Japanese Multicultural Coexistence: Emblematic of a Liberal
Democratic Society?
Stephen Robert Nagy
Research Associate, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies
PhD Candidate, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University
I.

Introduction

Beginning in the 1980s and then in 1989, Japan saw a precipitous rise in the number offoreign residents coming to Japan as economic migrants (See Figure 1.0).1 The first wave of
foreign residents was fueled by the roaring economy which raged during the “Bubble
Economy” era.2 These foreign residents were deemed newcomers and acted as the labour poolin the 3 K (kiken, kitainai, kitsui) industries. 3 The second wave was instigated by the 1989
amendment of the Immigration-Control and Refugee-Recognition Act, enabling thosenon-skilled individuals of Japanese heritage and mostly from South America to come andwork in Japan.4 As a result, in concrete terms the population of foreigners living in Japan
has increased 1.5 times in the last 10 years and 7.0 times in the past 30 years.5
According to the Statistics Bureau of Japan, the number of foreigners living, working andstudying in Japan reached 1,973,747 in 2004 representing 1.6% of the total population. 6 This
number represented a 46% increase in the number of registered foreigners compared with
1994. This figure does not include the number of known illegal foreign residents whichaccording to the Ministry of Justice has climbed to 207,299. 7 Moreover, the number of foreign
residents could be much higher if we consider those children that come from international
1 See: Ministry of Justice’s Basic Plan for Immigration Control (3 rd edition)
http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/bpic3rd-02.html#2.htm(Accessed September 2007)
2 Shipper, A.W. “The Political Construction of Foreign Workers in Japan” in Critical AsianStudies. Vol. 34, No.1, pp.41-68
3 Ibid.
4 Yamanaka, Keiko. New Immigration Policy and Unskilled Foreign Workers in Japan.
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 1. (Spring, 1993), pp. 72-90.
5 Suzuki, Eriko. 2004.”Tabunkaka suru Nihon wo Kangaeru: Kokkyo wo Koeta Hito no Idou
ga Shinten suru Naka de.” in FIF Special Report No.8. Tokyo: Fujita Mirai Keiei Kenkyujo.
pp.16-18.
6 See: Japan Statistics Bureau Homepage for a break down of foreigner population growth.
(Accessed January 15th, 2006)
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2000/gaikoku/00/01.htm
7 See: Ministry of Justice homepage:
http://www.moj.go.jp/English/issues/issues05.html (Accessed September 16th, 2006)17

marriages euphemistically called daburu8 in Japan.9
Figure 1.0 Changes in the number of foreign nationals from 1950 to 2003 and its percentageof the total Japanese population

Source: Adapted from the Ministry of Justice’s Basic Plan for Immigration Control (3rd
Edition)http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/bpic3rd-02.html#2.htm(Accessed

September 2007)
As of 2005, Japan’s population began to decline owing to low fecundity, a reality that willaffect the country’s future economic vitality.10

The unpredictability of future social andeconomic prosperity is exacerbated by a rapidly graying population and the unabatedpressures associated with globalization, including economic interdependence and migration.11
In fact, according to the Keirendan’s 12 “Second Set of Recommendations on Accepting
8 Daburu is the Japanese pronunciation of “Double”. It refers to children who have one
Japanese parent and one non-Japanese parent. Children who have two parents from different
countries but whose parents are not of Japanese nationality are called international children
or just foreign children.
9 Suzuki, Eriko. 2004. “Gaikokujin Shuju Chiki ni miru Tabunka Kyoushakai no Kadai:“Kyousei” wa Nani Ka?” in FIF Special Report No.8. Tokyo: Fujita Mirai Keiei Kenkyujo.
pp.23-25
10 Economist, January 7th-13th 2005, pp. 29-30.； Economist, July 28th-August 3rd 2007, pp.
11, 24-27；Also see: Sakanaka Hidenori. “The Future of Japan’s Immigration Policy: a battle
diary” in Japan Focus. http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2396 (Accessed May 23rd, 2007)
11 Soumusho. 2006. Tabunka Kyousei no Suishin ni kan suru Kenkyukai Houkokusho: Chiiki
ni okeru Tabunka Kyousei no Suishin ni Mukete. Japan: Tokyo.p.5
12 Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) is a comprehensive economic organization
born in May 2002 by amalgamation of Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic
Organizations) and Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers' Associations). Its membershipof 1,662 is comprised of 1,343 companies, 130 industrial associations, and 47 regional18

Non-Japanese Workers” released March 27, 2007, the Japanese work force is expected to dropby 4 million workers in 10 years if nothing is done to curb the population decline.13 The UN
has also commented on Japan’s coming demographic crisis estimating that Japan needs toaccommodate for an influx of 600,000 immigrants a year to maintain its current standard ofliving (United Nations 2000). 14
The implications of these challenges are several-fold. Firstly, growing numbers of retirees willplace an inflated burden on the social welfare system. 15 More specifically, as 4 million
Japanese retire and begin enjoying what life offers outside the kaisha existence, they will not
only demand social insurance payments be paid for their many years of work, they will also
require medical care to treat health conditions associated with growing old.
Above and beyond the impact this graying population will have on social welfare system, theshift of the work force from tax contributors to tax consumers means that industries will belosing a vast capacity of knowledge and skilled workers who maintain the high-skilled
infrastructure of Japan, and contribute to the coffers of the national government. Importantly,
the removal of this body of knowledge and experience rich workers truncates Japan’s ability
to be globally competitive in two ways.
First and most obvious, is that there is a sudden removal of knowledge, experience andhuman networks from the work force which has the effect of removing a vast source ofeconomic potential. Second, this large body of tax consumers affects Japanese economic
prosperity in a more significant way, since economic resources, including workers andeducational institutes shift their activities to support

services, programmes andinfrastructure that meet the needs of this gray population. The effect of this shift in resources
is significant in that resources are directed away from industries and sectors of the economy
that make Japan globally competitive towards services industries related to health care forthe elderly etc.
Compounded by the low fecundity, Japan is predicated to see a large drop in its population
economic organizations (as of June 22, 2007).
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/profile/pro001.html (Accessed December 2007)
13 http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/2007/017.html (Accessed December 21st, 2007)
14 http://www.ipss.go.jp/pp-newest/e/ppfj02/ppfj02.pdf
Population predictions for future Japan (accessed December 21st, 2007)
15 The Prime Minister’s Commission on Japan’s goals in the 21 st Century. 2000. Japan’s

Goal’s in the 21st Century, The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment and Better
Governance in the New Millennium January 2000. Japan: Tokyo. pp. 5-6.
19

over the next 50 years, decreasing from its peak in 2006 of 127 million to 80 to 100 million in
2050.16 Out of this population, 35.7% will be those Japanese 65 plus, subsequently creating a
scenario in which a very large number of retired Japanese are being supported by an
insufficient number of tax paying individuals.17
To help mitigate the demographic challenges that lie ahead, Japan has used foreign workers
in a very limited capacity to compensate for her labour shortage.18 According to David
Bartram of the Center for Migration Studies of New York, foreign labourers constituted lessthan 1.5 percent of the total Japanese labour force in 2000. 19 Others like the Shuukan

Daiyamondo, a Japanese weekly news magazine further describe the role of foreign workers
and in particular, their role in the Japanese automobile industry as crucial and integral to theJapanese automotive and manufacturing industries profitability. 20 No matter which
hypothesis you accept vis-à-vis the role of foreigners and their contribution to the labour
market, we cannot dispute that the number of foreign residents is increasing in an
unrelenting fashion year-by-year.
In order to deal with the growing foreign resident issue as well as its associated problems, inMarch 2006 the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC) released
a report entitled “Research Report on the Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence” as a
response to the growing diversification of Japanese society that is occurring in concert withever increasing numbers of non-Japanese coming to Japan for work, studies, marriage or tosettle.

