INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION
April 4, 2011
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) in cooperation
with Elsevier, the publishers of the Annals of the ICRP, present this special costfree release of ICRP Publication 111 Application of the Commission’s
Recommendations

to

the

ProtectionofPeopleLivinginLong-term

Contaminated Areas after a Nuclear Accident or a Radiation Emergency.
ICRP is a registered charity that relies on the sale of publications to help support
its ongoing work. However, the cost-free release of this publication is a gesture
to aid the Japanese people in recovering from the recent earthquake, tsunami,
and accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Our thoughts arewith those in Japan dealing with the aftermath of these tragic events, and weregret that the recommendations of ICRP Publication 111 need to be put into
active use so soon after having been published.
This special free release of ICRP Publication 111 is dedicated to those in Japan
who have lost so very much.

With deep sympathy, on behalf of ICRP,

Claire Cousins

Christopher Clement

ICRP Chair

ICRP Scientific SecretaryAnnals of the ICRP
Published on behalf of the International Commission
on Radiological Protection
Aims and Scope
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) is the primary body in protection against ionisingradiation. ICRP is a registered charity and is thus an independent non-governmental organisation created by the1928 International Congress of Radiology to advance for the public beneﬁt the science of radiological protection.
The ICRP provides recommendations and guidance on protection against the risks associated with ionisingradiation, from artiﬁcial sources widely used in medicine, general industry and nuclear enterprises, and fromnaturally occurring sources. These reports and recommendations are published approximately four times each year
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needing a single report covering their own ﬁeld of interest. Please order through your bookseller, subscription agent,or direct from the publisher.
ICRP is composed of a Main Commission, a Scientiﬁc Secretariat, and ﬁve standing Committees on: radiationeﬀects, doses from radiation exposure, protection in medicine, the application of ICRP recommendations, andprotection of the environment. The Main Commission consists of a Chair and twelve other members. Committees
typically comprise 10–15 members. Biologists and medical doctors dominate the current membership; physicists arealso well represented.
ICRP uses Working Parties to develop ideas and Task Groups to prepare its reports. A Task Group is usuallychaired by an ICRP Committee member and usually contains a number of specialists from outside ICRP. Thus,
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International Commission on Radiological Protection
Scientiﬁc Secretary: C.H. Clement, ICRP, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada; sci.sec@icrp.org
Chair: Dr. C. Cousins, Department of Radiology, Addenbrooke’s Hospital, Cambridge, UK
Vice-Chair: Dr. A.J. González, Argentina Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Buenos Aires, Argentina

Members of the 2009–2013 Main Commission of the ICRP
J.D. Boice Jr, Rockville, MD, USA
J.R. Cooper, Didcot, UK
J. Lee, Seoul, Korea
J. Lochard, Fontenay-Aux-Roses,
FranceH.-G. Menzel, Genève, Switzerland
O. Niwa, Chiba, Japan
Z. Pan, Beijing, China

R.J. Pentreath, Cornwall, UK
R.J. Preston, Research
Triangle Park, NC, USA
N. Shandala, Moscow, Russia
E. Vañó, Madrid, Spain

Emeritus Members
R.H. Clarke, Hampshire, UK
B. Lindell, Stockholm, Sweden
C.D. Meinhold, Brookhaven, NY, USA
F.A. Mettler Jr., Albuqverqve, NM, USA
W.K. Sinclair, Escondido, CA, USA
C. Streﬀer, Essen, Germany

The membership of the Task Group during the period of preparation of this report was:J. Lochard (Chair)
P. Hedemann-Jensen
A. Oudiz (2006–2007)

I. Bogdevitch
A. McEwan
T. Schneider

E. Gallego
A. Nisbet
P. Strand

T. Lazo

Z. Carr

The corresponding members were:
A. Janssens

Annals of the ICRPICRP PUBLICATION 111

Application of the Commission’s
Recommendations to the Protectionof People Living in Long-term
Contaminated Areas after a Nuclear
Accident or a Radiation Emergency
Editor
C.H. CLEMENT

Authors
J. Lochard, I. Bogdevitch, E. Gallego, P. Hedemann-Jensen,
A. McEwan, A. Nisbet, A. Oudiz, T. Schneider, P. Strand,
Z. Carr, A. Janssens, T. Lazo

PUBLISHED FOR
The International Commission on Radiological Protection
byICRP Publication 111

Application of the Commission’s
Recommendations to the Protectionof People Living in Long-term
Contaminated Areas after a Nuclear
Accident or a Radiation Emergency
ICRP Publication 111
Approved by the Commission in October 2008

Abstract–In this report, the Commission provides guidance for the protection of people
living in long-term contaminated areas resulting from either a nuclear accident or aradiation emergency. The report considers the effects of such events on the affected
population. This includes the pathways of human exposure, the types of exposed populations, and the characteristics of exposures. Although the focus is on radiation
protection considerations, the report also recognises the complexity of post-accident
situations, which cannot be managed without addressing all the affected domains ofdaily life, i.e. environmental, health, economic, social, psychological, cultural, ethical,
political, etc. The report explains how the 2007 Recommendations apply to this type ofexisting exposure situation, including consideration of the justification and optimisationof protection strategies, and the introduction and application of a reference level to drive
the optimisation process. The report also considers practical aspects of the implementation of protection strategies, both by authorities and the affected population. Itemphasises the effectiveness of directly involving the affected population and local
professionals in the management of the situation, and the responsibility of authorities atboth national and local levels to create the conditions and provide the means favouring
the involvement and empowerment of the population. The role of radiation monitoring,
health surveillance, and the management of contaminated foodstuffs and other commodities is described in this perspective. The Annex summarises past experience of longterm contaminated areas resulting from radiation emergencies and nuclear accidents,
including radiological criteria followed in carrying out remediation measures.
Ó 2009 ICRP Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Post-accident; Rehabilitation; Optimisation; Reference level; Stakeholder
involvement; Radiation monitoring; Health surveillance; Contaminated foodstuffs
1

ICRP Publication 111

Editorial
AFTER THE EMERGENCY. . .
This issue of the Annals provides advice on the application of the Commission’s
2007 Recommendations (ICRP, 2008) with respect to existing exposure situations.
Speciﬁcally, it deals with people living in long-term contaminated areas after a nuclear accident or radiation emergency, although many aspects of this advice also apply
to other instances of existing exposure situations (e.g. radon in dwellings or workplaces, naturally occurring radioactive material, or contaminated sites resulting frompast activities).
In some ways, this report picks up where Publication 109 ‘Application of the Commission’s Recommendations for the protection of people in emergency exposure situations’ (ICRP, 2009) leaves oﬀ, since the situations dealt with in this issue may wellhave evolved from an earlier emergency exposure situation.
The Task Groups working on these two documents have co-ordinated their eﬀorts
so that they give complementary advice of use to radiological protection professionals in the ﬁeld of emergency and consequence management. This co-operation wasvital given that an important aspect of the larger problem is the transition froman emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure situation. Strategies mustchange from those driven mainly by urgency, with potentially high levels of exposure
and predominantly central decisions, to more decentralised strategies which aim to
improve living conditions and reduce exposures to as low as reasonably achievablegiven the circumstances.
One general point that the reader should take from this report is that it emphasises
the new approach of the Commission which reinforces that the principle of optimisation of protection (with some type of restriction on individual doses) is absolutely
central to the system of protection, and that it is to be applied in a similar way to all
exposure situations. Optimisation, aided by the use of reference levels, is essential tothe approaches described in this report.
Another important point is that the success of measures taken to control doses tomembers of the public in existing exposure situations relies heavily on the behaviourof those exposed. This should not be seen as a weakness, but rather a strength thatcan be exploited through the involvement of key stakeholders; provision of timely,
understandable, and practical information; and encouragement of self-protection
measures.
Worldwide experience following accidents (both nuclear and non-nuclear) has
shown that individuals are often not particularly willing to leave aﬀected areas. In
3

ICRP Publication 111

addition, even if restrictions must be put on land uses and lifestyles, in the long term
people wish to live life that is as normal as possible. Therefore, whenever possible, along-term goal should be to rehabilitate areas to allow people to return to their normal habits.
After all, isn’t it true that what most people really want is to continue living theirlives, and that they are willing and able (sometimes with a little guidance) to help
make that happen?
CHRISTOPHER H. CLEMENTSCIENTIFIC SECRETARY , ICRP

References
ICRP, 2008. The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection.
ICRP Publication 103. Ann. ICRP 37 (2–4).
ICRP, 2009. Application of the Commission’s recommendations for the protection of people in emergency
exposure situations. ICRP Publication 109. Ann. ICRP 39 (1).

4

CONTENTS
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................

1

EDITORIAL .....................................................................................................................

3

CONTENTS ......................................................................................................................

5

PREFACE .........................................................................................................................

7

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...............................................................................................

9

1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................
1.1. Background .........................................................................................................
1.2. Scope ...................................................................................................................
1.3. Structure of the report ........................................................................................
1.4. References ...........................................................................................................

15
15
16
16
17

2. LIVING IN CONTAMINATED AREAS ..................................................................
2.1. Exposure pathways .............................................................................................
2.2. Characteristics of exposures................................................................................
2.3. Experience from past events ...............................................................................
2.4. References ...........................................................................................................

19
19
20
22
23

3. APPLICATION OF THE COMMISSION’S SYSTEM TO THE
PROTECTION OF PEOPLE LIVING IN CONTAMINATED AREAS ................
3.1. Justification of protection strategies ...................................................................
3.2. Optimisation of protection strategies..................................................................
3.3. Reference levels to restrict individual exposures ...............................................
3.4. References ...........................................................................................................

25
25
26
29
33

4. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTION STRATEGIES .......................................
4.1. Protective actions implemented by authorities ...................................................
4.2. Protective actions implemented by the affected population ...............................
4.3. References ...........................................................................................................

35
35
37
38

5. RADIATION MONITORING AND HEALTH SURVEILLANCE .........................
5.1. Radiation monitoring ........................................................................................
5.2. Health surveillance ..............................................................................................
5.3. References ...........................................................................................................

39
39
40
41

6. MANAGEMENT OF CONTAMINATED FOODSTUFFS AND OTHERCOMMODITIES ..........................................................................................................
6.1. Management inside the contaminated areas .......................................................
6.2. Management of exportations outside the contaminated areas ...........................

43
43
44

5

ICRP Publication 111

6.3.
6.4.

Management of other commodities ....................................................................
References ...........................................................................................................

45
46

ANNEX A. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF LONG-TERM
CONTAMINATED AREAS ......................................................................................

47

ERRATUM TO THE REFERENCES IN PUBLICATION 98,(VOLUME 35, ISSUE 3) .............................................................................................

63

CORRIGENDUM TO ‘THE HISTORY OF ICRP AND
THE EVOLUTION OF ITS POLICIES’ [ANN. ICRP 39(1)] ...................................

69

6

PREFACE

At its meeting in Paris in March 2005, the Main Commission of the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) approved the formation of a new
Task Group, reporting to Committee 4, to develop guidance on the implementationof its new Recommendations (ICRP, 2007) for the protection of people living in
long-term contaminated areas after a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency.
The terms of reference of the Task Group were to provide guidance on: setting reference levels for planning long-term protection strategies;
 implementing optimised protective actions; involving stakeholders in radiological protection;
 developing radiation monitoring and health surveillance; and managing contaminated commodities.
In developing its guidance, the Task Group was encouraged to co-ordinate withthe concurrently approved Task Group in charge of elaborating recommendations
on the application of the Commission’s Recommendations for the protection of people in emergency exposure situations (ICRP, 2009).
The present report takes account of past experience of the protection of populations living in contaminated areas, particularly in the Commonwealth of Independent States countries aﬀected by the Chernobyl accident, and to a lesser extent toother past accidents and events that resulted in the contamination of large areas.
It takes also into account recent methodological and practical developments at international and national levels: the INEX programme of the Committee of Radiation
Protection and Public Health of the Nuclear Energy Agency/Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (NEA/OECD), the EURANOS Project of
the European Commission, the French CODIRPA exercise, the ETHOS Project,
and the CORE Programme on post-Chernobyl rehabilitation in Belarus.
The guidance oﬀered by the Task Group is generic, providing a basic frameworkthat can be tailored for speciﬁc circumstances. The detailed implementation of theCommission’s Recommendations is a matter for the relevant national authorities.
The membership of the Task Group during the period of preparation of this report was:J. Lochard (Chair)
P. Hedemann-Jensen
A. Oudiz (2006–2007)

I. Bogdevitch
A. McEwan
T. Schneider

E. Gallego
A. Nisbet
P. Strand

The corresponding members were:
A. Janssens

T. Lazo7

Z. CarrICRP Publication 111

The membership of Committee 4 during the period of preparation of this report
was:A. Sugier (Chair)
D. Cool
J-F. Lecomte (Secretary)
G. Massera
M. Savkin
W. Weiss

P. Burns
J. Cooper (Vice-Chair)
H. LiuA. McGarry
K-L. Sjöblom

P. Carboneras
M. KaiJ. Lochard
K. Mrabit
A. Tsela

The Task Group met four times:
13–15 February 2006, NEA/OECD, Issy-les-Moulineaux, France
2–4 October 2006, NEA/OECD, Issy-les-Moulineaux, France
16–18 April 2007, NEA/OECD, Paris, France
4–6 February 2008, World Health Organization (WHO), Geneva, Switzerland
The Task Group members wish to thank Peter Schmidt from Wismut GmbH who
gave a useful presentation on management of the rehabilitation of areas contaminated by uranium mining and milling activities in the former East Germany, Mikhail
Savkin from the Biophysics Institute of Russia for sharing his experience of the management of the long-term consequences of the Chernobyl accident, and Céline Bataille from CEPN-France for her scientiﬁc assistance.
The Task Group would also like to thank those organisations and staﬀ that madefacilities and support available for its meetings. These include NEA/OECD (Paris)
and WHO (Geneva).
The report was adopted by the Commission at its meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina on 25 October 2008.

References
ICRP, 2007. The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection.
ICRP Publication 103. Ann. ICRP 37 (2–4).
ICRP, 2009. Application of the Commission’s recommendations for the protection of people in emergency
exposure situations. ICRP Publication 109. Ann. ICRP 39 (1).

