Co‐sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN‐ISIS)

Report of
The 4th JAPAN‐ASEAN DIALOGUEBY GFJ / ASEAN‐ISISon“The Prospect for East Asian Community andRegional Cooperation”

June 12‐13, 2005 / Toranomon Pastoral
Tokyo, Japan

Supported by
Japan‐ASEAN Exchange Projects (JAEP)In Cooperation with
The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)

Clara JOEWONO, Deputy Executive Director, CSIS, chairing the Session I (third from right)

Hank LIM, Director of Research, SIIA, giving the keynote speech in the Session II (third from left)

Participants lively exchanging views in the session III

Preface
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote a policy‐oriented exchange of views
between business, opinion and political leaders of Japan and their counterparts in the rest of the world
and to contribute to the deepening of mutual understanding and the formation of the consensus.

For

this purpose, GFJ has been actively engaged for the past 23 years in organizing policy‐oriented bilateral
and/or multilateral “Dialogues” every year between Japan and the rest of the world.
It is against this background that GFJ held the 4th Japan‐ASEAN Dialogue “The Prospect for
East Asian Community and Regional Cooperation” in Tokyo on 12‐13 June 2005.

This report intends

to summarize the achievements of these discussions between Japanese and their ASEAN counterparts.
The full text of the report will be available at the website of GFJ (http://www.gfj.jp/) as well.
The 4th Japan‐ASEAN Dialogue “The Prospect for East Asian Community and Regional
Cooperation” was held under the joint auspices of GFJ and ASEAN‐ISIS, in cooperation with theCouncil on East Asian Community (CEAC), and was attended by 104 participants including 11
panelists representing ASEAN.

Participants exchanged opinions on matters of significance related to

the future of Japan‐ASEAN relations towards East Asian Community.

We would like to take thisopportunity to express our gratitude to the Japan‐ASEAN Exchange Projects, which generously
supported this 4th Japan‐ASEAN Dialogue.

August 1, 2005
Ito Kenichi
President
The Global Forum of Japan

Table of Contents
1. Program ……………………………………………...………………………………1

2. Participants List ………………………………………...………………………………...3

3. Biographies of Mediators and Panelists ……………...……………………………..5

4. Outlines of Discussions ………………………….…………………………………12

5. Policy Recommendations ………………………….…………………………………….14

6. Keynote Papers ……………………...……………………………………………….16
Session I: “An Open Community Based on Universal Values”…………..…...…..……..…......……….…16
by ITO Kenichi ………………..…………….......……..…......……….…19

by Carolina G.HERNANDEZ

Session II: “Promoting Functional Approaches”………..….……….……..………………….….…22
by Hank LIM …………………..……………..…………..……...………29

by TAKEUCHI Yukio

Session III: “The Role of ASEAN Towards Community Building”
by Hadi SOESASTRO ….………………………...……………………….37
by OE Hiroshi ….………………………...……………………….….….44

7. Appendix ………………………………………………………………...…………………46(1) “The Role of ASEAN Towards Community Building” by Termsak Chalermpalanupap…... 46(2) “Asia and Its Diversity” by Kai Noritake ……………………………………….…….….......52

8. An Introduction to GFJ……………………………………………...…………………65

9. An Introduction to ASEAN‐ISIS …………………………………...……………….68

1. Program
THE 4th JAPAN-ASEAN DIALOGUE
第４回日・ＡＳＥＡＮ対話

The Prospect for East Asian Community and Regional Cooperation「東アジア共同体への展望と地域協調」
June 12-13, 2005 Toranomon Pastoral／2005年6月12-13日 虎ノ門パストラル
Tokyo, Japan／東京
Supported by／助成Japan-ASEAN Exchange Projects (JAEP)／日・ASEAN学術交流基金
Co-sponsored by／共催
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) ／グローバル・フォーラム
ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) ／ASEAN戦略国際問題研究所連合
In Cooperation with／協力
The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)／東アジア共同体評議会

Sunday, June 12, 2005 ／ 2005 年 6 月 12 日（日）"Pêche", Toranomon Pastoral, 6th Floor
Welcome Dinner *Invitation Only ／開幕夕食会 * 特別招待者のみ
18:00-20:00

Welcome Dinner hosted by ITO Kenichi, President, CEAC
伊藤憲一東アジア共同体評議会議長主催開幕夕食会

Monday, June 13, 2005 ／ 2005 年 6 月 13 日（月）"Rosé," Toranomon Pastoral, 6th Floor / 虎ノ門パストラル６階「ロゼ」
Session I ／本会議Ⅰ
9:30-11:40"An Open Community Based on Universal Values"「普遍的価値に基づいた開かれた共同体」

Opening Remarks (5 min.)
開会挨拶 （5分間）

KAI Noritake, Governor, GFJ
甲斐 紀武 グローバル・フォーラム世話人

Co-chairpersons
共同議長

FUKUSHIMA Akiko, Director of Policy Studies and Senior Fellow, National Institute for
Research Advancement / Individual Member, CEAC
福島 安紀子 総合研究開発機構主席研究員 / CEAC有識者議員
Clara JOEWONO, Deputy Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS) （Republic of Indonesia)
クララ・ユウォノ 戦略国際問題研究所副所長（インドネシア）

Opening Speech (5 min.)
開会挨拶

OKAWARA Yoshio, Chairman, GFJ / Vice-President, CEAC
大河原 良雄 グローバルフォーラム代表世話人 / CEAC副議長

Paper Presenter (15min.)基調報告 （15分間）

Carolina G. HERNANDEZ, President, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies(ISDS)(Republic of Philippines)
カロリナ・G・ヘルナンデス 戦略開発問題研究所理事長（フィリピン）Paper Presenter (15min.)基調報告 （15分間）

ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ / President, CEAC伊藤 憲一 グローバル・フォーラム執行世話人 / CEAC議長

Lead Discussant A (5 min.)
コメントA （5分間）

Stephen LEONG, Assistant Director General, Institute of Strategic and International Studies
Malaysia (Malaysia)
スティーブン・レオン 戦略国際問題研究所副部長（マレーシア）

Lead Discussant B (5 min.)
コメントB （5分間）

TERADA Takashi, Assistant Professor, National University of Singapore
寺田 貴 シンガポール国立大学助教授

Lead Discussant C (5 min.)
コメントC （5分間）

Chap SOTHARITH, Executive Director, The Cambodian Institute for Cooperation andPeace(CICP) (Kingdom of Cambodia)
チャップ・ソティラット カンボディア平和協力研究所所長（カンボディア）

Free Discussions (70min.)
自由討議 （70分間）

All Participants
出席者全員

11:40-12:45

Break ／ 休憩

1

Session Ⅱ ／本会議Ⅱ
12:45-14:35"Promoting Functional Approaches"「機能的なアプローチの推進」

Co-chairpersons
共同議長

KAI Noritake, Governor, GFJ
甲斐 紀武 グローバル・フォーラム世話人
Clara JOEWONO, Deputy Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS) （Republic of Indonesia)
クララ・ユウォノ 戦略国際問題研究所副所長（インドネシア）

Paper Presenter (15min.)基調報告 （15分間）

TAKEUCHI Yukio, ｆormer Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan竹内 行夫 前外務次官

Paper Presenter (15min.)基調報告 （15分間）

Hank LIM, Director of Research, Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA)(Republic of Singapore)
ハンク・リム シンガポール国際問題研究所研究部長（シンガポール）

Lead Discussant A (5 min.)
コメントA （5分間）

KINOSHITA Toshihiko, Professor, Waseda University / Individual Member, CEAC
木下 俊彦 早稲田大学教授 / CEAC有識者議員

Lead Discussant B (5 min.)
コメントB （5分間）

Nyunt TIN, Secretary, Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies (MISIS)(Union of Myanmar)
ニュン・ティン ミャンマー戦略国際問題研究所書記（ミャンマー）Lead Discussant C (5 min.)
コメントC （5分間）

MATSUDA Iwao, Member of the House of Councilors / Individual Member, CEAC
松田 岩夫 参議院議員 / CEAC有識者議員

Free Discussions (60min.)
自由討議 （60分間）

All Participants
出席者全員

14:35-14:40

Break ／休憩

Session Ⅲ／本会議Ⅲ
14:40-16:30"The Role of ASEAN Towards Community Building"「共同体形成へのASEANの役割」

Co-chairpersons
共同議長

KAKIZAWA Koji, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan / Opinion Leader Member GFJ /Vice Chairman, CEAC
柿澤 弘治 元外務大臣 / GFJ有識者メンバー / CEAC副会長
Bounnheuang SONGNAVONG, Deputy Director Ｇeneral, Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA)（Lao People's Democratic Republic)
ブンニュアン・ソンナボン 外交問題研究所副部長 (ラオス）

Paper Presenter (15min.)基調報告 （15分間）

Hadi SOESASTRO, Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS)(Republic of Indonesia)
ハディ・ソエサストロ 戦略国際問題研究所所長（インドネシア）

Paper Presenter (15min.)基調報告 （15分間）

OE Hiroshi, Professor, University of Tokyo / Individual Member, CEAC
大江 博 東京大学教授 / CEAC有識者議員

Lead Discussant A (5 min.)
コメント A （5分間）

Termsak CHALERMPALANUPAP, Special Assistant to the Secretary-General of ASEAN(ASEAN Secretariat)
タームサック・チャラーンパラヌパップ ASEAN事務総長特別補佐官（ＡＳＥＡＮ事務局）

Lead Discussant B (5 min.)
コメント B （5分間）

OGASAWARA Takayuki, Professor, Yamanashi Gakuin University
小笠原 高雪 山梨学院大学教授

Lead Discussant C (5 min.)
コメント C （5分間）

HOANG Anh Tuan, Deputy Director General, The Institute for International Relations (IIR)(Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)
ホアン・アン・トゥアン 外務省国際関係研究所所長（ヴィエトナム）

Free Discussions (60min.)
自由討議 （60分間）

All Participants
出席者全員

Final Wrap-up Session ／総括
16:30-17:00"The Prospect for East Asian Community and Regional Cooperation"「東アジア共同体への展望と地域協調」

Co-chairpersons (30min.)
共同議長（30分間）

TANIGUCHI Makoto, President, Iwate Prefectural University / Individual Member, CEAC
谷口 誠 岩手県立大学長 / CEAC有識者議員
Suchit BUNBONGKARN, Senior Fellow, Institute of Strategic and International Studies(Kingdom of Thailand)
スジット・ブンボンカーン 安全保障問題研究所初代所長（タイ）Closing Remarks
閉会挨拶

KAI Noritake, Governor, GFJ
甲斐 紀武 グローバル・フォーラム世話人

2. Participants List
【ASEAN Panelists】
Suchit BUNBONGKARN
Termsak CHALERMPALANUPAP
Carolina G. HERNANDEZ
HOANG Anh Tuan

Stephen LEONG
Hank LIM
Hadi SOESASTRO

Senior Fellow, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) (Kingdom of Thailand
Special Assistant to the Secretary‐General of ASEAN (ASEAN Secretariat)
President, The Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) (Republic of Philippines
Deputy Director‐General, the Institute for International Relations (IIR
(Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)
Deputy Executive Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS(Republic of Indonesia)
Assistant Director‐General, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (Malaysia
Director for Research, Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) (Republic of Singapore
Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (Republic of Indonesia

Bounnheuang SONGNAVONG

Deputy Director General, Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) (Lao Peopleʹs Democratic Republic)

Chap SOTHARITH

Executive Director, The Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP(Kingdom of Cambodia)
Secretary, Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies (MISIS(Union of Myanmar)

Clara JOEWONOU Nyunt TIN【Japanese Panelists】
FUKUSHIMA Akiko

KINOSHITA Toshihiko
MATSUDA Iwao
OE Hiroshi
OKAWARA Yoshio
OGASAWARA Takayuki
TAKEUCHI Yukio
TANIGUCHI Makoto
TERADA Takashi

Director of Policy Studies and Senior Fellow, National Institute for Research
Advancement / Individual Member, CEAC
President, GFJ / President, CEAC
Governor, GFJFormer Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan / Opinion Leader Member GFJ/Vice Chairman, CEAC
Professor, Waseda University / Individual Member, CEAC
Member of the House of Councilors / Individual Member, CEAC
Professor, the University of Tokyo / Individual Member, CEAC
Chairman, GFJ / Vice‐President, CEAC
Professor, Yamanashi Gakuin University
Former Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan
President, Iwate Prefectural University / Individual Member, CEAC
Assistant Professor, National University of Singapore【Participants】
Abdul IRSANADACHI Jun
AKAO Nobutoshi
ARAI Hirofumi
ARAIKE Katsuhiko
ASAMI Tadahiro
ASOMURA Kuniaki
CHHAU Sothira
Daw Hmway Hmway KHYNE
FUJITA Takashi
FUKATA Yuko
FUKUCHI Aki
HASHIMOTO Hiroshi
HIBINO Masaaki
HIRONAKA Wakako
HIRONO Ryokichi
HOSOKAWA Disuke
IMAGAWA Yukiko
IKEO Aiko
ISHIGAKI Yasuji
ISHII Ichiji
ISHIZUKA Yoshikazu

Ambassador, Indonesian Embassy
Editor in Chief, Japan Broadcast Publishing Co.,Ltd.
Secretary General, ASEAN‐Japan Center
Manager, General Affairs Division, Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia
Regional Policy Division, Asian & Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Managing Director, Institute for International Monetary Affairs
Visiting Professor, Reitaku University
Second Secretary, Royal Embassy of Cambodia
1st Secretary, the Embassy of the Union of Myanmar
Senior Economist, Japan Cnter for International Finance Asia Department 2
Student, ChuoUniversity
Manager, Rseaerch Office, The Bank of Tokyo‐Mitsubishi, Ltd
Senior Advisor, ITOCHU Corporation
Director, ST.Margaretʹs College
Member, House of Councilors
Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
Professor, Osaka University of Economics
President, Japan Cambodia Association
Professor, Waseda University
vice president ,CEAC/Councilor, GFJ
President, Japan Center for Confilict Prevention
Editorial Adviser, Keizai Koho Center (Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs)

ITO Kenichi
KAI Noritake
KAKIZAWA Koji

3

IWANAMI Michio
KAJI Yasuhiro
KAWAI Masao
KIMURA AYAKIMURA Takayuki

Director for International Trade Policy Negotiations, International Affair
Department,
Business Division General Manager, Japan Credit Rating Agency
Senior Adviser, Infrastructure Development Institute Japan
Asian News Section, Foreign News Department, Asahi Shimbun
Visiting Professor, International Christian University

4

KOBAYASHI Toshio
KOGURE Masayoshi
KONDO Seiichi
KONDO Tetsuo
KUSAKA Sumio
MURAYAMA Hiroshi
Mireya SOLISNAGAI Shigenobu
NAGANO Shigeto
NARITA Hironari
NISHIMURA Naomi
OIWA Takaaki
OKAMOTO Yumiko
POU Sothirak
SAKAJIRI Kengo
SAKAMOTO Masahiro
Sandora SAKIHARASAWAI Teruyuki
SHIBAMOTO ShoSHINDO Eiichi
SHIRAISHI EikoSHIRAISHI Saya
TAJIMA Takashi
TAKAGI Seiji
TAKAHASHI Katsuhide
TAKEUCHI Kazumasa
TAKEUCHI Yukifumi
TANAKA Yasumasa
TANIKAWA Hiroya
TOJO Yoshiaki
URATA Shujiro
YAMADA Takio
YAMASHITA Eiji
YAMAZAWA Ippei
YOSHITOMI Masaru
YUSHITA Hiroyuki
ZHANG Yan

Representative, Office in Japan, Inter American Development Bank
Former Professor of Toyo University
Director ‐General, Public Diplomacy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
President, INES
Deputy Vice Minister for Internal Affairs, Ministry of FinanceStaff Writer, International Department, The Nikkei
Assistant Professor, American University, Visiting Professor, Waseda University
Councilor, FEC International Friendship Exchange Council
President, Japan Forum Strategic Studies
Professor, Ohkagakuen University
Student, ChuoUniversity
Special Assistant to Director General/ Senior Researcher, Japan International Cooperation Agency(JICA)
Professor, Faculty of Policy Studies, Doshisha University
Ambassador, Embassy of Kingdom of Cambodia
Politics department, Asahi Shimbun
Chief Researcher, Japan Forum of International Relations
Mansfield Fellow, International Affairs Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisherie
Former Ambassador to Norway
Student, National University of Singapore
Professor Emeritus, University of Tsukuba
Regional Policy Division, Asian & Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Professor, the University of Tokyo, Graduate School
Visiting Professor, Graduate School, ToyoEiwa University
Director, Trade Policy Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
Associate Professor, Kobe University
Manager, Corporate Planning, Asahi Glass Co., Ltd.
Staff Writer, Foreign News department, Asahi Shimbun
Emeritus Professor, Gakushuin University
Director, Industrial Safety Division, METI
Director for International Economic Affairs Division, METI
Professor, Waseda Uniiversity
Director, Regional Policy Division, Asian & Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Professor, Osaka City Univ.
President, International University of Japan
President & Chief Research Officer, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry
Visting Professor, Kyorin University
Third Secretary, Embassy of the Peopleʹs Republic of China
In Alphabetical Order【The Secretariat: The Global Forum of Japan】
WATANABE Mayu
Executive Secretary
MURATA Aya
Executive Secretary
KOGA Kei
Assistant Executive Secretary
KIRIYAMA Ken
Officer in Charge
SANO Takeshi
Officer in Charge
FUJII Miyuki
Secretarial Staff
NAGAYAMA Daigo
Secretarial Staff
NORO Naoko
Secretarial Staff
SHIBUYA Momoyo
Secretarial Staff
HAYASHI Yuka
Secretarial Staff
LEE Sang soo
Secretarial Assistant
MATSUMOTO Akiko
Secretarial Assistant
NEZU Yukio
Secretarial Assistant
TAKAI Yusuke
Secretarial Assistant
TERUYA Aki
Secretarial Assistant
SANUKI Ayami
Secretarial Assistant
SEKI Nobuyasu
Secretarial Assistant5

3. Biographies of Mediators and Panelists【ASEAN Panelists】
Clara JOEWONO
Deputy Director, The Centre for Strategic and International Studies （CSIS）（Republic of Indonesia)
Graduated from University of Indonesia. Received M.A. from the University of California, Berkeley.
Served as visiting fellow at the George Washington University in 1981, Congressional Fellow U.S.
Congress from 1981‐82, Secretary of the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic Studies from 1984‐2003,
Chairperson of Bung Hatta Anti‐Corruption Award from 2003‐04.

