Selective Technology Choice, Adaptations, and Industrial
Development: Lessons from Japanese Historical Experience
Tomoko Hashino
Keijiro Otsuka
September, 2021
Discussion Paper No. 2124

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
KOBE UNIVERSITYROKKO, KOBE, JAPANSelective Technology Choice, Adaptations, and Industrial
Development: Lessons from Japanese Historical Experience
Tomoko Hashino
Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University
Keijiro Otsuka
The Center for Social Systems Innovation
and Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University
Abstract
It is well-known that Japan successfully imported advanced technology from Europe during the
Meiji era (1868-1912), notably in the modern cotton spinning industry which used imported British
ring machines and Indian cotton and outcompeted India in Asian cotton yarn market. It is also truethat traditional industries, especially the sedentary silk reeling and the cotton and silk weaving
districts located in various parts of the country, successfully developed while using imported
technologies. This study attempts to explore key factors contributing to the successful industrial
development in prewar Japan based on the review of the development of the modern cotton textile
and silk reeling industries, and the traditional cotton and silk weaving and sedentary silk reelingindustries. We found that these industries commonly selected appropriate technologies and adapted
them to the initially abundant endowment of labor followed by its growing scarcity.

Acknowledgement: This research was partially supported by grants from The Center for Social Systems Innovation in
Kobe University and The Murata Science Foundation.

1

1. Introduction
While it is well-known that Japan was the first country outside the western world thathas successfully industrialized, it is much less known why Japan was so successful inindustrialization. It is true that by taking advantage of backwardness, Japan caught up
with Europe by importing advanced technologies (Gerschenkron 1962; Ohkawa andRosovsky 1973). But this technology catch-up hypothesis does not explain why Japanalone was particularly successful in industrial development in Asia. Nor does it explain
what industries and what types of imported technologies played critical roles inindustrial development in Japan.
Akamatsu (1962) was concerned with structural transformation of the Japanese
economy during the prewar period. He argues that Japanese industries developed
following the growth paths of inverse V-shape as if a flock of wild-geese fly; import ofmodern good increases and then declines because domestic production begins andexpands, which leads to launching of export, followed by decreases in domestic
production and eventually export due to the loss of comparative advantage. He further
argues that such growth pattern, firstly observed in the cotton spinning industry, isfollowed by another flying geese pattern of development in other industries, such as thecotton weaving industry. Although the import substitution is assumed to be assisted by2

technology import, the process of technology import is not explicitly incorporated into
his flying geese model.
Sugihara (2013) argues that Japanese industrial development is characterized
by labor-intensive path, using labor-intensive technology in labor-using industries,
particularly in the early phase of modern economic development. Considering thatJapan was highly labor abundant country in the beginning of the Meiji era (1868-1912),
his argument makes sense, but it does not explain why Japan was particularly successful
in industrial development among Asian countries.
This study attempts to explore key factors leading to the successful industrial
development in prewar Japan based on the review of the development of the four major
textile industries, viz., the cotton spinning and weaving and silk reeling and weaving
industries. As is shown in Table 1, these industries were important sources ofmerchandise export, accounting in total for roughly 50% of export in the prewar period.
These industries also provide ample employment opportunities. There are a large
number of case studies on the development of the modern cotton spinning industry by
Saxonhouse (1974, 1977), Otsuka et al. (1988), Braguinsky and Hounshell (2015), andBraguinsky et al. (2015), and on the development of the silk-weaving districts by
Hashino and Otsuka (2013a, 2013b, 2020) and Hashino (2021). This study attempts to3integrate accumulated insights of these studies. Specifically, we hypothesize that uniqueand common feature of the industrial development in prewar Japan was selective choiceof appropriate foreign technologies, combined with their adaptations to factor
endowments in prewar Japan including the skill endowment in the traditional textile
districts. We found that Japan did not always introduce the most advanced technology,e.g., power looms, and selected labor-intensive technology, e.g., handlooms, as well assuch highly labor-saving technology as Jacquard in the late 19th century. Also
noteworthy is the adaptation of ring spinning technology to abundant endowment oflabor by developing unique labor-intensive cotton mixing technique. １ Another uniquefeature is the remarkable development of the traditional cotton and silk weaving
districts; the former was closely linked with the development of the modern cotton
spinning industry, while the latter was more closely linked with the development of the
traditional silk reeling industry.
<Table 1>
We do not argue that such selective technology choice and adaptations are“causes” for the successful industrial development, as technology choice and１Ranis (1957, 594) pointed out that in prewar Japan, “There was no wholesale adoption of theadvanced techniques elsewhere perfected and now available to her.”4

adaptations are “endogenous” decision variables. What we would like to emphasize isthat the cotton textile and silk industries would not have developed so successfully
without appropriate technology choice and adaptations, which include the choice ofquality and types of cotton and silk products.
The organization of this article is as follows. In Section 2 we examine theextent to which the development of the modern cotton spinning and weaving industries
followed the flying wild-geese patterns of development and identify critical roles playedby technology choice and adaptations in the development of these industries. Section 3
briefly explores the development and technology choice of the selected traditional
cotton weaving districts. Section 4 examines production and export of raw silk as wellas the supply of raw silk to domestic silk weaving districts from the traditional andmodern silk reeling industries. Given that the detailed production data of the traditional
cotton weaving districts are limited, we pay more attention to contrasting patterns of thedevelopment of three silk-weaving districts in Section 5, for which the detailed data are
available. We conclude this study by summarizing lessons from development
experiences of the textile industries in prewar Japan in Section 6.

