DPRK Nuclear Programs and Regional Responses
Xuecheng Liu
Research Fellow and Director of American Studies
China Institute of International Studies
Prepared for Workshop on“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”
Hiroshima Peace Institute
Hiroshima, Japan
March 11-12, 2004
The nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula has become one of the focal points in thecurrent global campaigns against nuclear proliferation. Since the disclosure of the North
Korean nuclear weapon programs in October 2002, the relevant parties have madeefforts to defuse the tensions on the peninsula. The second round of the six-party talks
was held on February 26-28, 2004 and the pattern of the current interactions remains
nuclear programs versus security concerns. The approach under deliberation is still
within the framework of economic compensations and security assurances for
dismantlement of nuclear weapon programs. Currently, the interactions remain within
the context of the six-party talks. China’s mediating efforts have been encouraged andsupported by all the other parties in this regard. Our current problem is how to pushforward the process of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula within the context ofthe six-party talks and how to maintain peace and stability permanently on the peninsula.
Background of the Current Nuclear Crisis
The current nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula is a complicated process and has
its multi-facet nature. To address the issues related to the current crisis, we have to look
into three dimensions of its nature or background.
Firstly, the current crisis is a legacy left over by the Cold War. Although the Cold
War globally ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the Cold
War mechanism remains on the Korean Peninsula. The security mechanism on thepeninsula has been based on the armistice agreement signed after the Korean War. The
efforts were made to replace the current armistice treaty with a peace treaty throughnegotiations during the four-party talks in the 1990s, but they were unable to reach thegoal.
Secondly, hostility and confrontation have begun to give way to engagement and détente
in the relations between North and South Koreas. Although the North-South militaryconfrontation remains in terms of international law, it has been transformed into the one
between the DPRK and the United States. Since the Bush Administration came to power,
the DPRK has been part of the “Axis of Evil”, the target of the US nuclear strike in its
report of the Nuclear Posture Review, the state sponsoring international terrorism, andLiu

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the WMD proliferator. This administration has pursued a hostile policy towards the
DPRK. The DPRK has, in turn, seen the United States as its archenemy. Since thecurrent crisis occurred, President Roh Moo Hyun of the ROK has claimed that the ROK
has acted as a mediator rather than an ally between the DPRK and the United States.
During the current nuclear crisis, the North-South ministerial meetings have madesubstantial progress in reducing suspicion and promoting cooperation. While the Bushadministration hasn't ruled out any options in dealing with the North, President Roh has
rejected the possibility of starting a military strike or imposing sanctions. The Bushadministration regards ROK's approach as injurious to the alliance.
China has actually acted as a mediator rather than a DPRK ally during this crisis.
Russia has also played a mediating role, while Japan has its own agenda as a US ally.
Thirdly, the ongoing crisis is the continuation of the 1993-94 nuclear crisis which
led to the Framework Agreement between the United States and the DPRK, the KEDO
with the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors, the four-party talks involving
the United States, China, North and South Koreas, and the South-North summit in 2000.
The engagement process ended with Secretary of State Albright’s trip to Pyongyang, andthe would-be Clinton-Kim summit. The implementing processes within the frameworkof the 1994 framework agreement were the bilateral and multilateral ones. The process
was suspended with the policy review decision after the Bush Administration came to
power in early 2001.
Nature of the DPRK Nuclear Weapon Programs
The nature of the DPRK nuclear weapon programs can be assessed in terms of its
Plutonium-generating program, the uranium-enriching program and its missiles
developing program.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported in the past that North Korea hadenough plutonium on hand in the early 1990s to make one or two nuclear weapons. But
it is a matter of some uncertainty. There is no persuasive evidence that North Korea
possesses these nuclear bombs.