Carolina G. HERNANDEZ
President, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies（ISDS）(Republic of Philippines)
Graduated from the University of the Philippines. Received M.A. from the University of Karachi, andPh.D. from the State University of New York at Buffalo. Served as Chairperson of the ASEAN
Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, Visiting Professor at the University of Toronto, Kobe
University, Professor of the University of the Philippines.

Stephen LEONG
Assistant Director‐General, Institute of Strategic and International Studies(Malaysia)
Graduated from University of Illinois in 1960. Received M.A. from University of California at
Berkeley in 1962, and Ph.D. from University of California at Los Angeles in 1976. Involved in ISIS
from 1984. Served as Senior Fellow and Director, Centre for Japan Studies in 1992. Serves also in otherimportant positions.

5Chap SOTHARITH
Executive Director, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace(Kingdom of Cambodia)
Graduated from Institute of Economics, Phnom Penh in 1989. Received Master from Asian Institute ofTechnology, Bangkok in 1994, Ph.D. from the University of Sydney in 2002. Served as English
Language lecturer at private schools from 1983‐93, Director of ASEAN Department, the Office ofCouncil of Ministers from 1996‐98, World Bank Consultant as Training Coordinator from 2002‐04.

Hank LIM
Director for Research, Singapore Institute of International Affairs(Republic of Singapore)
Graduated from Gannon College in 1966. Received M.A. and Ph.D. from University of Pittsburgh in1968 and 1975 respectively. Served as Senior Lecturer of National University of Singapore from1982‐96, Associate of National University of Singapore from 1996‐2000, Associate Professional Fellowof National University of Singapore from 2000‐03

Nyunt TIN
Secretary, Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies(Union of Myanmar)
Graduated from the Myanmar Defense Services Academy in 1965. Served various positions in the
Myanmar Air Force as a pilot officer from 1965‐89. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Appointed
to Consul‐General of the Myanmar Consulate General from 1990‐92, the Myanmar Ambassador
accredited to Indonesia, France, Canada from 1992‐2003.

Bounnheuang SONGNAVONG
Deputy Director General, Institute of Foreign Affairs(Lao People’s Democratic Republic)6

Graduated from the Institute of Law and Administration in Vientiane in 1975, and M.A. from the
University of Wollongong in 1993. Served Deputy Director‐General, the Lao Committee for Peace,
Solidarity and Friendship with Foreign Countries, various positions in Ministry of Foreign Affairs
including Counselor & DCM, Embassy of the Lao PDR to Japan.

Hadi SOESASTRO
Executive Director, The Centre for Strategic and International Studies(Republic of Indonesia)
Graduated from RW‐TH Aachen, Recieved Ph.D. from the Rand Graduate School, Served as
Executive Director, CSIS from 1989 excluding 1997, a professor in various universities in Indonesia
and USA including Lecturer, University of Indonesia from 1985‐88, Visiting Professor, Columbia
University from 1988‐89.

Termsak CHALERMPALANUPAP
Special Assistant to the Secretary‐General of the ASEAN Secretariat(Kingdom of Thailand)
Graduated from Chulalongkorn University in 1977. Received M.A. and Ph.D. from University of New
Orleans in 1982 and 1986 respectively. Served various positions in The Nation, an independent
English‐language daily in Bangkok from 1972‐92, Assistant Director of the ASEAN Secretariat from
1999.

HOANG Anh Tuan
Deputy Director‐General, The Institute for International Relations(Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)
Graduated from the College of Foreign Affairs. Received M.A. and Ph.D. from Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Served as Visiting Fellow of the Institute of International Peace
Research, Norway, the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

7Suchit BUNBONGKARN
Senior Fellow, The Institute for Security and International Studies(Kingdom of Thailand)
Graduated from Chulalongkorn University. Recieved M.A., M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Served as an advisor to Prime Minister Prem
Tinasulanonda, as a member of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly in 1997, Chairman of ISIS
Thailand and as a Justice of the Constitutional Court from 2000‐04, Professor Emeritus of
Chulalongkorn University.

(In order of appearance)【Japanese Panelists】
FUKUSHIMA Akiko
Director of Policy Studies / Senior Fellow, The National Institute for Research Advancement(NIRA)
Received M.A. from Johns Hopkins University in 1994, and Ph.D. from Osaka University in 1997.
Served various positions including Adjunct Professor at Keio University from 2000‐02, Visiting
Professor at Center on International Relations, Visiting Professor at University of British Columbia
from 2002‐03. Concurrently, Individual Member, CEAC

OKAWARA Yoshio
Chairman, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
B.A. from the University of Tokyo and entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1942. Served
various positions including Director‐General of the American Affairs Bureau, Deputy Vice‐Minister
for Administration, and Ambassador to Australia and the U.S. Served as President of the Institutefor International Policy Studies since 1993. Chairman of the Global Forum of Japan since 1993.

8

ITO Kenichi
President, GFJ
Graduated from Hitotsubashi University. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at
Harvard University from 1961‐63. Served in the Japanese Foreign Service until 1977. Concurrently,
President & CEO of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), President of CEAC, President& CEO of GFJ, and Professor at Aoyama Gakuin University.

TERADA Takashi
Assistant Professor, National University of Singapore
Received Ph.D from Australian National University in 1999. A co‐editor, with Peter Drysdale,of Asia‐Pacific Economic Co‐Operation: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy (4 volumes),
RoutledgeCurzon, 2006. His research interests include international relations in Asia and the Pacific,
Japanese politics and foreign policy, and empirical and theoretical studies on regionalism.

KAI Noritake
Governor, GFJ
Graduated from Hitotsubashi University. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1964. Served
various positions including Director of the First Africa Division, Deputy Chief of Protocol,
Ambassador to Panama, Ambassador to Lebanon, Ambassador to Tunisia, Professor at Kagoshima
Prefectural College in 2003. Concurrently, Councilor of the Japan Forum on International Relations.

TAKEUCHI Yukio
Advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Executive Advisor for Japan Business Federation
Graduated from Kyoto University in 1966 and Worcester College, Oxford University in 1969. Served
various positions including Deputy Director‐General of Asian Affairs Bureau from 1993‐95,
Director‐General of North American Affairs Bureau from 1997‐99, Deputy Vice‐Minister for Foreign
Policy at Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1999‐2000, Ambassador to Indonesia 2001‐02, Vice‐Ministerfor Foreign Affairs from 2002‐05.

9

OE Hiroshi
Professor, The University of Tokyo
Graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1979. Entered Japanese Diplomatic Service in 1979. Served
various positions including Deputy Director of China and Mongolia Division, Asia Affairs Bureau in
1993, Director of Treaties Division, Treaties Bureau from 2000‐02, Minister of Japanese Embassy inThailand from 2002‐05. Concurrently, Individual Member of CEAC.

OGASAWARA Takayuki
Professor, Yamanashi Gakuin University
Graduated from Keio University. Served the Japan Institute of International Affairs. Held his visiting
posts in Singapore from 1991‐92 and Hanoi from 1994‐95. His Research interests include politics andsecurity of South East Asia.

KAKIZAWA Koji
former Minister for Foreign Affairs
Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Entered the Ministry if Finance in 1958. Elected to theHouse of Councilors in 1977, Member of the House Representatives from 1980‐03. Served as
Parliamentary Vice‐Minister for Education, Parliamentary Vice‐Minister for Transport, Parliamentary
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan. Concurrently, Professor of
Tokai University, and from 2004 Vice Chairman of CEAC.

KINOSHITA Toshihiko
Professor, Waseda University
Professor, Graduate School of Commerce, Waseda University (2000‐04). Graduated from Keio
University in 1963. Served The Export‐Import Bank of Japan (currently, Japan Bank for International
Cooperation or JBIC) from 1963‐96, Visiting Scholar, National Bureau of Economic Research andHarvard Institute for International Development, Special Advisor for Asia, A.T. Kearney from
1996‐2000; Individual member of CEAC.

10

MATSUDA Iwao
Member of the House of Councilors
Graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1960. Served the Ministry of International Trade andIndustry from 1960‐81, Visiting professor at George Washington University in 1997, the first SeniorVice Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry in 2001. Concurrently, Chairman of ResearchCommittee on International Affairs from 2004, Chief Secretary of Research Commission on Foreign
Affairs from 2004 (LDP), Acting Chairman of Special Committee on External Economic
Cooperation from 2004 (LDP), Individual member of CEAC.

TANIGUCHI Makoto
President, Iwate Prefectural University
Graduated from Hitotsubashi University in 1954. Received M.A. from Hitotsubashi University andCambridge University in 1956 and 58 respectively. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1959.
Served various positions including Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations,(1986‐89) and Deputy
Secretary‐General of OECD from 1990‐96, Professor at Waseda University from 1997‐2000, Director of
the Research Institute of Current Chinese Affairs at Waseda University from 2000‐04. Concurrently,
Individual member of CEAC.

(In order of appearance)11

4. Outlines of Discussions
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) and the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic andInternational Studies (ASEAN‐ISIS) with the cooperation of the Council on East Asian
Community (CEAC), co‐sponsored the 4th Japan‐ASEAN Dialogue on the theme of“The Prospect for East Asian Community and Regional Cooperation” on June 12‐13,
2005 in Tokyo. This Dialogue followed the “Japan‐China Dialogue” in September,2004 and the “Japan‐Korea Dialogue” in April, 2005 and concluded a series of“Dialogues” regarding East Asian Community. There was a full day of lively
discussions among the 104 participants from Japan and ASEAN countries.
Universal Values and an Open Community in East Asia
In Session I on the theme of “An Open Community Based on Universal Values,”
Prof. Carolina G. HERNANDEZ, President, the Institute of Strategic andDevelopment Studies, presented her keynote speech, stating that “East Asian
Community is committed to the universal values found in the Charter of the United
Nations. Universal values being spread by economic prosperity, telecommunications
and transportation technology is likely to permeate into East Asia. ASEAN should
continue lying at the center of the East Asian Community building. After that, Prof.
ITO Kenichi, President of the GFJ, made a second keynote speech, stating that “inorder to create a region‐wide community, it will be essential to foster common values
which develop both Asian values rooted in the history of the region as well as theuniversal values shared by the modern world.”
In response to the keynote speeches, commentators put forward their opinions
for and/or against those speeches. “Our Asian values are important but most of all,trust is essential,” said Dr. Stephen LEONG, Assistant Director General of the Instituteof Strategic and International Studies of Malaysia. “Openness and universal values areimportant concepts when we discuss the East Asian community,” said Prof. Takashi
TERADA, Assistant Professor of National University of Singapore.
Promoting Functional Approaches in East Asia
In Session II on the theme of “Promoting Functional Approaches,” Yukio
TAKEUCHI, former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, gave the first keynote
speech. He stated that Functional cooperation in various fields such as economy,
culture, ethnicity, religion, politics, and security, should be promoted in order toestablish regional community in East Asia. In order to carry out such joint efforts
successfully, it is indispensable that national leaders demonstrate political leadership12and the people of each country express support.” Following that, Hank LIM, Directorof Research, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, stated that “To havefunctional cooperation, countries in the region must have clear concept about thedesired nature and characteristics of the community they intend to establish.”In response to the keynote speeches, “functional approach should be put
priority in the process of community building; however, we should not over‐politicize
the community building,” said KINOSHITA Toshihiko, Professor, Waseda University.
“Functional approach is the most powerful approach in the East Asian community
building, especially, in dealing with security issues,” commented Mr. MATSUDA Iwao,
Member of the House of Councilors.
Community Building in East Asia and the Role of ASEAN
In Session III under the theme of “the Role of ASEAN towards Community
Building,” Dr. Hadi SOESASTRO, Executive Director, the Centre for Strategic andInternational Studies of Indonesia, made a keynote speech and stated that “ASEAN
has played a critical role in the development of ASEAN Plus Three. ASEAN
experience and experiment should inspire community building in East Asia. China,
Korea and Japan should not continue to quarrel and must comet to settlement of thehistorical burden.” Subsequently, Prof. OE Hiroshi, the University of Tokyo, gave thesecond keynote speech. He stated that “Confidence building and preventive
diplomacy will be increasingly emphasized in East Asia. In response, “The ASEAN
way of community building in Southeast Asia, consisting of universally‐recognizedprinciples which can be inferred from the United Nation’s Charter and practicalmodalities, is very relevant to community building in East Asia” commented Mr.
Termsak CHALERMPALANUPAP, Special Assistant to the Secretary‐General of
ASEAN, ASEAN Secretariat. Prof. OGASAWARA Takayuki, Yamanashi Gakuin
University, said that “ASEAN should tackle Mekong project more actively, and Japan
should encourage ASEAN in this direction.”In the Final Wrap‐Up Session, Mr. TANIGUCHI Makoto, President, Iwate
Prefectural University, summarized, “It is indispensable for Japan and China tocooperate in order that the East Asian Community building is realized.” Mr. Suchit
BUNBONGKARN, Senior Fellow, Institute of Strategic and International Studies ofThailand, added that “Japan looks at economy; however, it is hoped for Japan to beconcerned more about politics.”

13

5. Policy Recommendations
1. The Prospect for East Asian Community (EAC)
1) Creation of a “Community of Willingness” is necessary for establishing EAC,
where East Asian countries cooperate willingly in various fields such associo‐economy and political‐security by emphasizing the “openness” of thecommunity.

2) “Openness” is the key to establishing EAC, but it is necessary to further consider
what kind of “openness” a community will be required to have.

3) Despite the fact that various obstacles still exist in East Asia, we should achieve“Peace, Prosperity, and Progress” through EAC in this region.

2. An Open Community Based on Universal Values
1) An East Asian Community should be an open community, as ASEAN+3 and theother participants in the EAC are all committed to open regionalism.

2) Universal values and Asian values are not mutually compatible, but they can be
blended, and it is important to have Asian uniqueness, while promoting such
universal values as democracy, human rights, and freedom.

3. Promoting Functional Approaches
1) A “functional approach” will be the core method of community building in East
Asia; however, and through this approach, we should let East Asia as a whole
progress.

142) Strengthening the functions of the secretariat to secure efficiency and avoiding
unnecessary overlaps in functional cooperation is important for community
building.

4. The Role of ASEAN Towards Community Building
1) ASEAN +3 must be the core to build an East Asian Community, and ASEAN
should also play an important role as a core, for ASEAN+3 will be serving as a corefor East Asian Community building.

2) With the “ASEAN Way”, ASEAN is able to set an agenda with the least number ofobjections from other countries, and for the time being, this method is useful forcommunity building in East Asia.

