East Asian Regional Security and Arguments for a Nuclear Japan

Mitsuru Kurosawa
Professor
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University

Prepared for Workshop on“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”
Hiroshima Peace Institute
Hiroshima, Japan
March 11-12, 2004

Entering into the new century, the security circumstance in East Asia has been deteriorating
mainly because of the North Korean nuclear issue, and among Japanese experts the argument thatJapan should go nuclear has emerged and developed.

In order to promote global nuclear

disarmament, the situation in East Asia is critical and we need to create more peaceful and secure
circumstance here.
First, I will discuss and analyze the argument for a nuclear Japan: How has this argument comeout?

How has this argument developed? What are the reasons of promoters?

consider the negative effects of Japan’s nuclearization.

Second, I will

In particular, what kind of negative effects

would it have to Japanese security as well as East Asian security?

Third, I will examine theprobability of Japan going nuclear, taking all kinds of arguments in Japan into account.
Fourth, I will identify and survey three main backgrounds of the arguments for a nuclear Japanand propose the ways to get rid of or remedy the backgrounds in order to prevent Japan from going
nuclear as well as to promote the regional peace and security.

As the first cause is the North

Korean nuclear issue, we need to resolve the issue as soon as possible.

Since the nuclear

nonproliferation regime has been eroded as the second cause, we have to examine the ways torebuild and strengthen the regime.

As the last cause for recent instability comes out of Japanese

security policy, we should rethink Japanese security policy in order to improve the regional security
environment.

NEW ARGUMENTS FOR A NUCLEAR JAPAN

Emergence of New Arguments in Japan

Kurosawa

East Asian Regional Security and Arguments for a Nuclear Japan2

For a long time it was considered a taboo to discuss whether Japan should go nuclear and those
who argued for a nuclear Japan were generally severely criticized, sometimes losing their politicalposts.

On May 13, 2002, Japan’s Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe stated at Waseda

University that Japanese Constitution did not prohibit Japan from using tactical nuclear weapons.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, on May 31, 2002, commenting on it, told that an amendmentof the three non-nuclear principles could take place, suggesting the future possibility of theamendment.

While these statements were criticized by the mass media, they did not lose their posts

and no political disorder resulted.

Facing with the changing international environment, including

the threat from North Korea, the taboo has been weakening.1
On September 17, 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi visited Pyongyang to attend a summit meetingwith Kim Jong Il.

Although they agreed a joint statement, the abduction issue of Japanesenationals could not be well resolved, and it created strong anger to and distrust in North Korea
among Japanese public, followed by North Korea’s admission of their uranium enrichment programin the middle of October. In the light of these developments, some experts started arguments how
to prepare for a possible attack by North Korea with nuclear missiles.
In December 2002, Professor Terumasa Nakanishi of Kyoto University stated, “The best way forJapan to avoid being the target of North Korean nuclear missiles is for the prime minister to declarewithout delay that Japan will arm itself with nuclear weapons.

If North Korea threatens us with

nuclear missile, we should say that we are obliged to go nuclear,” and literary critic Kazuya Fukuda
asserted, “We should make it clear that we have capability to make nuclear weapons and can makethem as soon as we decide.”2
The arguments in Japan are principally a reaction to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat,
and they call on Japan to develop nuclear weapons in order to counterbalance the nuclear threat from
North Korea, or to resist to and prevail over North Korea’s political blackmail.

Arguments in the United States

In parallel with the development in Japan, some experts in the United States argued on a
possibility of Japan’s nuclearization in the context of the North Korean issue.
On January 3, 2003, Mr. Charles Krauthammer wrote in the Washington Post, “We should go to
the Chinese and tell them plainly that if they do not join us in squeezing North Korea and thus
stopping its march to go nuclear, we will endorse any Japanese attempt to create a nuclear deterrentof its own.

Even better, we would sympathetically regard any request by Japan to acquire

American nuclear missiles as an immediate and interim deterrent.
North Korea, China’s is a nuclear Japan.

If our nightmare is a nuclear

It’s time to share the nightmare.”3

On January 6, 2003, Mr. Ted Carpenter of the Cato Institute, after examining three options to deal

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East Asian Regional Security and Arguments for a Nuclear Japan3

with North Korea, recommended the following approach; Washington should inform North Korea
that, unless it abandons its nuclear program, the United States will encourage South Korea and Japanto make their own decisions about also going nuclear.4
On February 16, 2003, Senator John McCain commented on a nuclear North Korea on FOX TV,
stating “I think the Chinese have to understand that unless they become very engaged with North
Korea and bring about a quick resolution to this crisis then the Japanese will have no choice but tonuclear arm themselves.”5
On March 16, 2003, Vice-President Dick Cheney, on NBC TV, commented that Pyongyang’s yen
for the bomb could set off a regional arms race and others, perhaps Japan, for example, might beforced to consider whether or not they want to readdress the nuclear question.6

This statement has

special relevance because it comes from within the administration.
The arguments by the U.S. experts are not directly calling for or encouraging Japan to develop
nuclear weapons, but rather they are more likely messages to China and to North Korea. However,
the arguments in the United States triggered more active arguments in Japan, and many of those inJapan who argued for Japan’s going nuclear interpreted the arguments in the United States as a signalof U.S. tacit approval or encouragement of a nuclear Japan.

Main Arguments for a Nuclear Japan among Japanese Experts

Japan should go nuclear to counter the threat from North Korea, as the United States will approve
Japan’s nuclearization.

The vast majority of those who support the idea of Japan going nuclear

presuppose that the United States will approve or acquiesce to a nuclear Japan mainly based on thestatements by American experts, in particular those made by Vice-President Cheney.

