NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION AND
THE DYNAMICS OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

Jing-dong Yuan
Director of ResearchCenter for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
Prepared for Workshop on“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”
Hiroshima Peace Institute
Hiroshima, Japan
March 11-12, 2004

INTRODUCTION
Sino-U.S. relations have been at their best since President Nixon’s historical 1972 visit toChina. Not only are the two countries in regular and close consultation on issues ranging fromanti-terrorism to North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs, Beijing and Washington were evenin agreement on the controversial Taiwan referendum, with the U.S. side explicitly discouraging
the Chen Shui-bian government from undertaking such a provocative act. This is a far cry fromthe (in)famous “whatever it takes” statement by President George W. Bush barely three years
ago.
China and the United States have also sought to manage disputes that used to irritate
bilateral relations with various degrees of success. These include trade, human rights, andproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Bilateral security, arms control, and defense
consultations are being institutionalized, enabling the two sides to discuss their differences
through dialogue. Beijing for its part over the last two years issued a series of nonproliferation
export control regulations and is now considering joining two multilateral export control regimes– the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

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The amicable atmosphere is due in no small part to Washington’s post-9-11 efforts toseek major power cooperation in its campaign against international terrorism and to Beijing’s
desire to maintain a stable relationship with the U.S. However, fundamental differences between
the two countries over military alliances, the role of nuclear deterrence, missile defenses, use offorce, and the resolution of the Taiwan issue remain. Indeed, both continue to view each other’s
objectives and policies with caution and even suspicion, and neither has let up guard against
future contingencies.
This paper examines the current dynamics in Sino-U.S. relations, from cooperation on
resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, to issues that could drag the two into conflict –Chinese misgivings about the U.S.-Japan alliance, the controversies over missile defenses, andcross-Strait relations – and discusses the role of nuclear weapons in the bilateral relationship. It
argues that the possibility of nuclear threat reduction between the two countries – which in itself
should be a worthy goal to pursue – will depend on two sets of variables. The first is whether theissues in question are merely perceptual or fundamentally irreconcilable ones. Better
communication and strategic dialogue could help resolve perceptual misunderstanding.
Otherwise, arms control and conflict management would be the more appropriate mechanisms.
The second refers to the relative importance that the two countries ascribe to these issues and thedegree of determination in protecting their interests, including the use of force (and even nuclear
force. Prevention of such occurrence would be of utmost interests to policymakers in both
Washington and Beijing.

COOPERATION AND CONFLICT
Sino-U.S. relations did not begin well with the incoming Bush administration. During the2000 presidential campaigns, candidate Bush described China as a potential strategic competitor“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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for the U.S. The new administration vowed to strengthen its alliance relationships anddownplayed the importance of China in its Asia policy. Then came the April 2001 EP-3 incident
and the largest U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in a decade. The bilateral relationship dropped to thelowest point. The September-11 terrorist attacks on the United States provided a “strategic
window of opportunity” for re-building tattered Sino-U.S. relationship. The Bushadministration’s international focus is now on the war against terrorism, not on the possibility ofa future challenge from China.1 Chinese analysts recognize that the challenge for Beijing would
be to maximize the benefits and minimize other negative impact such as growing U.S. global
military presence and preemptive use of force. 2 For the time being at least, common interests infighting global terrorism and defusing the North Korean nuclear crisis have seen Beijing andWashington enjoying a period of stable relationship.
At the same time, China and the U.S. have different objectives and priorities for the postCold War Asia.3 For Beijing, the end of the Cold War has removed a major threat (from theSoviet Union) to its territorial security and a peaceful environment is conducive to its goals of
economic development and building the country into a stable, prosperous regional power.
Economic security, political stability, and national unity have become major Chinese foreign
policy objectives. The United States, on the other hand, seeks to maintain its primacy in theregion through its alliance systems and by strengthening its military presence. Washington isdetermined to prevent any power from rising to challenge its interests and looks to emerging

1

Jia Qingguo, “The impact of 9-11 on Sino-US relations: a preliminary assessment,” International Relations of the
Asia-Pacific 3:2 (August 2003), pp.159-177; David M. Lampton, “Small Mercies: China and America after 9/11,”
The National Interest (Winter 2001/2002), pp.106-113.
2
Wang Jisi, “Xinxingshi de zhuyao tedian he zhongguo waijiao [Main Characteristics of the New Situation and
China’s Diplomacy], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No.4 (April 2003), pp.1-3; Liu
Jianfei, “Zhanlue jiyuqi yu zhongmei guanxi [The Period of Strategic Opportunity and Sino-US Ties],” Liaowang[Outlook Weekly], January 20, 2003, pp.56-57; Yuan Peng, “9.11 shijian yu zhongmei guanxi [September 11th andSino-U.S. Relations],” Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No.11 (November 2001),
pp.19-23, 63.
3Adam Ward, “China and America: Trouble Ahead?” Survival 45:3 (Autumn 2003), pp.35-56.

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democratization and continued marketization as the pillars to ensure regional stability.4 Threecontentious issues have emerged to dominate the Sino-U.S. strategic discourse: the U.S.-Japan
alliance, missile defenses, and Taiwan.
The North Korean Nuclear Crisis
The crisis over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has provided the opportunity for
Sino-U.S. cooperation, even though Beijing’s initial reactions were rather passive. When thecrisis first broke out, China stated its positions on the issue as follows: (1) peace and stability on
the Korean Peninsula should be preserved; (2) the peninsula should remain nuclear-free; and (3)the dispute should be resolved through diplomatic and political methods between the UnitedStates and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). These positions form the core ofChinese approaches to the resolution of the nuclear issue. Chinese officials and analysts
maintained that the key to resolving the crisis would be direct dialogue between North Korea andthe United States. Instead of blaming North Korea for the collapse of the 1994 Agreed
Framework, Beijing had been calling for both Pyongyang and Washington to resolve theirdispute through dialogue. The Chinese hoped that face-saving ways could be found for
Pyongyang and Washington to return to the negotiating table.5
Beijing worries that hard-line positions in Pyongyang and Washington and continued
stalemate could push North Korea to take even riskier steps. A military confrontation on the
Korean Peninsula not only will cause much destruction it would also bring down the North
Korean regime, costing China a strategically important buffer. The environmental devastation
4

Zalmay Khalilzad et al., The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications. MR-1082-AF(Santa Monica: RAND, 1999); Zalmay Khalilzad et al., The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy
and Force Posture. MR-1315-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001); Bates Gill, Contrasting Visions: United States,
China, and World Order (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2004).
5
Bates Gill and Andrew Thompson, “A Test for Beijing: China and the North Korean Nuclear Quandary,” Arms
Control Today 33:4 (May 2003) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_05/gillthompson_may03.asp>; Jing-dong
Yuan, “China and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 22, 2003
<http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/chidprk.htm>.

