Report of
The Second “Japan-US Dialogue”
on"US-Japan Relations
Under the New Obama Administration"

April 24, 2009
The Japan Forum on International Relations “Conference Room”
Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP)Preface

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote a policy‐oriented exchange of views
between business, opinion and political leaders of Japan and their counterparts in the rest of the world,
and to contribute to the deepening of mutual understanding and the formation of the consensus. For
this purpose, GFJ has been actively engaged for the past 27 years in organizing policy‐oriented
bilateral and/or multilateral “Dialogues” every year between Japan and the international community.
It is for this reason that GFJ held The Second “Japan‐US Dialogue” on the topic of“US‐JAPAN Relations Under the New Obama Administration” in Tokyo on April 24, 2009. This reportintends to summarize the achievements of these discussions between Japanese and U.S. counterparts.
Although the printed version of the report will be made available to only a limited number of people
such as members and friends of GFJ and their counterparts from the United States, the full text of thereport will be available at http://www.gfj.jp/.
The Second “Japan‐US Dialogue” on the topic of “US‐JAPAN Relations Under the New
Obama Administration” was co‐sponsored by GFJ and National Committee on American Foreign
Policy (NCAFP), and was attended by 29 participants including 13 panelists. Participants exchanged
opinions on matters of significant importance related to the future of Japan‐US relations.

June 1, 2009
ITO Kenichi
President
The Global Forum of Japan

Table of Contents

Ⅰ

Programs of The Second “Japan‐US Dialogue”
1.

Program.............................................................................................................................................1

2.

Participants List................................................................................................................................2

3. Biographies of the Panelists............................................................................................................3Ⅱ

Outlines of Discussions of The Second “Japan‐US Dialogue”………………5

Ⅲ

Minutes of Discussions of The Second “Japan‐US Dialogue”
1.

Opening Remarks………………………………………………………………...………………92.

The Morning Session: …………………………………………………………………………..11“Overall Assessment of the Foreign Policies of the Obama Administrationin Face of the Global Challenges”

3.

The Afternoon Session: …………………………………………………………………...…….22“The Role of the Alliance in the Making of a Regional Order”

Ⅳ

Appendix
1.

An Introduction to GFJ...............................................................................................................33

2. An Introduction to NCAFP.........................................................................................................36

I

Programs of The Second “Japan‐US Dialogue”

1. Program
The Second "Japan-US Dialogue"" US-Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration "April 24, 2009 / Tokyo, Japan
Co-Sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP)Friday, April 24, 2009
The Japan Forum on International Relations "Conference Room"Opening Remarks
10:00-10:05

Amb. OKAWARA Yoshio, Chairman, GFJ

Morning Session
10:05-12:00"Overall Assessment of the Foreign Policies of the Obama Administrationin Face of the Global Challenges″

Chairperson

Dr. George D. SCHWAB, President, NCAFP

Lead Discussant A (10min.)Amb. Winston LORD, Chairman Emeritus, The International Rescue Committee

Lead Discussant B (10min.)Prof. TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University

Lead Discussant C (10min.)Prof. Donald S. ZAGORIA, Senior Vice President & Project Director of the Northeast Asia Projects, NCAFP

Lead Discussant D (10min.)Prof. MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University

Free Discussions (75min.)All Participants

Lunch

Lunch hosted by Prof. ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ

12：00-13：00
Afternoon Session
13：00-15：00"The Role of the Alliance in the Making of a Regional Order ″Chairperson

Prof. ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ

Lead Discussant A (10min.)Mr. Evans REVERE, President & CEO, The Korea Society

Lead Discussant B (10min.)Prof. TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, The University of Tokyo

Lead Discussant C (10min.)Mr. Robert DUJARRIC, Director, Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies at Temple University Japan
CampusLead Discussant D (10min.)Amb. HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Councilor, JFIRFree Discussions (80min.)All Participants

12. Participants List
The Second "Japan-US Dialogue"on“US-Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration”
April 24, 2009
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Conference Room
[US Panelists]
George D. SCHWAB
Winston LORD
Donald S. ZAGORIA
Evans REVERE
Robert DUJARRIC
Gerald CURTIS
A. Greer PRITCHETT

President, NCAFP
Chairman Emeritus, The International Rescue Committee
Senior Vice President & Project Director of the Northeast Asia Projects, NCAFP
President & CEO, The Korea Society
Director, Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies, Temple University Japan Campus
Burgess Professor, Department of Political Science, Columbia University
Assistant Project Director, Northeast Asia Projects, NCAFP[Japanese Panelists]
OKAWARA Yoshio
TAKUBO Tadae
MORIMOTO Satoshi
ITO Kenichi
TAKAHARA Akio
HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi

Chairman, GFJ
Guest Professor, Kyorin University
Professor, Takushoku University
Professor, President, GFJ
Professor, The University of Tokyo
Councilor, Japan Forum on International Relations(In order of appearance)[Participants]
AKIYAMA Masahiro
IIYAMA Masashi
INA Hisayoshi
ITO GoKAMIYA Matake
MAGOSAKI Ukeru
MIYOSHI Masaya
MURAKAMI Masayasu
MURATA Koji
NAKABE Yuzuru
NUMATA Sadaaki
OGASAWARA Toshiaki
ONO Hikariko
SUZUKI Yoshikatsu
WAKABAYASHI Hideki
YAMANO Yoichi

Chairman, Ocean Policy Research Foundation
Senior Research Fellow, Yomiuri Research Institute, Yomiuri Shimbun
Foreign Policy Columnist, Nikkei Shimbun
Professor, Meiji University
Professor, National Defense Academy
former Professor, National Defense Academy, former Ambassador to Iran

former Director General, Keidanren
Opinion Leader Governor, GFJ
Professor, Doshisha University
Counselor & Director, Maruha Nichiro Holdings
Executive Director, The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership
Honorary Chairman, The Japan Times Nifco Group
Director for Policy Planning Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Commentator, Jiji Press
Executive Governor, GFJ
Senior Manager for the U.S. and Europe External Affairs Dept., Global Business Div.,(In alphabetical order)[The Secretariat of GFJ]WATANABE Mayu
KIKUCHI Yona
TAKAHATA Yohei
YANO Takuya
NAKAMURA Yumi
AKIYAMA Hiromi

Executive Secretary
Officer in Charge
Officer in Charge
Officer in Charge
Secretarial Staff
Secretarial Assistant2

3. Biographies of the Panelists[US Panelists]
George D. SCHWAB

President, NCAFP

Received his Ph.D. from Columbia University and taught there until joining the Department of History at the City College ofCity University of New York in 1960. He co‐founded the NCAFP in 1974, along with the late Hans Morgenthau, and has
served as its president since 1993. For the past thirty years he has been editor of American Foreign Policy Interests, its bimonthly
journal. He is currently Professor Emeritus of history at the City College and the Graduate Center. He received the Ellis
Island Medal of Honor in 1998 and the Order of the Three Stars, Latvia’s highest honor, in 2002.
Winston LORD

Chairman Emeritus, The International Rescue Committee

Received B.A. from Yale (Magna Cum Laude) and finished first in his class at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy for
M.A. For over three decades Ambassador Lord has been at the center of U.S.–China relations. He accompanied Henry
Kissinger and President Nixon on their groundbreaking trips to China in the early 1970s. He also served as Ambassador to
China (1985‐1989), Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian policy (1993 to 1997) and President of the Council of Foreign
Relations (1977‐1985).
Donald S. ZAGORIA

Senior Vice President & Project Director of the Northeast Asia Projects, NCAFP

Received B.A. from Rutgers University, and M.A. and Ph.D. from Columbia University. Served as a consultant to both the
National Security Council and East Asian Bureau at the U.S. State Department during the Carter Administration. He has
frequently been called as an expert witness on Asia by the United States Congress. He has written and edited numerous
articles and books on U.S.‐China, U.S.‐Soviet, and Sino‐Soviet relations. Dr. Zagoria was Professor of Government at HunterCollege for many years and is actively associated with the East Asian Institute of Columbia University.
Evans J.R. REVERE

President and CEO, The Korea Society

Graduated from Princeton University. He came to The Korea Society after a 35‐year career in government service. He served
as Acting Assistant Secretary and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Director forJapanese Affairs, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, Korea (2000‐2003), Director for Korean Affairs andPrincipal Officer of the U.S. Consulate in Fukuoka, Japan, and the U.S. Embassies in Tokyo and Beijing.
Robert DUJARRIC

Director, Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies, Temple University

Graduated from Harvard College and received an MBA from Yale University. He is a frequent contributor to the publicdebate on Japanese affairs and international political and economic issues. Mr. Dujarric took his current position at Temple
University Japan in 2007 after having worked closely with the university for several years organizing events. He served as
visiting fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo (2005‐2007) and from 2004‐05, he was a Council on
Foreign Relations Hitachi Fellow in Japan.
GERALD L. CURTIS

Burgess Professor, Department of Political Science, Columbia University

Received his Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1969 and has been on the Columbia University faculty since 1968. He isconcurrently Visiting Professor at Waseda University and Senior Research Fellow at the International Institute for Economic
Studies, Tokyo, and the Tokyo Foundation. He is a specialist on politics in Japan and U.S.‐East Asian relations, with particularresearch interests in parties, interest groups, and state‐society relations. In 2004, Professor Curtis was awarded the Order ofthe Rising Sun, Gold and Silver Star by the Emperor of Japan.

3[Japanese Panelists]
OKAWARA Yoshio

Chairman, GFJ

Graduated from University of Tokyo. Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1942. Served various positions including
Director‐General of the American Affairs Bureau, Deputy Vice Minister for Administration, Japanese Ambassador toAustralia and Japanese Ambassador to the United States (1980‐1985). Concurrently serving as President of Institute forInternational Policy Studies and President of America‐Japan Society, Inc.
TAKUBO Tadae

Guest Professor, Kyorin University

Graduated from Waseda University and received Ph.D. from Keio University. Served as Hamburg, Naha andWashington correspondent and foreign news editor of Jiji Press before becoming deputy managing editor in 1983.
Visiting Fellow at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1979‐1980). Joined the faculty of social sciencesat Kyorin University in 1984 and served as Dean (1992‐2002).
MORIMOTO Satoshi

Professor, Takushoku University

Graduated from National Defense Academy of Japan and entered Defense Agency in 1965. From 1979 served various
positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including First Secretary at Japanese Embassy in Washington D.C. and Directorof Security Policy Division in Bureau of Information Analysis, Research Planning（1987‐1989）. Senior Researcher at Nomura
Research Institute, Ltd（1992‐2000）. Concurrently, a member of advisory committee to strengthen the function of Prime
Minister’s Office for national security.
ITO Kenichi

President, GFJ

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University and Studied at Harvard University. Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960.
Served various positions, including Director of First Southeast Asian Division until 1977. Served as Professor at Aoyama
Gakuin University (1980‐2006). Concurrently, President of Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), President ofCouncil on East Asian Community (CEAC), and Professor Emeritus at Aoyama Gakuin University.
TAKAHARA Akio

Professor, The University of Tokyo

Graduated from Faculty of Law, The University of Tokyo in 1981 and received M.Ph. (Development Studies) in 1983 andPh.D. in 1988 from Sussex University. Served as Researcher at Sasagawa Peace Foundation in 1988, Researcher at
Consulate‐General of Japan in Hong Kong (1989 ‐1991), full‐time lecturer and Associate Professor at Oberlin University(1991‐1995), Associate Professor and Professor at Rikkyo University (1995‐2005), and Professor, The University of Tokyo
from 2005.
HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi

Councilor, Japan Forum on International Relations

Graduated from The University of Tokyo. Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1963. Served as Director‐General of
Economic Cooperation Bureau, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1993, Director for Cabinet Councilor’s office on External
Affairs in 1995, Ambassador to India and Ambassador to France. Concurrently serving as Executive President of Indo‐Japan
Association, Visiting Professor of Graduate school of Waseda University, Outside Director of Toshiba Corporation, Directorof MITSUI & Co., Advisor of NHK Promotions.

