Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change:
Case of Meiji Restoration Japan*

Tomoko Matsumoto (Nagoya University)†andTetsuji Okazaki (The University of Tokyo)‡

Abstract
Despite its significance for regime change and state building, the impact of regime change on
elite group has not received adequate scholarly attention. Using the newly constructed 2,979
government elites’ data after the Meiji Restoration in Japan, this paper shows that the uprisingcamp changes the strategies used to recruit political elites from the regime transition phase to its
consolidation phase. Dividing the elites into the pre- and post-Meiji-Restoration born groups, weanalyze how the membership and internal ranking of political elites shifted over phases of theregime change and state building. Two main findings emerged: (1) barriers preventing
commoners’ access to the elite group were steadily lowered throughout the process and (2) once
the transfer of power was achieved, the new government reintegrated old elites into the elitegroup, and the intra-elite hierarchy again reflected the social stratum of the former regime.
Keywords: Regime Change, Social Mobility, Elites, Japan, the Meiji Restoration*

The authors thank Tomoko Masuda, Tomoya Sano, and Haruo Iguchi for valuable comments
and support on earlier drafts, including the construction of the dataset. For their valuablecomments, we are also indebted to Amy Catalinac, Akira Hara, Takeo Hoshi, Jacque Hymans,
Kaoru Iokibe, Yuko Kasuya, Yukinobu Kitamura, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Phillip Lipscy, Susan
Pharr, Yuichiro Shimizu, Yu Jin Woo, and the participants of the workshop on the frontiers ofstatistical analysis and formal theory of political science at Gakushuin University (Tokyo) andthe EPSA and MPSA conferences. All remaining errors are our own. This research project isfinancially supported by the Kaken Project Grant Number 16H01998, the JALII project at
Nagoya University, and the Canon Institute for Global Studies.
1Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

INTRODUCTION
Although all regimes consist of those who govern and those who are governed, social mobility
can fulfill poor people’s dream of becoming elites. Scholars have focused on this social mobility
as far back as Alexis De Tocqueville’s De la démocratie en Amérique (Democracy in America)(1835); Pareto’s elite circulation theory (1916), which argues that elites in one regime are
replaced by other elites when regimes change; and Schumpeter’s elite reproduction theory (1919),
which emphasizes path dependency and casts doubts on social mobility. These studies haveinspired a century of work that broadly considers mobility during regime change. However, thepresence or absence of social mobility during regime change continues to remain a matter ofdispute. For example, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Moore (1966) insist that regimechange influences elite mobility while Clark (2014), Gerber (2000), Hankiss (1990), andSzelényi and Szelényi (1995) argue that there is no such influence. To our knowledge, one
problem of most existing studies is that they only compare before and after the regime change,
owing to which little attention has been devoted to how each phase of regime change influences
elite mobility differently. How does elite mobility, particularly the mobility of government elites,change from the regime transition phase to the phase of consolidating a new regime?
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Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

We argue here that the answer to this question can be found in the change in elite
recruitment strategies of the rebels (or the new governments) for overthrowing the incumbent
regime, establishing a new regime, and consolidating the new regime. When attempting tooverthrow the existing regime, the uprising camp, which is establishing a new regime, recruits
talented activists from the non-elite strata and assigns them to higher-level positions based on
their abilities to challenge the elites of the existing regime. In this phase, the uprising campattempts to exclude the incumbent elites from politics and expropriate their lands, goods, andservants to weaken their power. When a transfer of power is achieved, however, alleviating thediscontent with the new regime becomes the primary concern of the uprising camp. There are
two targets: the masses and the former elites. To garner public support, barriers preventing
access to the elite group are steadily lowered in the process of regime change. However, the new
government simultaneously also attempts to reintegrate old elites into the new elite group tofoster a sense of security among the former elites. Therefore, as not only former commoners but
also former elites increase their participation in the new regime, the internal hierarchy of politicalelites comes more extensively reflect the social stratum of the former regime. We assess thesehypotheses empirically using new data on 2,979 government elites since the Meiji Restoration
3

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

Japan (1868), which transformed Japan from a feudal and authoritarian state with a rigid social
class system to a modern, liberal, and inclusive state by the end of the nineteenth century.

GOVERNMENT ELITE MOBILITY OVER PHASES OF REGIME CHANGE
Why do some revolutions fail? How do rebels establish a new regime? When does a civil war
end? Why is a nondemocratic regime replaced by a democracy? Many distinguished scholars
have engaged with these questions but their main focus has been on the arrangements ofinstitutions and policies that determine reallocation or redistribution of public goods, private
resources, or seats in the legislature. The question of how these new arrangements affect the elitegroup has not received adequate scholarly attention. In the remainder of this paper, by dividing
regime change process into the regime transition phase and the phase of consolidating the new
regime, we extend the knowledge derived from those existing studies to an account of the impactof regime change on elite continuity and mobility.
We examine elite continuity and mobility with a focus on the two dimensions: elite
membership and inner-elite hierarchy. Although an individual might obtain elite membership, ifthat individual has no possibility of upward mobility in the concerned structure of elites, he or

4Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

she might experience a sense of frustration. Many bureaucrats, military officers, politicians, orbusinessmen from private enterprises are not satisfied with the membership of the organizations
that they are affiliated to but regardless struggle to attain higher positions in their innerhierarchies. Government elites at regime change are no exception. One suggestive study by Laski(1928) focusing on the United Kingdom’s history from the 19th to 20th century shows thatfranchise expansion did not affect the composition of the cabinet members but that it mightchange the British parliament’s composition in the long run.1 The openness of lower-ranked
elite society does not necessarily imply openness of upper-ranked elite society. Therefore,
distinguishing between elite membership and inner-elite hierarchy is essential to understand elite
mobility.

