CIRJE-F-1042

Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites overPhases of Regime Change
Tomoko Matsumoto
Nagoya University and New York University
Tetsuji Okazaki
The University of Tokyo
March 2017; revised in August 2017 and March 2018

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Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change *Tomoko Matsumoto
Nagoya University (visiting New York University)
Tetsuji Okazaki
University of Tokyo
Abstract
Does changing the form of government actually change who are in power? Despite its significancefor regime change and state building, the impact of regime change on the elite group has notreceived adequate scholarly attention. The new data on 2,980 government elites since the Meiji
Restoration Japan (1868) revealed the three results: (i) the proportion of elites whose fathers were
elites in the former regime is low in the regime transition phase but increases in the regime
consolidation phase, (ii) the proportion of elites whose fathers were commoners increases
throughout the regime change process, and (iii) the internal hierarchy of political elites begins tomore intensively reflect the social stratum of the former regime and discount the people’s own
talents as the new regime consolidates. Regime change increases social mobility in the elite society
but it does not last long.

*

The authors thank Tomoko Masuda, Tomoya Sano, and Haruo Iguchi for valuable comments andsupport on earlier drafts, including the construction of the dataset. For their valuable comments,
we are also indebted to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Aditya Dasgupta, Akira Hara, Takeo Hoshi,
Jacque Hymans, Kaoru Iokibe, Yuko Kasuya, Yukinobu Kitamura, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Hitoshi
Komiya, Tomila V. Lankina, Phillip Lipscy, Susan Pharr, Adam Przeworski, Shinasi Rama, Shiro
Sakaiya, Yuichiro Shimizu, David Stasavage, Yu Jin Woo, and the participants of the workshop
on the frontiers of statistical analysis and formal theory of political science at Gakushuin
University (Tokyo) and the APSA, EPSA, JPSA, and MPSA conferences. All remaining errors are
our own. This research project is financially supported by the Kaken Project Grant Number
16H01998, the JALII project at Nagoya University, and the Canon Institute for Global Studies.
1Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration JapanINTRODUCTION
To what extent are revolutions truly revolutionary? Does changing the form of government
actually change who is in power? Mobility of elites in a society under a regime change has long
been investigated by social scientists. There are two classic views pertaining to this issue. One ofthem is Pareto’s elite circulation theory (1916), which argues that elites in one regime are replacedby other elites when regimes change. The other is Schumpeter’s elite reproduction theory (1919)
that emphasizes path dependency and casts doubts on social mobility. These views have inspireda century of works that broadly consider mobility during regime change. However, the presenceor absence of social mobility during regime change continues to remain a matter of dispute. For
example, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Moore (1966) insist that regime change influences
elite mobility while Clark (2014), Gerber (2000), Hankiss (1990), and Szelényi and Szelényi(1995) argue that there is no such influence. However, is the effect of a regime change reallylinear? A regime change certainly changes the elite society at least in the short term and perhaps
in the long term. Meanwhile, whether a critical juncture is a revolution, a palace coup, a militarycoup, or other type of regime change, there is more or less a resilience to past structures of elite
stratification that transcends a critical juncture in the post-critical juncture phase. The aim of our2

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

paper is not to support either side of the social mobility discussion but to analyze this more
complicated elite circulation and reproduction dynamics under a regime change.
This paper explores the mobility of political elites under a regime change, exploiting thedata from Meiji Restoration, Japan in 1868. By this event, the regime of the Tokugawa Shogunate,
which had ruled Japan for more than 260 years, had been taken over by the regime of the Meiji
government, and Japan started to transit to a modern state from a feudal and authoritarian statewith a rigid class system. We constructed a database of 2,980 government elites as of 1915, from
Who’s Who (Jinji Koshinroku) data. An advantage of this source is that it provides detailed
information about each political elite, including occupation, title, awards, birth year, birth place,educational background, father’s name, father’s hometown, father’s social strata in the feudal
regime, etc. The information on the father’s social strata is particularly valuable in the context of
this paper, because we can observe the change in the social and political position of each elite’sfamily over the Meiji Restoration.
Using the data, we examine the influence of father’s social stratum on the position of apolitical elite in the Meiji regime. In the analyses, we divide the samples into two subsamples, thatis, the elites who were born before 1868 and those who were born after that. We can compare the3Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japanchange in the influence of father’s social strata over time, or more specifically over the phases of
the regime change. The elites who were born before 1868 became adults before the end of the
1880s, when the fundamental structure of the Meiji state, including the Constitution (1889) andthe Imperial Diet (1890), was established. However, the elites who were born after 1868 became
adults after the fundamental structure of Meiji state was established. We assume that the positionsof the former group reflected the situation in the phase where the new regime was being established(the regime transition phase)1 and that the positions of the latter group reflected the situation in
the phase where the new regime had already been established (the regime consolidation phase).2
By comparing the influence of the fathers’ social strata on the positions of elites between theregime transition phase and its consolidation phase, we found that the influence of fathers’ social

1

The transition is defined as “the interval between one political regime and another (O’Donnell

and Schumitter 1986, p.6).”They later argue that since in transitions there are not establishedrules to the political game, the impact of the whole set of structural variables diminishes at thosetimes of generalized uncertainty.” (Munck and Snyder 2007, p.292)
2

Extending the definition of Linz and Stepan (1996, p.4), we argue that a regime consolidates

when no significant political group seriously attempts to overthrow the regime or secede fromthe state.


4

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

strata on the elites’ positions increased in the regime consolidation phase. The proportion of elites
whose fathers were elites in the former regime was thus low in the regime transition phase, but
increased in the regime consolidation phase.
This paper contributes to the literature on social mobility and the literature on regimechange. Political regime changes provide opportunities for social mobility in general, but the extent
of increase in social mobility differs across regime changes. Indeed, in the cases of radical regimechanges such as the post-war Chinese Civil War, the American War of Independence, and theFrench Revolution, almost all the old elites were killed or banished by the challenger. However,
not only in the Meiji Restoration but even in the Russian Revolution, one of the most radical regimechanges, the impact of the former regime on the new elite group remains although the influence ismitigated by new factors (e.g. Lankina, Libman, and Obydenkoya 2016; Silberman 1964). Ourfindings, taking this discussion one step further, suggest that the extent of increase in social
mobility or continuity differ not only across regime changes, but that it also differs across thephases within a regime change.
With regard to the regime change, Samuel Huntington argues in his book, The Third Wave,
that “(N)egotiations and compromise among political elites were at the heart of the5Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

democratization process (Huntington 1991, 165).” The importance of power sharing with the elitesof the former regime at a regime change is widely agreed upon by studies on democratization (e.g.
Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992; Higley and Burton 1989; Higley and Moore 1981; Huntington
1984, 1991; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Levine 1978; Linz 1978; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986;
Peeler 1985; Przeworski 1986; Rustow 1970; Sartori 1987; Wilde 1978). Even the literature on
establishment of authoritarian regime argues that a new dictator not only uses punishment andother deterrent means to keep the vanquished in line, but also attempts to diminish the fear of
exclusion among people in order to establish loyalty, solicit cooperation, and/or deter threat ofanother revolution (e.g. Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Bueno
de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Svolik 2009; Wright 2008).
In this respect, Tilly (1978) noted that optimal power sharing depends upon the phases ofregime change.
It is the formation of coalitions between members of the polity and the contenders
advancing exclusive alternative claims to control over the government. The relationship is
actually curvilinear: If no such coalition exists, that diminishes the chance that therevolutionary coalition will win—that there will be any transfer of power at all. However,

6Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

if the coalitions are extensive, the revolutionary settlement will tend to restore the previous
status quo. The wise revolutionary who wishes to produce a large transfer of power forms
the minimum necessary coalition with existing members of the policy, and forces his
coalition partners to break irrevocably with other members of the polity (Tilly 1978, 213).