8

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY(a) The present report provides guidance on the application of the Commission’s
Recommendations for the protection of people living in long-term contaminatedareas resulting from either a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency. This postaccident rehabilitation situation is considered by the Commission as an ‘existing
exposure situation’.
(b) The following recommendations are the ﬁrst to deal with the management ofexisting exposure situations since publication of the 2007 Recommendations (ICRP,
2007). They complement those made in Publication 82 (ICRP, 2000), and further
develop the role of stakeholders, introduced for the ﬁrst time by the Commission
in this publication. They also take into account the evolution introduced by the2007 Recommendations from the previous process-based approach of practices
and interventions to an approach based on the characteristics of radiation exposure
situations. They particularly emphasise the new approach of the Commission, which
reinforces the principle of optimisation of protection to be applied in a similar way
to all exposure situations with restrictions on individual doses.
(c) Although developed for managing a speciﬁc category of existing exposure situation, many recommendations developed in this report are broadly applicable with
the necessary adaptations to other existing exposure situations like, for example, radon in dwellings and workplaces, naturally occurring radioactive material, or contaminated sites resulting from past nuclear and industrial activities. Thisparticularly concerns the use of reference levels to plan protection strategies, the roleof self-help protective actions complementing the protective actions implemented byauthorities, and the accompanying measures to inform the aﬀected individuals.
(d) The transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure
situation is characterised by a change in management, from strategies mainly driven
by urgency, with potentially high levels of exposure and predominantly central
decisions, to more decentralised strategies aiming to improve living conditions
and reduce exposure to as low as reasonably achievable given the circumstances.
The decision to allow people who wish to live in contaminated areas to do so istaken by the authorities, and this indicates the beginning of the post-accident
rehabilitation phase. Implicit with this decision is the ability to provide people withprotection against the potential health consequences of the radiation, and sustainable living conditions, including respectable lifestyles and livelihoods.
(e) Past experience of existing exposure situations resulting from a nuclear accident or a radiological emergency has revealed that all dimensions of the daily lifeof the inhabitants within the contaminated areas, as well as the social and economic
activities, are aﬀected. These are complex situations which cannot be managed withradiation protection considerations alone, and must address all relevant dimensions
such as health, environmental, economic, social, psychological, cultural, ethical,
political, etc.
(f) In most existing exposure situations aﬀecting the living place of the population,
the level of exposure is mainly driven by individual behaviour and is diﬃcult to
9

ICRP Publication 111

control at the source. This generally results in a very heterogeneous distribution of
exposures, which call for an individual approach for control of the situation. As aconsequence, the use of the ‘average individual’ is not appropriate for the management of exposure in a contaminated area.
(g) Living or working in contaminated areas is considered to represent an existing
exposure situation. For such situations, the fundamental protection principles
include the justiﬁcation of implementing protection strategies, and the optimisationof the protection achieved by these strategies. Reference levels are used during the
optimisation process to plan protection strategies that would result in estimatedresidual doses lower than these levels. Dose limits do not apply because existing
exposure situations cannot be managed in an a priori fashion.
(h) Protection strategies are made up of a series of protective actions directed at
the relevant exposure pathways. The justiﬁcation and optimisation of protection
strategies are an evolution from previous Recommendations, which were focusedon justiﬁcation and optimisation of individual protection measures.
(i) In the case of an existing exposure situation following an emergency exposure
situation, justiﬁcation applies initially to the fundamental decision to be taken by
the authorities at the end of the emergency exposure situation to allow people to live
permanently in long-term contaminated areas. Such a decision may be accompaniedby the setting of a radiation protection criterion above which it is mandatory to
relocate the population, and below which inhabitants are allowed to stay subject
to certain conditions. Several areas may be deﬁned with relevant conditions according to a graded approach. Secondly, the justiﬁcation principle applies at the level ofdecision related to the deﬁnition of the protection strategies to be implemented tomaintain and possibly improve the radiological situation resulting from theemergency phase.
(j) The responsibility for ensuring an overall beneﬁt to society as well as to individuals when populations are allowed to stay in contaminated areas lies with governments or national authorities. Worldwide experience following nuclear andnon-nuclear accidents shows that neither nations nor individuals are very willingto leave aﬀected areas. In general, while authorities may require individuals to leave
the aﬀected areas for health reasons in case of excessive residual levels of exposure,
wherever possible, they will aim to rehabilitate these areas to allow further humanactivities.
(k) The principle of optimisation of protection with a restriction on individual
dose is central to the system of protection recommended by the Commission
for existing exposure situations. Due to its judgemental nature, there is a strong
need for transparency of the process. This transparency assumes that all relevant information is provided to the involved parties, and that the traceabilityof the decision-making process is documented properly, aiming for an informed
decision.
(l) Protection strategies have to be prepared by authorities as part of national
planning arrangements. These plans should take into account self-help protective actions, including the conditions to allow such actions to be undertakenby the inhabitants, and their results in terms of prospective dose reduction.
10

ICRP Publication 111

Although it is diﬃcult to ask the population to plan in advance for these actions, the Commission recommends authorities to involve key representative
stakeholders to participate in the preparation of these plans.
(m) As in most cases in long-term contaminated areas, the level of exposureis driven by individual behaviour; the authorities should facilitate processes toallow inhabitants to deﬁne, optimise, and apply their own protective actions
if required. A positive aspect is that individuals regain control of their own situation. However, self-help protective actions may be disturbing and their implementation supposes that aﬀected individuals are fully aware of the situation andwell informed. It is the government’s responsibility to provide good guidance
and to provide the means to implement it. Hence the government, or the
responsible authority, will need to constantly evaluate the eﬀectiveness of theprotection strategy in place, including protective actions carried out at local
or individual levels, in order to provide adequate support on how to further
improve the situation.
(n) The Commission recommends that reference levels, set in terms of individual
annual eﬀective residual dose (mSv/year), should be used in conjunction with theplanning and implementation of the optimisation process for exposures inexisting exposure situations. The objective is to implement optimised protection
strategies, or a progressive range of such strategies, which aim to reduce individual
doses below the reference level. During the planning stage, the optimisation process
should result in estimated residual doses that are below the reference level. During
implementation of the optimisation process, particular attention should be given to
reduce individual exposures that may remain above the reference level. However,exposures below the reference level should not be ignored; they should also beassessed to ascertain whether protection is optimised or further protective actions
are needed.
(o) The reference level for the optimisation of protection of people living incontaminated areas should be selected in the lower part of the 1–20 mSv/year
band recommended in Publication 103 (ICRP, 2007) for the management of thiscategory of exposure situations. Past experience has demonstrated that a typicalvalue used for constraining the optimisation process in long-term post-accident
situations is 1 mSv/year. National authorities may take into account the prevailing circumstances, and also take advantage of the timing of the overall rehabilitation programme to adopt intermediate reference levels to improve the situation
progressively.
(p) Reference levels are used both prospectively, for planning of protection
strategies (as well as, if necessary, deﬁning derived reference levels for the implementation of some speciﬁc protective actions such as, for instance, trade of foodstuﬀs), and retrospectively as a benchmark for judging the eﬀectiveness of
implemented protection strategies.
(q) The fact that exposures have been reduced below the reference level is not a
suﬃcient condition to discontinue protective actions as long as there is room toreduce exposures further in conformity with the optimisation process. The continuation of such actions would probably be a prime mechanism to maintain11

ICRP Publication 111

exposures close or similar to those in normal situations as recommended by theCommission.
(r) The management of an existing exposure situation following a nuclear accident or a radiological emergency relies on the implementation of a more or lesscomplex rehabilitation programme coping with numerous dimensions (social, economic, health, environmental, etc.) according to the level of contamination andits space and time distribution. The implementation of protection strategies is a
dynamic process which changes with the evolution of the radiological situation.
(s) It is the responsibility of the authorities, particularly at the regulatory level,
to establish the conditions and to implement the means to allow eﬀective engagement of the aﬀected population in the protection strategies and more globally inthe rehabilitation programme. Past experience of the management of contaminated areas has demonstrated that the involvement of local professionals andinhabitants in the implementation of protection strategies is important for sustainability of the rehabilitation programme. Mechanisms for engaging with stakeholders are driven by national and cultural characteristics, and should be adapted
to the circumstances.
(t) The priority of protection strategies implemented by authorities is to protect
people with the highest exposures, and in parallel to reduce all individual exposures associated with the event to as low as reasonably achievable. This implies
assessment of the dose distribution, comparison of all doses with the reference level, and subsequent optimisation of protection. Typical strategies to be implemented by the authorities in a post-accident situation are clean-up of buildings,
remediation of soils and vegetation, changes in animal husbandry, monitoringof the environment and produce, provision of clean foodstuﬀs, managing of waste(resulting from clean-up or from unmarketable contaminated goods), provision of
information, guidance, instruction and equipment (e.g. for measurements), healthsurveillance, education of children, information for particular exposed groups andthe public at large, etc. Experience has shown that the dissemination of a ‘practical radiological protection culture’ within all segments of the population, andespecially within professionals in charge of the public health and education, is
key to the success of protection strategies in the long term.
(u) Typical actions taken by the inhabitants in long-term contaminated areas,
called ‘self-help protective actions’ by the Commission, are those aiming at thecharacterisation of their own radiological situation, notably their external andinternal exposure. These mainly consist of monitoring the radiological qualityof their direct environment (ambient dose rates in living areas and contaminationof foodstuﬀs), their own external and internal exposure, and the exposure of thepeople for whom they have responsibility (e.g. children, elderly), and in adapting
their way of life accordingly to reduce their exposure. Authorities should facilitate
the setting-up of local forums involving representatives of the aﬀected population
and relevant experts (e.g. health, radiation protection, agriculture authorities,etc.). These forums will allow gathering and sharing of information, and favour
common assessment of the eﬀectiveness of strategies driven by the populations
and the authorities.
12

ICRP Publication 111(v) In recent years, stakeholder engagement has moved steadily to the forefrontof policy decisions. Such engagement is considered by the Commission as key tothe development and implementation of radiological protection strategies for mostexisting exposure situations. The control of radon in dwellings is another typicalexample. As experience in stakeholder engagement has grown, it has been possible to use many of the lessons learned as a basis for the development of bestpractice among the radiation protection community. Processes and tools are
becoming established that can be generally applied to situations where the views
and input of stakeholders are instrumental in improving the quality of protection.
(w) In the case of an existing exposure situation, the Commission recommends
that the individuals concerned should receive general information on the exposure
situation and the means of reducing their doses. In situations where individual
lifestyles are key drivers of the exposure, individual monitoring is an important
requirement, coupled with an information programme. Furthermore, given theuncertainties concerning future potential health eﬀects of the exposures received
by the population since the emergency phase, it is the responsibility of theauthorities to implement a radiation and health surveillance programme.
(x) From the perspective of assessing the evolution of the exposure situationand the eﬀectiveness of the protection strategies, the Commission recommends
that a monitoring record system should be established under the responsibilityof the relevant authorities. Such records are particularly important for determining potential groups at risk, in conjunction with health surveillance. Furthermore,
to allow eﬀective long-term health surveillance of the aﬀected population, theCommission also recommends that health registries should be established forthe population residing in the contaminated areas.
(y) The management of contaminated foodstuﬀs and other commodities produced
in areas aﬀected by a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency presents a particularly
diﬃcult problem because of issues of market acceptance: Furthermore, maintaining
long-term restrictions on the production and consumption of foodstuﬀs may aﬀect
the sustainable development of the contaminated areas, and therefore call for appropriate implementation of the optimisation principle. Reconciling the interests of local
farmers, producers, and the local population with those of consumers and the food
distribution sector from outside the contaminated territory has to be considered carefully.
(z) The Commission considers that, despite the socio-economic complexity of the
management of contaminated foodstuﬀs, in view of the interests of diﬀerent stakeholders, protection strategies should be developed to meet the established reference
level and optimised at all levels where it is possible to intervene: production, distribution, processing, as well as measures taken for informing consumers and allowing
them to make appropriate choices. Derived reference levels expressed in Bq/kg or
Bq/L play an important role in this process, in particular for the placing of foodstuﬀs
on the market.
(aa) Commodities other than foodstuﬀs may be contaminated following a nuclear
accident or other radiological emergency. These could include agricultural products
such as wood, paper, and oil, or other products recycled from contaminated materials
13

ICRP Publication 111

such as scrap metal. The objective again is to reduce exposure to as low as reasonably
achievable, taking into account social and economic factors.
(bb) Past experience of long-term contaminated areas resulting from either nuclear
tests (Bikini, Maralinga), nuclear accidents (Kyshtym, Palomares, Chernobyl), or aradiological source accident (Goiânia) illustrates the potential importance of ingestion of contaminated foodstuﬀs several decades after the event at the source of the
problems when large rural areas are aﬀected. Management of these foodstuﬀs to protect the local population against chronic internal exposure and to maintain the viability of local productions is essential. When urban and semi-urban environments areaﬀected, irradiation and inhalation may remain signiﬁcant exposure pathways for along period of time. As far as the setting of reference levels for existing exposure situations resulting from nuclear accidents and radiation emergencies is concerned, pastexperience shows that typical dose values selected by authorities to manage such situations are close or equal to 1 mSv/year, corresponding to the desire to progressively
reduce long-term exposure to levels that are close or similar to situations considered‘normal’, i.e within the band of constraints set for public exposure in planned
situations.
References
ICRP, 2000. Protection of the public in situations of prolonged exposure. ICRP Publication 82. Ann.
ICRP 29 (1–2).
ICRP, 2007. The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection.
ICRP Publication 103. Ann. ICRP 37 (2–4).

14

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background(1) In Publication 103, the International Commission on Radiological Protection(ICRP) described the general principles for the implementation of its system of protection in three diﬀerent types of exposure situation – planned, emergency, and existing – which replace the previous distinction between practices and interventions(ICRP, 2007, Para. 176):
 planned exposure situations are situations involving the deliberate introduction
and operation of sources; emergency exposure situations are situations that may occur during the operationof a planned situation, or from a malicious act, or from any other unexpected situation, and require urgent action in order to avoid or reduce undesirable consequences; and existing exposure situations are exposure situations that already exist when a decision on control has to be taken, including prolonged exposure situations after
emergencies.
(2) The present report provides guidance on the application of the Commission’s
Recommendations for the protection of people living in long-term contaminatedareas resulting from either a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency. This postaccident rehabilitation situation is considered by the Commission as an ‘existing
exposure situation’ (ICRP, 2007, Para. 240).
(3) In the past, the Commission has set out general principles for planning protective
actions after an accident. The ﬁrst guidance was issued in Publication 40 (ICRP, 1984)
but this was conﬁned to short- and medium-term actions. This guidance was then revised and complemented in Publication 63 (ICRP, 1993) in the light of the 1990 Recommendations (ICRP, 1991). Publication 82 (ICRP, 2000), on the protection of the
public in situations of prolonged radiation exposure, was the ﬁrst to deal explicitlywith application of the Commission’s system of radiological protection to controllable
radiation exposure due to long-lived radioactive residues in the environment.
(4) The recommendations in this report complement those of Publication 82(ICRP, 2000). They further develop the role of stakeholders, recognising that thoseconcerned with this type of situation should be involved and given the opportunity
to participate directly in the implementation of protective actions to control their
exposure. They also take into account the evolution introduced by the 2007 Recommendations from the previous process-based approach of practices and interventions
to an approach based on the characteristics of radiation exposure situations. They
particularly emphasise the new approach of the Commission, which reinforces theprinciple of optimisation of protection to be applied in a similar way to all exposure
situations with restrictions on individual doses.
(5) The following recommendations are the ﬁrst to deal with the management ofexisting exposure situations since publication of the 2007 Recommendations.
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Although developed for managing a speciﬁc category of existing exposure situation,
many recommendations developed in this report are broadly applicable with the necessary adaptations to other existing exposure situations, such as radon in dwellings
or workplaces, naturally occurring radioactive material, or contaminated sites resulting from past nuclear and industrial activities. This particularly concerns the use ofreference levels to plan and implement protective actions (Section 3.3), the role ofself-help protective actions complementing the protective actions implemented byauthorities, and the accompanying measures to inform the aﬀected individuals(Section 4.2).
1.2. Scope(6) Nuclear accidents and radiation emergencies are managed according to guidance covering short-, medium-, and long-term actions. The most recent guidance related to the management of short- and medium-term actions is provided by ICRP
Publication 109 (ICRP, 2009) on the Application of the Commission’s Recommendations for the protection of people in emergency exposure situations. The post-accident rehabilitation situation covered by this report corresponds to the long-term
actions that may need to be implemented in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological event resulting in long-term contamination of large inhabited areas.
(7) The transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure
situation is characterised by a change in management from strategies mainly driven
by urgency, with potentially high levels of exposure and predominantly central decisions, to more decentralised strategies aiming to improve living conditions and reduce exposures to as low as reasonably achievable given the circumstances. These
strategies must take into account the long-term dimension of the situation, and exposed individuals should be directly involved in their own protection. The Commission recommends that this transition should be undertaken in a co-ordinated andfully transparent manner, and agreed and understood by all the aﬀected parties.
(8) The decision to allow people to live in contaminated areas if they wish to do so
is taken by the authorities, and this indicates the beginning of the post-accident rehabilitation phase. Implicit with this decision is the ability to provide individuals withprotection against the potential health consequences of radiations, and the provisionof sustainable living conditions, including respectable lifestyles and livelihoods.
(9) In the case of severe accidents aﬀecting very large areas, the management of the
response may need to deal simultaneously with actions relating to its diﬀerent phases
in diﬀerent geographic areas. Thus, the transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure situation may occur at diﬀerent times within the contaminated areas.
1.3. Structure of the report(10) Chapter 2 considers the eﬀects of a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency
on the aﬀected population. This includes the pathways of human exposure, the types
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of exposed populations, the characteristics of exposures, and the experience frompast events. Chapter 3 discusses the application of the Commission’s Recommendations in this type of existing exposure situation, and includes consideration of justiﬁcation and optimisation of protection strategies, and the introduction andapplication of reference levels to reduce inequity in individual dose distributions.
Chapter 4 considers practical aspects of the implementation of protection strategies,
both by authorities and the aﬀected population. Chapter 5 covers radiation monitoring and health surveillance, and Chapter 6 deals with the management of contaminated foodstuﬀs and other commodities.
(11) Finally, Annex A summarises past experience of long-term contaminatedareas resulting from radiation emergencies and nuclear accidents, including theradiological criteria followed in carrying out remediation measures.
1.4. References
ICRP, 1984. Statement from the 1984 Stockholm meeting of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection. ICRP Publication 40. Ann. ICRP 14 (2).
ICRP, 1991. 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. ICRP
Publication 60. Ann. ICRP 21 (1–3).
ICRP, 1993. Principles for intervention for protection of the public in a radiological emergency. ICRP
Publication 63. Ann. ICRP 22 (4).
ICRP, 2000. Protection of the public in situations of prolonged exposure. ICRP Publication 82. Ann.
ICRP 29 (1–2).
ICRP, 2007. The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection.
ICRP Publication 103. Ann. ICRP 37 (2–4).
ICRP, 2009. Application of the Commission’s recommendations for the protection of people in emergency
exposure situations. ICRP Publication 109. Ann. ICRP 39 (1).

