CAUSES OF PRISON OVERCROWDING

I. INTRODUCTION
Imprisonment rates

An unprecedented expansion of penal control has occurred in recent decades in diﬀerent parts of
the world. Since the mid 1970s imprisonment rates in North America have increased nearly ﬁvefold. A
similar increase occurred in many other countries during the 1980s and 1990s, in Africa, Asia, Europe
and Oceania. During the last 15 years (1992-2008), in two out of three (63 %) countries, imprisonment
rates increased by at least 10 %. The steepest increases exceed 200 %. Changes in prisoner rates bycountry from 1992-2008 are shown in ﬁgure I.1 (measured as percentages).

Figure I.1. Changes in national imprisonment rates per 100 000 population in 1992-2008 by country (ICPS)

Another distinct feature is a huge variation in the size of the prison population in diﬀerent countries(counted per 100 000 population.). Imprisonment rates by country are presented in ﬁgure I.2 below.

43Figure I.2. Imprisonment rates per 100 000 population in 218 countries 2007/8 (ICPS)At the top of the scale remains the US with 760 prisoners/100 000 pop. The lowest ﬁgures, around10-20, can be found in the smaller (mostly Western) African countries, as well as in some micro-states(Liechtenstein, San Marino, Faeroe Islands, Tuvalu, Nauru, Timor Leste). The overall mean lies
around 165 prisoners / 100 000.1
Regional analyses within continents show the lowest overall rates in Europe (mean 144) with thefigures ranging regionally from 56 in Scandinavia to over 300 (Russia and the former Soviet Union
region). In Africa (mean 111) the ﬁgures range from 50 in Western Africa to 250 in Southern Africa, in
Asia (mean 158) between 110 (South-Central Asia) and a little below 200 (Central-Asia) . The Highest
overall ﬁgures are found in the Americas (mean 282) ranging between 200 (South America) and 750(USA, and 350 Canada included).

Occupancy and overcrowding

The increase in the use of imprisonment has resulted in severe overcrowding. In this paper,
overcrowding is given a technical definition with the help of the statistical occupancy rate.
Overcrowding means simply that the number of prisoners exceeds the official prison capacity (over
100 % occupancy rate). For the moment, this is the only available measure for wider comparisons
between countries. The main problem with this measure is that the extent of overcrowding in thissense depends heavily on national/local standards. County which allow four prisoners in one cell may
report free space if some cells are occupied by only three prisoners, while countries with single-cellaccommodation as a norm may report overcrowding with much less objective overcrowding. Neither
does this measure take into account diﬀerences in space, or in other prison conditions.
This means that the following figures of overcrowding are in most cases the absolute minimum
ﬁgures. Using more substantial criteria - for example those imposed by the CPT - ratings for prison
overcrowding would most probably look much worse.
More substantial criteria would refer for example to spatial density (sq meters /person), social
density (number of persons in one space), and privacy (the time individuals can spend on their own).
Subjective criteria of overcrowding would also include feelings of helplessness and stress, etc.
144

Data is obtained from the ICPS (International School of Prison Studies, Kingʼs College, London) website. At the
moment there is information from 218 countries. See http://www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/law/research/icps. Theseﬁgures contain raw imprisonment rates on a speciﬁc day (not as annual averages). They do not take into accountthe diﬀerences whether ﬁgures in individual countries include juveniles detained in juvenile institutions, persons
in drug treatment or mental health facilities, immigrants and foreigners detained on the basis of immigration
laws. These adjustments are possible only for a limited number of countries (see Lappi-Seppälä 2008 and SPACE I
2009).

However, for the moment there is no data of these measures for comparative purposes. Neither isthere agreement on international standards of what constitutes prison overcrowding. The Council ofEurope Prison Rules has no provisions for the minimum space in the EPR (as there is the risk that theminimum will become a norm, see Zyl Smit & Snacken 2008 p.131 ﬀ). The CPT has emphasized thatthe acceptable minimum space depends also on the quality of the space and the time to be spent in
the cells. Nevertheless, according to the CPT, the absolute minimum would be 4 sq meters in sharedaccommodation and 6 sq meters in single cells, which is more than can be found in several countries
across the world.
Figure I.3. shows the distribution of countries according to the level of occupancy rate. Rate 100 %means that all prison places are in use. Rates exceeding 100 % demonstrate that prisoners have been
inhabited more densely than the oﬃcial enforcement policy would indicate.

Figure I.3. Occupation rates (% of total prison capacity) in 185 countries 2007/8 (ICPS)

The data from ICPS indicates that more than two out of three countries have an occupancy rate ofover 100 %. The average global occupancy rate is 122 %, exceeding the overall capacity by more than
one ﬁfth. In the worst cases the number of prisoners exceeds the number of prison places by three toone. Figure I.4. displays occupancy rates by region.

Figure I.4. Occupancy rates (% of total prison capacity) by regions 2007/8 (ICPS)

45

Occupancy levels differ systematically. All European regions are below 100 %, while all African
regions are above 100 %, and most of them over 150 %.

