FOCUS ASIA-PACIFICAPRIL 2010 VOLUME 59

Focus
Asia-PacificNewsletter of the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center (HURIGHTS OSAKA)

March 2012 Vol. 67

Contents
Central Asia: Censorship and Control of theInternet and Other New MediaThis is a summary of a briefing report
prepared by several NGOs on the recent
developments in Central Asia that appear
to be aimed at controlling the internet andthe access of people to information.
- Brigitte Dufour and Farid Tuhbatullin on
behalf of International Partnership for
Human Rights, Turkmen Initiative for
Human Rights and Other Partner
Organizations
Page 2
Freedom of Information in the PacificThis is an overview of the situation in the
Pacific regarding freedom of information.
It is an update on the efforts in several
Pacific Island countries on the adoption ofpolicy or law on freedom of information.
- HURIGHTS OSAKA
Page 6
Human Trafficking in the Mekong Region: One
Response to the Problem
This article explains the programs of theUnited Nations Inter-Agency Project on
Human Trafficking (UNIAP) that focus on
the Greater Mekong Subregion.
- Matthew Friedman
Page 9Human Rights and Development in ASEAN
This is a report on the conclusions andrecommendations of the Workshop on
Human Rights and Development in
ASEAN.
- Working Group for an ASEAN Human
Rights Mechanism
Page 13

Editorial

OnlineIn 1948, the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights must have believed that information andcommunication technology would develop to an almost
unimaginable degree that they saw the need to adopt a futureoriented clause in Article 19. The clause “to seek, receive andimpart information and ideas through any media andregardless of frontiers” points to the current digital
information and communication technology’s still to-beimagined impact on the whole wide world. Current
experiences show that this medium is definitely able to assist
people “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas ...
regardless of [physical and digital] frontiers.”
But the very foresightedness of Article 19 is now the worry ofsome governments. Online information and ideas are now
seen as threat to national security, instead of fulfillment of theright declared in Article 19. There are governmental attempts
at stifling access to online information, or to express ideas
online. These attempts are a throwback to the period of
human rights repression during the Cold War era. But whether
such attempts would succeed is highly doubtful considering
the varied uses of online information and the strong support
for online media from the people.
National security has to be properly defined in order to avoid
human rights repression. In the meantime, the development ofdigital technology is unstoppable due to people’sunquenchable thirst for information available online. What isonline is now a need, as much as a right.

1

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFICMARCH 2012 VOLUME 67

Central Asia: Censorship and Control of the Internet
and Other New Media 1
Brigitte Dufour and Farid Tuhbatullin on behalf of International Partnership for Human Rights, Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights and Other Partner Organizations

Authorities in Central Asian
countries in the former
Soviet Union closely monitor
and restrict the use of theinternetandothercommunications technologies,
filter and block access toundesirable online content, andintimidate and put pressure on
websites and internet users who
publish or share informationthat is critical of official
policies. The authorities of thesecountries have sought to justify
their repressive approach to theinternet and other new media
w i t h t h e fi g h t a g a i n s t"extremism" and other vaguely
defined threats to national"security" and "stability".
However, in reality, this fight isused as a pretext for
implementing measures to stifle
free speech and help preserve
the governments' grip on power.
Developments at the Regional
Level
Recently, several joint initiatives
have been made by Central
Asian and neighboring countries
to regulate the internet for thestated purpose of countering"extremism", "terrorism" andother vaguely defined threats tonational security. These steps
appear to reflect growing fearon the part of the authorities ofthese countries that the internet
may be used to scrutinize theconduct of those in power andmobilize opposition.

The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), an
organization founded in 2001
by China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan andU z b e k i s t a n t o c o u n t e ra c t"terrorism", "separatism" and"extremism", has recently paid
increasing attention top e rc e ive d o n l i n e s e c u r i t ythreats. At a SCO summit heldin June 2011 draft “Rules ofc o n d u c t i n t h e fi e l d o fsafeguarding international
information security” wereadopted.2 In a joint letter dated
12 September 2011, thePermanent Representatives tothe United Nations (UN) of
China, Russia, Tajikistan andUzbekistan proposed that thesame rules be endorsed by the
UN General Assembly in theform of a resolution.3
The stated purpose of the draft
code of conduct is to enhancecooperation among states inaddressing "the common threats
and challenges in theinformation space". By adopting
it, states would undertake,among others, to cooperate in"curbing the dissemination of
information that incites
terrorism, secessionism or
extremism or that undermines
other countries' political,
economic and social stability, as
well as their spiritual andcultural environment."4"Online threats" are also being
dealt with in the framework of
the Collective Security Treaty

2

Organization (CSTO), a military
cooperation body consisting of
Russia, Armenia, Belarus,
K a z a k h s t a n , Ky r g y z s t a n ,Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
According to media reports,
efforts are under way in thisorganization to create amechanism to control social
networks for the purpose of
preventing "extremist" actions in
the form of mass riots, such as
those seen in Tunisia and Egypt
in early 2011.5
In connection with a meeting in
Minsk in September 2011, thegeneral prosecutors from Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan
publicly defended the need tocontrol the use of social
networks, as well as the internet
more generally. Kazakhstani
General Prosecutor Ashad
Daulbaev was quoted as sayingthat this is "a question of the
future" and that states "should
jointly counteract this evil",
obviously referring to"extremism" in the internet.
According to him, the Russianlanguage part of the internet
alone has "hundreds of sites that
instigate extremism andterrorism.6
The Representative on Freedomof the Media of theOrganization for Security andCo-operation in Europe (OSCE),
Ms. Dunja Mijatovi, has
expressed concern that
initiatives such as the SCO andCSTO "endanger freedom of
expression" and "risk erecting

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
barriers" to the free flow of
information and ideas.7 She
noted that they rely on broadand vague definitions of terms
such as "extremism", as isalready the case with thenational laws in the countries
behind them.8
International experts haveemphasized that restrictions
relating to internet use are only
permissible if they meet thestrict requirements set out byinternational law provisions
protecting freedom of
expression (in particular article
19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights).
Developments in Three Central
Asian Countries
In spite of its proclaimed
commitment to promoting
information technology, thegovernment of Kazakhstan has
created different mechanisms to
m o n i t o r a n d fi l t e r o n l i n ematerial. Access is regularly
blocked to websites that contain
information that shows those inpower in a bad light. As of
October 2011, more than one
hundred websites had been
blocked for allegedly containing"extremist" propaganda, among
them the popular blog
community Live Journal. The
online video portal stan.kz,
which has provided
independent coverage of the oilworkers strike that is currently
under way in the country, hasbeen sued by authorities forallegedly violating health andsafety regulations. Its journalists
have reported intimidation andtwo of them were brutally
attacked in October 2011. The
online news outlet guljan.org,
which reports on corruption
and other misconduct involving
o f fi c i a l fi g u r e s , h a s b e e n

