China and Major Powers in East Asia
CHU Shulong
Professor, Institute of Strategic Studies
School of Public Policy and Management
Tsinghua University

Prepared for Workshop on“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”
Hiroshima Peace Institute
Hiroshima, Japan
March11-12, 2004

Chu

China and Major Powers in East Asia

2China is one the major players in Asian economy and politics, and China’s
relations with other major powers such as the United States, Japan, and Koreas always
are the strategic foundation of Asian security.

China and the United States

1. The Current Status of the Sino-US Relations: The Best Time in Thirty Years?
There has been a high words and remarks on the Sino-US relations in recent
years since the two sides end up their disputes on the EP-3 incident in June 2003 andsince September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in New York and Washington. The highwords are even higher from the American side, for the Secretary State Colin Powelland other high level administration officials regarding the relationship “at best time inthirty years since President Nixon visited China” in 1972.1
However, there has been almost no Chinese responding the Secretary’s nicewords on the relationship. Officially, the Chinese government has given a positive
assessment on the current bilateral relations with the United States in the past three
years. The Chinese President Jiang Zemin, in later 2002 when he was still thepresident of the country, even regarded the relationship having gone into a “new stageof stable and constructive development.”2
The real assessment on the relationship, from the Chinese view if not so from
American view, is the basic satisfaction on the recent development and still great
suspicion on the direction and long-term future.
When talking about the current situation of the relationship, both leaders andofficials in Washington and Beijing have said it is “good.” Is good for what? Nobody
answers it quite clearly. They said clearly it is a good relationship between the two big
countries in the world, but nobody says what the relationship is. Or in other words, no1
Ren Minjun: “Qian Qichen Points Out that Sino-US Relations Should Be Better,” Renmin Ribao (People’s
Daily), November 7, 2003, p.3.
2
“Jiang Zemin Met with American Guests,” China Daily, December 12, 2002, p.1.

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leaders and officials of both sides can give a clear saying about the nature anddefinition of the Sino-US relations today and in the future.
Both sides say it is a good relationship. But is it a friend relationship? Nobody
says it clearly and continuously. Is a kind of alliance? Everybody says no. Then whatis the nature or what a sort of the Sino-US relations? Nobody knows. And ifeverybody is not clear about current situation of the relationship, then how about the
future? Again nobody is certain. Nobody is sure about nature and direction that the
Sino-US relations would be in the long term future, in ten, fifteen or twenty years
from now.
Then, what is the problem?

2. The Real Problems between China and the United States
American China Strategy. At least to almost all the Chinese, the real andfundamental problem in the Sino-US relations is American problem, is American
China strategy problem. To the Chinese, there has always been a shadow over the
relations between the two countries and that is the illness of American strategy toward
China.
To be fair, even to those Chinese, there is a positive part of American China
strategy. The Chinese leaders, officials, officers, scholars and general public have seen
the “engagement” part of American China strategy in the post-Cold War era. They see
the increasing ties between the two economies, huge amount of bilateral trade andAmerican investment in China, various consultation and cooperation on many areasand issues between the two countries. Those positive parts of the relations areimportant to the Chinese understanding about the Sino-US relations now and in the
future.
However, many Chinese would argue that the bad or negative part ofAmerican China strategy is more important or the most important part of the strategy,
because that is the real and fundamental part. What is that? The Chinese leaders,
officials, officers, scholars and general public have given some different wording.

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Some say it is “containment,” others argue is “constrainment,” and still others would
say it is “westernization,” “separation,” “blocking the rise of China” and many otherwords.
Many Chinese believe that the negative part, containing China or at least
checking China, is the real intention and goal of American China strategy andAmerican relations with China. In this assessment, engaging and cooperating with
China is only tactical, is to serve American national interests. And containing or
constraining China is of the strategic design, serves fundamental and comprehensive
values, goals of American global strategy, including American strategy in Asia.

Americans also have same sort of “strategic suspicion” on China’s grandstrategy. And to those “China threat” believers, the real and final China’s strategic
goal in dealing with America and other parts of the world is undermining American
global role, kicking Americans out of Asia, and seeking China’s own domination in
Asia and the world.

