Discussion Paper No. 134
Towards Integrated Business Resilience Model
Against Business Crisis in China, Japan, andSouth Korea- Comparative Case Study on Sanlu,
Toyota, and Samsung
Weng Xuanbin

2019 / 10 /18

TOHOKU MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING RESEARCH GROUP
Discussion Paper

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND

MANAGEMENT TOHOKU UNIVERSITY

27-1 KAWAUCHI, AOBA-KU, SENDAI,
980-8576 JAPANTowards Integrated Business Resilience Model Against Business Crisis in China, Japan, and South KoreaComparative Case Study on Sanlu, Toyota, and Samsung
Keyword: Business Resilience, Business Crises, Business Failure, CSR, Strategy
1. Introduction
No matter how big companies emphasize their business transparency and business ethics, scandals neverstopped showing up in the business world, including in East Asia. Business is the footstone of the economy; hence,
it is critical for firms to avoid corporate scandal to escape from breakdown by look deep into the technical details of
the mechanism of formation of business scandals in the dominant economy entities in the region, which are China,
Japan, and South Korea.
This paper examines the reasons for the risen of massive corporate public scandals of the key business players
in each countries’ in respective industries via deploying the Stage Model proposed by Turner and Kayes (2015).
With offering the timeline of business scandals of Sanlu, Toyota, and Samsung, a detailed comparative analysis
focused on the similarities and differences originated from the views of business strategy, business resilience, andcorporate social responsibility (CSR). This paper introduces the relative academic implication and empiricalimplications in the later section as well for highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of the existing theory andthe lessons learned from the three cases.
2. Previous Literature Review
2-1. Representative Theories
2-1-1. Turner and Kayes Stage Model, As the Analytical Framework of This Paper
Turner (1976) outlines six stages that distinct the procedures of crises from the perspective of cultural norms andKayes (2015) adds an additional stage, then forms Turner and Kayes stage model as a whole. Details of the stage
model are as follows:Stage 1. Normal Operating Procedures. Cultural norms of companies and organizations are functional at thisjuncture. These norms could contribute to avoiding business failure via providing foundation about setting businessgoals, such as policies, business procedures, and business values.
Stage 2. The Incubation Period. The most obvious signal shows companies and organizations have stepped into
this stage is cultural norms could not function as good as in stage 1. Meanwhile, series of events occur due to theprevious cultural norms, and their adverse affection starts to enlarge without notice from the leadership ofcompanies and organizations. The old cultural norms are mixed with dynamic business routines while both parties
are not compatible. As a result, cultural norms become difficult to alter and reject to accept information or evidence
which oppose to the legitimacy of them.
Stage 3. Precipitating Events. Initial event or events begin to expose. Companies and organizations have an
opportunity to change the old cultural norms into new ones if the leaders paid attention to those event(s). Otherwise,companies and organizations are extremely vulnerable because of staffs are likely to pick out problems withexisting routines, rather than change cultural norms by finding other illustrations explaining things are not goingsmoothly.
Stage 4. Onset of Failure. In this stage, companies and organizations can apparently experience the‘consequences of the collapse of cultural precautions’ (Turner 1976, p. 381).
Stage 5. Rescue and Salvage. It is another critical stage that could lead companies and organizations to start thejourney towards business resilience. In this stage, companies and organizations are supposed to response businessfailures immediately. Three components consist of the method of right-away response: ‘contain the failure, limit its
impact, or begin its recovery’ (Kayes 2015, p. 47). Moreover, if companies and organizations failed to trace themethods above, immediate breakdown or further crisis could strike them. Many companies and organizations could
only reach this stage.
Stage 6. Cultural Adjustment. In this stage, cultural norms are reviewed, re-evaluated and changed. ‘New
models of how the organization works (or fails) emerge, and new norms are developed and infused in the culture
throughout the organization (Kayes 2015, p. 47). Furthermore, nature of the problems are beginning to be redefined,
and protective steps are taken to get away from future failures.
Stage 7. Industrywide assessment and adjustment. In this stage, companies, and organizations which distributedin the same industry begin to learn and share the experience with each other to achieve business resilience in future.
Kayes (2015, p.47) emphasizes this stage as ‘lessons learned are disseminated across industry, and industrywide
norms associated with the prevention of future failure are established’. Figure 1 briefly illustrates the structure of
the stage model.

