RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56

CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE FIGHT AGAINSTCORRUPTION AND SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS:US PERSPECTIVE
Anthony Didrick Castberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
Official corruption occurs and is fought
at several different levels of the criminal
justice system in those nations using afederal model. The levels may generally
be labeled as enforcement, prosecution, andtrial, which in the US occur at both thefederal level and the state level. There arefifty-one criminal justice systems in the US.
This decentralization offers perhaps more
opportunities for corruption, but at thesame time provides more agencies to fightagainst corruption. The US has law
enforcement agencies at the federal level1,
the state level2, the county level3, and the
local level4. Prosecution takes place at thefederal level (US attorneys), the state level(attorneys general), and the county level(prosecutors) 5. Trials take place at thefederal level and the county level, although
the courts in a county are generally state
courts and the judges, state judges. Thisrather complicated system may soundstrange to those unfamiliar with the US
system of justice, and in fact, very few
citizens of the US have a goodunderstanding of it.
This system of government was createdduring the Constitutional Convention that
met in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in
1787. The delegates to the Convention
originally met to revise the Articles ofConfederation, which had established aleague of states with a relatively weaknational government, but ended up writing
an entirely new document that divided the* Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii
at Hilo, United States of America.

400

powers of government between the national
government and the states. Thus, the US
became a country with some powers
reserved to the national government, somepowers reserved to the states, and somepowers that are concurrent. Article I,
Section 8, gives Congress the power toestablish tribunals (courts) inferior to theSupreme Court, while Article III delineates
the powers of the judicial branch of
government. The power to establish state
courts and state criminal codes was left tothe states. But because many of the more
influential figures of the time felt that theConstitution established a national
government that was too strong, there wasgreat debate about ratification, with the
major factions being the federalists (who
supported the Constitution) and the antifederalists (who wanted the power of thenational government limited). In acompromise that allowed ratification totake place, the federalists agreed to support
amendments to the Constitution thatwould limit the powers of the national
government. These 10 amendments, whichbecame known as the Bill of Rights, were
ratified in 1791. Amendments 4, 5, 6, and
8 directly affect the criminal justiceprocess, but until the middle of the 20th
century these rights applied almost
exclusively to the national government.
Through a series of Supreme Court
decisions however, almost all of the rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights have been
applied to the states through the due
process and equal protection clauses of the
1 4 th A m e n d m e n t . P r i o r t o t h i s
incorporation, different standards applied
to federal and state law enforcement.

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II. PROBLEMS OF INVESTIGATION
Investigation of corruption depends ona number of variables, the first of which isdetection. As official corruption is bydefinition committed by government
officials, its detection may be difficult
because of its hidden nature, but also by
the ability of government officials to
intimidate subordinates who are in aposition to reveal the corruption or tothreaten the funding of law enforcement
agencies which have jurisdiction over them.
The federal government and most states
have “whistle-blower” laws6 which protect
those who reveal corruption, but there are
no protections against retaliation bycorrupt politicians against law enforcement
agencies who investigate them. Whistleblowers are responsible for many
investigations into corruption, both byproviding information directly to law
enforcement agencies and by contacting themedia, which may launch its own
investigation. However information froman informant is only the beginning, as
many tips do not result in investigation,
let alone conviction.
Official corruption may range from freerestaurant meals provided to police officers
to bribes paid to high-ranking federal
officials by stock manipulators. In the US,
many corruption investigations involveillegal contributions made to political
campaigns. In such cases, detection isfrequently accomplished by agencies
created for that very purpose7, in contrast
to other types of corruption that areinvestigated only after tips provided bywhistle-blowers and other citizens. Thus,
detection may take place in a proactive ora reactive manner. Regardless of how thealleged illegal activity is detected, adecision must be made to investigate or not.
Such decisions should rest solely on
sufficiency of evidence, but in practice areinfluenced not only by evidence but also by