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would be severe and massive refugee flight into China, where an estimated 100,000 to 300,000
illegal North Koreans residents.6 A hastily unified Korea following the collapse of the North
Korean regime would present Beijing with tremendous uncertainty. China could face the specter ofa U.S. military presence right up to the Chinese-Korean border. A united Korea might inherit theNorth’s nuclear and missile capabilities and rising Korean nationalism could also pose a challenge
to Beijing’s ability to manage its Korean ethnic minority in Jilin Province. Finally, there is also thespecter of a nuclear chain reaction, with concerns over Japan’s possible rearmament andnuclearization, using the North Korean nuclear issue as a pretext.7
These considerations led China to adopte a more active diplomacy in order to forestall thepotentially negative consequences. Indeed, one could argue that Beijing’s efforts – including
twisting Pyongyang’s arms – play no small part in getting Pyongyang to the April 2003 trilateralmeeting in Beijing and to accept the subsequent two rounds of six-party talks in August 2003 andFebruary 2004, respectively.8 However, while the process for engaging North Korea has been
kept alive and both China and the U.S. have found common grounds for continued cooperationand consultation, significant differences remain between the two countries over specificapproaches and long-term objectives, which could in future strain bilateral relations.9 The U.S.
and North Korea’s positions remain poles apart, as demonstrated by the second round meeting of

6“North Korean refugees in China: The current situation and strategies for protection,” Testimony by Joel R.
Charny, Vice President for Policy, Refugees International to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
November 4, 2003. <http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/CharnyTestimony031104.pdf>.
7
Wang Yong and Teng Hongwei, “Jingti dongya xinlengzhann [Beware of a New Cold War in East Asia].”8
Andrew Scobell, China and North Korea: From Comrades-in-Arms to Allies at Arm's Length (Carlisle,
Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute United States Army War College, March 2004); Willy Wo-Lap Lam,
“Beijing’s New Urgency over N Korea,” CNN.com, July 30, 2003; Jing-dong Yuan, “A Turning Point for Beijing,”
International Herald Tribune, September 2, 2002, p.6 <http://www.iht.com/articles/108434.html>; Robert Marquand,“China brings shift on nukes to Korean talks,” The Christian Science Monitor, February 24, 2004
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0224/p01s02-woap.html>.
9Phillip C. Saunders, “U.S.-China Relations in a Changing Nuclear Environment,” in Jonathan D. Pollack, ed.,Sino-American Strategic Dynamics in the Early 21st Century: Prospects, Scenarios, and Implications (Newport:
Naval War College Press, 2003), forthcoming.

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the six-party talks held in Beijing and China’s patience may wear thin as it increasingly finds it
frustrating in its role as a facilitator and honest broker.10
The U.S.-Japan Alliance
Chinese attitudes toward the U.S.-Japan alliance have over the years shifted from outrightcondemnation and opposition in the 1960s, to tacit acquiescence in the 1970s and 1980s, to growing
criticisms since the end of the Cold War. Beijing has reacted negatively to the April 1996 U.S.Japan Joint Declaration on Security and the September 1997 U.S.-Japanese Defense Cooperation
Guidelines. While in the past the alliance in Beijing’s eyes served a useful purpose of keeping
Tokyo from seeking re-militarization, it is now increasingly viewed as a security threat.11
Three issues stand out. First, Beijing considers the revitalized U.S.-Japan military allianceas part of Washington’s containment strategy against China. After all, the alliance wasestablished during the Cold War years with the defense of Japanese territories as its primary
mission. Now the Cold War has ended, the very raison d’être – protecting Japan from Soviet
aggression – no longer exists. The alliance therefore reflects Cold War mentality and actuallyjustifies and facilitates continued U.S. military presence in the region with unmistakably clear
objectives: to maintain American primacy against China as a potential future adversary.
Second, the new defense guidelines extend the alliance’s defense perimeter to include theTaiwan Strait; China is understandably concerned with the possible intervention of the U.S.Japan alliance in what it regards as its internal affairs and re-unification plans. Tokyo’s

10Mark Magnier, “Lack of Progress in N. Korea Talks Fodder for Accusations,” Los Angeles Times, February 29,
200411Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International
Security 23:4 (Spring 1999), pp.49-80.

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ambiguity regarding its defense perimeter based not on geography but on events only heightens
Beijing’s suspicions.12
Third, the revitalized alliance allows the Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) to take on
additional responsibilities. Beijing is increasingly worried that a more assertive Japan actively
involved in the region’s security affairs and seeking to be a “normal” power will emerge as aresult.13 The new defense guidelines in effect give Japan the green light to go beyond the original
exclusive self-defense to a collective defense function, therefore providing justification for Japan tointervene in regional security affairs.14 Japan already has one of the largest defense budgets in theworld and has a reasonably sized (given its peace constitution) but the best-equipped military in
the region. In addition, Japan’s industrial and technological wherewithal will provide it withready resources should it decide to become a military great power at short notice, including theacquisition of nuclear weapons.15
Indeed, Beijing is particularly attentive to Japan’s growing military capabilities. The
December 2001 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) earmarked ¥25.16 trillion for the
next five years, making Japan second to the United States in terms of overall defense spending
and first on a per-soldier basis. Large allocations have been devoted to procuring major sea andair weapons systems and platforms. When JDA announced its participation in the 2000 Rim of
the Pacific (RIMPAC) military exercises, the Liberation Army Daily commented that Japan “iscasting off its peace constitution” and “the ghost of Japanese militarism is stirring on the12

Liu Jiangyong, “Xin ‘rimei fangwei hezuo zhizhen’ heyi lingren youlu [Why the New US-Japanese Defence
Cooperation Guidelines Arouse Concerns]?” Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], no.11(November 1997), pp.7-12.
13
Lu Zhongwei, “Riben de guojia zuoxiang yu rizhong guanxi [Japan’s Course of Direction and Its RelationshipWith China],” Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], (July 2001), pp.2-7.
14
Liang Ming, “Rimei xin fangwei jihua yinren zhumu [The New US-Japan Defense Guidelines Attracts
Attention],” The PLA Daily, December 22, 2000 (internet version).
15“Opposition Leader Ozawa Says Japan Could Produce Nuclear Weapons,” Kyodo in English, April 6, 2002.
FBIS-JPP20020406000056.