15

6. Keynote Papers
Session I
AN OPEN COMMUNITY WITH UNIVERSAL VALUES 1

Carolina G. HERNANDEZ, PhD
Founding President and Chair, Board of Directors
Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc.

The process of building a community in East Asia is well underway withnumerous initiatives and activities taking place including the earlier efforts of the East
Asia Vision Group and East Asia Study Group, followed by the ASEAN+3 process as aregional response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997. During the first decade of the 21st
century, the process received a further boost with the forging of comprehensive
economic agreements between ASEAN and China, ASEAN and Japan, ASEAN andSouth Korea, as well as numerous bilateral FTAs among many of them. In November
2003, ASEAN adopted the Bali Concord II seeking to establish an ASEAN Community
with three pillars – an ASEAN Economic Community, an ASEAN Security Community,
and an ASEAN Socio‐Cultural Community – by 2020. And in December 2005, the first
East Asia Summit (EAS) is scheduled to convene in Malaysia with more that ASEAN+3
countries participating.
ASEAN lies at the center of the East Asia community building process because
it enjoys the trust and confidence of all the neighbors in the region as well as the broader
Asia Pacific. Japan has had over 30 years of mutually beneficial and constructive
relations with ASEAN member states whose physical and other infrastructures critical to1

Prepared for the 4th Japan-ASEAN Dialogue “The Prospect for East Asia Community and Regional

Cooperation” hosted by the Global Forum of Japan, Tokyo, in cooperation with ASEAN ISIS, 13 June
2005.

16

their economic growth and development Japan helped tremendously to build through its
ODA, trade, and investments in Southeast Asia. Japan‐ASEAN relations also
demonstrates that former adversaries can build trust and confidence over time throughgood neighborly relations and the sharing of common values that are necessary elementsof reconciliation. China needs ASEAN to serve as its interlocutor with other powers
while it is rising, and possibly to prevent ASEAN from becoming partners of a risen
China’s future strategic competitors. And South Korea needs ASEAN in a wider
grouping so it is not left to face two major regional powers alone.
Since its founding, ASEAN has also developed a set of norms and values thatproved helpful in forging stable relations among its member states on the one hand, andbetween them and their dialogue partners in and outside the region on the other. Not
entirely enamored with formal institutional mechanisms and preferring flexibility,
ASEAN norms and values are more informal codes of interstate behavior seen in its
various declarations and two treaties. These declarations began with the Bangkok
Declaration of 1967, followed by others such as the first Bali Concord adopted during its
first summit in 1976, its Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality(ZOPFAN), the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea of 1992, the ASEAN Vision
2020, and the November 2003 Bali Concord II, among others. Its two treaties are theTreaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ).
These documents consist of principles of interstate conduct based on the United
Nations Charter, as well as the goals to make Southeast Asia a zone of peace, freedom,and neutrality, a nuclear weapons‐free zone, and a three‐pillared ASEAN community. Asa claimant state to the South China Sea disputes, China has associated itself with thenorms of interstate conduct adopted by ASEAN through bilateral memoranda ofagreements with Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, for example, and with ASEAN
as a group in the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea forged between them in 2002.
The Plus 3 countries, India, and New Zealand (and Russia) have acceded to the TAC. As
such they have bound themselves to the self‐constraining rules of interstate conduct,
including sovereign equality of states, respect for the territorial integrity and nationalsovereignty of other states, peaceful settlement of disputes, and non‐interference in thedomestic affairs of other states. These norms and principles – values in other words –are held by all the ASEAN+3 countries, as well as prospective participants in the East
Asia Summit because the preconditions for participation in the EAS includes accession to17

the TAC in addition to having substantive relations with ASEAN and being a full
dialogue partner. Among the prospective participants of the EAS, only Australia has yet
to accede to the TAC. In this regard, some Australian officials are optimistic of theirgovernment’s accession prior to the EAS.
The East Asia community is also going to be an open community. ASEAN+3 andthe likely participants to the EAS are all committed to open regionalism such as that in
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the ASEAN Vision 2020
where one of the elements is “an outward looking ASEAN”. The East Asia community is
unlikely to be a closed community because its members are interdependent with otherregions, particularly North America and the European Union (EU). Not only are theireconomies highly integrated and interdependent, so are they also interdependent andincreasingly being integrated with the economies of North America and the EU.
Contemporary globalization will help ensure an open East Asia community in the future.
Universal values in this open East Asia community consist in those already found in the
U.N. Charter and the TAC. Beyond the norms and principles of interstate conduct foundin these documents, East Asia is also in principle committed to the universal values ofhuman rights found in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights by the sheer dint of
the fact that the members of this emerging community are U.N. members obligated toobserve U.N. values. Within ASEAN that I argued earlier is the core of this East Asia
community, the elements of the ASEAN Security Community include politicaldevelopment, norms setting, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution with the end inview of creating within ASEAN a just, democratic, and harmonious community. In the
pursuit of political development, the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) to realize thisASEAN Security Community includes human rights promotion and observance as wellas greater people’s political participation, an ASEAN euphemism for democracy.
Finally, universal humanitarian values being spread by economic prosperity,
telecommunications and transportation technology, and increasing education andmobility of peoples are likely to permeate these dynamic East Asian economies andsocieties within the foreseeable future and make this open East Asia community also one
with universal values. In this process, the increasingly empowered and skillful citizens of
the members of this community would be the likely sources of their government’s
eventual acceptance of these universal values, so that the principle of non‐intervention in
the domestic affairs of other countries would not have to remain a refuge of governments
unwilling to share power with their citizens.
18

Kenichi ITO
President, Global Forum of Japan

East Asia stands at the historic crossroads today. In the economic aspect, East
Asia is now a tremendous source of dynamism for the entire world, and the process
toward de facto regional economic integration is in progress. Wide‐ranging functional
cooperation is moving forward in a variety of areas including FTAs, finance, and thetransnational issues. Moreover, in social and cultural spheres, a new middle class—one
which shares the same lifestyles and interests—is emerging in East Asian countries,
and this class is shaping new cultural phenomena and values. On the other hand, fromthe political and security aspects, enormous diversity and disparities still exist among
the countries in the region, particularly in the political principles and regimes as wellas in recognitions of security threats. Various political problems cast shadows over the
future of the region, for which the current state of Japan‐China relations is just an
example.
In order to achieve the creation of an East Asian community, we need todevelop our own original approaches based on the actual situation in the region. The
experiences of Europe and other regions may give us many valuable insights andlessons regarding the creation of a region‐wide community, but we cannot just apply
the same approaches to East Asia. Mr. Yasushi Akashi, former Under‐Secretary‐Generalof the United Nations who made great efforts for peace building in Cambodia and theformer Yugoslavia, makes a very pertinent point when he says that “for peace building,a different methodology is necessary for each and every case, and each approach must
be tailor‐made.” In the same way, approaches for regional community–building mustalso be “tailor‐made.” It would be a mistake to try to apply the same European
methodology to East Asia. At the same time, just because the European methodology
cannot be applied to East Asia, we should not be pessimistic about the prospects for thecreation of an East Asian community.
Then, what kind of approach is appropriate for East Asia? Many people argue
that a “functional approach” rather than an “institutional approach” is best suited toEast Asia. I, too, share this view. Considering the situation in East Asia, it would be19very difficult to establish anytime soon political institutions similar to the EU’s. A much
more realistic approach is to start from promoting functional cooperation in various
areas and sectors. But in order to create a region‐wide community, it will be essential
not only to promote functional cooperation but also to foster common values in theregion, which could be called the ethos of the community. These common values
provide the basis for the fostering of mutual trust and confidence as well as a sharedsense of community among the countries in the region. They also serve as a catalyst forbringing together the different lines of cooperation in the various functional fields andintegrating them into the comprehensive entirety of the community. In light of thediversity in East Asia, fostering common values in the region is by no means an easytask. But this makes it all the more incumbent on us to develop original and effective
methods for doing so.
The origins of the common values in Europe can be traced both (a) to theshared historical roots reaching back to the early days of Christianity, Roman law, Latin,and so forth, and (b) to the more modern universal values represented by liberal
democracy and market economy. We can, of course, theoretically consider taking asimilar approach for East Asia. However, the problem is that Asia is far more diverse incultures, religions and ethnicities than Europe, and it is not easy to identify common
traditional values shared across the region. Rather we should try to find commonality
in the region’s tolerance in accepting this diversity of cultures, religions, and traditions.
In either case, finding the true state of values and perceptions in East Asia is anincreasingly important endeavor from now. We are placing high expectations on the
results of projects in this area, such as the Promotion of East Asian Studies project,headed by Professor Akihiko Tanaka of Tokyo University, and the Asia Barometer
Survey project, led by Professor Takashi Inoguchi of Chuo University.
With reference to the universal values like freedom, human rights, anddemocracy, although we call them “universal,” they are clearly originated in modern
Western societies. It is thus difficult to claim that these values have taken root in East
Asia to a level comparable to that in the Western world. At the same time, in East Asia
the process of democratization is progressing steadily, step by step, in the Philippines,
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, and other countries, and the importance of
these universal values is increasingly well recognized. Moreover, references touniversal values like democracy have come to be incorporated as an essential element
in statements and documents issued by regional summit meetings, such as the Tokyo20

Declaration issued by the Japan‐ASEAN Commemorative Summit in 2003, theDeclaration of ASEAN Concord II by the 2003 ASEAN Summit, and the Declaration ofStrategic Partnership by the Asia‐Africa Summit in April of this year. Moreover, the“new middle class,” which is expected to be the cadre for the creation of an East Asian
community in the future, is a generation of globalization. When this generation comesto occupy the nucleus of East Asian societies, greater possibilities will open up foruniversal values to take root in a genuine sense.
Looked at in this way, I believe we should search for the origins of East Asian
common values both in Asian values rooted in the history of the region as well as in theuniversal values shared by the modern world. The search for, and recognition of, Asianvalues will serve to clarify the identity of an East Asian community and contribute to
the creation of prosperous societies and cultures that retain their own uniqueness andoriginality. On the other side, the genuine realization of the universal values will
facilitate the establishment of more dynamic and mature social, economic, and politicalinstitutions. Moreover, the common values forged in this way will greatly contribute to
the fostering of mutual trust and confidence among the countries in the region and to
the enhancing of understanding of, and trust in, the creation of an East Asian
community among countries outside of the region. I already alluded to the problems
between Japan and China at the beginning of my remarks, but I believe that these
problems currently bedeviling the Japan‐China relationship have arisen largely
because trust and confidence based on shared values has not been fostered between thetwo countries.
At the East Asia Summit to be held in December of this year, the leaders of theparticipating countries should agree to make the sharing of values—values both Asianand universal in nature—one of the important pillars underpinning the fundamental
principles for regional cooperation with a view to creating a region‐wide community inthe future. They should then make clear their aspiration to realize an Asian‐like East
Asia, which is richly unique and diverse, as well as to build a new East Asia, in which
respect for freedom, human rights, and democracy is genuinely rooted. Moreover,Japan, which has realized to a high degree both Asian and universal values, should
demonstrate strong leadership in this endeavor.

21

Session II
PROMOTING FUNCTIONAL APPROACHES

Yukio TAKEUCHI
former Vice‐Minister for Foreign Affairs

1. Background: The Dynamism of East Asia and the Deepening of MutualInterdependenceWith the economic development of countries in the region and advancing
globalization since the latter half of the 1990s, common economic interests and mutual
complementarities within the region have rapidly deepened. This development can beseen as the advancement toward de facto regional economic integration.
During the last 10 years, the trade volumes between Japan and China, China
and South Korea, and China and ASEAN have increased by four, eight and six fold,respectively.
The intra‐regional trade share in East Asia, i.e. Japan, China, NIEs and ASEAN
countries, reached 53.3% in 2003, while it was only 33.6% in 1980. This is greater than the
44.5% ratio of NAFTA, which has regional arrangements for trade liberalization. In thecase of the EU, the ratio is 60.3 %.
The Asian currency crisis in 1997 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. served
as catalysts to awaken people in the region to the importance of regional cooperation.
ASEAN has served as a hub of regional cooperation in East Asia.
Japan, China and Korea: Progress of ASEAN+3 cooperation; movements toward
the conclusion of FTA/EPA agreements with ASEAN counties.
Australia and New Zealand: An ASEAN‐CER Summit; efforts to reach an FTA
agreement.
India: ASEAN‐India Summits; efforts to reach an FTA agreement.
ARF: A forum concerned with security issues aiming at confidence‐building,22

preventive diplomacy, and, in the future, dispute settlement.
Set against the background described above, the creation of an East Asian
community for the future is today becoming a shared region‐wide goal in East Asia. In aspeech delivered in Singapore in January 2002, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi calledon the countries in the region to build a community that “acts together and advances
together” and to pursue cooperation in a wide range of areas to ensure stability andprosperity in the region. Since then, Japan has expressed its commitment to the creationof an East Asian community in the future at various opportunities.

2. Progress of “Functional Cooperation” in East Asia

Accompanying the deepening interdependence mentioned above within East
Asia, a wide array of functional cooperation is making progress in the region. Some
specific examples are as follows:‐Trade and investment: Various types of FTAs are being developed.
‐IT: Asia IT Initiative, Asia Broadband Initiative, etc.
‐Finance: Chiang Mai Initiative, and Asian Bond Markets Initiative‐Transnational issues: terrorism, illegal drug trafficking, piracy, humantrafficking, nuclear proliferation, etc.
‐Development assistance: Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI); Mekong
Region ‐Development; East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP‐EAGA); humanresources development, etc.
‐Energy: energy security‐Environmental preservation: Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia,
and Asia Forest Partnership‐Disaster prevention and mitigation countermeasures against natural disasters
such as tsunamis‐Food: food security‐Health care: SARS, avian influenza, and other infectious diseases
The ASEAN+3 frameworks have already been playing important roles for thepromotion of functional cooperation. At present 48 consultative bodies covering 17 areas
ranging from trade and finance to countermeasures against transnational crime exist
within the ASEAN+3 frameworks. The East Asia Study Group (EASG), comprised ofsenior Foreign Ministry officials of all the ASEAN+3 countries, submitted its report to the23

ASEAN+3 Summit in 2002 on the possibilities and means for promoting East Asian
regional cooperation. The 17 short‐term and 9 medium‐ and long‐term measures
proposed by the report cover a considerable part of the “functional cooperation”
currently underway in the region.
On the other hand, the scope of participating countries in “functional
cooperation” is decided flexibly and openly according to the characteristics of each area
and the intentions of each country. As described below, countries outside of theASEAN+3 frameworks, in particular Australia, New Zealand, India, the United States,
etc., are also playing essential roles in various areas of “functional cooperation.”‐Various FTA networks are developing with the involvement of Australia, theU.S. and India, in addition to ASEAN, Japan, China and South Korea.
‐16 countries, including India and Sri Lanka, participated in the negotiations on
the Regional Co‐operation Agreement on Anti‐Piracy in Asia.
‐Under the initiative proposed by Indonesia and Australia, 38 countries are
participating in the Bali Process on the prevention of human trafficking andsmuggling.
‐A large number of countries and international organizations both inside andoutside of the region have provided assistance and cooperation for relief andreconstruction efforts in the aftermath of the earthquake off of the Sumatra
Island and the resulting devastating Indian Ocean tsunamis. A Special ASEAN
Leaders’ Meeting on the Aftermath of the Earthquake and Tsunami to deal withthe crisis was held in January, with the participation of 29 countries andinternational organizations. A core group mainly comprised of Japan, theUnited States, Australia, and India was formed after the disaster and played an
active role in relief efforts.
‐23 countries, including the ASEAN countries, Japan, China, South Korea,
United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and North Korea, and the EU
participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum.

3. “Functional Approach”

Two approaches
Approaches for the creation of a community can be theoretically categorized
into two types: an “institutional approach” and a “functional approach.” An24

“institutional approach” is one that attempts to form the community through thecreation of comprehensive institutional and legal frameworks in the region from theoutset. In contrast, the “functional approach” attempts to create a comprehensive
community through the promotion of various types of functional cooperation in
individual fields, rather than building comprehensive institutional and legal frameworks
from the outset. The promotion of functional cooperation will facilitate the setting up of
institutional and legal frameworks in each individual functional sector, which could, if
combined closely with each other, constitute integral parts of a future region‐widecomprehensive community.

