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グローバルセキュリティセミナー叢書

第７号

GLOBAL SECURITY SEMINAR SERIES NO. 7

NDA-FOI Joint Seminar

China’s Use of Influence in the

Indo-Pacific: Patterns andRegional Insights
Coedited by
Hideya Kurata and Oscar Almén

防衛大学校先端学術推進機構
グローバルセキュリティセンター

© National Defense Academy, Japan Ministry of Defense
1-10-20 Hashirimizu, Yokosuka, 239-8686 JAPANGlobal Security Seminar Series No.7

NDA-FOI Joint Seminar

China’s Use of Influence in the IndoPacific: Patterns and Regional Insights
Coedited by
Hideya Kurata and Oscar Almen

March 2024

Center for Global Security, National Defense Academy
Yokosuka, Japani

CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iii

INTRODUCTION

1CHAPTER 1
Masafumi Iida

China’s Military Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region

4

CHAPTER 2
Per Olsson

China’s Growing Military Power and Influence

17

CHAPTER 3
Matake Kamiya

Emergence of the US–Japan Alliance to Counter China

27

CHAPTER 4
Johan Englund

China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe

37

CHAPTER 5
Hideya Kurata

China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization

52

CHAPTER 6
Christopher
Weidacher Hsiung

Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean
Peninsula

67

Revisiting China’s Influence: A Case Study of South
Asia

83

The Sino-Indian Border Conflict and Current Limits to
Chinese Influence in India

98

Evolution of China’s Influence in Australia: 1996 to
Today

114

CHAPTER 7
Masahiro Kurita

CHAPTER 8
Oscar Almen

CHAPTER 9
Teruhiko Fukushima

CONTRIBUTORS

152ii

GLOBAL SECURITY SEMINAR SERIES
Global Security Seminar Series is published occasionally by the Center for Global Security.
The Center designs series of international seminars and other independent seminars. This seriesconsists of the working papers of these seminars. The views expressed in this publication aresolely of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions or governments of
the authors.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Center for Global Security (GS), National Defense Academy (NDA) and Totalforsvarets
forskningsinstitut (FOI), Swedish Defence Research Agency, launched a joint research project,called NDA-FOI Joint Seminars based on the Memorandum of Understanding between Japan
Ministry of Defense and Sweden Ministry of Defense on mutual defense cooperation.
This volume is based on the working papers presented at the NDA-FOI Joint Seminars on“China’s Use of Influence in the Indo-Pacific: Patterns and Regional Insights” held on February
22, 2023. Most of the chapters are revised or up-dated to reflect the views expressed during thecourse of the seminar.
On behalf of GS and FOI, we would like to express our sincere appreciations not only to thecontributors for their precious time and efforts in the process of this publication, but also to all
those who attended the seminar and participated in the discussions. The views expressed in eachof the chapters, however, strictly represent those of the respective authors, and so go the credits.
We hope the insights shared by the authors here invite a new round of discussion among readers.
Comments and suggestions on our joint research project are more than welcome.
March 2024
Hiroaki Tanaka
Director of Center for Global Security
National Defense Academy

Copyright ©2024 by National Defense Academy of Japan.
Published by the Center for Global Security, Institute for Advanced Studies, National Defense
Academy, Yokosuka, JAPAN.
iii

Introduction (Kurata and Almén)

1

INTRODUCTION

Hideya Kurata and Oscar Almén

The continued rise of China toward great power prominence has had consequences on
the global arena, but especially throughout the Indo-pacific region. From the Korean
Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait to Southeast Asia and its relations with India, China
has been asserting its influence through military power and gray-zone activities.
China’s influence and projections of power in the Indo-Pacific affect not only regional
powers but also Europe. Here, at stake are not only questions of territory and theregional balance of power but fundamentally the US-led liberal rule-based world order.
In addition, the repercussions of a serious military conflict, for example a Chinese
attack on Taiwan, would be enormous for European countries. There is a continually
growing need to increase our understanding of China’s security strategies andbehaviors. Every bilateral relationship is unique, as is every conflict, and important
insights can be drawn from a comparison of the different experiences of Chinese
influence. In the study we refer to influence in a broad sense by looking at means,
ends and outcome. This comparative study explores the following questions: What
behavioral patterns can be observed in China’s influence activities in different regions?
What important differences stand out? When did China’s growing economic andmilitary capacity translate into increased influence, and when did it backfire and result
in reduced influence?

This publication provides perspectives from Japan and Sweden on Chinese influencein the Indo-Pacific region. It is part of a series of collaborative studies conducted
between Japan’s Global Security Center, part of the National Defense Academy(NDA), and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). This study is based on
papers submitted to the seminar “China’s Use of Influence in the Indo-Pacific:
Patterns and Regional Insights,” held at the NDA on February 22, 2023. A regional
focus on China’s influence in the region was determined by both sides before the onsetof the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, during which the seminar was put on hold. As
the pandemic subsided, the seminar resumed at a time when the world faced a new

2

Introduction (Kurata and Almén)

challenge in the form of Russia’s full-scale invasion in Ukraine initiated one year
earlier. While this war is taking place in Europe, the Russian invasion forms afundamental challenge to the US-led liberal, rules-based world order, with
implications for the Indo-Pacific region, and it has implications for also for China’s
strategic thinking, not least with regard its intention to absorb Taiwan. However,
Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific extends far beyond Taiwan. This series ofarticles examines China as a security actor and its influence throughout the region,
including the Korean Peninsula, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

The first section of the report focuses on China as a military actor. First, Professor
Masafumi Iida, Head of the China Division, Regional Studies Department of the
National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), and Per Olsson, researcher at the
Department of Defence Economics at FOI, analyzed China’s military capabilities in
the Indo-Pacific region, depicting their patterns and recent characteristics. To
understand how the Japan–US alliance is addressing this issue, Professor Matake
Kamiya, at the Department of International Relations, NDA, examines the Japan –US
alliance as an alliance against China and discusses it in relation to statements by theleaders of the two countries. This study also examines how China’s influence is being
felt in Europe, along with how Taiwan is attempting to counter it, including how
European countries are responding. Dr. Johan Englund, researcher at the Asia programat FOI, provides an analysis of China’s efforts to isolate Taiwan through influence
campaigns directed at European countries.

The following section examines China’s role in the Korean Peninsula, with chapters
by Professor Hideya Kurata at the Department of International Relations of the NDA
and Dr. Christopher Weidacher Hsiung, researcher at the Asia Program at FOI.
Professor Kurata examines China’s influence on the Korean Peninsula across twodimensions: that of establishing a peace regime unique to the Korean Peninsula and
US–China cooperation in the UN Security Council to curb North Korea’s nuclear
weapons development. Dr. Hsiung traces how China and Russia have responded to
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and other issues in the political/diplomaticand security dimensions.

Introduction (Kurata and Almén)

3

The final section deals with China’s exercise of its influences in the western andsouthern areas of the Indo-Pacific region. Dr. Masahiro Kurita, Senior Research
Fellow in the Policy Simulation Department at NIDS, and Dr. Oscar Almén, Head of
the Asia Program at FOI, analyze Chinese influence in South Asia. Dr. Kurita,
focusing on China’s Belt and Road Initiative, examines the country’s interests and thediversity of its involvement in South Asia, painting a picture of the reality of China’s
influence. By contrast, Dr. Oscar Almén analyses Chinese perspectives on China’s
influence and its limitations in South Asia with a focus on the Sino–Indian borderdispute. Finally, former Professor Teruhiko Fukushima at the Department ofInternational Relations of NDA and a visiting professor at the Kanazawa Institute ofTechnology, examines China’s influence over Australia from 1996 to the present by
successive Australian administrations.

We believe that this study can illuminate the extent but also limits of China’s influence
across regions of the Indo-Pacific. To that extent, we believe that this study will
benefit those who study China’s military power and those in various regions. We hopethat this research will be part of future studies to generalize China’s use of influence
throughout the region. We are grateful to everyone involved in this study and its
publication.

March 2024

4

Chapter 1 — China’s Military Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region[Iida]

CHAPTER 1

China’s Military Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region
Masafumi Iida

INTRODUCTION
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been rapidly modernizing its military for morethan three decades. With the growing capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA)—particularly the PLA Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF), and Rocket Force—
China has steadily expanded its military influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In the East
China Sea, China is intensifying its challenges to Japan’s territorial claims over the
Senkaku Islands. Indeed, the China Coast Guard (CCG), supported by the PLAN, hasbeen conducting continuous operations in Japanese territorial waters and contiguous
zones. In the South China Sea, China has constructed artificial islands and establishedmilitary bases, enabling the PLAN, CCG, and Maritime Militia to enhance their capacity
to resist countries making maritime claims over disputed waters, such as the Philippines
and Vietnam. The PLA has also increased its activities around Taiwan. For example, the
PLA frequently flies aircraft into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) andconducts large-scale military exercises. The vigorous and sometimes aggressive maritime
posture assumed by the Chinese military has led regional countries, including Japan, todevelop serious security concerns.1 The PLA has been gradually expanding its area of
operations beyond the “first island chain” and into the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.
Consequently, China’s military influence in the Indo-Pacific region continues to increase,
impacting the regional security environment.
This paper examines the history of Chinese national security and elucidates how thesechanges have influenced the Chinese military’s ongoing maritime expansion. The paper
also discusses the major objectives behind China’s expansion of its military influence in
the Indo-Pacific region and analyzes the Chinese military’s activities in the region andtheir strategic implications for the future security order. Finally, the paper introduces
several policy recommendations that Japan and European states could adopt to maintaina rules-based international order that opposes China’s growing revisionism.
1 Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2023, July 2023, p. 70.

Chapter 1 — China’s Military Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region[Iida]

5

CHINA’S MARITIME EXPANSIONThe Chinese military’s expanding projection of power in its peripheral waters during thepost-Cold War era must be understood within the context of the changing historicalconditions of China’s security environment. Since its founding in 1949, the PRC has faced
security threats and concerns from various bordering countries. In October 1950, theChinese military, then known as the People’s Volunteer Army, crossed the Yalu River toprovide support to North Korea, resulting in a nearly three-year bloody war against United
Nations forces led by the US on the Korean Peninsula. In October 1962, the PLA launchedattacks against the Indian Army over disputed land borders in eastern and western China,
causing India to harbor deep hostility toward China. The antagonism between the twocountries resulted in a prolonged military standoff in the Himalayas. In March 1969, the
PLA clashed with Soviet border guards on the disputed Damansky (Zhenbao) Island near
the Ussuri (Wusuli) River. This was followed by a military confrontation over the border
between Xinjiang and Russia in August of the same year. Furthermore, the SinoVietnamese War began in February 1979 when China invaded the northern part ofVietnam by crossing the China–Vietnam land border. Military skirmishes between thetwo countries continued throughout the 1980s, even after the PLA withdrew from
Vietnamese territory in March 1979. The history of the wars that the PRC has participatedin indicates that the majority of security threats faced by China have come from borderingcountries.
However, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a significant
shift in China’s security environment. In late 1991, the PRC came to share land borders
with newly independent Central Asian nations. Soon after, in 1992, China began
negotiations on confidence-building measures and border agreements with Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia. In April 1996, these five countries signed aconfidence-building agreement, and in April 1997, they signed an additional agreement
on reducing the presence of military forces along their common borders.2 In 2002, China
signed border demarcation agreements with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, and in 2004, it
signed similar agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Moreover, China signed the
China–Vietnam Land Border Treaty with Vietnam in December 1999.3 Completing theseland border demarcation agreements with the majority of its neighbors significantly
2 Sun Zhuangzhi, “The Relationship between China and Central Asia”, Iwashita Akihiro (ed.), Eager

Eyes Fixed on Eurasia: Russia and Its Neighbors in Crisis, Slavic Eurasian Studies, Volume 1, Number
16, June 2007, p. 54.
3 “China and Vietnam Sign Land Border Treaty, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 15, 2000”,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2792_663578/2793_663580/200011/t20
001115_525037.html.

6

Chapter 1 — China’s Military Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region[Iida]

reduced the threats posed to China’s security by land border disputes. Nevertheless, thesituation between China and India in the Himalayas remained contentious.
This substantial reduction of land-based security threats enabled the PLA to shift the focus
of its power projection initiatives from land borders to maritime areas, where the PRC
claims the so-called “lost territories” exist. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regards
Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, and the Spratly Islands as PRC territories. To achieve thestrategic goal of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, it is imperative for China
to establish control over these islands. However, these islands are located far from
Chinese coastal areas, and therefore, establishing control over them will require the PLA
to enhance its maritime capabilities as a prerequisite to increasing its military presence in
the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and South China Sea. Therefore, the Chinese military’s
objective of solving these maritime territorial problems has driven it to expand into East
Asian waters in the 21st century.
China’s remarkable economic development is another important factor motivating the
PRC to increase its maritime power projection capabilities. Since first implementing
economic reforms and opening-up policies in the late 1970s, China has achieved dramatic
economic growth, with the country emerging as the world’s second-largest economy after
the US. As the Chinese economy rapidly expands, China’s demand for energy sources
such as oil and natural gas is increasing dramatically. Until the 1980s, China produced
enough oil to meet domestic demand, making it a net oil exporter. However, in the early
1990s, China’s oil consumption substantially increased alongside stagnated domestic oil
production, and by 1993, China had gone from a net oil exporter to a net importer. 4 This
surge in energy demand may have motivated China to take action to secure peripheral
waters for oil and natural gas exploration. In the South China Sea, the PLA attacked
Vietnamese forces in 1988 and occupied six shoals. Moreover, in 1995, China forced thePhilippines to surrender control over the Mischief Reef to Beijing. In the 1990s, China
also unilaterally engaged in oil and gas exploration in the East China Sea.
The rapid growth of the Chinese economy has made the sea lines of communications(SLOCs) strategically important for China’s security. China imports large amounts of oilfrom the Middle East and Africa, transporting this oil via SLOC through the Malacca
Strait, into the South China Sea, and finally to Chinese coastal cities. In 2015, more than
80% of China’s oil imports and approximately 30% of its natural gas imports passed

4 Li Zhidong, Ito Kokichi, and Komiyama Ryoichi, “Energy Demand and Supply Outlook in China

for 2030 and A North Asian Energy Community”, p. 2.

Chapter 1 — China’s Military Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region[Iida]

7

through the Strait of Malacca. 5 As the world’s largest trading nation, China depends
heavily on maritime routes to conduct trade. In 2016, nearly 40% of China’s trade passed
through the South China Sea.6 The increasing dependence of China’s oil imports andtrade on sea lanes, particularly those transiting the Malacca Strait and the South China
Sea, requires China to expand its maritime power projection capabilities and strengthen
its control of the SLOC.7
As the Chinese Government continues to promote economic globalization, Chinesecompanies and workers are increasingly expanding into foreign countries and markets.
This, in turn, necessitates that the Chinese Government strive to protect them in serviceof its national interests.8 At the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs
held in August 2006, Hu Jintao, the General Secretary of the CCP, urged that China
should incessantly strive to enhance its capabilities to protect “overseas interests”, giventhat large numbers of Chinese companies and citizens are active abroad. 9 A Defense
White Paper published in April 2013 by the Chinese Government emphasized theimportance of protecting overseas interests as an “important… means for the PLA tosafeguard national interests and fulfill China’s international obligations”. 10 This newprioritization of overseas interests has accelerated the PLA’s efforts to enhance its power
projection and overseas operational capabilities and expand its presence and influence
beyond the first island chain.

CHINA’S INCREASING MILITARY INFLUENCE IN EAST ASIAN WATERS
In an effort to expand its sphere of operational capabilities beyond the immediate area of
mainland China, the Chinese military has strengthened its maritime presence andinfluence in the East Asian region. In the East China Sea, Chinese military vessels have
5 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic ofChina 2016, Washington DC: Office of Secretary of Defense, April 2016, pp. 41-42.
6 China Power Team, “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea, China Power, August 2, 2017”,
https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/.
7 Xie Zhihai, “China’s Rising Maritime Strategy: Implications for Its Territorial Disputes”, The
Journal of Contemporary East Asian Studies, Volume 3, Number 2 (March 2017), p. 117.
8 For detailed discussion, See, Mathiew Duchâtel, Oliver Bräuner, and Zhou Hang, SIPRI Policy
Paper No. 41, Protecting China’s Overseas Interests: The Slow Shift Away from Non-interference,
Stockholm: Stochholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2014.
9 胡锦涛 (Hu Jintao), “国际形势和外事工作 (International Situation and Work Relating to Foreign
Affairs)”, 胡锦涛文选 第二卷 (Selected Works of Hu Jintao, Vol. 2), September 2016, p. 517,
https://ebook.dswxyjy.org.cn/dswxbooks/storage/files/20220801/ec8131a7347739d2de261112e2a1c
39f65275/mobile/index.html.
10 “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Information Office of the State Council,
March 2013”, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_2814749829865
06.htm.

Chapter 1 — China’s Military Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region[Iida]

8

repeatedly intruded on Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. In
December 2008, two vessels belonging to China’s State Oceanic Administration invaded
Japanese waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands for the first time. In September 2012,
the PRC deployed over ten government vessels into these same waters in response to
Japan’s decision to transfer the ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands from private
citizens to the government. Since then, the CCG and other Chinese Government ships
have continued to operate within Japan’s contiguous zone, and Chinese vessels haveintruded into Japan’s territorial waters several times a month.11 The CCG, which was
founded in 2013 through the merging of four maritime agencies, was reformulated as thePeople’s Armed Police (PAP) in 2018. The PAP is directly controlled by the Central
Military Commission as a part of the Chinese military, meaning that the CCG is no longer
a civilian agency but rather a military organization.

No.
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

Fig.1 Number of Chinese Vessels Intruding Japanese
Territorial Water around Senkaku Islands
188

121
88
73

2

0

0

95

129

126
110

108

103

88
70

2

Source: Compiled by the author based on data released by the JCG.

11 “Trends in China Coast Guard and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands

and Japan's Response, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 4, 2023”, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html.

Chapter 1 — China’s Military Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region[Iida]

9

Fig.2 Number of Chinese Vessels Entering JapaneseContiguous Zone around Senkaku Islands
No.
1400

1282
12221201
1161
1097

1200
1000

819

800
600

729 709 752 696

615

428

400
200
2

0

46 12

0

Source: Compiled by the author based on data released by the JCG.
Similar to the CCG, the PLA has also become increasingly active in the East China Sea,
including the waters around the Senkaku Islands. The PLAN regularly conducts training
and exercises in the Eash China Sea and frequently makes passages through the Miyako
Strait and the Osumi Strait to the Western Pacific Ocean. In June 2016, a Chinese Jiangkai
I-class frigate made a passage through Japanese contiguous waters around the Senkaku
Islands. In January 2018, a Shang-class submerged nuclear attack submarine and a
Jiangkai II-class frigate entered the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands on thesame day.12 In July 2022, a Jiangwei II-class frigate entered the contiguous zone aroundthe Senkaku Islands while pursuing a Russian warship. 13 Additionally, the PLAAF isincreasing its presence in the East China Sea. The number of flights by Chinese military
aircraft over the East China Sea and the Western Pacific has been increasing, forcing theJapan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) to frequently scramble fighter jets to secure
Japanese airspace. The PLA recently started to operate unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
in the airspace over both the East China Sea and the Western Pacific, complicating efforts
by the JASDF to intercept Chinese aircraft.

12 Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2023, July 2023, p. 70.
13 “Chinese Warship Chases Russian Frigate Near Japan-controlled Senkakus, Kyodo News, July 4,2022”, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/07/984a35abdb64-chinese-russian-warships-spotted-near-senkaku-islands-japan-protests.html.

Chapter 1 — China’s Military Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region[Iida]

10

No.

Fig. 3 Number of Scrambles to Respective Countries by JASDF

1400
1168

1200
943

1000

810

999
873

851

904

800
600
400

299
197

200

64
38

386
264
96
26

425
247
156
22

306
248
13

638

571

567
415
359

36

500
390

464
473

288

301

6

14

16

14

1004

947
675

725

722

778
575

458
343

18

268
4

258

266

9

16

150
53

0

RussiaChina

Others

Total

Source: Compiled by the author based on data released by the Joint Staff.
The Chinese military has established a much larger presence in the South China Sea
compared to that of smaller rival states and has taken assertive actions to expand its
influence and control over this maritime area. In June 2012, after a two-month standoff,
Chinese Government vessels expelled Philippine Coast Guard ships from the waters
around the Scarborough Shoal and established de facto control over the reef. In 2014,
China began land reclamation on seven features in the South China Sea for the purposeof constructing military bases and strengthening the Chinese military presence in the area.
These CCG vessels have increased patrols of the area while also harassing Southeast
Asian countries engaging in oil and natural gas exploration projects, exacerbating existing
conflicts and sometimes resulting in dangerous encounters between regional coast guard
ships.14 The CCG is enhancing its presence around contested land features, such as theSecond Thomas Shoal, Thitu Island, and the Luconia Shoals, to pressure rival claimants.15
In December 2023, CCG vessels sprayed water cannons at Philippine civilian supply
boats, even ramming them at one point. The civilian supply boats were sailing to theSecond Thomas Shoal to provide Marine troops with logistical support.16 The Chinese

14 See, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Perilous Prospects: Tension Flare Up at Malaysian,and Vietnamese Oil and Gas Fields, March 30, 2023”, https://amti.csis.org/perilous-prospectstensions-flare-at-malaysian-vietnamese-oil-and-gas-fields/.
15 See, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Flooding the Zone: China Coast Guard Patrols in 2022,
January 30, 2023”, https://amti.csis.org/flooding-the-zone-china-coast-guard-patrols-in-2022/.
16 “South China Sea: Philippine and Chinese Vessels Collide in Contested Waters, BBC News,
December 10, 2023”, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67668930.

Chapter 1 — China’s Military Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region[Iida]

11

Maritime Militia is also strengthening its presence in the South China Sea.17 In December
2023, the Philippine Government announced that more than 100 Chinese Maritime Militia
vessels were occupying the waters around the Whitsun Reef, over which the Philippine
Government claims jurisdiction.18
The PLA has also increasingly enhanced its operational capabilities in the South China
Sea. In April 2018, the PLAN conducted a large-scale naval parade off the coast of Hainan
Island. As the largest parade ever carried out by the PLAN, it featured 48 ships and 76
aircraft, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning and its carrier strike group. President Xi
Jinping reviewed the parade and made a speech, demanding that the PLAN remain onhigh alert and defend the country’s interests; he also pledged to accelerate themodernization of the navy. 19 In May 2021, 16 PLAAF transport aircraft, including abrand-new Y-20, flew over the South China Sea in a train formation and approached
Malaysian airspace, causing the Royal Malaysian Air Force to scramble fighter jets tointercept them. This flight by PLAAF transport aircraft can be regarded as preparation for
conducting airborne operations in relation to contested islands, such as Taiping Island,
Swallow Island, and Thitu Island in the South China Sea.20
In recent years, China has increasingly engaged in large-scale military exercises andoperations intended to intimidate Taiwan. In August 2022, on the pretext of US House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, the PLA conducted joint exercises of an
unprecedented scale around Taiwan. During these military exercises, the PLA Eastern
Theater Command announced that it would hold live-firing exercises in six zones
encircling Taiwan. The PLA’s artillery units fired long-range rockets into the Taiwan
Strait using its multiple-launch rocket system. Chinese naval vessels operated in areas
close to Taiwan Island. Chinese military aircraft, including fighters, bombers, tankers,
spy aircraft, and UAVs, made hundreds of sorties crossing the Median Line in the Taiwan
Strait and entered the Taiwan ADIZ. The PLA Rocket Force launched multiple ballistic“The Ebb and Flow of Beijing’s South China Sea Militia, Asia Maritime Transparency
Initiative, November 9, 2022”, https://amti.csis.org/the-ebb-and-flow-of-beijings-south-china-seamilitia/.
18 “Philippines Says Chinese Boats ‘Swarming’ Reef in South China Sea, Japan Times, December 3,2023”, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/12/03/asia-pacific/politics/philippines-china-whitsu
n-reef-maritime-militia/.
19 “President Xi Jinping Reviews Navy in South China Sea, Xinhua, April 12, 2018”, https://www.xinh
uanet.com/english/2018-04/12/c_137106908.htm.
20 Moriki Aita (Translated by Derek Solen), “The True Meaning of the Chinese Air Force’s Flying
Transport Aircraft Near Malaysia: Airborne Units in Power Projection, China Aerospace Studies
Institute, May 6, 2022”, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Articles/Article-Display/Article/3018
960/the-true-meaning-of-the-chinese-air-forces-flying-transport-aircraft-near-malay/.
17 See,12

Chapter 1 — China’s Military Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region[Iida]

missiles into live-firing zones located to the north, south, and east of Taiwan.21 In April
2023, after President Tsai Ing-wen met with US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in
California, the PLA conducted extensive joint exercises around Taiwan. The Shandong
carrier group, which operates in the Western Pacific, participated in this exercise, and thecarrier-based airplanes made approximately 120 sorties from April 7 to 9, 2023.22 The
Taiwanese Government interpreted these two military exercises as a blockade exercise—that is, they saw it as a simulation of how China might first encircle and then attack
Taiwan.23

CHINA’S QUEST FOR MARITIME PREDOMINANCE IN THE INDO-PACIFICREGIONThe Chinese military has significantly expanded its power projection and operational
capabilities in East Asian waters while also harassing and intimidating surrounding
countries in pursuit of its national goals of retaking what it sees as “lost territories” andprotecting its maritime rights and interests. However, the CCP will be unable to achieve
its national goals simply by establishing a military presence that is more powerful thanthose of its regional competitors. The US has maintained a predominant military presence
and influence in the Indo-Pacific region for decades, and it is a treaty ally of Japan and
the Philippines. If either Japan or the Philippines were to become engaged in military
conflicts in the East China Sea or South China Sea, it is highly likely the US would
provide military support to its security allies. Although the US terminated diplomatic
relations with Taiwan in 1979, Washington has played a central role in maintaining
Taipei’s self-defense capabilities by providing military equipment pursuant to the Taiwan
Relations Act. In the context of intensifying US–China strategic competition, the US
Government has deepened its defense relations with Taiwan in recent years. Chinese
leadership must seriously consider the possibility that US forces could conduct counteroperations against the PLA if China engaged in military actions against Taiwan.
China continues to promote the modernization of the PLA to shift the regional balance ofmilitary power in favor of Beijing. At the 19th National Congress of the CCP held in
October 2017, General Secretary Xi Jinping stressed that the party’s goal of building a

21 See, China Power Team, “Tracking the Forth Taiwan Strait Crisis, China Power, August 5, 2022”,

https://chinapower.csis.org/tracking-the-fourth-taiwan-strait-crisis/.
22 統合幕僚監部 (Joint Staff), “中国軍艦艇の動向について (Movement of Chinese Naval
Vessels)”, April 10, 2023.
23 Taiwan Ministry of National Defense, ROC National Defense Report 2023, September 2023, p. 38.

Chapter 1 — China’s Military Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region[Iida]

13strong military requires transforming the PLA into a world-class military force.24 China
aims to weaken the US military’s presence and influence in the region by establishing a“world-class force” to prevent US forces from supporting its allies and partners incollectively resisting China’s military coercion. The CCP’s long-term strategic objective
is to usurp US military dominance in East Asia and achieve its national objective of
establishing control over disputed islands and safeguarding its maritime rights andinterests in East Asian waters.
The PLA has made significant efforts to reduce the US military’s predominance in East
Asia by developing anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. China seeks todevelop A2/AD capabilities that would enable it to conduct long-range attacks against
enemy militaries that maintain a robust presence in the first island chain and could
possibly deploy to or operate in the Western Pacific.25 In July 2019, as a clear display ofChina’s powerful A2/AD capabilities, the PLA test launched anti-ship ballistic missiles(ASBMs) into waters south of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea.26 In August of
the following year, the PLA again launched ASBMs into the areas north of the Paracel
Islands. The ASBMs, which likely included DF-15D and DF-26B missiles, were launchedfrom different sites in mainland China and were reported to have successfully struck amaneuvering vessel at sea.27 China’s deployment of the ASBMs and their successful test
launch raised concerns among US military leaders. After the test firing in August 2020,
the US Department of Defense issued a statement criticizing the ballistic missile test as
an action intended to destabilize the situation in the South China Sea while blaming China
for escalating its military exercises.28
In addition to conventional A2/AD capabilities, China is rapidly developing its nuclear
capabilities. The US Department of Defense estimates that the PRC has increased its stockof nuclear warheads from the low 200s in 2020 to over 500 as of May 2023. It also

24 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects

and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, Xinhua,
October 18, 2017.
25 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republicof China 2021, Washington DC: Office of Secretary of Defense, November 2021, p. 77.
26 Xiavier Vavasseur, “China Launched 6 ASBMs into the South China Sea, Naval News, July 15,
2019”, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/07/china-launched-6-asbm-into-the-south-china-sea/.
27 Steven Stashawick, “Chinse Ballistic Missiles Fired into South China Sea Claimed to Hit Target
Ship, Diplomat, November 17, 2020”, https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/chinese-ballistic-missiles-fir
ed-into-south-china-sea-claimed-to-hit-target-ship/.
28 “DOD Statement on Recent Chinese Ballistic Missile Launches, US Department of Defense, August27, 2020”, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2327641/dod-statement-on-rece
nt-chinese-ballistic-missile-launches/.

14

Chapter 1 — China’s Military Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region[Iida]

anticipates that it will expand this stockpile to at least 1,000 by 203029 and approximately
1,500 by 2035.30 The PLA has not only increased its number of nuclear warheads but has
also modernized its nuclear weapons delivery mechanisms and vehicles, including its DF41 intercontinental ballistic missiles, type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines, and H-6N strategic bombers. The rapid qualitative and quantitative increaseof China’s nuclear capabilities has the potential to enhance China’s nuclear deterrencevis-à-vis the US, possibly lowering the threshold at which the PLA would be able toexercise its conventional forces against regional rivals without fear of nuclear retaliationfrom US forces.31
China’s ambition to dominate East Asian waters and its robust military buildup willundoubtedly result in an increase in the Chinese military’s presence and influence in the
Indo-Pacific region. The PLAN has conducted antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden
since the end of 2008. Protecting Chinese companies and citizens overseas has emerged
as a major priority of the PLA. China constructed its first overseas logistical support basein Djibouti in 2017. China’s growing maritime power projection capabilities and waning
US military dominance in East Asian seas will encourage the PLA to be more active in
the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China’s Defense White Paper issued in July 2019 states,“One of the missions of China’s armed forces is to effectively protect the security andlegitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese people, organizations and institutions”,
and that the PLA “builds far seas forces, develops overseas logistical facilities, andenhances capabilities in accomplishing diversified military tasks”. 32 Given China’s
growing overseas interest in the IOR as part of the ongoing Belt and Road Initiative, the
PLA is expected to attempt to enhance its presence in the region, including developing“logistical facilities”, such as Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and Gwadar Port inPakistan.33 If the PLA achieves a dominant position in the Western Pacific by replacing
the US forces, then China will surely seek maritime predominance in the IOR.

29 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republicof China 2023, Washinton DC: Office of Secretary of Defense, October 2023, p. 111.
30 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republicof China 2021, Washinton DC: Office of Secretary of Defense, November 2022, p. 97.
31 Masafumi Iida, “China’s Strategy to Transform the Existing International Order”, Masafumi Iida,
Hiromu Arakaki, and Takeyuki Hasegawa, NIDS China Security Report 2024, Tokyo: National
Institute for Defense Studies, November 2023, pp. 25-27.
32 “China’s National Defense in the New Era, Information Office of the State Council, July 2019”,
https://english.www.gov.cn/atts/stream/files/5d3943eec6d0a15c923d2036.
33 Brad Lendon and Simone MacCarthy, “Blue-water Ambitions: Is China Looking Beyond Its
Neighborhood Now It Has the World’s Largest Navy? CNN, September 2, 2023”, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/01/asia/china-navy-overseas-military-bases-intl-hnk-ml/index.html.

Chapter 1 — China’s Military Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region[Iida]

15

China’s prevailing military influence in the IOR will negatively affect the security
interests of Japan and European nations. China has repeatedly taken action to interrupt
the legal passage of foreign ships in the South China Sea to enforce its illegal maritime
claims, which contradict existing international rules, such as freedom of navigation, as
articulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. If China establishes
a dominant military presence in the seas of East Asia, its belligerent behaviors will spreadto the Indian Ocean, severally damaging the existing maritime rule of law in the area,
which is of critical importance to both Japan and European states. Therefore, the two
major powers responsible for maintaining the existing maritime order should enhancetheir cooperation in countering China’s ambition to establish military dominance in East
Asian waters.

CONCLUSIONSJapan and European countries can play a significant role in maintaining peace andstability in the Indo-Pacific by preventing China’s military ascendancy in East Asia inseveral ways. First, the two parties should support the effort of US forces to maintain its
predominant military presence and compete with China’s growing power projection
capabilities in the region. Japan and the NATO countries of England, France, andGermany, as long-standing allies of Washington, have the necessary defense capabilities
to support and facilitate a variety of operations by US forces. The Japan Self-Defense
Forces (JSDF) and NATO militaries need to enhance their capabilities to conduct
combined military operations with US forces in the East Asian region by more frequently
conducting realistic military exercises, enhancing common command and control systems,
and preparing joint warfighting plans. For this purpose, it is desirable for European
militaries to dispatch more ships and aircraft to the region. Moreover, the JSDF andNATO militaries should increase the logistical support they provide to US forces by
sharing more military facilities in their territories with US forces. Higher interoperability
among the US, Japan, and NATO forces in the region would lead to a stronger combined
military presence compared to that of China in the Indo-Pacific region.
Japan and European countries should expand their defense cooperation with regional
partners in addition to the US. US’ allies and partners, such as Australia, the Philippines,
South Korea, Indonesia, and Singapore, have a strong stake in maintaining the rules-based
maritime order in the region. Multilateral frameworks for defense and security
cooperation—such as Japan–US–South Korea cooperation and the Quad—are emerging.
Moreover, European participation in multilateral cooperation and coordination formaintaining the existing maritime order in the East Asian region could make a significant

16

Chapter 1 — China’s Military Influence in the Indo-Pacific Region[Iida]

contribution to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The establishment of
AUKUS represents a clear first step toward expanding European engagement in East
Asian security. Japan and NATO should try to establish a new security cooperation
framework among status quo powers, including European and Southeast Asian countries.
A joint program between Japan and European states for providing regional developing
countries with economic assistance of infrastructure investments would enable the twoparties to enhance their influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
The CCP, with General Secretary Xi Jinping at its center, has demonstrated firm resolve
to retake the “lost territories” and protect China’s maritime rights and overseas interests
by strengthening China’s military presence and influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
Meanwhile, the US’ resolve to maintain the existing maritime order seems unstable in theface of the growing political divide over foreign policy within the US leadership. Under
these circumstances, it is critically important for Japan and the European nations to makejoint efforts to enhance their military presence and influence in the Indo-Pacific, in turnsupporting the US in maintaining its maritime predominance in the region.

Chapter 2— China’s Growing Military Power and Influence[Olsson]17

CHAPTER 2

China’s Growing Military Power and Influence
Per Olsson
During the past two decades, China’s military power has increased steadily andsignificantly. Its military spending has increased more than sixfold, thereby enabling acomprehensive modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). However, to what
extent this growing military power has resulted in increased influence is much less certain,
for in some ways, the results may have had the effect of neighbouring countries increasing
their own military spending and modernisation efforts. Furthermore, many countries in
the Indo–Pacific region have sought closer ties with the US as China’s power andassertiveness grow.

INTRODUCTION
In political science, power can be defined as the ability of one actor to coerce or influenceanother.1 This power can take several forms.2 It may be hard power, such as political,
economic or military power or soft power such as cultural influence or swaying public
opinion.3
This paper addresses military power, specifically trends in the military power of thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC) between 2000 and 2023, assessed by addressing threefactors: (1) military expenditure, (2) the amount of military equipment and (3) arms
exports.

1 This paper adopts a rather straightforward definition of power as conceptualised by Robert Dahl in

his early work, see, Robert A. Dahl, ‘The Concept of Power’, Behavioral Science, Vol. 2, No. 3 (July
1957). For how power can be conceptualised more specifically in international relations theory, see,e.g. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, International Organization, Volume 59,
Issue 1 (February 2005), pp. 39-75.
2 The different forms or types of power, particularly distinguishing between military and non-military
types of power, have been well discussed by Joseph Nye. See, Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means
to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs. 2004.
3 For a multifaceted approach of measuring power or influence, see, e.g. the Lowly Institute Asia
Power Index, https://power.lowyinstitute.org/ (Accessed on August 30, 2023).

18

Chapter 2— China’s Growing Military Power and Influence[Olsson]The paper uses quantitative data. Military expenditure and arms export data have beencollected from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), while
military equipment data have been collected from the International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS).4 The military equipment discussed in this study is limited to the large
conventional weapons systems of the Chinese navy, ground forces and air force. For thisreason, nuclear, space, cyber, psychological and intelligence capabilities are not included.
A focus on hard factors such as expenditure and equipment also means that capability
factors such as doctrine, training and morale are excluded, and this will limit theconclusions that can be reached.
It should be relatively undisputed that China’s military power has increased during thepast two decades, both in absolute terms and in relation to other countries. However, it is
far less certain that this power has resulted in increased influence. Therefore, the paper
includes a brief discussion concerning the degree to which China’s military power has
translated into influence.

MILITARY EXPENDITURE
During the past two decades, China has undergone a rapid and comprehensive militarybuild-up and modernisation, underpinned by sustained growth in military spending.
According to data from the SIPRI, China spent USD 292 billion on its military in 2022.
This places China as the world’s second-largest military spender, albeit a distant second
to the US, which spent USD 877 billion in 2022, but significantly more than the thirdlargest spender, Russia, which spent USD 86.4 billion.5
Measured in fixed prices, China’s military expenditure increased by 554 per cent between
2000 and 2022 (see Figure 1). This has had significant consequences for both the regionaland global power balances. In 2000, China accounted for about 17 per cent of total
military spending in the Indo–Pacific region and about 3 per cent of global militaryspending. By 2022, China’s Indo–Pacific share had increased to 51 per cent and its global
share to 13 per cent. This has confirmed China’s position as the largest spender in the
Indo–Pacific region and narrowed the global spending gap between it and the US andNATO. Meanwhile, China’s military expenditure as a share of GDP has not increased
during the past two decades. Indeed, it has decreased slightly from about 2 per cent in the
4 The data and figures in this paper are similar or taken from a report from the same author, Per Olsson,

Defence Economic Outlook 2023: An Assessment of Military Strength among Major World Power,
Stockholm: FOI, 2023.
5 Data on military expenditure have been collected from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2023,
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex (Accessed on July 7, 2023).

Chapter 2— China’s Growing Military Power and Influence[Olsson]19

early 2000s to 1.6 per cent in 2022. This means that the sustained growth of China’s
military expenditure can be attributed mainly to the country’s overall economic growth. 6

Figure 1: Military Expenditure, Fixed 2021 Prices and Share of GDP. Source: StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2023.

MILITARY EQUIPMENT QUANTITIESChina’s growing military power and increased capabilities can also be seen in the
expansion and changing structure of its armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA), and more precisely, the navy, ground forces and air force.7
In 2000, the PLA Navy (PLAN) was mostly a coastal force, consisting largely of imported
or copied Soviet and Russian surface combatants and submarines. During the past two
decades, the PLAN has undergone a drastic transformation, shifting towards indigenous
and increasingly Western–inspired designs. Beginning with a small production series ofincrementally improved classes, China’s naval shipbuilding industry has matured. In the2010s, China began the serial production of domestically developed and produced
destroyers, frigates, corvettes and submarines (see Figure 2). At the beginning of 2023,
the PLAN had 2 aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and the Shandong,8 3 Type 075 amphibious
6 Ibid.
7 Data on military equipment has been collected from various volumes produced by The Military

Balance, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020,2023).
8 A third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, was launched in June 2022.

20

Chapter 2— China’s Growing Military Power and Influence[Olsson]assault ships, 7 Type 055 large new destroyers, 25 Type 052D new destroyers and 17
slightly older destroyers, 31 Type 054A frigates and 10 slightly older frigates in addition
to 50 Type 056A corvettes in active service. It also had 6 strategic nuclear submarines, 6
nuclear attack submarines and 46 conventional attack submarines.9

Figure 2: Surface Combatants and Submarines of the PLAN. Source: The Military
Balance, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000–2023.
Taken together, this naval expansion has significantly increased China’s ability to project
power throughout most of the Indo–Pacific region. Moreover, it has granted the PLAN
sizable numerical superiority over other navies in the region. Compared to China’s 203
surface combatants and submarines, Japan has 69 such naval vessels, South Korea has 72
and India has 51. During the past decade, the PLAN even surpassed the US Navy’s 198
surface combatants and submarines to become the world’s largest fleet. However, the US
Navy is still much larger in terms of total size. The combined displacement, or ‘weight’,of the US Navy is more than three times that of the PLAN. This substantial difference
stems from the fact that the US Navy has a higher proportion of large vessels, such as
aircraft carriers, destroyers and nuclear submarines, platforms needed to project powerover long distances.10
The PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) has also been modernised, transforming it from amassed infantry army into an increasingly mechanised one. In 2000, the PLAGF consisted

9 The Military Balance, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023.
10 Olsson, op. cit.

Chapter 2— China’s Growing Military Power and Influence[Olsson]21

of some 1.7 million active personnel. In 2023, that number had been reduced to 965,000.11
While still the largest conventional army in the world, the reduction of PLAGF personnel
has enabled a reallocation of resources forward to new generations of tanks, otherarmoured vehicles and artillery.
During the past two decades, the PLAGF has undergone steady modernisation. In 2000,
the PLAGF tank force consisted of mainly older first-generation main battle tanks(MBTs) of Soviet design. During the past two decades, domestically produced thirdgeneration MBTs have gradually become the mainstay of the PLAGF tank force (seeFigure 3). To mechanise the ground forces, a large number of infantry fighting vehicles
and armoured personnel carriers have been introduced and/or upgraded. Meanwhile, the
PLAGF’s sizable arsenal of artillery has been reduced in numbers but has become
increasingly mobile with more self-propelled pieces.

Figure 3: Main Battle Tanks in the PLAGF. Source: The Military Balance, London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000–2023; Per Olsson, Defence Economic
Outlook 2023: An Assessment of Military Strength among Major World Power,
Stockholm: FOI, 2023.
Although the PLAGF might not be the most decisive element in any potential armed
conflict in the Indo–Pacific, it is still interesting to illustrate how China compares to its
neighbours. In 2023, the PLAGF had 4,800 MBTs, 14,050 light tanks, infantry fighting
vehicles (IFVs) and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) as well as 4,380 artillery pieces
and 1,320 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), in active service. This is significantly more
11 The Military Balance 2023, op. cit.

