Y2Q: A JOURNEY TO
QUANTUM SAFE
CRYPTOGRAPY
A note on potential largest global migration programs since Y2K
Authors

Gireesh Kumar Neelakantaiah • Julian van Velzen • Jerome Desbonnet

Capgemini Quantum Lab

Table ofContents

Capgemini Quantum Lab

Y2K toY2Q

01

Furtherunderstanding of Y2Q

03

Factors influencing
uncertainty around Y2Q

06

Challenges and global
developments around Y2Q

08

Opportunity for
Global IT industries

10

References

12

1

Y2K TO Y2Q

Y2K, a quick recap
Almost three decades ago, in 1993
an article titled “Doomsday 2000”
got published in Computerworld,
describing the Year 2000 problem
or Y2K problem which is also known
as the Millennium bug. The Y2K
issue originated from the 1960s
through the 1980s, when memoryand disk space was very expensive
and limited. Ingenious computer
programmers tried to save memory
by representing four-digit year
values with only the last two digits.
But this clever method to savememory led to a serious problem
when approaching the end of the
century. It was difficult to predict
how computer programs would
handle year 2000, represented

as “00” in computer programs.
This potential malfunctioning ofcomputer systems, known as theY2K bug, caused anxiety among
governments and organizations
across the world, fearing large scalecollapsing of critical systems acrosssectors in the world. The problem
did not only exist in enterprisecomputers, but also in computersused by factories, utilities, power
plants, airplanes and otherembedded and operational systems.
Global pre-emptive business
continuity efforts were put inplace by governments and privateorganizations to update or upgrade
computer systems, addressing

the Y2K problem. Many of thegovernments across the globe
established special committees
to mitigate the problem and passspecific laws. For example, theUS government passed the Year
2000 Information and Readiness
Disclosure Act to encouragecompanies to share their readinessdata and to offer them limited
liability protection. The solution
to this problem was to scan andanalyse each line of software
programs to either fix or rewrite
them. Sounds simple, but it
required huge efforts and a profuse
number of trained computerengineers to implement thesolution.

With international coordination and efforts, the Y2K problem was well addressed, and the beginningof the new century was uneventful. It is estimated that nearly 308 billion USD was spent worldwide, inaddressing the Y2K problem with more than 130 billion USD in the US alone.

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An Introduction to Y2Q
Let’s fast forward to 2023. We
are hearing about another similarsounding: the Y2Q problem. The
initial seed for this was sown just
one year after the publication of
the famous Doomsday 2000 article
in Computerworld in 1993. The
event was the development of
the famous Shor’s Algorithm byAmerican mathematician Peter
Shor in 1994. This is a quantum
computer-based algorithm used for
integer factorization. The algorithm
finds prime factors of an integerin polynomial time, providing
exponential speed up, compared tothe classical computer algorithms
which require super-polynomial
times to do the same. This is one of
the first and best-known algorithms

demonstrating the power ofquantum computers.
Before getting into moredetails of the Y2Q problem, it isnecessary to quickly introduce
quantum computers, theircapabilities, and the current
state. Quantum computers
are based on the principles ofquantum physics. They leverage
the principles of superposition,
entanglement, and interference
to solve computing problems.
The fundamental building blockof quantum computing is a qubit(short for quantum bit), which
is fundamentally different froma classical bit. Because unlike aclassical bit, which can be in thestate of binary “0” or “1”, a qubit

can be in a quantum state of “0”or “1” or in a superposition ofstates “0” and “1” – i.e., at thesame time. Quantum computers
have the potential to provide an
exponential speed-up for certain
types of problems when compared
to classical computers. The
applications of quantum computing
are many. Some examples are
drug simulation, material science,
aerodynamic modelling, supply
chain optimization, financial
modelling, and many more.
Application domains where
quantum computers are expected
to deliver value can be grouped
at a high level, in three areas:
optimization, simulation, andmachine learning.

The promise of unprecedented computing power to solve current intractable problems is a very attractive
proposition for quantum computers. But these quantum computers also have the potential to pose a significant
threat to the security of many cryptographic systems that we currently use.

