From Lyon to Kyoto: Modernization of a Traditional
Silk-Weaving District in Japan, 1887–1929
Tomoko HASHINO
August 2021
Discussion Paper No. 2122

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
KOBE UNIVERSITYROKKO, KOBE, JAPANFrom Lyon to Kyoto: Modernization of a Traditional
Silk-Weaving District in Japan, 1887–1929
Tomoko Hashino
Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University
2-1 Rokko, Nada, Kobe City, Hyogo Prefecture, 6578501 Japanhashino@econ.kobe-u.ac.jp

ABSTRACT (193WORDS)
In 1872, three craftsmen were sent by the Kyoto prefectural government to
Lyon, France, to learn about power-looms and other weaving innovations.
Instead of bringing back a power-loom, they brought back the Jacquard
mechanism and the flying shuttle to Kyoto because they thought powerlooms were too expensive and inappropriate for their sophisticated fabrics.
This paper explores the production trend from 1887 to 1929 to characterize
growthphases—Jacquard-led,out-weaver-based,

andpower-loom-

assisted—in Kyoto. By doing so, the importance of selective adoption of
new technologies for industrial development is discussed.
Keywords: industrial district, technology import, technology choice,technology adoption, institutional change, division of labor

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT
An earlier version of this study was presented in a seminar at the Université Lumière Lyon 2.
I appreciate Pierre Vernus and Keijiro Otsuka, who gave valuable comments from theperspectives of French economic history and development economics. A question from John
Styles at the workshop ‘Centuries of Cloth: Historical Approaches to the Study of Textiles’ inJanuary 2021 was helpful to reconsider changes in the supply chain caused by the
introduction of new technologies. A discussion with Yoshifumi Saito and Koji Yamamoto
after the Annual Meeting of Socio-Economic History in Japan in May 2021 helped me tofurther understand the technological history of the Lyonnaise silk-weaving industry. I am
grateful for important comments from the participants, especially Masaki Nakabayashi and
Hirokazu Ishise, at The Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations andPre-workshop for World Economic History Congress (Co-organized session on Silk: Trades,
Production, and Skills in a Eurasian Perspective from the 17th to the mid-20th Century) in
May 2021. I also thank Avril Madrid for her excellent English editing. This research waspartially supported by grants from The Kobe University Center for Social Systems
Innovation.

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INTRODUCTION
It is well-known that industrial districts or industrial clusters are characterized byorganized and flexible specialization of production and the division of labor among
enterprises (Scranton 2000, 2002, 2003; Sabel and Zeitlin 1997). In fact, industrial districts
usually consist of many small enterprises, each specializing in a particular production process
and is linked with other enterprises through contractual relationships. In addition,organizations, such as trade associations, technical schools, and industrial research institutes,
facilitate the growth of the district in various ways in western countries and in industrializing
modern Japan (Zeitlin 2009; Abe 1999; Sawai 1999; Calnevali 2004, 2011; Hashino 2012; Di
Maltino, Popp, and Peter 2017; Hashino and Kurosawa 2013). Similar phenomena areobserved in contemporary developing countries in Asia and Africa (Sonobe and Otsuka 2006,
2011; Hashino and Otsuka 2016). Certainly, industrial districts play critical roles in industrial
development in history and in the developing world.
Historically, one of the driving forces that promote industrial development indeveloping countries has been technology transfer, which enabled backward regions to catch
up with advanced countries (Gerschenkron 1962). Modern economic development in Japan
since the Meiji Restoration (in 1868) is considered a typical case of successful economic
development based on technological catch-up (Nakamura 1971; Minami 1994 Morris-Suzuki
1995). In Meiji Japan, the large-scale modern cotton-spinning industry was established basedon technology import from the United Kingdom (Saxonhouse 1977; Otsuka, Ranis, andSaxonhouse 1988; Farnie and Jeremy 2004; Braguinsky et al. 2015). The most advanced
large-scale modern silk-reeling factory was imported from France (Ma 1996; Hunter 2003;
Kiyokawa 2005). There are many other examples of the development of modern industries
because of imported technologies (Okazaki 1993; Nakamura 1998, 2000; Kuwahara 2004;
Kurosawa and Hashino 2012). Although there is no doubt that the introduction of modern
3industries contributed to the fairly rapid development of Japan during the prewar period since
the end of the 19th century. It is also true that the modernization of traditional industries bymeans of technology imported from the West was no less important than the introduction ofmodern industries, particularly in terms of employment generation (Nakamura 1966;
Tanimoto 2016). Nakamura estimated that more than 30% of workers in Japan worked at
traditional industries around the turn of the century (Nakamura 1966). However, there havebeen scant quantitative empirical studies that inquired into the role of western technologies in
the modernization process of traditional industries.
It is important to note that majority of traditional industries, especially weaving
industries, historically developed by forming industrial districts (Tanimoto 1992; Abe 1992,
2019; Ōta 2002; Yamazaki 2002; Tamura 2003; Nakaoka 2006; Hashino and Otsuka 2013a,
2013b, 2020; Hashino and Saito 2004). The relevant question is whether and how the
introduction of new technology affected the division of labor among these enterprises andproduction growth in these traditional districts. Related questions are what technologies wereassociated with the strengthening or weakening of the division of labor and whatorganizational changes took place to facilitate the division of labor or discourage it byvertically integrating production processes in the industry.
This study aims to examine the modernization process of Nishijin, a traditional silkweaving district in Kyoto. It is by far the most advanced silk-weaving district in Japan in thelate 19th century. Special attention is paid to the role of technology transfer from Lyon in
France, which was the most advanced silk-weaving district in the world. The Kyoto
prefectural government sent delegations to Lyon in the late 19th century in order to introduce
modern silk-weaving technologies, particularly power-looms, to Kyoto. Technology import,4however, was not linear. Although Nishijin adopted the Jacquard1 mechanism or attachment(Jacquard hereafter) relatively early, power-looms were widely adopted only several decades
later.
Furthermore, organizational changes, such as the development of a small-scale outweaver system led by contractor-cum-merchants (CCM), played critical roles in the longterm development of the Nishijin District. In this article, I would like to demonstrate that
Nishijin successfully developed by selectively importing western technologies and making
various technological and organizational adaptations.
The following sections provide an overview of the development of Nishijin from1887 to 1929, identify the three distinct development phases, and postulate hypotheses to
explain why such distinct development phases emerged. More specifically, the entire growth
process in Nishijin is subdivided into three phases: Jacquard-led growth, out-weaver-based
growth, and power-loom-assisted growth. This is then followed by an examination of the roleof the introduction of the Jacquard in the first phase and why firm size declined and output
expanded in the second out-weaver-based growth phase. The next section investigates thecauses for the adoption of power-looms that accompanied the rise of family enterprises inplace of out-weavers in the third phase. Finally, in section 6, major findings are summarizedwith policy implications.

