G-SEC WORKING PAPER No.7
Techniques for Raising the Intellectual
Productivity of Meetings— Preliminary considerations focusing
on utterances and their linkage —Haruo Takagi * and Takeshi Sato **April, 2006

Abstract
Meetings fulfill an important function in corporate management, and how to raise theintellectual productivity of meetings is a critical factor. At the same time, though, theintellectual productivity of meetings is difficult to ascertain, and for this reason more
devices are needed in the methods of running meetings. Previous research by the authors
has detected at experimental meetings the “inconclusive transition” phenomenon in which
discussion on a given topic will shift to the next topic without reaching a certain agreement
as a factor affecting the level of intellectual productivity. Providing a theoretical base to this
discovery, this paper gives preliminary consideration for developing techniques for raising
the intellectual productivity of meetings. First, to explore techniques that can focus on
utterances and their linkage, we give theoretical consideration to how people perceive this.
Next we establish working hypotheses regarding methods of raising meeting productivity.
Lastly, we view a video recording of actual meetings to test the working hypotheses, andprepare for empirical research.

* Graduate School of Business Administration, Keio University** Graduate School of Management, GLOBIS University©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Sato

Techniques for Raising the Intellectual Productivity of Meetings— Preliminary considerations focusing on utterances and their linkage —Haruo Takagi, Professor
Graduate School of Business Administration, Keio University

Takeshi Sato, Professor
Graduate School of Management, GLOBIS University

Abstract
Meetings fulfill an important function in corporate management, and how to raise the intellectual
productivity of meetings is a critical factor. At the same time, though, the intellectual productivity ofmeetings is difficult to ascertain, and for this reason more devices are needed in the methods ofrunning meetings. Previous research by the authors has detected at experimental meetings the“inconclusive transition” phenomenon in which discussion on a given topic will shift to the next topic
without reaching a certain agreement as a factor affecting the level of intellectual productivity.
Providing a theoretical base to this discovery, this paper gives preliminary consideration fordeveloping techniques for raising the intellectual productivity of meetings. First, to explore techniquesthat can focus on utterances and their linkage, we give theoretical consideration to how people
perceive this. Next we establish working hypotheses regarding methods of raising meetingproductivity. Lastly, we view a video recording of actual meetings to test the working hypotheses, andprepare for empirical research.

1©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Sato

1.

Improving intellectual productivity of meetings and the aims of this paper
Meetings fulfill an important function in corporate management. As information is shared

among participants, more information is created, and decisions are made. It goes without saying thatthe value of meetings depends on the level of the intellectual productivity.
Meetings are held with the hope that decision making will be better if participants exchange
their respective views and creatively stimulate each other rather than have one person consider theissue and make a decision. Certainly, there are conclusions reached at meetings that nobody hadenvisaged before the meeting and that cannot be reduced back to the thoughts or opinions of individual
participants. If such conclusions can be achieved, we can say the meeting where they are achieved iscreative.
Of course, not all meetings have a creative aim; some are held simply to communicate
information, or to ensure that participants are fully conversant with the issues. Typical of these aremeetings for advising participants of their respective roles in already determined policies or plans, andmeetings that enable participants to confirm each other’s awareness of the issues. Or meetings inwhich colleagues whose work commitments make it hard to communicate with each other on a routine
basis set a time to sit down together and discuss various issues. Besides these, meetings are held forany number of diverse reasons and aims.
This paper focuses on meetings aimed at producing a creative conclusion, and these we willcall creative meetings. This kind of meeting requires a high level of intellectual activity from theparticipants, and productivity is critical. At the same time, though, the intellectual productivity ofmeetings is difficult to ascertain, and for this reason more devices are needed in the methods ofrunning meetings.
Here we will look at research to date broadly relating to decision-making. This research can beclassified into the following four categories: 1) research regarding the centralization anddecentralization of decision-making; 2) research regarding the setting of formal and informal decisionmaking procedures; 3) research regarding the quantity and quality of and ease of access to information
essential for decision-making; and 4) research regarding conflicts in decision-making. Of these, 4) isconnected with the nature of meetings, and its essence is research dealing with the emergence of bias
in collective decision-making. Representative of this is research into “groupthink”, in which themeeting becomes fixed in a specific direction if it is overly conscious about reaching a consensus(Janis, 1972), and research into the rise of political posturing over conclusions reached (Child, 1972).
This research provides definite guidelines on the nature of meetings in the sense of how to avoid bias.
There is, however, a scarcity of research that gives an insight into how to proceed withmeetings aimed at decision-making in a positive sense. In this light, Takagi (1994) stands out. This
research directly considers intellectual productivity at meetings focusing on the utterances exchanged2©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Satoand their linkage. A particularly important point is the detection at experimental meetings of the“inconclusive transition” phenomenon in which discussion on a given topic will shift to the next topic
without reaching a certain agreement as a factor affecting the level of intellectual productivity. That is,a tendency could be seen in which the higher the number of inconclusive transitions in a meeting, thelower the intellectual productivity, and vice versa. Certainly, meetings that move on to the next topic
leaving the previous topic ambiguous without adequate discussion cannot hope to reach top-quality
conclusions. Therefore employing some form of technique to prevent the uncontrolled emergence ofinconclusive transitions can contribute to raising the intellectual productivity of meetings. In otherwords, it is worth examining the effect of techniques to prevent the shift to a new topic without acohesive settlement of the utterances by the meeting participants on the previous topic.
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical base to this discovery, and give preliminary
consideration for developing techniques for raising the intellectual productivity of meetings. The
discussion will proceed in the following order. First, to explore techniques that can focus on utterances
and their linkage, we give theoretical consideration to how people perceive this. Next we establish
working hypotheses regarding methods of raising meeting productivity. Lastly, we view a video
recording of actual meetings to test the working hypotheses, and prepare for empirical research.

