CASE STUDIES OF U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUESAGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS
Joseph K. Wheatley＊

I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. law enforcement authorities face a variety of domestic and transnational organized crime groups.
Those groups run the gamut in the types of crimes committed; structure and unifying purposes; from small tolarge in size; and from local to regional to national and transnational in scope. While not statutorily binding,there are several major definitions of organized crime in the United States, including the following two
definitions, which may aid decision-makers in setting priorities and focusing resources as new criminal
threats are identified and prosecuted.
In 1986, the Presidentʼs Commission on Organized Crime released a report, which listed six
characteristics of organized crime groups:
The criminal group is a continuing, structured collectivity of persons who utilize criminality, violence,
and a willingness to corrupt in order to gain and maintain power and profit. The characteristics of thecriminal group, which must be evidenced concurrently, are: [1] continuity, [2] structure, [3] criminality,[4] violence, [5] membership based on a common denominator, [6] a willingness to corrupt and apower/profit goal.1
In 2008, the Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime defined internationalorganized crime groups as:[T] hose self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate internationally for the purpose ofobtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means,
while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence. There is no single
structure under which international organized criminals operate; they vary from hierarchies to clans,
networks and cells, and may evolve to other structures. The crimes they commit also vary.2
The 2008 Strategy’s definition shares terms in common with the 1986 Presidentʼs Commission on
Organized Crimeʼs six characteristics, such as continuity, structure, and pursuit of power as a goal; andshares terms in common with the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. These
definitions are not limited to a particular organization, such as the Mafia, leaving room for various types oforganizations to qualify as an organized crime group, such as gangs and cybercrime groups.
This article examines three different forms of organized crime groups in the United States, which also
operate transnationally in some cases̶the Mafia, gangs, and cybercrime groups. In doing so, this article
offers case studies of how various types of law enforcement tools have been used successfully against those
three forms of organized crime groups. By no means are those three organized crime groups an exhaustive
list of the groups which operate in the United States or elsewhere. However, as they are each distinctive
forms of organized crime groups, with varying predicate offences, structures, modes of operations, andunifying purposes, they serve as helpful examples about law enforcement tools which may be successful
Trial Attorney, Organized Crime and Gang Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, United States ofAmerica.
1
Presidentʼs Commission on Organized Crime, Report to the President and the Attorney General, The Impact: Organized Crime
Today (1986), pp. 25-29 [hereinafter President’s Commission Report].
2
United States Department of Justice, The Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime (23 April 2008),
p. 2.
＊

24

166TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTSʼ LECTURES

against different types of organized crime groups.

II. THE AMERICAN MAFIAThe Mafia holds a prominent place in American popular conceptions of organized crime. The terms of“Mafia” and “organized crime” even tend to be treated as one and the same. Congressional investigations in
the 1950ʼs and 1960ʼs increased the governmentʼs knowledge about the Mafia, also known as “La Cosa Nostra,”commonly translated into English as “Our Thing”.3 Until that time, the Mafia as an institution was largely
unknown to the U.S. Congress. Investigations by the U.S. Congressʼ Kefauver and McClellan Committees
helped reveal, to the public and legislators, the Mafiaʼs infrastructure, rules, and leadership.4
The Mafia is a hierarchical organization, composed of career criminals, that requires its members to show
loyalty and obedience.5 Mafia groups, also known as “families,” operate in a given city or region.6 A “boss”
serves as the leader of a Mafia family and receives a large fraction of the familyʼs earnings.7 An “underboss”
manages the daily operations of a Mafia family and represents the boss when necessary.8 “Captains” manage
the “soldiers,” the low-level members who carry out most of the Mafia familyʼs activities, at times using
uninitiated associates of the family.9
The Mafia earns money from various crimes. In the 1950ʼs, the Mafia derived most of its revenue fromloan-sharking and gambling.10 The Mafia has also earned money from prostitution, labor racketeering, andsales of black market goods.11 Starting in the 1980ʼs, narcotics trafficking became the most significant sourceof revenue for the Mafia.12 Using legitimate businesses as money laundering fronts, the Mafia hides thesources of its finances.13
The Mafia is just one example of the large, hierarchical organized crime groups that operate in the UnitedStates. For instance, U.S. law enforcement agencies face Russian organized crime groups and gangs, such as
MS-13 and others described below, that are also large and hierarchical.
A. Successful Methods against the Mafia
Various methods have been used successfully against the Mafia, including electronic surveillance andinformants. While various methods have been used successfully, this section offers examples of the use of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute and undercover operations against the Mafia.
1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute (“RICO”)
In 1970, the U. S. Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act, which included Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, a landmark law commonly known as “RICO”. RICO represented a new
approach by the United States for conceptualizing and targeting organized crime.14 RICO treats organizedcrime groups as they really are, criminal enterprises to be dismantled, whether they are traditional groups
that prey upon their victims face-or-face, or cybercrime groups that prey upon their victims from thousandsof miles away. To paraphrase, RICO criminalizes a pattern of conduct performed as part of a criminal
enterprise, such as owning, participating in, or funding such enterprises, or conspiracies to commit such
See United States Congress, Senate Report No. 617 (1969), pp. 36-43.
See generally United States Congress, Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics: Hearings Before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations (1963), p. 80 [hereinafter McClellan
Committee Hearings]; United States Congress, Report of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime inInterstate Commerce, S. Rep. No. 307 (1951) [hereinafter Kefauver Committee Report].
5
McClellan Committee Hearings, p. 2 (remarks of Senator John McClellan).
6
Presidentʼs Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Organized Crime (1967), p. 7
[hereinafter Task Force Report].
7
President’s Commission Report, p. 39.
8Id.; Task Force Report, p. 7.
9President’s Commission Report, p. 39; Task Force Report, pp. 7-8.
10
Task Force Report, pp. 2, 4; Kefauver Committee Report, p. 2.
11
Kefauver Committee Report, p. 1.
12President’s Commission Report, p. 11.
13
Task Force Report, p. 4.
1418 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West).
3
4

