The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 27 (2016)
Copyright © 2016 Yoneyuki Sugita. All rights reserved. This work may be used, with thisnotice included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work may be distributed,
electronically or otherwise, in whole or in part, without permission from the author.

The Yoshida Doctrine as a Myth

Yoneyuki Sugita*

Introduction
During the Allied occupation of Japan after World War II, Prime Minister
Shigeru Yoshida developed a set of postwar foreign and security policies
that came to be known as the Yoshida Doctrine. Masataka Kosaka has
defined the doctrine as follows: (1) Japan ensures its national security
through an alliance with the United States; (2) Japan maintains a low
capacity for self-defense; and (3) Japan spends resources conserved by the
first and second policies on economic activities to develop the country as a
trading nation.1 The term “Yoshida Doctrine” was coined in 1977 by
Masashi Nishihara, a prominent expert, as a way to define a consistent,
pragmatic strategy in postwar Japan.2 It became a fixture among Japanesescholars in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when US hegemony was
gradually declining and Japan was becoming an economic giant.3 This
interpretation of the postwar era appropriately validated an emerging selfconfidence about Japan’s role in the world. This article addresses a following
research question: What were the terms and conditions for Japan, avanquished, weak country, to be able to establish the Yoshida Doctrine?
This article verifies my hypothesis that it was possible for Japan to do so*Professor, Osaka University

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because the United States acquiesced to it.
Many scholars have since analyzed the significance of the Yoshida
Doctrine, and, roughly speaking, their interpretations fall into two categories:
those that criticize Yoshida’s naïve judgements, secrecy, and inappropriate
policies;4 and those that praise Yoshida’s foresight, strategic thinking, andpragmatic approach.5 The latter interpretation is the more widely accepted,
along with the assumption that Yoshida, or for that matter Japan, waspowerful enough to resist consistent and strong pressure from the UnitedStates for rearmament and instead was able to implement (wisely) an
economy-first policy favorable to Japan.
Yet how could it have been possible for Japan, a vanquished, weak
country after World War II, to implement such an important independent
policy if it went against the wishes of the United States, a hegemonic powerat that time? In short, Japan could not and did not, and the policy was not.
The doctrine was possible only because it satisfied the interests of theUnited States—or at least because the United States acquiesced to it. Thus
this article focuses on American perceptions and policies that establishedthe framework within which Yoshida and other Japanese policymakers tried
their best, in a rational and strategic manner, to advance Japan’s national
interests. Ultimately, the Yoshida Doctrine proves to be not only of historicalinterest but also still relevant to the understanding of Japan’s current foreignand security policies.6

I. Rearmament
As early as 1946, the Joint Staff Planners, a principal planning agency
serving the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), began considering Japan’s
rearmament in preparation for a presumed Soviet attack against Japan.7
Within General Headquarters in Japan, Gen. Charles Willoughby, Chief ofIntelligence Division, and Lt. Gen. Robert Eichelberger, Eighth Armycommander, were earnest advocates of Japanese rearmament.8 In March
1948, when Washington considered starting peace treaty negotiations withJapan, Under Secretary of the Army William Draper stated that the War
Department was generally in favor of Japanese rearmament.9 In response to
an inquiry by the secretary of defense, the JCS stated: “Solely from themilitary viewpoint, the establishment of Japanese armed forces is desirable”
to offset “our own limited manpower.”10
Yet there were those who had reservations about Japanese rearmament.
George Kennan, director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department,

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asserted that Washington should neither proceed with the peace treaty nor
allow Japanese rearmament.11 Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), vehemently opposed the idea ofJapanese rearmament as running counter to US international commitments
and Occupation objectives.12 Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall
supported Japanese rearmament in principle, considering the criticalshortage of manpower in the US military; however, Japan’s depressed
economy at the time precluded pursuing this idea.13
Without consensus among Washington officials, NSC13/2, an important
document prepared by the National Security Council, represented a turning
point in US thoughts about the Allied occupation of Japan. It supported
strengthening the Japanese police force without making any definite
commitment in US policy on the matter of Japanese rearmament, and it wasapproved by President Harry S. Truman on 9 October 1948.14 NSC13/2
checked the desires of the JCS to promote Japanese rearmament. Even
limited Japanese rearmament was deemed inadvisable because it would
require amending the new Japanese constitution, abrogate the Potsdam
Declaration, and adversely affect Japanese economic recovery. Thus, theJCS had to be content with merely planning for future limited rearmamentin Japan while still insisting that “the terms of NSC 13/2 should now be
reviewed.”15
NSC13/3, a revision of NSC13/2, was adopted on 6 May 1949, but noamendment was made under the subtitle, “The Post-Treaty Arrangements.”16
Taking NSC13/3 into consideration, the JCS claimed, “from the military
point of view, that a peace treaty would, at the present time, be premature.”17
However, according to the JCS, “plans . . . for limited Japanese armed forces
for self-defense to be effectuated in war emergency” should be included inpeace negotiations.18 Agreeing with the JCS, the Defense Department
advocated Japanese rearmament as being “consistent with the overall
strategy of the United States of concentrating its power in Europe andmaintaining minimum strength in the Far East.”19
Nevertheless, the Central Intelligence Agency emphasized that, no matter
how important Japanese rearmament might be for the US military
establishment, it could have unpredictable consequences. “There would be
no assurance that those forces would be used in opposition to Communism,
if there were compelling economic reasons for an accommodation with theCommunist world,”20 one memo cautioned. Aside from the trust issues, theCentral Intelligence Agency was also worried about negative reactions toJapanese rearmament from Japan’s former enemies.21 John B. Howard,