the availability of resources8 and by thepolitical considerations. The resource
problem in the US is frequently a functionof the federal system and its decentralized
law enforcement. While the US has more
law enforcement officers per population
than most other countries,9 60% of all local
police departments employed fewer than
10 full-time, sworn officers.10 Few local law
enforcement agencies in the US then havethe capability to investigate significant
cases of official corruption. Politicalinfluences may range from threats ofretaliation by those targeted, to fear of
exposing community influentials; but it issafe to say that there are virtually always
political factors in any decision toinvestigate official corruption.
There are, of course, legal considerations
when undertaking an investigation of
official corruption. Law enforcement
agencies must observe all constitutionaland statutory guidelines, with particularemphasis paid to search and seizure, which
may include electronic eavesdropping, andentrapment, frequently an issue in “sting”
operations.11 Law enforcement agencies
normally consult with prosecutors on such
legal issues. There are 50 different state
penal codes, the US Code, and precedent(common law) from appellate courts in eachstate, federal circuit courts of appeal, andthe US Supreme Court, all of which must
be considered when undertaking an
investigation. Thus, the legal preparationand monitoring of a major corruption
investigation is frequently complex andlengthy, and often involves search warrants
which must be approved by judges. A
successful investigation, therefore, ishighly dependent upon adequate resources
and the quality of and cooperation between
law enforcement, prosecution, and the
judiciary. And they are all dependent uponlegislation that clearly delineates what
constitutes official corruption.12

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Corruption must be clearly defined in
the law, citing specific acts, the elementsof which constitute a violation. The
example cited above of a police officer
receiving a free meal from a restaurant isa typical example. This practice is very
common in the US, with some fast-foodchains apparently having policies ofproviding free or discounted food to on-duty
police officers. In this corruption? If so,
what is the quid-pro-quo? What does therestaurant receive in return for the freefood provided to the police officer? At best,
the restaurant encourages police officers
to eat on the premises, thereby affordingsome form of security. But is this the kindof behavior that should be made criminal?13
And if so, how much effort should be madeto enforce such laws? The law, then, mustclearly define what acts are criminal andmust make distinctions between breechesof ethics on the one hand and true crimeson the other. Ethical standards can be
enforced administratively without invoking
criminal sanctions. All government
agencies should have standards of conduct,and it is important that such standards be
rigorously upheld, as a lack of suchenforcement may well lead to violations
that are truly criminal in nature.
Redundancy must be built into law
enforcement so that the lack of resources
will never jeopardize detection or
investigation. Jurisdictional jealousies
must be put aside in the interests ofeffective law enforcement, and this may
require a higher level coordinating agency.
Thought should also be given to anindependent agency at both the state andfederal levels in a federal system, and at
the national level in a unitary system, thatspecializes in the detection andinvestigation of official corruption.
Governmental agencies themselves shouldeach have a specific internal unit devoted
to detection and investigation of corruption,
402

such as the internal affairs units commonly
found in US police departments. Finally,
law enforcement must be apolitical. Law
enforcement agency heads should not be
popularly elected nor directly appointed bya political figure, but rather selected by anon-partisan commission of experts in thefield, with the commission also deciding
whether the head is reappointed.
Law enforcement agencies should beaccredited by a national accrediting bodywhich makes periodic visits to the agency,
and there should be minimum standards
for hiring and training at the state level.
Within agencies, recruitment of new
personnel and promotion of existing
personnel must be done according to strict
rules with merit being the only criteria for
both. Regular rotation of personnel is also
an effective method of reducing the
likelihood of corruption. Agencies should
also have probationary periods after initialhiring during which time they can assess
the abilities of their new employees and beable to fire for cause without civil service
protection. Pay must be such that officers
do not have to resort to payoffs to support
a spouse and children, although it is clearthat high ethical standards, rather thanpay, are the best deterrent against
corruption. Retirement pay should beenough that officials will not feel the needto engage in corruption to prepare forretirement.
IV. PROBLEMS AT THE TRIAL
LEVEL
In some nations, investigatory authority
rests almost solely at the law enforcementlevel of the criminal justice system. Where
this is the case, the prosecutor relies almost
entirely on the police to carry out
investigations, making prosecution highly
dependent upon the ability of the law
enforcement agency in whose jurisdiction
the corruption occurred. This issue isdiscussed in the previous section, but

