Who’s Getting Globalized?
The Size and Implications of Intra-national Trade Costs∗
David Atkin† and Dave Donaldson‡
July 2015

Abstract
How large are the intra-national trade costs that separate consumers in remote locations ofdeveloping countries from global markets? What do those barriers imply for the intra-national
incidence of the gains from falling international trade barriers? We develop a new methodology for answering these questions and apply it to newly collected CPI micro-data from Ethiopia
and Nigeria (as well as to the US). In order to overcome three well-known challenges that arise
when using price gaps to estimate trade costs, we: (i) work exclusively with a sample of goods
that are identified at the barcode-level (to mitigate bias due to unobserved quality differences
over space); (ii) collect novel data on the origin location of each product in our sample (to focus
only on the pairs of locations that actually identify trade costs); and (iii) use estimates of costpass-through to correct for mark-ups that potentially vary over space (to extract trade costs
from price variation in an environment with potentially oligopolistic intermediaries). Without
these corrections, we find that our estimates of the cost of distance would be biased downwards by a factor of approximately four. Our preferred estimates imply that the effect of log
distance on trade costs within Ethiopia or Nigeria is four to five times larger than in the US.
We also use our pass-through estimates to calculate the incidence of surplus increases due tofalling world prices. We find that intermediaries capture the majority of the surplus, and that
their share is even higher in distant locations, suggesting that remote consumers see only asmall part of the gains from falling international trade barriers.

∗ We thank Rohit Naimpally, Guo Xu, Fatima Aqeel and Max Perez Leon for excellent research assistance, andAlvaro González, Leonardo Iacovone, Clement Imbert, Horacio Larreguy, Philip Osafo-Kwaako, John Papp, and theWorld Bank Making Markets Work for the Poor Initiative for assistance in obtaining segments of the data. We havebenefited greatly from many discussions with Glen Weyl, as well as conversations with Treb Allen, Pol Antràs, Ariel
Burstein, Arnaud Costinot, Michal Fabinger, Penny Goldberg, Seema Jayachandran, Marc Melitz, and David Weinsteinand from comments made by numerous seminar participants. Finally, we thank the International Growth Centre in
London for their generous financial support and the Kilts-Nielsen Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth
School of Business for making available to us their Nielsen Consumer Panel Data.
† MIT and NBER. E-mail: atkin@mit.edu‡ Stanford and NBER. E-mail: ddonald@stanford.edu

1Introduction
Recent decades have seen substantial reductions in the barriers that impede trade between

nations, a process commonly referred to as “globalization”. But trade does not start or stop at
national borders. The trading frictions faced by many firms and households include not only theinternational trade costs that have fallen in recent times, but also the intra-national trade costs that
separate these agents from their nearest port or border. Many commentators have argued thatthese intra-national trade costs are especially large in developing countries, potentially limiting
the gains from globalization for remote regions (see, for example, WTO (2004)). Yet we lack rigorous estimates of the size and implications of these costs, particularly in data-scarce regions of theworld such as sub-Saharan Africa. In this paper we develop a new methodology for estimating
trade costs and apply it to newly collected micro-data from Ethiopia and Nigeria (as well as to
the United States, for purposes of comparison). In addition, we explore the implications of ourestimates for the geographic incidence of globalization within these countries.
To fix ideas, consider a product that is imported from abroad. Suppose this product enters acountry through port of origin o where it sells to domestic traders at the wholesale price Po . These
traders then sell the product at a destination location d for Pd , where these prices reflect the identity
Pd − Po = τ (Xod ) + µd .

(1)This equation states that the spatial price gap Pd − Po reflects both the intra-national trade costsτ (Xod ) over a route that has cost-shifting characteristics Xod (such as distance) as well as the markup µd charged by traders. In common with a voluminous existing literature, we seek to estimate
how τ (Xod ) depends on Xod by drawing inferences from the equilibrium distribution of prices
over space. But we make progress with respect to this literature by using new data and new tools
to overcome three well-known challenges that plague such inferences:
1. Spatial price gaps may reflect differences in unobserved product characteristics (such as quality)
across locations. Clearly one cannot hope to apply equation (1) by making comparisons acrossnon-identical products. In recognition of this point, and following the pioneering work of
Broda and Weinstein (2008) for the US, we have compiled what we believe to be the firstdataset on the geography of prices of products defined at a barcode-equivalent level withina developing country.
2. Spatial price gaps are only rarely directly informative of trade costs. It is standard in the literature
to assume that trading is perfectly competitive (µd = 0).1 Under this assumption—which
we relax shortly—equation (1) states that price gaps identify trade costs: Pd − Po = τ (Xod ).
But this method is only applicable when the researcher knows which locations are origins
and destinations. Our paper provides the first widespread attempt to learn the precise origin locations for each product in our sample. Failure to incorporate this new information
1 As we discuss further below, a related and commonly used assumption is that preferences and market structure

belong to the special case in which mark-ups are positive but do not vary across locations and hence mark-ups do notbias estimates of how τ (Xod ) depends on Xod .

1

would cause us to underestimate intra-national trade costs by a factor of two in Nigeria andEthiopia.
3. Spatial price gaps may reflect varying mark-ups across locations as well as trade costs. If µd 6= 0
then, as equation (1) makes clear, spatial price gaps Pd − Po cannot be used to identify how
τ (Xod ) depends on Xod because unobserved mark-ups may also depend on Xod (for example,
if markups respond to marginal costs which are in turn a function of trade costs).2 However,
we demonstrate that, in a general model of oligopolistic trading, estimates of the extent towhich shocks to Po pass through into Pd act as a sufficient statistic for how mark-ups respondto trade costs or any other cost-shifter. The pass-through rate, which we estimate separately
for each location and product in our sample, therefore allows us to purge price variation of
mark-up variation in a flexible manner, without having to estimate demand or supply relations. Applying this correction we find that existing approaches would underestimate trade
costs by an additional factor of two. This finding has the auxiliary implication that markups are lower in relatively remote locations in our sample countries. Our results suggestthat this is predominantly because demand curves, for nearly all products and locations in
our sample, are more elastic at higher prices. Since remote locations pay higher prices due
to trade costs, intermediaries choose to charge lower markups in these locations (despite
remote locations appearing to be less competitive).
In summary, we estimate that the cost of distance within our two African sample countries is approximately four to five times larger than in the US. In addition, we find that this relatively highburden of distance in our African sample countries remains once we adjust our distance metric forthe availability and quality of roads. Reassuringly, our results on the costs of intra-national tradein Africa relative to the US line up with direct evidence from trucker surveys in Teravaninthorn
and Raballand (2009).
The preceding discussion has centered on our new method for estimating τ (Xod ) but two additional results follow, both concerning how the surplus created by international trade varies acrosslocations within a country. Remote locations, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, pay hightrade costs. This naturally implies that, all else equal, remote locations enjoy less surplus fromforeign goods. Our first result provides evidence consistent with this by demonstrating that theprobability of a product not being found by price enumerators is higher in remote locations. In asecond result, we estimate the relative shares of surplus that would accrue to consumers versus
traders following a change in the port price such as would be caused by a change in inter-national
trade barriers. That is, we estimate the incidence of a global price change. Using an extension of
the analysis in Weyl and Fabinger (2011), we show how the pass-through rate in a market can beused to construct a sufficient statistic for the distribution of surplus in that market. Our estimates
imply that the incidence of the gains from globalization is skewed in favor of intermediaries and
2 The distinction between marginal costs and mark-ups is important here, even beyond the usual reasons groundedin policy and distributional consequences, since the incidence of global price changes hinges on the relative importanceof marginal costs and mark-ups in intra-national trade.

2

deadweight loss (relative to consumers), and increasingly so in remote locations. This is to be
expected if, as our data suggest, remote locations are less competitive.
A notable feature of the above results is that they require no data on the quantities of products
traded or sold—data that would not be available for narrowly-defined products in most developing countries. Nor do they require us to estimate price elasticities or mark-ups, functions offirst-order derivatives which are difficult to estimate even with quantity data. Instead, the passthrough rate, a substantially easier object to estimate, uncovers the key second-order demand
derivatives that determine both how mark-ups vary and how surplus is distributed over space.3
The need to understand intra-national trade costs in the absence of such quantity data is a primary
motivation for the methodologies we propose in this paper.
The work in this paper relates to a number of different literatures. First, this paper complements a recent literature that extends models of international trade to accommodate intra-national
trade costs (see, for example, Ramondo, Rodriguez-Clare, and Saborio-Rodriguez (2012), Redding(2012), Du, Wei, and Xie (2013), Agnosteva, Anderson, and Yotov (2014), Fajgelbaum and Redding(2014), and Cosar and Fajgelbaum (2015)). The implications of these models depend crucially on
the size of intra-national trade costs, and we provide a methodology for estimating such costs
using spatial price gaps.
Since our methodology is applicable to the measurement of trade costs more generally, thepaper relates to a voluminous literature surveyed in Fackler and Goodwin (2001) and Anderson
and van Wincoop (2004) that uses spatial price dispersion in order to identify trade costs. Various
segments of the literature have dealt with each of the three previously described challenges inisolation, although we believe that our work is unique in attempting to circumvent all of them together. In terms of the first challenge, Broda and Weinstein (2008), Burstein and Jaimovich (2009)and Li, Gopinath, Gourinchas, and Hsieh (2011) draw on proprietary retailer or consumer scanner datasets from the US and Canada in order to compare prices of extremely narrowly identified
goods (that is, goods with unique barcodes) across space. In terms of the second challenge, Eaton
and Kortum (2002), Simonovska (forthcoming), Donaldson (forthcoming) and Simonovska andWaugh (2014) argue that spatial arbitrage is free to enter and hence that spatial price gaps place
lower bounds on the costs of trade, where these lower bounds are binding among pairs of locations that do trade. A central obstacle in this literature has been the need to work with narrowly
defined products and yet also know which location pairs are actually trading those narrowly defined products. Our approach exploits unique data on the location of production of each productin our sample that allows us to do both. In terms of the third challenge, Feenstra (1989), Goldberg
and Knetter (1997), Atkeson and Burstein (2008), Goldberg and Hellerstein (2008), Burstein andJaimovich (2009), and Li, Gopinath, Gourinchas, and Hsieh (2011) consider, as we do, the possibility that producers or intermediaries have market power and hence that firms may price to market.
In particular, this literature has placed emphasis on the extent of exchange rate pass-through and3 In contrast to price elasticities that require both price and quantity data, the estimation of pass-through rates re-quires only price data. Additionally, estimating either typically requires exogenous cost shocks which directly identify
pass-through rates but require instrumental variables techniques (with their well known finite-sample shortcomings)
to identify price elasticities.

3

its implications for estimating market power. We instead apply a similar logic to the market foreach product and location in our sample with the goal being to infer how intermediaries’ market
power and equilibrium mark-ups vary across locations, as well as how variable mark-ups overspace cloud inference about how the costs of trading vary over space.
The paper also relates to work that considers the distribution of gains from trade in the presence of markups and intermediation. A recent literature explores the interaction between the gains
from trade and variable mark-ups, although with a focus that is very much on producers rather
than intermediaries with market power. (See, for example, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Feenstra and Weinstein (2010), Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2011), Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson,
and Rodriguez-Clare (2012), De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2012), and Cosar,
Gieco, and Tintelnot (forthcoming)). The growing literature on intermediation in trade includes
Chau, Goto, and Kanbur (2009), Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011), Antràs and Costinot (2011),
and Bardhan, Mookherjee, and Tsumagari (2013). This work aims to understand when trade isconducted via intermediaries rather than by producers directly. Our work addresses the consequences of intermediation—by traders who potentially possess market power—for the magnitudeof intra-national barriers to trade and the incidence of globalization.
Finally, the elasticity of the slope of inverse demand plays a key role in determining the variation in markups across space and the incidence of globalization. In the paper we show that foralmost every location and product, consumer demands become more elastic at higher prices. Recent work has highlighted the importance of this elasticity in determining the impacts of tradein the presence of imperfect competition (see, for example, Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, andThisse (2012), Neary and Mrazova (2013) and Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano (2014)). Given thepaucity of empirical estimates of this critical elasticity, an additional contribution of this paper isto provide guidance on realistic parameter values.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the new dataset that wehave constructed for the purposes of measuring and understanding intra-national trade costs inour sample of developing countries. Section 3 outlines a theoretical framework in which intranational trade is carried out by intermediaries who potentially enjoy market power, as well as
how we use this framework to inform empirical work that aims to estimate the size of intranational trade costs. Section 4 discusses the empirical implementation of this methodology andpresents our findings. Section 5 describes how pass-through rates provide a sufficient statistic for
identifying the distribution of the gains from trade between consumers and intermediaries andimplements the procedure. Section 6 concludes.

2

Data
The above Introduction details three challenges faced by researchers hoping to uncover trade

costs from spatial price gaps. A core component of this paper is the creation of a dataset that allows us to overcome these challenges. The methodology we propose requires data of two types.
First, we require retail price data that document the price of narrowly defined (i.e. barcode-level)
products, at many points in space within a group of developing and developed countries, at high4

frequency over multiple years. Second, we need to know the location at which each product ineach country in our sample is produced or imported. Here we briefly describe these two types ofdata and their construction. Appendix A provides more detail.

2.1

Retail price data
We work with the CPI microdata from two sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries—Ethiopia andNigeria—because of their large geographic sizes and because they were particularly forthcoming
in making price data available to researchers. Enumerators in these countries visit pre-specified
sample outlet locations within a market town or city, typically many times per month, and obtainprice quotes for a pre-specified list of precisely defined products. We obtained data in digital form
spanning the period from September 2001 to June 2010 in the case of Ethiopia and January 2001 to
July 2010 in the case of Nigeria.
Both Ethiopia and Nigeria report a CPI that is based on price observations in urban areas. In
Ethiopia we obtained a sample of 103 urban market places and in Nigeria we obtained a sample
of 36 state capitals (one for each state). These locations are shown on the maps of Ethiopia andNigeria depicted in panels A and B of Figure 1, respectively. (These maps also depict major andminor roads, as discussed in Section 4, as well as the production locations for each product in our
sample, as discussed in Section 2.2.)
Both Ethiopia and Nigeria base their CPI on a set of products that did not change substantially during our sample period. These products are designed to span the typical consumption
basket. Of the many products that are covered, the vast majority refer to activities—such as a“man’s haircut”—or goods—such as “rice”—whose very nature means that the products cannot
be precisely codified. Because concerns of spatially-varying unobserved quality differences haveappeared prominently in the literature (see, for example, Broda and Weinstein (2008)), we work
instead with the sub-sample of products that we consider to be particularly narrowly defined. In
practice, this involved a restriction to brandname products with detailed product descriptions.
Because these descriptions appear to be as precise as those linked to unique barcodes in US data,
we refer to these products as products that are defined at the barcode level. Note that, while theoriginal sample of products in our sample is designed to be representative of consumer spending,our restriction to a sample of products with brandnames is not likely to be representative in thisregard. However, to the extent that the technology used to trade important barcode-level products in the CPI basket is similar to that used to trade other products, the resulting sample will still
be representative of the cost of trading goods within Ethiopia and Nigeria. The resulting sample
contains 15 products in Ethiopia and 19 products in Nigeria that were broadly available acrossboth the locations and years in our sample (examples of which include “Titus Sardines (125 g)”,“Bedele Beer (300 cc)” and “Lux Toilet Soap (90 g)”; a full list is given in Appendix Table C.1).
In order to provide a basis of comparison for our Ethiopian and Nigerian estimates, we seek
similar estimates for the United States. Following Broda and Weinstein (2008), we use data fromthe Nielsen Consumer Panel (NCP) due to its extensive geographic and product coverage. The
NCP incentivizes sample households to use hand-held barcode scanners to scan all products pur-5

chased by the household and enter the price that they paid for each product. From the resulting
price observations we use each household’s county of residence to aggregate up to a dataset that
contains the average price paid, in each of the 2,856 counties and each month in 2004-2009, for the
1.4 million unique barcodes purchased by NCP households. In order to obtain a sample similarin nature to the SSA samples, we work with a relatively small sub-sample of barcodes that are theleading product in 230 Nielsen “product modules” (examples of which include frozen pot pies orchilli sauce).
Our main analysis uses a cleaned sample of price data, obtained by applying a simple cleaningalgorithm to the raw data. However, we also report (in Table 3) results obtained from the original,
uncleaned data set; these are similar in terms of both the magnitudes and statistical significanceof the resulting estimates. In addition, in order to arrive at estimates of trade costs that are in realterms, we require all prices to be similarly expressed in terms that correspond to a common year
(which we take to be 2001) and a common currency unit (US dollars). We therefore apply a simple
correction, based on inflation rates calculated from prices at origin locations and the prevailingbilateral exchange rates, to all prices used in the analysis.4

2.2

Production origin location data
To identify origin locations, we conducted telephone interviews with the firms that produce

each product, asking for the precise location(s) of production that serve markets in each countryin each year. For the case of imported products we have contacted distributors to learn the port ofentry of each imported product in each country (and year) in our sample. From these two sources
we obtain the latitude and longitude of the production location(s) or port of entry for every goodin our sample.
For Ethiopia and Nigeria, we were able to locate the factory that produced every product in our
sample.5 The US posed additional difficulties since firms were less willing to respond for confidentiality reasons, and in many cases could not easily find out where a particular barcode was made.
Of the 230 leading products, we were able to successfully find factory locations for 88 products.6
In a handful of cases the product was reported to be produced at multiple locations, in whichcase we pair each destination location (for a given product) with its closest origin location. In nocases was a product’s origin location(s) reported to have changed over the sample period so in
our analysis below each destination has a fixed and unique origin location for each product. We
refer to one of these unique origin-destination pairs as a “trading pair”, i.e. a pair where one of
the locations is the destination where it is sold and the other is either the factory location for that
product or the port of entry.
4 Appendix A contains further details. Note that we would obtain even larger differences in trade costs between
the US and Sub-Saharan Africa if we were to convert trade costs into real consumption quantities using PPP-adjusted
exchange rates as price levels are higher in the US.
5 For goods imported into Nigeria, we take Lagos as the origin price since all the goods enter through the port
there. For Ethiopia, which is landlocked, we take the town of Kombolcha, the first major stop on the trucking routefrom the port in Djibouti (which conducts more than 90 percent of Ethiopia’s trade, Assefa (2013)) to Addis Ababa.
6 In 101 cases we were told that the information was confidential, in 5 cases the firm claimed that it did not know,
in 7 cases the product was made abroad and the port of entry could not be provided, in 10 cases there were too manyfactory locations to list, and in 19 cases we could not contact the firms.

