─ Kiko Network Report ─Japan’s Path to Net Zero by

2050

2030 and 2040 GHG Reduction Targets and Policy Recommendations

March 2021

■■■

Introduction■■■

Climate change is reaching a critical level and putting humanity at risk — not only future
generations, but also us in the present generation — and the damage is predicted to spinout of control unless we change course. The Japanese government’s target of net zero
greenhouse gas emissions (carbon neutrality) by 2050 is a target also set by a majorityof the world’s countries to avert dangerous climate change.1 To limit the global averagetemperature rise to 1.5°C, it is necessary to achieve net zero by 2050. To do this, we must
follow a steady path of emission reductions, and this means cutting global emissions in halfby 2030.
This target is beyond what can be achieved by the actions of individuals alone. It
requires major transformations in society and economic systems, and programs must be
implemented to realize them. The achievement of this net zero target is also important for
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which aim to ensure that no vulnerable groups,
communities, regions and countries are left behind. As the world’s fifth largest emitter, andas a developed country providing support for vulnerable countries, Japan has an importantrole to play in achieving these global goals.
This report proposes Japan’s targets for the years 2030 and 2040 and also proposes
policies and measures to attain the emission reductions required to meet the 2050 net
zero target. In this report, we have referred to science-based analysis for Japan’s emission
pathways to be consistent with the 1.5°C target. For measures and technologies, we also
refer to estimates and scenarios in existing reports and recommendations available inJapan (references at end). This report also includes content from Kiko Network’s previous
paper, “Recommendations for the Revision of Japan’s Strategic Energy Plan.”2

1
2

Net Zero Tracker (https://eciu.net/netzerotracker) indicates that 127 countries have set or support net zerotargets for 2050 (as of February 2021).

“Recommendations for the Revision of Japan’s Strategic Energy Plan,” December 2020 (in Japanese).
https://www.kikonet.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/revisionof-strategic-energy-plan.pdf

22030 and 2040 GHG Reduction Targets and Policy Recommendations
Japan’s Path to Net Zero by 2050 (March 2021)■■■

Executive Summary■■■

Fundamental approach

Japan and the rest of the world must make steady progress to reduce emissions in 2030
and 2040 in order to achieve the net zero target for 2050 and avert the climate crisis.
To do so, Japan needs science-based targets, efforts to close the gaps with the required
emission reduction levels, and the determination to break free from our dependence on
fossil fuels, the main driver of climate change. At the same time, the transformation to net
zero must also improve the environment for vulnerable populations and help workers who
are affected by decarbonization make the transition to new and green jobs. To realize a net
zero society by 2050, we need inclusive mechanisms in which people can participate andcontribute to create the future we want.

Actual GHG emissions in Japan
After decreasing for five years in a row, Japan’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in2018 were 12% below the 2013 levels (3% below 1990). At this pace, Japan would achieve a
reduction of about 40% in 2030. The largest sources of emissions are coal-fired electricity
generation, followed by transport and LNG gas-fired electricity generation, and then theenergy-intensive steel industry and chemical industry; these five sources alone account for
70% of Japan’s total emissions. While priority must be given to these sectors, emissions
should also be reduced in other sectors and for gases other than CO2.

Japan’s GHG emission reduction targets
Japan’s emission reduction targets must reflect this country’s responsibility to achieve
the global reductions needed to limit the temperature rise to 1.5°C. Based on analyses by
climate policy thinktanks on the reductions needed to be consistent with the 1.5°C target,
Japan’s GHG emission reduction targets relative to 2013 must be at least 60% by 2030 (or56% relative to 1990), 80% by 2040 (or 78% relative to 1990), and net zero by 2050.

Strategies in key sectors• Reducing energy consumption

Resource consumption should be reduced as much as possible in view of the declining
population, the maturing of society and infrastructure, and increased efficiency in resourceand energy use. Japan should aim to reduce final energy consumption relative to 2013 to at3

least 40% by 2030, 55% by 2040, and 70% by 2050, while electricity demand is expected
to increase due to electrification, with the net reduction in electricity relative to 2013 at-20% by 2030, and -27% by 2040 and 2050.
• Power sector

By 2030, coal-fired power generation should be reduced to zero, along with nuclear
power generation, which is unsafe, uneconomical, and unsustainable. Additionally, the small
remaining amount of oil-fired power generation should also be zero. Renewable energy,
currently at about 20%, should increase to at least 50%, and LNG-fired power generation
should be no more than 50%. By 2040, renewable energy should increase to at least 80%,and LNG should be no more than 20%. Renewable energy should reach 100% by 2050.
•Transport sector

Passenger mobility should shift from automobiles to a transportation infrastructure
centered on walking, cycling, and public transport, while freight transport should undergoa modal shift from truck to rail and ship. Passenger vehicles should be regulated so thatby 2030, 100% of new sales are electric vehicles (EV, BEV, or PHEV), and by 2035, 100%of new sales are electric vehicles (only EV or BEV). Besides automobiles, carbon-freetechnologies should also be introduced for heavy-duty transport and aviation, and shipping
before 2050. Emissions from the transport sector as a whole should be reduced by morethan 50% by 2030 relative to 2013 and more than 75% by 2040, with the sector completely
decarbonized by 2050. Although some hydrogen-powered fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) havebeen commercialized, EVs are overwhelmingly superior for passenger vehicles when it
comes to cost, diffusion of the technology, and the development of infrastructure.
• Industrial sector

Demand in the steel, chemical, cement, and pulp and paper industries, all of which havehigh emissions, should be reduced through improved efficiency of material utilization andstreamlined systems, and measures should be taken to improve energy efficiency, waste
heat recovery, and electrification. Relative to 2013, CO2 emissions of the industrial sector
as a whole should be reduced by at least 65% by 2030 and at least 80% by 2040, withcomplete decarbonization achieved by 2050.
• Residential and commercial sectors

Considering the long-term impacts of these sectors, a shift should be accelerated tohave 100% of newly-built houses and buildings being zero emission (ZEH, ZEB) by 2025.
For existing houses and buildings, emissions should be reduced through renovations andthe introduction of renewable energy, at a pace of 2% per year. In addition, there should besignificant efficiency improvements in building structures and related equipment to further
reduce electricity consumption. All of these should result in reduced emissions from theresidential sector relative to 2013 by at least 65% by 2030 and at least 80% by 2040, and4

from the commercial sector, at least 70% by 2030 and 85% by 2040. Both sectors should
achieve complete decarbonization by 2050.
• Waste sector

The reduction of waste involves a number of actions by many actors. For businesses, thisincludes the selection and reduced consumption of raw materials, along with reductions in
the amount of waste disposed. On the user side, this includes changes in thinking about
the purchase and use of a multitude of items, including manufactured products and food,and reduction in the amount of garbage generated, including plastics and food loss. With
additional electrification, heat utilization, and the transition to renewable energy, CO2
emissions from the waste sector relative to 2013 should be reduced by 50% by 2030 and
75% by 2040, and should reach zero by 2050.
• F-gases (4 fluorinated gases)

HFCs are mainly used as refrigerants, and their emissions have been rising at a dramatic
rate (46.4% up from 2013 levels in 2018) and now account for 4% of all GHG emissions.
By promptly banning where alternatives are available, shifting to natural refrigerants, andrecovering HFCs properly, the rapidly-increasing amount of HFCs used as refrigerants
should be limited to 2013 levels by 2030, and with accelerated actions to eliminate
fluorocarbons, their total emissions relative to 2013 levels should be reduced by at least 15%
by 2030 and 70% by 2040, and F-gas emissions should be completely eliminated by 2050.

Proposed emission reduction targets
Projecting Japan’s future emissions based on the measures indicated above, GHG
emissions relative to 2013 will be reduced by 63–65% by 2030, 84–86% by 2040, and 98–
99% by 2050, and GHG emissions in 2050 are projected to be about 15 million t-CO2, shownin the bars in Figure 1 below. Based on these projections, as stated in the introduction, weare proposing reduction targets of at least -60% relative to 2013 by 2030, at least -80% by
2040, and net zero by 2050 (the line in the figure below).

Greenhouse gas emissions［Mt-CO₂］

1600
1400
1200
1000
800

▲60%

(relative to 2013)

600
400

▲80%

(relative to 2013)

200
0

▲100%

1990

2013

2018

2030

2040

2050

■Energy-related CO₂ ■Other GHGs ━■━ Proposed targets

5

Figure. Emission
reduction scenario andtargets proposed by Kiko
Network
Prepared by Kiko Network

Ten key policy actions
To achieve targets, we propose the following policy actions to be introduced immediately.
(a) Legislate targets and processes to enhance them

Clearly indicate the 2050 net zero target and short-term reduction targets in legislation.
Furthermore, the process of enhancing reduction targets every five years should also be
set into law.
(b) Introduce carbon pricing

To promote energy efficiency and energy transition in all sectors, introduce a carbon tax
and gradually increase it to 10,000 yen (100 USD)/t-CO2 equivalent in 2030.
(c) Set targets to end electricity generation from fossil fuels and nuclear power

Set targets to completely retire all coal-fired power plants and nuclear power plants by
2030. For LNG gas-fired power plants, cancel plans and construction of all new units, andlimit the LNG share of the electricity mix to less than 50% by 2030, less than 20% by 2040,
and zero by 2050.
(d) Adopt policies for a just transition

Establish within the government’s organizational structure a mechanism to ensure a justtransition for both industry and labor. Introduce budgetary measures for just transition
policies for workers, such as green business development and technical assistance,
vocational training, and unemployment compensation.
(e) Adopt policies to expand renewable energy

To significantly expand renewable energy, revise the transmission rules of the electric grid
system, fundamentally reform electricity markets (capacity market, non-fossil value trading
market, base load power supply market), and promote renewable energy and heat utilization
policies.
(f) Promote electric vehicles and a modal shift to walking, cycling, and public

transportation

To decarbonize the transport sector, in addition to carbon pricing, promote the shift toEVs, the decarbonization of long-distance transport such as aircraft, ships, and trucks, anda modal shift to walking, cycling, and public transportation.
(g) Strengthen regulations on housing, buildings, and equipment

Shift to ZEH/ZEB for new housing and buildings by 2025, accelerate policy adoption for
public facilities and housing, and promote energy-efficiency renovations and renewableenergy for existing houses and buildings to cut emissions by 2% per year.

6(h) Adopt policies to reduce waste and plastics

Moving toward zero waste and zero plastics, promote the gradual introduction ofregulations on raw materials, set waste reduction targets, and encourage stronger food loss
and waste plastic reduction programs by local governments.
(i) Regulate F-gases

For HFCs, prohibit certain uses and set recovery targets based on F-gas tax and/or
deposit systems. For SF6, PFC, and NF3, prohibit uses other than in closed systems, andmake leakage prevention measures and recovery mandatory.
( j) Strengthen finance policies

End support for fossil fuel-related projects, evaluate consistency (with the Paris
Agreement) and suitability of unproven innovative or problematic technologies (CCUS,
hydrogen, ammonia, nuclear power), and make information disclosure mandatory based on
the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure (TCFD).

Conclusion
A 50% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 and decarbonization by 2050 is required
to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5°C. Like many countries in the world, Japan
must set clear targets and a vision for decarbonization, and have the determination andresolve to make it happen. Most of the measures and technologies indicated in this report
are currently available. The costs of renewable energy are declining, and the systems,
technologies, expertise, and mechanisms for mass deployment are becoming increasingly
available to us. By promoting renewable energy while striving for energy conservation andlocal communities thriving together, we can begin to see decarbonization coming quickly
into view. It’s time for us all to participate in this discussion and take action so that thisnecessary transformation is not delayed by some actors or false solutions under the guiseof “innovation.” To achieve a decarbonized society, Kiko Network calls upon the Governmentof Japan to establish targets and implement policies and actions based on the proposals
presented in this report, and we will continue in our efforts to urge all actors to step up theiractions.

