Philosophical Discussion of “Human Life” and “Benefits for Humankind” in the Study of Human Embryos﻿

Shuku FUNAKI

Philosophical Discussion of “Human Life” and“Benefits for Humankind” in the Study of Human
Embryos
Shuku FUNAKI
Sapporo Medical University
Email: s.funaki@sapmed.ac.jp

Abstract
This article concerns the question of whether, and to what extent, comparative weighting
is possible between human life on the one side and benefits for humankind on the other.
Comparative weighting underlies the representative positions in both the Japanese report titled“Basic Principles on Handling of Human Embryos” on July 23, 2004, and statements of theGerman Ethics Council on cloning practices (September 2004). In contrast, Dietmar Hübner
stresses the priority of the negative “right of defense” of the human embryo over the positive“right of claim” of scientists. Anselm Müller suggests that human beings are more responsible
for positive, rather than negative, action. Moreover, Müller discusses the issue of radical
instrumentalization. Through this consideration, Müller asserts that human dignity is morestrongly infringed upon by cloning practices for research purposes than by the study of surplus
human embryos. In the former case, the human embryos would be produced only for specificresearch uses. The practice of comparative ranking or weighting of human life and benefits tohumankind, in order to assess relative moral claims, is over-simplified and inadequate to the task.
Other viewpoints are needed to advance our thinking on this subject.
Keywords: human life, benefits for humankind, instrumentalization, legal status of the humanembryo, the right of defense, the right of claim, moral responsibilities

Introduction
In the recent international debate about humanembryo studies, some argue that the humanembryo should be respected for its “humandignity,” whereas others argue that “a humanembryo is not a person.” As this would be an
endless dispute, which would serve no purpose
but to reveal the signif icant differences inour cultural values, it is necessary to review
each argument grounded in various ethicalstandpoints.1 In this chapter, I will first examine
the reports and joint statements regarding humanembryo studies published in Japan between
2001 and 2004 to confirm the underlying idea
supporting their arguments. Next, I will review
the statement issued by Germany in 2001, which

has some of the strictest legal policies on research
practice in the life sciences, to clarify thesimilarities and differences from the reports by
the Japanese government. This article will showthat a specific argument in the Japanese reports
offers a similar view to one of the three policy
statements announced in Germany. This specificargument puts “human life” on the one side and“benefits for humankind” on the other, to weighthe moral significance of each. I will discuss thearguments of Reinhard Merkel, a law professor
at the University of Hamburg, and the opposing
view of Dr. Dietmar Hübner of the Institute of
Science and Ethics at the University of Bonn.
While discussing these conflicting perspectives,
I will assess whether a conceptual distinction
h a s b e e n neg le c t e d i n s uch c ompa r at ive
weighting practice. I will also investigate the23

Journal of Philosophy and Ethics in Health Care and Medicine, No. 14, December 2020

new concept ual distinction int roduced byAnselm Müller, whose position differs from Dr.
Hübner’s. To advance the ethical debate beyond
comparative weighting between “human life”
and “benefits for humankind”, I will assess thecompeting arguments noted above, to identify
and utilize a possible clue to advance the ethicaldebate on the issue of human embryo studies.

1. Ethical standpoint in reports
and joint statements published inJapan
The current situation concerning scientificresearch on human embryos or human somatic
cell nuclear t ransfer (hSCNT) embr yos inJapan, described below, derives from importantmilestones in the discussion as well as arguments
found in related published documents. The“Guidelines for Derivation and Utilization of
Human Embryonic Stem (ES) Cells” issued in
September 2001 by the Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)
authorizes the utilization of surplus embryos
left over from assisted reproductive technology(ART), “within 14 days after fertilization,” solely
for “Basic Research” purposes (Articles 2 and
6). The Bioethics Experts Committee of theCouncil for Science, Technology, and Innovation(CSTI) in the Cabinet Office published the “Basic
Principles on Handling of Human Embryos(Interim Report)” on December 26, 2003. The
majority of the committee members supported
the MEXT guidelines and further proposedthat the “creation of the human embryo can be
acceptable exclusively for research purposes(IV.2.c),” while they remained “undecided (VI.1)”
about the appropriateness of creating/usinghSCNT embryos for human embryo research
purposes.
I n r e s p o n s e , t h e Bi o e t h i c s E x p e r t s
Committee published the “Basic Principles on
Handling of Human Embryos”2 on July 23, 2004.
This report focused on the discussion of theappropriateness of “creating/using the humanembryo for research purposes” and “creating/using human somatic cell nuclear transfer
embryo[s] for research purposes” under thepremise that the use of surplus human embryos
for research purposes had been socially approved(Chapter 2, Section 3, Article (1) and Chapter
24