172. LIVING IN CONTAMINATED AREAS(12) Past experience of existing exposure situations resulting from a nuclear accident or a radiological emergency has revealed that all dimensions of daily life of the
inhabitants, as well as social and economic activities, are aﬀected within the contaminated areas. These are complex situations which cannot be managed with radiation
protection considerations alone, and must address all relevant dimensions such as
health, environmental, economic, social, psychological, cultural, ethical, political,
etc. (UNDP, 2002). Although the present recommendations focus on the basic radiation protection principles to be applied to this type of exposure situation, they havebeen developed taking into account this complexity and the experience gained so far
with its management.

2.1. Exposure pathways(13) The types of existing exposure situation considered in this report are the resultof dispersive events that lead to radioactive contamination over relatively extended
areas. The pattern of deposition is dependent on the magnitude of the dispersive
event, both in terms of activity and energy release, and on prevailing meteorologicalconditions at the time of the release, particularly the wind direction and any rainfall
occurring during the passage of the plume. For an extended release, wind direction
can be expected to vary over time. In the longer term, rainfall and weathering willallow penetration of deposited radionuclides into soil and some migration via water
pathways or through resuspension. Uptake in plants from soils may vary seasonally.
The levels of deposition may also vary greatly from one area to another. After the
Chernobyl accident, surface contamination (activity per unit surface area) varied
by factors of up to 10–100 within the same village. Generally in the longer term,
one or a few radionuclides will dominate as the principal contributors to human
exposure.
(14) Following contamination of the environment, several exposure pathways canbe distinguished: external exposure due to deposited radionuclides and intake via
consumption or inhalation of contaminated material. Radionuclide intake by humans may arise from consumption of vegetables, milk, meat and ﬁsh. The transfer
to animals will depend on their intake and metabolism of the various radionuclides.
Radionuclides deposited directly on plants or in soil may be bound to insoluble particles and be less available for intestinal absorption than radionuclides incorporated
in foodstuﬀs. There may be considerable variation in intakes by the population withtime, depending on the season of the year and resulting agricultural practices, andthe types of soil and vegetation. Certain areas such as alpine pastures, forests, andupland areas may show longer retention in soils than agricultural areas, and high levels of transfer to particular foods, e.g. berries and mushrooms in forests, may giverise to elevated intakes.

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2.2. Characteristics of exposures(15) In most existing exposure situations aﬀecting the living place of the population, the level of exposure is mainly driven by individual behaviour and is diﬃcult
to control at the source. This generally results in a very heterogeneous distributionof exposures. Day-to-day life or work in such a territory inevitably leads to some
exposure.
(16) The exposure situation prevailing after the implementation of short- and medium-term actions following a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency will generally show a very broad range of individual exposures, both for the doses alreadyreceived and for the projected residual doses. The range of individual exposures
may be aﬀected by many individually related factors. These include: location (of home and work) with respect to the contaminated areas (after cleanup); profession or occupation, and therefore time spent and work undertaken in particular areas aﬀected by the contamination; and individual habits, particularly the diet of each individual, which could be dependent on her/his socio-economic situation.
Experience has shown that the use of an ‘average individual’ is not appropriate forthe management of exposure in a contaminated area. Large diﬀerences may exist between neighbouring villages, within families inside the same village, or even within
the same family according to diet, living habits, and occupation. These diﬀerences
generally result in a highly skewed dose distribution among the aﬀected population.
Fig. 2.1 shows the individual dose distribution of children residing in a contaminateddistrict around Chernobyl 20 years after the accident.
(17) Exposure from ingestion of contaminated foodstuﬀs may result from both
chronic and episodic intakes according to the relative importance of locally produced
foodstuﬀs in the diet. As an example, Fig. 2.2 presents the evolution of the wholebody activity associated with an episodic intake of 1000 Bq of 137 Cs and with a daily
intake of respectively 1 and 10 Bq of 137 Cs over 1000 days. For the same total intake,the resulting whole-body activity at the end of the period is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
This illustrates the intrinsically diﬀerent burden between daily ingestion of contaminated foodstuﬀs and periodic ingestion. In practice, for people living in contaminated areas, the whole-body activity is resulting from a combination of daily andepisodic intakes depending on the origin of foodstuﬀs and dietary habits.
(18) Twenty years after the Chernobyl accident, typical average daily intake due to137
Cs for an adult in the contaminated areas around Chernobyl is in the range of
10–20 Bq, and additional higher episodic intakes in the range of a few hundred
Bq are common due to, for example, the ingestion of wild mushrooms or berries.
This results in annual eﬀective doses in the range of 0.1 mSv. However, some poorly
informed individuals or those with very particular dietary habits may present daily
intakes in the range of 100 to a few hundred Bq. This corresponds to an annual
eﬀective dose in the range of 1 to a few mSv.
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1194

1200

1000

800

738

600

400

190

200

123
31

0

< 0.030.03-0.05 0.05-0.08 0.08-0.1

16

15

0.1-0.12 0.12-0.13 0.13-0.14 0.14-0.2

40

0.2-0.3

10

12

1

0.3-1

1-1.5

> 1.5

1

mSv/yearFig. 2.1. Typical dose distribution from caesium intake of children in the contaminated area around
Chernobyl 20 years after the accident.

1400

Chronic ingestion of 10 Bq/day

1200
1000
800
600
Episodic ingestion of 1000 Bq

400
Chronic ingestion of 1 Bq/day

200
0

0

200

400

600

800

1000

Days
Fig. 2.2. Evolution over a pluri-annual period (1000 days) of whole-body activity (Bq) associated with an
episodic intake of 1000 Bq and daily intake of 1 and 10 Bq of 137 Cs.

(19) For the sake of controlling exposure in long-term contaminated areas, diﬀerent exposed groups of populations may need to be considered to assess the overall
dose impact in people. The typical population groups generally considered are:21

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 the ‘rural’ population: farmers or families with small holdings who are assumed toreside and work in the aﬀected area, and to derive part of their food from locallygrown products; and the ‘urban’ population: people who inhabit houses constructed in an aﬀectedbuilt-up area, and who may derive foodstuﬀs from outside the aﬀected area.
In addition, various groups of exposed workers may need to be considered according to the economic activities aﬀected, such as foresters and employees of sawmills in
the case of a forest region being impacted. Members of these groups may reside in
the contaminated area, or just stay in the area during working hours and reside outside the aﬀected zone. In the latter situation, most of their food will come from noncontaminated areas. If the region attracts tourists, the transient resident population
may also need to be considered with its peculiarities.
2.3. Experience from past events(20) In the past, several nuclear tests (Bikini Island in the Paciﬁc, Maralinga inSouth Australia, Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan) and several nuclear accidents (Windscale in the UK, Kyshtym in Russia, Palomares in Spain) have resulted in the contamination of large areas. In addition, the more recent Goiânia radiological source
accident in Brazil resulted in the contamination of a limited area. These events haveprovided signiﬁcant experience that is of practical value in developing appropriate
management approaches to address long-term post-accident radiological issues,
and also social, economic, and political issues. However, the Chernobyl accident
in Ukraine and other non-radiological emergencies that caused long-term social disruption (ﬂooding, earthquakes, etc.) provided the most important lessons that have
served as input for the Commission in its development of these recommendations.
More details about the nuclear events can be found in Annex A.
(21) The complexity of the situations resulting from widespread and long-term
contamination inevitably generates concerns and anxiety among the aﬀected populations, who could feel helpless. If the experts and professionals in charge of managing
the situations use scientiﬁc terms, measurement units, and technical procedures,
which are diﬃcult to understand by non-specialists, these could contribute to reinforce their feeling of loss of control of the situation.
(22) A commonly observed consequence is the progressive renouncement of individuals to involve themselves in the day-to-day management of such complex situations, and their confrontation with a multitude of questions, which usually remainunanswered. What are the long-term eﬀects of radioactivity on health? Is it possible
to protect oneself from the contamination? As a result, inhabitants of contaminatedareas often face diﬃcult personal choices concerning their future, and are particularly confronted by the dilemma of whether to leave the place or to stay. Experience
shows that it is diﬃcult to answer this dilemma solely on the basis of radiation protection considerations. Many personal aspects enter into the balance; people living incontaminated areas are generally very reluctant to leave their homes, and hope to
improve their living conditions. This calls for authorities to not only develop protec22

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tive actions but also to favour initiatives to enhance the quality of life of the residentsof the areas.
(23) Past experience of long-term contamination has also shown that, in the absence of good knowledge of the radiological situation, aﬀected populations tend to
adopt a denial or fatalist attitude. This is a way to further support the situation,
which generally results in basic radiation protection advice and actions being neglected, and in increasing exposures. Various projects implemented in the contaminated areas in Belarus (see Annex A) have demonstrated that the direct
involvement of inhabitants and local professionals in management of the situation
is an eﬀective way to improve the rehabilitation process (Lochard, 2007). This requires regular information on the radiological situation, and the successes and diﬃculties with implementation of protection strategies. It is the responsibility of theauthorities (both national and local) to create the conditions and provide the meansfavouring the involvement and empowerment of the population. This must be donetaking local social and economic living conditions into account to provide individuals with information, thus allowing them to understand and assess their personal situation and to maintain vigilance with the objective to improve their daily life and toprotect themselves and their oﬀspring for the future. The aim of the authorities
should be to help individuals to regain control of their lives, in which radiation protection against the existing contamination is a factor to add to several other factors
aﬀecting the rehabilitation of living conditions.
2.4. References
Lochard, J., 2007. Rehabilitation of living conditions in territories contaminated by the Chernobyl
accident: the ETHOS Project. Health Phys. 93, 522–526.
UNDP, 2002. The Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident: a Strategy for Recovery.
Report of the United Nations Development Programme.