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Japanese archipelago.”16 The dispatch of JSDF ships and personnel to the Gulf and Iraq since theAfghan War is a worrisome sign that Japan may have started on this path.17 It is no coincidence that
Beijing is also critical of Japanese intention to upgrade the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to theministerial level.18
U.S. Missile Defenses
Another potential point of conflict between Beijing and Washington concerns thecontentious U.S. missile defenses and their deployment in Asia.19 Beijing has a number of
specific concerns over the development and deployment of missile defense.20 First, U.S. missile
defenses can negatively affect China’s core national security interests, in particular their ability
to undermine the credibility and effectiveness of China’s small-size nuclear retaliatory
capabilities. Given Russia’s large nuclear arsenals, proposed U.S. missile defenses would not beable to neutralize Russian retaliatory capabilities. The apparent U.S. targetsthe so-called rogue
statesdo not yet possess long-range missiles to threaten continental America, nor would theyrisk massive retaliation by attacking the United States first. The only explanation for the U.S.
missile defense system, Beijing strongly suspects, is that it is aimed at China’s limited nuclear

16

Liang Ming, “Japan Seizes on a Pretext Again,” Beijing Jiefangjun Bao in Chinese May 8, 2000, p.5. FBISCPP20000508000054.
17
Beijing Xinhua, “Riben anbao tixi yanbian [Japan’s Evolving Security System],” February 22, 2004; “The‘New Defense Group’ in Japanese Polity and the Adjustment in Security Strategy,” Forum on International
Studies, No.3, 2003, pp.38-47.
18
Pan Xiaoying, “Be Vigilant against Japanese Desire to Establish a Ministry of Defense,” Beijing Renmin ribao in
Chinese, December 11, 2000, p. 2. FBIS-CPP20001211000026.
19
General discussions include the Atlantic Council of the United States, Missile Defense in Asia (June 2003);
Michael D. Swaine, with Loren H. Runyon, “Ballistic Missiles and Missile Defense in Asia,” NBR Analysis 13:3
(June 2002), pp.1-84.
20
On Sino-U.S. disputes over the issue and Chinese positions, see Sha Zukang, “Some Thoughts on NonProliferation,” address given at the 7th Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 11-12 January 1999,
Washington, DC. http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/sha/html; Howard Diamond, “China Warns U.S. on East Asian
Missile Defense Cooperation,” Arms Control Today 29:1 (January/February 1999), p.27; Evan S. Medeiros, Missiles,
Theater Missile Defense and Regional Stability. Conference Report, 2nd US-China Conference on Arms Control,
Disarmament and Nonproliferation (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute ofInternational Studies, July 1999); Jing-dong Yuan, “Chinese Responses to U.S. Missile Defenses: Implications forArms Control and Regional Security,” The Nonproliferation Review 10:1 (Spring 2003), pp.75-96.

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deterrent capability. This is particularly so in the context of the continued Sino-U.S. conflict overTaiwan and the declared U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense. Indeed, one prominent Chinese
missile defense analyst suggests that “China fears that if the USA believes that a first nuclear
strike plus an NMD system could render impotent China’s nuclear retaliatory capability, theUSA might become less cautious during any crisis involving China.”21 That crisis, in most
instances, would well be over Taiwan.
Second, the Chinese dismiss U.S. justification that missile defenses are a reaction toincreasing ballistic missile threats from the so-called rogue states. Rather, Beijing sees it as yet
another deliberate step that the United States has taken to further enhance its offensive as well as
defensive capabilities. Beijing is aware that U.S. development of missile defense systems as away to pursue absolute security comes at a time when major shifts are emerging in new U.S.
defense policy, including the heightened role of nuclear weapons in the strategy of pre-emption.
In this context, missile defenses could elevate the importance of military elements ininternational relations, resulting in greater U.S. unilateralism and the threat and use of force. It ispart of U.S. global strategy of sustaining its post-Cold War primacy and absolute security
through increased military interventions in regional affairs. U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty
and its planned missile defense deployment could erode international arms control and invite
regional arms races, further undermining international and regional security.22
While China tacitly acknowledges the role of TMD in protecting U.S. forward-deployedtroops from missile attacks, it objects to an advanced TMD system that could extend to Taiwan
and may also serve as a forward component of NMD.23 In an interview with Defense News in

21

Li Bin, “The effects of NMD on Chinese strategy,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (March 2001).
Zhu Feng, Dandao daodan fangyu jihua yu guoji anquan [Ballistic Missile Defenses and International Security](Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, July 2001).
23
Sha Zukang, “Some Thoughts on Non-Proliferation,” address given at the 7th Carnegie International NonProliferation Conference, January 11-12, 1999, Washington, DC. <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/4061.html>
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February 1999, Sha Zhukang said that China was not concerned about “what we call genuine
TMD.” Instead, “what China is opposed to is the development, deployment and proliferation of
antimissile systems with potential strategic defense capabilities in the name of TMD that violate theletter and spirit of [the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty] and go beyond the legitimate self-defense
needs of relevant countries.”24
Third, Japan’s participation in theater missile defense is also drawing increasing attention
from China and elsewhere in Asia.25 Since the North Korean Taepo-dong missile launch inAugust 1998 and recent nuclear developments, Japan has speeded up steps to acquire anddeployment missile defense systems in addition to its ongoing research and development
collaboration with the U.S.26 China contends that regional (theater) missile defense (TMD)
research and development encourage and provide a pretext for Japanese re-militarization.27
Beijing’s suspicion of a post-Cold War assertive Japan is reinforced by Tokyo’s reluctance to beforthcoming on its historical records, its ambiguity regarding its defense perimeter, its potent andpotential military capabilities, and its potential involvement in a Taiwan crisis.28 Given Japan’scurrent naval capability (it already possesses four Aegis destroyers and has the strongest naval