6Due to the requirements of our procedure for estimating pass-through rates (as explained in
Section 4.2 below), we omit any barcode for which the price at the product’s origin location isobserved in six or fewer months.7 This final procedure removes no products from the Ethiopian
sample and one product from the Nigerian sample. Unlike in SSA, where enumerators are told toseek out specific products, the NCP only records products actually purchased by sample households. Since many of the US factories are located in counties with small populations, 42 products
from the US sample are lost through this restriction.
Our final sample contains 15 products in Ethiopia, 18 products in Nigeria and 46 products in
the US (coming from 8, 6 and 36 unique origin locations respectively, with the exact factory locations shown in Figure 1). The average origin prices, price gaps and origin-destination distances
are reported in Table 1 while Appendix Table C.1 lists the products themselves. One may be concerned about the representativeness of our trade costs estimates if few people live in remote areas.
Despite the fact that, in Ethiopia and Nigeria, our origin locations are typically in the major cities
of Addis Ababa and Lagos, there is no systematic tendency for population at destination locations
to be higher close to the origin locations. Appendix Figure C.1 plots the distribution of the population at each destination location for all trading pairs (except from the origin to itself) across all
products. As is evident, many people in these countries live in locations where goods are travelinglong distances to reach them.

2.3

Distance data
Our primary measure of distance is simply the geodesic distance (i.e. the shortest distancealong the Earth’s surface) between two locations. In Section 4.5, we try to explain differences
across countries by disentangling the quantity and quality of their transportation networks. To
control for quantity differences, we use a distance measure that is based on the distance between
origin and destination locations while following the quickest road route as calculated by Google
Maps.8,9 The approximate road network used, for each country, in these alternative distance calculations is shown in Figure 1.10 Because measures of road quality are unavailable for our Africancountries, we work with a measure of quality based purely on travel speeds. We again extract
these from Google Maps (the time taken to travel along the quickest route).11
7 For the origin price, we take prices in the closest location to the factory where the product is observed. If theclosest location is more than 100 miles away from the factory we omit this product.
8 Our assumption that intermediaries follow the quickest route from any origin location to any destination location
rules out the possibility of economies of scale in trading which could give rise to (for example) hub-and-spoke trading
networks. The complexity of such networks puts a full treatment of this possibility beyond the scope of this paper(and the literature to date).
9 These quickest road route distances are based on Google Map data from the year 2012—the earliest year for whichthese data were available—and so may not be strictly equal to the actual road distances in earlier sample years.
10 The road network is only approximate because the underlying road network data used by Google Maps is not
publicly accessible. The roads illustrated in Figure 1 therefore come from public data sources (Digital Chart of theWorld, via DivaGIS; and http://infrastructureafrica.org) that closely match the road networks shown in Google Maps.
11 To provide a sense of the mapping between time and distance in the three countries, we picked 5 random points
in each country and calculated the minutes/mile on the nearest national highway, nearest secondary road and nearest
tertiary road. For Ethiopia, these were 1.2, 1.4 and 1.9 minutes/mile respectively; for Nigeria these were 1.2, 1.6 and2.6 minutes/mile; and for the US these were 0.8, 1.2 and 1.2 minutes/mile.

7

3

Theoretical Framework
In this section, we first describe a model of intra-national trade carried out by intermediaries

who potentially enjoy market power. We then go on to discuss how this framework can be used
to inform estimates of the size of intra-national trade costs, as well as the distribution of the gains
from trade between consumers and intermediaries.

3.1

Model environment
We begin by considering a single product which is potentially sold in multiple markets indexedby d. For the sake of simplicity we assume that there are no interactions across locations. In eachmarket the (inverse) demand for the product is given by P( Qd ; Dd ) where Qd is the total quantity consumed and Dd parameterizes (without loss of generality) the demand curve in location d.
Section 3.4 introduces the multiple products and time periods that enter our empirical analysis.
The product in question could be either domestically produced or imported from abroad. Domestically produced products are made at a single factory location indexed by o, and imported
products are imported into the country through a port or border crossing at location o. Regardlessof whether the products are made at home or abroad, the domestic ‘origin’ of the product is therefore location o. We assume that the product is bought and sold on wholesale markets at the origin(i.e. factory gate or port) location for a price Po . This product is then traded from location o to thedestination location d by domestic intermediaries. These intermediaries specialize in the activityof purchasing a product in bulk at a wholesale market, transporting the product to a destination
location, and finally selling the product to consumers at that location. Again for the sake of parsimony, we assume that these distribution and retail activities are bundled into the actions of one‘intermediary’ sector.
Intermediaries incur total costs Cd (qd ) while trading qd units from location o to location d. (Tosimplify notation we use d rather than od subscripts here to denote an origin-destination trading
pair since we only consider a single source location for the product. When we introduce multiple
products in Section 3.4 originating from potentially different source locations we reintroduce theod notation.) These total costs include both a fixed cost, Fd , and a marginal cost, cd . We assume
that the marginal cost is both ‘specific’ (i.e. charged per unit of product shipped) and constant (i.e.
independent of qd ).12 Marginal costs in the intermediary sector are the sum of the cost of buying
the product at the origin location (which is simply the origin price, Po ) and the marginal costs oftrading, denoted by τ = τ (Xd ), which depend on a vector of potential cost-shifters Xd .
We refer to τ (Xd ), the focus of our analysis, as ‘trade costs’ for short. Our goal is to estimate
the extent to which these costs depend on cost shifters—that is, we aim to recover the derivative∂τ (Xd )∂xd for some particular cost-shifter xd . A leading example of such a cost-shifter in the empiricalliterature is the distance from location o to location d. An analysis of distance forms the bulk of ourempirical analysis in Section 4, but other potentially important cost-shifters might include intra12 We believe that this assumption, that marginal trade costs are specific rather than ad valorem, is realistic in thesetting considered here. However, if the true trade costs contain an ad valorem component, this assumption will lead us
to underestimate trade costs, as discussed in footnote 22 below.

8national borders, differences in language or ethnicity, or roadblocks at which formal regulatoryburdens or even requests for bribes might be encountered by traders. Note that, following theprevious literature, we take an all-encompassing view of intra-national trade costs, τ (Xd ), suchthat they consist of the entire marginal cost of buying a product in location o and selling it toconsumers in location d (such as, for example, destination-specific local retail costs).13
Summarizing these assumptions about costs we have:
Assumption 1 [Costs]. The cost to an intermediary of selling qd units of the product in location d, whensourcing the product from location o is given by:
C (qd ) = [ Po + τ (Xd )] qd + Fd .
Let there be md identical intermediaries who buy the product at location o and sell it at location d. We assume that intermediaries maximize profits by choosing the quantity of the productto sell (as seems reasonable in this setting since intermediates must purchase goods at the origin
before selling them at the destination). Let Qd denote the total amount sold in location d by allintermediaries. The essential strategic interaction across intermediaries here is the extent to which
an intermediary’s quantity choice qd affects other intermediaries’ profits through the aggregate
quantity Qd . We follow the ‘conduct parameter’ approach to modeling oligopolistic interactions
d(e.g. Seade, 1980) and assume that this relationship is summarized by the parameter θd ≡ dQ
dqd .

We allow this parameter to take any value; however, as is well known, a number of prominentassumptions about market structure are encapsulated in distinct values of the parameter θd . For
example, the case of Cournot oligopoly corresponds to θd = 1, the case of a pure monopolist
corresponds also to θd = 1, the case of collusion corresponds to θd = md , and the case of perfectcompetition corresponds to θd → 0. Finally, we define the ratio φd ≡ mθdd as the ‘competitiveness index’ (since it rises in the number of intermediaries md and falls in these intermediaries’ perceived
individual influence on aggregate supply θd ) and assume that this ratio is fixed within a location.
Summarizing our assumptions about market structure we have:
Assumption 2 [Market structure]. md identical intermediaries selling the product in location d choose
supply qd to maximize profits subject to the perceived response of other firms summarized by the parametermddθd ≡ dQ
dqd . The competitiveness index φd ≡ θd is fixed within a location d.

It is important to note that, in our empirical analysis below, we will not need (nor be able) to
separately identify md or θd . These two variables matter only to the extent that they shift the competitiveness index φd . Further, note that while we assume that the parameter φd is fixed withineach location, it can vary freely across locations and hence be arbitrarily correlated with the costshifters xd —this flexibility is important given that the key variation for identifying trade costs is in
the cross-sectional comparisons of prices across locations. Focusing on the Cournot case, θd = 1,
for example, Assumption 2 implies that entry is fixed, an assumption that we believe is plausible(over the high-frequency, monthly-data time periods in our application) given credit constraints,
13 In Section 4.4 we discuss attempts to separate destination-specific costs from origin-to-destination distance.

9reputation issues and ethnic trading traditions. In addition, Section 4.4 presents a number of empirical extensions designed to explore the sensitivity of our results to Assumption 2.

3.2

Identifying intra-national trade costs from price gaps
Recall that our goal is to estimate∂τ (Xd )∂xd , the extent to which trade costs τ ( Xd ) depend on someparticular cost-shifter xd . Following a large previous literature, we estimate this relationship using
information contained in spatial price gaps, Pd − Po . Using Assumption 1, and the intermediaries’
first-order conditions, spatial price gaps can be written as:
Pd − Po = τ (Xd ) + µ (cd , φd , Dd ) ,(2)

where µ (cd , φd , Dd ) is the mark-up charged by intermediaries in location d.14 Without loss ofgenerality, the mark-up is a function of the intermediaries’ marginal costs cd , the competitive environment faced by the intermediaries (summarized by the competitiveness index φd ), and thedemand conditions Dd .
To see how∂τ (Xd )∂xd can be identified empirically, we consider how a small change in xd would

alter equation (2). This is empirically analogous to a comparison between two destination locations with a small difference in the value of their cost shifter xd . Such a perturbation to equation(2) would satisfy:15∂µ ∂τ (Xd ) ∂µd ∂φd∂µ ∂Dd∂τ (Xd ) ∂µd ∂φd∂µ ∂Ddd( Pd − Po )= (1 + d )
+
+ d
≡ ρd
+
+ d
.
dxd
∂cd
∂xd
∂φd ∂xd∂Dd ∂xd∂xd∂φd ∂xd∂Dd ∂xd(3)

In this expression the quantity ρd is known as the (short-run) pass-through rate, defined as theeffect of a firm’s marginal cost on the price it charges while holding competitiveness (and hence
d 16
dentry) fixed, as per Assumption 2. That is, ρd ≡ ∂P
∂cd = 1 + ∂cd . Note that while ρd is defined such∂µthat φd is held fixed, equation (3) is fully general and allows for the possibility that φd is correlatedwith xd . In the remainder of this paper we refer to the short-run pass-through rate ρd as simply
the pass-through rate. It is straightforward to show that, in general, pass-through takes the form:(1 + Ed ( Pd )) −1
ρd = 1 +,φd

where Ed ( Pd ) ≡∂ Qd 
∂Pd
∂Qd

∂Pd
∂Qd
∂Qd

(4)



Q 0 is the elasticity of the slope of inverse demand. As equation (4)14 That is,φd− 1 ] −1 ,−η ( Dd , cd , φd )where η is the elasticity of inverse demand.
We assume that boththesecond-order and stability conditions shown inµd ≡ Pd − cd = cd [d 
Seade (1980) hold, namely that  Q
∂Pd
∂Qd

∂

∂Pd
∂Qd

∂Qd

d 
> −2φd and  Q
∂Pd

∂

∂Pd
∂Qd

∂Qd

> −φd − 1.

∂Qd

15 In writing equation (3) we have assumed that φ and D depend on x in a continuous manner. As we describedddbelow, this assumption is not necessary for our empirical analysis but we make it here for simplicity.
16 As is typical in the Industrial Organization literature, and as in Weyl and Fabinger (2013), we define the passd
through rate ρd as the effect of marginal costs on prices (i.e. ∂P∂c ) rather than the proportional effect of marginal costs ondPd
prices (i.e. ∂∂ ln
ln cd ). Note that the well-known case of monopolistic competition with CES preferences and a continuumof firms delivers proportional pass-through equal to one but ρd > 1.

10

makes clear, pass-through depends on only two market characteristics: the competitiveness of themarket (i.e. φd ) and the second-order curvature of the demand curve (i.e. Ed ( Pd ), the elasticity ofthe slope of demand).
The expression in equation (3) highlights the challenges involved when attempting to identify
the object of interest here—the way that trade costs depend on a cost-shifter xd , or∂τ (Xd )∂xd —fromthe extent to which price gaps vary across locations with different values of the cost shifter (i.e.
d( Pd − Po )). To interpret equation (3), begin by observing that if the mark-up did not depend on
dxddµ∂τ (X )
the cost-shifter (i.e. dxdd =0) then variation in spatial price gaps would identify ∂xdd in a straight-

fromforward manner since ρd = 1 in such a setting and the last two terms would be zero. As discussed
in the Introduction, this has been the case assumed in virtually all of the existing literature on
estimating trade costs from price gaps. In what follows, we relax this assumption.
The first term in equation (3) describes the most obvious concern when mark-ups are variable,
namely that the pass-through rate ρd 6= 1. That is, when an oligopolist’s marginal costs increase(e.g. because∂τ (Xd )∂xd > 0), the oligopolist will find it optimal to increase its price either by less than(i.e. ρd < 1) or more than (i.e. ρd > 1) the marginal cost increase. All that can be said in generalis that some of the marginal cost will be passed through into prices (i.e. ρd > 0). The extent ofimperfect pass-through (i.e. the deviations of ρd from unity) governs, in an important manner, theextent to which spatial price gaps provide a biased estimate of trade costs. As we describe shortly,
this observation forms the core of our empirical strategy for estimating trade costs in imperfectlycompetitive settings. In summary, a cost shifter such as xd has both a direct effect (via the marginal
cost, i.e.

∂τ (Xd )∂xd ) and an indirect effect (via the mark-up) on the price charged; but in any case, ρd isa sufficient statistic for the magnitude of the indirect effect, which allows us to uncover the direct
effect, the object of interest here.
The second and third terms in equation (3) describe a source of bias that is conceptually distinct
from that in the first term. These terms capture the natural possibility that mark-ups vary acrosslocations not just because, whenever ρd 6= 1, mark-ups vary with marginal costs and marginal
costs vary across locations, as captured in the first term, but simply because competitive conditions φd vary across locations or because preferences Dd vary across locations. (In fact, as we
discuss in Section 5, long-run entry decisions within our framework will naturally lead to lesscompetition in remote locations.) Our empirical strategy for dealing with this source of bias is,
as described in detail below, based on attempts to control for these two terms. While this would
be challenging in general, because competitiveness φd and preferences Dd are not observable, wewill be helped by the fact that the pass-through rate ρd is observable and, as equation (4) suggests,
knowledge of the pass-through rate reveals a great deal about competitiveness and preferences.

3.3

The case of constant pass-through demand
Equation (3) above described three sources of bias that may arise when estimating trade costs

from spatial price gaps in settings of imperfect competition: incomplete pass-through, variation incompetitiveness, and variation in preferences. However, an estimate of the pass-through rate ρdcan be used to avoid all three of these sources of bias. The methodology we propose here therefore
11

proceeds in two steps: in a first step we estimate ρd , and in a second step we use this estimate ofρd to correct for bias due to variable mark-ups.
In order to do so as parsimoniously as possible, we make an additional assumption: that thepass-through rate ρd is constant over quantities. As equation (4) makes clear, a sufficient condition for the pass-through rate to be constant over quantities (given Assumption 2, which holds φdconstant over quantities) is that consumer preferences are such that the elasticity of the slope of
inverse demand, Ed ( Pd ), is constant at all prices Pd . Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) prove that a necessary and sufficient condition for Ed to be constant is that demand belongs to the following class:
Assumption 3 [Bulow-Pfleiderer demand]. Consumer preferences take the constant pass-through,Bulow-Pfleiderer inverse demand form such that price Pd depends on total demand Qd in the following
manner: ad − bd ( Qd )δd
Pd ( Qd ) = ad − bd ln( Qd )





ad − bd ( Qd )δdif δd > 0 and ad > 0, bd > 0, 0 < Qd <

  δ1adbd

if δd = 0 and ad > 0, bd > 0, 0 < Qd < exp

d

 
ad
bd

(5)

if δd < 0 and ad ≥ 0, bd < 0,0 < Qd < ∞.

For this demand form we have Ed = δd − 1; that is, by design, Ed is pinned down by a (constant) model parameter, but this parameter is free to vary. Hence, from equation (4), equilibrium
pass-through under Assumption 3 is equal toδρd = 1 + d
φd

 −1
.