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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inasmuch as inadequacies in law
enforcement may affect prosecution andtherefore the likelihood of conviction, it
must be mentioned here as well. In thosenations where investigatory authority rests
in both law enforcement and prosecution,
there is a redundancy that usuallyenhances the chance of conviction. Whilevirtually all prosecutors in the US have theauthority to investigate, lack of resources
frequently prevents them from doing so.
There may, however, be poor relations
between law enforcement and prosecution,a situation than hinders successfulprosecution. There may be corruption and/or incompetence in either or both. And
there may be political considerations that
affect prosecution. While it is probably truethat corruption is more likely to be foundin law enforcement agencies than inprosecution, there are exceptions. In
Orange County, California, for example, aformer deputy district attorney is being
held without bail on charges that he waspart of a nationwide methamphetamined i s t r i b u t i o n r i n g . 14 P r o s e c u t o r i a lcorruption in the US is , however, quiterare, 15 and we must be careful todistinguish official corruption from simple
law breaking; in the Orange County
incident, for example, the deputy district
attorney used his official position to obtain
information on law enforcement efforts toinvestigate the ring.
Local chief prosecutors in the US are
either elected or appointed. 16 Elected
prosecutors may run in either partisan or
non-partisan races, while appointed
prosecutors are almost always members of
the same political party as the person orgroup who does the appointing. Terms ofoffice of elected prosecutors are usually 4
years, while appointed prosecutors serveat the pleasure of the appointing individual
or group. Whenever prosecutors areelected or appointed it is virtually

impossible to remove politics fromprosecutorial decision-making. Would, forexample, a prosecutor approve prosecution
for corrupt business practices of a major
campaign contributor? Or would aprosecutor prosecute a corrupt member ofthe cabinet of the mayor who appointed
him or her? To what extent will public
opinion affect prosecutorial decisionmaking? Public outcry over a particularly
terrible crime may bring about a rush to
indict and try a suspect or suspects, andthe result may be a poorly prepared casethat results in a not guilty plea, the tryingof the wrong people, or an ill-advised plea
bargain. The failure to obtain a conviction
in one high profile case may be a major
issue when the prosecutor runs for reelection or is up for re-appointment.
It should be noted that only about 10%of defendants charged with a felony in the
US go to trial. The vast majority of cases
are settled through a guilty plea by the
defendant, almost always as a result of plea
bargaining. Plea bargaining involves
consideration given by the prosecution in
return for a guilty plea, with theconsideration often consisting of areduction in the charges or a sentence
recommendation.17 Plea bargaining is avery low-visibility activity, and except inhigh-profile cases, is rarely reported by the
media. As a result, the public can only
evaluate a prosecutor on the basis of a few
well-publicized cases rather than on thevast majority of cases handled by the office.
There are no national standards forprosecutors, nor are there standards inmost states beyond having been a memberof the bar for a specified period of time.
Thus, the quality of prosecution varies
considerably from county to county. This,
coupled with the fact that prosecutors
generally earn less money than an attorneyin private practice, does not lend itself tohaving the best legal minds as

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
p r o s e c u t o r s . 1 8 M a n y, i f n o t m o s t ,prosecutors however, choose that positionout of dedication to the administration ofjustice rather than out of financial
considerations. At the same time, theturnover among junior prosecutors tends
to be high in most offices, so that thepercentage of career prosecutors in any
g i v e n o f f i c e i s n o t g r e a t . 19 M a n yprosecutors’ offices in the US, then, aresimply not capable of investigating orprosecuting major corruption cases.
Because most official corruption is also afederal offense, prosecution is frequently
undertaken by US attorneys.
State judges are also either appointed
or elected in the US.20 Regardless of themethod by which a judges reaches thebench, however, politics are involved.
Terms of office for judges generally range
from 4 to 10 years, with the longer terms
providing greater judicial independence.
Federal judges, by contrast, are appointed
for life. As is the case with prosecutors,
judicial salaries are not competitive withthose in large law firms, so those attorneys
who aspire to a judgeship do not do so for
economic reasons. As is the case withprosecutors, there are virtually no
qualifications for becoming a judge otherthan having been a member of the bar fora specified number of years (normally 5).
Judges in the US are not required to have
any training beyond that of law school, anda judge can be elected or appointed to thebench and handle criminal cases without
ever having had any criminal law
experience. The quality of judicial decisionmaking, therefore, varies considerablyfrom county to county and state to state.
Defendants in US, criminal cases havethe right to a speedy trial.21 Generally thismeans that they must be tried within 180
days of being charged.22 In order to assure
the right to a speedy trial there must be a
sufficient number of prosecutors, judges404

