Nihon Boseki Kyokai (ed.).

1980
5.5%

(%)
1985
5.9%

26.7%
32.1%
2.2%
5.5%
0.2%
0.2%
0.0%
3.0%
62.4%
59.5%
1.4%
2.9%
16.9%
7.9%
6.1%
19.7%
8.0%
22.2%
5.5%
2.0%
6.2%
6.9%
7.3%
8.3%
100.0%
100.0%(316.4)(445.6)

Table 2 Geographical Distribution of Cotton Spinning and Coal Mining(1)Cotton Spinning Mills(2)Coal Mine Lots
RegionEnd of 1949
End of 1973
End of 1949
End of 1973
Mills 1,000 Spindles
Mills 1,000 Spindles
Mine Lots Area (1,000 Ares) Mine Lots Area (1,000 Ares)
Hokkaido1
11 (0.3% )
00(
0.0% )
536 14,667 ( 40.7% )700 16,363 (
37.5% )
Tohoku2
24 (0.6% )
2
106 (
1.1% )
244
3,226 (
8.9% )
291 4,536 (
10.6% )
Hokuriku
10555 (
14.8% )
13882 (
9.2% )
11200 (
0.6% )
16225 (
0.5% )
Kanto
5
78 (2.1% )
238 (
0.4% )
59830 (
2.3% )
61863 (
2.0% )
Chubu
27 1,107 (
29.6% )
79 4,914 (
51.1% )
1270 (
0.2% )
14157 (
0.4% )
Kinki
25
886 (
23.7% )
54 1,987 (
20.7% )
8103 (
0.3% )
699 (
0.2% )
Chugoku
8307 (8.2% )
24874 (
9.1% )
134
1,716 (
4.8% )
00(
0.0% )
Shikoku
14557 (
14.9% )
11518 (
5.4% )
6124 (
0.3% )
7142 (
0.3% )
Kyushu7212 (
5.7% )
6300 (
3.1% )
848 15,117 ( 41.9% )987 21,129 (
48.4% )
Japan Total
99 3,736 ( 100.0% )191 9,620 (
100.0% )1,858 36,054 ( 100.0% )2,082 43,614 ( 100.0% )(Sources) (1)Nihon Boseki Kyokai(ed.); (2)Shigen-cho Chokan Kanbo Tokei-ka (ed.) (1949) and Tsusho-sangyo Daijin Kanbo
Chosa-tokeibu (ed.)(1973), Sen'I Tokei Nenpo.