5

2. Development of the Modern Cotton Textile Industry
The cotton textile industry consists of cotton spinning and weaving industries. While thetraditional cotton spinning industry collapsed in the mid-19th century due to the importof cheap and higher quality yarn (Uchida 1960), as in the case of Southeast Asian
countries (Hymer and Resnick 1969; Resnick 1970), the traditional cotton weaving
industry dominated over the modern cotton weaving industry in prewar Japan. We
would like to examine changes in import, domestic production, and export of cotton
yarn and fabrics as well as technology choice and adaptations in the modern cotton
spinning and weaving industries from the 1880s to the early 1930s.

2-1. Did Wild Geese Really Fly in the Cotton Textile Industry?
In order to examine the validity of the flying wild-geese model of development, Figure 1
shows changes in import, domestic production, and export of cotton yarn over the 50year period. If we focus on the period before the turn of the century, the data are consistent
with the prediction of the flying geese model; import increased, followed by rapid
increase in domestic production from 1888 to 1898 and later by increase in export.
However, the production and trade structures changed markedly in the subsequent 30year period: While the production continued to increase, the export declined since the6mid-1910s. While the latter trend can be explained by the establishment of cotton
spinning mills by the major Japanese textile companies in China, the former trend can be
explained by increased domestic demand for cotton yarn by the cotton weaving industry.
<Figure 1>
Figure 2 shows changes in import, domestic production by traditional andmodern sectors, and export of cotton fabrics. ２ Unlike the case of cotton yarn, import ofcotton fabrics was negligibly small even in the early period, nullifying the flying geese
model. Also important is the dominance of the traditional sector, which had been engaged
in the cotton fabric production for centuries. The majority of them were clustered andmany of them were located in rural towns and cities. Their production increased steadily
from 1887 to 1915 and sharply from 1915 to 1933 except during the Great Depression
period when export declined precipitously.
<Figure 2>
The modern spinning mills began producing cotton fabrics in the first decade of
the 20th century but their production has been significantly smaller than the production by
the traditional sector throughout the prewar period. The traditional sector was not static
technologically by any means; it introduced flying shuttle, foot-operated “handlooms,”
２

As explained in footnote of Figure 2, production of traditional sector is estimated by subtracting
production of modern sector from total production.
7

and Jacquard（e.g., Kiyokawa 1995）. The continuously increased production of cotton
yarn without accompanying increased export observed in Figure 1 can be explained by
the continuous growth of the domestic cotton weaving sector, particularly the traditional
weaving districts. Such inter-industry linkage is not considered in the flying geese model.
It is also interesting to realize that export of cotton fabrics generally exceeded
the production by the modern sector, which implies that the traditional sector was also
responsible for continued growth of exported cotton fabrics. In fact, export andproduction by the traditional sector were highly correlated, particularly since the 1910s.
Thus, it is clear that the traditional cotton weaving sector achieved the export-led growthin the early 20th century.

2-2. Technology Choice and Adaptations in the Modern Cotton Textile Industry
There is no question that the modern cotton spinning industry equipped with mule andring spinning machines was more capital-intensive than the traditional cotton weaving
industry using handlooms. Yet, the former grew more rapidly than the latter in the late
19th century (see Figures 1 and 2). Such observation appears inconsistent with the laborintensive growth envisaged by Sugihara (2013). It seems more sensible to argue that thedevelopment of labor-intensive traditional cotton weaving industry was stimulated by the8supply of reasonably high quality yarn by the modern cotton spinning industry. If so, therelevant question is how the modern spinning industry developed in the first place.
Using primarily the Long-Term Economic Statistics of Japan (Fujino et al. 1979),
Figure 3 shows changes in spindle-labor ratio in the cotton spinning industry and capitalstock-labor ratio in the modern cotton textile industry. Labor is measured by person-days.
Since male workers were important in the early phase but gradually replaced by female
labor, ３ whose wage rate was roughly one-half of male wage rate, both the total numberof workers and the number of female labor equivalent workers, which was obtained bysumming up the number of female workers and that of male workers multiplied by malefemale wage ratio. The estimates of capital stock are available only for the modern cotton
textile industry consisting of spinning and weaving sectors. Thus, the spindle-labor ratio
is a proxy for capital-labor ratio in the cotton spinning industry. The potential problem ofspindle-labor ratio is that although mule spinning machine was exclusively used before
1885 but largely replaced by ring machines in the following 10 years (Otsuka et al. 1988),
this ratio does not distinguish between the spindles of the two types of machines.
According to Otsuka et al. (1988), however, the total cost of installing mule spindle andring spindle was roughly the same. Furthermore, estimated capital stock-labor ratio

