G-SEC WORKING PAPER No.21
Japan’s Southeast Asian Policyin the Post-Vietnam War
The Jakarta Conference, Economic Aid to Indochina Countries,
and Diplomatic Normalization with North Vietnam

Amiko NOBORI※
October, 2007

Keywords

Japan, Southeast Asia, foreign policy, Vietnam War, U.S.-Japan relations

Abstract

This paper seeks to illustrate Japan’s new Southeast Asian policy in the post-Vietnam
War period with particular focus on its efforts in the May 1970 Jakarta Conference on
the Cambodian problem, her aid policy toward Indochina countries after 1970, anddiplomatic normalization with North Vietnam in September 1973. What are the motives
behind these decisions made by Japan to play a political role in the Southeast Asian
region in the early 1970s? What made this Japanese initiative possible? This paper
attempts to answer these questions from the following three different perspectives: (1)Japan’s aspiration to play an active role in policymaking in the post-Vietnam War era;(2) the changing U.S. policy toward Asia; and (3) increase in the self-confidence among
the Asian nations with regard to their own development efforts, coupled with a growing
sense of regionalism. The paper concludes that in the post-Vietnam War era, Japan’sSoutheast Asian policy was entering a new phase in the late 1960s and the beginning of
the 1970s, wherein it attempted to play an active role in the political field.

※

Research Fellow, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Visiting Scholar,

National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo. 7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku,
Tokyo 106-8677 JAPAN. Email: amiko_n@hotmail.com.

Introduction
The aim of this paper is to illustrate Japan’s new Southeast Asian policy in the
post-Vietnam War period with particular focus on its efforts in the May 1970 Jakarta
Conference on the Cambodian problem, her aid policy toward Indochinese countries
after 1970, and diplomatic normalization with North Vietnam in September 1973.
A highly experienced diplomat in Asia, Kenneth T. Young, wrote, “The years
1969–1970 were a major watershed in contemporary Asian history. The old era ofWestern supremacy was ended. The American presence began slowly to recede. A new
era of Asian primacy in Asia had begun—an era in which Japan is emerging as thepreeminent power in the region. 1”
Indeed, in 1970, Japan significantly increased her political role in the region:
the Japanese government shifted from providing humanitarian aid to providing
developmental aid to South Vietnam and expressed its willingness to assist in thepeacekeeping efforts in Indochina. Another conspicuous attempt was Japan’s initiativein the Jakarta Conference on Cambodia.
What are the motives behind these decisions made by Japan to play a politicalrole in the Southeast Asian region in the early 1970s? What made this Japaneseinitiative possible? By analyzing the details of Japan’s decision-making process ofholding the conference on Cambodia, her aid policy toward Indochina, and diplomatic
normalization with Hanoi, this paper attempts to answer these questions from thefollowing three different but interrelated perspectives: (1) Japan’s aspiration to play anactive role in policymaking in the post-Vietnam War era; (2) the changing U.S. policy
toward Asia and U.S.-Japan relations; and (3) increase in the self-confidence among the
Asian nations with regard to their own development efforts, coupled with a growing
sense of regionalism.
In the study of Japan’s postwar diplomatic history, Southeast Asian region did
1

Kenneth T. Young, “The Involvement in Southeast Asia”, in James William Morley ed., Prospect
for Japan: Security in the 1970’s (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972) , p.169.

1not attract so much attention as the United States or China. Among a few existing
literature, Chaiwat and Sudo respectively explored new dimensions in the area byclosely analyzing the process of Japan’s Southeast Asian policy in the post-Vietnam era,
and argued that the period of mid-1970s was a departure from traditional economic
diplomacy. 2 Soeya considered the significance of the American factor for Japanesepolicy toward Southeast Asia and argued that structural changes in the regional order aswell as in the United States at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s
encouraged Japan to take on larger regional roles. 3
The author’s view is similar to that of Soeya’s, while stressing the consistencyof Japanese policy orientation throughout the 1960s and 1970s. To put it another words,
in Japan’s postwar Southeast Asian policy, there has been always a desire to commit
itself to the entire region beyond the difference of domestic political system andideology of each country.
The primary goal of Japan’s Southeast Asian policy has been to reduce tensions
and threat and maintain stability in Asia by the means of providing humanitarianassistance or by giving developmental aid which would improve the livelihood of thepeople. There is no questions that Tokyo contributed to Washington’s strategy to contain
China by these means. Japanese Government, at the same time, attempted to keep
certain distance from the U.S. Cold War thinking.
This characteristic in Japan’s policy toward Southeast Asia became more
conspicuous in the détente period. In speaking of the governments whom they help, theJapanese leaders preferred to describe them as being “neutral” and to portray Tokyo’s
efforts as being on behalf of their “independence and neutrality.” While these phrases
were meant for domestic consumption, they reflected the government’s sincere desire to2

Khamchoo Chaiwat, "Japan's Southeast Asian Policy in the Post-Vietnam Era: 1975-1985," (Ph.D.
Dissertation, The University of Washington, 1986); Sueo Sudo, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN:
New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992).
3
Yoshihide Soeya, “Japan’s Policy towards Southeast Asia: Anatomy of ‘Autonomous Diplomacy’and the American Factor,” in Chandran Jeshurun ed., China, India, Japan and the Security ofSoutheast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), pp.93-94.

2encourage détente in Southeast Asia.4
The paper concludes that Japan’s Southeast Asian policy was entering a newphase in the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, wherein it attempted to play anactive role in the political as well as economic field, with a view to contributing torestore order in post-Vietnam War era.

