Proposal for Peaceful Resolution of Nuclear Crisis

Cheong WooksikFounder & Representative, Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea

Prepared for Workshop on“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”
Hiroshima Peace Institute
Hiroshima, Japan
March11-12, 2004

1. Crisis on the Korean peninsula

It’s so regrettable and shameful that we, Koreans, are facing with another war crisis in stead of thepeace process today. Even though the dismantlement of Cold War system at the global level has
passed more than 10 years, the cold war system has been continued in the level of Northeast Asia as
well as the Korean peninsula.

The president of the United States, George W. Bush said in his first Union Address in 29, January,
2002, "the United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten
us with the world's most destructive weapons." In particular, he named North Korea, Iraq and Iran"an Axis of Evil" pointing out that these countries have been developing weapons of mass
destruction.

Since then, the Korean peninsular has faced a complicated situation; South Korea joins theinternational coalition against terrorism led by U.S. while North Korea was included in an “axis ofevil” by U. S. government that is one of potential target of ”'war on terrorism”. This extremely
paradoxical situation on the peninsular would give two Koreas, but one nation, catastrophic results if
the Bush administration expanded “war on terrorism”, or “preemptive strike” to North Korea.

U.S, hawkish policies against North Korea have intensified the radical tension on the Korean
Peninsular. In the early 1994, Korean people were ever shocked at a hidden fact that the U.S.
government planed to attack North Korea. Even the current situation is on the brink of theprobability of war that may occur on the Peninsula without the Koreans’ agreement. The U.S.
government still adheres to one of its options, which is a military action against the North Korean
nuclear program.

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If the war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, South Korean or North Korean or Japanese or U.S
troops, anyone, cannot but be free from threaten their lives. According to the war simulation of
USFK in 1994, the 2nd Korean war might result in the casualties of 50,000-100,000 U.S solders,
500,000 South Korean solders, and millions of South Korean civilians during three months. This
figure excluded the North Korean who would be killed the most at war. Besides, the war on the
Korean Peninsula is highly possible to go to the nuclear war by the U.S nuclear weapon or North
Korea’s missile attack on the nuclear facilities in South Korea and Japan. The reason that we should
prevent 2nd Korean war is clear considering these results.

To the greatest relief, the likelihood of talk among countries involved, two Koreas, the U.S., China,
Russia, and Japan, temporarily relieves a concern about the Korea crisis escalating to war. However,
it is too early to feel safe about this situation. As the precedence of the crisis in 1993-94 reminds us,
starting talks doesn’t always translate to a peaceful resolution of crisis. Moreover, we can’t be too
optimistic about the outcomes from six party talks since both North Korea and the U.S. have taken
different lessons from the failure of the 1994 Agreed Framework and would most likely demandstronger concession from each other than in 1994.

Therefore, the outcome of forthcoming talks depends on how flexible the U.S. and, North Korea areat the negotiation table and how well South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia play the role ofmediator.

2. Real Differences between North Korea and Iraq to the Bush Admin

Above all, it is very important that the Bush administration would awake from the dream of “regimechange” in North Korea. In other words, the Bush administration should refocus on the matter of the
primary concern of the international community, which is nonproliferation of nuclear weapons andmissiles, instead of the unfavorable and impossible temptation of regime change.

Contrary to the official announcement of the U.S. government, the difference between Iraq andNorth Korea for the Bush administration is that while Iraq has been ‘a target of occupation’, there
hasn’t been a specific goal toward North Korea. The Bush administration has targeted on Iraq
because it has wanted to reorganize the order of the Middle East more favorable to itself and Israel
and tighten the control of energy supply by dominating the 2nd largest oil-producing country.
Therefore, the Bush administration intends to make its hegemony secure in the Middle East. Mr.
Bush may also have intention to leave military industries, oil oligarchies, and construction“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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3companies as his powerful sponsors for the 2004 Presidential Election by guaranteeing them to makehuge profits.

