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グローバルセキュリティセミナー叢書

第２号

GLOBAL SECURITY SEMINAR SERIES NO. 2

NDA-FOI Joint Seminar

North Korea’s Security Threats
Reexamined

Coedited by
Hideya Kurata and Jerker Hellström

防衛大学校先端学術推進機構
グローバルセキュリティセンター

© National Defense Academy, Japan Ministry of Defense
1-10-20 Hashirimizu, Yokosuka, 239-8686 JAPANGlobal Security Seminar Series No.2
NDA-FOI Joint Seminar

North Korea’s Security Threats
Reexamined

Coedited by
Hideya Kurata and Jerker Hellström

March 2019

Center for Global Security, National Defense Academy
Yokosuka, Japani

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iv

INTRODUCTION

1CHAPTER 1
Hideya Kurata

Kim Jong-un' s Nuclear Posture underTransformation: The Source of North Korea's
Counterforce Compulsion

5

Estimating Ballistic Missile Performance Based on
Incomplete Information: Application to North
Korea's 2016–2017 Missile Tests

19

Technical Assessment and Prospects on North Korean
Nuclear Capability

32

Evaluating the US Approach to North Korean Threat
under Trump Administration

40

North Korea's Evolving Strategy toward the UnitedStates: Kim Jong Un's New Buy-Time Tactic

51

ROK's Perception of and Posture toward the DPRK's
Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Development

63

CHAPTER 7
Sugio Takahashi

North Korea's Threat and Japan's Response

73

CHAPTER 8
Takeshi Watanabe

Japan-US-ROK Cooperation for Sustaining Deterrence

81

European Perspectives on North Korea's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Programs

88

CHAPTER 2
Anders Lennartsson

CHAPTER 3
Sangmin Lee
CHAPTER 4
Jonathan Miller
CHAPTER 5
Hiroyasu Akutsu
CHAPTER 6
Kyengho Son

CHAPTER 9
Jerker Hellström

SEMINAR PROGRAM

101

CONTRIBUTORS AND PARTICIPANTS

103
ii

GLOBAL SECURITY SEMINAR SERIES

Global Security Seminar Series is published occasionally by the Center for Global
Security.

The Center designs series of international seminars and other independent

seminars.

This series consists of the working papers of these seminars.

The views

expressed in this publication are solely of the authors, and do not necessarily represent
those of the institutions or governments of the authors.

Copyright ©2019 by National Defense Academy, Japan.

Published by the Center for

Global Security, Institute for Advanced Studies, National Defense Academy, Yokosuka,
JAPAN.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Center for Global Security (GS), National Defense Academy, and Totalförsvarets
forskningsinstitut (FOI), Swedish Defence Research Agency, launched a joint research
project, called NDA-FOI Joint Seminars based on the Memorandum of Understanding
between Japan Ministry of Defense and Sweden Ministry of Defense on mutual defense
cooperation.
This volume is based on the working papers presented at the NDA-FOI Joint Seminaron “North Korea’s Security Threats Reexamined” held on February 7, 2018.

Most ofthe chapters are revised or up-dated to reflect the views expressed during the courseof the seminar.
On behalf of GS an FOI, we would like to express our sincere appreciations not only tothe contributors for their precious time and efforts in the process of this publication,
but also to all those who attended the seminar and participated in the discussions.
The views expressed in each of the chapters, however, strictly represent those of therespective authors, and so go the credits.
We hope the insights shared by the authors here invite a new round of discussion
among readers.

Comments and suggestions on our joint research project are morethan welcome.

March 2019
Hideya Kurata and Jerker Hellström
Coeditors

ivIntroduction (Kurata and Hellström)

1

INTRODUCTION

Hideya Kurata
Center for Global Security, National Defense Academy

Jerker Hellström
Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)

At least since its first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea’s ambitions to develop
nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles have been regarded as one of the major
threats to international security. In 2017, the Kim Jong-un regime tested more
missiles in a single year than ever before and conducted its sixth nuclear test.
Towards the end of the year, the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) declared that
North Korea had become a nuclear state.
These developments prompted international concerns, no least in the United States,
which held military exercises with South Korea and continued the launch of theterminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) missile defense system south of Seoul.
This, in turn prompted aggressive rhetoric and a “war of words” between
Washington and Pyongyang. The latter also received political backing by China andRussia, which emphasized the concept of ‘double suspension’, by which the U.S.
would reduce its military engagement in the region in exchange for a North Korean
freeze of missile and nuclear tests.
This was the backdrop to a seminar convened in early 2018 by the Center for Global
Security at the National Defense Academy (NDA) in Japan and the Swedish Defense
Research Agency (FOI) to address North Korea’s security threats. This publication
is based on the papers presented at this joint seminar and the discussions they
provoked. The chapters presented herein give various perspectives on the security
challenges related to North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs as seen by

2

Introduction (Kurata and Hellström)

Japanese, Swedish, South Korean and Canadian scholars.
In Chapter One, Hideya Kurata of NDA assesses the development of North Korea’s
nuclear posture. While North Korea has employed a nuclear no-first use andminimum deterrence doctrine, the regime has also issued statements that run
counter to it. For example, it has not ruled out the possibility of conducting a‘nuclear preemptive strike’. He also examines North Korea’s nuclear posture incomparison with evolving nuclear postures of both China and India.
In Chapter Two, Anders Lennartsson of FOI reviews North Korea’s ballistic missile
tests in 2016 and 2017. The chapter provides insights into the physics that
determine the range of a ballistic missiles and analyzes the range capacity of North
Korean missiles tested during this time period.
In Chapter Three, Sangmin Lee of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA)
makes a technical assessment of North Korea’s nuclear capability and discusses theprospects for its development. One conclusion is that North Korea is developing
anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) as tactical nuclear weapons, and that the ScudER, Rodong, and Polaris-1 and -2 missiles can become candidates for ASBMs.
Moreover, due to limited progress in denuclearization talks with the United States,
North Korea may return to nuclear development in the future.
In Chapter Four, Jonathan Berkshire Miller of the Japan Institute of International
Affairs (JIIA) evaluates the United States’ approach to North Korean threats during
the Trump presidency. Berkshire Miller describes how the intensity of North
Korea’s missile program is making for very difficult strategic choices for UnitedStates and its allies which are looking to deter and defend against Pyongyang’s
bellicosity. He suggests that the United States should accelerate deterrence efforts
and coordinate further with Japan and South Korea, also in regards to sanctions anddiplomatic efforts.
In Chapter Five, Hiroyasu Akutsu of Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies(NIDS) examines North Korea’s approach to the United States. Akutsu argues that
North Korea has adopted a two-phased approach, namely taking advantage of South
Korea’s engagement policy, while also agreeing to a US offer for a summit meeting
between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un. Pyongyang’s most immediate policy

Introduction (Kurata and Hellström)

priority appears to force the US into accepting North Korea’s status as a de facto
nuclear weapons state.
In Chapter Six, Kyengho Son of the Korea National Defense University (KNDU)
discusses South Korean perceptions and responses in regard to North Korea’s
development of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles. Son suggests that North
Korea’s nuclear weapons program may have two major purposes: as a tool forpreserving the regime, and as a means to change the status quo on the Korean
peninsula. In response to Pyongyang’s ambitions, he proposes a range of strategic
considerations and makes recommendations for South Korean policymakers toponder.
In Chapter Seven, Sugio Takahashi of NIDS examines Japan’s response to North
Korean threats. Takahashi states that Japan has made multiple efforts against
North Korea’s nuclear escalation ladder. First and foremost, Japan has attempted
to improve its credibility of extended deterrence by the United States. He assertsthat Japan plays a critical role in coping with Korean Peninsula contingencies, whilst
having virtually no direct military commitment. Moreover, Takahashi stresses thatthe effects of North Korea’s strategic weapons must be neutralized in order tomaintain regional peace and stability.
In Chapter Eight, Takeshi Watanabe of NIDS reviews the Japan-United States-South
Korea trilateral cooperation for sustaining deterrence. Watanabe states that North
Korea has significantly improved its power to coerce others and take advantage of
the China-South Korea ‘three no’ policy, namely that Seoul is not to join the U.S.
missile defense system, nor to develop the trilateral cooperation into a military
alliance, or make an additional deployment of THAAD system. He asserts that thethree powers must, in fact, improve their trilateral security cooperation for
denuclearization negotiations and deterrence to be effective.
Finally, in Chapter Nine, Jerker Hellström of FOI discusses European perspectives on
North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs. Hellström argues that the
Sino-Russian concept of ‘double suspension’ could lead to reducing tensions in North
East Asia, which is one of the European Union’s key interests in regards to security
on the Korean peninsula. However, the concept also suggests a weakening of U.S.
military engagement in East Asia. As a resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue3

4

Introduction (Kurata and Hellström)

is not in the cards, Pyongyang’s ambitions may provoke period of build-up of
defensive and offensive capabilities, also beyond East Asia.

Chapter 1 — Kim Jong-un's Nuclear Posture under Transformation (Kurata)

CHAPTER 1

Kim Jong-un’s Nuclear Posture under Transformation:
The Source of North Korea’s Counterforce Compulsion

Hideya Kurata
National Defense Academy

INTRODUCTION
Given the comparative inferiority of nuclear and conventional forces vis-à-vis the USROK Combined Forces, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK: North
Korea) choice of nuclear posture was originally limited. North Korea’s emerging
nuclear posture seems common to the Minimum Deterrence which some of nuclear
subsequent countries; China and India, for example, are currently believed to adopt1.
Under this posture, they make it clear not to provoke/challenge a nuclear war,
pledging the No-First-Use (NFU) of the nuclear weapons. North Korea also adopts
a similar position. Predicting the first nuclear test in October 2006, North Korea’s
Foreign Ministry released the statement declaring that North Korea will never use
nuclear weapons first2. Under the NFU pledge, nuclear weapons are supposed to
be used only for the second strikes in retaliation, thus inflicting intolerable
retaliatory damages to adversaries are therefore regarded as sufficient to deter thepreemptive the first strike. It constitutes countervalue attacks giving the priority
to the explosiveness to kill the citizens in habitant cities of the adversaries.
Second-strike capabilities must survive despite a first attack undertaken by anadversary. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) are concealed and dispersed
Zafer Kahn, “North Korea's Evolving Nuclear Strategy under the Pretext of Minimum
Deterrence: Implications for the Korean Peninsula”, International Journal of Korean Unification
Studies, Vol. 24, Issue 3, 2015.
2 Hideya Kurata, “Formation and Evolution of Kim Jong Un’s ‘Nuclear Doctrine’: The Current
State of North Korea’s ‘Minimum Deterrence’ in Comparison”, The Kim Jong Un Regime and the
Future Security Environment Surrounding the Korean Peninsula, Tokyo, The National Institute for
Defense Studies, 2017, p. 43.
1

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Chapter 1 — Kim Jong-un's Nuclear Posture under Transformation (Kurata)

in silos underground or in mountains, charged on Transporter Erector Launcher(TEL) on the ground and or even underwater as Submarine Launched Ballistic
Missile (SLBM). The second-strike capabilities are, moreover, required to beperpetual readiness, that is, they are capable of being launched immediately after
suffering the first strike to threaten an adversary. The solid-fueled engines are
preferred to liquid-fueled ones to shorten the time needed before launch.
With regards to survivability and readiness of the second-strike capabilities, North
Korea has demonstrated remarkable progress. North Korea possesses short-range
Toksa (KN-02) solid-fueled missiles. It applied these technologies to longer-range
missiles, and conducted a ground test of a high-powered solid-fuel rocket engine andits cascade separation in March 2016. Kim Jong-un has stressed on the need to beable to make nuclear strikes from anywhere on the ground, in the air, at sea andunderwater3. North Korea applied these technologies to the SLBM tests in April,
July and August 2016.
However, while seeking Minimum Deterrence, North Korea recently engaged inrhetoric that ran counter to it. North Korea’s official organs, for instance, stated to“nuclear preemptive strike” in 2013 and even Kim Jong-un referred to it as such in2016. These are not the mere changes in rhetoric; North Korea’s nuclear posturecannot be explained only by the ‘Minimum Deterrence’ when considering its ballistic
missiles that it developed and tested recently4.
This article begins with the brief examinations of the nuclear postures of China andIndia, paying attention to the NFU pledges and the force structure. The nuclear
postures of these two countries are often compared as both countries seek toestablish the Minimum Deterrence; that is making official pledges to NFU andpursuing the survivability and readiness of the second-strike capabilities. The
determinants of North Korea’s shift to counterforce ought to be examined incomparison with China and India. Following these analyses, this article will
examine the achievements that North Korea made in 2017 in the realm of ballistic
missile developments.

“경애하는 김정은동지께서 조선인민군의 전략군 탄도로케트발사훈련을 보시였다”, 민주조선, March
11, 2016.
4 Kurata, “Formation and Evolution of Kim Jong Un’s ‘Nuclear Doctrine’”, p. 47.
3

Chapter 1 — Kim Jong-un's Nuclear Posture under Transformation (Kurata)

EXOTERIC NFU AND ESOTERIC FU?: SOURCES OF COUNTERFORCE COMPULSIONSIN COMPARISONCHINA’ COUNTERFORCE COMPULSION: LOCAL AIR-SUPERIORITY
Although China has retained the NFU pledge since its first nuclear test in October
1964 5 , several remarks have been made by the affiliates within the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) that conflict with the NFU pledge concerning with the Taiwan
Strait and other security issues. Owing to the buildup of the conventional forces
across the Strait in the 1990s, China came to be confident in its air-superiority acrossthe Taiwan Strait in the early 2000s6. That is to say, China came to be convincedthat ‘liberation’ of Taiwan was not impossible if the US would not intervene in the
Taiwan Strait.
The arguments on the revision of the NFU came from among the ex-officers of the
PLA and scholars, representing frustrations in some sectors in the PLA and those
held by academics. Admittedly these arguments do not necessarily or specificallyrefer to the Taiwan issue, some of them contend that the possible first nuclear use
might be effective to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial unity, implying the
Taiwan Strait7. China’s self-imposed NFU pledge to eliminate one of the effective
options for China to intimidate the US forces not to intervene to the Taiwan Strait
threatening to use the nuclear weapons; the pledge works as the restraint on China’s
military operations. Against this backdrop, China was faced with the need todevelop the ballistic missiles for counterforce targeting to deter US intervention8.
潘振強, “中国不首先使用核武器問題研究”, 李彬・趙通主編 , 理解中国核思維, Beijing, Social Science
Publications, 2015, pp. 48-49; 孙向丽, “中国核战略性质与特点分析”, 世界経済与政治, Issue 9, 2006;“中国是唯一宣布不首先使用核武器的国家”, 中国新聞週刊, April 19, 2010.
6 Regarding the details of the unofficial remarks examining the NFU pledge and the reaction of
the Chinese government, see Kurata, “Formation and Evolution of Kim Jong Un’s ‘Nuclear
Doctrine’”, pp. 44-46.
7 Eric Heginbotham, et al, China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for theUnited States, Santa Monica: RAND Cooperation, 2017, pp. 130-131. Regarding the cases inwhich China might revise the NFU pledge, China is reported in early 2000 to assume to drown
millions of Chinese citizens by destroying the Three Gorges Dam. Jeffery G. Lewis, Paper Tigers:
China’s Nuclear Posture, London, International Institute of Security Studies, 2014, p. 31.
8 The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (中国人民解放军 2 砲兵战役学) , the internal
document in the PLA’s Second Artillery is said to stipulate the waves of nuclear attacks to themilitary objects of the adversary. M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for
Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure”,
International Security, Vol. 30, No. 4, Spring 2006.
5

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Chapter 1 — Kim Jong-un's Nuclear Posture under Transformation (Kurata)

Counterforce capabilities require high accuracy, flexible yield, and prompt delivery
by the technological advance9.
The counterforce capabilities to the US Naval and
Air Force Bases including the Seventh Fleet’s homeport Yokosuka and Kadena Air
Force Base (AFB) in Okinawa are intended to negate US access to the Taiwan Strait10.
High explosive force, even at a distance target like Yokosuka or Kadena is only
assured when a missile mounts a nuclear warhead.
Whilst China’s nuclear first use vis-à-vis Japanese soil conflicts with the NFU pledge,
it runs counter to another self-imposed pledge of Negative Security Assurance(NSA): assurance not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
weapon states (NNWS). The argument is said to contend that a country that isallied with an NWS, houses nuclear weapons, or provides basing for a nuclear
adversary should not be regarded as an NNWS11. This reminds the ‘Warsaw-Pact
Exclusion Clause’ that the rest of the NWS had retained to allow themselves to makethe first nuclear strike to the NNWS if they were associated with another NWS, bywhich they could deter use of nuclear weapons by another NWS.
The notable example of such counterforce capabilities would be the Dongfeng-21(CSS-5): a surface-to-surface Medium-range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) converted
from the SLBM Julang-1 (CSS-N-35) with a range of approximately over 1700 km.
These ballistic missiles are intended to negate the US Seventh Fleet intervening in
the Taiwan Strait; thus constituting China’s Anti-access/Area-denial (A2/AD)
strategy. Likewise, re-examination of the NFU entails the development of thecounterforce capabilities and vice versa. The strategic change is often considered
as a shift to limited nuclear deterrence, providing greater flexibility in the use of
nuclear weapons than the countervalue punitive second strikes used under the‘Minimum Deterrence’ Strategy12.

9 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict”,
Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 2013, p. 7.
10 Thomas Shugart and Javier Gonzalez, First Strike: China´s Missile Threat to US Bases in Asia,
Washington DC, Center for a New American Security, 2017.
11 Heginbotham, China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent, p. 131.
12 Paul H. B. Godwin, “PLA Doctrine and Strategy: Mutual Apprehension in Sino-American
Military Planning”, Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti eds., The People’s Liberation Armyand China in Transition, Washington DC, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National
Defense University, 2003. pp. 274-275.

Chapter 1 — Kim Jong-un's Nuclear Posture under Transformation (Kurata)

INDIA’S COUNTERFORCE COMPULSION: ADVERSARY’S DEVELOPMENT OF SRBM
Admittedly, unlike China, India is not a legitimate NWS, India’s official nuclear
doctrine is officially known as the ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’ as India
propounded this nuclear posture the Nuclear Doctrine under the Bhāratīya Janatā
Party (BJP) Vajpayee administration in January 2003. However, it manages toretain the ‘calculated ambiguity’: the room for nuclear use in retaliation for theadversary’s bio/chemical weapons attacks. The NFU pledge in conjunction withthe massive countervalue assured retaliation is supposed to be the major
component of India’s nuclear doctrine 13 . After the subsequent Indian National
Congress (INC) administration, Modi, the head of BJP, declared India would retain the
NFU pledge even after his taking office in the election campaign in 2014 despite the
BJP’s commitment to revision of the nuclear doctrine14.
Controversies erupted because of Pakistan’s alleged support of terrorist attacks,
notably on India’s national assembly in December 2001. Being convinced that theterrorist attacks emanated from Pakistan, India is reported to have created the ‘Cold
Start Doctrine’, which authorizes mobilization of its army to conduct punitive andproportionate retaliation with conventional weapons15. India, however, failed totake retaliatory measures in response to the alleged Pakistan-sponsored terrorist
attack at Mumbai in November 2008.
India was further challenged by Pakistan’s attempt to deploy the Short-range
Ballistic Missiles (SRBM) Nasr/Hatf-IX, under the banner of the ‘full-spectrum
deterrence’, of which estimated range is approximately 60 km 16. It was obviousthat Pakistan had attempted to deter the limited conventional retaliatory strike of“Press Release: Cabinet Committee of Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing I
ndia’s Nuclear Doctrine, 4th January 2003”. https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/20
131/The_Cabinet_Committee_on_Security_Reviews_perationalization_of_Indias_Nuclear_Doctri
ne+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine
14 “Modi Rules out BJP’s Will to Revise ‘No-First-Use’ of Nukes’ Policy”, Reuters, April 16, 2014.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1100300/modi-rules-out-bjps-will-to-revise-no-first-use-ofnukes-policy
15 Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War
Doctrine”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007/2008.
16 Arun Vishwanathan, “Pakistan’s Nasr/Hatf-IX Missile: Challenges for Indo-Pak Deterrence”,
Strategic Analysis, Volume 38, Issue 4, July 2014; Arka Bismas, “Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear
Weapons: Deconstructing India’s Doctrinal Response”, Strategic Analysis, Volume 39, Issue 4,
November 2015.
13

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Chapter 1 — Kim Jong-un's Nuclear Posture under Transformation (Kurata)

the ‘Cold Start Doctrine’, offsetting their inferiority in conventional forces andlowering the nuclear threshold via-a-vis India. By deploying the SRBM, Pakistan
attempted to make India fall into the ‘commitment trap’ Sagan argued 17 . India
officially still retains the ‘Minimum Deterrence’ and is prepared to make massive
countervalue retaliations while pledging the NFU. The massive countervalue
retaliation, however, is no doubt disproportionate to the nuclear strike by the SRBMs.
India, when attacked by Pakistan’s nuclear SRBM, must make the choice whether it
conducts a massive nuclear retaliation or conventional retaliations. The credibilityof India’s nuclear deterrence could not avoid being undermined in case India
chooses the latter18.
It would not be surprising if India were tempted to develop the nuclear counterforce
capabilities to make the proportionate retaliations to Pakistan’s nuclear SRBM
strikes. Moreover, India’s must suffer at least one Pakistan’s nuclear SRBM strike
before the massive countervalue retaliations can be put into play according to India’s
own doctrine on this. This dilemma may imply the need for India to build
counterforce capabilities to neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear SRBM, leading to the ideathat India should cancel its self-imposed NFU pledge. As seen in China’s caseearlier, the re-examination of the NFU pledge facilitates the shift to the counterforce
capabilities, and vice versa.
Narang has argued that the controversies were in fact a means to provoke, albeit
indirectly, a re-examination of India’s declared NFU, thereby allowing room for firstuse of nuclear weapons in India. Quoting the former National Security Adviser,
Menon, he argued that India’s initiation of preemptive nuclear use was possible if it
detected Pakistan moving tactical nuclear weapon batteries into the theater ofbattle19.

Menon also stated that Pakistan’s possession of the SRBM prevented India

Scott D. Sagan, “The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear
Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks”, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4,
Spring 2000.
18 Arka Biswas, “Incredibility of India’s Massive Retaliation: An Appraisal on Capability, Cost,and Intention”, Comparative Strategy, Volume 36, Issue 5, 2017.
19 Policy Conference, Washington DC, March 20, 2017 (Remarks as Prepared, not as Delivered).
17Chapter 1 — Kim Jong-un's Nuclear Posture under Transformation (Kurata)from retaliating by massive conventional weapon 20 .
Based upon Menon’s
statement Narang argued these controversies might pave a way for India to go fromthe singular nuclear posture for both China and Pakistan and to ‘decouple’ it from
China and align it differently toward Pakistan 21 . Namely, while retaining the‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’ for China, leaving a room the first use of nuclear
weapons as the proportionate strikes against Pakistan concurrently.
Even in the case of India where cancels its NFU pledge and deploys tacticalcounterforce capabilities following Pakistan, there is no assurance that the limited
war will not develop into a total war 22. In so far as India does not escalate thesituation from tactical war to total war to end the war in India’s favor, the ‘Credible
Minimum Deterrence’ is supposed to require no review 23 . However, the recent
controversies over the NFU in India show that Pakistan’s deployment of the SRBM
ignited it, challenging the effectiveness of the ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’.

DETERMINANTS OF NORTH KOREA’S COUNTERFORCE STRATEGYPERCEIVED US OPERATIONS IN WAR-TIME
Whilst North Korea retains Minimum Deterrence by pledging the NFU and building
the countervalue second-strike capabilities for survivability and readiness, it began
to seek a different nuclear posture in the mid-2010s. It is motivated by drafting
military operations to de-escalate and contain any potential war within the
Peninsula, by preventing use of the US forces’ bases located outside the Korean
Narang’s quotation of the Menon’s sentence is as follows; “There is potential gray area as towhen India would use nuclear weapon first against another NWS. Circumstances areconceivable in which India might find it useful to strike first, for instance, against an NWS that
had declared it would certainly use its weapons, and if India were certain that adversary’s launch
was imminent” (Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy,
Washington DC, Brookings Institution’s Press, 2016, p. 110). Menon also stated that Pakistan’s
possession of the SRBM prevented India from retaliating by massive conventional weapons,(Ibid., pp. 115-116). Besides Menon, regarding the recent controversies over the NFU in India,
Kumar Sundaram and M. V. Ramana, “India and the Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons”,
Journal of Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2018, pp.10-11.
21 Policy Conference.
22 栗田真広,“インドの核ドクトリンにおける先制核攻撃オプションの可能性”, 国際安全保障, 第 45 巻,
第 4 号, 2018 年 3 月, p. 66.
23 Yusuf Unjhawala, “India Is Not Moving to Counterforce Doctrine” http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/Xgg3LgQFFB0U40hB2oH7rO/India-is-not-moving-to-counterforce-doctrine.ht
ml; Arun Sahgal, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine is Robust and Requires No Review”, DPG Pol
icy Note, Vol. II, Issue 3, March 2017.
20

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Chapter 1 — Kim Jong-un's Nuclear Posture under Transformation (Kurata)

Peninsula.
At that time, Kim Jong-un underlined in — the Enlarged Meeting of the Central
Military Commission the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) of February 2015 — that
the KPA should be prepared to react to any form of war ignited by the “USimperialists” and he is reported to have clarified the methods of fighting a war with
the US and corresponding operational and tactical matters24. The hypothetical war
in question would not be imagined to be the legally renewed war. The war, ignitedeither by the US or by North Korea, will develop into armed attacks to the UN
Command, doubling the US-ROK Combined Command and the US Forces Commandin Seoul. It would also serve to justify the interpretation that the war is theresumption of the Korean War; when at least six US bases designated as the UN bases
are to be possibly mobilized as the Korean War was fought by. Moreover, the US
strategic bombers — B-1Bs, B-2s and B-52s deployed on the rotation-basis atAndersen Air Force Base (AFB) in Guam — are supposed to be ready to launch the
air strikes against North Korea when armed conflict commences, as well as theSeventh fleet being dispatched under the Pacific Command (PACOM)’s operation.
North Korea must demonstrate its will to escalate the war to deter the US fromintervening on the Korean Peninsula. The measures deployed to deter the US fromusing the bases outside the Korean Peninsula for staging and bombing North Korea
will be different from those to deter the local US-ROK Combined Forces. The
greater the distance the missiles travel, the less explosiveness the conventional
warheads tipped on them yield; conventional warheads do not, therefore, constitutedeterrence to these distant targets.
The countervalue retaliation to deter the US first strike depleting all the nuclear
forces would not be enough to deter the US not to use the bases outside the Korean
Peninsula to stage and bomb North Korea. Counterforce capabilities are thus
needed for North Korea to target the specific US bases with flexible nuclear yields.
North Korea needs the counterforce IRBMs whose range covers the US bases in the
Asia-Pacific as well as countervalue ICBMs to hit the US continent for thecountervalue strikes to have any real weight in terms of legitimate deterrence.

