FEATURE

Japan and the Nuclear Challenge in a
New Era of Rising Tensions
Balancing Between Disarmament and Deterrence
SAYURI ROMEI

F

ollowing the rapid succession of diplomatic developments between North
Korea, South Korea, and the United States, Japan’s security position has
become more delicate. Former Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera stated in
May 2018 that Japan is facing its toughest security environment since World War
II and pledged to resolutely protect the nation’s territory. At the same time, China’s
aggressive posture in the East and South China Seas and its rapidly expanding
military budget pose constant concerns for Japan. Along with challenges, however,opportunities have also emerged for rethinking Japan’s nuclear security policy inthis new era of post–Cold War uncertainty. In the wake of the Nuclear Weapon
Ban Treaty (NWBT), passed in July 2017, nuclear disarmament movements havestarted to grow remarkably and are pressuring the Japanese government to join thetreaty. Japan’s status as a nuclear umbrella state highlights once again the country’s
postwar security dilemma between maintaining nuclear deterrence in the shortterm and seeking nuclear disarmament in the long run.
This article will first examine how Japanese officials and experts have perceived
the US security guarantee to their country and the nuclear component of extended deterrence. Subsequently, it will discuss the obstacles that Japan faces tobalance the two goals of its nuclear policy. Lastly, it will study how Japan cancontribute to the creation of a more favorable regional environment for nuclear
disarmament and ensure that the disarmament side of the country’s policy does
not remain neglected.
These challenges and opportunities, combined with the revision in December
2018 of Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines, constitute a crucial time tothink of some steps Japan can take today and in the upcoming years to strike abetter balance between deterrence and disarmament.

Background
When I told a former high-­ranking Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
official that I wanted to understand how Japan balances its deterrence needs
with its disarmament goals, he responded that there was nothing to understand,66   JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS FALL 2019

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investigate, or discuss about it, as Japan is “simply stuck pursuing both aspectsof its nuclear policy in the same way. End of story.”1 Albeit disappointing at
first, his response highlights one of the core dilemmas encompassed in Japan’s
nuclear policy and urges us to question the way the country has been dealing
with both of these goals. Is Japan indeed pursuing disarmament and deterrencein the same way?
Disentangling Japan’s nuclear policy is no easy task. The Four Pillars of Nuclear
Policy (Kaku Yon Seisaku), introduced by former Prime Minister Eisaku Satō in
January 1968 as a wider framework for the Three Non-­Nuclear Principles (Hikaku
San Gensoku), perfectly reflects the various discrepancies embedded in Japanese
nuclear policy. As the only country that has experienced nuclear attacks on its
own soil, Japan officially positions itself as a nuclear victim (hibakukoku) and considers the Three Non-­Nuclear Principles as the cornerstone of its nonnuclear
policy (the first pillar). Japan’s nuclear kokuze (national policy) assigns exclusively
peaceful purposes to the country’s atomic energy program (the second pillar), but
the political rhetoric on the nuclear option and the government’s past nuclear
studies always introduce doubts regarding Japan’s commitment to this kokuze.
Moreover, Japan’s role in promoting disarmament (the third pillar) is sometimes
seen by neighboring countries and domestic peace activists as hypocritical, as thecountry also heavily relies on the extended nuclear deterrence (END) provided by
the United States (the fourth pillar).
This article focuses on the dilemma that the last two pillars pose between
maintaining the credibility of US extended deterrence while taking concrete
steps toward nuclear disarmament. The first section will examine how Japanese
government officials have perceived the US extended deterrence, and in particular its nuclear component. The subsequent section will tackle the rise and fall of
the global nuclear disarmament movement around 2009 and the deterrence vs.
disarmament dichotomy in Japanese thinking. The final section will attempt toprovide recommendations on how Japan could regain the lost momentum while
maintaining a strong security alliance with the United States.