Multicultural coexistence, in contrast to the more widely recognized multiculturalism has
been adopted by numerous local governments in Japan and the MIAC as the panacea to

See Obuchi Cabinet Report, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/21century/report/pdfs/(Accessed December 21st, 2007 )17 National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. 2002. Population
Projections for Japan: 2001-2050, With Long-range Population Projections: 2001-2050. Japan:
NIPSSR. Pp.3-4.
18 See Ministry of Justice Homepage for a complete explanation of the Immigration andRefugee Recognition Act:
http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/IB/STANDARD/standard01.html(Accessed November 15th, 2005)
19 David Bartram. “Japan and Labour Migration: theoretical and Methodological
Implications of Negative Cases” International Migration Review, Vol. 34, No.1. (Spring2000) ,pp. 5-32.
20 See Shuukan Daiyamondo. June 6th, 2004.
16

20

mitigate the growing real and perceived stresses caused by a growing number of foreign
residents choosing to stay in Japan for extended periods of time or obtaining permanent
residency.
Questions remain though as to what exactly is multicultural coexistence, and how does it
differ from multiculturalism as seen in countries most experienced in multiculturalism suchas Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States? Whereas theaforementioned countries who practice multiculturalism view multiculturalism as a part ofimmigration, on the road to citizenship or a mid-point in the integration process,21 in Japan’s
multicultural coexistence discourse, immigration is a peripheral and distant debate at best,
being neither a road to citizenship, naturalization or immigration. In fact, multicultural
coexistence is a set of policies and practices primarily targeted at denizens22 or what Micheal
Walzer articulates as metics23. 24
The aim of this paper is to examine Japanese multicultural coexistence through the prism ofliberal democratic multiculturalism. The purpose of this examination is to locate Japan’s
multicultural coexistence policy within the liberal democratic multiculturalism debate, and to
examine whether or not Japanese multicultural coexistence adheres to the principles of theliberal democratic multiculturalism tradition.
To achieve this objective this paper will be divided into 4 sections. The first section locatedabove introduced the demographic changes that have prompted local governments and mostrecently the MIAC to adopt multicultural coexistence policies. The second section will thenintroduce the multicultural coexistence policy of the MIAC and some of its recommendations
21 Kymlicka, Will. 2003. “Immigration, citizenship, Multiculturalism: Exploring the Links”
in The Political Quarterly. Oxford, UK: The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. pp.
195-208.
22 Hammer, Tomas is professor emeritus at the Centre for Research in International
Migration and Ethnic Relations (CEIFO), Stockholm University. He proposed the term
“denizen” to denote the quasi-citizenship foreign residents of foreign residents characterized
by long-term residency, access to a host of rights, privileges and obligations that are
customarily associated with passport holders, i.e. full fledged citizens of a particular country.
See: Hammer, Tomas. 1990. Democracy and the nation state : aliens, denizens, and citizens
in a world of international migration Aldershot, Hants, England : Avebury Brookfield, Vt. :Gower Pub. Co.
23 Michael Walzer, Professor at the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced
Study describes metics as permanent residents who are denied citizenship. See: Walzer,
Michael. 1983. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. Oxford: Blackwell.
24 Chapman, David. “Discourses of Multicultural Coexistence (Tabunka Kyousei) and the“old-comer” Koreans of Japan”, Asian Ethnicity, Vol.7, No.1, February 2006, pp. 91-102
21

in terms of specific practices in order to orient the reader as to what multicultural coexistence
is in terms of policy and initiatives. The third section will then examine the debate which
exists between multiculturalism and liberal democratic principles. The purpose of this section
is to introduce the debate surrounding the complementary or uncomplimentary nature ofmulticulturalism and liberal democratic principles and whether equal outcome or equal
opportunity should be the barometer of liberal democratic multiculturalism. This position will
be subsequently used in the fourth section of this paper in order to conduct a critique ofJapanese multicultural coexistence using the prism of the compatibility of multiculturalism
and liberal democratic principles. The results of this critic will indicate whether or not
Japanese multicultural coexistence is emblematic of liberal democratic principles.
II.

Multicultural Coexistence

The origins of Japanese multicultural coexistence type activities can be traced to theimmediate post WW II environ in which cultural exchange activities occurred between the
United States and Japan. However, the “catch word” of multicultural coexistence surfaced in
the early 90’s, in particular the Kansai area of Japan.25 In the crucible of the Kansai area,multicultural coexistence activities blended the troika of social integration activities,
anti-discrimination initiatives and mutual cultural understanding activities in order tomitigate the challenges faced by Japanese vis-à-vis foreign residents, attenuate intercultural
friction and ameliorate the social integration of foreign residents.26
Multicultural coexistence activities eventually culminated in the establishment of theForeigners Earthquake Information Centre in January 1995, and the subsequentestablishment of the Tabunka Kyousei Senta- / Multicultural Coexistence Center in October
1995, a centre for information exchange, and the promotion of multicultural coexistence
related activities.27
Beginning in 2001, several local governments in Japan began to implement multicultural
coexistence plans including; Toyada City (2001), Tobashi (2002), Shinjuku Ward (2005),
Kawasaki City (2005), Iwata City (2005), Tachikawa City(2005), Adachi Ward (2006),
Hiroshima (2006), amongst others.28 Most recently in March 2006, the MIAC published a
Miyajima, Takashi. 2003. Kyousei ni Ikirareru Nihon he: Gaikokujin Jissaku to Sono
Kadai. Tokyo: Yuhikaku. pp.4-5.
25
26

Ibid.; Also see Menju Toshihiro. 2003. “Kokusai Kouryu/ Kokusai Kyouryoku to wa” inKokusai Kouryu/Kyouryoku Katsudou Nyumon Kouzai I: Kusa no Ne no Kokusai Kouryu to
Kokusai Kyouryoku. Menju, T. (eds). Tokyo:Akashi Shoten. Pp.37-41.
27

http://www.tabunka.jp/osaka/summn.html(Accessed January 29th, 2008)

28Yamamoto, K., Matsumiya, Asa. 2007. “Jichitai no Gaikokujin Jissaku ni kan suru Hikaku