Elite Mobility in the Regime Transition Phase
A regime change can arise from four actors’ initiatives: foreign enemies who seek to control thecountry’s governance; incumbent political leaders who seek to change their own regime in orderto retain their political power; rivals within the current political order; and domestic non-elite1Laski’s argument is supported by Guttsman (1951) and Berlinski et al. (2014).
5

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

activists who wish to overthrow the incumbent regime. According to Smith et al. (2003), if these
dissatisfied actors have prospect of entering or staying in the winning coalition, they might notneed to adopt risky means. If they do not have such prospects, however, they may orchestrate arevolution or a civil war to overthrow the current regime. How do the regime changes involved
in civil war or revolution affect the ruling elite membership and the hierarchy among those
government elites? Our focus is on such drastic regime changes initiated by the rebels within the
country, and hence the regime changes initiated by incumbent political leaders or foreign
enemies are not the subject of this study.
The first step in regime change is to overthrow the incumbent regime. To do this, therivals within the existing political order or non-elite activists outside of the order may have toplot a revolution or win a civil war. Tilly (1978) notes how to complete a revolution as follows:

It is the formation of coalitions between members of the polity and the contenders
advancing exclusive alternative claims to control over the government. The relationship is
actually curvilinear: If no such coalition exists, that diminishes the chance that therevolutionary coalition will win—that there will be any transfer of power at all. However,

6Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

if the coalitions are extensive, the revolutionary settlement will tend to restore theprevious status quo. The wise revolutionary who wishes to produce a large transfer of
power forms the minimum necessary coalition with existing members of the policy, andforces his coalition partners to break irrevocably with other members of the polity (Tilly
1978, 213).

According to Tilly’s argument, the uprising camps are not expected to allow many incumbent
elites to join their group in the regime transition phase. Examining the regime change by a new
dictator, Albertus and Menaldo (2012) argue that the new dictator expropriates to survive theuncertainty that besets him or her upon taking power, and large-scale expropriation early in theprocess of the regime change helps dictators maintain their power. The compromise with theexisting or original government elites, therefore, hinders the success of overthrowing theincumbent regime. Instead, the uprising camps attempt to weaken their power by excluding theincumbent elites from politics and expropriating their lands, goods, and servants.
To contend against the incumbent elites and establish the new regime, the uprisingcamps must gather allies and staff members because they are a minority within the current7Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

political order. Therefore, in this phase, even activists from the non-elite social classes have an
opportunity to join the government elite group and be assigned to higher-level positions based on
their abilities. Consequently, during the regime transition phase, the number and proportion ofpolitical elites from the incumbent elite group joining the new elites is low, and the intra-elite
hierarchy is determined regardless of their social status.

Elite Mobility in the Phase of Consolidating the New Regime
Following the achievement of complete transfer of power, however, the primary aim of theuprising camps shifts from overthrowing the outgoing regime to alleviating the discontent with
the newly established regime. Since the 1990s, a growing number of scholars who haveexamined regime change from an authoritarian regime to a democracy and those who haveexamined regime change from a democracy to an authoritarian regime, have discussed how a
new regime can be consolidated. Linz and Stepan (1996), one of the distinguished studies on
democratic consolidation, explain the essence of new regime consolidation in one sentence:“Democracy becomes the only game in town when no significant political group seriously
attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 4).
8

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

The literature that examines how a dictator establishes a new regime also agrees about thenecessity to diminish the fear of exclusion among people in order to establish loyalty, solicit
cooperation, and/or deter threat of rebellion (e.g. Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Bueno deMesquita and Smith 2009; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Smith et al. 2003). With
whom then do the new governments have to compromise for regime consolidation? They have
two targets: the former elites and the masses.
Elites from the old regime have the potential power to threaten the new regime or tolegitimize the regime even following the transfer of power. All existing literature agrees that
regime change cannot be explained without accounting for these former elites. Most literature on
democratization agree that compromises by elites are essential for the consolidation or stabilityof democracy (e.g., Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992; Higley and Burton 1989; Higley and
Moore 1981; Huntington 1984, 1991; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Levine 1978; Linz 1978;
O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Peeler 1985; Przeworski 1986; Rustow 1970; Sartori 1987;
Wilde 1978). Scholars who explore the birth of authoritarian regimes also argue that new
dictators should foster a sense of security among former elites to consolidate the new regime
after overthrowing the old regime (e.g. Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and9Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

Przeworski 2007; Smith et al. 2003; Svolik 2009). Civil war studies such as Hartzell and Hoddie(2003) confirm as well that institutions to facilitate power-sharing perpetuate the peace in theaftermath of a civil war.
The old elites’ fear is simple: they are afraid of losing their wealth, social status, andlives. How can new governments mitigate their fears? Scholars claim that the answer is theestablishment of systems to ensure that the old elites have veto power (e.g. Albertus andMenaldo 2012; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; North and Weingast 1989; Svolik 2009;
Wright 2008). Typical examples of these arrangements are the establishment of Privy Council,
the House of Peers, a military junta, and a nobility system. These new institutions facilitate theintegration of the former elites into the new elite group, which increases the share of elites fromthe former elite class in the regime consolidation phase although their share in the regime
transition period is low.
The other target is the masses. Even some activists engaged in the democratization
process might hesitate to pursue full democracy partly because poor people’s demand forresources may threaten their own assets and statuses (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 2006;
Ansell and Samuels 2014; Boix 2003; Kocka 2010) and partly because new governments no10Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

longer have an urgent need to find top leaders from the non-elite strata once the desired new
regime is established. The elites of the former regime and the core members, who worked tooverthrow the former regime, demand high positions in the new government. Thus, the upward
mobility of the internal elite hierarchy or the possibility of non-elites reaching the top of the elite
hierarchy reduces.
Nonetheless, a regime change arouses the people’s desire to climb the ladder of power
even if the new governments do not intend to democratize. One reason is that they see somepeople become elites from the non-elite strata. These success cases raise the question of “whythem and not me [us]?” among many other non-elites (Silberman 1993, 173-174). This pressure
becomes stronger in particular when the new governments need to mobilize the masses tooverthrow the old regime. The other reason is that many governments need to increase public
spending for establishing the new regime. New governments have many tasks such as
management of new administrations, counterinsurgency operation, and reestablishment of
diplomatic relations with other countries, all of which cost a significant amount of money. To
complete these tasks, it is necessary to collect taxes from people. Tax payment increases people’s
demand for participation in politics. When faced with these demands from the masses, new11Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

governments have to compromise with them. Establishment of legislature and expansion of
franchise are the prototypical examples of such a compromise. Even dictators may establish a
legislature, which is merely a custom in many cases though, for his or her regime survival(Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2001, 2003; Conley and Temimi 2001; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi
and Przeworski 2007; Lizzeri and Persico 2004). In addition, many governments guarantee
people more freedom to access higher education, choose occupations, and get married to aperson of their choice regardless of their social strata. As a result, new governments lower
barriers preventing access to the elite group steadily even after they have reduced the urgency ofthe need to recruit talented people from the non-elite strata.
Overall, mobility of elite membership and internal hierarchy among elites change fromthe regime transition phase to the regime consolidation phase. The uprising camps recruit new
elites to contend against incumbent elites during the regime transition phase, while they recruit
new elites to alleviate the dissatisfaction of the masses and the former elites with the new regime
during the consolidation phase. Therefore, by comparing an elite’s status in the new regime withhis/her father’s status in the former regime, we form the following hypotheses and examine thechange in elites’ mobility over phases of a regime change.
12Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

With regard to elite membership,
Hypothesis 1:

The proportion of elites with fathers from the relatively low class of theformer regime steadily increases throughout the process of regime change.

