UK-Japan 21st Century Group 40th Annual Conference, January 2024
Chairmen’s Summary
The 40th Annual meeting of the UK-Japan 21st Century Group was held on 2-4 February at the
Hilton Hotel in Odawara. The meeting was chaired by Mr Seiji Kihara MP, Japanese CoChair, and the Rt Hon Lord Lansley, UK Co-Chair.
24 Japanese and 18 British participants included parliamentarians and senior representatives
from business, the media, academia, think tanks and the diplomatic service from bothcountries.
Tokyo Programme
A lunch for both British and Japanese participants was hosted by Her Excellency Ambassador
Julia Longbottom at the British Embassy on 1 February. She expressed sympathy for thoseaffected by the earthquake on the Noto peninsula on 1 January and noted the resilience ofJapan’s response which had earned respect in the UK and elsewhere. The Ambassador
underlined the growing pace of exchanges at all levels between the UK and Japan. She
stressed the value of the annual dialogue of the Group. The signature of the UK/Japan
Hiroshima Accord in 2023 had been foreshadowed in the Group’s discussions at its previous
conferences. In thanking her, the Group’s Co-Chairs noted that the 21st Century Group
continued to play a distinctive role in the increasingly strong UK/Japan partnership.
Call on the Prime Minister
The British participants, accompanied by Mr Kihara, called on Prime Minister Kishida on 1
February. The Prime Minister said his visit to the UK and the signing of the Hiroshima
Accord in 2023 marked a new chapter in UK-Japan relations. Japan and the UK had
developed partnerships in areas of next generation fighter technology, renewables, and semiconductor supply. Japan welcomed the prospect of UK accession to the CPTPP. Extending
and deepening that cooperation in 2024 was an essential step in developing a longer-term
partnership. He hoped the Group’s discussion in Odawara would produce meaningfulrecommendations.
Both Co-Chairs agreed the Hiroshima Accord provided a solid basis for the Group’s
deliberations. The Group had expertise to help focus on security and defence issues, but also
climate change, global health, and AI. Lord Lansley said the successful passage of legislation
for UK accession to the CPTPP would mean ratification by the UK by July 2024. It was
important that the UK and Japan – both strong proponents of the rule of law and democratic
principles – should continue to work closely together. Informed contribution fromparticipants on both sides was an important asset of the Group.
In the evening of 1 February, participants attended a reception hosted by Foreign Minister
Yoko Kamikawa. In her address, Minister Kamikawa spoke warmly of the strength of the1bilateral relationship and her commitment to it, and the important role the UK-Japan 21stCentury Group continued to play.
Odawara Conference
In their opening remarks, the Co-Chairmen noted that the Group was meeting at a time when
our strong UK/Japan relations are needed more than ever to meet global challenges. Therewas scope for collaboration in many areas. It was also good to see new participants.
In its 39th meeting in Norwich, the Group had explored ways of formalising the relationship.
By signing the Hiroshima Accord, both governments had created a platform from which the
21st Century Group could recommend new bilateral initiatives and help contribute to evencloser cooperation on multilateral issues. The Group’s discussions provided a means ofidentifying concrete action together, based on the UK and Japan’s shared values.
Session 1: Latest Developments in Japan and the UK - Politics and the Economy
The Group discussed political and economic developments in both Japan and the UK.
In Japan, opinion polls showed weak support for the government but no increase of support
for the Opposition as well. The LDP faced challenges in 2024/25 with a leadership election
in September 2024, Upper House elections in October 2025, and a Lower House election due
by autumn 2025. Financial scandals affecting the LDP’s factions, the current LDP’s
leadership strategy and by-elections in April 2024 could influence the timing of a General
Election, as could the recovering economy, booming stock markets and positive GDP growth.
In the UK, the Conservatives faced similar challenges. A General Election was due by
January 2025, though the most likely current scenario remained October or November 2024.
Issues of concern to the voters were the economy, cost of living, immigration and public
service provision, particularly in the NHS. Both government and opposition parties
recognised the importance of positive UK/Japan relations, with Japan a key element of the
UK’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific. The Opposition, whilst careful not to be overconfident, were poised to return to power. They recognised the importance of a strengthened
UK defence posture, CPTPP accession which would enhance the UK’s role in Asia and thePacific, and the value of international aid cooperation. Labour would be inclined to “leaninto” relations with the EU and would continue to attach importance to the Middle East, but
not at the expense of Asia/Pacific policy. Consistency and continuity in international affairsremained important. Scottish politics had moved on since the Group’s discussion in 2023. The
SNP had experienced a drop in popularity, with the economy and good governance of more
immediate concern to voters than constitutional issues.
Group members discussed the significance of a break in the LDP’s faction system. It mightprovide opportunities for a younger generation of politicians or those outside the traditional
factions to rise to prominence. Members from the UK side raised the question of Komeito’srole in the ruling coalition given its difficulties with defence export rule changes, which could
help the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). But this could not prejudice theProgramme.
In the UK, voters were increasingly concerned with the quality of governance andinconsistency of investment in public services. In both countries there seemed to be a problem
of engagement with politics, particularly amongst the younger generation. The Group was
keen to help address this issue through its recommendations.