MARCH 2012 VOLUME 67
subjected to invasive cyberattacks and one of its reporters
was recently convicted on
criminal defamation charges.
In March 2010, the head of
K a z a k h s t a n ’s
StateCommunications Agency
informed members ofparliament that a new “centerfor computer incidents” hadbeen set up to review andcompile blacklists of“destructive” websites.9 While
the official referred to concerns
about “political and religious
extremism,” no details havebeen made public about how
the work of this center is carriedout, to whom it is accountable
or on what grounds websites
are singled out for review. Civil
society activists have expressed
concern that the center may betasked to censor websites that
do not please the authorities.10
An existing presidential Security
Council has already been
regularly compiling lists ofwebsites that should beblocked.
Turkmenistan is one of theworld's most hostile countries
for internet users, with its
monopoly state-run provider
offering only a highly censoredversion of the internet. All
online activities in internet cafes
are recorded, while rates forprivate internet connections
remain excessively high. Newr e p r e s s ive m e a s u r e s h ave
followed the July 2011
explosions at an ammunition
depot in Abadan, whose
destructive impact theauthorities wanted to hide.
Security services have tried to
track down internet and cell
phone users suspected ofreporting on the accident to theoutside world; the website ofAustria-based Turkmen Initiativefor Human Rights was hacked

3

after it published a set of stories
about the explosions; and aRadio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
correspondent who blogged
about the events was
imprisoned on trumped-up
charges (even if lateramnestied).
While official media initiallydid not report anything about
the Abadan events, and foreignbased internet sites thatprovided coverage about themwere not accessible in
Turkmenistan, many residents
received information about theblasts and their impact throughsatellite TV channels. Suchchannels are among the few
remaining means for obtaining
information that is independentof official propaganda inside thecountry. In what appeared to be
an attempt to choke off also thissource of information, thepresident issued an order inAugust 2011 to dismantle
private satellite dishes because
they allegedly “spoil theappearance” of residentialbuildings.11 A similar campaign
was initiated in 2008, but
gradually subsided.
A s i d e f r o m Tu r k m e n i s t a n ,Uzbekistan is the mostrepressive country for internet
users in the former Soviet
Union. It is characterized by apervasive regime of online
control and censorship: material
that does not please authorities
is systematically filtered andblocked. Email and cell phonecorrespondence by "suspicious"
individuals is subject tosurveillance, and participants inonline discussions on politicallycharged issues risk facingharassment, as did a number ofarbuz.com forum users, whowere arrested in early 2011. The
recent launch of a new social
networking site by the state

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFC
telecom monopoly has raised
concerns about growing control
in this area of the internet.
Internet users who openly speak
up on social problems arehighly vulnerable tointimidation and harassment.
Recent victims include two
women human rights defenders
who published online articles
about shortcomings in waste
management, the care of oldpeople, as well as theimplementation of a reform topromote non-cash transactions.
In a step that appeared aimed at
muzzling online debate oninconvenient issues, a new
governmental oversight bodywas set up in August 2011. This”committee of experts” wascharged with tracking downmaterial distributed on theinternet, satellite channels andother media resources that doesnot “correspond to therequirements of the law”, has a“destructive and negative”
impact on the “social
conscience of citizens” orundermines “national cultural
traditions and heritage”. It wasgiven powers to identify andpropose measures to address
the “violations” it identifies, aswell as to elaborate new medial e g i s l a t i o n . 1 2 Th e b r o a d l yworded mandate of this bodymakes it possible for it to single
out any internet material that
does not please the authorities
for control and sanction.
Recommendations
The
followingarerecommendations to theauthorities of Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan:a. R e s p e c t f r e e d o m o f
expression in the internet andother new media and refrainfrom imposing any

MARCH 2012 VOLUME 67
restrictions on the use of
these media - by law or in
p ra c t i c e - t h a t a r e n o t
consistent with the strict
requirements of internationalh u m a n r i g h t s l a w, i nparticular article 19 of theInternational Covenant for
Civil and Political Rights.
b. Do not misuse national
security concerns to restrict
the use of the internet orother new communications
technologies, keeping in
mind that restrictions onthese gro u n d s o n l y a r epermissible in exceptional
circumstances and if they are
shown to be a necessary andproportionate response to a
direct and imminent threat ofviolence.13
c. Refrain from systematic
fi l t e r i n g , c e n s o r i n g o r
blocking of online content,
and do not restrict access toonline content simply
because it contains
information that authorities
do not like or agree with.
d. Ensure that any measure toprevent access to online
content deemed illegal isstrictly limited to that specificcontent. The measure mustalso be fully consistent withinternational human rights
standards, proven to beabsolutely necessary, andsanctioned through a court
decision, which provides
justification for the measureand is subject to appeal.
e. P u t a n e n d t o e x i s t i n g
s ch e m e s f o r s y s t e m a t i cmonitoring of email andother online communication,
tapping of phone
conversations of journalists,
human rights defenders orothers known to be critical of
authorities, as well as

4

surveillance of the activitiesof visitors to internet cafes.
f. As a matter of priority, takeeffective measures to promote
u n ive r s a l a c c e s s t o t h einternet, ensuring that internet
access is widely available,
accessible and affordable tothe population.14
g. Do not subject internet orotherelectronic
communications service
providers to strict licensing
regimesorotherrequirements that are notcompatible with international
freedom of expression
standards, and promote freecompetition in this area;
h. Implement recommendations
relating to freedom of
expression and the use of theinternet and other new media
made by the UN Special
Rapporteur on Freedom ofExpression, the OSCE
Representative on theFreedom of the Media, as
well as other UN and OSCE
human rights bodies.
Thefollowingarerecommendations to
i n t e r n a t i o n a ltelecommunications
companies:
a. U p h o l d i n t e r n a t i o n a lstandards on freedom ofe x p r e s s i o n wh e n d o i n gbusiness in the Central Asian
countries and act with due
diligence to avoid infringing
protected rights in any way.15
b. Provide full transparency oncompany policies and termsof service in Central Asian
countries, implement ethicalcodes of conduct, and seek
advice from international
human rights bodies whenrelevant.

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFICMARCH 2012 VOLUME 67

Brigitte Dufour is the Director of
the International Partnership for
Human Rights, while Farid
Tuhbatullin is the Chairperson of
the Turkmen Initiative for
Human Rights.
For further information, pleasecontact: International
Partnership for Human Rights,
Blvd. Bischoffsheim 11, 8thFloor 1000 Brussels, Belgium;
ph (32 475) 39 2121; e-mail:
IPHR@IPHRonline.org;
www.IPHRonline.org; and the
Turkmen Initiative for Human
Rights (TIHR), P.O. Box 13,
A-1016 Vienna, Austria; e-mail:turkmen.initiative@gmail.com;
www.chrono-tm.org.