(In order of appearance)4

Ⅱ Outline of Discussions of
The Second “Japan‐US Dialogue”

Outline of Discussions
The Second “Japan‐US Dialogue” on the topic of ʺUS‐JAPAN Relations under the New Obama
Administrationʺ was convened in two sessions with lunch break in between. In the Morning Session on thetheme ʺOverall Assessment of the Foreign Policies of the Obama Administration in Face of the Global
Challenges,ʺ and in the Afternoon Session on the theme ʺThe Role of the Alliance in the Making of a
Regional Order,ʺ heated discussion was held among panelists and participants, the outline of which is asfollows.
Before the two sessions, Amb. OKAWARA Yoshio, Chairman of GFJ, made opening remarks
representing GFJ, in which he stated, ʺWe welcome the fact that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton choseJapan for the first country to visit on her official trip abroad, which signifies the Obama administration’semphasis on its closer relations with Japan. According to the recent public survey, Japanese feel, as before,
intimacy to US.
Japan‐US‐China relations, important as they are, could not be a regular triangle but must be atriangle, with two legs of Japan‐US alliance as its cornerstone. Next year marks the 50th Anniversary of theconclusion of Japan‐US Security Treaty, and this offers a good opportunity for us to redefine thesignificance thereof.ʺ

Morning Session: Overall Assessment of the Foreign Policies of the Obama
Administration in Face of the Global Challenges
In the Morning Session, which was chaired by Dr. George D. SCHWAB, President of NCAFP, twoLead Discussants from each of Japan and US made following opening statements.

(i) Amb. Winston LORD, Chairman Emeritus, The International Rescue Committee：
Although I am a registered Republican, I consider myself a centrist. I have also worked for
Democratic presidents. As a centrist, I would say Obama has a chance to be a ʺgreatʺ president not just aʺgoodʺ president, who is a good listener to his opponents, and aims to become a president that would go
down in history. Based on reflection on his predecessor, Obama emphasizes multilateral approach incoordination with other countries in the world and deals with a variety of issues in a pragmatic way. I
think he is off to a good start.

(ii) Prof. TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University:
The biggest challenge that Japan faces is the question of how to respond to the rising China.
5China has different faces, and a hegemonic China which is rapidly expanding its military is nothing lessthan a threat. Japan has three options for the future; a) to further strengthen the Japan‐US alliance, b) toseek closer relationships with China, and c) to pursue an independent defense policy. US, in pre‐war era,chose pro‐China and anti‐Japan policy advocated by Stanley Hornbeck and rejected pro‐Japan policy
advocated by John Antwerp MacMurray. Even today, in US there is a tension between ʹstrong Japanʹ
faction and ʹweak Japanʹ faction.

(iii) Prof. Donald S. ZAGORIA, Senior Vice President & Project Director of the Northeast Asia Projects,
NCAFP:
I think Japan needs better public relations with the rest of Asia. While being confronted with suchserious problems as demographic one, i.e., increase in average life expectancy and low birthrate, Japan has
some enormous inherent strength and therefore needs to have more confidence in itself. US and Japan
have some common interests in such areas as a) recovery from the current economic crisis, b) Af‐Pak
problem, c) clean energy, d) better relationship with the Muslim world, e) regional security challenges like
North Korea, etc. US and Japan should work out some common action program to address such challenges
facing both of us.

(iv) Prof. MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University:
I have some concern about President Obama’s idea of nuclear disarmament or a ʺnuclear‐freeworld.ʺ Should US and Russia sign to extend START I and set out to reduce their respective nuclear
arsenals down to no more than 1000, China’s nuclear capability rises accordingly. This move could risk
destroying the current military balance in East Asia. Should it be the case, we must question the efficacy of
US nuclear deterrence which is supposed to provide Japan with the nuclear umbrella.

(v) In the following Free‐Discussions, both US and Japanese panelists and participants exchanged frankviews, such as;“Although the Obama administration, in principle, is likely to inherit its North Korean foreign
policy from its predecessor, North Korea must, first of all, be determined to be denuclearized and to walkback to the Six‐Party talks before US ‐ North Korea relations are normalized. Obama administration, unlike
its predecessors, will, for sure, emphasize closer cooperative ties with Japan based on bilateral talks indealing with North Korean issue.”(US side)“While Japan endorses the nuclear disarmament policy launched by Obama administration, it isimperative that China in addition to US and Russia be involved in the reduction process of nuclear
arsenals. Japan is aiming for two seemingly contradictory objectives of nuclear disarmament andprotection under the nuclear umbrella. With respect to the latter, we should reconsider the validity of oneof Japan’s three non‐nuclear principles (not to produce, not to possess and not to allow the entry of nuclear
6

weapons into the country), namely, not to allow the entry of nuclear weapons into the country.”(Japan
side)

Afternoon Session: The Role of the Alliance in the Making of a Regional OrderIn the Afternoon Session, which was chaired by Prof. ITO Kenichi, President of GFJ, two Lead
Discussants from each of Japan and US made following opening statements.

(i) Mr. Evans REVERE, President & CEO, The Korea Society:
Although there have been some hard feelings and misunderstandings between Washington andTokyo over the policy towards North Korea, President Obama will listen more carefully to Japanese
voices and will put the relation in a much better track. Japan and US have to work closely to engage
China in the international community as a ʺresponsible stakeholder.ʺ While Obama needs to understandJapan’s vision of a regional order in East Asia, Japan needs to be vocal enough to express and elaboratethat vision.
(ii) Prof. TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, The University of Tokyo:
When it comes to Japanʹs relations with China, taking into account its outstanding features interms of population and area, we should seek a democratic regional regime in East Asia, which is
conducive to the sustainable peace and development of the region. While Hu Jintao attributes China’s
military modernization to national defense purposes, he claims Senkaku Islands, which belongs to Japan,
as part of Chinese territory. Although we need to build good relations with China, the Japan‐US allianceneeds to play a role as public good in the region.

(iii) Mr. Robert DUJARRIC, Director, Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies at Temple University
Japan
Campus:Japan‐US alliance is not an alliance based on shared values, as is often claimed. It is easy to prove
this by looking at the conflict of views between US and Japan over the question of ʺcomfort women.ʺ
Another threat to the alliance is Japan’s demographic death spiral or dwindling birthrate and an aging
population. The gap between Japan and US in the underemployment rate of women in the professional
labor force is expanding. If these demographic trends, which are real threats to Japan’s national security,
are to be left unsolved, Japan’s stand in the international community would increasingly be marginalized
and the significance of Japan‐US Alliance would be downplayed.

7

(iv) Amb. HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Councilor, JFIR:
In order for the Japan‐US Alliance to be strengthened, three things have to be considered
respectively by Japan and US; for the Japan side, a) to transfer smoothly the Hutenma Airbase, b) to enact apermanent law which allows the dispatch of Self Defense Forces overseas, c) to reinterpret our constitution
so that we can exercise the right to collective self‐defense, and for the US side, a) to cooperate with Japan totransfer Hutenma Airbase, b) to take appropriate policy towards China and North Korea, c) to regain thecredibility of the extended nuclear deterrence of the US vis‐à‐vis Japan.

(v) In the following Free‐Discussions, frank opinions were raised, such as;“Even though Japan and US in 2005 jointly formulated ʺCommon Strategic Objectivesʺ andthereby agreed upon further developing defense cooperation between the two countries, Hutenma Airbase
issue has not been resolved yet. This is the breach and neglect of duty on the part of Japan, which I am
afraid would hinder the prospects of future‐oriented Japan‐US alliance.”(US side)“In order to formulate a regional order in East Asia, reinforcement of Japan‐US alliance based
upon our ‘common values’ is indispensable. But on the other hand, with the rise of China, we have to take
into account Chinese point of view in dealing with a variety of issues in the region. How to cope with thissituation is the challenge that the alliance will face in the future.”(Japan side)8

Ⅲ Minutes of Discussions of
The Second “Japan‐US Dialogue”

Minutes of Discussions
1. Opening Remarks

ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ
As I read the Report of the last ʺJapan‐US Dialogueʺ held in June 2007, I noticed that it
began and ended with pausing questions from two sides without reaching any conclusion. For
instance, while the US side stressed the importance of future US‐Japan relations aimed at closer
partnership with China, and stated that the US wanted Japan to be strong both politically andeconomically but not militarily, the Japan side raised such questions as, while the US seemed to
oppose Japan going nuclear, how reliable the Japan‐US Alliance was, and whether the
nuclearization of North Korea was the only result of the eight‐year diplomacy

of BushAdministration. The last ʺDialogueʺ ended with such comments and questions. Therefore, it ishighly appropriate and necessary to for us to continue to have dialogue with each other this time.