According to Tilly’s argument, the contenders are not expected to allow many incumbent
elites to join their group in the regime transition phase, in order to achieve the regime change
successfully. The compromise with the existing or original government elites would hinder the
success of overthrowing the incumbent regime. Instead, the contenders attempt to weaken theirpower by excluding the incumbent elites from politics and expropriating their lands, goods, andservants. Examining the regime change by a new dictator, Albertus and Menaldo (2012) also argue
that the new dictator expropriates to survive the uncertainty that besets him or her upon taking
power, and large-scale expropriation early in the process of the regime change helps dictators
maintain their power. Those argument suggests that the contender may compromise with theformer elites after a regime change is accomplished and a new regime is established.



7

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

The influence of fathers’ social strata in the feudal society and its overtime changethat we found for Japan’s Meiji Restoration, indicates how the power sharing was done, and how
the manner of power sharing changed over the phases of the regime change. To contend against
the incumbent elites and establish the new regime, the contenders must gather allies and staff
members because they are a minority within the current political order. Therefore, in this phase,even activists from the non-elite social classes have an opportunity to join the government elitegroup and be assigned to higher-level positions based on their abilities. Consequently, during theregime transition phase, the number and proportion of political elites from the incumbent elitegroup joining the new elites is low, and the intra-elite hierarchy is determined regardless of theirsocial status.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we overview the case of the Meiji
Restoration. Second, we explain the dataset of political elites. Third, using the dataset, we analyze
the change in the elite membership and the intra-elite hierarchy over phases, focusing on fathers’social strata in the feudal society on the position of elites. The final section concludes with a
discussion of the implications of our analyses for the study of mobility and continuity during a
regime change.
8Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Meiji Restoration Japan, 1868
In 1868, a drastic political regime change, referred to as the Meiji Restoration or the Meiji
Revolution, that occurred in Japan shifted the power from the Tokugawa Shogunate to the Meiji
government under the authority of the Emperor who achieved rapid modernization and laggardly
ushered in partial democracy by the end of the century. The Meiji Restoration, therefore, marked
Japan’s revolution from a feudal and authoritarian state with a rigid social class system to a modern
industrial nation-state with more liberty, albeit without the uprising from frustrated peasants andbourgeois in the English revolution and the French revolution (e.g., Banno 2012; Beasley 1972;
Gluck 1985; Gordon 2003; Hoston 1991; Jansen 2002; Lockwood 1954; Mitani 2013; Moore
1966; Moulder 1977; Scalapino 1953; Trimberger 1978). Let us trace the history of the Meiji
Restoration briefly.3
The Tokugawa Shogunate ruled Japan from the early 15th century and enjoyedconsiderable prestige for two centuries. However, Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States

3

For more information on the Meiji Restoration, see Banno (2012), Gordon (2003), Jansen(1989. 2002), and Mitani (2013).


9

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

arrived in Japan in 1853 and demanded that Japan be opened to trade. Although Japan had been
sealed off to the outside world for two centuries, the Tokugawa Shogunate agreed to his demand
due to American military pressure and also signed treaties with the European powers. This forced
opening of the treaty ports had an immediate impact on both economy and politics. The beginningof the trade caused sharp inflation, because the difference of gold-to-silver exchange rates of Japan
with international rate led to the massive drain of gold to foreign countries, and to prevent the drainof gold, the Shogunate issued new gold oval coins with a much lower weight standard. Consumers
and producers were thus angered by the decision of the Tokugawa government. Cholera spread,and people attributed it to the opening of the ports. Additionally, the treaties demonstrating the
Tokugawa government’s inability to protect the country resulted in lowering the reputation of thegovernment. At that time, the Shogun and other samurai who ruled Japan enjoyed politicalprivileges because of their status as warriors. However, the forced treaties with the U.S. andEuropean countries destroyed the authority of the Tokugawa Shogun for ruling the country. In thissituation, feudal lords (Daimyo) of the outer domains that had been eliminated from the Tokugawa
politics – Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen – and the middle- and lower-ranked samurai, manyof who were from the above four domains became the core members of the rebels. In the process

10Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

of overthrowing the Tokugawa regime, Japan had two small-scale and one-large scale civil wars.
The first two wars were between the Tokugawa government and Choshu in 1861 and 1866. Afterthese civil wars, the rebels finally gained permission to overthrow the Tokugawa government fromthe Emperor, who despite not having substantial power after the 14th century, continued to retain
the symbolic status as Japan’s top leader. They began a civil war with the Tokugawa Shogunate in1868 that ended in 1869. Approximately 0.8-1.2 million people were mobilized in this civil war,and 14,000 people died.
The first task for the contenders was to terminate the former regime. Therefore, thechallengers removed all traces of the Tokugawa Shogun from the castle in 1868, confiscated thelands and servants of the feudal lords (Daimyo) by 1872, and deprived the privileges of the samurai
such as the right to carry weapons in public and their salaries until mid-1870s. The new Meiji
government proceeded with a series of these reforms peacefully, pledging to pay salary to feudallords for their whole lifetime and a lump-sum salary to other samurai. Some disaffected samurai
rose in revolt against the Meiji government until 1877 but the government successfully quelled all
revolts.



11

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration JapanThe Meiji government also quickly granted liberty to the masses. The government newly
allowed non-elite people to have a family name in 1870, and granted people the freedom toestablish residence in any location they wanted, choose any occupation, and get married to anyone
regardless of their social strata in 1871. The government also announced compulsory educationfor eight years in 1872. Nevertheless, most core members of the Meiji government were negative
about establishing the legislature and enfranchising the people. Additionally, the newly establishedbureaucracy consisted of staff selected based on informal criteria or connections with core
government members. Therefore, at first, people had no formal access to become involved inpolitics or become government elites. Rather, they had to bear the heavy land taxes that the Meiji
government newly established to address the huge costs such as the war costs for the civil war andthe rebellions, the costs for industrialization, and the costs for paying salary to the former feudallords. Farmers who became frustrated with the heavy tax burden revolted repeatedly against the
new government, but the Meiji government suppressed them and only slightly decreased the tax
rate.
The failures of samurai revolts and peasant riots in the 1870s indicated that the Meiji
government achieved to gain military supremacy. As a result, people started the freedom and

12Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

people’s right movement to voice their feelings within the existing political framework instead ofsubverting it, by demanding the opening of the parliament and enfranchisement, and the Meiji
government started to establish institutions and systems for consolidating the new regime. To
address the people’s frustration, the Meiji government promised to open a parliament and grant
the franchise to the large taxpayers in 1881 and fulfilled the promises in 1890. In addition, thegovernment formulated the Examination of High Civil Servants rule for bureaucrats in 1887. This
rule made everyone who had obtained a bachelor of law or arts from the University of Tokyo,
which was the first imperial university after the Meiji Restoration, eligible as a bureaucracy
candidate without taking the entrance exam. Moreover, the Army War College was founded in
1882, and the Naval War College was established in 1888. These institutions gave everyone accessto the government elite group regardless of birth. Meanwhile, the Meiji government also
institutionalized the new nobility system in 1884, the Privy Council in 1888, and the House ofPeers in 1890, in order to garner the support of the former elites and ensure the privileges of bothold and new elites. By the early 1890s, the government had thus succeeded in establishing the main
governing institutions.

