23EXPORT–IMPORT BANKTHE EXPORT–IMPORT BANK SHOULD BE ABOLISHED
Veronique de Rugy

T

he Export–Import Bank of the United States (EXIM or the Bank) is a federal
agency that was established in 1934 to provide export subsidies through taxpayer-backed financing to private exporting corporations, as well as to foreigncompanies buying U.S. exports, with the ostensible purpose of promoting American
exports, creating jobs, supporting small businesses, improving U.S. competitiveness, and protecting U.S. taxpayers.
In 1986, David Stockman, who served as Director of the Office of Management
and Budget under President Ronald Reagan, wrote that:
Export subsidies are a mercantilist illusion, based on the illogical proposition
that a nation can raise its employment and GNP by giving away its goods forless than what it costs to make them.… Export subsidies subtract from GNP
and jobs, not expand them…. Moreover, in 1981, the EXIM’s practice was tobestow about two thirds of its subsidies on a handful of giant manufacturers,
including Boeing aircraft, General Electric, and Westinghouse.1

Since then, very little has changed. EXIM operates in effect as a protectionist
agency that picks winners and losers in the market by providing political privileges to firms that are already well-financed. By doing so, it risks taxpayer funds
as it stymies economic growth. This reality is not altered by the argument that the
Bank could be a weapon to fight China—an argument that rests on a misguided— 717 —

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understanding of what competitiveness is and how it is achieved and maintained.
The Bank should be abolished.
BACKGROUND

The Export–Import Bank was created in 1934 as an export credit agency (ECA)
to finance trade with the Soviet Union. It was reorganized as an independent government agency in 1945. President Franklin Roosevelt’s Executive Order 6581
gave it “the power to aid in financing and to facilitate exports and imports andthe exchange of commodities between the United States and other Nations or theagencies and nationals thereof” to create jobs in the United States.2
EXIM has four main tools with which to pursue these goals: loan guarantees,
working capital guarantees, direct loans, and export-credit insurance. Importantly,
for four years starting at the end of 2015, the Bank became incapacitated. Lacking
a quorum for its board of directors, it could not extend financing that exceeded $10
million per project. That put an end to about 85 percent of the Bank’s financing
obligations. As the numbers below show, the Bank hasn’t yet recovered from thatlong interruption.
Total Bank authorizations in recent years have gone from $12.6 billion in fiscal
year (FY) 20073 to $21.5 billion in FY 20144 to $5.2 billion in FY 2022.5 A betterway to understand these numbers is to look at the amount of financial exposure
the Bank has—that is, the risk the Bank takes for which taxpayers are ultimately
responsible. During this same period, the Bank’s total exposure increased from$57.42 billion in FY 20076 to $112.1 billion in FY 20147 and then fell to $41.3 billion
in FY 20218 and $35.4 billion in FY 2022.9
CLAIMS VS. THE FACTS

Supporters of EXIM make many claims about the benefits that our nation andcitizens derive from having an Export Credit Agency. These claims, however, arenot supported by the facts.
The Bank is an example of government-granted privilege. Traditionally,
one of EXIM’s top 10 domestic beneficiaries is Boeing, which at a 40 percent shareof total loan authorizations dwarfs the 25 percent share for all small businesses thatreceived EXIM’s services combined.10 On the foreign side, things are not much different: The subsidized financing largely benefits very large companies like Mexico’s
Pemex, Ireland’s Ryanair, and Emirates Airlines that either collect massive subsidies as state-controlled entities or could easily access private financing.11 Americanbusinesses that lack political connections are put at a competitive disadvantage by
their own government because they are forced to compete against both domestic
and foreign businesses that enjoy access to subsidized loans.12
The Bank does not maintain or create jobs. EXIM’s supporters point to thenumbers of new jobs that they claim have been created through federal spending,— 718 —

