1. What is the purpose of this note?
This note aims to provide a basis for an orientation discussion at the DSM Steering Group on apotential new initiative for the next college to update the horizontal regulatory framewerk for all
digital services in the single market, in particular for online platforms. Such an update would
encompass a RE FIT of the E-Commerce Directive.
2. What problems would this initiative address?
The box below contains some illustrative examples of the type of issues that an updated
horizontal regulatory framewerk could tackle.

Illustrative Examp • (1) Soclal networks face multiple divergent rules for removing illegal
hate speech on their servlces in different Member States (eg. Germany, France), and different
rules for text or video material. As a result, the ftght agalnst onllne hate ls expensive andinefflclent across the Single Market, without binding safeguards for freedom of expression.
(2) There are no common legally binding rules on online advertising services in the EU,
including for polideal advertising across bon::lers. As a result, cross-border mlcro-targeted
dlslnformatlon campalgns are easy to set-up, but difßcult to detlict. (3} Digitalcollaborative economy services increasfngly face uncoordinated national or even regional
regulation of their services and no standards exists fOr information exChange wlth local or
national authorities (e.g. on tax matters). As a result of this legal fragmentation Iack ofenforcement (e.e. of the E-Commerce Directive), and the latlcof information for regulators,
home-grown collaboratlve economy start-ups such as Taxlfy cannot scale-up acrossthe EU and grow to compete wlth US rlvals such as Uber.
Below is an initial Iist of possible problern statements, their causes, and their consequences.
a) Divergent rules for online services across the Digital Single Market. Services such associal networks are used by the majority of Europeans on a daily basis, but are subject to anincreasingly wide set of rules across the EU. For example, Germany, and soon France, havedifferent nationallaws for hateful comments online on social networks. lreland, Hungary, andFrance have (or are preparing) divergent nationallaws for online advertising. Collaborative
economy services are subject to a plethora of different laws at national and at local Ievei.
Furthermore, ase law has increased this complexity through sometimes diverging interpretationsof the rules across the Single Market.
Even if consumer rules, data protection rules, as weil as contract rules, have converged acrossthe EU, in today's regulatory environment, only the big platform companies can grow andsurvive. A fragmented market with divergent rules is difficult to contest for newcomers, and theabsence of dear, uniform, and updated rules in areas such as illegal content online is dissuasive
for new innovators. This is a major strategic weakness for the EU in the digital economy andincrease reliance on non-EU services for essential services used by all citizens on a daily basis.

b) Outdated rules and significant regulatory gaps for today's digital services. Many of theCornerstone rules of the horizontal framewerk in the E-Commerce Directive have not been
adapted since 2000, and do not adequately reflect the technical, social and economic reality of
today's services, across their whole life cycle from establishment, to advertising, to contracts,
and to liability. For example, concepts such as "active" or "passive" hosts, linked by the court tothe notion of "optimising content", appear outdated in light of today's services. At the same time,a variety of online intermediaries such as Content Delivery Networks or Domain Name
Registrars and Registries are not sure what the legal regime is under which they operate.
Similarly, online advertising services now play a key role, e.g. in the context of cross-bordermicro-targeted political advertising or in the context of disinformation campaigns, while the roleof algorithms in the way information flows are shaped can take on a wider societal significance.
Yet such new problems in the cross-border provision of services occur in a regulatory gap in the
Digital Single Market.
The consequence is legal uncertainty for many established and new services operating
cross-borders, combined with Iack of regulatory control on key aspects of today's information
environment.
c) lnsufficient incentives to tackle online harms and protect legal content. The Iack of legal
clarity also entails a regulatory disincentive for platforms and other intermediaries to act
proactively to tackle illegal content, as weil as to adequately address harmful content online,
especially when combined with the issue of fragmentation of rules addressed above. As aconsequence, many digital services avoid taking on more responsibility in tackling illegal
content, for fear of becoming liable for content they intermediate. This Ieads to an environment
in which especially small and medium-sized platforms face a regulatory risk which is unhelpful inthe fight against online harms in the broad sense. At the same time, when companies do takemeasures against potentially illegal content, they have limited legal incentives for taking
appropriate measures to protect legal content.
d) lneffective public oversight. The extremely fast evolution of digital services and the highcomplexity of issues resulting from the wide take-up of digital services raises structural problems
in the ability of regulators to implement, enforce and adapt rules dynamically and in a timely andeffective manner. Although digital services regulators exist for Data Protection, Audio-visualmedia, Competition, Electronic Communication Services, and Consumer Protection etc, there iscurrently no dedicated "platform regulator" in the EU, which could exercise effective oversightand enforcement, e.g. in areas such as content moderation or advertising transparency. Manyof the existing regulators also Iack the digital capacities needed to interface with online
platforms today. At the same time, no regulatory authority is presently available to provide quick
and reliable EU-wide guidance on emerging, unforeseen issues, such as the recent organised
abuse of multiple platforms seen in the Christchurch attack, or such as the ever-changing issues
araund online harms for minors.