24“조선로동당중앙군사위원회회장이신 경애하는 김정은동지 지도밑에 조선로동당중앙군사위원회
확대회의가 진행되였다”, 로동신문, February 23, 2015.

Chapter 1 — Kim Jong-un's Nuclear Posture under Transformation (Kurata)

CONFLICTING REMARKS ON NUCLEAR USE
China as well as India officially retains the NFU pledge even in spite of the repeatedunofficial remarks claiming the potential first use of nuclear weapons. In contrast,
Kim Jong-un’s remarks regarding use of nuclear weapons are dubious and evencontradictory.
If the US forces conduct combat actions on the Korean Peninsula from bases outside
the Korean Peninsula, despite North Korea’s threatening a nuclear response, North
Korea evidently could not tolerate the US bombings without any form of retaliation.
In a case where the US conducts conventional bombing by the nuclear-incapable B1B strategic bombers, and North Korea’s retaliation then includes nuclear counterattacks, it results in North Korea using nuclear weapons first.
In this regard, Kim Jong-un’s address at the meeting of the Central Committee of the
WPK on March 31, 2013 is worth noting. He stated, while proposing the ‘ParallelLine’ of simultaneously pursuing nuclear and economic developments, that “thePeople's Army should perfect the war method and operation in the direction ofraising the pivotal role of the nuclear armed forces in all aspects concerning the war
deterrence and the war strategy, and the nuclear armed forces should always roundoff the combat posture (emphasis added)25.
The ‘war deterrence’ strategy is supposed to be tantamount to be the Minimum
Deterrence, the key components of which are the NFU pledge and survivability of
second-strike capability readiness. The ‘war strategy’, on the other hand, can beinterpreted as the strategy to be taken when it is judged that a war is inevitable.
The ‘combat posture’ that Kim Jong-un referred then is not restricted by either the
NFU pledge or by the countervalue second-strike.
Afterwards, the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) adopted the Ordinance ‘On
Consolidating the Position of Nuclear Weapons State for Self-Defense’. Article 4 of
the Ordinance states that ‘“the nuclear weapons of the DPRK can be used only by afinal order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army to repel
invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory strikes.”“경애하는 김정은동지께서 조선로동당 중앙위원회 2013 년 3 월전원회의에서 하신 보고”, 로동신문,April 2, 2013.
25

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Though it assumes ‘a hostile nuclear weapons state’ as the subject that makes an‘invasion or attack’, it does not limit the means of that invasion or attack to nuclear
weapons. This provision of the ordinance therefore indicates the possibility ofNorth Korea repelling an attack by ‘a hostile nuclear weapons state’ using
conventional forces by use of nuclear weapons. Thus, the provision cannot be
regarded as NFU, rather it leaves room for nuclear first use26.
Regarding the NFU, it is also worth noting that Kim Jong-un referred to the literal
NFU in his address to the Seventh Congress of the WPK in May 2016. He said, “Our
Republic will not use a nuclear weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by
any aggressive hostile forces with nukes (emphasis added) 27 .
Unlike theOrdinance adopted by the SPA, Kim Jong-un confined the measures for ‘hostile forces’to ‘encroach’ the North Korea’s sovereignty to “nukes”.
On the contrary, one month later, Kim Jong-un stated that it was necessary toincrease in a sustained way our preemptive nuclear attack capability on the
successful test-fire of the Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Hwasung-10(Musudan), after the repeated failures on June 2328. Kim Jong-un’s contradictory
remarks on nuclear use correspond to the ‘war deterrence’ and ‘war strategy’ thathe propounded himself.
THE SHIFT TO COUNTERFORCE
North Korea’s possible nuclear first use is coupled with its efforts to develop its
deterrence into counterforce capabilities via the ‘war strategy’, contrasted to thesecond-strike countervalue capabilities known as the ‘war deterrence’.
Ascounterforce capabilities are incorporated in military operations, precision attacks
are highly required. It is symbolic, seen in this light, that the commentary of North
Korea’s official organ first enunciating the first use of nuclear weapons referred to“조선민주주의인민공화국 최고인민회의 법령 자위적 핵보유국의 지위를 더욱 공고히 할 데대하여”, 민주조선, April 2, 2013. For the further details of North Korea’s nuclear doctrine, see
26

Kurata, The Current State of North Korea’s ‘Minimum Deterrence’ in Comparison, pp. 39-43.
27 “조선로동당제 1 비서이신 경애하는 김정은동지께서는 조선로동당 제 7 차대회에서 한 당중앙위원회
사업총화보고”, 로동신문, May 8, 2016.
28 “조선의 국방력 일대과시 지상대지상중장거리전략탄도로케트《화성-10》시험발사에서 성공 처경애하는 김정은동지께서 지상대지상중장거리전략탄도로케트《화성-10》시험발사를 현지에서 지도하시였다”,민주조선, June 23, 2016.

Chapter 1 — Kim Jong-un's Nuclear Posture under Transformation (Kurata)

the ‘precision nuclear attack’ concurrently29.
Going back to February 2015, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the
WPK adopted the resolution stipulating that they would display the manufacture of‘a large number of powerful, cutting-edge military hardware of our own style thatare of high precision, light, unmanned and intelligent 30 (emphasis added).
Furthermore in 2016, Kim Jong-un was reported to have given authorization for the
research and development of Korean-style ballistic rockets with high precision
capable of “attacking the arbitrary specific targets on the sea and the ground likeenemy’s fleets as if reeving them through the eye of a needle31”.
In this context, Hwasung-10’s test-fire in June 2016 should be noted again. Its
effective range is estimated to be 2000-4000 km, allowing it to reach Guam. A few
days before the test-fire, North Korea’s National Defense Commission Spokesmanlabelled Andersen Air Force Base as “a logistic base for invading the DPRK”, hinting
at nuclear first-use. The missile could be characterized as a counterforce weapon
against Andersen AFB in Guam32. A couple of days later, Kim Jong-un was reported
to clarify that the Strategic Force of the KPA had developed it into a powerful service
equipped with miniaturized and high-precision nuclear strike means 33 . In case
North Korea attempts to test-fire the counterforce ballistic missiles covering the US
Forces in Japan as well as Andersen AFB in Guam, it must be fired in an east andsoutheast direction.

“우리식의 정밀핵타격으로 미제와 괴뢰역적패당을 쓸어버리자”, 조선중앙통신, Pyongyang, March
6, 2013. http://www.kcna.co.jp
30 “조선로동당 중앙위원회정치국 결정서《조선로동당창건 일흔돐과 조국해방 일흔돐을 위대한 당의령도따라 강성번영하는 선군조선의 혁명적대경사로 맞이할데 대하여》를 채택”,로동신문, February 13,
2015.
31 “경애하는 최고령도자 김정은동지께서 정밀조종유도체계를 도입한 탄도로케트시험발사를 지도하시였다”, 민주조선, May 30,2017. The instruction’s exact date is not identified.
32 Hideya Kurata, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapon Capabilities: Emerging Escalation Ladder”,
CSCAP Regional Security Outlook, Canberra, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific,
2017, p. 35.
33 The remarks of Kim Jong-un were made on the occasion that the SPA designated July 3rd as
the anniversary of the foundation of the Strategic Forces of the KPA in commemoration of theday 1999 when Kim Jong-il founded the Strategic Rocket Forces. “조선민주주의인민공화국
최고인민회의정령 1177 호 조선민주주의인민공화국전략군절을 제정함에 대하여”, 민주조선, June 26,
2016.
29

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DEMONSTRATED COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITIES: ACHIEVEMENTS34
2017 may be marked as the year when North Korea accomplished and demonstrated
its counterforce capabilities with the ballistic missiles. On February 13, North
Korea test-fired a ground-to-ground medium-to-long range strategic ballistic missile
called Pukguksong-2 (KN-15), and it again fired the same type of ballistic missiles on
May 21, 2017. Its range is estimated at more than 2000 km, was originallydeveloped as SLBM. It was tested in May and August 2017 with success. Kim
Jong-un was reported to say with pride that the missile's hit rate was very accurate.
It should be noted that he stated its tactical and technical data met the requirementsof the Party35. It indicates that the accuracy of targeting was directed by the WPK.
In early March, North Korea, in the drill, fired Scud-Extended Ranges (ER)s (KN-05),
of whose is estimated at approximately 1000 km, shorter range than that of
Hwasung-7 (Nodong) and Paektusan (Taepodong) -1, the countervalue ballistic
missiles. Their coverages do not extend to the major cities of Japan, Tokyo andOsaka. As the official organ reported the task of the Hwasong artillery units of theKPA Strategic Force involved in this drill was to ‘strike the bases of the U.S.
imperialist aggressor forces in Japan in contingency’. The targets of the Scud ERs
are the US naval base in Sasebo and the Marine Corps base in Iwakuni; that is, thosemobilized in the Korean War. Scud ERs are regarded as the counterforce weapons
needed to deter US from using US bases in Japan in the case of contingency. Kim
Jong-un was reported to have given the officials accompanying him the task to“continuously develop Korean-style ultra-precision and intellectually promoted
rockets and bolster them in quality and quantity36”. The memorandum released by
the Foreign Ministry also underlined its efforts to develop its ballistic missiles forcounterforce purposes saying “the DPRK's mode of attack, once launched, would be
the precision strike to destroy only the military bases of the US and its vassal forcestargeting the DPRK37”.
For the further details of this section, see 倉田秀也「北朝鮮の核態勢と対価値・対兵力攻撃能力――弾道ミサイル開発の二系列」平成 29 年度外務省外交・安全保障調査研究事業‘不確実性の時代’の朝鮮
半島と日本の外交・安全保障, Japan Institute of International Affairs, March, 2018.
35 “국가핵무력강화의 길에 울려퍼진 다발적.련발적 뢰성 지상대지상중장거리전략탄도탄《북극성2》형 시험발사에서 또다시 성공 경애하는 최고령도자 김정은동지께서 탄도탄시험발사를
참관하시였다”, 민주조선, May 23, 2017.
36 “경애하는 최고령도자 김정은동지께서 조선인민군 전략군 화성포병부대들의 탄도로케트발사훈련을
지도하시였다”, 민주조선, March 7, 2017.
37 “미국의 반공화국 전쟁책동과 우리의 선택: 조선민주주의인민공화국외무성 비망록”, 민주조선,34

Chapter 1 — Kim Jong-un's Nuclear Posture under Transformation (Kurata)

In mid-May 2017, Hwasung-12 (KN-17) whose range is estimated at 3000-5000 km
was test-fired. The rocket accurately hit the targeted open waters 787 km away
after flying to the maximum altitude of 2111.5 km along its planned flight orbit38.
Hwasung-12 was not merely a pathway to the ICBM. Subsequently in August, thestatement released by General Kim Rak-gyom, Commander of the Strategic Force ofthe KPA, noticed that it seriously examined the plan for an ‘enveloping strike’ atGuam through simultaneous fire of four Hwasong-12 crossing the sky above Shimane,
Hiroshima and Kochi prefectures of Japan flying 3356.7 km for 1065 seconds, hitting
the waters 30-40 km away from Guam39. Hwasong-12 is, therefore, the manifest to
be the counterforce to Andersen AFB serving to deter the US from using its base forbombing to Korea, showing its will to escalate the war for de-escalating the battle
when a war occurs on the Korean Peninsula.

CONCLUSION: DUALITY OF NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR POSTURE
As seen in China and India’s cases, even if unofficial controversies are underway overthe self-imposed NFU, the governments of these two countries officially defy them.
In contrast, North Korea’s leadership pledges the NFU while asserting the‘preemptive first nuclear strike’. As the declaratory policy, North Korea’s nuclear
posture embodies a contradictory duality. It is also seen in its armed forces
structure. While developing the countervalue nuclear capabilities to strike thehabitant cities in the US mainland, North Korea also shifted to building counterforce
nuclear capabilities against the US bases outside the Korean Peninsula, and whichwere largely achieved in 2017.
This duality corresponds to the each of the two strategies; the ‘war deterrence’ andthe ‘war strategy’ that Kim Jong-un propounded in his address in 2013. The set of
the NFU pledge and the countervalue capabilities constitutes the ‘war deterrence’strategy tantamount to ‘Minimum Deterrence’; does the set of the ‘preemptive firstnuclear strike’ menace and the counterforce capabilities constitute ‘war strategy’.
April 7, 2017.
38“주체적 핵강국건설사에 특기할 위대한 사변 경애하는 김정은동지께서 새형의 로케트시험발사를
현지에서 지도하시였다”, 민주조선, May 16, 2017; see also 김보미, “북한의 핵선제불사용 (No First
Use) 선언의 배경과 의미”, 전락연구, Vol. 23, Issue 3, November 2016, p. 61.
39 “우리는 실제적 군사행동으로 미국에 엄중한 경고를 보낼 것이다--조선인민군전략군사령관
김락겸대장의 발표”, 민주조선, August 10, 2017.

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Latter strategy, as shown in China and India’s cases, addresses reexamination of the
NFU, also entails the development of the counterforce capabilities.
However, North Korea’s ‘preemptive first nuclear strike’ menace and the shift tocounterforce strategy are not motivated, unlike China’s case, by the buildup of its
owns conventional forces: that is the local air superiority in conventional forces overthe conflicted area. Nor are they motivated, unlike India’s case, by the adversary’s
deployment of the tactical nuclear weapons and resultant lowering threshold of useof the nuclear forces. North Korea’s shift to counterforce does not rest on the
military buildup of its own or adversary, rather it rests on the perceived US bases
mobilization that remains unchanged since the Cold War. It does also rest on theescalation ladder; demonstrating the will to escalate the conflict even with nuclear
weapons to de-escalate the conflict by deterring use of US bases outside the Korean
Peninsula for staging and bombing.

Chapter 2 — Estimating Ballistic Missile Performance Based on Incomplete Information(Lennartsson)

CHAPTER 2

Estimating Ballistic Missile Performance Based on
Incomplete Information: Application to North Korea’s
2016–2017 Missile Tests
Anders Lennartsson
Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)INTRODUCTION
Ballistic missiles are vehicles for delivering weapons quickly over a large range of
distances, depending of course on the range of a particular missile. High speed andthe fact that warheads are traveling at very high altitudes, often above theatmosphere, means they are difficult to defend against.
From a military
perspective, these advantages are further improved by a short time from firing
decision to missiles being deployed, although this depends both on the type of
missile and how forces are organized to tend to the missiles.
The intention of this paper is to provide some insights into the physics that
determines the range of a ballistic missile, and in particular how various incomplete
observations of a ballistic missile test give clues as to its actual performance whenit comes to range. Equipped with these relations, an analysis of the range capacityof North Korea’s missiles is performed, based on information available in news
media about the country’s tests during 2016–2017.

A BALLISTIC MISSILE SHOT
Ballistic missiles function by accelerating their payload, that is, one or morewarheads, by accelerating them in a carefully controlled direction by the propulsive
forces from one or more rocket stages, each propelled by one or more either solid
propellant rocket motors or liquid propellant rocket engines. For each of thestages, as propellant is expelled, the remainder of the missile becomes lighter, andthe acceleration increases as the propulsive force is often relatively constant for

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each stage. Between each stage a short time is needed to separate the burned-out
stage and to ignite the next stage when the conditions for doing so are met. Whenthe last stage shuts down, the payload free-falls toward the target position, or
positions in the case of multiple warheads.
The payload in the form of single or multiple warheads typically separates from therest of the missile before reentry, although some short-range missiles have anonseparating warhead. For example, some early Scud missiles do not haveseparating warheads. However, we shall only consider the case with a single
separating warhead. To hit a specific target over the long distances a long-range
missile can fly, means accurately hitting a point in four dimensions. In addition to
the three spatial coordinates, there is time, as also targets such as a cities or missile
silos are moving because of the rotation of the Earth. As the probability of hitting
the target by chance at a distance of several thousand kilometers is very slim, aguidance and control system is necessary for any kind of precision. In fact, forprecision strikes against military hardened targets, highly accurate guidance andcontrol systems are fundamental to obtain destruction with any type of warhead.
This also highlights the importance of information about the target location and why
mobility has such high relevance for military forces, as it makes it increasingly
difficult to strike the intended target.
Equipment for navigation and control is often placed in the very last stage,sometimes called the bus, which sometimes has a capacity for fine-tuning thevelocity of the warhead before releasing it toward the coordinates of the target, inorder to increase accuracy. Moving toward the target, the final part of the free fallis gradually turned into the reentry when the warhead is coming into theatmosphere and meets an increasing density of air molecules. As its velocity isvery high, several kilometers per second, and increasing as it is exchanging potential
energy for kinetic energy, the warhead, or reentry vehicle, is subjected to severe
forces from the atmosphere. An object entering a gas with such a high velocity
compresses the oncoming gases and by doing so increases their temperature. For
medium- and long-range missiles, the velocity is so high and the compression so
intense that the gas molecules are ripped apart and some electrons escape their hostatom or molecule. It is thus a very hot ionized gas that surrounds the reentry
vehicle. Energy left behind the warhead in the form of moving hot gases and an
expanding shock wave, is the result of the work done by the warhead on theChapter 2 — Estimating Ballistic Missile Performance Based on Incomplete Information(Lennartsson)

surrounding gas, and corresponds to a drag force on the warhead. This drag force
results in a reduction of velocity of the warhead, that is, an acceleration opposite thevelocity, which is often many times the normal gravitational acceleration on the
Earth. A functioning warhead, including the internal devices, needs to be able towithstand such accelerations. In addition, most parts of the missile, including thewarhead(s) must be able to cope with strong vibrations during the ascent when therocket motors are thrusting the missile to higher speeds. For a warhead, this also
applies during the reentry phase, as vibrations manifest themselves in addition to
the large decelerating forces and intense heat loads that are a result of atmosphericdrag during reentry.
The forces on a warhead during reentry also impact its accuracy. The higher theforces, the more the accuracy is decreased. More on this in section for Balllistic
Missile Accuracy.

INFORMATION ABOUT MISSILE TESTS
A thorough analysis of a missile test would require lots of quantitative information
about the missile, its components, and their performance. Some examples of suchinformation are what type of fuel is used in the various stages, the empty weight ofeach stage, the fuel mass for each stage, the mass of the final payload, the shape andsize of the expansion nozzles for each rocket motor or engine, and the aerodynamic
characteristics of the various flight configurations of the missile. Other examples
are the test objectives, how the control system is functioning, and the control systemparameter values that are used for the test, position, and velocity measurements,
temperature measurements at various stations in the missile, and so on. With sucha large set of information it would be possible to make realistic simulations of aparticular test and answer questions regarding how the test could have gone
relative to what actually happened. In fact, such analysis would probably be done
while planning a test, so that it would be reasonably expected that the tests would
reveal information vital to answering outstanding engineering questions.
Rarely are so many parameters available for the bystander, however, be it for tests
by any country. Thus analysts have to use what is available. For many of North
Korea’s ballistic missile tests during 2016 and 2017, the available information has
been limited to some photographs of the launching missile, occasionally a video of

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the event, and some measurements of the distance flown, maximum altitude, andtime of flight. So what insights can be derived from these numbers?
First, it should be noted that without any information on the payload of the tested
missile, it is very difficult to assess actual performance data accurately. This is so
because the payload mass has a significant influence on the range performance of a
missile. If a missile is tested with a payload mass that differs drastically from what
would actually be used, the results will still mean a lot to those who conducted thetest, but not so much for outsiders without the full picture. We shall assume thatthe tests have been performed with a realistic payload mass on board.
From measurements in pictures, estimates of the size of the missile can be obtained.
With added knowledge, and some assumptions, on how much such a structure
would weigh and how much fuel there is room for, and calculations or evensimulations for how much velocity such a missile would gain when boosting, it ispossible to get an estimate of the missile’s performance. Depending on the qualityof the assumptions, there would be some margin for error.
Another approach is to look at the obtained orbit and see what range can beobtained with the same specific orbital energy. This is based on the assumptionthat a tested missile can insert a warhead in any orbit without difference as to theresulting specific energy of the warhead. This is not strictly true as during theboost for a highly lofted orbit, the gravity drag is higher than when boosting for a
maximum range orbit (minimum energy trajectory) or a depressed orbit.
However, the losses due to aerodynamic drag are smaller during a near verticallaunch, compared to a long-range launch, which often starts at quite a low angle
above the horizon. However, the differences in aerodynamic drag do not make upcompletely for increased gravity drag loss during a near vertical launch.

RANGE CALCULATIONS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILESORBITS IN GENERAL
Before going into the analysis of orbits based on limited information, we briefly
revisit some facts about astrodynamics and orbits in general.

Chapter 2 — Estimating Ballistic Missile Performance Based on Incomplete Information(Lennartsson)

Astrodynamical orbits for objects free-falling around a large massive object such asa planet, are sections of a cone, that is, circles, ellipses, parabolas, or hyperbolas.
The mass center of the Earth is in one of the foci points of the cone section. As longas the engines are accelerating a ballistic missile, it is not following a single wellpredictable orbit; instead, the control system is functioning to navigate the missile
to a point where it can insert the missile’s warhead into such an orbit. While spaceprobes move on hyperbolic orbits away from Earth, and satellites move on ellipses(sometimes circles) that do not intersect the shape of the Earth, warhead orbits arealmost exclusively ellipses that intersect the Earth. The general idea is to constructwarhead orbit ellipses so that the target passes through the intersection point of the
Earth’s surface and the orbit, at the same time the warhead arrives along its orbit.
However, the last part representing the reentry has to be specially considered as it
is not a section of an ellipse.
For a given missile with a specific payload mass, there is a maximum range. This
range manifests itself as a single orbit between the start point and the target point.
So for a predetermined launch position and a particular target on the range limit,
the actual orbit flown by the missile, including the free-falling section of the warhead
where there is no propulsion, is very close to a computable orbit, which is a sectionof an orbital ellipse through the location where the last engine is shut down, and thelocation where the reentry begins. This orbit is called a minimum energy trajectory.
When a missile is directed to fly toward a target closer than its maximum range,
there are essentially two procedures that can be followed. One is that the thrusting
motor or engine is shut down at a point where the velocity has a magnitude anddirection by which the released warhead will fall on a minimum energy trajectory
toward the target. The other procedure is that the excess energy is used toaccelerate the warhead to a higher-than-necessary velocity for reaching the target.
This excess velocity can either be used to send the warhead on a lofted trajectory
where the extra energy is used to reach a higher altitude at the expense of increasingtime to target, or on a lower depressed orbit where the extra energy is used toincrease the speed above the ground and have the warhead arrive sooner than it
would on a minimum energy trajectory. Two such orbits are shown in Figure 1.
This is all relevant as North Korea has used very lofted trajectories to test its missiles
in the past year or so. The tricky question is, of course, what range the energy ofsuch a lofted trajectory can be converted into.

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Figure 1. Two elliptical orbits through two points on the surface of the
Earth. Both orbits have the same specific energy and thus a missile that
can insert a warhead on one of these, can also insert a warhead on theother.
All the orbital options are ellipses, and each of them has a particular specific energy
as all objects on a particular orbit have precisely that specific energy per unit mass,
which depends only on the parameters that describe the orbit. In astrodynamics,
specific energy 𝜀 is defined by𝑣2

𝜇𝜀 = 2 − 𝑟,(1)

where 𝑣 is velocity, 𝜇 the gravitational parameter that for Earth orbits has thevalue 𝜇𝐸 = 3.986012 × 105 km3 /s2 , and 𝑟 is the distance from the center of the
Earth, that is, 𝑟 = 𝑅𝐸 + ℎ, where 𝑅𝐸 is the radius of the Earth and ℎ the altitude
above the Earth’s surface.
𝑅𝐸 = 6378 𝑘𝑚.

We assume that the Earth is spherical and has the radius

ESTIMATING ACTUAL ORBIT PARAMETERS FROM TEST DATA
Given information from a test of the maximum altitude and the range obtained, it ispossible to estimate the shape of the particular ellipse that represents the actual
orbit of the missile or its warhead. For some useful definitions, see Figure 2.
Orbital ellipses can be described with the parameters eccentricity e and the conic
parameter 𝑝, given the relation

Chapter 2 — Estimating Ballistic Missile Performance Based on Incomplete Information(Lennartsson)𝑝𝑟 = 1+𝑒 cos 𝜈,(2)where 𝜈 is an angle pointing out directions from the origin of a cylindricalcoordinate system, and 𝑟 is the radius distance in that direction. For a thin ellipse,
𝑒 is close to 1, and for a circle it is 0. The parameter 𝑝 is a measure of how thickthe ellipse is, and for a circle it is the radius of the circle.

Figure 2: The orbit for a ballistic missile divided into three sections,boost phase covering the angle 𝛤, free-flight section covering the angle
𝛹, and the reentry section covering the angle Ω. Each corresponding
distance, Rp, Rff, and Rre, is the related angle multiplied by RE.

