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グローバルセキュリティセミナー叢書

第６号

GLOBAL SECURITY SEMINAR SERIES NO. 6

NDA-FOI Joint Seminar

Nuclear Threshold Lowered?
Coedited by
Hideya Kurata and Jerker Hellström

防衛大学校先端学術推進機構
グローバルセキュリティセンター

© National Defense Academy, Japan Ministry of Defense
1-10-20 Hashirimizu, Yokosuka, 239-8686 JAPANGlobal Security Seminar Series No.6

NDA-FOI Joint Seminar

Nuclear Threshold Lowered?
Coedited by
Hideya Kurata and Jerker Hellströ m

March 2021

Center for Global Security, National Defense Academy
Yokosuka, Japani

CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iv

INTRODUCTION

1CHAPTER 1
Frank A. Rose

CHAPTER 2
Hirofumi Tosaki

CHAPTER 3
John Rydquist

CHAPTER 4
Naomi Koizumi

CHAPTER 5
Masahiro Kurita

CHAPTER 6
Johan Englund

CHAPTER 7
Hideya Kurata
CHAPTER 8
Jerker Hellströ m

CHAPTER 9
Takeshi Watanabe

Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review?

7

Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control:
A Japanese Perspective

20

Nuclear Dilemmas in Europe: Nuclear Deterrence andStrategic Stability post-INF

38

Russia’s Debate on Strategic Deterrence:
From Strategic Nuclear Deterrence to Hybrid Warfare

50

Strategic Stability in Changing Nuclear South Asia:
Emerging Risks

63

China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino–Indian Relations in the
Nuclear Realm

77

Escaping from the Accuracy-Vulnerability Paradox:
The DPRK’s Initial Escalation Ladders in War Strategy

93

North Korea’s Nuclear Posture after the Summit 105
Meetings: A View from China

South Korean Civilians’ Political Domain behind
Coercion: A Chance for Autonomy from Alliances

CONTRIBUTORS

110

124
ii

GLOBAL SECURITY SEMINAR SERIES
Global Security Seminar Series is published occasionally by the Center for Global Security.
The Center designs series of international seminars and other independent seminars. This
series consists of the working papers of these seminars. The views expressed in thispublication are solely of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions
or governments of the authors.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Center for Global Security (GS), National Defense Academy (NDA) and Totalfö rsvarets
forskningsinstitut (FOI), Swedish Defence Research Agency, launched a joint research
project, called NDA-FOI Joint Seminars based on the Memorandum of Understanding
between Japan Ministry of Defense and Sweden Ministry of Defense on mutual defense
cooperation.
This volume is based on the working papers presented at the NDA-FOI Joint Seminars on“Nuclear Threshold Lowered?” held on March 5, 2019. Most of the chapters are revised or
up-dated to reflect the views expressed during the course of the seminar.
On behalf of GS and FOI, we would like to express our sincere appreciations not only to thecontributors for their precious time and efforts in the process of this publication, but also to
all those who attended the seminar and participated in the discussions. The views expressedin each of the chapters, however, strictly represent those of the respective authors, and so go
the credits.
We hope the insights shared by the authors here invite a new round of discussion among
readers. Comments and suggestions on our joint research project are more than welcome.
March 2021
Hideya Kurata
Director of Center for Global Security
National Defense Academy
Copyright ©2021 by National Defense Academy of Japan.

Published by the Center for

Global Security, Institute for Advanced Studies, National Defense Academy, Yokosuka,
JAPAN.
iii

Introduction (Kurata, Hellströ m, Rydqvist and Englund)

1

INTRODUCTION

Hideya Kurata, Jerker Hellström, John Rydqvist, Johan Englund

Nuclear dilemmas in East Asia and the transatlantic region have continued to abate.
However, the problem has been closely connected to the widespread political contention
and hostile behavior from two major authoritarian regimes, namely, Russia and China,
which continue to prioritize the modernization of strategic and non-strategic nuclear
forces. Missile build-up has been of particular concern due to the dual nature of thesystems. With their superior regional nuclear forces, Russia and China may intend to deter
allied countries, such as the United States (U.S.), from intervening with its ally countries,
should they determine that a local war of aggression is in their interest. Such examples
include, but are not limited to, China’s invasion of Taiwan or the Russian war against east
European NATO countries or allies.
In war, missile forces can contribute to regional area access and denial because they canprovide these powers with the capability to target strategic assets with high precision. At
the same time, nuclear forces can be used to control escalation, such that war remains
limited and winnable within terms favorable to China or Russia. In addition, the need tooffset continued American superiority in terms of conventional strike capability canpartially explain the focus on regional nuclear forces. Such regional strategic priorities
are in contrast with arms control measures in several aspects. Therefore, Russia opts tobreach its obligations to several arms control treaties, which led to the collapse of oldarms control regimes, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.
Conversely, China continues to reject any serious dialog on regional and strategic nuclear
balance, let alone accept participation in any new arms control regimes, whose fate is tied
to the evolving European and East Asian developments. Failure from the Russian and U.S.

Introduction (Kurata, Hellströ m, Rydqvist and Englund)2

sides to negotiate a follow-on treaty to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty(START), which is due to expire in 2021. The treaty can be prolonged for up to five years.
However, regardless of agreement after the 2020 U.S. election, a new formula should beestablished if strategic arms were to remain restricted in the long-term.
Inherently, the nuclear dilemmas faced by the democratic alliance are a consequence of
the ambitions and goals entertained by China and Russia. In their unique ways, they aim
to reshape and dominate regional and global orders by changing norms and challenging
the rights and interests of neighbors through military coercion or force if necessary. Hence,
the free world is left with no choice but to react and resist the detrimental behavior of thetwo powers. In short- and medium-terms, such a scenario will necessitate reinforcementof deterrence across conflict domains, including extended nuclear deterrence. In thecurrent situation, this scheme is the only means for ensuring strategic stability.
Alternatively, North Korea continues to develop short-, medium-, and long-range nuclear
strike capabilities. In other words, the nuclear ambition of the regime in Pyongyang
remains a major threat to international security. New initiatives by the Trumpadministration to find solutions to the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula, such as
two U.S.–Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) summits, prove to be null. In
addition, although North Korea has refrained from nuclear or long-range missile tests
since 2017, it will undoubtedly continue to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities.
The jury is out to determine whether any progress can be made in the final year of the
Trump administration. Therefore, any deal acceptable to North Korea should include aform of step-by-step sanction relief in return for a step-by-step complete, irreversible, andverifiable disarmament. Outside of North Korea, the world remains skeptical about its
sincerity and, therefore, is reluctant to reward North Korea before the existence of a proofof substantial progress toward denuclearization. The track-record of the Kim regime, lackof trust between parties, and security dilemmas guiding the behavior of North Korean
renders continued nuclear build-up an extremely more likely scenario to the detriment ofother countries.

Introduction (Kurata, Hellströ m, Rydqvist and Englund)3

Many of the abovementioned issues were discernable even in early 2019 during a seminarconvened by the Center for Global Security at the National Defense Academy (NDA) in
Japan and the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) to address security threats andresponses to such challenges. This publication is based on papers presented at the joint
seminar and subsequent discussions. The chapters presented herein provide various
perspectives on security challenges as depicted by scholars from Japan and Sweden withspecial participation from scholars from the U.S.
In Chapter One, Frank Rose of Brookings (assistant secretary for arms control,
verification, and compliance under the Obama administration), provides an assessmentof the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Rose concludes that although the NPRof the Trump administration is indeed responsive to threats faced by the country and its
allies, the President’s controversial public statements and heavy price tag of the strategic
nuclear modernization program challenged the bipartisan consensus on the nuclear policy.
He notes that the chances of success of the Trump administration may improve with thecalibration of its public messages; effective engagement of the U.S. Congress, generalpublic, and allies on the importance of nuclear deterrence; advance pragmatic arms
control and non-proliferation initiatives; and enhancement of strategic stability withpotential adversaries, such as Russia and China.
Chapter Two features Hirofumi Tosaki of the Japan Institute of International Affairs who
addresses the U.S. NPR of 2018 and the withdrawal of the U.S. from the INF Treaty, andJapan’s positions. Tosaki elaborates on the necessity of pursuing arms control andaddresses challenges, such as China’s refusal to accept substantive nuclear arms control
and nuclear weapons reductions. He concludes that the uncertaity of the international
system has seriously disrupted the nuclear order due to power transition, multipolarizationof nuclear relations, and diversification of deterrence systems. Nuclear-armed states havebecome increasingly interested in maintaining and strengthening their nuclear deterrence
capabilities but substantially less interested in arms control to enable regulation, reduction,
and/or elimination of their military powers, including nuclear weapons.

4Introduction (Kurata, Hellströ m, Rydqvist and Englund)

In Chapter Three, John Rydqvist discusses the strategic balance in Europe in the post
INF-era. The Russian violation and subsequent abrogation of such a key Cold War-era
nuclear arms control treaty is a symptom of the turbulence experienced by European
security. Wars of aggression fought by Russia since 2008 onward are a fundamental root
cause. Therefore, superior Russian land forces with direct land access to eastern European
allies and partners is a key military challenge. As such, continued build-up of dual use,
non-INF compliant delivery systems, such as nuclear capable ones, for use in Europe is apressing problem. In this regard, a new set of limitations on nuclear forces in Europe canbe achieved only through a comprehensive approach that addresses political and military
problems at the same time. Thus, the transatlantic community should formulatecompromises that will enable it to further enhance multi-domain deterrence. Only from a
position of strength can Russia then be convinced to work toward a new formula forstrategic stability that considers caps on non-strategic nuclear forces.
Chapter Four highlights Naomi Koizumi of NDA, who analyzes the debate among
Russian military analysts on the issue of strategic deterrence. In terms of strategic nuclear
deterrence, Koizumi notes that Russia perceives the U.S. missile defense system as amajor threat, which defeats the strategic parity between the two parties. This notion
explains Russia’s efforts to develop new offensive weapons that can evade the defensive
system of the U.S. Furthermore, in terms of a large-scale regional war, she asserts that
the Russians are unlikely to lower its nuclear threshold. Rather, the political and militaryleadership is shifting its emphasis to “non-nuclear deterrence,” which currently includes
non-military measures. Military analysts are relatively aware of Russia’s inferiority in
networking and conventional weapons in terms of local conflicts. Thus, such analysts are
critical of the “non-nuclear deterrence” doctrine, which was newly introduced in the 2014
Military Doctrine. As a result, they cannot shift from the limited nuclear use option on
the one hand and tend to increase their dependence on non-military measures that arecomparatively reliable, such as cyberattacks, on the other hand.

Introduction (Kurata, Hellströ m, Rydqvist and Englund)

5

In Chapter Five, Masahiro Kurita of The National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS)
assesses the emerging risks for strategic stability in nuclear South Asia. Kurita points outthat a key question is whether the strategic stability of the competitive relations between
India and Pakistan and between India and China should be maintained. The chapter thenhighlights certain risks that may threaten the overall stability of these relations in the
short- to mid-term future, such as the stability–instability paradox and evolution of India’s
countermeasures, developments in Pakistani and Indian nuclear postures, and potential
discovery of the stability–instability paradox in the China–India dyad. Kurita asserts thatthe extent to which such risks will lead to serious consequences is dependent on thepolitical atmosphere surrounding the security relations between the three countries. The
scenario, however, is not a source of relief. In fact, it is relatively the opposite of relief as
the China–India relations are gradually worsening, whereas the India–Pakistan politicalconnection is currently at its lowest point since the end of the 2001–2002 crisis. Hence,risks to the strategic stability in South Asia should be monitored. Appropriate
engagements by the international community are also required, especially in the crisis
management field.
Chapter Six features Johan Englund of FOI as he examines the current issues that are thesubjects of debates among Chinese strategists regarding China’s nuclear posture.
Furthermore, he discusses the impact on the Sino–Indian security dynamics. He deems
that China is likely to adhere to its formal no-first-use (NFU) pledge in the near future.
However, China is expected to acquire capabilities relevant to war fighting doctrines andmay unofficially undertake adjustments to its nuclear posture in the long-term. Thistendency may lead to serious implications for the security dynamics in South Asia ingeneral and the Chinese-Indian security relations in particular. In summary, Englundstates that, in the short-term, the general and structural nuclear stability between China
and India is in check despite the burden of significant rivalry on the sources of suchbilateral instability. However, in the medium- and long-term, potential doctrinal changes
in minimum deterrence and NFUs (albeit informal) combined with uncertain regional

6Introduction (Kurata, Hellströ m, Rydqvist and Englund)security dynamics and increased capability of nuclear forces may trigger the China–
Indian nuclear rivalry to become more precarious.
In Chapter Seven, Hideya Kurata of NDA explores the duality of North Korea’s nuclear
posture and demonstrates how the relocation plan of the United States Forces Korea inthe wake of the 9-11 terrorist attacks in 2001 necessitated the DPRK to extend the rangeof its counterforce projectiles to reach receding targets. He points out that accuracy
becomes a sacrificial component when targets of counterforce projectiles recede.
Accuracy, however, increases vulnerability to interception by the low-tier missile defenseof the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK). To avoid the “accuracy–vulnerability
paradox,” Kurata examines North Korea’s initial escalation ladders in its war strategy.
Jerker Hellström of FOI (current Director of the Swedish Center for China Studies)presents the Chinese perspectives on North Korea’s nuclear posture after the two summits
in Singapore and Hanoi in Chapter Eight. Hellström argues that a major divide exists
between the Chinese and American views of North Korea’s nuclear program, including
China’s acceptance of the peaceful development of nuclear energy of the DPRK, which
the U.S. did not accept. Moreover, Chinese scholars are mainly influenced by the fact that
China, in contrast to the U.S., values stability more than denuclearization. In addition,
Hellström explains the Chinese notions of “denuclearization” and the direct implicationsof the nuclear ambitions of the DPRK for China.
Finally, Chapter Nine presents Takeshi Watanabe of the NIDS, who reviews several
issues, such as coercion, and perceptions among civilians. He examines the quest of theincumbent government of ROK for greater autonomy from the alliance by reconcilingwith North Korea. He offers the conclusion that the decision-making of a nation targetedby coercion should involve the perceptions and political objectives of civilians. As theincumbent governments in the U.S. and ROK are seeking autonomy from alliances on thebasis of improving legitimacy through adherence to the objectives of civilians, the nuclear
coercion imposed by North Korea is becoming increasingly effective.

Chapter 1 — Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review?
[Rose]

7

CHAPTER 1

Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review?
Frank A. RoseEXECUTIVE SUMMARYIn February 2018, the Trump administration released the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),
which seeks to ensure that the United States will continue to maintain a safe, secure, andeffective deterrent that protects the U.S. homeland, assures allies, and above all, deters
adversaries. The review largely achieves these goals. However, it’s uncertain whether or
not the administration can use the document to build a sustainable bipartisan consensus
on nuclear policy. The president’s controversial public statements and the hefty price tagof the strategic nuclear modernization program represent key challenges to fostering andmaintaining that consensus.
The administration’s chances of sustaining a consensus may improve if it is able tocalibrate its public messages on nuclear weapons; effectively engage Congress, thegeneral public, and allies on the importance of nuclear deterrence; advance pragmatic
arms control and non-proliferation initiatives; enhance strategic stability with potential
adversaries such as Russia and China; and put in place effective oversight mechanisms toaddress cost concerns associated with the strategic nuclear modernization program.

INTRODUCTION“Nuclear Posture Review signals new arms race.”1“An arm race toward global instability.”2“The time is 2 minutes to nuclear midnight.”3
Katrina vanden Heuvel, “The Nuclear Posture Review Signals a New Arms Race,” The Nation,
February 13, 2018, https://www.thenation.com/article/the-nuclear-posture-review-signals-a-new- arms-race (accessed December 18, 2020).
2 Omar Lamari, “An Arms Race Toward Global Instability,” Forbes, February 20, 2018, https://www.
forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2018/02/20/an-arms-race-toward-global-instability/#7324cb25b62 (accessed December 18, 2020).
3 Tony Magliano, “The time is 2 minutes to nuclear midnight,” Angelus, March 2, 2018, https://angelus
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Chapter 1 — Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review?
[Rose]

Reading these headlines about the recently released Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), you
would think that the document is a dramatic break from long-standing U.S. nuclear policy
and strategy. As former U.S. Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) once said, it’s like “chicken
licking, the sky is falling.”4 Is the sky really falling? Is the NPR as bad as critics claim?
Is the review leading the United States and the world toward a new arms race?
On the contrary, I would argue that the 2018 NPR is fundamentally consistent with longstanding U.S. nuclear policy and strategy, including the Obama administration’s 2010
NPR. However, the authors of the 2018 NPR face significant challenges as they seek tomove forward with implementation of the review. This paper will discuss some of the key
issues in the NPR, note the long-term implementation challenges the review faces, andpropose practical recommendations for how the Trump administration might mitigate
these challenges.

ASSESSMENT OF THE NPR
THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENTThe NPR’s assessment of the current security environment is compelling. It states that“global threat conditions have worsened markedly since the most recent 2010 NPR. …
The United States faces a more diverse and advanced nuclear-threat environment thanever before.”5 In particular, the NPR highlights the return of great power competition,
especially as it pertains to U.S. relationships with Russia and China. As my colleague
Thomas Wright notes in his recent book, All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the
21st Century and the Future of American Power, “The United States is in competition
with Russia and China for the future of the international order.”6 By the end of the Obamaadministration, many senior officials, including myself, had come to a similar
conclusion.7

news.com/content/the-time-is-2-minutes-to-nuclear-midnight (accessed December 18, 2020).
4 “Did you hear: 38 classic ‘Hollings-isms,’” The Times and Democrat, December 16, 2004, http://
thetandd.com/news/did-you-hear-classic-hollings-isms/article_8327afa8-b598-5930-aeb0-3a09e6d6
88e4.htm (accessed January 21, 2021).
5 U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review 2018,” (Arlington, VA: U.S. Department of
Defense, February 2018), p. V, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NU
CLEAR-POSTURE -REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed January 21, 2021).
6 Thomas Wright, All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the 21st Century and the Future ofAmerican Power, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), 189.
7
“U.S. accuses Russia of dismantling security agreements,” The Financial Times, March 30, 2016,
https://www.ft.com/content/943a8ae0-f62e-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132.

Chapter 1 — Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review?
[Rose]

9In April 2009, President Obama delivered his seminal speech in Prague outlining his longterm vision for a “world free of nuclear weapons.”8 In actuality, the Prague speech was anuanced document that carefully balanced deterrence, arms control, and non-proliferation
priorities. While the speech laid out the president’s long-term vision, Obama also notedthat this was unlikely to happen during his lifetime, and that as long as nuclear weapons
existed, the United States would maintain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent.9 The
speech was intended to serve as a catalyst to encourage further action on arms reduction
and non-proliferation by other nations.
Unfortunately, that did not turn out to be the case. As the 2018 NPR notes:
Despite concerted U.S. efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international
affairs and to negotiate reductions in the number of nuclear weapons, since 2010 nopotential adversary has reduced either the role of nuclear weapons in its national security
strategy or number of nuclear weapons in the field. Rather, they moved decidedly in the
opposite direction.10
While the Obama administration made modest progress with Russia on nuclear reductions
early in the administration, Russian security elites never bought into Obama’s long-term
vision. For example, Russia signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NewSTART) in 2010 not because it believed in a “world free of nuclear weapons.” Rather,
New START was fundamentally about maintaining strategic nuclear parity with theUnited States, capping the number of U.S. nuclear forces, and providing Russia insights
into the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal that it might not have access to without the treaty.
Furthermore, Russia has shown little interest in pursuing additional nuclear reductions,especially with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons, which are not limited by New
START, and in which Russia has a large numerical advantage.

CONTINUING THE OBAMA STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MODERNIZATIONPROGRAMFar from being a dramatic departure from previous nuclear policy and strategy, the 2018
NPR essentially ratifies the Obama administration’s strategic nuclear modernization
8 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered,” (speech, Prague,

Czech Republic, April 5, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-barack-obama-prague-delivered (accessed January 21, 2021).
9Ibid.
10 U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review 2018,” 7.

10

Chapter 1 — Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review?
[Rose]

program. Specifically, the NPR recommends moving forward with the Obamaadministration’s strategic modernization program: the Columbia-class ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN), the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), the B-21 bomber, andthe Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile. Though some experts, primarily in thearms control and disarmament community, opposed elements of the Obamamodernization program, the program was key to winning Senate advice and consent for
New START, and it continues to maintain strong bipartisan support in Congress. Thesesystems enhance strategic stability and are consistent with U.S. arms control obligations
and commitments.

ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION
Many analysts, including myself, were concerned with some of the Trumpadministration’s initial statements regarding arms control and non-proliferation,
especially claims that New START was a “bad deal for the United States.”11 Luckily,
those concerns have not yet come to pass, and the language on arms control and nonproliferation is largely consistent with the approach taken by previous U.S.
administrations. Admittedly, the 2018 NPR does not focus the same level of attention andemphasis on arms control and non-proliferation as the Obama administration’s 2010 NPR.
However, under the 2018 review, the U.S. will maintain our negative security assurance
not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state incompliance with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations; 12 continue to fund theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, the International Monitoring System, andthe International Data Center; 13 remain a party to New START; and continue active

11 Jonathan Landay and David Rhode, “In call with Putin, Trump denounced Obama-era arms Treaty,”

Reuters, February 9, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-putin/exclusive-in-call-with-putin-trump-denounced-obama-era-nuclear-arms-treaty-sources-idUSKBN15O2A5 (accessed January 21, 2021).
12 The 2018 NPR caveats this assurance by noting that given the potential of significant non-nuclear
strategic attacks, the United States reserves the right to make adjustments to the assurance that may be
warranted by the evolution of the threat. The 2010 NPR made a similar caveat with regard to biologicalweapons, which states: “Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of
bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in theassurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat
and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.” See U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review,”(Arlington, VA: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010), 14, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/
features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf (accessed February 19,2021).
13 However, the NPR makes clear that “the United States will not seek Senate ratification of theComprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.” That said, the U.S. Senate does not ratify treaties, it
provides its “advice and consent” to ratification. It is the president who officially ratifies treaties onbehalf of the United States.

Chapter 1 — Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review?
[Rose]

11

participation in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification(IPNDV).14
Some analysts have criticized the NPR for treating arms control and non-proliferation as
an “afterthought.” This line of criticism is not entirely fair. Despite its best efforts, theObama administration was unable to make any further progress on arms reductions during
its second term in office. Moreover, it is unlikely that any new U.S. administration—
Democrat or Republican—would have been in a position to make significant progress onarms control given the current security environment, and Russia’s violation of several
arms control agreements.15 Indeed, a strong argument can be made that the bilateral U.S.Russia arms reductions process that began in the late 1980s may be at an end, making it
imperative to anticipate what a future U.S.-Russia strategic stability framework mightlook like in the absence of further negotiated reductions.
Critics of the NPR also argue that the document fails to explicitly reference Article VI of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which calls on signatories “to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”16 While this is true, the NPR doesreference the NPT, stating: “The United States remains committed to nuclear nonproliferation, continues to abide by its obligations under the NPT, and will work tostrengthen the NPT regime.”17 Of the four NPRs conducted by the United States since
1994, only one, the Obama administration’s 2010 review, specifically references Article
VI on the NPT in publicly released documents.18 The failure to specifically reference
Article VI in itself is not a big deal. The more legitimate question is whether the Trumpadministration feels if it has an obligation to pursue disarmament.
Evaporating support for arms control initiatives by the Republican Party, especially inCongress, is also a cause for concern. If arms control is to have a long-term future, new
14 U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review 2018,” 71-74.
15 The United States judges Russia to be in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. See “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” U.S. Department of State, April
14, 2017,) https://2017-2021.state.gov/2017-report-on-adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-agreements-and-commitments//index.html (accessed February
19, 2021).
16
The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, https://www.un.org/disarmam
ent/wmd/nuclear/npt/text (accessed February 19, 2021).
17 U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review 2018,” 70.
18
The United States has conducted Nuclear Posture Reviews in 1994 (Clinton), 2002 (Bush), 2010
(Obama), 2018 (Trump).

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Chapter 1 — Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review?
[Rose]

efforts will be required to build a bipartisan consensus in favor of such treaties andagreements that advance U.S. security interests. Better integration of arms control with
U.S. deterrence and stability requirements is key to developing this consensus.
In addition, there are several essential national security benefits that arms control provides,
which are little appreciated in conservative circles. For example, it’s important toacknowledge that while President Obama did not get everything right in the nuclear policy
arena, critics should acknowledge that his nuclear policies helped create a bipartisanconsensus in favor of strategic nuclear modernization. Specifically, New START playeda critical role in building support among congressional Democrats for the strategic nuclear
modernization program.
Anti-nuclear feelings run high among the publics in many allied countries, especially in
Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, and Japan. Arms control and non-proliferationagreements play an essential role in helping allied governments build domestic politicalconsensus to support nuclear deterrence, especially with regard to hosting U.S. assets on
their territory, and procuring dual-capable aircraft.
And finally, as the NPR acknowledges, arms control can complement U.S. defense
planning. For example, strategic arms control agreements like New START, by bounding
the threat and providing transparency and predictability, have enabled U.S. defense
planners to design and deploy with confidence an effective deterrent that can survive afirst strike by an adversary.

EXTENDED DETERRENCE
Despite widespread criticism of its management of alliance relationships, the Trumpadministration’s consultations with allies in the context of the NPR stand out as an
exception to the rule. Similar to the 2010 NPR, the 2018 NPR established an effective
consultation process that enabled allies to provide input and help shape the review. Basedon publicly available information, allied governments appear to be satisfied both with theconsultative mechanisms and with the document’s final conclusions. Such consultation isessential to maintaining alliance cohesion and support.
In a February 2, 2018 statement on the NPR, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono stated:“Japan highly appreciates the latest NPR which clearly articulates the U.S. resolve toensure the effectiveness of its deterrence and its commitment to providing extendedChapter 1 — Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review?
[Rose]

13

deterrence to its allies, including Japan.”19 The only negative public comment about the
NPR from a senior allied official came from Sigmar Gabriel, German foreign minister at
the time the document was released. According to press reports, Gabriel criticized the
NPR and called on Europe “to begin new initiatives for arms control and disarmament.”20
However, it is unlikely that Gabriel’s views were fully representative of the German
government, especially the Chancellery and the Ministry of Defense, which are occupied
by members of the center-right Christian Democrat Union (CDU) party.
The NPR devotes significant attention to extended deterrence and recommends several
specific actions to enhance U.S. and allied capabilities.21 These include acquiring the B21 bomber and LRSO cruise missile, developing a new nuclear-armed sea-launchedcruise missile (SLCM), enhancing the readiness and survivability of NATO dual-capable
aircraft, and working with allies “to improve our shared understanding of nuclear dangers
and corresponding deterrence requirements through continued consultative dialogues.”22
Overall, the NPR is good for extended deterrence.

DECLARATORY POLICY
Similar to the 2010 NPR, the 2018 review states: “The United States would only consider
the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interest of theUnited States, its allies, and partners.”23 However, unlike the 2010 NPR, the most recent
review explicitly defines “extreme circumstances” to include “significant non-nuclear
strategic attacks.”24 It’s not clear why the Trump administration felt further clarificationof U.S. declaratory policy was necessary. Unfortunately, the clarification has fueled apublic narrative that the United States is expanding the instances when it would use
nuclear weapons. This was probably not the intention of the review’s authors, but it will
require senior administration officials to constantly address the issue. It is a self-inflicted
wound that will likely fester for some time and provide propaganda fodder for Russia.

19 “Release of the Nuclear Posture Review: Statement of Foreign Minister Taro Kono,” Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Japan, February 2, 2018, https://www. mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001893.
html (February 19, 2021).
20 “Nuclear weapons: Germany’s Sigmar Gabriel calls on Europe to lead disarmament push,”
Deutsche Welle, February 24, 2018, http://www.dw.com/en/nuclear-weapons-germanys-sigmar-gabri
el-calls-on-europe-to-lead-disarmament-push/a-42449629 (accessed January 25, 2021).
21 U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review 2018,” 34-37.
22 Ibid., 37.
23
Ibid., 21.
24 Ibid., 21.

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Chapter 1 — Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review?
[Rose]

NEW LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR CAPABILITIESThe NPR recommends that the United States “pursue select supplements” to the Obamaadministration’s strategic nuclear modernization program to “enhance the flexibility andresponsiveness of U.S. nuclear forces.”25 These supplements include developing a new
low-yield warhead for the D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and a new
SLCM deployed on attack submarines and surface ships. Several analysts have argued
that these supplemental capabilities will lower the threshold for nuclear use. However,the United States currently deploys several low-yield nuclear weapons in its arsenal (e.g.,the B-61 gravity bomb and the air-launched cruise missile) and was modernizing its lowyield capabilities under the Obama administration’s program of record (e.g., B-61-12,
LRSO). Therefore, it’s difficult to imagine how introducing a modified D-5 warhead ora new SLCM is going to “lower the threshold” for nuclear use. If the United States needed
to employ a low-yield nuclear option today, it could do so.
The key question is not whether these new capabilities will “lower the threshold fornuclear use,” but whether additional lower yield capabilities—beyond the B-61-12 andLRSO—are needed to maintain effective deterrence against Russia and others. From myperspective, as long as the United States moves forward with deployment of the B-61-12
gravity bomb and the LRSO cruise missile, that should be sufficient to deter the threat
from Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces and other potential adversaries.
However, of the two supplemental capabilities the NPR proposes, a strong case can bemade for developing a new nuclear-armed SLCM as a complement to the B-61-12 and
LRSO. Such a capability could serve as a hedge against longer-term advances in antisubmarine warfare capabilities, as this would increase the number of nuclear-armed
submarines; 26 provide a treaty-compliant response to Russia’s violation of theIntermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; and enhance extended deterrence,
especially with Japan and the Republic of Korea, by providing a prompt response option.
Japan was initially concerned by the retirement of the Tomahawk Land Attack MissileNuclear (TLAM-N) SLCM in 2010, and Japanese officials have generally welcomed U.S.
plans to reintroduce this capability.
A decision to proceed with the development of a nuclear-armed SLCM will face two key
challenges. First, it is unclear where the administration will find the additional resources
to pay for the new system. However, developing a sea-based version of the LRSO might25

Ibid., 52.

26 The NPR does not rule out also deploying nuclear-armed SLCMs on surface vessels.

Chapter 1 — Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review?
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15

be an affordable option. Second, the U.S. Navy has traditionally been ambivalent about
deploying nuclear-armed systems on surface vessels and attack submarines. The Obamaadministration’s decision in the 2010 NPR to retire the TLAM-N nuclear-armed cruise
missile was, in large part, driven by the Navy’s reluctance to fund and sustain the program.
I find the case for the low-yield D-5 warhead to be less compelling and question whether
there truly is a “gap” in our theater-level deterrence posture in Europe, as the NPR claims.
On the other hand, I am also uncertain that placing a low-yield warhead on the D-5 missile
would undermine stability and increase the chances of miscalculation, as some haveclaimed. For example, the United Kingdom has deployed low-yield warheads on it
SSBNs for over a decade, 27 and few experts have claimed that this deployment has
undermined stability.28

RUSSIAN VS. CHINESE NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
There is no doubt that China represents a potential threat to the United States and its allies.
Nevertheless, it is not fully clear why the NPR lumps China in with Russia in the nuclear
context, given that their approaches to nuclear weapons policy differ significantly. First,
though China has been actively modernizing its strategic nuclear forces over a decade(e.g., deployment of mobile intercontinental-range ballistic missiles and ballistic missile
submarines), and its nuclear forces have certainly become more survivable, there’s noevidence that it seeks to move beyond a “minimum deterrent” force or pursue nuclear
parity with the United States. Second, Russia has made numerous nuclear threats against
other countries, while China has not. To the contrary, China continues to maintain its “nofirst use” of nuclear weapons policy.
The primary challenge from China is its attempt to tilt the balance of power in the Western
Pacific in its favor through a major conventional force build-up and development of antiaccess, area denial and “asymmetric” capabilities (e.g., counter-space, cyber). While it isimperative that the United States continue to deter China’s nuclear forces, its primaryconcern should be focused on countering China’s efforts to gain conventional superiority
in the Western Pacific.
27 AustinLong, “Discrimination Details Matter Clarifying Argument About Low-Yield Nuclear
Warhead,” War on the Rocks, February 16, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/discriminationdetails-matter-clarifying-argument-low-yield-nuclear-warheads (accessed January 25, 2021).
28 For a more detailed discussion of the issues associated with deploying low-yield warheads on
SSBNs, see Franklin C. Miller, “Addressing Fears About The Nuclear Posture Review and Limited
Nuclear Use,” War on the Rocks, February 28, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/addressingfears-nuclear-posture-review-limited-nuclear-use (accessed January 25, 2021).

16

Chapter 1 — Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review?
[Rose]GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (GLCM)
The NPR also recommends that the United States “commence INF Treaty-compliant
research and development by reviewing military concepts for conventional, groundlaunched, intermediate-range missile defenses” in response to Russia’s violation on the
INF Treaty.29 As I noted in testimony before the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee
in March 2017,30 the challenge with conducting research and developing a new GLCM isthat once the system is developed, where would it be deployed? For example, public
protests in reaction to NATO’s decision to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles
and GLCMs in Europe in the 1980s almost broke the alliance. In addition, the recent
decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense
system in the Republic of Korea has been highly controversial. 31 Given the politicalchallenges associated with basing GLCMs on foreign territory, it would be wiser to invest
those funds into developing a conventional variant of the LRSO or a new SLCM. Airand sea-launched systems would not require the United States to negotiate basing rights
with host nations and could meet military requirements. Either approach would have theadded benefit of being INF Treaty-compliant, while a U.S. GLCM would be as treaty
non-compliant as the Russian GLCM.32

IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGESPRESIDENT TRUMP’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS
There are two key issues that will fundamentally impact the Trump administration’s
ability to implement the NPR over the long term: President’s Trump’s personal rhetoricon nuclear policy and the affordability of the strategic nuclear modernization program.
Unlike previous presidents who used careful language when discussing nuclear weapons,
President Trump has taken a different approach, using inflammatory language to describe
his approach to nuclear policy. Some of his more controversial statements include:

29 U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review 2018,” 10.
30 Frank A. Rose, “Consequences and Context for Russia’s Violations of the INF Treaty,” (testimony

before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Washington, DC,
March 30, 2017), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20170330/105811/HHRG-115-FA18Wstate-RoseF-20170330.pdf (accessed January 25, 2021).
31 “THAAD Controversy Threatens Bumpy Ties with US,” Chosunilbo, May 2, 2017, http//english.
chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/05/02/2017050201313.html (accessed January 25, 2021).
32
Research and development of INF-range systems is permitted under the INF Treaty, but flighttesting and deployment is not.