(6)

Equilibrium pass-through can be ‘incomplete’ (i.e. ρd < 1) with δd > 0 and ‘more than complete’ (i.e. ρd > 1) with δd < 0. Nothing in this class of preferences restricts how pass-through ρdvaries across locations d within a country; the only restriction is that pass-through does not change
within a location in response to the quantity Qd supplied there in equilibrium. Finally, note that,whatever the demand parameters, the state of competitiveness (summarized by φd ) matters forequilibrium pass-through; in particular, if competition were perfect (i.e. φd → ∞) then equilibrium pass-through is ‘complete’ (i.e. ρd = 1) for any value of the demand parameter δd .
From an empirical perspective, there are a number of attractive features of the constant passthrough demand class. The first is that, as we describe in the next subsection, this demand classleads to a parsimonious empirical strategy for estimating trade costs despite the presence of variable mark-ups. A second attraction of the approach embodied in Assumption 3 is its flexibility.
This demand class nests prominent special cases such as linear, quadratic and isoelastic demand,
but whereas those special cases restrict the pass-through demand parameter δd to take a particularvalue, the constant pass-through demand class of Assumption 3 allows δd to take on any value.17
17 While in principle demand could be such that even the second-order curvature parameter E varies with the quandtity demanded, in such a case our estimates will still provide a local approximation to the pass-through rate aroundthe equilibrium market quantity. For example, in Section 5 we explore the incidence of a small change in internationaltariffs, an exercise for which locally constant pass-through estimates are sufficient for calculating local incidence.

12

Assumption 3, together with the intermediaries’ first-order conditions, implies that
Pd − Po = ρd τ (Xd ) + (1 − ρd )( ad − Po ).
Recall from equation (3) that a challenge in estimating(7)∂τ (Xd )∂xd arises because unobserved prefer-ences and market structure may co-vary with xd . Equation (7) highlights that, in the BulowPfleiderer case, two variables—the pass-through rate ρd and the demand-shifter ad —are sufficient
to control for these two sources of omitted variable bias. Naturally, the ad component is a demandside parameter, but what is useful empirically is that the other demand parameters, bd and δd , do
not enter equation (7) directly. Instead, bd does not enter at all and the effect of δd is subsumed
by the presence of ρd since, as per equation (6), ρd depends on δd . Likewise, equation (7) suggeststhat ρd acts as a sufficient statistic for the competitiveness of a location.18
Equation (7) will form the bedrock of our empirical strategy for correcting for the three biases
laid out in the previous section and estimating∂τ (Xd )∂xd from variation in price gaps Pd − Po across lo-

cations d with differing levels of the cost-shifter xd . In order to describe this strategy, which draws
on data spanning many locations, products and time periods, we first introduce our notation (andthe additional assumptions required in a dynamic environment) for incorporating such variation.

3.4

From theory to estimation
We now extend the discussion above, which pertained to a single product in a given destina-

tion market d, to a setting in which we observe multiple products k ∈ K selling in locations d ∈ N
at multiple time periods t ∈ T. However, for simplicity we continue to assume that there are nointeractions across locations, products or time periods.19 We therefore simply allow all variables
and parameters from the previous subsection to vary freely across products, destination locations
18 To see this formally, note that taking the derivative of equation (7) with respect to x

d impliesd( Pd − Po )∂τ (Xd )dρ P − ad∂a= ρd+ d( d) + d (1 − ρ d ),
dxd
∂xd
dxd
ρd
∂xd
∂µ ∂φ

∂µ

d
where the second and third terms then correspond to ( ∂φd ∂x d + ∂Dd ∂D) in equation (3) for the Bulow-Pfleiderer case.
ddd ∂x dHowever, it is more straightforward to transform equation (7) to obtain(1 − ρ d )Pd − ρd Po−
a d = τ ( X d ).
ρdρd∂τ (X )

This implies that a perturbation with respect to xd in the left-hand side identifies ∂x d , the object of interest. Thedprocedure we describe below provides an estimate of ρd for each location. In addition, we propose a procedure tocontrol for the demand-shifter ad . Put together this implies that the left-hand side is identified at each location and∂τ (X )

hence its variation across locations with distinct values of xd identifies ∂x d .
d
19 This assumption involves three restrictions on the economic environment. First, we abstract from generalequilibrium considerations that would introduce interactions in factor markets across or within locations; however,
our empirical approach below will introduce various fixed effects that are likely to control for any bias due to suchinteractions. Second, we do not model explicitly the possibility that the demand curve for a given product-location
is dependent on the price of other products, or on the income of consumers in that location. While these effects are
k of inverse demand in equation (5), where we would
not modeled explicitly, we do allow the level akdt and slope bdt
expect the bulk of income and cross-price substitution effects to play out, to vary freely across locations, products andk , to vary freely across location and products
time. (We also allow the second-order demand curvature parameter, δdt
and—to a lesser extent, as discussed below—across time.) Finally, we assume that intermediaries’ marginal costs
are sufficiently low (relative to consumers’ travel costs) that consumer always prefer to buy goods locally from anintermediary rather than traveling themselves to other locations to make their purchases.

13

and time periods. As products are made in different origin locations, we must now keep track of
the source for each product in each destination and so we replace d subscripts with od subscripts.
∂τ (Xkodt )from variation in price gapsk∂xodt
k − Pk across locations d with differing levels of the cost-shifter x k . As discussed briefly above,
Pdt
ot
odt
our strategy relies on using an estimate of ρkodt to correct for the possibility that intermediaries
k . To implecharge differential mark-ups at locations with different values of the cost-shifter xodt
ment this strategy we will therefore first need to estimate ρkodt . However, there is no hope of
estimating a separate value of ρkodt for each time period t, as there would then be as many valuesof ρkodt to estimate as there are price observations. We therefore proceed first with the extreme assumption that ρkodt is constant over the entire sample period of length T (but still free to vary across

We now discuss our proposed strategy for estimatingproducts k and destinations d). However, we relax this assumption in Section 4 by estimating sepe < T (where T
e ≥ 2 is a minimum requirement
arate values of ρk in various periods of length Teod T

for identification). Summarizing this discussion, we have:
Assumption 4 [Static Pass-Through]. The pass-through rate ρkodt is free to vary across products k anddestination locations d, but it is fixed across time periods within a product-destination. That is, ρkodt = ρkodfor all t ∈ T.
Recalling that ρkodt =δk1 + φkdt

 −1, two natural sufficient conditions for Assumption 4 arise.

odt

k is constant across time periods. We believe
The first is that the demand curvature parameter δdt

this to be a reasonable restriction on preferences that is considerably weaker than in the existing
k to be constant across time periliterature. Recall that, while this sufficient condition restricts δdtods, we have placed no restrictions at all on the level of inverse demand akdt or the slope of inverse
k . The second condition is that the competitiveness parameter φk is constant acrossdemand bdt
odt

time periods, which would be the case if both the number of intermediaries mkodt and those intermk

k do not change across time periods (since φk ≡ odt ). While themediaries’ conduct parameter θodt
odt
θk
odt

k is a natural restriction, holding mk constant amounts toconstancy of the conduct parameter θodt
odt

assuming that entry across time periods doesn’t respond to changes in the economic environment.
This restriction is clearly more plausible over short time spans, the length of which is unknown;e over
we therefore find it reassuring that our results are robust to using different lengths of time T
which entry is assumed to be fixed.20
Combining Assumptions 1-4 and equation (7) then immediately implies the following:kPdt= ρkod Potk + ρkod τ (Xkodt ) + (1 − ρkod ) akdt .

(8)This equation forms the core of our empirical analysis. The immediate challenge in taking equak , Pk and Xk are directly observable, the objects
tion (8) to the data is that, while the variables Pdtotodtτ (·), ρkod and akdt are not. Our approach will be to estimate the parameters of interest, τ (·) and ρkod ,while treating akdt as unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. an econometric error term, the properties of
20 The two-step strategy that we describe below estimates ρk using monthly time variation, so Assumptions 2
od

and 4 are consistent with the common argument that high-frequency time-series analysis is likely to reveal short-run
responses (and cross-sectional analysis long-run responses); see, e.g., Houthakker (1965).

14

which we discuss at length in Section 4). While it would be possible, in principle, to estimate τ (·)
and ρkod in this equation directly, for ease of exposition, and to reduce computational burden, we
instead describe an unbiased two-step procedure that achieves the same goal. We describe thistwo-step procedure briefly here, and in more detail in Section 4.
Step 1: Recover estimates of pass-through ρkod : Equation (8) implies that a regression of destinak on origin prices Pk , conditional on controls for both trade costs τ ( Xk ) and local
tion prices Podt
ot
odt

demand shifters akdt , would reveal the equilibrium pass-through rate ρkod inherent to each destination market and product.21 While both trade costs and local demand shifters are unobservable toresearchers—indeed, if these were observable then answers to the questions we pose in this paper
would be immediately available—in Section 4.2 we propose an empirical strategy that aims to control for these variables and hence to provide unbiased estimates of the equilibrium pass-throughrate ρkod prevailing in each destination location d and product k.
Step 2: Recover estimates of intra-national trade costs τ (·): Suppose, with Step 1 complete, that an
k . Then we can write equation (8) as
unbiased estimate of ρk is available; denote this estimate ρcododk − ρck Pk
k )Pdt(1 − ρcod k
od ot= τ (Xkodt ) +
adt .
c
c
k
k
ρ
ρ
od

(9)

od

k − Pk that has featured prominently in the existing literature
In contrast to the spatial price gap Pdt
oton trade costs, we refer to the left-hand side of equation (9) as the ‘adjusted price gap’. Equation(9) suggests that, once the left-hand side is written in terms of the adjusted price gap rather thanthe price gap, the object of interest,∂τ (Xkodt )k .22, can be traced out empirically from variation in xodtk
∂xodt

Note that if mark-ups did not exist, or did not vary across locations, then we would be in thek = 1—exactly the case in which the adjusted price gap would be equal to thecase for which ρcodprice gap and the methods used in the existing literature would be valid. Away from this knifek would not equal one. Indeed, in Step 1 we find, as is consisedge case, however, pass-through ρcod

k often differs substantially fromtent with many previous estimates of pass-through rates, that ρcodone. Our approach is therefore designed to provide unbiased estimates of trade costs for any value
k . The only complication—as suggested by equation (9)—is that the unobserved demandof ρcod

21 A potential concern here is that the variation used to identify ρk , variation in origin prices, may be correlatedodwith shocks to the price of some other product (say k0 ) produced at the same origin location. To the extent that products0

k could affect the demand for product k in such ak and k0 are substitutes/complements, the resulting changes in Pdtk ) the pass-through rate of
way as to affect (if they were to affect the second-order curvature of the demand curve, Edtkkinterest, ρod . A related concern is that, if trade costs τ (Xodt ) contain a component that is common to both products k
and k0 , then the pass-through from trade costs into prices will affect the price of both products, which again may affectthe mark-up charged on product k to the extent that the products are substitutes/complements. We have ruled out
such cross-product general equilibrium effects in this section by assumption, but because the bulk of consumption is
non-traded, and because many products come from separate origin locations, we feel this assumption offers a usefulapproximation for the questions posed here.
22 Returning to the possibility that trade costs are ad valorem rather than specific, as in Assumption 1, wek ( η + η x k ). Equation (9) then becomescan sign the bias. Consider the case where τ (Xkodt ) = Pot
0
1 odt
1
1
1
k
k
k τ ( X odt ) + ( ρk − 1+ η + η x k ) a dt and we will underestimate
1+η0 +η1 xodt
0
1 odt
od

15

∂τ (Xkodt )
k
∂xodt

k
Pdt
−ρkod Potk
ρkodsince 1+η +1 η xk is concave in distance.
0

1 odt

=

shifter akdt must be controlled for (and multiplied by a term involving pass-through,Section 4.3 we propose an empirical strategy that does exactly this.

4

k )
(1−ρc
od
).
k
ρc

In

od

Estimating Intra-national Trade Costs
In this section we provide estimates of how intra-national trade costs depend on distance in

Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United States. That is, we provide estimates of∂τ (Xkodt )for a particulark∂xodt

k that are based on metrics of distance. Our estimates rely on a two-step
set of cost-shifters xodt

empirical procedure, described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 below, which aims to provide unbiased estimates of intra-national trade costs from price gaps across locations even when mark-ups varyacross those locations. However, we begin in Section 4.1 with a simpler first look at spatial pricegaps in order to facilitate a comparison with the existing literature.

4.1

A first look at spatial price gaps
For benchmarking purposes we begin by imposing the restriction that ρkod = 1, such that mark-ups do not vary across locations. This has been the dominant approach in the existing literatureon estimating trade costs, and would hold if trading were perfectly competitive. Under this restriction, equation (9) then implieskPdt− Potk = τ (Xkodt ).

(10)

As is clear from equation (10), in the case where ρkod = 1 trade costs can be easily inferred fromprice gaps. This is intuitive: if mark-ups don’t vary across locations then prices vary across locations only because of trade costs. Unfortunately, the assumption of constant mark-ups is directly
refuted in our data, as we show in Section 4.2 below. Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider
what the spatial price gaps in our data imply for estimates of intra-national trade costs were weto (erroneously) assume that ρkod = 1.
While the methodology we develop in this paper could be applied to any vector of cost-shifters
Xkodt , in practice we work primarily with one variable, the natural logarithm of the distance between location o and location d. We denote this variable xod . We begin with this simple distancemetric because of its prominence in the literature, but we explore additional distance variables in
Section 4.5 such as those that adjust for road quality and availability. To highlight this emphasison xod , consider the following decomposition,
τ (Xkodt ) = f ( xod ) + χkodt ,(11)where f (·) is a nonparametric function that captures how log distance xod affects trade costs andχkodt embodies any component of trade costs that does not depend on log distance. This decomposition, along with our decision to work with the log of distance, holds without loss of generality
due to the fact that we place no restrictions on f (·).
Our results throughout this Section present nonparametric estimates of the function f (·). In allcases we normalize our estimate of f (·) such that normalized trade costs are zero at the most prox16

imate destination location (approximately 50 miles from the source) in each country. The absolutelevel of the reported relationships is therefore not meaningful (nor is it identified in the more general models that we estimate below). In practice, we use locally weighted polynomials (with an
Epanechnikov kernel of bandwidth = 0.5) to estimate f (·). We also include a fixed effect for eachproduct-time period interaction (where a time period is a month-year pair) to control for systemic
product-specific shocks to trade costs.23 To estimate nonparametric regressions with fixed effects
we follow the procedure in Baltagi and Li (2002). Finally, the reported 95 percent confidence intervals are obtained from block-bootstrapping 100 times at the product-destination level following
the procedure in Deaton (1997).
Estimating trade costs (when ρkod = 1) using spatial price gaps between all pairs of locations
Before presenting results on∂τ (Xkodt )derived from equation (10), we begin with an additionalk∂xodt

intermediate step that is designed to connect our results to the existing literature. To do so, weestimate equation (10) among a sample that includes all pairs of locations. The key distinction
here is that this construction pays no regard to which locations are actually origin and destination locations for any given product. Without this knowledge there is no reason to expect that ank )) would apply within a sample of all locations i andanalogous equation (i.e. Pitk − Pjtk = τ (Xijt

j.24 Nevertheless, we present estimates of the effects of distance obtained from a sample of all
locations because these estimates speak to what we would conclude from our sample if, as is thecase in the prior literature, we proceeded without knowledge of which pairs were trading pairs.
Our estimate is displayed as the dotted line in Figure 2.25 In each of our three sample countries,
there is a strictly positive relationship between (the absolute value of) intra-national price gaps
Pitk − Pjtk and log distance xij , when this relationship is estimated across a sample of all pairs of locations i and j. However, it is surprising that this relationship has a similar slope in two countries(Ethiopia and the US) with seemingly distinct trading environments, and yet such substantial dif23 With a balanced panel of observations the inclusion of product-time period fixed effects would have no bearing

on our estimates of the purely cross-sectional f (·). Their inclusion here has the advantage of controlling for any sample
selection concerns in which the availability of a product in a given time period is correlated with distance. Note alsok − Pk , contains a component, Pk , that would be perfectly correlated with product-timethat the dependent variable, Pdtotot
period fixed effects were it not for the small number of products that are sourced from multiple locations.
24 Instead we expect Pk − Pk = τ ( Xk ) − τ ( Xk ), which implies that variation in price gaps across pairs of locations
it
jt
oit
ojt
k does not identify the object of interest,i and j separated by cost-shifters xijtk∂τ (Xijt)k∂xijtk ) does not appear on the, as τ (Xijtright-hand side. Note that even if arbitrage were perfect across all locations (something we have ruled out in Section 3)k ) and hence
then this would imply that Pitk − Pjtk ≤ τ (Xijtk ), the same cannot be said for
could be placed on τ (Xijtk∂τ (Xijt
)
k
∂xijt

k
∂τ (Xijt)
k∂xijt

would still not be identified (and while a lower-bound).

25 These all-pair estimates use the absolute value of the price gap as the dependent variable because, in the absenceof any knowledge about the trading status and direction among locations i and j, one would not know whether to
expect Pi > Pj or Pi < Pj . Our sample here consists of all unique pairs of locations (so as not to double-count pairs)
for which i 6= j. The resulting all-pairs sample is sufficiently large that we faced two computational limitations. First,
the US sample is so large that local polynomial estimation on the full sample was infeasible; we therefore work witha random 10 percent sub-sample of locations. Second, in all three countries the sample was too large to computeconfidence intervals via a bootstrap routine; we therefore instead display the 95-percent confidence interval from theasymptotically normal conditional variance of the local polynomial estimator. These limitations do not apply to oursmaller sample of trading pairs that underpin all other estimates in this paper (including our preferred estimates).