3, Section 3, Article (1)). The report argued
that “creating/using human embryos” should
be “approved” exclusively for the “purpose of
ART study (Chapter 2, Section 3, Article (1))”
and “creating/using human somatic cell nuclear
transfer embryo[s]” should also be “approved”
only to resolve “the issue of rejection reaction”
a nd “li m ited to basic resea rch pr act ice,”
exclusively for “regenerative medicine study forthe treatment of intractable diseases (Chapter 3,
Section 3, Article (1) and (2)).” Guided by theinterim report’s ethical standpoint mentioned
above, this f inal report def ined the humanembryo as the “‘sprout of human life’ capableof growing into a ‘human being’” (Chapter 2,
Section 2, Article (3)). They limited the period
in which the human embryo could be used forresearch purposes to “before the formationof primitive streaks.” This refers to the fact
that, before the formation of primitive streaks,
the embryo has not yet reached the “status ofgrowing into an individual human being” because
the human embryo “cells have the pluripotency”
at this point (Chapter 2, Section 3, Article (1) and
Chapter 3, Section 3, Article (1)).
On what argumentative grounding is the
exclusive approval reported in this particular
final report based? The argument in this report
appears to be characterized by the belief in
a consistent comparative weighting between“human existence and life,” on the one hand, and“benefits for health and well-being of the people,”on the other hand, balanced on the same scale ofmoral assessment. The comparative weighting
in this particular report gives more weight to thelatter than to the former. The report argues thatthe human embryo is “not the same as ‘a humanbeing,’” although it is a “sprout of human life
(Chapter 1, Section 1, and Chapter 2, Section 2,
Article (2)).” Thus, it should be weighted lightly,
until the formation of primitive streaks because
its legal status at this point should be consideredthat of an immature “individual human being.”
Regarding the benefits and health of humanity,
two weights are probably placed on the scale,
namely, f u r ther “improvement ” in “A RT”
development conducted thus far concerning thecreation/usage of the human embryo (Chapter 2,
Section 3, Article (1)), and the possible solution
for “the matter of rejection reaction” concerning
the creation/usage of the hSCNT embryo (Chapter

Philosophical Discussion of “Human Life” and “Benefits for Humankind” in the Study of Human Embryos﻿

3, Section 3, Article (2)). However, an essential
question remains: Is it helpful to evaluate theissue by opposing “human existence and life”
to “benefits for health and well-being of thepeople” and weighting their moral significanceby removing or adding weighted benefits on thescale?
The “Joint Statement Regarding the ‘Basic
Principles on Handling of Human Embryos’(July 13, 2004)3” issued by five members of the
Bioethics Experts Committee handles the above
question by raising several doubts: whether “thematter of ‘human dignity’ and the ‘benefits’
brought by the life-manipulating technology‘should be placed on the same scale,’” whether“any exceptions in the fundamental principle
can be tolerated in exchange for ‘benefits,’”
and whether “there can be any ‘benefits’ placed
above the ‘dignity of human beings (or lifeforms
capable of growing into human beings) ’ (Chapter
1, Section 2).”T he joi nt st atement f u r t her develops
the discussion from different perspectives.
According to the statement, “the creation of thehuman embryo for research purposes” must be
grounded in an “extensively justifiable cause
and reasoning” in comparison with the researchusing surplus human embryos. This is because
the life of human embryos, in this case, is“decided in advance to be sacrificed” for the goalof conducting research. Besides, the statement
further argues that a solid argument to support
this claim “was not presented” in the discussionof this particular committee (Chapter 2). As aresult, the “creation of the human embryo forresearch purposes” was not to be approved in
the situation at that time. These remarks reveal
the statement’s underlying assertion that a
particular difference should exist at the level of
instrumentalization of human life. Concerning
the matter of “creation /research of humansomatic cell nuclear transfer embryo[s],” thestatement also argues that the “discussion fromthe viewpoint of the levels of possible risks of[...] human life instrumentalization in creation/utilization of embryos should be essential (Chapter
1, Section 1 and Chapter 3).” This argument
reveals the statement’s concern about the highrisks related to this practice leading to the
instrumentalization of human life. Accordingly,
the st atement demands highly persuasive