Hypothesis 2:

The proportion of elites with fathers from the elite class of the former regime
is low in the regime transition phase but increases in the regime
consolidation phase.

With regard to elite internal hierarchy,
Hypothesis 3:

The intra-hierarchy of elites more intensively reflects the social structure of
the former regime than in the regime transition phase.

DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Meiji Restoration Japan, 1868
We test these hypotheses focusing on the case of the Meiji Restoration Japan (1868). In 1868, adrastic political regime change, referred to as the Meiji Restoration, that occurred in Japan
shifted the power from the Tokugawa Shogunate to the Meiji government under the authority of
the Emperor who achieved rapid modernization and laggardly ushered in partial democracy by

13Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

the end of the century. The Meiji Restoration, therefore, marked Japan’s revolution from a feudal
and authoritarian state with a rigid social class system to a modern industrial nation-state withmore liberty, albeit without the uprising from frustrated peasants and bourgeois in the English
revolution and the French revolution (e.g., Banno 2012; Beasley 1972; Gluck 1985; Gordon
2003; Hoston 1991; Jansen 2002; Lockwood 1954; Mitani 2013; Moore 1966; Moulder 1977;
Scalapino 1953; Trimberger 1978). Let us trace the history of the Meiji Restoration briefly.2
The Tokugawa Shogunate ruled Japan from the early 15th century and enjoyedconsiderable prestige for two centuries. However, Commodore Matthew Perry of the UnitedStates arrived in Japan in 1853 and demanded that Japan be opened to trade. Although Japan had
been sealed off to the outside world for the two centuries, the Tokugawa Shogunate agreed to his
demand due to American military pressure and also signed treaties with the European powers.
This forced opening of the treaty ports had an immediate impact on both economy and politics.
The beginning of the trade caused sharp inflation. Consumers and producers were angered by thedecision of the Tokugawa government. Additionally, the treaties demonstrating the Tokugawa
government’s inability to protect the country, resulted in lowering the reputation of the2

For more information on the Meiji Restoration, see Banno (2012), Gordon (2003), Jansen(1989. 2002), and Mitani 2013.


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Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

government. At that time, the Shogun and other samurai who ruled Japan enjoyed politicalprivileges because of being warriors. However, the incidents destroyed the authority of theTokugawa Shogun for ruling the country. In this situation, feudal lords (Daimyo) of the outerdomains that had been eliminated from the Tokugawa politics – Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, andHizen – and the middle- and lower-ranked samurai, many of who were from the above fourdomains became the core members of the rebels. In the process of overthrowing the Tokugawa
regime, Japan had two small-scale and one-large scale civil wars. The first two wars were
between the Tokugawa government and Choshu in 1861 and 1866. After these civil wars, therebels finally could gain permission to overthrow the Tokugawa government from the Emperor,that despite not having substantial power after the 14th century, continued to retain the symbolicstatus as Japan’s top leader. They began a civil war with the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868 that
ended in 1869. Approximately 0.8-1.2 million people were mobilized in this civil war andfourteen thousand people died.
The first task for the uprising camp was to terminate the former regime. Therefore, the
new government removed all traces of the Tokugawa Shogun from the castle in 1868,
confiscated the lands and servants of the feudal lords (Daimyo) by 1872, and deprived the15

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

privileges of the samurai such as the right to carry weapons in public and their salaries until
mid-1870s. The government proceeded with a series of these reforms peacefully, pledging to pay
salary to feudal lords for their whole lifetime and a lump-sum salary to other samurai. Some
disaffected samurai rose in revolt against the new government until 1877 but the new
government successfully quelled all revolts.
The new government also quickly granted liberty to the masses. The government
newly allowed non-elite people to have a family name in 1870, and granted people the freedom
to establish residence in any location they wanted, choose any occupation, and get married toanyone regardless of their social strata in 1871. The government also announced compulsory
education for eight years in 1872. Nevertheless, most core members of the new government were
negative about establishing the legislature and enfranchising the people. Additionally, the newly
established bureaucracy consisted of staff selected based on informal criteria or connections withcore government members. Therefore, at first, people had no formal access to become involvedin politics or become government elites. Rather, they had to bear the heavy land taxes that the
Meiji government newly established to address the huge costs such as the war costs for the civil
war and the rebellions, the costs for industrialization, and the costs for paying salary to the16Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

former feudal lords. Farmers who became frustrated with the heavy tax burden revolted
repeatedly against the new government but the Meiji government suppressed them and only
slightly decreased the tax rate.
Failures of samurai revolts and peasant riots in the 1870s showed that the Meiji
government achieved to establish the new regime. As a result, people started the freedom andpeople’s right movement to give voice to their feelings within the existing political framework
instead of subverting it, by demanding the opening of the parliament and enfranchisement, andthe Meiji government started to establish institutions and systems for consolidating the new
regime. To address the people’s frustration, the Meiji government promised to open a parliamentand grant the franchise to the large taxpayers in 1881 and fulfilled the promises in 1890. In
addition, the government formulated the first entrance examination rule for bureaucrats in 1887.
This rule also made everyone who had obtained a bachelor of law or arts from the University ofTokyo, which was the first imperial university after the Meiji Restoration, eligible as abureaucracy candidate without taking the entrance exam. Moreover, the Army War College wasfounded in 1882 and the Naval War College was established in 1888. These institutions gave
everyone access to the government elite group regardless of birth. Meanwhile, the Meiji17