Chapter 1 — Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review?
[Rose]

17“Let it be an arms race;”33“… we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea. Rocket Man
is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime. The United States isready, willing and able;”34 and“I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one thanhis, and my Button works!”35
Conversely, senior Trump administration officials have generally been thoughtful andrestrained in their public statements on nuclear policy. However, make no mistake, thepresident’s statements are impacting the administration’s ability to effectively articulate
its message on the NPR, and have the potential to undermine the current bipartisanconsensus in favor of strategic nuclear modernization.
For example, in the U.S. domestic political context, mainstream congressional Democrats
are beginning to take a more skeptical view on nuclear weapons issues, largely in reaction
to President Trump. The Trump administration should view this as a potential warning
sign. At the same time, Democrats need to acknowledge, as the Council on Foreign
Relations’ Max Boot writes, “Trump won’t be president forever.” 36 Therefore, theyshould be careful about allowing their reactions to Trump to prompt them to “make longterm decisions that will undercut the nuclear deterrent commanded by his successors.”37
Loose talk regarding nuclear weapons could also damage our deterrence relationships
with allies. As noted previously, nuclear weapons are deeply unpopular with the publics
in many allied countries. Certain allied governments struggle to maintain a domestic
political consensus in favor of nuclear deterrence. President Trump’s public statements
have made an already difficult task even harder.

33 Carrie Dann, “Donald Trump on Nukes: Let it be an arms race,” NBC News, December 23, 2016,

https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/trump-nukes-let-it-be-arms-race-n699526 (accessed
January 25, 2021).
34 Ali Vatali, “Trump Threatens to ‘Totally Destroy’ North Korea in First U.N. Speech,” NBC News,
September 19, 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-un-north-korean-leadersuicide-mission-n802596 (accessed January 25, 2021).
35 “Trump to Kim: My nuclear button is ‘bigger and more powerful,’” BBC, January 3, 2018,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42549687 (accessed January 25, 2021).
36 Max Boot, “Trump won’t be president forever. Nuclear policy shouldn’t pretend he will,” The
Washington Post, February 8, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global- opinions/tru
mp-wont-be-president-forever-nuclear-policy-shouldnt-pretend-he-will/2018/02/08/6eba8a98-0cd611e8-880-372e2047c935_story.html?utm_term=.88a0f7ab2957 (accessed January 25, 2021).
37 Ibid.

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Chapter 1 — Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review?
[Rose]

Why should the United States really care what our allies think? The response to thisquestion is simple: The United States needs its allies’ support to effectively deter anddefend itself from strategic threats. For example, the upgraded early warning radars inGreenland and the United Kingdom provide early warning against strategic missile attack,and directly support the missile defense of the United States; the two forward-deployedradars based in Japan support regional and U.S. homeland missile defense; and the relay
ground stations and other communications facilities around the world directly support
U.S. nuclear command and control systems. Fundamentally, the security of the U.S.
homeland is intricately linked with the security of its allies. Therefore, it is critical that
the United States remain attuned to allied concerns, especially their unique domestic
political situations, and avoid loose rhetoric that inflames alliance relations.

AFFORDABILITYPROGRAMOFTHE

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MODERNIZATIONThe second long-term challenge for NPR implementation deals with the issue of thestrategic nuclear modernization program’s affordability. While Trump administration
officials have generally sought to downplay the costs associated with the strategic nuclear
modernization program, there are legitimate concerns as to whether the modernization
program outlined in the NPR can be executed within projected defense budgets.
For example, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the Obamaadministration’s program of record would have cost at least $1.2 trillion over 30 years.38
At a recent panel discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington, DC, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer was more candid about the costs.
According to press reports, he noted that the cost of the Columbia-class submarine “willmake your eyes water. Columbia will be a $100 billion program for its lifetime. … I think
we have to have big discussions about it.”39 Though defense budgets are scheduled toincrease in fiscal years 2018 and 2019, President Trump’s own budget projections show
defense spending flat-lining in fiscal year 2020. In addition, with the modernization
program in its early phases, the costs of the program will almost certainly grow as thesystems mature. Therefore, it’s imperative that effective oversight mechanisms are put in

38 Congressional Budget Office, “Approaches for Managing the Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to

2046,” (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, October 2017), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53211-nuclearforces.pdf (accessed January 25, 2021).
39 Travis J. Tritten, “Costs of new nuclear sub is ‘eye watering,’ Navy secretary says,” The Washington
Examiner, March 12, 2018, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national- security/cost-of-new-nuclear-subs-is-eye-watering-navy-secretary-says (accessed February 19, 2021) .

Chapter 1 — Assessing the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review?
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19

place to ensure that the programs are delivered on time and within budget. It will also
require sustained funding for the program by Congress.

CONCLUSION
In summary, the Trump administration has developed an NPR that is responsive to thethreats faced by the United States and its allies. However, it’s uncertain whether or not
the administration can use the document to build a sustainable consensus on nuclear
policy. Both the president’s controversial public statements and the hefty price tag of thestrategic nuclear modernization program represent key challenges to fostering andmaintaining that consensus. However, the Trump administration’s chances of success will
improve if it is able to calibrate its public messages; effectively engage the U.S. Congress,
general public, and allies on the importance of nuclear deterrence; advance pragmatic
arms control and non-proliferation initiatives; and enhance strategic stability withpotential adversaries such as Russia and China.

A previous version of this paper was originally published as “Is the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review as badas the critics claim it is?”, Brooking Institution, April 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/research/is-the2018-nuclear-posture-review-as-bad-as-the-critics-claim-it-is (accessed January 25, 2021).

20

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]

CHAPTER 2

Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control:
A Japanese Perspective
Hirofumi Tosaki
INTRODUCTION
In the latter half of the 2010s, nuclear deterrence relations and nuclear arms control havebecome increasingly unstable and uncertain. Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s
Nuclear Posture Review in 2018 (2018 NPR) and its withdrawal from the Intermediaterange Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty in August 2019 have significant implications for the
security policies of Japan, especially extended deterrence provided by the United States.
The U.S. current nuclear posture reflects its threat perception that it faces the mostserious strategic environment since the end of the Cold War. For instance, the 2018 NPR
clearly stated,[G]lobal threat conditions have worsened markedly since the most recent, 2010
NPR. There now exist an unprecedented range and mix of threats, including major
conventional, chemical, biological, nuclear, space, and cyber threats, and violent
non-state actors. International relations are volatile. Russia and China are contesting
the international norms and order we have worked with our allies, partners, andmembers of the international community to build and sustain. Some regions aremarked by persistent disorder that appears likely to continue and possibly intensify.
These developments have produced increased uncertainty and risk, demanding arenewed seriousness of purpose in deterring threats and assuring allies andpartners.1
In particular, the U.S. unfavorable evaluation of China and Russia stands out in the 2018
NPR. While the NPRs of the past three administrations implied the preservation of their
1 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, p. 2.

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]

21

nuclear deterrence posture vis-à-vis China and Russia, they, at least seemingly,
emphasized that they were not its adversaries. On the other hand, the Trumpadministration assessed, “Since 2010 we have seen the return of Great Power competition.
To varying degrees, Russia and China have made clear they seek to substantially revise
the post–Cold War international order and norms of behavior.”2 The current great powercompetition under the ongoing power transition has also triggered geopoliticalcompetitions in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. In the relative decline of U.S. power,
China and Russia have taken this opportunity to expand their sphere of influence and/or
modify the existing regional order, with implicit or explicit nuclear coercion, and theUnited States and its allies have struggled to maintain the status quo. In addition, various
disputes/conflicts in these regions, including territorial issues, have reemerged andescalated, which further complicated regional as well as global security situations.
To address these great power/geopolitical competitions, the countries involved haveincreased their reliance on, and reaffirmed the roles of, nuclear deterrence, and situations
surrounding nuclear deterrence relations and arms control has become more diverse,
complicated, and unstable than ever. During the Cold War, most nuclear issues ultimately
converged to the bipolar U.S.–Soviet relation. After the Cold War, most of these issues
have decentralized and attenuated their degree of linkage with the global nuclear order:
the risk of a regional nuclear exchange escalating into a global nuclear war has decreased,
but the concern is an increase in the risk of a limited or regional nuclear war because of
the great powers’ weakening control on regional actors. In addition, dealing with nuclear
issues has become more complicated since it should thoroughly consider each region’s
unique dynamics and logic as well as the highly asymmetric nature of countries’
capabilities, interests, and resolves on nuclear deterrence.
Northeast Asia, where Japan is located, is the region with the highest threat level: China,
Russia, and the United States, which are engaged in a great power competition, are all
directly involved in security issues in this region; North Korea violates the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and possesses nuclear weapons; Japan and South Korea areprovided with U.S. extended nuclear deterrence; and security relations among thesecountries under nuclear deterrence are multiple, complicated and unstable. This article
examines the implications of the U.S. nuclear policies under the 2018 NPR and its
withdrawal from the INF Treaty for Japan’s security, particularly the extended deterrence
2 Ibid., p. 6.

22

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]it provides Japan as well as nuclear arms control in Northeast Asia under a thick nuclear
shadow.

1. THE U.S. 2018 NRP, WITHDRAWAL FROM THE INF TREATY, AND
JAPAN’S POSITIONS(1) U.S. POLICY CHANGESThe concrete nuclear policies as well as basic principles in the 2018 NPR reflects much
more continuity than change.3 With regard to regional deterrence, following the 2002
and 2010 NPRs, the 2018 NPR articulates that U.S. deterrence consists of not only
nuclear but also conventional forces, including missile defenses, and applies “a tailoredapproach to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts.” On
the other hand, significant changes from the previous NPR presented in the 2018 NPR
are to bolster non-strategic nuclear options and to imply a negative attitude toward
nuclear arms control, both of which reflect the ongoing great power/geopoliticalcompetitions in the latter half of the 2010s.
As for nuclear forces that constitute tailored deterrence for regional issues, the 2010 NPR
aimed to “[r]etain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tacticalfighter-bombers [or dual-capable aircraft (DCA)] . . . and heavy bombers.”4 The 2010
NPR further mentioned the U.S. decision to retire the TLAM-Ns, or the nuclear-equipped
sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) by 2013. The Obama administration argued thatheavy bombers and DCA “can be visibly forward deployed, thereby signaling U.S.
resolve and commitment in crisis.”5 However, since these capabilities are not deployedin Northeast Asia—owing to a lack of readiness or promptness—there were concerns
about the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis regional
rivalries.
On the other hand, the 2018 NPR states, “[To] enhance the flexibility and range of its
tailored deterrence options . . . in the near-term, the United States will modify a small
3 See, for instance, John R. Harvey, Franklin C. Miller, Keith B. Payne and Bradley H. Roberts,“Continuity and Change in U.S. Nuclear Policy,” Real Clear Defense, February 7, 2018,https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/02/07/continuity_and_change_in_us_nuclear_poli
cy_113025.html (accessed January 13, 2021).
4
2010 NPR, p. 14.
5 Ibid., p. 24.

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]23

number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in the longer term,
pursue a modern nuclear-armed [SLCM].”6 The 2018 NPR indicates that introductionof these new capabilities is required as a primary response to Russia, which is likely topossess the option of a limited use of nuclear weapons to “escalate to de-escalate,”demonstrating their determination to engage a nuclear war for preserving its national
interest by detonating a small number of nuclear weapons, and has been suspected toacquire and deploy 9M729 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in violation of the
INF Treaty. However, given that China and North Korea deploy a large number ofground-based medium- and intermediate-range missiles (GBIRs), the U.S. acquisition of
new nuclear capabilities will also have important implications in Northeast Asia.
According to a report by the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission
published in February 2019, China possesses more than 2,000 missiles, 95% of which
are GBIRs (of which about 400–600 have a range of 1,000 km or more) prohibited underthe INF Treaty.7 Nearly all these missiles can carry nuclear or conventional warheads.
Among these missiles, the DF-21 (range: 1,800 km) and the DF-26 (range: 3,000 km)
can reach Japan and Guam, respectively, and their derivative types are considered to haveanti–ship strike capability. China’s GBIRs constitute one of the core weapon systems in
its Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy against the United States, and they pose aserious threat to Japan’s security as well. North Korea has also strived to numericallyand qualitatively strengthen its ballistic missiles, including the No-dong (range: 1,300km), which covers the whole of Japan, and the Hwasong-12 (range: 4,500 km), which
can reach Guam.
In the meantime, the 2018 NPR implies that the Trump administration would not beproactive in promoting nuclear arms control as a measure to enhance its national security:“The United States remains willing to engage in a prudent arms control agenda. We areprepared to consider arms control opportunities that return parties to compliance,
predictability, and transparency, and remain receptive to future arms control negotiations
if conditions permit and the potential outcome improves the security of the United States,

6 2018 NPR, p. 54.
7

Jacob Stokes, “China’s Missile Program and U.S. Withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,” Staff Research Report, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, February 4, 2018, p. 3, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20an
d%20INF_0.pdf (accessed January 13, 2021).

24

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]its allies, and partners.” 8 This position partly reflects the perception that “[d]espite
concerted U.S. efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs andto negotiate reductions in the number of nuclear weapons, since 2010 no potential
adversary has reduced either the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy
or the number of nuclear weapons it fields. Rather, they have moved decidedly in the
opposite direction.”9Since the Cold War era, one of the Washington’s most important objectives in nuclear
arms control is to institutionally ensure strategic stability with major nuclear powers
while maintaining nuclear deterrence. However, the 2018 NPR does not necessarilyemphasize even the importance of strategic stability with Russia or China. This is also
evident in the Trump administration’s attitude toward arms control.
While the United States has officially called attention to Russia’s noncompliance with
the INF Treaty since 2014, President Trump suddenly announced his intention towithdraw from the treaty in October 2018. The United States formally notified Russia
and other states parties of the withdrawal in February 2019, which entered into effect inAugust 2. The reasons for withdrawing from the treaty by the United States included notjust Russia’s noncompliance but also the need to establish a multilateral treaty on
controlling GBIRs that especially included China, which is not a party to the INF Treaty
and possesses hundreds of such missiles. Soon after the termination of the INF Treaty,
U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper said, “[W]e would like to deploy a capability sooner
rather than later . . . I would prefer months.”10 In addition, the United States conducteda flight test of the conventional GLCM on August 20.
(2) JAPAN’S REACTIONS
Soon after the 2018 NPR was publicized, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono said,“Japan highly appreciates the latest NPR which clearly articulates the U.S. resolve toensure the effectiveness of its deterrence and its commitment to providing extended
deterrence to its allies including Japan” (emphasis added).11 The 2018 NPR states, “The8 2018 NPR, p. 74.
9 2018 NPR, p. 7.
10“US to Deploy New Missiles in Asia ‘Sooner Rather Than Later,’” DW, August 3, 2019,https://www.dw.com/en/us-to-deploy-new-missiles-in-asia-sooner-rather-than-later/a-49878171(accessed January 13, 2021).
11 “The Release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR): Statement by Foreign Minister TaroChapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]25

United States has extended nuclear deterrence commitments that assure European, Asian,and Pacific allies. The United States will ensure the credibility and effectiveness of thosecommitments.”12
In Northeast Asia, the security environment has been steadily eroding, aggravated by theregional nuclear powers’ modernization of their nuclear arsenals. Meanwhile, before his
inauguration, President Trump often questioned the importance of alliances for U.S.
national security and suggested reducing U.S. commitments to its allies, including Japan.
Therefore, the abovementioned passage in the 2018 NPR on alliance commitment, tosome extent, alleviated the allies’ worries.
It could be argued that the 2018 NPR just reiterated the U.S. commitments made byprevious administrations. However, significance of reiteration and reaffirmation in U.S.
strategic documents, including the NPR, should not be underestimated, especially in lightof the current security environment. Furthermore, the 2018 NPR mentions the phrase“extended nuclear deterrence” eight times (excerpt from its executive summary), which
was not used in the 2010 NPR. This can be interpreted as the Trump administration’s
intention, in its emphasis of a nuclear aspect of extended deterrence, to send a clear
message that the United States will not hesitate to use nuclear deterrent to defend its
allies, thereby bolstering both deterrence against potential adversaries and reassurance
to its allies.
For effective and credible (extended) nuclear deterrence, it is vital to have appropriate
employment policies and nuclear forces as enablers. However, Tokyo has not clarified
its position regarding, for instance, the U.S. introduction of new nuclear capabilities in
the 2018 NPR. Japan’s reaction to the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty was also
ambiguous. When the United States sent its notice of withdrawal, Chief Cabinet
Secretary Yoshihide Suga said, “We understand the U.S. awareness of problems that led
it to announce it will halt its obligations under the treaty . . . As the treaty has played ahistoric role in arms control and reduction, it is undesirable that the treaty be ended.”13
Kono,” February 3, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001893.html (accessed
January 13, 2021).
12 2018 NPR, p. 22.
13 “Japan Reluctantly Endorses ‘Undesirable’ U.S. Exit from INF Nuclear Arms Pact with Russia,”
Kyodo, February 4, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/02/04/national/politics- diplom
acy/japan-reluctantly-endorses-undesirable-u-s-exit-inf-nuclear-arms-pact-russia/#.XWnoV5P7Rn
Y/ (accessed January 13, 2021).

26

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]When the U.S. withdrawal entered into effect, Secretary Suga reiterated theabovementioned position and added that it was necessary to consider a situation wherecountries that are not parties to the INF Treaty have developed and deployed GBIRs andthat it is also essential to thoroughly discuss a modality of arms control in East Asia,
which includes enhancing transparency.14
Such ambiguous positions were derived from a complicated situation which Japan needs
to contemplate. Tokyo did not treat the U.S. withdrawal as a countermeasure against
Russia’s noncompliance with the INF Treaty. The U.S. deployment of GBIRs would also
strengthen its (extended) deterrence in Northeast Asia. In addition, it is imperative toconsider alliance management in light of a security situation where Japan needs to bestrongly aligned with the United States. At the same time, Japan, as a country that has
suffered from atomic bombings and advocated nuclear disarmament, could not express
its overwhelming support for the termination of a historic nuclear arms control treaty.

2. BOLSTERING DETERRENCE AND ITS CHALLENGES(1) POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESSThe United States and its allies have raised concerns that their regional nuclear
adversaries would attempt to conduct early and limited use of nuclear weapons inregional conflicts to offset U.S. superiority in conventional forces, deter U.S.
intervention and escalation, and force the United States to terminate conflict on terms
favorable to them. In the 2010 NPR, the United States allocated heavy bombers and
DCAs as regional nuclear deterrent components. However, there is considerable
apprehension whether these nuclear forces could be effectively operated in A2/AD
environments and perceived as sufficient deterrents in Northeast Asia. The United States
does not deploy nuclear weapons in this region, and heavy bombers from the Andersen
Air Force Base (Guam) would take several hours to reach the region, making it lessresponsive than missile forces. In addition, its adversaries’ GBIR attacks could disable
its air force bases in Northeast Asia and Guam. Furthermore, deployment of U.S. nuclear
forces in Japan or South Korea is neither highly realistic nor effective from strategic(including vulnerability due to proximity to potential adversaries) and political
14 “Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary,” August 2, 2019, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/tyo

ukanpress/201908/2_a.html (accessed January 13, 2021) (in Japanese).

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]27(including Japan’s antinuclear sentiment and its three non-nuclear principles) viewpoints.
Under such situations, the introduction of nuclear SLCMs as well as low-yield nuclear
warheads for SLBMs in the 2018 NPR is expected to bolster U.S. regional nuclear
deterrence to enable rapid and precise strikes, limit collateral damage, increasesurvivability, add U.S. escalatory options, and avoid deployment to its allies’ territories.
A strong criticism against the 2018 NPR is that U.S. adoption of the low-yield, limited
nuclear attack option would lower the threshold of using nuclear weapons. However,proponents argue that such an option aims to prevent adversaries’ nuclear attacks or, if it
fails, restore deterrence by preparing a nuclear posture that includes capabilities andemployment policies, which could impose greater caution and restraint on adversaries.
Compared with the United States, its regional adversaries often have stronger interest
and resolve regarding the use of nuclear weapons (which affects deterrence strength).
The U.S. introduction of the low-yield, limited nuclear attack option could fill thedeterrence gap derived from the imbalance of interests and resolve by adding capabilities,
thereby bolstering deterrence effectiveness and credibility in regional contingencies.
Regarding the roles of conventional GBIRs, which the United States seeks to introduce
in the Indo-Pacific region after the termination of the INF Treaty, Indo-PacificCommander Philip Davidson said in April 2018, “[T]he absence of the INF Treaty would
provide additional options to counter China’s existing missile capabilities, complicate
adversary decision making, and impose costs by forcing adversaries to spend money on
expensive missile defense systems.”15 Eric Sayers, Adjunct Senior Fellow of the Center
for a New American Security, also pointed out that the treaty’s advantages include:16
providing offensive conventional strike capabilities with less expensive but larger
quantities than sea- or air-launched missiles and enabling air and maritime forces toprioritize other missions such as anti-surface, submarine, and air warfare missions;
holding China’s interior at risk and imposing cost to protect its military assets and

15 Alex Hollings, “Trump Backing out of the INF Treaty Removes a Significant Chinese Advantage,”

NewsRep, February 4, 2019, https://thenewsrep.com/113610/trump-backing-out-of-the-inf-treatyremoves-a-significant-chinese-strategic-advantage (accessed January 13, 2021).
16 Eric Sayers, “The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Future of the Indo-Pacific
Military Balance,” War on the Rock, February 13, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/asia-inf(accessed January 13, 2021).

28

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]infrastructures.
complicating China’s military planning by presenting an offensive capability thatcan be deployed at locations across the first-island chain and beyond; andoffering new opportunities for cooperation with allies and partners.
Tokyo highly evaluated the Obama administration’s nuclear posture from the perspectiveof extended deterrence commitment and reassurance, especially because Japan and theUnited States launched the Extended Deterrence Dialogues; U.S. conventional forces,
including missile defense, were properly included in its regional security architecture;
and Washington reaffirmed that it would not adopt a countervalue strategy or a no-firstuse policy. On the other hand, some viewed that the regional deterrence policies,
including the retirement of the TLAM-Ns, were inhibitory and were concerned about
whether heavy bombers and DCA alone would be sufficient to deter would-be
adversaries in Northeast Asia. In that sense, Japan could consider that nuclear postureunder the Trump administration would help improve extended deterrence by taking
measures to introduce additional regional-level nuclear and conventional deterrents.
(2) CHALLENGES
On the other hand, there is considerable opposition to such nuclear policies under the
Trump administration. For example, opponents argue that the effectiveness of extended(nuclear) deterrence, as well as the United States’ and its allies’ security, could be rather
undermined if U.S. deployment of “new capabilities”—that is, low-yield SLBMs,
nuclear SLCMs, and GBIRs—provokes the acceleration of its adversaries’ nuclear
buildup or adoption of a more aggressive nuclear posture. In addition, as Brad Robertssuggested, testing one’s resolve to use nuclear weapons is a risky strategy because of ahigher risk of overreactions, bluffs, miscalculations, and misperceptions, which would
lead to a failure of deterrence or escalation control.17 One cannot help but question theextent to which the United States and its allies could expect their adversaries to be
prudent with nuclear weapons.
It is also unclear whether limited and non-strategic use of SLBMs, which are highly
valuable assets and have been primarily used in missions for strategic and/or retaliatory

17

Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2016), pp. 77-78.

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]

29

nuclear attacks on an adversary’s mainland, would be a realistic option for the UnitedStates. For example, such strikes by SLBMs would trigger an unexpected adversary’s
nuclear escalation since the adversary cannot recognize the yield of nuclear warheads
mounted on the SLBMs until their detonation. Also, China and Russia, depending on thecapabilities of their early warning systems, might misunderstand or misperceive such
nuclear attacks as a part of strategic operations. In addition, the question remains whether
the United States would actually decide to launch just one or a few SLBMs from SSBNs
for a limited purpose, risking detection and attack by an adversary’s anti-submarine
warfare forces. As for nuclear SLCMs, senior Pentagon officials have indicated that it
would take around 10 years to introduce them. In the meantime, regardless of the security
environment in Northeast Asia, there is the possibility that a plan involving nuclear
SLCMs would be cancelled.
Regarding GBIRs, first, conventional GLCMs would have limited effectiveness against
hardened targets (including underground facilities) and mobile missiles, and isconsidered practical for use as an anti-ship weapon. U.S. introduction of IRBMs would
take 7–10 years, which might also be cancelled during this period as in the case of nuclear
SLCMs.
Second, it would not be easy to find U.S. allies which are suitable for and would accept
GBIR deployment.18 Japan would be one such candidate for Northeast Asia deployment
because of its stable domestic politics and close alliance with the United States, as wellas its location—a moderate distance (more than 1,000 km) from China and North Korea.
However, U.S. deployment would face opposition, especially by residents near the
deployment site. Debates on deployment might cause a rift in the alliance.
Third, the vulnerability of GBIRs cannot be ignored. Mounting them on mobile launchers
could reduce their vulnerability. However, their effectiveness would be reduced when
they are deployed in small countries such as Japan—particularly the Nansei islands
where anti-ship cruise missiles would be deployed—because of a lack of strategic depth.
Constructing underground or tunneling facilities for missiles to protect other missiles andrelated assets, as North Korea has intensively done, requires considerable time and cost.

18 Meanwhile, the 2018 NPR proposed the development of a low-yield SLBMs and SLCM because

they “will not require or rely on host nation support to provide deterrent effect.” 2018 NPR, pp. 5455.

30

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]

Deploying GBIRs only in times of crisis would also face the challenge of ensuring
sufficient emergency deployment capabilities in an A2/AD environment.
The fourth question is whether there are any alternatives. Whereas land-based missiles
are superior in terms of reliability and responsiveness in a crisis situation, submarinebased missiles are highly survivable, and air-launched missiles can be operated flexibly.
Tokyo and Washington need to make careful strategic calculations regarding what
capabilities are required for their deterrence, whether the U.S. existing assets cannot
serve the roles that GBIRs are expected to play, or whether deploying GBIRs in Northeast
Asia would actually be the cost-effective option. Regarding these points, U.S. ViceChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Paul Selva stated in 2017, “[W]ith respect towhether or not we use the INF Treaty as a reason to say targets inside China might not
be held at risk I think is a bridge too far. I believe we can assert that the deployment of
missile systems on aircraft and ships allow us to hold those targets at risk.”19 In addition,
Japan and the United States should carefully assess the impact of countermeasures that
potential adversaries would take against U.S. GBIR deployment in Northeast Asia. FuCong, director general of the arms control department of China’s foreign ministry,warned, “China will not stand idly by and be forced to take countermeasures should the
U.S. deploy intermediate-range ground-based missiles this part of the world.”20
Lastly, the implications of deploying GBIRs for crisis stability should be contemplated.
During the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was determined to
deploy U.S. INFs to increase deterrence despite the possibility of decreasing crisis
stability as it faced the threat of the Soviet bloc’s massive invasion of Western Europe.
On the other hand, in a situation where Japan does not face at least a similar threat, Japan
should carefully assess a possible trade-off between deterrence improvement and thedeterioration of strategic stability through GBIR deployment.

19 General Paul Selva, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, statement before the Senate

Armed Services Committee, July 18, 2017.
20 “China Vows ‘Countermeasures’ If U.S. Deploys Intermediate-Range Missiles to Asia,” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-defence-idUSKCN1UW044 (accessed February 8, 2021).

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]31

3. POSSIBILITIES AND CHALLENGES IN ARMS CONTROL(1) NECESSITY OF ARMS CONTROLAs status quo powers, Japan and the United States need to improve deterrence to counterattempts to alter the status quo or revise the existing international and regional order byundisguised powers. At the same time, they should simultaneously explore promoting
arms control to maintain stable deterrence relations with China and Russia, whose
revisionist acts may not be just offense-oriented, in which they expand their respective
spheres of interest and capitalize on the U.S. relative decline, but also, to some extent,
defense-oriented, in which they secure their regimes based on their perception derived
from their history of repeated invasions. Addressing them solely through military powers
might excessively provoke their defensive stance, lead to more aggressive policies, andresult in a serious security dilemma. Besides reacting offensively vis-à-vis China andRussia, it is also necessary to prepare an “exit” for them, including nuclear arms control,
to mitigate their inherent fears.
During the Cold War, former U.S. president Ronald Reagan advocated “peace throughstrength” in the confrontation with the Soviet Union and actively pursued a buildup of
strategic nuclear forces and promotion of the Strategic Defense Initiative. At the sametime, he explored strategic stability with the Soviet Union through nuclear arms control.
From the outset of his inauguration, President Reagan proposed drastic U.S.–Soviet
nuclear weapons reductions under intrusive verification and finalized the INF Treaty in
1987. He also advanced the negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty(START), which was signed in 1991 by his predecessor. The bilateral nuclear arms
control talks certainly helped the two superpower rivals move toward the end of the Cold
War without escalating into an armed conflict.
Unlike the bipolar Cold War era, multiple nuclear powers with different national andnuclear capabilities are now competing in various regions. Since such a complicatedstrategic environment undoubtedly places a heavy burden on stabilization efforts througharms control, prudence is required when pursuing “peace through strength.” Inmultipolar nuclear relations where a security trilemma21 would easily arise—behavior
21 Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Reassurance in the

Pacifc during the Second Nuclear Age,” Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Travis Tanner,eds., Strategic Asia 2013-14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age, National Bureau of Asia Research,

32

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]of Country A vis-à-vis Country B unintentionally affects Country C, resulting in acomplex spiral—the role of nuclear arms control in addressing the negative aspect of“peace through strength” is growing.
Particularly important for Japan’s security is bringing China into the framework of
substantial nuclear arms control. Since announcing its intention to withdraw from the
INF Treaty in October 2018, the United States has repeatedly called on China and Russia
to discuss the establishment of a new framework to replace the treaty. In December 2018,
President Trump also tweeted, “I am certain that, at some time in the future, President Xi
and I, together with President Putin of Russia, will start talking about a meaningful halt
to what has become a major and uncontrollable arms race. The U.S. spent 716 Billion
Dollars this year. Crazy!” However, U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty and thesubsequent GBIR development seem less likely to lead to a trilateral or global agreement
among China, Russia, and the United States to reduce or eliminate GBIRs as a new“double-track decision.”22(2) DIFFICULTIES IN PURSUING ARMS CONTROL
Among the five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) under the NPT, only China has not
accepted any substantive nuclear arms control, including nuclear weapons reductions.
Beijing has argued that “[s]tates possessing the largest nuclear arsenals . . . should takethe lead in substantially reducing those nuclear arsenals,”23 and when conditions are ripe,other NWS should join multilateral talks on nuclear disarmament. Regarding the INF
Treaty, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang clearly said, “The
multilateralization of the INF Treaty involves a series of complex issues covering
political, military and legal fields, which draws concerns from many countries. China
opposes the multilateralization of this treaty.”24 China also opposed Japanese Foreign
Minister Kono’s suggestion to create a new multilateral structure for replacing the INF

2013, pp. 292-293.
22 The original “double-track decision” was agreed by the NATO in December 1979, in which theUnited States would deploy the INF unless the Soviet Union deploying SS-20 IRBMs did not accept
negotiations on an INF Treaty.
23 NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.32, April 19, 2018.
24 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang's Remarks on the US Suspending INF Treaty
Obligations and Beginning Withdrawal Process,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, February 2,
2019,https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1635268.sh
tml (accessed January 13, 2021).

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]33

Treaty by the five NWS, arguing, “If the agreement becomes multilateral, this will
influence a whole range of complex political, military and legal issues . . . The Chineseside does not give its consent.”25
With regard to the U.S. proposal for martializing the INF Treaty, Shen Dingli, Professorof Fudan University argued that the United States is seeking to prevent China and othercountries from enhancing GBIRs to maintain its regional hegemony while thesecountries intend to mitigate the challenge in East Asia posed by the United States. 26
Gregory Kulacki, China Project Manager of the Union of Concerned Scientists, also
pointed out that “[i]f the United States were serious about wanting China to join the INF
Treaty, it would be talking with Chinese arms controllers about changes the United Statesmight be willing to make in exchange for surrendering what Chinese military planners
see as one of their most valuable military capabilities. There is no indication such a
discussion has ever taken place.”27
In addition to China’s opposition to joining arms control on substantive reductions with
the United States and Russia, structural aspects of the international security situation also
complicate the promotion of arms control. The ongoing power transition is a dynamic
and highly uncertain process in which policy developments of the involved countries arelikely to fluctuate along with changes in the balance of power; a security trilemma would
easily arise, resulting in an unintended scale of tensions and/or arms race; andconvergence of interests among the concerned countries, which is essential to develop
arms control, is less likely achieved. Moreover, multipolar nuclear relations raise thepossibility that incentives to strengthen nuclear forces might continue until a reliablemutual deterrence is achieved in all potential hostile combinations.28
The fact that the current focus of arms control is GBIRs also adds to the complexity. The
25 “China Does Not Support Creation of New Multilateral Deal Replacing INF Treaty,” Sputnik, July

31, 2019, https://sputniknews.com/world/201907301076404441-beijing-says-does-not-supportcreation-of-new-multilateral-deal-replacing-inf-treaty (accessed January 13, 2021).
26 Shen Dingli, “What the Post-INF Treaty World will be Like,” China Daily, February 21, 2019,http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/21/WS5c6dea76a3106c65c34ea76e.html/ (accessed January 13, 2021).
27 Gregory Kulacki, “Don’t Scapegoat China for Killing the INF Treaty. Ask It to Join,” Union ofConcerned Scientists, February 6, 2019, https://allthingsnuclear.org/gkulacki/dont-scapegoat-chinafor-killing-the-inf-treaty-ask-it-to-join (accessed January 13, 2021).
28 James J. Wirtz, “Beyond Bipolarity: Prospects for Nuclear Stability after the Cold War,” Paul,Harknett and Wirtz, eds., The Absolute Weapon Revisited, pp. 150-151.

