RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56

PREVENTION AND REPRESSION OF CORRUPTION WITHINA LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
Michael A. DeFeo*
I. INTRODUCTION
My remarks today will begin with adescription of the FBI’s system of internal
investigation, discipline and ethics
instruction. Please understand that thismethod of presentation is not intended topresent the FBI system as a model to beimitated. Even if it were my intention to
persuade an audience to adopt one or moreelements of the FBI’s internal
investigative, disciplinary or ethics
instruction approach, the mostunpersuasive and counterproductive
argument possible would be an arrogant
assertion that our system is a model to becopied. In my opinion, the organizational,
legal and social realities between countries
are so different that a proposal to copy
another country’s system would be not only
insulting but also technically unfeasible.
We do believe that our system functions
well for us, but only because it is custom
designed to serve our agency populationand organizational culture, as any systemshould be. The reason why my remarks
first focus on the FBI system is that it isalways safest to begin a discussion with asubject you know well, and then to expand
the discussion from that point of departure.
Describing how the FBI conducts internal
investigations, imposes administrative
discipline and provides ethics instruction
to its employees will provide a convenient
frame of reference for discussing how otherlaw enforcement agencies address common* Assistant Director, Office of Professional
Responsibility, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US
Department of Justice, United States of America.

440

problems and how they solve them.
Because we are a multinational group,
it would be helpful to begin our discussion
with a comprehensive explanation of theFBI’s jurisdiction, to provide a context fora description of its integrity mechanisms.
Unfortunately, a comprehensive and logicalexplanation of that jurisdiction is not
feasible, because the allocation of law
enforcement responsibilities between thestate and federal governments in the
United States has developed as a result ofhistorical accidents, rather than in any
coherent fashion. Accordingly, the FBI is
responsible for an odd mix of violent crimes
and offenses against national sovereignty,
for espionage investigations and healthcare fraud offenses. Its drug trafficking
jurisdiction is shared with other agencies,
and it investigates brutality and corruption
by local police agencies.
In an effort to sort some sense out of avery confused jurisdictional situation, theFBI’s strategic plan establishes threepriorities. Primary importance is dedicatedto terrorist, espionage or organizedcriminal activities which threaten thenational security, such as computer
intrusions into sensitive systems.
Secondary importance is given to criminal
enterprises that impact significantly on
public safety or government integrity, suchas street gangs and public corruption. The
least emphasis is assigned to the crimes
traditionally associated with the FBI in the
popular imagination, which are crimes
against individuals and property, such as
kidnaping persons for ransom and bankrobbery.

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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The FBI currently has about 11,700
Special Agents with full law enforcement
powers and 16,800 non-law enforcement
personnel who perform clerical, technical,
scientific, legal or linguistic duties. Reports
reflecting disciplinary actions against ouremployees for Fiscal Year 1997 and 1998
have previously been distributed. Tosummarize their content, we investigate
about 500-600 employees each year forallegations of crime and serious
misconduct, screened from among
thousands of insubstantial or minor
complaints, which are left to our field orother headquarters divisions to address.
About half of those serious misconduct
inquiries are at least partiallysubstantiated, meaning that we investigate
about 2% of our employees per year anddiscipline about 1%. Among the mattersinvestigated, the incidence of criminalcases is low. 60% of our employees are nonagent support employees, with varying
degrees of skill and education, and anumber of those will be dismissed each year
for commission of state offenses, such astheft, assault and fraud. However, thenumber of such cases is probably less than
10 per year.
For agents, criminal offenses are
sometimes spectacular, but rare. One
agent murdered an informant/girlfriend in
the late 1980s. Others have been convicted
for stealing drug evidence, travel voucher
fraud, bribery and using informants tocommit cargo thefts. Counting bothoffenses prosecuted by state authorities
and crimes relating to corruption in office,which are investigated internally andprosecuted as federal offenses, only two to
three agents per year are prosecuted anddismissed. In the last three years we have
had highly publicized federal convictionsof three agents for crimes related to theirofficial positions: an agent who spied for
Russia for money; a supervisor in Miami
who stole $400,000 in seized currency andoperational funds to support his gamblinghabit; and a young agent in New Orleans
who tried to extort a drug dealer to support
his spending habits.
While not numerous, theseembarrassing prosecutions and the several
hundred administrative punishments
imposed yearly reflect that FBI
management does not suppress misconduct
for public relations motives. A criticism
alleged against former FBI Director
Hoover, during his tenure from the 1920s
to the 1970s, was that an FBI agent caught
committing a crime would be allowed toresign rather than be prosecuted, to avoid
embarrassing publicity which would
damage the image of the organization.
That is certainly no longer the practice, if
there ever was any truth to the allegation.
As a practical matter, we recognize that the
proportion of reported to unreported
misdeeds is an unknowable mystery. Whatis important to us is that, to the extent
misconduct does go unreported, the reason
is because it is concealed by the guilty
parties and not because of negligence,
tolerance or concealment by the institution.
The title of our course is “The Effective
Administration of Criminal Justice for thePrevention of Corrupt Activities by Public
Officials.” Corrupt and criminal activities
are at the low end of the range ofprobabilities for FBI employees because of
a number of integrity-reinforcing factors
and processes. Some of those factors andprocesses are criminal in nature and someadministrative, but they will be discussed
together in this presentation because weregard them as inseparably intertwinedmeans of preventing corrupt activities.
II. INTEGRITY REINFORCING
AND CONTROL FACTORS RELIEDUPON BY THE FBI
Among integrity-reinforcing features,the first which comes to mind is personnel
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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
selection. Despite the many otheropportunities available in a boom economy,
the FBI still receives 30 applicants forevery position, and enjoys a wealth ofchoice. Every applicant selected, fromentry level clerical staff and maintenanceworkers to senior executives, must undergoa full background investigation justifying
the granting of a security clearance. That
investigation includes criminal record andcredit checks, verification of family,
education and employment history, as wellas interviews of classmates, former coworkers, relatives, neighbors, ex-wives andformer romantic interests about thec a n d i d a t e ’ s h o n e s t y, r e l i a b i l i t y,truthfulness, work ethic, alcohol
consumption, drug use, and any
vulnerabilities. One condition of
employment is successful completion of apre-employment polygraph, or lie detector,
examination on issues such as drug use andcontacts with foreign intelligence services.
The age of new Agent Trainees now
averages between 29 and 30, depending on
the training class, so every one is a known
quantity with a proven record ofaccomplishments as a law enforcement or
military officer, as a professional in law,teaching or accounting, or in the fields ofb u s i n e s s , s c i e n c e o r t e c h n o l o g y.
Admittedly, even the most rigorous
background investigation cannot
guarantee good character, but it can ensurethat a candidate has achieved a successful
adult career without demonstrating bad
character, which is as good a predictor of
future conduct as can realistically beachieved.
Once an agent or support employee ishired into the FBI, it is very much in theirfinancial and psychological self interest to
avoid misconduct. A senior agent can earnmore than USD $75,000 per year in a
metropolitan area with a high cost of living,with salaries of $100,000 for a mid-level442

