‫املركز الفلسطيين للبحوث السياسية واملسحية‬Palestinian Center for POLICY and SURVEY RESEARCH

Survey Research Unit

Polls
15 April 2024

Public Opinion Poll No (91)
The Palestinian Center for Policy and
Survey Research (PSR) is an independent
nonprofit institution and think tank of policy
analysis and academic research. PSR was
founded with the goal of advancing scholarshipand knowledge on immediate issues of concern
to Palestinians in three areas: domestic politics
and government, strategic analysis and foreign
policy, and public opinion polls and survey
research. The center engages in several
activities. It conducts academic and policy
analysis studies. It organizes socio-politicalsurveys and public opinion polls on current
Palestinian political and social attitudes. It
sponsors study groups and task forces on issuesof critical importance to the Palestinians.
Finally, it organizes conferences, public
lectures, and briefings on current public policy
issues. PSR is dedicated to promoting objective
and nonpartisan research and analysis and toencouraging a better understanding ofPalestinian domestic and international
environment in an atmosphere of free debate
and exchange of ideas.

This poll is part of PSR series of regularpolls.
This poll has been conducted incooperation with the Konrad-AdenauerStiftung in Ramallah

For further information, pleasecontact
Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid
Ladadwehat the Palestinian Center for
Policy and Survey Research
Ramallah, Palestine
Telephone 02 296 4933
e-mail: pcpsr@pcpsr.org
http://www.pcpsr.org

With humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip worsening,support for Hamas declines in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip; and as support for armed struggle drops in both the WestBank and the Gaza Strip, support for the two-state solution
rises in the Gaza Strip only. Nonetheless, wide popular support
for October the 7th offensive remains unchanged and thestanding of the Palestinian Authority and its leadership remains
extremely weak.
5-10 March 2024

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the PalestinianCenter for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip between 5-10 March 2024. The period leading up to
the poll witnessed the continuation and expansion of the war on the
Gaza Strip to include a ground offensive in the center and south of
the Gaza Strip, with few exceptions. This development led to an
worsening of the humanitarian suffering, the displacement of
hundreds of thousands more, the killing of some thirty thousand,mostly women and children, and the arrival of signs of famine in thenorthern Gaza Strip, which has received little food aid delivery.
There were also fears of the magnitude of the catastrophe that may
befall the Rafah area if the ground war spreads to it. South Africa has
filed a complaint against Israel at the International Court of Justiceaccusing it of genocide against the Palestinian people in the Gaza
Strip. Efforts to reach a ceasefire before the start of Ramadan havefailed during this period, although these efforts led by Qatar, Egypt
and the United States have continued. Talk of the day after the war
continued with little progress. But talk of the need to revitalize thePalestinian Authority (PA) led to the resignation of Mohammad
Shtayyeh's government and talk of possible alternatives. Meanwhile,
restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank
continued, as the entrances to most towns and villages were blocked
by the Israeli army in order to prevent residents from accessing themain roads. Settler violence against Palestinian towns and villages incertain vulnerable parts of areas B and C also continued.
This poll covers all these issues, in addition to others such as thepeace process and the alternatives options available to thePalestinians in light of the current stalemate in that process.

To ensure the safety of our data collectors in the Gaza Strip, we have restricted the interviews withresidents and displaced persons to specific areas where there was no on-going daily fighting. These
areas included the Rafah area, parts of the Khanyounis area, the central Gaza Strip, and all shelters inthese areas. Our data collectors were not deployed in the besieged northern Gaza area nor in parts inthe central Gaza Strip and parts in the Khanyounis area that saw daily fighting or Israeli army
deployment.
The data collection dates where selected carefully in the hope that the interviews would be
conducted under two different conditions: continued war and a ceasefire. We hoped (1) to be able todocument and measure the change that might be generated by the ceasefire, which we expected totake place on the first day of the month of Ramadan, and (2) to be able compare the findings under
the two conditions. Therefore, half of the interviews were completed during the first three days ofdata collection. At that point, on the fourth day, 8 March, we suspended data collection in order toassess the prospects for a ceasefire. On that day, we concluded that no ceasefire would take place as
we originally expected. Therefore, we resumed data collection on the fifth day and continued until
10 March.
The sample size of this poll is 1580 adults, of whom 830 were interviewed face to face in the WestBank (in 83 locations) and 750 in the Gaza Strip (in 75 locations). Given the uncertainty about the
population distribution in the Gaza Strip, we almost doubled the size of the sample in that area inorder to lower the margin of error, which stands at +/-3%. The combined West Bank-Gaza Strip data
file was reweighted to reflect the actual proportionate size of the population in the two Palestinianareas. Therefore, the sample is representative of the residents of the two areas.
For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933
or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Methodology of data collection in the Gaza Strip:
Seventy-five locations were selected from among those in Rafah, Deir al-Balah, Mawasi Khan
Younis, and the displaced persons who were forced by the Israeli army to relocate into these areas.
These communities were either “counting areas,” according to the classification of the PalestinianCentral Bureau of Statistics, as the case was in Rafah and some areas of Deir al-Balah, or gatheringsof displaced persons in shelters, that are schools or institutions affiliated with the government or
UNRWA, or tent gatherings distributed in the areas of Rafah. The sample was drawn according to
the following methodology:1) In the shelters, a regular random sample was selected from the lists of these locations,representing all the shelters in Rafah, Deir al-Balah and Mawasi Khan Younis, and the number ofthese locations was 42.
2) In the “counting areas” specified by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the number of
selected locations was 14 representing a previously selected sample in those areas.
3) On top of that, we identified additional “sampling areas,” including tent clusters in Rafah,
where satellite images showed the areas of these communities. Maps were drawn and divided into
blocks; 19 blocks were randomly selected, on a regular basis, for interview..
In each shelter, counting or gathering area, 10 people were randomly selected on a regular basis forinterviews. The rejection rate, those refusing to be interviewed, stood at 9%.

2

Summary of the Main Findings
As in our previous poll, conducted three months ago, most of the questions asked in the first quarterof 2024 revolved around October the 7th offensive and the subsequent Israeli war and groundinvasion of the Gaza Strip, the unprecedented humanitarian suffering of the population, the horrors
and atrocities of the war, the debate about the future of the Gaza Strip after the war, the likely
repercussions of an Israeli ground offensive in Rafah, the South African case before the International
Court of Justice, and public satisfaction with the performance of the various relevant actors during
the war. One of the surprising developments documented in this poll is that the differences between
the attitudes of West Bankers compared to Gazans have narrowed on most of these issues. One
reason for this might have been the fact that the data in the West Bank, for the pervious poll, wascollected during the release by Israel of West Bank prisoners as part of the Hamas-Israel ceasefire
agreement. Other than the ceasefire, no equivalent development was unfolding in the Gaza Strip atthat time. This poll also examined the impact of the war on the internal balance of power, support for
the Palestinian leadership, and the Palestinian-Israeli relations and the peace process.
We begin with the humanitarian and living conditions. Conditions in the Gaza Strip continue toworsen. The poll shows that the majority of Gazans are still unable to find food, that the shelters
where they now live lack most of the basic needs, and that efforts to have access to some of the basic
needs involve great difficulties and risks. It is also worth noting that there are significant complaintsof discrimination, on political grounds, in the distribution of humanitarian aid. But perhaps the most
disturbing is that fact that almost 80% of Gazans report that at least one of their family members
have been killed or injured. Three months ago, only 64% reported the same. Indeed, 60% report
today that at least one family member has been killed. Almost two-thirds blame Israel for theirsuffering and most of the others blame the US; in the Gaza Strip, only 9%, a 10-point drop from ourprevious poll, blame Hamas.
While support for Hamas’ offensive on October the 7th remains as high as it was three months ago,
Palestinian support in the West Bank has in fact dropped by 11 points while, surprisingly, support in
the Gaza Strip has increased by 14 points. It is clear from the findings however, that support for theoffensive does not mean support for Hamas. Instead, the findings show that three quarters of thePalestinians believe that the offensive has put the Palestinian-Israeli issue at the center of attention
after years of neglect at the regional and international levels.
As we have found in the previous poll, almost all Palestinians think Israel is committing war crimes
while almost all believe Hamas is not committing war crimes in the current war. Moreover, morethan 90% believe that Hamas did not commit any atrocities against Israel civilians during its Octoberthe 7th offensive. Only one in five Palestinians has seen videos showing atrocities committed byHamas. Only one fifth of those who did not see the videos had access to such videos but decided not
to see them; the rest report that the media they watched did not show these videos. The findings
show that those who have seen the videos are almost 10 times more likely to think that Hamas men
have committed atrocities on October 7.
We explored possible ramifications of an Israeli ground offensive in Rafah. The findings show that
only one quarter of Gazans think an Israeli ground operation in Rafah would lead to a mass rush to
the border with Egypt. Indeed, 70% of Gazans say that even if the Rafah-Egypt barrier is to collapse
they would not seek safety in Egypt. Perhaps one reason for the reluctance to cross the border is thefact that almost 70% of Gazans think the Egyptian army and police will shoot at those crossing theborders.
3