Shuku FUNAKI“scientif ic grounds” to justify the practice(Chapter 1, Section 1).
Should such grounds be presented, thestatement contends that “a fragile compromisein ethical considerations could be reached tojustify [...] the creation/usage of human somatic
cell nuclear transfer embryos to save the patients
suffering from specific intractable diseases.”Yet, since there is “no guarantee of realization of
benefits” from results “expected in the research
practice” at this point, the “creation/usage ofhuman somatic cell nuclear transfer embryos”
should not be “authorized” yet (Chapter 3). The
joint statement has presented the two propositions
missing in the final report mentioned above.
The first proposition concerns a hierarchicaldifference enabling the comparative weightingof “human dignity and human life” and “benefits
brought by life-manipulating technology” on thesame scale. The second proposition concerns
the different degrees of instrumentalization ofhuman life in research using surplus humanembryos compared to creating human embryos
precisely for research purposes and creating/using hSCNT embryos. Regarding the first
proposition, however, the statement has failed to
dig deeper into the matter; this first proposition
only raised a question about this issue. As forthe second proposition, the report argues thatcreating human embryos for research purposesand creating/using hSCNT embryos must not be
authorized until a persuasive scientific argument
is presented. Nevertheless, the “Joint Statement
Regarding the ‘Basic Principles on Handlingof Human Embryos’” (July 13, 2004) fails to
explain the specific practices that would show thedifferent degrees of instrumentalization of humanlife.

2. Arguments in the recent
statement announced in Germany
regarding human embryo studies:Differences and similarities witharguments in JapanThe evolving legal situation regarding humanembr yo st udies in Ger many offers several
competing moral standpoints. First, under theso-called “Embryo Protection Law” of January
1991, it is prohibited to “transfer, acquire, oruse” human embryos for any purposes except
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for sustenance of life with “punishment of
imprisonment of not more than three years ora fine (Article 2, paragraph 1).” This particularcriminal law further establishes that “those who
artificially create the situation in which a humanembryo with the same genetic traits as embryosof other species, infants, humans, or the deceasedis created will be charged with imprisonmentof not more than five years or a fine (Article 6,paragraph 1).” Nevertheless, the so-called “StemCell Laws” (=Stammzellengesetz), enacted July
2002, allow for importing and using human ES
cells limited to those collected before January 1,
2002, for research purposes.
A movement to amend relevant laws isgradually emerging in Germany in responseto the growing public concerns over a possiblede c re a se i n t he levels of i nt e r n at ion al ly
competitive scientific research technologies,
leading to a problematic situation in which strict
criminal laws hinder the efforts to save patientswith intractable diseases. In this context, theGerman Ethics Council, established in 2001
by the German Federal Government, issued a“(Statement Regarding) the Cloning Practices
for Reproduction Purposes and Medical andBiological Research Pu r poses (September2004).”4 This particular statement presents thefollowing three standpoints in parallel, namely,
Standpoints A, B, and C.
Standpoint A: All studies, including not
only those involving the creation of hSCNT
embryos but also those using surplus humanembryos, must be banned entirely.
This particular standpoint is based on thefollowing logic. First, it can be acceptable toinfringe on the right to life of a specific person
when the specific person endangers anotherperson’s life; however, the survival of the surplus
human embryo threatens no other lifeforms’
survival. For that reason, it is unacceptable toinfringe on the right to life of the surplus humanembryo.5 As a result, the study of surplus humanembr yos is unacceptable because it would“limit” or even “terminate” the “existence” ofa specific human embryo, which would neverpose any threat to others. The argument proceedsby disagreeing that the human embryo has alower degree of “dignity and right to life as [a]26human being” than those already “born”. The
fundamental human right of the born is notrecognized solely for the protection of “selfconsciousness, sensibility, or the ability toact.”6 The argument continues that the level of
instrumentalization should be remarkably higher
in the research creating hSCNT embryos, inwhich the purpose of the embryo’s use is “setin advance” before its creation, as opposed toresearch using surplus human embryos, and thatno “other purposes” can justify such action. This
standpoint further argues that if we allow thisuse, the research creating hSCNT embryos would
qualify as nothing more than “animal tests.”7This particular standpoint shows a unique viewthat is not seen in Japan’s previously mentioned
published reports or statements.
Standpoint B: The creation/utilizationof hSCNT transfer embryos for research
purposes can be allowed under specificconditions.
This par ticular standpoint argues thatthe demands for “protection” of pre-birth life
should increase accordingly as “the delivery
date comes closer,” and that the human embryo
cannot be accorded “the same level of [...] right todignity or protection of the right to life as thoserecognized in persons after birth.” This argument
admits studies of surplus human embryos andresearch on the creation of hSCNT embryos,
such as practices revealed in the aforementioned
summary published in Japan.8
Standpoint C: The study of surplus humanembryos can be allowed, but the researchconcerning the creating hSCNT embryos
should be banned in the current situation.
This particular standpoint points out firstthat the degree of “instr umentalization” ofhSCNT embryos, which “[...] has not been createdsolely for their own purposes,” should be higher
than in the case of surplus human embryos.9Then, it argues that whether we could “control
the growth of ES cells or whether they should not
develop any tumors in the first place” currently
remai n s u n k now n. T hu s, t h is st a ndpoi nt
estimates the chances of gaining clinical or
academic benefits from these technologicalPhilosophical Discussion of “Human Life” and “Benefits for Humankind” in the Study of Human Embryos﻿