Howard Diamond, “China Warns U.S. on East Asian Missile Defense Cooperation,” Arms Control Today 29(January/February 1999), p. 27. For a comprehensive analysis, see Evan S. Medeiros, “Missiles, Theater Missile
Defense and Regional Stability,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies,
July 1999, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/research/uschina2/index.htm>.
24
Quote from Howard Diamond, “China Warns U.S. on East Asian Missile Defense Cooperation,” Arms Control
Today 29 (January/February 1999), p. 27.
25
Michael Swaine, Rachel Swanger, Takashi Kawakami, Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense (Santa Monica:
RAND, 2001); Norimitsu Onishi, “Japan Support of Missile Shield Could Tilt Asia Power Balance,” New YorkTime, April 3, 2004.
26“Japan Adopts Missile Defense System,”Mainichi Daily News, December 19, 2003
<http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp/news/archive/200312/19/20031219p2a00m0dm007000c.html>
27
Hong Yuan, “The Implications of a TMD System in Japan to China’s Security,” Nuclear Policy Project Special
Report, August 1999; Sun Cheng, Riben yu yatai – shiji zhijiao de fenxi yu zhanwang [Japan and Asia Pacific –Analysis and Prospect at the Turn of the Century] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1997).
28
Hong Yuan, “The Implications of a TMD System in Japan to China’s Security,” Nuclear Policy Project Special
Report, August 1999; Sun Cheng, Riben yu yataishiji zhijiao de fenxi yu zhanwang [Japan and Asia
PacificAnalysis and Prospect at the Turn of the Century] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1997).

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fleet among Asian countries), TMD systems would equip Japan with both offensive anddefensive capabilities.
Finally, China is strongly opposed to missile defense coverage of Taiwan for threereasons: (1) It encourages Taiwan independence; (2) It leads to de facto Taiwan-U.S. security
alliance; and (3) It interferes with China’s unification objectives. To quote Ambassador Sha
Zukang, former director-general of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament in
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “China’s opposition to U.S. transfers of TMD to Taiwan is
also based on … its adverse impact on China’s reunification. TMD in Taiwan will give the proindependence forces in Taiwan a false sense of security, which may incite them to recklessmoves. This can only lead to instability across the Taiwan Strait or even in the entire North-East
Asian region.”29
TaiwanDespite the apparent common stands on the Taiwan referendum issue expressed by both
Beijing and Washington in recent months, the stability of long-term Sino-U.S. will likely remain
affected by their handling of the cross-Strait relations.30 The U.S., while annoyed by Taipei’sreckless and provocative postures that could disrupt the status quo and create unnecessary tension ata time when American capabilities are tied elsewhere, is nonetheless sympathetic to Taiwan’s
democratization and bound by the Taiwan Relations Act regarding the latter’s defense. With the
U.S., there are forces that are strongly pro-Taiwan and call for U.S. support of the independence
course.31 Indeed, even as Washington admonishes Taipei’s referendum plan, officials in the Bush29

Amb. Sha, “Some Thoughts on Non-Proliferation.”
Editorial, “Taiwan Issue Core of Sino-U.S. Ties,” People’s Daily, February 28, 2004; Michael D. Swaine,“Trouble in Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs 83:2 (March/April 2004), pp.39-49.
31
William Kristol and Ellen Bork, “The Bush Administration, Taiwan, and China: Why is the Bush administration
siding with Beijing against Taiwan's democratic referenda?” The Daily Standard, February 10, 2004.
<http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/719aazqc.asp>
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administration are also sending signals of reassurance to Chen’s government.32 The re-election ofChen Shui-bian for a second term and recent U.S. announcement of planned sale of long-range
early-warning radar worth up to $1.78 billion to Taiwan reinforce this concern.33
Indeed, long-term U.S. Taiwan policy remains the most serious security concern for Beijing.
Since the mid-1990s, three trends have been particularly worrisome for the Chinese leadership. The
first is U.S. deviation in recent years from the “One China” principle set forth in the three Sino-U.S.
joint communiqués. In recent years, the U.S. has steadily upgraded its supposedly unofficial ties
with Taiwan. High-ranking Taiwanese officials, including those between the two militaries, havebeen granted visas to make transit stops on their way to Central and South America. Transit stops
granted to Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan’s president and Annette Lu (vice-president) are also more
frequently than during the Clinton administration. The U.S. has also openly supported Taiwan’s bid
to join the World Health Organization.34
The second is the continuing U.S. military sales to Taiwan, which is seen by China as
contravening the spirit of the August 17, 1982 Sino-U.S. Communiqué.35 Over the last two decades
since the communiqué was issued, the U.S. has provided Taiwan with a full spectrum of militaryequipment, including F-16 air superiority fighters, Knox-class frigates, Kidd-class destroyers, antisubmarine S-2T, E-2T Hawkeye airborne early-warning aircraft, long-range early-warning radars,
attack helicopters, Patriot-derived Modified Air Defense Systems; Hawk and Chaparral groundbased air defense systems, among others. The U.S. Department of Defense also runs exchange

32See, for instance, statements by Richard Lawless, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and Randy Schriver,Deputy Assistant Secretary of State at the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing on
Military Modernization and Cross-Strait Balance, February 6, 2004.
33
John Ruwitch and Jim Wolf, “China Scolds U.S. for Radar Sales to Taiwan,” Reuters, April 1, 2004.
34
See Robert Sutter, “Bush Administration Policy Toward Beijing and Taipei,” Journal of Contemporary China
12:36 (August 2003), pp.477-492.
35
Wei-Chin Lee, “US Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan: from Carter to Clinton,” Journal of Contemporary China
9:23 (March 2000), pp.53-75; John P. McClaran, “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan: Implications for the Future of the
Sino-U.S. Relationship,” Asian Survey 40:4 (July/August 2000), pp.622-640.

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programs with Taiwan on C4I, air defense, anti-submarine warfare (ASW).36 In April, 2001,
President Bush caused quite a stir when he gave the controversial “whatever it takes” to help defend
Taiwan statement.
Third and finally, there have been incessant congressional efforts at not only enhancing
U.S.-Taiwan relationship, as is manifest in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 but also
expanding it to include closer security cooperation.37 The 1999 Taiwan Security Enhancement Act,
which was passed in the House in a landslide, would require even closer defense cooperation
between the U.S. and Taiwan in the areas of defense planning, threat analysis, training program, andmissile defense systems, all of which have been strongly opposed by Beijing.38 The establishmentof the Taiwan Caucuses in the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives are the latest
development. U.S. positions on its Taiwan policy over the next four years will be a critical element
in both the stability of the Taiwan Strait and Sino-U.S. relations.

