 David Chapman University of South Australia
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Tama-chan and the Seal of Japanese Identity
David Chapman
University of South Australia/Waseda University

Abstract
On 22 February 2003 a group of foreign residents of Japan gathered in Yokohama‟s
Nishi Ward next to the Katabira River to protest the awarding of a residency
certificate (juminhyo) to a seal called Tama-chan. Tama-chan had frequented the riverand as such was awarded the certificate because he was “more or less like a fellow
resident” (Brophy 2003). The group of foreign residents criticized what they believed
to be discrimination by the Japanese state because, whilst a seal is able to gain aresidency certificate, foreign residents are legislatively excluded from obtaining one.
The Tama-chan protest provides an opportunity for investigating not only theresidency registration system but also other population registries such as the Japanesefamily registration system and alien registration system. In this paper, I argue that a
deeper and more informed understanding of the processes of marginalization of
migrants in Japan can be achieved through a comprehensive investigation of Japan‟s
population registries and their respective histories. I also discuss how these population
registries are sites of tension in which contained notions of Japanese citizenship andnational identity are being contested by migrant populations with vested interests inJapan as home thus revealing the inadequacies, inconsistencies and ambiguities ofthese registration systems.

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Introduction
In 2002, a seal made frequent appearances in the polluted waters of the
Katabira River in Yokohama‟s Nishi Ward. Dubbed Tama-chan, the seal gatheredconsiderable attention throughout 2002 and 2003 and became a media celebrity inJapan. Described as “cute” (kawaii), the popularity of Tama-chan grew withnumerous fan clubs being formed and throngs of onlookers gathering whenever heappeared. Tama-chan was so popular in fact that he was awarded a special residency
certificate (tokubetsu jūminhyō) which symbolized official sanction as a resident ofJapan. The special residency certificate was given because, according to officials,
there was a great deal of pressure from local residents insisting that the seal was“more or less like a fellow resident”.1
This turn of events and the popularity of Tama-chan were quickly recognized
as an opportunity by a small group of foreign residents who wanted their voices to beheard. On 22 February 2003, this group gathered in Nishi Ward next to the same
River in which Tama-chan had frequently appeared. This was not a gathering in hopeof seeing Tama-chan, nor was it a celebration of the seal‟s fame. Marking it as an
unusual assembly was the fact that the entourage wore makeup and other garb in orderto take on the appearance of a seal, complete with whiskers, wetsuits and painted
noses. This gathering was an exercise in drawing attention to what these residents
believed to be blatant discrimination by the Japanese state.
Organisers of the protest made it clear through the media that they were
opposed to a residency registration system that excluded them because of theirnationality, despite being long-term tax paying residents. Highlighting contradictions
and ambiguities with humour, the protestors underscored the fact that, while they1

Brophy 2003.

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were excluded from registering as residents, Tama-chan, a non-tax paying fellow“mammal”, was granted a residency certificate2 by the official issuing authority. 3
Although humour was used in making their point, the protestors drew attention
to serious concerns of discrimination and marginalisation faced by Japan‟s foreign
resident population. Japan, like other nations, is seeing unprecedented increases inimmigrants who, although initially considered to be temporary sojourners, areincreasingly putting down permanent roots. 4 Legislation and social practices thatdifferentiate between foreign residents and resident Japanese nationals have been
critiqued by „old-comer‟ migrants from the early post-war period. However, thesesame practices are being increasingly scrutinized by newcomer migrants as well,raising key questions on citizenship, marginalisation and policies that discriminate.
The Tama-chan protest provides an opportunity for investigating not only theresidency registration system but also other population registries such as the Japanesefamily registration system and alien registration system. In this paper, I argue that a
deeper and more informed understanding of the processes of marginalization of
migrants in Japan can be achieved through a comprehensive investigation of Japan‟s
population registries and their respective histories. I also discuss how these population
registries are sites of tension in which contained notions of Japanese citizenship andnational identity are being contested by migrant populations with vested interests inJapan as home, revealing the inadequacies, inconsistencies and ambiguities of theseregistration systems.

2

Tama-chan was given a „special‟ residency certificate (tokubetsu jūminhyō) which is different fromthe certificate usually issued to Japanese residents. The practice of giving a special residency certificate
to humans as well as non-humans is a common practice in Japan. In some cases the certificate has been
issued to animation characters, such as Tsurikichi Sanpei, a manga character who was given a special
residency certificate by Masuda Town in Akita prefecture in 2003.
3
Japan Today 2003.
4
The number of registered foreigners in Japan has increased from 1,354,011 in 1994 to 2,084,919 in2006 (Ministry of Justice 2003, 2006a).