1 According to the definition by Hall (2014), Jacquard is an attachment that can be added to a handloom or a
power loom to control the warp threads. This means that a weaver does not have to remember the entire
sequence of treadlings that make up a pattern, or keep track of where they are in the sequence—the Jacquard
does this for them.

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DEVELOPMENT OF NISHIJIN FROM 1887 TO 1929: AN OVERVIEW
Background history of Nishijin’s development
Nishijin had been the most advanced silk-weaving district in Japan, producing highquality fabrics for the privileged classes since the medieval period. In 794, the emperor
moved the capital to Kyoto and established the Office of Textiles, or Oribeshi, which
exclusively produced high-quality and sophisticated silk fabrics. In the medieval period, silk
weaving was originally a government monopoly, but it gradually opened to the private sector.
After the Onin War (1467–77), which devastated the Kyoto area and damaged the local
weaving industry, people who had evacuated returned to Nishijin to resume the production ofsilk fabrics using textile technology introduced from China (Bank of Japan - Kyoto Branch,
1914, p. 3).
In the Edo period (1603–1868), Nishijin continued to be the most advanced silkweaving district in Japan, producing high-quality silk products not only for the limited
number of privileged people but also for the many wealthy people who could already afford
such products. In the early 18th century, local weaving districts, such as Tango, Kiryu,
Nagahama, Ashikaga, Isezaki, Hachioji, and Gifu, emerged in various parts of Japan byintroducing technologies from Nishijin (Horie and Goto 1950, pp. 6–7; Hashino andKurosawa 2013, p. 495).
Even after the capital was moved to Tokyo in 1868 at the Meiji restoration, Nishijinremained the leader in Japan’s silk-weaving industry. The policies of the Kyoto prefectural
government initially focused on the promotion of trading at the beginning of the Meiji period
but gradually shifted to industrialization through the transfer and diffusion of western
technology (Nakaoka et al. 1988, p. 125). The local government sent craftsmen to Lyon,
France, to learn skills and introduce new technologies in weaving and dyeing in 1872. Their
original mission was to introduce power-looms equipped with a steam engine, but power6

looms were considered not appropriate to produce high-quality and highly sophisticatedproducts in Nishijin. The craftsmen, instead, brought back the flying shuttle and synthetic
dyestuffs technologies, which diffused rapidly to all weaving districts throughout Japan(Hashino 2012). As will be discussed later, the Jacquard was also introduced, but it took along time to diffuse within Nishijin, even though Nishijin craftsmen had already acquired theskills to introduce, absorb, and imitate western technologies.
There were 18,000 workers in Nishijin in 1877, and the number increased to 35,000
in 1905, reflecting rapid development. After that, it remained roughly 35,000 partly because
labor-saving technologies were gradually adopted since the 1910s. According to the survey
done by the Kyoto Branch of the Bank of Japan (1914), members of 11,000 households were
engaged in silk-weaving-related businesses, and the livelihood of one-third of the populationin Kyoto was dependent on the silk-weaving industry (Bank of Japan - Kyoto Branch 1914,
p. 2).

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREE PHASESOF NISHIJIN’S DEVELOPMENT (1887–1929)
What factors promoted growth in Nishijin after the introduction of new technologies
from the West? To identify the major components of growth in production in Nishijin fromthe late 19th century to the early 20th century, I decomposed the real value of production (Q)into the number of enterprises (N), enterprise size in terms of the number of looms perenterprise (K/N), the number of workers per loom (L/K), and labor productivity (Q/L),
according to the following formula:
𝑄 = 𝑁 × (𝐾 ⁄𝑁) × (𝐿⁄𝐾 ) × (𝑄 ⁄𝐿).

(1)

By taking the logarithm, Equation (1) can be written as:
ln 𝑄 = ln 𝑁 + ln(𝐾 ⁄𝑁) + ln(𝐿⁄𝐾 ) + ln(𝑄 ⁄𝐿),
7

(2)

where K/N is an indicator of the type of production organization, such as out-weaver, family
enterprise, and factory; L/K is an indicator of technologies, which are expected to be changedby the introduction of new technology (for example, 3–4 persons per traditional draw-loom,
one person per hand loom with the Jacquard, and less than one person per power-loom); andQ/L is an indicator of the composite impacts of enterprise size and technology.
Figure 1 shows the logarithm of indexes of production, the number of enterprises,
enterprise size in terms of number of looms, worker-loom ratio, and labor productivity in
Nishijin with the common base year of 1899.2 Several distinctive characteristics can be seenin Figure 1. First, the real value of production rapidly increased from 1887 to the turn of the
century but dropped suddenly before the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05). Second, theworker-loom ratio tended to decrease toward the turn of the century, largely stagnated for a
few decades and began to rise after 1910. Such a sharp decline in the worker-loom ratio
before the turn of the century suggests that the introduction and spread of the Jacquard took
place, which displaced workers previously engaged in drawing yarns. Third, the number ofenterprises continuously rose for almost the whole period, even though it slightly declined
occasionally and in the 1920s. Curiously, growth in enterprises was remarkably high for morethan ten years after the Russo-Japanese War. Fourth, while enterprise size in terms of thenumber of looms continued to increase until the end of the century, it started shrinking toward
the mid-1910s. From the third and fourth findings, it is clear that the number of small
enterprises increased in the early years of the 20th century. Finally, labor productivity waslargely stagnant from 1887 to 1905 but began to increase rapidly shortly after the Russo-

2 For obtaining the real value of production, I tried to apply several price indexes (habutae, kaiki, and silklining price indexes, for example). These silk-related price indexes undervalued the increase in price during
the boom period in the late 1910s. When I used the textile products price index, which covered all types ofmaterials including cotton, silk, wool, and others, the increase in the price in the boom period became higher
than in the silk-related price indexes. On the whole, however, I found similar trends by using various priceindexes. As will be shown later, since the materials of fabrics produced in Nishijin became diversified, Iapplied the textile products price index for constructing Figure 1.

