FOCUS

Focus
Asia-PacificNewsletter of the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center (HURIGHTS OSAKA)

June 2017 Vol. 88

Editorial

Contents
South Korean Policy on Human Rights inNorth Korea After the Political ChangeThis article discusses the current challenges
to addressing the human rights situation in
North Korea, especially in ensuring that therights of the North Koreans are protected.
- Go Myong-Hyun
Page 2
Crimes Against Humanity in North Korea:
Three Options for Accountability
This article presents several legal options
that can be used to hold North Korean
officials accountable for massive humanrights violations.
- Transitional Justice Working Group
Page 5
Issues and Tasks: Human Rights in AsianBusiness
This is another report on a regional
workshop on business and human rights in
Asia held in the Philippines in March 2017.
- Jefferson R. Plantilla
Page 8Anti-Discrimination Laws in Australia andJapan
This is an analysis of the historical, social,and legal characteristics of antidiscrimination laws in the two countries.
- Mai Mitsumori-Miller
Page 11

Human Rights and Justice
How are human rights violators held accountable? What are thebest means of ensuring full human rights accountability? These
are difficult questions, even more so in the case of violators
being current high officials of an independent state. The answers
go beyond existing human rights mechanisms and have much to
do with international politics. This is the situation of North
Korea.
Past experiences on cases of massive and systematic humanrights violations point to the need for the preparation of solidbases for the prosecution of violators at some future date.
At the same time, while the accountability mechanisms are notyet established, the victims deserve assistance in protecting andrealizing their human rights.
The main challenge lies in pursuing a two-pronged approach toaddressing the human rights situation in the country; building
accountability measures and helping to protect and realize
human rights are both important but also inherently difficult
tasks.
In all these efforts, serving justice to the people must be theultimate objective.

1

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JUNE 2017 VOLUME 88

South Korean Policy on Human Rights in North Korea
After the Political Change
Go Myong-HyunTh e n e w S o u t h Ko r e a n
President, Moon Jae-in, hasstated that he would reverse his
conservative predecessors’
North Korea policy of pressuring
and isolating North Korea andreturn to one that focuses on
engagement.
In addition tobringing a fresh, new approachto North Korea’s nuclear issue,
the Moon administration will
refocus their North Korea policy
on humanitarian assistance,development aid, economic
cooperation (e.g., restarting the
Kaesong Industrial Complex andMount Kumgang tourism
projects), and cultural andpeople-to-people exchanges.
This policy could potentiallycreate friction with theinternational community’s
approach of prioritizing
accountability for the humanrights violations in North Korea.1
North Korea Human Rights
Policy: New vs Old
Under the conservative
administrations of Lee Myungbak and Park Geun-hye, theNorth Korean human rights
movement2 received a major
boost in support. The Park
administration in particular wasvery keen on raising global
awareness of North Koreanhuman rights issues; it
supported the work of theUnited Nations (UN)Commission of Inquiry on

Human Rights in the
Democratic People’s Republicof Korea (UN COI) and raised
North Korean human rights
issues in other high-profile
international gatherings.3
Domestically, one of the majorachievements of the Park
administration in improving theNorth Korean human rights
situation was the passage of the2016 North Korean Human
Rights Act, which had been
languishing in the National
Assembly for more than ten
years. The law provides for theestablishment of the North
Korea Human Rights
Foundation that would support
research on human rights andhumanitarian issues as well as
provide grants to civil society
organizations. One importantfeature of the Foundation’s workis the creation of the Human
R i g h t s A r ch iv e , wh i ch i smodeled after the Central
R e g i s t r y o f S t a t e Ju d i c i a l
Administrations in Salzgitter,
West Germany. Just like theGerman model, the Human
Rights Archive is designed tohelp in the identification andprosecution of those responsible
for human rights violations inNorth Korea. The law has also
institutionalized theinternational coordination
efforts of the South Korean
government through thecreation of an ambassadorship2

specifically for the North
Korean human rights issue.
The new progressive
administration is likely tomaintain the institutions createdunder the conservative
administrations, but it would
reassign policy priorities andresources. Under the new, moreengagement-oriented
a d m i n i s t ra t i o n , t h e S o u t h
Korean government will shift its
focus from accountability tohumanitarian assistance when it
comes to improving the humanrights situation in North Korea.
Moon’s electoral platformc o n c e r n i n g N o r t h Ko r e a nhuman rights (Vision 2, Section5)4 states that his administration
will work for the “combined”
improvement of political andsocial rights of North Koreans.
Given that the North Korean
regime’s horrendous treatmentof political prisoners andrepression of political dissent
has been the main focus of theNorth Korean human rights
movement for several decades,
suddenly giving equal
prominence to social rights
could be considered as
detracting from the internationalc o m m u n i t y ’s f o c u s o naccountability. However, social
rights as well as economic andcultural rights are certainly lesscontroversial since they
concern collective rights rather
than individual rights (e.g.,political rights), and theirFOCUS ASIAPACIFIC
improvement is more amenable
to the Moon administration’s
policy of increasing
humanitarian assistance anddevelopment aid to North
Korea.
One area that the Moon
administration could make asignificant impact with its use ofhumanitarian assistance is thereunion of separated families,
since the North Korean regime
would likely be more responsive
to South Korean requests if theadministration is willing to add
economic payoffs, such as theconstruction of health facilities.
The humanitarian concern iscertainly enormous given theurgency of family reunions dueto the advanced age of theapplicants. Despite this, only
972 individuals were able tomeet their separated kin in thelast family reunion that took
place in 2015, and in South
Korea alone there are still
60,000 persons awaiting theirchance to travel to the Northand meet their families.
Moreover, records show that
progressive administrations havebeen more successful thanconservative administrations inthis regard. Whereas 12,576
South Koreans were able tomeet their Northern kin from2002 to 2008 (the Roh Moohyun administration), only
3,559 did during the period of
the conservative administrationsof Lee Myung-bak and Park
Geun-hye.5
Institutionalization of the North
Korean Human Rights Issue
The institutionalization of theNorth Korean human rights
issue began in earnest when theinternational community took
notice of the worsening human

