Advances in Applied Sociology, 2018, 8, 397-421
http://www.scirp.org/journal/aasoci
ISSN Online: 2165-4336
ISSN Print: 2165-4328

Exploring New Socio-Economic Thoughts for a
Small and Narrow Earth
Mamoru Kaneko
Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan

How to cite this paper: Kaneko, M.
(2018). Exploring New Socio-Economic
Thoughts for a Small and Narrow Earth.
Advances in Applied Sociology, 8, 397-421.
https://doi.org/10.4236/aasoci.2018.85024
Received: January 23, 2018
Accepted: May 12, 2018
Published: May 15, 2018
Copyright © 2018 by author andScientific Research Publishing Inc.
This work is licensed under the Creative
Commons Attribution International
License (CC BY 4.0).
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Open Access

Abstract
The earth has been getting smaller and narrower with the expansion of humanactivities. Now, it is an urgent task for social scientists to explore and study
new socio-economic thoughts for this small and narrow earth. This article
provides a normative theory and a descriptive theory for the present and future earth. The former is to provide, viewing the earth and human community
as unity, evaluations of possible events and of designs of social institutions.
The normative theory helps us think about where we should direct the earth.
The latter discusses social sciences for practical management of the earth.
Since, however, great diversity of cultures will remain, a unified managementof the earth is practically impossible. We are required to rethink and develop
new socio-economic thoughts in radical manners.

Keywords
Free-Market Libertarian, Large-Environment, Small Earth, Normative
Theory, Nash Social Welfare, Descriptive Theory, Cognizance Assumption,
Inductive Game Theory, Bounded Rationality

1. Introduction
As the century has turned into the 21st, we continue to witness poverty, famine,
hungers, deadly diseases, conflicts, wars, genocides, and other serious problems
in the world. These events have been problems at any time of our history, butthey are now more worldwide as human economic activities with technologicalprogress are getting larger and non-negligible relative to the size of the earth.
These sizable impacts require us to rethink a new socio-economic thought andalso to consider the management of the entire earth by taking the influences ofhuman economic activities seriously into account. In this article, we explore
what we, as social scientists, should and can do for the future earth.
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This article consists of two almost contradictory parts: a normative theory anda descriptive theory. The former is to provide, viewing the earth and humancommunity as unity, evaluations of possible events and of designs of social institutions. The latter discusses social sciences for practical management of theearth, but at the same time, it shows that a great diversity of cultures remains
and a unified management of the earth is practically impossible. Social problems
and theoretical/methodological thoughts to be discussed vary over a vast range.
It would be helpful to summarize the main themes of this article and to give amap of the subjects to be discussed.
The main themes are:

•
•
•
•
•
•

small and narrow earth: unity of the earth vs. diverse cultures;
dominant socio-economic thoughts;
normative theory for the unity of the earth;human nature: bounded rationality and conservativeness;social scientific research on these problems;
practical managements of the earth and societies.
Figure 1 depicts the logical relationships of these themes. The top box states

the conflicting features of the present earth, which are discussed in Section 2.
Then, we go to the normative theory, which is in the left box and discussed in
Section 3. The right box consists of thoughts on the present economics and gametheory, which are discussed in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 address the necessitiesof descriptive/empirical studies and practical managements of the future earth.
Let us look at each section. In Section 2, we discuss conflicting features on
dominant socio-economic thoughts and the present world. Free-market libertarianism with individualism remains strong in developed countries but is nolonger compatible with the small earth. It has tremendous influences to underdeveloped countries, while there remain diverse cultures contradicting thefree-market libertarianism. We discuss these features from the viewpoint of thepresent economics.

Figure 1. Logical Structures of the Themes.
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In Section 3, we consider the normative theory for the earth as unity. The
Hobbesian social contract theory is applied to the entire world, where his “stateof nature” is replaced by the total destruction of the earth. This change leads to adifferent conclusion that all people should be treated equally and freed fromvested rights. We argue that this extreme view is evitable for the small earth but
at the same time, it has great difficulties in its applications.
In addition to the normative theory, we need to reconsider the foundations
and developments of human/social sciences in order to understand the present
worldwide problems. In Section 4, we reconsider the standard economics andgame theory from the methodological point of view. These fields are well developed but lack the reflective thoughts on their boundaries from the outside. We
consider these features and give a brief description of a new theory called induc-tive game theory (Kaneko & Matsui, 1999; Kaneko & Kline, 2008), which is motivated by reflective thoughts on cognitive assumptions in the standard theories,
i.e., bounded rationality and conservativeness.
To think about the problems of the entire world, we look at historicalchanges/developments of societies and social institutions. In the end of the 19th
century, which is only 120 years ago, the worlds and institutions tremendously
differed from the present world. Vast changes have been occurring with social
structures, but people with bounded logical and perceptional abilities were notable to follow such changes. In Section 5, we discuss needs of positive/empiricalstudies of societies and social institutions.
Even though we expect more technological developments, the basic nature ofhuman beings will not change drastically. In Section 6, we argue that practicalmanagement of the earth should be decentralized, and here social sciences play
crucial roles.
In Section 7, we conclude our explorations into new socio-economic thoughts
on a small and narrow earth. As a whole, the article describes where the earth
should go and what we, social scientists, should/could do, though these appear
very difficult.

2. Conflicting Features in a Small and Narrow Earth
2.1. Economics as a Science and a Thought
Although economic activities are one among many social aspects of humanworlds, they become more important as people pursue materially richer lives.
This tendency is getting stronger as technology is progressing, with which theearth is even getting smaller and narrower. In this section, first, we look at how
the present economics thinks, and also consider, from the viewpoint of the entire earth, what important issues are.
Economics has two sides; social science and social thought. The former is to
study objectively the economic structures and behavior of economic agents. The
latter includes some normative judgments, based on the former, about how society should be. The economics of the 20th century emphasized its former side so
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that economics should be a value-free science; it should be silent of normative
judgments. However, since it treats people and societies, we cannot avoid thequestions of how human economic lives and societies should be. The present
economics still keeps a tradition of this value-freeness, but has slightly retreated;instead of avoiding such normative questions, it looks for an economic science
with minimum normative judgments.
Also, the present economics has a strong tendency to focus only on economic
aspects as if all social aspects could be treated in the same manner. In this article,
we will take the position that economic aspects are only part of the entire humanworlds. From this perspective, we should critically investigate the foundations of
the present economics. We now start with its benchmark.