Figure 1. Structure of Turner and Kayes Stage Model
2-1-2. High-reliability Organizations
As the reason of the stage model helps to analyze the business crisis from the view of organizational cultures,considerations other than that are not mentioned in the stage model. Hence, new theories are necessary to perfect
the analysis about the business crisis. The theory of high-reliability organizations (HROs), which is based on adifferent perspective compared with the stage model, is a theory that focusing on clarifying the function ofexperience. Moreover, it is more directly targets to how to tackle failure before it is out of control. High-reliability
organizations come from the background of assumptions related to interpersonal interaction.
Weick and Sutcliffe (2015) asserts that five principles, which will be one of the supplementary theory of this paperother than the stage model, consist of high-reliability organizations into regular practice. Kayes (2015, p. 49) states‘The HRO perspective moves us closer to understanding the role that direct experience plays in failure because it
reveals that learning is a process of interpretation, not a process based on probability’.
However, the HROs theory depends on various assumptions about the essence of learning while illustration oncomplicated emotions and experiences are not sufficient.
2-1-3. Välikangas’s Theory on Resilient Organization
Välikangas offers an additional theory to achieve business organizational resilience. Välikangas (2010, p. 7)
illustrates ‘In this new world, resilience will again come to mean the capacity to survive the long term not only its
hardships but, more importantly perhaps, also the temptations to act for short-term benefit. Many as opportunity
still looms. The question is how to pursue these opportunities, this time with resilience.’. The purpose of
Välikangas’s theory on resilience is not only limit to achieving overall benefits of companies and organizations but
also grab the chances while they become apparent.
Accordingly, Välikangas (2010) comes up with the three-step theory to achieve resilience, which will be anothersupplementary theory of this paper.
2-1-4. Relationship of the Representative Theories
Figure 2 reflects the relationship among the theory of stage model, high-reliability organizations and the theory
on resilient organizations.Turner and Kayes stage model is the root among the representative theories. At first, time
points that highlight when companies and organizations failed in organizational cultures related issue can be
uncovered by the stage model, then detailed reactions toward business resilience will be provided by the theory ofhigh-reliability organizations and the steps theory.
Remedies that the theory of high-reliability organizations offers are focusing on addressing problems while thesteps theory delivers the detailed procedures about forming business resilience.

Figure 2. Relationships of the Representative Theories
2-2. Reasons of Choosing the Three Cases
Sanlu was the representative business in the dairy industry in China before its bankruptcy. Toyota and Samsung are
the firms with profound influence not only on their domestic market under the category of their industries but also

beyond the border of the countries of their origin. For the purpose of proposing and testing an integrated model inbusiness resilience while facing business crises, it is critical, as well, to understand the differences among the threecases beside the commonalities.
2-2-1. Various Industries
Although Toyota, Sanlu, and Samsung experienced similar public crises, industries that they distributed in are
different. Toyota belongs to automobile manufacture industry, Sanlu was classified to the dairy industry, andSamsung Electronics attributes to the technology industry. Due to the various characteristics of different industries,
detailed reactions from companies and organizations in various industries that respond to crises are distinctive.
For enterprises and organizations like Sanlu that belongs to the dairy industry and food industry, they should
notify their consumers about the potential risks or confirmed risks that their products could bring. For instance, inthe case of Sanlu, the most critical issue for the company is announcing the possible contamination immediately
after receiving the vast scale of complaints and medical reports of infants who consumed Sanlu’s products. Thenfollow up with official recalling collecting the defective products. Finally, start to revise the contents of thesuspected products.
From the perspective of the automobile industry, take Toyota’s case as an example, the essence is let theconsumers know about the possible consequences that the defective cars or components in defective cars could
result in. Then launch recalling with publish necessary information that consumers and public stakeholders concern
at the utmost. In the end, check the vehicle models inside of the company to spot the problems and consistently
deliver the most updated information that Toyota obtains and grab further requirement(s) from its consumers andthe public stakeholders.
As for companies and organizations distributed in technology industry like Samsung Electronics, similar
approaches as the above two industries should be deployed. It is urgent for companies and organizations to tell theirconsumers and the public stakeholders about the strong features that defective products possess and the worst
scenario it might occur. Then release recalling based on users’ comprehension of the risks originated from defective
products and ultimately find out the root of the problems in product models.
2-2-2. Different Cultural and Sociological BackgroundSome differences about business cultural issues and sociological context exist among Toyota, Sanlu, andSamsung Electronics. Toyota obtains cultures which seek perfectionism. The company will not respond to its
consumers until every detail of the events that it is required to face are figured out. It is accepted in Japanesesociety while it is not tolerable in the nations of the rest two companies. Sanlu, as a state-owned business, isoriginated from a community that government is involved in daily business operations. Tiny business errors could
be covered by the local administration, however, events that bring severe negative results to consumers and central
government’s reputation, companies and organizations will breakdown in a short period. Samsung Electronics
possesses the business culture that the most prominent leader controls absolute authorities. Moreover, business ismore like a kingdom belongs to the founder’s family; the power vacuum will quickly appear while the mostinfluential leader in the company is not distinguished.
2-2-3. Different Business Management Structure
Distinctions of Management structure existed among Toyota, Sanlu, and Samsung. Toyota is not thestate-owned business, and it is the parent company of its subsidiaries. Samsung Electronics, as well, is not thestate-owned company. However, Samsung Electronics is one of the subsidiaries of Samsung Group. Moreover,Samsung Electronics obtains its affiliates. Sanlu was state owned, which is different compared to Toyota andSamsung Electronics.

