April 2020

The New Deal for Oil Markets:
implications for Russia’s short-term tactics
and long-term strategy

Introduction: adapting to three crises in one
Oil prices have fallen sharply over the past few weeks and have tested lows not seen since the early
2000s. In effect a triple blow has hit the markets. Firstly, the demand shock caused by the coronavirus
pandemic; secondly the supply shock as a result of the collapse of the OPEC+ deal on March 6 th 2020;and finally the intensified rivalry between the global powers that has led to trade wars, sanctions anddisagreement over how best to re-balance the global oil market. This paper focuses on the position of
Russia in the current events, highlighting some of the reasons why the country and its oil companies
have felt confident in adopting an assertive position in negotiations with both Saudi Arabia and the US.
Russia has certainly now become an integral part of the “big three” oil producers and exporters, who
combined account for over one-third of the global oil supply. Their actions are going to be key to the
future shape of the global oil market, and as a result Russia’s strategy and its position with regards to
OPEC+ and the current crisis deserves careful consideration.
In early March it appeared that the Kremlin was prepared to sit out a lengthy price war, having refusedto accede to Saudi Arabia’s demand of production cuts by the OPEC+ group. This decision was driven
by a disagreement over the benefit of cuts in stabilizing the oil market and also by a Russian belief thatits state budget and the country’s oil sector are in a robust position relative to their key competitors
thanks to a flexible exchange rate policy, large financial reserves, an adjustable tax system and low
production costs. However, one month later the country has decided to completely shift its position andagree to a significant cut in output equivalent to around 20% of crude oil production. The very obvious
question is why?
Clearly the reality of the impact of the Covid-19 epidemic and the resulting global economic crisis haveplayed a role, as the speed of change has shocked even those countries who believe they have a strong
position. A collapse in oil demand and resulting low oil prices have tested the stress levels of all oilproducing nations as never before and catalysed questions about their economically viable cost of
production, fiscal break-evens, and elasticity of supply and demand under quickly changing market
conditions. This Energy Insight focuses on Russia’s position in regard to these questions and assesses
how its oil market strategy has evolved in response to its understanding of the positions of its key rivals.
We will outline our understanding of the Russian position going into the March 6 th OPEC + meeting andwill discuss what we continue to believe is the country’s long-term position with regard to the oil market,
which is essentially that the Russian oil industry can survive and maintain a relatively strong position inwhat will undoubtedly be a very tough two years for the global oil industry. We will also explain our
thoughts on why Russia has taken the short-term decision to re-enter the OPEC+ group, which we

Energy Insight: 67

Vitaly Yermakov and James Henderson

believe has been made possible by easier operating conditions in the Russian oil sector during thesummer months but is mainly driven by political considerations and a desire to be seen to be part of a
responsible effort to stabilize global markets in a time of crisis. We will also outline why, over the longer
term, we believe that the Russian economy and its oil companies can survive a low oil price environment
for some time and therefore why Russia’s short-term tactics may not reflect its long-term oil market
strategy.

Calm before the storm
The year 2020 started with the oil price reaching above $70 per barrel. Cooperation between OPEC
and Russia since 2016 had been keeping oil prices in check and seemed to be delivering satisfactory
results, with the level of inventories having been brought down to the targeted 5-year average levels.
However, during February 2020 oil prices quickly slipped to the low $50s, reflecting the new worries
over the reemergence of a surplus on the back of growing US shale oil and the spread of COVID-19 in
China and its impact on Asian (and global) demand for oil. Oil demand projections for 2020 publishedin February suggested a slowdown, but it was not expected to be too long or too dramatic. For example,
the IEA’s forecast in February predicted global oil demand would grow by 825,000 b/d in 20201. Other
parts of the world seemed little affected by the epidemic at the time, although first concerns over the
global dispersion of the virus started to appear. During the next few weeks, however, as COVID-19
spread into Europe and North America, the outlook became much grimmer, raising fears that oil demandmight not increase at all this year, or might even fall year-on-year, for the first time in decades. On
March 9 the IEA assessed global oil demand at 99.9 mb/d in 2020, down around 90,000 b/d from 2019,a first year-on-year decline in several decades 2. Now, of course, these expectations seem wildly overoptimistic.

The failed meeting which exacerbated a much bigger crisis
The much- discussed meeting between OPEC and Russia in Vienna on March 6th, 2020 took place inan atmosphere of complete uncertainty over the prospects for near-term oil demand. In response to
the fall in the oil price the Saudis initially proposed an extension of the most recent production cut of
2.1 mb/d (relative to the output as of October 2018 agreed in December of 20193) and, also put forward
a proposal for a new cut of 1.5 mb/d until the end of 2020. All OPEC+ members supported the proposal
except for Russia which suggested an alternative “wait and see” approach, arguing that because theoil demand outlook for 2020 was so vague, OPEC+ should extend the existing deal through the second
quarter of 2020 only and return to the question of further production cuts in June. The Saudis, clearly
irritated by what they interpreted as Russia’s lack of cooperation, said that they were not prepared tocountenance a “no action” strategy or bear the bulk of the burden of adjustment and made an ultimatum:
either Russia becomes part of the proposed reduction, or the whole OPEC+ deal is off the table. The
Russians did not budge, and the rest has become history: from April 1, 2020 all OPEC+ producers havebeen able to extract as much oil as they like, with the Saudis announcing record discounts for theircrude for April deliveries, effectively pursuing a market share strategy. Meanwhile, the COVID-19
pandemic has been accelerating, bringing global economies to a standstill. By March 20th, 2020 oil
prices had fallen to the low $20s, at which level a significant share of current oil output becomes
uneconomic, undermining the budgets of countries relying on oil revenues.
In retrospect, the obvious questions to ask are: First, had OPEC+ agreed to the proposed reduction,
could it have prevented the oil price collapse? Second, was Russia’s position a blunder or a strategic
calculation? As far as the first question is concerned, the answer is that it probably could only haveslightly mitigated the price fall but not prevented it, given the extent of the demand destruction caused
by Covid-19. As to the second question, we are fortunate to have a detailed account of Russia’s
strategic thinking with regards to OPEC+ from a person who was instrumental in forging the agreement
between Russia and Saudi Arabia in 2016 and has been involved in all key negotiations since thenincluding the meeting on March 6 – Russia’s Deputy Energy Minister Pavel Sorokin.
1

https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-february-2020
https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-march-2020
3
OPEC+ has been reducing output by 1.7 mb/d and several countries led by Saudi Arabia committed to slash additional 0.4
m/bd.
2