8

Japanese War to around 1918. After declining in the early 1920s, it started rising again fromthe mid-1920s.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Based on these observations, the entire development path in modern Nishijin can bedivided into three growth phases. From 1887 to around 1905, increases in average enterprisesize and number of enterprises and decreases in the worker-loom ratio were associated withgrowth in production. Relatively large factories that produced fabrics different fromtraditional ones were built in this period. In addition, though it is unclear why the workerloom ratio slightly increased in the early 20th century, the introduction of the Jacquard
mechanism seems to be responsible for the declining worker-loom ratio, as will be seen later.
I consider this as Phase I. Phase II started around 1905 with increases in the number ofenterprises and labor productivity, which continued until 1918. At the same time, a sharp
decline in enterprise size is noticeable. The entry of small producers and the widespread useof the Jacquard seemed to contribute to the growth in this phase. The period after 1918 can be
regarded as Phase III, when labor productivity, the worker-loom ratio, and enterprise size
slightly and steadily increased.

HYPOTHESES OF THIS STUDY
Why such characteristically different phases of development emerged is a questionthat I would like to address in subsequent sections. Specifically, I would like to advance threehypotheses corresponding to each phase.
Hypothesis 1: Worker-loom ratio declined significantly in Phase I, particularly fromthe mid-1890s to 1900, due to the diffusion of hand looms with the Jacquard mechanism.
Hypothesis 2: There was a significant rise of small-scale out-weavers in the growth
Phase II due to the increasing production of labor-intensive figured products under the9leadership of contractor-cum-merchants.
Hypothesis 3: The number of out-weavers decreased, and the adoption rate of powerlooms increased in Phase III, probably because small family enterprises, which were larger
than out-weavers, were more suited to use power-looms.
By utilizing quantitative data and qualitative information, I will explore how thisstructural transformation occurred in the most advanced silk-weaving district in Japan while
paying attention to the introduction of new technologies, organization of division of labor, andchanges in the facilitating roles of production organizations.

ROLE OF THE INTRODUCTION
OF JACQUARD IN PHASE I (1887–1905)
FROM ‘HUMAN JACQUARD’ SYSTEM
TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THE JACQUARDAs I mentioned in the previous section, local craftsmen were sent to Lyon by the
local government in the early 1870s with two missions. One was to conduct a survey ofadvanced production systems and learn skills for dyeing, weaving, and finishing. The otherwas to purchase western looms, two for twilled fabrics and two for plain fabrics (Kyoto
Municipal Center for Dyeing and Weaving 1990, p. 18). The two looms for plain fabrics
seemed to be power-looms, which the craftsmen were requested to purchase on behalf of the
Ministry of Public Works. This was a plan by Vice-Minister Yozo Yamao, who learned
engineering and shipbuilding technology in London and Glasgow in the 1860s and returned
to Japan in 1868. His evaluation was that although Nishijin had high skills for production, its
production method was obsolete. Therefore, Mr. Yamao planned to purchase the power-looms
and lend them to producers in Nishijin to make them realize how efficient and productive themechanized machines were. Subsequently, the Ministry planned to lend them to otherpromising weaving districts in Japan for wider diffusion (Nakaoka 2006, pp. 94–95).
10

Visiting a factory in Lyon, Japanese craftsmen were overwhelmed by mechanizedproduction. Factories that were equipped with as many as 90 power-looms were common. All
the weaving processes, such as warping, weft winding, and reeling, were all mechanized.
After a week-long survey, the craftsmen reached the conclusion that it was inappropriate topurchase power-looms, partly because they were too expensive and partly because it was not
economical unless many power power-looms were operated to fully utilize a large-scalesteam engine. In other words, they would have had to buy not only power-looms but also
excessively expensive auxiliary machines and equipment indispensable in western-stylefactory operation.
Contrary to Mr. Yamao’s expectation, what the craftsmen realized in Lyon was theusefulness of manual instruments, which, they found, would be more appropriate forfacilitating production in Nishijin. One was the flying shuttle, and the other was the Jacquard
attachment or mechanism (Nakaoka 2006, p. 97). Although both the flying shuttle and theJacquard were introduced to Nishijin in the 1870s from Lyon, the diffusion of the Jacquard
needed more time than the flying shuttle. Shortly after the arrival of the flying shuttle and theJacquard, carpenters in Nishijin tried to imitate them. In Nishijin, Mr. Masashichi Hasegawa
succeeded in producing an imitation of the flying shuttle in 1876. According to Horie andGoto (1950), the flying shuttle became widely used in Nishijin in producing the fabrics formilitary uniforms in 1877 when the civil war occurred. In the early 1890s, satin was produced
using the flying shuttle in Nishijin (Horie and Goto 1950, p. 14). Thus, the flying shuttle
diffused quickly (Nakaoka 2006, p. 107).
After the introduction of the Jacquard from Lyon, the Kyoto municipal government
facilitated its diffusion in various ways. It was exhibited in Kyoto in 1874 and shown in an
exhibition of weaving using the Jacquard attached to the hand loom at a model factory in
Kyoto. From 1875, this model factory is where the craftsmen who had returned from Lyon

11taught other craftsmen, some of whom came from other local weaving districts, how to use
the flying shuttle and the Jacquard attachment. The Austrian Jacquard was also introduced toJapan, triggered by the attendance of the Japanese delegation to the Vienna Exposition in
1873.3
Despite the extraordinary effort to introduce Jacquard, there were reasons why it did
not diffuse so easily. First, the draw-loom was more appropriate to weave sophisticatedfigured fabrics than the imported Jacquard, which could not deal with the complicatedmechanism required to produce the kimono. However, the Jacquard mechanism wasappropriate for producing simpler figured fabrics than those usually produced in Nishiijin.
Therefore, the momentum for adoption of the Jacquard did not rise until the improved
Jacquard, which could produce more complicated figured fabrics, became available. It mustalso be pointed out that imported Jacquard was expensive, especially high-quality ones,
which could produce sophisticated fabrics. Local skilled carpenters struggled to imitate theJacquard, but they needed engineers or mechanics who had knowledge of modern
engineering to understand the complex mechanism, which can weave sophisticated fabrics
like those made by traditional draw-looms (Nakaoka 2006, p. 100, pp. 106–107). In Nishijin,
it was reported that full-scale diffusion of Jacquard started after 1885, more than ten years
later after it was first imported (Tokutake 2014, p. 140). According to the Kyoto Municipal
Center of Dyeing and Weaving (1990, p. 22), draw-looms were almost completely substituted
by looms with Jacquard attachment around the turn of the century.
Traditionally in Nishijin, more than a few workers were needed per hand loom to
weave figured fabrics because, in addition to the weaver, the supervisor had to give instructions

3 Mr. Yasuke Date attended the Vienna Exposition in 1873 and brought the Austrian Jacquard, more than 120
instruments, and samples of fabrics after visiting weaving districts in Europe for two years. The exhibition ofweaving using the Austrian Jacquard also started at the industrial-promotion center in Tokyo (Nakaoka 2006,
p. 100).

