Case 5:19-cv-06856-JSC Document 1 Filed 10/21/19 Page 1 of 48

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WILMER CUTLER PICKERINGHALE AND DORR LLP
Mark D. Selwyn (SBN 244180)
mark.selwyn@wilmerhale.com
950 Page Mill Road
Palo Alto, CA 94304
Telephone: (650) 858-6000
Fax: (650) 858-6100
WILMER CUTLER PICKERINGHALE AND DORR LLP
Leon B. Greenfield (pro hac vice to be filed)leon.greenfield@wilmerhale.com
Amanda L. Major (pro hac vice to be filed)amanda.major@wilmerhale.com
1875 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20006
Telephone: (202) 663-6000
Fax: (202) 663-6363

WILMER CUTLER PICKERINGHALE AND DORR LLP
William F. Lee (pro hac vice to be filed)william.lee@wilmerhale.com
Joseph J. Mueller (pro hac vice to be filed)joseph.mueller@wilmerhale.com
Timothy D. Syrett (pro hac vice to be filed)timothy.syrett@wilmerhale.com
60 State Street
Boston, MA 02109
Telephone: (617) 526-6000
Fax: (617) 526-5000

Attorneys for Plaintiff
Intel Corporation

14
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
15NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
16
SAN JOSE
17
INTEL CORPORATION,

Case No.

18
Plaintiff,
19
20

v.
COMPLAINT22FORTRESS INVESTMENT GROUP LLC,
FORTRESS CREDIT CO. LLC,
VLSI TECHNOLOGY LLC, and
DSS TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT, INC.,

23

Defendants.

21

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

24
25
26
27
28

Plaintiff Intel Corporation (“Intel”) on personal knowledge as to its own acts, and on
information and belief as to all other acts based on its own and its attorneys’ investigation, by
and through its attorneys, alleges as follows:
Case No.

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1

INTRODUCTION

2

1.

Intel brings this action under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Sections 4

3

and 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 15, and 18; under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et

4seq.; and to prevent and restrain Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct and other violations of the

5

law.

6

2.

Rather than promote the progress of science and useful arts, patent assertion entities

7(“PAEs”), including Defendants, that aggressively pursue meritless litigation have long been

8

recognized to harm and deter innovation. For example, one study estimated that patent litigation

9

brought by PAEs in the United States resulted in expenditures of $29 billion in 2011 for licensing

10

fees, legal fees, and other costs of responding to PAE litigation. 1 Another study found, by looking

11at the impact on stock price, that lawsuits by PAEs from 1990 through 2010 were responsible for12

the defendants losing half a trillion dollars. 2 And those losses are not offset by corresponding

13

gains to patent holders that promote innovation. One study found that the profits received by PAEs

14

from litigation amounted to less than 10% of the lost share value of companies targeted by the15

PAEs. 3

16

3.

Based on such studies, the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, the National

17

Economic Council, and the Office of Science & Technology Policy warned in a 2013 report that18

“Patent Assertion Entities . . . focus on aggressive litigation, using such tactics as: . . . creating

19

shell companies that make it difficult for defendants to know who is suing them; and asserting that20

their patents cover inventions not imagined at the time they were granted.” 4 Further, the report21

concluded that PAEs “have had a negative impact on innovation and economic growth.”

22
23

4.

Recognition of the threat posed by improper patent assertions has led to judicial

determinations clarifying the law, and legislative changes with the potential to curb meritless

24
25

1

James Bessen; Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 387 (2014).

2

26
27

James Bessen; Jennifer Ford; Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 34 Regulation 26(2011).

3

James Bessen; Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 387 (2014).

4

Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation (June 2013).

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1litigation. In 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit struck down the overreaching2

presumption that, as a rule of thumb, infringement of a single patent warranted twenty-five percent

3of the product’s profit. The same year, Congress enacted the Leahy Smith America Invents Act,

4

including inter partes review procedures through which the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

5(“PTAB”) of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (“USPTO”) can be asked to review whether

6

issued patents are actually valid. And in 2014, the Supreme Court held in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank

7

International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014), that inventions directed to abstract ideas could not be patented

8

unless they contain an “inventive concept” beyond implementation of the abstract idea in computer

9

code. These and other measures have started to level the playing field by making it more difficult

10

for PAEs to impose leverage of inflated damages exposure and to assert invalid patents.

11

5.

In 2016, the Council of Economic Advisers returned to the subject of PAEs,

12

observing that research since 2013 continues to show “that a substantial amount of patent litigation

13

in the United States, often with little substantive merit, often arises from certain types of NPEs

14

called ‘patent assertion entities.’” 5 But the Council noted that legislative and judicial actions, such15

as those described above, are “promising in that all of them should reduce the level of frivolous

16

patent litigation.”17

6.

In the face of these challenges, PAEs have evolved. PAEs have increasingly been

18

partnering with investment firms to fuel their litigation. Having deep-pocketed investment firms

19

standing behind them has made PAEs only more aggressive. Indeed, to meet the expectations of

20

their new investors for high returns, PAEs must act ever more aggressively. These new investors

21

are content to incur loss after loss so long as they have the chance to hit a windfall reward that will22

justify their investment. Patent assertion thus becomes simply a numbers game disassociated from23

the merits of the underlying patents, with PAEs and their investors betting that serial assertions

24

with aggressive demands will strike a jackpot eventually making up for many other losses. This

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5

Council of Economic Advisers Issue Brief, The Patent Litigation Landscape: Recent Research and Developments(March 2016).

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1strategy of repeated assertions without regard to the merits of the patents requires aggregating a2

large patent portfolio.

3

7.

A central player in this emerging investment strategy is Fortress Investment Group4

LLC (“Fortress”). Fortress is an investment firm that went public in 2007. Fortress’s shares traded5

at over $35 per share after going public but one decade later, Fortress was struggling with poor

6

returns and its share price had plummeted to around $5 per share in 2017. Fortress was acquired

7

that year by SoftBank Group Corp. for $3.3 billion. Fortress contends it is “a leading, highly8

diversified global investment manager” and claims to have approximately $39.2 billion of assets

9

under management as of March 31, 2019. One way in which Fortress has tried to turn around its

10

performance and justify SoftBank’s investment in it is through increased speculation on patent11

assertions.

128.

Intel brings this complaint to end a campaign of anticompetitive patent aggregation

13

by Fortress and a web of PAEs that Fortress owns or controls. Fortress has used its stable of PAEs

14

to aggregate a massive portfolio of patents that purportedly read on high-tech consumer and15

enterprise electronic devices and components or software therein and processes used to16

manufacture them. By employing a network of PAEs that it either owns or controls, Fortress has

17

created a web of entities that obscures Fortress’s puppeteering role in this scheme. Rather than

18

enhancing efficiency, Fortress uses aggregation to undermine it by creating a structure in which

19

Fortress and its PAEs benefit by asserting weak patents—i.e., those that never would have been20

asserted by their former owners—in order to stretch the resources of their targets and increase the21

possibility that those weak patents will improperly be found valid and infringed or the prospect

22

that a target (like Intel) will agree to a license to resolve the threat posed by Fortress and its PAEs.

23

Thus, rather than promoting the procompetitive benefits of the patent system by increasing

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innovation and output, Fortress’s scheme has the opposite effect. Fortress and its PAEs acquire25

and seek to monetize meritless patents that never would have been asserted by their original

26

owners, imposing a tax on the electronics industry that increases prices, decreases output, and27

ultimately harms consumers. To the extent that Fortress and its PAEs have patents that would

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1actually be of value to potential licensees, the transfer of those patents to Fortress’s control limits

2

access to them because those patents are now held by entities that have no incentive to license

3

patents in a way that captures royalties that are commensurate with their actual value. Instead,4

those entities have incentives to obtain excessive monopoly rents by exploiting patent portfolios

5that aggregate the valuable patents with many meritless patents.

6

9.

Through its anticompetitive aggregation scheme, Fortress has engaged in

7

anticompetitive conduct in creating a portfolio of patents that purportedly read on electronic8

devices and components or software therein and processes used to manufacture them that allows

9

it to charge far more than the value of the inventive contributions (if any) of the patents and of

10competitive prices for licenses. Fortress and its PAEs seek to use that ill-gotten power to extract11

and extort exorbitant revenues unfairly and anticompetitively from Intel, and other suppliers of

12electronic devices or components or software for such devices and ultimately from consumers of

13

those products. Fortress’s aggregation is thus intended for an anticompetitive purpose—to invest

14

in patents at costs lower than the holdup value of the patents to ensnare as many potential licensees15

as possible and to allow it and its PAEs to assert as many possible claims of infringement to tax

16

the commercial use of existing technology at rates beyond the actual value (if any) of the17

aggregated patents.

18

10.

In furtherance of the anticompetitive scheme, Fortress and its PAEs have deployed

19

patents in waves of lawsuits against their targets without regard for the merits of the claims. Rather

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than licensing and litigating based on the merits of the patents, Fortress and its PAEs operate based21

on volume and repetition, targeting the resolve of the targets instead of establishing the merits and22value of the patents. Given the size of the portfolio, Fortress and its PAEs can deploy patent after

23

patent in case after case against their targets with the threat of ever more patent assertions and ever24

more litigation. Faced with this threat, many victims have agreed to settle rather than to challenge

25

Fortress and its PAEs for amounts that reflect not the merits of the underlying patents but the26

effectiveness of the Fortress model. Thus, Fortress and its PAEs foreclose the possibility—which

27

existed before aggregation—that litigation can be an economic alternative to licensing patents.

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111.

Intel brings this action to remedy the harms that it has already suffered from2

Defendants’ violations of federal antitrust and state unfair competition laws and to prevent further3

harm to itself, the broader electronics industry, and U.S. consumers.

4
5

PARTIES
12.

Plaintiff Intel develops, manufactures, and sells integrated digital technology

6

products. Intel is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware,7

having its principal place of business within this District at 2200 Mission College Boulevard, Santa

8

Clara, California.

9

13.

Defendant Fortress Investment Group LLC claims to be a Delaware limited liability

10company. Fortress does business and maintains an office within this District at One Market Plaza,

11

Spear Tower, 42nd Floor, San Francisco, California.

12

14.

Defendant Fortress Credit Co. LLC (“Fortress Credit”) claims to be a Delaware

13

limited liability company with its principal place of business at 1345 Avenue of Americas, 46th

14

Floor, New York, New York. Fortress Credit is registered with the California Secretary of State15

to do business in California and also maintains an office within this District at One Market Plaza,

16

Spear Tower, 42nd Floor, San Francisco, California. Fortress Credit is an affiliate of Fortress.

17

15.

Defendant VLSI Technology LLC (“VLSI”) claims to be a Delaware limited

18

liability company with a registered office at Corporation Trust Center, 1209 Orange Street,

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Wilmington, Delaware.

20

16.

Defendant DSS Technology Management, Inc. (“DSS”) claims to be a Delaware

21

corporation with a principal place of business at 1650 Tyson’s Boulevard, Suite 1580, Tyson’s

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Corner, Virginia.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
17.

This Court has jurisdiction over the federal claims alleged under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

25

and 1337(a). This Court has jurisdiction over the unfair competition claims arising under state law

26

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The Court may grant declaratory relief in this action pursuant to27

28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

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118.

Venue is proper in this District pursuant to, at least, 15 U.S.C. § 22 and/or 28 U.S.C.

2§ 1391(b) and (c) because, during the relevant period, Defendants resided, transacted business,3

were found, or had agents in this District, and/or because a substantial portion of the affected

4interstate trade and commerce described herein has been carried out in this District. In particular,

5Intel has addressed Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct described herein from its headquarters in6this District, including addressing licensing demands and coordinating the defense of Defendants’

7

litigation, much of which has occurred in this District. Further, Eran Zur, a Managing Director in

8

Fortress’s San Francisco office, runs Fortress’s Intellectual Property Group, which has directed9and controlled the anticompetitive conduct described herein.

10

19.

This Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant based on its national

11

contacts with the United States as a whole pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 22, as well as Defendants’12

relevant contacts with this judicial district. Defendants have conducted and continue to conduct13

business in this District and/or have engaged in continuous and systematic activities in this District,14

including licensing activities, demands, negotiations, and litigation directly or through their agents.

15

Defendants have minimum contacts with this forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction over them16

would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

17
18

INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT
20.

The appropriate intradistrict assignment is in the San Jose Division. Under Civil

19

Local Rule 3-2(c), a civil action shall be assigned to the division “serving the county in which the20

action arises.” An action “arises in the county in which a substantial part or the events or omissions

21

which give rise to the complaint occurred.” Civ. L.R. 3-2(c). Here, a substantial part of those

22

events or omissions occurred in Santa Clara County, where Intel is headquartered and where a23

substantial portion of the events set forth in this Complaint have a locus. As described above, Intel24

has addressed Defendants’ litigation and licensing demands from its headquarters in Santa Clara

25

County. Civil actions arising in Santa Clara County “shall be assigned to the San Jose Division.”26

Id. at 3-2(e).

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1
2

I.

FORTRESS’S ANTICOMPETITIVE PATENT AGGREGATION SCHEME
21.

Fortress describes its investing approach as “making control-oriented investments

3

in cash flow generating assets.” When it comes to patent investments, Fortress has taken its

4“control-oriented” approach to an extreme. Fortress’s model is to condition its investments in

5

PAEs on terms so severe that the PAEs have no choice but to make aggressive and reckless patent6

assertions to attempt to generate the revenue required to meet their obligations to Fortress. When7

they fail to do so—as is often the case—Fortress steps in and assumes even more control and/or

8

ownership of the patents, allowing it to ratchet up the aggressiveness of the assertions. In other9

instances, such as with VLSI, Fortress has skipped this intermediary step of finding a partner to10

do its bidding and partnered with NXP B.V., NXP USA, Inc., and their related entities

11(collectively, “NXP”) to acquire the patents through a subsidiary outright from the start. The result

12

is that Fortress has either acquired or controls a portfolio of well over a thousand U.S. patents for

13high-tech consumer and enterprise electronic devices and components or software therein and

14

processes used to manufacture them to deploy against its targets.

15

22.

Fortress has targeted suppliers of high-tech consumer and enterprise electronic

16

devices or components or software for such devices because they provide attractive targets for

17

repeated and meritless assertions. An article co-authored by Eran Zur, Managing Director of the

18Intellectual Property Finance Group at Fortress, observes that courts can grant “oversized awards”

19in the technology sector that “stem from the sheer complexity of interoperable components and20

systems sold as part of functional units, if not integrated devices.” Further, the article notes that21

“because technology invention tends to be incremental, to the extent an individual patent owner

22

can be awarded damages on the price of the entire end product as opposed to their specific patent23

claim, a litigation incentive arises.” That litigation incentive is coupled with what the article notes

24

are “the substantial legal costs to defend a patent infringement suit,” creating a situation in which25“speculative behavior drives an ever-inflating price ceiling (given the possibility of oversized26

damages) [and] a price floor becomes set by the extreme expense of litigation defense, marked at27

just under nuisance value.”

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123.

Further, aggregating a massive portfolio of electronics patents allows Fortress and2

its PAEs to amass a range of patents that are both substitutes for and complements to one another.

3

When a firm wants to build an electronic device, such as a smartphone, there are many ways to do

4so. Each alternative requires multiple technologies. However, the alternatives do not require the5same combination of technologies. For example, Alternative 1 might require technologies A, B

6

and C, while Alternative 2 might require technologies D, E and F. The technologies used for7

Alternative 1 (A, B and C) are complements: they are each needed to create the device using

8

Alternative 1. Similarly, the technologies used for Alternative 2 (D, E, and F) are economic

9

complements. The technologies comprising Alternative 1 are also a substitute for the technologies

10comprising Alternative 2, because the bundle of technologies used in Alternative 1 can be used as

11

a substitute for the bundle of technologies used in Alternative 2.

12

24.

There are many possible permutations of complement and substitute technologies

13

for electronics patents. For instance, Alternative 3 might require technologies A, C and D. In that

14

scenario, the technologies bundled in Alternative 3 are a substitute for the technologies bundled in

15

Alternatives 1 and 2 respectively; A, C, and D are complements in the production of Alternative16

3; and technology D is a substitute for technology B. Technologies can thus be both substitutes

17and complements. If Alternative 4 used technologies A, B, and D, then B and D are complements

18

for Alternative 4, and substituting D for B changes Alternative 1 to Alternative 3.

19

25.

Some of the technologies that can be used to make the device might be patented.

20

But even with the most diligent approach to assessing the patent landscape for a product, it can be

21

challenging to determine whether the technologies included in the device are patented, including

22

because the scope of patent claims may be uncertain prior to litigation, as well as the validity and23

enforceability of such claims.

24

26.

When this array of patents is held by multiple owners, each patent owner would

25

only assert a patent if the expected value of doing so was net positive. “Weak” patents that have

26

questionable validity, infringement, enforceability, and/or are easily designed around, and27
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1

therefore have little or no meaningful value, are either not asserted, or are asserted to demand a2license at an amount that is commensurate with the value of the patent’s merits.

3

27.

Faced with a patent asserted against its device, the supplier can typically either take4

a license to the patent or refuse to license and litigate the infringement claim. Regardless of which

5

course is taken, the feasibility of designing around the asserted patent will affect the outcome

6

because the supplier will not pay the patent owner a royalty greater than the cost to design around7

the patent.

828.

When patents are aggregated as Fortress has done, the dynamics for determining

9

whether to assert a patent change and the options available to the target of the assertion also

10change—both of which have harmful impacts on competition.

11

29.

First, the scope of Fortress’s aggregation and its focus on electronics patents

12

ensures that it can effectively exercise hold-up power by eliminating substitutes. Fortress has

13

inevitably acquired substitute patents that, before aggregation, competed with each other. When14

the patents were held by their original owners, there was competition and a prospective licensee

15

could choose between competing options (or forego those options and design its product in a16

different way). But now, under the control of Fortress, the prospect of competition disappears and17

so does the feasibility of redesigning products. Fortress and its PAEs can thus threaten a target

18

with the serial risk that the next best alternative design to an asserted patent is also subject to a19

patent claim by one of Fortress’s PAEs.

20

30.

Second, aggregation elevates the value of asserting weak patents by Fortress-

21

backed PAEs, untethered to the value of the patents themselves. Before aggregation, there would

22

be no incentive to assert such patents because there would be no expectation of a positive return23

from asserting a weak patent because the patent could be expected to be proven invalid, not24

infringed, or unenforceable in litigation, or would be easily designed around.

25

aggregation, assertion of weak patents as part of a wave of assertions against a target generates

26

economic value even if many of those assertions are defeated in litigation. By increasing the27volume of assertions a target faces, Fortress and its PAEs cause targets to deploy licensing andBut, after

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1litigation resources less efficiently and thereby increase the value of litigation to Fortress and its

2

PAEs. In particular, Fortress and its PAEs increase the likelihood that a weak patent will slip

3

through litigation and be found infringed, valid, and enforceable when it should not be. Further,4

this strategy creates incentives for targets to settle with Fortress-backed PAEs for amounts that5

exceed the value (if any) of their patents to put an end to this risk. In this manner, Fortress’s patent

6

aggregation enables the use of weak patents to force targets to pay undeserved and inflated

7

royalties.

8

31.

Patent aggregators often claim they are more efficient at enforcing patents than9

other licensors and that their greater efficiency results in higher payments to inventors and10

therefore in more innovation. But there is no efficiency associated with patent aggregation in the11

Fortress assertion model described above. To the contrary, patent licensing becomes less efficient

12with this type of abusive patent aggregation because the targets waste resources to defend against

13

meritless assertions. Nor do the higher royalties that patent aggregation generates lead to welfare-14

enhancing additional innovation.

15

32.

Aggregating patents in the way that Fortress has done harms competition. First, by

16

aggregating patents covering technologies that are actual or potential alternatives for one another,

17

Fortress injures competition in the same way as any merger or combination of competitors. Before

18

aggregation, when multiple parties held such patents, those parties competed with one another to19license the patents, and licensees benefited from that competition through more favorable licensing

20

terms. Multiple holders of substitute patents were forced to compete with each other to offer better

21

terms to secure licensees. Once the patents were aggregated and controlled by Fortress, however,

22

that competition was eliminated.

23

33.

Second, by creating a massive portfolio of patents aimed at the electronics industry

24

and serially asserting those patents—including patents that would not have been asserted had they25

not been transferred—Fortress introduces a new cost to suppliers of electronic devices and the26

components and software for those devices. Introducing that cost dampens incentives for product27

suppliers to invest in research and development to drive innovation, thereby further undermining

28
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1competition and harming end consumers. Exposing the targeted suppliers to another cost benefits

2

their competitors by making the targeted suppliers’ products more expensive and/or less3

innovative. Those competitors might have previously owned some of the patents aggregated by

4

Fortress but were unable to impose such high costs on suppliers using technologies claimed by the5patents when the patents were not aggregated into a massive portfolio. Fortress’s aggregation thus

6

undermines competition in the sales of electronic devices and components and software for those7

devices.

8
9
10

34.

Third, the higher royalty payments that Fortress and its PAEs generate reward thecreation of patents that are not actually inventive or are not actually used.
35.

Fourth, Fortress’s hold-up power is amplified by the uncertainty it creates through11

the size of the portfolio it controls and obfuscation regarding the scope of that portfolio. After

12

aggregation, potential licensees lose the ability to decipher the extent to which Fortress controls

13

patents that they may actually have wanted to license ex ante or that would be substitutes to

14

asserted patents. By way of example, Fortress employees are listed as managing members or

15

directors of companies that otherwise have no publicly known ties to Fortress. Mysterious patterns

16

emerge such as entities with names connoting an unspecified relationship with Fortress, by a prefix

17“CF.” District court judges have gone so far as having to compel Fortress’s PAEs to reveal the18

ownership history of the asserted patents and the degree to which Fortress held rights in, and19

control over, those patents. The effect is that the hold-up power of those patents is imbued on

20

other patents Fortress controls. Thus, rather than fostering pro-competitive patent licensing,

21

Fortress’s aggregation scheme reduces potential licensees’ ability to obtain licenses to any patents

22

they might be interested in licensing while simultaneously elevating the value of weak patents.

23

36.

By placing its patents across a web of PAEs, Fortress ensures that the patents are24

held by entities with incentives to wield them aggressively. PAEs like VLSI face no risk to its

25

reputation or ongoing business relationships by adopting abusive licensing or litigation practices.

26

Nor does it face the risk of counter-assertions of its targets’ patents.

27
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137.

Moreover, PAEs can benefit in litigation from having had no role in prosecuting

2

patents that they obtained from operating companies—such as, described further below, VLSI

3

receiving patents from NXP entities. Transferring the patents from an operating company to a

4

PAE means that the holder of the patent prosecution evidence is no longer a party to the litigation

5but rather a mere third party, and one sometimes located outside the United States. The result is6that it can be difficult for a defendant to obtain evidence and to mount a complete defense to a7

PAE’s assertion—thereby increasing the likelihood of a mistaken verdict of infringement or failure

8

to find unenforceability. Accordingly, a PAE can bring lawsuits to enforce weak patents that a

9practicing entity would not assert because the PAE has different abilities and incentives to do so.

10

Further, when the PAE risks losing its patents if it cannot generate sufficient revenue to meet its

11

payment obligations to Fortress, the PAE is further incentivized to engage in abusive conduct to12extort royalties.

13

38.

Fortress’s use of a web of separate PAEs to disperse and enforce the portfolio also

14

ensures that there is no single entity that can offer a comprehensive license to the Fortress portfolio

15

and thereby increases the number of transactions necessary for licensees to attempt to secure patent

16

peace or the number of litigations that Defendants and Fortress’s other PAEs can bring. Fortress17

and its PAEs benefit from increasing the number of transactions because the more transactions,18

the more opportunities that they have to extract anticompetitive royalties that are not reflective of19

the value of the patents being licensed. The same goes for litigation—the more cases that Fortress20

and its PAEs bring, the more opportunities they create for mistaken findings of infringement or21

coercive settlements.

