ROLES Insights Number 2021-04 November 21, 2021

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New Infrastructures on Matua Island: Enhancements in Russia’s Anti-Access in the Pacific?
Number2021-04

November 21, 2021
By Yu Koizumi

Russia seems to have begun deploying new military assets in Matua Island located in the middle of the Kuril
archipelago that surrounds the Sea of Okhotsk (Fig. 1).
Given that the Russian Pacific Fleet’s nuclear-powered strategic submarines (SSBNs) are patrolling this area,
the island chain is critical for Russia’s nuclear deterrence as the “nuclear bastion” to protect their SSBNs fromU.S. and Japanese anti-submarine operations.
The importance of the “nuclear bastion” has been increasing after 2010s when Russia has started a major
modernization program to replace obsolete Project 667BDR (Delta III) SSBNs built during the Soviet era.
Since 2013, the Pacific Fleet has been joined by two newly built Project 955 (Borei) SSBNs, and two Project955A (Borei-A) SSBNs are expected to be deployed there in 2022.
Developments have also been taking place in the “nuclear bastion” itself. Vladivostok and PetropavlovskKamchatsky – the two main naval bases of the Fleet – are now armed with advanced area denial assets suchas the long-range S-400 (SA-21 Growler) and the short-range Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) air-defensesystems, anti-ship missiles (AShM) like the 3K55 Bastion (SS-C-5 Stooge) and 3K60 Bal (SS-C-6 Sennight),
as well as electronic warfare (EW) systems like the Murmansk-BN. Similar assets are being deployed in thesouthern rim of the “nuclear bastion” in Sakhalin and southern Kuril Islands, of four have been disputed byJapan and Russia.
At the same time, the pace and scale of construction in the middle Kuril Islands have been slow and limited
when compared with the other parts of the “nuclear bastion.” While plans to construct a naval base and deploy
AShMs have been reported several times, significant developments have not taken place. Much is because
these islands are uninhabited with some having extremely rough terrains, making the costs for deployment,

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Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, the University of Tokyo
4-6-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8904 JAPANhttps://roles.rcast.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en
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ROLES Insights Number 2021-04 November 21, 2021

operation and maintenance of units are considerably high. Essentially, the only significant development in themiddle Kurils was the construction of a 1,400m runway paved with steel panels in Matua Island in 2016.

Fig. 1 Location of Matua Island★ Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky(SSBN base)★ Matua Island

Russia★ Vladivostok(Pacific Fleet HQ)

JapanIsland disputed by Japanand Russia
Source: Google EarthHowever, recent satellite imagery reveals that some military infrastructures are being constructed on Matua
Island from October this year.
As is shown in Fig. 2, 3, and 4, the small camp site on the eastern coast of the Island originally built forexpeditionary scientific research has been enlarged by several times, and small numbers of military tents andobsolete buildings have been replaced by new container units. The western side of the camp site has beentransformed into aprons paved with concrete panels, along with the construction of two large hangers (30mlong, 10m wide).

RCAST Open Laboratory for Emergence Strategies
Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, the University of Tokyo
4-6-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8904 JAPANhttps://roles.rcast.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en
office@me.rcast.u-tokyo.ac.jp

ROLES Insights Number 2021-04 November 21, 2021
Source: Google EarthCamp site in September8,2021

Camp site for scientificresearch teams

Source: Secure Watch (Maxar Technologies)

Airfield constructed in
2016

Fig. 2 Entire View of Matua

Source: Secure Watch (Maxar Technologies)

The apron underconstruction

Fig. 3 Beginning of Construction (October 23, 2021)

RCAST Open Laboratory for Emergence Strategies
Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, the University of Tokyo
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ROLES Insights Number 2021-04 November 21, 2021
Source: Secure Watch (Maxar Technologies)

Constructed apron

Newly built hangers

Military container units

Fig. 4 New Facilities in Matua (November 16, 2021)