THE NUCLEAR FACTOR
China developed its nuclear weapons program in response to U.S. nuclear blackmail.
After detonating its first nuclear bomb in October 1964, China achieved the hydrogen bomb
capability in 1967 and by 1981 had deployed its first-generation intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States. Over the next two decades, progress in36

East Asia Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Arms Sales to Taiwan: Statements andDevelopments 1979-2003 <http://www.nti.org/db/china/twnchr.htm>. Additional information regarding US arms
sales to Taiwan can also be found at: <http://taiwansecurity.org/TSR-Arms.htm>
37James Mann, “Congress and Taiwan: Understanding the Bond,” in Ramon H. Myers, Michel C. Oksenberg, andDavid Shambaugh, eds., Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administration (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), pp.201-219.
38
Julian Baum, “Silent Running,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 1, 1999, p.28; George Gedda, “China Warns
Against Sales to Taiwan,” Associate Press, October 14, 1999 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp5…ne/19991014/aponline163839_000.htm>.

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Chinese nuclear modernization has continued be slowed down by technological issues.39 The
Chinese leadership’s priority in economic development, coupled with an improved international
security environment since the mid-1980s also contributed to the slow progress. Today, China
has the third largest nuclear arsenals among the P-5 countries with over 400 weapons.40 However,most of the systems currently in deployment are of the 1970s and 1980s vintage and theirvulnerability to disarming first strikes remains an issue for Chinese strategic planners.
Anticipating U.S. missile defense deployment and a new nuclear posture, China has renewed its
efforts to develop and deploy new generations of nuclear missiles.41
U.S. Nuclear Posture Review
In January 2002, the Bush administration released the declassified summary of its
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). According to Chinese analysts, a number of fundamental trends
in post-Cold War U.S. defense posture can be detected. These include Washington’s
reassessment of the new international security environment and major threats facing the UnitedStates and its allies; new strategic guidance for the U.S. nuclear force structure, size, andmissions; and the move away from massive retaliation-based threats to the development ofcredible nuclear capabilities that could be put to use. Within this broad context, the Cold War
nuclear triad of land-based ICBMs, airborne strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic
39

John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Lewis andXue, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1994).
40“Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2003,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59:6 (November/December 2003), pp.77-80.
41
Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts, China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A
Preliminary Assessment (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000); Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark
Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in James C. Mulvenon and
Andrew N.D. Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army as Organization: Reference Volume v.1.0 (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2002); Mark Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the Age of global Missile Defense:
Challenges and Responses,” in Andrew Scobell and Larry m. Wortzel, eds., China’s Growing Military Power:
Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, 2002), pp.107-168; Phillip Saunders and Jing-dong Yuan, “China’s Strategic ForceModernization: Issues and Implications for the United States,” in Michael Barletta, ed., Proliferation Challenges andNonproliferation Opportunities for New Administrations. Occasional Paper No. 4 (Monterey, Calif.: Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, September 2000), pp.40-46.

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missiles (SLBMs) are to be replaced with the new strategic triad of offensive systems (nuclear
and non-nuclear), active and passive defenses, and the defense-industrial infrastructure. This new
U.S. defense posture would thus enable Washington to reserve massive retaliatory capabilities(even after the significant reduction of its strategic nuclear force) against the other major nuclear
powers, to confront and neutralize threats from the so-called “rogue” states through its missile
defense systems, and to deal with any potential opponents effectively by applying precisionguided munitions.42
U.S. nuclear policy is of considerable concern to China. The NPR reveals that it contains
contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against China and six other countries.43 Chinese
strategic analysts focus particularly on what they consider as fundamental shifts in post-Cold
War U.S. strategic posture. One is the nuclear threshold. The elevation of the role of nuclear
weapons is particularly worrisome to Chinese analysts. In the past, nuclear weapons were always
the weapon of last resort, of deterrence against the use of nuclear weapons. However, the new
posture suggests the use of nuclear weapons against hardened, difficult-to-penetrate targets, andas retaliation against WMD use. Perhaps the most serious concern to Beijing is the potential
nuclear use “in the event of surprising military developments,” including a war between China
and Taiwan.44

42

See Zhu Qiangguo, “Meiguo heweishe zhanlue de tiaozhenghetaishi shenyi baogao pingxi [Readjustment of
U.S. Strategy of Nuclear DeterrenceAn Analysis of the Nuclear Posture Review],” Xiandai guoji guanxi[Contemporary International Relations], No.148 (February 2002), pp.28-31; Zhu Qiangguo, “US Seeks Absolute
Military Superiority,” China Daily, March 13, 2002. FBIS-CPP20020313000030 Beijing China Daily (Internet
Version-WWW) in English 13 Mar 02; Zhou Jianguo, “Nuclear Strategy of Bush Administration Moving Gradually
From Deterrence to Actual Combat,” Jiefangjun bao [PLA Daily], March 18, 2002, p.12.
43Paul Richter, “U.S. Works Up Plan for Using Nuclear Arms,” Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2002
<http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/la-000017501mar09.story>; William M. Arkin, “Secret Plan Outlines
the Unthinkable,” Los Angeles Times, March 10, 2002 <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oparkinmar10.story>44
Zhu Feng, “Meiguo zhunbei fadong hegongji [US Prepared to Launch Nuclear Attack]?” Zhongguo ribao
wangzhan, March 11, 2002 <http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/worldrep/2002-03-11/20220.html>; interviews with
Chinese security analysts, March 2002, Beijing and Shanghai.

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Current Chinese discussions of the NPR remain confined to academic analysis. One of
the most clearly articulated views is that China needs to maintain and enhance its deterrence
proficiency in terms of capability, credibility, and survivability. The Chinese government has yet
to articulate its position beyond mere initial reactions. Indeed, one would wonder about theheretofore relatively low-key responses from the official channel, given the fact that China
probably would be the most negatively affected by a change in U.S. policy. This ambivalence
may reflect the dilemma Beijing faces in developing viable counterstrategies, particularly in theinternational diplomatic arena. China would be all alone in opposing the U.S., well aware that it
won’t have any real impact. At the same time, there is the need to assess the overall effect of the
new U.S. strategy on China’s security interests. In this regard, Chinese reactions cannot be seen
as merely responding to the NPR but also reflecting the general trends in U.S. nuclear strategy inthe coming years.
Chinese Nuclear Modernization45
As mentioned above, China’s nuclear modernization over the years since the early 1980s
has been slow and sporadic. The pace and scope of Chinese nuclear modernization in the past
have been affected by technological and economic constraints. While China demonstrated aremarkable feat in achieving a nuclear detonation, an MRBM flight, and a hydrogen bomb
explosion within a short span of three years (1964-1967 – generating great expectations of its
future nuclear weapons developments – the actual experiences suggest that such optimism was
not well founded.46 Economic constraints and political turmoil such as the Cultural Revolution of
1966-1976 may have contributed to slow progress, and a technological bottleneck may have beena key impediment to the development of new-generation ICBMs and miniature nuclear warheads,
45

The following discussion draws on Phillips C. Saunders and Jing-dong Yuan, “China’s Strategic ForceModernization: Three Scenarios and Their Implications for the United States,” unpublished manuscript.
46
John Lewis and Hua Di, “China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals,” International
Security 17 (Autumn 1992).