2. Distributed cognitions in meetings
Why do several people discuss an issue with each other and make a decision rather than one
person alone consider the issue and decide? Meetings are held at least on the premise that several
people can reach a better decision than one person deciding alone. There are limits to the extent ofknowledge that any one person has, and also to cognitive capacity. It is because of the potential tosupplement and extend the limited capacity of a single person that cooperative work, i.e. a meeting, isconducted.
Certainly from our everyday experiences we can often gain completely new perspectives anddiscover clues for solving problems by discussing things with other people. As we exchange words,
we can at times acquire a fresh perception completely different from the one we had before engaging
in the conversation. This is the perception that something new has been generated within theconversation, rather than a sense that one of the conversation participants is directing or instructing theother participants.
Why, then, can we have such an experience? We will look at this on the basis of the theory
known as distributed cognition. First, to briefly summarize the concept of cognition, it is a higher
brain function. It is a process of reasoning, judgment and memory. Since it is a brain activity, it is aprocess consummated within the individual. So whether an individual can make a superior decision3©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Sato

will depend on the capabilities and endeavors of that individual. Naturally character, capability andperspective differ from person to person. Some can perform a given task well, while others cannot.
Some are sharper than others in analyzing an issue, and some have outstanding powers of memory.
Many people use calculators when working with numbers. Or they work out calculations on
paper. Such calculation methods are actions of substituting a part of one’s own brain function with amachine, i.e. the calculator, or paper. This reduces the load on the brain cognition by substituting apart of it. This is true not just in calculation, but when we prepare a document, word processing
software on the computer is a substitute for cognition. That is, even if we do not remember every
single letter of every word, the word processing software is a substitute for this memory.
Cognition resources are not just machines, paper or software; people other than oneself arealso resources. As has already pointed out, ideas not previously thought of among conversation
participants can be generated in the course of the conversation, and this is an example of others beinga cognition resource. In this way, utilizing the surrounding environment for cognition is referred to as
distributed cognition (Salomon, 1993).
Here we will give slightly more consideration regarding distributed cognition focusing on
meetings. 1 First, all participants in a conversion bring to it their own different knowledge andcapability, so they are all able to make use of the knowledge and capabilities of other participants thatthey as individuals do not have. That is, they can supplement their cognition. What we need to notehere is that having information about the knowledge and capabilities that the others possess is acondition for being able to supplement cognition. Another condition is an accurate understanding ofwhat knowledge and capabilities are necessary regarding the issues being discussed.
Distributed cognition is not just mutually supplementing knowledge. There is much guided
stimulation - or better, qualitative scaffolding, whereby one partner activates, provides meaning to ,and possibly directs the cognitive activity of the other and thereby qualitatively changes the activity. 2
In a sense, cognition is supplemented at a quantitative dimension. People bring together theirknowledge and capabilities in an effort to enrich the knowledge and capabilities they believe they arelacking, and through this, improve their decision-making and problem-solving. So while the quantityof knowledge and capability brought to the discussion increases, this does not necessarily mean thatthe quality of the knowledge or capability itself changes. If five people participate in a discussion, theknowledge that can be shared by all will only ever be those five people’s worth of knowledge. It will
never be more than that.
In contrast, another possibility for distributed cognition is that the knowledge structure orcapability itself can be qualitatively changed. Stimulating each other to enhance the perspective of

1
2

Discussion on the characteristics of distributed cognition is based on Chapter 4 of Salomon (1993).
Salomon (1993) p.133.

