Why the IndoPacific matters?

Growing and lasting importance of IndoPacificChapter 1. Southeast Asia’s Indo-Pacific Balance: FOIP and BRI as Hedging Strategies to Secure
Strategic Autonomy
Stephen R. Nagy, PhD, Department of Politics and International Studies, International Christian
UniversityChapter 2. Conceptualizing an Evolving Philippine National Security Strategy in a Changing IndoPacific Region: The Marcos Administration’s Return to Hard Balancing StrategyRenato Cruz De
Castro, PhD, International Studies Department, De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines
Chapter 3. Malaysian Perspective on Great Power Competition in the Indo-PacificTharishini Krishnan, PhD, Department of Strategic Studies and a Centre of Defense and International
Security Studies (CDISS), National Defense University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Chapter 4. Indonesia’s Careful Tread between the U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-PacificM.
Waffaa Kharisma, MSc, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, Indonesia
Chapter 5. Thailand’s Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pacific: Beyond Sino-U.S. Competition
Mark S. Cogan, PhD, Peace and Conflict Studies, Kansai Gaidai University, Hirakata, Osaka, Japan
Chapter 6. The Potential of QUAD: Preparing for a New Order in the Indo-Pacific
Satoru Nagao, PhD, Hudson Institute, Tokyo, Japan
Chapter 7. Old Is New Again: Historical Perspectives on U.S. Partners in Asia and the South China
SeaChristopher L. Kolakowski¹, PhD, Jose A. Custodio², MA, Brendan Donnelly³, MA, and Grant Willis4,
MA
Chapter 8. Security Assurance Policy of the United States and Impact on its Southeast Asia Partners
Leo S. F. Lin¹, PhD, Indu Saxena², PhD
Chapter 9. U.S. Integrated Deterrence Strategy in Support of Free and Open Indo-PacificIndu Saxena¹, PhD, Leo S. F. Lin², PhD, Neil Law³, MA, and Mohammad Rubaiyat Rahman⁴, LLM

You can order here: https://novapublishers.com/shop/southeast-asia-andthe-indo-pacific-construct/

Key take homes

Heterogeneity
Reading the ASEAN Tea Leaves
Strategic Autonomy
Multilevel engagement: ASEAN (multilateral), Minilateral, Bilateral

STEPHEN R NAGY (PHD) NAGY@ICU.AC.JP
PROFESSOR, INTERNATIONAL CHRISTIAN
UNIVERSITYVISITING FELLOW, JAPANESE INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (JIIA)

Securing strategic autonomy in the South China Seas: FOIP and BRI asHedging Strategies

Southeast Asian View of the Region

Hedging as a Framework

Orientation

FOIP and BRI as Hedging Strategies

Multi-alignment and Diplomatic Flexibility

Conclusion

SoutheastAsia and thebilateralrelationshipbetween theUS and China

In 2020 PM Lee Hsien Loong in his essay in Foreign Affairs Magazine
argued that Southeast Asian countries do not want to choose
between the US and China (Lee, 2020)

Southeast Asia wants to continue its beneficial economic relationshipwith China.

We find that Southeast Asian countries trust Japan and the EU much
more than the US and China (in that order)

The 2023 iteration of the Asia Power Index illustrates that China
continues to be in a more dominant position compared with US interms of free trade agreements in the region, its economic networks
and dominant (but shifting) position within the region’s supply chains.
(Patton et al., 2023)

Southeast
Asia and thebilateralrelationshipbetween theUS and China

China’s economic footprint, strong linkages into Southeast Asia
continue to be the bedrock of its relationship and ability to influence
region.

the US has a large security and diplomatic footprint in the region
tethered together with security partnerships including those with thePhilippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

US–ASEAN trade totalled US$234 billion in 2015, while US companies
invested US$32.3 billion in ASEAN countries in 2012–2014 alone —more than three times that of China.

The total stock of US foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region isUS$226 billion — more than that of China, Japan and the European
Union combined. Washington also contributes a variety of regional
aid programs such as the Lower Mekong Initiative, and its US$4 billion
in aid (as of 2015) outstrips that from Beijing three to one.”(Shambaugh, 2018))

Researchquestions?

How does Southeast Asia manages theconundrum that its largest economic
benefactor China is also a geopoliticalchallenger to the region’s cohesion and rulesbased order?

How do Southeast Asian states balance theireconomic interests and security interests? Whatis the role of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Vision (FOIP) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) inthat balancing process?

How can we conceptualize these balancing
actions using hedging?

Concept of Hedging

A set of strategies to avoid
undecided situation withstraightforwardalternatives (Goh, 2006).

A behavior to offset risks
by pursuing multiple policy
options with mutuallycounteracting effects at
high-uncertainties/stakes(Kuik, 2008).

14

A continuum between
bandwagoning &balancing.