2.2. Theory of Perfect Competition
The theory of perfect competition in the tradition from Adam Smith (1776) issuitable to the research attitude of minimizing normative judgments. The salient
characteristic of the theory of perfect competition is to start with a very individualistic description of an economic agent (a consumer and/or a producer), restricting its scope only to economic aspects of human beings and societies. The
theory as described in general equilibrium theory succeeds in explaining the behavior of the market economy as a harmonization of activities of many economic agents. See Hicks (1939), Debreu (1959), and Arrow & Hahn (1971). This
success, however, has made many economists ignore other aspects different
from economic ones.
Game theory has been regarded as supplements for the theory of perfectcompetition to allow us more micro behavior of people and societies. John von
Neumann, the founder of game theory, intended to surpass the idea of perfectcompetition, while including descriptions of other aspects of human beings andsocieties (cf. von Neumann, 1945, and von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).
However, his followers have not taken such steps toward a development of a new
basic idea for the understanding of humans and society: At present, game theoryis effectively included in economics and its teaching is not very different fromthe theory of perfect competition. In Section 3, we will discuss the necessity of adevelopment in the direction von Neumann addressed. It will be presently argued that the theory of perfect competition is, in fact, used to support some social thought, but its basic structure leads people to unconsciousness of the social
thought.
In the theory of perfect completion, given fixed prices, each consumer maximizes his utility and each firm maximizes its profits. The theory purports that awell-organized market institution guarantees commodities and services to besuitably produced and circulated. One main result, called the (first) fundamental

theorem of welfare economics, (cf., Arrow & Hahn, 1971), states that the resulting outcome of the market is optimal in the sense of Pareto. It means that themarket functions with no waste in production processes as well as in distributions (exchanges) of commodities and services.
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This result is typically summarized as “optimization of economic efficiency bydecentralization”. It may be easier to divide this statement into three levels; theindividual level, organizational level, and entire economy level. The first is a motivation for an individual agent (laborer, employer, or entrepreneur). The work
environment for each agent should be designed to promote his/her work motivation. The second requires an economic organization (a private firm or a public
sector) to be created so as to guarantee that each individual agent as well as theorganization itself can pursue freely their profits/utilities and that efficiency isachieved for the organization as a result of their free behavior. The last level isthat the total profits/utilities of the entire economy are maximized as a result of
the free and competitive behavior of the economic agents and organizations in
the economy.
For example, the privatization of the Japanese railway company divided into
several independent companies, which took place in 1987, is based on the firsttwo levels of the above idea to eliminate legal constraints on decision making byworkers and organizations. The transition of former East-European communist
countries into market economies, which started around 1990, is based moreclearly on all the three levels of decentralization.
A basis of the idea of perfect competition is the large-number assumption thateach economic agent at the individual or organizational level has many (or atleast several) similar competitors. Under this assumption, each individual or organizational economic agent should be a price-taker (or environment-taker),and his/its pursuit of profits/utilities contributes for the entire social benefits andwelfare. This is the teaching of the theory of perfect competition, specifically, thefundamental theorem of welfare economics.

2.3. Free-Market Libertarianism (Individualism) as a Social
Thought
The theory of perfect competition supports what we call free-market libertarianism. This school of thought takes individual economic freedom as the supreme
principle, and thus regards a socio-economic institution allowing every agent tofreely pursue his economic profit/utility as an optimal one1. However, this already includes a normative judgment in that society should allow such freedom
for each economic agent as much as possible and political/legal systems should
be arranged to support this idea. Although it asserts to maximize individual
freedom, some political and institutional arrangement of society, e.g., basic
property rights, is inevitably needed.
Since a political institution finally chooses a social system, we should mention
the political counterpart of free-market libertarianism. It is political libertarianism, which asserts a minimum political system to support individual freedom.
These two thoughts appear to include no normative judgments, but make thenormative judgment that such individualistic freedom has the supreme value.
Pareto optimality allows many “optimal” states, and the theory of perfect competition chooses one
or a few states among others.
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These include typically the presumption that each person’s ownership including
property rights is taken for granted. This is seriously problematic in the present
small and narrow earth.

2.4. Expansion of Human Activities in a Shrinking Earth
Many problems in the present earth suggest us to rethink free-market libertarianism (and individualism). In the world, there are many societies with different cultural traits incompatible with free-market libertarianism, for example,
family ties are still very important in many Asian countries. Religions are substantial part of society and human lives in the world, even in Europe and North
America. These societal aspects constitute the substructures for economic lives
and activities. Here, we postpone our discussions on societal and cultural aspects
to Sections 4 and 5; instead, we look at free-market libertarianism from theviewpoint of economics itself taking the smallness and narrowness of the earth.
As mentioned above, free-market libertarianism relies upon the fundamental
theorem of welfare economics. In fact, in addition to the large-number assumption, this theorem needs another assumption, which we call thelarge-environment assumption, that the natural environment behind the economy is large enough for economic activities to have only negligible influence tothe environment. This assumption may already be inconsistent with thelarge-number assumption; that is, economic activities of a large number of economic agents almost necessarily change the environment. The fundamental
theorem should be regarded as one (not really fundamental) theorem underthese assumptions.
What we pointed out above is often called a market failure in the economics
literature. However, the function of market as productions and exchanges isquite another problem. An example is an economy with air pollutions by automobiles; it is convenient for each economic agent to use a car, and even though
an individual agent stops using a car, his contribution for an improvement of air
is negligible in the city. Thus, each agent continues to use a car, and pollution
also continues and may become serious. Unless the pollution escalates to thelevel of incurring serious damages to inhabitants, the market could still function
to promote individual economic activities. The market itself generates and often
magnifies the environmental problem. This structure exists commonly behindenvironmental problems such as global warming in the present earth.
Theoretical discussions and some examples on the above phenomena, widespread externalities, are given in Hammond, et al. (1989) and Kaneko & Wooders (1994). Implications are extensively discussed in Kaneko (2004), 3rd act.
It may help our understanding to give a brief look at the history of economics.
Economics has a history of about 250 years from Adam Smith, and slightly morethan 100 years from the beginning of the 20th century when full-dress research
was started. Now in the 21st century, the influence of human activities is entirely
different at the material and cognitive levels from 250 years, 100 years and even
50 years ago. The large-environment assumption might not be a problem in the
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time of Smith. However, if we carefully look at local events in the past, we findthat the large-environment assumption was already inappropriate in many places. Various ancient civilizations collapsed by destroying their natural environments. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the American West was still a frontier, thenatural environment there was almost unbounded relative to human activities,
but in the old continents, a lot of famines and hungers happened constantly andvictimized many people.
The above point is confirmed by looking at the world populations of the pastand future. The world population exceeded 1 billion in the beginning of the 19th
century; it reached 3.0 billion in 1930 and 4.0 billion in 1965. The present total
human population on the earth is 7.2 billion in 2013, and according to theUnited Nation’s prediction, the total human population of the world will reach
9.6 billion in the year 20502. It would be enough to say that the total populationof 2100 would be much beyond 10 billion. Taking these figures into account, thelarge-environment assumption is no longer valid; we cannot keep free-market
libertarianism (and the fundamental theorem of welfare economics) as a soundbasis of the socio-economic thought for the present-future earth.