The vast majority is satisfied with the South African efforts to take Israel to the International Courtof Justice (ICJ) accusing it of genocide. But two thirds of the public express dissatisfaction with thecourt’s decision that did not ask Israel to abide by a ceasefire. Moreover, less than 40% think the ICJ
will eventually convict Israel of genocide. But even if convicted, more than 70% of the Palestinians
think Israel will not reassess its continued occupation of the Palestinian territories.
The findings show that while half of the West Bankers are optimistic about a ceasefire soon, only alittle over a quarter of Gazans express the same expectation. Indeed, the largest percentage of
Gazans (38%) expects the war to continue. Surprisingly however, while less West Bankers expect
Hamas to win, compared to our findings three months ago, more Gazans express that expectation
today. Indeed, Gazans’ expectation that Israel will win the war has dropped by one third.
Furthermore, while less West Bankers think today, compared to three months ago, that Hamas willremain in control of the Gaza Strip in the future, more Gazans now think Hamas will be in control.
Indeed, almost 60% of Gazans think that. When asked about their own preference, Gazans’ support
for continued Hamas control over the Gaza Strip has increased to more than 50%, a 14-point rise.
Indeed, given the magnitude of the suffering in the Gaza Strip, this seems to be the most counter
intuitive finding of the entire poll. Nonetheless, it is consistent with the increase in the percentage of
Gazans who think Hamas will win the current war. This is particularly interesting because theopposite happened in the West Bank, with the preference for Hamas staying in control dropping
significantly while West Bankers’ expectations that Hamas will win dropped by 14 points.
As we did in our previous poll, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role
played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors. The findings
show similar results, with the satisfaction with Hamas and Yahya Sinwar remaining very high. By
contrast, satisfaction with Fatah and president Abbas remains very low. At the regional level,satisfaction with Yemen and Qatar increases while satisfaction with Iran, Jordan, and Egypt remains
low. Indeed, satisfaction with Egypt in particular has drops by half in both the West Bank and theGaza Strip. None of the international players, including Russai, receive high satisfaction. The
findings continue to show almost zero satisfaction with the US.
We explored the impact of the war on the internal Palestinian balance of power. The current pollindicates a significant change compared to the previous one. In total, only one third of thePalestinians support Hamas today, an 11-point drop. The drop has been almost equal in the WestBank and the Gaza Strip. However, Fatah does not benefit from the drop in support for Hamas as its
own support remains unchanged compared to our findings three months ago. It is worth
remembering that our previous poll was conducted during the release of Palestinian women andchildren as part of the Hamas-Israel ceasefire agreement. Undoubtedly, Hamas’ popularity benefited
greatly as a result of that deal.
At the leadership level, the current poll also shows significant change. The most important change isthe rise in support for Marwan Barghouti. In presidential elections against current president
Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas’ leader Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti wins the majority of thoseparticipating in the elections. In a two-way competition between Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former
wins by more than 60% of the participating voters. These findings indicate an 11-point rise in thevote for Barghouti among voters and an 8-point drop in the vote for Haniyeh. By contrast, in the
two-way competition is between Haniyeh and Abbas, the former wins 70% of the participating
voters. Indeed, the demand for the resignation of president Abbas, while declining a little in the
Gaza Strip, has increased slightly in the West Bank.
Also domestically, the resignation of the Shtayyeh government is not seen as a sign of reform andthe vast majority rejects the appointment of Mohammad Mustafa as prime minister. More than 60%of the public want a government that is neither under the control of a political party nor under thecontrol of president Abbas. Two thirds continue to express the belief that the PA is now a burden on
4the Palestinian people and the majority favors its dissolution. Finally, perception of personal andfamily safety and security in the West Bank keep dropping, as 9 out of 10 West Bankers say they do
not feel safe or secure.
On Palestinian-Israeli relations, the findings are also different than those reported in our previous
poll three months ago. Two findings are worth noting: support for the two-state solution has
increased significantly and support for armed struggle has dropped significantly. However, theincreased support for the two-state solution, while dramatic, came only from the Gaza Strip, a 27point increase, while remaining stable in the West Bank. Given three choices for ending the Israeli
occupation, the current findings indicate a 17-point decrease in support for armed struggle; a 5-point
rise in support for negotiations; and a 5-point rise in support for non-violence. The drop in threemonths in support for armed struggle comes equally from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
(1) October the 7th and the War in Gaza:
1. Support for Hamas’ decision to launch the October the 7th offensive remains unchanged:• As we did in our previous poll three months ago, we asked the respondents in this poll what
they thought of Hamas’ decision to launch the October the 7th offensive. A vast majority of
71%, compared to 72% in December 2023, say it was correct. However, despite the stabilityof the total response, the findings do show significant change when looking at the two areas
separately. As the figure below shows, the perception that the decision of the offensive wascorrect drops in the West Bank by 11 points and increases in the Gaza Strip by 14 points.

Gaza Strip

Mar-24Total

Mar-24

West Bank

Figure (1): In your view, was Hamas decision to launch its
offensive against Israel on 7 October a correct or incorrect one?
71%

Dec-23

23%

57%

37%
71%

5%

16%

Dec-2382%

Mar-2471%

Dec-23

72%
0%

10%

20%

6%

30%

13%
12%

19%

10%

22%
40%

Correct

50%

60%

Incorrect

DK/NA

70%

80%

6%

6%
90%

100%

• The continued and consistent support for Hamas’ offensive despite significant changes inpublic attitudes during the past three months, including a significant decline in Hamas’
popularity in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as we will see later in this report, can bepartially explained by the findings regarding a question about the diplomatic fallout from that
offensive and the Israeli response to it. We asked the public if it thinks that “the war on Gaza
since October 7 has revived international attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that it
could lead to increased recognition of Palestinian statehood.” Three quarters say “yes”; only
22% say “no.”52. Humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip:• Only 44% of Gazans say they have enough food for a day or two and 55% say they do not.
These are almost identical to the same findings we obtained three months ago. It is worth
remembering that we did not conduct any interviews in the besieged northern parts of the
Gaza Strip.
• When they need food or water, only 19% of Gazans say they can reach a place where they
can have access to assistance; another 77% say they can but with a great difficulty or risk,
and 4% say they cannot.
• Sixty percent of all Gazans say a member of their family has been killed during the current
war. In a separate question, 68% say a member of their family has been injured. When
combining the two questions, the findings show that 78% say a member of their family has
been either killed or injured; only 22% of Gazans say none of their family members havebeen killed or injured. Three months ago, 64% of Gazans said a member of their family had
been killed or injured during the current war.
Figure (2): Humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip
90%
78%

77%

80%

68%

70%
60%
60%
50%

55%
44%
39%

40%

31%

30%

22%

19%

20%
10%

4%

0%
Yes

N0

Do you have foodsufficient for a day
or two?

Yes

Yes, butwithgreat
difficultyor riskN0

If you need food orwater, is there a place
you can reach that can
provide the assistanceyou need?

Yes

N0

Has any memberof your family
been killed during
the current war?

Yes

N0

Has any memberof your family
been injured
during the current
war?

Yes

No

Any family
member of yourfamily been
killed OR injuredin the current
war?

• We asked Gazans about the availability of essential needs: water, food, electricity, tents,
covers, clothing, medical care, and toilets. Those who said “Yes, available” ranged between
10% for tents and 33% for water. But the largest percent said these needs are available butwith great difficulty and risk. This was particularly the case for medical care, tents, food,6

water, and electricity. The needs that seem unavailable at all for the largest percentage of
Gazans are tents, clothing, and covers.
Figure (3): What services or assistance, from among the following, are available in your placeof residence or shelter?
70%
60%

55%

53%

58%

55%

53%

47%

50%
40%

33%

31%

39%

34%

30%

42%

48%

44%

27%

30%
20%

13%

13%

17%

14%

10%

27%

24%

15%

14%

10%

Water

Food

Electricity tocharge phone

Tent

CoversClothing

Medical care

Not available

Yes, with great difficulty and risk

Yes, available

Not available

Yes, with great difficulty and risk

Yes, available

Not available

Yes, with great difficulty and risk

Yes, available

Not available

Available, but with great difficulty

Yes, available

Not available

Yes, with great difficulty and risk

Yes, available

Not available

Yes, with great difficulty and risk

Yes, available

Not available

Yes, with great difficulty and risk

Yes, available

Not available

Yes, with great difficulty and risk

Yes, available

0%

Toilets• We asked those in shelters about the identity of the organizers in charge. The majority of the
respondents (62%) said it was UNRWA, 15% said it was government, 13% local Palestiniangroup, and 8% said other international organization.
Figure (4): Shelters’ organizers
70%

62%

60%
50%
40%
30%
15%

20%

8%

10%

13%

0%
UNRWA

Government

Other International
Organization

Local Palestinian Group

Which main body or bodies oversee the provision of assistance at your place of residence or shelter?

7• We asked respondents to assess, based on their personal experience, the fairness of aid
distribution to displaced residents currently in shelters. The vast majority (70%) said it was
discriminatory while only 27% said it was fair. When we crosstabulated these responses
based on the identity of the shelters’ organizers, it becomes clear, as shown in the following
figure, that greatest complaint (90%) comes from those in shelters organized by local
Palestinian groups, followed by those organized by UNRWA, other internationalorganizations, and the government.
Figure (5): Based on your personal experience, is the process of aid distribution todisplaced people currently in shelters, fair or discriminatory on political grounds?
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

90%
70%
58%

56%
41%

40%

27%
9%

1) UNRWA,

2) Government,
Fair3) Other International
Organization,4) Local Palestinian Group,

Discriminatory• A majority of 64% (compared to 52% three months ago) blames Israel for the current
suffering of Gazans in the current war while 20% (compared to 26% three months ago) place
the blame on the US; only 7% (compared to 11% three months ago) place the blame on
Hamas, and 6% (compared to 9% three months ago) blame the PA. It is worth noting that thepercentage of Gazans who place the blame on Hamas has dropped from 19% to 9%.
3. War crimes and atrocities:• As we found in the previous poll, almost all Palestinians (94% think Israel has committed
war crimes during the current war. By contrast, only 5% (compared to 10% three monthsago) think Hamas also committed such crimes; 4% think Israel has not committed suchcrimes and 91% think Hamas did not commit war crimes during the current war.
• 80% (compared to 85% in December 2023) say they did not see videos, shown byinternational news outlets, showing acts committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians, suchas the killing of women and children in their homes; only 19% (11% in the West Bank and
30% in the Gaza Strip) saw these videos.
• We asked those who did not see the videos to tell us the reasons they have not seen them:
60% said that the media they watched did not show them while 20% (14% in the West Bankand 31% in the Gaza Strip) said that they did not want to watch them.
• When asked if Hamas did commit these atrocities that are seen in these videos, theoverwhelming majority (93%) said no, it did not, and only 5% said it did. As shown in the
figure below, the belief that Hamas fighters have committed atrocities against civilians is

8higher among those who did watch videos showing such atrocities (17%) compared to those
who did not (2%).

Figure (6): The belief that Hamas fighters committed atrocities on October 7 is higher
among those who watched videos showing such atrocities
120%
97%

100%
81%
80%
60%
40%
20%

17%
2%

0%
I watched the videos

I didn't watch

1) Yes, Hamas committed attrocities

2) No, Hamas did not

4. Possible ramifications of an Israeli ground invasion of Rafah:
We explored three possible ramifications of an Israeli invasion of Rafah: people rushing to cross theborder with Egypt, perception of likely Egyptian police and army response to such development, andthe likely behavior of the residents and displaced person when they see people crossing the border
toward Egypt:•

We asked the public to speculate about the likely behavior of Rafah residents and displaced
persons in the event of an Israeli invasion of that city: would these people in this case rush tosafety on the Egyptian side? While half of the West Bankers expect them to do so, only 24%
of Gazans say residents and displaced person would rush towards the border and cross tosafety in Egypt. In total, 40% said they think they would and 51% said they think they wouldnot.

•

We then examined public perception of the likely behavior of the Egyptian army and police,on the other side of the border, when seeing masses of people rushing and crossing the border
into Egypt. Findings show a majority of 61% thinks the Egyptian army and police would
indeed shoot at those crossing the borders. Gazans are more likely than West Bankers tothink so, 68% and 55% respectively.