３

Female workers accounted for 64% in 1884, 72% in 1890, and 78% in 1900.
9pertains solely to the cotton spinning sector before 1910 when cotton textile mills
exclusively produced cotton yarn. Therefore, the comparison of spindle-labor ratio withcapital stock-labor ratio can check accuracy of the former as a measure of capital-laborratio.
<Figure 3>
Regardless of the measures of capital-labor ratio, it is remarkable that the ratio
declined sharply from 1885 to 1895. As was mentioned earlier, this was the period during
which ring machines were rapidly introduced. The operation of ring machine is speedierthan mule machines and, hence, the former is more efficient than the latter, if cotton yarns
are not broken. If short staple cotton is used, however, only mule machines can be used.
Japanese and Chinese cotton staples are very short and unsuitable for the ring machine.
Indian cotton staples are longer but Indian cotton spinning factories exclusively used mulemachines. It was only Japan among developing countries that used ring machines incombination with such short-staple cotton as Indian (Saxonhouse and Wright 1984). As
is shown in Table 2, Japan exclusively imported short staple Chinese cotton in 1884 but
rapidly increased the import of Indian cotton in the 1890s. ４

４

According to Otsuka et al. (1988, p. 25), Japanese cotton accounted for 14.3% of cotton
staple used in 1890 and nil in 1900.
10

<Table 2>
Actually, Japan uniquely developed cotton mixing technique, which was highlylabor intensive and identified to be labor-saving technological progress by Saxonhouse(1977). A large number of female workers were employed to calm, sort out, and skillfully
mix relatively long and short staple cotton so as to operate the ring machines (Otasuka etal. 1988; Saxonhouse and Wright 2010). Starting with the spindle-worker ratio of nearly30, which was somewhat lower than 40 in India around 1885, Japan reduced spindleworker ratio to one-half or even to one-third. Almost simultaneously Japan increased the
production of cotton yarn and its export to Asian market (see Figure 1). This labor-using
technological progress made it possible for Japan to become major producer of cotton
yarn globally. This is consistent with labor-intensive growth view of Japanese industrial
development.
As is suggested by Figure 3 and more rigorously confirmed by econometricanalyses by Saxonhouse (1977) and Braguinsky et al. (2015), subsequent

technological progress was labor-saving and capital-using. In particular, the two

measures of capital-labor ratio shown in Figure 3 indicate that capital deepening
gradually took place and accelerated in the 1920s. ５ It is well-known that real wage
５

Ranis (1957) was the first study that has pointed out changing capital-labor ratios from labor11

rate had been stagnant until around 1920, after which it increased rapidly (seeFigure 4). This was the case not only in the cotton textile industry but also

everywhere in Japan. This was termed “turning point” by Fei and Ranis (1964). In all
likelihood, not only the substitution of labor by capital but also labor-saving

technological progress was induced to take place. Indeed, short-staple Indian cotton
was replaced by longer-staple American cotton and even by the longest-staple
Egyptian cotton in the 1920s (see Table 1), indicating that cotton mixing technology wasless intensively used in the 1920s. At the same time, the quality of yarn, measured bycount, improved significantly in this period (Sanpei 1941).
<Figure 4>
Japan relied almost entirely on imported spinning machines (Figure 5). Although
the quantitative data are not available, Japanese cotton spinning companies increasingly
used high-speed, high-draft ring machines (Saxonhouse 1974). In the modern weaving
sector, Japanese cotton textile companies relied on imported power looms until 1910,
after which domestically produced power looms became common. Many of them weremixed wooden and iron power-looms invented, among others, by Sakichi Toyoda in 1897,
father of the founder of Toyota Automobile Company. Development of such cheap

using to labor-saving directions in the course of development of the cotton spinning industry inprewar Japan.
12capital-saving technology can be considered as an adaptation to labor-abundant andcapital-scarce Japanese economy. According to Kiyokawa (1995, pp. 172-74), imported
power loom costed 400 to 6000 yen, whereas mixed iron and wooden power loom costed
30 to 40 yen in the late 1890s.
<Figure 5>
Labor abundance ended at the turning point, and power looms were replaced byautomatic looms in the 1920s. As is shown in Figure 5, the use of both imported anddomestically produced automatic looms increased slowly together from 1915 to 1925, but
after that domestic automatic looms produced by Toyota Automatic Loom Company
became predominant. This pattern of development is unexpected in the flying geese
model of industrial development.
To sum up, it is likely that the development of cotton mixing technology in theearly phase of industrial development and adoption of labor-saving technologies insubsequent periods were guided by level and changes in factor endowment in the Japanese
economy from the late 19th century to the early 20th century.

3. Production and Technology Choice in the Traditional Cotton Weaving Industry
Compared with silk-weaving districts to be examined in Section 5, studies on cotton
13weaving districts written in English are scant. Two exceptions are study on Iruma in
Saitama prefecture by Itoh and Tanimoto (1998) and study on Enshu in Shizuoka
prefecture by Yamazaki (2002). Although Saitama and Shizuoka prefectures were notmajor cotton fabric producing regions in prewar Japan, the detailed prefecture level data
are available. ６ Furthermore, the two prefectures are representative of domestic market
oriented and export oriented weaving districts and contrasting in types of products andtargeted markets, as will be shown shortly.

