Maritime cooperation: challenges and opportunities
Dr Anthony Bergin
Director of Research Programs, ASPI(This paper was presented at the Fifth Japan-Australia Track 1.5 Dialogue, co-hosted by
the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute,Tokyo, July 23-24, 2009. The views presented here are the author’s own and do not
represent the views of the Japan Institute of International Affairs)

Our concept of security has broadened. It now includes considerations ofenvironmental security, safety, food security and human security, as well as ofresource security.

In the oceans, relevant threats include IUU fishing, ocean acidification, sea levelrise, pollution, loss of marine biodiversity and habitats, and marine naturalhazards. Safety and security can also be closely related, again particularly in themaritime domain. Climate change and its implications are now regarded ashaving significant security dimensions.

An important quality of non-traditional security is that in the main threats are of ashared nature and not direct threats to the interests of any one nation.

Dealing with these threats invites a cooperative response.

I will talk about the interests our countries have in maritime security andcooperation.

Maritime energy security is one of the most important elements needed toensure stable energy supplies for the fast growing Asian economies.

Major user states, must contribute to the security of chokepoints such as theStrait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait.

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As far as energy is concerned we see rapid increases global energy demand,and most especially in Asia.

China and India are demonstrating remarkable growth.

The supply of energy from non-OPEC countries is declining.

This is leading to Japan becoming more dependent on energy imports from theMiddle East. 30 per cent of the world’s oil production is currently concentrated in
the Middle East, and this will increase to about 40 per cent by 2030.

The Middle East supplies about 50 per cent of China’s oil requirements; about 85
per cent of Japan’s and about 50 per cent of South Korea’s.

These oil tankers could be considered critical cargoes that would require
protection in the event of hostilities.

It’s in the region’s collective interests to ensure that the energy continues to flowto North Asia.

The majority of this oil transported by sea through the two very narrow waterwaysof the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait.

The majority of Australian export trade to Japan transits the IndonesianArchipelago, passing through the Lombok Strait, then the Strait of Makassar into
the Pacific Ocean, south of the Philippine Archipelago.

The importance of the Malacca Strait, along with the Strait of Singapore, hasrisen over the past decade.

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The Malacca and Singapore straits now constitute the most economicallyimportant waterway in the world.

The main shipping channels between the Indian and Pacific oceans, they carrynearly half of the world’s annual seaborne trade, including oil supplies.

Nearly 94,000 vessels used the straits in 2004, a figure thought to rise to150,000 vessels by 2020, with tankers in the energy trade accounting for much of
the increase

The importance of safety, security, and environmental protection in these straits
is increasing.

User states have been concerned about the high level of piracy and seaborne
robbery in the straits and, following the 11 September 2001, the possibility that amaritime terror attack could disrupt shipping in the straits.

Countries bordering the straits are worried about the implications of increased
shipping traffic, the threats posed to the marine environment, the high costs ofmaintaining navigational safety and environmental protection, and the possibility
that their sovereignty could be jeopardized by the operational involvement of nonlittoral countries in providing security in the straits.

We need closer cooperation among the littoral and user states tomanage these issues.

This requires a comprehensive approach: navigational safety, maritime security
and environmental protection. China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea areheavily dependent on shipping through the Straits.

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This includes tankers and gas carriers moving from the Middle East, and large
container ships on around-the-world service runs among Europe, East Asia, andNorth America as well as other types of vessel, such as car carriers and ro-rovessels carrying important export and import commodities.

Of these states, Japan has been the most active in assisting the littoral countries
with their efforts to provide safety and security in the straits and to protect themarine environment.

The Japanese Coast Guard has sent experts, held seminars and conducted joint
training sessions with these states.

The Japanese Government is developing the global maritime distress and safetysystem, conducting joint hydrological surveys, and developing electronichydrological maps of the straits.

Japan Coast Guard ships and aircraft regularly visit Southeast Asian states toassist local security forces through training and exercises in building theircapacity to combat threats from piracy and maritime terrorism.

I will come back to role of the JCG, of which I’m a big fan!

In June 2006, Japan donated three patrol boats to Indonesia to help fightterrorism and piracy, after earlier donating a training vessel to the Malaysian
Maritime Enforcement Agency.

In January 2008, Japan announced a major grant to assist in upgrading
Malaysia’s maritime surveillance system along the Malacca strait.

I’d like to acknowledge the great work of Japan’s Coast Guard. As Richard
Samuels noted in recent article in ‘International Security’ journal the4modernisation and expansion of the JCG enhance not only Japan’s power
projection capabilities but also Japan’s ability to project influence—and it does sowithout the destabilizing consequences that a shift in the formal defense budget
might entail.