Balance of power logic: Risk contingency -Hedging(Kuik 2007, p. 163)
Hedging

Indirectbalancing

Dominance
DenialReturnmaximizing

Binding-enagement

Major
characteristics

Coalitionbuilding,bargaining
withininternational
institutions,short offormalalliances(Saltzman,2011)

Preventingand denying
theemergenceof apredominant
power that
may exert
undueinterferenceon smaller
countries(Kuik, C.C.
p.164)

Maximizing
economic,diplomaticand politicalbenefits froma positive
relationshipwith a rising
power (Kuik,C. C. 2016,p.504)

Maximize diplomatic benefits by engaging
and binding a big power in various
institutionalized bilateral and multilateralplatforms, for the functions of creating
channels of communication and increasing
the status-quo tendency of the power’s
behaviour (Kuik, C.C. 2016, p.504)

Balance of power logic: Soft vs Hard Balancing
Soft balancing

Hard balancing

Objective

Constraint
Restrict (McDougall, 2012, pp.3-4)

Undermine or confront emerging
state (Saltzman, 2012, p.133)

Tools

Non-military assets: economic tools,international institutions, diplomacy(Pape, 2005, p.17)

Military build-up, alliance, militarytechnology (Pape, 2005, p. 36)

FOIP and BRI asHedging Strategies

Belt Road
Initiative New

developmentalism?

 Geo-economics?
 Economic autonomy?
 Security?
 Grand strategy?

⮚ Massive scope of the BRI:

⮚ 150 plus countries and growing⮚ Investments of over US$1.4 trillion in announced projects up to mid-2016 andan estimated US$4 trillion cost for all projects (Sheng 2017)⮚ 2015: Chinese enterprise along New Silk Road totalled US$14.8 billion, 1/8 of
China’s total ODI (Sheng 2017)

Free andopen IndoPacific(FOIP)

USResponse(Japaneseresponse)Inclusivity
Infrastructure and connectivity(including digital economy)

Key pillars

Trade
Rules-based order (RBO): Digital,Maritime, Space, Trade
Maritime Security

Comparing key tenants of FOIP and BRIJapan FOIP

China (BRI)

Regional Order (power)

Multipolarity with U.S.-leadership + Coalition of Willing

New Type of Great Power Relations + China centered Asia

Regional Order (value)Free, Open & Rules-based (inclusive)

Non-intervention to core interests (exclusive)

Principle

Rule of Law

Non-intervention (Westphalian)

Structure

Hierarchical (US-led) for Horizontal (RBO)

Hierarchical for China (China Dream)

Asia policy

Assisting autonomous, rules-based & good-governed development (FOIP)

Creating economic reliance on China

Implication for investment

RBO, high standards, fiscal sustainability, environmentally high standards,
transparency, good governance, international standard, market-based
competition

Standards set by Beijing, negotiating closed digital system,privacy??,

Adapted from: Hanada Ryosuke’s presentation “Turbulences in the International Order: Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific and Rules-based Order International Christian University. 5 February 2020

FOIP and BRI asHedging
Strategies

Southeast Asian states have benefited from engaging with theFree and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) plan and Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) as part of their efforts negotiate the increasingly
challenging US-China strategic competition and security strategic
autonomy.
Economic opportunity, trade and connectivity, partnershipdiversification, security partnerships, infrastructure anddevelopment, and people-to-people exchanges

Tactically hedging as Koga (2023a, b) writes to preserve andsecure strategic autonomy but not alienate their importanteconomic and security partners.

VariousOpportunities

States are leveraging their engagement with the BRI to
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and develop
critical infrastructure projects.

Southeast Asia in general promoting intra-regional
economic integration through infrastructure andconnectivity projects

“fractured growth” (Calabrese and Wang, 2023)

Tools:Development
based FOIP
Infrastructure connectivity

EWEC, NSEC, SEC

Promote for intra-ASEAN
economic synergy

Capacity buildingSecurityCooperation



Rather than dominance denial, Southeast Asian states
are engaging in indirect balancing through the FOIP planthat includes components for security cooperation andmaritime domain awareness.

Southeast Asian states, particularly those with territorial
disputes in the South China Sea, have welcomed theFOIP plan's support in ensuring freedom of navigation
and upholding international law (Hosoya, 2019; Koga ,2022)

They also welcome the numerous strategic partnershipsthat Japan has cultivated in the region (Nagy, 2018)neralpromoting intra-regional economic integration throughinfrastructure and connectivity projects

FOIP and BRI
TogetherSoutheast Asian states have experienced various benefits
from engaging with the FOIP plan and BRI
However, they also face challenges and risks associatedwith great power competition, project sustainability,
protecting national interests, and managing debt
vulnerabilities. Balancing these factors
The most critical of areas are maintaining strategic
autonomy, multi-alignment and engagement, diplomatic
flexibility and pragmatism, constructive engagement anddialogue, and regional cooperation and solidarity.

Southeast Asian states continue toprioritize maintaining their strategic
autonomy and independence in theirforeign policy choices.
2. Multi-alignment and engagement
serve Southeast Asian states toleverage competing interests among
these powers to their advantage.
3. ASEAN centrality, the character of
each Southeast Asian state when it
comes to multi-alignment varies.
Southeast Asian states strive to maintain
diplomatic flexibility and pragmatism
when interacting with major powers suchas China or the US and even Japan
1.

Multi-alignmentand DiplomaticFlexibility

Key Takeaways

Southeast Asian states balance theirrelationships with major powers while engaging
in the FOIP plan and BRI
1. Maintaining strategic autonomy,
2. Employing multi-alignment and engagement
3. Practicing diplomatic flexibility andpragmatism
4. Emphasizing constructive engagement anddialogue
5. Employing hedging and risk management
strategies
6. Promoting regional cooperation andsolidarity,
7. Protecting their national interests andsovereignty.
These approaches enable them to navigate thecomplex dynamics of great power competitionand safeguard their autonomy in the region.