PUBLIC–PRIVATE ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES IN THE
PHILIPPINES: MEASURES FOR SUSTAINABILITY
Atty. Rowena A. Del Rosario-Vidad *I.

INTRODUCTION

The Philippines used to be known as one of the most corrupt countries in Asia. 1 An
opportunity to drastically transform that image came under President Benigno Aquino’s anticorruption platform that served as a snowballing call for the private sector to join thegovernment in weeding out the roots of corruption.
The latest snapshot of public opinion from recent surveys 2 reflecting a steady decline incorruption of the private sector in its affairs with the government and the Philippine’s upward
climb by 10% points in controlling corruption 3 clearly show the Philippine governments’metamorphosis from one plagued with corruption to one that is focused on trudging thestraight path.
In the Global Competitiveness Report for 2013-2014 of the World Economic Forum,
the Philippines is ranked 59th of 148 economies. Government is also perceived to be more
efficient in spending public revenue (86th to 36th) and the diversion of public funds due tocorruption is now perceived to occur less often (100th to 79th). 4
Indeed, the Philippines is perceived to be becoming less corrupt over the past 3 years as
it continues to improve its ranking in a global corruption survey. This is affirmed by thePhilippines’ improved ranking from 134th in 2010, up from 105th in 2012, 94th in 2013, to85th in 2014, as published in Germany-based watchdog Transparency International’s
Corruption Perception Index. 5 These statistics demonstrate an improving trend, despite thehype of the pork barrel issue involving high-ranking elected officials of the Philippine
government. 6
This goes to show that the Aquino administration’s anti-corruption efforts are on theright track and are gaining momentum. Part of this victory should be attributed to the private*

Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, Philippines.
Dumlao, Doris, WB: Corruption in RP worst in East Asia, Philippine Daily Inquirer, available at<www.article.wn.com/view/2008/06/25/WB_Corruption_in_RP_worst_in_East_Asia/> (last accessed on 07
October 2015).
2
Social Weather Station survey conducted from November 2014 to May 2015, available at<http://www.sws.org.ph/> (last accessed on 26 September 2015).
3
2014
World
Bank’sWorldwide
GovernanceIndicators
availableat<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home> (last accessed on 08 October 2015).
4
The
GlobalCompetitiveness
Report,2013-2014
availableat<www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf> (last accessed on 07 October2015).
5
Corruption Perceptions Index report published on 03 December 2014, available at<https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/cpi2014> (last accessed on 05 29 September 2015).
6
Business Pulse: Entrepreneurs on PH Economy and Campaign Against Corruption, available at<http://www.integrityinitiative.com/articles/media-news> (last accessed on 01 October 2015).
1- 118 -

sector’s active participation in the government’s anti-corruption campaign over the past five
years. The gains thus achieved by the Aquino government only make more urgent theimperative to continue a strategic anti-corruption policy geared towards fostering morepartnerships with the private sector.
This paper focuses on Philippine public and private corruption initiatives to prevent anddetect corruption, arguing that to ensure the sustainability and impact of such initiatives thegovernment must reduce, if not totally eliminate, private sector cynicism and encourage
private sector cooperation through provision of adequate incentive mechanisms or rewards
systems, strong whistle-blower laws and full enforcement of anti-corruption laws.
The first part of this paper briefly looks at the different private-sector-led initiatives that
institutionalize a culture of integrity in the business sector and address the promotion oftransparency and good governance. The second and third parts outline the different
corruption prevention initiatives being implemented by the Office of the Ombudsman, theprimary anti-corruption body of the Philippine government, in partnership with the private
sector.
By integrating the lessons learned from two high-profile corruption cases mirroring a
successful collaboration of the public and private sectors in the detection and prosecution ofcorrupt acts, the final part of this report identifies key factors for the success andsustainability of public–private sector initiatives in combating corruption.
II.

PRIVATE SECTOR INITIATIVES AT A GLANCE

A.

Integrity Initiative: the SHINE Project
The Makati Business Club and the European Chamber of Commerce started theIntegrity Initiative (initiative) in 2010 shortly after the Philippines received a grant from
Siemens Germany to implement project SHINE (Strengthening High-Level Commitment
for Integrity initiatives and Nurturing Collective action of Enterprises)—a four-year
undertaking which aims to initiate collective action among ethical foreign and local businessenterprises that wish to see the creation of fair market conditions for all market participants. 7
Aside from enjoining all business executives to sign integrity pledges, which
institutionalize integrity, honesty, and transparency in all aspects of conducting business, theinitiative also imposes upon all signatories the duty to maintain a code of conduct for
employees to pursue ethical business practices. 8
As of November 21, 2014, 1,896 private companies, 202 icon organizations, 43
government agencies, and 86 members of the academe have signed the Integrity Pledge. 9
In its early birth years, the initiative convened a series of discussions with
communication experts focused on sharing best practices in promoting integrity habits,
among the highlights of which are:7

Integrity Compliance Handbook, <www.integrityintiative.com>.
The Integrity Compliance Handbook, p. 2, published by the Makati Business Club (Integrity Initiatives ProjectManagement Team).
9
Signatories’ Registry, available at <www.integrityinitiative.com/signatories-to-pledge> (last accessed on 02
October 2015).
8- 119 -•MERALCO’s 10 launching in 2010 of “Be Right” Open Communication Policy, whichallows employees to report unethical behaviour through: e-report mo, a whistleblowing channel, and e-suggest mo, where employees can share their suggestions on
increasing efficiency in the company’s operations. 11•

Punongbayan and Araullo 12 launched the “Proactive Hotline” service, a web-based
reporting facility which provides stakeholders and concerned citizens with a platform
to report conflicts of interest and misappropriation of assets and other acts of fraudanonymously to company authorities for proper action. Aside from ensuring fullanonymity for the whistle-blower, the hotline also features a monitoring system forthe reporter to track the progress of his or her report. 13

The initiative envisions to set up an Integrity Certification Program similar to the ISO
or a Seal of Good Housekeeping. It will train a pool of accreditors who will examine andassess the level of implementation of organizational integrity practices so that thosecompanies that have a good track record of enforcing business ethics can invite the initiative
for their certification. Certified companies can avail themselves of incentives from thegovernment and other private sector partners. Presently, details of such incentives are being
worked out by the initiative.
AIM Hills Program on Governance 14
A prototype of the integrity initiative project that was launched five years ago, the
AIM Hills Project on Governance is a one-year project grant from the Center for International
Private Enterprise implemented by the Asian Institute of Management (AIM) with thefollowing objectives: strengthening awareness and understanding of the social and economic
costs of corruption among Philippine businesses and generating their support for anticorruption efforts, and strengthening the ability of Philippine small and medium enterprises(SMEs) to prevent corrupt and other unethical behaviour among their employees. This project
includes a series of workshops and focus-group discussions for small and medium enterprises
on strategies to combat corruption. It also intends to prepare a manual on operating a businesswithout corruption for SMEs, and to develop a website. To support this project, theDepartment of Trade and Industry (DTI) created a website “Business Fighting Corruption”
that serves as the clearinghouse of all information relating to business ethics and the control
of corruption in the private sector in the Philippines. 15
B.

Judicial Reform Initiative Program 16
The Judicial Reform Initiative Program is a private sector umbrella group tasked tocoordinate, monitor and push for judicial reforms which was launched at the Integrity
Summit in 2012. This project was initiated by the Financial Executives Institute of theC.

10

The Manila Electric Company, also known as Meralco, is the Philippines' largest distributor of electrical
power.
11
Supra note 7.
12
Punongbayan and Araullo is a member firm within Grant Thorton International Ltd, one of the world’s
leading organizations of independently owned and managed accounting and consulting firms.
13
Supra note 7.
14<http://csis.org/programs/hills-program-governance/governance-centers-philippines>.
15<http://www.businessesfightingcorruption.org/>.
16<http://www.finex.org.ph/>.

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Philippines (FINEX) 17 and is now under the Integrity Initiative with support from 18 majororganizations in collaboration with the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice, and theArangkada Project.
FINEX aims to promote the progressive and innovative application of financial
knowledge and skills in beneficial service to business, government, and society as a whole,by observing the highest standards of competence and ethical behaviour at all times. Throughthis advocacy programme, the private sector, through corporate social responsibility, can also
embrace activities supporting judicial reform.
Coalition Against Corruption (CAC) 18
Launched on 21 September 2004, the Coalition against Corruption (CAC) is a multisectoral partnership that includes the academe, business sector, civil society organizations,and churches that fights corruption. Its mission is to implement and support countercorruption projects in the area of procurement reforms and delivery of essential public
services.
D.

CAC’s goals are to strengthen public participation in governance and to ensure properuse of public funds. The projects supported by CAC include government procurementmonitoring, textbook and medicine monitoring, internal revenue allotment (of barangays)
monitoring, Priority Development Assistance Fund (Pork Barrel) monitoring, catching the big
fish, and lifestyle checks on public officials.
Bantay.ph 19
This is an educational and volunteer platform supervised by the CAC. Founded three
years ago, the majority of its activities in the fight against corruption have been rooted in
civic education. Through the use of internet media, it promotes youth and citizen engagement
in monitoring frontline government services and upholding good government service. A
highlighted endeavour of Bantay.ph is information dissemination and monitoring of the AntiRed Tape Act (ARTA). 20
E.