9Figure (7): possible ramifications on Egypt of an Israeli army invasion of Rafah
80%

68%

70%

61%

60%
50%

50%

55%

40%

40%
30%

24%

20%
10%
0%
If Israel entered Rafah with tanks to occupy it, do you
If people started a rush towards the Egyptian borders andexpect residents and displaced people to rush towards the the separation barrier between Egypt and Rafah collapses,
border with Egypt in search of safety? YES
do you expect Egyptian soldiers and police to shoot at
Palestinians rushing to cross the border? YES
Total

•

West Bank

Gaza Strip

We asked Gazans about their own behavior if they see people rushing toward the Egyptian
border and seeing the separation barrier between Egypt and Rafah falling, would they leave
home or shelter in search of safety and cross the borders with the others? Almost 70% saidno, they would not; only 25% said yes, they would.
Figure (8): If you see people rushing toward the Egyptian borders and the separation barrier
between Egypt and Rafah falling, you think you too would leave your home or shelter to seek
safety in the Egyptian territories?

6.0%
25.3%

68.7%

Yes

N0

DK/NA

5. South Africa and the case of genocide at the International Court of Justice•

We asked the public about its satisfaction or dissatisfaction with South Africa for bringing
the case of genocide against Israel to the international Court of Justice (ICJ). The vast
majority (78%) expressed satisfaction; only 19% expressed dissatisfaction. But almost two
thirds of the public (65%) expressed dissatisfaction with the court’s decision that did not ask
Israel to abide by a ceasefire; only 31% expressed satisfaction with the court’s decision.

10Moreover, only 37% expressed the belief that the ICJ would indeed eventually convict Israelof genocide. A majority of 59% said it did not expect the ICJ to issue such a conviction.
•

Finally, when asked if such conviction, if it happens, would contribute to force Israel toconsider ending its occupation of the Palestinian territories in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, a majority of 72% said no; only 23% said yes. It is noticeable that Gazans, as shown
below, show a little more satisfaction with the court’s decision and optimism regarding the
likely court decision and the impact of such a decision on the larger question of the Israeli
occupation of the Palestinian territories.
Figure (9): Attitudes toward South Africa’s case of genocide at the ICJ

90%
80%

78%

79%

76%

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%

43%
37%
31%

37%

32%

28%
23%

22%

26%

20%
10%
0%
Are you satisfied with South Are you satisfied with the
Do you expect theIf the ICJ convicts Israel ofAfrica's performance at the court's decision to accept the International Court of Justice genocide, will this contribute
International Court of Justice: case …., but without asking to eventually convict Israel of to forcing Israel to end its
SATISFIED
genocide? YES
occupation? YES
Israel to abide by a ceasefire?
SATISFIED
Total

West Bank

Gaza Strip

6. Expectations regarding the ceasefire and who will win the war• We asked the public about its expectations for the following weeks and months regarding the
war and the prospects for a ceasefire. The largest percentage (40%) expect Israel and Hamas
to reach a permanent ceasefire while 27% expect the continuation of the war and 25% expect
the expansion of the war to include other regional and non-regional states and actors. The
expectations of a ceasefire is much higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 50% and
27% respectively. The largest percentage of Gazans (38%) expects the war to continue while
only 20% of West Bankers expect that.

11

Figure (10): In light of the current war conditions in the Gaza Strip and the ceasefire
negotiations, what do you expect to happen in the coming weeks and months?
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

50%
40%

38%
27%

27%

25%

20%

25%

26%
7%

Reaching a permanentceasefire between Hamas andIsraelContinuation of the war

Total

The expansion of the war in
the Middle East and the entryof other regional orinternational parties morethan nowwest bank

5%

9%

DK/NA

Gaza Strip• As we did in December 2023, we asked in the current poll “who will win” this war. Today,
the majority expects Hamas to win. But it is a little smaller majority than we found threemonths ago, 64% and 70% respectively. It is worth noting, as indicated in the figure below,that today, more Gazans expect Hamas to win than three months ago, 56% and 50%
respectively. By contrast, today, less West Bankers expect Hamas to win than three months
ago, 69% and 83% respectively. It is worth noting also that while almost no one in the WestBank expect Israel to win the current war, almost one fifth (19%) of Gazans expect Israel towin. The current percent of those Gazans who expect Israel to win is more than a third lessthan the case three months ago, 19% and 31% respectively.

Total

West Bank Gaza Strip

Figure (11): In your opinion, in this war, who will emerge victorious, Hamas or Israel?
Mar-2456%

Dec-23

19%

50%

17%

31%

Mar-2469%

Dec-23

18%

3%

19%

83%

Mar-241%

64%

Dec-23

9%

70%
0%

10%

20%

40%

50%

60%

Hamas

IsraelNeither

DK/NA

70%

80%

1%

9%
12%

18%
13%

30%

8%

4%
9%

14%

3%

90%

100%

7. “The Day After:” Who will rule Gaza after the war?
• We asked the respondents to speculate about the party that will be in control of the Gaza
Strip in the day after the end of the current war. Gazans and West Bankers agree by 59%, foreach side, that it will be Hamas. This represents a drop of 5 points compared to our findings
three months ago. The drop came from the West Bank, declining by 14 points while in the

12Gaza Strip the percentage of those who thought Hamas will be in control increased by 8
points. Only 5% think the Israeli army will be in control; 9% selected a PA under president
Abbas, and another 9% selected the PA without Abbas; 2% selected one or more Arabcountry; and 2% selected the UN.
• When asked about their own preferences for the party that should be in control in the Gaza
Strip after the war, 59% (64% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip) selected Hamas;
13% selected the PA without President Abbas; 11% selected the PA with Abbas; 3% selected
one or more Arab country;1% selected the UN, and 1% selected the Israeli army. Threemonths ago, we asked an identical question, but with a slightly different set of options tochoose from. At that time, a similar percentage (60% in total; 75% in the West Bank and
38% in the Gaza Strip) selected Hamas as the party preferred by the respondents to control
the Gaza Strip after the war. The change in the preferences of the Gazans, with a 14-point
increase among them selecting Hamas today, is one of the most intriguing findings of thecurrent poll. But it is consistent with the increase, indicated above, in the percentage of
Gazans who think Hamas will win the current war. This is particularly interesting because theopposite happened in the West Bank, with the preference for Hamas dropping significantly
by 11 points. Yet, this West Bank finding is consistent with the significant decrease by 14
points, also indicated above, in the percentage of West Bankers who think Hamas will win
the war.

Figure (12): If it was up to you, which of those would you prefer to see in control of the
Gaza Strip?
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

64%
59%
52%

21%
13%
8%
Hamas

PA undersomeoneother than
Abbas

19%
11%
6%
PA under
Abbas

3% 1%

5%

One or moreArabcountries

Total

West Bank

1% 1% 1%

1% 1% 1%

3% 5%

UN

Israeli Army

Other

0%

15%
9%
1%
DK/NA

Gaza Strip• In another question involving speculation about the most likely scenario for the day after thewar, the results were almost identical, to the question asked above, as 59% said Hamas will
return to control the Gaza Strip. But unlike the first question above, 63% of the West Banker
and only 52% in the Gazans expected that. The reason for the change has to do with theavailable set of scenarios we provided in which we omitted the option of a return of the PA
without president Abbas and provided new possibilities, such as the establishment by Israelof local authorities, tribal and family control, the emergence of multiple armed groups. The
return of the PA under Abbas was expected by 11%, 6% expected Israel to establish local
authorities, another 6% expected the Israeli army to assume control, 4% expected control bytribes and families, and another 4% expected the establishment of multiple armed groups.
• Here too we asked about preferences regarding these scenarios. Given the new choices, themost important change, compared to the earlier question, about preferences in the day after
13

the war, has been the rise in the percentage that selected Hamas. As shown in the figure
below, the return of Hamas reaches 63%, with a 7-point increase in the Gaza Strip compared
to only 2-point increase in the West Bank. Gazans were also more likely to increase theirsupport for the return of the PA, even if under Abbas’ control, with a 14-point rise. West
Bankers increased their support for a PA under Abbas by only 3 points.

Figure (13): Which scenario would you prefer?
70%
60%

63%66%
59%

50%
33%

40%
30%

18%

20%

9%

10%

4% 4% 4%

1% 1% 2%

1% 1% 2%0% 0% 0%3% 5%0.0%

14%
9%
0.5%

Other

DK/NA

0%
Return of
Hamas

Return of the
PA underAbbas

Control by Establishment
The
Control by thetribes/largeof multiple establishment Israeli army
families
armed groups
of a local
authority
formed by
IsraelTotal

West Bank

Gaza Strip• Our previous poll in December 2023 asked about the deployment of an Arab security
contingent from Egypt and Jordan in the Gaza Strip. At that time, three months ago, we
found a 70% opposition to the idea even if the forces were deployed to assist the PA security
forces. In this poll, we asked about support for the “immediate deployment of aninternational force under the UN flag to temporarily police the Gaza Strip in order to end thecurrent war and bring about an Israeli withdrawal.” Only one third supported this option and
62% opposed it. Support for it was higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip (43% to
17% respectively).
Figure (13-0): Would you support deployment of an international force under the UN flag totemporarily police the Gaza Strip in order to end the current war and bring about an Israeli
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip?
76%

80%
70%

62%

60%

53%

50%
40%

43%
33%

30%

17%

20%

6%

10%

4%

0%

Yes

N0
Total

West Bank

14

DK/NA
Gaza Strip

8%• We also asked the respondents to speculate about attitudes of Gazans toward a possible
deployment of Turkish forces in the Gaza Strip. But this scenario stated that such deployment
would take place with Hamas’ approval and international cover and funding. The findings
show the majority thinks Gazans would reject the idea. The assessment of Gazans howevershows a split with 51% believing Gazans would welcome the deployment and 48% believing
they would reject it.