JUNE 2017 VOLUME 88
rights situations in North Korea
and China, especially with theoutflow of refugees from North
Korea after the economic
collapse in the 1990s.
International actors instituted aseries of human rights initiatives
on the North Korean issue
within the framework ofinternational law. The firstaction was the UN Human
Rights Council’s adoption of theNorth Korean Human Rights
Resolution in 2003. This marked
the beginning of the UN’s efforts
to shed light on the North
Korean regime’s long history ofhuman rights violations. In
2 0 0 4 , t h e fi r s t S p e c i a l
Rapporteur was appointed tolook into the human rights
situation in North Korea. Other
governments also adopted legal
measures, such as the UnitedStates’ 2004 North Korean
Human Rights Act, Japan’s 2006
Law on the Abduction Question
and Other North Korean Human
Rights Problems, and theEuropean Union’s Council
Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007.
In 2013, the UN COI wasestablished, and, in 2014, it
released its landmark report on
the North Korean human rights
situation.
The report by the UN COI put
mechanism for accountability
into motion. The UN COI reportfound that the North Korean
regime had committed crimes
against humanity andrecommended referring
individuals responsible (i.e., thetop leadership) to theInternational Criminal Court(ICC). This recommendation was
overwhelmingly reaffirmed by
the UN General Assembly in2014. The most engaged actor
in this regard was the UnitedStates, which had incorporated3

human rights components into
its sanctions against the regime
i n N o r t h Ko r e a . S e ve ra lcountries have sincec o n d e m n e d N o r t h Ko r e a ,including Botswana, who cut all
diplomatic ties with North
Korea after the release of the
COI report.6
The international ramificationsof the UN COI’s findings andrecommendations are stillu n f o l d i n g . N o w, t h e r e i sinternational attention not only
on North Korea’s domestic
human rights violations, butalso on the regime’s violations
beyond its national borders.
One particular issue that caught
the international community’s
attention was the case of North
Korean workers posted overseas,
which was the perfect exampleof how the regime’s policy ofhuman rights violations werebeing used to generate hardcurrency income.
The North Korean human rights
movement regards North
Korea’s export of workers
overseas as forced labor, which
is a form of slavery. This
classification is based on ample
evidence of severe restrictions
on the workers’ freedom of
movement: passports are
confiscated, and they are forced
to live in barrack-like
dormitories under the watch ofNorth Korean security agentssent to guard them. There is noformal labor contract, andworking conditions are
inhumane; their work schedule
typically ranges between twelve
to fourteen hours of work perday, with only one day off permonth.
The international community
appealed to destination states toFOCUS ASIAPACIFIC
address the situation; the UnitedStates and South Korea applied
diplomatic pressure, while theinternational media put a
spotlight on the issue.7 As aresult, the governments of
Qatar, Malta, and Poland
expelled some or all North
Korean workers deployed totheir countries.8
Conclusion and Pending Issues
The case of the North Korean
workers overseas is a perfect
example of how theinternational community isaddressing the North Koreanr e g i m e ’s a b u s e s i n a ninstitutionalized manner. By
working together toinstitutionalize the issue, South
Korean civil society and state
actors galvanized theinternational community aroundthe cause of protecting thehuman rights of the North
Koreans, and they made theissue a robust part of thepolitical changes in key
stakeholder countries. As such,
this case serves as the templatefor future actions to address
North Korean human rights
violations.
What is left pending is how tostrengthen the civil society
actors that are vulnerable topolitical changes. Civil society
actors play a key role incollecting evidence and helping
victims, but their work is not
s u f fi c i e n t l y s u p p o r t e d ,especially in South Korea. The
South Korean government inparticular does not extensively
support the work of nongovernmental organizations(NGOs). The total size ofgovernment funding on North
Korean concerns tends to bequite small; for example, SouthJUNE 2017 VOLUME 88
Korea’s Ministry of Unification
disbursed only 650 million won(roughly 560,000 US dollars) totwenty-six recipients in 2015.
Furthermore, the bulk of themoney went to NGOs that help
defectors resettle througheducational programs, rather
than to NGOs that prioritize
human rights campaigns. As thefocus of the government’s policy
shifts towards engagement,
fi n d i n g s t a b l e s o u r c e s o ffinancing can become evenmore challenging.
One should also consider how
to empower North Korean
defectors to help them takemore prominent leadershiproles within the North Koreanhuman rights movement. Their
number is likely to pass the
30,000 mark this year, and a
growing number of young,
South Korean-educateddefectors are joining the
movement. As activists thatcarry the moral authority as
victims, North Korean defectors
have the ample potential to
become very effective civilsociety actors when given
proper training and support.
However, given their collective
political orientation that atpresent tends towards theconservative opposition, it islikely that they will be lessinfluential in affecting the new
a d m i n i s t ra t i o n ’s p o l i cy o fengaging North Korea. This
could be addressed byproviding them withinternational platforms to voice
their concerns and capacitybuilding opportunities.
The North Korean human rights
movement must adapt to thepolitical changes in South Korea
by institutionalizing
mechanisms for monitoring and4prosecuting North Koreanhuman right abuses, as well as
by empowering civil society
actors.
In conclusion, the newadministration’s policy towards
North Korea presents
opportunities and challenges inequal measure. Putting aside thedebate on the validity ofengagement, it is likely that the
new administration would be
more successful than theirconservative predecessors inaddressing the urgent
humanitarian concern of
helping separated families tomeet before they pass away.
Human rights NGOs, inparticular, can raise awarenesson this issue and extend theirsupport. On the other hand, thenew policy can also divert someattention from the issue of theregime’s systematic violation ofhumanrights.
An
institutionalized approach to thehuman rights issues throughclose coordination between
international, state, and civilsociety actors is key to keeping
the North Korean human rights
movement effective in the longrun.
Go Myong-Hyun is a Research
Fellow at the Center for Risk,
Information and Social Policy of
the Asan Institute for Policy
Studies.
For further information, pleasecontact: Go Myong-Hyun, Asan
Institute for Policy Studies, 11,Gyeonghuigung 1-ga-gil,
Jongno-gu, Seoul 03176 Korea,
ph (822) 3701-7311; fax (822)8254-7573;
e-mail:mhgo@asninst.org;
www.asaninst.org.
(Continued on page 15)

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Crimes Against Humanity in North Korea:
Three Options for Accountability
Transitional Justice Working GroupT

he United Nations
Commission of Inquiry on
Human Rights in North Korea(UN COI) reported in 20141
that crimes against humanity,
including extermination,
murder, enslavement, torture,
imprisonment, rape, forced
abortions, persecution,
deliberate starvation, andenforced disappearances, havebeen committed “pursuant topolicies established at thehighest level of the State” in the
Democratic People’s Republicof North Korea (DPRK).2 In his
statement to the UN Human
Rights Council, COI Chair,
Michael Kirby, stated that thegravity, scale, and nature ofthese violations — which havebeen perpetrated for decades —“reveal a state that does nothave a parallel in thecontemporary world.”3 The UN
COI called for practicalmeasures to end the abuses andpursue accountability for those
responsible.4
Transitional Justice Working
Group
Sparked by the report of the UN
COI, the Transitional Justice
Working Group (TJWG) was
formed in September 2014 tosupport the call foraccountability and develop
strategies of redress for victimsof abuse. Its first two years ofactivities include thed e ve l o p m e n t o f a d i g i t a lmapping system to document

and visualize evidence ofpossible crimes against
humanity in North Korea. The
database and mapping systemsecurely collects information on
alleged mass burial and killingsites and visualizes theinformation in the form ofdigital maps. The data also
includes locations of national
security offices, local police,
military units, andadministrative units where
documentary evidence may be
stored. The TJWG believes thatthe preparatory work of locatingthese sites is crucial inpreventing blanket amnesty foralleged perpetrators and, in thecase of future investigations ortrials of individuals charged
with serious human rights
violations, quickly securing
forensic and documentary
evidence. Importantly, its work
also focuses on surveying
defectors regarding their desires
and hopes for the future, andwhat, if any, transitional justicemechanisms they recognize as
relevant or necessary.
Accountability Preferences
The TJWG conducted a surveyof North Korean defectors on
the accountability of
perpetrators of human rights
abuses in the DPRK.
“Accountability” in transitional
justice is a concept often
associated with legal remedies
applied to situations where
atrocities have taken place. The