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

2Russia’s official view
On March 11, 2020 Sorokin gave a very detailed account of the Russian negotiating team’s
interpretation of the events in Vienna to the Reuters’ correspondents in Moscow. Reuters publishedthe full text of this very important interview only in Russian on the Russian version of its website 4. It
also offered a drastically shortened and abridged version of the interview with some key quotes fromSorokin on the English version of its website.5
Sorokin started the interview by describing how the Russian side understood the changing context ofthe events preceding the OPEC+ agreement and the developments after the deal had been reached.
The period of extremely high oil prices in the early 2010s led to many FIDs for high-cost projects inevery region of the world. In addition to conventional projects with long investment spans, the shale
revolution in North America became a game changer by adding more than 4 mb/d to global supply
during 2010-2014 period from tight oil projects with a much shorter investment cycle. Sorokin pointed
out that this was also a period of extremely low interest rates in developed countries which enabled
new debt to be raised and refinanced easily. Ultimately, he concluded, this launched a cycle ofinvestment into numerous unprofitable projects and resulted in “an unprecedented distortion of
economic reality” which is still affecting the oil market today.
Sorokin’s next important point was that during the previous oil war for market share a critical price levelof $26-27/bbl had been tested. It led to “supply destruction” on a grand scale and changed “the reckless
behavior” of many producers investing in unsustainable projects. The creation of the OPEC+ groupingat that time was meant to be an instrument to encourage stability and predictability, allowing the oilmarket to become “healthy”. At the same time, argued Sorokin, some market players mistakenly
decided that OPEC+ would target a certain price range and cut output to ensure that the lower limits
were not breached. These players started to increase investments into tight oil in the US, in Canadiantar sands, in offshore projects in Brazil and the Gulf of Mexico. However, this “free ride” for those
producers had the effect of making each consecutive production cut by OPEC+ less and less efficient.
It also meant, said Sorokin, that at some point OPEC+ would inevitably have been forced to expand its
supply to protect the market from a new wave of uneconomic projects.
Commenting on the failure of OPEC+ to agree on March 6th, Sorokin said that Russia’s proposal toextend the deal, but not introduce a new cut before the second half of 2020, would have given time foreveryone to evaluate the true effect of COVID-19 on demand. Had Russia’s proposal been accepted,
oil prices would have declined only by $5-8 per barrel, he suggested, but it would have prevented a
price collapse and given plenty of time to assess the situation and make an informed decision.
Furthermore, he argued that the outcome would have been within an optimal price range of $45-55 perbarrel, which would be high enough for producers and comfortable for the global economy.
Turning to the alternative proposal, Sorokin asserted that it would be technically challenging for Russia
to commit to an additional 300,000 b/d output reduction, bringing Russia’s total output reduction
commitment (relative to output as of October 2018) to 600,000 b/d. He claimed that Russia is not aswing producer and is working many more fields and wells than producers in the Middle East. Many
marginal wells, once stopped, could not be re-started again, but even more importantly, “we cannot
fight a falling demand situation when there is no clarity about where the bottom (of demand) is. It is very
easy to get caught in a circle when, by cutting once, you get into an even... worse situation in say two
weeks: oil prices would shortly bounce back before falling again as demand continued to fall.”Sorokin referred to the spat with Saudi Arabia during the negotiations as “differences of opinion”
regarding the most appropriate course of action and insisted that Russia does not want a price war. He
said Russia was open to talking to OPEC again: “All communication channels are open, but I cannot
predict when we will meet again - this largely depends on our partners”.
4 https://ru.reuters.com/article/topNews/idRUKBN20Y2TV-ORUTP
5 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-opec-russia-exclusive/exclusive-russia-to-opec-deeper-oil-cuts-wont-work-

idUSKBN20Y2TJ

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

3

According to Sorokin, Russia’s negotiating team modeled different price scenarios, including one ofunrestrained production by the members of OPEC+. The key conclusion from this analysis was thatwithout any agreement, oil prices would quickly fall to about $30/bbl but would then settle in a range of$40-45/bbl by the end of the year. This explains Russia’s negotiating position: the shock, according totheir analysis, was going to be relatively short-term and would lead to quicker market rebalancing as“high-cost projects will disappear”.
When asked about the impact of the low oil prices on Russia’s macroeconomic situation and theperformance of Russia’s oil companies, Sorokin said that the risks for the budget are minimal owing to
the floating ruble exchange rate and the flexible tax system that lowers tax take in a low oil priceenvironment. He gave his estimates of average OPEX and CAPEX for the majority of the Russian oil
fields as $3-8/bbl and $4-8/bbl correspondingly, while the range of OPEX plus CAPEX for most of
Russian producers is from $9-10/bbl to $15-20/bbl, not including transportation costs from the wellhead.
To conclude, the Russian Ministry of Energy’s position was that it was not Russia that started the pricewar, but now it has happened Russia is extremely competitive and can withstand a low oil priceenvironment for as long as it takes.

President Putin and the meeting that set Russia’s position for the OPEC+
summitA further interesting element to the oil market debate concerns the involvement of the key actor in all
Russia’s strategic decisions, namely President Putin. The timeline of his schedule around the March 6th
meeting can also tell us much about the Russian position.
Putin had a very busy schedule on March 1st: he was flying to the city of Pskov to attend the 20th
anniversary of one of the key events of the Chechen war when 90 paratroopers (the 6th regiment) of
the 76th division based in Pskov fought more than 3,000 rebels for two days and did not give groundwith almost all the paratroopers being killed in the battle. Before boarding his plane, Putin summoned
the heads of the main Russian oil companies and the key members of the government (including Energy
Minister Alexander Novak, who was going to Vienna for the OPEC+ meeting shortly after) to Vnukovo
airport in Moscow for a brief meeting. This was apparently the last discussion between the key decisionmakers when Russia’s strategy with regards to OPEC+ was agreed. The Kremlin website has theaccount only for the start of the meeting, as the main discussion happened behind closed doors, butnevertheless Putin’s opening remarks are interesting.6
Russia’s President started by pointing out the troubling economic developments resulting from COVID19, in particular the decline of the oil price from $70/bbl at the beginning of the year to $50/bbl by thetime of the discussion. He then said that this price level was comfortable for the Russian budget andthe Russian economy since the fiscal breakeven price for the Russian budget in 2020 was set at$42.40/bbl. Moreover, Russia’s financial reserves were substantial and would allow Russia to withstanda possible worsening of the situation in the global economy. Putin said that the international currency
reserves of Russia’s Central Bank amounted to $563 billion. This includes Russia’s National Welfare
Fund created for dealing with external crises had accumulated $124 billion, which would ensure budget
stability even under severe economic stress. Then Putin proceeded to talk about the upcoming meetingin Vienna. He called OPEC+ “an effective instrument in providing long-term stability for the global
energy markets” and said that “we received additional budgetary revenues [as a result of the deal] and,
importantly, our oil companies could invest in perspective new projects”.
Putin’s remarks match Sorokin’s account of Russia’s position being in favor of the OPEC+ deal ingeneral and confirm that the meeting did not discuss the end of cooperation with OPEC. Also
noteworthy is the general conviction among Russian decision-makers that Russia’s position withregards to a possible economic crisis is solid and that Russia’s “pain threshold” allows it to confront avery low oil price environment for a long time.

6

http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62888

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

4

The views of the Russian oil companies
But what about the Russian oil companies? After all, the Energy Ministry was merely the coordinatorof the cooperation between Russia and OPEC, but it is the oil companies that will have to survive thecrisis.
On March 12th Russia’s Energy Minister Alexander Novak held a meeting with the representatives of
Russia’s main oil companies. In the midst of the unfolding price war following Saudi Arabia’s
announcement that it would sharply increase its supply to 12.3 mb/d and would offer huge discounts
for its crude for April deliveries, the Russian companies said they were ready to work in a low oil priceenvironment.7 Alexander Dukov, the head of Gazpromneft, said that given the company’s combined
OPEX and CAPEX of only $10/bbl it was ready for oil prices as low as $35/bbl for an extended periodof time. He also said that Russia wanted the continuation of cooperation in an OPEC+ format, but thedecision to end the deal had been taken by OPEC members. Nail Maganov, CEO of Tatneft announced
that even an $8/bbl price was not critical for his company. Vagit Alekperov of LUKoil confirmed that
Russian oil companies “have been mobilized” to address the challenge of low prices.
As prices dwindled, however, some started to express their concerns. Leonid Fedun, Vice-President of
LUKoil and also one of its largest shareholders, gave an interview to RBC TV on March 19th, 2020,
shortly after oil prices had breached $25/bbl, 8 where he called the current oil price “catastrophic”. He
confirmed that during the meeting of the Russian oil companies with President Vladimir Putin on March
1st there was no discussion about leaving OPEC+, although he admitted that some Russian statecompanies “did lobby that”, but even they “could not imagine in their worst nightmare” that prices would
fall to the low $20s. Cheap crude oil as a result of the “war of attrition” between Russia and Saudi
Arabia might be beneficial to the US as the world’s largest importer and consumer of petroleum,continued Fedun. On the other hand, he said, the price war “will not kill but only wound” US tight oil
producers, pushing developments in the US oil patch back six or seven years.

