Japan as an American Protectorate and Collapse of the Hatoyama Administration
Takao SEBATA
Abstract
This paper deals with Japan as an American protectorate or vassal and a power struggle
between the Hatoyama-Ozawa group of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and thebureaucrats-major mass media coalition over Ozawa, the Status of Forces Agreement(SOFA), and United States Forces in Japan (USFJ). It is not just a power struggle
among them, but a battle between those who supported vested interests represented by
the bureaucrats, the major mass media, the business people, and the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) backed by the United States and those who tried to carry out reforms
represented by the Hatoyama-Ozawa group. It is also a conflict over democracy or who
really governs Japan.
Key Words: An American protectorate, the SOFA, and Ichiro Ozawa
Introduction
Is Japan an American vassal or protectorate?
Once the United States-Japan relations were described as one of the most important
relations in the world, but now the Sino-United States relations have become more
important than the United States-Japan relations. Many even think that the era of thegroup of two (G2) has come and many American leaders and people regard China as
more important country than Japan. It is obvious that the United States treats China
more equal than Japan. The United States has been treating Japan as an American
servant since 1945. In fact, Zbigniew Brzezinski says that although Japan has become
an economic power, she remains an American protectorate. (Brzezinski, 1997, pp. 27,
152, 177) Gavan McCormack also describes the United States-Japan relations as amaster and a servant relationship. (McCormack, 2013, p. 34) Karel van Wolferendepicts the alliance relationship as unparalleled in history. He cannot describe therelations with an ordinary expression, but at least he does not think that the UnitedStates-Japan relations are alliance relations. Japan is an American protectorate, whichmeans in other words an American servant, he says. (Wolferen, 2011, pp. 144-49;
Magosaki and Wolferen, 2013, pp. 19-22, 26-27) In this way, many critics argue that the1United States has not treated Japan as her alliance, but protectorate, vassal, or servant.
Of course, the government officials of the United States and Japan would deny such aword and emphasize the important bilateral relationship. However, if one examines thereal conditions of the people in Okinawa, one can easily understand why Japan is called
protectorate, vassal, or servant.
According to McCormack, an incomprehensible but very important fact is that
subordination was not imposed on Japan but her choice. A vassal state is willing to let
the empire occupy a part of its land, tries not to anger the empire at any cost, seeks apolicy which satisfies the empire, and tries not to be deserted by the empire.
(McCormack, 2013, p. 20) McCormack mentions that the United Kingdom andAustralia also faithfully follow the United States, but Japan is different in the sense that
the United States publicly despises Japan. (McCormack, 213, p. 34) In fact, it is obviousthat not only does the United States look down on Japan, but also applies a double
standard to Japan, which indicates that Japan is an American vassal or protectorate. The
United States Government does not listen to the people in Japan, particularly in
Okinawa, but listens to the American people. Interestingly, the Japanese leaders haveaccepted this position at least under the LDP administrations. The Japanese Governmentis willing to pay huge amount of HNS to keep USFJ in spite of the fact that USFJ hurts
the Japanese people. Hatoyama of the DPJ for the first time tried in vain to change thisposition and sought more equal relationship with the United States.
McCormack argues that in December 2008 Joseph Nye tried to obstruct a newpolicy advocated by the DPJ. Nye pointed out three policies which United States
Congress might regard as anti-United States: suspension of the dispatch to the Indian
Ocean of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces vessels; revision of SOFA; and revision of
the agreement on the reorganization of USFJ such as the transfer of the Futenma Air
Base. When Seiji Maehara of the DPJ expressed his party’s intention to revise SOFA
and the agreement on the reorganization of USFJ, Nye sent him a message warning that
the United States Government would regard DPJ’s intention as anti-United States.
McCormack states that Nye has not changed his belief which was distrust toward Japanand the necessity of United States military control over Japan for an indefinite period.
(McCormack, 2013, p. 25) Nye’s attitude toward Japan shows who is a master and who
is a servant and indicates that a “cork in the bottle” argument is still alive. If the revisionof the SOFA is considered as anti-United States, Japan has no choice but to abrogate the
Security Treaty because it indicates that the United States has no intention to improve
the living condition of the people in Okinawa and the areas which host USFJ and bases.