and courtrooms. When there are not, there
is great pressure to plea bargain, resulting
in many criminals receiving lesspunishment than they would have gotten
had they been convicted at trial. If the
defendant refuses to plea bargain and theprosecutor must try a case without
adequate preparation, the likelihood of a
not guilty finding increases substantially,as the state must prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
alternative is not to charge the suspect
until the prosecution’s case is solid andthereby run the risk of the suspect’s fleeing
the jurisdiction. State and local
governments can rarely afford the numberof judges, prosecutors, and courtrooms thatare necessary for the effective
administration of justice, so the system isconstantly compromised.
There is a tendency in the US to restrict
the sentencing discretion of judges.
Federal judges must use a sentencing gridthat has six criminal history categories
along one axis and 43 categories of offense
level along the other, while state judges areoften restricted by penal codes that specify
mandatory sentences for certain offenses
or have a “three-strikes” provision. 23
Judges in Hawaii, for example, must
sentence a felon to the maximum term asprescribed by law, with the Paroling
Authority setting the minimum term. 24
This is part of a “get tough” policy toward
crime and a backlash from what many
perceive is a tendency on the part of too
many judges to hand down lighter
sentences than are justified. In some cases,
however, light sentences are a function ofprison overcrowding.25 In other cases, thesentences reflect the philosophy of thejudge. But without flexibility insentencing, judges cannot hand down
sentences that sufficiently distinguish, forexample, between free meals for police
officers and payments to police chiefs tooverlook methamphetamine laboratories.

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Because corruption is such a broad
category that encompass a wide variety ofcriminal acts, it is especially important thatthe punishment fit the crime. This is notpossible when a judge lacks flexibility insentencing.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Prosecutors must have the legal
authority to investigate, an authority
shared jointly with the police. Where
prosecutors do not have such authority, or
where they have it but rarely exercise it, it
is not unusual for cases to be returned tothe police for further investigation.
Because prosecutors must prepare a casefor presentation to a grand jury or
preliminary hearing, and ultimately for a
trial (even if ultimately settled throughplea bargaining), their perspective is on
admissibility of evidence and proof beyonda reasonable doubt. Police, on the other
hand, tend to focus on obtaining evidence
sufficient to charge, or a standard ofprobable cause.
Prosecutorial
investigation, therefore, should be
supplementary to police investigation inorder to best use scarce resources.
Nevertheless, additional resources will beneeded by prosecutors who gain
investigatory authority, generally in theform of non-lawyer investigators. In theUS, prosecutorial investigators are
frequently former police officers.
Election, or appointment by elected
officials, of prosecutors necessarily makes
the process, and therefore the position,
political. The same is true with respect tojudges. In the latter case, however, longer
terms of office to some extent offset the
influence of politics, but this influence cannever be completely eliminated. Even
those systems combining election andappointment by a commission have notcompletely avoided politics, but they may
hold the key to a better method of