They argue

that Japan does not have to worry of the collapse of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty even if Japan gets
nuclear weapons, and that Japan’s new arguments emerged just because Americans argue for nuclear
Japan.
Professor Terumasa Nakanishi, an advocate of Japan’s nuclearization even before Cheney’s
statement, interprets his statement as an advertising balloon for Japan, and a sign of containment
against North Korean nuclear development and Chinese arms buildup.
nuclearization is in the U.S. interest.

In the longer term, Japan’s

Responding to the claim that we do not need nuclear weapons

because of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, he states that the option of relying on extended deterrence
can only be considered credible in a situation where there is a perfectly bipolar confrontation such as
the structure in the Cold War, and it will be hard for us to find any effective way of dealing with thesituation other than with nuclear arms of our own.

Japan must not hesitate to declare its intentionof acquiring a nuclear capability if any of the following three situations becomes reality: i) a
situation in which the U.S. commitment to Japan’s security clearly wavers; ii) a situation in which“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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China develops a full-fledged naval capability extending to the high seas and establishes a regularpresence around Okinawa and the Senkaku Islands; or iii) a situation in which the question of North
Korea’s nuclear capability is allowed to remain ambiguous.7
Kazuya Fukuda, while arguing that Japan would not be isolated under the approval by the UnitedStates, asserts, “As the number of the states that have or are eager to have nuclear weapons isincreasing, the myth of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is about to die.

As a dangerous state isdeveloping a nuclear capability, the illusion of the nuclear umbrella is disappearing.

Therefore,

Japan has no other option than to go nuclear to maintain its own nuclear deterrent.”8
Professor Satoshi Morimoto, while arguing that we should respond to North Korea’s nuclear
forces by development and deployment of missile defense and guided precision weapons, asserts thatas a last resort we should pursue British-style nuclearization where the United States provides us
with nuclear-capable Polaris submarines, in the case when we are under serious nuclear threat from aneighboring country, but we can not completely depend on nuclear deterrence under the Alliance,
and the NPT and other international undertakings do not ensure the survivability of Japan.9
Kan Itoh, while understanding that the United States would permit a nuclear Japan and the UnitedStates is not necessarily dependable, argues that Japan should maintain an independent nuclear
deterrent through many small submarines and destroyers with nuclear cruise missiles.10
Main purpose of these strong arguments for a nuclear Japan, based on the presumption of the U.S.
approval, is to counter the North Korean nuclear threat.

NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF JAPAN’S NUCLEARIZATIOM

When we think of Japan’s nuclearization from the viewpoints of Japanese and regional as well asinternational security, Japan’s nuclearization would have many negative effects on them andsometimes be counterproductive to security environments in general.

It Would Undermine the Security in East Asia

With regard to the East Asian countries, a nuclear Japan would encourage a Chinese nuclear
build-up and probably lead to nuclearization by South Korea and Taiwan as well. As a result, Japan
would be less secure. Matake Kamiya analyzes as follows: Japan’s decision to go nuclear would
surely undermine the stability of the international environment in which the country lives. As a
resource-poor island country, friendly international relations are Japan’s only hope to maintain its
security and prosperity….A decision to go nuclear might trigger an arms race in Northeast Asia—in
a worst-case scenario, prompting the two Koreas and Taiwan to accelerate their nuclear development
or go nuclear as well—ultimately reducing regional and global security.11“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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Yuri Kase states, “Japan’s nuclearization would likely to trigger severe criticism in the region, inparticular from China, which could result in deterioration of the international environment in theregion, where there are various contentious issues.

The political situations on the Korean Peninsula

and the Taiwan Strait remain tense, and there are uncertainties over the national objectives andmilitary capabilities among the countries in Northeast Asia.”12

Shinichi Ogawa warns that Japanesedevelopment of nuclear weapons, even if initiated for the limited purpose to deter North Korea,
would give incentives to China and Russia for improving their nuclear arsenals to strengthen
deterrent against Japan.13

It Would Damage the Friendly Relationship with the United States

In relation to the United States, Japan’s nuclearization would obstruct the friendly relationshipbetween the two, lead to the collapse of the Alliance, and make Japan confront with the UnitedStates, and as a result be harmful to Japan’s security. It is argued that, “If Japan goes nuclear, theUnited States would be threatened most, and it would lead to the cutoff of Japan’s defense lifeline,
the Alliance.”14 Yuri Kase argues, “There is little doubt that a nuclear Japan would severely harm
the U.S.-Japan security relationship….There is no promising alternative to the existing
U.S.-Japanese security alliance as the base for Japan’s national security in the foreseeable future.”15
Matake Kamiya states, “Japan’s decision to develop nuclear weapons would inevitably have a
detrimental effect on the country’s relationship with the United States – Japan’s most importantbilateral relationship.

U.S. leaderships do not want to see Japan become a major military power,much less a nuclear power.”16
The deterioration of the U.S.-Japan security arrangement would have negative effect not only to
Japanese security, but also to the East Asian regional security environment because the U.S. presence
here also plays a role to stabilize the regional situation.

It Would Collapse the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Regarding the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, Japan’s nuclearization would lead toa breakdown of the regime and invite many states to have nuclear weapons, and as a result, Japanese
security would decrease.
extremely expensive.

It is argued “The political cost of Japan’s going nuclear would beJapan has to withdraw from the NPT.

The damage that Japan’s withdrawal

from the NPT would incur on the nuclear nonproliferation regime could not be compared with thecase of North Korea’s withdrawal.
NPT.

Japan is one of the most faithful and important members of the

If Japan withdraws from the NPT by radically shifting from the previous policy, the regime

would become just nominal and many states would possibly acquire nuclear arsenals.