7

1. Fundamental approach

■■■

■■■

Extreme weather is occurring more frequently, and climate change is intensifying. Japan
has at last joined the list of countries that have declared a target of achieving net zero GHG
emissions by 2050, and now must make steady progress in reducing emissions by 2030
and 2040 in order to achieve that target.
Until now, Japan has taken the “forecasting” approach: adding up measures it considers
to be feasible for implementation, sector-by-sector, and using those numbers as the basis
for setting emission reduction targets. However, reduction targets to date have been far
too low, as simply adding up a string of measures aligned with conventional approaches andfailing to envision bold structural reforms will not get Japan close to the level of ambition
required. Nevertheless, Japan now has the goal of achieving net zero within thirty years, andso we need to take actions toward that goal with a proper vision in mind.
Below, we look at the fundamental approach Japan should focus its efforts on to achieve
net zero by 2050.

(1) Base it on science: Close the gap to achieve the 1.5°C goal
The latest climate science tells us that past actions have not gone far enough, leaving
us very little time to avoid dangerous levels of climate change. It also tells us that stronger
actions are needed, and that bold emission reductions are required in the short term by2030. When devising policies and measures, we cannot simply take a bottom-up approach
to list a series of today’s feasible technologies and actions. The Japanese government
needs to take seriously the warnings about the climate crisis, declare bold targets to close
the gaps between current targets and the level of actions required to realize the 1.5°C goal,
and commit to a major transformation to get us there. This should all be guided by theconcept of backcasting: defining a desirable future state and then working backwards toidentify policies and programs to get us there from where we are now.

(2) End our reliance on fossil fuels
To cut global CO2 emissions in half by 2030 and achieve net zero by 2050, it is necessary
to fundamentally reexamine modern society’s use of the fossil fuels the world has reliedon so heavily since the Industrial Revolution. In other words, while boldly promoting energy
conservation, it is necessary to significantly transform our energy supply and demandsystems and make a complete energy transition away from fossil fuels to renewable energy.
If we consider this transition, including the required infrastructure improvements, it is
too risky to postpone action by pinning our hopes to innovations that still have no clear
prospect of practical application. To meet the 2050 target, we need to take immediate
action to end use of fossil fuels.

8

(3) Support the vulnerable as the world transitions to net zero
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is heavily impacting businesses and workers in manyindustries. This has serious effects on local economies, severely impacting vulnerable andmarginalized people and increasing social inequity. Efforts to achieve net zero in 2050 must
help the world recover from this situation and promote integrated efforts to build a newsociety. A decarbonized society will be unattainable without a major structural transition
away from energy-intensive industries. Thus, it is crucial to anticipate the impacts on local
economies and workers that may occur from the transition, create new industries and jobs
suited to this new reality, and provide support to facilitate the transition.

(4) Promote participation, dialogue, and inclusivenessA society that attains net zero in 2050 will be self-sufficient and sustainable, and its
energy systems and economic systems will reveal a world dramatically transformed fromwhat we see today. In such a world, individual households, communities, and businesses
will produce much of their own renewable energy, locally-based businesses will drive
their own local economies, and there will be a diversity of options for renewable energy
and sustainable employment. Dangerous levels of climate change will have been avoided,
extreme weather events will have been kept within our ability to anticipate and mitigate
them, ecosystems will be maintained, and the future of life will be secure. Furthermore, wewill have various opportunities for participation and dialogue to create such a sustainable
future, where diverse voices and choices are respected, and self-directed, proactive,
responsible actions by individuals are encouraged. To create a future that offers choices likethese, democratic processes and mechanisms that will allow for proactive engagement are
required.

■■■

2. Japan’s greenhouse gas emissions■■■(1) Trend in Japan’s GHG emissions
In FY2018, Japan emitted 1.24 billion tons of GHG emissions,3 of which about 90% (1.13
billion tons) were CO2 emissions. With the exception of the global financial crisis of 200809, emissions were on a rising trend until FY2013, but peaked that year and have been
declining ever since, with 2018 at 12% below FY2013 (or 3% below FY1990) (Figure 1).
Japan’s current target of 26% reduction for 2030 is yet to be reached, but if the reduction
rate of 2-3% per year for the past five years continues, Japan could meet that target with
3

With the exception of the economic downturn in 2009, this was the first time below 1.2755 billion tons since
1990.

9

room to spare, with a projected reduction of about 40%. However, no path to net zero in
2050 has yet been laid out, greater efforts are needed to strengthen the 2030 target, anda 2040 target needs to be set.
(Million t-CO2 equivalent)
2020 target-3.8% relative to 2005
2030 target-26.0% relative to 2013
■Nitrogen triﬂuoride (NF3)■Sulfur hexaﬂuoride (SF6)■Perﬂuorocarbons (PFCs)■Hydroﬂuorocarbons(HFCs)■Nitrous oxide (N2O)■Methane (CH4)■Carbon dioxide (CO2)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

1,500
1,400
1,300
1,200
1,100
1,000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

(FY)

Figure 1. Trends in Japan’s GHG emissions
Source : Greenhouse Gas Inventory (FY2018 Report), National Institute for Environmental Studies.

(2) Emissions by sector: Coal power is the top emitter
Based on actual results for FY2018, CO2 from coal-fired power generation is the largest
source of Japan’s GHG emissions, accounting for over 20% (267 million tons) of total
emissions. Second is the transport sector, third is LNG-fired power generation, followed by
the energy-intensive steel and chemical industries (the latter including coal and petroleum
products). Together, these five sectors account for nearly 70% of Japan’s total emissions(Figure 2). The most important challenge when Japan works toward decarbonization is
to take a serious and fresh look at the economic activities that consume such massive
amounts of fossil fuels, and steadily progress toward zero emissions. In addition, the central
government, local governments and all relevant actors need to work together to advancedetailed emission reduction measures for all GHGs, including F-gases and non-energyrelated CO2 emissions from sources such as small and medium-sized enterprises, theresidential and commercial sectors, industrial processes, and waste.
Other CO₂
4%

Non-CO₂
sources8%
Coal-ﬁred power
generation
22%

Residential andcommercial
9%
Other industries
12%⁄

Chemicalindustry5%

Steelindustry
11%

Transportation
16%
LNG-ﬁredpower
generation
13%

10

Figure 2. Breakdown of Japan’s
greenhouse gas emissions
Source: Prepared by Kiko Networkfrom Greenhouse Gas Inventory(before electricity and heatallocation, FY2018 Report), by
National Institute for Environmental
Studies.

■■■

3. GHG emission reduction targets

Japan’s GHG emission reduction target for 2030 set in 2015 was for a 26% reduction
relative to 2013 levels (–18% relative to 1990). It has been pointed out that this falls
significantly short of the goals consistent with the Paris Agreement, and existing research
indicates that it would be equivalent to inviting a temperature rise of 3°C to 4.3°C.4
The level of Japan’s GHG emission reduction targets must reflect the country’s
responsibility to reach the global reductions needed to limit the temperature rise to 1.5°
C. As shown in Table 1, leading analysis performed overseas has looked at reduction levels
needed for Japan to be consistent with the Paris Agreement goal of 1.5°C. Some of the
reductions are shown as a range, but considering Japan’s responsibilities as a developed
country, it would be inappropriate for Japan to adopt the lower values. Climate Action
Tracker has pointed out that for Japan’s reductions to be 1.5°C-consistent, the reduction
targets should be –62% by 2030 relative to 2013, and –82% by 2040.
Based on the above points, Kiko Network proposes that Japan adopt GHG emission
reduction targets relative to 2013 of at least –60% by 2030 (or –56% relative to 1990) and–80% by 2040 (or –78% relative to 1990).

4Japan's target of a 26% reduction by 2030 is a level that will result in 3–4°C of warming according to Climate
Action Tracker (https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/japan/), and Paris Equity Check puts the number

at 4.3°C (http://paris-equity-check.org/warming-check.html#open-graph).

11

Table 1. Levels of Japan’s GHG emission reduction targets
Organization

2030 emissions

2040
emissions2050
emissions

Details

Analyses of Paris Agreement-consistent GHG emission pathways for Japan

Climate Action
Tracker*5

Climate Analytics*6–62%(relative to 2013)

Approx. –65%
(relative to 2013)–39% to –71%
Paris Equity Check*7 (relative to 1990)

Top-down approach from global
model. Levels consistent with 1.5°C
target. Excludes forest sinks and otherland-use change.

–82%(relative to
2013)

ー

Net zeroTop-down approach from global
model. Levels consistent with 1.5°C
target. Excludes forest sinks and otherland-use change.
Top-down approach from global
model. Levels consistent with Paris
Agreement. Includes reductions
overseas (based on multiple equity
indicators).

–65% to–110%(relative to
1990)

Proposals by Japanese organizations
Kiko Network–60%(relative to 2013)–80%(relative to
2013)

Net zero

Validated bottom-up based on levels
calculated top-down.

WWF Japan–48%(relative to 2013)–68%(relative to
2013)

Zero

Calculated mainly based on energyrelated CO2. Other gases straight line
to zero after 2030.

Institute for Global
Environmental
Strategies(IGES)

ーー

Net –98%

Renewable Energy
Institute

Energy-related
CO2–47%(relative to 2013)

ー

Future Group*

Energy-related
CO2–61%(relative to 2013)

Energy-related–93% in 2050 with existing
CO2
technologies, –100% with new–93% totechnologies.
–100%(relative to2013)* Energy Transition for the Future Research Group5

6
7

Transition scenario. Includes small
amount by CCS & DAC (direct air
capture) technologies.

Prepared by Kiko Network

Climate Action Tracker, 1.5°C-consistent benchmarks for enhancing Japan’s NDC ambition, March 2021.

https://climateactiontracker.org/documents/841/2021_03_CAT_1.5C-consistent_benchmarks_Japan_NDC.
pdf

Climate Analytics, What is Japan’s required contribution to limit global warming to 1.5°C? March 2021.

http://1p5ndc-pathways.climateanalytics.org/countries/JPN/
Paris Equity Check, http://paris-equity-check.org/

12

■■■

4. Strategies and projected reductions■■■(1) Fundamental approach
The following principles were used to identify emission reduction strategies to achieve
net zero in 2050. The fundamental approach was to seek the deeper emission reductions
that are necessary, while considering the technology trends based on the research andrecommendations mentioned above, and applying the backcasting concept covered in
Section 1.
⿠Aim to achieve significant reductions in energy consumption.
⿠Promote a steady transition away from large emission sources.
⿠Promote the swift introduction of technologies that can be relied upon to ensure
steady emission reductions and have low environmental impacts.
⿠Choose technologies that are highly safe, economical, and sustainable.
⿠Simultaneously promote reduction strategies for emissions other than energy-related
CO2.

(2) Strategies in key sectors
Top priority is placed on reducing energy consumption through energy conservation,
and approaches are recommended for key emission reduction strategies and targets thatshould be declared, with an emphasis on major emission sources.
(a) Energy consumption reductions

Japan is experiencing a decline in population, with the population in August 2020 at 125.8
million. This is projected to be 119.1 million in 2030, 101.9 million in 2050 (down by about
20% from today), and to decline below 100 million in 2053.8 Much of Japan’s infrastructureis already adequate, so in the coming years there is likely to be a greater emphasis on
the repair and maintenance of existing infrastructure than on new construction projects.
Additionally, resource consumption can be minimized by promoting greater efficiency andsmart energy use. Minimized energy consumption makes it possible to end the use of fossil
fuels and nuclear power, and to fast track an increase in the renewable energy share of theenergy mix.