34

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]purpose of the 1987 INF Treaty was to maintain U.S.–Soviet strategic stability by
reducing and eliminating the possibility of using INFs in European theater, the main
battlefield of the Cold War, as well as escalating to a full-scale nuclear war.
On the other hand, the current situation surrounding GBIRs is much more complicatedsince countries that have them are located in several regions and constitute a complex
web of security relations. Their security interests regarding GBIRs are diverse, whichreflect differences in their acquired capabilities (such as type, number, and range). In
addition, some of them also possess or seek to acquire sea- and air-launched missiles
and/or ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. The INF Treaty’s “prohibition of landbased ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km” could be agreed onlyin the context of the U.S.–Soviet strategic relation during the Cold War. It is difficult toassume what range, types, and numbers of missiles could be subject to restriction or
prohibition under a global post-INF Treaty.
Building a regional arms control on GBIRs also faces difficult challenges. The first isreaching an agreement on military balance among the countries involved in regional
security issues because of asymmetry in their military capabilities. A calculation ofbalance is intractable in a regional security which countries outside the region—usually
the United States—are involved because the superiority or inferiority of military forcesthat can be projected to the region, rather than the overall capabilities of each country
involved, determines the outcome of deterrence and the crisis.29 In particular, the extent
to which countries outside the region allocate their capabilities to the region, including
those to be built up in a crisis situation, have a significant impact on the regional militarybalance.
Second, the balance of interests and resolve has a decisive impact on regional deterrence
relations. In this respect, a country outside the region is likely inferior to regionalcountries and would seek to complement these asymmetries by bolstering its capabilities.
Complicated calculations of balances regarding capabilities, interests, and resolves inregional security make arms control difficult to establish.
Third, the involvement of China, Russia, and the United States in security issues in

29 Paul Huth and Brice Russet, “Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation,” International Study

Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 1988, pp. 29-45.

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]35

several regions would increase the possibility of an inter-regional security trilemma. In
this situation, arms control measures that can be implemented in Region A but cannot bedone in Region B is less likely to be accepted by countries involved in both regional
security issues for fear of a negative impact of Region A’s arms control to Region B’s
security.
(3) POSSIBLE ARMS CONTROL IN WHICH CHINA PARTICIPATES
Tong Zhao, Senior Fellow of the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, noted that
U.S. and Chinese experts need to “find different means to build common understanding
about how to mitigate risks from gaps in the security perceptions.” Furthermore, heargues, [T]he era of relying on the US-Russia bilateral arms control structure is at its
end . . . As China becomes a top-tier military power, its fast-growing force projection
capabilities will meet with increasing international pressure and resistance. It is time for
Beijing to think strategically about how to best defend its long-term security interests
sustainably: is pursuing cooperative arms control better than simply accumulating
military power? As a rising power aspiring to shape international norms and principles,
China can no longer follow the lead of others.30
China’s growing confidence in its power could increase the possibility that it will
formulate and implement more aggressive foreign/security policies and attempt to revise
the existing international order. On the other hand, as its military capabilities increase,
China—whose nuclear and conventional forces have been inferior to those of the UnitedStates and Russia and which has accordingly been quite passive about participating in
U.S.- and Russian-led nuclear arms control efforts that may fix their relative advantage—might gain more confidence in taking part in arms control discussions and negotiations.
Tong Zhao also concluded that “China . . . perceives itself as possessing a uniquely
superior military capability in [GBIR] and seems relatively confident in its long-term
potential to outcompete the United States in a post-INF world.”31 Such confidence might
be a clue to getting China to participate in future arms control.

30 Tong Zhao, “Why China Is Worried About the End of the INF Treaty,” Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, November 7, 2018, https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/11/07/why-china-isworried-about-end-of-inf-treaty-pub-77669 (accessed January 18, 2021).
31 Tong Zhao, “An Inquiry into the NPT and Nuclear Disarmament,” Testimony, U.K. House ofLords, February 12, 2019, https://carnegietsinghua.org/2019/02/12/inquiry-into-npt-and-nucleardisarmament-pub-78574 (accessed January 18, 2021).

36

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]As mentioned above, the numerical control and reduction of GBIRs is not expected to beachieved at least in the near future. One serious concern is that relying more on GBIRs
would decrease crisis stability by increasing the incentive for first use. Besides GBIRs,
sea- and air-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs/ALCMs) and BMD also have significant
implications for regional security. The best way to reduce and/or constrain the negative
impacts of such offensive and defensive capabilities on regional stability and security isa pressing issue for China as well. Primary consideration should be given to discussions
among states involved in Northeast Asian security on such topics as the overall security
environment, the need for missiles and BMD, the risks posed by these capabilities tostrategic stability, and the role of arms control to mitigate destabilization. Covering theregion’s strategic and security issues in these discussions would provide China with agreater incentive to participate.
To prevent the unintended escalation of tensions or crises or the inadvertent use of
nuclear weapons, a layer of confidence-building measures, as well as reliable crisis
management methods, including communication channels, should be establishedbetween rivalries. Improved transparency regarding the number of missiles possessed,
their ranges, the warheads they carry, their deployment locations, and the doctrines
regarding their use—all issues of direct relevance to the region’s security—should also
be pursued to diminish mutual distrust and misunderstanding. The involved countries, inlight of their varying capabilities, may adopt an approach to implement mutual, equitable,
but different measures; for instance, China could endeavor to increase transparency
regarding GBIRs while Japan would do the same for BMD.32
Furthermore, measures such as setting upper limits on the capability and number of such
missiles and restricting their deployment locations could be considered. From a Japanese
security standpoint, it is conceivable that China would be required to clearly distinguishbetween intermediate-range missiles that carry nuclear warheads and those that use
conventional warheads, and at least not to deploy GBIRs carrying nuclear warheads inareas within Japan’s range. Needless to say, in denuclearization talks, North Korea should
agree on the abolition of not only long-range missiles, but also medium-range missiles.
32 Lewis A. Dunn, “Exploring the Role of U.S.-China Mutual and Cooperative Strategic Restraint,”

Lewis A. Dunn, ed., Building toward a Stable and Cooperative Long-Term U.S.-China Strategic
Relationship, Science Applications International Corporation, The Pacific Forum CSIS, and China
Arms Control and Disarmament Association, December 2012, p. 75.

Chapter 2 — Regional Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control: A Japanese Perspective[Tosaki]37

CONCLUSION
According to William Walker, Emeritus Professor of the University of St Andrews, thenuclear order has been composed of complementary cooperative systems of systems ofdeterrence and abstinence. 33 The nuclear order has been seriously disturbed by theuncertain future of the international system because of the power transition, themultipolarization of nuclear relations, and the diversification of deterrence systems.
Faced with intense great power/geopolitical competitions, nuclear-armed states haveincreased interest in maintaining and strengthening their nuclear deterrence capabilities,
and they are also becoming much less interested in arms control to allow for regulation,
reduction, and/or elimination of their military powers, including nuclear weapons. Theinternational system’s fluidity and its security relations makes it difficult to reach an
agreement on a modality of arms control for the next generation.
To reconstruct the arms control architecture, it is essential to find solutions to theconundrums of addressing weapons system asymmetries as well as the different interests
and resolves among the countries involved in great power/geopolitical competitions.
This will undoubtedly require significant time and effort. Meanwhile, the unstabletransition is likely to continue. For now, to prevent international and regional security
from destabilizing further and resorting to the use of nuclear weapons, the involved
countries would need to find a minimum common interest to avoid a further deteriorationof the nuclear situation and to gain more time to realize further progress in arms control.34
Cooperation on the minimum efforts that can be made during the transition period to
reduce the risk of nuclear weapons use and to limit nuclear destabilization will also be
an important basis for future progress. Any efforts to pursue “post-INF Treaty” arms
control for GBIRs and related weapons systems could not only reduce the risks of nuclear
weapon/missile use but also serve as a first step toward a nuclear arms control
architecture for the next generation. This is a crucial policy agenda item that Japan should
actively address.

33 William Walker, “Nuclear Order and Disorder,” International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4, October

2000, p. 706-707.
34 Harold Brown, “New Nuclear Realities,” Washington Quarterly, Vol.31, No.1, Winter 2007-2008,
p.18; James M. Acton, “Bombs Away? Being Realistic about Deep Nuclear Reductions,” Washington
Quarterly, Vol.35, No.2, Spring 2012, pp.49-50; Robert Legvold, “Managing the New Cold War,”
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 4, July/August 2014, pp. 82-84.

38

Chapter 3— Nuclear Dilemmas in Europe: Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability
post-INF [Rydqvist]

CHAPTER 3

Nuclear Dilemmas in Europe : Nuclear Deterrence andStrategic Stability post-INF
John Rydqvist

In August 2019 a key arms control treaty affecting European stability and security wasabsolved. The demise of the bilateral US–Soviet/Russian Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty highlights the ongoing erosion of Cold War arms control regimes,
which in turn is the result of the drastically deteriorating European security environment.
Russian armed aggression and the use of its military instruments of power to achieve
territorial and political gains is the fundamental problem in Europe.
The INF termination had been long in the making. As early as 2014, the US government
publicly announced that the “Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations underthe INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test“ INF-range missiles.1 Attempts toconvince Russia to return to treaty compliance yielded no results. Absent any progress innegotiations, the Trump administration in early 2019 decided to withdraw from the treaty.
Initially the decision was met with criticism from arms control proponents. Someobservers perceived it as a way for arms control skeptics in the Trump administration tofurther their principled agenda and worried that New START, scheduled to expire in 2021,
might not be extended or superseded by a new strategic arms control treaty. Others
contended that the United States should have postponed its INF withdrawal until 2020.
In the mean time one last effort should be made to convince Russia to return to treaty
compliance. Finally, there were those who irrespective of blame feared that without caps
on missiles in Europe, a new nuclear arms race would follow, one that would severely
destabilize the European security order and increase the risk of nuclear war.

1 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Non Proliferation, and Disarmament Agreements

and Commitments, Department of State, July 2014, p. 8 URL: https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf (accessed February 09, 2021).

Chapter 3— Nuclear Dilemmas in Europe: Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability
post-INF [Rydqvist]

39

Most Western countries and the NATO alliance soon came to support the US decision. A
treaty only adhered to by one party is after all pointless, even counterproductive, to uphold.
Experts also warned that arms control, for the sake of it, is not a viable component of areshaped and stable security architecture in Europe. The fundamental antagonism inEurope has a strong political component. Military and political dimensions of security
therefor cannot be decoupled. Any move that would seem to legitimize aggressive
Russian behavior would be detrimental to the security of Europeans.
In this situation the questions is what are necessary steps to achieve strategic stability in
post-INF Europe.

BACKGROUND
Signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 after more than a decade ofarms buildup, escalating nuclear tension, and cross-Atlantic negotiations the INF treaty
was a major political and military step.2 The so-called Euromissile crisis that predated
INF had been triggered by the Soviet introduction of the new SS-20 missiles in the second
half of the 1970s. The SS-20 missiles targeted Europe but not the United States. American
strategists initially considered its strategic nuclear arsenal sufficient to counter the new
missile. However, nuclear balance was always a political affair as much as a military one.
The Soviet continental nuclear superiority afforded by the SS-20, exasperated NATO
allies’ fears of nuclear decoupling. Most notably this view was advanced in the landmark
1977 speech held by German chancellor Helmut Schmidt. In the absence of parity inEurope, the Warsaw pact could coerce and attack Europe without posing a direct threat
to the United States. Washington, the fear was, might refrain from a strategic nuclear
response to the Soviet use of theater nuclear weapons in Europe and leave the Europeans
to fend for themselves.3
After 2 years of alliance discussions, NATO in 1979 agreed on a dual-track response. The
alliance would introduce nuclear-armed intermediate-range Pershing II ballistic missiles

2 Daryl Kimball, “The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) at a Glance,” Arms Control

Association, August, (2019) URL: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty (accessed
February 09, 2021).
3 Helmut Schmidt, “The 1977 Alastair Buchan memorial lecture,” Survival, Jan./Feb. 1978, p. 3.

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Chapter 3— Nuclear Dilemmas in Europe: Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability
post-INF [Rydqvist]and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs).4 If the Soviets agreed to an arms control
accord banning all ground-launched missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 km,
NATO would refrain from these deployments. However, the Kremlin’s reluctance toremove all SS-20s triggered NATO to proceed with missile placements starting in 1983,
forcing the Soviets’ negotiation hand.5

THE ROAD TO INF-BREECH
During the 2000s, Russia undertook a consorted modernization of its nuclear arsenal.
Among the new systems being developed was a ground launched cruise missile in breachof the INF. Reminiscent of the arrival of the INF treaty, its passing is part of a greater
dynamic of change that reaches beyond the question of medium-range nuclear forces in
Europe.
Starting in the early 2000s, the Kremlin leadership began convincing itself that the Westwas not honoring the intent and purpose of agreements underpinning post-Cold War
détente. NATO was expanding eastward and intruding, as it was were, into what Russia
saw as its legitimate sphere of influence. Wariness about Western intentions was
exacerbated by the financial, industrial, material, and personnel weaknesses of Russianand its armed forces.6 Grave inferiority in conventional military strength and a lack oflong-range precision-strike capability were particularly problematic.
Nuclear parity with the United States was the only instrument that ensured Russia’scontinued status as a global power. Likewise, it was the one fundamental capability
ensuring effective deterrence. As it turns out, Moscow also had an edge in theater nuclear
capability. By the late 1990s, nuclear drawdowns in the West had led to deep reductionsin the number of non-strategic weapons. Russia, by contrast, had retained much of its
inventory. The resulting capability gap was an important regional deterrent because it
offset Western conventional superiority. It also gave Russia the potential of dominating
the escalatory dynamics in high-end regional war, at the threshold of nuclear use.
Europe was not the only challenge for Russia. INF-range missile proliferation in Asia has
also been of increasing concern to the Russian armed forces. China, unrestrained by the
4 Björn Hagelin, “Swords into Daggers, the origins of the SS-20 missiles,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals,Vol. 15 No. 4, 1984, pp. 341–353.
5 Soviet Strategy To Derail US INF Deployment—An Intelligence Assessment, Director of Intelligence,
February 1983, CIA Historical Review Program, Released as Sanitized, 1999.
6
Jan leijonhielm et al. (2009) Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective: Ambitions andChallenges in 2008, FOI-R—2759--SE, Stockholm, p. 24.

Chapter 3— Nuclear Dilemmas in Europe: Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability
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INF, has continued to develop and field a variety of short- and medium-range groundlaunched missiles with conventional and nuclear warhead options.
An indication of the Russian strategic approach was the explicit interest in leaving theINF exhibited between 2004 and 2006. In October 2007 Vladimir Putin at an ongoing
two-plus-two Defense and Foreign Ministerial meeting in Moscow also expressed adesire to expand the INF to more countries.7 If not, it would consider leaving the treaty.8
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov even suggested mutual termination of the INF on thesegrounds. At the time, the George W Bush administration refused to consider such moves.9

RUSSIAN MISSILESAs Russian prospects for alleviating the strategic conventional gap anytime soon were
low, retaining an edge in theatre nuclear capabilities became a priority early on. In the
mid-1990s, Russia had started the modernization of INF-compliant systems, such as theCH-102 long-range dual-capable air-launched cruise missile. However, progress was
slow. Air-launched missiles also relied on a flotilla of medium Tu-22 and heavy Tu-160
bombers Russia was hard-pressed to operate, and maintain, let alone modernize.10 New,survivable and more cost efficient ground-launched systems would be required to retain
non-strategic nuclear superiority in the long run. The planned 2001 termination of the
INF verification regime, combined with lack of Western attention during a decade of antiterrorist wars, provided Russia with an opportunity to covertly develop the necessary
systems.11

7 Taylor: Ukraine: Read-out of Moscow Two-Plus-Two Meeting Provided, U.S. Embassy,

Kyiv,
October 23, 2007, URL: https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07KYIV2673_a.html (accessed
February 09, 2021).
8 Luke Harding: “We will dump treaty, Putin warns,” The Guardian, October 13, 2007, URL:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/13/russia.international (accessed February 09, 2021)
9Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Non Proliferation, and Disarmament Agreements
and Commitments, Department of State, August 2019, p. 11‒20, URL: https://www.state.g.,ov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/Compliance-Report-2019-August-19-Unclassified-Final.pdf (accessed February 09, 2021).
10 Carolina Vendil et al. (2012) Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2011, FOI-R—
3474—SE, Stockholm, p. 145.
11 Darya Dolzikova (2019), “The Role of Verification in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty Dispute,” RUSI Commentary, January 15, URL: https://www.rusi.org/commentary/role-verifi
cation-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-treaty-dispute (accessed February 09, 2021).

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Chapter 3— Nuclear Dilemmas in Europe: Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability
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Until recently, there was some confusion about the actual nature of Russia’s treaty
violation.
At first, public speculation centered on the dual-capable (conventional and nuclear)
Iskander short-range ballistic missile (the 9M723 or Iskander-M) or the 9M728 IskanderK ground launched cruise missile (GLCM)). In February 2017, the New York Times,
citing Trump administration officials, reported that the noncompliant system was another
GLCM, known as the 9M729 (NATO designation SSC-8) with an estimated range ofaround 2,500 km.12 By this time, Russia had tested and begun fielded the system.13 Russia,
for its part denied and continues to deny any treaty violation. Instead, it has accused theUnited States of breaching the INF by installing Aegis Ashore missile defense systems in
Bulgaria and Poland. The missiles, Russia claims, could be converted for use against
ground targets, an accusation most observers attach little merit to and the United States
denies, although the vertical launch system could be viewed as a problem if paired withother missile types.14
While the US grievance regarding the lapse of the INF rightly focused on the development
and fielding of the treaty-breaking GLCM 9M729, other problems compound thechallenges Europe faces from Russia’s short-, medium-, and intermediate-range nuclear
capable missiles. It has been speculated that the Iskander-M SRBM has a range in excessof the treaty’s upper limit of 500 km. 15 Another concern is the development andintroduction of a two stage MIRV-ed ballistic missile, the RS-26 Rubezh. Corresponding
to the SS-20, which in its time evolved from a three-stage ICBM, the two-stage RS-26
was developed using technology from the three-stage RS-24 Yars ICBM.16 A first test of
the RS-26 conducted in 2012 at a range of 5,800 km. It reportedly employed a light12 Michael R. Gordon (2017), “Russia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty and Challenging Trump”,

The New York Times, February 14.
13 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Non Proliferation, and Disarmament Agreements
and Commitments, Department of State, August 2019, p. 11–20, URL: https://www.state.g.,ov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/Compliance-Report-2019-August-19-Unclassified-Final.pdf (accessed February 09, 2021).
14 https://thebulletin.org/2019/02/russia-may-have-violated-the-inf-treaty-heres-how-the-united-state
ss-appears-to-have-done-the-same (accessed February 09, 2021).
15 Stefan Forss: Russian Operational-Tactical Iskander Missile System, National Defence University
Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Series 4, Working Paper No. 42, 2012, URL: https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/84362/StratL4_42w.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed February 09, 2021).
16 Stefan Forss: Intermediate Range Missiles—Back to the 70’s, Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademin,
April 28, 2017, URL: https://kkrva.se/intermediate-range-missiles-back-to-the-1970s/ (accessed February 09, 2021).

Chapter 3— Nuclear Dilemmas in Europe: Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability
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43

weight warhead. On the merits of this test, the RS-26 was defined as a strategic system
according to provisions in the New START agreement. Three consecutive tests werereportedly conducted at ranges of 2,000 km and with heavier payloads, possibly several
warheads (MIRV). 17 If correct Russia could be said to have used provisions in New
START to build an INF-range system. As of late 2019 it is unclear whether the RS-26
has been deployed, but its existence gives Russia an ability to quickly proceed with the
deployment of a modern intermediate-range missile that would threaten Europe the same
way the SS-20 did.

CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN STRATEGY
Assessments about current Russian thinking on theater nuclear use is obscured andsomewhat confused by a contradictory declaratory policy. The current US administrationsuggests that Russia’s armed forces have an “escalate-to-de-escalate” strategy foroffensive first strikes to de-escalate a conflict.18 Other experts argue that Russia’s nuclear
arsenal remains more of a defensive deterrent and that strategies for offensive first use
are not explicitly articulated.19
Assessments about the nuclear posture of Russia hinges on what overarching strategic
and military objectives Moscow prioritizes. Defending its wider geopolitical, strategic,
and economic interests, while at the same time ensuring political and military flexibility
to further those same interests is a core principle for Russia. It seeks to do so from a
position of military strength. Deterring attacks against Russian territory, that of its allies,
and against other key national interests is of primary importance. Checking NATO’s
ability to further expand eastward is another.
A key element in strengthening regional deterrence while at the same time enhancing
strategic flexibility is the ability to quickly fight, win, and terminate limited wars, such asthat against Crimea, on terms favorable to Russia. Should Russia see a future need towage war against a NATO country in Eastern Europe, there are some essential capabilities
necessary. Ideally, Russia would be able to dissuade or limit the response of the NATO

17 SS-X-31 (RS-26 Rubezh), Missile Threat, CSIS, October 22, 2018, URL: ]https://missilethreat.csis.

missile/ss-x-31-rs-26-rubezh/ (accessed February 09, 2021).
18 NPR 2018.
19 Oliger.

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Chapter 3— Nuclear Dilemmas in Europe: Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability
post-INF [Rydqvist]

alliance in ways that allow a quick and decisive victory.20 If the NATO response is quick
and strong enough to threaten the success of its military campaign, Russia needs theability to escalate the war in a tailored way. Such escalation should allow it to prevail
against NATO and achieve its war aims, while at the same time preventing escalation to
major war.
This is where the combination of strong conventional capabilities and regional nuclear
forces play a key role. Theater nuclear capabilities may be used to deny an opponent fromescalating the war, by threatening limited use against a range of targets such as airfields
and deeply buried, hardened targets. Russia has spent considerable resources on the
improvement of its conventional precision-strike capabilities and if key strategic target
could be eliminated using conventional precision-strike assets Russia is likely to choosesuch options first.21 But such conventional capabilities are likely limited in comparison
to that of the West and may not be able to effectively attack all target types. The versatileand scalable theatre nuclear options of Russia serve as a strategic reserve should there bea drawn-out conflict. The combination of Russian conventional ground force superiority
in its near abroad, growing conventional strike capabilities, and numerical superiority intheater nuclear capabilities thus provides Russia with a greater number of choices andgraded escalatory capabilities in relation to that of the West. In other words, its theater
nuclear forces are a key asset in achieving escalation dominance. This integration of
nuclear and non-nuclear assets is emphasized in Russia’s doctrinal plans and strategic
culture.22

WESTERN OPTIONS IN A POST-INF ENVIRONMENT
For those European states located in close proximity to Russia, Moscow’s embrace of acompetitive, multipolar worldview and the revisionist wars of aggression against Ukraine
and Georgia represents a critical challenge. Russian actions have long violated agreed-toprinciples guiding the European security order. Despite attempts to improve relations,
Russia has not withdrawn from Ukraine, is acting in opposition to Western interests in
20 Paul Bernstein, Deborah Ball,

Putin’s Russia and U.S. Defense Strategy, Conference Report,
National Defense University, August, (2015).
21 Dave Johnson (2018), Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crisis, andNuclear Thresholds, Livermore Papers on Global Security No. 3, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, February, p. 93.
22 Two examples are: Russian Military Capability 2016, Johnson (2018), Russia’s Conventional
Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crisis, and Nuclear Thresholds, Livermore Papers on Global
Security No. 3.

Chapter 3— Nuclear Dilemmas in Europe: Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability
post-INF [Rydqvist]45

the Middle East, and is trying to undermine European cohesion. 23 The deteriorating
relationship between Europeans and Russia has increased the risk of war.24
Europe has faced challenges of its own. Internal political and economic tensions havebeen amplified by a strategic schizophrenia on defense-related issues. Terrorism has had
an increasing impact on the continental powers, forcing Southern and Western European
countries to pay attention to the arc of instability stretching from Western Africa to
Afghanistan. Brexit has underlined and expanded the debate on faltering public support
for further EU integration. Differing views on how best to interact with Russia divides
the European allies and partners. In the short term, transatlantic political cohesion has
been undermined by the unpredictable and hostile policies of the Trump administration.
While future US abandonment of Europe is improbable, the continued need to shiftattention and resources to East Asia in order to manage the Chinese threat is a key driverof US security policy. Europe will therefor by necessity have to accept a greater role andresponsibility for its own defense.
Deterrence against Russia is not limited to high-end conflict. The ability to defend against
so called hybrid threats is also a necessity. Any Russian campaign will make use of allavailable instruments of power to achieve objectives.
NATO has come a long way in renewing a capability for the defense of Europe includingin the nuclear field. It emphasizes the overall deterrent capabilities available to it and thatany use of nuclear weapons against the alliance would “fundamentally alter” the natureof the conflict. NATO’s nuclear posture as well as that of its members, however, lacks
some of the flexibility Russia posesses. The dual-capable B-61s can draw on an inventoryof some 200 nuclear free-fall bombs as opposed to Russia’s thousands of theater nuclear
weapons. The B-61 delivered by dual-capable F-15 and F-16 fighters. This is a riskybusiness as the air defenses protecting critical targets in Russia are difficult to penetrate,even though the supposed superiority of Russia’s A2AD capability has recently beenquestioned. 25 US B-2 strategic bomber can deliver a version of the B-61 bomb. The
dilemma is that the use of this platform might be interpret by Russia as an ongoingstrategic attack.
23

Märta Carlsson, Mike Winnerstig, Irreconcilable differences—Analysing the deteriorating USRussia relationship, FOI-R—4276—SE, Stockholm, May (2016).
24 Tomas Graham, “Let Russia Be Russia—the case for a more pragmatic approach to Russia,”
Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec., 2019.
25 Dalsjö, Berglund, Jonsson, Bursting the Bubble—Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region:
Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications, FOI-R—4651—SE, Stockholm, March, 2019.

46

Chapter 3— Nuclear Dilemmas in Europe: Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability
post-INF [Rydqvist]

The final nonstrategic nuclear system currently in the US inventory is the AGM-86, astandoff air-launched cruise missile with a reported range of 2,400+ km and variable yieldof 5–15 kt. This missile is of a 1980s design. Thus, it may lack adequate accuracy andpenetration capability desirable for some contingencies requiring limited nuclear use.
Among the West Europeans, France currently may have the most robust theater nuclear
option with its modern Rafale dual-capable aircraft and its 600+ km ASMP-A airlaunched cruise missile. But France does not participate in NATO nuclear coordinationand therefor could not be counted on to dovetail with alliance deterrence and defense
efforts in war. In other words, the current US/NATO capabilities are likely less precise,less flexible, and cannot be used with the same discrimination as those in the Russianarsenal. This arguably makes their employment slightly less credible in some conflict
scenarios, in turn weakening deterrence against Russia at threshold of nuclear
employment.
After two decades of relative neglect, the United States has started taking steps to alleviate
its inferior sub-strategic nuclear capabilities in a bid to catch up with Russia. The 2018
Nuclear Posture Review discusses immediate and more long-term measures the UnitedStates needs to take. The new F-35 stealth fighter will eventually be dual capable andhave the capacity to deliver new, standoff versions of the B-61. The development of a
low-yield warhead for the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile will be completed
in a matter of years. A new ship-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile will be built inthe medium term. In 2017, the United States awarded contracts for the construction of a
new air-launched cruise missile, the LRSO, for its current and future bombers. This cruise
missile is scheduled to be deployed by the early 2030s. Once the new B-21 Raider longrange bomber aircraft is fielded in the mid-2020s, theater nuclear capabilities will befurther strengthened. Until such time as these assets are deployed, the theater nuclear
capability gap will remain.
How can Russia be prevented from exploiting its escalation dominance in the meantime?
To some Europeans, a new arms control agreement that removes or limits Russian theater
nuclear capabilities would be the preferred option. However, for the reasons discussed
earlier, the interest in and incentive for such an accord from the Russian side is weak.
Vastly expanded US/NATO garrisons in Eastern and Central Europe could improve
conventional deterrence to a level where Russian land grabs and limited wars of
aggression would have a low chance of succeeding in the first place. This might offset

Chapter 3— Nuclear Dilemmas in Europe: Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability
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47

some of the advantages its theater nuclear force provide. The question is whether current
efforts are sufficient to deter war in the short term. Western reluctance to garrison theEast, and Russian sensitivity to permanent deployments in its neighborhood will limit the
number of troops and assets permanently stationed there.
Should deterrence fail, limited Russian theater nuclear use needs to be discouraged so thata war can be kept conventional even if strikes against the Russian homeland are necessary.
Missile defense systems are a key asset in conflict as it denies an opponent the capability
for isolated missile launches, in effect forcing a more robust and more risky nuclear
escalation. Dispersal of assets and the hardening of installations are other ways to bluntbut not eliminate Russia’s theatre level nuclear options.
A quick US buildup of short- and medium-range missiles based on existing inventories
or missiles under development is one option. This might involve nuclear arming aTomahawk missile and forward basing it to Eastern Europe and extending the range, as
well as nuclear arming the US Army’s precision-strike missile, which is currently being
developed.26 The former was tested from a ground-based platform in August 2019, which
was likely a demonstration to Russia of what might come.27 Rumor has it that the latter
will be tested at a range above 500 km in November 2019.
Although responses like this may restore theater nuclear parity to Europe in a shorter time,they are also risky if decoupled with a strategy of restraint. An accelerating nuclear arms
race in Europe is not in the interests of either the United States, Russia or the Europeans.
This is where dilemmas associated with China reemerge. Both the United States andRussia have made clear that if China is not drawn into an accord of restraint, it isexpanding regional capabilities must be deterred. Thus, finding new formulas that preventan unchecked arms race while accommodating the US and Russian need to counter Chinais where most thinking has to be done. In the meantime, Europe will have to brace forincreasing nuclear tension and prepare its public and politicians for a possible occurrenceof a new version of the Euromissile crisis.

26 https://breakingdefense.com/2019/10/raytheons-pitch-for-precision-strike-the-post-inf-missile/(accessed February 09, 2021).
27 https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-04/news/us-test-inf-treaty-range-missiles (accessed Feb-

ruary 09, 2021).

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Chapter 3— Nuclear Dilemmas in Europe: Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability
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CONCLUSION—STRATEGIC STABILITY IN EUROPE AFTER THE INF

A combination of deteriorating political relations and Russia’s willingness to use armed
aggression in pursuit of political objectives beyond territorial defense has altered theEuropean security landscape. The erosion of Cold War arms control regimes, including
the INF, is a result of this wider shift. Stability, Henry Kissinger once wrote, “depends
upon the relative satisfaction and the relative dissatisfaction of all the sides.”28 Helmut
Schmidt, in his famous 1977 lecture, pointed out that “political and military balance isthe prerequisite for our security…and fruitful progress in East–West détente.”29 In aneffort to reach a new equilibrium in Europe today, these fundamental principles likely
have some merit. However, in a drastically different world, new concepts to enhancestrategic stability need to be found.
The fundamental compromise the United States will accept in exchange for a relatively
stable and peaceful Europe is to remain a close ally and devote resources to NATO andother partner countries. If Trump-like policies continue to be pursued, the transatlantic
partnership may become permanently damaged. Should the United States fail to take steps
that reassure the Europeans of its commitment they may be harder-pressed to findalternative security arrangements among themselves. The European compromise is toaccept an enhanced role in the defense of the continent and willingness to devote moreresources towards comprehensive deterrence.
As the challenge from Russian spans the full conflict spectrum, from subversion andmeddling in the political process of other countries to full-blown nuclear war Western
efforts must be geared towards building robust multi domain defense capabilities. These
capabilities need to be integrated and complementary. For the higher levels of conflict
deterrence must be thought of as a continuum, from conventional to nuclear. Multidomain deterrence is a necessary response to the broad Russian toolbox. Accepting thatsuch an approach necessitates new ways of dealing with arms control is an important partof the European compromise.
Should the trans-Atlantic community fail to firmly commit, coordinate and evolve its
defense capabilities, an alternative might be some degree of accommodation vis-à-vis
28 As quoted in: Jamie Shea: 1979: The Soviet Union deploys its SS-20 missiles and NATO responds,

NATO Lecture, March (2009).
29 Helmut Schmidt: “The 1977 Alastair Buchan memorial lecture,” Survival, Jan./Feb. 1978, p. 3

Chapter 3— Nuclear Dilemmas in Europe: Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability
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Russia.30 For front-line states exposed to Russian coercion and manipulation this would
be a serious and detrimental development. Any moves that would seem to legitimize
current Russian military behaviour in order to achieve a political deal would deterrence.
Such an approach has little merit in light of recurring initiatives to “reset” political
relations with Russia during the last decade. Instead of drawing Russia closer and shaping
Moscow’s behaviour for the better, the results have been European splintering and further
Russian lies. Moscow is unlikely to re-evaluate its perception of and behavior towards
the West. Nor is Russia likely to change into a liberal democracy set on promoting thecommon good. The relations among Russia, Europe, and the United States have “beenfundamentally competitive from the moment the United States emerged as a global
power.” 31 Russia must therefor be forced to accept a new concept for stability. At aminimum, such a concept would involve some new form of arms limitation.
A last important feature of the new world order is that any strategic grand bargain in
Europe intimately hinges on China. Thus far, China has refused to consider arms
limitations and exhibited reluctance to conduct a genuine strategic dialogue. A post-INF
trans-Atlantic approach to Russia therefor must be coupled to a coordinated trans-Atlantic
approach towards China in order to achieve strategic stability. This is where Japan andother East Asian partners might play a small, yet important role in informing Europe about
the nature of the Chines threat and coordinating with it on how to deal with the broader
challenges posed by the rise of China.