Table 3 Top Japanese Spinning Companies by Number of Spindles
Dec., 1935
Dec., 1949
Dec., 1955
Dec., 1964
Order Company
SpindleOrder Company
SpindleOrder Company
SpindleOrder
Company
1 Toyobo
1,476,080 14.3%
1 Toyobo
479,800
12.9%
1 Toyobo
615,576
7.5%
1 Toyobo
2 Kanebo
928,384
9.0%
2 Dai Nihonbo
462,532
12.5%
2 Dai Nihonbo
595,216
7.3%
2 Nichibo
3 Dai Nihonbo
922,760
8.9%
3 Daiken Sangyo
429,840
11.6%
3 Kanebo
573,002
7.0%
3 Kanebo
4 Fujigasubo
675,764
6.5%
4 Shikibo
343,364
9.2%
4 Kurehabo
562,708
6.9%
4 Nisshinbo
5 Nisshinbo
503,496
4.9%
5 Fujibo
323,300
8.7%
5 Nisshinbo
549,400
6.7%
5 Daiwabo
6 Kurabo
500,348
4.8%
6 Kanebo
308,852
8.3%
6 Kurabo
466,780
5.7%
6 Fujibo
7 Kinkabo
445,960
4.3%
7 Kurabo
300,652
8.1%
7 Shikibo
448,788
5.5%
7 Kurehabo
8 Kurehabo
439,484
4.3%
8 Daiwabo
291,780
7.9%
8 Daiwabo
433,880
5.3%
8 Kurabo
9 Hukushimabo
324,704
3.1%
9 Nisshinbo
284,016
7.6%
9 Fujibo
391,360
4.8%
9 Shikibo
10 Kishiwadabo
321,132
3.1%
10 Nittobo
181,048
4.9%
10 Omikenshi
268,496
3.3%
10 Omikenshi
11 Tenma Orimono
246,928
2.4%
14 Kondobo
10,0000.3%
11 Nittobo
245,080
3.0%
11 Nittobo
12 Toyoda Boshoku
181,368
1.8%
14 Omikenshi
10,0000.3%
13 Tsuzukibo
192,560
2.4%
13 Tsuzukibo
13 Hinode Boshoku
172,492
1.7%
14 Tsuzukibo
10,0000.3%
14 Kondobo
163,160
2.0%
16 Kondobo
Subtotal (13 Firms)
7,138,900 69.1% Subtotal (13 Firms)
3,435,184
92.5% Subtotal (13 Firms)
5,506,006
67.4% Subtotal (13 Firms)
Subtotal (except 3 Shinbo ) 3,405,184
91.7% Subtotal (except 3 Shinbo ) 4,881,790
59.8% Subtotal (except 3 Shinbo )Total (60 Firms)
10,330,452 100.0% Total (35 Firms)
3,714,548 100.0% Total (134 Firms)
8,167,754 100.0% Total (134 Firms)
Dec., 1973
Dec., 1980
Dec., 1985
Order Company
SpindleOrder Company
SpindleOrder Company
Spindle1985/1949
1 Toyobo
1,082,600 10.5%
1 Nisshinbo
985,108
10.9%
1 Tsuzukibo
812,032
10.1%
81.2
2 Nisshinbo
685,668
6.7%
2 Toyobo
888,680
9.9%
2 Toyobo
702,2808.7%
0.8
3 Kanebo
616,080
6.0%
3 Tsuzukibo
806,860
9.0%
3 Nisshinbo
685,108
8.5%
2.4
4 Unitika
566,176
5.5%
4 Unitika
461,332
5.1%
4 Omikenshi
431,416
5.4%
43.1
5 Tsuzukibo
521,688
5.1%
5 Kondobo
450,008
5.0%
5 Daiwabo
423,408
5.3%
1.4
6 Daiwabo
482,982
4.7%
6 Daiwabo
428,444
4.8%
6 Kurabo
386,486
4.8%
1.3
7 Kondobo
450,008
4.4%
7 Omikenshi
408,140
4.5%
7 Kondobo
380,092
4.7%
38.0
8 Fujibo
448,692
4.4%
8 Kurabo
400,648
4.4%
8 Shikibo
373,340
4.6%
1.2
9 Kurabo
445,436
4.3%
9 Kanebo Cotton Yarn
390,580
4.3%
9 Fujibo
345,784
4.3%
1.2
10 Omikenshi
398,240
3.9%
10 Fujibo
385,308
4.3%
10 Unitika
320,972
4.0%
0.7
11 Shikibo
396,612
3.9%
11 Shikibo
373,340
4.1%
11 Kanebo Cotton Yarn
304,2403.8%
0.9
13 Nittobo
317,916
3.1%
13 Nittobo
323,500
3.6%
12 Nittobo
296,544
3.7%
1.6
Subtotal (12 Firms)
6,412,098 62.4% Subtotal (12 Firms)
6,301,948
69.9% Subtotal (12 Firms)
5,461,702
67.8%
1.6
Subtotal (except 3 Shinbo ) 5,042,162 49.1% Subtotal (except 3 Shinbo ) 4,636,940
51.5% Subtotal (except 3 Shinbo ) 3,838,162
47.7%
1.1
Total (93 Firms)
10,275,894 100.0% Total (84 Firms)
9,011,099 100.0% Total (72 Firms)
8,052,105 100.0%
2.2(Notes) Spindles in 1935 include those for rayon staple (39,934 spindles). Spindles in 1949 and 1955 are only for cotton spinning. Spindles after 1964
include those for rayon staple. Dai Nihonbo changed the name into Nichibo in 1964. Nichibo and Nihon Rayon merged, and Unitika was established in1969. Daiken Sangyo was Kurehabo. Krehabo was merged with Toyobo in 1966. Kanebo Cotton Yarn was separated from Kanebo in 1977. Three Shinbo :Kondobo, Omikenshi and Tsuzukibo.
(Source) Nihon Boseki Kyokai(ed.).