4©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Satoothers or, conversely, urging others to change their perspective is not simply quantitatively
supplementing knowledge, but is actively giving rise to new perspectives.
In any event, through the joint intellectual activity of distributed cognition, people can resolve
problems and engage in creative activities that would be beyond the scope of one person acting alone.
Distributed cognition, though, is not all positive. Supplementing cognition is to substitute apart of one’s own intellectual activity, and this may result in a decline in specific capability. For
example, people who have become used to preparing documents on computer word processing
software could experience difficulty in spelling some words when actually writing by hand. This isbecause they have become dependent on the automatic correction or spell checking function of thesoftware. On the other hand, in distributed cognition that accompanies a qualitative transformation,that qualitative transformation is not always for the better. When there is intense pressure within ameeting to reach a consensus, the groupthink phenomenon mentioned earlier will rise to the surface. In
this phenomenon, there is no effort to develop the perspective of the individual, instead, theconversation proceeds in a way that suppresses each person’s diversity and creativity. Individuals arepressed to change their utterances and perspectives to a specific direction.
What, then, are the conditions necessary for invigorating creative meetings focused on in thispaper? In the next chapter we will use the distributed cognition we have discussed to date as a lead in
examining this.

3. Meeting creativity and self-organization
Kariyazono et al. (2001) researched cooperative problem-solving behavior based on theframework of distributed cognition. In the research, university students were picked as test subjects,
and four groups were formed each with five members. They were given fragmentary information, andinstructed to cooperate to solve a problem. Naturally, they exchanged their respective views in theprocess of solving the problem. This was an experiment in solving a problem with the group members
at times coming into conflict over interpretation of the given information. This is basically the same aswhat this paper has called a creative meeting. While it was an experiment and information was
controlled, to the subjects, this was an exercise in making a decision or solving a problem premised on
the given information, regardless of whether that information was controlled or not. This is because at
general meetings, not all information necessary for decision-making is available, and people makedecisions based on judgments and inferences formed from the limited information.
An important point indicated by the research by Kariyazono et al. (2001) is a “common
understanding” among participants. Common understanding is the condition of sharing the same levelof understanding, the same knowledge, and the same interpretation regarding the information. It points

5©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Satoout that without this common understanding, the conversation loses direction. That is, utterances
become ad hoc. Participants merely speak based on their own interpretation of the information theyeach possess, and if the phenomenon in which the understanding and acceptance of other participantscannot be gained continues, it becomes impossible to maintain the cohesion of the conversation, and,in turn, the meeting.
The research also highlighted that interaction increases when a common understanding isformed. As other participants give meaning to an utterance or clarify its standing within the meetingand this process is repeated, rules (how utterances are to proceed, the context) will be created for the
meeting. Rather than one person setting meeting rules, the repeated actions of participants taking ineach other’s utterances and affording value to those utterances give direction to how the meeting
proceeds.
Once meeting rules have been formed, interaction among participants increases. Whenutterances are made based on certain knowledge and information, other participants assess theutterances, or compare them with their own ideas. And participants are able to find out the knowledge
and perspective of the other participants. They also become aware of the kind of information needed toresolve issues that are currently relevant, and this will encourage the utterances of other participants.
Research by Kariyazono et al. (2001) dealt with the formation of common understanding andmeeting rules, but the research that addressed this from the perspective of self-organization is Takagi(1994) introduced earlier. It points out the following regarding the connection between the selforganization of meetings on the one hand and an increase of intellectual productivity and meeting
creativity on the other from observations of experimental meetings.
“Meeting participants constantly seek to change discussion formats that prescribe the mannerof their own activities, and conduct new discussions with a different format. If this self-organization
functions toward raising the intellectual productivity of the meeting, new perspectives and ideas in thetrue sense will be generated. If, conversely, it functions toward lowering intellectual productivity, themeeting will end in a state of confusion with nothing remaining but muddled perspectives andfragmented ideas. As for whether self-organization is creative or not, in both cases something is
generated so it is creative. But for intellectual productivity, the former mode of self-organization must
be realized.
Self-organization of a meeting is manifest in discussion on how debate will proceed, andforms a linkage of context topics. To achieve a truly creative meeting, participants at all times need toproperly recognize the discussion context, that is, the context topic of what is to be discussed and how,
and renew this through adjustment and modification. Sharing context by way of a new angle ordifferent perspective gained from this among participants, and through this, discussing and linking6©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Sato