2Session 2: Global Security including Ukraine and Russia
The Group considered the current geo-political situation and challenges posed to existing
structures, particularly by China and countries of the Global South. Russia’s misguided
perception of the threat to its security from western democracies has shaped its desire for
defence of its borders and beyond. Both China and Russia had sought to undermine
democratic regimes and to encourage their allies to do the same. Russian strategy in Ukraine,
nuclear weapons in DPRK and the prospect of a nuclear arming Iran, and China’s
determination to extend its reach in the South China Sea had all underlined the renewedsignificance to some countries of a nuclear capability. It was important that global
democracies responded carefully, stressing the values of stability and prosperity to thosecountries in China’s and Russia’s spheres of influence.
Japan and the UK, with other like-minded countries, had a role to play in fora such as the G7,
UN and elsewhere, while continuing to coordinate closely with the US. Three regions
provided examples of the challenges arising: the Indo-Pacific where China was becoming
more assertive; Ukraine where Russian aggression had a significant impact both in Ukraine
and on her neighbours; and the current conflict in Israel/Gaza. Whilst the UK and Japan did
not always have identical interests and the public reaction in each country differed, the valueof closer UK/Japan coordination in responding remained clear.
Group members discussed the “Five Eyes” intelligence framework and the prospect of future
Japanese involvement. As discussed at previous conferences, there were significant
challenges, not least the need for security reform and corresponding political and legal
structures in Japan. GCAP had shown the importance of aligning processes, although there is
still more urgent work needed. Japanese longer-term involvement, once the correct
procedures were in place, would be welcome.
Dinner Discussion: China
Over dinner, Professor Takahara spoke to the Group about developments in China and thegrowing challenges faced by President Xi Jinping. There was intense debate within theCommunist Party about the pace and direction of reform. Whilst some sectors might beperforming well, overall confidence was low with declining investment and weak
consumption. China’s external policy caused alarm amongst her neighbours and more
widely, but Xi’s main priority was in maintaining the regime.
Group members were interested in China’s approach to Taiwan and the South China Sea;
progress of the Belt and Road initiative; China’s efforts to dominate key technologies andcrucial minerals; Xi’s anti-corruption policy; China’s attitude towards India; and China’s
ambition to challenge the US.
Session 3: Global Security: U.S. Response to International Security
The Group discussed pre-election scenarios in the US. It was too early to predict the outcome,but the prospect of a second Trump Presidency was not to be ruled out. Trump had strong
Republican support, though polls suggested that within the Republican party, it was lower
than in 2016. Biden, on the other hand, needed to convince the public that the economy was
genuinely improving. Should he win, Trump was better prepared this time, with links to key
think tanks and his own team ready to push through a foreign policy and trade agenda without
the moderating influences brought in last time.
Group members agreed on the need to engage with both sides in the US in advance of the
Presidential election and seek to demonstrate that isolationism was not a viable option. If
Trump won, and this led to a weakening of US international commitments, the UK and Japan3