233. APPLICATION OF THE COMMISSION’S SYSTEM TO THE
PROTECTION OF PEOPLE LIVING IN CONTAMINATED AREAS(24) Living or working in a contaminated area is considered as an existing exposure situation. For such situations, the fundamental protection principles include thejustiﬁcation of implementing protection strategies and the optimisation of the protection achieved by these strategies. Reference levels are used during the optimisation
process to plan protection strategies that would result in estimated residual doses
lower than these levels. Dose limits do not apply because existing exposure situations
cannot be managed in an a priori fashion.
(25) Protection strategies are made up of a series of protective actions directed at
the relevant exposure pathways. The justiﬁcation and optimisation of protection
strategies are an evolution from previous ICRP recommendations, which were focused on justiﬁcation and optimisation of individual protection measures.
3.1. Justiﬁcation of protection strategies(26) The principle of justiﬁcation is a source-related principle, ensuring that any
decision that alters the radiation exposure situation should do more good than harm.
In the case of an existing exposure situation following an emergency exposure situation, justiﬁcation applies initially to the fundamental decision to be taken by theauthorities at the end of the emergency exposure situation, to allow people to live
permanently in the long-term contaminated areas. Such a decision may be accompanied by the setting of a radiation protection criterion above which it is mandatory to
relocate the population, and below which inhabitants are allowed to stay subject tocertain conditions. Several areas may be deﬁned with relevant conditions according
to a graded approach. This is, for example, the approach adopted by the authorities
in the Commonwealth of Independent States countries aﬀected by the Chernobyl
accident (see Annex A). Secondly, the justiﬁcation principle applies at the level ofdecision related to the deﬁnition of the protection strategies to be implemented tomaintain and possibly improve the radiological situation resulting from the emergency phase.
(27) For existing exposure situations, protection strategies carried out to reduce
individual exposures should achieve suﬃcient individual or societal beneﬁt to oﬀset
the detriment that is caused (ICRP, 2007, Para. 203). However, justiﬁcation of protection strategies goes far beyond the scope of radiological protection as they may
also have various economic, political, environmental, social, and psychological consequences. The social and political value of reducing exposure and limiting inequity
in the exposure received by those living in the contaminated areas needs to be included when justiﬁcation of protection strategies is being carried out. The properconsideration of many of these non-radiological factors may require expertise otherthan radiological protection, and could dominate decisions on protection strategies(NEA, 2006).
(28) Justiﬁcation is concerned with the cumulative beneﬁts and impacts of individual protective actions composing the protection strategy. A range of individually
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justiﬁed actions may be available but may not provide a net beneﬁt when considered
as an overall strategy because, for example, collectively they bring too much social
disruption for the considered exposed population as a whole, or they are too complex to manage. Conversely, a single protective action may not be justiﬁed alone,
but may contribute to an overall net beneﬁt when included as part of a protection
strategy.
(29) The responsibility for ensuring an overall beneﬁt to society as well as toindividuals when populations are allowed to stay in contaminated areas lies withgovernments or national authorities. Worldwide experience following nuclear andnon-nuclear accidents shows that neither nations nor individuals are very willingto leave aﬀected areas. In general, while authorities may require individuals to leave
the aﬀected areas for health reasons in the case of excessive residual levels of
exposure, they will aim to rehabilitate these areas wherever possible to allow further
human activities.
(30) In existing exposure situations, justiﬁcation should be considered for all protective actions that may be included in a protection strategy: those implemented centrally and locally by authorities, experts, and professionals; and those directly
implemented by the exposed individuals as self-help protective actions with the support of the authorities. The protection strategy deﬁned by the authorities should take
into account both categories of protective actions, and should enable aﬀected individuals to take self-help initiatives. However, as self-help protective actions are
implemented – and thus largely decided – by the inhabitants themselves, they must
be properly informed and, if relevant, trained (to use the means and equipment provided by the authorities) in order to take informed decisions concerning their own
protection, with a net beneﬁt. The balance to be considered by the individuals includes, on one side, their desire to improve the situation and, on the other side,the ‘burden’ induced by the implementation of protective actions.
(31) For the management of long term contaminated areas after an accident
authorities may consider maintaining some of the protective actions implemented
during the emergency exposure situation, and also introducing a whole set of new
protective actions. The decision about whether to introduce these new actions will
depend on several criteria including the residual individual levels of exposure of
the residing population, the feasibility of implementing new actions, and the impactthat these actions will have on the quality and sustainability of the living conditionsin the territory.
3.2. Optimisation of protection strategies(32) Implementation of the principle of optimisation of protection is a source-related process, which should ensure the selection of the best protection strategy under
the prevailing circumstances, i.e. maximising the margin of good over harm. In order
to avoid severely inequitable outcomes of this optimisation procedure, there should
be restrictions on the doses or risks to people from a particular source through theapplication of dose or risk reference levels. Therefore, optimisation involves keeping
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exposures as low as reasonably achievable, taking into account economic and societal factors as well as the distribution of doses and beneﬁts resulting from the implementation of the protection strategies.
(33) The process of optimisation of protection is intended for application to thosesituations for which the implementation of protection strategies has been justiﬁed.
The principle of optimisation of protection with a restriction on individual dose iscentral to the system of protection as it applies to existing exposure situations.
Due to its judgemental nature, there is a strong need for transparency of the optimisation process. All the data, parameters, assumptions, and values that enter into theprocess should be presented and deﬁned very clearly. This transparency assumes that
all relevant information is provided to the involved parties, and that the traceabilityof the decision-making process is documented properly, aiming for an informed decision (ICRP, 2006b, Para. 34).
(34) Protection strategies have to be prepared by authorities as part of national
planning arrangements. These plans should take self-help protective actions into account, including the conditions to allow such actions to be undertaken by the inhabitants, and their results in terms of prospective dose reduction. Although it is diﬃcult
to ask the population to plan in advance for these actions, the Commission recommends that authorities should involve key representative stakeholders to participate
in the preparation of these plans.
(35) The case of an existing exposure situation following an emergency exposure
situation comprises some speciﬁcities. The fact that the population will stay in a contaminated area is, per se, a compromise for them and their family and friends. The
optimisation process in such a case faces many speciﬁc challenges, notably: consumer vs producer interest: to live in a contaminated area supposes that an
economic activity is maintained on the spot with local production and trade ofgoods including foodstuﬀs. Optimisation strategies should balance the need toprotect people against radioactivity and the need for the local economy to exist
and to be integrated in the global market;
 local population vs national and international population: the conditions to
restore a ‘normal’ life in the contaminated area suppose solidarity in sharing somedisadvantages of the situation between local and non-local populations (mainly
related to the movement of goods and people). Optimisation strategies should
favour equity, taking into account national regulations and plans as well as international recommendations (e.g. on trade of foodstuﬀs); and the multiple decisions taken by the inhabitants in their day-to-day life: in mostcases, the level of exposure is driven by individual behaviour. The authorities
should facilitate processes to allow inhabitants to deﬁne, optimise, and apply theirown protection strategies if required. A positive aspect is that individuals regain
control of their own situation. However, self-help protective actions may be disturbing (e.g. pay constant attention to the food one eats, the places one goes, thematerial one uses. . . in order to avoid internal and external exposures as much as
possible). This supposes that aﬀected individuals are fully aware of the situation
and well informed. To support this, various local individuals may also need to27

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be properly equipped and possibly trained (for the use of equipment provided by
the authorities). Authorities should also be prepared to assist segments of the population with particular needs (elderly, mentally handicapped, etc.).
As mentioned previously, taking into account the fact that the predominant pathway
in contaminated areas is generally ingestion, protection strategies should be based oncontrolling this pathway in relation to relevant groups of the population.
(36) Unlike in emergency exposure situations where there is a need to take urgent
action, in a post-accident rehabilitation situation, the optimisation process can be
implemented step by step, taking the prevailing circumstances into account. Experience has demonstrated that in long-term contaminated areas, it is generally possible
to reduce exposures progressively to levels comparable with those in normal
situations.
(37) The Commission has introduced the concept of constrained optimisation inorder to reduce inequity in the distribution of individual doses. According to Publication 103 (ICRP, 2007), in the case of existing exposure situations, as for emergency
exposure situations, the dose criteria to serve as dose restriction is termed ‘reference
level’ (see Section 3.3).
(38) Optimisation of protection strategies is the process of developing the strategy’s form, scale, and duration. The aim is to obtain not only a positive net beneﬁt,
but also a maximised net beneﬁt, and decision-aiding techniques can be used to guidethe selection of protection strategies and their various elements. The recommendations of the Commission on how to apply these techniques have been provided in
Publication 37 (ICRP, 1983), Publication 55 (ICRP, 1989), and Publication 101(ICRP, 2006), and these recommendations remain valid and are not repeated in detail here. In the process of selecting strategies for protecting people living in contaminated areas, the participation of relevant stakeholders is essential.
(39) The optimisation of protection is a forward-looking iterative process aimed atpreventing or reducing future exposures. It takes into account both technical and socio-economic factors, and requires both qualitative and quantitative judgements.
The process should be systematic and carefully structured to ensure that all relevant
aspects are taken into account. Optimisation is a frame of mind, always questioning
whether the best has been done in the prevailing circumstances, and if all that is reasonable has been done to reduce doses (ICRP, 2007, Para. 217). While initially the
exposures may be rather high and priority should be given to reducing the highest
exposures, continuous eﬀorts need to be made to reduce all exposures with time.
(40) Comparison of justiﬁed protection strategies is a key feature of the optimisation process, which must entail careful consideration of the characteristics of theindividual exposure distribution within the exposed population. Each group of an
exposed population can be described by diﬀerent attributes as well as by various
exposure parameters. The Commission recommends that particular attention should
be given to equity in the distribution of exposure among the groups of people
concerned.
(41) The best option or strategy is always speciﬁc to the exposure situation andrepresents the best level of protection that can be achieved under the prevailing
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circumstances. Therefore, it is not relevant to determine, a priori, a dose level below
which the optimisation process should stop (ICRP, 2007, Para. 218). According to
the characteristics of the situation, with the presence of relatively long-lived radionuclides in the environment aﬀecting living places, protective actions are expected
to be implemented for a long time (up to several tens of years). Optimisation of protection, however, is not minimisation of dose. Optimised protection is the result ofan evaluation which carefully balances the detriment from the exposure with the relevant economic and social factors. Thus, the best option is not necessarily the one
resulting in the lowest residual dose level for the individuals (ICRP, 2007, Para. 219).
(42) It is the government’s responsibility to provide good guidance and the means
for its implementation. Hence the government, or the responsible authority, willneed to constantly evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the protection strategy in place,including protective actions carried out at local or individual levels, in order to provide adequate support on how to improve the situation further.
3.3. Reference levels to restrict individual exposures(43) The use of reference levels for the management of both emergency and existing exposure situations is a change for Publication 103 (ICRP, 2007) compared with
Publication 60 (ICRP, 1991). Some other ICRP publications issued in between introduced the concept of reference level as appropriate to manage prolonged exposure
situations, but Publication 103 clariﬁes the concept.
(44) The source-related concept of reference level as deﬁned by the Commission in
Publication 103 (ICRP, 2007, Para. 230) represents the level of dose or risk above
which it is judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow exposures to occur, and below
which optimisation of protection should be implemented. It means that protection
strategies should be planned and optimised. The chosen value for the reference level
will depend upon the prevailing circumstances of the exposure under consideration.
The Commission proposed the term ‘reference level’ for emergency and existing situations (while the term ‘dose constraint’ is retained for planned exposure situations)to express the fact that a wide range of exposures may characterise the situation, andthe optimisation process may apply to initial levels of individual doses above the reference level.
(45) The Commission recommends that reference levels, set in terms of individual
annual eﬀective residual dose (mSv/year), should be used in conjunction with theplanning and implementation of the optimisation process for exposures in existing
exposure situations. The objective is to implement optimised protection strategies,
or a progressive range of such strategies, which aim to reduce individual doses below
the reference level. During the planning stage, the optimisation process should resultin estimated residual doses that are below the reference level. During implementationof the optimisation process, particular attention should be given to reduce individual
exposures that may remain above the reference level. Speciﬁc groups such as children
and pregnant women should also be given particular attention. However, exposures
below the reference level should not be ignored; they should also be assessed to29

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ascertain whether protection is optimised or if further protective actions are needed(ICRP, 2007, Para. 286).
(46) In the case of an existing exposure situation following an emergency exposure
situation, the reference level is set at the end of the emergency exposure situation
phase, when the decision is taken to allow people to live in the contaminated area.
The selected reference level represents a level of dose which is intended not to be exceeded, and to strive to move all individual exposures below this level as low as reasonably achievable, with social and economic factors being taken into account.
(47) The Commission proposed a framework presenting the factors inﬂuencing the
choice of source-related dose constraints and reference levels (ICRP, 2007, Table 5).
In this framework, the Commission introduced three bands of constraints or reference levels according to the characteristics of the exposure situation, taking into account the controllability of the exposure, the beneﬁt from the situation to individuals
or society, and the radiological protection measures that would need to be implemented. These measures include the need or not to establish protection strategies
as well as to provide information, training, and/or monitoring to exposed individuals. It is the responsibility of regulatory authorities to decide on the legal status of thereference level set to control a given situation.
(48) In the case of an existing exposure situation following an emergency exposure
situation, the radiation source is under control but the controllability of the situation
may remain diﬃcult and require constant vigilance by the inhabitants in their day-today life. This constitutes a burden for the individuals living in contaminated areas
and for society as a whole. However, both may ﬁnd a beneﬁt of continuing to livein the aﬀected areas. Countries generally cannot aﬀord to lose a part of their territory, and most inhabitants generally prefer to stay in their homes rather than tobe relocated (voluntarily or not) to non-contaminated areas. As a consequence, when
the level of contamination is not too high to prevent sustainable human activities,
authorities will preferably implement all the necessary protective measures to allow
people to continue to live in contaminated areas instead of abandoning them. These
considerations suggest that appropriate reference levels should preferably be chosen
in the 1–20 mSv band proposed by the Commission.
(49) The value of the reference level should result from a careful balance of many
inter-related factors, including the sustainability of social, economic, and environmental life, and the overall health (WHO, 1948) of the aﬀected populations. The process of selecting the value of the reference level should also be carefully balanced toappropriately include the views of all relevant stakeholders.
(50) As the long-term objective for existing exposure situations is ‘to reduce exposures to levels that are close or similar to situations considered as normal’ (ICRP,
2007, Para. 288), the Commission recommends that the reference level for the optimisation of protection of people living in contaminated areas should be selectedfrom the lower part of the 1–20 mSv/year band recommended in Publication 103
for the management of this category of exposure situation. Past experience has demonstrated that a typical value used for constraining the optimisation process in longterm post-accident situations is 1 mSv/year (see Annex A). National authorities may
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take into account the prevailing circumstances and also take advantage of the timingof the overall rehabilitation programme to adopt intermediate reference levels to improve the situation progressively .
(51) Reference levels are used both prospectively, for planning of protection strategies (as well as, if necessary, deﬁning derived reference levels for the implementationof some speciﬁc protective actions, such as trade of foodstuﬀs), and retrospectively asa benchmark for judging the eﬀectiveness of implemented protection strategies. A
key focus of protective actions should be on exposures above the reference level,
whose existence may indicate that the distribution of exposures is not equitable,
and will generally suggest that greater weight should be put on the protection of
the most exposed groups of people rather than that of the general population.
(52) The use of reference levels in an existing situation is illustrated in Fig. 3.1,
which shows the evolution of the distribution of individual doses with time as a resultof the implementation of protection strategies. The evolution of the distributions
indicates that the number of people in the contaminated areas exceeding the reference level decreases with time as a consequence of the step-by-step optimisation
process.
(53) The fact that exposures have been reduced below the reference level is not a
suﬃcient condition to discontinue protective actions as long as there is room for further reduction in exposure in conformity with the optimisation process. The continuation of such actions would probably be a prime mechanism to maintain exposuresclose or similar to those in normal situations as recommended by the Commission.

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Fig. 3.1. Use of a reference level in an existing exposure situation and evolution of the distribution ofindividual doses with time as a result of step-by-step implementation of the optimisation process.

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3.4. References
ICRP, 1983. Cost–beneﬁt analysis in the optimisation of radiation protection. ICRP Publication 37. Ann.
ICRP 10 (2–3).
ICRP, 1989. Optimisation and decision-making in radiological protection. ICRP Publication 55. Ann.
ICRP 20 (1).
ICRP, 1991. 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. ICRP
Publication 60. Ann. ICRP 21 (1–3).
ICRP, 2006. The optimisation of radiological protection: broadening the process. ICRP Publication 101 –Part 2. Ann. ICRP 36 (2).
ICRP, 2007. The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection.
ICRP Publication 103. Ann. ICRP 37 (2–4).
NEA, 2006. Stakeholders and Radiological Protection: Lessons from Chernobyl 20 years after. NEA No.
6170.
WHO, 1948. Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organisation as adopted by theInternational Health Conference, New York, 19–22 June 1946; signed in 22 July 1946 by the
representatives of 61 States and entered into force on 7 April 1948.