13

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Many scholars have examined the influence of the Meiji Restoration on social mobility,
including that of elites, but they conclude that new factors such as education strengthen theinfluence on social mobility while the former regime maintains the influence (Bellah 1957;
Donnithorne and Allen 1954; Fujita 1948; Harootunian 1959; Man’nari 1965; Moore 1966;
Nakamura 1999; Silberman 1964; Skocpol 1979; Sonoda 1990; Sugano 1931; Takane 1976, 1981;
Tominaga 1990; Tsuchiya 1954). They consider the changes to have occurred in one direction anddo not examine the possibility of non-linear change. On the other hand, the theoretical study by
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1995) argues that the Meiji Constitution and other institutions were theoutcomes of bargaining and compromises between relevant entities at each moment. This study
suggests that elite compositions are also bargaining for their desired outcomes at each moment,
and therefore, the change in the new elite group might not be in one direction.
The Meiji Restoration is particularly advantageous for exploring elite membership andits internal hierarchy over phases of regime change. First, the post-Meiji Restoration government
created a new internal hierarchy for government elites named Kyuchu-Sekiji – literally means“order of precedence in the emperor’s court” – that categorized the elites into 70 ranks. Therefore,
we can precisely specify government elites in the new regime and their ranks in the new hierarchy.


14

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Second, we were able to collect detailed biographical information about the 2,980 political elites
in the new regime from Jinji-Koshin-Roku (Who’s Who Record) volume 4 published in 1915 (Jinji
Koshin-Jo 1915).4 Obtaining text data using OCR technology, we could construct a database of
all the persons listed in the record, which included detailed biographical information—not only
about their own careers, education background, and ranks in the new elite hierarchy but also theirfathers’ home towns and social classes in the former regime—and we were able to measureintergenerational social mobility, comparing the relative statuses of fathers and sons.5
One important previous study uses Jinji-Koshin-Roku. Takane (1976, 1981) examines elite
mobility from 1869 to 1969, and reveals the factors that influence elite membership and intra-elite
hierarchy. However, his focus is not on the difference between the regime transition phase and its
consolidation phase, and hence, his strategy and conclusion are different from ours. One differenceis that he did not collect the data in the transition phase. In addition, since he analyzes the elites’
own feudal status in the new regime and not the status of their fathers in the former regime, the4

Jinji-Koshin-Roku is known as a provider of the most credible who’s who record during theperiod, and scholars are in consensus about the relative reliability of their provided information(e.g. Aso 1978; Iwami et al. 1981; Takane 1976, 1981).
5



We collected the information of the elites’ biological fathers and not foster fathers.
15

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

analyzed social status includes the posteriori ones acquired by elites’ career success or adoption.
Therefore, his conclusion is that feudal status maintained a strong influence from 1860 to 1936
and faded only after World War II (Takane 1981, 151). He does not demonstrate that empirical
weakening of the former elites occurred in the regime transition phase.6 The following analyses,
therefore, have added a new perspective to the literature of modern Japanese history.

Data
To specify the government elites and their ranks in the intra-elite hierarchy, we use the order ofprecedence in the emperor’s court (Kyuchu-Sekiji) established by the Imperial House Law Act(Koshitsu-Rei) Number 1 in 1915. The ranks of Kyuchu-Sekiji consisted of current and former
posts, titles—the Royal and Noble Ranks (Shakui)— and awards that divided government elites
6

The studies by Takane (1976, 1981) have the following technical limitations: firstly, his dataset

does not include military awards, owing to which he fails to capture information about many
military men, although they played a substantial role in the new regime. Secondly, the size of his
dataset is much smaller than ours, since he obtains the data by sampling and not by using thecomplete dataset of Jinji-Koshin-Roku. Thirdly, he records elites’ ranks inaccurately. He assumes
that the more number of high awards a person had, the higher was his/her position, which
contradicts the contents of Article 2 of the Imperial House Act No. 1, as we explain later.


16

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

into 70 ranks (See Appendix). Each title and award had been institutionalized before 1915 but thisorder arranged all ranks derived from them in the same line. The Royal and Noble Rank system
was institutionalized in 1884 and these titles, divided into four ranks, were given to the old elites
such as the Tokugawa Shogun and feudal lords (Daimyo), and the new elites who had rendered
distinguished services to the Meiji government. These titles could be inherited by their descendants.
Awards were divided into (1) Kunto (Order of Merit), (2) Ikai (Court Rank),7 (3) Kokyu (Merit
Grade) particularly for military, and (4) Jako-no-Mashiko and Kinkei-no-Mashiko (honorary posts
entitled to enter into the special rooms in the Emperor’s Palace). An individual such as a bureaucrat
or a military man would be assigned an award corresponding to his or her position, whenever heor she reached a higher post. Currently, the imperial ranks are only given to elder people but atthat time, the awards were given immediately in principle. 8 These awards were principally
7

Ikai (Court Rank) was the most popular award (Fujii 1990) and offered to nobilities, government

officers, military men, imperial university professors, national school headmasters, and those thatwere given credit for Japan.
8

For example, the chief judge of a district court was normally awarded the Fourth Order and theFifth Rank. An army general was normally awarded the First Order and the Second Class, andsome of them were awarded as the Grand Cordon of the Order and the First Class. Vice-ministers,
the top position of civilian bureaucrats, were at least awarded the Third Order. The ambassadors

17

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japanguaranteed for a lifetime but could not be inherited by the descendants of the receiver. Therefore,
these awards were indicative of the highest position that each elite has held in the new government.
We excluded the ranks derived from the current and former posts and selected only theranks derived from awards and titles for the analyses. The reason is that awards and titles wereprincipally guaranteed for a lifetime while current and former positions were unstable as well as
could have been attained through elections that contradicted the emperor’s will.9
The analytical focus was on the new governments’ strategies for elite recruitment, andKyuchu-Sekiji is therefore ideal because it was determined by the Emperor; reflected the Emperor’s
intentions;10 and included a variety of elites, such as bureaucrats, military leaders, businessmen,at the big countries such as the UK, the US, Italy, Russia, and France were awarded the First Order.
9

