On the Broader Implications
Of The Latest Developments
In Somalia

I. Introduction
Permit me to begin by saying how pleased and honored I
am to be here at this prestigious institution – The Japan Instituteof International Affairs. I am particularly grateful to the Instituteand its officials for their wisdom and their farsightedness indeciding that the latest developments in the Horn of Africa
deserve a hearing at this forum. I am also grateful to each andevery one of you for being here and for your generous decision to
devote your time to this event. I am hopeful you would find it
worthwhile.
Let me start out with some general remarks about the latest
developments in the Horn of Africa and in Somalia which I hopeto look at in greater detail as I proceed.
It is very easy to be misled by the fact that the Horn ofAfrica has always beena trouble spot and Somalia a placeseemingly always mired in a quagmire of a never-ending conflictthat their would not be anything qualitatively different in thelatest flare up in that country. But that is not only wrong, but it
might also end up being a dangerous line of thought.
The Horn of Africa has always been affected bydevelopments in the Middle East, and developments in the Hornhave had some limited consequences on event in the Middle East,as well. For our purpose, what is relevant now is the type of newcontext – political, security and psychological – that has beencreated in the Horn of Africa, and perhaps in Islamic world ingeneral, because of the constellation of factors associated with the
Iraq phenomenon. On one hand, the sense of grievances whichappears to grow out of the conviction that Islam has been targeted
has contributed to the creation of a psychological state of mind inmany muslim societies at the grassroots level which has been1

abused and utilized by forces that have always had extremist
agenda, and have had a history of close association with terrorist
activities. The Horn of Africa is being affected by this newly
created psychological phenomenon far beyond what has beenthought would be possible by many.
This psychological state of mind operating at the grassroots
level is reinforced by the confidence at the level of leaders of
extremist groups that their agenda is the wave of the future. Again,
they seem to see their confidence being validated by the Iraq
phenomenon and by what they see as a major setback suffered bytheir adversaries. Thus one sees a growing trend of hubristic
behavior by Jihadists in the Horn of Africa and preparedness ontheir part to defy principles of international law governing interstate relations and emboldenment in terms of being unwilling toconsider peaceful methods of resolving disputes. This is the newcontext that we have to deal with in the Horn of Africa and which
has made the situation in Somalia much more formidable andpotentially very dangerous than hitherto.
The second general remark that I wish to make has to dowith the fact that regrettably there is no sufficient realization at
the international level concerning this radically changed situationand commensurate with the potential danger that the new politicalcontext has brought about. No where is this more vividly evident
than in the kind of massive support – from diverse sources – that
the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia has been receiving comparedto the meager level of support that the Transitional Federal
Government is receiving from very limited sources. This has been
made abundantly clear by the Monitoring Group of theCommittee of the Security Council on the arms embargo on
Somalia in its report submitted this past November. Though theTransitional Federal Government is recognized as a legitimate
government by the sub-regional organization of the Horn ofAfrica, IGAD, by the African Continental Organization, the AU,
and by the world body, the UN, according to the report of theMonitory Group, the Islamic Court Union which is guided and led
by extremist personalities, is being supported allegedly by sevencountries, while the legitimate government is supported only by2three. In terms of the quality of support provided, the Monitoring
Group makes it clear that there is no comparison between the two,the Islamic Courts Union being the beneficiary of assistanceinvolving very sophisticated weapons hitherto unavailable forfighters in Somalia.
The third general remark that I wish to make relates to thefact that – despite developments in the Middle East and the Iraq
phenomenon – what we are seeing in the Horn of Africa withrespect to the ascendancy of Jihadists was far from inevitable if it
had not been for certain mistakes that were committed fromwhich we have to draw some lessons. In fact, if we draw theproper lessons from our past mistakes, it is possible that we might
be able to save the day in the Horn of Africa.
It is this last general remark that I would like to take up
first and show how we shot ourselves in the foot and prepared theground for the emergence of the situation we face in Somalia now.
II. The Lost Opportunity in Somalia
The circumstances that surrounded the creation of theTransitional Federal Government highlight the value ofinternational co-operation as much as the emergence of theIslamic Courts Union underline the negative consequences of the
deficit in the good will to co-operate with regional countries andorganization by those that are in a position to make a difference.
The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia came into
being in October 2004 after more than two years of peace making
and negotiation among the various Somali factions for which theco-operation between IGAD and the European Union was
extremely decisive. Without that support from the EU it would
have been impossible for the IGAD countries to raise the funds
necessary for facilitating the long and complicated process ofpeace making that led to the formation of the Transitional Federal
Government.
It is to be recalled that this was an achievement that laid3