33

4. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTION STRATEGIES(54) The management of an existing exposure situation following a nuclear accident
or a radiological emergency relies on the implementation of a more or less complex
rehabilitation programme coping with numerous dimensions (social, economic,
health, environmental, etc.) according to the level of contamination and its space
and time distribution. The radiation protection part of this programme is characterisedby radiation protection strategies that include actions driven by authorities at national
and local levels, and self-help protective actions implemented by the aﬀected
population within the framework provided by the authorities. For these strategies tobe successful, authorities should provide the necessary infrastructure as well as practical guidance for their implementation. The implementation of protection strategies is a
dynamic process, which changes with the evolution of the radiological situation.
(55) It is the responsibility of the authorities, particularly at the regulatory level, toestablish the conditions and to implement the means to allow the eﬀective engagement of the aﬀected population in the protection strategies and more globally inthe rehabilitation programme. Past experience of the management of contaminatedareas has demonstrated that the involvement of local professionals and inhabitantsin the implementation of protection strategies is important for the sustainability of
the rehabilitation programme (Lochard, 2004). Mechanisms for engaging with stakeholders are driven by national and cultural characteristics and should be adapted tothe circumstances.
4.1. Protective actions implemented by authorities(56) The priority of protection strategies implemented by authorities is to protect
people with the highest exposures, and in parallel to reduce all individual exposuresassociated with the event to as low as reasonably achievable. This implies assessmentof the dose distribution, comparison of all doses with the reference level, and subsequent optimisation of protection.
(57) This assessment can often be most eﬀectively supported by radiation monitoring. If measurements are not feasible or suﬃciently comprehensive, it is possible toestimate doses likely to be received by the individuals based on local information. In
such a situation, the concept of ‘representative person’ as described in Publication
101 (ICRP, 2006) may be used, bearing in mind that this concept is most usefulfor the purpose of prospective assessments of continuing exposure. However, incases where it is used, the Commission recommends that doses related to the 95–
100% percentile should not be discarded.
(58) Once the individual dose distribution is characterised, it is necessary to further
investigate the main exposure pathways for the aﬀected population (ambient dose
rates, soil contamination, foodstuﬀ contamination, etc.). This will help authorities,
in co-operation with the aﬀected population, to decide if they need to pursue protection strategies (decontamination works, foodstuﬀ restrictions, etc.), to modify them
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according to the evolution of the radiological situation, or to establish new
strategies.
(59) Typical strategies to be implemented by the authorities in a post-accident situation are clean-up of buildings, remediation of soil and vegetation, changes in animal husbandry, monitoring of the environment and produce, provision of clean
foodstuﬀs, waste management (resulting from clean-up or from unmarketable contaminated goods), provision of information, guidance, instruction and equipment(e.g. for measurements), health surveillance, education of children, information forparticular exposed groups and the public at large, etc.
(60) Radiological contamination of the environment will evolve with time due toradioactive decay of the radionuclides present, the eﬀect of physical and chemical
processes on the distribution of the radionuclides in the environment, and the impact
of human activities that may further concentrate or dilute the contamination present
in the environment. The long-term dimension of an existing exposure situation therefore calls for step-by-step implementation of protection strategies.
(61) Identiﬁcation of the highest doses of the distribution should prompt investigation of whether further collective protection strategies can be implemented toprotect speciﬁc groups of people, or whether the high doses are related to individual
habits such that the individuals can be informed and empowered to implement theirown strategies.
(62) From this perspective, authorities will have to set up infrastructures to support the implementation of all protection strategies, including self-help strategies
implemented by the aﬀected population. The dissemination of a ‘practical radiological protection culture’ within all segments of the population, and especially withinprofessionals in charge of public health and education, is also an important elementof the strategy. Experience has shown that the development of such an infrastructure
is based on three key pillars: a radiation monitoring system, by which the radiological quality of the environment can be evaluated, levels of internal and external exposure of people
assessed, and allowing the aﬀected individuals direct access to this information (see Section 5.1);
 a health surveillance strategy to follow the health status of the aﬀected population. This calls for a system based on regular clinical investigations aswell as the development of registries to monitor important indices in publichealth in relation to the level of individual exposure. Such a system should
allow the identiﬁcation of any changes in the health status of the populationthat could occur, and investigate whether these changes could be related toradiation or other factors (in relation with the early phase or long-term
exposure) – see Section 5.2; and the transmission of practical knowledge within the population about thecontrol of the radiological situation to current and future generations basedon the dissemination of monitoring results, for example through the education system.

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4.2. Protective actions implemented by the aﬀected population(63) In the case of a radiological accident, the aﬀected population will be confronted with new problems and new preoccupations. Each individual will have questions regarding radioactivity and its eﬀects: how is the environment contaminated,
how is one exposed, and at what time, particularly, is one contaminated? Individuals
will also wonder how to face this new situation, and what to do to reduce their current and future exposure to as low as reasonably achievable.
(64) The engagement of the aﬀected population in the development and implementation of actions deﬁned by authorities will be key to their eﬀectiveness. In addition,
however, many actions to manage exposures will be driven by individual behaviour.
These will also require a framework of support from the authorities in order to beeﬀective and sustainable.
(65) Typical actions taken by the inhabitants in this framework, called ‘self-help
protective actions’ by the Commission, are those aiming to characterise their own
radiological situation, notably their external and internal exposure. These mainly
consist of monitoring the radiological quality of their direct environment (ambient
dose rates in living places and contamination of foodstuﬀs), their own external
and internal exposure, and the exposure of the people for whom they have responsibility (e.g. children, elderly), and adapting their way of life accordingly to reduce
their exposure.
(66) As far as the evaluation of external exposure is concerned, inhabitants may
better manage the situation by establishing local mapping of their living places(e.g. house, garden, working place, leisure areas). They can then identify places
where the higher ambient dose rates are registered and/or those contributing significantly to the external dose according to the time spent in these places. In both cases,
it is possible to try to minimise, as far as possible, time spent in these places.
(67) As far as the evaluation of internal exposure is concerned, inhabitants can act
according to the radiological quality of the foodstuﬀs consumed each day. This supposes that they have access to the measurements of local products. Based on the
results of these measurements, they can classify foodstuﬀs according to their sensitivity to radioactivity, and identify products that are usually more contaminated thanothers (e.g. mushrooms are much more sensitive to radioactive contamination thanvegetables and fruits). In this context, they can adapt their dietary habits to reducethe ingested fraction of contaminated foodstuﬀs.
(68) In rural zones, a signiﬁcant part of the aﬀected population may own a private
garden. As above, the ﬁrst step may involve the measurement of radiological qualityof the grown foodstuﬀs. According to the results, they will have to identify how to
reduce the contamination of their products by selection of those which are lesssensitive to radioactivity, identiﬁcation of the less contaminated areas in the garden,
use of agricultural techniques to limit transfer of radionuclides from soil to plants,
etc.
(69) Beyond their contribution to individual exposure, self-help protective actions
can also concern management of the radioactive contamination of the environment.
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From that perspective, the aﬀected population should take care to adopt protective
actions that would avoid reconcentration of radioactivity in their local areas; particular attention may have to be paid to the management of radioactive house waste,such as ashes from ﬁreplaces in rural areas.
(70) As mentioned above, authorities should facilitate the implementation of protection strategies by the inhabitants. They should provide existing results of measurements, information and training to help people to understand and manage theirradiological situation, and monitoring equipment (e.g. making the equipment available through local authority oﬃces or doctors or pharmacies who are trained to takemeasurements). Furthermore, they should ensure regular whole-body measurementsof the aﬀected population so that people can evaluate the eﬃciency of changes intheir diet.
(71) Authorities should facilitate the setting-up of local forums involving representatives of the aﬀected population and relevant experts (e.g. health, radiation protection, agriculture authorities, etc). These forums will allow gathering and sharing of
information, and favour a common assessment of the eﬀectiveness of strategies driven by the population, and the authorities.
(72) In recent years, stakeholder engagement has moved steadily to the forefrontof policy decisions. Such engagement is considered by the Commission to be key tothe development and implementation of radiological protection strategies for mostexisting exposure situations. The control of radon in dwellings is another typicalexample. As experience in stakeholder engagement has grown, it has been possible
to use many of the lessons learned as a basis for the development of best practiceamong the radiation protection community. Processes and tools are becoming established that can be generally applied to situations where the views and input of stakeholders are instrumental to improving the quality of protection.
4.3. References
ICRP, 2006. Assessing dose of the representative person for the purpose of radiation protection of the
public. ICRP Publication 101 – Part 1. Ann. ICRP 36 (2).
Lochard, J., 2004. Living in contaminated territories: a lesson in stakeholder involvement. In: Current
Trends in Radiation Protection. EDP Sciences, pp. 211–220.

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5. RADIATION MONITORING AND HEALTH SURVEILLANCE(73) As recommended by the Commission in the case of an existing exposure situation, the individuals concerned should receive general information on the exposure situation and the means of reducing their doses (ICRP, 2007, Table 5). In
situations where individual lifestyles are key drivers of the exposure, individual
monitoring is an important requirement, coupled with an information programme.
Furthermore, given the uncertainties concerning future potential health eﬀects ofthe exposures received by the population since the emergency phase, it is the
responsibility of the authorities to implement a radiation and health surveillance
programme.
5.1. Radiation monitoring(74) In a situation of long-term contamination, it is essential to establish a radiation monitoring system allowing follow-up of the radiological situation and theimplementation of adequate protection strategies. The key objective of monitoring
systems is to assess current levels of human exposure (both external and internal)
and environmental levels of contamination, and to allow the prediction of theirevolution in the future. In practice, this supposes a radiation monitoring
system providing measurements of ambient dose rates, concentrations of radionuclides in foodstuﬀs and the environment, and whole-body contamination ofindividuals.
(75) The eﬀectiveness of the monitoring system relies on its ability to cope withthe speciﬁcities of the local aﬀected territory. This allows identiﬁcation of population groups receiving elevated doses and better orientation of radiation protection strategies. For this purpose, a key issue is to take advantage of radiologicalcompetence at the local level in combination with the national system. Furthermore, the existence of validated measurements from diﬀerent origins – authorities,
expert bodies, local and national laboratories (non-governmental organisations,private institutes, universities, local stakeholders, nuclear installations, etc.)– allows a better understanding of the local radiological situation and favours
conﬁdence in the measurements among the aﬀected population. In this regard,
all parties providing measurements should be subject to appropriate quality
assurance requirements.
(76) The monitoring system should be designed to provide regularly updated information to authorities and other concerned parties, and to allow extended coverage ofthe aﬀected territory over the long term. From the perspective of assessing evolutionof the exposure situation and the eﬀectiveness of the protection strategies, the Commission recommends that a monitoring record system should be established by therelevant authorities having responsibility. Such records are particularly importantfor determining potential groups at risk, in conjunction with health surveillance.
The sustainability of such a system will require the establishment of continued maintenance and training programmes by national and local authorities.
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5.2. Health surveillance(77) Following a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency, the exposed population should have had an initial medical evaluation. The ﬁrst step of this evaluation isa census of the aﬀected individuals, possibly with an early dose assessment. In addition, regardless of the level of dose, the aﬀected population should also have been
supplied with accurate and appropriate information regarding their level of exposure
and potential type of risk.
(78) Taking this background into account, long-term health surveillance programmes will have to cover the following objectives (WHO, 2006):
 the follow-up of persons who have received exposures that have resulted inclinically signiﬁcant deterministic eﬀects (e.g. skin burns, cataracts, etc.) or
suﬃciently high levels of exposure to justify preventive surveillance; the ‘medical monitoring’ of the general population, which consists of investigating
for potential adverse eﬀects (mainly incidence of radiation-induced cancers). A
subcategory of medical monitoring is the follow-up of potentially ‘sensitive subgroups’ (e.g. children, pregnant women); and ‘epidemiological’ studies.
(79) Medical monitoring refers to screening of the entire aﬀected population in order to detect speciﬁc preclinical disease with the purpose of delaying or preventing
the development of disease in those individuals. The ﬁrst step is to justify and delineate the extent of the programme based on consideration of a number of factors. For
instance, the following characteristics are of prime importance: the exposure of concern (e.g. its certainty, dose, and temporal relationship of exposure to observation);
the disease of interest (e.g. its natural history and prevalence in the population); thecharacteristics of available screening tests (e.g. their eﬀectiveness, sensitivity, andspeciﬁcity); the potential for the tests used to cause harm themselves; the potential
for action when test results are positive (e.g. the availability of and risks from follow-up evaluation); whether there is evidence that an intervention can improve clinical outcome; and the latency period between radiation exposure and thedevelopment of a clinically detectable eﬀect. Beyond the responsibility of publichealth authorities to preventively monitor the aﬀected population, another important role of medical surveillance is the reassurance given to the population in response to its concerns regarding the potential health impacts of the situation.
(80) According to WHO deﬁnitions (WHO, 2006), the aims of epidemiologicalstudies from a long-term perspective are to: identify adverse health eﬀects in an at-risk group and determine whether the risk ofsuch eﬀects is greater than that for a comparable non-exposed group of individuals;
 determine whether the increased risks that may be identiﬁed are statistically associated with the exposure; determine whether the increased observed risk is related to or inﬂuenced by otherfactors associated with or independent of the exposure, such as tobacco smoking
and radon; and40

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 add to the scientiﬁc knowledge base, which can then be used to derive and reﬁnerisk estimates, and evaluate the eﬃciency of protective actions that have been
implemented or develop new actions.
(81) In practice, epidemiological studies will be adjusted and implemented according to the following considerations: size and composition of the studied population,
magnitude and distribution of radiation exposure, accuracy of exposure measurements, disease identiﬁcation and associated background rate, and availability of
information on other risk factors that might aﬀect the outcome. To allow eﬀective
long-term health surveillance of the aﬀected population, the Commission recommends that health registries should be established for the population residing in
the contaminated areas.
5.3. References
ICRP, 2007. The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection.
ICRP Publication 103. Ann. ICRP 37 (2–4).
WHO, 2006. Health Eﬀects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes. In: Bennett,
B., Repacholi, M., Carr, Z. (Eds.), Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum, Expert Group ‘Health’. WHO
Press, Geneva, p. 160.