The Civil Service Commission 21 deputizes Bantay.ph student volunteers to go todifferent government agencies to monitor ARTA compliance, report violations, and do
advocacy work in their schools and chosen communities. These volunteers come from
Bantay.ph’s official school partners. 22

17

FINEX is a non-stock, non-profit, non-political association founded in 1968 and is composed of more than
700 financial executives all over the Philippines.
18<http://www.cac.org.ph>.
19<http://www.bantay.ph>.
20
Republic Act 9485 or the Anti-Red Tape Act (2007) was enacted to improve efficiency in the delivery of
government service to the public by reducing bureaucratic red tape and preventing graft and corruption.
21
The Civil Service Commission is a constitutional body which acts as the central personnel agency of thePhilippine government.
22
Speech of Integrity Initiative and Makati Business Club Chairman Ramon r. Del Rosario, Jr. published on 15
July
2013
at
the
development
Bank
of
the
Philippines
website:<https://www.devbnkphl.com/about.php?cat=271&0d3267bddc3d3d38c3630493837533ab> (last accessed on
01 October 2015).

- 121 -

Transparent Accountable Governance Project 23
Financed by USAID, the Asia Foundation—in partnership with the Makati Business
Club, Social Weather Station (SWS), the Philippine Center for Policy Studies (PCPS), and
the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ)—developed the innovative
Transparent Accountable Governance (TAG) Project. Its mission is to promote transparency
and accountability in government and push forward a collaborative action-oriented agenda tocombat corruption.
F.

Working closely with the above organizations, TAG documents business and civilian
viewpoints on corruption as related to doing business in the Philippines (via survey research);
identifies and analyses key areas of corruption and quantifies their economic costs (via casestudies); and focuses business and public attention on the ways particular types of corruption
affect the conduct of business and economic growth in the Philippines and builds consensus
on a concrete agenda for counter-corruption reform (via public debate).
TAG's integrated approach has progressed well since its launch in 2000. Its mainachievements include: disseminating information on the Estrada trial and mobilizing public
support (Makati Business Club); completing and disseminating three economic researchstudies on corruption to identify key areas of corruption and analyse their dynamics and coston the political economy (PCPS); undertaking public and business opinion surveys (SWS);
investigative reporting (PCIJ); and keeping the public up to date on the new administration's
progress in the first few days of government changeover. 24
Transparency and Accountability Network 25
The Transparency and Accountability Network is an umbrella organization composedof anti-graft allies such as non-government, faith-based organizations, civil society groups
and watchdogs as well as universities and research institutions, united together in its
advocacy for corruption reduction, prosecution and good governance. It was established in
November 2000 with 19 organizations as founding members amid concerns over lack oftransparency and accountability in governance. Today, it has grown to a 25-member group oforganizations.
G.

Specifically, TAN aims to:• Serve as a mechanism for coordinating transparency and accountability initiatives ofcivil society;• Engage government, the private sector, and the citizenry in a comprehensive strategy
to promote transparency and accountability; and• Formulate, advocate, and where appropriate, implement strategic reform initiatives.

23

TAG Tools, available at <https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/TAGTOOLSFINALRRL.pdf> (lastaccessed on 07 October 2015).
24<http://www.tag.org.ph>.
25<http://www.tan.org.ph/>.

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III. CORRUPTION PREVENTION INITIATIVES OF THE OFFICE OF THEOMBUDSMAN IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR 26
A.

Campus Integrity Crusaders
Campus Integrity Crusaders (CIC) refers to any non-partisan school-based youth
organization recognized by a secondary or tertiary educational institution and duly accreditedby the Office of the Ombudsman. 27 The strategy of accrediting Campus Integrity Crusaders
aims to empower the youth in their involvement in corruption prevention initiatives bydeveloping their leadership skills and instilling values of integrity and social responsibility.
The Office of the Ombudsman and a CIC may jointly undertake activities that aim to:• Cultivate the virtues of uprightness, responsibility, honesty, respect for authority, andlove of country;• Instill a sense of good citizenship and responsible leadership;• Inculcate the basic principles of human rights and civic duties; and• Promote the integration of corruption prevention education (CPE) teaching modules
in the school curricula.
Corruption Prevention Unit (CPU) 28
Corruption Prevention Unit (CPU) refers to any formal and non-partisan organizationfrom the private sector and civil society that is duly accredited by the Office of the
Ombudsman to undertake corruption prevention initiatives. As a partnership mechanism, thenetwork of corruption prevention units aims to assist and support the Office of the
Ombudsman in the implementation of its corruption prevention programmes. In coordination
with the Office of the Ombudsman, a CPU shall undertake the following functions: a) To
facilitate public information, education and capacity-building on accountability, transparency
and integrity in public service; b) To provide feedback on efficiency, red tape,mismanagement, fraud and corruption in the government, and report any information that
could determine the causes thereof; c) To promote and advocate high standards of ethics andefficiency in public administration; or d) To mobilize support for reforms in public service
delivery.
B.

C.

Integrity Caravan
Launched in 2013, the Caravan aims to communicate and engage the public and private
sectors on the various programmes and projects of the Office of the Ombudsman to further
build a broad-based strategic partnership of all anti-corruption stakeholders. It involves key
government agencies, local government unit (LGUs), private institutions, academic
institutions, the business sector, development partners, peoples’ organizations (POs), civil
service organizations (CSOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the generalpublic.
The Caravan is a year-long project launched on a nationwide scale. Supported by theUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other development partners, the26<http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/>.
The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional body responsible for investigating andprosecuting Philippine government officials accused of crimes, especially graft and corruption.
28<http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/docs/publication/cpu%20primer%20final.pdf>.
27- 123 -

Caravan composed the following initiatives:• Public Governance—A public dialogue that will bring together multi-sectoral
practitioners, champions and advocates of good governance and anti-corruption.
• The Ombudsman Integrity Lecture Series—A series of lectures on various good
governance and anti-corruption topics to be delivered by distinguished personalities
from the local and global community.
• University Integrity Tour—This integrity roadshow is specifically designed to build
the foundations of good governance and anti-corruption in the country’s educational
system. It will showcase the various programmes and projects through mini-lectures,audio-visual presentations and photo exhibits in several universities nationwide.
• Barangay Integrity—A knowledge sharing and public exchange among barangay
officials on ethical standards, good governance and public accountability. The
seminar will cover relevant and timely topics such as but not limited to the roles,
functions and programmes of the Ombudsman, and an orientation on the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).
• Integrity Development Contest—Another activity for students at various levels
aimed at introducing them to the fundamentals of good governance and anticorruption through creative means including essay-writing, poster-making and shortvideo production.
IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ESTRADA AND NAPOLES PLUNDERCASES: A SUCCESSFUL JOINT COLLABORATION OF THE PUBLIC ANDPRIVATE SECTORS IN THE DETECTION AND PROSECUTION OF
CORRUPTION
Two cases illustrative of a successful joint collaboration of the public and private
sectors in the detection and prosecution of corrupt acts are the cases involving former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Erap) and the Pork Barrel Queen Janet Lim Napoles. The
common denominators in the successful prosecution of these grand corruption scandals are:(1) the private sector’s heightened participation in alerting the authorities of corrupt acts andstaunch cooperation in the prosecution of corrupt officials and their accomplices; and (2) the
government’s strong support to witnesses and whistle-blowers by giving them security andimmunity from suits, and (3) effective inter-agency coordination.
The Estrada Plunder Case 29
In 2001, former Philippine President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Erap) was indicted forplunder. 30 The trial of Estrada took place between 2001 and 2007 at the Sandiganbayan.
A.

29

People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al., Criminal Case No. 26558, September 12, 2007
available at <http://www.lawphil.net/courts/sandigan/sb_26558_2007.html> (last accessed on 07 October 2015).
30
Section 2 of RA 7080 (July 02, 1991) defines plunder as: “plunder is committed when a public officer who, byhimself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination orseries of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) of RA 7080 in the aggregate amount or total valueof at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00).”- 124 -

Popularly called Erap, Estrada was ousted from office in 2001 during a popular uprising in
Metro Manila following a botched attempt to impeach him by the Senate in which he wascharged with plunder and perjury. Soon after his ouster, the same charges were filed against
him in the Sandiganbayan.
Six years thereafter, or in 2007, the Sandiganbayan 31 ruled Estrada not guilty of perjury
but convicted him of plunder punishable by reclusión perpetua and consequently ordered theforfeiture of his illegally acquired assets. All of his co-accused were acquitted.
The plunder case consisted of four separate charges: 1) acceptance of 545
million pesos from proceeds of jueteng, an illegal gambling game; 2) misappropriation of 130
million pesos in excise taxes from tobacco; 3) receiving a 189.7-million-peso commission
from the sale of the shares of Belle Corporation, a real-estate firm; and 4) owning some 3.2
billion pesos in a bank account under the name Jose Velarde. All of these totalled
4,097,804,173.17 Pesos.
Jueteng Collections and Tobacco Excise Tax
The principal witness of the prosecution in the first and second predicate acts ofplunder is former Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson (Chavit). He testified extensively
on the following charges:
1.

(i) Estrada accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounting to 545 million Pesos more or lessfrom November 1998 to August 2000, through the monthly remittance to him of money
collected from operations of illegal gambling, commonly known as “jueteng,” based in the
different provinces of the Philippines in consideration of the unimpeded operation of said
illegal gambling.
(ii) Estrada illegally converted for his personal gain and benefit public funds in theamount of 130 million Pesos more or less, representing a portion of the 200 million Pesos
tobacco excise share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur.
Chavit presented to the court two sets of ledgers methodically showing said payments
to Estrada. His testimony was corroborated by his aides and other bank officials who testified
as to the existence of checks paid by Chavit which landed in the accounts of persons
associated with Estrada. The paper trail of the 200 million deposited for the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation, Inc. was also incontrovertibly established as coming from juetengcollections.
The slew of bank accounts, involving mind-boggling amounts of money andauthenticated by competent and credible bank officers, convinced the court that the entries
entered in the ledger of Chavit were not manufactured. Singson also mentioned some of
Estrada’s prime properties, which include the Boracay mansion and a casino named
Fontainebleau, Inc.

