Witness Statement for the Hearing

Returning to the Moon: Keeping Artemis on Track
U.S. House of Representa�ves
Commitee on Science, Space and Technology
Space and Aeronau�cs Subcommitee
Rayburn House Oﬃce Building
Room 2318
Michael D. Griﬃn
17 January 2024
NASA, as well as the na�on on behalf of which it executes our civil space program, should
modify the strategy, tac�cs, acquisi�on approach and programma�c structure of human lunar
return as it is presently planned. To the topic of this hearing, the Artemis Program should not
be “kept on track”; it should be ﬁxed and then prosecuted with all deliberate speed.
Strategic issues ﬁrst. The agency has awarded ﬁxed-price contracts to SpaceX and Blue Origin tocarry out lunar landings for, respec�vely, $2.9 and $3.4 billion dollars(htps://www.ny�mes.com/2021/04/16/science/spacex-moon-nasa.html,
htps://www.reuters.com/technology/space/nasa-name-second-company-build-astronautlunar-lander-2023-05-19/). The cost of the Apollo Program over the 14-year period from 196073 is es�mated to have been $257 B in 2020 U.S. dollars (C. Dreier, An Improved Cost Analysis of
the Apollo Program, Space Policy, htps://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2022.101476). It isreasonable to believe that with the ﬂight experience and space industrial infrastructure thatexist today, human lunar missions could and should be executed for considerably less than
Apollo. It is grossly unrealis�c to suggest that they could be done for 1.5% of Apollo’s cost. The
award of these unrealis�cally low ﬁxed-price contracts makes it clear that cost reasonablenesswas not a factor in ranking these contract awards. The further implica�on is that the UnitedStates is not yet serious about a program that should be regarded as a core na�onal interest –returning U.S. and interna�onal partner astronauts to the Moon before our self-declared
adversaries can do so.
As in the 1960s, we are again faced with near-term peer compe��on in space, this �me with the
Chinese Communist Party and, once again, poten�ally Russia:(htps://www.newsweek.com/russia-approves-plan-establish-lunar-base-china-1848731). For
the U.S. not to be able to put its own and partner astronauts on the Moon, to be watching on
the internet while adversary powers do so, makes a statement about a shi� of global power andpreeminence that we ought not to allow. People and na�ons align themselves with leaders; formost of the last 80 years that has been the United States, in partnership with our European andWestern Paciﬁc allies. Are we prepared to relinquish that leadership to China? If not, and if weview preeminence in space as part of that leadership and therefore an element of na�onal
security, then it is again necessary to priori�ze urgency of execu�on.
Underlying the above is a key theme: we cannot separate civil space explora�on from na�onal
security space. It's one na�onal program, ar�ﬁcially separated at birth by President Eisenhower
to demonstrate to the world, and especially to the Soviet Union, that we were a peacefulna�on, exploring and developing space for peaceful purposes. But the reality is that thecrea�on of NASA was a na�onal security ini�a�ve from the start, a response to the Soviet
Union's launch of Sputnik.
Na�onal security takes many forms beyond raw power projec�on. In exploring and developing
the space domain we are pioneering the human fron�er. Even a casual reading of history showsthat every great na�on was on the fron�ers of its �me; this is almost a deﬁning characteris�c ofgreat powers. To quote from President Kennedy’s “man, Moon, decade” speech, where
mankind goes, free men must fully share. The point is that value systems mater. The UnitedStates mounted one of the most powerful yet non-aggressive responses in history to the Soviet
Union’s launch of Sputnik. Had the ﬁrst satellite been launched by the United Kingdom, theUnited States might have been a bit chagrined that we weren't ﬁrst, but the response would
simply not have been the same. The values of the United Kingdom and our own are highlyaligned; the values of the United States and the Soviet Union were about as an�the�cal as it
was possible to be. This diﬀerence was cri�cal to our response to Sputnik, as it should havebeen.
The reality is that decisions are made, standards are set and values are established on a fron�er
by the people who show up, not by those who stay home and watch. The society that sets
those standards (as we have done for global air transporta�on since the end of World War II)
and establishes the key infrastructure emerges as ﬁrst among equals, the proper goal for theUnited States.
Finally, when a society can do things that others cannot it commands a degree of respect that isby itself a valuable na�onal security asset, possibly more so than in many instances of theexercise of “hard power”. Quite simply, the very best people want to come to the place wherethe very best things are being done. It is quite instruc�ve to observe how many key ﬁgures in
the Manhatan and Apollo programs were immigrants, a number that was hugely out of
propor�on to the rest of the popula�on. To quote an observa�on by former Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Dr. Lisa Porter, the United States is a country
where a six-sigma individual can ﬂourish. They are the people who create, in the words ofanother quote atributed to JFK, the rising �de that li�s all boats. Space explora�on atracts
such people. That is something in which we should take pride and is an asset to be nourished.
These are the forms of na�onal security that NASA enables, and that we should take to heart incra�ing our na�onal space explora�on strategy.