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6. MANAGEMENT OF CONTAMINATED FOODSTUFFS AND
OTHER COMMODITIES(82) The management of contaminated foodstuﬀs and other commodities produced in areas aﬀected by a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency has been addressed previously by the Commission. In Publication 104 (ICRP, 2007), theCommission recognised that ‘this type of situation presents a particularly diﬃcult
problem’ because of ‘issues of market acceptance’. Furthermore, maintaining longterm restrictions on the production and consumption of foodstuﬀs may aﬀect thesustainable development of the aﬀected areas, and therefore calls for appropriate
implementation of the optimisation principle. Reconciling the interests of local farmers, producers, and the local population with those of consumers and the food distribution sector from outside the contaminated territory has to be considered
carefully. Determining optimal protection strategies for contaminated foodstuﬀs
may be perceived diﬀerently for the population living inside the contaminated territory than for those living outside.
(83) Reducing exposure from the ingestion of foodstuﬀs produced in long-term
contaminated areas to levels as low as reasonably achievable, taking economic
and social conditions into account, may involve the implementation of complex protection strategies. The radiological quality of foodstuﬀs can be managed by many
protective actions aimed at reducing the transfer of radionuclides in the foodchain
from farm to fork (Nisbet et al., 2006). These protective actions include, for example,
the physical and chemical treatment of soils, changes in husbandry practices, provision of feed additives to livestock, selection of alternative land uses, and industrialscale food processing to remove contamination. The actions selected will depend on
the physical and chemical properties of the radionuclides released, season of the year,
and the types of land use aﬀected. Whenever possible, protective actions should be
implemented so that restrictions on local produce can be avoided. There may be situations where a sustainable agricultural economy is not possible without placing
contaminated food on the market. As such foods will be subject to market forces,
this will necessitate an eﬀective communication strategy to overcome the negative
reactions from consumers outside the contaminated areas.
(84) For management of the radiological quality of foodstuﬀs in a country with acontaminated territory, relevant stakeholders (authorities, farmers’ unions, foodindustry, food distribution, consumer non-governmental organisations, etc.) andrepresentatives of the general population should be involved in deciding whether
individual preferences of the consumers should outweigh the need to maintain agricultural production, rehabilitation of rural areas, and a decent living for the aﬀected
local community. A thorough debate at national level is necessary to achieve a certain degree of solidarity within the country.
6.1. Management inside the contaminated areas(85) A fraction of the diet of the local population may include local agricultural
produce, food from private gardens, and food gathered from the wild (e.g. berries,
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mushrooms, game). The relative importance of local produce depends on the characteristics of the region, as well as on traditions or habits. To some extent, such habits may be inﬂuenced by a preference for food that is less contaminated, or as a resultof the availability of food from non-contaminated areas. The local population may
also be in a position to manage its intake of radionuclides by avoiding or reducing
consumption of products with higher levels of contamination. Furthermore, moresensitive groups of the population or those perceived to deserve special protection(e.g. children, pregnant or breastfeeding women, people with poor health) may beadvised to avoid or reduce consumption of certain types of food with higher levelsof contamination.
(86) In order to help the local population to control foodstuﬀs, authorities should
provide relevant information and set contamination criteria based on directly measurable levels of contamination (expressed in Bq/kg or Bq/L), taking into account the
proportion of locally produced food in the diet. Guideline levels have been developedby the Codex Alimentarius Commission for use in international trade (FAO/WHO,
2006). These levels are based on a dose level of 1 mSv/year assuming that a maximumof 10% of the diet consists of contaminated food. The assumption that 10% of thediet is contaminated may not be valid for some local communities, hence the contamination criteria for foodstuﬀs may be set below the Codex guideline levels. Conversely, if the contamination only aﬀects a few categories of foodstuﬀs, thecontamination criteria may be set to higher values. Higher contamination criteria
may also be set to preserve local production, which may be deeply embedded in traditions or which may be essential to the economy of the entire community.
(87) Disruption to the local economy through the placement of restrictions on thesale of contaminated foodstuﬀs, the loss of market share as a result of consumer
preferences, or through the provision of uncontaminated food may not be warranted
in terms of a beneﬁt in dose reduction. Such decisions must be taken in close cooperation with the local stakeholders, as was the case in Norway with reindeer meatproduced by the Sami population after the Chernobyl accident (Skuterud et al.,2005). The contamination criteria for foodstuﬀs ﬁnally selected indirectly represents
a level of individual dose which is not intended to be exceeded, and the long-term
objective should be to reduce this level to as low as reasonably achievable, with socialand economic factors taken into account. From this perspective, contamination criteria may be reduced step by step to take the progressive improvement of the situation into account.
6.2. Management of exportations outside the contaminated areas(88) Protection of populations living outside contaminated areas is mainly driven
by the control of trade. Consumers from non-aﬀected areas generally expect uncontaminated foodstuﬀs to be placed on the market. However, this situation may notalways be achievable. First, the interests of the aﬀected population living in the contaminated areas need to be considered, as it may be important to maintain someform of agricultural production there. Furthermore, there is also an intrinsic
diﬃculty in ensuring that radiological control will cover all foodstuﬀs everywhere44

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and at all points in time. For these reasons, foodstuﬀs coming from outside the contaminated areas may contain some contamination, even though it is well below thecontamination criteria.
(89) The placement of contaminated foodstuﬀs on the market may be governed by
the Codex guideline levels for use in international trade, which apply to food contaminated following a nuclear or radiation emergency (including both accidents
and malevolent actions) for an indeﬁnite period. According to the Codex Alimentarius Commission, food should be considered as safe for human consumption when its
levels of radionuclides do not exceed the corresponding guideline levels. When theguideline levels are exceeded, national governments decide whether, and under whatcircumstances, the foodstuﬀs should be distributed within their own territory or
jurisdiction. The Commission recognises that once food is placed on the market, it
is very diﬃcult to manage doses and consequently to optimise them, since any actionin the distribution process of food may merely shift contamination from one sectionof the population to another. This may promptly lead to situations which are regarded as unethical. Even the free supply of such food as humanitarian aid in regionsaﬀected by famine would be perceived as such by the beneﬁciaries. Bearing market
forces in mind, these considerations call for investigating all possible actions to improve the radiological quality of foodstuﬀs before placement on the market.
(90) The restoration and maintenance of consumer conﬁdence is of prime importance in the management of contaminated foodstuﬀs. Traceability of food is an
important factor in consumer preferences. The Commission views the mention of
the region of origin on foodstuﬀ labels as a suﬃcient indicator for marketing purposes. However, the management of market mechanisms is beyond the scope of
the Commission’s recommendations.
(91) The Commission considers that, despite the socio-economic complexity of the
management of contaminated foodstuﬀs in view of the interests of diﬀerent stakeholders, protection strategies should be developed to meet the established reference
level, and the strategy should be further optimised at all levels where it is possible tointervene, e.g. production, distribution, processing, as well as measures taken for
informing consumers and allowing them to make appropriate choices. Derived reference levels expressed in Bq/kg or Bq/L play an important role in this process, inparticular for the placement of foodstuﬀs on the market.
6.3. Management of other commodities(92) Commodities other than foodstuﬀs may be contaminated following a nuclear
accident or other radiation emergency. These could include agricultural products
such as wood, paper, and oil, or other products recycled from contaminated materials such as scrap metal. The objective again is to reduce exposure to as low as reasonably achievable, taking social and economic factors into account.
(93) The Commission recommends the development of optimisation strategies,
including the prevention of contamination (e.g. by substitutes whenever possible
and relevant, taking into account that agriculture in contaminated areas may bedeliberately reoriented towards non-food products), and management of contami45

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nated commodities. Such contaminated commodities can be traded and used with orwithout conditions. Relevant contamination criteria for foodstuﬀs should be determined depending on the intended use of the commodities and the conditions for
trade or use.
(94) The contamination levels for the use of contaminated commodities inside thecontaminated areas should be derived from the annual dose reference level on thebasis of realistic exposure scenarios. Authorities may ﬁx binding or recommended
conditions for use.
(95) Trade of contaminated commodities or consumer products manufactured
with contaminated material outside the contaminated territory should be in accordance with the rules or recommendations for international trade. Nevertheless, there
could be situations in which provision is made for trading contaminated commodities subject to explicit provisions negotiated with the recipient, and agreed with therelevant stakeholders, in particular the regulatory bodies of the exporting andimporting countries. International bodies have recommended numerical values forthe use or trade of contaminated commodities (e.g. after the dismantling of a nuclear
facility); these can be used as benchmarks by the national authorities to set relevant
contamination criteria (IAEA, 2005).
6.4. References
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission, 2006. Codex Guideline Levels for Radionuclides in Foods
Contaminated Following a Nuclear or a Radiological Emergency for Use in International Trade.
CAC/GL 5-2006.
IAEA, 2005. Safety Guide No. RS-G-1.7. Application of the Concepts of Exclusion, Exemption and
Clearance. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.
ICRP, 2007. Scope of radiological protection control measures. ICRP Publication 104. Ann. ICRP 37 (5).
Nisbet, A.F., Rice, H., Jones, A., et al., 2006. Generic Handbook for Assisting in the Management ofContaminated Food Production Systems in Europe Following a Radiological Emergency. EURANOS(CAT1)-TN(06)-06. Available at: http://www.euranos.fzk.de.
Skuterud, L., Gaare, E., Eikelman, M., Hove, K., Steinnes, E., 2005. Chernobyl radioactivity persists inreindeer. J. Environ. Radioact. 83, 231–252.

46

ANNEX A. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF LONG-TERM
CONTAMINATED AREAS
A.1. Introduction(A 1) This annex brieﬂy describes a series of past experiences with long-term
contaminated areas resulting from either nuclear tests (Bikini, Maralinga), nuclear
accidents (Kyshtym, Palomares, Chernobyl), or a radiological source accident(Goiânia). These experiences are presented in chronological order. Beyond thelong-term feature of the contamination, which is common to all, each event illustrates diﬀerent aspects developed in the present report.
(A 2) The Bikini and Maralinga experiences are not, strictly speaking, prolonged
exposure situations since the inhabitants were evacuated prior to the events that led
to long-term contamination of their habitat, and no individual now lives permanently in these places although a few people came back for a few years. The options
envisaged or eﬀectively implemented to restore the contaminated sites illustrate thepredominant exposure pathways and the type of protective actions that may be necessary to maintain exposure to as low as reasonably achievable. It is interesting tonote the importance of ingestion of contaminated foodstuﬀs several decades after
the events, particularly in the case of Bikini.
(A 3) The long-term existing exposure situations resulting from the Kyshtym andChernobyl accidents are, without doubt, the most representative of the types ofsituation aimed at by the present recommendations. The information concerning
management of the Kyshtym accident is relatively poor, but the spread of contamination in space and time is fairly representative of potential large-scale nuclear
accidents. The long-term consequences of the Chernobyl accident, both in the
Commonwealth of Independent States countries and in Western Europe, have deeply aﬀected the living conditions of millions of inhabitants of the contaminatedareas. In all countries, the main concern has been with the management of foodstuﬀs
to protect the local population against chronic internal exposure and to maintain theviability of local productions.
(A 4) Neither the Palomares nor the Goiânia accident can be considered as very
representative of the existing exposure situations dealt with in this report becauseof the relatively limited size of the aﬀected areas and the number of individuals
directly concerned. However, they illustrate the type of protective actions to be
implemented to control exposure in an urban and semi-urban environment when
external irradiation and inhalation are signiﬁcant exposure pathways.
(A 5) As far as the setting of reference levels for existing exposure situations resulting from nuclear accidents and radiation emergencies is concerned, past experiencedemonstrates that typical dose values selected by authorities to manage such situations are close or equal to 1 mSv/year, corresponding to the desire to progressively
reduce long-term exposure to levels that are close or similar to situations considered‘normal’, i.e within the band of constraints set for public exposure in planned
situations.
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ICRP Publication 111

A.2. Bikini(A 6) Between 1946 and 1958, Bikini Atoll was used for atmospheric tests ofnuclear weapons. It was the site of 23 of the 66 underwater, ground-level, andabove-ground tests conducted in the Marshall Islands by the USA. As a result of
the above-ground tests, the land surfaces and the lagoon became extensively
contaminated with radionuclides, of which 137Cs subsequently proved to be the mostradiologically important.
(A 7) Prior to the ﬁrst nuclear test in 1946, the 167 Bikinians were evacuated toneighbouring islands; however, some of them returned in the late 1960s and early
1970s after a preliminary radiological survey of the atoll. Measurements carriedout between 1975 and 1978, however, revealed that the 137Cs body contents of theresettled people had increased by factors of approximately 10 since their return. This
increase was attributed to high caesium uptake from the soil by coconut trees, producing high caesium concentrations in the coconut milk and ﬂesh consumed by the
Bikini islanders; as such, in 1978, the population was relocated again. Scientiﬁcstudies of the radiological conditions at Bikini Atoll have continued, but the population has not been able to return to date.
(A 8) It is considered that, without remedial action or restrictions on their behaviour, returnees to Bikini Atoll would, on average, receive an annual dose of 4 mSv
from the remaining contamination. The highest plausible dose to people who might
consume only locally grown foods rather than the more typical mix of local and imported foods is estimated to be approximately 15 mSv/year. The projected doses arelargely from 137Cs in foods and the soil. With regard to the other radionuclides stillpresent at signiﬁcant levels, 90Sr uptake in foods is low because of strong competition
from high levels of (chemically similar) calcium, while plutonium and americium isotopes are largely ‘trapped’ in lagoon sediments, with uptake into ﬁsh and other forms
of seafood being extremely low.
(A 9) In radiological protection terms, the contamination of Bikini Atollrepresents a potential existing exposure situation in the sense that the population
was allowed to return to live permanently on the island. A possible protective action
to allow this return is soil removal in residential areas and potassium treatment of
the existing soil in crop-growing areas. Soil removal would reduce doses fromexternal exposure, and from inhalation and inadvertent ingestion of soil in the areas
where islanders spend most time.
(A 10) Potassium treatment would reduce doses from intakes of caesium in food; themain contributor to the overall projected doses. On the basis of extensive trials, it has
been estimated that a programme of potassium treatment, repeated every 4–5 years,
would reduce the concentration of 137Cs in typical Bikini foods to well below the
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius guidelines for international trade in foodstuﬀs.
Projected doses would be reduced to approximately 0.4 mSv/year from the normal
mix of local and imported foods, or 1.2 mSv/year from a diet of exclusively local produce.
(A 11) An alternative option would be to remove the topsoil from the crop-growing
areas as well as the residential areas. This would undoubtedly be eﬀective in reducing
exposures, perhaps even more than the potassium treatment. However, it would
48

ICRP Publication 111

generate very large volumes of soil requiring safe disposal. Furthermore, replacement
soil would need to be imported. The ﬁnancial, environmental, and social costs of thisoption would probably be much greater than the ﬁrst option, and deserve to beevaluated in a proper optimisation process.
A.3. Maralinga(A 12) British nuclear tests occurred between 1955 and 1963 at the Maralinga sitein South Australia. A total of seven major nuclear tests were performed. Prior to
selection, the Maralinga site was inhabited by Aboriginal people. Many were relocated to a new settlement at Yulata, and attempts were made to curtail access to
the Maralinga site. These were often unsuccessful.
(A 13) Australian authorities established criteria in 1990 for the rehabilitation offormer British nuclear test sites in Australia. At two of these sites, Emu and theMonte Bello Islands, there was little need for remediation. However, at Maralinga,
several locations were contaminated with plutonium that had been dispersed locallyby the explosions.
(A 14) Following extensive experimental studies, it was established that the inhalation of plutonium-contaminated dust by a critical group of Aborigines, living asemi-traditional lifestyle, was the dominant pathway for exposure in most cases. A
second important pathway was the incorporation of plutonium, by way of woundcontamination, in areas where many plutonium-contaminated fragments or particles
were found. The general criterion for the clean-up was to undertake remedial measures to ensure that annual eﬀective doses to the critical group under conditions offull-time occupancy should not exceed 5 mSv, which was the international individual
dose limit for practices at that time. The Maralinga clean-up began with site preparations at the beginning of 1996, and took approximately 4 years.
(A 15) At the most extensively contaminated Taranaki site, soil from areas where241
Am exceeded 40 kBq/m2 was removed, with a restriction on land use which prohibited camping but allowed access for hunting or transit. This ﬁgure was based on
observations of the likely proportion of time to be spent in the area on allowed activities. At three smaller contaminated sites, which remain outside the area of restricted
land use, clean-up levels were required to be more stringent than for Taranaki.
Approximately 2.3 km2 of soil were removed from the most contaminated areas.
The removed soil was buried in large excavated trenches adjacent to the soil-removal
areas and covered with 5 m of uncontaminated rock and soil.
(A 16) An outer boundary, marked by heavy-duty galvanised steel posts at 50-mintervals, warns that camping is not permitted within the area. These warning signs
generally follow the road system and contain all areas where continual occupancy
could lead to doses in excess of 5 mSv/year.
A.4. Kyshtym(A 17) In September 1957, a major accident occurred at the Chelyabinsk-40 military plutonium production facility near Kyshtym in the southern Ural mountains
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ICRP Publication 111