25

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 103

conduct.15 In its focus on criminal enterprises, RICO distinguishes itself from the various laws targetingorganized crime that preceded it. RICO possesses considerable flexibility to target new criminal groups thatarise, since it names no particular criminal group as liable for prosecution.
In 1980, ten years after enacting RICO, the federal government used the statute to prosecute a leader ofthe Mafia. On November 21, 1980, Frank “Funzi” Tieri, the head of the Genovese organized crime family, oneof the Mafiaʼs five families in New York City, became the first Mafia boss convicted under RICO. He wassentenced to ten yearsʼ imprisonment on January 23, 1981.16
By the mid-1980ʼs, the federal governmentʼs RICO prosecutions of organized crime figures had expanded
considerably. On February 25, 1985, in the “Commission Case,” a federal grand jury in New York City indicted
the bosses, and some major subordinates, of the cityʼs five Mafia organized crime families, for various
racketeering offences, including murder.17 The Commission Case targeted not only the five Mafia families in
New York, but also the “Commission”, the governing board created by the families to oversee Mafia
operations in the United States.18 The trial made extensive use of electronic surveillance, including recordingsof Mafia headquarters, phones, and vehicles. On November 19, 1986, a jury convicted the eight defendants ofnearly all the charges against them.19 On January 13, 1987, a federal judge sentenced each defendant to onehundred yearsʼ imprisonment, except for one defendant, who received a forty-year prison sentence.20
In the years following the Commission Case, Mafia leaders, members, and associates around the country
were convicted, including the heads of the New York, Boston, and Philadelphia Mafia families, which further
weakened the Mafia families. In another blow to the Mafia, on January 20, 2011, the U.S. Department ofJustice announced charges in three cities against more than 100 alleged Mafia leaders, members, andassociates, including RICO and related crimes, such as murder and extortion. This was the largest day of
Mafia arrests in U.S. history.21
Cases such as the Commission Case and the indictments in 2011 are merely a few examples of the large
RICO prosecutions of Mafia families. Around the United States, law enforcement authorities continue toundermine the Mafia crime families using RICO and other methods. Such prosecutions attack the structure
and the chains of command of the Mafia families by impeding the recruitment and retention of their leadersand members. In turn, these prosecutions diminish the Mafia families as institutions and limit their capacity
to commit crimes.
2. Undercover Operations
One prominent example of the effectiveness of undercover operations against the Mafia is Joseph Pistone,a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), who infiltrated the Bonanno and Colombo
Mafia crime families.22 From 1976 through 1981, Pistone worked undercover as Mafia associate “Donnie
Brasco.” By using an undercover agent, the FBI did not have to rely for evidence on informants inside of thecrime families.
Posing as a jewel thief providing his skills to the Mafia, Pistone earned the trust of leading members of thecrime families, who discussed various crimes in his presence, including murders of rival Mafia members,
hijackings of delivery trucks, and the sale of stolen property. Some of those conversations were recorded by
Pistone, which further corroborated the events that Pistone observed. Because those conversations wererecorded, prosecutors could rely on both Pistoneʼs testimony and the voices of the Mafia members
themselves as evidence.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 (West).
Les Ledbetter, “Frank Tieri, 77, Convicted New York Crime Leader”, New York Times, 31 March 1981.
17
Michael Arena, et al., “Raising the Curtain on Organized Crime”, Newsday, 9 July 1986.
18
Ed Magnuson, “A jury convicts eight Mobsters”, Time, 1 December 1986.
19
Arnold H. Lubasch, “Judge Sentences 8 Mafia Leaders to Prison Terms”, New York Times, 14 January 1987, p. A1.
20
Id.
21
William K. Rashbaum, “Nearly 125 Arrested in Sweeping Mob Roundup”, New York Times, 20 January 2011, p. A21.
22
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Joe Pistone, Undercover Agent”. Available from https: //www. fbi. gov/history/famouscases/joe-pistone-undercover-agent (accessed 25 April 2017).
15
16