22

39.

Distributing the patents across a network of PAEs, rather than having Fortress23

directly own and assert them, is also intended to limit the exposure of Fortress and the broader

24

portfolio to potential blowback from aggressive assertions. For example, to the extent that one of25

Fortress’s PAEs is subject to an award of significant sanctions or attorneys’ fees, Fortress could

26

decide either to cut its losses or that it is worth continuing to fund the PAE to pursue further

27

assertions.

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1

40.

There is nothing inherently illegal with owning many patents or obtaining those2patents through acquisition. But Fortress’s patent aggregation scheme is unlike the development

3of patent portfolios by operating companies that use patents to safeguard their ability to offer their4

own products and services free from infringement by others. And it is different, too, from a

5company acquiring patents for the purpose of licensing based on the intrinsic value of those

6

patents. Both of those scenarios have the potential to increase output and lower prices by putting

7

patents to efficient use. But Fortress’s aggregation is intended for an anticompetitive purpose—8

to invest in patents at costs lower than the holdup value of the patents to ensnare as many potential

9

licensees and to allow it and its PAEs to assert as many possible claims of infringement to tax the10commercial use of existing technology at rates beyond the actual value (if any) of the aggregated11

patents. And Fortress’s aggregation scheme has had its intended anticompetitive effects, capturing

12

hold-up values that exceed the values at which Fortress or its PAEs acquired the patents, leading13

to reduced output.

14

41.

Nor are the transfers of patents at issue here typical sales that place patents in the15

hands of new owners that intend to practice them to develop their businesses or to license them16

based on their technical merit to generate revenue. Instead, the PAEs’ transfers are made with the17

purpose and effect of stifling competition by allowing Fortress and those using Fortress-backed

18

patents to extort supracompetitive royalties unrelated to the value (if any) of the Fortress-backed

19

patents.

20

42.

Transferring patents from operating companies to Fortress and its PAEs reduces or21

eliminates competitive constraints that restricted the ability of the former owners to impose

22

onerous licensing terms when they asserted the patents. Product companies generally sell a range

23

of products in competition with other firms, and their ability to sell any of them is constrained by24

the competition faced by all the products.

25

aggressively or rapaciously toward the customers of some of its products, those customers and26

others will be more likely to buy other products offered by the company from other firms that have27

not been so aggressive. In that way, competition in the sale of one product constrains the prices

A product company knows that, if it acts too

28
Case No.

14

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1

of other products, and the product companies selling such products will have a strong competitive2

incentive to maintain a positive industry reputation and good customer relationships over the full3

range of their products. For example, infringement actions by component or software suppliers

4against customers or potential customers will limit prospects for future sales. Suits by electronic5

device suppliers against suppliers or potential suppliers of components or software could

6

jeopardize their ability to source essential components or software for their devices. Reputational7

and relational harm from filing repeated, baseless infringement suits will limit product companies’

8ability to participate effectively in collaborative industry initiatives, such as standard setting or

9other industry endeavors. Because transfers of patents from product companies to Fortress and its

10

PAEs lessen or eliminate these and other constraints and place the patents with a party with11

different incentives, those transfers result in inflated royalties or other less favorable licensing

12

terms. Transfers to Fortress and its PAEs place patents in the hands of entities that face no such

13

competitive constraints and that are thus free to maximize their profits through aggressive litigation

14

campaigns.

15

anticompetitive effects of such transfers. That Fortress and its PAEs have repeatedly entered16

patent transfer agreements with no efficiency rationale and those agreements have resulted in17

inflated royalties is direct proof of the anticompetitive effects of those transfers.

18

43.

Moreover, Fortress’s use of obfuscation and a web of PAEs heighten the

In addition, Fortress and its PAEs face no risk of countersuit on their own products

19

because they supply no products. Fortress and its PAEs are therefore not constrained by the risk

20

that their own product profits will be threatened by counter assertions by product companies.

21

A.

Fortress and VLSI

22

44.

Fortress strategized for six months with NXP about how they would assert NXP’s

23

patents before undertaking the creation of VLSI and the patent transfers. Among the options that24

Fortress and NXP considered were a “Financing Option” in which NXP would retain ownership25

of all patents and act as the named plaintiff in enforcement actions funded by Fortress. They also

26

considered a “Privateering Option” in which the patents would be transferred to a new entity to27

carry out enforcement. A third option was the “Corporate Carve Out” in which Fortress would

28
Case No.

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COMPLAINTCase 5:19-cv-06856-JSC Document 1 Filed 10/21/19 Page 16 of 48

1purchase a division of NXP along with some of its patents. Ultimately, they settled on the2

Privateering Option, to be accomplished through the creation of VLSI to obtain patents from NXP

3and then assert them in litigation. The terms of the arrangement were spelled out in a Patent

4

Purchase and Cooperation Agreement.

545.

Fortress formed VLSI on June 27, 2016. VLSI’s formation document is signed by

6

Marc K. Furstein, Fortress’s Managing Director, President of the Credit Funds & Chief Operating

7

Officer of Credit Funds. Two days after VLSI’s formation, Justin Klein (then Chief Financial

8

Officer of Fortress’s credit arm) formed CF VLSI Holdings LLC (“VLSI Holdings”). VLSI is a

9subsidiary of VLSI Holdings. That VLSI ultimately operates at the behest of Fortress is further

10

evidenced by the signature of Eran Zur, Managing Director of Fortress’s Intellectual Property

11Group and an “authorized signatory” for VLSI on several documents assigning NXP’s patents to

12

VLSI.

13

46.

VLSI holds nearly 200 patents that were transferred to it from NXP, starting with

14

an August 16, 2016 assignment. Mr. Zur signed a certain number of the patent assignment

15

agreements on behalf of VLSI. Further, VLSI maintains that VLSI and NXP are “working

16

together” to monetize the former NXP patents. 6

17

47.

Neither VLSI nor VLSI Holdings manufactures or sells any products. VLSI

18

appears to have a single employee—its Chief Executive Officer, Michael Stolarski. Mr. Stolarski

19

is an attorney who worked at several law firms before becoming the CEO of VLSI.

20

B.

Fortress and DSS

21

48.

On February 13, 2014, Fortress Credit entered into an Investment Agreement with

22

DSS and other undisclosed investors (“DSS-Fortress Investment Agreement”). Under the DSS-

23

Fortress Investment Agreement, Fortress and the investors granted a loan to DSS in exchange for24

it placing a lien in favor of the investors on ten semiconductor patents and assigned to the investors

25
26
27

6
VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 6:19-cv-00254 (W.D. Tex.), Dkt. 41 at 1; VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp., No.
6:19-cv-00255 (W.D. Tex.), Dkt. 30 at 1; VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 6:19-cv-00256 (W.D. Tex.), Dkt. 39 at
1.

28
Case No.

16

COMPLAINTCase 5:19-cv-06856-JSC Document 1 Filed 10/21/19 Page 17 of 48

1certain funds recoverable from successful patent litigation involving these patents, including

2

settlement payments, license fees and royalties on the patents.

3

49.

On December 2, 2016, following DSS’s default on its payment obligations under4

the DSS-Fortress Investment Agreement, the parties amended that agreement—including to5extend the period for DSS to meet its payment obligations, to add the requirement that DSS repay

6

certain expenses, and to require that DSS share proceeds from monetization efforts associated with

7

certain additional patents. DSS also granted Fortress and the investors a security interest in certain

8of DSS’s unencumbered semiconductor patents to further collateralize the amounts owed under9

the DSS-Fortress Investment Agreement. In February 2018, DSS failed to meet its payment

10

obligations under the amended agreement.

11

50.

On June 26, 2018, DSS entered into an agreement with Fortress Credit, pursuant to12which DSS transferred to Fortress Credit all the remaining economic rights to certain of DSS’s

13

semiconductor related patents.

14

C.

Fortress and the Uniloc Entities

15

51.

On December 30, 2014, Fortress Credit entered into a Revenue Sharing and Note

16

and Warrant Purchase Agreement (“Uniloc-Fortress Revenue Sharing Agreement”) with Uniloc

17

Luxembourg, S.à.r.l (“Uniloc Luxembourg”) and Uniloc USA, Inc. (“Uniloc USA”). Under the18

Uniloc-Fortress Revenue Sharing Agreement, Fortress provided a loan to Uniloc USA in exchange

19

for a share of future licensing revenue from its patent portfolio. If Uniloc USA failed to timely

20

make a required payment to Fortress or any other “Event of Default” occurred, Fortress had the21

right to accelerate the full payments owed by Uniloc USA.

22

52.

Fortress also entered into a Patent License Agreement with Uniloc Luxembourg

23

and Uniloc USA on December 30, 2014.

The License granted Fortress “a non-exclusive,

24

transferrable, sub-licensable, divisible, irrevocable, fully paid-up, royalty-free, and worldwide

25

license to the Licensed Patents, including, but not limited to, the rights to make, have made, market,

26

use, sell, offer for sale, import, export and distribute the inventions disclosed in the Licensed

27

Patents and otherwise exploit the Licensed Patents in any lawful manner in Licensee’s sole and28
Case No.

17

COMPLAINTCase 5:19-cv-06856-JSC Document 1 Filed 10/21/19 Page 18 of 48

1absolute discretion solely for the benefit of the Secured Parties (‘Patent License’), provided that2

Licensee shall only use the Patent License following an Event of Default.”3

53.

Fortress later took steps to control even more directly the assertion of Uniloc

4patents. On February 23, 2018, Fortress formed Uniloc 2017 in order for Fortress to direct and5control the assertion Uniloc patents. James K. Noble, who was previously Fortress’s Secretary,

6signed the certificate of formation for Uniloc 2017.

754.

On May 3, 2018, Uniloc Luxembourg S.A. assigned over 600 patents to Uniloc

82017 pursuant to a March 28, 2019 Asset Purchase Agreement. Constantine Dakolias signed the9agreement as President of Uniloc 2017. Mr. Dakolias is also Co-Chief Investment Officer, Credit

10

Funds at Fortress.

11

55.

As one court observed about the various transfers of patents and agreements

12

between Uniloc entities: “The Court suspects that Uniloc’s manipulations in allocating rights to13

the patents-in-suit to various Uniloc (possibly) shell entities is perhaps designed to insulate Uniloc

14

Luxembourg from any award of sanctions in the event Uniloc loses this litigation (or some15

substantial part thereof).”

16

56.

The patents that Uniloc Luxembourg assigned to Uniloc 2017 included patents

17

claimed to be standard-essential patents (“SEPs”) for cellular standards that originated with18

Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. (“Philips”). Philips had provided a commitment to the19

European Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”) to license any of its essential patents

20

on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms and conditions. The patents were21

subsequently transferred to the PAE Pendragon Wireless in 2012 and then to Uniloc Luxembourg

22

in 2018 before ultimately being transferred to Uniloc 2017 in 2018. Standards, such as LTE, are23

created and publicly distributed by standard setting organizations (“SSOs”). Industry standards

24

provide potential benefits by allowing devices made by different companies to communicate with25

each other because these devices support the same standard. But standards also present risks of26

harm to competition and consumers when patent holders claim to have patents essential to the27

standards—i.e., the standard cannot be practiced without using the patent—and exploit those

28
Case No.

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COMPLAINTCase 5:19-cv-06856-JSC Document 1 Filed 10/21/19 Page 19 of 48

1patents to demand excessive royalties or hold up companies that use the standard. Before a2standard is set, the SSO can choose different ways of implementing particular functionality within3

the standard. But once the standard is set and technology to perform a particular functionality is

4

incorporated in the standard, users of the standard become “locked in” to using that technology

5through their investment in products and services that support the standard. This “lock-in” effect6

creates a risk that patent holders claiming to have essential patents will attempt to exploit their7

patents by demanding excessive royalties or seeking to enjoin the use of their patents. In particular,

8

SEP holders may seek royalties that do not reflect the incremental value of their patents (which

9

may cover only a fraction of the matter addressed in a given standard) but instead are based on the

10user’s investments in supporting the standard.