new content topics will lead to the creation of the necessary new ideas. If self-organization manifests
in this direction, the intellectual productivity of the meeting will improve.” 3
Research by Takagi (1994) points out that the intellectual productivity of a meeting is higher
when the level of inconclusive transition is zero or low, that is, when self-organization proceeds with aproper recognition of the context topic (i.e., topic relating to the meeting format) with no confusion.
This does not mean that self-organization takes a predetermined direction. As mentioned
above, Takagi (1994) points this out in the fact that context topics change as they are adjusted.
Similarly, Kariyazono et al. (2001) points out that the kind of information that is focused on in thediscussion is determined extemporaneously according to the situation at that time.
What we should note here, though, is that all participants must understand the continuallychanging context within the meeting, and be conscious of this in their thinking and utterances. Failurein this respect will give rise to inconclusive transition, resulting in confused meeting self-organizationthat generates no creativity.

4. Self-organization conditions that can raise intellectual productivity
If participants in a meeting can maintain productive self-organization in the form of speaking
with an understanding of meeting format and any changes to it, they should be able to raise theintellectual productivity of the meeting. That is, it is worth focusing on inconclusive transition in thesense of preventing non-productive self-organization in which the meeting format is confused. This isbecause the fewer times topics are changed while remaining inconclusive, the deeper the discussion
becomes, increasing the possibility of generating new discoveries and perspectives from there. As
already pointed out in 3., from the framework of distributed cognition, it becomes possible to induce
utterances from each other, or modify the knowledge structure from a new viewpoint with theutterances of others as a steppingstone.
In this chapter, we will establish working hypotheses regarding factors for maintaining
productive self-organization in meetings, and confirm the working hypotheses through observation
experiments in the next chapter.
When viewing meetings as a scene of distributed cognition, what is first essential is conviction
among the participants that their collaboration will generate creative results.
If intellectual activity is premised as an activity of the individual and consummated within theindividual, the concern of the participants from the beginning to the end of the meeting is whether
their utterances are accepted by others, or not. Here, concern is given only to whether information andknowledge will move from the speaker to the listener, rather than to the notion that something new
3

Takagi (1994) p.57.

7©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Sato

will be generated through the mutual exchange of opinions. When people who embrace such a premise
participate in a meeting, they spend more time on inward reflection than on responding with interest to
the utterances of other participants (e.g., listen and be convinced, or present a counter argument).
On the other hand, if the meeting is premised on the mutual sharing of as many viewpoints
and perspectives or as much information as possible, participants will most likely to engage in active
discussion.

Conditions for meetings to be productively self-organized:[1] Participants have a common understanding that intellectual activity (cognition) will be creative
through collaboration.
There may be a meeting that gives priority only to novelty in an effort to present many
viewpoints and perspectives or much information, possibly resulting in utterances that are out ofcontext or that completely disregard timing. Feedback on these utterances can hardly be expected fromother participants. Feedback is an action that gives value to an utterance. Value, however, is somethingthat is not given beforehand. It forms gradually with the linkage of utterances, and becomes thestandard for judging whether the utterances contribute to resolving the issues that are the theme of themeeting. But there is no way of knowing beforehand what kind of information or knowledge will be
useful in problem solving. So there is a need to judge the situation and set judgment standards frommoment to moment during the meeting. If, though, uniformity of judgment standards isoveremphasized, there is a risk that establishing and agreeing on judgment standards will become thefocus, and problem solving — the primary aim of the meeting — will diverge from the topic core. For
example, if undue focus is given to the framework under which discussion is to proceed, thediscussion may not advance, and this is considered to be a phenomenon caused by a preoccupation
with the coherence of judgment standards or formal logic.

[2-1] Formulate standards for giving value to the utterances of others.
[2-2] Value standards are changed according to the situation.
[3] Speak in accordance with the context that arouses in the course of carrying out 2.
The context in a meeting, i.e., format, will be self-organized. Although there are cases where
someone will impose the meeting format on others, there are also more than a few cases where theformat will be devised and will emerge from within utterances between each other. So there is a needfor participants to discuss with each other, even though initially it may seem like fumbling away in thedark, until the context becomes clear. For example, even though the leader may try to form the context,
if that person cannot convince the other participants to accept that context, it will not function as acontext. It is therefore necessary to continue the conversation until the context is formed. What wemust note here is that context functions to give value to utterances, and at the same time, also8©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Sato

functions as a map showing the kind of content (content of utterances) that is the topic of discussion.
So without context, there is a possibility that participants may no longer be aware of the direction theconversation is headed. All participants therefore need a map to confirm what the current topic is.