On the other hand, in case of North Korea, the U.S. doesn’t have any ‘clear’ strategy on North Korea.
Hence, the Bush administration’s goal toward North Korea has been divided. The Bushadministration can’t accept willingly the nonproliferation policy of weapons of mass
destruction(WMD) that has been the fundamental policy toward North Korea since thedismantlement of cold war. However, if the U.S. ensures Kim Jongil’s regime survival in exchange
for the North Korea’s abandoning its weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. will have to face selfcontradiction of guaranteeing the security of one member of the “Axis of Evil” while having beenadamant about destroying another member, Iraq. In other words, the Bush administration has goneback and forth between two contradicting principles of nonproliferation and regime change.

The dilemma of the Bush administration is that either military strike, as in Iraq, or blockade andsanctions to induce the collapse of North Korea is not a realistic option. Looking through the courseof the Bush administration’s actions, it is more likely to use the current crisis to accomplish its
military objectives such as establishing missile defense(MD), making mini-nuke, and strengthening
the alliance with South Korea and Japan rather than to solve this nuclear crisis by diplomatic means
through a positive and serious negotiation.

From now on, the Bush administration should get out of its confused policy by making diplomaticefforts to focus on nonproliferation. In other words, the U.S. must guarantee that North Korea canassure its regime security by recognizing its sovereignty, signing a non-aggression agreement, lifting
economic sanctions and normalizing the relation with North Korea. If the Bush administration shows
willingness to negotiate seriously with North Korea on the issues of WMD nonproliferation, North
Korea will be willing to accept negotiation with the U.S. as the North has already indicated its hopefor a simultaneous and package deal in several occasions.

At this point, we have to ask a very fundamental question concerning the Bush's North Korean
policy. "Does Mr. Bush really want to remove threats of weapons of mass destruction by North
Korea?" Or, "Is it possible for Mr. Bush to continue his new military strategy including theambitious MD plan without so-called the threat from North Korea?" It may sound like a conspiracy,
but we must seek the right answer to this question in order to understand real intention of the Bush's
policy on North Korea.

There has been a fundamental tension between the peaceful settlement of weapons of mass

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destruction in North Korea and the new military strategies of the Bush administration. As wellknown, the Bush administration is connected with the military-industrial complex. The Bushadministration has a variety of military projects ranging from MD to new nuclear weapon
development. From these projects, the Bush administration would guarantee the profit of the defense
industries which are the biggest sponsor of the Bush administration, and pave the road to military
dominance on the globe and space. Needless to say, these military projects need astronomical budget.
In order the Bush to persuade American taxpayers to burden huge military budget, there should be aconstant outside threat, something like North Korean threat

In fact, the Bush administration stopped the missile talk with North Korea and announced thedeployment of MD, as soon as it launched, even though Collin Powell, the Secretary of State said
that there are “some promising factors” in dealing with North Korea. The Bush administration fearedthat it would lose the biggest rational for MD, if the North Korean missile issue was resolved
peacefully.

This case is not merely past. Since the confrontation between North Korea and the U.S in October
2002, the Bush administration has reluctant to negotiate with North Korea.

Why? I will explain thereasons by the example of the Bush’s policy toward Japan.

The goal of the Bush administration’s policy toward Japan is to make Japan as “the U.K in Asia”. It
means that the Bush administration intends to use Japan like the U.K. in order to strengthen its
hegemony in Northeast Asia. By making Japan into the tool of military hegemony, the Bushadministration, “if necessary”, will attack North Korea with Japanese help as the U.K played a rolein invading Iraq, prevent China from becoming the rival of the U.S, and vitalize Japanese militaryrole in the US led wars as the Iraq invasion shows.

In order to realize this goal, the Bush administration needs a “threat.” If Japanese didn’t feelthreatened by North Korea, it would be difficult to pass contingency law, increase military power,and decide to deploy missile defense as soon as possible by purchasing 2 billions dollar-weapons
made in the U.S. This is one of the biggest reasons that the Bush administration has preserved andexaggerated “North Korean threat” while refusing to negotiate with North Korea.

3. Anticipated Outreaches Triggered by Nuclear Armed North Korea

Many foreign media and experts have said that South Koreans would not care about North Korea
nuclear armament. But it’s not true. Most of South Koreans recognize that the crisis reaches peak“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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when the nuclear armament of North Korea comes to the reality.