It is not enough for Japan to ask for the revision of SOFA. However, the United States2Government does not allow the Japanese Government to even discuss SOFA needless to
say its revision. Nye’s remarks represent this position of the United States Government.
The United States Double Standard
As for the United States double standard, Yoichi Iha argues that the United States armed
forces have to abide by state law and the federal law in the United States since1978 andabide by the environmental standard in the areas outside of the United States since 1996.
In September 2000, both the United States Government and the Japanese Government
issued a joint statement that USFJ would maintain the same environmental standard asthat of Japan or the higher environmental standard. However, since the statement, noiselevel became even higher and almost no access to the inside of the base remained thesame. USFJ strictly applies the United States environmental standard to USFJ members,
but does not apply at all to the areas outside of the bases. Iha further contends that theJapanese Government must ask the United States Government to abide by the UnitedStates Federal Aviation Law, which requires setting up a clear zone in the Futenma Air
Base. (Iha, 2013, pp. 169-171) However, the bureaucrats of the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs and Defense as well as the politicians of the LDP do not want to antagonize theUnited States Government. Therefore, the Japanese Government cannot ask the UnitedStates Government to abide by the 2000 joint statement. It is obvious that thebureaucrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs give priority to USFJ over the people in
Okinawa.
Ignoring the people in Okinawa is a typical attitude of the bureaucrats. The
deployment of Osprey is a case in point. Flight training in circles for Osprey takes place
within Marine Corps Air Station Miramar at San Diego, whose area is about twenty
times Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and five times Ginowan City. In the UnitedStates, flight training in circles over the urban and residential areas is prohibited.
However, flight training in circles for Osprey will take place over the urban andresidential areas of Ginowan City, Naha City, and Urasoe City. USFJ avoids flighttraining in circles over the facilities and residential areas of USFJ members so that it
abides by the United States military standard. In other words, USFJ follows the UnitedStates military standard for the members and facilities of USFJ in Okinawa as in the
United States, but it does not apply the standard to the Japanese people in Okinawa. (Iha,
2013, pp. 171-72) In this way, the United States does not apply democracy to Japan,
particularly in dealing with the people in Okinawa. This is a clear example that Japan is
an American servant. Neither the United States Government nor the Japanese3

Government has intention to revise SOFA or solve the problems which the people in
Okinawa face. In the eyes of many bureaucrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thepeople in Okinawa must endure the burdens of the Security Treaty. Or in the eyes ofmany politicians of the LDP, the people in Okinawa must pay social cost to keep good
relations with the United States.
The cases mentioned above clearly show that the United States uses double
standard because SOFA protects USFJ members and prevents the Japanese Government
from taking a necessary step to impose the United States Federal Aviation Law or theJapanese Aviation Law. In order to keep smooth relations with the United States, thebureaucrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the politicians of the LDP have nointention to revise SOFA ignoring the voices of the people in Okinawa for more thanforty years.
The United States Forces in Japan and the Hatoyama-Ozawa GroupAs for the necessity of keeping USFJ, Ichiro Ozawa mentioned in February 2009 that
the United States 7th Fleet which had a home port at Yokosuka would be sufficient to
defend Japan and her neighboring areas, and therefore, Japan would not need USFJ,
particularly in Okinawa. One week later after this remark, Ozawa was arrested for thesuspect of bribery. McCormack argues that the core of the lawsuit against Ozawa was
not a matter of whether he was guilty or not but the removal of the most talented and thebravest leader of the DPJ and eradication of those who sought independent foreign
policy in the Japanese politics. (McCormack, 2013, p. 25; Takano: 2012, 226-227) In
this respect, McCormack and Wolferen have the same view toward the case of Ozawa,
which both agree that the prosecution tried to defend the current system by eliminating
the reformers such as Ozawa and Hatoyama. Ozawa must have thought of the treaty,
which would allow the United States forces to stay in Japan only in peace time.
However, because of the Host Nation Support (HNS), the United States would not
accept such an idea. Due to a financial problem of the United States Government, HNS
is of vital importance to USFJ. In fact, without HNS, USFJ would have to be reduced or
has to go home in the worst scenario.