of the former Soviet Union. The facility, built in 1953, had a number of undergroundsteel storage tanks equipped with cooling systems to store high-level waste so that it
would not be dumped in the River Techa. These high-level wastes overheated when
the cooling system failed. The heat build-up resulted in evaporation of the coolant
water, which allowed the sediment to heat further and dry. The chemicals in the tank
exploded on 29 September 1957 with an explosive power of 70–100 tons of TNT,
which hurled the 2.5-m-thick concrete lid 25–30 m. The radioactive cloud from the
explosion reached approximately 1 km. Due to calm wind conditions, approximately
90% of the materials deposited locally, while 100 PBq was dispersed away from theplant in an oblong fallout pattern approximately 300 km in length, including parts of
Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, and Tyumen counties. Almost all of the radioactive fallout
occurred within the ﬁrst 11 h.
(A 18) The major contaminants released were 144Ce, 95Zr, 95Nb, and 90Sr. Most
ﬁssion products deposited on the ground, allowing the strontium isotopes to enter
the food chain. A ban on food containing 90Sr at concentrations greater than
2.4 Bq/g resulted in the destruction of 10,000 tons of agricultural produce in the ﬁrst
2 years. All stores in Kamensk-Uralskiy which sold milk, meat, and other foodstuﬀswere closed as a precaution against consuming radioactive material, and new supplies were brought in 2 days later by train and truck.
(A 19) Approximately 10,000 people were evacuated from the high contaminationarea, while approximately 260,000 people remained in less contaminated areas.
There were 1154 people in areas with a 90Sr deposition density greater than
40 MBq/m2, 1500 in areas with a deposition greater than 4 MBq/m2, and 100,000
in areas with a deposition greater than 70 kBq/m2. The highest individual doses wereexperienced by those evacuated within a few days of the accident. These people received an average external dose of 170 mSv and an average internal (gastrointestinal)
dose of 1500 mSv; the average eﬀective dose equivalent was approximately 520 mSv.
The collective eﬀective dose received by the evacuated people amounted to approximately 1300 man Sv.
(A 20) In the case of those that were not evacuated, the average 30-year committed
eﬀective dose for a group of approximately 10,000 people living in areas with a 90Sr
surface contamination level of 40–70 kBq/m2 was estimated to be 20 mSv, and 4 mSv
for a group of approximately 2000 people living in areas with a deposition density of
4–40 kBq/m2. The collective eﬀective dose received by the non-evacuated population(approximately 260,000 people) has been assessed as 1200 man Sv over a 30-year period, with ﬁgures pointing to 5000 man Sv.
(A 21) In the 1990s, the criteria for radiation protection of the population in thecontaminated areas of Russia were revised. Protective measures were supposed to beundertaken in the areas with a dose level above 1 mSv/year.
A.5. Palomares(A 22) The Palomares accident occurred on 17 January 1966 when two US military planes, a B-52 bomber and a KC-135 tanker aircraft, collided in the process
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of a midair refuelling operation above the town of Palomares, in the south-east of
Spain on the Mediterranean coast. Both aircrafts were destroyed in the air. Fourthermonuclear weapons, 11 men (four survived), and hundreds of tons of debris fellto earth in and around the town. Parts of the aircraft were scattered over a wide area.
Two weapons landed without incident, one in a dry river bed near the mouth of the
Almanzora river and the other in the sea, and both were recovered undamaged. The
parachutes of the other two weapons failed to deploy; one fell in low mountains westof the town, and the other on agricultural lands to the east. The high explosives inthese last two weapons detonated and burned, causing some of the plutonium inside
to also burn and to be spread throughout the area. 239,240Pu particulate contamination was distributed in varying degrees over a 2.26-km2 area, including the northernedge of the village, farmlands, and non-cultivated terrains.
(A 23) This resulted in a 3-month response eﬀort to identify, characterise, remove,and remediate the accident site. With a peak of approximately 680 personnel on 31
January 1966, the clean-up operation involved approximately 1600 individuals, themajority of whom were active duty US Air Force personnel (US Air Force Medical
Services, 2001). Wherever the deposition density of alpha emitters was greater than
1.2 MBq/m2, the contaminated vegetation and a surface layer of soil, approximately
10 cm depth, were collected, separated, and disposed of as radioactive wastes. The
removed soil was replaced by fertile earth from uncontaminated areas. Arable landwith levels below 1.2 MBq/m2 was irrigated, ploughed to a depth of 30 cm, harrowed, and mixed. On rocky hillsides where ploughing was not possible, soil witha plutonium level greater than 0.12 MBq/m2 was removed to some extent with handtools. Bushes and trees with contamination levels above 3.7 · 10 2 Bq/m2 were removed or pressure washed. Contaminated roofs and walls of houses were pressure
washed until complete clean-up. In cases where complete decontamination was notpossible, removal by mechanical procedures was carried out. The ﬁnal amount ofwastes produced from removed soil of approximately 1000 m3 were placed inapproximately 5000 metallic drums of 200 L each and sent to Savannah River Plant
in the USA. Approximately 310 m3 of vegetation wastes with levels above 7 kBq/m2
were buried in a disposal trench; the other vegetation removed was burned and theashes mixed and placed in drums with the most contaminated soil (Gutiérrez et al.,1994).
(A 24) Immediately after the decontamination operation, a radiological surveillance programme was established by the former Nuclear Energy Board and thencontinued indeﬁnitely by the national research centre CIEMAT. Reports are presented periodically to the national regulatory body, the Nuclear Safety Council
and the Spanish Council of Nuclear Safety (CSN). The radiological surveillance programme has included medical examinations and urine analyses to determine bioelimination of plutonium and americium for approximately 150 people per year. In theenvironment, sampling and analysis of soil, water, vegetation, crops, and livestock
products, as well as marine water and sediments, have been performed since theaccident.
(A 25) The medical controls for the population (total of 1043 people) have notshown any radiation-related ﬁndings. Of the urine analyses of local inhabitants
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ICRP Publication 111

undertaken since 1966, only 3.3% (153/628) have had a positive result. The percentage of people who have had their committed eﬀective dose calculated is 5.5% (59/1066), with values that do not imply any signiﬁcant radiological risk, as reported
to CSN.
(A 26) The average annual concentration of plutonium in the air at Palomares(39 lBq/m3 in the rural area and 4 lBq/m3 in the urban area) since the accident implies an annual average dose to the population by inhalation that is ‘signiﬁcantly
lower’ than 1 mSv. The dose by ingestion of locally produced food, based on a large
number of analyses and measurements of representative agricultural products, would
also be much lower than 1 mSv/year (only 1% of the samples have shown contamination above 1 Bq/kg in the edible part of the food).
(A 27) In recent years, the socio-economic situation of the Palomares area haschanged drastically, with continuous and growing economic development that involves high technical agricultural practices (with many greenhouses), intensive andextensive use of land, and a strong and stable development of tourism with a significant increase in new building. These changes in land use, involving the movement oflarge amounts of soil, could lead to higher availability of the remnant radioactive
contamination, and therefore motivated the implementation of a programme forthe adequate management of the most aﬀected zones. In July 2000, CIEMAT communicated to the CSN that, in the so-called ‘zone 2’, the plutonium inventory within
the top 45-cm layer of soil was 2.85 TBq. In 2003, the CSN established speciﬁc criteria for the use of soil in Palomares, which were ratiﬁed in 2007. The criteria refer tothe top 15-cm layer of soil. Unrestricted use of soil is allowed if the assessed residual
doses are lower than 1 mSv/year; partial restriction in land use and additional characterisation is necessary when the assessed residual doses are of the order of 1 mSv/
year. Finally, a complete interdiction on the use of soil is adopted when the assessed
residual doses could be above 5 mSv/year. Based on these criteria, the Government
determined an occupation of the aﬀected areas as the most appropriate way to proceed with an in-depth study of the situation that could lead to a deﬁnitive solution to
the problem.
(A 28) A research plan on radiological surveillance of the area was approved withthe objective of performing a detailed characterisation of the remnant contamination. Surface 241Am contamination has been measured in the top 15-cm layer of soil
in an area of 660 hectares (6.6 km2), resulting in more than 63,000 records. Beyond
the previously known existence of residual contamination in 20 Ha in the proximityof the impact points of the two weapons, this characterisation showed signiﬁcantresidual contamination levels in approximately another 20 Ha out of the ‘zero contamination line’ initially marked after the accident. This has justiﬁed the occupationof 40 Ha of terrain by the Public Administration. Once closed to the public, the mostaﬀected 40 Ha have been characterised with more than 255,000 records of surface
241
Am contamination in the upper 15-cm layer of soil. Static measurements of ‘insitu’ gamma spectrometry and external dose levels have been performed in 581
points, from which 1698 unaltered samples of soil have been taken and analysed.
Also, boreholes have been created in 310 places (280 up to a depth between 2 and5 m; 30 between 0.5 and 1 m) in order to evaluate the deeper migration of the resid52

ICRP Publication 111

ual contamination. This detailed information will allow elaboration of the recommendations leading to the ﬁnal rehabilitation of the aﬀected terrains (Barrigós,2008).
(A 29) Close interaction and ﬂuid communication has been maintained with the affected communities, including frequent meetings with regional and local authorities, aswell as with other stakeholders such as individual citizens, environmental organisations, local media, etc. (Barrigós, 2008). This has contributed to generate and maintainconﬁdence in the experts’ assessments and the authorities’ recommendations.
A.6. Chernobyl/Commonwealth of Independent States countries(A 30) The Chernobyl accident that occurred in April 1986 resulted in widespreadcontamination of inhabited areas in the republics of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine of
the former Soviet Union. Immediately after the accident, the inhabitants of the cityof Prypiat close to the power plant were evacuated, followed by the entire population
living in settlements located within a 30-km radius around the plant. Restrictions onaccess and consumption of foodstuﬀs were also adopted rapidly, as well as decontamination, hydrological, and agricultural countermeasures to minimise the impactof the contamination. During the months following the emergency phase, concern
increased progressively regarding whether or not further relocation of populations
and supplementary countermeasures were needed. The long-term rehabilitation issue
emerged progressively during the late 1980s when it became more and more evident
that the protection strategies adopted after the emergency phase, basically aiming at
moving the inhabitants away from the most contaminated areas and reducing andcontrolling the contamination in the environment whenever possible, were insuﬃcient to durably protect the population still residing in large, less-contaminatedareas.
(A 31) The long-term contamination in these areas was a permanent worry for the
population as far as health was concerned because of the remaining uncertainty concerning protracted exposure, particularly due to internal contamination. It was alsoa very serious handicap for the long-term preservation of the quality of life of the
inhabitants and the sustainable maintenance of the socio-economic infrastructure.
This led the Governments of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine to elaborate and adopt
ambitious national laws in the early 1990s in an attempt to organise radiation
monitoring and health surveillance, and to improve the social and economic living
conditions of the population residing in the contaminated areas. The objective of
these laws was mainly to address long-term issues through a series of nationalcountermeasures and compensation mechanisms, designed mainly according toradiological protection criteria.
(A 32) In Belarus, for instance, two laws were published to deﬁne the principles
governing the social protection of the aﬀected population and the status of contaminated areas. The ﬁrst law, voted in February 1991, concerned ‘the social protectionof citizens aﬀected by the disaster at the nuclear power plant of Chernobyl’ andclariﬁed the status of those aﬀected by the accident: liquidators, populations, andworkers in the contaminated areas, as well as the compensation allocated in each53

ICRP Publication 111

case. The second law, voted in November 1991, which concerned ‘the legal status of
the contaminated areas following the disaster at the nuclear power plant ofChernobyl’ deﬁned the conditions and means for organising the social and economic activities in the areas, as well as the scientiﬁc accompanying programme.
It also stipulated the zoning organisation of the Belarus regions (Table A.1). Bothlaws applied to approximately 2 million Belarusian people and recognised that
20% of the Belarusian territory (approximately 40,000 km2) were signiﬁcantly
contaminated.
(A 33) Schematically, the rehabilitation programmes adopted in the early 1990s
relied on further restriction of human presence in the contaminated areas (mandatory or voluntary relocation), and on strictly controlling the level of contamination in foodstuﬀs and the whole-body contamination of individuals. Many
countermeasures were focused on the control and improvement of the radiological quality of agricultural products in collective farms; private production was restricted as much as possible because of diﬃculty in controlling and monitoring its
quality.
(A 34) In 2001, the law on ‘the social protection of citizens aﬀected by the disasterat the nuclear power plant of Chernobyl’ was amended and clariﬁed. It was thenestablished that in areas where conditions of life and work are not subject to any
restriction, the average total exposure (external and internal) of the population
should not exceed 1 mSv/year (excluding background). This law stipulated that: if the average exposure of the population is more than 1 mSv/year, protective
measures must be implemented;
 if the average exposure of the population is between 0.1 and 1 mSv/year, actions
to reduce exposures should not be deleted but adapted to the situation; and if the average exposure of the population is less than 0.1 mSv/year, protective
measures are not necessary.

Table A.1. Zoning criteria adopted in Belarus in 1991.
Zoning criteria
137

Oﬃcial designation of zones
2

Periodic radiation monitoring
37 < Cs < 185 kBq/m
Individual dose < 1 mSv/year
Zone with resettlement rights
185 < 137Cs < 555 kBq/m2
18.5 < 90Sr < 74 kBq/m2
0.37 < Pu < 1.85 kBq/m2
Individual dose > 1 mSv/year
Zone of secondary resettlement555 < 137Cs < 1480 kBq/m2
74 < 90Sr < 111 kBq/m2
1.85 < Pu < 3.7 kBq/m2
Individual dose < 5 mSv/year
137
Cs > 1480 kBq/m2
Zone of priority resettlement
90
Sr > 111 kBq/m2
Pu > 3.7 kBq/m2
Individual dose > 5 mSv/year
Zone of evacuation (exclusion zone)
54ICRP Publication 111(A 35) As far as the control of foodstuﬀs is concerned, authorities have adopted apragmatic approach by reducing the concentration criteria as the situation
improved. Table A.2 illustrates the evolution of food contamination criteria from1986 to 1999 in Belarus.
(A 36) It should be noted that, with minor changes, this legal framework remained
the basis of the successive rehabilitation programmes that were implemented until
the late 2000s, i.e more than 20 years after the accident.
(A 37) Despite the huge amount of national resources dedicated to the rehabilitation programmes in the early 1990s, the protection strategies failed to properly consider the complexity of the situation created by the contamination. In particular,
they did not succeed in mobilising the local communities and the individuals who felt
progressively powerless in the face of the radiological situation. This situation contributed to generate a general feeling of loss of control of daily life, exclusion, andabandonment among the inhabitants.
(A 38) During the mid 1990s, the continuous degradation of the economic situation due to both the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ﬁnancial burden of therehabilitation programmes pushed the inhabitants of the areas to restart private production and to rely ever more on wild products to ensure their daily subsistence. In
the absence of individual knowledge and adequate means to control the radiologicalquality of foodstuﬀs at the local level, the eﬀect of this change was inevitably a signiﬁcant increase in the level of exposure within the population, and particularly
among children because of the importance of dairy products in their diet. This put
strong pressure on the authorities and experts, and contributed to aggravate further
the loss of conﬁdence of the population in their ability to manage the situation.
(A 39) Faced with this diﬃcult situation, the authorities tested new approaches,such as the ETHOS Project in the late 1990s and the CORE Programme in the early
2000s in Belarus, with the aim of involving the population directly in the management of the radiological situation. These new approaches demonstrated that theTable A.2. Evolution of 137Cs contamination limits infoodstuﬀs in Belarus from 1986 to 1999.
Years

Foodstuﬀs
Drinkable water
Milk
Butter
Meat:
Beef
Lamb
Pork, poultry
Potatoes
FruitsWild berries
Fresh mushrooms
Dried mushrooms
Baby food137

Cs contamination (Bq/kg, Bq/L)