2.5. Globalization: Explosive Progress of Information andTransportation Technology
Another important fact we should admit is the rapid progress in informationand transportation technology. Scientific knowledge and technological progressare explosive as a whole, which may support globalization of economic and industrial activities. This makes the worldwide trades possible, but at the sametime, it generates a lot of social problems; an obvious example, other than global
warming, is the instability of the worldwide market, e.g., the 2008/2009 financial
crisis. Some local event may influence the worldwide market so rapidly throughinformation channels; this differs entirely from the world of 30 years ago. In fact,
the concept of perfect competition requires also informational decentralization,and is not compatible with rapid spreads of information (cf., Kaneko, 2004:
p.106). This requires us to rethink the present economics and game theory.

2.6. Steady Slowness: Diversified Cultures and Values in theWorld
We are apt to think that the entire world can and/or does move in the same direction by globalization and people will have the same and uniform values in thenear future. This inclination is caused by the negligence of local social backgrounds surrounding each person: While accumulated knowledge and technology in the human world are getting larger, the ability of an individual being remains, more or less, unchanged. At the superficial level, technological progress
will give more global information, but at a slightly deeper level, each person iscreated by his family and community in that he follows the patterns of behavior
and thinking developed in his community and its local history. This locality“World Population Prospects-Population Division-United Nations”. esa.un.org. Retrieved
2016-09-15.
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leads to a great social diversity of cultures, languages, religions, values, etc. in theworld, which together with globalization cause inevitable serious conflicts between groups of different cultures. This will be discussed in Section 4 from theviewpoint of inductive game theory and bounded rationality.
The above fact is confirmed by looking at the evidence that the worldwide illiteracy rate in 2015 is still more than 20%, and that many developing nations
have even higher illiteracy rates. This implies the existence of a big barrier to exclude illiterates from economic activities to be supposed in the present economics and game theory.
Thus, the present world shows explosive progress of informational technology, and only some people in some nations are enjoying prosperities brought
about by such technological progress, sacrificing many other people and denying
their cultures.

2.7. Unity of the Earth vs. Diversity of Cultures in the Earth
We are meeting various contradictory problems occurring in the earth. The oneis that the earth is small and narrow with the growth of human population andexplosive technological progress, which implies that individualism such as
free-market libertarianism can no longer be a suitable social thought. In Section
3, we discuss a normative theory for the future earth as unity, though we should
admit a great variety of human cultures and difficulties in practical applications.
The contradictory features may have no reconciliation, but at least we shouldlook at them seriously.

3. Normative Theory for the Earth as Unity
3.1. The Entire Earth as Unity
There are about 200 sovereign nations in the present earth. It is an implication of
the smallness and narrowness of the earth that those nations will no longer beable to retain their sovereignty in the near future. We will inevitably face someworldwide problems for which we should take the entire earth as unity. For example, when present nations face severe conflicts, or when a problem at the levelof the entire earth happens such as global warming, we need to consider the integrated unity of the nations and people in the earth, which we call the world na-tion. We cannot directly go to practical management of the entire earth by theworld nation. The earth has too many people and many local regions for practical managements. When an event is serious and cannot be resolved by local
authorities, the world nation should intervene in the event. The world nation is
the supreme authority to make a normative judgment for such an event3.
This argument sounds related to “global justice” discussed in the field of philosophy of law. It has
been discussed that developed countries are responsible to poverty in underdeveloped countries
such as in Africa. The main issue in this field is to look for moral responsibilities of the advanced
nations and their people. Many viewpoints have been discussed, but Rawls’ (1971) distributive justice relative to “global justice” is the central term (see Pogge, 2001). We will discuss only briefly the
relation of Rawls to the normative theory to be given in this paper.
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Since many local and global events possibly occur in the present and futureearth, the normative theory for the world nation should have a scope large
enough to evaluate each of possible events. For example, the scope should include genocides such as ones occurred in Cambodia of 1970’s and the Congoarea in 1990’s, and famines and hungers occurring in the present sub-SaharanAfrica. When the earth is running well, we do not need the normative theory;
but we do need it when some very bad events happen or are expected to happen.
To enable to have all possible events in the scope of the theory, we should choose
the ultimate worst possibility for the entire earth and can discuss other events ina relativistic manner in the scope.
In fact, the problem of the ultimate worst possibility was already discussed by
two great thinkers. They are the 17th century philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, andthe 20th century physicist, Albert Einstein. Hobbes was the initiator of social-contract theory, and put the worst scenario as the basis for his social-contract theory of a nation. Einstein considered the total destruction of theearth by nuclear bombs as the worst possibility for the earth.

3.2. Hobbes’s Social-Contract Theory of a Nation
Thomas Hobbes belonged to the 17th century, and he mentioned nothing about
the small and narrow earth and the world nation. Nevertheless, the logic of his
social-contract theory of a nation described in his “Leviathan” (1651) can almost
directly be extended into the social-contract theory of the world nation. In orderto study the logical origin of a nation, he considered the hypothetical state of thesociety, called the “state of nature”, by eliminating all social institutions and governmental authorities for protection of the individual rights from the present
society. We emphasize that this is the logical origin of a nation but not a historical origin/emergence of a nation.
In the state of nature, since no authorities protect and control people’s rights
and duties, everybody owns the unbounded rights for everything. These rights
contradict each other, and lead the state of nature to “a war of all against all”,
where everybody robs everybody else: Hobbes described the state of nature as“In such condition, there is no place for industry; … no culture of the earth; …
no arts; no letters; … and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, andshort”. To avoid this cruel state, everybody gives up and provides almost all
rights to the nation, and agrees on a social contract to have the central authority
for governing the nation4.