22

Chapter 2— China’s Growing Military Power and Influence[Olsson]than Japan’s 696 MBTs, 872 IFVs and APCs and 450 artillery pieces and MRLs. South
Korea had 2,149 MBTs, 3,096 IFVs and APCs while surpassing China with 5,830 artillery
pieces and MRLs. India, the other major land power in the Indo–Pacific had 3,740 MBTs,
3,469 IFVs and APCs and 3,469 artillery pieces and MRLs. In 2023, the US had 2,640
MBTs in active services, surpassing China with 15,191 IFVs and APCs, but with far fewer
artillery pieces and MLRs—2,550 in total.12
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has also undergone a rapid modernisation process. 13 In
2000, the combat aircraft of the PLAAF consisted mainly of older Soviet designs. The
modernisation of PLAAF combat aircraft proceeded throughout the 2000s with theintroduction of third- and fourth-generation aircraft. This process accelerated during the2010s with fourth-generation combat aircraft becoming the mainstay of the PLAAF
inventory. With the introduction of the J-20 in 2017, China became the second country in
the world, after the US, to develop, produce and introduce a fifth-generation stealthfighter aircraft. In 2023, China had 140 J-20s in service, and relatively modern fourthgeneration fighters made up the vast majority of its combat aircraft. The PLAAF fourthgeneration fighters are a mix of Russian imported aircraft such as the Su-27, Su-30 and
Su-35, domestic derivatives such as the J-11, J-15 and J-16 and domestic designs such as
the J-10. The PLAAF also operates about 600 older third- and second-generation
fighters.14
The modernisation of the PLAAF has enhanced China’s capabilities. In 2023, China
fielded 2,081 combat aircraft of which 1,348 were fourth generation and 140 fifth
generation. The PLAAF outnumbers neighbouring countries by a significant margin interms of equipment. In 2023, Japan had 323 combat aircraft, made up of 292 fourthgeneration and 31 fifth-generation models, in active service. South Korea had 532, of
which 280 were fourth generation and 40 fifth generation, while India had 742 combat
aircraft, of which 481 were fourth generation. However, the US has a clear advantage incombat aircraft compared to China, in terms of both numbers and generations. In 2023,
the US Air Force, Naval Aviation and Marine Aviation combined had 2,534 combat
aircraft in active service, of which 1,771 were fourth generation and 704 fifth
generation.15

12 Ibid.
13 For classification according to generation, see, Olsson, op. cit.
14 The Military Balance, op. cit., 2023.
15 Olsson, op. cit.; The Military Balance 2023, op. cit.

Chapter 2— China’s Growing Military Power and Influence[Olsson]23

Figure 4: Combat Aircraft of the PLAAF. Source: The Military Balance 2000–2023, op.
cit.; Olsson, op. cit.
To summarise, in 2022, China outspent all other Indo–Pacific countries combined, apartfrom the US. While the US still spends about three times more on its military compared
to China, this spending gap has decreased significantly during the past two decades.
Moreover, the PLAN has undergone rapid expansion and modernisation, and the PLAGF
and the PLAAF have modernised their equipment.

ARMS EXPORTS
Another means of evaluating military power is by reviewing defence–industrial
relationships. China does have some of these relationships, mainly connected with theexports and imports of arms. Historically, China based many designs on Soviet andRussian equipment, some through licence production and others through illicit copying.
As of 2023, Russia remains China’s most important source of imports by far.16 In the past
two decades, the Chinese arms industry has made significant strides to become more selfsufficient, achieved through a combination of significant and sustained investments,
unlicensed copying, industrial espionage and genuine improvements. 17 While most of
16 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Arms Transfer Database (Accessed on

August 30, 2023).
17 See, e.g., Michael Raska, and Richard Bitzinger, “Strategic Contours of China’s Arms Transfers”,
Strategic Studies Quarterly, Volume 14, Number 1(Spring 2020); see also, Cheung Tai Ming,“Innovation in China’s Defense Technology Base: Foreign Technology and Military Capabilities”,
Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 39, Issue 5-6 (2016).

24

Chapter 2— China’s Growing Military Power and Influence[Olsson]China’s industrial arms production is aimed at the domestic market, China has seen somemodest success as an arms exporter.
In the past decade, China has become the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter.18 However,
Chinese arms sales have so far been concentrated among a few key buyers. The main
destinations of Chinese arms exports between 2010 and 2022 were Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Myanmar and Algeria (see Table 1). Pakistan is by far the most important export market,
with sales including combat aircraft, frigates and tanks. 19 Recently, Thailand has also
become an important export market, including sales of tanks and submarines.20 Despite
China’s rise as an arms exporter, it still lags far behind the US, Russia and France.
Moreover, its arms exports are small compared to the overall size of China’s defence
industry.
Table. 1
Chinese Arms Exports, Top 10 Destinations, 2010–2022. Source: SIPRI (2023)
TIV 2010–2022
Share (%) 2010–2022
Pakistan
8,954
43.4
Bangladesh
2,724
13.2
Myanmar
1,602
7.8
Algeria
1,015
4.9
Venezuela
494
2.4
Morocco478
2.3
Nigeria469
2.3
Thailand442
2.1
Tanzania371
1.8
Saudi Arabia
351
1.7
Total
20,630100.0
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Arms Transfer
Database.

DISCUSSION
Over the past two decades, China’s military spending has increased more than sixfold, its
navy has become the world’s largest in terms of number of vessels, and its army and airforce have become increasingly modern. All these efforts and developments have served
18 Although it has lost some of its global share in recent years, see, Pieter D. Wezeman, et al., SIPRI

Fact Sheet: Trends in International Arms Transfers, March 2023.
19 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, op cit., SIPRI Arms Transfer Database (Accessedon July 11, 2023).
20 “China Competes with US for Weapons Sales to Thailand, Bangkok Post, December 3, 2019”,
https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/1807664/china-competes-with-us-for-weapons-sales-to-thailand (Accessed on July 11, 2023).

Chapter 2— China’s Growing Military Power and Influence[Olsson]25

to strengthen China’s potential for influence through coercion or deterrence. However, it
is worth asking whether this increase in its military strength has impacted China’s
influence in the region, and the picture seems mixed.
China has no military allies of any significance, few strategic military partnerships andonly a handful of defence industrial partners. Furthermore, China only has a single
confirmed overseas military base in Djibouti and a few potential bases in the Indo–Pacific.
However, this might be a question of time lag, as China has the hardware, the perceived
needs and the ambition to increase its military footprint along the shorelines of the Indo–
Pacific. Whether or not these ambitions will materialise will ultimately depend on China’s
continued willingness, how welcoming potential host nations are and what the reactions
from the US and its allies might be.
China’s military build-up has certainly caught the attention of neighbours. However, it
has not deterred rival claimants around the South China Sea, such as the Philippines orVietnam, from reinforcing their territorial and maritime claims. The US and its allies havealso kept up their freedom of navigation operations.21 Even worse for China, its militarybuild-up has caused a backlash in the form of strengthened military capabilities, joint
exercises and strengthened partnerships between the US, its allies and partners.
Traditional US allies in the region, such as Japan and South Korea, have increased andpledged to further increase their military spending, investing in naval, aerial and longrange capabilities.22
Other US partners such as the Philippines and Vietnam have also strengthened their ties
to the US.23 India has also sought a closer partnership with the US and several of its
21 Jim Garamone, “Navy Conducts Freedom of Navigation Op, as DOD Releases China Military

Report, DoD News, November 29, 2022”, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3231196/navy-conducts-freedom-of-navigation-op-as-dod-releases-china-military- report/ (Accessed on July 10, 2023).
22 For Japan’s defence goals expressed in National Security Strategy, see, “National Security Strategy(NSS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html(Accessed on July 10, 2023). For South Korean defence budget increases, see, e.g. “South Korea
Unveils 2023-2027 Mid-Term Defense Plan”, Naval News, January 26 2023, https://www.navalnews.
com/naval-news/2023/01/south-korea-unveils-2023-2027-mid-term-defense-plan/ (Accessed on July
10, 2023).
23 Makoi Popioco, “Reset in US–Philippines Relations Tells of Yet Another China fumble, The
Interpreter, Lowly Institute, February 15, 2023”, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/resetus-philippines-relations-tells-yet-another-china-fumble (Accessed on July 10, 2023); Jonathan
Stromseth, “A Window of Opportunity to Upgrade US-Vietnam Relations, Brookings, December 20,2022”, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/a-window-of-opportunity-to-upgrade-us-vietnam-relations/ (Accessed on July 10, 2023).

26

Chapter 2— China’s Growing Military Power and Influence[Olsson]allies, 24 not least through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or the Quad), a
quadrilateral cooperation mode between the US, Japan, India and Australia. Australia, for
its part, has also strengthened its security partnership with the US and the UK, throughthe AUKUS pact. While the main practical outcome of AUKUS was a nuclear-powered
submarine deal, the agreement also features increased security and technology
cooperation within the underwater domain.25 Meanwhile, US political support for Taiwan
has only strengthened in recent years,26 as China has increased the number and scale ofmilitary exercises around the self-governing island. In sum, it is hard to claim that China’s
growing military strength has translated into growing influence.
During the past two decades, China’s military has undergone a rapid transformation—its
military expenditure has increased more than sixfold, its navy has undergone rapid
expansion and modernisation and its ground forces and air force have modernised theirequipment. China’s arms industry has improved in tandem with its military modernisation.
Exports have been rising but are still limited to a few countries. While China’s military
power has undoubtedly increased, it is much less certain that this power has resulted inincreased influence, and, in some sense, it has been counterproductive, as countries
increase their military spending and seek closer ties with the US, China’s most significant
geostrategic rival. As China’s military build-up continues, tensions in the Indo–Pacificregion are unlikely to ease.

24 Jim Garamone, “Defense Part of Deepening Overall U.S.-India Relationship, DoD News, June 22,2023”, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3436525/defense-part-of-deepe
ning-overall-us-india-relationship/ (Accessed on July 10, 2023).
25 Ashley Townsend, “The AUKUS Submarine Deal Highlights a Tectonic Shift in the U.S.-Australia
Alliance, Carnegie Endowment, 27 March 27, 2023”, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/03/27/
aukus-submarine-deal-highlights-tectonic-shift-in-u.s.-australia-alliance-pub-89383(Accessed on
July 10, 2023).
26 See, e.g. Wesley Rahn, “How Does the US Support Taiwan Militarily? DW, April 8 2022”,
https://www.dw.com/en/how-does-the-us-support-taiwan-militarily/a-62711617 (Accessed on July
10, 2023).

Chapter 3 —Emergence of the US–Japan Alliance to Counter China[Kamiya]27

CHAPTER 3

Emergence of the US–Japan Alliance to Counter China
Matake Kamiya

INTRODUCTIONThe US–Japan alliance is now widely recognized as an alliance whose primary objective
is to counter the security challenges posed by China. Japan and the US are making noattempt to hide this reality. In fact, however, only recently did Japan and the US come toposition the alliance as such. For more than a quarter of a century since the end of theCold War, the US–Japan alliance was regarded as a regional stabilizer in the Asia-Pacificregion that did not regard any particular country an antagonist. The reason underlying the
sharp turn of the alliance in the direction of one to counter China is that the developmentof China’s external behavior in recent years has betrayed the expectations of Japan andthe US and has taken on a color that is undesirable for the two allies.

THE US–JAPAN ALLIANCE AS A REGIONAL STABILIZER IN THE ASIAPACIFICThe US–Japan alliance was originally created as one for jointly addressing the Soviet
threat. When the Cold War ended, and the Soviet threat dissipated, Tokyo andWashington needed a rationale for continuing this alliance into the future. Two types ofrationalization were possible for the continuation of the alliance. The first was to address
China and North Korea as potential remaining threats to the Asia-Pacific region and to
redefine the US–Japan alliance as a counter to these new threats. The second was not toconsider China and North Korea antagonists but to facilitate security dialogues andconfidence-building measures among the countries in the region, including both countries.
In this manner, cooperation to contain the remaining factors in the post-Cold War AsiaPacific that could destabilize the regional order in the region could be promoted, and the
US–Japan alliance as an order stabilizer in the region to support such efforts could be
defined.

28

Chapter 3 —Emergence of the US–Japan Alliance to Counter China[Kamiya]Japan and the US opted for the latter: with the issuance of the 1996 Japan–US Joint
Declaration on Security,1 the two governments redefined their alliance as the stabilizer ofthe Asia-Pacific, which was not directed toward any particular country. Eventually, withthe progression of the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by North
Korea, Tokyo and Washington gradually began to take the stance that their alliance wasintended to address the increasing threat from Pyongyang. With regard to China, however,
the two allies maintained the stance that their alliance was not directed toward it for nearlya quarter of a century after the issuance of the joint declaration.

ENGAGEMENT POLICY TOWARD CHINA AND BETRAYED EXPECTATIONSBY JAPAN AND THE US
During this period, the US adopted the strategy of engagement and hedging toward China,
and Japan took a similar posture. Two expectations underlie the emphasis by the US andJapan on engagement with China and their willingness to help the development of thecommunist state of China through investment and generous economic and other types of
support. The first is that by deepening relations with China in various ways and by
welcoming it into international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, they
could shape the external behavior of China to a direction in which it would increasingly
view the maintenance of the existing US-led international order as beneficial in thecontext of international interdependence and would increasingly come to respect
international rules. The second expectation was that if the two allies helped China’s
economic development, Beijing would become gradually increasingly tolerant of liberalvalues, such as freedom and democracy, which may even lead to a gradual start ofdemocratization in China.
In other words, with the policy of engagement, Japan and the US hoped to shape thedomestic and external behavior of China to a direction that would gradually change inways that would be desirable to the US and Japan. Doing so could promote constructive
cooperation between the two sides for the international community and make China apartner for the US and Japan in maintaining the existing US-led international order.
However, the actual behavior of China has betrayed such expectations.
China, as it gains affluence and power, has been moving in the opposite direction byincreasing its rejection of liberal values, strengthening the Communist Party dictatorship,
and tightening control over speech and thought. Externally, as exemplified by the
1 “Japan-U. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century, April 17, 1996”, https://www.

mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html.

Chapter 3 —Emergence of the US–Japan Alliance to Counter China[Kamiya]29

construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea and the escalation of acts ofprovocation around Japan’s Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, Beijing has beenconspicuously attempting to change the status quo by force instead of by adherence tointernational rules. Recently, instead of supporting the existing rules-based international
order, Beijing has taken an overt stance of attempting to revise it. Contrary to the hopes
entertained by Japan and the US that China, with the increased power due to theengagement policy of their alliance, would increasingly exercise its influence in ways
beneficial to the international community, including Japan and the US, Beijing in reality
has been employing its enhanced power in ways that were detrimental to the interests ofTokyo and Washington as well as the international community.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE US–JAPAN ALLIANCE INTO ONE FOR
COUNTERING CHINA
In the face of such a development, the transformation of the US–Japan alliance into one
for countering China has become particularly evident since the Biden administration took
office in the US at the beginning of 2021.
At the US-Japan Two-Plus-Two meeting held in Tokyo in March 2021, US Secretary ofState Anthony Blinken, who earlier stated that the relationship with China represents “thebiggest geopolitical test of the 21st century” for the US,2 mentioned that “we will pushback if necessary when China uses coercion or aggression to get its way”. 3 JapaneseForeign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi echoed him by saying, “the strategic environmentof the Indo-Pacific has entered into a completely different dimension than where it used
to be”.4
At the Yoshihide Suga–Joe Biden summit meeting in April 2021, which was also held inTokyo, the remarks of President Biden at the joint press conference after the meeting
clearly demonstrated the transformation of the nature of the US–Japan alliance to theworld in terms of its direction toward a counter-China alliance. 5 Very clearly, Biden
2 Anthony J. Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People, Speech, March 3, 2021”, https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/.
3 “Transcript: Secretary Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Japanese Foreign
Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, and Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi at a Joint Press Availability,
March 16, 2021”, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-austin-japanese-foreign-minister-toshimitsu-motegi-and-japanese-defense-minister-nobuo-kishi-at-a-jointpress-vailability/.
4 Ibid.
5 “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Suga of Japan at Press Conference, April 16, 2021”,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/16/remarks-by-presidentbiden-and-prime-minister-suga-of-japan-at-press-conference/.

30

Chapter 3 —Emergence of the US–Japan Alliance to Counter China[Kamiya]declared that the US and Japan will work together to face the challenges from China. The
President also stated that “[w]e’re going to work together to prove that democracies canstill compete and win in the 21st century”. Prime Minister Suga also stated, “we agreed
to oppose any attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in the East and South
China Seas, and intimidation of others in the region”.6 Their statements demonstrated thatJapan and the US had agreed to share the determination to stand up against andoutcompete the challenge posed by China.
The US–Japan Joint Statement at the time explicitly expressed that the alliance was now
intended to with the Chinese challenges. 7 For example, it stated that Suga and Biden“shared their concerns over Chinese activities that are inconsistent with the internationalrules-based order, including the use of economic and other forms of coercion” andexplicitly used the name China. It also declared that the two allies will “not tolerate anychange of status quo by force” by China using phrases such as “oppose any unilateralattempts to change the status quo in the East China Sea” and “reaffirmed our strong sharedinterest in a free and open South China Sea governed by international law”.
It was also noteworthy that the joint statement at that meeting pointed to the importanceof peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait for the first time in 52 years in a jointstatement at a US-Japan summit meeting. Other prominent statements included the clear
commitment of the US to the defense of the Senkaku Islands under the US–Japan allianceand the shared concern between the US and Japan about the human rights abuse in Hong
Kong and Xinjiang. In addition, in a high-tech and supply chain review, cooperation
between the US and Japan was put forward with a view on countering China.
With regard to the last point, the agreement to launch the US–Japan Competitiveness andResilience (CoRe) Partnership was particularly significant for both countries. 8 Its
objective was to strengthen cooperation between them in the field of economic security.
The areas of cooperation include advanced fields such as semiconductors, AI, genome
science, and quantum computing. Biden stated that CoRe “will enhance our ability –enhance our ability to meet the pressing challenges of our time –together meet thosechallenges”, and added as follows:

6 Ibid.
7 “U.S.- Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement: ‘U.S.-Japan Global Partnership for a New Era’, April 16,2021”, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/16/u-s-japan-joint-leaders-statement-u-s-japan-global-partnership-for-a-new-era/.
8 “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership, April 16, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/16/fact-sheet-u-s-japancompetitiveness-and-resilience-core-partnership/.

Chapter 3 —Emergence of the US–Japan Alliance to Counter China[Kamiya]31

Japan and the US are both deeply invested in innovation and looking to the future.
That includes making sure we invest in and protect the technologies that will maintainand sharpen our competitive edge. And those technologies are governed by shareddemocratic norms that we both share — norms set by democracies, not by
autocracies.9
As such, his words clearly indicated that this partnership is intended to help the US andJapan outcompete the economic and technological competition with autocratic China.
Thus, the central issue for the US–Japan alliance is now how to jointly address the
security challenges posed by China. The most critical of which is the protection of theexisting rules-based international order from the increasing tendency of Beijing’s external
posture to rely on its power without sufficient respect for international rules. Although
the US–Japan alliance lacks a formal redefinition by both countries as an alliance forcountering China, the two allies clearly share a common understanding on this point.
Moreover, although the Suga–Biden summit in April 2021 represented a watershed eventin this change in the characteristic of the alliance, this common understanding has
remained unwavering between the two countries since then. It has even become evenclearer and stronger since Fumio Kishida replaced Suga as the prime minister of Japan.

HIGH DEGREE OF COMMONALITY IN THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGIES OF JAPAN AND THE US ON THEIR PERCEPTION OF CHINA’S
CHALLENGE
The high degree of commonality of perceptions on this point between Tokyo andWashington is evident when comparing Japan’s new National Security Strategy, which
was issued in December 2022, with the new US National Security Strategy issued earlier
in October of the same year.10
The greatest challenge for US national security policy, as put forward by the US National
Security Strategy, is to defend democracy and the free, open, and rules-based international
order against the challenges posed by authoritarian China and Russia. Out of thechallenges posed by China and Russia, China is the country considered more serious andessential in the long term.
9 “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Suga of Japan at Press Conference, April 16, 2021”.
10

National Security Strategy of Japan (Provisional Translation), Tokyo, Cabinet Secretariat,
December 2022; National Security Strategy, Washington DC: The White House, October 2022.

32

Chapter 3 —Emergence of the US–Japan Alliance to Counter China[Kamiya]

The US National Security Strategy describes Russia as “an immediate threat to the free
and open international system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the international order
today”. However, Russia is not positioned as a major competitor to the US regarding thefuture form of international order. The reason is that Russia lacks the capability to shapea new international order.
However, China possesses such a capability of which the US is more wary. The document
defines China as “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international
order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power toadvance that objective”. Moreover, the US is transparent about its alarm at the manner inwhich China exercises its international influence. It is wary of China’s attempts to createa favorable international environment for the authoritarian model by creating a sphere of
influence in the Indo-Pacific region and exerting influence on international institutions
regarding the establishment of international rules.
In other words, it is believed that China represents the main opponent that the US willneed to outcompete for the formation of international rules, institutions, and order.
Alternatively, although Russia is fighting the war that may destroy the rules, institutions,and order that the US intends to protect in the short term, it is not considered a competitor
over the future shape of international order in the long term, as is the case with China.
The document notes that the outcome of the US–China geopolitical competition will exert
the greatest impact on the Indo-Pacific. However, it emphasizes that this competition isby no means limited to the Indo-Pacific but poses significant global dimensions.
The notable aspect about Japan’s National Security Strategy, which was released twomonths after than the US National Security Strategy, is that Japan’s strategy is mainly
consistent with the US strategy with regard to the abovementioned perceptions. Reading
through Japan’s National Security Strategy, one notes that it repeatedly expresses Japan’s
determination not to allow “unilateral change of the status quo by force”. This statement
is an indication of Japan’s willingness to uphold a liberal rules-based international order,or, to use the expression used in this document, “a free and open international order basedon the rule of law”. The national security strategies presented by Japan and the US are
fully aligned with the recognition that the maintenance of the existing rules-based
international order is currently the top priority for the security of each country.

Chapter 3 —Emergence of the US–Japan Alliance to Counter China[Kamiya]33

Japan’s National Security Strategy is identical to that of the US in that it names China
and Russia as serious challenges to “a free and open international order based on the ruleof law”.
In addition, Japan’s National Security Strategy is based on the fundamental recognition
that the competition over the shape of the future international order has been developing
between “advanced democratic countries, including Japan”, which “have devoted
themselves to upholding universal values such as freedom, democracy, respect for
fundamental human rights, and the rule of law, and to spearheading the effort to shape
the international society of coexistence and coprosperity”, and “some nations, not sharing
universal values” which “are making attempts to revise the existing international order”,“guided by their own historical views and values”. This recognition is also basicallyconsistent with that of the US, which portrays a competition between democracies andautocracies over the future shape of international order.
Japan’s strategy shares common aspects with that of the US in that Japan positions theRussian threat as one that could destroy this order in the short term, while it positions the
Chinese threat as a more serious one that could alter this order in the long term. The
document states that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has easily breached “the very
foundations of the rules that shape the international order”. However, the Japanese
document, similar to the US National Security Strategy, takes the position that the more
fundamental threat to the future shape of international order is China. Japan’s National
Security Strategy is based on the recognition that China represents “an unprecedented andthe greatest strategic challenge” to Japan and the international community:
China’s current external stance, military activities, and other activities have becomea matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present
an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace andsecurity of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, as wellas in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law, to which Japan
should respond with its comprehensive national power and in cooperation with its
ally, like-minded countries and others.
Here, China’s external stance, which is raising a concern for Japan and the international
community, refers to China’s external exercise of influence, in which it frequently
disregards international rules and does not hesitate to attempt to “unilaterally change thestatus quo by force”.

34

Chapter 3 —Emergence of the US–Japan Alliance to Counter China[Kamiya]Another commonality is noted in the 2022 national security strategies of the US and Japan,that is, the treatment toward North Korea. Although both countries recognize the growing
threat of the nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles of North Korea, they consider thechallenges posed by China and Russia to the existing international order as more serious
for their national interests. Although the US document notes that North Korea continues
to “expand its illicit nuclear weapons and missile programs”, as a reaction by the US tothat development, the document only mentions the strengthening of extended deterrence
and seeking of diplomacy with North Korea toward the complete denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula.
For Japan, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles of North Korea represent far more
immediate threats to its security than they do for the security of the US. Thus, the Japanese
document makes considerably detailed references to the North Korean threat than did the
US document. Notably, however, the document does not list North Korea first when
listing countries that pose threats to security of Japan. The fact that China, North Korea,
and Russia are listed in this order demonstrates how the Japanese government evaluates
the relative seriousness to Japan of the challenges posed by China and Russia to theexisting rules-based international order.
Without a doubt, North Korea is the most serious physical threat to Japan’s security.
However, North Korea lacks the capacity to transform the existing rules-based
international order. For this reason, North Korea is considered a lower-ranked threat toChina.
Why, then, is Russia positioned as a lower-ranked threat than not only China but also
North Korea? The reason is that Russia possesses only the capability to damage theexisting international order but not the capability to form a new order. Moreover, Japan
perceives Russia as a country that poses only limited direct physical threats to it. In
contrast, China poses a serious physical threat to Japan, particularly through its attempts
to change the status quo by force around the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan in addition to
being the most serious challenge to the rules-based international order, because it
possesses the capability to remake it into a new order.
These descriptions are expected elucidate the reason why the status of the Russian threat
to the National Security Strategy of Japan is regarded lower-ranked than that of North
Korea, not to mention China. Although Russia started a war of invasion that could destroy
the rules-based international order, as previously cited, it lacks the power to create a newChapter 3 —Emergence of the US–Japan Alliance to Counter China[Kamiya]35

order. Moreover, thus far, it has taken little actions that directly threaten Japan’s security,
as has been done by China and North Korea.

CONCLUSION
This brief paper elucidated that the national security strategies of Japan and the US in
2022 are aligned in that they are alert to the ways in which China is externally exercising
its influence. Tokyo and Washington agree that responding to the challenge posed by
China to the existing rules-based international order is the biggest security challenge forJapan and the US in the future. Based on this common understanding, the study predicts
that the strengthening of the US–Japan alliance will be accelerated going forward, whilestrengthening its character as an alliance for countering China, unless China’s external
behavior depicts a sign of changing toward a direction of increased tolerance of liberalvalues and increased acceptance of the rules-based international order led by the US.
Regrettably, no sign of such a change is evident in China’s attitude, which was
symbolized by statements by Yang Jiechi, a member of the Politburo of the Communist
Party of China, at a top-level diplomatic meeting between the US and China in Alaska in
March 2021. At the outset, Secretary of State Blinken stated, “Our administration iscommitted to leading diplomacy to advance US interests and strengthen the rules-based
international order” and criticized China’s actions regarding Xinjiang, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, the cyber-attacks on the US, economic coercion against US allies, and otherissues as threatening the rules-based international order.11 In response, Yang denied theuniversality of values upheld by the US and squarely rejected the existing US-led
international order, as follows:
What China and the international community follow or uphold is the United Nationscentered international system and the international order underpinned byinternational law, not what is advocated by a small number of countries of the socalled rules-based international order.
The US itself does not represent international public opinion, and neither does theWestern world. Whether judged by population scale or the trend of the world, theWestern world does not represent the global public opinion …. I don’t think theoverwhelming majority of countries in the world would recognize that the universal
11 “How It happened: Transcript of the US-China Opening Remarks in Alaska, Nikkei Asia, March 19,2021”, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-China-tensions/How-it-happenedTranscript-of-the-US-China-opening-remarks-in-Alaska.

36

Chapter 3 —Emergence of the US–Japan Alliance to Counter China[Kamiya]values advocated by the US or that the opinion of the US could represent international
public opinion, and those countries would not recognize that the rules made by asmall number of people would serve as the basis for the international order12.
Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy clearly states that Japan’s national interests to beprotected include the maintenance of “universal values, such as freedom, democracy,
respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law, and international order basedon international law”. The US National Security Strategy of 2022 also declares: “Our goalis clear—we want a free, open, prosperous, and secure international order”. Given that
China continues to adopt a revisionist attitude toward the existing international order, theUS and Japan continuing to make their alliance counter China to protect the interests ofthe two countries is only natural.

12 Ibid.

Chapter 4 —China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe[Englund]

37

CHAPTER 4

China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe
Johan Englund
Beijing is actively undertaking pressure tactics beyond its borders to isolate Taiwan. This
chapter illustrates how China seeks to shrink Taiwan’s space in Europe by pressuring
European actors to refrain from engagements with Taiwan on many levels and in many
areas. Chinese efforts to isolate Taiwan in Europe take place on a national and a local
level, as well as in official and private domains, and target both individuals and groups.
Although the success of Chinese tactics has been sporadic in their individual cases, thesepressure activities so far seem largely ineffectual from a wider perspective. As indications,rather, point in the direction of Europe seeking closer ties with Taiwan, these trends run
contrary to China’s ultimate strategic aims. It remains to be seen whether Europe canrefrain from self-censorship and restrain itself when facing Beijing on the issue of Taiwan.

INTRODUCTION
Since the election of Taiwanese President Tsai Ingwen in 2016, cross-strait tensions havebecome increasingly strained. While Tsai has rejected the formula of “one country, twosystems” that Beijing seeks to pursue over the strait, China has intensified its pressure on
Taiwan to alter the status quo in the region. China is stepping up its military presence andthreats around the island. In 2022, China made 1727 incursions into Taiwan’s air defense
identification zone, compared to 960 incursions in 2021 and 380 in 2020. 1 Chinese
incursions by drones also appeared for the first time in 2022. At the same time, Beijing
employs a wide range of tools for political warfare and economic coercion to further
intimidate and influence Taiwan. These activities include disinformation campaigns, cooptation of economic and political elites, and inroads into the Taiwanese media
landscape.2

1 “China’s Warplane Incursions into Taiwan Air Defense Zone Doubled in 2022”, The Guardian,January 2, 2023.
2 See, Michael J. Cole, Cross-strait Relations since 2016: The End of the Illusion, New York:
Routledge. 2020.

38

Chapter 4 —China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe[Englund]On the global stage, Beijing continues to isolate Taiwan from international relations andreduce its room for maneuver both in third countries and in international forums. This isseen in Chinese efforts to poach Taiwanese diplomatic allies, Beijing’s obstruction of
Taiwanese participation in international organizations, and China’s pressure on privatecompanies to disengage from Taiwan or Taiwanese actors.3 Beijing’s activities all seek
the same goal, namely, to hollow out the international legitimacy of Taiwan.
The strained relationship between China and Taiwan increasingly affects the international
community. Countries across the world find that the sensitive issue of Taiwan is not only
being fought in international institutions but also appearing within their own domestic
life. This is further exacerbated by the fact that Taiwan sits at the center of the great power
rivalry between China and the US. Thus, the status of Taiwan taps into power politics andpulls other countries into the conflictual ground between the two sides of the strait.
One important region in which China wants to diminish Taiwanese legitimacy is Europe.
As the issue of Taiwan becomes increasingly international, Chinese efforts to isolate
Taiwan also have an impact inside European borders. European democracies areimportant countries for Taiwan to strengthen its ties with, while Europe is also a region
that China would oppose substantially moving closer to Taiwan. This chapter examines
briefly how China is seeking to isolate Taiwan in Europe. The chapter also analyzes
Europe’s response and approach to Taiwan in recent years.

CHINESE TACTICS TO ADVANCE ITS NARRATIVE ABOUT TAIWAN IN
EUROPEThe battle of narratives is always an important arena for advancing China’s interests. A
recurring approach by the Chinese government is to instill a narrative that not only
adheres to Beijing’s line but also portrays any European “missteps” on the issue of
Taiwan as part of American and “Taiwanese separatists” attempts to challenge China’s
territorial integrity.
One Chinese tactic is to intentionally conflate its own “One China principle” with theEuropean “One China policy”. The People Republic of China’s (PRC) “One China
3 See, Thomas Shattuck, “The Race to Zero? China’s Poaching of Taiwan’s Diplomatic Allies”,

Orbis,Volume 64, Issue 2 (Spring 2020) ; see also, Gary Sands, “Beijing’s Blue Book on
Cyberbullying Taiwan”, Asia Times, January 29, 2019; Tara Francis Chan, “‘Economic Blackmail’:Zara, Qantas and Delta Air Lines Reverse Position on Taiwan for Fear of Angering China, Business
Insider, January 17, 2018”, https://www.businessinsider.nl/zara-marriott-qantas-apologized-to-chinalisting-taiwan-as-country-2018-1/?international=true&r=US; Cindy Sui, “China Warns Western
Firms over Taiwan BBC, June 29, 2018”, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-44614106.

Chapter 4 —China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe[Englund]39

principle” asserts that “there is only One China in the world, Taiwan is part of China, andthe government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of
China”.4 The EU maintains a “One China policy” that recognizes the PRC as the sole
legitimate government of China but reserves the right to cooperate and develop its
relations with Taiwan.5 As such, although the EU’s “policy” is intentionally vague topursue unofficial relations with Taiwan, it does not replicate the PRC’s “principle”.
European countries such as France, Germany, and the UK also have their own “One China
policy” which does not replicate the “principle” that is promoted by China.
Thus, Beijing claims that its “principle” is a universal consensus and seeks to establish
this narrative in its contacts with media and international institutions and in official
documents. For instance, three Chinese policy papers on the European Union publishedin 2003, 2004, and 2018, state that China “appreciates the EU’s adherence to the ‘One
China principle’”.6 As such, Beijing seeks to create the impression that the EU adheres toChina’s “principle”, and not the EU’s own “policy”.7 Another similar example followed
the adoption of a report about Taiwan by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European
Parliament in September 2021. In its response, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
claimed that the “One China principle is a widely recognized norm of international
relations and a consensus of the international community”.8 It went on to argue that the
EU has often recognized the “One China principle” in its various documents, thus again
making a false remark about the EU’s representation. By doing this, China hopes toestablish a universal norm and acceptance of its own “principle”, which is much more
limiting for Taiwan.
A crucial component of Beijing’s narrative on Taiwan is to react to and push back onactions and statements concerning Taiwan by the EU or its member states. China often
seeks to paint Europe as a victim or an accomplice of “Taiwanese separatists” and “US
4 See, White Paper: The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, Beijing, Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, People’s Republic of China, 2004.
5 The European Union and Taiwan, Taipei: European External Action Service, 2021; see also, Joint
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council-Elements for a New EU Strategy on
China, Brussel: European Commission, June 22, 2016.
6 See, 中国对欧盟政策文件 (China’s EU Policy Paper), Beijing: The People’s Republic of China,
2003; see also, 中国对欧盟政策文件：深化互利共赢的中欧全面战略伙伴关系 (China’s Policy
Paper on the EU: Deepen the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit andWin-win Cooperation), Beijing: The People’s Republic of China, 2014; China’s Policy Paper on theEuropean Union, Beijing: The People’s Republic of China, 2018.
7 Justyna Szczudlik, “The EU–China Battle of Narratives on Taiwan”, Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, (ed.),Unpacking Beijing’s Narrative on Taiwan, Institute for Security & Development Policy, Asia Paper,
April 2023, p. 23.
8 Ibid., p. 23.

40

Chapter 4 —China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe[Englund]hegemony”. When the Czech Senate President Milos Vystrcil led a delegation from his
country to visit Taiwan in September 2020, Beijing labeled the act as plagued by antiChinese sentiments and occurring as a result of Taiwanese and external anti-China
forces.9 At the same time, it also sought to conflate the Czechian “One China policy” with
the PRC’s “One China principle” by describing the visit as a violation of not only “theOne China principle that is an element of Czech’s foreign policy” but also as a violationof international law.
A similar reaction was seen following Lithuania’s decision to open a TaiwaneseRepresentative Office (rather than “Taipei”) in its capital Vilnius. Beijing described
Lithuania as a victim of external forces. In a statement, it directed its ire against “Taiwan
authorities that [are] trying to coerce foreigners to seek ‘independence’ [...]”.10 Indeed,
the shadow of the US. was also present, as it claimed that “Lithuania’s progress to where
it is today was instigated by some great powers but at the expense of Lithuania’s
interests”.11 Thus, Beijing seeks to pressure Europe on Taiwan by shaming them as partof an “illicit plot” to split Chinese territory as well as to shape Europe’s own “One China
policy”.

INSTANCES OF CHINESE PRESSURE ON EUROPE ABOUT TAIWAN
Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has logged various instances of mainland China’s
interference with Taiwan’s international presence. From 2016 to 2022, the ministry
recorded at least 35 instances of Chinese attempts to interfere with Taiwan’s presence
that have taken place in Europe or concerning European actors. 12 However, theseregistered instances are merely a snapshot of the situation. There are likely many morecases of Chinese influence operations seeking to remove Taiwan from Europe. For
example, the widely publicized case of Lithuania is not even included in the list.
Even so, the recorded instances provide a useful illustration of the various kinds ofpressure that China applies in Europe to try to limit the Taiwanese presence in the region.
For example, in 2016, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade had seemingly
been under pressure from Beijing, as it requested government ministers not to attend

9 Ibid., p. 24.
10 Ibid., p. 24.
11 Ibid., p. 25.
12 Instances of China’s Interference with Taiwan’s International Presence, Taipei: Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Republic of China, 2022.

Chapter 4 —China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe[Englund]

41

Taiwan’s National Day celebrations. In its request, the Irish Department had emphasizedthat their participation risked undermining Ireland’s policy goals regarding China.13
In 2018, China exerted pressure on international companies to change their designationof “Taiwan from Republic of China” to “Taipei, China” or “Province of China, Taiwan”.
Many European companies, particularly international airlines that were given deadlines
by the Chinese government, complied with these demands and adjusted their websites’
designation of Taiwan. Airlines that complied included, inter alia, Scandinavian Airlines,
Lufthansa, and Air France, but auto companies such as Mercedez-Benz also followed
suit.14 In another example that same year, the Taiwanese team participating in the 2018
Paris Gay Games had to change its name due to pressure from China. First, it waspressured to shift its name to “Chinese Taipei” and then to “Taipei”.15
There are other telling examples of the variety of issues and locations in which Beijingseeks to diminish Taiwan’s presence in Europe. In 2019, the Representative of the Taipei
Economic and Cultural Office in Prague, Mr. Wang ChungI, was forced to leave anannual meeting on the economic achievements and prospects of the Czech Republic, heldby the Ministry of Industry of the Czech Republic, due to pressure from the Chinese
embassy.16 In the UK that same year, the London School of Economics depicted Taiwan
and China on a globe sculpture in the same colors, while referring to Taipei as a regional
city, following pressure from China.17 In 2021, China’s Ambassador to France, Lu Shaye,sent a letter to French Senator Alain Richard, demanding that he cancel a planned visit to
Taiwan and shy away from all official contacts with Taiwan.18 Senator Richard defied theChinese demand and carried on with his travel plans. The following year, in 2022, China
exerted pressure on local government officials in Bologna, Italy. Chinese diplomats
demanded that the Taiwanese illustrator of an award-winning work at the 2022 Bologna
Children’s Book Fair should be re-named as originating from “Taiwan, China” instead of“Taiwan”. 19 Following a request to comply by a local government leader, the event
organizers decided in the end to not list any country name at all.
13 Instances of China’s Interference with Taiwan’s International Presence, Taipei: Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Republic of China, 2016, n.a.
14 Instances of China’s Interference with Taiwan’s International Presence, Taipei: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Republic of China, 2018, n.a.
15 Ibid.
16 Instances of China’s Interference with Taiwan’s International Presence, Taipei: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Republic of China, 2019, n.a.
17 Ibid.
18 Instances of China’s Interference with Taiwan’s International Presence, Taipei: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Republic of China, 2021.
19 “China Pressured Italy Book Fair over Use of ‘Taiwan’”, Taipei Times, March 25, 2022.

42

Chapter 4 —China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe[Englund]

These selected examples show how China seeks to influence European contacts andengagements with Taiwan on many levels and in many areas. The case that has seized themost attention, however, is the aforementioned case of China’s fury against Lithuania. In
2021, the Chinese government downgraded diplomatic relations with Vilnius and targeted
the Baltic state with sanctions for allowing Taiwan to open a “Taiwan Representative
Office” in Lithuania, rather than using “Taipei” in the name.20 Following the opening of
Taiwan’s trade office, Beijing withdrew its ambassador from Vilnius and imposed
secondary sanctions against Lithuania. Reportedly, China blocked the clearance ofLithuanian goods in Chinese ports and discriminated against exports of EU products
containing content from Lithuania. 21 In this way, China sought to deter others fromfollowing Lithuania’s example of strengthening ties with Taiwan and to have a cooling
effect on conducting business with Lithuania. Furthermore, in its communication with
Brussels, Beijing pushed for the EU to “urge Lithuania to return to the right track of the‘One China principle’ as soon as possible”.22 By doing this, China seeks to claim that the
EU has adopted Beijing’s “principle”. Thus, as stated above, Beijing seeks to control thenarrative and establish a discourse that differs from the EU’s original position.
Finally, in a report entitled “Isolating Taiwan Beyond the Strait—Chinese Pressure
Tactics in Four Democracies”, this author examines Chinese tactics to isolate Taiwan inthird countries during the period 2016–2022.23 The study looks into four cases, among
which two are European countries—Germany and Sweden (the other two being Japanand South Korea). Similarly, to the abovementioned instance, the report finds that China
is active on many levels and in many areas in its efforts to shrink Taiwan’s room formaneuver and spur disengagement from Taiwanese actors. In the report, four overarchingcategories of means or methods are identified in which China seeks to influence actors’
engagements with Taiwanese counterparts to isolate Taiwan;

20 Milda Seputyte, “Lithuania Open Trade Office in Taiwan as Ties with China Sour, Bloomberg,

November 7, 2022”, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-07/lithuania-opens-tradeoffice-in-taiwan-as-ties-with-china-sou.
21 Andy Bounds, “EU Challenges China at WTO over Lithuania Trade Embargo and Tech Patents”,
Financial Times, December 7, 2022.
22 “China Says EU Should Urge Lithuania to Return to One China Principle, CGTN,26-Feb-2022”,
https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-02-26/China-says-EU-should-urge-Lithuania-to-return-to-oneChina-principle-17Xwq9DFf56/index.html.
23 See, Johan Englund, Isolating Taiwan Beyond the Strait: Chinese Pressure Tactic in Four
Democracies, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), 2022.

Chapter 4 —China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe[Englund]43(1) “DISCIPLINARY” PUBLIC STATEMENTS:
The Chinese embassy puts out statements in which it reacts to what may havebeen said or done in the country regarding Taiwan. For the most part, thestatements criticize the media for what they convey about Taiwan, but they
can also include angry comments about allowing Taiwanese representatives
to write in the media or general statements about international incidents that
may have occurred regarding Taiwan. Occasionally, the statements involve
direct or indirect warnings to individuals or organizations about the possible
consequences or future actions by China.
(2) PUBLICATIONS IN THE MEDIA:
In recent years, Beijing has become increasingly active in submittingcomments and replies in both local and national media outside its borders. As
with its public statements, the publications in the media seek to protest against
an event or argument that has taken place regarding Taiwan and clarify
Beijing’s position on Taiwan.
(3) CONTACTING OR WARNING MEDIA OUTLETS, JOURNALISTS, AND
POLITICIANS:
In addition to public dissatisfaction, China also uses a strategy of contacting
or warning actors. The PRC embassy has contacted and sometimes warned
media outlets, individual journalists, and parliamentarians, telling them what
they ought to write and how they ought to act about Taiwan. On occasions,
Beijing has intimidated actors by warning them about “consequences”.
(4) PRESSURE ON CIVIL SOCIETY, PRIVATE ENTERPRISES,ACADEMIA:AND

The report identified several cases of China exerting pressure on actors within
civil society, private companies and academia to refrain from engaging with
Taiwan. Targeted actors ranged from universities to sports events or hotelvenues.

44

Chapter 4 —China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe[Englund]The first two categories—statements on the embassy website and publications in media—
are, in general, not controversial features of Chinese agency. Voicing opinions in the
media and publishing its position on the embassy website are fundamental rights indemocracies with a culture of free expression and a free media. As for public statementson the embassy’s website, the extent of its impact is also highly debatable as it is unclear
how many people read the posts. However, the parts where the embassy formulates
intimidating warnings against individuals and organizations are more worrisome.
Similarly, the two last categories—contacting or intimidating media outlets andindividual journalists and politicians and pressuring civil society, private enterprises andacademia—are conducted covertly.
The purpose of China’s pressure tactics is to draw red lines against how actors can engage
with Taiwanese counterparts. This serves as a clarification of China’s position and awarning to others of Beijing’s boundaries and what it considers acceptable. Thus, thestatements signal its red lines and efforts to discipline the states and other actors in theircontacts with Taiwan. By contacting individuals and organizations with warnings ofconsequences, Beijing seeks to police and silence those who are vocal in support of
Taiwan. China wants to influence and control the discourse surrounding Taiwan. It seeks
to instill self-censorship and self-restraint among actors about Taiwan, thereby blocking
future actions that might create a stronger Taiwanese presence abroad.
Overall, however, the report finds that China has not been very successful. Although there
have been instances of concessions to Chinese pressure, in most of the examples
identified, German and Swedish actors did not change their actions in response to
Beijing’s pressure. This is also reminiscent of other Chinese pressures on Taiwan inEurope, which have had sporadic success. Furthermore, in both Germany and Sweden,
there are indications that the countries seek to deepen their relations with Taiwan, albeit
still within the boundaries of unofficial relations. Thus, in the bigger picture, it is doubtful
whether the pressure tactics address Beijing’s wider strategic interests efficiently.
However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fully discern the extent of self-censorshipand self-restraint that actors undertake. China’s red lines may bear fruit in the end. The
question is how actors continue to respond when they face angry Chinese remarks, or ifthey just refrain from addressing the Taiwan issue to avoid conflict going forward.

