Discussion Papers In Economics
And Business
Daewoo Motors (1992-1999):
A dragon multinational in the car industry*
Sardor Tadjiev
Pierre-Yves Donzé

Discussion Paper 20-15

November 2020

Graduate School of Economics
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPANDaewoo Motors (1992-1999):
A dragon multinational in the car industry*

Sardor Tadjiev† and Pierre-Yves Donzé††November 25, 2020

Abstract
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) from emerging countries have shown their ability tocompete as latecomers against established enterprises in various industries. Such latecomers
are known as “dragon multinationals” and much research has been conducted to analyze
their behavior and competitive advantages. This paper focuses on the strategy implemented
by the Korean automobile company Daewoo Motors to expand into the global market. Basedon the international business literature on the emergence of multinational enterprises inemerging countries, this paper examines why Daewoo Motors invested first in developing
economies such as Uzbekistan and Eastern Europe upon expanding into the global market.
It discusses both the growth of foreign sales and the organization of overseas assembly plants.
In addition, this paper explores the impact of investing in other emerging countries on thecompetitiveness of the firm and evaluates the potential risks of this approach.

Keywords: Daewoo Motors, globalization, dragon multinationals, automobile industry
JEL classification: D22, F23, L62, N85*

This research was supported by a Japanese Grant Aid for Human Resource Development Scholarship (JDS).
Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, sms2002@gmail.com††
Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, donze@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp†

1. Introduction
The automobile industry is one of the most globalized industries. Automobiles are sold allover the world and this industry is dominated by a small number of global companies.
Moreover, the automobile industry is one of the biggest employers in the world economy.
Direct auto jobs comprise approximately 5% of worldwide manufacturing employment, andeach direct job in the automobile industry creates five indirect jobs. Based on this, theautomobile industry employs, directly and indirectly, over 50 million people worldwide,
making it one of the most internationalized and globalized industries (Covarrubias &Ramírez Perez, 2020).
Another characteristic of this industry is its domination by multinational enterprises (MNEs)
based in America, Europe, and Japan (i.e., the Triad) A small number of companies from
Triad countries account for the vast majority of production and sales in automobile industry
globally. These firms have maintained a 70%–80% market share globally from the 1990s to
the 2010s (Humphrey & Memedovic, 2003; Marklines.com, 2020). The Fortune Global 500
list (2018) includes 15 automobile MNEs from Triad countries, including Toyota (ranked6th), Volkswagen (7th), Daimler (16th), General Motors (GM) (21st), Ford (22nd), Honda(30th), BMW Group (51st), Nissan Motor (54th), Peugeot (108th), Mitsubishi (129th),
Renault (134th), Volvo (286th), Suzuki Motor (348th), Mazda Motor (378th), Subaru(384th). These firms are organized globally and own production subsidiaries throughout theworld. For instance, Toyota has 606 subsidiaries and 199 affiliates in 26 countries, including
67 manufacturing companies worldwide, and sells its vehicles in over 170 countries (Toyota,2020). Volkswagen Group operates 125 production plants in 31 countries and sells its
vehicles in 153 countries (Volkswagen, 2020). Large domestic markets, low wages, andlocal policies to attract inward foreign direct investment (FDI) have made emerging
countries a major target of investment by MNEs. Global automobile production rose by1

almost 7 million units between 1990 and 1997, with developing countries making the biggest
contribution to this growth. Taken together, these fast-growing emerging markets increased
vehicle sales by 80% and production by 93% (around 9% annually) between 1990 and 1997,
whereas sales in the Triad economies increased by less than 0.1% annually. In the same
period, Triad countries have faced overcapacity, cost pressures, and low profitability.
However, despite the domination of the global automobile industry by MNEs from the Triad,
newcomers have appeared in emerging countries, due mainly to changes in trade andinvestment policies, global value chains, and new globalization strategies implemented byleading companies (Sturgeon & Van Biesebroeck, 2011). During the 1970s and 1990s, newentrants to the automobile industry included Hyundai, Kia, and Daewoo from South Korea;
Mahindra from India; Proton from Malaysia; and FAW, Dongfeng Motors, Geely, and SAIC
from China. However, not all of these new entrants were able to become global car makers;
indeed, some such as Proton did not even pursue a globalization strategy and instead focusedon serving only the domestic market (Ahmed & Humphrey, 2007). For these new entrants,
it is challenging to expand across borders and compete against global leaders. Korean carcompanies are among the few exceptional cases that were able to establish a stable footholdin world markets. The total output of car production in South Korea increased from only
29,000 units in 1970 to 1.3 million units in 1990 and 3.2 million units in 2000, making Korea
the fifth largest car manufacturing country in the world (Hyun, 2020). Hyundai and Kia havemaintained their competitiveness even today, whereas Daewoo disappeared in the late 1990s.
As of 2019, Hyundai and Kia, being affiliated companies, held a 7.9% global market share,
which has been increasing year-over-year (Marklines.com, 2020). In light of these changes
to the global automobile market, this paper tackles the case of Daewoo Motors and examines
its strategy for expanding into foreign markets. Although this firm failed after the Asianfinancial crisis, the case of Daewoo Motors features many of the elements that enabled other2