22

report entitled “Report on the Research Group concerning the Promotion of Multicultural
Coexistence: Towards the Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence at the Local Level”.29 This
report was completed the following year by the publication of the “2007 Report concerning the
Research Group concerning the Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence”. 30
The MIAC defines multicultural coexistence in its most recent report entitled “Research
Report on the Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence”31 as the following:
Local multicultural coexistence refers to people of different culturesand ethnic backgrounds living alongside one another as contributors
to civil society, and the building of bridges between each otherthrough the acceptance of each other’s culture.32
The overall theme behind the MIAC statement is the acceptance of cultural differences andliving along side people of difference cultures and ethnicities. This statement can be examinedat three levels.
The first level of the MIAC multicultural coexistence statement relates to its target audience.
Examining the statement we can see that the Ministry targets all residents of Japan, without
prejudice for nationality, ethnicity and presumably other differences such as religion or race.
The statement does not expressly mention sexual orientation or gender. The inclusive natureof the multicultural coexistence statement is significant in that it considers all residents ofJapan to be the target of its policy initiative.
Whereas the first level of the MIAC multicultural coexistence statement above addresses thetarget audience, the second level stresses the objective of the statement, in particular, thecreation of a “local society”/ chiiki shakai

or local community in which all residents live

together as the same members of the community. Again, this position is emphasizing onenessor a shared role in living together in the same community as members of the same community.
Encompassing all residents, regardless of background, this focus on residency, resonates
inclusiveness and equality by eliminating hierarchical and role designations. By not stressing
Kenkyu: Aiichi Ken no Jirei wo Chushin ni” in Gaikoseki Jumin no Souka to Chiiki Saihen:
Tokai Chihou wo Jirei Toshi. Japan: Aiichi Kokuritsu Univeristy. Pp.131.
29 Soumusho. 2006. Tabunka Kyousei no Suishin ni kan suru Kenkyukai Houkokusho: Chiiki
ni okeru Tabunka Kyousei no Suishin ni Mukete. Japan: Tokyo.p.5
30 Soumusho. 2007. Tabunka Kyousei no Suishin ni kan suru Kenkyukai. Japan:Tokyo.
31 The Japanese name for this report is: Tabunka Kyosei no Suishin ni Kan suru Kenkyukai:

Chiiki ni okeru Tabunka Kyosei no Suishin ni Mukete.
32 Somusho.2006. Tabunka Kyosei no Suishin ni Kan suru Kenkyukai: Chiiki ni okeru
Tabunka Kyosei no Suishin ni Mukete. Tokyo
23

particular roles for foreign residents and Japanese residents, the MIAC statement overcomes
the dichotomization of Japanese and foreigners and as a result inculcates inclusiveness in its
statement, at least on paper.
The third and final level of the MIAC multicultural coexistence statement stresses the means
through which the MIAC objective will be achieved, namely through the mutual acceptance of
cultural differences. Through the advocating of mutual acceptance of cultural differences, we
can conclude that MIAC believes that it is cultural differences and ignorance of those culturaldifferences that impedes foreign and Japanese residents from feeling as if they form part ofthe same community.33 This is an interesting standpoint, especially for foreign residents, as
is insinuates that cultural savvy is an integral part of good local citizenship. Where this logic
crumbles is when we enquire as to the treatment and feelings related to oldcomers, thoseforeign residents of Japan who are of Korean, Taiwanese or Chinese ethnic extraction. This
will be covered in the final section in more detail.
The report also broaches the manner in which it will achieve this objective. It points out thesignificance of being Japanese, the need to adhere to international conventions, the economic
importance of multicultural coexistence and the concept of “Universal Design”34, which refers
to planning and building cities for everyone. In the Ministry’s view, the most ideal way topreempt intercultural friction between Japanese residents and the growing number of foreign
residents is to accept each other’s culture. In short, to build cities that are easy to live within,and convenient for people of multiple cultural backgrounds.
As a supplement to this definition of multicultural coexistence, in the March 27th 2006
Sogyokoku Dai 79 edition to local governments called the “Information concerning thepromotion plan of multicultural coexistence in local governments,”35 the Ministry stressed
In the MIAC Report, language, culture and customs are highlighted as the primary hurdles
that newcomers face in Japanese society. In particular, the Ministry stresses that these
deficiencies prevent foreign residents from being able to receive administrative services, being
informed about the local community to which they live and having a limited set of knowledge
concerning their community in general. Although it is very clear how language proficiency
would strengthen the newcomers’ ability to be independent, cultural savvy and awareness ofcustoms is more nebulous in that good citizenship is being associated with culture and custom
rather than just abiding by local laws and good local citizenship. See: Soumu 2006. p.4-5
34 For information on Universal Design refer to:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_design (Accessed October 11th, 2006)
35 The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications’ International Affairs Office for Local
Authorities released the Chiiki ni okeru Tabunka Kyousei Suishin Puran ni tsuite in March
2006 in order to jump start its new initiative to promote multicultural coexistence inmunicipalities across Japan. Interestingly, in interviews conducted with public officials in
33

24

that multicultural coexistence at the local government level was significant for five reasons.
Firstly, local governments are the immediate interface for foreign residents and thus the locus
of multicultural coexistence policy implementation. Second, the communiqué stressed theimportance of securing the human rights of foreign residents in an effort to abide by allinternational conventions. Third, the Ministry highlighted that multicultural coexistence canbe used as a tool to revitalize local municipalities. Fourth, multicultural coexistence was agood opportunity to raise the overall understanding of other cultures and lastly multicultural
coexistence was part of the creation of universally designed municipalities.
Part in parcel of realizing the above ideals, the Ministry put forth four areas in which it
consider essential pillars or the bedrock to the promotion of multicultural coexistence;(1)Communication Assistance, (2)Lifestyle Assistance, (3) The creation of multicultural
coexistence in local communities, and(4)The establishment of a multicultural coexistencesystem (See Table 1.0). The report also proposed for future research on the establishment ofan emergency network, the establishment of an information system and an enquiry as to themanner in which a multicultural coexistence promotion system could be implemented at the
local government level.
In short, multicultural coexistence as advocated by MIAC is a social integration system basedon the aforementioned pillars. What makes multicultural coexistence different from othersocial integration programmes is its emphasis on the acquisition of cultural savvy andlanguage proficiency. Moreover, where most social integration programmes are coeval witheither a step on the road to permanent residency, multicultural coexistence attempts to stave
off problems associated with linguistic and cultural gaps.36

Itabashi Ward, there were numerous questions as to the relevancy of instituting multicultural
coexistence from both the standpoint of necessity and ability. See Sogyokoku Dai 79 Go.
Heisei 18 Nen 3 Gatsu 27 Nichi.Chiiki ni okeru Tabunka Kyousei Suishin Puran ni tsuite. Jiji
Gyoseikyoku Kokusai Jitsucho.
36 Kymlicka, Will. 2003. “Immigration, citizenship, Multiculturalism: Exploring the Links” in
The Political Quarterly. Oxford, UK: The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. pp.
195-208.; Also see Inglis, Christine. “Multiculturalism: A Policy Response to Diversity”
Development and the Differentiation of Growth Patterns. History and Observation of Social“transformations” (HOST) Network, MOST/ Statistical Publishing House, Vietnam, 1996.
pp.28-29.
25

Source: Soumusho. 2006. Tabunka Kyousei no Suishin ni kan suru Kenkyukai Houkokusho:

Chiiki ni okeru Tabunka Kyousei no Suishin ni Mukete. Japan: Tokyo.