11
12
13

57.

The risk of exploitative SEP licensing conduct is exacerbated by the fact that SSOs

typically make no evaluation of whether a claimed-essential patent is actually essential.
58.

In response to this risk of exploitative behavior, SSOs have adopted licensing

14

commitments that govern patents claimed to be essential to a standard. Many SSOs impose a15requirement that patent holders claiming to have essential patents timely disclose those patents to

16

the SSO and commit to license them on FRAND terms and conditions.

17

59.

FRAND royalties for SEPs should reflect the ex ante value of the technology

18

covered by the SEP before standardization, when alternative means of performing the functions

19

purportedly covered by the patented technology were available. That is, FRAND royalties should20

be apportioned so that they do not reflect any value attributable to adoption in the standard of the21

feature covered by the SEP or unpatented features within the standard. Transferring SEPs from

22

an operating company that supplies its own products and participates in SSOs to a PAE allows the23

PAE to escape the protections for licensees to which licensors agree through making a FRAND

24

commitment. When an operating company demands royalties for patents it has declared essential

25

to industry standards, it faces bounds on the reach of its demands because it remains an operating

26

company and an SSO participant. As an operating company that sells its own products or services,27

it remains subject to assertion of patents against it by potential licensees. Thus, for example, an

28Case No.

19

COMPLAINTCase 5:19-cv-06856-JSC Document 1 Filed 10/21/19 Page 20 of 48

1

operating company would face constraints in demanding non-FRAND royalties or otherwise

2

failing to adhere to a FRAND commitment because it could be subject to reciprocal demands or

3

conduct from other SEP holders.

460.

And, as SSO participants, operating companies have reputational interests at stake

5

that may be injured though directly breaching their FRAND commitments. Such conduct will

6

make SSOs and their members less likely to standardize the operating company’s technology in

7

future standards. By transferring SEPs to PAEs, operating companies avoid these constraints and8enlist PAEs that are not subject to the same constraints to exploit the monopoly power associated9with their claimed SEPs.

10

61.

Patent transfer schemes like Uniloc 2017’s frustrate the purposes of the FRAND

11

commitment in another way.

12

companies to PAEs for the purpose and with the effect of driving up transaction costs and evading

13

FRAND commitments, the scheme not only introduces inefficiencies but also makes it impossible

14

for device suppliers to license all of an operating company’s declared SEPs in a single license.

By transferring portions of the SEP portfolios of operating

15

D.

Fortress and INVT

16

62.

Inventergy Global, Inc. (“Inventergy”) is a patent licensing company based in

17
18

Cupertino, California.
63.

In May 2013, Inventergy acquired over 180 patents from Huawei Technologies Co.

19

claimed to relate to IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) and Voice over IP (VoIP). Inventergy

20

acquired the Huawei patents subject to certain ongoing payment obligations to Huawei, including

21

to make a one-time payment when a certain revenue threshold was obtained by licensing the22patents and also to share a certain percentage of the quarterly net revenue earned by licensing the23

patents.

24

64.

In October 2013, Inventergy acquired nearly 500 patents from Panasonic25

Corporation (“Panasonic”) claimed to relate to 3G and 4G mobile telecommunications. Inventergy26acquired the Panasonic patents subject to an obligation to share a certain percentage of the27quarterly net revenue earned on the patents with Panasonic, including to make certain guaranteed

28
Case No.

20COMPLAINTCase 5:19-cv-06856-JSC Document 1 Filed 10/21/19 Page 21 of 48

1

payments. Inventergy agreed that if it failed to make the guaranteed payments by a specified date,2

Panasonic could charge it late fees and Panasonic may have the right to collect interest and in

3

certain circumstances to terminate the agreement under which the patents were transferred to4

Inventergy. As described further below, a number of the Panasonic patents are claimed to be5

essential to cellular standards and subject to commitments to license them on FRAND terms and6conditions.

765.

In May 2014, Inventergy acquired approximately 80 patents claimed to be related

8

to IMS and VoIP from Nokia Corporation. As consideration, Inventergy agreed to make cash

9

payments to Nokia on or before October 1, 2014, June 1, 2015, and June 1, 2016.

10

66.

On October 1, 2014, affiliates of Fortress, DBD Credit Funding, LLC and CF DB

11

EZ LLC, entered a Revenue Sharing and Note Purchase Agreement with Inventergy. Through the12arrangement, Fortress provided $11 million in financing to Inventergy, consisting of $10 million

13

in debt financing and $1 million in sale of stock. As Inventergy informed its shareholders, the14

Fortress funds were “applied towards the repayment of existing debt obligations and improvement

15

of our capital structure.”

16

67.

In exchange for Fortress’s investment, Inventergy agreed to apply revenues

17

generated from patent monetization to repayment of the investment and, further, to provide

18

Fortress with an additional portion of Inventergy’s licensing revenues. If Inventergy failed to19

make the required payments, it could default under the agreement. As Inventergy subsequently

20

warned its shareholders: “In the case of a default, Fortress could accelerate our obligations under21

the Fortress Agreement and exercise their right to foreclose on their security interests, which could

22

force us to cease operations.”

23

68.

Fortress’s backing emboldened Inventergy to aggressively pursue licensing targets.

24

As Sonus Networks alleged in a case against Inventergy, Inventergy’s CEO Joe Byers told Sonus

25

in January 2015 that “Fortress[,] does not settle” in litigation and that if Sonus Networks declined

26

to take a license, it would face “an IP bloodbath.”

27
28
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21

COMPLAINTCase 5:19-cv-06856-JSC Document 1 Filed 10/21/19 Page 22 of 48

1

69.

On December 22, 2016, Inventergy entered a Restructuring Agreement to amend

2

the Revenue Sharing and Note Purchase Agreement. As Inventergy explained the consequences3of the Restructuring Agreement, “Fortress will have the sole discretion to make any and all4

decisions relating to [Inventergy’s] patents and patent monetization activities (excluding future5acquired patents related to Inventergy Innovations, LLC, a subsidiary of Parent, and related

6monetization activities) (such patents that are subject to the Restructuring Agreement, the7‘Patents’), including the right to license, sell or sue unauthorized users of the Patents.”

870.

Further, the Restructuring Agreement modified the revenue sharing arrangement to9provide that after making certain required payments, including to Nokia, Huawei, and Panasonic,

10

Fortress would receive proceeds “until Fortress has received (x) reimbursement of any amounts

11

advanced by Fortress pursuant to the Restructuring Agreement plus 20% annual interest on such

12

advances plus (y) $30.5 million less any amounts paid to Fortress for the Note Obligations under13

the Revenue Sharing and Note Purchase Agreement after December 22, 2016” and “after all of the14

foregoing payment obligations are satisfied, 70% to Fortress and 30% to the Company.”

15

Inventergy announced the Restructuring Agreement as an arrangement “under which Fortress may

16fund, at its discretion, an enhanced enforcement program to further monetize Inventergy’s 740

17telecommunications patent assets that the Company previously acquired from Panasonic, Nokia

18

and Huawei.”

19

71.

As a result of the Restructuring Agreement, Inventergy and a Fortress affiliate, CF

20

INVT Holdings LLC, on April 27, 2017 formed INVT SPE LLC (“INVT”). Mr. Dakolias, Co-

21

Chief Investment Officer, Credit Funds at Fortress, is the President of CF INVT Holdings LLC,

22

and signed INVT’s Limited Liability Company agreement on behalf of INVT and CF INVT

23

Holdings LLC. Michele Moreland, a Director at Fortress, serves as the Licensing Officer of INVT

24

SPE LLC.

25

E.

Fortress and IXI

26

72.

On April 2, 2014, IXI IP, LLC (“IXI IP”) was formed in New York. IXI IP is a27

patent assertion entity that received patents from IXI Mobile (R&D) Ltd. (“IXI R&D”) on June 5,28
Case No.

22

COMPLAINTCase 5:19-cv-06856-JSC Document 1 Filed 10/21/19 Page 23 of 48

12014. The same day IXI IP received the transfer, it licensed the patents back to IXI R&D. (IXI

2

IP and IXI R&D are referred to collectively as “IXI.”)

3

73.

On June 5, 2014, IXI IP assigned a security interest in each of the patents it received

4

from IXI R&D to Fortress Credit. Three months later, on September 11, 2014, Fortress Credit Co.

5

DBD LLC assigned its interest to FCO V CLO Transferor LLC, another Fortress subsidiary.

6F.

Fortress and Seven Networks

7

74.

Seven Networks, LLC (“Seven Networks”) was originally incorporated in

8

Delaware in 2000 as a mobile messaging company under the name Seven Networks Inc. Seven

9

Networks Inc. subsequently registered to conduct business in Texas in 2005.

10

75.

Fortress was formerly an investor in Seven Networks Inc. Fortress gained control

11

of Seven Networks in 2015. In July 2015, Fortress converted Seven Networks Inc. to a limited

12

liability company. Seven Network Inc.’s patents passed to Seven Networks at the time of the July

13

2015 corporate conversion.

14

76.

Seven Network’s parent is CF SVN LLC, a Delaware company formed on July 2,15

2015, and a Fortress subsidiary. Mr. Dakolias, the Co-Chief Investment Officer, Credit Funds at

16

Fortress, signed CF SVN LLC’s certificate of formation.

17

G.

Fortress and KIP CR P1

18

77.

Crossroads Systems, Inc. (“Crossroads”) is a publicly-traded company that used to

19
20

be in the business of licensing intellectual property.
78.

In July 2013, Crossroads received a loan up to $10 million from Fortress Credit that21

was later assigned to another Fortress affiliate, CF DB EZ LLC. As part of the loan agreement,

22

Crossroads assigned 109 granted or pending patents to a partnership, KIP CR P1, formed by

23

Crossroads and Fortress. The transferred patents were all of Crossroads’ patents with the exception

24of one patent family (for U.S. Patent No. 5,941,972). As with Fortress’s other loan deals,

25

Crossroads risked losing its interests in the transferred patents in an “Event of Default,” including26

missing a payment to Fortress.

27
28
Case No.

23

COMPLAINTCase 5:19-cv-06856-JSC Document 1 Filed 10/21/19 Page 24 of 48

179.

Crossroads was ultimately able to repay the loan to Fortress in October 2015 only2

when it made a deal to share revenue from the monetization of the ’972 patent family with another3company. But this arrangement was not enough for Crossroads to stay solvent. In August 2017,

4

Crossroads announced that it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in order to restructure its business5

and attract new investment.

6

80.

In the end, Fortress wound up acquiring all of Crossroads’ patents. As part of its

7

restructuring, Crossroads announced in November 2017 that it had sold its patent portfolio to KIP

8

CR P1 to take over patent monetization efforts. Fortress and Crossroads agreed to “share the9proceeds from such efforts equally (after deducting expenses and a $1.5 Million monetization

10

hurdle).”

11

II.

12

LICENSING AND LITIGATION CAMPAIGNS
81.

Consistent with Fortress’s intent, the PAEs it has created or in which it has invested,

13

including VLSI and DSS, have engaged in prolific patent assertions and litigation campaigns. The

14

practice of serial litigations that Fortress’s PAEs have pursued demonstrate that they have used15

litigation to impose a crushing burden on their targets rather than with regard to the merits of their16

patents or to vindicate their patent rights.

17

A.

VLSI

18

82.

On October 2, 2017, VLSI filed a suit against Intel in the Northern District of19

California, asserting eight patents acquired from NXP against virtually every one of Intel’s

20

microprocessors ever sold since 2011 (the “California Action”). 7 Despite VLSI’s aggressive

21

litigation strategy in that case, it suffered numerous setbacks, including losing various discovery-

22and damages-related disputes. After the PTAB instituted inter partes review proceedings to23

evaluate the patentability of the claims in six of the asserted patents, a court in the Northern District

24of California stayed the case.

25
26
27

7

VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 5:17-cv-05671 (N.D. Cal.).

28
Case No.

24

COMPLAINTCase 5:19-cv-06856-JSC Document 1 Filed 10/21/19 Page 25 of 48

183.