31

Sandiganbayan is an anti-graft court which has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft andcorrupt practices and such other offences committed by public officers and employees, including those ingovernment-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. (Section
5, Art. XIII), 1973 Philippine Constitution as amended by section 4 (Art. XI), 1987 Philippine Constitution.

- 125 -

2.

Kickbacks from the Sale of Belle Shares
The third predicate act of plunder accuses Estrada of pressuring the heads ofgovernment financial institutions, the Social Security System 32 and the Government Service
Insurance System 33 to buy Belle shares worth a total of more than P1.8 billion. Three highly
regarded personalities in the private sector testified in the plunder case accusing Estrada of
pocketing P189.7 million in commissions from the purchase of shares of Belle Corporation.
In exchange for their testimonies, Carlos Arellano, former president, chairman and CEO of
the Social Security System; Federico Pascual, former president and general manager of theGovernment Service Insurance System; and businessman Willy Ng Ocier, vice chairman ofBelle, were granted broad immunity from criminal charges.
3.

Jose Velarde Account
The prosecution presented overwhelming evidence that there were numerous deposits
of astoundingly large sums of money into the Jose Velarde account. Former Equitable-PCI
Bank Chief Trust Officer Clarissa Ocampo testified that she saw Erap sign as “Jose Velarde”
in bank documents, in particular, a debit–credit authority which facilitated the P500-million
loan to a certain Gatchalian, a crony of Estrada.
However, the prosecution failed to prove the predicate act/s or crime/s through which
the said deposits could have been acquired or amassed, except for the amount of P189 million
representing illegal commissions from the sales of Belle shares and money collected fromillegal gambling.
Unknown assets under the Velarde account (Investment Management Account (IMA)
number 101-78056-1) were unearthed only in 2008 when Banco de Oro Unibank Inc.
(BDO) 34 submitted its report on the same to the Sandiganbayan in compliance with thelatter’s forfeiture ruling issued on January 28, 2008, and a subsequent Notice to Deliver on
July 12, 2013.
Among the assets turned over were cash in the trust fund amounting to P101.3 million;
450 million shares of stock of Waterfront Philippines Inc. registered in the name of The
Wellex Group Inc.; 300 million Wellex shares of stock in the name of William T. Gatchalian;the originals of the promissory note and chattel mortgage pertaining to a P500-million loan
by Wellex from the owner of the Velarde account. 35
4.

Key to Success of the Estrada Plunder Case
Essentially, the backbone of the plunder case against former President Joseph Estrada isthe evidence presented by the prosecution—thousands of documents and 76 witnesses
ascribing a series of alleged wrongdoings to the ousted leader. More than 30 of theprosecution witnesses were officials and employees of at least 10 banks—Equitable PCI
Bank, Citibank, Philippine Savings Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, Security Bank,

32

A state-run, social insurance programme for non-government employees in the Philippines founded in 1957.
Its mandate is to provide and administer the following social security benefits for government employees:
compulsory life insurance, optional life insurance, retirement benefits, disability benefits for work-related
contingencies and death benefits.
34
Now successor in interest of Equitable PCI bank.
35
Court gets assets of Jose Velarde, available at <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/587002/court-gets-assets-of-josevelarde#ixzz3nx1Zk64s> (lastaccessedon
8
October2015).
33- 126 -

Land Bank of the Philippines, Urban Bank, Export and Industry Bank, United Asia Bank and
Keppel Bank.
The bank’s vice presidents, branch managers, account officers and customer service
assistant tellers were constrained to appear before the Senate and, eventually, theSandiganbayan because they were authorized by the bank president himself, who received
the subpoena containing the list of witnesses.
The government provided legal refuge to those involved in the Erap plunder case, inparticular, Ilocos Sur Governor Luis “Chavit Singson” who was granted legal immunity by
testifying as a star witness against Estrada. Singson testified that the Erap Muslim YouthFoundation was the repository of jueteng proceeds he remitted to Erap through thefoundation’s account at Equitable PCI bank. Witnesses from the private sector involved in thesale of Belle shares were also afforded broad immunity from criminal charges.
B.

The Pork Barrel Scam
Thirteen years after the Aquino administration, the pork barrel scam surfaced. The porkbarrel scam 36 was the biggest high profile case to be brought by the administration of
President Aquino to court since he was elected to office in 2010 on an anti-corruption
platform.
The scam was first exposed in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on July 12, 2013, with thesix-part exposé of the Inquirer on the scam pointing to businesswoman Janet Lim-Napoles as
the scam's mastermind after Benhur K. Luy, her second cousin and former personal assistant,
was rescued by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation on March 22, 2013, fourmonths after he was detained by Napoles at her unit at the Pacific Plaza Towers in Fort
Bonifacio. Initially centering on Napoles' involvement in the 2004 Fertilizer Fund scam, thegovernment investigation on Luy's testimony has since expanded to cover Napoles'
involvement in a wider scam involving the misuse of PDAF funds from 2003 to 2013. 37
Then came the 16 August 2013 Commission on Audit 38 report detailing the results of athree-year investigation into the use of legislators' PDAF and other discretionary funds during
the last three years of the Arroyo administration. The report not only affirmed the Inquirer's
findings, but also pointed to more legislators being privy to misuse of their PDAF funds. 39
Described as the “mother of all scams,” this case involves Napoles, a private individual,
who established numerous foundations and NGOs and misused these entities as conduits toillegally siphon government funds. She collaborated with lawmakers and agreed on a plan tomisappropriate/embezzle funds from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of
lawmakers under the guise of implementing projects which turned out to be fictitious. The
scam’s modus operandi was that lawmakers would submit a list of projects to the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) 40 for the issuance of the corresponding Special
36

Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF, popularly called "pork barrel"), a lump-sum discretionary fundgranted to each member of Congress for spending on priority development projects of the Philippine
government, mostly on the local level.
37
Carvajal, Nancy C. (July 12, 2013). "NBI probes P10-B scam". Philippine Daily Inquirer (Philippine Daily
Inquirer, Inc.) (last accessed on 6 October 2015).
38
COA SAO Report 2012-03, available at <http://www.gov.ph/directory/commission-on-audit/9> last accessedon 06 October 2015).
39
Id.
40
An executive body under the Office of the President of the Philippines. It is responsible for the sound and- 127 -

Allocation and Release Order (SARO). The list of projects indicated the Implementing
Agency (IA), project cost, designated non-government organizations (NGO) and/or
foundations established by Napoles as recipients of the fund. Thereafter, the lawmaker would
then endorse Napoles’ NGO/foundation to the IA to receive the funds and implement the
project. Thereafter, the IA, without competitive public bidding would award the project andenter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the said NGO/foundation for the
supposed implementation of the project. In exchange for selecting one of Napoles’
NGO/foundation, the lawmaker received “kickbacks or commissions” from Napoles of about
40-60% of the cash value of the project. 41 In the initial report published by the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, 28 members of Congress (five senators and 23 representatives) were named
as participants in the PDAF scam. 42
Finally, in April 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan
three sets of “Information for Plunder” against Senators Enrile (docket number SB-14CRM0238), Revilla (SB-14CRM-0240) and Estrada (SB-14CRM-0239) and their co-accused—
Jessica Lucila “Gigi” Reyes (Enrile’s former chief of staff), Richard Cambe (Revilla’s chiefof staff), and Paulene Therese Mary C. Labayen (Estrada’s deputy chief of staff); Napoles,
her fugitive brother, John Ronald Lim, and her driver-bodyguard John Raymund de Asis.
These nine individuals constitute the first batch to be formally charged by the Ombudsman
since the Department of Justice and the National Bureau of Investigation filed plundercharges against them and 29 other people in 2013. 43
The three senators 44 and Napoles, the alleged brains behind the pork barrel scam, andfive other people allegedly stockpiled a combined total of P581 million in kickbacks throughthe diversion of pork barrel funds to bogus foundations from 2004 to 2012.
To expedite the trial, the Ombudsman formed three four-member teams to handle theprosecution of the nine accused. The Ombudsman based its conclusions on the paper trail
arising from either the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), or each Implementing
Agency (IA)/NGO tandem, if one SARO was split and coursed through different agencies,
regardless of the number of projects. The panel also cited the sworn statements of whistleblower Benhur-Luy and his co-witnesses, Marina Sula and Merlina Sunas, detailing thesequence of events, the Commission on Audit report on the PDAF disbursement, and the field
verification reports with sworn statements of local government officials and purported
beneficiaries of the supposed projects who turned out to be non-existent. 45
As of 1 July 2015, the Ombudsman has indicted at least 19 lawmakers and public
officials privy to the pork barrel scam. 46 A number of investigations are currently ongoing todetermine the extent of the PDAF scam. Senators Revilla and Estrada remain incarcerated injail along with their co-accused in the Plunder cases. Recently, the Supreme Court allowed
efficient use of government resources for national development and also as an instrument for the meeting of
national socio-economic and political development goals.
41
Supra note 36.
42
Carvajal, Nancy C, 28 solons linked to scam, available at <www.inquirer.net/> (accessed on 6 October 2015).
43
Gil Cabacungan and TJ Burgonio, Napoles, 5 others charged in P10B plunder of pork, available at<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/609215/enrile-estrada-revilla-indicted> (last accessed on 6 October 2015).
44
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Senator Ramon Revilla Jr. and Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
45
Cabacungan Jr., Gil C., "Ombudsman forms special team to probe ghost pork projects, available at<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/446483/ombudsman-forms-special-team-to-probe-ghost-pork-projects>(lastaccessed on 6 October 2015).
46<http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/index.php?home=1&pressId=Njc4> (last accessed on 6 October 2015).

