establishingestablishing criteria
for IFQ programs

Individual fishing quotas (IFQs) have been one of the most hotly
debated topics in fishery management since the early 1980’s. IFQs
and other share-based management systems allocate privileges toharvest a certain portion of the total allowable catch to individuals
or groups of individuals. With IFQs, the race to fish andincentives to over invest in catching capacity are eliminated,giving fishermen greater flexibility in their harvesting activities,
possibly reducing costs while increasing revenues and enhancing safety. IFQs may also decrease
bycatch, fish that are caught but not kept, by providing incentives for IFQ holders to be more
selective in targeting fish.
Despite benefits, IFQs are highly controversial. Strongly worded arguments have been made that
IFQs are both beneficial and harmful to the fish resource, fishing industry members and fishingdependent communities. While some claim they promote a greater conservation ethic toward
fishery resources, others maintain share-based management programs privatize and unfairly
allocate a public resource, and allow only a chosen few to reap substantial economic benefits.
The debate surrounding IFQs drew national attention during the process of reauthorizing theMagnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act in 1996. Before reauthorization,
there were three IFQ systems in the United States; the North Pacific halibut and sablefish fisheries,
the South Atlantic wreckfish fishery and the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fisheries.
Controversy surrounding these programs led some stakeholders to call for a ban on IFQs. In
response, Congress placed a moratorium on new IFQ programs until October 1, 2000 and askedthe National Academy of Sciences to study IFQs and provide recommendations to Congress. The
Academy recommended lifting the moratorium and made recommendations for the developmentof new IFQ programs.
Following the expiration of the moratorium in 2000, other share-based management programs
were developed. The fixed gear sablefish fishery in the Pacific and the Bering Sea pollock fisheries
are managed under share-based systems. Similar programs for crab fisheries in the Bering Sea
and Aleutian Islands are slated to come online later this year. Three councils are currently
considering IFQs or share-based management in other fisheries. IFQs are also used in Canada,
New Zealand, Australia, Scotland, Iceland, and other countries.
Congress is again considering reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. In the past threeyears, six proposed Congressional bills have included provisions for future IFQ programs. Each ofthese bills would establish substantive and procedural requirements for the development of IFQ
programs on a national level.

key concepts and controversies
Elements of IFQ Programs
There is no single definition that characterizes the elements of an IFQ program. Each one isdifferent and is designed to address specific goals and objectives. Open public debate anddialogue are necessary precursors to advancing IFQ specifications.

Duration and review
There is little disagreement about the need to periodically review IFQ programs. There is,however, controversy over whether IFQ programs should be designed to expire or “sunset”
after a given period of time. Programs could then be renewed after a thorough review. Some
believe that making IFQ allocations permanent would allow ownership of a public resource.
Because of concerns over long-term investments, others claim sunsets would reduce
economic gains. A 1999 National Academy of Sciences report, Sharing the Fish: Toward aNational Policy on Individual Fishing Quotas, found that sunset provisions are fundamentallyinconsistent with the nature of IFQs and may be counterproductive to their purpose.

Limitation of interests
All current legislative proposals for IFQ programs support limiting the amount of IFQ aperson may hold and allowing quotas to be revoked at any time without compensation.

Allocation criteria
Policies for allocating IFQs are controversial. The potential for gains or losses to historic
participants may be greatest at the time of share allocation. Often, allocation is based oncatch history as many in the fishing industry view their history as a quantifiable andverifiable proxy for participation and investment. Others argue that relying solely oncatch history tends to reward those who remained in the fishery for several years and may
deprive those who moved between fisheries from year-to-year of the same opportunity.

Conservation
Many stakeholders believe IFQ programs should be required to promote conservation,
including bycatch reduction. One legislative proposal would create an incentive forparticipants to meet conservation standards by increasing the annual allocations of quota
to participants who meet those standards.

Processor sharesSome industry and community interests believe processors should have their own individual
quota system with shares representing the opportunity to buy fish. They believe thisrecognizes the importance of processors’ investments and could address overcapacity in thissector, as well as provide additional community protection. Processor shares would require
fishermen to sell all or a portion of their catch only to processors that hold shares. Someargue that this reduces competition in the marketplace and upsets the traditional balanceof power between fishermen and processors.

story ideas
Referenda
Requiring a referendum to implement an IFQ program
would allow people who are actively involved in a fisheryto vote on whether the fishery transitions to an IFQ
system. Many questions remain about who would beeligible to vote, how potential voters would be contacted,
the size of the majority required to pass the referendum,referendum wording and other matters. Some areconcerned that a referendum could exclude many
interests from the IFQ decision. Others argue that theMagnuson-Stevens Act process is already an open,
public and deliberative process for selecting among
various management alternatives.