Besides the costly, slow and potentially Contradietory oversight exercised by different sectoral
regulators, one consequence is that many public interest decisions that should be taken byindependent public authorities are now delegated to online platforms, making them de-facto
regulators without adequate and necessary oversight, even in areas where fundamental rights
are at stake.
The perceived Iack of control over the activities of globally operating service providers is also
one of the drivers for increasing national regulatory activity in this area.
e) High entry barriers for innovative services. Besides the regulatory fragmentation, the EU
has no legally binding, controlled way for regulatory experimentation with innovative services as
they are introduced. For example, collaborative economy services face similar problems inmany EU cities, but there is no method at present to develop controlled regulatory sandboxes
which would allow shared learning between innovators and regulatory authorities for a fixed
period of time with a view of establishing harmonised rules across the EU after a certain trial
period. The consequence is that innovative services find it hard to launch and scale in the EU.

3. What objectives wou/d we pursue, and what wou/d be the scope?
Initial ideas for possible objectives of any initiative could be:•••

To provide providers of digital services with a clear, uniform, and up-to-date innovation
friendly regulatory framewerk in the Single Market;
To protect, enable, and ernpower users when accessing digital services;
To ensure the necessary cooperation among Member States, tagether with theadequate and appropriate oversight of providers of digital services in the EU.

The scope would cover all digital services, and in particular online platforms. This meansthat the clarification would address all services across the internet stack from mere conduits
such as ISPs to doud hosting services; while a special emphasis in the assessment would be
dedicated to updated rules for online platforms such as social media, search engines, or
collaborative economy services, as weil as for online advertising services.

4. How does this relate to other recent initiatives?
The outgoing Commission decided in 2016 to take a sector and problem-specific approach.
The sector-specific rules for AVMSD, Copyright, Terrorist Content, Explosive Precursors, Child
Sexual Abuse, as weil as the recent New Deal for Consumers, or the P28 regulation leave(most of) the ECD unaffected. For example, the proposed Regulation on terrorist content
envisages Obligations on platforms to quickly remove content following a notice from competentauthorities, but does not provide for a notice-and-action framewerk for content flagged by users.

A revised set of rules would thus complement the recently adopted rules, making them more
impactful through a harmonisation step.

5. What sott of substantive provisions could be included?
ln full respect of the Better Regulation rules, an updated set of rules would amount to an
implementation check and a RE FIT of the ECD into an updated, future-proof Digital Services
Act or Digital Service Code for the EU. The nature of such an instrument should support its
overall aim to update, clarify, and harmonise rules for digital services in the Single Market, which
could potentially mean that the Directive should evolve into a Regulation . The main structuralcomponents would - subject to a rigorous assessment of all relevant options - build on theexisting building blocks of the ECD:

Interna/ Market. This component would build on, and strengthen the home state control
principle, by updating its scope in light of the increasing convergence of consumer protection,commercial communications and contract laws across the Union during the last 20 years. As theECD, it would reinforce the treaty freedom of establishment and free movement of digital
services through specific rules for the internal market. Unlike the ECD, it should also assess theneed to expand its scope to services established in third countries. Clearer rules should also
simplify establishment in the EU, e.g. by mandating a singledigital representative, and by
narrowly limiting any exceptions to the home state control principle.

Updated scope. The ECD regulates information society services, a concept which has been
subject to a rich case-law by the Court of Justice. However, there are some grey areas asregards a wide range of services across the entire stack of digital services in the EU. This would
include services such as ISPs, cloud services, content delivery networks, domain nameservices, social media services, search engines, collaborative economy platforms, online
advertising services, and digital services built on electronic contracts and distributed ledgers.
This scope could be clarified, also in light with recent regulatory developments (EECC, FFD).
Options to define a category of services on the basis of a large or significant market status,
complementing the competition threshold of dominance, in order to impose supplementary
conditions, should also be examined.
Services building on distributed ledger technologies should equally be covered in an
assessment, and if necessary the legal regime applicable to such distributed ledger contracts
should be clarified with a view of stimulating the sustainable and trusted development of these
new technologies, without limiting innovation.

lntermediary liabillty. This component would update the liability provisions of the ECD, inparticular taking stock of the regulations adopted during the last mandate (copyright, AVMSD,
Omnibus, explosives precursors, etc). Recent debates have shown that the general principle ofa harmonised graduated and conditional exemption continues to be needed as a foundational
principle of the internet. The principle, however, needs to be updated and reinforced to reflectthe nature of services in use today. This could mean that the notions of mere conduit, caching
and hosting service could be expanded to include explicitly some other services. ln someinstances, this can amount to codifying existing case-law (e.g. for search engines or wifi
hotspots), while in other cases a clarification of its application to collaborative economy
services, cloud services, content delivery networks, domain name services, etc is necessary.
ln addition, the concept of active/passive hosts would be replaced by more appropriate
concepts reflecting the technical reality of today's services, building rather on notions such as
editorial functions, actual knowledge and the degree of control. Finally, a binding "Good
Samaritan provision" would encourage and incentivise proactive measures, by clarifying the Iackof liability as a result of Such measures, on the basis of the notions already included in the
Illegal Content Communication.