manager. Agents are eligible for retirement
at half pay at age 50 after 20 years ofservice, and can reach a maximum
retirement benefit near 80% with an
exceptionally long career. Few stay longer
than 25 years because they enjoy
outstanding prospects for a second careeror part-time employment in the business,financial services or private security fields
or in local law enforcement. Support
employees are also well compensated, andvalue the status conferred by theiremployment so much that many havecareers of 35 and even 40 years. Despite
cynicism in our society about mostinstitutions, employment by the FBI is still
one of the most respected occupations in
the United States and confers significant
social status on employees and theirfamilies.
Our employees almost universally dovalue and appreciate their positions, andfear the possible loss of both position andrespect. That fear is reinforced by therealization that our disciplinary systemdeals severely with any conduct which may
bring discredit on the institution, and isadmittedly draconian for integrity offenses.
We operate under what is called the BrightLine policy - that lying under oath,cheating, stealing and similar integrity
offenses, whether committed on or off duty,
are inconsistent with the values of the FBI
and can be expected to result in dismissal.
If an off-duty employee is caught stealinga small amount of merchandise in a store,
what we call shoplifting, and the evidence,such as a confession or a videotape, provesthat the employee committed attempted
theft, that employee will be dismissed, even
if no prosecution results. If an agent
commits an offense which normally would
be punished by a suspension from duty
without pay for five or 10 days, but thenlies about the facts during the disciplinary
inquiry, we will normally dismiss thatagent for having lied under oath, absent

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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some exceptional mitigating
circumstances. One drunken driving
offence, whether involving a government
or personally owned vehicle, results in asuspension of thirty days without pay, anda second offence results in dismissal.
Everyone knows the rules and demands
that they be enforced even handedly. Like
the Central Intelligence Agency and otherintelligence agencies in our government, weare exempt from the civil service laws
which can make it very difficult tosuccessfully discipline most of ourgovernment employees. With the exceptionof a small percentage of employees who
have combat military veteran status, ouremployees have no recourse to the courts
against a disciplinary action, including
dismissal.
Employees are required to reportwrongdoing and are disciplined for failure
to do so, particularly if they havesupervisory responsibilities. If thewrongdoing constitutes a possible crime,
we immediately inform a prosecution office
and warn all possible subjects that theyneed not talk to our investigators because
anything they say may be used as criminal
evidence against them. Once theprosecutors have decided that no criminal
prosecution is possible and the inquiry
focuses on whether administrative
discipline should be imposed, we compel
employees to respond to questioning underoath and will dismiss them for failure to
do so. We also regularly use polygraphexaminations in aid of both criminal andadministrative inquires.
The July, 1999 Report for the Fiscal Year1998 by the FBI’s Office of Professional
Responsibility, reveals that 301 employees
were disciplined, of whom 32 weredismissed. Of those dismissed, 11 wereSpecial Agents, or law enforcement officers,
and 21 were Support Employees, that is
non-law enforcement employees. 26