Spindle711,592
6.3%
676,184
6.0%
665,5205.9%
633,616
5.6%
499,7224.4%
497,284
4.4%
494,192
4.4%
482,916
4.3%
467,0464.1%
422,252
3.7%
404,448
3.6%
375,9883.3%
257,626
2.3%
6,588,386 58.2%
5,532,520 48.8%
11,329,011 100.0%

Table 4 Diversification of Main Cotton Spinning Companies
Company
1964
1973
KaneboTextiles
86.4% Textiles
Cosmetics
10.4% Cosmetics
Food
3.2% Food
Others 5)

1985
74.7% Textiles 10)
13.2% Cosmetics
3.3% Pharmaceuticals
8.8% Industrial materials
Electronics

56.9%
35.3%
3.6%
2.9%
1.3%

Nisshinbo

TextilesAsbesto
Plastics
Paper goods
Polyurethane form
Others 1)

87.7% Textiles
3.6% Automotive brakes
2.5% Polyurethane foams
1.9% Paper goods
1.8% Plastics
2.5% Others 6)

84.3% Textiles
4.9% Automotive brakes
3.5% Paper goods
3.3% Polyurethane foams
1.4% Machine tools
2.7% Labels

75.8%
9.2%
5.7%
4.5%
4.2%
0.6%

Nittobo

Textiles 2)
Vynyl chloride resin tile
Plastics
Sound absorption ceiling board

91.6% Textiles
4.2% Chemical goods such as boards
2.8% Glass fiber goods
1.4%

67.3% Textiles
16.4% Glass fiber goods
16.3% Chemical goods such as boards
Rock wool goods
Property development

58.4%
19.0%
16.0%
4.1%
2.6%

KuraboTextilesPlastics

95.1% Textiles
4.9% Plastics and others 7)

93.4% Textiles
6.6% Plastics and other non-textiles

88.9%
11.1%

ToyoboTextiles 3)

100.0% Textiles
Plastics

97.8% Textiles
2.2% Plastics

82.2%
17.8%

Unitika (Nichibo) Textiles

100.0% Textiles
Others 8)

94.7% Textiles
5.3% Plastics
Construction & engineering
Other non-textiles

78.8%
9.1%
7.1%
5.0%

FujiboTextiles 4)

100.0% Textiles
ERP ship manufacturing
Electronics

99.4% Textiles
96.1%
0.3% Electronics, sanitary goods and so on 3.9%
0.3%

Daiwabo

Textiles

100.0% Textiles 9)100.0% Textiles 9)100.0%

Shikibo

Textiles

100.0% Textiles

100.0% Textiles

100.0%

Omikenshi

Textiles

100.0% Textiles

100.0% Textiles
Others 11)

94.6%
5.4%

(Notes)1) includes machines & tools manufacturing, and printing.
2) includes rock wool and glass fibers.
3) includes pulp (0.4%).
4) includes chemicals.
5) includes fashion, housing and pharmaceuticals.
6) includes machinery and labels.
7) includes environmental controlling equipments and sale of information.
8) includes glass fiber, plastics, housing and engineering.
9) includes such service as golf playing and hotel.
10) except cotton goods.
11) includes electronics and employment agencies.
Precentages show the ratios in sales.
1964 and 1973: April-September in respect years. 1985: April, 1985-March, 1986.
Kurehabo, which was merged in 1966 by Toyobo, did not diversified into non-textiles in 1964.
Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha(ed.), Kaisha Nenkan .

