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June 7, 2006

The Idea of New International Order China Is
Seeking and An East Asia Community (3)By AMAKO Satoshi
3. The Concept of the East Asia Community for China
Up to now, China’s foreign policy has consisted of the basic principle of addressing specificproblems through bilateral negotiations with the parties involved and a global grand strategy (forexample, the “Three World theory,” meaning a strategy against hegemonism, the “Big Triangle
theory,” referring to a power game among the United States, the Soviet Union and China), andthere was a lack of ideas for an intermediate strategic space in between. However, as mentioned
earlier, China began to actively seek to establish mechanisms for cooperation with neighboring
countries and areas from around 2000. As a strategic reason for this, since the 16th Party
Congress, it came to regard East Asia clearly as an important strategic region. This recognition
was explicit in Wang Yi’s statements such as “make friends with neighbors and make neighborspartners” and “neighboring countries form the most important foothold for China to defend its
sovereignty and interests and play an international role.” Another paper emphasizes that “Givingpriority to multilateral mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region should contribute to establishing astrong foothold for China to advocate the solidarity and mutual assistance of Asian countries andto defend the sovereignty and interests of our country…China will have powerful backing if it
can forge friendship with neighboring countries, stabilize the areas surrounding it and promotecooperation in the region.”
These arguments developed into the idea of an “East Asia Community.” Men Honghua, associate
professor at the Central Party School, points out that “strengthening cooperative andcollaborative relationships with neighboring countries is the most important objective in China’sgeopolitical strategy. China should establish the leading position in economic cooperation withneighboring countries and promote the ‘integration of East Asia’ through economiccooperation.” Ruan Zongze goes as far as emphasizing that “diplomacy toward neighboring
countries is a new thinking” and “China’s position in economic cooperation in East Asia stands
out, and the scale of the market it can provide for East Asia exceeds that of Japan,” adding that
“China and neighboring countries are developing and prospering as one and beginning to share acommon destiny.”
In 2004, moves were launched at the government level to promote the “East Asia Community.”1

In April, the Institute of Diplomacy, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
sponsored a symposium on the “East Asia Community,” at which then Vice Foreign Minister
Wang Yi delivered a keynote speech. In that speech, he put forward China’s strategy, in a very
cautious but comprehensive way. He emphasized: (1) there is no need to define the significanceof the East Asia Community prematurely, and for the time being, China will focus on economic
cooperation and proceed steadily with security dialogue and cooperation; (2) China will support
the leading role of ASEAN, and at the same time China, Japan and South Korea will try to makeuse of their advantages and play the greatest roles possible; (3) China does not think that China
and Japan are vying for leadership and hopes to see the development of regional cooperation inEast Asia through China-Japan cooperation; and (4) China will place weight on dialogue andcooperation with outside countries such as the United States and practice “open regionalism.” At
the ASEAN+China meeting, held in Qingdao in June, Chinese officials described the realizationof the East Asia Community as the long-term objective of East Asian cooperation andemphasized the need to hold a summit meeting of East Asian countries and China’s support forthe leading role to be played by ASEAN. Further, at the ASEAN+3 Summit in Jakarta in July,
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing in his remarks reemphasized the above-described points.
Outside of the economic realm, what moves is China making concerning the “integration of EastAsia” (the community)? One such move is related to the issue of identity. At the level of “socialintegration theory,” the above-mentioned “actually progressing (economic) regional integration”
should be interpreted absolutely in a functional context, and the expansion andinstitutionalization of functional integration does not necessarily result in a “community.”
Integration in terms of social structures cannot be said to be making “progress” and is only at thestage of “signs.” Under such circumstances, the idea of “building a common home for Asia”
which China has been espousing since around 2000 merits some attention. Subsequently, experts
from many countries have put forth ideas for “a common home of Northeast Asia” and “acommon home of East Asia,” with several activities actually under way to realize these ideas.
In a sense, these moves may indicate the beginning of an approach toward what Benedict
Anderson calls the “awareness of ‘we’” that is to be created through languages of ethnic groups,religious rites and cultural activities, or the process of vaguely condensing “somethingenvisaged as an image,” that is, the creation of “imagined political communities.” However, as
is well known, the structure of the identity of East Asia is not so simple that it can be explainedby the single term “multi-layered.” It is an “intricate situation,” where national identities, ethnicidentities, religions as supranational identities are found and despite some forms of eliteidentities chaos is common among common people.
Moreover, there is an unavoidable problem in addressing the “Chinese identity” though China ispotentially the biggest comprehensive identity. If the “Chinese nation” with its population ofover 1.3 billion forms a cohesive identity, it becomes the core identity, overwhelming Japan(130 million), South Korea (47 million) and ASEAN (a little less than 500 million). Moreover, if2