the basis for the rebuilding of the Somali State after thirteen yearsof lawlessness and anarchy. Those were thirteen years during
which the notion of legality, rule of law and the concept oflegitimacy were thrown out the window in Somalia. It wastherefore, important that the people of Somalia were given theopportunity to create a broad-based government based on the ruleof law and free of the forceful methods and gangsterism that was
so rampant during the previous thirteen years. Accordingly, theemphasis was put more on the need to create the right conditions
for making the new government legitimate in the eyes of thepeople of Somalia than enabling it to have a monopoly of force
within the country. Since the Transitional Government was in any
case a transitional institution, it was tacitly assumed that thenecessary steps to help the new government develop the requisite
capacity in the security area would be undertaken later.
In other words, it was by the deliberate decision of those
who helped in the creation of the Transitional Federal
Government that the new Somali Government was made weak inthe security area so much so that when the need arose it was
unable even to protect itself.
It was at the beginning of 2005 that the IGAD countries
discovered this weaknesses in the security arrangement for the
new Somali Government. The problem surfaced when the needarose to relocate the new government inside Somalia fromNairobi where it had been seated starting from its very creation.
The Kenyan Government felt that Nairobi could not continue
accommodating two governments - one that of Kenya's and theother that of Somalia's. It was under these circumstances that theIGAD countries felt that some things needed to be done and as
speedily as possible.
At an emergency meeting on the fringes of the AU Summit
in January 2005 in Abuja, the IGAD Heads of State andgovernment agreed to present a draft resolution to the AU summit
providing for the creation of a peace support mission(the future
IGASOM) to help in the relocation of new Somali Government
inside Somalia. The resolution was subsequently adopted by the4AU summit which also called for a meeting, first, of the IGAD
Chiefs of Defense Staff, to draw up the plan, and following that,for a meeting of the IGAD Foreign Ministers, to approve the planand finalize the preparation for the relocation of the new Somali
government inside Somalia.
This is where the tragedy of Somalia started to be repeated,
and this time manifesting itself in the attempt made to scuttle theeffort that was being made by IGAD. The Foreign Ministers ofIGAD met in Nairobi in March 2005 and approved thedeployment plan for IGASOM which was submitted to them by
IGAD Chiefs of Defense Staff. It was by consensus – all IGAD
member states being in favor of the plan despite difficult bilateralrelation among some of them – that the plan was approved. But
IGAD run into a brick wall immediately. Washington was
opposed to the idea. At about the same time, the International
Crisis Group (ICG), embarked on a major campaign branding theplan as a dangerous move that would be likely to exacerbate theproblem in Somalia.
It was impossible, under those circumstances, for IGAD –no matter how much unified its position might have been at thetime – to proceed with the deployment of IGASOM. Given theformidable opposition we faced it was felt unrealistic for us to go
it alone – both for political as well as financial reasons. The effort
needed the support of the international community in both areas.
Even if the financial means were to be found, the whole enterprisewould not have been viable in light of the opposition it faced frompowerful countries.
It is still not clear why the ICG was so vehemently opposedto the IGAD plan, but as far as why Washington was not keen
about the project became clear almost a year later when it was
revealed that Washington was allegedly supporting those few
individuals in Mogadishu who, though part of the Transitional
Government, were nonetheless opposed to the efforts IGAD was
making to help in the creation the Somali state and who at thesame time were also at loggerheads with Islamic Courts Union. In
other words, the efforts of IGAD was frustrated and the5Transitional Government could not be assisted. The opportunity
was lost for the attempt to control both the warlords in Mogadishu
and to deny a chance to the Islamic Court Union to ride the waveof popular anger against the warlords and achieve victory. In thebattle between those selfish gangsters hated by Mogadishu
residents and the extremists, the choice of the people – in light of
their day–to–day humiliation in the hands of the warlords – could
not have been doubted. The extremists won with their hands down
and thus began the confrontation in our region between those who
stand for legality and those committed to transforming the entire
Horn of Africa into an Islamic Emirate. In effect, the lack ofcooperation and coordination between the countries of the region
and international partners made it possible for the Islamic Courts
Union to emerge. Their emergence and the formidable challenge
they now represent to peace and stability in our region andbeyond was far from inevitable. No doubt, this is an experiencethat we have to draw lessons from.
III. The Challenge Faced By Countries Such As Ethiopia
What are the various challenges faced by countries such as
Ethiopia under these circumstance? The first challenges of course
relates to the international context within which the struggle istaking place. This I have already alluded to in my introduction
when I referred to what I characterized as the Iraq phenomenon
and the psychological state of mind which has been spawned bythat phenomenon. The extremists are using this to the hilt andhave found it convenient to label countries such as Ethiopia as
Christian crusaders determined to violate the rights of Muslim
Somalis. The moderates among the Islamic Courts Union – who
In fact might constitute the majority – are forced to keep quite
because of the prevailing psychological state of mind as well as
the seeming momentum enjoyed by the extremists thanks to the
support they enjoy from various sources. The extremists lackneither money nor war material.
Most paradoxically, even a few within the international
media – either because of naivety or owing to the usual
condescending attitude toward the developing world, including6Africa, or for reasons not very easy to figure out – have given
them the opportunity both to be lionized and also, when it isfound convenient, to play the role of the under dog, thus
simultaneously drawing admiration and sympathy.
Even more ironic has been the difficulty – until two days ago that has been encountered by those parties who have been trying
to get the Security Council to partially lift the arms embargo on
Somalia so that it would be possible to help the Transitional
Federal Government in the security area, including in providing
training to its security personnel.
That problem has now been
overcome and hopefully it may now be more possible forcountries in our region to be in a better position to ensure that
Transitional Federal Government would be strong enough to
conduct serious negotiation with the Islamic Courts Union being
taken serious by the latter which has not been the case so far.