[4] Share the map that enables context cognition.
If there is a context-related cognitive map, using this will enable judgment to be made onwhether the necessary information is available or not. It will also identify the information that islacking. With this, participants can encourage each other’s utterances. Timely utterances requestingnecessary information from other participants are important during the course of a conversation. And
through such encouraged utterances, new information will be added to the map. Those who encourage
utterances will, by listening to the utterances of others, also be able to learn whether their own
perceptions were correct or not. If the utterance is irrelevant, it will also make the person who
encouraged the utterance realize their own lack of cognitive capability, that is, their ability tounderstand the topic. Occasionally, there may be cases such as this where irrelevant utterances arerequested, but the encouragement of utterances within a meeting means that the importance of one’s
presence is recognized by the other participants, and if the act of encouraging occurs mutually, theutterances will also become more dynamic. A sense of belonging will arise among the participants.
The catalyst for this is the act of acknowledging others, and this is to encourage the utterances ofothers.

[5] Mutually encourage utterances.
Considering the above, we presented working hypotheses by way of conditions for a meeting
to be productively self-organized. Next, we will not just consider this, but carry out observation
experiments to further test whether these working hypotheses stand up as hypotheses. Observing how
self-organized an actual meeting is will give us an idea on how much information we need fordesigning specific techniques when conducting empirical research on these hypotheses in the near
future.

5. Preconditions for observation experiments regarding the intellectual productivity ofmeetings
Several preconditions must be cleared for measuring the intellectual productivity of a meeting.
First we need to determine the kind of variables necessary for measuring the concept of “intellect”,
and we must quantify intellectual output. However, when something is decided at a general meeting,there are perhaps very few aspects within it that can actually be quantified. As mentioned earlier, in

9©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Satothis paper our consideration focuses on creative meetings. Therefore, meetings that are to be observedin the experiment must have the aim of producing some form of creative, i.e. intellectual, output. And
some device for quantifying this output is essential. Very little research to date has directly addressed
intellectual output. For example, in decision-making research “rationality” is a key concept, butrational decision-making does not necessarily produce creative or intellectual output.
Similarly, what variables to use for measuring the concept of productivity is also an issue thatmust be addressed in the experiment. Output is considered to be an intellectual result, so we must
devise variables that form the output denominator. There are, however, few candidates fordenominator. “Time” would be an appropriate denominator when assuming decision-making of ageneral organization. How to produce an intellectual result within the scheduled time is an everyday
concern in practical business. Of course, it would also be possible to have “number of persons”
inputted into the decision-making process as the denominator, and in practice as well, this is an
important issue. If we know the number of team members at which productivity is highest, thisknowledge would be useful in team composition and management. However, knowledge andcapability differ from individual to individual, so it is difficult to discuss productivity simply in termsof the number of personnel. So in this paper, we will measure productivity with time as thedenominator, and look at number of persons for productivity denominator as a future issue.
Next we will consider the condition of meetings to be observed. We need to configure themeetings so that we can confirm that a meeting has high intellectual productivity, while anothermeeting has low intellectual productivity. In short, we need to observe multiple meetings forcomparison.
It is desirable that the meeting members share similar qualities as much as possible. So far wehave discussed the functions of distributed cognition, but we also, naturally, have to consider thecognitive capability of the individual. So if the meeting includes some members with a particularlyhigh cognitive capability, those individuals will influence the output of the meeting. While it is notpossible to completely eliminate the effect of specific individuals, for research it is preferable to createa situation in which the way the meeting is run and the meeting format will influence the meeting
output as much as possible.
In this light, to give numerical value to meeting output, we can present the issue in advance,
and then consider methods of judging whether the issue has been resolved. It is difficult to predict thekind of output from a meeting with absolutely no control conditions, and also to compare the output
from several meetings. Devices enabling us to make an objective judgment on whether an issue has
been resolved or not are essential. There is also a need to set a meeting time limit for resolving theissue when the issue is presented. This will enable us to measure intellectual productivity on a time
axis.

10

©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Sato

We will set the experiment so that it satisfies these conditions, but rather than conducting a
new experiment, we will use an existing experiment. As has been pointed out already on a number ofoccasions, there are many experiment conditions, and some are quite difficult to control, so in thispaper, to look into the structure of the hypothesis, we will again watch the recorded meeting videos
used in Takagi (1994). We thought that again watching the video through which we detectedinconclusive transitions would facilitate lifting this focus to the level of developing techniques.