17

ferences in slope between two countries (Ethiopia and Nigeria) whose trading environments one
might expect to be relatively similar. These counter-intuitive results are perhaps less surprisingwhen we remember that, as stressed above, the economic basis for the all-pairs analysis conducted
here—and more generally for variation in price gaps Pitk − Pjtk across all sample locations to identify
τ (·), even under perfect competition—is unclear. We now move on to further estimates that we believe provide a closer connection to the structural object of interest here, the magnitude ofk )∂τ (Xijt∂xij .

Estimating trade costs (when ρkod = 1) using spatial price gaps among trading pairs only
We now turn to the estimation of equation (10), which holds as stated only among trading
pairs—that is, among pairs of locations for which one location is the origin (for the particular
product under consideration) and the other is the destination.26 In contrast to the estimates fromthe all-pairs sample used above, we now expect our estimate—because it focuses only on trading∂τ (Xkodt )in the case of perfect competition (that is, when mark-ups don’t vary∂xodkacross locations, or ρod = 1). These estimates are displayed, again for each country separately andpairs—to identify

following the nonparametric estimation procedure described above, in the dashed line in Figure 2.
For two countries in our sample, Ethiopia and Nigeria, the dashed line (which uses only trading pairs) is about twice as steep as the dotted line (which uses all location pairs). Despite thesimplicity of the bias-correction procedure we employ here, which simply requires data on the location of production/importation for each product in our sample, we are not aware of prior workthat documents systematically the difference between the all-pairs and trading pairs approaches.27
Our results suggest that the all-pairs approach can dramatically underestimate trade costs.
We turn now to the third country in our sample, the US, for which the estimated relationshipbetween trade costs and distance is non-monotonic. This finding is challenging (though not impossible) to explain if equation (10) is taken literally, such that the estimate in Figure 2 is truly
an estimate of how the costs of trading rise with (log) distance.28 However, in a more generalenvironment (such as that formalized in Section 3 above) in which spatial price gaps reflect bothmarginal costs of trading and mark-up differences across locations (i.e. ρkod 6= 1), a price gap that
falls with distance is entirely possible, as we describe below.
This finding from the US sample highlights the fact that, while we believe the results in Figure
2 are useful for illuminating the difference between the all-pairs and the trading pairs approaches
to estimating trade costs from price gaps, both of these approaches have little to say about trade
costs in environments that depart from perfect competition (that is, those where ρkod 6= 1). In Section 4.2 below we go on to estimate ρkod for all products k and locations d and then, upon findingthat we can almost always reject the null that ρkod = 1, pursue an estimate of trade costs in Section
26 In this and all ensuing analysis we omit the trivial location pair for which o = d.
27 This echoes Cosar, Grieco, and Tintelnot (forthcoming) who, in contemporaneous work, document that, fortrade in German and Danish wind turbines, the border effect (i.e. the additional cost incurred when trade crosses theinternational border) estimated on the all-pairs sample is smaller than that on the trading pairs sample.
28 One possible explanation would be that local distribution costs—costs such as retail factor prices that are paidin the destination location regardless of a good’s origin—are higher at locations near to the origin than at locations
further afield. However, in Section 4.4 below we explore the plausibility of such spatial variation in local distribution
costs and find little evidence for variation of this type.

18

4.3 that is robust to the presence of imperfect competition.

4.2

Step 1: Estimating pass-through rates
We now move on to estimate the pass-through rate ρkod for each location d and for each productk in our sample. This is the first step of the two-step procedure for estimating trade costs that is
outlined in Section 3.4. The pass-through estimates we obtain here are also useful for identifying
the incidence of a world price change, as described in Section 5.2 below.
Recall from equation (8) above that pass-through (ρkod ) relates to the extent to which exogenousk ) in the following manner:origin prices (Potk ) affect endogenous destination prices (PdtkPdt= ρkod Potk + ρkod τ (Xkodt ) + (1 − ρkod ) akdt ,(12)where akdt represents a shifter of the location of the inverse demand curve from equation (5) above.
Estimating the pass-through rate (ρkod ) from equation (12), using variation in origin prices (Potk ),requires controls for the two other terms on the right hand side of the equation: the cost of trading(i.e. τ (Xkodt )) and local demand shifters (i.e. akdt ). Unfortunately, both the cost of trading and local
demand shifters are unobservable to researchers—indeed, if these were observable then answers
to the question posed in this paper would be immediately available. In the absence of such controls we use a fixed effects approach, which requires that the product-specific variation in trade
costs and local demand shifters within destinations over time is orthogonal to the variation in thek , such that τ ( Xk )origin price over time. Formally, we assume that τ (Xkodt ) = βk1od + βk2od t + ζ odt
odt

can be decomposed into local but time-invariant (βk1od ), local but trend-like (βk2od t), and residualk ) factors.29 Analogously, we assume that destination market additive demand shocks ak from(ζ odtdt
k + αk t + νk . Note that while thisequation (5) above can be decomposed as follows: akdt = α1d2ddt

assumption places certain restrictions on how the additive demand shifter, akdt , varies across locak , fromtions, time and products, we place no restrictions on the multiplicative demand shifter, bdt

equation (5). Combining equation (12) with these assumptions we estimate pass-through rates ρkodby location and product by estimating the following specification,kPdt= ρkod Potk + γkod + γkod t + εkdt ,(13)

k is the destination price, Pk is the origin price, γk is a product-destination fixed efwhere Pdtotodk + (1 − ρk ) νk is an unobfect, γkod t is a product-destination linear time trend, and εkdt = ρkod ζ odt
od odtserved error term. The computational advantage of such a specification is that we can estimate
pass-through rates from separate regressions for each product-destination pair (recall that eachproduct-destination pair has a unique origin location in any period, and since we have no products where we were told the factory had moved over our sample period, γkod is equivalent to a
product-destination fixed effect). However, we explore the sensitivity of our results to substantially weakening our identification assumptions through the inclusion of either year-destination
γdy or time-destination γdt fixed effects in Section 4.4.
29 Recall that in addition to these fixed effects, all prices are inflation-adjusted using the procedure described inAppendix A and hence are purged of changes in national price levels over time.

19For OLS estimates of ρkod in equation (13) to be unbiased we require the additional assumption that the origin price Potk is not correlated with the time-varying and local (that is, destination
location d-specific) shocks to trade costs τ (Xkodt ) or demand shifters akdt .30 If origin prices are set
abroad (in the case of imported goods), or are pinned down by production costs at the factorygate (in the case of domestic goods), or are set on the basis of demand shocks at the origin location(locations that we omit from our analysis), then this orthogonality restriction seems plausible. But
a nation-wide demand shock for product k (above and beyond the nation-wide or local demand
shock for all products that can be controlled for by the addition of a time-destination γdt fixed
effect that we introduce below) would violate this assumption and lead us to overestimate ρkod .
Because it is plausible that demand shocks are spatially correlated, we assess the possibility of thisbias in Section 4.4 below by exploring how our estimates change when we restrict our sample to
only those destination locations d that are beyond a given distance threshold from the origin.
Appendix Figure C.2 displays our estimates of the pass-through rate ρkod for all products k andlocations d, plotted against the relevant log origin-to-destination distance xod (in addition, we display the estimated nonparametric relationship between ρkod and xod ). These estimates span a substantial range, though recall that the only restriction that theory places on the pass-through rate isthat it be positive, a restriction that very few of our estimates violate.31 Importantly, our procedurein Step 2, which draws on the estimates here, will adjust for the sampling variation in these estimates via a block-bootstrap procedure. Despite the wide range spanned by these estimates, some
general tendencies are noteworthy. One feature of these estimates is that, regardless of the country,
the pass-through rate is lower, on average, at destinations that are further distances from the product’s source.32 A second feature is that most of these pass-through estimates are below one, often
considerably so. The average estimated pass-through rate in our sample is approximately 0.5.33
Hence, our estimates suggest that pass-through below one is commonplace in our sample countries, especially since these estimates should, if anything, be biased upwards if product-specific demand shocks at the origin are correlated with those at the destination. This is important because,
as discussed above, incomplete pass-through is prima facie evidence for imperfect competition.
Recall that the primary motivation for estimating the pass-through rate ρkod is that it enters
Step 2, our procedure for estimating∂τ (Xkodt )∂xod , as well as our incidence analysis in Section 5.2. How-ever, it is worth noting that the pass-through rate is a measure of interest in its own right, since
it measures the extent to which cost shocks at a distant origin location feed through into equilib30 Formally, this requires E

h

i
h
i
k ζ k | γk , γk t = 0 and E Pk νk | γk , γk t = 0 since εk = ρk ζ k + (1 − ρk ) νk is
Pot
ot odt od od
odt od od
dt
od odtod odtthe composite error term (and ρkod is a scalar within each product-destination cell).
31 The percentage of ρk estimates lying below zero is 8, 17 and 2 in Ethiopia, Nigeria and the US, respectively.
od
Footnote 36 describes how we treat these inadmissible values in our baseline Step 2 estimation procedure, and Section
4.4 discusses the robustness of these estimates to alternative procedures.
32 This is confirmed by significant negative coefficients (-0.0449, -0.101 and -0.0112 with t-statistics of -2.95, -1.98
and -2.95 for Ethiopia, Nigeria and the US respectively) from the regression of pass-through estimates on log
origin-to-destination distance.
33 For Ethiopia, the mean estimate of ρk is 0.58, with a standard deviation of 0.44 and 89 percent of these estimatesod
below 1 (58 percent significantly so at the 5 percent level). Similarly, for Nigeria the mean is 0.39 (SD =0.66) with 92
percent below 1 (65 percent significantly so), and for the US the mean is 0.77 (SD =0.36) with 78 percent below 1 (31percent significantly so).

20

rium retail prices at a destination location. As discussed above, and shown in Appendix Figure
C.2, remote locations have, on average, lower estimated pass-through rates; that is, retail prices inmore remote locations respond relatively weakly to a given cost shock at the origin. Despite thesimplicity of this exercise, our nonparametric finding that pass-through rates are lower in remotelocations is, to the best of our knowledge, new in the literature.
There are a number of alternative ways to estimate pass-through rates and it is important to
explore the sensitivity of our results to these alternative modeling and econometric assumptions.
However, because our primary interest is not in estimates of ρkod per se but in how estimates of ρkod

∂τ (Xkodt )∂xod , we postpone this sensitivity analysis to Section 4.4, after reporting our∂τ (Xkodt )main estimates of ∂xod in Section 4.3.

affect estimates of

4.3

Step 2: Using pass-through adjusted price gaps to measure the effect of distanceon trade costs
In Section 4.1 above, we detailed how the price gaps among pairs of trading locations increased

with (log) distance. However, this positive relationship is not driven solely by the fact that thecosts of trading increase with distance. In addition, intermediaries charge mark-ups, and ourmodel clarifies that the size of the mark-up may be related to distance for three distinct reasons.
For the empirically relevant case of incomplete pass-through, remote locations (1) face higher trade
costs, which reduces the mark-up that intermediaries choose to charge; (2) may be served by lesscompetitive routes, which raises mark-ups; and (3) may have different levels of the demand shifteralso generating a correlation between mark-ups and distance. Our aim in this section is to estimate
the true costs of distance—∂τ (Xkodt )∂xod , that is, how a cost shifter xod such as distance affects trade costs,

τ (Xkodt )—by correcting for these three biases using a procedure that draws on the pass-throughestimates reported in Step 1 above. The theoretical framework outlined above offers guidance.
In the case of constant pass-through demand preferences, recall that equation (9) states thatk − ρk Pk
Pdt
od ot

ρkod

= τ (Xkodt ) +(1 − ρkod ) k
adt .
ρkod

(14)

k − Pk by the pass-through rate purges the price gap of the first bias—
Dividing the price gap Pdt
otspatial variation in markups due to trade costs. However, as in Step 1 above, an identification
challenge is posed by the presence of the unobserved demand-shifter akdt on the right-hand sideof this estimating equation. We again pursue a fixed effects approach and assume that akdt can be
decomposed as akdt = αkt + αd + ukdt and that the variation in additive demand shifters akdt acrossdestination locations (i.e. the variation ukdt that remains after macro-level time-product effects, αkt ,and destination effects, αd , are removed) is uncorrelated with shifters to the cost of trading acrosslocations, Xkodt .34 Finally, as in Step 1 above, it is important to note that we require no restrictions
k , from equation (5) above.
on the multiplicative demand shifters, bdt

With this assumption in place, we obtain our main estimating equation for identifying thei
Xkodt ukdt |αkt , αd = 0. Note that the assumptions made about demand here aredifferent from—but not contradictory to—those made in Section 4.2 above.
34 Formally, this requires that E

h21extent to which distance affects trade costs:k − ρc
k Pk
Pdt
od ot
= τ (Xkodt ) + αkt
c
k
ρ
od

k
1 − ρc
od
c
k
ρ

!

k
1 − ρc
od
c
k
ρ

+ αd

od

!

+ ε̃kdt ,

(15)

od

k is a consistent estimator of the pass-through rate ρk obtained in Step 1 above, αk is awhere ρct
od
od

product-time fixed effect, αd is a destination fixed effect and ε̃kdt is a composite error term.35 In Section 4.4, we explore the sensitivity of our results to weakening our identification assumptions byreplacing the destination fixed effect with either a year-destination or time-destination fixed effect.
Equation (15) implies that this relationship between distance and trade costs is revealed, despite the potential presence of market power in the trading sector, by simply using ‘adjusted pricegaps’ (i.e.

k − ρck PkPdt
k − Pk ) as has been
od ot
) as the dependent variable, rather than price gaps (i.e. Pdt
ot
k
ρc
od

k with Pk / ρck , as well as
prominent in the literature. Transforming the price gap by replacing Pdt
dt
odincluding the product-time and destination fixed effects interacted with

k
1−ρc
od
, explicitly controlskρcod

for the fact that mark-ups may vary over space due to different marginal costs, different levels ofcompetition, or the possibility that the demand shifter varies over time, products and destinations.
In principle, the joint effects of all elements of the vector Xkodt on the trade costs function τ (Xkodt )can be estimated non-parametrically using the method above. But as discussed in Section 4.1, weapply the decomposition τ (Xkodt ) = f ( xod ) + χkodt and focus on the nonparametric relationshipbetween trade costs and log distance xod embodied in f (·).
The solid line in Figure 3 displays our baseline nonparametric estimate of how τ (Xkodt ) depends on log distance—that is, the function f (·)—when using the adjusted price gap specificationsuggested by equation (15).36 We follow the same procedure as in Section 4.1 above, estimating
equation (15) by replacing the term τ (Xkodt ) with f ( xod ) and employing the procedure in Baltagi
and Li (2002). We report the 95 percent confidence interval that obtains when block-bootstrapping
100 times at the product-destination level following the procedure in Deaton (1997)37 , and we normalize the plotted line so as to pass through zero at the most proximate location. For comparisonk
35 That is, ε̃k ≡ (1−ρod ) uk − αk
t
dt
dt
ρkod



k
1−ρc
1− ρ kod− ρk od + 1
k
ρc
od





− αd

od

k
1−ρc
1− ρ kod− ρk odkρcod. As with all previous specifications, weodk appears on both sides of equation
also control for product-time fixed effects αkt when estimating equation (15). As ρcod
15, there will be correlated measurement error from any finite sample bias in estimating ρkod . However, since themean of the bootstrap estimates is close to the OLS estimate, in practice this appears not to be an issue. Note also thatk1−ρc(1−ρkod )(in ε̃kdt ) and the dependent variables Xkodt is not problematic as we condition on ck od byρkodρodincluding a full set of αkt fixed effects interacted with this object.
36 One potential concern with implementing the procedure in equation (15) is that it requires division by ρck , sood
k s close to zero. In our baseline results weour results could in principle be sensitive to our treatment of estimated ρcodk that fall below 0.2. Our results are robust to this procedure,
therefore winsorize all pass-through rate estimates ρcodcorrelation between

however, as we discuss in Section 4.4 below.
37 We bootstrap the confidence interval in order to mitigate concerns about generated regressor bias given that somek obtained in Step 1. The fact that the estimates of ρck vary at the
regressors depend on the estimated values of ρc
od

od

product-destination level motivates our choice of blocks at which to block-bootstrap, but we explore alternatives below.

