The Futenma United States Marine Corps Baseand Japan’s Foreign Policy
Takao SEBATA

Abstract
First of all, this paper discusses the problem of the relocation of the Futenma UnitedStates Marine Corps base from the viewpoint of a Chinese threat and the United Statesnational interests. In 2010, Prime Minister Hatoyama was not able to keep his promise ofmoving the Futenma Marine Corps base out of Okinawa. As a result, he resigned giving into the United States demands and an argument on deterrence advocated by the bureaucratsof the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. However, I contend that maintaining
status quo only benefits the United States and the Chinese threat is exaggerated. The paper
also analyzes deterrence of the Marine Corps base in relation to the Senkaku Islands(Diayudao in China or the Pinnacle Islands). According to those who support the UnitedStates-Japan Security Treaty (hereafter referred to as the Security Treaty), if there were no
Security Treaty, China would occupy the Senkaku Islands. In order for China to not do so,Japan maintains the Security Treaty and the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa. That is theessence of the Security Treaty, they argue. However, I propose that Japan cooperate with
China and Taiwan to administer the Senkaku Islands to utilize ocean resources. China andJapan can keep peace by sharing ocean resources in the vicinities of the Senkaku Islands
instead of Japan relying on the Security Treaty and the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa. I
point out that today’s Marine Corps troops can be sent anywhere in the world by air, so
there is little reason why they should stay in Okinawa. The United States forces would
stay in Japan for indefinitely although no town or city in Japan welcomed Marine Corps
troops as Hatoyama proved. The reason why the United States forces would not leave
Japan is very simple: generous Japan’s host nation support. Therefore, I recommend that
the Japanese Government immediately abolish the host nation support. In conclusion, I
argue that Japan does not need the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa and United Statesforces should withdraw from Japan since they are not welcomed in Japan. Instead of
relying on the Security Treaty and the Marine Corps troops, Japan should put emphasis on
the diplomatic efforts that will enhance Japan’s security.
Keywords: Futenma, Okinawa, the United States Marine Corps, the United States forces
and bases in Japan, Japan’s security, Deterrence

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Introduction
In June 2010, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama resigned because he was not able to keep his
promise of transferring the United States Marine Corps base in Futenma, Ginowan City, Okinawa
Prefecture to another prefecture. In fact, Prime Minister Hatoyama did not have the politicalleadership or courage to say to the United States that he could not find another relocation place
after all efforts of searching. Hatoyama never demanded that the United States close the Marine
Corps base in Futenma and transfer it to Guam without condition. If he had ultimately kept his
promise, the Japanese public would have supported him even though the relations between the
United States and Japan would have deteriorated. This decision is another case in point of Japan’sPrime Minister not having strong leadership, and bureaucrats still exercising strong influence overforeign and defense policies in Japan.
A major reason why the United States-Japan relations had been good for sixty-five years was
because Japan has almost always followed the United States. In other words, Japan seldom said
No to the United States. Now, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power in September
2009. At first, Hatoyama tried to assert Japan’s national interests, which would maintain Japan’s
security while reducing a burden of people in Okinawa. In the end, however, the DPJ acted likethe Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It is natural that the United States-Japan relations would
deteriorate if Japan emphasizes her national interests. Japan cannot resolve the United States
military base issue if she fears that she might antagonize the United States. It is because
maintaining the status quo is in the national interest of the United States. It is regrettable that theargument went unchallenged this time too, which following the United States national interests
was also Japan’s national interests, and therefore, keeping the Security Treaty was Japan’snational interests.
Examining Marine Corps bases in Okinawa is important because the Marine Corps troops
symbolize the Security Treaty, and the presence of the Marine Corps relates to the territorial issue
between China and Japan, the Senkaku Islands. In the United States and Japan after the Soviet
Union dissolved in 1991, an argument on the Chinese threat is increasing. A so-called deterrencecaught attention of the policy makers in the Hatoyama Administration and the general public in
Japan in 2010. Prime Minister Hatoyama cited the importance of the deterrence as a major reason
why the Marine Corps troops would stay in Okinawa.
In this paper, first of all, I will examine the problem of the relocation of the Futenma UnitedStates Marine Corps base from the viewpoint of a potential Chinese threat and from the UnitedStates national interests. How these factors are intertwined will be discussed. Secondly, this paper
analyzes the deterrence of the Marine Corps base and the Senkaku Islands. Whether the Marine
Corps bases should stay in Okinawa will be discussed. In conclusion, I will argue that Japan does
not need the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa and diplomatic efforts will enhance Japan’s
security.

