Global Nuclear Disarmament and Northeast Asia Security:
A Japanese Perspective
Hiromichi Umebayashi
President, Peace Depot, Yokohama, Japan
Prepared for Workshop on“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”
Hiroshima Peace Institute
Hiroshima, Japan
March 11-12, 2004

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1. Introduction
It is well known that the fundamentals of the current nuclear disarmament policy of Japan
have been established in mid to late 1960s by Eisaku Sato Administration. In this framework,
promotion of nuclear disarmament is one of four larger nuclear policies. The minutes of Prime
Minister Sato’s comprehensive statement on such policies in the Diet (National Parliament) in 1968
read as follows.1“With regard to the nuclear policy of our country, I can say there are fourpillars.
Firstly, we will not develop nuclear weapons, we will not allow bringing-in ofthem, and we will not possess them. These are so-called three non-nuclear principles.
(Some shouted ‘You are lying.’) I hear someone’s hoot that I am lying. No. I should beclear about it.
Secondly, our nation, which had tragic experiences caused by nuclear weapons,has desire to eliminate or abolish such weapons. However, as a matter of reality, we cannot
realize it immediately, so for the time being we will make our efforts for nuclear
disarmament2 to start with whatever practically possible. Accordingly we are expressing
our views (internationally) on international regulation and control. Even such tasks are noteasy and we have to work with patience.
Thirdly, consistent with the Peace Constitution, we will maintain our own
self-defense force to defend against the conventional invasion. But in relation to theinternational nuclear threat, our security continues to rely upon the U.S. nuclear deterrence.
This is the third decision.
Fourthly, we will make our best to advance the peaceful use of nuclear energy asa priority of our national policy. We will contribute to the global progress of science andtechnology. While we ourselves will enjoy the benefit of such progress, it will make ournation more prideful, prestigious, and consequently more influential in addressing peaceissues.
The above four is the foundation of the nuclear policies of our nation.”(translation by the author)
Yasuo Fukuda, Cabinet Secretary of the Koizumi Administration, made a controversialcomment in a recent press conference that the three non-nuclear principles could be changed.3 His
statement obviously departed from past statements made by other administrations as they often
referred to the three non-nuclear principles as unchangeable principles of the nation. In a special Diet
session organized specifically to discuss over Fukuda’s comments, he reaffirmed, in the presence ofPrime Minister Koizumi and without logical explanation, that they are unchangeable.4 The turmoil
ceased. However, it is now more important to ask why they are so. Given the contemporary trends inJapan in which various political and legal systems constructed upon the Article 9 of Peace
Constitution undergo new scrutiny, it is relevant and important to review and examine the logics thatwere developed to make up the nuclear policies of Japan. For this purpose, we will focus in this“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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paper upon the development of Diet discussions on nuclear issues until 1968, when the above fourpillars was established, because the Diet is the only official arena where underlying logics ofpolitical decisions are questioned and answered in specific security situations of the time.
2. Diet Discussions over Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
No doubt, the “Treaty of Peace with Japan” (San Francisco Peace Treaty) and “Security
Treaty between Japan and the United States of America” (Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) are the mostfundamental treaties that influenced the post World War II history of Japan. The two treaties weresigned on Sep. 8, 1950, ratified on Nov. 18, 1951 and entered into force on Apr. 28, 1952. Although
the Diet started sessions in May 1947, twenty months after the surrender of Japan, it was under thecontrol of GHQ (General Headquarter) of the occupation force headed by the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers during the whole lead time to the two treaties. The GHQ press code prohibitedany acts and reports that will create serious distrust of the Allied Powers. Reports and criticisms onhuman aspects of atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the U.S. were considered to besuch examples.
Although the contents of the treaty became open only one month before the signature of
the treaty, heated disputes took place in advance between the proponents of overall peace and thoseof separate peace with U.S.-led allies. At the entrance of the nuclear arms race between the U.S. andSoviet Union, the disputes were inevitably related to the impact of atomic bombs upon the securityof Japan. Many of the proponents of overall peace argued that the invention of atomic weapons
created the situation in which Japan would be more vulnerable to annihilation if it would ally with
one side of the world. Accordingly, some argued for the status of permanent neutrality of Japan forthe same reason.