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

government also institutionalized the new nobility system in 1884, the Privy Council in 1888,
and the House of Peers in 1890 in order to garner the support of the former elites and ensure theprivileges of both old and new elites. By the early 1890s, the government had thus succeeded inestablishing the main governing institutions thus.
The Meiji Restoration is particularly advantageous for exploring elite membership andits internal hierarchy over phases of regime change. First, the post-Meiji Restoration government
created a new internal hierarchy for government elites named Kyuchu-Sekiji – literally means“order of precedence in the emperor’s court” – that categorized the elites into 70 ranks.
Therefore, we can precisely specify government elites in the new regime and their ranks in the
new hierarchy. Second, we were able to collect detailed biographical information about the 2,979
political elites in the new regime from Jinji-Koshin-Roku (Who’s Who Record) volume 4
published in 1915 (Jinji Koshin-Jo 1915).3 Obtaining text data using OCR technology,4 we

3Jinji-Koshin-Roku is known as a provider of the most credible who’s who record during theperiod, and scholars are in consensus about the relative reliability of their provided information(e.g. Aso 1978; Iwami et al. 1981; Takane 1976, 1981).
4

To construct this dataset, Tomoko Masuda, Tomoya Sano, and Zhao Di greatly support us. We

are particularly grateful for the technical help of Tomoya Sano.


18

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

could construct a database of all the persons listed in the record, which included detailed
biographical information—not only about their own careers, education background, and ranks inthe new elite hierarchy but also their fathers’ home towns and social classes in the former
regime—and we were able to measure intergenerational social mobility, comparing the relative
statuses of fathers and sons.5
Many scholars have examined the influence of the Meiji Restoration on social mobility
including that of elites, but they consider the changes to have occurred in one direction and did
not examine the possibility of non-linear change (Allen and Donnithorne 1954; Bellah 1957;
Clark and Ishii 2012; Fujita 1948; Harootunian 1959; Man’nari 1965; Moore 1966; Nakamura
1999; Silberman 1964; Skocpol 1979; Sonoda 1990; Sugano 1931; Takane 1976, 1981;
Tominaga 1990; Tsuchiya 1954). In addition, their focus was primarily on elite membership andnot the internal elite hierarchy that we examine in this paper. The following analyses, therefore,
have added a new perspective to the literature of modern Japanese history.

5

We collected the information of the elites’ biological fathers and not foster fathers.
19Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

Data
To specify the government elites and their ranks in the inner-elite hierarchy, we use the order ofprecedence in the emperor’s court (Kyuchu-Sekiji) established by the Imperial House Law Act(Koshitsu-Rei) Number 1 in 1915. The ranks of Kyuchu-Sekiji consisted of current and former
posts, titles—the Royal and Noble Ranks (Shakui)— and awards that divided government elites
into 70 ranks (See Appendix). Each title and award had been institutionalized before 1915 but
this order arranged all ranks derived from them in the same line. The Royal and Noble Rank
system was institutionalized in 1884 and these titles, divided into four ranks, were given to theold elites such as the Tokugawa Shogun and feudal lords (Daimyo), and the new elites who had
rendered distinguished services to the Meiji government. These titles could be inherited by theirdescendants. Awards were divided into (1) Kunto (Order of Merit), (2) Ikai (Court Rank),6 (3)Kokyu (Merit Grade) particularly for military, and (4) Jako-no-Mashiko and Kinkei-no-Mashiko(honorary posts entitled to enter into the special rooms in the Emperor’s Palace. An individualsuch as a bureaucrat or a military man would be assigned an award corresponding to his or her
6

Ikai (Court Rank) was the most popular award (Fujii 1990) and offered to aristocrats,

government officers, military men, imperial university professors, national school headmasters,
and those that were given credit for Japan.
20

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

position, whenever he or she reached a higher post. Currently, the imperial ranks are only given
to elder people but at that time, the awards were given immediately in principle.7 These awards
were principally guaranteed for a lifetime but could not be inherited by the descendants of thereceiver. Therefore, these awards were indicative of the highest position that each elite has heldin the new government.
We excluded the ranks derived from the current and former posts and selected only theranks derived from awards and titles for the analyses. The reason is that awards and titles wereprincipally guaranteed for a lifetime while current and former positions were unstable as well as
could have been attained through elections that contradicted the emperor’s will.8

7For example, the chief judge of a district court was normally awarded the Fourth Order and theFifth Rank. An army general was normally awarded the First Order and the Second Class, andsome of them were awarded as the Grand Cordon of the Order and the First Class. Vice-ministers,
the top position of civilian bureaucrats, were at least awarded the Third Order. The ambassadorsat the big countries such as the UK, the US, Italy, Russia, and France were awarded the First
Order.
8

In 1915, 90 percent of the members of the House of Peers had received while a half of themembers of the House of Representatives did not have any awards according to our database.
21

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

The analytical focus was on the new governments’ strategies for elite recruitment, andKyuchu-Sekiji is therefore ideal because it was determined by the Emperor; reflected theEmperor’s intentions;9 and included a variety of elites, such as bureaucrats, military leaders,businessmen, scholars, scientists, and cultural celebrities. Therefore, we assume that government
elites were those who had been given titles or awards and create the dependent variable, ranki∈[1,70],10 that records the highest rank each elite had.11

9

Strictly speaking, we should distinguish emperors from governments; however, emperors weresymbolic figures for the uprising camps that overthrew the former regimes, established new
regimes, and consolidated them. Therefore, we use Kyuchu-Sekiji to indicate government elites.
Additionally, Nishikawa (1996, 2002) argues that military personnel were more likely thancivilians to obtain high-ranking posts. This ranking system could be considered a biased system,
but what is notable is that the Emperor intentionally biased his appointments. This is meaningful
because we can interpret it as a sign that emperors and the core members of the Meiji
government valued support from the military more than they valued it from civilians.
10

In the Imperial House Law, a low-numbered rank meant a high rank, but we refined thenumber from the higher to the lower for avoiding confusion. This means that ranki is recorded as
71 minus the original rank.
11

We follow Article 2 of the Imperial House Act No. 1, which determined that a person shouldtake the highest-ranked seat if more than one rank was available. One problem with Takane(1976, 1981) is that he recorded elites’ ranks inaccurately. He assumed that the more awards a22