6. Meetings in the observation experimentFirst, in this chapter we will state our reasons for using the video used in Takagi (1994). The
following is a summary of the experiment. First-year students on the MBA program at the KeioBusiness School (a year in the 1990s) were divided into five groups, each of about eight members. The
groups were directed to achieve the following theme in two hours.
The theme was for each group to decide on a single prediction based on consensus among all
members of the group. The groups were shown the first one-third of the 1950s American movie“Twelve Angry Men”, then each group was asked to predict how the remaining two-thirds of themovie would unfold. The movie revolves around the discussions among twelve jurors who are
required to determine whether a youth charged with murder is guilty or not guilty. At the beginning of
the movie, one of the twelve jurors insists on a not guilty verdict, while the other eleven believe theyouth is guilty. As the movie progresses, the eleven jurors who advocated a guilty verdict over time
gradually changed their opinions to not guilty one after the other. The movie ends at the point when all
twelve jurors have agreed on a not guilty verdict. The first one-third of the movie takes us up to thepoint just before the first of the eleven jurors who advocated a guilty verdict changes his opinion to not
guilty. 4This experiment covered virtually all conditions listed in 5. First, the aim is to look at meetingproductivity, so, preferably, we should be able to make an objective comparison of each of the group’s
productivity. In this experiment, the order of the 11 jurors is determined, so we can quantify the extent
to which each of the groups accurately predicted the result. In other words, we are able to ascertain thelevel of achievement or creativity of the meetings. The time limit imposed would also enable us toascertain the difference in productivity by each group. Moreover, we thought that since all groupmembers were MBA students in the 1990s, no one would have an especially detailed knowledge abouta movie produced in the 1950s.
The groups were given no special directions other than the theme mentioned above. Whowould preside over the meetings or be group leaders was not determined in advance. It is therefore
4

Takagi (1994) p.59.

11©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Satoassumed that with no specific format laid down from the beginning, the meetings started in a naturalway. All group members viewed the first one-third of the movie together, so there was no variation in
the information given before discussion. From the above points, we believe the results emerging fromeach of the groups were greatly influenced by the content of discussions within the respective groups.
So we judged this to be suitable as an experimental observation.
Under these conditions, the progress of discussions in the five groups was videotaped.
Differences in performance emerged for each of the groups. Performance indicates how much theaccuracy improved between individual prediction decisions before discussion, and decisions after
discussion. The groups were classified from the group with the highest level of increased accuracy to
the group that had no increase in accuracy whatsoever. The group with the highest level of increased
accuracy is to be referred to as Group A, and that with the lowest level of accuracy increase is to bereferred to as Group B. As already seen in Takagi (1994), inconclusive transitions did not occur at allin the Group A meeting, whereas in the Group B meeting, four cases of inconclusive transition
occurred per hour. In short, for all themes raised in the meeting, the group that improved accuracy
reached some form of consensus on a theme before moving on to the next theme. The group that could
not improve accuracy moved on to the next theme without first forming a consensus on the previous
theme.
This paper will therefore again closely observed the conditions of Group A and B meetings to
explore the differences. For this, we will use the five conditions for meetings to be productively selforganized listed in 4.

7. Comparison between meetings with high and low intellectual productivity
The meeting of Group A, whose intellectual productivity was high, proceeded as follows.

[Flow of the Group A meeting]
10:30 — Start
Begin listing on the blackboard the order thought by participants.
10:35 — Complete writing on blackboard.
Discussion on whether to begin looking from the second or twelfth juror.
Decision was reached to look from the second juror. After circling their second juror on theblackboard lists, members gave their respective reasons for choosing the juror they did.
10:46 — Added the average value for the order given by individual members to the blackboard list.
10:47 — Topic changed. Time was spent to confirm all members understood what the jury system is.

12©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Sato

10:54 — Members envisaged how the movie would unfold from the cast of actors and movie storyline.
From this, they began working out who would be the second juror.
11:01 — All members agreed on the second juror.
Amended the list on the blackboard.
Began discussing the third juror.
11:11 — Race became a topic based on the photographs. Prediction was made from racial issues.
11:40 — Decided to narrow down third juror to three candidates for discussion.
11:43 — All members agreed on the third juror.
Amended the list on the blackboard.
11:44 — Discussion on whether to look at fourth juror or twelfth juror. During discussion, decided tofocus on fourth juror.
11:55 — All member agreed on the fourth juror, and at the same time, on the fifth juror.
Amended the list on the blackboard.
12:06 — All members agreed on sixth and seventh jurors at the same time.
Amended the list on the blackboard.
12:07 — All members agreed on the eighth juror, followed by the ninth juror.
12:15 — All members agreed on the tenth, eleventh and twelfth jurors in succession.
Amended the list on the blackboard.