General monitaring and automated filterlng. While the prohibition of general monitaring
Obligations should be maintained as another foundational cornerstone of Internet regulation,
specific provisions governing algorithms for automated filtering technologies - where these areused- should be considered, to provide the necessary transparency and accountability of
automated content moderation Systems.
Regu/ating content moderation. Uniform rules for the removal of illegal content such as illegal
hate speedi would be made binding across the EU, building on the Recommendation on illegal
content and relevant case-law, and include a robust set of fundamental rights safeguards. Suchnotice-and action rules could be tailored to the types of services, e.g. whether the service is asocial network, a mere conduit, or a collaborative economy service, and where necessary to thetypes of content in question, while maintaining the maximum simplicity of rules. The feasibility of
introducing thresholds could be examined in this context, taking due account of the size andnature of the service provider and of the nature of the potential Obligations to be imposed on
them.
Building on the Recommendation on illegal Content, binding transparency Obligations would
also be at the heart of a more effective accountability framewerk for content moderation atscale, and would complement recently adopted rules on AVMS or Copyright. Options fortransparency for algorithmic recommendation systems of public relevance such as newsfeeds
should also be examined. At the same time, these rules would avoid that Member States
impose parallel transparency Obligations at national Ievei, thus providing for a simple set of rulesin the Single Market.
The analysis will also cover harmful content (which is not necessarily illegal), as such content is
not only addressed in EU-level policies (such as the AVIVSD), but also at MS Ievei (e.g. thedraft French fake news law, the UK Online Harms White Paper, etc. However, a clear distinction
will be made between illegal and harmful content when it comes to exploring policy options. For
instance, the ever changing nature of harmful content seems to make it unsuitable for strict
notice and actiontype Obligations; in case of harmful content, codes of conduct and user

empowerment in choosing sources could be given higher prominence; the role of the regulator
could be strengthened (e.g. via approval of such codes of conduct).

Ru/es for online advertising services. Additional specific Obligations should be examined forcross border online advertising services, including for rules araund political advertising,adequate possibilities for auditing and accountability, as weil as with a view of lowering entry
barriers for competitors and alternatives.

Service interoperabillty. Where equivalent services exist, the framewerk should take accountof the ernerging application of existing data portability rules and explore further options forfacilitating data transfers and improve service interoperability - where such interoperability
makes sense, is technically feasible, and can increase consumer choice without hindering theability of (in particular, Smaller) companies to grow. Such initiatives could be accompanied byappropriate standardisation initiatives, and co-regulatory approaches.

Innovation sandboxes. Options to include in the general framewerk provisions which would
allow controlled regulatory experimentation should also be examined. This should facilitate theintroduction of new services, while allowing close monitaring and assistance during a trial
period.

Regulatory oversight. A dedicated regulatory structure should ensure oversight andenforcement of the rules, in particular for cross-border situations, but also partnerships andguidance for ernerging issues, and with appropriate digital capacities and competences, interalia to help translate rules into technical solutions. The nature of the regulatory structure will
depend on the speafic mission, and could involve a central regulator, a decentralised system, oran extension of powers of existing regulatory authorities. Possible roles and powers of such
regulatory structures will be explored, including reporting requirements, powers to require
additional information, complaint handling, the power to impose fines or other corrective action,or the approval of codes of conduct. This analysiswill draw on external advice (e-g. through theObservatory of the Online Economy) and any insights to be gained from existing or planned
regulatory structures, both at EU and national Ievei.

Cooperation with public authorities, including data access. Cleaner rules would also
involve a simpler interface with public authorities, including e.g. data access to public interest
data sets, or of illegal content notifications, or in the context of oversight and compliance, eg.
with local tax authorities. These interfaces should be digitally enabled and harmonised acrossthe EU to the greatest degree possible, and reflect the appropriate division of responsibility
between public and private actors.

6. What is the evidence base?

At present internal work in underway to proeure a study on online services in the Digital Single
Market, alongside preparations to analyse the implementation of the ECD and a RE FIT
evaluation.
A dedicated study on algorithmic transparency will cover areas such as content filtering,transparency of recommender systems, and online advertising.
Associated evidence gathering is taking place in the context of the Administrative Arrangementwith the Joint Research Centre, as weil as in future plans in the context of the Online Platform
Observatory.
National sources, e.g. from the evaluation of the German NetzDG, as weil as the ongoing
monitaring in the framewerk of the illegal content recommendation (including Hate Speech,
Terrorist Content, Counterfeit goods) will similarly inform the assessment.
Existing studies including multiple previous public consultations, the work done in the context ofthe terrorist content regulation, as weil as recent studies on the legal aspects of the liability
provisions and business models for online intermediar les will equally be used. Additionaltargeted studies, public consultations, and stakeholder werkshops will be indispensable.

7. Questions for Discussion
a. Are there elements of the problern analysis missing?
b. Are there additional substantive angles which should be included in the assessment?
c. How can we ensure proper coordination across instruments, e.g. during thetransposition period for Copyright and the revised AVMSD?