Intergenerational Wealth Shifts To and From the Retired Generation
A Comparative Study of Japan and South Korea

Soon-May Lum(Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies, Waseda University)
February 2008
1. Introduction
The issue of an Aging population has been in the forefront since the start of the twentiethcentury although it has taken on an even more urgent note this year, 2008, as the first batch of
baby boomers (those born between 1946 and 1964) retires. Generally the issue has been looked
upon with fear and apprehension because of expected adverse effects on the economies of theworld.
The underlying assumption that creates the uncertainty is that the retired generation will stop
being productive and the remaining working population and the social systems of the countries
will have to cope with supporting this fast, growing generation so much so that economies will
suffer and social welfare systems will burst at the seams. The question that faced most
governments is how to adjust the economic and social arrangements to allow for this proportionof old people.
While the world awaits the imminent doom, the elderly generation, while growing, has beenchanging. “Active Aging” became the campaign slogan for many activists. Reports are now
appearing that the elderly are making significant contributions to the economy, the family andsociety.
This paper examines briefly the characteristics of an aging population for two Asian countries –Japan and South Korea – and reviews a recent survey which found the elderly on the giving end
instead of being on the receiving end all the time. Although this trend has been identified, great
differences were found across countries. Further research is suggested to understand the pattern
and nature of transfers between generations and also the factors that contribute to the differences
across countries.

125

While this paper has focused chiefly on Japan and South Korea, where appropriate, comparisonswith other countries and East Asia have been made in order to put the issue in perspective.
In keeping with the reference sources, it has not been possible to use a standard term for theelderly so various terms like “senior”, “old”, “older” and “retired” have been usedinterchangeably.

2.

Demographics

A population is defined as “aging” if it satisfies either or both of these conditions: (1) its average(mean or median) age is increasing; (2) there is an increase in the proportion of the population
above a certain threshold age, most commonly designated as the Statutory Retirement Age that
divides those expected to be economically inactive from those expected to be active (Jackson,1998).
An illustration of the Median Age trend from 2000 to 2050 for Japan, South Korea, China(excluding Hong Kong and Macau) and East Asia as a region is given in Figure 1. East Asia, as
defined by the United Nations‟ Population Division (UN) includes China, China–Hong Kong,
China-Macau, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Mongolia.
Figure 1: Median Age

60.0
55.0

Age

50.0

Japan
S. Korea
China
E.Asia

45.0
40.0
35.0
30.0
25.0
2000

2025
Year

2050

Source: Charted from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,
World Population Prospects: 2006 Revision

126

Japan has the oldest Median Age which peaks at 54.9 years by 2050. Although South Korea had
a relatively younger Median Age of 32 years in 2000, its Median Age is projected to rise sharply
to the same level as Japan by 2050. In comparison to the East Asian region, Japan and South
Korea will have older Median Ages than the region's average over the next 50 years from 2000.
In examining the proportion of population over the statutory retirement age, the population is
first divided into three major age groups:- Age 0 to 14 to represent the Young population, Age
15 to 64 to represent the Working population and Age 65 and older to represent the Old
population. It is noted that South Korea currently has a retirement age of 60 while Japan's is 65.
For consistency, the UN's population database is used instead of each country's published data.
The UN population database assumes a retirement age of 65. Figures 2 and 3 show the projectedchanges in these age groups in Japan and South Korea over 25-year periods - 2000, 2025, 2050.
Figure 2: Japan’s Population by Age Groups
100%

Percentage

17%

29%

38%

68%
59%

51%

15%

11%

11%

2000

2025
Year

2050

0%

Old (65 years and older)
Working (15-64 years)
Young (0-14 years)

Source: Charted from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,
World Population Prospects: 2006 Revision

Figure 3: South Korea’s Population by Age Group

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100%

7%

20%

Percentage

35%

72%
68%
54%

21%
0%
2000

12%

10%

2025
Year

2050

Old (65 years and older)
Working (15-64 years)
Young (0-14 years)

Source: Charted from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,
World Population Prospects: 2006 Revision