The current cryptographyalgorithms provide the required
security based on complexity ofmathematical problems, suchas integer prime factorization,
which is practically intractableby classical computers. But asufficiently large and capable
quantum computer leveraging
Shor’s algorithm could potentiallyperform the factorization task in
only hours. This capability can beused to break asymmetric publickey cryptographic systems, such
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as the RSA and Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) algorithms,
used in secured communications
and digital signature applications.
Another quantum algorithm called
Grover’s search algorithm, could
also potentially be used to breaksymmetric key cryptographic
systems, such as the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), which
is used to protect sensitive data.
However, the threat of quantum toasymmetric public key algorithms isof the highest.

With quantum computers, actors
with malicious intent could
potentially break the security of
government and enterprise systems,
disturb or even damage public
services and utility infrastructure,
disrupt financial transactions, andcompromise personal data. Thislarge-scale threat of the potential
ability of quantum computers
to crack some of the major
cryptographic systems in use today,
is referred to as the Y2Q problem.

2

Y2Q - MORE
TO EXPLORE

Standard bodies supported by governments and private organizations worldwide are developing multiple quantum
safe solutions against the Y2Q problem. Two prominent solutions being proposed are Post Quantum Cryptography(PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD).

Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC):
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines, Post Quantum Cryptography (also referred to as
quantum-resistant cryptography) as a development of cryptographic systems that are secure against both quantum
and classical computers and can be integrated with existing communications protocols and networks. This consistsof a class of asymmetric cryptography algorithms designed to be resilient to attacks by quantum computers. They
are still based on classical computing techniques expected to replace today’s quantum vulnerable key establishment
and digital signature algorithms e.g.: RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and ECC algorithms.

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD):
Quantum Key Distribution
is a mechanism for securecommunications implementing
cryptographic protocols based onprinciples of quantum physics toenable exchange of keys in mostsecured manner. Unlike PQC, QDK
requires additional hardware forexchanging photonic qubits in freespace or over fibre to implement
communication system leveraging
quantum superpositions and/or
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entanglements for transmission ofquantum states. Communicating
parties using QKD can detect any
compromise in the communication
channel due to eavesdropping
as it disturbs the quantum states
which can be detected. QKD canbe used mainly for exchanging thesecret keys and is mostly envisaged
to be used along with symmetrickey algorithms for secured
communication. Though there

are some commercial solutions,the technology is still underdevelopment.
PQC is expected to be mostcommon form of quantum safe
cryptography to be adopted
worldwide as they are designed withclassical methods and expected towork in the existing infrastructure
without need for special hardware,
unlike QKD. Standards and industry

bodies are collaborating to develop
new quantum safe PQC algorithms.
The U.S. Department of Commerce’s
National Institute of Standards andTechnology (NIST) is in the forefrontof this action and has initiatedthe process to solicit, evaluate
and standardize post-quantum
cryptography (PQC) algorithms in2016. These new algorithms are
expected to standardize digital

signature, public-key encryption,and key-establishment algorithms
capable of protecting sensitive
information even after the adventof sufficiently powerful quantum
computers. After the third roundof evaluation process, NIST has
selected four candidate algorithms
for standardization.
As per this NIST report publishedin July 2022, the public-key

encryption and key-establishment
algorithm that will be standardized
is CRYSTALS–KYBER. The digital
signature algorithms that will
be standardized are CRYSTALS–
Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+.
These four selected algorithms are
expected to become part of thehighly anticipated NIST standards
for post-quantum cryptography in2024.

As the announcement makes clear, these algorithms are designed for two main encryption tasks – the first is
general encryption to protect information exchanged over public networks, and the second is digital signatures
to authenticate/verify identities. In addition, there are additional candidate algorithms that are being
evaluated and the selection of those will be decided by NIST in the fourth round and beyond in the evaluationand selection process.

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Similarities and Differences
between Y2K and Y2Q
There are some similarities between Y2K and Y2Q. These include:•

Both are triggered by FUD (Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt) based dynamics.

•

Both have potential to have large-scale impact on computing and communication systems worldwide.

•

Implementation of solution needs a huge number of trained engineers.