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The Koseki, Jūminhyō and Gaikokujin Registration Systems
There are three main population registration systems in Japan, the residency
registration system (jūminhyō), the Japanese family registration system (koseki) andthe alien registration system (gaikokujin tōroku). The modern day version of the
koseki was introduced in 1872, much earlier than the gaikokujin tōroku and the
jūminhyō, both of which were introduced in the post-war period (1952).5 The powerof the koseki hō is pervasive and entrenched. It is the foundation of many of Japan‟scontemporary laws and its long history has contributed to its embeddedness inJapanese society. Having one‟s name registered on the koseki is recognizedthroughout Japan‟s bureaucracy as definitive proof of Japanese identity. The koseki
contains details of gender, date and place of birth, details of one‟s parents, siblings
and records of divorce and marriage. It is based on the Family Registration Law(koseki hō) which was, until the introduction of the Nationality Law (kokuseki hō) in
1950, the principle means for defining and determining nationality in Japan.
The jūminhyō is a separate document to the koseki and serves a different
purpose. The koseki is administered by the state, whereas the jūminhyō is used as
proof of residence and is the responsibility of the public affairs division of eachmunicipality. The jūminhyō is used for recording the residential details of people inlocal municipalities, managing the electoral register as well as being the basic
administrative unifying system for recording, managing and plotting accurate
information on current residential addresses of all Japanese nationals living in Japan.
Information such as how long an individual has lived in a location, who they lived
with, previous and forwarding addresses and the name of the head of the household(setai nushi) are all recorded on the jūminhyō.
5

The jūmin tōroku hō (resident‟s registration law), on which the jūminhyō is based was introduced in
1951 and implemented the following year in 1952, the same year as alien registration. The Resident
Registration Law was replaced by the Basic Resident Register Law (jūmin kihon daichō hō) which waspromulgated in 1967.

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In the beginning, although administered by local municipalities (jichitai), the
jūminhyō was closely controlled by the central government and closely aligned withfamily registration (koseki). This nexus can be seen in the way the jūminhyō conforms
to the hierarchical format of the koseki in having provision for registration of the headof the household at the top of the document.6 Moreover, similarities can also be foundin how both the koseki and jūminhyō registration systems recognize the family as thebasic social unit. Thus, although different documents with ostensibly different
purposes, the koseki and jūminhyō are closely related and overlap in a number of
aspects.
Furthermore, both the koseki and the jūminhyō systems rigidly differentiate
between those who hold Japanese nationality and those who do not. Both systems
legislatively exclude non-Japanese nationals from being registered on them. The Basic
Resident Registration Law clearly states in article 39 that the jūminhyō does not apply
to “non-national” residents in Japan.7 Similarly, non-nationals are unable to registeron the koseki. Instead, all non-national residents in Japan must register on the alien
registration system (gaikokujin tōroku) which is administered by the Ministry forInternal Affairs and Communications (sōmushō). 8 The Alien Registration Law(gaikokujin tōroku hō), on which this registration system is based, was implemented
when Cold War concerns over communism and the outbreak of war in Korea
toughened the stance of Japanese authorities toward Japan‟s resident Korean
population (zainichi).

6

The head of household on the jūminhyō is called the setai nushi. However, on the koseki the term
hittōsha is used.
7
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
8
Foreign residents staying in Japan longer than three months must register at the local ward officeclosest to where they live and carry an alien registration card (gaikokujin tōroku shōmeisho) at all times.
According to the law, any foreign resident not carrying an alien registration card could be arrested anddeported.

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Governmentality, Surveillance and the Other
Population registration systems introduced from China have existed in Japan
since the early 5th century. The first large scale and most significant population census,
the kōgo no toshi no seki, was introduced in the year 670 under the ritsuryō system ofgovernance. It was renewed every six years and used for collecting taxes as well as togather information on individuals and families. 9 The decline of the ritsuryō systemand the establishment of private land estates (shōen) saw the disappearance of thefamily register after 1004. Population registries were virtually non-existent for the
next 600 years. In the late sixteenth century, after more than a century of civil war, theJapanese authorities produced the shūmon aratame ninbetsuchō (population census ofreligious affiliation). This was in response to concerns over the activities of Christians
and the perceived threat that Christianity posed to unification. In an effort to eliminate
Christianity, surveillance was maintained through the ninbetsuchō which not only
recorded family details but also temple affiliations. The ninbetsuchō was suspended
two years after the beginning of the Meiji period in 1870 and the Family Registration
Law (koseki ho), which paved the way for the modern day koseki, was introduced in
1871. In the following year the first nation-wide compilation of family records(jinshin koseki) was completed.
The Meiji period (1868-1912) during which these changes to the koseki
occurred, is equated with the modernization of the Japanese state. It was a period
when Japan moved to secure sovereignty by defining its national borders anddeveloping a centralized government system in which the state became increasingly,
in Foucaultian terms, “governmentalized”. 10 That is, in the race to modernize andcreate the nation state of Japan, governance and construction of the population

9

Sato 1981, 14.
Foucault 1991, 103.