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but the unseen effects are ignored. For example, funding for one industry or firmmight take more jobs away from other industries and firms, resulting in a net job
loss even though jobs are created for the financed firm. At best, it could be said thatthe Bank redistributes employment from unsubsidized firms to subsidized firms.
However, with very rare exceptions, most exports financed by EXIM would
have taken place without government support. Many companies have said sothemselves;13 the procurement happens before the decision to get government
support; and, as noted above, most EXIM deals go to large companies with easy
access to capital. Thus, the agency is taking credit for jobs that would have existed
in any event.
The Bank does not promote exports. EXIM presidents commonly claimthat the agency’s mission is to support U.S. jobs by facilitating American exports
through its export-financing tools. However, trade economists have long known
that export credit subsidies merely redistribute exporting opportunities to subsidized firms instead of increasing the net number of exports—something that also
slows economic growth.14
Even more telling is the performance of the U.S. economy and American exports
during the four years when EXIM lacked a board quorum (2015–2019) and wasbarred from finalizing deals in excess of $10 million. During that time, EXIM authorizations fell from $21 billion in FY 2014 to $3.6 billion in FY 2018 (adjusted for
inflation).15 However, also during that time, regular big-ticket EXIM beneficiaries
continued to benefit from their easy access to capital markets and still had theability to finance their export activities.
Further, U.S. exports were utterly unaffected by the reductions in the Bank’s
activities.16 U.S. unemployment fell to a level not seen in half a century, but exports
soared with financing provided by commercial lenders. The only negative economic impact from EXIM’s lack of a board quorum was its effect on the Bank
itself. This contradicts EXIM’s claim that its activities are crucial for the successof U.S. exporters and economic growth. Instead, it shows that economic growthis the best booster of U.S. exports and job creation and that it does not depend on
EXIM subsidies.
Subsidy-boosted exports do not boost economic growth. EXIM’s primaryreason for existing is to increase exports, as if more exports themselves represent
more jobs and economic growth. Recent expressions of this fallacious belief can befound in a book by former EXIM President Fred Hochberg. According to Hochberg,“We know that trade, and exports in particular, can have a big impact on jobs.”17
While this is a common misconception about exports, it is one worth correcting.
As trade economists know, exports are a cost to the economy: They subtract from
GDP. Imports, on the other hand, add to GDP. If the U.S. could acquire all of theimports that it currently gets without exporting anything in exchange, that would
be the best of all worlds. Unfortunately, one reason that foreigners are so eager— 719 —

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to sell us their goods is that they want our dollars to buy our debt, invest in the
country, and buy our exports. That is why exports drop when overall imports drop.
Exports promote U.S. economic growth only if the value of the resources used to
produce them is less than the value of what we receive as imports in exchange forthose exports. By subsidizing American exports, EXIM causes too many resources
to be devoted to producing exports. As a result, the total value of our exports ismade larger than it would otherwise be to obtain any given amount of imports.
In other words, EXIM thus compels American taxpayers to subsidize foreigners’
standards of living at no appreciable benefit to the U.S.
Unfortunately, this misunderstanding and the constant glamorization ofexports and their impact on jobs and growth are used to justify government support for some exports (on average, 98 percent of exports are not backed by EXIM
financing). It also is extremely unfair. Because capital will tend to shift from unsubsidized companies to subsidized companies (taxpayers foot the bill if companies
backed by the Bank default), unsubsidized export companies face higher borrowing
costs, which could translate into fewer jobs in unsubsidized companies or lower
pay for their workers.
The Bank does not promote growth by leveling the playing field. EXIM’scharter stipulates that one of its missions is to support U.S. exports with the goalof creating jobs and promoting economic growth through the provision of export
financing via its loan-guarantee and insurance programs. In particular, EXIM is
to intervene in cases “where such support is necessary to level the competitive
playing field for U.S. exporters due to financing provided by foreign governments
to their exporters.”18
As a result, EXIM for years has been focused primarily on what other countries’
ECAs are doing and how much financing they are providing.19 A reading of any of
EXIM’s Competitiveness Reports shows that the Bank frames the “competitiveness” of the U.S. economy and exporters in extremely narrow terms—specifically,as the amount of business that foreign ECAs are doing relative to EXIM.
The report for 2020 features striking evidence of this mindset. For instance,
lamenting the “nearly four-year hiatus” during which the Bank lacked a board
quorum to approve large deals, EXIM’s leadership maintains that these years“severely hindered EXIM’s ability to support the competitiveness of U.S. exporters.” During that time, foreign ECAs “fundamentally evolved their philosophy andsubstantively expanded their roles,” and “the United States must work hard to keeppace.” The Bank goes on to promise that it will “re-emerge from the years of beingout of the long-term export finance business and restore its standing as one of theworld’s most competitive ECAs.”20
In other words, EXIM bureaucrats appear to believe that economic growthand jobs result not from a favorable tax and regulatory environment, but from a
victory in hand-to-hand subsidy combat between government banks. The Bank’s— 720 —