3-1. Domestic Production and Export in Saitama and Shizuoka Prefectures
According to Figure 6, which shows real value of production of all fabric as well as
cotton fabric in Saitama and Shizuoka prefectures from 1905 to 1933, Saitama wasmore importance producer of cotton as well as other fabrics than Shizuoka until theearly 1910s. Consistent with the production data of cotton fabrics shown in Figure 2, theproduction of cotton fabrics in the two traditional weaving districts increased from 1905
to 1910. This observation strongly suggests that the development of rural cotton
weaving districts was stimulated by the newly emerged supply of high-quality cotton

６

Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (1925) conducted detailed data collection on weaving
districts and showed useful data from 1902 to 1923 for Saitama prefecture and from 1912 to 1923 in
Shizuoka prefecture. Although this study does not use this data, we learned useful information fromthis data set.
14

yarn by the modern cotton spinning industry. This is reminiscent of the argument of
Schumpeter (1912) that the discovery of new input is an important category ofinnovations. Such inter-industry growth linkage was not taken into consideration by theflying geese model.
<Figure 6>
While the production in Saitama prefecture had been largely stagnant after mild
growth from 1905 to 1910, the production in Shizuoka prefecture continued to increase
for the entire 30-year period. Note that Saitama prefecture specialized in the productionof narrow-width cotton fabrics and other fabrics destined for domestic markets, whereas
Shizuoka prefecture specialized mainly in the production of plain wide-width cotton
fabrics for export. In 1923, 10.5% of products was exported from Shizuoka, whereas
only 2.0% was exported from Saitama. Export of cotton from Shizuoka accelerated insubsequent years (Yamazaki 2002). Furthermore, cotton weaving was farmers’ side-line
activities using handlooms in some cotton weaving district in Saitama prefecture (Itohand Tanimoto 1998).

3-2. Choice of Handlooms vs. Power-Looms
Difference between stagnated production in Saitama prefecture and sustainably growing
15

production in Shizuoka prefecture corresponds to the difference in the speed of shift
from handlooms to power-looms. The data on the number of handlooms and powerlooms for aggregate fabric production are available from 1905 and onward, whereas thedata for cotton production are available since 1922 (see Figure 7). In Saitama
prefecture, indigenously invented foot-operated looms were also common, accounting
for 35% of looms in 1923 (Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce 1925). For
simplicity, it is combined with handlooms in Figure 7. It is obvious that Saitama used
exclusively handlooms in 1905 and produced much larger volume of fabrics than
Shizuoka. This means that cotton weaving district in Shizuoka prefecture was tiny or
almost non-existent in 1905. In general, the number of handlooms were on the declining
trend in both prefectures, whereas the number of power-looms increased slowly andsomewhat substantially after the turning point in Saitama prefecture but increased
sharply since 1915 in Shizuoka prefecture. The rapid growth of cotton fabric production
in Shizuoka prefecture observed in Figure 6 can be attributed to rapid growth of the
adoption of power-looms in this prefecture.
<Figure 7>
Popular power-looms used in Shizuoka prefecture were mixed wooden and irontype produced in the same prefecture. According to Kiyokawa (1995, p. 179), out of16

17,720 power looms used in this prefecture in 1919, 61% were mixed wooden and irontype and only 39% were iron type. ７ Manual work using handlooms can be easily
substituted by power-looms, if the products are simple plain fabrics. Thus, higher
adoption of power-looms in Shizuoka prefecture was closely related with its exportorientation of simple cotton fabrics (Minami and Makino 1983). It is highly likely that
Shizuoka prefecture selected power-looms as they fitted well with its production of
simple fabrics. Furthermore, the rapid adoption of power-looms largely coincided withthe rapid growth of wage rate. These observations suggest that increased scarcity oflabor induced the adoption of the labor-saving technology in the traditional cotton
weaving districts. In fact, labor productivity significantly increased with the adoption of
power-looms (Okazaki 2021).

4. Development of the Silk Reeling Industry
The silk reeling industry in prewar Japan consisted of the mechanized modern sector,
which adopted factory system and used reeling machines imported mainly from Italy,
and the traditional sector, which used sedentary reeling technology for producing raw
silk and douppion raw silk. Machine reeled silk yarn is finer, glossier, and more
７

Share of imported power looms was mere 3.3%.
17

homogeneous without fewer nodes than that by sedentary reeling (Uchida 1960).

Therefore, the price of the former was roughly 15% higher than the latter (Fujino et al.
1979). Production methods employed by the traditional sector was much more labor-

intensive than those employed by the modern sector. A question is how the modern andtraditional silk producing sectors are related with traditional silk weaving sector andalso with massive export of raw silk from Japan.

4-1. Silk Yarn Production and Export
Unlike the case of cotton yarn, there was practically no import of raw silk in prewar
Japan. Thus, argument of the flying geese model does not apply. Figure 8 showschanges in total volume of raw silk production in Japan from 1868 to 1933, along withthe production volume of machine reeled silk by the modern sector and total export.
Several interesting observations can be made. First, export began quite early, whichindicates that Japan had a comparative advantage in raw silk production even before thewestern technology was introduced. Second, production of raw silk increased rapidly
and continuously from the late 1870s to the early 1930s. Third, such rapid production
growth was achieved by the equally rapid production growth of machine reeled raw silk,which indicates predominant importance of the modern silk reeling industry. Fourth,
produced raw silk was mostly exported. Amount of export fluctuated widely reflecting
18

business cycles in advanced countries, particularly in the U.S., which was a major
importer of raw silk from Japan. Lastly, although the production share was not large, thetraditional sector survived sustainably, which is reflected in the persistent gap between
total domestic production and production of machine reeled silk by the modern sector.