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

To compare the statuses of sons to their fathers, we identify the father’s social stratumof each government elite in the former regime, f_classi. We divided the social strata in the former
regime into four scales [1,4]: (a) higher-ranked elites (aristocrat and feudal lord) recorded as
four,12 (b) middle-ranked elites (higher-ranked samurai) recorded as three,13 (c) lower-ranked
elites (samurai) recorded as two,14 and (d) non-elites (commoner) recorded as one.
To examine the difference between the regime transition phase and its consolidation
phase, dividing government elites into the pre-Meiji-Restoration-born group and theperson had, the higher was the position taken, which contradicts the contents of Article 2.
12

The category of aristocrats and feudal lords includes Shogun who was the military dictator ofJapan in the former regime, Imperial families, feudal lords (Daimyo), and aristocrats who
dominated the Japanese imperial court (Kuge).
13

The category of higher-ranked samurai includes the upper vassals of the Tokugawa house(Hatamoto), feudal lords’ relatives (Hanshu-Ichimon), and advisors of feudal lords (Karō).
14

The category of samurai also includes Shizoku. More than half of the samurai in the

Tokugawa Shogunate became re-categorized as Shizoku after the Meiji Restoration by anadministrative order issued in 1869 (Yamaguchi 2000). The rest of the samurai were the people
who chose to become commoners or were rejected because of their very low status in thesamurai group. Therefore, we assume that most Shizoku were samurai in the former regime since
it was nearly impossible that commoners in the former regime became Shizoku after the Meiji
Restoration.
23

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

post-Meiji-Restoration-born group, we created a dummy variable phasei, which takes value one,
if an elite was born after 1867 and zero otherwise. The reason we differentiate the regime
transition phase from its consolidation phase was that the government could not establish mostnationwide institutions until the early 1890 as we have mentioned in Section 3.1. We considered1890 to be the pivotal year because not only did these institutions consolidate the new regime but
they also opened avenues for everyone to join the elite group. Before 1890s, people had to find away to join the elite group by themselves. However, these institutions allowed all people,
regardless of birth, to become bureaucrats as long as they passed the entrance exam or graduate
from the University of Tokyo, to become military elites if they graduated from military schools
and colleges with a good degree, or to become politicians if they won an election. At that time,
the standard age for earning a bachelor’s degree was 22 for medical students and 21 for others(Ministry of Education ed. 1981). Therefore, we assume that the people who started their careerin the regime consolidation phase were born after 1867.
In addition, we created the following control variables. Concerning the educational
background, an important variable is overseas study experience. Tokugawa Shogunate had aforeign policy that restricted the entry of foreigners and forbade the Japanese from leaving and

24

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

reentering Japan until 1866. Therefore, the people who had Western knowledge were rare and indemand for achieving modernization (Ishizuki 1972; Silberman 1964; Tsuji 2010; Watanabe1977). We argue that the people who experienced study abroad were more likely to be promoted(Silberman 1964) and examine its effects using a dummy variable, edu_overseai, which takes
value one, if an elite had experience of studying abroad and zero otherwise. Additionally,
domestic education might have influenced their success (Aso 1978; Amano 1990; Iwami et al.
1981; Man’nari 1965; Takane 1976, 1981); hence, we create three more dummy variables toassess their latest academic background. These were based on whether elite was a PhD holder(edu_phdi), whether one had a BA and/or a masters but not a PhD (edu_bai), and whether one
graduated from a high school or higher-level school but not imperial universities(edu_highschooli).15
15

During the time, only the imperial universities established after the regime change were able

to offer students bachelor and PhD degrees, and other (higher) professional schools and private
universities in Japan could offer neither. We also counted the bachelor and PhD degrees gainedby foreign countries. In addition, we counted the people who had graduated from the Naval War
College or Army War College in Japan as bachelor holders. We assume that if the record does notinclude any information regarding education background about a person, his or her educational
level was less than high-school. For reference, before the regime change, no educational system

25

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

Additionally, we add the variable representing the father’s hometown to see if thepeople from the four domains that initiated the Meiji Restoration had privileges. These fourdomains are Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen,16 and the people from these domains weregenerally believed to gain some privileges (e.g. Silberman 1964; Takane 1976, 1981). We,
therefore, create a dummy variable, f_connectioni, which takes a value of one if the father of anelite was from one of those four domains and zero otherwise. Lastly, we add a variable for each
elite’s birth date, birthdatei,17 to control for the effect of the Confucian sense of seniority.
We extracted the above information from the Who’s Who Record (Jinji-Koshin-Roku)
volume 4 published in 1915. A total of 3,612 government elites, in the sense defined above, were
included in this record, and for 2,981 of them, we were able to obtain information about their

could confer a degree although there were schools that taught Confucianism or Westernknowledge.
16

Japan abolished the previous domain system and instead introduced a new system ofprefectures in 1871. Kagoshima prefecture included most area of Satsuma domain, Yamaguchi
prefecture included most of Choshu domain, Kochi prefecture included most of Tosa domain,and Saga prefecture included most of Hizen domain. Therefore, we record both the elites whose
fathers were from the four domains and the ones whose fathers were from these four prefectures.
17We record birth year (yyyy), month (mm), and day (dd) as “yyyy.mmdd.”
26

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

fathers’ social classes in the former regime from the record. For 2,980 of them except one, thedata of their birth dates were available as well. We can check the coverage of our data set bycomparing it with the number of people who had titles and awards in the previous year, 1914,
from the official government data provided by the Bureau of Statistics in the Cabinet Office(Naikaku-Tokeikyoku 1926). It is confirmed that 77 percent of the people who had titles in 1914
are included in our 2,980 observations. Regarding Ikai (Court Rank), 60 percent of the people
who had Junior Fourth Rank or higher are included.
Table 1-a summarizes the distribution for dummy variables, and Table 1-b summarizes
descriptive statistics for the other variables.
<Table 1-a should be here><Table 1-b should be here>