Having struck out in California, VLSI next set its sights on Delaware. On June 28,2

2018, VLSI filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware asserting five different

3

patents against many of the same products accused in the California Action (the “Delaware I

4

Action”). 8 In the past year, the Delaware I Action has imposed substantial burdens on Intel: the5parties have engaged in extensive discovery, with Intel having produced over a million pages of6

documents related to the accused products and 2.5 TB of source code, and thousands of pages of7noninfringement and invalidity contentions.

884.

On March 1, 2019—the same day that VLSI agreed to stay the California Action—

9

VLSI filed yet another suit in the District of Delaware, asserting six new patents against many of10

the same products at issue in the previous cases (the “Delaware II Action”). 9

11

85.

Evidently concerned that the Delaware I Action and the Delaware II Action might12

be consolidated, VLSI again abandoned its litigation in hopes of obtaining a favorable outcome

13

elsewhere. On April 11, 2019, just hours after Intel filed its reply brief in support of its motion to

14

consolidate—and without any warning—VLSI voluntarily dismissed the Delaware II Action and,

15

that same day, filed three suits in the Western District of Texas (the “Texas Actions”), 10 asserting16

the same six patents at issue in the Delaware II Action, as well as two additional patents.

17

86.

The patents at issue in these suits constitute only a fraction of the original patent18

portfolio owned by NXP. Yet VLSI claims up to $7.1 billion in connection with eight patents in

19

the California Action and multiple billions of dollars in damages in the Delaware I Action. These

20

inflated numbers are a product of transferring the patents away from NXP and employing them in

21

Fortress’s unlawful aggregation scheme, including the fact that VLSI (unlike NXP) does not22

invent, produce, or sell any products.

23
24

87.

VLSI, at Fortress’s direction, can and does take advantage of the fact that—unlike

NXP—it produces nothing at all and therefore has no desire or need for dispute resolution.

25
26
27

8

VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 1:18-cv-00966 (D. Del.).

9

VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 1:19-cv-00426 (D. Del.).

10

VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 6:19-cv-00254 (W.D. Tex.); VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 6:19-cv00255 (W.D. Tex.); VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 6:19-cv-00256 (W.D. Tex.).

28
Case No.

25

COMPLAINTCase 5:19-cv-06856-JSC Document 1 Filed 10/21/19 Page 26 of 48

1

Because VLSI’s litigation costs and risks are trivial in comparison with those of the product2

companies it sues, it can afford to bring these types of serial suits based on weak or low-value

3

patents under the theory that even a modest settlement for supra-competitive royalties will be

4

profitable.

588.

As a non-practicing entity, VLSI cannot credibly seek injunctions in U.S. litigation

6

under the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388

7(2006). Faced with this problem, VLSI is seeking to enjoin Intel in multiple litigations in China,

8

as leverage to coerce Intel to accept unreasonable licensing terms—including for its U.S. patents—

9or face the risk of having its business shut down in a major market.

10

B.

DSS

11

89.

Backed by Fortress funds, DSS sued Intel on February 16, 2015, in U.S. District

12

Court for the Eastern District of Texas, asserting two patents. DSS also named Dell Inc.,

13

GameStop Corp., Conn’s Inc., Conn Appliances, Inc., NEC Corporation of America, Wal-Mart

14

Stores Inc., Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC, and AT&T, Inc. as defendants in the suit.

15

90.

Intel then petitioned the PTAB to assess in inter partes review proceedings whether

16

the claims of the asserted patents were patentable. The PTAB instituted the proceedings, and Intel17

and DSS agreed to stay the litigation pending the outcome of those inter partes reviews.

18

91.

In final written decisions issued on June 1, 2017, the PTAB held that all challenged

19

claims (which included the claims DSS had asserted against Intel) were unpatentable. DSS and

20Intel jointly requested that the litigation stay continue pending appeal.

21
22

92.

In January 2019, Intel and DSS entered into a settlement, and the district court

litigation was dismissed.

23

C.

The Uniloc Entities

24

93.

The Uniloc entities have been prolific in filing patent litigation cases. A favorite

25

target has been Apple, which to date Uniloc entities have sued 25 times in the United States:•

26

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 2-16-cv-00638 (E.D. Tex.)

27
28
Case No.

26

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Uniloc USA, Inc. et al. v. Apple Inc., 2-17-cv-00258 (E.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 3:18-CV-00357 (N.D. Cal.) (LHK)•

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al. v. Apple Inc., 2-17-cv-00454 (E.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 3:18-CV-00358 (N.D. Cal.) (WHA) and 18-2094 (Fed. Cir.)•

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al. v. Apple Inc., 2-17-cv-00455 (E.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 3:18-CV-00359 (N.D. Cal.) (WHA)•

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al. v. Apple Inc., 2-17-cv-00457 (E.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 3:18-CV-00360 (N.D. Cal.) (WHA)•

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 2-17-cv-00469 (E.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 4:18-CV-00361 (N.D. Cal.) (PJH)•

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 2-17-cv-00470 (E.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 4:18-CV-00362 (N.D. Cal.) (PJH)•

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 2-17-cv-00522 (E.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 4:18-CV-00364 (N.D. Cal.) (PJH)•

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 2-17-cv-00534 (E.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 3:18-CV-00363 (N.D. Cal.) (WHA)•

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 2-17-cv-00535 (E.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 3:18-CV-00572 (N.D. Cal.) (WHA)•

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 2-17-cv-00571 (E.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 3:18-cv-00365 (N.D. Cal.) (WHA)

16•

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 2-17-cv-00708 (E.D. Tex.)

17•

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 1-18-cv-00158 (W.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 4:19-CV-01691 (N.D. Cal.) (JST)•Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 1-18-cv-00159 (W.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 5:19-CV-01692 (N.D. Cal.) (EJD)•

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 1-18-cv-00161 (W.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 4:19-CV-01693 (N.D. Cal.) (JST)•Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 1-18-cv-00163 (W.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 4:19-CV-01694 (N.D. Cal.) (JST)•Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 1-18-cv-00164 (W.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 5:19-CV-1695 (N.D. Cal.) (LHK)•

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 1-18-cv-00166 (W.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 4:19-CV-01696 (N.D. Cal.) (YGR)•

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 1-18-cv-00293 (W.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 3:19-CV-01697 (N.D. Cal.) (VC)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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1
2•

Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple Inc., 1-18-cv-00296 (W.D. Tex.), subsequently
dismissed without prejudice•

Uniloc 2017 LLC et al v. Apple Inc., 1-18-cv-00838 (W.D. Tex.),
subsequently refiled as 1:18-cv-00990, and subsequently transferred as 3:19CV-01904 (N.D. Cal.) (WHO)•

Uniloc 2017 LLC et al v. Apple Inc., 1-18-cv-00851 (W.D. Tex.),
subsequently refiled as -18-cv-00989 (W.D. Tex.), and subsequently
transferred as 3:19-CV-01905 (N.D. Cal.) (JD)•

Uniloc 2017 LLC et al v. Apple Inc., 1-18-cv-00890 (W.D. Tex.),
subsequently refiled as 1-18-cv-00992 (W.D. Tex.), and subsequently
transferred as 4:19-CV-01949 (N.D. Cal.) (JSW)•

Uniloc 2017 LLC et al v. Apple Inc., 1-18-cv-00907 (W.D. Tex.),
subsequently refiled as 1-18-cv-00991 (W.D. Tex.), and subsequently
transferred as 5:19-CV-01929 (N.D. Cal.) (EJD)•

Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Apple Inc., 6-19-cv-00532 (W.D. Tex.)

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
94.

The Uniloc entities have often filed their cases in waves, with the apparent aim of

12heightening the threat to increase leverage and extract a settlement. For example, in June 2016,13
Uniloc USA and Uniloc Luxembourg sued Apple on four patents; between April to October 2017,14
Uniloc USA and Uniloc Luxembourg sued Apple on another 16 patents; in February 2018, Uniloc
15
USA and Uniloc Luxembourg sued Apple on another seven patents; in April 2018, Uniloc USA
16
and Uniloc Luxembourg sued Apple on another two patents; and in October 2018, Uniloc 201717
and Uniloc Licensing USA sued Apple on another four patents.
18
95.

The Uniloc entities have also made Google a frequent target. On October 1, 2018,19
Uniloc 2017 and Uniloc Licensing USA filed four separate complaints against Google. Between
20
October 31, 2018 and November 1, 2018, Uniloc 2017, Uniloc Licensing, and Uniloc USA filed
21
another 10 separate complaints against Google. Later in November, the Uniloc entities dismissed
22
those 14 complaints without prejudice and Uniloc 2017 and Uniloc USA filed 14 new complaints
23
against Google on the same 14 patents asserted in the prior complaints. In December 2018, Uniloc
242017 filed an additional seven complaints against Google, one of which it later dismissed. That
25
amounts to a total of 35 lawsuits against Google by Uniloc entities over three months.
26
27
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196.

Since its creation in February 2017, Uniloc 2017 has been a plaintiff in more than2

130 patent infringement suits. Beyond Apple and Google, the Uniloc entities’ targets have3

included the following companies that supply high-tech consumer and enterprise electronic4

devices or components or software for such devices:

5•

Barnes & Noble, Inc.

6•

BlackBerry Corporation

7•

Cardo Systems, Inc.

8•

Cisco Systems, Inc.

9•

Hike Ltd.

10•

Huawei Devices USA

11•

LG Electronics USA, Inc.

12•

Samsung Electronics America, Inc.

13•

Terrano, LLC

14•

ZTE (USA), Inc.

15•

Netflix

16

•

Hulu

17

97.

By targeting a broad number of suppliers of a particular electronics product—e.g.,

18

smartphones—the Uniloc entities (as well as the Fortress’s other PAEs) increase the chances that19

the costs imposed on those suppliers will be internalized and passed along to consumers.

20

98.

The three years so far of Uniloc entities suing Apple has demonstrated Fortress’s

21

scheme to assert endless, meritless litigation. The four patents in Uniloc’s first case against Apple22

have all been found unpatentable by the USPTO. Uniloc’s second case against Apple revealed

23

how little pre-suit diligence is taken before suing, when after suing, Uniloc voluntarily dismissed

24

one the three asserted patents and admitted that the “Patent is probably commercially worthless.” 1125

It is no surprise that one judge described Uniloc’s infringement theories in a case as “bogus and

26
27

11

Patent Owner Preliminary Response to Petition, Unified Patents Inc. v. Uniloc Luxembourg, S.A., IPR2017-01850(PTAB Nov. 30, 2017).

28
Case No.

29

COMPLAINTCase 5:19-cv-06856-JSC Document 1 Filed 10/21/19 Page 30 of 48

1

conclusory.” 12 The examples below demonstrate the flaws in Uniloc’s patents, including patents

2

that have been found invalid in multiple ways by multiple adjudicators.

399.

In one example of Uniloc asserting invalid patents, Uniloc sued eight companies

4

on a patent that two courts have found invalid and on which the PTAB has initiated an inter partes

5

review.

6“Communication System,” in the following cases:

Uniloc entities asserted U.S. Patent No. 6,993,049 (the “’049 patent”), titled•

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 1-18-cv-00164 (W.D. Tex.), subsequently
transferred as 5:19-CV-1695 (N.D. Cal.) (LHK)•

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., No. 2-18-cv-00040(E.D. Tex.)

10•

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Logitech, Inc., No. 5-18-cv-01304 (N.D. Cal.)

11•

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. LG Electronics USA, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-00559 (N.D. Tex.),
subsequently transferred as 3:18-cv-06738 (N.D. Cal.)•

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Huawei Device USA, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00074 (E.D. Tex.)•

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. ZTE (USA), Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00307 (E.D. Tex.),
subsequently transferred as 3:18-cv-02839 (N.D. Cal.)

15•

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Blackberry Corp., No. 3:18-cv-01885 (E.D. Tex.)

16•

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 8:18-cv-01279 (C.D. Cal.)

7
8
9

12
13
14

17

100.