The result of the North's nuclear armament will be catatonic when it fails to agree with the UnitedStates. Nuclear weapons of the North cause South Koreans 'fear on nuclear war', since the danger of
war on the Korean peninsula has not yet resolved. The U.S, South Korea, and maybe Japan will aim
North Korea nuclear arsenal as the first strike target, and practice to block the sea, air, and landaround North Korea. The Korean peninsula will be on the brink of war as a military tension increase.

The problem does not stop here. The effect of the North's nuclear weapons on the whole world aswell as the Northeast Asia is incredible. The North's possession of nuclear weapons will bring about
Japanese nuclear armament of which it already has the capability. South Korea is also to be inclined
to develop nuclear programs when Japan produces nuclear bombs together with North Korea.
Likewise, it will affect China to increase nuclear power, although it has been slow to do it so far.
Furthermore, Twain, India, Pakistan, and Middle Eastern countries are likely to start or expand their
nuclear programs, which pose a great danger to the world security and nuclear nonproliferation
regime.

Also, North Korean success in nuclear programs will increase its exports of nuclear technology forthe economic profits. The expected dangers tell us that nuclear possession of North Korea will
accelerate nuclear arms race in East Asia and result in collapse of the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty).

The most significant problem to Koreans lies in the fact that the unification becomes impossible
when North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. Neighboring countries around the Korean peninsula
have complicated interests in the united Korea. However, their common interests stand in 'Nuclearfree Korea'. Given the fact that Korea cannot be united when it faces strong opposition from theneighboring countries, denuclearization on the Korean peninsula is essential for the unification.

In this context, most of Koreans oppose nuclear armed North Korea as well as the U.S strike against
North Korea. But there is important point. Nuclear armed North Korea, however difficult, can bereversed, while rebuilding from the 2nd Korean war is impossible. This is the biggest dilemma to
Koreans and the reason that we should strive hard to resolve the standoff between North Korea andthe U.S peacefully by the negotiation.

4. How to break the ice through 6-party talks“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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There are three options to take to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis and achieve peace on thepeninsular. The ongoing six-party talks, North Korea-US negotiation like the one in 1994 andnegotiation between the two Koreas like the one that achieved the 2000 Summit. However, starting a
new round of US-DPRK negotiation seems unlikable during the Bush administration and interKorean talks has its own limit to cover all aspects of the North Korean nuclear issue and security
guarantee for North Korea.

Of course, considering North Korea and the U.S. are the main players to resolve the North Korean
issues, we should not completely rule out North Korea-US conversations. And we also should not
close door for inter-Korean dialogues despite institutional and political difficulties in case of six-way
talks’ failure. But, we have to understand that the six-party talks will be the possible best option on
the table since the official and substantial framework addressing the standoff between North Korean
and the U.S is based on the six-way talks.

It needs to set goals and follow proper procedure to take the six- party talks as an opportunity toestablish peace on the Korea and lay the ground for common security in Northeast Asia. The goals
can be △ resolving the crisis on the peninsular through both addressing the North Korean nuclear
issue and guaranteeing North Korea its security simultaneously △ normalizing North Korea-US andNorth Korea-Japan relations for finishing the cross recognition in Northeast Asia △ coming up witha framework for a peace system that can replace the current armistice system which has been lasted
since 1953 △ working for common security in the Northeast Asia through creating the nuclear
weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia and establishing multilateral security cooperation.

To achieve these goals, first, six parties need to reaffirm that the issues should be resolved throughdialogue and negotiation and prevent the situation from getting worse. Second, they need to
document and announce achievements they make in every talk. Third, they need to pursue a new
agreement that can replace the 1994 Agreed Framework as an ultimate step.

(1) How to make North Korea give up nuclear ambition and the U.S. to promise North Korea’s
security at the same time

There will be no alternative to dealing with the situation except for North Korea’s giving up nuclear
program and US guaranteeing security of the North Korean regime simultaneously. And this is thesolution supported by four countries participating in the 6-party talks as well as many experts.