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The Futenma United States Marine Corps Base, the Potential Chinese Threat,and United States National Interests
First of all, concerning the issue of the relocation of the Futenma United States Marine
Corps base in Okinawa, pressure from the United States was strong. The United States intentions
strongly influenced the result.１ The United States consistently supported an existing plan whichmeant the construction of an alternative military base. Giving in to the pressure, Hatoyama was
not able to maintain his belief that he would take the Marine Corps base in Futenma out of
Okinawa. During the election campaign in 2009, he promised that he would at least move themilitary base out of Okinawa. However, the ultimate result was that the base stayed in Okinawa.
The people in Okinawa were very disappointed and angered at Hatoyama’s decision. The Social
Democratic Party of Japan (SDP) protested against his decision and left the coalition government,
which weakened his cabinet and became one of the reasons for his resignation.
Prime Minister Hatoyama said that the United States was very firm in insisting on building a
new base in Henoko in Nago City, Okinawa, and admitted that coming to a resolution within halfa year was optimistic.２ He also stated that the United States strongly opposed Tokunoshima,
Kagoshima Prefecture, arguing that if a part of the Marine Corps troops moved far away,
deterrence or troop function would deteriorate. Since the Marine Corps needs to make all thetroops function as one organization, it would be very difficult to move only a part of the troops.
The United States insisted on all or nothing, which meant all the Marine Corps troops would stayin Okinawa or leave Okinawa, said Hatoyama. In the end, he was not able to refute how to
operate the Marine Corps.３ In this way, Hatoyama was not able to keep his promise since he was
dragged into technical arguments of how to operate the Marine Corps troops and deterrence
arguments. Besides, he did not have political or bureaucratic support in both his own party andgovernment to implement his idea.
Moreover, the international situation in North East Asia in the early 2010, such asheightened relations with North Korea over the sinking incident of the South Korean naval vessel
and growing Chinese military power in addition to North Korean nuclear problem, all justify
keeping peace by force, and a concept of deterrence gains momentum of its own. As a result, theUnited States national interests took precedence over Japan’s national interests this time, too, andthe opinions of the people in Okinawa were ignored. This decision is the same pattern as we haveseen many times under LDP administrations. The LDP had always given priority to the demandsof the United States and ignored the opinions of the people in Okinawa since 1972 with regard to
the United States military base issues.
Secondly, Prime Minister Hatoyama did not seriously negotiate with the United States
Government concerning the relocation of the Marine Corps base in Futenma.４ His administration
looked for an alternative place for the military base inside and outside of Okinawa, but was notable to find a suitable place. Consequently, Hatoyama should have told the United States
Government that there was no relocation place inside of Japan except for Guam. In other words,
the Prime Minister should have negotiated with the United States Government forthrightly todefend Japan’s national interests. If he had done so, most Japanese people, including the majorityof the Okinawan people, would have supported him. Even though the relations between the

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United States and Japan might have temporarily deteriorated, the Futenma issue would not lead tothe abrogation of the Security Treaty or withdrawal of all the United States troops from Japan.
Moreover, in today’s world, which is rapidly globalizing, it is unthinkable that the UnitedStates would bring about protectionism in the United States-Japan trade relations. Both countries
would gain nothing in restricting free trade since the two countries are the largest and the thirdlargest economic powers. The United States fully recognizes the importance of her military basesin Japan in terms of the United States military strategy. She also fully understands that Japan as
host nation carries the burden of keeping United States troops in Japan paying up to 75% of themaintenance cost. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the United States national interests, it isinconceivable that she wishes to close and withdraw all the United States bases and troops fromJapan. Keeping the United States forces in Japan is much less expensive than in the United States.
That is why the United States continues to keep troops and bases in Japan in spite of the fact thatno town or city in Japan wishes to host Marine Corps troops.
Thirdly, the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense
exercised very strong influence. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that neither the Ministry ofForeign Affairs nor the Ministry of Defense, in addition to the United States, cooperated withhim.５ His remarks deserve attention. The DPJ emphasized politician-led politics, but thebureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who put emphasis on good relations with theUnited States and the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defense, who stressed a threat of China andNorth Korea, influenced Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and Defense Minister Toshimi
Kitazawa in the relocation issue. As a result, Okada and Kitazawa were not able to reflect theintention of Hatoyama on the policy in the end. Bureaucrats had maintained strong influence andcontrol over the foreign and defense policies under the LDP administrations for many decades.
The DPJ was not able to regain political control over this issue either.
In other words, the bureaucrats took the leadership and decided on the Futenma issue. This
relocation issue indicates that even the Prime Minister was not able to impose his will or take theleadership. In the area of defense, the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and theMinistry of Defense are still very strong. However, both the LDP and the DPJ firmly support the
Security Treaty, and in this respect both parties are the same in principle. DPJ politicians’
attitudes toward the defense issue are the same as those of the bureaucrats in the Ministries ofForeign Affairs and Defense. Therefore, Okada and Kitazawa were willing to cooperate with thebureaucrats. It is obvious that both Japanese bureaucrats and United States military officials who
support the Security Treaty cooperated with each other and were able to persuade the politicians.
Fourthly, deterrence was emphasized. Foreign Minister Okada mentioned that China andNorth Korea were the targets of the deterrence at which Japan would aim making use of the
Security Treaty. United States Ambassador John Roos repeatedly stressed the importance ofdeterrence.６ Bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense are therealists and have the same view toward deterrence. Hatoyama gave in to pressure of these realists
as well as the United States and was not able to take the leadership to realize his idealism. This
result indicates that the politicians and the bureaucrats in Tokyo are influenced by the security
view, which was popular in the 19th and the 20th centuries: Peace through military might.
Both the United States and the Japanese Governments do not clearly mention deterrence