OKAWARA Yoshio, Chairman, GFJ
Iʹd like to start with recent developments with regard to the Japan‐US relations under the
new Obama Administration. Earlier this month, the Mansfield Foundation held a symposium inTokyo in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the Foundation. Amb. Mondale made a keynote
in which he emphasized the very close and friendly relationship between our two countries andmentioned that Secretary of State Clinton made Japan the first country to visit in her regional tour inEast Asia. Following this very welcome visit, our Prime Minister was received at the White Houseby President Obama as the first foreign guest for the new president.
These two events suggest that the US under the new administration has given very carefulconsiderations to uphold the already close relations between the two nations. In that Symposium,
the American panelists seemed to be taking positive and optimistic views about the current state ofaffairs between our two countries, while the Japanese counterpart panelists seemed to be a little
more cautious in that context in reflecting on the recent developments. Another point I would like tomention in this connection is a public survey conducted by the Japanese government on therelationship between Japan and other countries. In it a question was raised whether Japanese have asense of intimacy towards the US. The reply was that 73.3% of the answers were ʺyesʺ and only
24.8% of them were ʺno.ʺ In the case of China, 31.6% said ʺyesʺ but 66% said ʺno.ʺ This is the general
attitude of the Japanese people.
9A question coming here now is how about our relations with China and the relations
between the US and China. Naturally the relations between the US and China are definitely very
important for us to consider. In some quarters in Japan there is an argument that Japan, the US andChina formulate a regular triangle. I donʹt agree with this idea, because we have an alliance with the
US while Japan and the US have no such treaty relation with China. The US termed it merely ʺaresponsible stakeholder.ʺ
Having said all these things, Iʹd like to mention that next year we will observe the 50 years
anniversary of the conclusion of the current security treaty between our two nations. Some opinion
has been expressed that in consideration of that anniversary we should consider issuing a jointstatement or declaration, emphasizing the significance of the relationship between the two nations.
Those arguments are endorsed by the fact that in 1996 Prime Minister Hashimoto issued a jointstatement with President Clinton after the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War,emphasizing a renewed significance of the security treaty. Some doubts are present as to why weneed to pronounce a new definition of the alliance with the US, it would be useful to consider
something positive to remind us of the significant role played by the alliance relation.
Looking ahead at our relationship in the coming years, I think there are two important
aspects. One is how Japan should cooperate with the US transformation policy. We have tocooperate with that policy so that the base issues are taken care of to the satisfaction of both sides.
The recent agreement to exercise the move‐out of the US Marines from Okinawa to Guam iswelcomed as one example of our joint efforts. The base issues in Okinawa are very sensitive andshould be handled with utmost care, and yet we should make every possible effort to cooperate with
the US in conjunction with the transformation policy.
Another point is that we should work closely with the US for the reconstruction andrecovery of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Recently our Diet passed a bill allowing Japanese Self
Defense Forces to engage in anti‐piracy operations off Somalia. These are the things we have to workout and cooperate with the US on in order to participate in the international cooperation.
One final point is that in recent times, there has been a strong drive to organize some kindof regional architecture in Asia. More specifically, we have observed some effort or argument that
Asia should have an East Asian Community and that APT and APS are specific moves to proceedwith a regional integration as a long term objective. The important point to be considered is that interms of geography the US cannot be a part of that community. At the same time, it is clear thatwithout the US, Asian integration cannot properly be managed in realistic term. Therefore, weshould work for the building of an Asian community by asking the US to continue to be engaged in
Asia as it has been. This is one specific aspect Iʹd like to mention. Having said all this, I look forward
to lively and positive discussions.

102. Morning Session:
ʺOverall Assessment of the Foreign Policies of the Obama
Administration in Face of the Global Challenges″

Chairperson:

George D. SCHWAB, President, NCAFPThe theme chosen here is very appropriate. The challenges Obama faces are global, notonly here in Northeast Asia, but also in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. Things are beginning tohappen on the African continent, in South America and of course in a resurgent Russia. But today
we will focus our discussion on our relations concerning Northeast Asia.

Lead Discussant A:

Winston LORD, Chairman Emeritus, The International Rescue

Committee
First, I will give a broad perspective on Obamaʹs foreign policy, touching a little bit on Asia
at the end, and will go more in depth with the US, Japan and Asia as we go along. But let me firstmake clear my own political perspective. Iʹm a centrist. Iʹm a registered Republican, actually. But, I
worked for Republicans and Democrats. When you hear my enthusiasm about our new president, it
is not coming from my nature as a “Liberal” or “Democrat” but is out of my support for someone
who is admired by both Republicans and Democrats. People wondered a couple of years ago when
Obama declared he was running for president, a man with a relatively thin resume, only 45 years
old, why he was moving now? He has a great future and perhaps is needed to be more experienced.
The answer from someone who knows him well is that he wants to be a ʺgreat presidentʺ not justʺpresident.ʺ
He had a sense that there were going to be huge challenges for the next president. As helooked at history, people like Roosevelt and Lincoln and others in our history are considered great
presidents not just because they were good but also because they had big issues to deal with. As theold saying goes, ʺBe careful what you wish for.ʺ He has, of course, inherited incredible amounts ofproblems both domestic and foreign. But I do believe that Obama has a chance to be a ʺgreat
presidentʺ not just a ʺgood president.ʺ His various qualities suggest this. I think he is off to a goodstart.
His general guiding principles, when applied in East Asia, are in contrast to those of his
predecessors: to engage enemies rather than isolate them to pursue multilateral approaches not justunilateral ones; to be pragmatic, not ideological; to display examples of American values and not tolecture about them, beginning at home, for example, with abolishing torture, closing Guantanamo,
11and admitting to past US mistakes. He is inspirational as the first African American president and isa fantastic speaker. But he is a centrist. One should not mistake his forward leaning policy for beingnaïve or soft. He has strong principles, believes in mutual respect, moves and is responsive toinitiatives. He believes the US is the indispensable leader, even as he believes that it is indispensable
to work with others in dealing with problems. He believes in sticks as well as carrots. He has
indicated specific policies, as a centrist, in Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, etc.
There are some troublesome areas potentially; particularly in the trade area, because the
Democrats generally have the support of the trade unions and therefore can tend to be rather
protectionist. Obama is still balancing constituencies. The automobile industry is a good example.
He has a huge problem in front of him. In the short‐term, at least for the next couple of years, theeconomy is a crisis every country is going to have to face. He will also have to seriously address theAfghanistan/Pakistan problem. Moreover, he is facing some conservative attacks for being naïve orsoft, trying to be popular rather than getting results, being too apologetic for America. This is not amajor problem for him yet. But if he doesn’t show achievement over time, this could begin to be apolitical problem for him at home. In the longer run, it’s going to require some positive responses
from other countries and some coordination and help from countries and strong allies, like Japan.
He has been already bold in his foreign policy, such as at the G20, at NATO, during his
speech on nuclear disarmament, and eliminating nuclear arms, his approach to Islamic world, etc.
These are significant activities for his first 100 days. Along with his wide spectrum of support, he isready to listen to his opponents. Talking about Asia, this region is top of our agenda. I think that the
Secretary of State coming to this region first is very significant. The other significance, particularly
relevant today, is that she visited Japan first not just as allies but as two countries who share values,
unlike China. She handled herself extremely well in other countries in the region. Especially in
China, she elevated the strategic dialogue, treating China as a major partner not only for bilateralissues but to move on to regional and global ones. Two big traditional problems remain here in theregion, however, the cross‐Strait issue which is the best we have seen in decades, and the North
Korean issue which is the worst we’ve seen in more than a decade.
There are going to be challenges. I am not naïve about the challenges Obama faces. But I
believe he is off to a good start, and I am very optimistic about US foreign policy, both with respect
to Asia and with respect to Japan.

Lead Discussant B:

TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University

Let me express my views from the standpoint of the Japanese. Now the biggest challengethat faces the Japanese is the question of how best to respond to the rising China. The way in which
we respond, after all, will seriously affect Japan’s future. On the one hand, the mutual dependence
between China and Japan will basically continue to grow, as the flow of the people, goods andmoney expands in an increasingly borderless world. The same will be true for the relationshipbetween China and the US, and China and Taiwan.
12

The most pressing question, however, is how we should regard the essential nature, thefundamental realities of China‐‐‐the fact that it is a single‐party dictatorship, that it suppresses
human rights, that it is engaged in an unrelenting buildup of its military. This last issue is aparticularly grave concern for Japan. For Japan, the buildup of China’s military is nothing less than athreat.
We have no wish to cause unnecessary discord with China, nor do we intend to take anaggressive stance with our neighboring country. I believe every Japanese long for establishing afriendly, normal relationship with a democratic and peace‐loving China. We cannot help, however,
but to take a strong stance against a hegemonic China.
For Japan, China’s relationship with the US is also a matter of concern. Robert Zoellick
stated that the US was prepared to play a role in helping to ease any frictions that might arise
between Japan and China. He also called upon China to become a “responsible stakeholder.” As the
US administration increasingly leans towards China, I cannot help but feel that the
Washington‐Beijing relationship differs from the relationship between Washington and Tokyo.
Japan is faced with three choices for its future. First, Japan could further strengthen theJapan‐US alliance, and in addition, Japan could work to strengthen its own role within this alliance.
Second, Japan could move to establish closer relationships with China, diluting the alliance with the
US. Third, Japan could choose to dissolve the Japan‐US alliance, and decide to pursue an
independent defense policy on its own. Most Japanese will definitely pursue the first option
Having said that, let me introduce my article from the Sankei Shimbun dated March 6,
which the US Embassy was kind enough to have translated into English, and which has been partly
revised by myself for today.
John Antwerp MacMurray, who was at one time the most knowledgeable expert on Asia at
the US Department of State, served as minister (ambassador now) to China, like Amb. Lord, for five
years from 1925 to 1929. MacMurray, as is well known, wrote a memorandum titled ‘How the Peace
Was Lost.’ In those days, the US was lenient toward China’s drawbacks, having strong exclusive
expectations of that country’s potential. But this helped turn Japan against the US. In his memo,
MacMurray sharply pointed out that mistake and made a policy proposal to his home government.
However, his rival, the then director for Far Eastern affairs at the State Department, Stanley
Hornbeck, quashed the report. Later on, the US, joining hands with China, drove Japan into a corner.
In the end, a tragedy developed.
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton chose Tokyo for the first official visit abroad. To hermeeting with Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone, Secretary Clinton brought a big souvenir, an
invitation for a Japan‐US summit meeting in Washington. This is unusual. The meeting took place atthe White House on Feb. 24. Short as the summit meeting was, it became an occasion for Japan toshow the solidarity of the alliance with the US to the world. I can see the Obama administration’s
policy of attaching importance to Japan. Even so, I don’t know why, but I cannot be wild with joy.
In point of fact, the reason is because former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who
has been supposed to play a role of sorts of behind the scenes as Secretary Clinton’s advisor on
foreign affairs, wrote something curious in her book that was published last year and titled ‘The
13