The ’049 patent purports to cover an improvement of Bluetooth technology. On

18

April 19, 2019, a court in the Northern District of California held the ’049 patent invalid as failing19

to recite patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Specifically, the court concluded

20

that the ’049 patent is “directed to the abstract idea of additional polling in a wireless

21

communication system” and that “there is no inventive concept sufficient to save the claim.”

22

Amended Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 17, 32, Uniloc USA Inc. v. LG Elecs. USA Inc.,

23

No. 5:18-cv-06738-LHK (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2019).

24
25

101.

On April 5, 2019, a court in the Eastern District of Texas held that there were

multiple bases to conclude that asserted claims 1 and 8 of the ’049 patent are indefinite. Claim

26
27

12

Transcript of Proceedings, Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 18-cv-359 (WHA) (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2018).

28
Case No.

30

COMPLAINTCase 5:19-cv-06856-JSC Document 1 Filed 10/21/19 Page 31 of 48

1Construction Memorandum and Order, Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., Nos.

2

2:18-cv-00040-JRG-RSP, 2:18-cv-00074-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2019). On July 2, 2019,3

Uniloc jointly filed with the Huawei defendants in that case a Joint Motion to Dismiss with

4

Prejudice, in which dismissal of Uniloc’s claims was sought to be “conditioned on the Court’s

5vacating the Claim Construction Memorandum Opinion and Order . . . entered April 5, 2019.” By

6seeking to dismiss without prejudice, Uniloc attempted to avoid having final judgment entered7

finding the ’049 patent invalid, allowing Uniloc to continue to pursue baseless claims using that8

patent. The court denied Uniloc’s ploy, ordering on July 9, 2019 that the parties were to file a9“new motion to dismiss that is not conditioned upon the Court vacating the Claim Construction

10

Memorandum Opinion and Order.”

11

102.

Finally, on July 22, 2019, the PTAB instituted an inter partes review of the ’049

12patent, concluding that Apple’s “Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that [Apple] would

13

prevail in showing claims 11 and 12 [of the ’049 patent] are unpatentable” as obvious in light of

14

multiple prior art references. Apple Inc. v. Uniloc 2017 LLC, Case IPR2019-00251 (PTAB July

15

22, 2019).

16

103.

As the number of times that Uniloc’s cases against Apple have been transferred out

17of Texas—shown in the list above in paragraph 93—makes clear, the Uniloc entities have time18

and again sought to impose the additional burden on parties of litigating in an inconvenient forum.

19

Uniloc has gone so far as to misrepresent facts about its connections to Texas and lack of20

connections to California in an effort to fend off Apple’s requests to have cases transferred to this21

District. In Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00258-JRG (E.D. Tex.), the court detailed

22

a series of deceptive statements made by Uniloc, concluding that such “contradictory

23

representations [are] troubling, particularly because they are not isolated exceptions.”

24

example, Uniloc made repeated misrepresentations about its lack of connection to California:

25

For

Mr. Burdick, Uniloc’s only party witness residing within the Eastern
District of Texas, does not spend the majority of his time in the
Plano office. (Dkt. No. 60-2, Ex. B at 2.) Mr. Burdick spends
equally as much time in Plano, as he does in Boise, Idaho and insouthern California. (Id.) In addition, Mr. Etchegoyen [the CEO of
Uniloc Luxembourg] spends about twenty percent of his time in

26
27
28
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110either Newport Beach or Irvine, California and owns a residence in
Newport Beach, which he uses when he “is doing business inOrange County.” (Id.; Dkt. No. 60-1, Ex. A at 160:15–16.) Both
Mr. Burdick and Mr. Etchegoyen have held around one hundred“top-level strategy meetings” in southern California, for Uniloc
business purposes. (Dkt. No. 60-1, Ex. A at 54:2–55:11.) Mr.
Etchegoyen separately travels to southern California every month tomeet with Mr. Turner, Uniloc Luxembourg S.A.’s CFO. (Dkt. No.
60-1, Ex. A at 47:18–25.) All of these facts fly in the face ofUniloc’s prior representations: that Uniloc had only one full-time
employee, Tanya Kiatkulpiboone, working at its office in Irvine,
California as of April 2017 (Dkt. No. 30-7, Burdick Decl. ¶ 10); that
Mr. Etchegoyen has lived in Hawaii since well before the filing dateof the Complaint and does not maintain a residence in California(Dkt. No. 30 at 12); and that Mr. Burdick does not work in California(Dkt. No. 43 at 2 n.3 “Apple also repeats its erroneous assertion that
Uniloc’s IP counsel lives and works in California.”); and that Apple“attempts to exaggerate Uniloc’s ties to California” (Dkt. No. 30 at
1–2).

11

Memorandum Order and Opinion at 16-17, Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00258-

12

JRG (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2017).

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

13

D.

INVT

14

104.

INVT sued Apple and HTC in May 2017 in the District of New Jersey. INVT has

15

asserted eight SEPs that it claims are essential to cellular standards and are subject to FRAND

16

commitments. On August 29, 2017, INVT filed suit against ZTE Corporation (“ZTE”), in which17

it has asserted the same eight patents.

18

105.

Apparently dissatisfied with the pressure it could exert through district court

19

litigation alone, on September 14, 2018, INVT asserted five of the patents from New Jersey against

20

Apple, HTC, and ZTE in the International Trade Commission seeking an order excluding the21

accused products from importation into the United States.

22

E.

The IXI Entities

23

106.

IXI R&D and IXI IP brought suit, in the Southern District of New York, against

24

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (“Samsung”) and25

BlackBerry Limited and BlackBerry Corporation (“BlackBerry”) on June 17, 2014 and June 18,

26
27
28
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12014 respectively, on the same set of four patents. IXI R&D and IXI IP, voluntarily dismissed2

without prejudice, their complaint against BlackBerry on February 5, 2019.

3

107.

IXI R&D and IXI IP also sued Apple on the same patents on October 2, 2014 in the

4Southern District of New York. On May 11, 2015, IXI R&D, IXI IP, and Apple jointly stipulated5

to dismiss with prejudice one of the patent claims at issue in the case.

6

108.

On December 21, 2016, the PTAB found unpatentable every asserted claim of one

7of the remaining patents-in-suit in inter partes review proceedings. See IPR2015-01444, Paper 27

8(PTAB Dec. 21, 2016). While the PTAB’s decision was on appeal, IXI filed an ex parte9

reexamination of the patent. The patent issued from reexamination with one amended claim and10

68 new claims. U.S. Patent No. 7,039,033 (requested Mar. 24, 2017) (issued Feb. 1, 2018). IXI

11

obtained the reexamined claims by adding trivial additional limitations—like a “speaker,” a12“microphone,” and a “touchscreen”—that make the new claims no more novel than the canceled

13

claims.

14

109.

Similarly, on December 21, 2016, the PTAB found unpatentable all but one of the15

asserted claims of another asserted patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,295,532 (the “’532 patent”). See

16

IPR2015-01443, Paper 27 (PTAB Dec. 21, 2016).

17

reexamination of the ’532 patent challenging, among other claims, the sole originally-asserted

18

claim that survived the inter partes review. All challenged claims, including the lone remaining

19

originally-asserted claim, currently stand rejected. Office Action (mailed Sept. 25, 2018). In

20

response, IXI is seeking to add numerous new claims and argues for patentability of the challenged

21

claims.

22

110.

The USPTO thereafter instituted a

IXI subsequently moved to amend its infringement contentions in the litigation

23

against Apple to assert newly-issued claims and additional unspecified claims that have not yet

24even been allowed by the USPTO. IXI Mobile (R&D) Ltd. v. Apple Inc., Case No. 15-cv-3755

25(HSG) (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2019), Dkt. 157. IXI thereby seeks to restart the litigation that it

26

comprehensively lost five years after the complaint was filed. Apple opposed IXI’s motion,

27
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1

arguing that IXI’s attempt to insert reexamined claims into the litigation should be barred by res

2judicata. Id., Dkt. 164. That motion is currently pending.

3

111.

Apple filed inter partes review petitions on the reexamined claims of the ’033

4

patent in 2018, but the PTAB denied institution because—even though the new claims did not

5exist during the year after the complaint was filed—the PTAB concluded that the petitions were6

time-barred. Apple Inc., v. IXI IP, LLC, IPR2019-00124, Paper 13 (PTAB Jun. 3, 2019). IXI thus

7

effectively immunized its patent from inter partes review challenge.

8

F.

Seven Networks

9

112.

In May 2017, Seven Networks sued ZTE and Samsung in the Eastern District of

10

Texas on the same seven patents and also asserted those patents plus two others against Google.

11

Seven Networks voluntarily dismissed its case against ZTE a couple months later before refiling12

the same patents. In November 2018, Seven Networks asserted another group of six patents

13

against Samsung and Google.

14

113.

Seven Networks eventually obtained settlements with ZTE, Samsung, and Google.

15

Seven Networks, LLC v. ZTE (USA) Inc., No. 3:17-cv-1495 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2019), Dkt. 318;

16

Seven Networks, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No. 2:17-cv-441 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2018),

17

Dkt. 67; Seven Networks, LLC v. Google LLC, No. 2:17-cv-442 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2019), Dkt.

18

608.

19

114.

Seven Networks sued Apple on April 10, 2019 in the Eastern District of Texas,

20

asserting sixteen patents against Apple related to a wide range of Apple products and services. Per

21

the complaint, Seven Networks is listed as the “assignee of all rights, title, and interest in” for each

22of the sixteen patents-in-suit.

23

G.

KIP CR P1

24

115.

Since receiving a loan from Fortress Credit in 2013, Crossroads has asserted eight25

separate patent actions in the Western District of Texas against Dot Hill Systems Corp.; Oracle

26

Corporation; Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.; Huawei Enterprise USA, Inc.; Huawei Technologies

27
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34

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1

USA, Inc.; Cisco Systems, Inc.; NetApp, Inc.; and Quantum Corporation claiming infringement2of some combination of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,425,035 (the “’035 patent”), 7,051,147 (the “’147

3

patent”), 7,934,041 (the “’041 patent”), and 7,987,311 (the “’311 patent”).

4

Crossroads alleged in each of the eight actions that the ’035 patent was infringed, and in seven of5

the actions that the ’041 patent was infringed.

6

116.

Specifically,

In final written decisions dated January 29, 2016 and March 17, 2016, the PTAB

7

found in inter partes review proceedings all asserted claims of the asserted ’035 and ’041 patents

8

were invalid. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that decision on June 6,

9

2017.

10

117.

Fortress and KIP CR P1 agreed to step into the place of Crossroads in these11

litigations notwithstanding the PTAB and Federal Circuit findings. Fortress’s subsequent writs of

12

certiorari to the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the PTAB’s inter partes review

13

process were denied on April 30, 2018. Each of these actions was ultimately dismissed.

14

III.

16

FORTRESS AND THE OTHER DEFENDANTS HAVE HARMEDCOMPETITION IN A MARKET FOR PATENTS FOR HIGH-TECH
CONSUMER AND ENTERPRISE ELECTRONIC DEVICES ANDCOMPONENTS OR SOFTWARE THEREIN AND PROCESSES USED TO
MANUFACTURE THEM

17

118.

15

Fortress and the other Defendants, through their anticompetitive conduct, have18

harmed competition in an antitrust market for patents for high-tech consumer and enterprise

19

electronic devices and components or software therein and processes used to manufacture them,

20

the “Electronics Patents Market.”

21

119.

The Electronics Patents Market constitutes a relevant patent licensing market where22

Fortress (either directly through its PAE subsidiaries or by acting in concert with the PAEs in23

which it invests) and other holders of patents claimed to read on electronic devices demand that24

suppliers of electronic products license their patents.

25
26

120.

The geographic scope of the Electronics Patents Market is the United States, as

patents are national in scope.

27
28
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35

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1

121.

Fortress has market power in the Electronics Patents Market based on the number

2of patents that Fortress and its PAEs have aggregated, the means by which Fortress and Defendants

3hold and assert those patents, and the other anticompetitive conduct described above and below.

4

122.