IV. The Broader Implications of the Failure in Somalia
The Iraq phenomenon might have provided to Jihadists in
the Horn of Africa an opportunity for the mobilization of bias
against countries such as Ethiopia in which they might have madesome progress but the situation is not irreversible. One thing thatthey can not easily succeed in, is in convincing a lot of people thatthe situation in Iraq is comparable to the one prevailing in theHorn of Africa. In the Horn, no one can overlook the fact that it is
the Jihadists that have repeatedly proclaimed that they arecommitted to disregarding existing borders and insisting that theirproject is to unify all Somali speaking people in the Horn ofAfrica.
Despite the protestation to the contrary - by the extremists
and their supporters, among whom paradoxically are somecountries that are by all measures moderate - those who have been
arrogant and who have rejected dialogue and have been flexing
their muscle have been the extremists. They have been the once
who have defied principles of international law and have been
demonstrating a wish to dominate others.

7What has been tragic is that this fact is not being brought out
so that the true reality in the Horn of Africa would be appreciated.
Here again, one of the major difficulties is the wide-spreadassumption that one could draw a parallel between the underlying
factors in the crisis in Iraq and those taking place in the Horn ofAfrica. The extremists in the Horn have no doubt benefited fromthe sentiments that have been aroused by the Iraq phenomenon in
the Islamic world. However, while those in Iraq could plausibly
argue that they face the reality of occupation – no matter how thegenesis of that reality may be interpreted – those in the Horn ofAfrica have absolutely no reason at all for claiming that they havebeen targeted or their right has been violated. As such, if theysucceed in their wild ambition – which includes claims on
Ethiopia and Kenya and even more, apart from the objective they
have over Somaliland and Puntland – the consequences would be
more devastating than anything that the region and Africa hasever experienced. The example that it would set for emulation inother parts of the world near and far would also be incalculable inthe damage it would cause for peace and stability and harmony
within societies where different religious communities have lived
in harmony.
I would indeed have been less optimistic about the situation
in Somalia if I had delivered this statement a few days ago specifically prior to the adoption by the Security Council of aresolution two days ago authorizing the deployment of IGASOM
with the mandate, among other things,(a)To monitor progress by the Transitional Federal
Institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts in
implementing agreements reached in their dialogue,(b)To ensure free movement and safe passage
those involved with the dialogue process,of all(c) To maintain and monitor security in Baidoa- theseat of the Transitional Federal Government,(d)To protect members of the Transitional Federal
8Institutions and Government as well as their key
infrastructure,(e) To train the Transitional Federal Institutions’security forces to enable them to provide their own
security and to help facilitate the reestablishment of
the national security forces in Somalia.