Taiwan Issue. If anybody argues that the Chinese strategic suspicion about
American China strategy is groundless, then here is the major part of those Chinese
evidences, and this is Taiwan issue, or in order words, American policy and position
on Taiwan issue. Although the United States has cut off its diplomatic relations with
Taiwan and repeated its statement of “one China policy,” the continuing arms sale to
Taiwan, the official contacts, including increasing military to military contacts
between the U.S. and Taiwan, and those statements such as “protect Taiwan” stated by
the President on April 24, 2001, all strengthen the Chinese suspioun that the real partof United States’ Taiwan policy is to keep China divided, or divide further bysmphasizing and encouraging Taiwan’s independent movement.
And Taiwan is a fundamental and critical national sovereignty and security
issue to China. Therefore, it is nature for the Chinese military, the people and thegovernment to regard Taiwan’s independent movement and its backing force, the“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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United States, if not also Japan, including the possibility of American military
involvement in Taiwan issue, as the major threat to China’s national security andunity.

Besides Taiwan, other issues in the Sino-US relations, such as non-proliferation,
trade, human rights, religious freedom, democracy, are basic and long-term troubles
between the two countries, but they are not fundamental national interest issues, atleast to the Chinese.

3. Future Perspectives
The changing Chinese foreign policy principle is a positive factor in today’s andfuture Sino-U.S. relations, because China no longer put anti-hegemony as its major
theme of foreign policy. This means China’s foreign policy will be less anti-Americanor even be less focusing on the United States. However, the nature and future
Sino-U.S. relations remain uncertain because the relationship is two-side story, it does
not only depend on the Chinese side. The positive change of Chinese foreign policy
does not automatically lead to more positive bilateral relations between China and theUnited States. The relationship also, and even much more depends on American China
strategy and overall American foreign policy today and in the future.
On the U.S. side, the development does not look quite positively. While there
have been clear and strong evidences that Chinese foreign policy is changing into
more constructive direction, there has been little evidence that American China policy
and American foreign policy has been moving into positive direction.
In fact, there is hard anything really and substantial new in U.S. China policy
since the “9/11.” There has been change in agendas, topics, formats, and tactics inAmerican relations with China and other countries. In the past two years since the
9/11, Americans have emphasized anti-terrorism in its relations with China and othercountries. It demands and needs the cooperation with China and other countries in its
war against terrorism. And the result is common language and interests become a“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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mainstream in U.S. foreign relations with China and some other countries in the worldin the past two years.
However, those are tactical not strategic change. American leaders and officials
have made this very clearly in the past two or three years.

In many statements givenby the President, Vice President, Secretaries of Defense, States, National Security
Adviser and other high level officials, American side have made clearly that the newpriority of counter-terrorism does not mean American view, strategy and policy
toward outside world has changed very much. As China is concerned, American view
about China, policy goal towards China, positions on major issues with China such as
Taiwan, human rights, non-proliferation, remain same or similar today as they were
two or three years ago.
Therefore, the change of Chinese foreign policy principle is not strong enoughto ensure a better relationship between China and the U.S. today and in the future. The
long-term Sino-U.S. relations remain uncertain because American China strategy andpolicy remains uncertain, if not remains basically negative and hostile.

China and Japan

China and Japan are real Asian giants. However, the relationship between the
two Asian giants has not been in a satisfactory shape for more a hundred years sincelate 19th century.

1. Economic Cooperation and Political Stagnation
The economic ties between China and Japan have been expending all the timein the past decades, especially in the past years. Japan has been the largest trade
partner to China in the past decade, according to official China’s statistics, and Japan’s
trade value with China bypassed the United States in 2002, making China the largest
trade partner of Japan. Bilateral trade reached US$ 133.6 billion, up around 31% thenthe previous year. Japanese investment in China also expend heavily in recent years.

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Besides, Japan offers most official development aid (ODA) to China, Japanese areamong the largest resources of foreign visitors come to China each year. In 2003 alone,
there were about 4 million Japanese paid their trips to China.1
However, while the economic ties between the two countries are strengthening,
the political atmosphere has been decay. The general public in two societies becomesless friendly with each other. People in both countries become tired with the morethen five decade long issues of “history.” Governments of the two countries become
hostages of their negative public mood and opinion, and thus become more rigid on
those differences issues between them.
In order words, the two giants in Asia are becoming bond together in economic
area and at same time, alienating further with each other in political areas.

2. The Problems between China and Japan
Compared with the Sino-US relations, people find the tones, atmosphere areless positive but actually fewer problems in the Sino-Japanese relations. Or in otherwords, the real problems between China and Japan are far less serious and numerous
then they are appeared to be.
History and Public Resentment. The most serious problem between China andJapan is conceptual or emotional issue, it is not a real national interest issue. The issue
or issues are all about history, about how to say about the history between 1931 and1945 when Japan invaded and occupied China, causing Chinese people great
sufferings, including lost of hundreds and thousands of lives, including the massacrein Nanjing and other Chinese places.
History is important for the past, today and future, but history is history.
Chinese and Japanese should not live under the historical shadow for ever, or for too
long. History causes emotion to too many people, but it is not a fundamental national
interest issue. It was national interest issue at the war time because it was live or die
issue, but it should not be live or die issue today. People of the two countries should
1Those figures are coming from Lu Kejian’s article: “Reading the US$ 130 Billion – The Sino-Japanese
Economic and Trade Relations in 2003,” Renmin Ribao, January 5, 2004, p.7.