- 128 -

Senator Enrile to post bail based on humanitarian reasons. 47 Napoles is serving her sentenceof life imprisonment at the Correctional Institute for Women in Mandaluyong, Manila after
the court found her guilty of illegally detaining whistle-blower Benhur Luy. 48 Napoles also
currently faces 5 counts of plunder, 74 counts of graft and 14 counts of malversation before
the Sandiganbayan anti-graft court.
The pork barrel saga showcases the anti-corruption campaign of the Philippine
government as a system comparable to a three-legged stool. The first leg was the exposé ofthe massive theft and swindling of billions of pesos of pork barrel funds, through the audit
reports of the Commission on Audit, the testimony of whistle-blowers, and the vigilant
campaign and clamour of the media and the public for a complete halt to the appropriations
and release of the congressional pork barrel. The Inquirer’s initial expose of the P10-billion
pork barrel scam was the first bomb. The filing of charges in court is the vital second leg. The
third leg, which completes the system’s solid foundations, is the trial and possible convictionof the accused in the Sandiganbayan, the nation’s graft court. 49
The instigation of official action on the pork barrel scam following the whistle-blowers’
actions is testimony to the power of public–private mobilizations and campaigns. 50
V.

RECOMMENDATION

Paragraph 2(a) of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption
highlights the importance of promoting cooperation between law enforcement agencies andprivate entities. The purpose of the provision is to support effective identification anddetection of irregularities which could be indicative of corrupt conduct. 51
For the government sector to erase private-sector cynicism and encourage businesses/organizations to cooperate, it must enforce incentive mechanisms for the private sector,
provide for internal reporting of corruption and effective whistle-blower laws, provide
mechanisms and procedures used by law enforcement to strengthen cooperation with theprivate sector, including outreach, points of contact and confidential reporting lines, and fully
enforce anti-corruption laws that should culminate in the prosecution of hi-profile
perpetrators.” 52 Moreover, to mobilize a national movement against corruption, public–
private partnerships at the grassroots level should also be explored.

47

RosetteAdel,SupremeCourt's
decisiontogrant
Enrile'sbail,availableat<http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2015/08/20/1490224/full-text-supreme-courts-decision-grant-enriles-bail>(last accessed on 6 October 2015).
48
Ira Pedrasa, Napoles sentenced to life in prison, available at <http://www.abscbnnews.com/nation/04/14/15/napoles-sentenced-life-prison> (last accessed on 06 October 2015).
49
Yen Makabenta, Major breakthrough in anti-corruption campaign, April 2, 2014, available at<http://www.manilatimes.net/major-breakthrough-in-anti-corruption-campaign/87167/> (last accessed on 6
October 2015).
50
Garry Rodan, The Politics of Accountability in Southeast Asia: The Dominance of Moral Ideologies (2014).
51
The Philippines is a signatory to UNCAC, which was ratified in 2006 by the Philippine Senate.
52
Underscored by Guest Lecturer Adam Lurie, Senior Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General at the Criminal
Division of the United States Department of Justice during the 4th Installment of the Ombudsman Integrity
Lecture Asian Development Bank, 27 February 2014 as cited in www.rappler.com (1 March 2014).

- 129 -

A.

Adoption of Strong Whistle-Blower Laws that Align with Current International
Conventions and Bilateral Commitments
The risk of corruption is significantly heightened in environments where the reportingof wrongdoing is not supported or protected. Public and private sector employees have access
to up-to-date information concerning their workplaces’ practices, and are usually the first torecognize wrongdoing. 53
However, those who report wrongdoing may be subject to retaliation, such as
intimidation, harassment, dismissal or violence by their fellow colleagues or superiors. In
many countries, whistle-blowing is even associated with treachery or spying.
Whistle-blower protection is therefore essential to encourage the reporting of
misconduct, fraud and corruption. Giving whistle-blowers an effective protection andsecurity mechanism supports an open organizational culture where employees are not only
aware of how to report but also have confidence in the reporting procedures. It also helps
businesses prevent and detect bribery in commercial transactions. “The protection of bothpublic and private sector whistleblowers from retaliation for reporting in good faith suspected
acts of corruption is therefore integral to efforts to combat corruption, safeguard integrity,
enhance accountability, and support a clean business environment.” 54
There is currently no express obligation conferred by any statute requiring the public towhistle-blow when they encounter corrupt practices in the Philippines.
Presidential Decree No. 749 55 provides immunity for “givers of bribes [and] theiraccomplices in bribery and other graft cases against public officers”. While the title seems to
be limited to bribe givers, the decree covers “any person who voluntarily gives information”
about the commission of bribery under the RPC and violations of “other laws, rules andregulations punishing acts of graft, corruption and other forms of official abuse” (section 1).
Particular conditions must be established under the decree before immunity will be granted.
Moreover, the Ombudsman has the power to grant “immunity from criminal
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession [of] evidence may benecessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding, in the furtherance of[the Ombudsman’s] constitutional functions and statutory objectives.” 56 General immunity
laws are also available such as the discharge of an accused to be a state witness under theRules of Court 57 and the Witness Protection Program (Republic Act No. 6981). 58
It is noteworthy to mention that a pending legislative measure seeking to strengthen RA
6981 (Senate Bill 2860 of March 2012) has been favourably recommended by the Senate
Committees on Justice and Human Rights, and Finance. 59 A counterpart bill in the lower
house, House Bill No. 2922, is also pending for congressional deliberation. The said bills,
however, have not been passed into law.
53

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit, 3rd Edition, Vienna, 2004, p. 67.
Whistleblower protection: encouraging reporting, available at <http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/toolkit/
50042935.pdf> last accessed on 5 October 2015.
55
PD No. 749 (1975).
56
The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Section 17.
57
Philippine Revised Rules of Court, Rule 119, Section 17.
58
An Act Providing for a Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program and for Other purposes, Section 3.
59<http://www.senate.gov.ph/lis/bill_res.aspx?congress=15&q=SBN-2860>.
54- 130 -

The proposed bills titled as “Whistleblower Protection, Security and Benefit Act”
provide financial rewards for whistle-blowers. Upon admission into the programme, if thecase is susceptible of pecuniary estimation, such as plunder, forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth,bribery, malversation, and damage or injury to the government, the reward is P200,000. Uponthe filing of the case with the Office of the Ombudsman, the cash reward amounts toP100,000 and another P100,000 upon the completion of the testimony of the whistle-blower.
For such cases, the whistle-blower shall be entitled to an additional reward of 10 percent of
the actual amount recovered by final judgement.
If the case is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, the reward upon admission into
the programme is P100,000; P50,000 upon the filing of the case with the Office of the
Ombudsman; and P50,000 upon completion of the testimony of the whistle-blower.
Under the substitute whistle-blowers’ bill, apart from having secure housing facilities
and relocation, the state witnesses shall be allowed to change their personal identity, which
may include physiological appearance or change of name.
Before a person is provided protection as a whistle-blower or informant for the state, heshall first execute a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which shall set forth his/her
responsibilities. Substantial breach of the MOA shall be a ground for the termination of theprotection provided under the Act.
If ultimately enacted and adequately implemented, this legislation protecting whistleblowers can become one of the most effective tools to support Philippine public and private
anti-corruption initiatives. 60
B.

Full Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Laws that Should Culminate in the
Successful Prosecution of the Offenders
Corruption becomes more widespread when government lacks sincerity to act onreported corruption. This is true in the public as well as in the private sector. 61 The present
legislative framework for fighting corruption is complicated and is not effectively enforcedby the weak and non-cooperative law enforcement agencies. 62 According to Marcelo, 63 “thejudicial structure is incomplete because of its inability to secure swift punishment for the
guilty.”A recent study by the Office of the Ombudsman cites that cases take 10.2 years on the
average in the Sandiganbayan, from the filing of information to the rendition of a decision.
Data from the PCIJ’s MoneyPolitics Online website shows that from 2010 to 2012, a total
1,132 cases were filed against public officials before the Sandiganbayan, 836 of which still
have a “pending” status. 64
60David Banisar, “Whistleblowing: International Standards and Developments” in Sandoval, I. (editor),
Corruption and Transparency: Debating the Frontiers between State, Market and Society, World Bank-Institutefor Social Research, UNAM, Washington, D.C. 2011.
61
Whistleblowing in the Philippines: Awareness, Attitudes and Structures, Asian Institute of Management(2006).
62
Ex-Ombudsman Marcelo: Corruption cases stagnating. February 5, 2014 · Posted in: Access toInformation, Civil Society, Freedom of Information, General, Governance, Human Rights, available at<http://pcij.org/blog/2014/02/05/ex-ombudsman-marcelo-corruption-cases-stagnating>.
63
Former Ombudsman.
64<http://moneypoliticstransparency.org/>.

- 131 -

Part of the response to this situation is the creation of independent and specialized
agencies to deal with corruption. The Philippines employs this system, with the Office of the
Ombudsman as an example.
A new system of handling cases may be also adapted, new investigators should be
recruited, the Freedom of Information bill 65 should be passed, and the president should
strengthen the oversight commissions and the judiciary in order to remove the hold of theelites on them.
Overall, the Philippine government should demonstrate political will to fight corruption
by fast-tracking high-profile cases and ensuring that grants of immunity do not create asituation of impunity. 66 The goal is to change the current perception of corruption in thePhilippines—from a “low-risk, high-reward” activity to a “high-risk, low-reward activity.” 67
C.