This essentially means that, at least belatedly. theinternational community has taken the vital step for peace inSomalia which IGAD had tried to take in early 2005 but which
was scuttled for reasons explained earlier. Though a lot of damage
has been caused in the meantime, the fact that now this resolution
has been adopted would mean that the Transitional Federal
Government would have a real possibility for engaging theIslamic Courts Union in good faith dialogue for national
reconciliation and for the setting up of a broad-based governmenton the basis of the Federal Charter.
This resolution which was co-sponsored by the UnitedStates and all three members of the African Union on the Security
Council - Congo, Ghana and the United Republic of Tanzania was unambiguous in underlying the principle that the Transitional
Charter and Institutions provide the framework for the dialogue
between the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic
Courts Union. The following is what in this regard the resolution
says in its first operative paragraph:［The Security Council］Reiterates that theTransitional Federal Charter and Institutions after the only route toachieving peace and stability in Somalia...

Equally important is what the resolution says in its operative
paragraph two which goes as follows:
Urges both parties to fulfill commitments made, resume without
delay peace - Talks on the basis of the agreement reached in
Khartoum, and adhere to agreements reached in their dialogue,
9and states its intention to consider taking measures against thosethat seek to prevent or block a peaceful dialogue process,overthrow the Transitional Federal Institutions by force, or takeaction that further threatens regional stability.