“Suppose that Japan enters an arrangement of military protection of particularstates and seeks its security by providing military bases to them. Of course, I do hope that
there will be no war between the U.S. and Soviet Union, but if a war should break out
between the two countries, then mainland Japan would become a battle field and a central
target of air raids, and would be razed to the ground by tens of atomic bombs. …I believe,
therefore, the only way left is some form of substantial neutrality.”5“…if matters should go worse, the atomic bombs could fall upon our people. In
order to prevent it, we have to maintain as good terms as possible with Soviet and Chukyo(Communist China). We should not abandon such efforts by saying it would be very
difficult. …When these treaties are ratified and enter into force, I think we will need asystem of civil defense (to protect against atomic bombs) preparing for the emergency.”6
These arguments exhibit the underlying logics of their contention. They recognized thatthe destructive power of nuclear weapons and the global confrontational climate governing such
weapons were critical terms to define the safety of Japan. Since “safety of Japan” is a word that canbe used by both sides of the disputes over security issues, specific analysis of the situation isessential to justify either one of them. Nevertheless, there was no counter argument from proponents“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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4of two treaties or from the Government, referring to the nuclear dimension of their contention.
In the same period of time, there were some discussions about the nuclear disarmament per
se. It is note-worthy that the first challenge in the Diet history against the atomic bombs came fromhumanitarian perspectives in November 1949. It was claimed that atomic bombs were to be banned
because of its inhumane nature. However, Government of Japan (GOJ) made no comment.
“Member (Koichi) Sekou: …I believe it is inhumane to wage a war using atomic
bombs. Especially, peace advocates in the world are unanimous in arguing that future useof atomic bombs will annihilate the whole world. We have many survivors who
experienced miseries caused by atomic bombings. Then on this occasion, I would like tolisten to the Prime Minister’s unequivocal view that the use of atomic weapons isinhumane. I believe your response would contribute to the world peace enormously.
Prime Minister (Shigeru) Yoshida: This is related to diplomatic affairs, and I
have no freedom to comment on it at this time. I will comment on later days.”7
Also parliamentarians mostly from Communist Party asked the Government for support
the ban of atomic weapons and their use in relation to the Stockholm Peace Appeal that was adopted
in March 1950, and to the possible use of nuclear weapons in the Korean War that broke out in June
1950. As is exemplified by the case of Kanichi Kawakami, a communist who strongly requested
Prime Minister’s support of the “absolute ban” of atomic weapons8 and was expelled from the Diet
because of his anti-imperialist speech next year, genuine exchange of logics on nuclear disarmament
was very difficult at the Diet that was placed under the control of GHQ.
However, it is to be noted that there appeared already a notion expressed by a GOJ official
that nuclear weapons were preventing the war, a view that later became common to the advocates ofnuclear deterrence.
“…it is a common saying in the peace movement community that any country
that may use atomic bombs is asserted to be on the side of invasion whatever the reason
may be. I think, however, measures to build peace and serve as a breakwater against therisk of war are pursued through sufficiently strengthening the most advanced armaments. I
think it is a global trend. I don’t believe they are meant to prepare for a war. This is theview of the Foreign Ministry.”9
3. Diet Discussions over Nuclear Test Ban and Atomic Energy
When Japan enacted the Fundamental Law for Atomic Energy in December 1955, it closed
the door to its military use of the nuclear energy. By this time since the recovery of independence in
1952, Japanese public had received considerable flow of information on the devastation ofHiroshima and Nagasaki, including photos and survivors’ memoirs. In addition, there was anotheraccident of great influence upon Japanese public opinions and politics, namely the Bikini hydrogenbomb test on March 1, 1954 and the suffering of Japanese fishing boats. The Article 2 of theFundamental Law reads “Research, development and use of atomic energy will be limited to thepeaceful purposes and conducted while securing safety, operated under a democratic administration“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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and maintaining independence. Their outcomes will be publicized and voluntarily contributed tointernational cooperation” (translation by the author). But it is remarkable that there was noargument in the Diet against abandoning military option. Rather much discussion was maderegarding the danger that the Administration might allow any clandestine diversion from thepeaceful purposes. In fact the concerns of the conservative Administration were directed more to
maintain harmony with the rising public opposition to nuclear weapons, the deepening Japan-U.S.
security relationship and the desire to develop national nuclear science and technology.