3. Timeline of the Three Cases
3-1. Case of Sanlu
On the surface, Sanlu was remained until 2009, but the rudiments of breakdown had started its infancy. As earlyas 2004, a list of brands of milk powder that caused infants kidney disease, the “big head disease," was exposed tothe public by a local media from Fuyang City, Anhui Province, and Sanlu was involved (Lu & Tao 2009). As aresult, the brand of Sanlu was removed from the list mentioned above under the explanation of “accidentally put
Sanlu into the list by related workers’ mistake” from authorities of Fuyang City.
Later, Sanlu tested for the milk it collected from a various channel, such as purchasing from brokers, for thereason of quality control. Protein content was one of the key factors to judge whether the milk is good or not. Under
this circumstance, to increase the profit, dairy suppliers of Sanlu started to cheat. In October 2007, melamine, achemical used in industrial work was added into the milk provide Sanlu. By adding melamine into the milk, thecompounded milk could maintain its protein content even diluted by water (Veil &Yang 2012). Melamine is toxic
to human body, especially fatal for babies. By using contaminated milk powder, kids who drink it are in grave
danger.
As the consequences, large number of feedback of infants’ kidney diseases after using Sanlu’s products were
initiated to uncover since late 2007. In 2008, the company launched a few products qualification tests in qualified
inspection department with the results of ‘qualified’. Some death reports were collected in the same year. In
September, 2008, the CEO of Sanlu, Tian, was arrested after the central Chinese government intervention. In early
2009, the company went bankruptcy.
3-2. Case of Toyota
Toyota experienced a six-year continuous recall event from 2005 to 2010. At the early stage of 2005, Toyota
recalled 790,000 vehicles in U.S. market alone because of the engine issues and 880,000 cars on the global scale.
Toyota's car model, Prius, was reported as some problems were spotted later in 2005. Hence there was no accident
reported, Toyota did not recall any Prius units with potential risks. While only a few weeks after that, in October,far more recalls followed up. 1.23 million Toyota vehicles were recalled domestically in Japan and another 246,592
more cars around the globe. In 2006, the total break out of recall happened due to the non-reaction of Toyota to its
market. 380,000 Lexus model and Toyota Highlander models were recalled for the reason of engine problems. In
all, 1.2 million Toyota vehicles were recalled in that year.
More complaints and recalls were coming in 2007. 500,000 cars were recalled to repair after some accidents
were cited. At the end of the year, another 470,000 vehicles were recalled due to the engine problems as well. The
problems related to seatbelts were spotted, and 90,000 sport utility vehicles were recalled in the U.S. Market.
During the following two years, about 9.59 million vehicles were recalled.
The president of Toyota, Mr. Akio Toyota, made a formal apology in February to the public that due to lack of
the communication with Toyota’s customers and promised to set a committee which would specifically supervise