Elite Membership
What kind of people joined the elite group and how did their membership change over phases ofregime change? Figure 1 shows the composition of the social stratum of the fathers of the27Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

pre-Meiji-Restoration-born elites compared with those of the post-Meiji-Restoration-born elites
in order to analyze the change in the elite membership owing to the regime change.
<Figure 1 should be here>
We find that the share of the elites whose fathers were lower-ranked elites (samurai)
was more than 60 percent in the regime transition phase, while their share became reduced in its
consolidation phase. This reflects that they led the Restoration, although they declined in
influence during its consolidation phase.
On the other hand, in the regime consolidation period, their share declined
substantially, while the sons of the higher-ranked elites of the old regime (feudal lords andaristocrats) as well as the sons of the non-elites (commoners) increased. The results are
consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 2 that barriers preventing access to the elite group are steadily
and continuously lowered in the process of regime change; on the contrary, the rebels against theTokugawa regime or the new governments act differently toward elites during phases of regimechange. They first contend against these elites in order to overthrow the incumbent regime while
they reintegrate these elites into their new elite group after establishing the new regime in order
to alleviate their dissatisfaction against the new regime and gain their support.
28

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

INTERNAL HIERARCHY OF ELITESLet us move on the next question: how does social strata in the former regime influence theinternal ranking of elites and how does the impact change over phases of regime change? Wedraw box plots of government elites by phases of the regime change over their fathers’ social
strata (See Figure 2). We find that overall, the higher the social stratum of one’s father in theformer regime, the higher one’s own rank in the new regime. Moreover, both boxes and whiskers
in the regime transition phase were larger than those in its consolidation phase. This supports ourtheoretical argument that the internal hierarchy of government elites again begins to reflect thesocial stratum of the former regime in the regime consolidation phase. Particularly, the ranks ofelites whose fathers were middle- and higher-ranked elites in the former regime were extremely
concentrated in the regime consolidation phase, which suggests that former middle- andhigher-ranked elites gained their ranks in the new regime only because of their high social strata
in the former regime.
<Figure 2 should be here>

29

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

To examine the impact of social strata in the former regime on the internal elite
hierarchy in the new regime, we draw a two-way graph between fathers’ social strata in theformer regime ("_$%&''( ) and the sons’ ranks in the new regime ()&*+( ) (See Figure 3). Thisgraph is deduced by calculating the prediction for )&*+( from a linear regression of "_$%&''(on )&*+( and plotting the resulting curve along the 95 percent confidence interval of the mean(solid/dash lines and gray zones). The solid line indicates the ones in the regime transition phase(,ℎ&'.( = 0) while the dash line indicates the ones in its consolidation phase (,ℎ&'.( = 1).
Figure 3 shows that the slopes of both lines were positive; however, the slope angle in the regime
consolidation phase became steeper than the one in its transition phase. Similarly, the confidence
interval of the mean in the transition phase became narrower than the one in its transition phase.
The empirical results support our theoretical expectation that social strata in the former regime
influenced sons’ ranks in the internal elite hierarchy throughout the process of the regime change
but the impact becomes stronger in the new regime than in its transition phase.
<Figure 3 should be here>

30

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

In order to measure the impacts of their fathers’ social strata in the former regime on
the internal hierarchy of government elites that we have discussed, we estimate the following
ordered probit regression models18:
Pr ()&*+( = 6) = Pr (89:; < =; "_$%&''( + =? ,ℎ&'.( + =@ AB)CℎD&C.( + E( ≤ 89 )where E( is assumed to be normally distributed; in either case, we estimate the coefficients =; ,=? , …, =@ together with cutpoints 8; , 8? , 8@ ; 8G is taken as −∞, and 8J is taken as +∞.
…Model 1
Pr ()&*+( = 6) = Pr (89:; < =; "KLMNN ( + =? ,ℎ&'.( + =@ AB)CℎD&C.( + =J .DE_OP.)'.&(+=Q .DE_,ℎD( + =R .DE_A&( + =S .DE_ℎBTℎ'$ℎOO%( + =U "_$O**.$CBO*( + E( ≤ 89 )where E( is assumed to be normally distributed; in either case, we estimate the coefficients =; ,=? , …, =U together with cutpoints 8; , 8? , 8@ ; 8G is taken as −∞, and 8J is taken as +∞.
…Model 2
Model 1 is the baseline model and Model 2 the extensive version. In addition, we estimate Model
3 and Model 4 that include interactive terms between ,ℎ&'.( and other independent variables

18

Since all variance inflation factor (VIF) values are less than three, we infer that there is no

multicollinearity problem in each model.
31

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

except AB)CℎD&C.( for each Model 1 and 2 in order to see the changes in each impact overphases of the regime change. The estimated coefficients of each model are reported in Table 2.
<Table 2 should be here>
On comparing the estimated coefficients in Table 2 with the theoretically predictedeffects, we observe three striking findings. First, all models predict that fathers’ social strata in
the former regime ("_$%&''( ) positively affected sons’ ranks in the internal elite hierarchy.
Focusing on the interaction term with phases of the regime change ("_$%&''( ×,ℎ&'.( ) in Models
3 and 4, we find strong empirical support for Hypothesis 3 that the influence of the social strata
in the former regime on the internal elite hierarchy in the new regime becomes stronger in theregime consolidation phase than in its transition phase.
Our second empirical result is that on introducing all interaction terms, the educational
background (.DE_OP.)'.&( , .DE_,ℎD( , .DE_A&( , and .DE_ℎBTℎ'$ℎOO%( ) positively influenced
their ranks in the new internal-elite hierarchy although the impact became weaker in the regime
transition phase. This suggests that that the uprising camps (or the new government) recruit
talented activists out of the non-elite strata and assign them to higher-level positions based on32Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

their abilities in the regime transition phase rather than in its consolidation phase, which isconsistent with Hypothesis 3.
Lastly, we find that the connection with the uprising camps against the Tokugawa
regime ("_$O**.$CBO*( ) had a positive impact on the rank in the new inter-elite hierarchy but
became weaker in the regime consolidation phase. This empirical result suggests that the
influence of the rebels against the Tokugawa Shogunate declined gradually in the regime
consolidation phase.
Additionally, we divide the elites into two – upper-ranked elites (ranki >32.75 (themean value of this variable) and lower-ranked elites (ranki <32.75) – and check the difference
between them. Table 3 reports the estimated results for each model by each group.
<Table 3 should be here>
A study of the estimated results for the upper-ranked elites reveals that fathers’ social strata in
the former regime had a positive impact on sons’ ranks in the internal elite hierarchy. This
impact became stronger in the regime consolidation phase rather than in the transition phase.
Second, educational background negatively influenced the ranks in the inner-elite hierarchy
except the experience of overseas study, and even the impact of overseas study became weaker

33

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

in the consolidation phase. These suggest that the upper elite ranks were likely to be determinedbased on family roots and not individual ability. If ordinary people study hard, they might havean opportunity to join the upper-ranked elite group but it would be difficult to reach to the top in
this upper society. On the other hand, the most important factor influencing the upward move inthe lower-ranked elite group was to earn a bachelor’s degree from imperial universities orimperial military college while the significant influence of fathers’ social strata in the former
regime disappears in the Model 3 and 4.
Summarizing, these additional analyses demonstrate that regime change caused
talented people to join the new elite group and obtain middle ranks in the inner elite hierarchy
regardless of their family roots. However, this principle did not apply to the top ranks of thishierarchy. Top ranks of the elite hierarchy were determined according to each family’s original
social strata in the former regime and this tendency became clearer in the consolidation phasethan in the transition phase.