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not forget the history and should learn lessons from the past, but they should not livein the past.
Regional Competition? The more substantial, strategic and long-term problem
between China and Japan might be the sense and the fact of regional competition. The
two Asian giants did engage competition in Asia for hundreds of years in modern
times. They may still in competition in the area of economic development andregional influence now and in the future.
Competition may be inevitable, but it is nature and normal. The real issue
here is how to view competition and how to manage the competition.

3. Future Perspectives
As two large economies in Asia and almost as neighbors, the economic ties
between China and Japan are definitely to be stronger. This is the foundation of the
Sino-Japanese relations, and it is the common interest of both nations and people ofthe two countries. This is an inevitable trend between China and Japan.
Therefore, the coolness of public feeling and opinion in the two countries, theconceptual and emotional problem on history will have limited impact on the real
picture of long term Sino-Japanese relations. The real issues lie between the two
Asian giants will be how to manage their competition in the region. Competition
include economy and security/regional influence. In the interdependent and globalized
world, it is possible for the two countries to find the way to manage their competition.
And regional mechanism/institution such as the growing APEC (Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation) and ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) or APT (ASEAN Plus
Three) my develop as the solution, to provide the framework and structure forcountries to play their role in regional affairs.

China and US-Japan Security Alliance

China’s relations with either Japan and the United States in Asia cannot be“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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China and Major Powers in East Asia9purely bilateral, because of the interactions of major powers and because U.S.-Japansecurity alliance.

1. The Chinese Acceptance and Suspicion
The bilateral security alliance between the United States and Japan has been
one the most controversial security/political issue among the three major powers in
the region. This was a conflicting issue in some period of Cold War era, and it seems
become more serious since the end of the Cold War in late 1980s and early 1990s,
especially since the signing of the Guidelines of U.S. and Japan Security Cooperationin 1996 between the two countries.
China takes U.S.-Japan security alliance as a major threat to its national
security because it sees the target of the such security/military alliance in the
post-Cold War era is China, as it used to be the Soviet Union and China in the Cold
War era. And the specific linkage between the threat and possible real conflicts
between China and the allied countries is Taiwan, because both Japanese andAmerican leaders and officials state that Taiwan is within the “area of concern” or“area of responsibility” of US-Japan security cooperation and alliance.
Therefore, the Chinese leaders, officials, officers and scholars attacked the
US-Japan security alliance heavily in middle and late 1990s, regarding the alliance as
major threat to China and major obstacle for multilateral security cooperation in Asia.
But in past few years, the Chinese critics on US-Japan security alliancebecome fading. This does not mean that China becomes to accept the alliance system
in Asia, it means that China cannot do too much to change the system and thus Chinamight have to live with the system.
However, it does not mean China support or accept the system. China may
never accept the US-Japan security alliance as a positive or legitimate security
structure/mechanism in the region of Asia, because the bilateral nature and theexclusiveness of the system.
Strange enough, that as China does no show any flexibility toward the“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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US-Japan security alliance in Asia, it has shown some flexibility and acceptancetoward American military presence in west Pacific and Asia based on those bilateral
security system between the U.S. and Asia-Pacific nations, including Japan.
In recent years, the foreign ministry and officials in China tend to state that
American military presence in Asia has been “a historical phenomena.” This could
mean that Chinese government recognizes the rationale or reason for American
maintaining troops in Asia and accepts the military presence. In a number of official
talks between Chinese and American government officials, including some high leveltalk, the Chinese side has made clearly to their American counterparts that China has
no intention to challenge American military presence in the Western Pacific and East
Asia and China does not oppose American military presence in the region.