Factors contributing to overcrowding and overuse of imprisonment

Technically, overcrowding results from the fact that the justice system is sending more people toprison, and for longer periods, than the prison capacity allows. The immediate cause of overcrowding
is either overuse of imprisonment or insufficient prison capacity.2 Also the remedy is simple: send
fewer oﬀenders to prison and/or for shorter periods, or build more prisons. But which would be themost preferable way to proceed?
Prison construction hardly provides a sustainable solution to the overcrowding problem. Prisons
usually tend to get ﬁlled once they have been built. Also the CPT has concluded that the expansion ofprison capacity to tackle prison overcrowding has not been successful (see Zyl Smit & Snacken 2008
p.89 and 132).
The search for remedies needs to draw attention also to those factors that contribute to the generaluse of imprisonment. There are also substantial reasons to be worried, not only about overcrowding but
also of overuse. The consensus represented in the UN standards and norms urge member states to use
prison as a last resort (see the UN Handbook on alternatives to imprisonment). Also, the social costsof extensive use of imprisonment are well documented in research literature (Garland 2001).
The following examines in more detail the reasons behind both overcrowding and overuse of
imprisonment with the help of comparative statistics from the ICPS and two other data bases.3 Since
causal explanations are highly problematic in explaining the functioning of complex social institutions,such as criminal punishment, the following discusses instead direct causes of factors contributing toovercrowding and overuse of imprisonment .

II. OVERCROWDING AND THE ROLE OF PRE-TRIAL DETENTION
The overall share of pre-trial prisoners of all prisoners is 32 %. However, this share varies between
diﬀerent regions from 15 to 55 %, and among single countries from 0 to close to 100 %. Figure II.1.
displays these diﬀerences by regions.

2

3

46

Which of these alternatives is stressed, depends, of course, of each and everyone's own point of view. There is,perhaps, even less agreement on what constitutes overuse than overcrowding (see above). It is fundamentallya value judgment. However, this judgment can be given reasons related to the social and economic costs involvedin the use of imprisonment, as well as its relative cost-effectiveness, as compared to other available crime
prevention strategies.
Three samples are employed. The ﬁrst contains all 218 countries in the ICPS database. The second covers top 100
countries ranked according to the UN human development index. Third sample includes 25 industrialized countries
with more detailed information on possible background variables. The sample includes 16 in Western Europe,
three in Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland), two Baltic countries (Estonia, Lithuania), andfour Anglo-Saxon countries (United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia). Samples and sources aredescribed in more detail in Lappi-Seppälä 2008.

Figure II.1. Pre-trial rates (% of all prisoners) by regions 2007/8 (ICPS)

These differences are reflected also in differences in occupancy rates. We may confirm this bycomparing the share of pre-trial detainees occupancy rates.
Table II.1. Pre-trial rates and occupancy rates by selected regions
HIGH PRE TRIAL REGIONS
Occupancy
Pre trial %rate %LOW PRE-TRIAL REGIONS
Occupancy
rate %Pre trial %Central Africa

173

53

Scandinavia

94

19South-Central Asia

203

53

North America

91

18

Western Africa

149

51

Central-Eastern Europe

94

16South America

141

51

Oceania99

16

Eastern Africa

170

42

Central Asia

78

15

47

Figure II.2. Pre trial rates and occupancy rates by regions 2007/8 (ICPS)The overuse of pre-trial detention is one major factor contributing to prison overcrowding. Thisapplies to most countries in all African regions. The situation is exceptionally bad also in South Central
Asia and in parts of South America. The scatter plots below illustrate the association between theshare of pre-trial detainees and occupancy rates by individual countries.

EcuadorMexicoBahamasUnit. Arab Emir.
MoroccoLibya
Sri Lanka
Suriname
Peru
PanamaDominican Repub.
LebanonUruguay
Honduras
Cameroon

Prisoners /Occupancy % Pre trial %
pop
126
146
44,4
209
134
41,5
407
129
43,0
238
159
45,9
167
198
46,5
200
142
47,7
129
193
51,5
356
163
55,0
153
192
61,3
293
143
61,3
189
188
61,8
159
121
62,5
244
134
63,1
161
140
63,5
139
296
65,6

Figure II.3. Pre-trial rates and occupancy rates by countries 2007/8 (ICPS)

The higher the share of pre-trial detainees in prisons, the higher the occupancy levels. The upper
right corner in the ﬁrst plot displays countries with over 110 % occupancy rates and more than a 40
% share of pre-trial prisoners. In these countries especially, the reducing of the use and length of
pre-trial detention would work eﬀectively against overcrowding. The separate table on the right lists
countries with a pre-trial rate exceeding 40 %, occupancy rate exceeding 120 % and imprisonment rate
exceeding 120 prisoners / 100 000.