would need to respond through closer cooperation and a more inclusive approach tointernational partners particularly those in the Global South.
The Group also noted some cold war-style reactions to China’s more aggressive profile.
Whilst concern about China’s internal repression and combative foreign policy was
understandable, the UK, Japan and other like-minded partners needed to find a pragmatic wayof dealing with China. We should continue to insist on the rule of law, non-use of economic
threats and human rights norms, while engaging China on a case-by-case basis whereappropriate.
Session 4: Climate Change and Energy
The Group heard presentations on climate change and energy, and the prospects for finance inthe transition to green energy policies. The Hiroshima Accord helpfully underlined the UK
and Japan’s partnership in enabling greater deployment of renewable energy andimprovement in the effectiveness of multilateral institutions and the international financial
system.
COP 26 in Glasgow was a turning point in establishing the 1.5° C temperature rise goal andthe commitment to net zero. The Hiroshima Summit Communiqué reconfirmed this. COP 28
in Dubai was the first opportunity for a stock-take, and helpfully confirmed the transition
away from fossil fuels in energy systems and tripling of renewable energy.
In working towards net zero by 2050, the private sector – including members of this Group had taken a lead in adapting and mainstreaming climate considerations into corporate
strategy. Higher energy prices due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine were driving renewables
investment. However, there were security implications in the transition to renewables because
the materials required were geographically concentrated, including in China.
Finance for renewable energy required a combination of public and private funding using
policy intervention, blended finance, and venture capital to overcome the barriers for purely
private investment.
Session 5: Global Health: Enhancing Innovation Through Collaboration
The Group compared Japan’s and the UK’s respective experience in the pandemic. The UK's
Recovery clinical trial, data modelling expertise and rapid vaccine development werevaluable, as were the open discussions on lessons learnt. Japan’s case rates and death rates
were lower than the UK but more heavily affected by the Omicron variant from 2022
onwards. The pandemic also introduced some new opportunities including real time data
availability, a new approach to rapid vaccine production and commitments through the
Cornwall and Hiroshima Summits to the 100 Days Mission initiative.
There is potential for UK/Japanese collaboration on pandemic prevention, preparedness andresponse including on AMR; tackling neglected diseases in low- and middle-income
countries; climate change-related health security; and dementia and other age-related healthissues.
The Hiroshima Accord underlined the value of the health and science and innovation
partnership between the UK and Japan. The sources of innovation came largely frompartnerships and venture capital. Japanese innovation from start-ups and venture capital was
considerably less than in the UK, Europe or the US. There was therefore scope for publicprivate collaboration between the UK and Japan to stimulate greater healthcare innovation.

4Former Group Co-Chair, Minister of Health Labour and Welfare Keizo Takemi spoke toparticipants about his plans for a Drug Discovery Infrastructure Enhancement Project
involving public-private cooperation. It would bolster drug discovery capacity in Japan andintegrate closely with the regulatory system ensuring continued access to innovative new
drugs. He hoped to draw on experience from the UK, US and others to bridge the gap
between basic research and clinical trials, create a base of laboratories and hospitals allowinginteraction between experts, and encouraging biotech talent. A task force had been establishedin his Ministry to take this forward.
Session 6: AI: Policy Implications of Artificial Intelligence
The Group considered recent developments in AI in Japan and the UK. In 2023, generative AI
technologies developed rapidly. In response, the Japanese government launched an initiativeon generative AI to develop guidelines and principles in key areas. Global responses included
a US Executive Order for AI safety and technological innovation and the G7 Hiroshima AI
process both in October, and the UK-hosted AI Safety Summit in November. AI legislation in
the EU is currently in preparation.
Group members discussed what elements could be incorporated into AI policy or legislation,
taking account of both the risks and benefits, and made recommendations.

Recommendations below

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UK-Japan 21st Century Group 40th Annual Conference: Recommendations
The Group welcomed the positive response to its previous recommendations, including
several reflected in the UK/Japan Hiroshima Accord of 2023. The Group urged that others,
including those on international development collaboration and economic security, should
continue to be pursued by both governments. The Group reiterates the recommendation fromits 39th conference on maintaining and strengthening ODA budgets.
International affairs, defence and security•

Given the proliferation of regional conflicts by aggressive states, the Group reiterates
its previous recommendation that the UK and Japan should strengthen their bilateral
security cooperation and strategic dialogue. In that respect, continuing joint
engagement in the Indo Pacific region remained essential.

•

Security threats also require both the UK and Japan to increase their defence budgets
relative to GDP and do so with the explicit objective of deterring aggression; not for
aggressive purposes. These commitments should also enable the UK to encourage
further strengthening of European defence capability.

•

Welcoming the application of the Reciprocal Access Agreement, the Group saw value
in further exercises and joint operations to enhance interoperability, including during
the visit of the UK’s Carrier Strike Group to Asia in 2025, which will giveopportunity to coordinate on operations, choke point protection, and support of
UNCLOS.

•

Mutual reassurance created in the alignment of defence technology for the GCAP
programme should help enable other forms of industrial and defence collaboration.