26

166TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTSʼ LECTURES

Pistone became such a trusted associate of the Mafia that the Bonanno crime family considered making
him a full member of the organization. However, the FBI decided to conclude the undercover operation
before Pistone became a member, because of the risk of violence. After the Pistoneʼs true identity was
revealed, chaos erupted within the Mafia world, with leaders and members concerned about future
infiltration by government investigators and informants. Evidence collected by Pistone contributed to theconvictions of more than 100 Mafia members and associates. The prosecutions particularly depleted theleadership and membership of the Bonanno crime family and damaged the crime family as an institution,
which was shunned for a period of time by the Mafiaʼs ruling Commission.

III. GANGSIn recent years, the federal government has engaged in a crackdown on gangs, many of which are largeorganizations that operate internationally, nationally, or regionally. While gangs commit a variety of crimes,
including white-collar offences such as fraud and identity theft, they tend to focus on drug crimes and violent
crimes, such as murder, shootings, and robberies. Certain gangs may resemble or eventually resemble a
traditional organized crime group, such as the Mafia. The primary author of the RICO statute, G. Robert
Blakey, has remarked that the Mafia was once less sophisticated and gradually morphed over time into anorganized crime group: “[Gangs are] in the process of growing into Mafias ... The Mafia started out as agang.”23
While there is a no single definition for gangs, a report by the U.S. Department of Justiceʼs Bureau of
Justice Assistance remarked that most of the gang definitions include a portion, or all, of the following factors:[1] Three or more individuals associate periodically as an ongoing criminal group or organization,
whether loosely or tightly structured.
[2] The group or organization has identifiable leaders, although the leader for one type of criminal
activity may be different than the leader for another.
[3] The group has a name or identifying symbol[4] The organizationʼs members, individually or collectively, currently engage in, or have engaged in,violent or other criminal activity[.][5] The group frequently identifies itself with or claims control over specific territory (turf) in thecommunity, wears distinctive dress and colors, and communicates through graffiti and handsigns
among other means.24
One example of a prominent gang in the United States is Mara Salvatrucha 13, commonly known as MS13. U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions has named MS-13 and other violent groups as major threats, andcommitted significant federal resources to prosecuting them.25 MS-13, which is composed primarily ofSalvadorans and other Central Americans, has thousands of members in various states around the UnitedStates, and reputedly tens of thousands of members in Central America.26 Prosecutions in cities across thecountry, such as Atlanta, Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, D.C., have shown coordination
between MS-13 chapters domestically and internationally, including coordination of violent crime between
Central American MS-13 leaders and MS-13 chapters operating in U.S. cities. Among the gangʼs crimes are
murder, armed assaults, robbery, transportation and distribution of drugs, and alien smuggling.
Another prominent gang in the United States is the Vice Lords, which has thousands of members
nationwide. As shown in court, the gang engages in a variety of crimes, including murder, shootings, robbery,
John Gibeaut, “Gang Busters”, ABA Journal, January 1998, p. 65.
United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Urban Street Gang Enforcement (January 1997), p. 30.
25
Jake Pearson, “Trump, top officials take aim at brutal MS-13 street gang”, New York Daily News, 19 April 2017. Available
from http: //www. nydailynews. com/newswires/new-york/trump-top-officials-aim-brutal-ms-13-street-gang-article-1.3069112(accessed on 27 April 2017).
26
Id.
23
24