In 1915, 90 percent of the members of the House of Peers had received while a half of themembers of the House of Representatives did not have any awards according to our database.
10

Strictly speaking, we should distinguish emperors from governments; however, emperors weresymbolic figures for the challengers that overthrew the former regimes, established new regimes,
and consolidated them. Therefore, we use Kyuchu-Sekiji to indicate government elites.
Additionally, Nishikawa (1996, 2002) argues that military personnel were more likely thancivilians to obtain high-ranking posts. This ranking system could be considered a biased system,
but what is notable is that the Emperor intentionally biased his appointments. This is meaningful18

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japanscholars, scientists, and cultural celebrities. Therefore, we assume that government elites were
those who had been given titles or awards and create the dependent variable, ranki∈[1, 70],11
which records the highest rank each elite had.12
To compare the statuses of sons to their fathers, we identify the father’s social stratumof each government elite in the former regime, f_classi. We divided the social strata in the former
regime into four scales [1,4]: (a) higher-ranked elites (nobilities and feudal lord) recorded as four,13

because we can interpret it as a sign that emperors and the core members of the Meiji government
valued support from the military more than they valued it from civilians.
11

In the Imperial House Law, a low-numbered rank meant a high rank, but we refined the number

from the higher to the lower for avoiding confusion. This means that ranki is recorded as 71 minus
the original rank.
12

We follow Article 2 of the Imperial House Act No. 1, which determined that a person shouldtake the highest-ranked seat if more than one rank was available.
13

The category of nobilities and feudal lords includes Shogun who was the military dictator ofJapan in the former regime, Imperial families, feudal lords (Daimyo), and nobilities who
dominated the Japanese imperial court (Kuge).
19

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan(b) middle-ranked elites (higher-ranked samurai) recorded as three, 14 (c) lower-ranked elites(samurai) recorded as two,15 and (d) non-elites (commoner) recorded as one.
To examine the difference between the regime transition phase and its consolidation
phase, dividing government elites into the pre-Meiji-Restoration-born group and the post-MeijiRestoration-born group, we created a dummy variable phasei, which takes value one, if an elite
was born after 1867 and zero otherwise. The reason we differentiate the regime transition phasefrom its consolidation phase was that the government could not establish most nationwide
institutions until the early 1890 as we have mentioned in Section 3.1. We considered 1890 to be
the pivotal year because not only did these institutions consolidate the new regime but they also
opened avenues for everyone to join the elite group. Before 1890s, people had to find a way to join

14

The category of higher-ranked samurai includes the upper vassals of the Tokugawa house(Hatamoto), feudal lords’ relatives (Hanshu-Ichimon), and advisors of feudal lords (Karō).
15

The category of samurai also includes Shizoku. More than half of the samurai in the Tokugawa

Shogunate became re-categorized as Shizoku after the Meiji Restoration by an administrative orderissued in 1869 (Yamaguchi 2000). The rest of the samurai were the people who chose to becomecommoners or were rejected because of their very low status in the samurai group. Therefore, we
assume that most Shizoku were samurai in the former regime since it was nearly impossible that
commoners in the former regime became Shizoku after the Meiji Restoration.
20

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japanthe elite group by themselves. However, these institutions allowed all people, regardless of birth,
to become bureaucrats as long as they passed the entrance exam or graduate from the Universityof Tokyo, to become military elites if they graduated from military schools and colleges with agood degree, or to become politicians if they won an election. At that time, the standard age for
earning a bachelor’s degree was 22 for medical students and 21 for others (Monbu-sho ed. 1981).
Therefore, we assume that the people who started their career in the regime consolidation phasewere born after 1867.
In addition, we created the following control variables. Concerning the educational
background, an important variable is overseas study experience. Tokugawa Shogunate had aforeign policy that restricted the entry of foreigners and forbade the Japanese from leaving andreentering Japan until 1866. Therefore, the people who had Western knowledge were rare and indemand for achieving modernization (Ishizuki 1972; Silberman 1964; Tsuji 2010; Watanabe 1977).
We argue that the people who experienced study abroad were more likely to be promoted(Silberman 1964) and examine its effects using a dummy variable, edu_overseai, which takes value
one, if an elite had experience of studying abroad and zero otherwise. Additionally, domestic
education might have influenced their success (Aso 1978; Amano 1990; Iwami et al. 1981;

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Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Man’nari 1965; Takane 1976, 1981); hence, we create three more dummy variables to assess theirlatest academic background. These were based on whether one was a PhD holder (edu_phdi),
whether one had a BA and/or a Masters but not a PhD (edu_bai), and whether one had graduatedfrom a high school or higher-level school but not imperial universities (edu_highschooli).16
Additionally, we add the variable representing the father’s hometown to see if the people
from the four domains that initiated the Meiji Restoration had privileges. These four domains are
Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen,17 and the people from these domains were generally believed

16

During the time, only the imperial universities established after the regime change were able tooffer students bachelor and PhD degrees, and other (higher) professional schools and private
universities in Japan could offer neither. We also counted the Bachelor and PhD degrees gained byforeign countries. In addition, we counted the people who had graduated from the Naval War
College or Army War College in Japan as Bachelor holders. We assume that if the record does notinclude any information regarding education background about a person, his or her educational
level was less than high-school. For reference, before the regime change, no educational system
could confer a degree although there were schools that taught Confucianism or Western knowledge.
17

Japan abolished the previous domain system and instead introduced a new system of prefecturesin 1871. Kagoshima prefecture included most area of Satsuma domain, Yamaguchi prefecture
included most of Choshu domain, Kochi prefecture included most of Tosa domain, and Saga
prefecture included most of Hizen domain. Therefore, we record both the elites whose fathers were

22

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japanto gain some privileges (e.g. Silberman 1964; Takane 1976, 1981). We, therefore, create a dummy
variable, f_connectioni, which takes a value of one if the father of an elite was from one of thosefour domains and zero otherwise. Lastly, we add a variable for each elite’s birth date, birthdatei,18
to control for the effect of the Confucian sense of seniority.
We extracted the above information from the Who’s Who Record (Jinji-Koshin-Roku)
volume 4 published in 1915.19 A total of 3,612 government elites, in the sense defined above,were included in this record, and for 2,981 of them, we were able to obtain information about theirfathers’ social classes in the former regime from the record. For 2,980 of them except one, the dataof their birth dates were available as well. We can check the coverage of our data set by comparing
it with the number of people who had titles and awards in the previous year, 1914, from the official
government data provided by the Bureau of Statistics in the Cabinet Office (Naikaku-Tokeikyoku
from the four domains and the ones whose fathers were from these four prefectures.
18

We record birth year (yyyy), month (mm), and day (dd) as “yyyy.mmdd.”