Also this is why a series of remarks before and after the first round of six-way talks in late August“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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2003 from US Secretary of State Collin Powell on this issue drew attention. He said that the U.S. isseeking ways to ensure the security of North Korea. The Bush administration, which had been
sticking to its unilateral and rigid stance by saying, “there will be no concession unless North Korea
abandons its nuclear program completely, verifiably, and irreversibly” hinted that it could discusswith North Korea about guaranteeing security before North Korea completes the wholedismantlement process. In this respect, Secretary Powell said that although it is impossible to give
what exactly North Korea wants, the administration is considering an official, written andmultilateral security assurance to the regime. The US offer is confirmed by President Bush at the
APEC Summit in October, 2003.

It is clearly a positive sign. But we should not be too optimistic about the future, since the U.S.
demands North Korea take the first step. Moreover, it is not clear whether the hawks, including vicepresident Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, are with the upcoming security
proposal. Although the Bush administration indicated that it would provide a written multilateral
security assurance, it also clarified that the assurance would be provided only after North Korea
agreed not to resume its nuclear program and started dismantling its nuclear facilities. It can beinterpreted that even though the U.S. shifted its position from “complete, verifiable and irreversible
dismantlement” as the timing of giving a multilateral security assurance, it still wants to see thebeginning of the dismantlement of the North’s nuclear program first. Considering that North Korea
wants a substantial security guarantee and energy aid in return of freezing its nuclear program, there
is a visible gap between the two stances.

To bridge the gap, North Korea’s nuclear disarmament process and security assurance and energy
aid plan in return should be developed. Given changes from the U.S. and North Korea, there must be
an intersection and in that case, this approach makes a sense. North Korea already made it clear at
the end of the first round of six-nation talks that it would dismantle nuclear facilities when the lightwater reactor is completed. On December 14th, 2003, North Korea said that if the U.S. takes theNorth’s comprehensive and simultaneous proposal, it will respond with complete abolishment of
nuclear program. In other words, North Korea may accept the whole dismantlement of nuclear
program. As mentioned above, the U.S. also suggested that it would guarantee the security of theregime before North Korea completely dismantlement its nuclear program. Further discussion will
be needed for details, method and procedure, but what the U.S. demands, which is CVID, and what
North Korea demands, which is security assurance before nuclear dismantlement, can be achieved at
the same time.

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In that case, based on the complete dismantlement and security assurance beforehand, what will be
the new peace process like? The new process must take three steps: firstly, crisis management toprevent the situation from getting worse and leverage the conversation: secondly, resolution of thecrisis and establishment of peace system through joint declaration: thirdly, implementation of thedeclaration and institutionalization of peace system by signing a new comprehensive agreement thatwill replace the Agreed Framework.

(2) First step: crisis management and making the breakthroughThe first step was mostly covered by a statement released by China, the host of the six-party talks,
right after the first round of talks. And the statement says about,- the need to seek peaceful resolution for the North Korean nuclear issue, peace and security on the
Korean peninsular- the need to discuss a wide variety of matters of concerns including nuclear weapon-free Korean
peninsular and security of North Korea- the need to reach a fair and rational resolution that addresses all the concerns of the participants- the need to avoid any remark or action that may worsen the situation during the negotiation- the need to continue conversation to build trust and address differences- the need to recognize the importance of the six-party talks and schedule the next meeting as soon as
possible through diplomatic channels

Right after the first six-way conversation, North Korea called the talks useless and made a series ofstrong statements. North Korea even declared that it would build nuclear deterrent capability.
However, the U.S. did not pay much to the statements. In the meantime, there were news about aplan to strengthen the US military forces in Korea including incorporating the patriot advanced
capability (PAC-3) missile and a comment from US Defense Secretary about plan to use nuclear
weapon against North Korea. Surprisingly, North Korea did not use them to reject six-party talks.
These show that no matter how bumpy the road is, the six-party talks will continue as long as there
is a road. Why? Failure of the talks will be a great burden both for North Korea and the U.S. In
addition to that, other players in the talks such as South Korea and China actively work as a mediatorand manager to revive the talks.

Despite all the bright signs, we cannot say the six-party talks is the best tool for crisis management.
There are criticism about the usefulness of the six-party talks from hardliners in both North Korea
and the U.S. Moreover, the talks do not take place on a regular basis. To make the six-party talks to“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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become the best crisis management tool, all the parties should acknowledge the usefulness of thetalks and meet on a regular basis. Besides, to make the talks a substantial stage for negotiation, theformat of it should be reformed to allow bilateral talks between North Korea and the U.S.