Rosneft versus all
However, although the views of these oil companies are interesting it is really the position of Rosneft,and its CEO Igor Sechin, that matter most, given that the state oil company produced 4.6 mbd of crude
in 2019 (41 percent of Russia’s total). LUKoil’s Fedun hinted in his interview that Rosneft was the main
opponent of continued cooperation with OPEC, and this was reiterated when Sechin gave an interview
to Evgeniy Primakov, the host of a respected TV program “International Affairs”, on March 20, 2020. 9
Sechin referred to the current crisis as “complex”, the result of a mixture of economic and politicalfactors as well as the COVID-19 pandemic. He, however, appeared to believe that these factors weretransitory in nature. He pointed out China’s recent success in bringing the spread of the coronavirus
under control.
Among the “political” factors that contributed to the oil price collapse Sechin mentioned the future US
presidential elections and the issue of the succession of power in Saudi Arabia. He then said that theinternational sanctions against OPEC members such as Iran and Venezuela had also contributed to
the reduction of their output. He further argued that the sanctions had diminished the role of OPEC+ inbalancing the market and raised questions about its relevance amid the new realities in the marketplace.
Speaking about the significance of the OPEC+ agreement, Sechin said that it did play a role in balancing
the oil market by reducing supply, but it was very limited. He pointed out the tremendous increase in oil
output in the United States that had turned the former net importer of petroleum into a net exporter.
According to Sechin, the US was actively increasing its market share in areas that were criticallyimportant to OPEC+ countries: in particular in Europe, China and India. Other non-OPEC producers
like Mexico, Brazil and Norway with relatively high production costs were also increasing their output.
Sechin then turned to the issue of production costs and stressed that OPEX in Russia is very low, at7

https://www.rbc.ru/business/12/03/2020/5e6a5c559a79472e60d5b361
https://www.rbc.ru/business/19/03/2020/5e726cd49a79475a72b455dc?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_refe
rrer=https%3A%2F%2Fyandex.ru%2Fnews
9
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AouhoU_uiX08

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

5about $3.10/bbl, and not much higher than in Saudi Arabia. So, he concluded: “Does it make any sense
for us to cut output in this situation?”
Commenting on the oil price collapse, Sechin said that he expected a price recovery to $50-60 per
barrel by year end as a result of the contraction of “shale oil” in the US. Moreover, he expressed doubts
about the revival of US oil output to pre-crisis levels after the price rebound since “investors would nottrust it [the US tight oil business model]”.
To summarize, most of the Russian oil companies have been braving the storm and saying: "We did
not want it, but we can survive the shock better than our key competitors". At the same time, hardly
anyone in Russia anticipated that prices would fall to the low $20s. Nevertheless, Russia feels that it isbetter positioned for this price downturn than in 2014-2016 thanks to its record-level of currency
reserves and savings in the National Welfare Fund. Rosneft has been the “hawk” with regards tocooperation with other producing countries, but Russia's official position remains that the agreement
worked, and it made sense to extend it. The directives given to Novak did not contain any instructions
to terminate OPEC+. This was expressly confirmed by several other key participants in the meetingwith Putin on March 1st – Russia’s Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin 10 and First Deputy Prime Minister
Andrey Belousov.11 The initiative to kill the deal, according to Belousov, belonged to “our Arab partners”.

Who is afraid of a low oil price?
Russia’s confidence in its position is based on its beliefs about the issues facing its key competitors.
These can be summarized as follows: Saudi Arabia has low-cost production but expensive social
needs, while US shale oil cannot survive extremely low oil prices due to its cost base and financing
model. Below we outline our understanding of the Russian view based on observations andconversations in Moscow.
Saudi Aramco has the world’s lowest-cost oil. However, the Saudi economy is extremely dependent on
oil revenues, and the Saudi budget has had a fiscal breakeven oil price that has exceeded market levels
since 2014. Indeed, the IMF estimates that the fiscal breakeven oil price for the kingdom is about$80/bbl in 2020 (See Figure 1).
Figure 1: Fiscal breakeven price for Saudi Arabia
160

$/bbl

140
120
100
80

60
40

Fiscal breakeven oil prices
Range for MENAP
Oil price (average of Brent, WTI, Dubai)
Fiscal breakeven oil price for Saudi Arabia

20
0
2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

Source: OIES, data from IMF and World Bank10

http://government.ru/news/39127/
https://www.rbc.ru/business/22/03/2020/5e7680e69a79477afec1cfe7?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=
https%3A%2F%2Fyandex.ru%2Fnews
11

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

6

Furthermore, a recent report by the IMF team covering Middle East and Central Asia gave a grave
warning that the current fiscal policies of GCC countries are leading them towards a fast depletion of
their wealth12. Unless GCC countries radically change their fiscal systems, a high oil price can only
delay this process but not stop it. Moreover, a low oil price may result in a major financial crisis for thesecountries as soon as 2027 (See Figure 2)
Figure 2: GCC countries’ financial wealth depletion under the current fiscal stance(in real 2018 $US trillion)

Source: The International Monetary FundAs far as North America is concerned, the region’s oil and gas sector has produced a miracle, morethan doubling its output during the last decade. The US EIA sees this expansion continuing through to2030 with crude and condensate output reaching a plateau of over 14 mb/d and then slowly declining
during the 2040s (See Figure 3). These high expectations are now confronting the reality of sub-$30
per barrel prices that may undermine a sector that is already struggling financially. The key reason forthis is that “in financial terms, this production boom has been an unrelenting financial bust”, as a recent
report by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis argues 13.
Figure 3: US Production of Crude Oil and Lease Condensate

Source: US Energy Information Administration

12

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2020/01/31/The-Future-of-Oil-and-FiscalSustainability-in-the-GCC-Region-48934
13
https://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Shale-Producers-Spilled-2.1-Billion-in-Red-Ink-Last-Year_March-2020.pdf

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

7

Specifically, as a group the main shale-focused companies in North America have generated negative
free cash flows in every single year over the past ten years, resulting in a negative cumulative total of$188.6 billion (See Figure 4).
Figure 4: Free Cash Flow of 34 North American Shale-Focused Oil and Gas Companies
0.0

90

-2.1

80

-6.2

Price of the WTI, $/bbl

70

-10.0
-15.0

60
-17.0

50

-17.2 -17.6

-18.1

40
30

-5.0

-20.0
-25.0

-23.8
-26.3

-25.1

FCF, Billion $

100

-30.0

20

-35.0

10

-35.3

0

-40.0

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
FCF (Billion $) - R-scale
WTI ($/bbl) - L-scale
Source: OIES, data on FCF based on corporate reports compiled by IEEFA, price data from the World Bank

The cash flow losses reduced in 2019 but remained in negative territory for the group as a whole despitecollective cutbacks in capital spending of nearly $8 billion year-on-year by the companies. Only a few
of them produced positive cash flows during 2017-2019 (See Figure 5).
Figure 5: Free Cash Flow of Individual North American Shale-Focused Companies, 2017-2019
4000
EOG
3000
2000