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Competitiveness Reports include a table that ranks countries by ECA financing
volume. An adjacent map displays the most “competitive” ECAs around the world,
implying that the U.S., which ranked eighth in terms of volume in 2019 (the year
before the pandemic), is losing ground compared to more “hyperactive” (ranked
higher) ECAs.21 The implication is that ECA export financing improves the overall
health of the export market and thereby fuels economic and job growth—which
it does not do.
l

l

l

l

Consider Italy’s hyperactive ECA. In 2019, Italy was ranked first among
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries in terms of volume and was highlighted in the report as an example
for other countries to follow. Yet the Italian ECA’s hyperactivity appears tohave had little impact on that country’s economic growth or employment.
Germany was the second-highest ranked OECD country on this list in 2019.
While Germany had respectable economic growth at the time of the report,
only 0.7 percent of its exports were backed by ECA financing. These data
provide little support for the argument that Germany’s strong economic
performance has much, if anything, to do with the German ECA.
China by all accounts had a hyperactive ECA: It ranked first on the list in
2019. ECA-backed exports in China represented 2.1 percent of exports
backed by government financing. Whatever one perceives as China’s
economic successes, it is hard to argue that the main driver of China’s
exports is its ECA.
The report highlights the eighth-ranked U.S. for its unusually low levelof EXIM-backed exports. At the time of the report, the U.S. economy
was thriving, wages and employment were up, and the country still had
flourishing trade—but it was also striving when EXIM was mostly dormant.
In other words, one cannot argue that the bustling economy was the resultof EXIM support.

Even in countries touted as leaders in relying on ECA financing, ECA-backed
exports are never more than 4.7 percent of total exports. Moreover, even that is
an outlier. For 23 of the 28 countries on this list (including both China and theU.S.), the share of exports backed by ECA financing is less than 2 percent. This
fact suggests that—contrary to the claims of EXIM’s advocates—ECA financing isirrelevant to the overall health of the export market as well as to economic growth.
This is consistent with what economists know about the impact of subsidies on
economic growth.

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The Bank does not support small businesses. Most of the Bank’s funding
goes to large corporations such as Boeing—a recipient of 68 percent of EXIM’sloan guarantees and 30 percent of EXIM’s overall activities.22 Over the years, 10
large domestic corporations have received roughly 65 percent of the Bank’s total
assistance (it is closer to 70 percent today). More than 99.9 percent of U.S. small
businesses receive no benefits from EXIM and are often placed at a competitive
disadvantage by the subsidies doled out to larger competitors. In fact, the Bank’s
support for small businesses has declined from $2.3 billion in FY 201923 to “morethan $2.0 billion” in FY 202024 to only $1.6 billion in FY 2021.25 This decline
occurred amid a pandemic that hit small businesses especially hard, and it continues today.
The Bank is not a good deal for taxpayers. The Bank’s accounting practices
are deficient, and the Bank miscalculates its budget savings. While it claims thatits operations will save taxpayers $14 billion over the next decade, the Congressional Budget Office has found that EXIM programs will actually cost taxpayers$2 billion.26 Numerous audits done by the Bank’s internal inspector generalalso show that the Bank’s risk analyses, default assumptions, internal reporting
procedures, and financial reporting practices are not reliable enough to ensure
the safe stewardship of taxpayer funds and responsible management of EXIM’svast portfolio.27
FAILING TO MEET THE CHINA CHALLENGE