advancements to be relatively low.10 Given theabove reasons, this standpoint takes a similar
position as in the previously mentioned jointstatement issued in Japan to allow the studyof surplus human embryos, but it denies thepossibility of research on hSCNT embryos in thecurrent situation.
A mong t he above t h re e st a ndp oi nt s,
St a n d p oi n t B p r o p o s e s r e c og n i z i n g t h egradual differences in human life protection,
which is the core argument of the previously
me nt ione d su m m a r y publ ishe d i n Japa n.
Standpoints A and C are based on the “degreeof instrumentalization” as described in the jointstatement issued in Japan; moreover, the issue of“the case in which the infringement of the rightto life can be tolerated,” which is not recognizedin the relevant debates in Japan, seems to beconsidered in Standpoint A.

3. Merkel and Hübner
To further clarify the issue that creates thedifference in viewpoints around the study ofsurplus human embryos and the research aroundcreating hSCNT embryos, let us consider theviews of Professor Merkel, who strongly supports
Standpoint B, as well as the opposing opinion by
Hübner, in the following section.
3.1 Merkel―the argument based on atheory of the legal status of the humanembryoMerkel’s argument starts with the following
thought experiment. A fire breaks out in abiotechnology laboratory. If “ten living humanembryos fertilized in vitro” and “an unconscious
infant [...] are left in the smoke-filled room andwe could save either one of them, which would
we save? Merkel argues that, without a doubt,
we would save the infant in this case. In otherwords, the value of “protecting” human embryos
is “lower” than that of protecting the infant.11 As
above, Merkel advances his argument, startingwith this thought experiment to emphasize
the clear “differences in qualitative [legal]
status” between human embryos and infants orchildren.12
Merkel further argues that an early-stage

Shuku FUNAKI

human embryo cannot be treated as “equivalent
to [a] person” such as an infant, toddler, or fullygrown adult. Until the formation of primitive
streaks, the human embryo is not “the numerally
same as one human life.” Therefore, Merkel
concludes that the f undamental r ight of ahuman embryo would have a low level of legal
protection, which is hardly the same as that ofan adult; also, this legal protection should be“limited” if it “conflicts with the vital interest” of
the “individual personality.”13
According to Merkel, in other words, thefollowing benefits are expected in the humanembryo study: “replacement for the damaged
brain cells of patients with Parkinson’s diseaseor Alzheimer’s disease, treatment for multiple
sclerosis, treatment for transverse palsy, [...]
regeneration of the damaged cardiac muscle cells,[...] or regeneration of bone marrow cells.” Eachof them is a “morally high-ranking goal.” Thus,
Merkel argues that the “use of the human embryoin the early stage [...] in the research for the goal”
can be “morally tolerated.”14 Merkel also argues
that even the creation of the human embryo canbe “morally tolerated” for research aiming at“morally high-ranking goals.” Merkel insists that
how the human embryo “has reached the current
status is not the point,” but “the only point is what
we are allowed to create by using” the being withthe low legal status called the “human embryo.”15
The answer to the debate around the matter of“cloning for medical purposes” should present
itself by following his argument, because “thefuture solution for the issue in transplantation
therapy” should be the “morally high-ranking
goal.”16
Fr o m M e r k e l’s v i e w p o i n t , c r i m i n a lprohibitions such as the “Embryo Protection
Law” amount to acts of “violation against the
duty of the nation” to offer “salvation” for“patients in critical condition with the chance tolive.”17 The above arguments by Merkel appear
to show a distinctive characteristic; his approach
ranks the levels of protection for “human life”
hierarchically, by weighting or assessing levels ofprotection comparatively with the “other moral
goals.”