Million US$

1000

COG
CLR

0
0
-1000

AETUF
APA
AR

MRO
CPG

CPE

ERF
EQT

HPR
LPI

CXO
-2000
-3000

CHK

GPOR
HES

40

PE

-4000
-5000

TRMLF
XEC
OAS PVACPDCE PXD RRC S… SPGYF WLL
SM
WPX
MTDR
QEP
NBL

FANG

-6000
Source: OIES, data from IEEFA

It would appear that the business model of delivering increased production volumes while disregarding
profitability may have reached its limits, with the IEEFA stating that “fracking has failed as a financial
endeavor: even after a decade of technical improvements and increasing investor scrutiny, most shale-

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

8focused companies still burn through more cash than they produce” 14. Indeed, the oil price slump in
2020 combined with a looming recession suggests that North American shale producers are now facing
the risk of massive shut-ins.15
According to an IHS Markit report published on April 1, 2020, if no agreement on supply cuts among
the main producers can be reached, the oil market would be overwhelmed by production exceeding
available capacity. The result could then be the forced shut-in of oil production amounting to 10 mb/d
as storage would essentially be full. Then, following an “extreme, light-speed rebalancing of the oilmarket” the situation in 2021, when demand returns, would be drastically different from today. U.S.
crude production could be as low as 8.8 mb/d by the fourth quarter of 2021 – nearly 32 percent below
the figure for the first quarter of 2020. In contrast, Saudi output should be 1.8 mb/d higher and Russian
output “just slightly lower” by the final quarter of 2021 compared with Q1 2020. 16
Nevertheless, low oil prices will hurt Russia as well, but in a different way from the Middle Eastern
producers or the US. Overall, Russia's resilience to a prolonged oil price slump is quite high as a resultof its flexible exchange rate, which allows the country to balance its state budget by way of macro
policies, high levels of hard currency reserves and a self-adjusting tax take that protects oil producers
in a low oil price environment. In addition, a large share of output from Russian oil companies comesfrom brownfields with low production costs, and many large fields also enjoy special tax exemptions.
While trade-offs between reduced tax take in a low oil price environment and the fiscal needs of thestate are an inevitable source of conflict in the longer term, for the next few years Russia is wellpositioned to survive the crisis. We review all these factors below.

Russia’s budget and oil & gas revenues
Russia’s reliance on hydrocarbon revenues is well known. In 2019, proceeds from sales of oil and gas
amounted to $128 billion, or 41 percent of the federal budget revenues (See Figure 6).
Figure 6: Oil and gas revenues of Russia’s Federal Budget
250

60
50

200

Billion US$

30
100

Percent

40
150

20
50

10

Oil&gas revenues of Russia's Federal Budget

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

0

2000

0

% of total, right-hand scale

Source: OIES, data from Russia’s Ministry of Finance and Central Bank

14

https://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Shale-Producers-Spilled-2.1-Billion-in-Red-Ink-Last-Year_March-2020.pdf
https://www.woodmac.com/news/the-edge/seven-days-that-shook-the-world/
16
https://www.rigzone.com/news/10mm_bpd_of_oil_output_could_vanish-01-apr-2020-161594-article/
15

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

9This is something of a decline from the 2011-2014 period, when annual oil and gas revenues werehovering around $200 billion thanks to the $100-plus oil price environment, providing around a 50%
share of budget revenues, but nevertheless it underlines that hydrocarbons remain a vital source ofgovernment cashflow.
Converting Russian oil and gas revenues to dollars, however, hides an important feature of the Russian
system – a highly flexible exchange rate regime that has been used to stabilize budgetary revenues
during external oil price shocks. Russia moved to a floating currency regime after oil prices collapsed
at the end of 2014 and has been using the weak ruble as a shield against adverse external
circumstances ever since. When measured in rubles, oil and gas revenues for the budget experienced
only slight declines in 2015 and 2016 but have grown strongly in the past two years (See Figure 7).
It is also worth noting that in spite of an oil price recovery to $80 per barrel and above by the end of
2018, the ruble did not strengthen owing to Russia’s additional policy of putting any extra revenues fromoil prices above $40 per barrel into a national “rainy day” fund called the National Welfare Fund.
Essentially, Russia has designed a system that allowed the ruble to depreciate when global oil prices
were falling but did not allow it to appreciate when oil prices increased. This had two benefits: as a
macroeconomic and fiscal tool it shielded the budget while as an industrial policy instrument it protected
the competitiveness of Russian exporters.
Figure 7: Russia’s budgetary oil and gas revenues in rubles
25000

80
70

20000

Billion rubles

60
50

15000

40
10000

30
20

5000
10

Oil&Gas

Other

Total

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

0

2000

0

RUR/USD, R-scale

Source: OIES, data from Russia’s Ministry of Finance and Central Bank

A further important consideration is the changing structure of the oil and gas tax take, as over the past
few years the Russian government has reallocated the bulk of the overall fiscal burden for crude oil andrefined products away from export taxes and towards the mineral extraction tax (Russia’s equivalent ofa mineral royalty). (See Table 1)

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

10

Table 1: Russian budgetary oil and gas tax revenues in 2012-2018 (as percent of GDP)
2012
31.86

2013
30.8

2014
31.29

2015
28.97

Total fiscal revenues
Fiscal revenues from taxes on oil, gas,
10.18
9.65
10.01
7.42
and refined products
including
MRET, crude oil
3.13
2.99
3.11
3.25
MRET, natural gas
0.39
0.44
0.47
0.51
Excise taxes, refined products
0.54
0.57
0.49
0.36
Export duties, crude oil
3.65
3.19
3.31
1.72
Export duties, natural gas
0.64
0.66
0.62
0.66
Export duties, refined products
1.66
1.65
1.88
0.9
Export duties, oil and oil products for
0.17
0.14
0.14
0
exports from Republic of Belarus
Fiscal revenues, not related to oil&gas
21.69
21.15
21.28
21.55
Source: OIES, data for GDP from Rosstat, data for revenues from Federal Treasury

2016
28.51

2017
30.27

2018
32.72

6.12

6.84

9.03

2.72
0.57
0.49
1.2
0.62
0.52

3.64
0.73
0.36
1.06
0.63
0.43

5.04
0.75
0.35
1.49
0.78
0.62

0

0

0

22.39

23.42

23.69

The shift towards wellhead taxes is designed to protect the budget against a possible decline in thevolume of Russian oil and gas exports. In 2020 the marginal rate of the export tax on crude oil in Russia
is 20% compared with 65% in the early 2010s, and Russia’s so-called “tax maneuver” will see acomplete phase-out of export taxes on crude and refined products by 2024 (See Figure 8).
Figure 8: Planned schedule of phasing out petroleum export taxation in Russia: marginal rates
of export duty for crude oil and refined products
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2014

2015

Crude oil

2016

2017

Gasoline

2018

Naphtha

2019

2020

Diesel/gasoil

2021

2022

Fuel oil

VGO

2023

2024

Source: OIES, based on multiple RF governmental resolutions, actual for 2014-2020, planned for 2021-2024

The downside of this change has been the negative impact it has had on the economics of many
Russian brownfields. Whereas mineral royalties are usually site specific, the philosophy of the Russian
MRET when it was introduced in the early 2000s was of a “one-size-fits-all” tax. However, over time
the Russian tax administrators have had to accept the reality that a production tax should reflect
differences in project economics that are a function of site-specific mineral rents. However, a fear oftax avoidance has driven Russian tax policy away from cost-based calculations that might bemanipulated by company accountants.

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

11

Figure 9: Share of oil production in Russia subject to reduced rates of MRET
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Reduced tax (MRET exemptions)

Full-scale tax

Source: OIES, data from Russia’s Ministry of Finance

As a result, numerous exemptions and rate reductions to MRET have had to be granted to alleviate theburden of this revenue-based tax, with these discounts primarily addressing the problems of depleted
fields and also the higher cost of new fields in regions lacking developed infrastructure. However, as
Russia’s mature production base has deteriorated and more new fields have been brought into
production, the share of assets that have been granted various MRET exemptions had reached almost
60 percent by 2020. Moreover, Russia’s Ministry of Finance is concerned that by 2035 the output with
reduced rates of MRET could reach 90 percent of the total (See Figure 9).