These days, to get whatever expansion of government one wants or to justify a new government activity, one has only to declare that more government
intervention is needed to help fight China. President Trump used this argument
to secure reauthorization of EXIM in 2019. Today, President Biden argues thatthe Bank could be a powerful weapon in the government’s geoeconomic arsenal
against China.
The rationale is that this will prevent China from dominating the global market
with its subsidies and will boost American jobs and manufacturing. The problem is that cynics who support such policies make no effort to adopt a serious
strategic plan to achieve this goal. For instance, how can EXIM help us to fightChina while state-owned Chinese companies like China Air have been some of thecompanies most subsidized by EXIM?28 Furthermore, it has now been four years
since Congress instructed EXIM to focus on China, but there has been no fundamental change in the way EXIM operates or the companies to which it extends
taxpayer-backed financing: Deals related to the aircraft industry still dominate
the Bank’s portfolio.
In addition, there is no evidence that EXIM has altered its intense focus oncompeting with other governments’ ECAs. If the Bank were serious about competing against China, it would be targeting the low-income markets where China— 722 —

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has been making its most important investments. Instead, its obsession with other
ECAs has caused EXIM to direct the vast majority of its funding to large foreigncompanies in higher-income nations. Data available on the OECD website showthat the level of ECA financing in high-income countries in 2019 was more thandouble the amount in low-income countries.29 The same was true for previous years.
In other words, EXIM and the ECAs of the OECD are competing in markets wherecommercial lending is abundant—a trend that continues today.
The failure to deliver on its congressionally imposed obligation—however misguided that obligation may be—is also noticeable in the fact that EXIM’s China
and Transformation Exports Program (CTEP) extended only $141.3 million in
financing in FY 2022—a fraction of the $27 billion it is supposed to deliver by theend of 2026.30 The Bank’s efforts have also included a misplaced focus on emerging
technologies such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence, which do notneed EXIM financing because their foreign sales attract commercial financing
without government support. The lack of demand for EXIM products could also
be reflected in the Bank’s authorization of $5.2 billion in loan guarantees and support in FY 2022,31 down from its FY 2012 peak of “over $35.7 billion” during the
Obama Administration.32
This lack of activity also extends to the semiconductor industry, which has been
picked as a focal point for a governmentwide industrial policy effort to counter
China’s ambition to dominate that industry. Ironically, at the same time that somewant to become more like China to fight China, China’s leaders are realizing that
their heavy-handed semiconductor subsidies are weakening the Chinese economy.
According to Bloomberg News:Top [Chinese] officials are discussing ways to move away from costly
subsidies that have so far borne little fruit and encouraged both graft andAmerican sanctions, people familiar with the matter said. While somecontinue to push for incentives of as much as 1 trillion yuan ($US145 billion),other policymakers have lost their taste for an investment-led approach that’s
not yielded the results anticipated, the people said.33

This development is not surprising to those who understand basic economics.
The goal of using EXIM as a weapon against China was a bad idea in the first place.
Even if it were a good idea, for it to succeed would have required that EXIM stop
serving the clients it has been serving for decades. That has not happened, and it
will not happen.
CONCLUSIONThe Export–Import Bank should be abolished because it wastes taxpayer money,
adversely affects American businesses, and does not promote economic growth— 723 —

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effectively. Furthermore, any attempts to reorient the agency and make it a weapon
with which to fight against China are going to fail. Economic fights and national
security fights are not won with subsidies.