Japan’s Perception of US Extended Deterrence and
Its Nuclear Component
The role of the postwar US security guarantee to Japan, and in particular its
nuclear component, has sometimes been compared to a lid that prevents the return of a militarist Japan—and Tokyo’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities of its
own. For the United States, the main objective of the postwar US-­Japan alliance
was a double containment: on the one hand, against the communist bloc, and on
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Romeithe other hand, against the return of a militarist Japan.2 This would in fact be thecore meaning of the Security Treaty signed by the United States and Japan on 8
September 1951: by sealing a formal agreement, the United States sought to simultaneously defend themselves against a communist encroachment as well as
controlling any straying in the future path of Japan.3
Because of the constant US engagement in the postwar era, Japan’s Cold War
foreign and security policies remained limited and reliant on the United States,
allowing the emergence of Japan’s pacifist identity in the aftermath of World War
II.4 Edwin O. Reischauer, one of the most renowned Western scholars of Japanand former US ambassador to Tokyo (1961–1966), stated in the late 1980s that
“today no people surpass the Japanese in their devotion to pacifism. It is theirgreat ideal, supported by both their emotions and their intellects.”5 While not so
confident about it in his early postwar work, Reischauer seemed to have come tosuch a conclusion after seeing Japan’s foreign and security policies so immobile for
decades during the Cold War.6
Throughout the Cold War and the post–Cold War era, the Japanese government has indeed been careful to reflect the general public’s widespread pacifist
sentiment developed after the war and to maintain the country’s official status ashibakukoku. However, that also meant that the Japanese government had to ensure
the security needs of the country, i.e., testing the credibility of the US commitment to extend deterrence to Japan. Indeed, the statements suggesting a possible
nuclear option for Japan appear to be linked to the Japanese government’s need toperiodically survey the degree of the US commitment.
According to a 1971 airgram from the US embassy in Tokyo to the Departmentof State, for instance, Shintarō Ishihara, then a promising young Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politician, claimed “a Japanese nuclear system was necessary inorder to trigger the American deterrent in case Japan was attacked or seriously
threatened because the American nuclear umbrella, as presently constituted, wasnot, for Japan, a reliable deterrent.”7 Interestingly, the US embassy comments in theairgram that Ishihara has little political influence in his own party, and he is literally the only one who publicly advocates nuclear weapons for Japan. However, themissive continued, by stating it is possible that “Ishihara’s popularity as a culture
hero will enable him to convince his large following among Japanese youth thatJapan should go nuclear. Should he be able to do so, others competing politiciansmight also find it politically profitable to advocate such a program or, failing that,to argue against closing Japan’s options by ratifying the Non-­Proliferation Treaty(NPT). . . . Ishihara’s doubts about US credibility are another matter. They are
considerably more widely held, even though few Japanese would articulate them as
frankly as Ishihara did.”8 Many of these political comments questioning the US
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security commitment and simultaneously alluding to Japan’s nuclearization, in fact,
are aimed at the United States and have been a subtle way to request stronger extended deterrence guarantees at a specific point in time. A more recent example
came in the wake of the 2006 North Korean nuclear test. Even after Secretary ofState Condoleezza Rice had visited Tokyo and publicly reassured Japan of the solidity of the END to Japan in October 2006, more Japanese politicians felt theneed to test the US commitment. Shōichi Nakagawa, for instance, at the timepolicy chief of the LDP, stated in November 2006 that Japan should at least discuss
the nuclear option because North Korean nuclear-­tipped missiles could reach Japan before the United States could help their ally.9 Foreign Minister Tarō Asō also
sparked a controversy10 as he offered his support to Nakagawa’s statements andcalled for a more open debate on the nuclear option because of the threatening
environment.11 These statements are a sign that, despite coming to the conclusionthat the only possible security option at the moment is strengthening the alliancewith the United States, Japan could not fully and completely rely on its ally forprotection. This lingering and underlying mistrust toward the American security
guarantee, fomented since the late 1980s by the bitter feelings of Japan bashingthen Japan passing,12 is a leitmotiv in the US–Japan security alliance that can befound in more recent years as well. When Prime Minister Shinzō Abe and Adm
Harry Harris, then commander of the US Pacific Command, met in Tokyo after
North Korea’s nuclear test in January 2016 and a ballistic missile launch in February, Abe stated, “The missile launch by North Korea was not only a direct threat toJapan but also a challenge to the United States.”13 Political scientist Shōgo Imoto
writes that “it is clearly an exaggeration to state that Mr. Abe is thinking of nuclear
weapons for Japan. However, I interpret [Mr. Abe’s quote] as the following: “If theUnited States abandons Japan now and runs away from the North Korean threat,
Japan will seriously consider a shift in its policy and acquire nuclear weapons.
United States, I would like you to be fully aware of this as you tackle the North
Korean issue.”14 The classic debate on the Japanese nuclear option and the relatively
recent awareness for a public nuclear discussion by Japanese politicians15 have,therefore, a twofold purpose. The most obvious one is deterring Japan’s regional
rivals and sending them the message that should a crisis occur, Japan’s nuclear latency can be turned into nuclear weapons very quickly. The second purpose is toconstantly gauge the level of security commitment from the United States. Japan’s
historical fear of abandonment is now complemented by a fear of a new potential“Japan passing” moment with the Trump administration. The idea that the UnitedStates will downgrade the security alliance with Japan in favor of other priorities iscurrently very alive. Journalist Takao Toshikawa even used the phrase Japan dissing
to describe this rough patch with the United States.16 A 2015 survey by the Pew
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RomeiResearch Center shows that when asked “if your country and China got into a
serious military conflict, do you think the US would defend your country militarily?” 60 percent of the Japanese respondents answered “yes.” While it might seem
like a significant number, the participants from South Korea and the Philippines
responded, respectively, 73 percent and 66 percent.17
This Japanese modus operandi of regularly requesting US reassurance about its
extended deterrence is especially interesting if we examine its nuclear component.
Since the horrors of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, then the Lucky Dragon #5 incident in
1954,18 there has been a sharp divide between the nuclear abolitionists, who reject
all nuclear weapons, and the realists, whose main concern is to respond to Japan’s
security needs, for example, maintaining a strong and credible US deterrent tocounter threats from China, North Korea, and Russia. The realist view, which sees
extended deterrence as a necessity, has dominated in the LDP-­run governments,
and the issue of “no first use” (NFU)19 has become fundamental for them. In
1994, Shunji Yanai, a senior government official, expressed his fears that the US–
North Korea Agreed Framework would undermine nuclear deterrence against
any type of attack from North Korea.20 When US Amb. Robert Gallucci proposedthat Washington drop all threats of first use once North Korea complied with the
NPT, Yanai strongly opposed the idea because it would “punch a hole in theAmerican nuclear umbrella.”21
In 2003, prior to the first Six-­Party Talks, the director-­general of the MOFA’s
Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Mitoji Yabunaka, asked Assistant Secretaryof State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly “to make sure the UnitedStates does not again [as in 1994] promise not to use its nuclear weapons against
North Korea if Pyongyang agrees to dismantle its nuclear development program.”22
Implicitly referring to China’s unverifiable and unenforceable declaratory NFU
policy, former Prime Minister Tarō Asō also commented, “Even if a nuclear powersays it won’t make a preemptive strike, there’s no way to verify its intentions. I
wonder if that’s a realistic way to ensure Japan’s safety.”23
This security-­centered approach, prevailing in the conservative LDP governments, persisted even in 2009, a few months before the elections brought to power
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) for the first time. Masakatsu Ōta of Kyodo
News revealed in November 2009 that Japanese diplomats conducted aggressive
lobbying activities on the US congressional nuclear task force and asserted thatthey believed the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N) was an
essential element to maintain the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella against
China and North Korea.24
The tune changed dramatically when the newly elected progressive government led by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama attempted to reverse the Japanese
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narrative on the retirement of the TLAM/N. In a December 2009 letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, then Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada suggested
opening discussions for the adoption of a US NFU, which, in his view, would
move Japan one step closer to its goal of promoting a nuclear-­free world.25 Thiseffort, however, was short-­lived. As the DPJ was defeated in 2012, Shinzō Abe’s
government again showed a realist approach, speaking against the possibility ofan NFU policy for the US.
After Pres. Barack Obama’s historical visit to Hiroshima on 27 May 2016, his
administration attempted to include the NFU policy into the US nuclear declaratory policy. However, the main reason why the adoption of such policy became difficult to implement was, again, Japan’s concerns. The Japanese government’s belief was that adopting an NFU policy would weaken the perception ofAmerican commitment to Japan’s defense.26
This pattern clearly shows that the NFU policy is a key issue in Japan’s strategic
thinking and stems from the deep mistrust that the Japanese government feels
toward China’s 1964 declaratory NFU policy. However, even with an untrustworthy China, Japan’s firm opposition to the adoption of an NFU policy by the
US seems outdated at a time when Japan is gradually making efforts to strengthen
its defense posture and become a more proactive player.
Japan’s official goal of promoting disarmament or being the mediator (hashiwatashi) between nuclear states and nonnuclear ones is being chipped away at by
the importance Japan still assigns to the nuclear component of the US deterrent,
thus trapping Japan in a permanent dilemma between vanishing long-­term disarmament goals and the fear of abandonment stemming from short-­term security
needs.