Provision of Adequate Incentive Mechanisms for the Private Sector
In particular, the Integrity Initiative, a major flagship project of the private sector, isenvisioned to lead to fundamental, long term and institutionalized reforms, and transform theway business is conducted and corruption is fought in the Philippines.68 The need to elevatethe initiative to a new level is imperative. The Aquino government should consider signing an
executive order that will require all private contractors to sign integrity pledges prior totransacting with the government. “It is important that the government get on board to provide
recognition to those compliant companies so that the latter would not feel that they are at acompetitive disadvantage if they’re competing against other companies who are not soconstrained in the way they do business.” 69
D.

Develop More Public–Private Partnerships at the Local Level
The challenge in the coming years is to ensure that it is not only a handful of private
sector organizations that actively participate in combating corruption. To reduce corruption, awidespread commitment by the private sector, regardless of size, industry, and location isessential. Hence, public–private anti-corruption initiatives at the local level should likewise
be explored and strengthened. If we are to engage people from all over the country andmobilize a national movement against corruption, joint initiatives should likewise start fromthe grassroots level. 70

65

The proposed Freedom of Information (FOI) Act aims to mandate the disclosure of public documents. The
proposed bill also outlines the exceptions for public disclosure and the procedures for accessing public
documents. On March 10, 2014, the Senate passed the FOI bill on third and final reading, with 22 affirmative
votes. On March 4, 2015, the bill was passed by the House Committee on Appropriations; as of this date, it isawaiting 2nd reading.
66
Robert Klitgaard, Ronald MacLean-Abaroa, and H. Lindsey Parris, Jr., Corrupt Cities (Oakland: ICS Press,
2000).
67
Vinay Bhargava, Country Director, Philippines, The World Bank, Combating Corruption in the Philippines,
available at <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN019123.pdf> 9 (lastaccessed on 5 October 2015).
68
A
Call
for
Integrity,
Editorial,
Philippine
Daily
Inquirer,availableat<htttp://www.opinion.inquirer.net/37432/a-call-for-integrity> (last accessed on 7 October 2015).
69
Id.
70
<http://www.cipe.org/blog/2014/09/04/local-level-governance-in-the-philippines-and-nigeria/#.VhJH__
nvOM8>.

- 132 -

VI.

CONCLUSION

Corruption requires a multi-faceted approach, as well as short-term and long-term
approaches. 71 It also appears very clearly that an effective anti-corruption strategy must be
integrated and holistic. 72 Global experience suggests that efforts to combat systemic
corruption have to go beyond ad hoc, stand-alone reforms of the government since they are
unlikely to achieve much progress, at least in the short term. No matter how committed ourgovernment will be, still, the most effective anti-corruption programmes involve a coalitionof public and private stakeholders fostering institutional reforms that promote ethicalbusiness practice and good governance. 73
A national anti-corruption strategy needs to tackle many battle-fronts, and acknowledge
that a comprehensive programme to combat corruption will take many years to implement.
The government's commitment to fighting corruption and its emerging partnership should beanchored on a collaborative approach involving government, business, media, and NGOs. 74

71

BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR. & FRITZ HEIMANN, The Long War Against Corruption, 85 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, 77 (2006).
72
Peter, Langseth, Prevention: An Effective Tool to Reduce Corruption (Paper presented at the ISPAC
conference on Responding to the Challenge of Corruption, 19 November 1999, Milan) available at<https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicp2.pdf> (last accessed on 5 October 2015).
73
Kim Eric Bettcher and Boris Melnikov, Combating Corruption: A Private Sector Approach, January 2011,
available at www.cipe.org (last accessed on 6 October 2015).
74“World Bank, Combating Corruption in the Philippines: An Update,” available at<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/15435> (last accessed on 6 October 2015).

- 133 -

APPENDIX AI.

PHILIPPINES, 1996-2013 AGGREGATE INDICATOR: CONTROL OF
CORRUPTION- 134 -

II. THE 2014/15 SWS SURVEY OF ENTERPRISES ON CORRUPTION:
RECORD-LOW 32% OF EXECUTIVES HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OFCORRUPT TRANSACTION WITH GOVERNMENT IN THE LAST 3 MONTHS
A. Chart I- 135 -

B. Chart 2

C. Chart 3- 136 -

D. Chart 4

E. Chart 5- 137 -

APPENDIX B

I.

2013-2014 GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT- 138 -

APPENDIX CI.

CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX RESULTS: TABLE AND RANKINGSThe Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their
public sector is perceived to be. A country or territory’s score indicates the perceived level of
public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). A country or
territory's rank indicates its position relative to the other countries and territories in the index.
This year's index includes 175 countries and territories. Click on the column headings to sort theresults, or use the drop-down menu to view results by region. Note that N/A means a country
was not included in the index during a particular year.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
5
7
8
9
10
11
12
12
14
15
15
17
17
17
17
21
21
23
24
25
26
26
26
29
30
31
31
31
31
35

Country
Denmark
New ZealandFinlandSwedenNorwaySwitzerland
Singapore
Netherlands
Luxembourg
CanadaAustralia
Germany
IcelandUnited Kingdom
BelgiumJapan
BarbadosHong Kong
IrelandUnited States
Chile
Uruguay
Austria
BahamasUnited Arab Emirates
Estonia
FranceQatar
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
BhutanBotswana
CyprusPortugal
Puerto Rico
Poland- 139 -

2014
92
91
89
87
86
86
84
83
82
81
80
79
79
78
76
76
74
74
74
74
73
73
72
71
70
69
69
69
67
65
63
63
63
63
61

2013
91
91
89
89
86
85
86
83
80
81
81
78
78
76
75
74
75
75
72
73
71
73
69
71
69
68
71
68
62
63
64
63
62
62
60

2012
90
90
90
88
85
86
87
84
80
84
85
79
82
74
75
74
76
77
69
73
72
72
69
71
68
64
71
68
62
63
65
66
63
63
58

Rank
35
37
37
39
39
39
42
43
43
43
43
47
47
47
50
50
50
53
54
55
55
55
55
55
55
61
61
63
64
64
64
67
67
69
69
69
69
69
69
69
76
76
78
79
80
80
80
80
80
85

Country
TaiwanIsraelSpain
Dominica
Lithuania
Slovenia
Cape Verde
Korea (South)
LatviaMalta
Seychelles
Costa Rica
Hungary
Mauritius
Georgia
Malaysia
Samoa
Czech Republic
Slovakia
BahrainJordanLesothoNamibia
RwandaSaudi Arabia
Croatia
Ghana
Cuba
Oman
The FYR of Macedonia
TurkeyKuwaitSouth Africa
BrazilBulgaria
GreeceItaly
Romania
SenegalSwazilandMontenegro
Sao Tome and Principe
SerbiaTunisia
Benin
Bosnia and Herzegovina
El Salvador
Mongolia
MoroccoBurkina Faso

2014
61
60
60
58
58
58
57
55
55
55
55
54
54
54
52
52
52
51
50
49
49
49
49
49
49
48
48
46
45
45
45
44
44
43
43
43
43
43
43
43
42
42
41
40
39
39
39
39
39
38

- 140 -

2013
61
61
59
58
57
57
58
55
53
56
54
53
54
52
49
50
#N/A
48
47
48
45
49
48
53
46
48
46
46
47
44
50
43
42
42
41
40
43
43
41
39
44
42
42
41
36
42
38
38
37
38

2012
61
60
65
58
54
61
60
56
49
57
52
54
55
57
52
49
#N/A
49
46
51
48
45
48
53
44
46
45
48
47
43
49
44
43
43
41
36
42
44
36
37
41
42
39
41
36
42
38
36
37
38

Rank
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
94
94
94
94
94
94
100
100
100
103
103
103
103
107
107
107
110
110
110
110
110
115
115
115
115
119
119
119
119
119
124
124
126
126
126
126
126
126
126
133
133
133

Country
India
Jamaica
Peru
Philippines
Sri Lanka
ThailandTrinidad and Tobago
ZambiaArmenia
Colombia
Egypt
Gabon
Liberia
PanamaAlgeria
China
Suriname
Bolivia
MexicoMoldova
Niger
Argentina
DjiboutiIndonesia
Albania
Ecuador
Ethiopia
KosovoMalawi
Côte d´Ivoire
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
Mali
BelarusMozambique
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Vietnam
Guyana
Mauritania
Azerbaijan
GambiaHonduras
Kazakhstan
Nepal
Pakistan
Togo
Madagascar
Nicaragua
Timor-Leste

2014
38
38
38
38
38
38
38
38
37
37
37
37
37
37
36
36
36
35
35
35
35
34
34
34
33
33
33
33
33
32
32
32
32
31
31
31
31
31
30
30
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
28
28
28

- 141 -

2013
36
38
38
36
37
35
38
38
36
36
32
34
38
35
36
40
36
34
34
35
34
34
36
32
31
35
33
33
37
27
29
29
28
29
30
30
33
31
27
30
28
28
26
26
31
28
29
28
28
30

2012
36
38
38
34
40
37
39
37
34
36
32
35
41
38
34
39
37
34
34
36
33
35
36
32
33
32
33
34
37
29
32
33
34
31
31
31
35
31
28
31
27
34
28
28
27
27
30
32
29
33

Rank
136
136
136
136
136
136
142
142
142
145
145
145
145
145
150
150
152
152
154
154
156
156
156
159
159
161
161
161
161
161
166
166
166
169
170
171
172
173
174
174

Country
Cameroon
Iran
Kyrgyzstan
LebanonNigeria
RussiaComoros
UgandaUkraineBangladesh
GuineaKenya
Laos
Papua New Guinea
Central African Republic
Paraguay
Congo, Republic of
Tajikistan
Chad
Congo, Democratic Republic ofCambodia
MyanmarZimbabwe
BurundiSyria
AngolaGuinea-Bissau
Haiti
Venezuela
Yemen
Eritrea
Libya
Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
Iraq
South Sudan
Afghanistan
Sudan
Korea (North)
Somalia- 142 -

2014
27
27
27
27
27
27
26
26
26
25
25
25
25
25
24
24
23
23
22
22
21
21
21
20
20
19
19
19
19
19
18
18
18
17
16
15
12
11
8
8

2013
25
25
24
28
25
28
28
26
25
27
24
27
26
25
25
24
22
22
19
22
20
21
21
21
17
23
19
19
20
18
20
15
17
17
16
14
8
11
8
8

2012
26
28
24
30
27
28
28
29
26
26
24
27
21
25
26
25
26
22
19
21
22
15
20
19
26
22
25
19
19
23
25
21
17
17
18
#N/A
8
13
8
8

APPENDIX DI.