8

National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Population Projections for Japan (2017), P.
222 (in Japanese). http://www.ipss.go.jp/pp-zenkoku/j/zenkoku2017/pp29_ReportALL.pdf

13• Final energy consumption

The 2015 Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook from the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI) projected a 10% reduction (relative to 2013) in final energy
demand in 2030, but in reality, it has been steadily declining since 2010, and in 2019
was already 8% lower than in 2013 (4% below 1990).9 If the current pace of reduction is
maintained, a reduction of over 30% can be expected by 2030. Regarding existing studies
on final energy demand in 2030, the Renewable Energy Institute has presented a scenario
with a 25% reduction (relative to FY2018), WWF Japan a 20% reduction (relative to FY2015),
and the Energy Transition for the Future Research Group (Future Group) a 38% reduction(relative to FY2013).10 IGES presented a conservative estimate of a 38% reduction in
consumption by 2050 (relative to FY2015).
To achieve net zero CO2 emissions, based on the fact that energy conservation shouldbe the key strategy, Kiko Network proposes more intensive efforts to reduce final energy
consumption relative to FY2013 by at least 40% by 2030, at least 55% by 2040, and at least
70% by 2050.
• Electricity demand

A declining trend in electricity demand has continued since 2010 when it was 1,035 TWh,and while the government is projecting demand at 980 TWh in 2030, it had already declined
to 946 TWh in FY2018. Going forward, some increases in electricity demand are likely tooccur due to electrification in the transport sector, and to electrification for heat utilizationin the industrial sector and in steel manufacturing. However, electrification also offers
opportunities to choose technologies that can significantly increase efficiency. Moreover,by implementing both efficient use and appropriate energy conservation, even with the
expected increases11 considered, overall it is possible to limit the increase in electricity
demand. Existing studies have proposed a range of electricity demand in 2030 of 725–840
TWh.12
Based on the points above, we propose reductions in electricity demand of 20% by 2030
and 27% by 2040 and 2050 relative to 2013 levels. These reductions will make it possible
to avoid increases in LNG imports that would otherwise occur due to the temporarilyincreased reliance on LNG-fired power generation toward 2030.

9

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Energy Supply and Demand Results Brief, November 2020

10Regarding final energy consumption in 2030, the Renewable Energy Institute indicates 9,820 PJ, and the1112(in Japanese). https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2020/11/20201118003/20201118003-1.pdf
Future Group 7,734 PJ in 2030 and approx. 4,961 PJ in 2050.

The total projected increase in demand for steelmaking electric furnaces and the increase in demand

due to the shift to EVs in automobiles in 2030 is about 70 TWh in 2030. Of this amount, the portion forautomobiles is projected at about 20 TWh in 2030, 110 TWh in 2040, and 150TWh in 2050.

Electricity demand in 2030 under each organization’s proposed scenario: 790 TWh (WWF Japan), 840 TWh(Renewable Energy Institute), 725 TWh (Future Group).

14

Table 2. Proposed targets for final energy consumption and electricity demand

Kiko Network proposal(relative to 2013)

Actual
2010

2013

2018

2030

2040

2050

Final energy
consumption (PJ)

14,712

14,085

13,1248,400(–40%)

6,300(–55%)

4,200(–70%)

Electricity demand
(TWh)

1,035

990

946

790
(–20%)

720(–27%)

720(–27%)

Actual values are from General Energy Statistics, etc.

Prepared by Kiko Network(b) Electricity generation (coal, LNG, oil, renewable energy, nuclear)

Climate Analytics has pointed out that to be 1.5°C-consistent, renewable energy needs
to account for 45–85% of the power sector by 2030.13 Working from the estimates by
Climate Analytics, Climate Action Tracker pointed out that in order to be consistent with thetarget, renewable energy (plus nuclear and thermal power generation with carbon capture,utilization and storage [CCUS] technology) needs to be at least 60% of the energy mix by
2030 and at least 80% by 2040, and coal-fired power generation without CCUS needs to becompletely phased out by 2030. Regarding nuclear and CCUS, they also point out that it isunrealistic to expect significant contributions, and that it is most reasonable to focus efforts
on renewable energy.14
Reliance on nuclear power in the power mix is unrealistic and inappropriate, and it would
be risky to rely on CCUS, which is an unproven technology (see Column 1). Recently, theJapanese government and power utilities have started promoting the use of hydrogenand ammonia for power generation, but there are various problems with this, including
the fact that they too are generated from fossil fuels, as well as additional issues with thetechnologies and costs (see Column 2). To approach the levels required in 2030, emissions
from thermal power generation — the largest emitting sector — must be brought down tozero as soon as possible, while maximizing the expansion of renewable energy.
To go fossil fuel-free and nuclear-free as quickly as possible, it is necessary to increase
the capacity utilization of LNG-fired power generation facilities until 2030. According to
Climate Action Tracker, to keep LNG-fired power generation below the current level of 320–
340 TWh, total electricity generation would need to be kept to roughly 800–850 TWh, andthis level would generally be 1.5°C-consistent.
Several reports have verified that the power supply/demand balance will not be affected— even in a scenario for 2030 that does not rely on nuclear and coal, and even if the shareof renewable energy increases above 45%. This includes a report by the Renewable Energy
Institute showing that electricity costs could be lower than they were in 2019 even with 45%
13

Climate Analytics, Closing the Gap, http://1p5ndc-pathways.climateanalytics.org/countries/JPN/closing-the-14

Ibid. Footnote 5.

gap/

15

of the supply coming from electricity from renewable energy,15 and one by the Future Groupconfirming that in each power supply area there would be no electricity supply problems in
2030.16• Coal-fired power generation: Zero by 2030

Japan has increased its dependency on coal power over the past few decades. In 2018,
coal had the largest share of the power mix at 31.6%, and new power plants are still being
constructed to this day. It will be difficult to avert a climate crisis without measures toaddress coal-fired power generation, the largest source of CO2 emissions. To be consistent
with the Paris Agreement, unless they install CCUS technology, developed countries haveto reduce coal power to zero by 2030.17 However, even if this as-yet unproven CCUS
technology could be successfully developed, the risk of leakage would always remain,and costs are high, so the merits of CCUS are unconvincing (see Column 1). Even if thesetechnologies could deliver on their promises, they will only be put to use after 2030, which
would be too late. The proposition that coal-fired power generation can continue as longas it is accompanied by CCUS is not globally accepted. Climate Analytics, WWF Japan, andthe Renewable Energy Institute have all presented scenarios for 2030 with zero coal-fired
power generation. Thus, we propose that any new projects for coal-fired power generation
be halted, including any currently under construction, and that there should be a complete
coal power phase-out by 2030 (for details of the proposal, see the Kiko Network paper ona coal phase-out).18

15
16
17

18

Renewable Energy Institute, Verification of electricity supply and demand balance and costs in 2030,
February 2021 (in Japanese). https://www.renewable-ei.org/activities/reports/20210210.php

Energy Transition for the Future Research Group, Report 2030, February 2021 (in Japanese). https://green-

recovery-japan.org/pdf/japanese_gr.pdf.

Already 60% of developed countries have recognized its importance and are proceeding with actions toachieve a target of being coal-free by 2030. (Reference: E3G, Global Status of Coal Power, https://www.e3g.
org/publications/oecd-eu28-lead-the-way-on-global-coal-transition/)

Kiko Network, Japan Coal Phase-Out: The Path to Phase-Out by 2030 (2020 edition), February 2021

(English edition) https://www.kikonet.org/eng/Japan-Coal-Phase-out-2020-edition

16

COLUMN

1

Unproven technology: Carbon capture, utilization and storage(CCUS)

CCUS, intended to capture CO2 emitted from power plants and utilize or store
it, is an unreliable technology wrought with problems. These problems include
its effectiveness, cost, concerns about environmental impacts, and technicalrisks. There is still no clear prospect for commercial application, and it will makeabsolutely no contribution to the emission reductions of over 50% required by
2030. Even if commercialization was achieved, the costs would be prohibitive.
Pouring subsidies into R&D for fossil fuel-related ventures that have no real
future prospect of being viable simply amounts to an attempt to prolong our
fossil fuel dependency. Also, this would unnecessarily delay the exit from coaland make it more difficult to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. It is
inappropriate to place emphasis on CCUS and rely on it as a climate change
countermeasure, and we should stop considering decarbonization based on
CCUS technology. (Regarding the various problems with CCUS, please refer toa previous paper by Kiko Network.)19• LNG-fired power generation: 50% cut by 2030, zero by 2050

LNG-fired power generation accounted for the largest share of Japan’s electricity
generation mix in 2018, at 38.3%. Although it has about half the CO2 emissions ofcoal, it is nevertheless a fossil fuel with enormous environmental impacts. Many of the
major concerns regarding coal power, such as development of technology and potential
application for hydrogen, also exist for LNG. Thus, any further increase in capacities should
be avoided, new construction should be halted, older power plants should be phased out
starting with the least efficient ones, and the shift should be made to renewable energy.
There will be a higher reliance on LNG as a result of the phase-out of coal and nuclear by
2030, but capacity utilization at LNG-fired power plants has been declining in recent years,
and this trend is expected to continue. Therefore, the existing plant facilities are alreadysufficient. However, by limiting electricity demand, LNG imports should be kept to less thanthey are today, and we should act to ensure a rapid decrease after 2030.
•Renewable energy: At least 50% share of electricity mix by 2030, 100% by 2050

The expansion of renewable energy is critically important to achieve a major reductionof GHG emissions and phase out coal and nuclear power. It is necessary to promote the19

Kiko Network, Position Paper - Risky Dreams: Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS), August,
2019, https://www.kikonet.org/eng/publication-en/2019-08-15/paper-on-ccus

17

introduction and expansion of land-based solar and wind power, as well as offshore wind
power and geothermal. However, proper environmental consideration and consensusbuilding are essential when installation is being planned. Biomass should be used only when
it has been assessed to result in CO2 emission reductions, utilization should be based on
cascading uses (from high to low value-added), and sustainability must be considered toensure that biomass use does not cause environmental destruction, result in human rights
abuses, or compete with food production. Existing studies have presented scenarios withthe share of renewable energy in 2030 being between 45% and 50% of the electricity mix.20
Based on the above points, we propose targets for renewable energy of at least 50% by2030, at least 80% by 2040, and 100% by 2050.
• Nuclear power: Zero by 2030

The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in March 2011 revealed
the enormous damage and impact on society, the economy, and local communities.
Ten years have passed, but there is still no end to the accident in sight — many serious
problems remain, and the risks and burdens are being left for the next generation.
Moreover, regardless of the government and industry's strong push, even the government
admits that the installed capacity will rapidly decline going forward, and there is no
expectation that nuclear is able make any contribution as a means of tackling climatechange. Furthermore, nuclear power is neither conducive to nor consistent with building asustainable decarbonized society, nor does it make sense from an investment perspective.
Therefore, we are proposing that policies be devised to end the use of nuclear power, thatno more reactors be restarted, and that any reactors still operating be shut down quickly
and proceed to decommissioning, resulting in a complete phase-out to zero nuclear before
2030.
• Electricity generation mix

Based on the above, for the electricity mix in 2030, the targets for the share of renewableenergy should be increased to at least 50% by 2030 from the current level (approx. 20%),and LNG-fired electricity generation should be no more than 50%. By 2040, renewableenergy should be more than 80%, with LNG limited to 20% or less (Table 3). Coal-fired
power generation should be reduced to zero by 2030, along with nuclear power generation,
which is unsafe, uneconomical, and unsustainable, and the small remaining amount of oilfired power generation should also be zero. The share of LNG-fired power generation
should also be significantly reduced gradually after 2030 to zero by 2050.