19

We chose this volume for three main reasons. First, it was in 1915 that the emperor establishedthe order of precedence in the emperor’s court (Kyuchu-Sekiji). Second, as 25 years had passed
since 1890, those who became bureaucrats by passing the Examination of High Civil Servants
became a vast majority by 1915. Third, the number of the people covered by the previous volumesof Jinji-Koshin-Roku is significantly lower.
23

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan1926). It is confirmed that 77 percent of the people who had titles in 1914 are included in our 2,980
observations. Regarding Ikai (Court Rank), 60 percent of the people who had Junior Fourth Rankor higher are included.
Table 1 summarizes the distribution for dummy variables, and Table 2 summarizes
descriptive statistics for the other variables.20<Table 1 should be here><Table 2 should be here>

Membership and Internal Hierarchy of Elites
What kind of people joined the elite group and how did their membership change over phases ofregime change? Figure 1 shows the composition of the social stratum of the fathers of the preMeiji-Restoration-born elites compared with those of the post-Meiji-Restoration-born elites inorder to analyze the change in the elite membership owing to the regime change.

20

Our dataset includes a very few young people. The minimum age of them were 4 years old.

These two boys were Yoshikane Yoshida and Hiromasa Arao, both of whom were sons ofaristocrats and inherited the title since their fathers died.


24

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan<Figure 1 should be here>
We find that the share of the elites whose fathers were lower-ranked elites (samurai)
was more than 60 percent in the regime transition phase, while their share became reduced in its
consolidation phase. This reflects that they led the Restoration, although they declined in influenceduring its consolidation phase.
On the other hand, in the regime consolidation period, their share declined substantially,
while the sons of the higher-ranked elites of the old regime (feudal lords and nobilities) as well as
the sons of the non-elites (commoners) increased. The results suggest that barriers preventing
access to the elite group are steadily and continuously lowered in the process of regime change;on the contrary, the rebels against the Tokugawa regime or the new governments act differently
toward elites during phases of regime change. They first contend against these elites in order tooverthrow the incumbent regime while they reintegrate these elites into their new elite group after
establishing the new regime in order to alleviate their dissatisfaction against the new regime andgain their support.
Let us move on the next question: how does social strata in the former regime influence
the internal ranking of elites and how does the impact change over phases of regime change? We25

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japandraw box plots of government elites by phases of the regime change over their fathers’ social strata(See Figure 2). We find that overall, the higher the social stratum of one’s father in the former
regime, the higher one’s own rank in the new regime. Moreover, both boxes and whiskers in theregime transition phase were larger than those in its consolidation phase. This supports ourtheoretical argument that the internal hierarchy of government elites again begins to reflect thesocial stratum of the former regime in the regime consolidation phase. Particularly, the ranks ofelites whose fathers were middle- and higher-ranked elites in the former regime were extremely
concentrated in the regime consolidation phase, which suggests that former middle- and higherranked elites gained their ranks in the new regime only because of their high social strata in theformer regime.
<Figure 2 should be here>
To examine the impact of social strata in the former regime on the intra-elite hierarchyin the new regime, we draw a two-way graph between fathers’ social strata in the former regime("_$%&''( ) and the sons’ ranks in the new regime ()&*+( ) (See Figure 3). This graph is deducedby calculating the prediction for )&*+( from a linear regression of "_$%&''( on )&*+( andplotting the resulting curve along the 95 percent confidence interval of the mean (solid/dash lines

26

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japanand gray zones). The solid line indicates the ones in the regime transition phase (,ℎ&'.( = 0)
while the dash line indicates the ones in its consolidation phase (,ℎ&'.( = 1). Figure 3 shows thatthe slopes of both lines were positive; however, the slope angle in the regime consolidation phasebecame steeper than the one in its transition phase. Similarly, the confidence interval of the meanin the transition phase became narrower than the one in its transition phase. The empirical results
support our theoretical expectation that social strata in the former regime influenced sons’ ranks
in the intra-elite hierarchy throughout the process of the regime change, but the impact becomesstronger in the new regime than in its transition phase.
<Figure 3 should be here>
In order to measure the impacts of their fathers’ social strata in the former regime on theinternal hierarchy of government elites that we have discussed, we estimate the following ordered
probit regression models21:
Pr ()&*+( = 6) = Pr (89:; < =; "_$%&''( + =? ,ℎ&'.( + =@ AB)CℎD&C.( + E( ≤ 89 )21

Since all variance inflation factor (VIF) values are less than three, we infer that there is no

multicollinearity problem in each model.
27

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

where E( is assumed to be normally distributed; in either case, we estimate the coefficients =; ,=? , =@ together with cutpoints 8; , 8? ,…, 8IJ ; 8K is taken as −∞, and 8NK is taken as +∞.
…Model 1
Pr ()&*+( = 6) = Pr (89:; < =; "OPQRR ( + =? ,ℎ&'.( + =@ AB)CℎD&C.( + =S .DE_TU.)'.&(+=V .DE_,ℎD( + =I .DE_A&( + =N .DE_ℎBWℎ'$ℎTT%( + =X "_$T**.$CBT*( + E( ≤ 89 )where E( is assumed to be normally distributed; in either case, we estimate the coefficients =; ,=? , …, =X together with cutpoints 8; , 8? , … , 8IJ ; 8K is taken as − ∞, and 8NK is taken as +∞.
…Model 2
Model 1 is the baseline model and Model 2 the extensive version. In addition, we estimate Model
3 and Model 4 that include interactive terms between ,ℎ&'.( and other independent variables
except AB)CℎD&C.( for each Model 1 and 2 in order to see the changes in each impact over phasesof the regime change. The estimated coefficients of each model are reported in Table 3.
<Table 3 should be here>
On comparing the estimated coefficients in Table 3 with the theoretically predictedeffects, we observe three striking findings. First, all models predict that fathers’ social strata in the28Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

former regime ("_$%&''( ) positively affected sons’ ranks in the intra-elite hierarchy. Focusing on
the interaction term with phases of the regime change ("_$%&''( × ,ℎ&'.( ) in Models 3 and 4, we
find that the influence of the social strata in the former regime on the intra-elite hierarchy in the
new regime becomes stronger in the regime consolidation phase than in its transition phase.
Our second empirical result is that on introducing all interaction terms, the educational
background (.DE_TU.)'.&( , .DE_,ℎD( , .DE_A&( , and .DE_ℎBWℎ'$ℎTT%( ) positively influenced
their ranks in the new intra-elite hierarchy in the earlier phase but the significance of the education
merit diminished later on. This suggests that that the challenger (or the new government) recruits
activists with high ability out of the non-elite strata and assign them to higher-level positions basedon their abilities in the regime transition phase rather than in its consolidation phase. We need tonote the share of the elites whose latest degree was bachelor increased from 23.4% in the regime
transition phase to 41.9% in the regime consolidation phase while the distribution of othereducational background variables changed slightly from the regime transition phase to theconsolidation phase. This suggests that although having a bachelor’s degree helped people acquireelite membership, it did not guarantee them top ranks of the elites.