additional employees were terminated fordisciplinary reasons during their period ofprobationary employment or resigned or
retired after receiving notice of proposed
discipline. 32 dismissals and 26 other
involuntary departures from FBI service
total 58 persons, which is approximately
10% of the number of persons investigatedyearly.
Perhaps surprisingly, there is very little
employee protest against the system andpolicies which produce these results. One
reason why our employees accept such rigor
without complaint is that they take pridein their reputation and competence inholding citizens criminally responsible for
their actions and are not particularly
sympathetic to wrongdoing, even by theirco-workers. Collectively, if not always
individually, they consider it a point ofhonor to hold themselves and theircolleagues responsible for any deviationfrom established standards of integrity andperformance. They may sometimes
disagree with the sanctions we impose for
performance errors, for exercises of bad
judgment or violations of administrative
rules, but they are not in the least tolerantof intentional wrongdoing or dishonesty.
When we discuss disciplinary statistics
with our employees’ advisory andprofessional groups and explain that a highpercentage of dismissals involve integrity
offenses, their typical reaction is agreementthat we need to remove from theorganizations those persons who will not
uphold its standards and character.
Obviously, cleansing the ranks of dishonest
persons as soon as they demonstrate lackof character is far preferable to allowing
them to continue as employees until they
commit some criminal abuse of their office.
Referring again to the July 1999 reportfor Fiscal Year 1998, it reveals thatinquiries were initiated on 517 employees,
which is slightly less than 2% of the present

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
total workforce of 28,500 employees.
Inquiries were closed on 615 employees, ofwhom 301, or nearly 50%, received someform of discipline. Those 301 employees
represent approximately 1% of the total
employee population, meaning that the FBI
investigates approximately 2% of its
employees each year for crimes or serious
misconduct and imposes discipline on
approximately 1%. Among the 2% of the
population who are investigated, thestatistics demonstrate that the mostcommon offenses are administrative rather
than criminal violations. The mostcommon offense is unprofessional conduct,
which covers a multitude of sins nototherwise specified, such as becoming
involved in a traffic altercation anddrawing a weapon, or a domestic assault
not resulting in an arrest. The next mostfrequent offense category involved false or
inaccurate statements or documents, with
42 persons disciplined and four dismissed.
Another unfortunately common offense
was driving while intoxicated. 27 out of
the 31 persons investigated for driving
while intoxicated were disciplined, 25 ofwhom were suspended for more than 15days without pay and two of whom weredismissed. I should explain here, thatwhile we use this report for public
information purposes, its primary goal is
to educate our employees and thereby deter
misconduct. Statistics like those involving
driving while intoxicated are powerfularguments to persuade our employees tocontrol their alcohol consumption, because
drinking to excess is quite obviously a very
high risk proposition which will be treatedwith unforgiving discipline. Of course,
while excessive alcohol consumption may
lower inhibitions and lead to misconduct,
it is not in itself corruption, so you may askwhy is it being discussed in a lecture about
how to prevent law enforcement
corruption?

444

The answer is that the entire FBI
environment is focused on encouraging
conformity with clearly recognized
standards of integrity and professionalism,
enforced by detailed administrative
procedures and safeguards, so that deviant
behavior is immediately recognized andcorrected or punished, preferably before it
escalates to criminal conduct. We feel that
if we can succeed in motivating our
employees to observe the administrative
rules, both by appealing to their selfinterest and to their idealism, thencriminal or corrupt behavior will be so
unusual that it will quickly be recognizedand eradicated. Rather than concentrating
our resources on corruption once it occurs,
the traditional approach in the FBI has
been to identify and deter administrative
misconduct, such as falsification of reports
or covering up minor violations by coworkers, before they lead to or can be used
to facilitate corruption. Former Director
Hoover may have been a difficult
personality, but he was unquestionably an
administrative genius. During his nearlyfive decades heading the FBI he created aseamless, even obsessive, system of manual
provisions and performance and quality
controls. Particular attention is paid tocontrolling the riskiest operations weapons handling, dealing withinformants, seizing drugs, custody ofevidence and handling of money.
Immense resources are invested in the
Inspection Division. The inspection systemacts as a Headquarters control on local field
office’s supervisors and managers, auditing
and checking every important operational
and administrative aspect of a division’s
operation at least every three years, ormore frequently when warranted.
Particular attention is paid to areas ofpossible misconduct, once again using
administrative controls as an early
warning system and defense against
corruption and criminal conduct.