Figure (14): If Turkey deploys its own armed forces in the Gaza Strip, with Hamas' approval andwith international political cover and funding, do you think the residents of the Strip would
welcome them or reject these Turkish armed forces?
60%
50%

54%

51%

57%
48%

41%
34%

40%
30%
20%

5%

10%

9%
0.2%

0%
Welcome them

Reject them
Total

West Bank

DK/NA

Gaza Strip• Finally, we asked the public about if it is for or against an idea of a long-term vision for the
day after in which the US and an Arab coalition comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan
would develop a plan that would strengthen the PA, restore negotiations based on the twostate solution, and bring about an Arab-Israeli peace and normalization. Almost threequarters (73%) said it stands against the idea and only 23% said it stands for it. It is worth
noting that the support for the idea among Gazans is much higher than it is among West
Bankers, 36% and 14% respectively.
Figure (15): A proposal has been submitted for “the-day-after-arrangements” according
to which, under the auspices of the United States and an Arab coalition comprising Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Jordan, the Palestinian Authority would be strengthened and re
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

80%
73%
61%

36%
23%
14%

1) For2) Against
Total

West Bank

15

Gaza Strip

8. Satisfaction with relevant Palestinian, regional, and international actors:• The vast majority (83%) thinks the US administration repeated declarations about thereaching a two-state solution are not serious; only 15% (9% in the West Bank and 23% in the
Gaza Strip) think they are serious.
• As we did in our previous poll, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with therole played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors:
1. On the Palestinian side, satisfaction with the role of Hamas remains stable at 70% (75%in the West Bank and 62% in the Gaza Strip) was the highest followed by the role played
by Yehia Sinwar (61%; 68% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip), Fatah (27%;
24% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip), and president Abbas (14%; 8% in theWest Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip). As the figure below indicates, support for Hamas,
while indeed stable for the total, has in fact dropped in the West Bank by 10 points, from
85% three months ago to 75% today. The opposite happened in the Gaza Strip:
satisfaction with Hamas increased by 10 points. Satisfaction with Sinwar remains stablein the Gaza Strip and drops 13 points in the West Bank. Satisfaction with Fatah increases
by 5 points for the total, 1 point in the West Bank and 11 points in the Gaza Strip.
Finally, satisfaction with Abbas increases by 3 points, 1 point in the West Bank and 5
points in the Gaza Strip.
Figure (16): Now I will ask you about several Palestinian actors and whether you are satisfied ordissatisfied with their performance in the current war.:
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

85% 81%
72% 69%

75%

70%
61%

68%

62%
52% 52%

27%

22%

14%

11%

Dec-23Mar-24

Dec-23

Hamas

Mar-24
West Bank

Yahya Sinwar

22%

21% 17%
8%

7%

Total

32%

24%

23%

52%

Dec-23Mar-24
Gaza Strip

Fatah

President Abbas

2. For the Arab/regional actors, as in our previous poll, the highest level of satisfaction goesto Yemen (83%; 88% in the West Bank and 75% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Qatar(56%), Hizballah (48%), Iran (30%), Jordan (22%), and Egypt (12%). The following
figure shows the distribution of satisfaction in the two polls over the West Bank and theGaza Strip. In the Gaza Strip, the figure shows a significant rise in satisfaction with
Yemen and Qatar and a decrease in satisfaction with Hezbollah and Egypt. In the West
Bank, the figure shows a rise in satisfaction with Hezbollah and a decrease in satisfaction
with Qatar, Iran, Jordan, and Egypt. The regional Arab country that has lost satisfaction
in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is Egypt, cut down by half to 12% for the total,
5% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip.

16

Figure (17): Now I will ask you about several Arab and regional actors and whether you
are satisfied or dissatisfied with their performance in the current war:
100%
90%

89%

83%

80%

88%
75%

80%

68%

70%
60%

56%

56%
49%

50%

30%

49%
44%

39%

35%

40%

55%
48%

20%

52%

41% 39%
36%

30%

30%
22%

24%23%

67%

63%
57%

40%
36%

23%
16%
11%

12%

23%

12%
5%

10%
0%
Dec-23Mar-24

Dec-23Total

Mar-24

Dec-23

West Bank
Yemen

Qatar

Hezbollah

Mar-24
Gaza Strip

Iran

JordanEgypt

3. For the non-regional international actors, the highest level of satisfaction goes to Russia(19%, 21% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Canada and theUN (7% each), and the US (1%). The following figure shows a drop of 3 points insatisfaction with Russia for the total sample. The drop came from the Gaza Strip (12points) while satisfaction with Russia in the West Bank increased by 4 points.
Satisfaction with the US performance remains non-existent.

Figure (18): Now I will ask you about several international actors and whether you are satisfied
or dissatisfied with their performance in the current war:
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

22%

19%
6%

1%

Dec-23

7% 7%

3%

1%

Mar-24

28%

21%

17%

4% 5% 1%0%

Dec-23Total

Mar-24
West Bank

RussiaUN

Canada16%11%11% 10%1%

1%
Dec-23Mar-24
Gaza Strip

United States of America

9. What should the Palestinian Authority do?
• We asked about the policy measures that the PA leadership should take today to help address
the current war in the Gaza Strip. Three policy options were provided. The largest percentage(42%) opted for bringing about an immediate reconciliation and reunification of the WestBank and the Gaza Strip. Secondly, selected by 37%, came the formation of a national unity
17

government to negotiate with Israel and the international community the end of the war andthe future reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. The third, selected by 14%, was for the PA to“lead the humanitarian service delivery to Gazans in cooperation with Egypt and theinternational community.” It is worth noting that for Gazans, the formation of a national
unity government has been the most preferred measure, while for West Bankers, it has beenreconciliation and reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. When compared tothese two measures, both sides, West Bankers and Gazans, almost equally, viewed thehumanitarian role as the least important.
Figure (18-0): Of the following policy measures, which one you think is the most important for
the PA leadership to do now to address the current war in Gaza?
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

42%

45%
39%

42%
36%

33%

14%

15%

12%

7%

7%

Bring about immediate
reconciliation andreunification of the WestBank and the Gaza Strip

Form a national unity
Lead the humanitarian service
government to negotiate withdelivery to Gazans in
Israel and the international cooperation with Egypt andcommunity the end of the the international community
war and the futurereconstruction of the Gaza
Strip
Total

West Bank

7%

DK/NA

Gaza Strip(2) Parliamentary and presidential elections and the domestic balance of power:• If a presidential competition is to take place between three, Marwan Barghouti from Fatah,
Mahmoud Abbas, also from Fatah, and Ismael Haniyeh from Hamas, participation in theelection would stand at 72%; vote for Marwan Barghouti would stand at 40%, the highest
rate in the last three hypothetical elections since September 2023, followed by Haniyeh at
23%, and Abbas at 8%. Among the voters, Barghouti receives 56%, Haniyeh 32%, andAbbas 11%. Three months ago, support for Barghouti among the voters stood at 47% andHaniyeh at 43%, and Abbas at 7%. These findings show Barghouti’s vote increasing by 9
points while vote for Haniyeh drops by 11 points.

18

Figure(19): In a competition between Marwan Barghouti, Ismail Haniyeh, and Mahmoud
Abbas, you would vote for:

Total

Sep-2330%

Dec-2326%

Gaza Strip

Mar-24

West Bank

22%

8%

35%

40%

Sep-2323%

25%

Dec-2335%
33%

Mar-2430%

39%

Sep-2313%

Dec-2338%

Mar-2441%
10%

Marwan Barghouti

20%

28%

2%

8%

29%

1%

12%

26%

2%

5%

29%

40%

Ismael Haniyyah

50%

Mahmud Abbas

11% 0%

47%

27%

30%

2%

16%

5%

16%

1%

9%

34%

34%

0%

38%

1%

2%

31%

2%

2%

40%

60%

70%

1%

80%

90%

I will not participate in the elections

100%

DK/NA

• However, if the new presidential elections were held with only two candidates, Mahmoud
Abbas from Fatah and Ismail Haniyeh from Hamas, competing, the voter turnout would drop
to 52%; vote for Haniyeh would stand at 37% and Abbas at 11%. Among the voters, Haniyeh
would receive 70% and Abbas 22%. Three months ago, the vote for Abbas among the votersstood at 16% and vote for Haniyeh stood at 78%.
Figure (20): If new presidential elections are to take place today, and Mahmud Abbas was
nominated by Fateh and Ismail Haniyeh was nominated by Hamas, whom would you vote for?

Total

Sep-2316%

Gaza Strip

58%

2%

Dec-23

8%

41%

47%

3%

Mar-24

11%

37%

48%

4%

Sep-2319%

Dec-2337%

13%

Mar-24

West Bank

24%

40%
48%

13%

Dec-235%

Mar-245%
0%

16%Mahmoud Abbas

7%

69%

2%
49%

29%
20%

3%
23%

42%

10%

2%

44%

22%

Sep-23

42%

4%

64%
30%

40%

Ismael Haniyyah

50%

60%

3%
70%

I will not participate in the elections

19

80%

90%
DK/NA

100%

• But if the two presidential candidates were Marwan Barghouti from Fatah and Haniyeh from
Hamas, participation would rise to 69%; 42% would vote for Barghouti and 26% forHaniyeh. Among the voters, Barghouti would receive 62% and Haniyeh 37%. These findings
indicate a rise in the vote for Barghouti among voters by 11 points and a drop in the vote forHaniyeh by 8 points.

Total

Figure (21): And what if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti from Fatah andIsmail Haniyeh from Hamas, to whom would you vote?
Sep-2336%

Dec-2335%

West Bank Gaza Strip

Mar-24

22%

41%

31%

42%

Sep-2332%

Dec-23

30%

31%
26%

31%

36%

31%

36%

Mar-2431%

44%

Sep-2339%

Dec-2338%

Mar-24

41%
0%

10%

20%

Marwan Barghouti

39%

17%

13%

47%
28%

31%

16%
30%

40%

Ismael Haniyyah

50%

41%
60%

70%

80%

I will not participate in the elections

90%

100%

DK/NA

• If the two presidential candidates were Haniyeh from Hamas and a different Fatah candidate,prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh, participation would drop to 53%; 13% would vote for
Shtayyeh and 38% for Haniyeh. Among the voters, Shtayyeh receives 24% and Haniyeh
72%.

West
Bank

Gaza
Strip

Total

Figure (22): And what if the competition was between prime minister Mohammad
Shtayyeh from Fatah and Ismail Haniyeh from Hamas, to whom would you vote?
Sep-23
Dec-23Mar-24
Sep-23
Dec-23Mar-24
Sep-23
Dec-23Mar-24

14%

26%

13%
15%

59%
38%
39%

47%
45%

27%

0%

17%

24%
69%

32%
10%

2%
2%

48%

13%
3%

2%

20%

Muhammad Shtayyeh

63%
30%

40%

Ismael Haniyyah

50%

60%

70%

1%
2%
2%

80%

I will not participate in the elections

90%

100%

DK/NA

• Finally, if the two presidential candidates were Haniyeh from Hamas and a non-Fatah
candidate, Mustafa Barghouti, the leader of al Mubadara and a former presidential candidate,the voter turnout rises slightly to 56%; Mustafa Barghouti receives 23% and Haniyyeh 31%.
Among the voters, Mustafa Barghouti receives 40% of the vote and Haniyyeh 56%.

20

Figure (23): And what if the competition was between Mustafa Barghouti from Al
Mubadara and Ismail Haniyeh from Hamas, to whom would you vote?