3.3. Einstein’s Principle for World Peace
In the paper on the special relativity theory published in 1907, Albert Einsteinderived the conclusion that mass might be transformed into energy; if mass m is
Hobbes (1651) himself went to the conclusion of the “political absolutism” to centralize all therights to the nation except for a small number of “natural rights” for individual members. The
present author does not think that his conclusion is inevitable from his state of nature.
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changed into energy E, it obeys the formula E = mc 2 , where c is the speed oflight and is gigantic (about 300,000 km/sec). Hence, if, even, a small amount ofmass is changed into energy, the tremendous amount of energy would be released. In the 1940’s, atomic bombs became technically possible, and in 1945,
atomic bombs were thrown to Hiroshima and Nagasaki victimizing 300~400
thousands of people. In the 1950’s, the USA and USSR (the present Russia) already kept a sufficient number of atomic (hydrogen) bombs to destroy the entire
earth.
In the 1940’s, Einstein recognized the crisis of the earth, and faced the fact thatthe earth was no longer unbounded for human beings. Being apprehensive ofhuman race in the earth, Einstein wrote in a letter to a Russian scientist in 1949:

3.4. (*): The Objective of Avoiding Total Destruction (of the Earth)Must Have Priority over Any Other Objective5
This has been called the principle for world peace.
It is to avoid the worst possibility for the earth and human race. The worst
possibility differs from Hobbes’s time in that human beings can now destroy theentire earth. In our normative theory, we consider problems and event in thepresent/future earth from this point of view. It is time for us to think about thevery existence of the entire earth and human race in order to look at worldwide
events. Taking this extreme reference point, we can think about any events topossibly occur in the present/future earth in a relativistic manner.

3.5. The Hobbes-Einstein-Nash Social-Contract Theory of theWorld Nation
After the finding of possible release of atomic energy, the implication of
Hobbes’s question of what would happen if no social institutions guarantee individual rights. In Hobbes’s age, its logical/physical implication is “a war of all

against all”. However, now, the pure logical answer to his question is the total
destruction of the earth and annihilation of the human race.
Our normative theory for the world nation is obtained from the Hobbes’s social-contract theory by substituting the destruction/annihilation of the earth andhuman race for Hobbes’s state of nature. Substitution of the total destruction for
the Hobbesian state of nature has an implication very different from Hobbes’s aswell as from currently prevailing thoughts about rights and duties for an individual being. To understand this implication, we look at the nature of vested
rights in the context of free-market libertarianism.

3.6. Abrogation of Vested Rights and Interests
Property rights are very basic for libertarianism; ownerships for properties (and,more basically, individual lives) are protected by a law and police power fromstealing, robbing, and killing. This legal and police power needs to be financed
Einstein (1968: p. 146).

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by a tax system, which is a partial denial of property rights; and this system isneeded for free-market libertarianism to work.
We, living in “modern” developed societies, are apt to think that ownership ofsome property should belong to its owner, and that each individual should haveintegrity, meaning that his/her identity belongs to himself/herself. For this, somesocial systems are needed to protect ownerships and individual integrity. Manyof us living in developed societies have not experienced states without such protecting social systems. Similar beliefs are held on “sovereignty” of a nation
meaning that it should retain its own rights and interests. Once, however, a nation is in a war or is beaten by another nation, individual integrity and nation’s
sovereignty are meaningless.
If we take individual integrity and a nation’s sovereignty literally, people indeveloped nations could have no duties/rights and ignore droughts, famines,
wars, and genocides in Africa. A cause for droughts and famines may be economic activities in developed nations. People in the developed nations think thatthey should give some aids to the people suffering from droughts and famines6.
This gives only a temporal resolution, and is not more than an adjustment of thefree-market libertarianism.
Very contrary to the free-market libertarianism, in the Hobbes-Einstein social-contract theory for the world nation, no individual beings and no nations
can keep vested rights. From the viewpoint of (*), we reconsider social institutions and events as possible alternative targets but not as granted. For practicalmanagements of the earth, we may need social systems allowing property rights
to some extent, but we are now considering a basis for evaluations of social systems for such managements.

3.7. The Principle of the World Human Community
The principle (*) is more extreme than Hobbes’s state of nature; it is applied to
the very existence of each individual being. From the viewpoint of (*), each human being and his rights exist simultaneously with the entire earth. This is formulated as follows:

3.8. (**WHC) The Body and Talent of Each Human Being Belong to
the World Human Community, Which Owns All Rights for
Them. The World Human Community Consists of All Human
Beings on the Earth
All rights including those to his body and talent are taken away from each but
are gathered to the world human community. The world human community itself is a hypothetical entity, and it may be regarded as already presumed for the
principle (*). The principle (**WHC) itself, however, induces no conclusive decisions. We assume the other principle for the world human community to makedecisions:Arguments of this type have been found in the field of global justice (see Pogge, 2001).

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3.9. (**IRW) Every Individual Being in the Community Has the
Entire Right to the World human Community
We denote these two, (**WHC) and (**IRW), simply by (**). We call this (**)
the principle of the world human community.
The principle (**) has a similar status to Hobbes’s state of nature. In either(**) or Hobbes’s, each being has the entire rights, but in Hobbes, physical/technological constraints lead to “a war of all against all”. In our case, thedevelopment of atomic bombs leads to the total destruction of the earth, and theproperty rights of each is entirely denied, including the body and talent.
Hobbes’s argument is still logically consistent; “a war of all against all” shows it,
the avoidance of which leads to a social contract for the nation. On the other
hand, in (**), each retains all rights even to the entire earth. When at least one
disagrees, he can destroy the earth, which means that each keeps the switch of
the huge atomic bomb.
The principle (**) denies and abrogates all the vested interests and rights of all
people and nations. This is the supreme normative principle for individual
rights. Practically, we cannot directly follow (**); when we need the very basis of
our normative principle, we should recall this principle.
Let us apply the principle (**) to people waiting for death by famines, hungers,
or genocides in Africa. It is legitimate for the suffering people to demand people
in the developed nations to save them. The people in developed nations cannot
ignore those demands; it is their duty to save the suffering people by sacrificing(some part of) their rich lives, since not only the economic capitals of developed
nations but also the bodies and talents of people there belong to the world human community. It is a more apparent duty for all the people in the world toimmediately stop genocides. Neither sovereignty nor the “nonintervention of theaffairs of other nations” can be applied here.