The

altitude is exaggerated in the figure relative to a realistic orbit coveringsuch a distance.
Now we assume a realistic boost trajectory by setting values of the burnout altitude
hbo and an ascent angle φa that inserts the warhead into the elliptical orbit withthe velocity at burnout relatively parallell to the elliptic orbit.
indication of the free-fall range angle if we set

This angle gives an

25

26

Chapter 2 — Estimating Ballistic Missile Performance Based on Incomplete Information(Lennartsson)𝑅𝛹 = 𝑅 𝑡 − 2𝜙𝑎 .

(3)𝐸

Now the parameters for determining the shape of the ellipse can be estimated by𝑒=ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 −ℎ𝑏𝑜

(4)

𝛹
2

𝑅+ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 −cos (𝑅+ℎ𝑏𝑜

and
𝑝=

𝛹
2

(𝑅+ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 )(𝑅+ℎ𝑏𝑜 )(1−cos )𝛹2𝑅+ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 −cos (𝑅+ℎ𝑏𝑜 ).

(5)However, we are more interested in a, the semimajor axis of the ellipse that
represents the orbit. It can be computed as𝑝

𝑎 = 1−𝑒 2,(6)from which we get𝑎=

𝑅+ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥1+𝑒.

(7)Now, between specific energy and the semimajor axis a of any conic orbit therelation𝜇𝜀 = − 2𝑎holds.

(8)

With the value of a, this becomes𝜇(1+𝑒)

𝜀 = − 2(𝑅 +ℎ

,

𝑚𝑎𝑥 )

𝐸

(9)

where we use the computed eccentricity e (based on some assumptions) and themeasured maximum altitude hmax.
To convert this specific orbital energy to a maximum range, we need the quantity
𝑣2𝑟

𝑄= 𝜇,

(10)

where Q is a measure of energy at a point on an orbit, and r is as before the distancefrom the Earth’s center. However, for elliptical orbits there is also the relation𝑟

𝑄 = 2 − 𝑎,and at burnout the values are(11)

Chapter 2 — Estimating Ballistic Missile Performance Based on Incomplete Information(Lennartsson)

𝑄𝑏𝑜 = 2 −

𝑅+ℎ𝑏𝑜

.

(12)

sin 𝑚𝑎𝑥= 2−𝑄𝑏𝑜 .
2

(13)

𝑎

Maximal range is related to Qbo by
𝛹

𝑄

𝑏𝑜

Thus we have a method of assuming the ascent angle and the altitude for burnout,
then using the measured maximum altitude and actual range of a test, after which
we can compute the maximum free-fall range 𝛹𝑚𝑎𝑥 .

BALLISTIC MISSILE ACCURACY
Orbital ellipses are accurate and predictable, but actual warhead orbits are distortedby the forces on a warhead during its reentry, and this part of the orbit is not asection of an ellipse. Simply put, it is more difficult accurately to predict the impact
point of a blunt reentry vehicle with large aerodynamic drag, as it will fall short ofthe elliptic orbit with miss distance being a nonlinear function of shape, atmosphericconditions, and initial position and velocity, including the angle velocity makes withthe vertical when coming into the atmosphere.
The time to traverse theatmosphere also depends on the aerodynamic drag, and uncertainties of the time
introduce additional miss distance. Reentry vehicles with low drag tend to staycloser to the predictable elliptic orbit. Target accuracy is thus improved by low
drag of a reentry vehicle. Low-drag vehicles are, however, more sensitive to heatloads and require better technology to protect the inner devices.
Accuracy is also affected by other factors, such as the sensors of the control system
during ascent, the performance of the actuators used to control the direction of thethrusting force, and the implementation of the control system that computes theactual actuator control signals based on signals from navigation systems and othersensors. For the final stage, the bus, this includes how well the small adjustments
to velocity are made depending on where the remaining parts of the missile are
relative to the target, at what time, and with what velocity when the main engines
have burned out.

27

Chapter 2 — Estimating Ballistic Missile Performance Based on Incomplete Information(Lennartsson)

28

ANALYSIS OF NORTH KOREA’S MISSILE TESTS DURING 2016–2017
During 2016–2017, North Korea performed several tests of ballistic missiles.

Here weprovide a review of some of these tests and the quantitative measures of performance thatwere publicly circulated at the time by news media, and in general attributed to government
sources.

JUNE 22, 2016
In June 2016, North Korea made two tests of a Musudan/BM-25/Hwasong-10
missile. One failed but the other was successful, the only successful one of the firsteight tests of this missile type. North Korea claimed 1 the maximum altitude(apogee) of this test was 1413 km. With the method described in section for
Estimating Actual Orbit Parameters from Test Data, and assuming a near-verticalascent angle of 86 degrees and a burnout altitude of 120 km, a maximum range ofsome 2573 km is obtained. This is below what would be expected for this missile
type, but still impressive for someone starting to use technology not fully developed
in-house.
With the maximum altitude of 1000 km, and identical assumptions as above, themaximum range is about 1760 km. It is clear that the maximum altitude of suchvery lofted orbits influences the maximum range significantly.
FEBRUARY 11, 2017
In February 2017, North Korea fired a Pukkuksong-2. According to militarysources in South Korea2, it flew about 500 km and reached an altitude of 550 km.
Assuming a burnout altitude of 100 km and an ascent angle of 65 degrees, themaximum range is estimated at 940 km.
On May 21, 2017, they once again tested this missile with identical range and apogee.

1

https://www.38north.org/2016/06/jschilling062316/

2

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pukkuksong-2

Chapter 2 — Estimating Ballistic Missile Performance Based on Incomplete Information(Lennartsson)

MARCH 6, 2017

North Korea launched four missiles into the Sea of Japan3. They flew some 1,000 km
before splashing down in the sea. Information on the maximum altitude 260 km
was obtained from somewhere, but it is unclear where it came from. Assuming aburnout altitude of 80 km and an ascent angle of 45 degrees, the maximum range ofthis missile is about 910 km. This is close, but still a bit too short. The range andaltitude figures are a bit uncertain, though.
MAY 13, 2017
In May 2017, North Korea tested a Hwasong-12 missile. This missile reached an
altitude 4 of 2111 km and flew 787 km. Assuming a burnout altitude of 100 km
and a near-vertical ascent angle of 86 degrees, the maximum range is estimated at
4,080 km.
JULY 5, 2017 AND JULY 28, 2017
On July 4, 2017, North Korea made a first test of a Hwasong-14 5 . arguably anintercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This missile reached an altitude of
2,802 km and flew 933 km. Assuming a burnout altitude of 120 km and a nearvertical ascent angle of 86 degrees, the maximum range is estimated at 5,489 km.
This is just below the limit for what is called an ICBM.
On July 28, they made a second test of this missile, and this time it reached 3,725 km
and flew 998 km. Assuming a burnout altitude of 120 km and a near vertical ascentangle of 87 degrees, the maximum range is estimated at 7,566 km. This was clearlyan ICBM. But it is not known whether this was obtained by lowering the payload
mass, compared to the previous test.

3

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/05/world/north-korea-ballistic-missiles.html

4https://en.wikipedihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hwasong-12

5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hwasong-14

29

Chapter 2 — Estimating Ballistic Missile Performance Based on Incomplete Information(Lennartsson)

30

SEPTEMBER 15, 2017
North Korea launched a missile that overflew Hokkaido in north Japan, with amaximum altitude of 770 km, reaching a distance of 3,700 km. Assuming aburnout altitude of 120 km and an ascent angle of 60 degrees, the maximum range
is estimated at 3,600 km. This is very close to what was actually reported6.
A plot of the computed based on measurements is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: The orbit profile for the September 15, 2017, missile test that
overflew Japan. Numbers are coordinates with unit kilometer. The
lower circular arc is the Earth’s profile, and the lower purple arc is theupper atmosphere at about 100 km altitude. The upper purple arc
indicates the maximum altitude reached by the missile or warhead.
NOVEMBER 28, 2017
North Korea launched a missile that reached a maximum altitude of 4,500 km, which
flew 960 km. Assuming a burnout altitude of 120 km and an ascent angle of
86 degrees, the maximum range is estimated at 9,490 km. This estimate is likely
below the actual performance. It is not known what the payload mass was.

CONCLUSIONS
The method of estimating specific energy as a means for obtaining maximum range
works well for normal long-range orbits, which are close to minimum-energy orbits.

6

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41275614

Chapter 2 — Estimating Ballistic Missile Performance Based on Incomplete Information(Lennartsson)

However, more work is needed to assess the impacts of gravity drag. This isimportant for near vertical launches, which the Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea used several times during the past two years, likely to avoid overflights offoreign territory.

31

Chapter 3 — Technical Assessment and Prospects on
North Korean Nuclear Capability (Lee)32

CHAPTER 3

Technical Assessment and Prospects on North Korean
Nuclear Capability

Sangmin Lee
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

INTRODUCTIONOn April 27, 2018, a historical inter-Korean summit meeting was held at Panmunjom,
a symbol of the two countries’ division, and it was possible to establish an
opportunity for negotiations on the denuclearization of North Korea. The Trumpadministration strongly promoted a policy of “maximum pressure and engagement”
in North Korea. However, the tension between North Korea and the United Stateshas been somewhat relieved through the efforts of the South Korean government.
The Korean government’s role in understanding both the US and the North Korean
position was crucial to the change in the situation on the Korean peninsula. The
summit meeting between the United States and North Korea, held on June 12, 2018,
must be the beginning of a new history. However, the role of the Korean government
as mediator will become more important in the future, as it is difficult for long
distrust and conflicts to be cleared up through a single encounter. This paper aims
at predicting how North Korea’s ballistic missiles will be developed regardless ofNorth Korea’s success at denuclearization in the future.
At present, the concept of war in North Korea is expected to be an asymmetricalconventional war under the nuclear threat. This concept of war is estimated byreflecting North Korea’s current military strength. In the near future, if North Korea
develops tactical nuclear weapons, it is expected that such a concept of war will be
developed into a “North Korean nuclear war” that aims at winning by offsetting theconventional power of South Korea. In other words, the second Korean war scenariothat North Korea uses is “a decoupling strategy” aimed at neutralizing US extended
deterrence with strategic nuclear weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the “North KoreanChapter 3 — Technical Assessment and Prospects on
North Korean Nuclear Capability (Lee)A2AD [anti-access area denial] strategy” to block the access of US troops withtactical nuclear weapons such as the Polaris (북극성)-2 or Scud-ER antiship ballistic
missiles (ASBMs).
On the one hand, considering the geographic conditions and the military strategy ofJapan and Guam, the role of Rodong and Musudan missiles capable of attacking US
bases in Japan and Guam in the Pacific, it can be said that alliance separation and
A2AD strategies are both partially achievable. The Rodong missile with a nuclear
warhead can be said to be aimed at offering extended deterrence against the UnitedStates, and Japan’s willingness to participate as a backbone, by threatening Japaneseforces and US forces stationed in Japan. However, because the Rodong missile does
not affect US territory or the majority of Americans, there are limits to the means ofseparating the alliance. On the other hand, the Musudan missile is expected tobenefit from the partial alliance segregation strategy by attacking the nearest US
territory instead of the US mainland. In the absence of a direct means to strike the
US mainland, use of this missile is expected to exert an access denial effect. After USintervention is blocked, North Korea would try to secure an asymmetrical advantage
over the Republic of Korea (ROK) military’s conventional power by mounting a large
amount of a nuclear warhead on its own Scud-B/C.
The asymmetrical power that Pyongyang is pursuing can be classified into nuclear
weapons and the rest1. The role of nuclear weapons that North Korea’s dependence
on nuclear weapons is expected to be greater than the expectations for other nuclear
powers on their nuclear weapons. In general, nuclear powers have pursued nuclear
development aimed at deterring enemy nuclear threats, while North Korea, in
addition to its goal of securing nuclear retaliation capability, would have to overcome
its weakness in conventional power against the ROK-US alliance. Therefore, North
Korea’s nuclear development is not expected to end at its securing minimum
deterrence against the United States. The deterrence of conventional power, which
1 In order to overcome the relative weakness of the Korean military’s conventional military

power since the Korean War, North Korea has developed a dependency on asymmetrical militarymeans. North Korea’s asymmetrical military power, such as nuclear weapons, biochemical
weapons, multiple launch rocket systems, special forces, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cybercapability, has been pursued to overcome the limitations of symmetrical conventional militarydevelopment. As the gap between North Korea and South Korea in conventional symmetricalmilitary forces, such as tanks, airplanes, and ships, will increase as time goes by, North Korea willcontinue to develop various asymmetrical forces and secure a means of war through choice andconcentration on their nuclear weapons.

33

Chapter 3 — Technical Assessment and Prospects on
North Korean Nuclear Capability (Lee)34

is boosted not only by the United States but also by Hawaii, Guam, and the UnitedStates Forces Korea, would have been an important axis of North Korea’s nuclear
development. In other words, it is impossible to rule out the possibility of starting atactical nuclear weapon at the same time as a strategic nuclear weapon. Clues to thedevelopment direction of North Korea’s tactical nuclear weapons may be found in
the new concept of the “Juche (주체) weapon”.

STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A JUCHE WEAPON
The concept of the Juche weapon pursued by North Korea is well expressed in thebusiness summation (사업총화) of the Seventh Congress2. It emphasizes the need todevelop precision, lightweight, unmanned, and intelligent Juche weapons. I cannot
help but wonder what the meaning of precise, lightweight, unmanned, andintelligent is, compared to the existing miniaturization, weight reduction, anddiversification3.
It is assumed that nuclear weapons are miniaturized, lightweighted, diversified, andstandardized with nuclear warheads. However, it is assumed that the precision,lightweight, unmanned, and intelligentization of Juche weapons are limited to theballistic missile as a means of delivering nuclear weapons.

PRECISION
First, precision can be interpreted in terms of accuracy. In the case of nuclear
weapons, whose accuracy has improved to precision strike, it refers to nuclear
weapons used for tactical purposes. Of course, strategic nuclear weapons also
require accuracy. This is a case in which strategic nuclear weapons should becapable of attacking an ICBM launch base, which is the enemy’s military target, asNorth Korea would not target a US ICBM launcher, which would more closely matchtactical nuclear weapons grade than strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, it can besaid that North Korea’s precision as a Juche weapon implies the development of
2 Rodong Newspaper, May 8, 2016, p.9.

3 North Korea says that “lightweight” means miniaturization of nuclear warhead, which refers toa nuclear warhead with low yield. Therefore, it can be interpreted as the intention to give it asmall footprint that is smaller and lighter. In addition, because of the trade-off characteristics of
missiles, if the weight of the payload is smaller, it can be sent farther with the same ballistic
missile of the same specification, so weight reduction also means enlargement of the range.

Chapter 3 — Technical Assessment and Prospects on
North Korean Nuclear Capability (Lee)tactical nuclear weapons. From a Pyongyang perspective, tactical nuclear weapons
correspond to Scuds, Rodong, and Polaris (북극성)-1 and -2, which are equipped with
nuclear warheads4. For reference, nuclear shells, nuclear backpacks, and nuclear
torpedoes, which were developed during the Cold War era, are not likely to be
subject to precision. North Korea is unlikely to develop nuclear shells, which aresomewhat unfavorable to precision because their power is far too high compared to
the range. For nuclear shells, the accuracy of nuclear weapons may not be significant.
Nuclear backpacks are not dropped, so their use has nothing to do with precision,and for the nuclear torpedo, the effect of precision is irrelevant because it has a shortrange compared to the yield, just like a nuclear shell. The purpose of still testing thealready developed Scud-ER and Rodong missiles is to improve precision.
Likewise, it seems that the purpose of avoiding interception is hidden in the twostage rocket system of the newly developed solid-fuel ballistic missile, the Polaris-1
and -2. The first-stage rocket requires the necessary range and speed, while thesecond-stage rocket requires the avoiding of interception. In the end, it is expectedthat the Scud-ER, Rodong, and Polaris-1 and -2 will be used as “North Korean A2AD”
by improving their precision as tactical nuclear weapons5.

4 The criterion for distinguishing strategic weapons from tactical weapons is relative, and for thesame weapon system, attacker and defender may be accepted as strategic weapons and tactical
weapons, respectively. For example, if a North Korean Scud missile is equipped with a 20 kt
nuclear warhead, North Korea could accept it as a tactical nuclear weapon, while South Korea
could recognize it as a strategic nuclear weapon. It depends on how the damage from a nuclear
attack affects the fate of a nation. In the case of North Korea, which has to deal with the ROK-US
alliance, Scud missile is accepted as a tactical nuclear weapon because it is not enough to get the
victory of the war. Sud missile is accepted as a strategic nuclear weapon because it can threaten
our own survival by attacking with a nuclear warhead.
5 It is advantageous that the Polaris-1 has a single stage rather than two stages because of theheight limitation of the Sinpo class submarine. However, new Polaris-1s having two stages were
test-fired in March and August 2016, respectively. A similar case can be found in the SLBM R-27
and the improved R-27K of the former Soviet Union. The Polaris-1 has been developed bycopying the R-27. The R-27 was a reliable single-stage liquid rocket type SLBM mounted on a
Golf-class submarine. The R-27K was an improved ASBM with a two-stage liquid rocket. As theengine was added in the middle, without increasing the length, the amount of propellant was
reduced so that the range decreased to less than half. Nevertheless, the reason for adopting the
R-27K in two stages was to increase precision. North Korea announced that it was equippedwith a precise guided missile intercept evasion technique after its launch on February 12, 2017,
in the form of a two-stage rocket system of Polaris-2.

35

Chapter 3 — Technical Assessment and Prospects on
North Korean Nuclear Capability (Lee)36

LIGHTWEIGHTThe expression lightweight is of course different for nuclear warheads and missiles.
Lightweight for nuclear warheads means they are small and lightly produced
nuclear warheads, while lightweighting missiles does not simply reduce the weightor size of the liquid fuel engine by converting it to a solid fuel engine. In other words,
it is possible to reduce the requirement for additional equipment (fuel, oxidizer
supplementation device, facilities) and to start the operation in the nighttime byusing a solid fuel engine and an infinite track vehicle in the Polaris-2 type. In thisway, it is possible to simplify the operation from preparation to launching and to
shorten the time, and it is possible to reduce the need to maintain the transporter
erector launcher moving path.
Scud-ER and Rodong missiles, which still use liquid fuel engines, are expected to be
replaced by solid-fuel engine missiles in the long run to lighten their actions, but for
now, the launch system should be simplified to reduce launching preparation time,and North Korea will strengthen its efforts to shorten time to reload for launchingcontinuously. For example, replacing a navigation device with an electronic gyro
instead of a mechanical gyro can dramatically reduce the preparation time andlighten the action. So, it is dangerous to judge that there is no need to lightweight a
weapon system because it has already been developed, because the response
systems of the ROK-US alliance will be different depending on whether or not it
accepts that North Korea’s time to prepare for launching a missile may become
shorter, and the effect of the kill chain will be differentiated when it is actuallyoperated.

UNMANNED
Unmanned weapons may seem unlikely to apply to nuclear weapons, but
unexpectedly may be very important. This is because they can play an importantrole in providing the accurate location of targets in the sky above a target area anddetermining whether to attack again through damage assessment. For the abovementioned “North Korean A2AD”, it is essential to provide real-time monitoring of
the position of a US aircraft carrier and to supply relevant location information to
the North Korean Strategic Rocket Command. It is almost impossible for North
Korea, which has absolutely low air power, to operate a reconnaissance aircraft on

Chapter 3 — Technical Assessment and Prospects on
North Korean Nuclear Capability (Lee)37

the high seas, but when it comes to UAV, if it is not right now, it is more likely to use
advanced commercial technology. Unmanned reconnaissance aircraft with stealthcapability are expected to be able to transmit the movement of and accurate location
information for the US Seventh Fleet to Pyongyang while being active in the Western
Pacific region, the Korean peninsula, and Japanese waters. Naturally, not the UScommercial GPS, but BeiDou (北斗) and GLONASS satellite signals from China andRussia will be useful to obtain information about the target. An ASBM is a means ofattacking an aircraft carrier based on the information provided by a UAV. In thesense that the Scud-ER, which has been tested and fired several times recently, is ameans of nuclear shooting developed by Russia in order to attack targets moving
within a range of 1,000 km, there is no reason for North Korea to simply limit fixed
targets on the ground. The Scud-ER, Rodong, and Polaris-1 and -2 are considered
improved or newly developed, to be used as ASBMs.

INTELLIGENCE“Intelligence” means developing smarter (nuclear) weapons.

It may mean

maximizing attack power by intelligent means of shooting rather than the use of
nuclear warheads. That is, nuclear warheads have the ability to penetrate missile
defenses and strike targets. North Korea mentioned about intercept escapecapability in the statement after the Polaris-2 test launch. A general (nonintelligent)
weapon system is supposed to perform a mission through human command.
However, an intelligent weapon system should at least be able to judge and act on its
own without command. If applied to a missile, the situation in which suchintelligence is required is likely to be one that avoids interception because not muchcan be commanded in the ground control center in order for a missile to avoid
interception. It is difficult to say that a missile is intelligent enough to avoid
interception by simply moving along a specified path. Thus, intelligent intercept
avoidance is the detection and counteracting of intercept attempts. The only way todetect intercept attempts is to recognize the signals of the detection radar by the
nuclear warhead reentrant. Normally, an interceptor missile is fired at an
approximate intercept position based on the trajectory of a nuclear warhead
captured by ground or sea detection radar, and then it captures and tracks theinfrared signal of the nuclear warhead. Therefore, the only way to determine that a
nuclear warhead is caught in a missile defense system is to analyze the signals of thedetection radar. And the way to avoid an interceptor missile is to modify theChapter 3 — Technical Assessment and Prospects on
North Korean Nuclear Capability (Lee)38

trajectory, fire a decoy, or disturb or destroy the interceptor missile. Decoys,
separated from nuclear warheads automatically after boosting, seem unrelated tointelligent nuclear weapons. In other words, intelligent nuclear warheads should be
redirected to avoid an intercept, or to actively attack an interceptor missile if it isjudged to have been captured by detection radar. Furthermore, it would be better ifwarheads had the ability to attack and neutralize the detection radar by themselves.
Although North Korea seems to be rushing to develop strategic nuclear weapons sothat the US nuclear umbrella does not reach the Korean peninsula at present, its
development of tactical nuclear weapons will be underway because it is well known
that strategic nuclear weapons alone cannot guarantee victory in the Korean
peninsula. Although it may be understood that it is common for nuclear-weapon
states to switch to producing tactical nuclear weapons once they have completed
strategic nuclear weapons, the possibility cannot be excluded that North Korea may
be planning to complete development of the two at the same time. In this sense, we
can see that there are many coinciding parts when we apply the precision,lightweight, unmanned, and intelligence pursued in the production of the Juche
weapons to tactical nuclear weapons.

CONCLUSION
Taken together, North Korea is developing the ASBM as a tactical nuclear weapon,
and the Scud-ER, Rodong, and Polaris-1 and -2 can become candidates for ASBMs.
North Korea will use a satellite navigation system for precision, shorten the launchtime by reducing the weight of the action, and make precise guidance to attack anaircraft carrier by using unmanned reconnaissance vehicles. Intelligent nuclear
warheads are expected to have a smart warhead reentry system that actively avoids
intercepts and destroys interceptor missiles as well as ground and sea radar.
Negotiations on the denuclearization of North Korea are taking place more slowly
than expected. Political events are waiting for North Korea and the United States inthe second half of 2018, and it is difficult to predict how negotiations will develop in
the future. In addition, because the trade conflict between the United States andChina is showing signs of intensifying, the denuclearization of North Korea may befurther delayed due to China. In the worst case, North Korea may return to the pathof nuclear development again. In this regard, North Korea’s ballistic missile

Chapter 3 — Technical Assessment and Prospects on
North Korean Nuclear Capability (Lee)development needs to be monitored constantly regardless of denuclearization
negotiations.

39

Chapter 4 — Evaluating the US Approach to North Korean Threat
under Trump Administration (Miller)

40

CHAPTER 4

Evaluating the US Approach to North Korean Threat under
Trump Administration
Jonathan Berkshire Miller1
Japan Institute of International Affairs

Introduction

Last year, in the early morning hours of August 29, 2017, many Japanese citizens in
the northern prefectures were awaken by a jarring J-Alert2 notice of an imminent
missile from North Korea headed in Japan’s direction. The missile test of
Pyongyang’s new intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) ― the so-called
Hwasong 12 ― had a trajectory that flew over Japan’s northern island of Hokkaido.
The missile test was another shock to Japan’s sense of vulnerability to the region’s
growing threats. Indeed, the August 29 test appeared to break the threshold ofballistic missile overflights of Japan’s airspace ― an informal practice that theNorth had avoided up until that point. Pyongyang then followed up its initial test
over Japan with a subsequent Hwasong 12 test in September that also had a trajectory
over northern Japan but travelled a distance much farther3 than the earlier launch.
The intensity of North Korea’s missile program – both in terms of frequency of tests
and speed of enhanced capabilities – is making for very difficult strategic choices forUnited States and its allies which are looking to deter and defend against
Pyongyang’s bellicosity. Further raising anxieties in the region is the North’s
concurrent developments on its nuclear program ― as evidenced by its test of
The author is a senior visiting fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, adistinguished fellow at the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada, and is a senior fellow at the Asian
Forum Japan. The views expressed are his own. This paper was based on discussions, held at
the National Defense Academy, in February 2018.
2 Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Efforts to Protect Civilians in an Armed Attack Situation and Other Situations”, Ministry of Defense, 2006. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_pa
per/pdf/2006/3-4-1.pdf
3 http://www.usfj.mil/Media/Press-Releases/Article-View/Article/1311946/us-pacific-com
mands-statement-on-latest-north-korea-missile-launch/1

Chapter 4 — Evaluating the US Approach to North Korean Threat
under Trump Administration (Miller)hydrogen bomb in September and its rapid improvements on the process of
miniaturization of a nuclear war4 head to fit on top of one of its ballistic missiles.
Fig. 1 North Korean missile launches
Pyongyang has also raised concerns in the region due its developments towards
perfecting its capabilities on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) ― and has

already successfully tested such a delivery system through its “lofting” trajectory
tests5 this past July. These developments have further convinced the US to doubledown on deterrence efforts with its two East Asian allies ― Japan and South Korea,
and also look to bolster trilateral security cooperation despite lingering bilateralstrains between Tokyo and Seoul.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/north-korea-now-making-missi
le-ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/e14b882a-7b6b-11e7-9d08-b79f191
668ed_story.html?utm_term=.14dcd0e4b31d
5 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/press/release/2017/07/29b.html
4

41

42

Chapter 4 — Evaluating the US Approach to North Korean Threat
under Trump Administration (Miller)

STRATEGIC CONTEXTIn June 2018, US President Donald Trump met with North Korean leader Kim Jongun in Singapore and made pledges to work towards the “denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula”. The summit, which followed inter-Koreas meetings andmultiple trips to China by Kim, was on high on theatrics with a backdrop at a luxury
resort and marked the first time a sitting US President has sit-down with a leader
from North Korea ― a country that it is still technically at war with (although conflicthas been largely latent the armistice signed in 1953). While the Singapore meeting
was a welcome move towards diplomacy between Washington and Pyongyang,many analysts remains skeptical due to the fact that there was no mention
whatsoever of verification in the joint release after the summit ― despite US
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s subsequent insistence that verification was“mutually understood” to by both sides in the communique’s version of “complete
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula”.
Indeed, over the past few years, the regime of Kim Jong-un in North Korea continues
to expand the size and scope of its nuclear weapons program and its ballistic missile
capabilities. The North has also worked on the miniaturization of a nuclear
warhead ― which could be tipped on its ballistic missiles in order to be a morecredible nuclear deterrent. But, despite all of these provocations - and an umbrellaof sanctions and efforts to deter Pyongyang ― there is no indication that the North
is willing to negotiate in good faith to rollback its nuclear weapons capabilities ― asdemanded by the US, Japan, South Korea and others in the international community.
This had raised the specter, in some circles in Seoul and Washington, that it might betime to put more serious thought into a pre-emptive strike or other military action
against the North. While the end result would almost surely be the end of the Kim
regime in the North, the costs of such potential action remain unacceptably high,leaving the prospect of pre-emptive military action on the Korean peninsula a lastcase and undesirable policy option.