Memorandum to the President Elect.’ She says the new president‐‐‐though he may first want tothink of China when he is going to make his first visit to East Asia‐‐‐should first set foot in Tokyo, anally of long standing. Her recommendation goes: ‘When visiting Japan, I hope he will remember tohave a smile on his face, have a souvenir in his hand, and a fork in his pocket.’ Secretary Clinton was
smiling all the time during her stay and she actually brought a big present with her for Prime
Minister Aso.
What the ‘fork’ in Albright’s words means is something like this. In her book, Albright sets
forth her cutting sarcasm, quoting a diplomat as saying: ‘Japanese politicians are sophisticated, butwhat they say is too boring, so I will fall asleep in the dinner party unless I think that I’m sitting on afork.’ Secretary Clinton, wherever she went, stressed the Obama administration’s stance of regarding
Japan as important, and the Japanese politicians she met must have all alike emphasized to her how
important the Japan‐US alliance is. I wonder if she did not become sleepy.
What is clearly shown in ‘The Memorandum to the President Elect’ is a deep‐seated senseof distrust toward Japan. Albright writes that Japan is respected in a way, but she also says China,
which is ‘a victim of the massacre’ Japan carried out during the war, has a grudge against Japan.
That is why Japan still does not have a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council eventhough it should already qualify for it. That is why she says in a roundabout way, Japan has no
choice but to be allied with the US. As seen from the wording, she nonchalantly has written
something shocking to those who would otherwise feel elated by the reaffirmation of the Japan‐US
alliance. Her view of history‐‐‐when it comes to Japan’s pre‐war conduct‐‐‐has something incommon with China’s.
When Japan was under the Occupation, GHQ had the Government Section, headed by Gen.
Whitney, and the Intelligence Section, headed by Gen. Willoughby. The former was a member of the‘keep Japan weak’ faction, or those who basically would never allow Japan to again have military
power. As is well known, Col. Kades, who was under Gen. Whitney, took part in the work ofdrafting the Constitution of Japan. Gen. Willoughby can be classified as a member of the ‘keep Japanstrong’ faction, insisting Japan should retain its military power to a certain extent.
Albright writes that the US has a military presence in Asia for which even China is nomatch. She clearly states that US military presence in the region has two objectives; defending Japanand preventing Japan from having an independent military capability.
Former Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer, a close friend of former President Bush,said frankly that he did not know why only Japan has cut its defense spending, while the US, South
Korea, China and Russia had substantially increased their military spending over the past decade.
Schieffer made remarks similar to the ‘strong Japan’ faction, when he addressed the Japan National
Press Club in January. In answering a question, Schieffer stated: ‘I was disappointed at what Mr.
Tamogami (former Air Self‐Defence Force Chief) said.’ Tamogami wrote for a prize‐competition
essay for a private company to the effect that Japan had not necessarily been aggressive in pre‐war
days. He was dismissed at once. Schieffer has the same view of history as Albright, who belongs tothe ‘weak Japan’ faction.
As far as the view of history is concerned, individual perception cannot be unified. But if
14

someone on the U.S. side would stand in Japan’s position and admit that what Tamogami wrote had
make sense, then what Schieffer said would fit together. The Japan‐U.S. alliance would become areal thing. The late MacMurray also should be satisfied.

Lead Discussant C:

Donald S. ZAGORIA, Senior Vice President & Project Directorof the Northeast Asia Projects, NCAFP
I’d like to associate myself with option 1 of Prof. Takubo and with all of Amb. Okawara’s
points. The US‐Japan alliance remains the key to peace and stability in this region for a variety ofreasons, including shared values, democracies, rule of law, our common economic interests, and ourcommon interest in stability in Asia. One of the conclusions I have come to recently is that Japanneeds a better public relations agent.
On the one hand this country seems to face many serious problems, such as thedemographic problem… the average age of the population is increasing, and there aren’t enoughbabies…this is one of the serious challenges. There is a lot of nervousness that we detect in thiscountry, with regard to Japan’s relationships with the US and China, and the US relationships with
China. Gerald Curtis made a very eloquent speech in China, in which he said that Japan has many
problems as we do, and as China does, and that Japan has some enormous inherent strengths, andonce this economic crisis is finished Japan will come out in a much better condition than many othercountries. Some of Japan’s strengths include: your egalitarian capitalist model; your banks are inbetter shape than ours; your savings rate is much better than ours; you still have soft power; you arestill the third largest economy, the quality of life is still high; and when asked where in Asia they’dmost like to live, Tokyo is the first or second city to be named where Foreigners want to live. Part ofthe problem is that Japan needs to have more confidence in itself and in its alliance with the US.
Talking about the Japan‐US alliance, I’d like to stress, also as a centrist American, that I am
enormously proud of the fact that an African American was elected president in the US. I was
skeptical about that. I knew Obama was extraordinarily brilliant, talented and thoughtful. But I did
not have enough confidence in the American people. I think Obama will be a great president. He has
a strong base of core values that Japan and the US share. I don’t think he would mistake Japan for
China. He is clear on the difference. The Obama administration currently has four priorities.
I’d like to see Japan work closely with the US in accomplishing things in all four of thesepriorities; one is economics, how to restore the global economy, how we could all come out of thiseconomic crisis for a healthier economy. Clearly we have a common interest in this. Japan, as thethird largest economy, and the US, as the first, must work together to come out of this without
getting into protectionism. Secondly, we have a common interest in what is called the Af/Pak
problem. You can certainly help with this problem. Japan is already helping with development
assistance in Afghanistan. The third area where we can work together is in clean energy. In Beijing
and Shanghai, it is hard to get fresh air. You have great experience with clean energy. The fourth area15

that you can help with, which is the highest priority in the Obama administration, is our relationshipwith the Muslim world. You have strong relations with Iran, for example. This is another area where
you can help us.
You can also help us with the regional security challenges like North Korea. I think somecommon action program can work, between the US and Japan on major challenges facing us andyou. Now, let me turn to North Korea. No one can be optimistic about North Korea. But the great
historical value of Kim Jong‐Il is that he brought the US and Japan closer together. He brought South
Korea and Japan closer together. He’s made Chinese sufficiently nervous so that the people in China
are thinking about post‐Kim Jong‐Il scenarios, along with some of us. He has made Aso more
popular than he was in the past. He has shown that Obama’s America is reasonable and North
Korea is unreasonable. So, I’d venture to joke that I want to congratulate Kim Jong‐Il.

Lead Discussant D:

MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University

I think the new US leader is very pragmatic, less ideological, a very good listener, capableof flexible thinking, more of a manager than a strict commander. But as I understand it, the wholepolicy guideline of the new administration has not been set out yet, except some parts of theeconomic and financial policy, nuclear arms control initiative, policy guideline for Iraq, Afghanistan
and Pakistan, but there is no comprehensive policy guideline that covers not only for Iran and the
Middle East but also for climate change, Africa development and other global issues. We are pleased
that the new administration placed a high priority on some areas of the agenda, which have been
our top priority for many years, such as disarmament (nuclear and non‐nuclear), climate change,
African development, and some United Nations issues. We can cooperate with the US on suchcommon agenda items, thereby taking the initiative in the international community.
Here, I wish to raise a question on nuclear disarmament, which President Obama referred
to in his Prague speech several hours after North Korea launched missiles. As I said, Japan has been
making the utmost effort to foster nuclear disarmament, and arms‐control for many years, so we arepleased that President Obama takes a strong initiative in nuclear disarmament and nuclear
non‐proliferation. But I have some concern about this, because I do not support nuclear
disarmament. Some circles in Japan striving for disarmament are pleased with the move of the US
toward nuclear disarmament and they are talking about inviting President Obama to Hiroshima or
Nagasaki.
But I have some concern about his idea of nuclear disarmament and nuclear
non‐proliferation as expressed in his speech, in terms of national security and defense. Recently,
even the roles and the mission of nuclear weapons have been reduced and the US will be successful
in taking drastic measures to reduce nuclear arsenals in the US and Russia. Those kinds of initiatives,
I’m afraid, would have a serious impact on, or implications for the alliance, extended deterrence andthe nuclear umbrella. Personally, I am a little pessimistic about the possibility of the US and Russia
signing a new nuclear arms control agreement in order to extend START I by the end of this year.
16Besides, even if Russia would agree to hold this kind of nuclear negotiation, China is not likely tojoin a new framework for nuclear reductions.
Hypothetically speaking, if the two super powers reduce nuclear arsenals to try to reach apoint when there are no more than 1000, as nuclear warheads, if the US has already designatedspecific potential uses and targets for those weapons, the US will not be able to allocate additional
nuclear weapons in order to protect the US allies, especially Japan, which faces a serious nuclear
menace not only from Russia but also from China and North Korea. Also, if the role of nuclear
weapons should shrink and be reduced, I wonder what kind of impact the changed new nuclear
balance is expected to have upon the conventional military balance in East Asia. As the Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW) development budget has already been frozen, we are seriously
concerned about the efficacy of the US nuclear deterrence to protect the US allies under suchinitiatives for nuclear disarmament.
While US President and Secretary of State reaffirmed the commitment of your nuclear
umbrella to the US allies, I wonder how the US could imagine such thing as “nuclear‐free world” inthe future. I am a little bit pessimistic about the idea of nuclear disarmament. My recommendation isthat the US and Japan hold frank dialogues on the use of nuclear weapon so that we are more
confident that we may be consulted by the US on their use. Anyway, in dealing with Obama’s longcherished idea of nuclear disarmament, we should be mindful of the impact and implications it has
not only on arms control but also on national security. That is the point.

Free Discussions:

MAGOSAKI Ukeru, former Professor, National Defense Academy, former Ambassador
to IranProf. Zagoria mentioned the possible Japanese involvement in US‐Iran relations. But ingeneral, if we take actions, the US is reluctant about it. For example, I was ambassador to Iran in
2001, and was asked by the Iranian government, which was endeavoring to establish relations with
the US, to pass massages to the US. But the US was reluctant about the Japanese role in this. Amb.
Lord said that President Obama wants to be a great president and wants to achieve something
historical. I think he can achieve something on the Korean peninsula. He can establish bilateralrelations with North Korea and work out an end to the Korean War. And the media reports say
President Obama is willing to do so. I wonder how serious the President Obama’s administration isabout this. And what is the real motive on the part of North Korea not to come forward to establish
bilateral relations with the US?

Evans REVERE, President & CEO, The Korea Society
I have a high degree of confidence that the team that has been assembled in and around the17

Obama administration is a group of people who are very experienced in the region, understand thehistory of the region and the various issues we are confronting in the region, in particular the
peninsula question. On the two specific questions Amb. Magosaki asked, I don’t think theadministration has developed a specific position on either of these issues yet. But, I see a certain
measure of continuity between the current administration and the previous administration on theseissues in terms of discussions that I had so far. The essence of what I see evolving is that there is noobjection, and will be no objection in the Obama administration, to the eventual discussion andeventual conclusion of a peace treaty that will put an end to the Korean War. But this is an issue thatis not ready for prime time yet. The Administration has more urgent issues to deal with such as therecent moves of North Korea. I would say the normalization issue is in a similar place. In principle,
the Administration will probably adopt a position very similar to that of the Bush administration.
When we resolve the question of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, when we complete thefinal verification that they have no nuclear weapons and no nuclear programs, we will normalize
relations with North Korea. The point is that denuclearization of North Korea must come first andnormalization, second, and not the other way around. This is the essential approach of the Obamaadministration. What is driving North Korea’s external behavior now is, to a large degree, amanifestation of changing internal political dynamics, including the health of Kim Jong‐Il, and thedelicate succession process which has not had enough time to complete yet. Even in an authoritarianregime like North Korea, they have politics, too, over the question such as who the likely successor
may well be. Support of the key elements of the North Korean system is required to settle thisquestion.

LORD
One addition ‐‐ this administration will be much more careful and meticulous about
consulting Japan and South Korea than its predecessor ‐‐ whether on short time tactics or on large
goals.

ZAGORIA
North Koreans have been the world’s leading blackmailers. Now we have to figure out how
not to reward that this time, while still keeping the door open.

OKAWARA
Amb. Boswell is reported to have stated that the US is considering bilateral talks with
North Korea. But I wonder if the official position of the US is that the resumption of the Six‐Party
Talks is a more proper step in the face of the recent developments.

