U.S.-Japan Relations and Nuclear Weapons
Benjamin Self
Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center
Prepared for Workshop on“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”
Hiroshima Peace Institute
Hiroshima, Japan
March 11-12, 2004

The U.S.-Japan Alliance is the most positive element of the East Asian regional security
environment. It ensures structural stability as a key pillar of both U.S. regional strategy andJapanese national security policy. At the same time, the Alliance has not been sufficiently
effective in preventing nuclear proliferation, nor in promoting nuclear disarmament.
Changing conditions have propelled adaptation in the U.S.-Japan relationship since the
Korean War brought about the Reverse Course during the Occupation, continued with thebuild-up of Japanese maritime defense capabilities in the 1980s, and through to the postCold War revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. In the aftermathof the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S.-Japan Alliance has confronted theglobal challenge of transnational terrorism.
If the history of the Alliance has been one of evolution from a transaction to a partnership,
its present reveals the early stages of institutionalization. The Alliance has begun totranscend the Mutual Security Treaty, and through deepening interaction in operations,planning, research and development, and strategic dialogue, it is becoming an entity in its
own right. Faced with severe tests of the international regime against nuclear weapons
proliferation, the United States and Japan must strengthen their alliance’s capabilities toresist proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems,
while promoting universal nuclear disarmament and the complete abolition of nuclear
weapons.
The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Regional Security
The U.S.-Japan Alliance has been the linchpin of regional security in the Asia-Pacificregion for decades.i During the later phase of the Cold War, after Japan’s emergence as amajor economic and technological power, the significance of the Alliance began totranscend the American military bases on Japanese territory and emerged as a politicalpartnership for common global goals. That the world’s two largest economies, accounting
at the end of the Cold War for as much forty percent of global product (and a vastly larger
share of Asia-Pacific economic output) could sustain their close partnership through theSelf

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turbulence of the post-Cold War era, in the face of sometimes severe trade friction, hasbeen the key buttress of regional prosperity.
As part of preserving stability, the Alliance plays a role in threats to use force ininternational politics (although Japan is forbidden from this by its Constitution, it
undoubtedly abets American threats, particularly in regard to North Korea, and especiallysince 1999). These threats have until recently been oriented toward preserving the statusquo; in other words, for deterrence. Deterrence has been a critical function of the Alliancein coping with threats in Northeast Asia from the Cold War era to the present.
The most explicit target of deterrence for the Alliance had been the forces of the Red Armyand Soviet Pacific Fleet, but after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR,
explicit deterrence was briefly replaced by “preserving regional stability” as the Alliance’s
rationale.
In 1993, suspicions over North Korean activities at its nuclear research reactor at Yongbyon
led Pyongyang to declare in early 1994 its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, or NPT (under which it received nuclear technology as a non-nuclear weapons
state). This first North Korean nuclear crisis escalated through the summer of 1994, with
U.S. military pressure intensifying to the brink of war before former President Jimmy
Carter brokered a compromise that, through bilateral negotiations in Geneva, led to theAgreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea (DPRK) in October of 1994.ii While the conflict was avoided, U.S. preparations andconsultation with Japan revealed limits in the ability of the Alliance to respond to a regional
contingency.
With the flaws in Alliance operability highlighted by the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis,
the strategic context in post-Cold War East Asia was being reshaped by the emergence ofChina as a potential regional challenger to the global dominance of the U.S.-centeredsystem. Chinese rhetoric of multipolarization, its criticism of the U.S.-Japan Alliance as a“relic of the Cold War,” and its aggressive claims to maritime territory in the South andEast China Seas caused concern in Washington and Tokyo. From 1994 on, the direction ofstrategic reevaluation in both capitals moved to emphasize the continuing importance of the
Alliance, as seen in the Nye Initiative and the Higuchi Commission report.