In December 2002, after the US announced the suspension of the oil supply, North
Korea reopened a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon that was shut down under the
1994 Agreed Framework. North Korea removed monitoring equipment from the site,
expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, and withdrew fromthe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was reported that North Korea might beremoving spent fuel rods from a storage facility at its Yongbyon nuclear complex. The
report said the North might transfer the rods to a reprocessing plant and they could be
converted into enough weapons-grade plutonium for several nuclear bombs by summer
2003.i During the visit of the US delegation in December 2003, North officials tried tolet members of the delegation believe it. North Korea showed them the material that is
supposed to be plutonium.
The CIA has also reported that North Korea has tried to obtain technology andequipment needed to enrich uranium and the North can use highly enriched uranium tomake two or more bombs a year. The United States contends that North Korea admitted“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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to a U.S. envoy in October 2002 that it had a uranium-enriching program. The US has
been unable to locate the whereabouts of the project. It is widely reported that North
Korea received information and equipment related to uranium enrichment from Pakistan,in exchange for ballistic missile parts. North Korea has repeatedly denied that deal.
However, the recent disclosure of the Qadeer nuclear leakage increases such suspicion.
The DPRK officials claimed that they have already acquired the nuclear deterrent. It
is still unknown whether it is its capability or the nuclear weapon. Experts are uncertain
about whether the DPRK actually wants to build up an atomic arsenal or whether it isjust what the US has called the “nuclear blackmail”, trying to deter a pre-emptive strikes
by the United States. Even though the US insists that it has no intention to attack the
North, Pyongyang seems worried that it might be next after Iraq.
North Korea has ballistic missiles capable of reaching Japan and South Korea.
North Korea has developed and sold ballistic missiles, equipment, and related
technology. It has exported ballistic missiles and related technology for hard currency. It
is often reported that North Korea has sold missiles or related technology to countries
such as Iran, Syria, Libya, and Pakistan.
The Bush administration is committed to resolving the North Korea crisis
peacefully and has insisted that the North must completely, verifiably, and irreversibly
abandon its nuclear weapons programs. The Bush Administration has said that it has no
hostile intent towards the North Korea, has no intention to launch a military strikeagainst North Korea, and has no intention to change the regime in Pyongyang. The
DPRK has showed its willingness to freeze its nuclear programs as the first step indismantling them. It demands that the US abandon its hostile policy towards the DPRK,
remove it from the State Department’ register of the states sponsoring terrorism, and lift
economic sanctions against the DPRK. Lack of mutual trust between the US and the
DPRK is the serious barrier to the settlement of the current nuclear crisis on the Korean
Peninsula.
Current Development of the Korean Nuclear Crisis
The latest nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula broke out in October 2002, when
the United States confronted North Korea with evidence that it was enriching uranium.
But the DPRK has denied the existence of the uranium enrichment program. The
tensions between the US and the DPRK intensified dramatically. During this period, theNorth Koreans once insisted on bilateral talks with the U.S., while the U.S. advocatedmultilateral talks with the five countries. Later on, Russia joined the Five.
With China’s active coordination and mediation, the first round of the six-party talks
took place in Beijing in August 2003. Consensus was reached on the first round of thesix-party talks for exploring the approach to defusing the ongoing crisis. The moststriking points are the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons and peaceful settlementof the current nuclear crisis.
At the first round of the six-party talks, the six participants agreed that the peninsula
should be denuclearized and North Korea’s security concerns should also be addressed,
the current crisis should be settled by peaceful means and neither side should take“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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provocative actions, and simultaneous or parallel steps should be taken in seeking justand reasonable resolution of the crisis. Before the meeting, the U.S. insisted that theNorth Koreans should first stop their nuclear weapon programs, while the North
Koreans insisted that the U.S. should first give up its hostile policy and promise to sign a
non-aggression treaty. The core of the crisis is to abandon the nuclear weaponization
programs for security assurances and economic compensations. The key actors of thecrisis are the United States and the DPRK.
Just after the end of the first meeting of the six-party talks, North Korea stated thatthe talks were useless and it would not attend the second meeting. Then North Korea
insisted that Japan should be excluded from the future six-party talks because Japanintended to settle their bilateral issues at the talks. In October 2, 2003, North Korea
announced that it had finished reprocessing its 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods. North
Korea also claimed that it had solved "all of the technological matters" for making
nuclear weapons. Diplomats and intelligence officials dismissed North Korea's claimthat it had finished reprocessing the rods as "rhetoric" and "posturing." However, it isdifficult to obtain conclusive intelligence about North Korea's nuclear activities.