(3) Second step: resolving crisis and laying groundwork for peace system

The first round of six-party talks failed to come up with a joint announcement. However, future talks
must see joint statements about goals, achievements, plans and implementing agreed terms. Because,a joint announcement can not only leverage the next talks, but also prevent the situation from getting
worse by putting some sort of political pressure on the six countries. Moreover, a joint statement will
make the talks more formal and official.

The six needs stated in the announcement that China released at the first talks cover most of what thejoint announcement should mention. Thus, the first priority will be making it a ‘joint’ announcementagreed by all the participants. But at the same time, the content should be reviewed in a more
concrete way. Most of all, the joint statement should be able to set a goal to ‘put things back in theirplace where they were’ on the Korean peninsular.

The controversial part in the phrase is ‘where’. Many experts think the point should be October 2002
when North Korea and the U.S. clashed over secret nuclear weapons development. However, thisclaim lacks of fairness and objectivity. Although North Korea sees ‘where’ as October 2000 when
North Korea and the U.S. were about shaking hands, the view does not seem realistic. Now president
Gorge W. Bush took the office and he made it clear that he would not take same approaches to North
Korea as his predecessor did. This is why we need to take another look at ‘where’.

Looking back, there began the signs of crisis when the Bush administration downplayed theachievement made by the Clinton administration. President Bush’s “axis of evil” remark and thenuclear posture review (NPR) and national security strategy (NSS) document based on ‘pre-emptive’
war concept heightened the tension. And finally, the crisis reached its peak in October 2002. In thisrespect, at the time of “axis of evil” should be the ‘where’.

It does not mean that president Bush should take back his words or the NPR and NSS should be
reviewed. Those are necessary but not realistic. Moreover, they can’t be covered in the joint
announcement. Then what should the announcement be about?

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10First, the announcement must be able to present the goals of the six-party talks in general terms.
These can be △ simultaneous or balanced resolution of both North Korean nuclear issue andsecurity assurance for North Korea △ completion of cross approval system in Northeast Asia
through normalizing ties between North Korea-the U.S., and North Korea-Japan △ layout forbuilding peace system in the Korean peninsular and recognition of importance of Korean unification△ peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia.

Second, the two main players, North Korea and the U.S., should not provoke each other and speakout their mind clearly to restore trust. In this regard, North Korea should show its willingness to giveup its nuclear ambition as well as to address the missile issue. On the other hand, the U.S. should
assure North Korea that it has no intention to either invade the country or topple the regime. Also the
U.S. should respect the North Korea’s sovereignty. In other words, the two should make it clear that
their goals can meet through cooperation.

Third, detailed measures to restore trust between North Korea and the U.S. should be reached. North
Korea should halt its nuclear program as a first step to dismantle the whole program and allow IAEA
inspectors in the country as well as rejoin the NPT. North Korea once defined ‘halt’ as ‘no more
nuclear weapons or tests, no more transfer and no more nuclear facility even for peaceful use.’ Givethe definition, North Korea seems ready to freeze its nuclear program. In return, the U.S. should
reward North Korea by lifting sanction, removing its name from the terror support nation list andproviding energy aid.

However, the measures may spark controversy. ‘No more nuclear weapon’ defined by North Korea
can be interpreted that North Korea already acquired nuclear weapons and would keep the existing
ones. While North Korea mentioned several times about building “nuclear deterrent” capability, it
never used the word ‘nuclear weapon’. To clear the doubt, North Korea could include ‘nuclear
deterrent’ in the phase of nuclear program dismantlement.

Another big issue is who will take the role of inspector. North Korea has withdrawn from thenuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Thus, for IAEA to play the role, North Korea will be asked
to not only rejoin the treaty but also sign an additional protocol that gives more power to IAEA
inspectors. To make it worse, both North Korea and the U.S. do not trust the IAEA with different
reasons. North Korea sees IAEA as a US spy while the U.S. is not satisfied with IAEA’s inspection
system. However, considering there is no alternative, utilizing the IAEA by strengthening its system
will be the next-best thing.