Community impacts of IFQ programs

Transferability

sides of the IFQ debate. Some believe that

Transferability allows people to buy and sell harvest
share privileges. Transferability can also help fishermenplan and manage their business operations and reduce
capacity. In a multispecies fishery, transferability may
allow fishermen to match quota to catch in order toreduce bycatch. A lack of proper controls on transferability
can concentrate interests in the hands of a few.
Transferability can be controlled through limits ontransfers and acquisition of quota shares. On the otherhand, limitations on transferability can reduce thepotential benefits of an IFQ program.

Fees
IFQ programs may involve higher government costs thanother management programs. To compensate for these
additional costs, some proposals include cost recovery
programs. A number of interested parties believe that any
IFQ program should provide for the collection of fees toreturn a portion of the fishery rent to the public.

Enforcement, Monitoring & Data Collection
Effective management, monitoring and enforcement
are critical to realizing the benefits of IFQs. Increased
observer coverage and routine collection of social andeconomic data could help managers determine whether
an IFQ program is meeting its goals.

Although many fishermen support IFQs,
others are concerned they will harm
communities by concentrating wealth in
the hands of a few. How have existing IFQ
programs affected communities? How can
the design of an IFQ program resolve thisconcern?

Environmental benefits
Environmental groups have landed on bothIFQs offer an effective way to reduce
bycatch, which is one of the most importantenvironmental problems associated withcommercial fisheries. Others believe IFQs
harm the resource and environment. An
examination of existing IFQ programs would
clarify positive or negative outcomes.

Privatization of a public resource?
Fish stocks are a publicly owned resource.
Under IFQs, fishing opportunity iscontrolled through shares that can bebought and sold, so many view harvest
control through IFQs as the privatizationof a public resource. Do IFQs reallyprivatize a public resource, or are they
merely a different way of structuring aharvesting system that already exists?

information
conference participants
IFQ panel (Chair Presenter Panelist )1

2

3

Dr. Ken Roberts1
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA
225-578-2391, kroberts@agcenter.lsu.edu
Richard Allen2
Rhode Island fisherman and rights-based management advocate
401-789-1463, rballen@cox.net
Dorothy Lowman2
Portland, Oregon environmental consultant
503-292-8553, dmlowman@earthlink.net
Dr. Seth Macinko2
University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI
401-874-2596, macinko@uri.edu
Robert Alverson3
Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association, Seattle, WA
206-284-4720, robertalverson@msn.com
Jay Bornstein3
Bellingham, WA commercial fish processor
360-734-7990, jay@bornstein.com
James Donofrio3
Recreational Fishing Alliance, New Gretna, New Jersey
609-404-1060, jdrfa@aol.com
Kevin Duffy3
At-Sea Processors Association, Seattle, WA
206-285-5139, kduffy@atsea.org
3Dr. Samuel Pooley
Pacific Islands Fisheries Science Center, Honolulu, HI
808-983-5390, samuel.pooley@noaa.gov
Joe Sullivan3
Seattle, WA fisheries consultant
206-624-5950, jsullivan@mundtmac.com
Craig Severance3
University of Hawaii at Hilo, Hawaii
808-974-7472, sevc@hawaii.edu
3David Wallace
Maryland fisheries consultant, Wallace and Associates
410-376-3200, dhwallace@aol.com
William Wells3
New England Fishery Council Advisor & commercial fisherman
Seaford, VA
757-898-8512, WellsScals@aol.com
Wayne Werner 3
Commercial fisherman, Galliano, LA
985-632-4389, fishwife75@atlantic.net
For more information about this conference topic
Jon McCracken (Staff Assistant)
North Pacific Fishery Management Council, Anchorage, AK907-271-2809, jon.mccracken@noaa.govMark Fina (Rapporteur)
North Pacific Fishery Management Council, Anchorage, AK907-271-2809, mark.fina@noaa.gov

councils using or considering
IFQs and other share-based
management programs
Pacific Fishery Management Council
Fixed gear sablefish; considering IFQs
for trawl groundfish
Jim Seger503-820-2280, Jim.Seger@noaa.gov
http://www.pcouncil.org/groundfish/gfifq.html
North Pacific Fishery Management Council
Halibut and sablefish, Bering Sea pollock,Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands crab;
considering Gulf of Alaska rockfish andgroundfish
Mark Fina907-271-2809, mark.fina@noaa.gov
http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc
Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council
Surf clam and ocean quahog
Tom Hoff
302-674-2331, thoff@mafmc.org
http://www.mafmc.org/midatlantic/mafmc.htm
South Atlantic Fishery Management Council
Wreckfish
Gregg Waugh
843-571-4366, gregg.waugh@safmc.net
http://www.safmc.net/
Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council
Considering red snapper and grouper
Wayne Swingle
813-228-2815, wayne.swingle@gulfcouncil.org
http://www.gulfcouncil.org/index.htm