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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Informant payments are verified.
Financial and evidence audits are
performed. Outside contacts are made withjudges, prosecutors and local law
enforcement executives to uncover any
information which may have come to theirattention about misconduct or deficiencies
by our employees in the performance of
their duties. Both agents and support
personnel are interviewed and any
indication of sexual harassment,
mishandling of evidence, falsification ofrecords or concealment of wrongdoing isreported to our Office of Professional
Responsibility. While this comprehensive
system of controls and double and triple
checks has undoubted costs in
administrative resources, and arguable
costs in frustrated creativity, it produces
an immense integrity dividend, as I will
explain.
A commission which investigatedcorruption in the New York City Police
Department years ago categorized corrupt
officers as either grass-eaters or meateaters. The grass-eater designation wasused to refer to situational offenders, police
officers who knew right from wrong but
were weak-willed and engaged incorruption when exposed to temptation orpressured by corrupt associates. The meateater was the predator with no moral
scruples or conscience, who saw a law
enforcement position as a means to exploit
opportunities for profit, sex or other ego
gratification, and who often compromised
entire groups.
A rigid system of internal transparency
and close supervision serves as a defense
against misconduct by both types ofoffenders. The grass-eaters who mightyield to temptation when left to their own
devices, may, precisely because of theirmore malleable character, perform
creditably in a structured ethicalenvironment with clearly enunciated rules,

conscientious supervisory attention,
consistent disciplinary enforcement andpeer pressure from honest colleagues ofstrong character. The predatory meateater, on the other hand, is both identified
and made vulnerable by a comprehensive,well-supervised administrative system.
Carnivores need the freedom to roam. By
nature they are unlikely to have thepatience and self-control necessary to avoid
conflict with rigorous supervisory
enforcement of a multitude ofadministrative regulations. Ultimately
these meat eaters are likely to leave theorganization, sometimes voluntarily and if
necessary by dismissal, because theycannot conform to an environment
specifically structured to deny them all
those illicit pleasures which the predatory
animal seeks.
III. INTERNAL INVESTIGATION
AND DISCIPLINE
Turning now to a discussion of how our
Office of Professional Responsibility
performs its investigative and disciplinary
functions, our practice is to respond to any
specific and credible allegation of criminalor administrative wrongdoing. Sources
include citizen, judicial or legislativecomplaints, anonymous allegations,referrals from the Inspection Division,
reporting by management or individual
employees, accusations by hostile exspouses or lovers, or derogatory
information turned up during the
mandatory five-year security reinvestigation to which all of our employees
are subject.
If an allegation suggests that criminal
conduct is ongoing and merits a covert
inquiry, we utilize the operational
resources of the entire Bureau, bringing insurveillance squads and technicalassistance from distant offices to apply
whatever resources and tactics are

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
appropriate to resolve the allegation,
including electronic surveillance, ruses or
decoys. To furnish an example, we received
an allegation several years ago through adefense attorney in New Orleans,Louisiana that his client, a suspected drug
dealer, was being extorted by theinvestigating agent. We approach suchallegations with great care, because
defendants and their lawyers sometimes
fabricate them to provoke an internal
investigation which can be manipulated todamage the credibility of the investigatorat trial and cast suspicion on theprosecution. So that we cannot be easily
manipulated, or accused of rejecting
potentially meritorious allegations based
upon subjective judgements about their
credibility, we utilize a standard procedurein such situations. That procedure is to
first ask the person making the allegation
to voluntarily submit to a polygraph, or lie
detector examination, to screen out
unfounded complaints. In the New Orleanscase, even though this agent had a goodrecord and reputation and was not believed
to be engaged in any impropriety by the
management of that division, we followed
this standard procedure and requested thedrug dealer to submit to a polygraphexamination.
To our surprise, the drug dealer ’s
assertions that he had received
extortionate demands for money from ouragent showed no indications of deception.
We then made arrangements to monitor
telephone and personal contacts between
the witness and our agent. We brought ina surveillance aircraft and a special
surveillance squad from other cities, bothto limit knowledge of the investigation in
the local office and because the agent mightrecognize fellow agents conducting
surveillance of his movements. A scenario
was orchestrated at our direction in which
the drug dealer requested certain
confidential information from FBI files, the446

agent was recorded agreeing to provide thei n f o r m a t i o n f o r m o n e y, a n d a f t e r
overwhelming evidence was secured of his
corrupt efforts to secure the informationfrom our records and to trade it for money,
he was arrested, convicted and has been
imprisoned.
The reality in the FBI is that such meateater cases are rare. The vast majority ofthe misconduct we investigate is the
product of human frailty rather thanaggressive venality. Most inquiries arereactive and administrative rather thanconvert and criminal. In overt inquiries
we inform our employees promptly when
they come under investigation so that they
can secure the assistance of counsel, if
desired. Interviews are conducted underoath, and polygraph examinations are used
to eliminate suspects and to resolve
credibility issues, particularly because suchexaminations frequently result in pre-and
post-polygraph admissions of misconduct.
Our staff of approximately 70 in the
Office of Professional Responsibility
delegates all cases of minor misconduct and
75% of our inquiries into serious
administrative misconduct to field
divisions or to other headquarters divisions
for investigation. We feel that it would be
a waste of taxpayers’ money to send a teamfrom Washington to Chicago or Los Angeles
to investigate a drunken driving arrest ofa non-supervisory employee or the theft of$100 from someone’s purse. We reserve ourheadquarters investigative resources forcases in which the credibility or sensitivityof the inquiry requires that it be conductedwith independent resources, such as anallegation against a member of the
management of an office or involving
criminal activity.
Because we delegate cases to otherdivisions, and levy on field resources fromthroughout the country when we conduct