1. Japan’s response to Cambodian problem
The Japanese government had maintained a cordial relationship with Cambodia
even though its relationship with the Free World, including the U.S., worsened in the
1960s. A paper prepared by the Southeast Asian Section of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA) in 1968 stated that they believed it was in the interest of the Free World
for Japan to hold a friendly relation with Cambodia as one of few pipelines between
Phnom Penh and the Western countries. The same paper suggested Japan should
consider the possibility of using Cambodia to promote peace in Vietnam5.
By early 1969, the importance of Cambodia as a sanctuary and as a transit
point for supplies for the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the North Vietnameseincreased significantly. The Nixon administration made a decision to resume diplomatic
relations with Cambodia in July 1969 and dispatched a Charge d’affaires to Phnom
Penh in September in the same year. On March 18, 1970, General Lon Nol andSisowath Sirik Matak ousted Sihanouk while the Prince was in Paris. From the outset,
the United States sought to bolster the new regime and sought for international support
for the new Cambodian government.
4

Airgram from Embassy Tokyo to Department of State, Subject: Japan’s Evolving Role inSoutheast Asia, May 18, 1971, Box 2401, National Archives, College Park, MD (hereafter, NA).
5
Nantou ajia ka “Kanbodia mondai (nichiei teiki kyougi shiryo)” [First Southeast Asia Division,“Cambodian problems (Paper for regular consultation between Japan and the UK)”] January 6, 1968,
Nihon eikokukan gaiko kankei nichiei teikikyougi kankei dairokukaikankei kaidan kankei, [Files
related to Japan-UK diplomatic relations, Regular consultation between Japan and the UK, the 6th
Meeting], Copies of documents obtained through Freedom of Information Act, collection of
Diplomatic Record Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Tokyo, (hereafter, FOIA, Diplomatic Record
Office).

3

Two days after the “coup,” the Japanese government expressed its view that the
new government of Cambodia was considered to be established through a legitimate
procedure based on its constitution; thus, it was not required to renew her recognition of
Cambodia. 6
The turmoil in Cambodia and infiltration by NLF and North Vietnamese into its
territory were an issue of serious concern for the Southeast Asian leaders. At the 26th
ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) Meeting held in Bangkok on
April 14 1970, the topic of the restoration of peace in Indochina, including Cambodia,
was brought up. At this meeting, foreign Ministers Aichi Kiichi of Japan, Adam Malikof Indonesia, and Thanat Khoman of Thailand agreed to make efforts toward restoring
peace in the region.
At that moment, there were two possible means to realize this effort by Asian
nations.7 One was the Indonesian proposal for convening a meeting inviting a large
number of Asian countries to rally for peace in Cambodia; the other was the Japanese
proposal for having an ambassadorial consultation among five nations includingIndonesia, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan with an issuance of the appeal
for peaceful settlement of conflicts in whole Indochina region. Both the Japanese andIndonesian governments did not have the intention of competing for this initiative. Fromthe beginning, Tokyo asked Jakarta to take the initiative and host the consultation
meeting in Jakarta.
Later, the Japanese government decided to set aside its initial plans for smaller
five-nation consultations, and began to devote herself to supporting Malik’s idea andexpressing Japan’s views through that conference. This decision was made because
Malik’s plan had developed faster than was expected, and Tokyo sought to avoid
projecting an image that Japan and Indonesia were competing with each other for an
6

Asahi Shimbun, March 21, 1970.
In addition, France and New Zealand made a proposal for international conference respectively,
neither of which elicited limited support.

74

initiative to resolve the Indochina problem. 8
On May 9, the First Southeast Asian Division of the MOFA completed a paper
titled “Our Basic Attitude for the Conference.” The paper stated the following: (1) the
conference should reflect the views of the Asian countries as a whole, including those of
the nonparticipants; (2) it should emphasize the need for realistic and steady efforts forpeaceful settlement; (3) participants should make efforts to avoid projecting themselves
as confronting the communists and forming a group based on a particular political
position. Regarding the concrete problems, the paper pointed out that the participants
should ensure that the conference would not result in the endorsement of any collective
military action, including the right to collective self-defense. It also suggested that theyshould not condemn or support the action of any specific country or administration,
including the Lon Nol administration, North Vietnam, NLF, or the U.S.9
The Jakarta Conference was held on May 16 and 17, 1970. The participants
included foreign ministers or their deputies, from Australia, Indonesia, South Korea,
Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, South Vietnam, andJapan. In his speech, Foreign Minister Aichi stated, “it is the first time that the countries
of Asia have gathered together in this way in the face of the danger to peace in Asia.
The common aspiration of the Asian peoples, namely, ‘Asian problems to be solved by
Asians’ has come to fruition in this memorable meeting.” He stressed that the meetingwas “one that should not seek to form a grouping based on a particular political position
much less a forum for criticism or confrontations.”10
The conference ended on May 17 with the communiqué that made the8

Saitou taishi hatsu gaimu daijin ate koden “Indoshina mondai ni kansuru apiru” [Telegram fromAmbassador Saito to Foreign Minister, Joint Appeal for Indochina problems (Offering my opinion)]
April 25, 1970, FOIA, Diplomatic Record Office.
9
Nanto ajia daiichi ka “Kaigi ni nozomu waga kuni no kihonteki taido” [First Southeast Division,“Our country’s basic attitude toward the Conference”] May 9, 1970, a document obtained from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Freedom of Information Act (hereafter, FOIA, MOFA); Nanto
ajia daiichi ka “Ajia kaigi” [First Southeast Asia Division, “Asian Meeting”, February 3, 1970],
FOIA, Diplomatic Record Office, Tokyo..
10
Statement by Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi at the Jakarta Conference, FOIA, MOFA.

5following appeals: (1) all foreign forces be withdrawn from the territory of Cambodia;(2) all parties respect the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, and territorial integrityof Cambodia and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of that country; (3) theInternational Control Commission (ICC) be reactivated; (4) the participants of the 1954
Geneva Conference and all other interested parties come together to consult each otherin order to arrive at a consensus about the early convening of an international
conference.
This was almost in line with Japan’s moderate position vis-à-vis the
Cambodian problem despite some differences in the attitudes of the participants.
Initially, countries such as Thailand, South Vietnam, and South Korea hold hard line
positions, and they condemned the communists in their speeches. The drafts ofcommuniqué submitted by Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand included theestablishment of a standing committee. This was unacceptable for Japan, who fearedthat this would be perceived as an act of confronting the communists and forming apolitical bloc. 11 Due to the joint efforts by Japan, Indonesia, and Malaysia, theparticipants arrived at the consensus that the conference should moderately call forpeaceful settlement of the Cambodian problem and not directly condemn thecommunist.
The consequence of the Conference was successful from the Japanese point ofview. Aichi said that “I am 100% satisfied with the result of the Conference. I am
pleased that the principles which Japan has initially proposed were reflected to theCommuniqué” at the press conference after the ending ceremony. 12 At the Japanesechiefs of mission conference on Indochina held on May 27 in Hong Kong, Aichi briefed
Japanese Ambassadors in Southeast Asian nations on the Conference and added that the11

Nanto ajia daiichi ka “Ajia kaigi ni okeru kankeikoku tono nikokukan kyougi shiryo” [Papers forbilateral consultation with countries concerned for the Asian conference], May 13, 1970, FOIA,
MOFA.
12Asahi Simbun, May 18, 1970.