1986

1993

1996

1999

370
370
7400

18.5
111
-

18.5
111
185

10
100
100

3700
3700
3700
3700
-

600
370
370
185
3700
-

600
600
370
100
100
185
370
3700
-

500
500
180
80
40
185
370
2500
37

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direct involvement of local stakeholders in the day-to-day management of a radiological situation is feasible, and evidenced the potential for implementing many protective actions in day-to-day life in addition to the collective actions taken by theauthorities. These approaches also demonstrated that to be sustainable, managementof a radiological situation by stakeholders must rely on a dynamic of economic
development relying primarily on individual initiatives of the local actors in partnership with national and international institutions and organisations.
A.7. Chernobyl/Norway(A 40) The Chernobyl fallout in Norway was signiﬁcant and had serious agricultural consequences (Brynildsen et al., 1996; Tveten et al., 1998). As the geographicalextent and the potential long-term consequences of the fallout emerged during thesummer of 1986, the Government passed a resolution regarding compensation for
all farmers and other producers for economic losses due to the mitigating actions.
The most aﬀected areas in Norway are rural. Breeding of cattle, sheep, goats, andreindeer is common in these areas, and summer grazing on rough forest and mountain pastures is part of traditional agricultural practices. High uptake of radiocaesium in plants growing in these poor soils has contributed to a persistentcontamination problem in animal production. Twenty-two years after the accident,
countermeasures are still needed in large areas of sheep and reindeer production, as
well as smaller areas of dairy cow and goat production, for compliance with foodintervention levels. The countermeasures are expected to be needed for at least another decade (e.g. Skuterud et al., 2005a).
(A 41) The Norwegian radiological protection criteria in the Chernobyl management was based on the recommendations of the ICRP concerning exposures of the
public, with 5 mSv as the maximum dose during the ﬁrst year after the accident, and1 mSv/year in subsequent years. A range of measures were needed to comply withthese criteria, including dietary advice to consumers of reindeer meat and freshwaterﬁsh (Strand et al., 1992). The measures reduced the average ingestion doses of reindeer herders approximately 10-fold. However, without measures, there is continued
potential for doses exceeding 1 mSv/year among reindeer herders in central Norway(Skuterud et al., 2005b).
(A 42) The Chernobyl fallout management in Norway focused on maintaining
domestic food production and consumer conﬁdence in these products. Control ofcontamination levels in traded foods was applied, and intervention limits for radiocaesium were established (600 Bq/kg in basic foodstuﬀs). However, to avoid condemnation of 85% of the total national reindeer production, and to maintain ameaningful business base for reindeer herders (as well as Sami culture and lifestyle),
the intervention limit for radiocaesium in reindeer meat was increased in the autumn
of 1986 to 6000 Bq/kg (from 1987, this was also applicable to wild freshwater ﬁsh
and game). This was justiﬁed by the low average consumption of these productsby the general Norwegian population. As the situation improved, the intervention
limit for reindeer meat was reduced to 3000 Bq/kg in 1994.
56

ICRP Publication 111(A 43) During 1986, approximately 2850 tons of meat, worth nearly 18 million
USD, was condemned. In recognition of the long-term perspective of the contamination problems, the authorities realised that measures were needed to reduce the highcost associated with monitoring and compensation for condemned meat and milk. In
addition, condemnation produced waste. The procedures developed for monitoring
live animals (sheep, cattle, and reindeer; Brynildsen and Strand, 1994) have been
particularly appreciated, both by animal owners and the authorities, since theyrapidly determine if animals can be slaughtered or should be given clean feed before
slaughter (with compensation for extra labour, fodder, construction of enclosures,etc.). Caesium binders mixed in concentrates, added to salt licks, or applied as
rumen boli have also been popular measures with no extra economic costs for the
producers. Early slaughtering was applied as a measure in reindeer herding, withassociated compensation for reduced weight of animals. Many of the measures weredeveloped and tested in the ﬁeld, with the involvement of local people, and thisapproach has been regarded as important for the success of the strategies adopted.
(A 44) Elevated contamination levels in wild products, combined with signiﬁcantconsumption of these products by the rural population, particularly reindeer herders,
led to a need for advice on the level of consumption of various products and how tocook in order to reduce radiocaesium intake. In addition, the authorities monitored
radiocaesium levels in reindeer herders for surveillance of doses to the most exposed
population group. Maybe even more importantly, this monitoring made the contamination situation more tangible and controllable for the people (Mehli et al., 2000).
More than 20 years after the accident, there is a continued request for this monitoring from the reindeer herders, motivated by their willingness to maintain control of
the radiological situation but also because of the still open discussions on risks associated with long-term, low-dose exposure to radiation.
(A 45) To manage the extensive monitoring of various animals and products inrural areas, the authorities equipped nearly 60 local food control laboratories andveterinarians with detectors for radiocaesium measurement in 1986–1987 (Strand
et al., 1987). These also freely served the people if they wanted to check contamination levels in their own products. This monitoring network helped to build signiﬁcantlocal knowledge on contamination levels.
(A 46) It has been estimated that the various countermeasures in animal production during the ﬁrst 10 years, costing some 70 million USD in total, reduced the condemnation of meat worth nearly 300 million USD (Tveten et al., 1998). Additionally,
monitoring and controlling animals and foodstuﬀs probably contributes to maintaining the public’s conﬁdence in Norwegian products, thereby avoiding even more
dramatic economic consequences associated with market drops.
(A 47) The focus on local competence and direct involvement of the aﬀected population in countermeasure application and monitoring in Norway was a result ofboth the request from the population in the contaminated areas, and the recognitionby the central authorities that the local food producers had detailed knowledge ofimportance for everyday management of the contamination problem. This local focus appears to be another success of the Chernobyl fallout management in Norway.
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A.8. Chernobyl/UK(A 48) Radiocaesium originating from the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant in the Ukraine was deposited across the UK on 2–4 May 1986. The
highest levels of radiocaesium deposition, in the range of 20–40 kBq/m2, occurredin the uplands of western Britain, where sheep farming is an important agriculturalactivity. A countrywide programme of sampling carried out after the accident identiﬁed sheep meat as the foodstuﬀ of most concern. To protect consumers, a maximum limit of 1000 Bq/kg radiocaesium was applied to sheep meat aﬀected by theaccident. This limit was introduced in the UK in 1986, based on advice from theEuropean Commission’s Article 31. Under powers provided in the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 (FEPA), emergency orders have been used since 1986
to impose restrictions on the movement and sale of sheep exceeding the limit in certain parts of Cumbria, North Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The orders deﬁne geographical areas, often termed ‘restricted areas’, within which the controls
must be followed. Under the FEPA orders, sheep with levels of contamination above
the limit are not allowed to enter the food chain. Due to the particular chemical andphysical properties of the peaty soil types present in the upland areas of the UK, theradiocaesium is still able to pass easily from soil to grass and hence accumulate in
sheep. Consequently, more than 20 years after the accident, areas exist where restrictions are still in place. Initially, these restricted areas were large, but they have reduced substantially as levels of radioactivity have fallen, with all restrictions lifted
in Northern Ireland in 2000. Table A.3 gives a breakdown of the number of sheep
and farms under restrictions for 1986, 1990, 2000, and 2007. The restrictions, whichwere implemented as a response to an emergency exposure situation, have become
part of a protection strategy for what is now considered as an existing exposure
situation.
(A 49) It was not possible to implement protective measures to reduce levels ofradiocaesium in vegetation in the restricted areas due to the physical limitations of
the terrain and the environmentally sensitive nature of these areas. Nevertheless,the development of a very well-designed monitoring programme following the Chernobyl accident did enable lamb production to be sustained and the livelihoods ofsheep farmers to be protected. Furthermore, consumer conﬁdence in lamb was maintained. The monitoring programme, known as the ‘Mark and Release’ scheme, hasoperated in the restricted areas since 1986. Under this scheme, a farmer wishing tomove sheep out of a restricted area can have the animals monitored to determine
their level of radiocaesium. A live monitoring technique is used which, to allow
Table A.3. Number of sheep and farms under restrictions in the UK for 1986, 1990, 2000, and 2007.

June 1986
August 1990
May 2000February 2007

Farms

Sheep

8914
757
387
369

4,225,000
647,000
231,500
196,50058

ICRP Publication 111

for inherent variability in live monitoring results, applies a working action level of
645 Bq/kg (rather than 1000 Bq/kg). Any sheep which exceed the working action level are marked with a dye and are not released from restrictions. Those which passare allowed to enter the food chain.
(A 50) Since 1986, sheep farmers in the restricted areas started to become awarethat their lambs could pass the ‘Mark and Release’ test if they were brought downfrom the upland unimproved pastures to improved lowland pasture for a periodof fattening prior to slaughter. Subsequently, these sheep farmers have adapted theirhusbandry practices to make use of their own improved land or rented land to fatten
their lambs prior to slaughter. Live monitoring has become part of this routine and isgenerally accepted by farming communities as the new practice. The restrictions willremain in place for several years to come.
A.9. Goiânia, Brazil(A 51) On 13 September 1987, two scavengers found an abandoned teletherapy
device in a derelict medical clinic in Goiânia, Brazil. The machine contained a radioactive 137Cs source with an activity of 50.9 TBq in the form of powdered and soluble
137
CsCl. After removing the rotating assembly of the machine containing the sourcefrom its shield, they took it home and managed to rupture it and spread pieces about
the property. Both became ill within hours. Five days later, they sold the pieces of therotating assembly to a junk dealer in the neighbourhood. This dealer noticed a luminescence emanating from the unit and used tools to cut the unit apart to gain accessto the material inside. The rupture allowed the 137CsCl powder to disperse easily andbe further distributed. Several land areas and 129 people were signiﬁcantly contaminated, resulting in four deaths and one forearm amputation.
(A 52) 137Cs contamination was spread by social contacts, the sale of contaminated material, the movement of pieces of the source, and wind and rain dispersal.
Contamination was found on seven major properties; in 42 residences, including
22 homes of family and friends who were evacuated, and 20 others where radiationlevels ranged from 1 to 10 mSv/h; and on 68 of more than 10 million bank notes
tested. The population was internally exposed by inhalation and the ingestion offruits and vegetables, and externally exposed to the penetrating 137Cs gamma radiation, but the drinking water supply was found to be clean. More than 4000 urine andfaecal samples from a total of 80 people were analysed between October 1987 andJanuary 1988. The estimated collective doses were 56.3 man Sv from external exposures and 3.7 man Sv from internal exposures, including 14.9 man Sv (external) and2.3 man Sv (internal) for the four people who died.
(A 53) More than 550 decontamination workers were mobilised. Contaminatedmaterials in the environment were removed from the various sites and loaded into
containers, with liquids being immobilised in concrete. Decontamination limits forsolids were set by the national standard. Anything contaminated below 74 kBq/kg
was considered to be clean and unaﬀected by the accident. The contamination level
was characterised by the contact radiation level, with values of 2 and 20 mSv/h being
the respective limits for low- and medium-level contamination. An estimated activity
59

ICRP Publication 111

of 44 TBq of 137Cs (of the 50.9 TBq of the source) was recaptured during the decontamination eﬀort, which left the area with no signiﬁcant residual hazard. The total
volume of waste generated was 3500 m3.
(A 54) The initial media coverage of the accident raised a lot of concern for a community with recent memories of the Chernobyl reactor accident in the former Soviet
Union. The situation improved when the news media focused their eﬀorts on reporting the actions implemented and public education. However, beyond the direct costin human lives and medical treatment and care of victims, monitoring of people andthe contaminated area, and the countermeasures described above, the economic andsocial consequences of the accident were very signiﬁcant. Even without any agricultural contamination, the wholesale value of the entire state’s agricultural production
fell by 50% within 2 weeks of the announcement of the accident. Manufactured
goods from Goiânia state experienced a drop of 40% in their sale prices for approximately 30–45 days. There was a very deﬁnite impact on the number of homes sold,home sale prices, rental prices, and land prices, and this was more acute nearer to thecontaminated areas. The negative impact on hotel reservations and tourism wasapproximately 40%, even in areas more than 1 hour’s drive away. Some residents
of Goiânia were not allowed to register in hotels, to ﬂy on aeroplanes, or to travelon buses. Oﬃcial certiﬁcates of non-contamination were requested for people andgoods everywhere.
(A 55) In the long term, due to heavy rains, the material was easily transported
through the streets in addition to in-depth soil migration. Therefore, an additional
decontamination was necessary for long-term recovery, mainly dealing with contaminated houses, gardens, and streets. At the time, Brazilian regulations did not cover
remediation, and the only number that people understood and accepted was the dose
limits for practices. Therefore, it was decided to use an approach which leads to
5 mSv for the ﬁrst year but an average of 1 mSv/year considering the weatheringand physical decay of caesium over 70 years. As a conceptual model, it consideredindoor and outdoor external exposures in addition to inhalation of resuspended
material and ingestion of food available from private gardens (such as vegetables,
chicken, eggs, fruits). The criteria adopted for external exposure was 1 mSv for indoors and 3 mSv for outdoors, and the criteria for internal doses was 1 mSv/year.
The authorities had to use a similar approach to that established in the national regulation for practices.
(A 56) Follow-up of all recovered areas has been performed over the years. However, in 1996, the environmental monitoring programme was stopped because of
public stress, which caused behaviours such as TLDs disappearing from monitored
houses, people not allowing workers to go into monitored places, etc. A new survey
was requested in 2004 by the District Attorney in which some ‘hot spots’ of contamination, with levels higher than the operational level, were found on the streets andwere removed in spite of not being of primary concern considering their location.
The worst-case dose scenario indicated an eﬀective dose of 3.2 mSv/year.
(A 57) A lesson learnt from the Goiânia accident is that the post-accident phasealso requires planning and co-ordination with diﬀerent stakeholders, particularly
with the local population. Many resources were used to implement actions that could
60

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have been avoided with better planning of management of the situation, and betterawareness of all involved entities on how to deal with this type of situation.
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Assessment of the Environmental Impact of Radionuclides Released During Three Major Nuclear
Accidents: Kyshtym, Windscale, Chernobyl. Luxembourg, 1–5 October 1990. EUR-13574. pp. 749–
767.
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concernant le contrôle et le suivi de la contamination des sols, des denrées alimentaires et des produits
commerciaux en Biélorussie). CEPN Report No. 291.

61

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Bogdevitch, I., 2003. Remediation Strategy and Practice on Agricultural Land Contaminated with 137Cs
and 90Sr in Belarus. Eurosafe, Paris, 25–26 November 2003. Environment and Radiation Protection.
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62ICRP Publication 111

Erratum

Erratum to the References in Publication 98,(Volume 35, Issue 3)
The Publisher would like to point out that the last page of the references wereomitted from the PDF and printed versions of the above publication. They are
reproduced in full below:

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ICRP Publication 111

Corrigendum

Corrigendum to ‘The History of ICRP and
the Evolution of its Policies’ [Ann. ICRP 39(1)]R.H. Clarke, J. Valentin
The authors would like to point out that there were errors present in Table 1.3, on
page 84, under ‘Committee 1 Chair’.
The error as present is:
1985–2001
2001–2009
2009–

Warren K Sinclair, USA
Roger Cox, UK
Ohtshura Niwa, JapanThe corrected form is:
1985–1997
1997–2005
2005–

Warren K Sinclair, USA
Roger Cox, UK
Julian Preston, USA

The Publisher and Authors apologize for this error.

DOI of original article: 10.1016/j.icrp.2009.07.009
69