Anticipating the storm: Russia runs stress-tests for its budget
Amid this complex tax background, at the end of 2019 Russia’s Ministry of Finance submitted a budget
for 2020 to the Russian parliament as well as projections for 2021-22. As part of this process it also ran
a stress-test that looked at the Russian budget’s resilience to a low oil price (See Table 2).The
simulation suggested that even if the oil price (in this case Urals blend) remains at $25/bbl for a year,
oil and gas revenues for Russia would fall by only 2.4 percent of GDP. If oil prices remain at this level
for three years, the oil and gas revenue shortfall could reach 7.6 percent of GDP. At the same time,
Russia’s National Welfare Fund had collected $123.4 billion (7.3% of GDP) from surplus oil revenues
as of March 1, 2020, which would be enough to offset losses to the state budget from a $25 oil price foralmost three years. Indeed, Russia’s total war chest is even larger, as the country’s total currency
reserves (including the NWF) stood at $581 billion as of 13 March 2020. 17

17

https://www.minfin.ru/ru/statistics/fonds/

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

12

Table 2: Reduction in oil and gas revenues of Russia's Federal Budget under different oil priceassumptions (percent of GDP)

Urals price, $/bbl
40
35
30
25
20
15
10

Number of years
5
0
0
-2.5
-4.4
-5
-8.9
-7.6
-13.6
-10.7
-19
-13.9
-25
-16.1
-29.1

1

3
0
-0.8
-1.6
-2.4
-3.4
-4.4
-5

7

10

0
-6.5
-13.2
-20.2
-28.3
-37.5
-44.1

0
-9.9
-20.4
-31.5
-43.6
-58.9
-70.4

Source: Source: Russia's Ministry of Finance, Main directions of budgetary, fiscal, and customs policies for 2020
and 2021-22

At the end of 2019 Russia’s Central Bank also ran a stress-test simulation looking at the sensitivity of
the ruble exchange rate to changes in oil price 18. According to the CBR if the oil price were to decline
to $25 per barrel then the ruble would depreciate considerably, to a range of 75-94 rubles per US dollar,
compared with an average annual exchange rate of 64.9 in 2019. The upper band of the range,
apparently, refers to the impact upon the ruble of a prolonged period of low oil prices as opposed torelatively short-term oil price fluctuations (See Figure 10).

RUR/USD

Figure 10: Ruble/US dollar exchange rate sensitivity to changes in oil price

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

94
81
75

70

75

69
64

67

65

60

62

RUR/USD exchange rate
RUR/USD exchange rate, CBR Stress Case

25

35

42.4
50
Urals price, $/bbl

60

70

Source: OIES, based on CBR guidance

Another important element of stability for Russia has been its very strong financial position, as it has avery low level of external state debt at only 4% of GDP (See Table 3).

18

http://cbr.ru/Content/Document/File/71220/main_directions.pdf

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

13

Table 3: Russia’s state debt (billion rubles)

201915439.5
14.2
3351.43.1
11142.2
72.2
1793.24297.327.8
1558.3

State debt
Percent of GDP
including under state guarantees
Percent of GDP
Internal state debt
Percent of total debt
including under state guarantees
External state debt
Percent of total debt
including under state guarantees

2020*
17201.9
15.2
3448.93.112981.3
75.5
1823.24220.624.5
1625.7*Projection
Source: OIES, data from Russia’s Ministry of FinanceAt the same time, Russia’s foreign currency reserves have been increasing steadily and amounted to$562 billion dollars at the start of 2020. It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia had to spend a significant
part of its reserves during the previous oil price shock of 2015-16 and never recovered its pre-2014
position. As a result, in 2019 Russia’s foreign currency reserves exceeded those of Saudi Arabia andare $60 billion higher as of January 2020 (See Figure 11).
Figure 11: Dynamics of international reserves and foreign currency liquidity for Russia andSaudi Arabia
800
750

732

700

Billion US$

650
562

600
550
500
450

502

408

400
350
2014

2015

2016
Russia

2017

2018

2019

2020*

Saudi Arabia*January 2020
Source: OIES, data from IMF

Impact on Russian oil companies
As noted above, Russian oil companies have also generally been putting a brave face on their ability
to survive a low oil price environment, and a look at some of the key numbers would suggest that,
although financially painful, current oil prices need not be catastrophic for the majority of the major
Russian oils. There are three key reasons for this – firstly the flexible tax system, secondly the
movement of the ruble which means that US$ costs are also very adjustable and thirdly the fact that
The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

14most of the sector has used the recent stronger oil price to strengthen its financial foundations, inparticular by reducing debt. It is worth going through each of these in turn.

The Russian tax system helps to lower upstream costs when the oil price is low
Russia’s reliance on oil tax revenues has been discussed above, but the tax system has been set up
to ensure two things – firstly that when oil prices are high that the Russian state takes the majority of
the windfall in revenue terms and secondly that when oil prices are low Russian companies areprotected by a sharply reduced tax take. Both MRET and export duty for crude oil work in a way thatthe first $15 of any revenue is effectively tax free, with differential rates when the oil price is between$15 and $20 per barrel and then between $20 and $25 per barrel. The full rate is only applied torevenues over $25 per barrel, meaning that at the current oil price of around $33 per barrel it is only
being applied to around $8 per barrel of revenue. Figure 12 below shows the impact that this has on
upstream operating costs and also shows the free cashflow generated at various oil price levels.
Figure 12: The impact of tax on Russian upstream operating costs
120

100
19.83
17.81

80
15.78
13.76

60

11.74

9.71

40

7.69
5.67

20

4.98
1.36

0
10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Export tax

MRET

Operating Costs

Transport and Other

Profit Tax

Post-tax cashflow

100

Source: OIES Calculation

MRET (a levy analogous to mineral royalty) has become by far the largest burden on Russian oil
companies as the export tax is gradually phased out, and in this graph the full impact is shown. In
reality, and as discussed above, oil companies can often claim discounts for more difficult or more
depleted fields, but even when the full tax is paid it is clear that the average upstream breakeven canfall to as low as $10 per barrel on a cash basis. If one includes funds for re-investment in production
from new fields, which analysis of the accounts of the major Russian oil companies equates to around$7 per barrel, then the full breakeven price of Russian upstream production is in the range $30-40 per
barrel.19

The ruble exchange rate helps companies to breakeven at low oil prices
Figure 13 underlines the variable nature of Russian upstream costs in line with the oil price. Data forthis graph is taken from the SFAS 69 filings of the major Russian oil companies and shows very clearly
how costs fluctuate over time, driven largely by tax payments but also thanks to the devaluation of theruble when the oil price falls. The correlation between annual upstream costs in the period 2012-2019
and the oil price is very obvious and has an r2 of 0.94, emphasizing just how close the link is. The
fluctuation in direct production costs is masked by the high level of tax payments, but the correlation is

19

Data from the SFAS 69 filings by the major Russian oils suggests that the average development cost in the period 2015-2019
was $6.87 per barrel

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

15equally strong with an r2 of 0.91. This has something to do with oil company management of costs
during periods when revenues fall but is mainly related to movements in the ruble exchange rate in linewith the oil price. As discussed above, when the oil price falls the CBR allows the exchange rate to
weaken, reducing costs in US$ terms to the great benefit of exporting companies.
Figure 13: Russian upstream costs and the oil price (2012-2019)120.0040.00