12

to one or two child workers who sat on top of the draw-loom. Thus, the craftsmen in Lyon were
impressed with the Jacquard, which could weave figured fabrics operated by only one weaver.
That is why they decided to write to the government that they wanted to start learning how to
operate the Jacquard machine. In fact, weaving by hand looms equipped with the Jacquard
mechanism saved on at least one worker and halved the production time, compared withweaving by the traditional draw-loom. As a result, productivity increased four times by using
hand looms with the Jacquard mechanism (Hattori 1948, p. 158).
Figure 2 shows changes in the average worker-loom ratio from 1887 to 1927 and thatby production organization from 1905 to 1919.4 When the traditional draw-loom was used for
production, more than two people were needed per loom.5 Therefore, the worker-loom ratio
would have been more than three, including the people engaged in the preparation process andsupervision. This is consistent with the data in Figure 2 for 1887–94. Although the workerloom ratio grew again toward 1903, it began to drop again, and the average worker-loom ratio
has declined rapidly since then. These trends indicate that the spread of the Jacquard occurredin Nishijin during Phase I, resulting in a worker-loom ratio of roughly by the first decade of
20th century.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 1 shows the diffusion of the Jacquard in 1886, 1891, and 1895 in which relevant
data are available. Not only did the total number of looms rapidly increase, especially from1891 to 1895, but the number of looms with the Jacquard mechanism also increased 18-foldduring the nine-year period. The share of looms with the Jacquard to the total number of looms
4 The types of production organization are defined as follows. A factory is a workshop with more than ten
workers; a family enterprise is one with less than nine workers; and an out-weaver worked for merchantcum-manufacturers, which out-sourced the weaving process by providing hand looms and raw materials.
5 To produce highly sophisticated and complicated fabrics, two drawers per loom were needed (Tokyo Regional
Taxation Bureau 1905, p. 41).

13

was almost 25% and reached nearly 50% of looms used for figured fabrics by 1895 (also see
Yamaguchi 1974, p. 210). The Jacquard was likely introduced primarily by large enterprises
since enterprise size significantly increased in Phase I (see Figure 1).
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]FROM MEN’S WORK TO WOMEN’S WORK
In general, weaving had traditionally been men’s work in Nishijin. Before the modern period,
only male craftsmen who belonged to the guild were allowed to be engaged in weaving. Womenand children supported men’s work in the preparatory processes by drawing the warp while
sitting on the top of the draw-loom and in the finishing processes. After the Meiji Restoration(1868), traditional guilds were dissolved, free business was allowed, and many people entered
the weaving industry (Hashino 2012). The question is, Did the diffusion of the Jacquard in
Phase I affect gender division of labor?
Figure 3 represents changes in the proportion of female workers in Nishijin.
Unfortunately, the data on production organization for Phase I is not available, but the detailed
data in Phase II will help us to conjecture the trend in the employment of female workers during
the period of the wide diffusion of the Jacquard in Nishijin. The average proportion of female
workers had been around 40% until the turn of the century, then it increased to 60% in 1905,
regardless of the type of production organization. This suggests that the wide diffusion of theJacquard resulted in the emergence of the female worker class who were freed from being
limited to working in draw-looms. What did female workers do then?
According to the Kyoto Branch of the Bank of Japan (1914), whereas male workers
generally engaged in weaving the figured obi or sash of the kimono, female workers engaged
in both preparatory processes and in the production of the kimono. Such gender division of14

labor appeared because, unlike female workers, male workers had accumulated the skill to
weave complicated and sophisticated fabrics such as those used in the obi (Bank of Japan Kyoto Branch 1914, p. 16). This is supported by a statement that can be found in a report about
the first decade of the 20th century: “Female workers generally engaged in weaving simple
fabrics, such as satin, simple obi, and half-width obi” (Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau 1905,
p. 362). From these observations, the introduction and spread of the Jacquard mechanism, evenwith the trial-and-error process, played a significant role in facilitating the restructuring of thegender composition of workers in Nishijin.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

INCREASING DOMINANCE OF OUT-WEAVERSIN PHASE II (1905–18)
INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF OUT-WEAVERS
Phase II was characterized by increases in the number of enterprises and laborproductivity. At the same time, it was remarkable that enterprise size declined sharply. Now
the question is, why did the number of enterprises increase so substantially?
Figure 4 presents the changes in the number of enterprises from 1887 to 1929 and in
the production organization from 1899 to 1929 by using different data sources.6 Interestingobservations can be made. Firstly, the total number of enterprises started to grow at the
beginning of Phase II. Although it dropped with the outbreak of World War I, it began toincrease again until the end of Phase II. It increased almost three times during the period.
This rise is mainly due to an increase in the number of out-weavers in Phase II. An outweaver is under contract with a contractor-cum-merchant (CCM), and they weave fabrics by

6 For 1905 to 1919, I found data on the number of factories and family enterprises in the Statistical Survey ofthe Kyoto Prefecture (various years).

15

using looms and yarns provided by the CCM, who gives them piece-rate wages. The numberof out-weavers increased from about 4,000 in 1905 to nearly 10,000 in 1919. Secondly, thenumbers of both family enterprises and factories remained stagnant during Phase II, although
the former started growing around the end of Phase II. Although the data on production
shares of the three types of production organizations are unavailable, the employment shareof factories decreased from 32% in 1905 to 18% in 1918, whereas that of out-weavers
increased from 30% to 60% during the same period. It is clear that out-weavers became thedominant production organization in Phase II.
It is interesting to note that such an increase in the number of out-weavers in Nishijin
was quite similar to the experience in Kiryu in the 1910s, which developed its fabricproduction system through advanced technologies introduced from Nishijin (Hashino andOtsuka 2013b; Hashino and Kurosawa 2013). In Kiryu, too, the organization of a division oflabor and the expansion of the contractual relationship between out-weavers and CCMs took
place (Hashino and Kurosawa 2013, p. 504; Editorial Group of History of Kiryu Textile
Industry 1938).7[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

DIFFUSION OF JACQUARD AND DEVELOPMENT
OF DIVISION OF LABOR
It is interesting to inquire why out-weavers became dominant in Phase II. Nishijin
had a long tradition of division of labor among small enterprises to produce high-quality andsophisticated fabrics. However, production by hand loom with the Jacquard mechanism

7 In Kiryu, local producers attempted to introduce modern machines for weaving and related processes not only
from Nishijin but also directly from the United States and European countries. Like in Nishijin, Kiryu
craftsmen also made the effort to acquire Jacquard looms and related machines (Editorial Group of Historyof Kiryu Textile Industry 1938, pp. 370–92). Subsequently, the introduction of the power-loom started in
Kiryu in the late 1910s (Hashino 2007, p. 19).

