Chatham House Briefing Paper:
Sanitizing Occupation is not Creative
Eritrean Centre for Strategic Studies (ECSS)
Asmara, 18 April 2014
The Chatham House Briefing Paper of 10 April 2014 by Jason Mosley, titled“Eritrea and Ethiopia: Beyond the Impasse”, supposedly sets out to challenge andrectify obsolete perceptions of the Horn of Africa’s political dynamics andprevailing reality. This is refreshing and must be welcomed at the outset. Indeed,
the author debunks certain presumptions here and there in order to clear the way
for what he aptly calls “creative engagement” of the international community visa-vis the two countries, and especially Eritrea.
Jason Mosley lucidly underscores the fact that conventional “Western” (read US)
foreign policy towards the region has thus far failed in promoting a lasting andmeaningful peace. And, as a panacea to past flawed policies and approaches, theauthor pleads for policy makers in principal Western countries to reassess their
negative and often times overtly biased stance against Eritrea. Unfortunately, hesimultaneously argues for continuation of “the special treatment” and cuddling ofEthiopia.
This ambivalent and palpably contradictory disposition severely
punctures the “novel approach” that he wants to earnestly enunciate.
Mosley rightly calls on the “international community” to reconsider and reverse
the ineffective and counterproductive policy measures taken against Eritrea. In
this vein, he boldly argues for the lifting of the unwarranted, US-engineered, UN
sanctions on Eritrea as a vital and long-overdue gesture of goodwill andconfidence-building.
Mosley appropriately calls on IGAD to facilitate the resumption of Eritrea’s
membership that has been blocked by Ethiopia for several years now.
Hehighlights the urgent need for the international community to increase proactive
economic engagement with Eritrea instead of paying undue, or perhaps untimely,
attention to internal affairs under the pretext of human rights and democracy. All
these views and approaches are certainly positive and reinforce new trends thathave gained currency in the recent months.
In as far as the Algiers Peace Agreement and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border
Commission’s ruling are concerned, the author explicitly states:

“Eritrea has the weight of international law on its side, and correctly
accuses Ethiopia of occupying its sovereign territory…”
This unequivocal legal acknowledgement surely vindicates Eritrea’s firm position
which is in consonance with fundamental tenets of international law, the UN andAU Charters, as well as, with time-tasted AU principles on the sanctity of colonial
treaties and borders. But unfortunately, the author changes tack at this point toadvocate a “pragmatic approach” that makes a caricature of basic edifices ofinternational law. As it happens, Mosley opines:“…the reality of Ethiopia’s demographic and, increasingly, economic
predominance in the Horn of Africa must be understood, accepted andaccommodated by its neighbours, including Eritrea, and byinternational actors…. it will probably mean violating the letter (if notthe spirit) of the 2000 peace deal, and working around the EEBC
ruling, since Ethiopia cannot be forced to comply with it…”
Why the author presumes that Ethiopia can ride roughshod and trample, withimpunity, fundamental pillars of international law is really mind-boggling. TheAlgiers Peace Agreement contains explicit provisions empowering the UN Security
Council to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take punitive measures against
the recalcitrant party. Surely, Ethiopia is not a veto-wielding permanent member of
the UNSC and/or does not possess unassailable diplomatic clout to defy andforestall appropriate punitive action by the latter.
Furthermore, Chatham House and the author must know full well by now that theputative “controversy” does not revolve around the “final and binding” EEBC’sruling anymore. This is now a case of unlawful occupation; pure and simple. The
EEBC had indeed closed shop in 2007 after undertaking its demarcation of theborder by coordinates and depositing its demarcation decision with the UN
Cartographic Office as well as both parties.
In the event, Mosley’s reasoning can make sense only if and when the politicalradar is zeroed on the United States. If the author’s subliminal argument is that
Ethiopia cannot be persuaded to abide by international law as long as it enjoys theblind protection of the United States; that is another matter. But then, one would
expect the author not to mince his words; and, to call “a spade a spade”. In any
case, this has nothing to do with a novel, “out of the box”, approach. It epitomizes
a meek endorsement of power politics; it represents toeing the line of the powersthat be. And of course, this approach can only set a dangerous precedent, a!2

Pandora’s Box, for unresolved border conflicts in the global south and elsewhere in
the world. It undermines the integrity of international treaties and the validity of
Arbitration processes and awards by circumventing international law despite
solemnly signed international agreements and unequivocal rulings. It is not evenhelpful to Ethiopia as its historical claim on the Ogaden ultimately rests on
international treaties and the sanctity of colonial borders.