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special adviser to the secretary of state, was likewise distrustful and asserted
that “a decision to rearm Japan should not be made without more adequate
assurances than are now present that Japan will continue to be friendly, or atleast not hostile, toward the United States.”22 Harboring similar suspicions,
the JCS pursued a limited Japanese rearmament that would be easy tocontrol.23
In November 1949, the Defense Department recommended postponing
the decision about Japanese rearmament, given that Washington officials
could not yet reach a consensus.24 Secretary of State Dean Acheson made it
clear that “the rearming of Japan for self-defense is not under present
circumstances an acceptable alternative.”25 Even Gen. Omar Bradley,
chairman of the JCS, grudgingly agreed that Japan should have its armed
forces in the future but that “at the present it was not feasible to permit
Japan to rearm.”26 In April 1950, William Sebald, political adviser to SCAP,
concluded that Japanese rearmament “in the immediate post treaty period
must be rejected.”27

II. Impacts of the Korean War on Japanese Rearmament
The outbreak of the Korean War seemed to decide the controversy infavor of rearmament. In July 1950, SCAP issued a directive to the Japanese
government to establish a Police Reserve Force totaling 75,000 men andincreasing the number of the Maritime Safety Force by 8,500 men.28 SCAP
claimed that the Police Reserve Force was separate and distinct from theregular police. Gen. Willoughby even devised a plan to organize the Police
Reserve Force into four armed divisions.29 Changing his opinion, Sebald
acknowledged in September that “Japan must be partially rearmed” todefend against a possible Communist attack.30 Facing a “new situation
radically different from that envisaged in the Potsdam Proclamation,” thePolicy Planning Staff also expressed its support for Japanese rearmament.31
US officials were not, however, monolithic in their opinions of how muchpressure they should apply to Japan for rearmament. Even after the outbreakof the Korean War, John Foster Dulles, special consultant to the secretary ofstate, said that former victims of Japanese aggression as well as the Japanese
themselves would oppose the plan to rearm Japan.32 General MacArthur
argued that the Allied Powers should be more concerned about the threat
from a remilitarized Japan than a threat of attack against Japan.33
Searching for a compromise between these two opinions, a working
group in the Department of Defense circulated a draft peace treaty that

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would allow Japan to possess its own armed forces, stipulating that “suchprohibitions against the rearmament of Japan” during the Allied occupation“shall cease to be operative.” The draft nonetheless paid careful attention to
the anxieties of those who remained distrustful, specifying that “no land,sea, or air forces will be established by the Japanese government . . . except
with the advice and consent of the United States government.” Moreover, toprevent the Japanese armed forces from becoming independent, “all armed
forces in Japan . . . shall be placed under the unified command of a Supreme
Commander designated by the United States government.”34 The secretaryof defense gave the JCS memorandum to the secretary of state, insisting that
Washington should face “the necessity of a Japan eventually adequately
rearmed for effective self-defense.” The State Department concurred.35 In
the end, on 7 September 1950, the secretaries of state and defense agreed on
the following security matters and wrote a joint memorandum for thepresident, stipulating that the peace treaty “must not contain any prohibition,
direct or implicit, now or in the future, of Japan’s inalienable right to selfdefense in case of external attack, and to possess the means to exercise thatright.”36 In other words, the Departments of State and Defense agreed not to
impose on Japan any restrictions on rearmament.
In January 1951, President Truman decided to start a peace settlement
negotiation and sent John Foster Dulles to Japan.37 Dulles regarded his real
purpose as discovering “how dependable a commitment could be obtained
from the Japanese Government to align itself with the nations of the freeworld against Communist imperialism.”38 Considering the strong demand
from the military, Truman and Dulles anticipated obtaining even a nominal
rearmament commitment from Japan. Contrary to Dulles’s expectation,
however, Jiro Shirasu, aide to Prime Minister Yoshida, indicated that insteadof rearmament, the United States “should utilize Japanese industrial capacity
to the full in the coming period of shortages to help supply the needs of thefree world. There can be no more effective way of firmly binding Japan to
the free world.”39 Because the Japanese economy greatly benefited from US
special offshore procurement after the outbreak of the Korean War, Shirasu
sought to use Japan’s economic productivity for the security of the Western
bloc as Japan’s ideal “military” contribution to the West.
On 29 January 1951, Yoshida and Dulles had their official meeting.
Dulles solicited Yoshida’s view on Japan’s rearmament. His purpose was toconfirm Japan’s willingness to commit itself to the free world. Dulles states,“No one would expect the Japanese contribution at present to be large but it
was felt that Japan should be willing to make at least a token contribution

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and a commitment to a general cause of collective security” (emphasis
added). Yoshida responded in a vague manner without specifying what kindof contribution Japan would make.40 The US delegates repeatedly requested
that Japan contribute to the defense of the free world, not only by the use of
its police forces and industrial power, but also to a certain extent with its
ground forces. They understood that Japan could only increase its forces
gradually but wanted to know the rough size of the first stage. When the US
delegates offered assurances that they would provide enough assistance,
both fiscally and materially, to build up Japanese ground forces, their
Japanese counterparts asked to know the amount they would receive. Thus
the Japanese government accepted, in principle, the US proposal to establish
ground forces and tried to secure the best possible deal. The focus of thenegotiation was not on whether Japan would implement a rearmament
program but rather on the terms and conditions of Japan’s rearmament.
Finally, on 3 February 1951, Tokyo submitted its “Initial Steps for a
Rearmament Program,” which stipulated that the “security forces, land andsea, totaling 50,000, will be created apart from the existing police forces
and the National Police Reserve.”41
Because Japanese rearmament was deemed necessary in the post-treaty
era, Dulles compelled Yoshida to make a concrete commitment torearmament so as to obtain approval from the military. Dulles was satisfied
with Yoshida’s somewhat nominal commitment, keeping in mind the US
strong reservations about Japanese rearmament. For the United States,
acquiring base rights would be more secure, more practical, and more usefulthan forcing Japan to implement rapid rearmament.