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3.2 Hübner―discussion based on theview of the demand for rights of the“subjects”
I f we at t e mpt t o d is ag r e e w it h Me rkel’s
abovementioned view by insisting that the humanembr yo has an essential or comprehensive“human dignity”, regardless of its stage ofdevelopment, thus denying any status ranking
after fertilization, we would not likely convince
ot her s. Hübner seem s to u nder st a nd t h is
likelihood as well and starts his argument withthe following question. Suppose there were“qualitative differences” in human life’s legal
status—in other words, suppose we accept thepremise of the opposing argument. Should sucha ranking theory justify the use or disposal of
the human embryo in experiments with the goalof “establishing disease treatment in the future”
for patients?18 Hübner identifies the following
important difference between the cases of thepreviously mentioned laboratory incident and thestudy of surplus human embryos. In the exampleof the laboratory incident, the “lives” of both“human embryos” and the “infant” are in danger
under the same circumstance. In contrast, in thecase of the study of surplus human embryos,“one of the concerned parties,” namely, only
the patient, is in danger, not the human embryo,which has not suffered from fatal disease at thispoint yet. The embryo has “been demanded”
to give up its right to life, solely to “save theothers.”19 If we replace the human embr yowith an adult, the case should be the same as“saving [other] patients by killing a healthy
person.” Hübner asks if the “status ranking”
that supposedly exists between human embryos
and adults should genuinely justify such a brutal
act of “saving patients by killing the healthy
embryo.”20 Hübner answers this question as
follows. It is unacceptable to sacrifice the “holderof the right to life” for those “in danger,” eventhough the former has a lower “right to life” thanthe latter and its life is not in immediate danger.21
Hübner refers to the following two legal
rights to support the argument; the f irst is“ the negative right of defense” (negatives
Abwehrrecht), and the second is “the positive
right of claim” (positives Anspruchsrecht). This
negative right is related to “the freedom frominvasion of others,” while the negative right is28

related to “the freedom of action of oneself.” In
the case of the study of surplus human embryos,
the negative right indicates “the right to life” ofthe human embryo in question, and the positive
right is expressed as “the right of the scientist
to freedom of research” to advance medical
technologies.22 According to Hübner, prohibiting
the violation of “the right of defense” of thenegative right satisfies “the right of claim” of thepositive right. In other words, “prohibiting thesacrifice of others to save those in danger,” is too“fundamental” to be sanctioned based solely on
different rankings in the right-to-life hierarchy.23
It could be plausibly argued, in the case of thepreviously mentioned laboratory incident, toweight the differences in the right to life to saveeither ten human embryos or one infant, if thelevel of danger they were facing, as well as thelevel of the possible damages they would suffer,
were equal.24 However, in the case of the studyof surplus human embryos, the levels of their“liability”25 are already different, for “the rightof defense” is engaged in the case of the humanembryo, while “the right of claim” is involved in
the case of the scientists. Moreover, the levels of
the danger posed are different as well since thehuman embryo would be killed when the research
is approved, but the patient would not suffer thesame fate, regardless of whether the research isapproved.26 As a result, it is impossible to balancethese concerned parties’ situational differences
merely by applying the differences in how theyrank in terms of the right to life, based on legal
status.27
As discussed above, Hübner’s argumentthat we cannot become complacent on thecomparative weighting of “human life” and“benefits for humankind” on the same scale
should be noteworthy in the argument over theconceptual distinction between the new notionsof “the right of defense” and “the right ofclaim.”28 However, even if we consider the matterby the distinction between “the right of defense”
and “the right of claim,” and assume the former
is superior to the latter, uncertainties remain. For
example, in what situation is it evident enoughthat “the right of defense” should supersede“the right of claim” to overrule the comparative
weighting of “human life” and “benefits forhumankind” as Hübner claims?
Does a human embryo a moral value above

Philosophical Discussion of “Human Life” and “Benefits for Humankind” in the Study of Human Embryos﻿

‘zero’ have? Does it no moral value whatsoever
have? Is there some middle position? What if
the human embryo’s right to life is ranked alittle higher? Should we consider “the right ofdefense” of the human embryo as the priority,
before we weight “human life” and “benefits forhumankind” comparatively? As Hübner bases
his argument on the hierarchical distinction ofdifferent protection levels of human embryonic
life, further discussion is needed concerning how
to properly rank these levels.

4. Müller―discussion from theviewpoint of the “doer” handlingthe objects
4.1 Ranking by moral responsibilities
As discussed in the previous section, Hübner
proposes a new distinction based on the claim ofrights from the object, the human embryo. Müller
also points out another possible distinction
neglected in the debate surrounding humanembryo studies. He treats the issue of the studyof surplus human embryos as involving “moral
responsibilities.” In other words, Müller discusses
the matter of human embryo studies from theviewpoint of the “doer” who deals with humanembryos and patients.
Müller’s argument starts with the following
question: “Does a person bear the same levelof [moral] responsibility in his doing (Tun) andnot doing (Lassen)?” 29 In other words, he isasking if we are to hold the same level of “moral
responsibility” in choosing to do and not to dosomething. In response to this question, Müller
argues that we cannot give these responsibilities
the same weight because “the responsibility ofaction” and “the responsibility of inaction” arecharacterized by “asymmetry” (Asymmetrie).30
He advances the following argument, which
often appears in the debate around the study ofsurplus human embryos, as the core issue in his
discussion:[We are] responsible for the deaths ofhuman embryos to be used in experiments,
and at the same time, if such experiments
should not be conducted, any possible
benefits in research findings would not be
accomplished, and as a result, the cure for