In the case of Japan, the Old population increases steadily from 17% in 2000 to 38% in 2050.
South Korea had a relatively low percentage of Old population at 7% in 2000 but the proportion
increases sharply to 35% by 2050. In addition to the increasing trend of the Old population, adeclining trend of the Working population is observed over the same period. In Japan, theWorking population decreases from 68% in 2000 to 51% in 2050 whereas in South Korea, it
decreases from 72% to 54% in the same period. Both countries are expected to show a decline
in Total population by 2050.
Another common way to characterize an aging population is through the Old-age Dependency
Ratio. The Old-age Dependency Ratio is an indicator of the dependent elderly population as aproportion of total working population. The Support Ratio, the reciprocal of the Dependency
Ratio shows the proportion of working population over the elderly population. It, therefore,
indicates the average number of economically active persons available to support each retired
elderly person. In the case of Japan, the Old-age Dependency Ratio doubles from 25 (4.0
working persons supporting 1 senior person) in 2000 to 50 in 2025 (2.0 working persons
supporting 1 senior person) and then increases to 74 in 2050 (1.4 persons supporting 1 seniorperson). For South Korea, the Old-age Dependency Ratio started at 10 in 2000 (9.8 working
persons supporting 1 senior person), goes up to 29 in 2025 (3.5 persons supporting 1 seniorperson) and then shoots up to 65 in 2050 (1.6 persons supporting 1 senior person). The
following figure (Figure 4) shows the changes in the Dependency Ratio for Japan, South Korea,
China and the East Asian region. It is clear that the acceleration rate of the Old-age Dependency
Ratio is the highest for Japan and South Korea.

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Figure 4: Old-age Dependency Ratio
80

74
65
50
39 41
29

25

20 22

Japan
South Korea
China
East Asia

10 10 11
0
2000

2025

2050

Source: Charted from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,
World Population Prospects: 2006 Revision

3. Causes of Aging Population
As the definition of an "aging" population hinges on proportion of the population, it is easy tounderstand that the issue is affected by three factors of demographic change: - mortality, fertility
and migration (Jackson, 1998). Mortality decline is due to improvement in sanitary and nutrition
conditions, and reductions in contagious and infectious diseases. Longer life expectancy is also
associated with reduction in child mortality rate.
The Total Fertility Rate (Number of Births per Woman) is 1.27 for Japan and 1.21 for South
Korea for 2005-2010 (UN, 2006). Fertility decline is due to improvement in child survival,
increase in parental investment in each child, advancement of the status of women andimprovement in contraceptive technology (Bessho and Kihara, 2006).
The replacement rate is the number of children a woman would have in order to replace herself
and her partner, that is, population growth will be maintained at zero. Globally the replacement
rate for the population is 2.33. The rate is higher than 2 after taking into consideration childhood
mortality. The replacement rate is lower in developed countries and higher in developing
countries because of the higher childhood mortality rate. It is clear that Japan and South Korea
are below the replacement rate which implies an eventual decrease in population.

129

Bessho and Kihara (2006) commented that the decreasing speed of the Total Fertility Rate
and/or the increasing speed of life expectancies in Asian countries have been faster than otherregions like Europe and North America.
Migration can act in the same way as fertility, when inward migration adds new members of the
population, or in the same way as mortality, when outward migration removes current membersof the population. The effects on the age composition are more ambiguous than those of fertility
and mortality: the population gained through migration is not inevitably young as with fertility,
and the population lost through migration will frequently be younger than that lost throughmortality. Migration is also partial and usually voluntary. In most cases, migration has a limited
influence on population aging, as international migration flows are far smaller than national
populations (Jackson, 1998).

4. Implications of Aging Population
Economists are divided on the impact of population aging on economic growth. According to
the neoclassical growth model, population aging, associated with a decline in working
population growth, seems to lead to low economic growth. The “neutralist” view, however,considers population growth and growth in per capita income to be independent. Most experts
tend to subscribe to the “neutralist” view because it is difficult to distinguish the effect of
population structure on economic growth from that of business cycle, productivity growth or
public policy.
Generally it has been said that population aging and the resulting reduction in the working
population would affect savings, investment, external balances, as well as economic growth rate,
in various kinds of ways. In the fiscal sphere, government budgets are adversely affected bypopulation aging due particularly to higher spending on pensions, health care and long-term
residential care (Bessho and Kihara, 2006).
In the area of savings, the life-cycle model implies that individuals will finance their living
expenses during retirement by dissaving previously accumulated wealth. While a number ofprevious studies provided inconclusive evidence, Horioka et al (1996)'s findings supported thelife cycle model although they also underscored the importance of taking account of
employment status, bequest motives, etc. when analyzing the saving behavior of the aged.