appointing both prosecutors and judges.
What is needed is a non-partisancommission, perhaps composed ofexperienced attorneys, which solicits
names from the public, evaluates
candidates, and makes the appropriate
appointments. Members of the commission
themselves could be popularly elected.
While some may criticize this process as
undemocratic and elitist, it must be
realized that neither the judiciary nor
prosecution is democratic by nature, asdecisions may have to be made by bothwhich are not supported by the majority.
The judiciary is a check on the tyranny oft h e m a j o r i t y, t h e t h i r d b r a n c h o fgovernment which, among other things,
protects the rights of minorities. The
prosecutor represents the people, not in thesame manner as a legislator, but rather as
an impartial and relatively independent
legal authority. Popularity, then, should
not be the criteria for appointment orelection of judges or prosecutors but rather
independence and legal ability.
Legal ability is not a requirement forappointment or election as a prosecutor ora judge in the US, but prosecutors must be
familiar with criminal law and criminal
procedure, while judges, because theyrarely specialize26, must be familiar withall areas of substantive and procedural law.
This presents the dilemma of seasoned
criminal law attorneys facing recently
elected prosecutors (who have neverpracticed criminal law) in a case heard by
a judge (who specialized in real estate law
before appointment to the bench). Theremust, therefore, be minimum qualifications
for appointment as a prosecutor or a judge.
With respect to prosecutors, minimum
qualifications should include at least 5
years experience practicing criminal law or
one year post-law school training incriminal law and procedure, as well as
public administration.27

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
For judges to be truly professional, andtherefore free from political influences andresulting corruptive enticement, they musthave training above and beyond that ofother members of the bar. This training
could take the form of post-law school
education or an institute dedicated totraining potential judges.28 Because thepenal code of each state and the federal
government varies, and because criminal
procedure also varies from state to stateand from the federal system, a national
institute for training judges would have toteach principles rather than the law of eachstate and the federal system. This would
be more economical and efficient thanhaving separate training institutes in eachstate, and would have the added benefit ofbringing together potential judges from theentire nation. Specific training in the lawof individual states and the federal system
could come from an apprenticeshipprogram whereby national institutegraduates spend a specified period of time
as assistants to veteran judges.
Just as specialized training is importantin preparing prosecutors and judges to fightcorruption, so too may be specialization
within those professions in the handlingof corruption cases. Where possible, one
or more prosecutors should be assigned
solely to corruption cases, and reporting
directly to the chief prosecutor. This not
only allows dedication to only one type ofcase, but some degree of independence as
well. In smaller offices, however, this may
not be possible. One possibility that does
not depend upon the size of prosecutors
office or court system is to centralize theprosecution and adjudication of corruption
cases at the state level, with prosecution
handled by a special unit of the Attorney
General’s Office and adjudication by a court
established for that purpose, with branches
in the largest cities of the state. The same
could hold true for the federal system, withdedicated units in larger US attorney’s

406

offices and a court in each federal circuit.
The problem of inadequate resources toprovide speedy trials for all who do not
waive that right can only be solved byallocating substantial sums of money to the
51 different judicial systems in the US. Any
increase in the number of courts and judges
would, of course, have to be met byadditional prosecutors and publicdefenders, again a costly proposition. The
alternative- more corruption, lighter
sentences and dismissal of cases due to 6th
Amendment (speedy trial) violations.
Plea bargaining is, at the same time, astandard practice and a hotly debated topic.
The system could not operate without it,
yet there are acknowledged abuses of it andinjustices in its application. It can beparticularly controversial in corruption
cases, as it leaves prosecutors and judges
open to charges of favoritism as well as
their own corruption. Part of the problem
with respect to plea bargaining is that it isa low visibility process, or a process thatlacks transparency, and a process that the
public does not completely understand. It
is also a problem because it may be used to
avoid, rather than as an alternative to,trials. There is very little case law on plea
bargaining and it is rarely dealt with inrules of procedure. The solution, then, is
to institutionalize plea bargaining while atthe same time making it more transparent.
There should be specific rules of procedure
about plea bargaining and all plea bargains
should be judicially approved prior to aformal change of plea. Some plea
bargaining involves consideration given to
defendants in return for their testimony
against collaborators or co-conspirators.
This is frequently true in corruption cases,
and may result in those guilty of multiple
felonies serving no time in prison in returnfor testimony against high ranking corrupt
officials. While this may not sit well withthe public, it is essential for the effective