CLOSER EU-TAIWAN TIES AMID SOURING EU-CHINA RELATIONS
The findings in the aforementioned cases may correspond with developments in Europe
at large, even though significant differences exist between the countries. Generally, thereChapter 4 —China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe[Englund]45

is a growing awareness of Taiwan in Europe, as Taiwan has achieved a higher profile inthe discourse in the EU and among many of its member states. 24 Indeed, European
countries generally remain careful not to provoke China over Taiwan. The EU reiterates
its “One China policy” and countries abide by the unwritten rule of no meetings between
Taiwan’s five highest political representatives (the so-called “Big 5”) with their European
counterparts.25 Nonetheless, exchanges between Taiwan and European states are fairly
broad in scope, and the EU is the single largest investor in Taiwan. This is coupled withwhat seems to be an increasing willingness to strengthen ties with Taiwan, albeit within
the existing unofficial relationship.
Indeed, closer EU–Taiwan ties occur in the context of a growing perception of threat from
China in Europe. European views of China are increasingly unfavorable, particularly
concerning China’s policies on democracy and human rights.26 Several factors accountfor Europe’s increasing skepticism toward Beijing as a trustworthy actor on theinternational stage. China’s dismantling of Hong Kong’s democracy movement, its
treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, and the growing centralization of Xi Jinping’s
repressive rule in China are all domestic factors contributing to negative views of China
in Europe.27 Moreover, Beijing’s domestic and foreign policies during the COVID-19
pandemic have further soured European views of China, while China’s coercive andprotective trade and investment policies have aggravated the relationship for quite sometime. 28 Additionally, China’s failure to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has
severely damaged the EU’s trust in China as a responsible and trustworthy actor.29 Thus,
although the EU continues to deal with China simultaneously as a partner for cooperationand negotiation, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival, as outlined in the 2019
Strategic Outlook, the focus has increasingly shifted toward the latter.30

24 Gudrun Wacker, “Taiwan’s ‘Upgrade’ in the European Union”, Ferenczy (ed.), op. cit.
25 The “Big 5s” are: President, Vice-President, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs andMinister of Defense. In Germany, the list was expanded to seven and includes the President of theLegislative Yuan and the Highest judge. See, Wacker, op. cit. p. 35.
26 Laura Silver, Christine Huang, and Laura Clancy, “Negative Views of China Tied to Critical Views
of Its Policies on Human Rights, Pew Research Center, June 29”, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/29/negative-views-of-china-tied-to-critical-views-of-its-policies-on-human-rights/.
27 Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, “Taiwan in the European Discourse: Toward Political Consensus?”,Institute for Security & Development Policy, Issue Brief, October 2022.
28 Richard Q. Turcsányi, et al. European Public Opinion on China in the Age of COVID-19: Difference
and Common Ground across the Continent, Bratislava: Central European Institute of Asian Studies,2020.
29 EU-China Relations Factsheet, The European External Action Service, April 2022.
30 EU-China: A Strategic Outlook, European Commission, March 12, 2019.

46

Chapter 4 —China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe[Englund]

China’s growing military threats to Taiwan have also added significantly to Europe’s
worsening perspectives of China. They have elevated European awareness of Taiwan’s
relevance for global security and supply chains and supported the EU’s growing
inclination to take heed of matters concerning Taiwan. Further underscored by the war in
Ukraine, the threat of an authoritarian China toward a democratic Taiwan and the dangers
of being too dependent on authoritarian regimes like Russia and China have prompted astronger interest and concern for Taiwan in Europe.

SIGNS OF GROWING EU INTEREST IN STRENGTHENING TIES WITH TAIWAN
Although there is no inclination from the European side to abandon its unofficial
relationship with Taiwan, there are indications of an interest in Europe in bolstering ties
with Taiwan. The growing presence of Taiwan in EU discourse was first seen in the EU
Commission’s 2016 “Elements for a new EU strategy on China”.31 The strategy reaffirms
the EU’s “One China policy” twice while emphasizing “the shared values underpinningits system of governance”, and its commitment to continuing to develop relations with
Taiwan such as the negotiations on investment with Taiwan. Indeed, the language iscautious and vague, but it brings up Taiwan’s participation in international organizations
and the importance of Taiwan’s democratic system.
The European Parliament (EP) has used significantly stronger language, particularly inrecent years. In October 2021, the Parliament’s first report on EU–Taiwan relations
recommended that the EU and its members strengthen ties with Taiwan. In the report, theEP identifies Taiwan as a strategically important and like-minded partner that not only
shares common democratic values with the EU but also has critical roles in global hightech supply chains. 32 It calls for the EU and its member states to undertake several
measures to enhance EU–Taiwan ties. These include, for example, intensifying political
relations with Taiwan under the EU’s “One China policy”, deepening bilateral economic
ties, expressing concerns about Chinese activities in the East Asian region, andadvocating for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations.
Although the recommendations are not binding, they are still of importance in the way
they underline a growing political focus on Taiwan and signal a potential change ofdirection for Europe regarding Taiwan. Moreover, in the same month, a seven-member
EP delegation visited Taiwan, marking its first official visit to the island.

31 Elements for a New EU Strategy on China, European Commission, June 22, 2016.
32 EU-Taiwan Political Relations and Cooperation, European Parliament, October 21, 2021.

Chapter 4 —China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe[Englund]47

Similar language could be seen in 2022. In its resolution on the EU and the security
challenges in the Indo-Pacific, the EP again identified Taiwan as a key partner for the EU
in the region and argued for closer cooperation between Taiwan and Europe. 33
Furthermore, following China’s large-scale military exercises around Taiwan in August
2022, EP members supported a resolution condemning China’s military aggression
against Taiwan, while also urging the PRC to stop both its military actions and other grayzone military activities against Taiwan. Adopted by an overwhelming majority, theresolution stated that Beijing’s actions “must have consequences for EU–China relations
and that the possibility of contingency planning must be considered”.34 It continued bycalling for EU member states to increase their diplomatic presence in Taiwan and enhancethe existing partnership with Taiwan. While still merely rhetoric, it underlines Europe’s
growing attention to the Taiwan Strait and its increasing willingness to deepen its ties
with Taiwan.
Another sign of Taiwan’s growing presence in the EU’s outlook for global security is its
mention in the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. In 2021, the EU stepped up its ambitions toplay a larger role in the Asian region with its publication of the “Strategy for Cooperationin the Indo-Pacific”. At the heart of the EU’s engagement in the region is cooperation
with like-minded partners. Taiwan would be one of those like-minded partners withwhom the EU needs to deepen cooperation. The strategy points out that tension in the
Taiwan Strait “may have a direct impact on European security and prosperity”.35 It also
elevated Taiwan as a partner for the EU to cooperate with in building resilient anddiversified value chains and ensuring free and safe data flows in the region, as well as
being a partner with whom the EU should deepen trade and investment relationships.36
The EU has stated that it views Taiwan as an important partner in achieving its goals of
the European Chips Act, in which the EU seeks to boost European semiconductor
manufacturing and increase its global market share.37 Since early 2021, there have beenrumors of Taiwanese semiconductor giant TSMC setting up production in Europe—in
northern Italy and Dresden, Germany.38 However, progress has been slow. Doubts about
33 Szczudlik, op. cit.
34 The Situation in the Strait of Taiwan, European Parliament, September 15, 2022.
35The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, European Commission, September 16, 2021.
36 Ibid.

Jillian Cota, “The European Chips Act: A Strategy to Expand Semiconductor Production
Resiliency”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 7, 2022; see also, EU-Taiwan
Political Relations and Cooperation: Speech on behalf of High Representative/Vice-President Josep
Borrell at the EP Plenary, European External Action Service, October 19, 2021.
38 Johannes Nordin and Larissa Stünkel, “EU-Taiwan Semiconductor Cooperation: Lopsided
Priorities?”, Institute for Security & Development, Issue Brief, October 29, 2022, p. 4.
37

48

Chapter 4 —China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe[Englund]long term sustainability in the European market for advanced chips (as the largest
electronics giants using the most sophisticated chips are not present in the EU) and highcosts have been cited as existing concerns.39

INCREASING EU-TAIWAN INTERACTION AND EUROPEAN VISITS TO ISLAND
Further indications of closer EU–Taiwan ties may be discerned in the number of European
visits to Taiwan. As travel restrictions on entering Taiwan due to COVID-19 eased in thefall of 2022, European visits are returning to pre-pandemic levels. Indeed, there areindications of a higher frequency of European delegation visits compared to earlier years.
According to an EU visit tracker compiled by the multinational consortium China
Observers in Central and Eastern Europe, counting visits from 2016 to today, visits from
European countries were most frequent in 2016 and 2018.40 The frequency of those years
amounted to 27 visits each year, while in 2022 the number reached 17 visits. However,considering that travel restrictions were not eased until October 2022, the intensity ofvisits from European delegations seems to have increased with a continuation into thebeginning of 2023. As of June 26, there had been 17 visits from European delegations to
Taiwan in 2023.
Importantly, given that 13 of the 17 visits from Europe in 2022 took place between Augustand December, the number of visits indicates that European delegations did not shy awayfrom traveling to Taiwan, despite Chinese threats and a high conflict level across the
Taiwan Strait. In other words, European visits did not try to avoid upsetting Beijing
following China’s large-scale military exercises around the island in August. On thecontrary, the visits may have even increased in frequency. Throughout this period, French
political officials traveled to Taiwan most often, followed by German representatives andthen in most recent years, large numbers of delegations from Lithuania and the Czech
Republic.
Furthermore, by broadening the scope of EU–Taiwan interactions (including
governmental, parliamentary, military, economic and cultural engagements), the EUrecorded a substantial increase in Taiwan-related activities from 2019 to 2022. According
to the EU–Taiwan Tracker, administered by the Central European Institute of Asian

Nordin and Larissa Stünkel and, Matthew Gooding, “Europe Is Thinking Big on
Semiconductors But Has Plenty of Hurdles to Overcome”, Techmonitor, June 24, 2022.
40 Veronika Blablová, Filip Šebok, “Tracking EU Visits to Taiwan, China Observers in Central andEastern Europe, September 15, 2022”, https://chinaobservers.eu/tracking-eu-visits-to-taiwan/.
39 Johannes

Chapter 4 —China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe[Englund]49

Studies, the entire EU had only 23 interactions with Taiwan in 2019.41 However, in 2022,
this number increased significantly as the total number of interactions jumped to 167
across the EU.

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTIES TAKING THE FIRST STEP?
A large proportion of the visits and general engagements between Europe and Taiwan
came about via Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, in particular from
Lithuania and the Czech Republic. Indeed, the recent rapprochement in EU–Taiwan
relations may be partly driven by CEE countries, many of which are increasing their ties
with Taiwan, while drifting away from China. In 2022, CEE countries accounted foralmost 60% of the EU’s interactions with Taiwan.42 Beijing’s failure to condemn Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine and the absence of expected large Chinese investments in the region
have caused some CEE countries to start to disengage from China. What became known
as the “17 + 1” grouping, consisting primarily of CEE countries and China to deepen
economic integration between the two sides, has now shrunk to 14 + 1, the Baltic statesof Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia having left the group.
The most prominent examples of countries boosting ties with Taiwan are the Czech
Republic, Lithuania, and Slovakia. Among various engagements, these countries have allrecently signed technology-related and trade agreements with Taiwan, which has alsoannounced the creation of a Central and Eastern Europe Investment Fund specificallytargeting these three markets.43 The previously mentioned case of Lithuania has captured
the most attention, followed by closer Taiwanese–Lithuanian ties. This has, inter alia,
included a large number of delegation visits, a USD200 million investment fund and a
joint semiconductor center in Lithuania.44 The Czech Republic has also made notable
overtures toward Taiwan. In 2019, Prague refused to sign a One China clause into a city

41 “Public Seminar Series: Contextualizing Taiwan’s Role in Central and Eastern Europe, Global

Taiwan Institute, March 15, 2023”, https://globaltaiwan.org/events/march-15-contextualizingtaiwans-role-in-central-and-eastern-europe/.
42 Ibid.
43 See, Chris Horton, “China Is Losing Europe’s East to Taiwan, The China Project, January 23, 2023” ,https://thechinaproject.com/2023/01/31/china-is-losing-europes-east-to-taiwan/; see also, Nora Tenta,“Taiwan’s Recent Impact on EU-China Relations: A Farewell to the Status Quo?, European Guanxi,
March 7, 2022”, https://www.europeanguanxi.com/post/taiwan-s-recent-impact-on-eu-china-relations-farewell-to-the-status-quo; Patryk Szczotka, “Slovakia is the Next European Country to Strengthen
Ties with Taiwan, Warsaw Institute, December 15, 2021”, https://warsawinstitute.org/slovakia-nexteuropean-country-strengthen-ties-taiwan/.
44 Ferency, op cit.; Nordin and Stünkel, op cit.

50

Chapter 4 —China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe[Englund]partnership agreement with Beijing and instead entered such a partnership with Taipei.45
Two years later, in 2021, Taiwan’s foreign minister Joseph Wu addressed the Czech
senate and met with senate president Milos Vystrcil. Before this meeting, Vystrcil led a90-person delegation visit from CEE countries to Taiwan.46 In January 2023, the Czech
Republic President-elect Petr Pavel accepted a phone call from President Tsai Ing wen,
and vowed to meet Tsai “in person in the future”.47

CONCLUDING REMARKSThe status of Taiwan is an increasingly important issue beyond the Taiwan Strait. The
conflict between China and Taiwan is intensifying, and it is already present ininternational forums and within third countries’ domestic spheres. As described in thischapter, China is actively employing pressure tactics in Europe to isolate Taiwan. This is
unsurprising, given the importance and sensitivity that Beijing attaches to the issue of
Taiwan. Many of China’s activities are overt and carried out legitimately, such as iteratingstatements on its embassy’s website and writing articles in the media stating its position.
However, other methods by China are covert and problematic. Making implicit threats
and trying to silence journalists and politicians are illegitimate and unacceptable modesof conduct that democratic societies in Europe need to identify and counter.
A notable feature is the scope and variety of levels and areas in which these pressure
activities take place. Chinese efforts to shrink the Taiwanese presence in European
countries happen on a national as well as a local level, within governmental and official
domains as well as in private and informal spaces, and against individuals as well as
against groups. As Chinese foreign diplomacy grows more assertive, this wide range ofpressure activities demonstrates the depth of importance that the Taiwan issue has for
Beijing.
It is, however, also noteworthy that Chinese pressure tactics so far seem to be largely
ineffectual, given the indications that Europe is drawing closer to Taiwan. Indeed,
individually, Chinese efforts to isolate Taiwanese activities have been a mixture of
successes and failures, and yet, viewed from a wider perspective, Beijing’s pressure
tactics on Taiwan have not pushed Europe to distance itself from Taiwan, which is
China’s ultimate aim. On the contrary, Europe seems to be seeking closer cooperation
with Taiwan.
45 Wacker, op cit.
46 Horton, op cit.
47 Stuart Lau, “China Warns New Czech President after Taiwan Call, Politico, January 31, 2023”,

https://www.politico.eu/article/china-warn-czech-republic-president-petr-pavel-taiwan-call/.

Chapter 4 —China’s Efforts to Isolate Taiwan in Europe[Englund]

51

Europe is currently trying to grasp the scope and intensity of Chinese influence activities.
Considering how Taiwan constitutes Beijing’s most prioritized core issue, the intensity
and uncompromising approach of China regarding Taiwan is likely to continue. By
pressuring European actors to disengage from Taiwanese counterparts, Beijing seeks to
draw red lines for European–Taiwanese interactions. The goal for Beijing is to reduce
Taiwan’s room for maneuver as much as possible. Therefore, the red lines are set tobecome thicker and more restrictive if too many concessions are being made by theEuropean side. Europe, therefore, needs to articulate its standpoints better, identify thescope of space within its unofficial relationship, and select productive engagements with
Taiwan. To some degree, it also needs to draw its own red lines against Chinese influence
activities regarding Taiwan.
Given the lack of knowledge that sometimes characterizes the understanding of the
Taiwan issue in Europe, there is still a risk of Taiwanese space becoming increasingly
marginalized in the face of Chinese efforts to isolate Taipei. China is a powerful andimportant country for many European actors and the risk of self-censorship remains.
However, as this chapter has shown, many European countries have responded by seeking
to strengthen their ties with Taiwan. That being the case, for now, indications point toEuropean views of China becoming increasingly skeptical while relations between
Europe and Taiwan are deepening.
However, while interactions between Europe and Taiwan have increased in number andvocal support in Europe for Taiwan has become louder, substantive results have yet tomaterialize. Advances with an EU–Taiwan Bilateral Investment Treaty and a Free Trade
Agreement are still unclear. In terms of security cooperation, there is little on the table.
Moreover, it remains to be seen if these Chinese warnings against interactions with
Taiwanese actors are successful or not in the long term. Considering China’s economic
power, many interests in Europe seek to avoid confrontation with Beijing. Even though
there are defying voices in the immediate response, European actors may still become
more cautious in the future when engaging with Taiwanese actors and impose selfcensorship. Therefore, indications point to closer ties between Europe and Taiwan, but it
remains to be seen how these ties will be sustained going forward.

52

Chapter 5— China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization[Kurata]

CHAPTER 5

China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization
Hideya Kurata
INTRODUCTION: LIMITED BILATERAL INFLUENCE AND THE “SINO-US ADHOC CONCERT”

Opportunities for China to engage with the Korea-specific issue of converting a Military
Armistice Agreement in 1953 into a peace agreement have, in the past, required regional
multilateral talks. If China had influence over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK) on this issue through bilateral relations, multilateral talks would not be needed.
In other words, the multilateral talks involving China indicate the limits of its influence
over North Korea on this issue. The Four-Party Talks involved North and South Korea,
the US, and China and were jointly proposed by US President Bill Clinton and Republicof Korea President Kim Youngsam in April 1996. The purpose was to provide North
Korea an opportunity to consult with the US while presenting China with a forum forbecoming involved in the issue, despite North Korea’s opposition to concluding a bilateralpeace agreement with the US. China’s “constructive role” in the process stemmed fromits willingness to engage on the issue of building a peaceful regime.1 Neither the Taiwan
Strait issue, which had heightened tensions only a month before the proposal was made,nor the cross-regional value issue, were on the agenda, suggesting the possibility offorming a “Sino–US ad hoc concert”.2
Regarding the Six-Party Talks held in Beijing in the 2000s regarding the nuclear issue,
multilateral talks would not be necessary if China could also restrict North Korea’s
nuclear development through bilateral relations. In response to North Korea’s
1 倉田秀也 (Hideya Kurata), “朝鮮半島平和体制樹立問題と中国:北東アジア地域安全保障と‘ 多国間外交’(The Issue of Building a Peace Regime on the Koren Peninsula and China: theRegional Security in North East Asia and the ‘Multilateral Diplomacy’”, 高木誠一郎(Seiichiro

Takagi) (ed.) , 脱冷戦後の中国外交とアジア・太平洋 (Chinese Diplomacy and the Asia-Pacificafter the Cold War), Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2000, pp. 225-226.
2 Hideya Kurata, “Korean Peace Building and Sino-US Relations: An ‘Ad-Hoc’ Concert of Interests?”,
Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, Volume 8, Number 1 (July 2019), p. 31.

Chapter 5— China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization[Kurata]53

announcement to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty: NPT) in January 2003, the US and China informallyconsulted at the UNSC. The Bush administration, in preparation for the war with Iraq
based on the “preemptive” assertion, proposed that North Korea’s nuclear issue not be
submitted to the UNSC to avoid tensions in Northeast Asia. The Hu Jintao administrationof China agreed with this proposal. The US and China considered bringing the North
Korean nuclear issue into regional talks and showing readiness to discuss building a peace
regime and other issues that would lead North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.
However, regarding the preemptive strike that the Bush administration advocated, China
argued that North Korea’s “reasonable security concerns” should be addressed and urged
the US to engage in dialog with North Korea. The Six-Party Talks were outlined with theaddition of Japan, South Korea, and Russia to the US–North Korea–China Trilateral talks
in April 2003. The Six-Party Talks sought to address North Korea’s security concerns
regarding the development of nuclear weapons by providing security assurances andbuilding a peaceful regime based on a Sino–US ad hoc concert of interests in which
Korea-specific concerns were the only issues on the table.3
In contrast, considering that the Six-Party Talks were regional multilateral talks replacing
the UNSC by informal agreement between the US and China, the Sino–US ad hoc concert
was also formed at the UNSC. Since North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in
October 2006, the US and China have cooperated to adopt joint resolutions, instead ofrefraining from submitting North Korea’s nuclear development to the UNSC. However,
it is worth noting that UNSC Resolution 1718 embraced Sino–US cooperation between
the region and the UNSC. While Resolution 1718 required that all members not permit
any battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft,
attack helicopters, warships, missiles, or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to
be used against the DPRK, the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK,
supporting or promoting, the DPRK was called upon to immediately return to the SixParty Talks without requirement”. Additionally, the Resolution affirms the need to beprepared to review the appropriateness of the measures for sanctions stipulating“strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed atthat time considering the DPRK’s compliance” .4 In other words, UNSC Resolution 1718
and subsequent resolutions required punitive “externalizing” measures to denuclearize
3 倉田秀也 (Hideya Kurata), “6 者会談の成立過程と米中関係: ‘非核化’と‘安保上の懸念’をめぐ る 相 互 作 用 (The Formation Process of the Six-Party Talks: The Interaction between‘Denuclearization’ and ‘Security Concerns’”, 高木誠一郎(Seiichiro Takagi) (ed.),米中関係: 冷戦後の構造と展開 (US-China Relations: Its Structures and Developments), Tokyo: The Japan Instituteof International Affairs, 2007. pp. 77-79.
4 S/RES/1718, October 14, pp. 2-4.

54

Chapter 5— China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization[Kurata]

North Korea at the UNSC and “internalizing” North Korea into the regional talks. 5 Even
if no peace regime were built through a Sino–US ad hoc concert and if US–China
cooperation in the UNSC did not lead North Korea to abandon its WMD development,each of these two dimensions of US–China cooperation was essential for curbing North
Korea’s attempts to build a peace regime with the US over South Korea’s head.
Additionally, it would still impose costs on North Korea’s WMD development.
As North Korea withdrew from the multilateral Four-Party and Six-Party Talks andturned to bilateral talks with the US, it recognized the Sino–US ad hoc concert as an
attempt for “Sino–US joint management of a Korean-specific issue”. China, as a de facto
signatory to the Military Armistice Agreement, had sent the Chinese People’s Volunteer
Army delegation to the Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom; however, as the
US–North Korea high-level talks were underway in 1994, North Korea evicted themilitary delegation and prohibited them from returning. Although North Korea hopes for
greater Chinese influence and less US presence in the region, it has not relaxed its
vigilance against Chinese influence over the peacebuilding issue on the Korean Peninsula.
At the UNSC as well, North Korea has criticized US–China cooperation, which imposed
costs on its WMD development in inverse proportion to the deterioration in its relations
with China, leading to heated criticism by the party. 6 This chapter examines China’s
influence over North Korea from the perspective of building a peace regime in theregional arrangements and North Korea’s WMD development at the UNSC.

THE SINO-US “AD HOC CONCERT” UNDER CHALLENGE:“PARALLEL TRACKS” PROPOSED AT SUMMITSWith North Korea’s withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks and the UNSC sanctions
imposed on its WMD development, in February 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang
Yi proposed the “Parallel Tracks (Shuanggui Bingxing)” initiative to simultaneously
denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and build a peace regime. China expressed its
readiness to play a constructive role as it had in the previous Four-Party Talks and called
for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. However, unlike the Four-Party Talks, Kim
Regarding the concepts of “externalization” and “internalization”, see, Hideya Kurata, “A
Conceptual Analysis of the Six-Party Talks: Building Peace through Security Assurances”, Asian
Security, Volume 3, Number 1 (2007), pp. 13-14.
6 “中澳外長举行外交战略对话 (The Chinese and Australian Foreign Ministers Hold Diplomatic
Strategic Dialogues)”,人民日报 海外版 (Renmin Ribao Overseas Edition), February 18 , 2016; seealso, 倉田秀也 (Hideya Kurata), “北朝鮮‘非核化’と中国の地域的関与の模索: 集団安保と平和
体 制 の 間 (China’s Search for Engagement with the Korean Peninsula in North Korea’s‘Denuclearization’: Between Collective Security and a Peace Regime)”, 国 際 安 全 保 障（International Security）, Volume 46, Number 2 (December 2018), p. 69.
5

Chapter 5— China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization[Kurata]55

Jongun’s trip to Beijing to meet with President Xi Jinping after the inter-Korean and US–
North Korea summits improved relations between China and North Korea, which had
once been the subject of harsh criticism by the party, raising expectations that China
would use its influence on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, after the China–North
Korea summit talks in Beijing in March 2018, at the 3rd Plenum of the 7th Session of theCentral Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) (April 21, 2018), Kim Jongun
declared that “no further, intermediate-long range, and intercontinental ballistic rocket
test launches are necessary” and that the “northern nuclear test site” had “completed its
mission” and was “closed”.7 In addition, North Korea destroyed the tunnels of the nuclear
test site at Punggye-ri on May 28. These moratoriums were measures to relax UNSC
sanctions while seeking concessions from US President Donald Trump at the upcoming
US–North Korea summit. Although they could not be regarded as substantive
denuclearization measures, North Korea might have moved toward adopting serious
denuclearization measures, depending on the outcome of the US–North Korea summit.
In such a case, parallel tracks, linking denuclearization measures within building apeaceful regime, were expected to materialize.
Parallel tracks continued to be a guiding principle in its Korean policy, but North Korea
sought to limit China’s voice in building a peaceful regime despite improving relations
with China at the summit level. The Panmunjom Declaration announced at the interKorean summit on April 27, 2018, stated that the DPRK would “actively pursue trilateralmeetings involving the two Koreas and the US , or quadrilateral meetings involving thetwo Koreas, the US and China to declare an end to the War, turn the armistice into a peace
treaty, and establish a permanent and solid peace regime”.8 This would render China’s
engagement in building a peace regime subsidiary in multilateral talks. This indicated that
North Korea’s recognition remained unchanged as far as China’s role in building apeaceful regime was concerned. This is also true for the China–North Korea summit in
7 “조선로동당

중앙위원회 제 7 기 제 3 차전원회의 진행: 조선로동당 위원장 김정은동지께서 병진로선의 위대한 승리를 긍지높이 선언하시고 당의 새로운 전략적 로선을 제시하
였다（Proceedings of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of
Korea: Comrade Kim Jongun, Chairman of the WPK, Proudly Declared the Great Victory of the
Byungjin and Presented the Party’s New Strategic Line) ”, 로동신문 (Rodong Shinmun), April 21,
2018. The term “intermediate-long” range is the classification inherent with North Korea, referring to
the range to cover the US bases in Guam; the Hwasong-10 (Musudan) and the Hwasong-12. Although
the English text of this speech referred to this part as an intermediate-range ballistic rocket, it wasreferred as ‘intermediate-long range rocket (중장거리 로켓)’ in Korean text in the Korean Central
News Agency. See, Hideya Kurata, “Synchronizing Two Asymmetrical Deals: The Panmunjeom
Declaration and the US-DPRK Joint Statement from Japan’s Perspective”, The Korean Journal of
Security Affairs, Volume 23, Number 2 (December 2018), pp. 38-39.
8“조선반도의 평화와 번영,통일을 위한 판문점선언 (Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of Korean Peninsula)”, 로동신문 (Rodong Shinmun), April 28, 2018.

56

Chapter 5— China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization[Kurata]

Dalian on May 8–9, 2018. The Renmin Ribao reported that Xi Jinping described the
China–North Korea relationship as a “lip-tooth relationship”, stating that China “willcontinue to express its readiness to play an active role for lasting stability in the region
together with the countries concerned”. Kim Jongun also hoped that “the countries
concerned will finally achieve denuclearization and lasting peace on the peninsula”. 9
However, the Rodong Shinmun reported that the two leaders “deeply exchanged views on
how to resolve several serious issues of joint concern” without mentioning the issue ofestablishing a peaceful regime.10
Regarding the US–North Korea Joint Statement released at the subsequent summit
meeting in Singapore on June 12, 2018, it was stipulated that the US and the DPRK would
join efforts to build a lasting and stable peaceful regime on the Korean Peninsula,
indicating that building a regime of peace would be a priority in the US–North Korea
bilateral talks rather than multilateral talks.11 Moreover, President Trump mentioned thepossible withdrawal of strategic bombers from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam at thepress conference after the meeting. 12 With Trump’s suggestion of reducing extended
deterrence, Kim Jongun must have seen that reduced extended deterrence was possible
by repeating the US–North Korea summits.
China’s concerns would have been that North Korea would lean toward a bilateralrelationship with the US in building a peace regime and minimize China’s engagement.
On June 19, 2018, at the DPRK–China summit following the US–DPRK summit, Xi
Jinping stated, “China hopes the relevant sides will join forces to jointly promote thepeace process on the Peninsula, playing a constructive role”, and that Kim Jongun also
stated that he “hopes to build a sustainable peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsulawith China and all related parties”, in Renmin Ribao. In contrast, Rodong Shinmun failed
9 “習近平同朝鮮労働党委員長金正 恩 在大連挙行会陪(XiJinping Accompanies Kim Jongun,
Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea in the Meeting in Dalian”,人民日报 (Renmin Ribao), May
9, 2018.
10 “조선로동당 위원장,조선민주주의인민공화 국국무위원회위원장 김정은동지께서 중국공산당 중앙위원회 총서기,중화인민공화국주석 습근평동지와 또다시 상봉하시였다 (Comrade
Kim Jongun, Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Chairman of the State Affairs Committee of
the DPRK Meets Again with General Secretary of the Central Committee . the Communist Party of
China, and Comrade Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China”, 로동신문 (Rodong Shinmun),May 9, 2018.
11 “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim
Jongun of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit, June 12, 2018”,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trumpunited-states-america-chairman-kim-Jongun-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/>.
12 “Press Conference by President Trump, June 12, 2018, Capella Hotel, Singapore”, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/press conference-president-trump.

Chapter 5— China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization[Kurata]57

to report Xi Jinping’s remarks regarding peace regime building, saying that Kim Jongun
would “cooperate and work closely with Chinese comrades in the General Staff”.13 Kim
Jongun did not deny multilateral talks per se. Still, despite the inter-Korean and US–North
Korea summits, North Korea was vigilant about China’s engagement in building a peace
regime. Nonetheless, China was emphatic on its role in the peace regime. When Kim
Jongun again visited China in January 2019, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesmanstrongly refuted suggestions that China was a “variable” in the Korean issue, saying that
China was a “positive factor”.14 In the same vein, North Korea’s Minju Choson failed toreport “Parallel Tracks” and China’s “constructive role” in Vice Foreign Minister Ri
Gilsong’s meeting with Wang Yi, suggesting 15 that North Korea had no immediate
interest in building a peace regime with China’s engagement.
China’s willingness to establish a peace regime under the parallel tracks guiding principle
continued even after the US–North Korea Second summit talks in Hanoi ended without
an agreed document. With the continuation of the US–North Korea summit talks injeopardy, Xi Jinping made his first visit to Pyongyang as President in June 2019, where
he offered Kim Jongun “four supports”: (1) North Korea’s continued adherence to thedirection of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, (2) continued improvement ofmutual relations between the two Koreas, (3) the US–North Korea summit meetingproducing results, and (4) the countries concerned to resolve issues of reasonable concern
to each side through dialog. Xi Jinping’s reference to the inter-Korean dialog before the
US–North Korea summit indicates his expectations for the resumption of inter-Koreandialog, where he emphasized his willingness to “play a positive and constructive role forthe denuclearization of the peninsula and long-term regional stability in coordination andcollaboration with the DPRK and all relevant sides”. Assuming that “long-term stability”
refers to establishing a peace regime, this sentence is also synonymous with “Parallel
Tracks”. Given China’s desire for a peace agreement between North Korea and South

13 倉田 (Kurata), “北朝鮮 ‘非核化’と中国の地域的関与の模索 (China’s Search for Engagementwith the Korean Peninsula in North Korea’s ‘Denuclearization’) ”, op. cit., pp. 79-80.
14 “2019 年 1 月 8 日外交部発言人陸慷主持例行记者会 (Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang
Hosts a Regular Press Conference on January 8, 2019) ”, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/t1627853.shtml.
15 “우리 나라 외무성 부상이 중국국무원 국무위원 겸 외교부장을 만났다 (The Vice Ministerof Foreign Affairs of Our Country Met with the State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of theState Council of China)”,민주조선 (Minju Choson), March 2, 2019. Ri Gilsung also met Vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs Kong Yongyou on this occasion, but ‘China’s constructive role’ was notreported.

58

Chapter 5— China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization[Kurata]

Korea—not between the US and North Korea, the emphasis on South Korean
involvement did not deviate from the framework of the “Parallel Tracks”.16
Furthermore, China’s efforts to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at theregional level were concurrent with its efforts at the UNSC. Immediately after the first
US–North Korea Summit in June 2018, China and Russia jointly distributed a draft of the
Chairman’s statement calling for the easing of economic sanctions against North Korea,
reminding the UNSC Resolutions since 1718 that called on North Korea to return to the
Six-Party Talks. 17 After the failed second US–North Korea summit in Hanoi in late
February 2019, China again jointly submitted a Resolution with Russia, in which thereversibility of the UNSC Resolutions was pointed out, as well as the option of a formal
declaration and /or a peace treaty for the end of the Korean War.18

LIFTED “MORATORIUMS”: KIM JONGUN’S “NEW COLD WAR”
NARRATIVE
So long as the moratoriums laid out by Kim Jongun remain in place, US–China
cooperation at the UNSC will not be challenged. Since the failed 2nd US–North Korea
summit until the end of the Trump administration, North Korea had repeatedly launchedshort-range missiles (SRBM), and it refrained from testing launches of missiles withlonger ranges under the moratoriums. North Korea hoped to reduce extended deterrenceby continuing the US–North Korea summit talks during the Trump administration.
Considering this, the weapons that Kim Jongun listed as “Strategic Tasks” (later referred
to as the “Five-Year Defense Plan”) at the 8th Congress of the WPK in January 2021 are
worth noting. It included intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with a range of 15,000
16 “共同开创中朝两党两国关系的美好未来: 记习近平总书记对朝鲜进行国事访问

(Jointly
Create a Bright Future for Relations between the Two Parties and Two Countries in China and Korea:
General Secretary Xi Jinping Paid a State Visit to Korea) ”, 人民日報 (Renmin Ribao) June 21, 2019;see also, 倉田秀也 (Hideya Kurata), “朝鮮半島平和体制樹立と中国：多国間協議なき対中関与の 南 北 間 格 差 (China in the Building a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula: North-South
Disparities in Engagement with China in the Absence of Multilateral Arrangement)”, 外務省外交・安全保障調査研究事業：中国の対外政策と諸外国の対中政策(Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofJapan’s Research Project on Foreign Policy: China’s Foreign Policy and Foreign Countries’ Policies
toward China, Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2020, p. 198.
17 “ 2018 年 6 月 29 日外交部発言人陸慷主持例行记者会(Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang
Hosts a Regular Press Conference on June 29, 2018) ”, http:www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt674879/ rbt_67889/t1572824.shtml.
18 Draft for Resolution (unpublished), p. 4; see also Michelle Nichols, “Russia, China to Hold More
U.N. Talks on Lifting North Korea Sanctions: Diplomats”, Reuter, https://www.reuters.com/ article/
us-northkorea-usa-un-idUSKBN1YX0LD.

Chapter 5— China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization[Kurata]

59

km, multiple warheads, medium- and long-range cruise missiles, nuclear submarines, andtactical nuclear weapons to be accomplished by the next party congress.19 Most of theseweapons cannot be developed without lifting Kim Jongun’s self-imposed moratoriums.
Put differently, when Kim Jongun announced the “Five-Year National Defense Plan”, it
was tantamount to announcing the “moratoriums” would be lifted. It is not a total
coincidence that the 8th Congress of the WPK was held contemporaneously with theinauguration of President Joe Biden, Jr. Although the Biden administration indicated its
readiness to resume unconditional talks with North Korea, it touted the restoration of analliance damaged under the Trump administration. It was difficult for North Korea todetermine how the resumption of US–North Korea talks could lead to reduced extended
deterrence. In another aspect, announcements of the “Five-Year National Defense Plan”
expressed a determination to prioritize weapon development over the US–North Korea
talks.
Despite the circumstances, China hoped the US–North Korea talks would resume. In July
2021, Wang Yi asserted that the US was applying military threats and pressure, addingthat North Korea’s “reasonable security concerns” were to be addressed. As noted, thiswas a rhetorical tool used by China to encourage the US to engage in dialog with North
Korea while criticizing the Bush administration’s preemptive strategy. However, North
Korea’s prioritizing completion of its Five-Year Defense Plan over US–North Korea talks,
which would require North Korea to freeze or halt its weapons development, turned into
criticism of the US while defending North Korea’s weapons development. Wang Yi also
repeated his original assertion that the sanctions imposed by the UNSC Resolution on
North Korea’s WMD development plans were reversible, while repeating the need forparallel tracks.20
In this context, Kim Jongun’s speech at the 5th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s
Assembly on September 29, 2021, should be underscored. He criticized the “fundamental
dangers” coming from the US and its vassal forces’ high-handed and arbitrary practices,noting the complicated nature of the current international situation due to the structure of
19 “우리식 사회주의건설을 새 승리에로 인도하는 위대한 투쟁강령: 조선로동당 제 8 차대회에서 하신 경애하는 김정은동지의 보고에 대하여 (The Great Program of Struggle to Lead Our
Socialist Construction to a New Victory: Regarding the Report by Respected Comrade Kim Jongun atthe 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea) ”, 로동신문 (Rodong Shinmun), January 9, 2021.
Quotations from this speech hereafter are taken from this document.
20 王毅 (Wang Yi), “守护世界和平, 推动人类进歩(Safeguard World Peace and Promote theAdvancement of Mankind)”, 环球时报 (Huanqiu Shibao), July 5, 2021; see also, “清华大学主办第
九届世界和平论坛 (Tsinghua University Hosted the 9th World Peace Forum”, https://www.tsinghua.
edu.cn/info/1173/85558.htm.

60

Chapter 5— China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization[Kurata]international relations having been reduced to a New Cold War in response to US
unilateral and prejudiced bloc-forming foreign policy.21 Kim Jongun’s New Cold War
narrative was reminiscent of Xi Jinping’s Cold War mentality rhetoric. During this period,
Xi Jinping asserted, “We must abandon the old concept of the Cold War Mentality andthe zero-sum game”. 22 Xi Jinping criticized the US for its Cold War mentality ofencircling and interfering with China’s domestic affairs, including Taiwan, as well as forstrengthening relations with its allies. In the case of Kim Jongun’s New Cold War
narrative, North Korea’s bandwagoning on the resurgence of Cold War hostilities
between the major powers was justified, thereby preventing them from jointly managing
the Korean problems. Unlike Xi Jinping’s Cold War mentality, North Korea could benefit
by taking advantage of the structure and dynamics of the Cold War. Kim Jongun’srecognition of multipolarity suggested that China and Russia are not monolithic, and that
North Korea considered its relationship with each country separately. With regard to
China, North Korea’s critical stance of the US regarding the Taiwan Strait issue became
an opportune point of contention for North Korea to capitalize on the dynamics of the
New Cold War. Although there are many examples, one notable instance was North
Korea’s immediate response to defend China when President Biden made remarks
defending Taiwan when it was under attack from China.23
In this speech, Kim Jongun also touched upon the issue of building a peaceful regime.
The Moon Jaein administration of South Korea was consulted with the US over the“declaration of the end of the Korean War” as indicated in the “Panmunjom Declaration”,
to which Kim Jongun critiqued, “The South Korean authorities are bent on begging for21 “경애하는

김정은동지께서 력사적인 시정연설《사회주의건설의 새로운 발전을 위한 당면투쟁방향에 대하여》를 하시였다 (Respected Comrade Kim Jongun Makes Historic Policy Speech‘On the Orientation of Present Struggle for a Fresh Development of Socialist Construction’)”,민주조선 (Minju Choson), September 30, 2021.
22 習近平（Xi Jinping）, “让多边主义的火炬照亮人类前行之路：在世界经济论坛 ‘达沃斯议程’对话会上的特别致辞（Let the Torch of Multilateralism Light Humanity’s Way Forward: A Special
Message at the World Economic Forum’s ‘Davos Agenda Dialogue’)”, 人民日报 (Renmin Ribao),
January 26, 2021.
23 “박명호외무성부상 미국의 대만문제간섭은 조선방도정세긴장 촉진 (Vice Minister of Foreign
Affairs Pak Myongho placed the US Interventions in Taiwan Affairs Leads to Tensions in the Korean
Peninsula)”, Korean Central News Agency, October 23, 2021. Regarding President Biden’s remarks,see, “Remarks by President Biden in a CNN Town Hall with Anderson Cooper, Baltimore Center
Stage, Baltimore, Maryland. October 21, 2021”, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
speeches-remarks/2021/10/22/remarks-by-president-biden-in-a-cnn-town-hall-with-anderson-cooper-2/. For fear that this statement might be interpreted as a departure from the existing US policy on
Taiwan, the White House spokesman had to emphasize that the existing policy remains unchanged.
See, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, October 22, 2021”, https://www.whitehouse. gov/
briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/10/22/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-october-22-20
21/.

Chapter 5— China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization[Kurata]61

external support and cooperation while clamoring for international cooperation inservitude to the US”. He added that “as regards the issue of declaring the termination of
the war proposed by South Korea recently, though the termination of war is declared,
hostile acts would be continued and, therefore, unexpected different clashes repeated,arousing the anxiety of all the fellow countrymen and international community”. This wastantamount to giving the relinquished US hostile actions a higher priority than the“declaration of the end of the Korean War”, rendering the relaxation or elimination of US
extended deterrence a condition for the declaring the Korean War over. This could spillover to the UNSC into another US–China cooperation dimension. If the US, China, andRussia are prevented from cooperating at the UNSC in response to North Korea’s nuclear
tests and missile launches, North Korea will be able to conduct its nuclear tests andmissile launches without fear of additional sanctions.