26

Source: Soumusho. 2006. Tabunka Kyousei no Suishin ni kan suru Kenkyukai Houkokusho:

Chiiki ni okeru Tabunka Kyousei no Suishin ni Mukete. Japan: Tokyo.

27

III.

Liberal Democratic Multiculturalism

Egalitarian interpretations of liberal democratic principles among scholars have a significant
impact on how they conceptualize concepts like multiculturalism and subsequently ourinterpretation of multicultural coexistence. This diversity stems from the varying degrees of
support for the prioritization of individual rights in the liberal democratic debate. It goes
without saying that there exists a continuum of opinions and interpretations vis-à-vis theextremes of liberal democratic principles, which manifest themselves as the poles ofcommunitarianism and individualism, and amongst those who find themselves in thesecamps, we find those sometimes more or less individualistic or communitarianistic than theircolleagues.
3.1 Liberal Democratic Multiculturalism as Equal Opportunity
On the one hand, Brian Barry, author of Culture and Equality and Professor of Philosophy
and Political Science at Colombia University exemplifies one end of the spectrum in theliberal democratic multiculturalism debate. He interprets liberalism as having equal
treatment or opportunity as one of its salient features.37 The central thrust of his argument
interprets liberalism in the classical sense, that is the “classical idea of liberal citizenship”
and the egalitarian “demands of social and economic citizenship” that defines egalitarianliberalism. 38 In this sense, Barry’s essential supposition with regards to a liberal democracyis that a liberal democratic society with liberalism as its founding principle strives toestablish judicial equality or as the author of A Theory of Justice John Rawls calls “justice as
fairness”.39 In other words, the essence of liberalism from this point of view is a judicial
system that is blind to colour, ethnicity, race or religious affiliation, a system in which all
citizens or residents are treated equally under the law. For these scholars, this impartial,
transparent and predictable system secures equal opportunity for all citizens.
Barry’s strong opposition to multiculturalism that advocates exceptions for minority groups isbased on his interpretation of liberal democratic principles. Specifically, he puts forth several
convincing arguments on how multiculturalism can create exceptionalism, and as a result
provides members of the same society with different cultural, ethnic or religious backgrounds
37 Barry, Brian. 2001. Culture and Equality: An egalitarian critique of multiculturalism.
Cambridge ,UK: Polity Press.
38 Freeman, Samuel. “Liberalism and the Accommodation of Group Claims” inMulticulturalism Reconsidered. Paul Kelly. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. pp.18-19
39 Rawls, John. “Justice as Fairness” in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 67, No. 2. (Apr., 1958),
pp. 164-194.; Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass,: Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press.
28

unequal access or privileges. This inequality of exceptionalism subsequently goes against thevery essence of Barry’s interpretation of liberalism which he interprets as judicial equality.
In Barry’s diatribe attacking multiculturalism he cites numerous examples in which aminority group compels the state/ local government to create “exceptions” to laws grounded in
the argument of rights to culture. For example, Sikhs in Canada argued successfully for theirreligious headdress (turban) to be worn in lieu of the traditional Canadian RCMP Stetton, on
grounds of religious expression and cultural protection.40 Another example (again Sikhs),
Sikhs in England fought successfully to be exempt from the law requiring that all motorcycle
riders must wear helmets. 41 Still another example of exceptionalism in Britain is thehalah/kosher slaughter of animals for those of Muslim and Jewish faith groups. 42 Each caseillustrates how minority cultural groups, on the basis of laws espousing multiculturalism canbe turned up-side down to create extra-territorial like “exceptionalism”, in which groups of
citizens are exempt from laws and obligations based on cultural, ethnic or religious grounds.
What Barry is espousing as part of his interpretation of liberal democratic principles andtheir complementary nature with multiculturalism is that liberal democratic principles
provide all who are subject to them with equality of opportunity. Laws neither proactively
discriminates, admonishes or prevents opportunity because they are uniform, transparent
and subject to all. Securing equal opportunity ensures that all adherents of liberal democratic
law can, it they choose receive equal and fair treatment.
In short, Barry’s interpretation of the appropriate balance between liberal democratic
principles and multiculturalism is one that emphasizes equality of opportunity. His argument
against multiculturalism policies stresses that current multiculturalism initiatives overenthusiastically foment the “recognition of differences” 43 and as a result, do not secure
equality of opportunity. Rather what develops is an unequal system that gives certain rights
and privileges to particular residents based on the premise that their cultural affiliation
requires them to be immune or exempt from certain legal obligations.

40 Kymlicka, Will. 2001. “The Theory and Practice of Immigrant Multiculturalism” in Politics
in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. New York:Oxford
University Press. pp.163-165.; Barry, Brian. 2001. Culture and Equality: An egalitarian
critique of multiculturalism. Cambridge ,UK: Polity Press.pp.44-50
41 Barry, Brian. 2001. pp.44-50.
42 Barry, Brian. 2001. pp.296-298.
43 Taylor, Charles. 1994. “The Politics of Recognition” in Multiculturalism. Amy Gutmann(ed.). United Kingdom: Princeton University Press. pp.25-73.
29

3.2 Liberal Democratic Multiculturalism as Equal Outcome
In contrast to Barry’s more pessimistic interpretation with regards to the compatibility ofmulticulturalism and liberal democratic principles, Will Kymlicka, Canadian Research Chairin Political Philosophy and author of several books on multiculturalism, liberalism andcitizenship sees liberal democratic principles and multiculturalism to be mutual compatible.
In a similar vein to Christian Joppke, Director of the Migration and Integration ResearchCenterattheAmerican

University

inParis,

Kymlickatracesmodernliberalmulticulturalism’s roots to the nexus of post WW II civil rights movements.44 According to
Kymlicka, the realization of civil rights for all racial groups provides the impetus to extol
liberal values in a broader context, and to encompass a reservoir of minority group rights
including women, homosexuals and cultural minority groups which in most cases formed the
body of the immigrant roots.45
In this view of liberal democratic multiculturalism, multiculturalism manifests itself as apolitical ideology chiseled out of the marble of the civil rights movement. More specifically,
Kymlicka espouses a liberalism which ensures the rights of all cultural, ethnic, religious andracial groups, arguing that an inclusive liberal society is epitomized by a legal framework
which is transparent and that guarantees and protects all citizens and residents fromdiscrimination based on the aforementioned categories.
Kymlicka’s views contrast those such as Barry who argue that multiculturalism andliberalism are ultimately incompatible; this collision of ideologies reaches a boiling point
when the minority attempts to fully manifest their cultural, ethnic, religious etc. practices
which create an obstacle to integration of the minority groups into the majority group of thehost society.
The Canadian Research Chair in Political Philosophy argues that flexibility with regards tolegal interpretations on laws that effect newcomers are not representative of exceptionalism,
where as Barry sees exceptions to laws as a fundamental flaw in multiculturalism policy. For
Kymlicka, “they are intended to make it easier for members of immigrant groups toparticipate within mainstream institutions of the existing society” and consequently facilitate
44 Joppke, Christian. Ethnic diversity and the state. The British Journal of Sociology 2004,
Vol. 55, Issue 3, pp.451-463.
45 Kymlicka, Will. 2005. “Liberal Multiculturalism: Western Models, Global Trends, andAsian Debates” in Multiculturalism in Asia. Will Kylmicka and Baogang He (Editors). New
York: Oxford University Press. pp.31-36
30