29

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Lastly, we find that the connection with the challengers against the Tokugawa regime("_$T**.$CBT*( ) had a positive impact on the rank in the new inter-elite hierarchy but became
weaker in the regime consolidation phase. This empirical result suggests that the influence of therebels against the Tokugawa Shogunate declined gradually in the regime consolidation phase.
Additionally, we divide the elites into two – upper-ranked elites (ranki >32.75 (the meanvalue of this variable) and lower-ranked elites (ranki <32.75) – and check the difference between
them. Table 4 reports the estimated results for each model by each group.
<Table 4 should be here>
A study of the estimated results for the upper-ranked elites reveals that fathers’ social strata in theformer regime had a positive impact on sons’ ranks in the intra-elite hierarchy. This impact became
stronger in the regime consolidation phase rather than in the transition phase. Second, educational
background negatively influenced the ranks in the intra-elite hierarchy except the experience ofoverseas study, and even the impact of overseas study became weaker in the consolidation phase.
These suggest that the upper elite ranks were likely to be determined based on family roots andnot individual ability. If ordinary people study hard, they might have an opportunity to join theupper-ranked elite group, but it would be difficult to reach to the top in this upper society. On the

30

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japanother hand, the most important factor influencing the upward move in the lower-ranked elite group
was to earn a bachelor’s degree from imperial universities or imperial military college while thesignificant influence of fathers’ social strata in the former regime disappears in the Model 3 and 4.
Summarizing, these additional analyses demonstrate that regime change caused people
with high ability to join the new elite group and obtain middle ranks in the intra-elite hierarchy
regardless of their family roots. However, this principle did not apply to the top ranks of thishierarchy. Top ranks of the elite hierarchy were determined according to each family’s original
social strata in the former regime and this tendency became clearer in the consolidation phase thanin the transition phase.

Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of our results, we conduct three additional analyses. First, toexamine the adequacy of our “phase” dichotomization, we divide the people by their birth years(per 4 and 5 years) and estimate the arranged version of Model 2 that excludes an independent
variable, phase. Table 5 and 6 show that although the estimated coefficients of f_classcontinuously increased throughout the time, the increasing speed accelerated from the late 1960s
to the early 1970s.
31

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan<Table 5 and 6 should be here>
Second, we also consider a general problem to the age of elites: young people still havethe opportunity to get promoted to a higher rank, while retired/ dead people generally do not. We
focus on the people listed in Jinji-Koshin-Roku volume 4 published in 1915, obtain their ranks in
1928 from Jinji-Koshin-Roku volume 8, and examine the models again by their upgraded
ranks, )&*+(d . (Note that if we cannot find the same person in volume 8, we fill the rank in 1915
instead.) The results reported in Table 7 basically support the former results. The coefficient of theinteraction between f_class and phase is 0.08 with 5.5 percent significance in Model 3, but when
we control for other independent variables, the coefficient becomes significant. On the other hand,the effects of high school level educational background and fathers’ connection with the new
regime significantly become weaker (.DE_ℎBWℎ'$ℎTT%( × ,ℎ&'.( , "_$T**.$CBT*( × ,ℎ&'.( ) inperiod 1, and although it is not significant, the coefficients of the interactions of the othereducational background with phase are also negative.
<Table 7 should be here>
To examine the first and second issues in more detail, we check the contrasts ofpredictive margin of upper-ranked elites versus commoners and lower-ranked elites (samurai) with
32

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

95% confidential level by birth year, using both the original rank in 1915 and the updated rank in
1928. The results are summarized in Figure 4. The figure shows the tendency that the difference
between them became clearer after mid 1860s.
<Figure 4 should be here>
Lastly, we create a dependent variable, )&*+( ′, that combines the 70 ranks of )&*+(
into four ranks by cutting each quantile and estimate the coefficients for each model (see Table 8)
as well as check the marginal effects for Model 4 (see Figure 5). The results reported in Table 8
and Figure 5 confirm the former outcomes: the positive impact of fathers’ classes becomes stronger("_$%&''( × ,ℎ&'.( ) in the phase 1 while the positive impacts of all educational backgrounds andfathers’ connection with the new regime weaken ( .DE_TU.)'.&( × ,ℎ&'.( , .DE_,ℎD( ×,ℎ&'.( , .DE_A&( × ,ℎ&'.( , .DE_ℎBWℎ'$ℎTT%( × ,ℎ&'.( , "_$T**.$CBT*( × ,ℎ&'.( ).
<Table 8 should be here><Figure 5 should be here>
CONCLUSION
Despite its significance for regime change and state building, the question of how the influence ofregime change on elite group shifts over time has not received significant scholarly attention.
33

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Using detailed individual-level data from the Meiji Restoration, Japan, we analyzed the changes
in the social, political, and educational backgrounds of political elites over the phases of regimechange, i.e. the regime transition phase and the regime consolidation phase and demonstrated elite
reproduction dynamics. Several significant findings have emerged. First, while fathers’ social
strata in the feudal society had a positive influence on the positions of political elites, it was smallerin the regime transition phase than in the regime consolidation phase. This implies that the
proportion of elites whose fathers were elites in the former regime was low in the regime transition
phase but increased in the regime consolidation phase. Second, the positive impact of educational
background on the positions of political elites was larger in the regime transition phase than in theregime consolidation phase. Third, while the elites whose fathers’ hometowns were the four feudal
domains initiating the Meiji Restoration (Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen) tended to have higher
political positions, the impact of this hometown connection factor was larger in the regime
transition phase than in the regime consolidation phase. Fourth, the percentage of political elites
whose fathers were commoners in the feudal society increased in the regime consolidation phase.
These findings are important both theoretically and empirically. First, to our knowledge,
this is the first study to explore the mobility and continuity of political elites over political regime34

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japanchange, focusing on the difference between them in the regime transition phase and the regime
consolidation phase, based on a large set of individual-level data. It was revealed that the mobility
and continuity of elites indeed changed from the regime transition phase to the consolidation phase.
Second, this study contributes to the understanding of the regime change. As statedabove, Tilly (1978) noted that the extent of the coalition between members of the polity and thecontenders is essential for the success or failure of a revolution. This study supports and enriches
this view by showing the overtime change in the continuity and mobility of elites. The findings
above suggest that the Meiji government initially recruited activists with high ability out of the
non-elite strata, particularly from the four feudal domains initiating the Meiji Restoration andassigned them to higher-level positions. In this sense, in the regime transition phase, the politicalcoalition was narrowly focused and power sharing was limited, which arguably enabled theoverthrow of the old regime successfully. They then strengthened the coalition with the old elites
to consolidate the new regime. Power sharing with the elites of the former regime facilitates
consolidation of the new regime, but this should occur after overthrowing the former regime.
Meanwhile, the number of government elites whose fathers were commoners in the
feudal society kept increasing throughout the process of regime change, although the access to35

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japanhigh positions in the hierarchy for these commoners became narrowed after the regime transition
phase due to the resilience of the old elites. Barriers preventing commoners from accessing theelite group were thus steadily lowered in the process of regime change. It can be interpreted as apart of the strategy of the government in the regime consolidation phase to extend power sharing.
A regime change may arouse people’s desire to climb the ladder of power even if the
new governments do not intend to democratize. One reason is that they see some people become
elites from the non-elite strata. These success cases may raise the question of “why them and notme [us]?” among many other non-elites (Silberman 1993, pp.173-174). In addition, the new
government needs to increase public spending for establishing the new regime. The government
has many tasks such as management of new administrations, counterinsurgency operation, andreestablishment of diplomatic relations with other countries, all of which cost a significant amountof money. To complete these tasks, they need to collect taxes from people. Tax payment may
increase people’s demand for participation in politics. When faced with these demands from themasses, the challenger may have to compromise with them. Establishment of legislature andexpansion of franchise are the prototypical examples of such a compromise. Even dictators may
establish a legislature, which is merely a custom in many cases though, for his or her regime36

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japansurvival (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2001, 2005; Conley and Temimi 2001; Gandhi 2008;
Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Lizzeri and Persico 2004). Although the new elite hierarchy is not
identical to the one before the regime change, elite reproduction dynamics does occur after aregime change.

