Reviewing Emission Mitigation
Contributions

Joseph E. Aldy
Harvard Kennedy School

ALPS International Symposium
February 27, 2015

Reviewing Emission Mitigation
Contributions
Role of Information in Agreements
Lessons from Other International Agreements
UNFCCC Review
Ex Ante and Ex Post Review
Role for Civil Society, Academics, and IOs

Role of Information in Agreements

Uncertainty
Uncertainty in credibility of commitments• Will countries implement policies to deliver oncommitments?
• Can a country’s performance be observed?

Exogenous Shocks• Economic growth shocks, energy system shocks
may affect incentives for participation/complianceSignaling
Transparency and publicity of a commitment
and outcomes enhances credibility• Schelling (1956)

Publicity requires information structures
created by rules of international institutions“Naming and shaming” and prospect ofadverse reputational consequences may
promote complianceIncentives to Monitor
Incentives for countries to defect from anagreement (free-ride) creates incentives forothers to monitor
Probability of detecting defection increases
with transparency of regime• Reassure those predisposed to comply• Deter those considering defection

Building Credibility and Trust
Repeated nature of climate negotiations
allows for transparency to inform future talks• Countries unlikely to agree on subsequent round ifthey differ in understanding of previous round

Effective monitoring a condition for sustainedcooperation
Facilitates reciprocity that can accelerate
ambition over timeLessons from Other InternationalAgreements

Credibility of Information
Delegate surveillance to “neutral” thirdparties, such as international organizations
IOs employ permanent staff experts, make incountry visits – IMF, OECD, WTO
Data, analysis, evaluation of policy actions andoutcomes key to effective transparency

Engaging PeersExpert reviews at IMF, OECD, and WTO feed
into peer review mechanisms
Facilitate understanding about effective policy
practice“Reciprocal multilateral scrutiny” –Schelling’s description of pledge and review

Learning
Identifying best practices assists othercountries in their mitigation policy design
Assess collective effort of mitigation• Global emissions• Efficacy and costs of mitigation policies• Thematic examinations• Analogs in World Economic Outlook, World Energy
Outlook, UNEP Emission Gap reports

Implementing Surveillance
International institutions of informationcollection and dissemination can lower thecosts of an international agreement
Standards for data dissemination and codesfor good policy practice can enhancecountries’ technical capacities
Frequency of review could build on experiencein IMF, OECD, and WTO

Role of Civil Society
Shining light on policy implementation andoutcomes can empower stakeholders
Civil society can review the reviewers anddevelop new methods for review and analysis
CITES formally relies on NGOs to review
national reports and monitor trade inendangered species

UNFCCC Review

Shortcomings of UNFCCC Review
No global emissions estimatesInfrequent reporting• China reported 1994 emissions in 2004, 2004
emissions in 2012

Policy made on incorrect assumptions about
emissions data – Berlin MandateProgress with ICA and MRV
Copenhagen and Cancun establishedInternational Consultations and Analysis andMeasurement, Reporting, and Verification
Biennial reporting subject to consultations
with peers

Lima Call for Climate Action
Countries invited to submit INDCs in a“manner that facilitates the clarity,transparency, and understanding of INDCs”
Countries may submit information withINDCs that, inter alia, “how the party
considers that its INDC is fair and ambitious”
Expect first INDCs tabled within a monthEx Ante and Ex Post Review

Ex Ante Review
Inform assessment of aggregate pledges• UNFCCC will publish an assessment in November

Inform determination of ambition andcredibility of country pledges• Some will call for more ambition before Paris• Countries will assess comparability of actions by
their peers

Establishes foundation for ex post review

Benchmarking
Natural / de facto benchmarking• Rank all countries on comparability metrics

Identifying peer groups for benchmarking• Annex I v. Non-Annex I or new classifications

Identifying explicit benchmarks• Explicit thresholds for comparability metrics• Could vary by peer groups

Ex Post Review
Assess whether countries delivered on theirpledges and why• Determine if good-faith effort undertaken• Analyze impacts of exogenous shocks on outcomes• Identify effective mitigation policies• Rigorous ex post review can increase costs on
countries for failing to deliver on pledges• Need for long-term success of pledge and review

Ex post review and ex ante review could
become integrated over timePlanning for Ex Post Review
Identify ex ante the data and analytic needs
for ex post review• Implement data collection protocols

Promote advanced transparency of ex post
review process so that countries andstakeholders can assess interim progress
Identify ways to implement policies thatfacilitate causal inferenceRole of Civil Society, Academics, andInternational Organizations

Going Beyond the Emission Gap
Many environmental groups will focus on the“emission gap” later this year
• What comes next?

Transition from the question of adequacy tocomparability• If there is a gap, who could do more?
• Domestic politics will focus more on comparabilityof effort than on overall ambition• Non-governmental actors can facilitate this process

Data, Analysis, and Modeling
Analysts can identify existing data, describe
opportunities for collecting new data, anddetermine how to use the data
Establish gold standard for data collection,analysis, and modeling
Review the procedures envisioned for ex anteand ex post review

Learning
Independent analysts can evaluate theefficacy, costs, and distributional impacts ofvarious mitigation policies
Enable reviewers to learn about effective waysof reviewing data and countries’ policies
Fill the learning gap by identifying best policy
practicesDemonstrating Models of Reviewand Consultation
Independent experts could experiment withvarious models of review and consultation• Experts could evaluate the voluntarily submitted
information by countries in support of their INDCs• Could employ multiple review models to multiple
sets of countries

Experts could work with a small group, suchas the Major Economies Forum• Serve as technical experts performing analysis andenabling consultations at a MEF meeting

Facilitating InternationalCooperation
Independent analysts can provide a check on
countries’ claims that promote credibility• Or undermine credibility if a country’s policies do
not support its pledged contribution

Assist countries with less technical capacity toprocess and understand other countries’
contributions
Enable an informal peer review process

Conclusions

Conclusions
Transparency crucial for credibility and longterm durability of international climate policy
Important lessons from other international
policy contexts can inform climate regime
Civil society and independent analysts caninform the design and implementation of ex
post and ex ante reviews of contributions

References and Contact Information
Aldy, Joseph E. 2014. The Crucial Role of Policy Surveillance inInternational Climate Policy. Climatic Change 126: 279-292.
Aldy, Joseph E. and William A. Pizer. 2014. Comparability ofEffort in International Climate Policy Architecture. Harvard
Project on Climate Agreements Discussion Paper 62.
Akimoto, Keigo, Joseph E. Aldy, and William A. Pizer. 2015.
Comparing Emission Mitigation Effort. Forthcoming
working paper.
Joseph E. Aldy
Harvard Kennedy School
joseph_aldy@hks.harvard.edu
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/jaldy/