6Japanese Government was pleased with her role at the Conference and viewed it as“Japan’s post-war debut on world political stage.”13
The summary report of the Conference evaluated the result as successful
because Japan’s basic attitude vis-à-vis the Conference was fully carried out. It alsostressed that taking opportunity of this successful experience in the Conference; Japan
should depart from her traditional defensive stance and to take more active initiative inSoutheast Asian policy. 14(2) Japanese aid to Indochina
In 1969 and 1970, the Japanese Government clarified its intention to increase
its economic aid substantially. At the OECD Cabinet Meeting in May 1970, Minister ofTrade and Industry announced Tokyo prepared to devote 1% of its GNP—amounted inexcess of $3 billion—to foreign assistance by 1975. One Japanese official has referredto this move as “The beginning of the beginning.”15 This decision has enhanced Japan’s
economic contribution to Indochina countries.

1. Vietnams
Both Johnson and Nixon Administrations repeatedly urged Japan should givebilateral economic aid to the government of South Vietnam. To this, Tokyo hademphasized that they preferred aid to Asia in general and within a regional cooperative
framework comprising all the countries in Southeast Asia, which would eventually
include North Vietnam after a peaceful settlement was realized. A former chief of theFirst Southeast Division of the MOFA, Miyake Wasuke recalled that Japan limited its
13

Telegram from Consulate Hong Kong to Secretary of State, #2991, June 1, 1970, RG 59,
SNF,1970-1973, POL 7, Box 2401, NA.
14
Nanto ajia daiichi ka “Ajia kaigi” [First Southeast Asia Division, “Asian Meeting”, February 3,1970] FOIA, Diplomatic Record Office.
15
Briefing Book for the Secretary’s visit to Japan, July, 1970, Ishii Osamu, Gabe Masaaki, Miyasato
Seigen eds., America gasshukoku tainichi seisaku bunsho shusei dai15ki nichibei gaiko mondai 1970
nen dai110 kan (Tokyo: Kashiwa-shobo, 2004) [Documents on United States Policy toward Japan,
XI Documents Related to Diplomatic and Military Matters 1970 Vol.10], p.326.

7

economic aid to humanitarian aid in spite of strong pressure from the US Governmentso as to avoid projecting any image that Japan was cooperating with U.S. war efforts in
Vietnam. Thus, Japanese aid to South Vietnam after the start of American bombing toNorth Vietnam in 1965 was only given in the form or humanitarian and emergency
grant aid in a small amount.
After the President Johnson’s announcement of his decision to reduce air attacks
against North Vietnam, to attempt direct negotiations with the Communist side, and not
to seek reelection in March 1968, the MOFA prepared the following policy options in
the event of a realization of peaceful settlement: (1) the Japanese government would
actively support post-war reconstruction of both South and North Vietnam without
discrimination; (2) the Japanese government would participate in an international
conference on the Vietnam War settlement; and (3) the Japanese government would
send civilians to international truce supervision organization if established. In March
1970, Japanese Ambassador to South Vietnam remarked that aid to Vietnam had to beconsidered in the context of economic development of whole Indochina region. 16
With the Nixon Doctrine and progress in the Paris peace talks, Tokyo made adecision to resume yen loans to Saigon in the late 1970 for the first time since 1960.
Since then, the Japanese Government offered yen loan to South Vietnam in September
1971, in February and November 1972. Between 1968 and 1970, Japan’s assistance toSouth Vietnam averaged about $2 million per year, mainly for humanitarian purposes.
In 1971, assistance increased to $42 million: $16.8 million in grants and $25.2 million
in loans. In addition to the increase in size, the scope of the program now includes
development projects such as generating facilities, telephone system, etc.17
The decision to provide aid with South Vietnam was not only a response to
Nixon’s request, but also made in the context of Japan’s prospect for future contribution
16

Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Kitahara, Japanese Ambassador to South Vietnam
and Mr. Ray Cline, Director INR, March 24, 1970, Box 2401, NA.
17
Background Paper, August, 1972, NSC Files, VIP visits, Box 926, NA.

8to reconstruction and rehabilitation of whole Indochina region at the time of peacefulsettlement.

2. Cambodia
In addition to its efforts in the Jakarta Conference which was examined earlier
in this paper, Tokyo made a decision to provide some aid to Cambodia. As early as April
2, Sirik Matak contacted the Japanese Ambassador to Cambodia and requested theJapanese government’s aid. The initial reaction of the Government of Japan wasfavorable but cautious due to the strong Japanese feeling against intervening in theinternal affairs of Cambodia. Before arriving at a decision, the Japanese government
requested the U.S. Government to share its views on this issue. 18 In response to theTokyo’s inquiry, Washington strongly encouraged Tokyo to respond favorably to the
Cambodian approach. A day after the Japanese foreign official approached U.S.
Embassy in Tokyo, the Department of State (DOS) instructed the U.S. Embassy inTokyo to convey a message to the Japanese government that the continuance andexpansion of Japanese aid to Cambodia was desirable. The DOS hoped that Japan
would also constructively influence other selected Asian countries such as Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Ceylon with respect to extending their political support and aid.19
At the June 2 meeting, the cabinet approved in principle a contribution of $2
million from a contingency fund to the Japan Red Cross (JRC) for purchasing
commodities to be supplied to the Cambodian Red Cross as “humanitarian assistance.”20
The decision of second round aid to Phnom Penh was approved by the Cabinet in theform of the grant of humanitarian assistance on November 20. This time, the aid totaling$2 million consisted of two parts: (1) $1.7 million would be provided through JRC
18

Telegram from AmEmbassy Tokyo to Secretary of State, #2395, Subject: Cambodians ask GOJ
for aid, April 7, 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970-1973, Box 515, folder AID (JAPAN) CAMB, NA.
19
Telegram from DOS, #51990, April 9, 1970, Subject: Cambodian Approach for Japanese aid, RG
59, SNF 1970-1973, Box 515, folder AID (JAPAN) CAMB, NA.
20
Telegram from AmEmbassy Tokyo to Secretary of State, #4012, June 3, 1970, Subject: Japan aid
to Cambodia, G 59, SNF 1970-1973, Box 515, folder AID (JAPAN) CAMB, NA.