•

Testing and validation are a very critical part of the solution implementation in both cases.

•

There are global efforts and collaboration, across US, Europe, and Asian countries, to address the problem,
including involvement of governments. For example, the US passed laws with specific focus on both problems.

•Computer programs and infrastructure across enterprise and operational systems are to be reviewed, assessed,
fixed and upgraded in both cases.

Unlike similarities, the differences are more serious with Y2Q, compared to Y2K. For example,

Timelines:
In the case of Y2K, there was a very clear deadline: the beginning of the new century is when the problem would hit
the computer systems, if it was not fixed. However, in the case of Y2Q, we do not know when sufficiently powerfulquantum computers will be available, which can break currently used cryptography algorithms, thus complete
uncertainty of timelines of the threat.

Source of threat:
With Y2K, it was certain that the problem was internally. However, the source of Y2Q is mostly external with
malevolent intentions of causing damage/harm.

Solution:
Though Y2K was a huge problem, the solution to solve it was simple and straight forward. To solve the Y2Q
problem, there are multiple solutions being proposed. The two key solutions include – Post Quantum Cryptography(PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). Each has its own complexity in implementing as a solution. In the nearterm the recommended solution is implementation of post quantum cryptography.

Execution:
In Y2K, there was a clear deadline before which all systems of an organization had to be updated/upgraded. It wasa one-time activity and once the issue was fixed, it was done/solved. But with Y2Q, we need to perform detailed
analysis of the systems and data and prepare a roadmap to fix/upgrade the systems considering different priorities
like criticality and vulnerability of the systems and shelf life of the data etc. It may end up being a multiyear project.
It may not be a one-time activity and organizations need to achieve a state of crypto agility requiring on-going
dynamic states of monitor and update cycles.

Visibility of damages:
The potential damages due to Y2K, if not addressed, were expected to be directly visible or noticed. However, with
Y2Q the damages may or may not be visible or experienced due to nature of the threat. The malicious agent may
not even be revealed immediately and can cause damages at a later point in time.

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3

FACTORS INFLUENCING
UNCERTAINTY AROUND Y2Q

There is more urgency and anxiety across some industry segments and organizations (especially defense, space, finance, public utilities, and the like) than in others due to different risk profiles. The factors that influence the varying
risk profiles and the urgency of different organizations include:

Shelf life of the systems and equipment
Systems and equipment deployed in an organization have a different shelf life. For example, critical infrastructure,vehicles, satellites, intelligent industries, governments, defense, and other hardware equipment with a shelf
life longer than 10 years need to be protected on urgent basis, especially over the air (OTA) update related
authentications.

Time duration required for migration of the systems
Longer the estimated migration durations, sooner we need to start the journey.

Shelf life of data to be encrypted/protected
The value of data handled and stored by organizations also can have different shelf life. The data considered to bevaluable even after 5 to 10 years will need more attention and prioritization than the data with shorter life value.
The reason is that the actors with malicious intent could capture and store the encrypted data flowing over theinternet today and could decrypt this stored data when large-scale quantum computers become available. This
“store now and decrypt later” strategy has become a serious and imminent threat, especially to systems carrying
data that has a valid life beyond the anticipated ten years.
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Potentially different timelines of threat
Depending on the type of the encryption algorithms used, quantum computing resources required to break themvaries. For example, the quantum computing resources required for tackling ECC is less than the resources requiredfor RSA for a given classical security level. In addition, symmetric key algorithms are also vulnerable to Grover’s
algorithm requiring a much larger quantum computer.

PQC algorithms are new and not proven
The new PQC algorithms selected/shortlisted by NIST are not hardened/proven in the real life environments. Dueto this, experts are recommending hybrid approaches (with combinations of traditional and PQC algorithms). These
are necessary to be tested in real world applications for functionality and performance. These hybrid solutions,further add to the complexity of implementations. Some leading organizations are already planning to test thecandidate algorithms according to their specific use cases.

Fast evolution of quantum systems:
Finally, there are significant investments and efforts going towards improving the performance of quantum
computers across all the layers of quantum stack (hardware, control software, algorithms, architecture, andapplication designs). New algorithms, methods and techniques are being proposed to speed up the journey towards
quantum advantage, which could potentially reduce the time available for implementing quantum safe systems.

