Compartmentalization of Trivialism:
Nishida on Contradictory Self-identity
出口康夫

Yasuo Deguchi
京都大学

This talk tries to interpret the later Nishida who advocated absolutely contradictory self-identity (絶対矛盾的自己同一) as committing actual trivialism and to render
his position as making sense or plausible by introducing such ideas as trivializer ortruth maker that makes every proposition as true, non-transitive identity for which thetransitivity doesn’t hold; a = b, a = c ̸⇒ b = c, and etc.
Trivialism is the claim that every proposition is true. It can be derived from theextreme version of dialetheism; not only some, but also all contradictions are true, given
the conjunction elimination; because, if, as an extreme dialetheist claims, A∧¬A is true
for any A, A is true by virtue of the inference. Even some contemporary philosophers
who are brave enough to be dialetheists don’t commit trivialism, taking it as simply
wrong or absurd on the reason, among others, that it flies in the face of obvious falsityof some propositions such as ‘one plus one is three’ and ‘here isn’t my hand’ (Priest2006, chap.3).
But we claim that some Asian philosophers, traditional or modern, embraced not
merely dialetheism but also its extreme version, and therefore trivialism. Our listof Asian suspects of trivialism includes Laotzu who seems to declare that Dao as
the principle or nature of everything is self-contradictory and Hua-yen thinkers who
asserted that one is all and all is one. Among those suspects is the later Nishida who
advocated absolutely contradictory self-identity, claiming that anything is identicalwith anything else, which possess the properties that are contradictory with each other(西田 1987).
Then how can the later Nishida’s trivialism avoid persisting some obviously false
propositions as true? Or how can we reinterpret or reconstruct his stance in such away that it doesn’t go against the obvious falsity of the above mentioned propositions?
The first idea that might come to our mind is to modify his trivialism by using theconcept of possible worlds. Estrada-González distinguishes stronger or weaker versionsof trivialism in terms of possible words (Estrada-González, 2012, 181). Let us reduce
his versions into the two; actual and counterfactual trivialism. An actual trivialist
claims that every proposition is true in the actual world whereas a counterfactualtrivialist holds that every proposition is true only in a counterfactual world.
Then let us note that the obviously false propositions are to be taken as wrong
about, at least, the actual world, in other words, they are to be dismissed as actuallyfalse. So by modifying the later Nishida’s stance as a counterfactual trivialism, one
1can make it compatible with the actual falsity of some propositions. This measure forreconciliation implies possibilism; the claim that every truth is merely possible andthere is no necessary truth.
But such a measure cannot be applied for the later Nishida who seems to uphold
actual rather than counterfactual trivialism. Then how can we rescue his actual trivialism from the absurdity? An answer is to introduce a special ilk of truth maker thatmakes every proposition true; i.e., trivializer, and to claim that in the actual world
there is at least one trivializer, or actual trivializer as well as other truth makers thatmake some propositions false and their negations true, or actual non-trivializer. (Thismeans that truth value of a proposition is not a function of one or another possible
world, but rather a function of one or another truth maker in a given possible world.
Therefore, even in a given possible world truth value of one and the same proposition
varies with truth makers.) Thus we try to reconstruct the later Nishida’s absolutely
contradictory self-identity as implying that both trivializer and non-trivializer inhabit
in the actual world. Putting another; we try to sort the actual world into two compartments; the one of trivializers and the other of non-trivializers, and to delimit thelater Nishida’s trivialism to the section of trivializers, or shortly to compartmentalize
his actual trivialism.
Nishida developed his idea of absolutely contradictory self-identity in several diﬀerent
contexts; philosophy of time, that of life, that of self and etc. Each context has its own
ontological domain. The domain for philosophy of time consists of such temporal points
as past, present and future. His philosophy of life presupposes such entities as humans,
non-human organisms, and non-living things as its basic ontological categories. So
his trivialism is to be interpreted against the background of each of those ontologicaldomains and categories. In other words, the later Nishida’s actual trivialism is tobe categorized into diﬀerent ontological milieus. Thus, in the ontological domain ofphilosophy of time, we take present as trivializer and past and future as non-trivializers.
Also in the context of philosophy of life, humans are interpreted as trivializers and nonhuman organizes and non-living things as non-trivializers.

References[1] 西田幾多郎, 西田幾多郎全集（安部他編）（旧版第四版）第９巻・第 11 巻, 岩波書店,1987.
[2] Estrada-González, L., 2012, Models of Possibilism and Trivialism, Logic and Logical Philosophy, 21, 175–205.
[3] Priest, G., 2006, Doubt Truth to be a Liar, Oxford University Press.

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