dragon multinationals in the automobile industry to build competitive advantages andestablish themselves as competitors in the global market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review
on globalization theories, dragon multinationals, global expansion strategies, andinternational competitiveness factors. Section 3 looks at the South Korean automobile
industry and Daewoo Motors’ development path. Section 4 examines the globalization
process of Daewoo Motors. In the last section, the paper discusses the key findings of thepaper and adds concluding remarks.

2. Literature Review
To discuss the ability of MNEs from emerging countries—so-called “dragon
multinationals”—to compete as latecomers against established enterprises in the automobile
industry, this paper considers three main areas in the literature on international business andbusiness history.
First, there is general research on the reason why companies internationalize and the meansby which they do so. Many researchers (Banalieva & Dhanaraj, 2013; Daniels et al., 1985;
Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002; Rugman & Verbeke 2004) have contributed to this area ofanalysis and have identified various reasons that companies choose to go global, including
the search for new markets, cost optimization, and tax privileges, among others. Existing
theories on international business focus mostly on the host market and the economic
conditions that influence firms’ strategic decisions to internationalize from asset-seeking andopportunity-seeking perspectives (Luo & Tung, 2007). Buckley and Casson (1985) andBuckley (1988) emphasized the importance of two factors. First, firms look for the least-costlocation (L) for their activities, where they may benefit from low taxes, wages, and resource3costs. Second, firms seek advantages from economies of scale and scope throughinternalizing (I) activities spread across firms and countries. Dunning (1977; 1980; 1993)
added a third factor, namely, ownership advantages (O) to location (L) and internalization(I) advantages, leading to his eclectic theory being known as the ‘OLI paradigm’. The OLI
paradigm suggests that firms develop competitive ownership advantages at home and thentransfer them to the countries abroad based on location advantages via FDI, which eventually
allows them to internalize those advantages.
Overall, the literature distinguishes four kinds of FDI according to their goals (Franco et al.,2008; Brainard, 1997). First is resource seeking, in which the firms look to acquire certain
resources at a lower cost than is readily available in their home market. These are mainly
natural resources, raw materials, or cheap labor. Second, is market seeking, in which
companies invest abroad to earn additional profit by following suppliers into a market or to
pursue customers that have moved their facilities abroad. This strategy allows a firm to avoid
the costs of serving a market from distance (Brainard, 1997; Markusen & Venables, 1998;
2000). Third is efficiency seeking, in which firms seek to take advantage of economies ofscale, differences in consumer tastes, and various supply capabilities (Dunning 1993). Fourthis strategic asset seeking, in which firms seek to acquire a new technological base, rather
than exploiting an existing asset; this purpose was proposed by Dunning (1993).
There is a newer area of research on “born-global firms,” that is, companies that wereglobally organized when they were founded. This strain of research has emerged relatively
recently in the international business literature (Knight & Cavusgil, 1996; Luostarinen &Gabrielsson, 2004; Oviatt & McDougall, 1994). These works argue that these born-global
companies behave differently from conventional firms, which typically have a relatively
long history of domestic business activity before proceeding to the internationalization
process (Madsen & Servais, 1997; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). In contrast, born-global firms
4start international operations before or along with home-country operations and build theirproduct, market, operations, marketing strategy differently from conventional companies,
thereby realizing extraordinarily fast growth in global markets (Luostarinen & Gabrielsson,2004).
Second, the literature on MNEs from emerging countries has flourished since the late 1990s.
Increased global competition has led many born-global firms to expand internationally eventhough they are still in an early stage of development, contrary to the generally establishedpath of globalization in which a firm pursues international markets only after gaining