Why is the “functional approach” appropriate to East Asia?
The “functional approach” is appropriate for the creation of a community inEast Asia because of the following reasons.
(a) The concept of an East Asian community has surfaced within the backdropof the rapid deepening of interdependence and the actual progress in various functional
cooperation as described above.
(b) On the other hand, in East Asia, enormous diversity and disparities exist inlevels of economic development, culture, ethnicity, religion, political principles, security
policies, and so on. At present, objective conditions for building region‐widecomprehensive institutional and legal frameworks have not emerged.
(c) Accordingly, under the current situation in East Asia, the most practical
approach would be to further promote functional cooperation, and thereby to facilitate
the creation of institutional and legal frameworks in each functional field. In parallelwith this, efforts should also be made to rectify intra‐regional disparities in development,
to foster common values and principles, and to forge a shared sense of community. All ofthese efforts will lead to the creation of a region‐wide community in East Asia in the
future.

Progress of the European integration
From the beginning of the European integration process in the 1950s, Western
European countries shared a common foundation of liberal democracy, security policies(NATO), and free market economies. Moreover, they were bound by many common ties
related to history, culture, religion, and so on. This was the reason Europe was able tobuild comprehensive institutional and legal frameworks. At the same time, it should be25noted that even in the European context, the integration process began from cooperation
in individual functional sectors, such as coal and steel (ECSC) and nuclear energy(EURATOM).

4. Promotion of a “Functional Approach” and an East Asian community

The creation of an “economic community” will precede.
It is important for East Asia to aspire to the creation of a comprehensive
community that will contribute to the peace and prosperity of the region. However,under the present circumstances, although East Asia is rapidly deepening common
economic interests and mutual complementarities within the region and advancing
functional cooperation in many fields, from the security aspect, recognitions of security
threats vary to a substantial extent and differences in policy remain among the countries.
Hence in East Asia, the creation of an “economic community” will probably precede, intandem with the creation of a “socio‐cultural community”. It is highly likely that theestablishment of a “security community” will require a considerable amount of time.

Traditional and non‐traditional security issues
In East Asia, cooperation in so‐called “non‐traditional” security issues, such as
terrorism, piracy, narcotics trafficking, and human trafficking, has already made aconsiderable progress. Hence it is an important task to promote regional cooperation inthese areas under the “functional approach”. Moreover, as widely recognized in theregion, the military presence of the United States plays an essential role for regional
stability. Accordingly, it is more suitable at present to address issues related to“traditional” security at forums like ARF, in which countries outside of the region likethe United States participate, and to promote dialogue and confidence‐building
measures through those channels. In addition, depending on the case, it can be effective
to utilize frameworks like the Six‐Party talks established to deal with North Korea’s
nuclear development.

Institutional and legal frameworks for individual functional fields
Under the functional approach, institutional frameworks for individualfunctional fields will be set up before a comprehensive framework is established. In fact,
the nine mid‐ and long‐term measures proposed by the EASG report include the26

following measures that presume the introduction of institutional and legal frameworks
for each individual field: (a) establishment of an East Asian Free Trade Area, (b)establishment of an East Asia Investment Area, (c) establishment of a regional financing
facility, and (d) pursuit of a more closely coordinated regional exchange rate mechanism.
Among these measures, from April of this year, an ASEAN+3 experts’ group began study
on the East Asian Free Trade Area concept, and the establishment of a regional financing
facility is already being realized to a certain extent through the Chiang Mai Initiative.
These kinds of institutional and legal frameworks for specific fields could play importantroles in fostering the conditions necessary for the creation of more comprehensive
frameworks in the future. (As mentioned earlier, in Europe, the process of integration
began from cooperation in specific fields like coal and steel [ECSC] and nuclear power[EURATOM].)

Political leadership
In order to promote the creation of a region‐wide comprehensive community inEast Asia, it will be essential for national leaders to express their commitment to thecreation of such a community and to demonstrate their leadership for the deepening ofcooperation in each field and the fostering of common values and a shared sense ofcommunity. Venues like the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN+3 Summit, and the
APEC Summit will play an important role as opportunities for the demonstration of suchleadership at the highest levels.

Strengthening regional coordinating functions
In order to create a comprehensive region‐wide community that encompasses awide range of areas through the “functional approach”, it will be essential to strengthen
the functions of the relevant secretariat to coordinate cooperation in each field. A
measure that can be taken for the time being is to strengthen and expand the ASEAN+3
Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat. For the mid‐term, another recommendation is to explore
the possibility of the establishment of an independent organization (an East Asia versionof the OECD), which would monitor the progress of all types of functional cooperationand offer advice if needed with its expertise.

Inclusiveness of participating countries
It is not appropriate to fix the scope of the participating countries of a future27

East Asia community at this stage. If the creation of a region‐wide community isadvanced through the “functional approach,” it is highly likely that the ASEAN+3
countries would be the core of the community, while a high degree of inclusiveness will
be achieved with the participation of relevant countries in addition to the thirteen
countries of ASEAN+3. This is because the scope of participating countries cooperatingin each field should be decided flexibly and openly depending on the characteristics ofthe particular field and the willingness and intention of each country. For example,
regarding FTAs, highly inclusive networks have already been created, involving not only
the ASEAN+3 countries but also India, Australia, New Zealand, and, to a certain extent,
the United States and other countries. The Bali Process, which addresses humantrafficking and smuggling, already has the participation of 38 countries. Although only
ASEAN+3 countries participate in the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond Markets
Initiative of the Finance Ministers process, the EMEAP (Executivesʹ Meeting of East
Asia‐Pacific Central Banks; see note) Group’s Asian Bond Fund has included Australia,
New Zealand, and Hong Kong among its participating members from its inception.

Note: EMEAP=Executives’ Meeting of East Asia‐Pacific Central Banks
EMEAP is comprised of central banks and monetary authorities of 11 countries:
Japan, Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

5. Conclusion

As explained above, it is most practical to adopt the “functional approach” tobuild a comprehensive region‐wide community in East Asia in the future that spans thefull range of the region’s economic, socio‐cultural, and security fields. In order to carryout such joint efforts successfully, it is indispensable that national leaders demonstrate
political leadership and people of each country express support and enthusiasm. As
functional cooperation can only be advanced through the voluntary efforts by eachcountry, a community created through the “functional approach” could be called a“Community of Willingness,” one that is based on this spirit of voluntarism.

28

Hank LIM
Director of Research, Singapore Institute of International Affairs

The East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) submitted its Report to the 5th ASEAN + 3
Summit in 2001 entitled “Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace,
Prosperity and Progress”. In the Report, EAVG recommended the creation of East Asia
Community, East Asia Free Trade Area, evolution of ASEAN + 3 Summit into East Asia
Summit. The recommendations were studied by the East Asia Study Group (EASG).
There are 17 short‐term measures and 9 long‐term measures for the establishment of East
Asia Community (the details of the recommendations are attached in the annexure). Outof 17 short‐term measures, there are 6 measures for business, investment and financemeasures, 2 for information technology, 2 for intellectual exchange, 3 for humanresources and human development, 1 for security and 3 for social and cultural. It is clearthat the recommended measures have a strong bias for the development of regional
trade and investment which can be implied to have stronger and favorable implications
to developed members of East Asia, recognition of existing development gaps in theregion and importance given to identity and values in the community building. Out of 9long‐term measures, there are 5 for trade, investment and finance measures, 1 for politics,
2 for energy and environment and 1 for social problems and civil society organization.
As in the short‐term measures, there is a strong bias for trade and investment, somerecognition for environmental and energy problems, and the importance of NGO’s roleand partnership with states in dealing with social problems.
The findings and recommendations of the East Asia Study Group imply thatdiversity in ethnic, socio‐cultural, political systems and stage of economic growth define
its challenges for fulfilling its vision for a regional community, However, East Asia has
the prerequisite and promising potential to be the most dynamic economic region in theworld. It has huge potential market size, existing reservoir of technology and financial
resources in terms of enormous official reserve of USD 2.5 trillion.
Having considered its diversity and propensity for regional fragmentation, East
Asia must approach regional cooperation based on a comprehensive and broad
approach to community building. East Asia should consider an integrated framework
designed not only to enhance economic exchanges in trade and investment liberalization
29

but also to promote security, conflict‐prevention measures and to promote social andcultural affinity. Such conscious measure would ultimately enhance a sense of regional
identity and vested interests to developed as well as less‐developed countries in theregion.
As clearly recommended in the East Asia Study Group, trade and investment
liberalization should be the prime mover of regional cooperation based on sharedprosperity. This, in turn, would promote regional security and peace strengthened bybilateral and regional arrangements through confidence‐building and community
bonding. However, trade and investment liberalization are necessary but not sufficientconditions for the establishment of a sense of regional shared identity. Towards thisobjective, developed countries in the region must actively provide regional “public
goods” which will disproportionately benefit the less developed members of thecommunity. These “public goods” can be in the form of human resource development,
technology transfer and maintaining regional peace and stability which is a prerequisite
condition for economic growth.
Proliferation of regional and bilateral FTAs in the region is not harmful if theyembody regional and multilateral elements. In other words, bilateral FTAs should not be
pursued to serve national interests only but it should be built on a common regionalframework in order to avoid or minimize duplication and overlapping and worst
containing conflicting rules and regulations on trade and investment rules andregulations. It is therefore, urgently required that bilateral FTAs should be transparent
and predictable for regional comparison and examination. Such action would reducetransaction costs and facilitate efficient allocation of scarce resources and the subsequentdivision of labour in East Asia. In order to have a seamless market, it is not enough justto reduce tariff but its is equally important to standardize custom procedures, harmonize
technical standardization, rules and regulations of the movement of consumer andcapital goods, services and skilled labour across East Asia.
East Asia Community vision should be driven by issues and functionality.
Powerful as well as medium and small countries in the region can play important roles
by initiating useful policy recommendations and acting in concert with other members tocreate a common synergy towards a prosperous, caring and peaceful East Asia
Community.
Specifically, to have effective functional cooperation, countries in the region
must have a clear concept about the desired nature and characteristics of the community
30

they intend to establish, as well as action plans and flexible and adaptive mechanism andprocess.
Liberalization, deregulation and harmonization of trade and investment rules, morevigorous efforts in promoting Asian Bond to finance Asian infrastructure, institutionalbuilding and human resource development should be given priority. At the same time,development agenda for less developed countries in the region should also be given highpriority in order to close the development gap.
Political and security cooperation are much more difficult to achieve in the
short‐run. Countries must first cultivate a sense of confidence and trust throughmutually beneficial economic exchanges. Over time, regional cultural identity and social
affinity reinforced by strong, broad and multi‐level trade and investment flows, politicaland security cooperation and institutional cooperation are more likely to emerge.
Increasingly, functional cooperation would take the form of establishing a
regional mechanism and process to meet the challenges of natural disasters (liketsunami) and health problems (like SARS), maintaining of vital sea‐lanes and combatingof piracy and terrorism, environmental degradation and energy security. To complement
and reinforce inter‐governmental efforts, NGOs and civil organizations can play
important roles in fostering regional functional cooperation. In fact, on certain sensitive
issues such as regional security and other inherently divisive and long‐term issues, theregional second‐track organization such as ASEAN‐Institute of Strategic andInternational Studies (ASEAN‐ISIS) can play a useful strategic and pioneering role ininitiating and soft‐pedaling functional cooperation. ASEAN‐ISIS has demonstrated its
usefulness in initiating ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in advocating ASEAN Economic
Community, ASEAN Security Community (ASC) and ASEAN Socio‐Cultural
Community (ASCC) as embodied in ASEAN Concord II. ASEAN‐ISIS has also pioneered
the establishment of the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), a third‐track of people‐topeople annual assembly which aims to promote interactions and interfacing among
ASEAN civil organizations and civil societies. The fourth APA was just convened in May
2005 in Manila.

ANNEXURE
East Asia Study Group (EASG) Short‐term Measures for East Asia Community
1

Form and East Asia Business Council

2

Establish GSP status and preferential treatment for least developed countries

31

3

Foster an attractive investment environment for increased FDI

4

Establish an East Asian Investment Information Network

5

Develop resources and infrastructure jointly for growth areas and expand
financial resources for development with active participation of the private
sector6.

Provide assistance and cooperation in four priority areas: infrastructure,
information technology, human resources development, and ASEAN regional
economic integration

7.

Cooperate through technology transfers and joint technology development

8.

Develop information technology jointly to build telecommunications,infrastructure and to provide greater access to the internet

9.

Build a network of East Asian think‐tanks

10.

Establish an East Asia Forum

11.

Implement a comprehensive human resource development program for East
Asia

12.

Establish poverty alleviation programs

13.

Take concerted steps to provide access to primary health care for the people

14.

Strengthen mechanisms for cooperation on non‐traditional security issues

15.

Work together with cultural and educational institutions to promote a strong
sense of identity and an East Asian consciousness

16.

Promote networking and exchanges of experts in the conservation of the arts,
artifacts, and culture heritage of East Asian countries

17.

Promote East Asian studies in the region

East Asia Study Group’s Long‐term Measures for East Asia Community
1. Form and East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA)
2. Promote investment by small and medium enterprises
3. Establish an East Asia Investment Area by expanding the ASEAN Investment
Area (AIA)
4. Establish a regional financing facility
5. Pursue a more closely coordinated regional exchange rate mechanism
6. Pursue the evolution of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit into an East Asia
Summit7. Promote closer regional marine environmental cooperation in the region
8. Build a regional network for energy policies, strategies and action plans
9. Work closely with NGOs in policy consultation and coordination to encourage
civil participation and state‐civil society partnership in tackling social problems.

32

The 4th Japan – ASEAN Dialogue
Promoting Functional
Approaches
Professor Hank Lim
Director for Research,
Singapore Institute of International Affairs

Findings and Recommendations of
the EAVG
The diversity in ethnic, socio-cultural,political systems and stage of economic
growth define its challenges for fulfilling its
vision for a regional community.
However, East Asia has a promisingpotential due to its huge market size,
existing reservoir of technology andfinancial resources (official reserves of
USD 2.5 trillion).

1

4

Framework for the East Asia Vision
Group (EAVG)

Findings and Recommendations of
the EAVG

At the 5th ASEAN + 3 Summit, the EAVG
submitted a report entitled “Towards an
East Asian Community: Region of Peace,
Prosperity and Progress”.
EAVG recommended the creation of
1. East Asia Community
2. East Asia Free Trade Area
3. Evolution of ASEAN + 3 Summit into East
Asia Summit

East Asia must thus approach regional
cooperation based on a comprehensive
and broad approach to community building.
East Asia should consider an integrated
framework designed not only to enhance
economic exchanges in trade andinvestment liberalization but also topromote security, conflict-prevention
measures and the promotion of social andcultural affinity to enhance a sense ofregional identity and interest.

2

5

Framework for the East Asia Vision
Group (EAVG)

Findings and Recommendations of
the EAVG

There are 17 short-term measures and 9long-term measures for the establishmentof East Asia Community (See annexure)
It is clear that the measures have a strong
bias for the development of regional tradeand investment, implying a stronger andmore favorable implications to developed
members of East Asia, recognition ofexisting development gaps in the region
and importance given to identity and values
in the community building.

As recommended in the East Asia Study
Group, trade and investment liberalization
should be the prime mover of regional
cooperation based on shared prosperity.
This would in turn would promote regional
security and peace strengthened bybilateral and regional arrangements
through confidence-building andcommunity bonding.

3

6

Findings and Recommendations of
the EAVG

Issues and Functionality

However, trade and investment
liberalization are necessary but not
sufficient conditions for the establishmentof a sense of regional shared identity.
Developed countries must actively provide
regional “public goods” which will benefit
the less developed members of thecommunity – these can be in the form of
human resource development, technology
transfer and the maintenance of peace andsecurity.

East Asia Community should be
driven by issues and functionality.
Large and small countries can initiate
useful policy recommendations andacting in concert with other members
to create a common synergy towards
a prosperous, caring and peaceful
East Asia Community.

7

10

Issues and Functionality

Premise of regional/bilateral FTAs
Proliferation of regional and bilateral
FTAs in the region is not harmful ifthey embody regional and multilateralelements.
Bilateral FTAs should not be pursued
to serve national interest but built on acommon regional framework tominimize duplication and overlapping.

Specifically, to have effective functional
cooperation, countries in the region musthave a clear concept about the desired
nature and characteristics of thecommunity they intend to establish, theaction plans, mechanism and process.
Priority should be given to liberalization,
deregulation, harmonization of trade rules,
promoting Asian Bond, institutional building
and human resource development.