III. US Base Rights and Armed Forces
Because President Truman argued that the United States should play aleading role throughout the Pacific in times of war and peace, Secretary ofState James F. Byrnes asked Truman in February 1946 whether the UnitedStates would withdraw all armed forces or maintain them for an indefinite
period after a peace conference.42 In August 1947, the Navy Department
demanded “base rights at Yokosuka and necessary air fields to provide
protection for the base.”43 General MacArthur, however, opposed the idea
as being “imperialistic in concept, in purpose, and in form.”44 He argued
that given adequate US forces at Okinawa, the United States would not
require military bases in mainland Japan.45 With this split in opinion overUS base rights, NSC13/2 made no concrete mention of US base rights or

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stationing its armed forces in the post-treaty era.46
The JCS could not concur with MacArthur and insisted that Okinawa was
not suitable for a naval base, arguing that Yokosuka should continue to be
used as a base.47 A peace treaty seemed premature. The JCS justified its
attitude by claiming that it would be necessary first to obtain “assurance ofJapan’s economic, psychological, and political stability, and of her
democracy and western orientation.”48 Disagreeing with the JCS assessment,
the State Department asserted that the early conclusion of a peace treaty
would preserve Japan’s current democracy and Western orientation.49 Two
critical issues emerged: how to find a compromise between these two
agencies and, likewise, how to forge some consensus between MacArthur
and Washington.
In December 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson asked Secretary of
Defense Louis Johnson about the essential security requirements. Based on
the JCS demand, Johnson replied that the United States should be the only
power to have military forces and base rights in any part of the Japaneseislands. He did not include Japan’s rearmament in the essential militaryrequirements.50 Concurring with the JCS, Acheson explained the US stanceto the British ambassador: “It would be essential that there be retained
United States forces in Japan.”51 The Joint Strategic Survey Committee of
JCS agreed with the State Department and argued that as long as US forces
remained in Japan, “the prohibition against rearmament in the JapaneseConstitution may remain in effect.”52 Maintaining US armed forces in Japanafter the Occupation offered a way to bridge the gap between the State
Department and the military. In February 1950, John Howard of the State
Department reported that “the minimum security requirements . . . [included]
US bases and forces on Japan itself,” while the maximum demands would
be “the rearmament of Japan and the reactivation of Japanese armed
forces.”53
General MacArthur found himself at odds with Washington. He was atfirst completely opposed to the maintenance of US military bases in Japan
during the post-Occupation period, but he gradually learned to compromise.
He suggested that US forces of 30,000 to 35,000 men should be stationed inJapan for five years to prevent Soviet aggression.54 In April 1950, MacArthur
explained to Sebald that “95% of the Japanese people are opposed toAmerican bases in Japan and that unless a wholehearted request for
American troops and bases is made by the Japanese, the entire proposition
should be abandoned.”55 Thus, it would be ideal for the United States if
Japan made a voluntary request for the retention of US bases in Japan in the130

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post-treaty era. This is exactly what Prime Minister Yoshida provided.
In spring 1950, Yoshida sent Finance Minister Hayato Ikeda to the UnitedStates. On 2 May 1950, in his talks with Joseph Dodge, financial adviser tothe SCAP and fiscal adviser to the under secretary of the Army, Ikeda
conveyed Prime Minister Yoshida’s secret message to the effect that theJapanese government “desires the earliest possible treaty. As such a treaty
probably would require the maintenance of US forces to secure the treaty
terms and for other purposes, if the US Government hesitates to make these
conditions, the Japanese Government will try to find a way to offer them.”
High-ranking officials, including Acheson, Butterworth, Dulles, andMacArthur, read the summary of the conversation. Butterworth wrote on
the copy that “the conversation is regarded as significant because it is thefirst expression we have had at an official level of the attitude of the Japanese
Government on the peace treaty and related questions.”56 This voluntaryoffer seemed to give Washington what it wanted. But Yoshida was cleverenough to confuse Washington officials and keep them guessing about hisreal intentions. Shirasu, who accompanied Ikeda to Washington, explained
the difficulty in accepting the retention of US forces and bases as a sovereign
nation.57 Talking with Shirasu, Butterworth perceived that there was“growing popular opposition in Japan to the retention of post-treaty US
bases.”58
While Washington officials were left to wonder about Japan’s own aims,
they tried to convince MacArthur to agree with them about the base issue.
In June 1950, Secretary of Defense Johnson visited Japan with General
Bradley to assess Japanese conditions and exchange opinions with General
MacArthur. On 23 June 1950, before the outbreak of the Korean War,
MacArthur made a drastic proposal: “The entire area of Japan must be
regarded as a potential base for defensive maneuver with unrestricted
freedom reserved to the United States.”59 He changed his opinion probably
because of his keen sense that, without an appropriate security arrangement,
Washington would not terminate the Occupation in the foreseeable future.60

IV. Impacts of the Korean War
on Base Rights and Armed Forces”I am against leasing military bases to any foreign country,” Yoshidaclaimed in July 1950 at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House ofCouncilors. “Allied powers do not intend to present such a demand, as it isthe desire of the Allied powers to keep Japan out of war,” he asserted. His