Endnotes
1 This is an edited short version
of a briefing paper jointly
published by the International
Partnership for Human Rights(IPHR), the Netherlands
Helsinki Committee,
Kazakhstan International
Bureau for Human Rights andRule of Law, Turkmen Initiativefor Human Rights (TIHR) andthe Initiative Group of
Independent Human Rights
Defenders of Uzbekistan inNovember 2011. The full reportis available at websites of IPHR
and
TIHR,
at
w w w. i p h r o n l i n e . o r g /ca_internet_20111128_e.html,
as well as www.chrono-tm.org/
en/archives/207.
2 Russian Embassy in the United
Kingdom, "Russia's approaches
to cooperation in the sphere ofinternational information
security," 28 October 2010, at
www.rusemb.org.uk/press/297(inRussianatwww.rus.rusemb.org.uk/press/
168).
3 Letter dated 12 September
2011 from the Permanent
Representatives of China, the

4
5

6

7

8
9

Russian Federation, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan to the United
Nations addressed to theSecretary-General. Available at
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
blog.internetgovernance.org/
pdf/UN-infosec-code.pdf (inRussianatwww.rus.rusemb.org.uk/data/
doc/internationalcoderus.pdf).
Ibid.
Izvestia, «ODKB voz'metsja za
social'nye seti» ("CSTO takes
on social networks"),
12.08.2011, www.izvestia.ru/
news/500269; The Moscow
News, "CSTO wants to monitor
the internet to prevent a repeato f A ra b r e vo l u t i o n s , " 1 3
September 2011, at http://
themoscownews.com/society/20110913/189040987.html;
R a d i o Fr e e E u r o p e / R a d i oLiberty, "Russian-Led Security
Body To Monitor Social MediaIn Wake Of Arab Spring," 15September 2011, at
w w w. r f e r l . o r g / c o n t e n t /russian_led_security_body_csto_to_monitor_social_media_in_
wake_of_arab_spring/24329629.html.
Lenta.ru, «Jurij Chajka
p o t r e b ova l k o n t r o l j a n a dsocsetjami» ("Yuri Chaika
demands control of social
networks"), 14.09.2011, http://
lenta.ru/news/2011/09/14/
chaika/.
“Proposals to regulate Internet
could threaten freedom of
expression, warns OSCE media
freedom representative,” 28
September 2011, at
www.osce.org/fom/83112 (inRussian at www.osce.org/ru/
fom/83135).
Ibid.
C e n t e r f o r Jo u r n a l i s m i n
Extreme Situations, Weekly
Bulletin of Events in CIS
Countries, 23 February – 1
March 2010, at www.cjes.ru/
b u l l e t i n s / ?
bid=3744&country=SNG&lang=eng&PHPSESSID=3278f0f7cd
fce970184b4058459938e7;5Committee to Protect
Journalists, “Disdaining Press
Freedom, Kazakhstan
U n d e r m i n e s O S C E ,” 1 4
September 2010, at
www.cpj.org/reports/2010/09/
disdaining-press-freedomkazakhstan-underminesosc.php.
10 R a d i o Fr e e E u r o p e / R a d i o
L i b e r t y, « V K a z a h s t a n e
sozdaetsja chernyj spisok«destruktivnyh» veb-sajtov» ("Ablack list of "destructive"
websites is being created in
Kazakhstan"), 1 March 2010, at
http://rus.azattyq.org/content/
Kuanyshbek_Esekeev/
1971451.html?page=2
11 S e e
Chronicles
ofTurkmenistan, “Wandering
Aerials,” 13 September 2011,at www.chrono-tm.org/en/
archives/60.
12 P o s t a n o v l e n i e K a b i n e t a
Ministrov Respubliki
Uzbekistan 5 avgusta 2011 g.
N 228 O dopolnitel'nyh merah
po sovershenstvovaniju sistemy
monitoringa v sfere massovyh
kommunikacij ("Decree No.
228 of the government of the
Republic of Uzbekistan on
additional measures toenhance the system ofmonitoring in the sphere ofmass communication, 5 August2011"), http://norma.uz/
p u b l i s h / d o c /text64561_o_dopolnitelnyh_m
erah_po_sovershenstvovaniyu_
sistemy_monitoringa_v_sfere_
massovyh_kommunikaciy.
13 See par. 73 in Report of theSpecial Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of
the right to freedom of opinionand expression, Frank La Rue(A/HRC/17/27), 16 May 2011,at www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/hrcouncil/docs/
17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf
14 Ibid., par. 85.
15 Ibid., par. 76.

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFC

MARCH 2012 VOLUME 67

Freedom of Information in the Pacific
HURIGHTS OSAKA

F

reedom of information isslowly getting support in
Pacific Islands countries as seenin the recent developments at
both Pacific and national levels.
But challenges remain, andcontinuing efforts by various
stakeholders are needed.
Pa c i fi c C o m m i t m e n t s t o
Accountability
andTransparency
Leaders of the Pacific Islands
Forum declared in 2000 in
Biketawa their "[C]ommitment
to good governance, which isthe exercise of authority(leadership) and interactions ina manner that is open,transparent, accountable,
participatory, consultative anddecisive but fair and equitable."1
In 2004, they adopted theForum Principles of Good
Leadership and Accountability2that commit Pacific Islands
F o r u m m e m b e r- s t a t e s t oprinciples on disclosure offraud, corruption and maladministration, 3 as well astransparency in budget-making,spending, auditing andreporting processes in thegovernment sector.4 Under theForum Principles, they also havea duty to ensure that theirpeople have ready "... access tothe administrative laws
governing access to government
benefits, the applications oftaxes, duties, and charges, etc."
and "executive discretion is at aminimum."5
In the same year, Pacific Islands
Forum Leaders invited"members to consider signingand ratifying the UN [United
Nations] Convention against
C o r r u p t i o n [ U N CAC ] t ostrengthen good governance inaccordance with the spirit of the
Biketawa Declaration."6 To date,seven Pacific Island countries
have ratified UNCAC, namely,
Papua New Guinea (PNG), Fiji,
Pa l a u , Va n u a t u , M a r s h a l l
Islands, Cook Islands andSolomon Islands.
Article 13 of the UNCAC
provides that each state-party"shall take appropriate
measures, within its means andin accordance with fundamental
principles of its domestic law, topromote the active participationof individuals and groups
outside the public sector, sucha s c i v i l s o c i e t y, n o n governmental organizations andc o m m u n i t y - b a s e dorganizations, in the preventiono f a n d t h e fi g h t a g a i n s t
corruption and to raise publicawareness regarding theexistence, causes and gravity ofand the threat posed bycorruption."7
Article 10 of UNCAC
s p e c i fi c a l l y p r o v i d e s f o rmeasures that would support
public participation, namely:(a) Enhancing the transparency ofand promoting thecontribution of the public todecision-making processes;(b) Ensuring that the public has
effective access to information;(c) U n d e r t a k i n g p u b l i c
information activities that
contribute to nontolerance ofcorruption, as well as public

6

education programmes,
including school anduniversity curricula;(d) Respecting, promoting andprotecting the freedom to seek,
receive, publish anddisseminate information
concerning corruption.