27

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 103

narcotics trafficking and witness intimidation. The Vice Lordsʼ leaders are located in Chicago and Detroit andthe gang is broken down into various “branches,” with names such as the “Traveling Vice Lords” and “Insane
Vice Lords.” Members who seek to leave the gang oftentimes endure a physical beating by multiple Vice
Lord members or are targeted for killing. The Vice Lords also has a biker gang affiliate known as the
Phantom Outlaw Motorcycle Club (“Phantoms”), which emerged from the Vice Lords and was led in part byVice Lords. The Phantoms are headquartered in Detroit and have sub-groups, known as “chapters” in at least
ten states, as well as a chapter of “Nomads” that travel at will. As shown in court, the Phantoms and its
members were involved in a range of criminal activity, including conspiracy to commit murder, shootings,
robbery, extortion, and the possession and sale of stolen vehicles and motorcycles.
A. Successful Methods against Gangs
Various methods have been used successfully against gangs across the country, including RICO. For
instance, the U.S. Department of Justiceʼs Organized Crime and Gang Section (“OCGS”) and U.S. Attorneyʼs
Offices have prosecuted the MS-13 gang using RICO in various U. S. states, including Maryland, Georgia,
Virginia, New Jersey, North Carolina, and California.27 In another example, OCGS and the Detroit U. S.
Attorneyʼs Office have pursued RICO and other charges against the Vice Lords and Phantoms over several
years, resulting in seven indictments and the convictions of 27 leaders, members, and associates. RICO
indictments, such as these and others, have aided the government in undermining gangs as organizations andpreventing further violence.
While various methods have been used successfully against gangs, such as the RICO prosecutions
described above, this section offers specific examples of the use of informants, electronic surveillance, andtestimony under cooperation agreements.
1. Informants and Electronic Surveillance
In Detroit in 2013, the governmentʼs use of an informant and electronic surveillance helped prevent largescale violence, and assisted in the prosecution of the Vice Lords and Phantoms. As shown in court, a memberof the Phantoms agreed to become an informant for the government, following his arrest on a firearms
charge in 2013. Once he agreed to cooperate with the government, the informant began providing information
to investigators about the historical and ongoing activities of Vice Lords and Phantoms. Further, theinformant began recording his in-person conversations with other Vice Lords and Phantoms members, aswell as his phone calls with members. In total, the informant recorded dozens of conversations, with somelasting more than an hour. Given the informantʼs former role as National President of the Phantoms and hislong association with its members, he was well-placed within the organization to gather information, including
recorded conversations with Antonio Johnson, the “Three-Star General” over all Vice Lords in Michigan and
the National President of the Phantoms.
The informant made recordings and told law enforcement investigators about various crimes by the Vice
Lords and Phantoms, including shootings, extortion of rival groups, robberies, assaults, and motorcycle thefts.
For instance, recordings entered into evidence showed Vice Lords and Phantoms talking about shooting amember of a rival group in September 2013, including the identity of the Phantom/Vice Lord who fired thegun. Other recordings show Antonio Johnson telling the informant before the shooting took place, “I donʼtburn buildings. At all. I burn bodies”, and after the shooting, “I think they gonna want to talk with once we killlike ten of them”.
However, there was one particular crime to which the informant alerted law enforcement, which helped
the government prevent large-scale violence by the Vice Lords and Phantoms in 2013. Recordings made by
the informant and other evidence showed that the Vice Lords and Phantoms developed a three-phase massmurder plot against a rival group that was interrupted by law enforcement as phase one was just about tobegin. In the first phase, the Vice Lords and Phantoms were to murder at least three members of a rival
group in Detroit, in order to lure additional victims to Michigan for the funeral. In the second phase, the Vice
Lords and Phantoms were to murder all members of the rival group who would be at the rivalʼs Detroit
headquarters following the funeral of the three victims murdered in the first phase. In the third phase, theVice Lords and Phantoms were to kill rivals in other cities throughout the country where the Phantoms had

27

Id.