16

needed a larger number of subdivided processes, such as preparation processes for theJacquard’s perforated card-chain; and making original designs, transforming it onto a section
paper, perforating cards, and combining cards to a chain of cards (Nakaoka et al. 1988, p.
134). It appears that many of such tasks were carried out by factories in Phase I because of
the absence of various service provisions in this phase. Since loom prices were too high forpoor out-weavers to purchase and the preparation and finishing services and the service toprovide card chains were initially unavailable, out-weavers were unable to engage in weavingwith the Jacquard.
However, the putting-out system was developed gradually for the diffusion of theJacquard, especially for producing obi and sash, under the leadership of CCM (Nakaoka et al.
1988, p. 138). Nakaoka (2006) argues that while the introduction and diffusion of theJacquard contributed to labor-saving, more importantly, it also promoted the restructuring of
the division of labor in Nishijin through out-weavers (Nakaoka 2006, p. 119).8 Figure 5
illustrates a highly simplified picture of the division of labor among CCM, out-weavers, andother enterprises. In Figure 5, while two-headed arrows indicate a contract between CCM andother enterprises, a one-headed arrow shows a one-way transaction with other enterprises.
Designing and making figures includes drawing the original design, transforming the original
design onto a section paper, preparing the perforated card chain for the Jacquard, perforating
cards, and combining cards into a chain of cards. Yarns were cleaned and sorted out by yarnprocessors before these were delivered to out-weavers. Woven fabrics produced by outweavers are then sent to finishing processors before they are sold to wholesalers.9 CCM

8 In such situation, the massive order received from the Imperial Household Agency to produce fabrics for theinterior decoration of the new Emperor House in 1888 was the main occasion for promoting the introductionof the Jacquard in Nishijin (Tsunoyama 1983, p. 297).
9 Note that since workers engaged in designing and making figures, yarn processing, and finishing processes
are not counted in the computation of worker-loom ratio and labor productivity reported in Figure 1, the“true” worker-loom ratio would have been underestimated and labor productivity overestimated.

17

actively coordinated the whole production process and even employed out-weavers. In thisway, a refined system of division of labor gradually evolved.
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Table 2 depicts changes in the number of CCM and out-weavers in Phase II. Not
only did the number of CCM increase, but the number of out-weavers more than doubled
from 1905 to 1917. The number of out-weavers per CCM also tended to increase, and in
1917, one CCM outsourced to almost as many as 60 out-weavers.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Thus, growth was promoted by the increased number of out-weavers in Phase II,
which was possible based on developing a division of labor system. Interestingly, what
happened in Nishijin after introducing the Jacquard contrasted with India’s experience in theearly 20th century. Roy (2002) argued that the major reason why the Jacquard did not diffuse
in India so easily was the failure to develop a division of labor supporting weaving using theJacquard (Roy 2002, p. 514).

POWER-LOOM ADOPTION IN FACTORIESAND SMALL ENTERPRISESLet us examine the enterprise scale in terms of the number of looms and theintroduction of power-looms in Nishijin in Phase II. Figure 6 shows the changes in the
average number of looms per enterprise (K/N) from 1887 to 1929 and by production
organization from 1905 to 1919. On average, it can be easily found that the average enterprisesize was quite small in Nishijin throughout the whole period. It was almost five looms perenterprise at most and remained unchanged until 1905. A typical out-weaver exclusively useda few hand looms in Phase II. It was factories that introduced power-looms and expanded the18enterprise size. As shown in Figure 6, a remarkable expansion of enterprise size in factories
with power-looms took place, especially in the 1910s. Nishijin was regarded as one of theearliest weaving districts to adopt the use of the power-loom, but its diffusion lagged behind
other districts (Minami and Makino 1983, p. 4; Hashino and Otsuka 2013a). In fact, theaverage adoption rate of the power-loom in Nishijin rose very slowly in Phase II, even though
the adoption rate in factories grew rapidly to 60% at the end of this phase (Figure 7). It isclear that there were significant differences between factories and other production
organizations, such as out-weavers and family enterprises, regarding the willingness to adopt
power-looms and expand their enterprise size in Phase II.
[FIGURE 6 AND FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]
Although it is not possible to obtain detailed production information about all factories
due to the lack of data, Table 3 shows the major characteristics of the seven largest factories inPhase II.10 It is interesting to note that figured fabrics were not reported as the main product inalmost all the seven factories from 1904 to 1916. Even at the end of Phase I in 1904, five outof the seven factories had already introduced power-looms with the employment share offemale workers quite high. Though less information was available in 1907 and 1916, almost
all of the factories became larger in terms of the number of workers and more progressive inthe employment of female workers. The largest factories seemed to produce less complicatednon-figured fabrics by employing female workers and using power-looms.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
What kind of fabrics were produced by smaller enterprises in Nishijin? Figure 8

10 These seven largest factories were introduced in the Tokyo Regional Taxation Office (1905, pp. 44–45).
These factories were also found in the Statistical Survey of Factories reported by the Ministry of Agriculture
and Commerce (1906), which can be regarded as original data source. They were the seven largest factories,
in terms of number of workers, out of 45 factories which were operating in the Kyoto Prefecture in 1904.