At this stage, it is unclear whether the infrastructural developments on Matua Island indicates the start ofRussian military build-ups in middle Kuril Islands. There is still the possibility that this is just the constructionof a new scientific research facility, and newly built hangers are too small when compared to the AShM units
deployed in other parts of the Kuril archipelago. For example, in the case of Kunashiri and Etorofu, disputed
islands between Japan and Russia, each of the AShM hangars measure approximately 130m long and 30mwide. Nevertheless, the presence of large aprons in front of hangers matches with the features of AShM
facilities. For example, the AShM hangers in Kunashiri and Etorofu have such aprons to park and maintain theAShM battalion vehicles.
In addition, two launch pad-like facilities have been constructed in Matua as shown in Fig. 5. Given that theconstruction of the launch pads took place almost at the same time as the hangers, it is reasonable to consider
those to be interrelated. Furthermore, Russian AShM units are often accompanied by launch pads around theirbasing facilities. Thus there are reasons to believe that the developments on Matua Island also follows thatpattern.
The abovementioned facts strongly suggest that the latest developments in Matua Island are indeed theconstruction of Russia’s first AShM base in the middle Kurils. While the most likely assets deployed there arethe SS-C-5 and/or the SS-C-6 AShMs, smaller assets could also be deployed. In 2019, Russia unveiled a newtype of small AShM launch systems known as the Rubezh-ME that consists of launch vehicles with Kh-35U
AShM canisters, a Monolit-B fire control radar, and a command post unit mounted on KamAZ-6350 off-roadtrucks (Fig. 6). Even though the individual capacity of the Rubezh-ME is much smaller than SS-C-6, which isequipped with eight Kh-35U canisters, its compact size makes it possible for a whole battalion to beaccommodated in small hangers like those in Matua.

RCAST Open Laboratory for Emergence Strategies
Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, the University of Tokyo
4-6-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8904 JAPANhttps://roles.rcast.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en
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ROLES Insights Number 2021-04 November 21, 2021

Launch pads like sites

Fig. 5 Possible Launch Pads
(November 16, 2021)

Source: Secure Watch (Maxar Technologies)

Fig. 6 Rubezh-ME AShM
Launcher vehicle

Source: Photographed by author(Sankt-Peterburg, 2019)

RCAST Open Laboratory for Emergence StrategiesResearch Center for Advanced Science and Technology, the University of Tokyo
4-6-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8904 JAPANhttps://roles.rcast.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en
office@me.rcast.u-tokyo.ac.jp

ROLES Insights Number 2021-04 November 21, 2021

Indeed, the anti-access arrangement on Matua is incomplete with the absence of air-defence systems.
However, in the case of Kunashiri and Etorofu, the air-defense systems were deployed four years after thedeployment of AShMs in 2016, thus it is possible that the same trend will take place in the middle Kurils.
There are also logistical problems given that the facilities are located in distant, uninhabited islands,
particularly given that Russia’s landing ship fleet in this area has shrunk dramatically over the last 30 years.
However, the Russian navy is rebuilding its landing ship fleet, and some of these new generation vessels areto be deployed in the Pacific (Table 1). Hence it is expected that Russia’s military build-ups in the middle
Kuril Islands will proceed in congruence with the development of its logistic capabilities.
Table 1 Transition of Russia’s Landing Ship Fleet

ClassDisplacement

Project 775/775M
Project 1171
Project 1174
Project 11711
Project 23900

4,400t4,360t14,000t
6,600t40,000t2030（expected）
1985
2021
Pacific
Pacific
Pacific
EntireEntireEntire
Fleet
Fleet
Fleet
1816313318
144
1002
1000001104
20000
2
1

Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1985; IISS, The Military Balance 2021; and estimates by the author.

***********************************************
Yu Koizumi is a Project Assistant Professor at the Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology atthe University of Tokyo.

RCAST Open Laboratory for Emergence Strategies
Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, the University of Tokyo
4-6-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8904 JAPANhttps://roles.rcast.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en
office@me.rcast.u-tokyo.ac.jp