Shuku FUNAKI

various intractable diseases would not be
available in the near future; [we are] also
responsible for such a situation.31
According to Müller, the result of a specificaction, in this case, “the death of the humanembryo,” is something certainly expected, forwhich life science researchers must be held
responsible. However, they should not be liable
for all results from not doing something. At
the same time, the range of responsibility inthe “practice” of bioengineering could include“unexpected results,” such as “damage to thefilial generations” or the creation of new “genetic
disorders.”32 As for something that we “let be,”on the other hand, we will not be accused ofanything if we merely maintain its status quo.
Therefore, Müller’s argument above is not soundenough to justify placing these “asymmetrical”
responsibilities of different weights on the samelevel.
Fur ther more, Müller mentions that wesometimes should be accountable for moral
responsibility in “not doing” something, forinstance, failure to perform promises we make,to execute contracts we sign, or to fulfill our
professional “duties.” He also refers to thepossible case of uncompensated damages we“have involuntarily inflicted upon” others andhave failed to amend.33 Müller continues to say
that, although doctors indeed have a “professional
obligation” to save actual patients, they aremorally exonerated by refraining to act in allcases to effect potentially huge benefits expectedin bioengineering. The moral responsibility “notto harm others” is usually more significant than
the responsibility “to serve others,” except forthe cases mentioned above.34 In the case of thestudy of surplus human embryos, therefore, themoral responsibility involved in violating thehuman embryo’s “life” is more severe than thatengaged in the delay caused by our “inaction” inadvancing the “benefits for humankind.”
The above arguments by Müller are quite
significant as they reveal a new problem inthe discussion of the comparative weighting
in placing “human life” and “benef its forhu ma n k i nd” on t he sa me scale, f rom t heviewpoint of a “doer who handles the object.”In the discussion about the study of surplus
human embryos, we cannot simply contrast
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“action” and “inaction,” or more specifically, themoral responsibility engaged in “killing humanembryos” with that involved in the failure to“contribute to the benefits for humankind.” Wealso cannot insist that the moral responsibility of“inaction” should be more significant than thatof “action,” merely by bringing up the possible“benefits for humankind” expected in action.
Müller’s arguments, however, are not entirely
free from some points of ambiguity. If the moral
responsibility in “inaction” is demanded in somecases, while other cases can be free from liability,
where specifically can we draw the line? Suppose
for a moment that we are morally responsible forour “inaction” when we fail to keep our promises
or fulfill our professional duties, as Müller
argues. If that is true, despite many uncertainties
currently involved in the estimation of theacademic/medical outcomes of ES cell studies,
not doing something that could save patientsin the future with sufficient prospect could
be considered morally irresponsible. Besides,
we should consider if there would be room forcomparison between the responsibility for the“death” of the human embryo and responsibility
for the “benefits” for humanity.
4.2 Ranking of “levels of
instrumentalization” until “total
instrumentalization”
Müller continues his argument from anotherstandpoint of “human dignity” (Menschenwürde).
Müller defines “human dignity” as follows: “Torespect the dignity of a person is to admit hisvalue simply by his existence. Existence is, then,according to Müller, the definitive criterion forhuman dignity, not functionality, usefulness,or achievements.”35 Müller then discusses theissue of “radical (radikal) instrumentalization.”36
Müller’s argument rests mainly on the violationby the “production” (Erzeugung)37 of the humanembryo, rather than the infringement of “humandignity” of the existing human embryo. In otherwords, the producer (Erzeuger) of the humanembryo admits the “value of the human embryo
only for its usefulness for specific purposes” inthe context of “radical instrumentalization.”38 The
human embryo would “come into existence” only
for specific purposes and would “be disposedof ” for that goal. 39 If we further discuss the30