The two dimensions of China and North Korea came together again in April 1996, when
President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro announced the reaffirmation
and rejuvenation of the Alliance (to include a revision of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.Japan Defense Cooperation to repair the weaknesses apparent at the time of the 1994 North
Korea nuclear crisis) in the wake of a major crisis in the Taiwan Strait. As a result of thecoincidence in timing, the process of revising the Guidelines included discussion of the
security of Taiwan.iii With the passage of Guidelines-enabling legislation (the Law on
Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan), the long-awaited regionalization of the Alliance
was complete. Having struggled to involve Japan formally in the security of the Korean“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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Peninsula and the are of the Taiwan Strait since the Nixon-Sato Communiqué of 1969, theUnited States had at last captured an explicit Japanese commitment in the case of theformer, and implicit support for the latter. Contrary to Chinese expectations ofmultipolarization and greater freedom of action, Northeast Asia remains firmly under thehegemony of the United States.
Nuclear Weapons in U.S.-Japan Relations
The U.S.-Japan relationship has been intertwined with nuclear weapons issues since thedawn of the nuclear age with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. As
a result, the normative dimension of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in U.S.Japan relations shows a stark contrast. On the one hand, the United States is the only
country to have actually employed nuclear weapons, and clings to its status as a nuclear
weapons state. On the other hand, based on its experience as the sole victim of atomic
attack Japan has maintained a strenuous anti-nuclear posture, not only abjuring nuclear
weapons itself but encouraging their total elimination.
At the same time, the Alliance relationship between the two has been predicated on U.S.
willingness to use nuclear weapons to defend Japan. While Japan has opposed nuclear
weapons, it has also been criticized for doing so from under the protection of the American
nuclear umbrella.iv
The charge of hypocrisy has some basis. Japan has always taken a different position on
nuclear weapons within its Alliance relationship than it has in general. Despite the three
non-nuclear principles not to possess, produce, or introduce nuclear weapons, Japan turned
blind eye to nuclear-equipped U.S. Navy vessels entering Japanese ports. Furthermore,
despite demanding (and securing) the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in a“denuclearized” state, the Japanese government secretly agreed to allow the reintroductionof nuclear weapons to Okinawa in the event of a crisis.
The U.S.-Japan Alliance versus Proliferation
The Alliance has played an important part in reducing the danger of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, both regionally andglobally. The first of the means by which it has done so is by obviating Japanese nuclear
armament. With the decision by Prime Minister Sato Eisaku to reject nuclear armamentdespite China’s 1964 nuclear test, Japan prepared to accept the framework of nonproliferation established by the nuclear powers. Japan’s hesitation in accepting thisframework drew primarily on concern that the inherent discrimination against non-nuclear
weapons states would make it more difficult for them to apply pressure for disarmament(although within Japan there was also the argument that Japan should retain the potential toobtain nuclear weapons if the national interest demanded). As it turned out, Japan’s
expectation was correct, as the government became ever-more concerned about preserving“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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4the guarantee of the extended U.S. nuclear deterrent and therefore muted its position on
issues such as No First Use doctrine or core deterrence.
In the mid-1970s, under the Carter administration, the United States made a substantial
effort to restrain Japan’s development of a plutonium-reprocessing capability in the 1970sout of concern over the potential for Japan to convert the fuel-cycle into a weapons-grade
plutonium manufacturing system (and simultaneously pressured both Taiwan and South
Korea to abandon suspected nuclear weapons programs). Japan had already declared its
firm intention to remain free of nuclear weapons in domestic law, bilateral treaties, and the
NPT. The pressure to roll back Japan’s plutonium program had less to do with any
reasonable suspicion of Japan than a concerted effort by both superpowers to deal
comprehensively with the threat of proliferation – a common security concern in Moscow
and Washington.
Japan’s Plutonium and Meta-Deterrence
The effort in the 1970s to shut down Japan’s plan for a domestically self-sustainable
nuclear fuel cycle met with severe resistance in Tokyo for several reasons. First, Japan had
already invested substantial funds in developing the program. Second, in an era of high andvolatile oil prices, the importance of energy security was very high indeed. Third, national
pride was on the line and many Japanese were unwilling to submit to superpower pressure.
