Introduction to CrossNational Time-Series
and other data
Statistical analysis of secondary
data sources: Introduction tocross-national time series
Oct 7, 2020
Isamu Okada

SocioeconomicInstitutional

Ø Population
Ø Identity
Ø Education
Ø HealthØ Transportation
Ø Communication
infrastructureØ Economic level & growthØ TradeØ State capacity
Ø Government revenue &expenditureØ Political regimeØ Party systemØ Electoral results
Ø Constraints on
executives (veto points)

Behavioral
Ø Perception
Ø PreferenceØ Identification
Ø Experience

OthersQuantitative data in categories

Banks, Arthur S., Wilson,Kenneth A. 2020. CrossNational Time-Series Data
Archive. Databanks
International. Jerusalem,Israel; see
https://www.cntsdata.com/

CNTS data (Arthur Banks’)

14

12

demonstrations
andingeneralstrikesinA series of Anti-government“domestic conflict”
events reported
New YorkTimes.
Counted by country-year Argentina (1919-2012)
Original sources attached as a supplement

10864219
119 9
219 1
219 3
219 5
219 7
219 9
319 1
319 3
319 5319 7
319 9
419 7
419 9519 1
519 3
519 5
519 7
519 9
619 1
619 3619 5619 7
619 9719 1
719 3
719 5
719 7
719 9819 1
819 3819 5819 7819 9
919 1
919 3
919 5
919 7
920 9020 1020 3020 5020 7020 9
110

Conflict event data

Papers citing CNTS data
2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

A series of “domestic conflict” events reported in New York Times.
Counted by country-year
Original sources attached as a supplement
7060

50403020100

03 052013 Schatzman (to/d)

22/3/05

10:53 amPage 291© 2005 Journal of Peace Research,
vol. 42, no. 3, 2005, pp. 291–310
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CAand New Delhi) http://jpr.sagepub.com
DOI 10.1177/0022343305052013

Political Challenge in Latin America: Rebellion andCollective Protest in an Era of Democratization*
CHRISTINA SCHATZMAN
Department of Political Science, University of New Mexico
Democratization is expected to quell violent political challenge while opening channels for nonviolent
opposition. By offering the opportunity for revolutionary groups to promote their interests and seekchange without recourse to violence, democracies are expected to stifle violent opposition with inclusion. Yet, revolutionary groups have continued to threaten governments throughout the 1980s and1990s, a period marked by extensive democratic opening. Meanwhile, democracy is tied to the mobilization of civil society, opening channels for nonviolent challenge to government, arguably increasing instability, especially in the short term. Using a negative binomial event-count model on a pooled
cross-sectional sample of 18 Latin American countries for the period 1980–93, this article examines theeffects of an array of theoretical determinants on occurrences of violent rebellion and nonviolent collective protest. For rebellion, some traditional expectations are supported, including the role of state capacity
and repression, although social development is also identified as an important determinant. For collective protest, repression exerts a demobilizing influence, as expected. Of primary interest, democracy
significantly impacts both rebellion and collective protest, although its effect is surprising: increasing
democracy promotes violent rebellion while quelling protest overall in the time period under analysis,
supporting work suggesting a continuation of political challenge despite recent democratization.

Introduction
Aboard the Fokker-50, Colombian rebels
brandishing semi-automatic machine gunsof the National Liberation Army (ELN) and
the Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia (FARC), in April 1999. Compli-

RQ: Were rebellion and collective protest
affected by political opening during thetransition to democracy in Latin America?
Unit of analysis: country year (1980 to 1993)

Source: Peru.com

Schatzman 2005Dependent variables = target of explanation

Riots
General strikes
Demonstrations
Assassinations
Guerrilla wars
Rebellions

F1
ProtestFactor analysis

Six variables available in CNTS dataset

Schatzman 2005

F2

Rebellionhypothesis

F1
Protest

F2

Rebellion

Level of democracy(Polity IV score)

Peasants’subsistence(caloric intake)

Middle-class living
conditions(unemployment)

Economic crisis(1% > GNP growth/c)Inequality(Gini coefficients)

Government efficacy(HDI, gov
expenditure/GDP)

Repression(repression ofhuman rights)

US influence(aid from & tradewith US)Corruption(Political Risk Serviceindex)

Schatzman 2005

F1
Protest

F2

Rebellion

Schatzman 2005

18 countries x
14 years = 252 cases

Dependent variable

Negative binomial model
R package MASS
Function glm.nb

F1
Protest

F2

Rebellion

Schatzman 2005

Results
Collective protests are likely tohappen and increase when

Lower level of democracy, less repression
Rebellions are likely to happen andincrease when

Higher level of democracy, lower HDI, lower state capacity, more
repression

Schatzman 2005

Advantages of CNTS
Domestic conflict data

Long-term macro data

• CNTS collects six
different types ofdomestic conflict
event-count datafrom New York Times• CNTS collects andmerges numerous
socioeconomic andinstitutional data fromother data sources

Disadvantages of CNTS
Domestic conflict data
in more detail• The larger the scope, theharder would be its
interpretation.
• Domestic conflict data isavailable alternatively.

The more credible areprimary sources.
You may be able to findmissing data in othersources (and vice versa).
• Intl organizations, governments,NGOs• Websites, annual and special reports• Survey archives• Books•••••Start with good RQ & hypothesis
Check what previous literature uses
Check multiple sources
Elaborate correct measurement
Report results from multiple
sources and measurements

Main Points

Thank You!
You may want to find other data
sources here
https://www2.gsid.nagoyau.ac.jp/blog/isamuokada/researc
h-data-links/