THE CASE FOR THE EXPORT–IMPORT BANK
Jennifer Hazelton

In 1986, President Ronald Reagan signed a bill extending the charter of theExport–Import Bank (EXIM) by an additional six years. In a signing statement
attached to the bill, the President declared that “[t]his sends an important signal
to both our exporting community and foreign suppliers that American exporters
will continue to be able to compete vigorously for business throughout the world.”34
As a candidate for President, Ronald Reagan was opposed to EXIM, but as President, he learned the challenges America’s businesses face when competing foropportunities overseas, and his position on EXIM evolved. As President Reagan
once famously remarked, “Why would I want our businesses competing with two
hands tied behind their backs?” On January 30, 1984, the President said, “Exports
create and sustain jobs for millions of American workers and contribute to thegrowth and strength of the United States economy. The Export–Import Bank contributes in a significant way to our nation’s export sales.”President Reagan was exactly right. EXIM provides a mechanism that Americancompanies can use to vie for projects that would otherwise be out of reach, notably
deals that the banking industry won’t finance because of the risk associated withthe host country or because the host nation itself requires a sovereign guarantee
in order to submit a bid. EXIM is the only American vehicle that can provide thatsovereign guarantee.
Since Reagan’s presidency, the global economic order has shifted dramatically,
and a rising China has completely disrupted the export credit sector.
lll

In Reagan’s era, export credit financing was a means for nations to compete
for and win projects overseas in order to create more jobs at home. It was abenign tool for economic expansion. China, however, has morphed export
credit financing into a weapon of national security.
Where most nations have just one export credit agency (ECA), China
has three, all targeted for specific stages of economic and industrial
development. The amount of money China has put behind these three
instruments is staggering.
It is estimated that in 2018, China provided more than $500 billion in export
credit, approaching in that one year the total amount of financing EXIM has
provided in its 90-year history.

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2025 Presidential Transition ProjectllChina’s export credit activity is greater than that of the ECAs of theentire G7 combined. Today, China is the world’s largest official creditor,
maintaining a portfolio more than twice the size of the World Bank andInternational Monetary Fund combined.
China’s highly aggressive Belt and Road Initiative, which has promptedinternational criticism for ensnaring the developing world in “debt-trap
diplomacy,” has created a sphere of economic and strategic influence that
includes about 150 countries, rivaling the relationships of the United Statesand her allies.

Unlike America and the G7 economies, China does not subscribe to the rulesbased order that has governed export credit financing for nearly a century. As inso many other things, China plays by its own rules and is opaque in how it operates,
weaponizing its export credit financing deals by offering developing nations terms
that are often “too good to be true.” Once the project is underway, the Chinese havebeen known to change the terms, making a project unaffordable for the purchasing
country. These tactics have yielded China important strategic plunder like mines
and critical minerals, satellites, and even ports like those in Hambantota, Sri Lanka,
and Mombasa, Kenya.
Export credit is a strategic weapon in China’s whole-of-government approachto enhance its global power, economic might, and national security. The only
country that has the economic heft to counter China’s aggressions in export credit
financing is the United States. Not only do American companies risk losing out toChinese competitors for international opportunities if EXIM is not there to offer
support, but a United States without a functioning export credit agency also leaves
an unchecked China with a wide-open field to claim jurisdiction over swaths ofocean and shipping lanes, expand its economic influence, and create major changes
in the global balance of power.
In response to Chinese aggression in export credit, the ECAs of other countries have reacted defensively to change their policies and programs to avoid
losing access to large chunks of global markets. Many countries, including strong
U.S. allies like the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Italy, have changed themission of their ECAs from one of leveling the playing field for their exporters
to hunting proactively for transactions for their businesses and advancing theirnational strategic interests over the long term. In addition, foreign buyers, particularly those looking to build large international projects, have been indicatingthat the availability of government-backed financing is a core component of theirevaluation of bids and identification of sourcing. Allied nations have taken steps
like lowering their content requirements in order to lure more deals, often at
U.S. expense.