In 2005, the Pacific Islands
Forum Leaders endorsed thePacific Plan, which provides
guidance to the work of the
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat(PIFS) as well as of relevant
development partners. Under
Initiative 12.3 on enhancing
governance mechanisms,
Freedom of Information (FOI) is
identified as a milestone insupport of the Plan's Good
Governance Pillar.
A 2009 study,8 reviewing theimplementation of the Forum
Principles of Good Leadershipand Accountability, reveals
obstacles to the fulfillment ofthese commitments. The study
cites three major difficulties:
mindset influenced by colonial
past, poor communication
facilities, and outdated publicrecords management systems
and practices.9
Fr e e d o m o f I n f o r m a t i o n
Legislation in the Pacific
In 2008, Cook Islands became
the first Pacific Island country toenact freedom of information(FOI) legislation, with theenactment of the Official
Information Act. But other PacificIslands countries have not beenable to follow suit. The 2009
study mentioned earlier identifies
several probable reasons for theFOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
lack of progress on FOI
legislation, such as the:10
a. "ever-present debate over thesuitability of democracy andhuman rights as core values ofgovernance in Pacific Island
communities, many of which
are used to the exercise of
authority based on traditions
and privilege"b. "Commonwealth history ofclosed governments, asevidenced by the Official
Secrets Acts which were
imported from England during
the colonial period," andc. government resistance to"public transparency andaccountability and [the]downplay[ing of] the fact thatin a democracy information isa public good that is createdand held by public authorities
and functionaries to be used in
the public interest."

Nevertheless, there is a growing
commitment
among
governments in the PacificIslands to give more importanceto right to information andtranslate it into effective andreliable mechanisms that would
help improve their overall
governance.
Since 2007, the United Nations
Development Programme(UNDP) Pacific Centre has beenworking with partners such as
PIFS, the Commonwealth
Pacific Governance Facility,
Commonwealth Human Rights
Initiative and national partners
to implement a program on FOI
in the Pacific. Following a
regional UNDP-PIFS workshop
on FOI for Pacific policy-makers
in 2008, a number of PacificIsland countries started to more
actively work on FOI. In Nauru,
a national workshop in 2009 on
FOI resulted in the right toinformation being included as a
new human right in the
proposed amendments to the1968 Constitution, along with a

MARCH 2012 VOLUME 67
duty of the government to enact
a law to protect this right.
H o w e v e r, t h e p r o p o s e dconstitutional amendments did
not receive sufficient votes in
the 27 February 2011referendum. But other proposedconstitutional amendments(including the proposed FOI
provision) that did not needapproval by referendum might
still be adopted throughlegislation.
The governments of Palau andSolomon Islands also
respectively held national FOI
workshops in 2009 and madepublic commitments to enact
FOI legislation. These initiatives
also received support from
UNDP and/or PIFS.
The Constitution of Papua New
Guinea (PNG) has provisions on
Freedom of Information (S.51)
and the Freedom of Expression(S.46) that journalists utilize tobe "able to gather news of thefrustrations of the people andexpress those frustrations andconcerns in relation to issues
affecting PNG."11 PNG has yet
to enact an FOI law, but the
new National Anti-Corruption
Strategy launched in early 2012s p e c i fi c a l l y r e c o g n i z e senactment of an FOI law as apriority. In January 2012, PNG
Prime Minister O'Neillspecifically recognized the needfor an FOI law as one of his key
anti-corruption legislativereforms.12
Recent FOI Developments in
Tonga13
The government of Tonga,
through the Ministry ofInformation and with thesupport of the UNDP PacificCentre and the Commonwealth
Pacific Governance Facility,
began in October 2011 thedrafting of a new FOI policy. In
November 2011, when

7

launching the new Radio Mast
for the Tonga Broadcasting
Commission, Lord Prime
Minister Tu'ivakano highlighted
that a FOI policy would be an
important framework in theongoing development of theinformation infrastructure of
Tonga.
In early February 2012, thegovernment made available to
the general public a draft“Discussion Paper on the
Fr e e d o m o f I n f o r m a t i o n
Policy” (FOI Discussion Paper)to enable people to submit theirviews and input on the policy
considerations and guidelines
recommended by this FOI
Discussion Paper.
This FOI Discussion Paper setsout guiding principles for the
FOI Policy, with explanation ofprocedures for requesting andaccessing information, a set of
exemptions for non-disclosureof government information, andthe public's right to information
held by the government andp u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s . Th i s
document outlines expected
implementation costs once thepolicy is approved. In addition,
it discusses key issues forappeals process andindependent complaints
mechanisms for Tonga.
On 13 February 2012, thegovernment held a national
consultation on the FOI
D i s c u s s i o n Pa p e r. T h e
Chairperson of the Cabinet
Steering Committee for theFreedom of Information Policy,
Tongan Deputy Prime Minister
Samiu K. Vaipulu, stressed theg o v e r n m e n t ’s s t r o n gcommitment to have “a moreo p e n g o v e r n m e n t .” L a d y
Fusitu'a, former Minister for
Information
andCommunications as one of the
key Facilitators emphasized thatthe fundamental issues oflanguage and cultural identity

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFC
be addressed. "We are pleased
that [the] Government is giving
us this exercise, where we canparticipate in drafting [the]context of the Policy, with thevoices of our very community
who make up the very essenceof this policy, be[ing] heard and[their] views be[ing]considered."
The Acting Police Commissioner
explained that the Police
Ministry's information
disclosure policy involved theuse of public interest test to
determine whether or not adisclosure would be at theinterest of the government,
public or personal level, and inaccordance with the law.
Mr. Pesi Fonua, President of the
To n g a n M e d i a C o u n c i lreiterated that
[W]hen the government isdeciding what information
should be released and whatshould remain exempt, it
should always apply the'public interest' test. … 'Public
interest' basically refers to
information held bygovernment which is of suchimportance that it will affectthe decisions and day-to-day
lives of the Tongan people.

The Cabinet Steering Committee
for the Freedom of Information
Policy has adopted “the guiding
principle of maximum
disclosure” with exemptions
being harm-based and subject
to public interest test.
A
subsequent FOI legislation will
entrench the legal right toinformation for all Tongans.
Recent Developments in
Vanuatu
In 2011, the government of
Vanuatu created an Information
Committee, with the task ofdeveloping a media
development policy for thegovernment, including

MARCH 2012 VOLUME 67
formulating an FOI Bill. Thisinitiative indicated thecommitment of the government
to the fundamental aim ofdeveloping an information
disclosure policy that promoted
and enhanced the processes of
democracy and representative
government by increasing
access by the public toinformation. This Information
Committee was comprised ofrepresentatives from the Officeof the Prime Minister, theMinistry of Justice, theParliament of Vanuatu, theOmbudsman, civil society, andthe media.