The supracompetitive licensing returns Fortress’s PAEs have obtained are direct5

evidence of its market power. For example, DSS obtained a settlement from Intel and Uniloc has

6been able to coerce several parties (including Amazon and Huawei) to license its patents, even7though the patents lack merit. Fortress has been able to acquire patents at costs below their hold-8

up value and then, through the benefit of its anticompetitive scheme, extract higher payments from9

licensees that reflect hold-up value rather than the actual value of the patents based on their10

technical and commercial merits.

11

123.

Defendants’ demands also show that Fortress has the power to control prices in

12

Fortress’s Portfolio Market. As detailed above, VLSI purports it is entitled to billions of dollars

13from Intel.

14

124.

By creating a massive portfolio, Fortress decreases the importance of any particular

15

patent held by its PAEs because, given the size of the portfolio, it becomes exceedingly difficult

16

for any potential licensee to meaningfully analyze the patents in the portfolio in a systematic

17

fashion. Thus, the size of the aggregated portfolio imposes substantial costs to for suppliers of

18

electronic devices to design or work around no matter the merits of the constituent patents. Further,19

as described above, Fortress’s PAEs assert their patents to read broadly on the accused products

20

in ways that are facially invalid, but that Fortress’s PAEs also claim make it infeasible to design

21

around. Moreover, the features of products accused of infringement by Fortress’s PAEs may be

22difficult or impossible to modify because of the extremely high switching costs involved given the23

investments that have already been made in product design and production. Even if targets of24

Fortress-backed assertions have had success in invalidating or proving non-infringement of certain

25

Fortress-backed patents, Fortress and its PAEs just turn to the next patent in the portfolio to assert.

26

Fortress and its PAEs exploit that dynamic to shield from scrutiny their patents and to extract

27

royalties based on the size of the portfolio (including by distributing it among multiple PAEs to28
Case No.

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COMPLAINTCase 5:19-cv-06856-JSC Document 1 Filed 10/21/19 Page 37 of 48

1

assert) rather than its quality. Further, the asserted SEPs held by INVT and Uniloc 2017, by

2

definition, claim to cover essential technology that it would generally not be feasible to design

3around if they are actually essential.

4

125.

Thus, the power of Fortress’s patent portfolio is not based on the value or lawful

5

scope of its constituent patents, but on the size of the portfolio itself, which imposes hurdles to6design around regardless of the merits of the patents within it, and its distribution among aggressive

7

PAEs, including VLSI and DSS. That size allows the PAEs to threaten serial litigation and impose

8

uncertainty on their victims regardless of the merits of the asserted patents, which become9secondary to the sheer size of the portfolio. Accordingly, the targets of Fortress’s PAEs’ assertions

10

have no choice but to buy licenses from the PAEs or to face endless, meritless litigation. Before

11

aggregation, the holders of meritless patents lacked the same incentives to assert them as do

12Fortress and its PAEs. But, to the extent that they had asserted them, litigation would have been13

a viable possibility for the targets to address those assertions. In their aggregation and serial

14

assertion strategy, however, Fortress and its PAEs are not dissuaded by repeated litigation failures15

from asserting ever more patents.

16

126.

Fortress’s aggregation of patents also decreases access to any patents that Fortress

17

controls for which a licensee might actually want a license to use the technology in the patent.

18

Before aggregation, those patents could have been the subject of licensing discussions focusing on

19

the merits of the patents and that would have promoted use of the technology. But by aggregating

20

potentially valuable patents in a huge portfolio with meritless patents in an anticompetitive

21

scheme, Fortress and the PAEs obscure those patents from the market and reduce the availability

22

of information. Thus, rather than increasing efficiency and enhancing output, the scheme has the23

opposite effect—the value of meritless patents is enhanced and the value of any patents in which

24

there might have been interest in practicing is decreased, thereby reducing innovation and output.

25

127.

There is no procompetitive justification for the anticompetitive aggregation of26

patents by Fortress and its PAEs. To the extent Defendants assert that any procompetitive27

justifications exist, such purported justifications are outweighed by the anticompetitive effects in

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the markets alleged herein or could be obtained through less restrictive means. As an example,

2

NXP’s securities filings indicate that it has a patent portfolio of over 9,000 patent families and that3“[i]n situations where we believe that a third party has infringed on our intellectual property, we

4

enforce our rights through all available legal means to the extent that we determine the benefits of5such actions to outweigh any costs and risks involved.” Further, NXP confirms that it has

6experience in licensing its own patents. Thus, NXP would have been capable of licensing to third

7

parties the patents that it transferred to VLSI, if those patents had merit. But what it could not8have done was to capture the hold-up value of such patents as VLSI seeks to do and to do so in a

9

way that overcame the “costs and risks involved.”

10

IV.

11

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FORTRESS AND THE OTHER DEFENDANTS HAVEHARMED COMPETITION IN A MARKET FOR LICENSES TO FORTRESS’S
AGGREGATE PORTFOLIO

12

128.

In the alternative to the antitrust market described above in Section III, Fortress13

holds a monopoly in an antitrust market for licenses to the patent portfolio that it owns or controls

14

relating to electronic devices (including components and software for such devices), “Fortress’s

15

Portfolio Market.”

16

129.

Fortress’s Portfolio Market constitutes a relevant licensing market because Fortress

17(either directly through its PAE subsidiaries or through the PAEs in which it invests, acting in

18

concert with it) demand that electronics companies license the patents in the portfolio to continue

19

selling their products. The targets of Fortress and its PAEs’ assertions cannot license alternative

20

portfolios from other patent holders, because such alternative portfolios would not eliminate the21need to address the licensing threat from the PAEs. Nor can the targets of Fortress and its PAEs’

22

patents practically design around the Fortress portfolio because of its massive size. Fortress and23

its PAEs assert patents broadly against locked-in features in the electronic devices of their targets

24

in such volume that even if it is possible to design around particular patents (or to have particular25

patents found invalid or not infringed), it is not possible to fully escape their assertions.

26
27
28
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130.

The geographic scope of Fortress’s Portfolio Market is the United States, as

2Fortress has aggregated U.S. patents into a portfolio that a supplier of electronic devices in the3

United States cannot avoid.

4

131.

Fortress has monopoly power in Fortress’s Portfolio Market.

5

132.

The supracompetitive licensing returns Fortress’s PAEs have obtained are direct6

evidence of its market power. For example, DSS obtained a settlement from Intel, and Uniloc has

7been able to coerce several parties (including Amazon and Huawei) to license its patents, even8though those patents lack merit. Fortress has been able to acquire patents at costs below their hold-9

up value and then, through the benefit of its anticompetitive scheme, extract higher payments from10

licensees that reflect hold-up value rather than the actual value of the patents based on their11

technical and commercial merits.

12

133.

Fortress’s PAEs’ demands also show that Fortress has the power to control prices

13

in Fortress’s Portfolio Market. As detailed above, VLSI purports it is entitled to billions of dollars

14from Intel.

15

134.

16

Fortress (including through the PAEs it controls) has a 100% share of Fortress’s

Portfolio Market because it alone can offer a license for the patents that comprise the portfolio.

17

Fortress faces no threat of entry from would-be competitors to constrain its monopoly

18

power in Fortress’s Portfolio Market because no other entity can offer a license to the portfolio of

19

patents that Fortress holds and, by definition, no other patent portfolio can act as a substitute.

20

135.

Through creating a massive portfolio, Fortress decreases the importance of any

21particular patent held by its PAEs because, given the size of the portfolio, it becomes virtually22

impossible for any potential licensee to meaningfully analyze the patents in the portfolio in a

23

systematic fashion. Thus, the size of the aggregated portfolio imposes substantial costs to work24

around for suppliers of electronic devices no matter the merits of the constituent patents. Further,25

as described above, Fortress’s PAEs assert their patents to read broadly on the accused products

26

in ways that are facially invalid, but that Fortress’s PAEs also claim make it impossible to design

27

around. Moreover, the features of products accused of infringement by Fortress’s PAEs may be

28
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1

difficult or impossible to modify because of the extremely high switching costs involved given the2

investments that have already been made in product design and production. Even if targets of3

Fortress-backed assertions have had success in invalidating or proving non-infringement of certain

4

Fortress-backed patents, Fortress and its PAEs just turn to the next patent in the portfolio to assert.

5

Fortress and its PAEs exploit that dynamic to shield from scrutiny their patents and to extract

6

royalties based on the size of the portfolio (including by distributing it among multiple PAEs to

7assert) rather than its quality. Further, the asserted SEPs held by INVT and Uniloc 2017, by

8

definition, claim to cover essential technology that it would not be feasible to design around.

9

136.

Thus, the power of Fortress’s patent portfolio is not based on the value or lawful

10

scope of its constituent patents, but on the size of the portfolio itself, which imposes hurdles to11

design around regardless of the merits of the patents within it, and its distribution among aggressive

12

PAEs. That size allows Fortress and its PAEs’ to threaten serial litigation and impose uncertainty

13

on their victims regardless of the merits of the asserted patents, which become secondary to the14

sheer size of the portfolio. Accordingly, the targets of Fortress’s PAEs’ assertions have no choice15

but to buy licenses from the PAEs or to face endless, meritless litigation. Prior to aggregation, the16holders of meritless patents lacked the same incentives to assert them as do Fortress and its PAEs.

17

But, to the extent that they had asserted them, litigation would have been a viable possibility for18

the targets to address those assertions. In their aggregation and serial assertion strategy, however,19

Fortress and its PAEs are not dissuaded by repeated litigation failures from asserting ever more

20

patents.

21

137.

Fortress’s aggregation of patents also decreases access to any patents that Fortress22

controls for which a licensee might actually want a license in order to use the technology in the23

patent. Prior to aggregation, those patents could have been the subject of licensing discussions

24

focusing on the merits of the patents and would have promoted use of the technology. But by

25

aggregating potentially valuable patents in a huge portfolio with meritless patents in an

26

anticompetitive scheme, Fortress and its PAEs obscure those patents from the market and reduce27

the availability of information. Thus, rather than increasing efficiency and enhancing output, the28Case No.

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1

scheme has the opposite effect—the value of meritless patents is enhanced and the value of any

2patents in which there might have been interest in practicing is decreased, thereby reducing

3

innovation and output.

4

138.

There is no procompetitive justification for the anticompetitive aggregation of5

patents by Fortress and its PAEs. To the extent Defendants assert that any procompetitive

6

justifications exist, such purported justifications are outweighed by the anticompetitive effects in7

the markets alleged herein or could be obtained through less restrictive means. As an example,

8

NXP’s securities filings indicate that it has a patent portfolio of over 9,000 patent families and that9“[i]n situations where we believe that a third party has infringed on our intellectual property, we

10

enforce our rights through all available legal means to the extent that we determine the benefits of

11such actions to outweigh any costs and risks involved.” Further, NXP confirms that it has

12experience in licensing its own patents. Thus, NXP would have been capable of licensing to third

13

parties the patents that it transferred to VLSI. But what it could not have done was to capture the14

hold-up value of such patents as VLSI seeks to do and to do so in a way that overcame the “costs

15

and risks involved.”

16

V.

17
18
19

THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF DEFENDANTS’ SCHEME
139.

As set forth above, Fortress possesses market power in the Electronic Patents

Market (or in the alternative, monopoly power in Fortress’s Portfolio Market).
140.

Putting aside market definition, direct evidence demonstrates the adverse effects on

20competition of the anticompetitive conduct of Fortress and the other Defendants through21

aggregation (as described above and below). In particular, through their aggregation scheme,

22

Fortress and the other Defendants seek and/or obtain far more for their patents than the costs at

23

which they acquired those patents.

24

141.

Fortress and its PAEs’ anticompetitive scheme—including patent aggregation,

25

ownership by an array of aggressive PAEs, and baseless litigation—has led to anticompetitive26

effects, reduced output, the creation and enhancement of market power in the Electronic Patents

27

Market (or, in the alternative, the creation and enhancement of monopoly power in Fortress’s

28
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1

Portfolio Market).

2interstate commerce.

3

142.