5

survey has revealed that among
defectors who have participatedin its mapping project, there is astrong preference to see thosedeemed responsible for humanrights abuses held accountable
in a courtroom setting. When
asked about what they would
like to see happen to those who
committed violent human rights
abuses in the DPRK, punitive
measures featured highly, withthe restorative measures ofconfessing crimes and asking
for forgiveness also being seen
as important. Amnesties were aless popular option.5
The large volume of potential
perpetrators in the North Koreansystem means that it may well
be practically impossible tobring formal charges against
every individual suspected ofcarrying responsibility forhuman rights crimes, not tomention the problems that may
arise in attempts to charge those
who are both victims andperpetrators of the regime’s
abuses. The data gathered by
the mapping project will makean important contribution todetermining the nature of thecrimes concerned and inbuilding cases against known
perpetrators. While amnesties
may have a place in the future,
the survey respondents deem
punitive measures as important,and this should be taken into
consideration in any transitional
justice process.

FOCUS ASIAPACIFIC
The question of whether judicial
m e a s u r e s a l o n e h ave t h ecapacity to redress systematic or
massive violations of humanrights is a crucial one, andtransitional justice (and the
TJWG’s research) operates on
the conviction that they do not.
The UN Backgrounder ontransitional justice states that, tobe effective, the process should
be holistic: “It should be madeup of several initiatives thatcomplement and reinforce eacho t h e r.” 6 Th e d e s i g n o f apotential transitional justiceprocess, which includes
accountability measures in the
North Korean context, must be
accompanied by sustained
engagement with the affected
communities, and the efficacy
of different accountability
mechanisms should be properly
assessed. However, at this earlystage in our work, the TJWG
seeks to draw attention to threemain types of accountability
mechanisms most often triedelsewhere by pointing out theirassociated obstacles andopportunities.
Types of Courts
The International Criminal Court
The UN COI’s recommendation
for the referral of the situation in
the DPRK to the ICC waswelcomed by North Koreafocused human rights groups inSouth Korea. However, there
are numerous obstacles,
including the lack ofjurisdiction for crimes
committed prior to theestablishment of theInternational Criminal Court(ICC) in 2002 under Article
11(1) of the Rome Statute, the
DPRK’s hostility to the ICC, aswell as China and Russia’s
objections to the ICC referral by

JUNE 2017 VOLUME 88
the UN Security Council.
Because the ICC Prosecutor caninitiate investigations only for“crimes within the jurisdictionof the Court” under Article
15(1), the ICC may exercise
jurisdiction over the crimes
committed by nationals ofStates Parties to the Rome
Statute, such as South Korea
and Japan, but not by China,
p e r h a p s t h e D P R K ’s l a s t ,reluctant ally.
It would, however, be possible
to prepare for possible futurecases at the ICC. Long-term
political changes in the DPRK
may lead it to accede to theRome Statute with a declaration
accepting jurisdiction for cases
reaching back to July 1st, 2002,
per Articles 11(2) and 12(3) of
the Rome Statute. In the case of
the reunification of the two
Koreas, the successor state may
issue a declaration to the same
effect. If so, it would be possible
for the Prosecutor to initiate
investigations proprio motu, orfor the successor state to refer
the situation to the ICC.
An Ad Hoc Tribunal
The UN COI also mentioned
the possibility of an ad hoc
tribunal. However, the current
DPRK regime is not likely toconsent to investigating andprosecuting its own leaders andexecutioners for the numerous
atrocities they committed.
Therefore, this option also must
be preceded by fundamental
political change within the
DPRK to become viable.
Thus far, when thinking abouttransitional justice for regime
crimes in the DPRK, SouthKo r e a n c iv i c g r o u p s a n d
academic advisors to thegovernment have shown a
growing preference for an ad

6

hoc tribunal over ICC
proceedings in The Hague,
which is geographically far
removed from the scene ofcrimes as well as the domicileof the perpetrators, victims, andthe interested population. The
logistics and resource
requirements for the recruitment
of Korean-speaking personnel
and the transportation of thewitnesses and documents to thecourt, which is located on theother far end of the Eurasianlandmass, would be inefficientand detrimental to theinvestigation and trials. The vast
majority of the victims andconcerned individuals in the
Korean Peninsula would haved i f fi c u l t y f o l l o w i n g t h eproceedings even via TV or
webcast, given the 8-hour timedifference. The same may besaid of Japan, which would
have particular interest becauseof the abduction of its citizens
by the DPRK in the past. In thecase of an ad hoc tribunal,
S o u t h K o r e a ’s j u d i c i a linstitutions and legal expertise
may provide helpful
infrastructure for theinvestigation and trial of theatrocities in the DPRK.
One option may be a hybrid
tribunal akin to the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) or
the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC),
which would ideally be situatedin Pyongyang. The Cambodiancase may be pertinent to the
DPRK given the similar patternof murder, extermination,
enslavement, torture,deportation, imprisonment,
rape, persecutions, andenforced disappearance
committed as state policy by atotalitarian regime in thecontext of a communisti n fl u e n c e d , p o s t - c o l o n i a l

FOCUS ASIAPACIFIC
national liberation movement
radicalized by devastating war
into xenophobic paranoia. The
ECCC as an institution alsosuggests a way to by-pass the
UN Security Council, where
China may wield its veto andrely upon the authority of the
UN General Assembly, which
may enjoy greater international
legitimacy.
The Domestic Transitional
Justice Process
The UN COI also alluded to theurgent need for a “Korean-led
transitional justice process”
parallel to the international
judicial procedures, including“extensive, nationally owned
truth seeking and vetting
measures to expose anddisempower perpetrators at them i d - a n d l ow e r- l e ve l s . . .
coupled with comprehensive
human rights education
campaigns to change the mindsets of an entire generation ofordinary citizens, who havebeen kept in the dark about
what human rights they areentitled to enjoy and in how
many ways their own state has
violated them.” A special
national prosecutor “relying on
international assistance to theextent necessary” should also
investigate and prosecute
crimes against humanity.
Even prior to the transition,d o m e s t i c c o u r t s m ay, o noccasion, prosecute and try
individual perpetrators whomthey happen to have in theircustody by the exercise ofuniversal jurisdiction or anotherlegal basis. For example, theSouth Korean courts haveconvicted and sentenced ethnic
Korean Chinese upon arrestingthem as undocumented workers
in South Korea for collaboratingin the abduction of ROK