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Fig. 2 North Korea’s missile arsenal

The past two years have been marked by incremental and sustained provocations by
the Kim regime in North Korea. In addition to three nuclear tests, Pyongyang has
also conducted numerous tests of its ballistic missile program ― all in defiance ofsanctions put in place by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)6. Meanwhile,
Kim ― despite summits now with South Korean President Moon Jae-in and US
President Donald Trump - has shown no indication that the North is interested inbartering its cherished nuclear weapons capabilities in a renovated version of thelong moribund Six Party Talks ― or some other form of multilateral discussions.
Indeed, most rhetoric from Pyongyang now indicates an interest in talks under theprecondition of denuclearization ― at least in complete and verified terms - is a nonstarter.
Last year, North Korea opened its Worker’s Party Congress (WPC)7 in Pyongyang
amidst much pomp and ceremony. Before the meeting, a WPC had not occurred in
the North for almost forty years, since the 1980 session, which served as a grooming
event for his late father, Kim Jong-Il. During the event, Kim reinforced ― on the
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http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/dprk-north-korea/
http://38north.org/2016/05/rfrank052016/43

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44biggest stage ― the North’s commitment to maintain its status as a “nuclear weapons
state” ― a notion that the regime believes adds to its legitimacy and provides
deterrence against the US and South Korea. Kim has also enshrined the importanceof the nuclear weapons program through the adoption of byungjin line ― which
dovetails the North’s development of nuclear weapons alongside its stated priorityof economic growth and development.
The inability of the international community to shape or alter North Korea’s calculus
through diplomacy, along with the simultaneous expansion of its WMD capabilities,
has raised questions amongst some in Seoul and Washington on whether the only
solution remaining is the use of force. But, while most policymakers and experts
familiar with the North Korea situation stress the importance of the credible threatof the use of force ― for deterrence purposes ― few actually see it is a viable option.
There are numerous reasons for this but the most central reason is the difference inrisk tolerance between Pyongyang versus that of Seoul and Washington (andpotentially Tokyo as well).

STRATEGIC PATIENCE: LESSONS FROM THE PASTThe approach of the former Obama administration to Pyongyang’s provocations andescalations was essentially styled as a type of containment policy sprinkled withoccasional carrots. The policy ― dubbed “strategic patience” 8 ― relied on theimposition of sanctions and the enhancement of deterrence in order to dissuade theNorth’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Indeed, Obama remained consistent in his
policy of unwillingness to accept Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons status.
Shortly following the North’s nuclear test in September, 2016, Obama remarked9
that: “To be clear, the United States does not, and never will, accept North Korea
as a nuclear state”. Far from achieving its stated national security and economic
development goals, North Korea's provocative and destabilizing actions haveinstead served to isolate and impoverish its people through its relentless pursuitof nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities. Finally, Obama took
ownership of the stakes involved 10 with the North’s volatile behaviour: “As
http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/us-policy-toward-north-korea/p29962
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/09/statement-president-north-ko
reas-nuclear-test
10 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/09/statement-preside89Chapter 4 — Evaluating the US Approach to North Korean Threat
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Commander in Chief, I have a responsibility to safeguard the American people andensure that the United States is leading the international community in responding
to this threat and North Korea's other provocations with commensurate resolveand condemnation”.
The approach from the Obama administration however failed to dissuade theNorth from advancing both its nuclear and missile programs. Especially over thelast two years of his administration, Obama was been spinning diplomatic tires
with a seemingly defiant and resigned acceptance that problems on the Korean
peninsula would not experience any significant amelioration during the lastmonths of his tenure. Indeed, he warned President Donald Trump ― hissuccessor ― that tensions on the Korean peninsula would be his biggest and mostimmediate security challenge after Trump’s election last November.
The one area of measurable improvement under the Obama administration
regarding the Korean peninsula was its efforts to enhance deterrence through its
alliances with South Korea and Japan. Obama exerted intense efforts to bringSeoul and Tokyo together and concentrate on the threat from North Korea11. This
proved an exhausting and difficult initiative at times over the past three years asties between Japan and South Korea plummeted over historical issues. But
resilience paid off for Obama ― at least temporarily ― as ties are slowly improved
between Tokyo and Seoul in 2014-15 and was a noticeable uptick in trilateral
security cooperation with joint exercises, frequent high-level diplomatic meetings
and a new trilateral information sharing agreement that demonstrate joint resolve
to deter future North Korea provocations.
Deterrence efforts within the US-ROK alliance framework are also growing.
Despite intense criticism from China, South Korea and the US have agreed to deploy
the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system 12 . Proponents ofdeploying the THAAD system to the Korean peninsula argue that the current antimissile capacity from the South Korean and US Forces is insufficient to meet theevolving challenges posed by the North’s arsenal of short and medium-ranged
missiles. Before the THAAD deployment, the US Forces in Korea are limited toPatriot Advanced Capability (PAC) batteries which only target missiles during their
final descent and lack THAAD’s ability to intercept missiles at a higher altitude.
nt-north-koreas-nuclear-test
11 http://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/604481/us-japan-south-korea-hold-trilateral-security-talks
12 https://www.army.mil/article/171316/us_to_deploy_thaad_missile_battery_to_south_korea

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46

Critics of THAAD’s potential impact note that, despite its enhanced capabilities, itwould likely be unable to fend off a massive attack from the North, which has theability to deploy 1,000 short-medium range missiles.

MAXIMUM PRESSURE AND ENGAGEMENT
In response to the latest provocations, the Trump administration declared an “endto Strategic Patience” and rolled out is new policy of “Maximum Pressure andEngagement 13 ”.

Essentially the new policy looked at doubling-down on thecommitment to denuclearization but with stronger coercive diplomacy laced withthe threat and ambiguity of military action. Trump stoked tensions and concern
in the region through his promise of “fire and fury” if North Korea provoked the US
and its allies. He further promised to “totally destroy” Pyongyang if it attacked
first.
But Trump’s goal towards turning the screws on the regime of Kim Jong Un in North
Korea depends on more than just deterrence and solidarity with Japan and South
Korea. One of the cornerstones of US policy has been to pressure China ― North
Korea’s biggest source of trade and commerce ― to get tough on Pyongyang.
Washington has also looked to stitch together meaningful ― and sustainable ―international commitment to working towards denuclearization on the Korean
Peninsula.
This starts of course with Japan and South Korea ― as the region’s top US allies andkey stakeholders in the brewing crisis. But it will also require a consistent andnuanced approach to China, which remains North Korea’s largest trading partner.
Despite Beijing’s own frustration with the Kim regime, and its incremental efforts toimpose new sanctions on the North ― their efforts to reign in Pyongyang need tocontinue and it is crucial that efforts are made to verify the implementation of
sanctions. There has been much effort ― some successful - on new sanctions andworking more stridently with China on the implementation of the existing
sanctions regime ― but neither of these are new options in the toolkit.
Moreover, neither lever has proven demonstrably effective as the North continues
https://nl.usembassy.gov/secretary-tillerson-addresses-state-department-employees-wash
ington/13

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to push through on its weapons development despite sanctions. Meanwhile
Beijing, despite taking an incrementally tougher stance vis a vis Pyongyang,continues to be unwilling to make a comprehensive shift in its approach towards
North Korea.
The election of Moon Jae-in in South Korea in 2017 has been another an important
marker on the Korean peninsula crisis. At first, there was a great deal of caution on
how Moon and Trump will interact and how the intersection of Washington’s“Maximum Pressure and Engagement” would dovetail with Moon’s desire to retrofit Seoul’s hardened approach to the North. In some sense, there has been common
ground between the two ― both have signaled engagement is a possibility, including
even meeting with leadership in Pyongyang. On this note, Trump appeared to tout
himself as kingmaker ― resulting in the pre-Olympic diplomacy between South andNorth Korea. That said, there are also glaring divergences coming to the US-Korea
relationship too. Moon seems disenchanted with the “deterrence plus” approachat turning the screws on North Korea and will likely push back on the need for talks
on more robust trilateral security cooperation with Japan. Moon is also likely tobrush off suggestions of regional missile defense ― and has previously bristled at
THAAD and the Japan-South Korea GSOMIA intelligence-sharing pact. This makes
for a mix of uncertainty in the US-Korea relationship going forward.

MILITARY OPTIONS?
The situation in the Korean peninsula continues to be a critical insecurity challenge
for Washington also, but its military options to respond to the North’s provocations
and threats remain limited. That said, as the North continues to refine its ballistic
missile capabilities ― in both range and accuracy terms ― the threat to continental
US becomes clearer. This has prompted some in the US to start warning that thenext administration might face a critical question on the need for the use of force
against Pyongyang. As retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling remarked recently14, "Whenyou have this many tests, you are eventually going to get it right. That's what
concerns me. As soon as they have one test that they could classify as an extreme
success, then we are talking a whole different ballgame (in) their potential tothreaten other sovereign nations in their area but also potentially parts of the UnitedStates".
14

http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/17/politics/north-korea-nuclear-attack-warning-time/

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These concerns about North Korean capabilities have led to the so-called “bloodynose” argument of a pre-emptive slap at North Korea to demonstrate US resolve andpunish it for its defiance. In this argument, it is thought that deterrence ― andWashington’s overwhelming ability to respond in concert with its allies ― would
restrict or mitigate any North Korean retaliation. The “bloody nose” approach ispremised, therefore, on a measured or negligent kinetic response from Pyongyang.
The reality remains however that there is very little evidence to suggest that North
Korean regime would ― or perhaps even could ― roll over a take a bloody nose strike.
Moreover, despite the valid concerns on Pyongyang’s capabilities, the potential costs
involved with military action remain unacceptably high. In addition to the issue ofPyongyang’s missile capabilities and concerns about it WMD programs, the mostcritical threat remains the North’s ability to inflict significant damage on South Korea
through its conventional forces, in addition to its ability to create asymmetricproblems through cyberwarfare and terrorism.
The US-ROK alliance force has a wide gap in qualitative capabilities over the North,but this leverage does not eliminate the ability of the North to lash out with its vast
artillery batteries, which are trained on Seoul. This not only threatens millions of
Korean civilians but also the lives of thousands of US troops stationed there. Most
scenario planning and contingencies indicate that the US-ROK alliance would havelittle problem winning a conflict on the Korean peninsula, as a result of theirsignificant advantage in qualitative capabilities.
But the challenge for Washington and Seoul has always been measuring
proportionality of their potential military actions and assessing the likely reaction
from Pyongyang. In other words, the overwhelming military advantage enjoyed by
the US and South Korea provides important deterrent benefits but its applicability
is limited in scope unless the security situation descends so rapidly that the use offorce is seen as the only avenue. Such a calculation also must take into account thebenefits versus the potential costs ― as Washington and Seoul have a desire to
manage the escalation ladder. This is true for all types of hypothetical military
actions ― whether it be strikes aimed at degrading Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities
or more invasive plans aimed at the North’s critical military infrastructure sites andcommand and control centers.

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This has resulted in a balanced and strategically ambiguous posture from the US on
the possibility of the military option. Trump ― along with his predecessors ―continues to stress that military force cannot be taken off the table and reinforced
Washington’s indivisible commitment to Seoul. This is a sensible policy for the US,
considering its deterrence efforts are grounded on the credibility attached to its
commitments to South Korea.
There has also been some talk, especially in South Korea at the end of the Park
administration, on the capabilities that could be used to take out the leadership in
Pyongyang. South Korea’s former Defense Minister, Han Min Koo, revealed suchplans after the North’ most recent nuclear test in September. Han stressed that, if
the situation required, Seoul has prepared a so-called “assassination unit” thatwould focus its efforts on removing the key leadership figures in North Korea,
including Kim Jong-un. Han specifically noted that, “if it becomes clear the enemy
is moving to attack the South with nuclear missiles, in order to suppress its aims, theconcept (of the special forces) is to destroy key figures and areas that include theNorth Korean leadership”. Former South Korean President Park Geun-hye alsostressed the need for steely resolve against the North and has promised significant
retaliation against any potential attacks from Pyongyang ― such as previous strikes
against the naval corvette, the Cheonan, or the shelling of Yeonpyeong island ―both in 2010.

LOOKING FORWARD
Instability on the Korean peninsula will undoubtedly remain a concern throughout
the Trump administration and there are no silver bullets. Trump ― and his
predecessors ― have tried almost every option in their playbook with the aim ofconvincing the North to give up its nuclear capabilities and restrain the growth of its
missile program. The most recent approach involved an unprecedented diplomatic
outreach to Kim Jong-un, with hopes that the North’s top-down system will pushforward a path towards denuclearization. Despite this, the US needs to remainsteely-eyed and focused on the evolving threat from Pyongyang. In response,
Washington should accelerate deterrence efforts and double down on its trilateralcoordination with its Northeast Asian allies ― Tokyo and Seoul.

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The US should also coordinate with Seoul and Tokyo (in addition to China andRussia) on pushing for sanctions with a larger bite ― including levying penalties onbanks that deal with North Korea. The sanctions may not pass through the United
Nations Security Council, due to China’s resistance, but the three sides can still work
towards a multilateral sanctions regime that would further tighten the screws on the
North. This is a necessary option especially if talks fizzle between the US and North
Korea over the coming months. Meanwhile, the US should also look at balancing
this tightening of the vice with a sustained diplomatic effort for Pyongyang todemonstrate its intentions on denuclearization. Up until this point, the carrot-andstick approach has been lacking and Washington, along with its allies, has basicallywithdrawn incentives for North Korea to negotiate because of an ― understandable― trust deficit. Despite this lack of trust, pressure and coercion alone will not leadto denuclearization in the North.

Chapter 5 — North Korea’s Evolving Strategy toward the United States (Akutsu)

CHAPTER 5

North Korea’s Evolving Strategy toward the United States:
Kim Jong Un’s New Buy-Time Tactic
Hiroyasu Akutsu
National Institute for Defense Studies

INTRODUCTION: NORTH KOREA’S TACTICAL SHIFT
After launching 55 ballistic missiles and conducting four nuclear tests since April
2012, North Korea declared that it had finally achieved “the state nuclear force” on
November 29, 2017, when the country successfully test-fired an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) Hwasong-151. With all these achievements, the Kim JongUn regime then made a new tactical move in a rather abrupt manner at the beginningof 2018. This new move is two phased: 1) taking advantage of South Korea’s
engagement policy and 2) agreeing to the US offer for a summit meeting between US
president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un. Kim met with President Moon Je-in ofSouth Korea on April 27 and then with President Trump on June 12, 2018,
maintaining a “peaceful” atmosphere while avoiding substantial denuclearization.
This leaves us wonder whether North Korea’s ostensible shift to a softer diplomatic
attitude might be just one of its usual buy-time tactics employed for multiple
purposes, and whether the priority is likely to secure and enhance the state nuclear
force and deterrence power against the United States while maintaining theframework of the Byungjin strategic line. By definition, the strategic line allows
Pyongyang to shift its focus to economic development. No official statement by theregime has been found so far to indicate that the regime has abandoned its nuclear
and missile program.
In this paper, I discuss why North Korea has taken this diplomatic turn and what canbe learned from it in terms of its strategic game plan by briefly analyzing the Kim
Jong Un regime’s grand and military strategy as well as the regime’s diplomatic“DPRK Gov’t Statement on Successful Test-fire of New-Type ICBM”, Korean Central News
Agency, November 29, 2017.
1

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moves to date through the first-ever US-DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea) summit meeting in Singapore on June 12 and the series of North-Southmeetings since the signing of the Panmunjom Declaration on April 23, 2018.

NORTH KOREA’S ULTIMATE STRATEGIC GOAL TOWARD THE UNITED STATESNorth Korea’s constitution suggests that the country’s ultimate goal is the realizationof Korean reunification on its own terms. Other official statements indicate its
grand strategic goals are 1) becoming a strong and prosperous nation and 2) ending
America’s hostile policy. The ongoing Byungjin policy, or new strategic line,
remains the primary means to achieving those goals2.
Kim Jong Un’s strategic goal, reiterated in his New Year’s address, is to possess a“powerful and reliable war deterrent” against the United States3. What this means,in my view, is to possess the capability to 1) deter US military attacks not only in the
nuclear dimension but in the conventional dimension as well, 2) drive US forces outof South Korea by replacing the armistice with a peace treaty with the United States,and 3) pave the way for a North-led unification of the divided Korean Peninsula. It
is now obvious that the major distinction between the Kim Jong Un regime andprevious North Korean regimes is that it has accelerated the pace of nuclear andmissile development since 2012 toward its ultimate goal.
However, North Korea’s most immediate policy priority appears to be to make its
status as a nuclear weapons state a fait accompli by forcing the United States (andthe rest of the world as well) to accept it as an undeniable reality while continuing
to actually possess a “powerful and reliable war deterrent” against the United States4.
This is substantially the precondition for a dialogue that North Korea has put
forward to the United States. The first-ever summit meeting with the United States
and North Korea can be seen as a de facto US acknowledgment of North Korea as anuclear weapons state at least, even if the United States officially denies it, because
what matters more to North Korea is not the US denial in this case but North Korea’s
The grand and military strategies of North Korea under the Kim Jong Un regime wereintensively discussed at the 2017 NDA-FOI Joint Seminar. See Hiroyasu Akutsu, “North Korea’s
Nuclear and Missile Threats and Their Impact on Japanese Security”, The Future of East Asian
Security, Global Security Seminar Series No. 1, Center for Global Security, National Defense
Academy, October 2017.
3 Kim Jong Un, “New Year Address”, Korean Central News Agency, January 1, 2018.
4 Akutsu, “North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Threats and Their Impact on Japanese Security”.
2Chapter 5 — North Korea’s Evolving Strategy toward the United States (Akutsu)

own interpretation of the US response and utilization of the summit meeting for its
further domestic regime legitimation. In addition, from the perspectives ofextended deterrence and non-proliferation, the US accommodation with North
Korea is highly contentious, while Japan, its key ally in Northeast Asia, is still facedwith serious missile threats from North Korea.
Kim Jong Un’s 2018 New Year’s address only confirms that there is no change inNorth Korea’s intention to enhance its nuclear and missile capabilities. The
address can be summarized into the following points regarding the country’s
nuclear and missile strategy toward the United States:-Last year the moves of the United States and its vassal forces to isolate andstifle our country went to extremes, and our revolution faced the harshestever challenges.
-On this platform one year ago I officially made public on behalf of the(Korean Workers’) Party and government that we had entered the final
stage of preparation for the test launch of an ICBM. In the past year we
conducted several rounds of its test launch, aimed at implementing the
program, safely and transparently, thus proving before the eyes of the world
its definite success.
-By also conducting tests of various means of nuclear delivery and superintense thermonuclear weapons, we attained our general orientation andstrategic goal with success, and our Republic has at last come to possess a
powerful and reliable war deterrent, which no force and nothing can reverse.
-Our country’s nuclear forces are capable of thwarting and countering any
nuclear threats from the United States, and they constitute a powerfuldeterrent that prevents it from starting an adventurous war.
-In no way would the United States dare to ignite a war against me and ourcountry. The whole of its mainland is within the range of our nuclear strike,and the nuclear button is on my office desk all the time. The United Statesneeds to be clearly aware that this is not merely a threat but a reality.
-The nuclear weapons research sector and the rocket industry shouldmass-produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles, the power andreliability of which have already been proved to the full, to give a spur to theefforts for deploying them for action.
-We should always be ready for an immediate nuclear counterattack to

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cope with the enemy’s maneuvers for a nuclear war5.
Although Kim Jong Un clearly recognizes the international sanctions that are in place
as difficult challenges, they may have been alleviated as some major countries havefailed to comply with UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. It may be true, on
the one hand, that North Korea’s efforts to acquire goods and energy from foreign
cargoes on the sea is evidence of the mounting hardship caused by thoseinternational sanctions, but, on the other, North Korea can still enjoy loopholes inthe sanctions as the support from China and Russia virtually continues. The
ongoing diplomatic peaceful atmosphere could work for North Korea despite theefforts by Japan and like-minded members of the international sanction regime tomaintain the sanctions on North Korea.
Despite the commitment, or more correctly the lip service, to “complete
denuclearization” in the Singapore Joint Statement in June, North Korea has beenreluctant to do so and appears to be using the dialogue process to buy time for atleast the maintenance of and further development of its nuclear and missile
capabilities by arguing against the US unilateral demand for North Korea’s action
and playing the card of the return of the remains of former US soldiers in the Korean
War with a view toward the upcoming mid-term Congressional elections in the
United States.
On April 21, North Korea confirmed that the country had achieved “the state nuclear
force” and declared the victory of the Byungjin strategic line, while committing itself
to the continuation of economic development at the Third Plenary Meeting of theSeventh Central Committee6. He stated in his report at the meeting:[T]he overall situation is rapidly changing in favor of the Korean revolution
thanks to the DPRK’s initiative action and efforts after the declaration ofcompleting the state nuclear force last year… (The miraculous victory of
having perfectly accomplished the great historic cause of building the state
nuclear force in a short span of less than five years is the great victory of the
WPK’s line of simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction
Kim, “New Year Address”.
“The Third Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea”,
Korean Central News Agency, April 21, 2017.
5
6

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and the building of a nuclear force and, at the same time, a brilliant victorythat could be won only by the heroic Korean people7.

NORTH KOREA’S TACTICAL TURN
Regarding North Korea’s approach to South Korea, the North rejected through its
silence all of South Korea’s offers for inter-Korean dialogues in 2017. Why is North
Korea now trying to reach out to South Korea? Before analyzing this shift, it isuseful to see how “nicely” Kim Jong Un approached South Korea in his New Year’s
address. The most notable remarks are as follows:-Even though the conservative “regime” in South Korea, which had resorted
to fascist rule and confrontation with our fellow countrymen, collapsed andthe ruling circles were replaced by another thanks to the massive resistanceby the enraged people of all walks of life, nothing has been changed in therelations between the North and the South.... We can never escape theholocaust of a nuclear war forced by outside forces, let alone achieve
national reunification, unless we put an end to this abnormal situation.
-This year is significant both for the North and the South as in the Norththe people will greet the seventieth founding anniversary of their Republic
as a great, auspicious event, and in the South the Winter Olympic Games willtake place.
-First, we should work together to ease the acute military tension between
the North and the South, and create a peaceful environment on the Korean
Peninsula.
-As long as this unstable situation – which is neither wartime nor
peacetime – persists, the North and the South cannot ensure the success ofthe scheduled events, nor can they sit face-to-face to have a sincere
discussion on the issue of improving bilateral relations, nor will they
advance straight toward the goal of national reunification.
-The South Korean authorities should respond positively to our sincere
efforts for a détente, instead of inducing the exacerbation of the situation byjoining the United States in its reckless moves for a North-targeted nuclear
war that threatens the destiny of the entire nation as well as peace andstability on this land. They should discontinue all the nuclear war drills
7

Ibid.