100.00

35.00
30.00

80.00

25.00

60.00

20.00
15.00

40.00

10.00

Oil Price (US$/bbl)

Upstream Costs (US$/boe)

45.00

20.00

5.00
0.00

0.00

Production Costs

Exploration Expenses

DD&A

Taxes Other Than On Income

Related Income Taxes

Oil Price (RHS)

Source: SFAS 69 data from Company Accounts, OIES analysis

This benefit can also be seen at a corporate level when one examines the sensitivity of company
financial results to the oil price. We have used analysis from Sberbank Research to illustrate this, anda key result can be seen in Figure 14. The graph shows the percentage change in EBITDA for the mostimportant Russian oil and gas companies when the oil price is adjusted from the base case ($43 in
2020E) down to $30 and $20. As the graph shows, this equates to a 30% and a 53% decline in the oil
price, but the average decline in company EBITDA is much lower than this at 15% and 21%
respectively. This is partly driven by the lower tax burden as the oil price approaches $15 per barrel but
is also due to the ruble depreciation that is assumed. While the dollar is assumed to be worth around72 rubles in the $43 case, this falls to 80 and 100 in the $30 and $20 cases.
Perhaps not surprisingly Gazprom is the least sensitive as its gas prices in Russia and Europe now
have a relatively low link to the oil price, and indeed gas prices have now been low for some time
meaning that a fall in the oil price has little additional impact. Novatek appears most sensitive becauseof its increasing liquids production and its relatively high level of current expenditure on new LNG
projects. Meanwhile of the oil companies Lukoil and GazpromNeft appear to benefit from their greater
downstream diversification which allows them to offset the impact of a lower oil price in their refining
and marketing arms to a greater extent than Rosneft and Tatneft. Overall, though, it is clear that EBITDA
and profits for the Russian oils fall more slowly than the oil price itself.

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

16

Figure 14: Sensitivity of oil company financials to oil price (estimates for 2020)
Oil Price

Rosneft

LukoilGneft

Tatneft$30/bbl$20/bblGazprom

Novatek

Total

0%
-10%

-20%
-30%
-40%
-50%
-60%

Source: Estimates from Sberbank Research, graph created by OIES

Most Russian oil and gas companies have limited debt exposure
A final crumb of comfort for Russian oil companies in these difficult times is the fact that most of themenjoy a strong balance sheet position. Figure 15 shows the net debt position for each company as wellas their Net Debt to EBITDA ratio. The latter is viewed as a good measure of how financially secure a
company is, measuring how many years of cashflow would be needed to pay back a company’s debt. 20
A number of conclusions can be drawn.

140000

4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0

Net Debt (US$mm)

120000100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
-20000Net Debt

Net Debt to EBITDA (x)Figure 15: Russian oil company Net Debt and Net Debt to EBITDA Ratio

Net Debt / EBITDA

Source: Company Financial Reports, Sberbank Research, OIES analysis

20

https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/net-debt-ebitda-ratio/

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

17Firstly, the majority of the debt in the sector is held by state-controlled companies (Rosneft andGazprom) who would have significant government support in times of difficulty. These two companies
are liable for 90% of the sector’s total net debt of $118 billion, with Rosneft alone accounting for 58%
of the total. That this could be a potential problem is underlined by the fact that Rosneft’s Net Debt to
EBITDA ratio is much the highest in the sector at 3.4x. A level of 4-5 times is generally regarded asproblematic by banks and ratings agencies, and so Rosneft is below this critical level, but neverthelessat times of economic stress a level above 3 is some cause for concern. Meanwhile the rest of theRussian oil sector is much more secure, with two companies have net cash rather than debt and theaverage Net Debt to EBITDA ratio for the sector being a healthy 1.5x, which falls to 0.9x if Rosneft is
excluded.
Finally, given the volatile nature of energy markets, it is also instructive to look at the companies’ shortterm exposure to their debt positions by comparing the cash and short-term investments on theirbalance sheets with their short-term debt (Figure 16). This reveals a similar picture to the overallsituation, but underlines that the sector does not have an unsustainable financial exposure in a low oil
price environment. Rosneft is once again the most vulnerable, with cash only covering 61% of thecompany’s short-term debt, but in all other cases the figure is over 100%, in some case considerably
so. The average for the sector as a whole is 167%, emphasizing that in extremis the companies could
pay back their debt immediately if absolutely necessary.
Figure 16: Russian oil and gas company Cash as share of Short-Term Debt
1000%

1800%

900%

Cash as % ST Debt

800%
700%
600%
500%
400%

300%
200%

100%
0%

Source: Data from Sberbank Research, analysis by OIESRussian oil production
Having established that both the Russian economy and the Russian oil companies are relatively
resilient to an oil price decline, it should nevertheless be acknowledged that the country and its major
oil players have been shocked by the speed of the decline and the low level that the oil price hasreached. This has led the Kremlin to agree to cut 2.5mb/d from the 11mb/d threshold level agreed
during the April 10th meeting for the next two months, falling to 2mb/d for the rest of 2020 and 1.5mb/din 2021 and the first quarter of 2022. Given that the Russian oil industry has always protested about
the difficulty of making any cut, it is therefore important to understand the make-up of the country’s
liquids production and how it might be reduced.
In 2010 Russia’s oil output crossed the important 10 mb/d threshold. Since then, production has grownby 12 percent, to 561 million metric ton in 2019 (11.25 mb/d), confirming the country’s position as oneof the top 3 producers in the world (See Figure 17).

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

18

Figure 17: Russia’s crude oil and gas condensate output
580
555

560

541

Million ton

520
500

502
16

508
17

519

514

21

18

522

35
28

22

11.0

540

529

36
10.5

27

27
10.0

480

9.5

460
440

11.5

486

491

496

498

500

502

513

513

520

525
9.0

Million b/d

540

561

8.5

420
400

8.0
2010

2011

2012

2013

Crude oil

2014

2015

2016

Gas condensate

2017

2018

2019

Total

Source: OIES, data from Russia’s Ministry of Natural Resources and JODI

How to cut oil output
Usually, Russian statistical reports on oil output include gas condensate in the overall crude oil output
without showing the figures for the two categories separately. However, we are showing these statistics
separately, based on data reported by Ministry of Natural Resources, because it highlights a very
important fact: in the past ten years crude oil output in Russia increased by 8 percent, but gas
condensate output has grown by a staggering 125%. The key reason for this is the wide-scale
development of the deep layers at many of Russia’s major gas fields which contain a lot of “wet” gas.
The issue of gas condensate became front-and-center in Russia’s negotiations with OPEC in December
2019. The quotas of each OPEC member are calculated on the basis of crude oil output, not including
NGLs. The original Russian quota for the OPEC+ deal was agreed in relation to Russia’s overall crude
oil and gas condensate output. But in 2019 Russia argued successfully that the methodology of thequota calculation should be uniform for both OPEC and non-OPEC members of the agreement, which
would allow Russia to exclude gas condensate production from its quota. As a result of this change,
Russia could comfortably meet the requirements of the deal without actually cutting its overall output in2019. For the Saudis, Russia’s ingenuity with regards to the technical aspects of quota calculation
apparently were something of an unpleasant surprise.
It would seem that this differentiation between crude oil and condensate may also be crucial in the latest
deal. All the announcements over the past few days have talked about crude oil, implying thatcondensate would be excluded, and have mentioned target production levels for May-June 2020 andfor the remainder of 2020 and then 2021. The target for Russia is 8.5 mb/d in the May-June period, but
this can be interpreted in two different ways. If condensate is included in the calculations, this would
imply a cut of 2.8 mb/d from recent total liquids production of 11.3 mb/d (in March 2020). However, ifcondensate is excluded then it implies a production cut of around 2 mb/d, given that condensate
production is c.0.75mb/d, implying crude output of c.10.5mb/d in March 2020. Clearly it will be importantto understand the exact definition of the cuts agreed in order to assess future compliance, but it isinteresting to note that following the agreement in December 2019 it would seem that condensate
should not be included in its quota, implying that the lower reduction may be what is planned.