JUNE 2017 VOLUME 88
nationals in China to the DPRK.
Similarly, the pre-unification
West German courts punished
East German defectors who
were responsible for theshooting of border-crossers
before their own successful
flight. It may also be noted thatJapan has been conducting acriminal investigation on theabductions of its nationals tot h e D P R K a n d m ay a l s oproceed to try and convict those
responsible for the abductionsin its own courts.
Transitional Justice in North
Korea
Most of the many countries thathave looked to a past marked
by dictatorship, armed conflict,and large-scale serious crime
have used multiple transitional
justice measures, implemented
simultaneously or gradually, torestore rights and dignity tovictims, ensure that humanrights violations are notrepeated, consolidate
democracy and sustainable
peace, and lay the foundations
for national reconciliation. Dueto the many challenges present
in seeking justice for the crimes
believed to have beencommitted in the DPRK, it is
crucial that a holistic policy oftransitional justice be adopted
when the conditions permit. The
TJWG hopes that, by examining
accountability strategies inadvance of a transition, judicial
procedures will be more
effectively designed andimplemented, so that they canplay their important role insecuring a just future for thepeople of North Korea.
For more information, pleasecontact: Scott Stevens,
Communications and7

A d m i n i s t r a t i v e D i r e c t o r,
Transitional Justice Working
Group, #302, Koryo Building,
91 Saemunan-ro, Jongno-gu,
Seoul, 03182, Republic ofKorea; ph (82-2) 722-1162; fax(82-2) 722-1163; e-mail:scott.stevens@tjwg.org;
www.tjwg.org.
Endnotes
1. “Report of the commission of
inquiry on human rights in the
Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea,” United Nations Human
Rights Council, A/HRC/25/63, 7
February
2014,
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HR
C/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx.
2. Ibid., para. 75.
3. Michael Kirby, “Statement by
Mr Michael Kirby Chair of theCommission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea tothe 25th Session of the Human
Rights Council, Geneva, 17
March 2014,” United Nations
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 17
March
2014,
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?News
ID=14385&LangID=E.
4. See Conclusions and Recommendations in the “Report of thecommission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea,” opcit.
5. For a more detailed discussionof defector preferences, pleaserefer to TJWG’s forthcoming
report “Mapping Crimes Against
Humanity in North Korea”
available at
HYPERLINK" h t t p : / / w w w. t j w g . o r g / "www.tjwg.org.
6. United Nations, “What Is Transitional Justice?: A Backgrounder”(United Nations, 20 February 2008),
www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/
doc_wgll/justice_times_transition/26_02_2008_background_note.pdf.

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Issues and Tasks: Human Rights in Asian Business
Jefferson R. PlantillaT

he recent workshop on“Business, Human Rights,
and Access to Justice,” held in
Mandaluyong City,1 raised theserious need to use the “United
Nations Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United
Nations ’Protect, Respect andRemedy’ Framework” (UNGP)
as another tool in addressing
human rights issues that havelong been affecting themarginalized sections ofsocieties in Asia. The workshop
also emphasized the need tomaximize the opportunities forresolving human rights
concerns arising fromcompanies and governments
supporting this UN initiative.2
Persistent Issues
Workshop presenters from
China, Korea, Mongolia, Japan,
Nepal, Malaysia, and thePhilippines discussed issues thathave been lingering in the Asian
region for decades.
Workers still suffer from avariety of problems includingprohibition to stage strikes, badworking conditions, and illegal
recruitment for migrant workers.
The exploited, undocumented
foreign migrant workers in the
Malaysian palm plantations
suffer even at the stage ofdeportation. Communities
likewise continue to suffer fromcompany operations especiallythose related to natural
resources exploitation.

Effective labor movements
hardly exist in China andM o n g o l i a . Th e A l l - C h i n a
Federation of Trade Unions(ACFTU) and other local unions
are trying to promote collective
bargaining in some pilot casesand projects, while the tradeunions in Mongolia have notbeen functioning effectively.
Also, labor contracts are notenforced to protect the interestsof the Mongolian workers.
The Japanese labor bureau has
been receiving complaints ofbad working conditions. As
Yasunobu Sato of the HumanS e c u r i t y F o r u m ( To k y oUniversity) reported:
In 2015, out of 5,173 cases
investigated by the labor
standards inspection office,violations of legislations
related to labor standards
were found in 3,695 cases(71.4%) and only 46 serious
or vicious cases were sent toprosecutors. These violations
pertain to working hours,
among others.

Illegal recruitment of workers
for jobs abroad remains
rampant, while employers in the
country of destination continue
to exploit them. Daryll Delgado
of Verité explained that ”most of
the problems lie in theoperation of intermediaries —
illegal recruiters such as subagents, brokers (independent orotherwise), and even humantraffickers.”3

8

On the other hand, although big
Asian companies, including
state-owned enterprises in thecase of China, have declared
subscription to the UNGP,
many small and medium-sizedenterprises, whose role in theover-all economy of countries issignificant, are seemingly
largely uninvolved. Many socalled “technical interntrainees” in Japan, who comemostly from China, Vietnam,
Indonesia, and the Philippines,
are being deployed to be“trained” at small and mediumsized enterprises where they
suffer from labor exploitationand other problems.
Some Developments
In the case of Japan, the 2020
Tokyo Olympics provides theopportunity to introduce
measures that would protect
workers, foreign construction
workers in particular, frombeing abused while they help
construct facilities related to thegames. Other human rights
issues related to business (suchas discrimination against nonJapanese) will have to beaddressed, as well.
Urantsooj Gombusuren of theCentre for Human Rights andDevelopment reported thefollowing developments in
Mongolian laws:4• Granting of legal standing
to non-governmentalorganizations (under thenewGeneralFOCUS ASIAPACIFIC
Administration Law, July2016) to enable them tofile claims before thecourts in public interest
cases;• Recognition of theparticipation of people inmore than a hundred lawsthat have provisions on therights to accessinformation, participationin different decisionmaking processes,
participation in theimplementation processes(including monitoring), andfiling of complaints todemand accountability
with upper levelgovernment offices or the
courts.
Zhong Huang of Wuhan
University Public Interest andDevelopment Law Institute(PIDLI) noted the improvementof environmental laws in China
but remarked, “the crippling
court costs deterred proenvironment NGOs frompursuing their advocacies, citing
instances where they wereordered to pay expensive court
fees.“5Geeta Sangroula of the
Kathmandu Law School noted
the initiatives in India related tocorporate social responsibility
and the enactment oramendment of a number oflaws, especially after the Bhopal
Gas Disaster in 1984: the
National Voluntary Guidelines
on Social, Environmental andEconomic Responsibilities ofBusiness in 2011; the corporatesocial responsibility provisions
in the Company Act (2013),
which affect Indian companies
operating inside and outside of
the country; the Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty (BIT) in 2015;