<Figure 8>
A number of technologically simple adaptations but economically importantinnovations were made in mechanized reeling (Uchida 1960, pp. 195-99). The processof cocoon cooking was mechanized and it was widely diffused in the late 1910s.
Subsequently the method of reeling using cold water, instead of almost boiling water,
was developed, which saved fuel cost and improved efficiency of reeling. The mostoutstanding innovation was multi-frame reeling machine made by Minorikwa, which
contributed to improving the quality of raw silk by reducing nodes and non-uniformity.
This was important, as the demand for high quality raw silk increased in the U.S.A. toproduce stocking made of silk. The Minorikwa reeling machine reduces speed ofspinning to prevent nodes and non-uniformity but increased the number of frames tocompensate the production loss associated with the reduction in speed. Such newmachines with a number of new improvements became common since around 1920. In
19

all likelihood, these adaptive innovations contributed to accelerated growth of raw silk
production in the 1920s (see Figure 8).

4-2. Silk Yarn Supply to the Weaving Industry from the Traditional and Modern
Sectors
It is known that silk produced by the traditional sector was used for production ofJapanese kimono and obi produced exclusively by the traditional silk weaving districts
with a few exceptions. The question is how much raw silk produced by the modern
sector was supplied to the traditional silk weaving districts. In order to answer thisquestion, we estimated the supply of raw silk by the modern sector to the traditional
weaving sector by subtracting the amount of export from the amount of production by
the modern sector. ８ Figure 9 shows changes in the silk production by the traditional
sector and estimated supply of raw silk from the modern sector to domestic fabricproduction after 1889, for which the data available. It is clear that the traditional sector
was a sole supplier of raw silk to the silk weaving districts until around 1915. Thus,
unlike the case of cotton weaving districts, the development of the silk weaving

８

An assumption here is that only the modern sector exported raw silk, which is likely to bevalid.
20

districts, which will be reviewed in the next section, was supported largely by raw silk
production by the traditional sector. The traditional sector improved production
efficiency by replacing hand-driven reeling by foot-driven type, which doubled
production per day (Uchida 1960, pp. 195-96). However, the modern sector became an
important source of raw silk for the traditional weaving sector in the 1920s and 1930s.
How such changes are related with structural changes in silk weaving sector is an
important issue to be examined in the next section.
<Figure 9>

5. Production and Technology Choice in the Traditional Silk Weaving Industry
Similar to the case of silk yarn, there was no import of silk fabrics to Japan and thewhole production of silk fabrics was carried out by the traditional weaving districts. The
dominance of the traditional sector in the silk weaving industry is highly dissimilar tothe case of the cotton spinning and silk reeling industries. After examining the total
production and export, we will examine production and the use of handlooms andpower-looms in the three major and contrasting weaving districts of Nishijin, Kiryu, andFukui. Nishijin was the center of production of Japanese kimono and obi (Hashino2021), whereas Kiryu is an imitator of Nishijin (Hashino and Otsuka 2013). Fukui was a21

newcomer, which learned weaving technology from Kiryu and Nishijin and engaged in
the production of the simple silk fabrics, called habutae, for export (Hashino andOtsuka 2020).

5-1. Domestic Production and Export of Silk Fabrics
Figure 10 shows changes in the real value of production and export of silk fabrics from1886 to 1933. The production increased substantially from 1886 toward the end of the
19th century, which may be termed “initial growth phase.” This indicates that theindustrial districts were tiny in the 1880s. The initial growth phase was followed byprolonged slow growth period from around 1900 to 1918. This “slow growth phase”
was followed by “rapid growth phase” from 1918 to 1933. It is important to realize thatthe initial growth phase corresponds to increases in raw silk production by the
traditional sector, whereas rapid growth phase corresponds to substantial increases inthe supply of raw silk produced by the modern sector to the traditional weaving sector(see Figure 9).
<Figure 10>
Unlike the case of raw silk, export of silk fabrics was small, even though it
increased from 1918 to 1930. Indeed, the truly traditional silk weaving districts, such as
22

Nishijin and Kiryu, specialized in the production for domestic market. Newly emerged
Fukui weaving district, however, specialized in the production for export. This indicatesthat unlike raw silk, Japan did not have strong comparative advantage in silk fabricproduction.

5-2. Production in the Three Silk Weaving Districts
As is shown in Figure 11, Nishijin was by far the largest silk weaving district in 1886.
Its production value, however, was less than one-fifth of the level in 1930, indicatingthat this was the so-called “survival” cluster without any growth. According to Hashino(2021), Kyoto prefectural government sent three craftsmen in Nishijin to Lyon, which
was the most advanced silk weaving district in the world, to learn advanced
technologies. In particular, these craftsmen were requested to purchase power-looms
which were widely used in Lyon at that time. Curiously, however, these craftsmen judge
that the use of power-looms was too expensive for small-scale family enterprises in
Nishijin to adopt, particularly if the cost of installing a large-scale steam engine for
operating 70 to 80 power-looms is taken into account. Thus, they actually brought backflying shuttle and Jacquard. Jacquard is highly labor-saving because the so-called draw
boys pulling yarn from the roof of handloom were displaced by Jacquard device.
23