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Meanwhile, U.S. content requirements have remained constant, and the UnitedStates continues to abide by traditional Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) rules. For example:ll

The United Kingdom offered Boeing financing backed by Britain’s ECA if
Boeing would put Rolls Royce engines on its jets instead of GE engines.
Italy’s ECA offered General Electric export credit financing in exchange formoving the production of some of its turbine components from the UnitedStates to Italy.

China’s tactics, as well as those of some of America’s allies, have been successful in drawing manufacturing and the jobs associated with that production awayfrom U.S. soil. EXIM’s 2018 Competitiveness Report accurately documents how
extensively foreign ECAs have expanded programs aimed at embedding their small
and medium-sized exporters into the global supply chain to the detriment of U.S.
exporters, particularly small businesses.35 To ignore these changes and leave theUnited States without its own export financing weapon is to resign the UnitedStates to a reduced role in world geopolitical affairs and accept fewer jobs andlower standards of living for many Americans.
Critics of EXIM employ a host of defamatory slurs like “crony capitalism” and“Bank of Boeing.” The “Bank of Boeing” moniker is particularly misleading, as it
was born in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis when the airline industry was particularly hard hit and private-sector financing was not available for many airlines
looking to purchase Boeing aircraft. EXIM’s portfolio tends to be cyclical withdifferent industries relying on export credit financing at different points in time,depending on economic conditions.
The truth is that EXIM provides financing only when the private sector will notor cannot (a concept known as additionality). In addition:lllWhen EXIM does provide financing, usually in the form of a loan or loan
guarantee, the borrower pays interest rates that are driven by the market.
EXIM does not undercut the private sector. It does not solicit any
applications for financing, and all applications are judged on the merits ofthe transactions.
All transactions must have “reasonable assurance of repayment,” which
is why EXIM has an exceptionally low default rate, historically hovering
around 0.5 percent—a default rate that is the envy of private banking.

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2025 Presidential Transition ProjectllWhen EXIM enters a deal, the American taxpayer is always protected
first. If a deal goes into default, the U.S. taxpayer is paid back before anyother lender.
Borrowers are loathe to default on the United States of America.

This ability to manage risk successfully is why EXIM actually makes a profit
for American taxpayers, described in government parlance as “negative subsidy,”
sending more than $9 billion to the U.S. Treasury for debt reduction since 1992.
The bank has also supported hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs, most of them inmanufacturing, during the past decade.
Export credit financing has become a critical lever for macroeconomic growth
for many countries, allies and competitors of the U.S. alike. Other nations are using
ECAs strategically to influence decisions and procure economic opportunities,
hindering the participation of U.S. firms and costing American jobs, particularly
in manufacturing.
China’s aggressive actions in export finance bleed beyond economic advancement and are clearly an effort to expand both its national security and its global
power. The United States would be foolish to abandon this field of play, surrendering it to China and other nations, and to relinquish EXIM as a powerful tool in
America’s asymmetrical warfare toolbox.

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ENDNOTES

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

9.
10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.
17.
18.