Hatoyama has also been pursuing the Security Treaty without permanent bases.
(Hatoyama and Takano, 2012, pp. 18-19) In this respect, both Hatoyama and Ozawa aim
at the Security Treaty without USFJ and bases in peace time. However, the UnitedStates would not agree to their thought since USFJ and bases are indispensable to theUnited States worldwide strategy. Moreover, no United States ally pays more generous
4

HNS than Japan. USFJ is comfortable for staying in Japan. The members of USFJ enjoy
extraterritoriality and generous HNS. There is no reason why USFJ should give up theprivilege and the position of the master. Therefore, the United States would notvoluntarily give up her military bases in Japan. If the current politics under the LDP and
the bureaucratic control of Japan would continue, USFJ would stay in Japan for anotherfifty or one hundred years.
Yukio Hatoyama points out that the Japanese major mass media and theJapanese bureaucrats severely criticize and hate those who hold the view which seeks
Japan’s independence from the United States. For the media and the bureaucrats,
pursuing independent foreign policy against the United States is outrageous, Hatoyama
says. They regard those who seek to make Japan regain independence and dignity as
freaks or those who have a wrong idea. (Magosaki and Kimura, 2013, pp. ii-iii) He
argues that we must fight the bureaucrats who give the United States priority overeverything and resist reforms, the business community which is a group of large
companies maintaining close contact with the LDP and the bureaucrats, the major mass
media which are closed to the outside and control newspapers and radio waves, and the
LDP. They all stuck to the vested interests and the bureaucrats were particularly strong
standing in front of him like a brick wall, Hatoyama says. Hatoyama recalls that he was
not able to persuade any ministers except for the cabinet minister over the Futenma Air
Base or directly communicate with anyone but through the bureaucrats. Hatoyama
mentions that the bureaucrats of the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense did notlisten to him saying that the United State would never agree to what he said and that heshould return to the idea of Henoko since it had been already decided on. He thinks that
the United States would have thought that Hatoyama was hostile to the United Statessince he presented an idea of the East Asian Community and suggested transferring theMarine Corps of the Futenma Air Base to another prefecture or overseas. (Hatoyama
and Takano, 2012, pp. 5-6, 21-23, 41-42) The remarks of Hatoyama mentioned above
indicate that the bureaucrats control Japan, not the Prime Minister. The bureaucrats of
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense did not allow the Prime Minister todirectly communicate with his counterpart in the United States. They controlled andselected the information available to the Prime Minister, sabotaged Hatoyama’s plan,
tried to persuade him not to pursue a new policy on the relocation of the Futenma Air
Base. This is not the attitude of any bureaucrats. This kind of things would never happen
in the United Kingdom. The bureaucrats should have to follow the instructions of theirboss, the Prime Minister. However, in Japan the bureaucrats control the country. As aresult, Hatoyama’s wish did not materialize.
5

Hatoyama tried to carry out the following policies, which the United States did
not want Japan to take. Namely, they were suspension of the dispatch to the Indian
Ocean of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces vessels; revision of SOFA; and revision of
the agreement on the transfer of the Futenma Air Base. Hatoyama was able toaccomplish the first policy, but failed in implementing the second and the third ones dueto the opposition from not only the United States but also the bureaucrats of the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense and the politicians of the LDP and his own
party DPJ. In other words, the opposition of the vested interests group was very strong.
Hatoyama was not strong enough to carry out reforms.
Ozawa vs. the Prosecution
Yuko Mori argues that before the change of power in 2009, the prosecution made up a
story that Ozawa received an illegal donation from the Nishimatsu Construction
Company through a dummy political organization. As a result, Ozawa resigned from thepresident of the DPJ. According to her, however, a witness for the prosecution upset thestory and the accusation against Ozawa itself simply disappeared. Then, the prosecution
cooked up another story, the case of the Rikuzankai. This time too, it was a frame-up.
