The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 25 (2014)
Copyright © 2014 Haruo Iguchi. All rights reserved. This work may be used, with thisnotice included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work may be distributed,
electronically or otherwise, in whole or in part, without permission from the author.

Psychological Warfare during the American
Occupation of Japan: The Documentary Film
Project of Shu Taguchi and Bonner Fellers,
1949–1951

Haruo Iguchi*

Introduction
In the summer of 2013 the movie Emperor (Japanese title: Shusen no
Empera), directed by Peter Webber, became a box office hit. The film wasshown in 301 cinemas throughout Japan on July 27. According to a Kogyo
Tsushinsha survey, it ranked fourth based on attendance and sales for July
27 (Saturday) and July 28 (Sunday): 157,964 people saw this movie and thesales figure was 183,166,700 yen (about $1.83 million). By August 12, thefilm ranked eleventh based on the following figures: 878,106 had seen it attheaters in Japan since its release and the box office revenue totaled
991,120,500 yen (about $9.91 million).1 The film did far better in Japan
than in the United States, where it opened in the spring. First released thereon March 8, it grossed $1,014,099 on the first weekend. It was shown in 260
theaters and ranked sixteenth in ticket sales revenue. By the time the movie
ended its run on June 13, it had grossed $3,346,265.2
This film is an entertaining historical fiction that mixes suspense andromance. The main character, Brig. Gen. Bonner Frank Fellers (Matthew
Fox), was a real-life figure who served as Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s
military secretary and confidant. He was the key person in charge of*Professor, Nagoya University

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MacArthur’s psychological warfare against Japan during the Pacific War.
The film opens with the dramatic explosion of the atomic bomb over
Hiroshima. In the next scene, General MacArthur (Tommy Lee Jones) andhis men, on board the general’s aircraft Bataan, are bound for Atsugi airfieldnear Yokohama on a historical mission to start the Allied Occupation ofJapan. If Fellers, who died in 1973 at the age of seventy-seven, had beenable to see the movie, perhaps he would have been pleased to see himself
appearing in front of MacArthur inside Bataan for consultation. MacArthur’smemoir had no mention of Fellers whatsoever, since it was edited (andperhaps written) by Fellers’s arch rival, Courtney Whitney, who was incharge of the Government Section during the Occupation.3 However, in thefilm Fellers appears much younger than a real-life brigadier general would
be. Furthermore, Fellers in real life was married and a committed familyman, whereas the film portrays him as single and in love with an exchange
student from Japan whom he met during his college years. He searches forthis fictional student, called Aya in the film, when he arrives in Japan and isordered by MacArthur to investigate whether or not Emperor Hirohito was
guilty of war crimes.
In actuality, Fellers from 1949 to 1951 was involved in a project to create
a semi-documentary film based on his 1947 essay “Hirohito’s Struggle to
Surrender,” which had been published by Foreign Service, the mouthpiece
for a major American veterans organization of which Fellers was the publicaffairs director. The article was immediately republished during that year by
Reader’s Digest (July edition) and translated into Japanese by the magazine’s
Japanese subsidiary for its September edition.
I discuss in this essay the background and details regarding the failed
attempt to create the semi-documentary based on Fellers’s essay and observe
the reasons behind its failure. Furthermore, I address Fellers’s motivation
for getting involved in this project.

Shu Taguchi Approaches Fellers
Shuji (Shu) Taguchi, a relatively well-known independent film producer,
approached Fellers in a letter dated January 14, 1949, for permission to use
his article as the basis of a documentary. Taguchi first got into touch with
Reader’s Digest Japan president Dennis McEvoy, who during the war had
worked in the US Navy’s Intelligence unit (Office of Naval Intelligence
Psychological Warfare Brance, Op-16-W) under Capt. Ellis Zacharias, thecoordinator of psychological warfare against Japan, who worked with