8

11

Issues and Functionality

Premise of regional/bilateral FTAs

Political and security cooperation are much
more difficult to achieve in the short-run.
Countries must first cultivate a sense ofconfidence and trust through mutually
beneficial economic exchanges. Over time,
regional cultural identity and social affinity
reinforced by strong, broad and multi-level
trade and investment flows, political andsecurity cooperation and institutional
cooperation are more likely to emerge.

Bilateral FTAs should be transparent andpredictable for regional comparison andexamination – this would reducetransaction costs and allow efficient
allocation of scarce resources
Besides reducing tariff, it is equallyimportant to standardize custom
procedures and technical rules as well as
the regulations of the movement of goods,
services and skilled labour.
912Types of Functional
Cooperation

ANNEXURE
East Asian Study Group (EASG) Short-term
Measures for East Asia Community
1. Form an East Asia Business Council
2. Establish GSP status and preferential treatment
for least developed countries
3. Foster an attractive investment environment forincreased FDI
4. Establish an East Asian Investment Information
Network
5. Develop resources and infrastructure jointly for
growth areas and expand financial resources fordevelopment with active participation of theprivate sector

Increasingly, functional cooperation
would take the form of establishing a
regional mechanism and process tomeet the challenges of natural
disasters (tsunami) and healthproblems (SARS), maintaining vitalsea-lanes and combating of piracy
and terrorism, environmental
degradation and energy security.
13

Types of Functional
Cooperation

16

ANNEXURE

To complement and reinforce intergovernmental efforts, NGOs and civilorganizations can play important roles.
This includes the regional track 2organization such as ASEAN-Institute ofStrategic and International Studies(ASEAN-ISIS) which play a useful strategic
and pioneering role in initiating and softpedaling functional cooperation.

6.

Provide assistance and cooperation in fourpriority areas: infrastructure, information
technology, human resources development, and
ASEAN regional economic integration
7. Cooperate through technological transfers andjoint technology development
8. Develop information technology jointly to build
telecommunications infrastructure and to provide
greater access to the internet
9. Build a network of East Asian think-tanks
10. Establish an East Asia Forum14

17

Types of Functional
Cooperation

ANNEXURE

ASEAN-ISIS has demonstrated its usefulness
in initiating ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
in advocating ASEAN Economic
Community, ASEAN Security Community(ASC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural
Community (ASCC) as embodied in
ASEAN Concord II. ASEAN-ISIS has also
pioneered the establishment of the ASEAN
People’s Assembly (APA), a third-track ofpeople-to-people annual assembly whichaims to promote interactions andinterfacing among ASEAN civilorganizations and civil societies.

11. Implement a comprehensive humanresource development program for East
Asia
12. Establish poverty alleviation programs
13. Take concerted steps to provide accessto primary health care for the people
14. Strengthen mechanisms for cooperation
on non-traditional security issues
15. Work together with cultural andeducational institutions to promote astrong sense of identity and an East Asian
consciousness

15

18

ANNEXURE
16. Promote networking and exchangesof experts in the conservation of thearts, artifacts, and cultural heritage of
East Asian countries
17. Promote East Asian studies in theregion19

ANNEXURE
East Asia Study Group’s Long-term
Measures for East Asia Community
1. Form an East Asia Free Trade Area
(EAFTA)
2. Promote investment by small andmedium enterprises
3. Establish an East Asia Investment Areaby expanding the ASEAN Investment
Area (AIA)
4. Establish a regional financing facility
20

ANNEXURE
5. Pursue a more closely coordinated regional
exchange rate mechanism
6. Pursue the evolution of the ASEAN Plus Three(APT) Summit into an East Asia Summit
7. Promote a closer regional marine environment
cooperation in the region
8. Build a regional network for energy policies,
strategies and action plans
9. Work closely with NGOs in policy consultation andcoordination to encourage civil participation andstate-civil society partnership in tackling social
problems
21

Session III
THE ROLE OF ASEAN TOWARDS COMMUNITY BUILDING

Hadi SOESASTRO
Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies

Introduction
In East Asia, ASEAN is the first attempt at regional community building.
ASEAN is an on‐going experiment in community building. It began in 1967 as a regional
cooperation arrangement to promote welfare and peace in Southeast Asia. In that sense,
it was based on some vision of regional order and regional community. Building thisregional community began with some modesty. The regional arrangement sought topromote cooperation in the economic and social fields. This was understandable. The
region had just opened up a new page in its history. Having gained independence andhaving experienced continued internal turmoil for about two decades, and more
importantly, having made an end to political animosities, the five original members of
ASEAN embarked on the path of community building by taking steps to learn more
about each other and to learn to live together in harmony and peace.
It took these countries almost a decade to bring their leaders together for the
first Summit meeting. That happened in 1976 in Bali. From then on, several concrete
cooperation programs were introduced. They included the ASEAN Industrial Projects(AIP), the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA), ASEAN Industrial Joint
Venture (AIJV), and ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO), to name some of the more
important programs. ASEAN members began to learn how to cooperate and work
together to achieve some common objectives. They were prepared to pool their resources,
but they were unprepared to share their markets. Therefore, there were continuing
tensions between “resource pooling” and “market sharing” in implementing andup‐grading the cooperation programs. As a result, not much progress was achieved in37the field of economic cooperation.
ASEAN founding fathers did not envision the economic integration of theregion. In their view, that was a remote possibility, perhaps even an impossibility.
However, gradually the regional economies became more integrated. It was theremarkable economic growth of regional countries and the gradual economic reform andopening up that greatly increased their economic interactions. This was not a direct
result of ASEAN economic cooperation programs. Rather, the region saw the working of“market‐driven” integration.
This paper argues that this market‐driven integration was not independent ofdevelopments in the political field and the intensification of ASEAN external relations.
As the region turned into an ocean of stability and peace, thanks to the establishment of
the regional forum, national governments were able to concentrate on national economic
development. In the two decades until the middle of 1990, the region was growing at an
average rate of 7 percent or more. This made the region even more attractive for traderelations with and investment from other parts of the world. The wave of Japanese
foreign direct investment following the Plaza Accord in 1985 further deepened thedevelopment of regional production networks.
ASEAN has established dialogues with its main trading partners since the late1970s. These dialogues helped shape trade, aid and investment policies of ASEAN’s main
dialogue partners in enhancing cooperation with ASEAN. In turn they also contributed
to ASEAN’s increased diplomatic clout in the international arena.
Increased political cooperation amongst ASEAN members was a manifestationof the growing need amongst them to coordinate their views and policies in regard tointernational and regional strategic and political developments. The fall of Saigon
changed the region’s political map, but the wave of “boat people” from Vietnam and thesubsequent invasion of Cambodia by Vietnamese forces created potential sources of
instability for Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s determination to help resolve the conflict inIndochina provided a strong glue for ASEAN’s cohesion. ASEAN’s efforts were
supported by the international community. Its international standing was at its heightand signified ASEAN’s success.
It was felt, however, that the region needed to step up its economic cooperation
to be able to effectively respond to economic globalization. There was much talk about

38

the need to take “bold” decisions in the economic field. Eventually these led to thedecision in 1992 to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Its boldness was theagreement to promote regional economic integration through resource pooling andmarket sharing. The ASEAN leaders produced a new kind of community building,
namely one that stresses more on openness to each other, economically, socially as wellas politically. ASEAN, it was argued, should have reached a state of maturity that allows
them to be more open to each other. Due to growing interdependence, developments in
one member country are likely to have a greater effect on the neighbors and the region asa whole. Thus came about the calls for “enhanced interaction” that allows for greater
openness to comments and suggestions from fellow members on internal developments.
Another major move was the expansion of membership to finally complete the“One Southeast Asia” project. It was remarkable that in the middle of the 1990s ASEAN
accepted the membership of Vietnam, its erstwhile enemy. A few years later, Laos andMyanmar were also brought in. Cambodia’s membership was delayed because of its
internal development. By the late 1990s, all Southeast Asian countries have become amember of ASEAN, realizing the founding fathers’ dream. The broadening of ASEAN
has become a challenge to ASEAN’s deepening. The new members have to take part in
AFTA, but they are each given a longer time to implement the trade liberalization
program. In reality, a two‐tier ASEAN has emerged. This should not be a problem solong as they share a common goal.
ASEAN Vision 2020 was formulated to provide such a common goal. Its
implementation was guided by the Hanoi Action Plan (HAP). At the mid‐term review of
the HAP, it was felt that ASEAN members must have stronger commitments to realize
the ASEAN Vision 2020. This led to the proposal to deepen ASEAN economic integration
towards an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). By the time Indonesia hosted theSummit in Bali in 2003, ASEAN members agreed to create an ASEAN Community by
2020. As stated in the so‐called Bali Concord II, the ASEAN Community consists of an
ASEAN Economic Community, an ASEAN Security Community, and an ASEAN Social
and Cultural Community. At the following Summit in Vientiane, leaders endorsed a
Vientiane Action Program (VAP) to guide the process of community building in ASEAN
for next five years.
It has taken ASEAN nearly 40 years to come to the point where its members

39agree to form a Community (with a C) and not simply a community (with a c). They
have about 15 more years to realize this vision. This remains a big challenge for ASEAN.
It can be argued that this next phase in the integration process will be much moredifficult.
The ASEAN model of community building, when contrasted to otherexperiences, is seen as having a distinct characteristic, namely its loose and open‐ended
process and its reliance on minimal institutional arrangements. These, plus the principleof consensus and the sanctity of national sovereignty, have characterized the so‐called
ASEAN way. However, the ASEAN way has undergone a modification. ASEAN’s modeof operation has evolved from one that was based on full consensus to one that allows
for the emergence of the coalition of the willing. Several members also believe that the
sanctity of national sovereignty can no longer be used as a protection against
irresponsible actions. A new ASEAN way may be necessary to realize the ASEAN
Community.
The experiment will continue. Thus far, the experience has been worthwhile. To
some extent the ASEAN experience and experiment have inspired community buildingin the wider region.

ASEAN and the Wider Region
ASEAN has definitely left a footprint in regional community building in East
Asia and the Asia Pacific because ASEAN has played a critical role in the development ofcooperation processes in the wider region.
ASEAN’s critical role has been due to two factors. First, its experience as the“first mover” in the region influenced the modality of other regional processes in which
it is involved. Second, ASEAN’s dialogue process with major countries, which
established the regular (annual) Post‐Ministerial Conference (PMC), provided theinspiration for a wider regional process.
When the idea of an Asia Pacific cooperation process began to take hold,
ASEAN proposed that the ASEAN PMC process be the basis for it. A proposal for an
Asia Pacific Forum (APF) was adopted by ASEAN Foreign Ministers but was notendorsed by some ASEAN members. The ball was then taken by Australia, and the first
Ministerial Meeting of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) was held in Canberra40

in 1989. Recognizing the fact that ASEAN had first come up with the initiative and thecritical role ASEAN’s participation has in any Asia Pacific process, an agreement wasmade that any other APEC meeting must be held in an ASEAN country. ASEAN has
since become the co‐pilot in the APEC community building process.
The APEC process is characterized by the important role of the chair in shaping
the agenda. The one year cycle of APEC’s chairmanship has its positive and negative
aspects. However, the main problem with APEC is its loose and open‐ended nature andits minimal institutionalization. APEC was ahead of ASEAN in setting a clear target for
its process when in 1994 leaders endorsed the Bogor Goals of “free and open trade andinvestment in the region” by 2010 for developed countries and 2020 for developing
countries. This year, APEC is undertaking a mid‐term review towards the Bogor Goals.
The widespread view is that the process will not be able to deliver on the leaders’commitment. APEC is in the process of some soul searching now. The APEC Business
Advisory Council (ABAC) proposed that APEC abandoned its voluntary nature andmove towards the creation of a Free Trade Area for the Asia Pacific (FTAAP). At the last
APEC Summit in Chile, leaders rejected this proposal as being infeasible.
The other Asia Pacific process, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), appears tohave stagnated as well. Formed in the middle of the 1990s to promote cooperation in thepolitical and security fields, in parallel to APEC’s economic cooperation process, the ARF
was to become an important pillar of the Asia Pacific regional architecture. In terms ofdefining the process, the ARF should be less open‐ended as it has formulated the threephases of confidence building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution. However,the process lacks the mechanism to move from the first phase to the next, largely because
it also is a very loose process. It has been questioned whether ARF’s stagnation could beovercome by ASEAN’s willingness to release its driver’s seat in the process. The ARF is
by design ASEAN‐driven. This resulted from a recognition that the process would nothave taken off at all if it is not driven by ASEAN. The proposal for a co‐chairmanship has
been aired, but there has been no decision on this.
In addition to APEC and ARF, ASEAN is involved in, and in fact also theinitiator of, three other processes: ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting), FEALAC (Forum of
East Asian and Latin American Countries), and most importantly the ASEAN Plus Three(ASEAN+3).

41

There have been regular meetings of ASEM and FEALAC, but these twoprocesses failed to produce concrete programs or measures that can confidently be seenas creating bridges to connect East Asia with Europe and Latin America, respectively.
In comparison much more is going on in the ASEAN Plus Three process. A
great deal has been written lately about this process. However, the region fails to develop
a strategic plan for the ASEAN Plus Three process. This is in part the failure of ASEAN,
who is in the driver’s seat, to do so. Instead, governments agreed on holding an East
Asian Summit without having clearly visualized and articulated a strategic plan. It was
really strange to have two parallel tracks involving the same countries and with noclearly distinct agenda. This resulted in an agreement, largely as an after‐thought, toexpand the membership of the East Asian Summit to include India, Australia, and New
Zealand, the three countries with which ASEAN also has agreed to form a Free TradeArea.
The original proposal by the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) that wasendorsed by the East Asian Study Group (EASG) was to transform the ASEAN Plus
Three process to an East Asian Summit process. This was to happen after a lot of
preparations and a consolidation of the ASEAN‐driven ASEAN Plus Three process. It
was unfortunate that the East Asian Summit was prematurely taken on the region’s
agenda for 2005. What then will happen to East Asian community building?

ASEAN and East Asian Community Building
Had a strategic plan for East Asia been properly worked out, it would have beenconcluded that the transformation of the ASEAN Plus Three process to an East Asianprocess is the most critical element not only for East Asian community building but also
for the other processes, namely APEC, ARF, ASEM and FEALAC (or EALAF).
At this stage, ASEAN’s main task is to consolidate the ASEAN Plus Three
process. ASEAN must have a strategic plan to develop a new vehicle that would ensurethat it as well as the Plus Three members feel comfortable to travel in even though
ASEAN is no longer in the driver’s seat. As things stand today, ASEAN is in the driver’s
seat of a defective vehicle.
It is in this new vehicle that a better “roadmap” can be traveled in. But thepassengers must also behave, and the driver must be fit.

42

China, Korea and Japan should not continue to quarrel and must come tosettlement of the historical burden. Governments must, once and for all, stand up above
the public and not to allow the relationship (China‐Japan and Korea‐Japan) be used fordomestic political purposes. ASEAN too must agree on a modality that ensures theeffective functioning of its international diplomacy and not to allow the organization beheld hostage to one of its members, whose regime remains illegitimate.
Once a consolidated ASEAN Plus Three process emerges, ASEAN need nolonger be in the driver’s seat in the process towards an East Asian community. This will
be jointly pursued and managed by all East Asian countries. ASEAN should also accept
that it will be East Asia as a whole, rather than ASEAN, that will be the hub in the web ofrelationships that have emerged.
In APEC: East Asia can function as a strong driver of a trans‐Pacific relationship.
This has been articulated many years ago when ASEAN proposed the East Asian
Economic Caucus (EAEC).
In ARF: the process will have to become an East Asian‐driven process.
In ASEM: East Asia will be an equal counterpart of the European Union. A newmodality will have to be found to connect the 25 countries in Europe with the 13
countries in East Asia. While in the beginning the prevailing view was that ASEM was
not to be designed as a region‐to‐region relationship, in practice it tends to develop inthat direction. As such the European side has an advantage.
In FEALAC: East Asia and the Latin American countries also need to develop asimilar modality as for ASEM.
Finally, what currently is likely to be the East Asian Summit involving India,
Australia and New Zealand, should become a forum that promotes closer relations
between East Asia and its immediate neighbors.
Last April, a strategic partnership between Asia and Africa was also launched.
East Asia must also play an active part in the development of this relationship.
In may be argued that a major rationale for the development of an East Asian
community is to enable the region to contribute to the creation of a peaceful andprosperous world through constructive relations with other parts of the globe.

43

Hiroshi OE
Professor, The University of Tokyo

1.

Comparison with the EU(1) Feasibility of creating a common community similar to the EU in EastAsia(2) Difficult process of integration of the EU

2.