David A. Stockman, The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed (New York: Harper & Row,1986), pp. 113–114.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Executive Order 6581 Creating the Export–Import Bank of Washington,”February 2, 1934, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-6581-creating-theexport-import-bank-washington#:~:text=Executive%20Order%206581%20Creating%20The%20ExportImport%20Bank%20of,by%20promoting%20the%20fullest%20possible%20utilization%20of%20 (accessed
February 23, 2023).
Export–Import Bank of the United States, Annual Report 2007, p. 14, https://img.exim.gov/s3fs-public/
managed-documents/ar2007.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023).
Export–Import Bank of the United States, Annual Report 2014, pp. 84 and 86, https://img.exim.gov/s3fspublic/reports/annual/EXIM-2014-AR.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023).
Export–Import Bank of the United States, Annual Management Report for the Year-Ended September 30,
2022, and September 30, 2021, pp. 1 and 7, https://img.exim.gov/s3fs-public/reports/annual/2022/EXIM%20
FY22%20AMR%20Final_SignOff_508_v27_FINAL.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023).
Export–Import Bank of the United States, Annual Report 2008, pp. 35 and 63, https://img.exim.gov/s3fspublic/reports/annual/2008AnnualReport.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023).
Export–Import Bank of the United States, Annual Report 2015, pp. 28 and 42, https://img.exim.gov/s3fspublic/reports/annual/EXIM-2015-AR.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023).
Export–Import Bank of the United States, Annual Management Report for the Year-Ended September 30,
2022, and September 30, 2021, pp. 1 and 18, https://img.exim.gov/s3fs-public/reports/annual/2022/EXIM%20
FY22%20AMR%20Final_SignOff_508_v27_FINAL.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023).
Ibid.
Veronique de Rugy, “Export–Import Is Still Boeing’s Bank,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Data
Visualization, March 3, 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/data-visualizations/export-import-stillboeings-bank (accessed March 21, 2023).
Veronique de Rugy, “The Export–Bank: Winners and Losers of Government-Granted Privilege,” Testimony
before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, June 2, 2015, https://www.
mercatus.org/research/federal-testimonies/export-import-bank-winners-and-losers-government-grantedprivilege (accessed February 23, 2023).
Veronique de Rugy, Nita Ghei, and Michael Wilt, “Should the US Export–Import Bank Be Reauthorized?”
Mercatus Center at George Mason University Policy Brief, July 28, 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/
policy-briefs/should-us-export-import-bank-be-reauthorized (accessed February 23, 2023).
Veronique de Rugy, “Emirates to Ex–Im Bank: We’ll Be Just Fine Without You,” National Review, The Corner,
September 8, 2014, https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/emirates-ex-im-bank-well-be-just-fine-withoutyou-veronique-de-rugy/ (accessed February 22, 2023).
Sallie James, “Time to X Out the Ex–Im Bank,” Cato Institute, Herbert A. Stieffel Center for Trade Policy, Trade
Policy Analysis No. 47, July 6, 2011, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1960016 (accessed
February 22, 2023), and Salim Furth, “Export–Import Bank: What the Scholarship Says,” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 2934, August 7, 2014, https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/the-export-import-bankwhat-the-scholarship-says.
Veronique de Rugy and Justin Leventhal, “Ex–Im Bank: A Comparative Analysis of Pre- and Post-Quorum
Lending,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Policy Brief, April 23, 2019, pp. 1 and 2, https://www.
mercatus.org/research/policy-briefs/ex-im-bank-comparative-analysis-pre-and-post-quorum-lending(accessed February 22, 2023).
Ibid., p. 5.
Fred P. Hochberg, Trade is Not a Four-Letter Word: How Six Everyday Products Make the Case for Trade (NewYork: Simon & Schuster/Avid Reader Press, 2020), p. 71.
Export–Import Bank of the United States, Agency Management Report for the Years Ended
September 30, 2020, and September 30, 2019, pp. 2 and 4, https://img.exim.gov/s3fs-public/reports/
annual/2020/508Compliant_EXIM%20Q4%20FY20%20AMR%20FINAL_Signoff_updated12.1.2020.pdf(accessed February 22, 2023).