Fourth, Japanese leaders and officials were offended by the implication that their program
had even the potential for clandestine weapons development purposes. Fifth, incontradiction to the previous point, there were the lingering arguments that whatever thecurrent situation (including provision of the nuclear umbrella by the United States), thefuture was uncertain and it would be unwise to completely close any avenue. Finally, thereis the logic of meta-deterrence, which assumes that the potential to “go nuclear” is a useful
tool for Japanese diplomacy and security, even if nuclear weapons themselves are
undesirable.
Meta-deterrence exploits the expected negative consequences for other states if Japan were
to develop a nuclear arsenal as a tool to constrain the behavior of those states. Moreover,meta-deterrence relies on Japan’s bad reputation in Asia to threaten China and North Korea,
as well as U.S. allies such as South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan with the prospect ofa nuclear Japan. This technique continually undermines other countries’ trust in Japan,
carrying substantial image costs for a country that seeks to develop a plutonium-based
nuclear fuel cycle. In essence meta-deterrence exploits both the horror of nuclear weapons
and the horror of Japan’s own atrocious 20th century history.
Meta-deterrence appeared again in response to the North Korean nuclear crisis of 2002,
when the Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer suggested playing the “Japan
Card” against China. This would consist of informing Beijing that unless it took dramatic
steps to prevent North Korea from moving forward with a nuclear weapons capability,
Japan would likely find it impossible to resist pressure to obtain nuclear weapons itself.
The Japanese, once eager to deny any prospect of violating their treaty obligations, played“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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5along by hinting to the Chinese that their thinking was proceeding along these lines, while
privately admitting that in fact no Japanese nuclear deterrent makes sense even vis-à-vis
North Korea. If North Korea can be deterred by nuclear weapons, then U.S. nuclear
weapons suffice. If North Korea cannot be deterred by nuclear weapons, Japan gains
nothing and loses a great deal by obtaining them. If there is some question about thecredibility of the extended nuclear deterrent, suggestions that Japan is dissatisfied only
erode its credibility further.
U.S.-Japan Cooperation for Arms Control
The Clinton administration devoted substantial efforts to arms control, negotiating several
multilateral treaties during the 1990s while seeking to uphold the legacy of priorachievements. The most notable success was in the entry into force of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), an accomplishment that saw the United States and Japanworking together for common ends in a positive sum security milieu. Other endeavors,
despite joint efforts, yielded no similar triumphs. The most frustrating of these for Tokyo
was undoubtedly the failure of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was
not only a commitment undertaken in connection with the indefinite extension of the NPT
in 1995, but a goal close to the hearts of the Japanese. Stopping nuclear testing had been ahope at least since the H-bomb test at Bikini atoll in 1954 irradiated the crew of theJapanese fishing vessel Dai-go Fukuryu-maru.v The challenge of guiding Chinese
modernization away from excessive emphasis on military power likewise made the CTBT a
strategically rational aim for Japan.
The refusal of the U.S. Senate to ratify the CTBT drastically undermined the Japanesebelief in the extent of reciprocal constraint in the Alliance. Japan was certainly subject tovarious forms of control by the United States, and could be pressured into offering
generous Host Nation Support or financial contributions for multilateral military activities,
but when Tokyo sought to constrain Washington it found the Alliance offered little
leverage. Despite the revision of the Guidelines and the decision to proceed with joint
research on ballistic missile defense (see below), there was no American consideration ofJapanese preferences.
Still eager for Japan’s diplomatic support in multilateral negotiations (including especiallythe 2000 NPT review conference), the Clinton administration offered the creation of a
special U.S.-Japan Commission on Arms Control and Disarmament, jointly chaired by
Undersecretary of State John Hollum and Arms Control and Scientific Affairs Bureau
Director-General Kenji Hattori. This body aimed at resolving some of the Senators’
objections to the CTBT, especially in the area of verification technology, but the change ofadministrations shifted the focus to non-proliferation and saw the end of serious effort topass the CTBT. In the meantime, the Bush administration decided to scuttle the Biological
Weapons Convention’s verification protocol and withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile(ABM) Treaty.