22we also report (with a dashed line) the estimate reported in Figure 2, which is what we obtaink =1. In all threewhen using trading pairs only (as with the solid line) but when assuming that ρcod

k from Step 1 above) is considerably
countries, the solid line (which relies on the estimates of ρcod
k = 1 by assumption), implying that procedures that igsteeper than the dashed line (which sets ρcodnore the possibility of mark-up variation over space would considerably understate intra-national
trade costs in our sample. Notably, the solid line (in contrast to the dashed line) for the U.S. is
weakly upward-sloping everywhere as might be expected from a cost curve. And equally, as one
might expect, the solid line estimates for Ethiopia and Nigeria seem similar, at least relative to thatfor the U.S. which is considerably shallower (note that the scale of the x-axis for the U.S. is smaller
than that of the other countries).
Because the estimated nonparametric relationships in Figure 3 appear relatively linear, and to
facilitate our analysis of robustness checks below, we now consider a parametric version of theestimation of equation (15) in which τ (Xkodt ) is assumed to be a linear function of log distance; thatis, we set f ( xod ) = µxod in what follows. Estimates of the parameter µ are reported in Table 2.
Columns 1-3 refer to Ethiopia, and we describe these specifications in turn here; columns 4-6 and7-9 then contain entirely analogous specifications for Nigeria and the US, respectively. By way
of comparison, we start in columns 1 and 2 with the linear analog of the two first-pass estimates
discussed in Section 4.1. Column 1 shows how (the absolute value of) price gaps vary with log distance across all location pairs, while column 2 shows how price gaps vary with log distance acrosstrading pairs only. Finally, column 3 reports the estimated coefficient from a parametric versionof equation (15) based on a regression of the ‘adjusted price gap’ on log distance. All specifications in Table 2 include product-time fixed effects and report standard errors that are clusteredat the product-time period level. We also report block-bootstrapped standard errors in column
3 to mitigate generated regressor bias concerns, setting blocks either at the product-time period
or the product-destination level. All estimates are statistically significant. Consistent with the
nonparametric estimates in Figure 3, the estimates based on adjusted price gaps in column 3 areconsiderably larger than those based on simple price gaps (columns 1 and 2)—and the same is true
for Nigeria (columns 4-6) and the US (columns 7-9). Further, the extent to which the coefficientchanges when correcting for variable mark-ups (that is, in the Ethiopian case, when comparing
column 2 to column 3) is similar—by a factor of approximately two—in all three countries. Thisagain suggests that, regardless of the country we examine, assuming that mark-ups are constant(i.e. ρkod = 1) can lead to substantial bias.
What does differ across countries in Table 2 is the magnitude of the coefficient estimates. To
interpret these magnitudes, consider the following. The least remote locations in our sample areapproximately 50 miles (or 3.9 log miles) away from the source of production.38 The most remotelocations in our African countries are approximately 500 miles (6.2 log miles) away from the sourceof production.39 The estimates in columns 3, 6 and 9 of Table 2 then imply that the additional trade
38 This distance represents approximately the fourth percentile of the distribution of route lengths in Ethiopia andNigeria, and the third percentile in the US.
39 This travel time falls within the 99th percentile of route lengths in Ethiopia, the 77th percentile in Nigeria, but

23costs incurred when trading goods to the most remote compared to the least remote African sample locations (a difference of 2.3 log miles) is 9 cents in Ethiopia and 13 cents in Nigeria, but thesame distance in the US would cost only 2 cents. The mean product observation in our Ethiopia
sample costs 43 cents. So the ad valorem equivalent of this relative cost of remoteness is 20 percent.
The equivalent calculation for our Nigeria sample (mean product cost of 1.03 dollars) suggests a
relative cost of remoteness of 12 percent, and the equivalent calculation for the US (mean productcost of 61 cents) is 4 percent. The estimates in Table 2 therefore suggest that the intra-national trade
costs imposed by distance are considerable in our African countries, and are substantially smallerin the US. Section 4.5 provides further discussion of the interpretation of the coefficient estimates.

4.4

Robustness checks
We now evaluate the sensitivity of the baseline estimates presented in Section 4.3, to a numberof alternative empirical assumptions. These alternative estimates are presented in Table 3. We begin, in row 1, by re-stating the baseline estimates of interest—the parametrically estimated effectof log distance on trade costs, corresponding to columns 3, 6 and 9 from Table 2.
We first examine various alternatives for estimating pass-through rates. These estimates are
not a focus of this paper but, rather, a crucial input for Step 2, in which we estimate intra-national
trade costs in oligopolistic settings. As discussed in Section 4.2, our baseline pass-through estimates are sometimes close to zero or (in less than 4 percent of cases, as discussed in footnote 31)
actually negative. Our baseline estimates winsorized all pass-through estimates, bottom-coding
k = 0.2, but the estimates in row 2 suggest that this is inconsequential as we obtainthem as ρcodsimilar results when using all of the raw pass-through estimates. The estimates in rows 3 and 4
relax Assumption 4, that the pass-through rate (while free to vary across products and locations)is constant throughout our sample time period. Row 3 splits our 10-year sample into two 5-year
periods and estimates a separate pass-through rate within each of these shorter time periods; row
4 does the same for each of four 2.5-year time periods.40 Despite allowing the pass-through rate tovary freely across these shorter time periods, we obtain similar estimates to those in our baseline.
Although it is the short-run pass-through rate that provides a sufficient statistic for the competitive conditions prevailing across locations at any given point in time, rows 5 and 6 explore thesensitivity of our estimates to using longer-term pass-through rates; this has the advantage of allowing for the possibility of sticky price adjustment. Row 5 estimates the pass-through rate byregressing destination prices on origin prices, but also on three lagged origin price terms (as wellas the fixed effects in equation 13); the pass-through rates that then enter our Step 2 analysis in row
5 are the sum of these four origin price coefficients. Evidently, allowing longer-term pass-throughrates (typically higher than short-run pass-through rates) to inform our Step 2 estimates does nothave a large effect on the coefficient in any country. In a similar vein, the results in row 6 aggregate
the data used to estimate pass-through rates up to the quarterly level and proceeds as before withthis aggregated data. This acts to reduce the coefficients (relative to baseline) in all three countries,
only the 45th percentile in the US, a much larger country.
40 For the US sample, where we only have 6 years of data, we divide the sample into 3- and 1.5-year time periods
respectively in rows 3 and 4.

24

but the relative effect of distance on trade costs in each country is very similar to those in rows 1-5.
A natural concern with our pass-through estimation procedure is that a shock to the origin
price is correlated with an unobserved macro shock that could affect trade costs and hence affectlocations differently. One possible candidate for such a shock is the price of oil, which would
raise the price of gasoline and hence the relative cost of accessing remote locations, leading ourprocedure to over-estimate the pass-through rate.41 In row 7 we therefore present results obtained
while estimating pass-through rates using regressions that control for the world oil price (a simple
average of Brent, Dubai and West Texas spot prices converted into local currency for each country and then inflation-adjusted) in each of the product-destination pass-through regressions; onaverage this has only a minor impact on our estimates.
We now turn to an extension to our baseline procedure for carrying out Step 2 above. Row 8
estimates equation (15) while directly including fixed effects for each destination location d (recall
from equation (15) that in our baseline procedure these fixed effects were only included as interactions with(1−ρkod )). This is important because we suspect that many components of trade costs
ρkod(such as local distribution or retail costs, the non-tradable components of traded retail goods) may
co-vary with distance to the origin locations. It is therefore noteworthy that our coefficient estimates change very little after including destination fixed effects, though the standard errors rise
substantially in some cases.42 This suggests that spatial variation in location-specific trade costs is
not correlated with spatial variation in the distance between average trading pairs.
The next set of extensions alters our entire estimation procedure (that is, both Steps 1 and 2).
Rows 9 and 10 increase the set of fixed effects included in Step 1 and 2 to account for more generaldemand and trade costs structures which could confound our main estimates. Recall from equation (15) that, once one works with adjusted price gaps as the dependent variable, the only demand
shocks that could potentially bias estimates of trade costs (those which shift the inversedemandcurve, i.e. akdt ) enter equation (15) interacted with a term involving the pass-through rate,

k
1−ρc
od
c
k
ρ

.

od

In rows 9 and 10 we therefore interact two more exhaustive sets of fixed effects, year-location γyt
and time-location fixed effects γdt , respectively, in lieu of the destination fixed effects in equation(15). Additionally, these two specifications also include the same fixed effects in Step 1, adding either year-location or time-location fixed effects to estimating equation (13). The estimates changevery little for either the year-destination fixed effect specification (row 9) or the time-destination
41 Given that oil is also produced and processed close to some of the origin locations in two of our sample countries(Nigeria and the US) a related concern is that the world price for oil affects factor prices in destination locations relatively near to oil-engaged origin locations, which then affect transport costs to these destination locations; alternatively
factor price effects could increase demand in these destination locations.
42 Because the main regressor of interest here—log origin-destination distance—is fixed over time, the only variationthat remains after controlling for destination fixed effects in row 8 is that generated by the fact that products comefrom distinct origin locations. So for a country like Nigeria, where (as is apparent in Figure 1), most products areproduced in the same (or extremely proximate) origin locations, it is not surprising that the standard error in row
8 is considerably higher than in the baseline (row 1). In fact, in the US case there is insufficient variation to include
destination-specific fixed effects and simultaneously cluster the standard errors at the product-time period level; thereported standard error in row 8 of Table 3 for the US therefore reports robust standard errors that are not clustered(and similarly for row 12 that we will discuss shortly). Our main concern here is with the coefficient estimate, however,which is unaffected by these considerations.

25

specification (row 10). (Unfortunately, the latter of these two specifications is computationally infeasible for the US since it would entail estimating a regression with several million fixed effects.)
Rows 11 and 12 continue to examine the possibility that our estimates are biased due to covariance between trade costs and unobserved demand shocks. As discussed above, both Step 1
and Step 2 required us to assume that demand shocks at the origin location are uncorrelated withthose at the destination location (conditional on demand shocks that are common across products). Because unobserved demand shocks (be they due to taste, migration or income shocks) arelikely to be spatially correlated, our identifying assumption seems increasingly plausible for destination locations that are increasingly remote from origin locations. In row 11 we therefore repeat
our entire estimation procedure (that is, both Steps 1 and 2) for a sample that contains destination
locations that are more than 100 miles from the origin; row 12 performs the analogous check withthis exclusion raised to 200 miles. That the estimated coefficients do not change substantially as
we increase this exclusion band from 0 miles (row 1) to 100 miles (row 11) to 200 miles (row 12)
therefore suggests that our identifying assumption is plausible.
Finally, we explore two miscellaneous extensions to our main analysis. First, in row 13 we report an estimate that is based on an entirely raw data sample. This suggests that the various data
cleaning procedures described in Section 2.1, while potentially important a priori, do not appear tomatter much for our central parameter estimate. Lastly, in rows 14 and 15 we report specifications
that interact log origin-destination distance xod with the log weight (per unit) of the product k inquestion; row 14 reports the level effect of log distance and row 15 reports the coefficient on theinteraction term (the level effect of the product’s weight is subsumed by the product-time period
fixed effects that we use throughout). While a full exploration of how trade costs differ acrossproducts is beyond the scope of this paper, we find it reassuring that our procedure picks up, ineach of our three sample countries, the common-sense notion that heavier goods are costlier totrade, and statistically significantly so.
All told, the general message of Table 3 is that, regardless of the precise form that a numberof important identifying assumptions take, or the exact implementation of a number of empirical details, our baseline parameter estimates are relatively stable. We therefore go on, in the next
subsection below, to a deeper discussion of our baseline results.

4.5

Discussion of Results
We now describe additional context behind our baseline results from Section 4.3 above. We

first explore some possible explanations for relatively high costs of distance in our African countries, and then discuss how our results compare to other estimates in the literature.
Unpacking the effect of distance on trade costs
Figure 3 and Table 2 document how the impact of a given unit of (log) distance on intranational trade costs is approximately 4-5 times higher in our African sample countries (Ethiopia
and Nigeria) than in the US. One potential explanation for our findings is that there are simply
more roads in the US than in Nigeria. We therefore re-estimate the costs of distance using thequickest-route distance measure described in Section 2.3. If part of the US’s trade cost advantage
26

lies in the omnipresence of roads, we should see this advantage fall relative to Ethiopia and Nigeria when we use the road distance metric. Table 4 reports how our estimate of the cost of (log)
distance in each of our African sample countries (Ethiopia and Nigeria) changes as we shift froma distance metric that is based on road distance (along the quickest route) rather than straight-line(i.e. great circle) distance.
In the case of Ethiopia we find that the relative coefficients fall but by a small amount—from
3.53 times higher cost of (log) distance in Ethiopia relative to the US, to 3.19 times higher. But inthe case of Nigeria the relative coefficient is actually slightly higher (5.26 to 5.40). This suggeststhat adjusting for the mere presence of roads does little to explain why the costs of distance are somuch higher in Ethiopia or Nigeria than in the US.
A natural continuation of this explanation is to adjust for the quality of roads in the US relative to our African sample countries—we certainly expect the US to be relatively endowed withhigh-quality roads. To adjust for road quality we use the quickest-route travel time measure described in Section 2.3. As reported in Table 4, when we use travel time (along the quickest route)from origin to destination as our ‘distance’ metric, the effect of (log) distance on trade costs is now
2.46 times higher in Ethiopia than in the US, and 4.01 times higher in Nigeria than in the US. So
adjusting—to the best of our ability—for speed of travel along the roads in our three countries
reduces the gap between our African countries and the US, but a considerable gap remains. Thissuggests that even the cost per (log) hour of travel is substantially smaller in the US than in our
African countries, a finding that is surprising given that we expect higher wages (or other factor
prices) to lead to higher costs of time in the US.
Following from this, it is important to recall that, in looking at how retail prices vary overspace, our approach has identified all-encompassing trade costs—the full cost of getting a goodfrom its origin o to its destination d. As a consequence, our estimates of the cost of distance include any systematic variation in local retail and distribution costs between origin and destination
locations. If our sample countries have differing spatial gradients of local retail/distribution costs(perhaps due to differing rent or wage gradients) or local retail productivity, our results could bepicking up these differences. However, as we have seen (in Table 3) the inclusion of destination
location fixed effects does very little to change our baseline point estimates. Spatial variation infactor prices does not seem to be strongly correlated with (log) origin-destination distances in anyof our three sample countries, and hence this is not a successful explanation for our finding thatthe costs of distance appear to be considerably higher in Ethiopia or Nigeria than in the US.
There remain a range of other factors that could potentially contribute to higher intra-national
trade costs within African countries yet not operate through road distance, travel time or locationspecific factors. For example, commentators on African transport (e.g., Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2009)) have highlighted inferior technology, both through the use of old truck fleets that are
fuel-inefficient, terrible road conditions that necessitate frequent truck repairs, and poor logistics.
Fuel costs are also generally higher in Africa, due in part to a lack of local refining capacity. Additionally, many routes are characterized by low payload utilization and a low total number of miles
traveled per trip, reducing any economies of scale. Finally, there are long waiting times for loading27

and unloading as well as frequent checkpoints (whose time costs are not accounted for in Google
Maps algorithms for calculating travel times in Africa) often accompanied by bribe demands.
Comparisons to existing literature
We now discuss how our trade costs estimates compare to those in the existing literature. We
are not aware of any previous work that has estimated how origin-destination price gaps dependk ), nor any work that has attempted to purge such priceon distance (or any other cost-shifter xodt

gap inferences of spatially-varying mark-ups. Numerous studies have documented how spatial
price gaps co-vary with distance but, as is clear from Figures 2 and 3, our new data on origin locations suggest that, within our sample at least, spatial price gaps can provide misleading estimateswhen not restricted to trading pairs or when failing to correct for variation in mark-ups over space.
An alternative method for estimating trade costs, however, is to simply ask transport firms
what they would charge for a shipment (or transportation-using firms what they pay for suchservices). The well-known difficulty with this method is that it measures the price that traders
charge their customers rather than those traders’ marginal costs. In addition, there are supplementary costs of trading (such as regulatory barriers or local distribution costs) that are not borneby the surveyed transport firms, as well as aspects of quality (time in transit, uncertainty, damage
or loss of goods in transit) that are difficult for surveyors to measure. But a relative comparisonof such estimates across countries may still be meaningful if the price-cost margin charged bytraders, and the proportion of costs that are unobserved, is similar across countries. A particularly
relevant study containing such results is Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2009). These authors survey trucking companies in the US and along major transport corridors within sub-Saharan Africa.
They report an average of costs per unit distance in the US, as well as along one West African
trucking corridor (Bamako-Accra) and one East African corridor (Mombasa-Nairobi). While thesemain trucking arteries do not pass through our sample countries, our hope is that estimates basedon these journeys nevertheless provide a useful comparison. As shown in Table 4, the survey
estimates, expressed as ratios of East and West African costs to US costs, are similar to—thoughsomewhat lower than—our trade costs estimates for Nigeria and Ethiopia respectively.43 Furthermore, both our estimates and those in Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2009) imply that costs inWest Africa are around twice those in East Africa.
How markups vary over space
We now turn to a discussion of what our results imply for the variation in mark-ups overspace. Our finding that the effect of distance on trade costs is larger once we account for markup variation across space implies that remote locations feature lower mark-ups. At first glance
this is surprising. Appendix Figure C.2 shows that pass-through rates tend to be lower in more
remote locations, suggesting that these locations are less competitive and mark-ups there should

43 One possible explanation for the fact that the Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2009) estimates are lower than ourestimates is that they focus on some of the regions’ relatively high-quality transport corridors rather than the full set ofroads, major and minor, that underpin our estimates.

28

be higher rather than lower.44 However, there are two other channels at work that can generate
the decline in mark-ups with distance. Most directly, because we estimate that pass-through rates
are below one for the vast majority of product-location pairs, the higher trade costs τ (Xkodt ) in remote locations move consumers almost everywhere onto a more elastic portion of their demand
curve, leading intermediaries to charge lower mark-ups in remote locations. In addition, remotelocations may be poorer and so have lower demand shifters akdt , also lowering mark-ups.
Figure 4 explores the extent to which these two possibilities are driving our result. Here weplot three lines. First, with a solid line we plot the empirical derivative of mark-ups with respect
to distance, as recovered from the gap between the two curves in Figure 3. Second, with a dotted line we plot the empirical derivative of akdt with respect to distance, as recovered from thedemand-shifter fixed effects αkt + αd in specification 15. And finally, with a dashed line we plot theempirical function −τ (Xkodt ), with respect to distance (as presented earlier, but without the minus
sign, in Figure 3). As can be seen, there is limited evidence that demand shifters are systematicallylower in more remote locations. Hence, our finding of lower mark-ups in more remote locations
is predominantly driven by the fact that the high trade costs of reaching those locations moves
remote consumers onto more elastic parts of their demand curve.