Factual Inaccuracies and Flawed Assumptions
The Chatham House Briefing paper also contains several assumptions and factualerrors as we illustrate below:
1. Causes of the war: The article quotes Tekheste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll to
substantiate the view that the cause of the conflict transcends a good-faithborder dispute. The problem with these sources is that they are not neutralresearches. Tronvoll has long-standing business associations with Ethiopia’sForeign Ministry. Tekheste Negash was against Eritrea’s independence
during the liberation war (was involved with the Mengistu regime as late as1989) and openly stated, in an interview with an Ethiopian Newspaper few
weeks ago, that “the problem with the EEBC ruling is not the mechanics ofdemarcation. The central issue is there should be no demarcation or border
between the two countries at all”. Clearly, description/analysis of events by“scholars” with well-known political biases and perspectives cannot be taken
at face value. In any case, as far as Eritrea is concerned, disagreements on
and pursuance of divergent policies would shape and influence the ebb andflow of bilateral ties between the two countries; but they cannot be a cause ofwar. And for the record, Eritrea-Ethiopia bilateral ties of cooperation wereexemplary, and perhaps among the best in the region, prior to the eruption of
the border war in 1998.
2. Economic and power asymmetry between the two countries: A central themeof the article revolves around the assumption of an economic asymmetry
between the two countries. (“… Ethiopia’s demographic and increasinglyeconomic predominance in the Horn of Africa must be understood…”). The
validity of this assumption is dubious. True, Ethiopia has a much larger
population and considerable natural resources and endowments. But Eritrea
has also substantial natural resources/potentials (mining etc.) as well vital
locational and comparative advantages. In a congenial environment ofregional peace, Eritrea can develop its mining, tourism, agricultural,manufacturing, fisheries and locational (ports) advantages to ensure rapid
economic growth on a sustainable basis. In a level playing field of peaceful!3competition and cooperation, Eritrea’s economic prospects and performances
will not lag behind that of Ethiopia. (This is discounting religious/ethnic
fault lines which are deep and pronounced in Ethiopia). Apart from thedistortions entailed by war and its sequel, one must also factor in the massiveinternational aid injections into Ethiopia’s economy in the last ten years.
Furthermore, it is worth noting here that despite myriad challenges – mostly
externally driven – Eritrea has managed to creatively and conscientiously
work on rebuilding and strengthening its economy in ways that has
impressed even the most skeptical observers.
Some of the tangible
achievements include: the visible change in the quality of lives in all the rural
areas; the remarkable rise in school enrolment and literacy rates since
independence; the increased access to clean water and health facilities andthus the ability to control many communicable diseases; the completion ofmajor infrastructure projects that lay the foundation for future expansion andgrowth and much more. In the event, the relative economic growth of thetwo countries in the past ten years with all its distortions cannot serve as agood indicator of trends in the future.
3. Eritrea’s presumed propensity to trigger proxy wars to undermine Ethiopia :This is an utterly wrong perception. As briefly indicated above, Eritrea’sregional policy is firmly anchored on the precepts of a safe neighbourhood.
Eritrea’s developmental and security interests are better served in a regionalarchitecture of conflict prevention and avoidance of tension. War and/orcontinued tensions usually imply higher expenditure on defence, prolonged
national military service and other negative consequences for trade andinvestment which are not positive factors for a small country. Indeed, Eritrea
demobilized 65,000 soldiers, downsizing the size of the new Eritrean
National Defence Forces (EDF) to 35,000 only, immediately afterindependence when the regional security environment was relativelyconducive. Eritrea also launched a two-phased, World Bank financed,
demobilization programme in 2001 when the Algiers Peace Agreement wassigned with Ethiopia. And until 2004, it demobilized around 105,000
soldiers from the National Military Service. But when Ethiopia reneged on
its treaty agreement, the demobilization programme was shelved andpostponed. In Somalia, Eritrea was not involved in a proxy war withEthiopia.
This would not make sense in pure military terms even fromlogistical considerations. But more pointedly, Eritrea is not involved in thebusiness of incubating “proxy wars” with Ethiopia for the overriding
developmental considerations outlined above. The US and Ethiopia know
these facts full-well. Still, the accusations that were conceived originally for!4the purposes of imposing the unfair sanctions are willfully perpetuated inorder to rationalize their continued maintenance. The speculation that South
Sudan may become another arena of proxy war between Eritrea and Ethiopia
is equally unfounded and peddled for other ulterior reasons. In brief, thesemisperceptions are not based on facts but used by the US and Ethiopia toportray Eritrea as a “pariah State” in order to maintain the unfair sanctions.
4. Economic interdependence of the two countries: In Eritrea’s view, long-termand ultimate continental economic cooperation can only be realized throughconsolidation of regional economic cooperation and integration at the level ofthe RECs. In the Horn of Africa, IGAD is the appropriate vehicle forincremental regional economic cooperation. Eritrea’s economic ties with
Ethiopia will be seen, in the future, within this context. Eritrea has interests
to develop economic ties with the Sudan, the Republic of South Sudan,
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, as well as Kenya and Uganda. The ties of thedistant past will not have much impact with what is and will develop in thefuture.