STAR REPORT ON ERAP PLUNDER CASE

Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Case Control Number:
66
Description:
In September 2007, Joseph Estrada was convicted by the Philippine Sandiganbayan (anti-graft court) of the crime ofPlunder. According to an unofficial copy of the court decision obtained through the website of the Chan and Robles
law firm, Mr. Estrada was accused in an Amended Information filed on April 19, 2001 of having amassed, whileserving as President from 1998 to 2001, $87.3 million in unexplained wealth and that the funds were derived frombribes, kick-backs, and protection money collected from illegal gambling operators. The chief government witness
against him in the Plunder trial was Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, his co-conspirator in the collection ofprotection money from illegal gambling operators. The court stated that some of the illegal proceeds had been
deposited in Mr. Estrada's Erap Muslim Youth Foundation and a bank account that Mr. Estrada opened in the falsename of "Jose Velarde." He was also convicted of having coerced two government agencies to purchase shares in agaming company owned by an associate and collecting commissions from the sale of the shares. In addition to asentence of life imprisonment, Mr. Estrada was ordered to forfeit his mansion and more than $15 million in assets,
including the illicit proceeds from the illegal gambling operators that had been transferred to the account of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation and the "Jose Velarde" account. One month after his conviction, President Arroyo
granted him a conditional pardon, but the Sandiganbayan's ruling on property and asset forfeiture remain in effect.
Type of Illicit activity involving Public Official :Abuse of Power, Bribes (kick-backs), Money Laundering
Impediments to investigation:
Fake Name ("Jose Velarde" bank account); Multiple Bank Accounts.
Most recent legal action against Public Official?:
Other legal action/ other prosecutions:Region:EAPCountry of Public Official:
Philippines
Jurisdiction(s) of legal action:
Philippines
Sources:
People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al. (Sandiganbayan, Criminal Case No. 26558, Sept. 12,2007) accessed at
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralawsandiganbayandecisionconvictionofestradaforplunder2007.html Malacanan
Palace (Manila), By the President of the Philippines, Pardon of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Oct. 25, 2007, available at- 143 -

the website of the Philippine Office of the Press Secretary (obtained via the US Library of Congress, Directorate ofLegal Research)
Position of Public Official during scheme:
President
Is there a pending case or appeals?:
No
UNCAC Articles(s) Implicated:
Art. 15
Art. 19
Art. 23
Money laundering Implicated?:
Yes
Year scheme began:
1998- 144 -

APPENDIX E
15 WHISTLE-BLOWERS WITH LINKS TO JANET LIM NAPOLES GAVESWORN STATEMENTS TO THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE.

I.

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APPENDIX FI.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 749 GRANTING IMMUNITY FROMPROSECUTION TO GIVERS OF BRIBES AND OTHER GIFTS AND TO THEIRACCOMPLICES IN BRIBERY AND OTHER GRAFT CASES AGAINST PUBLIC
OFFICERSWHEREAS, public office is a public trust: public officers are but servants of the people, whomthey must serve with utmost fidelity and integrity;
WHEREAS, it has heretofore been virtually impossible to secure the conviction and removal of
dishonest public servants owing to the lack of witnesses: the bribe or giftgivers being always reluctant totestify against the corrupt public officials and employees concerned for fear of being indicted andconvicted themselves of bribery and corruption;
WHEREAS, it is better by far and more socially desirable, as well as just, that the bribe or gift
giver be granted immunity from prosecution so that he may freely testify as to the official corruption, thanthat the official who receives the bribe or gift should be allowed to go free, insolently remaining in public
office, and continuing with his nefarious and corrupt practices, to the great detriment of the public service
and the public interest.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue ofthe powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order that:
Section 1. Any person who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Articles 210, 211
and 212 of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act Numbered Three Thousand Nineteen, as amended:
Section 345 of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and otherprovisions of the said Codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the public officials concerned;
and other laws, rules and regulations punishing acts of graft, corruption and other forms of official abuse;
and who willingly testifies against any public official or employee for such violation shall be exempt fromprosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his information and testimony were
given, and may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution:
Provided, that this immunity may be enjoyed even in cases where the information and testimony are given
against a person who is not a public official but who is a principal, or accomplice, or accessory in thecommission of any of the above-mentioned violations: Provided further, that this immunity may beenjoyed by such informant or witness notwithstanding that he offered or gave the bribe or gift to the
public official or is an accomplice for such gift or bribegiving; and Provided, finally, that the following
conditions concur:
1. The information must refer to consummated violations of any of the abovementioned
provisions of law, rules and regulations;2. The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the accused public officer; 3.
Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;
4. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points; and- 146 -

5. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
Section 2. The immunity granted hereunder shall not attach should it turn out subsequently thatthe information and/or testimony is false and malicious or made only for the purpose of harassing,molesting or in any way prejudicing the public officer denounced. In such a case, the public officer sodenounced shall be entitled to any action, civil administrative or criminal, against said informant or
witness: Provided, however, That such action may be commenced only after the dismissal of the caseagainst the denounced public officer after preliminary investigation or after the latter’s acquittal by acompetent court. The prescriptive periods for the various actions under the provisions of this section shallstart to run from the time such actions may be commenced as herein provided. (As amended by BP Blg.
242, approved Nov. 11, 1982.)
Section 3. All preliminary investigations conducted by a prosecuting fiscal, judge or committee,
and all proceedings undertaken in connection therewith, shall be strictly confidential or private in order toprotect the reputation of the official under investigation in the event that the report proves to be
unfounded or no prima facie case is established.
Section 4. All acts, decrees and rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of thisDecree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 5. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 18th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred andseventy-five.

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APPENDIX GI.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service
and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to thepeople, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, act with patriotism and justiceand lead modest lives.
Section 3. Office of the Ombudsman. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall include the Office of theOverall Deputy, the Office of the Deputy for Luzon, the Office of the Deputy for the Visayas, the Officeof the Deputy for Mindanao, the Office of the Deputy for the Armed Forces, and the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. The President may appoint other Deputies as the necessity for it may arise, as recommended
by the Ombudsman.
Section 4. Appointment. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least twenty-one (21) nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council, and from a list of three (3) nominees for each vacancy thereafter, which shall be filled within
three (3) months after it occurs, each of which list shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
In the organization of the Office of the Ombudsman for filling up of positions therein, regional, culturalor ethnic considerations shall be taken into account to the end that the Office shall be as much as possible
representative of the regional, ethnic and cultural make-up of the Filipino nation.
Section 5. Qualifications. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shallbe natural-born citizens of the Philippines, at least forty (40) years old, of recognized probity andindependence, members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective
national or local office in the immediately preceding election whether regular or special. The Ombudsman
must have, for ten (10) years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
Section 6. Rank and Salary. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the same ranks, salaries
and privileges as the Chairman and members, respectively, of a Constitutional Commission. Their salaries
shall not be decreased during their term of office.
The members of the prosecution, investigation and legal staff of the Office of the Ombudsman shallreceive salaries which shall not be less than those given to comparable positions in any office in the
Government.
Section 7. Term of Office. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shallserve for a term of seven (7) years without reappointment.

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Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. —(1) In accordance with the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may beremoved from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of theConstitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of
the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.
(3) In case of vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman due to death, resignation, removal or
permanent disability of the incumbent Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy shall serve as Acting
Ombudsman in a concurrent capacity until a new Ombudsman shall have been appointed for a
full term.n case the Overall Deputy cannot assume the role of Acting Ombudsman, the President
may designate any of the Deputies, or the Special Prosecutor, as Acting Ombudsman.
(4) In case of temporary absence or disability of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy shallperform the duties of the Ombudsman until the Ombudsman returns or is able to perform his
duties.
Section 9. Prohibitions and Disqualifications. — The Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special
Prosecutor shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office or employment. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financiallyinterested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. They shall not
be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately following their cessation from office. They
shall not be allowed to appear or practice before the Ombudsman for two (2) years following theircessation from office.
No spouse or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree and no law, business or
professional partner or associate of the Ombudsman, his Deputies or Special Prosecutor within one (1)year preceding the appointment may appear as counsel or agent on any matter pending before the Officeof the Ombudsman or transact business directly or indirectly therewith.
This disqualification shall apply during the tenure of the official concerned. This disqualification likewise
extends to the law, business or professional firm for the same period.
Section 10. Disclosure of Relationship. — It shall be the duty of the Ombudsman, his Deputies,
including the Special Prosecutor to make under oath, to the best of their knowledge and/or information, apublic disclosure of the identities of, and their relationship with the persons referred to in the preceding
section.
The disclosure shall be filed with the Office of the President and the Office of the Ombudsman before theappointee assumes office and every year thereafter. The disclosures made pursuant to this section shallform part of the public records and shall be available to any person or entity upon request.
Section 11. Structural Organization. — The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandateof the Office of the Ombudsman and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the
Ombudsman, who shall have supervision and control of the said office.