the integration process.46
This interpretation of multiculturalism policy echoes other scholars such as Paul Kelly, David
Miller and Iris Marion Young who asserts that liberal democratic multiculturalism should not
only be manifested as equal opportunity but also as equal outcome. 47 Where Kelly differsfrom Young, is in shifting the emphasis of Young’s argument from strict proportionality to anargument that favours “an egalitarian ethnos or broad social morality that combines bothoutcome and opportunity”.48 Miller on the other hand inserts the variable of “responsibly forcultural commitment” and how culture can affect one’s ability to realize equality ofopportunity by imposing “heavy costs” on the individual.49
Young, Kymlicka, Miller and Kelly all have subtle differences in their interpretations ofmulticulturalism and its place in liberal democratic principles but they do agree that solely
relying on the judicial equal to ensure equality of opportunity does not take into account theessential and integral link of culture and identity, and how this relationship affects the abilityof minorities to realize equal opportunity, even if it is legally entitled to them. What theyargue for is stronger adherence and a balance for not only equal opportunity but also equal
outcome.
Equal outcome takes into account the inevitable influence that cultural roots and identity
have and their impact on choices available in liberal democracies espousing multiculturalism.
In many cases, minority groups, which could include citizens, denizens or legally residing
foreign residents, may have to make the choice between forgoing their cultural identity in lieu
of the choice which allows them to integrate into the mainstream society. If this is indeed thecase, then minority groups are not in fact enjoying the same freedoms as their majority
compatriots or fellow residents, rather they are being forced to choose between abiding by andmaintaining the integrity of their mother cultures, or the latter choice of giving up theirfundamental obligations to their mother cultures in lieu of realizing equality of opportunity.
For example, in many Muslim traditions women are required or strongly encouraged to wear
a headscarf and in some case the full bodied burka to maintain their religious sense of
46 Kymlicka 2001, p.165
47 Kelly, Paul.2002. “Defending Some Dodos: Equality and/or Liberty? in Multiculturalism
Reconsidered. Paul Kelly (Ed.)United States: Polity Press. pp.63-74; Young, I.M. Justice and
the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pp.15-38.
48 Kelly, P. 2002 pp. 76
49
Miller, David. 2002. “Equal Opportunities and Cultural Commitments”. in
Multiculturalism Reconsider. Paul Kelly (ed.). United States: Polity Press. pp.52-55.
31

modesty and decorum. Similarly, Sikhs, who have taken the oath to be full-fledged Sikhs, arerequired to wear a turban, garner a short blade among other requirements. In both cases,
removal of the required cultural and especially symbolic accessories would be tantamount to
blasphemy and sacrilegious behaviour because both are culturally interpreted to be indelible
requirements to their particular traditions, not merely decorative, cultural or fashionable
accessories. If realizing equal opportunity entails compromising these fundamental beliefs,
then the so-called equal opportunity advocated by Rawls and Barry are actually limiting
opportunity.
In these cases, Kelly, Iris, Miller and Young all argue that equal outcome style liberal
democratic multiculturalism creates flexibility in how laws are interpreted to manage thechallenges of not marginalising minority cultures and groups by the mainstream majority. At
the same time, these laws ensure that minority cultures and groups are not receiving
extraordinary or special treatment compared to other citizens or residents. Liberal democratic
multiculturalism policy that is inculcated with this balance ensures that all citizens andresidents can realize equal opportunity through the support of equal outcome.
3.3 Liberal Democratic Multiculturalism as a blending of Equal Opportunity and Outcome
In a similar vein, I agree with Kelly, Miller, Young and Iris that solely relying on equal
opportunity secured through the judicial system is first, at a legal level, inadequate to deal
with the multifarious and exceedingly complex peculiarities of today’s multicultural societies.
Flexibility and some freedom to interpret law to mitigate the plethora of diversity that exists
in multicultural societies are logical and coherent from the standpoint of ensuring that all
residents and citizens can be mobilized for the benefit of the nation as a whole. In this sense I
am echoing the rationale used by the Australian government’s advocacy of multiculturalism
in its 1989 National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia. Specifically, the Australian
government at the time based their support for multiculturalism on three premises; rights tocultural identity, the rights to social justice and the need for economic efficiency which
involved the effective development and utilisation of the talents and skills of all Australians.50
Effectively, the Australian government argued persuasively that economic benefits would be
gained by all Australians through the recognition of the human capacity of all Australians
National Multicultural Advisory Council. 1995. Multicultural Australia: The Next Steps
Towards and Beyond 2000, A Report of the National Multicultural Advisory Council ,Canberra:AGPS.; Inglis, Christine. “Multiculturalism: A Policy Response to Diversity”
50

Development and the Differentiation of Growth Patterns. History and Observation of Social“transformations” (HOST) Network, MOST/ Statistical Publishing House, Vietnam, 1996.
pp.44-45.
32

which included cultural, professional and skill based capital.
What is more, outside the economic benefits that can be derived by broad based inclusion,
cultural

and

skill

based

recognition,

adopting

more

flexibleinterpretationsofmulticulturalism in a liberal democratic environ is also prudent from the standpoint of social
integration, ensuring that minority groups are represented at all levels of society and are notprone, out of choice or necessity to form ethnic ghettos and consequently self-segregate
themselves from mainstream society.
I argue that the equal outcome perspective advocated by the above authors is also importantfrom the standpoint of creating greater cultural tolerance and awareness nationwide. By
emboldening minorities groups to participant fully in mainstream society, despite culturaldifferences, equal outcome liberal democratic multiculturalism policies have the effect of
encouraging all resident/ citizens to contribute to mainstream society because they feel part ofmainstream society and are recognized by the mainstream for their contributions.
With these considerations in mind, I contend that liberal democratic multiculturalism should
indeed be a balanced mixture of ensuring equal opportunity but also equal outcome. This
process of accommodation and recognition should ensure that the majority or mainstream
cultural norms do not marginalise minority groups while at the same time, they should
ensure that minority groups do not act in extra-territorial fashion, avoiding their obligations
to the mainstream cultural values. Moreover, multiculturalism policies should not only
foment equal outcome but be sensitive enough to ensure the minority cultures or groups do
not use fundamental obligations to their mother cultures as a means to subject, control orabuse members of their own minority groups.
IV.