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goal in the moment and for that audience was to increase his bargaining
power in dealing with the United States, to contain anti-US forces in Japan,
and to demonstrate Japan’s pacifist posture to neighboring countries.61
When Sebald asked Ichiro Ohta, vice minister of foreign affairs, to reveal
Yoshida’s real intentions, Ohta replied that no Japanese politician could say
in public that he would grant the base rights to foreign countries after the
Occupation.62 Privately, however, Yoshida informed Sir Alvary Gascoigne,
the head of the British Liaison Mission in Japan, that he intended to permit
US troops to be stationed in Japan for its security after the Occupation.63
Regardless of Yoshida’s shrewd tactics, MacArthur’s volte-face led
Dulles to draft a proposal to be discussed with Tokyo. Then, Dulles
telephoned Johnson and said that the proposal “gave the United States theright to maintain in Japan as much force as we wanted, anywhere we wanted,
for as long as we wanted, and I did not see very well how the Defense
Establishment could want more than that.” Johnson, delighted by the
proposal, told Dulles that the two of them could “get together and goplaces.”64 Now there emerged a solid triad among MacArthur, Dulles, andthe military. The secretaries of state and defense jointly sent a memorandum
to President Truman insisting that the United States “should now proceedwith preliminary negotiations for a Japanese Peace Treaty.” They argued
that the peace treaty “must not contain any prohibition, direct or indirect,
now or in the future, of Japan’s inalienable right to self-defense.” They also
demanded that the treaty “must give the United States the right to maintainarmed forces in Japan, wherever, for so long, and to such extent as it deems
necessary.”65 This memorandum demonstrated the essence of theirconsensus: acquiring bases in Japan proved to be more imperative thanJapanese rearmament. The agreement between the Departments of Stateand Defense culminated in NSC60/1, which was approved by Truman on 8
September 1950.
In January 1951, President Truman sent Dulles to Japan to start a peace
settlement negotiation with Japan.66 A series of formal negotiations between
Dulles and Yoshida began on 29 January 1951. On 1 February, the Japanese
government submitted its “Formula concerning Japanese-American
Cooperation for Their Mutual Security” to the US delegates, clearly stating,“Japan will agree to the stationing of United States forces within theJapanese territory.” Japan also assured free movement of US armed forces
anywhere in Japan.67

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V. Economic Recovery Necessary to Keep Japanin the Western Bloc
Demilitarization and democratization proceeded smoothly in occupied
Japan, but economic recovery was indispensable to solidify these earlier
achievements. The National Advisory Council on International Monetary
Affairs, a council to coordinate the policymaking of US government
agencies involved in foreign lending, foreign exchange, or foreign monetary
policy,68 argued that economic stabilization would be a prerequisite for theeffective use of US aid to Japan. NSC13/2, which was a crucial documentemphasizing economic revival as a major occupation objective, stipulated
that “second only to US security interests, economic recovery should bemade the primary objective of United States policy in Japan for the coming
period.”69 President Truman sent Joseph M. Dodge, president of the Detroit
Bank, to Japan in February 1949 to achieve this objective with the following
message: “Recovery rather than relief must be our aim.”70
Dodge requested the Japanese government to implement Japan’s
economic recovery based on a rigid balance between the consolidated
budget, which included those of the general, special, other governmentrelated institutions, and local governments. Inflation spiraled downward
almost immediately after the so-called Dodge Line was cast. The Dodge
Line not only brought stability to the Japanese economy but also laid thegroundwork to support the rise of the financial community by establishinga close linkage among Dodge, Ikeda, and Hisato Ichimada, governor of the
Bank of Japan. Their common objective was to establish and maintain thebalanced budget by implementing a tight-money policy. Ikeda wasdetermined to execute the Dodge Line in earnest because he was convincedthat the Japanese economy “was a green-house economy and there was aneed to break some of the windows in it.”71 Delighted with the Dodge Line,
Ichimada explained that “the grand policy for Japanese economic
rehabilitation which you so clearly put into effect was a policy which I had
always earnestly desired to put into practice myself but had not succeededin doing so due to my lack of power.”72
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 generated an economic
boom, which increased imports far more than exports.73 Although Japanwas faced with a large trade deficit throughout the 1950s, it was financed by
special offshore procurements amounting to about $500 million annually
until 1961.74 In September 1951, Ichiro Ishikawa, president of the Federationof Economic Organizations (Keidanren), publicly announced that Japan

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should develop a domestic military industry. The Ministry of International
Trade and Industry actively promoted a program to increase exports anddevelop technology by soliciting US subsidies for the development of amunitions industry.75 In March 1952, the United States allowed Japan toresume weapons production. Two months later, the US military beganplacing orders for finished weapons, stimulating the resumption of weapons
production in Japan in earnest.76 In August 1952, Keidanren established the
Defense Production Committee to analyze how to improve Japanese defense
capabilities. From the outset, the committee assumed the creation of thirty
military divisions in six years.77
In contrast, the financial community, led by the Finance Ministry and the
Bank of Japan, opposed the militarization of the Japanese economy because
it would take much scarce capital that might otherwise be used for moreproductive purposes.78 The financial community remained powerful enoughto maintain the balanced-budget policy with consistent strong support from
Dodge and Yoshida, which in turn checked Japan’s rapid remilitarization.
Indeed, Japan was leaning in the direction of large-scale rearmament anddependence on a defense industry between 1951 and 1953, but the consistentconviction of preserving the tight-money, balanced-budget policies shattered
the possibility of this militarized course. The Dodge Line channeled thedevelopment of the Japanese economy along a path charted by the financial
community. This specific type of economic development set the conditions
to allow Japan to implement its restrained rearmament.79

VI. Implications: Rearmament, Base Rights,
and Economic Recovery
The US decision to strengthen Japan in the Cold War power struggle
narrowed the range of policy options toward Japan: It was imperative for
Washington to ensure that Tokyo would not join the Communist bloc and to
implement Japan’s economic recovery to assure its orientation toward theUnited States.80
Both Sebald and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and PacificAffairs Dean Rusk argued that it would be important to convince Japan tomake a voluntary commitment to the Western bloc.81 Gen. Matthew Bunker
Ridgway, MacArthur’s successor, also agreed that it was of “vital importanceto retain Japan on side of free world.”82 For this purpose, rearmament was astumbling block. Many Japanese supported US policies toward Japan, butaccording to the Psychological Strategy Board, “the situation may radically134