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once nuclear weapons are used in a regional conflict, the world would fall into disorder, and Japan’s
economical prosperity would be severely damaged.”17

It Would Damage Japan’s International Status

With regard to international position of Japan, if Japan withdraws from the NPT and develops
nuclear weapons, it would be severely criticized and isolated from the rest of the world.
would run counter to Japanese political and security interests.
nuclear threat is temporary.

That result

It is argued that “North Korea’s

If Japan chooses to have nuclear weapons to counter it, Japan would

have to confront with international isolation.”18

Tetsuo Maeda warns that Japan would confront

with just the same critical international public opinion as in the 1930s when Japan withdrew fromthe League of Nations, as Japan have to withdraw from the NPT, IAEA safeguards agreement andthe CTBT to go nuclear.19
Matake Kamiya argues, “again contrary to the views of many foreign observers, the decision to go
nuclear would only weaken Japan’s political power internationally.

In fact, Japan has won therespect of other nations for its decision not to go nuclear despite its latent nuclear capability.”20
There are also concerns that Japan would lose its international political reputation as an enthusiastic
promoter of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, and might jeopardize the prospect for Japan
to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.21
A nuclear Japan would suffer from economic sanction that would severely damage Japaneseinterest.

It is also afraid that since Japan imports 99.7% of oil and 60% of foods from foreigncountries, it would be the most vulnerable state to economic sanctions.22

As Japanese nuclear

industry operates strictly under the condition for peaceful purposes in agreements with the UnitedStates and other countries, a nuclear Japan would not be able to sustain atomic industry whichapplies about 34% of all electricity used in Japan.

THE PROBABILITY OF JAPAN GOING NUCLEAR

In order to examine the probability of a nuclear Japan, we have to take into account the thirdargument that passively opposes a nuclear Japan, in addition to the arguments by positives and active
opponents.
First, the United States will never approve of or acquiesce to Japan to develop and possess nuclear
weapons.

In contrast to the positives’ opinions, the majority of speakers on this issue believe that it

is unthinkable for the United States to allow a nuclear Japan.
Second, Japan needs no nuclear weapons as long as the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is healthy andnuclear deterrence is effective.

Many experts have expressed this opinion.

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Third, Japan’s nuclear forces would be useless because they would not function as a deterrent
against the threat from North Korea.

Mr. Ogawa argues, “Some say that while U.S. nuclear

umbrella will not function against North Korea, Japan’s indigenous nuclear weapons can deter North
Korea.

However, such a view can not be made into a concrete and realistic scenario.

If you saythat U.S. nuclear deterrence will not work because the leadership in North Korea has a peculiar andirrational way of thinking, then Japanese nuclear forces cannot either.”23
Fourth, it is impossible for Japan to develop and deploy nuclear weapons from a military andstrategic point of view because of Japan’s geographical nature.

It is argued that Japan has its own

geographical vulnerability that it can not absorb nuclear damage.

As Japan is surrounded by thesea it is difficult to assume the situation like in NATO states where tactical nuclear arsenals aresupposed to intimidate massive conventional attacks.
In addition, in Japan there are still strong public opinion that Japan should not develop nuclear
weapons because Japan is the only victim of nuclear holocaust and is the only nation that knows
their disastrous effects. Many in Japan still completely deny nuclear weapons from the viewpointof their immorality based on the experiences in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
While some Japanese experts argue for a nuclear Japan, many experts are rather negative not only
for the passive reasons that it is not necessary or useful but also for the active reasons that it would
damage Japan’s security. Taking all arguments above into consideration, the probability for Japanto develop nuclear arsenals seems to be extremely low for the foreseeable future.

The reasoning

included in the negatives is very convincing, and overall analysis including traditional non-nuclear
feelings among Japanese people, Japan’s national and security interest, Japan’s position in theinternational society, and technical, military and strategic difficulties leads us to conclude that a
nuclear Japan is not likely.24
The members of the Japanese Diet are also very cautious to a nuclear Japan as reflected in recent
survey data. Under a survey conducted in August 2003 among the 394 members of the House ofRepresentatives, only one member said yes, 26 said neither yes nor no, and 357 said no to theacquisition of nuclear weapons.25

In the questionnaire of September 2003 to all members of theDiet including Houses of Representatives and Councilors, 1% said that we should examine
nuclearization soon, 6% said that we should examine it in the future, 19% said that we might
examine according to domestic and international circumstance change, and 68% said that we should
never discuss it.26

A questionnaire in November 2003 to the newly elected members of the Houseof Representatives shows that only one person that is 0.25% statistically demanded to begin theexamination soon, 17% said that we might study according to international circumstance change,
and 75% responded that we should never examine it .27
Although it is no longer a taboo to discuss the probability of a nuclear Japan, as

shown in the

results of the questionnaires, the vast majority of the members of the Diet are reluctant even to“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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East Asian Regional Security and Arguments for a Nuclear Japandiscuss this issue, and active promoters are extremely few.

8

We can therefore conclude that Japan

will not go nuclear in the foreseeable future.
A nuclear Japan would deteriorate general security environment in East Asia, as it would
accelerate North Korean nuclear development, promote further nuclear improvement in China, andpossibly lead South Korea and Taiwan to develop their own nuclear forces.

In order to avoid thesesituations from occurring, it is necessary not only for Japan to refrain from going nuclear, but also
for the regional states to construct a new security environment that improves regional peace andsecurity.

BACKGROUDS AND FUTURE MEASURES FOR EAST ASIAN SECURITY

In order to construct a new security framework in East Asia, it is necessary to survey the
backgrounds on which the arguments for a nuclear Japan have emerged and by which regional
security has deteriorated, and examine measures to remove or correct the causes and show the ways
ahead.

It can not be disputed that the first and most direct cause is the threat posed by North Korea.