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERSa criminal inquiry, one must make certain
projections and calculations to estimate thetotal resources dedicated to the FBI’sinternal integrity program. Adding
together Headquarters personnel
dedicated exclusively to the disciplinary
function, the number of Headquarters’ andfield resources which we levy upon to
support our efforts, and the resources usedby the field and other Headquarters
divisions to handle delegatedinvestigations would yield a total of about
140 - 150 work years, or about half of one
percent of our total personnel resources.
We consider ourselves unusually
fortunate and believe that for the moment
our system seems to be working well andcost-effectively, insofar as we candetermine. The current scarcity ofdangerous internal criminality permits us
to concentrate resources on deterrence
without having to resort to tactics which
would erode employee support for our
integrity enforcement efforts. We conduct
random and reasonable suspicion drug
tests as a condition of continued FBI
employment, but we do not use random
integrity testing without some specificinvestigative predicate. By integrity
testing I mean such techniques as planting
information through an informant that a
particular apartment contains large
amounts of illegal drugs and money, andinstalling a concealed video camera to
determine if agents steal drugs or money.
We do not recruit convert agents-in-place
among New Agent Trainees or infiltratethem into the field divisions, both becauseof the considerable morale costs of suchtactics and their immense logisticaldifficulties. When agencies are tempted to
set up such programs, one must consider
the problems of documenting and reporting
intelligence and information, and of
disclosure risk. The longer such an
operation runs, and the more operatives it
utilizes, the greater the risk of compromise.

The costs of controlling that risk quickly
escalate once action is taken based on theinformation being generated or the
personnel who initially organized andoperated the program rotate out of internalaffairs duties into other operational ormanagerial assignments.
Nevertheless, our choice not to use suchtechniques up until now is not a moral
conclusion that such tactics might not benecessary if one had to confront pervasive
corruption. While we are always concerned
about the constant risk and sometimes
serious incidents which occur with drug
and undercover investigations, and withinformants and money, the FBI has simply
not yet experienced or perceived integrity
problems serious enough to persuade usthat random integrity testing tactics would
be cost-effective. We hope that vigilant
prevention will make recourse to
extraordinary tactics unnecessary, but if
the incidence of corruption escalated, wewould be compelled to consider more
dramatic remedies.
IV. COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION
At this point it may be helpful tocompare our system with how other
American law enforcement agencies deal
with comparable issues. With respect topersonnel recruitment and selection, theFBI is blessed with an unusually adequate
personnel budget which permits the hiringof persons with professional degrees. By
way of contrast, many police departmentsin the United States and elsewhere recruit
employees who have barely passed theirteenage years and have minimal
educational qualifications. Such hiring
policies by a police organization are notnecessarily inappropriate, because hiring
authorities have to balance the financial
resources provided by political authorities
with the available labor pool, the nature of
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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
factors. Nevertheless, the public and themass media should recognize that the lessselective a police organization can afford
to be in choosing its candidates, the more
integrity problems the community should
expect. Law enforcement agencies will
never be able to outbid drug organizations
for the loyalty of an officer, but to maintaintheir integrity they must be able to pay
salaries which allow them to build up acadre of persons with maturity anddemonstrated good character, who can set
a moral and professional example for theorganization.
A current concern to us in the FBI is theexperience of police departments whichhave encountered serious integrity
problems as a result of too much urgency
in hiring. This typically happens when abudgetary increase or resolution of alitigation dispute, which are unfortunately
common in our society, presents theopportunity or the need to hire a large
number of officers within a short period oftime, which several years later leads to anincrease in integrity problems among those
hired in haste. Because our Congress has
authorized the hiring of additional FBI
agents during the last several years tocombat domestic and international
terrorism and computer crime, we aretaking pains to identify and avoid thefactors which cause an increase incorruption and misconduct to result froma rapid increase in hiring. The mostobvious factor is that many departments
lower standards in order to secure enoughacceptable candidates quickly. We hopethat our increased hiring has been gradualand selective enough to avoid that risk.
However, we are also concerned that there
may be a more subtle risk, a form oforganizational indigestion which makes it
difficult for an institution to assimilate,train and properly indoctrinate new
recruits with its values if there are too
many recruits in comparison to the448experienced cadre. There are sociologicalstudies which speculate about whatpercentage of immigrants a country can
assimilate without social disruption andfriction arising from frequent clashes ofdiverse or inconsistent value systems andcustoms. We are similarly concerned about
the assimilation of large numbers of new
recruits, many of whom come in with yearsof experience in other law enforcement
agencies or the military, where they havealready formed certain values and habits.
Similarly, we are concerned in the FBI
whether we can do an adequate job
communicating and ensuring the adoptionof our existing value system when morethan 20% of our agent population have lessthan three years experience, and 35% haveless than five years experience. When
three or four new recruits are assigned to
an office with a complement of 100 agents
per year, it is relatively easy to find veteranagents with eight or 10 years experience
to serve as mentors, what we call a fieldtraining agent. That training agent has
the official responsibility to offer practical
instruction to the new recruit and tooversee their professional development.
Normally, that training agent and therecruit’s supervisor will be important
influences in communicatingorganizational culture and values. Finding
three or four experienced agents who also
are good moral examples to serve as
mentors is not difficult. However, when
the number of new agents to be trained
each year increases to six, seven or 10,
there are obviously fewer veteran agentsavailable who are not fully occupied withother duties, and correspondingly evenfewer veterans who can serve as
outstanding examples of both professional
competence and good character.
One response to this concern is our ethics
training program, which in the past wasadministered by our Training Division, but