THE UKRAINE WAR UNDERMINES THE SINO–US CONCERT AT THE UN
As predicted the previous year, Kim Jongun instructed the 6th Political Bureau of the 8thCentral Committee WPK on January 19, 2022 to “reconsider in an overall scale the trustbuilding measures that we took on our own initiative on a preferential ground and topromptly examine the issue of restarting all temporally suspended activities”.24 This wasfollowed by the Hwasong-12, an intermediate-long-range ballistic missile launched on
January 30, and, subsequently, by a new ICBM called the Hwasong-17 launched on
March 24 and 25. The UNSC held an emergency meeting on these ballistic missile
launches in March 2022, where the Chinese Ambassador to the UN Zhang Jun repeatedits previous concerns, urging the US to consider North Korea’s “reasonable security
concerns”. In response to the joint Russia–China Resolution on the humanitarianconsiderations in North Korea, the US Ambassador to the UN, Thomas-Greenfield, had
to rebut that the goodwill toward North Korea expressed in the Resolution had been
undermined by the lifting of the moratorium by North Korea.25
The lifting of the North Korean moratorium at about the same time as the war in Ukraine
helped tip the debate in the UN toward North Korea. At the end of February 2022, North
Korea’s Foreign Minister spoke for Russia, stating, “The root cause of the Ukraine crisis
totally lies in the hegemonic policy of the US and the West, which indulge themselves in24 “조선로동당중앙위원회정치국 제 8 기제 6 차회의 진행 (The 6th Political Bureau Meeting of

the 8th Central Committee, the Workers’ Party of Korea Held)”, 로동신문 (Rodong Shinmun),
January 20, 2022.
25 S/PV/9004, March 20, 2022, p. 16.

62

Chapter 5— China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization[Kurata]high-handedness and arbitrariness toward other countries”.26 At an emergency session of
the UN General Assembly in March 2022, when the Resolution condemning Ukraine wassubmitted, North Korea voted against it, showing more support for Russia than China,
which abstained.27 As North Korea had already expressed its support for Russia in its
2014 annexation of Crimea,28 its position did not change with the invasion of Ukraine.
North Korea’s strong support for Russia must have been considered in its tacit support ofNorth Korea’s ballistic missile launches at the UNSC. Furthermore, in response to the
Meetings of the G7 Foreign Ministers (May 12-14, 2022) criticizing Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine and North Korea’s ballistic missile launches, on May 15, the North Korean
Foreign Ministry issued a statement titled “The US is Responsible for the Escalated
Situation on the Korean Peninsula”.29
Thus, at the May 26 UNSC meeting on North Korea’s ballistic missile launches since
January, China and Russia adopted the position that unilateral sanctions would not solve
the problem, invoking their veto of US draft Resolution S/2022/431. 30 This meeting
constituted the first occasion in which the UNSC failed to act in unison on a North Koreanballistic missile launch longer than an intermediate-long range. For North Korea, as with
the Taiwan Strait issue in US–China relations, the war in Ukraine served to fuel the great
power conflict in US–Russian relations. Kim Jongun characterized Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine as “the sacred feat of achieving international justice”.31
North Korea’s missile launches continued. In early October 2022, it launched the
Hwasong-12, passing over Japan for the first time in five years. A UNSC meeting washeld in response, where China’s Ambassador to the UN, Geng Shuang, asserted that North
Korea’s launch activities occurred either before or after military exercises, criticizing the
US for regrettably failing to respond while suggesting moratoriums as North Korea took
26 “조선외무성

우크라이나사태의 근원은 미국과 서방의 패권주의정책, 평양 2 월 28 일발(Korea Foreign Ministry, the Root Cause of the Ukraine Crisis Lies in the Hegemonic Policy of the
US and the West, Pyongyang, February 28)”, www.kcna.co.jp/index-k.htm. The position was repeated
one month later, see, “정당한 선택 2022. 3. 28（Legitimate Choice, March 28, 2022)”, www.mfa.
gov.kp/view/article/14647.
27 GA/12407, March 2, 2022; see also, Ramon Pacheco Pardo and Yeong Ik Kim, “Russia’s Invasion
and China-North Korea Relations: Stronger Weak-Great Power Alignment”, Asian Survey, Volume
62, Number 5-6 (September/October/ November/December 2022), pp. 932-933.
28 A/68/PV.80, March 27, 2014, p. 17.
29 “조선반도정세격화의 장본인은 미국이다, 2022. 5. 15 (The US is Responsible for the Escalated
Situation on the Korean Peninsula, May 15, 2022)” , www. mfa.gov.kp/view/article/15146.
30 S/PV.9048, May 26, 2022.
31 “경애하는 김정은동지께서 로씨야련방 대통령에게 축전을 보내시였다 (Respected ComRade Kim Jongun Sends Message of Greeting to Russian President)”, 로동신문 (Rodong Shinmun),
June 12, 2022.

Chapter 5— China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization[Kurata]63

positive measures in 2018. Geng Shuang spoke about the draft Resolution submitted to
Russia to ease the humanitarian situation, create a climate conducive to mutual trust
among the parties and the resumption of dialog, and inject new impetus into a politicalsettlement of the Korean peninsula issue.32 In response, Thomas-Greenfield stated that
North Korea had enjoyed blanket protection from two members of the Security Council.
Concerning North Korea’s moratoriums, as defended by Geng Shuang, she pointed outthat North Korea itself claimed that such moratoriums do not “exist”. She also rebutted
the draft Resolution submitted by China and Russia as “rewarding North Korea for its
bad action”.33 The UNSC failed to issue even a chairman’s statement, showing that North
Korea’s diplomacy to prevent Sino–US cooperation had worked at the UNSC.
When North Korea launched the Hwasong-15 on February 18, 2023, the UN Security
Council again failed to react. China’s charge d’affaires to the UN, Dai Bing, emphasized
the resumption of dialog and the parallel tracks, as before, 34 while Russia’s Deputy
Ambassador to the UN Polyanskiy stated, “(t)he desire to force the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea into unilateral disarmament with the help of sanctions and highpressure based on the concept of so-called extended deterrence will not yield the resultsthat Washington is apparently expecting”, emphasizing the effectiveness of the draft
Resolution that has been submitted jointly with China.35 It should be noted that, since the
UNSC meeting in March 2022, China’s and Russia’s claims were shared at the summit
level. Xi Jinping issued a joint statement with Vladimir Putin on his visit to Russia in
March 2023: “The US side should respond to the legitimate and reasonable concerns of
the DPRK with concrete actions to create conditions for the resumption”. The two sides
agreed to promote the parallel tracks that China has long advocated for in the Korean
Peninsula’s political settlement process.36 This indicates that North Korea’s attempts to
32 S/PV.9146, October 5, 2022, pp. 11-12; see also, “Remarks by Ambassador Zhang Jun at the UN

Security Council Meeting on the Situation of the Korean Peninsula, 2022-11-22 01:06”, http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/asia/202211/t20221122_10979162,
htm>; 劉海生(Liu Haisheng）・叢超（Cong Chao）, “安保理審議半島局勢,中方強調三点:呼吁有関各方堅持政治解決方向,防止局勢論升級甚至失控 (Security Council Reviews the
Situation on the Peninsula, China Emphasizes Three Points : Calling on Relevant Parties to Adhere to
the Direction of Political Settlement and Prevent the Situation from Escalating or Even Getting Out ofControl) ”, 环球时报 (Huanqiu Shibao), November 23, 2022.
33 S/PV.9146, op. cit., pp. 3-15.
34 “Remarks by Ambassador Dai Bing at the UN Security Council Briefing on the Korean Nuclear
Issue, 2023-02-20, 21:42”, un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalpots/asi
ia/202302/t20230221_11028315.htm.
35 S/PV. 9264, March 23, 2023, p. 12; see also. “Security Council Report: DPRK (North Korea): Open
Briefing and Closed Consultations, April 17, 2023”, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinbl
ue/2023/04/dprk-north-korea-open-briefing-and-closed-consultations.php?print=true.
36 “中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于深化新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系的联合声明 (Joint
Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Deepening the64

Chapter 5— China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization[Kurata]prevent cooperation between the major powers in the US–China relationship on the
Taiwan Strait issue and the US–Russia relationship on the Ukraine war, have beensuccessful. Furthermore, the WMD issue in North Korea has made coordination between
the US, China, and Russia increasingly difficult.

CONCLUSION: NORTH KOREA’S SUCCEEDED DIPLOMACY
The framework for China’s engagement on the Korean Peninsula has remained
unchanged since the Four-Party and Six-Party Talks. The parallel tracks offered by Wang
Yi continued to be a framework that linked building a peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula, discussed in the Four-Talks, with the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
matter, the main agenda item in the Six-Party Talks. However, the US–China cooperationthat provided the basis for these multilateral talks has been undermined at both theregional level and the dimension of the UNSC.
This is largely due to North Korea’s diplomatic efforts to thwart cooperation between the
US and China. North Korea has bandwagoned the US–China confrontation to create aline of defense against the US by defending China on the Taiwan Strait issues. An ad hoc
Sino–US concert, held most notably to decouple them from the Taiwan Strait issue, would
undermine the US if North Korea joins China’s criticism of the US on the Taiwan Strait
issue to aggravate the US–China confrontation. Whereas China attempted to engage itself
in the process of building a peace regime within the framework of multilateral talks under
the parallel tracks proposal, North Korea considered China’s engagement on this issue as
secondary. Without multilateral talks, China’s engagement will remain at a secondary
level. Despite the summits, this position was also indicated in North Korea’s decision to
not allow the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army delegation to return to the Military
Armistice Commission.
The limited room for the US and China to cooperate also failed to prevent North Korea
from developing WMDs. Since North Korea launched ballistic missiles, the moratoriums
self-imposed by Kim Jongun were lifted. China has sought to preserve improved relations
with North Korea through the inter-Korean US–North Korea summits in 2018–19 rather

Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation in the New Era”, 人民日报 (Renmin Ribao),
March 22, 2023. No reference to North Korea was made at the US–Russia summit meeting
immediately after the war in Ukraine in March 2022, see, “中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于新时代国际关系和全球可持续发展的联合声明 (Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China andthe Russian Federation on International Relations and Global Sustainable Development in the NewEra) ”, 人民日报 (Renmin Ribao), March 5, 2022.

Chapter 5— China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization[Kurata]65

than cooperating with the US. However, improved Sino–North Korean relations have not
led to enhanced Chinese influence over North Korea.
North Korea’s diplomacy aimed at preventing cooperation among major powers was
further manifested in Kim Jongun’s New Cold War narrative. The approach was put into
practice during the war in Ukraine, which began shortly after the lifting of themoratoriums. By supporting Russia in the war in Ukraine, North Korea has succeeded inthwarting cooperation between the US and Russia on the ballistic missile launches. As aconsequence, North Korea blocked the adoption of a Resolution by launching a ballistic
missile at the UNSC. At that time, North Korea’s security concerns and China’s insistenceon parallel tracks were confirmed at the China and Russia summit. Of concern is thepossibility that if North Korea conducts an additional nuclear test, China and Russia—
both nuclear weapon states under the NPT and united in their opposition to North Korea
developing nuclear weapons—will veto the resolutions that have been unanimously
adopted in cooperation with the US. This essentially means that China and Russia willlose their influence in seeking a denuclearized North Korea and controlling its WMD
development. Kim Jongun stated in his speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly in
September 2022 that the multipolarity of the power structure surrounding the Korean
Peninsula is accelerating, and asked himself, “Which side on earth is time on?” Given the
adoption of the ordinance on the use of nuclear weapons by the Supreme People’s
Assembly, Kim Jongun’s statement that the enemy feels “hard-pressed” reveals his
acknowledgment that the situation is increasingly tilting in favor of North Korea’s nuclear
program. 37
The lifted moratoriums included nuclear testing. Now that they have been lifted, it isexpected that the seventh nuclear test will be conducted. In February 2023, North Korea’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the following statement: “If the UNSC continues to beinveigled by the US as the latter wishes, the DPRK will be compelled to reconsider
measures for additional actions, to say nothing of the category of normal militaryactivities, in protest against the UNSC which is being reduced into a tool for the US
unilateral pressure on the DPRK”, 38 implying a threat to conduct a nuclear test. If a

37 “조선민주주의인민공화국 최고인민회의

제 14 기 제７차회의에서 하신 경애하는 김정은동지의 시정연설 (Respected Comrade Kim Jongun Makes Policy Speech at 7th Session of the 14th
Supreme People’s Assembly of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea)”, 민주조선 (Minju Choson),
September 9, 2022.
38 “조선민주주의인민공화국
외무성대변인 담화발표 (Press Statement of DPRK Foreign
Ministry Spokesperson Issued), February 17, 2023”, www.mfa.gov.kp/view/article/16535.

66

Chapter 5— China in Korean Peacebuilding and Denuclearization[Kurata]nuclear test is conducted, the rift between the US and China, and between China andRussia in the UNSC, would become even more significant.

Chapter 6 — Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean Peninsula[Hsiung]

67

CHAPTER 6

Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean
Peninsula
Christopher Weidacher Hsiung

INTRODUCTION
This paper aims to examine Sino-Russian strategic coordination on the Korean Peninsula,in particular, the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme. 1 In addition, thepaper discusses how China’s interaction with Russia can impact Chinese strategic
influence on North Korea, but also more broadly, Northeast Asian security. An importanttakeaway is that heightened US–China strategic rivalry and the US–West-Russia rift due
to the war in Ukraine further increases Sino-Russian global strategic coordination,
including on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea is also taking advantage of the situation
to advance its nuclear weapons programme. China and Russia seem to deprioritise
denuclearisation over bolstering ties with Pyongyang and aim to further deter US militaryand security presence in the region which also complicates resolutions on the North Korea
nuclear issue.
The paper is organised in four parts. To put China–Russia interactions on the Korean
Peninsula in a wider context, the first part discusses some general features when it comesto Sino-Russian strategic coordination on global affairs and international security issues.
The second part highlights the common positions that China and Russia have on the
Korean Peninsula but also some differences. The third part then details how and to what
extent China and Russia coordinate their positions and policies with regard to the issueof North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme by looking at two dimensions of SinoRussian strategic coordination: (1) political/diplomatic and (2) security/military
coordination.2 The fourth and final part concludes the paper and discusses future Sino1 The paper does not consider developments after the summer of 2023.
2 Two clarifications here. First, the paper mainly considers initiatives and measures that more or lessqualify as ‘jointly performed’. China and Russia conduct a wide range of unilateral policies towards
North Korea that are similar, or that to a certain degree can be considered ‘coordinated’. However, tomake the analysis more focused, more direct unilateral policies are largely excluded. This would, forexample, include bilateral diplomatic engagement such as high-level visits or economic and trade

68

Chapter 6 — Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean Peninsula[Hsiung]

Russian strategic coordination and how this might impact China’s strategic influence not
only on the Korean Peninsula but also in Northeast Asia more broadly.

STRATEGIC COORDINATION IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONALSECURITY ISSUES
Sino-Russian coordination and cooperation on global affairs and international security
issues is a major component in the evolving Sino-Russian strategic partnership. On themost basic level, China and Russia share similar views and positions with regard to global
affairs and governance. Both countries conceive the current international order as
Western-centred and largely dictated by the US. Both strongly defend the principles ofstate sovereignty and non-interference (at least rhetorically) and, therefore, seek toarrange an international environment that is more conducive to their respective politicalsystems and a normative conception of international relations conduct—what Beijing andMoscow refer to as the ‘democratization of international relations’.3 Beijing and Moscow
are especially opposed to the Western global promotion of democracy, support of civilsociety movements and an interventionist human rights agenda. Such efforts are viewed
as undermining the political legitimacy of authoritarian states and are ultimately directed
towards regime change, including in China and Russia. Events like the ‘colour revolutions’in the post-Soviet sphere, the Arab Spring in 2011 and, more recently, the protest
movements in Hong Kong are commonly interpreted as such efforts by the West, notably
the US.4
The shared views and common positions are reflected in several joint declarations,statements and other documents adopted over the years. One of the earliest suchdeclarations came in 1997 with the so-called ‘Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World’.
Such major joint statements are summarised in Table 1 below.5 As is evident, the number

engagement. Second, the economic and trade dimension of Sino-Russian interaction with North Korea
is left out of the analysis. This is motivated by the fact that joint Sino-Russian economic engagement
toward North Korea is relatively limited (again, barring existing not least on the Chinese side, theunilateral economic engagement that obviously exists).
3 Feng Zhongping and Huang Jing, “China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy: Engaging with a
Changing World”, ESPO Working Paper, No. 8, June, 2014, Madrid: Fundación para las Relaciones
Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, (FRIDE), pp. 4-19.
4 Christopher Weidacher Hsiung, China's Perspective on Russia. Assessing How Beijing Views andValues Its Relationship with Moscow Now and Late (FOI-R-5267-SE), Stockholm: FOI, 2022, pp.
26-27.
5 It should be added that the table does not include all examples. There exist some more narrowly
issue-specific documents/statements that could fall into the category of global security coordination,for instance, on Syria or on the Iran nuclear issue from 2018. In addition, several more broadstatements or documents are framed primarily as bilateral but, in fact, contain important segments on
international affairs. One such example is the Treaty of Friendship 2001. Excluded from the table areChapter 6 — Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean Peninsula[Hsiung]69

of joint declarations has increased over the years. Moreover, the scope and stated ambition
for concrete cooperation have also expanded and increased. For instance, the joint
declaration signed during Vladimir Putin’s meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing for the
opening of the Winter Olympics in February 2022 contains very detailed and outspoken
accounts of how China and Russia view the international order and global affairs. 6 For
this paper, there have also been several declarations and statements relevant to the North
Korea issue, Northeast Asian security and global strategic stability.
Table 1.
Key Joint Statements and Documents on Global Security and International Affairs
Year

Statement

Main content

1997, April

Joint Declaration on a Multipolar WorldFirst joint statement expressing common
views on international affairs.

(中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于世界多极化和建立新世界秩序的联合声明)
2000, July

Joint Statement on Anti-missile Defence(中华人民共和国主席和俄罗斯联邦总统关于反导问题的联合声明)

2005, July

Joint Statement on the International
Order in the 21st Century (中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于 21 世纪国际A joint statement that condemns USplans to create a national anti-missile
defence system in violation of the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty.
Contains text on strategic stability, arms
control, disarmament and nonproliferation.

秩序的联合声明)
2008, May

Joint Statement on Major International
Issues (中俄元首签署关于重大国际问
题的联合声明)2011, June

Joint Statement between China andRussia on the Current International
Situation and Major International Issues

Contains text on the management of theNorth Korean issue, particularly on therole of the six-party talks mechanism.

Includes, for instance, joint opposition
to nuclear proliferation.

(中国和俄罗斯关于当前国际形势和重
大国际问题的联合声明)
2016, June

Joint Statement on Strengthening Global
Strategic Stability (中华人民共和国主席和俄罗斯联邦总统关于加强全球战For instance, concerns over missile
defence systems, specificallymentioning THAAD and opposition to
the militarisation of outer space.

略稳定的联合声明)
Joint Statement on International Law(中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于促进国际法的声明)

Expresses strong adherence to the UN
charter and principles of statesovereignty. Also includes opposition toalso numerous statements and documents adopted by regional organisations where China and Russia
are key members, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the BRICS group.
6 President of Russia, “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China
on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development, February
4, 2022”, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770.

70

Chapter 6 — Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean Peninsula[Hsiung]
individual states using sanctions as‘unilateral coercive measures’.

2017, July

Statement on Current World Situationand Major International Issues (中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于当前世界

Contains some more explicit text on
Northeast Asian security and North
Korea.

形势和重大国际问题的联合声明)
2022, February

Statement on International Relations
Entering a New Era (中华人民共和国
和俄罗斯联邦关于新时代国际关系和

A detailed and pronounced account ofcommon views and positions regarding
global security and affairs.

全球可持续发展的联合声明)

Author’s compilation. Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, United
Nations Digital Library.

China and Russia cooperate most frequently on issues about crisis and conflict
management within the framework of the UN system. 7 China and Russia havecoordinated positions and policies on numerous international security issues such as the
Arab revolutions, the Syrian civil war and the Iranian nuclear programme, and as detailed
more below, on the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. For instance, China andRussia have vetoed six Western proposed United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
resolutions on Syria (6 out of 11 cases between 2011 and 2018). 8 China and Russia alsouse various regional and international multilateral institutions where common positions
and policies on security issues can either be articulated or formulated. The best example
here is within the format of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). More broadly,
the two countries coordinate positions on global issues in other less security-focused
institutions such as within the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa, the G20 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
The common strategies for China and Russia are to change the narrative and normative
discourse in multilateral institutions, notably within the UN system. A good example here
is a similar approach to ‘internet sovereignty’ or standards in shaping digital technologies
inside the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Another strategy is to use
personnel policy as an instrument by increasing the general level of Chinese and Russian
nationals working inside the system and securing key positions. China in particular has,over the years, increased its influence in the UN substantially.9
7 Guihai Guan, “Thirty Years of China-Russia Strategic Relations: Achievements, Characteristics andprospects”, China International Strategic Review, Volume 4, Issue 1 (June 2022), pp. 21-38.
8 Marcin Kaczmarski, “Russia and China in Global Governance”, Emel Parlar Dal and Emre Ersen(eds.), Russia in the Changing International System, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 97.
9 Olaf Wientzek, “Cooperation between Russia and China in Multilateral Organizations: A Tactical ora Strategic Alliance?”, Sarah Kirchberger, Svenja Sinjen and Nils Wörmer (eds.), Russia-China
Relations: Emerging Alliance or Eternal Rivals, Cham: Springer, 2022, pp. 229-231.

Chapter 6 — Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean Peninsula[Hsiung]

71

There exists a certain ‘tacit division of labour’ between China and Russia regarding global
governance cooperation. Russia is more active about international security issues while
China takes the lead on issues related to economics, trade, finance and the environment.
This is largely related to the strengths and weaknesses of the two nations as well as thedifferent interests and stakes in the global system considered in a broader context. Thatsaid, of late, China has indicated a more active approach to international security
governance.10
In addition to the joint declarations and statements noted above, China and Russia have,over the years, initiated and maintained numerous bilateral high-level exchanges,
consultations and a regular dialogue mechanism whereby both sides discuss andcoordinate security and policy issues on regional and global affairs. 11 An overview ofsome of the most important examples of these is provided in Table 2. For instance, theChina–Russia Northeast Asia Security Dialogue was initially created to deal mainly with
North Korea-related issues but has developed into a major venue for Sino-Russia security
coordination. 12
Table 2.
Important Bilateral Security Exchanges and Mechanisms
Exchange
type/mechanism
Regular meetings
between defence
ministers of Russia
and China.
Annual strategic
consultations
between chiefs ofthegeneral staff.
Russia-China
consultations on
national security
issues.

Year of
Regularity
initiation
1993
Annually

Level ofexchange
Ministryhead level

1997

Annually

2005

Quarterly

Chiefs ofstaff frombothcountries’
militaries
Head of
SecurityCouncil(Russia) and

PurposeA regular exchange andcooperation mechanism
between the defence
ministries.
Allows for regular contact
between Chinese andRussian armed forces.

Enables a high-level
platform to discuss
emerging challenges andprotect their national

10 Marcin Kaczmarski, “Russia and China in Global Governance”, op. cit.
11 A note of clarification. Many of these examples also include topics and discussion centred more on

bilateral nature and not exclusively on international affairs, such as cross-border issues. Moreover,many of the existing exchanges and consultations began as bilateral confidence-building measures(CBMs) in the 1990s as China and Russia were trying to establish firm political foundations for thebilateral relationship in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and not least as a continuationof the normalisation process during the 1980s following the Sino-Soviet split.
12 It can also be mentioned that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) holds regular exchanges with
Russian counterparts. Often underappreciated, there are well established party-party relations between
China and Russia. Related note: ties to North Korea, traditionally, are handled by the International
Department of the CCP rather than the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

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Chapter 6 — Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean Peninsula[Hsiung]

China-Russia
Northeast Asia
security dialogue.

2015

Normally
twice a yearbut
sometimes
with a higher
frequency but
varies basedon theurgency ofmatters

State
Council(China)Deputyforeignministerlevel

security interests. The only
such forum China has withanother country.
To deal with regional
security issues inNortheast Asia, initiallycentred on Korean issues.
Involves representatives
from the Ministry of
Defence and the Ministryof Foreign Affairs.

Author compilation. Sources: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic ofChina, media reports.

CHINESE AND RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA
China concluded an alliance treaty with North Korea in 1961. Indeed, North Korea is the
only country which China has a formal obligation to defend, even though it is suspectedthat China would not honour such security guarantees should North Korea be attacked.13
Russia also used to have a defence treaty with North Korea but this was terminated after
the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and then replaced by a new treaty in 2000,
but without formal security guarantees.
China and Russia share several similar security interests and policy priorities on the
Korean Peninsula. That does not mean, however, that they are always aligned or act outof the same interests and motivations.
Both China and Russia view the North Korean issue primarily from the perspective ofglobal security and their strategic competition with the US. More concretely, Beijing andMoscow aim to counterbalance the US military presence on the Korean Peninsula andundercut US strategic influence in Asia more broadly. For instance, at the UNSC meetingin May 2022 when China and Russia vetoed a US–North Korea sanctions proposal, theChinese representative Zhang Jun stated:
The US has recently been vigorously promoting an Indo-Pacific strategy thatis of necessity linked to the latest developments on the peninsula. It has been
13 Jaewoo Choo, “China’s Strategic Cooperation with Russia and the Neutralization of the Korean

Peninsula”, The China-Russia Entente and the Korean Peninsula, National Bureau of Asian Research,
NBR Special Report 78, March 2019, p. 35.

Chapter 6 — Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean Peninsula[Hsiung]73

promoting cooperation on nuclear submarines with certain countries thatcarries serious risks of nuclear proliferation […] The US also continues topromote and expand military exercises, strengthen military alliances withcertain countries involved in the region and engineer small, exclusive
circles.14
China and Russia put a very high premium on maintaining stability on the Korean
Peninsula and preventing regime collapse in Pyongyang. While unification of the two
Koreas remains a potential end goal, neither China nor Russia see this as a short-term
reality. Unification is only acceptable under conditions that would see a neutral Korea
and no US military troops on Korean soil. China and Russia lament that the US uses theissue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme development as a pretext to increase
its own military presence in the region and strengthen its security relations with South
Korea and Japan. A clear example is the 2017 deployment of the US Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile defence system in South Korea,
ostensibly against North Korea but which, in Beijing’s view, also targets China andthereby weakens its second-strike capability. China reacted particularly strongly,
including imposing a wide range of economic sanctions and other retaliatory measuresagainst South Korea.
That said, China and Russia, at the same time, oppose North Korea’s nuclear weapons
programme, evidenced by the backing of UNSC-approved sanctions against Pyongyang(more below on these). They also want to prevent a rapid deterioration of the security
conditions on the Korean Peninsula, especially tensions between Seoul and Pyongyang
which could lead to military confrontation. Potentially, a war would have graveconsequences, not least for China as it could face a large migration influx from North
Korea and bring about negative effects for the economic development of China’s
northeast. Moreover, a more belligerent and fully capable nuclear-weapons-armed North
Korea could lead to other regional states developing nuclear weapons or making majorchanges in their military posture, notably South Korea and Japan. The basic approach for
China (as for Russia) has, thus, been to work towards denuclearisation but at the sametime reduce the US military presence and sustain the regime in Pyongyang by providing
it with substantial diplomatic and economic support.15

14 Zhang Jun, “United Nations Security Council, 9048th Meeting on ‘Non-proliferation-Democratic

People's Republic of Korea, May 26, 2022”, https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/2022,
p. 4.
15 More specifically for China, this has been a consistent policy which one scholar has labeled China’s
North Korea ‘sheltering policy’. See, Henrik Stålhane Hiim, China and International Nuclear
Weapons Proliferation. Strategic Assistance, New York: Routledge, 2019, Chapter 5.

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Chapter 6 — Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean Peninsula[Hsiung]

Despite the substantial overlap in interests, there are also some differences. The biggest
difference is that China is a more influential actor than Russia on the Korean Peninsula.
This has been evident for a long time, and as will be discussed below, will likely only
grow in the near future. China’s stakes in the North Korea issue are larger than Russia’s.
Compared to Russia, North Korea is a more immediate neighbour as China shares a longer
border with the country and would be more directly affected in the event of a crisis or war
on the Korean Peninsula.16 For one observer, there is no more important area on China’s
periphery, except for Taiwan, than the Korean Peninsula.17 Russia also has a somewhat
stronger interest in improved relations between South Korea and North Korea as thiswould allow it to better pursue its economic development objectives for the Russian Far
East and enhance its role and position in Northeast Asia.18

INTERACTION ON THE NORTH KOREA ISSUE
This part now provides an overview of Sino-Russian interactions over North Korea. It
covers two dimensions which aim to examine the content, scope and level of Chinese–
Russian coordination and cooperation on the issue. The two dimensions are (1) thepolitical/diplomatic, such as major statements and actions taken within the UNSC and (2)security/military, notably joint military exercises.
（1）THE POLITICAL/ DIPLOMATIC DIMENSIONOver the years, North Korea has steadily developed and advanced its nuclear weapons
programme. In 2003 Pyongyang withdrew from the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) andsince 2006, when it tested its first nuclear weapon, has conducted six nuclear tests withthe most recent one in 2017. North Korea is thought to hold approximately 30 operational
nuclear warheads (as of writing) and a growing arsenal of ballistic missiles which canreach the continental US and its regional allies, such as Japan.19
Diplomatic coordination on North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme arguably stands
out as the most apparent feature of Sino-Russian interaction regarding North Korea,
particularly as this has played out in the UNSC. Moreover, diplomatic actions are much

16 Chu Shulong and Lin Xinhua, “The Six Party Talk: A Chinese Perspective”, Asian Perspective,

Volume 32, Number 4 (2008), pp. 29-41.
17 Robert Sutter, “Sino-Russian Relations, South Korea, and North Korea”, Gilbert Rozman (ed.),Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies. The East Asian Whirlpool: Kim Jong-Un’s Diplomatic Shake-up,
China’s Sharp Power, and Trump’s Trade Wars, Volume 30 (2019), p. 21.
18 Brian Carlson, “Sino-Russian Relations and Security Ties to North Korea”, ibid., p. 63.
19 Hans Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Kate Kohn, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,
Federation of American Scientists, March 31, 2023”, https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclearforces/.

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75

centred on periods of heightened tensions and crisis on the Korean Peninsula, such as in
1993–1994, 2002–2003 and 2017–2018.20
Early interaction was evident during the so-called six-party talks. The talks, which began
in 2003 and involved China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the US were
set up to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear programme following the second nuclear crisis(2002–2003). Although Russia only played a minor role in the talks, China showed
deference to Russian inclusion in the multilateral mechanism. For China, Russia wasuseful as a supporter of Chinese positions vis-à-vis the US and both states often adopted
similar positions. That said, although the talks broke down in 2009, they did provide aspringboard for further Sino-Russia coordination on the North Korea issue. In 2010,
China and Russia shielded Pyongyang for the sinking of the South Korean military vessel
Cheonan.21
During the third nuclear crisis (2017-2018 as North Korea conducted nuclear tests twice
in 2016 and once in 2017), China and Russia issued a joint statement in July 2017. Thiswas based on separate earlier proposals of a Chinese ‘double freeze’ and Russian ‘paralleladvancements’ as efforts towards denuclearisation.22 According to one observer, the joint
declaration was the first time the two sides articulated their common position on the
Korean issue so clearly.23 China and Russia also expressed joint diplomatic opposition to
THAAD. Putin and Xi at a meeting in June 2017 stated explicitly that THAAD should
not be used as a pretext to expand US military capabilities in East Asia. At the ShangriLa Dialogue in Singapore the same year, both the Chinese and Russian defence ministers
voiced criticism. In 2018, China, Russia and North Korea began holding trilateral talks
as a way to coordinate positions and strengthen Pyongyang’s bargaining position vis-àvis Washington. A main common objective is to work for gradual UN sanctions
alleviation and address North Korean security concerns in exchange for

20 For a comprehensive timeline overview of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes, see for

instance, Arms Control Association, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile
Diplomacy, 1985–2022, (last reviewed 22 April, 2022)”, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprk
chron.
21 Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Triangles Reshaping International Relations in Asia, New York:
Routledge, 2022, pp. 34-35.
22 Both the Chinese and Russian proposals were similar. China’s double freeze called for thesuspension of North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests if the US and South Korea agreed to suspend
their joint military exercise. The Russian proposal was somewhat more comprehensive but included
similar points and thus merged well with the Chinese proposal.
23 Sutter, op. cit., p. 26.

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Chapter 6 — Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean Peninsula[Hsiung]denuclearisation.24 While not directly related to North Korea, in 2016 China and Russia
held their first joint brief on missile defence issues.25
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Sino-Russian engagement on the nuclear issue with
North Korea to a large degree halted. In the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of
Ukraine, however, Sino-Russian cooperation resumed. In 2022, Pyongyang conducted an
unprecedented number of missile tests which caused renewed regional and international
concerns over North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme where China and Russia
adopted a much more reserved posture, even indicating a more supportive approach thanearlier. For instance, a noteworthy development came in May 2022 when Beijing andMoscow for the first time jointly vetoed a sanctions proposal on North Korea. The twocountries called sanctions on Pyongyang ‘inhumane’ and pushed for negotiations to
reduce tensions on the peninsula. 26 As a comparison, China and Russia have jointly
vetoed far more on other global security issues. For instance, in Syria and the Middle East,
China and Russia have vetoed a total of eight UN resolution proposals.27 Moreover, the2023 March joint statement, adopted when Xi met with Putin in Moscow, contains
explicit statements urging the US to take North Korea’s concerns into account. The
statement renounces sanctions and calls for efforts to resume dialogue while also statingthat China and Russia will continue with close coordination on the North Korea issue
following what is called ‘advancing in parallel’.28
Between 2006 and early 2022, the UNSC adopted nine major sanctions resolution
packages as a response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities. 29 China andRussia have supported all of these packages, albeit not without first calling for
adjustments or changes to the initial proposals. China and Russia have also been accusedof lacking in compliance, for instance by keeping some economic trade exchanges goingor by just circumventing sanctions in other ways. In addition, China and Russia also at
24 Julia Masterson, “North Korea, China, Russia Converge Positions”, Arms Control Today, Volume

50, January/February 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-01/news/north-korea-china-russiaconverge-positions.
25 Hong Xiao, “Security Risk Seen in Anti-missile Setup, China Daily, October 13, 2017”,
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2017-10/13/content_33204330.htm.
26 Ramon Pacheco Pardon and Yong Ik Kim, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and China-North Korea
Relations: Stronger Weak–Great Power Alignment”, Asian Survey, Volume 62, Number 5-6(September/October/ November/December 2022), p. 935.
27 Full list of UNSC resolutions can be found on United Nations Security Council website,“Resolutions”, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions.
28 “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Deepening
Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation for a New Era, 21 March, 2023”. The fulldocument is available on United Nations Digital Library, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4011991?
ln=en.
29 See, United Nations Security Council website, “Resolutions”.

Chapter 6 — Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean Peninsula[Hsiung]77

times propose draft resolutions to lift UN sanctions or to offer sanctions relief to North
Korea, for instance in 2019 and 2021. Both times the US opposed the draft resolution.30
More broadly, during UNSC member states plenary discussions, China and Russia often
highlight the joint efforts or similar positions adopted by the two sides. A summary ofsome major diplomatic statements and actions is presented in Table 3.
Table 3.
Diplomatic Actions: Major Joint Statements and Actions on North Korea
Year
2003-2009
2006
2009
2013
2013
2016
2016
2017
2017
2017
2017, July

Event
Six-party talks
UNSC resolution 1718 (support of)
UNSC resolution 1874 (support of)
UNSC resolution 2087 (support of)
UNSC resolution 2094 (support of)
UNSC resolution 2270 (support of)
UNSC resolution 2321 (support of)
UNSC resolution 2371 (support of)
UNSC resolution 2375 (support of)
UNSC resolution 2379 (support of)
Joint statement by Russia and China on the Korean Peninsula’s Problems(combining China’s ‘double-freeze’ and Russia’s ‘parallel advancement’)2017,
China and Russia supported new UN sanctions on North Korea (albeit after
Sept, Dec blocking harsher measures proposed by the US)
2018
Initiation of trilateral talks between China, Russia and North Korea
2019
China and Russia jointly block a UN critique of North Korea violating sanctions
and call for the lifting of some sanctions
2021, Nov China and Russia submit a draft resolution calling for the UNSC to easesanctions on North Korea
2022, May China and Russia veto US-led UN sanctions proposal (first veto in 15 years infavour of North Korea)

Author compilation. Sources: United Nations Digital Library, media reports.
（2）SECURITY DIMENSION
Beyond the diplomatic dimension, China and Russia also engage in numerous joint
initiatives and activities in the security and military domain with direct or indirectreference to the North Korean issue.31 A particularly salient feature has been that of joint
military exercises. The main purpose has often been to signal common opposition to the
US and its allies against their diplomatic or security activities in Northeast Asia that are
viewed as infringing on Chinese and Russian interests and positions with regard to the
Kelsey Davenport, “China, Russia Propose North Korea Sanctions Relief, Arms Control
Association, December 21, 2021”, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-12/news/china-russiapropose-north-korea-sanctions-relief.
31 The security dimension does not consider the question of Chinese and Russian direct or indirect
military-technical assistance or support to North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme.
30

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Chapter 6 — Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean Peninsula[Hsiung]

Korean Peninsula and more broadly on regional security issues. A summary of some joint
military and security activities in Northeast Asia is shown in Table 4 below.
Table 4.
Military Actions: Northeast Asia Joint Military Exercise or Other Related ActivitiesYear
2012, Apr

Event
Naval exercise (Joint Sea)

2014, May

Naval exercise (Joint Sea)

2015, Aug

Naval exercise (Joint Sea, phase II)2016, April

Aerospace security

2017, Sept

Naval exercise (Joint Sea, phase II)2017, Dec

Aerospace security

2018, Sep

Vostok-18

2019, May

Naval exercise (Joint Sea)

2019, July

Joint Aerial Strategic Patrol

2020, Dec

Joint Aerial Strategic Patrol

2021, Nov
2021, Oct2022, May

Joint Aerial Strategic Patrol
Naval exercise (Joint Sea)
Joint Aerial Strategic Patrol

Location and content
Yellow Sea: maritime rescue operations, airdefences, anti-submarine warfare.
East China Sea; air and missile defences,anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue,etc.
Sea of Japan; live-fire exercise, antisubmarine and anti-aircraft training, etc.
Moscow; computer-based joint air andmissile defence simulation
Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk; antipiracy, anti-submarine warfare, air defence,
ship-to-ship combat.
Beijing; computer-based joint air andmissile defence simulation.
Russia Eastern Military District; major
strategic Russian exercise but first-time
participation for China.
Yellow Sea; live fire drills, anti-submarine
and air defence.
East China Sea and Sea of Japan: combined
aerial patrolling, first-time exercise.
Sea of Japan and East China Sea; combined
aerial patrolling.
Sea of Japan; combined aerial patrolling.
Sea of Japan and East China Sea.
Sea of Japan/East China Sea and Western
Pacific.

Sources: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) China Power Project,
media reports
China and Russia have objected in particular to the growing US–South Korea defence
and military cooperation, and to a certain degree, also the US–Japan alliance. The SinoRussian naval exercises which began in 2012 can be viewed very much from thisperspective. Moreover, in 2016, when South Korea and the US announced the placementof the THAAD system, Beijing and Moscow not only reacted diplomatically (as noted
above) but also conducted a joint naval exercise in September 2017 in the Sea of Japanand the Sea of Okhotsk (the latter for the first time), although denying any connection to
the heightened tensions on the Peninsula.

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79

More directly connected to the Korean Peninsula, in 2016 and again in 2017, China andRussia held a joint computer-based air and missile defence simulation, likely a strong
signal toward the US on the issue of the THAAD deployment. 32 In the Vostok-2018
Russian strategic exercise, to which China was invited for the first time, the two sides
likely held discussions on possible security coordination of a military outbreak on the
Korean Peninsula and partly as an effort to influence the course of events in Northeast
Asia.33
Military exercises in Northeast Asia in the naval domains have continued but China andRussia have also begun to conduct joint air patrols, with the first such occurring in July
2019. The exercises included two Chinese H-6K and two Russian Tu-95 bombers thatentered overlapping South Korean and Japanese Air Defense Identification Zones. Manyof these are conducted in the Sea of Japan and are likely targeted at both the US–South
Korea and US–Japan alliances. Both Seoul and Tokyo have strong threat perceptions ofa more aggressive North Korea which has made South Korea and Japan increasingly
inclined to improve their defence and security cooperation with the US. For China, closer
defence collaboration with the US is, however, very much interpreted as targeting
China.34
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that Sino-Russian joint military exercises inNortheast Asia do not necessarily relate to the North Korean issue per se. Instead, suchactivities are also part of broader elements of Sino-Russian military cooperation which
includes numerous cooperative components such as arms sales, high-level meetings andtraining. Over the years, the scope, nature and sophistication of Sino-Russian joint
military exercises have grown, as has the broader security and defence cooperation, which
points to if not a formal alliance, at least an increasingly close defence partnership.35
That said, while intensified security cooperation between China and Russia does notnecessarily relate in all aspects to Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula in particular,
the security dimension of Sino-Russian cooperation concerning North Korea is of
growing importance. Indeed, according to one China–Russia analyst, the Korean
Peninsula constitutes a likely region where China and Russia could develop joint

32 Yu Bin, “Between the Past and the Future, Comparative Connections, Volume 19, Issue 3, Pacific

Forum”, https://cc.pacforum.org/2018/01/between-the-past-and-the-future/.
33 Brian Carlson, “Sino-Russian Relations and Security Ties to North Korea”, op. cit., p. 70.
34 Adam P. Liff, “China and the US Alliance System”, The China Quarterly, Volume 233 (March2018), pp. 137-165.
35 Alexander Korolev, “On the Verge of an Alliance: Contemporary China-Russia Military
Cooperation”, Asian Security, Volume 15, Issue 3 (2019), pp. 233-252.

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Chapter 6 — Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean Peninsula[Hsiung]

operational plans. 36 For another observer, increased interoperability between the two
militaries can be beneficial for China and Russia in the event of a military crisis on the
Korean Peninsula.37

CONCLUDING DISCUSSION: SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION AND
CHINA’S STRATEGIC INFLUENCE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND
BEYOND
The above overview has shown that Sino-Russian security coordination on global affairs
and international security issues has increased over time, especially in recent years.
Underlying closer coordination is the basic aversion that Beijing and Moscow have to US
global and regional dominance and particularly how this plays out in what China andRussia perceive as their regional spheres of influence—for Russia in Europe and the postSoviet sphere and China in the Indo-Pacific region. This broad, uniting feature has
impacted also how China and Russia deal with the North Korean issue with greater
emphasis on common approaches and coordination, despite existing differences in roles
and interests as noted above.
Current heightened US–China strategic rivalry and the US/West–Russia rift due to thewar in Ukraine have not only brought China and Russia even closer together but alsobrought about what some view as potentially growing China–Russia–North Korea
trilateral cooperation.38 North Korea is using the war in Ukraine and the heightened US–
China strategic rivalry to advance its nuclear weapons programme. China and Russia arewilling to deprioritise denuclearisation in strengthening ties with Pyongyang and further
deter the US military and security presence and alliance-building in the region. This iscreating difficult conditions in addressing the North Korean nuclear weapons issue.
The question is whether current trends and developments are favourable for China’s
security interests on the Korean Peninsula and, more broadly, in the Northeast Asia region.
On the one hand, China’s close strategic partnership with Russia enables Beijing andMoscow to work increasingly in coordination on issues related to North Korea in generaland its nuclear weapons programme in particular. A more unified China–Russia position
on North Korea vis-à-vis the US can give China and Russia greater leverage to advance
Gabuev, “Russia Is Moving Deeper Into China’s Embrace, The Moscow Times,
September 11, 2018”, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/09/11/russia-is-moving-deeper-intochinas-embrace-op-ed-a62839.
37 Lyle J. Goldstein, “What Russia’s Vostok-18 Exercise with China Means, The National Interest,
September 5, 2018”, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-russia-vostok-18-exercise-china-means-30577.
38 Rozman, op. cit., Chapter 3.
36 AlexanderChapter 6 — Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean Peninsula[Hsiung]81

their interests. More broadly, China has gained from its closer defence partnership with
Russia to augment its power in the Northeast region. As noted above, the growing levelof joint military exercises conducted work as a geopolitical deterrent signal to the US and
its allies in the region. Russian arms sales to China have strengthened Chinese militarycapabilities, not least in the air and naval domains which have helped create a morefavourable military balance vis-à-vis the US in the Asia-Pacific maritime theatre. In
addition, the growing power asymmetry between China and Russia in Beijing’s favour
will likely make China the dominant partner in the Sino-Russian relationship. Russian
dependency on China can lead to reduced strategic manoeuvring space in the Northeast
Asia region where Moscow will be compelled to support Chinese positions and policies
more clearly. This includes the Korean Peninsula where Russia has long been worried
about being marginalised in relation to China.
On the other hand, China will have to contend with a wider regional security environmentthat is becoming increasingly hostile from China’s perspective. The US and its allies arestrengthening their security cooperation, due not only to concerns over China’s militarymodernisation and more assertive foreign policy but also to the strengthening of the SinoRussian relationship which is viewed as a challenge to the Western-led international order.
Japan has announced unprecedented changes to its security posture, including acommitment to spending 2% of its GDP on defence and acquiring counter-strikecapabilities. South Korea, having long maintained a balanced position between China andthe US, is taking steps to deepen its security cooperation with the US, much to China’s
dislike. Moreover, there are few indications of major movements between the US andNorth Korea on the nuclear weapons issue. A more emboldened North Korea could pushSouth Korea or even Japan to pursue their own independent nuclear weapons programmes,
thus creating a nuclear arms race in East Asia. This is something China and Russia havelong been concerned about as noted above.
China’s influence over events on the Korean Peninsula also needs to be considered. Whileit can be claimed that current developments could signal growing Chinese influence over
North Korea, past interactions instead show the limits to Chinese influence overPyongyang. China has always viewed North Korea as an unreliable ally and must still
consider the possibility of entrapment.39 North Korea will also want to maintain a certain
autonomy in terms of China. Pyongyang could again try to play the big players off against
each other as it has in the past, including ‘re-approaching’ the US. Russia, too, will notwant to become subordinate to China, although Moscow might not have any real choice
39 Kerry Brown, “What Does China Really Think of North Korea?”, The Diplomat, May 25, 2019,https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/what-does-china-really-think-of-north-korea/.