•

The Group also reiterated its strong support for close association of Japan with the“Five Eyes” security structure, once the necessary political and legal adjustments tofacilitate sensitive collaboration and information exchange were in place.

•

The Group would welcome greater joint coordination with countries of the Global
South, demonstrating a more inclusive and less didactic approach in defending therule of law and human rights.

•

In particular, the UK and Japan should seek opportunities to work in collaboration
jointly and severally with India, to encourage a reorientation of India’s approach on
geopolitical issues. This might include joint work on defence-related or spacetechnologies, on AI and on financial support for aid projects in South-East Asia or
East Africa.

•

Recognising the economic and political weight of the European Union and its
potential role in helping secure geopolitical stability, the UK and Japan should seek
ways of engaging jointly in Brussels - as third country partners - across a range ofissues to promote free trade, joint initiatives in technologies, standards including AI,
climate action and medicines supply.

•

The Group reiterated its unequivocal support for Ukraine and for the rejection ofchanges to territorial integrity or international order by force, and the need for asustainable and long-term commitment to the defence of Ukraine. UK military aid to6

Ukraine and Japanese financial and humanitarian aid should be maintained orenhanced.
•

In advance of the Presidential election in 2024, the Group saw value in joint
engagement within the US and with both political parties to underline the risks ofisolationism.

•

The Group would welcome new opportunities for tri-lateral cooperation involving theUK, Japan and the Republic of Korea, including on policies towards DPRK and theabduction issue.

•

As both nuclear and non-nuclear states, the UK and Japan continue to have an
important joint role to play in pursuing non-proliferation.

•

The Group fully supports reform of the United Nations and the Security Council,
including permanent membership for Japan.

International Development Cooperation•

The Group recommends that the UK/Japan dialogue on international development
should include specific joint projects, for example for girls’ education in Ethiopia orfamily planning projects in Niger.

People to People Exchanges•

The Group strongly supports the promotion of people to people exchange in the spiritof the 2023 UK/Japan Memorandum of Cooperation. The Group would seek to
identify opportunities to encourage this further, including through school groupexchanges and homestay programmes. The working visa programme had been
extremely successful, and its expansion was very welcome.

•Given the relative lack of engagement in traditional political activities by young
people in both countries, the Group encourages the facilitation of exchange
opportunities between students and young parliamentarians to help promote trust inpolitics and governance, and the possibility of work experience in both parliaments.

•

The Group also recommends the promotion of interparliamentary exchanges,
including through the IPU in 2024, as well as the possibility of joint SelectCommittee exchanges on issues such as immigration and cyber security.

•

As an area of serious concern to the younger generation in the UK and Japan, theGroup recommends that both governments encourage exchanges between young
people on climate issues.

•

The Group would welcome joint training of junior or mid-career professionals andpractitioners in public and private institutions in Japan, the UK and in third countries
in Asia and Africa where both countries have experience.

•

The Group also suggests that the two governments consider with the Group how wemight establish a youth-based parallel grouping to the UK-Japan 21st Century Group(virtual or real) to encourage the active and sustained involvement of young people inthe bilateral relationship.

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•The Group also noted the potential vulnerability of the university sectors in bothcountries to intellectual property safe-guarding, and the importance of securing the
integrity of their knowledge and research bases while maintaining their openness tostudent and international exchanges.

Climate Change and Energy•

The Group welcomes the establishment of the Renewable Energy Partnership as a
key strand in the implementation of the Hiroshima Accord and urges bothgovernments to collaborate further in the deployment of more renewable energy
towards national and international targets.

•

The Group further recommends that this partnership should also support othercountries in developing various pathways to scale up their green energy capacity,
working with private sector companies that have successfully delivered the expansion
we have already seen in the UK and Japan.

•

The Group welcomed the establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund at COP28 in
Dubai, and the initial investments from the UK and Japan into the fund. We
recommend that both governments consider further contributions to this importantfund, supporting a just transition for the most fragile and least developed countries.

•

The Group is concerned that uncertainty in the US might affect the momentum
delivered by recent COP agreements and urges both governments to use their roles in
the G7 and other fora to strengthen global leadership on climate action.

•

The Group noted the development of different taxonomies, carbon pricing and carbon
border adjustment regimes in some significant economies and recommended the UK
and Japan initiate a dialogue, extending this potentially to the EU and others, with aview to greater consistency and clarity for market participants and less disruption to
trade.