As expected from a historic coincidence that the first Japanese national budget to constructa home made nuclear reactor was proposed on the very next day of the first Bikini hydrogen bomb
test in 1954, the developments of the Diet discussions from March 1954 to December 1955 werevery instrumental to shape the later Japanese nuclear policy. The first adoption of Diet resolution on
the international control of atomic energy and the ban of atomic weapons in April 1954 was anintermediate landmark achievement in this period. Both Houses resolved similar texts unanimously
but with a little different emphasis.
The “Resolution on the International Control of Atomic Energy” by the House ofRepresentatives reads, “This House will request the United Nations (U.N.) immediately to takeeffective and appropriate measures to promote the international control and peaceful use of atomic
energy and the ban of use of atomic weapons, as well as measures to prevent damages caused byatomic weapon tests. It resolves the aforesaid.”10 The “Resolution on the International Control ofAtomic Energy and the Ban of Atomic Weapons” by the House of Councilors reads, “This House
will request the U.N. urgently to take appropriate measures to realize the establishment of theeffective international control of atomic energy, the ban of atomic weapons, and the prevention ofdamages caused by atomic weapon tests, as well as measures to achieve peaceful use of atomic
energy for promotion of welfare of humankind. It resolves the aforesaid.”11 It is to be added thatthese resolutions were welcomed by the Administration, and that Japan was not the member of the
U.N. at that time. It was allowed to join the U.N. in December 1956.
In the Diet sessions leading to such resolutions emerged some significant elements
concerning the logics of Japan for nuclear disarmament. One is the logic of Japan’s responsibility tohumankind. It calls on Japan to speak out toward international community about the danger ofnuclear weapons and the necessity of their prohibition. All speeches from different political parties
presented to support the resolutions contained such logic. Obviously it came out of overwhelming
voices for “no more Hiroshima and Nagasaki” in the civil society. Another notable one is the logicof the benefit of the free world that came from the Administration. It claimed that while theinternational control was good idea, Japan should not jeopardize the U.S. efforts to improve its
arsenals until the international agreement was reached. Katsuo Okazaki, then Foreign Minister ofJapan, responded in the Diet as follows.
“As for Government of Japan, we are very eager to tackle the international
control of atomic energy. …However, pending its accomplishment, both the Soviet Union
side and the U.S. and the U.K. side will conduct various (atomic) tests and try to makenew inventions. Therefore I don’t want to take any measures to weaken the defense force“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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6of the free world.”12“We believe that to strengthen the U.S. defense force is to increase the safety of
the world. Therefore, we would like to seek measures (to protect fishery) as much as
possible so that we may cooperate with the U.S. protection of secrecy (regarding the tests)
and may not disturb the U.S. tests.”13
These two logics, Japan’s responsibility to humankind and benefit of the free world, wereseemingly conflicting with each other, but they still worked in preserving apparent consistency of
the Administration’s nuclear disarmament policy. It could call for the international control and banof nuclear weapons and at the same time it could cooperate with the U.S. on the U.S. bomb
development until the international agreement was attained. Two years later, both houses adopted
further resolutions to call for the nuclear test ban,14 but the hypocritical structure of the logic
remained same.
4. Revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and Elements of Three Principles
The Law to Establish Defense Agency and the Law of the Self-Defense Force (SDF) werepassed by the Diet in June 1954, thus the Diet debates over the Japanese rearmament took placealmost in parallel with debates leading to the above Diet resolutions in 1954. The nuclear armamentof the SDF was clearly denied in such debates but the nuclear armament of the U.S. Forces Japan
was accepted by the GOJ at that time.
“Member (Shichiro) Hozumi: …I would like to ask the two questions regarding
the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan and growing SDF of Japan …First, I think you should
say that the SDF or future armed forces of Japan will never possess nor use atomic
weapons. Do you agree? Second, we would like to ask the U.S. Forces neither to possess
nor to use atomic bombs, but naturally we cannot dictate them. …However, …I think it isnatural for us to refuse their bringing-in of atomic weapons to the U.S. military bases inJapan, since the Japanese people will be the first that suffer damages from such dangerous
weapons. …
Vice Prime Minister (Taketora) Ogata: …As for your question whether theJapanese SDF will possess atomic weapons, no, it will not. As for the possession of such
weapons by the U.S. Forces in Japan, …I think Japan should not interfere, though I don’t
think such situation will occur for the time being. This is the question of the U.S. Forces,
and we cannot dictate them not to be equipped …”15
When the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty grew the central political agenda inJapan, one of the key claims of the Administration was to attain more equal partnership with the U.S.