The Lost Momentum and the Security vs. Disarmament Dichotomy
In September 2001, historian and author of an official Nobel Peace Prize history
Oivind Stenersen told reporters that former Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Satōwas the Committee’s “biggest mistake.” The Three Non-­Nuclear Principles policy
had earned Eisaku Satō the Nobel Peace Prize on 11 December 1974, exactly
seven years after his declaration of the country’s nonnuclear policy. According to
the Committee at the time, Satō represented the will for peace of the Japanesepeople, and his work was to be considered a great step toward nuclear disarmamentand peace.27 The prize was also awarded to him for his efforts in signing the NPT
in 1970 and for establishing Japan’s official nonnuclear policy. Stenersen criticized
the Committee’s choice, noting that awarding the prize to Satō was, in fact, notreceived warmly in Japan, either by the public or by the left-­wing parties.28 His
opponents questioned how a strong supporter of US military actions in Asia and
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Romeiof the US nuclear deterrent was deserving of such an honor.29 The book states,“Some reacted with disbelief, others with laughter and anger,” adding that Japanesewomen’s organizations also contested the prize to Satō because he had supported
the United States in the Vietnam War.30
The dilemma between pacifism and security is in fact also translated into thecatch-22 that still finds the Japanese government constantly juggling between
disarmament and deterrence. Former Hiroshima mayor Takashi Hiraoka’s frustrated comment that “people from other countries point out that Japan preaches
to others about abolishing nuclear weapons while, at the same time, it relies on US
nuclear arms for its own security. . . . When I tell them that the citizens of Japanare doing their utmost for peace, they aren’t convinced and dismiss this as double-­talk” expresses the powerlessness felt by many disarmament activists in Japan.31
The government, in fact, has created a conceptual division that does not see deterrence and disarmament as conflicting.
As shown earlier in this article, government officials and policy experts seethem as two different and coexisting components of the country’s nuclear policy.
Disarmament and deterrence are thus seen as both equally indispensable for Japan, and not at all inconsistent.32 In May 2018 at a conference in Washington,
DC, Amb. Kazutoshi Aikawa, deputy chief of mission at the Japanese embassy to
the United States, statedpursuing the goal of disarmament cannot and should not be conductedwithout taking into account the security considerations and implications.
In the same vein, maintaining a robust and credible extended deterrence
and pursuing the disarmament goal are not contradictory. . . . As Japan, anon-­nuclear state under the NPT, faces such serious security challenges
and threats . . . its disarmament policy cannot and should not be pursued
without giving due consideration to its security concerns. To ensure its
security against such regional security concerns, the extended deterrence isimperative for Japan. That, however, does not mean in any way that Japanis just reactive or takes the security situations as given. On the contrary,
Japan proactively pursues its diplomatic undertakings to improve the security situation regionally and globally, in joint efforts toward creating thecondition to build a world without nuclear weapons.33

This conceptual distinction echoes with Anthony DiFilippo’s description ofJapan’s approach as “selective disarmament” that makes neighboring states callJapan out on its perceived hypocrisy or even wonder what Japan’s real intentions
are. Japan has always remained silent whenever the United States conducted nuclear experiments,34 with the exception of the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
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who wrote letters of protest to the US president.35 As Hiroshima governor Hidehiko Yuzaki (LDP) stated in 2016,
There is definitely a gap in perception between Hiroshima and the rest ofJapan on nuclear-­weapon issues. Living in Hiroshima makes it feel likeeveryone in Japan is naturally thinking about nuclear issues, but when I
get out of my city, I have to readjust to the general national lack of awareness of these important issues. This is also evident in the way the media
reports about the annual Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony, for example: Hiroshima is the only city that shows the entire ceremony on TV,
while the NHK in Tokyo only dedicates twenty minutes to it. In otherparts of Japan they don’t even talk about it!36