48

The use of pre-trial imprisonment is not the only factor behind high occupancy rates. The upper left
corner in ﬁgure III.3. holds countries with high occupancy rates, but low pre-trial rates. Thus, quite
often overcrowding is just a result of the overuse of imprisonment, or a result of insuﬃcient prison
capacity (depending on oneʼs point of view on this issue). If high occupancy rates coincide with highoverall prisoner rates, one might be inclined to support more the former than the latter interpretation.
The table in the appendix divides countries according to the overall levels of incarceration andoccupancy rates (see appendix).

III. THE RELEVANCE OF CRIME
What is the impact of the level of crime and criminality on overcrowding and the general use of
imprisonment? In advance one could imagine several mechanisms: prisons are used as a consequenceof crime, and it would be only natural that the number of sentenced oﬀences would reﬂect also theoverall use of imprisonment (overcrowding). Imprisonment is also used as a means to reduce crime.
Therefore the views of policymakers on trends of crime (and the eﬀectiveness of imprisonment), may
well have an eﬀect on policy decisions.
The following correlation table III.1. takes a brief look at the statistical associations between
imprisonment rates and crime rates. Crime is measured using several indicators: The UN survey
data for total recorded crime in 44 countries (row 1), health statistics data (mainly WHO) data forcompleted homicide in 192 countries (row 2), data from victimization studies in assault worldwide (68countries, row 3) and for 10 crimes in the EU (29 countries, row 4). In addition, the impact of crimeon imprisonment is examined using conviction statistics both from the UN surveys and the European
Sourcebook (Space I, rows 5-6).
Table III.1. Bivariate correlations between crime and imprisonment rates
PRISONERS / 100 000(2007/8, ICPS)COUNTRIES
N

1. Total reported crime /100 000 (2004, UN)-0,36*

44

2. Homicide /100 000 (completed, WHO, UN)

,031

192

3. Victimization % assault % (ICVS, van Dijk 2009)

0,06

68

4. Victimization % (EU ICS, prevalence 2005, 10 crimes)

0,14

29

5. Convictions 2004 / 100 000 (total, UN)

-0,08

34

6. Convictions 2003 (traﬃc excluding, Space I)

-0,21

20

*. Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

49

Figure III.1 Reported crime, victimization and imprisonment rates

The only statistically significant correlation is a negative one. Total reported crime is inversely
associated with the number of prisoners (more crime, less prisoners). This may well be partly a
result of diﬀerences in reporting practices (developed Western countries report more crimes). Healthstatistics on lethal violence are usually deemed to be the most reliable sources for comparisons. They
cover also the largest number of countries. However, the correlation is close to zero. Victimization
studies give a more reliable picture of the true level of crime less serious forms of crime. However,neither the worldwide victimization ﬁgure for assault, nor the European victimization ﬁgures for 10
oﬀences correlate with prisoner rates. The same applies to conviction data. The number of convictions
and prisoner rates are at best negatively correlated, if at all (see rows 5-6 in the table).
A tentative conclusion is that neither reported crime nor victimization is systematically reﬂectedin the levels of incarceration. Also, trends in the use of imprisonment and trends in crime may diﬀer
without a seemingly constant pattern, as is indicated in following comparisons.

50

Figure III.3 Prisoners and Reported Crime in Finland, Canada and the United States 1980-2005 per 100,000
population (1980=100). Source: National Statistics

In Finland, total reported crime went up when prison trends were declining. In England & Wales
both crime trends and prison rates were going up (but not simultaneously). In the US, crime trends
remained ﬁrst stable and then declined, as the prison ﬁgures were rising. The Canadian crime trend
looks much like the one from the US, but the imprisonment curve is totally diﬀerent.
These and other similar comparisons indicate that general crime trends do not explain the overall
use of imprisonment. This does not preclude the possibility that in some countries drugs and drugrelated criminality may give a speciﬁc proﬁle for those countries' prison problems. Neither does thispreclude the possibility that in some countries concerns of serious and visible forms of crime have asubstantial impact also on prison policies.

IV. BEHIND PRISON OVERCROWDING I - MACRO LEVEL FACTORSHigh prison rates and overcrowding are not automatic results of a high level of crime or
increasing crime trends. We may find high-crime countries with high imprisonment rates, but also
high-crime countries with low imprisonment rates and no overcrowding. And we may ﬁnd low-crimecountries with high imprisonment rates, but also low crime countries with low imprisonment rates.
One explanation for these diﬀerences is that diﬀerent systems react diﬀerently to trends in crime.
Some systems may be more prone to respond to changing crime trends by altering their prison
policies, other systems may be less sensitive to changes in crime and try to respond by alternativemeans.
Another closely related explanation is that the level of imprisonment is affected by other factors,
and not by crime (or by public impressions of crime). These other factors may relate to macro levelstructural factors, such as social, economic and political structures. But they may also relate to theindividual countries' speciﬁc histories and local circumstances.
This section takes a look at the first group of factors. The next one gives some examples ofcountry-speciﬁc micro level factors.
Criminological research provides a variety of theories oﬀering explanations for diﬀerences in penal