Tac�cally, the selected mission architectures pose signiﬁcant concerns. SpaceX’s approachrequires an imprac�cally large number of orbital refueling opera�ons for even a single lunar
mission (Space News, 17 Nov 2023; htps://spacenews.com/starship-lunar-lander-missions-torequire-nearly-20-launches-nasa-says/), while Blue Origin’s mission design depends on thedevelopment of one of the most diﬃcult enabling technologies for long-dura�on space ﬂight,
zero-boiloﬀ cryogenic fuel storage (htps://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Moon_(spacecra�)).
These architectures feature concepts – cryogenic propellant storage, likely in large depots withlow, controllable boiloﬀ – that are cri�cal to long-term, sustainable human space explora�on.
But while important, their development is unlikely to be completed easily or quickly, and overthe last half-century we have used up the �me that could have been devoted to the evolu�on of
Apollo-era systems to a more sustainable architecture. Like it or not, we are engaged in acompe��on with others who do not wish us well; �meliness maters.
There are other concerns as well.
Crew Safety
The present Artemis mission architecture requires staging opera�ons at a Gateway based in a
lunar polar near-rec�linear halo orbit (NRHO) with a 6.5-day period and dimensions of 3,000 km
x 70,000 km al�tude above the lunar surface. This approach is said to oﬀer two signiﬁcantadvantages: the Orion spacecra�, which as discussed below has limited ∆V capability, can get
into and back out of this orbit on the way to and from the Moon, and any point on the lunar
surface can be accessed from the staging area. The ﬁrst of these issues can be addressed by far
simpler means, discussed below, and the second is not unique to NRHO – it is a characteris�c ofany polar orbit.
However, these points are trivial in comparison to the major disadvantage of staging from
NRHO, which is that immediate return to the Gateway from the lunar surface is possible only on
6.5-day centers. If a lunar crew encounters a problem on the surface that mandates a return tothe compara�ve safety of the Gateway, then depending upon when that problem occurs, amul�-day wait may be required. It is possible in some scenarios to wait in low lunar orbit (LLO),
but access to the Gateway is only possible at periodic intervals.
With present technology, ﬂying in space is just barely possible; even in Earth orbit it is bothdiﬃcult and dangerous. Expedi�ons to the Moon will be even more demanding. From a safety
perspec�ve, no early human lunar mission should knowingly accept the risk of stranding a crew,whether on the surface or in lunar orbit, for days at a �me. No mission architecture should becontemplated without, as in Apollo, the capability to leave the surface and rendezvous with asafer habitat within a few hours. Somewhat like the ﬁrst experience of “wintering over” inAntarc�ca, when enough lunar surface infrastructure has been emplaced to allow a viable longterm shelter-in-place op�on to be implemented, the crew abort strategy can be reconsidered.
Such is not the case for early human lunar return. The Artemis program has not been designedwith this considera�on in mind.
Reliability and Mission Risk