Additionally, even within Hiroshima, there are clashing positions regarding thequestion of disarmament. In fact, while Governor Yuzaki agrees with the ruling
LDP’s line that disarmament should follow a step-­by-­step cooperation process,others, including former mayor Hiraoka, believe the government should take abolder stance and start declaring immediately that it will be striving toward thecomplete abolition of all nuclear weapons and propose a specific timeline for thisgoal.37
President Obama’s 5 April 2009 speech in Prague represented an important
symbolical moment for disarmament movements around the world. His speech
was very well-­received globally and in Japan and launched an international momentum by giving visibility and hope to existing disarmament movements such
as Global Zero.38 Nagasaki mayor Tomihisa Taue took the opportunity to publicly
emphasize the importance of the message spread by the hibakusha (atomic bomb
survivors). Taue stated, “The hopes of these citizens have been raised by the wordsof United States President Barack Obama, who proclaimed in Prague this April
that the United States will take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear
weapons.”39 Similarly, Hiroshima mayor Tadatoshi Akiba coined a new term, the“Obamajority,” to refer to the increasing number of nuclear abolitionists aroundthe world, explaining that President Obama “is the one who has given all of us
new energy and hope that we can and must abolish all nuclear weapons from thesurface of this earth.”40
On the other hand, Tokyo remained cautious and very conservative in its
security-­centered posture. A 3 September 2009 secret cable sent to Secretary Clinton indicated that the LDP government, right before losing the election later thatmonth, was effectively discouraging President Obama from visiting Hiroshima in
November, where he might have reiterated his message in favor of a nuclear-­free
world.41 As shown earlier, the global disarmament momentum launched by the
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RomeiPrague speech coincided in Japan with the brief shift in the government in 2009–2012, which strived to increase transparency and attempted to emphasize the goalof disarmament within the kokuze.
With North Korea resuming its missile tests coinciding again with the LDP
regaining power, Japan has predictably shifted its emphasis back to security needs,
and disarmament seems to have taken many steps backward. The “step-­by-­step”
approach to disarmament that the current Japanese government has been promoting, in fact, espouses this shift and prioritizes deterrence in the short term
while maintaining a long-­term vision for disarmament. An example of the challenge that this stance poses is Japan’s 25 October 2016 vote at the United Nations
Assembly General against the initiative to launch negotiations on a nuclear weapons ban. Japan, along with four of the nuclear states (United States, Great Britain,
France, and Russia), decided to vote against the proposed resolution because thegovernment would prefer a step-­by-­step approach to nuclear disarmament, whichsome have called not only disappointing, but also hypocritical. Tokyo’s move wascriticized as it only reflects the government’s reliance on US END, while stripping the country of moral credibility in its disarmament efforts.42 At the press
conference held three days after the vote, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, whois originally from Hiroshima and has always highlighted this personal detail in his
political career, stated, “Japan’s actions and position have been consistent throughout. Our position is to emphasize cooperation between nuclear-­weapon states
and non-­nuclear-­weapon states.”43 Again, the issue of the NWBT, adopted in July
2017, has created a divide between the government and the public opinion andespecially peace activists in Japan. The vocal Japanese branch of the Nobel Peace
Prize laureate International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has
been leading a pressure campaign against the Japanese government to join the
NWBT as soon as possible, because Japan’s reputation as an atomic victim is atstake.44 The disarmament vs. deterrence issue has also divided Japanese scholars
and experts into two categories, those who study disarmament (gunshuku) andthose who study deterrence (yokushi). As Takushoku University professor Heigo
Satō comments, “there are two academic communities dealing with nuclear issues
in Japan: the ‘disarmament’ camp, and the ‘deterrence’ one, and they do not talk toeach other.” The two communities have their own events and conferences andhave not attempted to find a common platform to discuss the two issues together.45 Furthermore, the two MOFA bureaus who work on the issues, the North
American Affairs Bureau and the Disarmament, Non-­Proliferation, and Science
Department, neither interact nor feel the need to consult each other.46
Another setback for the recent disarmament movement is the discrepancy between the “Three Disarmament Reductions” (the three Rs) proposed by former
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Foreign Minister Kishida in 2014, and the way MOFA reacted to the Trumpadministration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in 2018. The three Rs suggest thatto accomplish the goal of disarmament, there should be
1. a reduction of the number of nuclear weapons;
2. the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons; and3. the reduction of the incentive for possession of nuclear weapons.47

US Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Juan Torres

Figure 1. Trump visits Yokota Air Base, Japan. Pres. Donald J. Trump greets Lt Gen Jerry P.
Martinez, US Forces Japan and 5th Air Force commander, during a Troop Talk, 5 November
2017, at Yokota Air Base, Japan. During his talk, Trump highlighted the importance of the
US–Japan alliance in the Indo-­Pacific region.