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19. Veronique de Rugy, “Ex–Im Bank Competitiveness Doesn’t Help Export Competitiveness,” testimony before
the Ex–Im Bank Advisory Committee, September 30, 2021, https://www.mercatus.org/research/federaltestimonies/ex-im-bank-competitiveness-doesnt-help-export-competitiveness (accessed February 22, 2023).
20. Export–Import Bank of the United States, Report to the U.S. Congress on Global Export Credit Competition
for the Period January 1, 2020 Through December 31, 2020, June 2021, p. 3, https://img.exim.gov/s3fs-public/
reports/competitiveness_reports/2020/EXIM_2020_CompetitivenessReport_Web-Ready_Single%20pages.
pdf (accessed February 23, 2023).
21. Export–Import Bank of the United States, Report to the U.S. Congress on Global Export Credit Competition
for the Period January 1, 2019 Through December 31, 2019, June 2020, p. 38, https://img.exim.gov/s3fspublic/reports/competitiveness_reports/2019/2019-EXIM-Competitiveness-Report-FINAL.pdf (accessed
February 22, 2023).
22. De Rugy and Leventhal, “Ex–Im Bank: A Comparative Analysis of Pre- and Post-Quorum Lending,”
pp. 7 and 10.
23. Export–Import Bank of the United States, Keeping America Strong: Export–Import Bank of the United States
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24. Export–Import Bank of the United States, All America: Export–Import Bank of the United States 2020 Annual
Report, pp. 7 and 42, https://img.exim.gov/s3fs-public/reports/competitiveness_reports/2019/2019-EXIMCompetitiveness-Report-FINAL.pdf (accessed February 22, 2023).
25. Export–Import Bank of the United States, Building a Better America: Export–Import Bank of the United States
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26. Congressional Budget Office, “Fair-Value Estimates of the Cost of Selected Federal Credit Programs for2015 to 2024,” May 2014, pp. 1 and 5, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45383FairValue.pdf (accessed February 22, 2023).
27. Export–Import Bank of the United States, Office of Inspector General, Report on Portfolio Risk and Loss
Reserve Allocation Policies, OIG-INS-12-02, September 28, 2012, https://img.exim.gov/s3fs-public/oig/Final20Report-20Complete-20Portfolio-20Risk-20120928-1.pdf#:~:text=Date%3A%20September%2028%2C%20
2012%20I%20am%20pleased%20to,measure%2C%20price%2C%20and%20reserve%20for%20its%20
portfolio%20risk. (accessed March 21, 2023). See also Export–Import Bank of the United States, Office ofInspector General, Export–Import Bank’s Management of Direct Loans and Related Challenges, OIG-AR-13-05,
September 26, 2013, https://img.exim.gov/s3fs-public/oig/audit/OIG-Final-Report-Audit-of-Ex-Im-Bank-sManagement-of-Direct-Loans-and-Related-Challenges-09-26-13-2.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023).
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without%20a%20quorum%2C%20the%20Ex-Im,is%20doing%20better%20without%20the%20Ex-Im%20
Bank%E2%80%99s%20aid (accessed February 22, 2023).
29. Figure 3, “Arrangement Official Export Credits—Destination Countries by Income Level (Billion USD),” inOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Export Credit Statistics: Trends and Cashflow:
Trends in Arrangement Official Export Credits (2009–2019),” https://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/exportcredits/statistics/ (accessed March 21, 2023).
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2021 Annual Report, pp. 19, 44, and 47.
31. Export–Import Bank of the United States, Annual Management Report for the Year-Ended September 30,
2022, and September 30, 2021, pp. 1, 7 and 57.
32. News release, “Ex–Im Bank FY 2012 Annual Report Details Fourth Consecutive Record-Breaking Year,” Export–
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33. Bloomberg News, “China Retreats on Going Toe-to-Toe with US on Critical Tech,” The Sydney Morning Herald,
January 4, 2023, https://www.smh.com.au/business/the-economy/china-retreats-on-going-toe-to-toe-withus-on-critical-tech-20230104-p5cae9.html (accessed February 23, 2023).

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34. President Ronald Reagan, “Statement on Signing the Export–Import Bank Act Amendments of 1986,” October
15, 1986, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-signing-the-export-import-bank-actamendments-1986 (accessed February 22, 2023).
35. Export–Import Bank of the United States, Report to the U.S. Congress on Global Export Credit Competition for
the Period January 1, 2018, Through December 31, 2018, June 2019, https://img.exim.gov/s3fs-public/reports/
competitiveness_reports/2019/EXIM2019CompetitivenessReport-final.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023).

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