We need a resolution of it as soon as possible.

The second cause is the erosion of the international

nuclear nonproliferation regime, and in particular, the weakness in its effectiveness and universality,
as well as the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament.

The issue of U.S. new nuclear policy, andin particular of increasing usability of nuclear weapons should be addressed.

The third cause is thatJapan is becoming more assertive in military activities in consonance with the militarism andunilateralism of the Bush administration.

For a more stable and secure regional circumstance, acooperative rather than confrontational approach is required.

The Nuclear Threat from North Korea

The situation in East Asia became more urgent when North Korea admitted their program ofuranium enrichment in October 2002, and then the relation between the United States and North
Korea rapidly deteriorated. While KEDO halted its provision of heavy oil to North Korea, North
Korea defreezing its nuclear activities and declaring its withdrawal from the NPT.
Perception among Japanese public of the threat from North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles
is heavily influenced by the negative attitude of North Korea’s dealing with the abduction issue andthe anger to and distrust in North Korea.

An image that North Korean regime is extremely

inhuman and dangerous resulted from the abduction issue contributed to significantly increase theperception of the nuclear and missile threat.
The first two important articles that called for a nuclear Japan, “Nuclear Declaration for Japan”
and “Then, Japan Should Take the Nuclear Option”, mainly dealt with the abduction issue, where“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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East Asian Regional Security and Arguments for a Nuclear Japan9they criticized North Korea as well as the Japanese Government, and they recommended for anuclear Japan to counter North Korea.28
As the threat is the most fundamental cause in instability in East Asia and has triggered the current
arguments for a nuclear Japan among Japanese experts, international society and the six-party talks
in particular should achieve a peaceful settlement to this issue using both dialogue and pressure.
The following four approaches are conceivable for its resolution; a military solution, economic
sanctions, U.S.-North Korea bilateral negotiations, and the six-party talks.

A military solution,quite different from the Iraqi case, would be difficult and dangerous because North Korea has
considerable military forces and the negative effect to Japan and South Korea would be immense.
Although partial measures of economic sanction have been adopted by individual states, we should
be cautious to take comprehensive economic sanctions because China would not support them, andeven if China supported them, they would lead to military reaction from North Korea and escalate toa major military conflict.

In the beginning, North Korea insisted on bilateral negotiations with theUnited States, while the United States insisted on multilateral talks. As North Korea agreed to the
six-party talks, there is no other option than to proceed within the framework of the six-party talks.
It will be possible, however, to have a bilateral negotiation within the framework of the six-party
talks.
The United States, since the inauguration of the Bush administration, has not engaged in this issue
for more than two years.
development.

This has resulted in a more dangerous situations of North Korean nuclear

It is praiseworthy for China to take initiative in acting as a mediator between the two.

Nevertheless, as the resolution of the issue heavily depends on the relationship between the two, theUnited States should engage more positively and take concrete actions in order to resolve theproblem.
For Japan, the abduction issue is more important and concerned than the nuclear issue. However,as the central agenda in the six-party talks surely is on the nuclear issue, Japan should make efforts
to resolve the abduction issue through a bilateral negotiation with North Korea.

As a resolution of

the abduction issue is a pre-condition for normalization talks just like nuclear issue, Japan should
work hard to resolve the abduction issue.
If the North Korean nuclear and abduction issues are solved, there will be high possibility that thearguments for a nuclear Japan may diminish, and East Asian security condition may be highly
improved.

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

The health of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime is a key to Japanese security as
well as East Asian security.

Almost all non-nuclear-weapon states signed and ratified the NPT“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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believing that it was in their interest, on the presumption that all other states would join the NPT and
its obligation would be implemented in good faith including nuclear disarmament.

However, recent

phenomena lead us to question this presumption.

Non-Compliance and Effectiveness
The first is the effectiveness of the NPT, as some states parties to the Treaty seem to be
non-compliant with treaty provisions and international society can not take effective measures todeal with the situation.

The most prominent example is North Korea, which announced its

withdrawal from the Treaty in March 1993, suspended it in June 1993, and then again announced its
withdrawal in January 2003.

It is believed that the withdrawal became effective in April 2003.

Iraq, Iran and Libya, all the parties to the Treaty, have been also suspected that they were not incompliance with the provisions of the Treaty.
In order to strengthen the effectiveness, the IAEA adopted a model Additional Protocol in 1997.
Japan is active to strengthen the IAEA safeguards, and have accepted new burdens by ratifying the
Additional Protocol, but many states including those suspected to be non-compliant have not sign or
ratify it. This situation, in the short term, produces the feeling of unfairness among the Japanesepeople.

In addition, a way to withdraw from the NPT after violating its obligation with nopunishment may be interpreted by Japanese nationalists that even if Japan goes nuclear, criticism
would not severe enough.
For a wider acceptance of the Additional Protocol, we should work to increase the supporters of
the interpretation that the Additional Protocol is obligatory, and ask nuclear supplier states to makeits ratification by a recipient as a condition for their provision of nuclear-related material or
technology. We also should work for more strict rules of procedure and substance in order toaddress possible non-compliance.

The measures to address possible non-compliance should not betaken by individual states but by the international society as a whole.
As shown in North Korea and Iran, we should deal with the possibility that a state acquiring
nuclear material or technology through Article IV of the NPT and diverting it to military use orwithdrawing from the Treaty after violation becomes clear.

We should examine the possibility ofinternational control or supervision of the use of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

Universality
The second is universality of the NPT, as Israel, India and Pakistan stay outside of the NPT andcontinue to develop nuclear weapons. The fundamental thinking of non-nuclear-weapon states at
the time of signature and ratification must be that the number of the nuclear-weapon states would
never increase to more than the five provided for in the Treaty. Although Japan was reluctant toaccede to the Treaty because of its discriminatory character, it joined the Treaty with the“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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understanding that the Treaty would be necessary for future nuclear disarmament, while no morethan five would be nuclear-weapon states.
double standard.