Current Foreign Minister Tarō Kōno, however, released an immediate statement
the morning after the Trump administration’s NPR was issued on 2 February 2018,
stating, “Japan highly appreciates the latest NPR which clearly articulates the US
resolve to ensure the effectiveness of its deterrence and its commitment to providing extended deterrence to its allies including Japan. . . . Japan will strengthen thedeterrence of the Japan-­US Alliance by closely consulting on the extended deterrence, including nuclear deterrence, through the Japan-­US Extended Deterrence
Dialogue and other consultations.” The statement ends with “Japan, as a leadingstate towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, will continue to closelycooperate with the US to promote realistic and tangible nuclear disarmament,
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Romeiwhile appropriately addressing the actual security threats.”48 ICAN vice-­chair
Akira Kawasaki pointed out the “worrying discrepancy” between the second pointof the Three Rs and the fact that the Trump NPR has virtually given a greater roleto nuclear weapons.49 Kawasaki also expressed concern that the government’s continuous mixed signals are a sign that Japan’s step-­by-­step process is in fact a one
step forward, two step backward approach with regards to disarmament.50
This persisting conceptual distinction, therefore, created by the Japanese government to be able to pursue the two goals simultaneously, has had the effect ofmaintaining both a strong pacifist national identity and a solid alliance with theUnited States. The 2013 and the latest 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines state, “In dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, US extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential: Japan will closely cooperatewith the United States to maintain and enhance its credibility. To deal with thethreat, Japan will also increase its own efforts including comprehensive air andmissile defense as well as civil protection. At the same time, toward the long-­term
goal of bringing about a world free of nuclear weapons, Japan will play an active
and positive role in nuclear disarmament and non-­proliferation.”51 (emphasis
added)
Indeed, as the most-­recent developments with North Korea have shown, deterrence is certainly still an essential tool. Extended deterrence dialogues between
the United States and Japan are crucial to maintain a credible deterrence mechanism understood by both allies and keep the dialogue open between them. However, as Japan is making efforts to undertake a more proactive role in defense
matters, Tokyo also needs to take on greater responsibility to promote nuclear
disarmament. Thus, Japan’s dualistic approach seems inevitable, yet how can Japanese nuclear kokuze maintain a better balance between the two goals?

How to Ensure That the Goal of Disarmament
Does Not Remain Neglected?
Commenting on the role of mediator (hashiwatashi) that Japan aspires to play,
Prof. Tatsujirō Suzuki of Nagasaki University said, “Being a bridge-­builder does
not mean that Japan just takes the middle ground between nuclear weapons states
and non-­nuclear weapons states.”52 Clarifying the meaning of the phrase hashiwatashi has been challenging. While the MOFA had used the expression “leader
for non-­proliferation and disarmament” to describe Japan’s aspired role since the1990s, in 2016 the MOFA changed it to “mediator.” This new role may imply amore concrete and realistic perspective, which resonates not only with Japan’sheightened regional threat perception but also with the deepening gap between
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nuclear and nonnuclear states. However, the repeated emphasis solely on security
has had the effect of pushing the goal of disarmament further in the backgroundand driving a wedge between the government and the public.
Frictions rose in January 2018 when the MOFA declined the requests fromICAN to schedule a meeting between Prime Minister Abe and ICAN executive
director Beatrice Fihn, who visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the first time.53
Atomic bomb survivor and well-­known antinuclear activist Setsuko Thurlow was
also denied a meeting with the prime minister in December 2018. Thurlow later
stated that she was disappointed that Abe was not able to meet her, and submitted
a letter addressed to the prime minister, in which she wrote that she felt “betrayed
as an atomic bomb survivor. . . . I request that Japan break from its dependence on
the nuclear deterrent and deepen true conversation and consultation, not as a fakemediator, with atomic bomb survivors and civil society organizations.”54
These missed opportunities for dialogue are indeed problematic. The government conveys its lack of confidence by showing that its only priority and concern
is maintaining the US deterrent. Whether the reason why the prime minister
declined these requests is scheduling conflicts or avoiding dialogue with antinuclear activists, the message that the domestic and international publics see is that
the Japanese government is eclipsing the country’s identity as an A-­bomb survivor. The hibakukoku status of Japan has played a major role in the country’s postwar
identity. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which in Japanese are written
in katakana as opposed to the kanji that simply indicate the cities, have been usedby politicians as a symbol of Japanese uniqueness over the decades. “The only
country that has been subjected to atomic bombing” (“唯一の被爆国”—yuiitsu
no hibakukoku) is a very common phrase that many politicians have used in publicstatements. The phrase started being commonly used in the 1970s, after Japaneseprime ministers began attending the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony. The
first prime minister to attend the ceremony on 6 August 1971 was Eisaku Satō,who had declared the Three Non-­Nuclear Principles four years prior. Since thatyear, in fact, the phrase has become popular in most Peace Memorial Speeches
every year in August, and every prime minister since at least 1998 has included
the phrase in his Peace Memorial Speech.
Therefore, one way the Japanese government could ensure that the proclaimed
goal of disarmament is not neglected is to engage in public opportunities for dialogue with the hibakusha community and open a more transparent conversation
about ways Japan can serve as mediator in NWBT discussions. In the official
statement on the Nobel Peace Prize to ICAN, the MOFA’s foreign press secretarydeclared, “Although ICAN’s activities to date are different from the Japanese government’s approach, we share the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.”55 If the
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Romeigovernment acknowledges this shared goal, then mitigating the gap with the antinuclear community through an increased mutual engagement would be beneficial to maintain an open dialogue on security and disarmament.
Another important element the Japanese government needs to discuss further
is the nuclear component of the extended deterrent. As examined earlier, Japanese
officials have often emphasized their opposition to a potential US NFU policy
and their insistence on nuclear capabilities. As former Deputy Assistant Secretaryof Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy Elaine Bunn suggests, “I’d say
to the Japanese, don’t hang your hat on a specific capability; don’t put too muchemphasis on any one weapon or platform.”56 Although Japan has been under theAmerican security umbrella since the outset of the Cold War, it was only in 2010that the two allies, through the Extended Deterrence Dialogue, started an official
dialogue specifically on deterrence. Because this dialogue is still relatively new andofficials and experts in Tokyo have long been reticent to talk about nuclear deterrence issues, thoughts on the details of deterrence mechanisms need to be worked
out in a more pragmatic manner.57 How effective is the current END to Japan incontaining or countering threats from North Korea, China, or Russia? How would
the United States realistically use nuclear weapons in contingencies involving the
Senkaku Islands, or other critical areas?58 Posing specific questions would also
encourage Japanese government officials to organize and engage in more domestic and multilateral tabletop exercises, which are currently lacking.59 These simulations would help update and reevaluate the actual role of nuclear weapons in both
American and Japanese thinking, thus bringing the two sides of the same coin,
deterrence and disarmament, closer together.
Lastly, strengthening confidence-­building measures and trust in the region is anecessary aspect that would also help Tokyo strike a better balance between thetwo sides of Japan’s nuclear policy. Japanese officials mostly feel that their country
is impotent in promoting disarmament, because it does not possess nuclear weapons.60 However, Japan’s history as a hibakukoku is a very powerful tool in building
trust, especially in the Indo-­Pacific region, and not only through an annual speechat the United Nations. Easing tensions and reestablishing constructive relations
with South Korea is imperative for Japan and for the region’s stability, as well as
finally reopening an official dialogue with North Korea.