2. China and the Limitation of US-Japan Security Alliance
Even China sounds to accept American military presence and some American
security role in Asia, there looks no way for China to accept U.S-Japan security
alliance system and any role it wants to play in regional security.
First is because China does not accept Japan to play a regional security role,no mater Japan does it unilaterally or bilaterally with somebody. The historicalmemory on the time when Japan tried to play the regional security role before andduring the World War II prevents Chinese and Koreans from accepting Japaneseregional security role, again unilaterally or bilaterally. It is one thing to ask the
Chinese to forget the history, but it is quite another thing to ask the Chinese to accept
a regional security role of Japan’s military.
Secondly, it is almost impossible for China to accept that U.S.-Japan security
alliance as the guarantee of regional security in Asia. American and Japanese officials
always state that their security alliance has played such a role and has been a“cornerstone” and contributed to regional security in Asia. No matter whatever they
say and whatever the rationales behind the statements, the Chinese government,
military and people will never buy it and never accept it. Because if a bilateral“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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arrangement between two countries serves as a regional security mechanism, where is
the role of the most of other countries in the region? And who can guarantee thesecurity interests of the countries who are not parts of the bilateral alliance?
Therefore, the U.S.-Japan security alliance will never have the legitimacy to
become a structure/mechanism/arrangement for the regional security in Asia, at least
to the Chinese. Besides the Chinese resistance, other countries will also have thedifficulty to recognize the regional role of such a bilateral alliance, even most of themwelcome some roles the alliance system playing in the region.

China and the Two Koreas

By traditional standards, Koreas are not major powers in Asia and in the world.
However, if one looks at the economic and military strength of the two Koreas, oreven only one Korea in the south of the peninsula, one should recognize that Republicof Korea is a major power in Asia and an united Korea is going to be another major
power in Asia and in the world in future, economically if not also militarily.

1. China and DPRK
Beside Iraq, another hard evidence to indicate the major shift of China’s
foreign policy is North Korea.
In more then five decades since the foundation of PRC in 1949 till very
recently, the stated Chinese position on anything of North Korea had been clearlyand consistently. When stated about DPRK (The Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea), the Chinese government always stated its support and sympathy with the
Korea. China never criticized North Korea in its public statements given by its
leaders, officials and official news media. China might remain silence toward
anything that North Korea did that the Chinese did not like.
However, it is no longer the case now.

Since the new Korean nuclear crisis

breaking out in October 2002 when North Korea leaders telling the visiting U.S.

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Assistant Secretary Mr. James Kelly that the country is developing nuclear weapons,
the Chinese government changes its position on Korean issues. This time, from
October 2002 to now, the Chinese government does not support North Korea, nor
keep silence on the actions that North Korea taking and the Chinese do not like.
Since October 2002, all Chinese leaders, old and new, and Chinese Foreign Ministry
officials have repeatly stated: China supports non-nuclearization of Korean Peninsula,
the Korean Peninsula should not have nuclear weapons; all the relevant parties
should honor the agreements, clearly refer to the 1994 US-DPRK Framework
Agreement and NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) that North Korea has joined. The
Chinese leaders and officials even go far to state that China opposing thedevelopment of nuclear weapons on Korean Peninsula. This may be the first time inmore then half a century that China publicly states that is opposing something that
North Korea is doing. Although at the same time the Chinese government states thatthe security concerns of North Korea also should be addressed, and China does notsupport military actions and sanctions against North Korea.1
The new Chinese position on North Korea has number of rationales, and oneof them is because the change of fundamental theme of China’s foreign policy.
Because that policy is nor longer opposing hegemonism, then the nuclear issue
between DPRK and the U.S., and other issues between the United States and othercountries are nor longer view as something between hegemony action and thesuffering party of hegemonism. Thus China does not need and should not
automatically oppose American position in international affairs, because American
positions are no longer viewed as all the hegemonism through the Chinese eyes. Andeven they are hegemony actions, the Chinese need not always oppose them because
opposing hegemonism is no longer the major task of the Chinese foreign policy.

1

The official Chinese statements on North Korean nuclear issues since October 2002 can be seen from thefollowing reports: Meng Yan: “Tang, Powell Talk about DPRK Issue,” China Daily, January 10, 2003, p.1; Guo
Nei: “China Backs Non-Nuclearization of Peninsula,” China Daily, January 16, 2003, p.1; Hu Qihua: “Hopes for
Peace Still Exist,” China Daily, February 28, 2003, p.1; and “Restraint Called for after DPRK Missile Test,”
China Daily, March 12, 2003, p.1.; Jiang Zhuqing: “DPRK Shows Resolve On Nuclear Talks,” China Daily,
October 31, 2003; and Hu Xiao: “Six-Party Talks To Resume in June,” China Daily, March 1, 2004, p.1.