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51

Fellers’s group. McEvoy had been president of Reader’s Digest Japan since
its inception in 1946.
Taguchi had in mind creating a semi-documentary with the tentative title“The Last Day of the Japanese Empire.” Fellers responded to Taguchi that
he needed to have the right to censor the script and the cast; that he beallowed to be present at the production of the film; that “proper
acknowledgment be made”; and, most important, that the film credit his
psychological warfare campaign as contributing to the Japanese surrender.
This campaign had been done through air dropping of leaflets so that theJapanese people “learned the truth about the war” and “supported theEmperor in his decision to force the militarists to surrender.” Fellers wanted
a film that would foster good relations between Japanese and Americans byportraying favorably the character of the Japanese emperor and the Japanesepeople (with a caveat “if properly presented”), alongside “the decency of
the American campaign and occupation.” Although Fellers believed the
proposed semi-documentary would do well in the United States, heinstructed his own confidant, Lt. Col. J. Woodall Greene, that “the film must
be watched to make sure that MacArthur’s views and American prestige arein no way violated.” Fellers thought that “the Japanese might easily do thiswithout realizing it.” Taguchi replied in a letter dated February 2 that heagreed with Fellers that the film should portray the effectiveness of his
psychological warfare campaign and that, “if properly done,” it would
significantly contribute to fostering amicable relations between the twocountries. (Although Fellers in his Reader’s Digest article argued that theatomic bombs were unnecessary, it was not clear how that would be
portrayed in the film, nor for that matter the draconian firebombing ofJapanese cities.)4 Greene, in late February, began a new assignment underG-2 (Intelligence) chief Charles Willoughby to carry out “psychological
warfare” in Japan and in the Far East in the context of the Cold War.5 Taguchi
was very bullish about the outlook for this proposed semi-documentary.
Taguchi informed Fellers, “I have been assured of powerful financial
backing by one of the leading motion picture magnates in Japan, Mr.
Takejiro Otake of the Shochiku Motion Picture Company.” Taguchi had
already submitted a synopsis of the proposed documentary to Don Brown,
the officer in charge of the Information Branch in the Civil Information and
Education Section, or CIE, and George Gerck, chief of the Motion Picture
Branch in the CIE.6 (CIE’s preceding wartime organization had been
Fellers’s Psychological Warfare Branch.) With regard to the issue ofFellers’s rights in regard to the film, Taguchi proposed a generous offer

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based on his bullish outlook:
I told Mr. Greene that we were willing to offer you ten per cent (10%)
of the gross income of the film in Japan with a minimum guarantee of
Two Million Yen. . . . Moreover, we would be happy to share with you
on a fifty-fifty basis the income derived from showing of the film
outside of Japan proper, including the United States.7
During the war, Taguchi had been Nihon Eigasha’s Manila bureau chief.
The company was a state-sponsored media company that produced apropaganda news film series called Nihon News. By the end of the war his
weight had dwindled due to malnourishment and disease by thirty kilograms
down to thirty kilograms (sixty-six pounds). After the war, Taguchi started
Shu Taguchi Production in the Nippon Ko-on film lab building in the Ginza
area. In 1947 Taguchi made his debut as an independent documentary film
producer and director with Tachiagare Nippon (Can Japan rise to its feet?)in which he, as the creator of the documentary, encouraged the revival ofJapan. This film caught the attention of the US State Department’s Office ofInternational Information and Cultural Affairs, a remnant of the disbanded
wartime government propaganda machine, Office of War Information; it
saw Taguchi‘s talent in producing documentaries as useful in educating theJapanese about reforms carried out under the Allied Occupation of Japan. In
1948 Taguchi produced Men Who Fish, which was a public relations filmthat aimed at informing viewers about changes in the fishing laws that freed
ordinary fishermen from feudalistic relations in the fishing industry. The
movie won first prize in the Office of International Information and Cultural
Affairs international film competition. Another documentary of his that wascompleted about a year later, This Land Is Mine, was about the positive
impacts of land redistribution, a central reform program of the General
Headquarters (GHQ) under MacArthur; the film won second prize in the
Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs international
competition. (In 1950 Taguchi produced The Eye of a Typhoon, adocumentary that for the first time in history filmed inside the eye of atyphoon; the person in charge of special effects for this film, Eiji Tsuburaya,
later started a science fiction monster series and the Ultraman series.)8
Why Fellers?
Fellers argued to the authorities in the GHQ that Emperor Hirohito hadPsychological Warfare during the American Occupation of Japan53

personally approved the scenario of the proposed documentary. I need to
explain why Fellers believed this was the case. Although there is no
indication that the emperor actually gave his approval to Taguchi’s script,
called “A Prayer for Peace,” which was based on Fellers’s Reader’s Digest
article and Joseph Grew’s memoir about his years as ambassador to Japan
from 1932 to the outbreak of the Pacific War. Fellers believed that
information forwarded to him in 1947 from Japan indicated that he haddone so.
On May 9, 1947, Fellers sent a copy of the final galley of his Reader’sDigest article to Greene, his trusted confidant in the Psychological Warfare
Branch and now a central member of GHQ’s CIE, the department in chargeof censorship. Fellers asked Greene to show his article to Hidenari Terasaki,
former diplomat and an interpreter for the emperor, as well as to otherJapanese whom Greene considered important. Greene responded to Fellers
in a letter dated May 16 informing him that he was now waiting for approval
for the publication of Fellers’s essay.9
Shortly after the September edition of the Reader’s Digest Japan cameout with Fellers’s article, Terasaki got a copy from Greene. He subsequently
presented the main points of the Fellers article to Emperor Hirohito on
September 12.10 On September 19 Terasaki described to Greene his meetingwith the emperor. Greene, in turn, reported this information to Fellers.
Although it is unclear the extent to which Terasaki accurately presented theFellers article to the emperor, it is most likely that Terasaki gave a detailed
description of it. According to Greene, the emperor stated that Fellers’s
description of Japan’s negotiations with the Soviet Union was substantiallyaccurate; that the important facts presented in the Fellers article were for themost part in accordance with the emperor’s memory of them; and that,
although Fellers overdramatized the parts describing the emperor’s decision
to surrender during the meetings on August 10 and 14, the overall picture ofthose meetings was accurate.11 Terasaki’s letter dated December 19, 1947,
informed Fellers that the emperor expressed his deep appreciation for what
Fellers had done for him.12 Why the emperor was grateful to Fellows can beunderstood from the following passage in his article:
As titular leader of Japan, of course, the Emperor cannot but sharetechnically the war guilt of his leaders. Yet that does not lessen the highdrama of a figurehead Emperor who dared face down his own fanatic
militarists, usurp their power, and compel them by sheer strength ofwill to surrender a defeated country to a superior enemy.13