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Energy aid is not easy, too. The Bush administration made it clear that there would be no reward in
exchange of North Korea’s freezing nuclear facilities. Therefore, the five participants to the talks
except for North Korea should come up with a good method to provide energy aid to the North.

Fourth, the issue concerning highly enriched uranium, or HEU, program should be addressed.
Especially, given the stance of US hawks who put the highest priority on the HEU program, theissue can be a big huddle to the ongoing six-party talks. To resolve the issue, North Korea shouldreport its HEU program-related facts to the IAEA while the U.S. should present ‘evidence’ regarding
North Korean HEU program to the IAEA. If necessary, recorded file at the special envoy talks in
October 2002 in Pyongyang. For this, the HEU problem should be dealt in “Working Group” that
may be composed of the experts.

Fifth, a working group discussed at the first six-party talks should be formed. Although the groupwith experts from all six countries will not be permanent, it will be effective as long as the talks takeplace. The main job of the group must be conducting researches on expected issues, analyzing
situations and suggesting alternatives. Main agenda should include △ how to resolve the difference
between DPRK-US position about HEU △ how to guarantee security of North Korea △ how toinspect North Korean nuclear program △ how to address energy shortage in North Korea and seek
multilateral energy cooperation△ how to establish peace on the Korean peninsular △ how to realize
nuclear weapon-free Northeast Asia. The organization should be able to provide the outcome ofresearches and discussions at any time for the six countries to use them as basic material.

Finally, ‘the importance of inter-Korean relationship’ should be mentioned. Through this, two
Koreas will be able to get international support and assurance in maintaining and developing therelations. Moreover, it can work as a foundation to seek a variety of alternatives by expanding
political autonomy of two Koreas.

It will be ideal if the next talks come up with a conclusion for all the subjects mentioned above. But
step-by-step agreement and statement will be welcomed as well. And ultimately, the six parties
should put their utmost efforts to reach a new and comprehensive agreement that will replace the1994 Geneva framework.

5. A Draft for a New Agreed Framework that would replace the 1994 Agreed Framework

The following is my proposal for a new agreed framework that could replace the Geneva Agreed
Framework of 1994. I hope it would offer important insights when you read in comparison to the“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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Agreed Framework(bellow attached). I welcome all your thoughts and criticisms on this proposal.

Delegations of the governments of the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Democratic People’s Republicof Korea (DPRK), the United States (U.S.), China, Russia, and Japan held talks to negotiate
resolutions on many pending issues including the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and efforts
to ensure coexistence in Northeast Asia. The participating nations agreed to uphold the principles of
the October 21, 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace anddenuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. They also agreed on the necessity to amend some of thearticles agreed in Agreed Framework. Moreover, the participating nations affirmed the importance of
formulating concrete and comprehensive measures to materialize the DPRK-U.S. joint communiquéand to improve peace and security on the Korean Peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia.

I. Participant nations will amend some provisions of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S.
and the DPRK that undertook the replacement of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors andrelated facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

1) The construction of one of the two LWRs, which were to be completed under the U.S.
leadership in 2003, will continue while the other LWR will be replaced with alternative energy
supply.

-- The Korean Peninsula energy Development Organization (KEDO) will continue its role as theprinciple organization of the LWR project and will be in charge of the completion of the first
LWR and supply of heavy fuel oil. KEDO will make best efforts to complete the LWR, and the
U.S. will provide 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year until its completion. The DPRK will use
the received heavy fuel oil for heating and electricity production.

-- The U.S. and the DPRK will assure the progress of the LWR project and conclude a bilateralagreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

-- Participant nations will provide measures for supplying non-nuclear energy to the DPRK toresolve its electricity shortage in exchange for the second LWR and will find comprehensive
solutions such as improvement of worn-out power lines to ameliorate electricity shortage. For thispurpose, the participant nations will organize an international consortium with the participation of
all the signatories and the sponsorship of important international financial institutions, including theWorld Bank.

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132) With concrete provisions to complete the first LWR and supply alternative energy to the DPRK,
the DPRK will freeze its nuclear facilities and related facilities and will eventually dismantle thesefacilities.