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The official meetings of the Commission since the inauguration of Undersecretary John
Bolton have dealt with North Korea and the threat of ballistic missile and WMD
proliferation. Although the Track II component of the Commission process has brought
together Japanese and American scholars and policy analysts to provide new ideas andinsights, these have made no dent in the Bush administration’s posture. Instead, theJapanese face the danger of being co-opted into the preemption doctrine.
Counter-proliferation
The proliferation of ballistic missiles has been a bipartisan security concern in the UnitedStates since at least the Gulf War of 1991. The development of ballistic missile defenses,
seen to be technically feasible, was pursued as part of a strategy to reduce the appeal ofsuch systems for asymmetric warfare. If the penetrability of a ballistic missile can becompromised, its value as a military tool declines sharply. Particularly for lowertechnology ballistic missiles, the combination of poor accuracy and spotty reliability makesa Scud-type ballistic missile a far from ideal choice of weapons system to begin with, so
reasonably effective (and not too expensive) missile defenses might dry up demand forsuch missiles.
With the global threat of ballistic missiles growing and North Korea building and deploying
large numbers of Nodong rockets, the United States and Japan shared an interest in building
such an effective missile defense system. After the launch of the Taepodong rocket inAugust 1998, Tokyo and Washington were quick to conclude a memorandum of
understanding on joint research on Theater Missile Defense (TMD), particularly a seabased mid-course intercept system known (then) as Navy Theater-Wide (NTW). NTW wasto have relied on the advanced radars of the Aegis radar system, operated by both the U.S.
Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.
Missile defense was made a top priority by the Bush administration, and the program wasreconfigured to be more flexible, less constrained by the ABM treaty, and quicker. Japan,
which had been arguing that its participation in TMD was not connected to the issue of the
global strategic balance (a matter raised by the prospects for National Missile Defense),
found the lines blurring. Nonetheless, Japan has proceeded on the assumption that defenses
are inherently legitimate, and conform to Japanese preferences for avoiding retaliatory
measures for security.
The joint development of missile defense has raised questions about the sustainability of
two components of Japanese defense doctrine: the ban on arms exports and the refusal toexercise the right of collective self-defense. Although Japan has exported militaryequipment to the United States, the prospect that components or technology that Japan had
developed or even produced would be sold to third countries raised concerns that Tokyo
might break with its posture of not contributing to conflict as an arms exporter. Most
recently the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency, Ishiba Shigeru, has argued thatthe arms export ban should be not only relaxed to allow for BMD-related exports, but also
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on which to achieve economies of scale. Japan seems to retain enough pacifist preferences
to resist such an extreme shift, and the otoshidokoro (point of settlement) seems likely to bea relaxation limited to missile defense equipment only, but the trend of erosion in Japan’santi-military norms is clear.
Another dimension of concern in relation to missile defense is the question of whether
Japan can engage in missile defense cooperation with the United States to shoot down a
missile that is not attacking Japan (or U.S. Forces in Japan). If Japan were to destroy oreven support the destruction of a missile that was aimed at another country, this would
violate the traditional interpretation of the Constitution as banning the exercise of the rightof collective self-defense. The Cabinet Legislative Affairs Bureau (Naikaku Hoseikyoku)
has argued that any action that becomes integrated with the use of force – such as providing
munitions or even intelligence – violates Article IX’s prohibition of the use or threat offorce to resolve international disputes. This interpretation has been under great pressure
since the Guidelines review process of 1996-7, as both Japanese and American defense
specialists call for its relaxation. The problem is that once Japan accepts the right ofcollective self-defense, there is no clear indicator of when the use of force is justified or not.