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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early this year was placed under the
management of our Office of Professional
Responsibility. The purpose for thatchange was to better integrate our practicaldisciplinary experience into what we teachour recruits. FBI New Agent Trainees
undergo 16 weeks of law enforcement
training, and those 16 weeks include 16
hours of ethics instruction. We recognizethat one cannot teach an adult to be honest.
What we do communicate during our 16
hours of instruction are the ethicalstandards which are important to a federal
law enforcement officer and what ourduties are under our Constitution and ourlegal system. We insist that our agents
understand why society has authorized
them to lie in an undercover assignment
but not as a witness in court. We also try
to inform our employees about the practicalproblems they will face in reality, so thatthey will not make mistakes or becompromised through failure to foresee theconsequences of their actions.
We remind our agents that any personalor professional compromise with aninformant, such as accepting gifts orengaging in a sexual relationship, places
the agent at the mercy of that informant
or of others who may learn of therelationship. Some confidential sources are
sincerely motivated citizens, but those withthe most knowledge of underworld
activities are usually seeking personaladvantage by betraying their criminal
associates. It should come as no surprisethat a person who would betray theircriminal associates for personal advantage
would do the same to the officer who is theircontact in law enforcement. Consequently
we urge our agents to focus on the practicalrisk, as well as the moral consequences, ofallowing their integrity to be compromisedin any way by a personal relationship witha confidential source.

Similarly, we urge them to think ahead
and to discuss the thousand ethicaldilemmas which may arise in the course of
their career. It is not enough to avoid
personal wrongdoing. If colleagues falsify
the hour at which they begin or leave work,
should a new agent make a report to asuperior? Perhaps not, because we should
not concern ourselves with de minimis
violations, because the primary
responsibility for enforcing time andattendance rules lies with a supervisor, andbecause one agent may not know if
someone who leaves work early is being
given compensatory time off for a night
surveillance or extra-long work days, or has
experienced a family emergency. On theother hand, if colleagues falsify the chainof custody for a piece of evidence or testify
falsely in court, what should the new agent
do? If fellow agents or a police officer wereto strike a handcuffed prisoner, and thevictim filed no official complaint, whatshould an agent who witnessed the violencedo?
We want our people to think throughthese problems so they will not make awrong decision based on panic or a failure
to recognize what duties are paramount.
We attempt to educate them about what
ethical values are most important. We
would consider it normal that an agent did
not report another agent leaving work
early, absent some personal knowledge ofserious intentional abuse. Because ouragents work such long hours, particularlyin emergencies, even proof of an isolated
intentional abuse would normally beconsidered primarily a performance issue
to be addressed by the agent’s supervisor,
and we in the Office of Professional
Responsibility would not be greatlyinterested unless a pattern of abuseexisted. We insist, however, that ouragents recognize their individual andindependent responsibility to protect our
citizens and the integrity of our criminal

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justice system. That responsibility meansthat they must intervene to stop any clearly
unnecessary use of force, must immediately
report conduct which they believe may
constitute a falsification of evidence or
brutality by their colleagues, and that they
will be punished for failing to do so.
Returning to a discussion of differences
between FBI practices and those of otherlarge American law enforcement agencies,
a significant distinction exists with respect
to the staffing and conduct of internal
investigations. While the FBI’s Office ofProfessional Responsibility devises thestrategy for a corruption inquiry, selects theresources to implement that strategy,
oversees its tactical execution and normallyconducts the crucial interviews, we do nothesitate to levy upon operational assets
from our investigative divisions. That
approach differs from most American police
departments and other federal agencies,
which create wholly self-sufficient internal
investigative units. Such units are staffedwith sufficient personnel and resources,
including technical equipment andexpertise, to conduct investigations
without the knowledge or participation of
personnel from the operational divisions of
the organization. The United States Drug
Enforcement Administration and Customs
Agency Service have internal affairs field
offices distributed geographicallythroughout the country, and do not rely on
investigative assistance from operational
offices to the same extent as we do in the
FBI.
The FBI has never felt the need to createa standalone operational capability to
conduct disciplinary inquiries without theassistance of field resources for two
reasons. The first is that cases of serious,
meat-eater type corruption are stillcomparatively rare. It would not be costeffective to staff, equip and pay the travel
costs of a Headquarters surveillance squad