20

For electricity generation from renewables as a share of the power mix in 2030, the Renewable Energy
Institute is proposing 45% (400 TWh), WWF Japan 48% (450 TWh), and Future Group 44% (372.5 TWh).

18

COLUMN

2

Hydrogen and ammonia will not save us

While hydrogen does not emit CO2 during use, it is a secondary energy
source created by electrolysis powered by other sources — fossil fuels such ascoal and natural gas, nuclear power, or renewable energy. It is important to notethat hydrogen produced from fossil fuels is not carbon-free, as CO2 is emitted
when it is produced. As for ammonia, the Japanese government and industry
have been indicating its use not only as a hydrogen carrier (for transport andstorage), but also as a fuel for electricity generation as a replacement forcoal.21 However, ammonia will also be made from fossil fuels, so in terms of CO2
emissions it is similar to hydrogen.
The justification being used to label hydrogen and ammonia as carbon-freetechnologies is the assumption that CO2 emitted during their production will
be captured using CCUS. However, CCUS is itself an unproven technology thatcomes with many problems and has limited potential if it cannot be made costeffective. Therefore, it is very risky to build any zero-emissions vision based onthese technologies. The purported intention may be to use renewable energy
to produce hydrogen or ammonia, but if the idea is to burn that hydrogenor ammonia to fire a boiler to generate electricity, it would be immeasurably
simpler to just use renewable energy to generate electricity, and the costs andlosses would be lower as well. A report by the International Energy Agency (IEA)
states that what power systems need is the flexibility to install and respondto variable renewable energy, and it proposes various strategies to ensure
flexibility depending on a country’s phase of renewable energy deployment.
Correspondingly, it ranks hydrogen as being necessary only in the final phase(Phase 6) and does not recommend hydrogen as necessary from the start.22
Japan, currently at Phase 2, still has a long way in the deployment of renewableenergy, so there is no obvious reason to rush to use hydrogen at this point.
To achieve net zero in 2050, hydrogen is not necessary for electricity
generation where renewable energy would be the simplest choice. Instead,hydrogen should be mainly used in specific applications, such as large ships
and aircraft, steel, and cement. Moreover, hydrogen should only be used if it isproduced by surplus electricity generated from renewable energy.
21

See for example a report by the Basic Policy Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Natural

Resources and Energy, December 22, 2020 (https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/committee/council/basic_

policy_subcommittee/035/035_004.pdf) (in Japanese) and JERA’s Zero Emission 2050 Strategy (https://22

www.jera.co.jp/english/corporate/zeroemission).

IEA, Status of Power System Transformation 2019, https://www.iea.org/reports/status-of-power-systemtransformation-2019.

19

Table 3. Electricity generation mix and proposed targets (TWh)Government target**(share of mix)

Actual*Kiko Network proposal(share of mix)

2013

2018

2030

2030

2040

2050

Electricity demand

990

946

981

790

720

720

Electric power
generation

1,085

1,051

1,065

900

800

1,200

Coal

357

332

281
(26%)

0

0

0

LNG

444

403

285
(27%)

450
(50%)

160
(20%)

0

Oil, etc.

157

74

32
(3%)

0

0

0

Nuclear965

217–232(20–22%)0

0

0

Renewable energy

118

177

237–252(22–24%)

450
(50%)

640
(80%)

1,200
(100%)

From General Energy Statistics, Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook.
* From FY2018 Greenhouse Gas Inventory.

Prepared by Kiko Network** From National Climate Action Plan (2016).

(c)Transport sector

The transport sector accounted for 16% (202.7 million t-CO2) of Japan’s GHG emissions
in 2018, with 89% from vehicles (passenger vehicles 51%, freight 38%). According to
Climate Action Tracker, to be 1.5°C-consistent, 75–95% of new passenger vehicle sales
should consist of electric vehicles (EVs) by 2030, increasing to 100% by 2040, and theentire transport sector needs to be decarbonized, with emissions intensity decreasing
15–20% by 2030, 45–60% by 2040, and 75–100% by 2050.23 Based on the need for a rapidtransition to EV vehicles and modal shift, Japan should aim through the following measures
to reduce CO2 emissions from the transport sector relative to 2013 by at least 50% by
2030 and by at least 75% by 2040, with the sector completely decarbonized by 2050.
• Cars and trucks

Passenger mobility should shift from cars to a transportation infrastructure centered onwalking, cycling, and public transport. And freight transport should undergo a modal shift
from truck to rail and ship, and through greater efficiency in distribution, passenger andfreight volumes transported by car and truck should be reduced.24 Passenger vehicles(personal use and commercial use) should be regulated so that electric vehicles (EV or
PHEV) account for 100% of new sales by 2030, and all new sales are 100% electric vehicles
23
24

Ibid. Footnote 5.

Compared to truck transport, CO2 emissions (per ton-kilometer of transport volume) are reduced to one-eleventh by rail, and one-sixth by ship.

20

by 2035 (EV only, with plug-in hybrids excluded in 2035). From 2035 onward, 100% of
diesel- and gasoline-powered buses and trucks should be electric (with the exception ofheavy-duty trucks), and from 2040 onward, 100% of new heavy-duty truck sales should beelectric, with all fleets electric by 2050.
Although some hydrogen-powered fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) have been commercialized,
EVs are overwhelmingly superior as passenger vehicles in terms of cost, technology
diffusion, and infrastructure development. Hydrogen should be prioritized for use inheavy-duty transport and in other sectors where electrification is difficult, but only on thecondition that it comes from the use of surplus electricity generated by renewable energy.
Additionally, to promote emission reductions in the transpor t sector throughelectrification, it is essential to have 50% of the electricity supply coming from renewableenergy by 2030, and 100% by 2050.
•Transportation other than cars and trucks

For non-electrified sections of passenger rail lines, battery- and fuel-cell-powered railcars are already being used in Japan, but efforts should be made to ensure that theelectricity comes from renewable energy. Small electric-powered vessels are alreadyin service overseas, and this seems possible in Japan as well. For large ships andaircraft, technologies are currently being developed. Moving toward 2050, carbon-freetechnologies should be introduced for large ships and aviation in order to achieve complete
decarbonization of the transport sector.
(d) Industrial sector

In the industrial sector, we propose that efforts focus on the following major emitting
industries, with target reductions of at least 65% by 2030 relative to 2013, and at least 80%
by 2040.
• Iron and steel industry

The iron and steel industry accounted for 11% (135.5 million t-CO2) of Japan’s GHG
emissions in FY2018, making it the top emitter in the industrial sector. Coking coal isneeded today for blast furnace reduction processes in steel manufacturing, producing
enormous CO2 emissions. 25 Decarbonization of the steel industry is a very importantpriority. In other countries, the use of electric arc furnaces is expanding and zero-carbon
technologies are being developed, such as the use of hydrogen for reduction processes.
25 In Basic Policy of the Japan steel industry on 2050 Carbon Neutrality aimed by the Japanese government(February 15, 2021) the Japan Iron and Steel Federation declares its intention of working to realize “zerocarbon steel,” saying, “the Japanese steel industry will explore multiple pathways to the challenge by

employing every possible means including, our actively ongoing efforts for the drastic reduction of CO2

emissions from blast furnace through COURSE 50 and ferro coke technologies plus CCUS (carbon capture,utilization, and storage), development of super innovative technologies such as hydrogen-based iron making,expanded use of scrap, recovery of low- to medium-temperature waste heat, and use of biomass.” However,what is missing is its own commitment to be carbon-free by 2050.

21

On the consumption side, actions are being taken toward using only decarbonized steel by
2050.
According to Climate Action Tracker, on a global level, the CO2 emissions intensity of steel
production needs to decrease below 2015 levels by 25–30% by 2030, and by 95–100% by
2050.26
For the near future, it would be reasonable for Japan to promote the electrification of
furnaces and to expand the use of electricity generated by renewable energy. Japan should
decrease the volume of iron and steel production by focusing on domestic demand andon applications where domestic production is really necessary, and decommission blast
furnaces when it is deemed technically feasible to continue iron and steel production using
only electric furnaces. With this, the market share of production from electric arc furnaces
using recycled steel should be increased to 70% by 2030, 85% by 2040, and at least
90% by 2050. Japan should strive to reach the targets earlier through the developmentof carbon-free technologies, such as reduction by hydrogen. In terms of policies, thePetroleum and Coal Tax should be applied to coking coal (which is currently subject totax exemptions), and the tax rate should be gradually increased. As for steel from blast
furnaces, its use for public works and public construction projects should be banned,
and its use for construction purposes should be abolished as soon as possible. The useof thermal coal and anthracite should be banned from 2030 onward, and the use of allcoal, including coking coal, from 2050 onward. Through all of the above, CO2 emissions
intensity should be reduced by 65% by 2030, 80% by 2040, and 90–100% by 2050, andCO2 emissions by at least 70% by 2030, and at least 90% by 2040.
• Chemical industry

Emissions from the chemical industry (including petroleum and coal products) in
FY2018 were approximately 57 million t-CO2, accounting for 5% of Japan’s GHG emissions(indirect emissions including electricity were about the same). The chemical industry
produces a wide variety of products, but the use of plastics should be decreased, waste
should be reduced, and efficiency should be improved in a variety of applications in order
to significantly reduce resource inputs. A number of measures should be accelerated,
including equipment upgrades, electrification and hydrogen use in naphtha pyrolysis
processes at medium and high temperatures, and waste heat utilization in low-temperature
distillation processes.27 Whereas the Action Plan for a Low-Carbon Society of the Japan
Chemical Industry Association indicates a reduction of 6.79 million t-CO2 (10.7% reduction)by 2030 relative to FY2013, we call for a 50% reduction target by 2030 relative to FY2013,
a 70% reduction by 2040, and complete decarbonization by 2050.

26
27

Ibid. Footnote 5.

Institute of Applied Energy, Prospects for industrial heat decarbonization in energy systems, March 31,
2020 (in Japanese). Ref.: https://www.jst.go.jp/sip/dl/p08/report2019_4.pdf

22• Cement industry

Energy-related CO2 emissions in FY2018 from the cement manufacturing industry(including ceramic products) were about 25 million t-CO2 , or about 2% of total GHG
emissions (indirect emissions including electricity came to 31 million t-CO2, or 2.5% ofJapan’s total). Counted separately, emissions from industrial processes were about 34
million t-CO2, or about 3% of GHG emissions. Energy-related CO2 emissions have continued
to decline, with a 43% decrease relative to FY1990 and a 13% decrease relative to FY2013.
Similarly, emissions from industrial processes have decreased by 32% relative to FY1990
and by 4% relative to FY2013.28
According to Climate Action Tracker, the global emissions intensity of cement productionneeds to decrease by 40% by 2030 and 85–90% (aspirational target -100%) by 2050 inorder to be 1.5°C-consistent.
It is challenging for Japan to make further improvements in energy intensity — it isalready somewhat ahead of other countries — and CCUS should not be relied upon. Taking
this into account, Japan should set a target of reducing energy-related CO2 emissions
for the cement manufacturing industry by 40% by 2030 and 50% by 2040, through the
reduced use of resources (by improving the efficiency of material utilization), electrification,and reduced energy intensity, and by 2050 should achieve complete decarbonization
through technology development for hydrogen use and other technologies. Technologicaldevelopment should be promoted for applications where the decarbonization of industrial
processes is difficult for non-energy-related CO2 emissions.
• Pulp and paper industry

CO2 emissions from the pulp and paper manufacturing industry in FY2018 amounted to
18 million t-CO2, or 1.5% of GHG emissions (indirect emissions including electricity cameto 22 million t-CO2, or 2% of Japan’s total). In terms of current measures, the Japan Paper
Association has set a voluntary target of a 21% reduction by FY2030 relative to FY2013,
with the actual reduction as of FY2019 at 11.8% (16.58 million t-CO2). In January 2021, theJapan Paper Association declared a goal of net zero emissions in 2050,29 from what was 21
million t-CO2 in FY2013, including 3 million t-CO2 of waste-related emissions. However, theuse of CCUS is anticipated to help achieve these targets. CCUS will be unable to contributeto any reduction by 2030, and since there are no clear prospects for the technology even
thereafter, targets should not rely on CCUS. Instead, the pulp and paper industry should
promote energy conservation and renewable energy, and set a target for CO2 emission
reductions of 50% by 2030 relative to FY2013, 80% by 2040, and zero emissions by 2050.
28 Low-Carbon Society Action Plan, Phase II, released by the Japan Cement Association in December 2014(https://www.jcassoc.or.jp/cement/4pdf/jg1k_03.pdf, in Japanese) states that it had set a target of 3,334

MJ/t-cem by 2030 to reduce the energy intensity of cement production by 4% relative to FY2010, but the29

actual results in FY2018 (3,328 MJ/t-cem) already achieved this goal.