82

Chapter 6 — Sino-Russian Strategic Coordination on the Korean Peninsula[Hsiung]in the end. That said, Russia’s main security interests and priorities are in Europe and theformer Soviet states and less so in the Asia-Pacific countries. As long as China’s basic
interests align with Russia’s on the Korean Peninsula, Russia’s deference to China should
not pose any significant challenge to Russian interests or the broader Sino-Russianstrategic partnership.
For now, North Korea is taking advantage of heightened US–China tensions and of theRussia–West stand-off. Recent developments are creating even stronger incentives for
China–Russia coordination on North Korea, but whether this will lead to more concrete
coordinated actions remains to be seen. As long as China and Russia maintain similargoals to uphold stability and prevent regime collapse in Pyongyang while limiting US
military and security presence and influence in North Korea, China–Russia coordinationon the Korean Peninsula will remain intact.

Chapter 7 — Revisiting China’s Influence: A Case Study of South Asia
[Kurita]83

CHAPTER 7

Revisiting China’s Influence: A Case Study of South Asia
Masahiro Kurita
INTRODUCTION
This study examines China’s engagement with the small- and medium-sized nations ofSouth Asia bordering India as a case study to consider the broad question of China’s
influence. Unlike Northeast or Southeast Asia, South Asia has historically not been ageopolitical priority for Beijing.1 However, it is natural for China—a semi-regional statesharing borders with five of the eight South Asian countries—to have developed ties withthese countries since the relatively early period of their independence after WWII.
Based on these decades-old relations, China has expanded its economic engagement with
South Asian countries dramatically since the announcement of the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) in 2013, the flagship project of the Xi Jinping government. This has
elevated the priority of South Asia in China’s interests and calculation, as demonstrated
by the frequency of senior officials’ visits to these countries in recent years.2
Against this background, this study focuses on two questions. First, since the launch of
the BRI, what kind of engagement has China made toward small- and medium-sizedSouth Asian nations? Second, in terms of Beijing’s influence over these countries, what
are the tangible results of this increase in China’s engagement in South Asia, where India
has traditionally exercised the dominant influence as a de facto regional hegemon?

CHINA’S INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA
While South Asia has not been a top geopolitical priority for Beijing, the region is by nomeans irrelevant to China; in fact, China has several notable interests in South Asia. Firstand foremost, it has a longstanding border dispute with the regional power, India, which
1 USIP Senior Study Group, China’s Influence on Conflict Dynamics in South Asia, Washington DC:

United States Institute of Peace (USIP), December 6, 2020.
2 Amit Ranjan and Zheng Haiqi, “China’s Diplomatic Investments in South Asia, ISAS Insights, April
22, 2022”, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/chinas-diplomatic-investments-in-south-asia/.

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Chapter 7 — Revisiting China’s Influence: A Case Study of South Asia
[Kurita]

has become increasingly contentious over the past two decades. Besides, although India
is currently not believed to be capable of posing a serious security threat to China, Beijing
is aware of the possibility that India may emerge as a peer competitor in the future. This
perception has prompted Beijing to take measures to inhibit India’s rise as an Asian powercomparable to China.3
Second, South Asia is related intrinsically to China’s internal stability. The 14th Dalai
Lama and the Tibetan exile government—along with a large Tibetan diaspora—have been
given asylum in India, which has fueled Beijing’s anxiety over India’s potential
interference in the Tibetan separatist movement. 4 Likewise, Nepal and Bhutan hostsubstantial Tibetan populations. Meanwhile, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region,
which has a large Muslim population and has witnessed China’s suppression of separatist
movements there, is contiguous with two Muslim-dominated countries in South Asia:
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Beijing has been particularly concerned about the nexus
between Islamic separatist militants in Xinjiang and jihadist outfits in these states. 5
Third, Beijing has felt a strong need to secure its Indian Ocean sea lanes. 6 In this light,
China’s relations with the Indian Ocean littoral states in South Asia are critical. Amongthese states, Pakistan’s position is particularly notable, because its ports along the Arabian
Sea can serve as a gateway to the Indian Ocean, enabling China to import energy
resources from the Middle East or Africa without passing through the Malacca Strait,
where the US Navy can easily interdict Chinese shipping in the event of a future U.S.China confrontation.7
Meanwhile, South Asia is a region that has frequently invited China. Small- and mediumsized South Asian states have had complicated and occasionally difficult relations with
India, the regional hegemon. Due to their huge power asymmetry with India, thesecountries have developed ties with Beijing and occasionally played the “China card” in
3 Anil Kumar, “Rising India: A Chinese Strategic Perspective, The Asia Dialogue, May 15, 2013”,

https://theasiadialogue.com/2013/05/15/rising-india-a-chinese-strategic-perspective/.
4 Shi Jiangtao, “Tibet Again Causes Friction between China and India, and It Doesn’t Bode Well for
Ties, South China Morning Post, August 16, 2022”, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/
article/3189101/tibet-again-causes-friction-between-china-and-india-and-it.
5 Sanjeev Kumar, “China’s South Asia Policy in the ʻNew Eraʼ”, India Quarterly, Vol. 75, No. 2(2019), p. 139; Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (Paperback ed.),London: Hurst & Company, 2020, pp. 74-76.
6 Eryan Ramadhani, “China in the Indian Ocean Region: The Confined ‘Far-Seas Operations’”, India
Quarterly, Vol. 71, No. 2 (June 2015), pp. 153-154.
7 Anu Anwar, “South Asia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Security Implications and Ways
Forward”, Alexander L. Vuving (ed.), Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the
Indo-Pacific, Honolulu: Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2020, pp. 163-164.

Chapter 7 — Revisiting China’s Influence: A Case Study of South Asia
[Kurita]85

dealing with Delhi.8 This is most notable in the case of Pakistan, which has a longstanding
and highly militarized dispute with India over the sovereignty of Kashmir. Based on theirshared animosity, China and Pakistan have developed a close anti-India partnership. To
a lesser extent, India’s other neighbors have also forged historical partnerships with
Beijing.

BRI AND THE EXPANSION OF CHINA’S ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT
Even before the launch of the BRI, instances of economic engagement could be observedin China’s relations with South Asian nations. Large-scale infrastructure development
projects, a defining feature of the BRI, were already in place as early as the 2000s,
including the development of ports in Gwadar, Pakistan, and Hambantota, Sri Lanka.
Nevertheless, the announcement of the BRI—initially proposed as two separate initiatives,
the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR)—
in 2013 marked a significant shift in the relations between China and South Asian nations.
Since then, China’s economic engagement with small- and medium-sized countries inSouth Asia has expanded markedly.9
The BRI does not focus solely on South Asia, but the region is placed as a node where
the two “roads” under the BRI, the SREB and the 21st-Century MSR, intersect. Originally,
the SREB was conceived as an initiative to build six economic corridors spanning acrossEurasia. South Asia was supposed to encompass two of these corridors, the China–
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar
Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC),10 although the latter has largely become dormant due to
India’s reluctance to participate. Most importantly, South Asia could serve as a showcase
for the fruitfulness of the BRI. In South Asia, which includes several countries with
rapidly growing populations and economies, a major obstacle for the regional economic
development has been a lack of intra-regional connectivity.11 This was the problem thatthe BRI, which centers on the idea of improving connectivity through large-scale
infrastructure development projects, was supposed to address.
Among the eight South Asian nations, six have expressed their support for the BRI—
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan—while India andBhutan, a de facto protectorate of India, have not participated in the initiative. In
8 Christian Wagner and Siddharth Tripathi, India’s Response to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative,

Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, January 2, 2018, p. 2.
9 USIP Senior Study Group, op. cit., p. 39.
10 Antara Ghosal Singh, “China’s Vision for the Belt and Road in South Asia, The Diplomat, March
2, 2019”, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-vision-for-the-belt-and-road-in-south-asia/.
11 USIP Senior Study Group, op. cit., p. 21.

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implementing concrete projects under the BRI in these six countries, China has adopted“country-wise customized approaches”.12
In Pakistan, China has implemented the CPEC, which has been touted as the “flagship”
of the BRI. 13 The CPEC was officially launched in April 2015 as a comprehensive
economic development package with four pillars: energy, transportation infrastructure,
further development of the port of Gwadar, and industrial cooperation. The total level ofChinese investment announced at the time was around $46 billion. 14 The actual
implementation of the CPEC since then has hardly been smooth, hampered by issues
including the (re-)emergence of Pakistan’s chronic macroeconomic problems and achange of government in Islamabad in 2018. Nevertheless, under the CPEC, 27 projects
worth $19 billion had been completed by September 2022.15 This is a significant amountfor Pakistan, a country that has long struggled to attract foreign investors.
There have been bilateral cooperation schemes under the 21st-Century MSR for
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.16 Although the initially envisioned BCIM-EC
has stalled due to India’s objections, China offered a $38 billion economic package during
Xi’s visit to Bangladesh in 2016 and Dhaka has actively received Chinese investments.
In total, China has financed projects worth over $10 billion in Bangladesh, including
many China–Bangladesh friendship bridges, an economic zone, and power plants. 17
China is actively involved in joint ventures in Bangladesh, contributing to the country’s
cluster-based industrialization.18
Sri Lanka joined the 21st-Century MSR in 2014. China has been engaged in infrastructuredevelopment in Sri Lanka since before the start of the BRI. Although the projects insideand outside of the BRI are not clearly delineated, the BRI projects in the country
reportedly include the development of ports, roads, railways, airports, communication

12 Anwar, op. cit., p. 164.
13 “Expert: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Is Flagship Project of BRI, CGTN, November 2, 2022”,

https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-11-02/-Expert-China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor-is-flagship-pro
ject-of-BRI-1eD iXCi4Jyg/index.html.
14 “China’s Xi Jinping Agrees $46bn Superhighway to Pakistan, BBC, April 20, 2015”, https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-32377088.
15 “27 CPEC Projects Costing $19b Completed, The Express Tribune, September 13, 2022”, https://
tribune.com.pk/story/2376322/27-cpec-projects-costing-19b-completed.
16 Muhammad Faisal, China’s Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia: An Assessment and Outlook,
Ottawa: Macdonald-Laurier Institute, June 3, 2021, p. 3.
17 Manjari Chatterjee Miller, China and the Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia, New York: Council
on Foreign Relations, June 2022, pp. 15-17.
18 Deep Pal, China’s Influence in South Asia: Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries,
Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2021, p. 13.

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infrastructure, and the development of cities.19 A particularly prominent project is thedevelopment of Colombo Port City, for which around $1.4 billion has been invested. 20
The Sri Lankan government, beset with unmanageable external debt burdens, signed adeal to lease the Hambantota port for 99 years to a Chinese company in 2017, which
seriously tarnished the image of the BRI; however, Sri Lanka has been continuing tocooperate with China in the development of infrastructure.
The Maldives joined the 21st-Century MSR as well, which has led to development
projects such as the construction of the 2-kilometer-long China–Maldives Friendship
Bridge and the expansion of the Male International Airport. 21 Subsequently, after
President Abdullah Yameen, known for his pro-China stance, stepped down, the Maldivesseemingly shifted away from the BRI.22 That said, in January 2022, the Maldives declaredthat it “will join hands with China to expand the BRI” during the post-pandemic economic
recovery, and China, for its part, pledged to provide $63 million for social andinfrastructure development projects in the Maldives.23
Regarding Nepal, the Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor (THEC) has been conceived
as a project connecting China with India via Nepal, although India has been reluctant tocooperate. 24 In addition to advancing the $2.15 billion Kyirong–Kathmandu railroad
under the THEC, China has committed to constructing hydropower projects and oil
storage and border facilities. Besides the projects under the BRI, China provided
substantial humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support in the wake of the 2015
earthquake in Nepal. 25 In 2016, Kathmandu signed a comprehensive transit andtransportation agreement with Beijing, which took effect in 2020, following India’s defacto blockade against Nepal in a bid to influence the latter’s constitutional issues.26

19 Miller, op. cit., p. 9.
20 Pranay Sharma, “India’s Concerns over China’s Rising Influence in Sri Lanka Grow with Progressof US$1.4 Billion Port City Project, South China Morning Post, June 8, 2021”, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3136486/indias-concerns-over-chinas-rising-influence-sri-lanka-grow.
21 Cui Yige and Wu Chaolan, “Pathway to Brighter Future: Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia (3),People’s Daily Online, April 2, 2022”, http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0402/c90000-10079566-3.html.
22 Miller, op. cit., p. 20.
23 “The Belt and Road and the Maldives’ Position on the Globe, Maldives Financial Review, February
3, 2022”, https://mfr.mv/international-sector/the-belt-and-road-and-the-maldives-position-on-the-glo
be.
24 “The Belt & Road’s Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor, Silk Road Briefing, June 17, 2019”,
https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2019/07/17/belt-roads-trans-himalayan-economic-corridor/.
25 Miller, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
26 Pal, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

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Since the early 2010s, China has gradually furthered its involvement with Afghanistan.27
In 2014, Beijing pledged $327 million in aid to Afghanistan,28 and subsequently, Kabul
signed a memorandum of understanding to join the BRI in May 2016. 29 However, as
Afghanistan was marred by instability and other issues, this memorandum did not result
in concrete development projects, nor was there notable progress in other investment
projects by Chinese stakeholders.30 That said, after the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021,
China expressed its intention to support Afghanistan’s reconstruction efforts, which was
welcomed by the Taliban. 31 In May 2023, China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan under
Taliban rule agreed to strengthen cooperation under the BRI and extend the CPEC into
Afghanistan.32

DIVERSIFICATION OF CHINA’S ENGAGEMENTAs Beijing expands its economic relationships with South Asia’s small- and mediumsized nations, its engagement with these countries has diversified beyond the economic
realm. What is particularly notable in relation to China’s influence is Beijing’s attempt todirectly reach out to important stakeholders within the regional countries.
These attempts are most noticeable in Pakistan. To facilitate the implementation of the
CPEC, Beijing has felt an acute need to directly court stakeholders in Pakistan anddisseminate a positive narrative about the project. Therefore, China has invited many
Pakistani politicians, tribal leaders, businesspeople, and journalists to China and provided
scholarships for students. 33 In addition, Beijing established a body for consultation
27 Small, op. cit., pp. 159-161.
28 Michael Martina, “China Says Afghan President Vows to Help China Fight Militants, Reuters,

October 29, 2014”, https://jp.reuters.com/article/us-china-afghanistan/china-says-afghan-presidentvows-to-help-china-fight-militants-idUSKBN0IH1D420141029.
29 Rupert Stone, “Slowly but Surely, China Is Moving into Afghanistan, TRT World, September 15,
2016”, https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/slowly-but-surely-china-is-moving-into-afghanistan-242
76.
30 Raffaello Pantucci, “The Myth of Chinese Investment in Afghanistan, Nikkei Asia, August 16,
2021”, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/The-myth-of-Chinese-investment-in-Afghanistan2.
31 Teddy Ng and Catherine Wong, “China Pledges to Help Rebuild Afghanistan and, While Blaming
US for Chaos, Insists It Pays Too, South China Morning Post, August 31, 2021”,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3146986/china-calls-us-be-investigatedcivilian-deaths-afghanistan; “China Is Our Most Important Partner, Says Taliban, India Today,
September 3, 2021”, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/china-is-our-most-important-partnersays-taliban-1848950-2021-09-03.
32 Iftikhar A. Khan, “CPEC Will Be Extended to Afghanistan as Trilateral Cooperation Set to Deepen,
Dawn, May 9, 2023”, https://www.dawn.com/news/1751728.
33 Arif Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Barriers and Impact, Washington DC: USIP,
October 2017, pp. 49-50; Adnan Aamir, “China’s Efforts to Speed up Belt and Road in Pakistan Falters,
Nikkei Asia, September 16, 2019”, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/China-s-effortsto-speed-up-Belt-and-Road-in-Pakistan-falters; Adnan Aamir, “Rural Pakistan Voices Dissatisfaction

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between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and multiple Pakistani political parties.34
Moreover, China has promoted pro-CPEC narratives in Pakistan via an extensive networkof news media, think tanks, and NGOs.35 For example, China’s state-owned Xinhua news
agency signed cooperation agreements with Pakistani media outlets in December 2019.36
Similar measures have been documented in other small- and medium-sized South Asian
countries, although the entire picture of China’s efforts in the region remains unclear.37
China has offered various scholarships and fellowships; invited policymakers, academics,
and journalists; subsidized Mandarin-language education; and established Confucius
Institutes in these countries. The CCP’s efforts to cultivate relationships with politicalparties in these countries are also notable. In Bangladesh, it has developed its relationshipwith both major parties, the ruling Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party.
Regarding Nepal, the CCP has interacted closely with the ruling Communist Party of
Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist), while Beijing has reached out to other Nepali politicalparties as well. China’s close relationship with the Rajapaksa family in Sri Lanka is wellknown, but Beijing has diversified its outreach there as well, courting opposition andgovernment officials. 38 In Afghanistan, China previously interacted with both the
democratic government in Kabul and the Taliban,39 which yielded dividends after thelatter’s takeover in 2021.
The COVID-19 pandemic served as an opportunity for Beijing to enhance its credentials
through health diplomacy. Beginning with shipping rapid test kits to Bangladesh in
February 2020, Beijing sent medical items including test kits and dispatched medical
experts to South Asian countries, and provided financial relief to alleviate the economic
pressure caused by COVID-related lockdowns. Additionally, China held virtual meetings
with South Asian states to enhance coordination in combating the pandemic, albeit

over Belt & Road, Nikkei Asia, December 31, 2018”, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-andRoad/Rural-Pakistan-voices-dissatisfaction-over-Belt-Road.
34 Sherry Rehman, “CPEC 2.0: The Promise and the Peril, Dawn, September 8, 2019”, https://www.
dawn. com/ news/1502790.
35 Aamir, op. cit., “China’s Efforts to Speed up Belt and Road in Pakistan Falters”.
36 Adnan Aamir, “Xinhua Begins Pakistan Language Service to Push Belt and Road, Nikkei Asia,
January 4, 2020”, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Xinhua-begins-Pakistan-languageservice-to-push-Belt-and-Road.
37 The following description about China’s outreach toward stakeholders in small and medium-sizedSouth Asian nations in this section are based on Pal, op. cit., pp. 9-21, unless noted otherwise.
38 Samantha Custer, et. al., “Silk Road Diplomacy: Deconstructing Beijing’s Toolkit to Influence Southand Central Asia, Williamsburg: AidData at William & Mary, December 10, 2019, pp. 26-27.
39 Vanda Felbab-Brown, A BRI (dge) Too Far: The Unfulfilled Promise and Limitations of China’s
Involvement in Afghanistan, Washington DC: Brookings Institution, June 2020, pp. 4-6.

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[Kurita]without the participation of India, Bhutan, and the Maldives.40 Chinese vaccines havebeen provided to all small- and medium-sized countries in the region.41

THE REALITY OF CHINA’S INFLUENCE IN SOUTH ASIA
There is no doubt that, as Beijing has ramped up its engagement with small- and mediumsized South Asian states, China’s influence in the region has increased, at least in theeconomic realm. In theory, economic influence can be translated into political influence
to achieve strategic gains, especially in the case of asymmetrical economic
interdependencies.
Since the introduction of the BRI, several notable developments have been observed thatapparently indicate that China intends to expand its political influence in South Asia. For
example, Sri Lanka received the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine port
call to its Colombo port twice in 2014, followed by the effective confiscation of the
Hambantota port by a Chinese company in 2017. In May 2017, the CCP-run Global Timespublished an article suggesting that “given the massive investment” made, Beijing “has avested interest in helping resolve regional conflicts including the dispute over Kashmir
between India and Pakistan”—even though Delhi has vehemently objected to any thirdparty involvement in this dispute. 42 When the confrontation between the Maldivian
Supreme Court and the pro-China President Yameen developed into a political crisis in
2018, raising the possibility of Indian intervention, the Chinese government issued a

40 Priyanka Tanwar, S.S. Bindra, and Nisar Ul Haq, “China’s Vaccine Diplomacy in South Asia:

Geopolitical Perspective”, Asian Journal of Pharmaceutics, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January-March 2023), p.
35.
41 “Pakistan Has Received 4.06 Million Doses of Covid Vaccines So Far, The Express Tribune¸ May
2, 2021”, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2297910/pakistan-has-received-406-million-doses-of-covid-va
ccines-so-far; “Bangladesh, Sri Lanka Receive New Batches of Chinese COVID-19 Vaccines, Xinhua,
September 19, 2021”, http://www.news.cn/english/2021-09/19/c_1310197282.htm; “China-donated
COVID-19 Vaccines Handed over to Afghanistan, Xinhua, June 13, 2021”,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-06/13/c_1310005186.htm; “China Donates 200,000 Dosesof Sinopharm Vaccine to the Maldives, Government of Maldives, March 25, 2021”,
https://www.gov.mv.en/news-and-communications/china-donates-200000-doses-of-sinopharm-vacc
ine-to-the-maldives: “4.4 mln Doses of Chinese COVID-19 Vaccines Arrive in Nepal, Xinhua,
September 19, 2021”, http:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/asiapacific/2021-09/19/c_1310197917.htm; Elizabeth Roche, “China Sends 50,000 Doses of Sinopharm COVID Vaccines to Bhutan, Mint, July
15, 2021”, https://www.livemint.com/news/world/china-sends-50-000-doses-of-sinopharm-covid-vac
cines-to-bhutan-11626337840042.html.
42 Hu Weijia, “China Ready to Play a Greater Role in Resolving Conflicts in South & Southeast Asia,
Global Times, May 2, 2017”, retrieved via Factiva.

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91

statement to urge non-interference in the internal affairs of the Maldives, in parallel withhaving a PLAN fleet enter the East Indian Ocean.43
These developments have naturally prompted a reaction from India, as Delhi considers
itself as the leader of South Asia and regards the region as under its sphere of influence.
India made its opposition to the BRI clear in May 2017 by rejecting Beijing’s invitation
to the first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. Officially, this rejection
was linked to its concerns about the CPEC, which encompasses projects in Pakistani
Kashmir, over which India claims sovereignty, and the BRI’s lack of conformity withinternational standards in development cooperation. However, reportedly, Delhi’s
rejection was driven by India’s broader strategic concerns as well: the BRI, which would
lead to an increase in China’s economic and political influence in South Asia, would
eventually threaten India’s leading position in South Asia.44 As a result, India has sought
to counter China’s influence in the region by strengthening its own engagement withneighboring countries (except for Pakistan) and deepening partnerships with external
powers, such as the United States and Japan.
However, it is questionable whether China’s increased economic influence in the region
has translated into political influence. In this regard, the state of China’s security
cooperation with South Asian countries is notable.
As mentioned earlier, China has a close and longstanding military partnership withPakistan, which has further deepened in recent years.45 It also has a decades-old security
cooperation with Bangladesh centered on arms transfers from China and joint exercises.46
That said, these partnerships date back to the pre-BRI period.
Beijing has had limited success in leveraging its increased economic clout to deepen its
security partnership with other small- and medium-sized South Asian nations. As Nilanthi
Samaranayake of the US Center for Naval Analysis points out, China’s military
cooperation with Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Nepal, and Bhutan remains at a nascent stage,
being far more limited than the close relationships India has developed with these nations
43 “Chinese Warships Enter East Indian Ocean amid Maldives Tension, Reuters, February 28, 2018”,

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-maldives-politics-china-idUSKCN1G40V9.
44 C. Raja Mohan, “Network Is the Key, Indian Express, May 9, 2017”, https://indianexpress.com/
article/opinion/columns/network-is-the-key-4646728/.
45 Regarding the recent development of Sino-Pakistan security relations, see, Sameer P. Lalwani, A
Threshold Alliance: The China-Pakistan Military Relationship, Washington DC: USIP, March 2023.
46 Anu Anwar, “China-Bangladesh Relations: A Three Way Balance between China, India and the US,
Mercator Institute for China Studies, August 18, 2022”, https://merics.org/en/china-bangladeshrelations-three-way-balance-between-china-india-and-us.

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[Kurita]in the security realm. China’s military cooperation with these countries is largely limited
to education for their military officers and elementary joint drills, and the Sagarmatha
Friendship with Nepal is the only regularized exercise.47 The only case of China’s majorarms transfer to these countries since the 2010s was the donation of a second-hand frigate
to Sri Lanka, announced in 2018, which “was a reminder of how much China’s defense
hardware cooperation had fallen off with Sri Lanka”.48
The PLAN submarine’s port calls to Colombo in 2014 raised eyebrows in India, but sincethen, Chinese submarines have not made another port call there.49 The docking of a PLAN
surveillance vessel to the Hambantota port in August 2022 entailed a behind-the-scenes
tussle between Beijing and Delhi, between which the Sri Lankan government wascaught. 50 Hambantota and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port have been seen since the 2000s as
commercial ports that will eventually be converted into naval facilities for the PLAN.
However, no concrete evidence has emerged to date that suggests China is indeed setting
up a naval base there.
In terms of political gains, China is said to have had success in securing what is criticalfor China but not a huge concession for the regional states, such as their endorsement of
Beijing’s One China policy.51 Also, South Asian nations were not forthcoming in aligningwith India’s condemnation of China in the wake of the Galwan Valley clash in June
2020.52 Although not directly related to this incident, an official of the Maldives Ibrahim
Mohamed Solih government once mentioned in an interview that, due to Beijing’s
financial leverage, they are reluctant to criticize China directly.53
47 Nilanthi Samaranayake, China’s Engagement with Smaller South Asian Countries , Washington DC:

USIP, April 2019, pp. 4-13. This exercise, which had begun in 2017, was last held in 2019. See, Huang
Panyue, “China-Nepal ‘Mt. Everest Friendship 2019’ Special Forces Joint Training Kicks Off, China
Military Online, August 30, 2019”, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/MOOTW/CounterTerrorism/News_209173/16001346.html.
48 Samaranayake, op. cit., p. 8. During the civil war in Sri Lanka, which lasted until 2009, China wasa major arms provider to the country.
49 It is reported that Sri Lanka rejected another request from China for a port call of its submarine.
Shihar Aneez and Ranga Sirilal, “Sri Lanka Rejects Chinese Request for Submarine Visit, Reuters,
May 11, 2017”, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-china-submarine-idUSKBN1871P9.
50 Anjana Pasricha, “Chinese Ship Docks in Sri Lanka, Causing Diplomatic Tensions, Voice ofAmerica, August 16, 2022”, https://www.voanews.com/a/chinese-ship-docks-in-sri-lanka-causingdiplomatic-tensions-/6703390.html.
51 Samantha Custer, China’s Influence in South and Central Asia, Testimony before the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, May 12, 2022, p. 10.
52 Tarushi Aswani, “How India’s Tilted Foreign Policy Paved China’s Road to South Asia, London
School of Economics, September 20, 2021”, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2021/09/20/how-indiastilted-foreign-policy-paved-chinas-road-to-south-asia/.
53 Custer, et. al., op. cit., p. 32.

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However, barring the takeover of the Hambantota port, it is difficult to identify anoccasion when China leveraged its influence to force small or medium-sized South Asian
countries into significant political concessions. 54 Meanwhile, albeit anecdotally, somenotable events have demonstrated the limitations of China’s political influence in theregion. The Maldives under the Solih government largely kept a distance from the BRI,55
although this stance seems to be changing under the new Muizzu government that cameinto power in November 2023. When the Chinese ambassador to Bangladesh warned
Dhaka not to join the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the foreign minister of Bangladesh
responded sharply, emphasizing “we decide our foreign policy”.56 The Nepal parliament
approved the US Millenium Challenge Corporation grant agreement in early 2022,
notwithstanding the fact that Beijing had reportedly tried to foil the agreement.57 Despite
Beijing courting the Taliban-dominated new Afghan government since August 2021,
anti-China Uighur militants, such as the East-Turkistan Islamic Movement, are said tohave expanded their activities in Afghanistan.58 In the country, the Islamic State Khorasan
Province has also targeted Chinese interests.59 Even in Pakistan, China was unable toprevent the Pakistan Army from deposing Nawaz Sharif—Beijing’s trusted partner in
implementing the CPEC—from power in 2017, and the CPEC encountered serious
difficulties under the new Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government.60
In this context, South Asian observers widely opine that, notwithstanding China’s
increasing economic clout in South Asia, there are clear limitations to Beijing’s politicalinfluence over small- and medium-sized countries in the region. There is also a consensus
that such limitations exist largely because of India’s presence as a regional hegemon.
Even though small- and medium-sized regional states have occasionally resented India’s
interference in their affairs and played the China card to resist pressure from Delhi, these
54 It is debatable even whether taking over Hambantota in such a manner was what Beijing had hopedfor.
55 Miller, op. cit., p. 20.
56 Syful Islam, “Bangladesh Hits Back after China Envoy Warns against Joining Quad, Nikkei Asia,
May 11, 2021”, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Bangladesh-hits-back-afterChina-envoy-warns-against-joining-Quad.
57 Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Smaller South Asian Countries and the US Indo-Pacific Strategy at One
Year”, Asia Pacific Bulletin, Vol. 642 (May 21, 2023), p. 2.
58 “United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 25 May 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council
Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1988 (2011) Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, S/2022/419, May 26, 2022”, pp. 20-21, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3975071.
59 Zia Ur Rehman, “ISIS-K Attack in Kabul Compounds China’s Insurgency Headaches, Nikkei Asia,
December 18, 2022”, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Terrorism/ISIS-K-attack-in-Kabul-compoundsChina-s-insurgency-headaches.
60 Andrew Small, Returning to the Shadows: China, Pakistan, and the Fate of CPEC, Washington
DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, September 2020, pp. 41-47.

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[Kurita]countries (except for Pakistan) have had wide-ranging, well-entrenched ties with Delhi
that are far more significant than their relations with Beijing. 61 As pointed out by ananalyst, these countries are aware of the risks of seriously infringing upon India’s
interests.62

THE DECLINING APPEAL OF THE BRI
In addition to the limitations of China’s political influence, what is noteworthy is thepossibility that a series of events in 2022 may have lessened the appeal of China’s
economic engagement. Signs of such a trend had already emerged in the late 2010s. The
effective confiscation of the Hambantota port by a Chinese company in 2017 sent
shockwaves throughout South Asia, as well as globally. As Pakistan’s chronic balance of
payments issues resurfaced in late 2017 and gradually worsened, Islamabad failed to gain
enough financial assistance from Beijing to avert a crisis and had to request a bailout fromthe International Monetary Fund (IMF). 63 This experience nudged Pakistan towardmending its relations with the United States, reportedly pledging that “no country would
be allowed to use [Gwadar] for naval purposes”.64
That said, the events in South Asia in 2022 had more serious implications for the
reputation of the BRI and China’s economic engagement. The Sri Lankan economy wasmarred by policy mismanagement and external shocks, such as the global lockdown andthe economic ramifications of the Ukraine war; as a result, it faced the worst economiccrisis in its history in 2022. Amid fiscal and current account deficits and hyperinflation,
the country experienced severe shortage of fuel and food, and requested an IMF bailout;
finally, it fell into default for the first time. As the crisis deepened, the Prime Minister andPresident, both of whom hail from the Rajapaksa family close to China, were forced toresign.65
Pakistan, which had been struggling to deal with ballooning liabilities from CPEC energy
projects since 2021, was ravaged economically in 2022 by the hike in commodity prices
due to the Ukraine War and massive flooding in the summer. Thus, Pakistan had to relyon the 39-month IMF program agreed upon in 2019 to meet its external financial
these views, see, Samaranayake, op. cit., China’s Engagement with Smaller South AsianCountries, pp. 3-4, 15-16; see also, Pal, op. cit., p. 3; Custer et. al., op. cit., pp. 38-39.
62 Samaranayake, op. cit., China’s Engagement with Smaller South Asian Countries, pp. 15-16.
63 Masahiro Kurita, “How Far Away from Non-interference? A Case Study of China’s Development
Initiative in Pakistan”, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 31, No. 134 (2022), pp. 296-297.
64 Small, op. cit., p. 50.
65 Tamanna Salikuddin, “Five Things to Know about Sri Lanka’s Crisis, USIP, July 15, 2022”,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/07/five-things-know-about-sri-lankas-crisis.
61 On

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requirements, but negotiations for phased disbursement with the IMF, which was
frustrated by Pakistan’s failure to conform to the conditions of the bailout, were far fromsmooth. 66 The IMF’s demand included the rationalization of CPEC-related debts to
Chinese power producers, which Beijing has been reluctant to accept.67
The crisis even reached Bangladesh, which had been seen as an economic success story
in South Asia in recent years unlike Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Bangladesh faced thedwindling of foreign exchange reserves and a hike in the prices of fuel, food, and othernecessities, leading to a request to the IMF for a $4.5 billion loan package, although themove was viewed as a precautionary step to prevent a full-blown crisis.68
Objectively, although the BRI—its unviable development projects in particular—is atleast partially to blame, it is unfair to attribute the economic ordeals of these countries
entirely to China’s engagement. Their misguided economic policies are responsible aswell, especially in Pakistan, to which the IMF has provided 22 loans so far. Further, allthree nations were affected by external economic shocks caused by the pandemic and thewar in Ukraine.
Nonetheless, given China’s substantial economic involvement in these countries, it canbe reasonably assumed that the appeal of China’s economic engagement under the BRI
has been negatively affected by this turn of events. The incumbent finance minister ofBangladesh stated, referring to the BRI, “Everybody will be thinking twice to agree tothis project”.69 In addition, Beijing’s response may also have dented its credentials as a
generous economic partner. While China has provided financial assistance to Pakistan
during the ongoing crisis, 70 Beijing has consistently been unwilling to accommodate
Islamabad’s requests to restructure debts from CPEC power projects and revise their

66 Zarar Khan, “IMF Agrees to $3 Billion Bailout for Pakistan, The Diplomat, June 30, 2023”,

https://thediplomat.com/2023/06/imf-agrees-to-3-billion-bailout-for-pakistan/.
67 Mifrah Haq, “Pakistan and China Hail ‘Brotherhood’, But IMF Terms Spell Friction, Nikkei Asia,
September 17, 2022”, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Pakistan-and-Chinahail-brotherhood-but-IMF-terms-spell-friction.
68 “Inflation, Unrest Challenge Bangladesh’s ‘Miracle Economy’, Voice of America, September 23,2022”, https://www.voanews.com/a/inflation-unrest-challenge-bangladesh-miracle-economy/676014
1.html.
69 Benjamin Parkin, “Bangladesh’s Finance Minister Warns on Belt and Road Loans from China,
Financial Times, August 9, 2022”, https://www.ft.com/content/65632129-dd75-4f23-b9c4-9c049684
0a54.
70 Farhan Bokhari, “Chinese Banks Lend Pakistan $2.3 Bn to Avert Foreign Exchange Crisis,
Financial Times, June 25, 2022”, https://www.ft.com/content/6250c214-cfdc-4b4f-85b3-876666d01ff
4; “China Rolls over $1billion Loan to Pakistan amid IMF Uncertainty, Pakistan Observer, June 16,2023”, https://pakobserver.net/china-rolls-over-1billion-loan-to-pakistan-amid-imf-uncertainty/.

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contracts.71 Unlike in the past, in 2022, China was not forthcoming in assisting Sri Lanka,
and its reluctance to agree to the debt restructuring requested by the Sri Lankan
government caused a delay in negotiations between Colombo and the IMF.72
This does not suggest that China’s economic influence in South Asia has suddenly begun
to wane—an unlikely scenario given its significant economic clout and presence in theregion. However, it can be inferred that it has become more difficult than before for
Beijing to expand its influence over small- and medium-sized South Asian countries, notonly in the political realm but also in the economic realm. This is all the more true as
India has attempted to regain its influence through its active efforts to save Sri Lanka
from economic crisis.73

CONCLUSION
This study focuses on China’s influence in South Asia, especially over small- andmedium-sized countries in the region, and addresses two questions. First, what kind ofengagement has China conducted toward these nations? Second, what are the tangible
results of this increase in engagement in terms of China’s influence?
As a semi-regional state, China has longstanding and diverse relations with South Asian
nations, including infrastructure development cooperation in Sri Lanka and Pakistan thatbegan as early as the 2000s. After the launch of the BRI, China significantly expanded
economic engagement, in parallel with diversifying its field of engagement, such asreaching out directly to important stakeholders within the respective countries.
While these efforts have resulted in an increase in China’s economic influence in SouthAsia, it is questionable whether this has led to a concomitant increase in political influence.
Rather, there are clear limitations in Beijing’s political influence over the small- andmedium-sized countries in the region. Apart from its traditional partnerships withPakistan and Bangladesh, Beijing has had limited success in deepening security
cooperation with other small- and medium-sized South Asian nations, even as it has
ramped up its economic engagement with them. It remains a rare occurrence in South
Asia where China actually leverages its influence to force these states into significant
71 Haq, op. cit.
72 Harsh V. Pant and Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, “South Asian Nations Get Back to Reality,

Observer Research Foundation, March 17, 2023”, https://www.orfonline.org/research/south-asiannations-get-back-to-reality/.
73 Tanya Anand, “Can India Contain China’s Influence in South Asia? Nepal Institute for International
Cooperation and Engagement, September 11, 2022”, https://niice.org.np/archives/8255.

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political concessions. Moreover, the economic woes of Sri Lanka, Pakistan, andBangladesh in 2022, along with Beijing’s response to the crises, may have lessened
China’s appeal as an economic partner in the region.
Although it has not been historically a region of geopolitical priority for Beijing, China
has made significant efforts in South Asia in terms of economic engagement over the past
decade compared to other regions. The current status of China’s overall influence in South
Asia is worthy of attention when considering the reality of China’s economic and politicalinfluence in general.

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CHAPTER 8

The Sino-Indian Border Conflict and Current Limits to
Chinese Influence in India
Oscar Almén
On June 15, 2020, deadly violence broke out between Chinese and Indian troops in the
Galwan Valley, a disputed border area in the Himalayas. The resultant deaths were thefirst in the border conflict since 1975 and they led to a sharp deterioration in relations
between the two nations. Three years later, the situation remains tense with substantial
numbers of troops on both sides of the border. While it is in China’s interest to improve
relations with India, both sides’ hardline position on the border issue makes such an
outcome somewhat unlikely. Instead, as also noted by Chinese analysts, this borderconflict has led India to strengthen its ties with the US, making China’s position in theSouth Asian region rather more fraught. The border conflict with India constitutes aproblem for Beijing in its efforts to strengthen its relationship with, and influence in India.

INTRODUCTION
The border conflict originates in disagreements over where both the historical territorial
border and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) are located, that is, where the line runs that
denotes where each side exercises control since the border war of 1962. 1 Currently, theborder issue is far from a solution and at some positions along the border, troops havestill not disengaged more than three years after the Galwan Valley clash. 2 Both sides have
moved a large number of troops to the border and strengthened the infrastructure in thearea. While China has an advantage over India in terms of its greater military strength,
however, the regional security environment does not necessarily work in China’s favor.
For China, India’s rapprochement with the US is the biggest worry as it threatens tochange the balance of power between China and India which was previously tilted in
1 B.R. Deepak, India and China: Beyond the Binary of Friendship and Enmity, New Delhi, Springer,

2020. p. 64.
2 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “India-China Relations: Still Bogged Down, Observer Research
Foundation, May 3, 2023”, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-china-relations-still-boggeddown/.

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China’s favor. China, therefore, tries to some extent to stress its similarities with India as
ancient Asian civilizations with common global interests as an attempt to improve SinoIndian relations. By strengthening relations with India, China hopes to erode India’s
increasingly strong ties to the US. At the same time, there are no signs that China isbacking down in the border conflict and the existing conditions for achieving improved
relations with India are quite poor. In this sense at least, China’s hardline position on theborder issue only serves to push India closer to the US.
The objective of this chapter is to provide a background to clarify what the border conflictis about, give a current picture of the parties’ positions, and analyze how the Chinese
government and Chinese analysts view the border conflict and the ongoing relationshipwith India. Finally, the chapter discusses how the border conflict might affect China’s
potential influence in India. The study is based on Chinese and English-language research
literature, extant analysis from think tanks and media reports, and official statements fromboth the Chinese and Indian governments.

BRIEF BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT SITUATIONThe border between China and India has been subject to conflict since 1962 when a shortlived border war broke out. After that war, relations were very strained and several minor
conflicts broke out periodically until 1975. The situation improved somewhat during the
1980s and 1990s in connection with China’s opening to the outside world and attendantefforts to resolve some of the border conflicts that existed with neighboring countries,
and between 1993 and 2005, progress was made in negotiations. Among other things, it
was decided in 1996 that firearms could not be fired within two kilometers of the LAC.3
In recent years, as both countries have grown in power and influence, tensions between
them have increased once again. Both Xi Jinping, who came to power in China in 2012,
and Narendra Modi, who was elected as Prime Minister of India in 2014, have clarified
their countries’ great power ambitions and further fueled the nationalist mood. It was
during this time that the border situation worsened again. In both 2013 and 2014, there
were incidents where Chinese and Indian troops confronted each other. In 2017, a serious
conflict arose between Chinese and Indian troops in the disputed area of Doklam between
China and Bhutan, which, historically, has had close military cooperation with India.
Chinese troops had started building a road in the area, whereupon India sent armed troops
to Bhutan to stop the construction. After just over two months, both sides left the area and3 Deepak, op. cit.