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prompting the Cox Report charges of Chinese nuclear espionage. While finding the necessary
resources presents few obstacles given China’s growing economic capabilities, technologicaldeficiencies will remain a serious impediment to what China can achieve in its strategic nuclear
force modernization and at how fast a pace.
However, new U.S. nuclear policy and its planned missile defense deployment could
prompt Beijing to re-energize its efforts. Of the various responses China could adopt, one of themost feasible would be to expand the number of current missile forces to avoid a potential
decapitating first strike. A higher number will also give China psychological reassurance as wellas sustain the level of uncertainty that the United States must cope with. This short-term
makeshift measure could be paralleled by accelerated development, testing, and deployment of
the road-mobile DF-31s and DF-31As to enhance survivability of China’s retaliatory capability.
A three-stage, solid-fuel, mobile ICBM mounted on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), the8,000-kilometer DF-31 has been flight-tested several times since 1999.47 The extended range
version of the DF-31, the DF-31A, would have a range of at least 12,000 km. An SLBM
derivative, JL-2, with a range of about 8,000 km, is also under development and will be deployedon the next-generation fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the Type 094.48
The exact number will likely depend on the types of missile defenses that the UnitedStates is going to deploy, the estimated ICBMs surviving a first strike, and the ability of theremaining missiles to penetrate missile defenses with or without penetration aids, such as decoys
and other countermeasures. The July 2003 DoD report put the number at 60 ICBMs, while the47

Norris and Arkin, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2001,” pp. 71-72; Howard Diamond,“Chinese Strategic Plans Move Forward With Missile Test,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 29, No. 5, (July/August1999), p. 27 < http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_07-08/chija99.asp>; and Global Security.org, “DF-31,”
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/df-31.htm.
48Gill et al., “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps.”“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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December 2001 NIE report projected 75-100 by 2015.49 China might also retain older missiles in
its inventory for longer periods instead of retiring them. The same DoD report on Chinese
military power suggests that the DF-5A, Mod-2 will likely be deployed over the next few years.
Chinese responses likely will remain proportionate to the size and types of missile defenses the
U.S. will deploy.
The ways in which China’s responses take place will also be determined by whether itwill seek to enhance the survivability of its limited nuclear forces, thus maintaining theuncertainty principle, or reformulate its nuclear doctrine to adopt a limited deterrence posture orlaunch on warning. The latter would also have significant impact on China’s no-first-use (NFU)
principle and its ability to develop smaller nuclear warheads, raising questions about its
commitment to a nuclear test moratorium. It also raises the issue of its nuclear transparency.50
Missile defenses would make submarines more attractive as a means of increasing missile
survivability and for launching from locations and depressed trajectories where missile defenses
have limited coverage.
The new-generation ICBMs could be armed with countermeasures, such as decoys. Once
deployed, these new capabilities will enable China to achieve real credible minimum deterrence,even under a U.S. missile defense environment. It could deploy MRVs or MIRVs to increase thenumber of warheads that could penetrate U.S. missile defenses. U.S. missile defenses would also
make the deployment of penetration aids essential. However, MIRVing requires smaller nuclear
warheads. Without nuclear tests, the technical hurdles involved in MIRVing could prevent its
introduction in the near term. China has tested multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs), decoys, and

49

U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, July 28,
2003 <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/20030730chinaex.pdf>.
50
Paul H.B. Godwin, “Potential Chinese Responses to US Ballistic Missile Defense,” Report No. 43 (Washington,
DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 2002) <http://www.stimson.org/china/pdf/godwin.pdf>“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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penetration aids, but has not deployed these capabilities on operational missiles.51 While Beijing
may still face significant technological hurdles in adopting these measures, it could also turn to
Russia for technical assistance in developing countermeasures and even develop its own missile
defense systems. China and Russia may also pool their resources together to develop means to
overcome U.S. missile defenses.52
Indeed, technical assistance from Russia could significantly speed up China’s
modernization. There have been unconfirmed reports of Ukrainian missile experts working in
China, and Russia may have shared technical data on its own 4th-generation ICBM (SS-18 andSS-25).53 While such information is difficult to verify, recent developments in Sino-Russian and
Sino-Ukrainian military cooperation are openly reported. From the Russian/Ukrainian
perspective, there is much to gain through such assistance. It could further strengthen the socalled strategic partnership, and it serves to alleviate concerns about what it views as a recent tilt
toward the United States. Economic factors are also important as Russia and Ukraine seek tomaintain the viability of their defense industrial complexes. R&D on future weapons
development could also be funded through greater cooperation with and assistance to China.

AVOIDING NUCLEAR MISUNDERSTANDING
U.S. decisions on ballistic missile defenses and the changing role of nuclear weapons in
its nuclear strategy will directly shape Chinese decisions about force structure. While chances fornuclear confrontation between major powers in the post-Cold War are remote, uncertainties and51

John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals,”International Security, vol.17, no.2, Autumn 1992; James A. Lamson and Wyn Q. Bowen, “‘One Arrow, Three
Stars,’: China’s MIRV Program, Part I,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1997, pp.216-218; and James A. Lamson
and Wyn Q. Bowen, “‘One Arrow, Three Stars,’: China’s MIRV Program, Part II,” ibid., June 1997, pp.266-269.
52“China, Russia could team up on U.S. missile shield: official,” Kyodo, May 11, 2002. FBIS-JPP20000511000045;
Andrey Ivanov, “Sha Threatens United States [sic],” Kommersant (Moscow), May 12, 2000. FBISCEP20000512000106
53
Private correspondence with former Soviet/Russian officials.