Japan Paper Association, The paper industry’s long-term vision 2050 for global warming countermeasures,

January 2021. https://www.jpa.gr.jp/file/topics/20210119062903-1.pdf

23

• Non-material manufacturing industries

For the non-material manufacturing industries (including food manufacturing andequipment manufacturing, etc., and excluding the four materials-related industries andnon-ferrous metal smelting), CO2 emissions in FY2018 amounted to 32 million t-CO2 indirect emissions, or about 2.6% of total GHG emissions (about 8.6% of indirect emissions
including electricity). Emissions from thermal power plants for purchased electricity
accounted for most of the 6% difference between direct and indirect emissions, and thisamount can be reduced to zero by transitioning to electricity from renewable energy.
Direct emissions are the result of fossil fuel consumption for the use of heat in factories.
Of this, for heat utilization at 200°C or lower, emissions should be reduced to zero bytransitioning to heat from renewable energy, or by electrification and transitioning toelectricity from renewable energy. Only a small portion of the emissions are from the useof high-temperature heat, and for these applications, electric heating should use electricity
from renewables, or technologies should be developed. Based on the above, non-material
manufacturing industries should set a target of a 50% reduction by 2030 relative toFY2013, a 75% reduction by 2040, and complete decarbonization by 2050.
• Non-manufacturing industries

CO2 emissions from non-manufacturing industries (agriculture, forestry and fisheries,
mining, construction) in FY2018 amounted to 18 million t-CO2 (indirect emissions: 22
million t-CO2), or about 2% of Japan’s GHG emissions. Although emissions have declined by
34% relative to FY1990, emissions from agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and construction
increased again since 2013–2014, so the reduction has been only 4% relative to FY2013.
Fossil fuel consumption for use in agricultural greenhouses should be transitioned torenewable energy by measures such as a transition to solar thermal and biomass heating,the use of geothermal and groundwater, and the use of electricity from renewable energy
for electric heat pumps. Energy conservation measures should be promoted for equipment
in agriculture and forestry industries, the mining industry, construction equipment, andfishing boats in the fishing industry. In addition, electrification and a transition to the use ofelectricity from renewables should be promoted. Based on the above, the target reductions
relative to FY2013 in the non-manufacturing sectors should be 50% by 2030, 75% by 2040,
and complete decarbonization by 2050.
(e) Residential and commercial sectors

CO2 emissions from the residential sector in FY2018 amounted to 52 million t-CO2,
or 4.2% of GHG emissions, a reduction of 13.5% relative to FY2013 (indirect emissions
including electricity were 170 million t-CO2, or 13.5% of GHG emissions, a 20.3% reduction
from FY2013).
CO2 emissions from the commercial sector in FY2018 amounted to 69 million t-CO2, or
5.5% of GHG emissions, a reduction of 33.7% relative to FY2013 (indirect emissions including
electricity amounted to 200 million t-CO2, or 16% of GHGs, a 15.2% reduction from FY2013).

24

In both sectors, a decline in electricity demand has contributed significantly to the
reductions seen to date, and further emission reductions can be expected as more
renewable energy is introduced in the coming years. In addition, measures targeting houses
and buildings, equipment and facilities, play an important role in these sectors.
According to the government’s 2016 National Climate Action Plan, the target for 2030
is a 39% reduction relative to FY2013 in the residential sector (122 million t-CO2 in indirectemissions), and a 40% reduction in the commercial sector (168 million t-CO2 in indirectemissions). If reductions continue at this pace, the targets are expected to be met, but
further efforts going forward should result in reduced emissions from the residential sector
relative to FY2013 of 65% by 2030 and 80% by 2040, and from the commercial sector, 70%
by 2030 and 85% by 2040. Both sectors should achieve complete decarbonization by 2050.
• Houses and buildings

It is crucial to take early action for houses and buildings because once constructed, theiremissions will continue over a long period of time. Currently, average targets have been
set to have all newly-built buildings and houses be Net Zero Energy Buildings (ZEBs) and
Net Zero Energy Houses (ZEHs) by 2030. The scope of compliance with energy-efficiency
standards for newly-built houses and buildings has been expanded with the gradual
implementation of the amended Building Energy Efficiency Act,30 but no regulations apply
to new buildings with floor areas less than 300 m² (only the obligation to explain how they
comply with energy-efficiency standards), so new construction with poor thermal insulationis still permitted. Furthermore, measures for the renovation of existing houses and buildings
are still inadequate, leaving much room for further reductions.
According to Climate Action Tracker, in order to be 1.5°C-consistent, energy efficiency
renovations of existing residential and commercial buildings should proceed at an annual
pace of 3.5%, and by 2040 energy intensity should be reduced by 90% for residential and
90–95% for commercial buildings. Furthermore, all newly constructed buildings shouldbe net zero emission buildings starting immediately. In Japan, where the ratio of new
construction is higher than in other developed countries, 100% of new construction should
be ZEB or ZEH by 2025, and for existing buildings — including public facilities, public
housing, detached houses, apartment buildings, and small and medium-sized buildings —energy efficiency renovations should proceed at an annual pace of at least 2%, so that by
2050 all stock will have been converted to ZEB or ZEH and completely carbon-free.
• Equipment and facilities

To achieve zero emissions from houses and buildings, equipment and facilities in theresidential and commercial sectors should be subject to stronger actions to improve energy
efficiency and apply energy-saving strategies. Additionally, where oil or gas are being used,30

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), Outline of the Act on the Improvement ofEnergy Consumption Performance of Buildings (Building Energy Efficiency Act) [in Japanese],https://www.mlit.go.jp/policy/shingikai/content/001315639.pdf

25

electrification and a transition to electricity from renewables should be promoted, as well as
the use of heat from renewable energy heat (solar thermal, etc.).
(f) Waste and plastics

Waste emissions (including energy use) accounted for 2.3% (29 million t-CO2) ofgreenhouse gas emissions in FY2018. Three-quarters of the waste plastics incinerated
are reportedly used for heat, but incineration also emits CO2. The reduction of waste
involves many actions by many actors, such as the selection and reduced consumptionof raw materials by businesses and reductions in the amount disposed. On the userside, changes are necessary regarding the purchasing and use of a multitude of items,
including manufactured products and food, as well as changes in reducing the amountof garbage generated, including plastics and food loss. Together, these will lead to a
reduction in methane released from landfills and CO2 emissions from incineration. In thewaste sector, all actors should take stronger actions, with changes in materials used(including a substitution of petroleum-derived plastics with carbon-zero materials by 2050),
electrification, heat utilization, and transitioning to renewable energy. Through all of these
efforts, CO2 emission targets for this sector relative to FY2013 should be a 50% reduction
by 2030, 75% reduction by 2040, and zero emissions by 2050.
(g) F-gases (4 fluorinated gases)

Fluorinated gases used as CFC alternatives such as HFCs, PFCs, SF6 and NF3 are verystrong greenhouse gases. Among them, HFCs are mainly used as a refrigerant, and theiremissions have been rising at a dramatic pace (46.4% up from 2013), now accounting
for 4% of all GHG emissions. Replacements for HFCs are available for uses other thanas refrigerants (except for some uses such as in medical applications), so they shouldbe immediately banned for use in open and semi-open systems such as sprays, playequipment, and thermal insulation. Additionally, in the rapidly increasing refrigerant
category, there should be a quick transition to natural refrigerants and proper recovery ofHFCs, with the target of reducing emissions back to FY2013 levels by 2030 (about half of
FY2018 levels), and zero emissions in 2050. Meanwhile, PFCs, SF6, and NF3 are used mainly
for semiconductor manufacturing and electrical insulation and are reportedly difficult toreplace, but 100% of atmospheric releases should be prevented through bans on theiruse in open systems and in equipment with no gas recovery capability, through proper
recovery during use, and by limiting their use to closed systems only. F-gas-free alternative
substances should be introduced well in advance of 2050. Based on the above points,
emissions reductions of all F-gases relative to FY2013 should be 15% by 2030 and 70% by
2040, and emissions should be reduced completely to zero by 2050.
(h) CO2 from industrial processes, methane, and nitrous oxide

Non-energy-related CO2 emissions include emissions from industrial processes, waste(e.g., combustion of plastics and waste oil), agriculture (chemical fertilizers), and indirect

26

emissions (e.g., CO2 production from methane and non-methane hydrocarbons due to fossil
fuel consumption, etc.). Of these, waste-related CO2 is covered in Section (f).
CO2 emission reductions from industrial processes, such as cement, lime, and glass
manufacturing are not easy to achieve. Among these, the largest emissions are from
cement and lime, and they should be reduced by scaling down production volumes throughmore efficient use of materials and streamlined design. About half of lime used is in blast
furnaces for steel manufacturing, so reducing blast furnace steelmaking will also reduce
CO2 emissions related to lime in industrial processes. Indirect emissions should be reduced
through timely reductions in fossil fuel consumption.
Methane and nitrous oxide emissions come from fossil fuel combustion and leakage,
agriculture, and waste.
Emissions from fossil fuel combustion and leakage can be reduced by phasing out theuse of fossil fuels. In agriculture, methane and nitrous oxide emissions should be reduced
through better management of livestock waste. For methane emissions from paddy fields,
methane emissions from livestock, and nitrous oxide emissions from agricultural soils,
methods are being developed to reduce emissions. With a view toward the sustainability ofagriculture, emissions from agricultural sources should be cut in half by 2050, with otheremissions reduced to as close to zero as possible, through efficiency improvements andother measures.

(3) Emissions projections based on the measures proposed
Based on the proposed measures and targets covered in Section (2) above, and taking
into account some reductions in resource consumption due to an expected declining
population and more efficient use of materials, a scenario was formulated projecting GHG
emissions up to 2050 with the proposed measures in Table 4 being implemented.
Calculated from estimates based on the scenarios summarized in the table above were
a 70% reduction in energy-related CO2 emissions in 2030 relative to FY2013, a 90%
reduction in 2040, a 98% reduction in 2050 (using existing technologies), and a 100%
reduction in 2050 (with new technologies). As for non-energy-related CO2 emissions and
GHGs other than CO2, emissions relative to 2013 would be reduced 30–37% in 2030, 58–
68% in 2040, and 83–92% in 2050.
All combined, the projected GHG emission reductions relative to FY2013 would be 63–
65% by 2030, 84–86% by 2040, and 98–99% by 2050. Under this scenario, GHG emissions
in 2050 are projected to be about 15 million t-CO2.
This 15 million t-CO2 (about 1% of FY2013 emissions) could become net zero throughoffsetting with forest sinks (see Column 3). However, since Japan has limited potential forsequestration through forests or other means, and because the calculation of carbon
sinks is complex, it would be preferable to seek to introduce reduction measures andtechnologies that include non-energy-related CO2 emissions, and aim to achieve net zero
without relying on sequestration.