One of the prosecutors in charge of the case testified that the case was a grandeur
fabrication based on fantasy of the prosecution. Nevertheless, the court decided thatthree former secretaries of Ozawa were found guilty based on reasonable presumption
without evidence. The Rikuzankai case was in fact a simple mistake on paperwork as
the court approved. Mori argues that since the two cases mentioned above were false
accusation, there was no evidence and therefore, the prosecution was not able to indict
Ozawa. (Mori, 2012, pp. 2-3) According to Sadao Hirano, the prosecution wasted about
3 billion yen of tax which was estimated by experts. (Hirano, 2011, p. 5) As
McCormack described, for the prosecution it did not matter whether Ozawa was guilty
or not. The important point for the prosecution is that Ozawa should not be allowed to
become the Prime Minister. Therefore, the prosecution was about to fight a total war
against Ozawa. The prosecution lost the battle at the court, but won the war because the
DPJ lost power and Ozawa left the party. It was a triumph for those who tried to keep
the status quo and prevented reforms.
In the process of this fighting, the prosecution wasted a huge amount of tax
because of false accusation and ruined Ozawa’s political career. Moreover, theprosecution prevented sound development of democracy in Japan. The bureaucrats ofthe prosecution think that they are the masters and control Japan, not the politicians like6

Ozawa. Therefore, the prosecution was not interested in the development of democracy
in Japan. Their concern was to defend the interests of their organization. It was obviousthat the case of Ozawa was a frame-up and a grandeur fabrication as the prosecutor in
charge of the case himself testified and the prosecution was not able to indict Ozawa notonce but twice.
Mori argues that there were up to 500 similar cases in some year due tomistakes on paperwork. She wonders why the prosecution accused only the case of
Ozawa. She assumes that the real purpose of the prosecution was to prevent the DPJ
from coming to power. The prosecution arrested the first public secretary of Ozawa,
who was then the president of the opposition party. The arrest would certainly affect thechange of power. Mori says that in March 2009, the deputy cabinet secretary, who was
the former Commissioner General of the National Police Agency under the Taro Aso
Administration of the LDP, made a slip of the tongue saying that the prosecution would
not extend the investigation to the LDP. The prosecution thought that if they would
destroy Ozawa, the bureaucrats would be able to control the DPJ even though it came to
power, Mori mentions. (Mori, 2012, pp. 21, 29-30) It is interesting to see why the
deputy cabinet secretary mentioned above said that the prosecution would not touch thepoliticians of the LDP. This is indicative that both the prosecution and the LDP
cooperate with each other in weakening the political power of the DPJ. If the DPJ lost
power and the LDP came to power once again, the bureaucrats would continue tocontrol Japan under the LDP administration.
Mori was right in saying that the bureaucrats would be able to control the DPJ.
After Ozawa was blocked from becoming the Prime Minister, Hatoyama became thePrime Minister. However, he was not able to carry out his policy such as the relocationof the Futenma Air Base. It was because Hatoyama was not able to rely on Ozawa who
was out of the cabinet and his political power was limited. After all, Ozawa was asuspect. Then, the bureaucrats of the Finance Ministry persuaded the DPJ to implement
the consumption tax. By the time of the birth of the Yoshihiko Noda Administration, theDPJ became under the complete control of the bureaucrats of the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs, Defense, and Finance.
Mori thinks that this is a crisis of the DPJ, a crisis of the political reforms, anda crisis of democracy in Japan. It is because if one lets the prosecution arrest and indict
the politicians and the innocent people based on false accusation, they would control
Japan, which would destroy democracy in Japan. Japan has already been under thecontrol of the bureaucrats for almost 150 years since the Meiji Restoration. The
prosecution is the representative of the bureaucrats. (Mori, 2012, pp. 37-39, 66) She
7

argues that if the prosecution failed to indict a person based on fabrication, it could
make use of the judging committee on the prosecution to indict him while letting the
major mass media carry out a large campaign against him. In this way, he would
become a suspect. Mori contends that if the prosecution uses this method, it could makeanyone a suspect and destroy his life. This is a crisis of democracy since the prosecution
could decide whether he or she would become a suspect. (Mori, 2012, pp. 165-167)
Hirano also points out degradation of the prosecution, which brings about the crisis of
democracy in Japan. He thinks that the Hatoyama Administration was the first state
power and the first change of power that the Japanese people by themselves created in
the history of the Japanese parliamentary government over the last 120 years. Moreover,according to Hirano’s historical view, it was the first administration by the people andfor the people in 2,669 years of Japan’s history since Emperor Jinmu. It was revolution
without blood, he says. Therefore, those who had vested interests such as the LDP and
the bureaucrats had a sense of a crisis. (Hirano, 2011, pp. 20, 23, 264) Unfortunately, forthose who sought reforms, opposition of the vested interests was very strong. Since the
Meiji era, the bureaucrats have consolidated their stand accumulating know-how onpolitics and controlling information, budget, and personnel. It would take more than adecade to destroy the system under the control of the bureaucrats. Therefore, theJapanese people should have given more time to the DPJ and supported Hatoyama andOzawa. However, the bureaucrats and the major mass media cooperated with each otherand led the public to anti-Hatoyama and anti-Ozawa position.