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concerns remain and miscalculations cannot be completely ruled out in the Sino-U.S. context,
especially given the contentious issues between them. For one thing, a vastly expanded and muchmodernized Chinese nuclear force can raise questions about the credibility of U.S. nuclear
umbrella to its allies in the region; it can also confirm allegations within the U.S. that China isdriving for regional hegemony. Military conflicts over the Taiwan Strait also exist and a China
with inferior conventional forces has greater incentive to rely on nuclear deterrence. These
factors must be addressed.54
U.S. strategic interests in Asia call for strengthened alliance relationships, forward
military presence, and efforts to prevent WMD proliferation.55 Washington seeks to be a force ofstability and here Beijing may share some of its more immediate goals such as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Resolution of the crisis could forestall a potential
Northeast Asian nuclear chain reaction, with Japan going nuclear as the most serious threat toChinese security interests. While China is concerned with Japan’s growing military role, it also
recognizes the values of continued U.S. engagement in the region as a check on unboundedJapanese re-militarization. It is here that greater consultation not only between Washington and
Beijing but a trilateral process that also involves Tokyo would be very helpful in addressing
issues and concerns ranging from the missions of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the exact role
for the Japanese SDF, and the perimeter and limitation of its new responsibilities. Such efforts
are already underway, albeit at lower governmental level and mostly involve Track-II
activities.56

54

Brad Roberts, China-U.S. Nuclear Relations: What Relationship Best Serves U.S. Interests? Institute for Defense
Analyses and Defense Threat Reduction Agency, August 2001.
55
U.S. Department of Defense, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998.
<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98/index.html>
56
Morton I. Abramowitz, Funabashi Yoichi, and Wang Jisi, China-Japan-US: Managing the Trilateral Relationship(Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998); ‘Trialogue: U.S.-Japan-China Relations and Asian-PacificStability’ (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, September 1998); U.S.-Japan-China Relations: Can“Prospects for East Asian Nuclear Disarmament”

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Although technology and resource constraints have shaped and often limited China’s
strategic modernization efforts, political and strategic factors have played an equally importantrole. Perceived nuclear threats from the United States prompted China’s initial decision todevelop nuclear weapons.57 During the Korean War and the 1954/1958 Taiwan Strait crises, theTrumen and Eisenhower administrations had threatened use of nuclear weapons against China.58
In the 1960s, the Kennedy administration even contemplated preventive strikes to destroy
China’s nascent nuclear programs.59 Concerns in the early 1980s about the potential impact of
the Strategic Defense Initiative prompted Chinese efforts to develop the new strategic weaponssystems that will be deployed in this decade. The United States cannot dictate the size of China’s
nuclear forces, but Washington’s decisions about its own nuclear forces, nuclear doctrine, andpolitical relationship with China will have a large influence on the decisions Chinese leaders
make about the size and composition of China’s future strategic forces. U.S. nuclear decisions
and international actions will also influence the overall health of the global arms control andnonproliferation regime, another factor in Chinese strategic decision-making. The United Statesneeds to recognize this strategic interaction, and take China’s likely reactions into account when
deciding the role that nuclear weapons should play in U.S. security.60
The United States could address China’s concern over its missile defenses by clarifying
the technical parameters of its planned BMD architecture and discussing China’s responses.
Three Part Harmony Be Sustained (Honolulu: CSIS Pacific Forum, September 1998); David M. Lampton and
Gregory C. May, A Big Power Agenda for East Asia: America, China, and Japan (Washington, DC: The Nixon
Center, December 2000).
57
Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb; Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse,
Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol.5, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,1994); Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithacaand London: Cornell University Press, 1993).
58
Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict,
1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
59
William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: The United States and theChinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64,” International Security 25:3 (Winter 2000/01), pp.54-99; Gordon Chang, “JFK,
China, and the Bomb,” Journal of American History 74:4 (March 1988), pp.1289-1310.
60
Roberts, China-U.S. Nuclear Relations.

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Strategic dialogue is important because differing assessments of BMD’s effectiveness mean thatmany Americans will view China’s response as excessive, even if China feels it is being
restrained. The goal should be to minimize damage to bilateral relations through mutual strategic
reassurance.61 The United States might offer assurances about the ultimate scope of its BMD
system; China might offer greater transparency about its modernization plans (possibly including
force structure levels keyed to specific missile defense architectures). Open-ended U.S. plans for
BMD expansion or an explicit effort to nullify China’s nuclear deterrent would have adevastating impact on bilateral relations that would foreclose prospects for future security andarms control cooperation. Addressing Chinese concerns without allowing Beijing to dictate U.S.
policy could help avert misperceptions (and potentially moderate the size of China’s nuclear
build-up). However, any serious strategic dialogue requires a minimum degree of reciprocity.
Greater transparency on China’s part about its views on nuclear deterrence without revealing
details in its planned nuclear force structure could go a long way toward dispelling U.S. andregional concerns.
The two countries must address the issue of nuclear misunderstanding and their long-term
nuclear relationship. Here the determining factors will be whether the two view each other as
strategic foes with irreconcilable differences over fundamental issues, competitors with potential
conflict of interests but with each ascribing differing degree of importance and commitment tosome rather than others, or potential partners on general international and regional security issues.
The history of the bilateral relationship suggests that all three scenarios are possible and indeed
have manifested themselves at one time or another. Obviously, the reality today is a combinationof the latter two descriptions but the first scenario can not be completely ruled out and one that

61

Banning Garrett, “The Need for Strategic Reassurance in the 21st Century,” Arms Control Today 31:2 (March 2001), pp.
9-14 < http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_03/garrett.asp>.

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both countries should try hard to avert and avoid. The successful management of this criticalbilateral relationship would also say a great deal and perhaps contribute to the existing debates ininternational relations theories.
Over the past few years, the process of bilateral security dialogue has been establishedbetween Beijing and Washington. However, that process needs to move beyond being a forum
where the U.S. presents its Chinese interlocutors with long lists of the latter’s WMD proliferation
violation to mutually beneficial and frank exchanges. This “new” dialogue is apparently taking
place since 9/11 and the two countries’ shared interest in defusing the North Korean nuclear
crisis provides a basis to put nuclear threat reduction on the bilateral agenda. A model that could
be followed may be the kind of strategic dialogue that developed over the years between theformer Soviet Union/Russia and the United States. A key element of superpower arms control
negotiations during the Cold War years was the development of communication channels that
could address potential misperceptions and miscalculations that might trigger a nuclear exchange.
A corollary of that process was the formation of what analysts later called an epistemic
community that shared a culture of hard-nosed but professional exchanges on substantive lifeand-death issues in the nuclear age.62 This kind of strategic dialogue is currently lacking between
the United States and China.63 For instance, Chinese officials have repeatedly expressed the viewthat strategic political relationships will have a major impact on how China perceives U.S. BMD
deployments.
Nuclear threat reduction can take a number of forms ranging from confidence building tode-targeting, to reduction of weapons. One form of confidence building can start with a mutuallyagreed pledge for “no-first use” between the two countries. For instance, the two countries have
62 Emanuel Adler, “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolutionof the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,” International Organization 46:1 (Winter 1992), pp.101-145.
63 Banning Garrett, “Facing the China Factor,” Arms Control Today 20:8 (October 2000), pp.14-16<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_10/garrettoct00.asp>.