•The Group noted the support growing for the financial reforms of the Bridgetown
Agenda and urged both governments to work together to help deliver these changes
that could assist developing countries to invest efficiently in energy transitions andclimate adaptations.

•

The Group believes there may be value in encouraging the Japan/UK Financial
Regulatory Forum to consider the views of younger people on climate finance.

•

The Group welcomes Japan’s intention to commit to net zero health systems such as
ATACH. The UK and Japan have much to learn from each other and should makeefforts to engage the Global South in this respect.

•

The Group noted the importance of a policy plan for promoting Japan as a leading
asset management centre in the climate change context. We recommend
implementation in both countries of proactive stewardship activities by asset
managers and asset owners on sustainable climate outcome.

Global Health: Enhancing Innovation Through Collaboration•

As outlined by Minister Takemi, the group supports enhanced collaboration andresearch into vaccine development, drug discovery, and deployment of diagnostics,
surveillance, and evaluation.

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•

Following the G7 Nagasaki Health Ministers Communiqué in May 2023, the Groupwill consider arranging a separate working group of experts to implement specificcollaboration between the UK and Japan in this regard.

•

In collaborating on vaccine and drug development the Group encourages bothgovernments to address the issue of pricing and regulatory mechanisms for new andinnovative drugs.

•

The Group supports online and hybrid meetings between related institutions in the
UK and Japan to share data and experience on healthcare issues.

•

The Group would welcome closer UK/Japan cooperation on pandemic prevention,
preparedness and response (PPR); neglected infectious diseases; antimicrobial
resistance (AMR); climate change-related health security; mental health and agerelated diseases.

•

We encourage both governments to support continued sharing of healthcare
investment and expertise in improving healthcare systems in the countries of the
Global South.

•

In order to stimulate innovation in healthcare, the Group would welcome closer
UK/Japan collaboration on certification of venture capital companies; support forJapan’s Global Health Innovative Technology Fund (GHIT) and its projects; support
to Japanese start-ups drawing on British companies’ experience; and support toJapanese pharmaceutical companies investing in the UK.

Policy Implications of Artificial Intelligence•

Given Japan’s recent appointment of a head of the newly established AI Safety
Institute, the Group recommends early engagement with her UK counterpart. Our
governments should consider how we may provide an intendent framework for ethics
in AI.

•The Group would also welcome close cooperation between the UK and Japan on AI
in healthcare, education and criminal justice and on the environmental impacts of AI.

•

The Group would support consideration of a Geneva-style protocol to prohibit the useof autonomous systems in nuclear command, control and communications.

•

The Group proposes that our governments work together on possible AI legislation
based on seven principles of safety, fairness, openness, accessibility, contestability,
accountability, and redress. This legislation could also provide for regulators able toimpose ex-ante obligations on foundation or large language models as necessary. We
see the need for legislation which is adaptive and able to respond to this fast-moving
technology.

These recommendations are based on a consensus among participants but should not
be interpreted to imply that they represent the view of individual participants or theorganisations which they represent.

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The UK-Japan 21st Century Group

40th Annual Conference
February 2-4, 2024
Tokyo and Odawara, Kanagawa

Japanese Participants
Mr Seiji Kihara

Japanese Co-Chairman, UK-Japan 21st Century
Group; Member of the House of Representatives(LDP)

Mr Hiroyuki Akita

Commentator, Nikkei Shimbun

Mr Hirohide Hirai

Advisor to CEO, Hitachi, Ltd.

Prof Yoko Iwama

Professor, International Relations, National Graduate
Institute for Policy Studies

Mr Isao Kano

President, Japan Center for International Exchange;
Japanese Executive Director, UK-Japan 21stCentury GroupDr Sadaharu Kotani

Executive Director, Government Relations Strategy
Department, Eisai Co., Ltd.

Prof Fumiaki Kubo

President, National Defense Academy of JapanDr Osamu Kunii

CEO and Executive Director, Global HealthInnovative Technology Fund (GHIT)

Ms Karen Makishima

Member of the House of Representatives (LDP)

Professor Yutaka Matsuo

Professor, Graduate School of Engineering, The
University of Tokyo

Mr Hidehiro Mitani

Member of the House of Representatives (LDP)Mr Keiichiro Nakamura

Senior Managing Executive Officer, Co-Head of
Global Business/Banking Unit, Sumitomo Mitsui
Financial Group/ Sumitomo Mitsui Banking
Corporation

Mr Mitsunari Okamoto

Member of the House of Representatives (Komei)