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2. China and ROK
Sino-ROK relations have developed dramatically in the short period of elevenyears since establishing diplomatic relations in 1992. China and ROK have become
major trade partner with each other, with China becomes the largest one to ROK, andROK becomes the fifth largest trade partner to China. Trade value between the twocountries reached US$53 billon in 2003. South Korean business has invested close to
US $20 billion in China1, and millions of Koreans and Chinese go each other country
as visitors and tourists each year. There are more then 45,000 South Korean students
studying at Chinese universities, making it largest foreign students’ group in China.2
The Sino-ROK relations can be said as a short of “problem free” relationship.
There is almost no Taiwan, non-proliferation, human rights, security problems in theirrelations. The two countries have some sort of trade deficit, and small trade wars inrecent years, but they are marginal compared with the overall rapidly growing ties
between the two countries. Besides strong economic, social, and cultural ties, the twocountries also engage in military exchange, security dialogue and consultation on
Korean Peninsula issues, including North Korean nuclear issue.

3. China and Future Korean Peninsula
When united, Korea will not only become another major power house in Asia,
but will also have bigger role in major power relations and whole international
relations in Asia.
The future perspectives on the Sino-Korean relations have many reasons to be
optimistic. Because China and Korea have enjoyed close relations in thousands ofyears in history, and there have been strong social and cultural ties between the twosocieties. Besides, economic ties between the two sides are bond to be growing everstronger, and the two countries will be tied together economically, culturally, sociallyand geographically as immediate neighbors. Besides China, no other major countries,
including Russia, Japan, and the United States, have had or could enjoy such a kind
1
2

Zhan Xiaohong: “The Love and Hate of the Sino-ROK Economies,” Nan Feng Chuang, January 1, 2004, p.53.
The number was at the time of 2002, see Nan Feng Chuang, January 1, 2004, p.52.

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relationship with Korea.

China’s Foreign, Asian Policy and Regional Security

When talking about the relations between China and other powers in Asia, wehave to be keep in mind that the driving force of those relationships are not matters
between them, but the rationales and thinking, strategies and policies of theconcerning powers. And as to China, those values, thinkings, theories, and strategies
on foreign relations are under the process of great changing.

1. The Changing China’s Foreign Policy
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been the single ruling party in China
since 1949, and the party congress normally holding every five years is the mostsignificant political and policy event in the Chinese politics, because usually it is thetime that the Chinese leadership and even policy change. The significance of the party
congress to the Chinese politics is as great as the shift of the White House to
American politics and policies in every four or eight year.
In the arena of foreign policy, the 16th CCP Congress held in November 2002
did make a major or even fundamental change. Such a change has already affected
China's foreign policies on specific issues in international relations such as Iraq andNorth Korean nuclear issues. The change looks like setting somewhat new directionof China's foreign policy in the early of the 21st century.
When somebody reads the report given by Mr. Jiang Zemin, then the generalsecretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, to the delegates of the
16th party congress on November 8 of 2002, she or he may not notice too muchchange of the Chinese foreign policy. Large part of the statement is almost similar
with the 15th party congress and those statements made by the Chinese leaders andofficials in the past years.
However, there is one major shift in the statement of the Chinese foreign“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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policy, and this is the Zongzhi (the fundamental principle) change.
Mr. Jiang Zemin's report at the 16th party congress states that:

No matter how the international situation changes, we will, as
always, pursue the independent foreign policy of peace. The
purpose of China's foreign policy is to maintain world peace andpromote common development. We are ready to work with allnations to advance the lofty cause of world peace and development.
1This statement on the fundamental principle and goal of the Chinese foreign
policy is significant change because it is different from past statements.
The previous statements made at the 15th, the 14th, the 13th and the 12th
party congresses in the past twenty years since 1982 always put "opposing
hegemonism and maintain international peace" as the fundamental principle and goalof China's foreign policy.2

The 16th party congress is the first time in the twenty

years that the Chinese leadership states at the most important occasion that the
Chinese foreign policy goal and the fundamental principle is no longer "opposing
hegemonism" or somebody but is "maintaining world peace and promoting mutual
development."3
When we look back, we may find such a shift is not an only fundamental
change in the past twenty years since the 12th party congress, but it is also a majorchange in more then fifty years since the foundation the Peoples' Republic of China(PRC). For in the past fifty years since 1949, the PRC's foreign policy had always
been "opposing" somebody or something. It opposed the imperialism led by America
in the 1950s and fought a hot war with America in Korea from 1950 to 1953. It
opposed both the imperialism and “revisionism” or "social imperialism" led by theSoviet Union in 1960s and 1970s. China supported the Vietnamese fighting against