27

Table 4. Summary of measures covered in Kiko Network's proposal

Sector, gas, etc.

2030

2040

Power

・ LNG 50%, renewableenergy 50%
・ Coal, oil, and nuclear
phased out

・ LNG 20%, renewableenergy 80%

・ Renewable energy
100%・ Reduced energy
intensity
・ Reduced production
due to more efficientuse・ Steelmaking: Electric
furnace ratio >80%,
CO2 emissions cut
85%
・ Chemicals: CO2
emissions cut 70%
・ Cement: Energyrelated CO2 emissions
cut 50%・ Pulp and paper: CO2
emissions cut 80%

・ Reduced energy
intensity
・ Reduced production
due to more efficientuse・ Steelmaking: Electric
furnace ratio >90%
・ All industrial sectors
decarbonized, throughexisting technologies
and R&D
・ Electricity and heatutilization fromrenewable energy
100%

Industrial

・ Reduced energy
intensity
・ Reduced production
due to more efficientuse・ Steelmaking: Electric
furnace ratio >70%,
Material
CO2 emissions cut
70%
manufacturing
・ Chemicals: CO2
emissions cut 50%
・ Cement: Energyrelated CO2 emissions
cut 40%・ Pulp and paper: CO2
emissions cut 50%

2050

・ Electrification
・ Electrification
・ Electrification
・ Electricity from・ Electricity and heat・ Electricity from
Non-material
renewable energy 80% from renewable
renewable energy 50%
manufacturing
・ CO2 emissions cut 50% ・ CO2 emissions cut 75% energy 100%・ Decarbonized・ Electrification
・ Electrification
・ Electrification
・ Electricity from・ Electricity and heat・ Electricity fromrenewable energy 80% from renewable
renewable energy 50%
Non・ CO2 emissions cut 50% ・ CO2 emissions cut 75% energy 100%
manufacturing
・ Electrification offisheries (boats), etc.
・ Decarbonized

Residential andcommercial

Transport

・ Improved efficiency
・ Improved efficiency
・ Improved efficiency
of equipment andof equipment andof equipment andfacilities
facilities
facilities
・ 100% ZEB/ZEH
・ 100% of buildings
・ 100% ZEB/ZEH
energy-efficient new(including existing) areenergy-efficient new
houses and buildings
ZEH/ZEBhouses and buildings
・ Energy efficiency
・ Decarbonized
・ Energy efficiency
improvement (>2%/
improvement (2%/year) for existingyear) for existinghouses and buildings
houses and buildings
・ CO2 emissions cut 50% ・ CO2 emissions cut 75%

・ 100% of new vehicles ・ Transition to EV buses, ・ Complete thetransition to EV cars
trucksare EVs (by 2035 forand trucks
・ Emission reductions
PHVs)
per distance covered ・ Modal shift
・ Modal shift (walking,・ Electrification of small
・ Modal shift (walking,cycling, public
vessels, etc.
cycling, public
transportation)
・ New technologies
・ CO2 emissions cut 50% transportation)
・ CO2 emissions cut 75% for large ships andaviation・ All modes oftransportation
decarbonized28Sector, gas, etc.

Non-energy-related CO2
emissions

MethaneNitrous oxide

HFCs

PFCs, SF6, NF3

2030

2040

2050

・ More efficient・ Plastic waste reduced
・ More efficientmaterials use to cut
through more efficientmaterials use to cut
plastic wastematerials use
plastic waste
・ CO2 emissions from・ CO2 emissions from・ CO2 emissions fromindustrial processes
industrial processes
industrial processes
cut by higher materials reduced through more
reduced through moreuse efficiency, reduced efficient materials use
efficient materials use
use of blast furnaces
and reduced use of
and reduced use of・ Reduced indirect
blast furnaces
blast furnaces
CO2 emissions from・ Reduced indirect
・ Reduced indirect
methane- and nonCO2 emissions fromCO2 emissions frommethane- and nonmethane- and nonmethane hydrocarbon
methane hydrocarbon
methane hydrocarbon
by cutting fossil fuelby cutting fossil fuelby cutting fossil fuel
use
use
use

・ Livestock waste
・ Livestock waste
・ Livestock waste
management
management
management
・ Paddy field methane・ Paddy field methane・ Paddy field methaneand ruminant livestockand ruminant livestock
management (e.g.,management
management
enhanced mid-season
・ CO2 emissions cut 50% ・ CO2 emissions cut 70%
aeration)・ CO2 emissions cut 30%

・ Livestock waste
・ Livestock waste
・ Livestock waste
management
management
management
・ Agricultural soil・ Agricultural soil・ Agricultural soil
management
management
management
・ CO2 emissions cut 30% ・ CO2 emissions cut 50% ・ CO2 emissions cut 70%
Refrigerants
Refrigerants
・ Emission 100% cut
・ Reduce emissions to ・ CO2 emissions cut 50% (recovery rate 100%)
・ Complete transition to ・ Complete elimination
the level of FY2013
natural refrigerants in・ Complete transition toof F-gases fromalternative refrigerants air conditioners
existing F-gas
for refrigerators and ・ Recovery rate 60%
equipment
Semiconductor, liquid
freezers
Semiconductor, liquid
crystal manufacturing
・ Recovery rate 60%
crystal manufacturing
・ Require gas recovery ・ Require gas recovery
Non-refrigerants
equipment, enhance(sprays, insulation,equipment, enhance
regulations to control
solvents, cleaners,
regulations to control
leakageetc.)leakage
Leakage during HFC
・ Ban use
production
Semiconductor, liquid
crystal manufacturing ・ Prohibit new
manufacturing
・ Require gas recovery
equipment, introduce
regulations to control
leakage

Magnesium casting,
PFCs, SF6, NF3 leakage Semiconductor
accelerators
・ Prohibit new
manufacturing,・ Ban any use other than manufacture
insulators
semiconductor liquid
Semiconductor
・ Transition to
crystal manufacturing
manufacturing,alternative substances
and insulating
insulators
equipment
・ Ban all except essential
Semiconductor
uses or in closed
manufacturing,systems, target 100%
insulators
recovery rate・ Ban all except essential
uses or in closed
systems, target 100%
recovery rate
Prepared by Kiko Network

29

COLUMN

3

The role of forests: Focus on sound forest management, notcarbon sinks

The Paris Agreement, like the Kyoto Protocol, allows for the utilization ofincreases in anthropogenic sinks from changes in forestry and other land
uses to offset emissions. The word “net” in “net zero” refers to balancing
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks.
However, forests are already well-established in Japan, and very little land isavailable for afforestation. Thus, no significant increases in CO2 sequestration
by forests can be expected, even with extensive human intervention andmanagement. Japan's reported forest sinks in FY2018 amounted to 47 million
tons, but this amount is the total forest sequestration in Japan, not actually
an increase in sequestration due to human intervention. The official numbers
include non-additional sequestration, and thus it is not appropriate to use
the full amount to offset CO2 emissions. The numbers presented here in our
proposal do not include sinks from forest management. However, if Japan
were to conduct extensive forest thinning and other forest management in
the future and about one-third of the government-reported amount (i.e., 16
million t-CO2) was recognized as additional sinks, under our present proposal,
the remaining 1% (i.e., 15 million t-CO2) could hypothetically be used as offsets,making it possible to reach net zero.
In any case, forest sinks cannot be significantly relied upon as a part ofJapan's domestic climate policies. The majority of Japan’s forests are planted,
and Japan needs to manage its forest resources properly to make use of
the multiple functions of forests, not just for carbon sinks. To maintain its
abundant green cover in 2050, Japan needs to properly care for and manage
its forests through a diverse set of strategies, including thinning programs andother aspects of forest management, sound forest industry operations anddevelopment, and the utilization of forest resources.

30

(4) Proposed GHG emission reduction targets based on Kiko
Network estimates
Based on the fact that our future projections of GHG emissions in line with the proposed
measures show that significant reductions are indeed possible, we propose GHG emission
gas reduction targets of at least –60% relative to FY2013 by 2030, at least –80% by 2040,
and net zero by 2050 (line in Figure 3). A particularly important point is that a sufficient
reduction is needed by 2030 to achieve the 1.5°C goal. Our proposed emission reduction
targets by sector and by type of gas are shown in Table 5. Our proposed targets for Japan
in 2030 and 2040 are slightly less ambitious than the potential emission reductions we
calculated. On the other hand, for 2050, we propose a more ambitious target of zero that
includes non-energy-related CO2 emissions, etc., to be achieved through the application of
new technologies.

Greenhouse gas emissions［Mt-CO₂］

1600
1400
1200
1000
800

▲60%

(relative to 2013)

600
400

▲80%

(relative to 2013)

200
0

▲100%

1990

2013

2018

2030

2040

2050

■Energy-related CO₂ ■Other GHGs ━■━ Proposed targets
Figure 3. Emission reduction scenario and targets proposed by Kiko Network
Prepared by Kiko Network
Note: The bars in the graph are projected emissions from the cumulative effects of our proposals, and the line
shows our proposed emission reduction targets

31

Table 5. Proposed emission reduction targets, by sector and by gas

Government
target**(relative to2013)

Actual*(relative to 2013)

SectorIndirect emissions (Mt-CO2)

Kiko Network proposal

1990

2013

2018

2030

2030

2040

2050

Energy-related
CO2

1068

1235

1059
(-14.2%)927(-25%)

437(-65%)

165(-85%)

0

Industrial

503

463

398
(-14.0%)401(-13%)

152(-67%)

80(-83%)

0Commercial and
other

130

238

196
(-17.6%)158(-34%)

70(-71%)

35(-85%)

0

Residential

131

208

166
(-20.3%)

122(-41%)

70(-66%)

40(-81%)

0

Transport

207

224

210
(-6.2%)

163(-27%)

120(-47%)

40(-82%)

0

Energyconversion(indirect
emissions)

96.2

103

89.4
-

73
(-24%)

25(-76%)

10(-90%)

0

Energyconversion(direct
emissions)

348

526

456
(-13.3%)-

170(-68%)

70(-87%)

0Non-energyrelated CO2

96.3

81.7

78.5
(-3.9%)

70.8(-14%)

55(-33%)

39(-52%)

6(-93%)

Methane

44.4

32.5

29.9
(-8.2%)

31.6
(-3%)

21.6
(-34%)

16(-51%)

8(-75%)

Nitrous oxide

31.9

21.5

20.0
(-7.0%)

21.1
(-2%)

13.2
(-39%)

8(-63%)

2(-91%)

F-gases

35.4

39.1

52.8
(+35.1%)

28.9(-26%)

33.2(-15%)

12(-71%)

0(-100%)

HFCs

15.9

32.1

PFCs

6.5

3.3

SF6

12.9

2.1

NF3

0.03

1.6

Total GHGs

1275.51410.1

47.0

21.6

32.0

11.6

0

(+46.4%)(-33%)(-0.3%)(-64%)(-100%)

3.5

4.2

0.2

0.1

0

(+6.3%)(+27%)(-94%)(-97%)(-100%)

2.0

2.7

0.8

0.2

0

(-1.6%)(+26%)(-62%)(-91%)(-100%)

0.3

0.5

0.2

0.1

0

(-82.5%)(-31%)(-88%)(-94%)(-100%)

1240.4(-12.0%)1079.4***(-23%)

560(-60%)

280(-80%)

0 ～ 15(-99–
100%)* From FY2018 Greenhouse Gas Inventory.
Prepared by Kiko Network** From National Climate Action Plan (2016).
*** After Japan's National Climate Action Plan was adopted (2016), the FY2013 emissions were revised, the result
being that the numbers shown in this table do not amount to a 26% reduction relative to FY2013.