9using funds from the contingency fund, which is primarily intended for domestic
disaster relief; (2) $0.28 million would be provided on a government-to-government
basis with funds from previous aid allocations to Cambodia. 21(3) Japan’s Normalization with North Vietnam
At the San Francisco Peace Conference of September 1951, the Japanese
government normalized relations with the Bao Dai government of Saigon, whileneglecting the existence of the Ho Chi Minh government of Hanoi. Consequently, thesettlement for wartime reparations was made only with the South Vietnamese
government. Just after the Johnson’s announcement in March 1968, the Foreign
Ministry began to seek a way to contact North Vietnam for future diplomatic
normalization22. In April this year, the Japanese Government permitted the entry of
citizens of DRV for the first time since 1965. In April 1970, the MOFA’s First Southeast
Asian Division completed a paper entitled “Our Country’s Basic Policy toward North
Vietnam” which stated “it is natural for us to expand our exchange and relations with
North Vietnam, paying careful attention to the positions of the U.S. and South Vietnam.
By doing so, we can prepare the ground for effective policies at the time of peace inVietnam, at which we will need to discuss with North Vietnam.”23 The same paper
suggested the Japanese Government should make it clear its intention to give economic
aid to North Vietnam as soon as peace was achieved in Indochina. It clarified Japan’sview that economically stable North Vietnam which can co-exist and cooperate withother Southeast Asian countries is extremely desirable to peace and stability of Asia.
The Japanese Government gave humanitarian aid through Japan Red Cross to North
21

Telegram from AmEmbassy Tokyo to Secretary of State, November 5, 1970, #8958, Subject:
Japanese aid to Cambodia, RG 59 Subject Numeric files 1970-73 Box 515, NA.
22 From the mid-1960s, the Japanese Government had attempted to contact with North
Vietnamese government officials in several cities such as Moscow, Vientiane and Paristo seek her role as peace broker between Washington and Hanoi.
23
Nanto ajia daiichika “Kita betonamu ni taisuru wagakuni no kihonteki sisaku (shiron)” [FirstSoutheast Asian Division, “Our Country’s Basic Policy toward North Vietnam”] (undated), FOIA,
MOFA.

10

Vietnam in 1971 and 1972 respectively.
Thus, the medium level foreign officials had taken the initiative in opening
communication channels between Japan and North Vietnam by early 1971. At that time,
however, there was no consensus in Foreign Ministry as to whether Tokyo should
initiate an official contact with Hanoi. Majority of officials insisted the time was notripe yet.
The turn of the tide came when President Nixon announced his trip to China inJuly 1971. 24 The President’s trip seriously undermined the basic principles on which
Japan’s Asia policy had been grounded since the San Francisco Peace Conference in
1952. Consequently, the “Nixon Shock” accelerated Japanese desire for conducting“autonomous diplomacy” generally, and reconsidering its Southeast Asia policy. The“Nixon Shock” changed the attitude of high-level foreign officials such as Chief of
Asian Affairs Bureau and Vice Minister toward Japan’s initiation of official contacts
with North Vietnam.
In November 1971, the Foreign Ministry made a proposal for establishingpermanent trade offices in Tokyo and Hanoi, and investigated the North Vietnamese
response through Consulate General of Hong Kong.25 At the same time, Tokyo looked
into the possibility of dispatching one or two foreign officials to exchange views on
promoting the economic relationship. The North Vietnamese government responded tothis proposal through the Japanese Embassy in Paris on January 5, 1972. The North
Vietnamese government basically agreed to exchange permanent trade representatives
and permitted Japanese foreign ministry officials’ entry into Hanoi.
From the Japanese Government’s perspective, opening windows to North
24

Ito Go analyzed the normalization process as an autonomous aspect of Japanese foreign policy
after the “Nixon Shocks.” Go Ito, Alliance in Anxiety: Détente and the Sino- American-Japanese
Triangle, (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp.122-130. I agree to Professor Ito’s analysis, whilestressing the continuity in Japan’s contact with North Vietnam from 1960s to the post-“Nixon
Shock” period.
25
The Secret Memorandum, for the President, January 14, 1972, General Records of Department ofState 1970-73, Box 2402,NA.

11

Vietnam would serve Japan in six different ways, by:26(a) Improving the Japanese Government’s ability to deal with both South andNorth Vietnamese in bringing peace to Indochina;(b) Establishing a cornerstone for future governmental relations when peace
has been achieved;(c) Providing an opportunity to discuss trade relations;(d) Providing an opportunity to impress upon North Vietnamese representatives
a more realistic assessment of the situation in Indochina and Asia;(e) Providing a device to counter domestic criticism that Japan’s policy toward
Indochina was one-sided (Tokyo believed that by broadening its approach andexpressing interest in North Vietnam it would also be able to cooperate morefor South Vietnam);(f) Enhancing Japan’s leverage in the post-war reconstruction program.