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China stopped the road construction that it had begun. 4 From the Chinese side, theconfrontation in Doklam was perceived as Indian aggression and both sides subsequently
increased their troop presence and greatly increased the construction of military
infrastructure along the border area, and China has more than doubled the number of air
bases and air defense installations within the operational range of the LAC since 2017.5

Map of the Contested Areas in the Sino-Indian Border Conflict

THE CLASH IN THE GALWAN VALLEY
The Galwan Valley is located in the western part of the border region in what India calls
Ladakh. It is part of the larger Kashmir region, which is the subject of ongoing conflict
between Pakistan, India, and China. For a long time, India and China had been building
Rory Medcalf, “Doklam: Who won? The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, August 31, 2017”,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/doklam-who-won.
5 Arzan Tarapore, “The Crisis after the Crisis: How Ladakh will Shape India’s Competition with
China”, Lowy Institute Analysis, May 2021, p. 9.
4

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infrastructure and moving troops into the area. Both sides argued that the opponents’
infrastructure construction crossed the LAC.6 According to Indian observers, the conflictbegan with Chinese troops occupying several posts along the LAC in Ladakh in April
2020. When India resisted on May 5, scuffles broke out and a large number of soldiers
were injured. Talks were then held between the respective commanders to cease theconfrontation and both sides agreed that a Chinese camp located on the Indian side of the
LAC would then be dismantled. Later, on June 15, an Indian delegation went toinvestigate the camp, which eventually led to a new confrontation. Fighting broke out inseveral places with a total of over 300 soldiers involved, using stones and spiked stakes,
among other things. The fighting lasted for five hours and when it ended, 20 Indiansoldiers were dead, including the commanding officer, Colonel Babu. Data on the numberof dead Chinese soldiers differ somewhat. According to the Indian side, the bodies of 16
Chinese soldiers were handed over after the fighting.7 Many believe it is likely that thetrue number of casualties was much higher than the number officially accepted by China.8
Only in February 2021 did the Chinese side provide the information that four soldiers had
died in the fighting.9
The spokesman for China’s Western Military Command, Colonel Zhang Shuili, issued astatement the day after the fighting blaming the Indian army for “breaking its promiseand once again breaching the LAC”. It is also clear from the statement that China
considers the entire Galwan Valley to have always been Chinese territory. 10 Chinese
media reported extensively but followed the official Chinese narrative of the incident
closely, laying all the blame on the Indian side, which was described as having carriedout a planned provocative act while the Chinese troops acted in self-defense and exercised

6 Yan Sun, “China’s Strategic Assessment of the Ladakh Clash, War on the Rocks, June 2020”,

https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-the-ladakh-clash/.
7 Shiv Aroor, “3 Separate Brawls, ‘Outsider’ Chinese Troops & More: Most Detailed Account of the
Brutal June 15 Galwan Battle, India Today, June 21, 2020”, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/ 3separate-brawls-outsider-chinese-troops-more-most-detailed-account-of-the-brutal-june-15-galwanbattle-1691185-2020-06-21.
8 According to Indian Lt. Gen. YK Joshi, at least 45 Chinese soldiers died in the fighting. See, Shreya
Dhoundial, “Exclusive: India Has Not Ceded Land; China Has Just Earned a Bad Name; At Least 45
Chinese Soldiers Were Killed, Says Lt Gen YK Joshi, CNN-News18, February17, 2021”, https://www.news18.com/news/india/exclusive-india-has-not-ceded-land-china-has-just-earned-a-bad-name-atleast-45-chinese-soldiers-were-killed-3444080.html.
9 Steven Lee Meyers, “China Acknowledges 4 Deaths in Last Year’s Border Clash with India, NewYork Times, February 19, 2021”, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/19/world/asia/china-india-clash.
html.
10 新华社（Xinhua News Agency）, “张水利大校就中印边阘人列位加勒万河谷地场手机发表发动 (The Spokesman for the Western Theatre Command, Colonel Zhang Shuili, Did One Statement
about the Conflict between Chinese and Indian Border Guards in Galwan Valley Area), June 16, 2020”,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-06/16/c_1126122358.htm.

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great self-restraint. 11 According to Lin Minwang, a researcher at the Institute ofInternational Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, most of the deaths on the Indianside were, in reality, caused by their inability to provide prompt treatment to the injured.12
Only in February 2021, in an article in the People’s Liberation Army Daily, where dataon the Chinese deaths were mentioned for the first time, was the Chinese account of theevent described in more detail. There, the heroic effort of the Chinese troops against agreater number of foreign troops was presented. It described how the Chinese troops, led
by the commander, Qi Fabao, who was himself wounded in the fighting, managed to holdtheir ground against the opponents until reinforcements arrived. They were then able topush back the foreign troops from the “territory of the motherland”. The four Chinese
soldiers killed were the portrayed as martyrs.13
The view among Chinese analysts was also that the Indians caused the dispute. The China
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) is a think tank attached to the
Ministry of State Security (国安部) which is close to the decision-makers in Beijing.14 Hu
Shisheng, director of the South Asia Institute at CICIR and one of China’s foremost
experts on relations with India, claims in an article that India carried out a surprise attack
at night and that it was the careless actions of the Indian commander that caused thefighting. He further argues that the conflict in the Galwan Valley was welcomed by Modi
because it shifted the focus away from his domestic political concerns.15 Lou Chunhao, aresearcher at the same institute, believes that the reason why Indian soldiers dared toviolate the LAC and provoked China has its basis in Modi’s nationalist policy, which
often involves more risk-taking diplomacy.16

11 LiuXuanzun and Liu Xin, “China Urges India to Restrain, Global Times, June 16, 2020”,
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202006/1191837.shtml.
12 林民旺(Lin Minwang), “中国起初的沉默，使用是想经单业时间，设后自己冷静这个(China’sFirst Silence Was Just for to Give India Time to Calm down), observeGuancha, June 20, 2020”,
https://www.guancha.cn/LinMingWang/2020_06_20_554839.shtml.
13 王天益(Wang Tianyi), “英雄广立喀喇昆仑:走近新时代卫国戍边的英雄官兵(Heroes Stands in
Karakoram-Heroic Officers and Troops Approaching the Limits for to Defend the Country in the New
One Era), 解放日报(People’s Liberation Army Daily), February 19, 2021”, http://military.people.com.
cn/n1/2021/0219/c1011-32031261.html/.
14 Mathieu Duchatel, “The Border Clashes with India: In the Shadow of the US, China Trends,
February 2021”, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/publications/china-trends-8-military-optionsxis- strategic ambitions.
15 Hu Shisheng and Wang Jue, “The Behavioral Logic of India’s Tough Foreign Policy towards China”,
CIR, September/October 2020.
16 楼春豪 (Lou Chunhao), “南京对华政策的电影与中国电影支件反思(Changes in India’s China
Policy and China’s Policy Reflection)”, 南亚研究电影， South Asian Studies Communication,
February 2, 2021.

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DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE FIGHTING IN GALWAN
It is clear that both sides paint the opponent as the aggressor and explain their actions as
self-defense. The deaths stirred strong emotions and led to a mobilization of troops along
the LAC, and both China and India stationed 50–60,000 troops each around the border in
Ladakh.17 There are also reports that in 2020 China started building new villages along
the LAC, thus trying to make the Chinese demands and presence an unalterable fact. 18
The deadly fighting led the Indian army to change its rules and now allow border troops
to use firearms when they deem it necessary, which is something Chinese analysts havewarned, will worsen the situation. 19 Warning shots were fired by the Indian army inAugust and September 2020. In August 2020, Indian troops also fortified several strategic
heights near Pangong Lake Tso, which to an extent strengthened India’s tactical
position.20
Relations also deteriorated in other areas. India warned that economic relations would be
adversely affected, and from September 2020, the government further banned 267
Chinese apps such as TikTok and WeChat in batches from being used in the country. The
justification was that they were “harmful to India’s sovereignty and integrity, India’s
defense, state security and public order”.21 However, despite this, trade between China
and India has been booming and in 2022 reached a record US$ 136 billion of which morethan 100 billion was made up of Chinese exports to India.22 In 2018–2019, trade had stoodat around US$ 90 billion.23

17 Krishn Kaushik, “Next India-China military Talks on January 12, Indian Express, January 8, 2022”,

https://indianexpress.com/article/india/next-india-china-military-talks-on-january-12-7712423/.
18 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Did China Create New Facts on the Ground Along the LAC with
India?” The Diplomat, November 12, 2021.
19 Hu and Wang, op. cit., p. 62; Lin. op. cit.
20 Tarapore, op. cit.
21 “India Permanently Bans TikTok and 58 Other Chinese Apps, Nikkei Asia, January 26, 2021”,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/India-permanently-bans-TikTok-and-58-other-Chineseapps; Duchatel, op. cit.
22 “India-China Trade Climbs to USD 135.98 Billion in 2022, Trade Deficit Crosses USD 100 Billion
for the first time, The Economic Times, January 13, 2023”, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new
s/economy/foreign-trade/india-china-trade-climbs-to-usd-135-98-billion-in-2021-trade-deficit-crosses-usd-100-billion-for-the-first-time/articleshow/96969775.cms; Anath Krishnan, “India’s Trade with
China Set to exceed $100 Billion in 2021, The Hindu, October 13, 2021”,
https://www.thehindu.com/business/indias-trade-with-china-set-to-exceed-100-billion-in-2021/articl
e36991136.ece.
23 “India China Bilateral Trade Makes Steady Growth in 2019, DD News, January 15, 2020”,
https://ddnews.gov.in/business/india-china-bilateral-trade%C2%A0continue%C2%A0-make-steadygrowth.

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At the same time, talks and negotiations have been carried out continuously. The politicalleadership of both China and India expressed their desire to see a de-escalation of theconflict. In a meeting in Moscow in September 2020, the two foreign ministers agreed ona five-point plan which involved maintaining an open dialogue and implementing
confidence-building measures.24 After several rounds of fruitless talks, China suddenly
announced in February 2021 a phased troop withdrawal plan.25 By November 2021, bothsides had moved their troops back from most areas along the LAC, including the Galwan
Valley.26 However, by April 2023, troops had still not disengaged at the Depsang Plainsin Ladakh.27
In October 2021, China’s National People’s Congress, decided on a new land border law
that came into effect on January 1, 2022. The law is related to the conflict with India as it
is only Bhutan that, apart from India, has a disputed land border with China. The law
states, among other things, that citizens and civil institutions must support the Chinesearmy and the armed police forces in the defense of the border. India reacted strongly
against the law and warned China against using it as an excuse to change the situation at
the border.28 According to one observer, since China and India do not agree on where the
LAC lies, it may mean that it is China’s unilateral interpretation of it that will activate thelaw. The presence of Indian troops within what China considers as its territory would thenautomatically trigger the law, which could further increase the subsequent risk ofintervention by Chinese troops. 29
On the eastern side of the border too, tensions remain high. In December 2021, China
announced that it had standardized the names of 15 places in South Tibet (藏南 Zangnan),
24 “Joint Press Statement, Meeting of External Affairs Minister and Chinese Foreign Minister Ministryof External Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs, India, September 10, 2020”, https://mea.gov.in/press
releases.htm?dtl/32962/Joint_Press_Statement__Meeting_of_External_Affairs_Minister_and_the_Foreign_Minister_of_China_September_10_2020.
25 Vijaita Singh, “India, China Agree to Return to Pre-April 2020 Positions in Eastern Ladakh, The
Hindu, February 10, 2021”, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-china-agree-to-return-topre-april-2020-positions-in-eastern-ladakh/article33803617.ece.
26 Laura Zhou, “China and India Agree to Keep Working to Resolve Border Issue, South China
Morning Post, November 19, 2021”, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/ article/3156610/
china-and-india-agree-keep-working-resolving-border-dispute.
27 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “India-China Relations: Still Bogged Down, Observer Research
Foundation, May 3, 2023”, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-china-relations-still-bogged-dodown/.
28 Suhaisini Haidar, “Don’t Use New Law to Justify LAC Moves, India Tells China, The Hindu,
October 27, 2021”, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-criticises-china-for-new- countryborder-law/article37191680.ece.
29 Shuxian Luo, “China’s Land Border Law: A Preliminary Assessment, Brookings, November 4,2021”, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/11/04/chinas-land-border-law-a-preliminary-assessment/.

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which is China’s name for the part of Arunachal Pradesh claimed to belong to China. In
2017, China standardized the names of seven places in the area and yet another 11 places
were renamed in April 2023.30 China’s foreign ministry further said in 2021 that the sites
were within an area that had been Chinese territory since ancient times. 31 New Delhi
commented that invented names did not change the fact that Arunachal Pradesh has
always been a part of India.32
In December 2022 in Arunachal Pradesh Chinese and Indian troops again clashed in themost serious incident since the Galwan conflict. While no deaths were reported, the battle
was a setback in the efforts to improve relations between the two powers. Again, India
accused the Chinese of trying to “unilaterally change the status quo” while the Chineseside tried to downplay the significance of the fighting.
Although by April 2023, 18 corps-commander meetings had been held, which has led tolimited troop withdrawals from some of the tensest sites, both sides continue to build-up
permanent civilian and military infrastructure along the LAC. In the Galwan Valley, forinstance, China has built several military bases. This development does not bode well fora de-escalation of the border conflict.33

THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE BORDER DISPUTE
It may seem strange that so much energy and resources are spent on a border issue in a
virtually inaccessible area. To a great extent, the reasons why the border issue is so
important and intractable can be found far back in history.

30 Liu Caiyu and Cao Siqi, “China Standardizes Names of 15 More Places in Zangnan Based on

Sovereignty, History, Global Times, December 30, 2021”, http://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202112/
1243788.shtml. A list of the places and their names was published by the Ministry of Civil Affairs.
See, “Southern Tibet (Second Round), December 29, 2021”, http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/xw/tzgg/
202112/20211200038944.shtml; see also, Anjana Pasricha, “India China Military Standoff Enters
Fourth Year without Sign of Thaw, Voice of America China News, May 16, 2023”, https://www.voa
news.com/a/india-china-military-standoff-enters-fourth-year-without-sign-of-thaw/7095154.html.
31 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference on December 31, 2021,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China”, https://mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_
665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202112/t20211231_10478051.html.
32 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “China ‘Renames’ 15 Places in Arunachal to Buttress Claims, The
Economic Times, December 31, 2021”, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/chinarenames-15-places-in -arunachal-to-buttress-claims/articleshow/88599696.cms.
33 John Pollock and Damien Symon, “Are China and India Bound for Another Deadly Border Clash?
Chatham House, June 2, 2023”, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/202306/are-china-and-india-bound-another-deadly-border-clash; Nishant Rajeev and Alex Stephenson,“Why We Should All Worry about the China-India Border Dispute, US Institute of Peace, May 31,2023”, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/05/why-we-should-all-worry-about-china-india-border-dispute.

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The background to the disputed border can be explained by the fact that, historically, there
was no clearly defined border between the Chinese Qing Empire (1644–1912) andcolonial India in these inaccessible regions where the Chinese side is made up of Tibet.
China and India share a 400-mile-long border and the dispute concerns 13 different areas
along the border covering a total area of 125,000 km2, roughly the size of Greece. 34
British officials in the 19th century proposed a demarcation, with Aksai Chin as Indian
Territory. The eastern part of the disputed border concerns the Indian state of Arunachal
Pradesh. During a conference in 1913–14 in which Great Britain, Tibet and China wererepresented, the British negotiator Henry McMahon proposed a border, the so-called
McMahon Line. Britain and Tibet’s representatives signed an agreement that accepted
the McMahon Line as the border; however, China refused to sign the agreement.35
The 1950 Chinese occupation of Tibet and the construction of a road through Aksai Chinsparked tensions. In 1958, Indian Prime Minister Nehru raised the issue with his Chinesecounterpart Zhou Enlai. Zhou’s 1959 response declared for the first time that China
considered that the borders between India and China had never been determined. In thesame year, a failed Tibetan uprising led the Dalai Lama to flee to India.
China proposed negotiations on the demarcation and the withdrawal of both sides’ troops
from the LAC. India’s position was based on the internationally recognized demarcationin which Aksai Chin belongs to India. Later it emerged that China’s strategy was to gain
the Aksai Chin area in the west in exchange for recognizing the McMahon Line in theeast.36
In 1961, India advanced troops to posts in areas that China considered its territory. In
October 1962, China responded with a massive military operation along the Sino-Indian
border. The war lasted a month, resulting in over 700 Chinese and 3,000 Indian soldiersdead or missing.37 China is generally considered to have emerged victorious from thebattle. After the fighting, China withdrew its troops behind the line it claims is the LAC.
The role of Tibet is crucial to China’s view of the border with India. Hu Shisheng at
CICIR believes that Nehru attempted what the British never succeeded in, namely,
splitting Tibet from China to create a buffer zone between India and China and that this34 P.K. Chakravorty, “Sino-Indian War of 1962”, Indian Historical Review, Volume 44, Issue 2 (2017),

p. 288.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Bertil Lintner, China’s India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World, New Dehli, Oxford
University Press, 2020, p. 5.

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policy ultimately led to the 1962 war. 38 Both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai expressedsimilar views about India’s ambitions and after the Dalai Lama fled and set up agovernment-in-exile in India in 1959, their suspicions about India’s support for Tibet
were confirmed.39
Both China and India use historical documents and maps to assert their territorial claims
but since these borders are incompatible with each other, it is necessary for some form ofcompromise to take place for the border conflict to be resolved.

THE TWO GOVERNMENTS’ CLAIMSIn addition to the larger areas of Arunachal Pradesh in the east and Ladakh/Aksai Chin in
the west, there are several smaller disputed areas. There is already an agreement that thetroops should withdraw two kilometers behind the LAC. To de-escalate the conflict andavoid new battles, some type of agreement needs to be reached on where the troops will
withdraw from. The larger long-term territorial question is, thus, partly separated fromthe question of where the troops can be allowed to stand. It has become increasingly clearthat China’s demand is for the troops to be positioned based on how they stood after the
1962 war, while India’s demand is for the troops to be moved back to their positions in
April 2020 before the unrest in Ladakh started.40
The two sides also differ on how relations should be improved. China believes that theborder issue must be disconnected from other relations because it is so difficult to solve.
They want to focus first on economic and political relations and leave the border issue atthe status quo for now. This was, for a long time, a position that India also supported, but
in recent years, there has been a shift in the Indian attitude and this was strengthened after
the Galwan conflict. India now believes, on the contrary, that the border issue is decisiveand cannot be disconnected from relations in general. These positions emerged in a
meeting between Foreign Ministers Jaishankar and Wang Yi in July 2021 where
Jaishankar said the most important thing was first to resolve the remaining issues
concerning the western part of the LAC. Wang Yi said that the focus should be on
improving other aspects of relations first.41
38 Hu and Wang, op. cit., p. 55.
39 Manjeet S. Pardesi. “Explaining the Asymmetry in the Sino-Indian Strategic Rivalry”, Australian

Journal of International Affairs, Volume 75, Issue 3 (2021), p. 350.
40 Laura Zhou, “China and India Agree to Keep Working to Resolve Border Dispute, South China
Morning Post, November 19, 2021”, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3156610/
china-and-india-agree-keep-working-resolving-border-dispute.
41 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “China–India Foreign Ministers Meet in Dushanbe, The Diplomat,
July 16, 2021”, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/china-india-foreign-ministers-meet-in-dushanbe/.

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Chapter 8 — The Sino-Indian Border Conflict and Current Limits to Chinese Influencein India [Almén]Some Indian observers believe that China is prepared to recognize most of India’s claimsin the eastern part, in other words, the McMahon Line. The counter-demand would bethat India recognizes China’s claims in the western part. This would also have been themeaning of Zhou Enlai’s original position on the border issue presented in 1959. At thattime, the remaining disagreements were mainly about the details of drawing the border.42
However, the border conflict is closely linked to the issue of Tibet’s status, which further
complicates searching for a solution.43 There is great suspicion on the part of China of
India’s intentions regarding Tibet. The Indian government’s close relationship with theDalai Lama has enabled a vibrant Tibetan nationalism to be maintained, which has createdgreat irritation within the Chinese government. For China, the issue of Tibet is an issueof China’s existential security. Giving in on minor issues would risk leading to further
demands for Tibetan independence. In the western part, Aksai Chin is a strategic area thatis the only direct route between Xinjiang and Tibet, two ethnically sensitive areas. On the
one hand, in the eastern part, Arunachal Pradesh, lies Tawang, which is believed to be thebirthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama. To recognize Tawang as Indian would mean, de facto,that the Dalai Lama was born in Indian Territory. From India’s point of view, on the other
hand, the status of Arunachal Pradesh is non-negotiable.44

CHINA’S VIEW ON THE BORDER CONFLICT AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH
INDIA
Generally speaking, China perceives itself as the stronger party in the relationship with
India. China does not see India as an equal rival, mainly because of China’s superiority
in terms of economic, technological, and military capabilities.45 China’s GDP is morethan five times that of India’s and military spending is almost four times higher. 46 A
42 Deepak, op cit., p. 33; HS Panag, “China Has Taken LAC Clock Back to 1959: India Not in a

Position to Take Back Aksai Chin, The Print, October 8, 2020”, https://theprint.in/opinion/china-hastaken-lac-clock-back-to-1959-india-not-in-a-position-to-take-back-aksai-chin/519101/; Sutirtho Patranobis, “China Takes 1959 Line on Perception of LAC, Hindustan Times, September 29, 2020”,
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/china-takes-1959-line-on-perception-of-lac/story-jOeT
LuvyvsNy7gJXI.html.
43 Pardesi, op cit., p. 354.
44 Yan Sun, “China’s Strategic Assessment of the Ladakh Clash, War on the Rocks, June 19, 2020”,
https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-the-ladakh-clash/; Sameer Lalwani, Daniel Markey and Vikram Singh, “Another Clash on the India–China Border Underscores Risks
of Militarization, US Institute of Peace, December 2022,” p. 3.
45 Adhiraj Anand, “How Does China’s Military View India?” The Diplomat, October 2, 2021.
46 “World Military Spending Rises to Almost S2 Trillion in 2020, SIPRI, April 26, 2021”,
http://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2021/world-military-spending-rises-almost-2-trilion-2020;“Gross Domestic Product 2020, World Bank”, https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.

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recent opinion survey in China showed that Chinese respondents view India as having theleast global power among all the great powers, behind countries like Australia and Canada.
The survey also showed that respondents saw little potential for future collaboration with
India.47 For China, on the one hand, the US and Japan are the major rivals, while India is
indeed seen as a threat to Tibet, although not as a global, but as a regional power. For
India, on the other hand, China represents a major geopolitical threat.48
It is also clear that Chinese observers are most concerned about India’s strategiccooperation with the US as it greatly changes the balance of the China–India relationship.
All of China’s strained relations with neighbors are seen from the perspective that the US
is mobilizing other countries against China.49 In recent years, the US has strengthened the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in which India, Japan, and Australia are included.
India’s increasingly close cooperation with Australia and Japan is also something thatworries China.50 The Chinese government itself wants to manage all relations bilaterally
because that generally means that China is the stronger party. Many in China believe thatIndia, by allying itself with the US and together holding China back, is trying to get China
involved on two fronts and thereby force the Chinese military to spread its resources.51
According to Hu Shisheng and other Chinese analysts, Modi feels strengthened by thecooperation with the US and the Quad, which has made him more inclined to pursue an
offensive policy against China.52
Although China’s leadership displays great confidence in its military capabilities, it isclear that it believes that the current external relations in the region are to China’s
detriment. Chinese analysts, therefore, believe that it is in China’s interests to weaken US
security cooperation with India. China’s way of dealing with this is to try to improvebilateral relations with both the US and India, thereby weakening the basis of theircooperation which is the common perception of China as a rival. If relations with the US
can improve somewhat, it is less in the US’s interest to support India’s claims on China.
Liu Zongyi of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies expressed hope for this after
pdf.
47 “How China Sees the World in 2023, University of Alberta, China Institute, May 2023”,
https://www.ualberta.ca/china-institute/research/research-papers/2023/how-china-sees-world-220231/index.html.
48 Pardesi, op cit.
49 Oscar Almén, Johan Englund and Björn Ottosson, Great Power Perceptions: How China and the
US View Each Other on Political, Economic and Security Issues, Stockholm: FOI, 2021.
50 Lin Minwang, “China Should be Vigilant of India Becoming de facto ‘sixth eye’”, Global Times,
September 13, 2021.
51 Zheng Haiqi, “China-India Relations: How Different Perceptions Shape the Future, ISAS Insights,
No. 659, April 2021”, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/china-india-relations-how-different-percep
tions-chape-the-future/.
52 Hu and Wang, op. cit.; Lou Chunhao, op. cit.

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the meeting between Xi Jinping and Joe Biden in November 2021.53 However, hopes ofimprovements in the US–China relationship have since diminished.54
Similarly, China wants to strengthen ties with India by pointing out their common
interests. Chinese analysts like to highlight the similarities between China and India as
being two ancient eastern civilizations which are both undergoing a civilizational
renaissance (文明复兴) and which have common interests in reforming the international
order. 55 This commonality is manifest also in the fact that India participates in nonWestern multi-national organizations such as the China-initiated Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, as well as in the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS)
group, which China has put forward as an alternative to Western-dominated organizations
such as the International Monetary Fund and G7. Liu Zongyi, at the Shanghai Institutes
for International Studies, wrote that the successful BRICS meeting in August 2023 should
serve as a reminder to India to stop supporting the US and that China and India shouldshare interest in other developing countries.56 In a similar reasoning that emphasizes thecommon interests of China and India, Professor Hu Shisheng believes that it is thecolonial and, thus, the Western world order that caused the border conflict between China
and India.57 Chinese observers hope that India will stick to its strategic autonomy and notenter into an alliance with the US.58
The border conflict stands in the way of China’s ambition to improve relations with India.
Professor Zheng Yongnian at the National University of Singapore warned after the
Galwan clash against pushing India into the arms of the US. “If the Sino-Indian bordercrisis promotes an alliance between the US, Japan and India, the consequences will bevery troublesome for China”.59

53 Lara Zhou, “China and India Agree to Keep Working to Resolve the Border Dispute, South China

Morning Post, November 19, 2021”, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/h3156610//china-and-india-agree-keep-working-resolving-border-dispute.
54 Keith Bradsher, “China’s Leader, With Rare Bluntness, Blames U.S. Containment for Troubles,
New York Times, March 7, 2023”, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/07/world/asia/china-us-xijinping.html.
55 楼春豪 (Lou Chunhao), “南京对华政策的电影与中国电影支件反思(Changes in India’s China
Policy and China’s Policy Reflection)”, 南亚研究电影， South Asian Studies Communication,
February 2, 2021.
56 Liu Zongyi, “BRICS Summit Should Serve as a Wake-up Call for India, Global Times, August 25,
2023”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202308/1296987.shtml.
57 Hu Shisheng and Wang, op. cit.
58 Zhang Jiadong, “Pursuing Strategic Autonomy, India Seen as a Liability by US, Global Times,
December 8, 2021”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202112/1240993.shtml.
59 郑永年 (Zheng Yongnian), “不要把印度推向美国的怀抱 (Do Not Push India into the Arms of theU.S.), Sina.com, June 30, 2020”, https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2020-07-30/doc-iivhvpwx8304344.shtml.

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Russia also plays an important role in the relationship between China and India. India has
traditionally had close ties with Russia dating back to the days when the Soviet Union
was in conflict with China. Russia is also a major arms supplier to India, but also supplies
arms to China. India has previously been able to use its relationship with Russia to balance
China’s growing influence, but Russia and China’s increasingly close relationship haschanged the trilateral balance.60
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put India’s relations with Russia in the spotlight. India’s
refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been hailed in Chinese media as an
instance of common ground between China and India that stands in opposition to theWestern-led sanctions.61 India has also increased its imports of Russian oil following theinvasion. However, India has also been careful not to be seen to be taking the side of
Russia or China. In contrast to Beijing, India has not blamed the US or NATO for
instigating the war and for supporting Ukraine with weapons, which shows the limits ofIndia and China’s common interests. 62 There are also signs that India is reducing its
defense dependence on Russia in favor of Western arms producers. For instance, the US
company, General Electric, recently signed a deal with an Indian firm to build fighter jet
engines.63
Hu Shisheng argues that the US’ tolerance toward India has become even stronger with
the Ukraine war.64 Modi’s state visit to Washington in June 2023 further underlined US
determination to strengthen relations with New Delhi.65 To make matters worse for China,
Beijing sometimes undermines its own efforts to improve relations with India by taking
actions that infuriate the Indians. For example, India initially chose not to carry out adiplomatic boycott of the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics, which was highlighted in the
Chinese nationalist newspaper Global Times as an example of India standing firm in its

60 Christopher Weidacher Hsiung, “A Tenuous Trilateral? Russia-India-China Relations in a Changing

World Order, UI Brief, March 2019”, https://www.ui.se/butiken/uis-publikationer/ui-brief/2019/atenuous-trilateral-russia-india-china-relations-in-a-changing-world-order/.
61 “Ukraine Crisis Mirrors China-India’s Common Interests: Global Times Editorial, Global Times,
March 26, 2022”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202203/1256836.shtm; Rabi Sankar Bosu, “Wang
Yi’s Visit Lends Credence to Strength of China-India Ties, People’s Daily Online, April 6, 2022”,
http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0406/c90000-10080561.html.
62 Amrita Jash, “The Ukraine Crisis and China-India Relations, China Brief, Volume 12, Issue 19,
October 19, 2022”, https://jamestown.org/program/the-ukraine-crisis-and-china-india-relations/.
63 Stephen Collinson, “China Was the Ghost at the US-India Feast, CNN, June 23, 2023”, http://editi
on.cnn.com/2023/06/23/politics/china-us-india-state-visit/.
64 胡仕胜 (Hu Shisheng) and 王珏 (Wang Jue), “印度莫迪政府”对华产业替代”政策 (India’s Modi
Government’s ‘Industrial Substitution for China’ policy)”, 现 代 国 际 关 系 (Contemporary
International Relations), No. 11 (2022).
65 Collinson, op. cit.

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strategic autonomy and not following the US’ lead.66 However, after Officer Qi Fabao,
who was injured in the Galwan battles, participated in the torch relay with the Olympic
flame, India chose to join the diplomatic boycott. 67 This is but one example of how
Beijing keeps underestimating India’s mistrust of China, which in itself limits China’s
influence in India.

CONCLUDING REMARKSThe border conflict is currently far from being solved. Troops have still not disengaged
from all sites more than three years after the Galwan clash and both sides continue tobuild new infrastructure along the border. The fact that the parties disagree about where
the LAC lies means that the risk of new fighting is ever present despite both sides’ stateddesire to de-escalate the conflict. The sensitive issue of Tibet is a crucial reason why the
conflict arose and why it is so difficult to resolve. China, therefore, believes that thecountries should instead focus on improving economic and political relations and leave
the difficult border issue for the future, while the strong nationalist currents in both China
and India, fueled by the statements and offensive foreign policies of both governments,
make it domestically difficult for the governments of both sides to compromise on theborder issue.
The border conflict with India constitutes a problem for Beijing in its efforts to strengthen
its relationship with and influence in India. Most Chinese analysts emphasize India’s
increasingly close relationship with the US and its allies in the region such as Japan andAustralia as a troublesome challenge for China. In this way, the border conflict may also
undermine China’s strength in its geopolitical rivalry with the US. Still, Chinese
observers are convinced that China is in a position of superior military and economic
strength vis-à-vis India. China’s military strength and the PLA’s increasing presencealong the border with India constitute a show of power. However, as argued also in Per
Olsson’s chapter in this volume, military power does not always translate to military
influence. Arguably, if China’s military build-up along the border with India leads to astronger US–India security collaboration, the net result might be negative for China’s
security situation vis-à-vis India. Tensions resulting from the Galwan clash have led toseveral Indian measures to limit Chinese influence in India and reduce its dependence on
China, such as banning a large number of Chinese apps. At the same time, Indian imports

66 “India’s Support for Beijing’s Winter Olympic Games Shows It not a Natural US Ally, Global

Times, November 28, 2021”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202111/1240130.shtml?id=11.
67 Ingela Ahlberg, “India Boycotts Olympics after Torch Bearer Brawl, Svenska Dagbladet, February
4, 2022”, https://www.svd.se/indien-bojkottar-os-efter-fanbararbrak.

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from China have continued to increase which shows that India’s economic dependence
on China might be difficult to reverse.
China’s regime feels increasingly attacked by a US-led alliance to stop China’s rise as agreat power. From a Chinese perspective, India is exploiting its closer relations with the
US to create advantages for itself in the border dispute with China. It is, therefore, in
China’s interests to weaken India’s ties with the US.

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Chapter 9—Evolution of China’s Influence in Australia: 1996 to Today[Fukushima]

CHAPTER 9

Evolution of China’s Influence in Australia: 1996 to Today
Teruhiko Fukushima
INTRODUCTION: AUSTRALIA’S MASSIVE ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON
CHINA
Compared to other countries, Australia is the most economically dependent on China. In
2018–2019, just before the outbreak of COVID-19, China’s share in Australia’s
merchandise exports was 36.1%, followed by Japan at 15.8% and the Republic of Korea
at 6.9%. The fourth largest export market was India at 4.3%, the fifth was the UnitedStates (US) at 3.9%, the sixth was Taiwan at 3.3%, and the seventh was Singapore at
2.8%. The combined share of these second-largest to seventh-largest markets is 37%,
indicating that China (at 36.1%) is Australia’s largest export market. In the merchandise
import trade of the same financial year, China’s share was 24.5%, followed by the US at
10.6%, Japan at 7.0%, Germany at 4.7%, and Thailand at 4.6%. The combined share of
the second to fifth largest sources of imports was 26.9%, near that of China; thus, China
is undeniably Australia’s most important trade partner.
Australia’s largest merchandise export to China in 2018–2019 was iron ore (46.8% of thetotal), followed by natural gas (12.3%) and coal (10.5%). The combined share of these
top three merchandise amounted to a massive 69.5%. Australia’s top five goods andservices exports were iron ore at 16.4%, coal at 14.8%, natural gas at 10.6%, education
at 8.0%, and tourism at 4.8%.1 These figures show that China is a significant consumerof Australia’s top three export earners.
China is Australia’s largest export market for commodity trade and service exports, suchas education, the fourth largest foreign currency earner. In 2019, international education
brought Australia A$40.3 billion in income. Again, China was the top education export

1 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Composition of Trade Australia 2018-2019, AustralianGovernment, January 2020, p. 58, 79, 5.

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income earner at 31.4%, followed by India at 15.9% and Nepal at 7.4%. 2 In tourism,
Australia’s fifth largest export earner, China’s contribution is evident. In 2018–2019, 9.3
million international tourists visited Australia; 1,432,800 tourists were from China, justsurpassing New Zealand visitors at 1,407,200 for the first time. These numbers were
followed by the US at 811,900, the United Kingdom at 718,600, and Japan at 484,300.3
However, in 2019, Chinese tourists spent A$12.4 billion in Australia, much more thanother countries: New Zealand at A$2.6 billion, the US at A$3.9 billion, the United
Kingdom at A$3.4 billion, and Japan at A$2.1 billion.4 Chinese tourists produced massive
incomes and employment for Australians through this “buying spree”.
In June 2020, the Australian economy entered the first recession in 29 years due to the
COVID-19 lockdown.5 Thanks to the economic reform by the Labor governments of the
1980s to the mid-1990s and the subsequent Coalition 6 government, Australia enjoyedeconomic prosperity for an unprecedentedly long period. Australia’s annual average grossdomestic product (GDP) growth from 1992 to 2017 scored more than 3%, the eighth
highest among 32 countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment.7 This period has overlapped with the rapid expansion of its export tradewith China. In the early 1990s, China’s share in Australia’s merchandise trade was onlyaround 2%–3%; however, it surpassed 5% by the early 21st century, exceeded 10% by themid-2000s, reached 15% by the late 2000s, and reached 25% by the early 2010s.8 Buoyant

2 Education Export Income by Country 2019, Research Snapshot, Canberra: Department of Education,

Skills and Employment, Australian Government, July 2020.
3 Camper Champ, “Australian Tourism Statistics2023”, https://camperchamp.com.au/statistics/austra
lia/.
4 Budget Direct, “Australian Tourism Statistics 2020”, https://www.budgetdirect.com.au/travelinsurance/research/tourism-statistics.html.
5 Michael Janda, “Australia in Its First Recession in 29 Years as March Quarter GDP Shrinks, ABC
News, June 3, 2020”, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-03/australian-economy-gdp-recession-m
arch-quarter-2020/12315140G.
6 Australian politics has been under the quasi-two-party system between the Labor Party and the
Coalition. The Coalition consists of the Liberal Party which is supported by city-based middle classand business and the National Party which is supported by country-based farmers. When the Coalition
is in government, the Liberal leader takes up a position of the Prime Minister and the National leader
the Deputy Prime Minister.
7 “Figure 2: Annual Average GDP Growth, OECD Countries, 1992 to 2017”, in Greg O’Brien, “27Years and Counting since Australia’s Last Recession, Parliament of Australia, undated (early 2019?)”,https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook46p/LastRecession.
8 “Chart 3: China’s Share of Australia’s Total Merchandise Trade”, in Wilson Au-Yeung, Alison Keys
& Paul Fischer, “Australia-China: Not Just 40 Years, Treasury, Australian Government, December 12,
2012”, http://treasury.gov.au/publication/economic-roundup-issue-4-2012/australia-china-not-just40-years.

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Chapter 9—Evolution of China’s Influence in Australia: 1996 to Today[Fukushima]economic relations with China contributed to Australia’s successive economic growthover the long term.
Australia, one of the most loyal allies of the US, remarkably expanded its economic
relations with China in two decades. Australia–China relations have badly deteriorated in
the last few years despite Australia’s heavy economic dependence on China. The Japanese
media attributes this to the proposal by Australia’s Coalition government for an
independent international investigation into the source of COVID-19 infection, against
which Beijing responded vehemently, including official and unofficial sanctions onimported commodities from Australia9; however, this process is not straightforward. This
paper discusses how Australia has responded to rapidly growing Australia–China
economic relations in the last two-and-a-half decades and which factors have led thebilateral relations to the current shape. By doing so, we argue that the recent friction inAustralia–China links was caused by the revelation of China’s influence on Australia’s
domestic affairs since 2017. This revelation generated significant concern in theAustralian public regarding foreign interference, which is irrevocable despite the adventof the Labor government since the election in May 2022.

A SERIES OF OFFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST BEIJING AND EFFORTS TO
IMPROVE CHINA RELATIONS UNDER THE HOWARD COALITION
GOVERNMENT, 1996–2007
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Australia and China in December
1972, bilateral links have developed rather quietly. The exception was during theaftermath of the crackdown on prodemocracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in June
1989, when Australia’s Labor Prime Minister Bob Hawke single-handedly decided toallow Chinese students to stay in Australia. As a result, 42,000 Chinese nationals were
granted permanent visas.10
After the Coalition government under Prime Minister John Howard was elected, theAustralian media covered the Chinese connections more intensively. Howard’s election
victory in March 1996 overlapped the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis when the Chinese
launched heavy missile tests to intimidate Taiwanese voters before their first democraticpresidential election. The US attempted to deter China’s bullying by sending two aircraft
9 For example, Hiroshi Mori, “Sona Kogeki Tai-chu Yuwa ni Hamon (China’s Ping Attack Affects

Australia’s reconciliation with China)”, Sankei Shimbun, November 21, 2023.
10 Gabrielle Chan, “Cabinet Papers 1988-89: Bob Hawke Acted Alone in Offering Asylum to ChineseStudents, The Gurdian, December 31, 2014”, https//www.theguardian.com/australia- news/2015/jan/
01/cabinet-papers-1988-89-bob-hawke-acted-alone-in-offering-asylum-to-chinese-students.

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carrier battle groups to the area. Howard unequivocally supported the deployment of US
naval ships and urged China to show restraint. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer
welcomed Washington’s decision because it showed its strong commitment to regional
security participation; thus, Australia became the only nation in the region to publicly
support US naval deployment.
This situation marked the first of a series of provocative actions against Beijing that yearby the newly elected Howard government. When Australia and the US announced theSydney Statement to use the alliance for regional security in July, US Defense Secretary
William Perry described Japan and Australia as the northern and southern anchors of US
security arrangements in Asia. The People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), responded by likening the two anchors to the claws of a giant
crab threatening China. In August, the Howard government confirmed initiating
negotiations with Taiwan for uranium export. In September, Australia’s senior minister
visited Taiwan with a business delegation, while Howard met with the Dalai Lama in
Sydney in the same month.11 In response to these actions by the newly elected Coalition
government, the Chinese media reacted vehemently, likening Australia to a parrot
following what the US said or a bat identifying itself as Asia regarding the economy but
as the West over security.
Howard eventually came to show a strong will to improve his attitude toward China,
meeting Chinese President Jiang Zemin on the sidelines of the Asia–Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Manila in November 1996. This conference seemed towork for reconciliation, as Jiang remarked to Howard at the end of their meeting: “Faceto-face is much better, isn’t it?”12 In April 1997, Howard visited Beijing and told Jiang
that Australia would fully support “one China policy” and that the Australia, New Zealand,
and the US (ANZUS) alliance did not target any third party. The two leaders agreed to abilateral annual strategic dialogue, and the Howard government avoided participating in
the US Missile Defense program.13

11 Stjepan Bosnjak, “The Dragon has Claws: 1996 and The Howard Government’s Hurdles with China,

Australian Outlook, January 23, 2019”, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/dragon-claws-1996-the-howard-governments-hurdles-china/.
12 Donald Greenlees, “Asialink Milestones: John Howard Reflects on the China Challenge andTrump’s Legacy, Asialink, University of Melbourne, November 15, 2020”, https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/insights/asialink-milestones-john-howard-reflects-on-the-china-challenge-and-trump's-legacy.
13 David Goldsworthy, “Regional Relations”, David Goldsworthy (ed.), Facing North: A Century ofAustralian Engagement with Asia Volume I: 1901 to 1970s, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press,
2001, p. 148.

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It was in Australia’s interest to reconcile with China during this period. In 2001, China’s
share of Australia’s exports was about 5%. By 2005, its share surpassed 10%, and China
became Australia’s largest export market by 2009. 14 In August 2002, the Australianconsortium won a A$25 billion contract to supply China for 25 years; according toHoward, “the largest single export order ever won for Australia”. It was reported that
Howard lobbied Premier Zhu Rongji for this deal during his China visit in May, and Zhu
rejected his advisers’ recommendation to buy from another source to select an Australian
supplier15 as if rewarding Australia’s improved attitudes. In return for huge benefits from
Chinese trade, Howard invited President Hu Jintao to address the Joint Meeting of theAustralian Parliament, the first ever by foreign leaders except US presidents.16
This development would have been ideal for Beijing. Australia was an essential sourceof critical raw materials such as iron ore and coking coal to sustain China’s rapid
economic growth. Conversely, the Howard government demonstrated its loyalty to a US
ally, sending the personnel of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to Afghanistan in 2001
and Iraq in 2003. However, the conservative government’s provocative actions against
China in its earlier stages dissipated once the Chinese media became involved, and theHoward government became China-friendly. Howard later described his diplomatic
approach, saying that Australia did not need to choose between China, an economic
partner, and the US, an ally, and should maximise Australia’s links with both countries.17
The improvement in the Howard government’s stance towards China drove Beijing tofocus on Australia as a target of its influence. According to a former Chinese diplomat
seeking political asylum in Sydney in 2005, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
conveyed the Central Committee’s new strategy to senior diplomats in Canberra’s
embassy early that year. The diplomats were instructed first “to secure Australia as areliable and stable supply base for China’s continued economic growth over the next 20
years”. Second, in the longer term, they were directed “to drive a wedge into the America–
Australia alliance” through “comprehensive influence over Australia economically,
politically, culturally, in all ways” and thus “to turn Australia into a ‘second France,’ a

14 Rachelle Guttmann, Kate Hickie, Peter Richards & Ivan Roberts, “Spillovers to Australia from the

Chinese Economy, Reserve Bank of Australia, June 2019”, https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bul
letin/2019/jun/spillovers-to-australia-from-the-chinese-economy.html.
15 “$25 Billion Deal a Coup for Australia, The Age, August 9, 2002”, https://www.theage.com.au/nati
onal/25-billion-deal-a-coup-for-australia-20020809-gduh8t.html.
16 Daniel Flitton, “Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: July to December 2002”, Australian Journalof Politics and History, Volume 50, Number 2 (June 2004), pp. 243-244.
17 “No Need to Choose China or US: Howard, Sydney Morning Herald, October 2, 2012”, https://www.
smh.com.au/national/no-need-to-choose-china-or-us-howard-20121002-26xs9.html.