10

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through various forms of surveillance, social control and policing became animperative for the Meiji elites. As Appadurai argues, upholding the very legitimacy ofa nation state and the meaningful presence of its boundaries is, amongst other things,
dependant on policing its borders and the construction of its citizens. 11 Indeed, in
broader terms, surveillance is accepted as a core institutional element of modernity. 12
Through the koseki and the process of population registration the Meiji
government was able to survey and establish who lived within the borders of thenation state of Japan. It was also a way for the Meiji elite to mould its citizens through,as I will further explain below, the notion of the broader family nation. The way inwhich this occurred can again be usefully addressed through Foucault and the notion
of “governmentality”. Foucault argues that power, at the core of governmentality,
demonstrates its complexity through various apparatuses of security. 13 In his analysis
of modern power, Foucault used eighteenth century reformer Jeremy Bentham‟s“panopticon” as a model. 14 The panopticon is an arrangement that enables prisoners ina penitentiary to be observed by a guard located in a central tower. Each prisoner canbe observed while the guard remains invisible, becoming in effect an “object of
information, never a subject in communication”. 15 The prisoners are unable then to
determine when they are being observed and when they are not. Foucault‟s concern
was less with the panopticon itself, rather he was more interested in how such astructure could be used in explaining the process and exercise of modern power. I
believe Foucault‟s analysis here illustrates how the nation-wide compilation of family
records through the koseki was one important way that allowed the Meiji government,
and governments since, to govern the population. Such population governance was
11

Appadurai 1996, 189.
Giddens 1990.
13
Foucault 1991, 102.
14
Bentham 1995.
15
Foucault 1995, 200.
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facilitated by the continuous exercise of power through various social institutions thatused the koseki register as an apparatus of security, surveillance and social control.
Assisting the exercise of governmental power in the Meiji period were notionsof what constituted a family as represented through the koseki and formalized with theintroduction of the Civil Code in 1898. The Civil Code established the „ie‟ system andcalled for one family member, usually the father, to be registered as the head of thehousehold on the koseki. The significance of such a hierarchical and patriarchal
structure for the family registry is demonstrated by the importance that was placed on
the family as a cultural tool by which Japanese nationalism aimed to become powerfulenough to withstand the West.16 Consolidating the link between nationalism and the iesystem, the dominant discourse of the 1890s increasingly symbolized the Emperor as
the father of the family nation-state (kazoku kokka) in which the Imperial household
and the Japanese people were genealogically bound as family. 17
As Howell observes, however, the great paradox of modern Japanese history
was that the emperor system “evolved more or less contemporaneously with theacquisition of a culturally and ethnically diverse colonial empire”. 18 This was the casewith populations on the periphery of Japan proper and later with colonial populationsof neighbouring nations. Not considered to be truly „Japanese‟, the populations of theperipheries were necessarily, although conditionally, included in defining andconsolidating the borders of the modern nation of Japan. The koseki also assisted
population management and the assimilation process in colonizing the inhabitants of

16

Hamada 1997.
Fujitani argues that the “seeing-Emperor facilitated the production of the nation state” through thepeople‟s belief that they were under constant observation (1998: 25). The koseki, I believe was also
vital in maintaining this sense of constant observation and assisted with the belief that all Japanesepeople were organically linked to the Emperor.
18
Howell 2004, 5.
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the peripheries as quazi-members of the state and turning them into sovereign
individuals. This enabled inclusion and demarcation to occur simultaneously.
In the late eighteenth century, influential European notions of nationhood andthe encroaching influence of Russia required a greater emphasis on population
management and consequently the Japanization of the Northern frontier of
Hokkaidō.19 Part of the process of redefining the Ainu as Japanese was to include theentire indigenous Ainu population on the official household registration system.
Although the process of including the Ainu in Northern Honshū on the population
census began before 1868, 20 the nation-wide compilation of family records
implemented in 1872 completed the process by including the remaining Ainu of
Hokkaido. A different registry from the koseki was created in 1873 for the Ainu of
Karafuto (Sakhalin), called the Revised Karafuto Native Household Census (Karafuto
Dojin Iekazu Ninbetsu Okaichō). This was the first household registry that created acategory of jun-nihonjin (quasi-Japanese) and emphasised registration according tolocation (chiiki seki). Further differentiation from the wajin (Japanese) population
occurred in 1878 when the Ainu were registered on the koseki as „former native‟(kyūdojin) households.21
Other peripheral frontiers such as the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands were
included as a frontier of the Japanese nation. In 1875, these islands were inhabited byan eclectic group of travellers from various places around the world including
America, Denmark, Italy, Hawaii and Britain. In 1876, Japan proclaimed sovereignty