Two foreign officials visited Hanoi on February 8, 1972 by the invitation by the
Chamber of Commerce. Although it was ostensibly private, this was the first de facto
official visit to North Vietnam from Japan in the post-war era. The only agreement
reached in Hanoi was to continue exchange of visits in future.
After the peace agreement was signed in Paris between the U.S. and North
Vietnam in January 1973, the Japanese government decided to provide ¥1 million
emergency aid for refugees in Indochina, including North Vietnam. Tokyo alsoannounced that it would dispatch officials to Hanoi to exchange views for rehabilitation
aid.
The additional impetus for normalization came on February 2, when Foreign
Minister Ohira made the following points at the Diet:(a)The Japanese government recognizes that there is a government in Northern
Vietnam.
(b)The Japanese government admits that it was problematic that a former Cabinet
had arranged the wartime reparation agreement only with the South Vietnamese
government that did not represent the entire country.
26

Secret Telegram, January 13, 1972, General Records of Department of State 1970-1973, Box2402, NA.

12

(c)Hereafter, the Japanese government articulates its policy towards South Vietnam
with the recognition that it does not control the whole country.

This was the first time since 1951 that Tokyo changed its official position thatthe government of South Vietnam was the only legitimate government representing theentire Vietnam.
The Japanese government dispatched the second mission to Hanoi in April 1973.
This time, normalization was the central topic of the negations, along with economic
cooperation and exchange of personnel. Now there was no obstacle on the road toestablishing diplomatic relations between Japan and North Vietnam. However, due tothe continued skirmishes between the South and North Vietnam, the U.S. asked Japan to
wait until late July before starting normalization talks, because it could have a negative
impact on North Vietnamese compliance with the ceasefire. The U.S. also asked Japanto delay substantial economic aid to North Vietnam until after diplomatic relations were
established.27
The Japanese government had to wait until the U.S. and North Vietnam issued ajoint declaration for completion of a Paris peace agreement in mid June. Substantive
negotiations for establishing diplomatic relations took place on July 25 and August 14 at
the North Vietnamese Embassy in Paris. Both parties confirmed at these meetings thatthey did not have any serious problem in establishing diplomatic ties. After having
several working-level meetings, both countries reached agreement on September 18.
Three days later, Japanese Ambassador and the North Vietnamese Charge d’affaires toFrance exchanged notes for the establishment of diplomatic relations at the North
Vietnamese Embassy in Paris.

27

Secret Memorandum from Kissinger, July, 1973, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Security
Council Files, VIP Files, Box.927, NA.

13

2. Japan’s aspiration to play an active role in policymaking in the post-Vietnam
War era
The Japanese decision for the Jakarta Conference, aid to Indochina, andnormalization with Hanoi was attributed to Japan’s postwar policy toward Southeast
Asia. Japan’s policy or role in Southeast Asia in the early 1970s can be understood andappreciated after a brief review of it.
Japan has had a considerable interest in promoting stability and security inSoutheast Asia because the stability and prosperity of this region are clearly related toJapan.28 First, on the economic front, Southeast Asia is a major source of essential raw
material for Japan and a substantial market for Japanese manufactured goods, next to
the U.S. Second, the peace and stability of the sea-lanes in Southeast Asia is very
important for Japan’s economic security, because more than 80% of Japan’s oil imports
are from the Middle East and the transportation of 40% of its foreign trade occurs via
the Strait of Malacca and Lombok.
In terms of international politics, Southeast Asian countries play a crucial rolein enhancing Japan’s influence on the international society. Japan’s engagement in thisregion is welcomed not only by the Southeast Asian countries but also by the U.S. andEuropean countries. Thus, a strong relationship with Southeast Asian countries based onJapan’s contribution by means of Official Development Assistance (ODA) is afoundation of Japan’s international status. The talking points prepared for Japaneseprime minister’s visit to Southeast Asia in 1974 clearly stated, “Securing a foothold inSoutheast Asia is one factor to underpin the international reputation of our country, andour prestige will be lowered if the image that neighboring countries are turning theirback on us prevails.”29 Moreover, Japanese foreign officials stated that in many cases,
28

Chaiwat, “Japan’s Southeast Policy in the Post-Vietnam Era,” p.2.
Ajia-Kyoku, “Souri no Tounan Ajia Shokoku Houmonyou Hatsugen Shiryo” [Talking Points forPrime Minister’s Visit to Southeast Asia], Postwar Diplomatic Records, Prime Minister Tanaka’s
Visit to Southeast Asia (1974.1 ) （A’1-5-1-16）, Postwar Diplomatic Records, Diplomatic Record
Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo.
29

14

for Japan, Southeast Asia is like an “electoral district” for carrying out activities in theinternational society.30
In the wake of the war in Vietnam, Japan’s policy toward Southeast Asia was
riddled with difficulty. The then Sato Cabinet was under pressure to show its firm
support for U.S. efforts in Vietnam for the sake of Okinawa Reversion. However, thewar in Asia provoked more anxiety than confidence over the bilateral relationshipamong the Japanese general public. 31 Foreign officials of the Asian Bureau shared theview that the conflict in Vietnam was essentially a fight for national independence, andthat Ho Chi Minh was not so much a communist as a nationalist. A paper prepared by
the Asian Bureau immediately after the incidents in the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin proposedthat the Japanese government support Vietnam in so far as it would develop as a state
led by nationalist leaders even if it had a left-leaning government. The paper alsosuggested that Japan play a significant role in maintaining a stable equilibrium inSoutheast Asia under the power vacuum after the U.S. withdrawal. 32
Foreign Minister Miki Takeo, known as a liberal and a rival of Sato, also
advocated the idea that Japan would play a role as a mediator. In May 1967, Miki said at
the Foreign Policy Committee of the House of Representatives, “The Japanese
government doesn’t have diplomatic ties with Hanoi, but there are still ways to work
toward ending the War, such as contacting it through third countries.” In his foreign
policy address to the Diet in January 1968, Miki made his idea clearer by saying:

Japan is now being expected to contribute to the settlement of the Vietnam War in
two ways. First, as an U.S. ally that remains outside of military commitment,
30

Ajia kyoku chiiki seisakuka, Showa 49 nendo ajia taiheiyou chiiki kaigi gijiroku [Asian Bureau,
Regional Policy Section, FY 1974, Minutes of the Conference of Ambassadors to Asia-PacificRegion] October 1974, FOIA, MOFA.
31
By 1973, only 18 percent of those polled listed America as their favorite foreign country, which
was the lowest point since 1945. See, Thomas Haven, Fire Across the Sea: The Vietnam War andJapan 1965-1975, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1987), p.4.
32
Nanto ajia ichika “Indoshina mondai ni taisuru waga kuni no taido” [Our country’s position
vis-à-vis Indochina problems] September 9, 1964, FOIA, Diplomatic Record Office.