130Since there is abundant literature on the economic aspects of an aging population this paper will
not discuss the subject in any further detail. Overall, population aging has macroeconomic
implications for the economies as a whole alongside microeconomic implications for theindividual. Practical responses to aging will require specific policy measures covering issues
such as employment, pensions and healthcare (Jackson, 1998).
5.

Policy Responses to an Aging Population

On the question of how governments are responding to the issue of an aging population, policy
responses are found generally in three areas - increase in labor supply, increase in saving, andsocial security reforms.
Increase in labor supply could include promotion of immigration of young workers from laborabundant countries. However this will require supplemental policies to help migrants assimilate
and to minimize stress on the host population. Another way is to increase the participation rateof working age women and the elderly population. The third way is to encourage an increase in
the fertility rate. However, the effects of the policies are not clear, as it entails a long lag toincrease labor forces.
One way to increase national saving is to increase the saving of governments, that is, to registerprimary fiscal surpluses. Pension reforms with reduction of benefits or from pay-as-you-go to
the individual provident fund, could contribute to increase in private saving.
Social security systems include public medical insurance systems and public pension systems.
The reforms to sustain the systems include postponing retirement age, reduction in pension
benefits and increases in contribution rate (Bessho and Kihara, 2006).
In Japan, under a law passed in 2004 employers are obligated to take measures, in April 2006 orthereafter, to allow their employees to continue to work at least up to the age when public
pensions start to be paid. Specifically, they must take measures such as introducing thecontinuous employment system and gradually extending the retirement age up to 65 by 2013.
With regard to Long-term Care Insurance System, another law was enacted in June 2005 which
provided for a shift of the existing system to a prevention-oriented system, revision ofaccommodation and meal fees paid by nursing home residents, establishment of a new service
system, and improvement of service quality. In December 2005, the Council of the Government
and Ruling Parties for Medical System Reforms decided on general principles aimed to create a131new medical insurance system that comprehensively promotes the appropriate adjustment of
medical fees in view of an incoming ultra-aging society. The Government also put other laws inplace in the provision of child-care support services in local communities, and the extension of
the age for providing child allowance from April 2006 (Japan Cabinet Office, 2006)
South Korea has constructed a public pension and public health insurance system where allresidents are assumed to be participants. There were several public health insurance schemes but
integration of these schemes is in progress. In the midst of population aging, increase inpremium payment rates are scheduled after 2010 (Bessho and Kihara, 2006). The government isalso making plans to boost the fertility rate. This includes expansion of support for childcare andeducation of children under the age of five and to reform the healthcare insurance, by reducing
the direct cost of children. While boosting the fertility rate would slow the pace of population
aging, it would not be sufficient to prevent a significant decline in the labor force. Hence theplan is to increase the participation rate among prime-age women, as well as making better useof older workers (OECD, 2007).
While the governments have taken various steps to adjust policies and systems to accommodate
the aging population, such measures involve considerable time lag and would take many years
to become effective.
6.

Recent Trends

The underlying assumption discussed in the previous sections is that in old age, the elderly will
receive from the young and become a "burden" to society. It is important to take a step back andtake a look at the current elderly generation and question whether this image of the elderly
generation is up-to-date. Let us take a look at some recent trends.
The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) conducted a survey of opinion leaders in2006 entitled "Aging in Asia and Oceania". The survey was conducted through interviews of
423 opinion leaders in the United States and seven countries in Asia and Oceania. The sevencountries were Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore and South Korea. A totalof 50 interviews were conducted each in Japan and South Korea.
Most of the opinion leaders do not see the aging population issue as a one-sided phenomenon
but associate both challenges and opportunities. On the positive side, they see the potential
availability of knowledgeable and experienced older people who can contribute as productive132

members of the workforce, the creation of new markets for products and services targeted atolder people. They are also optimistic that the life quality of older people will improve withtechnology (computers and robots) extending the productive work lives, extending independent
living and improving health and medical care. On the negative side, they worry about theprovision of retirement income, healthcare and housing to the older generation. They are also
concerned that employers are not committed or prepared to cope with an older workforce.
The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC) conducted a series of surveys on The Future of
Retirement. Its third annual report was entitled “The New Old Age”.