Yoneyuki Sugitachange . . . if a serious effort to rearm Japan is undertaken.”83 The American
Embassy also warned that opposition to rearmament in Japan was “foundthroughout wide segments of the Japanese population.”84
As for US base rights, the Japan-US Security Treaty was overwhelmingly
favorable to the United States because “all of the basic decisions were left”
in US hands.85 As Secretary of State Acheson informed the British
ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, this security treaty was “dual in purpose:security against renewed Japanese aggression and security for Japan against
Soviet-Communist aggression.”86 Given these two objectives, acquiring
base rights was far more important for the United States than Japanese
rearmament.
The retention of bases in Japan, however, had forged a double-edged
sword for the United States. Freeman Matthews, deputy under secretary ofstate, emphasized the importance of Japan’s role as a successful model of
democracy for other Asian countries; Japan’s spontaneous ties with theUnited States and voluntary acceptance of stationing US troops would
greatly increase “United States prestige and influence throughout Asia.”87
Yet it would be disastrous if the United States forced Japan to accept US
bases and armed forces against the wishes of the Japanese people.88
Because the rearmament and base issues might stimulate nationalist
sentiments among the Japanese people and stir resentments among people
in other Asian countries as evidence of American imperialism, the UnitedStates had to be prudent to prevent these issues from becoming part of aheated debate in Japan. Each issue had its supporters and detractors, anddebate about one could immediately create repercussions for the other.
Consequently, in trying to maintain a low profile, the United States could
not compel Japan to carry out large-scale rearmament but had to acquiesce
to a constrained rearmament if it was to preserve the image of a benevolent
Washington stationing US troops in Japan at Japan’s own request. In
February 1952, Acting Secretary of State James Webb and Secretary of
Defense Robert Lovett advised President Truman that Japan was strategicallyimportant in securing positive US relations with other Asian countries.
“Every effort should be made to prevent the security mission, the presenceof United States forces in Japan, and the security arrangements with Japan
from becoming a domestic political issue in Japan.”89 President Truman
approved this memorandum on 20 February.90
As for the economic recovery, because Japan was a former enemy, theUnited States had to stimulate Japan’s self-interest to side with the West.
The Office of Intelligence Research of the State Department concluded that

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the United States would need to provide two conditions to retain Japan on
its side: maintenance of Japan’s security and assurance of its economic
prosperity. Otherwise, Japan might seek a policy of accommodation leading
to a position of neutrality.91 This way of thinking is similar to, if not identicalwith, the philosophy of the Yoshida Doctrine.
Despite Japanese docility and cooperative attitude during the Occupation,
the American Embassy realized that the Japanese people “have developed
certain critical and hostile attitudes toward the United States.” The embassy
worried about the rise of “a strong neutralist sentiment” among theJapanese.92 In May 1952, various intelligence organizations, along with theCentral Intelligence Agency, predicted that Japan’s “pro-Western orientation[will last] at least during the next two or three years.” Economic prosperity,
however, would be essential to maintain this orientation.93 “Whether thisalignment continues and becomes permanent,” an NSC staff study asserted,“is the basic problem to which United States policy must be directed.”94
In August 1954, regarding Japan as a realist country, the American
Embassy sent the secretary of state a critical analysis of Japan: “Japan does
not consider itself an ally or partner of the United States but rather a nation
which for the time being is forced by circumstances to cooperate with theUnited States but which intends while doing so, to wring out of thisrelationship every possible advantage at the minimum cost.” The embassy
pointed to a particular Japanese value system: “We should remember thatJapanese have no abstract sense of right or wrong—their guide to conduct
is situational and specific rather than general and ideal.” Guided by such
pragmatics, Japan was able to make a rational, realist choice: “Japan has no
basic convictions for or against the free world or communism. The attitude
toward either at any particular time depends upon specific situations andupon whether in the eyes of Japanese leaders cooperation with the one or
the other will advance Japanese interests.” Out of this analysis, the American
Embassy recommended that the “Japanese must be convinced that ours is
winning side.”95
The strong and persistent American distrust of Japan, its underestimationof Japan’s power, and its overestimation of Communist power all combined
to lead the United States along a course whereby the United States preferred
its base rights and stationing its armed forces in Japan to Japanese
rearmament and, consistently with this approach, entertained fears about
deterioration of Japanese economic performance.
Under these circumstances, the Japanese government’s primary task was
to find the very minimum defense contribution that would not jeopardize its

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alliance with the United States. Tokyo endeavored to acquire security
without wasting scarce resources on defense. Japanese officials wereexcellent at exploiting the hegemon’s Achilles’ heel: they used US security
anxiety about Japan as a bargaining chip to entice greater US engagementin Japan’s economic recovery. As a weak ally in an unstable area surroundedby two giant Communist countries, Japan found its weakness to be its best
asset for dealing with the United States. Indeed, Japan implemented realist
pragmatic policies and carried out interactions with the United Statesaccompanied by concessions and shrewd bargaining, but it did so only
within the arena set and approved of, or at least acquiesced to, by the UnitedStates.