28

166TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTSʼ LECTURES

chapters.
Acting on the recordings from the informant and other evidence, law enforcement officers from the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, FBI, and Detroit Police Department were able tointerrupt the mass murder plot before it could happen by executing search warrants and arresting Vice
Lords and Phantoms members in October 2013. During the execution of one of the search warrants, aPhantoms leader shot at federal agents. The informantʼs recordings and other evidence showed at trial that,at the time of the search warrants and arrests, the Vice Lords and Phantoms were preparing for the firstphase of the murder plot, including stockpiling firearms, hiring a thief to steal a van to be used in the murders,
conducting research and surveillance of their intended victims, and assigning Phantom members and Vice
Lords members to stalk and murder the intended victims.
Using these recordings and the informant, the government was able to avert the mass murder plot, andbuild a prosecution of the Phantoms and Vice Lords. In a series of indictments in 2013 and 2014, fourteen
alleged leaders and members of the Vice Lords and Phantoms were charged with RICO, the mass murder
plot, several shootings, and other offences. Among the defendants was Antonio Johnson, the “Three-Star
General” over all Vice Lords in Michigan and the National President of the Phantoms.
2. Testimony under Cooperation Agreements
Another example of an effective method against gangs is the use of witness testimony under cooperationagreements. Following the indictment of Vice Lords and Phantoms members, the government continued tobuild its prosecution of the criminal groups. As was shown in court, several Vice Lords and Phantoms agreed
to cooperate with the governmentʼs prosecution after being charged for their offences. Testimony by thesecooperating witnesses contributed significantly to the prosecution of the criminal groups.
Such agreements are commonly known as “cooperation agreements.” They require some liability for a
defendantʼs criminal conduct; in which a defendant agrees to fully and truthfully cooperate, testify in any
court proceeding concerning matters asked of him or her, and enter a guilty plea on other charges. In
exchange for this cooperation, the government files a motion giving the judge special discretion in
determining the defendantʼs sentence. Often the sentencing judge will reduce the defendantʼs sentence. This
opportunity for a sentence reduction creates an incentive to cooperate.
Testimony by witnesses under cooperation agreements is effective against organized crime groups, anddefendants in general, for a variety of reasons. First, insider witness testimony can be more effective at
explaining the internal operations of a criminal organization than undercover operations or electronic
surveillance. Second, insiders are already well placed within the criminal groups, compared to undercover
officers. If undercover officers are able to penetrate a criminal organization, it is very difficult and they are
rarely able to penetrate deep within the organization. Third, insider witnesses are able to interpret coded orconfusing language that is recorded on electronic surveillance, and explain those conversations in court.
In court during two trials, several cooperating witnesses testified against the Vice Lords and Phantoms,
and demonstrated the effectiveness of insider testimony. Witnesses explained to the jury how the criminalgroups worked from the inside, such as the groupsʼ leadership, membership, chain of command, rules, history,
and rivals. Further, they described crimes involving the two groups, and identified who committed each of
those crimes. This testimony included details and context about the Vice Lords and Phantoms organizations
and their crimes that other methods would not necessarily have uncovered. For instance, insider witnesses
testified about private conversations with other members of the organizations, the organizationsʼ private
meetings, and crimes that were not observed by the police, such as shootings, assaults, robberies, andmotorcycle theft.
This testimony by witnesses using cooperation agreements was powerful evidence against the Vice Lords
and Phantoms, especially when combined with other evidence, such as audio recordings made by the
informant. Through guilty pleas and two trials, thirteen of the fourteen alleged Vice Lords and Phantoms
described above were convicted for various crimes connected to the groups, including RICO, the massmurder plot, shootings, and robberies. The highest prison sentence was for 40 years, imposed on Marvin
Nicholson, a Vice Lord and the National Enforcer of the Phantoms; followed by 35 years in prison for Antonio
Johnson, the “Three-Star General” over all Vice Lords in Michigan and the National President of the29

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 103

Phantoms.
In total, the methods described above, such as RICO, electronic surveillance, informants, and cooperating
witness testimony, contributed to seven indictments and the convictions of 27 leaders, members, andassociates of the Vice Lords and Phantoms. The convictions were for a variety of additional crimes, including
armed home invasions, the disclosure of private medical information that was taken from a hospital database,and the shooting of a family of four with a machine gun, after two of the family members had left or
attempted to leave the gang.
Various methods, such as RICO, informants, electronic surveillance, and witness testimony undercooperation agreements, continue to be used effectively against gangs. The methods are effective against
large gangs, such as MS-13 and the Vice Lords, but also smaller gangs that commit violence and other crimes
in communities around the country.