competitiveness at home (Frink, 2009; Moncada-Paterno-Castello et al., 2011; Yeung et al.,2011). Even when they are latecomers, MNEs from emerging countries can successfully
pursue globalization by combining existing resources from different business entities,
acquiring foreign resources and choosing a niche market where it can compete effectively
against deep-rooted competitors (Oh et al., 1998; Oh & Rugman, 2007; Oh & Contractor,
2013). Mathews (2006) developed the concept of “dragon multinationals” and argued thatfirms from peripheral countries in the Asia-Pacific region started their internationalization
by aggressively entering global value chains to acquire technology and know-how.
Moreover, Li (2007) and Zheng (2013) have shown that mergers and acquisitions (M&As)
were an important strategy adopted by Chinese firms to internationalize. For instance, home
appliance manufacturer companies like Hisense and Haier were able to aggressively enter
global markets by cutting costs in their value chains and taking over other companies(Sawada & Wang, 2012; Kim, 2011). Similarly, the automobile company Geely took over
Volvo to leverage Volvo’s design and R&D capabilities (Gao, 2015).
Third, works on the globalization of South Korean companies is one important field of
research on dragon multinationals (Hyun, 2003; Kwon et al., 2004; Jeong, 2004; Yang et al.,2009; Hyun, 2018). Kwon et al. (2004) investigated Korean chaebol firms (i.e., family-run
5conglomerates), such as Hyundai, Samsung, Lucky-Goldstar (LG), and Daewoo, which havesuccessfully competed with Triad MNEs. These firms started their growth trajectory in a
protected domestic market, developed competitive advantages, advanced technologically,and expanded globally with unlimited financial government support. Most Korean
companies did not have substantial ownership advantages when they entered theinternational market in the early 1980s. Despite this, some of them became market leaders
because they quickly adapted to the international business environment, strengthened thecompetitive advantages they had, and achieved economies of scale for low-cost production(Kwon et al., 2004). However, by the late 1980s, they faced significant challenges in the
global business environment. They were forced to confront new protective barriers in theirmain export markets, rapid appreciation of the South Korean won, growth in domestic wages,
and expansion of Japanese companies to low-wage Southeast Asian countries and Mexico(Soon, 1994). Consequently, South Korean companies had no choice but to move up in thevalue chain by fostering in-house R&D and integrating vertically through M&As. They
invested massively abroad (Kwon et al., 2004). The case of the electronics industry is aparticular success story, with Samsung Electronics adopting a new strategy to establish itself
as a producer of high-quality home electronics (Ernst, 1998; Suárez-Villa & Han, 1990). In
the case of the car company Hyundai-Kia, Hyun (2020) demonstrated that government
support, corporate strategy, demand, entrepreneurship, leverage from operating as part of alarge conglomerate, knowledge base, and infrastructure for parts production allowed the lateentrant firm to become a market leader. Atilla (2000) showed that several car companies,
including Daewoo Motors, started their global expansion in Eastern Europe in the early
1990s. Acquiring existing car plants and pursing joint ventures allowed them quick entry to
the Eastern European market and opened doors to Central and Western European markets aswell. It allowed Daewoo Motors to access not only low-cost labor, but also the European
6Union market, which it used as a base for further expansion (Oh et al., 1998; Atilla, 2000).
However, the investments did not pay off as quickly as Daewoo Motors had forecasted,resulting in the downfall of this globalized Korean company in 1999.
Daewoo Motors is therefore a good example for a discussion of how a Korean dragon
multinational was able to internationalize as a latecomer in the automobile industry. The
main research questions addressed by this paper are: Why did Daewoo Motors invest in otheremerging countries? How did these investments impact its global competitiveness? How
effective was Daewoo’s latecomer strategy? I approach these questions from the perspectiveof business history, focusing on the development of the company over time. Given that there
are no company records available on this firm, the sources used for the present research
consist of published statistics and articles from business media.