by such revision. In the meantime, concerns about the atmospheric nuclear tests were swelling in theinternational community. Annual number of the atmospheric nuclear tests marked 62 in the U.S., thehighest record in history, and 34 in Soviet Union.16 The House of Councilors unanimously resolved
the ban of nuclear weapons for the third time in 1957. A year later the House of Representatives
adopted another test ban resolution, in which “it was reaffirmed that Japan will not possess nuclear“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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weapons,” and the House of Councilors unanimously passed the forth resolution to ban nuclear
weapons. Under these circumstances, the nuclear armament of the U.S. Forces became acontroversial political issue. Contrary to the previous position of the Government, Acting Prime
Minister Nobusuke Kishi came to the position in February 1957 that he would say “no” to any priorconsultation offered by the U.S. to introduce a U.S. atomic troop.17 Later of the year, Kishi, thenformal Prime Minister, made a clearer statement to deny any possible bringing-in of nuclear
weapons by the U.S. forces. The reasoning for it was not to make Japan a base for major U.S.
missiles and involved in the U.S. nuclear strategy.
“You may concern about the possibility that Japan will become a base of the U.S.
major missiles and get involved in the U.S. atomic strategy in the future. In this regard, asI have said clearly in the past, I reaffirm unequivocally herewith that we will never allow
the bringing-in of the U.S. nuclear weapons. Also we will never equip the SDF with such
weapons.”18
Thus, by the time of the Japan-U.S. Joint Statement of September 11, 1958 in which bothsides agreed to initiate negotiations to revise the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, each element of later
three non-nuclear principles had become a sort of norm in the Japanese domestic politics. As we seein the above discussions, underlying logics to support these principles were related to the recognitionof inhumane nature of nuclear weapons, the safety consideration of the world and Japan, the sense of
responsibility of the only bombed nation to the world. It is useful to note that all of these logics camefrom global or universal perspectives and none from regional perspectives.
4. Chinese Nuclear Test and East Asia Regional Perspective
China’s first nuclear test took place in October 1964. It apparently stirred in-depth security
discussions in the Diet, but they ended in much less change in the security policy framework ofJapan. One notable change, however, was the clearer emphasis of the role of the U.S. nuclear
deterrence in relation to the protection of Japan. The Chinese Bomb tightened up the link between
the nuclear disarmament policy and Japan-U.S. Security arrangement.
The theory of nuclear deterrence had been already common in the security discussions in
the Diet at that time. The first notion in the Diet that nuclear weapons had roles to prevent war
appeared as early as in 1951.19 In the discussions leading to the revision of the Security Treaty,frequently appeared such notion that the U.S.-Japan security system is a part of the U.S. global
nuclear deterrence system. Clearly, these discussions were done in the global Cold War context.
However, Chinese nuclear tests turned the U.S. nuclear deterrent into a direct defense measure forJapan. Just ten days before the Chinese test, which had already been a prospect, Junya Koizumi, then
Defense Minister under the 3rd Ikeda Administration, dared to say that there was no need of policychange of Japan if China developed nuclear weapons.
“Our view is that the nuclear weapons are primarily the deterrent force against
the war. It has been our formal policy that, in the Japan-U.S. security system, our national
defense depends upon the U.S. in relation to the nuclear weapons. With this spirit and“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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policy, we need not take any counter measures such as nuclear arming of ourselves, even if
Chukyo (Communist China) completes its nuclear arsenals.”20
This belief in the credible U.S. nuclear deterrence under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
was more clearly reiterated by himself ten days after the test actually took place, responding toAkimichi Ito, a socialist, who questioned about the Administration’s view on the possible re-revisionof the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1970.
“As you point out, it is the time of re-revision of the Security Treaty around1970. I also agree with Ito-sensei that the results of the Chinese nuclear test this time will
make a great progress by that time. Despite such circumstances, I believe that Japan neednot change its fundamental policies that Japan does not go nuclear and also opposes
bringing-in of nuclear weapons. We should go as we do now.”21
Eisaku Sato, who was a member of the 3rd Ikeda Cabinet, succeeded him as Prime Minister
two weeks after such Diet discussion. In about two years, Sato formalized the four pillars ofJapanese nuclear policy that was cited in Section 1 of this paper. As is seen from the above
discussions, all pillars other than the third one, including elements of the three non-nuclear principles,
had already been there, and what Sato innovated clearly by such formulation was the third pillar, thedependence upon the U.S. nuclear deterrence to defend Japan. Importantly, it had a concrete regional
context, namely it was introduced to deter the Chinese nuclear forces. About one and a half month
before the comprehensive statement, Sato explained as follows.