Legitimacy in the use of force would become a matter of executive authority, in a context
in which neither the Japanese public nor the region is yet comfortable with Japan’s
judgment in security matters.
The trend in debate seems to indicate that yet another special exception will be made inJapanese thinking about defense doctrine, to argue that destruction of a ballistic missile
constitutes a legitimate act of self-defense, but that dispatch of combat units overseas would
still be against the Constitution. That said, Japan is already strengthening its use of the
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) outside of its territory. While pursuing missile defense
cooperation with the United States within the framework of its longstanding senshu boei
(exclusively defense-oriented defense) policy, Japan has also been driven by the North
Korean threat and the imbalance in the Alliance to become a participant in the Bushadministration’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
The PSI is designed to stop rogue countries or non-members of international nonproliferation regimes from exporting WMD and delivery systems. It calls for the inspection
and, if necessary, seizure of suspected vessels (ships and aircraft) entering the territory of
any PSI member. Japan has in recent months strengthened its domestic laws to allow forsuch activities, while also expanding the legal ability of the Maritime SDF to use force tostop and search suspected ships even in international waters. This adjustment comes as the
SDF has sharply expanded its ambit of operation in terms of both geography and mission.
Junior Alliance Partner in a Larger Role
Since September 11, 2001, Japan has dispatched the SDF on two extraordinary new
missions far outside its traditional sphere of action. First, in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom (the U.S. attacks on the Taliban regime that harbored the terrorist group Al Qaeda“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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in Afghanistan), Tokyo sent the MSDF to supply fuel to coalition ships in the Indian Ocean.
Second, despite the lack of international authorization for the U.S.-led war against Iraq
(Operation Iraqi Freedom), Japan has dispatched Air and Ground Self-Defense Force units
to Iraq to aid in reconstruction there.
The logic of Japan’s participation in these missions has been threefold. First, these tasks
are in support of international peace and stability and are welcomed by the international
community as a whole (by the United Nations). Second, these missions advance Japan’snational interest directly, by reducing the threat of terrorist activities and by contributing to
the stable supply of petroleum from the Persian Gulf. Third, these missions contribute toJapan’s national interest by strengthening U.S.-Japan Alliance relations and ensuring thecredibility of the American defense commitment in the face of potential threats from China
and, above all, North Korea.
For many observers the third rationale is the honne, or true thinking, behind Japanesecontributions outside of Northeast Asia. Japanese who hold this view have observed theunilateralist tendencies of the Bush administration – and its willingness to damage allianceties to advance its own goals – with great dismay. The age-old tension between entrapment
and abandonment has apparently shifted once again to the fear among Japanese defense
intellectuals that the United States would punish Japan for failing to provide support byleaving Japan to face North Korea (and China) on its own. The perception is widespreadthat Japan is in serious relative decline and can secure its future only under the auspices of
the hegemonic power of the United States. Yet there is a fourth rationale for the missions
in the Indian Ocean and in Iraq: to continue the incremental expansion of Japan’sinternational military activities as a goal in its own right.
There are a couple of reasons for the government of Japan to wish to push the envelope interms of SDF missions. First, to improve the capability and profile of the SDF itself. SDF
officers have sought a larger and more prominent role through various new international
missions since the end of the Cold War, including participation in UN Peacekeeping
Operations (PKO) in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, and East Timor;
international Humanitarian Relief Operations (HRO) in Zaire; international Disaster Relief
Operations (DRO) conducted in Honduras, Turkey, and India; joint search and rescue
exercises (SAREX), including submarine rescue exercises carried out with militaries fromaround the region; and various forms of defense exchange and security dialogue asconfidence-building measures (CBMs). Such missions can fulfill on the global stage thepositive and popular role that the SDF has long carried out within Japan, enhancing theimage of the SDF and Japan.