REVERE
Secretary Clinton made a definitive statement on this. The US no.1 priority is to get North
Korea back to the table for the Six‐Party Talks. In that overall process, the dialogue between the US18and North Korea is the key component. The North Korean position is the opposite; to focus solely onbilateral talks with the US. But our position is to resume the Six‐Party Talks, which is the best forum
for the resolution of the North Korea issue.

KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy
I’d like to question the very purpose of dialogue between the US and North Korea or Japan
and North Korea. For the past 20 years, Japan and the US, in their efforts to have dialogue with
North Korea, have obtained virtually nothing, while North Korea gained a lot from us. I don’t think
dialogue is the best way to deal with the North Korea problem.

REVERE
While admitting that North Korea is very unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons foralmost anything we might offer, to get it back to the table, I would question the approach that avoids
dialogue. During the Six‐Party Talks, we have accomplished a moratorium on the flight‐testing of
medium‐ and long‐range ballistic missiles and have frozen, and put under international control,
North Korea’s ability to produce nuclear weapon materials. There are things that can be done with
North Korea through dialogue. We should not throw negotiations out the window.

NUMATA Sadaaki, Executive Director, the Japan Foundation Center for Global
Partnership
I do believe what we need is a reliable core of intellectuals and intellectual discourse, likethis. We should look at power capability of these. But what we lack is contextual intelligence, in thesense of a capacity to discern trends while trying to shape events. I think that the context defines ourrole. Now about the Af‐Pak problem, I feel as if the situation in Pakistan is getting very serious.

LORD
I think one of the fundamental problems we have in Pakistan is that the army and ISI
consider India the major problem and not the Taliban or Afghanistan. Unless they understand that
the Taliban is more of a threat than India, we are not going to solve this problem. It is our sharedgoal to defeat Al Qaida and the Taliban for the good of Pakistani people as well as ours.

ZAGORIA
Contextual intelligence is very difficult, even for specialists on Asia to keep up with, when
one considers the variety of developments in Japan, China, Korea, North Korea, etc. Those whoknow Japan don’t know China, and those who know China don’t know Korea so well. It is difficult
to know all these countries. That’s why the National Committee has been organizing Track II
dialogues and has been visiting all these countries every year. We always learn something fromthem. We need more public discourse.

19

LORD
The source of the Obama speech on nuclear disarmament is tough‐minded, security‐typepeople. Therefore you should take some solace in this idea, which is not a naïve, pacifist initiative. If
you read the speech carefully, it is very realistically put forward, and there is no illusion about thedifficulty to accomplish it.

OGASAWARA Toshiaki, Honorary Chairman, The Japan Times Nifco GroupI would like to emphasize the Japanese sentiment on North Korea, especially on
the abduction issue which is the greatest concern for Japan, probably more so than the issue of
nuclear weapons in which we do not have much faith. From the Japanese point of view, theabduction issue should be given more priority. In order to establish good relations between the US
and Japan, the economic issues is also very important. Although Obama is a democrat, it issomewhat hard on the automobile industry. “Engineered bankruptcy” is not a good way of solving
this industry’s economic problems. Rising unemployment is an urgent issue to be addressed which,after all, may also affect our relations.

REVERE
About the abduction issue, I understand the emotional power of this issue. I have been
following this issue for many years and have felt very strongly about it. In my discussions with
North Korea, I have said that this was one of the many issues that will ultimately need to be resolved.
This is a very long‐standing and sensitive issue. But it should not be a barrier to negotiations with
North Korea over the question of its nuclear and missile capabilities.

IIYAMA Masashi, Senior Research Fellow, Yomiuri Research Institute, Yomiuri
ShimbunJapanese are always nervous about whether the US loves China or Japan more. The
strategic relationship between the US and Japan and China and Russia is a very important factor in
the balance of power in Asia. When I interviewed Mr. Armitage, he said in the transition team of theRegan administration there was a big discussion about Asian policy. Dr. Kissinger said a China‐firstpolicy is the best one. Mr. Armitage demanded a Japan‐first policy. Is there a similar kind of strategic
discussion about positioning or relationships with Japan, China, the US and Russia in East Asia in
the transition team of Obama administration? What kind of orientation does the Obamaadministration have on this kind of relationship?

LORD
We will continue to treat China as very important, in view of its strategic importance in theregion. But the limit of our relationship with China is that we only share interests, but not values. In
addition to the military alliance with Japan, we share common values with Japan. I think China’s
repressive political system will form a ceiling on further development of US‐China relations, which
20

would not be equalized with US‐Japan relations. However, it is up to China to decide its own
internal politics, but we’ll never be as warm with China as Japan while it has a repressive regime. It
is not a zero sum game though.

AKIYAMA Masahiro, Chairman, Ocean Policy Research Foundation
With regard to Japan, the US and China relationships, I think the US will promote bilateraldialogues with China and other countries in East Asia and of course Japan. But, I think many
Japanese and even Chinese and Americans are very interested in a possibility of official trilateraldialogue on security matters among those three countries. My understanding is that not only people
within those three countries, but also within other Asian countries, are very interested in thistrilateral dialogue. So far China seemed reluctant to have such kind of official trilateral dialogue. But
I think now the Chinese government is interested in this official trilateral dialogue. I wonder what
the Obama administration thinks about the possibility of this official trilateral dialogue.

HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Councilor, Japan Forum on International Relations
I come back to the nuclear issue. About nuclear disarmament between the US and Russia,
the first thing to be considered is that China should be engaged. If nuclear disarment is conducted
only by the US and Russia, leaving China with a free hand, that will pose some kind of dilemma for
the Japanese. One of the possible suggestions, which would be considered by both countries’
policy‐makers and intellectual leaders to cope with that eventuality and at the same time to prevent
Japan from going nuclear, is to re‐examine the third principle of “the three non‐nuclear principles”,
namely the policy ‘not to produce, not to possess, not to introduce’. I refer to a report paper
published by the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management which was created by Mr.
MATSUSHITA Konosuke and which has produced so many policy makers. One of therecommendations of the paper is to re‐think the possibility of dropping the third principle of the“three non nuclear principles”. While keeping intact the first two first principles‐ ‘not to produce,
not to possess’, we may think about dilution of the third principle. This is a suggestion which should
be discussed.

TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, The University of Tokyo
Professor Zagoria mentioned four areas in which he wanted Japan to work with the US:
economy; Af‐Pak; clean energy; and the relations with Muslim countries. And then he added
another, which was regional security. I also want the US to work with Japan in all of these areas, but
how big a problem is it that our priorities are rather different?

21

3. Afternoon Session:
ʺThe Role of the Alliance in the Making of a Regional Orderʺ

Chairperson:

ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ

In the Morning Session, we have already referred several times to the concept of an East
Asian Community, but in this Afternoon Session more reference will be made to this concept and towhat the role of the alliance in that architecture is.

Lead Discussant A:

Evans REVERE, President & CEO, The Korea Society

In the morning session, we talked about many challenges that face the Obamaadministration. And Obama is approaching these challenges with a great degree of energy andvision. And there is a great degree of risk also attached to that approach, as well as opportunity forreward as a result of this approach. I’m reminded of the phrase “transformational diplomacy” used
often during the last 8 years of the Bush administration. I understand the seriousness of theirintention behind using that phrase and using that sort of approach. But in my assessment, theirefforts largely failed. They didn’t transform anything, and transformed America’s reputation in arather negative direction. Confidence in America, by our allies declined during this period.
But the Obama administration has an opportunity to transform American diplomacy in afundamental way. And this is already happening and the reaction to it thus far from inside andoutside of the country is quite positive. Looking back on the last 8 years, the management of
US‐Japan relations in Washington took a severe turn for the worse for the last 4 years of the Bushadministration. There are several reasons for this, partly because of the partnership of some of the
key figures, and partly because of the reversal of US policy towards the Korean peninsula andtowards North Korea in particular, that resulted in some hard feelings and some misunderstandings
between Washington and Tokyo. I would say Japan’s approach to put the abduction issue as its No.1
priority in terms of dealing with North Korea ran foul of the Bush administration. But we are on amuch better track right now.
As I look at the Obama administration’s approach to Asia and its approach to foreign policy
in general, it is clear there is going to be a tremendous emphasis on Asia. Secretary Clinton was thefirst Secretary of State to choose to visit Asia before going to other areas. Many of us have madeexactly this suggestion for the Secretary of State to come out to this region first, which has been
warmly received by the White House and the State Department. And it is also clear that in thisadministration, the US‐Japan alliance will play a prominent role. Japan is our major ally in theregion after all. It was a necessary thing for a number of reasons, most important of which was to22

send a clear message to China, that we attach importance to this traditional ally in the region.
Another reason is that this alliance became most problematic in the last couple of years of
the Bush administration. There is some damage to be repaired. Also the bilateral and trilateralcoordination between the US, Japan and Korea has suffered from a lack of attention in the previous
administration. This is one of the central elements of Obama’s approach to dealing with issues in theregion. US relations with Asia, in general, are going to be taken to a new level by the president’s visit
here which is expected later this year.
Another key element of the US policy approach in the region is going to be themaintenance of a strong deterrent capability, both nuclear and in other areas as well. In theaftermath of the North Korean missile launch and other actions of North Korea, there is going to bereaffirmation of a strategic US deterrent and the recognition of the need to demonstrate to our allies
that they can indeed rely on us in this particular challenge in Northeast Asia.
But there is also going to be a focus on the need to develop a positive, cooperative andcomprehensive relationship with China. We will be working with China and others to ensure that
China becomes a responsible stakeholder. But the bottom line is that that China needs to be morethan that as we expand our stake in the region. It is pretty hard to imagine a peaceful, stable andcooperative region without a peaceful, stable and cooperative US‐China relationship. There is going
to be a tremendous opportunity for the US and Japan to work together as two legs of this triangle tofigure out how to do that with China. All triangles are not equilateral. The important legs willremain the US and Japan. In this context, US‐Japan relations are central.
In the past, we have done good work on putting together declarations and visions etc., but
we have not done enough work on developing action plans together. This is the defect in our
cooperation. In 2005, the US and Japan put together a set of common strategic objectives to deal
cooperatively with each other in the region and beyond. This document is a powerful foundation for
the US and Japan to work together in the region and beyond. We need go back to that foundation.
Not just to pay lip service, but to implement it is important.
The US needs to understand Japan’s vision for our relationship in this region and beyond.
Japan needs to be more than just a silent partner. Japan needs to be a vocal partner in thisrelationship. Japan needs to exercise greater leadership as an alliance partner. President Obamalistens to the voices of our allies more than any president in my memory. I hope Japan’s leaders
make more effort to speak to him.