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also signed the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), a confidence building
measure modeled on U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement.64 De-targeting is another method. In
the late 1990s, Beijing and Washington did negotiate an agreement on nuclear de-targeting but
later events such as the Cox Report on Chinese nuclear espionage, the bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade, and the generally deteriorating atmosphere diminished if not completely
nullified the largely symbolic agreement.65 Arms control is yet a third, and one would argue,
very critical mechanism in managing the U.S.-China nuclear dynamic.
Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin defined arms control as to “include all the formsof military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood ofwar, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared
for it.”66 According to Jeffrey Larsen,
Arms control can be defined as any agreement among states to regulate some
aspects of their military capability or potential. The agreement may apply to thelocation, amount, readiness, and types of military forces, weapons, and facilities.
Whatever their scope and terms, however, all plans for arms control have one
common factor: they presuppose some form of cooperation or joint action among
the participants regarding their military programs.67
Contemporary arms control practices evolved from the U.S.-Soviet negotiations during
the Cold War in their efforts to manage arms competition.68 In the broader European context,

64

Julian Schofield, “The Prospects for Sino-American Incidents at Sea Agreement,” The Korean Journal of Defense
Analysis XI:1 (Summer 1999), pp.87-100.
65
Steven Erlanger, “U.S. Seeks Pact with China on Targeting Missiles,” The New York Times, July 14, 1998;
Howard Diamond, “Sino-U.S. Summit Yields Modest Advances in Arms Control Agenda,” Arms Control Today(June/July 1998), p.23.
66
Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: A Pergamon-Brassey’s
Classic, 1985), p.2.
67
Jeffrey A. Larsen, “An Introduction to Arms Control,” in Larsen, Arms Control, p.1.
68
Michael O. Wheeler, “A History of Arms Control,” in Larsen, Arms Control, pp.19-39; Forrest E. Waller, Jr.,
“Strategic Nuclear Arms Control,” ibid., pp.99-117.

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arms control mechanisms initially could be more accurately described as confidence building
measures. Indeed, some even suggest that conflict avoidance measures (CAMs) may be the more
appropriate term. Initial steps can be modest in that they meet “the minimal requirements of not
worsening any state’s security and not increasing existing levels of hostility.” The objectives are toprevent crises from occurring, facilitating disengagement, and based on a building block approach,with modest aims first.69 Both China and the United States could benefit from starting such a
process.

CONCLUSION
Chinese analysts point out that the new Chinese leadership faces serious challenges in the
coming years. These include unprecedented U.S. global dominance and its impact on China’s
security interests re Taiwan; economic adjustments and dislocation after WTO entry; China’s
security concerns in Northeast Asia, including the Korean nuclear issue and the rise of a normal
Japan; and Taiwan independence. Handling these challenges requires that China maintain astable working relationship with the U.S. to advance China’s interests. Certainly Beijing should
not seek confrontation with Washington. Challenging U.S. unipolarity only reinforces “China
threats” advocates in the U.S. government.70 China’s responses to U.S. dominance remain lowkey, and focus on key areas of fundamental security interests such as Taiwan. At the same time,
Beijing is seeking opportunity to expand the cooperative aspects in its relations with the U.S. to

69

Michael Krepon, “The Decade for Confidence-building Measures,” in Michael Krepon et al., eds., A Handbook ofConfidence-Building Measures for Regional Security (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, September
1993), pp.3-5.
70
Shi Yinhong, “Zhongguo de waibu kunnan he xinlingdao jiti miandui de tiaozhan [China’s External Difficulties
and Challenges Faced by the New Leadership],” Zhanlue yu guanli [Strategy and Management], No.3 (May 2003),
pp.34-39.

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advance its short- to medium-term interests – continued economic development andstrengthening of comprehensive national power.71
Hence the primary goals of Chinese foreign policy should continue to be sustaining
benign international environment for development and strengthen China’s power; unipolarity
will remain a fact of life in international politics for some time to come. China should oppose
hegemony but at the same time avoid direct confrontation with the U.S.; unilateralism andpreemption, while deplorable, are not directly targeted at China and therefore confronting
unipolar hegemonism should not be China’s strategic priority. China’s security interests are
better served by seeking and developing strategic dialogue with the U.S. to reduce mistrust andbetter address China’s security concerns.72 Beijing’s efforts in cooperating with Washington on
the North Korean nuclear and anti-terrorism issues, and its participation in the U.S. Container
Security Initiative are guided by such recognition.73
At the same time, the U.S. is focused on global terrorism and WMD proliferation. The
new U.S. national security strategy emphasizes the importance of major power cooperation.
However, as much as both countries seek to maintain a stable bilateral relationship, there remain
issues that could drag them into conflicts. Due to the asymmetry in both nuclear andconventional capabilities, miscalculations and incentives for nuclear use exist. Beijing andWashington need not repeat the Cold War U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race that resulted in huge
nuclear arsenals on both sides that threatened the entire human kind. Indeed, their efforts toavoid future nuclear confrontation would make significant contribution to global and regional

71

Denny Roy, “China’s Reaction to American Predominance,” Survival 45:3 (Autumn 2003), pp.57-78.
Zheng Yu, “Shijichu zhongguo waijiao shouyao mubiao [The Key Objectives of China’s Diplomay at the Turn of
the Century],” Renminwang [People’s Daily Online], September 5, 2003
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper68/10097/925403.html>
73“Bonner Says China Will Help with Container Security,” Washington File, U.S. State Department, August 5,
2003.
72

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peace and stability. Managing their differences over the U.S.-Japan alliance, missile defenses,
and the cross-Strait relations would be the test to start with.

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