CONCLUSION
Despite its significance for regime change and state building, the question of how the influenceof regime change on elite group shifts over time has not been a topic of significant scholarly34

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

attention. Literature of regime change has shed little light on the impact of regime change on
elite group, and most scholars studying social mobility at regime change have not distinguishedthe short-term impact from the long-term one, assuming that the impact is linear. Focusing on thecase of the Meiji Restoration Japan (1868), however, we acquired a different answer: uprisingcamps or new governments have different recruitment strategies for political elites between theregime transition and consolidation periods. First, in order to contend against the elites of theincumbent regime, the rebels against the Tokugawa regime or the Meiji government recruitedtalented activists out of the non-elite strata and assigned them to higher-level positions based on
their abilities. As a result, we found that the number of political elites in the new regime whose
fathers were elites in the old regime became low in the generation, and the intra-elite hierarchy
was determined based on competence such as educational background regardless of social
statuses. On achieving a transfer of power, however, new governments’ primary concern shiftedto alleviating the discontent with the new regime. They had two trenches: the masses and theformer elites. To garner public support, barriers preventing access to the elite group were steadily
lowered in the process of regime change. Therefore, the number of government elites whose
fathers were commoners continuously increased throughout the process of regime change.


35

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

However, the new governments also attempted to reintegrate old elites into the new elite group at
the same time to gain support from the former elites. The share of the political elites whose
fathers were former elites was low at first, but this share significantly increased in the regime
consolidation phase. The internal hierarchy of political elites again began to reflect the social
stratum of the former regime while the impact of each competence on the intra-elite hierarchy
weakened, particularly in the upper-ranked elite group. Summarizing, non-elites could join theelite group more easily in the regime consolidation phase but it also simultaneously became moredifficult for them to be promoted to a higher position in the internal hierarchy of elites.
These findings are important theoretically and empirically. First, to the extent of ourknowledge, this is the first study to explore the mobility and continuity of political elites overpolitical regime change, focusing on their difference between the regime transition phase and theregime consolidation phase, based on a large set of individual-level data. It was revealed that themobility and continuity of elites indeed changed from the transition phase to the consolidation
phase. The process of regime change, therefore, should be divided into and analyzed as those twophases separately.



36

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

Second, this finding was confirmed by studying the intra-elite hierarchies as well as
elite membership. This study demonstrated that elite membership and intra-elite hierarchies are
distinct and equally important aspects of regime change for understanding elite mobility andcontinuity. In the case of the Meiji Restoration, fewer non-elites joined the new regime’s elites
during the transition phase than during the consolidation phase, although they could have been
given high-ranking positions in the internal hierarchy based on their abilities. More non-elites
joined the elites of the new regime during the consolidation phase, but it was not as easy toobtain high positions in the hierarchy. Many non-elite people might become satisfied withlowering barriers to prevent access to the elite group in the regime consolidation phase becausesuch lowering offers them the opportunity to dream about them or their children becoming elites;
however, the ambitious people who actually managed to join the elite group might bedisappointed on facing another barrier preventing them from reaching the top of the intra-elite
hierarchy and experience a lesser sense of elite mobility.
Finally, this study contributes to the understanding of the regime change. As we statedabove, Tilly (1978) pointed out that the extent of the coalition between members of the polity
and the contenders is essential to the success or failure of a revolution. This study supports and

37Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting, San Francisco (1 September, 2017)
Please do not cite this manuscript without the authors’ permission.

enriches this view by showing the overtime change in the continuity and mobility of elites in the
Meiji Restoration. In the transition phase the coalition was weak, which enabled the contenders
to overthrow the old regime. They then strengthened the coalition with the old elites toconsolidate the regime. Power sharing with the elites of the former regime facilitates
consolidation of the new regime but this should happen after overthrowing the former regime. If
rebels overly compromise with the former elites before overthrowing the incumbent regime, theymight face the opposition from these elites and might fail the attempt itself.

APPENDIX
Kyuchu-Sekiji (Internal Hierarchy for Government Elites)<Table A1 should be here>

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Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
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Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
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Figure 1 Elite Membership

50

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
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Figure 2 Internal Elite Hierarchy (Box Graph)

51

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
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Figure 3 Internal Elite Hierarchy (Fitted Line)

52

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
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Table 1-a Descriptive Statistics for Dummy Variables
N of observations

N of observations for 0

N of observations for 1

phasei

2980

1776

1204

edu_overseai

2980

2431

549

edu_phdi

2980

2575

405

edu_bai

2980

2060

920

edu_highschooli

2980

2539

441

f_connectioni

2979

2545

434



53

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
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Table 1-b Descriptive Statistics for Other Variables
N of observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

Min

Max

ranki

2980

32.75

9.64

1

70

f_classi

2980

2.04

0.97

1

4

birthdatei

2980

1865.04

11.03

1828.101911.10

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Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
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Table 2 Estimated Effects of Fathers’ Social Strata on Government Elites’ Ranks
Independent Variables

Model 1Model 2Model 3Model 4!_#$%&&'

0.64*** (0.021)

0.65*** (0.023)

0.48*** (0.031)

0.52*** (0.032)(ℎ%&*'-0.33*** (0.057)-0.33*** (0.057)-0.86*** (0.092)-0.13 (0.143)+,-.ℎ/%.*'-0.03*** (0.003)-0.03*** (0.003)-0.04*** (0.003)-0.04*** (0.003)*/0_12*-&*%' 