Concluding Observations
My main research question is: What were the terms and conditions forJapan, a vanquished, weak country, to be able to establish the Yoshida
Doctrine? This article verifies my hypothesis that it was possible for Japanto do so because the United States acquiesced to it.
The United States was successful in acquiring a firm commitment fromthe Japanese to rearm. But the decision to rearm Japan narrowed the rangeof policy options: Washington had to make sure that Tokyo would not join
the Communist bloc. Strong and persistent American distrust of Japaneseintentions made the United States seek two forms of insurance against any
trouble with Japan: acquiring the base rights to prevent Japan from becoming
an independent military power and implementing Japanese economic
recovery to assure Japan’s orientation toward the capitalist Western bloc.
At the same time, the United States had to hedge against the possible
consequences of these two policies. The rearmament and base issues could
stimulate nationalist sentiments among the Japanese people and might stirresentment among people in other Asian countries as evidence of American
imperialism. Thus Washington sought to maintain a low profile withoutcompelling Tokyo to implement rapid, large-scale rearmament but insteadagreeing to a constrained rearmament. Rampant inflation was stabilized by
the Dodge Line, and Japanese economic growth was developed along a pathcharted by the Japanese financial community. This specific type of economic
development allowed Japan to maintain its restrained rearmament.
Moreover, US underestimation of Japan’s power and its overestimation of
the Communist threat stoked fears about allowing the Japanese economy tofalter at all. So intense were these concerns that Washington had to preserve

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a delicate balance between pushing Japan to spend more money on building
up the Japanese armed forces and putting more emphasis on Japanese
economic growth.
Tokyo, taking advantage of US anxiety about Japan, set its own goals.
Japan would ensure its security without wasting scarce resources on defense
and without undermining the US-Japan alliance. Japan exploited thehegemon’s Achilles heel to draw an ever greater commitment from theUnited States to maintain Japan’s security and economic recovery. As afeeble ally in an unstable area surrounded by two giant Communist countries,
Japan transformed its weakness into an asset in dealing with the UnitedStates. Indeed, Japan deftly deployed power politics and shrewd bargaining
in its relationship with the United States, even if only within the bounds
established and approved of by the occupying power—this was the essenceof the Yoshida Doctrine.

Notes
I have received generous financial assistance to conduct research for thisarticle from Osaka University International Joint Research Promotion
Program, Osaka University International Symposium Grant, Osaka
University International Joint Meetings Grant, Grants-in-Aid for Scientific
Research by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Grant-in-Aid for
Exploratory Research number 26590109), and the Research Support System
of Osaka University. I appreciate their support.
1 Masataka Kosaka, “Nihon Gaiko no Bensho” [Dialectic of Japanese diplomacy] in
Koza Kokusai Seiji [International politics], vol. 4, ed. Tadashi Aruga, Shigeaki Uno,
Shigeru Kido, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, and Akio Watanabe (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku
Shuppankai, 1989), 299.
2 Masashi Nishihara, “How Much Longer the Fruits of the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’?,” in
Korea and Japan: A New Dialogue across the Channel, ed. Bae-ho Hahn and Tadashi
Yamamoto (Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1978), 151–54.
3 Yoshihide Soeya, “Yoshida Rosen to Yoshida Dokutorin” [Yoshida’s way and the
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4 Akira Fujiwara, “Senryo ka Saigunbi no Tokushitsu” [Characteristics of rearmament
under the Occupation], Rekishigaku Kenkyu 460 (June 1978): 23–35; Michael M.
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Nagai, “Yoshida Dokutorin wa Eien nari” [The Yoshida Doctrine forever], Bungei
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no. 13 (1985): 66–79; Kenneth B. Pyle, “In Pursuit of a Grand Design,” Journal ofJapanese Studies 13, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 243–70; Yoshihisa Hara, Sengo Nihon to
Kokusai Seiji [Postwar Japan and international politics] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1988);
Makoto Iokibe, Nichibei Senso to Sengo Nihon [Japan-US war and postwar Japan](Osaka: Osaka Shoseki, 1989); Shin’ich Kitaoka, “Yoshida Shigeru no Senzen to Sengo”[Prewar and postwar of Yoshida Shigeru], Nempo Kindai Nihon Kenkyu 16 (1994): 105–
31; Akira Iriye, “Japan Returns to the World: Yoshida Shigeru and His Legacy,” in The
Diplomats, 1939–1979, ed. Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1994); Akio Watanabe, Yoshida Shigeru (Tokyo: Chuo
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The Yoshida Doctrine as a Myth

139

Nakanishi, “Kowa ni Muketa Yoshida Shigeru no Anzenhosho Koso” [Yoshida Shigeru’s
idea of national security toward a peace treaty], in Kantaiheiyo no Kokusai Chitsujo no
Mosaku to Nihon [Search for international order in the Pan-Pacific and Japan], ed.
Minoru Kawada and Yukio Ito (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1999); Kazuya
Sakamoto, Nichibei Domei no Kizuna [The ties of the Japan-US alliance] (Tokyo:
Yuhikaku, 2000); Hisahiko Okazaki, Yoshida Shigeru to Sono Jidai [Yoshida Shigeru
and his era] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 2002); Ayako Kusunoki, “Yoshida Shigeru no
Anzenhosho Seisaku,” [Shigeru Yoshida’s security policies] Kokusai Seiji 144 (February2006): 99–115.
6 Hiroshi Nakanishi, “’Yoshida Dokutorin’ no Keisei to Henyo” [Formation andTransformation of the “Yoshida Doctrine”], Hogaku Ronso 152, no. 5–6 (2003), 277.
7 Futoshi Shibayama, Nihon Saigunbi eno Michi-1945–1954nen [Toward Japan’s
rearmament, 1945–1954] (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 2010), 7.
8 Frank Kowalski, Jr., Nihon Saigunbi [The Rearmament of Japan] (Tokyo: Simul
Press, 1969), 32.
9 Conversation between MacArthur, Draper, and Kennan, 5 March 1948, UnitedStates Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS),
1948, The Far East and Australasia, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing
Office, 1948), 706.
10 Memorandum by the JCS to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, 1 March 1949,
FRUS, 1949, The Far East and Austrasia, vol. 7, pt. 2, 671–72.
11 Explanatory Notes by Kennan, 25 March 1948, FRUS, 1948, The Far East andAustralasia, vol. 6, 713.
12 Conversation between MacArthur, Under Secretary of the Army Draper, andKennan, 21 March 1948 (Amended 23 March 1948), ibid., 708.
13 18 May 1948, President’s Secretary’s File (hereafter PSF), Papers of Harry S
Truman (hereafter PHST), Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
14 NSC13/2, 7 October 1948, FRUS, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, vol. 6, 858–
59.
15 Memorandum by the JCS to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, 1 March 1949,
FRUS, 1949, The Far East and Austrasia, vol. 7, pt. 2, 671–72.
16 NSC13/3, 6 May 1949, ibid., 731.
17 Report by the JCS, 9 June 1949, ibid., 776.
18 Ibid., 776–77.
19 Memorandum on Reactivation of Japanese Armed Forces by the Department of
Defense, 7 November 1949, Department of State, Records of the US Department of State
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Japan (hereafter IAJ) 1945–1949 (Wilmington, DE:
Scholarly Resources, 1986), reel no. 12.
20 Central Intelligence Agency, 25 July 1949, Intelligence Memorandum no. 197,