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DOD photo by Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Dominique A. Pineiro

Figure 2. Multilateral meeting. Commander US Forces Korea, Gen Vincent K. Brooks; US
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Joseph F. Dunford Jr.; Japan Self-­Defense Force
Chief of Staff, Adm Katsutoshi Kawano; Republic of Korea (ROK) Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Gen Jeong Kyeong-­doo; Commander, US Pacific Command (USPACOM),
Adm Harry Harris; and Commander US Forces Japan, Lt Gen Jerry P. Martinez gather for atrilateral meeting at USPACOM headquarters. The 30 October 2017 session was the fifth
between the senior most US, ROK, and Japanese military officers since July 2014. The leaders discussed multilateral and bilateral initiatives designed to improve interoperability
and readiness as well as North Korea’s long-­range ballistic missile and nuclear tests andagreed to firmly respond to the acts in full coordination with each other. Dunford reaffirmed the ironclad commitment of the United States to defend the ROK and Japan andprovide extended deterrence guaranteed by the full spectrum of US military capabilities.

Conclusion
Masakatsu Ōta has an expression for the dance the Japanese government has
been performing under the US nuclear umbrella by finding a continuity between
the past, the present, and the future of the “US-­Japan nuclear alliance”—the“Nuclear Kabuki Play.” He argues that this play has two distinct audiences: theUnited States and the antinuclear domestic public. This separation, according to
the journalist, conveniently enables the Japanese government to simultaneously
address the issue of national security on the one hand and appease the antinuclear
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Romeisentiment of the public on the other hand.61 However, since the momentum infavor of disarmament started 10 years ago, this Nuclear Kabuki Play has been
performing for only one audience; thus, neglecting the domestic audience. The
usual speeches on disarmament with which the Japanese government has tried toappease the domestic public once or twice a year do not seem to be enough anymore, and the NWBT issue has exacerbated the tensions between the government and the public. Contrary to what the anonymous former MOFA official
mentioned earlier in this article suggested, deterrence and disarmament are notbeing pursued in the same way.
Echoing former Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera’s assessment, in August
2018 Prime Minister Abe stated that “the security environment of Japan is becoming more severe and increasingly uncertain.”62 A more challenging environment is certainly a valid reason to strengthen responses to security needs, but it isalso a great opportunity to initiate efforts to ease tensions in the region, open a
dialogue with the domestic public, and rethink deterrence mechanisms for specific scenarios in cooperation with the United States.
Becoming more proactive in global disarmament does not mean compromising
the US–Japan alliance or the security umbrella. With Japan becoming increasingly ready to take on a more “normal” role in the alliance and on the global scene,
Japan’s confidence in promoting disarmament will also need to grow at the samepace. JIPA

Notes
1. Author’s interview with former MOFA official who prefers to stay anonymous, 4 December 2018.
2. Timothy Temerson, Double Containment and the Origins of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance (Cambridge, MA: MIT-­
Japan Program, 1991), 91–94, https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/17094. Temerson attributes the phrase “double containment” to then–Secretary ofState Dean Acheson.
3. Ibid. Richard Samuels also points out three scenarios that the United States feared at thetime: firstly, the possibility of Japan’s rapid remilitarization, which could eventually escalate intoa revanchist military attack against the United States; secondly, a deeply unstable Japan thatwould have needed strong US attention for years to come; and finally, the possibility that Japan
could secure a separate peace with the communist countries and allow them easy access forpolitical and industrial influences. See Richard Samuels, Securing Japan – Tokyo’s Grand Strategy
and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 39.
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Feature