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There are many historically inaccurate and exaggerated arguments in thisarticle, such as the emperor indicating his wish to government officials to
end the war shortly after the battle of Iwo Jima in February 1945.14
Fellers Opposes Abdication
The main motive for Fellers’s favorable response to Taguchi’s inquiry
was his desire that the emperor continue to reign in Japan as a bulwark
against Communism. Fellers’s attitude toward the emperor was a minority
conservative approach both inside and outside Japan, where the morecommonly raised issue was of the degree of the emperor’s responsibility forJapan’s wartime national security decisions.
In a July 8, 1948, letter to Terasaki, Fellers pointed out widely reported
rumors in the American press regarding the emperor’s possible abdication
and asked Terasaki to convey his advice to the emperor not to abdicate incase he was considering it. Fellers argued that if his abdication coincidedwith the end of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East it would“in the eyes of the world, identify the Sire [the emperor] as one of theMilitary clique.” Fellers told Terasaki that the emperor was never part ofthis clique but that his abdication at such a moment would have the following
impact:
It would reverse public opinion in this country, which is beginning toturn to the impression that the Emperor was not responsible for thewar. Abdication would fix the Sire’s place in history as one who
sympathized with war criminals and, as a gesture of sympathy forthem, gave up his throne. Anti-Emperor groups would immediately
claim his abdication was a protest against the sentences. . . . [H]isabdication . . . would not give the Sire peace of mind—quite thecontrary—it would leave him forever frustrated.
Fellers believed that “no greater service could have been provided by theEmperor than his role in stopping the war and in giving his people spiritualleadership during this chapter of peace.” He argued that history wouldemphasize that Japan shed feudalism in the aftermath of war and “merged
spiritually with Democratic America.” Fellers suggested that once a peace
treaty with Japan was concluded, the emperor should “consider recording
his entire struggle with the military and then project his views of Japan’s
new destiny guided by new spiritual values. His work should be publishedPsychological Warfare during the American Occupation of Japan

55

widely. The Sire owes this to his people—it should be his contribution
toward the establishment of peace on earth.”15 It is not known whether or
not Terasaki conveyed the above message from Fellers to the emperor.
Fellers sent this letter to Terasaki through Lieutenant Colonel Greene, who,
in a letter dated October 23 to Fellers, informed him that he had, during adinner meeting a week before, shared with the emperor’s younger brother,
Prince Takamatsu, and his wife the contents of this letter, in which they
showed keen interest.16

The Commencement of the Project
Taguchi offered Fellers a minimum guarantee of 2 million yen (about$5,555) for his permission to use “Hirohito’s Struggle to Surrender”; more
would be paid depending on how the film performed in theaters. Taguchi
wanted the movie to be shown in the United States, but Fellers expressed
caution because of different cinematic styles; he, however, thought hewould approach Hollywood directors about making an American version.
Although Fellers released the copyright of his article for Taguchi’s proposed
documentary film, the project never got beyond CIE’s permission to start
production based on that script, “A Prayer for Peace.” On August 16, 1949,
however, Fellers sent a letter to CIE director Lt. Col. Donald Nugent stating
the advantages of producing the proposed documentary: “It occurs to me
much is to be gained by the filming of this story. It is pure drama, reflects
favorably on the Emperor, and on the Japanese people. It will go a long way
toward the complete discrediting of the Militarists, which, of course, is oneof the primary aims of our Occupation.” Fellers informed Nugent that theemperor himself read the Japanese translation of his “Hirohito’s Struggle to
Surrender” and his report on the effectiveness of the psychological warfare
against Japan; the latter was used in writing the former, and the notes in thereport consisted of Fellers’s interviews with Kantaro Suzuki, Mitsumasa
Yonai, Lord Keeper of Privy Seal Koichi Kido, and other officials close to
the emperor who played important roles in Japan’s decision to surrender.
Fellers told Nugent that “the Emperor himself read my notes and reported
they were accurate except for a few minor details.” The emperor “liked” thearticle and “said that it was generally correct.” Based on the discussion of
how Terasaki conveyed Fellers’s article, Fellers made an exaggerated
presentation to Nugent on this issue.
In preparing his “Report on Psychological Warfare in the Southwest
Pacific Area, 1944–1945” (hereafter referred to as the PWB [Psychological