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western country that would dare to say ‘no’ to America”.18 As a result, China’s influence
was everywhere in Australia, as discussed in Professor Hamilton’s famous book, Silent
Invasion: China’s influence in Australia. Most Chinese-language schools, media, andcommunities fell under Beijing’s control. Foreign Minister Downer rejected the story of
the Chinese diplomat’s political asylum for foreign affairs consideration, obviously
surmising Beijing’s stance. Nonetheless, the story was widely reported together with theactivities of Chinese spies in Australia. 19 Australia–China relations in the Howard
government years ended peacefully without concern about China’s influence in 2007,
with Beijing leaders hopefully looking to Australia’s progress in more favourable
directions with the change of government.

BEIJING WAS INITIALLY DISAPPOINTED AT THE ADVENT OF THE LABORGOVERNMENT BUT EVENTUALLY SATISFIED WITH AUSTRALIA’S RETURN
TO A NO-NEED-TO-CHOOSE APPROACH WITH THE CHANGES OF
GOVERNMENTS, 2007–2015（1）LABOR GOVERNMENT UNDER PRIME MINISTER KEVIN RUDD, 2007–2010
When the Labor Party defeated the Coalition in the November 2007 election, Beijing
should have held high hopes for bringing Australia into its hands. The newly elected
Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, was a former diplomat specialising in China and spoke
fluent Mandarin. The Chinese translation of his biography was published only a coupleof months after his vow as national leader, reflecting China’s high expectations for a new
era in links with Australia. 20 The Rudd government responded positively to Beijing’s
anticipation when Foreign Minister Stephen Smith announced Australia’s withdrawal
from the Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue with the US, Japan, and India (QUAD) about
which Beijing had expressed concern, at a joint press conference with Smith’s Chinesecounterpart, Yang Jiechi, in February 2008.21 Two months later, Chinese leaders shouldhave been jubilant when they heard that Japanese media was complaining about “Japan

18 Clive Hamilton, Silent Invasion: China’s Influence in Australia, Melbourne, Hardie Grant Books,

2018, p. 2.
19 “Chinese Diplomat Was Urged Not to Defect, The Age, July 27, 2005”, https://www.theage.com.au/
national/chinese-diplomat-was-urged-not-to-defect-20050727-ge0l2x.html.
20 “Rudd’s Life a Page Turner-in China, Sydney Morning Herald, February 2, 2008”, https://www.smh.
com.au/national/rudds-life-a-page-turner--in-china-20080202-1pnd.html.
21 The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, “Joint Press Conference with
Chinese Foreign Minister, TROVE, National Library of Australia, February 5, 2008”, https://webarchi
ve.nla.gov.au/awa/20091109220859.

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Chapter 9—Evolution of China’s Influence in Australia: 1996 to Today[Fukushima]passing” at the news that Rudd excluded Tokyo but Beijing in his first official overseas
visit as Prime Minister.
Nevertheless, this started friction with China under the Rudd Labor government. In his
speech delivered in Mandarin to the students of Beijing University in April, Rudd
demonstrated his apparent opposition to the idea of boycotting the Beijing Olympic
Games in protest against China’s oppression of the March riot in Tibet. He conveyed
Australia’s concern about human rights problems in Tibet as a true friend of China that
“offers unflinching advice and counsels and restraint to engage in principled dialogue
about matters of contention”.22 Rudd’s speech should have made Beijing’s top officials
uncomfortable as he directly conveyed his concern about Tibet’s human rights conditions
to the Chinese public while treating a middle-sized country like Australia as equal to theMiddle Kingdom.
The Rudd government further strengthened its offensive stances against China in 2009.
In May, the Department of Defence issued the 2009 Defence White Paper, which
introduced an ambitious military equipment program, including procuring 12 submarines
by the 2030s, culminating in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the US (AUKUS)
nuclear submarine program in 2021. While anticipating that China’s leaders would
appreciate the need to make a solid contribution to regional security, the White Paper
contained the following:
But the pace, scope and structure of China’s military modernisation have the potential
to give its neighbours cause for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does
not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans.
China has begun to do this in recent years, but needs to do more. If it does not, there
is likely to be a question in the minds of regional states about the long-term strategic
purpose of its force development plans, particularly as the modernisation appears
potentially to be beyond the scope of what would be required for a conflict overTaiwan.23

22 Prime Minister of Australia, “A Conversation with China’s Youth on the Future, Peking University,

TROVE National Library of Australia, April 9, 2008”, https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/ 200807210.
23 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030: Defence White Paper 2009, Canberra:
Department of Defence, Australian Government, 2009, p. 34. In Australia, the Defence White Papers
have been issued by the governments at the turning points of its strategic circumstances. In the past,
they were published seven times in 1976, 1987, 1994, 2000, 2009, 2013, and 2016.

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This passage was a straightforward warning about China’s rapid military buildup. Within
the Australian government, some intelligence organisations raised objections to thecontents; however, Rudd, backed by the top of the Department of Defence and the ADF,
pushed through. When the senior defence official visited Beijing to present the draft of
the White Paper, the top brass of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was indignant andrequested that the quoted part be amended.; however, he eventually accepted no
modification and thanked the Australian official for informing the Chinese military inadvance.24
Nonetheless, the most provocative measure by the Rudd government was not the Defence
White Paper but the blocking of Chinese investment in Australia’s mining giant. In 2008
and 2009, Chinese companies were active investors in Australian mines. Rudd had beenquite alarmed at China’s control of Australian quarries as a matter of national interest.
Conversely, other parts of the Australian government, such as the Treasury and theForeign Investment Review Board (FIRB), remained receptive to investment fromoverseas sources, including China, to secure sufficient capital to develop the nation’s
wealth, especially in the mining sector. In contrast, the Chinese side was quite dissatisfied
that iron ore prices from Australia remained high despite the economic downturn due tothe Global Financial Crisis (GFC).
BHP-Billiton, the world’s largest mining company, and Rio Tinto, the second largest,
dominate Australia’s best iron ore mines, functioning as price setters. However, Rio wasfinancially struggling in 2008 due to the GFC and accepted China’s state enterprise
Chinalco’s bid for 9% of Rio’s stocks in August. At the end of the year, Chinalco began
a new bid to increase its stake in Rio to 18%. This situation alarmed Rudd, the BHP, Rio,the Coalition, and even the Greens. BHP offered a joint venture for Rio and freed it fromthe financially tricky situation; Rio canceled Chinalco’s second bid in July. Soon after
that, as if in retaliation, the Chinese authority arrested Rio’s Shanghai manager, anAustralian citizen with Chinese background, for stealing state secrets.25
When Australia ignored the Chinese request not to issue a visa for a Uighur activist in
August, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, expressed his disappointment. The
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister’s visit to Australia was cancelled, and the People’s Daily
criticised the Rudd government as an “anti-China chorus” and “aiding with a terrorist”.26
24 David Uren, The Kingdom and the Quarry: China, Australia, Fear and Greed, Melbourne, Black

Inc., 2012, Chapter 7.
25 Ibid., Chapters 5, 6, 9.
26 Paul Kelly, “Shock of the New”, The Australian, August 22, 2009.

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Beijing’s harsh responses may suggest further deterioration of Australia–China relations;however, at the same time, a Chinese company entered into a large contract to purchase
Australia’s liquefied natural gas.27
In October, China’s Vice Premier Li Keqiang visited Canberra and concluded a jointstatement to bring the soured bilateral relations into a normal condition. The Australian
government confirmed its intention to welcome foreign investment in this document. In
contrast, the Chinese side offered a compliment by showing its support for Rudd’s
proposal to establish an Asia–Pacific community, which was not well received bySoutheast Asian countries. 28 The series of offensive actions by Rudd was quite
aggravating for Beijing, but China needed a stable supply of resources and energy andselected reconciliation with Australia.
China did not miss the opportunity for revenge when Premier Wen Jiabao played a central
role in declining deals for emission reduction at the Conference of Parties of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen (COP15) in
December. Rudd was deeply involved in drafting these proposals and revealed his
discomposure to China’s sabotage.29 Since then, Rudd’s mishandling of climate change
problems had cost his approval rates, driving his intraparty adversaries into a coup against
him because Labor could not win the forthcoming election with Rudd at the top in June
2010. Without party support, Rudd was forced to resign in tears.
（2）LABOR GOVERNMENT UNDER PRIME MINISTER JULIA GILLARD, 2010–2013
When she gripped her power, Australia’s first-ever female Prime Minister, Julia Gillard,offered her predecessor any ministerial post he wanted. Rudd selected the Foreign
Minister; thus, the foreign relations of the early years of the Gillard government were put
under the strong influence of Rudd, who had been vigorously working to strengthen the
US alliance. She hosted US President Obama for a parliamentary address where Obamadeclared the US a Pacific nation in November 2011. The Gillard government also agreed
to host an annual rotation of the US Marines in the northern coast city of Darwin fromthe following year. The People’s Daily responded strongly to this move, asserting that

27 Matthew Stevens, “Ferguson Fires Up Asia’s Interest in Gorgon Project”, The Australian, August19, 2009.
28 “Australia-China Joint Statement, Australian Embassy China, October 30, 2009”, https://china.em
bassy.gov.au/bjng/statement.html.
29 Toom Arup, “India Confesses It Helped Derail Copenhagen Deal”, Sydney Morning Herald,
December 25, 2009; Mark Lynas, “How China Gutted Copenhagen and Avoided the Blame”, Sydney
Morning Herald, December 26, 2009.

Chapter 9—Evolution of China’s Influence in Australia: 1996 to Today[Fukushima]

123“Australia surely cannot play China for a fool” and “If Australia uses its military bases tohelp the US harm Chinese interests, then Australia will itself be caught in the crossfire”.30
However, after Rudd resigned as Foreign Minister during leadership speculation in
February 2012, the Gillard government began to show more conciliatory attitudes towards
China. In October 2012, Gillard launched Australia in the Asian Century: White Paper.31
This White Paper called for improving Australia’s productivity to respond to Asia’s
economic growth more effectively and set targets for GDP, school pupils’ scholastic
standards, Asian language education, and universities’ academic achievement. In short,
the government urged Australian businesses to pursue new Asian export markets throughthis document. The White Paper, which a former Secretary of the Treasury wrote,presented optimistic views on regional security while recognising the risks of conflict
between the US and China, arguing that “The economic rise of Asia has been a win-win
on an unprecedented scale” and “the growing strength, breadth, and sophistication ofbilateral and regional engagement provide grounds for believing that shifting regional andglobal power can be managed constructively” in chapter 2. In chapter 8, allocated only tosecurity out of total 9 chapters, the White Paper stated, “We welcome China’s rise” and“We accept that China’s military growth is a natural, legitimate outcome of the growing
economy and broadening interests”.
In May 2013, the Department of Defence issued the Defence White Paper 2013, whichemphasised the importance of US–China relations for the regional security environment
while developing new approaches, pointing out the emergence of a strategic arc in thename of the Indo–Pacific region and the strategic significance of Indonesia forAustralia.32 This document was not a softer version of Rudd’s 2009 Defence White Paperin that it did refer to the possibility of the ADF engaging in unconventional warfare toconfront aggression or coercion against Australia’s regional partners. Nonetheless, withregard to China, the White Paper asserted that it was not inevitable for Australia to choose
between the US and China and that Australia would not approach China as an adversary,a tone similar to that of the Asia Century White Paper.
These two White Papers indicated that the Gillard government switched to Australia neednot to choose between the US and China approach from the US alliance-oriented andChina offensive approach of the Rudd government. As if rewarding Australia’s change
30 Rowan Callick, “Caught in the Crossfire as Neighbours to the North Voice Dismay at Closer

Military Ties”, The Australian, November 18, 2011.
31Australia in the Asian Century: White Paper, Canberra: Australian Government, October 2012.
32 Defence White Paper 2013, Canberra: Department of Defence, Australian Government, 2013.

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Chapter 9—Evolution of China’s Influence in Australia: 1996 to Today[Fukushima]of approach, China agreed to enter a strategic partnership with Australia and hold annual
prime, foreign, and economic ministerial meetings when Gillard visited China in April
2013, one month before the publication of the 2013 Defence White Paper. The Australian
media hailed the Strategic Partnership with China as a diplomatic victory and China’s
message to regard Australia as an important country.33 Only one Australian journalist
pointed out that the Australian Prime Minister would meet the Chinese Premier insteadof the President in the agreed annual ministerial meetings. Furthermore, the Australian
Foreign Minister would meet the Chinese Foreign Minister instead of the Director of the
Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission, and Australia’s Treasurer would meet the
Chinese Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission instead of the
Director of the Office of the Central Financial and Economic Commission. Thus,
Australian ministers were treated as lower-ranked.34
Australia’s responses to the Strategic Partnership with China reflected the atmosphere inwhich Rudd unnecessarily provoked China. Australia’s business circle widely shared that
Australia should not jeopardise economic benefits from China relations in pursuing
strategic interests from the US alliance. In November 2011, when President Obamadeclared the US rebalance towards Asia in Darwin, Malcolm Turnbull, former leader of
the Coalition’s Liberal Party and who would later introduce the offensive measuresagainst China as the Coalition Prime Minister, stated:
It suits President Obama’s domestic agenda to be seen to muscle up to China, even
if the additional muscling does not bear too much analysis. But an AustralianGovernment needs to be careful not to allow a doe-eyed fascination with the leaderof the free world to distract from the reality that our national interest requires us truly[and not just rhetorically] to maintain both an ally in Washington and a good friend
in Beijing.35
The fact that such a view widely prevailed in various circles, even among the US-inclined
Coalition politicians, reflects a solid attachment to China held by the Australian public.
At this stage, it might have been inevitable that Rudd’s provocative approaches to China
would return to Howard’s no-choice approach between the US and China, which was

33 Angus Grigg, “Gillard Scores Win with Beijing Accord”, Australian Financial Review, April 10,

2013; Tony Walker, “‘Satisfactory’ New Benchmark in China Relations”, Australian Financial
Review, April 10, 2013.
34 Greg Sheridan, “The Challenge of China”, The Australian, April 13, 2013.
35 “Malcolm Turnbull and China, Australia-China Relations Institute, University Technology Sydney,
September 16, 2015”, https://www.australiachinarelations.org/content/malcolm-turnbull-and-china.

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supposed to have driven Australia’s strong and sustained economic performance since
the early 1990s.
（3）COALITION GOVERNMENT UNDER PRIME MINISTER TONY ABBOTT, 2013–2015
In the September 2013 election, Australian voters gave up hopes for the Labor Party
which had been prone to leadership contests, and selected the Coalition government underPrime Minister Tony Abbott. The Abbott government actively enhanced security
cooperation with Japan, showing strong interest in sharing Japanese technology forAustralia’s new submarines.36 Just a month after the election, the foreign ministers ofJapan, the US, and Australia held the first Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD),
announcing their opposition to unilateral action to change the status quo in the East andSouth China seas. Concerns arose about the declaration as a deviation from the previous
position that Australia would not take a position on competing maritime claims over bothseas, even though the government explained that there was no change in Australia’s
policy not to take sides on territorial disputes but opposed coercive or unilateral action in
the resolution of such disputes.37 This stance shows that a strong fear of entrapment inJapan’s territorial dispute with China prevailed among the Australian public.
Nevertheless, the Abbott government remained undaunted. When China established the
Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea in November, Australia
officially protested to the Chinese Ambassador because, according to Abbott, “We’re astrong ally of the US. We’re a strong ally of Japan”. 38 When Foreign Minister Julie
Bishop visited Beijing in December, her counterpart Wang Yi asserted that Australia waswrong in its criticism of China’s ADIZ, adding that such a stance could jeopardisebilateral relations without concealing his anger in his face. However, Wang conveyed his
sincere hopes for the two countries “to work together with the same goals and purpose tohandle any potential problems”. Bishop immediately countered: “We respect China’s
right to speak out on issues that affect China, just as we hope you will respect our right

36 Brendan Nicholson, “Japan Asked to Share Submarine Technology, The Australian, December 7,

2013”, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/japan-asked-to-share-submarine-technology/nes-story/10aa94d1d8c9d3ccb406de8c622697e3.
37 Rober Ayson, “Yes, Australia Has Changed Its East China Sea Position, The Interpreter, Lowy
Institute, October 31, 2013”, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/yes-australia-has-changedits-east-china-sea-position.
38 Stephanie Balogh & Scott Murdoch, “Abbott Stands Up to China ‘Over Values’, The Australian,
November 29, 2013”, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/abbott-stands-up-to-china-over-values/news-story/07e5881c911dc0b1d817963ea31d4b5f.

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Chapter 9—Evolution of China’s Influence in Australia: 1996 to Today[Fukushima]to speak out on actions that affect a region of critical security importance to Australia”.39
According to an Australian senior official who accompanied Bishop, Wang’s attitude in
his meeting had been the rudest in his 30 years as a diplomat.40
Despite the earlier assertive attitudes of Abbott and Bishop, China did not try to punish
Australia. In line with the election promise, the Coalition government had opened
negotiations to conclude free trade agreements with Australia’s top three export markets(China, Japan, and Korea) within 12 months of its inauguration. A week after Abbott
concluded the Economic Partnership Agreement and the Transfer of Defence Equipment
and Technology Agreement with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the two
leaders agreed to upgrade the bilateral relations into the Special Strategic Partnership in
Canberra in July 2014, the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and PLA’s
top brass visited Canberra. They agreed with his Australian counterpart to hold Australia–
China–US Joint Exercise Kowari at Australia’s northern topend.41 Exercise Kowari wasa survival skills exercise held six times annually from 2014 to 2019, even after Australia’s
attitudes towards China started cooling in 2017.42
Furthermore, the trade ministers of Australia and China signed a Declaration of Intent for
the China–Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) in front of Prime Minister Abbott
and President Xi Jinping in Canberra in November 2014. Australia made significant
concessions over China’s investment in Australian farms, which provoked resistancefrom the Coalition’s partner, the National Party, and over the entry of Chinese workers,
about which Australian trade unions had shown strong concern.43 In return, China agreed
to eliminate tariffs on Australian dairy, beef, wine, coal, thermal coal, minerals,
pharmaceuticals, and other products. China also agreed to open its service markets to theAustralian legal, education, telecommunications, financial, tourism, health, and aged care

39 Scott Murdoch, “Angry China Rebukes Julie Bishop over East China Dispute, The Australian,

December 7, 2013”, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/angry-chinarebukes-julie-bishop-over-east-china-sea-dispute/news-story/4b08fe170b73347b3ef7ce77c05179eb.
40 David Wroe, “China’s Rebuke of Julie Bishop ‘Rudest’ Conduct Seen in 30 Years, Says Senior
Foreign Affairs Official, Sydney Morning Herald, February 27, 2014”, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/chinas-rebuke-of-julie-bishop-rudest-conduct-seen-in-30-years-says-senior-foreign-affair
s-official-20140227-33jid.html.
41 Brendan Nicholson, “China Joins Three Way Exercises”, The Australian, July 18, 2014.
42 “Exercise KOWARI Starts in North Queensland, Defence, Australian Government, August 28,
2019”, https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2019-08-28/exercise-kowari-starts-northqueensland.
43 “China-Australia Free Trade Agreement: About the Negotiations, Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, Australian Government”, https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/inforce/chafta/negoti
ations/Pages/about-the-negotiations.

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sectors. 44 If we compare the magnitude of these concessions from Beijing with the
Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan, Tokyo conceded the elimination of tariffs
on Australian wine and seafood but did not agree to the elimination of tariffs on beef anddairy.45 These concessions soon sparked Australia’s new exports to China. During the 4
years since the implementation of ChAFTA in 2015, the value of two-way goods andservices trade increased by 66%, Australia’s goods exports to China by 97%, andAustralia’s service exports by 76%.46
To show goodwill, Abbott invited Xi to address the Joint Meeting of the Parliament after
the signing of the Declaration of Intent for ChAFTA. While Xi referenced democracy inexplaining “the Chinese dream” in his speech, Abbott stated at the state dinner, “I havenever heard a Chinese leader declare that his country would be fully democratic by 2050”,
even though many China experts pointed out that there was nothing new in the contentsof Xi’s address.47 Abbott’s remark reflected the complacency about China widely held by
the Australian public. Even during enhanced security cooperation with the US and Japan,
Australia still adhered to the no-need-to-choose approach.

THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC BEGAN TO BE ALARMED AT CHINA, AND
BILATERAL RELATIONS DETERIORATED INTO AN ABYSS UNDER THE
COALITION GOVERNMENTS, 2015–2022（1）Coalition Government Under Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, 2015–2018
The Coalition had suffered from persistently low approval rates for the long haul due toPrime Minister Abbott’s poor handling of domestic politics. As a result, the majority ofits members of parliament switched their support to the more popular former leader,
Malcolm Turnbull, in September 2015. Turnbull had been widely regarded as a liberal,
China-friendly politician because of his business experience with China; however, his
relations with China as Prime Minister began erratically. In October, the Northern
44 Department of

Foreign Affairs and Trade, “China-Australia Free Trade Agreement: ChAFTA
Outcomes at a Glance, Australian Government”, https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/
chafta/fact-sheets/Pages/chafta-outcomes-at-a-glance.
45 “Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement: JAEPA Outcomes at a Glance, Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government”, https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/inforce/jaepa/fact-sheets/Pages/jaepa-fact-sheet-outcomes-at-a-glance.
46 China-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Post-Implementation Review, Canberra: AustralianGovernment, December 2020.
47 Daniel Hurst, Katharine Murphy & Tania Branigan, “Tony Abbott Lauds Xi Jinping’s ‘Commitment
to Fully Democratic China’, The Guardian, November 17, 2014”, https://www.theguardian.com/worl
d/2014/nov/17/tony-abbott-xi-jinping-china-democracy.

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Territory government leased the commercial port of Darwin, where the US rotated theMarines, to Landbridge, a Chinese company closer to the CCP for 99 years. The US
administration was so shocked at the lack of prior consultation that at the beginning of
their first bilateral summit meeting on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Manila inNovember, President Obama chided Turnbull, asserting, “Let us know next time”. The
lease contract had been reported to the Department of Defence but was duly approved in
the Department’s routine process for handling normal foreign investment without
considering the strategic significance of critical infrastructure.48 This situation illustrates
that even Australia’s security institution was affected by complacency about theeconomic benefits of China’s links.
Nonetheless, the Turnbull government responded quickly to protect Australia’s criticalinfrastructure. In December, David Irvine, former head of the spy-catcher Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), joined the FIRB, which examines significant
foreign investment applications. 49 The FIRB assessment of critical infrastructure was
mandatory only when assets were sold to state-owned enterprises; starting in March 2016,
however, future sales of critical infrastructure by State and Territory governments to
privately owned investors would be scrutinised by the FIRB.50 In April 2017, Irvine waspromoted to FIRB Chairman. 51 While the FIRB’s basic stance had been to promoteforeign investment in Australia, these changes reflected that national security concerns
were firmly embedded in the assessment of foreign investment.
Taking the FIRB’s advice, Australia’s Treasurers have rejected China’s application forinvestment in Australian corporations in the electricity, construction, health, and beverage
sectors. For example, when the Chinese state-owned State Grid Corp and Hong Konglisted Cheung Kong Infrastructure made bids to purchase Ausgrid, which supplied power
to the cities of New South Wales State, including Sydney, in 2016, Treasurer Scott
Morrison rejected the lease of 50.4% of Ausgrid to foreign investors as “contrary to the

48 Phillip Coorey & Laura Tingle, “‘Let Us Know Next Time’: How Obama Chided Turnbull overDarwin Port Sale, Australian Financial Review, November 19, 2015”, https://www.afr.com/politics/
let-us-know-next-time-how-obama-chided-turnbull-over-darwin-port-sale-20151118-gl1qkg.
49 Scott Morrison, Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia, “Security and Business Expertise
Added to Foreign Investment Review Board, TROVE, December 4, 2015”, https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20160105062027/http://sjm.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/021-2015/.
50 “Critical Asset Sales to Fall within Foreign Review Net, Treasury, Australian Government, TROVE,
March 18, 2016”, https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20220518140000/.
51 Scott Morrison, Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia, “FIRB Chair Appointment, TROVE,
April 8, 2017”, https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20180318081117/.

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national interest”.52 The State Grid had already owned electric distribution in Victoria andSouth Australia. Therefore, blocking its bid reflected the government’s new policy torestrict China’s investment in Australia’s critical infrastructure, which the China
Commerce Ministry criticised as “protectionist” and seriously affecting China’s
investment in Australia. 53 Voices were raised to doubt the effects of the decision inAustralia’s domestic circles as well. Former Labor Foreign Minister and Premier of New
South Wales Bob Carr described this decision as “a reaction to that elevation of
xenophobia”.54 An economist expressed concern about discouraging Chinese investors’interest, damaging Australia’s economic benefits. 55 At this stage of 2016, many
Australians seem to believe that their country did not have to choose between security
from the US and economic benefits from China.
The opinion poll published in June 2016 illustrates the intense feeling of intimacy with
China held by the Australian public. The poll asked the same questions to respondents
from five countries, including Australia, China, and Japan. Regarding the question,“Which country has the most influence in Asia today?”, in Australia, 22% answered theUS, and 69% answered China. In China, 40% answered the US and 56% answered China;
in Japan, 48% answered the US, and 39% answered China. Concerning the question of
the US and China as the world’s leading superpower, in Australia, 55% selected the firstanswer, “China will eventually replace the US as the world’s leading superpower”, and
14% selected the second answer, “China has already replaced the US as the world’s
leading superpower”. Finally, 30% selected the third answer, “China will never replace
the US as the world’s leading superpower”. In China, 57% selected the first, 10% selected
the second, and 33% selected the third answers, whereas in Japan, 17% selected the first,
5% selected the second, and 78% selected the third. 56 The poll shows how many
Australians appreciated China’s enormous benefits to the nation.

52 Scott Morrison, Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia, “Statement on Decision to Prohibit

the 99-Year Lease of 50.4 Per Cent of Ausgrid under Current Proposed Structure, TROVE, August19, 2016”, https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20161017192029/.
53 “Australia Blocks Ausgrid Energy Grid Sale to Chinese Companies, BBC News, August 19, 2016”,
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-37129047.
54 “Ausgrid Lease: Treasurer Scott Morrison Blocks Sale to Chinese, Hong Kong Bidders, ABC News,
August 11, 2016”, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-11/scott-morrison-sale-of-ausgrid-to-chinese-consortium-blocked/7720530.
55 James Laurenceson, “Ausgrid Decision Will Hurt Australia-China Relations, The Interpreter, Lowy
Institute, August 11, 2016”, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ausgrid-decision-will-hurtaustralia-china-relations.
56 Simon Jackman, et. al., “The Asian Research Network: Survey on America’s Role in the Asia
Pacific, United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney, June 2016, pp. 6-8”, https://perthusasia.
edu.au/research-insights/publications/survey-on-americas-role-in-the-asia-pacific/.

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Conversely, the positive sentiment began to change quickly. In August 2016, the Chinese
media reported that young, promising federal Labor Senator Sam Dastyari had told
Sydney’s Chinese community several weeks before the July election: “The South China
Sea is China’s own affair. On this issue, Australia should remain neutral and respect
China’s decision”. Furthermore, in 2014, he stated, “The Australian government must
abandon its hostile stance on the (China’s) ADIZ in the East China Sea”.57 Dastyari wasreported to have received political donations and other economic benefits from Huang
Xiangmo, the president of the Australian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful
Reunification of China, which was rumoured to have close links with the CCP’s United
Front Work Department. 58 These remarks from Dastyari contradicted Labor’s official
position, and there was every reason for the Australian media to suspect that Huang’s
money enticed Dastyari to mention stances favourable to China. In September, Dastyari
had no alternative but to resign as the manager of opposition business in the Senate andshadow minister for consumer affairs. 59 The stories about China’s influence on theAustralian political circle did not stop here.
In November 2017, damaging news about Dastyari was reported. In early 2016, the ASIO
blocked Huang Xiangmo’s Australian citizenship application; he asked Dastyari tointervene, and the Labor Senator approached immigration officials four times in the firstsix months of the year. In September, when Dastyari resigned from the Labor frontbench,
ASIO’s Director-General warned the Labor leaders, “Some of their donors had strong
links to the Chinese Government”. In October, Dastyari visited Huang’s mansion and met
face-to-face to convey that Huang’s phone was likely tapped by security agencies,
advising him to leave his phone inside and go outside to speak.60 Dastyari’s action could
be regarded as a leakage of security secrets to a foreign citizen and heavy disloyalty to
the nation, which he categorically denied. In December, Dastyari announced his decision
to resign from the Senate. In early 2017, he was reinstated as deputy opposition whip,

57 Primrose Riordan, “Sam Dastyari Pledges to Support China on South China Sea beside Labor Donor,

Australian Financial Review, August 31, 2016”, https://www.afr.com/politics/sam-dastyari-pledgesto-support-china-on-south-china-sea-beside-labor-donor-20160831-gr5mwk.
58 Anna Henderson & Stephanie Anderson, “Sam Dastyari’s Chinese Donations: What Are the
Accusations and Is the Criticism Warranted? ABC News, September 5, 2016”, https://www.abc.net.
au/news/2016-09-05/sam-dastyari-chinese-donations-furore-explained/7816588.
59 James Massola, “Labor Senator Sam Dastyari Quits over Chinese Donations Scandal, Sydney
Morning Herald, September 7, 2016”, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/labor-senator-samdastyari-quits-over-chinese-donations-scandal-20160907-grb3p1.html.
60 Nick McKenzie, James Massola & Richard Baker, “Labor Senator Sam Dastyari Warned ChineseDonor Huang Xiangmo His Phone Was Bugged, Sydney Morning Herald, November 29, 2017”,
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/labor-senator-sam-dastyari-warned-wealthy-chinese-donorhuang-xiangmo-his-phone-was-bugged-20171128-gzu14c.html.

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reflecting the party’s high appreciation of the 34-year-old Senator from New South
Wales; however, this time, the Labor leaders could no longer protect him.
China’s influence was not confined to the Labor Party. In June 2017, Craig Laundy,
Minister for Small and Family Business, the Workplace, and Deregulation, had Chinese
businessperson Yang Dongdong as his community adviser in Laundy’s Sydney electorate,
which had a large Chinese population. Before immigrating to Australia, Yang served as
the deputy secretary of a branch of the Chinese Communist Youth League in Shanghai.
With Chinese and Korean flags in his hands, Laundy participated in a rally organised by
Yang to protest against Shinzo Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in March 2016.61
In October 2017, Andrew Robb, former Trade Minister of the Turnbull government, told
Coalition MPs at a think-tank dinner that there was a “smear” campaign against him over“treasonous activity” through his post-retirement employment as a consultant for
extremely lucrative salary with Landbridge, which had leased the commercial port of
Darwin. Robb also said that some US leaders did not understand China and were tooparanoid about the country. He said that it was no longer the Cold War and that a policyof trying to contain China would not work. It was reported that Robb’s comments visibly
irritated Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, who attended the dinner.62
Robb’s complaints were aimed at the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme (FITS)
Bill, which the Turnbull government submitted to the Parliament in December 2017,
coming into effect one year later. Under FITS, individuals or entities were required toregister certain activities in Australia for political or government influence, such as
lobbying, communications, and payment of money or things of value, if they were taken
on behalf of a foreign principal, i.e., a government, a political organisation, a governmentrelated entity or a government-related individual. If an individual or an entity failed tocomply with FITS obligations, to register in circumstances where a person was required
to do so, or provided false or misleading information, or destroyed records to avoid
registration obligations, they would be in violation.63
Hamilton & Alex Joske, “Political Networking the Chinese Way-Sydney MP and His‘Community Adviser’, Sydney Morning Herald, June 22, 2017”, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/
federal/political-networking-the-chinese-way-a-sydney-mp-and-his-community-adviser-20170622gww0k6.html.
62 Andrew Tillett, “US Leaders Too ‘Paranoid’ about China, Andrew Robb Tells Coalition MPs,
Australian Financial Review, December 8, 2017”, https://www.afr.com/politics/us-leaders-too-parano
id-about-china-andrew-robb-tells-coalition-mps-20171208-h01fmb.
63 “Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme, Attorney-General’s Department, AustralianGovernment”, https://www.ag.gov.au/integrity/foreign-influence-transparency-scheme.
61 Clive

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Chapter 9—Evolution of China’s Influence in Australia: 1996 to Today[Fukushima]

The Chinese embassy in Canberra immediately issued an unusually fierce statement
against FITS: “Some Australian politicians and government officials also madeirresponsible remarks to the detriment of political mutual trust between China andAustralia. We categorically reject those allegations (of interference into Australianpolitics)”. The embassy urged Australia to look at China “in an objective, fair, and rationalmanner”. In its Chinese edition, the Global Times, the CCP’s tabloid paper, attacked
Canberra’s move as “reminding us of McCarthyism”. The paper went on to describe
Australia as “obsessed with antagonism against China” and “one of those most actively
making trouble against China, like a piece of chewing gum sticking to the sole of a
Chinese shoe”.64
Prime Minister Turnbull was undaunted in introducing the FITS, telling the Parliament,
switching between Mandarin and English: “Modern China was founded in 1949 withthese words: ‘The Chinese people have stood up’ (Mao Zedong’s remark). It was an
assertion of sovereignty, it was an assertion of pride and we stand up and so we say, theAustralian people stand up”. China’s Foreign Ministry described Turnbull’s remarks ascatering to irresponsible reports by some Australian media that were “without principle
and full of bias against China”. 65 Turnbull’s strong remarks showed his strong
determination for FITS, while China’s furious response reflected its strong aversion to
the allegation of foreign interference. At this time, tensions began growing in Australia–
China relations.
According to the observation by one analyst, the downfall of Dastyari was symbolic of afundamental change in the nature of Australia’s relationship with China, as significant as
Brexit for the UK or the election of Donald Trump for the US. Although China’s
Communist regime had long challenged Australia’s liberal democratic values, Australianpolitical, business, and educational leaders had produced “endless platitudes” about thepartnership with China, leading them to ignore the “complex realities of the party-state”.
Beijing’s fierce attack on FITS as anti-China was an attempt to contain honest discussion
on China in Australia; however, the unsayable became now sayable that the Leninist
party-state tried to influence Australian political and public life in its interests. Now,

64 Primrose Riordan & Rowan Callick, “Chinese Embassy Says Foreign Interference Laws Undermine

Trust, The Australian, December 6, 2017”, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreignaffairs/chinese-embassy-says-foreign-interference-laws-undermine-trust/news-story/ab4c99f69ef60f
01b569d380ba1fc2d4.
65 Christopher Knaus & Tom Phillips, “Turnbull Says Australia Will ‘Stand Up’ to China as Foreign
Influence Row Heats Up, The Guardian, December 9, 2017”, https://www.theguardian.com/australianews/2017/dec/09/china-says-turnbulls-remarks-have-poisoned-the-atmosphere-of-relations.

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133

academics, policymakers, professionals, and journalists can directly raise questions about
CCP’s operations in Australia.66
From December 2017, Beijing attempted to punish Australia for its alarm at China’s
interference. China’s embassy and consulates began to post the following warnings ontheir Chinese-language sites: “All Chinese students in Australia are warned to be on thealert for possible threats to their safety…Attacks and insults targeting Chinese students
have been taking place around Australia”. No such report was made in the Australian
media, which had closely followed the violence against Indian students in 2012. In
February 2018, China’s Ministry of Education issued similar warnings, targeting students
and their parents in China.67
Australian universities were the weakest link from China’s influence, as they heavily
depended on cash flows from tuition paid by overseas students. At the same time,
Australian students did not have to pay their tuition until they could earn a certain income
after graduation. In early 2018, the China Scholarship Council, overseen by the Chinese
Ministry of Education, raised concerns about the visa approval process for Ph.D students
taking up to 12 months due to vetting by intelligence agencies. The Global Times urged
students who wished to study in Australia to carefully consider the possibility of thesevisa delays.68
In January 2018, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sydney argued against calling
Chinese students spies without any evidence, accusing the Turnbull government of“Sinophobic blatherings”.69 Australia’s university leaders continued to grumble about the
government’s tougher stance against China’s influence throughout the year. In August,Turnbull responded to their anxieties in his “China reset” speech at the University of New
South Wales, not the University of Sydney, from which he graduated. In the earlier partof the speech, Turnbull recognised the significant role of universities in Australia’s
66 Mark Harrison, “Saying the Unsayable in Australia’s Relations with China, The Interpreter, Lowy

Institute, December 15, 2017”, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/saying-unsayable-austra
lia-s-relations-china.
67 John Fitzgerald, “Australia on Its Own When Managing Foreign Influence on Australian Soil,
Australian Financial Review, March 15, 2018”, https://www.afr.com/world/asia/australia-is-on-itsown-as-beijing-demonstrates-its-power-in-the-region-20180312-h0xbze.
68 Michal Smith & Robert Bolton, “China Raises Concerns about Student Visa Delays, AustralianFinancial Review, March 13, 2018”, https://www.afr.com/policy/health-and-education/china-raisesconcerns-about-student-visa-delays-20180313-h0xep0.
69 Andrew Clark, “Sydney Uni’s Michael Spence Lashes Government over ‘Sinophobic Blatherings’,
Australian Financial Review, January 28, 2018”, https://www.afr.com/policy/health-and- education/
sydney-unis-michael-spence-lashes-government-over-sinophobic-blatherings-20180128-h0pjc4.

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Chapter 9—Evolution of China’s Influence in Australia: 1996 to Today[Fukushima]engagement with the Indo–Pacific region, citing various academic collaborations between
Australian and Chinese scholars, universities, and companies. He clarified that Australia
should continue to welcome Chinese students, emphasising that Australia could enjoy the
economic benefits most when it remained open. He even said that his government was
looking forward to working with China on Belt and Road initiative projects. 70 The
Turnbull speech was well received by the Australian business circle and the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as “positive remarks”.71
According to one prominent security expert, Turnbull never conceded over China’s furywith FITS, and his “milder rhetoric” was not the return to the “old normal” in Australia–
China relations, where the strategic risks of a rising China or the fundamental differenceof political values were “unsustainably censored”. Instead, the speech revealed the“grammar of a new normal” of the multipolar regional system where Australia sought
security and prosperity with many partners, “not simply replacing an unpredictable
Washington for an authoritarian Beijing”, as Turnbull emphasised rule-based order.72
Turnbull had become a lame duck as Prime Minister by that time due to the intraparty
revolt from conservatives who had been angry at his coup against Abbott in 2015.
However, the Turnbull government showed it was on a “new normal” track when it
announced the measure to reject “the vendors who are likely to be subject to extrajudicial
directions from a foreign government that conflict with Australian law” from Australia’s
5G network. This move effectively excluded China’s Huawei and ZTE.73 This was the
final decision made by the Turnbull government, against which the Chinese Ministry ofForeign Affairs showed concern and urged Australia not to create “artificial obstacles”
between Australian and Chinese companies.74 The fact that China reacted to Australia’s
5G ban in a more reserved manner reflects that FITS was the real target of Beijing’s fury.
70 “Prime Minister of Australia, The Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP Speech at the University of New

South Wales, Australian Embassy China, August 7, 2018”, https://china.embassy.gov.au/bjng/180807
pmspeech.html.
71 Andrew Tillett, “China Commends Malcolm Turnbull for Conciliatory Tone, Easing of Tensions,
Australian Financial Review, August 8, 2018”, https://www.afr.com/politics/china-commends-malcol
m-turnbull-for-conciliatory-tone-easing-of-tensions-20180808-h13p5o.
72 Rory Medcalf, “Malcolm Turnbull Speech Places China in Multipolar System, Australian Financial
Review, August 8, 2018”, https://www.afr.com/opinion/malcolm-turnbull-speech-places-china-in-mu
ltipolar-system-20180808-h13ppk.
73 Michael Shoebridge, “Huawei and 5G: Clarity in an Uncertain World, The Strategist, AustralianStrategic Policy Institute, August 24, 2018”, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/huawei-and-5g-clarityin-an-uncertain-world/.
74 Glenda Korporaal, “China’s Grave Concern at Decision to Ban Companies from Participating inAustralia’s Network, The Australian, August 23, 2018”, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/ business/chinas-grave-concern-at-decision-to-ban-companies-from-participating-in-australias-5g- network/ne
ws-story/607331d2c5c285b30aad8ffe86ee0c5a.

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135（2）COALITION GOVERNMENT UNDER SCOTT MORRISON, 2018–2022
Turnbull’s successor was Treasurer Scott Morrison, a soft conservative who could luckily
become the Liberal leader, gaining support from the moderates over hard conservative
former Minister for Home Affairs, Peter Dutton. China tried to determine the stance ofthe new Australian government, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi welcoming his
Australian counterpart Marise Payne in Beijing in November. This conference was thefirst Australia–China foreign ministers meeting in almost three years, with both ministers
agreeing to trilateral cooperation involving Pacific island states.75
Nonetheless, in the same month, Treasurer Josh Frydenberg blocked the takeover bid of
the nation’s gas pipeline operator APA Group by Hong Kong’s CK Infrastructure on
national interest grounds because it would establish a dominant foreign player in the gas
and electricity sectors.76 While FITS took effect in December 2018, the new legislation
did not punish Sam Dastyari even if he was not registered because Huang Xiangmo wasa permanent Australian resident who was not treated as a foreign principal under thescheme.77 Therefore, ASIO ordered the cancellation of Huang’s permanent residency inAustralia while he was in Hong Kong for his business in February 2019, claiming he was“amenable to conducting acts of foreign interference”.78 The Morrison government had
inherited the “new normal” approach to China relations of the Turnbull government.
Conversely, in January, the Beijing Municipal State Security Bureau arrested Yang
Hengjun, an Australian citizen with Chinese background, writer, and activist, because hewas suspected of “endangering state security” through espionage.79 While Yang’s trial
began in secret in May 2021, his verdict has been postponed seven times and remains
75 Kirsty Needham, “Australia a ‘Partner, Not a Rival’, Says China, as Relations Warm Up, Sydney

Morning Herald, November 8, 2018”, https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/australia-a-partner-not-arival-says-china-as-relations-warm-up-20181108-p50evi.html.
76 Perry Williams, “CKI’s Bid for APA Abandoned after Treasurer Blocks Takeover on National
Interest Grounds, The Australian, November 21, 2018”, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/ business/
ck-infrastructures-bid-for-apa-group-rejected/news-story/b762b8c63f1a087d77a305c87315b172.
77 Kelsey Munro, “Australia’s New Foreign-influence Laws: Who is Targeted, The Interpreter, Lowy
Institute, December 4, 2018”, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-s-new-foreigninfluence-laws-who-targeted.
78 Su-Lin Tan, “Banned Billionaire Huang Xiangmo to Liberal and Labor: I Want My Money Back,
Australian Financial Review, February 8, 2019”, https://www.afr.com/politics/banned-billionaire-hua
ng-xiangmo-to-liberal-and-labor-i-want-my-money-back-20190208-h1b0e0.
79 Primrose Riordan & Glenda Korporaal, “Aussie Writer Yang Hengjun a ‘Threat to China’s Security’,
The Australian, January 25, 2019”, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/
aussie-writer-yang-hengjun-a-threat-to-chinas-security/news-story/71d3f204631ca9801cl1d81cf752
394ed.