1“Jiang Defines Theme of CPC Congress,” China Daily, November 9, 2002, p.3.
See Hu Yaobang’s report at the 12th, Zhao Zhiyang’s report on the international situation and foreign policy
section at the 13th, Jiang Zemin’s report at the 14th and 15th CCP party congresses, documents published byRenmin (Peoples’) Press in Beijing: 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997.
3
Ibid.
2

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Americans during the Vietnam War, had a number of serious border clashes with theSoviet Union in the 1960s. China engaged a strategic cooperation with the UnitedStates in opposing "the most dangerous superpower," the Soviet Union, in the 1970s
and 1980s. And after the June 4th Tiananmen Event in 1989 and the collapse of theSoviet Union in 1991, China's foreign policy against "hegemonism" became
retargeting the United States again.
It looks like that the "Fan Culture" or "opposing culture" had been thestrategic culture in China's foreign policy and foreign relations for long time since
the foundation of the PRC till the 16th party congress in November 2002. Thechange of the "Zongzhi" and fundamental goal of China's foreign policy also means
the shift of China's strategic culture in its foreign policy and foreign relations.
Therefore, it is really a fundamental change.
Is the shift a real change? The answer should be yes when we see thechanging Chinese policies on major international relation issues today.
Iraq issue is not new to China and to the world. It has been aroundinternational community for more then decade since 1990 when Iraq invaded andoccupied Kuwait. In the past thirteen years, Chinese position on Iraq issue haschanged somewhat. The government of China stood against Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait and demanded Iraq withdraw its troops from Kuwait and restore thesovereignty of the nation. But China voted for absence when the United Nations
passed the resolution to authorize the use of force against Iraq in 1990.
After the first Gulf War in 1991 and till recently, the Chinese position became
criticizing American military action in Iraq. China opposed the setting up of the“non-ply zones" in northern and southern Iraq, and condemned American and British
bombing against Iraq in 1996 and 1998. China supported the lift of sanctions against
Iraq before the second Iraq war in 2003 when the inspections and investigations on
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) had made progress. Chinese sympathy seemed
shifting to Iraq side after the first Gulf War in 1991.
However, when the new crisis over Iraq issue developing since early 2002, the“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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Chinese government position took another turn. This time the Chinese government
neither supports nor opposes US/UK sponsored resolution against Iraq and longplanned operation attacking Iraq. China's position seems to be neutral. It repeatedly
states its two-side position on the Iraq issue before the second Iraq war in March andApril 2003. On one side, the Chinese said that Iraq must comply with the United
Nations resolutions which requiring Iraq to give up its programs of weapons of mass
destruction, Iraq must accept and cooperate with the UN inspection term in Iraq toensure that the country did not develop the weapon systems. At the same time, theother side of Chinese position is that the UN should lift its sanctions against Iraq
when the inspection had made progress, Iraq’s sovereignty should be respected, andIraq issue should resolved by peaceful means only and should be within theframework of the United Nations.1 This is to say that China does not support
American plan and action of using forces against Iraq.
The Chinese two-side position is not new. What is new is that China did not
oppose American/British military action in Iraq this time in spring of 2003. Many
countries, including American alliances France and Germen, and Russia stoodagainst military action in Iraq. But China, a non-alliance and a non friend of theUnited States, did not say no to military action before the war, during the war andafter the war.
The Chinese position of not opposing American military action against othercountries is something new in the past decade since the first Iraq War in 1991.

In

more then a decade before recently, China stood against almost all American military
actions against other countries except Afghanistan.

China condemned American

action in Panama, Bosnia, Libya, and Kosovo in the past decade. The only exception
is the military action in Afghanistan after the 9/11. The Chinese government did not
only oppose but even also supported American action in Afghanistan because this is1

The Chinese positions are stated with the following states: Zhao Huanxin: “Political solution Urged for Iraq
Issue,” China Daily, January 31, 2003, p.1; “Tang Reiterates Position on Iraq Issue,” China Daily, February 5,
2003, p.1; “Jiang: UN Role Vital,” China Daily, February 12, 2003, p.1; “Weapons Probes Must Go On: Tang,”
China Daily, February 15, 2003, p.1; “China Opposes New UN resolution on Iraq,” China Daily, March 10, 2003;
and “Top Legislators and Advisers Urge: ‘Stop the Iraq War’,” China Daily, March 22, 2003.