JUNE 2017 VOLUME 88
and the court intervention indevelopment projects.
Commissioner Jerald Joseph of
the Human Rights Commissionof Malaysia (SUHAKAM) citedits (SUHAKAM’s) Memorandumof Understanding (MOU) on
business and human rights with
the Federal Land Development
Authority (FELDA) of Malaysia
and Felda Global Ventures
Holdings Berhad (FGV), whichis the biggest palm plantationcompany in the world. The twoyear MOU, according to thereport in the FGV website,6…offers mutual assistanceand commits the parties toshare knowledge andexpertise relating to businessand human rights in
Malaysia, as well as toimplement several initiatives
including establishing a planof action to ensurecompliance and respect [for]human rights principles, toconduct stakeholders
consultations and to
implement capacity building
programmes.

Necessary National Tasks
The United Nations
recommends that governments
adopt national action plan on
business and human rights(BHR NAP) in collaboration
with industry, labor, and othersectors of society. Current
experiences show both progressand delays in adopting the BHR
NAPs.
Pillkyu Hwang observed that
the Korean government had notbeen consulting the labor sector
and the civil society in draftingi t s NA P. Th e g ove r n m e n t
seemed to be reluctant in

9

accepting the BHR NAP
suggestions from the National
Human Rights Commission of
Korea. Also, the government
avoided sensitive issues likeunderemployment and“precarious” labor in its NAP
deliberations.
In the Philippines, the role of
the Commission on Human
Rights of the Philippines (CHRP)
is crucial in promoting multisectoral deliberation on the
B H R N A P. C o m m i s s i o n e r
Roberto Cadiz explained thatthe “guide to inform andassist” (GIA) framework
developed by the CHRP was
employed in holding a series ofroundtable discussions(beginning in 2012) on thehuman rights impact assessmentof mining communities and on
consultative processes of thegovernment towards thedevelopment of the Philippine
BHR NAP. But still, he foundthe situation to be a “start-stop“
process.
Commissioner Joseph reported
that a Minister had been tasked
to take care of the drafting of
the BHR NAP of Malaysia, but
finalizing it would take time
because of the consultations
with many groups and sectors.
Way back in 2010, several
rounds of consultations withvarious stakeholders, including
government agencies,
community-based organizations(CSOs), and businessorganizations, had beenorganized. The commissioner
viewed BHR NAP as necessary
in promoting policy coherence
across the government
bureaucracy, and in

FOCUS ASIAPACIFIC• Creating a platform forpolicy cross-fertilization
between states in Malaysia;• Crystallizing leadership forbusiness and human rights;• Widening participation in
NAP implementation;• Facilitating dialogue andtrust-building; and• Pr om oting sustainab ledevelopment.
The Philippine and Malaysianhuman rights commissioners
emphasized that the process ofdrafting BHR NAP must be
state-owned and state-led.
However, governments musttake serious consideration of theviews and concerns of the
stakeholders on what should be
the content of the BHR NAP.
International support is likewise
important, as shown in the caseo f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . Th e
P h i l i p p i n e o f fi c e s o f t h e
International Labour
Organizations (ILO) and theUnited Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) have been
supporting the government indrafting its BHR NAP. Dianne
Respall (Senior ProgrammeO f fi c e r o f I L O M a n i l a )explained that the ILO
promoted the Decent Work
Agenda (with four pillars: rights
and national standards,
employment, social protection,and social dialogue) as anecessary framework in dealing
with labor issues. Judith R.
Fortin (Project Manager of CHR
Projects: Nurturing a Culture of
Human Rights and Empowering
Citizens to Deepen
Democracy), on the other hand,
discussed how the UNDP
facilitated discussion on policy
reform. The UNDP has been
supporting the integration of the

JUNE 2017 VOLUME 88
international human rights
standards in national
development plans andcorporate laws. Aside from theUNGP, UNDP is also promoting
the use of the United Nations
Guiding Principles on Extreme
Poverty and Human Rights7 inaddressing business and humanr i g h t s i s s u e s . Th e U N D P
facilitated the government
review of the Philippine
National Development Plan
2017-2022 to find areas of
support for human rights andsupported the drafting of
proposed amendments to the
Corporation Code.
Additional Tasks
The nature a n d i m p a c t o foperations of big companies aswell as the movement ofworkers require crossbordercooperation
among
governments, labor unions, andcompanies. The workshop
participants discussed a numberof tasks relevant to business andhuman rights issues that crossnational borders.
A networking system amonggroups engaged in different
fields of work – within andamong countries – would help
circulate information as well as
collaboration on crossborderissues. A crossborder initiative
for Southeast Asia can focus on
the most vulnerable workers,
such as those in the fishery,
agriculture (i.e., palm oil),apparel, food manufacturing,
electronics, and service sectors.
Other crossborder issues
concerning foreign workers
should cover abuses byrecruitment agencies (illegal
collection of fees, unwarranted
high fees, fraudulent labor
contracts, etc.). Finally, a10crossborder networking systemshould help address humanrights issues in the supply
chains.
International support inresolving national issues is also
important. In the humidifier
disinfectant case in Korea, a UN
Special Rapporteur on humanrights and hazardous
substances 8 helped increasepressure on the company
involved to resolve the issue.
This pressure complemented a“public petition coupled withsignificant media coverage andeventually a court action [that]forced it (the company) toaddress the issue with a publicapology and a compensation
program.”9
A crossborder network can also
engage in research andpublication. The results ofresearch can be subsequently
used in lobbying for reforms at
the national level, as well as intraining workers and company
officials. Verité’s research inJapan revealed how workers
communicated among
themselves, accessed remedy,a n d h e l p e d e a c h o t h e r.
Improved “communication,”
however, also exposed themfurther to risks of illegal
recruitment. The main
challenges consisted of
maximizing this model while
avoiding negative impacts.
Workers were encouraged tolink fellow workers toorganizations that could help
them.10Jefferson R. Plantilla presented
the basic features andcontents 11 of the training
manual entitled Business,(Continued on page 15)