The global survey,

conducted in 2007, included 21 countries and a total sample of 21,000 people aged 40 to 79.
Both Japan and South Korea had a sample size of 1000 each. The survey focused on three main
topics – Contribution to Society, Family and Health. Overall, the survey found that, rather than
the traditionally held view that older people are a burden on society, older people arecontributing billions to the economy in volunteer work and they enable the working population
to function by supporting their family and more broadly, the community. They found that more
older people are giving money, support and care to families and friends than there are receiving
it. They can do this because they are more fit and active than ever before, they feel they are incontrol of their lives, that they are independent rather than dependent, and are generally looking
forward to the next 20 to 30 years of life. The survey also showed that "the family" is stillchosen by the overwhelming majority as defining "who they are".
Contributions to society were grouped into three main categories - voluntary work, paid
contribution through the labor force and contribution to families in providing financial, practicaland personal support. Japanese elders were said to have contributed 1.1 trillion yen in volunteer
work and 1.8 trillion yen in income taxes. South Korean elders contributed 464 billion won involunteer work and 688 billion won in income taxes.
The survey uncovered a number of interesting points and four points are highlighted below forfurther discussion. These points relate to two factual situations – providing/receiving of support,
working past retirement; and two attitudes – identification with family and family solidarity.
(a) Providing and Receiving Support
On the question of “Providing and receiving financial support”, the participants were asked
whether they provided and/or received financial support to/from family and friends within thelast 6 months. With the way this question was phrased, it was possible that the support referred133here did not include bequests. Figure 5 shows the result of all the countries surveyed.
It is interesting to note that the elderly consistently provided financial help in all the countries,
albeit in varying degrees. In some countries, they received little financial support. What is alsosignificant is that South Korea is at the top of the chart with substantial providing and receivingof support. Japan, on the other hand, is right at the bottom of the chart with slightly more
providing than receiving.

Figure 5: Providing and Receiving Financial Support (All countries)

Source: Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, The new old age report, 2007134

A breakdown of the top percentages by age group which has been mentioned in the report isgiven in the following figure (Figure 6):
Figure 6: Providing / Receiving Financial Support (Japan and South Korea)Japan

Age Group(Years)ProvidingSouth Korea
Receiving

ProvidingReceiving

93%

62%

40-49
8%
50-59
60-69

17%
73%

70-79

5%

64%

In terms of Providing and Receiving Practical Support, the top percentages for Japan and South
Korea are as follows (Figure 7):
Figure 7: Providing / Receiving Practical Support (Japan and South Korea)Japan

Age Group(Years)ProvidingSouth Korea
Receiving

ProvidingReceiving

40-49
83%
50-59
6%
60-69

15%

70-79

7%

82%
69%

In both Financial Support and Practical Support, South Korea‟s support is much higher thanJapan‟s.
(b) Working past Retirement Age
Japanese and South Korean elders who worked past their retirement age are analyzed by age
group in the following figure (Figure 8):135

Figure 8: Working past Retirement Age
100

Percentage

80
60

Japan
Korea

40
20
0
40-49

50-59
60-69
Age Group

70-79

The significant differences between Japan and South Korea are in the older ages beyond 60
where South Koreans tend to continue working while Japanese elders tend to stop working.
(c) What do People Identify Themselves with?
In every country and every age group in the survey, when asked to complete the phrase "whenyou think of who you are, you think mainly of ....." most people chose their Family. Overall,almost two-thirds chose family, with work and religion being the next most popular responses.
In the case of Japan, while the figure was high, the proportion decreased with age group from
70% of 40 - 69 year olds to 60% of 70-79 year olds. For South Korea, the figure was 75% for all
age groups.
The composition of the responses for Japan and South Korea are shown in the following figures(Figure 9 and 10):The items that the elders identify themselves with are approximately the same for Japan andSouth Korea. An interesting point worth noting is that while South Koreans tend to work
beyond retirement up to the older ages (see Figure 8), their identification with work (4%) islower than that of Japan (10%).