19

presents the changes in the real value of production by product, which was roughly categorized
by the materials used (silk and cotton) and the figures produced in Phase II. The production ofalmost all kinds of fabrics did not change markedly until 1914, even though the production ofsilk figured and silk-cotton figured fabrics slightly increased. However, the production of silk
non-figured, silk figured, and silk-cotton figured fabrics rapidly grew from 1915 to 1919. The
production growth in silk non-figured fabrics likely took place in factories that used powerlooms. This is one of the most important characteristics of Phase II.
[FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE]As Figure 9 shows, in 1907 and 1916, non-figured fabrics were produced in factories
with more than ten workers, even though some factories produced a small number of figured
fabrics. According to Hattori (1948), the early adoption of the power-loom in Nishijin was
limited to the production of inexpensive popular fabrics, such as cotton fabrics, lightweightclothes, simple figured fabrics, and fabrics for the export market (Hattori 1948, p. 173). Thesefabrics were not traditional fabrics produced in Nishijin using draw-looms or later by handlooms with the Jacquard mechanism.
[FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE]ADOPTION OF POWER-LOOMS AND THE EXPANSIONOF ENTERPRISE SIZE IN PHASE III (1918–29)
Although the data by type of production organization is limited in Phase III, theavailable data indicate that factories, particularly large ones, tend to specialize in producing
simple fabrics for export by using power-looms made of iron. In contrast, many family
enterprises and out-weavers began to use cheap power-looms made of iron and wood to
produce narrow fabrics for the domestic market, which were cheaper and more popular than
20

before.11 Furthermore, the distinction between out-weavers and family enterprises became
unclear because out-weavers, who used to rent hand looms from CCM, purchased their own
power-looms as well as hand looms. It seems that some out-weavers have climbed up theladder to become family enterprises in this phase.

POWER-LOOMS AND SPECIALIZATION OF FACTORIES
According to the survey conducted by the Nishijin Textile Association (1920), there
were a total of 3,344 power-looms in Nishijin, and 1,620 of them were utilized for producing
fabrics for the export market. These were ‘silk non-figured fabrics’ (shown in Figure 8). As
Shinkokai (1914, p. 67) attested, power-looms in Nishijin were mainly used to produce
fabrics for the export market and some fabrics that competed with imported simple fabrics inthe domestic market.
Table 4 shows the number of factories in Nishijin, which used power-looms in 1920
by product type. Two-thirds of power-looms were installed in factories that produced silk
fabrics for export. In addition, more than 90% of their power-looms were made of iron, andtheir average enterprise size in terms of the number of looms was also large at 127.4 looms(2,421/19). On the other hand, power-looms made of wood and iron, which were muchcheaper and sold by domestic loom producers, were used in the factories which produced
omeshi or high-quality silk crepe for the domestic market. Though their number of enterprises
and power-looms made of iron do not appear in Table 4, their enterprise size was only 6.2looms (320/52=6.2 looms)12, which was much smaller than the factories producing fabrics forthe export market.

11 According to the survey by the Nishijin Textile Association, the share of silk-cotton fabrics rose to 25% of
the total value of fabrics produced in Nishijin in 1925. In the case of the figured obi, the one made of silkand cotton was much cheaper than that of pure silk. In fact, the price of silk-cotton obi was only 60 percent
that of silk (Nishijin Textile Association 1928, appendix).
12 The source of these figures are as same as that of Table 4.

21

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
According to the report of the Nishijin Mission about newly-emerging silk-weaving
districts in Eastern Japan, including Kiryu, Ashikaga, Isezaki, and Hachioji, Nishijin had an
advantage over them due to the availability of electricity (Nishijin Shinkokai 1914, p. 55).13
There is evidence that the diffusion of electricity facilitated the utilization of power-looms bysmall weaving enterprises throughout Japan (Minami and Makino 1983, p. 15) because
electric motors enabled small factories and workshops to shift from human to mechanicalpower (Minami 1977, p. 956). This may explain why small factories could afford to introduce
power-looms in Phase III.

POWER-LOOMS AND OUT-WEAVERS
As shown in Figure 7, the average adoption rate of power-looms in Nishijin rosequite slowly in both Phases II and III, close to reaching 30% by 1929. This contrasts with
Kiryu, the second most advanced silk-weaving district in Japan and an imitator of Nishijin,
which produced similar but cheaper and popular fabrics. In Kiryu, the adoption rate of powerlooms began to increase in the 1910s and was more than 80% in 1929 (Hashino and Otsuka
2013, p. 791). The rising wage rate in the late 1910s accelerated the introduction of thepower-loom in Kiryu, as previous studies suggested (Hashino 2007, pp. 25–27; Hashino
2016, p. 57).
The average adoption rate of power-looms continued to increase in Nishijin in the
1920s. In all likelihood, such a rise in the adoption rate of power-looms was induced by the
sharp increase in wage rate in the late 1910s, as in Kiryu. The expansion of the demand for

13 Nishijin’s mission was organized by Eijiro Honjo and five other students. Honjo was a graduate student at
the Kyoto Imperial University at that time and became an economic historian later.

22

labor led to a sharp rise in wage rate, resulting from an accelerated increase in economic
activity during World War I (Minami 1968, p. 385). In fact, this is the case in Nishijin andother districts, including Kiryu and Fukui, where the wage rate increased markedly during the
economic boom (Hashino 2016, p. 57; Hashino and Otsuka 2020, p. 60). Producers, including
out-weavers, in Nishijin became keen to introduce power-looms due to increases in wage
rates, the increasing cost of materials, such as dyestuffs and raw silk, and increased
competition with other silk-weaving districts (Kuromatsu 1965, p. 21). As Kuromatsu (1951)
suggested, however, the silk product prices fell in the recession period in the 1920s, and theadoption of power-looms became necessary for the survival of the Nishijin factories (p. 50).
It is important to note that the Nishijin Textile Association played an important rolein promoting the shift from hand looms to power-looms in the 1920s. The association
implemented a policy that encouraged the adoption of power-looms in 1920 by subsidizing
and offering low-interest loans to producers who introduced power-looms. In addition, theassociation trained workers to operate power-looms and gave advice to producers who
wished to have their factory or workshop renovated for the installment of power-looms.
While the subsidy waned over time, the training of workers by the association continued.
Kyoto City and the Kyoto Municipal Center of Dyeing and Weaving cooperated to run
another training program on the operation of power-looms. This series of efforts by the
association to promote power-looms contributed to the increasing adoption rate of powerlooms from only 12.3% in 1919 to 28.9% in 1927 (Otsuki 1939, pp. 82–84), although thiswas still low compared with other silk-weaving districts.14 The unanswered question is, Who
introduced power-looms in Nishijin in Phase III? Could it be out-weavers, family enterprises,
or factories?

14 According to Kuromatsu (1951), the adoption ratio of power-looms increased to 55.4% at the end of 1937
(Akamatsu 1951, p. 50).