32

■■■

5. 10 Key Policy Actions■■■(1) Legislate targets and processes to enhance themJapan should clearly state its GHG emission reduction targets in legislation, including the2050 net zero target and short-term targets. Additionally, the process of setting five-year
reduction targets should also be included in legislation to ensure that GHG emissions are
kept within the limits of a science-based net zero carbon budget in 2050.
The targets are as follows:• GHG emission reduction targets:		At least -60% by 2030 relative to 2013 (or -56% relative to 1990)

		At least -80% by 2040 relative to 2013 (or -78% relative to 1990)

		

Net zero by 2050

• Energy efficiency targets:		

-40% in final energy consumption by 2030, -55% by 2040, and -70% by 2050

• Renewable energy targets		

At least 50% of electricity mix by 2030, 80% by 2040, and 100% by 2050

		

At least 25% of primary energy supply by 2030, 55% by 2040, and 90–100% by
2050

These targets should be given equal priority in Japan's National Climate Action Plan andStrategic Energy Plan, should be made mutually consistent when either plan is updated, andshould be enhanced every five years.

(2) Introduce carbon pricing
Carbon pricing is a means of putting a price on carbon. This can include approaches suchas proportionately applying carbon taxes to CO2 emissions, or imposing limits for specified
actors as emissions allowances and combining with emissions trading. This system isbased on the polluter pays principle (PPP), which places the burden on the emitters of
CO2 and serves as an economic means to promote cost-effective measures by each actor.
International organizations such as the United Nations and OECD are advocating for thisapproach as a crucial means of decarbonizing the economy, because carbon pricing canaccelerate efforts to move way from fossil fuels by promoting energy efficiency by every
actor and transitioning to renewable energy, as well as promote technological innovationand various system changes.
The “Report of the High-level Commission on Carbon Prices” prepared with assistance33

from the World Bank,31 recommended a carbon price of $50–100 USD/t-CO2 (about 5,000–
10,000 yen/t-CO2) in 2030 to be consistent with Paris Agreement goals. Some national andsub-national governments in Europe and North America, China and Korea are promoting
CO2 emission reductions using measures such as carbon taxes and emissions trading, andthe European Union is preparing to introduce a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.
Japan introduced a tax for climate change mitigation in 2012, but the added cost is only
289 yen/t-CO2 for fossil fuels, which is far below a level that can have any meaningful impact
on emissions.
In terms of measures, the usual choice is between a carbon tax or an emissions trading
system, but a tax is preferable because it has the effect of applying carbon pricing toa broad range of actors, does not involve the arbitrariness of determining emission
allowances, and has low administrative costs.
Based on the above points and recommendations of the High-level Commission, we arerecommending that Japan revises its existing taxation system to introduce a carbon tax
and adopt legislation to gradually increase it to the equivalent of 10,000 yen/t-CO2 in 2030.
In the development of such a taxation system, fundamental tax reforms are also neededin order to incorporate the concept of revenue neutral. That would mean, for example,
returning a portion of carbon tax revenues to low-income groups through social security.
After 2030, the system should be enhanced based on progress made on decarbonizationin the power sector, industrial sector, and so on.

(3) Set targets to end electricity generation from fossil fuels
and nuclear power
To achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, Japan should move ahead, withdetermination, to completely phase out coal-fired power generation by 2030. Japan should
also phase out all nuclear power due to its safety risks and numerous other issues, including
serious concerns about social and economic damage in the event of a major accident, andproblems with the disposal of radioactive waste. The government should set targets tocompletely retire all coal-fired and nuclear power plants by 2030.
This would mean a temporary increase in the ratio of LNG-fired power generation, but
no new plants need to be built beyond what already exists today. As for LNG-fired power
generation, the government should adopt a policy to terminate any new projects and should
adopt the targets of limiting LNG to no more than 50% of the power mix by 2030, 20% by
2040, and zero by 2050.

31

Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, “Report of the High-level Commission on Carbon Prices,” 2017.
https://www.carbonpricingleadership.org/report-of-the-highlevel-commission-on-carbon-prices

34

(4) Adopt policies for a just transition
To realize net zero emissions by 2050, Japan must implement bold reforms for thetransition away from the fossil fuel-dependent social and economic systems that havesurvived since the Industrial Revolution, and toward new, decarbonized social andeconomic systems. This will mean a transformation of the resource-consuming economic
systems that are reaching their limits today, the design of cities, and the way we live.
Additionally, emissions must be reduced in all sectors — including the power, industrial,
transport, household and commercial sectors — and the transition must be made to local,
decentralized products and services that consume little energy and provide new value forsociety.
As the foundation for its policies, the government should build comprehensive programsfor this bold transformation of the economy, society and employment, and needs to put inplace sufficient budgetary measures and policies to this end.
•Institutional arrangement of government for policies to promote a just transition
Since the topics associated with a just transition for jobs are distributed across multiple

sections of government (Ministry of the Environment, Ministry of Economy, Trade andIndustry, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, etc.), some issues tend to fall between
departments. Thus, the government should establish institutional arrangements, develop
strategies, and implement actions to deal with decarbonization-related employment
issues. Impacts on the economy and jobs differ by community, so when municipalities
and other levels of local government develop regional plans, they should consider andimplement the necessary measures to deal with those impacts and job transition. For policy
implementation, forums and opportunities for dialogue are needed where affected workers,
local governments, and citizens can participate.
• Budgetary measures for just transition policies

The transition to a decarbonized society can offer a variety of benefits for the economy,jobs, and communities (Column 4). Proper actions are needed in the transition process,particularly in energy-intensive industries, to facilitate the just transition to decarbonizedjobs and serve as a bridge to the creation of new, clean employment opportunities. The
government should provide systemic support for the development of decarbonizedindustries, technical assistance, vocational training, and unemployment compensation for
the transition. Some of the funding for all of this could come from the tax revenues fromcarbon pricing.

35

COLUMN

4

Decarbonization benefits for the economy, jobs,
and communities

The transition to a decarbonized society can help avert the climate crisis,
sustain society and the economy under a stable climate, and foster prosperity
for people and society. All people will benefit from this. Decarbonization can at
the same time be a plus for the economy, and governments are realizing that
responses to climate change do not have to negatively impact the economy.
The transition to local energy systems can create new business opportunities
and jobs, and create synergies to help tackle a variety of local issues.
Many international organizations have also projected broad increases in
employment from the transition to renewable energy. In Japan, the FutureGroup's “Report 2030” states that while there were about 200,000 workers(including about 50,000 in the nuclear industry) in six sectors in 2019 thatwould be affected by the energy-related impacts of a just transition (power,
oil refining, iron and steel, chemicals, cement, and pulp and paper), 270,000
workers were in jobs in renewable energy-related businesses, and thatthrough an energy transition centered on renewable energy, there could be an
estimated increase of 2.54 million new jobs each year until 2030.32 The report
points out the following benefits:• Economic benefits: Cumulative 230 trillion yen by 2030 (increase
compared to government projected GDP)

• Job creation: About 25.44 person-years by 2030 (2.54 million
persons working per year for ten years)• Reduced energy expenditures: Cumulative savings of about 358
trillion yen by 2030 (500 trillion yen by 2050)• Avoided deaths from air pollution: 2,920 deaths (from exposure toparticulate matter PM2.5) avoided by 2030

The Renewable Energy Institute has also looked at electricity supply anddemand, as well as costs. According to its report, renewable energy levies will
peak in the first half of 2030 at 4.8 trillion yen, but they would only accountfor a portion of electricity costs. The combined price of wholesale electricity
prices and cost of renewable energy levies in 2030 are projected to be higher
in Chubu and Kansai than in 2019. However, in Tokyo the combined price in2030 is protected to be less than in 2019. If social costs are included, the total
costs in 2030 are projected to be less than in FY2019 for Japan as a whole.
32

Ibid Footnote 15.

36

(5) Adopt policies to expand renewable energy
It is exceedingly important to broadly introduce renewable energy until the target levels
are reached, in order to achieve major emission reductions by 2030. In order to expand
variable power sources to the greatest extent possible, Japan will need to reform andenhance existing systems to introduce measures and programs to increase the flexibilityof electrical power systems and accelerate the introduction of decentralized and locallymanaged renewable energy.
• Introduce carbon pricing

Carbon pricing is an important means of promoting the transition from fossil fuels to
renewable energy.
• Revise operating rules for grid connections to promote the greatest possible

introduction of renewable energy

In order to introduce the maximum possible amount of renewable energy sources, gridconnection rules should be changed to adopt a merit order system that gives priority torenewable energy for grid connections. In doing so, coal-fired and nuclear power generation
should be limited.
• Implement major reforms in electricity markets

New electricity markets have been created in Japan in recent years, such as the capacity
market, the non-fossil fuel value trading market, and the baseload power supply market, butthey actually perpetuate incentives for nuclear and coal-fired power plants. Incentives havealso been introduced that favor nuclear power and are in conflict with market liberalization
efforts. One example is how utilities are allowed to add the costs of compensation fordamage caused by nuclear plant accidents to their electricity transmission and distribution
rates.
An auction was held in the capacity market in 2020 to secure 179.4 GW of electricity
based on the assumed surplus demand of 157.6 GW in 2024, and the total contract value
based on transitional measures came to 1.6 trillion yen. The majority of these effectivelyfunction as subsidies for coal-fired and other power sources, preventing the phase-out of
inefficient coal. This market should be terminated.
The non-fossil fuel energy value trading market puts a value on electricity not only fromrenewable energy but also from nuclear power. This is from the context of the Act on the
Promotion of Use of Nonfossil Energy Sources and Effective Use of Fossil Energy Materials
by Energy Suppliers, which requires retail electricity providers to use non-fossil sources
for 44% of their electricity. A positive environmental value placed on electricity generated
from nuclear power is hindering the energy transition to renewables. Nuclear should not betreated as equivalent to the value of renewable energy and should be excluded from tradingin the future.

37

The baseload power market should also be terminated, as there is little need for amarket based on an antiquated electrical grid system that includes baseload power. Powergeneration (mainly hydro) originally developed by the government and now owned by
J-POWER and other power companies should be opened up to the wholesale electricity
market, without relying on the baseload power market.
• Heat utilization of renewable energy

Commercial facilities and factories above a certain size should be required to consider
installing solar-thermal water heating systems and other renewable energy equipment.
The government should provide support, including technical assistance such as
expert building diagnostics, for the installation of equipment to utilize renewable energy
in agricultural facilities, small and medium-sized commercial facilities, factories andhouseholds.

(6) Promote electric vehicles and a modal shift to walking,cycling, and public transportation• Introduce carbon pricing

Carbon pricing is an important measure for the entire transport sector. This includes itsrole in limiting vehicle use and encouraging a modal shift.
•Transition to EV cars and trucks

For passenger cars, a ban should be introduced in 2030 on the production and sale of
new gasoline-powered vehicles, including hybrids, in order to promote a complete transition
to EVs as well as to lighter and smaller vehicles. This should be realized through the use ofvehicle tax incentives and inspection systems, and later by a complete transition to EVs andpromotion of EV infrastructure development.
• Long-distance transport including aviation, shipping, and trucking

Incentives and support should be provided to promote electrification where possible,
such as with small vessels and trucks, etc. As Japan moves toward net zero in 2050, thegovernment should provide support in the development of hydrogen technologies foruse in aviation and large ships, but this should be limited to the use of surplus electricity
generated from renewable energy.
• Modal shift

Public support should be increased to maintain and expand public transportation systems(including bus and rail) in order to reduce energy consumption while improving passenger
and freight mobility and service. Subsidies should be increased for users in considerationof their use of public transport, in the context of the aging and declining population,
households with children, and socially vulnerable groups. Financial tools should be used to38

support urban development and infrastructure improvements that will make cycling andwalking more convenient and accessible.