Total

23%

Gaza Strip

31%

44%

32%

West Bank

41%

17%

0%

10%

2%

27%

25%

20%

Mustafa Barghouti

1%

55%

30%

40%

50%

Ismael Haniyyah

60%

70%

3%

80%

90%

Will not participate in the elections

100%

DK/NA

• In a closed question, we asked the public to select the person they prefer to see as President
Abbas's successor. The largest percentage (40%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti; 19%
preferred Ismail Haniyeh; 10% chose Yahya al Sinwar; 6% chose Hussein al-Sheikh; 4%preferred Mohammed Dahlan, 2% preferred Khaled Meshaal, 1% chose Muhammad
Shtayyeh, and 18% said they did not know or chose someone else. It is worth noting that thepreference for Dahlan, al-Sheikh, and Shtayyeh comes almost only from the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 16% anddissatisfaction at 81%. Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 8% in the West Bank (compared to
10% three months ago) and 27% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 19% three months ago). Six
months ago, before the October 7 war, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 22% anddissatisfaction at 76%.
• 84% want Abbas to resign while 14% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 88%
said they want Abbas to resign. Six months ago, 78% wanted him to resign. Demand for
Abbas' resignation today stands at 93% in the West Bank and 71% in the Gaza Strip.
•

Gaza Strip

Mar-24

West Bank

Figure (24): If it is up to you, would you want to have Abbas resign or not resign?

Mar-24

93%

7% 0%

Dec-23

92%

8%

71%

5%

Dec-23

81%

17%

2%

Sep-23

79%

20%

1%

Sep-2378%

Mar-24

Total

24%

17%

84%

Dec-23

5%
14%

88%

Sep-23

11%

79%
0%

10%

20%

30%

To resign

19%

40%

50%

not to resign

21

60%

DK/NA

70%

80%

90%

2%
1%
2%
100%

• When asked which political party or political trend they support, the largest percentage
selected Hamas (34%), followed by Fatah (17%), while 11% selected other or third-party
groups, and 37% said none of them or did not know. Three months ago, 43% supported
Hamas and 17% selected Fatah. Six months ago, before the current war, support for Hamas
stood at 22% and support for Fatah stood at 26%.This means that support for Hamas during
the past three months has witnessed an 11-point drop while support for Fatah remained
unchanged during the same period. In the West Bank, support for Hamas today stands at 35%(compared to 44% three months ago), and for Fatah at 12% (compared to 16% three monthsago). In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas today stands at 34% (compared to 42% threemonths ago) and support for Fatah at 25% (compared to 18% three months ago).

Gaza Strip

Mar-24Total

Mar-24

West Bank

Figure (25): Which of the following political parties do you support?
25%

Dec-2334%

18%

Sep-23

42%
38%

12%

35%

Sep-23Mar-2417%

Dec-2317%

Sep-23

12%

0%

4%
52%
11%

37%

43%

10%

12%

22%
20%

35%

10%

34%

26%

23%
47%

44%
26%

17%

14%
7%

16%

22%

23%

25%

Dec-23

19%

30%

40%

Fateh

Hamas

12%
50%
Third parties

28%
40%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

DK\NA

• However, if new parliamentary elections were held today with the participation of allpolitical forces that participated in the 2006 elections, only 64% say they would participate inthem, 30% would vote for Hamas, 14% for Fatah, 6% for third parties, and 15% remain
undecided. Among the voters, support for Hamas stands at 47%, Fatah 22%, third parties 9%,
and the undecided at 24%. Compared to our findings three months ago, the current results
among the voters indicate a 4-point drop by for Hamas and a 3-point rise by Fatah. In the
Gaza Strip, vote for Hamas among the voters stands today at 45% (compared to 52% threemonths ago and 44% six months ago) and vote for Fatah among the voters stands today at
26% (compared to 21% three months ago and 32% six months ago). In the West Bank, votefor Hamas among the voters stands today at 48% (compared to 50% three months ago and
24% six months ago) and vote for Fatah among the voters stands today at 16% (compared to
18% three months ago and 40% six months ago).

22

Figure (26): If new elections agreed to by all factions are held today and the same lists that took
part in the last PLC elections were nominated, for whom would you vote?

West Bank

Gaza Strip

Total

Sep-2323%

Dec-2313%

Mar-24

14%

21%

6%

35%

3%

30%

Sep-236%25%

Dec-2320%

Sep-2322%

Dec-2311%

Mar-24

9%
0%

Fateh

13%

10%

20%

15%

change and reform (Hamas)

36%
7%

12%

22%

5%

17%

21%

35%

8%

14%

22%

5%

14%
2%

4%
30%

31%

41%

31%
26%

36%

17%

34%

16%

Mar-24

13%

18%

38%

16%

40%

Third parties

46%

50%

45%
60%

70%

None of the above/ DK/NA/

80%

90%

100%

Will not participate in elections• 49% (compared to 54% three months ago) believe that Hamas is the most deserving ofrepresenting and leading the Palestinian people today while 17% (compared to 13% threemonths ago) believe that Fateh under the leadership of Abbas is more deserving; 29%(compared to 26% three months ago) believe both are unworthy of representation andleadership. Six months ago, 27% said Hamas is the most deserving, 24% said Fateh led by
Abbas is the most deserving, and 44% said both are unworthy of representation andleadership.
(3) Domestic conditions, the resignation of Shtayyeh, and perception of safety and security:• We asked the public about the meaning of the resignation of the government of prime
minister Mohammad Shtayyeh: is it, in its view, a step toward reforming the PA? A majorityof 62% said it is not and only 30% said it is. Gazans are more likely than West Bankers toview the resignation as a step toward reform, 41% and 23% respectively.
• In the aftermath of the resignation of prime minister Shtayyeh, two candidates emerged as themost likely successors: Mohammad Mustafa (reportedly favored by Abbas) and Salam
Fayyad (reportedly favored by some regional and international donors). We asked the public,
which of the two it favors: 55% said none of them; 22% favored Fayyad and 10% favoredMustafa. Eventually, after the completion of data collection, Mustafa was appointed by
Abbas as his next prime minister.
• We asked the public about the make-up and source of authority for the new government: anational unity government that would come under the control of a political party, control ofpresident Abbas, or one that does not come under the control of Abbas or a political party. As
the figure below shoes, 62% opted for the third choice while only a quarter selected the twoother choices combined. It is worth noting that Gazans are less likely than West Bankers togo for the third choice.

23

Figure (27): Do you want the new government to be a national unity government that comesunder the control of a political party, under the control of President Abbas, or alternatively be
an independent national unity government made of competent professio
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

78%

62%
38%
23%

21%
13%

12%

7%

Under the control of a political party

4%

Under control of president Abbas
Total

West Bank

Not under the control of political parties
or president Abbas

Gaza Strip• A majority of 65% (compared to 68% three months ago) believes that the PA has become aburden on the Palestinian people and only 27% (compared to 28% three months ago) believe
it is an asset for the Palestinian people. Six months ago, 62% said the PA is a burden and
35% said it was an achievement.
• We asked the public in the West Bank about its personal and family safety and security. The
findings show that only 11% feel safe and secure while 89% feel unsafe and unsecure. Threemonths ago, the perception of safety stood at 14% and six months ago at 48%.
• Aljazeera is the most watched TV station in Palestine with 61% selecting it as the one they
watched the most during the past two months. West Bankers are more likely than Gazans towatch Aljazeera as 45% of Gazans (compared to 10% in the West Bank) say they do notwatch or have no access to TV these days. The second most popular TV station is Palestine
Today (4%), followed by Alarabiyya and al Mayadeen (3% each), Palestine TV (2%), Alaqsa
and Ma’an (1% each).
(4) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:• 45% support and 52% oppose the idea of a two-state solution, which was presented to the
public without providing details of the solution. Three months ago, support for this solution
in a similar question stood at 34% and six months ago support stood at 32%. In the current
poll, support for this solution came from Gaza Strip, a 27-point increase while remaining
stable in the West Bank at 34%.

24

Gaza Strip

Mar-24
Dec-2335%

Sep-2334%

West Bank

Figure (28): Do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a
Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution: SUPPORT

Mar-2434%

Dec-2333%

62%

Sep-2330%

Total

Mar-2445%

Dec-2334%

Sep-23

32%
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

• Support for the two-state solution is usually linked to public assessment of the feasibility ofsuch a solution and the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Today, 61%(compared to 65% three months ago) believe the two-state solution is no longer practical due
to settlement expansion but 37% (compared to 32% three months ago) believe it is stillpractical. Six months ago, 71% said that the two-state solution is no longer practical due tosettlement expansion. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or nonextant, and
27% believe the chances are medium or high.
• When asked about public support and opposition to specific policy measures to break thestalemate: 62% supported joining more international organizations; 45% supported resort tounarmed popular resistance; 55% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada;
58% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution anddemanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 69% supported a return
to confrontations and armed intifada; 39% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance;
58% supported the dissolution of the PA; and 29% supported abandoning the two-statesolution in favor of one state. Six months ago, before the current war, 58% supported a return
to confrontations and armed intifada; 53% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance;
52% supported the dissolution of the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-statesolution in favor of one state.
• We offered the public three methods to end the Israeli occupation and establish an
independent state and asked it to select the most effective. 46% (51% in the West Bank and
39% in the Gaza Strip) selected “armed struggle;” 25% (27% in the West Bank and 23% in
the Gaza Strip) selected negotiations; and 18% (12% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza
Strip) selected popular non-violent resistance. As shown in the figure below, these findings
indicate a 17-point drop in support for armed struggle; a 5-point rise in support fornegotiations; and a 5-point rise in support for non-violence. The drop in three months insupport for armed struggle comes equally from both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

25

Gaza Strip

Figure (29): In your view, what is the best means of achieving Palestinian goals in ending theoccupation and building an independent state?
Mar-2423%

Dec-2324%

Sep-23

West Bank

56%

29%

26%

Mar-24
Dec-2318%

Sep-23

20%

51%
23%

27%

50%

12%

51%

9%

Sep-22

68%
20%

54%

32%

Mar-2424%

25%

Dec-2320%

Sep-2320%

Sep-22
10%

35%

18%

46%

13%

63%
24%

53%

30%
0%

24%
20%

Negotiations

•

39%

19%

19%

Sep-22

Total

27%

30%

40%

41%
50%

60%

Peaceful popular resistance

70%

80%

90%

100%

Armed struggle

Support and opposition to negotiations is seen in the results to a question about attitudes
regarding “a return to Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations in order to achieve a two-statesolution under international and Arab auspice.” Support for such return to negotiations
received the support of 38% (46% in the Gaza Strip and 33% in the West Bank) of the
public.
Figure (30): Do you support a return to Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations in order toachieve a two-state solution under international and Arab auspices?