Lead Discussant B:

TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, The University of Tokyo

Some people say my view on China is tougher than before. If that is the case it is not
because I changed but because China changed. Some of its behaviors are problematic. China is still
an ambiguous factor when you think about the future regional order. Let me explain what I think is
the regional order Japan would like to make. In a nutshell, we want a regional order that is
conducive to the sustainable peace and development of our country and the region. We benefited23

economically from the rise of China. We all benefited from our cooperation in various areas
including security. But nobody really knows what China is going to be like in the future.
In order to achieve this target of having a regional order that will be conducive to stablepeace and development, we should aim for a democratic regional regime. The reason why we needthis regime is that in East Asia China is geographically outstandingly large, that is in terms of
population and area. With the rise of China, therefore, there is always fear among the neighboring
nations that it will be dominant, and become hegemonic. So we need a regional architecture that isdemocratic, in the sense that the operation and decision making of this architecture will be
conducted in a democratic way. Such democratic principles as freedom, equality and fraternity
should be the basic principle on which any action be taken in that architecture. I don’t mean that
China should domestically become a democracy, but regionally, it has to base its act on the
democratic principles.
Whatever we aim for, East Asian regional integration is proceeding day by day.
Globalization is one of the main reasons, which goes along with the rise of China. Globalization has
promoted China and China’s rise has promoted globalization particularly in this part of the world.
Economic integration or regional cooperation in such areas as non‐traditional security is proceeding.
But the link is weak when it comes to traditional security issues. Yesterday Hu Jintao made a speech,
in which he claimed as always that China’s military modernization is only for the defense of its own
country. But when they say so, it is problematic because China includes the Senkaku Islands andislands in the South China Sea as part of its territory. This is a matter of concern for all the countries
that have territorial disputes with China.
In this context the Japan‐US alliance should serve as a public good for the region. Anotherimportant factor in achieving a democratic regional regime is further improvement of therelationship between Japan and China. We have to develop trust with China, which is a very
important condition for such a regime. The relationship between Japan and China since 2006 has
been a favorable one. Security issues remain, though the situation is much better than before. There
has been a regular exchange of visits of high ranking officers in the defense area.
But more has to be done to enhance trust between the two countries in the area of security.
One notable incident is that, last December, two Chinese patrol boats made a very provocative moveoff the Senkaku Islands, which we claim to be our own territory. This came as a surprise to many
Japanese because the Chinese government had jointly and repeatedly pledged with the Japanese
government that they would make the East China Sea a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.
The Chinese navy has been active for the past several months around the borders with theneighboring countries. Certainly we don’t want an arms race with China.
In order to avoid an arms race, we have to have dialogues. In order to have effective
dialogues about security issues, it is not enough to hold them bilaterally, and we would like toinvolve the US. I hope this kind of trilateral discussion will be held sooner rather than later.

24

Lead Discussant C:

Robert DUJARRIC, Director, Institute of Contemporary

Japanese Studies, Temple University, Japan Campus
The Alliance’s primary role is not to be a “cork in the bottle.” Japan is not a volcano about toerupt. In fact it is characterized by low levels of nationalism, an unwillingness to press strongly its
territorial claims (Northern Territories, Dokdo / Takeshima), declining amounts of ODA, a flat
defense budget despite the DPRK’s increased capabilities to strike Japan and China’s rising military
expenditures and a very soft approach to diplomacy. For example it asked for a permanent seat on
the UNSC but took no “hard” action to press its case, such as threatening to cut or terminate its
financial contributions to the UN and its agencies; it doesn’t actively push the UN to increase thepercentage of Japanese among the staff.
It is true that if the US totally vanished from the region, Japan might take a much moreproactive defense posture but only if its neighbors became clearly threatening.
It is not an alliance based on shared values. In Japan, the left likes US values, such as the
US‐drafted Japanese constitution, but is not supportive of the military alliance with America. On theother hand, the right likes US foreign policy, but dislikes mainstream US ideology. It would like torevise the constitution which it sees as an alien transplant, is reluctant to acknowledge crimes
against humanity and has been opposed to compensation for victims of Imperial Japan, including
former American POW slave workers. Ambassador Okazaki’s remarks that “the real tragedy is thatJapan lost World War II” (at Temple University in a public forum) and Prime Minister Abe’s courtesy
calls to the relatives of Chandra Bose and Judge Pal in India are other indicators of a very ambivalent
attitude towards what most Americans consider to be their core values.
Moreover, at this stage an “alliance of values” and an emphasis on democracy is a veiled
attempt to encourage regime change in China, or to portray China as a foe, neither of which is in theinterest of the Alliance. China may well emerge to be a menace, but at this time, there is no reason to
publicly act as if it were, though there is obviously a need to maintain the military capabilities of the
US and Japan to deter Beijing.
The real threat to the alliance is Japan’s demographic death spiral which, unless reversed,
will further increase the gap between the US and Japan. The main challenges are a rapidly aging
population, a shrinking labor force (in 1990 there were approximately two working‐age Americans
per Japanese, by 2030 the ratio might be 3:1), a very low fertility rate, the underemployment of
women in the professional labor force (about 10% of Japanese managers are female, vs. 30‐50% in
the West; Hong Kong and Singapore have done much better at feminization, showing that this is not
an Asia vs. West issue), and low immigration. If the Alliance is to be the bedrock of the Asian
regional order Japan must be strong. If these demographic trends are not treated as a vital threat tothe country, a far more dangerous one than North Korea or China, Japan will become anincreasingly marginal actor and the Japan‐US Alliance will degenerate into irrelevancy.
Looking forward the Alliance can contribute to regional stability by (a) joining forces with
the ROK, and if possible, China, to plan for Korean unification, (b) see if the Six Party Talks can be25

transformed into some sort of Northeast Asian OSCE.
The military aspects of the Alliance are obviously vital, but though these may require
adjustment, there is no need to completely rethink them. Without the Alliance, the US could not be aregional Asian power, making the Japan‐US relationship critical to the continued ability of the US toremain a military hegemony in Asia.

Lead Discussant D:

HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Councilor, JFIR

The existence of the Japan‐US alliance could be a good public good in the Asia Pacific. But
when we talk about the role of the Japan‐US alliance in the making of a regional order in Asia, wehave to prove the effectiveness of this alliance. I think this alliance has been a little bit diluted in thesense that Japan’s confidence in the alliance has been slightly lowered and maybe vice‐versa,
because of the enlarged divergences of views in US foreign policy priorities.
For the alliance to be strengthened, three things have to be considered respectively by both
Japan and the US. For the Japan side, the first and foremost, the solution of Futenma Air base should
be attacked in earnest, namely the relocation of the base from the current Ginowan city to Nago city,
a northern part of the main land Okinawa. Should some minor concessions and compromises bemade among the parties concerned from both the Japan and US governments as well as the local
governments, this question could be put behind us forever. Then there would be no more serious“base issues” between the US and Japan. Secondly, a permanent act should be legislated so thatJapan can dispatch its Self Defense forces overseas whenever warranted, wherever solicited, without
the government of Japan being obliged to resort to a piecemeal legislation on each and every
occasion. Thirdly, Japan should more seriously discuss the need to reinterpret our constitution sothat we will be able to change our concept of “collective self defense”. If we will succeed, we can
improve our alliance.
Firstly, the US should take more flexible attitudes towards the Futenma base issue. Slight
concessions by the US and the central government of Japan will make possible the breakthrough on
this issue. Secondly, the US is required to handle its approach to China and North Korea very
carefully. We are happy about the commitments of the Obama administration to the establishedpolicy lines to China and North Korea, which are not in contradiction to Japanese expectations.
Thirdly, if necessary, we should think how to regain the credibility of the “extended nuclear
deterrence” of the US vis‐a‐vis Japan.
Let me make one more additional hope. If Mr. Obama comes to Japan, Japanese people
would like to see him visiting Hiroshima. Obama’s visit there will surely contribute enormously not
only to overall Japanese feelings towards the US but also to the Japan‐US Alliance. On the other
hand, of course, Japanese PM should visit Pearl Harbor and the sanctuary of “Arizona” there.
Having said this, if we can strengthen the alliance, it will be able to contribute more to theregional order in East Asia. In this sense, I am pleased that the Obama administration is willing to
improve its relations with ASEAN countries, especially the Islamic countries in Asia. The Islamic
26

population in Asia is the highest in the world. Even if we exclude Pakistan and India, still thenumbers are considerable. The Obama administration can better manage its relations with theIslamic world. If, for example, the US takes fairer attitudes towards the Palestine problem which in
my view is a most serious root cause of Islamist terrorism, that will help not only US relations with
the Islamic world but also the fight against international Islamic fundamentalism.
I think the US can play a more positive role in the making of a regional order, albeit in an
indirect manner. Many countries in the region are pursuing the concept of an East Asian Community,
which I think is still a remote possibility because of two reasons. Firstly, Japan has many problems
with China and two Koreas, and the other countries in the region have also problems among
themselves and with China. Secondly, the levels of development, economic and others, or the way tothink about the fundamental values are so different among the countries in the region. And yet, thepeoples are moving in that direction, though only slowly. In this process, some East Asian countries
want to see the US more engaged in this region. The others are not. The US is expected to be moretrustworthy, friendlier not only to Japan but to Islamic Asia.

Chairperson:

ITO K.

I’d like to make a short comment on the last point Amb. Hirabayashi raised, i.e., the goal ofan East Asian Community. Though it is a remote possibility, the common consciousness shared by
East Asian countries is deeper than Americanｓ might imagine. I can say so from my own
experience as a member of NEAT. In engaging myself in NEAT, I don’t think the goal of an East
Asian Community can be realized soon. However, the simple fact that the people in this region
share the common goal, however remote it may be, could make our thinking positive and different.
For instance, when we have bilateral discussions with Chinese or Koreans, we tend to criticize eachother. But when we meet multilaterally our exchange of views turn positive towards the common
goal of an East Asian Community, thereby reducing, if not eliminating, sources of conflict. That is
why I value this concept.

Free Discussions:

MAGOSAKI
We are talking about common values between the United States and Japan. If it is about
democracy, it is fine. But when it comes to security issues such as Afghanistan, for example, Japanesevalues are different from US values. In the case of Iran, also, we have a different policy orientation;
we prefer the soft‐power oriented policy rather than the hard‐power‐oriented policy. Do you thinkthese differences in the approach in Afghanistan and Iran, which can be the major policies of27

President Obama, will affect the course of regional cooperation between the United States and Japanin East Asia?

LORD
The point is how you define the differences. The point you made is not a question of values.
It is about tactics, methods and the assessment of possibilities. Also, the overall viability of themilitary approach is being questioned in the Obama administration. Obama has reduced US goals.
The major outcome of his strategic review on Af/Pak is to lower our objectives. It is no longer a talkof cohesive government or democracy. It is now only about US security against terrorist attacks. Plus,
he has increased non‐military ingredients in the US strategy such as economic development andreducing the trade. I think Japan can help us in Afghanistan in those areas.

YAMANO Yoichi, Senior Manager for the U.S. and Europe External Affairs Dept.,
Global Business Div., Hitachi, Ltd.
The priority on the issue of North Korea is different between Japan and the US. Also theoverall approach to the issue is different between the two countries. In my observation, North Korea
seems to have taken advantage of our different approaches of the US and Japan to this issue. I
believe that we should have common approach to tackle North Korean issue. What does the US side
think of this?