4. See Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara,“Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies,” International Security 17, no. 4(Spring 1993): 84–113; and Thomas U. Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-­Militarism,” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 119–50.
5. Edwin O. Reischauer, The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity (London: Belknap Pressof Harvard University, 1988), 352.
6. In his earlier works, and particularly in Japan Present and Past, 1946, republished in 1961
when he was Pres. John F. Kennedy’s ambassador to Japan, Reischauer seems to have had amore cautious stance on Japan’s will to maintain the same pacifist constitution.
7. Airgram from US Embassy in Tokyo to Department of State, Subject: “LDP Dietman
Shintaro Ishihara’s arguments for a Japanese nuclear force”, 19 February 1971, NND 969023,
Box 1752, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
8. Ibid.
9. Elaine Lies, “Japan Policy Chief Wants China ‘Discipline,’” Reuters, 13 November 2006.
10. See October 2006 opinion poll by Asahi Shimbun.
11. “LDP Official to Ask Aso, Nakagawa to Refrain from Nuke Weapon Talk,” Kyōdō News,
5 November 2006; “Japanese Nukes: Voicing the Unthinkable,” Asia Times, 16 November 2006;“Aso Says Discussion of Possessing Nuclear Weapons ‘Important’”, Kyōdō News, 18 October
2006; and House of Representatives, Diet of Japan, “The 165th Parliamentary Economy andIndustry Committee No. 2,” 25 October 2006, http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigirokua.nsf/html/kaigirokua/009816520061025002.htm.
12. See, for instance, Bill Emmott, Japanophobia: The Myth of the Invincible Japan (New York:Times Books, 1993). Japan passing refers to Tokyo’s concern of being left out of critical decisions affecting Japanese security.
13. See, for example, “Japan, U.S. Vow to Step Up Defense Ties over North Korean Provocation,” Japan Times, 16 February 2016, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/16/national/japan-­u-­s-­vow-­step-­defense-­ties-­north-­korean-­provocation/#.XNwrTY5KiUm.
14. Shōgo Imoto, “Usureru Kakubusō no tabū” [The eroding nuclear taboo], Agora, 17 February 2016, http://agora-­web.jp/archives/1670228.html.
15. Sayuri Romei, “Japan’s Shift in the Nuclear Debate: A Changing Identity?” (working
paper, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, May 2017).
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/publication/japans-­shift-­nuclear-­debate.
16. David Nakamura and Anna Fifield, “Trump, Abe to Meet as U.S.-Japan RelationshipShows Strains over North Korea, Trade,” Washington Post, 14 April 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-­abe-­to-­meet-­as-­us-­japan-­relationship-­shows-­strains-­over-­north-­korea-­trade/2018/04/14/4de8e202-3f2f-11e8-8d53-eba0ed2371cc_story.html.
17. Pew Research Center, “Global Publics Back U.S. on Fighting ISIS, but Are Critical of
Post-9/11 Torture.” 23 June 2015, 38, https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-­
content/uploads/
sites/2/2015/06/Balance-­of-­Power-­Report-­FINAL-­June-23-2015.pdf.
18. On 1 March 1954, the Lucky Dragon 5, a Japanese tuna fishing boat with a crew of 23 men,
was operating near Bikini Atoll when the United States conducted the Castle Bravo test of theworld’s first hydrogen bomb. The crew suffered severe illnesses associated with their exposure to
the radiation generated by the blast, with one member dying from complications associatedwith improper medical treatment received during their recovery.
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Romei19. NFU is a pledge or a policy by a nuclear weapons state not to use nuclear weapons as ameans of warfare unless first attacked by an adversary using nuclear weapons.
20. Nobuyasu Abe, “No First Use: How to Overcome Japan’s Great Divide,” Journal for
Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1, no. 1 (2018): 137–51.
21. Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “New Ambitions, New Obstacles: Japan and
Its Search for an Arms Control Strategy,” Arms Control Today 30, no. 6 ( July/August 2000):
17–24.
22. Masa Takubo, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons: Japan, the U.S., and ‘Sole Purpose,’” Arms
Control Today 39, no. 9 (November 2009): 14–20.
23. Ibid.
24. Masakatsu Ōta, “Japan Lobbied for Robust Nuclear Umbrella before Power Shift,”
Kyodo News, 23 November 2009.
25. Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada to the US State Secretary
Hillary Clinton, 24 December 2009, unofficial translation, https://icnndngojapan.files.
wordpress.com/2010/01/20091224_okada_letter_en.pdf.
26. Josh Rogin, “Obama Plans Major Nuclear Policy Changes in His Final Months,” Washington Post, 10 July 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-­opinions/obama-­plans-­major-­nuclear-­policy-­changes-­in-­his-­final-­months/2016/07/10/fef3d5ca-4521-11e688d0-6adee48be8bc_story.html; Steve Fetter and John Wolfsthal, “No First Use and Credible
Deterrence,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1, no. 1 (2018): 102–14; and ElaineBunn, conversation with the author, 2 May 2018.
27. Tore Frängsmyr and Irwin Abrams, Nobel Lectures in Peace (River Edge, NJ: World
Scientific, 1997), 66–68; the motivations are also available on the official website of the Nobel
Prize: https://www.nobelprize.org/.
28. Ivar Libæk, Øivind Stenersen, and Asle Sveen, The Nobel Peace Prize – One Hundred
Years for Peace (Oslo: Cappelen, 2001).
29. Fintan Hoey, Satō, America and the Cold War: US-­Japanese Relations, 1964–72 (NewYork: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 180.
30. Japan Times, 6 September 2001.
31. “The US Nuclear Umbrella, Past and Future,” Chūgoku Shimbun, 27 December 2008,
http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=19658&query=%26quot%3Bnuclear+umbrella%26q
uot%3B; and Takashi Hiraoka, interview with the author, 12 April 2016.
32. Michiru Nishida, interview with the author, 8 February 2018.
33. Kazutoshi Aikawa, deputy chief of mission and former director-­general of the Disarmament, Non-­Proliferation and Science Department, MOFA at Sasakawa Peace Foundation
USA’s Annual Security Forum, 2 May 2018.
34. Anthony DiFilippo, Japanese Nuclear Disarmament Policy and the U.S. Security Umbrella(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).
35. A collection of all the letters of protest written and sent by the mayors of Hiroshima canbe found here: http://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/shimin/heiwa/kakumenue.html.
36. Hidehiko Yuzaki, interview with the author, 14 April 2016.
37. Takashi Hiraoka, former mayor of Hiroshima, interview with the author, 12 April 2016.
38. Matake Kamiya, “Proactive Realism: Japanese Attitudes Toward Global Zero,” in National Perspectives in Nuclear Disarmament, ed. Barry M. Blechman and Alexander K. Bollfrass
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Feature(Washington, DC: Stimson Center, March 2010), https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/
file-­attachments/National%20Perspectives%20on%20Nuclear%20Disarmament.pdf.
39. Seana K. Magee, “Hiroshima, Nagasaki Mayors Back Obama’s Nuclear-­Free Commitment,” Japan Times, 7 May 2009.
40. Ibid.
41. “Obama Hiroshima trip discouraged in ’09,” Japan Times, 28 September 2011.
42. “Japan’s Hypocritical Nuclear Stance,” Japan Times, 3 November 2016.
43. Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida (press conference, 28 October 2016, http://www.mofa.
go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken4e_000315.html.
44. Akira Kawasaki, interview with the author, 20 February 2018.
45. Heigo Sato, interview with the author, 19 February 2018; Heigo Sato’s remarks at theStimson Center’s event “Balancing Between Nuclear Deterrence and Disarmament: Views
from the Next Generation,” 19 March 2018; Sugio Takahashi, interview with the author, 19
February 2018; Hirofumi Tosaki, interview with the author, 19 February 2018; Takashi
Kawakami, interview with the author, 21 February 2018; Tatsujirō Suzuki, interview with theauthor, 21 February 2018; and Masakatsu Ota, conversation with the author, 19 February 2018.
46. Author’s interviews with two MOFA officials who prefer to remain anonymous, 24
February 2018 and 15 March 2018.
47. Fumio Kishida, “Nuclear Disarmament and Non-­Proliferation” (policy speech, Ministryof Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nagasaki University, 20 January 2014), https://www.mofa.go.jp/
mofaj/files/000028597.pdf.
48. The Release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) (Statement by Foreign Minister
Taro Kono), 3 February 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001893.html
49. See, for example, Steven Pifer, “Questions about the Nuclear Posture Review,” Order from
Chaos (blog), 5 February 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-­from-­chaos/2018/02/05/
questions-­about-­the-­nuclear-­posture-­review/.
50. Kawasaki interview.
51. Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and Beyond, 18
December 2018, 8, provisional translation, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218_e.pdf.
52. Tatsujirō Suzuki, quoted in Masakatsu Ōta, “Disarmament Rift with U.S. Grows,” Japan
Times, 11 November 2018.
53. “Abe Snubs head of Nobel-­Winning No-­Nukes Group,” Japan Times, 15 January 2018.
54. “Too Busy to Meet?” Asahi Shimbun, 7 December 2018.
55. MOFA, “The Awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the International Campaign toAbolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) (statement by Foreign Press Secretary Norio Maruyama, 8October 2017), https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001750.html.
56. Elaine Bunn, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Problem of Deterrence” (presentation,
Brookings Institution Center for East Asia Policy Studies, 22 February 2018); and Bunn interview.
57. Ibid.; Romei, “Japan’s Shift in the Nuclear Debate.”
58. While US government officials find ridiculous the idea of using nuclear weapons for acontingency in the Senkaku Islands, some Japanese officials (interviewed by the author andwho prefer to remain anonymous) have alluded to such an option.
59. Lt Gen Sadamasa Oue, JASDF, interview with the author, 3 December 2018.
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Romei