issue of the “levels of instrumentalization” inthe human embryo study according to Müller’sview around “radical instrumentalization,” itwould be as follows. On the one hand, humanembryos used in the study of surplus humanembryos have come into existence initially for
their reproductive purpose; they were then usedand disposed of for research purposes. On theother hand, human embryos created solely for
research purposes have come into existence only
for others’ goals and were then used and disposedof after a specific period. Hence, in the latter
case, the very “existence” of human embryos
defined in the abovementioned argument by
Müller premised on “human dignity” is entirely
controlled from the beginning to the end byothers, which means that their “human dignity”
is entirely infringed. According to Müller, suchfactors as how urgent or noble the “goal” is insuch cases cannot alter the fact that their “humandignity” is “radically” infringed.40 For example,
we could insist on conducting x in any fashion
and because of any noble goal, such as the pursuitof truth, medical technology advancement, a curefor diseases, or the promotion of human welfare.
Yet, the fact remains that the dignity of thehuman embryo is utterly violated for such goals.
In a situation of such total instrumentalization,
all comparative weighting is denied, and suchaction should be prohibited.
As shown above, Müller’s view of “radical
instrumentalization” presents a vital clue toclarify the “levels of instrumentalization,” which
the previously discussed statements issued inJapan have not confirmed. However, Müller’s
analysis of “radical instrumentalization” appears
to be the difference among the views advanced.
The “levels of instrumentalization” in thesestatements did not show the highest moral rank;
as a result, these levels would remain relativein ever y respect. As a result, the study ofsurplus human embryos, the creation of humanembryos for research purposes, and the researchof the hSCNT embr yo, could be weighted
comparatively, on scientific grounds. Yet an issue
remains around the levels of instrumentalizationin the latter two types of research on the creation/
usage of human embryos. Is it morally defensible
to consider such instrumentalization as thehighest level of violation against “the dignity” ofthe human embryo? Is human embryo’s dignity at

Philosophical Discussion of “Human Life” and “Benefits for Humankind” in the Study of Human Embryos﻿

the same levels as that of other existing animals
or plants? Does the instrumentalization allow for
acknowledging the value of the human embryo as
an individual human being?41 The differences inthe standpoints would possibly emerge again inthis issue, depending on which moral argument
we choose from the above.

Conclusion
In this ar ticle, we have discussed Hübner’s
criticism of Merkel’s view and Müller’s argument.
Their arguments are significant in revealingthat we cannot dwell on the simple comparative
weighting between “human life” and “benefits forhumankind” in the discussion of human embryo
study; on the one hand, Hübner introduces a
new conceptual distinction based on “the claimof rights from the subject”, while, Müller has
proposed another distinction from the viewpointof “the doer who handles the object.” However,
we cannot expect the debate of human embryo
study to be settled entirely by introducing
their arguments alone, as shown in the several
questions that arose in the analysis. As for thematter of weights placed on the distinctions
they have proposed, we will discuss further
in the future under what circumstances theseweights would become more significant than theconflict between “human life” and “benefits forhumankind.”42

3

4

5

Endnotes
1

The author recognizes the significance of similar
recommendations in the following documents:
H at at e, To sh i h i ko, a nd Ku r i h a r a , C h ie ko.
Seimeirinri Senmon Chosakai Sono Mondaiten(Sono 1) [Bioethics Experts Review Board and its
Issues (Part 1)], 2004 Grant-in-Aid for Scientific
Research (B) (1) Project Number 16320002,
and Seimeikagaku ni okeru Rinriteki Houteki
Shakaiteki Shomondai I [Ethical, Legal, and Social
Issues in Life Sciences I], the Research Program by
the Research Grant of the Pfizer Health Research
Foundation. International Joint Research Project
2003-2004 for Research Group (B). p. 44.
2 R e f e r t o t h e fol l ow i n g d o c u m e n t fo r t h echaracteristics of the Bioethics Experts Committee:
H a t a t e , To s h i h i ko a n d K u r i h a r a , C h ie ko.