5

Implications for the Incidence of Globalization
As tariffs fall and international transportation and logistics improve—events often termed‘globalization’—the port price of an imported product will fall. A natural question then arises:
Who captures the benefits of these port price changes? Within a given location, do the gains
accrue to consumers or producers? And how does this vary across locations? In a perfectly competitive economy with no internal trade barriers, it is clear that all consumers, regardless of theirlocations, enjoy the benefits, and do so equally. But given the evidence for both high internal trade
costs and imperfect competition we have seen in Section 4 above, the answers to these questions
in our setting are more nuanced.
We provide here a two-part investigation of these questions. First, we consider the distribution of surplus across locations purely due to the extensive margin. Because of high costs of
intra-national trade, it is entirely possible that remote locations never import the product in question. That is, remote locations may enjoy no consumer or producer surplus from the product inquestion. Second, we consider the distribution of surplus between producers and consumers (anddeadweight loss), and how the relative share of surplus accruing to consumers changes acrosslocations. Our findings below suggest that relatively remote consumers are also relatively separated from the gains created by globalization: they live in locations with less total social surplus
and capture a smaller share of the total social surplus that does exist in these locations. In thissense, our findings on internal trade costs in Section 4 imply an uneven distribution of the gains
from globalization, both across locations and between consumers and intermediaries.
44 To see this, note that under Assumptions 1-4 the size of the mark-up, µk = (1 − ρk )( ak − τ ( Xk ) − Pk ), is a funcot
odt
od
dt
odt
k.
tion of the pass-through rate and the gap between the demand-shifter akdt and the intermediary’s total cost, τ (Xkodt ) + Pot

29

Before going forward, it is important to keep two caveats in mind. First, for our African sample countries no data on consumption quantities are available for the narrowly defined productsthat we study here. For this reason we speak only about the relative share of surplus accruing
to different agents rather than absolute amounts. Second, while our central interest here is in theincidence of globalization (the distribution of surplus from an imported good) the estimates so
far were obtained from a sample of largely domestic goods.45 However, because much domestic
goods production takes place in main port cities, and because the same intermediaries who distribute domestic goods will also distribute foreign goods, we believe that the estimates in Section
4 are useful for the questions posed here.

5.1

Implication 1: Remoteness and the size of the surplus
The estimates in Figure 3 (solid line) suggest that intra-national trade costs rise substantiallywith distance in Ethiopia and Nigeria. This implies that remote consumers in these countries, living far from a major port, would pay substantial trade costs—and also substantially higher prices,
as also seen in Figure 3 (dashed line)—to purchase foreign goods. We therefore expect these consumers to consume, all else equal, lower quantities of imported products and hence obtain lessconsumer surplus from them. In the extreme, the high cost of distance may even lead to the imported product not being available in remote locations.
Without data on the quantity of products sold we are limited in our ability to estimate themagnitude of this effect. But we are able to provide suggestive evidence that this extensive margin affects remote locations by exploiting the fact that, in Ethiopia and Nigeria, a missing priceobservation indicates that the CPI enumerators were unable to find that product (in any given
location and month), which indicates that consumption was likely to be zero or minimal.46 Figure
5 displays how this—admittedly imperfect—proxy for zero consumption relates to distance in our
two sample African countries. The y-axis reports an indicator variable for whether the enumerator
found the product in that location for a given month.47 It is clear that remote locations, those thatare far from the origin location of a given product, are considerably less likely to consume that
product. Columns 1 and 6 of Table 5 confirms this negative relationship using a linear probability model that regresses an indicator variable for product availability on distance from the origin
location and a time-product fixed effect. For example, in Ethiopia the probability of enumerators
locating a product in a particularly remote location (500 miles away) is 22 percent lower than in oneof the most proximate locations (50 miles away); the corresponding figure for Nigeria is 11 percent.

5.2

Implication 2: Remoteness and the distribution of surplus
We now consider a second question: If there is social surplus from an imported product ina location, how is that surplus distributed among market participants (consumers and intermediaries)? That is, we consider the incidence (across agents) of a change in the port price for the
45 As shown in Appendix Table C.1, 5 of the 15 Ethiopian goods, and 3 of the 18 Nigerian goods, are imported.
46 Note that such an exercise is not possible for the US sample since no enumerators are sent to search for products

but instead a small number of households in each county are sampled.
47 We restrict attention to products that were found in at least one location in the country in that month.

30

product within a given remote location. Because this question concerns shares of surplus, our lackof quantity data is less of a constraint, as we discuss below.
At the outset it is important to note that there are a priori reasons to expect that remote locations
may see larger shares of surplus accruing to intermediaries. Consider the theoretical frameworkfrom Section 3 above, where to simplify notation we revert temporarily to the setting with just one
location, product and time period. One can formally show that a sufficient condition for profits
Πd to be decreasing in the trade cost-shifter xd is ρd < 1. Since the vast majority of our estimated pass-through rates satisfy this condition, we expect there to be lower profits in relatively
remote locations. These lower profits will lead to less entry in the long run thereby reducing thelevel of competition among intermediaries and thus, all else equal, increasing the share of surplus
accruing to these intermediaries.
Naturally, it is challenging to identify the shares of surplus accruing to consumers and intermediaries. Fortunately, based on an extension of the logic in Weyl and Fabinger (2011),48 in thetheoretical framework we have outlined there exists a simple connection between pass-throughand the division of surplus, which allows an answer to this question without the need for data on
consumption quantities.
As we show formally in Appendix B, under Assumptions 1-3 we can express the ratio of intermediary variable profits, ISd ,49 and consumer surplus, CSd , asISd
1
1 − φd
=
+
,
CSd
ρd
φd

(16)

which means that the share of surplus enjoyed, in equilibrium, by intermediaries relative to consumers is a simple function of just the equilibrium pass-through rate ρd and the competitivenessindex φd prevailing in that market. Conditional on obtaining estimates of ρd and φd , therefore,
equation (16) provides a direct estimate of the division of surplus.50 To obtain some intuition for
why the distribution of surplus can be captured by such a simple expression, consider a monopolist intermediary (φd = 1) facing a small change in the port price. By the envelope theorem thechange in intermediary profits is simply equal to the quantity Qd . Meanwhile the change in consumer surplus is equal to the quantity consumed multiplied by the change in the destination priceas a result of the changing port price, or simply Qd ρd . Hence the ratio of intermediary to consumer
surplus is equal to the inverse of the pass-through rate as in equation (16) when φd = 1.
In order to implement the calculation suggested by equation (16) we therefore require esti48 This result extends the monopoly analysis in Weyl and Fabinger (2011) to the case of oligopoly. Subsequentversions (e.g. Weyl and Fabinger (2013)) contain a similar formulation derived independently.
49 We work with a notion of surplus defined on total variable profits because nothing in our dataset can be used toestimate the fixed costs intermediaries pay.
50 An additional result that holds under Assumptions 1-3 has been generously brought to our attention by Glen
Weyl: the ratio of deadweight loss (DWL) to intermediaries’ surplus in this environment is given by

DW Ld= (1 − ρd ) + ρd φd −
ISd



ρd φd
(1 − ρd ) + ρd φd ρd1− ρ d(ρd φd + 1) .

This result, together with that in equation (16) allows for a straightforward decomposition of total social surplus intothat accruing to consumers (CSd ), intermediaries (ISd ) and to deadweight loss (DW Ld ).

31

mates of both the pass-through rate ρd and the competitiveness index φd . We therefore revert ournotation to that of the empirical setting, with multiple products k, origin-destination trading pairs
od, and time periods t (but where, following Assumption 4, the pass-through rate ρkod and comISk

k are constant over time; this then implies thatod
petitiveness index φod
will also be constant overCSk
k are connected through the formula:time). Recall that ρkod and φodρkod =

1+

δdk
k
φod

od

! −1
,

(17)

where δdk is the preference parameter that captures the curvature of the demand curve (the elasticity of the slope of demand) in the constant pass-through demand class from Assumption 3.
k . Unfortunately, in genEquation (17) suggests that estimates of ρkod could be used to estimate φodk .
eral (that is, without further restrictions on δdk ) there is no unique mapping between ρkod and φod

We therefore assume (in Assumption 5 below) that the variation in the demand-side determinantsof pass-through (i.e. the parameters δdk ) and the supply-side determinants of pass-through (i.e. thek ) are sufficiently orthogonal over destination markets d and products k as to allow
parameters φod
k . However, the particular asdata on the pass-through rate (i.e. an estimate of ρkod ) to identify φod

sumption made in Assumption 5, while easy to interpret, is overly sufficient since it restricts there
to be only N + T unknown parameters to be estimated from NT pass-through estimates.51
Assumption 5 [Identification of δ and φ]. The demand parameter δdk is constant over destination locations d but can vary freely across products k; that is, δdk =δk for all d. Similarly, the competitiveness index
k is constant over products k but is free to vary across destinations d; that is, φk =φ for all k.
parameter φod
ododThis is a particularly stark assumption, but one that is perhaps not implausible. Because of
economies of scale it seems reasonable that the same intermediary will supply multiple goods toa given location. Consequently, the essential variation in the number of intermediaries and theirk ), is primarily across locacompetitive conduct (and hence the overall competitiveness index φod

tions rather than across products within a location. Likewise, while we allow the additive andk ) to vary across locations, products and time, it
multiplicative shifters of demand (i.e. akdt and bdt
k , the unique demand-side parameseems plausible that the second-order curvature parameter δdt

ter that governs pass-through, is constant across locations and time.
Assumptions 1-5 therefore imply that a consistent estimator of the competitiveness index at a
destination (i.e. φod ), up to a scalar, can be obtained by estimating the following regression by OLSkΞkod = γod + γ1k + γ2k ζ od
+ εkod .

(18)

k be a consistent estimator of the equilibrium pass-through rate obIn this expression: letting ρcodckk > 1 then Ξk ≡ ln(1 − 1 ); γ is atained in Step 1, if ρ < 1 then Ξk ≡ ln( 1 − 1), and if ρc
od

od

od

k
ρc
od

d

k
ρc
od

od

k is a dummy variable that
destination fixed effect; γ1k and γ2k are product-specific fixed effects; ζ od
k < 1 and zero otherwise; and εk is an error term (due to the finite sample varianceequals 1 if ρcod

od

51 Recall, N is the total number of destinations and T the total number of time periods.

32k ). This procedure effectively projects the estimated pass-through rates on locain our estimates ρcodtion and product fixed effects. We normalize the estimated φod values such that the lowest in thesample (within each country) is φod = 1, which amounts to a normalization of the least competitive location to a monopolistic scenario. Subject to this normalization, a consistent estimator of−γcod .
the competitiveness index in any location d is φcod ≡ eA natural question to ask is how well these estimates agree with external proxies for competitiveness. One possible proxy is the number of intermediaries who are active in a given location,
which we expect to be positively correlated with the competitiveness index φod (since, by the definition in Assumption 2, φod ≡ mθodod , where md is the number of intermediaries in location d). Indeed,
if intermediaries compete with Cournot conjectures then θod = 1, and the competitiveness index
φod is simply a measure of the number of intermediaries mod . In Ethiopia we have data from twocross-sectional surveys collected in 2001 and 2008 that report an empirical correlate of md , namely
the number of wholesale trading firms that are active in each location d. Panel A of Figure 6 illustrates how this empirical proxy for md correlates with our estimate of φc
od for each destination
location d in Ethiopia. The positive and statistically significant correlation between these two variables suggests that our procedure, and Assumption 5 in particular, generates plausible estimates.
Panel B of Figure 6 shows nonparametric plots of how the estimated competitiveness index φcodvaries with (log) distance to the main commercial city (Addis Ababa or Lagos) in each of our two
African sample countries.52 There is clearly a downward-sloping relationship, and the parametricequivalent of this descriptive relationship—presented as columns 2 and 7 of Table 5—suggeststhat the negative slope is statistically significant in each country. That is, more remote locations
have a less competitive intermediary sector serving them. This is consistent with the argument
offered above: as long as ρkod < 1, profits Πkodt will be falling with a cost-shifter such as distanceand hence we should expect the number of entrants to be similarly falling with distance.
k and competitiveness φc
We now go on to use our estimates of pass-through ρc
od in equationod(16) to provide a consistent estimate of the ratio of intermediaries’ surplus to consumer surplus.
ISk

We calculate CSodk for each location d and product k and present in Figure 7 a nonparametric regresod

sion of this statistic on (log) distance from origin to destination. We use an analogous calculation
to report the share of consumer surplus in total surplus and how this varies by location. The general relationship is remarkably similar in each of our sample countries: Intermediaries capture alarger share of the surplus (relative to consumers) in remote locations relative to more proximate
locations. The total share of surplus enjoyed by consumers (that is, not going to intermediaries
or to deadweight loss) is relatively low in remote locations. Again, we present descriptive regressions in Table 5 that capture the parametric equivalents of these figures. These estimates imply
that the additional share of surplus going to consumers in the least remote locations (50 milesaway) compared to the most remote locations (500 miles away) is 4 percent in Ethiopia, 13 percent
in Nigeria and 1 percent in the US.
52 Such an exercise is less sensible for the US since there no single city that so dominates economic activity suchthat distance from it is a good measure of remoteness. Column 11 of Table 5 presents estimates based on distance toChicago (an important production and distribution hub); there is a positive but statistically insignificant relationship.

33

Overall, these findings suggest that consumers in remote locations are doubly harmed by theirremoteness. First, as argued in Section 5.1 above, consumers who are relatively remote from origin
locations face a considerably lower chance of finding an imported good available for consumption
at all. This suggests that the total quantity of surplus available to interior residents from a reduction in the world price of a product is lower in relatively remote locations. Second, as we haveseen in this subsection, relatively remote consumers capture a lower share of the surplus that does
exist in their location. In both senses, the incidence of ‘globalization’ is relatively unfavorable toconsumers in remote locations.

6

Conclusion
In this paper we have set out to answer the question, How large are the intra-national trade costs

that separate consumers in remote locations of developing countries from global markets? We find thatthe effect of distance on intra-national trade costs is substantially underestimated by standard
spatial price gap methods used to infer trade costs. That is, the cost of distance approximately
doubles when we discard uninformative price gaps, those price gaps for which neither of thepairs is a source location for the good in question. And the cost of distance approximately doubles again when we use a sufficient statistic, pass-through rates, to adjust spatial price gaps for
spatial variation in mark-ups (implying that markups are lower in remote areas, a result of hightrade costs placing remote consumers on more elastic parts of their demand curves). Our main
finding is that the costs of intra-national trade are approximately 4 to 5 times larger in our subSaharan Africa sample countries (Ethiopia and Nigeria) than in the US. This has obvious implications for consumer welfare in these developing countries, particularly for those consumers whose
relative remoteness—their location far from a country’s major port, for example—means that asconsumers they are connected to world markets only via these high intra-national trade costs.
Not only do these consumers therefore necessarily pay relatively more for imported goods,
which reduces the amount of potential surplus these consumers can derive from foreign goods.
But in addition—as we have documented using a methodology in which pass-through rates areagain a sufficient statistic—of the surplus that remains once foreign products do arrive at remotelocations, a relatively smaller fraction of that surplus accrues to consumers (instead of intermediaries and deadweight loss) than in locations near to the port of entry.
Like much research in developing countries, we are hampered by a lack of detailed consumption micro-data for the barcode-level products that we study here. Our goal therefore has
been to develop a methodology for estimating and understanding intra-national trade costs thatdraws only on widely available price data. Yet we have shown how one can nevertheless makeprogress—despite embracing a general environment with minor restrictions on tastes, technology
and market structure—because equilibrium prices and the extent to which they respond to costshocks contain essential information about the marginal costs and benefits of the decisions intermediaries make, and those decisions reveal exactly what is needed to understand the size and theimplications of intra-national trade costs.

34

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37Figure 1: Maps of sample locations

Panel B: Nigeria

Panel A: Ethiopia
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Panel C: US

*
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* Source Locations#! Market Observations(
Primary Roads
Secondary Roads

*
*#
#
0

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#

500 Miles

Notes: Market observations for the US are available for each of 1,881 counties so for clarity these are not illustrated.

38

*
#

Figure 2: Price gaps and distance

50

100

250

500

.05
0

.05
0

.05
0

Costs (2004 US$).1

US
(46 products, 1881 towns, 72 months ).1

Nigeria(18 products, 36 towns, 111 months).1

Ethiopia(15 products, 103 towns, 106 months)

50

100

250

500

50 100250

750 2000

Distance from origin location to destination market (miles, log scale)
all pairs

trading pairs only

Notes: Locally weighted polynomial (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth=0.5). 95% confidence intervals shown (block bootstrapped at
product-destination level). All plots control for product-time fixed effects. US plot uses compressed x-axis scale.

Figure 3: The effect of distance on intra-national trade costs

50

100

250

500

.05
0

.05
0

.05
0

Costs (2004 US$).1

US
(46 products, 1881 towns, 72 months ).1

Nigeria(18 products, 36 towns, 111 months).1

Ethiopia(15 products, 103 towns, 106 months)

50

100

250

500

50 100250

750 2000

Distance from origin location to destination market (miles, log scale)µ−adjusted, trading pairs only

trading pairs only

Notes: Locally weighted polynomial (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth=0.5). 95% confidence intervals shown (block bootstrapped at
product-destination level). All plots control for product-time fixed effects. Markup-adjusted (“µ-adjusted”) plot controls for interactions between pass-through and fixed effects as described in text. US plot uses compressed x-axis scale.

39

Figure 4: Variation in mark-ups across space

50

100

250

500

0
−.1

0
−.1

0
−.1

Costs (2004 US$).1

US
(46 products, 1881 towns, 72 months ).1

Nigeria(18 products, 36 towns, 111 months).1

Ethiopia(15 products, 103 towns, 106 months)

50

100

250

500

50 100250

750 2000

Distance from origin location to destination market (miles, log scale)
µ(x)

−τ(x)

a(x)

Notes: Locally weighted polynomial (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth=0.5). Semiparametric plots of demand shifters and trade costs
from the adjusted price gap regression (i.e. equation 15). US plot uses compressed x-axis scale.