3. The formation and growth of the Korean automobile industry
The South Korean automobile industry has undergone four stages of development: assembly(1962–1974), internalized production (1975–1990), generation (1991–1999), and leading(2010–present) (Hyun, 2020). The development of Daewoo Motors is closely related to theformation and growth of the car industry in South Korea overall (Lansbury et al., 2007). The
roots of the company go back to 1937, when National Motors was created by a private
entrepreneur in Bupyeong-gu, Incheon. Initially, the South Korean automotive industry
focused on repairing used cars. With the introduction of the first Five-Year Economic
Development Plan in 1962, the South Korean government adopted the Automobile Industry
Protection Law, which designated the automotive industry as a main driver of economic
development. South Korea pursued an imitative learning strategy in this initial stage of7

industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s (assembly stage), in which private firms learned byadopting foreign technology, with the goal of catching up with global leaders (Hyun 2020).
In this context, National Motors, later renamed Saenara Motors, entered into a technicalalliance with Nissan Motors in 1963. Saenara Motors went bankrupt in 1965 and thecompany was taken over by Shinjin Motors, another private company that established acooperative arrangement with Toyota in 1966. Toyota withdrew in 1971 and Shinjin Motors
established a new joint venture with General Motors under the name GM Korea in 1972
(Autoevolution.com, 2020), which was subsequently renamed Saehan Motors in 1976. Then,in 1982, the Daewoo Group purchased Saehan Motors shares and changed the company
name to Daewoo Motors (Blockhan 2018).
In 1980, Korean automobile production was only 123,000 units, whereas Spain and Brazil
each produced over one million vehicles that year. However, by 1995, Korea had become
the fifth largest automobile-producing country in the world, and by 2000, Korea’s
automobile production had reached 3.2 million units, outperforming both Spain (3.0 million)
and Brazil (1.6 million) (Hyun, 2020). The Korean share of global car production has
increased from a mere 0.1% in 1975 to 5.3% in 2000 (Table 1).

Table 1. Change in the Korean share of global car production (1975–2000)
Production source /
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
years

2000

Global car production(in thousand units)

32,99838,51444,812

48,34650,07758,942

Korean car production(in thousand units)

37

123

378

1,322

2,526

3,115

Korean share of global
production (%)
Source: KAMA (2014).

0.1

0.3

0.8

2.7

5.0

5.3

8

This fast growth accompanied an expansion of exports (see Figure 1). The share of exports
in overall production increased from 20.5% (25,000 units) in 1980 to 72% (347,000 units)
in 1990 and 53.6% (1.7 million units) in 2000. Exports have increased rapidly following
South Korean companies’ entry into the American market in 1986 and the global expansionof Korean car makers via FDI in the late 1980s and early 1990s, primarily to Asian, Eastern
European, and South American countries. The first export of cars from Korea was made in
1979, when Hyundai shipped six units of the Pony to Ecuador. A quarter of a century later,in 1995, South Korea exported one million vehicles (including knock-down car sets) for the
first time, making the country the eighth largest car exporter country in the world. Unlike
some companies in other large car exporter countries (e.g., Canada, Belgium, and Spain),Hyundai exported under its own brand via a dedicated sales network (KAMA, 2014).
The growth of the Korean automobile industry relied mostly on three major companies:
Shinjin Motors, Hyundai (founded in 1947 by Chung Ju-Yung), and Kia (founded in 1944
as Kyungsung Precision Industry and renamed Kia in 1951) (Autoinfluence.com, 2020;
CompaniesHistory.com, 2020). A joint venture with GM allowed Shinjin Motors to accesstechnology and learn from a much more advanced partner. GM Korea was able to increase
production volumes during the two decades of this partnership (1971–1992) and more
effectively compete against other local automobile companies. However, Daewoo Motors’s
share of Korean production share remained low (10%–20%) compared with Hyundai (40%–60%) and Kia (15-25%). For instance, GM Korea increased production volumes from 8,405
units in 1975 to 201,035 units in 1990, whereas Hyundai increased its production volumes
from 7,092 units to 676,067 units in the same years (Hyun, 2020).

9

Figure 1: Korean automobile production, imports, and exports (1970–2000)
3200

100%
90%

2800

80%
70%

2400

70%

th. units

2000
51%
1600

54% 60%

56%
53%

33%

1200
21%

800

17%
11%

400

53%

39% 47%
43%
32%

31%
26%26%
32%

26%

19%
11% 20%
15%

13%

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%

3%
0%

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

0

Production

ImportExport %Source: КАМА (2014).