Liberal Democratic Multiculturalism Critic of Multicultural coexistence

Examining the policies and practices that fall under the rubric of multicultural coexistence we
can conclude that elements of liberal democratic multiculturalism do exist. These elements
become more coherent and salient when we examine them using policy approaches tomulti-ethnic states, namely assimilationism, differentialism and inclusionism elaborated
Christine Inglis, Director of the Multicultural Research Centre of the University of Sydney.51
4.1 Assimilationist, differential and inclusionary dimensions of multicultural coexistence
Multicultural coexistence in Japan in part embodies each kind of multi-ethnic state
51

Ibid.
33

multiculturalism policy. For instance, I maintain that the continuing vacuum incomprehensive programmes for foreign residents and naturalized Japanese epitomize thiscontinuing dilemma and the assimilationist multi-ethnic state approach to multiculturalism.
Also, the continued disingenuous and acerbic nature of naturalization requirements and thelack of recognition of ethnic schools,52 numerous cases of “Japanese only” and the ineligibilityof graduates from ethnic schools in Japan to apply for entrance examinations for Japanese
universities are the most visible examples of the assimilatory nature of Japanese society.
These practices compel non-Japanese residents and those who have naturalized to attend
national schools where the language of instruction is Japanese, to change their name to a
Japanese sounding name and to naturalise since non-Japanese, even Special Permanent
residents and permanent residents are not permitted to work at all levels of government, voteand until 1984, receive national health care, social insurance and other benefits that their tax
paying Japanese counterparts enjoyed. 53
The MIAC multicultural coexistence plan has put forward initiatives to overcome toassimilatory aspect of Japanese society, in particular workplace assistance and placement,
the legal recognition of non-Japanese schools, the recommendation to establish official JSL
programmes (Refer to Table 1.0) at the state level, international understanding programmes
and multicultural coexistence awareness programmes, however these have yet to be realized.
In the case that these recommendations are implemented they will be interesting initial
yardsticks helping us determine whether or not the assimilationism approach tomulticultural coexistence is being replaced by an approach which secures both equal
opportunity and outcome as advocated in the liberal democratic multiculturalism discussion
above.
We can also view multicultural coexistence from the lens of differentialism. In differentialism,
conflict is avoided through a process which minimizes contact with ethnic minorities. It can beillustrated when we examine Japan’s recalcitrant attitudes towards immigration, quotes byministries vis-à-vis the apparent challenge of accommodating greater populations of foreign
residents and the ubiquitous myth-like rhetoric which extols the uniqueness andincompatibility of Japanese with non-Japanese cultures, languages and ethnic groups. In
effect, this tendency to dichotomize Japanese and non-Japanese is as pervasive as it common
See: “Point of view: Schools for foreign children deserve support”, Nobuyuki Satou, Asahi
Shinbun http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200801280049.html( Accessed
52

February 14th, 2008)
53 Shipper, A.W. “The Political Construction of Foreign Workers in Japan”, in Critical AsianStudies. Vol. 34, No.1, March 2002, pp.44-68
34

practice.54
A. W. Shipper illustrates the differentialism perspective in his paper on the Political

Construction of Foreign Residents. His research shows that different ethnic groups arecompartmentalized into different segments of the Japanese economy with Zainichi Koreans
and Chinese being
self-employment,

overlyrepresented in restaurants, pachinko parlors and in

Nikkeijin (Brazilians and Peruvians) in manufacturing, and Asian

workers (primarily South East Asian) in manufacturing and in “entertainment”.55
Again, the MIAC has put forth initiatives to deal with these challenges. Proposals such as
work assistance programmes through the collaboration with Hello Work, the provision toforeign residents of assistance to found their own enterprises, measures to help with
unemployment and orientation programmes for housing and education, multi-lingual
administrative and lifestyle information and multilingual advisory services are noteworthy
examples of measures to combat the differentialism which exists. These programmes aim to
put foreign residents on an equal footing with their Japanese counterparts in an attempt tobreak down the differentiation that occurs do to language and cultural differences.
The success of these programmes will be gauged by a broader representation of foreign
residents across the Japanese labour market, possibility in the public sector in the case ofpermanent residents and education programmes that reflect the preexisting diversity that
forms part of Japan, namely the Ainu, Ryukyu and Zainichi minority groups but also theswelling numbers of newcomers that are naturalizing and taking up permanent residency.56
I argue that broader representation across the labour market is indicative of not only equalityof opportunity but also equality of outcome which embodies the liberal democratic
multiculturalism stance that advocates equal outcome as a key determinant.
Inclusion, the third approach to multi-ethnic states and multiculturalism described by Inglis
Burgess, Chris. “Maintaining Identities Discourses of Homogeneity in a Rapidly
Globalizing Japan” in Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies.
See: http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/Burgess.html (Accessed August 12th, 2005)
55 Ibid.
56 For information on the minorities that exist in Japan see: Weiner, Michael.1997. Japan’s
Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity. United States:Routledge.; Soo im Lee, Stephen
Murphy-Shigematsu & Harumi Befu.2006. Japan's diversity dilemmas : ethnicity, citizenship,and education. New York: Universe, Inc.; Lie, John. 2001.Multi-ethnic Japan. Cambridge,
54

Mass.: Harvard University Press.; Oguma Eiji, 1998. Nihonjin no Kyoukai: Okinawa. Ainu,
Taiwan, Chosen Shokuminchi Shihai kara Fukki Undo made. Tokyo: Shinyosha.
35is also incorporated into the multicultural coexistence plan promulgated by the MIAC.
Specifically, the MIAC attempts to promote inclusion of foreign residents by stressing
Japanese language and culture acquisition in local and state led programmes, multilingual
information and advisory services, broader inculcation into the Japanese labour market
through support for enterprises, collaborations with local chambers of commerce andprogrammes to ensure that foreign residents are enrolled in social welfare programmes.
These measures again are demonstrative of concrete steps to ensure that foreign residents arebeing given equal opportunity and access. Through their own initiatives and the tools
provided, foreign residents are now able to access the same services as their Japanesecounterparts and the opportunities that come with those services, programmes and so forth.
The problem with these initiates is that although they lay the foundation for equal
opportunity, they are noticeably vacuous in securing equal outcome. To elaborate, the MIAC
multicultural coexistence plan does provide the tools to secure equal opportunity but it has
not addressed problems that secure equal outcome. For example, will tax paying foreign
residents receive the same assistance as Japanese counter parts in securing employment,
founding an enterprise, housing assistance, representation in local resident associations andprotection against discrimination?
Still today there are daily cases in which non-Japanese are refused entrance into schools, torent apartments, to receive medical treatment because of language difficulties, violence,
defamation and upper limits to corporate or public services positions because of nationality
requirements. These upper limits to promotions and employment in the public sector are notunique to Japan as only a few nations allow non-nationals political rights and the ability torepresent their host nation. Where Japan differs is with regards to their Special Permanent
Residents who have only lived in Japan, may only speak Japanese and have little if any ties totheir ethnic motherlands. With 2nd and 3rd generation Special Permanent Residents still being
excluded from upper levels of public services and politic offices we can see there is still an
upper echelon to inclusionism in Japanese society that non-Japanese cannot breach. The
existence of this limitation is demonstrative of the truncated equal of outcome which exists forminority groups such as Zainichi. Until laws are enacted to secure equal outcome, I openly
question the extent that the current multicultural coexistence plan can foment inclusion andequal outcome, key characteristics of liberal democratic multiculturalism.