Leaving safety aside, mission architectures requiring mul�ple complex opera�ons in series, suchas propellant supply launches and cryogenic fuel transfer, are inherently less reliable than thoserequiring fewer. The table below makes this point; the le� side of the table speciﬁes apostulated reliability for each launch and propellant transfer opera�on, while across the top isshown a varying number of such opera�ons.
Reliability of
One Opera�on
99%
98%
97%
96%
95%

5
0.95
0.90
0.86
0.82
0.77

Number of Opera�ons
10
15
0.90
0.86
0.82
0.74
0.74
0.63
0.67
0.54
0.60
0.46

20
0.82
0.67
0.54
0.44
0.36

The results speak for themselves. Even if (for example) it is assumed that each single opera�on,e.g., launch plus propellant transfer, can be performed successfully 98% of the �me, i.e., with a
1-in-50 failure rate, a mission requiring ten such opera�ons in a speciﬁed campaign window will
fail to be completed within that window 18% of the �me. As a prac�cal mater, mission
architectures requiring mul�ple launch and propellant transfer opera�ons will be very diﬃcult
to complete with a reasonable likelihood of overall success. Congress should ques�on whether
this is a gamble that, from either the ﬁscal or na�onal pres�ge perspec�ve, it wishes to support.
A Lower-Risk Approach: A Two-Launch Solu�on for Human Lunar Landing
Early lunar return missions that meet NASA’s basic requirements – four people on the surface
for a week at any loca�on – can be achieved using technology and systems that are largely
available today. One straigh�orward approach is discussed below. It requires two SLS Block 2
heavy li� launches, each carrying a Centaur III upper stage; an Orion command and service
module; and a two-stage storable-propellant lunar lander, yet to be designed. A schema�c viewof this approach is shown below:

Mission Sequence
1) A payload stack consisting of a partially fueled Centaur III upper stage and the fully
fueled but uncrewed Lander is launched as cargo on the SLS Block 2B cargo variant
with the capability to put about 45 metric tons (mT) into a trans-lunar insertion (TLI)
trajectory.
2) The Centaur III is fueled with sufficient propellant (including allowance for boiloff) to
provide a ∆V of about 1 km/s for the payload stack and is used as a lunar orbit
insertion (LOI) stage to deliver the Lander to LLO to await the crew.
3) At a later time, the crew is launched on an SLS Block 2 crew variant (41 mT to TLI) to
LLO in Orion using the same Centaur III LOI stage as for the Lander. As the fully
fueled Orion has a mass of 27 mT, there are potentially several tons of margin forthis launch.
4) The Orion crew rendezvous with the Lander in LLO and transfers crew and possibly
additional equipment and provisions enabled by the mass margin for the Orion
launch.
5) The lander descends and lands out of LLO. The crew executes its surface mission,launches back to LLO in the ascent stage, rendezvous with Orion, transfers crew, anddeploys the ascent stage into a controlled lunar surface disposal.