“… under the Peace Constitution and three non-nuclear principles, theresponsibility imposed upon myself is how I can guarantee the safety of Japan. …when I
met President Johnson in 1965, as well as this time, I asked him if the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty could protect Japan against any attack, in other words against the nuclear attack
upon Japan. He responded that obviously he would protect Japan against any kind of
attack. This is the purpose of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. …now Chukyo, our neighbor,is developing nuclear weapons. …They have tested six times already. …I am convincedthat even if Chukyo acquires nuclear weapons today, safety of Japan is secured under theJapan-U.S. Security Treaty.”22
5. Lessons to the Future: Significance of a Northeast Asia NWFZ
This policy framework of four pillars remains unchanged today. When Japan ratified the
NPT in 1976 and the CTBT in 1997, both of which enhanced further the impediment for Japan to go
nuclear, concerns of the conservatives were eventually appeased and apparent harmony between theconservatives and the progressives were maintained because of this framework. However, in thisframework it means that Japan’s policy of three non-nuclear principles and call for global nuclear
disarmament have to be bolstered by the nuclear deterrence of the U.S., most powerful nuclear
believer. Naturally, dilemmas, contradictions, internal conflicts and crashes have occurred frequently
within the framework. One of the most well-known of such crashes is found in relation to theportcall and homeporting of nuclear carrying U.S. naval vessels. The U.S. claims that such vessels“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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are part of deterrent forces, and then Japan needs them for its security. However three non-nuclear
principles prohibit the bringing-in of nuclear weapons. Ample official documents and evidences
have been revealed to tell the existence of secret accord between Japan and the U.S. to allow such
portcall, but the GOJ has constantly been denying them.
Global nuclear disarmament efforts by Japan have also been affected by the considerationof their consistency with the U.S. global and regional defense posture. One of the significant
examples is the attempt by the Government of Japan to weaken the text of its U.N. General
Assembly resolution in 2001 in relation to the call on the early entry into force of the CTBT. In spiteof the fact Japan had publicly announced many times that the CTBT was the top priority agenda ofits nuclear disarmament policy, it deleted a traditional phrase to urge the early entry into force fromits draft text of the resolution23 in August 2001 in order to avoid conflicts and get support of the
U.S., because the latter had renounced the CTBT a month before. Partly because of the strong public
opposition against this policy shift of the GOJ and partly because of the eventual finding that the U.S.
would not support even the watered-down resolution, the GOJ managed to recover the traditional
phrase in the final form of its resolution.24
It is very important to note that the nuclear disarmament setbacks related to the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty arrangement also happened by the initiative of Japan. When Masashi Nishihara,
President, National Defense Academy of Japan, contributed an op-ed to the Washington Post in
August 2003,25 he insisted “Washington should not sign a pact stating that it has no intention oflaunching a nuclear attack on North Korea,” because it might eventually create circumstances that
“Tokyo could no longer rely on its alliance with Washington and thus might decide to develop its
own retaliatory nuclear weapons.” It will be safe to assume that his contribution is intended to carry
the message from the GOJ, with or without prior consultation between the two, to the U.S.
Administration at the time of a six party talk on North Korea approaching in two weeks. According
to a Kyodo News report from Washington DC,26 by the time of that six party talk, the GOJ had
requested the U.S. to preserve its nuclear deterrence against North Korea, and accordingly at a threeparty high level consultation at the end of September 2003, involving the U.S., Japan, and South
Korea, the U.S. accepted Japan’s request and assured Japan that it would maintain its nuclear
umbrella against North Korea even after the U.S. provided some sort of security assurance to North
Korea.
This example impresses on us how the way of thinking of the GOJ about the East Asia
regional security remains the same with that of the days just after the Chinese first nuclear tests.
However, Japan is now much more powerful and influential country than it was in 1964, and if it
wants, it can formulate and develop its own new regional security strategy by using its influential
power. In fact, this power is placed at a juncture in that it can also be powerful to prolong thestalemate of nuclear disarmament or even to enhance the nuclear risk for the sake of alleged safetyof Japan by means of the U.S. nuclear deterrence.