Second, and more critically, the continual and incremental “normalization” of Japan’s
defense establishment is a long-term strategic aim that will add a vital aspect to Japanesenational power in an era of (at best) slow economic growth. Although Japan relied on
economic and financial power during the Cold War era, the need to buttress its“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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9“comprehensive national power” in response to the rise of China, in particular, has
motivated defense intellectuals and strategists.
In some ways this is a distinction without a difference, as the aims of these strategists interms of increasing Japan’s military power are shared with the United States. Washington
has sought to make Japan the “Britain of Asia,” a political and military partner without
reservation. North Korea and its proliferation threat are seen as a short-term (if serious)
challenge, but Japan is being groomed for the longer-term role of balancing against apotential challenge from China.
Nuclear Weapons, the Alliance, and the Regional Security Environment
For Japan to emerge as a “normal nation” has been seen either as natural and inevitable oras the destabilizing resurgence of ultra-nationalist militarism, depending on the perspectiveof the observer and the understanding of normality. The course of incremental expansionof Japan’s security role has been steady and predictable, if occasionally accelerated byshocks in the international system like the 9-11 attacks. The important point to keep inmind is that the process of incremental expansion should be transparent, in keeping withdemocratic values, and in accordance with Japan’s domestic and international legal
obligations.
There is no fundamental reason that Japan should avoid the onerous duty of actively
supporting international security, including rendering judgment on the legitimacy andnecessity of the use of force. In the case of the 1991 Gulf War, Japan’s position that theuse of force was appropriate and necessary made its own refusal to participate seemcowardly rather than principled. In the future, Japan also must take up the burden as amember of international society to decide when force is needed and to use it effectively
when called to do so. That said, Japan must beware of being entrapped by the self-serving
logic of preemptive war and the capability-based defense doctrine of the Bushadministration. This boils down to the notion that “if we can, we will attain any new
military technology or capability that gives us an advantage, but you if you seek to do
likewise we will destroy you.” In other words, might makes right.
This thinking is pernicious enough applied even to international pariah states like Iraq andNorth Korea. In regard to China it could be extremely dangerous as well. The prospect of
the Alliance moving toward naked military hegemony is disturbing indeed. At the sametime, the Alliance still holds out hope as an institution dedicated to preservation of thestatus quo and a guarantor of regional stability. As Japan strengthens its own credentials as
an ally, it should also be in a position to demand the Alliance adhere to shared core valuesof the American and Japanese people, including minimum use of force, an international
process of legitimization, and reduced dependence on nuclear weapons.
i

Arguably the Alliance was the key security institution in Northeast Asia (or, precisely, theFar East) from its inception, and the most important in the broader Asia-Pacific region at“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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least since the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1973. By the 1980s, in the famousphrase of U.S. Ambassador Mike Mansfield, the United States and Japan shared “themost important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none.”ii
Michael Green, “The Challenges of Managing U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation after theCold War,” in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., New Perspectives on U.S.-Japan Relations, Japan
Center for International Exchange (Tokyo: 2000), pp. 256-7.
iii
On the timing of the Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration, see Michael Green, “Balanceof Power,” in Steven K. Vogel, Ed., U.S.-Japan Relations in a Changing World, Brookings
Institution Press (Washington, DC: 2002), p. 27. On Taiwan and the Guidelines, see
Former Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, China Hand:
An Oral History, p. xxx
iv
India pointedly rejected Japanese complaints about its 1998 nuclear tests, arguing thatJapan made use of a proxy nuclear deterrent and thus had no basis to argue India should
do without. See Japan’s Proactive Peace and Security Strategies – Including the Questionof “Nuclear Umbrella,” NIRA Research Report No. 20000005, National Institute for
Research Advancement, Tokyo, 2001, p. 18.
v
See Nobumasa Akiyama, “The Socio-Political Roots of Japan’s Non-Nuclear Posture,” inBenjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson, eds., Japan’s Nuclear Option: Security,
Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century, Henry L. Stimson Center (Washington, DC: 2003),
pp. 72-76.

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