70%
59%

60%

52%
46%

50%
40%

63%

38%
33%

30%

20%
10%
0%
Yes

No
Total

•

West Bank

Gaza Strip

We asked the public about its willingness to compromise for the sake of peace: “if duringnegotiations, Israel agrees to make painful concessions to the Palestinian side, would you be
willing in this case to support a similar Palestinian position in offering similar concessions to
Israel?” A majority of 63% (70% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip) said “no,”while only one third (33%; 46% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank) said “yes.”26•

We asked the public to tell us what kind of role it thinks the international community canplay in address the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The poll provided five different roles. The
most popular role, receiving 39% support, was the one involving humanitarian assistance inproviding basic needs of refugees and displaced persons; the second, receiving 29% support,
was “mediation to bring the two sides to the negotiation table,” the third, receiving 11%
support, was the provision of financial and socio-economic assistance to the Palestinian
Authority; the fourth, with 8% support was the use of sanctions to force the parties to observe
international law; and the fifth, with only 6% support, was building Palestinian public
institutions.

Figure (30-0): Role the international community can play in address the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict:
39% 40% 37%

45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

29%

34%
26%
11% 13% 9%

Humanitarian assistance Mediation to bring thein providing basic needs
two sides to theof refugees andnegotiation tabledisplaced persons

Provide financial andsocio-economic
assistance to the PA

Total

•

8%

West Bank

6%

10%

6%

5%

8%

Use sanctions to force Build Palestinian public
the parties to observe
institutions
international law

Gaza Strip

When asked to select the Western country trusted the most in helping Palestine and Israel
make peace, two thirds selected “none of the above.” The list provided included four
countries: the US, Canada, France, and Germany. From among the four Canada came second,
after the US, with 8% favoring it. France came third and Germany fourth.
Figure (30-1): Western country you trust the most in helping Palestine and Israel make
peace

90%

78%

80%

66%

70%
60%

47%

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%

20%
11%

5%

8% 7% 9%The US

Canada12%3%

3% 2% 6%6% 6% 7%

FranceGermany

Other

6%

0%

Total

West Bank

27

Gaza Strip

None of the above•

We asked the public about its assessment of the potential impact of withholding financial
support from UNRWA by some countries “because some of its staff have been accused ofparticipating in Hamas’ October 7 offensive.” We asked the public to tell us if it thinks
withholding support from UNRWA would contribute to increasing or decreasing theprospects for Palestinian-Israeli peace. The overwhelming majority thought the withholdingof support would decrease the prospects for peace while only 5% thought it would do the
opposite and increase the prospects for peace.

Figure (30-2): "Some countries have withheld support from UNRWA because some of its staff
have been accused of participating in Hamas’ October 7 offensive. Do you think withholding
support from UNRWA would contribute to increasing or decreasing the prospe
100%

88%

90%

86%

80%

60%
40%
20%

5%

4%

7%

6%

9%

4%

0%
Increasing it

Decreasing it
Total

West Bank

DK/NA

Gaza Strip• In light of the increase in settler terrorist attacks against Palestinian towns and villages, we
asked West Bankers what means are most effective in combating this terrorism that are also
the most feasible. The largest percentage (41%) chose the formation of armed groups byresidents of the targeted areas in order to protect their areas; 23% chose to deploy Palestinianpolice forces in the targeted areas; another 23% chose the demand that the Israeli army takemeasures to prevent settler terrorism; and only 8% chose the formation, by residents of thetargeted areas, of unarmed groups to protect their areas. As the figure below indicates, theseresults show significant change compared to out findings three months ago. The mostimportant change is a 15-point drop-in support for the formation of armed groups, an 8-point
increase in the demand for protection by the PA police; and a 7-point increase in the demand
for an Israeli army measures to stop the settlers.

28

Figure (31): This year, settler terrorist acts against Palestinian towns and villages such as
Huwara, Turmus' Ayya and Um Safa escalated. Which of the following methods do you think is
the most effective in combating this terrorism and at the same time th
Mar-2423%

Dec-2323%

16%

Sep-23

15%

10%

0%

41%
56%

30%

10%

20%

8%
8%

47%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

8%

80%

90%

100%

The Israeli army should stop settlers’ terrorism
The Palestinian police forces should be deployed in the targeted areas to provide protection
Armed groups should be formed by the residents of the targeted areas to protect their areas
Unarmed groups should be formed by the residents of the targeted areas to protect their areas(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the most pressing problems confronting Palestinians
today:• 42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in
the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should beto obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages; 13% believe that thefirst and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society,one that applies all Islamic teachings; and 11% believe it should be to establish a democratic
political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest
percentage (56%; 66% in the Gaza Strip and 50% in the West Bank) said it is the continued
war in the Gaza Strip; (23%) said it is the Israeli occupation; 8% said it is corruption; 6%
said it is unemployment; and 5% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. Three months ago, (51%, 42% in the West Bank and 64% in the Gaza Strip) said it is
the continued war in the Gaza Strip; and 32% said it is the Israeli occupation.

29

Public Opinion Poll No (91)5-10 March 2024

Q100) From among thefollowing satellite news
stations, which one you
watched most during thelast two months?

Total

West Bank

Gaza Strip1) al Arabia

3%

1%

6%

2) al Jazeera

61%

77%

36%

3) Palestine Today

4%

3%

5%

4) al Manar

0%

0%

0%

5) Palestine TV

2%

2%

3%

6)alaqsa

1%

1%

2%

7) man(mix)

1%

1%

1%

al myadeen

3%

4%

2%

10) Do not watch TV

18%

10%

30%

11) others

0%

1%

0%

12) Do not have a dish

6%

0%

15%

13) DK/NA

0%

0%

0%

(4) (Gaza Strip only) Do
you have food sufficient fora day or two?

1) Yes

44%

2) N0

55%

3) DK/NA

1%(6) (Gaza Strip only) If you
need food or water, is therea place you can reach thatcan provide the assistanceyou need?

1) Yes19%2) Yes, but with great
difficulty or risk
3) N0

77%

4) DK/NA (do not read)0%(8) (Gaza Strip only) Has
any member of your family
been killed during thecurrent war?
(9) (Gaza Strip only) Has
any member of your family
been injured during thecurrent war?
Q101) (Gaza Strip only)
What services or assistance,from among the following,
are available in your placeof residence or shelter?
Water:

1) Yes

60%

2) N0

39%

3) DK/NA

1%1) Yes

68%

2) N0

31%

3) DK/NA

1%1)Yes, available

33%2) Available, but with great
difficulty3) Not available

53%4) DK/NA (do not read)

0%

Food

1)Yes, available

31%2) Available, but with great
difficulty3) Not available

55%

Electricity to charge phone

Tent

4%

13%

13%

4) DK/NA (do not read)

0%1)Yes, available

17%2) Available, but with great
difficulty3) Not available

53%4) DK/NA (do not read)

0%1)Yes, available

10%

30

30%

Total2) Available, but with great
difficulty3) Not available

CoversClothing

Medical care

Toilets

Other, specify ,,,,,,,

Q102) (Gaza Strip only)
Which main body or bodies
oversee the provision ofassistance at your place ofresidence or shelter?
First
Q102-2) (Gaza Strip only)
Which main body or bodies
oversee the provision ofassistance at your place ofresidence or shelter?
SecondQ103) (Gaza Strip only)
Based on your personal
experience, is the process ofaid distribution to displaced
people currently in shelters,
fair or discriminatory on
political grounds?

West Bank

Gaza Strip
34%55%4) DK/NA (do not read)

0%1)Yes, available

14%2) Available, but with great
difficulty3) Not available

47%4) DK/NA (do not read)

0%1)Yes, available

14%2) Available, but with great
difficulty3) Not available

42%

39%

44%

4) DK/NA (do not read)

1%1)Yes, available

15%2) Available, but with great
difficulty3) Not available

58%4) DK/NA (do not read)

0%1)Yes, available

24%2) Available, but with great
difficulty3) Not available

48%4) DK/NA (do not read)

0%1)Yes, available

0%2) Available, but with great
difficulty3) Not available

0%4) DK/NA (do not read)0%1) UNRWA,

62%2) Government,

15%3) Other International
Organization,4) Local Palestinian Group,8%13%5) Other/Specify,

1%6) I Don't Know (do notread)1) UNRWA,

0%30%2) Government,

49%3) Other International
Organization,4) Local Palestinian Group,

15%5) Other/Specify,0%6) I Don't Know (do notread)1) Fair

0%27%2) Discriminatory70%3) I don't know (do not
read)

2%

31

27%

27%

0%

6%

(10) In your view was theHamas decision to launch
its offensive against Israelon 7 October a correct orincorrect one?

Total

West Bank

Gaza Strip

1) Correct

71%

71%

71%

2) Incorrect

19%

16%

23%

3) DK/NA (do not read)

10%

13%

6%

(11) In the current war, has
Israel committed war
crimes?

1) Yes

94%

94%

94%

2) N0

4%

2%

6%

3) DK/NA

2%

3%

1%

(12) In the current war, has
Hamas committed war
crimes?

1) Yes

5%

5%

6%

2) N0

91%

90%

93%

3) DK/NA

3%

5%

1%

(13) A few months after thecurrent war, who in yourassessment will begoverning the Gaza Strip?

1. Israeli Army

5%

4%

6%

2. Hamas

59%

59%

59%

3. PA under Abbas

9%

5%

14%

4. PA under someone
other than Abbas
5. One or more Arabcountries
6. UN

9%

5%

14%

2%

2%

3%

2%

2%

2%

7. Other: please specify -------8. Don’t know (do not read)

1%

2%

0%

13%

21%

2%

1. Israeli Army

1%

1%

1%

2. Hamas

59%

64%

52%

3. PA under Abbas

11%

6%

19%

4. PA under someone
other than Abbas

13%

8%

21%

5. One or more Arabcountries
6. UN

3%

1%

5%

1%

1%

1%

7. Other: please specify -------8. Don’t know (do not read)

3%

5%

0%

9%

15%

1%

(17) In your view, what isthe best means of achieving
Palestinian goals in ending
the occupation and building
an independent state?

1. Negotiations

25%

27%

23%

2. Peaceful popular
resistance
3. Armed struggle

18%

12%

27%

46%

51%

39%

4. Don’t know (do not read)

10%

10%

11%

Now I will ask you about
several Palestinian actors
and whether you aresatisfied or dissatisfied with
their performance in thecurrent war. : Hamas

Satisfied

70%

75%

62%

Dissatisfied

20%

16%

27%

DK/NA (do not read)

10%

9%

11%

Yahya Sinwar

Satisfied

61%

68%

52%

Dissatisfied

25%

17%

37%

DK/NA (do not read)

14%

15%

11%

Satisfied

27%

24%

32%

(14) If it was up to you,which of those would you
prefer to see in control of
the Gaza Strip?