23

It is well-known that many local suppliers attempted to produce various kinds ofcheap power-looms which were suitable for producing special fabrics in local weaving
districts (Suzuki 1996, pp. 278–281). Power-looms made of wood and iron were a popular
innovation by Sakichi Toyoda, the “father” of the Toyota Automobile Company, in the late
19th century. They were diffused in both the cotton- and silk-weaving districts due to lower
prices. A detailed examination of the information from the report by the Nishijin Textile
Association (1922) shows that as many as 20 types of power-looms made of wood and iron
were newly installed in Nishijin in 1921. Table 5 shows the types of power-looms thatmembers of the association who applied for subsidized loans purchased in 1921. Although
there seem to have been some factories that purchased power-looms made of iron to produce
broad-width looms, most association members who applied for the loan were likely to besmall enterprises, such as family enterprises and out-weavers. As shown in Table 5, almost all
the power-looms purchased (257 out of 287) were narrow in width (less than 27 inches),
which were appropriate for the production of figured fabrics for the domestic market(Nishijin Textile Association 1922, pp. 22–23). There were at least 20 suppliers of suchlooms. In the case of iron looms, half of them were the narrow-width type, and the other half
were the broad-width type suitable for producing fabrics for export. Although the detailed
document is unavailable, it seems clear that domestic loom suppliers managed to innovate theproduction of power-looms suitable for the production of figured products by small
enterprises.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Since the price of the power-loom made of wood and iron was much lower than the
power-loom made of iron, small factories and much smaller workshops could afford to
introduce power-looms in Phase III. According to the survey conducted by the Kyoto

24Prefecture (1934) in 1933, 271 out-weavers households owned one power-loom, 307 owned
two, and 224 owned more than three (Table 6). Note that in Phase III, out-weavers alreadyowned looms, while all of them only rented looms in Phase II.
The above observations are reminiscent of the emergence of the family-based
cottage industry pointed out by Hareven (2002, p. 55), who argued that the cottage industry
gained momentum as Nishijin’s dominant production organization in the early 1920s.
Family-based cottage industries received orders for fabrics from CCMs, including designs,
the warp, and raw materials. They either owned looms or rented looms from CCMs and wovefabrics by piece-rate. In all likelihood, the rise of family enterprises, some of which used tobe out-weaver households, was a major factor underlying the steady increases in production,
worker-loom ratio, and labor productivity in Phase III (see Figure 1 and also the number offamily enterprises in 1929 shown in Figure 4).
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

CONCLUDING REMARKSThis study explored the development process in Nishijin, Japan’s most advancedsilk-weaving district that has been producing figured-silk fabrics since the medieval period,
with particular focus on the adoption of new technologies from Lyon, which was the mostadvanced silk-weaving district in the world. The important factors underlying thedevelopment of Nishijin from 1887 to 1929 were markedly different in the three major
phases. The introduction of the Jacquard mechanism triggered the structural transformation in
Nishijin, which laid the groundwork for sustainable long-term growth in Phase I from 1887 to1905. In Phase II, out-weavers grew due to the re-organization of the division of labor within
the district from 1905 to 1918. Finally, small workshops, such as family enterprises and outweavers, began to use power-looms (presumably responding to the rising wage rate) and25

played a significant role in the growth in Phase III from 1918 to 1929. Cheap power-looms
with narrow-width for small workshops were diffused partly because of encouragement fromthe Nishijin Textile Association and partly because of emerging domestic suppliers producing
power-looms made of wood and iron.
Although the mission of the three craftsmen sent from Nishijin to Lyon was topurchase power-looms with a steam engine, they decided to introduce the Jacquard
mechanism to Japan because they believed that it was the most appropriate technology for thedevelopment of silk-weaving. In other words, brand-new technology was not always
preferred. It is worth emphasizing that Nishijin craftspeople made several adaptations inorder to adopt new technologies. The best example is the development of a refined system ofdivision of labor that included small-scale out-weavers, Jacquard-related suppliers, and othersupporting enterprises within the district organized under the leadership of CCM.
It must also be pointed out that a local trade association played a significant role insupporting the introduction and adoption of new technologies. Local trade associations in
weaving districts in Japan had supported small producers in adopting synthetic dyestuffs(Hashino 2012). In the case of Nishijin, the local trade association encouraged not only the
adoption of synthetic dyestuffs but also that of power-looms especially for small workshops.
This resulted in the emergence of a new class of out-weavers who owned power-looms andwho have become dominant in Nishijin since the 1920s.
Finally, the findings of this study suggest that selective adoption of new technologies
is a critical strategy for developing economies eager for industrialization. New technologies
should be imported based on the right understanding of factor endowment in the country.
However, as discussed, factor endowment would change with economic growth anddevelopment change. This is why labor-using hand loom with Jacquard was chosen in the
Phases I and II and labor-saving power-loom was selected in Phase III. Such a dynamic

26

perspective could be helpful in further understanding Japan’s catch-up process as well as inplanning effective development strategies for contemporary developing economies.

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TABLE 1
DIFFUSION OF JACQUARD, 1886, 1891, 1895
1886
3,615
400
11.0
-

Total number of looms
Number of looms with Jacquard
Percentage of looms with Jacquard
Total number of looms used for figured fabrics
Percentage of looms with Jacquard used
for figured fabrics

1891
5,241
800
15.2
-

1895
28,4217,000
24.6
14,80047.3

Source: Maeda (1960, p. 105, 167).

TABLE 2
NUMBER OF CONTRACTOR-CUM-MERCHANTS (CCM)
AND OUT-WEAVERS, SELECTED YEARS
Number of
Out-weavers
3,914
4,886
5,790
7,770
8,886
7,228
10,545
10,202

Number of CCM
1905
1907
1909
1911
1913
1915
1917
1919

100
134
205
295
198
166
249

Source: Kyoto Prefecture (selected years).