Nuclear Israel has existed for a long time thanks to U.S.

More pertinent to Japan and East Asia is the nuclearization of India and Pakistan

after their nuclear tests in May 1998.
Just after their nuclear tests, Japan with the United States strongly criticized their tests byinflicting economic sanctions.

Many other states criticized without inflicting sanctions.

India and

Pakistan are not nuclear-weapon states, because according to the definition provided for in the NPT,
they can not be nuclear-weapon states without the amendment of the provision. However, in realinternational politics, they tend to be treated as if they were nuclear-weapon states.

In the UnitedStates, there was strong opinion for a lifting its sanction against India for economic interests even
before the 9.11 terrorist attacks.

Just after the 9.11 incident, the United States removed its

economic sanctions against both countries, because the United States needed cooperation from
Pakistan in order to initiate anti-terrorism operation in Afghanistan.
Thereafter, many states, in particular the United States have spoken or behaved as if India andPakistan were nuclear-weapon states. This damages the integrity of the nuclear nonproliferation
regime.

From the viewpoint of states that voluntarily renounced their nuclear option such as Japan,

international society seems unwilling to strictly maintain the regime.

This tends to generate theperception that even if you test, you will soon be accepted as a nuclear-weapon state though you willbe criticized in the short term.
Kurt M. Campbell analyzes this aspect as follows: Events of the last decade, however, havedramatically weakened this nuclear taboo, with India and Pakistan both detonating multiple nuclear
devices in May 1998 (without long-term diplomatic or economic consequences) and further
developing their nuclear arsenals since then.

The subsequent U.S. strategic embrace of India hasleft some with the perception that U.S. resolve against nuclear proliferation is weakening, leading
more states that have contemplated a nuclear agenda in the past to discount former fears of U.S.-led
international isolation and opprobrium.29
We should ask, as a matter of principle, the three non-NPT states--Israel, India, and Pakistan--to
accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states, and also to sign and ratify the CTBT.30

In

addition, we should engage them in a negotiation on a FMCT, and ask them to sign and ratify the
Additional Protocol while applying safeguards more widely.
proliferation by Pakistan was recently revealed.

In particular, nuclear technology

We should strongly ask them to apply export

control guidelines as adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to their own export ofnuclear-related material and technology.
Although it is necessary for international society to cooperate technically with India and Pakistan
for reasons of nuclear control or security, states should refrain from legally or politically recognizingthese states as nuclear-weapon states or according them a privileged status.

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Otherwise, it would

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lead to the collapse of the NPT regime.

12

Although these states are not under any obligation of the

NPT because they are not parties to it, all members of the NPT, nuclear- or non-nuclear, are underobligation to treat those three states as non-nuclear-weapon states.

Nuclear Disarmament
The third is the stalemate of nuclear disarmament, as it should be one of the most importantconditions for non-nuclear-weapon states to sign and ratify the NPT, as a way to mitigate thediscriminatory nature of the Treaty. According to the Japanese Government’s formal statement at
the time of its ratification, Japan believes that such discrimination must be corrected in the future
through nuclear elimination by the nuclear-weapon states, and the Japanese Government strongly
urges the nuclear-weapon states that have a special responsibility for nuclear disarmament to takeconcrete nuclear disarmament measures such as the reduction of nuclear weapons or the conclusionof a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty.
In the situation where the promise is not fulfilled, the nuclear nonproliferation regime only serve
to consolidate the privileged status of the nuclear-weapon states, and security of non-nuclear-weapon
states including Japan will deteriorate.
Joseph Cirincione states, “As long as countries such as Japan possess the capabilities to develop a
nuclear arsenal, it is critical that the political and diplomatic deterrents to the spread of weapons ofmass destruction remain strong and viable.

Japan will seriously consider its nuclear options if itcomes to believe that the United States and other nuclear-weapon states no longer have any intentionof pursuing “Effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament,” as required under Article VI of the NPT.”31
Selig S. Harrison also states, “The bottom line of this analysis is that the continuance of theAmerican nuclear umbrella over Japan will not, in itself, assure a non-nuclear Japan unlessaccompanied by meaningful U.S. and Russian steps leading to a global process of nuclear
disarmament embracing China.”32
The perception that nuclear disarmament is necessary for the viability of the NPT is expressed in
its review conferences every five years, where development of nuclear disarmament is evaluated andfuture measures that should be taken are agreed.

For the sustainability and viability of the NPT,

therefore, nuclear disarmament is indispensable.
As an interpretation of the Article VI of the NPT, the 1995 NPT Review Conference agreed tothe conclusion of the CTBT negotiation in 1996, to an immediate commencement and earlyconclusion of a FMCT negotiation, and to making efforts for systematic and progressive nuclear
disarmament.

The 2000 NPT Review Conference adopted a final document that included concrete

thirteen measures for nuclear disarmament.

However, the United States has since opposed some ofthese measures, and other nuclear-weapon states are not seriously implementing them.33“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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It is fundamentally urgent for the nuclear-weapon states to implement the thirteen concretemeasures for nuclear disarmament in order to keep the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Among thethirteen, the most seriously damaged issue is the demand to diminish the role of nuclear weapons insecurity policy.
Under the Bush administration, a new Nuclear Posture Review report was submitted in January
2002.

Threat no longer comes from Russia but rather from rogue states or terrorists.