19

see Morris-Suzuki 1998, 21.
In 1756 the indigenous Ainu populations of Sotogahama, and later in 1806, the Ainu of the Tsugaru
region in northern Honshū were recorded (henkan) on the forerunner to the koseki, the ninbetsuchō(Emori 1997: 195). The registration of the Ainu on the ninbetsuchō not only represented theassimilation and Japanization (wajinka) of the indigenous populations of Japan, it also symbolized thefirst step in the broader governance of peripheral populations that were later to become part of the
newly forming nation of Japan.
21
Sato 1988, 154; Siddle 2003, 451-2.
20

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over the islands and the new Meiji government made it clear to these residents thateither they were to naturalize as Japanese or face expulsion from the islands (taikyo ka
kika ka).22 By 1882, all were naturalized as Japanese citizens. According to Sato,
23

until the end of the Pacific War these individuals were labelled kikajin (naturalized

people) and, similar to the Okinawans, were seen as inferior and discriminated againstby mainlanders.
The Ryūkyū Kingdom in the southern periphery was another frontier that was
redefined as Japanese territory and part of the emerging modern nation. Consequently,
in 1887, the people of the newly formed Okinawa prefecture were also recorded on
the koseki. 24 As mentioned above, Okinawans were described as „backward andinferior‟25 and seen as part of Japan yet separate.26
Through differential registration and an administrative system that included
records of genealogy and birthplace, the internal Other was redefined andconditionally included as quazi-members of the modern Japanese state. The koseki, asa nation-wide register, provided a means by which administrators could govern andconstruct the population so that it simultaneously included and contained the
peripheral populations. Control and redefinition of the peripheries as Japanese wasalso a mechanism by which the Meiji leaders could legitimize an expectation ofparticipation in national objectives and shape these inhabitants as active subjects
along with the rest of the population. 27 These subjects were expected to assimilate andeventually become Japanese.

22

Sato 1988, 155.
Ibid 155.
24
The Ryūkyū Islands were annexed by the Meiji government and became Okinawa prefecture in 1879.
Sato 1988, 154.
25
Siddle 1998, 117.
26
Under the US occupation from 1945 Okinawa ceased to be a prefecture of Japan and Japanesenationality for Okinawans was revoked. It was reinstated in 1972 when Okinawa was returned to Japan.
27
Yasumaru 1977.
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In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, ambitions of empire
pushed the frontiers even further beyond the Japanese archipelago to neighbouring
nations. Such ambitions required rigid social control and tested the mechanisms ofsurveillance both within and without the Japanese nation. The koseki register again
proved valuable, this time facilitating the colonial gaze as the Japanese Empire
expanded its frontiers. In the process of becoming subjects of the Empire, Koreans
and Taiwanese were strategically differentiated from the rest of the Japanese populace.
This was done through a separate koseki system based on the Revised Karafuto Native
Household Census mentioned above. Two registries were created depending on
geographical location (chiiki seki), one for domestic or internal territory (naichi) and
one for overseas or external territory (gaichi). In essence, this was a surveillancesystem that differentiated and maintained a clear line of demarcation between the
inhabitants of the metropolis (colonizers) and those inhabiting the colonies(colonized).
Taiwan was the Japanese Empire‟s „experiment‟ in colonialism and to
facilitate control and management of the colonized population the Regulations for
Taiwan Households (taiwan toguchi kisoku) was established in 1905. This system wascontrolled and administered by the police and, similar to the Ainu, the Taiwanese
were categorized as jun-nihonjin (quasi-Japanese). By 1923, the greater part of the
Meiji Civil Code was in practice in Taiwan and by 1933 the household (ie) system
was also firmly in place.
In Korea there already existed a family registration system introduced from
China (ho-ju).28 However, by the time the Korean Family Registration Order (Chōsen

28

In 2005, lawmakers in Korea voted in favour of replacing the hoju family registration system. This isbeing done through a revision of the Civil Law. The hoju system was declared unconstitutional becauseof its patriarchal structure in granting priority to men over women as head of the family and will be
replaced on January 1 2008.