Oil production cuts in Russia: limits and trade-offs
Nevertheless, whatever the outcome concerning condensate the cut promised by Russia is verysignificant even if it is only 2 mb/d. This is effectively 19% of total crude output and would take production

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

19

back to levels last seen in the early 2000s and would involve dramatic action by all the Russian oil
companies. This is crucial, because Russia has never been a swing producer. Implementing an abrupt
production cut at this scale and within a very short timeframe will represent a tremendous technicalchallenge for Russian oil companies. It will also create significant above-ground risks since Russian
regulations on closing oil fields are complex and may involve criminal charges for actions that could led
to a “loss of reserves”. However, on the assumption that this regulatory issue can be temporarily
nullified by the government bodies who have insisted on the production cut, it is useful to consider what
other challenges the Russian oil industry is likely to face. The first, from a geographical perspective, isthat Western Siberia, the core oil production province, will have to carry most of the burden due to its
share of overall output (See Figure 18).
Figure 18: Russia’s crude oil and gas condensate production by region in 2018, million ton

Source: Authors, based on RF Ministry of Natural Resources data

While it is formally springtime, the air temperatures in different parts of Russia may remain below zero
until June. This is especially true for the northern parts of Western and Eastern Siberia and the northernparts of the European Russia. This creates problems for shutting in some wells, especially in Western
Siberia, where water flooding is the main production technique. While not an insurmountable constraint,
shutting in wells in cold temperatures can increase the risk of damaging well bores and operating
equipment.
Nevertheless, Russian oil companies, confronted with a task of delivering an unprecedented cut, will
have to solve a complex problem of optimizing output and trading it off against the risks of permanent
loss of production. There are more than 2,600 oil fields in Russia and about 130,000 producing oil wells(out of approximately 160,000 oil wells on the balance). For old wells that represent about 85 percentof the total stock of producing wells average daily output ranges from 7 to 10 tons (50-75 b/d), while
new wells produce around 30-40 tons (225-300 b/d). The natural decline rates for many mature fields
are in the order of 20-25 percent per annum,21 and as a result simply stopping to perform maintenancefor two months on all fields indiscriminately will not produce the needed cut in time and may result inexcessive damage to reservoirs with massive permanent output losses.

21

I.e. without performing ongoing reservoir management and well treatment, or GTM (geological and technical measures) in
Russian parlance.

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

20

At the same time, Russia’s Top-20 oil fields account for about 190 million ton of output (3.8 mb/d), or
one-third of total Russian production of crude oil and gas condensate. The latest available breakdown
of Russian oil production by the main fields is available for 2018 (See Table 4).
Table 4: Russia’s Top-20 Oil Fields (million ton)
Rank

Field

Reserves as of
1 Jan 2019
A+B1+C1 B2+C2

1

Priobskoye

2

Samotlorskoye

Developer
Rosneft/Gazpromneft/
SNG/Kondaneft
Rosneft/Russneft/
SibInvestNafta/Slavneft

3

Vankorskoye

Rosneft

West Siberia

Krasnoyarsk province

302.0

6.8

16.0

4

Romashkinskoye

Tatneft

Volga-Urals

Tatarstan/Samara region

193.9

39.9

15.5

5

Prirazlomnoye*

Rosneft

West Siberia

Khanty-Mansiisk AO

189.1

175.6

9.6

6

Fedorovskoye

Surgutneftegaz

West Siberia

Khanty-Mansiisk AO

250.3

28.5

9.1

7

Malobalykskoye

Rosneft

West Siberia

Khanty-Mansiisk AO

117.2

21.9

8.9

8

Verkhnechonskoye

Lena-Tungusskaya

Irkutsk region

129.0

30.8

8.2

9

Krasnoleninskoye

Rosneft/Gazpromneft
Rosneft/Lukoil/GPN/Inga/
Transoil/Bazhen

West Siberia

Khanty-Mansiisk AO

568.1

646.0

7.0

GazpromneftWest Siberia

Yamal-Nenets AO

188.8

29.4

6.4

11 Named after V. Filanovskiy

LukoilNorth Caucasus

Caspian Sea offshore

116.8

0.3

6.1

12 Arlanskoye

Rosneft

Volga-Urals

Bashkortostan/Udmurtiya

91.3

17.0

6.0

13 Talakanskoye

Surgutneftegaz
INK/INK-Zapad/PacificTerminal
Exxon Neftegaz
Ltd./Rosneft

Lena-Tungusskaya

Sakha Republic (Yakutia)

104.0

1.1

5.7

Lena-Tungusskaya

Irkutsk region

36.6

3.5

5.6

Sea of Okhotsk offshore

Sakhalin region

35.9

0.0

4.9

Surgutneftegaz

West Siberia

Khanty-Mansiisk AO

47.7

10.5

4.9

17 Mamontovskoye

Rosneft

West Siberia

Khanty-Mansiisk AO

90.4

36.7

4.8

18 Pravdinskoye

Rosneft

West Siberia

Khanty-Mansiisk AO

85.1

33.5

4.8

19 Ust-Tegusskoye

Rosneft (Uvat NG)

West Siberia

Tyumen region

61.2

6.6

4.8

20 Vostochno-Messoyakhskoye Rosneft/GazpromneftWest Siberia
Total for Russia's Top-20 oil and gas condensate fields in 2018
Total for Russia in 2018
Share of Top-20 in Russia's Total, percent

Yamal-Nenets AO

226.0

145.5

4.8
188.5
554.6
34%

10 Novoportovskoye

14 Yaraktinskoye
15 Chaivo
16 Severo-Labatyuganskoye

Oil province

Location (subject of RF)

Production in 2018

West Siberia

Khanty-Mansiisk AO

1165.9

477.8

37.1

West Siberia

Khanty-Mansiisk AO

858.2

29.7

18.3

* Not to be confused with Prirazlomnoye field in the Barents Sea offshore

Source: OIES, data from Russia’s Ministry of Natural Resources

However, an additional question for Russian oil companies attempting to reduce production is how thiscan be done with least impact on profitability. The obvious candidates for shut-ins would be wells andentire fields with very high water cut factor (i.e. a high share of water in total liquids produced). Water
injection and waterflooding techniques are widely used in Russia, especially in mature producing
regions such as Western Siberia and the Volga-Urals, which account for the bulk of national
production.22 In Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug for example, where over half of Russian oil is
produced, the average water cut rose from 84.2 percent in 2005 to over 90 percent in 2019. High water
cut is a common feature of both the larger, mature fields that are the workhorses of the Russian oil
industry but also of many smaller fields using stripper wells and indeed about 15% of Russia’s total oil
output is currently estimated to come from marginal wells with water cut ratios well above 90 percent.
The electricity unit costs per ton of oil at these wells are extremely high and so their operating costs are
typically about four times higher than the Russian average (i.e. in the order of $24–$32 per barrel), so
22 Once the primary energy of the reservoir depletes, the pressure inside the reservoir must be maintained to achieve optimum

production and to maximize ultimate recovery. This can be done by injecting into the reservoir water that is compatible to theformation water present in the reservoir, through several water injection wells. When the water is injected into the reservoir, it
tends to push the oil upward, thus increasing the reservoir life and ultimate recovery. Water injection and waterflooding are
essentially the same process; in the former water is injected into the reservoir’s water zone, and in the latter, it is injected directly
into the hydrocarbon zone.