30 Frank A. Rose, Benjamin Bahaney,“Reassuring Allies and Strengthening Strategic Stability.”
Tomas Graham, “Let Russia Be Russia—the case for a more pragmatic approach to Russia,”
Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec., 2019.
31

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Chapter 4 — Russia’s Debate on Strategic Deterrence:
From Strategic Nuclear Deterrence to Hybrid Warfare [Koizumi]

CHAPTER 4

Russia’s Debate on Strategic Deterrence:
From Strategic Nuclear Deterrence to Hybrid Warfare
Naomi Koizumi
INTRODUCTION
Since Vladimir Putin returned to office in 2012, we have witnessed Russia’s militarily
assertive behavior more than ever before. Its annexation of Crimea in March 2014 andmilitary intervention in the civil war in Ukraine are cases in point. With Russia’sintervention in Ukraine, the United States and the European Union imposed sanctions on
Russia, which brought United States–Russia relations to the lowest point since the end of
the Cold War. Under these conditions, Russia seems to be making every effort to develop
new nuclear weapon types.
What is Putin actually going to do with these newly developed nuclear weapons? Has
Russia lowered its nuclear threshold, as has been pointed out by many Western analysts?1
What role do the “hybrid warfare”2 operations that Russia allegedly used in Crimea playin its deterrence strategy? This paper aimed to answer these questions by analyzing thedebate on “strategic deterrence” currently taking place among Russian military specialists.
Strategic deterrence is their unique concept comprising more than nuclear deterrence, as
discussed below.
With regard to Russia’s recent behavior, just before the presidential election and twomonths before he entered his fourth term in May 2018, President Putin made his annual,
but a bit unusual, address to Russia’s parliament.3 It was unusual as he not only devoted

1 H.M Kristensen and M. Korda, “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol. 75, No. 2, pp. 4–5.
2 NATO’s web page gives the definition of hybrid threats as follows: “hybrid threats combine militaryand non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyber-attacks, economic
pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups and use of regular forces,” https://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/topics_156338.htm (accessed February 8, 2021).
3 “Poslanie Presidenta Federal'nomu Sobraniiu (Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly),”Chapter 4 — Russia’s Debate on Strategic Deterrence:
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51

one-fourth of his speech to military affairs but also presented to the audience a video
footage of some of the nuclear-capable weapons recently developed and deployed by
Russia. These include the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile; an intercontinental
undersea drone (later named Poseidon); a nuclear-powered, long-range cruise missile(later named Plevestnik); the Kinzhal hypersonic air-launched cruise missile; theAvangard hypersonic glide vehicle; and the Peresvet laser combat system.
While Poseidon and Plevestnik had no names yet and were still under development at thetime of Putin’s address, with many specialists skeptical of their feasibility, Kinzhal andPeresvet had already been deployed. The experimental phase of Sarmat had been
completed, and it was scheduled to be deployed in 2020. The development of Avangard
had also been completed, and it was announced that the first batch of these vehicles would
be deployed in December 2019.4
Russia has not only produced nuclear weapons but also demonstrated its intention to usethem in military exercises. Russia first incorporated a limited nuclear use scenario into its
exercises in the European theater with the Zapad-99, in June 1999, just after the NATOair strikes against Serbia were conducted during the Kosovo conflict. Russia simulated
the use of its two Tu-160 heavy bombers with air-launched cruise missiles against thestates that were supposed to have started the aggression. Then, Russia repeated the same
scenario in the quadrennial Zapad exercises. While Russia has toned down its emphasis
on nuclear use since 2013, presumably owing to its emerging confidence in precisionguided weapons and GLONASS, the Russian version of GPS, in the same year, it stirred
strong international objections in Europe when it performed a military exercise with
nuclear use against Sweden, which is neither a member of NATO nor a nuclear power
country. Putin’s statement that he thought of a nuclear option in the Crimean operation in2014 also fueled people’s fear.
Around the same time, the United States alleged that Russia had violated theIntermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty by conducting a missile experiment witha longer range than allowed by the treaty. Not seeing much effort on the Russian side toclear up the matter, the United States officially withdrew from the treaty in August 2019.
March 1, 2018, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 (accessed February 8, 2021).
4“Russia Deploys First Hypersonic Avangard ICBM Missile,” The Moscow Times, December 27,
2019.

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Chapter 4 — Russia’s Debate on Strategic Deterrence:
From Strategic Nuclear Deterrence to Hybrid Warfare [Koizumi]

In what follows, first, I summarize what Russian official documents refer to regarding
nuclear use in a military contingency. Then, I explore how Russia is currently trying todeter the three types of war, namely, an all-out nuclear war, a large-scale regional war,and local conflicts, by analyzing the debate on strategic deterrence. This paper is based
primarily on articles from Military Thought, the official organ of the General Staff (GS)of the Russian Federation.

１. RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY IN OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
Russia’s official documents dealing with the principles of nuclear use include the
National Security Concept (later called Strategy) of the Russian Federation drawn up by
the Security Council of the Presidential Administration and the Military Doctrine of theRussian Federation by the Ministry of Defense. Both documents go into effect withapproval by the president.
(1) THE BEGINNING OF THE 1990S
The first state document published after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was theMilitary Doctrine approved in 1993.5 The point that drew the most attention with regard
to this document was that it dropped the reference to the nuclear non-first use pledge that
the Soviet Union had announced in 1982. This is probably due to the fact that there wereno other means but nuclear weapons that Russia could rely on at that time, when the
country was in chaos after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although Russia recognizedthat the threat of a world war had significantly diminished, the document says that there
could be no limited nuclear war.
(2) FROM THE LATTER HALF OF THE 1990S TO THE END OF THE 2000S
The next document was the National Security Concept, which was approved in December
1997. 6 This document states that, although “there is no actual threat of a large-scale
5“Osnovnye polozheniia voyennoi doktriny Rossiyskoi Federatsii (The Basic Provisions of theMilitary Doctrine of the Russian Federation),” Krasnaia Zvezda, November 19, 1993, p. 3.
6“Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossyiskoi Federatsii (The Concepts of National Securityof the Russian Federation),” Diplomaticheskii vestnik, No. 2, February 1998, pp. 3–18.

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attack in the foreseeable future,” Russia will use nuclear weapons “when there emerges athreat against Russia’s existence itself as an independent sovereign state.” In other words,
nuclear weapons are regarded as a last resort. However, during this period, military andcivilian security specialists attempted to be more realistic, as NATO had already started
to enlarge its membership eastward. In the document published in 1998, the concept “deescalation” of a conflict by nuclear weapons, which means limited use of nuclear weapons,
was introduced, and the debate on the matter began.7
The confrontation between the United States and Russia came to a head when NATOlaunched air strikes against Serbia over the Kosovo conflict in 1999. Then, Putin cameinto office in May 2000. Shortly before this (January 2000, at that time Putin was stillprime minister), a new military doctrine was published, in which Russia made clear its
intention of nuclear first and limited use, stating that Russia “will use nuclear weapons
even in an enemy’s large-scale attack with only conventional weapons.” However, theterm “de-escalation” was not used here and has never appeared in official documents
except for the one published by the Ministry of Defense in 2003, titled “The Urgent Needsof the Development of the Military of the Russian Federation” (often called the Defense
White Paper, but this is not an official state document). The document states that Russia
will use nuclear weapons for de-escalation in a contingency. Here de-escalation is definedas “the termination of military activities under the conditions acceptable to Russia.”8(3) IN THE 2010S
For several years after the publication of the 2003 Defense White Paper, no new security
documents were published due to intensive internal arguments on what threats Russia wasfacing and how to deal with them. Finally, after Dmitry Medvedev came into office in2008, a new military doctrine was published in 2010.9 The document used the same

7

This document, called “The Basis (Concept) of the State Policy of the Russian Federation on the
Military Construction in the period until 2005,” was not disclosed, but drafted by the National Security
Council and authorized by El’tsin in July 1998. Andrei A. Kokoshin, Strategicheskoe upravlenie(Strategic Administration), Rosspen, 2003, p. 310.
8 “Aktual’nye zadachi razvitiia vooruzhennykh sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Actual problems ofdevelopment of the Military Forces of the Russian Federation),”Krasnaia Zvezda, October 11, 2003,
pp. 3–7.
9
Voennaia doktrina Rossiyskoi Federatsii (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), Rossiyskaia
gazeta, February 10, 2010.

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expression as the 2000 doctrine with regard to nuclear first use, 10 but with much
ambiguity, as it also stated that nuclear weapons would be used only when aggression
threatened the existence of Russia itself as an independent sovereign state. This was thesame as the moderate position that used to be taken in the 1990s denying nuclear first use;
thus, many specialists were puzzled about the intentions of the new leadership.
Then, Putin returned to office in 2012 and published a new military doctrine in 2014.11
This doctrine is a revised version of the 2010 Military Doctrine, and many articles werepassed down, including that of nuclear use. Much attention was rather shifted to theintroduction of a new concept of “nonnuclear deterrence,” which will be discussed later.
In this way, as far as the official statements are concerned, Russia’s attitude toward limited
nuclear use or a de-escalation strategy seems to have been put on the back burner. Then,
what ideas do Russian military specialists have about nuclear use? Next, I will discuss ontheir debates about strategic deterrence.

２. DEBATE ON STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
Only in recent years have Western analysts started to pay attention to the debates on“strategic deterrence” among Russian military specialists in Russian professional journals.
According to Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, the term was circulated in the 2000s, and it tookhold as a deterrence concept in Russia at the beginning of the 2010s.12 In fact, while adebate on de-escalation (limited nuclear use) took place in the latter half of the 1990s,
they started focusing on the broader concept of deterrence, “strategic deterrence,” in the
2000s. In official documents, the term was first used in the 2009 National Security
Strategy and the 2010 Military Doctrine.
What is strategic deterrence? The official site of the Russian Defense Ministry defines
this term as follows:“Strategic deterrence is a unified system of nonmilitary and military means taken
10

The 2010 Military Doctrine states that Russia “will use nuclear weapons even when an enemy
initiates a large-scale attack with only conventional weapons.”
11 Voyennaia doktrina Rossiyskoi Federatsii (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation),
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/military/document129 (accessed February 8, 2021).
12
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” Survival, vol. 58, no. 4, August-September
2016, p. 9.

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consecutively or simultaneously to deter the military activities, whatever they are, whichmight cause strategic damage or have such capabilities.”13
The Russian Defense Ministry states that strategic deterrence differs from traditional
deterrence, which is military and political deterrence to prevent aggression or a threat, inthe following respects: the former is carried out in both peacetime and in a time of
emergency, not only to prevent armed conflict with an enemy but also to hold/containthem at a limited level even after the failure of deterrence.14
In other words, strategic deterrence will be undertaken (1) both in peacetime and for deescalation of military conflict and (2) by using both military and nonmilitary means.
Bruusgaard thinks that as a result of attempting strategic deterrence, Russia’s nuclear
threshold has been increased, contrary to common belief, as Russia has more options todepend on other than nuclear weapons and so has become less reliant on them so far.15
However, Dmitry Adamsky says that Russia is trying to construct a cross-domain
coercion system, “orchestrating nonnuclear, informational, and nuclear influence withina unified program for the sake of coercion (both to deter and to compel).”16 I do not thinkthat Russia has been that successful in adapting to the currently developing changes inthe strategic environment.
In the following section, I will discuss what Russian military specialists are debating onwith regard to strategic deterrence, how they try to deal with actual threats in theirdeterrence system, and the challenges they are facing. By mainly considering the journal
published by the Russian GS, I sum up their thinking on deterrence at each of the threelevels of war: an all-out nuclear war, a large-scale war, and a local military conflict. At
each level, how they define deterrence, how they construct a posture, and finally what

13

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id=14206@morfDictionary (accessed February 8, 2021).
14 Ibid.
15 Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” p.19. Bruusgaard does not think that more options for
Russia means that it has discarded its nuclear first-use policy. Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “The Myth of
Russia’s Lowered Nuclear Threshold,” War on the Rocks, September 22, 2017, https://warontherocks.
com/2017/09/the-myth-of-russias-lowered-nuclear-threshold (accessed February 8, 2021).
16 Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy,” IFRI
Security Studies Center, Proliferation Papers 54, November 2015, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/
files/atoms/files/pp54adamsky.pdf (accessed February 8, 2021), p. 37. See also Dmitry Adamsky,“Nuclear Incoherence: Deterrence Theory and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia,” The
Journal of Strategic Studies, 2014, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 91–134.

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problems they feel in practice will be addressed in turn.
(1) AN ALL-OUT NUCLEAR WAR
As a deterrent for an all-out nuclear war, that is, a “way of persuading the adversary thatit does not pay to use force trying to achieve his military and political objectives,” Russia
thinks this is the catastrophic consequence of nuclear retaliation. 17 This is strategic
nuclear deterrence, which occupies a central place also within strategic deterrence.
As the Soviet Union always felt inferior to the United States in terms of nuclear forces, it
constantly attempted hard to catch up with the United States and achieve nuclear parity
with it. Under these conditions, their aim was for a long time not to lose, even if they were
not able to win. Therefore, in the first half of the 1960s, they prepared for the first use of
their strategic nuclear weapons. With technological development in long-range missilewarning radar systems and the early-warning satellites in the mid-1970s, they began torely on what they call a counterattack and a retaliatory counterattack (launch-on-warningand launch-under-attack, respectively) as well as a pure retaliatory attack (a second
strike).18
It has since been confirmed that in addition to these postures, the Soviets had conceived
and then abandoned what is called the Dead Hand, or the Perimeter system, by which allremaining missiles could be automatically launched even after the nuclear control centerand political and military leaders had all been destroyed. 19 Currently, a retaliatory
counterattack and a pure retaliatory attack remain as Russia’s central nuclear options.
In the debate on strategic deterrence among military specialists, there seems to be acommon understanding in this field, and a negligible disagreement is observed. They
share the perception that with the limitations on deployable nuclear weapons imposed by
START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) and New START, and newly deployed
17

V. I. Polegaev and V. V. Alferov, “Nonnuclear Deterrence in the Strategic Deterrence System,”
Military Thought, No. 3, 2015, p. 9.
18 Vladimir Dvorkin, “Sderzhivanie i strategicheskaia stabil’nost’ (Deterrence and Strategic
Stabiliry),” A. Arbarov and V. Dvorkin eds., Yadrnaia perezagruzka: Cokrashchenie inerasprostranenie vooruzhenii (Nuclear Reloading: Reduction and Nonproliferation of Armament),
Moscow Carnegie Center, ROSSPEN, Moscow, 2011, p. 28; Alexei Arbatov, “Understanding the USRussia Nuclear Schism,” Survival, vol.59, no.2, 2017, pp. 44.
19David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its
Dangerous Legacy, Anchor Books, A Division of Random House, Inc., New York, 2009, pp.150–154.

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missile defense systems of the United States, they face a much higher probability that
their strategic nuclear weapons would be neutralized, and they would suffer from anenemy’s attack that would leave them disarmed, thus requiring them to urgently deal withthis challenge. These concerns surely led to the development of new nuclear-capable
weapon systems, which was introduced by President Putin in his annual address in 2018.
They all fit for the strategic offensive system to evade US missile defense systems.
Putin’s way of dealing with this new challenge is termed asymmetrical and inexpensive
reaction to it, and in the same way as Mikhail Gorbachev responded to the SDI (Strategic
Defense Initiative) program announced by President Reagan in the 1980s. In theGorbachev era, numerous new projects related to strategic offensive weapons against SDI
were proposed, as well as the Soviet version of the SDI program, but most of these were
never built because they failed to win budgetary approval. 20 Then, after theannouncement of the US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM (Anti-Ballistic
Missile)Treaty in 2001, some of these ideas were revived. Putin mentioned in his 2018
annual address that Avangard was tested for the first time in 2004, soon after the formal
abolishment of the ABM Treaty in 2002.
(2) A LARGE-SCALE REGIONAL WAR
It is assumed that the result of escalation from local conflicts is a large-scale regional war
and that an appropriate deterrent should be the threat of ruinous results from nuclear
preemptive use21.
This is so-called de-escalation, and as previously mentioned, nuclear preemptive use wasformally adopted in the 2000 Military Doctrine. However, we must also remember thatin the Soviet era, the military strategy was based on a surprise attack by conventional
weapons and strategic nuclear deterrence. They had no limited nuclear war options. Thus,
it must have not been easy to operationalize limited nuclear war scenarios.
What kind of debates, then, are currently going on within the Russian military? First, as
mentioned above, both the 2010 and 2014 Military Doctrine give the impression that they
seem to reject nuclear preemption. President Putin, in his annual address in 2018,20
21

Hoffman, The Dead Hand, p.220 and p.527 (note 29).
Polegaev and Alferov, “Nonnuclear Deterrence in the Strategic Deterrence System,” p. 9.

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deliberately referred to this doctrinal principle on nuclear use. It appears that military
specialists are not happy with this policy orientation. One article says that an ambiguousprescription like this would ruin Russia’s chances to make strategic initiatives and doom
it to fail.22
Another article concerns when and how to decide on nuclear use. The authors point out
the Russian military’s lack of criteria for getting across the nuclear threshold. To make alegitimate decision on nuclear use in response to an act of aggression with conventional
weapons, a comprehensive estimate of the actual damage suffered and anticipated damage
would be essential. However, due to the lack of a reliable information-gathering system,
they claim that it is in fact impossible to make such a decision.23 They assert that thecurrent and anticipated damage assessment system (CADAS) is to be developed.
These arguments suggest that the Russian military has not been very successful in thedevelopment of a command-and-control system for limited nuclear use.
(3) LOCAL CONFLICTS
A deterrent for local military conflicts is assumed to be the threat of unbearable damagea retaliatory strike would likely inflict on the aggressor.24
As mentioned above, a new concept, “nonnuclear deterrence,” was introduced into the2014 Military Doctrine. The nonnuclear deterrence system is defined as “the complex
system of foreign policy, military and military technical measures in order to prevent with
nonnuclear means aggression against the Russian Federation.” It is worth noting that
nonnuclear deterrence includes nonmilitary measures and military means. Until the 2000s,
nonnuclear deterrent meant conventional precision-guided weapons.25
This new concept was proposed in an article written by the former chief of the generalstaff (CGS), Mikhail Baluevskii and published immediately before the announcement of

22

Ibid.
O. Yu. Aksyonov, Yu. N. Tretyakov, Ye. N. Filin, “Basic Principles of a System to Assess Current
and Anticipated Damage to Key Strategic Deterrence System Elements,” Military Thought, No.3, 2015,
p. 45.
24 Polegaev and Alferov, “Nonnuclear Deterrence in the Strategic Deterrence System,” p. 9.
25
V.V. Korobushin, “Russia's Strategic Deterrence: Security Functions and Development Prospects,”
Military Thought, Vo. 14, no. 3, 2005, p. 14.
23

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the new military doctrine. He argues that nuclear weapons are effective in preventing a
nuclear war and a large-scale regional war but not for de-escalating local conflicts ordomestic military conflicts. In such cases, nonnuclear deterrence should be applied.26
A year earlier, in January 2013, the current CGS, Mikhail Gerasimov, made a speech ,inwhich he stated that in a modern war, the rules had totally changed, seemingly having in
mind a network-centric warfare (NCW), adopted by the US Military in the 2000s, andasymmetrical measures, such as special task forces, the employment of local dissidentgroups, and informational warfare. He made this speech at the general meeting of the
Academy of Military Science, which was his first speech as CGS,27 His predecessor,
Nikolai Makarov was promoted unusually from department head of weapons andequipment of the GS and started the recent radical military reform with the then-ministerof defense, Anatoliy Serdyukov. Makarov is a man of distinction with broad knowledgeof the most up-to-date weapon systems and military theory, thus he bitterly criticized theold-fashioned Russian Academy of Military Science, and then his relationship with the
Academy remarkably soured. The newly appointed Gerasimov, trying to improve therelationship between the GS and the Academy, called on the Academy to pursue active
research on modern warfare using asymmetrical measures.
Because the speech sounded like prior notice of the Russian hybrid operation in Crimea
in March 2014, it has come to be called the “Gerasimov Doctrine.” However, the idea
behind it seems to be that of Makarov. In fact, the Russian troops deployed in Crimea,
called “little green men,” have turned out to be special operation forces (SOF) created by
Makarov and were first deployed in the field at that time.28 We also know that massive
cyberattacks were carried out on Ukrainian governmental institutions before and during
the Russian operation. If the origin of the Russian operation in the cyber domain was theone made against Estonia in 2007, such an operation was no longer unfamiliar to Russia
in 2013.

26

Yurii Baluevskii, “Novye smysly voennoi doktriny (The New Meanings of the Military Doctrine),”
Voenno-promyshlennyi kur'er, No.42(560), December 12, 2014, https://www.vpk- news.ru/sites/defau
lt /files/pdf/VPK_42_560.pdf (accessed February 8, 2021).
27 Valerii Gerasimov, “Tsennost’ nauki v predvidenii (The Value of Science in Prediction),” VoennnoPromyshlennyi kur’er, No. 8 (476), February 27, 2013, https://www.vpk- news. ru/sites/ default/ files/
pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf (accessed February 8, 2021).
28
Colby Howard, Ruslan Pukhov, eds., Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine(2nd.ed.), Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), 2015, Kindle, No.2371/8081.

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However, a coherent “hybrid warfare” operation seems to remain a challenge to theRussian military. Responding to Gerasimov’s call, an article titled “New-Generation War”
(NGW) appeared in the journal.29 According to the authors, months before the start of an
NGW, aggressor states will employ various nonmilitary measures, such as information
warfare and cyberattacks. Then, hours before the start of the conflict, there will be a
massive attack by electronic warfare (EW) technologies to inflict an “electronic
knockdown.” Following large-scale reconnaissance and subversive missions, anaerospace operation in the NCW environment will be started. A growing number ofRussian military theorists regard the “overwhelming superiority of either of the warring
sides in military technology as a hallmark of NGWs.”30
Therefore, the authors state that in order “not to repeat a historical error, the Russian
military must prepare for fighting a NGW in the middle- and longer term”31 (emphasis
added). They conclude the article by criticizing the official nonnuclear deterrence policy,
saying that “a nation which takes an oath supporting a defensive doctrine might get the
short straw when encountering a surprise attack by the aggressor.”32
Another article is more candid. The authors say that the argument for nonnuclear
deterrence is empty rhetoric and even dangerous, as nonnuclear deterrence against
conventional attacks is only possible when the aggressor has limited aims. In such a case,deterrence could be effective with appropriate forces and conventional weapons, neitherof which is available to Russia yet. They do not forget to add that behind these arguments,
there must be a desire to reduce the military budget.33 They also suggest that it is notnonnuclear deterrence that Russia needs right now but nuclear deterrence and nonnuclear
rapid reaction forces (SOF).34

CONCLUSION
I can point out the following from my observations of the debates among Russian military
29

S. G. Chekinov, S. A. Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War,” MilitaryThought, No.4, 2013, pp. 16–22.
30 Chekinov and Bogdanov, ibid., p. 21. See also A. L. Khryapin, D. A. Kalinkin, V. V. Matvichuk,“Strategic Deterrence against the U.S. Global ABM System and Prompt Global Strike Capabilities,”
Military Thought, No. 1, 2015, p. 3.
31 Chekinov and Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War,” p. 23.
32 Ibid.
33
Polegayev and Alferov, “Nonnuclear Deterrence in the Strategic Deterrence System,” p. 14.
34 Ibid.

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analysts:
1) In terms of strategic nuclear deterrence, Russia perceives the US missile defense
system as a major threat destroying the strategic parity between the two parties andhas made a huge effort to develop new offensive weapons that could diminish thepower of the defensive system. Putin proudly announced part of their efforts; however,Russia thinks that it is reacting to the American initiatives, not being an initiator ofthis new round of the arms race.
2) In terms of a large-scale regional war, the construction of a nuclear operating systemfor de-escalating local and regional conflicts, which was introduced in the 1990s,
seems to still be underway. Thus, it is not likely that the Russians would be willing tolower the nuclear threshold. Rather the political and military leadership has started toshift its emphasis to “nonnuclear deterrence,” which includes nonmilitary measuresat this time.
3) With regard to local conflicts, the Russian military has been analyzing what they calla “NGW” in the Middle East and Europe, considering the NCW system adopted by
the US Military in the 2000s and the nonmilitary measures, such as cyberattacks.
Russian military analysts know well the inferiority of the Russian side in networking
and conventional weapons, especially precision-guided weapons; therefore, they are
critical of the “nonnuclear deterrence” doctrine newly introduced in the 2014 Military
Doctrine. As a result, on the one hand, they cannot shift away from the limited nuclear
use option, and, on the other hand, they tend to further depend on nonmilitary
measures that are comparatively easy for them to rely on, such as cyberattacks35.
Through the Russian debates on strategic deterrence, we have observed that Russianefforts to adapt their deterrence posture to the emerging military environment have not
had much success. Russian military analysts are overtly critical of the doctrinal direction
taken by the politico-military leadership. Now, we are seeing not a coherent deterrence
strategy being built but a sign of frustration of the military theorists facing a dilemma

35

However, some Russian military specialists argue that comprehensive employment of various
nonmilitary measures has only been explored “superficially and inconclusively.” D. A. Pavlov, A. N.
Belsky, O. V. Klimenko, “Military Security of the Russian Federation: How It Can Be Maintained
Today,” Military Thought, No.1, 2015, p. 22.

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between the official policy line, and budget constraints as well as a technological lag.

Chapter 5 — Strategic Stability in Changing Nuclear South Asia:
Emerging Risks [Kurita]

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CHAPTER 5

Strategic Stability in Changing Nuclear South Asia:
Emerging Risks
Masahiro Kurita
INTRODUCTION
In the two decades after the overt nuclearization of South Asia in 1998, nuclear deterrence
relations between India and Pakistan witnessed many notable events and trends which
attracted international attention. The first five years saw two serious military crises which,according to observers, had the potential risk of nuclear escalation. Although the rest of
the 2000s saw no such spectacular confrontations, Pakistan continued its proxy war
against India, including the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, and both Delhi and Islamabad
steadily built up their respective nuclear arsenals. Then, around 2010, two trends started
to garner attention: their shifting nuclear postures and intensified reciprocal cross-bordershelling.
Related to these developments, what should be noted here is the increasing shadow ofanother important power in the South Asian nuclear environment―China. A nuclear
threat to India since the 1960s and once actively supported Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions,
China has become increasingly relevant to regional geopolitics because of its worsening
relations with India and Pakistan’s increased reliance on China against the backdrop of
Pakistan’s deteriorating relations with the United States. However, the more Beijing is
involved in South Asian geopolitics, the more complicated the nuclear security
environment in the region.
Against this background, there is growing interest in South Asian nuclear issues.
Undoubtedly, among these issues, a paramount question is: Can the strategic stability ofthe two competitive relations, Indo–Pakistan and Sino–Indian, be maintained? In
considering this question, we must identify risks that may threaten the overall stability ofthese relations. Hence, this article attempts to highlight such risks, albeit not exhaustively,
which can be featured in the short- to midterm future: the stability–instability paradox

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and evolution of India’s countermeasures, developments in Pakistani and Indian nuclear
postures, and the potential discovery of the stability–instability paradox in the China–
India dyad.

THE STABILITY INSTABILITY PARADOX AND EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S
COUNTERMEASURES
Nuclear scholars have widely regarded the India–Pakistan relation since the covert
nuclearization of both countries in the late 1980s as a typical example of the stability–
instability paradox. This concept, which is attributed to Glenn H. Snyder, a renowned
deterrence theorist during the Cold War, posits that strategic stability based on mutual
nuclear deterrence facilitates instability at the lower levels of the escalation ladder. 1
Within the South Asian context, the paradox has been invoked to explain Pakistan’s
continuing proxy war against India―materially supporting insurgency and terrorism inthe state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and in mainland India―even after the twocountries acquired nuclear weapons, and to point out how nuclear deterrence works infavor of Islamabad. The logic goes that nuclear weapons have facilitated theconventionally inferior Pakistan’s proxy war against India, by making it impossible for
India to retaliate using its superior conventional military strength for fear of nuclear
escalation, to an extent inconceivable in the prenuclear era. 2 This explanation has
become widely supported, bolstered by the 1999 Kargil conflict, the 2001 parliamentaryraid by militants allegedly linked with Pakistan’s intelligence, and the 2008 Mumbai
terror attacks.3
While many scholars have regarded Pakistan’s proxy war under the paradox as one of the
major threats to the India–Pakistan strategic stability, evaluating how much Pakistan has
actually benefited from its nuclear deterrence this way is difficult. Simply put, this refers
1 Glenn H. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in Paul Seabury ed., The

Balance of Power, Chandler, 1965, p. 199.
2 This detailed logic of the paradox applicable to South Asia was first elaborated by Professor S. Paul
Kapur. See S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in SouthAsia, Stanford University Press, 2007, pp. 34-55.
3 For instance, Dinshaw Mistry, “Complexity of Deterrence among New Nuclear States: The IndiaPakistan Case,” in T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Complex Deterrence:
Strategy in the Global Age, The University of Chicago Press, 2009, pp. 183-203; Rajesh M. Basrur,“Two Decades of Minimum Deterrence in South Asia: A Comparative Framework,” in Bhumitra
Chakma, ed., The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, Ashgate, 2011, pp. 20-22; Bhumitra
Chakma, South Asia’s Nuclear Security, Routledge, 2015, pp. 36-57; Saira Khan, Nuclear Weapons
and Conflict Transformation, Routledge, 2009, pp. 100-114.

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to the extent to which Pakistan has intensified its support to anti-India terrorism precisely
because of its confidence on nuclear deterrence in reality.4 Still, at least it can be said thatmodalities of interactions between India and Pakistan at the lower level―largely thesubconventional level―has not been monolithic in the past three decades. The level ofviolence in J&K, the main victim of Pakistan’s support for anti-India insurgency andterrorism, surged right after their covert nuclearization at the end of the 1980s and thennosedived in the mid-1990s, followed by a temporary increase at the turn of the century
to an extent slightly below the first peak and another significant decrease. While the lawand-order situation in J&K is said to have worsened since 2016, it remains completely
different from the condition in the mid-1990s and early 2000s.5 Moreover, while India,
until the early 2000s, has been largely overwhelmed by Pakistan’s offensive at thesubconventional level, since the inauguration of the Modi administration in 2014, Delhi
has become increasingly willing to exercise various lower-level countermeasures.
The evolution of such countermeasures by India should be highlighted here. It has beentraumatic for the Indian security establishment that, in the wake of the December 2001
parliamentary raid by Pakistan-backed militants, Delhi could effectively do nothing.
Although it attempted coercive diplomacy against Pakistan by mobilizing and deploying
hundreds of thousands of troops along the border, India could neither elicit Pakistan’s
compliance nor implement military actions. This experience led to the announcement of
the Indian Army’s ambitious but never-implemented solution in 2004, the Cold Start
limited conventional war doctrine, which was designed to punish Pakistan for its serious
terror attacks to an extent that does not cross the redline of Islamabad’s nuclear use.
However, what is more important here is another line of solutions which India has actually
implemented: lower-level countermeasures, as mentioned above, exercised mainly at thesubconventional level. 6 The Modi administration (2014–present) has shown little
reluctance in exercising these options. For instance, one cause of cross-border shelling
intensification in Kashmir since around the mid-2010s is India’s renewed policy, led by
National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, to respond to the shelling from the other side with
4 The author suggested that the actual benefits for Pakistan was rather limited in the following book:

Kaku no Risuku to Chiki Hunso: Indo Pakisutan Hunso no Kiki to Antei [Nuclear Risk and Regional
Conflict: Crises and Stability in the India Pakistan Conflict], Keiso Shobo, 2018, pp. 55-112.
5 Based on the statistics in annual reports of Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, which can be accessedat https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports (accessed January 13, 2021).
6 For the Cold Start doctrine, see Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?: The Indian
Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007/2008, pp.
164-165.

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Chapter 5 — Strategic Stability in Changing Nuclear South Asia:
Emerging Risks [Kurita]“full force.”7 In response to a Pakistan-backed militant group’s serious terror attack on
an army base in Uri, J&K, in September 2016, the Modi government authorized specialforce raids across the Line of Control against terrorist camps in the Pakistan-administered
Kashmir. While similar raids had been reportedly conducted, this was the first time thatDelhi publicly announced it, sending a strong message to Islamabad and the international
community. 8 Then, in the aftermath of another serious terror attack against security
forces in Pulwama, J&K, in February 2019, India resorted to limited aerial attacks against
terrorist camps in Pakistan’s mainland for the first time since the 1971 India-Pakistan War
While such a development seems natural given India’s long-standing frustration withPakistan’s unabated proxy war and the Modi government’s hawkish foreign policy stance,
it entails a serious risk. Traditionally, India’s countermeasures against Pakistan’s proxy
war focused on domestic counterterror and counterinsurgency efforts, and Delhi waslargely reluctant to militarily punish Islamabad for its terrorist and insurgent support.9
The Modi government altered the course and has gradually upped the ante by escalating
its responses, from intensifying cross-border shelling to conducting aerial attacks against
Pakistan. However, this policy evolution may have put India in a reputational
commitment trap: whenever a serious terror attack occurs, Delhi feels significant pressure
to take a response stronger than, or at least equivalent to, the last response in terms ofmeeting domestic expectations and maintaining the external credibility of India’s strong
security policy. It should be remembered that the “last response” has already reached thelevel of airstrikes though India described it as a “nonmilitary preemptive action.”10 This
process can eventually lead to a more serious direct military confrontation between thetwo countries.
It can also be said that it is this kind of danger that can restrain Pakistan’s misdeeds.
However, the stronger India’s response becomes, the higher the pressure faced by
Pakistan’s security establishment to make a counter-response because of its own
reputational concerns. Moreover, even if Pakistan shows some restraint because of sucha danger, it does not have complete reign over militants operating in J&K and mainland
India. These anti-India militant groups can act on their own will, and antiunion insurgency
in J&K has involved elements of indigenous movement, driven by grievances of local
7 “The Man behind India’s Policy Shift: NSA Ajit Doval,” Times of India, September 30, 2016.
8 Karthika Sasikumar, “India’s Surgical Strikes: Response to Strategic Imperatives,” The Round Table,

Vol. 108, No. 2, 2019, p. 164.
9 Navnita Chadha Behera, Demystifying Kashmir¸ Brookings Institution Press, 2006, p. 69.
10“MEA Statement on IAF's ‘Non-military Pre-emptive Action’ in Pakistan’s Balakot Differentiates
it from Surgical Strike of September 2016,” Firstpost, February 26, 2019.