Mori and Hirano share the same sense of crisis in democracy in Japan. It is
well known that the bureaucrats have controlled Japan for almost 150 years since the
Meiji era. Ozawa and Hatoyama in a sense challenged the 150-year-control by thebureaucrats and lost. It was because the Japanese people did not realize that Ozawa,
Hatoyama, Mori, and their colleagues were fighting for democracy in Japan. The major
mass media, the business leaders in the Zaikai, the politicians of the LDP along with thebureaucrats and the United States all criticized the reformers such as Ozawa andHatoyama saying that the DPJ under the Hatoyama Administration irritated the UnitedStates and disturbed good relations with her. The Japanese people believed thoseaccusations against Ozawa and Hatoyama and did not continue to support the DPJ. In
this respect, one can argue that it is the Japanese people themselves who destroyed an
opportunity to build a new Japan which the politicians, not the bureaucrats, would
control the politics. Therefore, they are in fact responsible for the failure of Hatoyama
and Ozawa, and eventually the DPJ.
Mori argues that the false report which a prosecutor made must have affected a8judging committee on the prosecution which indicted Ozawa. Fabrication of the report
is a crime. The investigating authorities illegally investigated the case, the procedure of
the decision to indict had a defect, and the report which would be the basis of thedecision was fabricated. Therefore, Mori argues that the judging committee on theprosecution should have terminated the investigation before the judgment was made.
The Rikuzankai case was a grandeur invention which the prosecution made up. In thefirst place, she says, the judging committee on the prosecution is a place where theprosecution explains that its judgment on the non-prosecution was not wrong. However,in fact, the prosecution sent a false report to the committee indicating that Ozawa was
guilty. (Mori, 2012, pp. 158-160) In other words, the judging committee on theprosecution became the second prosecution, which could try the case again that theprosecution was not able to indict. This was an excellent opportunity for the prosecution.
It is because even though the prosecution cannot indict an influential politician such as
Ozawa, the judging committee on the prosecution could indict him on behalf of theprosecution. In this way, the prosecution was able to drag Ozawa into a long struggle atthe court.
If the prosecution fabricated evidence, it does not just create a false accusation,
but commits a crime, Mori says. She continues that what the prosecution does denies
democracy since the prosecution could decide on who would become the Prime
Minister or which party would come to power by their preventing an influential
politician who might have become the Prime Minister from seizing power. Mori argues
that even though the prosecution lost the battle against Ozawa, if it could maintain thecurrent system which the judging committee on the prosecution could indict a suspect
instead of the prosecution itself, then, it would be a victory for the prosecution. (Mori,
2012, pp. 213-15, 223-227) This is a very important point. Mori accurately sees the real
power of the bureaucrats of the prosecution, who can choose or not to choose Japan’sPrime Minister or the party in power. This is not a democracy. Japan is in fat not ademocracy. The politicians whom the people elected cannot exercise power or influence.
The bureaucrats whom the people did not elect can exercise power and influence. The
bureaucrats are excellent since they all passed a very difficult national examination.
Many of them are graduates from the Law Faculty of the University of Tokyo, Japan’s
top university. However, many of them do not think of the people or Japan’s national
interests. They are only concerned about their ministries or agencies. As a result, they
become conservatives and cannot carry out reforms.