(Source)Table 5 Nisshinbo(100 million yen)
Year/month Fixed Assets Capital
Total Assets
Profits
Sales
Employees
A
B
A/B
C
B/C
D
E
D/E
Male
Female1960
412,397
10,422 119.0%
19,51453.4%
3,038
21,870 13.9%
2,216
6,560
1961
4
13,384
10,986 121.8%
22,12249.7%
2,582
23,131 11.2%
2,246
6,837
1962
4
14,51011,378 127.5%
25,21545.1%
1,562
23,104
6.8%
2,285
6,602
1963
4
14,93012,307 121.3%
27,15345.3%
2,597
27,095
9.6%
2,302
6,519
1964
4
16,57114,141 117.2%
33,95541.6%
2,025
30,982
6.5%
2,296
6,513
1965
4
17,702
15,032 117.8%
36,26641.4%
1,805
34,134
5.3%
2,351
6,685
1966
4
17,93315,752 113.8%
40,20339.2%
1,891
38,353
4.9%
2,459
6,683
1967
4
19,863
16,516 120.3%
42,691
38.7%
3,043
42,900
7.1%
2,569
6,691
1968
4
21,235
17,431 121.8%
47,50336.7%
4,280
49,544
8.6%
2,754
7,992
1969
4
21,202
18,879 112.3%
47,09540.1%
4,790
54,867
8.7%
1970
4
24,371
21,522 113.2%
55,09439.1%
5,219
61,262
8.5%
3,181
8,062
1971
4
26,26323,186 113.3%
57,17140.6%
4,309
68,431
6.3%
3,359
7,789
1972
4
27,991
24,799 112.9%
58,53442.4%
5,372
72,948
7.4%
3,319
6,875
1973
4
31,47328,477 110.5%
66,66642.7%
14,442
92,944 15.5%
3,331
6,426
1974
4
37,20836,392 102.2%
90,53840.2%
14,163 118,370 12.0%
3,445
5,997
1975
4
36,05039,335
91.6%
79,39849.5%-2,343
41,404 -5.7%
3,053
4,168
1976
4
35,114
41,372
84.9%
83,71649.4%
4,571
95,206
4.8%
2,848
3,700
1977
4
34,21544,43777.0%
83,98252.9%
6,501 111,317
5.8%
2,752
3,424
1978
4
34,016
47,10572.2%
81,10858.1%
4,862 115,565
4.2%
2,737
3,400
1979
4
33,77553,73162.9%
90,40459.4%
10,320 126,925
8.1%
2,767
3,367
1980
4
34,04358,751
57.9%
97,37360.3%
9,687 149,490
6.5%
2,860
3,350
1981
4
35,353
61,93057.1%
99,49962.2%
6,634 162,972
4.1%
2,978
3,271
1982
4
38,65764,76359.7%
106,88960.6%
6,585 170,303
3.9%
3,072
3,328
1983
4
46,94068,14768.9%
112,48660.6%
5,824 176,396
3.3%
3,174
3,344
1984
4
48,12971,85967.0%
125,39957.3%
8,020 190,288
4.2%
3,289
3,320
1985
4
55,92380,703
69.3%
138,87158.1%
7,922 210,153
3.8%
3,386
3,259
1986
4
59,76990,20666.3%
155,01758.2%
6,170 212,279
2.9%(Note)
Blanks are not available.
(Sources)
Nisshin Boseki Kabusiki-gaisha (ed.), (1969); Nisshin Boseki Kabusiki-gaisha, Yuka Shoken Hokokusho ; Nihon
Keizai Shinbunsha(ed.), Kaisha Nenkan .

Total
8,776
9,083
8,887
8,821
8,809
9,036
9,142
9,260
10,746
11,243
11,148
10,194
9,757
9,442
7,221
6,548
6,176
6,137
6,134
6,210
6,249
6,400
6,518
6,609
6,645

Table 6 Tsuzukibo
Year/month

Fixed Assets Capital
Total Assets
A
B
A/B
C
1970 5
15,535
5,018
309.6%
30,6941971 5
17,5436,038
290.5%
36,4601972 5
20,6937,133
290.1%
44,3941973 528,9799,879
293.3%
73,4541974 31975 343,404
10,117429.0%
92,092
1976 347,561
10,200466.3%
100,658
1977 3
48,712
11,424426.4%
108,9141978 347,167
10,263459.6%
108,1101979 350,605
11,705432.3%
98,7181980 354,752
13,280412.3%
106,889
1981 360,20911,922505.0%
114,769
1982 362,408
11,917523.7%
121,4221983 365,415
10,955597.1%
127,423
1984 3
68,586
12,842534.1%
130,171
1985 375,353
15,627482.2%
139,006
1986 3
78,101
17,626443.1%
134,265(Note)
Blanks are not available.
(Source) Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha(ed.), Kaisha Sokan.