IV. CYBERCRIME GROUPS
The traditional conception of organized crime, typified by the Mafia and gangs, has been upended, in part,by the Internet and other communications technologies that cybercrime groups use. Compared to the Mafia
and gangs, cybercrime groups may have opaque and fluid command structures, and they appear to avoid
using violence as a means of asserting control and discipline. Their offences are magnified by, or almost
entirely dependent upon, the use of the Internet and other communications technologies, such as identity
theft, online banking theft, and fraud schemes.
On April 23, 2008, in a speech before the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC,
then-U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey announced the release of The Law Enforcement Strategy to
Combat International Organized Crime (the “Strategy”),28 which identified cybercrime groups, among otherinternational groups, as an organized crime threat.
Cybercrime, perpetrated by organized crime groups and others, presents a major threat to the UnitedStates and other countries. In addition to human suffering and other harms of such crime, cybercrime
imposes significant costs upon people around the world. Estimates vary of the annual costs imposed bycybercrime, but they number in the hundreds of billions of dollars. For instance, the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies has estimated, in 2014, that the “likely annual cost to the global economy is more than$400 billion”,29 and that the costs account for about 0.8% of global GDP and about 0.64% of the United Statesʼ
GDP.30 Further, PwCʼs 2014 survey of organizations indicated that, in 2014, 19% of U.S. organizations each lost
between $50,000 and $1 million, and 7% of U.S. organizations each lost more than $1 million.31
Although cybercrime has been a matter of concern for decades, sophisticated cyberattacks have occurredin recent years, and been committed on a far grander scale than before. For instance, in January 2014, Target,a large U. S. retailer, announced that cybercriminals had stolen the credit card information of 40 million
shoppers, and the personal information of 70 million shoppers. Between 1 and 3 million of those credit cards
were reportedly sold, yielding an estimated $53.7 million for the perpetrators. The cyberattack cost Target
an estimated $148 million, and cost financial institutions an estimated $200 million.
While there are ways for U.S. law enforcement authorities to respond to such threats, the 2008 Strategy
recognized the challenges facing them by cybercrime groups and other international organized crime groups.
As then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey stated upon the release of the Strategy: “International organizedcrime poses a greater challenge to law enforcement than did the traditional mafia, in many respects. And thegeographical source of the threat is not the only difference. The degree of sophistication is almost markedly
different”.32 By their nature, organized crime groups may cross various jurisdictions, which complicatesnational law enforcement authoritiesʼ efforts to obtain evidence and prosecute members and associates of
The Strategy drew upon a threat assessment of international organized crime to which various agencies contributed.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime (June 2014), p. 1.
30
Id. at 9, 11. See also generally, KPMG International, Issues Monitor: Cyber Crime—A Growing Challenge for Governments(July 2011).
31
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Global Economic Crime Survey—US Supplement, 2014, p. 14.
28
29