One must also take into account the economic development
trajectories of the individual countries in question. In the case of Eritrea, forinstance, development of its high-growth potential sectors: tourism, mining,fisheries, etc., will depend on investment/trade ties with players outside theregion. In short, Eritrea and Ethiopia are not Siamese Twins joined at thehips when it comes to future economic growth and developmental
trajectories.
5. Eritrea’s purported international isolation: This perception is also wrong.
True, Eritrea has a major problem with the United States. This is not of its
making. But it has reasonably good ties with the international community. Ithas investment/trade and bilateral/multilateral ties of cooperation with theEuropean Union, China, Japan, India, the Middle Eastern countries and aplethora of other countries in the rest of the world as well as with various
international agencies.
6. Assuaging Ethiopia: The author gives undue weight to “mollifying Ethiopia
first” prior to any positive action of the “international community” in regards
to Eritrea. This unwarranted “note of caution” and role-reversal is intriguing.
Ethiopia has no levers that it can wield against the international community,depending, as it does, on massive development assistance/budget support for
its survival. Indeed, it is quite odd that a WB grant was withheld in the caseof Uganda for passing legislation that had over 85% approval and yet similar
measures cannot be called for against a country like Ethiopia whose more!5than 50% recurrent budget comes from IFIs. In terms of international law on
the border issue, it is Ethiopia which is on the wrong; not Eritrea or theinternational community. Eritrea has no interest and innate proclivity todestabilize Ethiopia or the region for all the reasons explained above. Yet,
the author emphatically pleads: “… a firm rhetorical stance by theinternational community that it will not tolerate efforts to destabilize theregion, or destabilize Ethiopia specifically should be maintained as part ofefforts to reassure Ethiopia”. This conclusion, which emanates from wrong
assumptions and perceptions, is not tenable by any stretch of imagination. As
underlined above, circumventing the border ruling and postponing pressure
on Ethiopia in this regard is not warranted and only creates negative
precedence in international law.
7. Mr. Mosley also makes allusions to “Ethiopia’s concerns for avoiding
spillover in case of a disorderly political transition in Eritrea”. Ethiopia’slong-standing approach is in fact the opposite. Ethiopia has throughout
supported an assortment of subversive, if ineffective, armed groups against
Eritrea (RASDO, Kunama Liberation Front, Eritrean Jihad groups etc.).
Ethiopia also talks about an official policy of “regime change” in Eritrea.
Above all, Ethiopia remains glued to a zero-sum power game; wants to see
the continuation of the sanctions as its recent secret instructions to its
diplomats underscores, and was behind the false story associating Eritrea
with Reich Machar in the crisis in South Sudan.
The Way Forward
Mosley has tried to blaze a new road by provoking fresh perspectives andapproaches of “creative engagement”. But his effort did not produce a novel andviable road-map, hampered as it was, by flawed assumptions and principally, amisguided approach that relegated the pivotal issue of occupation to the backburner. In our view, the elements of a viable approach must revolve around andconstitute of the following:• The Horn of Africa region is obviously undergoing through a difficult phasein its collective history. On the one hand, the flash-points of internal and/orinter-State conflicts remain multiple and intractable. On the other hand, thisregion which connects the Middle East and Africa and that straddles majorroutes of global maritime traffic has huge economic potential in terms of acollective market of more than 150 million people; considerable strategic
resources and prime geopolitical advantages. These vantage points will beunleashed when the multiple problems besetting the region are incrementally!6and irrevocably resolved. The region’s external partners can be a force ofgood when they act not only to advance their interests but also the principal
interests of the peoples of the region in a balanced and judicious manner.
This includes both comprehensive and piecemeal measures to assist andfacilitate in the resolution of pending conflicts. The various players mustalso recognize that the old paradigm of client/patron States and subordinationof the region to narrow geopolitical exigencies will not, indeed, havepermanence and sustainability in a changing global reality.
• As expounded above, Ethiopia’s occupation of sovereign Eritrean territories
in flagrant violation of international law is not only untenable by all
standards but it is also fraught with endangering peace and security in theHorn of Africa region. As such, a “business as usual” approach of rewarding
Ethiopia with extensive support and assistance is counterproductive to thequest of peace and the long-term cooperation of the peoples of Ethiopia andEritrea. In the event, it behooves on the United States, more than everbefore, to review its policies vis-à-vis Eritrea and Ethiopia in regard to thesecardinal issues.
• Demonization and harassment of Eritrea through various means, including
the unlawful UN sanctions, will not promote the cause of regional peace andsecurity. The challenges of economic development and nation building in all
the countries of the Horn remain enormous, and, they should not be shrugged
off and underrated lightly.
In this context, it is imprudent andcounterproductive for external partners to try to influence the nationaldevelopmental trajectories through heavy-handed conditionalities andinterferences. The ground rules and matrices for sustainable partnership must
be better articulated and agreed through symmetric consultations andnegotiations.

!7