Considering the above factors, organizations need significant preparation, efforts, and time to implement quantum
safe cryptography in their IT and OT landscape. It is better to start the journey soon and understand the risk profile
of your organization to prepare suitable roadmap.
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4

CHALLENGES AND GLOBALDEVELOPMENTS AROUND Y2Q

As of today, cryptography
management is spread everywherein the company since we havedifferent workforces managing
cryptography at various places
such as inside applications, at
network level, database layer, andin cybersecurity area. This highlights
the fact that it will take huge efforts
to assess the risk, quantify it, andmitigate it.
So, what are we missing now? We
are missing the ability to express thefinancial impact on companies andsince it’s hard to quantify, it’s still a
bit of an unknown. We know for afact that quantum risk will have an
impact on the insurance premium
since there is a risk in the financial
communications of the company.
Enterprises and governments
at least need to start assessing
quantum risk since cyber insurance
providers will assume the risk to bevery high by default. For example,
according to CNBC, cyber insurance
premiums increased by an averageof 28% in the first quarter of 2022,
the cyber security premium inFrance is increasing, and according
to Lloyd’s, the annual premiums incyber insurance market will growfrom 12 billion USD to 60 billion
USD over the next 5 to 10 years. Thisrisk will require the organizations tosave and put aside a certain amount,at the end of the year, to mitigate all
the financial risk, creating an impact
on revenues as well.

This also means that the amount that the companies need to put aside to cover risks is increasing alot. If enterprises start assessing the risk and are able to prove the impact of risk to be either high,medium, or low as well as taking proactive steps to manage that risk, the cyber insurance providers
can be convinced for providing insurance with less premium. So basically, it will have an impact on
the amount that is supposed to be provided to the shareholders, the value of the company on the
Stock Exchange, and the IPO planning of a company. From a board layer, it means that it will impact
the insurance premium, financial results and share value for years. This will be the real impact forenterprises and governments equally and if we don’t start preventing quantum risk proactively fromtoday, this impact will keep growing year after year. Furthermore, from 2023 onwards, major insurers
will stop nation-backed cyberattacks insurance coverage (quantum threats/attacks are expected
to be in the same class). We expect insurance costs related to quantum security to either increase
dramatically or not be covered over the next few years.

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Also, regulations such as GDPR,
California Consumer Privacy Act(CCPA), European Banking Authority,
etc. clearly states that dataencryption is a way to be protectedagainst fines. Since we know for afact that quantum computers will
break major existing encryptions,
it will break protection from legal
point of view and invite the burdenof non-compliance issues and heftyfines. This will make enterprises
either redo everything in emergency
situations such as complying withregulations or start preparing
right now so that it can be donein a much smoother way withoutcompromising the protection fromthe regulation standpoint.
Quantum risk in cyber is a growing

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concern because the materializationof the quantum risk in cyberspaceis slowly increasing. However,today’s quantum computers are still
rudimentary in their capabilities. It
will take many years (around ten
years based on survey of World
Economic Forum with industry
experts) for development of
powerful quantum computerscapable of breaking current security
algorithms. However, considering
the seriousness of the threat andmassive nature of the efforts
required, industries, governments,and standard bodies have alreadystarted working towards defining
standards for algorithms, protocols,and systems that are expected
to be secure and resistant to thethreats posed by the arrival of large

powerful quantum computers.
There have been many global
developments recently focusing
on quantum technologies andassociated risks. For example, issueof National Security Memorandum,
Commitment to intensity andelevate cooperation among G7
members to partner and deploy
quantum resistant cryptography,
release of Requirements of Future
Quantum Resistant algorithms for
National Security Systems by NSA
with 2035 as adoption deadline,
publication of post quantum
cryptography integration study by
The European Union Agency for
Cybersecurity (ENISA) and finallypassing of Quantum Computing
Cybersecurity Preparedness Act.