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Records of the National Security Council, PHST.
21 Ibid.
22 John B. Howard, “Position of Department of State on Reactivation of Japanese
Armed Forces,” Confidential US State Department Special Files, Japan 1947–1956 Lot
Files (hereafter SFJ) (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1990), reel no.
8.
23 Shibayama, Nihon Saigunbi eno Michi, 59.
24 Memorandum on Reactivation of Japanese Armed Forces by the Department of
Defense, 7 November 1949, IAJ, 1945–1949, reel no. 12.
25 Informal Memorandum by Dean Acheson for the British Ambassador, 24 December
1949, FRUS, 1949, The Far East and Austrasia, vol. 7, pt. 2, 928.
26 Memorandum of Conversation, by Ambassador Maxwell M. Hamilton of the Bureauof Far Eastern Affairs, 24 December 1949, ibid., 926.
27 Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to
the Assistant Secretary of State (Butterworth), 11 April 1950, FRUS, 1950, East Asia andthe Pacific, vol. 6, 1168.
28 John Welfield, Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System(London: Athlone Press, 1988), 72.
29 Hideo Ohtake, Sengo Ninon Boei Mondai Shiryoshu [Documents on Postwar
Japanese Defense Issues], vol. 1 (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1991), 432, 510.
30 Overton to Johnson, 19 September 1950, IAJ, 1950–1954 (Wilmington, DE:
Scholarly Resources, 1987), reel no. 20.
31 PPS, 26 July 1950, FRUS, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, vol. 6, 1256–57.
32 Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles) to the Director of the
Policy Planning Staff (Nitze), 20 July 1950, ibid., 1247.
33 Asahi Shimbun, 19 August 1950.
34 Draft of the Bilateral US-Japanese Treaty Prepared by a Working Group in the
Department of Defense, 27 October 1950, FRUS, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, vol. 6,
1341.
35 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 22 August 1950 and Memorandum by
the Department of State, 23 August 1950, ibid., 1279.
36 Memorandum for the President, 7 September 1950, SFJ, reel no. 1.
37 Draft Letter to Dulles, 9 January 1951, FRUS, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, vol. 6,
pt. 1, 788–89.
38 Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Consultant (Allison), 11–12 January
1951, ibid., 791.
39 Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to
the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles), 25 January 1951, ibid., 810.
40 Memorandum of Conversation, by Allison, 29 January 1951, ibid., 829.

The Yoshida Doctrine as a Myth141

Japan to the US Delegates, “Initial Steps for Rearmament Program,” Gaimusho[JMFA] ed., Nihon Gaiko Monjo: Heiwa Joyaku no Teiketsu ni Kansuru Chosho[Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy Records related to the conclusion of Treaty ofPeace with Japan], vol. 2 (Tokyo: Gannando, 2002), 192.
42 Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman, 27 February 1946,
FRUS, 1946, The Far East, vol. 8, 150–51.
43 Memorandum by Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge, Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations for Politico-Military Affairs, Navy Department, to the Chief of the Divisionof Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton), 18 August 1947, FRUS, 1947, The Far East, vol. 6,495.
44 Memorandum by MacArthur, 21 March 1947, FRUS, 1947, The Far East, vol. 6,454.
45 Conversation between MacArthur and Kennan, 5 March 1948, FRUS, 1948, The
Far East and Australasia, vol. 6, 700–701.
46 NSC13/2, 7 October 1948, FRUS, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, vol. 6, 859.
47 Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 June 1949, FRUS, 1949, The Far East andAustrasia, vol. 7, pt. 2, 775.
48 Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 June 1949, ibid., 776.
49 Department of State Comments on NSC 49 (June 15, 1949), 30 September 1949,
ibid., 872 & #8211;73.
50 Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson), 22
December 1949, ibid., 923.
51 Informal Memorandum by Dean Acheson for the British Ambassador, 24 December
1949, ibid., 928.
52 JCS 1380/77, 10 December 1949, Paul Kesaris, ed., Records of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, pt. 2, 1946–1953, The Far East (Washington, DC: University Publications ofAmerica, 1979), reel no. 6.
53 Howard to Rusk, 1 February 1950, SFJ, reel no. 11.
54 Miura, Yoshida Shigeru, vol. 1, 127.
55 Memorandum of Conversation, MacArthur and Sebald, 6 April 1950, FRUS, 1950,
East Asia and the Pacific, vol. 6, 1170.
56 Discussion with Mr. Ikeda by Joseph Dodge, 2 May 1950, ibid., 1195–98; “Daijin
Tobei Shiryo” [Reference for the Minister’s trip to the United States], 5 May 1950, John
Dower Collection (Professor John Dower’s personal collection of documents).
57 Memorandum of Conversation between Shirasu and Butterworth, 1 May 1950, SFJ,
reel no. 8.
58 Butterworth to the Secretary of State, 3 May 1950, SFJ, reel no. 8.
59 Memorandum by MacArthur, 23 June 1950, FRUS, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific,
vol. 6, 1227.
41