Figure 5: Product availability

.9
.75

.8

.85

.9
.85
.8
.75

Product Found by Enumerators (Binary).95

Nigeria.95

Ethiopia

50

100

250

500

50

100

250

500

Distance from origin location to destination market (miles, log scale)Notes: Locally weighted polynomial (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth=0.5). 95% confidence intervals shown. Linear probability
model. Sample restricted to time-product pairs where product found in at least one location.

40

Figure 6: Competitiveness of intermediaries and distance32

b=0.0057 (t-stat=4.49)

1

Relative Competitiveness Index
of intermediaries at destination market

4

Panel A: Competitiveness index and Ethiopia Distributive Trade Surveys (2001 and 2008)

0

50
100
150
Number of wholesale firms at destination market

200

Notes: Plots of competitiveness index against number of firms (2001 and 2008 Ethiopian Distributive Trade Survey). 95% confidence
interval shown.

1.8

2.5

2

3

2.2

3.5

Nigeria

2.4

Ethiopia2

1.6

Relative competitiveness index φ of intermediaries
at destination market (with lowest φ normalized to 1)

Panel B: Relative competitiveness index and distance

50

100

250

500

50

100

250

500

Distance from location to commercial capital (miles, log scale)Notes: Locally weighted polynomial (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth=0.5). 95% confidence intervals shown.

41

2.2

50

100

250

500

Ethiopia: Intermediary profits
over consumer surplus

100

250

500

50

250

500

100

250

500

Nigeria: Share of consumer
surplus in total surplus

100

50

50

250

750

100

250

750

US: Share of consumer
surplus in total surplus

100

US: Intermediary profits
over consumer surplus

Notes: Locally weighted polynomial (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth=0.5). 95% confidence intervals shown. US plot uses compressed x-axis scale.

Distance from origin location to destination market (miles, log scale)

50

Ethiopia: Share of consumer
surplus in total surplus

50

Nigeria: Intermediary profits
over consumer surplus

Figure 7: Ratio of intermediary profit/deadweight loss to consumer surplus and distance

1.8

.38

.4

.42

.44

1.6

2

3
2.5
2
1.5
.5
.45
.4
.35

.9
.8
.7
.6
.5
.8
.78
.76
.74

42

2000

2000

43

4,130,923

Observations (All Pairs)

395,762

26,02528,098,179

175,782369(1.00)

6.14(696.35)

952.17(546.70)674.01(533.94)775.76(0.210)-0.006(0.149)0.094(0.819)

0.618

US

(3)

population-weighted trading pairs while row 7 reports the distance in log miles between trading pairs. Standard errors in parentheses.

prevailing exchange rate during the base period (January 2001). Rows 4-6 report distances in miles between locations for all location pairs, for trading pairs, and forof entry. Prices are deflated by the average of the proportional price change for each good at its origin location. Real prices are converted into US Dollars using thepairs. Row 3 reports price gaps only using data from “trading pairs”, i.e. pairs where one of the locations is either the factory location for that product or the port

Notes: Row 1 reports the mean price at the factory location for that product or the port of entry. Row 2 reports absolute price gaps using data from all location

100,761

350

Median Weight (Grams)

Observations (Trading Pairs)(0.66)(0.66)

250

5.69(191.68)(86.30)5.24

300.91(170.88)(107.23)

188.19350.48(149.36)(137.90)221.16300.20(0.272)(0.120)269.230.062(0.260)(0.124)

0.025

0.131

0.055

0.968
(1.267)0.400(0.477)

Nigeria

EthiopiaLog distance to origin location(Trading Pairs, Log Miles)

Distance to origin location(Trading Pairs, Miles, Pop. weighted)

Distance to origin location(Trading Pairs, Miles)

Distance between locations(All Pairs, Miles)

Price Gap
(Trading Pairs)

Absolute Price Gap(All Pairs)

Origin Price

(2)

(1)

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

Table 2: Estimating the effect of distance on intra-national trade costs
Dependent variable:

Absolute Price Gap(All Pairs)

Price Gap
(Trading Pairs)

Adjusted Price Gap(Trading Pairs)

(1)

(2)

(3)

EthiopiaLog distance to origin (miles)

Observations
R-squared

0.0115***0.0248***0.0374***(0.000439)(0.00125)(0.00223){0.00370}[0.00594]

4,130,923
0.356

100,7610.252

100,761
0.932

(4)

(5)

(6)

Nigeria
Log distance to origin (miles)

Observations
R-squared

0.0210***0.0254***0.0558***(0.00237)(0.00437)(0.00759){0.0115}[0.0221]395,7620.500

26,0250.500

26,025
0.964

(7)

(8)

(9)

US
Log distance to origin (miles)

Observations
R-squared
Time-Product FE
Time-Product ×

1 − 𝜌𝜌�
𝜌𝜌�Destination × 1 − 𝜌𝜌�𝜌𝜌�

0.00684***0.00437***0.0106***(0.000480)(0.000731)(0.00100){0.00142}[0.00140]

28,098,179
0.432

175,782
0.408

175,782
0.928

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Notes: Columns 1, 4 and 7 use data on the absolute price gap between all location pairs. Columns 2, 5 and 8 use dataon the actual price gap between “trading pairs”, e.g. destination price minus origin price for pairs where one of thelocations is either the factory location for that product or the port of entry. Columns 3, 6 and 9 use the adjusted price gap
k Pk ) / ρck and additionally include time-product and destination fixed effects multiplied by (1 − ρck ) / ρck in
( Pk − ρc
dt

od ot

od

od

od

order to control for omitted variable bias due to the level of market power covarying with distance. Prices are deflatedby the average of the proportional price change for each good at its origin location. Real prices are converted into US
Dollars using the prevailing exchange rate during the base period (January 2001). All regressions include time-productfixed effects. Time-product clustered standard errors in round parentheses. Time-product block bootstrapped standard
errors in curly parentheses, product-destination block bootstrapped standard errors in square parentheses. * significant
at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent and *** at 1 percent.

44

Table 3: Estimating the effect of distance on intra-national trade costs: robustness checks
(1)

(2)

(3)

Coefficient from regression of adjusted price gap
on log distance to origin (miles)
Ethiopia

NigeriaUS0.0374***0.0558***0.0106***(0.00223)(0.00759)(0.00100)

2. Not Winsorizing
Pass Through Rates

0.0321***0.0388***0.00983***(0.00254)(0.00619)(0.00103)

3. ρ Estimated Every 5 Years

0.0329***0.0859***0.00943***(0.00200)(0.0101)(0.00113)

0.0394***0.0581***0.0162***(0.00265)(0.00928)(0.00207)

0.0322***0.0587***0.00731***(0.00193)(0.00749)(0.00117)

6. ρ Estimated Using Quarterly
Pass Through Rates

0.0150***0.0279***0.00465***(0.00163)(0.00819)(0.000921)

7. Controls for Oil Price in ρ

0.0389***0.0583***0.0215***(0.00236)(0.00791)(0.00298)

0.0270***0.04900.0117***(0.00173)(0.0376)(0.00100)

9. Destination-Year Interactions
and Pass Through Controls

0.0438***0.0637***0.00925***(0.00138)(0.00537)(0.00101)

10. Destination-Time Interactions
and Pass Through Controls

0.0471***0.0764***(0.00153)(0.00605)

11. Removing Locations<100 Miles Away

0.0668***0.0720***0.0159***(0.00439)(0.0118)(0.00170)

12. Removing Locations<200 Miles Away

0.0723***0.0563***0.0194***(0.00671)(0.0164)(0.00160)

13. Not Cleaning Price Data

0.0349***0.0724***0.0117***(0.00182)(0.0104)(0.00108)

14. Interaction with Weight:
Log distance coef.

-0.0803***-0.296***0.000265(0.00816)(0.0256)(0.00384)

15. Interaction with Weight:
Log distance × log weight coef.

0.0229***0.0528***0.00191***(0.00190)(0.00450)(0.000703)

1. Baseline Specification

4. ρ Estimated Every 2.5 Years
5. ρ Estimated Using 3 Lags

8. Destination Fixed Effects

Notes: Each cell reports (for a particular row specification and column sample country) the main coefficient on log distance from a
regression of price gaps on log distance using the adjusted price gap methodology described in Section 4.3 of the main text. Eachof the 15 robustness specifications is described in Section 4.4 of the main text. All regressions include time-product fixed effects.
Time-product clustered standard errors in parentheses except for the US estimates in rows 8 and 12 which are unclustered due tocomputational limits. * significant at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent and *** at 1 percent.

45

Table 4: Comparisons across distance metrics and existing estimates(1)(2)
Ratio relative to US marginal cost of distance
Ethiopia
Nigeria
Great circle distanceRoad distance
Travel time

3.53
3.19
2.46

5.26
5.40
4.01

(3)

(4)
Ratio relative to US trucking costs
East Africa
West Africa(Mombasa-Nairobi)(Bamako-Accra)
Per km for one truckload

1.88

3.28

Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the ratio of the coefficient on log distance for Ethiopia and Nigeria respectively, eachk − ρck on
k Pk ) / ρccompared to the coefficient on log distance for the US, from regressions of the adjusted price gap ( Pdtodod otk in order to control for omittedk ) / ρclog distance and time-product and destination fixed effects multiplied by (1 − ρcododvariable bias due to the level of market power covarying with distance. Ratios are presented for estimates calculatedusing three different distance metrics: row 1 uses geodesic (i.e. as the crow flies) distance, row 2 uses quickest routeroad distance as calculated by Google Maps, and row 3 uses quickest route travel time again calculated by Google
Maps. The raw coefficients on log distance using these alternate distance metrics are reported in Appendix Table C.2.
Columns 3 and 4 report ratios of trucking costs along major East and West African transport corridors relative to US
trucking costs from Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2009) (all calculated per km for one truckload through surveys oftrucking firms).

46

Table 5: Regressing product availability, competitiveness and surplus on distance
(1)

(2)
y

Dependent variable:

Log distance between
origin and destination

1=Price Record,
0=No Price Record(Time-GoodLocation)

0.0368***-0.0185**(0.0598)(0.00908)(0.00763)

1,418
0.009

1,418
0.009

1,418
0.004

-0.344***(0.127)

145,682
0.14

100
0.059
(7)

1=Price Record,
0=No Price Record(Time-GoodLocation)

CompetitivenessIndex ofIntermediaries(All Locations)(8)(9)
Nigeria
Ratio ofRatio ofIntermediary Profits Deadweight Loss toto Consumer Surplus Consumer Surplus(Good-Location)(Good-Location)(10)
Consumer's Shareof Total Surplus(Good-Location)-0.0490***0.347***

0.0833***-0.0546***(0.00410)(0.113)(0.0138)(0.0155)

36
0.168

526
0.019

526
0.063

526
0.023

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

Log distance between
location and Lagos
Observations
R-squared(Good-Location)

0.229***yLog distance between
origin and destination

Consumer's Shareof Total Surplus(0.00309)(6)

Dependent variable:(5)-0.0959***

Log distance between
location and Addis Ababa
Observations
R-squared

CompetitivenessIndex ofIntermediaries(All Locations)(4)(3)
Ethiopia
Ratio ofRatio ofIntermediary Profits Deadweight Loss toto Consumer Surplus Consumer Surplus(Good-Location)(Good-Location)-0.444***(0.114)35,4060.298

US
Dependent variable:

CompetitivenessIndex ofIntermediaries(All Locations)

Log distance between
origin and destination
Log distance between
location and Chicago(54.71)

Observations
R-squared

2,865
0.000

Ratio ofRatio ofIntermediary Profits Deadweight Loss toto Consumer Surplus Consumer Surplus(Good-Location)(Good-Location)

Consumer's Shareof Total Surplus(Good-Location)

0.0623***-0.000350-0.00422(0.0108)(0.000299)(0.00372)

9,614
0.003

9,564
0.000

9,564
0.000

25.33

Notes: Columns 1 and 6 regress product availability on log distance at the monthly time-product-location level by ordinary leastsquares. Sample restricted to monthly time-product pairs for which the product is observed in at least one location. Both columns
include time-product fixed effects and time-product clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Columns 2 to 5, 7 to 10 and
11 to 14 regress estimates of the competitiveness index, the ratio of intermediary profit to consumer surplus, the ratio of deadweightloss to consumer surplus and the share of consumer surplus in total surplus on log distance. Since the competitiveness index islocation not location-product specific, distance to the commercial capital is used in columns 2, 7 and 11 rather than origin-destination
distance. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent and *** at 1 percent.

47

A

Data Appendix
The methodology proposed in the main text requires retail price data for narrowly defined

products, at many points in space within a group of developing and developed countries, at highfrequency for many periods. Here we supplement Section 2 with a more detailed description of
the data sources we use to obtain these price data and how we construct our retail price dataset.
(In the interest of readability and completeness, we repeat certain details that are also containedin the main text.) We apply our methodology to a sample from two sub-Saharan African countries (Ethiopia and Nigeria) and from the United States. The construction of our African and US
samples differ, so we describe them separately below.

A.1

Ethiopia and Nigeria

Because particularly little is known about the magnitude and implications of intra-national
trade costs in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), we began the data collection exercise underpinning thispaper with a search for SSA countries that collect high quality retail price data satisfying the following requirements. First, a substantial number of sampled products must be extremely narrowly defined (that is, defined at a level equivalent to the barcode level). Second, the price of
these products prevailing at retail markets must be recorded at many locations throughout thecountry. And finally, these price records must be recorded at high frequency (e.g. on a monthly
basis) and for at least six years (the length of our US sample, as described below). While the official data collection infrastructure in this region is generally weak (Young, 2012), it is relatively
strong for the purposes of collecting the official consumer price index via surveys of the prices of
products at retail establishments. Fortunately, therefore, many SSA countries (and developing anddeveloped countries more widely) collect exactly the type of data that is required for our analysis.
We work with two SSA countries in particular—Ethiopia and Nigeria—because of their large geographic sizes and because they were particularly forthcoming in making available to researchers
microdata on unit-level CPI observations. We obtained data in digital form spanning the period
from September 2001 to June 2010 in the case of Ethiopia and January 2001 to July 2010 in the caseof Nigeria.
Selection of Locations: Both Ethiopia and Nigeria report a CPI that is based on price observations in urban areas. In Ethiopia we obtained a sample of 103 urban market places1 and in Nigeria
we obtained a sample of 36 state capitals (one for each state).2 These locations are shown on themaps of Ethiopia and Nigeria depicted in panels A and B of Figure 1 of the main text, respectively.
Reassuringly, the sample locations provide fairly even geographic coverage of these two countries.
Survey Procedure: Enumerators visit pre-specified sample outlet locations within a market town
or city, typically many times per month.3 They are instructed to find the precise product described
1 Urban market places are defined as localities with 2,000 or more inhabitants with exceptions made for administrative capitals. The urban market places in the survey were chosen to be nationally representative and were either a capital of an administrative region, an industrial market place and/or a market place for trade and commercial activities.
2 For larger states in Nigeria, our price observations are actually an average of prices in the state capital and othermajor cities within the state as discussed further in footnote 5, below.
3 In Ethiopia, prices are surveyed every day for the first fifteen days of the month; whereas in Nigeria, most of the1

in each product’s description and to report a missing value if that product was unavailable (that is,substitutes are not permitted). Once found, the enumerator’s job is to learn at what price the product would typically be sold on the given date and at the given location.4 The sample frame of outlets is intended to comprise a representative sample of open markets, kiosks, groceries, butcheries,
pharmacies, super markets, etc.. In many cases, multiple outlet observations are obtained.5
Selection of Products: Both Ethiopia and Nigeria base their CPI on a set of products that did not
substantially change during our sample period of 2001-2010. These products are designed to span
the typical consumption basket (among both goods and services) in each country. Of the many
products that are covered, the vast majority refer to activities—such as a “man’s haircut” or a “onekm taxi journey”—or goods—such as “rice” or “bread”—whose very nature means that the products cannot be precisely codified. To avoid concerns of spatially-varying unobserved quality differences we work with the sub-sample of products that we consider to be “narrowly defined.” Inpractice, this involved a restriction to products whose producer’s brandname was provided in the
product description. Most products for which a brandname was provided contained additional
details, such as a description including the product size, which were designed to be sufficiently
precise to allow enumerators to locate the exact product.6 Because these descriptions appear to be
as precise as those linked to unique barcodes in the US Nielsen Consumer Panel data described
below, we refer to these products as products that are defined at the “barcode level.” The resulting
sample contains 15 products in Ethiopia and 19 products in Nigeria that were broadly available
across both the locations and years in our sample (examples of which include “Titus Sardines”(125gm), “Bedele Beer” (300cc) and “Lux Toilet Soap” (90gm)).
Additional Processing: As with all micro-level price data, our data contain observations thatappear to be mis-recorded.7 Accordingly, our main analysis uses a cleaned sample of price data,obtained by applying a simple cleaning algorithm to the raw data.8 However, we also report (inproducts in our sample are surveyed once per week throughout the entire month. In both cases, the data available tous are an average over these multiple temporal observations per month.
4 The precise means by which these instructions are conveyed to enumerators varies across the two countries. In
Ethiopia, enumerators do not actually purchase the items in question but instead interview traders and consumers
about prices typically paid (after bargaining). In Nigeria, enumerators are instructed to make actual (bargained)purchases where thought necessary. The Nigerian enumerators’ manual advises that the enumerator “must not be too
sophisticated in dressing as this may make the respondent arbitrarily raise the price of his goods”.
5 In Ethiopia, price observations are collected at 1-3 outlets per location, with the exception of three larger cities(Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and Harar) in which case the city is first divided into a number of separate major market
areas and then 1-3 outlets are surveyed per market area. In Nigeria, two outlets are selected in each state capital, andalso in each of up to two other urban locations within the state; the precise locations of these non-capital locations
change from from month to month and are not known to us so we therefore take the location to be simply the state
capital’s location. The data available to us comprise an average over these multiple spatial observations per date.
6 Exceptions were the “Singer sewing machine” and the “Philips electric iron” in Nigeria; and the “National taperecorder (2 speaker)”, the “Croft Men’s Leather Shoes”, the “Philips 3 band Radio” and the “Philips 21 inch color TV”
in Ethiopia. We drop these products because their descriptions do not appear to be precise enough to determine theexact product being surveyed.
7 In the majority of these cases it appears that the enumerator in a particular location obtained the price for adifferent size or specification of product (contrary to instructions). While any such substitutions are meant to berecorded and flagged by enumerators to avoid such errors, we conjecture that such information was lost in thereporting and digitization process.
8 The algorithm is as follows. First, we remove price quotes that lie more than 10 standard deviations away fromthe log mean price of a product. Second, we eyeball the time series of prices for each product in each location. If a price2