15

Japan can frankly advise the U.S. regarding its policy to Vietnam. Second, as an
Asian country, Japan is in a position to be able to help both North Vietnam andNational Liberation Front (NLF) understand the real intention of the U.S. I am notreluctant to consider contacting with the North Vietnamese Government for the
purpose of meeting these expectations.33

Against this background, Japanese foreign officials recognized that the Jakarta
Conference would provide a good opportunity for Japan to play an active role in the
post- Vietnam War era. Japanese Ambassador to Thailand and former chief of Asian
Bureau, wrote in April 1970 that although Japan has occasionally declared its readinessto participate in any effort for resolving Indochina issues, it did not receive an
opportunity to do so, except for dispatching special envoys overseas. He stated thatJapan’s participation in the Jakarta Conference was significant to assure its influence on
future Indochina problems; further, it corresponded with Japan’s new mission which
would accord with the Nixon Doctrine.34

3. Changing U.S. policy toward Asia and JapanThe Nixon administration strongly encouraged and fully supported theinitiative taken by the Japanese and Indonesian government in terms of Cambodian
turmoil and Japan’s decision to the provide aid to South Vietnam. Under the “Nixon
Doctrine”, Washington promoted self-sufficiency among U.S. allies in Asia, Latin
America, and Europe. Thus, from American perspective, Jakarta Conference wasregarded as a test case of “Asian problems solved by the Asians.”
Among Asian states, Washington expected Japanese to assume more
responsibilities in world affairs as one of the five poles along with the U.S., Western
33

Hosoya Chihiro ed. Nichibei Kankei Shiryoshu, (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku-Shuppankai,1992), p.738(Reference Material for U.S.-Japan Relations).
34
Ushiroku taishi hatsu gaimu daijin ate koden, “Indoshina mondai ni kansuru Ajia Kaigi” April 21,
1970 [Telegram from Ambassador Ushiroku to Foreign Minister, Subject: Asian Conference on
Indochinese problems, Telegram from Thailand No.720], FOIA, Diplomatic Record Office.

16

Europe, Soviet Union, and China. The NSSM 5 stated that “if Japan is going to limit its
defense spending to one or at most two per cent of GNP, and if it is going to continue toamass large surpluses in its foreign trade, especially with the US. Then it becomes amatter of major concern that Japan takes a more helpful position in assisting the nationsof non-communist Asia with their economic development.”35 Japan’s contribution to
the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Southeast Asian region in the post-Vietnam
War era was considered to be extremely significant and was given considerable weight
age as a response to the U.S. request in the context of the Nixon Doctrine.
Japanese leaders fully understood America’s expectation and clearly statedtheir intention to respond to it. Then Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi wrote in the article
published in Foreign Affairs, that “clearly Japan can no longer be a passive agent ininternational affairs, particularly since economic power has become, in the eyes of theworld, political power. The United States, for example, which objects to what it
considers continuing restrictions on foreign access to Japanese markets, has raised thismatter to the proportions of a major political issue.”36 He also said that in the context of
Nixon Doctrine, “Japan seems now to have become highly visible to Americans as an
Asian power with the potential for contributing to the security of the region.”37(1) America’s reaction to the Jakarta Conference
Thus, from the American point of view, Japan’s contribution to the Jakarta
Conference and aid to Cambodia were praised as a good example of following the
Nixon Doctrine.

35

Memorandum for Office of the Vice President, Office of the Secretary of State, Officeof the Secretary of Defense, and Office of the Director of Emergency Preparedness,
Subject: NSSM 5: Japan Policy, April 28, 1969, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic,
Security and Economic Relations, 1960-1976 [microfiche] Document 1061 (Bell &Howell Information and Learning; National Security Archive, 2000), (hereafter, NSA).
36
Kiichi Aichi, “Japan’s legacy and destiny of change,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48 Issue 1,
October 1969, p.30.
37
Ibid., p.31.

17

On April 22, the DOS sent telegram to Ambassador Meyer in Japan that said“you should follow up at high level approach, presenting our view that prompt andencouraging Japanese response may be vital to continued maintenance Cambodian
neutrality and territorial integrity. Recent activity in Tokyo, Djakarta, Bangkok
concerning possible high-level Asian meeting to seek Indo-China solution may be
useful as immediate morale booster to Lon-Nol government.38 Subsequently, at themeeting of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) on April 24th, Kissinger
stressed that Nixon “wants a major diplomatic effort to get others to dosomething—Japanese, Indonesia,” and added that “he (Nixon) wants a proposal within
24 hours for the maximum encouragement to other countries.” Based on the
Washington’s instruction, Ambassador Meyer met with Prime Minister Sato on the same
day and stressed need for urgent action regarding Cambodia. 39 Meyer noted Sato’s callfor “Pacific Age” in last November in Washington and said this would be a good test
case. He asked expeditious action regarding Asian conference.
The United States did not expect the projected conference to bring peace toCambodia immediately. But it saw two important benefits that might emerge from it: thecreation of a neutral observer group to replace the defunct ICC in Cambodia, and afollow-up mechanism for continuing consultation among the conference participants.
Not wanting to be seen a influencing this conference of Asian nations, the United States
nevertheless made its views known behind the scenes.40
After the Conference, President Nixon highly evaluated the Japanese andIndonesian initiative for the Jakarta Conference by stating that the Conference was “aneffective effort made collectively to maintain Cambodian independence and neutrality”.
He went on to say that the Conference was one of the best things which had occurred
38

Telegram from DOS to Embassy Tokyo #599905, Subject: Japanese Aid to Cambodia, April 22,
1970, RG 59 Subject Numeric files 1970-73, (AID JAPAN CAMB) Box 515, NA.
39
Telegram from AmEmbassy Tokyo to Secretary of State, # 2933, April 24, 1970, Subject: Sato’s
help requested re Cambodia, RG 59, SNF 1970-1973, Box 515, folder AID (JAPAN) CAMB, NA.
40
Kenton Clymer, The United States and Cambodia, 1969-2000: a troubled relationship (London:
Routledge Curzon, 2004), p.35.