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people.11 Hence, it is conceivable that a serious terror incident that even Pakistan does
not want would occur, and then India makes a retaliatory move against Pakistan strong
enough to force Islamabad to respond, which sets off an escalation process. Based on theabove, not only Pakistan’s continuing proxy war but also India’s evolving
countermeasures can be seriously detrimental to strategic stability in South Asia.

DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR POSTURES
Developments in both countries’ nuclear postures also deserve attention. The implicationsof Pakistan’s force and doctrinal developments have already been well discussed, but it
is still worth mentioning here. Since the first test flight of the Nasr 60 km tactical ballistic
missile in 2011, seemingly configured to deliver tactical/battlefield nuclear weapons(TNWs), Pakistan has been regarded as shifting toward a strategy similar to NATO’s
flexible response during the Cold War.12 This move was caused by India’s pursuance of
the aforementioned limited conventional war option, Cold Start, which can be exercisedeven under mutual nuclear deterrence by exploiting the credibility problem of Pakistan’s
strategic deterrence. This means it would be irrational for Pakistan to respond to such
limited aggression with strategic nuclear weapons, which would inevitably trigger India’s
massive nuclear counterattacks. However, if Pakistan has tactical-cum-limited nuclear
options such as small-yield weapons against India’s armored forces in a battlefield within
its own territory, it can credibly threaten nuclear responses to India’s limited conventional
aggression. It is irrational, this time, for India to respond to Pakistan’s limited nuclear use
with its strategic weapons since it will invite a similar retaliation from the latter. Pakistan
is said to intend to use TNWs in this manner and thereby enhance deterrence.13 After the
first test of the Nasr, Pakistan proceeded further in this direction by developing andinducting several short-range ballistic and cruise missiles suitable for tactical roles andenunciating the doctrine of “full-spectrum deterrence” albeit along with its traditional“credible minimum deterrence.”14

11 Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of

Nuclear Weapons, University of Washington Press, 2005, p. 87.
12 Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict,
Princeton University Press, 2014, pp. 77-78.
13 Rodney W. Jones, “Pakistan’s Answer to Cold Start?,” Friday Times, May 13-19, 2011; Bruno
Tertrais, “Pakistan’s Nuclear and WMD Programmes: Status, Evolution and Risks,” Non Proliferation
Papers, No. 19, July 2012, p. 5, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/EUNPC_no-19.pdf (accessed
January 13, 2021).
14
Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Press Release, No. PR133/2013-ISPR, September 5, 2013,https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=2361 (accessed January 13, 2021).

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This development has raised serious concern from outside observers and even the U.S.
government, as it effectively meant lowering the nuclear threshold and making nuclear
use more likely.15 Islamabad will be tempted to use TNWs early in its confrontation with
Delhi if Pakistan is convinced that it can one-sidedly repulse India’s conventional
onslaught with its TNWs without inviting India’s strategic nuclear response. Moreover,such a targeting strategy can lead to a large and diverse arsenal, which seems to be
confirmed by Pakistan’s expansion of its weapons-grade plutonium production
capabilities since the mid-2000s. Some analysts opined that Pakistan’s estimated warheadcount could reach up to 250 in 2025.16 It is also pointed out that TNWs are inherently
susceptible to inadvertent or accidental use or theft by illegal elements.17
On the other hand, certain parties have pointed out that such a trajectory of Pakistan’s
nuclear posture is still not evident.18 As mentioned above, Pakistani military planners
should be attracted to the idea of early nuclear use if they believe they can successfully
repulse India’s advancing conventional forces using TNWs without inviting an escalation
to an all-out nuclear exchange―that is, fighting and winning a limited nuclear war.
However, Pakistan must face several difficulties in utilizing TNWs in this manner,
including the limited military utility of TNWs in physically stopping advancing armoredcolumns and the complexity of controlling an undesirable escalation.19 These challenges
15 David J. Karl, “Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Weapon Posture,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol.

21, Nos. 3-4, 2014, p. 320; Monika Chansoria, “Pakistan’s Tactical Nukes Threaten Stability in SouthAsia,” Foreign Policy, May 5, 2014; Evan Braden Montgomery and Eric S. Edelman, “Rethinking
Stability in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and the Competition for Escalation Dominance,” Journal ofStrategic Studies, Vol. 38, Nos. 1-2, pp. 160-161, 171; “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest,
4/4/16,” The White House, April 4, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/04/
press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-4416 (accessed January 13, 2021).
16 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Vol. 74, No. 5, 2018, p. 348.
17 Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Options and Escalation Dominance, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, May 2016, p. 3, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_273_Ind
ia_Nuclear_Final.pdf (accessed January 13, 2021); Jonas Schneider, “A Nuclear Deal for Pakistan?,”
CSS Analyses in Security Policy, No. 187, March 2016, pp. 2-3, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/
special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse-187-EN.pdf(accessed January
13, 2021).
18 For example, see Christopher Clary, “The Future of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” inAshley Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 2013-14: Asia in theSecond Nuclear Age, The National Bureau of Asia Research, 2013, p. 153; Sadia Tasleem and Toby
Dalton, “Nuclear Emulation: Pakistan’s Nuclear Trajectory,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 41, No.
4, 2019, pp. 146-150.
19 A.H. Nayyar and Zia Mian, “The Limited Military Utility of Pakistan’s Battlefield Use of Nuclear
Weapons in Response to Large Scale Indian Conventional Attack,” Pakistan Security Research Unit
Brief, No. 61, November 11, 2010, p. 4, https://eacpe.org/content/uploads/2014/05/Battlefield-Nuclear

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and the resulting doubts on the military effectiveness of Pakistan’s TNWs have repeatedly
been raised by India’s strategic community.20 What is puzzling is that, notwithstanding
the prevalence of such an understanding at the other side of the border, Pakistani officials
and experts hardly elaborate how they can effectively fight and win a controlled nuclear
war using TNWs. Rather, they emphasize that their TNWs and the doctrine of fullspectrum deterrence are not configured for warfighting but for deterrence, sometimes
insisting that what ensures deterrence is the risk of uncontrollable escalation generated
by these seemingly more usable weapons.21 There is also no suggestion that Pakistan has
actually reorganized its operational strategy for nuclear warfighting.22
The destabilizing effects of TNWs can be mitigated if they are configured not as a
warfighting instrument but as an equivalent of France’s “pre-strategic” weapons during
the Cold War. In this configuration, TNWs are employed as a “warning shot” in aconventional war to signal the user’s desperation and imminence of its use of strategic
nuclear weapons rather than to offset conventional imbalance and fight a calibrated
nuclear war.23 However, early use of “pre-strategic” TNWs cannot be an attractive option
since they are one step away from the “last resort” strategic response and are notconfigured to make the battlefield situation favorable in a meaningful way. Meanwhile, it-Weapons.pdf; Ryan W. French, “Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Implications for Strategic
Stability in South Asia,” Luce.nt: A Journal of National Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 2015,
p. 13; Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Options and Escalation Dominance,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2016, p. 27, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/C
P_273_India_Nuclear_Final.pdf (accessed January 13, 2021); Peter R. Lavoy and Stephan A. Smith,“The Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear Use between India and Pakistan,” Strategic Insight, Vol. 2, No. 2,
February 2003, http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/25461/The_Risk_of_Inadvertent_Nuc
lear_Use_Between_India_and_Pakistan.pdf (accessed January 13, 2021).
20 Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution
Press, 2016, p. 111; Gurmeet Kanwal, “Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Warheads and India’s Nuclear
Doctrine,” IDSA Issue Brief, September 22, 2016, pp. 4-5, http://www.idsa.in/system/files/issuebrief/h
ib_pakistan-tactical-nuclear-india-nuclear-doctrine.pdf (accessed January 13, 2021).; Surya Bhanu
Rai, “Have Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) Served its Policy of Full Spectrum
Deterrence?,” CLAWS Issue Brief, No. 75, March 2016, p. 4, https://www.claws.in/publication/havepakistans-tactical-nuclear-weapons-tnws-served-its-policy-of-full-spectrum-deterrence/.
21 Adil Sultan, “NCA’s ‘Full Spectrum’ Response,” The Express Tribune, November 7, 2013; Feroz
Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, Stanford University Press, 2012, pp. 395396; Zahir Kazmi, “Nothing Tactical about Nuclear Weapons,” The Express Tribune, May 17, 2014;
Qasim Qureshi, Deterrence Stability in South Asia, paper presented to US-Pakistan StrategicPartnership: A Track II Dialogue, Phuket, Thailand, September 18-19, 2011, Naval Postgraduate
School, September 2011, p. 5, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=709864.
22 Mansoor Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability,” Regional
Insight, June 30, 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-and-their-impact-on-stability-pub-63911 (accessed January 13, 2021).
23
Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and theEnduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution, Stanford University Press, 2000, p. 201.

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does not require a large tactical nuclear arsenal necessary for warfighting.24 According
to Sadia Tasleem of Quaid-i-Azam University and Toby Dalton of Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, the lack of clarity over the deployment and targeting policy of
TNWs suggests that Pakistan has not found a way to enhance its deterrence credibility
with this weapon system in the face of the inherent challenges to employing them.25 IfIslamabad follows the Paris precedent and avoids a nuclear warfighting posture, thedestabilizing effects of TNWs will not be as serious. Their choice on this respect will
inevitably have significant implications on the overall India–Pakistan deterrence stability.

DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA’S NUCLEAR POSTURES
India’s nuclear posture is also said to be moving in another dangerous direction. In 2017,
American scholar Vipin Narang of Massachusetts Institute of Technology raised thepossibility of India’s shift from its traditional assured retaliation posture, which centerson the no-first-use (NFU) pledge and the principle of credible minimum deterrence,
toward a preemptive counterforce first-strike option, similar with the damage limitation
strategy in the Cold War era.26 According to Narang, this option would be exercised when,for example, India detects Pakistan’s move to introduce TNWs into the battlefield. In
presenting this idea, along with India’s weapon developments suited to theoption―multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, missile defenses, andaccurate missiles―he cited a few novel and important notes from former national security
advisor Shivshankar Menon’s book, Choices: (1) there are some “gray areas” in India’s
NFU policy, such as the situation in which it is certain that an adversary is about to use
nuclear weapons against India; (2) the initial logical posture was (not is) countervalue
targeting; and (3) Pakistan’s use of tactical nuclear weapons may trigger India’s“comprehensive first strike.” 27 In a 2019 article, Narang, with Christopher Clary of
Albany University, concluded more explicitly that India has been intentionally pursuingpreemptive counterforce strike options to destroy Pakistan’s strategic deterrence, thereby
neutralizing its strategy to leverage the nuclear shield to engage in the anti-India proxywar.2824 Ibid.
25 Tasleem and Dalton, “Nuclear Emulation,” pp. 149-150.
26 “NUKEFEST2017 Hot Takes: Potential Indian Nuclear First Use?,” South Asian Voices, March 21,

2017, https://southasianvoices.org/sav-dc-nukefest2017-potential-indian-nuclear-first-use (accessed
January 21, 2021).
27 The original texts of Menon’s these remarks can be found in Menon, Choices, pp. 108, 110, 117.
28
Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas,
Doctrine, and Capabilities,” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 4, Winter 2018/19, pp. 7-52.

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This argument has provoked resentment and rebuttal from India’s strategic community,
asserting that India was not abrogating its NFU commitment.29 However, it seems not sounlikely, at least in the future, for India to shift its nuclear posture in that direction. In
August 2019, Rajnath Singh, India’s incumbent defense minister, stated that whether
India’s NFU policy will be maintained “in future depends on circumstances.”30 Moreover,even the concept of counterforce is not an anathema for India’s nuclear thinking.
This means not only that counterforce is not ruled out in India’s official doctrine but alsothat it is implicated in the country’s massive retaliation policy. Before Narang’s
suggestion stirred controversy, the center of debate within India’s strategic circle waswhether to revise the massive retaliation principle of the official doctrine. There were(and are) calls for the introduction of limited nuclear use options by revising the principle,
as a threat of massive nuclear counterattacks against any types of the adversary’s first use
is supposed to be incredible against Pakistan’s tactical nuclear use, which is supported byits strategic deterrent.31 However, to date, there is nothing to suggest that this debate has
led to an actual revision of the doctrine. While various reasons can be cited for this, theidea of limited nuclear use is not consistent with the notion of an inherently uncontrollable
nuclear war, which has been prevalent in India’s strategic thinking.32 On the other hand,
proponents of maintaining the massive retaliation policy have insisted that India should
show its willingness to retaliate massively even against a tactical/limited nuclear attack.33
29 For example, Arun Sahgal, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine is Robust and Requires No Review,” DPG

Policy Note, Vol. 2, Issue 3, March 24, 2017, http://www.delhipolicygroup.org/up loads_dpg/publicati
on_file/dpg-policy-note-vol-ii-issue-3-indias-nuclear-doctrine-is-robust-and-requires-no-review-104
1.pdf (accessed January 13, 2021); Dhruva Jaishankar, “Decoding India's Nuclear Status,” The Wire,
April 3, 2017.
30 “‘No First Use’ Nuclear Policy Depends on Circumstances: Rajnath Singh,” The Hindu¸ August 16,
2019.
31 For example, P.R. Chari, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Stirrings of Change,” Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, June 4, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/04/india-s-nucleardoctrine-stirrings-of-change-pub-55789 (accessed January 13, 2021); Gurmeet Kanwal, “India’s
Nuclear Doctrine: Reviewing NFU and Massive Retaliation,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies,
January 7, 2015, http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=4798. (accessed January 13, 2021).
32 It has been mentioned repeatedly by India’s strategic thinkers. For instance, Vijay Shankar, “Jihadi
Aggression and Nuclear Deterrence,” The Strategist, September 15, 2015, http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=4912 (accessed January 13, 2021); Jayant Prasad, “For a Clear Nuclear Doctrine,”
The Hindu, May 6, 2014; P.R. Chari, Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in SouthAsia, Stimson Center, August 2003, p. 9, https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file- attachments/
escalation_chari_1_1.pdf/.
33 Satish Chandra, “Revisiting India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Is It Necessary?,” IDSA Issue Brief, April 30,
2014, p. 5, http://www.idsa.in/system/files/ib_nucleardoctrine.pdf; Debalina Ghoshal, “The Caseagainst Tactical Nuclear Weapons in India,” Delhi Policy Group Issue Brief, August 2015, p. 8,
http://www.delhipolicygroup.com/uploads/publication_file/1088_The_Case_Against_Tactical_Nucle

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A counterforce element in India’s existing nuclear policy can be found within this debate.
In 2013, then–National Security Advisory Board chairman Shyam Saran delivered aspeech which was typical of the signaling recommended by proponents of massive
retaliation. It mentioned India’s will to engage in massive retaliation regardless of “thelabel on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India,” along with the notion that a nuclear
war is uncontrollable and a warning that Pakistan should not “assume otherwise.” 34
Although this threat apparently lacks credibility, it would not be the case if India canconvince Pakistan that India truly believes in the uncontrollability of nuclear warfare.
Supposing that even a single limited nuclear use inevitably leads to a strategic nuclear
exchange, a proportional response to Pakistan’s tactical use would be meaningless interms of escalation control; such a response cannot be a way to prevent an all-out nuclear
war. Rather, it can be relatively reasonable for India to respond to Pakistan’s initial limited
nuclear use―or a sign of use―with massive retaliation aiming to destroy Pakistan’s
strategic retaliatory nuclear capabilities and command-and-control architectures because
it has no other option to avoid the damage caused by a strategic nuclear exchange withPakistan. Balraj Nagal, a former commander of India’s strategic force, cited the following
merits of massive retaliation: “prevent[s] further damage to India’s economic andpopulation centers,” “prevent[s] further strikes on own nuclear forces,” and “decapitate[s]adversary leadership to prevent further nuclear exchange.”35
Combined with the fact that the massive retaliation principle has not been revised andSaran’s speech is regarded as semiofficial in nature, this point suggests that a counterforce
element has already been built in India’s existing massive retaliation policy.36 If this is
the case, then India’s shift toward the option suggested by Narang is all the more probable.
Another question is whether India can achieve the necessary capabilities to successfully
neutralize Pakistan’s strategic forces in preemption, and Narang himself is skeptical.37
ar_Weapons_in_India.pdf (accessed January 13, 2021).; Manpreet Sethi, “Responding to Pakistan’s
Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Strategy for India,” IPCS Debate, January 18, 2014, http://
www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=4263 (accessed February 8, 2021).
34 Shyam Saran, Is India’s Nuclear Deterrence Credible?, April 24, 2013, p. 16, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2013/05/Final-Is-Indias-Nuclear-Deterrent-Credible-rev1-2-1-3.pdf (accessed January 13, 2021).
35 B.S. Nagal, “Checks and Balances,” Force, June 2014, http://forceindia.net/guest-column/guestcolumn-b-s-nagal/checks-and-balances (accessed January 13, 2021).
36 For the nature of Saran’s 2013 speech, see Arka Biswas, “Incredibility of India’s Massive
Retaliation: An Appraisal on Capability, Cost, and Intention,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 36, No. 5,
2017, p. 446.
37 Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations,” pp. 40-47.

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Nevertheless, as he points out, even though such capabilities are unattainable, theexistence of a discussion about the option can introduce first-strike instability and an
impetus for an arms race into India–Pakistan deterrence relations in the following way.38
India’s potential counterforce option is supposed to be implemented when it detects a signof Pakistan’s tactical nuclear use, to neutralize not Pakistan’s TNWs but its reserve
strategic forces. However, if Pakistan knows India’s intention, Islamabad will feel astrong pressure to “go first”—and massively so—to avoid being disarmed instead ofresorting to tactical nuclear use. In turn, knowing such a Pakistani mind-set may further
drive India’s policymakers to a first strike to avoid exposure to Pakistan’s massive nuclear
attack. This is the typical dynamic of the first-strike instability discussed in the Cold War
era, which may also encourage a nuclear arms race in peacetime.
This can have serious destabilizing effects even beyond Delhi’s control because it isessentially an action–reaction phenomenon. Regardless of what India is able and willingto do in reality, Pakistan will take precautionary measures not only because of the worstcase assumption prevalent in security policymaking but also the unobservability ofIndia’s doctrinal shift: Delhi does not need to revise its declared doctrine to adopt apreemptive counterforce option, given Menon’s “gray area” suggestion.39 This can be aserious source of instability between the two countries.

POTENTIAL “DISCOVERY” OF THE STABILITY INSTABILITY PARADOX INTHE CHINA INDIA DYAD
The last one is the possibility that the “less nuclear” nature of China–India relations willchange. Compared with other nuclear rivalries, especially between the neighboring India
and Pakistan, Sino–India relations are notable in that its nuclear deterrence dimension is
far less salient in their overall bilateral relations. This is all the more noteworthy since
their state of nuclear deterrence lacks military stability because of significant imbalancesin their retaliatory forces: while China has secured an enough second-strike capability
against India, India’s equivalent capability remains rudimentary. Theoretically, suchasymmetry is supposed to cause intense and dangerous interactions at the nuclear level,
including nuclear coercion by the superior side leveraging its nuclear superiority or
38 Clary and Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptation,” pp. 9, 39; Vipin Narang, “India’s Nuclear

Strategy Twenty Years Later: From Reluctance to Maturation,” India Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2018, pp.
167, 172-174.
39 Ibid.

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desperate efforts by the weaker side to catch up and reduce vulnerabilities. Nevertheless,these interactions have largely been absent in China–India relations though India has
slowly made catch-up efforts.
This reality can be attributed to the stability of their overall bilateral relations, which havebeen maintained by various factors. For instance, while their relations has aconfrontational aspect caused by several thorny issues such as border dispute, it also
remains firmly rooted in cooperative elements such as economic interdependence andcooperation to achieve a multipolar international order. Border dispute, the most serious
bilateral issue between the two countries, is long-standing and intractable, but the
remoteness of the disputed areas from their political and economic centers makes it
unlikely that skirmishes in those areas would escalate into a major conflict.40 Because of
these factors, China–India relations are inherently not prone to involve the use or threatof military force. Furthermore, the stable conventional force balance in border areas anda series of confidence building measures have prevented a local armed clash fromoccurring and escalating into a major confrontation even though both countries haverecently intensified reconnaissance activities in border areas to assert their territorial
claims.41 Against these backdrops, nuclear weapons, the ultimate form of military force,
have kept a low profile in their overall relations. This has led to their relative insensitivity
to their militarily unstable state of nuclear deterrence, which could have otherwise
triggered off China’s nuclear coercion leveraging its superior position or India’s desperate
effort to catch up and reduce its vulnerabilities. India’s nuclear development has been
driven by China as a nuclear-armed threat, but its pace has been slow, and the Chinese
threat perceived by India in this context has been politico-strategic in nature.42
Nevertheless, even under this arrangement, there is one possible risk which may change
their insensitivity toward implications of their militarily unstable deterrence relations: thediscovery of the stability–instability paradox. This refers to the possibility that either sidecomes to perceive a linkage between nuclear deterrence and the other side’s attempts to40

Vipin Narang, Policy Q&A: China-India Nuclear Relations, The National Bureau of Asian
Research, October 2014, p. 3, https://www.nbr.org/publication/china-india-nuclear-relations (accessed
January 13, 2021).
41 For the detailed discussions about the conventional force balance in border areas, see Narang,
Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, pp. 111-112; Verghese Koithara, Managing India’s Nuclear
Forces, Brookings Institution Press, 2012, p. 201.
42This perception is explained in Manjeet S. Pardesi, “China’s Nuclear Forces and Their Significanceto India,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 21, Nos. 3-4, 2014, pp. 337-354.

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alter the status quo at lower levels of the escalation ladder.43 This does not mean thateither China or India will actually intensify its lower-level probing or provocation relying
on nuclear deterrence. Rather, either country may come to believe that the other side isdoing so—exploiting the paradox. The idea of the stability–instability paradox has been
so powerful and widely applied in contemporary security debates, even beyond South
Asia. Moreover, in the neighboring India–Pakistan relations, it has become conventional
wisdom that Pakistan has been using this paradox against India to the extent that the latter
would be inclined toward preemptive counterforce options intended to neutralize
Pakistan’s strategic nuclear deterrent—a necessary condition for the paradox. Against
such a background, it is conceivable that if one side intensifies probing or provocation at
the subconventional level to slightly change the status quo, the other side would interpret
it as another manifestation of the paradox regardless of whether such behaviors are
actually linked with nuclear deterrence in the decision-making process of the former. If
this happens, Beijing and Delhi would likely heighten their sensitivity to the state andimplications of their militarily unstable nuclear deterrence.
This scenario can be conceived in two ways. The first is that India heightens its concern
on the insufficiency of its nuclear capabilities and embarks on intensive efforts to catchup, driven by the perception of a link existing between the increasingly provocative andbold conducts of Chinese reconnaissance troops in border areas and Chinese nuclear
superiority. Not only can India’s such moves incite a serious nuclear arms race, but it canalso introduce first-strike instability when, though currently not so likely, a serious
military crisis occurs between Delhi and Beijing. The other scenario is that China,
convinced of a linkage between India’s intensifying activities in border areas and its
acquisition of Agni V, India’s first credible strike option against China’s strategic centers,seeks counterforce capabilities so that it can remove the necessary condition of theparadox―India’s still-nascent strategic deterrent. This is the same pathway India is said
to be treading against Pakistan. Given the aforementioned nature of their overall bilateralrelations, the chances of Beijing taking this course is not so high. However, India may
still be strongly concerned about a first strike from China based on its worst-caseassumption and tries to expand its nuclear forces rapidly regardless of what China reallyintends to do.

43This author discussed this issue more extensively in the following article: “China-India Relationshipand Nuclear Deterrence,” NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, No. 19, December 2018, pp. 59-61.

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Chapter 5 — Strategic Stability in Changing Nuclear South Asia:
Emerging Risks [Kurita]

These are hypothetical scenarios, and currently there is almost no sign of the stability–
instability paradox discourse gaining credence in China–India deterrence relations.
Nevertheless, three factors that may facilitate discourses on the paradox should be
mentioned here. First, the political climate between the two capitals has worsened, albeit
gradually, and their reciprocal reconnaissance activities in border areas has intensified
since the latter half of the 2000s, which occasionally led to incidents outside thetraditional modalities of their conducts, that is, serious standoffs between border troops.
Second, from Beijing’s perspective, India’s impending operationalization of Agni V
missiles means that Delhi has become more confident on its capability to deter China.
Third, if India is contemplating counterforce options to counter Pakistan’s strategy to
exploit the paradox, it will inevitably deepen India’s thinking on the general implicationsof nuclear (im)balance. Bearing these in mind, it cannot be ruled out that discourses on
the paradox will emerge in the near future in China–India relations, especially when theirpolitical relations worsens further.

CONCLUSION
These four risks are not uniform in terms of their probability of occurrence and theirpotential impact on strategic stability in South Asia. Still, what can be said through allthese observations is that South Asia may be entering a new, risky age of nuclear
competition. Except for the one brought about by Pakistan’s TNWs, these risks canlargely be regarded as newly emerging.
The extent to which these risks would cause serious consequences depends on the politicalatmosphere surrounding security relations among the three countries. This is not a sourceof relief. Besides the gradual worsening of China–India relations, the India–Pakistan
political relationship is currently at its lowest point in at least two decades. The Modi
administration’s move to abrogate the special status of J&K in India’s constitution andturn it into two union territories suggests that Delhi has abandoned its constructive
engagement with Pakistan, which it sought until early 2016.
The evolution of the risks to South Asian strategic stability against this backdrop must be
monitored. Proper engagements by the international community would also be required,especially in the crisis management field.
(Drafted on August 31, 2019)

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77

CHAPTER 6

China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino–Indian Relations in the
Nuclear Realm
Johan Englund
INTRODUCTION
China’s nuclear modernization has attracted increasing attention from scholars andpolicymakers.1 As China has undertaken extensive military modernization, the country’s
nuclear and conventional arsenals have also witnessed an expansion in scope andenhancement in capabilities. While China’s nuclear arsenal remains smaller and more
uncomplicated compared with those of the United States and Russia, the force isincreasing in number and variety.2
The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force’s (PLARF) growing nuclear deterrence
capacity provides Beijing with increased flexibility in the deployment and the targeting
capability of its nuclear forces. China can pose a credible threat to undermine deterrence
posed by its adversaries.3 With regard to this, the way Beijing formulates and exerts its
nuclear strategy and posture entails significant implications for the security dynamics in
the Asia-Pacific in general and for its immediate neighbors in particular.
Indeed, there have been active debates among Chinese scholars and former People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) officers on potential adjustments and revisions of China’s nofirst-use (NFU) pledge and overarching nuclear posture.4 Debates have been related tothe stance China has assumed with regard to the upholding of minimum deterrence andits NFU pledge. An important part of this concerns the adoption of a strategic earlywarning system that China seeks to improve, which has stirred up speculations on whether

1 Kampani, Gaurav. (2014) p. 5.
2 Kristensen, Hans M. and Norris, Robert S. (2018) p. 289.
3

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2017a) p. 113.

4 Kurata, Hideya (2019) p. 7.

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Chapter 6 — China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino-Indian Relations in the Nuclear Realm[Englund]

China is moving to a launch-on-warning posture. If this were the case, this might
compromise China’s NFU pledge.
Although China’s official line is that it is sticking to its NFU pledge, these debates
combined with the Chinese nuclear modernization trajectory raise questions about
China’s nuclear stance. What are the elements being discussed with regard to China’s
nuclear position? Moreover, what is the impact of these debates and the modernization of
its nuclear arsenal on China’s surrounding security environment, in particular for Sino–
Indian security dynamics?
Although the United States remains as China’s principal threat, which the Chinese nuclear
forces are designed to defend against, the nuclear dimension of the Indian security threat
is increasingly dawning on China. As for India, Indian nuclear analysts openly refer toChina as one of the two main threats, along with Pakistan, for which the Indian nuclear
arsenal has been developed.
In light of these developments, this chapter examines the ongoing issues being debatedby Chinese strategists with regard to China’s current nuclear posture. In addition, it
analyzes how this may impact on the relations between China and India in the nuclear
realm.

CHINA’S NUCLEAR WEAPON POSTURE
China’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons started in the mid-1950s in response to what
it perceived as nuclear coercion or nuclear blackmail from the United States and laterfrom the Soviet Union.5 As a newly founded republic, the People’s Republic of China(PRC) felt compelled to develop nuclear weapons to secure its survival and safety againstneighboring threats. 6 As a result, the rapid development of nuclear weapons led toChina’s first successful test of an atomic bomb in 1964.
Having produced nuclear weapons, Chinese leaders immediately declared its nuclear
policy, in which two guiding principles for its nuclear arsenal have been consistent: 1)

5 Xu Weidi (2016) pp. 22–23.
6 Ibid. p. 22.

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79

The weapons are to be deployed only for the purpose of defense, and 2) China will not be
the first country to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances.7 The
Chinese government published its nuclear strategy for the first time in a 2006 White Paper
titled “China’s National Defense in 2006.”8 Since then, China has been consistent in its
general standpoint on its nuclear arsenal. The major features in China’s nuclear strategy
include the following:9
China has implemented a self-defense nuclear strategy.
Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use
nuclear weapons against China.
Any nuclear attack by other countries against China would lead to China’s
retaliatory counterattack in self-defense.
China has committed itself to not being the first country to use nuclear weapons
at any time or under any circumstances.
China has committed itself unconditionally to not using or threatening to use
nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-freezones.
China supports the principles of the limited development of nuclear weapons andthe building of a lean and effective nuclear force.
China has never and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any othercountry.
Thus, the bedrock of China’s nuclear doctrine primarily rests on China’s posture of
upholding minimum deterrence and committing to the NFU pledge. China’s stance on
minimum deterrence indicates that the central objective of its nuclear arsenal is tomaintain a minimum and effective deterrence capability. This involves the buildup of a
nuclear force that can survive a nuclear strike from any adversary and then be capable of
returning a second strike against the enemy. In other words, it involves the ability to havea sufficient number of survivable and retaliatory nuclear weapons that can first “weather
the storm” and then maintain sufficient capacity to launch a second strike against the

7 Xia Liping (2015) p. 168.
8 Ministry of National Defense The People Republic of China (2006).
9 Ministry of National Defense The People Republic of China (2006); Xia Liping (2015) pp. 173–

174.

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Chapter 6 — China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino-Indian Relations in the Nuclear Realm[Englund]attacker, strong enough to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy.10 This second strikefrom China would not require precise accuracy to target the attacker’s nuclear arsenal, aso-called counterforce attack. The requirement is rather to hold sufficient capacity to
execute a counter-value attack, that is, to attack and create damage to the original
attacker’s population and industrial centers.11 Thus, China’s evolving missile capacity
may allow for a Chinese counterforce attack. The issue therefore becomes what China’s
standards of sufficiency are in terms of its ability to survive a first strike from an enemy
and launch a counterattack. With regard to this, its declared status is to build a nuclear
force and capacity that is lean and effective. 12 Hence, at least publicly, Beijing has
maintained this stated form of minimum deterrence.
China’s promise to adhere to NFU constitutes a cornerstone of its nuclear policy. Beijing
was the first nuclear-weapon state to make an official pledge “to not use or threaten touse nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.”13
China has committed itself to not being the first country to use nuclear weapons at any
time or under any circumstances. In the Chinese context of the NFU policy, the concept
of NFU entails that “it only requires that an enemy does not employ nuclear weapons for
China to also not employ them.”14 Consequently, in principle, this indicates that a nuclear
attack against Chinese conventional assets would be defined as first use, whereas an
attack against a Chinese nuclear system using conventional means would be excluded
from that definition.15 In other words, it is the weapon employed and not the assets being
attacked that defines the concept of first use.

FORTHCOMING CHANGES IN CHINA’S NUCLEAR POSTURE?
Since its successful test of an atomic bomb in 1964, China has been highly consistent inremaining committed to its nuclear policy. Beijing has repeatedly reaffirmed the central
tenets of its nuclear policy via official statements and policy documents, in which the
NFU pledge and adherence to having a limited number of nuclear arsenals are emphasized,

10 Teng Jianqun (2016) p. 3.; Grinter, Lawrence E. (2013) p. 4.
11 Grinter (2013) p. 4.
12 Heginbotham et al. (2017) p. 1.
13 The State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2015).
14 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, cited in Heginbotham et al. (2017) p. 19.
15 Heginbotham et al. (2017) p. 19.