36

Out-weavers
per CCM
39.1
36.5
28.2
26.3
36.5
56.7
41.0

TABLE 3
CHANGES IN THE SIZE OF THE SEVEN LARGEST FACTORIES, 1904, 1907, 1916
1904
Year Established

1889
1898
1893
1897
1891
1895
1890

1907

1916

Main
Product isFiguredFabricNo. of Hand
Looms (%
Unused)No. of Powerlooms(% Unused)

No. of Workers(% Female)

Main
Product isFiguredFabricNo. of Workers(% Female)

Main
Product isFiguredFabricNo. of Workers(% Female)

No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No

100 (45.0)00050 (56.0)
52 (32.7)
0288 (27.4)
508 (9.4)
48 (27.1)
77 (35.1)
00
40 (12.5)633 (80.8)
410 (86.5)
65 (87.6)
108 (86.1)
99 (90.0)37 (40.5)
74 (93.2)

No
No
No
No
No
No

615 (74.4)
466 (86.4)
157 (92.3)
141 (94.3)
71 (33.8)
85 (92.9)

No
No
No
No
No
No

1,059 (70.1)
91 (73.6)403 (94.0)
37 (91.8)
88 (20.4)
80 (87.5)

Source: Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau (1905, pp. 43–44), for data on the number of looms and main products; Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce(1906, pp. 126–128), for year of establishment; and information about main product, number of workers, and share of female workers in 1907 and1916 is from Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (1909) and (1918), respectively.

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TABLE 4
NUMBER OF FACTORIES USING POWER-LOOMS, BY PRODUCT, 1920
Number offactories

Fabrics for domestic market

72

Number of
power-looms
made of woodand iron
461

Number of
power-looms
made of iron

Total

109

570

Fabrics for export

19

214

2,207

2,421

Other fabrics

5

161

192

353

Source: Nishijin Textile Association (1920, p. 8).
Note: Fabrics for the domestic market include omeshi crepe and silk linings; fabrics for export arecomprised of ‘silk fabrics for export’ and ‘cotton fabrics for export’ in the original source.
‘Ribbons’ are included in other fabrics.

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TABLE 5
NUMBER OF NEWLY-EQUIPPED POWER-LOOMS IN NISHIJIN, 1921
Total Numberof Looms

Numberof Narrowwidth Looms

Power-looms made of wood & iron

287

257

20

Power-looms made of iron

257

124

15

Numberof Suppliersof Looms

Source: Nishijin Textile Association (1921, p. 8).
Note: Two out of the 15 suppliers of power-looms made of iron were foreign companies.

TABLE 6
NUMBER OF OUT-WEAVING HOUSEHOLDS IN NISHIJINBY OWNERSHIP OF LOOMS, 1933
No. of Looms Purchased

No. of Looms Rented from CCM

1

2

3+

1

2

3+

Handlooms

1,053

960

311

1,070

746

197

Power-looms

271

307

224

58

29

15

Source: Kyoto Prefecture (1934, p. 13).
Notes: According to the same source, the total number of out-weaving households was 4,937 in 1933.
The question was multiple answer type, allowing ownership and renting simultaneously.

39

FIGURE 1
LOGARITHM OF INDEXES OF PRODUCTION, NUMBER OF ENTERPRISES,ENTERPRISE SIZE IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF LOOMS, WORKER-LOOM RATIO,
AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN NISHIJIN, 1887–1927(THREE-YEAR AVERAGE, 1899=100)
Sources: Maeda (1960) is used for data of production, number of enterprises, and number of looms.
Data on the number of workers from 1886 to 1911, from 1912 to 1920, and from 1920 to1928 are from Kyoto Prefectural Library and Archives (1970), Kyoto Prefecture (every year),and Kyoto Prefectural Library and Archives (1970), respectively.
Notes: Value of production is deflated by ‘Textile price index’ from Ohkawa et al. (1967), pp. 192–
193. Enterprise size is calculated by dividing the number of looms by the number ofenterprises. I obtained labor productivity by dividing the real value of production by the
number of workers. All indexes are set to 100 in 1899.

40

FIGURE 2
CHANGES IN WORKER-LOOM RATIO BY PRODUCTION ORGANIZATION (L/K)
Sources: L or number of workers and K or average number of looms are from Maeda (1960), while L
and K for factories, family enterprises, and out-weavers are from Kyoto Prefecture (all years).

41

FIGURE 3
PROPORTION OF FEMALE WORKERS BY PRODUCTION ORGANIZATIONIN NISHIJIN, 1887-1898 AND 1905-1920 (%)
Sources: Data for average_1 are from Maeda (1960). Data for factories, out-weavers,
and average_2 are from Kyoto Prefecture (all years).
Note: Other enterprises is the total of factories and family enterprises

42

FIGURE 4
CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF ENTERPRISES BY PRODUCTIONORGANIZATION, 1887-1929 (N)Sources: Data for the total number of all enterprises, number of out-weavers, and other enterprises arefrom Maeda (1960). Data for family enterprises and factories are the same as Figure 2. The
number of factories in 1929 is from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (1931), in which
all workshops with more than 10 workers were surveyed.
Note: The number of family enterprises in 1929 is the difference in the number of other enterprises
from the number of factories in the same year.

43

FIGURE 5
DIVISION OF LABOR AMONG CONTRACTOR-CUM-MERCHANTS (CCM), OUTWEAVERS, AND OTHER ENTERPRISES
Notes: I simplified the original figure ‘The organization of Nishijin weaving industry) in Honjo(1914) for readers’ convenience.

44

FIGURE 6
CHANGES IN AVERAGE NUMBER OF LOOMS PER ENTERPRISEBY PRODUCTION ORGANIZATION (K/N)
Sources: Data for the number of factories and power-looms from 1887 to 1929 are from Kyoto
Prefecture (all years). Other data regarding the number of looms and other production
organizations are from Kyoto Prefecture (all years) and Honjo (1914), respectively.

45

FIGURE 7ADOPTION RATE OF POWER-LOOMS BY PRODUCTION ORGANIZATION (%)
Sources: Data for the number of factories and power-looms from 1887 to 1929 are from Kyoto
Prefecture (all years). Other data regarding the number of looms and other production
organizations are from Kyoto Prefecture (all years) and Honjo (1914), respectively.

46

FIGURE 8
CHANGES IN THE REAL VALUE OF PRODUCTION BY PRODUCT,
1905-1920 (IN MILLION YEN)
Sources: Otsuki ed. (1939)
Notes: Value of production is deflated by ‘Textile price index’ from Ohkawa et al. (1967), pp. 192–
193.

47

40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
(10-15)(16-20)(21-50)(51+)(10-15)(16-20)1907(21-50)

(51+)

1916
Figured fabrics

Non-figured fabrics

FIGURE 9
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF FACTORIES IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF WORKERS AND
PRODUCTION OF FIGURED AND NON-FIGURED FABRICS, 1907 AND 1916
Sources: Data in 1907 and 1916 are from the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (1909) and(1918), respectively.

48