5

OPPORTUNITY FOR
GLOBAL IT INDUSTRIES

Unlike Y2K, there are many
uncertainties around Y2Q.
But there are some importantdevelopments demonstrating theseriousness and urgency of the
problem, for example, passing of
Quantum Computing Cybersecurity
Preparedness Act by the US
government in December 2022, the
NSA releasing Quantum Resistantalgorithm requirements for National
Security Systems with setting
expectations for transition to
Quantum Resistant algorithms for
NSS by 2035, and some insurancecompanies declaring to end
insurance coverage for state cyberattacks. The organizations acrossthe globe need to recognize thesedevelopments. In addition, there has
been significant progress happening
in the capabilities and performancesof quantum computers across alllayers – hardware, control software,algorithms and application design
and architectures, accelerating thetime to quantum advantage.
Governments and privateorganization have spent an
estimated value of 308 billion USD
addressing the Y2K problem. As
of today, we do not seem to havegood/reliable estimates aroundoverall costs of the transition
to quantum safe cryptography
worldwide. Early estimates indicatethat it could be as much as a 1

trillion USD cybersecurity upgrade.
But it is very clear that the size andcomplexity of Y2Q is significantly
larger than Y2K and requires
solutions over the next couple ofdecades. It is also necessary torecognize Y2Q as not just a business
opportunity, but also as a criticalneed to secure national interests byadopting quantum safe solutions
for systems across governments andprivate organizations over countries.
Please note Y2Q is beyond theopportunities due to adoption
quantum technologies (quantum
computing, quantum sensing andquantum communication) acrossindustries.

Another watershed moment for
Indian IT industry?
IT industry in India was still nascent in the early 1990s, with 100 million USD in size. Indian IT Industry recognized thehuge opportunity around Y2K and started providing trained computer programmers/engineers to help fixing Y2K
issues for clients across the globe and hundreds of companies, with thousands of jobs, created in this process. It
was a watershed moment for the industry in India and by the end of the century the Indian IT exports reached nearly10Capgemini Quantum Lab8 billion USD. This also provided
the much-needed opportunity andrecognition for the industry andhelped building strong foundationsof the IT services export businessin India. The global Y2K problem
provided the launchpad for the
Indian IT industry to scale newheights in the coming years. In
the following two decades, as per
NASSCOM report, Indian IT industry
had very good growth and reacheda size of around 227 billion USD by2022.
During the Y2K problem, the Indian

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IT industry was still in its earlystages and acted as a low-costlabour centre, providing trainedengineers to implement a relatively
simple solution. Now the Indian IT
industry has grown to more than
200 billion USD and is recognized asa leading force worldwide, capableof delivering advanced digital andtechnical solutions to its global
clients. In addition, India has strong
academic and research institutions
around quantum technologies,
enabling development of innovative
solutions for both PQC and QKD

solutions. With this capability,
the Indian IT industry can take alead position providing innovative
solutions to Y2Q problem, whichis complex and needs significant
thought leadership.
Looking at the size and nature ofthis opportunity, the key question
is: How ready is the IT industry andmore specifically will the Indian IT
industry take the leadership role inproviding solutions to Y2Q, creating
another watershed moment for the
IT industry?

6

REFERENCES

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Year_2000_problem
2. https://nasscom.in/knowledge-center/publications/technology-sector-india-2022-strategic-review
3. https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/fNjocJ9cwlGCDqLWt2OjXP/Indian-IT-and-ITeS-journey-Liberalizationand-beyond.html
4. https://quantumconsortium.org/quantum-safe-guide/
5. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0268401298000437
6. https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/post-quantum-cryptography-anticipating-threats-andpreparing-the-future
7. https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/7535
8. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/M-23-02-M-Memo-on-Migrating-to-PostQuantum-Cryptography.pdf
9. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071834/-1/-1/0/CSA_CNSA_2.0_ALGORITHMS_.PDF
10. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-securitymemorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks-tovulnerable-cryptographic-systems/
11. https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Future_Council_on_Quantum_Computing.pdf
12. https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Transitioning%20to_a_Quantum_Secure_Economy_2022.pdf
13. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2022/NIST.IR.8413-upd1.pdf

12Capgemini Quantum Lab

About Capgemini
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