Chapter 6 — China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino-Indian Relations in the Nuclear Realm[Englund]81

though developed through the prism of being lean and effective in its deterrence.16 As
stated in the 2015 defense White Paper, the Chinese leadership has reiterated its stanceon the use of nuclear weapon: “China has always pursued the policy of NFU of nuclear
weapons and adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy that is defensive in nature.”17
China is unlikely to formally abandon these policy doctrines. However, the recent years
have seen an increasing debate among Chinese scholars and strategists with regard toadjustments to and interpretations of the NFU pledge and the minimum deterrence posture.
Concerning China’s approach to minimum deterrence, China’s military modernization
has resulted in a significantly improved and capable nuclear arsenal, which in turn has
provided China with new strategic options to its deterrence force. However, comparedwith nuclear peers, such as the United States and Russia, the Chinese nuclear arsenal
remains limited. China is estimated to maintain a stockpile of approximately 280 nuclear
warheads, which can be delivered by around 130 land-based and 48 sea-based ballistic
missiles, as well as by bombers.18 However, this stockpile is expected to grow over the
coming decade, as China has increased its number of warheads and strategic missiles.19
Its nuclear forces have shifted from being principally centered around intermediate- andmedium-range missiles to becoming a force relying on intercontinental and mediumrange nuclear systems.20
These improved capabilities, which provide the country enhanced striking power andsurvivability, may influence China’s nuclear policy and deployment strategies. New
strategic options can influence the thoughts on targeting, as its missiles are increasingly
accurate. This has led to a debate within the Chinese security community with regard towhether China should continue on the path of minimum deterrence or adopt a limited
deterrence posture. 21 A minimum deterrence posture entails “the ability to conduct
undifferentiated attacks against counter-value targets, a small and finite arsenal, andrelatively unsophisticated command and control,” whereas a limited deterrence posture

16 Ibid. p. 19.
17 The State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2015).
18 Kristensen and Norris (2018) pp. 289–290.
19 Ibid. pp. 289–290.
20 Heginbotham et al. (2017).
21 Kampani (2014) p.15.

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Chapter 6 — China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino-Indian Relations in the Nuclear Realm[Englund]implies “limited war fighting capability to inflict costly damage on the adversary at every
rung on the escalation ladder, thus denying the adversary victory in a nuclear war.”22 The
adoption of a limited deterrence posture requires larger and more sophisticated nuclear
weapons. The reasons for the growing preference among Chinese security analysts andmilitary strategists for assuming a limited deterrence posture are threefold: 1) holding
only minimal capabilities is perceived as making China vulnerable to a preemptive attack;2) the use of counter-value targeting is regarded as insufficient for ensuring deterrence
and controlling escalation; and 3) successful deterrence is achieved by China when it
signals the ability and willingness to engage in a nuclear war.23
As for the debates on adjustments in the NFU policy, views among many Chinese
strategists and scholars reflect a growing belief that the current NFU posture reduces thecredibility of China’s nuclear arsenal. The discussions focus on when and under whatcircumstances a Chinese nuclear strike is considered possible, not only after having
received a hostile first strike but also with respect to a situation in which Beijing deems
itself to be under the threat of such a strike. 24 Chinese scholars and strategists havediscussed whether China should modify its unconditional NFU pledge and, rather, putsome conditions on it.25 It has been argued that the threshold for a nuclear strike can belegitimately lowered—and thus China exempted from its NFU pledge—in certain
situations and for strategic targets in China. These certain circumstances may include
when Beijing deems that it is under threat by a conventional attack on its nuclear facilitiesor their command and control systems, on vital strategic targets or against economic andpolitical centers, and in the event of a situation in which there is a sustained and protracted
escalation of war that would compromise national security.26 In addition to this, otherexamples could include cases in which the Chinese leadership perceives that serious
threats to territorial or national sovereignty are at play, such as declared Taiwanese
independence or if faced with regime change.27
These potential exceptions for the legitimization of a nuclear strike together with theongoing nuclear modernization render China’s nuclear posture more ambiguous. This
22 Ibid. p.16.
23 Ibid. p.16.
24 Xia Liping (2016).
25 Heginbotham et al. (2017) p.21; Xia Liping (2016).
26 Hui Zhang (2010) p.146; Xia Liping (2016); Termine (2018); Heginbotham et al. (2017).
27 Hui Zhang (2010); Lowsen (2018).

Chapter 6 — China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino-Indian Relations in the Nuclear Realm[Englund]83

ambiguity also encompasses the new technologies and dual systems deployed by China
for both conventional and nuclear forces, such as satellites, C4 infrastructure, andsubmarines.28 Because any attack that would potentially cause damage to these systems
could be viewed by Beijing as a threat to the country’s retaliatory ability, the thresholdfor China to launch a nuclear retaliatory strike may become lower and thus blur the
distinction between conventional and nuclear wars.
However, Beijing has formally continued to reaffirm its NFU pledge. Recently, in a 2019
defense White Paper, it was reiterated that “China is always committed to a nuclear policyof NFU of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and not using or
threatening to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weaponfree zones unconditionally.”29
In a 2015 defense White Paper, China stated for the first time that Beijing aimed to“improve strategic early-warning” for its nuclear forces. 30 The mention of improving
strategic early-warning capabilities was less explicit in relation to its nuclear force in the2019 defense White Paper, though it remained. There has been a long-running debate on
the possibility of China developing a strategic early-warning capability for its nuclear
arsenal. One interpretation holds that this development would allow for the buildup of asystem that tracks the launch of an enemy’s missile coming toward its territory, whichenables an own quick nuclear retaliation; thus, it is called “launching on warning.”31
A launch-on-warning posture would indeed enhance China’s overall capabilities in termsof deterrence and survivability but also involve more risks. Factors such as false alarms
and the uncertainty of whether the incoming missiles are armed with nuclear orconventional warheads leave decision makers with small margins when making quick andcritical decisions. This also poses risks of compromising China’s commitment to NFU.
Moreover, a launch-on-warning may entail that missiles are mated with warheads, thusincreasing the risk of accidental launches.32 Of course, as stated by the scholar Tong Zhao,
Beijing’s interest in improving its capabilities in strategic early-warning may also rather

28 Johnson (2017); Termine (2018).
29 Ministry of National Defense in the People’s Republic of China (2019).
30 The State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2015).
31 Tong Zhao (2015).
32 Ibid. (2015).

84

Chapter 6 — China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino-Indian Relations in the Nuclear Realm[Englund]rest on the strive for enhancing missile defense capability or just developing its overall
strategic warning system, such as strategic warnings based on well-grounded assessmentsof adversaries’ military preparation and mobilization activities.33
Thus, in the near future, China is likely to stick to its formal NFU pledge. Nonetheless, atthe same time, the country is also expected to acquire capabilities relevant to war fighting
doctrines and may undertake adjustments, as it has increasingly discussed andreinterpreted its nuclear policies for a wide range of purposes. Its policies depend, to alarge extent, on China’s relations with the United States, but regional dynamics also havea significant impact. This is being played out more and more in two directions. In theevent of a revised Chinese nuclear posture reminiscent of war doctrine (ambiguousthreshold for use and targeting, adoption of launch-on-warning nuclear posture, and soon), this would indeed pose a challenge to the military balance in the Asian region, inparticular China’s role vis-à-vis India and the dynamics in South Asia.

CHINA AND INDIA IN SOUTH ASIA
China is located in an environment with highly complex security dynamics, involving
numerous overlapping and ongoing security considerations playing out simultaneously.
Thus, security issues, such as the tense relationship between Pakistan and India, may
therefore influence China’s security interests and its nuclear posture.34
Looking more closely at China’s security dynamics with India, Beijing has, for a longtime, downplayed the Indian threat in the nuclear realm. Following India’s first nuclear
test above ground in 1998, the Indian leadership explicitly proclaimed that they had
pursued the nuclear path in direct response to the perceived threat from Pakistan and
China.35 Yet, Chinese representatives dismissed this claim, explaining that it considered
the Sino–Indian border dispute an issue of the past and that the Indian claim was a coverup for its true intentions of state prestige and to seek legitimacy for its nuclear statusamong domestic and international audiences. Furthermore, Beijing chose to convey regret

33 Ibid. (2015).
34 Heginbotham et al. (2017) pp. 69–71.
35 Tellis, Ashley J. (2015) p. 3.

Chapter 6 — China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino-Indian Relations in the Nuclear Realm[Englund]85

and concern for the harm that India may have brought to the global movement toward
nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.36
China’s confident posture against India rests on the view that its nuclear and technologicalcapabilities are superior to those of India, at the same time as both countries havecommitted to NFU doctrines.37 Moreover, China is unwilling to accept Indian nuclear
parity, which has its origin in historical and cultural sources.38 Hence, although Chinese
strategists and scholars acknowledge that India’s nuclear weapons were developed with
China as a threat factor in mind, this consideration has not received reciprocal attention
from the Chinese side. To this end, there has been a well-anchored perception in Chinathat India and China would never engage in a full-scale war, whether nuclear orconventional.39
However, India has been clear about its threat perception. Indian nuclear analysts openlyrefer to Pakistan and China as India’s two primary sources of threats for which the Indian
nuclear arsenal is designed. 40 India’s nuclear modernization program has placed
increased emphasis on China, as the deterrent against Pakistan is overall adequate, while
the deterrence gap in relation to China remains considerable.41 The PLA has a nuclear
force that is increasingly alarming to India. The Chinese army possesses ballistic missiles
capable of targeting India, of which the launching sites in China’s Qinghai province andXinjiang have the capacity to reach India’s northern areas. 42 In addition, China’s
intercontinental ballistic missiles could reach India from anywhere in China, and China’s
ability to deploy sea-based missiles in the Indian Ocean and land-based missiles in theborder region in Tibet causes great worries for India. 43 Hence, India views thedevelopment Chinese nuclear force with wary eyes, harboring deep suspicions of China’s
unconditional NFU pledge and minimum deterrence posture.

36 Turner Haynes, Susan (2016) p. 42.
37 Yang, Xiaoping (2016).
38 Yang (2016); Heginbotham et al. (2017) p. 85.
39 Yang (2016).
40 Tellis (2015) p.3.; Pradhan, SD (2018).
41 Tellis (2015) p.3.
42 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2017b) pp. 67–68.
43 Ibid. pp. 67–68.

86

Chapter 6 — China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino-Indian Relations in the Nuclear Realm[Englund]However, China’s threat perception of India has recently started to somewhat change.
Although not the primary driver for China’s nuclear force development and policies, thedevelopment of Indian nuclear forces has begun to garner increased attention from
Chinese strategists and assumed more importance in Beijing’s strategic contemplations.44
India has been expanding and modernizing its nuclear capabilities, whereas important
Chinese targets are already within reach for Indian ballistic missiles. Moreover, theunstable nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan has challenged India’s NFU
pledge.45 On the other side of this, India’s emerging strategic partnership with the UnitedStates has also prompted China to more carefully observe India’s intentions. Thus, any
signs of a shift in New Delhi in its nuclear doctrine may also have a decisive impact on
the posture adopted by Beijing.
Indeed, there has been a subtle change of tone in statements from Beijing responding to
India’s missile tests. For instance, in the wake of the 2012 missile test of the Agni V,
China merely reacted by acknowledging that Beijing and New Delhi were cooperative
partners rather than rivals. However, after the fourth Agni V test in 2016, Beijing’s
rhetoric was significantly more hostile, describing it as a violation of United Nations
Security Council regulations and calling for clarification of India’s “intentions” with thetests.46 Furthermore, in the third edition of China’s Science of Military Strategy (2013),
India’s nuclear weapon development is described as “particularly rapid,” whereas China’s
White Paper of that same year states that “China’s armed forces … make overall andcoordinated plans to promote military preparedness in all strategic directions.”47
Thus, the expanding nuclear forces of both countries are increasingly having a mutual
impact on each other. Even though China’s nuclear force is primarily designed with
defense against the United States in mind, it also has a consequent impact on the Indian
nuclear strategy. As for China, India’s rapid nuclear development holds the potential to
become a more important factor for Chinese nuclear strategy, particularly if India takes
steps toward reevaluating its NFU doctrine and develops nuclear capabilities aimed at
war fighting. Moreover, adding to the uncertainty is that the rise and expansion of a newand neighboring nuclear power is a somewhat new situation for Beijing, which thus
presents a challenge to Beijing on how to properly respond to the Indian nuclear posture.
44 Heginbotham et al. (2017) p. 82.
45 Miglani, Sanjeev (2019).
46

Gupta, Rukmani (2018).

47 Heginbotham et al. (2017) p. 82.

Chapter 6 — China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino-Indian Relations in the Nuclear Realm[Englund]87

As a result, this entails spillover effects in Pakistan, which in turn create an interconnected
reciprocal security dilemma in South Asia. While the Chinese nuclear force expands andputs pressure on the Indian nuclear structure to expand itself, this Indian expansion
thereby puts pressure on Pakistan to follow the same path. However, on the other side of
the coin, Pakistan’s adoption of a nuclear war fighting posture prompts India to adjust its
retaliation strategy in the direction of a more flexible approach, which then seeds thebreeding ground for Beijing to further its nuclear advancements with an eye on India.
Hence, a three-way nuclear arms security dilemma is possibly at play, although withvarious motivations among the involved countries. From the Chinese side, the driver for
its nuclear modernization has been primarily directed toward the United States and its
allies. In this calculation, India has mostly been viewed at as being on the sidelines. By
providing nuclear assistance to Pakistan, Beijing has sought to dissipate India’s strategic
attention but has, in the meantime, exacerbated New Delhi’s security dilemma. For India,
its unsettled border dispute with China, deep-rooted distrust of China, and Chinese
assistance to Pakistan constitute major concerns and fears of Chinese nuclear blackmail.48
Thus, for India, it seems that the immediate nuclear threat originates from Pakistan,whereas the establishment of security in India views China as the long-term threat.

CHINA AND INDIA: FACTORS RELATED TO STABILITY AND INSTABILITY
Looking at the Sino–Indian relationship, it is of interest to identify the sources of stability
and instability, thus enabling us to evaluate the risk of these two Asian giants ending up
in a nuclear standoff. The question simmers around the extent to which the two countries’
declared NFU positions can be trusted in the event of a conflict, given the significant trust
deficit. Indeed, China and India have issues contributing to the unease in this bilateralrelationship. The areas of potential friction include the unsettled border dispute, thesecurity domains of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) and the maritime rivalry in
the Indian Ocean, and India’s relationship with the United States, as well as China’s
relationship with Pakistan and its deepening of ties with other South Asian states.
Thus, there are important sources of instability that can negatively affect the bilateral
security relationship. These are as follows:

48 Kampani (2014) p. 11.

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Chapter 6 — China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino-Indian Relations in the Nuclear Realm[Englund]

The Sino–Indian border dispute is still unresolved. This is creating a deep mutual
distrust and thus exacerbating the risk for further conflict.49
Both countries are engaged in other relationships that frustrate the Sino–Indian
bilateral relationship. China is a close friend of Pakistan, whereas India pursues
cooperative defense relations with both the United States and Japan. These
partnerships are divisive in nature as they exacerbate mutual suspicions.50
There is an increasing competition between the two giants in the maritime area.
Both countries have improved their navies and have strategic interests in eachother’s adjoining seas.51
Mutual distrust is further worsened by the lack of a clearly defined line of actual
control (LAC) that separates the troops of the two countries. This has led tofriction between the two sides and created fertile ground for further
confrontations.52
Chinese and Indian nuclear forces have witnessed significant technologicalimprovements in their nuclear arsenal. This development raises the question as towhether their current restricted postures can remain so for a much longer time.
The enhancement of sea-based nuclear deterrence on submarines and the additionof mobile missile systems will have an impact on the readiness of each country’s
nuclear forces.53 As a result, there are risks of more uncertainty in the area of
nuclear stability.
China’s reluctance to acknowledge India as a nuclear actor has resulted in a lackof nuclear dialogue between the two sides. China has previously not considered
India a nuclear threat and hence not had an interest in pursuing this path. For otherreasons, Beijing has likewise refrained from engaging in these talks, as it isunwilling to signal approval of India’s nuclear status while also being worried thatsuch talks may be of concern for Pakistan.54 Nonetheless, the absence of a nuclear
dialogue is a source of instability in the case of escalated conflict between the twocountries.

49 Basrur, Rajesh (2018) p. 4.
50 Ibid. (2018) pp. 4–5.
51 Basrur (2018) p. 5.
52 Ibid. (2018) p. 5.
53

Kampani (2014) p. 24; Tong Zhao (2015).

54 Tong Zhao (2015).

Chapter 6 — China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino-Indian Relations in the Nuclear Realm[Englund]89

However, despite these sources of uneasiness and instability, there are also factors ofstability that would lower the risk of a nuclear confrontation between China and India.
These factors constitute significant restraints on the Sino–Indian nuclear rivalry. These
factors are as follows:
Although the significance and essence of the Sino–Indian rivalry is alarming, theterritorial concerns are still considered to be “minor adjustments.” That is, theterritorial area is not considered to be in their strategic heartland and may not bewithin the realm of a conflict that triggers the use of nuclear weapons. Likewise,
the security of the SLOCs and the ongoing security assistance provided to third
countries are indeed serious disputes creating significant differences between thetwo countries. Nevertheless, these issues do not really threaten the existential
security of either state, thus making it a condition that can contribute to keeping
nuclear weapons away from the front lines.55
Structural factors, such as the vast geographic magnitude of the two countries andtheir large populations, may also restrain the inclination to use its nuclear arsenal.
The geographical vastness of the two countries provides them with a strategic
depth as protection in the event of invasion by a conventional army. In other words,
countries with large territories can, to a certain extent, afford to temporarily
sacrifice some space for a time if they are facing losses and defeat. Contrarily, asmaller state may face an existential security threat to its territory at an earlier
stage and must thus employ the nuclear threat earlier to prevent defeat.56
Both China and India formally uphold an NFU posture. This is likely to have apositive impact on the nuclear stability between the two adversaries, as it allows
for non-war fighting doctrines and thereby having warheads de-mated. The clear
benefit of this mutually held position is that it reduces the likelihood of accidental
nuclear launches as it decreases the risks in the event of a false alarm and timelimited decision-making.57
The militaries of both countries have exerted pressure on their leadership tochange their respective country’s current NFU policies and move toward a more
limited deterrence posture. However, civilian leaders on both sides seemingly

55 Kampani (2014) p. 23; The National Bureau of Asian Research (2014).
56 Kampani (2014) p. 23.
57 Ibid. (2014) p. 23.

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Chapter 6 — China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino-Indian Relations in the Nuclear Realm[Englund]hold strong veto power regarding any nuclear doctrinal changes, suggesting thatany shifts in nuclear posture will be a slow process.58

CONCLUDING REMARKS
There is generally deterrence stability between China and India. To this end, the overall
institutional and structural nuclear stability is in check. However, the relationship also
suffers from elements of crisis instability at the same time. Although these elements
may not strike at the heart of the existential security for either country, the sources ofstability, such as being cautious and conducting high-level economic exchanges, do noteliminate the existing strategic risks and conflicts.
Nevertheless, even though the relationship between China and India is burdened bysignificant rivalry, nuclear competition is not at the center of this rivalry, thus making the
Chinese–Indian nuclear competition rather stable, at least in the short term. The
stabilizing factors exert an influence in pacifying the elements that can cause an
unpredictable situation. However, there are medium- and long-term sources of instabilityon the horizon, such as potential doctrinal changes in minimum deterrence and NFUs
(although not formally), as well as the possible development of launch-on-warning
postures. Added to these uncertainties, the complicated trilateral security dynamics withPakistan can also act as a spoiler in the development of Sino–Indian nuclear relations. In
combination with more capable nuclear forces, these factors should not be underestimatedand may make the China–India nuclear rivalry increasingly more precarious.

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- Grinter, Lawrence E (2013) “Chinese Nuclear Doctrine, Weapons and Policies”, PacificFocus, XXVIII, No. 1, April. p. 1–16. URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1
1111/pafo.12002.
- Gupta, Rukmani (2018) “India and China–Time for a Dialogue on Nuclear Security?”
IDSA Comment, April 19. URL: https://idsa.in/idsacomments/india-and-china-time-fora-dialogue-on-nuclear-security-rgupta-190418.
- Haynes, Susan Turner (2016) “China’s Nuclear Threat Perceptions”, Strategic Studies
Quarterly, 10, No. 2. p. 25–62.
58 Ibid. (2014) p. 23.

Chapter 6 — China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino-Indian Relations in the Nuclear Realm[Englund]91- Heginbotham, Eric, Chase, Michael S., Heim, Jacob L., Lin, Bonny, Cozad, Mark,Morris, Lyle J., Twomey, Christopher P., Morgan, Forrest E., Nixon, Michael, Garafola,
Cristina L., and Berkowitz, Samuel K. (2017) “China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent:
Major Drivers and Issues for the United States”, RAND Corporation, 2017.
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Quarterly, 33, No. 2. p. 139–155, April 2010. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publica
cation/ 232824225_China's_Perspective_on_A_Nuclear-Free_World (accessed Februray
09,2019).
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2017.
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Strategic Re4sponse to China,” Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2017, June2017.
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Diplomat,” November 22, 2017. URL: https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/chinas-evolving-approach-to-nuclear-war-fighting (accessed February 09, 2021).
- Kampani, Gaurav (2014) “China–India Nuclear Rivalry in the “Second Nuclear Age,”IFS Insights”, November 2014 URL: https://fhs.brage.unit.no/fhs--xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/226454/Insight2014_3.pdf, 3.
- Kristensen, Hans M. and Norris, Robert S. (2018) “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2018”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74, No. 4. p. 289–295. URL: https://www.tandfonline.
com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2018.1486620?needAccess=true (accessed February 09,2021).
- Kurata, Hideya (2019) “Kim Jong-un’s Nuclear Posture under Transformation: The
Source of North Korea’s Counterforce Compulsion,” in (eds) Kurata,Hideya andHellström, Jerker” 2019) “North Korea’s Security Threats Reexamined”, Global Security
Seminar Series No. 2, NDA-FOI Joint Seminar. March 2019. Center for Global Security,
National Defense Academy: Yokosuka Japan.
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Diplomat, March 21, 2018. URL: https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/is-china-abandoningits-no-first-use-nuclear-policy/.
- Miglani, Sanjeev (2019) “India Says Committed to “No First Use” of Nuclear Weapons
for Now,” Reuters, August 16, 2019. URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indianuclear-idUSKCN1V613F (accessed February 09, 2021).
-Ministry of National Defense of The People’S Republic of China (2019) “China’s
National Defense in the New Era”, July 2019. URL: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/201907/24/content_4846443.htm/ (accessed January 28, 2021).
-Pradhan, SD “Growing Chinese Nuclear Arsenal: Is China Changing Its Doctrine?,”(2018), The Times of India, July 31, 2018. URL: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
blogs/ChanakyaCode/growing-chinese-nuclear-arsenal-is-china-changing-its-doctrine/(accessed January 28, 2021).
-Teng Jianqun (2016) “China’s Nuclear Deterrence in the Asian and Global Contexts,”
Regional Insight Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016. URL:
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bal-contexts-pub-63965/ (accessed January 28, 2021).

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Chapter 6 — China’s Nuclear Policy and Sino-Indian Relations in the Nuclear Realm[Englund]Tellis, Ashley J (2015) “China, India and Pakistan–Growing Nuclear Capabilities With
No End in Sight,” Congressional Testimony at Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, February 25, 2015. URL: https://carnegieendowment.
org/2015/02/25/china-india-and-pakistan-growing-nuclear-capabilities-with-no-end-insight/i2.xz Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/ (accessed January 28, 2021).
-Termine, Lorenzo (2018) “The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Doctrine: Updating or
Overhauling?,” RealClear Defense, March 16, 2018. URL:https://www.realcleardefense.
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-International Institute for Strategic Studies (2017a) “Chapter Eight: Managing the AsiaPacific’s Nuclear Dynamics,” Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2017, June
2017.
-International Institute for Strategic Studies (2017b) “Chapter Five: India’s Evolving
Strategic Re4sponse to China,” Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2017, June
2017.
- The National Bureau of Asian Research National Bureau of Asian Research, October(2014) “China–India Nuclear Relations: Interview With Vipin Narang,” URL: https://www.nbr.org/publication/china-india-nuclear-relations/ (accessed January 28, 2021).
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27/content_281475115610833.htm/ (accessed January 28, 2021).
-Tong Zhao (2015) “Strategic Warning and China’s Nuclear Posture,” The Diplomat,
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Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1.” URL: https://journals.aau.dk/index.php/jcir/article/view/1151/972,
2015.
- Xia Liping (2016) “China’s Nuclear Doctrine: Debates and Evolution,” Regional Insight
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2016. URL: https://carnegieen
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- Xu Weidi (2016) “China’s Security Environment and the Role of Nuclear Weapons,”
iIn Li Bin and Tong Zhao (eds.) Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking. URL: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ChineseNuclearThinking_Final.pdf, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington.
- Xiaoping Yang (2016) “China’s Perceptions of India as a Nuclear Weapons Power,”
Regional Insight Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016.URL:
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CHAPTER 7

Escaping from the Accuracy-Vulnerability Paradox:
The DPRK’s Initial Escalation Ladders in War Strategy

Hideya Kurata

DUALITY OF NUCLEAR POSTURE
In retrospect, North Korean then-First Secretary Kim Jong-un’s address delivered at the
Plenary Meeting, the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) on March
31, 2013 constituted the manifesto of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK)’s nuclear posture under his rule. It was comprised of two sets of nuclear postures:the “War-deterence Strategy,” as the Minimum Deterrence of China and India, consistingof No-First Use (NFU) pledge and projectiles; the second posture being the “War Strategy,”which consists of the First Use (FU) and projectiles. The duality is also addressed in the
Ordinance on “Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State for Self-Defense”
adopted in the Supreme People’s Assembly on the following day the address wasdelivered. While Article 5 stipulates, “the DPRK will never use nuclear weapons nor
transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear technology under any circumstances unless there isa nuclear threat and nuclear provocation against the DPRK” according to the norms of a
Nuclear Weapon State. Article 4 stipulates: “nuclear weapons of the DPRK can be used
…to repel invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory
strikes,” failing to limit the means of the invasion or attack to nuclear weapons. It
preserved the room for using the nuclear weapons to repel invention or attack from “ahostile nuclear weapons state” using conventional forces1.
1“Joseonminjujuuiinmingonghwagung Choegoinminhoeui Beomnyeong Jawijeong Haekboyugugui
Jiwireul Deoung Gonggohi Hal de Daehayeo”, Minju Joseon, April 2, 2013. For the further analysisof the Ordinance, see Hideya Kurata, “Formation and Evolution of Kim Jong Un’s “Nuclear Doctrine:
The Current State of North Korea’s ‘Minimum Deterrence’ in Comparison”, The Kim Jong Un Regime
and the Future Security Environment Surrounding the Korean Peninsula, Tokyo: The National

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Whereas countervalue second strike capabilities are regarded as effective as deterrence
from US all-out attacks, it is, not necessarily the case when the war is ignited by armed
clashes in the vicinity of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) or the Northern Limit
Line in the Yellow Sea, where indigenous forces of both Koreas are deployed. In the latter
warfare, when they are about to escalate, the DPRK might be tempted to lower its nuclear
threshold given the overwhelming conventional and nuclear superiority of the USRepublic of Korea (ROK) Combined Forces on the Korean Peninsula. On the European
front, this was the exact problem the US and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) allies throughout the Cold War era grappled with as deterrence from the Warsaw
Treaty Organization (WTO)’s overwhelming conventional forces. NATO’s FU option
during the era was supposed to be a declaratory measure to deter effectively the WTO’s
conventional forces 2 . Viewed from Russia, its nuclear doctrine lowered its nuclear
threshold by rescinding the NFU pledge after it lost its superiority in conventional forces
after the end of the Cold War. In the warfare in Korea, however, it is inapplicable to North
Korea to the locally overwhelming conventional forces of the US-ROK Combined Forces.
The newly developed Short-range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) as well as the Multiple
Launcher of Rockets (MLRs) fired in 2019 are presumed to be the initial level on theescalation ladder on the DPRK’s Peninsula “War Strategy.” The implication that theseprojectiles would have also should be explored in the whole of the escalation ladders thatwould be led to the total war invasion of the DPRK.

ESTIMATED FIRST LADDER TO RECEDING TARGETS
In standard strategic thinking, the weaker party in an alliance can be more daring than it
would have been otherwise, provided that it can trust allies to come to its aid in the caseof an actual physical conflict3. However, the DPRK does not trust China to intervene
against the US with nuclear weapons provided that China retains self-imposed NFU andits mainland is not under US nuclear attacks. The DPRK’s primary concerns, thus, would
be how to deter the US forces in Korea (USFK) from intervening to compartmentalize
the armed conflict within indigenous forces. Throughout the Cold War era, the tripwire
Institute for Defense Studies, 2017, pp. 42–43.
2 McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, Gerald C. Smith, “Nuclear Weapons
and the Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 759–761.
3
Jan Angstrom and Magnus Petersson, “Weak Party Escalation: An Underestimated Strategy for
Small States?” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2019), p. 289.

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effects provided by the USFK constituted the major components of conventional mutual
deterrence on the Korean Peninsula; the combat forces deployed in the vicinity of the
MDL and the Commands in trinity—United Nations Command (UNC), Combined Forces
Command (CFC) and the USFK Command—were located in the center of Seoul,
guaranteeing the US intervention in the event of armed attacks by the DPRK. It isbalanced by the DPRK’s long-range artillery, which itself deters a US invasion due to its
targeting of Seoul. These capabilities were strengthened by the deployment of the
Hwasong-5 (Scud-B) and Hwasong-6 (Scud-C) to cover the southern tip of the Peninsulain the 1980s.
However, the USFK relocation plan, in a wake of the 9–11 terror attacks of 2001,
undermined the mutual deterrence composition on the Korean Peninsula. In enhancing“Strategic Flexibilities” of US forces overseas, the strategy of the USFK deploying largescale ground forces in the vicinity of the MDL was deemed too rigid. In need of being
flexible, the Bush administration’s relocation plan, furthermore, was echoed by ROK
progressive President Roh Mu-hyun’s zeal for the ROK armed forces to be more “selfreliant.” The US and the ROK agreed in 2007 that the USFK were relocated in stages toPyongtaek-Osan “Southeast hub”—approximately 80 km south of the capital city, Seoul,
for agility and availability off the Peninsula, and Taegu-Busan “Southeast hub”—over
220 km southeast of Seoul for prepositioning and staging of reinforcement units. The
original relocation plans were supposed to be promoted in exchange for developing themilitary capabilities of the ROK armed force to recapture the wartime Operational
Control (OPCON) from the Commander of the US-ROK Combined Command (CFC)
concurrent with dismantling it. Though the planned OPCON transfer was postponed twice
under the conservative the Lee Myung-bak and Park Guen-hye administrations, some of
the units were relocated to the southern two hubs and the USFK Command as well as the
UNC were relocated to the one of the two hubs, Camp Humphreys in Pyongtaek in lateJune 20184, followed by the agreement that the CFC also finally relocate there after it
moved to the ROK’s Defense Ministry in early June 20195.

4“UNC and USFK Open New Headquarters Building, USFK Public Affairs, June 29, 2018”,
https://www.usfk.mil/Media/News/Article/1563387/unc-and-usfk-open-new-headquarters-building/.
For the detail of the USFK relocation plans in conjunction with the OPCON transfer, see Hideya
Kurata, “Zaikanbeigun to Shikitaikei no Saikento: ‘Senryakudomei 2015’ Shusei no Rikigaku”,
Kokusaianzenhosho, Vol. 42, No. 3 (September 2014), pp. 31–47.
5 Kukbang Ilbo, June 4, 2019.

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The USFK relocation plan required the KPA to face the need to extend the range ofcounterforce projectiles to reach the receding targets. As early as 2003, when the Bushadministration started to discuss the possible relocation of US bases in the ROK, the KPA
Panmunjom Representative told the US that there is no place for the US forces to escapefrom a strike of the KPA, even if the US relocated its forces to areas south of the River
Han in a bid to save the forces from the KPA artillery firing range and create conditions
for making a preemptive strike at the DPRK any time6. Extended ranges of SRBMs aswell as MLRs are in need for enabling the KPA to make strikes to the receding USFK
bases and to the ROK’s ballistic missiles under the US OPCON at wartime. Accuracy is
one of the more important components for counterforce projectiles than explosiveness;
however, accuracy sacrifices itself when the counterforce projectiles strike recedingtargets. Offsetting inaccuracy, the DPRK would deploy in the vicinity of MDL, though it
makes them vulnerable to preemptive strikes that the US-ROK Combined Forces would
launch. It provides the KPA added need to deploy SRBMs as well as MLRs further northto avoid vulnerability and the advanced technologies to further extend the ranges.
Regarding the SRBM solid-fueled Toksa (KN-02), supposed to be deployed in 2008 after
its first appearance in the military parade in April of the previous year, its range wasinitially estimated 100 to 120 km to deter the USFK deployed near the border and it’sCommand in Seoul7. Its range extended to approximately 160 km and it was demonstrated
in a March 2013 test that it reached Camp Humphreys in Pyongtaek8. The Spokesman for
the KPA Panmunjom Representative in July 2017 revealed that long-range artillery
consisted of 240 mm rockets and 170 mm self-propelled artillery targeting the capital areaof the ROK and tacitly admitted their ranges were short of attacking receding targets. The
Spokesman, however, reiterating the statement to the US relocation plan in July 2003
stated that the US “moved its aggressor forces bases in south Korea to the areas south of
the River Han to get rid of the striking range of the KPA’s long-range artillery strike”
while threatening that the USFK were the “primacy targets” of the KPA and they could
never escape “the mercilessly annihilating strikes by its long-range artillery, no matter
whether they are located in Pyongtaek or in Busan”9.

6“Joseoninmingun Panmunjeom Daepyobuaepyo Damhwa”, Minju Joseon, July 2, 2003; Hideya
Kurata, “Nanboku-shuno-kaidan-go no Heiwataisei-juritumondai: Seidotekisochi to Gunjitekisochi
no Kosaku”, Kiki no Chosen-hanto, Keio University Press, 2006, pp. 59–60.
7 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “KN-02 SRBM”, KPA Journal, Vol 1, No. 2 (February 2010), pp. 7–13;“North Korea Takes Wraps off KN-2”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 9, 2007.
8
Joseon Ilbo, March 16, 2013.
9 “Joseoninmingun Panmunjeom Daepyobuaepyo Damhwa”, Minju Joseon, July 15, 2017.