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Warfare Branch] report), Fellers had gathered historical documents andother evidence, including the interviews with Suzuki, Yonai, and Kido
conducted during the first three months of 1946 . Fellers apparently lent thisreport to Terasaki to get feedback from the emperor regarding the impact of
the leaflets dropped from the sky on his decision to surrender. Terasaki
informed Fellers that the emperor replied that it had a significant impact.
Fellers’s PWB report was based on his Pacific War experience and his
postwar investigations in Japan, which also included Kido’s diary and theemperor’s own recollections of the war years, known as “The Emperor’s
Monologue.” The PWB report was Fellers’s earliest presentation of theargument that in the period between the German surrender and the firstatomic bomb explosion over Hiroshima, Japan and the United States had
missed opportunities to reach an early settlement of the Pacific War.17
Fellers cajoled Nugent to approve the script for this documentary film
project, stating that “I would be the last to want it cleared without yourcomplete approval.” Fellers emphasized that if the CIE disapproved of thescript, this would mean postponement of a documentary about the Japanesesurrender until after the end of the Occupation. At that time, the Japanese
would create a documentary with “understandable bias,” which might notserve to “strengthen the leadership of the Emperor” and undermine “Soviet
prestige and the Communist movement.” The fact that the script was basedon Grew’s memoir and Fellers’s article “should eliminate any criticism that
the Japanese are endeavoring to whitewash any phase of the war or
circumstances of surrender.”18
The fact that Fellers did not tell Nugent that the emperor had approved
the script “A Prayer for Peace” raises questions about what Fellers told
Taguchi on this issue. In a July 30 letter to Taguchi, Fellers endeavored tocreate the impression that the emperor had approved the production of asemi-documentary based on “Hirohito’s Struggle to Surrender.” Because
Fellers never mentioned to Taguchi about the episode in 1947 when Terasaki
and Greene sought the emperor’s opinion of the article, it appeared as if theemperor had recently given his approval of the “script” for Taguchi’s
proposed film project. In order to provide leeway for any problem thatmight arise as a result of this, Fellers informed Taguchi that the emperor
would like to see any changes made to the “script” (actually Fellers’s
article).
At the same time as Fellers was writing this to Taguchi he wrote a letterto one of Emperor Hirohito’s confidants, Yasumasa Matsudaira, about thepossible need for his assistance in the film project; this was his way ofPsychological Warfare during the American Occupation of Japan

57

securing a channel to the emperor in case of problems that might arise in the
production of the documentary. As Greene pointed out to Fellers, the latter
needed to secure approval of the film script from the emperor. But Fellers
decided to avoid this for the time being by claiming that the emperor had
already approved the script because the emperor had allegedlly seen the socalled script as “Hirohito’s Struggle to Surrender.”When Taguchi sent Fellers his draft script “A Prayer for Peace” throughGreene, who had briefly returned to the United States, Fellers looked
through it and made extensive comments. Fellers thought the title should bechanged to “Hirohito’s Struggle.” He also thought that “we are not yet readyfor the atomic bomb on August 6.” Whether or not Fellers was telling
Taguchi to drop this subject is unclear, but what is clear is that Fellers
believed that “it has not been clearly established how the Emperor had
endeavored to force the peace. . . . My point is the dropping of the atomic
bomb in itself did not force the surrender. The decision was made long
before the bomb was dropped.”19 Fellers wanted to promote the idea that his
psychological warfare played an important role in achieving Japanesesurrender.
Fellers suggested to Taguchi that he incorporate in the film script thearguments Fellers made in his article that (1) the Japanese people were
aware of the true military situation of Japan’s de facto defeat because of themillions of leaflets dropped from the air; and (2) Emperor Hirohito madehis decision to surrender after his confidant Koichi Kido informed him ofthe leaflet that discussed the Japanese government’s query regarding theterms stipulated in the Potsdam Declaration and the Allied response to it.20
Fellers urged Taguchi to omit the lines: “True, as Emperor, His Majesty wastechnically responsible for all acts of his subordinates. But since he wasactually a prisoner he cannot be held responsible to history.”21
Instead of this observation, Fellers demanded that Taguchi insert thefollowing lines written by Fellers:
The Emperor became the symbol of the New Japan dedicated to peace.
Had Hirohito been a true pacifist from the beginning, who had been
made a tool of the fanatic militarists without means of fighting back?
Had he—actually a figurehead Emperor—at the risk of his life—daredto face down his own militarists, usurp their power, and compel themby sheer strength of will to surrender? I left Japan convinced that hehad.22