To gain independence in decision making in terms of expansion to global markets anddeveloping own proprietary models, GM’s shares in the joint venture were purchased byDaewoo Corporation in 1992 and the firm was renamed Daewoo Motors. Daewoo
Corporation was the fourth largest Korean conglomerate (chaebol) and operated in a range
of industries, including trading, commercial vehicle sales, shipbuilding, heavy industry,
aerospace, consumer electronics, telecommunications, and financial services. Starting in
1992, Daewoo Motors began operating as an independent auto producer, but still relied on
the technical assistance and models of foreign auto manufacturers, including General Motors,
Nissan, and Honda. Nonetheless, from its first days as an independent auto manufacturer,
the company decided to develop its own car. The Lanos project began in the autumn of 1993
and a short 30 months later the company was able to start mass production. The Daewoo
10

Lanos was introduced at the end of 1996 and became the first car that Daewoo Motors had
developed in-house, with the help of Italian automobile designer Giorgetto Giugiaro.
In the late 1990s, the Asian financial crisis hit Korean companies hard. Like many other big
Korean corporations, Daewoo Motors was supplied with nearly unlimited bank lending. The
company used this large amount of borrowed funds to develop new models and expand
capacity in its local market as well as abroad. However, the money was borrowed without
regard to actual sales of vehicles or a very optimistic assessment of future sales prospects(Thomas, 2001). Furthermore, among the country’s three major auto companies—Daewoo,
Hyundai, and Kia–Daewoo Motors was the most overextended. It had not only invested infour large plants in Korea, but also a dozen abroad. As a result, the company was
overleveraged and in 1999 declared bankruptcy—the largest in Korean automotive history,
involving $19 billion in assets (Thomas, 2001). This collapse led to a consolidation of the
Korean car industry, which included the takeover of Kia by Hyundai in 1998 (Companies
History, 2020). Today, Hyundai-Kia has an 82% share of Korean car production and has
become the fifth largest producer in the world, selling 8 million vehicles annually.
Consequently its world market share has increased from 5.9% in 2007 to 7.9% as of 2019
(Hyun, 2020; Marklines.com, 2020).

4. The global expansion of Daewoo Motors
Export was the first step towards Daewoo Motors’ internationalization. In 1984, Daewoo
Motors received approval from GM to start exporting the Le Mans to the US and to sell theunits via GM’s dealership network. Sales in the US peaked at 64,037 units in 1988, before
falling sharply to 37,000 vehicles in 1991 (Eisenstein, 1992). The Daewoo Group
complained about GM’s lack of marketing efforts and was not fully satisfied with the strict
limitations of the joint venture agreement. For instance, GM prohibited export to Eastern11

Europe, a territory allocated to Opel but which Korean considered as one of its main export
targets. Moreover, it was not allowed to expand independently to overseas markets and tosell in the United States using its own brand name. The joint venture was unprofitable due
to slow sales and continuous losses in South Korea, and so the company aimed to achieve
more profitable growth overseas. Because of its small share in the domestic market,
combined with its efforts to expand to new export markets, large licensing fee payments, andinadequate management, Daewoo Motors lost about $200 million in 1992 (Oh et al., 1998;
Peng, 2010). Consequently, in 1992, the Daewoo Group and GM dissolved its joint venture
and the Daewoo Group bought out GM’s shares for $170 million (Deyo, 1996). After 1992,
Daewoo Motors adopted an aggressive strategy to expand internationally. The company’s
new independence from GM in terms of sales strategies and its utilization of the global
presence of Daewoo Corporation’s trading offices allowed Daewoo Motors to increase its
export volume from 34,169 units in 1990 to 263,051 units in 1995, and then to 390,571 in
1996 (Table 2). In 1990, Daewoo Motors was third in terms of exports, after Hyundai andKia; however, by 1996, Daewoo Motors outperformed Kia and became the second largest
car exporter in South Korea.
The overall exports of Korean carmakers similarly increased from 1990 to 1996. Korean car
exports were increasingly targeting price-sensitive consumers and continued to compete
mainly in low-income markets in Eastern Europe and Asia. All Korean car companies fully
realized that their long-term success would depend on their ability to develop their own
technology, reduce their dependence on foreign components suppliers and distributors, andimprove productivity, quality, and production flexibility (Deyo, 1996).