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they stage with outside forces, as these drills will engulf this land in flames
and lead to bloodshed on our sacred territory.
-Even though the United States is wielding the nuclear stick and going wild
for another war, it will not dare to invade us because we currently have apowerful nuclear deterrent. And when the North and the South are
determined, they can surely prevent the outbreak of war and ease tension
on the Korean Peninsula8.
The above statements provide some ostensible reasons for North Korea’s shift in its
approach to South Korea. In my view, there may be at least two major factors.
First, although Kim Jong Un suggests that the imposed economic sanctions are
obvious challenges, his regime can still have some breathing space due to many
known and unknown loopholes and blind spots in the sanctions. Rather, mounting
US military pressure around the Korean Peninsula must have had a greater impact
on North Korea. The United States has increased its military presence by deploying
its strategic and tactical assets near the Korean Peninsula. North Korea probably
found it too risky to further launch provocative missiles amid such heavy militarypressure by the United States, at least until there occurs another chance to resume
the missile launches9. Of course, this is not to deny the possibility of North Korea’s
launch of another ballistic missile disguised as a space satellite launch for scientificpurposes10.
Second, after observing the behavior of the new administration in South Korea
during the year, Pyongyang has seen an opportunity to take advantage of theadministration’s “pro-DPRK” nature and to drive a wedge in the ROK-US alliance.
To be sure, North Korea may have seen the collapse of the Park Geun-hye
administration and the emergence of the Moon Jae-in administration as an evengreater opportunity because the latter is a progressive administration that is more
accommodating to the North. In fact, the Moon administration has embarked on apolitical program to indict and arrest former officials of both the Park administrationand the Lee Myung-bak administration on charges such as corruption and abuse ofKim, “New Year Address”.
Phil Stewart, “U.S. bombers fly off North Korea’s coast in show of force”, Reuters, September 24,
2017; Christine Kim, “North Korea’s bark may be worse than bite in threat to shoot down U.S.
bombers”, Reuters, September 27, 2017.
10 Such a launch would be conducted in a way North Korea considers less provocative to theinternational community.
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power. The Moon administration also proposed to North Korea the resumption ofvarious levels of dialogues despite the North’s “rejection” in the form of silence. Mr.
Moon has also publicly been opposed to US unilateral military action on North Korea.
Finally, the Moon administration decided to resume humanitarian aid to North Korea
on September 14, 2017, although the decision has been held back due to North
Korea’s launch of the missile on the following day. The Moon administration’s defacto political pressure on the conservative camp, or “積弊清算”（jokbyungchongsan),has continued to date. Simply put, North Korea may have judged that South Korea
has “passed” its test.
Thus, North Korea probably decided that it was time to test South Korea to see if it
could get as much as it could from South Korea without agreeing to abandon its
nuclear program and also by driving a wedge in the ROK-US alliance. The
diplomatic process following this has seemed to confirm my assessment.

REVISITING NORTH KOREA’S LIMITED “DETERRENCE” AGAINST THE UNITEDSTATESKim Jong Un claims that North Korea already attained its goal of possessing nuclearICBM capability in 2017 and that the country will accelerate the mass production of
nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles and deployment of them for action.
However, while Hwasong 15 missiles may potentially be capable of striking targets
as far away as Washington, DC, North Korea may still need to further improve thereentry capability 11 . This is not to underestimate the country’s actual capacity.
On the contrary, it should be noted that their past behavior indicates that wheneverNorth Korea sees a chance to resume more provocative testing, it will likely do so.
The likely limit of North Korea’s nuclear deterrence raises a fundamental questionof what is the nature of the country’s “deterrence” against the United States. The
source of such deterrence continues to be the military situation in the northern partof the demilitarized zone (DMZ). There has been intensive discussion on thecapabilities, scenarios, and consequences of US military strikes on North Korea12.
However, the constant and most crucial factor has continued to be the conventional
Independent, December 4, 2017.
See, for example, Kathleen J. McInnis et al., “The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military
Options and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, November 6, 2017.
11
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Chapter 5 — North Korea’s Evolving Strategy toward the United States (Akutsu)

military situation over the DMZ. Specifically, the hundreds and thousands of theNorth Korean artillery tubes deployed near the DMZ could still make the major partof Seoul “a sea of fire 13 ”. In 1994, US and ROK (Republic of Korea) militaryassessments concluded that within the first 12 hours of artillery firing over the DMZ,
a considerable number of US and ROK military personnel would be victimized aswell as there would be massive civilian causalities in Seoul14. Even today, the US
Department of Defense, according to a recent report by the RAND Corporation, hasestimated that artillery barrages could inflict 250,000 casualties on Seoul15. The
report also points out that in a single ten-minute barrage, North Korea could fireclose to 5,000 long-range artillery rounds into downtown Seoul and 25,000 artillery
rounds on the Seoul metropolitan area16.
Furthermore, given the past 24 years of North Korea’s military technologicaldevelopment, the recent numbers of casualties are much higher. According to a
South Korean member of parliament, there would be approximately 60,000
casualties a day in the first week of North Korean artillery attacks, and it would takethe South Korean military three days to eliminate the artillery, with the number ofcasualties amounting to 400,000 in the South Korean capital area17. Additionally,
North Korea may have enhanced at least its artillery batteries over the past few
years18.
For South Korea, fear of war with North Korea is not the only fear. South Korea haslong been under the threat of North Korean conventional weapons as well as various
Roger Cavazos, “Mind the Gap between Rhetoric and Reality”, NAPSNet Special Report, June
26, 2012.
https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/mind-the-gap-betweenrhetoric-and-reality/; Prakash Menon, “North Korea Can’t Destroy Seoul with Artillery”, The
National Interest, January 5, 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/north-korea-cantdestroy-seoul-artillery-23964; Kathleen J. McInnis, Andrew Feickert, Mark E. Manyin, Steven A.
Hildreth, et al., The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress,
Congressional Research Service, November 6, 2017. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R44994.pdf.
14 Gary Luck and William Perry, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January
25, 1995; Don Oberdorfer, Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, South Bend, The Better World
Books, 1997, pp. 313–315.
15 Michael J. Mazarr, Gian Gentile, Dan Madden, Stacie L. Pettyjohn et al., “The Korean
Peninsula: Three Dangerous Scenarios”, Perspective, RAND Corporation, 2018, p. 12. htt
ps://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE262/RAND_PE262.pdf
16 Ibid., pp. 11–12.
17 Cho Wi-jun, “US Government says North Korean Long-Range Artillery Attacks Kill 60
Thousand South Korean Lives a Day”, Chosun Ilbo, October 27, 2017.
18 Kathleen J. McInnis, Andrew Feickert, Mark E. Manyin, Steven A. Hildreth, et al., The North
Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress, p. 16.
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Chapter 5 — North Korea’s Evolving Strategy toward the United States (Akutsu)

types of missiles. From North Korea’s perspective, South Korea, as a US ally, hasbeen a useful “hostage” against the United States. For South Korea, “abandonment”
or “decoupling” by the United States is another serious concern. Since the failed
attempt to withdraw US forces from South Korea by the Carter administration,“decoupling” has remained a nightmarish scenario.
For North Korea, South Korea is no longer the only “hostage”.
With thedevelopment of its missile capabilities, North Korea finds it tactically and politicallyuseful to launch different ranges of missiles toward Japan and the United States todrive a wedge in the Japan-United States alliance.
Finally, if North Korea’s other offensive capabilities, including cyber-attacks, werecombined, the actual military and geopolitical consequences would be more
complicated. Thus, even nonnuclear military scenarios could involve massive
causalities and economic costs on both sides if war started19.
To sum up, North Korea’s capability to make Seoul “a sea of fire” continues to be thecountry’s essential source of limited “deterrence” against the United States as well
as South Korea. For North Korea, while maintaining that capability, possessing
complete nuclear deterrence power against the United States would remain its mosturgent goal, if the country had not yet achieved it despite its claim.

A FUTURE PROSPECT
Whether or not North Korea has really gained such a capability, the United States has
already agreed to “freeze” some of its military exercises with South Korea and also
to begin talks with the North while maintaining the existing financial and economic
sanctions. It is still unclear whether North Korea has really achieved “the state
nuclear force” against the United States. Technologically speaking, North Korea
might not have gained a stable and reliable capability to directly attack Washington
with a nuclear-tipped ICBM. But North Korea may believe that it is only necessary
to keep the United States guessing and make it hesitate in taking decisive action aslong as North Korea can buy more time to complete “the state nuclear force”. Given
See, for example, James Holmes, “Could the U.S. Navy Destroy North Korea?”, The National
Interest, January 23, 2018; Dave Majumdar, “If Donald Trump Attacks North Korea: Beware of
Kim’s Air Defense Systems”, The National Interest, January 23, 2018.
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Chapter 5 — North Korea’s Evolving Strategy toward the United States (Akutsu)

the regime’s ultimate goal of becoming “a strong and prosperous nation”, it would
seek to accelerate the “prosperous” aspect of the goal according to the Byungjin
policy, while at least sustaining its current nuclear weapons and missile capabilities.
The ongoing diplomatic process seems to have confirmed this.
Although the United States has not made clear whether it sees North Korea as a defacto nuclear weapons state, judging from the decisions made at the Third Plenary
Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in April,North Korea has virtually been acting as “a responsible nuclear weapons state” andseems to have accepted the ongoing talks with the United States as “arms control
negotiations” between two nuclear weapons states. With its status as a nuclear
weapons state, North Korea is now pushing the United States to “make a war-end
declaration” to formally terminate the Korean War, which is part of the Panmunjom
Declaration20. Given that the Singapore Joint Statement is formally linked to the
Panmunjom Declaration, South Korea has every reason to side with North Korea indemanding that the United States conclude such an agreement by the end of 2018.
The geostrategic impact of such an agreement would be huge if the agreement weretaken and used as a pretext for the dissolution of the United Nations Command or
the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. China and Russia would be themajor beneficiaries of this scenario.
It remains to be seen how the current talks between Washington and Pyongyang willplay out, but as of late August 2018, despite the North-South Panmunjom
Declaration and the United States-North Korea Singapore Joint Statement, at least it
seemed likely that North Korea’s nuclear and missile program had not been frozen.
It should also be noted that the nuclear program is not the only weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) program North Korea has invested in. Other programs include
chemical and biological as well. North Korea would continue to enhance its
chemical and biological weapons, cruise missiles, and offensive cyber capabilities aswell. North Korea could also export its WMD as well as missile technologies
despite its official statements.

CONCLUSION“War-end Declaration on Korean Peninsula Is Demand of Times”, Rodong Sinmun, August 9,
2018.
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Chapter 5 — North Korea’s Evolving Strategy toward the United States (Akutsu)

North Korea has emphasized that it has taken a new strategic line to concentrate on
economic development based on the successful achievement of the Byungjin
strategic line. However, this does not mean that North Korea has decided toabandon its nuclear and missile program. As stated in the introduction to thispaper, no official statement has been found to suggest such a decision. The
Byungjin policy was taken in 2013 and originally was intended to promote both
economic development and nuclear development in the first place. The onlychange is the shift in emphasis from nuclear to economic development. It should
be noted that the emphasis can shift back anytime as well as the technicaldevelopment of the existing offensive capabilities.
Regarding South Korea’s accommodative response to North Korea, the most criticalquestion would be how far South Korea aims to take its reconciliatory policy while
maintaining a deterrence posture within the US-ROK alliance and ROK-US-Japan
trilateral security cooperation the same time. South Korea is well aware that North
Korea will not discuss the nuclear issue with the South, so it is unlikely that South
Korea’s accommodation with the North will lead to North Korea’s denuclearization.
However, South Korea’s accommodation with the North could work to North Korea’s
advantage and undermine the deterrence and extended deterrence posture by theUnited States and Japan. In this sense, North Korea’s tactical “reconciliation” with
South Korea could make a strategic impact depending on South Korea’s future
actions. South Korea’s accelerated move to resume economic exchanges with theNorth is already affecting the psychological aspect of trilateral and multilateralefforts to maintain sanctions.
This is probably where immediate policy
implications should be drawn for the United States and Japan.
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo already admitted to Congress that getting North
Korea to dismantle its nuclear and missile programs would be a “decades-longchallenge 21 ”. Instead of observing the situation through pessimistic lenses, thisshould be taken to add to the rational for enhancing the Japan-United States alliancecoordination as well as Japan’s own defense capabilities. Japan should takeadvantage of North Korea’s de facto nuclear and missile test moratorium before theJeremy Diamond, “Pompeo Says North Korea Denuclearization ‘Decades Long’ Challenge”,
CNN, July 9, 2018.
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North begins to show an even more advanced capability, which would put Japan into
an even more serious situation.

Chapter 6 — ROK's Perception of and Posture toward the DPRK's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Development (Son)

CHAPTER 6

ROK’s Perception of and Posture toward the DPRK’s
Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Development

Kyengho Son
Korea National Defense University

INTRODUCTION
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK; North Korea) has strengthened
its nuclear capabilities.
In particular, since its launch of a Hwasong-15 on
November 29, 2017, North Korea has been expected to reach success with reentry
technology, which is critical to an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability.
In addition, North Korea was able to succeed in its sixth test of a nuclear bomb in
September 2017, which was regarded as a hydrogen bomb. The nuclear andmissile development of North Korea has put neighboring countries, including theRepublic of Korea (ROK; South Korea), in a quite uncomfortable situation.
The North Korean nuclear and missile programs have become a major threat to theregional security architecture. The national security strategy of the United States
has stipulated that North Korea is a main component of the adversary groups that
undermine US homeland security1. Japan has been trying to acquire capabilities todeal with incoming North Korean nuclear-tipped missiles to its territory. China
and Russia, though reluctant, are figuring out measures to maintain anonproliferation regime. Of course, South Korea, under direct threat from North
Korean nuclear ambitions, is seeking defensive measures, as represented in the
deployment of the terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) system. Without
proper intervention by the international community, North Korea will continue topursue the status of a nuclear-armed state. This may lead to a disaster for regional
stability.
National Security Strategy of the United States, December 2017, pp. 7-8. www.whitehouuse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18 (Accessed on December 19, 20
17)
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In this regard, it is necessary to assume the worst situation: facing a nuclear-armed
North Korea in the near future and devising ways to maintain security in Northeast
Asia. To cope with a nuclear-armed North Korea, it is necessary to analyze
precisely North Korean nuclear capabilities as well as the intentions of North Korea.
At the same time, to devise ways for South Korea to counter the North Korean
nuclear threat in the future security environment, it is critical to predict accurately
the behavior of other countries in Northeast Asia.
This paper attempts to examine South Korea’s posture for dealing with a nucleararmed North Korea. To this end, the paper examines North Korea’s rhetoricregarding nuclear and ballistic missile development to determine that country’s real
intentions. At the same time, this paper sheds light on North Korea’s nuclear
doctrine and the command and control structure of the North Korea Strategic Forceto get a sense of the country’s operational posture. In addition, the paper offers arough estimate of neighboring countries’ attitudes in dealing with a nuclear power,that is, North Korea. As a conclusion, this paper discusses strategic considerations
and makes policy recommendations for South Korea.

NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT
It is still unclear when North Korea possessed its first nuclear bomb. Based on
sources, it could be the early 1990s or early 2000s. Hwang, Jangyeop mentioned to
Voice of America that “he heard from Secretary Jeon, Byungho, who was in charge of
nuclear development, that they already finished creating nuclear bombs and were
waiting for the order of Kim Jong-il to test it before the 1994 Agreement with theUS2”. Another source for the argument that the DPRK already possessed a nuclear
bomb in the 1990s comes from Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. As is known, he visited
North Korea in 1999 to transfer the technology of enriching uranium using
centrifuges. He later testified that he saw three perfect nuclear devices in anunderground nuclear facility near Pyongyang3.
“N. Korea Defector Says Pyongyang Had Nuclear Weapons before 1994 Agreement with theU.S.”, Voice of America, June 20, 2004. http://www.voanew.com/articleprintview/261597.html(Accessed December 23, 2017)
3 “Pakistani Scientist Depicts More Advanced Nuclear Program in North Korea”, The
Washington Post, December 28, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contest/artic
le/2009/12/27/AR200912270125.html (Accessed December 22, 2017)
2

Chapter 6 — ROK's Perception of and Posture toward the DPRK's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Development (Son)

North Korean diplomats began mentioning their nuclear program starting in April
2003 at meetings with Americans. Lee, Geun, head of the North Korean delegationand deputy director of the America Bureau of the Department of Diplomacy of the
DPRK, asserted that the DPRK already had nuclear bombs, and that they would not
dismantle them. Furthermore, the North Korean government would conduct
nuclear tests or export them based on US actions to reduce tension between the twocountries4.
Even at the keynote speech made at the first meeting of the Six Party
Talks, on August 27, 2003, the North Korean representative argued, “If the UScontinually forces North Korea to denuclearize itself first, North Korea will not giveup its nuclear capability but will only strengthen it5”.
North Korea has artfully maneuvered to reveal its nuclear program, test nuclear
devices, and announce its nuclear doctrine and laws. All these efforts were wellorchestrated as part of a North Korean national strategy to serve its national goal:
being a nuclear state. These efforts involve rhetoric, cheating, bullying, military
surprise, and domestic politics. The whole process consists of North Korean
threats and illegal tests, consequential criticism from international community andsanctions, and the advancement of North Korean nuclear capabilities. This will berecorded as the failure of nonproliferation efforts and the success of the North
Korean scheme.
North Korea proclaimed itself a nuclear power on February 10, 2005, amid the Six
Party Talks and announced a boycott of the dialogue that would have no limit.
Twenty months after the announcement, North Korea conducted its first nuclear teston October 9, 2006. In fact, the participants in the Six Party Talks tried to restrain
North Korea by convening the fourth talks in July 2005 and later in September 2005.
At the dialogue, the U.S. and North Korea reached an agreement and announced a“9.19 communiqué”, but failed to prevent the first test. The North Korean test
seemed to be an attempt to resist a US sanction over BDA to cut the flow of money
to North Korea.
Victor Cha and David Kang, “The Debate over North Korea”, Political Science Quarterly 119.2,
2004, pp. 229-254.
5 “Jomisaiui Haekmoonjeedaehan 6jahoidam gaechoi—Joseonchok Ilgwaltagyul Dosikgwa
Dongsihaengdongsunseo Jesi [The Opening of the Six Party Talks to Tackle the Nuclear Problem
between North Korea and the U.S.—North Korea Suggested Options and Action Plans for a
Package Deal], Joseon Joongantongsin, August 30, 2003.
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North Korea’s second nuclear test was conducted on May 25, 2009. After the test,
North Korea began to disclose its uranium enrichment program. In September
2009, Shin Seon-ho, North Korean ambassador to the UN, said that the enrichment
process was in its final stage 6 . Later, as is well known, North Korea opened auranium enrichment facility to Siegfried S. Hecker in November 2010. According
to Hecker, the Yongbyon facility, equipped with 2,000 centrifuges, was supposed to
produce low-enrichment uranium7. One month after that visit, the North Koreanstate-run newspaper Rodongsinmun reported in an article on December 29, 2010,that a modern uranium enrichment facility was operating under normal conditions
to provide fuel to the light reactor.
North Korea moved quickly to make itself a de facto nuclear state after the twonuclear tests. The first attempt involved publishing a diplomatic memorandum toproclaim itself a nuclear power with newly developed nuclear policies on April 21,
20108. This effort was made in a stronger way in April 2012, when North Korea
published articles in its constitution describing itself as a nuclear state 9 . In
addition, in a long memorandum written in August 2012, North Korea elaborated on
its reasons for building up its nuclear capabilities: the U.S.’ continuous anti-North
Korean policy10.
The memorandum predicted that North Korea would continue
its efforts to develop advanced nuclear weapons, and that the North’s nuclear
deterrence against the U.S. would be empowered unless the U.S. abandoned its
hostile policies toward North Korea 11 . More importantly, North Korea began tochange its priority from denuclearization to the forming of a peace treaty12.
“UN Joseon Sangimdaepyo Anbori Euijangege Pyonji [Letter from North Korean Ambassador
to the Secretary of the UNSC]”, Joseon Joongantongsin, September 4, 2003.
7 Siegfried S. Hecker, “A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex”, Center forInternational Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, November 2010. http://iisdb.stanford.edu/pubs/23035/HeckerYongbyon.pdf (Accessed December 26, 2017)
8 “Joseon Oemusong Bimangrok [A Memorandum of North Korean Department of Foreign
Affairs]”, Joseon Joongantongsin, April 21, 2010.
9 “Sahoejuui Heonbob Bochoong [The Amendment of the Socialist Constitution]”, Joseon
Joongantongsin, April 13, 2012.
10 “Joseon Oemusong Bimangrok — Migukui Jeokdaesi Jeongcheakeun Haekmunje Haegyului
Gibonjangae [A Memorandum of North Korean Department of Foreign Affairs — The U.S. AntiNorth Korea Policy is the Basic Obstacle to Solve the Nuclear Problem]”, Joseon Joongantongsin,
August 31, 2012.
11 Ibid.
12 “Joseon Oemusong Seongmyong Pyunghwahoidameul Jeui [The Announcement of North
Korean Department of Foreign Affairs: Suggestion of a Peace Talk]”, Joseon Joongantongsin, April
21, 2010.
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Chapter 6 — ROK's Perception of and Posture toward the DPRK's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Development (Son)

The third nuclear test by North Korea was used to prove its nuclear capabilities.
Starting on February 12, 2013, North Korean news reports repeatedly emphasized
the success of a miniaturized and lightened atomic bomb test that would enable
North Korea to launch a precise attack to destroy any of its enemies in the world.
At this point, North Korea described its nuclear bomb as having “diversified
capabilities”. The exact meaning of diversified nuclear deterrence or diversified
precise attack methods was not clear; however, many experts believed that meant auranium bomb. In a larger sense, following the third test, North Korea seemed toconsolidate its nuclear state status, which would not compromise on
denuclearization by arguing that it had had success with a diversified miniaturized
and light atomic bomb.
In terms of domestic politics, North Korea achieved a national consensus formaintaining its nuclear development policy by publishing Byungjin Noseon, aparallel policy on March 31, 2013 13 . It argued that nuclear bombs were notnegotiable, that North Korea would possess nuclear capabilities permanently basedon laws, that nuclear capabilities would be continually enhanced as well as delivery
vehicles, and that a strategy for employing nuclear weapons in war would be
developed 14 . The next day, North Korea adopted a new law, entitled “Jawijeok
Haeckboyouguk Jiwirul Deouk Gongohi Hal De Daehan Beobryoung” [A Law toConsolidate the Status of a Defensive Nuclear State], which defined the goal of
nuclear capabilities, missions, command and control, management, and doctrines inten articles15. Since then, North Korea has conducted three more nuclear tests up
to September 2017. All three tests aimed to enhance the ability of thermonuclear
warheads, as was suggested by Kim Jong-un in December 201516. The final step in
the North Korean process of becoming a nuclear state was the convening of theSeventh Labor Party convention in May 2016.
“Joseon dang Joongangwi 2013nyon 3wol Jeonwonhoiui [A Plenary Meeting of Central
Committee of Joseon Workers’ Party in March 2013]”, Joseon Joongantongsin, March 31, 2013.
14 Ibid.
15 “Jawijeok Haeckboyouguk Jiwirul Deouk Gongohi Hal De Daehan Beobchetaek [Adopting a
Law to Consolidate the Status of a Defensive Nuclear State]”, Joseon Joongantongsin, April 1, 2013.
16 “Gyungaehanun Kim Jong Un Dongjikeseo Saero Gaegundoin Pyungchon Hyukmyung
Yujeokjirul Hynjijidohaseyotta [Respected Leader Kim Jong Un Visited Pyungchon Revolutionary
Memorial Site and Made Directions]”, Rodong Sinmun, December 10, 2015. Detailed
requirements for nuclear capabilities were explained in “Haekmoogiui Sohyonghwa,
Gyungryanghwa, Dajonghwa, Jeongmilhwa [Miniaturizing, Lightening, Diversifying, andAccurizing Nuclear Bombs]”, Joseon Joongantongsin, May 21, 2013.
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Chapter 6 — ROK's Perception of and Posture toward the DPRK's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Development (Son)68

NORTH KOREAN MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
North Korea has pursued long-range missile capabilities to deter South Korea, Japan,
and the U.S. North Korea deployed Scud Bs and Scud Cs, aiming them at South
Korea, in the mid-1980s and targeting Japan in the late 1990s. Interestingly, North
Korea put the mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile Musudan in operational
status without tests in 2007, though it was highly reliable because it was the samemodel as the old Soviet R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The Musudan
has a range of 3,000–4,000 km, meaning it can reach Guam. Superficially, within
three decades of developing missiles, North Korea has become able to deter three
countries with its missiles.
North Korea has sought multitracks to complete its ICBM program. First, North
Korean scientists used Rodong missiles as a base engine to compose two- or threestage missiles. The Taepodong-1 and -2 (Unha- 3) are Rodong-based missiles.
The Rodong was used for first- or second-stage engines. North Korea had used themissile for a long time, and as a result was able to understand its technicalcharacteristics. The Rodong has its origin in the Scud, which has a limited range
and payload. Although North Korea launched the Unha-3 in December 2012 andApril 2016 and achieved a successful result, North Korea would need more solid
delivery vehicles for their nuclear warheads with heavier payloads. The answer
was to use the R-27 or SS-N-6 with the assistance of former members of the Makayev
Design Bureau17. Its 4D10 engine, which used unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine
and nitrogen tetroxide, was adopted to develop the KN-08 and KN-14, which were
not test-fired yet. Interestingly, North Korea fired eight Musudan missiles but
succeeded only one time, in June 201618. This may suggest that North Korea sought
another solution to meet its requirements.
The third path was to develop the ICBM based on the Soviet Union’s old RD-250
engine. The new engine gave North Korea more reliable missile capabilities interms of range and payload. The country achieved major developments in new
types of missiles in 2017. The Hwasong 12 was successfully launched on May 14,
Missilethreat, CSIS Missile Defense Project, KN-08. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kn-08/ (Accessed January 3, 2018)18 Missilethreat, CSIS Missile Defense Project, Musudan.
https://missilethreat.csis.org/missi
le/musudan/ (Accessed January 3, 2018)17

Chapter 6 — ROK's Perception of and Posture toward the DPRK's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Development (Son)2017, and showed stable flight performance in two successful consecutive launches.
Its engine has 45–47 tons of power supported with four Vernier engines, which canshoot the missile to more than 6,000 km with a 500-kg warhead 19 . Before thelaunch, North Korea conducted ground engine tests three times. Using the
Hwasong 12 engine, North Korea manufactured the Hwasong 14 missile, which canreach 10,000 km with a 400-kg warhead. In addition, North Korea developed the
Hwasong 15, which is believed to have a gimballed engine, that is, two bundled
Hwasong 14 engines, for its first stage20. The Hwasong 15 reached an apogee of
4,500 km and flew 960 km. Based on the trajectory, experts believe that the
Hwasong 15 can fly to 13,000 km, putting the entire US continent within range.
North Korea created a special unit to organize its missile capabilities. Kim Jong-un
announced a “Strategic Rocket Force” during his first public speech on the occasionof Kim il-Sung’s one-hundredth birthday memorial parade on April 15, 2012. The
unit was an independent organization under the direct command of the Committeeof Defense Affairs via the General Headquarters21. Later, in March 2014, the unitchanged its name to Strategic Force. With the establishment of a specific unit,
North Korea revealed that its nuclear doctrine would affect the operation of theStrategic Force. On April 1, 2013, North Korea’s Supreme People’s Committee
adopted a law entitled “Jawijeok Haeckboyouguk Jiwirul Deouk Gongohi Hal De
Daehan Beobryoung” [A Law to Consolidate the Status of a Defensive Nuclear State],
which stated that the purpose of its nuclear weapons is to deter attacks from outside,
to repel attacks, and to retaliate against aggression22.
The North Korean nuclear doctrine should be understood in a stricter sense.
Although the law insists that Pyongyang would use the bombs to deter enemies, torepel aggression, and to retaliate, North Korean officials have frequently mentionedthat they would employ the bombs for preventive attacks against the U.S. 23 In

Michael Elleman, “The Secret to North Korea’s ICBM Success”, IISS Voices, August 14, 2017.
Missilethreat, CSIS Missile Defense Project. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/wasong15-kn-22/(Accessed January 3, 2018)
21 ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 2016, Seoul, Ministry of National
Defense, 2016, p. 23.
22 “Jawijeok Haeckboyouguk Jiwirul Deouk Gongohi Hal De Daehan Beobchetaek” [Adopting a
Law to Consolidate the Status of a Defensive Nuclear State], Joseon Joongangtongsin, April 1,
2013.
23 Lee, Su Yong (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK), Rodong Sinmun, March 6, 2015; Kim,
Jong Un, Rodong Sinmun, March 9, 2016.
19
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addition, Kim Jong-un ordered an increase in the role that nuclear arms could playin deterring foreign invasions and conducting wars with the development of newtactics employing nuclear bombs 24 . In this context, it is noteworthy that North
Korea emphasized the production of small-size nuclear bombs less than 15kt toconduct modern war, which is complicated by the mixture of enemy and friendly
forces25, This means that North Korea would consider nuclear bombs as usable
weapons in a practical sense.