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koseki rei) was officially introduced in 1922, the system largely replicated theJapanese koseki system. The only difference was the clear differentiation of insiders(naichijin) and outsiders (gaichijin). Individuals moved across borders but the koseki
ensured they were still anchored to their birthplace and thus easily identifiable. In
1930, Japan conducted a third national census which in lead up to the introduction ofa system in which colonial subjects were forced to change their names to Japanesestyle names (sōshi kaimei). This was a part of the kōminka campaign that aimed atturning both Korean and Taiwanese colonials into Imperial subjects of the Emperor; acrucial part of the process of assimilation.
After the end of the Second World War in 1945, the separate koseki systems
continued to be useful in maintaining distance between national subjects and thosecolonial subjects remaining in Japan. Although most Koreans and Taiwanese returnedto their respective homelands soon after Japan‟s defeat, there were over 600,000
Koreans, Chinese and Taiwanese that remained in Japan. The successful
categorization of Imperial Japan‟s population that the koseki facilitated in the interwar
period also proved to be useful in maintaining this segregation in the immediate postwar period. At this point, Japan went from creating and expanding sovereignty toprotecting it.
Former colonial subjects remaining in Japan after World War Two retained
their Japanese nationality for a short period. However, numerous rights such as that ofsuffrage and political representation were soon revoked. On 17 December 1945, an
amendment in election laws was passed through the Lower House that ensured only
those registered on the naichi koseki would be able to vote (Sato 1988: 188). In other353 David Chapman University of South Australia
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words, the social categorization created during the colonial period based on the koseki
was again used to marginalize Koreans, Chinese and Taiwanese in post-war Japan.29
Although the two koseki systems were efficacious in distancing the former
colonial Other, the introduction of an alien registration system was perhaps the mostsuccessful social sorting mechanism for ensuring a clear demarcation between the„Japanese‟ and all Others. On the second of May 1947, the day before the revised
constitution of Japan was effected, the Alien Registration Ordinance (gaikokujin
tōroku rei) was established and former colonial subjects living in Japan wereproclaimed to be aliens or foreigners (gaikokujin). The Alien Registration Law(gaikokujin tōroku hō) was subsequently introduced in 1952 and it became
compulsory for all foreigners in Japan to register and be issued with an aliencertificate of registration (gaikokujin tōroku shōmeisho). The alien registration system
was implemented at a time when Japan was recovering its sovereignty after defeat.
Further, in regaining sovereignty, the Japanese political elite were also determined tostrengthen myths of Japan as a homogeneous nation (tan’itsu minzoku) and exclude
former colonial subjects such as the Koreans and Taiwanese. 30
Not only did the alien registration system remove the threat of former
colonials laying any claim to membership of the Japanese nation, it excluded themfrom all rights as citizens. Along with the right to suffrage, access to welfare andpensions were revoked and opportunities for full employment were limited. Moreover,
the alien registration system also worked as a surveillance system keeping tabs on
foreigners and controlling the threat of communism that was embodied in suspicion

29
30

Kashiwazaki 2000, 21.
Morris-Suzuki 2006, 316.

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aimed at the zainichi Korean population.31 As Lyon argues, surveillance acts as a typeof social sorting mechanism “to discriminate and to exclude the suspicious
category”. 32 The context in which the alien registration system evolved was certainly
one of suspicion and a perceived necessity for social control, public order and anassurance that former colonials be excluded from any involvement in the workings of
the Japanese state.
Particularly powerful was the threat of possible incarceration or deportationthat the Alien Registration Law upheld. Further highlighting the panopticon-like
effects of the alien registration system is the fact that these same punitive measures
were available to the authorities if cards could not be produced wherever andwhenever requested. There are still harsh penalties for not carrying one‟s alien
registration card — a person can be imprisoned for a period of up until 12 months or
fined two hundred thousand yen (Ministry of Justice).
Although there have been significant changes in the way the three registration
systems work in contemporary Japan, they remain largely intact and continue thefunction of population surveillance, identity verification and the construction of theJapanese citizen.
Contemporary Surveillance and the Other
In a post 9/11 world in which the “war on terrorism” seems to justify
legitimizing increasing modes of surveillance that permeate our everyday lives,
governments are finding it easier to implement policies ostensibly described as being
for our protection. Protests against such measures are often directed at the subsequent31

Not only the Japanese authorities were distrustful, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers(SCAP) was also particularly suspicious of the zainichi Koreans in Japan and the various organizations
such as the League of Koreans (refer to SCAP Government Section 1949: 356)..
32
Lyon 2003a, 37. Although Lyon is mostly concerned with contemporary surveillance practices in a
global context, I believe his notion of surveillance as social sorting to be applicable to these historicalcontexts as well.

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loss of freedom and inevitable invasion of privacy. It is not unusual for the effects ofsurveillance and social control to be discussed in terms of the trade-off between
security and freedom or security and privacy. However, discussions about simplistic
trade-offs can often do more to obscure important issues 33 and simplify complex
concerns of discrimination and marginalization than to provide clarity.
Furthering Foucault‟s discussions on panopticism we can see how surveillance
induces “a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automaticfunctioning of power.34 So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its
effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action”. As such, power can be described as
omnipresent, net-like and capillary in its action, 35 rather than as unilateral and top
down. The effects of which are readily distinguishable when we look at the various
institutions and procedures that utilize the koseki, gaikokujin tōrokshō and the
jūminhyō registers.
For example, for Japanese nationals the koseki shōhon (official extract offamily background) is the definitive document used in numerous contexts for proof ofidentity. It is used in applying for a passport, job applications, obtaining a driver‟s
licence, school admissions and when joining many organizations in Japan. However,for foreign residents the procedures are different and in most cases the alien
registration card is used. The koseki/jūminhyō registration systems and the alien
registration system create a diametric differentiation of based on nationality. Proof ofidentity and residency processes thus clearly classify and categorize individuals as
either „Japanese‟ or „foreign‟. This opens up the possibility of prejudicial treatment
and discrimination and can also be the cause of social stigma.