FOI is a necessity, as observed
by a UNDP officer in the
Pacific:15

The planned FOI policy and law
will guide officials, as well as
the media, civil society and the
public, and provide a clear
framework and process foraccessing and disseminating
information. It will also guidethegovernment's
implementation of e-governanceand information management
systems.

HURIGHTS OSAKA appreciates
the substantive assistanceprovided by Ms. Charmaine
Rodrigues, the UNDP PacificRegional Legislative
Strengthening Expert, in the
preparation of this article.

A civil-society-drafted FOI billin 2006 did not move further
due to the need at that time tomake this proposal reflect local
conditions. This draft bill
nonetheless provided an
important starting point.

The right to know isfundamental to empowering
people to better exercise andprotect their human rights. As
such, the right to accessinformation underpins theMillennium Development
Goals because it recognisedthat without information
people will struggle to enjoy
their right to health services,education, a clean
environment and adequate
housing.

For further information, pleasecontact HURIGHTS OSAKA.

Endnotes
1

2

Final Note
The Leaders of Pacific Islands
countries have recognized theimportance of FOI in promoting
transparency and public
accountability, and thus address
the problem of corruption. The
Samoan Prime Minister, Hon.
Tuilaepa Lupesoliai Sailele
M a l i e l e g a o i , s p e c i fi c a l l yrecognized that "resources lostto corruption are resources lostto the poor... [that] slows the
progress towards theachievement of the Millennium
Development Goals."14"Biketawa" Declaration, PacificIslands Forum Leaders' Retreat,
31st Pacific Islands Forum, Biketawa, Republic of Kiribati, 28
October 2000.
Forum Principles of Good Leadership and Accountability, atwww.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/political-governance-security/goodgovernance/forum-principles-ofgood-leadership-accountability.html. The text of this paragraph isbased on Laura Halligan and
Claire Cronin, Status of the Right
to Information - The Pacific Islands of the Commonwealth(Delhi: Commonwealth Human
Rights Initiative, 2009) page 3.
Full report available atwww.humanrightsinitiative.org/p
ublications/rti/status_of_rti_in_pa
cific_island_of_cw.pdf.

(Continued on page 15)

8

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFICMARCH 2012 VOLUME 67

Human Trafficking in the Mekong Region:
One Response to the Problem
Matthew FriedmanHu m a n t r a f fi c k i n g –essentially the recruitment,
transport, receipt and harboringof people for the purpose of
exploiting their labor – affects
almost all parts of the world andi s w i d e l y b e l i e ve d t o b e
increasing in both scale andgravity. In the Asia-PacificRegion, the International Labour
Organization (ILO) estimatedthat 9.49 million people were inforced labor (2005), with asignificant proportion thought tobe in the Greater Mekong SubRegion (referred to as the
Mekong Region from this pointon), which includes Cambodia,
China, Lao PDR, Myanmar,
Thailand and Vietnam.
Although trafficking has existed
for centuries, the uneven effects
of globalization have, in recent
times, contributed to an
environment in which trafficking
has been able to flourish into ahighly profitable and generally
low-risk criminal business.
The Mekong Region comparedto many other parts of the worldcontains very diverse patterns ofhuman trafficking, e.g. internaland cross-border; highlyorganized and also small-scale;
sex and labor, through bothformal and informal recruitment
mechanisms; and involving thevictimization of men, women,boys, girls, and families. Thus,
within the Mekong Region,
there is not so much a single
pattern of trafficking in persons
as a range of different patterns,

with various victim and criminal
profiles.
Human Trafficking Myths andMisconceptions
Over the years, humant r a f fi c k i n g h a s b e c o m eincreasingly complex andsometimes confusing for many,
including those who work toaddress the problem as well as
those who fund the response.
There are several important
myths that have influenced ourc o l l e c t i v e a n t i - t r a f fi c k i n g
responses in Southeast Asia but,thanks to recent empiricalresearch, they have been shown
to be incorrect – based onassumptions or outdated data.
Some of the “busted” myths
include:• Myth: Trafficking is primarily
caused by poverty and alack of education.
Reality: Being at risk ofhuman trafficking is often
not as simple as poverty orlack of education, in termsof what motivates people tomigrate or look foropportunities to improvetheir lives. The common
assumptions often do not
fully apply in this region, or
perhaps others. The real risk
factors – inability to accessor afford formal migration
mechanisms, a desire toutilize education and skills
but no local opportunities to
do so, lack of citizenship, or

9inability to accessemergency medical loans or
quick money when family
members fall ill – need to be
examined and proven before
any intervention is designed.
• Myth: Large, organizedcriminal networks drive thehuman trafficking problem
in Southeast Asia.
Reality: Throughout much ofSoutheast Asia, humantrafficking criminal networks
are loosely organized, withoften difficult to trace
linkages. While larger-scaleorganized trafficking rings
certainly do exist in the
Mekong Region, moving
both sex and labor
trafficking victims, the vast
majority of networks that doexist are more typicallysmall-scale, loosely
connected,
andopportunistic.
• Myth: Human trafficking
relates mostly to women andgirls being exploited within
the sex industry.
Reality: A significant portionof trafficking is for the
purposes of labor
exploitation, victimizing
men, women, and children.
Trafficking is not only forsexual exploitation. Forced
l a b o r a n d s l av e r y - l i k epractices exist within anumber of labor settings
including exploitative
factories, domestic

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFC
s e r v i t u d e , fi s h e r i e s ,construction
andplantations. Despite this,some national laws inSoutheast Asia still limit thedefinition of trafficking to
women and children.
• Myth: If we could catch allof the ‘traffickers’ and put
them in jail, the problem
would go away.
Reality: Focusing mostly on
those who trick, deceive andtransport a person into an
exploitative situation will
only solve a portion of the
problem. To address the realdemand related to humantrafficking, the response has
to include more of anemphasis on actual
exploiters and enslavers –those who own and run theestablishments that enslave
trafficking victims, and who
make the most profits fromslave labor.
Lessons Learned
After years of anti-trafficking
programming in the Mekong
Region, some key lessons
learned have emerged that havehelped policy makers andpractitioners to better
understand the issue and what
is required to address it.
Asummary of some of the key
factors include:• Much of the trafficking in
the Mekong Region is forlabor exploitation. Countertrafficking efforts should
address both labor andsexual exploitation, with theunderstanding that this
exploitation makes victimsof human beings, whethermen, women, or children.
• Interventions should be
empirically based and