The transformation of the JCG into a de facto fourth branch of the Japanesemilitary may be the most significant and least heralded Japanese militarydevelopment since the end of the Cold War.

A well known commentator on maritime affairs, Sam Bateman has pointed outthat since 2000 Japan has been actively using the JCG as a ‘foot in the water’ inSoutheast Asian waters. In fact, the JCG has become a regular participant in theASEAN Regional Forum, Southeast Asia’s most prominent collective security
assembly.

Samuels notes this ‘foot’ may not be sheathed in a steel-tipped boot, but it isnonetheless a formidable addition to Japan’s diplomatic and military capacity—
ironically, not least because of its nonmilitary character.

The commitment by littoral states to maritime security cooperation constitutes
another major step forward with regime building in the Malacca and Singapore
straits. Relevant activities include trilateral coordinated maritime surface patrols
among Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore called the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols
and coordinated airborne surveillance under the Eyes in the Sky arrangement.

I would also mention here the Regional Cooperation Agreement onCombating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships that came into effect in2006.

This Japanese-inspired initiative, ReCAAP, is a very significant achievement thatprovides the basis for regional cooperation to counter piracy and seaborne

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robbery in the Asian region. The agreement became operational in September
2006 with the opening of the Information Sharing Center inSingapore.

With the important exceptions of Indonesia and Malaysia, it involves all ASEAN
nations, plus Japan, China, South Korea, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. It
includes an information network and a cooperation regime with assigned contact
points in each participating country.

Indonesia’s reluctance to join ReCAAP stems from the belief that ReCAAP
undermines state sovereignty in archipelagic waters and the territorial sea.
Malaysia’s reluctance to support ReCAAP is believed to lie in its objections to thelocation of the Information Sharing Center in Singapore and its view thatReCAAP is an unnecessary competitor for the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Center
located in Kuala Lumpur.

Tighter government control and onshore policing are important factors
contributing to the improved situation with piracy and robbery at sea.

As piracy off the coast of Somalia demonstrates, corrupt governance or lack ofgood order onshore facilitates disorder at sea.

Pirates operate from bases onshore, usually in small fishing communities, and it
is not unreasonable to assume that most of the community knows what is goingon. Official and community attitudes against piracy in Indonesia have hardened inrecent years. Greater awareness and more active policing onshore constitute themost significant factors leading to the reduced incidence of piracy and seaborne
robbery in Indonesia, including in the Malacca strait.

As the majority of energy flows in Asia are seaborne in nature, navies would be
involved in the protection of this shipping if it were threatened.

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We don’t yet have agreement on a common maritime threat assessment for
shipping in the Asia-Pacific region.

That’s the first step to wider bilateral and eventually multilateral naval
cooperation.

Its encouraging that ASEAN is establishing a Maritime Forum and ARF has set
up an inter-sessional meeting on maritime security. Both will address maritime
cooperation, including shipping safety and security.

In terms of Australian Japan maritime cooperation, Japan of course is aleading seafaring nation and as already noted depends on maritime commerce
and its one of the world’s largest importers of oil.

The ocean is a lifeline for Japan’s so security in the oceans is essential for yournational security. The US–Japan Defense Alliance is substantially a maritime
defense alliance in the sense of using the sea to protect common nationalinterests.

Australia maritime domain is around 4 per cent of the planet’s oceans, but
Australia is not a great maritime nation, even though we have world’s thirdlargest EEZ.

Why is it so? We choose to live and play on the shores of our country but lack amaritime culture. Our national identity has largely been forged by looking inward
to continental Australia, with the sea cutting us off from unwanted intruders.

We need to change this mindset. We persist in seeing our maritime jurisdiction
and surrounding oceans as isolated and unimportant issues. We haven’t grasped
their significance as central to the nation’s future in the twenty first century.

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Until about thirty years ago, our marine industries were mainly in the hands offoreigners. Our marine scientific research effort to explore the economic potentialof our oceans is paltry in comparison with other countries; notably in our region,
China, Japan and India. It’s a ‘Catch-22’ situation. We don’t invest resources inmarine research because we don’t know what we have.

Our maritime domain offers great economic potential: offshore oil and gas,shipping, marine tourism and fishing are key industries already, but there arealso emerging new industries, such as marine biotechnology, wind and tidal
energy, desalination, deep seabed mining, and carbon capture and storage.

In national security terms, our strategic planners too often regard our surrounding
oceans and seas as a moat that separates us from our neighbours: we continue
to seek security against rather than with the region. This is the mindset of insularinsecurity that has influenced Australian strategic thinking since the earliest daysof European colonisation.

Regional oceans and seas provide important opportunities for cooperation with
our neighbours. Australia has a clear strategic interest in helping to build goodlaw and order at sea with our neighbours. It’s one of the surest ways we canprevent threats to our security.