According to Hashino (2021), worker-handloom ratio changed from 3:1 to 1:1 due tothe introduction of Jacquard. In other words, Jacquard saved labor cost so much that it
was widely adopted, even though it was labor-saving. Owing to the introduction ofJacquard, the production in Nishijin more than tripled from 1886 to 1898. The
production stagnated thereafter and the peak production in 1898 was surpassed morethan 20 years later in the 1920s. Initial growth followed by long stagnation is somewhat
similar to the case of Saitama cotton weaving district shown in Figure 6.
<Figure 11>
The growth pattern of Kiryu was similar to that of Nishijin, as the formers wasimitator of the latter. Jacquard was introduced and handlooms were used in the initial
growth phase. This suggests that stagnant and tiny local weaving district began growing
due to innovations, particularly the introduction of Jacquard. As in the case of Nishijin,
the production in Kiryu stagnated from 1900 to 1920 and then increased sharply fromthe mid-1920s to the early 1930s (Hashino and Otsuka 2013a).
Traditionally there was no silk fabric production in Fukui in the 1870s. In orderto build new silk weaving district, Fukui prefectural government invited an instructorfrom Kiryu to provide training to local people in the late 1870s (Hashino and Otsuka2020). Unlike Nishijin and Kiryu, there were no skilled workers in the production of24

silk fabrics in Fukui. Thus, Fukui chose to produce simple silk fabrics called habutae
for export. Earlier Kiryu produced small amount of habutae but discontinued because
its accumulated weaving skill was not utilized for the production of such simple
product. Somewhat similar to the case of Shizuoka engaged in the production of simple
cotton fabrics for export, Fukui specialized in the production of habutae and succeeded
in its expanded export. After 1910, the value of production in Fukui consistently
exceeded that of Nishijin and Kiryu.

5-3. Choice of Handlooms vs. Power-Looms
Handlooms were predominantly used in the late 19th century, even though power-looms
were known. Since handloom is not an expensive fixed factor of production and sincehandloom-based production does not entail much division of labor among workers, themodern large-scale factory system did not emerge. ９ The choice of handloom-based
production system was probably more appropriate selection from the menu of available
western technologies.
Power-looms were widely disseminated much later in the 20th century. It was

９

There were a few attempts to initiate large-scale factory production in Nishijin and Kiryu without
notable success.
25

Fukui that actively and massively adopted power-looms and replaced handlooms since
as early as 1908. By 1930, power-looms completely dominated in Fukui. Similar to
Shizuoka, manual work to produce simple products could be easily replaced bymachines. Fukui procured silk from Yokohama, the most important port, which implies
that Fukui used machine reeled silk produced by the modern sector, which can beexported to abroad. In contrast, silk fabric producers in Kiryu and Nishijin began using
machine reeled raw silk and power-looms much later. Power-loom adopters were either
factories or relatively large family enterprises with the employment of more than a few
workers and exported the products abroad (Hashino 2021). That is, choices oftechnology, product types, and marketing channels were closely inter-related.
We must also mention that production in the stagnant phase in Nishijin andKiryu was carried out primarily by small-scale out-weavers consisting of a few workers
under the leadership of contactor-cum-merchants who procure yarns and request designs
and dying before handing over yarns to out-weavers and after finishing sell products tourban traders. So far as complicated fabric production using handlooms is subject toscale diseconomies, such production organization seems to be rational adaptation to therich skill endowment in the traditional silk weaving districts.

26

6. Concluding Remarks
We found in this study that behind the successful development of the cotton textile andsilk industries, Japan made a number of critical technology choices and adaptations. In
the late 19th century, ring spinning machine with cotton mixing techniques was chosenover mule spinning machine, sedentary reeling was chosen over machine reeling, andhandloom, with Jacquard in the case of silk weaving, was chosen over power-looms.
Overall, there was clear tendency that labor-intensive production methods were chosen.
In this sense, the Japanese development path can be characterized by high labor intensity.
A number of technological and institutional adaptations were also made, not tomention the invention of cotton mixing technique. Invention of wooden and iron powerlooms was a good example. Sedentary reeling was improved by incorporating new ideas
from imported machines from France and Italy. The development of fine division of labor
among yarn processors, out-weavers, and finishing processors in the production ofsophisticated silk fabrics under the leadership of contractor-cum-merchants is an
important institutional innovation.
As wage rate increased, technology choice shifted in favor of labor-saving
technologies. By importing long staple cotton, the ring machine was run without laborintensive cotton mixing techniques. Machine reeling dominated over sedentary reeling27and machine reeled raw silk was shipped to the silk weaving districts, which used to beserved by the traditional reeling sector. Handlooms were replaced by power-looms andthose cotton and silk weaving districts, which introduced power-looms more actively,
grew faster and became larger. These observations suggest that after the turn of the
century and particularly after World War I, labor-saving technological progress was
became appropriate.
Labor saving technological progress accompanied the change in the products. In
the cotton spinning industry, higher quality or higher count yarns were produced by using
longer staple cotton. It was cotton and silk weaving districts that adopted power-looms
actively and exported massively. In other words, adaptation of main products to newlabor-saving machines was actively made to sustain industrial growth with labor-saving
technological changes.
To sum up, this study attempted to deepen our understanding of the process oftechnological catch-up in the prewar Japan. We do not favor the flying geese model ofindustrial development, partly because it ignores selective technology choice andadaptations and partly because it did not pay attention to the role of inter-industry linkages.
We do not favor the view that Japanese economic growth was characterized by laborintensive path, because there was clear shift from labor-using to labor-saving
28

technological changes. It is probably fair to conclude that path of industrial developmentin prewar Japan was consistent with the level and changes in factor endowments which
are revealed most clearly in changes in real wage rate.