MARCH 2012 VOLUME 67
targeted at the most
exploitative destinations andthe most vulnerable
communities and victim
populations, rather thantaking a comprehensive andholistic approach that may
spread efforts and resources
too thin.
• Objective impact
assessments are needed toensure that interventions aretargeted and having theintended positive impacts ataddressing the problem.
• Exploitation
andenslavement should be ourtarget, recognizing that thetransportation in humant r a f fi c k i n g i s o f t e n aperipheral factor inSoutheast Asia andsometimes not a factor atall.
• Law enforcement should betargeted at those
perpetuating the trafficking
crime and all related crimes,withsentences
commensurate with thecrimes.
• Victim support should betailored to the needs of theindividual victim first andthe needs of the criminal
justice process (and anyothers) second.
UNIAP: One Response to the
Problem
The United Nations InterAgency Project on Human
Tr a f fi c k i n g ( U N I A P ) w a s
established in June 2000 to
facilitate a stronger and morecoordinated response to humantrafficking in the Mekong
Region. UNIAP is managed by aregional management office in
Bangkok, with country project
offices in the capitals of

10

Cambodia, China, Lao PDR,
M y a n m a r, T h a i l a n d a n dVietnam. The seven UNIAP
offices have a combined staff ofapproximately thirty-five.
Todate, UNIAP has had threephases:• UNIAP Phase I (2000-2003):
This phase concentrated on
creating linkages between
the different organizations
i nvo l ve d i n c o m b a t i n g
trafficking, using a broad
and responsive mandate toaddress emerging issues,and supporting new smallscale pilot counter humantrafficking initiatives.
• UNIAP
Phase
II(2003-2006): In this phase
UNIAP facilitated thedevelopment of the
COMMIT MOU – a regional
Memorandumof
Understanding to combat
human trafficking between
the six governments of the
M e k o n g R e g i o n . Th e
COMMIT process provides
an overall multi-sectoral
f ra m e wo r k f o r c o u n t e r
trafficking work at theregional level. (COMMIT is
described in detail in thesection that follows.)• UNIAPPhase
III( 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 1 3 ) : U N I A P ’s
current phase focuses on
increasing its technicalservice provider role to thecounter-trafficking sector, as
well as facilitating theove ra l l t ra n s i t i o n f r o mpolicy development to antitrafficking action on the
ground. Key functions of
UNIAP in Phase III can besummarized as:○ Inter-agency strategic andoperational coordination,at the regional andnational levels;

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC○ Information sharing andanalysis on trafficking
patterns, trends, andprograms;○ High-quality training andtechnical assistance invarious anti-trafficking
interventions – togovernment agencies,
United Nations (UN)partners,
nongovernmental organization(NGO) and communitybased organization (CBO)
partners; and○ Supporttothedevelopment and pilotingof innovative responses to
new and emerging issues.
UNIAP’s overall goal is to makea tangible and sustained impact
on human trafficking in the
Greater Mekong Sub-region
through
continued
advancement of a morecohesive, strategic and incisive
response. UNIAP’s modus
operandi is to be serviceoriented and responsive to
identified gaps, needs, anddevelopment opportunities
within the human trafficking
sector. The four main objectivesof UNIAP’s Phase III are
oriented towards key
constituencies:• Objective 1: Services togovernments: To support
governments in theinstitutionalization ofeffective multi-sectorala p p r o a ch e s t o c o m b a t
trafficking, primarily throughsupport to the COMMIT
Process in the role ofSecretariat;• Objective 2: Services to UN
partners: To maximize theUN’s contribution to theoverall counter-trafficking

MARCH 2012 VOLUME 67
response, including the
COMMIT Process;• Objective 3: Services to thebroader counter-trafficking
sector, including donors: To
facilitate optimal allocationand targeting of countert r a f fi c k i n g r e s o u r c e s ,particularly throughinformation and datacollection, analysis, anddissemination; and• Objective 4: Services to thebroader counter-trafficking
sector, including donors: To
play a catalytic role in the
counter-trafficking responseby identifying andsupporting special projects
to address new andemerging issues in humantrafficking.
To achieve these objectives,
UNIAP has six key initiatives
that are managed in service tothe anti-trafficking community
in the Mekong Region.
1. C o o r d i n a t e d M e k o n g
Ministerial Initiative Against
Tr a f fi c k i n g ( C O M M I T )Process: As Secretariat to
the COMMIT Process,
UNIAP provides on-going
technical and financial
assistance to this interg ove r n m e n t a l a l l i a n c e .
UNIAP also supports themonitoring
and
implementation of programs
and activities under the
COMMIT Sub-regional
Plans of Action (COMMIT
SPAs), working closely with
UN and civil society
partners to align additional
technical and financial
resources.
2. S t r a t e g i c I n f o r m a t i o n
Response Network (SIREN):
The aim of SIREN is top r o d u c e h i g h - q u a l i t y,

11

reliable research and caseanalyses to the antitrafficking sector, throughvarious formats, including
events and special reporting(in all six Mekong languages
plus English). UNIAP’s
strategic surveillance anddata collection systems aredesigned to inform, monitor,
and increase theeffectiveness andresponsiveness of antitrafficking interventions
region-wide.
3. Support to Under-served
Victim Populations: Working
closely with grassroots
organizations through theprovision of financial andtechnical support as well as
cross-border networking,
UNIAP mobilizes rapid andeffective assistance forunder-served victims ofcross-border trafficking, forexample, Cambodian men
and boys trafficked onto
Thai fishing boats.
4. Worst Offenders Project:
UNIAP and its partners(primarily police and selectNGOs) identify and tracksome of the worst humant r a f fi c k i n g o f f e n d e r s ,exploiters, employers andbrokers in the Mekong
Region, to assist law
enforcement withinvestigating trafficking
cases, developing cases for
successful prosecution in
the courts, and securing
compensation for victims.
Support to government law
enforcement links withCOMMIT as well.
5. Shelter Self-Improvement
Project: With a host of
government and nongovernment partners,
UNIAP is providing targetedFOCUS ASIA-PACIFC
technical, financial, andnetworking assistance tobuild the capacity of shelter
managers, counselors, andother personnel -- helping
them strengthen service
referral networks andimprove the conditions ofshelters and transit centersfor victims of trafficking.
Support to governmentsocial welfare ministries
links with COMMIT as well.
6. Ethics and Human Rights in
Counter-Trafficking:In
September 2008, UNIAP
launched a Guide to Ethics
and Human Rights in
C o u n t e r- Tra f fi ck i n g a n d
associated training package.
Since then, ethics trainings
have been provided topolice, journalists, victims
service providers,
researchers,
andprogrammers to help them
integrate ethical practices
into their day-to-day humantrafficking research andprogramming.
The first three programs listed
above – COMMIT, SIREN, andSupport to Under-served Victim
Populations, are UNIAP’s threemain programs and constituteover 80% of UNIAP’s total
program efforts. They support
and feed into each other.
As an inter-agency project,
UNIAP
works
with
governments, UN, and civilsociety partners at all levels –regional, national andcommunity. UNIAP has over
two hundred fifty local andinternational partners acrossseven countries, including wellknown international partners
ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UNDP,UNESCAP, UNESCO, UNFPA,UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM,
and UNODC within the UN;