Fatah

32

TotalWest Bank

Gaza Strip

Dissatisfied

59%

68%

46%

DK/NA (do not read)

14%

8%

21%

Satisfied

14%

8%

22%

Dissatisfied

73%

86%

54%

DK/NA (do not read)

13%

6%

24%

Now I will ask you about
several Arab and regional
actors and whether you aresatisfied or dissatisfied with
their performance in thecurrent war. : Yemen

Satisfied

83%

88%

75%

Dissatisfied

12%

7%

20%

DK/NA (do not read)

5%

5%

5%

Qatar

Satisfied

56%

49%

67%

Dissatisfied

39%

45%

29%

DK/NA (do not read)

5%

6%

5%

Satisfied

47%

44%

52%

Dissatisfied

47%

49%

43%

DK/NA (do not read)

6%

6%

5%

Satisfied

30%

23%

40%

Dissatisfied

59%

67%

46%

DK/NA (do not read)

11%

10%

14%

Satisfied

21%

12%

36%

Dissatisfied

72%

84%

53%

DK/NA (do not read)

7%

5%

10%

Satisfied

12%

5%

23%

Dissatisfied

81%

90%

66%

DK/NA (do not read)

7%

4%

11%

Now I will ask you about
several international actors
and whether you aresatisfied or dissatisfied with
their performance in thecurrent war. : Russia

Satisfied

19%

21%

16%

Dissatisfied

75%

72%

79%

DK/NA (do not read)

7%

7%

6%

CanadaSatisfied

7%

5%

10%

Dissatisfied

86%

86%

86%

DK/NA (do not read)

7%

9%

4%

Satisfied

7%

4%

11%

Dissatisfied

90%

92%

86%

DK/NA (do not read)

4%

4%

3%

Satisfied

1%

1%

1%

Dissatisfied

96%

95%

96%

DK/NA (do not read)

3%

3%

3%

1.Israel

64%

55%

77%

2.Hamas

7%

5%

9%

3.The PA

6%

8%

4%

4.The US

20%

26%

10%

5.DK/NA

3%

6%

0%

Mahmoud Abbas

Hezbollah

Iran

JordanEgypt

UN

United States

Q14) Whom you blame forthe current suffering in thecurrent war in the Gaza
Strip? Is it the PA, Hamas,
Israel, or the United States33Q19) The international
media have shown videos
and photos of acts it says
show that Hamas
committed against civilians
in Israel, such as killing
women and children in
their homes. Have you seensome of these videos?

Total

West Bank

Gaza Strip

1) Yes

19%

11%

30%

2) N0

80%

86%

70%

3) DK/NA

2%

3%

0%

Q19-1) Why didn't you see
these videos? Is it because
the media you watch didn't
show these videos, or did
you choose not to watch
them even though you wereable to watch them, or forsome other reason?

1) The media you're
watching didn't show them2) I didn't want to see them

60%

58%

64%

20%

14%

31%

3) Other, specify .........

11%

16%

2%

4) DK/NA (do not read)

9%

13%

2%

Q20) Do you think Hamas
did these things?

1) Yes

4%

3%

7%

2) N0

93%

94%

90%

3) DK/NA

3%

3%

3%

Q26) In your opinion, in
this war, who will emerge
victorious, Hamas orIsrael?

1. Hamas

64%

69%

56%

2. Israel

9%

3%

19%

3. Neither

18%

19%

17%

4. DK/NA

9%

9%

8%

Q27) Are you satisfied with
South Africa's performanceat the International Courtof Justice more than amonth ago when it filed acase against Israel accusing
it of genocide?

1) Yes

78%

79%

76%

2) N0

19%

16%

23%

3) DK/NA

3%

5%

1%

Q28) Are you satisfied withthe court's decision toaccept the case while
demanding that Israel stoptargeting civilians, facilitate
aid access, and demand thatHamas release its detainees
or prisoners, but without
asking Israel to abide by aceasefire?

1) Yes

31%

28%

37%

2) N0

65%

67%

61%

3) DK/NA

4%

5%

2%

Q29) Based on this South
African case, do you expect
or do you not expect theInternational Court ofJustice to eventually convict
Israel of genocide?

1) Yes I expect that

37%

32%

43%

2) I don't expect that

59%

62%

56%

3) DK/NA (do not read)

4%

6%

1%

Q29-1) If the International
Court of Justice convicts

1) Yes

23%

22%

26%

2) N0

72%

72%

72%

34

Israel of genocide, do you
think this will contribute toforcing Israel to end its
occupation of Palestinian
territories in the West Bankand the Gaza Strip?

Total

West Bank

Gaza Strip

3) DK/NA

5%

6%

2%

Q29-2) If Israel enteredRafah with tanks to occupy
it, do you expect residents
and displaced people torush towards the borderwith Egypt in search ofsafety?

1) Yes

40%

50%

24%

2) N0

51%

45%

60%

3) DK/NA

9%

5%

15%

Q29-3) If people started arush towards the Egyptian
borders and the separation
barrier between Egypt andRafah collapses, do you
expect Egyptian soldiersand police to shoot at
Palestinians rushing tocross the border?

1) Yes

61%

55%

68%

2) N0

33%

35%

30%

3) DK/NA

6%

9%

2%

Q29-4) (Gaza Strip only) If
you see people rushingtoward the Egyptian
borders and the separation
barrier between Egypt andRafah falling, you think you
too would leave your homeor shelter to seek safety inthe Egyptian territories?

1) Yes

25%

0%

25%

2) N0

69%

0%

69%

3) DK/NA

6%

0%

6%

Q108-1) In light of thecurrent war conditions in
the Gaza Strip and theceasefire negotiations, what
do you expect to happen in
the coming weeks andmonths?

1) Reaching a permanentceasefire between Hamas
and Israel2) Continuation of the war

40%

50%

27%

27%

20%

38%

3) The expansion of thewar in the Middle East andthe entry of other regional
or international parties
more than now
4) DK/NA (do not read)

25%

25%

26%

7%

5%

9%

Q104) Which post-war
scenario in the Gaza Strip
do you think is the most
realistic?

1) the return of thePalestinian Authority under
the leadership of President
Abbas,
2) the return of Hamas,

11%

8%

14%

59%

63%

52%

3) the establishment of a
local authority formed byIsrael,4) the establishment ofmultiple armed groups,5) the control of tribes andlarge families,

6%

3%

9%

4%

3%

5%

4%

3%

6%

35

TotalWest Bank

Gaza Strip

6%

4%

8%

1%

2%

0%

10%

13%

5%

1) the return of thePalestinian Authority under
the leadership of President
Abbas,
2) the return of Hamas,

18%

9%

33%

63%

66%

59%

3) the establishment of a
local authority formed byIsrael,4) the establishment ofmultiple armed groups,5) the control of tribes andlarge families,6) the control of the Israeliarmy,7) other, specify -------------8) DK/NA (do not read)

1%

1%

2%

1%

1%

2%

4%

4%

4%

0%

0%

0%

3%

5%

0%

9%

14%

1%

Q106) If Turkey deploys its
own armed forces in the
Gaza Strip, with Hamas'
approval and withinternational political coverand funding, do you think
the residents of the Strip
would welcome them orreject these Turkish armed
forces?

1) Welcome them

41%

34%

51%

2) Reject them

54%

57%

48%

3) DK/NA (do not read)

5%

9%

0%

Q107) A proposal has been
submitted for “the-dayafter-arrangements”
according to which, under
the auspices of the UnitedStates and an Arabcoalition comprising Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Jordan,
the Palestinian Authority
would be strengthened andrevitalized, negotiations
based on a two-statesolution would begin, andan Arab-Israeli peace andnormalization would takeplace. Are you for oragainst thesearrangements?

1) With

23%

14%

36%

2) Against

73%

80%

61%

3) DK/NA (do not read)

4%

6%

2%

0001) International actors
can play various roles in
helping to address thevarious aspects of thePalestinian Israeli conflict.
Of the following, which(1) mediation to bring thetwo sides to the negotiationtable(2) humanitarianassistance in providing
basic needs of refugees
and displaced persons

29%

26%

34%

39%

40%

37%

6) the control of the Israeliarmy,7) other, specify -------------8) DK/NA (do not read)Q105) Which scenario
would you prefer?

36aspects of the conflict inyour view would benefit themost from an international
intervention?

0002) Of the following
countries, which one among
the Western countries you
trust the most in helping
Palestine and Israel makepeace?
0003) If duringnegotiations, Israel agrees
to make painful concessions
to the Palestinian side,
would you be willing in thiscase to support a similar
Palestinian position inoffering similar concessions
to Israel?
0004) Of the following
policy measures, which one
you think is the mostimportant for the PA
leadership to do now toaddress the current war inGaza?

C6) Would you support or
oppose the immediate
deployment of aninternational force under
the UN flag to temporarily
police the Gaza Strip inorder to end the current
war and bring about an
Israeli withdrawal from the
Gaza Strip?
C7) Some countries have
withheld support from(3) build Palestinian public
institutions(4) use sanctions to force
the parties to observe
international law(5) provide financial andsocio-economic assistanceto the PA
other, specify ----------

Total

West Bank

Gaza Strip

6%

5%

8%

8%

6%

10%

11%

13%

9%

2%

2%

1%

(7) ) do not know (do not
read)(1) The US

5%

8%

1%

11%

5%

20%

(2) France

6%

3%

12%

(3) Canada

8%

7%

9%

(4) Germany

3%

2%

6%

(5) other, specify ----------

6%

6%

7%

(6) None of the above

66%

78%

47%

1) Yes

33%

24%

46%

2) N0

63%

70%

52%

3) DK/NA

4%

6%

2%

(1) Bring about immediate
reconciliation andreunification of the WestBank and the Gaza Strip(2) form a national unity
government to negotiatewith Israel and theinternational communitythe(3) lead the humanitarian
service delivery to Gazans
in cooperation with Egypt
and the international
community(4) do not know (do not
read)1) Yes

42%

45%

39%

36%

33%

42%

14%

15%

12%

7%

7%

7%

33%

43%

17%

2) N0

62%

53%

76%

3) DK/NA

6%

4%

8%

(1) increasing it

5%

4%

6%

(2) decreasing it

88%

86%

90%

37

UNRWA because some of its
staff have been accused ofparticipating in Hamas’
October 7 offensive. Do you
think withholding support
from UNRWA would
contribute to increasing or
decreasing the prospects forPalestinian-Israeli peace?

Total

West Bank

Gaza Strip(3) do not know (do not
read)

7%

9%

4%

Q30) Which of the following
problems are the mostpressing for the Palestinians
today?

1. The continued war in the
Gaza Strip
2. The Israeli occupation of
the West Bank and East
Jerusalem
3. Corruption

56%

49%

66%

23%

23%

23%

8%

10%

5%

4. The split between theWest Bank and the Gaza
Strip
5. Unemployment

5%

4%

5%

6%

10%

0%

6. Others: specify ---

2%

3%

1%

7. DK/NA

0%

1%

0%

Q31) (West Bank only)
Would you say that thesedays your security andsafety, and that of yourfamily, is assured or notassured?
Q32) If new presidential
elections are to take place
today, and Mahmud Abbas
was nominated by Fateh
and Ismail Haniyeh wasnominated by Hamas,
whom would you vote for?