(100 million yen)
Profits
Sales
Employees
B/C
D
E
D/E
Male
Female16.3%
2,033
32,417
6.3%
16.6%
3,110
32,529
9.6%
1,508
3,425
16.1%
2,187
35,118
6.2%
1,454
3,070
13.4%
5,873
50,821 11.6%
1,562
2,990
55,27011.0%-8,617
64,109 -13.4%
10.1%
-166
77,047 -0.2%
1,483
2,027
10.5%
4,042
89,962
4.5%
1,573
1,887
9.5%
-919
77,419 -1.2%
1,446
1,822
11.9%
6,947
80,202
8.7%
1,609
1,978
12.4%
7,578
95,027
8.0%
1,038
1,687
10.4%
1,648
94,821
1.7%
1,074
1,445
9.8%
976 108,847
0.9%
1,223
1,653
8.6%
2,871 113,917
2.5%
2,203
2,177
9.9%
4,866 128,297
3.8%
2,327
2,310
11.2%
8,658 148,919
5.8%
2,306
2,377
13.1%
4,332 136,676
3.2%
2,295
2,494

Total
4,933
4,524
4,552

3,510
3,460
3,268
3,587
2,725
2,519
2,876
4,380
4,637
4,683
4,789

Table 7 Omikenshi(100 million yen)
Total Assets
Profits
Sales
Employees
Year/month Fixed AssetsCapital
A
B
A/B
C
B/C
D
E
D/E
Male
Female
1961
4
5,184
3,672
141.2%
11,964 30.7%
12,682
1,586
4,850
1962
4
5,096
3,446
147.9%
11,810 29.2%
11,693
1,551
4,343
1963
4
5,294
3,383
156.5%
12,221 27.7%
1964
4
1965
4
6,360
3,495
182.0%
14,282 24.5%
929
4,501
1966
4
1967
4
1968
4
7,877
3,768
209.0%
19,929 18.9%
2,173
28,766
7.6%
963
4,830
1969
4
8,427
4,116
204.7%
23,134 17.8%
1,232
32,254
3.8%
1,018
5,177
1970
4
8,630
4,411
195.6%
24,620 17.9%
1,701
33,561
5.1%
965
4,980
1971
4
9,293
4,818
192.9%
27,764 17.4%
1,783
36,417
4.9%
1,261
4,791
1972
4
10,481
5,074
206.6%
30,307 16.7%
1,211
34,665
3.5%
1,313
4,836
1973
4
11,7705,824
202.1%
38,617 15.1%
4,651
46,021
10.1%
1,350
4,775
1974
4
15,9798,171
195.6%
53,703 15.2%
4,903
56,563
8.7%
1,535
4,839
1975
4
17,247
6,944
248.4%
52,955 13.1%-3,98920,620-19.3%
1,417
4,535
1976
4
16,1007,485215.1%
55,713 13.4%
236
50,697
0.5%
1,280
4,001
1977
4
15,076
8,025
187.9%
56,164 14.3%
1,409
57,898
2.4%
1,407
3,604
1978
4
13,151
7,755
169.6%
49,434 15.7%-1,95554,298
-3.6%
1,212
3,371
1979
4
14,9449,909
150.8%
53,254 18.6%
3,969
53,596
7.4%
1,325
3,225
1980
4
14,287
10,439136.9%
56,203 18.6%
2,584
59,223
4.4%
1,311
3,198
1981
4
14,1719,160
154.7%
56,764 16.1%-1,68660,164
-2.8%
1,282
3,167
1982
4
14,014
8,979
156.1%
58,338 15.4%-791
64,680
-1.2%
1,238
3,016
1983
4
14,935
9,068
164.7%
56,695 16.0%-640
66,430
-1.0%
1,175
2,805
1984
4
14,671
10,297142.5%
56,284 18.3%
2,057
70,417
2.9%
1,177
2,727
1985
4
14,363
10,546136.2%
56,330 18.7%
2,491
74,264
3.4%
1,203
2,768
(Note)
Blanks are not available.
(Source)
Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha(ed.), Kaisha Nenkan .