FOCUS ASIAPACIFIC

JUNE 2017 VOLUME 88

Anti-Discrimination Laws in Australia and Japan
Mai Mitsumori-MillerT

he 24th of May marked thefirst anniversary of theintroduction of Japan’s anti-hatespeech law. Anti-discrimination
laws are a current topic ofinterest in Japan’s trade-partnerand regional ally, Australia.
Despite the Australian law being
over forty years older, it is clearthat similar trends, issues, andpoints of debate arise in bothj u r i s d i c t i o n s . Th i s a r t i c l e
examines the antidiscrimination laws of Australia
and Japan by comparing theiroperation, historical origins, andthe current debate surroundingthem.
The Laws: Scope and Operation
Although both nations’ laws canb e c l a s s i fi e d a s a n t i discrimination laws, there aresome stark differences in theiroperation and scope. The
Australian Racial Discrimination
Act 1975 (RDA) is broad andprovides an effective process forpeople who want to make acomplaint. Japan’s Act on the
Promotion of Efforts to Eliminate
Unfair Discriminatory Speech
and Behavior Against Persons
Originating from Outside Japan(The Anti-Discriminatory Speech
Act or ADSA) however is moreof a symbolic gesture than alegislative sanction on hatespeech.

unlawful. Section 18C prohibits
public actions that are likely tooffend, insult, humiliate, or
intimidate others based on theirrace, colour, nationality, or
ethnic origin. The RDA also
includes exceptions where
actions that would usually beconsidered discriminatory under
this law will be exempt, such as
actions said or done as part of aperformance, exhibition, or
distribution of artistic work; orwithin the course of academic,
scientific, or artistic academic
debate; or genuine purposes forthe public interest.
Although the legislation deems
racial discrimination unlawful, it
is not a criminal offence.
Affected persons make acomplaint through theAustralian Human Rights
Commission, which caninvestigate the complaint andtry to resolve it by conciliation.
Therefore, these complaints are
not matters for Australian courts
to decide; rather it is a process
where both sides of the story aregathered and parties work
together to resolve thecomplaint. If, after this stage,
the matter has not been
resolved, the complaint may betaken to Australia’s Federal
Court (though this accounts forless than 5 percent of cases).

RacialJapan’s Anti-Discriminatory
Speech Act

In Australia, the RDA makes actsof racial discrimination

In Japan, the Diet (Parliament)
introduced the ADSA in May
2016, coming into effect inA u s t r a l i a ’s
Discrimination Act

11

June. The ADSA declares unfair,discriminatory speech andbehavior against people legallyliving in Japan, but whose
ancestors were from outside
Japan, intolerable. Examples
provided in the ADSA include
openly speaking in a mannerthat harms the life, person,
freedom, reputation, or propertyof such individuals as well as
insults which have the objectiveof encouraging or inducing
discriminatory feelings (Article2). The ADSA does not haveprovisions for punishment, but it
obliges local governments toimplement hate speechelimination measures andrespond to requests of victims
for consultation (Articles 4 and
5). For example, in Osaka, theimplementation of the law
through a city ordinancerequired that any complaint
filed be reviewed by a fivemember Auxillary Council.
Based on the views of theCouncil, the Mayor makes adecision as to whether todisclose the individual’s nameson their website as having
engaged in hate-speech
activities.
Context of Their Introduction
The contexts in which theselaws were introduced into theirrespective societies are different,
yet they have some importantparallels. Both stem from a long
history of race-based politics inthe nation, widespreaddissatisfaction with the lack of

FOCUS ASIAPACIFIC
protection in the law prior to
the legislation being introduced,
and calls from the international
community to eliminate
discrimination.
Australian Context
In the Australian context, twomajor factors prompted theintroduction of the RDA.
(a) Cultural Shift
The RDA was introduced inAustralia in 1975 during thec o u n t r y ’s s h i f t i n t o t h eimmigration policy of“multiculturalism.” From 1901
in the Australian Federation,
only white, English-speaking
immigrants were welcome
under the “White Australia
Policy.” It was only in 1973 thatt h i s p o l i cy wa s o f fi c i a l l ya b o l i s h e d , a n d r a c e wa s
removed from immigration
criteria. The cultural shift
underpinning this change had
slowly taken place since theend of the WWII when white
European immigrants who did
not speak English were allowed,
and later when Vietnamese
refugees from the Vietnam War
were accepted. Hence, thedecline of the white Australia
ideal, coupled with the civilrights movement of the
1960-1970s, brought concerned
attention to the suppression of
racial difference in Australia.
(b) International Pressure
The International Convention
on the Elimination of All Formsof Racial Discrimination(ICERD) came into force in
1969. Australia ratified ICERD
in 1973, and the progressive
government of the day declared
the “White Australia Policy”“dead and buried.” The RDA

JUNE 2017 VOLUME 88
was the legislative expression of
ICERD in Australia that ensured
all Australians had equality
before the law. The antidiscrimination provisions only
form part of the RDA and wereinterwoven into legislation aspart of Australia’s cultural shift
toward multiculturalism.
Japanese Context
In Japan over the last ten years“hate speech” towards people
from a different ethnic origin(particularly the resident
Ko r e a n s , c a l l e d Z a i n i c h i
Koreans) has increasingly
become a social issue that has
drawn the attention of the
public and legislators.
According to Professor Junichi
Satou from the Osaka Sangyo
University, there were threemain reasons the newlegislation was introduced lastyear: public momentum,
condemnation from theinternational community, andshifting of jurisprudence aroundthis issue.
(a) Public Momentum
In March 2016, the Japanese
Ministry of Justice reported
1,152 confirmed incidents ofhate speech between April 2012
and September 2015. Thesepublic demonstrations took
place in areas where minority
groups were concentrated. In
2014, the Mindan (Korean
Residents Union) reported thatthese demonstrations createdsignificant issues as they incited
direct ethnic discrimination,
posed a major threat toresidents, and affected themental health and opportunities
of children and youth.1 The
Mindan report also noted theshame these words and actions

12

brought to Japanese society andreferenced the motivations of
those tolerant of such hates p e e ch , s u ch a s “ wa r p e dpatriotism.” This sense of shameand call to responsibility was
also reflected in the Governorof Tokyo’s, Yochi Masuzoe,
opening speech to the Tokyo
Metropolitan Assembly in 2015,
where he reflected upon theheavy responsibility that Tokyo
city bears as the host of the2020 Olympics — a festival ofpeace.2(b) International Pressure
Th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a lcommunity also expressed
concern at the level of hatespeech in Japan, which ratified
the ICERD in 1995. The Acting
Secretary-General of theInternational Movement Against
All Forms of Discrimination andRacism, Megumi Komori, stated
that, whenever the United
Nations (UN) questioned theJapanese government about
ra c i a l d i s c ri mi n a t i on , t h e
response was consistent —claiming that the situation was
not serious enough to require
legal prohibition. However, in
mid-2014 the UN Committee
on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination and the UN
H u ma n R i g h t s C o m m i t t e echallenged this assertion,
calling on Japan to adopt firm
steps to combat hate speechand ensure perpetrators of hatespeech were given appropriate
sanctions — an unusually harshwarning from the UN.
(c) Shifting of Jurisprudence
In 2010 a Korean school in
Kyoto sought damages from the
far-right group, Zaitokukai, fortheir rallies throughout