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

21

even when oil prices exceeded $50 per barrel the netbacks from these fields were extremely low. Minor
increases in output can help extend their productive lives by lowering per-unit costs, but any oil pricedeclines can quickly make them lossmaking and so they would seem to be obvious candidates for any
shut-in.
However, although it is clear that at current extremely low oil prices output from many marginal fields
will be uneconomic, companies might nevertheless choose to keep them operational for various
reasons, including production obligations, employment issues, and the extra costs incurred in actuallyclosing a field down. The Russian authorities will have to address these issues if fields are to be shutin for any length of time, and a further complicating issue is that an increasing number of these fields
now receive tax breaks which companies will lose if production is shut down.
A good example is the Samotlor field. This legendary super-giant, one of the seven biggest fields in theworld, was once a workhorse for the Soviet economy, accounting for almost half of the Soviet Union’s
total oil production during its peak in 1980. Since development began in 1969 Samotlor has produced
over 2.3 billion tons (almost 17 billion barrels) and estimates of its remaining reserves are about 0.9
billion tons (6.5 billion barrels). In 2017 the water cut factor at the field exceeded 90 percent andproduction was declining rapidly, but its operator Rosneft convinced the government to grant tax relief
from mineral resource extraction tax (MRET) totaling 350 billion rubles ($4.5 billion at current exchange
rates) over a period of 10 years, starting from January 1, 2018. In exchange, Rosneft committed toincrease investments in the field and expand its production. 23 As a result, the company will be reluctant
to reduce output here even though it would seem to be an obvious candidate.
The issue has been broadened to other assets as during 2019 the question of giving MRET exemptions
to other fields with high water cuts was actively discussed between oil companies and Russian
government officials24 and following lively debates Russia’s largest oil producing field, Priobskoye, also
received tax exemptions. Rosneft operates the larger northern part of the field, where it produced 26
million ton in 2018 (0.5 mb/d) while Gazpromneft operates the smaller southern part of the giant field
where output amounted to 11.5 million ton (0.23 mb/d).25 Rosneft can save 46 billion rubles per year($0.6bn) while Gazpromneft can save 13.5 billion rubles ($0.2bn), and the discounts have been
approved for a ten-year period. Rosneft also managed to gain tax breaks for its flagship Vankorskoye
project in the Krasnoyarsk province, where exemptions were given in order to stimulate thedevelopment of infrastructure for a new production cluster and could total up to 60 billion ruble perannum ($0.8bn) for the next 10 years. However, there is a complication as the MRET breaks for
Priobskoye and Vankorskoye will only become effective if the Urals price exceeds the fiscal breakeven
price for the Russian budget ($42.4 per barrel in 2020). 26 As a result, without a strong oil price recovery
in the second half of the year, the tax breaks for Rosneft and Gazpromneft are unlikely to materialize
in 2020, providing another twist in the incentives to cut production.
Another potential problem with production cuts for Russian companies in the April-May period is thatlarge scale production cuts at oil fields in Western Siberia could cause a domino effect and create
problems for other sectors of the economy. One example is heat supply at the cities in the oil regions
where power supply comes from combined heat and power plants (CHPs). The widescale use ofelectric-submersible pumps (ESPs) consumes a lot of electricity, with about 130 kWh needed to extract
one ton of oil on average and much more needed for marginal wells with high water cuts and low
production. As a result, oil companies are the largest consumers for local power stations which are
predominantly CHPs. Drastic oil production cuts in these conditions will also mean sharp reduction inelectricity usage and will cascade into a problem for power providers that need to deliver heat to the
population in the Siberian regions until the end of May.
One final, and more corporate issue, is how the production cuts will be shared out between the key
companies. A straight pro rata sharing of the overall number based on existing production would be the23

https://www.rbc.ru/business/06/10/2017/59d7b0889a7947de154ad136
https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2019/09/15/811275-teryat-lgotah-neftyanikam
25
https://www.interfax.ru/business/671174
These numbers apparently include losses as opposed to the numbers for Priobskoye reported by Ministry of Natural
Resources.
26
https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2020/03/15/825230-deshevaya-neft
24

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

22obvious solution and could certainly be imposed by President Putin if he chose to put his foot down.
However, the evidence since 2016 has suggested that the debate may be somewhat more complex,
as some companies may be happy to see output decline at unprofitable fields while others will havebeen hoping to see production growth this year. It will be interesting to see if the various companies areable to agree amongst themselves, but it would be no surprise if more powerful entities such as Rosneft
and the other state companies tried to argue a for a sharing of the reduction that favored their own
interests. One powerful argument against pro rata cuts that might be brought forward by Rosneft is thatthe company has received prepayment for a significant share of its future output from the Chinese
buyers as part of the so-called “ESPO contract”.

Conclusion
Somewhat to the surprise of many, Russia has agreed to rejoin the OPEC+ group and to cut its output
significantly. We have argued in this paper that the Kremlin believes that it is in a relatively strong
position to survive a period of low oil prices and that its oil companies are also in reasonably robust
shape, and to date the logic presented by the Russian Ministry of Energy has pointed towards allowing
low prices to rebalance the market through the forced shut-in of higher cost production (most notably
in the US, but also elsewhere in the world). As a result, we are forced to conclude that Russia must
perceive other significant reasons for its change of strategy. These could include:

Political benefits to be gained from joining a production cut at this time. It will be interesting tosee how relations with Saudi Arabia and the US develop over the next few months. We would
not be surprised to see a reduction in US rhetoric over sanctions, for example. In addition wewould also surmise that President Trump’s successful intervention into the OPEC+ dispute andhis ultimate acknowledgement of the positive actions now taken by OPEC+ bode well for future
relations, and that this must have been a consideration in the Russian (and Saudi) thinking.



Necessity, as production cuts might have become inevitable in the near future as oil storage
reached its limits. Better to offer a cut now and gain some benefit from the impact rather thanbe forced into a cut later.



Buying time for a possible rebound in demand before oil storage is filled and the oil pricecollapses completely. Linked to the previous motive, oil producers need to try and extend theperiod within which oil demand might start to recover.



A sense that responsible action is needed at a time of global crisis. No useful purpose could beserved by extending the oil impasse and being seen to catalyse a price war at a time whenperceptions of the oil industry are already negative. Better to show a willingness for cooperationfrom a position of strength and to be part of a joint response by the OPEC+ group which has
been positively recognised by the G20.



An easier operating environment in Russia during the summer months. This will allow wells tobe shut-in more easily and without such damaging long-term consequences as might havebeen experienced in winter. In addition, the impact on electricity and heat generation in West
Siberia will not be as harmful during warmer months.

Having said all this, it will nevertheless be interesting to see how Russia observes the agreement. As
discussed earlier, if condensate is excluded it may well be that the reduction in output will be lower than
expected at around 2 mb/d for May and June, and monitoring compliance with this will be important injudging how committed Russia is to restoring order in the global oil market.
Furthermore, in terms of the practical implementation of any cut there will be complications surrounding
the geography of production, the choice of wells to shut in and the complexities of managing profitability
versus oil volumes. Furthermore, it may be that President Putin has to impose his will on the country’s
oil companies, as the evidence of the past 4 years has been that each will attempt to argue for afavourable share of any reduction. As a result, it will be important to monitor compliance, especially as
there is only a three-week period before around 20% of Russian oil production needs to be temporarily
shut down. We suspect that this may be a task that is very difficult to achieve but would notunderestimate the ingenuity of the Russian oil industry and the Kremlin to at least make a case forcompliance by May.

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent
the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

23