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Lukewarm Response from the General Headquarters
Shortly after Fellers commented on Taguchi’s script, Lieutenant Colonel
Nugent wrote Fellers about the overall reaction of GHQ regarding thesubmitted script, which had “been read by a number of interested persons,not only in CIE but in other sections.” Nugent informed Fellers that he“would be only too happy to explore the matter further” if the following“problem” could be “overcome” by changing the script:
It has been the unanimous feeling that the story, while intenselyinteresting, presents one problem which appears insurmountable—theportrayal of the Emperor on the screen during his lifetime. As you are
no doubt aware, even in democratic—or perhaps I should saysocialist—Great Britain, the portrayal on the stage or screen of thereigning monarch is unthinkable. I am not sure that it is prohibited
legally—but certainly it is by custom of long standing.
Nugent, therefore, informed Fellers that “this headquarters” believed it was“highly inappropriate . . . to take a position which would establish aprecedent in this matter in Japan, even though it is realized that the
documentary film is intended to be constructive in every way.”23
After reading this letter, Fellers wrote on September 27 to Nugent that hebelieved that the proposed documentary film could not be produced without
the emperor’s “approval.” He stated that a script featuring a living emperor
would not pose a problem “if it were known to the people the Emperor
approved.” Fellers informed Nugent that “if this suggestion is impractical, I
am of the opinion that Mr. Taguchi would examine the possibility of anothersolution.”24 On hearing from Nugent’s office that Fellers should discusswith Taguchi “the possibility of altering the treatment” of the emperor in the
proposed documentary film,25 Fellers wrote to Greene in Japan that he was
not going to do anything about this project until he heard Greene’s advice
on this issue. Fellers believed the emperor’s comment on “Hirohito’s
Struggle to Surrender” was tantamount to his approval of “the scenario” forthe proposed documentary film. He hoped to provide CIE with this“information . . . without courting [their] disfavor.” It is not known whether
Fellers told Nugent and his staff at CIE that Taguchi had decided to approach
the Imperial Household by himself in hopes of securing their approval forthe production of his documentary.26 The fact was that Taguchi had made nosuch approach to the Imperial Household.

Psychological Warfare during the American Occupation of Japan59

The Script Receives CIE Approval
What happened between mid-October 1949 and mid-March 1950 is notknown. On March 11, 1950, Fellers received a letter from Greene (missingin the Fellers papers). In that letter, Greene apparently informed Fellers that
“SCAP has finally cleared our script.” Fellers was elated and wrote Taguchithat “the film will do immeasurable good in strengthening the Emperor andin discrediting the Japanese militarists. It will also indirectly strike a blow
at Communism.” Fellers was interested in producing an American versionof Taguchi’s documentary film. He told Taguchi that “I know personally
two leading Hollywood producers, [Merian] C. Cooper and John Ford.”
Cooper, an Army pilot from the First World War years to the 1920s, hadserved as chief of staff for the Fifth Air Force in MacArthur’s Southwest
Pacific command and in the 1930s was a well-known American film
producer; he produced King Kong in 1933. After the war, in 1950, he
collaborated with his friend John Ford to produce the films Wagon Masterand Rio Grande.
Because Greene could not act as Fellers’s agent because of US government
regulations, in June Fellers hired T. Nakajima in Japan, who was introduced
to Fellers by Greene, as his agent. Fellers also applied for a license fromGHQ so he could assign the rights of his article “Hirohito’s Struggle to
Surrender” to Taguchi for production of his semi-documentary film. His
application for a license took place less than two weeks before the sudden
outbreak of the Korean War on June 25. Fellers was informed by his friend
Brig. Gen. Frayne Baker, executive chairman of the Foreign Investment
Board, three days after MacArthur’s UN forces successfully madeamphibious landing at Inchon, that his application for a license sent to thisboard through CIE had been approved.