FOCUS ASIAPACIFIC
2009-2010, during which theywould threaten and vilify thestudents from outside the school
grounds. While Japan did nothave any anti-discrimination
provisions in law at that time,t h e Ky o t o D i s t r i c t C o u r t
determined in 2013 that
Zaitokukai committed acts ofracial discrimination due toJapan’s ratification of ICERD.
The Osaka High Court affirmed
the lower court decision in
2014. In the same year, theSupreme Court rejected theappeal of Zaitokukai andupheld the decision of the
Osaka High Court.3 The courts
clearly signalled to the Diet thenecessity for legislativeintervention, and built upon the
pre-existing public andinternational pressure that
instigated the introduction of
the ADSA.
The Current Debate
In both jurisdictions theintroduction of an antidiscrimination law was met
with splintered support. Though
there were endorsements fromgroups who had been callingfor change, there were various
comments about the law,ranging from disappointment as
to the strength of the law, to fearof diminishing protection of freespeech, and even to scepticism
of the necessity of the law.
These conversations are still
occurring today.
Current Discrimination Debate
in Australia
The RDA has always caused
controversy. It took legislators
four attempts to get the billthrough parliament, due toheavily divided political andp u blic opinion. The RDA

JUNE 2017 VOLUME 88
dominated political headlines inlate-2016, when the current
conservative government
reignited the debate regarding
the scope of section 18C. At thecenter of the debate is thebalance between free speech
and protection against racial
hate speech. Commentators
take differing opinions about
what should happen to the 18C
provision; some advocate its
repeal or for partial change,
while others argue that it shouldr e m a i n u n ch a n g e d o r b e
partially extended.
Those arguing for a partialchange to narrow the provisionbelieve that the arguably
subjective terms “offend,”“insult,” and “humiliate” should
be removed as they are too far
reaching. The Prime Minister,
Mr. Malcolm Turnbull, supports
this position, and, in March
2017, he proposed that“ o f f e n d ,” “ i n s u l t ” a n d“humiliate” be replaced by“harass” to clarify the law.4
Others argue that the operationof the law needs to send astronger message of
condemnation of discrimination
by criminalizing the act soperpetrators can be taken tocourt for penal enforcement.
Alternatively, some are callingfor a review of the RDA in lightof all relevant laws such asdefamation, metadata, whistleb l ow i n g , a n d f r e e d o m o f
information laws,5 which are ahigher priority than reform to
the RDA.
Criticisms and Debates ofJapan’s Law
In the lead up and theimmediate aftermath of theintroduction of the ADSA, there
was considerable reluctance to13outlaw hate-speech due to thepotential limitation or conflictwith freedom of speech, anentrenched right in Japan’sConstitution (Article 21).
Proponents of the law note that
the UN International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights
states that the freedom ofspeech should not violate therights and reputation of others(Article 19(3)(a)).
Despite the introduction of the
Act being a milestone in Japan’s
human rights sphere, experts
and critics have expresseddisappointment with the current
provisions. Firstly, the ADSA did
not impose sanctions forbreaches. Similar to critiques of
the Australian law, ADSA is
criticized for “lacking teeth”
and simply obliging eachmunicipality to come up with
its own policies, and there are
no prescriptive sanctions or any
strongenforcement
mechanisms. It is a symboliclaw with no clear consequences
for breaches.
Secondly, the offence of “hatespeech” is not made clear.
Article 2 of the ADSA states thatthe law protects persons who
originate from outside of Japan,
and who lawfully reside inJapan, from significant insults
and open announcements ofharm to life, body, freedom,p r o p e r t y, o r r e p u t a t i o n .
However, this is a broad
definition that makes it difficult
to determine whether hatespeech has occurred. Therefore,
after demands for clarificationfrom Kawasaki, Kyoto, Osaka,
Kobe, and Fukuoka cities, theMinistry of Justice provided
some concrete examples, suchas: “go back to your homecountry,” “kill people [from aFOCUS ASIAPACIFIC
certain nation/ethnic group],” or
describing people as“cockroaches.”
Finally, the groups afforded
protection under the ADSA are
too exclusive. ADSA only
applies to individuals andtherefore is difficult to use when
ethnic minorities are being
targeted as a whole.
Furthermore, ADSA completely
fails to protect vulnerable
groups in Japanese society, suchas refugees and illegal
immigrants, who arguably face
more discrimination than legal
migrants from different
backgrounds. Therefore, the
ADSA is wholly inadequate, inthat it does not apply toeveryone, and only the narrow
offence of hate speech isconsidered, rather than
discrimination broadly.
Conclusion
It is clear that, despite the wide
acceptance of human equality,
anti-discrimination laws arecontroversial in both Australia
and Japan. Although there is noevidence to suggest thatbanning discriminatory speech
reduces bigotry, there is still astrong case for these laws tocontinue in order to build
inclusive, modern communities.
In Australia, racial
discrimination is still an issue,
with twenty percent of the
population stating that they
have experienced racial andreligious discrimination, elevenpercent believing they havebeen excluded from social
activities or workplaces due torace, and five percent reporting
physical assault due to theirbackground.6

JUNE 2017 VOLUME 88
The laws in Japan can be
criticized for many reasons, as
stated earlier. However, even asa symbolic law, the law seems
to have positive results, with thenumber of far-right rallies
having halved in the first elevenmonths since its enactment,
according to a survey
conducted by the National
Po l i c e A g e n cy. Th i s s a i d ,although the number of publicdemonstrations has declined,
discrimination continues inalternative forms. Advocates are
calling for a second phase ofbroader laws that aim to stampout hate speech by targeting any
messages of discrimination,
including those against
ethnicity, birth, or disability,
which could only be a positive
step towards social inclusivity.
Mai Mitsumori-Miller is as e c o n d ye a r Ju r i s D o c t o rcandidate at the University of
Melbourne, Australia and wasan intern of HURIGHTS OSAKA
during the December 2016January 2017 period.
For further information, pleasecontact: Mai Mitsumori-Miller atmaimitsumorimiller@gmail.com.