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administration of justice that suchbargaining not remain hidden. Finally, allparties to the case, including victims,
should have the opportunity to makeformal input on any and all proposedbargains.
VI. MEASURES TO PREVENTCORRUPT ACTIVITIES OF PUBLIC
OFFICIALS
Many of the suggestions discussed above
constitute measures that would help toprevent corruption among public officials,
but there are more that should beconsidered. The primary focus above has
been on the criminal justice system, but
measures are necessary to deter corruption
among all public officials. The primarymeasures are laws and codes of ethicalconduct. In the US there are numerous
sections of the US Code which contain suchprovisions, while at the state level there
are generally codes of conduct and statutes
prohibiting bribery and other abuses ofpower.29 In short, then, there is no shortageof laws prohibiting official corruption nor
codes of ethical conduct. But do they serve
as effective deterrents?
Deterrence is difficult to measure,although one study found that it is afunction of likelihood of conviction andlength of prison sentences.30 Bribery of, or
acceptance of a bribe by, a public official,for example, is punishable under 18 USC§201 by a fine and up to fifteen years inprison. Is the fine and prison sentence a
deterrent to bribery? The answer, of course,
depends upon the personalities of those
involved, the amount of money of the bribe,and the likelihood of detection andconviction. It very likely deters some anddoes not deter others. So the question iswhether increased efforts at detection andprosecution accompanied by increased
penalties will deter more than the current
penalties, and whether the increased costs

associated with these efforts will bejustified. There are other methods, ofcourse, that might not directly involve
deterrence but would be more effective in
reducing corruption.31
Susan Rose-Ackerman suggests thefollowing approaches to reduction ofcorruption:32
1. Program elimination (of corrupt
programs)
2. Privatization (of current government
services)
3. Reform of public programs (revenue
collection, regulation, social benefits)
4. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e f o r m ( m a k eadministration competitive)
5. Deterrent effect of anti-corruption
laws (increase deterrence and reward
whistleblowers)
6. Procurement systems (improve theefficiency of government purchasing)
7. Reform of civil service (substitutecivil service for patronage and ensurethat it is apolitical)
Rose-Ackerman’s suggestions tend to besocietal in scope, and while institution ofsuch reforms would clearly reduce
corruption, their implementation would be
difficult, costly and lengthy. This is not to
say that the effort should not be made, butrather that initial reforms must start at
the micro rather than the macro level.
Most of the recommendations I suggest
above can be made with a minimum of
disruption and political controversy, and amodicum of money, but allow me to suggest
several more.
Just as punishment may deter
corruption, rewards may achieve the same
result. Awards or salary increases could
be given to employees and officials who
detect and report corruption and to those
who themselves are examples of integrity
and honesty. Supervisors should be held407

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
more accountable for the actions of theirsubordinates, so that both rewards andpunishment would flow to supervisors as
well. Strict laws regulating postgovernment employment should be
i m p l e m e n t e d a n d e n f o r c e d . 33
Transparency, or openness in government,
must be increased. The public must beallowed access to all government meetings,
documents, rules, regulations, etc, withrestrictions only when national security isthreatened. Public reporting laws should
require all agencies to make available dataon corruption and efforts to prevent it.
Coupled with this is the importance of afree press. Only when the press is free fromgovernment restrictions and censorship
can access to information on the operationof government be widely available tocitizens. The press in the US has
traditionally been the primary watchdog
over government corruption.34
VII. INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN COMBATTINGCORRUPTION
Corruption has become a truly
international phenomena, thanks toorganized crime, modern transportation,and computers. Perhaps the mostcorrupting international commodity is
drugs, as the money involved in its
transportation, distribution and sale isastronomical. Bribes to law enforcement
officials constitute pocket change for large
drug cartels, but for the corrupt official thebribe may be many times that person’sannual salary. Despite the best efforts ofgovernments, the internationaltransportation of drugs continues at a highrate.35 International money laundering isa multi-billion dollar business as well, andwhile there seems to be little official
corruption in the US associated with thisactivity, that is not the case in many othernations. And while perhaps not a result ofcorruption, the failure of government