REVEREOf course we will not always agree. But the reconstitution of a bilateral and trilateral
consultative and coordinated mechanism, which was once effective during the Bush administration,
will be the key element of our approach to North Korean issues.

ZAGORIA
The Bush administration mismanaged our relations with North Korea. As a result,Japan‐US relations suffered. One of the reasons for the Bush administration’s mismanagement is that
it was divided between the hard‐liners and engagers.

REVERE
Our position on the abduction issue has changed several times. Even though the US once
gave support to Japan on the solution of this issue, the US reversed that position. Some Japanese felt
betrayed at that time. And Japanese were right to have felt betrayed.

OKAWARAI heard the US is trying to dispatch President Carter to Pyongyang but this approach was
rejected by Pyongyang. I wonder what the US objective of exploring this bilateral approach was.
28

ZAGORIA
I would be against that idea. I am in favor of sending Kissinger along with Perry to
Pyongyang, but not now. Maybe six months from now, after we have a cooling‐off period. I don’t
think we should be in a hurry. Kissinger recently wrote an article in which he said that North
Koreans have to be prepared before we are prepared to get back to the Six‐Party talks. They have tobring back in US inspectors, etc.

A Greer PRITCHET, Assistant Project Director, Northeast Asia Projects, NCAFPWe have talked about “democratic regional regimes” and freedom, equality and fraternity,
but I wonder what the current mood is in Japan about “values diplomacy”? Where is the idea of“Arc of freedom and prosperity” now?

ONO Hikariko, Director for Policy Planning Division, Foreign Policy Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Japan has been actively engaged in dialogues and cooperation with countries promoting
democracy and the shift to a market economy. Two years ago, then Foreign Minister Aso made afamous speech titled ʺArc of Freedom and Democracy,” in which he stated that this is to attempt to
put a name to Japanʹs diplomatic achievements. In fact, his successors FM Machimura and FM
Komura, who themselves did not specifically emphasize the arc, continued to support the efforts ofyoung democratic nations. Thus, I can say that there exists a certain level of continuity in this regard.

HIRABAYASHI
Two footnotes ‐ Firstly, I wish to see Japanese top leaders have well‐conceived ideas uponwhich to promote his or her own agenda. Japanese diplomacy has lacked in such ideas or ideals. I
have sympathy for Mr. Aso’s concept of the “Arc of freedom and prosperity.” Secondly, however, thisidea won’t work well for two reasons, although a word “democracy” was carefully avoided. First,
Russia and China feel targeted. Thirdly, a most important country in the “arc”, India, carefully
avoids to be engaged.

Gerald CURTIS, Burgess Professor, Department of Political Science, Columbia
University
My impression is that this idea is very close to that of Neo‐Cons in Washington. Mr. Aso
could advocate this idea when he was Foreign Minister but now he is Prime Minister and has to takeresponsibility for Japan’s relations with China, and Obama was elected and Neo‐Con was gone, so
was this idea.

29

ITO K.
I also have personal feelings that Mr. Aso tends to use “catch words” but is quite forgetfulof what he said.

AKIYAMA
Within a year both the Japanese and the US government will reach a very critical stage on
the Futenma issue. Although we have been discussing this issue for more than 15 years, it has notbeen resolved yet. Environmental assessments are being conducted and are to be completed within ayear. Then, the Japanese central government will have to face opponents like the Governor of
Okinawa and local mayor. The US will have to face strong opponents from the Congress to thereconsideration of the relocation site. Both governments must tackle these challenges next year.

REVEREOne of the problems that continues to hang over our relationship is that we spend
incredible amounts of time in US‐Japan security dialogues, talking about real estate andhousekeeping issues rather than major security challenges. A lot of energy was spent on discussing
issues which Americans thought were already fixed. This is the frank impression of the US Defense
Department and State Department. This prevents us from talking about more important issues inour relationship, such as what these bases are used for.

ZAGORIAThe US and China are having a real strategic dialogue at a high‐level. Do the US and Japan
have such dialogue now?

CURTIS
Before making a recommendation to the government, if there is a change of party in powerin the next election in Tokyo, this problem is going to be worse. You are going to spend more time indealing with these real estate issues. There is no way to avoid it because there is no consensus in
Japan on what to do.

HIRABAYASHI
On dealing with this US base issue of Futenma, Japan needs a stronger government withthe powerful ministers dedicated to it. We should pay attention to the next general elections and a
new administration after them. Things could go for better or worse depending on the outcome ofthese political events.

REVERE
Some time between now and next year, Secretary of State Clinton and her Treasury
counterpart will sit down with their Chinese counterparts to discuss major strategic issues between
30

the US and China. They will be talking about regional and global security issues. However, the US
and Japan are still talking about the Futenma issue. Here is a contrast of grave concern and it
presents some bad optics with regard to the U.S. and Japan alliance.

AKIYAMAI have a different impression on this matter. Japan‐US security talks have developed overthe past ten years. Until the 1990s, we were talking only about ʺJinkanpoʺ, but now we are talking
about more important issues including Japan’s role in the security of the region. So 2+2 should bequite different from that in the 1990s. The situation has changed.

REVEREI’d like to remind you that where we are today is not the same as where we were four years
ago.

KAMIYA
Many in this room have talked about whether the Japan‐US alliance is an alliance based onvalues or not, and to what extent American values and Japanese values overlap. Many in this room
have also talked about the making of a regional order as the most significant challenge for us. I thinkthat the Japan‐US alliance has to be recognized at least partially as an alliance based on values, inorder to make a regional order which is favorable both for Japan and the United States. Here, I have
China in mind. The rise of China is an unavoidable reality. For a long time, we have beenaccustomed to talk about an East Asian security order based on the Japan‐US alliance. Now, such a
way of thinking is gradually becoming unrealistic. In the future, when we talk about a regional order,
we will have to take China into account, we will have to build a regional order which will bebeneficial for Japan, the United States, and China. But China does not share many values that areshared between Japan and the United States. And Japan and the United States want a regional orderwhich are build on our shared basic values. For that purpose, we will have to face China as analliance of the values. This is the challenge we face.

TAKAHARA
When we envisage the future of the region, our relations with China have both the elementof cooperation and that of competition. These two elements co‐exist in the whole process. I think it isgood in a way to make use of a rising China in the formation of a new regional order. But we have to
make sure that certain values are maintained. This is the point of my idea of a “regional democratic
regime.” In this context, the December 8 incident in the South China Sea is of serious concern. I
wonder if this incident was discussed during your visit to China.

LORD
We raised this issue in a general sense but not as a specific topic. We said the weakest point31

in the US‐China relationship is in the military dimension.

CURTIS
I’m very uncomfortable with the idea of an alliance based on values. This is a very
dangerous way of thinking. Alliances are based on interests. If we don’t have interests, we are notgoing to have an alliance. The language of “alliance based on values” is a source of self deception
and leads to so many easy assumptions about the health of the relationship. So we should stay awayfrom this language.

LORD
I think the way you phrased it is a phony way to put it. Of course alliances are based oninterests. But how do we distinguish our relationship with Japan, Korea or Australia, from ourrelationship with China? I think it is a big mistake to go way from that language of values. This is analliance of interests and values.

CURTISThis is a phony argument. I am cautious our leaders underestimate the importance ofgetting our interests in line. Values reinforce interests; they are not a substitute for it.

DUJARRICWe must think of the dangers of focusing only on democratic values.

ITO Go, Professor, Meiji University
Two points ‐ First, China has national borders with 14 neighboring countries, with most ofwhich China has unique problems about history, territories, and so forth. Also, China has become
quite influential toward ASEAN countries. In this situation, I can say that China holds “veto power”
when countries in Asia make some decision. Unless China says “yes”, nothing can be done. Second,
given this concern, I would like to say that even if the US has strategic dialogues with China, the
US‐China discussions might resemble what Japan and China have been done in the past.

32

Ⅳ

Appendix1. An Introduction to GFJ(1) Introduction【Objectives】 As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, and globalization andregionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world, especially neighboring countries in the
Asia-Pacific region at both governmental and non-governmental level, is one of the indispensable conditions for Japan to survive. On the basisof such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in thefield ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion
leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.
【History】 The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there wereexpressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within thiscontext, it was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to betransmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade
Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVIGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward
LUMLEY, as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in
Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made itnecessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The
Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum wasintended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its
discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, thegravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic and International
Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be
operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent bodyfor organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The
Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be
self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.
【Organization】 The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japanto engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat
is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on
International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro,
OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Chairman and ITO
Kenichi as President. The membership is composed of 13 Business Leader Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and
TOYODA Shoichiro; 21 Diet Members including the three Governors, KOIKE Yuriko, HATOYAMA Yukio, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 83
Opinion Leader Members including the four Governors, SHIMADA Haruo, OKAWARA Yoshio, ITO Kenichi, and MURAKAMI Masayasu.
Friends and supporters of The Global Forum of the Japan are organized into the Supporters’ Club of the Global Forum of Japan. Financially theactivities of GFJ have been supported by the annual membership fees paid by 13 leading Japanese corporations (Toyota Motor Corporation andKikkoman Corporation contributing 5 shares each, and the other 11 corporations contributing 1 or 2 shares each) as well as by the grants
provided by The Japan Foundation, Japan-ASEAN Exchange Projects, The Tokyo Club, The Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation, etc.
WATANABE Mayu serves as Executive Secretary.
【Activities】Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangularcountries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including US,
China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India, Australia, European countries, and Wider Black Sea area , for the purposes of deepening mutual
understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchangeorganizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a substantial numberof Japanese participants in the “Dialogue,” GFJ in principle holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo. A listing of topics of “Dialogues” and its
overseas co-sponsors in last five years is given below.
Year

Month

2005 April
June
November

2006 February
June
September2007 January

June
July
November
2008 January
June
July
September2009 April

Topic

Co-sponsor

The Prospect of East Asian Community andJapan-Korea Cooperation
The Prospect for East Asian Community and Regional Cooperation
Peace and Prosperity in the Wider Black Sea Area
and the Role of Japan
Review and Perspective of the Japan-Taiwan Relationship
An East Asian Community and the United States
Prospect for Japan-ASEAN Strategic Partnership after the First
East Asia Summit
The China-Japan Relationship and Energy and Environmental Issues

Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative (Korea)
ASEAN-ISIS
University of Shizuoka, The Black Sea University Foundation (Romania),
The International Center for Black Sea Studies (Turkey)
Taiwan International Studies Association (Taiwan)
The Pacific Forum CSIS (US), The Council on East Asian Community
ASEAN-ISIS

China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China), Energy
Research Institute, National Development and Reform Commission (China),
The Japan Forum on International Relations
The US-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century
National Committee on American Foreign Policy (US)The Challenges Facing Japan and ASEAN in the New Era
ASEAN-ISIS
Japan and Black Sea Area in the Rapidly Changing World
Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Embassy ofTurkey, University of Shizuoka
An East Asian Community and the US
The Council on East Asia Community, The Pacific Forum CSIS (US)Cooperation in Environment and Energy
The Council on East Asian Community，The East Asian Institute of National
University of Singapore(Singapore)
Japan -China Relations Entering A New Stage
Institute of Japanese Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International
Relations (China)
Prospect of Japan-ASEAN Partnership after the Second Joint Statement ASEAN-ISIS
on East Asia Cooperation
US-Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration

National Committee on American Foreign Policy (US)33

(2) Membership List of GFJ【Chairman】
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies【President】
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
【Business Leader Governors】
MOGI Yuzaburo, Chairman and CEO, Kikkoman Corporation
TOYODA Shoichiro, Honorary Chairman, Toyota Motor Corporation【Diet Member Governors】
HATOYAMA Yukio, Member of the House of Representatives (DPJ)
KOIKE Yuriko, M.H.R. (LDP)TANIGAKI Sadakazu, M.H.R. (LDP)【Opinion Leader Governors】
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
MURAKAMI Masayasu, Executive Director, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies
SHIMADA Haruo, President, Chiba University of Commerce-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------【Business Leader Members】(13 Members)
HANDA Haruhisa, Chairman, Worldwide Support for Development
IMAI Takashi, Honorary Chairman, Nippon Steel Corporation
ISHIKAWA Hiroshi, Director, Kajima Corporation
KATSUMATA Tsunehisa, Chairman, Tokyo Electric Power Company.
KUSAKARI Takao, Chairman, Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha
MATSUNO Haruki, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
MOGI Yuzaburo, Chairman and CEO, Kikkoman Corporation
OKAYAMA Norio, Chairman, Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd.
SEYA Hiromichi, Senior Corporate Adviser, Asahi Glass Co., Ltd.
TAKAGAKI Tasuku, Senior Advisor, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd.
YAGUCHI Toshikazu, President, Biru Daiko Co., Ltd.
YAMAMOTO Tadahito, President and Representative Director, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
TOYODA Shoichiro, Honorary Chairman, Toyota Motor Corporation( T B D), Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation【Diet Member Members】(21 Members)
AICHI Kazuo, Member of the House of Representatives (LDP)HATOYAMA Yukio, M.H.R. (DPJ)HOSODA Hiroyuki, M.H.R. (LDP)IWAKUNI Tetsundo, M.H.R. (DPJ)
KITAGAMI Keiro, M.H.R. (DPJ)
KOIKE Yuriko, M.H.R. (LDP)
NAGASHIMA Akihisa, M.H.R. (DPJ)
NAKAGAWA Masaharu, M.H.R. (DPJ)
OGUSHI Hiroshi, M.H.R. (DPJ)
SHIOZAKI Yasuhisa, M.H.R. (LDP)SUZUKI Keisuke, M.H.R. (LDP)TANIGAKI Sadakazu, M.H.R. (LDP)
UEDA Isamu, M.H.R. (NK)YAMAGUCHI Tsuyosi, M.H.R. (DPJ)YAMANAKA Akiko, M.H.R. (LDP)ASAO Keiichiro, Member of the House of Councillors (DPJ)
FUJITA Yukihisa, M.H.C. (DPJ)HAYASHI Yoshimasa, M.H.C. (LDP)HIRONAKA Wakako, M.H.C. (DPJ)NAITO Masamitsu, M.H.C. (DPJ)SEKOU Hironari, M.H.C. (LDP)

As of June 1, 2009
In alphabetical order
IKEO Aiko, Professor, Waseda University
IMAGAWA Yukio, former Ambassador to Cambodia
INA Hisayoshi, Columnist, The Nikkei Newspaper
INOGUCHI Takashi, President, University of Niigata Prefecture
ITO Eisei, former Member of the House of Representatives
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
ITO Tsuyoshi, Professor, Meiji University
IWAMA Yoko, Associate Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
IZUMI Hajime, Professor, University of Shizuoka
JIMBO Ken, Associate Professor, Keio University
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy
KAWAI Masao, Guest Professor, Hakuo University
KIMURA Takayuki, Guest Professor, International Christian University
KINOSHITA Hiroo, Advisor, National Small Business & Information Promotion Center
KOGURE Masayoshi, former Professor, Toyo University
KOKUBUN Ryosei, Professor, Keio University
KONDO Tetsuo, President, Institute for New Era Strategy (INES)KUBO Fumiaki, Professor, Keio University
MANO Teruhiko
MIYAMOTO Nobuo, Diplomatic Commentator
MIYAZAKI Isamu, Honorary Advisor, Daiwa Institute of Research
MIYOSHI Masaya, Chairman and CEO, Miyoshi Networks Co., Ltd.
MORI Toshimitsu, former Ambassador to Kazakhstan
MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University
MURAKAMI Masayasu, Executive Director, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc
MURATA Koji, Professor, Doshisha University
MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Professor, The University of Shizuoka
NAKAGANE Katsuji, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
NAKAHARA Nobuyuki, President, The American Studies Foundation
NAKANISHI Terumasa, Professor, Kyoto University
NISHIKAWA Megumi, Foreign News Editor, Mainichi Newspapers
OGASAWARA Takayuki, Professor, Yamanashi Gakuin University
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies
OKONOGI Masao, Professor, Keio University
ONUMA Yasuaki, Professor, The University of Tokyo
OHYA Eiko, Journalist
RYU Ketsu, Professor, Waseda University,
SAITO Akira, President, Yomiuri Nippon Symphony Orchestra Tokyo
SAKAKIBARA Eisuke, Professor, Waseda University
SAKAMOTO Masahiro, Vice-president, Japan Forum for Strategic Studies
SAJIMA Naoko, Professor, Senshu University
SHIMADA Haruo, President, Chiba University of Commerce
SHIMIZU Yoshikazu, Director, U.N. Association of JapanSHIRAISHI Takashi, Guest Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
SOEYA Yoshihide, Professor, Keio University
SONE Yasunori, Professor, Keio University
SUDO Shigeru, Director, Energy and Environment Program, International Development Center of JapanTAHARA Soichiro, Journalist
TAIDA Hideya, Member of the board of trustees, Akita International University
TAJIMA Takashi, Guest Professor, Toyo Eiwa Women's University
TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, The University of Tokyo
TAKAHASHI Kazuo,Guest Professor, International Christian University
TAKASHIMA Hatsuhisa, President and CEO, Japan International Broadcasting
TAKEUCHI Yukio, Justice, Supreme Court of Japan
TAKEMI Keizo, Professor, Tokai University
TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University
TANAKA Akihiko, Professor, The University of TokyoTANAKA Toshiro, Professor, Keio University
TANINO Sakutaro, former Ambassador to China
URATA Shujiro, Professor, Waseda University
UTSUMI Yoshio, former Secretary General, International Telecommunication UnionYAMAUCHI Masayuki, Professor, The University of Tokyo
YAMAZAWA Ippei, Professor Emeritus, Hitotsubashi University
YOSHITOMI Masaru, Special Advisor, Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry
YUSHITA Hiroyuki, Guest Professor, Kyorin University
WAKABAYASHI Hideki, Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.

【Opinion Leader Members】(83Members)
AKASHI Yasushi, Chairman, The Japan Center for Conflict Prevention
AOKI Tamotsu, Commissioner, Agency for Cultural Affairs
AMAKO Satoshi, Professor, Waseda University
ASOMURA Kuniaki, Professor, North Asia University
CHINO Keiko, Columnist, The Sankei Shimbun【Supporters’ Club Members】(18 Members)
EBATA Kensuke, Defense Commentator
FUKUSHIMA Teruhiko, J.F. Oberlin University【Executive Secretary】
GYOHTEN Toyoo, President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs
WATANABE Mayu
HAKAMADA Shigeki, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
HARUNA Mikio, Professor, Graduate School of Nagoya University[Note] DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan
HASEGAWA Kazutoshi, Duputy Chairman, Japan-Korea Cooperation Committee
LDP:Liberal Democratic Party
HATA Kei, Vice Principal, Sakushin Gakuin
NK: New Komeito
HATTORI Kenji, Foreign News Editor, Jiji Press
HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Vice President, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
HONDA Masaru, Senior Staff Writer Political News Department, The Asahi Shimbun
ICHIKAWA Isao, Executive Director, Tokyo Gakugei University34

(3) Acknowledgment

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is grateful to its “Business Leader”
members listed below for their generous contributions. Their support
is making the activities of the Forum financially sustainable.

[Business Leader Governors][5 shares]

Toyota Motor Corporation
Kikkoman Corporation[Business Leader Members][2 shares]

Worldwide Support for Development[1 share]

Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd.
Kajima Corporation
Nippon Steel Corporation
Tokyo Electric Power Co.
Asahi Glass Co. Ltd.
The Bank of Tokyo‐Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd
Biru Daiko Co., Ltd.
Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha(In the order of enlistment)35

2. An Introduction to NCAFPThe National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) was founded in 1974 by Professor Hans J.
Morgenthau and Dr. George Schwab, its current president. It is a nonprofit, activist organization dedicated to theresolution of conflicts that threaten U.S. interests. Toward that end, the NCAFP identifies, articulates, and helps
advance American foreign policy interests from a nonpartisan perspective within the framework of political realism.
American foreign policy interests include: preserving and strengthening national security; supporting countries
committed to the values and the practice of political, religious, and cultural pluralism; improving U.S. relations withthe developed and developing worlds; advancing human rights; encouraging realistic arms‐control agreements;
curbing the proliferation of nuclear and other unconventional weapons; and promoting an open and global economy.
Believing that an informed public is vital to a democratic society, the NCAFP offers educational programs that address
security challenges facing the United States and publishes a variety of publications, including its bimonthly journal,
American Foreign Policy Interests, which present keen analyses of all aspects of American foreign policy.
The NCAFP has been running Track II projects for over 15 years and specifically on Northeast Asian security issues fora decade. It has organized three ongoing Track II projects on Northeast Asian security – one on U.S.‐China relations
with a particular emphasis on the Taiwan issue, a second on the North Korea nuclear challenge, and a third on the
future of the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea. NCAFP pursues each of its Track II projects by holding
closed‐door, off‐the‐record meetings between officials, former officials and leaders in academia and business. The
meetings fill a niche between official dialogues by providing a forum where direct discussions can take place. The
NCAFP believes the alignment of many transnational security concerns calls for multilateral dialogue.
The Northeast Asian region is of paramount importance in the minds of those in power in the United States; it is in thisregion that the interests of three of the world’s principal nuclear powers (the United States, China and Russia) intersect;
it is home to approximately 100,000 U.S. troops; and it contains three of the world’s five largest economies (the UnitedStates, China and Japan). It is against this backdrop that the NCAFP strives to defuse potential areas of tension while
seeking to maximize areas of common interest.
<The location of the office>National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Inc.
320 Park Avenue, Eighth Floor, New York, NY 10022‐6839
Tel:+1 (212) 224‐1120 Fax: (212) 224‐2524
E‐mail: contact@ncafp.org
URL: http://www.ncafp.org-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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GF-Ⅲ-E-B-0044

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193 [Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp [URL] http://www.gfj.jp/