3.10. The Nash Social Welfare Function
A mathematical formulation of the Hobbes-Einstein social contract theory isgiven as the theory of the Nash social welfare function proposed in Kaneko &Nakamura (1979). The Nash social welfare function is given as

W ( x)=∑ i=1 log ( ui ( x ) − ui ( x0 ) ),n(1)

where i = 1, , n are the members of the world nation, ui is the utility function of member i in the sense of expected utility theory, x is a world state tobe evaluated, and x0 is the total destruction/annihilation of the earth and human race.
Mathematically speaking, the Nash social welfare function of (1) is a different
representation of an 𝑛𝑛-person version of the Nash bargaining solution given by
Nash (1950). It is the main difference that in the former, the disagreement pointis the total destruction of the earth, while in the latter, the disagreement point isgiven or determined in each situation.
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By associating the Nash bargaining theory with the Nash social welfare function, the social-contract of our normative theory becomes more explicit and is
described as follows. Everybody has a button to destroy the earth, and only decision is made when it reaches a unanimous agreement. Thus, everybody makes adecision on agreeing or not, taking into account the possibility of his disagreement to lead to the total destruction of the earth. Here, nobody can guarantee his
vested rights and interests7,8.
Let us apply the Nash social welfare function to the above mentioned problems of famines/hungers/genocides. The world state x includes the deaths ofsuffering people in the near future. For any person i of these people, this state x
is very close to the total destruction x0 . Although the utility ui ( x ) is still

higher than ui ( x0 ) , the utility difference ui ( x ) − ui ( x0 ) is positive but close to0, equivalently, log ( ui ( x ) − ui ( x0 ) ) is almost -∞. This means that the total social welfare W ( x ) is also almost -∞. Hence, the Nash social welfare function
suggests to avoid the world state x and choose any world state y in order to stop
deaths from famines/hungers/genocides, for example, by sacrificing rich lives ofpeople in developed nations.

3.11. Difficulties in Applications of the Principle of World Human
Community
We have a lot of difficulties in practical applications of the principle of the world
human community (**) or the Nash social welfare function to more general andless extreme social problems. In the above example, the lives/deaths of somepeople are compared with the total destruction/annihilation of the earth andhuman race. In this case, the physiological part of “utility” dominates the social/cultural part. In less extreme problems, however, “utility” is closely related
to society and culture; in many cases, “utility” is formed by interactions with society. Red sweaters may give higher utilities to some people than blue ones, forexample, because red is the symbol color of their community. In this example,
social-psychological part becomes dominant than physiological part. A utility
loss by taking blue sweaters is negligible to that of genocide or starvation. Psychological “utility” is not as important as death or lives, and even may not need
to be counted in social welfare. We, as social scientists, should study the problems of what “utility” is and when it should be taken into account seriously9.
Direct and immediate actions are required in the example of famines/hungers/
genocides. These involve effectively no time structures. In many other social
This argument may look similar to some studies of contractarian-morality such as in Binmore(1994), Gauthier (1986) in that agreement is the fundamental components for morality. However,
our normative theory is not to explore people’s (natural) morality, which belongs to the subjects in
Section 4, but we take a different view for morality.
8
The above argument requires stringent mathematical foundations, and indeed, such mathematicalfoundations must be revealed to see the scope and limitations of this theory. Those mathematical
discussions should be given in a separate paper.
9
In the literature of social choice and welfare, it was asked whether or not individual welfare (utility)
is a right foundation for social welfare. Also, it is asked whether social decision processes should betaken into account. See Suzumura (2011).
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problems, however, we cannot directly choose resulting states; instead, weshould use some social institutions to manage societies. Therefore, social institutions and their management become the target of our study, which will be discussed in Sections 4 and 5. Together with such studies, we may apply our normative theory to the choice of social institutions.

3.12. Right-Based Normative Theory
The reader might wonder why we do not adopt Rawls’ (1971) theory of distributive justice. This theory starts with the social choice behind the veil of ignorance
and measuring in the worst position in the society. This is interpreted as expressing a unanimity decision of the members of the community in question; inthis sense, it is claimed that the theory is contractarian. The veil of ignorance
argument is more coherent to Harsanyi’s (1953) utilitarianism than Rawls(1971), as far as we look at them from the viewpoint of the present utility theory.
Nevertheless, these theories have no scopes to include the entire earth, nor nofurther consideration of individual rights is given. On the other hand, our normative theory, as in the Hobbesian theory, is based on the hypothetical setting toeliminate the institutions protecting and controlling individual rights from every
member of the world. Thus, our theory is a right-based normative theory.
As above mentioned, the use of social institutions will be inevitable for practical management of the earth. The central target of a design of a social institution is to control individual rights, within which each individual is admitted tohave freedom of behavior and thinking. Our theory evaluates a design of distributions of individual rights from the viewpoint of the principle of the world
human community (**).

4. Theoretical Studies of Humans and Societies
Here, we claim that a majority of individual beings are effectively living in theirlocal communities and are unchanged or changing slowly, even while they are
surrounded by globalized economic activities. This claim implies a great difficulty in practical management of the entire earth. The claim itself is not new,and is found in some social sciences such as sociology and cultural anthropology. But we need a theoretical investigation of it in order to have a better understanding of the human world. The key theory is inductive game theory recently
developed by the present author and his collaborators (e.g., Kaneko & Matsui,
1999; Kaneko & Kline, 2008)10. In this section, we explore the claim and its implications to the small and narrow earth.

4.1. Diversity of Customs, Behaviors, and Ways of Thinking
Some reader may doubt the above claim, since convenient and rapid informational technology will be available to people, with which they may communicate
to more people in the local and global manners. We argue below that the social
The basic research program is described in Kaneko (2004).

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context surrounding them exceeds their cognitive abilities. A change in informational technology is limited to the superficial level; communication device relies
upon a language, and a language is too coarse to convey their deeper and detailed cultural backgrounds.
Let us give a rough sketch of the idea of inductive game theory. It is a basic
observation that people cannot instantaneously adapt themselves to new situations. No a priori knowledge on the situation is available to a newcomer. Situational knowledge is only obtained by putting themselves to a new situation andhaving experiences there. Learning from experiences requires a lot of trials/errors; each time, a person may learn only small part of the structure. To
understand the structure better, he needs to put him deeply to the situation andexperience the same situation many times. However, experiences are scatteredover time, and forgetfulness may prevent from recalling them.
These activities are all time consuming and constrained to local social environments and individuals’ cognitive and perceptional abilities. These constraints
lead to inevitable slowness of individual changes. The reader may reflect upon
his social network and how many people he can communicate to in his local
community. This observation together with a large society has the implicationthat cultures, behaviors, and ways of thinkings are diversified even with rapid
information technology. Such diversity was emphasized by Benedict (1934), a
cultural anthropologist, by observing many advanced and primitive societies.
She was strongly against the biological-environmental determinism of humancultures that natural, biological, and environmental components determine
people’s behavior and thinking.