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unannounced.80 In February, according to Reuters, the Dalian Port Group imposed an
indefinite ban on imports of Australian coal on environmental grounds, while other major
ports in China prolonged clearing times for Australian coal to at least 40 days. 81 At first,
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the Reuters report of the ban on Australiancoal; however, they later insisted that the report was false and that customs in every port
in China were taking coal, including those from Australia.82
The Morrison government countered these coercive actions with provocative statementsthat amplified Beijing’s anger. In his speech in Chicago in September 2019, Morrison
stated that China’s growth was welcome in Australia. Furthermore, due to economic
maturity, China should be treated as a “newly developed economy” by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) or other international institutions. This stance meant that the WTO
should lift concessions for China as a developing country.83 Morrison’s speech came acouple of days after he was invited to the state dinner hosted by President Donald Trump,and Trump himself had been pressuring the WTO to stop treating China as a developing
nation. Therefore, Morrison’s proposal can be regarded as his demonstration of sympathy
with the Trump administration’s stance on China. In response, the Chinese embassy inCanberra countered Morrison’s claim that China was a “newly developed economy” as“both one-sided and unfair” and “basically an echo of what the US has claimed”.84 Whiledenying any intention to seek hegemony or spheres of influence, the Chinese Ambassador
to Australia, Cheng Jingye, urged some Australians not to forget that their economic
growth in the last three decades owed a lot to exports to China.85
China showed far harsher responses when Foreign Minister Payne called for a global
inquiry into the origins of the coronavirus pandemic, including China’s handling of the

80 “Australian Government ‘Deeply Troubled’ by Delays to Writer Yang Hengjun’s Espionage Trial

Verdict in China, ABC News, January 19, 2019”, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-01-19/australiatroubled-writers-espionage-trial-verdict-delayed-china/101873180.
81 Reuters, “Chinese Port Bans Imports of Australian Coal, Sending Dollar Tumbling, The Guardian,February 21, 2019”, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1QA0F1/
82 Michael Smith & Andrew Tillett, “Fears Australian Coal Might be Caught in US-China Trade War
Crossfire, Australian Financial Review, February 22, 2019”, https://www.afr.com/world/asia/fears-au
stralian-coal-might-be-caught-in-uschina-trade-war-crossfire-20190222-h1blso.
83 Phillip Coorey, “PM Push to Wind Back China’s Trade Benefits, Australian Financial Review,
September 24, 2019”, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/pm-presses-china-on-wto-reform-201909
23-p52u3h
84 Andrew Tillett, “‘One-sided and Unfair’: China Hardens Rhetoric against Scott Morrison,
Australian Financial Review, September 26, 2019”, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/one-sidedand-unfair-china-hardens-rhetoric-against-scott-morrison-20190926-p52v3r.
85 Ben Packham, “Our Economic Miracle Delivers Aussie Dream, Says Chinese Ambassador, The
Australian, October 1, 2019”, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/our-economic-miracle-delivers-aussie-dream-says-chinese-ambassador/news-story/fb38e5857bf324cddb71a21dfb248ed7.

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initial outbreak in the city of Wuhan. Payne stated, “The issues around the coronavirus
are issues for independent review, and I think that it is more important that we do that. In
fact, Australia will absolutely insist on that”. 86 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
immediately rejected Payne’s claim as “not based on facts”. 87 Since Payne’s remarks
came without the prior knowledge of her Department’s Secretary, they were highly
political in line with Morrison’s WTO speech. 88 A couple of days later, Morrison
confirmed his support for Payne’s remarks and urged China to accept an independent
investigation into the origins of the coronavirus pandemic.89
This time, Ambassador Cheng issued a dire warning against the proposal for aninternational independent investigation of the origins of COVID-19 by Payne andMorrison, branding it as “a kind of teaming up with those forces in Washington and tolaunch a kind of political campaign against China”. He said, “The Chinese public isfrustrated, dismayed and disappointed with what Australia is doing now” and pointed out
the possibility that the Chinese people would be discouraged to go to Australia for tourism
and to study and to buy Australia wine and beef.90 In 2020, Beijing began to impose some
restrictions on imports of nine Australian products: coal, copper, frozen beef, wine, cotton,barley, rough wood, lobster, and hay. These restrictions culminated in a total export loss
for Australia of A$3 billion in 2020, A$25 billion in 2021, and A$31 billion in 2022.91
China’s economic coercion did not deter the Morrison government from provocation
against Beijing. In June 2020, ASIO raided the office of NSW Labor MP Shaoquett
Moselmane, who had written China-friendly essays, as the first case of investigation

Brett Worthington, “Marise Payne Calls for Global Inquiry into China’s Handling of theCoronavirus Outbreak, ABC News, April 19, 2020”, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-19/payne-calls-for-inquiry-china-handling-of-coronavirus-covid-19/12162968.
87 Andrew Tillett & Michael Smith, “China Rejects Call for Independent Scrutiny of Virus Origins,
Australian Financial Review, April 20, 2020”, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/china-rejects-callfor-independent-scrutiny-of-virus-origins-20200420-p54lb6.
88 Paul Kelly, Morrison’s Mission: How a Beginner Reshaped Australian Foreign Policy, Sydney:
Lowy Institute, 2022, Chapter 5.
89 Andrew Tillett, “China Should Back Virus Probe: PM, Australian Financial Review, April 23,
2020”, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/later-china-should-back-virus-probe-pm-says-20200423p54mlm.
90 Andrew Tillett, “China Consumer Backlash Looms over Morrison’s Coronavirus Probe, AustralianFinancial Review, April 26, 2020”, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/china-consumer-backlashlooms-over-morrison-s-coronavirus-probe-20200423-p54mpl.
91 Mike Adams & Ron Wickes, “Standing Up to Chinese Economic Coercion: Is Australia a Model of
Economic Resilience? Institute for International Trade, University of Adelaide, May 17, 2023”,
https://iit.adelaide.edu.au/news/list/2023/05/17/standing-up-to-chinese-economic-coercion-is-australi
a-a-model-of-economic.
86

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along with FITS.92 At the same time, ASIO interviewed two Chinese journalists who weremembers of a WeChat group with Moselmane in September. They revealed that two
Chinese academics, also members of the WeChat group, had their Australian visas
cancelled. Anticipating Beijing’s retaliation, Canberra urged the two remaining
Australian journalists to leave China, with Chinese officials interviewing them at the
airports. 93 Two weeks after the visa cancellation of Chinese scholars, Beijing also
cancelled the visas for Professor Hamilton and an Australian China analyst. 94 In August,the Chinese government notified its Australian counterpart that Australian citizen and TV
anchor Cheng Lei had been arrested for unknown reasons.95
Although tensions were growing between the two countries, the Morrison government
further tightened its grip on China. In November, Foreign Minister Payne submitted a billto the parliament to establish the Foreign Arrangements Scheme. This bill allowed her todisapprove or terminate new or existing arrangements entered by state and territory
governments, local governments, and Australian public universities with foreign entities
if she determined they were not in the national interest.96
This bill was the last action, infuriating Beijing. The Chinese embassy in Canberra took
an extraordinary step to deliberately leak the dossier of China’s 14 grievances to theAustralian media, and a Chinese official said, “China is angry. If you make China theenemy, China will be the enemy”. The 14 grievances included: 1) foreign investment
restrictions; 2) the banning of Huawei and ZTE from 5G; 3) FITS; 4) the revoke ofChinese scholars’ visas; 5) call for international independent inquiry into the COVID-19;
6) the interference in China’s Xinjian, Hong Kong and Taiwan affairs; 7) the first nonlittoral country to make a statement on the South China Sea to the United Nations; 8)
siding with the US’s anti-China campaign; 9) the Foreign Arrangements Scheme bill; 10)providing fund to anti-China think tank; 11) the raid to Chinese journalists’ homes; 12)allegations against China on cyber attacks; 13) MPs’ condemnation of CCP; and 14) an
92 Nick McKenzie & Joel Tozer, “NSW MP’s Sydney Home Raided as ASIO Probes China Links,

Sydney Morning Herald, April 26, 2020”, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/nsw/nsw-mp-s-sydneyhome-raided-as-asio-probes-china-links-20200626-p556f6.html.
93 Michael Smith, “‘I Feared Being Disappeared’: Inside My Escape from China, Australian Financial
Review, September 8, 2020”, https://www.afr.com/world/asia/inside-my-escape-from-china-202009
08-p55ti7.
94 Eryk Bagshaw, “Beijing Bans Australian Researcher in Tit-for-Tat, Sydney Morning Herald,
September 24, 2020”, https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/beijing-bans-australian-researchers-in-titfor-tat-20200924-p55yus.html.
95 Eryk Bagshaw, “Australian TV anchor Cheng Lei Detained in China, Sydney Morning Herald,
August 31, 2020”, https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/australian-tv-anchor-cheng-lei-detained-in-ch
ina-20200831-p55r3j.html.
96 “Foreign Arrangements Scheme, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, AustralianGovernment”, https://www.foreignarrangements.gov.au/.

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antagonistic report on China by media. 97 Grievances 10, 12, 13, and 14 are false
accusations just to lay blame on Australia.
Undaunted by Beijing’s ire, Foreign Minister Payne announced the cancellation of theBelt and Road Initiative and two education agreements concluded between the Victorian
State government and China. The Chinese embassy in Canberra blasted the move,suggesting, “the Australian government has no sincerity in improving China–Australia
relations”.98
One of the reasons the Morrison government seemed to deliberately repeat offensive
measures against Beijing was to take advantage of the deteriorating perception of China
and impress the Australian public with the Coalition’s close links with the US and its firm
stance against China. In a 2018 opinion poll regarding the question, “In your own view,is China more of an economic partner or more of a security threat to Australia”, 82%
answered as an economic partner and 12% as a security threat. In contrast, in 2019, 55%
answered as an economic partner and 41% as a security threat. In 2020, 63% felt China
was a security threat, and 34% answered that it was an economic partner.99 Traditionally,
the Labor governments, except for the Rudd government, had shown conciliatory
attitudes towards China. When the Morrison government called for an international
independent inquiry on the origin of COVID-19, if Labor politicians had raised opposition
to provocative statements against Beijing, Morrison could have blamed the Labor Party
for its soft stance towards China’s handling of the pandemic. Probably conscious of such
Coalition tactics, Opposition Leader Anthony Albanese offered bipartisan support for thegovernment’s proposal as “sensible”.100 For the same reason, when Morrison surprised
the world with the new nuclear submarine project under AUKUS, the Labor Party’s
leadership, shadow cabinet, and caucus endorsed the project in principle. It was reported
that the four senior Labor Party figures (including Albanese, who had been briefed about

97 Jonathan Kearsley, Eryk Bagshaw & Anthony Galloway, “‘If You Make China the Enemy, China

Will be the Enemy’: Beijing’s Fresh Threat to Australia, Sydney Morning Herald, November 18,
2020”, https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/if-you-make-china-the-enemy-china-will-be-the-enemybeijing-s-fresh-threat-to-australia-20201118-p56fqs.html.
98 Anthony Galloway & Eryk Bagshaw, “Victoria’s Belt and Road Deal with China Torn Up, Sydney
Morning Herald, April 22, 2021”, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/victoria-s-belt-and-roaddeal-with-china-torn-up-20210421-p57l9q.html.
99 Natasha Kassam, “Lowy Institute Poll 2022, Lowy Institute, June 29, 2022”, https://poll.lowyinsti
tute.org/report/2022/.
100 Andrew Tillett, “China Should Back Virus Probe: PM, Australian Financial Review, April 23,
2020”, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/later-china-should-back-virus-probe-pm-says-20200423p54mlm.

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the project) had shown their commitments, although strong anti-nuclear sentiments
prevailed among some party sections.101
Morrison’s tough stance against Beijing paid off, as China’s economic coercion did notcause as much damage to the Australian economy as expected. Since 2019, Japan, Korea,
Taiwan, and India (Australia’s second, third, fourth, and fifth largest export markets) haveeach doubled their imports from Australia, offsetting China’s coercion. Exports toVietnam and Indonesia also doubled, while sales to the Philippines and Thailand
increased by around 80%.102
Nonetheless, the Coalition government received a severe blow from Beijing in its final
stages. The Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched their diplomatic relations from Taiwan
to China in 2019, and the Solomon Islands concluded a security agreement that allowed
the Chinese military and police to station in the archipelago just north of Australia’s
mainland in April 2022. At this time, tough electoral campaigns were being fought inAustralia. Shadow Foreign Minister Penny Wong insisted on the significance of looking
after security in the neighbouring region and claimed: “Mr Morrison has dropped the ballon that task”.103
Prime Minister Morrison was not negligent about the Pacific island countries. From theoutset, he clarified his commitment to “Pacific step-up”. In November, Australia andPapua New Guinea (PNG) agreed to develop a joint facility at the Lombrum naval baseon PNG’s Manus Island. The US also agreed to support the joint facility, which would
host more warships, including the US Navy.104 The Morrison government also agreed topartly finance Australia’s telecom giant Telstra’s bid to purchase Digicel Pacific, thelargest mobile phone carrier in the Pacific, in which Huawei had shown strong interest.105
However, only a junior Minister for International Development and the Pacific was sent
101 Paul Kelly, “AUKUS Alliance: Morrison Has Seated Australia at Top Table of Diplomacy”, The

Australian, September 25, 2021.
102 David Uren, “Why China’s Coercion of Australia Failed, The Strategist, Australian Institute ofStrategic Studies, April 27, 2023”, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-chinas-coercion-of-australia-failed/.
103 Katina Curtis, “‘Q&A in Honiara’: Scott Morrison Dismisses Labor’s Plan to Step Up in the Pacific,
Sydney Morning Herald, April 26, 2022”, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/q-and-a-inhoniara-scott-morrison-dismisses-labor-s-plan-to-step-up-in-the-pacific-20220426-p5ag2e.html.
104 Katharine Murphy, “America to Partner with Australia to Develop Naval Base on Manus Island,
The Guardian, November 17, 2018”, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/nov/18/amer
ica-to-partner-with-australia-to-develop-naval-base-on-manus-island.
105 Marian Faa, Stephen Dziedzic & Annika Burgess, “Telstra to buy Pacific Arm of
Telecommunications Giant Digicel with Canberra’s Support amid China’s Rising Influence, ABC
News, October 25, 2021”, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-25/telstra- digicel-pacific-telecomm
unications-deal-finalised/100564976.

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to Honiara, not Foreign Minister Payne, in response to the security agreement with China.
Even if this period fell on Australia’s election caretaker period, this action demonstrated
the limit of Morrison’s “Pacific step-up”.106
China was trying to capitalise on the weakness of the Coalition government in response
to pressure from the Pacific island countries. Morrison had been blamed for his inaction
against climate change in the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) summit meeting.107 Within the
Coalition, conservative politicians have held such a strong attachment to coal exports thatthey tended to be sceptical about climate change and averse to emission reduction. As aresult, in the May 2022 election, the Coalition’s electoral platform presented the target ofemission reduction of only 26%–28% by 2030, in contrast to the Labor Party’s 43% by2030.108 Soon after the election results were confirmed, China’s Foreign Minister Wang
Yi completed 10-day visits to eight Pacific island countries, had virtual meetings with hiscounterparts of the 10 Pacific countries, and tried to conclude security agreements similar
to those with the Solomon Islands.109 China’s hasty attempt seemed to be a last-minuterush in the Pacific before the Australian voters replaced the climate change sceptic
Coalition government with an islanders-friendly Labor government.
（ 3 ） ATTEMPTS BY THE LABOR GOVERNMENT UNDER ANTHONY ALBANESE TOSTABILISE CHINA RELATIONS, 2022–
From the outset, the Labor government under Prime Minister Anthony Albanese clarified
that it would continue the previous Coalition governments’ fundamental foreign andsecurity policies. On May 24, only three days after the election, Albanese attended thefirst face-to-face QUAD summit meeting in Tokyo. Along with Japanese Prime Minister
Fumio Kishida, US President Joe Biden, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, heissued a joint statement that they shared a “steadfast commitment to a free and open Indo–
Pacific that is inclusive and resilient”. In his opening remarks at the QUAD leaders’
106 Andrew Greene, “Australia’s Pacific Minister Zed Seselja Urges Solomon Islands Prime Minister

Not to Sign China Security Deal, ABC News, April 13, 2022”, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-0413/pacific-minister-solomon-islands-china-security-deal/100989656.
107 Erin Handley, “Australia Accused of Putting Coal before Pacific ‘Family’ as Region Calls for
Climate Change Action, ABC News, August 16, 2019”, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-0816/australia-slammed-watering-down-action-climate-change-pacific/11420986.
108 Climate Council, “Where Do Australia’s Major Parties Stand on Climate Action?”,https://www.climatecouncil.org.au/resources/australias-major-parties-climate-action-policy-2022/.
109 Kate Lyons, “China’s Foreign Minister Tells Pacific Leaders ‘Don’t Be Too Anxious’ After They
Reject Regional Security Pac, The Guardian, May 30, 2022”, https://www.theguardian.com/world/20
22/may/30/chinas-foreign-minister-to-meet-with-pacific-nations-amid-push-for-sweeping-reginal-de
al.

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Chapter 9—Evolution of China’s Influence in Australia: 1996 to Today[Fukushima]meeting, Albanese stated, “We have had a change of government in Australia, but
Australia’s commitment to the Quad has not changed and will not change”. 110 In
September 2022, Albanese issued a joint statement alongside US President Joe Biden andBritish Prime Minister Liz Truss that the three countries remained committed to pursuing
AUKUS at its first anniversary, while Australia would not acquire nuclear weapons.111
Concerning relations with China, the new Labor government refrained from provocative
actions, as the Morrison government had done. Therefore, China agreed to hold the firstforeign ministers’ meeting with Australia for nearly three years on the sidelines of theG20 foreign ministers’ meeting in Bali in July. Australia’s first foreign minister with
Asian background, Penny Wong, described her meeting with her counterpart Wang Yi as“the first step towards stabilising the relationship”. At the same time, she raised questions
about China’s trade coercion and the detention of Australian journalist Cheng Lei andwriter Yang Hengiun.112
At the meeting, Wang gave her a list of four demands to improve the relationship. First,
Australia should treat China as a “partner rather than a rival”. Second, the two countries
should seek “common ground while shelving differences”. Third, Australia should reject“manipulation by a third party”. Fourth, both countries should build “public support
featuring positiveness and pragmatism”. Albanese refused to “respond to demand”,
vowing to “respond to our own national interest”. The Global Times wrote that Albanese
had yielded to “the unhealthy atmosphere within Australia towards China”, blaming theMorrison government for the deterioration of bilateral relations.113 Wong also confirmedthat she had told Wang privately, “The Government of Australia has changed, but our
national interests and sovereign choices have not”.114

110 Isabella Keith, “27 May: The Week in Australian Foreign Affairs, Australian Outlook, AustralianInstitute of International Affairs, May 27, 2022”, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianloo
k/27-may-the-week-in-australian-foreign-affairs/.
111 Prime Minister of Australia, The Hon Anthony Albanese, “Joint Leaders Statement to Mark One
Year of AUKUS, Media Statement, September 24, 2022”, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/jointleaders-statement-mark-one-year-aukus.
112 Chris Barrett, “Wong Meets Wang as Ministers Attempt to Stabilise China-Australia Relations,Sydney Morning Herald, July 8, 2022”, https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/wong-meets-wang-asministers-attempt-to-stabilise-china-australia-relations-20220708-p5b0a8.html.
113 Will Glasgow, “Beijing Says ‘Anti-China Forces’ Manipulating Anthony Albanese, The Australian,
July 13, 2022”, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/world/beijing-says-antichina-forces-manipulatinganthony-albanese/news-story/3ad0a1afd2010ebf25de5f367cf1ce13.
114 Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, “Sunrise with Natalie Barr, Transcript,
July 13, 2022”, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/transcript/sunrise-nataliebarr.

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China’s four-point demands reflected Beijing’s hope to bring bilateral relations back into
the situations before the Turnbull government, i.e., without FITS, relaxed foreign
investment, more attachment to economic benefits rather than security and a friendly
stance towards China. However, the Albanese government did not show sympathetic
attitudes, prompting the Global Times to attack the forces manipulating Albanese.
However, the Labor government has consistently emphasised that Australia will
cooperate with China wherever possible but will prioritise national interest andsovereignty while avoiding provocative measures to “stabilise” bilateral relations.
Faced with Australia’s determined stance, Beijing seemed to soften its position. On thesidelines of the UN General Assembly in September, Wong had another meeting with
Wang. This time, indicating that 2022 marked the 50th anniversary of China–Australia
diplomatic relations, Wang showed China’s willingness to resolve differences andpromote healthy and stable development of bilateral relations, emphasising that “the twosides should meet each other halfway”.115 The Chinese side did not resurrect the fourpoint demands. Wang’s remark to “meet each other halfway” suggests that the Chinese
Foreign Minister had accepted Australia’s approach to defend its national interest andsovereignty. At the same time, China’s new ambassador to Canberra, Xiao Qian,
mentioned the possibility that detained Cheng Lei could talk to her children and even
hoped for Albanese’s meeting with President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of somemultilateral summit meeting.116
In November, Prime Minister Albanese met President Xi on the sidelines of the G20
summit meeting in Bali. Albanese said he could talk to Xi “constructively and respectfully”
and put Australia’s position “clearly, firmly, but politely”. At the same time, Xi praised
Albanese for handling China–Australia relations “in a mature manner”, adding that
“China attaches importance in Australia’s recent willingness to improve and develop
bilateral relations”. Xi did not raise AUKUS at the meeting. 117 While there was nosettlement over China’s economic coercion and the detention of Australian citizens, Xi’s
stance suggests that China found it in its interest to retain Australia as an important
115 Will Glasgow, “China Ready to Meet Australia ‘Halfway’, Xi’s Envoy Tells Penny Wong, The

Australian, September 25, 2022”, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/world/china -ready-to-meet-aust
ralia-halfway-xis-envoy-tells-penny-wong/news-story/5a77154d6a047f85f9365f5ccca57a24.
116 Geoff Raby, “Where There Is a Will, There Is a Way to Repair China Relations, AustralianFinancial Review, September 26, 2022”, https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/where-there-isa-will-there-is-a-way-to-repair-china-relations-20220925-p5bkvx.
117 Matthew Knott & David Crowe, “Xi Jinping Meets with Anthony Albanese, Ending Diplomatic
Deep Freeze, Sydney Morning Herald, November 15, 2022”, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/xi-jinping-meets-with-albanese-ending-diplomatic-deep-freeze-20221115-p5byhb.html.

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Chapter 9—Evolution of China’s Influence in Australia: 1996 to Today[Fukushima]economic partner, especially given the quest to establish alternative supply chains under
AUKUS and QUAD.
At the 50th anniversary of Australia–China diplomatic relations, Foreign Minister Wong
was invited to Beijing for the first time as an Australian minister since 2019. In her
meeting with her counterpart, Wong raised the detention of Australian citizens, trade
blockages, human rights, and global laws and rules underpinning Australia’s security. At
the same time, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang emphasised the complementary nature of
the two economies. Although the meeting produced no concrete outcome, both sides
showed willingness to negotiate the bilateral problems.118
The year 2023 saw steady progress in Australia’s efforts to improve relations with China.
In February, Trade Minister Don Farrell met with his Chinese counterpart via
teleconference and agreed to enhance dialogue as a “pathway towards the timely and fullresumption of trade”. Farrell accepted an invitation to travel to Beijing,119 suggesting that
Beijing was willing to negotiate with Canberra. In April, China agreed to undertake an
expedited review of its 80.5% duties on Australian barley imposed since 2020. In return,
Australia agreed to suspend its WTO appeal against Chinese duties for three months. The
deal was made during the visit to Canberra by China’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
the first senior Chinese official’s visit since 2017.120 In August, China’s Ministry ofCommerce announced the removal of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on barleyimports from Australia, just before Australia’s appeal to the WTO was resumed.121
In September, after meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang on the sidelines of the East
Asia Summit in Jakarta, Albanese announced that he would travel to China to mark the50th anniversary of Gough Whitlam’s first visit to China as Australian Prime Minister.122
118 Matthew Knott & Clare Armstrong, “‘Very Different Countries’: Wong Bridges Great Divide inHigh-stakes Beijing Meeting, Sydney Morning Herald, December 31, 2022”, https://www.smh.com.
au/politics/federal/china-talks-canvass-trade-human-rights-global-tensions-in-high-stakes-beijing-me
eting-20221221-p5c835.html.
119 Minister for Trade and Tourism, Special Minister of State, Senator the Hon Don Farrell, “Virtual
Meeting with China’s Minister of Commerce, Statement. February 6, 2023”, https://www.trademinister.gov.au/minister/don-farrell/statements/virtual-meeting-chinas-minister-commerce.
120 Andrew Tillett, Michael Smith & Campbell Kwan, “Hopes Rise for End to China Trade Bans After
Barley Tariff Deal, Australian Financial Review, April 11, 2023”, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/china-to-review-tariffs-on-australian-barley-20230411-p5czjx.
121 Andrew Tillett & Michael Smith, “China Lifts Barley Tariffs, Edging Albanese Visit Closer,
Australian Financial Review, August 4, 2023”, https://www.afr.com/world/asia/china-agrees-to-lifttariffs-on-australian-barley-20230804-p5du01.
122 Matthew Knott, “PM Will Head to China within Months after Accepting Xi Jinping’s Invitation,
Sydney Morning Herald, September 8, 2023”, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/albanese-tohead-to-china-within-months-after-accepting-xi-jinping-s-invitation-20230907-p5e2n1.html.

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After confirming Albanese’s visit, China showed goodwill when Australian journalist
Cheng Lei was released from a Beijing prison after three years of detention and reunited
with her two daughters in Melbourne. 123 This seems to be an extraordinarily big
concession because China’s Ministry of State Security claimed that Cheng had beenarrested for illegally providing state secrets to the overseas agency via her mobile phone.
The Chinese court had sentenced her to 2 years and 11 months in prison, plus deportation;
however, Cheng should have been sentenced to at least 10 years imprisonment if she hadcommitted the claimed offenses.124
A week later, Canberra returned its goodwill to Beijing when the Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet found no reason to cancel Chinese company Landbridge’s 99-yearlease of the Port of Darwin. Australia’s Anti-Dumping Commission released apreliminary recommendation that tariffs of up to 10.9% on wind towers should not be
extended after their expiry in April. China’s Ministry of Commerce had been dissatisfied
with Australia’s anti-dumping duties on steel products and welcomed this move. 125
Australia and China had agreed to suspend their WTO dispute over China’s 220% antidumping duties on Australian wine while Beijing undertook an “expedited review” ofduties, which could take five months.126 Before then, Chinese Ambassador Xiao Qian
predicted “more positive outcomes in the coming in the weeks or months” over the wine
dispute.127
This progress paved the way for Albanese’s visit to China, where, on November 6, he met
with Xi Jinping in Beijing. Albanese’s impression of the meeting was “positive” and“constructive”. He reiterated that Australia and China should “not be defined by ourdifferences and that where there are differences, you discuss them constructively”. In
123 Andrew Tillett & Michael Smith, “Cheng Lei Freed by China After Three Years in Jail, AustralianFinancial Review, October 11, 2023”, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/cheng-lei-freed-by-chinaafter-three-years-in-jail-20231011-p5ebjg.
124 Rowan Callick, “Beijing Keeps Its Secrets as Cheng Lei Walks in Sunshine, The Australian,
October 14, 2023”, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/beijing-keeps-its-secrets-as-cheng-leiwalks-in-sunshine/news-story/5386f9e52c30edac6639f9a375c74b6f.
125 Andrew Tillett & Michael Smith, “China Has Wins on Darwin Port, Wind Towers Ahead ofAlbanese Visit, Australian Financial Review, October 20, 2023”, https://www.afr.com/politics/
federal/tariffs-on-chinese-wind-towers-to-be-lifted-to-help-seal-wine-deal-20231020-p5edrs.
126 Australian Associated Press & Sarah Basford Canales, “Australia and China Suspend WTO Wine
Tariff Dispute Before Anthony Albanese’s Trip to Beijing, The Guardian, October 22, 2023”,
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/oct/22/australia-and-china-suspend-wto-wine-tari
ff-dispute-ahead-of-albanese-trip-to-beijing.
127 Andrew Tillett, “China Say Wine Tariff Hit Could End within Weeks, Australian Financial Review,
October 18, 2023”, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/china-says-wine-tariff-hit-could-end-withinweeks-20231018-p5ed6z.

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comparison, Xi mentioned China’s wish to join the Comprehensive Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership but did not mention AUKUS “explicitly”.128
Albanese’s emphasis on the difference between the two countries seems to convey to theChinese president that his government would not concede to China over Australia’sinterests, values, and sovereignty. At the meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang the nextday, Albanese agreed to provide visitors with access to three-to-five-year multientry visas
on a reciprocal basis and to resume a foreign and strategic dialogue and a joint economic
dialogue.129
Despite the considerable improvement of the once-frozen bilateral relations, the Albanese
government showed no move to relax its alert about China’s influence. In February 2023,
Treasurer Jim Chalmers blocked the bid from China’s Yuxiao Fund to increase its stakein Northen Minerals, one of Australia’s leading rare earth suppliers, from 10% to 19.9%,
to secure critical minerals supply chains.130 In July, Chalmers rejected the takeover bid ofbankrupted Alita Resources, which owned lithium mines in Western Australia, byAustroid, a US-registered company controlled by Mike Que, whose father owned alithium battery and EV manufacturer in China. This move was made to protect Australia’s
critical minerals. 131 The cautious stance on China’s investment, especially in criticalminerals, should have disappointed Beijing, signifying that the government had neverdiscarded its tough stance against Chinese investment in critical infrastructure andminerals under the Coalition.
Just one month before Albanese was to fly to Beijing, at the first Five Eyes summit in
California, ASIO’s Director-General Mike Burgess asserted: “The Chinese governmentis engaged in the most sustained, sophisticated and scaled theft of intellectual property
and expertise in human history”. He cited the case where China stole the intellectual
property of a successful Australian company by downloading malware into a staff
member’s laptop at an overseas conference. Usually, the intelligence boss does not

128 Katlheen Calderwood, “Anthony Albanese’s Visit to China Included a ‘Very Positive’ Meetingwith Xi Jinping and a Refusal to Budge on Some Issues, ABC News, November 7, 2023”, https://www.
abc.net.au/news/2023-11-07/the-key-takeaways-from-albanese-s-visit-to-china/103073390.
129 David Crowe & Eryk Bagshaw, “Flattery for ‘Handsome Boy’ Albanese as China, Australia Strike
New Deal, Sydney Morning Herald, November 7, 2023”, https://www.smh.com.au/ politics/federal/
flattery-for-handsome-boy-albanese-as-china-australia-strike-new-deal-20231107-p5eibc.html.
130 Brad Thompson, “Chalmers Blocks Chinese Investor from Rare Earths Stake, Australian Financial
Review, March 1, 2023”, https://www.afr.com/companies/mining/chalmers-blocks-chinese-investorfrom-rare-earths-stake-20230301-p5copj.
131 Tansy Harcourt, “FTRB rejects Austroid Takeover of Lithium Miner Alita Resources, The
Australian, July 20, 2023”, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/firb-rejects-aus
troid-takeover-of-lithium-miner-alita-resources/news-story/49e1a7cf51f8ba4fc854b36255097b71.

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mention China, but Burgess dared to mention it because he thought it was needed.132
Burgess’ warning reflected the intense alarm at China’s influence among the security
agencies.
The Australian public supported this sense. In the 2023 opinion poll regarding trust in
China, 44% answered not at all, 40% not very much, and 84% answered negatively.
Regarding confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping, 53% answered no confidence atall, and 26% had little confidence. An aggregate of 79% answered negatively, making
him third behind Russian President Vladimir Putin at 90% and North Korean leader Kim
Jong-un at 82%.133 These figures suggest that returning to the days when Australia did
not need to choose between the US and China is unlikely. In this sense, the Albanese
government’s approach to China is similar to the “new normal” introduced by the
Turnbull government.
Learning from the Solomon Islands’ security agreement with China, the new Labor
government took an extraordinarily active approach towards the Pacific island nations.
While the ministers of the Morrison government visited the island countries only twice in
12 months up to the May 2022 election, Albanese himself visited four times. The Defense
Minister visited 3 times, the International Development and Pacific Minister Pat Conroy
visited 7 times, the Assistant Trade Minister visited once, and the Foreign Minister Penny
Wong visited all 15 PIF member countries and 2 territories within the post-election 12
months.134 No Australian government has ever sent its ministers to the Pacific islands so
often within a short period.
The new Labor government also emphasised that Australia shared history and culture
with the Pacific countries. For example, Conroy visited the Solomon Islands to celebrate
the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Guadalcanal in August 2022. 135 In the same month,
Australia announced that it would finance $7 million over the next 2 years to establish
new Pacific Rugby League Championships, which would feature men’s and women’s
132 Farrah Tomazin, “Global Intelligence Chiefs Lash China’s ‘Sanctioned’ Theft of Intellectual

Property, Sydney Morning Herald, October 18, 2023”, https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/
global-intelligence-chiefs-lash-china-s-sanctioned-theft-of-intellectual-property-20231018- p5ed3f.ht
ml.
133 Ryan Neelam, “Lowy Institute Poll 2023, Lowy Institute, June 21, 2023”, https://poll.lowyinstitute.
org/report/2023/.
134 Isabella Keith, “The Week in Australian Foreign Affairs, Australian Outlook, Australian Instituteof International Affairs, Each Week from May 2021 to May 2023”, https://www.internationalaffairs.
org.au/?s=This+week+in+Australian+foreign+affairs.
135
Minister for International Development and the Pacific, The Hon Pat Conroy MP, “Solomon Islands,
Speech, August 7, 2022”, https://ministers.dfat.gov.au/minister/pat-conroy/speech/solomon-islands.

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teams from Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, New Zealand, PNG, Samoa, and Tonga.
Albanese says, “Geography makes us neighbours, but through sport we build strong andlasting ties across the Pacific family”.136 These moves seem to be attempts to impress the
Pacific nations with Australia’s intimacy, which China cannot share. This new Pacificfriendly policy by the Albanese government aims to counterbalance China’s advance in
the Pacific islands, Australia’s backyard.
When Albanese and Chinese Premier Li agreed to resume annual talks between leaders,ministers and officials in Beijing in early November 2023, the Australian public might
have the impression that the government strategy to stabilise China relations was working
effectively. However, a nasty incident happened soon after that. On 13 November, a PLA
Navy destroyer used its powerful sonar against Australian Navy divers and injured themduring an operation in international waters within Japan’s exclusive economic zone,
despite being warned that Australian personnel were underwater nearby. Deputy Prime
Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles stopped short of blaming China’s
offensive action, just warning it as “unsafe and unprofessional conduct”. He did not
explain why the government had waited to disclose the incident until after the APEC
summit meeting in San Francisco on the sidelines of which Albanese could meet Chinese
President Xi. Nor the government did clarify whether Albanese had raised this question
with Xi on its sidelines.137
While Coalition’s opposition leader Peter Dutton urged the government to take a resolutestance over this incident warning that Albanese should not “back peddle or soft peddle”
over matters of national interest, China’s defence ministry urged Canberra to “stopmaking reckless and irresponsible accusations against China” and insisted that China “didnot engage in any activities that may have affected the Australian divers”. 138 The
Albanese government did not make “reckless” accusations against China in that it avoided
further condemning China’s provocative sonar action.

Minister for International Development and the Pacific, The Hon Pat Conroy MP, “Pacific Rugby
League Championships, Joint Media Release, August 16, 2023”, https://ministers.dfat.gov.au/ minis
ter/pat-conroy/media-release/pacific-rugby-league-championships.
137 Sarah McPhee & Mary Ward, “Australian Navy Divers Injured After Sonar Pulses Detected from
Chinese Warship, Sydney Morning Herald, November 18, 2023”, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/
federal/australian-naval-divers-injured-by-sonar-pulses-from-chinese-warship-20231118- p5ekza.ht
ml.
138 Sarah Ison, “Anthony Albanese Urged to ‘Be Honest’ over Whether He Raised Sonar Incident withXi Jinping, The Australian, November 21, 2023”, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/
anthony-albanese-urged-to-be-honest-over-whether-he-raised-sonar-incident-with-xi-jinping/newsstory/448e66f8cff72188f969e16dc4320e291c41c6.
136

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149

Beijing seemed to have taken mean advantage of the softer approach of the Labor
government. In his new year press conference, Chinese Ambassador in Canberra Xiao
Qian denied the responsibility of PLA Navy over the sonar shot against Australian divers,
claiming a Japanese warship nearby was likely responsible. Then he expressed hope forresumption of military cooperation between ADF and PLA.139 Albanese told that hewas “not swayed” by Ambassador Xiao’s comments and reiterated that the sonar incident
was “wrong” and “shouldn’t have occurred”.140 Again the Labor government avoided
showing “wolf warrior” type hard responses adopted by the Morrison Coalition
government.
Beijing further made the next move to upset the government strategy to stabilise relations
with China. In early February, the Chinese court handed suspended death sentence toAustralian citizen, pro-democracy activist Yang Hengjun who had been detained for five
years and charged with espionage. His sentence could be commuted to life in prison after
two years. Foreign Minister Wong said that the government was “appalled” at this“harrowing news” and vowed to “continue to advocate for the interests of Dr Yang”.
However, she ruled out recalling Australian ambassador in China in protest and suggested
that the government would welcome a possible visit of Chinese Premier Li Qiang toAustralia later in the year.141
Two-year suspension of Yang’s death sentence virtually gave Beijing a hand to lead the
Albanese government in a more favourable direction, as shown in Wong’s softer response
as above. It will be forced to avoid provocative behaviour against China by all means. All
the Labor government can do to influence Beijing will be to resume its appeal with WTO
over China’s 220% anti-dumping duty on Australian wine, as Trade Minister Farrell
pledged to raise the issue with his Chinese counterpart on the sidelines of the WTO
meeting in late February. However, Canberra has no leverage to lift China’s ban on
lobster, another remaining restricted item from Australia, according to China, due to fears
of contamination.142
139 Andrew Greene, “Beijing Points Finger at Japan over Sonar Attack on Australian Warship HMAS

Toowoomba, ABC News, January 17, 2024”, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-01-17/beijing-points-finger-at-japan-warship-sonar-attack/103354026.
140 Sarah Ison & Joe Kelly, “Experts Slam Chinese Sonar Claims, The Australian, January 18, 2024”,
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-01-17/beijing-points-finger-at-japan-warship-sonar-attack/10335
4026.
141 Phillip Coorey, “Appalling Death Sentence Rocks China Relations, Australian Financial Review,
February 5, 2024”, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/appalling-death-sentence-for-dissident-rocks-beijing-relations-20240205-p5f2cq.
142 Nadia Daly, “‘On the Table, If Not on the Menu’: Minister to Discuss Wine, Lobster Trade
Restrictions with Chinese Counterpart, ABC News, February 13, 2024”, https://www.abc.net.au/news/

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Chapter 9—Evolution of China’s Influence in Australia: 1996 to Today[Fukushima]

Nonetheless, the Australian Labor Party under the leadership of Anthony Albanese would
not give in China’s pressure over national security matters including foreign interference,protection of critical infrastructure and critical minerals, once it cleared such a high hurdle
as accepting AUKUS. The Labor leadership knows very well that it will cause hugepolitical liability and will give great electoral advantage to the Coalition if the party is
regarded as weak in national security by the voters. Therefore, the Albanese government’s
stance towards China will remain the “new normal” approach adopted by the Turnbull
government, even in the advent of the suspended death sentence against Yang Hengjun.

CONCLUSION
The period of the Coalition government under Prime Minister John Howard (1996–2007)
was when Australia’s relations with China developed remarkably. When the Howard
government adopted a series of provocative actions, China was so offended that its state
media began an anti-Australia campaign. In response, Howard changed his China
approach into a friendly one, and Australia took care of China’s views. Thanks to thisfavourable shift, China came to make the most of Australia as a valuable resource supplierand a target of its foreign influence. Enjoying benefits from the rapid expansion ofChina’s trade, Howard insisted that Australia need not choose between the US as an ally
and China as an economic partner.
When Chinalco bid to increase its stake in Rio Tinto, Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
(2007–2010) was so alarmed at the possibility of China’s control of Australia’s best ironore mines that the government blocked the bid, causing Beijing’s intense anger. However,the Australian government and business circles were determined to protect the best ofAustralia’s critical iron ore mines from Chinese control. Labor Prime Minister Julia
Gillard (2010–2013) showed conciliatory attitudes towards Beijing, responding to thedomestic atmosphere that Rudd had been too provocative. Beijing, in return, agreed toenter into a strategic partnership with Australia, which the Australian media hailed as a
diplomatic victory. While Coalition Prime Minister Tony Abbott (2013–2015)
emphasised enhancing security ties with the US and Japan, his government concluded theFree Trade Agreement with China. At this stage, Abbott still believed that China washeading towards democracy.
The Coalition government under Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull was a game-changer.
The media coverage of China’s interference in Australian politics in 2016–2017 was the2024-02-13/china-trade-war/103457168.

Chapter 9—Evolution of China’s Influence in Australia: 1996 to Today[Fukushima]151

harbinger of the change in Australia’s public opinion, which had been very favorable
towards the economic benefits from China, becoming alert to China’s influence. The
Coalition government under Prime Minister Scott Morrison (2018–2022) made several
provocative statements, such as calling for an independent international inquiry into theorigin of COVID-19, triggering China’s economic coercion against a range of imported
products from Australia. It culminated in the cessation of bilateral ministerial exchanges.
Under Prime Minister Anthony Albanese (2022–), the Labor government avoided
Morrison’s provocative actions to stablise bilateral relations; however, the Labor
government remained alert to China’s investment in critical infrastructure and minerals,
and espionage while trying to expand ties with the Pacific islands nations tocounterbalance China’s advance in the region.
Finally, multicultural Australia’s unique approach to foiling foreign interference is worth
mentioning. In February 2023, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) launched an education
campaign for Australia’s ethnic communities to explain the risks of foreign interference,delivering factsheets translated into more than 30 languages, including Chinese.143 AFP
also established its Community Liaison Teams to help culturally and linguistically diverse
groups identify and report signs of foreign interference, closely collaborating with ethnic
communities.144 When a Liberal Senator requested three Chinese–Australian witnesses tocondemn the CCP at the Senate inquiry into foreign interference in diaspora communities
in October 2020, former ASIO Director-General Dennis Richardson pointed out the illeffect of questioning the loyalty of good Australians. 145 These were the approaches
adopted by the Australian law-enforcing agencies, which resulted in considerable
achievements in preventing terrorism by Muslim extremists. Maintaining good contact
with ethnic groups has proven the most effective measure to prevent the isolation ofculturally and linguistically diverse groups and to foil foreign interference.

143 AFP,“AFP Launches New Resource to Help Combat Foreign Interference, Media Release,
February 27, 2023”, https://www.afp.gov.au/news-centre/media-release/afp-launches-new-resourcehelp-combat-foreign-interference.
144 AFP, “AFP Community Liaison Teams Promote Community Safety in 2023, Media Release,
December 14, 2023”, https://www.afp.gov.au/news-centre/media-release/afp-community-liaison-tea
ms-promote-community-safety-2023.
145 Rob Harris & Anthony Galloway, “‘We’ll Be in the Dog House for Years’: Former Spy Boss Says
Mos Inflaming China Relations, Sydney Morning Herald, November 11, 2020”, https://www.smh.com.
au/politics/federal/we-ll-be-in-the-dog-house-for-years-former-spy-boss-says-mps-inflaming-china-r
elations-20201110-p56d7b.html.

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Contributors

CONTRIBUTORS
Masafumi Iida
Head, China Division, Regional Studies Department, National Institute for Defense
Studies (NIDS)Per Olsson
Senior Researcher, Department of Defence Economics, Division of Defence Analysis,
Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)
Matake Kamiya
Professor, Department of International Relations, National Defense Academy (NDA)
Johan Englund
Senior Researcher, Department of Security Policy, Division of Defence Analysis, FOI
Hideya Kurata
Professor, Department of International Relations, NDA
Christopher Weidacher Hsiung
Senior Researcher, Department of Security Policy, Division of Defence Analysis, FOI
Masahiro Kurita
Senior Fellow, Policy Simulation Division, NIDS
Oscar Almén
Deputy Research Director, Department of Security Policy, Division of Defence Analysis,
FOI
Teruhiko Fukushima
Former Professor, Department of International Relations, NDA
Visiting Professor, Kanazawa Institute of Technology

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