18

recently. Nixon expressed his view that conceivably, the diplomatic impact of thisconference might also have a restraining influence on the North Vietnamese and on theSoviets, who in contrast to the Chinese appeared to want an international conference on
Indochina.41
At the Chiefs of Mission Conference held in Tokyo in July 1969, Secretary
Rogers and other diplomats discussed that “While Japan’s political influence has not
kept pace with its economic growth, there are signs that this is beginning to change as aresult of the changing national mood. Japan’s Jakarta Conference role is illustrative….
We must work out a division of labor with Japan for our mutual goal of a stable anddeveloping East Asia. We cannot twist Japan’s arm as much as before. Project mustcommend themselves to the Japanese, and preferably be of Japanese inspiration”. 42
With regard to Japanese initiative, an Embassy officer in Tokyo wrote in thetelegram sent to the DOS that “Japan’s initiative with the Thais, Indonesians-and othersin bringing about the recent Jakarta Conference concerned with Cambodia, andsubsequent follow-up efforts may have been a watershed in Japan’s own view of its
political role and acceptability in the region, going beyond the forcefully defended but
essentially moderate attitudes displayed at Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC)
gathering.”43 The same telegram stated that “during the Occupation and immediate
post-Occupation period, Japan did not participate in most international gatherings
including those of a specifically Asian nature, e.g., the Geneva Conferences on Korea
and Southeast Asian problems. Thereafter, the Japanese attended with varying degree of
passivity international and regional gatherings, usually without leaving much specificJapanese imprint on the activities or conclusions of these efforts. The Jakarta
Conference signaled a third phase wherein the Japanese are now prepared to take41

Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting. Washington, June 15, 1970, Foreign
Relations, 1969–1976, Volume VI, p. 1060.
42
Airgram from Department of State to all East Asian Embassies, ConGen Hong Kong, CA-3861,
July 20, 1970, Subject: Chiefs of Mission Conference Report, Document 1302, NSA.
43
Airgram from AmEmbassy Tokyo to DOS, A-659, Subject: Japan and the Region in the Future,
June 26, 1970, Document 1290, NSA.

19

initiatives and assume leadership with others in efforts to achieve and defend a
consensus on Asian problems.”
From American point of view, the cooperation between Japan and Indonesia
was a kind of ideal form to solve Asian problems by the Asians. President Nixon saw
Indonesia as a key country in Southeast Asia, not just because of its size, but because it
could serve as a counterweight to Chinese influence in the area.44(2) American Reaction to Japanese aid to Indochinese countries
Japan’s contribution to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Southeast Asian
region in the post-Vietnam War era was considered as a major area where Japan could
contribute to as a response to America’s request in the context of Nixon Doctrine.
Actually, President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers urged Sato and Aichi that Japan
should contribute in this field. For example, talking points prepared for Nixon’s meetingwith Sato in November 1969 stated that “without a much greater degree of Japaneseparticipation, it will be difficult to get aid appropriations through Congress” and in thisconnection, the same paper suggested that Nixon should stress to Sato that he hopes andexpects Japan to increase its assistance to Asia particularly for post-war reconstructionof Vietnam through direct government aid.45
The Japanese decision to provide economic aid with South Vietnam andCambodia were partly motivated by the America’s request at the summit meeting with
Sato and Nixon in 1969 and 1970.

(3) American Reaction to Japan’s Normalization with North Vietnam
The Johnson Administration allowed or even encouraged Japan to develop achannel with neutral and communist countries in pursuit of peace in Vietnam. However,44

Summary, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972 online
version.
45
Memorandum for Kissinger from John Holdridge, November 16, 1960, Document 1164, NSA.

20

Washington had made it clear that any settlement must be based on “America’s positionof strength.”46 Therefore, after the direct channel was opened in the form of secret talks
between Henry A. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho in 1970, the U.S. attitude towards
Japan-North Vietnam ties became cautious. Recognizing American uneasiness, theJapanese Foreign Ministry immediately began consulting with Washington at both
middle and high levels after receiving Hanoi’s response of accepting Japanese foreign
officials in January 1972.
The reaction from the U.S. government was generally very negative to Japan’s
decision of initiating contacts with North Vietnam. Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson
expressed two concerns. First, wouldn’t Hanoi take Japan’s overture as a sign of North
Vietnam’s growing international prestige at this crucial stage of the war? The Japanese
mission in Hanoi, however carefully launched, would give propaganda advantages to
the North Vietnam. This could negatively affect the development of talks in Paris.
Second, the timing of Miyake’s visit to Hanoi was awkward, since it overlapped with
Nixon’s visit to Beijing. From their perspective, this Japanese gesture was most likely tohave negative impact on the U.S. position at the bilateral meeting.
Eventually, the date of the visit was changed lest it should conflict with thetiming of Nixon’s visit to Beijing. The only agreement reached in Hanoi was to continue
exchange of visits in future. Just after this visit, Japanese Foreign Minister assured the
U.S. that Japan would not stray far from the U.S. foreign policy objectives. The reactionof the U.S., however, remained negative towards Japan’s efforts to improve relations
with North Vietnam. The briefing paper and scope paper prepared for Kissinger’s trip toJapan in June 1972 clearly stated as follows:

While North Vietnam continues its aggressions in Laos, Cambodia, andSouth Vietnam, we would strongly prefer that Japan keep its economic and official
46

Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997), p.194.

21

relations at minimum. We hope that the Japanese Government will not allow
Hanoi to establish a permanent trade mission in Japan while hostilities continue.
We remain actively interested in the question of Japanese credits to North Vietnam
and in what channels will be used for payment of trade balances. The Japanese
Government has been willing to express views to the North Vietnamese thatparallel our own on such matters as POWs, a peaceful settlement, and the situation
in South Vietnam, but we should make clear that we can do without this Japanese
middle-man tactic aimed at improving Japan’s relations with Hanoi for otherends.47

It was obvious that the U.S. government did not want Japan to take a role ofmediator between itself and North Vietnam, which was not the case before 1968 when
Paris peace talks started. As to the improvement of bilateral relations between Tokyoand Hanoi, Washington had never encouraged it, and that position was made clearerhere.