36

4.2 Demographic-descriptive, ideological-normative and programmatic-political dimensions ofmulticultural coexistence
Inglis, provides us an additional lens to look at multiculturalism in the liberal democratic
context and in the case of this paper, multicultural coexistence. According to Inglis, publicdebates centered on multiculturalism can be distinguished into three categories: thedemographic-descriptive, ideological-normative and programmatic-political. 57

For Inglis,

demographic-descriptive usages of multicultural are used to refer to the existence of
ethnically or racially diverse segments in the population of state. This kind of discourse
represents a perception that such differences have some social significance-primarily becauseof perceived cultural differences though these are frequently associated with forms ofstructural differentiation.
Programmatic-political usages of multiculturalism on the other hand refer to specific types ofprogrammes and policy initiatives designed to respond to and manage ethnic diversity. 58 In
short, these embody the arguments presented above related to equal opportunity and or equal
outcome in that they are specific initiatives to mitigate challenges included minority groups
in mainstream society without marginalizing them.
Lastly, the ideological-normative usage of multiculturalism is that which generates thegreatest level of debate since it constitutes a slogan and model for political action based on
sociological theorizing and ethical-philosophical consideration about the place of those with
distinct cultural identities in contemporary society. 59 This place in society refers to how
minority groups, cultural, religious or otherwise integrate into mainstream society and areable to maintain the practice of their mother cultures without violating the judicial code orbeing treated differently according to the law.
From the demographic-descriptive viewpoint, multicultural coexistence does pay homage tothe existing diversity that can be found in Japanese society. In the case of the MIAC reportand recommendations, minority groups such as Ainu, Ryukyu people and Zainichi Koreans
are not expressly mentioned, where the report does concentrate its efforts is on the
newcomers who began washing up upon the Japanese shores in the 1980s to present and

57 Inglis, Christine.1996. “Multiculturalism: A Policy Response to Diversity” Development

and the Differentiation of Growth Patterns. History and Observation of Social“transformations” (HOST) Network, MOST/ Statistical Publishing House, Vietnam, pp. 16-18.
58
59

Ibid.
Ibid.

37

those that will come in the future.60 There is recognition from the MIAC that cultural andlinguistic differences which exist between foreign residents and Japanese residents is
unintentionally marginalising foreign residents in the areas of education, the ability toreceive administrative services, in the area of housing, and emergency care.
The first two pillars of the Multicultural Coexistence Plan aims to overcome some of thisstructural differentiation through communication and lifestyle assistance initiatives as
outline in Table 1.0. These initiatives will have the effect of promoting equal opportunity ifthey are professionally organised, widespread, easily accessible and most crucially, if foreign
residents embrace these measures to substantially improve their ability to negotiate throughlife while living in Japan.
Japan’s interpretation of multicultural coexistence cannot be completely explained using thecommon referents of “multiculturalism”; namely public debates which fall into three
categories; demographic-descriptive, programmatic-political or ideological-normative.
First, in terms of the demographic-descriptive debate, the salient feature of this category is
the recognition of ethnic or racially diverse segments of the population. In Japan’s case, avacuum exists when it comes to discussing ethnicity or racial diversity. This can be illustrated
in several examples. First, the National Census conducted every five years does not ask
questions with regards to ethnic or racial background. Naturalised citizens are not quantified
in the census unintentionally contributing to the vacuum in the tabulation of data which
recognizes ethnic and racial diversity among Japanese nationals.
Second, the same census does not recognize indigenous peoples such as the Ainu and Ryukyu
ethnicity as a population that exists within Japan that are deemed ethnic or racial minorities.
Third and more widely spread is the ubiquitous image of Japan as an ethnically andculturally homogeneous society.61 For example the Basic Plan for Immigration Control (2ndedition) published by the Ministry of Justice in 2000 also illustrates Japan’s concerns with the
influx of foreigners and their impact on the Japanese society.
If you trace back the history of Japanese society and give thought to60

Kibe, Takashi. “Differentiated Citizenship and Ethnocultural Groups: A Japanese Case” inCitizenship Studies, Vol.10, No.4, 413-439, September 2006

61 Quote from the Ministry of Justice’s The Basic Plan for Immigration Control (The 2ndedition) I Introduction -- Social changes and immigration control
http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/bpic2nd-01.html (Accessed June 15th, 2006)38

the Japanese people's perception of society, culture and their
sensitivity, it would not be realistic to suddenly introduce a large
number of foreign labor. Rather, it is necessary for Japan to aim at
maintaining the vitality of the socio-economy and enhancing tangible
and intangible affluence of social life by accepting foreigners in a waythat would cause little friction with society. We should solve theproblems step by step; the scope of acceptance (In which fields do welike to accept foreigners?), the conditions (What experience orbackground should foreigners have in order for Japanese people to live
together with them in harmony?), and the treatment (What social-life
environment can we offer to the foreigners once they are accepted?)On the other hand, ethnic diversity is recognized when Japan views its foreigner population,
especially the categorization of foreigners into Zainichi Kankokujin.
Clearly, Japanese multicultural coexistence does not encompass the first category ofmulticulturalism in that it does not recognize ethnic or racial diversity. It also implies thatwithout the recognition of ethnic and racial diversity, even amongst its own nationals thatstructural impediments may exist which do not take into account diversity amongst Japanese.
In the case of programmatic-political debates around multiculturalism, here again we see
multicultural coexistence manifests itself into two different ways. On the one hand,programmes are being instituted at the local government level in various municipalities acrossJapan which contributes to more open diversity and recognition of this diversity by sponsors ofthese events but also by participants. Mutual understanding programmes, ethnic festivals,
ethnic classes, language classes, annual parades and so forth are emblematic of initiatives
associated with these objectives. These cultural and ethnic initiatives underpin the types ofactivities that are being proposed and implemented by local governments to mitigate andalleviate some of the real and perceived inter-ethnic and inter-cultural friction that exists.
From this standpoint, these activities embody the multiculturalism programmatic-political
discourse that Inglis asserts by attempting to stave off both intercultural and interethnic
frictionthrough cultural exchange programmes intended to promote mutual cultural

understanding, language exchanges, community spirit and dialogue.
On the other hand, the programmes implemented by local governments are in most cases
patch-work, make-shift programmes that are staffed with amateur teachers, event managers,

39monolingual and mono-cultural representatives that do not have the education, experience orbackground to successfully manage ethnic and racial diversity.
For example, Keiko Yamanaka, specialist in transnational migration and social transformationin Japan of the University of California describes the “prevailing neglect” on the part of thenational government and many industries that depend heavily on immigrant labour. Morespecifically, Yamanaka makes the case that it is not the local government or national
government that creates and implements programmes to manage ethnic and racial diversity,rather local citizens, NPOs and women who are the primary care giver and supplementary
education. 62