Mr Masahiro Oya

Executive Officer, Vice President, Global Strategic
Planning & Marketing, Mitsubishi Electric
Corporation

Mr Yasuhisa Shiozaki

Chairperson, Keiso Nippon Initiative; Former Ministerof Health, Labour and Welfare; former Japanese
Co-Chairman, UK-Japan 21st Century GroupMr Isamu Suda

Deputy Senior General Manager, Defense Systems
Division, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation
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Professor Akio Takahara

Professor, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics,
The University of Tokyo

Professor Yukari Takamura

Professor, Institute for Future Initiatives, The
University of Tokyo

Mr Keizo Takemi

Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare; Member ofthe House of Councillors; former Japanese CoChairman, UK-Japan 21st Century GroupMr Yasunori Takeuchi

CEO/Representative Director, Corporate Action JapanMr Akihiro Tsuji

Minister, Embassy of Japan in the UK

Mr Koji Tsuruoka

President, The International Affairs Research Institute;former Japanese Ambassador to the UK

Mr Masahiro Yamauchi

Managing Director and Head of International Business
Planning Dept., Daiwa Securities Group Inc.

Ms Harumi Yoshida

Member of the House of Representatives (CDP)

UK Participants
Lord (Andrew) Lansley

UK Co-Chairman, UK-Japan 21st Century Group;
Member of the House of Lords (Conservative
Party)

Baroness (Elizabeth) Barker

House of Lords (Liberal Democratic Party)

Dr Lisa Cameron MP

Member of Parliament (Conservative Party)

Mr Simon Chelton

Director of the Security Industry Council of JapanMr Philippe Fauchet

Founder, Mirasense Partners

Mr David Fitton

UK Executive Director, UK-Japan 21st Century GroupMs Yuko Kidoguchi

Vice President Corporate Affairs, AstraZeneca KK

Dr Sylvain Lacomble

Vice President Commercial Operations EMEA,
TerumoMr Richard Lloyd Parry

Asia Editor, The Times

Mr Mark Logan MP

Member of Parliament (Conservative Party)

H.E. Julia Longbottom

British Ambassador to Japan

Lord (Jack) McConnell

Member of the House of Lords (Labour Party)

Mr Paul Madden

Business Adviser, Professor, and former Ambassador

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Dr John Nilsson-WrightHead, Japan and Koreas Programme, Centre for
Geopolitics, University of Cambridge; Fuji Bank
Associate Professor in Japanese Politics andInternational Relations, Faculty of Asian andMiddle Eastern Studies, University of Cambridge

Mr Rob Peer

BAE Systems Country Director Japan; President BAE
Systems Japan GK

Mr Naokazu Saito

Director Government Policy and Government Affairs,
AstraZeneca KK

Mr Edward Weeks

President and CEO, HSBC Japan

Ms Catherine West MP

Member of Parliament (Labour Party)

Observers
Mr Hiroyuki Goto

Manager, Europe, the Middle East and Africa Section,
Regional Marketing Division, Global Strategic
Planning & Marketing Group, Mitsubishi Electric
Corporation

Dr Yohei Kiguchi

Founder and CEO, ENECHANGE GroupMr Tetsuya Kodama

Executive Director, Nihon Cyber Defence Co

Ms Sherrie de Lacey

Research Analyst, Synergos Digital, UK

Mr Bradley Murray

Senior Policy Advisor, UK Ministry of Defence (onSabbatical)

Mr Kimitake Nakamura

Deputy Director-General/Deputy Assistant Minister(Ambassador), European Affairs Bureau, Ministryof Foreign Affairs

Dr Kazu Senshu

Chief Clinical and Regulatory Officer, Terumo

Ms Sayuri Takimoto

Associate Director, Government Affairs, AstraZeneca
KK

Ms Tomomi Tsukakoshi

Deputy Director, Western Europe Division, European
Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ms Izumi Yamamoto

The Americas Section, Regional Marketing Division,
Global Strategic Planning & Marketing Group,
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation

Ms Sophie Warner-Fog

Political Counsellor, (Bilateral and Internal), British
Embassy Tokyo

Ms Jessica Wells

Second Secretary Political (Bilateral and Internal),
British Embassy Tokyo
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Secretariat
Ms Hifumi Tajima

Chief Program Officer, Japan Center for International
Exchange

Mr Patrick Ishiyama

Digital and Print Production Officer, Japan Center forInternational Exchange

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