Economic integration in Asia

(1) Enlargement of intra‐regional economic gap by the joining of CLMV as
new members in ASEAN(2) Significance of AFTA: intra‐regional economic integration and preparation
for concluding FTA with the third countries(3) Japan’s moves for concluding economic partnership agreement with
ASEAN since 2002
(4) Realization of economic growth through inward foreign investment in
ASEAN countries(5) Market expansion and investment attraction through AFTA and throughFTA with the third countries(6) Need for rectifying intra‐ regional economic gap for further economic
integration(7) Importance of Mekong Sub‐regional Development(8) Importance of “cooperation” in the Economic Partnership Agreements(9) FTA network among Japan, China, Korea ,and ASEAN : the economic
foundation for the East Asia Community(10)The role of ASEAN

44

3.

Potentials for political cooperation and cooperation in the area of
security(1)

East Asia Declaration of 1999: in addition to socio‐economic areas, (a)political and security (b) eliciting cooperation in trans‐national issues(2)

Importance and potentials for cooperation in the area of “Human
Security”=Transnational issues(3)

Potentials for promoting cooperation on traditional security issues(a) Confidence building(b) Preventive Diplomacy(c) Conflict resolution(4)

Evaluation of ARF

4.

The role of culture and the sense of regional identity in regional
integration(1) Difficulty in sharing common regional identity within multi‐lingual andmulti‐religious culture(2) The role of the expansion of rapid transport of people, goods, andinformation as a result of globalization

5.

Geographical scope of the East Asia Community(1) ASEAN Plus 3(2) India, Australia, the New Zealand(3) East Asia Summit

45

7. Appendix(1)

The Role of ASEAN Towards Community Building
by Termsak Chalermpalanupap

This report was prepared by Mr. Termsak Chalermpalanupap, Special Assistant to theSecretary‐General of ASEAN, ASEAN Secretariat, for distribution to the participantsof the Dialogue.

**************************************************************************

1.

ASEAN has been in the forefront in regional cooperation since it wasestablished in 1967. In recent years, ASEAN and its Member Countries have been
active in regionalism and multilateralism in what Mr. Goh Chok Tong, Senior Ministerand ex‐Prime Minister of Singapore, once described as ASEAN’s “virtuous
promiscuity”.

2.

ASEAN Member Countries have been active in promoting cooperation not only

in Southeast Asia, but also in East Asia (i.e. the ASEAN Plus Three, and ASEAN’s
Dialogue Partnerships with China, Japan, and the RoK) and in pan‐Asia (i.e. the Asia
Cooperation Dialogue, ASEAN’s cooperation with SAARC, ECO, GCC, and SCO) as
well as in inter‐regional cooperation (i.e. APEC, ASEM, FEALAC, and Asia‐Africa
Summit). When Singapore hosts the first Asia‐Middle East Dialogue later this month,
ASEAN’s linkages with the world will be completed.

3.

In most of its first three decades, ASEAN’s five founding members (Indonesia,

Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) had slowly developed their skill
and gained experience in regional cooperation and external relations with Dialogue
Partners* in confidence‐building and development cooperation activities. Only in theearly 1990s did ASEAN begin to create its free trade area under AFTA and further

46

expand its membership to include Viet Nam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) andCambodia (1999);

Brunei Darussalam joined ASEAN in 1984 soon after gaining

independence.

*

ASEAN’s 10 Dialogue Partners are : Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan,

the RoK, New Zealand, Russia, the USA. The UNDP is also a Dialogue Partner, but it does notattend the ASEAN+1 Post Ministerial Conference with ASEAN Foreign Ministers or the ARF.
Pakistan is a Sectoral Dialogue Partner, it joined the ARF in 2004. Papua New Guinea is aSpecial Observer; it has been in the ARF from the beginning. This year, Timor Leste will be
invited to join the ARF, at the 12th ministerial meeting of the ARF in Vientiane on 29 July 2005.
Timor Leste has expressed its interest to join ASEAN and accede to the TAC and the Treaty on
SEANWFZ as a regional State in Southeast Asia.

4.

Through its growing web of comprehensive cooperation activities ASEAN haspractically brought its Member Countries closer together in many different ways. But
it was only at the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali on 7 October 2003 that ASEAN Leadersannounced in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II their resolve and commitment tobring about by the year 2020 an ASEAN Community comprising three pillars of
ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio‐
Cultural Community. In working towards the ASEAN Community, careful attention
will also be given to narrowing the development gaps within the ASEAN membershipand in pockets of undeveloped areas in the ASEAN region.

5.

From ASEAN’s perspective, its contribution to community building inSoutheast Asia is self‐evident; this need not be elaborated here.

6.

However, it can be pointed out that ASEAN is also contributing to community

building in East Asia by becoming in itself a strong and dynamic building block : morecohesive politically, more integrated economically, more caring socially, and more
outward‐looking externally.

7.

The ASEAN Way of community building in Southeast Asia, consisting ofuniversally‐recognized principles and practical modalities that have withstood the test47

of time and globalization, is very relevant to community building in East Asia. Let’s
examine the two lists below.

Principles

8.

Key principles in ASEAN include the following :•Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States;•

Respect for the principle of equal rights and non‐interference in internal
political affairs of States;•

Respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and self‐determination ofall, without distinction as to race, creed, religion, gender, or language;•

Adherence to the decision‐making by consultation and consensus and to thecollective responsibility in building the ASEAN Community and taking thecommunity‐building to greater heights;•

Abstention from threat or use of force in inter‐State relations;•

Settlement of differences or disputes through amicable consultations andpeaceful means as provided for in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation inSoutheast Asia and other ASEAN agreements;•

Equal sharing of responsibilities, including the annual contribution to theoperating budget of the ASEAN Secretariat, the rotation of chairmanship ofvarious ASEAN sectoral bodies, and the hosting of ASEAN meetings;•

Respect for the rich cultural heritage and linguistic diversity of Member
States while promoting an ASEAN common identity and a sense of
belonging to and support for ASEAN;

48

•

Non‐discrimination of any

Member Countries in ASEAN’s external

relations and cooperation activities;•

Fulfilment of all obligations to ASEAN in good faith and maximum effort inparticipating in ASEAN’s activities; and•Prosper thy neighbours, which is the newest principle embraced by ASEAN
in 2002 in the Initiative on ASEAN Integration IAI.

9.

Obviously the above are well‐known universally recognized principles

forinter‐State relations and peaceful coexistence under the internal law. Most of them,with perhaps the prosper thy neighbours as the only exception, can be found in or
inferred from the UN Charter – including the principle of non‐interference, which isinherent in the principle of the sovereign equality of all UN member States.

10.

Most of the principles in ASEAN have been enshrined in the Treaty of Amity

and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC, 1976) to which a growing number of Statesoutside of Southeast Asia have acceded : Papua New Guinea (July 1989), China andIndia (October 2003), Japan and Pakistan (July 2004) the RoK and Russia (November2004). Australia and New Zealand have expressed interest to accede to the TAC; bothare now taking active steps to prepare for the accession. Mongolia has also recently
expressed a similar interest.

Practical Modalities

11.

Over the years, ASEAN and its Member Countries have put in place practicalprocedures that have proven to be useful and appropriate for the pursuit of regional
cooperation and external relations in light of diversity and sovereign equality. To be
sure, the ASEAN Way is often neither the most desirable nor the most effective way ofachieving difficult goals. Rather, it is usually the least objectionable; it is what themost unprepared or the slowest is prepared to go along. Nevertheless, it is what
would keep all in ASEAN together in building the ASEAN Community by the year
2020 and beyond. The practical part of the ASEAN Way includes the following :49

•

ASEAN Member Countries share collective responsibilities in fulfilling theirregional commitments; they take turn in an alphabetical rotation in serving
as the ASEAN Chair and hosting ASEAN Summit and ministerial meetings;
all other ASEAN Member Countries would support the ASEAN Chair;•

ASEAN’s healthy habit of consultation and consensus‐building; decision‐
making by consultation and consensus; rarely has there been any voting in
ASEAN (though voting procedures do exist in some ASEAN agreements; inthe Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon‐Free Zone, for example, adecision can be made by a two‐thirds majority should consensus cannot bereached);•ASEAN is non‐ideological; all of its Member Countries are in the Non‐
Aligned Movement; the political diversity in ASEAN membership is well‐known; ASEAN does not attempt to change the political system of any of
its members; ASEAN believes in unity in diversity; differences need not
create divisiveness;•

ASEAN is neither a military bloc nor a collective defence pact; in fact
ASEAN so far has no defence or military cooperation programme, though
there is a move underway to start ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting; thePhilippines and Thailand are non‐NATO allies of the USA, Malaysia andSingapore are in the Five Powers Defence Arrangement together with
Australia, New Zealand, and the UK; no problem;•

ASEAN has no common external enemy; ASEAN does not see any major
powers near or far as a potential threat; in fact, all the world’s major powers
are friends and partners of ASEAN;•

ASEAN always emphasizes the positive and work for a win‐win outcome;differences, disputes, and conflicts among its Member Countries and50

between some of its Member Countries with outsiders may happen fromtime to time, but they will not be allowed to distract ASEAN from pursuingcommon regional interest and engage its external friends and partners;•

Differences, disputes, and conflicts shall be resolved as soon as possible byquiet diplomacy and other friendly peaceful means;•

Bilateral issues shall be dealt primarily by the two direct parties concerned;
they need not be brought up in a regional setting unless the two direct
parties concerned seek help from ASEAN directly, like bringing a dispute to
the TAC’s High Council;•

ASEAN likes to do things step by step, starting with the easy and simple
things first; gradualism with flexibility will ensure that every Member
Country is comfortable with the pace of cooperation in ASEAN and that noone is left behind;•

Low level of institutionalization; in fact, there was no ASEAN Secretariat
during the first 10 years of ASEAN until it was set up 1976 in the FirstASEAN Summit in Bali; a clear preference of informal arrangements•

Most policy decisions are to be made by ASEAN Member Countries; no
ASEAN regional authority to make any policy decision on behalf of theMember Countries; and•

ASEAN would do everything possible to serve as an efficient and impartial
driver of cooperation processes that it has initiated, to keep them useful andoutward‐looking.

51

(2) Asia and Its Diversity
by Kai Noritake

This report was prepared by Mr. Kai Noritake, Governor of The Global Forum of Japan,
for distribution to the participants of the Dialogue.
**************************************************************************
With Asia being a diverse region, ASEAN has realized a regional group based on thisdiversity. From this fact, ASEAN is clearly different from the EU, a homogeneous
regional entity.
The idea of creating an East Asian Community in which many Asian peoples haveshown keen interest intends to inaugurate an organization consisting of all the member
countries of ASEAN plus Japan, China and South Korea. As we have a precedent, i.e.
the EU, it is not an easy undertaking to realize a regional community in East Asia. We
should pursue this mission over a long time span, making good use of the diversity
and characteristics of Asia.
This essay is written to provide those concerned people with reference material inconsidering the idea of an East Asian Community.

1.

Wisdom of Asian People

In this Essay, when we refer to Asia, Asia is covered by 13 countries including Japan,
China, South Korea and the member countries of ASEAN. Alternatively, ASEAN or
Southeast Asia is used to indicate the 10 member countries of ASEAN.
In order to exist as a tightly united region consisting of countries or a group of nations,
it is necessary at first for the countries concerned to be closely tied politically, secondly
to have strengthened economic relationships among them, thirdly to be in common in
culture, fourthly to share a common sense while belonging to the same group sharing
the same destiny, and lastly to achieve worldwide recognition as an independent entity.
It is beyond our imagination that despite being so diverse, the countries in Southeast
Asia have been brought together to establish a longstanding organization named

52

ASEAN. This is a distinct character of ASEAN compared to the EU member countries
among which there are lots of similarities such as Christianity, culture, tradition,
values, etc.
ASEAN was established in 1967, in the midst of the war in Indochina, and the main
purpose of ASEAN was to prevent the war from spreading over other parts of Asia. If
it had been true that war alone held the organization together, ASEAN’s solidarity
might have been weakened after the Vietnam War, which worried many people.
However, ASEAN was able to overcome this trial.
According to some observation, the existence of ASEAN is justified only by its
relatively long history since its establishment. But this is a rather pessimistic viewpoint.
Indeed, it is an Asian wisdom and a wonderful fact for the eyes of Europeans andAmericans that ASEAN, composed of Southeast Asian countries having big differencesin languages, customs, traditions, and cultures, has being functioning smoothly as aregional entity.
In a word, Southeast Asia had been regarded as one of the backward regions in theworld in the decade from 1950 and 1960; this view seems to put emphasis only on
figures centered on GDP.
Furthermore, in this region there occurred the Vietnam War, one of the biggest
conflicts of the 20th century. Southeast Asia is still heading steadily toward
development, spurred on by the so‐called “Four Dragons”, 30 years after theconclusion of the war in Vietnam.
Some people say that there is no reality named Asia, which is in contrast to Europe, ahomogeneous continent. They point out the lack of cultural unity in Asia. To this, inthe decade of the 1990s, a leader of Japan, Shintaro Ishihara, and the leader of Malaysia,
Prime Minister Mahathir, each representing quite different cultures, formed a theory
on Asian values. This theory advocates that Asia, having a long tradition, is now
proceeding to forge a unity in dynamism toward development, pulled along by Japan.
At the same time it is strengthened by the certainty that globalization does notnecessarily mean Americanization, and the above‐mentioned Asian values are
considered a component of globalization. Indeed the past 500 years of history haveshown that Asia is not a region shaped by Europe. America and Africa arecommunities made by Europe politically and economically, but not Asia. In the case of53

Asia, some European elements are added to traditional, firmly establishedcommunities. In this sense, a scholar says that in the future only Asia may confront
Europe in terms of culture.
Including India, Asia has at present 3 billion one hundred million people as apopulation. This means Asia has nearly half of the world’s total population. In detail,in the continental part, India has one billion, China one point three billion. On the other
hand, in the peninsular areas, there are the Indochinese countries, South and North
Korea, and Malaysia. In the island parts, there are Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia
and Brunei. In these peninsulas and islands, we can count eight hundred million
people.
Without India, the total population of ASEAN plus three countries is about 2 billion
and one hundred million people.

2.

Diversity in religions and languages

In Southeast Asia, we find three different religions. In the northern continental region,
Buddhism is accepted in the three Indochinese countries, Thailand and Myanmar.
Among them Vietnam’s Buddhism is known as Buddhism of the big vehicle, the sameas in Japan. In other countries, Buddhism belongs to a different school, named
Buddhism of the small vehicle. Thai people are well known as devout Buddhists, andthe King is the protector of Buddhism. This northern continental region covers about
two million square kilometers of land with two hundred million inhabitants.
In contrast to this region, the southern and eastern parts of Southeast Asia are mainly
the world of the Malay people.
Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei are Islamic countries and the Philippines is a Catholiccountry. In this area, covering about two million five hundred thousand square
kilometers, there are three hundred million people. In this sense Southeast Asia is a
microcosm of Asia as a whole, with Indian and Chinese cultures mixing and Buddhism,
Christianity, and Islam co‐existing.
At the time of the drafting of this article, in the middle of April 2005, I am not in aposition to predict who will succeed Pope John Paul II after his death. Particularly in
Latin America, where four hundred and fifty million Catholics out of the world’s one

54

billion one hundred million Catholics live, there is the expectation that the new Pope
will be elected from this region, a person who understands current problems indeveloping countries. On the other hand, whoever the next Pope will be, he is expected
to play a role in promoting a dialogue with the Islamic world, because it is necessary tohave foresight into the situation of the Islamic countries if we consider problems suchas poverty. Now the Vatican is said to be worried that the number of Muslims isincreasing in the world and that in the Middle East Christians are decreasing in
number.
Islamic people are now assuming an undeniably important position in the world.
With regard to Muslims, Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world in termsof number and Malaysia and Brunei are also Muslim countries. In addition, in southern
Thailand, in Cambodia, and in the southern part of the Philippines we find Muslim
people. In this context, there should be a difference of view on the values between
Muslims and non‐Muslims. For instance, even at Al‐Azar University, the highest
authority of interpreting the Koran, there is a division of opinion about how toevaluate the 9‐11 terrorism and the indiscriminate suicide bombings of Palestinian
people. Although the president of the university expressed his opinion against
indiscriminate suicide bombings, the majority of Imams supported it. This situation
will affect the Muslim countries in Asia. In the final analysis there may be conflicts
between Islamic values and democracy and freedom. The religious diversity in Asia
contains the possibility of a clash of values among religions in the long run. The Islamic
question in this region of the world is, therefore, a problem not to be avoided in theprocess of boiling down an idea of East Asian Community. Actually there exist several
disputes linked with Islam. In the past some Muslims suspected that a Japanese joint
venture company in Indonesia was using pork in the production of seasonings and thismatter drew much attention among both Japanese and Indonesian people. We
Japanese should recognize delicate problems existing in Muslim society.
The diversity in Asia is remarkable also concerning languages. So many languages
coexist in the region, which is not common in the world. There exist three different
characters, i.e. Burmese, Sanskrit, which is mainly used in the three countries in the
Mekong basin, and Roman characters used in Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and thePhilippines. In addition to those three, Chinese characters are used among overseas
Chinese in the region; in the past Chinese characters were written in Vietnam before
the French introduced Roman characters.