33

Monahan 2006, 2.
Foucault 1995, 201.
35
Foucault 1980, 39.
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Such was the case for many second-generation resident Korean children in
Japan who had to endure the process of submitting documentation at school for
identity verification. 36 This fact was brought to light when a famous secondgeneration resident Korean baseball player Niura Toshio described how, when he wasin elementary school, all children were required to submit their jūminhyō. For Niura,
having Korean nationality meant that he had no jūminhyō to submit, instead he had touse his proof of alien registration certificate (gaikokujin tōroku zumi shōmeisho). It
was larger than the jūminhyō, different in colour and stipulated his nationality 37
ensuring that Niura stood out from his classmates. Niura‟s situation was not unusual
for second-generation resident Korean children growing up in Japan. 38
As mentioned above, problems with differential population registration also
occur when a Japanese national marries a foreign spouse. Because each individual isregistered on a different system and administered by different government
departments, in many cases, there is no official link made between the foreign spouseand their family on the jūminhyō. For example, Lee Hong-jun, provides a personalaccount of the marginalizing affects of the koseki in a zainichi Korean community
journal in 1993, he clearly demonstrates how the koseki impacts on the lives offamilies and individuals outside of what, according to policy, constitutes a Japanesefamily. Lee described himself as a second-generation resident Korean, born andeducated in Japan but with South Korean nationality. The article provides valuable
insight into how Japanese state policy and legislation affects some individuals andfamilies from diverse backgrounds. At the time of the article, Lee‟s wife held
36

There is a large number of special permanent Korean residents in Japan who are former colonialsubjects or their descendants. Although the younger generations were born and educated in Japan, they
still suffer discrimination and prejudice (for more information on resident Koreans in Japan see
Chapman 2007).
37
Yang Tae-ho 1996, 29.
38
The practice of using the jūminhyō at schools for identity verification is something that, at least in
Shinjuku Ward, has ceased (personal communication with Shinjuku Ward official, 2007).

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Japanese nationality and their two sons were aged two and six. 39 Because Lee and hiswife both retained their original last names and because they had different
nationalities, it was not possible for the marriage to be officially recorded on theJapanese family register (koseki).40 On the residency certificate (jūminhyō), althoughLee‟s wife was registered as the head of the household (setai nushi) with bothchildren entered as family members, Lee‟s name did not appear anywhere on the
document. The only official document on which Lee was registered in detail was hisalien registration card (gaikokujin tōroku shōmeisho).41 However, none of the otherfamily members name‟s appeared on this document. Consequently, according to
official documentation, claimed Lee, his family consisted of an unrelated man livingwith a woman and her two children. 42
In 1993, situations such as Lee‟s were not as common as they are today. An
increase in marriages between Japanese and „foreign‟ spouses has led to even morefamilies and individuals being affected by the differential treatment the koseki andjūminhyō systems deliver upon members of the same family. 43 However, according togovernment ordinance 292 affected in 1967, local municipalities are able to makeprovision for non-Japanese spouses of Japanese nationals to be listed, albeit a small
entry, in the bikōran (comments column) of the certificate. 44 Being only an ordinance,
the inclusion of a foreign spouse‟s name is not automatic and is something that has tobe requested. Also, granting of such entry is the prerogative of local level authorities
and is not guaranteed. On the other hand, the Juki Net, the electronic on-line version
39

Lee 1993,: 225.
The koseki law requires that both husband and wife adopt the same surname once married.
41
After marriage a foreign spouse‟s name automatically appears in the koseki as being married to thehittōshi. However, this is merely a comment in the remarks column.
42
Lee 1993, 222-223.
43
There has been a significant increase in the number of international marriages. In 2005 there were
41,481 international marriages in Japan, which equates to 5.8 percent of all marriages. This iscompared to 12,181 in 1985 which represented only 1.6 percent of the total (Ministry of Health, Labourand Welfare 2005).
44
This was made possible by a 1967 ordinance change.
40358 David Chapman University of South Australia
Draft copy do not quote without author permissionof the jūminhyō launched in August 2002, has no provision for the registration offoreign spouses. Furthermore, only a Japanese national can be registered as the headof household (setai nushi) on the jūminhyō. If the non-Japanese spouse is to beconsidered as the head of the household judged on either income or a desire to berecognized as such, this information can be included but only in the comments
column (bikōran) and on the Alien registration card of the holder. 45
We can see by the Tama-chan protests that the exclusion of non-national
Japanese on the jūminhyō has led to questions by long-term foreign residents about
entrenched notions of what constitutes citizenship. As the Tama-chan protestors
argued, because the certificate of residency is a document used in official dealings
with state organisations and authorities, such as schools, the immigration department,
licensing and employing authorities and financial institutions, being excluded fromthe jūminhyō often causes “unnecessary problems” for families with a „foreign‟
spouse.46 In particular, with only one parent registered on the jūminhyō, government
departments have mistaken some families as single parent households, the legitimacyof children has been questioned by schools and in some instances issues of childcustody in divorce cases between Japanese and non-Japanese spouses have surfaced. 47
In 2002, such problems were brought to the attention of the Japanese
government by the Japan Federation of Solicitor Associations (2002). Subsequently,
in 2003 a document called the tōroku genpyō kisai jikō shōmeisho (certificate ofregistered items) was made available for all foreign residents. 48 This document, as
explained to the author by an official at the Shinjuku Ward office in Tokyo (2007), is
45