The US reactions are mixed and confused. Secretary of State Colin Powell said on
October 3 that it was the third time they had told the US they had finished reprocessing
the rods, and the US had no evidence to confirm that. But new intelligence estimates that
North Korea may have produced one or two nuclear weapons in recent months. Some of
President Bush's advisers say it is possible that North Korea is telling the truth about
having turned 8,000 nuclear fuel rods into enough weapons-grade plutonium for several
warheads. But all these estimates cannot be confirmed by evidence. In June 2003,
evidence collected by American satellites and sensors that capture a gas, krypton 85,
released during reprocessing hints that additional nuclear facilities exist. The facilities
are thought to be in the mountains close to the Chinese border, and perhaps inunderground tunnels. But intelligence officials have been unable to verify those
presumptions. However, the international estimates have not assessed whether the
DPRK could convert it into a working bomb. North Korea has threatened to test, but has
never tested a nuclear weapon. No one knows for certain how big the North Korea's
arsenal is.
Recently, encouraging progress has been made in the joint diplomatic efforts. Boththe DPRK and the United States have desisted from their declared positions. President
Bush promised to provide the North Korea with a regional “written security assurances”
to be signed by the relevant participants, while North Korea responded to President
Bush’s remarks by agreeing to participate in the next round of the six-party talks anddesisted from the non-aggression treaty with the United States. The DPRK has further
put forward a proposal that it would freeze its nuclear programs and even stop its nuclear
power generation in exchange for U.S. aid and removal from Washington's roster ofstates sponsoring terrorism. Secretary of State Colin Powell has called the offer a"positive step." The DPRK has also invited a non-official US delegation to visit its
nuclear facilities to show its “nuclear deterrence”. All these developments haveincreased our confidence and optimism about the current process of the six-party talks.
At the second round of the six-party talks, substantial progress was made with
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seven-point agreement issued in the form of the Chairman’s statement. There are four
important points: (1) The six parties insist on nuclear free Korean Peninsula as its final
objective; (2) they insist on peaceful settlement of the nuclear crisis on the peninsula; (3)All the parties promise to coexist peacefully; (4) All the parties agree to create a working
group preparing the next round of the six-party talks and the third round of the talks will
be held before July, 2004.
At the meeting, as the first step, the DPRK proposed halting its nuclear weapon
program for economic compensation and security assurances from the other participants.
The ROK, China and Russia promised to provide energy assistance with certain
conditions. The Bush Administration wants the North Koreans to dismantle their nuclear
programs first. The DPRK condemned the US of lack of sincerity for resolving the issue.
Approach for the Future of the Korean Peninsula
At the first and second rounds of the six-party talks, all parties reached theconsensus that the Korean Peninsula should be denuclearized, the current nuclear crisis
should be settled by peaceful means, and all the relevant parties should refrain fromtaking provocative actions leading to escalation of the tensions. While North Korea isboasting of their nuclear capabilities, it leaves some room for future maneuvers with the
U.S. by agreeing to abandon its nuclear programs. Many analysts believe that recent
North Korean actions are intended to increase pressures upon the other participants tomeet its demands that its security concerns and economic aids should be definitely
guaranteed. Its strategy is to obtain security assurances from the U.S.
But analysts have warned that the U.S. is fully occupied in Iraq and Afghanistan,and the DPRK may be expanding and improving its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems
in the coming months, triggering escalation of the tensions. The Bush Administration's
strategy is to rely on pressure from China and other participants to force North Korea tostop its nuclear programs. The U.S. continues its multilateral approach and policy
coordination among its allies in the region. It seems that this administration has notprepared to make substantial concessions in the coming talks.