6) The crew returns to Earth from LLO in Orion. The Orion ∆V capability of 1.25 km/s ismore than sufficient for the trans-Earth insertion (TEI) maneuver.
LOI Stage
This stage is needed because the presently exis�ng Orion service module ∆V capability of 1.25
km/s is suﬃcient for either inser�on into or return to Earth from LLO, but not both. Ifdeveloped for this purpose, it is likely to be advantageous to use the LOI stage also for inser�onof the Lander into LLO. However, depending upon the eﬃciency of the Lander descent
propulsion engine, it can be reasonable to consider making the Lander descent stage large
enough to accommodate the addi�onal, less-eﬃcient, storable propellant necessary for
inser�on into LLO.
The present analysis does not incorporate this assump�on. It is conserva�vely assumed herethat the LOI stage will be used for both tasks and hence is sized for the more diﬃcult
requirement, Lander inser�on into LLO. To this point, the fully fueled Centaur III with a single
RL10C-1 engine (presently used as an upper stage for Atlas V) has the following parameters:
Speciﬁc Impulse (Isp) –Dry Mass–
Propellant Mass–
Gross Mass–
Diameter–
Length–450 s
2.25 mT
20.83 mT
23.08 mT
3.05 m12.7 mThe required inser�on ∆V from a three-day trans-lunar coast trajectory to LLO is approximately
1 km/s, depending in detail on a variety of factors including the choice of landing site. Assuminga required ∆V of 1 km/s for this analysis, the mass of propellant required for the Centaur III toinsert the ini�al payload stack (Mi = 45 mT) into LLO is
Mp = Mi (1 – e-∆V/gIsp) = 9.2 mT
and consists of about 8 mT of liquid oxygen and 1 mT of liquid hydrogen.
Propellant boiloﬀ, primarily of the liquid hydrogen fuel, must be included in the cargo launch.
For the produc�on Centaur III, ﬂown-vehicle data shows the loss rate to be 13-17% per day;with a few layers of insula�on this can be reduced to 5% or less.
(htps://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwj2hPPF5tDAxWdF1kFHbJOBywQFnoECBMQAQ&url=htps%3A%2F%2Fwww.ulalaunch.com%2Fdocs%2Fd
efault-source%2Fextended-dura�on%2Fcentaur-extensibility-for-long-dura�on-20067270.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1Vzv5kb-HhwZlszEs8dilI&opi=89978449). With this, the Centaur willlose less than 200 kg of propellant during a three-day trans-lunar coast. Including an alloca�on
for a docking mechanism and other airborne support equipment for the Lander/Centaur cargo
stack yields an allowable Lander mass of 32 mT, as shown:

SLS Block 2B TLI Payload
Less
Dry Mass, Centaur III
LLO Inser�on Propellant Mass
Fuel Boiloﬀ Allowance (5%/day)
Airborne Support Equipment Alloca�on
Subtotal for LOI Requirements
Maximum Allowable Lander Mass