The Film Project Fails
During the licensing process, Fellers asked Taguchi if he had incorporated
the suggestions he had made to “A Prayer for Peace.” Believing that thefilm production was going well,27 Fellers, in February 1951, instructed his
agent Nakajima to send the film to him as soon as it was completed. Fellers
was planning to contact film producers Cooper and Ford “at the righttime.”28
Shortly before Fellers sent his instruction to Nakajima, he received ahandwritten note from Greene in Tokyo informing Fellers that “you are60

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getting some publicity in Moscow” as “general arrangements” for the
production of the film was “about complete” and the production was soon
to begin. Greene was going to make sure that Fellers’s minimum guaranteed
payment for the film would be increased to 2.5 million yen before theproduction commenced.29
The message from Moscow was an anonymous commentary printed in
Izvestia under the title “The Japanese Emperor Becomes a Screen Star,”which was broadcast in Japanese by Moscow Soviet Far Eastern Service on
January 8, 1951, at 1200 GMT:
MacArthur made up his mind to produce a picture of Hirohito in orderto stress that Hirohito is a stubborn advocate of peace. The preparation
for the filming of The Emperor has begun in splendid style. Who doyou expect has been invited to write the scenario? It is the . . . general,
who, during the Pacific War, conducted (bacteriological) warfare fromMacArthur’s headquarters.30
Fellers, of course, never conducted bacteriological warfare, and it isunknown whether this description was a mistake or some kind of sarcastic
commentary on psychological warfare.
The broadcast from Moscow emphasized that “all this deceitfulpropaganda is merely aimed at hiding the Emperor as a war criminal fromthe eyes of the people.” The Korean War was in a phase in which the mostly
American United Nations forces, under MacArthur’s command, were
bitterly fighting North Korean and Chinese forces along the 38th parallel in
the aftermath of the Chinese intervention that pushed back the UN forcesfrom the North Korean border with China in November.
It is unlikely that MacArthur, who was commanding a major war, played
a role in backing the film project of Fellers and Taguchi. Back in March
1949, Greene had informed Fellers that when he brought up the issue of the
proposed documentary film project to MacArthur’s aide-de-camp, Laurence
Bunker, Bunker replied that he thought MacArthur would not support a
project in which the emperor played a central role. According to Greene,
Bunker “called Nugent of CIE and told him he was against the idea andthought it should be stopped before it be put on the Imperial Household todisapprove it, or have CIE disapprove it as a matter of policy.”31
Bunker thought that Fellers did not deserve to receive a lot of money for
information collected while serving as an officer of the US Army in Japan.
On the other hand, Greene had talked to Mrs. MacArthur, who held aPsychological Warfare during the American Occupation of Japan

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favorable opinion of Fellers and his article. She “could not see any harm in
the production” of a documentary film based on his article. Yet, she declined
to endorse the project and suggested to Greene that Fellers write directly to
MacArthur for the latter’s approval.32
Fellers, however, did not do this, even though Taguchi had wanted him tosecure MacArthur’s backing. Although Fellers remained in touch with
General MacArthur through Mrs. MacArthur between 1946 and 1948,
General MacArthur had distanced himself from Fellers on issues concerning
the Allied Occupation of Japan. Fellers learned in a memorandum written
by Bunker on May 6, 1947, that General MacArthur now claimed that heand Fellers “were frequently diametrically opposed in their views of theoccupation and international matters” and that “on several occasionsindividuals had misinterpreted General Fellers’ [sic] expression of opinion
as those” of MacArthur.33
Greene, who was conducting “psychological warfare” under General
Willoughby in G-2, fully supported Fellers because the project dovetailed
with what he was doing. Furthermore, he learned shortly after his first
conversation with Bunker regarding the film project that the Civil Censorship
Detachment of G-2 was evaluating “other film projects in which a life of thecurrent Emperor would have to be portrayed by some local actor.” They
“were all going to be rejected” because “the major studios are still controlled
by Communists and any picture of this nature would not portray the Emperor
to the best interest of Japan.” The detachment was concerned that suchprojects “might open the way for Communists to produce pictures orpropaganda that also might be detrimental.” Yet, the detachment looked
favorably on the project of Fellers and Taguchi since it portrayed “theEmperor as a forcible character bringing about peace.” Greene pointed to
the fact that the CIE’s job was to make sure films shown in Japan were “notdetrimental to the Occupation or to the best interests of Japan.”34 Greene,
Fellers, and Taguchi all believed their film project did not conflict with the
CIE’s mission as such.
Fellers was naturally disappointed when Taguchi, after a long silence
beginning in the autumn of 1949, reported to him in July 1951 that he had
to postpone indefinitely the film project because of Shochiku’s inability to
decide on the production of the proposed documentary film. “I had several
talks with Shochiku officials, and they . . . had a series of conferences among
themselves regarding the production of this film. As I understand it, theresults of these conferences were all inconclusive. No final decision wasapparently reached.” Shochiku viewed the film project as “a poor risk”

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because “the Japanese Motion Picture Code Committee [MPCC] . . . wasafraid to go all-out in supporting the picture.” Taguchi blamed the CIE forthis situation because its clearance of the script was “a negative one at best”
and its attitude toward the film project was “extremely passive.” Hence the
MPCC took their cue from the CIE.35