Private correspondence with Shinjuku Ward official 2007.
Brophy 2003.
47
Ibid. Other points of reference where foreign residents have asked questions about these registration
systems can be found at the following internet sites: http://www.tabunka.org/newsletter/story.html,
http://www.debito.org/juuminhyouupdate.html and http://www.crnjapan.com/references/en/koseki.html.
48This document is a new version of the previous gaikokujin tōroku zumi shōmeisho (proof of alien
registration).
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seen as the equivalent of the jūminhyō for alien residents. Although this is a step
forward in assisting with processes that require affirmation of family members and therelationships between them, this new certification still differentiates on the basis ofnationality. Furthermore, it still falls short of including foreign spouses of Japanesenationals on an equal footing with other family members on the jūminhyō or the jukinet.
In essence, both the jūminhyō and the koseki are authoritative mechanisms
which define, construct and categorize the population according to normative
expectations of family and identity in Japan. The continued existence of these twosystems also demonstrates the ongoing importance of the ie system in Japanesesociety, which although officially abolished through the 1947 Civil Code, as
Sugimoto argues, 49 still remains an integral part of Japanese society perpetuatedthrough the koseki system and the jūminhyō. Stevens and Lee, in discussing maternity
and child health care for foreigners in Japan underscore how foreign women areespecially disadvantaged by the ie system and the koseki. 50 This, they argue, isbecause “the koseki can be seen as a kind of co-requisite to Japanese citizenship”, thus
disadvantaging foreign women through not only ethnicized difference but throughgendered difference as well.
Nakamatsu, in a study on Chinese, Korean and Filipino wives of Japanese men
living in Japan, states that the social implications of the koseki had a “considerable
impact” on the decision of participants to naturalize or not. 51 For most of theparticipants in this study, practical aspects of being naturalized were weighed against
issues of losing one‟s own national identity with most affected by a feeling of
exclusion by the koseki system. The case of marriages between foreign and Japanese49

Sugimoto 1997, 137-138.
Stevens and Lee 2002, 92.
51
Nakamatsu 2003, 195.
50

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spouses and the dilemma of whether or not to naturalize, deeply affects the identity of
the individuals involved. As one spouse married to a Japanese national put it,
It matters to me, because I believe the issues it touches on are quite deep. Forme, identity is the key issue in culture shock and in the struggle for biculturaladjustment. As a foreign woman married to a Japanese man, finding andmaintaining a comfortable self-definition is somewhat more challenging thanif I had married within my own country and culture. 52
Who’s In and Who’s Out?
According to Kondo, 53 Japan strictly applies the principle of jus sanguinis(kettōshugi) or citizenship by descent. 54 This means that Japanese nationality is
acquired through one or both parents. 55 However, acquiring Japanese nationality isalso possible if one is married to a Japanese spouse or by meeting the requirements
stipulated in article five of the Nationality Law (kokuseki hō) namely: (1) having five
years of continuous residence in Japan; (2) being of upright conduct; (3) being twenty
years of age; (4) having the ability to secure a livelihood; (5) having no nationality or
be able to rescind one‟s nationality when taking on Japanese nationality and (6) never
having plotted or advocated to overthrow the constitution or the government ofJapan. 56 Ostensibly, application for Japanese nationality seems to be reasonably
straight-forward and an argument can be made that if foreign residents in Japan want
to be placed, at least legislatively, on an equal footing with Japanese nationals andhave access to full rights as citizens, then they only need naturalize as Japanese. This
argument however, as demonstrated by the discussions presented above, is somewhat
simplistic and ignores many of the problems and circumstances encountered by long52

Isozaki http://www.tabunka.org/newsletter/story.html, accessed 7 November 2007.
Kondo 2001, 227.
54
Sweden is another country that applies a strict jus sanguinis in the granting of citizenship (Kondo,
2001: 227).
55
There have been exceptions in Japan to the strict application of jus sanguinis in cases of a child being
stateless or when both parents are unknown (Kondo, 2001: 227). Provision is made for this in the
Nationality Law.
56
The last condition in this list was added in 1950.
53