As for the control by the bureaucrats, Ozawa himself argues that thebureaucrats, particularly revenue officers, police officers, and prosecutors control the9Japanese people from payment of taxes to indictment of crimes. It is up to the judgmentof these bureaucrats whether the people would become guilty or not. He continues thatthe major mass media such as large TV stations and large newspaper companies havethe vested rights and interests. According to Ozawa, the major mass media were afraidthat he would deregulate radio laws or reconsider the resale price maintenance system.
Therefore, they along with the prosecution tried to remove Ozawa from the politicalscene. (Mori, 2012, pp. 232-33, 246) Sadao Hirano also mentions that Ozawa aimed atreforms of the mass media, which would include introduction of a public auction into
the media industry, elimination of a press club, and a ban on the cross ownership, which
the newspaper companies and the TV stations hold each other’s capital. (Hirano, 2011: 6,
172-73) As Hirano and Mori accurately explain in the examples above, the major mass
media and the prosecution had the same concerns about Ozawa. As Wolferen pointed
out in many places, the bureaucrats use their discretion in implementing a law. Ozawa
tried in vain to change this system. In this respect, Ozawa was their enemy and shouldbe eliminated from the political scene. The major mass media also wanted to destroy
political career of Ozawa who tried to reform their industry. The prosecution leaked tothe major mass media some important information against Ozawa and the media
conveyed it to the public who in turn thought that Ozawa must have done something
wrong. In this way, the prosecution was able to keep Ozawa as a suspect for a long timemaking use of the public and the major mass media.
Violation of Human Rights by the Prosecution
Mori gave an example of how the prosecution abused its power. During the case of
Nishimatsu Construction Company, a prosecutor interrogated a female secretary ofHouse of Representatives Tomohiro Ishikawa who was a former secretary of Ozawa
about the case of Ozawa for almost ten hours. She was simply asked to come to theprosecution office to pick up the stuff that they confiscated from the office of Ishikawa.
Then, the prosecutor told her that she was a suspect of the case and isolated her without
letting her call anyone. The prosecutor asked her how the children would think if theirmother were arrested showing her the photos of the children on the computer. He thenthreatened her to confess that she had a hand in the case. The prosecutor refused to let
her contact the kindergarten where her three-year and five-year old children wait for her.
(Mori, 2012, pp. 106-108; Hirano, 2011, pp. 78-80) This is an excellent example of theabuse of power made by the prosecution which ignores human rights. In Japan, therights of a suspect are not protected. The prosecution and the police can ask a person to10

go with them voluntarily as a witness to the police station and detain him as a suspect
for up to twenty days without a warrant of arrest or contacting a lawyer. Unless thesuspect confesses a crime which he did not commit or sign the document that aprosecutor wrote indicating that he committed a crime, the suspect would not be able togo home for up to twenty days. Because there is no camera or a tape recorder in theinterrogation room or there is no lawyer with the suspect, no one knows what is goingon inside the room except for the suspect and the prosecutors and the police officers.
This is also exactly why USFJ and the United States Government refuse tohand over a suspect to the Japanese prosecution or negotiate with the Japanese
authorities over the criminal section of the SOFA. In the United States, a suspect can
ask for an attorney and his rights are protected. However, in Japan the investigation of
the prosecution inhumanly violates human rights of the suspect and USFJ knows about
it. One can argue that in a sense it is natural for the United States Government to protect
an American citizen. The prosecution refuses to introduce visibility into theinvestigation room since it would not be able to fully obtain evidence, the prosecution
argues. As a result, the United States Government refuses to negotiate with the Japanese
Government over the SOFA. Therefore, because of the prosecution’s way of handling asuspect, the human rights of the Japanese victims are ignored. In order to defend theinterests of the prosecution, the interests of the people are disregarded. This is acharacteristic of the elite bureaucrats.