APPENDIX
Kyuchu-Sekiji (Internal Hierarchy for Government Elites)<Table A1 should be here>

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46

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Figure 1 Elite Membership

47

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Figure 2 Intra-elite Hierarchy (Box Graph)

48

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Figure 3 Intra-elite Hierarchy (Fitted Line)

49

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Figure 450Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Figure 551Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Dummy Variables
N of observations



N of observations for 0

N of observations for 1

phasei

2980

1776

1204

edu_overseai

2980

2431

549

edu_phdi

2980

2575

405

edu_bai

2980

2060

920

edu_highschooli

2980

2539

441

f_connectioni

2979

2545

434

52

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Other Variables
N of observations



Mean

Standard Deviation

Min

Max

ranki

2980

32.75

9.64

1

70

f_classi

2980

2.04

0.97

1

4

birthdatei

2980

1865.04

11.03

1828.101911.1053

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Table 3 Estimated Effects of Fathers’ Social Strata on Government Elites’ Ranks
Independent Variables

Model 1Model 2Model 3Model 4!_#$%&&'

0.64*** (0.021)

0.65*** (0.023)

0.48*** (0.031)

0.52*** (0.032)(ℎ%&*'-0.33*** (0.057)-0.33*** (0.057)-0.86*** (0.092)-0.13 (0.143)+,-.ℎ/%.*'-0.03*** (0.003)-0.03*** (0.003)-0.04*** (0.003)-0.04*** (0.003)*/0_12*-&*%' 

0.19*** (0.057)

0.32*** (0.070)*/0_(ℎ/'0.04 (0.071)

0.19** (0.086)*/0_+%'-0.05 (0.049)

0.13** (0.065)*/0_ℎ,3ℎ&#ℎ11$'0.02 (0.058)

0.27*** (0.074)!_#144*#.,14'

0.37*** (0.053)

0.52*** (0.066)!_#$%&&' × (ℎ%&*'

0.30*** (0.041)*/0_12*-&*%' × (ℎ%&*' -0.36*** (0.120)*/0_(ℎ/' × (ℎ%&*'-0.47*** (0.157)*/0_+%' × (ℎ%&*'-0.48*** (0.107)*/0_ℎ,3ℎ&#ℎ11$'-0.71*** (0.126)

× (ℎ%&*'!_#144*#.,14' × (ℎ%&*'N
Log likelihood-0.45*** (0.111)
2980

2979

2980

2979

-7643.31-7607.54-7616.17-7545.00*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses

0.21*** (0.044)

54

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Table 4 Estimated Effects of Fathers’ Social Strata on Government Elites’ Ranks by Upper and Lower Ranked Elite Groups
Upper Ranked Elites (ranki >32.75)
Independent Variables!_#$%&&'(ℎ%&*'+,-.ℎ/%.*'*/0_12*-&*%' */0_(ℎ/'*/0_+%'*/0_ℎ,3ℎ&#ℎ11$'!_#144*#.,14'!_#$%&&' × (ℎ%&*'

Model 1Model 2Model 3Lower Ranked Elites (ranki <32.75)

Model 4Model 1Model 2Model 3Model 40.25***

0.24***

0.16***

0.15***

0.21***

0.16***

0.13

0.10

(0.028)(0.032)(0.036)(0.039)(0.053)(0.054)(0.079)(0.080)0.17*

0.18**-0.46***

-0.35

-0.01

-0.04

-0.23

-0.22

(0.901)(0.091)(0.174)(0.250)(0.090)(0.090)(0.189)(0.222)-0.04***-0.04***-0.04***-0.04***-0.03***-0.03***-0.03***-0.03***(0.003)(0.003)(0.003)(0.003)(0.006)(0.006)(0.006)(0.006)0.32***

0.43***

0.14

0.16

(0.777)(0.086)(0.089)(0.133)-0.30***-0.38***

0.39***

0.24(0.995)(0.108)(0.116)(0.163)-0.16**-0.20**

0.26***

0.23**(0.073)(0.089)(0.082)(0.107)

0.04

0.01

0.05

0.23*

(0.079)(0.0935)(0.096)(0.134)0.22***

0.23***

0.04

-0.07

(0.070)(0.067)(0.091)(0.138)0.25***

0.23***

0.15

0.10

(0.058)(0.067)(0.106)(0.109)55

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan*/0_12*-&*%' × (ℎ%&*' */0_(ℎ/' × (ℎ%&*'*/0_+%' × (ℎ%&*'*/0_ℎ,3ℎ&#ℎ11$' × (ℎ%&*'!_#144*#.,14' × (ℎ%&*'N
Log likelihood-0.59***-0.04(0.202)(0.179)

0.29

0.25

(0.321)(0.240)

0.16

0.04

(0.166)(0.171)

0.03

-0.29

(0.182)(0.203)-0.49***-0.04(0.169)(0.179)

1590

1590

1590

1590

1390

1389

1389

-3440.95-3442.20-3431.93-3404.45-2573.17-2555.64-2572.23*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses

56

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Table 5 Estimated Effects of Fathers’ Social Strata on Government Elites’ Ranks by 5 Birth-year Group
Birth year

~1849

1850~1854

1855~1859

1860~1864

1865~1869

1870~1874

1875~18791880~!_#$%&&'

0.35***

0.44***

0.45***

0.51***

0.59***

0.76***

1.06***

0.99***+,-.ℎ/%.*'-0.07***

-0.07

-0.08

-0.08**-0.10***

-0.07

-0.06

0.03

*/0_12*-&*%'

0.65

0.23

0.73***

0.22

-0.08

-0.01

0.02

0.16

*/0_(ℎ/'

-0.33

0.41

0.16

0.07

0.28

-0.15

-0.33

0.45

*/0_+%'

-0.49

0.01

0.29

0.40***

0.03

-0.11

-0.53

-0.65

*/0_ℎ,3ℎ&#ℎ11$' 0.42

0.52

0.52***

0.23

-0.05

-0.57***

-0.46

0.19

!_#144*#.,14'

0.76***

0.98***

0.10

0.21

0.07

0.12

0.21

0.16

229

234

388

510

648

531

214

225

N. of Obs.

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses

57

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Table 6 Estimated Effects of Fathers’ Social Strata on Government Elites’ Ranks by 4 Birth-year Group
Birth year

~1849

1850~1853

1854~1857

1858~1861

1862~1865

1866~1869

1870~1873

1874~1877 1879~!_#$%&&'