The Bush Administration, there has been the debate on the Korean nuclear issue,
and no consensus or compromise has been reached between the hawkish and the dovish
factions. The hawkish faction has insisted on the military approach and the “ 5030” plan
was disclosed by the US media in May 2003. The dovish faction has preferred the
diplomatic approach. In a recent telephone interview, Mr. Powell said, "We have someideas, some interesting ideas, about how we can move forward on providing somesecurity assurances to the North Koreans that might open up some new possibilities."
During President Bush's trip to Asia, he personally talked about his willingness toprovide “written security assurances” if the DPRK abandons its nuclear weapon
programs in a way of irreversibility and verifiability. The reaction highlighted Bush's
strategy of patience and unflappability shaped partly by design and partly by necessity.
Now President Bush is facing a tough reelection campaign and irritating military
resistances in Iraq and elsewhere. This administration can't afford another war during
this term. President Bush is unlikely to abandon his stated goal of achieving a diplomatic“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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solution to the crisis in the foreseeable future.
However, for the past few months, Libya has openly declared its willingness to giveup its nuclear weaponization programs and Iran has signed the additional protocol of the
NPT and promised to put its peaceful nuclear programs under the IAEA inspections. The
new developments have encouraged the Washington hawks to take tougher steps to force
the DPRK to give up its nuclear ambitions. One of the steps is economic sanctions andmaritime blockade by implementing the Proliferation Security Initiative.
The other nations involved in the talks - China, Russia, South Korea and Japan - areeven more eager to avoid a military showdown that could trigger hostilities, floods ofNorth Korean refugees, or even a decision by Japan or South Korea to get their own
nuclear arms. Thus all five nations have an interest in keeping the process of thesix-party talks going and making sure the negotiations do not collapse. Policy
recommendations for the approach for scrapping North Korea’s nuclear programs can bedivided into three phases:
The first phase: Denuclearization
The new agreement can be the agreement on denuclearization and security
assurances and economic compensations on the Korean peninsula. The Korean nuclear
issue should be settled within the context of the six-party talks based on theachievements of the Framework Agreement with the KEDO. The new arrangement
should correct the previous flaws of the Framework Agreement with the conditions ofverifiability and irreversibility. The new agreement should target at the dismantlement
instead of “freezing” of the nuclear weapon programs. “Written security assurances”
agreement should be signed by all the participants, including respecting DPRK’s statesovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression against each other, peacefulsettlement of the disputes through negotiations among the participants without using or
threatening to use military force. As inspection and supervising measures, theparticipants should discuss whether the IAEA will get involved with the six-party team.
We should realize that it is difficult to accept the US, Japanese, and ROK members of themonitoring team of the six countries.
Frankly speaking, to persuade North Korea to give up its right to acquisition of
nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapon possessors, including the U.S., have to offer
necessary incentives for compensation, including their security assurances. They have topromise not to use their nuclear weapons to threaten North Korea, help North Korea inacquiring and using civilian nuclear technology for generating electric power.
At the second round of the talks, the differences reflect lack of mutual trust between
the United States and the DPRK. All the parties should establish confidence-building
measures by increasing contacts, narrowing differences and expanding consensus in the
future talks. They should adopt a constructive stance, behave in a cooperative andaccommodating spirit, and take a flexible and practical attitude in pushing forward theprocess of the talks. They should conduct the dialogue in the spirit of mutual respect andon an equal footing.
The Korean nuclear issue is a complicated one, which needs a long process toresolve. To make the talks a success, the following factors must also be considered.
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The United States and the DPRK are the key actors in the whole process of the talks.
The success or failure will be determined by their attitudes, sincere efforts, and mutual
confidence. The favorable environment should be created for DPRK-US bilateralcontacts within a multilateral framework. After all, the US-DPRK relationship is themost crucial in this crisis. Without sincerity and willingness to make compromises on
their parts, the six-party talks will be difficult to reach the final goal.
Just one day after concluding the second round of the talks, in its first official
reaction, North Korea's foreign ministry said it was "difficult to expect any further talks
would help find a solution to the issue." ii The statement underlined the big differences
between the US and the DPRK following the four days of talks. A joint statement by thesix countries failed to materialise because of North Korean opposition to the wording.