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the war against terrorism. In all other occasions, China opposed the United States touse military forces against other countries.
The changing position of China on American military action this time is an
hard evidence that Chinese foreign policy has changed, the change stated by the 16th
party congress. That is China no longer taking position against hegemonism as thecentral theme of Chinese foreign policy. China may not like and does not support
American military action in Iraq, but the Chinese did not feel that they should oppose
Americans because opposing somebody no longer playing a central role in the
Chinese foreign policy, the principle set by the 16th party congress.
If the above argument that there is a major foreign policy change at the 16th
party congress is the real case, then the question following that will be why there isthe change?
To be sure, the change of the Chinese foreign policy is not incidental. It is an
accumulate and evitable step caused by the development in China and world in thepast twenty years.
The change is significant because the driving forces behind the change are so
fundamental and significant. It is an economic, social, cultural and a systemic change
inside China in the past two decades of development.
The forces are strong in China, and therefore the change will be stabilized.
The Chinese economy is likely to keep rapidly growth for another decade or two,
mainly because the consumers’ revolution and the strong domestic demand. Although
Chinese economy has lot of difficulties and problems, such as unemployment,
agriculture, state enterprises, bad loans, those difficulties are not new and they did notprevent China from rapidly development in the past twenty years, and they may notprevent China from keeping development in another twenty years.
What is more significant to the Chinese foreign policy is not just its economic
basis. The most important factor affecting China’s foreign policy is the changing
mind-set and thinking of Chinese people, including Chinese leaders.
The revolutionary generation has gone, and so the Soviet-trained generation“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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such as Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Li Lanqing. The people who are in charge in China
now at all the levels are the generation growing during the past twenty years of reformand openness. This generation knows little about revolution and the Soviet model ofsocialism. What they know is reform and openness that they have experienced during
the past twenty years.
The new generation comes to power with new thinking. They are better
educated with modern natural and social sciences. The know more about the today’s
world then their parents’ generation. They are much more open, flexible, democratic
then the old generation of Chinese people, especially the old leadership like Jiang
Zemin. Although the new leadership has been in power for only little bit more then ayear, it has showed lot differences from its previous one.

Their new thinking andway of governance can be seen from China’s news media coverage about Iraq War,their management on SARS, and their foreign trips recently.
These positive trends will be continuing because Chinese people and society
are new. No one likes the old way, old thinking about personal life, about community,
about country and the world. People are better educated, access more information
about the world, become more well-off, care more about individual rights andfreedom, and share more common values with the international community. The
country and society become more developed, market oriented, and rule of law.
Those are the fundamental forces which drive China’s international andexternal policies and actions. The general trend of China is the country becomes more
integrated with the other parts of the world, including with the common values. China
is getting closer and closer with international community, and it becomes a more
responsible and powerful player in the world.
The change will continue but not going to be overnight. The change will belong term development, but it will also be gradual. Most of the old thinking about
world and China’s foreign policy stays with ordinary Chinese, rather then Chinese
leaders, foreign policy officials and expert community. The Chinese general public
has little opportunity to know the real outside world. Their knowledge and view about“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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the world, about major powers such as the U.S., Japan, European countries, are still
very much old stories. Therefore, anti-Americanism, anti-Japanese, hard-line attitude
is still strong and common among Chinese general public. Such public opinion willcontinue to exercise some influence upon Chinese foreign policy. It puts pressure on
the government and restrains governmental actions in foreign and international
relations, especially during crisis when emotion is strong.

Another major development in China’s foreign policy thinking in the year is
the introduction the concept and thinking of “peaceful rise of China.”1 The ChinesePremier talked about the “peaceful path of rise China” and he said: “China today is acountry in reform and opening-up and a rising power dedicated to peace. China
tomorrow will continue to be a major country that loves peace and has a great deal tolook forward to.”2 “Peaceful rise of China” means while the Chinese leaders andpeople realize that the rise of China is on the way and is inevitable, then China does
not want to see the rise of the country will bring too much hurts to its neighbors andothers in the world, and the rise of China should not fall with the historical pattern ofconflicts between major powers. Therefore, the rise of China should be “peacefully.”

There is also something unchanged on the Chinese side too. Neither Chinese
people nor their government has changed anything on Taiwan. Taiwan’s independence
is still unacceptable to the Chinese people and their leaders, and national reunification
remains to be a grand dream and national goal of people in China.
To the Chinese people and their government, Taiwan is an internal issue.
However, it is also an important issue in China’s relations with the U.S., Japan andother countries in Asia and the world. Taiwan issue remains to be a fundamental parton which China judge other countries’ China strategy and policy. And the Chinese
people and government remain to be determined to fight with anybody in every frontof such a fundamental national sovereignty, security and reunification issue. This
1
2

Lu Hong and He Hongze: Wen Jiabao’s Speech at Harvard University,” Renmin Ribao, December 11, 2003, p.3.
Xing Zhigang: “China Picks Peaceful Path to Prosperity,” China Daily, February 20, 2004, p.5.