As was examined in the above, genuine non-nuclear policies of Japan, originated from theHiroshima and Nagasaki experiences and sense of responsibility as a member of humankind, areconsolidated in Sato’s first two pillars. On the other hand, the third pillar, which kills the impetus of“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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invaluable first two, was introduced to address the regional security concerns. Therefore, what isvitally needed is an alternative vision on the East Asia regional security arrangement that canaddress the security concerns of the region without relying upon the U.S. nuclear deterrence.
Obviously, the establishment of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) withappropriate negative security assurances is considered to be a thoughtful approach in this respect.27

Diet Minutes, 58th, Plenary, House of Representatives, Jan. 30, 19682
It is appropriate here to explain about a Japanese linguistic problem. In Japanese language “nuclear
disarmament” (kaku-gunshuku) means more likely “reduction of nuclear weapons” than theireventual “elimination.” When people want to be exact, they use the term “abolition of nuclear
weapons” (kakuheiki-haizetsu) or “(total) elimination of nuclear weapons” in order to mean theachievement of zero nuclear weapons. In the citations from the Diet Minutes, the present author
automatically translates the term “kaku-gunshuku” into “nuclear disarmament.”
3
Asahi Shimbun, Jun. 1, 2002
4
Diet Minutes, 154th, Special Committee on Measures to Situations of Armed Attack, House ofRepresentatives, Jun. 10, 2003
5
Kei Hoashi (Socialist Party of Japan): Diet Minutes, 6th, Plenary, House of Councilors, Nov. 10,1949 (translation by the author)
6
Aisuke Okamoto (independent, Ryokufu-kai): Diet Minutes, 12th, Special Committee on Peace
Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Nov. 16, 1951 (translation by the author)
7
Diet Minutes, 6th, Standing Committee on Budget, House of Representatives, Nov. 24, 1949.
Koichi Sekou was independent at that time. (translation by the author)
8
8th Diet, Plenary, House of Representatives, Jul. 15, 1950
9
Ryuen Kusaba: Diet Minutes, 10th, Standing Committee on Budget, House of Councilors, Feb. 6,
1951. (translation by the author)
10
Diet Minutes, 19th, Plenary, House of Representatives, Apr. 1, 1954 (translation by the author)
11
Diet Minutes, 19th, Plenary, House of Councilors, Apr. 5, 1954 (translation by the author)
12
Diet Minutes, 19th, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mar. 25, 1954 (translation by theauthor)13
Diet Minutes, 19th, Standing Committee on Welfare, Mar. 25, 1954 (translation by the author)
14
House of Representatives: “Resolution on the Request to Prohibit Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb
Tests,” Feb. 9, 1956, and House of Councilors: “Resolution on the Prohibition of Atomic andHydrogen Bomb Tests,” Feb. 10, 1956.
15
Diet Minutes, 19th, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mar. 29, 1954. Shichiro Hozumi wasa Socialist. (translation by the author)
16
Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1996
17
Diet Minutes, 26th, Standing Committee on Budget, House of Representatives, Feb. 8, 1957
18
Nobusuke Kishi: Diet Minutes, 28th, Plenary, House of Councilors, Dec. 23, 1957 (translation by
the author)
19
See note 8.
20
Diet Minutes, 46th, Standing Committee on Budget, House of Representatives, Oct. 6, 1964
(translation by the author)
21
Diet Minutes, 46th, Standing Committee on Cabinet, House of Councilors, Oct. 26, 1964
(translation by the author)
22
Diet Minutes, 57th, Standing Committee on Budget, House of Representatives, Dec. 11, 1967
(translation by the author)
23
A/C.1/56/L.35
24
A/RES/56/24
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25

Masashi Nishihara: “North Korea’s Trojan Horse,” The Washington Post, Aug. 14, 2003
The Kanagawa Shimbun, Oct. 31, 200327
As a realistic scheme of a Northeast NWFZ, the present author presented “three plus three”
scheme in which three non-nuclear states, Japan and two Koreas, compose the zone, and threesurrounding nuclear states, the U.S., Russia and China, provide security assurances to the zone. See
Hiromichi Umebayashi: “A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” Peace Depot Briefing,
April 30, 2003. On this topic, there are valuable contributions by John E. Endicott et al, Kumao
Kaneko, and Andrew Mack. Literature references on these contributions are found in the above
Peace Depot Briefing.
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