Most threats faced by the countries around us, such as population growth,terrorism, food shortages, military expansion, climate change and energy
insecurity, have a significant maritime dimension.

While we can’t have much influence on these issues at source, at least we cantry to have an influence, even in some cases a controlling influence, on how theyaffect Australia via the adjacent oceans and seas.

8The links between climate change and the oceans are under-appreciated. Theoceans directly affect climate and, in turn, are directly affected by climate change.

Most policy concern with climate change has focused on controls to reducegreenhouse gas emissions. However, climate change also poses significant
challenges for oceans management and policy. Increasing acidification of theseas is a particular threat that might have very severe consequences forAustralia and our region, particularly on pristine coral reefs.

The promotion of Australia as a maritime power and a clever maritime nation
would fit well with the Rudd government’s concept of Australia as an activist,
creative middle power focused on keeping our region peaceful and prosperous.

The Rudd government has set an ambitious goal to increase our international
influence as a middle ranking power: the oceans offer a potential source ofcredibility and leadership to achieve that status.

In terms of maritime security cooperation with Japan we should at this point
keep to the softer "S" side of security: climate change, oceans management,
ocean acidification, natural disaster mitigation, and capacity building initiatives.

The South Pacific is a good area for this, especially our navy cooperating withJapan coastguard in border patrolling.

Australia and Japan can also work together to give the islands greater economic
return on fisheries. Japan has a strong interest in the stability of the resource.

This can act as a balance for increasing Chinese presence there.

In the harder "S" security context Australia needs to be sensitive to Chineseconcerns about a US sponsored containment strategy.

9SLOC security is of course a common interest.

We can cooperate with Japan through PSI and also with Japan in your own
efforts to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Its pleasing to note that your parliament last month approved a law allowing theJapan Maritime Self-Defence Force greater powers in combating piracy off thecoast of Somalia. The bill allows the two JMSDF destroyers in the Gulf of Aden toescort any ship and fire at suspected pirate ships, as compared to previously
only being able to escort Japanese ships and use their weapons in self-defence.

Australia recently sent a frigate to this operation.

We can share information related to maritime security more generally, including
on climate refugees created by rising sea levels, and conflict created by depletionof fish stocks.

We can also cooperate in research on ocean energy resources in order to bringocean energy sources into production. Australia is soon to get major new marine
research vessel so we can cooperate more in research and development ofmarine resources. One area that Australia is very interested in is CO2 captureand sequestration technologies

Australia and Japan have an increasingly sophisticated understanding ofhighly complex climate systems – the relationships between oceanic andatmospheric systems – and how the increase in our carbon emissions isaffecting them. Australia and Japan have a long history of working together
on climate change and more recently acidification issues. In fact, it is thefocus of our Antarctic research cooperation.

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Because the Antarctic and the Southern Ocean play a major role in theglobal climate system Australia and Japan should work together to help us
understand the pace, and trajectory of climate change.

A related issue is the increasing need for good order at sea, including theprevention of IUU fishing, pollution and other illegal activity in the waters off
Antarctica.

Generally it seems to have been accepted that the use of naval vessels for
enforcement operations against illegal fishing constitutes a “peaceful purpose”
under the Antarctic treaty. Australia, for example, has used military deployments
over the years for fisheries interception, search and rescue, and logistic support.
Australia has a very large maritime Search and Rescue Region that stretches tothe Antarctic continent.

Australia and Japan are both members of CCAMLR so we direct interest tocooperate to reduce costs in the Southern Ocean and tackle IUU fishing. TheJapan Coast Guard could cooperate with Australia for Antarctic for policing andsovereignty protection and in so doing honour the spirit of the Antarctic Treaty.

Last season Australia helped Japan with its Antarctic logistic support and in thefuture with Japan’s new Antarctic vessel, this will open the door to future logistic
cooperation in eastern Antarctica. We can build on this to work with Japan toextend Australia’s work to western Antarctica as well.

Perhaps one area that Australia and Japan need to think more about is the issueof possible militiarisation of Antarctica. It is not inconceivable that resource
wars might extend into Antarctica in the future. The waters off Antarctica, and theclaimed excusive economic zones there, might be particularly vulnerable to suchcompetition and conflict. There’s the Madrid Protocol of 1998 that implemented a11

50-year ban on mining in the Antarctic. However, the Protocol only binds therelatively small number of countries that are party to it.

The emerging strategic competition between China on the one hand, and India
and Japan on the other, is one development that could impact on activities inAntarctica. There is increased risk of geopolitical competition in and around
Antarctica. China’s bases are in the Australian Antarctic Territory, and theexpanding Chinese presence there maybe one factor behind the funding
increase for the Australian Antarctic Division in the 2009–2010 Federal Budget.

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