ROK’S PERCEPTION OF THREATS AND A COUNTERSTRATEGY
The purpose of the nuclear program of North Korea may be twofold. North Korea
has raised the U.S.’ hostile policy toward it as a main cause for its developing nuclear
capabilities26. Yet in fact, North Korea never defined the hostile policy of the U.S.
However, the North Korea Department of Foreign Affairs described its intention tocontinue nuclear development by arguing that the U.S. tried to dismantle the North
Korean regime in October 2014 27. At the same time, North Korea compared its
destiny with other countries that gave up nuclear programs, emphasizing thebrilliance of the decision of its leadership in February 201328. In this sense, North
Korea’s nuclear weapons can be regarded as a tool for preserving its regime.
However, North Korea has the intention of using the nuclear weapons to change thestatus quo on the Korean Peninsula. After the success of the Hwasong-15, the staterun Rodongsinmun argued in an article on December 9, 2017, that this strategic
weapon would “protect the (right) of completing the conquering of territory (whole
peninsula)29”. North Korea threatened South Korea on March 7, 2013, that if a war“Joseondang Joonangwiwonhoe 2013nyon 3wol Jeonwonhoeuiegwanhan Bodo [Report on
Joseon Party’s Central Committee on March 2013]”, Rodong Sinmun, April 1, 2013.
25 “Haekmugiui Sohyunghwa, Gyengryanhwa, Dajonghwa, Jongmilhwa [The Miniaturization,
Weight Lightening, Diversification, and Refinement of Nuclear Arms]”, Rodongsinmun, May 21,
2013.
26
Joseon Gukbangwi [DPRK Defense Committee], “Migukun Daejoseon Jeokdaesi
Jeongchaekbuteo Cholwihayouya Halgeosida [The U.S. Should Stop its Hostile Policy to DPRK]”,
Joseon Joongangtongsin, October 12, 2013.
27 Joseon Woemuseong [DPRK Department of Foreign Affairs], “Miguki Wooriui Gukgajedolul
Muneoturiryohanun Isang Jeoseonbando Bihaekhwa Nonuinun Amuron uimido Oepsojige
Duoiotta [As the U.S. Tries to Dismantle Our Country System, Denuclearization Debates Will Lose
Its Meaning]”, Joseon Joongangtongsin, October 4, 2014.
28 “Haeksiheomun Ungdanghan Jajugowonui Haengsaui Gangjo”, Nuclear Test Is the Emphasison the Self-help Right]”, Joseon Joongangtongsin, February 21, 2013.
29 Rodong Sinmun, December 9, 2017.
24

Chapter 6 — ROK's Perception of and Posture toward the DPRK's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Development (Son)71

broke out on the peninsula, it would be an all-out nuclear war, and made this claim
right after the third nuclear test on February 12, 201330. At this time, the North
Korean government showed its desire to decouple the ROK-US alliance by sayingthat “our revolutionary power will conduct the right of nuclear prevention attack tothe bases of invaders” on the occasion of KR-FE exercises31.
The danger caused by North Korean nuclear capabilities could be furthered byrelated countries. China and Russia have not actively joined in international efforts
to place sanctions on North Korea. Both countries seem to be more concerned
about regional stability rather than addressing North Korean nuclear aggression.
North Korea was able to maintain its fragile economy by exploiting loopholes
created by the two countries while sneering at UN Security Council resolutions. In
addition, the two countries may seek to pursue a decrease of American influence inthe region by allowing North Korea to achieve success in the nuclear challenge.
China and Russia would take the advantage of a U.S.–free Northeast Asia.
Another problem is the US response to North Korean nuclear provocation.

Unlikethe relations between the U.S. and Russia, or the U.S. and China, the U.S. does nothave a robust communication channel that can prevent the misperception of North
Korean intentions. As a result, it is conceivable that the U.S. may conduct apreventive attack on North Korea based on wrong information, which may bring acatastrophe in the region.
To deal with this situation, South Korea should adopt a well-devised strategy. First,
no measure can be a panacea under these circumstances. South Korea should use
time as a major tool to get a window of opportunity by managing this uncomfortablesituation with patience. In this context, the goal of the strategy would be
preventing change in the status quo in the form of either North Korean armed
provocations or negotiation efforts by Pyongyang. The other goal of the South
Korean strategy should be to avoid decoupling by strengthening the ties between thetwo countries. The means of this strategy would be use of the military andnonmilitary assets of South Korea and the ROK-US alliance. Finally, South Korea“Joseon Oemuseong Haek Seonjetagyuk Gwonri Haengsahagedoelgusida [The Right of
Nuclear Prevention Attack Will Be Conducted]”, Joseon Joongangtongsin, March 7, 2013.
31 “Joseon Choegoinmingun Saryongbu Joseon Jeongjeonhyupjeongul Wanjeonhi Baekjihwa[The Supreme Command of DPRK People’s Army Nullified the Armistice Treaty]”, Joseon
Joongangtongsin, March 5, 2013.
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Chapter 6 — ROK's Perception of and Posture toward the DPRK's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Development (Son)should strengthen its military capabilities by focusing on the area of countering
weapons of mass destruction. As a result, South Korea should maintain the statusquo, intervene to give a clear understanding of North Korean intentions to the U.S.,
and prevent decoupling. If South Korea succeeds in carrying out this strategy, it
may have a chance to change the situation on its own terms.
In terms of a counter-nuclear policy, South Korea should adopt a more flexible stanceregarding a red line for dealing with North Korean nuclear development. If South
Korea sticks to the red line, it will be in a difficult position due to the obscuredefinition of the red line and the urgency that is inherent in the term to take somemeasures to prevent further developments. Instead of the red line, South Korea
may apply a red area for dealing with North Korean nuclear movement. A red area
will allow South Korea more time and flexibility to devise measures in the long term.
Second, given North Korea’s active nuclear doctrine for employing nuclear weapons
as a major tool of modern warfare, South Korea should develop details of ROE toavoid the unnecessary escalation of limited conventional conflicts to a nuclear war.
Finally, South Korea should find ways to enhance cooperation with Japan, whichfaces the same threat and has advanced capabilities.

Chapter 7 — North Korea's Threat and Japan's Response (Takahashi)

CHAPTER 7

North Korea’s Threat and Japan’s Response

Sugio Takahashi
National Institute for Defense Studies

INTRODUCTION
North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile development has posed a serious regional
security challenge since the 1990s. Likewise, the international community madesignificant efforts to block their development, such as the 1996 frameworkagreement, the 2005 denuclearization agreement and multiple United Nations
Security Council Resolutions. Regarding their current stage of development, the2017 version of Japan’s Defense White Paper assesses that it is possible that North
Korea has achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and has developed
nuclear warheads1.
Combining Kim Jong-Un’s highly provocative behaviors, their development ofescalation ladder is posing serious threats to the regional security environment.
Now, regional countries need to seriously prepare for a nuclear crisis or evenassociated contingencies living within a strong nuclear shadow. Regarding thisgrave security situation in East Asia, this paper attempts to tease out the strategic
implications of North Korea’s nuclear escalation ladder and Japan’s and the JapanU.S. alliance’s response to it.

Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan of 2017, Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2017, p.64.
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2017/DOJ2017_1-2-2_web.pdf
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STRATEGIC GAME-CHANGING EFFECT OF NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR ESCALATIONLADDER.2
In this region, the Japanese Archipelago has great geostrategic significance. One
clear example of its strategic significance was the Korean War in 1950. During thatwar, when North Korea took initiative initially, the U.S. was forced to retreat to the
Busan area. However, that situation was fundamentally overturned by the Inchon
landing operation that outflanked the main body of North Korea’s armies and took
the initiative back. This Inchon Operation was launched from Japan. And not justthis, throughout the Korean War, the Japanese Archipelago played an indispensablerole for the U.S. to defend South Korea. (Since Japan was under occupation at thattime, this “Japan” means the geographical, rather than political entity). Douglas
MacArthur, the Commander of the United Nations Command located its
headquarters in Tokyo. Bases in Japan were used for strategic bombing of North
Korea. And Japanese industry provided huge logistical and maintenance support
for U.S. forces and other militaries joining the UNC.
This geostrategic landscape illustrated in the Korean War, in which the combat
occurred only within the Korean Peninsula, and which did not directly affect theJapanese Archipelago, and in which Japan was utilized as a safe staging area and also
played a supporting role, continued to exist until recently.
This traditional geostrategic landscape in Northeast Asia has been changing
significantly, as a result of North Korea’s deployment of nuclear weapons andmissiles. Since the 1990s, North Korea has developed various ballistic missiles,
some of which, such as the Nodong are medium-range missiles whose range covers
significant parts of Japanese territory. Since its first nuclear test in 2006, North
Korea has conducted six nuclear tests as of the beginning of 2018. Their goal is
obvious: developing small nuclear warheads to load onto ballistic missiles. The
For more detailed analysis, please see Sugio Takahashi, “Thinking about the Unthinka
ble: The Case of the Korean Peninsula,” in Aaron L. Friedberg, Robert Jervis, J. James K
im, Jina Kim, Matthew Kroenig, Sugio Takahashi, Michito Tsuruoka, and Christopher Tw
omey, “North Korea and Asia’s Evolving Nuclear Landscape: Challenges to Regional Stability,” NBR Special Report, No.67, August 2017. http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialre
port/pdf/Free/10012017/SR67_North_Korea_and_Asias_Evolving_Nuclear_Landscape_August
2017.pdf
2

Chapter 7 — North Korea's Threat and Japan's Response (Takahashi)

question is whether, or more specifically when, they will succeed in it. While
nobody knows the reality, the Japanese Ministry of Defense estimated that “it ispossible that North Korea has achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons andhas developed nuclear warheads” in their Defense White Paper of 2017 3 . Thissuggests that regional countries, and the U.S., need to be ready now to treat North
Korea as capable of launching nuclear tipped ballistic missiles.
This development and potential deployment of nuclear tipped ballistic missile by
North Korea does not only mean that North Korea acquires more lethal destructive
measures with longer ranges. It actually has game changing effects in this region,
because nuclear tipped ballistic missile provide strike options against Japan for
North Korea. Obviously, was impossible during the Korean War, however, if a
conflict breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, Japan will no longer be a safe staging
area, unlike during the Korean War. Now, both the Korean Peninsula and theJapanese Archipelago would be a combat area in cases of the Korean Peninsula
contingency. This means that Japan’s decision making to support the U.S. forces on
the Korean Peninsula and to permit use of bases in Japan for U.S. military operations
on the Korean Peninsula, or even passage of Japanese territorial waters and airspaceby U.S. military assets can be a highly contentious one, since the decision to ally with
the U.S. would raise the risk that Japan might be attacked by nuclear tipped missiles
from North Korea. On the flipside, this means that the U.S. may no longer able
automatically rely upon support from Japan and permission to use bases from Japan.
At the end of the day, war on the Korean Peninsula would be a “war of choice” forJapan, rather than a “war of necessity”.

North Korea’s Possible Nuclear Escalation Ladder
U.S. bases in Japan would play critical roles in potential Korean Peninsula
contingency planning. U.S. reinforcements from all over the world would go to the
Korean Peninsula through U.S. bases in Japan. And they need to pass throughJapanese territorial water or airspace. Considering such geo-strategic importanceof Japanese physical locations, it is highly natural for North Korea to intimidate Japan
so as not to support the U.S., possibly with nuclear blackmail and Japan and the U.S.
need to consider this kind of intimidation as a likely scenario. If Japan surrenders
to North Korea’s blackmail, and if Japan denies support to the U.S. (including
3

Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan of 2017.

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permission to use bases in Japan, or even passage via Japan’s territorial water andairspace by U.S. military assets) U.S. forces in Korea would lose support from outsideof the Korean Peninsula and North Korea could drastically improve its strategic
situation. Considering such huge strategic benefit for North Korea, not just nuclear
blackmail, but warning shots including nuclear warning shots, attacks against
military facilities to interdict U.S. military operations, or counter-city strikes toincrease credibility of their intimidation should be regarded as a legitimate cause forconcern.
On the other hand, the U.S. provides commitment for extended deterrence for Japan4.
If Japan is actually attacked, the U.S. would launch massive counter-strikes against
North Korea’s strike forces. To deal with such a U.S. reaction, North Korea requires
nuclear escalation ladder, not just having a nuclear strike capability against Japan.
Nuclear tipped ICBMs would play that role. If North Korea succeeds in thedevelopment and deployment of nuclear tipped ICBMs, they can warn the U.S. that if
the U.S. launches retaliation for Japan against North Korea’s strikes toward Japan,
the U.S. would receive re-retaliation by nuclear tipped ICBMs launched from North
Korea.
Needless to say, even if North Korea succeeded in deploying nuclear tipped ICBMs,
the size of their force would be small. From North Korea’s perspective, however,regardless of objective and physical reality, there would be a room to formulate theirsubjective strategic calculation that they can deter U.S. retaliation, since North
Korea’s nuclear tipped ICBMs would put the U.S. at risk of nuclear strike.
Needless to say, nobody knows North Korea’s intentions nor calculations for their
nuclear and missile development program.
But these nuclear and missile
programs would have the strategic effects discussed above. Japan has made huge
efforts to deal with such emerging threats, including enhancing credibility ofextended deterrence and building ballistic missile defense capabilities.

JAPAN’S EFFORTS TO UPDATE DEFENSE POSTURE
Against North Korea’s nuclear escalation ladder, Japan has made multiple efforts.
Most recent commitment, see President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, “Joint
Statement”, February 10, 2017. http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000227768.pdf
4Chapter 7 — North Korea's Threat and Japan's Response (Takahashi)

The first one has been to improve its credibility of extended deterrence by the U.S.
But this creates two different issues: deterrence against a challenger and assurance
for an ally.
Among nuclear deterrence specialists, the “Healey Theorem”
summarizes the complexity of extended deterrence. In the 1960s, British Defence
Minister Denis Healey stated “only five per cent credibility of American retaliation isnecessary to deter the Russians, but ninety-five per cent credibility is required toreassure the Europeans”5.
On the assurance side, the first thing required by the U.S, is a of surge credibility ofextended deterrence through demonstration of its high-end capabilities including
forward deployment of dual-capable aircraft and strategic bombers to make bothregional allies and North Korea believe that the U.S. would certainly conduct
retaliation if Japan is attacked. The US has conducted such drills recently. Within
the alliance, to increase the credibility of extended deterrence, Japan and the U.S.
regularly hold Extended Deterrence Dialogues. Through such continuous dialogue,
Japan and the U.S., have deepened shared understandings of nuclear deterrence andcontinue efforts to develop frameworks to function as extended deterrence as isdeemed necessary.
On the deterrence side, there exists a serious challenge. Credibility of extended
deterrence basically means credibility of retaliation. However, reliability ofretaliation has one logical limitation. Even though Japan holds 100% confidenceby assurance efforts, it might not be enough for the security of Japan. By definition,
retaliation is launched after the opponent’s first strike, and retaliation would not
physically prevent a first strike. Thus, even if Japan has 100% confidence that the
U.S. would retaliate on behalf of Japan, if North Korea perceives their nuclear
escalation ladder would be able to deter U.S retaliation on behalf of Japan, there is acertain degree of possibility that Japan would nonetheless receive a serious attack,even though North Korea’s perception is just an overestimation for their nuclear
deterrent. The problem is not the Japanese perception of a U.S. reaction, but North
Korea’s perception and their strategic calculations based on this: as long as they havea certain degree of counter-city nuclear strike capabilities against the U.S. mainland,
Denis Healey, The Time of My Life, London: Michael Joseph, 1989, p. 243, quoted in
Clark A. Murdock and Jessica M. Yeats, Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Ext
ended Deterrence and Assurance: Workshop Proceedings and Key Takeaways , November
2009, pp. 2-3. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publicati
on/100222_Murdock_NuclearPosture_Print.pdf
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the possibility that North Korea embraces a subjective overestimation of the effectof nuclear deterrent against the U.S. cannot be eliminated. Even considering the
U.S. homeland BMD systems, even one successful strike can inflict devastation on atarget city so North Korea can expect this uncertainty will effectively deter the U.S.
In the context of extended deterrence, such subjective overestimation of North
Korea’s deterrence poses a serious challenge. If they subjectively overestimate
their credibility to deter the U.S., they may launch some kind of strike against Japan
including a nuclear warning shot. Even in that case, the U.S. would launch
retaliation and fulfill its commitment to extended deterrence. This retaliation
strike, however, is a post-event response and cannot save any lives of the Japanese
which may have already been lost by North Korea’s strike. In this sense, not just a
retaliation based extended deterrence, but damage limitation measures including
ballistic missile defenses are indispensable.
Japan and the U.S. have already deployed the most advanced and dense theaterbased missile defense system in the world. Additionally, in cases of contingency,
Japan will be able to expect reinforcements from U.S. deployable missile defense
systems.
Since North Korea’s Taepo-Dong launch in 1998, Japan has made serious efforts inballistic missile defenses. In 1998, Japan and the U.S. agreed to launch joint
research of AEGIS BMD. And in 2003, Japan decided to deploy a layered BMD
system with AEGIS BMD as a sea-based upper-tier defense and PAC-3 as a groundbased lower-tier defense. Since then, Japan has continuously spent about $1 billion
every year to develop Japan’s BMD systems including radar and command andcontrol systems, in addition to interceptors. And in 2017, Japan decided to deploy
AEGIS Ashore as a ground based upper-tier defense system. Regarding its
interceptors, the first phase of deployment after 2003 decision, the interceptor for
AEGIS BMD was SM-3 Block IA, however, it is to be updated to SM-3.
At the same time, the kinetic interceptor based BMD has inherent limitations. Even
if it succeeds in intercepting nearly 100 percent of incoming missiles, if the incoming
missile outnumbers kinetic interceptors, the magazine would run out and thedefense side can no longer block ballistic missile strikes. Given such a degradationof proficiency of the BMD system by a lengthy campaign of ballistic missile strikes,

Chapter 7 — North Korea's Threat and Japan's Response (Takahashi)

the importance of offensive air campaign strikes against ballistic missile launchers
before launching the missiles will be increased as time passes. This means amassive U.S. air campaign for pre-launch is essential in lengthy ballistic missile
strikes. In this sense, conventional strikes are also important for damage limitation.
These can be conventional cruise missiles, air strikes by fixed wing aircrafts, orarmed UAVs can also be an option. In addition, the most prompt and surest means,
ICBMs, should not be excluded from the options for damage limitation. For the U.S.
a strike means using ICBMs to provide the most prompt way to reach the target: thenuclear warheads of ICBMs can inflict serious damage against TEL-like soft targets
in a wide range of areas if it is utilized in air-burst mode. In this sense, the nuclear
option should be included in such damage limitation measures.

CONCLUSION
Regarding the speculation surrounding North Korea’s nuclear and missile
developments, in the past, the mainstream view was that these are a diplomatic“bargaining chip” designed to get assurance from the U.S. and Japan for regime
survival. Subsequently, the international community tried to achieve diplomatic
solutions such as the Framework Agreement or Six Party Talks. These efforts,
however, have all been in vain. Considering these failures and North Korea’s
consistent nuclear and missile development, now the international community needto start to assume that North Korea has no intention of ceasing their program andthere is very little hope of reaching an agreement for denuclearization6. Based on
this assessment, now is the time to consider that their nuclear and missile
development projects exist with the objectives of regime survival by minimum
deterrence, or even gaining strategic advantage through developing their version ofa nuclear escalation ladder.
To cope with Korean Peninsula contingencies, Japan plays a critical role, whilst
having virtually no direct military commitment. This unique role of Japan isprovided for by its geographical location. North Korea’s nuclear escalation ladder
has a deep effect of placing Japan at risk and thus improves North Korea’s strategic
situation. To maintain regional peace and stability, North Korea’s strategic
Prepared Statement by Scott Snyder before the United States Senate Committee on F
oreign Relations, United States Senate, 1st Session, 115th Congress, “Confronting the No
rth Korean Threat: Reassessing Policy Options”, January 31, 2017. http://www.foreign.s
enate.gov/imo/media/doc/013117_Snyder_Testimony.pdf
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weapons’ effects must be neutralized. In that context, the importance of efforts toenhance credibility of extended deterrence and improve capabilities of missile
defense systems cannot be overestimated. Considering the uncertainty of North
Korea’s subjective assessments of U.S. extended deterrence, damage limitation
would play an essential role. In addition to ballistic missile defenses, allied
conventional strikes against ballistic missile related assets are another importantelement of damage limitation.
However, both retaliation-based extended
deterrence and missile defenses have limitations. In this context, literally, fullrange of capabilities including nuclear options must be a part of U.S. options tophysically prevent North Korea from launching nuclear tipped missiles. Recently,
nuclear specialists have started to revisit arguments of limited nuclear war7. The
new geo-strategic landscape in Northeast Asia might not be an exception.

Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner, On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century, Stanford
University Press, 2014.
7

Chapter 8 — Japan-US-ROK Cooperation for Sustaining Deterrence (Watanabe)

Chapter 8
Japan-US-ROK Cooperation for Sustaining Deterrence

Takeshi Watanabe
National Institute for Defense Studies
South Korea (Republic of Korea; ROK) has reason to believe that it can prevent
China’s negative influence by restraining US-ROK-Japan security cooperation. In
October 2017, South Korea’s foreign minister, Kang Kyung-wha, virtually agreed toan assembly member’s demand that, to normalize relations with China (People’s
Republic of China; PRC), the ROK government needed to confirm the following threepoints: the ROK would not join the US missile defense system, develop the trilateral
cooperation into a military alliance, or make an additional deployment of theterminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) system1. This is the so-called “three
no-policies”. On the same day, the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson commented,“We hope the ROK will faithfully follow through on its above-mentioned
commitments, properly handle the relevant issue, and bring China-ROK relations
back [on] to the track of steady and sound development at an early date”2.
What Kang explained in the above remarks as the existing US-ROK-Japan trilateral
security cooperation, as opposed to an “alliance”, was the three nations’collaboration to increase “deterrence” and effectively respond to North Korea’s
nuclear and missile threats3. However, South Korea would face China even if thetrilateral cooperation focused on managing the North Korean threat, because
China’s demand for the “three no-policies” itself indicated that the nation
increasingly shares the objectives of North Korea’s coercive strategy for weakening
both of the two US-led alliances in Northeast Asia.
1 ROK National Assembly, Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee Record (temporary), 2017

Audit Session, October 30, 2017, pp. 6-7.
2 PRC Foreign Ministry, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference”, October 30, 2017. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/25
11_665403/t1505871.shtml.
3 ROK National Assembly, Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee Record (temporary), 2017
Audit Session, October 30, 2017, p. 7.

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DESPITE DISPUTES, CHINA SHARES A KEY OBJECTIVE WITH THE DPRK
Security ties depend on sharing the threat to be managed, whether or not there is adispute. Thus, alignment or an alliance is not the same as friendship. During the
2016–2017 nuclear crisis caused by North Korea, despite disputes with the North,
China was sharing a significant number of objectives with the nation in handlingissues related to the United States Forces Korea (USFK).
At the first high-level contact with the Trump administration, which was StateCouncilor Yang Jiechi’s telephone conversation with US Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson, the Chinese side raised a proposal seeking to achieve the denuclearizationof the peninsula in parallel with replacing the armistice with a peace deal4. Indeed,almost exactly a year earlier, on February 17, 2016, China’s foreign minister, WangYi, had expressed the equivalent position––the “dual-track approach”–– for the firsttime,5 soon after the US-ROK announcement starting the consultations for deploying
the USFK THAAD on February 7, 2016.
Given that the emergence of China’s dual-track or parallel-track approach wasclosely related to the THAAD issue, advocating a peace treaty would reflect thenation’s negative awareness of the USFK. Indeed, in a public speech a day after theannouncement of South Korea’s willingness to accept the THAAD operated by the
USFK, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin of China insisted that “the relevantbilateral military alliances are a product of a bygone era,” mentioning the THAAD
deployment as an example of a counterproductive result from making alliances.
Following that, Liu said, “parties should support the ‘parallel-track’ approach ofadvancing denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and replacing the armisticeagreement with a peace treaty”6. With respect to the relationship between a peace

4 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang's Regular Press Conference on February 22, 2017.