–
–
–
–
–
–
–

45 mT
2.3 mT
9.2 mT
0.2 mT
1.3 mT

13 mT
32 mT

The mass of the required LOI stage itself, slightly less than 12 mT, is about half the size of the
Centaur III. For a lunar return mission, the stage could be ﬂown as-is with a reduced propellant
load, or a modiﬁed version with shorter tanks developed if desired. Also, the RL10C-1-1 engine
variant for the Centaur V, the upper stage of Vulcan Centaur, oﬀers an improved speciﬁc impulseof over 453 seconds. Given the �me available before a lunar return mission will be executed, it
may be feasible to incorporate this engine into a modiﬁed Centaur III LOI stage, thus gaining
about 130 kg performance improvement.
Lunar Lander
To establish a baseline, the J-Series Apollo lunar landers (Apollo 15-17) had masses of less than
16.5 mT, including the 210 kg lunar rovers carried on each of these missions, and sustained twocrewmembers for three days. Scaling of this experience would suggest that a four-person, 32
mT vehicle capable of suppor�ng a 7-day mission is well within conserva�ve design limits.
Improvements are possible, for example the incorpora�on of storable, low toxicity “green
propellants” rather than the legacy, highly toxic, diﬃcult to handle nitrogen tetroxide/hydrazine
storable propellant combina�on. However, in the interest of oﬀering a low schedule risk
approach, the present analysis does not presume such advances.
Acquisi�on Strategy
The fundamental ﬂaw in the Artemis acquisi�on approach is the assump�on that the U.S.
government can and should leverage so-called “commercial space” for na�onal purposes, andthat this paradigm is applicable to human spaceﬂight. It is debatable whether, in general,“commercial space” is other than a catchphrase intended to diﬀeren�ate tradi�onal prime
contractors from newer ﬁrms aspiring to obtain government contracts without the excessive
and s�ﬂing regulatory framework surrounding tradi�onal government acquisi�on. However, it
should be clear that no signiﬁcant ﬁscal return on investment in human lunar missions can be
expected in the foreseeable future without signiﬁcant government subsidy.
It is thus NASA’s responsibility to acknowledge that it is the only signiﬁcant customer for human
missions to the Moon and that it must therefore establish and direct a credible mission design
to which contractors can bid, and to develop an equally credible cost es�mate to implementthat design, rather than agreeing to unrealis�c ﬁrm ﬁxed price (FFP) bids for complex
development programs. Government FFP contracts that are underbid leave both sides stuck ina bad deal with only a few possible but unsa�sfactory outcomes: the contractor demands
addi�onal money to ﬁnish the program and the government pays it, the program is ul�mately
canceled because the government doesn’t want to pay, or performance is reduced in acompromise between the amount of money the contractor wants and that which thegovernment is willing to pay. There is a long and depressing history of such eﬀorts:(htps://www.defensenews.com/industry/2024/01/09/cau�onary-tale-how-boeing-won-a-usair-force-program-and-lost-7b/). We should not add human lunar return to the list.
If our na�on is serious about returning to the Moon, this �me to stay, then it properly requires
an investment by the Congress on behalf of the public it serves. Congress and the public should
expect that investment to be expertly managed by Execu�ve Branch oﬃcials who areresponsible and accountable for the quality of their decisions and the direc�on they provide toindustry to implement those decisions. NASA’s acquisi�on approach should reﬂect that
fundamental principle.
Programma�c Considera�ons
The Artemis lunar landing missions as presently planned signiﬁcantly compromise crew safety,
carry high mission execu�on risk, are highly unlikely to remain on schedule, and are being
executed via an inappropriate acquisi�on approach with grossly unrealis�c ﬁxed-price cost
assump�ons. These facts require hard decisions to be made if success is to be atained in theend. Congress must use its power of the purse to direct the Execu�ve Branch to implement
these decisions.
Or, we can just kick the can down the road, as we have been doing for more than ﬁve decades
now.
Speciﬁcally, the exis�ng contracts should be terminated for the convenience of the government
and a new program ini�ated along the lines described above. Those who object will observethat termina�on for convenience will not allow signiﬁcant funding to be recaptured from theexis�ng ﬁxed-price contracts, and this is correct. But to con�nue programs that we know will
not achieve our goals distracts us from what must be done and damages NASA’s and thena�on’s reputa�on, even if they are being executed for free. We need to focus our eﬀorts on an
approach that we know will work in a �mely manner with the lowest mission risk and thegreatest crew safety we can provide. To this point, while the analysis presented here oﬀers apoint design to illustrate concept feasibility, a sensi�vity study should be conducted to establish
the parametric feasibility space within which the two-launch mission design can be op�mized.
Sustainability of our future space architecture does mater. Eﬀorts to develop systems that
expend fuel rather than hardware are important to that future. Because it is at the far end of
the lunar ∆V gear train, a single-stage reusable crew lander is the most important of thesedevelopments. Thus, the development of cryogenic propellant transfer and zero-boiloﬀ storage
technologies should be pursued. But the development of these technologies will not be quickor easy, and �meliness is presently the more important feature for our na�on’s human lunar
return program. Similarly, while NRHO and the Gateway as presently conceived are irrelevant tohuman lunar return, a transporta�on node or nodes like the Gateway will be valuable
components of a sustainable future lunar architecture if placed in a more useful staging orbit
than planned today.
But regardless of these ﬁner points, the straigh�orward approach outlined here could put U.S.led expedi�ons on the Moon beginning in 2029, given bold ac�on by Congress and expedi�ous
decision making and ﬁrm contractor direc�on by NASA. This is not the path being pursued atpresent and the exis�ng Artemis contractual and programma�c structure will not support it. A
new program, architected and managed by people who are clearly qualiﬁed for the job, should
be ini�ated and executed with funding adequate to carry out this urgent and important na�onal
mission.