60. Author’s interviews with three MOFA officials who prefer to stay anonymous, February
and December 2018.
61. Masakatsu Ōta, “Conceptual Twist of Japanese Nuclear Policy: Its Ambivalence andCoherence under the US Umbrella,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1, no.1 (2018),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/25751654.2018.1459286.
62. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Advisory Panel on Security and Defense
Capabilities,” Japanese Prime Minister’s Office website, 29 August 2018, https://japan.kantei.
go.jp/98_abe/actions/201808/_00043.html.

Dr. Sayuri Romei
Dr. Romei is the fellow for security and foreign affairs at Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA. Prior tojoining Sasakawa USA, she spent a year at Stanford University’s Center for International Security andCooperation as a MacArthur Nuclear Security Pre-doctoral Fellow. Her doctoral work focuses on Japan’s nuclear hedging posture and examines how the country started and maintained such a stancethroughout the postwar era. She holds a BA in English language and literature from the University ofSorbonne, a BA in international relations from the University of Roma La Sapienza, an MA in international relations from Roma Tre University, and a PhD in political science from Roma Tre University.
Her work has been published in English and in Japanese in the Washington Post and Kyodo News, and she
has edited the volume The New National Defense Program Guidelines: Aligning U.S. and Japanese Defense
Strategies for the Third Post-Cold War Era (Washington, DC: Sasakawa USA, April 2019): https://spfusa.
org/research/ndpgbook/.

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