408

regulators to detect and prevent suchlaundering calls for reform of some kind.36
International cooperation is essential infighting these types of criminal activities.
While one can correctly say that the supplyof drugs from South America to the US
would not take place were there not astrong demand for drugs in the US, that
does not mean that the problem is solelythat of the US. The corruption that ispresent in Mexico and Columbia, forexample, is damaging to the citizens of
those nations while at the same time
facilitating corruption in the US. The
problem of drugs if far too complex to
discuss in this paper, but it is an excellent
example of corruption that must be fought
through international cooperation,
cooperation that must take place at every
level, from law enforcement to heads ofstate.
International cooperation in fighting
official corruption, while in the bestinterests of all nations concerned, isunfortunately affected by politics, bothinternal and international. Effective
cooperation cannot exist, for example,
between nations which have no diplomatic
relations. Foreign trade issues may bemixed with anti-corruption efforts.
Political change within a nation may affectinternational cooperation. And culturaldifferences may cause disagreements overwhat constitutes official corruption as wellas the appropriate punishment for it. This,in turn, may affect extradition. Nations
jealously guard their sovereignty, and in
the end, one cannot compel another to fightofficial corruption. Only through mutual
understanding, frequent dialogue,
exchange of officials, and a sharedunderstanding that official corruption is
not in the best interests of any nation, caninternational cooperation prosper.

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NOTES
1. Although the FBI (Federal Bureau of
Investigation) is the best known federal
law enforcement agency, there aremany others: Immigration andNaturalization Service, US Marshals
Service, Federal Bureau of Prisons,
Drug Enforcement Administration(DEA), Internal Revenue Service, US
Postal Inspection Service, US Customs
Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF).
2. All states except Hawaii have “statepolice”, but their duties andresponsibilities vary considerably. In
California, for example, the largest
state law enforcement agency is theCalifornia Highway Patrol, which, as
the name implies, is primarily
responsible for traffic enforcement.
3. Traditionally, sheriffs are responsible
for law enforcement in counties. In
practice, sheriffs generally exercise
their law enforcement inunincorporated areas of the county andin those cities and towns which contract
for services from the county.
4. Law enforcement authorities in cities
and towns are usually called “police”,
although other terms may be used aswell.
5. “Prosecutor” is a generic term for those
who prosecute. Actual titles include
district attorney and state’s attorney,
among others. Prosecutors generally
enforce state laws as well as local
ordinances.
6. See, for example, 5 USC §2302.
7. In the state of Hawaii, for example, theCampaign Spending Commission may
investigate alleged violations ofcampaign spending laws, assess
administrative fines, and refer criminalcases to the appropriate prosecutor.
See HRS §11-191 - 11-229.
8. Small law enforcement agencies rarely
have the resources to pursue largescale corruption. Where theseresources are not available, the case isusually turned over to a larger agency
in the same jurisdiction or to federal
law enforcement officials.
9. The Bureau of Justice Statistics of the
US Department of Justice reports that
there were 25 sworn officers per 10,000
residents in 1996: Census of State andLocal Law Enforcement Agencies, 1996.
NCJ 164618, June 1998, p.2.
10. Ibid, p.5.
11. In the 1978 “Abscam” operation, forexample, the FBI used agents posing
as wealthy Arabs who offered bribes to
US legislators. All of the meetings
between the undercover agents and thelegislators were videotaped, and one
senator and four representatives were
ultimately convicted for bribery andconspiracy. The conviction of one
representative was overturned,
however, due to entrapment.
12. Federal legislation on corruption ismuch more comprehensive than thatfound in state penal codes, which
generally deal with bribery and codesof ethics that prohibit conflicts ofinterest, acceptance of gifts, etc. And
all legislation is subject to judicial
interpretation - a recent US Supreme
Court decision held that in order toestablish a violation of 18 USC §201,
bribery of public officials, thegovernment must prove a link between
the gift conferred and a specific official
act for which it was given. US v. Sun-