30

166TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTSʼ LECTURES

groups. Groups move across national borders with less difficulty, in comparison to law enforcement
authorities, which are confined to their domestic jurisdictions and which must cooperate with foreignauthorities to investigate crimes occurring beyond their borders. Additionally, international groupsʼ elaborate
financial and personnel structures, and prosecuting such groups, is time-consuming and expensive.
A. Successful Methods against Cybercrime Groups
The Strategy identifies four priority areas for the federal government to address against cybercrimegroups and other international organized crime groups: 1) gathering and making use of information andintelligence; 2) setting priorities and targeting the most significant threats; 3) using the resources of thegovernment in partnership with foreign authorities; and 4) using the enterprise model in investigating andprosecuting criminal enterprises to dismantle them.33
While various methods have been used successfully, this section offers examples of the use of anundercover operation, an informant, and RICO against cybercrime groups.
1. Undercover Operations
One prominent example of the effectiveness of undercover operations against cybercrime groups is theFBIʼs and U.S. Secret Serviceʼs investigation from 2006 through 2008 of DarkMarket, an Internet forum forbuying and selling personal data used in perpetrating fraud. The forum, which The Guardian newspaper
called the “top English language cybercrime site in the world”, cost the banking industry tens of millions ofdollars.34 As news articles reflect, FBI Special Agent J. Keith Mularski spent roughly two years undercoveron DarkMarket, posing as a cybercriminal, and infiltrating the forum. Mularksi, operating under the
nickname “Master Splynter”, inserted himself into DarkMarketʼs shadowy world of cybercrime, andgradually gathered information about the organization and the individuals buying and selling personal dataover it. Eventually, Mularski earned the trust of DarkMarketʼs founder, later revealed to be Renukanth
Subramaniam, nickname “JiLsi,” who was then living in London. In an interview with CNet News, Mularski
explained how he capitalized on that relationship to obtain greater access to the forum and its participants:
I had good relations with the administrator whose alias was “Jilsi.” He wasnʼt a very technical guy andwas having problems running the site because it was getting attacked by a rival group. So I told him
about my background as a spammer and told him how good I was at setting up sites. I did somedemonstrations and set up some test sites to show him I had the skills. Then there was just a lot of talkand rapport building. One night when DarkMarket was getting attacked by a rival group I said I was
ready and that I could secure the server for him and he said “letʼs move.” That gave me full access toeveryone using it and what they were doing.35
Thanks to Mularskiʼs penetration of the criminal organization, he was ultimately able to control and monitor
the forum from an FBI computer in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In 2008, law enforcement authorities
dismantled DarkMarket and began arresting alleged members of the forum around the world. Eventually, 60
alleged members were arrested in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Turkey, including
DarkMarket founder Subramaniam, who pleaded guilty to charges in January 2010 in London.
2. Informants
The governmentʼs prosecution of Shadowcrew shows both the advantages and risks of using an
informant. With the help of an informant, identified in court documents and media reports as Albert Gonzalez,
the government investigated and prosecuted Shadowcrew, an Internet forum that allegedly facilitatedcomputer hacking and the distribution of stolen credit card, debit card, and bank account numbers, as well as
counterfeit identification documents. Gonzalez, who had been working as a “moderator” on Shadowcrew,
United States Attorney General Michael Mukasey, Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey
on International Organized Crime at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (23 April 2008). Available at https://www.justice.gov/archive/criminal/icitap/2008/04-23-08-mukasey-speech.pdf (accessed on 1 May 2017).
33
United States Department of Justice, The Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime, p. 1.
34
Caroline Davies, “Welcome to DarkMarket ‒ global one-stop shop for cybercrime and banking fraud”, The Guardian, 14January 2010.
35
Elinor Mills, “Q&A: FBI agent looks back on time posing as a cybercriminal”, CNet, 29 June 2009. Available from https://www.cnet.com/news/q-a-fbi-agent-looks-back-on-time-posing-as-a-cybercriminal/ (accessed on 25 April 2017).
32