136

Figure 9:

Japan - What do people identify themselves with

Other, 16%

Religion, 13%
Family, 61%
Work, 10%Figure 10:

South Korea - What do people identify themselves with

Other, 25%

Family, 57%
Religion, 14%Work, 4%(d) Family Solidarity
The survey asked questions about individuals' responsibilities to other family members. The
overall results for all the countries were:(1) Children have a duty to their parents in later life
Over 80% of participants agree that adults have a duty to provide for their parents in time ofneed later in life.
(2) Parents have a duty to their children
More than 70% agree that parents have a duty to do their best for their children even at theexpense of their own well-being.

137

(3) Grandparents have a duty to their grandchildren
Over 75% of participants say that grandparents have a duty to be there for their
grandchildren in time of difficulty.
The top reported percentages for Japan and South Korea are given in the following figure(Figure 11):
Figure 11: Duty of Parents / Grandparents to do their best for their Children
even at the expense of their own well-beingJapan
Age Group(years)

Duty ofParents

South Korea

Duty ofGrandparents

40-49

Duty ofParents

Duty ofGrandparents

71%

72%

52%
50-59

60%

60-69

83%
48%

70-79

46%

88%

It is noted that in the case of Japan, the feeling of responsibility for children / grandchildren
decreases with age. In contrast, the feeling of responsibility for South Korean elders increases
with age.
It is also observed that although Japanese elders provide little support, both financial andpractical (Figures 6 and 7), their identification with Family (Figures 9 and 10) is at a similarlevel to South Korea and in terms of Family Solidarity, Japan is not far from South Korea(Figure 11).
The HSBC Study has highlighted that there are two-directional intergenerational transfers
between generations instead of the assumed one-directional transfer from young to old after
retirement. Nonetheless, from the quick comparative study above, significant differences havebeen found for the two countries of Japan and South Korea. Since detailed survey data is notavailable for further analysis, it is difficult to draw conclusions beyond superficial trends.
In the next section, we shall examine the existing literature on Intergenerational Relations andTransfers.

138

7.

Intergenerational Studies

A review of the literature on intergenerational relations and transfer showed that this is not a
new subject at all. Intergenerational transfers or exchanges have appeared in both the economic
literature as well as sociological literature, especially in the area of family studies. Under the
economic arena, intergenerational transfers refer to direct cash exchanges as well as bequests. In
the sociological arena, intergenerational transfers include financial exchanges as well as
non-financial exchanges like care and support, emotional support.
Past intergenerational studies have focused on subjects ranging from the expectations of elderly
parents and adult children, content of adult child and aged parent roles, parent-child interaction
to exchanges, assistance and support. Studies of exchange, assistance, and support conducted
over the past 25 years showed a large amount of intergeneration involvement, both instrumental
and affective.
As proposed by Sussman (1965) and Hill (1965), the redistribution of resources resulting fromfamily transfers has been held to be related to the life cycle in a curvilinear fashion, with the
middle aged being net providers for the young and elderly. This curvilinear model is consistent
with a view of aging as a time of role reversal. According to that view, the transition frommiddle age to old age is expected to be associated with a reversal in the direction of net-resource
flows.
Others have held the contrary view that role continuity is a more significant sociological featureof aging. According to this view, parents are believed to continue benefiting their children eveninto advanced old age, except in cases of extreme hardship. Intergenerational aid is believed,
therefore, to take the principal form of serial (or sequential) transfers, in which each generation
continuously redistributes resources to its successors. These two models have existed side byside in the literature for more than a decade (Cheal, 1983).
Mancini and Bleiszer (1989) maintained that older parents continue to provide support ofvarious kinds to their adult children and are not only the recipients of support. On average, older
parents are more likely to give help to their children rather than to receive help from theirchildren. What seems to impinge on the degree to which parents provide support is a change inhealth or in economic status.
Cheal (1983) noted that the culmination of the aging process is not necessarily a shift toward139