Table 3 of the main text) results obtained from the original, uncleaned data set; these are similar
in terms of both the magnitudes and statistical significance of the estimates. In addition, in order
to arrive at estimates of trade costs that are in real terms, we require all prices to be similarly expressed in terms that correspond to a common year (which we take to be 2001) and a common
currency unit (US dollars). We therefore apply a simple procedure to correct for inflation, basedon prices at origin locations, and then further convert all prices used in the analysis into 2001 US
dollars using the prevailing exchange rate at that time.9

A.2

United States

In order to provide a basis of comparison for our Ethiopian and Nigerian estimates, we seek
similar estimates for the United States. Following Broda and Weinstein (2008), we use data fromthe Nielsen Consumer Panel (NCP, formerly known as the AC Nielsen Homescan Consumer
Panel) due to its extensive geographic and product coverage.10 We have access to data spanning the period from January 2004 to December 2009. The NCP incentivizes sample households(of which there were approximately 40,000 between 2004 and 2007 and 60,000 in the last two yearsof our sample) to use hand-held barcode scanners, at home, to scan all products purchased by
the household on the date of purchase and, where necessary (that is, when a purchase is made ata smaller retail establishment that does not participate in Nielsen’s “ScanTrak” system), enter the
price that they paid for each product purchased. From the resulting price observations over space,
products and time (of which there are over 300 million) we use each household’s county of residence to aggregate up to a dataset that contains the average price paid, in each of the 2,856 counties
and each month in 2004-2009, for the 1.4 million unique barcodes purchased by NCP households.
Unlike the samples for Ethiopia and Nigeria which are collected in order to calculate the CPI,
the NCP includes many products that are neither widely available across the US nor importantcomponents of the average household budget. In order to obtain a sample similar in nature to
the SSA samples, we work with relatively small sub-sample of barcodes that are the leading product in each of Nielsen’s 230 “product modules” (examples of which include frozen pot pies, chilisauce, or women’s shaving cream).11
quote seems unusually high or low, we verify whether nearby prices for that same product in that same period werealso unusually high. If they were not, we remove this outlier.
9 This procedure is as follows. For every origin location-product-month price observation used in our analysis, we
calculate the proportional change in price over the previous month. We then calculate the (unweighted) mean of allthese proportional price changes across all products in our sample for each month and use this as a measure of monthly
inflation relative to the previous month with which to convert all prices into real prices in the base period. In the rarecase when a product price is not observed at the source location in a given month we use the pro-rated multi-monthchange between available monthly observations. The normalized prices are converted into 2001 US dollars using theprevailing exchange rate during the first month of the sample.
10 We obtained the NCP data from the Kilts-Nielsen Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School ofBusiness (http://research.chicagobooth.edu/nielsen).
11 We define the leading product as the barcode that is represented in the greatest number of counties per year,
averaged across 2004-2009. In order to maximize spatial and temporal coverage, we omit certain barcodes (thoseobserved in fewer than 100 counties per year in each sample year, or in fewer than four years) prior to calculating theleading barcode. . We also omit barcodes of supermarket own-brand items since the NCP anonymizes the supermarket
name for confidentiality reasons hence these barcodes do not uniquely identify a particular product. After theseomissions, 230 product categories contained at least one barcode.

3

B

Theoretical Appendix
In this appendix we formally prove the claim in equation (16) that the share of surplus enjoyed,in equilibrium, by intermediaries relative to consumers is a simple function of just the equilibrium
pass-through rate ρd and the competitiveness index φd prevailing in that market. We revert to thenotation of Section 3 here, considering just one product in one time period in one destination d.
Consider first the calculation of the amount of consumer surplus generated by the presenceof the product in destination market d in any partial equilibrium market setting (that is, where
the prices in all other markets are held constant). Consumer surplus when Qd is supplied to theRQmarket is defined as CSd ( Qd ) ≡ ψ=d0 [ Pd (ψ) − Pd ( Qd )]dψ, where Pd (ψ) is the consumers’ inverse
demand curve evaluated at quantity ψ and Qd is the total amount consumed in equilibrium in themarket. Now consider a marginal change in the exogenous origin price, Po . The marginal change
in consumer surplus is then, by an envelope argument,

dCSd ( Qd )= − Qd ( Pd ( Po ))ρd ( Po ), where, indPo

a slight abuse of notation, Qd ( Pd ( Po )) indicates that the quantity consumed depends on the destination price Pd , but the destination price is itself a function of the level of the origin price: Pd ( Po ).
Similarly, ρd ( Po ) is the equilibrium pass-through rate when the origin price is Po . Integrating suchsmall changes from the original value of the origin price, Po , to the highest value the origin pricecan take, infinity, the total consumer surplus available in this market (whose origin price is Po ) is:CSd ( Po ) =

Z ∞
υ= Po

Qd ( Pd (υ))ρd (υ)dυ.

(19)This is an alternative expression for the level of consumer surplus in the market that highlights its
essential connection to the pass-through rate.
We now seek a similar expression for the amount of intermediaries’ surplus in this market,
ISd ( Po ). The equilibrium level of profits for one intermediary is Πd ( Qd ) = [ Pd ( Qd ) − Po − τ ( Xd )].
Differentiating this with respect to Po yieldsdΠd ( Qd )dQ 1
= [ρd ( Po ) − 1]qd + [ Pd ( Qd ) − Po − τ ( Xd )] ddPodPo md(20)

din a symmetric equilibrium. Applying the chain rule to dQ
dPo and noting that the intermediary’s

dPd
first-order condition requires that Pd ( Qd ) − Po − τ ( Xd ) = − dQθd qd we have
d





dΠd ( Qd )φd − 1= qd ρd ( Po )
−1 ,
dPo
φd

(21)

where φd ≡ mθdd is the ‘competitiveness index’ introduced in Section 3.1 of the main text. Integrating these small changes to Po from its starting value, Po , to the highest value that it can take, andagain summing over the md symmetric intermediaries serving market d, the total intermediaries’
surplus available in this market is:
ISd ( Po ) =

Z ∞
υ= Po


Qd ( Pd (υ))dυ +1 − φd
φd

Z ∞
υ= Po

Qd ( Pd (υ))ρd (υ)dυ.

(22)

Applying equations (19) and (22) it is then straightforward to show that the ratio of interme4

diaries’ surplus ISd ( Po ) to consumer surplus CSd ( Po ) in the market at destination location d when
the origin price is Po is given by
1 − φd1
ISd+,( Po ) =CSdφd(ρ Q )dwhere (ρQ )d is a quantity weighted average of the pass-through rate, defined asR∞
Qd ( Pd (υ))ρd (υ)dυo.
(ρQ )d ≡ υ=RP∞
Q ( P (υ))dυ
υ= Po d d

(23)

(24)

The result in equation (23), which is derived for a completely general demand structure, highlights the close connection between pass-through and the division of surplus in a general oligopolistic setting. However, pass-through enters this formula always as a weighted average (ρQ )d of passthrough values at different quantities. Unfortunately, in our setting the weights in this weighted
average formula (consumption quantities Qd ( Pd (υ)) are not observed, nor is there any hope ofcredibly estimating the demand structure so as to estimate these weights because consumption
quantities are not observed. However, in the case of the constant pass-through class of demand(i.e. that described in Assumption 3 of the main text), pass-through is constant across quantities(that is, ρd (υ) = ρd for all υ) and hence the weights in equation (24) need not be observed. That is,under Assumption 3 we haveISd
1
1 − φd+,( Po ) =CSdρdφd
the expression in equation (16) of the main text.

5

(25)

C

Additional Figures and Tables

63,000,000

2,000,000

1,000,000

Destination market population (mid sample period)

100

250

500

50

100

250

Nigeria500

50 100250

US750 2000

Distance from origin location to destination market (miles, log scale)

50

Ethiopia: All Goods

Figure C.1: The distribution of population across space

Notes: Distance from origin location plotted against the population in the destination location for every product-location pair. US plot uses compressed x-axis scale.

08,000,000
6,000,000
4,000,000
0

10,000,000
5,000,000
02,000,000

7

50

100

250

Ethiopia

500

50

100

250

Nigeria

500

250

US

750 2000

Distance from origin location to destination market (miles, log scale)

50 100Figure C.2: Estimated pass-through rates for all goods and distancek . The solid line plots a locally weighted polynomial (Epanechnikov kernel, bandNotes: Each dot is an estimated pass-through rate for a product-location pair ρcodwidth=0.5) of these individual pass-through rates. 95% confidence intervals shown. US plot uses compressed x-axis scale.

Pass−through rate

1

.75

.25

0

.5

1
.75
.25
0

.5

1
.75
.5
.25
0

8

9

Cereal - Cerelac - 400 Gm Tin
Beer - Guinnes Stout - 30 Cl
Cement - Elephant - 50 Kg
Cement - Nigecem - 50 Kg
Cigarettes - Benson & Hedges - 30 Gm
Detergent - Omo - 1 Packet
Drink - Bournvita - 450 Gm
Soft Drinks - Coca Cola - 35 Cl Btl
Soft Drinks - Coca Cola - 35 Cl Can
Drink - Milo - 450 Gm
Drugs - Panadol - 1 Packet*Evaporated Milk - Carnation - 170 Gm
Evaporated Milk - Peak - 170 Gm
Margarine - Blue Band - 1 Tin
Powdered Milk - Peak - 400 Gm*Sardines - Titus - 125 Gm*Sugar - St Louis - 1 Packet
Tea - Lipton - 1 Box(2)Nigeria(3)
US
Nutritional Supplements - Airborne - 10 Tablets
Wafers & Toast & Bread Sticks - Ak Mak Whole Wheat and Sesame Crackers - 4.75 Oz
Contact Lens Solution - Alcon Opti Free Express - 12 Oz
Eye Drops & Lotions - Alcon Systane Lubricant Eye Drops - 0.5 oz
Dinners Frozen - Banquet Salisbury Steak & Gravy - 9.5 Oz
Pot Pies Frozen - Banquet Chicken - 7 Oz
Lighters - Bic Disposable Butane Lighters - 5 Ct
Lip Remedies Remaining - Blistex Medicated Lip Ointment - 0.21 Oz
Lip Remedies Solid - Blistex Medicated Lip Balm - 0.15 Oz
Vitamins Multiple - Centrum Silver Multivitamin for Adults - 100 Ct Btl
Abrasive Cleansers Powdered - Comet Powdered Cleaner with Bleach - 21 Oz
Precut Fresh Salad - Dole Fresh Favorites Classic Iceberg Salad Mix - 16 Oz
Gum Bubble - Dubble Bubble B/G PC - 16 Oz
Ground And Whole Bean Coffee - Folgers Classic Roast - 39 Oz
Dip Canned - Frito Lay Original Flavor Bean - 9 Oz
Hand Cleaners And Hand Sanitizer - Germ X Original Hand Sanitizer- 1.5 Oz
Disposable Diapers - Huggies Pull Ups Goodnites Underpants - 40-75 Lbs
Salad & Potato Toppings Dry - Hormel Real Bacon Bits - 3 Oz
Cooking Sauce - Hunt'S Manwich Original Sloppy Joe Sauce - 15.5 Oz
Oriental Sauces - Kikkoman Soy Sauce - 10 Oz
Bakery Breakfast Cakes/Sw - Little Debbie Pastries Honey Buns - 10.5 Oz
Bakery Cakes Fresh - Little Debbie Swiss Cake Rolls - 13 Oz
Bakery Doughnuts Fresh - Little Debbie - 6 Ct
Pizza Refrigerated - Mama Rosa's Original Cheese Medium Pizza - 17 Oz
Salad Dressing Refrigerated - Marie's Blue Cheese - 12 Oz
Gravy Mixes Packaged - McCormick Brown Gravy Mix - 0.87 Oz
Sauce & Seasoning Mix Remaining - McCormick Beef Stew Seasoning Mix - 1.5 Oz
Sauce Mix Taco - McCormick Mexican Original - 1.25 Oz
Seasoning Mix Chili - McCormick Original Chili Seasoning Mix - 1.25 Oz
Candy Hard Rolled - Necco Assorted Wafers - 2.02 Oz
Denture Cleansers - Polident 3 Minute Tablets - 84 Ct
Bakery Remaining Fresh - Rich's New York Style Eclair, Chocolate Iced, Bavarian Cream Filled - 8 Oz
Shave Creams Women's - Skintimate Raspberry Rain Moisturizing Shave Gel - 2.75 Oz
Soup Frozen Refrigerated - Skyline Original Recipe Chili - 13.25 Oz
Fruit Spreads - Smucker's Squeeze Strawberry Spread - 20 Oz
Soap Liquid - Softsoap Soothing Aloevera - 7.5 Oz
Abrasive Cleansers Liquid - Soft Scrub Anti-bacterial with Bleach - 24 Oz
Frozen Hors D' Oeuvres & Snacks - Superpretzel Soft Pretzels - 13 Oz
Tabasco/Pepper Sauce - Tabasco Original Flavor Pepper Sauce - 2 Oz
Candy Non Chocolate Miniatures - Tootsie Roll Midges Candy - 12 Oz
Candy Lollipops - Tootsie Roll Pops - 10.125 Oz
Entress Poultry Food Frozen - Tyson Crispy Chicken Strips, Chicken Breast Strip Fritters with Rib Meat - 28 Oz
Frozen Food Entrees Italian - Weight Watchers Smart Ones Classic Favorites Three Cheese Ziti Marinara - 9 Oz
Frozen Food Entrees Mexican - Weight Watchers Smart Ones Classic Favorites Santa Fe Style Rice & Beans - 9 Oz
Jelly - Welch's Concord Grape Jelly - 32 Oz
Sandwiches Refrigerated Frozen - White Castle Microwaveable Cheeseburgers - 6 Ct

Notes: Asterisks before a product name denote that that product is imported.

*Batteries - Eveready Drycell No - 40 Gm*Cigarettes - Rothmans - 20 Pack
*Detergents - Zahira - 50 Gm
Water Bottled - Ambo Mineral Water - 500 Cc
Beer - Bedele - 300 Cc
Soft Drinks - Coca Cola Fanta - 300 Cc
Beer - Harar - 330 Cc
Beer - Meta Abo - 330 Cc
Soft Drinks - Pepsi Cola Mirinda - 300 Cc*Electric Bulb - Philips 40/60 Watt No - 20 Gm
Hair Oil - Zenith Non-Liquid Form - 330 Cc
Motor Oil - Mobil Lt - 1.2 Kg
Pen Ball Point - Bic England No - 20 Gm*Toilet Soap - Lux - 90 Gm
Wine - Saris Normal - 750 Cc(1)Ethiopia

Table C.1: Product list

Table C.2: Estimating the effect of distance on intra-national trade costs: other distance metrics(1)

Dependent variable:
Distance metric:(2)(3)
Ethiopia
Adjusted Price Gap (Trading Pairs)
Great Circle
Google Road
Google Travel
Distance (miles) Distance (miles)
Time (mins)

Log distance toorigin0.0374***0.0383***0.0411***(0.00223)(0.00232)(0.00246)

Observations
R-squared

100,761
0.932

100,761
0.932

100,7620.933(5)

Dependent variable:
Distance metric:(6)(7)
Nigeria
Adjusted Price Gap (Trading Pairs)
Great Circle
Google Road
Google Travel
Distance (miles) Distance (miles)
Time (mins)

Log distance toorigin0.0558***0.0648***0.0669***(0.00759)(0.00844)(0.00877)

Observations
R-squared

26,0250.964

26,0200.958

26,0200.958(9)Dependent variable:
Distance metric:

(10)
(11)
US
Adjusted Price Gap (Trading Pairs)
Great Circle
Google Road
Google Travel
Distance (miles) Distance (miles)
Time (mins)

Log distance toorigin0.0106***0.0120***0.0167***(0.00100)(0.00120)(0.00159)

Observations
R-squared

175,782
0.928

174,599
0.933

165,6160.940

k − ρck Pk ) / ρck on log distance additionally including time-productNotes: Regressions of the adjusted price gap ( Pdt
od otodk ) / ρck in order to control for omitted variable bias due to the level ofand destination fixed effects multiplied by (1 − ρcododmarket power covarying with distance. Estimates calculated using three different distance metrics: columns 1, 5 and
9 use geodesic (i.e. as the crow flies) distance, columns 2, 6 and 10 use quickest route road distance as calculated by
Google Maps, and columns 3, 7 and 11 use quickest route travel time again calculated by Google Maps. All regressions
include time-product fixed effects. Time-product clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent
level, ** at 5 percent and *** at 1 percent.

10