51

severity and the use of imprisonment. Most of the in depth studies are conﬁned to a small selection of(usually Western) countries. Comparisons covering a larger numbers of countries, on the other hand,are often impaired by the availability of data.
None of the analyses so far have been able to produce a simple explanation for global penal
differences, and one may doubt whether they ever will. However, it has been possible to detect
factors which seem to explain a large proportion of the diﬀerences in the use of imprisonment in many
developed industrialized democracies. Still, it remains open to what extent these explanations apply todeveloping countries. One may need to pay attention to diﬀerent things in explaining penal policies inNorthern Europe, in Latin America, or in Africa. Being aware of these risks, the following gives someexamples of interesting associations between imprisonment and selected social, political and economic
factors.

Economic wealth

Building prisons is expensive, so it is natural to assume that an increase in economic resources will
at some point contribute to the increased use of imprisonment. But, one may also assume that after
reaching a certain level of economic wealth, also other measures and strategies become available,
should politicians wish to use them.
These assumptions have also some empirical support. The direction of the correlation seems to be
dependent on the general level of economic prosperity.

Figure IV.1 Prisoner Rates and GDP. GDP under and over 15,000 $.
Sample 100. Outliers US and Luxemburg removed.
Source: Sourcebook 2006 complemented, IMF

In poorer countries with GDP below $15,000 the association is positive (more money means
more prisoners), whereas in rich democracies the correlation changes direction (more money, fewer
prisoners - except in the US). Building prisons is expensive, and having a positive correlation makes
sense from this point of view.4 At some point, however, the accumulation of economic wealth becomes
negatively associated with penal severity. In general, wealthy nations seem to be less punitive, with
one obvious outlier - the United States.
This does not apply to overcrowding (occupancy levels). Here the general rule is that increased
452This fact is reﬂected also in recent trends in the use of imprisonment among developing countries. Johnson (2008,p.51) observes how developing countries in the Asian region are now constructing the required infrastructure forroutine based use of imprisonment, resulting in a rapid increase in the use of imprisonment in those regions.

wealth is weakly associated with less overcrowding both in poorer and richer countries.

Social indicators and general well-being

Along with economic wealth the use of imprisonment is affected by a number of social factors.
Indicators that measure the general well-being seem to be closely connected also with the quality andseverity of criminal justice. These factors include economic and social equality and the extent of social
protection provided by the state.
One measure of social equality is income distribution. There is a clear positive correlation between
income inequality5 and prisoner rates among the EU-member states. The correlation is somewhat
weaker but still significant among OECD countries, but much weaker and non-significant among
countries outside the EU and/or OECD.
Correlations between Imprisonment rates 2008/7 and income inequality (Gini-index
Corr. (Pearson's)
mid 2000s)

Countries N

EU Member state

0,60**

24

OECD member

0,37*

29

Not EU member

0,13

64

Not OECD member

0,11

69

Total

0,27*

88

*. Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Figure IV.2 Gini-Index and Imprisonment Rates 2000. EU-countries and Non-EU -countries
Source: Sourcebook 2006 complemented, ICPS, LIS, WB

The scatter diagram shows that the weaker correlation between income equality and prisoner rates
outside the EU is mainly explainable by six outliers, ﬁve from the former Soviet Union countries andby the US.
Other indicators measuring social security and social justice seem to cohere with less use of
imprisonment. Comparative data is unfortunately available only mainly from the OECD countries.
That evidence indicates clearly that increased investments in welfare (either in absolute terms or as
percentages of the GDP) associate with lower imprisonment rates.
5

The fairness of income distribution is measured by the Gini-index. The index expresses to what extent the real
income distribution diﬀers from the ideal and fair distribution (0=total fairness, 1=total unfairness). On theassociations between income inequality and imprisonment, see also Killias 1986 and Tham 2005.

53

Figure IV.3 Social expenditure and Imprisonment Rates: OECD countries.
Source: Sourcebook 2006 complemented, Eurostat

In the right lower corner are the countries with strong investments in welfare and low
imprisonment/occupancy rates. On the upper left corner we ﬁnd mostly Eastern countries.

Trust and legitimacy

It is also assumable that the legitimacy of the political system and conﬁdence in the legal systemand the severity of criminal justice may be intercorrelated. A legitimate system may get by with lesssevere sanctions, while a system in crisis may wish to uphold its credibility by increasing penalties.
And a legal system whose norms and procedures are experienced as fair and legitimate may becomplied with by the people because the system is felt to be worth following. The norms of criminal
law are followed out of legitimacy, and not out of fear. And in such a system the legislator may well beable to use more moderate sanctions.
Both assumptions get support among the developed countries, but less so among developing
countries.