Total
6,436
5,894

5,430

5,793
6,195
5,945
6,052
6,149
6,125
6,374
5,952
5,281
5,011
4,583
4,550
4,509
4,449
4,254
3,980
3,904
3,971

Table 8 Toyobo(100 million yen)
Year/month Fixed AssetsCapital
Total Assets
Profits
Sales
Employees
A
B
A/B
C
B/C
D
E
D/E Male
FemaleTotal
1960
425,571
26,38496.9%
50,663 52.1%
4,620
52,563 8.8%
1961
428,75526,562 108.3%
61,324 43.3%
3,438
58,264 5.9%
8,870
12,954
21,8241962
432,51829,975 108.5%
70,992 42.2%
1,931
62,441 3.1%
8,867
12,45921,3261963
434,22828,918 118.4%
71,656 40.4%
3,554
67,265 5.3%
8,882
12,617
21,4991964
438,014
29,125 130.5%
86,978 33.5%
4,124
81,990 5.0%
8,912
13,685
22,5971965
443,21728,479 151.8%
96,114 29.6%
3,850
84,192 4.6%
8,568
13,538
22,1061966
444,102
27,354 161.2%
99,053 27.6%
5,561 111,632 5.0%
9,870
18,28028,1501967
470,01333,589 208.4%
150,908 22.3%
11,402 149,502 7.6%
9,619
17,23026,8491968
470,37035,413 198.7%
157,906 22.4%
13,863 161,805 8.6%
9,509
18,89628,4051969
474,326
46,101 161.2%
177,741 25.9%
13,293 184,278 7.2%
9,588
18,85828,4461970
477,38247,458 163.1%
180,749 26.3%
15,004 196,010 7.7%
9,690
18,077
27,7671971
481,522
48,467 168.2%
197,683 24.5%
10,907 207,474 5.3%
9,928
17,06626,9941972
490,50047,784 189.4%
208,100 23.0%
6,639 230,056 2.9%
9,960
15,78825,7481973
495,31149,336 193.2%
224,454 22.0%
27,435 262,179 10.5%
9,742
14,87024,6121974
4112,268
53,447 210.1%
297,274 18.0%
20,455 304,224 6.7%
9,754
14,25824,0121975
4145,291
45,456 319.6%
314,799 14.4%-8,323 280,347 -3.0%
9,100
9,975
19,0751976
4
142,155
46,720 304.3%
307,174 15.2%
188 238,038 0.1%
8,574
8,763
17,3371977
4
135,570
43,268 313.3%
286,001 15.1%-4,777 211,776 -2.3%
7,609
7,767
15,376
1978
4
128,580
45,528 282.4%
280,536 16.2%
14,508 214,916 6.8%
7,273
7,126
14,3991979
4132,782
48,814 272.0%
290,272 16.8%
15,320 247,573 6.2%
7,029
6,863
13,8921980
4134,90249,072 274.9%
305,250 16.1%
8,684 263,940 3.3%
6,662
6,574
13,2361981
4
139,144
53,621 259.5%
330,086 16.2%
14,708 316,828 4.6%
6,068
6,402
12,4701982
4
141,740
53,102 266.9%
328,928 16.1%
16,457 353,992 4.6%
6,049
6,264
12,3131983
4
129,683
55,371 234.2%
311,859 17.8%
16,754 348,950 4.8%
5,332
5,785
11,117
1984
4
129,300
60,200 214.8%
301,721 20.0%
18,094 342,903 5.3%
5,282
5,334
10,6161985
4137,707
63,046 218.4%
302,610 20.8%
15,948 316,722 5.0%1986
4140,907
74,815 188.3%
298,409 25.1%
9,321 261,884 3.6%
4,097
4,712
8,809
(Note)
Blanks are not available.
(Sources) Toyo Boseki Kabusiki-gaisha Shashi Henshu-shitu (ed.)(1986), Vol.2; Toyo Boseki Kabusiki-gaisha; Nihon Keizai
Shinbunsha (eds.), Kaisha Nenkan .