0.19*** (0.569)

0.32*** (0.070)*/0_(ℎ/'0.04 (0.071)

0.19** (0.086)*/0_+%'-0.05 (0.049)

0.13** (0.065)*/0_ℎ,3ℎ&#ℎ11$'0.02 (0.058)

0.27*** (0.074)!_#144*#.,14'

0.37*** (0.053)

0.52*** (0.066)!_#$%&&' ×(ℎ%&*'

0.30*** (0.041)*/0_12*-&*%' ×(ℎ%&*' -0.36*** (0.120)*/0_(ℎ/' ×(ℎ%&*'-0.47*** (0.157)*/0_+%' ×(ℎ%&*'-0.48*** (0.107)*/0_ℎ,3ℎ&#ℎ11$' ×(ℎ%&*'-0.71*** (0.126)!_#144*#.,14' ×(ℎ%&*'-0.45*** (0.111)

N
Log likelihood

2980

2979

2980

2979

-7643.31-7607.54-7616.17-7545.00*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses

0.21*** (0.044)

55

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
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Table 3 Estimated Effects of Fathers’ Social Strata on Government Elites’ Ranks by Group
Upper Ranked Elites (ranki >32.75)
Independent Variables!_#$%&&'(ℎ%&*'+,-.ℎ/%.*'*/0_12*-&*%' */0_(ℎ/'*/0_+%'*/0_ℎ,3ℎ&#ℎ11$'!_#144*#.,14'!_#$%&&' ×(ℎ%&*'

Model 1Model 2Model 3Lower Ranked Elites (ranki <32.75)

Model 4Model 1Model 2Model 3Model 40.25***

0.24***

0.16***

0.15***

0.21***

0.16***

0.13

0.10

(0.028)(0.032)(0.036)(0.039)(0.053)(0.054)(0.079)(0.080)0.17*

0.18**-0.46***

-0.35

-0.01

-0.04

-0.23

-0.22

(0.901)(0.091)(0.174)(0.250)(0.090)(0.090)(0.189)(0.222)-0.04***-0.04***-0.04***-0.04***-0.03***-0.03***-0.03***-0.03***(0.003)(0.003)(0.003)(0.003)(0.006)(0.006)(0.006)(0.006)0.32***

0.43***

0.14

0.16

(0.777)(0.086)(0.089)(0.133)-0.30***-0.38***

0.39***

0.24(0.995)(0.108)(0.116)(0.163)-0.16**-0.20**

0.26***

0.23**(0.073)(0.089)(0.082)(0.107)

0.04

0.01

0.05

0.23*

(0.079)(0.0935)(0.096)(0.134)0.22***

0.23***

0.04

-0.07

(0.070)(0.067)(0.091)(0.138)0.25***

0.23***

0.15

0.10

(0.058)(0.067)(0.106)(0.109)56

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
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*/0_12*-&*%' ×(ℎ%&*' */0_(ℎ/' ×(ℎ%&*'*/0_+%' ×(ℎ%&*'*/0_ℎ,3ℎ&#ℎ11$' ×(ℎ%&*'!_#144*#.,14' ×(ℎ%&*'N
Log likelihood-0.59***-0.04(0.202)(0.179)

0.29

0.25

(0.321)(0.240)

0.16

0.04

(0.166)(0.171)

0.03

-0.29

(0.182)(0.203)-0.49***-0.04(0.169)(0.179)

1590

1590

1590

1590

1390

1389

1389

-3440.95-3442.20-3431.93-3404.45-2573.17-2555.64-2572.23*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses

57

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
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Table A1 Kyuchu-Sekiji (Internal Hierarchy for Government Elites)
Rank

Current and former post

Title

Award







Kunto (Order of Merit)

1

Daikun’i (Grand Cordonof the Order)2

Prime Minister

3

President of the Privy Council

4

Veterans of Restoration treated as Minister

5

Marshal, Minister, Minister of the Imperial
Household, Minister of the Interior

6

Governor-General of Korea

7

Former Prime Minister, former President of the
Privy Council

8

Former Minister, Former Minister of the Imperial
Household, Former Minister of the Interior

9

Vice President of the Privy Council

10

Army General, Navy General, Privy Council

11

Official appointed by the Emperor

12

Speaker of the House of Peers, Speaker of theHouse of Representatives

13First Order (Special)

58

Ikai (Court Rank)

Kokyu (Merit Grade)

Honorary Post

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
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14
15

First Class
Former official appointed by the Emperor

16

Duke

17

Junior First Rank

18

First Order (others)

19

Senior Official Level 1

20

Deputy Speaker of the House of Peers, Deputy
Speaker of the House of Representatives

21

Person entitled to enter
into Jako Room

22

Marquess

23
24

Second Rank
Senior Official Level 2

25

Second Class

26

Person entitled to enter
into Kinkei Room

27
28

Person treated as imperial appointee
Earl

29

Junior Second Rank

30
31



Second Order
Viscount

32

Third Rank

33

Junior Third Rank

59

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
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34

Third Class

35

Third Order

36

Baron

37

Fourth Rank

38

Junior Fourth Rank

39

Member of House of Peers, Member of the Houseof Representatives

40

Senior Officer Level 3

41

Person treated as Senior Officer Level 3

42

Fourth Class

43

Fourth Order

44

Fifth Rank

45

Junior Fifth Rank

46

Senior Officer 447

Person treated as Senior Officer Level 4

48

Fifth Class

49

Fifth Order50

Sixth Rank

51

Senior Officer Level 5

52

Person treated as Senior Officer Level 5

53
54



Junior Sixth Rank
Sixth Order60

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan
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55

Senior Officer Level 6

56

Person treated as Senior Officer Level 6

57

Seventh Rank

58

Senior Officer Level 7

59

Person treated as Senior Officer Level 7

60

Junior Seventh Rank

61

Sixth Class

62

Senior Officer Level 8

63Person treated as Senior Officer Level 8

64

Senior Officer Level 9

65

Person treated as appointee with the Emperor's
approval

66

Eighth Rank

67

Seventh Class

68

Seventh Order

69
70

Junior Eighth Rank

Eighth Order







Note: Rank in this table refers to the original rank in Kyuchu-Sekiji. As stated in the main text, we made the variable "ranki" by(70-Rank), so that the larger number of rank indicates the higher position.

61