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32

Figure 1. Changes in Real Value of Import, Domestic Production, and Export of
Cotton Yarn, 1880-1933 (Million Yen)a(Million yen)

800
700
600
500
400
300
200

0

1880
1882
1884
1886
1888
1890
1892
1894
1896
1898
1900
1902
1904
1906
1908
1910
1912
1914
1916
1918
1920
1922
1924
1926
1928
1930
1932

100

Production

ImportExportNotes and Sources: a Deflated by cotton yarn price index (1934-36=100).
Nominal values are deflated by price index of cotton yarns, 1934-36=100, which istaken from Fujino et al. (1979, p. 247). The nominal value of production for 188093 is from Otsuka et al. (1988, pp. 28-29). Since price index before 1890 is notavailable, we assume that prices before 1890 did not change. Real value of
production for 1894-93 is from Fujino et al. (1979, p. 241). Import and export datafor 1891-1933 are from Toyo Keizai Shimposha (1975, p. 230 and p. 50). Importdata for 1880-90 is from Otsuka et al. (1988, pp. 28-29). Here too, we assume thatprices did not change before 1980.

33

Figure 2. Changes in Real Value of Import, Domestic Production by Traditionaland Modern Sectors, and Export of Cotton Fabrics, 1887-1933 (Million Yen)
(Million yen)

600
500
400
300
200

Production by traditional sector

Production by modern sector

ImportExport

1933

1931

1929

1927

1925

1923

1921

1919

1917

1915

1913

1911

1909

1907

1905

1903

1901

1899

1897

1895

1893

1891

1889

0

1887

100

Notes and Sources: Nominal values are deflated by price index of cotton textiles, 193436=100, which is taken from Fujino et al. (1979, p. 247). The nominal value of
production for 1887-94 is from Otsuka et al. (1988, p. 47). Since price index
before 1890 is not available, we assume that prices before 1890 did not change.
Real value of production by the modern textile companies for 1898-1933 is takenfrom Fujino et al (1979, p. 245). Nominal values of total production, import, andexport are from Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (various years) for 191523 and Ministry of Commerce and Industry (various years) for 1924-33.

34

Figure 3. Changes in Spindle-Labor Ratio and Real Capital Stock-Labor Ratio in
the Cotton Spinning Industry, 1883-1933(Spindles)

Cotton spinning industry(Thousand yen)

Modern cotton textile industry

12

250

10

200

8

150

6
100

4

50

1883
1886
1889
1892
1895
1898
1901
1904
1907
1910
1913
1916
1919
1922
1925
1928
1931

0

1883
1886
1889
1892
1895
1898
1901
1904
1907
1910
1913
1916
1919
1922
1925
1928
1931

0

2

Spindle-Labor Ratio (Total Labor)

Capital-Labor Ratio (Total Labor)

Spindle-Labor Ratio (Female Labor
Equivalent)

Capital-Labor-Ratio (Female Labor
Equivalent)

Notes and Sources: The number of spindles is taken from Otsuka et al. (1988, pp. 20809) for 1883-1900 and from Fujino et al. (1979, pp. 74-83) for 1905-33. Missing
data between 1900 and 1905 are interpolated. Labor input and wage data are takenfrom Otsuka et al. (1988, pp. 211-13) for 1883-89 and from Fujino et al. (1979,
pp. 255-57, pp. 273-74) for 1890-1933. Net real capital stock data for 1883-1933
are taken from Fujino et al. (1979, pp. 250-51).

35

Figure 4: Changes in Real Wage Rate by Male and Female Workers in the Cotton
Spinning Industry, 1890-1933 (Yen per Day)
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

FemaleMale

Notes and Sources: Wage data are taken from Fujino et al. (1979, pp. 273-74), anddeflator is price index of cotton yarns (1934-36 = 100) taken from Fujino et al.
(1979, p. 247).

36Figure 5: Use of Imported and Domestically Produced Spinning Machines (theNumber of Spindles), Power-Looms and Automatic Looms in the Modern
Cotton Textile Industry, 1890-1935.
(Looms)(1000 Spindles)

8000

50000
45000

7000

40000

6000

35000

5000

30000
25000

4000

20000

3000

15000

2000

10000

1000
0

5000
1890

1895

1900

1905

1910

1915

Spindles of imported machines
Number of imported power looms
Number of imported automatic looms

1920

1925

1930

1935

0

Spindles of domestically produced machines
Number of domestic power looms
Number of domestic automatic looms

Source: Otsuka et al. (1988, pp. 142-43).