The basicstrategy shifts from a traditional threat-based approach to a capabilities-based approach. A new
triad consists of non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities, defenses including missile defense, andresponsive infrastructure. According to the new policy, the importance of nuclear weapons will besignificantly reduced and the importance of conventional weapons will be increased, in sharp
contrast with the traditional triad – ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers.
However, the importance of all nuclear weapons does not seem to have decreased entirely,
although the utility of nuclear weapons on strategic level is certainly diminishing due to thedecreased threat from Russia.

Under the new review, the barrier between nuclear and conventional

weapons appears blurred, as they are treated on the same level, implying that the usability of nuclear
weapons will increase just like conventional weapons.

This tendency is clearly evident in otherparts of the report in the context of assigning new missions to nuclear weapons: to attack hard anddeeply buried targets or mobile targets, and to limit collateral damage by improving accuracy rates.
For these purposes development of new types of nuclear weapons is required and shortening the timeneeded for test preparation is also recommended.
The U.S. Congress decided to abrogate a law of 1993 that prohibited research and development of
nuclear weapons with yield of less than five kilotons, to allow for the development of mini-nukes,
and to authorize a budget request for shortening the test preparation time.

This situation means that

the Unite States is now preparing to research and develop new types of small nuclear weapons, andpreparing for their testing. They are small in size with less collateral damage.

They are intended

to be usable, in sharp contrast to strategic nuclear forces for deterrence.
In addition, the United States adopted a new National Security Strategy in October 2002, whichstrongly emphasizes the preemptive use of military forces.
is not excluded.

The preemptive use of nuclear weapons

U.S. nuclear policy under the current administration maintains that nuclear

weapons are just as usable against rogue states or terrorists as conventional weapons.
This U.S. tendency sends a message to the world that nuclear weapons are usable and that it is nolonger a taboo to talk about using nuclear weapons in just the same way as conventional weapons.
This tendency seems to encourage the argument in Japan for a nuclear Japan.
In order to dampen the arguments for a nuclear Japan and improve regional and international
security, it is indispensable to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policy.
As concrete ways to diminish the role of nuclear weapons, we should make efforts to accomplish“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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East Asian Regional Security and Arguments for a Nuclear Japanno-first use pledges and negative security assurances.

14

These two concepts have to be clearly

divided because their scope and purpose are different, though sometimes the former is argued
including the latter.

A no-first use of nuclear weapons presuppose a second use of nuclear weapons

among nuclear-weapon states.

Negative security assurances means not to use nuclear weapons

against non-nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT.
Among the nuclear-weapon states, since the confrontation of the Cold War era disappeared,
U.S.-Russia relations have improved, and U.S.-China relations are not characterized by nuclear
confrontation.

The nuclear threat has shifted to rogue states and terrorist groups.

As China haslong proclaimed its no-first use policy, the United States should make a unilateral no-first use pledge,
and then work to conclude a bilateral agreement with China and then with Russia.

Eventually, atreaty of no-first use of nuclear weapons should be concluded among the nuclear-weapon states. In
parallel with these efforts, nuclear-weapons states must change their deployment and operational
policies of nuclear weapons accordingly, and increase transparency to build confidence.34
Negative security assurances should be given to non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT asquid pro quo for abstaining from their nuclear options.

As a result, beneficiaries must be fullycompliant with Article II, and the assurances should cease to apply in the event of an attack on a
nuclear-weapon state, carried out by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance witha nuclear-weapon state.

Such negative security assurances have already been given as a politicalstatement, but in the light of recent U.S. policy change, it is necessary to make a legally binding
treaty on negative security assurances.

This would mitigate the discriminatory nature of the Treaty,

and prevent many states from going nuclear for their national security.

Japan’s Security Policy and East Asian Security

After the 1991 Gulf War, Japan recognized that it should contribute more to international peaceand security, in particular by sending personnel, as Japan’s financial contribution was not highly
evaluated.

First, Japan enacted a Law of the Cooperation to the UN Peace-Keeping Operations in

1992, and sent Self-Defense Forces to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia(UNTAC) in 1993 as a logistic support unit.

Thereafter Japan has sent Self-Defense Forces for UN

peace-keeping operations to Mozambique, Golan Heights and other regions.
Second, with the U.S.-Japan Joint Statement on Security of 1996 as a turning point, newGuidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation were elaborated in 1997.

In order to implement

these guidelines, Japan enacted a Law on the Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan in 1999, which
provides for precisely what Japan should do to assist U.S. military action under Article VI of the
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

During the decade since the end of the Cold War, Japan has clearlytaken a more assertive stance in its military role.

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Entering into the new century, Japan’s military assertiveness has become more visible as the
Koizumi cabinet in Japan and the Bush administration in the United States emerged, while 9.11
terrorist attacks occurred in September 2001.

Just after the 9.11 attacks, Japan enacted a Law on

Anti-Terrorism Special Measures in November 2001 in order to support U.S. anti-terrorism
operations in Afghanistan, and dispatched Maritime Self-Defense Forces to refuel warships of othercoalition countries.

In June 2003, a Law on Armed Attack Contingency was enacted in order toprepare for a possible crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

In October 2003, in order to support thereconstruction in Iraq after the war, a new Law on Iraq Special Measures was enacted, andSelf-Defense Forces were dispatched to Iraq in January 2004.
Japan has emphasized its military role over the past ten years, and in particular under the Koizumi
cabinet Japan’s military activity is strongly emphasized in its foreign policy by making new laws andsending Self-Defense Forces abroad. This Japanese tendency has a strong connection with themilitarism under the Bush administration that preferred an armed attack on Iraq. Both in Japan andin an international society, there is a general tendency to emphasize military power in foreign policy.
This general tendency has indirectly influenced the arguments for a nuclear Japan.
Japan’s security policy has been based on the following three pillars: i) firmly maintaining the
U.S.-Japan Security Arrangement, ii) moderately building up Japan’s defence capability on an
appropriate scale, and iii) pursuing diplomatic efforts to ensure international peace and stability. As
examples of diplomatic efforts, dialogue, exchange, and cooperation with Asia-Pacific nations, aswell as promotion of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation are often mentioned.