What we first notice when looking at a meeting like the one mentioned above is that themeeting format is consistent with no ambiguity, and allows members to discuss matters within a stable
framework until the meeting ends. That is, the perspective is the order in which jurors in the movie
change their opinion. The context was clear, so it was easy for members to speak, and for others to
respond to those utterances. All participants were able to judge what kind of utterances was important.
Once a decision on a juror had been made, it was written on the blackboard without fail, sogroup members could immediately see and understand the result of the discussions, i.e., where they
had reached, simply by looking at the blackboard. Moreover, confirmation by all members of the
discussion results is also thought to have deepened their understanding. The blackboard played therole of a map for cognition.
On forming consensus, discussions continued until all members were satisfied with theoutcome, and we could observe the high regard they held for the meeting itself. This we feel
represents a belief by the participants in the possibilities of distributed cognition.
The meeting covered not simply information presented by the movie, but also incorporated theparticipants’ own views on how the movie would unfold if they were director. The meeting also took
up the social perspective of race. We can say these perspectives contributed to expand the outlook.

13©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Sato

Next we will examine the meeting characteristics of Group B, whose intellectual productivity
was low.

[Flow of the Group B meeting]
10:30 — It was suggested to split the jurors into three groups: those who would appear to advocate not
guilty quickly; those who would appear to advocate not guilty; and those who are hard to predict. The
importance of reaching a consensus was stressed.
10:35 — Instead of the above, it was suggested to list the individual predictions of members. Eachmember read out their own predictions, and other members wrote these down on a sheet of paper.
10:39 — Writing completed.
10:40 — Members checked the differences in each other’s predictions and ideas.
10:53 — Confirmation of strategy. Discussion on which number juror is easiest to decide.
Group decided to take the average values of each member’s order prediction for examination. All
members divided this up and calculated average values. Placed in order according to the averagevalues. Wrote down the results on the blackboard. For jurors with very little difference in averagevalues, member confirmed their respective reasons.
(From around this time, one participant stood in front of the blackboard and sought to lead thediscussion from beginning to end.)
From average values, all members agreed on the second juror.
11:13 — From discussions, members decided on the third juror by majority vote.
11:18 — Members decided to discuss four candidates as the fourth juror.
11:27 — From discussions, members decided on the fourth juror by majority vote. They then decided
to rank the remaining three candidates in order.
11:32 — All members agreed on the fifth, sixth and seventh jurors.
11:38 — To confirm what had been decided, they wrote the blackboard list on the sheets of paper.
They then changed the approach to decide on the twelfth juror.
11:57 — From discussions, members decided on the twelfth juror by majority vote.
Then decided to look at the eleventh juror.
12:02 — From discussions, members decided on the eleventh juror by majority vote.
12:03 — Decided to look at eighth juror first.
12:05 — From discussions, members decided on the seventh juror by majority vote.
12:06 — From discussions, members decided on the eighth juror by majority vote.
12:08 — From discussions, members decided on the ninth juror by majority vote. The tenth juror was
therefore decided automatically.

14©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Sato

The first thing that stands out in the overall meeting flow is the preponderance of judgments
by majority vote. Even when the order was not decided by majority vote, the discussion was carriedout premised on the average values of ranking order by all members, and it is hard not to feel that thediscussion was fairly mechanical. Mechanical means that members can only expect results that simply
combine the cognition of those participating in the meeting. They do not seem to believe in thepossibilities of distributed cognition that something new will be generated from the meeting. For
example, in an informal conversation, someone mentioned “What the group decides and what theindividual decides are two separate things.” This utterance is clearly indicative of a lack of belief inthe creativity of the meeting.
At the same time, deciding by majority vote will choke off utterances with the timing of thedecision rather than mutually encourage utterances. Certainly at first glance it may seem rational
decision-making, but participants who have to break off their utterances may lose their enthusiasm to
speak further. They may take such an attitude especially if the result of the majority vote is different
from their own idea.
Next we noticed that the strategy of the meeting changed many times. This seems to havemade it difficult to maintain the framework for how participants could consider aspects. In particular,changing the strategy five minutes after the start of the meeting not only causes a loss of time, but may
generate misgivings about how the subsequent meeting format would be maintained. In any event,participants probably felt some doubt about whether they would be able to take part in discussions
under a stable format. To be slightly more specific, shortly after the meeting started, one member
expressed his/her idea suggesting that they exchange information, and to this, other participant started
giving their own impressions and comments about this suggestion. The strategy was changed fiveminutes into the meeting in an effort to break through this situation.
A change in meeting strategy makes it difficult for participants to confirm what is currently
being discussed. Without a cognitive map, the meeting could wander about in confusion, resulting in
all members losing the means to determine the direction of the meeting.
In any event, in a situation such as that above, we cannot really expect context to be formed
within the meeting, giving rise to the possibility that utterances will be disconnected. That is, not all
members understood the rules setting standards for responses to certain utterances, and this wasprobably an underlying factor in inconclusive transitions. Thus the group may have employed majority
voting in an effort to give some form of direction to the meeting which in this way had become
directionless.
Another characteristic feature was that about 20 minutes into the meeting, one participant
stood up in front of the blackboard and began to run the meeting. This pressured participants to makedecisions over short periods of time. This person constantly urged participants to decide by majority