Endnotes
1 Committee on the Protection of
Human Rights of the Central Head
Office of the Korean Residents
Union in Japan (Mindan), Reporton the Issue of Racism and Hate
Speech in Japan, 18 July 2014,
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/
CERD/Shared%20Documents/JPN/
INT_CERD_NGO_JPN_17699_E.p
df.
2 Yoichi Masuzoe, “My Vision for
the World’s Best City: A PeacefulSociety that Upholds Basic
Human Rights,” policy speech

14during the first regular session oft h e To k y o M e t r o p o l i t a n
A s s e m b l y,
2015,
www.metro.tokyo.jp/ENGLISH//G OV E R N O R / A R C / S P E E C H /2015/0218/contents01.htm.
3 “Supreme Court upholds
compensation ruling against'hate speech' group,” The Asahi
Shimbun, 10 December 2014,
https://web.archive.org/web/20160310180800/http://a j w. a s a h i . c o m / a r t i c l e /behind_news/politics/
AJ201412100078.
4 Dennis Shanahan and SimonB e n s o n , “ 1 8 C : Pow e r s t o‘terminate’ trivial cases,” The
Australian, 21 March 2017,www.theaustralian.com.au/
national-affairs/18c-reformmalcolm-turnbull-takes-farreaching-overhaul-to-partyr o o m / n e w s - s t o r y /103a229210cb98d9c83e7af00f
b3aa69.
5 Media, Entertainment and Arts
Alliance, The Chilling Effect: thereport into the state of press
freedom in Australia in 2017, page
13; https://issuu.com/meaa/docs/
170503_press_freedom_report_lo
w-res.
6 Scanlon Foundation, Mapping Social
Cohesion 2015: National Report,
http://scanlonfoundation.org.au/
wp-content/uploads/
2015/10/2015-Mapping-SocialCohesion-Report.pdf.

FOCUS ASIAPACIFICSouth Korean Policy on Human
Rights in North Korea(Continued from page 4)
Endnotes
1 Human Rights Watch, “UN:New Move on North Korea
Crimes Human Rights Council
Opens Door to Prosecution
Strategies,” www.hrw.org/
news/2017/03/24/un-newmove-north-korea-crimes.
2 The “North Korean humanrights movement” refers togroups and institutions inSouth Korea that work on thehuman rights situation in
North Korea.

JUNE 2017 VOLUME 88
3 “FM Yun to raise voice against
N. Korea's human rights,
chemical weapons issues,”
Yo n h a p N e w s , h t t p : / /english.yonhapnews.co.kr/
n a t i o n a l /2017/02/26/0301000000AEN
20170226001251315.html.
4 See document in Korean at
http://theminjoo.kr/President/
p l e d g e D e t a i l . d o ?
bd_seq=65856.
5 See Trend on Inter-Korean
FamilyReunion,www.index.go.kr/potal/main/
E a c h D t l Pa g e D e t a i l . d o ?
idx_cd=1696.
6 Kwanwoo Jun, "Botswana Cuts
North Korea Ties," The WallStreet Journal, https://
blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/
2014/02/20/botswana-cutsnorth-korea-ties/.
7 “North Koreans working as‘state-sponsored slaves’ in
Q a t a r, ” T h e G u a r d i a n ,www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2014/nov/07/
north-koreans-working-statesponsored-slaves-qatar.
8. See Eunjung Cho, “North
Korean Workers in Qatar Fired
Over Labor Violations,” Voiceof America, 25 August 2015,www.voanews.com/a/northkorean-workers-in-qatar-firedove r- l a b o r- v i o l a t i o n s /2932647.html.

Philippines (CHRP) and theAsia-Pacific Human Rights
Information Center(HURIGHTS OSAKA) on 11-12
March 2017 at St. Francis
Square, BSA Twin Towers,
Ortigas Center, Mandaluyong
City, Philippines.
The following discussion isbased on the report entitled" Wo r k s h o p o n B u s i n e s s ,Human Rights and Access toJustice – Workshop Report,"
Quezon City, 2017.
Ibid., page 12.
Ibid., page 11.
Ibid., page 6.
S e e “ F G V, F E L D A a n d
SUHAKAM Collaborate toPromote Respect andCompliance for Human Rights
in Business Operations,”
FELDA
Global,www.feldaglobal.com/fgvfelda-and-suhakamcollaborate-to-promoterespect-and-compliance-forhuman-rights-in-businesso p e r a t i o n s /#sthash.owLSFnf9.dpuf.
See United Nations Guiding
Principles on Extreme Poverty

and Human Rights,
www.ohchr.org/Documents/
P u b l i c a t i o n s /OHCHR_ExtremePovertyandH
umanRights_EN.pdf.
8 See report of the Special
Rapporteur, “End of Visit
Statement by the United
Nations Special Rapporteur onhuman rights and hazardous
substances and wastes, Baskut
Tuncak (Republic of Korea 12 23 October 2015).” Statement
available at www.ohchr.org/
E N / N e w s E v e n t s / Pa g e s /DisplayNews.aspx?
NewsID=16639&LangID=E.
9 "Workshop Report," op. cit.,
page 9.
10 Ibid., page 14.
11 See powerpoint presentation ofJefferson R. Plantilla entitled
Facilitator’s Training Manual on
Business and Human Rights.
12 Published by HURIGHTSOSAKA in 2016 incooperation with the Northeast
Asia members of the Asian
Consortium for Human Rightsbased Access to Justice(HRBA2J-Asia).

Issues and Tasks: Human Rights
in Asian Business(Continued from page 10)
Human Rights and Northeast
Asia: A Facilitator's Training
Manual.12
Training and other educational
activities on the integration ofhuman rights in business
operations are important tasks
that have to be undertaken by
all stakeholders.
Jefferson R. Plantilla is the Chief
R e s e a rch e r a t H U R I G H T SOSAKA.

2

3
4
5
6

For more information, pleasecontact HURIGHTS OSAKA.
Endnotes
1 This workshop was jointly
organized by the Asian
Consortium for Human Rightsbased Access to Justice, GoJust Project-Commission on
Human Rights of the715

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HURIGHTS OSAKA, inspired by the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, formally opened in December 1994. lt has the following goals: 1) to promote human rights
in the Asia- Pacific region; 2) to convey Asia-Pacific perspectives on human rights to the international
community; 3) to ensure inclusion of human rights principles in Japanese international cooperative activities; and 4) to raise human rights awareness among the people in Japan in meeting its growing internationalization. In order to achieve these goals, HURIGHTS OSAKA has activities such as Information Handling, Research and Study, Education and Training, Publications, and Consultancy Services.
FOCUS Asia-Pacific is designed to highlight significant issues and activities relating to human rights in
the Asia-Pacific. Relevant information and articles can be sent to HURIGHTS OSAKA for inclusion in thenext editions of the newsletter.

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