(7) Strengthen regulations on housing, buildings , andequipment• Introduce carbon pricing

Carbon pricing is an important means of reaching the entirety of the residential andcommercial sectors, including measures targeting houses and buildings.
•Require new buildings to comply with energy efficiency standards and qualify as

ZEB or ZEH

The government currently plans to extend the Building Energy Efficiency Act to covermandatory compliance with energy-efficiency standards (expanding from large buildings
with a total area of 2,000 m2 to also include medium-sized buildings of 300-2,000 m2),
so it is urgent to ensure that any houses and buildings being built henceforth will comply
with energy-efficiency standards. However, even this is not sufficient. It should immediately
become mandatory for all houses and buildings to comply with the current energyefficiency standards. In addition, the current insulation standards for ZEB and ZEH are toolenient, so standards should be raised, and ZEB and ZEH for new buildings should be mademandatory by 2025.
• Require public facilities and public housing to make energy-efficiency

renovations and qualify as ZEB or ZEH

As a first step, the government should require public facilities and low-income public

housing to systematically make energy-efficiency retrofits and introduce renewable energy
systems, and as soon as possible before 2025 require new buildings to be ZEB and ZEH.
• Subsidize energy-efficiency renovations in existing houses and buildings

The government should introduce support, subsidy and exemption programs for energyefficiency renovations, to be implemented at a rate of 2% of the existing housing/building
stock per year. Systems should be established for official building specialists to conduct
diagnostics and offer advice on cost-effective retrofits. Japan should also establish anationwide system of experts to support energy-efficiency renovations and the installationof energy-efficiency equipment, and provide support and training for local building
contractors. For structures such as rental housing, detached homes, and leased buildings,
the government should make it mandatory to indicate compliance with ZEB/ZEH andinsulation standards, and this information should be disclosed to real estate agents andincluded in the "important information" sections of contracts.

39• Boost equipment efficiency

The “top-runner” standards for various types of equipment and products covered by
the Act Concerning the Rational Use of Energy should be enhanced. Additionally, insteadof having standards determined by type of equipment and size, they should be changed
to encourage decisions based on CO2 emissions by application (e.g., combine with solar
systems, rather than promoting high-efficiency water heaters powered by gas or standalone electric units), in order to encourage the introduction of equipment that uses
renewable energy and to ramp up decarbonization efforts.

(8) Adopt policies to reduce waste and plastics
To achieve zero waste and zero plastics, the use of raw materials should be reconsidered
for businesses from the manufacturing stage, and targets should be strengthened toreduce industrial and municipal waste. Regulations regarding materials should be gradually
introduced to move toward zero emissions, reaching zero by 2050. Efforts should be madeto strengthen municipal programs and measures to reduce food loss and waste plastics.

(9) Regulate F-gases
The Act on Rational Use and Appropriate Management of Fluorocarbons was enacted
in 2013. It stipulates comprehensive measures to be taken for the entire life cycle from,manufacturing to disposal, of fluorocarbons (CFCs, HCFCs, HFCs) used as refrigerants,
as well as the use of alternative substances, refrigerant management, and refrigerant
recovery, etc. However, there has been no improvement in the effectiveness of thislegislation, and related measures are exceedingly insufficient. Measures banning use of
these materials should be established for all applications (not only for refrigerants), andthe measures should apply to all stages of the material lifecycle. In terms of the recovery
rate of F-gases, government targets have not been achieved for more than two decades.
Obviously, it is not enough just to set targets. Taxes or levies need to be imposed, anddeposit systems or other economic incentives need to be created in order to boost
recovery rates.
The use of SF6, PFCs and NF3 is limited to certain applications (e.g., factory processes tomanufacture semiconductors, electrical transformers), so the government should ban theiruse except in closed systems, and institute measures to prevent leakage and require fullrecovery of these gases.

(10) Strengthen finance policies
ESG investments need to be expanded and made more rigorous to achieve ambitious
goals, so sustainable finance policies in public and private finance should be established,premised on making ESG investment consistent with the Paris Agreement. When doing40

so, it is necessary to stipulate that these investments will contribute to the realization of
not only net zero in 2050, but also halving greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. Specifically,
support for fossil fuel-related businesses should be ended, and support for unproveninnovative technologies (CCUS, hydrogen, ammonia, nuclear) should be carefully scrutinized
for consistency with the Paris Agreement (potential for reducing emissions by 2030),
cost-effectiveness vis-a-vis renewable energy technologies, technological feasibility, andsuitability. If a technology is to proceed as a part of climate actions, there should be fullassurance of accountability.
In particular, when support is being provided that involves energy-related infrastructure
and land use, the long-term impacts must be considered.
Financial institutions should establish policies and strategies to support businesses andservices that are consistent with the Paris Agreement, and require the implementation of
information disclosure based on the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related
Financial Disclosures (TCFD).

COLUMN

5

Support for developing countries: The role of Japan in theinternational community

As the world's fifth largest CO2 emitter, Japan has the responsibility to help
realize a decarbonized society not only domestically, but globally as well — it
has a role in the international community to contribute to the decarbonizationof the world. For net zero by 2050, developing countries must also decarbonize
at about the same speed as developed countries. However, many developing
countries lack the technology, human resources, and funds they need, andare also extremely vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, sothey face many difficulties in taking climate action and in adapting to climate
impacts. The government should expand its support for developing countries
through mechanisms such as long-term funding for the Green Climate Fund
(GCF) under the United Nations.
Japan should also play a role in technology development cooperation andtransfer to developing countries, but in this support Japan should make a major
shift from large-scale infrastructure exports such as coal and nuclear power
to decarbonization technologies and systems. If Japan can accelerate thetransition to decarbonization domestically, this will also foster internationallycompetitive businesses in decarbonization industries.
The use of market mechanisms for trading emission allowances throughtechnology transfers is also permitted under the Paris Agreement, but it is notincluded in the emission reduction targets proposed in this report. If market
mechanisms are used to support developing countries, they should be dealt
with separately from Japan's domestic emission reduction targets.

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6. Consensus-building andinstitutional arrangements■■■(1) Public participation
Climate change is an issue that affects everyone, and climate policies will have significant
impacts on present and future generations. To realize a decarbonized society nationallyand locally, it is important to examine not only Japan's existing government advisory council
processes, but also processes that involve people from various sectors, such as experts
and citizens in a wide range of fields. Appropriate information should be disseminatedto local communities, NGOs, and citizens affected by climate change, and it is necessary
to secure forums for participatory discussions for the creation of a decarbonized futuresociety, and to encourage various actors to proactively take action and participate.

(2) Information disclosure
For the implementation of climate-related measures and policies, actors need to be able
to access the relevant information to allow them to understand the actual status of energy
and other factors. For this, information disclosure is an absolute necessity.
In Japan today, much of the crucial information needed to understand the actual stateof emissions associated with business activities is not disclosed. For example, muchinformation related to electricity generation is not being disclosed (e.g., generation capacity
and utilization rates at each power plant, emissions of CO2 and other air pollutants, detailsof each power suppliers’ electricity supply plans and emission reduction plans). This
failure to disclose puts up major obstacles for anyone trying to consider the appropriate
CO2 emission reduction measures and contribute to the development of plans for adecarbonized energy transition. Moreover, it is currently impossible to objectively verify therecovery rates for F-gases, because no actual data, by substance or by use, is currently
being published regarding import, production, and consumption volumes.
In order for anyone — not only the government, but also outside experts and the public— to objectively examine policies, past and present measures, and the potential resultsof future measures, it is crucial to improve transparency in Japan so that essential data,details of measures, and information on the status of implementation are disclosed in atimely and appropriate manner. Government ministries and agencies should also encourage
information collection and disclosure in each sector, and share the information with eachother.

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Conclusion
Humanity obviously faces major challenges in efforts to realize a decarbonized society
in 2050 and reduce GHG emissions by 50% in the less than the decade remaining until
2030 in order to limit the temperature rise to 1.5°C. We have delayed climate action
for decades, and these delays have exacerbated the problems and narrowed our time
window for action. However, we are now facing the harsh reality that if we do not take theappropriate actions, planetary systems will be severely disrupted, our hopes for sustainable
development and a peaceful society will slip away, and the capacity for us to sustain ourlives, economies and security under a stable climate will be wiped out. Many countries, local
governments, businesses and citizens around the world now acknowledge this reality andare getting started on efforts to tackle the challenges of decarbonization. Japan is now
among the countries that have declared carbon neutrality by 2050, so now is the time for
us to establish clear and visionary goals, make the required commitments, and find thedetermination to move forward.
Fortunately, there are many possible actions that can be taken, and most of the measuresand technologies described in this report and other research already exist and are ready to be
implemented. The required systems, technologies, expertise, and programs are at the point
where they can be applied, such as rapid deployment of renewable energy, cost reductions,and the potential for supply and demand to be adjusted for mass introduction. By promoting
energy efficiency and renewable energy in ways that are compatible with the sustainability of
local communities, we will see decarbonization come quickly into view. If there is somethingthat cannot be done, sometimes it is because the belief that it cannot be done comes first
and takes on a life of its own, and so existing economic activities persist due to the lack of any
policy measures being implemented to make things change. Or, rather than considering theinterests of all of humanity in the context of climate change, some bureaucrats, politicians,
and industry leaders may seek to maintain the current economic structure and protect theirinterests, and try to block the necessary transition or influence policies and subsidies in orderto support unrealistic and unproven innovations to maintain their profits.
Now is the last chance to take action to halve GHG by 2030 and achieve decarbonizationin 2050. Our generation is beginning to feel the effects of climate change, and it is also said
that this is the last generation that can take action on decarbonization and have the chance
to shape the future. Each of us is being called upon to participate in discussions to achievethis, and to act to take on the responsibility to change. It is our hope that by taking action,
together we can create a more hospitable and prosperous society in many parts of Japan.
There is also great hope in the fact that that more and more people are starting to act.
To achieve a decarbonized society, Kiko Network calls upon the Government of Japanto establish ambitious targets and implement policies and actions based on the proposals
presented herein. For our part, we will continue in our efforts to urge all actors to raise their
voices, step up their actions, and work together.

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References: Published recommendations and scenario studies
Below is a list of previously-published studies on scenarios and recommendations
based on similar approaches to ours and were used as references in the preparation ofthis report.
All greenhouse gases

⿠ Climate Action Tracker, 1.5°C-consistent benchmarks for enhancing Japan’s NDC
ambition, March, 2021.
⿠ Climate Analytics, What is Japan’ s required contribution to limit global warming to
1.5°C?, March 2021.
⿠ WWF Japan, “2050 zero scenario for a decarbonized society,” December 11, 2020
(in Japanese).
⿠ nstitute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), “Net zero world: Japan in 2050”(draft), June 2020 (in Japanese).

Energy-related CO2 emissions

⿠ Renewable Energy Institute, “Proposed 2030 energy mix (first edition),” August 6,
2020 (in Japanese).
⿠ Energy Transition for the Future Research Group, Zero Nuclear, Energy Transition
Strategy, February 22, 2020 (in Japanese).
⿠ Energy Transition for the Future Research Group (Future Group), “Roadmap to2030 for a green recovery and carbon neutrality in 2050,” February 25, 2021 (inJapanese).

Published by: Kiko Networkhttps://www.kikonet.org/
March 2021
Author: Kimiko Hirata

Design/layout: Mihoko Araki
Tokyo Office:

6F, Ichibancho-Murakami Bldg., 9-7, Ichibancho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-0082, JAPANTEL: +81-3-3263-9210

FAX: +81-3-3263-9463

E-mail: tokyo@kikonet.org

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E-mail: kyoto@kikonet.org

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