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or technical team to work four or fivecorruption cases a year, when that numberof cases can be staffed far more efficiently
by commandeering field resources fromanother office. The second related reason
is that we have no history of investigations
being jeopardized by security breaches
from within, resulting from the use ofresources borrowed from field divisions.
Utilizing the operational resources of theentire system is also consistent with ourorganizational philosophy, which regards
a vigilant response to any suggestion ofcorruption as an overriding responsibilityof every field and Headquarters division.
Even though our office exercises decisional
authority in an internal investigation, theoperational managers in our field divisions
normally want to be involved todemonstrate that they individually, and thedivisions which they head, are intolerantof any form of corruption.
Moreover, involving the management of
an FBI field division when we must conduct
an investigation of one of that division’s
employees parallels the way the FBI
approaches its responsibility to investigate
corruption in state and local police
agencies. The FBI functions as anoversight mechanism for other police
agencies because, by federal statutes, weare assigned the legal competence toinvestigate brutality and other abuses ofcivil rights. Moreover, almost any form ofpolice corruption would violate federal
racketeering, extortion, fraud, bribery orother laws. In combating police corruption,
our field divisions regularly encounter
situations wherein corruption involves anumber of police officers, and may reachup the chain of command within an
organization. In such circumstances, onemust assume that anyone in that agency
could be a potential conduit of informationback to the subjects of the inquiry, not allof whom would be known in the early
investigative stages. Despite that need for113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
secrecy and caution, our field executives
normally make great efforts to find atrustworthy representative of thatorganization at the executive level, or if
necessary at the political oversight level,
who can safely be notified of the existenceof the investigation, and who caneventually be given public credit forcooperating in the investigation.
You may ask, why is that symbolic
contact considered important? There are
a number of reasons to enlist someone at
the executive or political level of a target
agency. If a responsible executive can betrusted, the investigation thereby gains
information and access to the internalmechanics of the target group, which may
be crucial in creating investigative
opportunities, protecting evidence andwitnesses, and focusing the inquiry alongproductive lines. The courteous gesture of
sharing credit with a representative of theorganization whose members are being
investigated also helps to avoid or to heal
the resentment which otherwise may comefrom prosecution of well liked local police
officers and impede future cooperation withthat department or agency. Perhaps mostimportant, however, is the fact that sharing
credit with an honest representative of thelocal police agency expresses ourinstitutional belief that public confidence
is essential to the performance of a law
enforcement agency’s mission.
Even if a local police organization is
being investigated for systemic corruption
by an FBI field divisions, organizationally
we recognize that at the end of theprosecution, our agents will move onto
other cases, and that the local police
department will still be responsible forpublic security within its jurisdiction.
When the FBI is confronted with evidenceof corruption in a local police agency, it
would be foolish to expect spontaneousreformation. Outside intervention isnecessary, and aggressive tactics may berequired, including decoys, integrity
testing, surreptitious electronic
surveillance, forcing colleagues to spy on
and incriminate each other, and all thetechniques used to secure evidence against
ordinary criminals. Ultimately, however,that police agency needs to regain theconfidence of the citizens in its community
in order to gain their cooperation andassistance. Yet citizens cannot realisticallybe expected to have confidence in a police
force if they are led to believe that it istotally corrupt and that only the FBI orsome other outside agency can be trusted
to effectively confront its corruption. That
is why we try, whenever feasible, topreserve an image of cooperation with someelement or representative of a local police
agency being investigated, in order tocommunicate the message that there aretrustworthy elements within everyorganization in whom citizens can place
their confidence. Maintaining some degreeof public confidence in a police agency is
the first step toward its rehabilitation in
public opinion, which ultimately will benecessary for that agency to stand on its
own in protecting the community.
This approach of attempting to preserve
some degree of public trust in police
agencies whose officers are underinvestigation by the FBI is unquestionably
influenced by the reality that the FBI onlyintervenes occasionally against police
corruption in a given community. Our
oversight role is essentially episodic, a parttime endeavor with regard to any
particular community or police agency,
because we are a general purpose law
enforcement body with many other
responsibilities and priorities. We also
recognize, however, the emergence of atrend in other contexts toward singlepurpose control agencies with the full-time
mission to monitor, displace or even totallyreplace the internal integrity mechanisms

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of a particular police organization. Oftenmodeled on the Hong Kong Independent
Commission Against Corruption, theseagencies may also have powers of public
education and program auditing for thepolice and other government agencies. In
Australia, the Police Integrity Commissionof New South Wales and the Criminal
Justice Commission in Queensland,
together with Ombudsman offices andother bodies, have been given substantial
jurisdiction over police corruption andmisconduct. Such bodies are typicallycreated after a governmental investigative
commission has revealed entrenchedcorruption of such a magnitude that the
public loses trust in the integrity of theo f f e n d i n g p o l i c e a g e n c y. I n s u c hcircumstances, drastic measures arenecessary to neutralize the citizens’
suspicion sufficiently so that public ordercan be maintained and some minimal
respect for governmental authority
restored.
The measures chosen to reassure public
opinion in Hong Kong and Australia wereto subject the police to extremely close
oversight by a permanent independent andparallel authority with sufficientcompetence and investigative resources tooversee or take over any significant police
investigations of internal criminality or
misconduct. My impression in studying
those institutions is that they also try to
work in partnership with the police agency
employing the suspected officer. There aremany practical reasons which may call forcooperation, but it would be interesting toknow if those Independent Commissions
also consider a need to maintain publicconfidence in the agency they oversee as areason to work in partnership with thatagency’s management or internal affairs
component.
As indicated previously, we consider
ourselves fortunate to have a relatively low