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Miura, Yoshida Shigeru, vol. 1, 211, 227.
Memorandum by Green to Allison, 2 August 1950, FRUS, 1950, East Asia and thePacific, vol. 6, 1262–63.
62 The Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary ofState, 9 August 1950, ibid., 1270–71.
63 Howard B. Schonberger, Senryho 1945–1952 [Aftermath of war] (Tokyo: Jiji
Tsushinsha, 1994), 304; Ohtake, Sengo Nihon Boei Mondai, vol. 1, 344.
64 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Dulles, 3 August 1950, FRUS, 1950,
East Asia and the Pacific, vol. 6, 1264–65.
65 Memorandum for the President, 7 September 1950, ibid., 1293–94.
66 Draft Letter to Dulles, 9 January 1951, FRUS, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, vol. 6, pt.
1, 788–89.
67 Gaimusho, Heiwa Joyaku, vol. 2, 40, 162.
68 The NAC consisted of representatives from the State, Army, Commerce, andTreasury Departments, as well as from the Federal Reserve Board. The NAC had theauthority to examine and approve all foreign aid budget requests after the implementationof the Marshall Plan.
69 NSC13/2, October 7, 1948, http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/img_l/M008/M008004l.html (accessed 12 February 2016).
70 Contract from Harry S. Truman to appoint Joseph M. Dodge, 17 January 1949,
Joseph Dodge Papers (hereafter JDP), Detroit Public Library, Detroit, Michigan; 7January 1949, Paul Kesaris, ed., Documents of the National Security Council, Fourth
Supplement (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1987).
71 Joseph Dodge, Summary of meeting with Finance Minister Ikeda, 4 March 1949,
JDP.
72 Ichimada to Dodge, 5 October 1949, JDP.
73 Trade Statistics by Ministry of Finance, http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/suii/html/
nenbet.htm (accessed 12 February 2016).
74 Yoshio Asai, “1950 nendai no Tokuju nitsuite (1),” [US military procurement fromJapan: 1950–60 (1)] Seijo Daigaku Keizai Kenkyu 158 (November 2002), 231–33.
75 Masao Kihara, Nihon no Gunji Sangyo [Japan’s military industry] (Tokyo: Shin
Nihon Shuppan, 1994), 90.
76 Richard J. Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army”: National Security and theTechnological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994),
142–43; John Foster Dulles and the Defense Department also supported the idea offostering military-related industries in Japan. Johnson to Rusk, 12 June 1951, IAJ, 1950–
1954, reel no. 20.
77 Kanzo Ohtake, “Boei Seisan Iinkai no Jittai” [Substance of the Defense Production
Committee], Keizai Shincho 18 (4) (May 1953), 25; Keizai Dantai Rengokai, Ishikawa
60
61

The Yoshida Doctrine as a Myth143

Ichiro Tsuisoroku [Reminiscence of Ishikawa Ichiro] (Tokyo: Kashima Kenkyujo
Shuppankai, 1971), 316.
78 Samuels, Rich Nations, 145; Yumi Hiwatari, Sengo Seiji to Nichibei Kankei [Postwar
politics and Japan-US relations] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1990), 40.
79 For more details about the role of the financial community, see Yoneyuki Sugita,“US Strategic Preference for Securing Military Bases and Impact of Japanese Financial
Community on Constrained Rearmament in Japan, 1945–1954,” in Demilitarization in
the Contemporary World, ed. Peter N. Stearns (Champaign: University of Illinois Press,2013), 89–110.
80 For more detail about the irony of American hegemony, see Yoneyuyki Sugita,
Hegemoni no Gyakusetsu: Ajia Taiheiyo Senso to Beikoku no Higashi Ajia Seisaku,
1941nen–1952nen [Irony of hegemony: The Asia-Pacific War and US policies toward
East Asia, 1941–1952] (Kyoto: Sekai Shisosha, 1999).
81 Allison to Matthews, 16 November 1951, IAJ, 1950–1954, reel no. 16.
82 Ridgway to Bradley, C-65938, 22 January 1952, CJCS-092.2 Japanese Peace Treaty,
RG 218, National Archives, Washington, DC.
83 7 February 1952, Psychological Strategy Board Files, PHST.
84 American Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 4 April 1952, Records of the
US Department of State Relating to United States Political Relations with Japan(hereafter USPR), 1950–1954 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1988), reel no. 2.
85 14 March 1954, Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S Truman Library.
86 Informal Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Franks),
24 December 1949, FRUS, 1949, The Far East and Austrasia, vol. 7, pt. 2, 927.
87 Matthews to Nash, 18 January 1952, USPR 1950–1954, reel no. 1.
88 NSC 125, 21 February 1952, PHST.
89 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)to the President, 15 February 1952, FRUS, 1952–1954, China and Japan, vol. 14, pt. 2,1163.
90 Ibid., web version, note no. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1952-54v14p2/d512#fnref1 (accessed 12 February 2016).
91 Office of lntelligence Research, the Department of State, “The Probable Orientationof Japan,” December 27, 1951, IAJ, 1950–1954, reel no. 1.
92 American Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 4 April 1952, USPR, 1950–
1954, reel no. 2.
93 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-52, 29 May 1952, PSF, PHST.
94 NSC125/1, 23 July 1952, PSF, PHST.
95 The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State, 25 August 1954,
FRUS, 1952–1954, China and Japan, vol. 14, pt. 2, 1714–15.