its identity as Confucian culture (Chinese culture) is pursued, it covers all of Northeast Asia andVietnam. Is the “common home of Asia” idea as proposed by China based on this Chinese
identity? Certainly, there are some scholars in China who argue for that kind of Chinese identity.
However, as long as the identity is defined as an “awareness of ‘we’” that is formed
endogenously through certain activities, the idea of a “common home of Asia” cannot be
considered the same as the “expanded Chinese identity.” In fact, it is common knowledge that
there is a serious and widening identity rift between mainland China and Taiwan, both of which
can be described as the same Chinese nation. Moreover, the problem of the identity of ASEAN
itself, which has grown into a stable organization for regional cooperation following many twists
and turns since its inception in 1967, cannot be made light of either. Thus, the formation of a“common home of East Asia” (the identity) corresponding to the economic EAC is still in aprocess of groping.
Another important non-economic matter involves ideas and developments regarding regional
cooperation in the area of security. Developments in the past couple of years show that China iseager to build a mechanism for East Asian regional cooperation in the area of security as well aseconomy. For example, though the statement has only a symbolic significance at present, in thesummer of 2003 China expressed its intention to join the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation(TAC) and in July 2004 the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Chinese Foreign Minister Li
Zhaoxing stated China would “actively participate in regional security cooperation” andproposed the holding of a first meeting of security policy in China, which the ARF officiallyaccepted. China has also taken the initiative at the six-party consultations on the Korean
Peninsula nuclear problem, which began in August 2003. In fact, China is seeking to turn thesix-party consultations into a future permanent forum, the “Northeast Asia SecurityOrganization” (overseas edition of the People’s Daily, August 30, 2003) and to build a “peacemechanism” that also covers non-traditional security issues (White Paper on Diplomacy, 2004).
Though not designed for East Asia, the Shanghai Five, formed in 1996 with the objectives ofmonitoring and exchanging information on independence movements of ethnic minorities andthe promotion of economic cooperation, evolved into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO), which since last year also covers security cooperation such as joint military exercises.
Why, then, did China change its policy and start to eagerly to seek the establishment of a“regional community”? The establishment and development of a framework for regionalcooperation in East Asia would: (1) allow China to develop stable economic interdependencewith neighboring countries to promote mutual benefits in economic development and to respondthrough cooperation with other countries to economic attacks (including the precedent of theAsian monetary crisis in 1997) from the outside (particularly the United States), and (2)contribute to the realization of the “great restoration of the Chinese nation,” the priority goal of
China’s national strategy. The key point in (2) is for China to win the appreciation and respect
befitting a leader of international society while maintaining the national strength to allow it to3

spurn the imposition of other countries’ intentions.
However, going beyond that, China seems to be also seeking: (3) to build a “framework for an
East Asian order” of its own that could influence the international society as a whole in thefuture. Before anything else, if the East Asian region as a whole can increase its comprehensive
strength as a regional bloc and if China can take the initiative in the region, though initially in a
restrained manner, it would be able to acquire the capacity to avoid China bashing (e.g., thebombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999) and interference in domestic affairs(Tibet, Taiwan, democratization and so forth) by the United States. In the longer perspective,
however, it appears that China thinks it may be able to destabilize the “hegemonistic order
imposed by the United States alone” that China has never fundamentally accepted. China seems
to design the establishment of a three sphere-oriented international order (North America led by
the United States + the EU + the East Asia Community) in the future, over a certain period oftime (perhaps over 10 to 20 years).
For example, Zhang Yunling, director of the Institute of Asian and Pacific Studies of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, made the following remarks at a round-table discussion on“regional cooperation in East Asia and the United States”: “We do not need the United States forregional cooperation in East Asia. We are not saying that its existence is not important. We aretrying to find our own independent way of cooperation in economics, politics and security in theEast Asian region. For example, needless to say, the United States is not in the European Union(EU). Still, the United States and Europe maintain relations. In U.S.-Europe relations, the UnitedStates is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). I think an ideal for
relations between the United States and East Asia would be the relationship that exits between
the United States and Europe. To achieve that sort of relationship, first, we have to firmly
establish a system of cooperation in East Asia.”
Admittedly, whether Zhang Yunling’s ideas are commonly accepted in China needs to be
examined further. For example, his ideas sound slightly different from the above-mentioned
keynote speech by Wang Yi. However, as pointed out earlier, China is fundamentally raising anobjection to the “unipolar hegemonistic order” imposed by the United States, and previously
advocated “multipolarization” to back up this opposition. But this opposition is not as effective
as China might have hoped. Given this, however, it would not be so off the mark to judge that
China is setting its sights on a new “three sphere-oriented order.” Besides, its emphasis on
ASEAN’s leading role sounds more like just a compliment to ASEAN nations. In reality,
China-led moves are actively underway toward the establishment of mechanisms for regional
cooperation, such as FTAs with ASEAN, the creation of the SCO, the six-party consultations onNorth Korea, and the proposal for a Northeast Asian security organization. Needless to say,
China is taking advantage of its status as the only permanent member of the U.N. Security
Council from Asia to push its own initiatives for the promotion of regional cooperation.

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(This is the text of an article by Prof. AMAKO Satoshi, Professor of Waseda University andMember of the Council on East Asian Community, which was originally posted on thewebsite of “Amako Ajia-ron” (http://eac.cocolog-nifty.com/amako/).)5