4. The growth in self-confidence and the sense of regionalism among Asian nations
The Jakarta Conference was considered as a significant event in terms of thedevelopment of regionalism because it marked the first time that the noncommunist
governments of East Asia, from Japan to Australia and New Zealand, met together todiscuss and adopt recommendations on Asian security problem without the presence of
the U.S., Great Britain, France, or the Soviet Union.48 Kenneth T. Young argued that
this participation reflected a growing convergence of views between the Japanese andthe Southeast Asians on certain political questions. They had come to share, for example,
a similar emphasis on nonmilitary growth and balanced modernization throughout

47

Memorandum for Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, The White House, April 10,1972, National Security
Council Files; Henry A. Kssinger Office File, Box21, National Archives, College Park, MD;
Memorandum for NSC Secretariat, The White House, May 27, 1972, National Security Council
Files; Henry A. Kssinger Office File, Box21, NA.
Scope Paper, Visits of Henry A. Kissinger to Japan, June 1972, NSC Files: Henry A. Kissinger
Office Files: Box22, NA.
48
Young, “The Involvement in Southeast Asia”, p.176.

22

Asia.49
Just before the Jakarta Conference, Ambassador Ushiroku, argued that thenotion of the Southeast Asian or Asia-Pacific region had taken root as a subregion
beyond the difference in domestic political system and political ideology, due to thedevelopments of regional frameworks such as Association of southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN), ASPAC, Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO),
and the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia. 50 He
stated that this subregion is economically and geographically the most reasonable andsubstantial rather than those of the non-aligned groups, which had lost their influence.
He also remarked that it was natural for the subregion to raise its own voice with regard
to political problems that solicit its interest.
The fact that the Conference was conducted through cooperation between
Japan and Indonesia illustrated that Tokyo’s will to become more politically involved in
Asian problems was accepted and welcomed by the regional countries. The MOFA
paper attributed the success of the Jakarta Conference to the fact that Asian countries
welcomed and expected Japan’s initiative in political matters. The paper also stated thatJapan’s effort in the conference was highly evaluated by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,and the Philippines. 51 Particularly, Japanese fully supported the position of Indonesianas a chairman of the Conference and worked jointly to moderate the hard-lining positionof some countries.
Thai foreign minister Thanat Khoman had stressed that Japan should raise its
voice in the field of international politics, let alone economics, and welcomed Japanese

49
50

Ibid.
Ushiroku taishi hatsu gaimu daijin ate koden, “Indoshina mondai” May 13, 1970 [Telegram fromAmbassador Ushiroku to Foreign Minister, Subject: international conference on Indochinese
problems, Telegram from Thailand to Foreign Minister, No. 784], Diplomatic Record Office, Tokyo.
51
Nanto ajia daiichi ka “Ajia kaigi” [First Southeast Asia Division, “Asian Meeting”, February 3,1970], FOIA, Diplomatic Record Office.

23

initiative. 52 Foreign Minister Malik said to Secretary Rogers that the Indonesian
Government is a sincere supporter of regional cooperation, active in ADB, ECAFE,
SEAMEC and ASEAN. The GOI is proud that it has been able to achieve some progressin this area. It is hoped that Japan will play a more prominent role in regional affairs astime goes on.53

Conclusion
The Japan’s decisions in the Jakarta Conference, increased aid to Indochinesecountries, and diplomatic normalization with North Vietnam were the cases that existing
Japan’s aspiration for active policy in Southeast Asia was realized in the form of policy
due to changing U.S. policy toward Asia and the growth among Asia nations ofconfidence and sense of regionalism. 54
The pursuit of peaceful settlement of the Indochina problems was made withina new framework of Japan’s policy toward Southeast Asia. It was not Japan’s
withdrawal from its compliance with the U.S. policy. Washington encouraged Tokyo tocontribute to peaceful efforts of the War, and the shift of America’s Asian policy moved
Japan to promote its willingness to take a role in political issue in Southeast Asian
region. However, without their own desire for taking an active role in the region,
combined with growing nationalism and increasing domestic anti-Vietnam War
sentiment, the Japanese government would not attempt to conduct vigorous policies
toward Southeast Asia.
52

Ushiroku taishi hatsu gaimu daijin ate koden, “Indoshina mondai” April 21, 1970 [Telegram fromAmbassador Ushiroku to Foreign Minister, Subject: Indochinese problems, Telegram from Thailand
No. 658]; Ushiroku taishi hatsu gaimu daijin ate koden, “Indoshina mondai ni kansuru Ajia Kaigi”
April 21, 1970 [Telegram from Ambassador Ushiroku to Foreign Minister, Subject: Asian
Conference on Indochinese problems, Telegram from Thailand No.720], FOIA, Diplomatic Record
Office.
53
Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, July 29, 1969,
Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972, p.576.
54
Aichi, “Japan’s Legacy and Destiny of Change,” p.29.

24

During the period of the Vietnam War, Japan’s Southeast Asian policy clearly
evolved from the previous policy toward the region based upon the economic assistanceand the strong American security commitments, to the one of playing a political role insecuring stability of the region. This also means Japan’s desire for “autonomous
diplomacy” which had existed throughout the post-war period, was eventually formed
as a policy. Japanese policymakers recognized that Nixon’s new policy in Asia created afavorable environment for Japan in which they could diplomatically articulate a thoughtthat was rather “autonomous” from if not “independent” of the American Cold War
thought.
The Japanese Government made clear that they had a desire to articulate“bridge-building diplomacy”, which was to mediate Asia and the West as well as Free
Southeast Asian countries and communist Southeast Asian countries.
This policy lines survived the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and wereformalized in the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977. The Fukuda Doctrine made clear that Japan
would do its best to consolidate relationships of mutual confidence and trust with
Southeast countries based on “heart-to-heart” understandings, and that Japan would
become an equal partner of ASEAN while aiming at fostering mutual understanding
with the nations of Indochina.

25

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