4.2. The Cognizance Assumption in the Standard Theories
The above view is very different from the standard economics and game theory.
It is typically and implicitly assumed in these fields that an individual agent has
well-formed beliefs over the structure of the model; “a belief” is expressed as
subjective probability in the sense of Savage (1954). This needs the cognizanceassumption that the structure of the target situation is a priori known to eachagent. The term “uncertain” which is often used as synonymous to “unknown”
means that some estimated probability is less than 1, or more generally, there are
multiple possibilities for given information. This requires the cognizance assumption that the set of possibilities is a priori known to an agent.

4.3. Inductive Game Theory: Exploring Experiential Sources ofBeliefs/Knowledge
Instead of starting with the above cognizance assumption, inductive game theory
explores the origin/emergence of beliefs/knowledge of the basic structure in individual experiences11. This changes our understanding of the social world byHere, the concepts of “belief” and/or “knowledge” are entirely different from those in the sense of
subjective probability. It is about a symbolic sentence or symbolic structure. “Knowledge” is a true
“belief”, where truth is defined outside. See Kaneko (2002: Section 6).
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almost 180˚ degree. First, let us see how inductive game theory thinks about society.
Each person is involved in various social situations of the social-web; families,
friends, schools, offices, companies, etc. In Figure 2, each of Γ 0 , Γ1 , is a social situation which may or may not involve him. The social-web is already very
complex for him, and only some small part is directly related to him; the otherparts are typically invisible to him. He follows some behavioral patterns in thosesituations. He has no a priori knowledge of the structure of each situation involving him. Only after experiencing a situation several or many times, he may
have a view about the situation. Then he may choose a better alternative action
using his understanding of the situation. If a situation is the first time for him,
he can choose only a default action predetermined.
Once the above idea is taken, we would notice that the cognizance assumption
for each agent is highly problematic. For example, let Γ 0 be the 2-person extensive game described in the left of Figure 3, which is described from the objective point of view: On the other hand, we make the basic assumption thatneither of persons PL1 and PL2 knows the structure of the game. To have a clear
distinction from the standard theory, let us assume that PL1 does not know eventhe existence of PL2 moving after PL1.

Γ3

PL1

PL2

Γo

Γo

Γ2

Γ1

Γo

Γ3

Γ4

Γ5

Γ6

Γ2

Figure 2. Social-Webb.
x1 :A

X2: B X3: C
b

a

X4: D

a

b

a

y0 : uPL2?

A
Cane domain
b
w

a

b

PL1

x0 : w

Subjective
Descriptions

Situation
B

A
Full Domain
a

C
a

b

D
b

w

Figure 3. Objective Description and Subjective Understanding.
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When both PL1 and PL2 have always been playing act a, PL1’s experiences
give a view like the upper right tree having the outcome A resulting from act a,while he recognizes another available act b without knowing the resulting outcome from b. If each of PL1 and PL2 has tried both actions, then PL1 has experienced the four outcomes which, objectively, have been led by his two actions
and PL2’s two actions. Since PL1 does not know the existence of PL2, PL1 thinksthat A and B are caused by his choice a, and similarly, C and D are by b. Hisview becomes like the bottom right tree; here, causality is not unique. Changing
the assumptions on trials/errors and accumulated experiences, we have otherpossible individual views.
The above game is extremely simple; yet we meet such multiplicity of individual views. For a game with more people and more available actions, thenumber of possibilities becomes astronomical. One society consists of a hugeand complex social-web, and people belonging to different parts of the social-web have developed their own views.
The computerized technology does not help very much each person to learn
details of the social-web. This constraint will not be eliminated by progress intechnology, since complexity involved is astronomical and the people havebounded cognitive and perceptional abilities12.
The above view is consistent with Benedict (1934) against the biological-environmental determinism of human cultures. Theoretically speaking, we
can study how such diversity has originated and emerged. Within the theory,
however, it would be difficult to find which forms of cultures occur more likely;
the theory can talk about the structure but may not find detailed patterns in diversity. To see detailed patterns, we need to look at real worlds and empirical research is required. Such studies should compensate for the theory, which will be
discussed in Section 5.

4.4. Underlying Model of a Human Being: Conservative Nature
An individual person typically follows his behavior pattern and only occasionallymakes deviations from it. In addition, a person has also a patterned way of
thinking. These are because making trials/errors is behaviorally and mentally
costly. In a social context, in addition, he may have learned patterned behavior
and thinking from other people from his childhood.
The underlying model of a human being in inductive game theory is such apattern-governed person, but only occasionally, he thinks about new possibilities. New trials are scarce at the behavioral and mental level for each being.
Thus, a human is necessarily conservative for his present situation and thought.
This gives a clear distinction from the standard economics and game theory,
which will be discussed now.
Recently, we have certain relevant developments. Kline, Lavendhomme, & Waltener (2018) describe a constructive process of a derived view from experiences. Kaneko (2017) gives a constructive
expected utility theory by restricting the permissible probabilities to finite (decimal) fractions.
These suggest a systematic study of the concepts of induction, deduction, and bounded rationality.
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4.5. Cognizance Assumption in the Standard Economics and Game
TheoryIt is the cognizance assumption for the standard theory that an individual agent
has well-formed beliefs over the structure of the model. This has various derivative aspects: for example, utility maximization is regarded as an important component of it, and the cognizance assumption is a sufficient condition for utility
maximization, but it is often ignored how utility maximization reaches a maximizing point.
A related aspect is the overuse of set-theoretical apparatus. All symbolic
propositional expressions are represented by sets of possibilities. The cognizanceassumption is based on this. For example, the concept of information is expressed as a set of alternative possibilities. In real world, however, information
comes to a person as a language (symbolic) expression. Expressing it as a set of
possibilities requires a set-theoretical interpretation of symbolic expressions.
This is also a base for an instantaneous utility maximization.