6
7
8
9
10
11

12

Shuku FUNAKI

Seimeirinri Senmon Chosakai Sono Mondaiten(Sono 1) [Bioethics Experts Review Board and its
Issues (Part 1)] ref. Note (1). pp. 37-45 and 49-63.
Hatate points out that the human embryo and thehSCNT embryo are discussed at the same level ofsignificance as a characteristic in the argument in
the final report (ibid. p. 40). Kurihara criticizes thereport from the standpoint of protecting the dignityof women who provide unfertilized eggs (ibid. pp.
55, 61, 69, and 71).
総合科学技術会議第３８回生命倫理専門調査会の 資 料 ３. https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/tyousakai/
life/haihu38/haihu-si38.html
The reference for the recent situation in Germany
after the enactment of the Embryo Protection
Law is the following: Morinaga, Shinichiro.
(2005). Doitsu oyobi EU [Germany and EU],Sei mei k a g a k u n i oke r u R i n r it ek i Hout ek i
Shakaiteki Shomondai I [Ethical, Legal, and Social
Issues in Life Sciences I], ref. Note (1), esp. p.86f.
Furthermore, a detailed reference for the statement
issued by the German Ethics Council is available
in the following document: Matsuda, Jun. (2005).
Idenshi Gijutsu no Hatten to Ningen no Mirai―
Doitsu Seimei Kankyou Rinrigaku ni Manabu[Gene Technology Advancement and the Future of
Humankind―Learning from Bioenvironmental
Ethics in Germany], Chisen Shoin, esp. pp. 41-48,
81f.
G e r m a n Et h ics C ou nci l (St at e me nt) 20 0 4,
Klonen zu Fortpf lanzungszwecken und Klonenz u b io m e d i z i n i s c h e n Fo r s c h u n g s z we c ke n
Stellungnahme [Cloning for Propagation andCloning for Biomedical Research Pur poses],
http://www.ethikrat.org/stellungnahmen/pdf/
Stellungnahme_Klonen.pdf
Ibid., pp. 55f.
Ibid., pp. 57f.
Ibid., pp. 64, 76; cf. ibid., pp. 66f.
Ibid., pp. 95f.
Ibid., p. 91.
Merkel 2001: Rein hard Merkel, Rechte f ü r
Embr yonen? Die Menschenw ü rde lässt sichnicht allein auf die biologische Zugehörigkeit
zur Menschheit gründen, in: C. Geyer (Hrsg.),
Biopolitik: die Positionen [Right for Embryos?
Hu man Dig nit y Unassociable to the Simple
Biological Trait of Humans, in: C. Geyer (Hrsg.),
Biopolitics: The Positions], Fran kf ur t a.M.:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001, p. 57.
Hübner 2004: Dietmar Hübner, Rechtsty pen
31

Journal of Philosophy and Ethics in Health Care and Medicine, No. 14, December 2020

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

29

30
31

32

und Pf lichtenty pen in der biomedizinischen
Ethik. Über Abwägungskonstellationen beim
Embryonenschutz, in: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft
und Ethik 9 [Types of Rights and Types of Duties
in the Biomedical Ethics: About Weighing up
Constellations in Embryo Protection, in: Journalof Science and Ethics 9], 2004, p. 77. According
to Hübner, the example of this particular thought
experiment was first discussed by Leonard Glantz
and published by George Annas. cf. ibid. p. 72.
Merkel 2001, p. 62.
Ibid., p. 63.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 64.
Ibid.
Hübner 2004, pp. 75f.
Ibid., p. 78.
Ibid., p. 79.
Ibid., p. 81.
Ibid., p. 69.
Ibid., p. 81.
Cf. ibid., p. 86.
Ibid., p. 68.
Cf. ibid., p. 86.
Cf. ibid., p. 92.
Unlike Dieter Birnbacher, who brings the patient’s
right to promote his health to the forefront of
the argument, Masayoshi Tarui points out thesignificance of the viewpoint that regards theright to life of human embryos as the fundamental
right. The author agrees that the issue should be
discussed based on this viewpoint. Birnbacher,
Dieter. “Ningen no Songen―Hikaku Kouryou
Kanou ka Ina ka [Human Dignity―Is it Possible
to Weight Them Comparatively]” (Symposium
presentation). Research Program by the Research
Grant of the Pfizer Health Research Foundation
International Joint Research Project 2003-2004 for
Research Group (B). Grant-in-Aid for Scientific
Research (B)(2) Project Number 16320001, and theGrant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)(1) Project
Number 16320002 ed. 2005. pp. 23f.
Müller 2004: Anselm Winfried Müller, „Lasst uns
Menschen machen!“ Ansprüche der Gentechnik― Einspruch der Vernunft [“Let us Make Man!”
Demands for Gen Technology. Opposition of
Reason], Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2004, p. 54.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 57; cf. ibid., p. 63. Müller introduces HansMartin Sass as the researcher who has a similarview. cf. ibid. p. 57.

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34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Ibid., p. 58.
Ibid., pp. 60f.
Ibid., p. 61
Ibid., p. 162.
Ibid., p. 145.
Ibid., p. 174; cf. ibid. p. 139.
Ibid., p. 142.
Ibid., pp. 143, 145.
Ibid., pp. 148, 158f.
Cf. ibid., p. 164.
I would like to thank the staff member of CRL
Inc. for their proofreading service to brush up mymanuscript.

* This article is an English version of the followingar ticle and includes updates: Shuku Funaki,“Hitohai kenkyuu wo meguru ‘hito no seimei’to ‘jinrui heno rieki’ nitsuiteno tetsugakuteki
kousatsu,” Igaku Tetsugaku Igaku Rinri (TheJapanese Association for Philosophical and EthicalResearches in Medicine), 2006, Vol.24, pp.1-9.