the safety and quality of Toyota’s cars. In March, Mr. Akio Toyota visited China to make another formal apology to
Toyota’s Chinese consumers.
3-3. Case of Samsung
In August 2016, Samsung released its new smartphone, Samsung Galaxy Note 7. The original schedule of thereleasing of Galaxy Note 7 should be later than what had happened. However, to compete with new product iPhone
7 from its main competitor in smartphone section, Apple Inc, Samsung rushed the schedule.
The source of the explosion of Galaxy Note 7 was firstly published by a local Korean mobile BBS on August24, 2016. Pictures from this BBS show that smartphone which was suspicious as Samsung Galaxy Note 7 was
explored. In the following days, more confirmed cases of the explosion of note seven were reported. Up until early
September in 2016, 35 burst reports were revealed.
Samsung reacted quickly but quickly does not necessarily represents doing well. Kim and Mckinnon (2016)
illustrate that Samsung launched recall to recollect more than 2 million Galaxy Note 7 devices internationally on
September 2. Meanwhile, Samsung announced that new software for affected devices was released on 13
September. This software allows affected devices could only charge up to 60% electric power. Reilly (2016) further
states that recalling activity and replacing operation were launched simultaneously. But Hern (2016) reports thereplacement devices began to explode as well from October. Consequently, Samsung launched recalling for thesecond time on October 10 to urge its customers to keep their Note 7 power-off and carry the devices to destined
place for the refund or other compensations (Lawler 2016).
Due to the worries and safety concerns from Samsung’s Chinese customers, Samsung made an official
statement on its homepage. Samsung implies there is no need for Chinese customers to worry about the quality of
Galaxy Note 7 sold in China due to the reason of the batteries of Galaxy Note 7 that sold in China come fromdifferent suppliers compared with note seven sold beyond China. The statement was not enough persuasive andGeneral Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) in China stepped into thisevent. As a result, Samsung recalled 1858 devices under the requirement of AQSIQ before the official sales in
China (Kim & Mckinnon 2016). Nevertheless, the fact against the first explanation from Samsung Electronics
China.
Since September 1, 2016, Samsung Galaxy Note 7 was released officially in the Chinese market. Sina (2016)
reports that series of explosions of Note 7 were reported in China. Samsung China later illustrated the reason for
the explosion to Chinese customers. On September 29, 2016, Samsung apologized to Chinese customers andexpressed the regret that the company did not adequately consider the feeling of Chinese customers.
Ifeng (2016) states that on October 11, 2016, Samsung presented the event to AQSIQ and launched recall tocollect all 190,984 Galaxy Note 7 devices that had been sold in Chinese market.
4. Comparative Case Analysis
Table 1 (see Appendix) list the comparative analysis based on Turner and Kayes stage model sequentially.
4-1. Common Points of the Three Cases
4-1-1. Cover-Up
Cover-up was the practice that all three analyzed companies performed in their crises. This action is regarded as
the most influential factor which contributes transfer incidents to scandal and crisis. In Toyota’s case analysis, thecompany hid the data of event data recorder from the public and blocked the procedure of investigations from U.S.
authorities. While there was no adequate explanation from Toyota to present the information that could respond to
the needs and concerns of its customers. As a result, Toyota was criticized for lack of transparency and suffered asignificant financial loss in its recall scandal.
Sanlu made the same mistake during its crisis. Sanlu did not revise its formula milk powder after Sanlu was put
into a blacklist of the dairy brand back in 2004. Rather, Sanlu only negotiated with local authorities and removed
Sanlu out of the blacklist. Meanwhile, customers of Sanlu and the public know nothing concrete about the risk ofcontaminated milk powder. The first cover-up occurred.
The second cover-up took place in 2008. At the end of 2007, Sanlu was directly suspicious about milk powder
contamination with accurate reports of illness of infants who consumed Sanlu’s milk powder. Even though thereports about contaminated milk were updated to the senior management group in Sanlu, the company decided tokeep the truth inside to maintain the brand image on the ground of the Beijing Olympic Games approached.
Sanlu bankrupted after the scandal was unveiled and the cover-up actions the company had played were the key
reasons answered the business failure.
Samsung failed to be transparent while recalling Galaxy Note 7. The most obvious cover-up happened in its
Chinese market. While Note 7s beyond China had reported the battery of Note 7 was hazardous, Samsung wasstuck to believe that batteries of Note 7 in Chinese market were considered safe due to collecting battery
components from different suppliers. However, Samsung made this statement on its homepage without any
inspection on Note 7s that were later sold in China. At last, Galaxy Note 7s sold in China were reported battery
explosion and self-ignite after two weeks that Samsung officially released Note 7 in China.
The design of batteries in Note 7s which were distributed in different markets was unified. Samsung shouldhave the knowledge of once there spot failures in its products at one place, and the same failure could occur in thesame product which is distributed other than that location. However, given consideration to compete with its
opponent and capture the market share, Samsung released Note 7s in China in a rush under the circumstance of
notifying potential risks in its products.
4-1-2. Lack of Efficient Communication with Public Stakeholders
Due to all three analyzed companies cover the truth during their public crises, communication between thecompanies and their customers became automatically absent. Toyota, Sanlu, and Samsung believed that werecritical for the company to spot the problems on their products by itself first, and then defend their brand images byclarifying the failures. Consequently, according to the analysis of all three cases, Toyota Sanlu and Samsung had
chosen other methods rather than respond on what concerned their customers and the public. Toyota was trying tofigure out the problems of its vehicles by itself while its clients and authorities of its market were asking for the
response from the company. Sanlu kept away from establishing the formal communication channel to communicate
with its customers instead of contacted customers under covered. Samsung operated in a cheat like a manner while
its clients criticized the safety issue of its products in China while customers from U.S. cannot be compensated by
the company once had promised.
4-1-3. Rigidity on Original Policies and Strategies
The reason for the three analyzed companies failed to respond the crises were similar, which means Toyota,
Sanlu and Samsung were rigid on the routines they accustomed. In other words, the three companies failed to beresilient on crises because of the reason above. Toyota was very successful on its business and had not experienced