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1440651.shtml
5 China. Foreign Ministry, “Wang Yi: Shixian Bandao Wuhehua yu Bandao Tinghejizhi
Zhuanhuan Bingxing Tuijin [Wang Yi: Moving forward Denuclearization on the Korean
Peninsula in parallel with transition from armistice to peace]”, February 17, 2016.
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1341212.shtml
6 “Actively Practice the Asian Security Concept and Jointly Create a New Future of Asia-Pacific
Security: Remarks by Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin At the Opening Ceremony of theChapter 8 — Japan-US-ROK Cooperation for Sustaining Deterrence (Watanabe)treaty and the USFK, North Korea has famously insisted that the US-ROK allianceshould disappear as a leftover of history after a peace treaty. Even though China
may still have a conflict with North Korea, which has occasionally called for a USDPRK bilateral peace treaty excluding China as a party, “a peace treaty” China
advocated in the parallel-track approach has almost the same logic as the North’s
denial of the legitimacy of the US-ROK alliance.

EXTENDING NORTH KOREA’S COMPELLENCE STRATEGYOne of the objectives the North Koreans promoted against the US-ROK alliance wastheir version of a peace treaty to replace the armistice agreement. As usual, North
Korea also urged people in South Korea to demand the withdrawal of US forces
through a peace treaty7. The development of nuclear capabilities is allowing North
Korea to expand the scope of this compellence strategy beyond the peninsula.
On May 29, North Korea tested a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV)-equipped
Scud-based short-range ballistic missile for achieving the capability of “making
ultra-precision strikes on the enemies’ objects in any area”8. This is probably a partof the extended version of diplomatic compellence rather than a Soviet-stylecounterforce strategy for nuclear war fighting, because North Koreans would neverincrease survivability in nuclear warfare by destroying enemy strike capabilities.
North Korea, a small nation, could not accept even a few nuclear retaliatory attacks
and survive. Even if the North’s nuclear forces could successfully destroy US forcesin Northeast Asia before a reciprocal attack, there is no reason for the nation to
expect to survive nuclear war with the United States after that. Thus, counterforce
targeting that assumes a nation can take advantage by first destroying the other’s
military instead of its cities is not suitable for North Korea. Indeed, on the same day
as the MaRV test was publicly announced, North Koreans expressed consistent
remarks concerning its traditional strategy for compelling the United States andInternational Seminar on ‘Security Framework and Major-Power Relations In the Asia-PacificRegion’”. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1379376.shtml
7 For example, “DPRK-targeted Nuclear War Exercises Flailed in S. Korea”, KCNA, Mach 10, 2017;“Exhibition for Dialogue and Reunification Opens in S. Korea”, KCNA, July 29, 2016.
8 “Kim Jong Un Guides Test-fire of Ballistic Rocket Based on Precision Guidance System”, Rodong,
May 30, 2017.

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Chapter 8 — Japan-US-ROK Cooperation for Sustaining Deterrence (Watanabe)South Korea to adopt ideas based on concepts like the North Korean version of apeace treaty, which would weaken their alliance.
Only the U.S. military objects for aggression in Japan have been within the
optical sight of the Strategic Force of the Korean People’s Army. But if Japan
persists in hostility toward the DPRK, following the U.S. and not properly
seeing the reality, the target of the DPRK will be changed9.
Even though MaRV should be used for targeting enemy forces, what this statement
stressed was preserving the option of using nuclear missiles on civilians. This isneither the nuclear war-fighting strategy of the Soviet Union nor the counterforce
targeting discussed by the US Air Force during the Cold War in rationalizing its firstuse of nuclear weapons as a decisive blow10. Rather than the air force’s counterforce
targeting, North Korea’s notion is closer to Robert McNamara’s “counterforce
strategy” of not targeting enemy cities with nuclear weapons in order to take them
hostage and thereby deter the Soviet Union from doing so. Leaving enemy cities
untouched instead of destroying them allows for effectively coercing or deterring
the enemy11.
The threat to US bases in Japan is a precisely extended version of North Korea’s
traditional military-diplomatic logic to take Seoul hostage for advancing its interestsvis-à-vis the US-ROK alliance. The aim of the MaRV test in this case is conveying toJapan that North Korea retains its nuclear option to seriously damage the Japanese
population rather than to demonstrate the credibility of destroying US bases inJapan.
What nuclear rather than other weapons can do much more effectively is to pose adirect threat to the enemy population even before destroying the defender’s militaryforces12. Even if North Korea were not strong enough to conduct nuclear warfare
with the United States, the power to inflict damage is not typically reduced by the
9 “Japanese Authorities Warned of Inciting Pressure and Sanctions on DPRK: Foreign Ministry

Spokesman”, Rodong Sinmun, March 30, 2017.
10 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed., New York, Palgrave Macmillan,
2003, pp. 121-123.
11 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, Revised Edition, New Haven, Yale University Press,
2008, pp. 190-192.
12 Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 22.

Chapter 8 — Japan-US-ROK Cooperation for Sustaining Deterrence (Watanabe)

adversary’s power to retaliate 13 . Much weaker nuclear power could compel a
coalition led by the much stronger United States to accept the North’s demands. The
MaRV test underlined the preservation of direct violence on Japanese civilians bytargeting military bases in the populated areas of the country, including Tokyo.
For this strategy to be successfully prevented, the United States, the ROK, and Japan
must continuously improve ballistic missile defense (BMD), which could minimize
the effects of North Korea’s limited military actions regarding coercion. Thiscounter-coercive strategy is conditional on sustaining the credible deterrence of the
ROK-US alliance against larger-scale attacks. Otherwise, North Korea would simply
expand missile launchings for offsetting BMD14. As long as North Korea feels fear
about not being able to survive full-scale warfare, the BMD, which raises the hurdle
for North Korea to make others worry about their capacity, will reduce thepossibilities of the North’s coercive strategy. There is no reason for the US-ROKJapan security cooperation to refrain from developing it.

CHINA’S ECONOMIC DETERRENCE TO THE US-ROK ALLIANCE
Strong economic performance does not necessarily provide a nation with the power
to control others until it is operationalized. What is required for operationalizing
power as an effective deterrence is drawing a clear red line, showing the enemy
what will happen if it crosses the line, and establishing the credibility of theretaliatory action. South Korea’s “three no-policies,” virtually demanded by China,
include clear red lines, and the recent economic pressure from China against theSouth’s first acceptance of the THAAD deployment led to the US ally believing in thecredibility of China’s retaliation concerning any future crossing of the red lines.
Even if the next administration of South Korea intends to abolish the “three nopolicies”, the government will have to be concerned about the possible economic
sacrifices and criticism generated within the nation. The acceptance of the “three
no-policies” by the South Korean government allowed China, based on its economic
performance, to establish a direct deterrence against the development of the USROK alliance.
13 Ibid., p. 3.
14 This effect of BMD supposed that an adversary could launch only limited missile attacks,

refraining from full-scale warfare. Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21stCentury, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2016, pp. 91-92.

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Yet Foreign Minister Kang has defined the “three no-policies” as merely confirming
the existing policies 15 . In answering questions from China’s CCTV about thecredibility of the “three no-policies,” President Moon Jae-in of South Korea also
stated that South Korea’s position on the THAAD was not new, but existed
currently16. However, deterrence specifically means preventing the alteration of an
existing position. Their remarks virtually admitted that they were sufficiently
deterred by China. Confirming the existing policies of the alliance effectively
promises China that they will not cross the red lines, whether or not the term
“promise” is used by South Korea.
The three no-policies reflect China’s increasingly shared national security objectives
with its junior ally, North Korea, because the red lines are clearly consistent with
North Korea’s interests. As argued earlier, improvements in anti-ballistic missile
capabilities are required to offset North Korea’s expanding strategy of compellence
and to sustain the existing deterrence involving North Korea. The three nations
must defend logistics in Japan and the seas surrounding the nation from theincreasing missile threats of the North. Credible missile defense requires
integrating systems in and beyond the host nations of the US forces, thereby leading
to trilateral security cooperation. The economic deterrence of the three no-policies
runs counter to these efforts.
In addition, if South Korea continuously follows the three no-policies, the UnitedStates and its allies may be forced to negotiate for denuclearizing North Korea
without effective incentives in terms of arms control. China only expressed its
demands to South Korea to accept the red lines about two months before Kim Jongun called for talks to settle the two-year-long crisis. China may know the history of
the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiations: the 1979 double-track
decision of the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) backed up the
successful US efforts to make the Soviet Union accept the withdrawal of SS-20
missiles, which seriously threatened NATO members in Europe. In the decision, the

15 ROK National Assembly, Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee Record (temporary), 354th

Session, No. 6, November 27, 2017, p. 15.
16 ROK Office of President, “Chunkook CCTV Moon Jae-in Daetongryong Intobyu (China’s CCTV interviewed with President Moon Jae-in)”, December 12, 2017. https://www1.president.go.kr/
articles/1724

Chapter 8 — Japan-US-ROK Cooperation for Sustaining Deterrence (Watanabe)

NATO nations urged arms control talks to continue and expressed the will to deploy
US Pershing II missiles to offset the SS-20 threat if the talks did not sufficiently easethe concerns. The reinforcement of deterrence was the centerpiece of NATO’s
strategy for letting the Soviet Union accept arms control––the treaty to eliminate
INF. With the three no-policies promised by South Korea to abstain from major
improvements in deterrence, that is, missile defense, the subsequent
denuclearization talks could become a worse version of the INF negotiations for theUnited States and its allies. Conversely, China’s three no-policies have fulfilled an
important condition for North Korea to ensure the talks are successful.

CONCLUSION
When the PRC Foreign Ministry demanded the ROK government reconfirm the three
no-policies on the day after Kang’s statement, China added a further point to befollowed by South Korea: “The current THAAD deployment in the ROK will notundermine China’s strategic security interests” 17. This should be a reminder ofChina’s response to the US-ROK maritime exercise planned to warn North Korea
after the Cheonan incident in 2010. At that time, China’s Foreign Ministry opposed
the exercise as undermining the “security interests” of China itself 18 . Even thecurrent THAAD, which focuses on North Korea’s missiles, could thus be against what
the PRC calls its own “strategic security interests”.
For effective denuclearization negotiations and deterrence, the United States, Japan,
and South Korea must improve their trilateral security cooperation. It will never beeasy to negotiate for denuclearization with North Korea, which has significantly
improved its power to coerce others and take advantage of the three no-policies.

17 PRC Foreign Ministry, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference”, October 31, 2017. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t
1506230.shtml
18 PRC Foreign Ministry, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang's Regular Press Conference”, July 15, 2010.

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CHAPTER 9

European Perspectives on North Korea’s Nuclear andBallistic Missile Programs

Jerker Hellström
Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)INTRODUCTION
The Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) in late November 2017 declared that North
Korea had become a nuclear state. In a statement on the test of the Hwasong-15
missile, KCNA quoted Kim Jong-un as saying that the regime had “finally realized thegreat historic cause of completing the state nuclear force, the cause of building a
rocket power1”.
According to initial calculations by Michael Elleman of the International Institute forStrategic Studies (IISS), the new missile could indeed deliver a nuclear weapon to
any city on the US mainland2. In response to the Hwasong-15 test, US president
Donald Trump told reporters that Washington would “take care of it3”.
How, then, are policymakers in the European Union (EU) planning to “take care of”
North Korea as a de facto nuclear power? In light of the developments in 2017, thischapter details and analyzes the European discourse regarding Pyongyang’s nuclear
ambitions.

1 KCNA, “DPRK Gov't Statement on Successful Test-fire of New-Type ICBM”, November 29, 2017.

http://kcna.co.jp/item/2017/201711/news29/20171129-07ee.html
2 Michael Elleman, “The New Hwasong-15 ICBM: A Significant Improvement That May be Ready as Early as 2018”, 38 North, November 30, 2017. http://www.38north.org/2017/11/mellem
an113017/
3 Reuters, “Trump says North Korea missile launch 'a situation that we will handle'”,November 28, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-trump/trumpsays-north-korea-missile-launch-a-situation-that-we-will-handle-idUSKBN1DS2T1

Chapter 9 — European Perspectives on North Korea's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Programs (Hellström)

On June 12, 2018, Trump and Kim met in Singapore. It was a historic summit in thesense that it was the first meeting between an incumbent president of the UnitedStates and a North Korean leader. At a press conference after Kim’s departure later
the same day, Trump asserted that Pyongyang had agreed to dismantle its nuclear
arms program in a verifiable manner, and that it would proceed “quickly4”.
During the weeks that followed the Singapore summit, however, there was scantevidence for any steps toward denuclearization. In fact, there were even signs that
Pyongyang was further advancing its nuclear program 5 . Despite the summit
declaration, in which the two parties agreed to work toward a “denuclearization of
the Korean peninsula”, North Korea might not have any intention of denuclearizing.
Indeed, few North Korea observers in Europe believe that the country will change
its strategic calculus by giving up its nuclear weapons, or that it will cave in tointernational pressure to do so6.
In response to North Korea’s activities, EU member states have issued criticalstatements — jointly and individually — and implemented UN sanctions. In
addition, the EU in 2006 began to adopt autonomous measures complementing andreinforcing the UN Security Council resolutions7.
Despite all efforts to persuade North Korea to dismantle its nuclear and ballistic
missile programs, this endeavor has yet to show tangible results. While thecontinuously strengthened sanctions regime may have hampered its developmentof missiles and nuclear devices, North Korea’s strategic calculus seems to remain
intact.

4 Jennifer Williams, “Read the full transcript of Trump’s North Korea summit press conference”,

Vox, June 12, 2018. https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/12/17452624/trump-kim-summit-transcript-press-conference-full-text
5 David Brunnstrom, “North Korea making bomb fuel despite denuclearization pledge: Pompeo”, Reuters, July 25, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa/north-koreamaking-bomb-fuel-despite-denuclearization-pledge-pompeo-idUSKBN1KF2QT; Choe Sang-Hu
n, “North Korea Starts Dismantling Key Missile Facilities, Report Says”, the New York Times, July23, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/world/asia/north-korea-dismantling-missile-facilities.html
6 Étienne Bassoot, “Ten issues to watch in 2018”, European Parliamentary Research Service, Ja
nuary 2018, p. 3. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/614650/EPR
S_IDA(2018)614650_EN.pdf
7 European Council, “EU restrictive measures against North Korea”, last updated January 22,
2018. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/history-north-korea/

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NORTH KOREA EMERGES IN THE EUROPEAN DEBATEAt least since its first nuclear test in 2006, Pyongyang’s ambitions have been
portrayed as one of the major threats to international security. Nevertheless, North
Korea has until recently occupied a limited space in the European security debate.
The geographic distance to East Asia is but one explanation for the lack of concern.
Moreover, the EU has been preoccupied with other crises that have seemed more
daunting and imminent8.
European perspectives on North Korea changed significantly in 2017. This was theyear when the Kim Jong-un regime tested more missiles in a single year than everbefore and conducted its sixth nuclear test9. The United States, for its part, held
military exercises with South Korea and continued the launch of the terminal highaltitude area defense missile defense system south of Seoul. These and similar
moves, regarded by Washington and Pyongyang as equally provocative andunacceptable, prompted aggressive rhetoric and a “war of words” between the twosides.
The anxiety in Europe over miscalculation and a preemptive strike by either theUnited States or North Korea rose in 2017, not least when President Trump
repeatedly emphasized the option of a military solution to contain North Korea10.
As these developments unfolded, European concerns over military escalation
between the United States and North Korea grew11.
Europe’s angst over a security crisis emanating from Pyongyang’s unimpeded
nuclear ambitions is not likely to go away. Speaking at the UN Security Council in
December 2017, Sweden’s foreign minister, Margot Wallström, referred to the

8 Janka Oertel, “Europe’s Options on the Sidelines of the North Korea Crisis”, GMF Policy Brief,

August 28, 2017. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/europes-options-sidelines-north-koreacrisis
9 CSIS, “North Korean Missile Launches & Nuclear Tests: 1984-Present”, updated September 20,
2017. https://missilethreat.csis.org/north-korea-missile-launches-1984-present/
10 Julian Borger, “Merkel offers German role in Iran-style nuclear talks with North Korea”, The
Guardian, September 10, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/10/merkelbacks-iran-style-diplomatic-solution-for-north-korea
11 Oertel, “Europe’s Options on the Sidelines of the North Korea Crisis”.

Chapter 9 — European Perspectives on North Korea's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Programs (Hellström)

situation on the Korean peninsula as “the greatest threat to international peace andsecurity facing the world today12”.
In January 2018, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) identified
North Korea as one out of ten issues deemed “likely to occupy a particularly
important place on the political agenda of the European Union” this year. In its
report, Ten Issues to Watch in 2018, the EPRS also listed challenges such as terrorism,
disinformation, and Brexit13. In the North Korean case, EPRS concluded that there
was “no war on the horizon”, but that risks remained for a “larger-scale geopoliticalconflict14”.

EUROPE IN NORTH KOREA’S CROSSHAIRS?
The worrisome sequence of events in 2017 furthermore gave rise to concerns that
North Korean missiles would eventually threaten European territory directly.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states including France, Britain,
and Germany have been vocal in pointing out Europe’s vulnerability to Pyongyang’s
nuclear arsenal.
French defense minister Florence Parly stated that Europe could be within range ofNorth Korean missiles “sooner than expected”, with Germany’s foreign minister,
Sigmar Gabriel, adding that North Korea’s nuclear ambitions did not only haveregional implications but could also have consequences for Europe15. UK defence
secretary Gavin Williamson asserted that North Korea had become a “real danger”
to Britain: “They are currently on the pathway to have ballistic missiles that could
12 Government Offices of Sweden, “Statement by Sweden at the Security Council Briefing on No

n-Proliferation (DPRK)”, December 15, 2017. http://www.government.se/statements/2017/1
2/ny-sida21/
13 Étienne Bassoot, “Ten issues to watch in 2018”, European Parliamentary Research Service, Ja
nuary 2018. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/614650/EPRS_ID
A(2018)614650_EN.pdf
14 Naja Bentzen, “Europe’s challenges in 2018: Ten issues to watch”, European Parliamentary
Research Service Blog, January 17, 2018. https://epthinktank.eu/2018/01/17/europeschallenges-in-2018-ten-issues-to-watch/; Bassoot, .
15 Reuters, “Europe could soon be within range of North Korean missiles: France”, September 5,
2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-france/europe-could-soon-b
e-within-range-of-north-korean-missiles-france-idUSKCN1BG1FZ; Sigmar Gabriel, “Waffen schaffen keine Sicherheit” [“Weapons do not create security”], Rheinischen Post, August 16, 2017.
http://www.rp-online.de/politik/deutschland/gastbeitrag-von-sigmar-gabriel-waffen-schaffen-keine-sicherheit-aid-1.7015181

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strike London 16 ”. The Defence and National Security Review 2017, issued by the
French government in October, argued that North Korea could soon have an
operational nuclear force of global reach, which could pose a direct threat toEurope17.
These statements should, of course, be understood in light of North Korea’s nuclear
capabilities and not its intentions. Currently, Pyongyang may not have the intention
to attack European capitals, but while its intentions can change, the regime will
strive to maintain or increase its nuclear capability. That said, the most pressing
issue from a European perspective is not the threat of a North Korean nuclear attack
on Europe but the risk for nuclear proliferation. This is perceived as an imminentand real threat, and is therefore routinely raised in official European statements on
North Korea. The Defence and National Security Review 2017 specifically raises thepossibility of proliferation of North Korean weapons of mass destruction to theMiddle East as a threat to Europe18.

EUROPE’S ROLE IN EAST ASIAN SECURITY
The threat of proliferation is often mentioned by observers as one of the key reasons
why Europe should engage in East Asian security. Other relevant European
interests include the safeguarding of the international legal order and thepreservation of regional peace and stability, not least in order to ensure unimpeded
trade with Asia 19 . Europe’s stake in East Asian security remains limited incomparison to the interests of the United States. Nevertheless, Europe’s continued
role as a dialog partner to North Korea is seen as vital for building confidence
between North Korea and the international community.
The EU established formal diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2001 (but has
yet to establish a presence in the country) and has held a dozen political dialogs with

16 Kate Ferguson, “North Korea MUST be dealt with before it develops missiles that can strike B

ritain, warns the Defence Secretary”, Daily Mail, December 19, 2017. http://www.dailymail.co.
uk/news/article-5194581/Gavin-Williamson-nuclear-North-Korea-confronted.html
17 Ministère des Armées, Defence and National Security Review 2017, October 11, 2017, p. 40. h
ttps://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/actualites/articles/strategic-review-a-lucid-and-proactiv
e-analysis-to-prepare-for-the-next-military-programming-law
18 Defence and National Security Review 2017, p. 40.
19 Oertel, “Europe’s Options on the Sidelines of the North Korea Crisis”.

Chapter 9 — European Perspectives on North Korea's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Programs (Hellström)

Pyongyang since 20 . At the time, Sweden was the only Western country with an
unbroken diplomatic presence in the country, dating back to the 1970s. Most EU
member states have established diplomatic relations with North Korea, of which
seven maintain diplomatic missions in Pyongyang21. Most notably Sweden, via its
embassy, functions as Protective Power for the United States, Australia, and Canada.
Sweden and Switzerland also supervise the armistice negotiated in 1953. In
addition, the two countries are among the major donors of humanitarian aid to
North Korea22.
North Korean officials have also traveled to Stockholm to hold talks with their
Swedish counterparts. In March 2018, the North Korean and Swedish foreign
ministers met in the Swedish capital to discuss the security situation on the Korean
peninsula23. The meeting came just two months after a visit to Stockholm by Han
Song-ryol, vice foreign minister, during which the bilateral deliberations focused on
Pyongyang’s relationship with the United States, Australia, and Canada from theperspective of Sweden’s function as Protective Power for the three states24. Several
meetings between North Korean and US diplomats have reportedly also been held
in Norway25.

20 Ibid.
21 Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom

have embassies in Pyongyang.
22 Financial Tracking Service, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. https://fts.unocha.org/
countries/118/summary/2017
23 Reuters, “Sweden, North Korea talks end, may help pave way for Trump-Kim encounter”,
March 17, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-sweden/swedennorth-korea-talks-end-may-help-pave-way-for-trump-kim-encounter-idUSKCN1GT0M5
24 Malin Hansson, “Nordkoreas vice utrikesminister på uppdrag — i Sverige”, [North Korea’s Vi
ce Foreign Minister on a mission — in Sweden], Expressen, January 29, 2018. https://www.ex
pressen.se/nyheter/nordkoreas-vice-utrikesminister-pa-uppdrag-i-sverige/; Xinhua, “DPRK F
oreign Ministry delegation leaves for Sweden”, January 27, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/2018-01/27/c_136929490.htm
25 NTB, “Norge i uvant rolle i Nord-Korea-samtaler [Norway assumes rare role in North Korea talks]”, May 9, 2017. https://www.abcnyheter.no/nyheter/verden/2017/05/09/195301430/
norge-i-uvant-rolle-i-nord-korea-samtaler; NRK, “Japansk presse: Planer om Nord-Korea-samt
aler i Oslo i oktober [Japanese media: Plans for North Korea talks in Oslo in October]”, Septemb
er 29, 2017. https://www.nrk.no/urix/japansk-presse_-planer-om-nord-korea-samtaler-i-osl
o-i-oktober-1.13710533

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EUROPE AND NORTH KOREA: CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT
As early as 2003, the European Council listed North Korea’s nuclear activities as oneof the key areas of concern in its European Security Strategy. It also stated thatproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was “potentially the greatest
threat to our security26”.
In its policy of “critical engagement” toward North Korea, the EU emphasizes three
key areas of engagement: 1) contributing to a sustainable reduction of tensions on
the Korean peninsula and in the region; 2) upholding the international
nonproliferation regime; and 3) improving the situation of human rights in the
country27.
The European Council describes the policy of critical engagement as “a means topromote the DPRK’s full compliance with UNSC Resolutions in terms of abandoning
its nuclear, WMD and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable andirreversible manner28”.
The EU, however, largely remains a bystander on the North Korea issue and has noapparent leverage vis-à-vis Pyongyang29. In order to be able to pursue its policy of“critical engagement” more effectively, it has been suggested that the EU could
follow through with its plans to open a delegation office in Pyongyang30.

26 EEAS Strategic Planning, “European Security Strategy — A Secure Europe in a Better World”,

pp. 4, 7. https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world
27 European Union External Action Service, “DPRK and the EU”, June 26, 2016. https://eeas.eu
ropa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/4186/dprk-and-eu_en
28 European Council, “Council Conclusions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, July17, 2017. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/17/conclusio
ns-korea/
29 Mark Fitzpatrick, “North Korean proliferation challenges: the role of the European Union”, St
ockholm International Peace Research Institute, June, 2012. https://www.sipri.org/publication
s/2012/eu-non-proliferation-papers/north-korean-proliferation-challenges-role-european-union; Lina Grip, “The European Union and Non-Proliferation”, Stockholm International Peace Res
earch Institute, August 2017. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-09/eunpc_final_
report_2017_0.pdf
30 Fitzpatrick, “North Korean proliferation challenges: the role of the European Union”.