Conclusion
Although Greene reassured Fellers in October that the film projectremained alive, it was, in fact, over because the San Francisco Peace Treaty
had been signed on September 8, 1951, and the Occupation was going to
end on April 28, 1952. Taguchi’s stillborn documentary film project should
be understood in the context of Fellers’s interest in establishing a view of
the Japanese emperor as a spiritual leader of peaceful Japan. But for what
purpose? Fellers wanted the semi-documentary film completed and shown
shortly before Japan regained full independence in order to spread his
conservative dissenting view of the emperor as a complete pacifist and touse the monarch’s influence in Japanese society as a bulwark against
Communism in Japan and the revival of militarism.
Greene probably wanted to continue exploring the film project so as touse it for psychological warfare that would promoted the idea of the Japanese
rallying around the emperor and rejecting Communism in the ongoing
Korean War. But, as I have pointed out, Fellers had told Greene the film
project was only worth pursuing during the Occupation when the UnitedStated dominated Japanese society.
In addition to the controversy of portraying a living emperor in a movie,
the proposed semi-documentary focused on the most controversial aspect ofJapanese history during wartime: the emperor’s degree of responsibility for
the war. Because of the divisiveness of this issue in Japanese society at thattime, and even now, the film project of Fellers and Taguchi was probably
doomed to fail. Still, the fact that the CIE approved the production of thefilm based on Fellers’s article points to the potential usefulness of the movie
for psychological warfare in the Cold War as believed by Fellers, Greene,
the censorship section of G-2, and probably the senior members of the CIE
as well.

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63

Notes
Cinema Today Eiga News, August 20, 2013, http://www.cinematoday.jp/page/N0055714, accessed August 30, 2013; and Cinema Today Eiga News, July 30, 2013,
http://www.cinematoday.jp/page/N0055178, accessed August 30, 2013. According to
the Kogyo Tsushinsha website, the film was first shown throughout Japan on July 27 andranked third in sales revenue for July 27–28. Cinema Ranking Tsushin, Kogyo Shunyu
Ranking, July 27–28, 2013, http://www.kogyotsushin.com/archives/extra/201307/
28000000.php, accessed August 30, 2013.
2 Box Office Mojo, “Emperor,” http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=emperor.
htm, accessed August 30, 2013.
3 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: Time, 1962).
4 Taguchi to Fellers, January 14, Fellers to Taguchi, January 21, Fellers to Greene,
January 21, and Taguchi to Fellers, February 2, 1949, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a,box 4, folder 20, MacArthur Memorial Library, Norfolk, Virginia.
5 Greene to Fellers, February 26, 1949, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 4, folder
20, MacArthur Memorial Library. Greene talks about “a new top secret division” towhich Willoughby is thinking of assigning him in his letter to Fellers on October 23,
1948, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 2, folder 2, MacArthur Memorial Library.
6 Taguchi to Fellers, February 2, 1949, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 4, folder
20, MacArthur Memorial Library. The minimum guarantee later was demanded byFellers to be increased to 2.5 million yen due to the depreciation of the yen; see Fellers
to Taguchi, March 20, 1950, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 4, folder 20, MacArthur
Memorial Library.
7 Taguchi to Fellers, February 8, 1949, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 4, folder
20, MacArthur Memorial Library.
8 With regard to representative works of Shu Taguchi, see “Films on Yamagata,”
http://www.yidff.jp/2011/program/11p5-e.html, accessed August 30, 2013. With regard
to the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs in the State Department,
see “Records of the United States Information Agency,” http://www.archives.gov/
research/guide-fed-records/groups/306.html, accessed August 30, 2013. Shu Taguchi’sson is also a respected film producer, and his niece is Tetsuko Kuroyanagi, aninternationally famous Japanese actress and TV talk show host as well as author of bestselling books; see “Kinenkan Dayori: Dai ni kai Kamakura Cinema Salon,” April 20,
2013, http://www.kamakura-kawakita.org/diary_87.html, accessed August 30, 2013.
9 Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 2, folder 12, MacArthur Memorial Library.
Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944). The book
was translated into Japanese by the newspaper company Mainichi Shimbunsha in 1948.
Taguchi’s script, “A Prayer for Peace,” cannot be found in the Fellers papers, and this1