31

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 103

agreed to become an informant for the government after his arrest in July 2003, and provided assistance tothe investigation. The New York Times described his work as an informant:
After he agreed in 2003 to become an informant, Gonzalez helped the Justice Department and theSecret Service build, over the course of a year, an ingenious trap for Shadowcrew. Called Operation
Firewall, it was run out of a makeshift office in an Army repair garage in Jersey City. Gonzalez was its
linchpin. Through him, the government came to, in hacker lingo, own Shadowcrew, as undercoverbuyers infiltrated the network and traced its users around the world; eventually, officials evenmanaged to transfer the site onto a server controlled by the Secret Service. Meanwhile, Gonzalez
patiently worked his way up the Shadowcrew ranks. He persuaded its users to communicate througha virtual private network, or VPN, a secure channel that sends encrypted messages between
computers, that he introduced onto the site. This VPN, designed by the Secret Service, came with a
special feature: a court-ordered wiretap.36
In October 2004, 19 of Shadowcrewʼs alleged members and associates were charged federally in New Jersey
for various cybercrimes stretching from 2002 to 2004.
The indictment alleged that Shadowcrew crossed the United States and at least six other countries, andinvolved approximately 4,000 people.37 Further, the indictment held the defendants responsible for trafficking
in at least 1. 5 million stolen credit and bank card numbers, and losses in excess of $4 million.38 Law
enforcement authorities estimate that, if Shadowcrew had not been stopped, the credit card industry may
have faced losses totaling hundreds of millions of dollars.39 To date, except for two fugitives, all of the
Shadowcrew defendants located in the United States have pleaded guilty and received sentences, ranging
from probation up to 90 months in prison.40
However, the governmentʼs successful use of Gonzalez as an informant demonstrates the risks of using
informants. As news reports show, the government later learned that Gonzalez committed crimes behind thegovernmentʼs back while he worked as an informant. At the time Gonzalez was aiding the governmentʼs
investigation of Shadowcrew, and after he ceased working as an informant, Gonzalez worked with othercybercriminals to obtain access to payment card accounts in the computer databases of large corporations. In
total, Gonzalez and others gained access to roughly 180 million accounts, including accounts in the databasesof large U.S. companies, such as OfficeMax and the T.J. Maxx and Marshalls clothing chains. According to thegovernment, the loss exposure for the victim companies for the data breaches was more than $400 million inreimbursements and forensic and legal fees. In March 2010, Gonzalez was sentenced to two concurrent
20-year prison terms, which he is currently serving. At one of his sentencing hearings, the judge stated:“What I found most devastating was the fact that you two-timed the government agency that you werecooperating with, and you were essentially like a double agent.”41
3. RICO
While the use of RICO is new in cybercrime cases, it has also proven to be an effective method. On
December 6, 2013, a federal trial jury in Las Vegas, Nevada reached the first RICO conviction of a defendantfor cybercrime offences. At trial, the government presented evidence that the defendant, David Ray Camez,
and others participated in an organization known as “Carder.su”, an alleged marketplace for the distribution
and sale of stolen personal and financial information, that reportedly had an estimated 5,500 members in July
2011. On May 15, 2014, a federal judge sentenced Camez to 20 years in prison for his offences, and ordered
him to pay $20 million in restitution.42 In total, 56 defendants were charged in four indictments, as part ofJames Verini, “The Great Cyberheist”, The New York Times Magazine, 10 November 2010. Available from https://mobile.
nytimes.com/2010/11/14/magazine/14Hacker-t.html (accessed on 25 April 2017).
37
United States Department of Justice, Nineteen Individuals Indicted in ‘Carding’ Conspiracy (28 October 2004). Available fromhttps://www.justice.gov/archive/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2004/mantovaniIndict.htm (accessed on 26 April 2017).
38
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, United States v. Mantovani, et al. (28 October 2004).
39
United States Secret Service, U.S. Secret Service’s Operation Firewall Nets 28 Arrests (28 October 2004). Available fromhttps://www.scribd.com/document/1220697/US-Treasury-pub2304 (accessed on 26 April 2017).
40
See United States Department of Justice, Houston Man Sentenced to 90 Months for Identity Theft (11 July 2006). Available
from http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/July/06_crm_424.html (accessed on 26 April 2017); U.S. Attorneyʼs Office, District of
New Jersey, ‘Shadowcrew’ Identity Theft Ringleader Gets 32 Months in Prison (29 June 2006).
41
Verini, “The Great Cyberheist”.
36

32

166TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTSʼ LECTURES

Operation Open Market, which targeted the Carder.su organization. As of December 2015, 33 individuals
have been convicted, with the remaining defendants being either fugitives or awaiting trial.43

V. CONCLUSION
This article has examined three forms of organized crime groups̶the Mafia, gangs, and cybercrimegroups̶and offered case studies of effective law enforcement tools against each group. While these threegroups and the case studies about them are not an exhaustive survey, they serve as an introduction to helpful
law enforcement tools. These tools may be used effectively against various types of organized crime groups,
even as groups differ in their predicate offences, structures, modes of operations, and unifying purposes. As
organized crime groups constantly evolve, so must the methods used against them. Each organized crimegroup has a weakness, whether it is a violent gang operating openly on the streets of a city, or a secretive
cybercrime group that stretches across the world. Law enforcement agencies, working collaboratively within
and across countries, must constantly search for new ways to capitalize on such weaknesses, use
investigative and prosecutorial tools that befit each situation, and bring those organized crime groups tojustice.

United States Department of Justice, Member of Organization That Operated Online Marketplace for Stolen Personal
Information Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison (15 May 2014).
43
United States Department of Justice, Member of Organized Cybercrime Ring Sentenced to 150 Months in Prison for Selling
Stolen and Counterfeit Credit Cards (9 April 2015).
42

33