1) Completely assured

1%

1%

0%

2) Assured

10%

10%

0%

3) Not assured

38%

38%

0%

4) Not assured at all

51%

51%

0%

5) DK/NA

0%

0%

0%

1) Mahmoud Abbas

22%

13%

28%

2) Ismael Haniyyah

70%

80%

63%

4) DK/NA

8%

8%

9%

Q33) And what if thecompetition was between
Marwan Barghouti, Ismail
Haniyeh, and Mahmoud
Abbas, to whom would you
vote?

1. Marwan Barghouti

56%

68%

43%

2. Ismail Haniyyeh

32%

26%

38%

3. Mahmud Abbas

11%

3%

18%

5. DK/NA (do not read)

1%

2%

0%

Q34) And what if thecompetition was between
Marwan Barghouti from
Fatah and Ismail Haniyeh
from Hamas, to whomwould you vote?

1) Marwan Barghouti

62%

70%

53%

2) Ismael Haniyyah

37%

28%

47%

4) DK/NA

1%

2%

0%

Q34-1) And what if thecompetition was between
Mustafa Barghouti from Al
Mubadara and Ismail
Haniyeh from Hamas, towhom would you vote?

1. Mustafa Barghouti

40%

37%

43%

2) Ismael Haniyyah

56%

56%

56%

4) DK/NA

4%

7%

1%

38

TotalWest Bank

Gaza Strip

Q34-2) And what if thecompetition was between
Mohammad Shteyyeh from
Fatah and Ismail Haniyeh
from Hamas, to whomwould you vote?

1. Mohammad Shtayyeh

24%

9%

35%

2) Ismael Haniyyah

72%

85%

63%

4) DK/NA

3%

6%

2%

Q36) If new elections
agreed to by all factions areheld today and the same
lists that took part in thelast PLC elections were
nominated, for whom would
you vote?

1) alternative

1%

1%

1%

2) independent Palestine

4%

4%

3%

3) Abu Ali Mustafa

1%

0%

1%

4) Abu al Abbas

1%

1%

0%

5) freedom and social
justice6) change and reform

1%

1%

1%

Q37) From among thefollowing vital national
goals, which in your viewshould the first mostimportant one that thePalestinian people should
strive to achieve?

Q38) Are you satisfied or
not satisfied with theperformance of Mahmud
Abbas since his election aspresident of the PA?
Q39) If it is up to you,would you want to have
Abbas resign or not resign?

Q40) President Abbas saysthat he will not nominate
himself in new presidential
elections. If it is up to you,

46%

48%

45%

7) national coalition forjustice and democ8) third way(headed bysalam fayyad)9) freedom andindependence
10) Palestinian justice

0%

0%

1%

0%

0%

0%

1%

0%

1%

1%

0%

2%

11) Fateh

21%

16%

26%

12) none of the above/
DK/NA/ Do not remember
1. Israeli withdrawal to the1967 borders and theestablishm
2. Obtain the right of returnto refuges to their 1948
towns
3. Establish a democratic
political system that
respects fre
4. Build a pious or moral
individual and a religious
society5) DK/NA

24%

29%

18%

41%

42%

41%

33%

29%

40%

11%

10%

12%

13%

16%

8%

1%

2%

0%

6

1%

1%

0%

1) very satisfied

4%

2%

8%

2) satisfied

11%

7%

18%

3) not satisfied

40%

39%

42%

4) not satisfied at all

40%

50%

26%

5) DK/NA

4%

3%

5%

1) Certainly resign

48%

59%

32%

2) Resign

36%

34%

38%

3) Not resign

11%

5%

18%

4) Certainly not resign

3%

2%

5%

5) DK/NA

2%

0%

6%

1) Marwan Barghouti

40%

43%

35%

2) Ismail Haniyeh

19%

12%

30%

3) Khaled Meshaal

2%

1%

4%

4 Mohamed Dahlan

4%

1%

10%

39

who do you want to be thepresident after him?

Total

West Bank

Gaza Strip

5 Yahya Sinwar

10%

14%

4%

6 Mohamed Shetia

1%

0%

2%

7 Hussein Sheikh

6%

0%

14%

8 8) Other:

1%

2%

0%

9 9) No opinion / I don't
know1) Hamas

16%

27%

0%

49%

51%

46%

2) Fatah

17%

10%

27%

3) None of them

29%

30%

28%

4) Others, specify: -----------

1%

2%

0%

5) DK/NA

4%

7%

0%

1 The PA is anaccomplishment for thePalestinian people
2 The PA is a burden on
the Palestinian people
3 DK/NA

27%

19%

40%

65%

76%

49%

8%

5%

11%

Q42-0) Prime Minister
Mohammad Shtayyeh
submitted his resignation to
President Abbas after
nearly five years in office.
In your opinion, will thisresignation contribute toreforming the Palestinian
Authority?

1) Yes

30%

23%

41%

2) N0

62%

68%

53%

3) DK/NA

8%

9%

6%

Q42-1) According to press
reports, President Abbas
prefers to appoint
Mohammad Mustafa,
chairman of the Palestine
Investment Fund, as prime
minister to succeed
Mohammad Shtayyeh,
while others prefer toappoint former prime
minister Salam Fayyad tosucceed Shtayyeh. Whomdo you prefer?

1) Mohammad Mustafa

10%

7%

15%

2) Salam Fayyad

22%

16%

32%

3) None of them

55%

57%

52%

4) Other (specify: ----------------------)
5) DK/NA (do not read)

1%

1%

0%

12%

20%

1%

Q42-2) Do you want thisnew Palestinian government
to be a national unity
government that comesunder the control of apolitical party, under thecontrol of President Abbas,
or alternatively be an

1) Prefer one that comesunder the control of apolitical party
2) Prefer one that comesunder control of president
Abbas3) Prefer one that is notunder the control ofpolitical parties or president
Abbas

13%

7%

21%

12%

4%

23%

62%

78%

38%

Q41) Whom do you see as
the most deserving ofrepresenting the Palestinian
people today, is it Hamas
who controls the Gaza Stripor Fatah under Abbas
leadership in the WestBank?
Q42) Some people say that
the Palestinian Authority
has become a burden on thePalestinian people whileothers say that it is anaccomplishment for thePalestinian people. What do
you think?

40

TotalWest Bank

Gaza Strip

independent national unity
government made ofcompetent professionals
who do not belong topolitical parties and are notunder the control ofpresident Abbas?

4) DK/NA (do not read)

13%

11%

18%

Q43) Do you support or
oppose the solution basedon the establishment of a
Palestinian state alongside
Israel, known as the twostate solution?

1. Support

45%

34%

62%

2. Oppose

51%

62%

36%

3. DK/NA

3%

4%

2%

Q45) Some believe that thetwo-state solution, an
independent Palestinianstate alongside the state ofIsrael, is no longer viable
due to settlement expansion
while others believe that itis still viable today as
settlements can bedismantled or evacuatedwhen an agreement isreached. What do you
think?

1. The two-state solution is
no longer viable
2. The two-state solution
remains viable today
3. DK/NA

61%

63%

57%

37%

34%

40%

3%

3%

3%

Q46) What in your view are
the chances for theestablishment of an
independent Palestinianstate next to the state ofIsrael in the next five years?

1) very low

37%

39%

34%

Low

36%

34%

38%

3) Medium

21%

21%

21%

4) High

6%

6%

6%

5) very high

1%

1%

0%

6) DK/NA

0%

0%

1%

00040. Do you support a
return to Palestinian-Israeli
peace negotiations in orderto achieve a two-statesolution under internationaland Arab auspices?
00070. In your opinion, has
the war on Gaza since
October 7 revived
international attention to
the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict that it could lead toincreased recognition ofPalestinian statehood?

1) Yes

38%

33%

46%

2) N0

59%

63%

52%

3) DK/NA

3%

4%

2%

1) Yes

75%

74%

77%

2) N0

22%

23%

19%

3) DK/NA

3%

2%

4%

Q47) Under current
conditions, do you support
or oppose the following
policy options?: Joining

1) Strongly support

24%

19%

31%

2) support

38%

34%

45%

3) oppose

29%

35%

19%

4) Strongly oppose

6%

8%

5%

41

TotalWest Bank

Gaza Strip

3%

4%

0%

7%

6%

10%

16%

16%

18%

48%

47%

49%

25%

26%

23%

5) DK/NA

3%

5%

1%

1) Strongly support

12%

8%

17%

2) support

34%

31%

39%

3) oppose

39%

40%

36%

4) Strongly oppose

12%

16%

7%

5) DK/NA

4%

5%

1%

1) Strongly support

23%

25%

19%

2) support

32%

34%

28%

3) oppose

31%

26%

39%

4) Strongly oppose

9%

7%

12%

5) DK/NA

5%

8%

1%

1) Strongly support

21%

22%

20%

2) support

36%

34%

41%

3) oppose

29%

29%

28%

4) Strongly oppose

10%

11%

10%

5) DK/NA

3%

4%

2%

1) The Israeli army shouldstop settlers’ terrorism
2) The Palestinian police
forces should be deployedin the targeted areas toprovide protection3) Armed groups should beformed by the residents ofthe targeted areas toprotect their areas
4) Unarmed groups should
be formed by the residentsof the targeted areas toprotect their areas
5) Others, specify

23%

23%

0%

23%

23%

0%

41%

41%

0%

8%

8%

0%

1%

1%

0%

6) DK/NA

4%

4%

0%

PPP

1%

1%

1%

PFLP

2%

2%

4%

Fatah

17%

12%

25%

Hamas

34%

35%

34%

DFLP

1%

0%

1%

PIJ

3%

1%

7%

Fida

0%

0%

0%

Al Mubadara

0%

0%

0%

Indep Islamist

1%

1%

3%

Indep Nationalist

2%

2%

3%

Third Way

0%

0%

0%

more internationalorganizations

5) DK/NA

Abandon the two -statesolution and demand theestablishment of one statefor Palestinians and Israelis

1) Strongly support
2) support3) oppose
4) Strongly oppose

Resort to popular nonviolent and unarmed
resistance

Return to the armed
intifada and confrontations

Dissolve the Palestinian
Authority

Q49) (West Bank only) This
year, settler terrorist acts
against Palestinian towns
and villages such as
Huwara, Turmus' Ayya and
Um Safa escalated. Whichof the following methods doyou think is the mosteffective in combating thisterrorism and at the sametime the most viable?

Q51) Which of the following
political parties do you
support?

42TotalWest Bank

Gaza Strip

None of the above

30%

35%

22%

Others0%0%0%

DkK/NA

7%

12%

0%

43