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current incidence of corruption andcriminality in the FBI, but recognize thatan influx of new agents could upset the
ethical equilibrium of the organization andcause more serious problems in the future.
If that were to occur, we would have toconsider techniques which we now do not
employ, but which have been successfulwhen used by other police organizations.
For example, we use integrity testing only
on the basis of reasonable suspicion. The
London Metropolitan Police Service has
used such tests to uncover corruption
among experienced detectives and retired
officers, and is now considering their use
on a routine basis. Such an approachrequires new and innovative thinking andexpectations. The goal of targeted integrity
testing is to come very close to a 100%
success rate, since only persons seriously
implicated in corruption by confidential
information or circumstantial evidence will
be tested, and numerous tests which
revealed no corruption would be both
expensive and would cast doubt on theintelligence or evaluation techniques of theintegrity unit.
To the contrary, the institutional goal ofroutine testing is to devise a cost-efficientmanner of random, universal testing withthe ultimate goal of achieving a high rateof non-incriminating results as a result of
ethics training and the deterrent effect ofpublicizing the routine testing technique.
To m y s u r p r i s e , I u n d e r s t a n d t h eMetropolitan Police Service labororganization has received this proposal
favorably, which would be a farsighted
response. If a police organization could
demonstrate to a policymaker and to the
public that nine out of 10, or 95 out of ahundred officers will refuse the opportunity
to steal or to be bribed, I think that much
public cynicism and suspicion about thepolice would be cured.

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The concept of integrity testing can bealso expanded to other contexts. The New
York City Police Department has sufferedterribly in the last year from adverse
publicity about brutality and the use ofexcessive force. In response, it has
experimented with an imaginative
approach of brutality testing. As thetechnique has been described to me, anofficer whose record demonstrates repeateduse of excessive force is assigned to respondto a violent domestic dispute in anapartment. On arrival the officer isconfronted by a subject who is verbally
abusive but neither uses nor threatens
violence, and who in reality is anundercover Internal Affairs Division officer
attempting to learn if the officer will
overreact to verbal abuse by using
unnecessary violence. The scene is recorded
and carefully monitored in a way so as tominimize the risk of serious injury to theundercover officer, with other officers readyto intervene immediately if the suspect
officer begins to use unnecessary force.
Fortunately, the nature of our work in the
FBI does not require us to confront routine
allegations of physical brutality, butdifficult and dangerous techniques are
sometimes necessary to confront serious
abuses.
V. CONCLUSION
Earlier in this paper reference was madeto the inability of any police organization
to compete financially with a drug dealer
in bidding for the loyalty of an officer or
agent. We are public servants and we
recognize that the taxpayers will never pay
their guardians as much for our honest
services as criminals would pay to corrupt
us. The officers or agents of some law
enforcement organizations arecomparatively well compensated, but mostare not so fortunate. However, financial
calculations alone do not determine theability to resist temptation. We have foundto our sorrow that even well-paid FBI
agents have betrayed their country andtheir institution for money. At the sametime, police officers who are paid much lessgenerously resist opportunities forcorruption, undergo hardships daily, andforego many pleasures and advantages forthemselves and their families, because they
believe that serving and protecting theirfellow citizens is valuable, important work.
A decent living wage is essential to honest
law enforcement, but it is not enough toachieve integrity.
The old proverb, that man does not liveby bread alone, expresses the concept thatmaterial considerations cannot explain all
human decisions. That concept is
extremely relevant to police work. Rational
persons cannot be paid enough money tomake a purely financial choice to risk theirlife by confronting armed robbers. Thereis no monetary calculation which explains
why an honest law enforcement officer isimmune to bribe offers worth many times
a year’s salary. The only reasons which canjustify such dedication and honesty are
non-material ideals. Such ideals can resultin unselfish, altruistic sacrifices, and caninspire whole institutions. Different
societies at different times have recognized
codes of conduct which rose above
individual self-interest, ennobled thehumans who observed them, and benefitted
all of society. Those codes of conduct may
have been called chivalry in Western
Europe, Bushido in Japan, or honor andduty in military organizations, but theircommon element is that they recognize andharness the idealism of the human spirit.
My observation of police organizations isthat the most successful are those which
capture that idealism, both to stimulate
performance and to avoid misconduct andcorruption. No system of internal affairs
and discipline can realistically hope torepress misconduct among persons withthe power, discretion and investigative

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training and practical experience of police
officers, absent some system of sharedvalues and the internal motivation toobserve those values. Accordingly, theconcept which I would like to emphasize
in closing today’s presentation is theimportance of pride, self-respect,community status, and a sense of honorand duty in preventing corruption. Very
frankly, my impression is that many othersocieties traditionally recognize andappreciate this concept much more than wematerialistic Americans do. Consequently,
I hope that during our discussion time wecan explore examples of how othercountries foster an esprit de corps, a senseof pride and even elitism, to bring out
values and performance in their law
enforcement officers far beyond that which
can be accounted for by mere material
rewards.

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