public crisis due to large-scale recall events before the analyzed recall scandal. Hence, the company recognized thatthe first routine to tackle public crisis was workable still, which was check the defective products by the company
and then apologize to its customers. The fact was opposite compared with Toyota’s conception on dealing with thecrisis. Customers and the public required consistent and dynamic information flow from the company, not the
time-consuming explanation in one shot. As a result, Toyota made its recall events into scandal and suffered greatly
on its finance.
In the case of Sanlu, due to the company was a state-owned business, Sanlu preferred to contact with authorities
who directly shoulder the responsibilities of supervising of the company. But Sanlu did not realize that on the
ground of widespread of online information platforms, it had become more difficult for companies to retain theissues happened inside of it. Adjustments on responding crisis were needed while Sanlu failed to do so.
Samsung practiced a similar scenario of Toyota. Samsung attempted to uncover the problems on Note 7 insideof the company while defective devices reports had been notified rather than reveal the process of dealing problems
to its customers and the public.
5. Implications
5-1. Practical Implications
Requiring In Time Communication Channel: According to remedy strategies for Toyota, Sanlu and Samsung
in each case analysis, forming resilient strategies responding to public crises are the key implication for big
companies and organizations. Because of successful business histories, big companies are accustomed to their
original ways of operating their businesses and becoming less sensitive about their customers’ need after-sale while
companies and organizations mark themselves as customer first ones. It is not necessarily because of companies
and organizations no longer pay attention to their clients, but due to their time consuming internal verticalmanagement structures. Once there is a crisis, detailed information about it will be collected by front-line
employees and delivered to senior management board layer by layer.
Similarly, instruction about responding to crisis flows from top management board to front-line staffs in thesame method. However, the procedures are time-consuming while responding in time is the essence when the crisis
occurred. Hence, establishing teams that are specifically dealing with public crises which directly respond to top
management board are recommended to big companies and organizations. Further, these teams should obtain theauthority to answer to customers and the public in urgent situations. By doing so, companies and organizations
could respond to the concerns and need from the market directly. Customers and the public could observetransparency of businesses and organizations. Eventually, in time information transfer platform between companies(organizations) and their public stakeholder's forms and misunderstandings between companies and public
stakeholders would diminish during crises and help big corporations and organizations to be more resilient.
Do Not Hide From Failure: It can be seem that Toyota, Sanlu, and Samsung were reluctant to apologize totheir customers and confess the faults on their products at the beginning. While the three companies received
reports about defections and contamination on their goods, they were more likely to hide from the problems rather
than communicate with their public stakeholders to uncover the nature of the problems on their products. It is risky
for big companies and organizations to cover the problems on their productions with intention. Once the problem(s)are spotted by customers and the public while there is evidence to prove companies and organizations know about
this, problems on products will promote to crises and scandals. Customers and the public will prefer to consider
that companies and organizations which cover the truth are not trustworthy. Automatically, enhance corporate