Hirano argues that as a result of no visibility in the investigation room, such
illegal acts as coercion, inducement, violence, or a threat against a suspect easily takeplace in the investigation room. Therefore, complete visibility in the investigation room
is necessary. (Hirano, 2011, pp. 258-59, 276) It is obvious that many false accusations
would continue without visibility in the investigation room. The prosecution is afraidthat if the visibility in the investigation room is allowed, a prosecutor would havedifficulty making a suspect confess. One can easily assume, however, that a prosecutor
would not be able to intimidate, shout at, or coerce a suspect into confession if there is acamera or a tape recorder in the room. Then, the prosecution would not be able tomaintain 99.9% of the victory at the court, which would certainly affect the promotionof the bureaucrats of the prosecution.
Hirano also mentions that the prosecution illegally investigated an office ofTomohiro Ishikawa without a search warrant. He also describes in detail about theinvestigation of Hiromasa Ezoe, who was falsely charged at the Recruitment Scandal.
The prosecution illegally and inhumanly investigated him by shouting at him, denying
his character, forcing him to kneel down on the ground, kicking up his chair, and letting
11

him keep standing for a long time. In this way, he was completely exhausted andbecame under the control of the prosecutor and finally confessed the crime which he did
not commit. It was because he was threatened by the prosecutor saying that theprosecutor’s office could detain him for longer than the actual sentence. The prosecution
often offered him plea bargaining, which is prohibited under the Japanese law. If hesigns the document which the prosecutor wrote, he would be released soon, but if herefuses, the prosecution would detain him for a long time. It took fourteen years todecide on the case of the Recruitment Scandal since the prosecution had to prove some1000 written statements, whose many were prepared under the intimidation of theprosecutors. (Hirano, 2011, pp. 77, 212-15, 233, 237, 256-57) This is how theprosecution maintains 99.9% in the ratio of winning the case. The case of the
Recruitment Scandal is outrageous, but one can assume that it is just a tip of the iceberg
in this kind of investigation. It is almost impossible to imagine that the elites of theprosecution intimidate or coerce a suspect into confession and commit a crime because
they are the group of the professionals and highly educated, who passed the mostdifficult bar examination in the country. However, the coarse language which they use
in the interrogation room is as worse as that of the Yakuza members, Japan’s criminalorganization.
Mori argues that one of the major reasons why the DPJ collapsed was because
Ozawa was not able to become a cabinet member as Deputy Prime Minister while
maintaining the position of the General Secretary of the DPJ. According to her, Sadao
Hirano told her that Yoshito Sengoku, Seiji Maehara, Yukio Edano, and other politicians
within the DPJ had already plotted to remove Ozawa out of the center of power after the
DPJ came to power. Mori points out that Hatoyama made a mistake for not appointing
those whom he trusted important posts such as Foreign Minister or Defense Minister.
Instead of doing so, he appointed those who were not close to him and let Ozawa stayout of his cabinet. Mori laments that without Ozawa the DPJ would not be able to carryout reforms or control the bureaucrats. Hirano confirms that anti-Ozawa group within
the DPJ along with the prosecution and the major mass media tried to prevent Ozawa
from taking the initiative within the DPJ administration. (Mori, 2012, pp. 42-44, Hirano,
2011, pp. 10-11)) Mori was right in saying that without Ozawa the DPJ would not beable to control the bureaucrats. In the end, the bureaucrats were able to prevent the DPJ
from implementing reforms and controlling the bureaucrats. On the contrary, it was the
DPJ that was controlled by the bureaucrats. In this respect, the anti-Ozawa group suchas Sengoku, Maehara, and Edano stabbed Hatoyama in the back. In a sense, Hatoyama
did not have strong leadership. Only would Ozawa be able to carry out reforms and
12fight against the bureaucrats. The bureaucrats of the prosecution knew about it andtherefore, they consistently sought to eliminate Ozawa from the political arena.
Conclusion
This paper argues that Japan is an American protectorate or vassal and there was apower struggle between the Hatoyama-Ozawa group of the DPJ and thebureaucrats-major mass media coalition in dealing with the violation of human rights by
the prosecution and the case of Ozawa’s alleged money politics. It was a battle between
those who supported vested interests represented by the prosecution which the major
mass media supported and those who tried to carry out reforms represented by the
Hatoyama-Ozawa group. It was also a conflict over who really governed Japan. Is it thebureaucrats or the politicians who control Japan? The Hatoyama-Ozawa reform grouplost the battle and Japan is still under the control of the bureaucrats.
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