Since

the end of the Cold War, Japan’s military assertiveness has developed mainly in the form of military
cooperation with U.S. forces.
cabinet.

In particular, this tendency becomes prominent under the Koizumi

The first two pillars, that is, the U.S.-Japan security arrangement and Self-Defense Forces,

have been strongly emphasized, by sending Self-Defense Forces abroad to assist U.S. military
operations.
Some experts argue that Japan does not need nuclear weapons so long as the nuclear umbrella iseffective, and strongly urge that the Alliance should be strengthened further.

Indeed we need boththe U.S.-Japan security arrangements and Japan’s military force in order to counter the threat posedby North Korea.

However, we have to take not only North Korea’s threat into account in the shortterm, but also international security environment surrounding Japan as a whole in the longer term,
and take more active diplomatic measures in addition to military ones.35
Strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and Self-Defense Forces would, on the one hand, enhance
Japan’s security.

However, on the other hand, this might lead to an arms race among the East Asianstates, resulting in “security dilemma”, that is, the overall deterioration of regional security situation
including that of Japan.

In order to avoid the situation from happening, positive security dialogue

among the East Asian states is imperative.

Using the framework of the six-party talks, they should“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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East Asian Regional Security and Arguments for a Nuclear Japan

start examining how to construct a new regional security framework.

16

By strengthening thestructure of the summit meetings among Japan, China, and South Korea, we should make efforts tocreate a cooperative regional security structure.
In addition, Japan should pursue to build up Japanese as well as international security throughactively engaging in the efforts of the United Nations.

Japan’s active participation in UN

peace-keeping operations has been highly praised both domestically and internationally.

If Japandesires a permanent seat of the UN Security Council, it should remain non-nuclear and contribute
more aggressively to international peace and security through mainly diplomatic rather than military
measures.
Japan has been working hard for nuclear disarmament in international society, submitting UN
General Assembly resolutions on nuclear elimination since 1994, that were adopted by the support ofan overwhelming majority. Japan is also very active in the efforts for the early entry into force of
the CTBT by serving as a chairman and a coordinator for its promoting process, in spite of the factthat the United States is now opposing the CTBT.

Japan is also a strong advocate for earlynegotiation of a FMCT, holding conferences and seminars for examining its technical aspects. In
strengthening the IAEA safeguards, Japan was active in drafting a model Additional Protocol, andbecame the first country with advanced nuclear industry to ratify it.
However, Japan’s efforts have its own limit because Japan is under the nuclear umbrella of theUnited States.

Since the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is one of the main pillars of Japanese security

and is supported by majority of Japanese, Japan, while pursuing total nuclear elimination in a longer
term, has no other option but to promote nuclear disarmament under the nuclear umbrella for the
short term.

Japan has been reluctant to support a no-first use policy because of the threats from theSoviet Union in the Cold War era, from China thereafter, and from North Korea today.36

Japan’s

reluctance stems from its desire to deter non-nuclear threats as well by the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
For the United States, Russia is not a threat anymore and Chinese threat appears not so severe as
leading to nuclear confrontation.

Japan should support a no-first use agreement between the UnitedStates and China as well as Russia in order to diminish the role of nuclear weapons and promotestrategic dialogue on nuclear weapons among them.

This is consistent with the National Defense

Outline of 1995 that says, “Japan depends on the U.S. nuclear umbrella against nuclear threat.”
Japan also should support negative security assurances as mentioned above.