15©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Satovote. So, as in this case, when the meeting format is such that it does not facilitate the full mutual
exchange of cognition, the intellectual productivity of the meeting seems to be diminished.
Looking at the meeting formats of Group A and Group B reveals some significant differences.
Comparing the two from a distributed cognition perspective, we can summarize the main features ofmeetings with a high level of intellectual productivity as follows.

Meetings with high intellectual productivity:

8.

1)

believe in the possibilities of distributed cognition,2)

reduce the cognitive load of the individual,3)

are designed so that the overall meeting condition is understood, and4)have stability in format strategy.

Techniques for raising meeting intellectual productivity as hypotheses
In conclusion, this paper will discuss specific techniques for raising the intellectual

productivity of meetings. As has already been pointed out, from observation, albeit limited, we knowthat meetings with high intellectual productivity have four characteristic features. Here, we will list as
hypotheses what kind of techniques can be considered from each characteristic.

1) Hypothetical techniques around distributed cognition
The reasoning for not placing emphasis on distributed cognition is a belief that the cognitionof the individual is superior. Which is superior is a difficult issue to settle, but as long as participants
do not recognize the possibilities of distributed cognition, theoretically, the meeting cannot become
creative. So the issue is how to convince participants of the possibilities of distributed cognition. One
specific technique is to for participants to get together before the meeting begins and urge each otherto “make the meeting creative”. In practice, there are a great many meetings, and there are people who
think many of these meetings are a waste of time. This is why confirming and expressing the will tomake the meeting fruitful to each other before the meeting begins is highly effective.

2) Hypothetical techniques for reducing the cognitive load of the individualThis is easy to relate to as a technique. And there is also a considerable amount of research on
this. For example, techniques can include the regular use of the blackboard to confirm the progress ofthe discussion, or the extensive use of memos and photographs. Not just tangible aspects, butclarifying context as well can reduce the cognitive load of the individual. For example, utterances16©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Satoconfirming what the current topic is, and where the discussion is broken off, i.e., utterances that markpoints within the meeting, are important as a technique.

3) Hypothetical techniques for raising overall cognition
Recognizing the overall condition of the meeting, that is, discussing and acquiring metacognition, is difficult. However, as was actually observed in the meeting experiment, it is notparticularly difficult if a third-person viewpoint is brought in, i.e., when the discussion is broken off ordoes not advance, move away from the viewpoints of the meeting participants, and take the viewpointof a third person who would seem to be able to serve as a useful reference. This viewpoint takes theform of “if it were so-and-so, how would he/she tackle this problem?” This assumed person would
preferably have a broader or more technical viewpoint that meeting participants.

4) Hypothetical techniques for stability in meeting format strategy
Meeting strategy should preferably have stability. If, however, too much importance is placedon this, the meeting can lose direction. One example of this is the groupthink that has already been
pointed out. What we must note here is given that the strategy may change several times during themeeting, participants must be aware that changes will be made if necessary. This will be maintenanceof stability in the sense that once a strategy has been decided, discussion will proceed in line with that.
The important point is that the strategy is stable, and lead by the strategy, meeting participants are able
to focus their discussion on the specific issues at hand.

The techniques we have listed are based on a number of theoretical considerations, and theresults of comparative studies between two meetings. These techniques are, therefore, ultimately
hypotheses. Naturally, we believe these techniques need to be substantiated. In particular, we believethat comparisons among a larger number of meetings are essential. And we believe there is a need todevelop new approaches regarding the method of observation itself.

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Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink. Boston : Houghton Mifflin.

17©2006 Haruo Takagi and Takeshi Sato

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