Figure IV.4 Trust in Police and Imprisonment Rates. Sample 100, EU-countries and Non-EU -countries.
Source: Sourcebook 2006 complemented, WVS

The strongest association between social trust (trust in people) and institutional trust (trust inpolice and the legal system) and the use of imprisonment can be detected among European countries

54

14

Figure IV.4 Social trust and trust in legal system and Imprisonment Rates. Basic sample.
Source: Sourcebook 2006 complemented, ESS

Discussion

These tentative ﬁndings need several qualiﬁcations. Firstly, there are other factors which should
also have been included; among others, the political culture and diﬀerences in democratic structures. A
closer analyses would indicate that consensual democracies , as opposed to conﬂictual majoritarian
democracies associate with more moderate penalty levels and lower imprisonment rates (Lijphart
1999, Lappi-Seppälä 2008, Green 2008). Such democracies are also characterized by better politicaland economic equality, stronger welfare and lesser fears.
In fact, most of the key factors studied above are interrelated. Economic wealth, social security,
low fears, income equality and the quality of democracy seem all to sustain each other, and at thesame time promote moderation in penal policies. It is hard to say which of these comes ﬁrst, or which
is more fundamental. In any case, that would be a task of another study. But for the purpose of the
discussions in the workshop it may be enough to conclude that the building of a democratic state under
the rule of law, and promoting social equality, is also building a legitimate system of criminal justice.
And this system manages to fulﬁl its tasks with less use of imprisonment.
Or put the other way around: a high imprisonment rate is not a sign of a well functioning democracy
and trusted legal system, rather the opposite. At least the eﬀorts to uphold conﬁdence in the justicesystem by severe sanctions do not seem to carry very far. After all, the countries with high trust tend
to have low imprisonment rates, but countries with high imprisonment rates tend to have low trust.

V. BEHIND OVERCROWDING II: MICRO LEVEL CASE STUDY OF FINLAND
But if the use of imprisonment is determined by structural factors, where does it leave humanaction? This question is based on misunderstanding. Macro level structural factors do not determine
the outcome, they merely increase the probability of some type of policies (and they may make otherpolicies less probable). Still, they never dictate the end result. Structure is not determination (Lacey2008 p. 205), and there always remains room for choice. That can be seen just by looking at thecountries (above and below the regression lines) which have not followed the general patterns.
Studying these deviant countries may also give information of these speciﬁc local conditions thathave inﬂuenced the policy choices. A single country case-study from Finland may also illustrate how it
has been possible to swim against the tide, at times when other countries were moving in the opposite
direction. These experiences give also concrete examples of the causes of overcrowding, as well as ofproper countermeasures.

55

Social and economic backgroundA small country from northern Europe with only a little over 5 million inhabitants may seem too
remote a point for meaningful comparison. However, the nature of the problems is surprisingly
similar, once we look back at history. Today Finland is a prosperous and safe Nordic welfare state.
However, this was not always the case. During the last century Finland experienced a brutal civil war,
the harshness of the Second World War, heavy war compensations, severe social crises, and deep
recessions.
These social and political crises were reflected in the Finnish criminal justice system. At the
beginning of the 1950s, the prisoner rate in Finland was four times higher than in the other Nordic-countries. Our prisoner rates were on the same level as several countries in Northern and Southern
Africa and South America, including Brazil. Finland had almost 200 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants,
while the ﬁgures in Sweden, Denmark and Norway were around 50. Even during the 1970s, Finland's
prisoner rate continued to be among the highest in Western Europe.
The first hand explanation for this relates to structural factors discussed above. Burdened with
political and economic crisis Finland had been unable to invest in criminal justice reform in a similarmanner to its neighbours. Consequently, the legislation became to lag far behind general societal
development. This discrepancy became more and more evident once Finland was joining the Nordic
welfare family in the course of the 1960s and 70s

Ideological and legislative background

Reasons behind overcrowding were partly ideological, as well. In the 1950s and early 1960s thecriminal justice system and imprisonment were seen as the key answer to the crime problem. The
strong reliance on the eﬀectiveness of imprisonment started to weaken during the 1960s. We began torealize the limitations of the prison system, ﬁrst just by comparing our prisoner rates and crime rates
with the other Nordic countries (see for example Christie 1968). The nature of the crime problem in
the Nordic countries was more or less the same, but there were huge diﬀerences in the numbers ofincarcerated people. This was deemed to be both irrational and inhuman.
Also, criminological research findings pointed at the same direction. Reoffending rates were
documented to be generally higher after imprisonment, compared to other sanctions. In Finland, as
well as in other Nordic countries, the conclusion was a general distrust of the overall eﬀectiveness ofcriminal sanctions, when compared to other means of crime prevention. As a consequence, attention
was directed to social and situational crime prevention strategies.
These findings may have relevance for today's discussions as well. Popular overreliance on thepreventive eﬀects of imprisonment (whether rehabilitation or deterrence) may still be one of the major
background factors behind high incarceration rates and high levels of overcrowding. Public policies
would beneﬁt from a lot of the systematic use of research evidence on relative cost-eﬀectiveness ofprison policies, as compared to social and situational crime strategies.
The simple technical explanation for the unduly high prisoner rates in Finland was, however, ouroutdated and overly severe criminal law. Political consensus was reached that the penal code should bereformed and our prisoner rates should also be reduced to be closer to our Nordic neighbours'. This, inturn, was motivated by the intensiﬁed Nordic cooperation in penal matters. This reform work started
in the mid 1960s and continued till the mid 1990s. This long-term programme can also be read as apart of a series of actions targeted against the major legislative causes of prison overcrowding.