The North Korean

threat should be dealt with within the framework of the six-party talks.
In addition, once the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved, Japan should take an initiative tocreate a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone in order to crystallize the non-nuclear status ofNorth Korea as well as Japan into a legally binding obligation.
Howard W. French, “Taboo Against Nuclear Arms Is Being Challenged in Japan,”
New York Times, June 9, 2002.
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Terumasa Nakanishi and Kazuya Fukuda, “Nihon Kakubusou Sengen (Nuclear
Declaration for Japan),” Voice 301 (January 2003), pp.79 and 81.
3 Charles Krauthammer, “The Japan Card,” Washington Post, January 3, 2003.
4 Ted Galen Carpenter, Options for Dealing with North Korea, Cato Institute, Foreign
Policy Briefing, No.73, January 6, 2003, p.1. Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Armitage
commented on these arguments, saying, “Nuclear umbrella traditionally provided by
the United States will continue. Japan has no need of nuclearization and I do notworry about it.” Mainichi Shimbun, January 18, 2003.
5 Mainichi Shimbun, February 17, 2003; The Age (Melbourne), February 22, 2003.
However, Special Advisor Rice who took part in the same TV program denied theopinion, stating, “There is no evidence that Japan thinks its nuclearization meet its
national interest.”
6 Kyodo, March 17, 2003, Asahi Shimbun, March 17, 2003, evening edition. On thisissue, Yukio Takeuch, Administrative Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofJapan clearly denied the possible nuclear Japan, stating, “Nuclear Japan is not arealistic option for Japan. The Administration has never examined the issue.”
7 Terumasa Nakanishi, “Nihonkoku Kakubusoueno Ketsudan (Decision to Nuclear
Japan), Shokun! 35(August 2003), pp.22-37. See the English translation, Terumasa
Nakanishi, “Nuclear Weapons for Japan,” Japan Echo 30 (October 2003), pp.48-54.
8 Kazuya Fukuda, “Nihon Kakubusou Shikanainoka (Japan has no Other Means than
Nuclearization),” Bungeishunju 80 (June 2003), p.182.
9 Satoshi Morimoto, “Eikokugata Last Resort Kakusenryakuno Susume (Pursue
British-Style Last Resort Nuclear Strategy), Shokun! 35(August 2003), p.67-69.
10 Ito, “No towa Iwanai,” p.117.
11 Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?” Washington Quarterly, 26(Winter 2002-03), pp.67-68.
12 Yuri Kase, “Japan’s Nonnuclear Weapons Policy in the Changing Security
Environment: Issues, Challenges, and Strategies,” World Affairs 165 (Winter 2003),
p.123.
13 Shinichi Ogawa, “Sainensiteiru Nihonno Kakubusouwomeguru Gironnitsuite (OnRekindled Arguments on a Nuclear Japan),” Japan Institute for Defense Studies,
Briefing Memo, September 203, p.3.
14 Kenichi Matsumoto, “Nichibei Doumeiwo Ayaukusuru (It will Put the Alliance inDanger),” Shokun! 35(August 2003), p.88.
15 Yuri Kase, “”Japan’s Nonnuclear Weapon Policy,” pp. 124 and 127.
16 Matake Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan,” p.69.
17 Hiroshi Nakanishi, “Nihonno Kakubusouwa Sekaino Konranwo Maneku (Nuclear
Japan would Invite World Disorder),” Shokun! 35(August 2003), pp.60-61.
18 Masamori Sase, “Ichiyazukede Hannousuruna (Do not React Hastily),” Shokun! 35(August 2003), p.87.
19 Tetsuo Maeda, “Kakuhoyuuronshaniha Hontouno Kakugoga Arunoka (Do Promoters
Have Real Resolution?), Shokun! 35(August 2003), p.77.
20 Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan,” p.69.
21 Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan,” p.69.
22 Toshiyuki Shikata, “Kakuyokusi Igaino Anzenhoshou Seisakuwo (Take Security
Policy except Nuclear Detterent),” Shokun! 35 (August 2003), p.101.
23 Ogawa, “Sainensiteiru Nihonno,” p.2.
24 For example, Katsuhisa Furukawa who recently examined the issue enumerates
four conditions for Japan to make a decision to develop nuclear weapons: a perceived
lack of credibility regarding U.S. extended deterrence; the virtual collapse of2“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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East Asian Regional Security and Arguments for a Nuclear Japan

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international regimes for arms control and nonproliferation; a significant increase inperceived threat from neighboring countries; and most importantly, the U.S.
Government’s approval for Japan to go nuclear. (Furukawa, “Nuclear Option, Arms
Control, and Extended Deterrence: In search of a New Framework for Japan’s Nuclear
Policy,” in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thomposn, eds, Japan’s Nuclear Option:
Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century (Washington D.C.: Henry L. Stimson
Center, 2003), p.97.)
25 Asahi Shimbun, August 27, 2003.
26 Mainichi Shimbun, September 28, 2003.
27 Mainichi Shimbun, November 11, 2003.
28 Nakanishi and Fukuda, “Nihon Kakubusou Sengen,” pp.74-85; Yoshiko Sakurai,
Tadae Takubo, and Nagao Hyodo, “Naraba Nihonmo Kakuno Sentaku (Then Japan
should Take the Nuclear Option),” Shokun! 35 (January 2003), pp.26-40.
29 Kurt M. Campbell, “Nuclear Proliferation beyond Rogues,” Washington Quarterly,
26 (Winter 2002-03), p.10.
30 Miller and Scheinman analyze that the non-universality of the NPT, and the U.S.
view of the nuclear reality in Israel, India, and Pakistan as a situation to be “managed”
rather than reversed, weakens the global nonproliferation norm and thus undermines
the regime, and demand that they should be involved in the regime as much as possible.
(Marvin Miller and Lawrence Scheinman, “Israel, India, and Pakistan: Engaging the
Non-NPT States in the Nonproliferation Regime,” Arms Control Today 33 (December
2003), pp.15-20; Sokolsky states that the United States and its allies have excused
Israel’s, India’s, and Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons as being“understandable,” but they would have to actively contest the notion that all states
have a natural right to acquire nuclear weapons.(Henry Sokolski, “Taking Proliferation
Seriously,” Policy Review 121 (October-December 2003), p.57.)
31 Joseph Cirincione, “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain,” Foreign Policy 118 (Spring2000), p.126.
32 Selig S. Harrison, “Japan and Nuclear Weapons,” Harrison, ed., Japan’s Nuclear
Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security (Washington D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1996.), p.7.
33 Mitsuru Kurosawa, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and Nuclear Disarmament:
Implementation of the 2000 Final Document,” Osaka University Law Review 51(February 2004), pp.1-19.
34 Bracken argues that today, acceptance of no-first-use could offer significant benefits,
since conventional forces have a strategic capability, and the United States would be
giving up very little compared to its gains. (Paul Bracken, “Thinking (Again) About
Arms Control,” Orbis 48 (Winter 2004), pp.156-157. Feiveson and Hogendoorn argue
for an unambiguous U.S. commitment not to use nuclear weapons first under any
circumstances, and strong no-first-use commitment by all the nuclear-weapon states
following a U.S. lead. (Harold Feiveson and Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, “No First Use of
Nuclear Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review 10 (Summer 2003), pp.1-9.)35 According to the latest public opinion survey on security conducted by the Ministryof Foreign Affairs in March 2002, majority highly evaluate diplomatic efforts rather
than military one. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/ah_chosa/]
36 Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “New Ambitions, Old Obstacles: JapanAnd Its Search for an Arms Control Strategy,” Arms Control Today 30 (July/August2000), p.23.

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