55

In mainland China, they simplified characters after the Second World War, which arecalled Jiăn tí zì; however in Taiwan and Southeast Asia, traditional characters, named
Hànzi, are still being used. In China, as they simplified the characters too much, thecharacters lost their calligraphic beauty. So it seems that they stopped thesimplification policy.
As is mentioned above, because the same characters are used in Thailand and Laosand also in Indonesia and Malaysia, people can communicate with each other by
writing. On the other hand, however, communication between Vietnam and Laos is not
easy.
Having no common language in Southeast Asia, Chinese and English are virtuallycommon languages in the region. Still, in Chinese there are several big dialects such as
Guāntōng huà, Fújiàn huà, etc.
The common language among Chinese people is Pŭtōng huà, a standard language. For
example, popular songs are sung mainly in Pŭtōng huà in order for as many people aspossible to understand them.
English is now an official language of ASEAN and the number of people studying
English is increasing in the region.
The Thai language is very soft in pronunciation, as is Pŭtōng huà, and we find both
Chinese and Indian influence in this language. They use Sanskrit as characters, but for
intonation they have six accents, which is two more than Chinese. The intonation
seems to add a musical sound. In analyzing the meaning of words, the second largest
city in Thailand is called Chiang Mai, of which Chiang (Chéng) means in Chinese castle
or town and Mai in Thai means new. In consequence, Chiang Mai means new town in
Thai. Lăo bān means master, being almost the same pronunciation as in Chinese. Nèi
háng’s pronunciation is the same, of which the meaning is master. However in Chinese
it means expert or specialist. Amateur in Thai is Wài háng, the same pronunciation andmeaning as in Chinese.
The people of the Philippines understand English well. Their English ability is so highFilipinos can find jobs all over the world. Not only in the US but also in Europe and the
Middle East, many Filipinos are employed in engineering and other professions. We
count in Japan more than one hundred thousand Filipinos. The original and native56

language in this country is Tagalog. On the other hand many Spanish words areincorporated into Tagalog. Certain names come from Spanish, such as Corazon
Acquino, former President. Corazón means a heart and Los Bagnõs, a famous resortarea, locates in the suburbs of Manila, which means hot spring.
In addition, the way of counting is introduced from Spanish: one, two, three is uno,dos, tres, etc.
Vietnam originally belonged to the Confucianism culture block and used Chinesecharacters. Chinese people thought that Vietnam was a very close neighbor, as if itwere a part of China. In Chinese Vietnam is called a country situated south of Yuè
country. When Vietnam was divided in two, the south was called the southern part ofYuè and the north was called the northern part of Yuè in Chinese.

3. Historical interaction of Indian and Chinese Culture. Spanish fragrance.
In the region of Southeast Asia Indian and Chinese cultures coexist in a harmonious
way. Indian influence was especially great, and has been strongly represented by theepics such as the Mahabarata, and Ramayana. Even in Thailand believers in Hinduism
and worshipers at Hindu temples can be seen. In fact many Indians emigrated to
Myanmar, Malaysia, and Thailand, and about 8 percent of the Malaysian population isof Indian origin. However, after the thirteenth century the influence of Islam became
predominant. As a result Indonesia and Malaysia have become Islamic countries.
China had been the potential sovereign state of Indochinese countries, especially thatof Vietnam. China ruled Vietnam for more than one thousand years, but it did notleave a visible cultural fingerprint in Cambodia and Laos. By the way, we recognize theinfluence of China in Vietnam, for instance by the discovery of framed calligraphy in
Chinese characters in a local Buddhist temple. Before the invasion of the French in thelatter half of nineteenth century, Vietnam had used Chinese characters. It was the
French who introduced Roman characters to replace Chinese. If the French had notcurbed the use of traditional Chinese characters, the Japanese would have felt muchgreater familiarity toward the Vietnamese people, and mutual understanding could
have been promoted much more easily. There are several remnants of Chinesecharacters in Vietnam. For instance, Vietnam Airways is called Háng Kōng Vietnam. In
Chinese Háng Kōng means Airlines.

57

Overseas Chinese (Huá Quiáo) have established a firm and strong position inSoutheast Asia, especially in the economic field. There are so‐called Chinatowns inevery country in the region and Singapore is the typical base of activities of the Huá
Quiáo, and the naming of the city comes from the Malaysian language, meaning theCity of the Lion.
Seventy five percent of the people in this city‐state are of Chinese origin. From the endof the Qìng dynasty about thirty million Chinese emigrated abroad and eighty percentof them settled down in Southeast Asia. There they have dealt mainly with the
distribution of goods and merchandise.
The Philippines is the only country in the region which still maintains the fragrance ofa Latin culture, as it was a colony of Spain. In the city of Manila we can find aparticular quarter which may lead us to think that we are in Mexico City. Filipino
people have a worldwide reputation as excellent entertainers. This ability is a reflectionof the Latin character of these people. They have come to Japan as entertainers, and for
immigration purposes there is a visa category related to entertainment, so if theysatisfy certain conditions their entry into Japan is not difficult.
In particular Filipino ladies have a keen service spirit, which is necessary in the field ofhealth and aged peopleʹs care. Japan and the Philippines have already decided to havein Japan a certain number of Filipino ladies working in certain health care‐relatedindustries. The smooth implementation of this system will contribute to guaranteeing
qualified care for aged people.

4. European influence
In Southeast Asia European influence remains. Southeast Asia has long been acrossroads for traffic. This geographical position, unfortunately, led to the colonizationof Southeast Asia by the European powers. Historically speaking, Portugal ruled East
Timor and Macao, the British ruled Burma, Malaysia, and Hong Kong, Holland ruled
Indonesia, France ruled Indochina, and Spain and then the US ruled the Philippines.
Only Thailand was able to keep its independence while facing the European powers.
However Thailand was obliged to pay considerable sacrifice to maintain independence.
Thai diplomacy was dexterous but the country endured great pain through the cedingof its territory. For example, Laos, which was once a part of Thailand, was ceded toFrance, as if a tree is broken in a violent way.

58

Even today there are similarities in customs and languages between northeastern
Thailand and Laos’s traditions. It is said that France took Laos with the view ofstrengthening the defense of Vietnam.
We find old Europe in some parts of Southeast Asia. A typical example is Yangon,
capital of Myanmar. This city had a lot of obsolete but majestic buildings whichreminded us of the old British era. I knew Yangon well in the 1970s. At that time theclosed door policy was applied, as a result of which the number of foreign tourists waslimited to a maximum of 500 persons per day. Consequently, reserving a hotel wasvery difficult. By the same token, tourists and businessmen could hardly visit
Myanmar. Yangon had been much more prosperous than Bangkok before the Second
World War. However the Yangon which I knew was an old town without vigor whose
majestic buildings were all musty. Of course at the present time, when the closed‐door
policy has been eased, I expect the town should have regained vitality as in the past.
A quarter of downtown Manila in the Philippines reminds us of La Ciudad de México.
In reality there had been services of trade ships between Manila and Acapulco in
Mexico after the sixteen century. Furthermore, Hasekura Tsunenaga and his party
landed at Acapulco and from there traveled to Rome. In Manila we find also China
Town. Still another characteristic of Manila lies in the fact that it is representative of theLatin Quarter or Quartier Latin, being the only such place in Southeast Asia. In the
Spanish spoken in Mexico there is a word called Warachi which probably originatesfrom Waraji, or Japanese sandal. Perhaps that is one proof of Hasekura‘s stay in
Mexico.
The Philippines derives its name from King Felipe the Second of Spain, who had
governed a vast region in the world. The Spain of Felipe the Second had been the
biggest empire in the world, as he inherited and governed the Iberian Peninsula,
Flanders, and a great part of the Nuevo Mundo. However, after the defeat of theseemingly invincible Spanish Armada by the British fleet, the sign of decline wasevident. Although they called it the invincible Armada, actually there was no suchArmada.
The Spanish Armada was defeated by the British off the cost of Flanders. Historical
records show that the British side resorted to the strategy of using fire as in the big
battle in the Yángzĭ River that occurred at the time of the three kingdoms in China

59

around the third century BC. After having been hit heavily by a typhoon off the east
coast of England, the Armada could barely return to Spain. The court, being afraid of
the reaction of Felipe upon hearing of this tragic news, refrained from reporting it to
the King. Finally they presented a report to Felipe with a comment referring to Louisthe Ninth, who died of pestilence in Tunis directing the Ninth Crusade in the 13th
century. They said that the King might be consoled in this defeat compared to the
tragic defeat and death of Saint Louis. We recall by the name of Felipe the epoch where
Spain had been losing its strength as a worldwide empire.
Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam, still conserves the fragrance and atmosphere of France
due to the fact that it was constructed according to a design drawn up by Frencharchitects. In the same token, the Opera House in Hanoi looks like a small scale Opera
House in Paris. As for the food, we can eat delicious bread in Laos because Laos was
also a French colony.
At the same time under the influence of Chinese communities, in both Thailand andLaos they serve very tasty Chinese noodles, i.e. lāmiàn, much better than Japanese ones.
In this sense it is interesting to note that there is no Japanese style lāmiàn in China.
Lāmiàn means literally handmade noodles made from the powder of wheat andChinese lāmiàn is a kind of Japanese udon made from the powder of rice.
The same noodles exist also in Vietnam. In particularly the taste of its soup is quiterefined which might be welcomed by the Japanese. Chūng juăn, spring roll, is a typical
Chinese dish. But its size differs by country: the biggest is Vietnamese, the second
biggest is Japanese, and the third is Chinese. Chūng juăn is thus a common dish tothese three countries in East Asia.

5. Variety in calendars
The mixed European and Asian culture can be seen in calendars. In general theEuropean calendar is commonly used in the region. At the same time Chinese
agricultural and Islamic calendars coexist. For instance the third millennium, e.g. year
2000, corresponds to 2543 in the Buddhist calendar and the Buddhist year is marked in
the official documents of the Thai Government.
The Islamic calendar is used in Indonesia and Malaysia. The year 2000 is counted as
the year 1378 after the Sacred Emigration to al‐madina that occurred in 622 according60

to the European calendar. It is a kind of wonder that such different calendars are usedspontaneously in the region without any hindrance. To celebrate a New Year thetiming is not the same between calendars. In the Chinese world the first day of the firstmonth of a year varies between the end of January and the beginning of February as
they use the lunar calendar. This lunar calendar is commonly called the agricultural
calendar and the first day of the first month is New Year‘s Day. This New Year’s Day
reflects much more faithfully a seasonal feeling of the people than the international
New Year of January 1. Japan introduced the international calendar in the Meiji epoch,and so New Year’s Day doesn’t correspond to a seasonal feeling. One of the famousstories about an act of revenge by the samurai class occurred on December 14 in the
lunar calendar in the seventeenth century, which is on January 30 in the international
calendar. Normally it has snowed heavily on December 14 or January 30 in Japan.
January is the coldest month in the Tokyo region.
Huá Quiáo celebrates the traditional New Year’s Day which for the Vietnamese is thecelebration of Tet. Thailand celebrates the so‐called water festival, which in the Thai
language is called Songkran and and in Laos is known as Pí Mai, as if to announce thebeginning of spring. The essence of this festival is without protocol. We can’t complain
if water is thrown at us from behind. A long time ago a Japanese worker had water
thrown upon him on his arrival at a hotel in Vientiane after several hours of tiresome
drive on a rough road. This gentleman became promptly furious and beat a man who
threw the water at him. He didn’t know that this festival was carried out without
protocol.
Of course he was detained in the police station after being arrested. This man‘s case is
one of not being acquainted with the customs and tradition of another country.
However it is not pleasant to be attacked from behind by a shower of filthy water. If
possible it is preferable to be showered by clean water.
The Islamic calendar used in Indonesia and other countries is based on the lunar
calendar in a strict sense of the term and one month is, therefore, composed of 29 daysor 30 days. Every year 11 days is rolled back. For instance, if Ramadan is scheduled on
November 30 this year, it will be on November 19 next year. Islamic people can follow
Ramadan under a pleasant climate, but when it falls in the hot summer, they feel a lotof pains while performing the disciplines imposed.

61

In spite of the fact that the calendar seems a trifling thing, people spend their lives
based on it. Therefore the differences in calendars possess an importance which cannot
be ignored. A calendar also influences the way of thinking and actions of a people.

6. Southeast Asia overcomes wars and pursues economic prosperity
As was mentioned above there are similarities as well as diversities in Southeast Asia.
At the same time Asia has been changing. Although in the colonial period Southeast
Asia was considered a group of poor nations in a state of underdevelopment, a big
industrial revolution took place in the 1970ʹs. Asian nations have emerged as newly
industrialized countries according to the Japanese model. This was the biggest event of
the 1970ʹs in the region.
In Asia there had existed wounds of historical hostilities caused by the invasion ofEuropean forces, conflicts between Japan and China, and the US versus the Soviets.
The region of the so‐called ʺFour Dragons,ʺ representing an economic miracle, hadbeen the stage of the ʺCold War.ʺ In other words ʺTwo Hot Warsʺ were fought in thisregion, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, in addition to others. In this sense it ismarvelous to note that in spite of these wars this region has accomplished remarkabledevelopment.
We are convinced that this Asian experience will certainly contribute to the realizationof an East Asian Community.
By the way, in order to see Asia from long and medium range perspectives, we shouldtake into account the following points.
The first point is the American presence. In the beginning of its involvement the US
acquired the Philippines on account of its victory in the Spanish‐American War of 1898.
Subsequently, after the Second World War, the US deployed its military forces in theentire Pacific basin area, taking into special consideration the presence of communist‐
ruled China.
However, the US did not militarily confront China on Chinese territory, and conflicts
occurred mainly in the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and Vietnam, all on the periphery of
China. At present the US has withdrawn from air bases in the Philippines but it still62maintains forces in the defense of the Western Pacific. Asia in the future and an East
Asian Community could not be conceivable while excluding the US.
The second point is the Korean Peninsula, where there exist side by side tension andeconomic development. On one hand we find big enterprises specialized in electronics
such as Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo, and on the other hand we find about a 250
kilometer‐long military demarcation line. The Korean War, fought from 1950 to 1953,
was a war between the US and Chinese armies. In June 2000 a mood of temporary
reconciliation was seen, but now the six party talks are in a deadlock. These talks
should be reinvigorated. In addition to the question of the abduction of Japanesenationals, the suspicion of nuclear armament by North Korea has made the situation
complicated. As long as the North Korean problem remains unsolved, this will be a big
obstacle for the realization of an East Asian Community.
The third point concerns Sino‐Taiwanese relations. These relations have become verymuch strengthened in recent years. In 1995 and 1996, at the time of Taiwan’s
presidential elections, Chinese military forces had launched drills. Even today the
Chinese Government has shown its opposition to the so‐called separatist movement in
Taiwan in a strongly categorical way. But at the same time the Chinese government has
invited leaders of Taiwan’s opposition parties to check the Taiwanese government’s
move toward independence. On the other hand Taiwan and China are dependent oneach other that politics cannot sever densely established economic ties between them.
The fourth point is the position of Vietnam. The Vietnamese people expelled the US
from their territory and achieved unification in 1975. This was a victory of information
rather than a military one, with the Vietnamese astutely manipulating international
opinion. Twenty years after this victory Vietnam entered ASEAN. However, being
exhausted by the wars which had lasted more than thirty years against the French andthen the US, the country needs a lot of time for its reconstruction. It took thirty years to
win the war, but it should take much more time to reconstruct the country. In terms ofper capita GDP, for instance, Vietnam vs. Thailand is 1 to 5. Cambodia meanwhile waslocked in a civil war, so therefore the situation in general is worse than in Vietnam. In
particular, the western part of Cambodia is in an unstable situation, having been under
the control of the Khmer Rouge and less developed than the rest of the country. Laosand Myanmar are akin to such a situation, which represents a sort of North‐South
problem inside ASEAN.