Fortress and the other Defendants’ conduct has harmed competition in

In particular, Defendants’ illegal scheme has resulted in inflated licensing

4

royalties—i.e., higher prices—and imposed burdens, costs, and uncertainties for Intel and other5purchasers in the Electronic Patents Market (or, in the alternative, in Fortress’s Portfolio Market).

6

The purchasers in those markets include electronic device suppliers (e.g., of smartphones, tablets,

7and computers) and providers of components for such devices (e.g., processors and chipsets, such8

as those offered by Intel) that are potential and actual licensees. In addition, as a result of the9illegal conduct of Fortress and the other Defendants, U.S. and other end consumers have been

10

harmed and face a continuing threat of increased prices and reduced innovation and quality for

11electronic devices.

12

143.

Defendants’ illegal conduct causes obvious harm to licensees such as Intel—i.e.,

13customers in the Electronic Patents Market (or, in the alternative, in Fortress’s Portfolio Market)—

14

when they are compelled to pay inflated royalties. Licensing customers are also harmed, even

15

when they do not acquiesce to an inflated royalty, by being forced to incur substantial expenses,

16

uncertainty, and burdens in resisting the patent litigations and threats that the aggregation and

17transfer schemes of Defendants have enabled. For example, Intel has spent millions of dollars to

18

date on outside resources (including counsel, experts, and vendors) to defend against Fortress-

19

backed demands and assertions. Intel has also been harmed by the enormous amounts of time its

20

employees have been forced to spend on these matters, including negotiating with Defendants as21

well as collecting information and documents and preparing for depositions, rather than doing their22jobs. In Intel’s litigation against VLSI in Delaware, Intel’s disclosures identify twenty-five Intel23

employees with knowledge relevant to the litigation, including engineers and employees in the24marketing and finance departments. An employee identified in such disclosures is typically25

deposed, necessitating at least two full days dedicated to the litigation between preparation and26

sitting for the deposition, in addition to other time dedicated to identifying relevant documents or

27

providing information to counsel on the facts of the case. Defendants have employed the strategies

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1

set forth herein to impose these costs on licensees and to use their leverage to extract unreasonable2

and unjustified royalties.

3
4

FIRST COUNT

5

Agreements to Restrain Competition in Patent Licensing

6(Section 1 of the Sherman Act)

7

(Claim Against Fortress, Fortress Credit, and DSS)

8
9
10

144.

Intel repeats and realleges the allegations of the preceding and subsequentparagraphs as if fully set forth herein.
145.

As alleged above, Fortress and Fortress Credit reached agreements with DSS and

11other PAEs to aggregate patents under Fortress’s control and to assert patents to increase the total

12

royalties obtained from licensing the Fortress-backed patents. Fortress and DSS intended that13

through their agreements they would extract royalties from their targets—like Intel—beyond the14royalties that could have been obtained but for aggregation by Fortress.

15

146.

The agreements between Fortress, Fortress Credit and its PAEs, including DSS, to16

aggregate patents substantially raised or threaten to raise prices and have resulted or threaten to17

result in other anticompetitive effects, including in the Electronic Patents Market (or, in the18

alternative, in Fortress’s Portfolio Market), and for downstream products sold to consumers. The

19

agreements have substantially affected interstate commerce.

20

147.

The agreements to aggregate and assert patents generated no efficiencies, and in

21

fact were designed to create inefficiencies in the licensing that Fortress could exploit to harm Intel22and other potential licensees, as well as finished product consumers. Any conceivable efficiencies

23

the agreements may have created were substantially outweighed by their anticompetitive effects

24

or could have been obtained through substantially less restrictive means.

25

148.

As a direct, proximate, and foreseeable result of Fortress and Fortress Credit’s

26

unlawful agreements with its PAEs, including DSS, Intel has suffered or will suffer harm to its

27

businesses and property, and, absent an injunction, Intel will continue to suffer from these effects.

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1Intel’s past and continuing harm includes litigation costs, the risk of supracompetitive licensing

2

rates, business uncertainty, and business resources lost in dealing with the consequences of3

Defendants’ unlawful agreements.

4
5

SECOND COUNT

6

Unlawful Asset Acquisitions

7(Section 7 of the Clayton Act)

8

(Claim Against Fortress, Fortress Credit, and VLSI)

9
10
11

149.

Intel repeats and realleges the allegations of the preceding and subsequentparagraphs as if fully set forth herein.
150.

Fortress, Fortress Credit, and VLSI have acquired numerous patents (or interests in

12patents), which are assets under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Those anticompetitive acquisitions

13

include at least those described in Section I above. The effects of the acquisitions have been to14

lessen competition substantially, and to tend to create market power, including in the Electronic

15

Patents Market (or, in the alternative, in Fortress’s Portfolio Market). Among other harms, the16transfers have significantly enhanced Fortress, Fortress Credit, and VSLI’s ability and incentives

17

to harm competition, including by evading constraints on assertion and creating incentives to assert

18patents aggressively and thus increasing the cost and likelihood of litigation.

19

151.

As a direct, proximate, and foreseeable result of Fortress, Fortress Credit, and20

VLSI’s unfair and wrongful conduct, as alleged above, there is a significant threat of inflated

21

royalties to consumers of licenses to Fortress-backed patents.

22

152.

As a direct, proximate, and foreseeable result of Fortress, Fortress Credit, and23

VLSI’s unfair and wrongful conduct, as alleged above, there is a significant threat of harm to24

consumers, including through the inevitable passing on to consumers of the inflated royalties

25

demanded for Fortress-backed patents.

26

consumers electronics products.

The anticompetitive acquisitions have thus harmed27
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153.

As a direct, proximate, and foreseeable result of the unlawful patent acquisitions,2Intel has suffered or will suffer harm to its business and property, and, absent an injunction and3

rescission of these transactions, Intel will continue to suffer from these effects. Intel’s past and4continuing harm include the risk of supracompetitive licensing rates, business uncertainty,

5

litigation costs, and business resources lost in dealing with the consequences of Fortress’s

6

unlawfully-acquired patents.

7
8

THIRD COUNT

9

Unfair Competition

10(Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200)

11(Claim Against All Defendants)

12
13
14

154.

Intel repeats and realleges the allegations of the preceding and subsequentparagraphs as if fully set forth herein.
155.

Defendants have engaged in unfair competition in violation of Cal. Bus. Prof. Code15

§ 17200, et seq. As set forth above, Defendants have engaged in illegal conduct by violating the16

Sherman and Clayton Acts. That conduct is also unfair in that it violates the spirit and policy of17

the antitrust laws.

18

156.

As a direct result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, competition has been injured,

19

including in the Electronic Patents Market (or, in the alternative, in in Fortress’s Portfolio Market)

20

as alleged above. Moreover, this conduct threatens injury to downstream competition for price,21

innovation, and quality in sales of cellular devices, thereby injuring consumers in California and22

elsewhere. These threatened injuries include the passing on to consumers of improperly inflated

23

royalties, and decreases in innovation and quality competition.

24

157.

As a direct result of Defendants’ illegal conduct, Intel has suffered economic harm

25in the form of litigation costs and diversion of resources away from innovation to respond to these26

entities’ serial nuisance suits.

27
28
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1

FOURTH COUNT

2

Fortress’s Monopolization of Fortress’s Portfolio Market

3(Section 2 of the Sherman Act)

4

(Claim Against Fortress Only)

5
6

158.

paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

78Intel repeats and realleges the allegations of the preceding and subsequent

159.

Fortress has violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by willfully acquiring andmaintaining monopoly power in the licensing market for the patents in Fortress’s Portfolio Market.

9

160.

Fortress’s aggregation of patents (whether through acquisition or by investment in

10

PAEs that do its bidding) across a network of PAEs to obscure Fortress’s central role and to impede

11

competition constitutes willful acquisition of a monopoly in Fortress’s Portfolio Market. Further,

12

Fortress exploits the lock-in effects of product investments by its targets through meritless

13

assertions and litigation, which both enhances Fortress’s monopoly power and also confirms

14

Fortress’s anticompetitive intent. Fortress has aggregated such a large portfolio with the apparent

15

goal of overwhelming prospective licensees with the threat of serial patent litigation. The

16

combination of patents in the hands of PAEs that do not face reputational constraints in their

17

licensing or litigation of patents creates or enhances monopoly power that did not exist prior to18

aggregation. Fortress’s aim in assembling such a large portfolio dispersed among PAEs was to19

take advantage of this dynamic and ensure that the value of any particular patent in the portfolio

20

becomes nearly irrelevant in the context of the sheer size and scope of the overall number of patents

21

that can be asserted.

22

161.

Fortress’s aggregation of patents generated no efficiencies, and in fact was designed

23

to create inefficiencies in licensing the transferred patents.

24

efficiencies created by Fortress’s aggregation are significantly outweighed by their anticompetitive25

effects.

Any conceivable or purported

26
27
28
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162.

As a direct, proximate, and foreseeable result of Fortress’s monopolization, there is2

a significant threat of inflated royalties to consumers of licenses to Fortress-backed patents.

3

Fortress’s anticompetitive scheme has thus harmed competition in Fortress’s Portfolio Market.

4

As a direct, proximate, and foreseeable result of Fortress’s monopolization, there is a5significant threat of harm to consumers, including through the inevitable passing on to consumers

6of the inflated royalties demanded by Fortress’s PAEs. Fortress’s anticompetitive scheme has thus

7

harmed consumers for products of licensees or potential licensees of Fortress-backed patents.

8

163.

As a direct, proximate, and foreseeable result of Fortress’s monopolization of

9

Fortress’s Portfolio Market, Intel has suffered or will suffer harm to its business and property, and,10

absent an injunction, Intel will continue to suffer from these effects. Intel’s past and continuing

11

harm includes litigation costs, the risk of supracompetitive licensing rates, business uncertainty,

12and business resources lost in dealing with the consequences of Fortress’s PAEs’ assertion of their13

unlawfully-acquired patents.

14

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

15Intel respectfully request the following relief:

16a)That Defendants’ unlawful conduct be declared a violation of Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2; Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18;
and Cal. Bus. Prov. Code § 17200, et seq.;b)That Intel recover damages against Defendants in an amount to be determined andmultiplied to the extent provided by law;c)That all contracts or agreements Defendants entered into violation of the Sherman
Act, Clayton Act, or Cal. Bus. Prov. Code § 17200, et seq. be declared void andthe patents covered by those transfer agreements be transferred back to thetransferors;d)That all patents transferred to Defendants in violation of the Sherman Act,
Clayton Act, or Cal. Bus. Prov. Code § 17200, et seq. be declared unenforceable;e)Award Intel its costs and expenses associated with this case, together withinterest; andf)Grant such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper under
the circumstances.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
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1
2

JURY DEMAND
Intel demands a jury trial on all issues and claims so triable.

3
4
5

DATED: October 21, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

6

By: /s/ Mark D. Selwyn

7Mark D. Selwyn (SBN 244180)
mark.selwyn@wilmerhale.com
WILMER CUTLER PICKERINGHALE AND DORR LLP
950 Page Mill Road
Palo Alto, CA 94304
Telephone: +1 650 858 6000
Facsimile: +1 650 858 6100

8
9
10
11

William F. Lee (pro hac vice to be filed)william.lee@wilmerhale.com
Joseph J. Mueller (pro hac vice to be filed)joseph.mueller@wilmerhale.com
Timothy Syrett (pro hac vice to be filed)timothy.syrett@wilmerhale.com
WILMER CUTLER PICKERINGHALE AND DORR LLP
60 State Street
Boston, MA 02109
Telephone: +1 617 526 6000
Facsimile: +1 617 526 5000

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Leon B. Greenfield (pro hac vice to be filed)leon.greenfield@wilmerhale.com
Amanda L. Major (pro hac vice to be filed)amanda.major@wilmerhale.com
WILMER CUTLER PICKERINGHALE AND DORR LLP
1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
Telephone: +1 202 663 6000
Facsimile: +1 202 663 6363

19
20
21
22
23

Attorneys for Plaintiff
INTEL CORPORATION

24
25
26
27
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Case No.

48

COMPLAINT