Unnecessary criminalization and overuse of default imprisonment for unpaid fines

The ﬁrst target was the overuse of default imprisonment for unpaid ﬁnes, as well as the misuseof the criminal law as a means of social control. Criminal law should be used as a last resort, and notextend itself to areas that can better be dealt with by means of social and health policy. This advice
was not appreciated in Finland in the 1950s and 1960s when public drunkenness was still punishable by56

ﬁnes. And as these people were often unable to pay their ﬁnes, ﬁnes were converted to imprisonment.
This practice was both irrational and unjust. In 1969 public drunkenness was decriminalized (removed
from the criminal law), and the use of default imprisonment was also reduced. These reforms reduced
the prison population by almost one third.

Figure IV.3 The number of ﬁne defaulters in Finland 1950 2007 (absolute ﬁgures)
Source: Criminal Justice Agency.

Criminal justice systems may become seriously overburdened if they adopt tasks that suit better thesocial and health services. Prohibition serves as a historical example. Drugs and drug-related oﬀences
constitute a similar problem today. In many parts of the world drug-related oﬀenders constitute a large
proportion of the prison population. Any eﬀorts to remove drug users outside the realm of criminal
justice, or at least outside the prison system, may have a substantial eﬀect on overcrowding. This cantake place in the form of drug-courts or speciﬁc treatment contracts.

Severe sanctions for minor property offences

Punishments should be proportionate to the seriousness of the oﬀence. This fundamental principle
is the backbone of any criminal justice system appreciating the principle of Rule of Law. Still, it is notalways followed. Valuations of the seriousness of oﬀences change over time, but the legislature does
not always follow these changes.
This is what happened with theft offences in Finland. Theft was once a serious offence. It
threatened the social security of an individual in the 18th century, when personal possessions were thefoundation of a person's economy. This was no longer the case in the late 20th century, when losses
were covered by insurances, and the relative value of stolen goods was reduced as a result of thesurplus of consumer items.
But the theft law hadn't followed this development, and theft offences were punisheddisproportionally severely. In the early 1970s and 1990s theft oﬀences were devaluated, penal latitudes
were reduced and crime deﬁnitions were made more ﬂexible. And this brought also a change in our
prison populations. Another oﬀence with similar changes (but for diﬀerent reasons) was drunk-driving.

Mechanical recidivism rules

Reoﬀending rules have a signiﬁcant impact on courts sentencing practices. Up till the mid 1970s
Finland had mechanical recidivism rules which led to almost automatic aggravation of sentences after
a certain number of previous convictions. By allowing the court more discretion and by restricting
the role of reoﬀending in sentencing prison sentences for property oﬀences (where reoﬀending is mostcommon) were reduced.
Today mechanical reconviction rules are still one key factor behind overly long prison terms in57

several parts of the world. Sometimes rigid deﬁnitions for organized crime have the same impact (forexample stipulating that any oﬀence committed together by several persons is to be treated as a formof organized crime). As a result, a substantial part of prisoners may be serving unduly long sentences
for fairly trivial property oﬀences. This is much due to the fact that in this oﬀence type reoﬀending is
generally common and rigid recidivism sentencing provisions lead easily to unduly harsh penalties.

Rigid early release practices

Early release and parole procedures are another key factor affecting the extent of the use of
imprisonment. In the 1950s, and even into the 1960s, Finland had quite rigid early release provisions,which granted the possibility for parole only after six months of a prison term had passed. This
minimum time was gradually reduced to 14 days, and early release was made a semi-automatic practice
now reaching 99 % of all prisoners. Also, the rules of parole revocation were made more ﬂexible. All
these reforms had an immediate impact on the Finnish incarceration rates.
Today the pivotal role of parole and early release is demonstrated by those countries withincreasing prisoner rates as a result of the adoption of a determinate sentencing system. This eﬀect isescalated if prior sentencing practice remains the same, but prisoners are denied parole.

Juveniles in prison

Sending young oﬀenders to prison is unwise policy. Research tells us that re-oﬀending rates are
generally very high. Placing juveniles in prison creates thus a substantial risk for a prolonged prisoncareer.
This was one of the obvious drawbacks of the Finnish prison policy in the 1960s. Finland had several
times more juveniles in prison than its neighbours. The detrimental effects of prison for juveniles
became widely acknowledged during the 1970s. This also led to a strong reduction in custodial
sanctions for children under 18, both in law and in court practice.