0.35***

0.44***

0.40***

0.50***

0.58***

0.58***

0.74***

0.97***

1.04***+,-.ℎ/%.*'-0.07*** -0.07

-0.09

-0.03

-0.04

-0.08

0.09

-0.26***

0.02*/0_12*-&*%'

0.65

0.31

0.47**

0.66***

-0.11

0.02

0.06

-0.10

0.12

*/0_(ℎ/'

-0.33

0.20

0.26

0.19

0.26

0.15

-0.02

-0.58

-0.20

*/0_+%'

-0.49

-0.13

0.11

0.49***

0.32**

-0.04

0.02

-0.79***-0.27*/0_ℎ,3ℎ&#ℎ11$' 0.42

0.52

0.72***

0.39

0.15

-0.17

-0.47**

-0.64

0.07

!_#144*#.,14'

0.76***

1.10***

0.09

0.21

0.25

0.11

0.13

0.28

0.09

229

174

283

371

467

485

456

228

286

N. of Obs.

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses

58

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Table 7 Estimation of models in Table 3 using the data from Jinji-Koshin-Roku volume 8 (1928)
Independent Variables

Model 1Model 2Model 3Model 4!_#$%&&'

0.43*** (0.020)

0.49*** (0.021)

0.39*** (0.030)

0.44*** (0.031)(ℎ%&*'-0.08 (0.055)-0.10 (0.055)-0.21** (0.087)-0.03 (0.127)-0.02*** (0.003)-0.02*** (0.003)-0.02*** (0.003)-0.03*** (0.003)+,-.ℎ/%.*'*/0_12*-&*%' 

0.32*** (0.056)

0.37*** (0.070)*/0_(ℎ/'

0.45*** (0.069)

0.47*** (0.084)*/0_+%'

0.19*** (0.047)

0.24*** (0.063)*/0_ℎ,3ℎ&#ℎ11$'

0.12*** (0.055)

0.28*** (0.071)!_#144*#.,14'

0.34*** (0.052)

0.51*** (0.066)!_#$%&&' × (ℎ%&*'0.08 (0.039)*/0_12*-&*%' × (ℎ%&*' -0.14 (0.117)*/0_(ℎ/' × (ℎ%&*'-0.04 (0.149)*/0_+%' × (ℎ%&*'-0.12 (0.100)*/0_ℎ,3ℎ&#ℎ11$' × (ℎ%&*'-0.39*** (0.116)!_#144*#.,14' × (ℎ%&*'-0.48*** (0.108)

N
Log likelihood

3181

3180

3181

2979

-8435.41-8337.64-8433.58-7545.00*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses

0.08** (0.042)

59

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Table 8 Estimated Effects of Fathers’ Social Strata on Government Elites’ Ranks Combined into Four Levels
Independent Variables

Model 1Model 2Model 3Model 4!_#$%&&'

0.57*** (0.0230

0.57*** (0.025)

0.38*** (0.033)

0.41*** (0.034)(ℎ%&*'-0.56*** (0.063)-0.55*** (0.063)-1.19*** (0.104)-0.39** (0.160)+,-.ℎ/%.*'-0.03*** (0.003)-0.03*** (0.003)-0.04*** (0.003)-0.04*** (0.003)*/0_12*-&*%' 

0.14** (0.063)

0.28*** (0.077)*/0_(ℎ/'0.08 (0.078)

0.32*** (0.093)*/0_+%'-0.14*** (0.0535)

0.03 (0.070)*/0_ℎ,3ℎ&#ℎ11$'0.04 (0.064)

0.27*** (0.080)!_#144*#.,14'

0.32*** (0.058)

0.46*** (0.072)!_#$%&&' × (ℎ%&*'

0.35*** (0.045)*/0_12*-&*%' × (ℎ%&*' -0.38*** (0.138)*/0_(ℎ/' × (ℎ%&*'-0.73*** (0.178)*/0_+%' × (ℎ%&*'-0.45*** (0.118)*/0_ℎ,3ℎ&#ℎ11$' × (ℎ%&*'-0.70*** (0.140)!_#144*#.,14' × (ℎ%&*'-0.42*** (0.125)

N
Log likelihood

2980

2979

2980

2979

-3556.23-3527.40-3526.53-3464.28*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses

0.23*** (0.049)

60

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

Table A1 Kyuchu-Sekiji (Internal Hierarchy for Government Elites)
Rank

Current and former post

Title

Award







Kunto (Order of Merit)

1

Daikun’i (Grand Cordonof the Order)2

Prime Minister

3

President of the Privy Council

4

Veterans of Restoration treated as Minister

5

Marshal, Minister, Minister of the Imperial
Household, Minister of the Interior

6

Governor-General of Korea

7

Former Prime Minister, former President of the
Privy Council

8

Former Minister, Former Minister of the Imperial
Household, Former Minister of the Interior

9

Vice President of the Privy Council

10

Army General, Navy General, Privy Council

11

Official appointed by the Emperor

12

Speaker of the House of Peers, Speaker of theHouse of Representatives



61

Ikai (Court Rank)

Kokyu (Merit Grade)

Honorary Post

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

13

First Order (Special)

14
15First Class
Former official appointed by the Emperor

16

Duke

17

Junior First Rank

18

First Order (others)

19

Senior Official Level 1

20

Deputy Speaker of the House of Peers, Deputy
Speaker of the House of Representatives

21

Person entitled to enter
into Jako Room

22

Marquess

23
24

Second Rank
Senior Official Level 2

25

Second Class

26

Person entitled to enter
into Kinkei Room

27
28

Person treated as imperial appointee
Earl

29

Junior Second Rank

30
31

Second Order
Viscount32

Third Rank

62

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan

33

Junior Third Rank

34

Third Class

35

Third Order

36

Baron

37

Fourth Rank

38

Junior Fourth Rank

39

Member of House of Peers, Member of the Houseof Representatives

40

Senior Officer Level 3

41

Person treated as Senior Officer Level 3

42

Fourth Class

43

Fourth Order

44

Fifth Rank

45

Junior Fifth Rank

46

Senior Officer 447

Person treated as Senior Officer Level 4

48

Fifth Class

49

Fifth Order50

Sixth Rank

51

Senior Officer Level 5

52

Person treated as Senior Officer Level 553Junior Sixth Rank

63

Matsumoto & Okazaki. Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change: Case of Meiji Restoration Japan54

Sixth Order

55

Senior Officer Level 6

56

Person treated as Senior Officer Level 6

57

Seventh Rank

58

Senior Officer Level 7

59

Person treated as Senior Officer Level 7

60

Junior Seventh Rank

61

Sixth Class

62

Senior Officer Level 8

63Person treated as Senior Officer Level 8

64

Senior Officer Level 9

65

Person treated as appointee with the Emperor's
approval

66

Eighth Rank

67

Seventh Class

68

Seventh Order

69
70

Junior Eighth Rank

Eighth Order







Note: Rank in this table refers to the original rank in Kyuchu-Sekiji. As stated in the main text, we made the variable "ranki" by (70Rank), so that the larger number of rank indicates the higher position.

64