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Under the condition that the USFK do not deploy ballistic missiles to reach Pyongyang,
the targets of DPRK’s counterforce projectiles include the ROK’s ballistic missiles under
the US OPCON at wartime. It is worth noting, in this respect that the KPA released the“Crucial Statement” in February 2016 threatened ports in the ROK for reception andstaging the US reinforcement units saying, “the US imperialist aggression forces’ nuclearpowered submarine North Carolina has already entered Pusan Port…the special operation
troops of the US imperialist aggressor forces are finding their way to south Korea one
after another to get involved in the operation”10.
The ROK was allowed to develop 500km-range ballistic missiles, revising the US-ROK
Missile Memorandum in 2011. The Chuje-100 (KN-09) was developed by Kim Jong-un’s
instruction in 2012, the KN-09 mission is estimated to deter the ROK’s ballistic missilesthat could reach Pyongyang even they are deployed southward avoiding vulnerability to
the DPRK’s armed forces11. The 300 mm caliber KN-09 was reported to have over 200km
range when first tested in March 2016. Upon the test-fire, furthermore, the Committee for
the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, reiterating the KPA’s Crucial Statement in theprevious month, designated to target the “rear area of the operational theater of thesouthern part of Korea” 12 . It implies to target the ROK’s mobile ballistic missiles
Hyunmoo 2-B of which range were allowed to extend up to 300 km and the Hyunmoo-3Aof which range was extended to 500 km were deployed in areas further south in the ROK,
decreasing vulnerability to DPRK’s armed forces.
To reach Taegu-Busan, another hub of the relocated US bases at the southern tip of thePeninsula, for reception and staging of the US forces out of the Peninsula at wartime, the
DPRK’s counterforce projectiles need extended range. When DPRK conducted the
Hwasong-10 (Musudan) test-fire in June 2016, the KWP’s official organ Rodong Sinmun
reported that the test-fire was conducted with shortened range to make preemptive strikes
to the ports and airports in South Korea for introducing the US “imperialist’s” nuclear
10“Joseoninmingunchoegosaryeongbu Jungdaeseongmyeong,” Minju Joseon, February 23, 2016. For
the details of the “Crucial Statement”, see, Hideya Kurata, “Kita-chosen no Kaku-taisei niokeru
Tainan-kankei: Esukareshon Dominansu no Kansei”, Chosen-hantou no Sogoteki Bunseki to Nihon no
Anzenhosho, Tokyo: Nihon Kokusaimondai Kenkyusho, 2017, p. 87.
11 Bonsajeongchibodoban, “Gyeongaehaneun Gimjeongeundongjikkeseo Sinhyeongdaegugyeong
bangsaposihyeomsagyeogeul Jidohasiyeotda”, Rodong Sinmun, March 4, 2016.
12 “Uriui Gyeonggoga Binmari Aniraneungeoseun Mijewa Bakgeunhaeyeokdoui Bichanhan Jongmari Geudaero Boyeojuge Doelgeosida: Jogukpyeonghwatongirwiwonhoe Jungdaebodo”, Rodong
Sinmun, March 24, 2016; see also, Kurata, “Kita-chosen no Kaku-taisei niokeru Tainan-kankei”, p.
86.

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projectiles. It also carried the map entitled “Strategic Forces Plan for Fire Attack”
showing Busan and Ulsan, the ports and the harbors for reception and staging the US
forces as targets13.
However, the DPRK must run a risk of inviting US nuclear retaliations when it uses thenuclear weapons first to the US bases in the ROK. The conventional counterforce
projectiles were in need to deter and prevent the US from intervention. In this respect, thestatement of the Spokesman for the Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee immediately
after the nuclear test in September 2017 is worth noting. It stated that the DPRK did not
develop the nuclear weapons and went so far as possessing H-bombs to deal with South
Korea and the DPRK’s armed forces. Also, people were well prepared to deal with “south
Korea without nuclear weapons and strategic ballistic missiles (emphasis added)”14. It
implied the conventional counterforce projectiles were under development to extend therange to reach at the southern tip of the Peninsula dispensing with nuclear weapons.

IRREGULAR TRAJECTORIES AND SATURATION ATTACKS
Stretched distance between launching points and targets would decrease accuracy, which
would require technological advancement. Enhanced accuracy yields, however, increases
vulnerability to interceptions: the deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense(THAAD) Missile systems in Southeastern Seong-ju, for the defense of the US bases, the
PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 and the Korea Air Missile Defense (KAMD) arecomparatively significantly better at intercepting the DPRK’s counterforce projectiles
with enhanced accuracy over the countervalue projectiles with no designated targets. The
DPRK’s counterforce projectiles fall into the “Accuracy-Vulnerability Paradox.” Even
slipping through the domain that the THAAD missile are assigned—approximately 40 to
150 km, the counterforce projectiles must sneak through the low-tier domain of the PAC3 Cost Reduction Initiative (CRI)—below than approximately 15 km apogee and PAC-3
13

Bonsajeongchibodoban, “Gyeongaehaneun Gimjeongeundongjikkeseo Joseoninmingunjeollyeok
gun Hwaseongpobyeongbudaeui Tandoroketeubalsahullyeoneul Jidohayeotda”, Rodong Sinmun, June20, 2016; see also, Kurata, “Kita-chosen no Kaku-taisei niokeru Tainankankei”, p. 87. In thefollowing month, the KPA Panmunjom Representative spotted Kimhae and Taegu airports as thetargets in addition to the Pusan and Ulsan (“Migugeun Hyungakan Namjoseonyeonggugangjeomgi
doreul Pogihago Dangjang Jesogullo Doragaya Handa:Joseoninmingunpanmunjeomdaepyobu
Debyeonin Damhwa”, Rodong Sinmun, July 20, 2016.
14“Joseon Asiataepyeongyangwiwonhoe Daebyeonin Seongmyeong”, Minju Joseon, September 8,
2017.

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Missile Segment Enhancement (to be deployed after 2021)—lower than theapproximately 30 km apogee, in addition to the KAMD Medium-range Surface-toAir Missile M-SAM Cheongung— lower than approximately the 15 km apogee and theLong-range Surface-to-Air Missile L-SAM Cheongung II (to be deployed after 2020)—
lower than approximately the 60 km apogee.
The SRBM codenamed KN-23, estimated to be modeled after the Russian 9K720 (SSC8)—the Iskander-M unit—appeared first in the military parade in February 2018—that
can alter its flight path after the boost phase, would be one of the workable projectiles toescape from the “Accuracy-Vulnerability Paradox” with altered trajectories to circumvent
interception by US anti-ballistic missiles. The KN-23, moreover, is reported to be capableof making course corrections when they are guided by satellite-navigations. Suchaccuracy allows them to destroy targets dependably when armed with conventional
warheads. 15 The projectiles tested first in the “strike drills” under Kim Jong-un’ssupervision mid-April 2019 were called new-type tactical guided weapons with peculiar
mode of guiding flight (emphasis added) in official organs, implying the revised KN-2316.
The tests conducted under this nominal designation on May 4th and 9th that followed on
July 25th and August 6th was also supposed to be demonstrations of the same projectiles17.
Besides gliding at an apogee of approximately 37 km slipping through the US THAAD
domain18, the KN-23 attempted to circumvent low-tier interceptions of the US and the
ROK’s missile defense by its irregular trajectories.

Michael Elleman, “North Korea’s Newest Ballistic Missile: A Preliminary Assessment, May 8,
2019”, https://www.38north.org/2019/05/melleman050819/.
16 Bonsajeongchibodoban, “Gyeongaehaneun Choegoryeongdoja Gimjeongeundongjikkeseo Sinhye
ongjeonsuryudomugisagyeoksiheomeul Jidohasiyeotda”, Rodong Sinmun, April 18, 2019; see also,
Bak Siyeong, “Haengmuryeong Wanseong Seoneon Jeonhu Bukanui Wihyeobinsikgwa Tseonhoui
Yeokjeont: Wiheomgamsueseo Wiheomhoepiro”, Kukbang Yongu, Volume 62 Number 1 (March2019).
17 For the report of the “strike drills” in frontline are and eastern front and western front on May 4th,
see,“Gimjeongeunwiwonjang Jeonyeon Min Dongbujeonseonbangeobudaedeurui Hwaryeoktagyeoku
llyeon Jido”, Minju Joseon, May 5, 2019. It refereed to the “tactical guided weapons” implying theKN-23. Though the “strike drills” in frontline and western front on May 9th did not referred to theprojectile (“Gimjeongeunwiwonjang Jeonyeon Min Seobujeonseonbangeobudaedeurui Hwaryeokta
gyeokullyeon Jido”, Minju Joseon, May 10, 2019), the drills were supposed to include the KN-23 testfire. See, Gabriel Dominguez and Neil Gibson, “North Korea Resumes Missile Firings”, Janes
Defence Weekly, May 13, 2019, p.4. Regarding the test on August 6th, see, “Gyeongaehaneun
Choegoryeongdoja Gimjeongeundongjikkeseo Sinhyeongjeonsuryudotan Wiryeoksiwibalsareul
Chamgwanhasiyeotda”, Minju Joseon, August 7, 2019.
18 “KN-23 | Missile Threat”, https:missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kn23.
15

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As designated in the KPA’s “Crucial Statement,” the ROK bases are also targets of the
KN-23. The policy research director at the Institute for American Studies of the DPRK’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement indicating that the ROK Cheongju Air
Base was included in its targets when it introduced the US F-23 stealth fighters in midJuly 2019, declaring that the DPRK had no choice but to develop and test the special
armaments19. It immediately followed the demonstration of the new-type tactical guided
weapon (emphasis added) under Kim Jong-un’s instruction on July 25th. The projectile isreported to be featured with low-altitude gliding and leaping flight orbit of the tacticalguided missile, attempting to circumvent the missile defense under the KAMD.20
Yet, the KN-23 with high accuracy is less effective for neutralizing mobile targets, suchas the ROK’s ballistic missiles Hyunmoo. Reversed “Accuracy-Vulnerability Paradox” ofcounterforce projectiles; inaccuracy yields decreased vulnerability, would work forcounterforce projectiles to the mobile targets. The MLRs first tested on July 31st, followedby August 2nd, would also suit to escape from it. Inherently, MLRs, including the KN-09,
are the projectiles best suited to compensating low accuracy with saturation attacks.
Whereas the KN-09 was used during the “large-caliber long-range multiple rocket
launchers” in the “strike drill” on May 4th, concurrently with the KN-23,21 the projectiles
called “newly developed large-caliber multiple launch guided ordnance rocket system”(emphasis added) was subsequently tested on July 3122 and the test was conducted withthe device to “track changing capability” on August 2nd.23 It indicates that the projectiles
tested on July 31st and August 2nd are the upgraded KN-09, equipped with Global
Positioning Systems receivers more advanced than before24. Rockets, by definition, are19“Joseonoemuseong Migugyeonguso Siljang Namjoseondanggugui Jeontugibanim Binan”, Minju
Joseon, July 12, 2019.
20 “Gimjeongeunwiwonjang Sinhyeongjeonsuryudomugi Wiryeoksiwisagyeogeul Jojikjido”, Minju
Joseon, July 26, 2019.
21 Regarding the fire drill on May 4th, it was reported to accompany with the test to “estimate andinspect the operating ability and the accuracy of striking duty performance of large-caliber long-range
multiple rocket launchers as well.” See, “Gimjeongeunwiwonjang Jeonyeon Min Dongbujeonseonban
geobudaedeurui Hwaryeoktagyeokullyeon Jido”, Minju Joseon, May 5, 2019.
22 “Gimjeongeunwiwonjang sinhyeongdaegugyeongjojongbangsaposiheomsagyeogeul Jido”, Minju
Joseon, August 1, 2019; see also, Peter Felstead and Gabriel Dominguez, “Kim Jong-un Continues to
Let His Missiles Do the Talking,” Janes Defence Weekly, August 21, 2019, p. 6.
23 “Gyeongaehaneun Choegoryeongdoja Gimjeongeundongjikkeseo Sinhyeongdaegugyeongjojong
bangsaposiheomsagyeogeul Ttodasi Jidohasiyeotda”, Minju Joseon, August 3, 2019.
24 Kim Jong-un reportedly supervised a test-fire of “the new-type ground-to-sea cruise rocket” in early
June in 2017, when the test-fire verified specification including “mobility in various flying course andaccuracy of target sensing and guidance by the complex guided head and identification ability andsharp transition to attitude at the time of advance into the target” (Gyeongaehaneun Choegoryeongdoja
Gimjeongeundongjikkeseo Sinhyeongdaegugyeongjojongbangsaposiheomsagyeogeul Ttodasi Jidoha

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101

not equipped with guidance system, however, the DPRK’s MLRs approach to missiles
with elemental guidance, bolstering utilities of attacking the mobile targets.
Moreover, the projectiles—what the DPRK called “new weapon”—that were tested on
August 10th and 16th, 2019, superficially resembled the US MGM-140 Army Tactical
Missile System (ATACMS). The codenamed KN-24 is observed to replace the aged andliquid-fueled Hwasong-5 /Hwasong-6 and makes a non-parabolic trajectory25, though the
DPRK’s official communications did not suggest that they were equipped with guidancesystems unlike the upgraded KN-0926. No matter its increased accuracy, it should be notedthat the KN-24—as well as KN-23 is armed with warheads containing submunitions27. It
rather is suited to neutralizing the mobile targets, the ROK’s new series of ballistic
missiles, the Hyunmoo. The effectiveness to neutralize them would be augmented when
it mounts increased brisance. The “newly developed super-large multiple rocket launchers”(emphasis added) tested on August 24th, September 10th, October 31st, and November
28th, 2019, would represent this effectiveness. Though the codenamed KN-25 is estimatedto have four fixed rear fins and four moving forward fins for guidance, it is equipped with
600 mm caliber four-tube wheeled transporter-erector-launcher, demonstrating roughly
doubled the brisance of single munitions of the KN-09 with 300 mm.28 Upon the test-fireon October 31st, it was broadcast that the projectile was verified… to “totally destroy withsuper-power the group target of the enemy and designated target area by surprise strikeof the weapon system of super-large multiple rocket launchers (emphasis added)”29.

UNBRIDGING AND BRIDGING TO THE SECOND ESCALATION LADDERS
The DPRK’s intensive test-fires of the SRBMs as well as MLRs, attributed to Kim Jong-siyeotda”, Minju Joseon, June 9, 2019. The technologies of radars and GPS for the cruise missiles may
have been converted to upgrade the KN-09.
25 Michael Elleman, “North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles: A Technical Evaluation, October 9,
2019”, https: www.38north.org/2020/03/melleman0325020/.
26 “Gyeongaehaneun Choegoryeongdoja Gimjeongeundongjikkeseo Sae Mugi Siheomsagyeogeul
Jidohayeotda”, Minju Joseon, August 11, 2019; “Joseollodongdangui Hyeonmyeonghan Ryeongdo
Arae Jawijeokgukbangnyeokganghwaeseo Sabyeonjeoguiuireul Gajin Saeroun Seonggwadeure
Ryeonieo Changjo: Gyeongaehaneun Choegoryeongdoja Gimjeongeundongjikkeseo Sae Mugi
Siheomsagyeogeul Ttodasi Jidohayeotda”, Rodong Sinmun, August 17, 2019.
27 Elleman, “North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles”.
28 Michael Elleman, “North Korea’s Recent KN-25 Launches New Short-Range Missiles”,
https//www.38north.org/2020/03/melleman030620/.
29“Joseonminjujuuiinmingonghwagung Gukbanggwahagwon Chodaehyeongbangsaposiheomsagye
ong Jinhaeng”, Minju Joseon, November 1, 2019.

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un’s unilateral declaration in his speech at the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central
Committee of the WKP on April 21, 2018 that “No nuclear tests, intermediate-range, orintercontinental ballistic rocket tests are necessary for the DPRK” (emphasis added),30
leaving the room for test-fires of SRBMs. Inasmuch as then US President Donald Trump
said that the DPRK side secured a halt of all missiles and of all nuclear tests at the press
conference following the summit talks with Kim Jong-un31, it is unlikely that Kim Jongun daringly canceled out the room for test-firing SRBMs contrary to his speech given
above. Regarding the KN-23, in light of its irregular non-parabolic trajectories, the DPRK
intended to be excluded from the UN Security Council resolutions banning the test-firesof the ballistic missiles regardless of ranges.
It was hinted, however that buildup of the counterforce projectiles verified in 2019 waslaid out by the WKP. Upon the first test-fire of the KN-23 in April 2019, Kim Jong-un
was reported to say, “the field of national defense science has waged a dynamic struggle
for attaining core research goals set forth by the Party at the 8th Conference of Munitions
Industry and thus conducted brisk activities for developing our own style weapon system,
which embodies four elements.”32 It was on December 12, 2017 when the 8th Conferenceof Munition Industry was convened, dating back before Kim Jong-un launched on thesummit talks with both Presidents of the ROK and the US. While the report at the 8th
Conference of Munition Industry by Thae Jong-su, Politburo member and Vice-chairmanof the Central Committee of the WPK focused on the accomplishments of Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles, the “New-type High-Thrust Engine,” the two hydrogen-bomb tests andthe test-fires of the Hwasong-14 (KN-20) twice in July and the Hwasong-15 (KN-22) inNovember 2017, respectively honoring “March 18 Revolution,” “July 4 Revolution,”30

The “intermediate-range” ballistic “rocket” referred in Kim Jong-un’s speech, in English versionof the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) was originally the “intermediate-long range(Jungjanggeori)” in the Korean text. The DPRK, failing to designate the range by distance, classifies
the IRBMs have two categories: “intermediate (Junggeori)” targeting Japan and “intermediate-long(Jungjanggeori)” targeting Guam. Regarding the English and Korean texts of Kim Jong-un’s speech,
see respectively, “Third Plenary Meeting of Seventh C.C., WPK Held in Presence of Kim Jong Un,”
KCNA, April 21, 2018, http//www.kcna.index-e.htm, and “Joseollodongdang Jungangwiwonhoe
Je7gi Je3cha Jeonwonhoeui Jinhaeng: Joseollodongdang Gimjeongeunwi Wonjangdongjikkeseo
Byeongjilloseonui Widaehan Seungnireul Gungjinopi Cheonmyeonhasigo Dangui Saeroun
Jeollyakjeongnoseoneul Jesihasiyeotda”, Rodong Sinmun, April 21, 2018. Further in details, see,
Hideya Kurata, “Synchronizing Two Asymmetrical Deals: The Panmunjeom Declaration and the USDPRK Joint Statement from Japan’s Perspective”, The Korean Journal of Security Affairs, Volume 23
Number 2 (December 2018), pp. 38–39.
31 “Press Conference by President Trump, Foreign Policy, Issued on June 12, 2018, Capella Hotel,
Singapore”, https//www.whitehouse.g.,ov/briefings-statements/press-conference-president-trump/.
32
Bonsajeongchibodoban, “Gyeongaehaneun Choegoryeongdoja Gimjeongeundongjikkeseo
Sinhyeongjeonsuryudomugisagyeoksiheomeul Jidohasiyeotda”, Rodong Sinmun, April 18, 2019.

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103“July 28 Victory,” and “Great November 29 Victory” at the opening ceremony of theConference,33 the report of the closing ceremony referred that Kim Jong-un gave the“theoretical and scientific instructions” to directions and methods of rockets industries34,
suggesting that SRBMs were also discussed in the Conference. It must be related to what
Kim Jong-un said upon the first test-fire of the KN-23 in April 2019, “core research goals
set forth by the Party at the 8th Conference of Munition Industry”35.
Counterforce projectiles, as the initial escalation ladders, are to deescalate the local
deterring the US intervention in case of armed clashes between indigenous forces.
Limited explosiveness should be sufficient to compartmentalize the conflict within theindigenous forces, making the USFK to hesitate to intervene; use of nuclear weapons
would rather invite US nuclear retaliation. Instead of limited explosiveness, accuracy is
an indispensable component of counterforce projectiles, even in neutralizing mobile
ballistic missiles of the ROK’s new series of the Hyunmoo. As described, the KN-23 withirregular trajectories attempt to escape from the “Accuracy-Vulnerability Paradox” toattack fixed bases, the KN-24 and the KN-25 attempted to escape from the reverse Paradox
with saturation attacks compensating comparative inaccuracy when targeting mobile
targets.
In case the initial escalation ladder fails to compartmentalize conflicts within indigenous
forces, the DPRK must be prepared for intervention of the US forces off the Peninsula.
To deter these forces from using for combat operation in Korea, the DPRK needs
counterforce capabilities to the US bases in Japan (USFJ) as well as Andersen Air Basein Guam. However, the degree of destructive power of the conventional warhead isinversely proportional to the distance to the targets. DPRK counterforce capabilities
therefore need extraordinarily powerful conventional warheads to neutralize their
33“Jawijeong Gukbangnyeokganghwaui Ryeoksae Teukgihal Seungnigwa Yeonggwangui Daehoe,
Gyeongaehaneun Choegoryeongdoja Gimjeongeundongjireul Mosigo Je8cha Gunsugongeopdaehoe
Seongdaehi Gaemak”, Rodong Sinmun, December 12, 2017.
34 “Widaehan Byeonjinui Gichinopi Juchejeokgukbanggongeopbaljeonui Choejeonseonggireul
Yeoreonagaja Je8cha Gunsugongeopdaehoe Paemang Gyeongaehaneun Choegoryeongdoja
Gimjeongeundongjikkeseo Daehoeeseo Ryeoksajeogin Gyeolloneul Hasiyeotda”, Rodong Sinmun,
December 13, 2017.
35 Upon the test-test of the KN-24 on August 16, Kim Jong-un was also reported to stress to make allout efforts to perfectly uphold the Party’s line when he called on the fields of the national defense
scientific research and the projectiles industry. See, “Joseollodongdangui Hyeonmyeonghan Ryeong
do Arae Jawijeokgukbangnyeokganghwaeseo Sabyeonjeoguiuireul Gajin Saeroun Seonggwadeure
Ryeonieo Changjo: Gyeongaehaneun Choegoryeongdoja Gimjeongeundongjikkeseo Sae Mugi
Siheomsagyeogeul Ttodasi Jidohayeotda”, Rodong Sinmun, August 17, 2019.

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objectives: the USJF over 1000 km and Andersen Air Base over 3000 km distant from thePeninsula. Under such circumstances the DPRK had to demonstrate nuclear
explosiveness and accuracy in the intensive test-fires of ballistic missiles in 2016-1736.
It should be recalled again, in this respect that the KPA’s “Crucial Statement” in February
2016 threatened, “if the enemies persist in their foolish military actions…the DPRK willstage the second striking operation to totally eliminate its very source” (emphasis added),
implying that the US bases off the Peninsula would be designated as the targets of thesecond strikes. In light of nuclear explosiveness as well as accuracy were demonstrated
in 2016–17, the DPRK would threaten to make second strikes with nuclear weapons to
the US bases off the Peninsula after the initial escalation ladders failed to deescalate thearmed clashes. Besides, in case the USFJ are used for the combat operations in Korea the
DPRK’s nuclear strikes to them amounts to be the FU as the USFJ where no nuclear
weapon is deployed. Rodong Sinmun carried an article endorsing this, “should a war occur
on the Korean Peninsula, Japan, the bases for the US logistic, combating and staging,
would be the first to be covered by radioactive clouds (emphasis added) 37 . Second
escalation ladders would be further followed by the menace of countervalue strikes to the
US mainland.
While the Minimum Deterrence with NFU remains one of the facets in DPRK’s nuclear
posturing in the “War-deterring Strategy,” the room for FU that is left falls in the realmof the deterrence to the US bases off the Peninsula in the “War Strategy” Kim Jong-un
referred to in his speech of March 2013. It is presumed that the latter consists of theescalation ladders from local armed clashes on the Korean Peninsula to the total war
involving Japan and the US, the counterforce capabilities demonstrated in 2019 are notisolated, incorporated in the initial part of the entire escalation ladders of the “WarStrategy.” The signed commentary Rodong Sinmun carried in the midst of the series ofthe projectile’s tests in summer 2019 is worth noting in this regard. While demonstrating,“the powerful defense capabilities and war deterrence” without referring to nuclear
deterrence,” it honored the “March 18 Revolution” and “July 4 Revolution” as well38.

36

See, Hideya Kurata, “Kim Jong-un’s Nuclear Posture under Transformation: The Source of North
Korea’s Counterforce Compulsion,” Hideya Kurata and Jerker Hellström (eds.), North Korea’s
Security Threats Reexamined, Yokosuka: National Defense Academy, 2019, pp. 16–17.
37 Lee Hyeon-do, “Seuseuro Pamyeoreul Jaechokaneun Mumohan Mangdong”, Rodong Sinmun,
May 2, 2017.
38
Myeong Juhyeok, “Gangnyeokan Jawijeokgukbangnyeogi Isseo Uriui Seungnineun
Hwakjeongjeogida”, Rodong Sinmun, August 31, 2019.

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CHAPTER 8

North Korea’s Nuclear Posture after the Summit Meetings:
A View from China
Jerker Hellström

In early March 2018, South Korean National Security Adviser Chong Eui-yung traveledto the United States to relay to President Donald Trump an invitation from Kim Jong Un
to jointly conduct the first summit ever between two leaders of the U.S. and North Korea,
which Trump accepted almost immediately. In 2017, when North Korea conducted more
missile tests than in any previous year, such a meeting would have been impossible. Thisis a reminder that, in matters concerning the DPRK, one should never rule out theunthinkable.
This commentary is focused on North Korea’s nuclear posture after the two summits in
Singapore and Hanoi, from a Chinese perspective. It is based on writings and statements
by leading Chinese scholars who focus on China’s relations with the U.S. and North
Korea, and on the North Korean nuclear issue in particular. As China is unarguably a
crucial actor in Korean peninsula dynamics, it is important to understand the deliberationsof Chinese observers and policymakers on North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile
programs.

U.S.-CHINA DIVERGENCE ON THE DPRK

There is a major divide between Chinese and American views of the North Korean
nuclear program.1 According to Yang Xiyu, Senior Fellow at the Chinese Institute ofInternational Studies (CIIS), China has accepted the concept of the DPRK’s peacefuldevelopment of nuclear energy, while the U.S. has not. Another major discrepancy noted

1 杨希雨 [Yang Xiyu], 朝鲜核问题与中国的对朝政策 [The North Korean Nuclear Issue and China's

North Korea Policy],《现代国际关系》 [Contemporary International Relations] 2017, Vol. 1.

106Chapter 8 — North Korea’s Nuclear Posture after the Summit Meetings:
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by Yang is that China will not agree to any action that threatens stability in the region,
valuing stability over denuclearization. The U.S., in contrast, prioritizes denuclearization.
Professor Yan Xuetong, Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua
University, suggests that China could potentially decide to accept North Korea as anuclear state with which it maintains friendly bilateral relations, on the condition that thiswould contribute to maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula.2 Yan argues that China
faces a simple choice between a nuclear North Korea with nuclear weapons that does nothave a hostile relationship with China, and a nuclear North Korea with nuclear weaponsthat does have a hostile relationship with China.
Chinese scholars regard the lack of trust between the U.S. and the DPRK as the principal
obstacle to progress. Moreover, they assert that the U.S. is strongly prejudiced against
North Korea. Most American scholars consider the summit as a capitulation to
Pyongyang, meaning it will be difficult to achieve a balanced dialog and to reachreciprocal, concrete results. Both leaders face domestic pressure to deliver substantive
progress.
Meanwhile, there is a clear Chinese lack of trust in American Korea policy and its
underlying motivations. Several scholars argue that Washington favors regime change inthe DPRK, as well as containment of China, with the end goal of expanding U.S. influencein the region. As such, U.S. non-proliferation efforts are understood by some Chinese
scholars as merely a pretext for replacing the regime in Pyongyang with one that will not
oppose U.S. interests. Moreover, the Chinese academic debate often refers to a U.S.
“double standard”; while Washington opposes DPRK nuclear ambitions, it “turns a blindeye” to those of Israel and India.

ON THE ISSUE OF DENUCLEARIZATION

In order to understand China’s DPRK policy, it is vital to grasp the analysis among
Chinese scholars on matters of denuclearization.

2 周晓加 [Zhou Xiaojia] 朝鲜核问题与中国学者的观点 [The North Korean nuclear issue and views

among Chinese scholars] 《和平与发展》[Peace and Development] 2017, Vol. 3.

Chapter 8 — North Korea’s Nuclear Posture after the Summit Meetings:
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107

On the one hand, North Korea is widely perceived among Chinese scholars as a de facto
nuclear state. As the DPRK has little interest in giving up its recent nuclear progress,
prospects for (unilateral) North Korean denuclearization are low, if not nonexistent.
Indeed, Pyongyang has added the development of nuclear weapons to its constitution andnational development plans.
Professor Li Limin of the University of International Relations in Beijing asserts that the
DPRK has never had the intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons program. Its
participation in the six-party talks and other dialogs were merely motivated by an effort
to buy time and advance with the byungjin policy of parallel economic and nuclear
development that is, catching up both economically and militarily.3
While China is under no illusion that North Korea will abolish its nuclear arsenal
unilaterally, denuclearization of the Korean peninsula remains one of the pillars ofChina’s DPRK policy. Importantly, however, the Chinese understanding of thedenuclearization issue involves both North Korea and the U.S. Not only does North Korea
remain convinced that nuclear weapons are present in the ROK, but Pyongyang also sees
a nuclear threat from U.S. extended deterrence to the ROK and Japan. Thus, the end ofextended deterrence may not be enough for Kim to consider the U.S. to no longer be athreat. His ultimate goal may be global nuclear disarmament, including U.S.
denuclearization.
According to Cao Xin (曹辛), Adjunct Fellow of the Charhar Institute in Beijing, aprerequisite for denuclearization is that the U.S. and the DPRK first negotiate a peace
regime. Without peace, it would be nearly impossible for Kim Jong Un to justify theelimination of nuclear weapons to his Party, the military, and the North Korean people.4
Yan Xuetong notes that there is an inherent conflict between China’s goal of“denuclearization of the Korean peninsula” on the one hand, and “peace on the Korean

3 林利民 [Lin Limin] 朝鲜核问题的战略本质: 反扩散还是地缘政治博弈? [The strategic nature of

the North Korean nuclear issue: non-proliferation or geopolitical game?]《现代国际关系》[Contemporary International Relations] 2018, Vol. 2.
4 曹辛 [Cao Xin] 二次“特金会”黄了：中国对朝核必须确立“底线思维”[As the second"Trump-Kim Summit" falls through, China must establish a “bottom line mindset” on the North
Korean nuclear issue], FT 中文网, March 1, 2019. URL: https://www.ftchinese.com/ story/00108167
7?archive (accessed February 5, 2021).

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peninsula” on the other. According to Yan, China is able to safeguard peace on thepeninsula, but has no ability to pressure Pyongyang into giving up its nuclear weapons.

ON MINIMUM DETERRENCE/NO-FIRST USE

Although the DPRK has pledged a no-first use policy, it is important to note that theregime has also threatened preemptive use of nuclear weapons. That said, Yang Xiyu of
CIIS asserts that, despite North Korea having stated on several occasions that it is readyto conduct a preemptive nuclear strike against the U.S., it has no intention of engaging in
nuclear war. Rather, it views its nuclear capabilities as a shield and strategic lever.
It is presumed that Pyongyang’s goal is to prevent the U.S. and its allies from attacking
North Korea and attempting to overthrow the regime. Several Chinese scholars posit that
the North Korean regime also seeks to force Washington to take the Kim regime seriously,
to treat it as an equal, and to reverse its hostile North Korea policy.

DIRECT IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA

Some Chinese scholars argue that China’s delivery of strategic supplies (e.g., hardcurrency and commodities) to North Korea is not primarily intended to keep the regime
from collapsing–which is otherwise accepted as conventional wisdom. Rather, by
supporting the DPRK, the Chinese government is attempting to persuade Pyongyang to
not strike South Korea. Hence, China is the primary guarantor of North Korea not
becoming hostile. The Kim regime is well aware that China would intervene should it
attack South Korea.
According to Cao Xin of the Charhar Institute, China’s role in Korean denuclearizationis pivotal, and this must be acknowledged. Moreover, Cao recommends that China adopt
baseline thinking in regard to denuclearization.
At the same time, Cao and his fellow Chinese Korea watchers argue that denuclearization
is of great and direct interest for China as a neighbor and ally of the DPRK; a nucleararmed North Korea undermines China’s national security interests. They argue that China
should handle the issue as a matter of national security. In geopolitical terms, North

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109

Korea’s nuclear program affects the border regions in Northeastern China. Chinese
scholars also argue that there is a risk of proliferation in the region, which could be used
as a pretext against China.
As the U.S. and the DPRK have failed—at two summits—to agree on the terms fordenuclearization, many scholars are convinced that China will have to play anincreasingly important role. China’s policies will significantly shape the Korean
denuclearization dynamics —its progress, speed, and direction. Chinese academics argue
that the U.S. leverages the DPRK nuclear issue to contain China and restrict its room tomaneuver, while strengthening its own ability to control its Japanese and South Korean
allies.

CHINESE SCHOLARS ON THE WAY FORWARD

China’s Korea watchers believe that the Korean nuclear issue is a question for North
Korea and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to manage that it should be
resolved within the UNSC framework, and that China should promote this agenda within
the Security Council.
Moreover, they argue that China should keep in close contact with the other four
permanent members of the UNSC and provide them with its independent timetable androadmap for Korean denuclearization, as well as seek assurances from the DPRK and
U.S.to agree on a timetable for denuclearization and an end-of-war agreement.
China is a signatory of the armistice and has diplomatic relations with both Washington
and Pyongyang. Hence, in the mind of Chinese analysts, China is the only country thatcan mediate an agreement to end the war.