Staffed with women who have lived abroad, raised children abroad, theseselfless women according to Yamanaka’s unstructured discussions expressed dismay andinadequacy with regards to filling the gap created by the neglect government and needs ofimmigrant children. 63
In a similar vein, the absence of programmes instituted by ministries such as the Ministry of
Education, Sports, Culture, Science and Technology (MEXT), in particular officially sponsoredJapanese as a second language programme reinforce the notion Japan’s multicultural
coexistence lacks a programmatic-political dimension that seriously meets the needs of foreign
residents of all categories. 64 The absence of specific programmes like a JSL programme which
is designed to ensure that foreign residents can have equal opportunity is indicative of a lack ofconcrete steps being taking to secure at minimum, equal opportunity. Without advanced
Japanese language skills, foreigners and their progeny are at a distinct disadvantage in termsof finding work, entering high education institutes and accessing services provide through thelocal government office. Based on this discrepancy in education and the lack of unwavering
support for the protection of all residents, it seems that at the programmatic-political level ofmulticulturalism policy in a liberal democratic society, the current plan does not completely
62 Yamanaka, Keiko. “Immigrant Incorporation and Women’s Community Activities inJapan: Local NGOs and Public Education for Immigrant Children” in Local Citizenship in
Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in Comparative Perspective. Takeyuki Tsuda (ed.).
United States of America: Lexington Books. Pp.97-119.
63 Ibid. pp.113
64 In many municipalities a body of volunteers supplement local government International
Exchange Sections’ International Exchange activities which include volunteer Japanese
language classes, municipally sponsored Japanese conversation class and similarly gearedclasses. The Japanese language classes rarely are geared for advanced language acquisition
necessary for upward mobility in Japanese society. Although similar to American volunteer
language classes, this approach is in stark contrast to Canadian programmes that are public
programmes supported by the Multiculturalism Act and the Constitution. See: Kymlicka, Will.
“Immigration, Citizenship, Multiculturalism: Exploring the Links. The Political Quarterly
Publishing Company Co. Ltd. 2003. 195-20840

secure equality of opportunity and outcome.
Examining the ideological-normative dimension of multicultural coexistence in Japan as
represented by the MIAC’s Multicultural Coexistence Plan,

it is evident that it does not

attempt to engage in a dialogue as to the appropriate place for minorities in Japanese society.
In fact, the plan does not discuss foreign residents in terms of forming a minority which exists
in Japan; rather it inserts foreigners all into one category and consequently marginalises all
their identities and cultures.
This lack of recognition of diversity in mainstream Japanese society, and the absence ofinitiatives in the MIAC’s Multicultural Coexistence Plan to advance the rights of non-Japaneseprecipitates a situation in which foreigners have the choice between exclusion or assimilation.65
In the case that they decide to retain their mother culture and language they remain excluded
from Japanese society because of the lack of recognition of diversity. On the other hand, if
foreign residents make the choice of adopting a Japanese persona, they are assimilated into
Japanese society.
At the ideological-normative level, for both of the above cases the policies and initiatives
advocated by the MIAC’s Multicultural Coexistence Plan do not encourage equality ofopportunity or equality of out come. In contrast, the vacuum in diversity related initiatives that
secure the rights of foreigners to maintain their mother culture and language, while at thesame time enjoy the rights and responsibilities of their fellow Japanese residents leave us tothe conclusion that multicultural coexistence is not emblematic of liberal democratic
multiculturalism principles.
V.

Conclusion

This paper began by introducing the demographic and associated pressures that havecompelled Japan to adopt a multicultural coexistence plan. It then outlined the major
components of the MIAC’s Multicultural Coexistence Plan which was followed by a discussionof the debate which exists vis-à-vis liberal democratic multiculturalism. As a result of this
discussion, I maintain that liberal democratic multiculturalism is a sensitive blending of
ensuring equal opportunity and equal outcome for all residents, based on this conclusion the
final section of this paper critiqued multicultural coexistence through the prism of liberal
democratic multiculturalism.
Chapman, David. “Discourses of Multicultural Coexistence (Tabunka Kyousei) and the“old-comer” Koreans of Japan”, Asian Ethnicity, Vol.7, No.1, February 2006, pp. 91-102
65

41

Critiquing multicultural coexistence using liberal democratic multiculturalism as abarometer demonstrated that multicultural coexistence as currently conceived is notemblematic of a liberal democratic multicultural society. The reasons are several-fold. First,
Japan is officially still not a country of immigration and subsequently, the multicultural
coexistence plan put forth by the MIAC does not inculcate immigration related objectives into
its grander scheme. It does not advocate immigration or naturalisation to Japan. It also does
not recognize that Japan is becoming increasingly and inevitably more diverse in terms of
ethnicity, religiosity, racially, linguistically and culturally. Until there is open and widespreadrecognition of the current and growing diversity in Japan it will be difficult to implement
equal opportunity and outcome stylized multicultural coexistence initiatives.
Second, since the multicultural coexistence plan was primarily designed with denizens,
metics and newcomers in mind, most of its initiatives concentrate on social integration,
especially on bridging the linguistic and cultural gap that the Ministry deems to be the mostbasic component to successful and frictionless integration.
Third, equal opportunity and outcome are not key components of the multicultural
coexistence plan because a large number of foreigners who currently live in Japan do not holdpermanent residents or are Special Permanent residents. This is also an importantconsideration as to why equal opportunity and out come have been unsuccessful graphed onto
the current multicultural coexistence plan. More specifically, only permanent residents,
Special permanent residents and Nikkei’s have complete freedom as to choosing their place of
employment. The rest have sponsored visas, meaning that they have much less choice inwhere they work and consequently realizing equal opportunity and outcome. To overcome thisinflexibility, the MIAC will have to work in concert with the Ministry of Justice to develop
more flexibility visa arrangements.
Fourth, as stressed throughout this paper, most of the initiatives suggested by the MIAC are
not officially organised, standarised long-term integration measures. Most in practice are
ad-hoc, amateur led initiatives which do provide support, but not the kind that allows
beneficiaries to reach the same levels as their Japanese counterparts. Hence, continued
discrepancies in the areas of equal opportunity and outcome when comparing foreign
residents, naturalised Japanese and Japanese.
Kymlicka describes “national citizenship” as becoming increasing obsolete and hence he42

advocates the development of a new way of assigning rights and responsibilities, perhaps
based on international law and human right norms that does not presuppose that immigrants
will or should become “national citizens”.66 Perhaps his suggestion should be heeded by the
MIAC in a manner in which it proposes more courageous steps to not only mitigate theproblems associated with the integration of foreigners in the short run, but in advocating a
multicultural

coexistence

plan

that

mirrors

thestrengthsofliberaldemocratic

multiculturalism; namely a sensitive balance between equal opportunity and equal outcome
for all residents that has the affect of mobilising all residents of Japan for the economic andsocial benefit of Japan.
By borrowing some of the successful strategies that have served traditional countries ofimmigration such as Australia, Canada and the United States such as making naturalisation
procedures more transparent and less assimilatory, creating public infrastructure such as
JSL programmes that help foreign residents meet language and cultural requirements, andequal access to civil rights (freedom of speech and association), social benefits (such as publichealth care and unemployment insurance) and the labour market (except for a few civil
service positions), as well as full protection of strong anti-discrimination laws regarding
housing and employment, foreign residents may “gain the psychological and legal security
that comes with citizenship, they will be more likely to put down roots, to contribute to local
community initiatives, to care about how well their children are integrating, to invest in the
linguistic skills and social capital needed to prosper, and more generally to develop stronger
feelings of Japanese identity and loyalty.67

66 Kymlicka, Will. “Immigration, Citizenship, Multiculturalism: Exploring the Links. The
Political Quarterly Publishing Company Co. Ltd. 2003. 195-208
67 Ibid.
43