Concurrently, Alexander Losyukov, Russia's representative at the talks, said that hethought the nuclear issue was unlikely to be resolved this year. "There are politicalfactors involved here," he said. "Before the US election the North Korean problem isunlikely to be solved."iii
The six-party talk is a long and complicated process. It may take a long time toachieve a satisfactory solution. Mutual distrust is deeply rooted in the minds of thepolicymakers of the United States and the DPRK and it is the biggest impediment. The
DPRK, learning lessons from the Iraq war, is unlikely to give up its nuclear agenda
without obtaining security assurances. The Bush Administration is also unlikely to offer
its security assurances before it believes that the DPRK has actually given up its nuclear
programs. It is crucial to bridge this huge gap between the two key actors.
The second Phase: Peace and Stability
During this phase, the central issue is how to implement the agreement. To maintainpeace and stability permanently on the peninsula, the six-party mechanism should
negotiate on the replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace agreement on thebasis of implementation of the denuclearization agreement. At this phase, establishmentof diplomatic relationship between the participants should be encouraged andaccomplished. This proposed peace agreement is a regional security arrangement,
assuring permanent peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.
The Third Phase: Economic Cooperation and Common Prosperity
On the basis of the multilateral and regional security mechanism, economic
development and cooperation should become the top priority on the future regional
cooperation. All the participants should encourage DPRK’s economic reform andopenness. The process of DPRK’s economic reform should be put into the process ofNortheast Asian economic cooperation and integration.
Conclusion: Beyond the Korean Nuclear Dilemma
We should recognize the difficulties in the global efforts against nuclear
proliferation. According to the NPT, nuclear weapons are temporarily legal in fivecountries, not illegal in three others, and forbidden essentially everywhere else,“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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including Iran and North Korea. It is clear that the NPT itself is a complex andinconsistent arrangement that presents a unique set of dilemmas in its implementation.
While we are talking about the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, we need tothink about the NPT regime itself. North Korea signed the NPT in 1985 and has beencaught twice escaping its obligations. During the current nuclear crisis, it announced thewithdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. This announcement came into force this June.
In order to resolve North Korea’s nuclear weapon programs, let’s look back at the courseof nuclear proliferation and some models of settling the nuclear weaponization programsin the world. We may obtain some revelation and lessons from them.
Since the NPT was signed in 1968, five states have obtained nuclear weapons
through their secret nuclear weapon programs. They are Israel, India, Pakistan, South
Africa, and perhaps North Korea. The first three have not signed on to the treaty anddeveloped their nuclear weapons programs after the signing of the NPT, so theirpossession of such weapons can be regarded as neither legal nor illegal in terms ofinternational law and norms. South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons and joined theregime as a non-possessor. Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan ceased theirsuspected nuclear weaponization programs under the international pressures. Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, but decided
to relinquish them in favor of joining the NPT. Iraq had a clandestine nuclear weapons
program that was detected and largely dismantled as a result of the first Persian Gulf War.
Today, Iran and North Korea are reported to be the only states actively seeking nuclear
weapons. Under international pressures, Iran has agreed to put its nuclear programs
under the supervision of the IAEA and North Korea has been bargaining for its survival
from the security threats.
Many arms control experts believe that the NPT regime has worked better andlonger than expected but nevertheless needs to be improved and revised to better handle
new challenges under the current circumstances. Moreover, It is very important for the
major powers concerned to coordinate and cooperate with each other in their efforts todenuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Historical experiences demonstrate that it is very
difficult to achieve such a goal without concert efforts of the major powers concerned.
More importantly, one of the crucial conditions in the efforts of preventing WMD is thatthe nuclear haves should promise not to threaten to use WMD against the nuclear
haven’ts.

i

The New York Times, January 31, 2003.
Asia Times, March 1, 2004.
iii
Asia Times on line, March 1, 2004.
ii“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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