-- The DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, and the IAEA
will be allowed to monitor this freeze. The DPRK will provide full cooperation to theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for this purpose.
-- The necessity of verifying and inspecting Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) program will bedecided after examining all documents provided by the U.S. and the DPRK. The nations
signing this agreement and IAEA will decide whether to inspect and verify HEU program.

-Spent fuel rods or reprocessed plutonium will be stored safely until they are moved out of the
DPRK under the IAEA monitoring, and these will be transferred to overseas as soon as the
U.S.-DPRK nuclear agreement is signed. The cost of this removal will be born by the U.S.

-The dismantlement of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be
implemented when the U.S.-DPRK nuclear agreement is signed and key components for the
LWR are delivered. Consequently, the dismantlement will come earlier since the completion of
the LWR project as stipulated in the 1994 Agreed Framework is no longer required for thedismantlement to begin. In regard to the financing of this provision, participant nations will
share the cost fairly.

II. Participant nations will make sincere efforts to promote reconciliation between the ROK and the
DPRK, to end hostile relations between the U.S. and the DPRK, and to achieve lasting peace on the
Korean Peninsula.

1) The U.S. provides formal assurance against the use or threat of force, including nuclear
weapons, on the DPRK. Participant nations will guarantee the assurance internationally.
2) The DPRK will discontinue permanently its missiles export, and the U.S. will makearrangements to compensate the DPRK’s economic loss due to the discontinuation of missile
exports. The principle of the compensation will be the supply of goods, such as food, fuel oil,and so on, instead of monetary payment.
3) The DPRK will abandon its development, production, and deployment of ballistic missiles
with the range of 300 miles (480km) or longer. The U.S. lifts the DPRK from economic
sanctions. The U.S. will also be responsible for providing substitute means for the DPRK tolaunch its satellites in compensation for abandoning its long-range missile development.

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144) The DPRK, the ROK and the U.S. will begin negotiation on the arms reduction on the Korean
peninsula and reorganization of the United States Forces in Korea (USFK), and participant
nations will offer cooperation with this process. The DPRK will be faithful to its obligation asa signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and will join the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) in accordance with the U.S.-DPRK-ROK disarmaments talks.
5) The DPRK, the ROK and the U.S. begin full-scale negotiation for elevating the armisticeagreement to the peace agreement to terminate the cold war system in Northeast Asia.
Participant nations will cooperate with this process.
6) The U.S. and the DPRK will open a liaison office in each other’s capital and upgrade bilateralrelations to the ambassadorial level.
7) The DPRK and Japan will move toward full normalization of their relations as soon as
possible.

III. Participant nations will make efforts to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation
regime and to promote peace in Northeast Asia.

1) The DPRK will return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and will allow implementation ofits safeguards agreement under the treaty. And DPRK will sign IAEA Additional Protocol.
2) Upon confirmation of the arrangement to supply electric power and compensate for one of thetwo LWRs, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the
IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA,
following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy andcompleteness of the DPRK’s initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.
3) The ROK, the DPRK and Japan will sign a nuclear-free zone treaty based on Joint Declarationof the Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula and non-nuclear three principles of Japan. In
accordance with this, the U.S., China, and Russia will officially guarantee it. To implement thisarrangement and to turn Northeast Asia eventually into a nuclear-free zone, Organization for
NWFZ in NEA’ will be launched .
4) Participant nations will recognize that building the Eurasian trans-continental railway by linking
the trans-Siberia railway to the inter-Korean railway would contribute to building trust andincreasing prosperity in Northeast Asia. Participant nations will support the establishment of the
EARO (Eurasian Railway Organization).
Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, October 21, 1994
Delegations of the Governments of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 17, 1994, to“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

Hiroshima Peace InstituteCheong

Proposal for Peaceful Resolution of Nuclear Crisis

15

negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994
Agreed Statement between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993
Joint Statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean
peninsula. The U.S. and the DPRK decided to take the following actions for the resolution of thenuclear issue:

I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities
with light-water
reactor (LWR) power plants.

1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will
undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total
generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003.

-- The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the
LWR project tobe provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing the international consortium, will serve as theprincipal point ofcontact with the DPRK for the LWR project.

-- The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply
contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this Document for the provision of the
LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this Document.

“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

Hiroshima Peace Institute