63

The fifth point is the relations between Japan, China and South Korea. Recently big
anti‐Japanese demonstrations occurred in China, partly because of the anti‐Japanese
education encouraged since the period of Jiang Ze Ming. It is possible that the Chinese
Government might have decided to divert to an outside target (in this case Japan) the
accumulated complaints and grievances of the Chinese people due to the big difference
between rich and poor inside the country. In China, fundamental human rights are notyet fully guaranteed, so the government there should be liable for such demonstrations.
The problem of Takeshima, being a territorial issue, has no easy solution. The problem
regarding the Japan Sea belongs in the same category. In February of this year,
Shimane Prefecture‘s local assembly made a declaration to the effect that Takeshimabelongs officially to Shimane Prefecture. This declaration put fire on the delicate
situation. Shimane Prefecture should have consulted the Japanese authorities well inadvance on such a hot issue as Takeshima.
The textbook issue and the question on an apology about past Japanese policy havebeen also taken into consideration in demonstrations in both countries. For example,
both the Chinese and South Korean governments stated that without reflection on thepast the Japanese government will not be qualified to be selected as a new permanent
member of the UN Security Council. Japan should analyze and judge in acomprehensive way the situation and find out how to preserve its national interests inthe face of Chinese claims. In any way it should avoid taking an ambiguous attitude
toward the textbook and Yasukuni Shrine issues. As long as Chinese and Koreans
criticize Japan on such issues, this is nothing but interference in another country’s
internal affairs and establishing genuine friendship is difficult.
Regrettably we find in Japan rootless criticism directed at China which unnecessarily
shows disdain for and provokes the Chinese people. Such comments irritate theChinese and are no use at all.
Before the realization of an East Asian Community we should put an end to suchinterregional conflicts as a prerequisite condition.
End64

8. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)【Objectives】
As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, andglobalization and regionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with theworld, especially neighboring countries in the Asia‐Pacific region at both governmental and non‐governmental
level, is one of the indispensable conditions for Japan to survive. On the basis of such understanding, The Global
Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field
ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business, opinion
and political leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss about the formulation of neworders in global and regional arenas.
【History】
The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly,
there were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that
Western solidarity was at risk. Within this context, it was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there
must be free and unfettered exchanges of private‐sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of theparticipating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister Okita Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative
William Brock, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne Davignon, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward
Lumley, as representatives of the private‐sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The
Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the alterednature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum tometamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The
Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as statedabove, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post‐Cold War issues
facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only to participants from thequadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravity of The
Global Forumʹs activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic andInternational Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and,after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved,
on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues withJapan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by‐laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global
Forumʹs Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principlethat the organization be self‐governing, self‐financing, and independent of any other organization.
【Organization】
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non‐profit, non‐partisan, and independent membershiporganization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy‐oriented matters of bilateral,
regional and global implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations,
GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations.
Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of Hattori Ichiro,
Okita Saburo, Takeyama Yasuo, Toyoda Shoichiro in 1983, GFJ is currently headed by Okawara Yoshio as
Chairman and Ito Kenichi as President. The membership is composed of 14 Business Leader Members including
the two Governors, Mogi Yuzaburo and Toyoda Shoichiro; 84 Opinion Leader Members including the four
Governors, Ito Kenichi, Kai Noritake, Okawara Yoshio, and Shimada Haruo; and 33 Political Leader Members
including the two Governors, Hatoyama Yukio, and Tanigaki Sadakazu. Financially the activities of GFJ havebeen supported by the annual membership fees paid by 14 leading Japanese business corporations (with 2
corporations, Toyota Motor Corporation and Kikkoman Corporation contributing 5 shares each and the other 12
corporations contributing 1 share each) as well as by the grants provided by The Japan Foundation, The Tokyo
Club, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan‐ASEAN Exchange Projects, The Daiwa Bank Foundation for Asiaand Oceania, The Japan‐Korea Cultural Foundation, Toshiba International Foundation, etc. Watanabe Mayu
serves as Executive Secretary.
66

【Activities】
Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1996, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the
Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring
countries in the Asia‐Pacific region including US, China, Korea, Taiwan, ASEAN countries, Australia and India,
for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order.
GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing
policy‐oriented intellectual exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a substantial number of Japaneseparticipants in the “Dialogue”, GFJ in principle holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo. A listing of topics of“Dialogues” and its overseas co‐sponsors in last six years is given below.
Year MonthTopic
Co‐sponsor
2000 May
EUʹs Options and Their Implications for JapanThe Royal Institute of International Affairs (UK)
July
Asia in the New Century and Japan‐China Relations China Association for International Friendly Contact (China)
December Japan and Korea: Building Foundations for a New
The Seoul Forum on International Affairs (Korea)
Partnership2001 May
U.S.‐Japan Security Relations under the New U.S.
The Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs (US)Administration
September The Role of Japan and Taiwan in the Asia‐Pacific
Chinese Eurasian Education Foundation (Taiwan)
Region in the 21st Century
2002 February The Japan and ASEAN: Cooperation for Peace and
ASEAN ISIS (ASEAN)
Prosperity in the Asia‐Pacific Region
May
Japan‐China Relationship in the world
China Association for International Friendly Contact (China)
September Japan and Australia: Perspectives on Cooperation
Australian Consortium (Australia)
in Asia and PacificNovember Japan and Korea: Working Together for The Future
The Seoul Forum on International Affairs (Korea)
of East Asia
2003 January
The Japan and ASEAN: Cooperation for Peace and
ASEAN ISIS (ASEAN)
Prosperity in the Asia‐Pacific Region
April
Entrepreneurship in Asia
The Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs (US)OctoberJapan‐Taiwan Dialogue: New Situation in Asia‐Pacific Foundation on International & Cross‐Strait Studies (Taiwan)
region and Japan‐Taiwan Cooperation
2004 JulyA Roadmap towards East Asian Community
ASEAN ISIS
September Future Prospect of East Asian Community andChina Association for International Friendly Contact (China)
Japan‐China RelationshipNovember The Japan‐ U.S. Korea Dialogue: Future of KoreanThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Peninsula and Japan‐U.S.‐Korea Security Cooperation US)･Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies (Korea)
2005 April
The Prospect of East Asian Community andPresidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative (PCNEACI)Japan‐Korea Cooperation
The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)
June
The Prospect for East Asian Community and Regional ASEAN ISIS (ASEAN)
Cooperation

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is grateful to its “Business Leader” members listed below for
their generous contributions. Their support is making the activities of the Forum sustainable.
[GFJ Governors][ 5 share]
Toyota Motor Corporation Kikkoman Corporation[GFJ Members] [ 1 share]
Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd.
Kajima Corporation
Nippon Steel Corporation
Tokyo Electric Power Co.
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation
Asahi Glass Co. Ltd.
The Bank of Tokyo‐Mitsubishi, Ltd.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd
Biru Daiko Co., Ltd.
H.I.S.Co.,Ltd.
(In the order of enlistment)66

【Membership List of The Global Forum of Japan (131 Members) 】【Chairman】
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies

NISHIKAWA Megumi, Foreign News Editor, Mainichi Newspapers
OKONOGI Masao, Professor, Keio University
ONUMA Yasuaki, Professor, University of Tokyo
OSANAI Takayuki, Foreign Policy Critic
OWADA Hisashi, Judge, International Court of Justice
OHYA Eiko, Journalist
RYU Ketsu, Professor, Waseda University
SAKAKIBARA Eisuke, Professor, Keio University
SAKAMOTO Masahiro,Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
SHIRAISHI Masaru, Professor, Kyoto University
SOEYA Yoshihide, Professor, Keio University
SONE Yasunori, Professor, Keio University
SUMIDA Nagayoshi, President, The Sankei Shimbun
TAHARA Soichiro, Journalist
TAJIMA Takashi, Guest Professor, Toyo Eiwa Women's University
TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, Rikkyo University
TAKAHASHI Kazuo, Professor, International Christian University
TAKASHIMA Hatsuhisa, Press Secretary/Director-General for Press andPublications, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University
TANAKA Akihiko, Professor, University of TokyoTANAKA Toshiro, Professor, Keio University
TANI Masahito, Commissioner, National Personnel Authority
TANINO Sakutaro, Former Ambassador to China
UEDA Takako, Professor, International Christian University
URATA Shujiro, Professor, Waseda University
WAKABAYASHI Masatake, Professor, University of Tokyo
YAMAGUCHI Tatsuo, Director General, Latin America Society
YAMAZAWA Ippei, President, International University
YONEKURA Seiichiro, Professor, Hitotsubashi University
YOSHITOMI Masaru, President & Chief Research Officer, Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry【President】
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
【Business Leaders】(13 Members)[Governors]
MOGI Yuzaburo, Chairman and CEO, Kikkoman Corporation
TOYODA Shoichiro, Honorary Chairman, Toyota Motor Corporation[Members]
HIRAIWA Gaishi, Advisor, The Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
IMAI Takashi, Honorary Chairman, Nippon Steel Corporation
ISHIKAWA Rokuro, Chairman, Kajima Corporation
KAMIYA Kenichi, Retired Chairman, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation
KOBAYASHI Yotaro, Chairman and CEO, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
MATSUNO Haruki, Chief Executive Counselor, Member of the Board, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
OKAYAMA Norio, Chairman, Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd.
SAWADA Hideo, Chairman, H.I.S Co.,Ltd.
SEYA Hiromichi, Senior Corporate Adviser, Asahi Glass Co., Ltd.
SHOTOKU Yukio, Executive Vice President, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
TAKAGAKI Tasuku, Senior Advisor, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd.
YAGUCHI Toshikazu, President, Biru Daiko Co., Ltd.
【Opinion Leaders】(84Members)[Governors]
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
KAI Noritake, Councilor, The Japan Forum of International Relations Inc.
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies
SHIMADA Haruo, Professor, Keio University【Political Leaders】(33Members)[Members][Governors]
AICHI Kazuo, Visiting Professor, Kansai University
HATOYAMA Yukio, Member of the House of Representatives (DPJ)
AKASHI Yasukazu, Foreign News Editor, Jiji Press
TANIGAKI Sadakazu, M.H.R. (LDP)
AKASHI Yasushi, Chairman, The Japan Center for Conflict Prevention
AOKI Tamotsu, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies[Members]
AMAKO Satoshi, Professor, Waseda University
ASOMURA Kuniaki,Executive Director, The Japan Center for Conflict Prevention
ABE Shinzo, Member of the House of Representatives (LDP)CHUMA Kiyofuku, Journalist
AIZAWA Ichiro, M.H.R. (LDP)
EBATA Kensuke, Defense Commentator
HOSODA Hiroyuki, M.H.R. (LDP)
FUKAGAWA Yukiko, Professor, University of TokyoIWAKUNI Tetsundo, M.H.R. (DPJ)GOMI Norio, Professor, Rikkyo Graduate School of Business
KISHIDA Fumio, M.H.R. (LDP)
GYOHTEN Toyoo, President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs
KOIKE Yuriko, M.H.R. (LDP)
HAKAMADA Shigeki, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
KOIZUMI Toshiaki, M.H.R. (DPJ)
HAMADA Takujiro, Former Member of the House of Councillors
KOMIYAMA Yoko, M.H.R. (DPJ)HANAI Hitoshi, Professor, Reitaku University
MAEHARA Seiji, M.H.R. (DPJ)
HARUNA Mikio, Special Correspondent, Kyodo NewsMASUHARA Yoshitake, M.H.R. (LDP)
HASEGAWA Kazutoshi, President, Japan-Australia-New Zealand Society
MATSUMIYA Isao, M.H.R. (LDP)
HATA Kei, Vice Principal, Sakushin Gakuin
NAKAGAWA Masaharu, M.H.R. (DPJ)HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
OTANI Nobumori, M.H.R. (DPJ)ICHIKAWA Isao, Executive Advisor for Financial Affairs, Keio University
SATO Akira, M.H.R. (LDP)
INA Hisayoshi, Columnist, The Nikkei Newspaper
SHIOZAKI Yasuhisa, M.H.R. (LDP)
INOGUCHI Takashi, Professor, University of Tokyo
SONODA Hiroyuki, M.H.R. (LDP)IOKIBE Makoto, Professor, Kobe University
TAKEMASA Koichi, M.H.R. (DPJ)ISHII Ichiji, President, The Japan Center for Conflict Prevention
TANAHASHI Yasufumi, M.H.R. (LDP)ITO Eisei, Corporate Auditor, Toyota Auto Body Co., Ltd.
TSUCHIYA Shinako, M.H.R. (LDP)
IWAMA Yoko, Associate Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
UEDA Isamu, M.H.R. (NK)IZUMI Hajime, Professor, University of Shizuoka
ASAO Keiichiro, Member of the House of Councillors (DPJ)
JIMBO Ken, Assistant Professor, Keio University
ARAKI Kiyohiro, M.H.C. (NK)
KAKIZAWA Koji, former Minister of Foreign Affairs
HATA Yuichiro, M.H.C. (DPJ)
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy
HAYASHI Yoshimasa, M.H.C. (LDP)
KANEKO Kumao, President, Japan Council for Economic Research
HIRONAKA Wakako, M.H.C. (DPJ)
KIMIWADA Masao, Senior Managing Director, Asahi Shimbun
KATOH Shuichi, M.H.C. (NK)
KOHNO Masaru, Professor, Waseda University
SEKOU Hironari, M.H.C. (LDP)
KOJIMA Atsushi, Corporate Officer, The Yomiuri Shimbun
SUZUKI Kan, M.H.C.(DPJ)
KOJIMA Tomoyuki, Professor, Keio University
TAKANO Hiroshi, M.H.C. (NK)
KOKUBUN Ryosei, Professor, Keio University
TAKEMI Keizo, M.H.C. (LDP)
KONDO Tetsuo, President, Institute for New Era Strategy (INES)YANASE Susumu, M.H.C. (DPJ)KUBO Fumiaki, Professor, Keio University[Note] DPJ: Democratic Party of JapanKUMON Shumpei, Senior Executive Director, GLOCOM, International University of Japan
KUSANO Atsushi, Professor, Keio University
LDP:Liberal Democratic Party
MANO Teruhiko, Professor under special assignment, Seigakuin University
NK: New Komeito
MATSUMOTO Kenichi, Professor, Reitaku University【Executive Secretary】
MIYAMOTO Nobuo, Diplomatic Commentator
WATANABE Mayu
MIYAZAKI Isamu, Honorary Advisor, Daiwa Institute of Research
MIYOSHI Masaya, Chairman, J-Wave, Inc.
As of August 1, 2005
MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University
In alphabetical order
MURATA Koji, Associate Professor, Doshisha University
NAKAGANE Katsuji, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
NAKAHARA Nobuyuki, Senior Advisor, Financial Services Agency
NAKANISHI Terumasa, Professor, Kyoto University
NAGANO Shigeto, President, Japan Forum for Strategic Studies

67

9. An Introduction to ASEAN‐ISISThe ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN‐ISIS) is a loose associationof institutes in the region that aims at strengthening regional cooperation through joint studies andseminars.
The group has established a series of meetings that have become a major venue for exchanges ofideas, not only amongst Southeast Asians but also with experts and government officials fromother parts of the world.
ASEAN ISIS also organizes regular bilateral seminars with counterpart institutions in China,
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India and Europe. Southeast Asia Regional Program sponsored by
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has provided financial support topromote these activities.
ASEAN‐ISIS was founded in 1988, comprised of following institutes: The Centre of Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia; The Institute of Strategic and International Studies(ISIS), Malaysia; Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), Philippines; Singapore
Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Singapore; and Institute of Security and International
Studies (ISIS), Thailand.
ASEAN ISIS has now nine member institutions: CSIS, Indonesia; ISIS, Malaysia; ISDS, Philippines;
SIIA, Singapore; ISIS, Thailand; Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (BDIPSS),
Brunei Darussalam; The Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), Cambodia;
Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), Laos; and The Institute for International Relations (IIR), Vietnam.
The network came to the attention of governments through its policy papers, leading to thedevelopment of close relations with the ASEAN senior officials meeting (SOM). What is now
known as track two or the second track came into being. ASEAN ISIS has become a model for anumber of similar activities.

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The Global Forum of Japan
17‐12‐1301, Akasaka 2‐chome Minato‐ku, Tokyo, 107‐0052, Japan[Tel] +81‐3‐3584‐2190 [Fax] +81‐3‐3589‐5120[E‐mail] info@gfj.jp [URL] http://www.gfj.jp/