Figure IV.5 The number of juvenile prisoners 1975 2007 (annual averages, absolute ﬁgures, remand included).
Source: Criminal Sanctions Agency

The large number of children in custody is a specific problem for a substantial number of highimprisonment countries. The share of juveniles under 18 of all prisoners may, in some cases, near
one tenth of the overall imprisonment rate, while in most low-imprisonment countries this shareranges between 1 to 2 %. Today several low-imprisonment countries prefer other than criminal justicesolutions in dealing with young offenders. According to the general Nordic youth justice model all
children under 15 and many of those aged 15-17 are dealt with using social welfare and child protection
measures, instead of the criminal law.

58More alternatives to imprisonment

The international movements of the 1970s towards alternatives to imprisonment began tohave legislative consequences first during the 1980s, and more widely in the 1990s. The Finnish
experiences, on the other hand, prove that visible results can be achieved just by using traditional
alternatives, such as ﬁnes and conditional sentences.
By the 1990s around two out of three prison sentences in Finland were imposed conditionally andﬁnes accounted for more than 60 % of all penalties imposed by the courts. It was unlikely that thesealternatives could be extended beyond that point. New alternatives were needed, and community
service served that purpose. Community service was adopted on an experimental basis in 1992 andmade permanent in 1995. As the statistics below show, the number of prison sentences fell, together
with the increase in the number of community service orders, between 1992 1997. In a short timecommunity service came to replace 35 % of short prison sentences of a maximum of eight months.

Figure IV.6 Imprisonment and community service in Finland 1992 2007 (court statistics).
Source: Statistics Finland

All in all, there is evidence from low imprisonment countries, such as Scandinavia and Germany
that frequent use of fines goes together with lower imprisonment rates. The same holds true fortraditional alternatives such as the conditional and suspended sentence, as well as more recent
innovations such as community service and electronic monitoring (especially in Sweden). Overall,a substantial part of the low imprisonment level in Scandinavia, Germany and Switzerland may be
attributed to the eﬀective implementation of non-custodial alternatives.
The lack of alternatives may obviously explain the overuse of imprisonment in countries whose
sanctions system operates mainly through imprisonment. Often this may also be a question of material
resources. New alternatives, such as community service and electronic monitoring, require a proper
infrastructure. But in such cases, it might be good to remember that there are also traditional
alternatives, such as fines and conditional and suspended sentences, which may contribute to thesystem with a much lighter infrastructure. These low-cost sanctions are available to most jurisdictions
without any major investments. And using shorter sentences does not require any infrastructure at all.

Prison rates and crime rates

These were by far not the only reforms that were carried out in order to bring down the Finnish
prisoner rates. Other important changes were made in provisions concerning pre-trial, preventive
detention, day-fine rules, conditional imprisonment, drunken driving, non-prosecution, etc. Also,
prison laws were reformed and new enforcement practices were adopted in order to ease theovercrowding problem (open prisons and prison furloughs).

59

The overall result of these reforms was a substantial reduction in the prison population from theexceptionally high level of 150 (p/pop) in the beginning of the 1960s, to the common Nordic level ofaround 60 in the early 1990s. This raises also the question of what were the crime preventive eﬀects ofthis steep decrease in the use of imprisonment. To evaluate this, we need to include the other Nordic
countries in the comparisons.
These countries have strong social and structural similarities. But they have diﬀerent penal history
on one point: in the exceptional fall of the imprisonment rate that took place in Finland from the
1950s. This provides an unusual opportunity to assess how drastic changes in penal practices in one
country have been reﬂected in the crime rates compared to countries (with similar social and cultural
conditions) which have kept their penal systems more or less stable. Figure VI.2 shows incarceration
and reported crime rates in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway from 1950 to 2005.

Figure IV.7 Prison rates and crime rates in four Nordic countries 1950 2005.
Compiled from: Falck et al 2003 and national Statistics

There is a striking diﬀerence in the use of imprisonment, and a striking similarity in the trends inrecorded criminality. That Finland has substantially reduced its incarceration rate has not disturbed
the symmetry of the Nordic crime rates. These ﬁgures, once again, support the general criminologicalconclusion that crime and incarceration rates are fairly independent of one another; each rises and falls
according to its own laws and dynamics.

V. CONCLUSIONSThe title promised an answer to the question of causes of prison overcrowding
no simple answers are available.