MARCH 2012 VOLUME 67
and ARTIP, ECPAT, Oxfam
International, Save the Children,
SEARCH, and World Vision fromthe NGO sector.
Collaboration in Action
For anti-human trafficking efforts
to be truly effective, there has tobe good communication andcoordination among thepartners. This ensures that theroles and responsibilities ofgovernment, UN and civilsociety partners are harmonized
in a way that complements eachother. As an example, over the
past four years, there have been
numerous cases of Cambodians
jumping off of fishing boats that
had slave-like conditions andending up in Malaysia. The
conditions on these boats as
described by the victims haveoften been brutal, with extreme
working and living conditions.
Victims were forced to work up
to nineteen hours a day, sevendays a week. They ate nothing
but fish and rice twice a day for
years. If the victim got sick,injured or if he complained,
reports have indicated that
captains would sometimes
throw the worker off the boat
into the ocean. He was beaten if
he did not work hard enough, oreven if he did. Days went by
with only a few hours of sleep.
To keep the person working,drugs were often provided withstrong stimulants that destroyed
the victims' health.
When cases like this werereported, the counter-trafficking
community in the Mekong
Region regularly stepped into
action. Cases would often bereported by a local CambodianNGO, such as the Legal Support
f o r C h i l d r e n a n d Wo m e n(LSCW), the Cambodian League
for Promotion and Defense of

12

Human Rights (LICADHO) or
the Cambodian Human Rights
and Development Association(ADHOC), who had received
the request for assistance fromfamily members, themselves
having received a desperate
plea for assistance from thevictim who had got hold of aphone while stranded inIndonesia or Malaysia. Once
there, the victims might havehidden away from the boat or
still be in the harme nv i r o n m e n t . Th e N G O
meanwhile would alert UNIAP
and other partners such as IOM
about the cases. They would
then be working together, andwith government partners, suchas the Cambodian embassies inthe destination countries, aswell as victim service providers
at the destination. The victims
would be located andinterviewed to determine theirstatus as victims. Immediate
support would be provided andthe process of securing safe,
voluntary repatriation homewould be initiated by IOM andother civil society partners.
IOM, UNIAP and civil society
partners would work together toensure that the person was able
to return home with someresources and security. The
NGO community then would
help to provide job training, job
referrals and/or micro loans to
help these people get back on
their feet.
When partnerships like thiscome together in unison, theoutcome is that real people
receive the support they need tomove on with their lives. Further
collaboration is conducted withlaw enforcement in therespective countries to follow
up on the brokering networks(Continued on page 15)

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFICMARCH 2012 VOLUME 67

Human Rights and Development in ASEAN
Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights MechanismIn November 2010, theDepartment of Foreign Affairsof the Philippines and theWorking Group for an ASEAN
Human Rights Mechanism coorganized a Workshop on
Developing National Human
Rights Action Plans in ASEAN.
Some of the interventions in theworkshop delved on the more
apparent importance being
given to national development
plans, rather than on national
human rights action plans, due
to the limited resources of manyof the Member States of the
Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). The
discussions subsequentlyr e vo l ve d a r o u n d t h e l i n k
between human rights anddevelopment. Some participants
shared their experiences inapplying the human rights
based approach (HRBA) todevelopment. One of the key
recommendations of theworkshop was the holding of anactivity that would discuss therelationship of human rights anddevelopment and also further
discuss HRBA. Although HRBA
as a concept was not new, theworkshop participants
recognized the need for morediscussions on this approachthat was yet to be mainstreamed
i n g ove r n m e n t p l a n s a n doperations.
The 2012 Workshop
On 30-31 January 2012, therepresentatives of governments,
national human rights
institutions and nongovernmental organizations

within ASEAN countries alongwith representatives of theUnited Nations, international
civil society organizations, andinternational development
partners met in Bangkok to
discuss the issue of humanrights and development in
ASEAN during the Workshop on
Human
RightsandDevelopment in ASEAN. The
workshop had several sessions
focusing on the following
themes:a. Human Rights Frameworkand Human Rights-BasedApproach to Developmentb. Right to Development
c. Challenges to a Human
Rights-Based Approach to
Development
d. Application of a Human
Rights-Based Approach to
Development (Case Studies
from UNDP and thePhilippines)e. Special Topics on Human
Rights-Based Approach to
Development.
Th e y a r r iv e d a t a s e t o f
conclusions
andrecommendations, as presented
below.
Conclusions
The following are theConclusions of the workshop:
Recurring Themes and Notions
1. Though development isperceived and defined inmany ways, its description

13

found in the second
preambular paragraph of
the United Nations
Declaration on the Right toDevelopment (December1986) is particularly useful,...[D]evelopment is acomprehensive
economic, social,
cultural and politicalprocess, which aims attheconstant
improvement of thewell-being of the entire
population and of all
individuals on the basisof their active, free andmeaningful participationin development and in
the fair distribution ofb e n e fi t s r e s u l t i n gtherefrom.
2. The right to development
upholds the principles ofuniversality, indivisibility
and interrelatedness ofhuman rights. Civil andpolitical rights andeconomic, social andcultural rights must be
integrated.
3. Development should be
people-centered andtherefore communities andpeople should be defined as
active participants in theprocess.
4. H u m a n R i g h t s - B a s e dApproach (HRBA) to
Development requires
accountability at all levels
and stages of the process.
Transparency necessarily
requires the enjoyment of
the right to information.

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFC
5. Human rights are seen bothas a means and an end;
HRBA to Development
looks into both the process
and the outcome, withequal importance.
Development results will bemeaningful and sustainable
if the process to attain it isrights-based.
6. The essence of HRBA to
Developmentisempowerment. Importantquestions that must be
addressed include: What dothe community and people
themselves want?, Havetheir efforts on the groundbeen understood?, and,How meaningful is their
participation?
7. HRBA to Development also
focuses on the dynamics of
p o w e r, t h e p r o p e r
distribution of power, andtheconsequenttransformation ofrelationships. The rights
based approach creates
opportunities for those who
might otherwise be
excluded.
8. HRBA to Development
requires a shift in paradigm,
to see that people live inpoverty because they are
excluded. Policies may beredirected from fighting
poverty to fighting against
exclusion.
9. H R B A r e q u i r e s t h eunderstanding of therelationship between therights-holder and the dutybearer (State). Duty-bearers
ensure that the humanrights of the rights-holders
are respected, protected,
and fulfilled. This is not tosay, however, that the Stateis responsible for providing
everything; rather, the State
has the obligation to create

MARCH 2012 VOLUME 67
conditions that enable all
duty-bearers to uphold their
obligations.
10. Taking into consideration
the context in ASEAN,
HRBA to Development
should be developed
locally. Universal humanrights principles, namely:
equality, nondiscrimination,
participation, inclusion,a c c o u n t a b i l i t y,transparency, and the ruleof law, must be upheld.
Recommendations
The following are therecommendations of theworkshop:
1. A d v a n c e a c o m m o nunderstanding of HRBA
through human rights
education and training ofboth duty-bearers andrights-holders.
2. To enable a meaningful
participation by the people,
particularly
thedisadvantaged andmarginalized groups ofs o c i e t y, t h e i r r i g h t t oinformation, freedom of
expression and freedom ofassembly shall be upheld.
3. All development strategies
must include concretecommitments to respect,
protect and fulfil women's
rights and their actual andmeaningful participation
throughout
thedevelopment process.
4. The application of HRBA to
Development requires
cooperation. The Stateshould initiate andencourage partnership withand participation of thepeople.
5. Governments at all levels
should consider a rights-