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Haruo Iguchi

article uses the comments Fellers made in a letter to Taguchi about “A Prayer for Peace.”
10 See Terasaki’s diary entries for July, August, and September 1947 in Showa Tenno
Dokuhakuroku Goyogakari Nikki [The emperor’s monologue: The diary of Emperor
Hirohito’s aide Terasaki Hidenari] (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1991). Greene to Fellers,
September 30, 1947, Bonner Fellers Papers RG 44a, box 2, folder 12, MacArthur
Memorial Library.
11 Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 2, folder 12, MacArthur Memorial Library.
12 Terasaki to Fellers, December 19, 1947, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 4,folder 23. Diary entries for September 19, 1947, and December 19, 1947, are in Terasaki,
Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku.
13 This quote began with the following sentence in the Foreign Service version but not
the Reader’s Digest version: “Was Hirohito always a pacifist who had been made a toolof the fanatic militarists without means of fighting back? I left Japan convinced that hewas.” See a copy of the article from the July 1947 issue of Foreign Service in “BonnerFellers,” Post-Presidential Individual Series, Herbert C. Hoover Papers, Herbert C.
Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.
14 Haruo Iguchi, “The First Revisionists: Bonner Fellers, Herbert C. Hoover andJapan’s Decision to Surrender,” in The Unpredictability of the Past: Memories of the
Asia-Pacific War in US-East Asia Relations, ed. Marc Gallicchio (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2007), 51–84.
15 Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 4, folder 23, MacArthur Memorial Library.
16 Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 2, folder 12, MacArthur Memorial Library.
17 With regard to the process leading to Fellers’s writing of his PWB report, see Haruo
Iguchi, “Bonner Fellers and US-Japan Relations, June 1945–June 1946,” Journal of
American and Canadian Studies 20 (2002): 73–80.
18 Fellers to Nugent, August 16, 1949, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 4, folder
20, MacArthur Memorial Library.
19 Fellers to Taguchi, September 6, 1949, Comment on “A Prayer for Peace,” 1, 3,
Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 2, folder 2, MacArthur Memorial Library.
20 Fellers to Taguchi, September 6, 1949, Comment on “A Prayer for Peace,” 2, 4,Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 2, folder 2, MacArthur Memorial Library.
21 Fellers to Taguchi, September 6, 1949, Comment on “A Prayer for Peace,” 1–2,
Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 2, folder 2, MacArthur Memorial Library.
22 Fellers to Taguchi, September 6, 1949, Comment on “A Prayer for Peace,” 5, BonnerFellers Papers, RG 44a, box 2, folder 2, MacArthur Memorial Library.
23 Nugent to Fellers, September 12, 1949, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 4, folder
20, MacArthur Memorial Library.
24 Fellers to Nugent, September 27, 1949, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 4, folder
20, MacArthur Memorial Library.

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65

Lt. Col. l F. C. Dahlquiest, Acting Chief, CIE Section, to Fellers, October 10, 1949,
Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 4, folder 20, MacArthur Memorial Library.
26 Fellers to Greene, October 18, 1949, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 4, folder
20, MacArthur Memorial Library.
27 Fellers to Taguchi, June 14, 1950, Fellers to Nakajima, June 14, 1950, Fellers to theForeign Investment Board, June 14, 1950, Fellers to Brigadier General Frayne Baker,
Executive Chairman, Foreign Investment Board, GHQ-FEC, June 15, 1950, Lt. Col.
Nugent to Fellers, September 5, 1950, Frayne Baker to Fellers, September 18, 1950, andFellers to Nakajima, February 2, 1951, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 4, folder 20,
MacArthur Memorial Library. On Cooper, see Mark Vaz, Living Dangerously: The
Adventures of Merian C. Cooper, Creator of King Kong (New York: Villard, 2005).
28 Fellers to Nakajima, February 2, 1951, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 4, folder
20, MacArthur Memorial Library.
29 Greene to Fellers, undated (sometime in mid to late January 1951), RG 44a, box 2,
folder 2, MacArthur Memorial Library. See note 6 regarding financial issues.
30 Greene to Fellers, undated (sometime in mid to late January 1951), Bonner Fellers
Papers, RG 44a, box 2, folder 2, MacArthur Memorial Library.
31 Greene to Fellers, March 8, 1949, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 2, folder 2,
MacArthur Memorial Library.
32 Greene to Fellers, March 12, 1949, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 2, folder 2,
MacArthur Memorial Library.
33 Laurence Bunker, “Memorandum for Record,” May 6, 1947, RG 5, box 2, folder 6,
MacArthur Memorial Library. With regard to Fellers informing General MacArthur
about the presidential election, including telling this to the general through Mrs.
MacArthur, see Haruo Iguchi, “Kyowato Uha to Douglas MacArthur Daitoryokoho
Yoritsu Undo (The right-wing Republicans and the MacArthur-for-President movement),”
Shirin [Journal of history] 93, no. 5 (September 2009): 96–134.
34 Greene to Fellers, March 8, 1949, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 2, folder 2,
MacArthur Memorial Library.
35 Taguchi to Fellers, July 24, 1951, Bonner Fellers Papers, RG 44a, box 4, folder 2,
MacArthur Memorial Library.
25