governance to help companies and organization to be transparent is critical at this point.
Trust from Public Stakeholders Is Fragile: It cost long time for companies and organizations to earncustomers’ trust. However, this confidence could evaporate due to one scandal or fail-contained crisis. One of thereasons for large enterprises feel they could obtain the result of scandal exposure is they believe customers would
still consume commodity from them due to the prevalence of their brand images. Nevertheless, customers and the
public are intolerable with dishonesty, especially while their safety is under threat due to failed performance of
products. In the case of Sanlu, the company shortly bankrupted after the milk powder contamination scandal was
revealed by New Zealand government. Toyota suffered from massive financial loss while Samsung is recognized as
the risky brand from business analysts.
Hence, how to monitor the relationship with customers and the public to achieve business resilience and what to
do while the first failure occurred are vital issues that big companies and organizations need to come up with duringcrises.
5-2. Theoretical Implications
Advantages of Turner and Kayes Stage ModelAs shown in Table 1, Crises consist of series of events based on the timeline; hence Turner and Kayes stage
model can appropriately analyze the events that form crises step by step. Details that reveal big companies failed incrises can be unveiled, and the point where failure begin to occur can be enlarged in a qualitative method. Moreover,
Turner and Kayes stage model can not only guide companies to cover the failures but also offer implications on
how to recover from failures for big companies and organizations to achieve business resilient.
Also, Turner and Kayes stage model points out that the first failure that companies failed to response could
deteriorate the scenario into crises and companies will suffer from the result. Last but not least, stage model assertsthat failures happen due to the wrong conception of the nature of how to deal with crises, which lead to the absenceof response while communicating with customers and the public is necessary. Further, the stage model categories
failures and crises take place on the ground of overlook safety regulations. As shown in the analysis of Toyota,
Sanlu, and Samsung, this statement is proved correct.
Limitation of Stage Model
Since Turner and Kayes stage model is based on the analysis of timeline oriented events, which implicates thatthe model is highly qualitative from the perspective of business culture. Turner and Kayes stage model focus on
forming resilient business strategy circles for big companies and organizations according to experienced failure andfurther ‘worst case’ scenario assumptions. For business managers and leaders, quantitative approaches arenecessary to analyze detailed information to deal with crises while Turner and Kayes stage model could not offer
this method. The additional quantitative approach needs to complement on it.
Moreover, not all resilient strategy forming procedures could follow with stage orders in Turner and Kayes
stage model during crises. Firstly, as the case analysis on Toyota, Sanlu, and Samsung, the three companies only
followed with several stages instead of all stages. For closed cases, Toyota traced the first five steps in stage modeland finished with the formal apology from the CEO of Toyota. Sanlu’s milk powder contamination scandal, anotherfinished case, failed in stage 4 and went to bankruptcy, which becomes impossible to follow up the rest stages. As
for the ongoing case, Samsung Electronics is still suffering from the damage of brand image due to Note 7 crises
and tried to diminish the financial lost by sales promotion based on cutting down the price of other products fromthe company. Further observation and analysis based on future business practices from Samsung Electronics isrequired.
According to the differences of the three businesses as previously discussed combined with the comparative
analysis based on the limitation of the theory, this paper propose a fixed stage model with additional two stages asshown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Revised Structure of Turner and Kayes Stage Model

In stage 8, commonalities of business crises can penetrate the boundaries of various industries. Firms under
different industry categories are supposed to analyze the events of business crises occurred beyond their industries
to testify the validity of their business resilience in the business emergency.
In Stage 9, business crises that happened in China, Japan, and South Korea can be integrated regardless of the
background of nationalities. In other words, giant businesses in the three countries are currently following aconsistent routine while facing business crises due to their internal failures. Hence, it becomes possible for the big
businesses in the three countries to learn the experiences of business crises with each other, and forming an
integrated mechanism to enhance business resilience.
6. Conclusion
This paper comparatively analyzes the cases of Toyota, Sanlu and Samsung Electronics solely based on Turnerand Kayes stage model to highlight the reasons for their wrongdoings. Meanwhile, relative core conceptions forbusiness resilience are validated through detailed discussion rather than proposing common sense. Further, thispaper come up with the revised version of the stage model according to the comparative analysis. However, otheracademic theories and frameworks are appropriate to utilize as well, such as high-reliability organizations theory
and steps theory from Liisa Välikangas. Future work is required to supplement the case analysis with these
additional theories. Last but not least, this paper is mainly conducted on qualitative methods, not quantitative
methods. Other quantitative methods like the arithmetic formula that could identify whether a company andorganization are still looking forward to being done.

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Table 1. Practices from Toyota, Sanlu, and Samsung

Appendix