14

based approach in theformulation, implementationand monitoring all
development plans,
programs and policies.
6. Encourage ASEAN Member
States to ratify theInternational Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights
and the International
Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.
7. For ASEAN to effectively
become a people-orientedorganization and to
implement the ASEAN
Community Blueprints witha rights-based approach, it
is recommended that
ASEAN complete soonest
the revision of Annex 2 of
the ASEAN Charter and
expedite the adoption of
the guidelines ofengagement of civil society
with ASEAN.
8. Adopt a transparent process
in the drafting of the ASEAN
Human Rights Declaration
for a meaningful
participation by the peoplesof ASEAN.
Th e Wo r k s h o p wa s c o organized and co-hosted by theWorking Group for an ASEAN
Human Rights Mechanism(Working Group) and theInternational Commission ofJurists (ICJ). It was attended byparticipants representing
ASEAN governments of Brunei,Indonesia, Malaysia, Lao P.D.R.,
Myanmar, the Philippines,
Th a i l a n d a n d Vi e t N a m ,Representatives to the ASEAN
Intergovernmental Commissionof Human Rights (AICHR) of
Brunei, Indonesia, Lao P.D.R.,
the Philippines, Thailand andViet Nam, the national humanrights institutions of Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Thailand,

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFICMARCH 2012 VOLUME 67

the ASEAN Secretariat, and civilsociety organizations fromaround the region. Also in
attendance were participantsfrom the United Nations,international civil society
organizations, and international
development partners.

For further information, pleasecontact: Ms. Ma. Kristina
Merginio, Communications
Officer, Working Group for an
ASEAN Human Rights
Mechanism, 20 Rockwell Drive,
Rockwell Center, Makati City
1200 Philippines; ph (632)8997691 loc. 2109; fax: (632)8994342;e-mail:mkmerginio@aseanhrmech.org;
www.aseanhrmech.org.

Freedom of Information

10 Ibid., page 81.

14 United(Continued from page 8)3

Principles 1 and 4, Forum Principles of Good Leadership, ibid.
4 Forum Principles of Accountability, ibid.
5 Principle 5, Forum Principles of
Accountability, ibid.
6 Forum Leaders Communiqué,
Thirty-Fifth Pacific Islands Forum, Apia, Samoa, 5-7 August
2004.
7 Article 13. Participation of society, United Nations Convention
against Corruption, United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/4, 31 October 2003.
8 Halligan and Cronin, op. cit.
9 Ibid., pages 79-80.

Human Trafficking in Mekong(Continued from page 12)

and exploiters in the case, todetermine what action can beundertaken with the evidence
provided by the victim towards
criminal justice.
Concluding Note
Collaboration is not a simple
thing. It is not something thatjust happens by bringing people
together. True collaboration isbuilt upon a foundation of trust
and a united sense of purpose.

11 Chronox Manek , "FOI in Papua

New Guinea - Challenges, and
the Way Forward," in Freedom ofInformation: The Right to Know
(Paris, UNESCO, 2011) page 40.
12 See Isaac Nicholas, Proposed
whistle-blower law revisited, at
http://malumnalu.blogspot.com/
2012/01/proposed-whistle-blow
er-law-revisited.html.
13 The text of this section is drawn
from "Tongan Government engages in National Consultation inits commitment to a Freedom ofInformation Policy," Tonga Government
Portal,www.pmo.gov.to/press-releases/3
364-tongan-government-engages-in-national-consultation-worksh
op-in-its-commitment-to-a-freedo
m-of-information-policy.

If one can develop feelings ofaccomplishment within acollaborative process, joint
ownership of a problem often
follows. With this ownership,
we tend to take care of theprocess and remain committed
to it. For this to happen, earlyand substantial involvement thatis positive, supportive andencourages initiative makes all
the difference. The process also
needs to take place at all levels:
between governments, UN andbilateral partners, NGOs and
CBOs to develop ac o m p r e h e n s ive , s u s t a i n e dresponse that caters to theneeds of the entire sector. When

15

Nations Development
Programme Pacific Centre, International Right to Know Day
highlights information forachievement of MDGs in the
P a c i fi c ,atwww.undppc.org.fj/pages.cfm/n
ewsroom/2010/international-rig
ht-know-day-highlights-importan
ce-of-information-achievementof-mdgs-pacific.html?printerfrien
dly=true.
15 Comments of Ms. Charmaine
Rodrigues, the UNDP PacificRegional Legislative Strengthening Expert, at the Right to Information Workshop organized by
the Media Association of Vanuatu (MAV) and Transparency
Vanuatu in Port Vila, ibid.

true collaboration is in place
1+1=11, not 2.
Mr. Matthew Friedman is theRegional Project Manager of theUnited Nations Inter-Agency
Project on Human Trafficking(UNIAP).
For further information, pleasecontact: Matthew Friedman,
UNIAP Regional Management
Office, United Nations Building
12th Floor, Rajdamnern Nok
Ave., Bangkok 10200; ph (662)
304 9100; fax (662) 280-0268;
e
m
a
i
l
:
matt.friedman@one.un.org;
www.no-trafficking.org.

HURIGHTS OSAKA Calendar
HURIGHTS OSAKA held a study meeting on the recent amendments to the Japanese immigration law
on 4 February 2012 during the One World Festival.

DE
AU
OSAKA

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PO

BUR
E

It also held an exhibit of photographs on international human rights issues taken by photojournalists
and on the 2011 earthquake-tsunami disaster in northeast Japan taken by residents of Sendai city. The
photo exhibit was held during 16-28 February 2012.

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HURIGHTS OSAKA, inspired by the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, formally opened in December 1994. lt has the following goals: 1) to promote human rights
in the Asia- Pacific region; 2) to convey Asia-Pacific perspectives on human rights to the international
community; 3) to ensure inclusion of human rights principles in Japanese international cooperative activities; and 4) to raise human rights awareness among the people in Japan in meeting its growing internationalization. In order to achieve these goals, HURIGHTS OSAKA has activities such as Information Handling, Research and Study, Education and Training, Publications, and Consultancy Services.
FOCUS Asia-Pacific is designed to highlight significant issues and activities relating to human rights in
the Asia-Pacific. Relevant information and articles can be sent to HURIGHTS OSAKA for inclusion in thenext editions of the newsletter.
FOCUS Asia-Pacific is edited by Osamu Shiraishi, Director of HURIGHTS OSAKA.
Sender: HURIGHTS OSAKA(Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center)
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