. Unfortunately,

In several countries, overcrowding results simply from the overuse of pre-trial detention. Thisapplies especially to the African regions. In many of the African prisons suffering from severe
overcrowding, more than half of the prisoners are on pre-trial detention.
But besides the use of pre-trial detention one should look also for other reasons behind
overcrowding.
Against what one could assume, trends in crime seem to have less impact on the overall use of60

imprisonment. There is no general association between total reported crime and victimization. Nor do
the overall trends of reported crime associate systematically with changes in incarceration. The search
for the reasons for overcrowding and diﬀerences in the use of imprisonment must proceed beyond theanalyses of crime trends. This does not mean that crime is irrelevant, but the relevance of crime may
diﬀer, depending on other social and political factors.
The search for these background causes may take different routes. We may examine individual
countries and their histories. Or we may compare a larger number of countries in order to figureout what factors are common in high imprisonment countries, and what unites low imprisonment
countries. Both methods increase our understanding of the dynamics of penal change.
In a wider historical and comparative perspective, the general practice of punishment seems to beconditioned by macro level factors, including economic and social structures, political culture, andalso public sentiments and political legitimacy. This may appear disappointing for anyone wishing toinitiate a penal change. However, there is always room for political choice, even in this structurally
given environment. It is, still, in the hands of local governments and politicians to decide, what to do
and how to conduct domestic penal policy. In the end, it is up to political will.
This conclusion is highlighted by the case study from Finland. High incarceration was deﬁned at
the political level as a problem. The Finnish politicians also understood and accepted that the use of
imprisonment could be reduced without serious repercussions on the level of criminality, and they
acted accordingly.
One central element behind the success was a broad based approach to the problem. The reform
programme was grounded in research-based theoretical notions on the functions of the criminal justicesystem. Legislative actions were carried out on all fronts and of all levels of the criminal justicesystem: in criminal process, sanctions systems, speciﬁc oﬀences, sentencing principles, enforcement
and prison law, and juvenile justice. This was achieved with the close cooperation of all the key groups
in the criminal justice system.

Appendix. Countries by prisoner rates and occupancy levels (ICPS)
Prisoners /100000 (2008)-50

Occupancy rate %<75 %75-100 %101-110 %Andorra
Liechtenstein
SolomonIslands
Niger
GambiaFaeroe Islands(Denmark)
Nigeria
Iceland

Sao Tome e
Principe
Iraq
Vanuatu
Syria

AngolaAustria
BahrainBosnia andHerzegovina: Federatio
DenmarkJapan
FinlandSwedenGermany
GuatemalaIreland, Republic of
Samoa
Kosovo/Kos
CyprusMalta
Kiribati
Netherlands
NorwayPapua New Guinea
Switzerland
Tonga
Northern Ireland

Mauritania
Republic of Guinea

Total
111-150 %151-200 % Over 200 % <75 %Liberia
India
Nepal

Burkina
Faso

SierraLeone

Italy
Paraguay
Venezuela
FranceBelgium
Slovenia
Marshall Islands
Mayotte (France)
Madagascar
Bosnia andHerzegovina:
Republika
Croatia
Mozambique
Cambodia

SenegalIndonesia
Ghana
Malawi
Haiti
UgandaBolivia
Cote D'Ivoire
Pakistan
Congo (Dem 28 %Repub of)
Bangladesh
Benin

8%

51-10061

101-150

Cook Islands(NZL)
MonacoKyrgyzstan
Guernsey(United
Kingdom)
Tajikistan
Isle of Man(United
Kingdom)

Slovakia
Romania
JordanArmenia
Portugal
Fiji
Bulgaria
CanadaLesothoHong Kong(China)UK: Scotland
Macedonia
KuwaitTurkeyZimbabwe
Australia
Montenegro

Uzbekistan
SerbiaHungary
Colombia
Nicaragua
Brunei Darussalam
GreeceMyanmarEcuadorPhilipp.
New
Caledon.
Sri Lanka
Tanzania

BurundiKenya
Cameroon
Zambia22 %Greenland(Denmark)
Mauritius
Reunion(France)
PolandLuxembourg

JamaicaEngland & Wales
Guadeloupe
Lebanon
Malaysia
Albania
Martinique (MexicoHonduras
Spain
Libya
Uruguay
BrazilUnitedArab
Emirates
Peru
Algeria
MoroccoRwandaFrenchPolynesia
Iran

22 %

GuyanaCaymanGuam (USA)
St Lucia
Antigua andBarbudaFrenchGuiana/Guyane
South Africa
Botswana
Maldives
Dominica

Chile
ThailandPanamaBarbados
Suriname
El Salvador

16 %Belarus
USA

BahamasGeorgia
AnguilaSt. Kitts
and Nevis

Grenada

5%

12 %

27 %

11 %

9%

100 %

151-250
Macau (China)
Moldova
Azerbaijan
Northern Mariana
Dominican Republic
Islands (USA)
Turkmenistan
Gibraltar
New Zealand(United
Lithuania
Kingdom)Swaziland
Jersey (United
Namibia
Kingdom)
Argentina
Czech Republic
Costa Rica
251-400

Seychelles
Bermuda (UK)
LatviaOver 400

Total

11 %

Relevant litterature

Kazakhstan
AntillesPuerto Rico (USA)Trinidad and Tobago
Aruba(Netherlands)
Estonia
Singapore
Israel
Ukraine
St Vincent and
the Grenadines
BelizeRussian Federation
Virgin Islands
(UK)
30 %

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