Chapter 9 — European Perspectives on North Korea's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Programs (Hellström)

THE MILITARY OPTION IS NO OPTION
The European Council is “strongly convinced” that denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula “must be achieved through peaceful mean 31 ”. From the European
perspective, a military solution to the North Korean crisis is not an option. In
response to repeated statements from the Trump administration on the option of
conducting preemptive strikes on North Korea, Federica Mogherini, High
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
emphasized the EU’s opposition against any military action toward North Korea.
Mogherini stated that the EU “will always look for a diplomatic solution, because weknow that thinking, even thinking of a military solution to this kind of tensions, notonly is dangerous but also it does not solve the problem at all32”.
If the United States were to attack North Korea, the consequences of even a
conventional counterattack could involve millions of deaths, including in South
Korea, a strategic partner to the EU 33 . Malcolm Chalmers of the Royal UnitedServices Institute (RUSI) describes this option as “the near certainty of catastrophe
if the United States were to launch a new Korean War without the agreement of
those it is committed to protect34”.
Hence, the EU regards dialog with North Korea as the most effective means toresolve tensions and to safeguard peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.
German foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel has even stated that there is no other way
to deal with North Korea than by means of negotiation35.

31 European Council, “Council Conclusions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”.
32 European Union External Action Service, “Speech by HR/VP Mogherini at the opening session of the 2017 EU Ambassadors conference”, June 26, 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarte
rs/headQuarters-homepage/31424/speech-hrvp-mogherini-opening-session-2017-eu-ambas
sadors-conference_en
33 Tom Plant, “Uniting US and European approaches to North Korea”, East Asia Forum, November
1, 2017. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/11/01/uniting-us-and-european-approachesto-north-korea/
34 Judy Dempsey, “Judy Asks: Is It Time for Hard Power in North Korea?”, Carnegie Europe,
September 06, 2017. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/73013
35 Gabriel, “Waffen schaffen keine Sicherheit”.

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DIALOG AND PRESSURE
Lacking direct leverage over Pyongyang, Brussels and individual EU member states
could contribute in terms of mediation and confidence-building measures 36 . In
particular, it has been suggested that the EU could draw from its experiences fromnegotiations with Iran, which resulted in the 2015 nuclear agreement.
According to Mogherini, the EU is willing to mediate in any talks aimed at freezing
North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons programs37. Sweden’s prime minister,Stefan Löfven, as well as Foreign Minister Margot Wallström have also offered theirassistance in any negotiations with North Korea38. Moreover, German chancellor
Angela Merkel offered German participation in any future nuclear talks with North
Korea. Merkel suggested that the 2015 agreement with Iran could serve as a modelfor negotiations39. In addition to promoting its own role in any future talks with
North Korea, Brussels has also voiced its support for South Korean initiatives torevive communications with the Kim Jong-un regime and to build confidence among
the parties40.
The critical engagement policy of the EU is, however, not only about dialog but also
involves exerting pressure on the regime in Pyongyang as a means to support
nonproliferation and denuclearization efforts 41 . In addition to multiple EU
sanctions on North Korea adopted since 2006, scholars have suggested that the EU
could attempt to persuade China and Russia to strike against the North Korean

36 Dempsey, “Judy Asks: Is It Time for Hard Power in North Korea?”.
37 Reuters, “North Korea seen seeking direct U.S.

talks as EU diplomatic back channel with Pyongyang goes cold”, October 4, 2017. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/10/04/asia-p
acific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/north-korea-seen-seeking-direct-u-s-talks-eu-diplomatic-back-channel-pyongyang-goes-cold/#.WnYWIGbpKRs
38 TT, ”Löfven erbjöd Trump hjälp med Nordkorea” [Löfven offered Trump assistance on North
Korea], 20 September, 2017. http://www.unt.se/nyheter/omvarld/lofven-erbjod-trump-hjalp-med-nordkorea-4762504.aspx; Robin Emmott and Gabriela Baczynska, ”EU defends Iran deal
despite Trump, appeals to U.S. Congress”, Reuters, October 16, 2017. https://in.reuters.com/a
rticle/iran-nuclear-eu/eu-defends-iran-deal-despite-trump-appeals-to-u-s-congress-idINKBN
1CL161?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews
39 Borger, “Merkel offers German role in Iran-style nuclear talks with North Korea”.
40 Emanuele Scimia, “Will EU be part of new Six-Party Talks on N Korea?”, Asia Times, July 23, 2017.
http://www.atimes.com/will-eu-part-new-six-party-talks-north-korea/
41 Deutsche Welle, “Sigmar Gabriel calls for 'pressure and dialogue' to deal with North Korea”,
September 18, 2017. http://www.dw.com/en/sigmar-gabriel-calls-for-pressure-and-dialogueto-deal-with-north-korea/a-40551777

Chapter 9 — European Perspectives on North Korea's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Programs (Hellström)

economy by the means of oil sanctions 42 . Moreover, the EU could increase thepressure on the regime by adopting sanctions in concert with the United States onbanks and financial institutions that are engaged in foreign exchange activities
related to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs 43. Yet secondary sanctions
would mainly be directed at China, the EU’s second-largest trade partner.
Considering the negative consequences for the relationship with China, theprospects for such sanctions remain unlikely44.

IS NORTH KOREA A NUCLEAR POWER?
In light of the perceived failure of sanctions on North Korea, many in Europe alreadyregard North Korean denuclearization as a “lost cause45”. It has become apparent
that the regime does not intend to stop short of recognition as a de facto nuclear
power, giving it the same status as India, Pakistan, and Israel, which are all outside
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)46. Few European observers expect Pyongyang
to change its strategic calculus47.
In Russia’s view, regional stability can be achieved by tacit acknowledgment ofNorth Korea as a de facto nuclear power48. In the long run, China too might be more
willing to accept a North Korean nuclear arsenal than a continued American militarypresence near its territory. Despite the fact that such recognition would beinconsistent with the NPT, Pyongyang may have been convinced by the cases ofIndia, Pakistan, and Israel that a tacit acknowledgment by the international
community could be achievable49.

42 Dempsey, “Judy Asks: Is It Time for Hard Power in North Korea?”.

43 Mason Richey, “EU-South Korea Security Relations: The Current State of Play”, Egmont RoyalInstitute for International Relations Security Policy Brief, May 2017. http://www.egmontinstitu
te.be/content/uploads/2017/05/SPB87.pdf?type=pdf
44 Ibid.
45 Mathieu Duchâtel, “Nuclear North Korea: Perpetuating the fiction” European Council on Forei
gn Relations, August 31, 2017. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_nuclear_north_korea_
perpetuating_the_fiction_7227
46 Bassoot, “Ten issues to watch in 2018”.
47 Bentzen, “Europe’s challenges in 2018: Ten issues to watch”.
48 Kathrin Hille, Bryan Harris and Demetri Sevastopulo, “Putin says sanctions drive against
North Korea is pointless”, September 6, 2017. https://www.ft.com/content/b4d37d7e-91d811e7-a9e6-11d2f0ebb7f0
49 Enrico D'Ambrogio, “North Korea: Possible scenarios”, European Parliamentary Research Ser
vice, September 2018, p. 4. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/608
681/EPRS_BRI(2017)608681_EN.pdf

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Chapter 9 — European Perspectives on North Korea's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Programs (Hellström)

A vital difference between the three de facto nuclear-armed states and North Korea
is their declared opponents. Pyongyang has explicitly stated that its development of
nuclear weapons is motivated by a need for deterrence against one specific actor:
the United States. It has also asserted that it could consider launching a preemptive
nuclear attack on the United States, that is, moving beyond a second-strike
doctrine50. Israel, India, and Pakistan have, of course, made no such threats vis-àvis the United States.
The EU has been clear in its message that it will not acknowledge, let alone accept, a
North Korea with nuclear arms. Some European observers have suggested that suchan acknowledgment could produce positive results, namely that Pyongyang may be
persuaded to agree to a moratorium on nuclear and missile tests. A much more
likely scenario, however, is that there will be no such recognition, and that North
Korean nuclear and missile tests will continue51.

EU Concerns over Nuclear Proliferation
North Korea declared in late November 2017 that it had become a nuclear state52.
It should be noted that its ability to attack the US mainland, or any other target, witha nuclear weapon remains in doubt. Nevertheless, the United States and its allies
have already begun to revise their defensive and offensive assets, partly in responseto the threat from Pyongyang.
The consequences of a nuclear-armed North Korea is one of the contentious issues
in the European debate on Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. France’s 2017 Security
Review states that the breaking of the status quo on the Korean peninsula could leadto the invoking of the clauses of mutual assistance between the United States and its
allies, but also to Japan and South Korea reconsidering their military postures53.

50 Reuters, “North Korea says pre-emptive attack on America is ‘imminent’ as US bombers

conduct show of force”, September 24, 2017. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/eastasia/article/2112571/north-korea-pre-emptive-attack-america-imminent-us-bombers
51 Bentzen, “Europe’s challenges in 2018: Ten issues to watch”.; Bassoot, “Ten issues to watch in2018”.
52 KCNA, “Kim Jong Un Guides Test-fire of ICBM Hwasong-15”, November 29, 2017.
http://dprk-doc.com/en/archives/1753
53 Defence and National Security Review 2017.

Chapter 9 — European Perspectives on North Korea's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Programs (Hellström)

Faced with North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, neighboring countries could come tosee no other option than to develop their own WMD programs, it said54.
Malcolm Chalmers of RUSI concludes that with North Korea as “a nuclear, ICBMarmed state”, the United States and its Asian allies will need to make significant
investments in the strengthening of nuclear defense and deterrent capabilities 55 .
Another observer states that North Korea’s activities could convince regional actorsthat they have to “adopt the nuclear option 56. Yet another scholar sees Northeast
Asian escalation and further instability as a potential result of Japan, South Korea,
and other regional powers acquiring nuclear capabilities57.
Meanwhile, NATO members France and Britain have rhetorically linked their own
nuclear deterrence to that of North Korea. The French Security Review states that it
is essential for France to maintain its nuclear deterrence as “some” powers use their
nuclear forces for “power demonstration, intimidation, or even blackmailing
purpose 58 ”. The UK Security Review of 2015 also lists proliferation of nuclear
weapons and North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as aserious concern59. (In contrast, Germany’s 2016 White Paper on Security Policy andthe Future of the Bundeswehr does not mention North Korea60).
Faced with these consequences of North Korea’s nuclear deterrence, China andRussia may become increasingly active in their attempts to affect strategic decisionmaking in Washington but also in allied states and within NATO. One such recent
example is China’s covert one-year boycott of South Korea, which was aimed at
putting an end to its cooperation with the United States on missile defense.
So far, China and Russia have promoted the concept of “double suspension” as ameans to lower tensions between North Korea and the United States. According tothis concept, which was originally suggested by Pyongyang, the United States andSouth Korea should suspend joint military exercises in exchange for a North Koreansuspension on missile and nuclear tests.
54 Defence and National Security Review 2017, p. 41.

55 Dempsey, “Judy Asks: Is It Time for Hard Power in North Korea?”.
56 Bassoot, “Ten issues to watch in 2018”.

57 D'Ambrogio, “North Korea: Possible scenarios”.
58 Defence and National Security Review 2017, p. 70.

59 UK Government, “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review”, pp.

19 and 34.
60 White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr.

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Chapter 9 — European Perspectives on North Korea's Nuclear andBallistic Missile Programs (Hellström)

If put into effect, the Sino-Russian proposal could indeed contribute to thepromotion of a key EU interest in the region, namely the reduction of tensions. Thatsaid, the concept of “double suspension” does not involve the issue ofdenuclearization, nor does it clearly rule out that North Korea is accepted as anuclear state. The concept rather suggests a weakening of American military
engagement in East Asia, which is a core strategic interest of both Moscow and
Beijing. The EU does not yet have a position on “double suspension61”. Brussels
should, however, not be expected to support the concept if it leads to undermining
the US strategic role in East Asia.
A resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue is currently not in the cards. We arelikely to witness a period of buildup of defensive and offensive capabilities both inEast Asia and elsewhere, motivated by North Korea’s threats. This is a chain
reaction that may well stretch into Europe.

61 Duchâtel, “Nuclear North Korea: Perpetuating the fiction”.

Seminar Program

101

SEMINAR PROGRAM
The 2nd NDA-FOI Joint Seminar
North Korea’s Security Threats Reexamined
February 7th, 2018
At the Conference Room No.2 at the Head Quarter Building of National Defense
Academy, 1‐10‐20 Hashirimizu, Yokosukashi, Kanagawa 239-8686 JAPAN
10:20 Opening Remarks
Yasuhiro Takeda (Director and Professor, Center for Global Security, National
Defense Academy NDA)
10:30-12:00 Session I: North Korea’s Nuclear Posture and Technological Development
Hideya Kurata (Professor, NDA)
North Korea’s Nuclear Deterrence Posture
Anders Lennartsson (Deputy Research Director, Swedish Defence Research
Agency: FOI)
North Korea’s WMD Development: Technological Aspects
Sangmin Lee (Active-Duty Researcher, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses:
KIDA)
North Korea’s WMD Development: Technological Aspects
12:00 Lunch Speech
Ryosei Kokubun (President of NDA)
13:30-15:00 Session II:

Developments and Prospects of US-DPRK-ROK Standoff

Jonathan Miller (Senior Visiting Fellow, Japan Institute of International
Affairs: JIIA)US Position
Hiroyasu Akutsu (Senior Fellow, National Institute of Defense Studies: NIDS)DPRK Position

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Seminar Program

Kyengho Son (Professor, Korea National Defense University: KNDU)ROK Position
15:30-18:00 Session III: Japan and Sweden in North Korea’s Nuclear Challenge
Sugio Takahashi (Chief and Fellow, NIDS)
Japan’s Defense Policies
Takeshi Watanabe (Senior Fellow, NIDS)
Japan-US-ROK Relations
Jerker Hellström (Project Leader, FOI)
European Perspective
18:00 Closing Remarks Jerker Hellström (FOI)*Each of presenter is requested to make presentation within 15-20 min*No discussant is designatedContributors and Participants

Dr. Hiroyasu Akutsu

阿久津

103

博康

Dr. AKUTSU Hiroyasu is a Senior Fellow and Professor at the Policy Simulation
Division at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS). He specializes inpolitical and military affairs on and around the Korean Peninsula and also works on
security issues in the Asia-Pacific with focus on Japan-US-ROK security cooperation,
Japan-Australia security cooperation, and the Japan-US alliance. His studies also
include scenario planning, policy simulation/strategic gaming and operations
research (OR). Before joining NIDS in 2008, he had been a director of research at aTokyo-based research institution and lecturer at several universities in Canberra
and Tokyo. After joining NIDS, he was also a visiting fellow at the Royal UnitedServices Institute (RUSI) in London (2010-2011) and a Japan Chair visiting scholar
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C.
(2014). He received his Bachelor of Law and LL.M. from Keio University and his Ph.D.
in political science and international relations from the Australian National
University (ANU).

Prof./COL Hisanori Fukada

深田尚則■ Personal Information
Date of Birth
13 March 1961
GenderMale
CitizenshipJapan■ Academic Background
April 1979 - March 1983, Mechanical System
Engineering Science, National Defense, Academy
August 1990 - August 1992, Command General Staff
Course, Staff College, Japan Ground Self Defense Force■ Military Career
Instructor
Officers Cadet School
Engineering School
Staff College
Staff
Staff, Ground Staff Office, Japan Ground Self Defense Force

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Contributors and Participants

Chief, Training division, Defense and Operation Department, Eastern Army
Chief of Staff, 5th Brigade, Northern Army
Director, General Affairs Department, Eastern Army
Commander
Commander, 340th Engineering Company, Northern Army
Commander, 4th Engineering Group, Eastern Army
Commander, Engineering Depot, Eastern Army
Commander, Middle Army Combined Brigade, Middle Army
Foreign Affairs
Liaison Officer, Headquarter, United States Army Japan
Liaison Officer, Headquarter, 1 Corps, United States Army

Mr. Jerker Hellström
Mr Jerker Hellström is a Deputy Research Director at Swedish
Defence Research Agency, FOI, where he has been working since
2008.
Mr Hellström heads the Asia and Middle East Programme at FOI.
He specializes in East Asian security, with a focus on China. His
research includes Chinese foreign, security and defence policy
and China’s relations with regional and global powers.
Most of his research-related work is on projects for the Swedish Ministry of Defence.
Mr Hellström previously held a position as Deputy Director at the Office for Strategic
Analysis of Sweden’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where he conducted China-related
research.
Mr Hellström is a Mandarin Chinese-speaker and has studied and worked in China
for several years. Prior to joining FOI, he worked as a correspondent at Reuters inShanghai and Stockholm.

Contributors and ParticipantsProf. Hideya Kurata

倉田秀也

Hideya Kurata is a Professor at Department of International
Relations and the Graduate School of Security Studies,
National Defense Academy (NDA). Before joining the NDA,
he worked at Tokoha-Gakuen Fuji Junior College (19902001) and Kyorin University (2001-2008). His majors are
International Security, Korean Politics and Foreign Policies.
His publications include “A Conceptual Analysis of the SixParty Talks: Building Peace through Security Assurances”
Asian Security, Vol.3, No.1 (2007, in English), The US-China
Relations: the Structures and the Evolutions, Nihon Kokusai Mondai
Kenkyuusyo(JIIA) (co-authored, 2007, in Japanese), “Six-Party Talks and the Establishment of thePeace System at the Korean Peninsula,” North Korean Studies (Dongguk University,
The Institute for North Korean Studies), Vol. 1(2005), (in Korean)．He also co-edited,
Korean Peninsula and International Politics, Keio University Press, 2005 (inJapanese). He learned at Graduate School of Keio University in Tokyo and Yonsei
University in Seoul and finished the Doctoral program at Keio University.

Dr. Sangmin Lee
Lee, Sang Min(November 8, 1974) is an Active-duty researcher at the Korea
Institute for Defense Analyses(KIDA) in Seoul, Korea. Dr. Lee received his Ph.D. in
Material science and engineering from Tohoku University, Japan. He was an expert
from the Ministry of National Defense at the South Korean Foreign Ministry. His main
research focuses on North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. Dr. Lee recently
published numerous articles and reports including Kim Jong Un’s Gains and Losses
from the Second Launch of Hwasong-14(2017); The Technological Assessment of the
Fourth North Korean Nuclear Test and the Prospect of Future Tests(2017).

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Contributors and Participants

Dr. Anders Lennartsson
18

Dr Anders Lennartsson is a Deputy Research Director at theSwedish Defence Research Agency, FOI, where he has beenworking since 1999. His main areas of work are missile
related questions, including cruise missiles, air to air missiles,
ballistic missiles and missile defence. Areas of interest include
dynamics and control, in particular of missiles and aircraft,and navigation.

Most of his research related work is on projects for the Swedish Armed Forces, but
for more than a decade he has been covering missile and missile defence related
questions for the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who need such expertise in
several multilateral fora. Part of these duties include work within the Missile
Technology Control Regime. Between 2011 and 2017 he was the Chair of theTechnical Experts Meeting, the working group where the MTCR Technical Annex ismaintained and updated based on technical developments in the area of missile
technology. He has also been involved with EU working groups in the area of export
control and sanctions. International contacts is a main theme in Lennartsson’s work,
and in parallel with research tasks he has been an international coordinator at FOI
responsible for bilateral contacts with defence research organizations in Canada, theNetherlands and the United Kingdom.
Lennartsson has also been deputy head and acting head of the department of
Systems Technology, who work mainly with modelling and analysis of weapon
systems. He is currently a project leader for a large research project covering
military aircraft technology.
Lennartsson received a Master of Science in aerospace engineering from the RoyalInstitute of Technology, KTH, in 1991 and a PhD in theoretical and appliedmechanics, focusing on dynamical systems, also from KTH, in 1999.

Contributors and Participants

Mr. Jonathan Miller
Jonathan is an international affairs professional withexpertise on security, defense and intelligence issues inNortheast Asia. He has held a variety of positions in theprivate and public sector. Currently, he is a senior visiting
fellow with the Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA) based in Tokyo, Japan. He is also a Distinguished
Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada.
Additionally, he is the Director and co-founder of the
Ottawa-based Council on International Policy. Miller is also a Senior Fellow on East
Asia for the Asian Forum Japan, based in Tokyo.
Previously, he was an international affairs fellow with the Council on Foreign
Relations, based in Tokyo. Jonathan also held a senior fellowship (2014-2017) with
the East West Institute and a fellowship on Japan with the Pacific Forum CSIS from2013-16. At the Pacific Forum CSIS, he chaired a ten-member group focused onJapan-Korea relations, in the context of the US “rebalance” to Asia. Miller has also
held a number of other visiting fellowships on Asian security matters, including at
JIIA and the National Institute of Defense Studies (Ministry of Defense - Japan).
In addition, Miller previously spent nearly a decade working on economic andsecurity issues related to Asia with the Canadian federal government and worked
both with the foreign ministry and the security community. He regularly attends
track 1.5 and track 2 dialogues in the region and lectures to universities,
corporations and others across the Asia-Pacific region on security and defense
issues. He also regularly provides advice and presents to multilateral organizations
and foreign governments on regional geopolitics.
Jonathan is a regular contributor to several journals, magazines and newspapers on
Asia-Pacific security issues including The Economist Intelligence Unit, Foreign Affairs,
Forbes and Newsweek Japan. He has also published widely in other outlets including
Foreign Policy, the World Affairs Journal, the Nikkei Asian Review, the Japan Times, theMainichi Shimbun, the ASAN Forum, Jane’s Intelligence Review and Global Asia. Miller
has been interviewed and quoted on regional security issues across a wide range of
media including the New York Times, the Washington Post, Reuters, CNN, CNBC, the

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Contributors and Participants

Wall Street Journal, Le Monde, the Japan Times, Asahi Shimbun, the Voice of Americaand ABC news.

Prof. Kyengho Son○ Education- Ph.D. The Ohio State University, History, 2003-2008- M.S. National Defense Academy, International Relations, 2000-2002○ Career- 2008.12-current: Professor, Department of Military Strategy at Korea National
Defense University (KNDU)- 2011.1 - 2012.2: Program Director of the Research Institute for Security Affairs(RINSA) at KNDU
- 2012.2 - 2013.2: Director of Center for Terrorism and International Conflicts of
RINSA- 2013.3 - 2014.1: Director of Center for North Korean Affairs of RINSA- 2015.1 - 2015.12: Visiting Scholar: Mershon Center, The Ohio State University- 2016.1 - 2017.5: Chief Secretary of KNDU
- 2018.1 – 2018.12: Director of Center for Military Strategy of RINSA- 2018.12 - current: Chair of the Department of Military Strategy at KNDU〇 Area of Expertise- Military History, The Korean War, Military Strategy〇 Selected Publications- “The Establishment and the Role of the State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting during
the Korean War,” War in History, December 2018,https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344518782712.
- Dongbuga Gukaduri 6.25jeongjaengjeongchekgwa Jeonryak [The Policies andStrategies of Northeast Asian Countries in the Korean War], Seoul: Jimundang,
2015.

Contributors and Participants

Mr. Sugio Takahashi 高橋

109

杉雄

Sugio Takahashi (Chief, Policy Simulation Division)
Education
1995 B.A. in Political Science, Waseda University
1997 M.A. in Political Science, Waseda University
Areas of Expertise
Military Strategy, Japan-U.S. Alliance
Selected Publications
English "The Japanese Perception of the Information Technology- Revolution in
Military Affairs: Toward a Defensive Information-Based Transformation," inEmily O. Goldman and Thomas G. Mahnken., eds., The Information Revolutionin Military Affairs in Asia (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
Japanese
 "RMA to Nihon no Bouei Seisaku [The Impact of Revolution in Military Affairs
on Japan’s Defense Policy]," in Tomoyuki Ishizu ed., Sensou no Honshitsu to
Gunjiryoku no Shosou [The Nature of Warfare and Forms of Military Power],(Tokyo: Sairyusha, 2004)
 "America no Misairu Bouei to Post-MAD Jidai no Kokusai Anzen Hoshou[American Missile Defense and International Security in the Post-MAD Era],"Kokusai Anzen Hoshou [The Journal of International Security], Vol.29, No.4
(March 2002).
 "Jouhou RMA to Bush Seiken no Kokubou Henkaku Kousou [Information-based
RMA and Defense Transformation of Bush Administration]," in Shigekatsu
Kondo and Tetsuya Umemoto, eds., Bush Seiken no Kokubou Seisaku [TheDefense Policy of the Bush Administration], (Tokyo: Japan Institute forInternational Affairs, 2002).

110

Contributors and ParticipantsProf. Yasuhiro Takeda 武田 康裕
Yasuhiro Takeda is the former Director of the Center for Global Security (2016.42018.3) and a Professor of International Relations at the National Defense Academyof Japan. Professor Takeda holds a Ph.D. degree from the University of Tokyo,
Graduate School of International Relations.
He is the author of the book,
Comparative Politics of Democratization: Regime Transitions in East Asia (Minerva,
2001, in Japanese), which was awarded the 18th Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Prize.
In addition, his publications include “Japan’s Compound Approach to Security
Cooperation” (2004), and “The Japan-US Alliance and Its implications for JapanChina Relations: A tool of Conflict Management or a Source of Hostilities?”(2008),
and “Sino-Japanese Strategic Relations in Multilateral Regional Framework” (2013).

Mr. Takeshi Watanabe 渡邊

武

Takeshi Watanabe is a senior research fellow of National Institute for Defense
Studies, Japan Ministry of Defense. He entered the institution in 2002 after receiving
degrees of B.A. from Tokyo Metropolitan University (1997) and M.A. from Keio
University (2000). Also, Watanabe finished the master course at the School ofInternational Service, American University in Washington DC (2009). His numerous
works include “Redefinition of Asymmetric Alliance in Bipolar World: The Role of
the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance in Great Power Politics” (2010,
Japanese), “The US-ROK Alliance Faces China: South Korea's Missile Defense” (2016)
and "Without Incentives: North Korea's Response to Denuclearization," NIDS Journalof Defense and Security, No.18 (December 2017).

GLOBAL SECURITY SEMINAR SERIES

Global Security Seminar Series is published occasionally by the Center for
Global Security. The Center designs series of international seminars andother independent seminars. This series consists of the working papersof these seminars. The views expressed in this publication are solely of
the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions or
governments of the authors.

CENTER FOR GLOBAL SECURITY
National Defense Academy, Japan Ministry of Defense