Table 2. Exports of South Korean Automakers in 1977–1996 (number of vehicles)

12

HyundaiDaewooKia

Others

Total

1977

7 427

68

1 540

1

9 036

1980

16 244

4 164

4 735

109

25 2521985

120 041

879

1 322

865

123 1071990

225 393

34 16985 8231 599

346 984

1995

490 454

263 051

270 92068 614

1 093 0391996

567 254390 571322 426

132 023

1 412 274

Source: KAMA (2014).

Second, Daewoo Motors undertook a risky strategy of FDI, seeking out opportunities inmarketing and manufacturing with the expectation that the company would prosper intandem with the development and economic growth of these countries. As shown in Figure
2, Daewoo Motors committed more than $11 billion to numerous joint ventures and startups around the world from 1992 to 1996 (Sohn, 1996).

Figure 2. Allocation of $11 billion in foreign direct investment by Daewoo Motors (19921996)

Factory in Poland

10%
9%

Factory in India

7%

Factory in Uzbekistan

2%

Factory in Romania
Others72%

Source: Sohn (1996).

13

In 1992, Daewoo Motors entered into a joint venture with an automaker in Uzbekistan, which
led to the opening in late 1996 of an $800 million plant capable of producing 200,000
vehicles annually (Tadjiev & Donzé, 2020). Another $250 million was spent in 1994 to buy
a state-owned automaker in Romania that was capable of producing 200,000 vehicles
annually after retooling (Oh et al., 1998). Furthermore, Daewoo Motors managed to obtaintax concessions and duty-free privileges to import components from Korea for assembly in
Romania. Also, in 1994, Daewoo Motors invested another $1 billion in a joint venture in
India. Daewoo Motors secured a presence in other emerging countries including the Czech
Republic and Poland. It also pursued smaller operations in the Philippines, Vietnam,
Indonesia, and Iran. Before its collapse, Daewoo Motors had plans for further investmentsin Libya, Pakistan, Russia, Latin America, and China (Oh et al., 1998). With 370,000
passenger cars sold in 1994 alone, Poland was the largest economy with the largest auto
market in Central Europe. Of these sales, 200,000 vehicles were manufactured locally andthe rest were imported. The largest car maker in the country, Fiat, had a 51% market share.
In turn, Daewoo Motors became the second largest vehicle producer in Poland overnight byacquiring a 70% ownership stake in FS Osobowych (FSO). In turn, by placing manufacturingin such countries as Poland and India, Daewoo would also be well-positioned to sell vehicles
locally in countries that were experiencing much higher growth in demand for new vehicles
compared with Western Europe or the United States (Oh et al., 1998). As detailed in Table
3, the result of this strategy was the achievement of a global sales expansion throughproduction centers in emerging countries with a capacity of more than 650,000 units in 11
factories reaching from Poland to Uzbekistan (Oh et al., 1998). For instance, establishingproduction of four models (Cielo-Nexia, Tico, Damas, Matiz) in Uzbekistan, allowed
Daewoo Motors duty-free entry to most Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
countries, including Russia, based on a free-trade agreement among member states. The
14

exports from the joint venture in Uzbekistan started in 1996 with 900 vehicles and reached14,600 units in 1997 (Tadjiev & Donzé, 2020). Similarly, as a result of its investments in
Poland and Romania, by 1998 Daewoo Motors was selling 218,700 vehicles in Central andEastern Europe and had gained a 17.7% market share (Atilla, 2000).

Table 3. Overseas operations of Daewoo Motors in 1996#

Location

Products

Uzbekistan
PolandRomania
India
Indonesia
Iran
Czech Rep.
PolandCielo, Tico, Damas
Espero, Tico
Cielo
Cielo
Espero, Cielo
Cielo
Truck
Truck

Capacity/YearIn units
200,000
125,000
100,000
60,00050,00050,00025,00020,000Philippines

Espero, Cielo

10,000Vietnam
China

Espero, Cielo
Bus

5,000
5,000

Name

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Uz-Daewoo Auto Company
Daewoo-FSO Motor Corp.
Rodae Automobile S.A.
DCM-Daewoo Motors Ltd.
PT. Starsauto Dinamika
Kerman Motor Co.
AVIA a.s.
Daewoo Motors Poland Corp.
Trans Daewoo Automotive Mfg.
9Co.
10 Vietnam-Daewoo Motors Co.
11 Guilin-Daewoo Bus Co., Ltd.
Total

650,000

Source: Oh et al. (1998).