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A Chance for Autonomy from Alliances [Watanabe]

CHAPTER 9

South Korean Civilians’ Political Domain behind Coercion:
A Chance for Autonomy from Alliances

Takeshi Watanabe

INTRODUCTION
Coercion is not a kind of warfare in which destroying military capabilities preludes thecoercer’s imposition of their will on their target. Instead of warfare between professional
militaries, the long-standing option to directly inflict violence on civilians involves thecoercer making the targeted nation obey.1 Therefore, the way targeted civilians, rather
than professionals, view the coercer’s threats is a critical factor in deciding whether thenation should accept what is being demanded of it. Civilian politics within the targetednation would be an indispensable part of the coercion process.
On January 10, 2018, in proclaiming his mediatory role in U.S.–North Korea relations,
President Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) declared, “I willtake a step forward along with the people in an effort to help create an everyday life thatis peaceful and safe, and with no worry over war.”2 This statement was clearly a quick
response to the New Year’s address by Kim Jong-un, the Supreme Leader of North Korea
and the Chairman of the Worker’s Party of Korea Central Committee, which called forbeginning North–South talks to avoid “the holocaust of a nuclear war”3 following theThomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, revised edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008),
21-23; Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 28.
2 Republic of Korea (ROK) Presidential Office, Moon Jae-in Taedongryong Yonsor Mun Jip [TheSpeeches of President Moon Jae-in], (Seoul: Office of Presidential Secretary, 2018), vol. 1, no. 2, p.
199; Republic of Korea Presidential Office, “Opening Remarks by President Moon Jae-in at the New
Year Press Conference,” January 10, 2018, http:// english1.president.go.kr/ BriefingSpeeches/Speech
es/21 (accessed January 21, 2001).
3 “Kim Jong Un Makes New Year Address,” Korea Central News Agency, January 1, 2018.
1

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A Chance for Autonomy from Alliances [Watanabe]series of nuclear and missile tests in the past two years. Although President Moon
mentioned “war” instead of “nuclear war,” the “concern over war,” which legitimized
President Moon’s acceptance of North Korea’s demand for a discussion, was due to aseries of nuclear-related tests. Eventually, President Moon and President Donald Trumpsuspended the major military exercises of the U.S.–ROK alliance, such as Ulchi Freedom
Guardian. In such nuclear diplomacy, North Korea achieved one goal.
This process should question the conventional argument that coercion depends on one’s
credibility of using force. 4 Nuclear capabilities were not a reliable aspect of North
Korea’s forces in warfare, as they are underdeveloped; thus, President Moon’s “worry
over war” was not based on the objective assessment of the likelihood of nuclear war. The
arbitrary decision, which pertained to whether the fear of a nuclear crisis was a goodenough reason to start negotiations, was in favor of the coercer.
Those who were directly targeted by the coercer were not military professionals who
objectively evaluate such a reputation but rather civilians engaging in politics. From a
political perspective, weakening the alliance improves autonomy,5 which is an importantsource of a nation’s legitimacy, especially considering its modern history of foreigninterventions. This paper examines the incumbent ROK government’s pursuit ofautonomy in competing with conservatives who—as an important factor of obedience tothe coercer—have played a leading role in sustaining the alliance.

POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY IN NATIONAL SECURITY
While North Korea’s nuclear capabilities could become more dangerous in the future, thisdoes not mean the country could immediately use nuclear weapons against the U.S.–ROK
alliance. Chairman Kim’s remarks, which emphasized a possible “nuclear holocaust,”
exploited the subjective image of the country’s abysmal nuclear power, which is clearly
ill-prepared for warfare. Such underdeveloped nuclear facilities led President Moon toaccept Kim Jong-un’s demand to suspend the U.S.–ROK combined exercises.
The classical distinction of objective and political responsibilities is critical toSechser and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, pp. 45-46.
James Morrow, “Arms versus allies: trade-offs in the search for security,” International Organization,
47 (2), 1993, pp. 213-217.
4
5

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understanding the factors that diminish the coercer’s credibility. This distinction refers to
the possibility that the targeted nation’s leadership requires professional apparatuses to
accept its subjective credibility evaluation for domestic political purposes.
Carl Friedrich separated governmental organs’ objective, politically neutral
responsibility of following predetermined rules or standards from the subjective duties ofarbitrary selection, among possible alternatives.6 This distinction became the basis for
Samuel Huntington’s concept of objective and subjective military control.7 Subjective
control implies that the national leadership controls its national security apparatuses for
its subjective responsibility. Because subjective responsibility involves political power
struggles for adopting alternatives,8 subjective control reflects the leadership’s attempt
to use professional organs to sustain the competition among political powers. The political
purpose of controlling the organs disagrees with objective control, in which leadershipintends to let these apparatuses focus on fulfilling objective, nonpolitical duties.
Evaluating the credibility of using force is a professional duty of the military, or
intelligence organizations, when managing outside threats. The usual coercion theory
assumes that, without credible threats, the targeted nation has no reason to do something
it does not want to do.9
Nevertheless, even if the coercer failed to objectively exhibit credibility, civilian politicalpower could express their fear of nuclear war because not only is the civilian’s
responsibility subjective, but such subjective duty also includes political contests to win
the constituency vis-à-vis other civilians. Nuclear fear could expand one side’s
constituency concerning the arbitrary selection of compromise or confrontation.10 The
6 Carl Friedrich, “Responsible Government Service under the American Constitution,” Commissionof Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, Problems of the American Public Service: Five Monographson Specific Aspects of Personnel Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935), pp. 36-37.
7 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 479 n1. I learned from Yasushi
Sukegawa, a senior research fellow at National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo that Huntington
established his civilian control concept based on Carl Friedrich’s administrative concept of subjective
and objective responsibility.
8 Friedrich, “Responsible Government Service under the American Constitution,” 36; Huntington, The
Soldier and the State, p. 80.
9 Sechser and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, pp.45-16; Robert Art and Kelly
Greenhill, “Coercion: An Analytical Overview,” Greenhill and Peter Krause ed., Coercion: The Powerto Hurt in International Politics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 4.
10
Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy andthe Limits of Military Might, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 65-68.

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A Chance for Autonomy from Alliances [Watanabe]targeted leadership’s emphasis on peacefully eliminating “worry over war” leads to aneffect that benefits the side that prefers conceding to the coercer. Coercion, which directly
threatens civilians, commences through the political process among targeted civilians.11
Incidentally, compliance to the coercer’s demand to avoid alliances could be a rationale
for civilian decision-makers because weakening alliances strengthens one’s autonomy
from the ally—an important source of political legitimacy. The security–autonomy tradeoff12 means that the coercer, by demanding to weaken alliances for peace, can provide achance for targeted civilians to internalize the rationale to achieve the nation’s autonomy,in competing with the opposition that preferred such alliances to reject coercion.
Advocating greater autonomy by reconciling with North Korea, President Moon
attempted to enlarge his liberal constituency vis-à-vis conservatives sustaining theexisting alliance. This approach was evident in his address for the commemoration of the
March First Independence Movement, which resisted Japan’s colonial rule in 1919,
celebrating the nation’s struggle for autonomy.
First, the president called for national unity to heal the social division created by pastconservatives who tortured “reds,” namely progressives, who were accused of siding withthe communist North. National unity in this case virtually means minimizing the nation’s
conservatives who oppose President Moon. The following are citations from his
address.13
Wiping out the vestiges of pro-Japanese collaborators is a long-overdue undertaking.
Only when we contemplate past wrongdoings can we move toward the future
together.
Hostility between the left and the right and ideological stigmas were tools used by
Japanese imperialists to drive a wedge between us.
Even in the liberated homeland, those who used to serve as police officers during Japanesecolonial rule painted independence activists as Reds and tortured them. Many people were
11 Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, pp. 48-49.
12 Morrow, “Arms versus allies.”
13

ROK Presidential Office, Moon Jae-in Taedongryong Yonsor Mun Jip, (Seoul: Office ofPresidential Secretary, 2019), vol. 2 no. 2, pp. 258-263; Republic of Korea Presidential Office,“Address by President Moon Jae-in on 100th March First Independence Movement Day,” March 1,
2019, http://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Speeches/128 (accessed January 18, 2021).

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Chapter 9 — South Korean Civilians’ Political Domain Behind Coercion:
A Chance for Autonomy from Alliances [Watanabe]labeled Reds and thus sacrificed. Their relatives and bereaved families had to live ill-fatedlives under social stigmas. This address clearly defines “pro-Japanese collaborators” as
those who sustained the ROK’s previous anticommunist regimes. Their political power
was largely succeeded by conservative groups opposing President Moon.
Second, the president linked the agenda of “wiping out the vestiges of pro-Japanesecollaborators,” who eventually became anticommunist conservatives, with the need for areconciliatory policy toward North Korea.
The 38th parallel drawn through our minds will disappear altogether once theideological hostility that caused internal rifts are removed. When we discard feelingsof aversion and hatred toward others, our internal liberation will be completed. Only
then will a new century be able to begin in a genuine sense.
The coming 100 years will differ from the past in quality. We will push ahead with abold transition toward a new Korean Peninsula regime and prepare for unification.
The new Korean Peninsula regime refers to the order of the coming century in which
we will take on a leading role. Working together with the people and with North
Korea as well, we will create a new order of peace and cooperation. The new Korean
Peninsula regime is a new community of peace and cooperation that will end
confrontations and conflicts.
On the basis of the spirit of the March First Independence Movement and national
unity, I will strive to foster this new Korean Peninsula regime.
These remarks imply that promoting reconciliation between the two Koreas, divided by
the “38th parallel,” denies the role of conservatives who have confronted North Korea.
Third, following this notion, President Moon legitimized the initiative of establishing the“new Korean Peninsula regime” by proclaiming it as the basis for achieving greater
autonomy. He said that the “regime refers to the order of the coming century in which wewill take on a leading role.” The so-called opportunity to realize autonomy cemented his
policy to avoid a confrontation with conservatives.
President Moon’s idea that compromising with North Korea would lead to the nation’s
greater autonomy echoed the stance of the coercer, Kim Jong-un, in initiating requests fortalks to avoid Korean entrapment into the U.S. military strategy on January 1, 2018.
Chairman Kim stressed the necessity to prevent “a nuclear war forced by the outside

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forces,” namely U.S. forces, as the reason for starting North–South discussions.14 Should
the U.S.–ROK alliance cause nuclear fear, the two-year-long nuclear missile crisis would
confirm the rationale of denying the conservative preference of the alliance. Kim Jongun gave President Moon the opportunity to achieve strong self-reliance, which people hadlong desired.

MOON’S POLITICAL CONFLICT WITH THE MILITARY
Prior to complying with North Korea’s demand to suspend the U.S.–ROK joint military
exercises, the Moon administration accepted China’s directive to follow the “three noes”
policy, under which South Korea would refrain from improving missile defense
cooperation with the United States and Japan.15 This policy states that the ROK would
not join the U.S. missile defense system, develop the U.S.–Japan–ROK trilateral
cooperation into a military alliance, or make additional deployments of its terminal highaltitude area defense (THAAD) system.
From a realist perspective, both moves seem consistent with the buck-passing of growing
threats from North Korea to the United States and Japan. If two buck-catchers could
manage stronger threats without South Korea’s support, it would be the most costeffective way for South Korea to leave such threats to the two nations. Nevertheless,neither the United States nor Japan can become the buck-catcher for South Korea. If South
Korea wants to buck-pass some burdens, reflected in the joint exercises within its territory,
to the United States, the U.S. ally has to invite more U.S. troops to replace the roles of
the ROK military, which is not the case. With respect to the “three noes” policy, Japancannot replace missile defense capabilities within the ROK territory. Furthermore, theUnited States can hardly bring missile defense assets to replace South Korean roles
because, under the “three noes” policy, South Korea would have to refrain from additional
deployments of its core assets such as the THAAD system. Thus, the rationality of theexternal security policy cannot explain South Korea’s reluctance toward the United States“Kim Jong Un Makes New Year Address,” Korea Central News Agency, January 1, 2018.
ROK National Assembly, Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee Record, 2017 audit session,
October 30, 2017, pp. 6-7; PRC Foreign Ministry, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's
Regular Press Conference,” October 31, 2017; PRC Foreign Ministry, “Zhong Han Shuangfang Jiu
Zhong Han Guanxi Deng Jinxing Goutong [China and South Korea Improves Communication on
China-South Korea Relations],” October 31, 2017; ROK FM, Hanchung Kwanke Keson Kwanryon
Yangkookkan Hyopui Kyorkwa [The Conclusion of the Talks Regarding Improvement of ROK-China
Relations],” October 31, 2017.
14
15

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and the trilateral security cooperation.
Instead, the Moon administration’s policy, which resulted in compliance with demands to
avoid the alliance, involved domestic contests with conservatives. The military, a major
professional apparatus that assumed direct responsibility to manage North Korea, was
one of the conservative political powers inclined to confront the coercer. The Moon
administration’s political control of the conservative military was seen in the Panmunjom
Declaration on April 27, 2018, in which the president expressed agreement with Chairman
Kim.
The joint declaration stated, “South and North Korea agreed to devise a practical scheme
to turn the areas around the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea into a maritime peacezone in order to prevent accidental military clashes and guarantee safe fishing activities.”
The “maritime peace zone” and a fishery zone in the “West Sea”—the Yellow Sea off the
Korean Peninsula’s west coast, where the two Korean navies clashed until recent years—
intend to effectively eliminate the North–South division in the sea. It was highly likelythat the maritime zones, agreed upon by President Moon, would deny the long-standing
policy of his nation’s military to prevent North Korean forces from crossing the Northern
Limited Line (NLL) in the sea.
Protecting the NLL as the maritime border was an arbitrary decision by the ROK military(i.e., political position). Although the United Nations Command drew the NLL to prevent
the U.S.–ROK side from going north beyond the line, the ROK armed forces conversely
defined the NLL as the maritime border against the North’s attempt to go south.16 While
the U.S. Defense Secretary has urged “the North to accept the practical value of, and abide
by, the Northern Limited Line”—along with the ROK Defense Minister—since 2011,17
U.S. support has been about the “practical value,” which falls short of supporting the legal
basis of the NLL. If the South Korean government seeks a North Korean policy denying
the military’s political stance, it faces conflict with the military as a power seeking the16

Narushige Michishita, North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008, (London:
Routledge, 2009) pp. 52-64.
17 Joint Communiqué, The 43rd U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, October 28, 2011, sec. 5;
Joint Communiqué, The 44th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, October 24, 2012, sec. 5;
Joint Communiqué, The 45th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting, October 2, 2013, sec. 5; Joint
Communiqué, The 46th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting, October 23, 2014, sec. 5; 47th
ROK-U.S. Joint Communiqué, November 1, 2015, sec. 5; Joint Communiqué of the 48th U.S.-ROK
Security Consultative Meeting, October 20, 2016; Joint Communiqué of the 49th ROK-U.S. Security
Consultative Meeting, October 28, 2017, sec. 4.

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conservative political goal of protecting the maritime area south of the NLL.
The ROK Defense Ministry has been aware that the maritime peace zone and a pilot joint
fishing zone, which first appeared in the official North–South agreement at the second
summit meeting of 2007 under the progressive Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003–
2008), reflected North Korea’s strategy to eliminate the NLL. The critical condition for
the ROK military’s acceptance of the establishment of these zones was that the zones
follow the “principle of containing the same area on the both sides” of the NLL.18 This
principle, which sustained the NLL as the baseline of the peace zone, was required for the
ROK military to prevent North Korea’s attempt to use the zones to dismiss the line. Under
President Roh, the ROK Ministry repeatedly advocated this principle after the summit
meeting joint declaration ended when North Korea’s confrontational attitude returned andthe definition of the maritime peace zone failed.19
President Moon, as a high-ranking official of the Roh administration who witnessed North
Korea’s unyielding stand to deny the legitimacy of the NLL, was probably conscious
about entering into a political collusion with the military when he, once again, agreed toestablish the maritime peace zone at the Panmunjom Declaration of the third inter-Korean
summit. Despite North Korea’s rejection of the principle for sustaining the NLL, theMoon administration pushed its Defense Ministry to make the military accord to define
the zone of easing maritime tension with their North counterparts. As a result, theimplementation agreement for the August 2018 Panmunjom Declaration between the two
militaries did not use the NLL as the baseline for drawing the zone in the Yellow Sea,
where both sides were required to take measures to stop confrontation, including ceasing

18

ROK Ministry of National Defense, “Panmunjom Sonon Ihengur Uihan Gunsabunya Hapuiso
Hesor Jyaryo [The Explanatory Document on the Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic
Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain],” September 19, 2018, p. 17.
19 Hideya Kurata, “‘2.13goui’ go no Heiwataisei Jyuritu Mondai: Kitachousen no Ninshiki ni Okeru
Toujisharon to Tetuduki ron (The Peace Regime Question after the ‘2.13 agreement’: The Theories ofDefining Parties and Procedures in North Korea’s Understanding),” the Japan Institute of International
Affairs, Kitachousen Taisei eno Jyuusouteki Apurouchi: Seiji, Keizai, Gaikou, Shakai (Layered
Approach to Understanding the North Korean Regime: Politics, Economy, Foreign Policy and Society),(Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2011), pp. 22-23, 27-29; National Institute for
Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2019 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies,2019), pp. 84-86; Takeshi Watanabe, “Moon jein Seiken no Taigaikankei ni Okeru Seigun Kankei
Youin [The Factor of Civilian-Military Relations behind the Moon Jae-in Administration’s External
Policy],” Japan Institute of International Affairs, “Fukakujitu Seino Jidai” no Chousen Hantou to
Nihon no Anzen Hoshou [The Korean Peninsula and Japan’s Security in an “Uncertain Era”], (Tokyo:
Japan Institute for International Affairs, 2019).

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Chapter 9 — South Korean Civilians’ Political Domain Behind Coercion:
A Chance for Autonomy from Alliances [Watanabe]“all live-fire and maritime maneuver exercises” or installing “covers on the barrels ofcoastal artilleries and ship guns.” 20 The ROK Defense Minister, admitting that the
military failed to define the area to confirm the NLL’s legitimacy, explained that theagreed maritime area should be regarded as a threat-reduction zone rather than an area
inclusive of equal-size zones north and south of the NLL.21 Unless required by South
Korea’s Presidential Office, it was highly unlikely that the ROK military accepted suchan accord.
While the ROK military repeatedly referred to the area of easing maritime tension as the“buffer zone,”22 neither North Korea nor South Korea’s Presidential Office adopted theterm. The only exception was its mention in one page of the Moon administration’s
official website for the North–South summit meetings, immediately after the
implementation agreement, which may have been drafted by the Defense Ministry. 23
Indeed, and strangely, the agreement separated the section to define the area for reducing
North–South tensions from the portion describing the “maritime peace zone,” which was
originally supposed to be established for the same purpose. The ROK military’s namingof the “buffer zone,” which clearly distinguished the area from the “maritime peace zone,”strongly suggested that South Korea’s military was the actor demanding the separation.
By separating these sections, the military might have narrowly prevented the progressiveleaning “maritime peace zone” from becoming an agreed concept that the two Koreas’
top leaders can use to directly deny the NLL. The implementation agreement in the
military domain, which defined the area of easing maritime tension, left the “maritime
peace zone” undefined.

20 The Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military

Domain, art. 1, sec. 2.
21 ROK National Assembly Office, Records of the National Assembly Plenary Session, 364th National
Assembly Session (Minutes of Regular and Extraordinary Sessions), October 1, 2018, 60; National
Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2019, (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense
Studies), pp. 84-85.
22 ROK National Assembly Office, Records of the National Assembly Plenary Session, 364th National
Assembly Session (Minutes of Regular and Extraordinary Sessions), October 1, 2018, 60; ROK
Ministry of National Defense, “Panmunjom Sonon Ihengur Uihan Gunsabunya Hapuiso Hesor Jyaryo,”p. 8.
23 ROK Inter-Korean Summit Preparation Committee, “Nampuk Irche e Jokdae Hengui Jonmyon
Chungji Koro [South and North Korea Agreed to Terminate All Aggressions],” August 19, 2018,
http://koreasummit.kr/Newsroom/News/316 (accessed January 28, 2021).

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SHOWING CAPABILITY STRENGTHENS POLITICAL POWER
The direct clashes between the North and South Korean militaries had been centered on
the NLL in the Yellow Sea since the 1990s because of the reinforcement of the U.S.–ROK
combined forces on the ground near the Military Demarcation Line.24 The NLL, which
North Korea had frequently challenged with force, became a symbol for South Korea’s
conservatives to confront such a strategy. Without improving its political power against
the conservatives, the progressive government would find it difficult to press the military
to accept the “buffer” zone, which virtually dismissed the NLL.
The progressives’ achievement against the confrontation-inclined conservatives followed
Kim Jong-un’s call for peace talks in January 2018. This move by North Korea allowed
the president to claim the responsibility of promoting self-reliance from the United Statesand depending on peaceful relations with North Korea. Even though Koreans have a longcherished desire to achieve autonomy from other powers, such as the United States orJapan, the only alternatives are the government’s assumed abilities. Thus, such abilities
are a critical driving force for political competition in selecting options.25 Those who
attempt to improve their competitive edge in political contests will focus on convincing
people that they can do what they claim by taking control of the government. The North
Korean leader’s call for an inter-Korean cooperation to prevent “a nuclear war forced by
the outside forces” was a necessary condition for President Moon to convince the people
that his political agenda for autonomy deserved their support.
President Moon was conscious that the people’s confidence in his agenda is critical for
improving his progressive power. In the address preluding South Korea’s decision to end
the Japan–ROK General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which
was required to secure backup forces for U.S.–ROK combined operations from the U.S.–
Japan alliance, President Moon urged people to unite under his reconciliatory policy,
following his remark hoping that skeptics of the government’s promotion of talks with
North Korea “face up to the reality” when the discussions continue.26
24 Narushige Michishita, North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, pp. 193-194.
25 Elmer Eric Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America,(Boston: Wadsworth, 1975), p. 12.
26 ROK Presidential Office, “Address by President Moon Jae-in on Korea’s 74th Liberation Day,”
August 15, 2019, http://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Speeches/638 (accessed January
18, 2021).

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President Moon showed further self-reliance by terminating the GSOMIA, and the stancein his address soon became similar to that of the Roh administration, with regard to the
U.S.–ROK alliance’s role in great power politics. In 2003, after the United States
proposed “strategic flexibility,” which would allow U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) to operate
beyond the peninsula, 27 a presidential committee of Roh Moo-hyun published theregional security initiative for the nation to serve as a “bridge” for maritime and land
powers, citing the potential contests between the United States and China. 28 By
advocating to act as a “bridge,” the Roh administration had the ability to keep the nationfrom forming an alliance with the United States in its conflict with China. Later, President
Roh called for an initiative to define South Korea as the region’s “balancer,” stressingthat he would never dismiss people’s concerns over the nation’s entrapment into the
USFK’s strategic flexibility. 29 Similarly, President Moon’s address, shortly before
ending the GSOMIA, highlighted the nation’s ability to be self-reliant by introducing theidea of being “a bridge” among great powers.30
The president’s address officially celebrated the day of the nation’s liberation fromJapan’s colonial rule, condemning what he called “Japan’s unwarranted export
restrictions.” Nevertheless, his consistency with the past administration’s policy oflegitimizing neutrality in regional security strongly suggested that he used his disputewith Japan to encourage the progressive power to seek self-reliance from the region’s
U.S.-led security architecture. The president took the responsibility of achieving
autonomy by stressing that Koreans can now build “a nation that cannot be shaken,” along sought-after dream since the end of Japanese rule. The “bridge” initiative was oneof the objectives for creating a self-reliant nation.31
To prove its claim of being capable of achieving the people’s long-cherished self-reliance,
leadership was required to show that the military seriously followed this agenda. The
27 ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Security Committee, “Chonryakchok Yuyonsong

Gwanryon Sormyong Jyaryo [Explanatory Document on Strategic Flexibility]” January 22, 2006.
28 ROK Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Business Hub, “Pyonghwa wa Ponyong e
Dongpuka Sidea Kusang: Bijyon gwa Chonryak [The Initiative on the Northeast Asian Era of Peaceand Prosperity: Vision and Strategy],” August 13, 2004, p. 7, 9.
29 ROK President Roh Moo-hyun, speaking for the 53rd Commencement and Commissioning
Ceremony of the Korea Air Force Academy, on March 8, 2005, ROK Presidential Office, Roh Moohyun Taedongryong Yonsor Mun Jip [The Speeches of President Roh Moo-hyun], (Seoul: Office ofPresidential Secretary, 2006) vol. 3, 80.
30
ROK Presidential Office, “Address by President Moon Jae-in on Korea’s 74th Liberation Day.”
31 Ibid.

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Moon administration’s objectives on “uncertain threats” or “potential threats,” referring
to future threats other than North Korea,32 were installed into the military’s strategic
documents during its continuous talks with North Korea in 2018. According to President
Moon’s statement regarding “defense reform,” the ROK military had to “manage thecurrent threats from North Korea and, at the same time, the armed forces is required toprepare the diversity of uncertain threats” by reforming its military posture, which
depends on “quantity.” 33 The large scale of the army has been vital in the military’s
central role in ground operations in the U.S.–ROK combined forces against North Korea,
which also depended on massive land power. By demanding that the military transform
away from a confrontational posture against North Korea, President Moon prioritized
future threats aside from North Korea.
The Defense Ministry, under all three administrations—Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003), Roh
Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in, who held summit meetings with North Korea—underlined“uncertain threats” or “potential threats” 34 while the conservative Lee Myung-bak(2008–2013) and Park Geun-hye administrations (2013–2017) did not prioritize such an
objective in their own version of defense reform.35 The ROK Defense Budget for the32

ROK President Moon Jae-in, speaking for the Annual Meeting of Major ROK MilitaryCommanders 2018, on July 27, 2018, ROK Presidential Office, Moon Jae-in Taedongryong Yonsor
Mun Jip [The Speeches of President Moon Jae-in], (Seoul: Office of Presidential Secretary, 2019), vol.
2, no. 1, p. 209, 211; ROK Ministry of National Defense, “Kookmin gwa Hamke Pyonghwa rur
Mandunun Kanghan Kookbang [National Defense for Making Peace with Citizens],” Report for the
President, December 20, 2018, p. 6; ROK Ministry of National Defense, “21seki Sonjin Jyonge
Kookbangnur Uihan Kookbang Kaehyok 2020 an [Defense Reform 2020 Plan for Advanced and Edgy
National Defense in 21st Century],” August 13, 2005, p. 5; ROK Ministry of National Defense, Mirerur Tebihanun Hankook e Kookbangpi 2001 [The ROK Defense Budget for the Future 2001], (Seoul:
Ministry of National Defense, 2001), p. 22.
33 ROK President Moon Jae-in, speaking for the Annual Meeting of Major ROK MilitaryCommanders 2018, on July 27, 2018, Moon Jae-in Taedongryong Yonsor Mun Jip, vol. 2, no.1, p. 211;
My following article previously argued the relations between “uncertain threats” and the politicalintention of liberal governments to politically compete with the army which has played the central rolein managing North Korean threats. Takeshi Watanabe, “Moon jein Seiken no Taigaikankei ni Okeru
Seigun Kankei Youin.”
34 ROK Ministry of National Defense, “21seki Sonjin Jyonge Kookbangnur Uihan Kookbang
Kaehyok 2020 an,” p. 5; ROK Ministry of National Defense, “Kookmin gwa Hamke Pyonghwa rur
Mandunun Kanghan Kookbang, p. 6; ROK Presidential Office, “2018 Jongun Jyuyo Jiuigwan Hweui
Modoo Baron.”
35 ROK Ministry of National Defense, “Kookbang Keahyok Kibon Kaehwek (2014-2030) [Basic Plan
for Defense Reform, 2014-2030],” March 3, 2014, pp. 3-5; “‘Kookbang Keahyok Sinsokhi
Kaehwekdero Heya,’ Puk Dopar Tebi Uri Gun Dundun, Kanghan Yajyonkun Pyonmo Kungjyong
Pyongka, Lee Myung-bak Taedongryong Jyuyo Jiuigwan Kyokryo Ochan [President Lee Myung-bak
Said “We Need to Promote the Defense Reform Swiftly as Planned,” Praising Our Military’s
Increasing Strength against North Korea’s Local Provocations],” Kookbang Ilbo, May 9, 2011.

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Future in 2001, a year after the first North–South summit by President Kim Dae-jung,showed statistics that clearly indicated the expectation of declining North Korean threats
and increasing uncertain threats without an objective basis. According to the document,
the future could see local conflicts with surrounding nations other than North Korea.36
This was a clear contrast to the defense reform under the Lee government, which notedthat the military had to assign high priority to existing threats, namely North Korea, rather
than potential threats in a deterrence posture.37
The Moon government’s direction for the military, shifting its focus away from the U.S.–
ROK combined operations, likely resulted in a confrontation with another regional U.S.
ally, Japan, instead of China, which competes with the United States. On December 21,
2018, Japan’s Defense Ministry published that an ROK naval vessel directed its firecontrol radar at a Japanese P-1 patrol aircraft.38 In response, the ROK Defense Ministrydemanded that Japan present absolute proof, insisting that another Japanese patrol aircraft,a P-3C, adopted a “dangerous” maneuver on the ROK naval ship.39 Concerning this issue,
the ROK Defense Minister stated “there are shortfalls in the standard measures to prevent
accidental crash with other forces.”40 This statement was similar to a part of the Defense
Ministry’s annual report to President Moon, which explained the necessity to prepare for“potential threats.” The annual report said, regarding “potential threats,” that “the ROK
military will actively respond” to surrounding nations, in the sea and air, while“considering to establish the measures to prevent accidental clash” with them.41
Even though it is unclear who decided to direct the radar to the Japanese P-1 aircraft, inthe dispute following the incident, the Moon administration used the Defense Ministry to

36 ROK Ministry of National Defense, Mire rur Tebihanun Hankook e Kookbangpi 2001, p. 22.
37 ROK Ministry of National Defense, “Kookbang Keahyok 307 Kaehwek Buriping [Briefing on

Defense Reform 307 Plan],” March 8, 2011.
38 Japan Ministry of Defense, “Regarding the incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control
radar at an MSDF patrol aircraft,” December 21, 2018, https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/radar/2018/12/
22a.html ( accessed February 05, 2021) Japan Ministry of Defense, “MOD’s final statement regarding
the incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at an MSDF patrol aircraft,” January
21, 2019, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/radar/pdf/final_
01.pdf (accessed February 05, 2021) Japan Ministry of Defense, “Reference Materials,” January 21.
2019, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/radar/pdf/final_03.p
df (accessed February 05, 2021).
39 “Il Chokaeki Kunchop Uihyoppiheng Myonbekhan Dobar [Dangerous Maneuver of a Japan’s
Patrol Aircraft Represent its Clear Provocation],” Kookbang ilbo, January 24, 2019.
40 Ibid.
41
ROK Ministry of National Defense, “Kookmin gwa Hamke Pyonghwa rur Mandunun Kanghan
Kookbang,” p. 6.

Chapter 9 — South Korean Civilians’ Political Domain Behind Coercion:

123

A Chance for Autonomy from Alliances [Watanabe]

prove the government’s ability to stand strongly against another U.S. ally in the region—
Japan. While the defense reform included policies to secure “political neutrality,” such as
dismantling the Defense Security Command, which had been accused of actions against
progressives,42 the military might be controlled for contributing to the progressive power
instead of political neutrality.
After beginning inter-Korean talks, as North Korea demanded, the Moon administration
adopted policies such as the suspension of the U.S.–ROK joint military exercises, entereda dispute with Japan’s defense forces which share the alliance, and ended the GESOMIA
with Japan, which was necessary to sustain the region’s U.S. operations. The ROK
government consistently claimed that it was capable of achieving stronger autonomy fromthe alliance by controlling its military’s stance on the United States and Japan

CONCLUSION
Since coercion is a strategy to directly influence civilians, who are political actors, thetargeted nation’s decision-making when responding to such coercion involves politicalobjectives for civilians. If the coercer’s objective was to decouple the alliance, the strategy
would become more effective when the targeted leadership preferred autonomy toalliance for improving legitimacy. Kim Jong-un provided both the U.S. and ROKpresidents a chance to claim their capability of avoiding an alliance. President Moon’semphasis on the necessity to eliminate “worry over war” echoed President Trump’s
remarks regarding legitimizing his policy preference away from a stronger alliance,
stating, “If I had not been elected president of the United States, we would right now, in
my opinion, be in a major war with North Korea with potentially millions of people
killed.”43 Without the credibility of using nuclear force, North Korea’s nuclear coercion
worked for the two targeted leaderships, which seek autonomy, a political interest that is
consistent with its demands.
42 ROK Presidential Office, “Kimusa Kaejhyok Kwanryon Moon Jae-in Taedongryong Jsisahang

Parpyo [Announcement of President Moon’ Jae-in’s Directions regarding the Reform of Defense
Security Command],” August 3, 2018, https://www1.president.go.kr/articles/3973; ROK Ministry of
Defense, “Gun Jyongchijyok Jungrip Jinjyonghan Gunin Yuksong e Kiban [The Military’s Political
Neutrality is a Basis for Raising True Military Professionals],” August 2, 2018; ROK President Moon
Jae-in, speaking for the Annual Meeting of Major ROK Military Commanders 2018, on July 27, 2018,
Moon Jae-in Taedongryong Yonsor Mun Jip, vol.2, no.1, p. 212.
43 US Whitehouse, “Remarks by President Trump in State of the Union Address,” February 5, 2019,https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-state-union-add
dress-2 (accessed February 5, 2021).

124

Contributors

CONTRIBUTORSFrank A. Rose
Senior fellow and Co-director, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology in theForeign Policy Program, The Brookings Institution, former Assistant Secretary of State
for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance.
Hirofumi Tosaki
Senior Research fellow, Center for Disarmament, Science and Technology, The Japan
Institute of International Affairs.
John Rydqvist
Deputy Research Director, FOI.
Naomi Koizumi
Former Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, NDA.
Masahiro Kurita
Research Fellow, Regional Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies.
Johan Englund
Analyst, Asia and Middle East Program, FOI.
Hideya Kurata
Professor/Director, Department of International Relations, Center for Global Security,
NDA.
Jerker Hellström
Director, Swedish Center for China Studies, former Deputy Research Director, FOI.
Takeshi Watanabe
Senior Research fellow, Regional Studies Department, National Institute for Defense
Studies.

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