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(1) The Office of the Ombudsman may organize such directorates for administration and allied
services as may be necessary for the effective discharge of its functions. Those appointed as
directors or heads shall have the rank and salary of line bureau directors.
(2) The Office of the Overall Deputy shall oversee and administer the operations of the different
offices under the Office of Ombudsman.t shall likewise perform such other functions and duties
assigned to it by the Ombudsman.
(3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of the Special Prosecutor and his
prosecution staff. The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be an organic component of the
Office of the Ombudsman and shall be under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman.
(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon theauthority of the Ombudsman, have the following powers:(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within thejurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.
The Special Prosecutor shall have the rank and salary of a Deputy Ombudsman.
(5) The position structure and staffing pattern of the Office of the Ombudsman, including the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, shall be approved and prescribed by the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman shall appoint all officers and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, including
those of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, in accordance with the Civil Service Law, rules andregulations.
Section 12. Official Stations. — The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy, the Deputy for Luzon, and the
Deputy for the Armed Forces shall hold office in Metropolitan Manila; the Deputy for the Visayas, inCebu City; and the Deputy for Mindanao, in Davao City. The Ombudsman may transfer their stations
within their respective geographical regions, as public interest may require.
Section 13. Mandate. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, orof any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where theevidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

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Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient.t has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, orof any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned orcontrolled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required bylaw, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at
fault or who neglect to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith;or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: provided, that therefusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove,suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary
action against said officer;(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may
provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts ortransactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds orproperties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of
its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2),(3) and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: provided, that the
Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may determine what cases may not be made public:
provided, further, that any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of highstandards of ethics and efficiency;(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any
investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts andrecords;(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure andwith the same penalties provided therein;(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shallensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or
hereinafter provided;- 151 -

(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.
The Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials and/or
those occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well as complaints
involving large sums of money and/or properties.
Section 16. Applicability. — The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in
Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.
Section 17. Immunities. — In all hearings, inquiries, and proceedings of the Ombudsman, including
preliminary investigations of offenses, nor person subpoenaed to testify as a witness shall be excusedfrom attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and/or otherrecords on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him, may
tend to incriminate him or subject him to prosecution: provided, that no person shall be prosecuted
criminally for or on account of any matter concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed theprivilege against self-incrimination, to testify and produce evidence, documentary or otherwise.
Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of theRules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession and production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to
determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its
authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives.
The immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness
from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removalfrom office.
Any refusal to appear or testify pursuant to the foregoing provisions shall be subject to punishment forcontempt and removal of the immunity from criminal prosecution.
Section 18. Rules of Procedure. —(1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective
exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties.
(2) The rules of procedure shall include a provision whereby the Rules of Court are madesuppletory.
(3) The rules shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publicationin the Official Gazette or in three (3) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, one ofwhich is printed in the national language.
Section 19. Administrative Complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but notlimited to acts or omissions which:(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;- 152 -

(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance withlaw;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
Section 20. Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of
any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:(1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;(2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman;(3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;(4) The complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or(5) The complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission
complained of.
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may beremoved only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
Section 22. Investigatory Power. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate
any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the
purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.
In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a private person, theOmbudsman and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person in the investigationand proceed against such private person as the evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and theprivate person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities.
Section 23. Formal Investigation. —(1) Administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be inaccordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process.
(2) At its option, the Office of the Ombudsman may refer certain complaints to the proper
disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against erring
public officers or employees, which shall be determined within the period prescribed in the civil
service law. Any delay without just cause in acting on any referral made by the Office of the
Ombudsman shall be a ground for administrative action against the officers or employees to- 153 -

whom such referrals are addressed and shall constitute a graft offense punishable by a fine of notexceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
(3) In any investigation under this Act the Ombudsman may: (a) enter and inspect the premises ofany office, agency, commission or tribunal; (b) examine and have access to any book, record, file,
document or paper; and (c) hold private hearings with both the complaining individual and theofficial concerned.
Section 24. Preventives Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt
is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from theservice; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but
not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the
Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case theperiod of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Section 25. Penalties. —(1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807, the penalties and rules
provided therein shall be applied.
(2) In other administrative proceedings, the penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one(1) year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from Five thousand pesos(P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the
Ombudsman, taking into consideration circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the liability ofthe officer or employee found guilty of the complaint or charges.
Section 26. Inquiries. —(1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall inquire into acts or omissions of a public officer,
employee, office or agency which, from the reports or complaints it has received, theOmbudsman or his Deputies consider to be:(a) contrary to law or regulation;(b) unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, irregular or inconsistent with the general course of
the operations and functions of a public officer, employee, office or agency;(c) an error in the application or interpretation of law, rules or regulations, or a gross or
palpable error in the appreciation of facts;(d) based on improper motives or corrupt considerations;(e) unclear or inadequately explained when reasons should have been revealed; or(f) inefficient performed or otherwise objectionable.

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(2) The Officer of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form
concerning an official act or omission.t shall act on the complaint immediately and if it finds thesame entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of such dismissal
citing the reasons therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall first
furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and require
him to submit a written answer within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof. If the answer
is found satisfactory, it shall dismiss the case.
(3) When the complaint consists in delay or refusal to perform a duty required by law, or whenurgent action is necessary to protect or preserve the rights of the complainant, the Office of the
Ombudsman shall take steps or measures and issue such orders directing the officer, employee,
office or agency concerned to:(a) expedite the performance of duty;(b) cease or desist from the performance of a prejudicial act;(c) correct the omission;(d) explain fully the administrative act in question; or(e) take any other steps as may be necessary under the circumstances to protect andpreserve the rights of the complainant.
(4) Any delay or refusal to comply with the referral or directive of the Ombudsman or any of his
Deputies, shall constitute a ground for administrative disciplinary action against the officer or
employee to whom it was addressed.
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be
filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of thefollowing grounds:(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant.
The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: provided, that
only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.
Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receiptof the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration inaccordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

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The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice
may require.
Section 28. Investigation in Municipalities, Cities and Provinces. — The Office of the Ombudsman may
establish offices in municipalities, cities and provinces outside Metropolitan Manila, under the immediate
supervision of the Deputies for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, where necessary as determined by the
Ombudsman. The investigation of complaints may be assigned to the regional or sectoral deputy
concerned or to a special investigator who shall proceed in accordance with the rules or special
instructions or directives of the Office of the Ombudsman. Pending investigation the deputy or
investigator may issue orders and provisional remedies which are immediately executory subject toreview by the Ombudsman. Within three (3) days after concluding the investigation, the deputy or
investigator shall transmit, together with the entire records of the case, his report and conclusions to the
Office of the Ombudsman. Within five (5) days after receipt of said report, the Ombudsman shall render
the appropriate order, directive or decision.
Section 29. Change of Unjust Laws. — If the Ombudsman believes that a law or regulation is unfair or
unjust, he shall recommend to the President and to Congress the necessary changes therein or the repeal
thereof.
Section 30. Transmittal/Publication of Decision. — In every case where the Ombudsman has reached adecision, conclusion or recommendation adverse to a public official or agency, he shall transmit his
decision, conclusion, recommendation or suggestion to the head of the department, agency or
instrumentality, or of the province, city or municipality concerned for such immediate action as may benecessary. When transmitting his adverse decision, conclusion or recommendation, he shall, unlessexcused by the agency or official affected, include the substance of any statement the public agency orofficial may have made to him by way of explaining past difficulties with or present rejection of the
Ombudsman's proposals.
Section 31. Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the personnelof his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service
to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases.
Those designated or deputized to assist him herein provided shall be under his supervision and control.
The Ombudsman and his investigators and prosecutors, whether regular members of his staff ordesignated by him as herein provided, shall have authority to administer oaths, to issue subpoena andsubpoena duces tecum, to summon and compel witnesses to appear and testify under oath before themand/or bring books, documents and other things under their control, and to secure the attendance orpresence of any absent or recalcitrant witness through application before the Sandiganbayan or before any
inferior or superior court having jurisdiction of the place where the witness or evidence is found.
Section 32. Rights and Duties of Witness. —(1) A person required by the Ombudsman to provide the information shall be paid the same fees
and travel allowances as are extended to witnesses whose attendance has been required in the trial
courts. Upon request of the witness, the Ombudsman shall also furnish him such security for his
person and his family as may be warranted by the circumstances. For this purpose, theOmbudsman may, at its expense, call upon any police or constabulary unit to provide the said
security.