Daewoo Motors’ FDI strategy was characterized by a strong involvement in emerging
countries. Daewoo Motors’ strategy was highly dependent on the growth perspectives ofthese countries, which Daewoo expected to be high given these countries’ low density of car
ownership per 1000 inhabitants and attractive domestic market in those countries (India, Iran,Indonesia). Furthermore, Daewoo counted on these developing countries to provide accessto the larger markets they were connected to (i.e., from Eastern European countries to15

Western and Central Europe, and from Uzbekistan to former Soviet countries including
Russia). In addition, the major Triad global car makers were not well-established in thosecountries, which Daewoo Motors viewed as providing a first-mover advantage. In most ofthese cases, Daewoo Motors pursued a quick market entry by making joint ventureagreements or acquiring existing companies in those countries.

5.

Discussion and conclusion

Companies from Triad countries hold a 70%–80% share of the world automobile market.
These companies transfer mainly production technology, rather than product technology, tothe countries that they enter. Product technology is one of the key features necessary fordragon multinationals to catch-up with the market leaders. In addition, in the automobile
industry, it is extremely difficult to achieve the scale of the market leaders and to get out
from the vicious circle: small market → small production → high price → small market.
New entrants to the automobile industry must achieve economies of scale in production andgain access to advanced technologies (Hyun, 2020).
The Korean automobile industry has relatively few car makers due to the government policyof nurturing oligopolistic competition. This policy also aimed to increase the localization ofdomestically produced vehicles. Meanwhile, the cases of Taiwan, Brazil, and Mexico, which
entered the automobile industry at the same time and from a comparable level of national
income, clearly show the differences in the level of development in the automobile industry.
Taiwan allowed domestic competition among five automobile makers in the 1960s, whichhindered all of them from achieving efficient levels of production. Furthermore, after
continuous entry of foreign manufacturers to Taiwan, by 1996 the country was flooded with
12 automobile makers, none of which joined the ranks of global leaders. Similarly, Brazil
16and Mexico each had more than ten car makers, none of which were able to become a global
MNE (Hyun, 2020). This clearly shows the importance of industry structure, government
policy, and an appropriate number of firms in the automobile industry for nurturing dragon
MNEs.
This paper has examined how in the 1990s Daewoo Motors adopted a particularinternationalization strategy, characterized by FDI in emerging markets. The research results
revealed that in the same period, Daewoo Motors had a limited market share (10%–20%) in
its domestic market due to intense competition with Hyundai and Kia. Furthermore, growthin domestic wages and rapid appreciation of the Korean won highly impacted the costcompetitiveness of Korean-made products. Therefore, Daewoo Motors pursued aninternationalization strategy to achieve higher production volumes and economies of scale,
which were necessary to justify investments made to develop its own new models and build
domestic production capacities. In the 1990s, Daewoo Motors pursued entry to emerging
markets through FDI, while firms in the Triad were occupied by intense competition among
the major automobile MNEs or shielded with protective barriers. Most Japanese companies
had already established production footprints in low-wage Southeast Asian countries.
The globalization strategy of Daewoo Motors to enter emerging markets was hence
motivated by a growth perspective in those countries and access to other larger markets using
regional free trade agreements. Notably, Daewoo sought to enter Russia (through a
subsidiary in Uzbekistan) and the European Union (through subsidiaries in Eastern Europe)and expanded its global presence and increased its global competitiveness by accessing local
resources and opening doors to the new markets. However, Daewoo Motors relied on overly
optimistic sales forecasts, which were not realized and ultimately led the company tofinancial insolvency.

17

As a result, the dragon multinational strategy adopted by Daewoo Motors can becharacterized as pursing backdoor access to large markets. This feature is not unique and canbe seen in other dragon multinationals, for example, in the Korean and Chinese automobile
industries as well as other high-tech industries. A prime example is the Chinese electric
appliance producer Hisense, which has established multiple production facilities in Mexico,
mainly due to its free trade agreements with the United states, the biggest consumer market
in the world. Moreover, Mexico has additional advantages, including growing domestic
consumption and cheap labor (Kaczmarski, 2017; Spoon, n.d.). Similarly, Korean firms suchas LG, Samsung, Hyundai, and Kia have established factories in Mexico for the same reasons(Jung & Dong 2009; Ahmed 2019). Although ultimately unsuccessful, this aggressive
strategy allowed Daewoo to shift from a latecomer Korean firm to a global player within adecade.

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