37

Figure 6: Real Vale of Production of Total and Cotton Fabrics in Saitama and
Shizuoka Prefecture, 1905-33(Million yen)

60
50
40
30
20

0

1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933

10

Saitama(Total)

Saitama(Cotton)

Shizuoka(Total)

Shizuoka(Cotton)

Notes and Sources: The data of nominal value of production are taken from Ministry ofAgriculture and Commerce (various year) for 1905-19 and from Ministry ofCommerce and Industry for 1924-33. The deflator is the price index of cotton
textiles from Fujino et al. (1979, p. 247).

38

Figure 7: Adoption of Handlooms and Power-Looms in Saitama and Shizuoka
Prefecture, 1905-33

Saitama Prefecture(1000 Looms)

Shizuoka Prefecture

60

50

40

40

30

30

20

20

10

10

0

0

1905
1907
1909
1911
1913
1915
1917
1919
1921
1923
1925
1927
1929
1931
1933

50

Total no. of hand looms
Total no. of power looms
No. of hand looms for cotton
No. of power looms for cotton

1905
1907
1909
1911
1913
1915
1917
1919
1921
1923
1925
1927
1929
1931
1933

(1000 Looms)
60

Total no. of hand looms
Total no. of power looms
No. of hand looms for cotton
No. of power looms for cotton

Sources: Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (various year) for 1905-19 andMinistry of Commerce and Industry for 1924-33.

39

Figure 8: Changes in Total Raw Silk Production from 1878, Export from 1868, andProduction of Machine Reeled Silk from 1889 to 1993 (1,000 kg)
50000
45000
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
0

1868
1870
1872
1874
1876
1878
1880
1882
1884
1886
1888
1890
1892
1894
1896
1898
1900
1902
1904
1906
1908
1910
1912
1914
1916
1918
1920
1922
1924
1926
1928
1930
1932

5000

Production

Total Export

Sources: Fujino et al. (1979, pp. 294-95, p. 308).

40

Production of Machine Reeled Silk

Figure 9. Changes in Silk Production in the Traditional Sector, 1889-1933, andEstimated Supply of Machine Reeled Silk to the Domestic Weaving Industry,
1902-33, (1,000 kg)
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
-2000

Traditional Sector

Estimated Supply of Machine Reeled Silk

Source: Fujino et al. (pp. 294-95).

41

Figure 10: Changes in Real Value of Domestic Production and Export of Silk
Fabrics, 1886-1933 (million yen)
(Million yen)

600
500
400
300
200
100
0

Production

ExportNotes and Sources: Nominal values of total production silk fabrics are from Ministry ofAgriculture and Commerce (various years) for 1915-23 and Ministry ofCommerce and Industry (various years) for 1924-33. Silk fabrics include silkcotton mixed fabrics. Nominal value of export data are taken from Toyo Keizai
Shimposha (1975, p. 230 and p. 50). Deflater is price index of textile products
from Ohkawa et al. (1967).

42Figure 11. Changes in Real Value of Domestic Production and Export of Silk
Fabrics, 1886-1933 (million yen)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Nishijin

Kiryu

Fukui

Notes and Sources: Hashino (2016) and Hashino (2019). Deflater is price index of
textile products from Ohkawa et al. (1967).

43Figure 12. Changes in the Number of Hand Looms (HL) and Power Looms (PL) in
the Three Traditional Silk Weaving Clusters, 1886-1930

35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0

HL_Nishijin
HL_Kiryu
HL_Fukui

PL_Nishijin
PL_Kiryu
PL_FukuiNotes and Sources: Same as Figure 11.

44

Table 1. Export Shares of the Textile Products and the Number of Workers in the
Textile Industries in the Prewar Japanese Economy in Selected Years
Export shares (%):
Cotton yarn
Raw silk
Cotton fabrics
Silk fabrics
Number of workers (1,000)
Cotton spinning
Silk reeling
Cotton weaving
Silk weaving

1894

1910

1930

0.8
34.8
1.6
7.5

9.9
28.4
4.5
7.2

1.0
28.3
18.5
4.5

10.2
117.6

29.0
n.a.b

43.0
509.1
221.8
206.5

943.6a761.3aa.
Only the total in the cotton and silk weaving industry is available.
b.
Not available.
Sources: Export data from Toyo Keizai Shimposha (1975, p.2, p. 50, p. 55, p. 72, p. 76).
Number of workers in cotton spinning and raw silk from Fujino et al. (1979, p.
257, pp. 300-301); Number of workers in a total of cotton silk fabric production
from Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (1900, 1910). Number of workers in
the cotton and silk weaving industries in 1930 is from the Ministry of Commerceand Industry (1930).

45

Table 2. Import of Cotton to Japan by County of Origin in Selected Years
Total amount(1000 tons)

Composition (%)
China

India

U.S.

Egypt

Others

1884

45

97.3

2.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

1890

333

73.6

21.0

5.3

0.0

0.0

1897

2,229

22.4

62.0

15.6

0.0

0.0

1902

3,386

23.1

53.3

21.6

2.0

0.0

1907

4,601

14.7

58.0

24.2

1.5

1.6

1914

7,839

4.7

70.1

21.7

3.2

0.3

1921

8,605

0.3

60.7

35.4

1.7

1.9

1930

9,573

7.3

49.4

40.6

1.9

0.8

1934

13,554

2.4

42.7

47.9

4.1

2.9

Sources: Sampei (1941).

46