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position certainly will not always lead a better and positive relationship with theoutside world, especially with the United States in Chinese foreign relations andpolicies.

2. The New Asian Approach and Policy
The clearer cut of new thinking and new approach of China foreign policy
since the 16th Party Congress and new leadership has been in Asia. Or in other words,
there has been new thinking and new approach of Chinese diplomacy in Asia in thepast years.
In foreign relations’ practices, Asians see more active Chinese role in Asian
economic development and multilateral approaches on regional security and economic
cooperation. China in recent years become much more active player in APEC, ARF,
APT and almost all the regional approaches. In those multilateral activities, China
increasing becomes initiatives-giving rather then initiatives-accepting part. China now
not only gives more ideas, suggestions, initiatives to Asia, but also gives money,
material, and aid to many Asian countries in the crises of financial, terrorist attack,
SARS, flu, and nature disasters. China actively promotes China-ASEAN free tradearrangement and Mekong River development among Burma, Thailand, Laos,
Cambodia, Vietnam and China’ Yunnan, a big project supported by AsianDevelopment Bank.
Behind ever-active role of China in Asia comes with the new concepts andthinking of China’s Asian policy. Such a policy became more clear cut in 2003 when
the leaders and foreign policy officials stated that China’s Asian policy is “Yi Lin Wei
Shan, Yi Lin Wei Ban” (taking neighbors in kindness, and taking neighbors as
partners), and “Mulin, Fulin, Anlin” (good neighborhood, enrich neighborhood, andsecure neighborhood).1 In his governmental report to the People’s Congress session
recently, Premier Wen Jiabao stated China’s Asian policy: “We will continue ourpolicy of friendship and partnership with our neighboring countries, deepen

1“Wu Bangguo’s Speech at Asian Parliament Association Meeting,” Renmin Ribao, September 2, 2003, p.3.

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good-neighborly and friendly cooperation with all our neighbors and safeguard
regional peace and stability.”1

Conclusion: Major Powers’ Relations and East Asian Security

1. Regional Stability
The more then five decade long history in Asia in both Cold War andpost-Cold War eras has approved the following argument: that Asian security lies
heavily on major powers’ relations. Asia was an unstable place in Cold War times
because major powers engaged and involved conflicts in Korea, Indochina,
Southeast Asia and South Asia.
And when major powers have not engaged and involved conflicts in Asia,
regional conflicts become isolated and limited. Although Korean Peninsula is still thelasting hot-spot of Cold War style problem and even crises, it has not affected regional
security and stability too much because major powers have not used the conflicts,
instead they tried to work together to manage the problem. Thus as the result, East
Asia has become most peaceful place in the world since the end of the Cold War, evencompared with Europe, Middle East, Africa and South Asia.
Therefore, peace, stability and development of East Asia need major powers’
accommodation, consultation and cooperation. It needs major powers to manage theirdifferences or even conflicts in some areas such as Taiwan issue.

2. Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
As stated above, major powers relations may be the first and most criticalfactor for maintaining the peace and stability in East Asia, and it needs further efforts
among those major powers and other powers in the region, including multilateral
institutions. And the second most important factor might be the non-proliferation
efforts in the region and in the world.

1“Wen Highlights Jobs, Development,” China Daily, March 6-7, 2004, p.6.

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Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament become more and more
important for maintaining peace and stability in Asia because the facts that Asia has
become most proliferating area of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). IncludingSouth Asia, Asia now has more nuclear nations then any other continental, and thenumbers are likely to grow. Asians have the concrete problems to solve in arms
control and non-proliferation frontier. Besides continuing efforts on North Korean
nuclear issue, the smuggling of nuclear material, technology and other material of
WMD is serious security problem facing Asian nations. The smuggling materials may
be used by countries and groups such as terrorist organizations and individuals andcause heavy damages to people and countries in Asia. Asians should united and work
together systematically to deal with the problem.

3. Regional Security Mechanism
Asia does need a multilateral security arrangement/structure/mechanism tomaintain peace and stability in the region systematically, and to provide systematic
opportunity, to ensure the role for countries such as China and Japan to play in theregional affairs. Without such a multilateral security arrangement, major powers in theregion will continue to have suspions, resistance and even conflicts in regional
security affairs and in their international relations in Asia. A multilateral security
arrangement needs long time efforts, so the efforts should be making consistently.

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