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(2) A person who, with or without service or compulsory process, provides oral or documentary
information requested by the Ombudsman shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities
as are extended to witnesses in the courts, and shall likewise be entitled to the assistance ofcounsel while being questioned.
(3) If a person refuses to respond to the Ombudsman's or his Deputy's subpoena, or refuses to be
examined, or engages in obstructive conduct, the Ombudsman or his Deputy shall issue an orderdirecting the person to appear before him to show cause why he should not be punished forcontempt. The contempt proceedings shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Rulesof Court.
Section 33. Duty to Render Assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman. — Any officer or employee ofany department, bureau or office, subdivision, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and local governments, when required by the Ombudsman,
his Deputy or the Special Prosecutor shall render assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Section 34. Annual Report. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall render an annual report of its
activities and performance to the President and to Congress to be submitted within thirty (30) days fromthe start of the regular session of Congress.
Section 35. Malicious Prosecution. — Any person who, actuated by malice or gross bad faith, files acompletely unwarranted or false complaint against any government official or employee shall be subject
to a penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months imprisonment and a fine not exceeding
Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
Section 36. Penalties for Obstruction. — Any person who willfully obstructs or hinders the proper
exercise of the functions of the Office of the Ombudsman or who willfully misleads or attempts tomislead the Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor in replying to their inquiries shall bepunished by a fine of not exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
Section 37. Franking Privilege. — All official mail matters and telegrams of the Ombudsman addressedfor delivery within the Philippines shall be received, transmitted, and delivered free of charge: provided,that such mail matters when addressed to private persons or nongovernment offices shall not exceed one
hundred and twenty (120) grams. All mail matters and telegrams sent through government telegraphfacilities containing complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman shall be transmitted free of charge,
provided that the telegram shall contain not more than one hundred fifty (150) words.
Section 38. Fiscal Autonomy. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Office of the Ombudsman may not be reduced below the amount appropriated forthe previous years and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Section 39. Appropriations. — The appropriation for the Office of the Special Prosecutor in the current
General Appropriations Act is hereby transferred to the Office of the Ombudsman. Thereafter, such sums
as may be necessary shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 40. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this Act is held unconstitutional, other provisions
not affected thereby shall remain valid and binding.

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Section 41. Repealing Clause. — All laws, presidential decrees, letters of instructions, executive orders,rules and regulations insofar as they are inconsistent with this Act, are hereby repealed or amended as thecase may be.
Section 42. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Official Gazette or in three (3) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Approved: November 17, 1989.

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ANNEX HI.
SECTION 17 AND 18 OF RULE 119, REVISED RULES OF CRIMINALPROCEDURE
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. — When two or more persons are jointly charged
with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may
direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for thestate when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;(b) The is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of said accused;(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies
the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible inevidence. (9a)Section 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. — The order indicated in the preceding section
shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to future prosecution for thesame offense, unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with hissworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge.

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APPENDIX I
I.

RA 6981- WITNESS PROTECTION ACT

Section 3. Admission into the Program- Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge orinformation on the commission of a crime and has testified or is testifying or about to testify before any
judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program:
Provided, That: a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the
Revised Penal Code, or its equivalent under special laws; b) his testimony can be substantiallycorroborated in its material points; c) he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity is subjected to threats to his life or bodily injury or there is a likelihood that hewill be killed, forced, intimidated, harassed or corrupted to prevent him from testifying, or to testify
falsely, or evasively, because or on account of his testimony; and d) he is not a law enforcement officer,
even if he would be testifying against the other law enforcement officers. In such a case, only theimmediate members of his family may avail themselves of the protection provided for under this Act. If
the Department, after examination of said applicant and other relevant facts, is convinced that therequirements of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations have been complied with, it shalladmit said applicant to the Program, require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his
knowledge or information on the commission of the crime, and thereafter issue the proper certification.
For purposes of this Act, any such person admitted to the Program shall be known as the Witness.
Section 8. Rights and Benefits- The witness shall have the following rights and benefits:(a) To have a secure housing facility until he has testified or until the threat, intimidation orharassment disappears or is reduced to a manageable or tolerable level. When the circumstances warrant,
the Witness shall be entitled to relocation and/or change of personal identity at the expense of theProgram. This right may be extended to any member of the family of the Witness within the second civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity.
(b) The Department shall, whenever practicable, assist the Witness in obtaining a means of livelihood.
The Witness relocated pursuant to this Act shall be entitled to a financial assistance from the Program forhis support and that of his family in such amount and for such duration as the Department shall determine.
(c) In no case shall the Witness be removed from or demoted in work because or on account of hisabsences due to his attendance before any judicial or quasi-judicial body or investigating authority,
including legislative investigations in aid of legislation, in going thereto and in coming there from:
Provided, That his employer is notified through a certification issued by the Department, within a periodof thirty (30) days from the date when the Witness last reported for work: Provided, further, That in thecase of prolonged transfer or permanent relocation, the employer shall have the option to remove the
Witness from employment after securing clearance from the Department upon the recommendation of the
Department of Labor and Employment. Any Witness who failed to report for work because of witness
duty shall be paid his equivalent salaries or wages corresponding to the number of days of absenceoccasioned by the Program. For purposes of this Act, any fraction of a day shall constitute a full day
salary or wage. This provision shall be applicable to both government and private employees.
(d) To be provided with reasonable travelling expenses and subsistence allowance by the Program insuch amount as the Department may determine for his attendance in the court, body or authority where his
testimony is required, as well as conferences and interviews with prosecutors or investigating officers.

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(e) To be provided with free medical treatment, hospitalization and medicines for any injury orillness incurred or suffered by him because of witness duty in any private or public hospital, clinic, or atany such institution at the expense of the Program.
(f) If a Witness is killed, because of his participation in the Program, his heirs shall be entitled to aburial benefit of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) from the Program exclusive of any othersimilar benefits he may be entitled to under other existing laws. (g) In case of death or permanent
incapacity, his minor or dependent children shall be entitled to free education, from primary to college
level in any state, or private school, college or university as may be determined by the Department, aslong as they shall have qualified thereto.
II. DOJ RULES ON WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM
Who can be admitted into the Program?
1. Any person who has knowledge of or information on the commission of a crime and has testified oris testifying or is willing to testify. 2. A witness in a congressional investigation, upon therecommendation of the legislative committee where his testimony is needed and with the approval of the
Senate President or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be. 3. A witness who
participated in the commission of a crime and who desires to be a State witness. 4. An accused who isdischarged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may be a State witness.
What benefits may a witness under the Program receive?
The benefits include the following:□ Security protection and escort services.
□ Immunity from criminal prosecution and not to be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for any
transaction, matter or thing concerning his compelled testimony or books, documents or writings
produced. □ Secure housing facility.
□ Assistance in obtaining a means of livelihood.
□ Reasonable traveling expenses and subsistence allowance while acting as a witness.
□ Free medical treatment, hospitalization and medicine for any injury or illness incurred or suffered
while acting as a witness. □ Burial benefits of not less than Ten Thousand pesos (P10,000.00) if thewitness is killed because of his participation in the Program.
□ Free education from primary to college level for the minor or dependent children of a witness who diesor is permanently incapacitated.
□ Non-removal or demotion in work because of absences due to his being a witness and payment of fullsalary or wage while acting as witness.

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APPENDIX JI.

SALIENT POINTS OF PROPOSED WHISTLEBLOWER’S LAW□ An organic Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program (WPSBP) security unit shall be created
to provide security and protective services.
□ “Whistleblower” shall refer to an informant or any person who has personal knowledge or access todata of any information or event involving improper conduct by a public officer and/or a public body.
□Whistleblowers or informants, whether from the public or private sector, shall be entitled to thebenefits under this Act, provided, that all the following requisites concur:-The disclosure is voluntary, in writing and under oath;-The disclosure relates to acts constituting improper conduct by public officers and/or public bodies; and-The information to be disclosed is admissible in evidence.
□ Except insofar as allowed by this Act, during and after the disclosure, and throughout and after any
proceeding taken thereafter, a whistleblower or an informant is entitled toabsolute confidentiality as to:-His identity;-The subject matter of his disclosure; and,-The person to whom such disclosure was made.
□A whistleblower, informant or any person who has made a disclosure under this Act shall have, as
defense in any other inquiry or proceeding, the absolute privilege with respect to the subject matter ofhis/her disclosure or information given to the proper authorities.
□A whistleblower, informant, or a person who has made or is believed or suspected to have made a
disclosure under this Act is not liable to disciplinary action for making said disclosure. When determined
to be necessary and appropriate, a whistleblower or informant, even if the disclosure is made inconfidence, shall be entitled to personal security. Should, at anytime the identity of the informant be
revealed, or his anonymity compromised, the whistleblower or informant shall, in addition to the otherbenefits under this Act, and when warranted, be entitled to the benefits of R.A. No. 6891.
□ The Senate of the Philippines or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall provide for aseparate "Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program" for their resource persons and/or witnesses.
□ Before a person is provided protection under this Act, he shall first execute a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) which shall set forth his responsibilities, including not to enter into an amicablesettlement through the execution of an affidavit of desistance.
□ Substantial breach of the MOA may be a ground for criminal action.

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□ When the circumstances warrant, the witness shall be entitled to relocation and/or change of personal
identity at the expense of the program. This right may be extended to any member of the family of thewitness within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity who is under threat.
□ Upon request of the program the TESDA and/or DepEd shall provide vocational training to qualified
witnesses to encourage them to be self-sufficient in preparation for their reintegration to mainstream
society. The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and/or Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA) shall likewise render assistance for the placement and employment of covered
witnesses locally and abroad.
□ In extremely meritorious cases, to be determined by the Secretary of Justice and upon request of thewitness, he may be relocated abroad.
□ The coverage of a witness under the program shall be one of the circumstances under which theperpetuation of the testimony of a witness shall be allowed in addition to those provided for in Rule 24 in
relation to Rule 134 of the Revised Rules of the Court of the Philippines.

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