more self-centered behavior. In particular, the active recognition of obligations to provide
economic support for others appears to remain strong. He added that economic studies of old
age have frequently suffered from a number of deficiencies including the difficulty in defining"poverty". The most common concept of poverty employed in quantitative analyses has been
income inadequacy. Income level, however, is not the sole determinant of economic well-being.
A number of studies in recent years have stressed the additional importance of accumulated
assets. Calculations of economic well-being based on personal wealth as well as income haveindicated that many old people are relatively better off than earlier analyses had suggested.
In this respect, Kitamura et al (2001) reported that the bulk of intergenerational transfers takeplace in the form of bequests. A study has shown that about one-third to one-half of household
assets is obtained by bequests in Japan.
Several patterns of aid exist: a direct flow from the old to the young, flow from the middle
generation to their parents and to their own children, and a true reciprocal flow among all
generations in the family (Mancini and Blieszner, 1989).
Other studies contrasted the indicators of instrumental and emotional support withpsychological well-being of the elderly. There was little support for the hypothesis that older
parent's well-being related positively to providing aid to adult children and negatively toreceiving aid from them. Mutran and Reitzes (1984) examined intergenerational support andwell-being via symbolic interaction and social exchange perspectives. They tested their model
separately for the married and the widowed and found that for the married, there was no
relationship between well-being and the exchange variables of the reception of aid and theprovision of aid. On the other hand, they found that for the widowed, the help they received
from children reduced negative feelings and that giving help increased negative feelings.
Hashimoto (1996) conducted an inquiry into the different cultural meanings of giving anddeserving help in two aging societies - in U.S. and in Japan. She emphasized that it is importantto recognize the key cultural assumptions and identify how they mold and constrain theorganization of support in each socio-cultural context. In both countries, these cultural
assumptions play a pivotal role in shaping support arrangements by defining the giving andreceiving of help in ways that are meaningful in their societies. The same categories ofassumptions matter in different ways. As an example, Japan's approach to support relies on theassumption that the filial, not conjugal, tie is the most intimate and reliable social bond and that
this intergenerational relationship is the unit of self-sufficiency. The American approach, on the140other hand, is linked to the perception that the conjugal tie takes precedence over the filial tie as
the primary bond, and that the couple makes the independent unit of self-sufficiency.
The literature showed that multi-directional transfers between older parents and adult children
had been going on for a long time. Parents, even after retirement continued to give more thanthey receive and they appeared to be in better financial status than previously thought. With anunderstanding of these generalizations, still we see marked differences across different countries(refer to Figure 5). Further research is needed to verify the patterns of intergenerational transfers
and understand the factors behind the differences across countries.
8.

Further Research

Most of the studies that we have reviewed in the previous section have been done in the West. It
would be important to understand the situation in the Asian context. An understanding of thesituation would help to manage the issue and also provide valuable lessons to other countries
that would be aging in the future. The ultimate aim would be to work towards greater regional
cooperation.
Based on the lessons learned from previous studies and surveys, it is hypothesized thatintergenerational familial financial support is functioning as the stabilizer for the wealthimbalance between the young and retired generations to complement the incompleteness of thelegal and social systems. Its effectiveness is dependent on the correlation between elements like
culture and economic development on a macro level.
The first stage of the proposed study will aim to define the patterns of intergenerational transfers
to and from the retired generation. A comparative study will be made of Tokyo and Seoul, thetwo capital cities of Japan and South Korea as it is assumed that they represent approximately
similar levels of economic development level.
To understand the patterns of transfers, questions will be asked to determine whom the parents
give to (children, grandchildren, siblings, relatives, friends), how often they give, what they give(monetary, gifts, purchases, non-monetary), how much they give and whether they volunteered
the transfer or they were asked to give the transfer. The study will also examine the impact ofsocial structure and subjective and self motives on the transfers. Factors under social structure
will include education, income, age, poor health indicator, gender, and retirement indicator.
Factors under subjective factors will include the subjective importance or significance attached141to the adult child or children, and subjective appraisals of rewards and costs of the transfers. The
roles to be examined will include the parents‟ role as marital partner, worker and community
member.
The methodology involves both quantitative methods, by way of questionnaire as well as
qualitative, by way of interview. The target participants will be elderly people who are notconfined to health institutions or living under welfare. The target sample size is a minimum of
400 in each city.
The anticipated limitation of this study is that Tokyo and Seoul are both cities and would not be
representative of the situation in rural areas of Japan and South Korea. Further research in futureis needed in those areas.
9.

Conclusion

Intergenerational wealth transfers to and from the retired generation involves both monetary andnon-monetary exchanges. It has been found that such dual-directional exchanges had been
taking place all the time and in almost all countries although the amount of transfer differs bycountries. It is hypothesized that such transfers are helping to balance out wealth imbalances
between generations even while countries are adjusting policies and systems to cope with an
aging population. Further research is required to understand the patterns and nature of thesetransfers and also the factors that contribute to their differences in countries in Asia.

142

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