4.6. Methodological/Philosophical Studies
Here, we mention necessity of methodological (/philosophical) studies of ourresearch itself. As we need a normative theory to discuss objectives and evaluations, methodological studies may direct theoretical and empirical research;without such bases, theoretical research could become mere mathematical exercises, and empirical research might be simple pursuits of social events.
In “Nineteen Eighty-Four”, Orwell (1949) wrote about a new system of language called the “new speak” forced upon people. Behind the new speak is thephilosophical idea that if some words were removed from the dictionary, theconcepts described by them would be eliminated. For example, if the word “revolution” were removed from the dictionary, then people might no longer be able
to conceive of a revolution. This metaphor is effectively observable in our profession. Here, we give two examples among others; Arrow’s (1951) impossibility
theorem and free use of the “probability” and “subjective probability”.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is regarded as an important theorem in welfare
economics, claiming that it is impossible to find a social welfare function satisfying certain “plausible” conditions. One interpretation of a social welfare function typically adopted is a mechanism of aggregating the preference relations
reported by the members of society. We find a difficulty in this interpretation inthat “having a preference relation” should be distinguished from “knowing his
own preference relation”. The former is already problematic but not very serious. On the other hand, the latter is deeply problematic: How does one know
his own preference relation? If the number of alternative choices is two or three,
it would not be problematic, but in the case with more alternatives, it is difficult
to think about his own preference relation. This is compared with a statement
about one’s brain; it is unavoidable to assume that a person has a brain but cannot know its inner functioning.
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Another example is free use of “probability” and/or “subjective probability”.
People’s beliefs are expressed by “subjective probability” by Savage (1954). In thetheory of games with incomplete information from Harsanyi (1967-’68), “subjective probability” is extensively used expressing beliefs about nature as well asother’s beliefs including logical inferences. Savage (1954) gave an axiomatizationof “subjective probability”, but any “axiomatization” is not beyond necessary
and sufficient conditions; some premathematical argument or evaluation about
the suitability of those conditions should be given. In the case of “subjective
probability”, the real problem is where and how such a probability comes from13.
The use of such beliefs expressing logical inferences is just coming from ignoring
the other field of mathematical logic, which has a long history from the ancient
Greece as a scientific study of human logical inferences.

4.7. Necessity of New Theories
The above are examples of existing theories regarded as important in the economics and game theory. Although the initiators of those theories dig new
problems at their times, these theories are now mediocre. According to Thomas
Kuhn (1964), a history of science has a long steady period of progress generating
variants within one paradigm and has a possible scientific revolution only whenserious anomalies appear.
Now, the earth and human race are in the urgent situation; we cannot wait fora long period before a revolution in our sciences. Instead, we should be conscious about what an important problem is and what a mediocre one is. We
should attack the very heart of each problem.

5. Descriptive/Empirical Studies of Societies andInstitutions
People from different communities meet each other more in the future earth;their meetings inevitably causes frictions and conflicts between those people.
Since different backgrounds are deeply impregnate in different communities,
diversity cannot be easily erased by teaching a common language such as English
and/or computer technology. In this section, we will discuss what kind of research is required to understand such diversified cultures.

5.1. Geological and Historical Understanding of the Human WorldFirst of all, we need to investigate what events have occurred, are occurring, andwill possibly occur in the human world. There are two kinds, horizontal and ver-tical, of empirical research for these questions: the horizontal research is to study
what are occurring over the present earth, and the vertical one is to study what
In the first half of the 20th century, the question of what “probability” is was discussed an extensively. Among various interpretations, the frequentist interpretation is only an attempt to view“probability” from the material world. See Weatherford (1982). For expected utility theory, von
Neumann & Morgenstern (1944), Chap.1 explicitly stated that they adopt the frequentist interpretation. See Hu (2013) for a treatment of expected utility theory from the frequentist perspective.
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have occurred in the past of each region. To consider the future world, we needthese different methods.
From the horizontal point of view, we see a great variety of human cultures aswell as events occurring in the present world. To study people and their behaviors in different situations helps our understanding of human beings and societies. On the other hand, from the vertical point of view, we trace events in thepast of a region and understand what social structures and social institutions
lead to them. By those studies, we may foresee possible events to happen in the
future earth and find some ways to prevent them.

5.2. Historical Investigations of Japanese Societies
Kaneko (2007) adopted the vertical methodology to look into Japanese historiesof 400 years. Even though Japan is geologically small, its histories are rich andgive hints to consider the future earth and possibility of the world nation. The
modern Japan started in 1868, and before it, Japan was governed by the Tokugawa family, a feudal clan, for the period from 1603 to 1867: during this period,
Japan had the policy of national isolation from 1633 until 1858, except for one
channel (a small island in Kyushu) to the Netherlands. After 1868, Japan wasquickly industrialized, and took the militarism until the end of World War II.
Then, it has grown and become one of the richest nations in the world.
Looking into Japanese societies in the past, we find some social situations
hardly perceivable in the present Japan. For example, extreme poverty prevailed
in the rural areas in the Tohoku14 region in Japan from the Tokugawa period until some years after the end of World War II. This is just one history relevant toour considerations. In the following, we mention some other observations about
Japanese histories, which give a hint to understand market economies.

5.3. Concentration of Land Ownerships and Its Implications
In the Japanese histories, we find that private ownership, which is one of our
crucial target issues as already discussed, created a small number of huge landlords and a large number of peasants. Some peasants were observed in the Tokugawa era, but after the reform of the tax system on farm lands in 1873 (6 year
after the Meiji restoration), the percentage of peasants in the Tohoku region had
increased from 15% - 20% to 45% - 50% in 40 years. Suffering cold weather forseveral years, many peasants in despair sold their daughters for prostitution inTokyo. After World War II, the concentration of land ownership was fully dissolved by the allied forces. In fact, this concentration of land ownerships and political dissolution were repeated many times from the civilization in Japan (about
7th - 8th century).
The market system with the specific legal structure led to the above mentioned
concentration of land ownerships. As discussed in Section 2, the central assumption for the market system is property rights (private ownerships), which needs alegal protection. For the practical management of the future earth, it could be
Tohoku is the north east area of the main island of Japan.

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inevitable to use a market system in a certain manner, which requires us to admit property rights. However, we should always be careful of controlling thesystem of property rights15.