It should be recalled, as I have already reiterated, thisresolution by the Security Council was adopted despite thecoordinated effort by a variety of parties - first of all the Islamic
Courts Union and the extremists within the group as well asothers, some of who have been providing support to the samegroup - to stop its adoption. it was said the passage of theresolution would worsen the situation in Somalia, and in fact,
military activities were speeded up by the Islamic Courts during
the debate on the resolution with the view to discouraging those
who were for the resolution.
Here it is only fair to commend the United States for having
taken the initiative on the resolution and, despite the formidable
opposition it has faced, for standing its ground - along with the
Africa members of Council - to ensure the passage of theresolution, which was supported by all fifteen members of theCouncil voting in favor.
Let me reiterate why the adoption of the resolution is critical.
As has been already explained, the Transitional Federal
Government was created without an arrangement for its security the focus having been on the creation of a broad-based
government which would gradually secure legitimacy in the eyesof the people of Somalia. But the hoped-for peaceful evolution of
the political situation in Somalia toward legality and legitimate
governance was aborted , first, because the belated effort by
IGAD to support the Transitional Federal Government in the
Security domain was aborted for reasons already explained and ,secondly, because the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union
brought force to the fore as a basis for establishing one’s right torule.
But it should be emphasized that the Islamic Courts Union
is not a group of fouls who advocate the use of force openly.
Stealth has been the tactic they used for advancing their agenda.
10This was made obvious starting from their first encounter with thedelegation of the Transitional Federal Government for the firstpeace dialogue between the two on June 22, 2006 in Khartoum.
That encounter resulted in an agreement between the two, notonly to stop hostilities but also to conduct their relations on thebasis of two key principles. The first principle, which was in fact
mentioned as the first point in the agreement, involved acceptanceby the Islamic Courts Union of the Transitional Federal
Government as the legal and legitimate government of Somalia.
The second principle had the Transitional Federal Government
accept the Islamic Courts Union as a political reality in Somalia.
Obviously, the expectation was that on the basis of theseprinciples, among others, the two would proceed during theirsecond meeting towards mutual accommodation with the view toestablishing a broad-based government. What happened in thefollowing days however was something which became insubsequent weeks and months the hallmark of the Islamic Courts
Union - verbal profession of commitment to dialogue but the
expansion of its presence on the ground, in practice. No sooner
had the delegation of the Islamic Courts Union returned to
Mogadishu from the Khartoum meeting where it had accepted thelegality and the legitimacy of the Transitional Federal
Government than it started to march on Baidoa for an onslaught
on the seat of the Transitional Government.
Those of you who have been following these developments
would recall how that aggressive move by the Islamic Courts
Union militia was halted. It was not through prayers. This also
explains why the Islamic Courts Union has been so preoccupied
with Ethiopia and why it has decided to allow Ethiopia’s enemies
to open in Somalia another front against Ethiopia.
Let me reiterate here that the international community
cannot indeed allow the Jihadists to prevail in Somalia. As isbecoming more and more apparent, the situation in Iraq isprobably getting to be worse before it gets better. The broader
implication of this is yet to be determined, and in fact, even the
broad outline of what might be expected is far from clear. Under
11these circumstances, victory in the Horn of Africa by a group of
extremists would be, as already indicated, a matter of incalculable
consequences.
Of course Ethiopia has a direct stake in all this, all themore so because, not only have the Jihadists made it clear thatthey have irredentist claims over Ethiopia, but they have also been
harbouring anti-Ethiopian forces, including Eritrean forces, andthey have also declared Jihad against Ethiopia.
But, on the other hand, Ethiopia has no ill - will toward
the Islamic Courts Union as a group. The disinformation about
how Ethiopia --- a Christian country --- has had a difficulty
dealing with the Islamic Courts Union is sheer fabrication meant
to mislead the Islamic world, the people of Somalia included.
Otherwise, Ethiopia is neither a Christian nor an Islamic country.
Its government and constitution is secular; and in terms of
population, it has more Moslems than the number of Moslems in
all the states of the Horn of Africa combined.
This is what I tried to convey to the representative of
the Islamic Courts Union that I met in Djibouti last Friday.
Ethiopia, I told the Islamic Courts representative, is perfectly
willing to be a good partner for the Islamic Courts Union as longas they are prepared to abide by principles of international law
governing inter-state relations and as long as they refrain fromengaging in hostile activities against Ethiopia. We are still
awaiting their concrete response in this regard.
We have to wait and see how the Islamic Courts
Union and their supporters would react in earnest to the adoption
by the Security Council of the resolution that I have alreadyreferred to. But their preliminary reaction has been violently
negative.
V. Conclusion
What the resolution does, among other things, is to highlightand confirm the support of the international community for the12Transitional Government as well as the dialogue between it andthe Islamic Courts Union. It is hoped that the political message
conveyed might produce results. After all, this was what states ofregion such as Ethiopia have been calling for.
Now what is the lesson in all this? The first important issue
to be taken seriously is the fact that the present situation in the
Middle East and in that general area meaning in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Lebanon, etc, has a way of affecting in a very serious way
developments in other places such as the Horn of Africa. It is
becoming more and more clear that events and developments areinter connected. The interconnection obtains not because ofdevelopments in these areas are comparable or similar but
because at the psychological level there is somehow a sense on
the part of a growing number of muslims that they are being thetargets of unfair treatment or those who belong them are being
subjected to that kind of treatment. These sentiments have a wayof resonating rapidly more and more affecting societies that havebeen known for ages for having admirable degree of tolerance
between their religious communities. This reality has provided afield day for those who have developed skill in the manipulationof symbols in the interest of their extremist agenda. This is one ofthe problems that we are facing in the Horn of Africa at present.
This is compounded by the second difficulty that we all facewith respect to the lack of effective co-operation and coordination
among those within the international community who haveinterest in maintaining stability and in peace and harmony amongpeoples, countries and religions. It is critical that there is effective
consultation between entities at various levels concerning
developments in various regions whereby the views of regionalcountries and organizations are taken seriously. We have paid theprice in the Horn of Africa because of the known deficits in thisregard. We are indeed hopeful that the latest resolution by the
Security Council would help rectify the damage caused bycourses of action opted for earlier. What has been most disturbingin this regard has been the fact that there is greater coordination
among those who are committed to overturning the geopoliticalstatus quo through whatever means available, than among those13

committed to preserving the peace on the basis of principles ofinternational law and legality. Equally disturbing is the fact that as
the experience in our sub-region would show those some groups
are extremely savvy and adept at manipulating the international
media outlets. By comparison, those who are committed tolegality and maintaining stability have been the most disorganizedand poor at public relation and public diplomacy.
But at the end of the day, nothing is inevitable. It all depends
up on what we do. If we sit idly by we lose, and if we are proactive we have a fair chance of saving the day. This is theexperience we have had in the Horn of Africa over the last two
years or so. I suppose this contains valuable lesson for others as
well.
Let me conclude by emphasizing how useful and critical it
would be for Japan and other friends to chip in for making the
IGASOM deployment possible. This is a very important peace
support mission indeed whose success would have enormously
positive implications for the peace and stability in the Horn ofAfrica and beyond.
I thank you.

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