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term foreign residents who are unable or unwilling, for whatever reason, to naturalize
as Japanese.
The bureaucratic process of naturalization itself can be arduous and often takes
twelve months or more to complete.57 The koseki ensures that naturalized Japanese areeasily distinguished through records that track three generations of family.
Furthermore, the Nationality Law, which is based on the Family Registration Law,
prevents dual nationality for Japanese nationals after the age of twenty two, forcing
those naturalizing to forego their previous nationality and any associated identity it
symbolizes. This expectation is problematic, particularly for special permanent
residents of Korean decent in Japan. 58 The historical context surrounding harsh
policies of assimilation during Korea‟s annexation by Japan (1910-1945) and thestigma attached to naturalization by many within the zainichi community make thedecision to naturalize a vexed one.59
The primacy placed on lineage as a marker of Japanese identity by theJapanese government is demonstrable through the 1985 and 1990 modifications to the
Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. 60 The 1985 change allowed
spouses and children of Japanese nationals the ability to naturalize after only three
years of residence as compared to five for everyone else. The 1990 change allowed up
to third generation descendants of Japanese emigrants (often referred to as nikkeijin)
to work legally and unrestricted in Japan. This „front door‟ (ethnic repatriates) entry
stands in contrast to the „side door‟ (trainees) and „back door‟ (irregulars) 61 shunting

57

Asakawa 2003, 105-137.
Special permanent residency was granted to old-comer former colonial Koreans and theirdescendants as part of the 1965 Normalization Treaty between South Korea and Japan.
59
Chapman 2007, 130-138. At present some 10,000 zainichi are naturalizing each year (Ministry ofJustice, 2006b), the majority of which are children with both Japanese and zainichi parents being
naturalized at birth.
60
See also Selleck 1997, 202 and Mackie 2002, 203.
61
Kondo 2002.
58

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Draft copy do not quote without author permissionof other unskilled workers endeavouring to gain entry into Japan. In verifying
Japanese lineage nikkeijin must produce, amongst other documents, the koseki tōhon
in which their family records appear, underscoring the koseki as the ultimate
authoritative mechanism in determining Japanese identity. 62
Conclusion
The central concern that comes to the fore in discussing the Tama-chan protest
is how population registries marginalize or exclude foreign residents in Japan. The
koseki, jūminhyō and gaikokujin tōroku systems uphold the principle of jus sanguinisin legislatively preventing those who do not have Japanese nationality from fullaccess to citizenship. Moreover, the differential treatment by Japan‟s population
registration systems not only creates a two tiered system of citizenship, it also sustains
deeply entrenched notions of Japanese nationality and ethnicity as intrinsically linked
through the primacy of decent or blood.
The maintenance of these registries in their present form also ignores thehistorical contexts in which they were developed. Japan‟s population registries havebeen used as tools by which Japanese elites could construct and control the population.
Part of the process of constructing the Japanese citizen has been to exclude or
marginalize the Other based on difference coded in terms of ethnicity. As I haveargued, closely examining the history, functions and workings of these population
registries provides a clearer understanding of how the mechanisms of marginalizationand exclusion of foreign residents work in contemporary Japanese society.
Furthermore, as we can see through dissent such as the Tama-chan protest,
citizenship based on nationality and genealogy is an approach to citizenship that is
becoming less sustainable with each passing year as the growing population of62

The koseki tōhon register contains the names of extended family as well as immediate family
members.

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migrants increasingly consider Japan to be their permanent home. As I mentioned at
the beginning of this paper, the objections of migrant residents highlights theinadequacies and inconsistencies of population registration systems in contemporary
Japanese society. Although foreign residents in Japan can naturalize and in principle
access the same rights accorded to Japanese nationals, the maintenance of separate
family, resident and alien registration systems creates extra layers of differentiationthat sustain notions of the Self and Other based on conflated orthodoxies ofnationality and ethnicity.
Population registries that differentiate between residents in this way areparadoxically opposed to recently emerging discourses describing Japan as a society
striving for multicultural coexistence (tabunka kyōsei). Such legislation and policy
also stands in contrast to developments at numerous local level municipalities where
migrants are not only being accepted but supported by those recognizing andembracing the increasing diversity of contemporary Japanese society. In a recent
study by Asakawa Akihiro, many of the subjects who underwent the process ofnaturalizing as Japanese agreed that allowing dual or multiple nationality and a jus
soli (citizenship according to birth) approach to citizenship are necessary for Japan toadjust to the present era of globalization. 63 Rethinking the construction and role of
population registries in Japan may also be another way of moving a step closer to thisrealization.

63

Asakawa 2003, 178.

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