5.4. Conservativeness and Its Implications
Concentrations of land ownerships are social phenomena. Scrutinizing, however, into landlords’ behavior and speaking, we find very conservative nature of
their mentality; they were apt to think that their ownerships would be eternal.
Their justification often took the following form; their furthest ancestors reclaimed wastelands by hard work and all successors had kept their lands fromgenerations to generations. Some bought lands from other farmers, but they
were all legally legitimate.
Their attitudes may be called rationalization. This is consistent with what we
discussed in Section 4; with a great multiplicity in possible individual views derived from an individual’s experiences, we have a tendency to find one convenient explanation (cf., Kaneko & Matsui, 1999). It is also important to noticethat such an explanation is often based upon some convenient part of reality.
This is the conservative nature of a human being. Our normative theory statesthat we should abrogate vested rights and interests, but in reality, people naturally want to keep them; they are conservative, regardless of being conscious or
unconscious. Therefore, the principle of the world human community, denying
them entirely, is needed to make us conscious of our conservative nature.

5.5. Administrative Units in the Past
Before 1868, Japan was divided into more than 300 feudal states and people were
not able to across freely the boarders between those states. Poor people such as
farmers were strictly restricted to their local places, and their views were limited
to their places. Therefore, each state developed its dialect and culture. After the
Meiji restoration, Japan became one nation without legal boundaries, but people
from different states had difficulties to communicate. This was true until recently between people even from next states, but now young people, due to the TV,
speak the standard Tokyo dialect. This fact may tell that diversity may be getting
smaller in Japan.
It is relevant here that the number of feudal states in 140 years ago was morethan 300, and before 1868, the scope of each person was typically restricted tohis small state. But now, nobody thinks that each feudal state is his country. Thischange has happened only in 140 years16. But it is unclear that diversity of people
Piketty (2013) shows, using data of incomes in many countries, concentrations of wealth throughmarket economies, and argues the necessity of high marginal income tax rates up to 80%.
16Another striking fact is that the total population in Japan did not grow for the period of the Tokugawa era. It grew from 1600 to 1700, but after it, the total population declined for many years,
and only at the end of the Tokugawa era, the total population was rebounded to reach the same level as that of 1700. This fact was not caused by a high rate of infant mortality; the birth rate itself waslaw during the period from 1700 to 1867. After the Meiji restoration, the birth rate became high.
Some demographic anthropologists have worked but did not give a good explanation for such decline of population.
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is getting smaller at least at a non-superficial level.

6. Management of the Future Earth
We have discussed the necessity of the world nation for the future earth, but also
argued that the earth would remain fulfilled with diversified cultures. Each individual being has a small social world, while being connected to larger societies invarious ways from social institutions and legal structures such as family, schools,
companies, towns, prefectures, and nations. Without those institutions, we could
not keep our present societies, economic activities, and people’s welfare. In 2,400
years ago, Plato (cf. the republic, 1955) already gave comprehensive discussions
on the needs of social institutions to run a nation.
Social institutions are connected in complicated manners; some are hierarchical, some are nested, exclusive, or inclusive. For example, a private company,
which is a relatively small social institution, can take economic activities freely
under the protections of local or central governments, which are larger social institution, provided that the company pays legitimate taxes.
The above description is more or less the same in many nations in the present
world. However, when worldwide disasters happen in some places in the earth,sovereignties of involved nations should no longer be kept; and the world nation
should play roles of stopping and/or coordinating. To control worldwide problems such as global warming, over-population, etc., coordination between theindividual economic activity level and worldwide global level would be more difficult.
One possibility is to return to the control of all detailed activities of local
community or even every individual person. This is, more or less, the communist planning economy, where the central planner makes all detailed productionplans. The failure of this idea was historically shown by communist nations up
to 1990. Once a great diversity of cultures is recognized, this failure could be
logically clear. Therefore, some decentralized managements of political units andeconomies are inevitable. Again, we meet the use of democracy and market systems. But as already discussed, we cannot go to free-market libertarianism
without restrictions. Now, we can say only that a restrictive use of a market system is aimed for practical management, but how to be restrictive must be our
future study.

Larger Administrative Units: Contradictory Features
As stated in Section 5, until 140 years ago, the Tokugawa family acted as thecentral government but Japan remained divided into more than 300 feudal states
as administrative units. In the present European Union, the borders are practically removed, and people can move freely in search of a job from one nation to
any other within the Union. In the year 2100, the concept of a “nation” will beless clear-cut in the European Union.
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ing that the unification of present nations to a certain degree would be a naturalconclusion. Also, some centralized management would be needed, but it is subject to risks of global instability, meaning that centralization may magnify an external shock and lead to a worldwide disaster. On the other hand, we have discussed also that due to diversified societies, decentralization of economic management is inevitable. Thus, we have a lot of contradictory features for practicalmanagement of the entire earth. We should study how to reconcile the centralized idea of the world nation with practical decentralization.

7. Conclusion
In this article, we considered various problems expected for a small and narrow
earth of the future earth. Our discourse consisted of two almost contradictory
parts: a normative theory and a descriptive theory. The former provides evaluations of possible events and of designs of social institutions from the viewpointof the earth as unity. The latter, discussed as social sciences for practical management of the earth, states that a great diversity of cultures will remain, which
implies that a unified management of the earth is practically very difficult.
The latter requires us to do a lot of theoretical and empirical studies in comprehensive manners. In particular, we discussed inductive game theory, but it isstill premature and needs to be developed in many ways. Also, for a historical
study, we looked briefly at the Japanese societies of past 400 years. It gave a dynamical change of the social structure of Japan, and perhaps a similar change
could be observed in the histories of other countries. This may give a lot of hints
for further considerations of the future earth. In this article, we have not discussed geological differences in the world. Such differences should be consideredempirically as well as theoretically.
We, social scientists as well as other scientists, should now very seriously investigate the problems of the future earth. To make a meaningful recommendation, we need to understand the world better, which requires philosophical,
theoretical, and empirical studies. These should include technical studies of theexternal worlds, people’s internal mental worlds, normative studies, and philosophical studies of researchers’ methods and their attitudes. We are also required
to synthesize studies of different fields; in the present academia, various fields on
close subjects exist almost separately. Scientists should cooperate to save theearth and human beings. As our task is urgent, we should take a truly radical attitude for every step.

Acknowledgements
The author thanks Jeffrey J. Kline, Nathan Berg, Yao Zeng, Oliver Schulte, andthe referee of this journal for many helpful comments on earlier drafts. Also, hethanks various people including Koichi Suga for helpful comments. He is partially supported by Grant-in-Aids for Scientific Research No.26780127 andNo.17H02258, Ministry of Education, Science and Culture.
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