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Diamond Growers of California, 98-131(1999).
13. Most, if not all, police departments
have administrative rules prohibiting
officers from accepting gratuities, withfood defined as a gratuity, but they are
rarely enforced.
14. T h e O r a n g e C o u n t y R e g i s t e r ,Wednesday, July 14, 1999, p.B04.
15. Prosecutorial corruption, such as theOrange County case, must be
distinguished from prosecutorial
misconduct, which, while not common,is more frequent than corruption.
16. Those deputies working under the chiefprosecutor may be civil service
employees or may serve at the pleasureof the chief.
17. Plea bargaining is facilitated by thenature of penal codes in the US, wherea given offense may have as many asfour or five degrees. In Hawaii, forexample, there are five degrees ofsexual assault and four degrees of theft.
A plea bargain may involve theprosecutor reducing the charge fromfirst degree sexual assault to third
degree sexual assault; the first ispunishable by 20 years in prison while
sexual assault in the third degree ispunishable by 5 years.
18. T h e a v e r a g e s a l a r y f o r a c h i e fprosecutor in 1996 was $64,000.
“Prosecutors in State Courts, 1996,”
Bureau of Justice Statistics, US.
Department of Justice, July 1998, p.1.
19. The median size of prosecutors offices
in 1996 was 9, 4 of whom wereprosecutors, and the median length ofservice was 6 years. Ibid.

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20. The are many variations on election
and appointment, such as “merit” plansthat provide for a nominating
commission to supply a set number ofnames for each vacancy to the governor,
who then selects one for appointment.
After a relatively short period of timeon the bench, a retention election isheld and the public is allowed to decide
whether the judge shall be retained on
the bench or not.
21. Amendment 6 to the US Constitution,
as applied to the states through the 14th
Amendment.
22. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (18 USC§3161) requires indictment within 30
days of arrest, arraignment within tendays of indictment, and trial within 60
days of arraignment in federal cases.
State requirements vary but do not
exceed 180 days.
23. “Three strikes” is a baseball analogy(“three strikes and you are out”) whichin criminal law refers to statutes which
require, for example, that a felon besentenced to life in prison for the third
violent felony.
24. There are some exceptions to this,where, for example, a judge may impose
a term of probation or grant a deferred
acceptance of guilty plea.
25. Judges may hand down light sentences
because they are aware of prison
overcrowding or, in states where paroleboards determine sentence minimums,
that this body will play the same role.
Prison overcrowding may constitute a
violation of the rights of the prisoner,so states run the risk of lawsuits orfederal supervision if they allow
overcrowding.

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
26. In small jurisdictions a judge will
normally hear every type of case, from
criminal to civil to equity, while inlarger jurisdictions a judge may be
assigned to a criminal court, or aprobate court, or another court dealing
with specific areas of the law. But evenin the latter, it is normal for judges tobe rotated from one court to another.
27. The vast majority of US law school
graduates take only one course incriminal law and one course in criminal
procedure. Chief prosecutors spend asignificant amount of time asadministrators, thus the need fortraining in that area.
28. The National Judicial College, locatedin Reno, Nevada, has trained over
38,000 judges over a 32 year period.
Attendance at this institution, however,is voluntary.

34. The Watergate scandal is perhaps thebest known example of the role of themedia in exposing official corruption,
but media exposure of official
corruption takes place frequently at thestate and local level in the US.
35. See, for example, “Peru’s Drug Success
Erode as Traffickers Adapt,” The New
York Times, August 19, 1999, via <http://www.nytimes/com/library/world/
americas/081999peru-drugs.html>.
36. It was recently revealed that Russianorganized crime laundered billions ofdollars through the Bank of New York.
See “Bank in Laundering Inquiry
Courted Russians Zealously,” The New
York Times, August 20, 1999, via <http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/
europe/ 082099russianslaunder.html>.

29. See, for example, 18 USC §201 - 211,
and 18 USC Chapter 31, for criminal
provisions, and 5CFR2635.02 forstandards of ethical conduct for
executive branch employees.
30. Rajeev Goal and Daniel Rich, “On the
Economic Incentives for Taking
Bribes,” Public Choice, 61:269-275(1989).
31. It is unreasonable to expect that
corruption can be completely
eliminated; at best we can reduce it toa tolerable level.
32. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and
Government: Causes, Consequences
and Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999, pp.39 - 88.
33. See 18 USC §207 is a good example ofthis type of legislation.

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