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against whom or which country. However, it is obvious that China is in their minds. Those who
support the Security Treaty cite a North Korean nuclear threat and the Chinese naval militarybuildup. If the United States troops in Japan are reduced, the Chinese threat would likely
increase, they argue. If the Security Treaty were abrogated, China would put pressure on Japanand might show off her military forces over the territorial issue. In order for China to not do so, it
is necessary for Japan to have the Security Treaty to deter China and to keep the Marine Corps in
Okinawa.７ Deterrence against China is the main reason why Japan has to keep the Security Treaty
even after the Soviet Union was abolished ending the Cold War. Those who support the Security
Treaty argue that as soon as the United States troops in Japan left, China would threaten Japanand violate Japanese sovereignty over the islands near Okinawa.
If one accepts this argument, Japan needs to build a new military base for the Marine Corps
in Okinawa. This policy indicates that the Marine Corps will almost indefinitely stay in Okinawa.
The real problem concerning Futenma is that the Japanese Government does not seriously discuss
why Okinawa needs so many bases and troops or whether there is an imminent threat to Japan.
Instead of doing so, the Japanese Government inevitably accepts the Security Treaty and looks at
the security issue from the viewpoint of the deterrence against China and North Korea. Since
Japan faces a threat, according to the United States rationale, Japan needs to keep the Marine
Corps in Okinawa, pay host nation support, and of course, bear the cost of transferring a part of
the Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam. It does not make sense that Japan has to pay for the cost
not for the Japanese, but for the American soldiers and their families going home. Even more
confusing to the Japanese people is the fact that Japan has to pay for the construction of theirhousing and bases in Guam, which is not a Japanese territory.
Today in the 21st century, China is Japan’s largest trading partner. In 2009, the Sino-Japanesetrade was US$232.1 billion, Japan’s exports to China were US$109.6 billion and imports from
China were US$122.5 billion.８ As compared with the Sino-Japanese trade, the United StatesChina trade in 2009 was US$366 billion, which was 2.5 times larger than the amount of theUnited States-Japan trade, US$147.1 billion. China’s exports to the United States were worth US$296.4, which was more than three times the amount of Japan’s exports to the United States, US$95.9 billion.９ Today, Japan’s largest trading partner is no longer the United States, but is China.
Japan continues to maintain the Security Treaty, keep the Marine Corps in Okinawa, and impose aburden on the people in Okinawa in order to deter China, which is Japan’s largest trading partner.
This policy does not make sense. It is not a rational choice or based on Japan’s national interests
since it is common that a country tries to maintain good relations with their largest trading
partner.
Dealing with the growing power of China with military forces is in line with the UnitedStates national interests, but not with Japan’s. Japan does not have to side with the United Statesin this respect. Antagonizing China is not in Japan’s best interests. In fact, the United States also
wishes to keep good relations with China. During the Futenma issue, on 21 May 2010, UnitedStates Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stopped by Japan for a very short period of time on her
way to China and emphasized the existing position of the United States on the relocation issue. It
is reported that Japan greatly conceded in negotiations with the United States.１０ While Prime
Minister Hatoyama was saying that Japan needed the Marine Corps in Okinawa for the purpose

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of deterrence, G2 (Group 2),which was the United States and China, was carrying out strategic
talks about economy and security. It is very ironic that the United States had a strategic dialogue
with the target of deterrence which the Security Treaty aimed at. The Japanese people must
wonder why the United States continues to have strategic dialogues with China and ask
themselves whether the United States would be really willing to deter China to militarily defend
Japan. If so, why does the United States continue to have strategic talks? If a Chinese threat isemphasized, why is the United States-China trade progressing so rapidly? Why do the highranking officials in the United States and China regularly meet and discuss economy andsecurity? Do these factors indicate that the United States does not wish to confront China
militarily? If so, why does Japan need to keep the Marine Corps in Okinawa to deter China?
Jitsuro Terashima points out that while 700,000 Americans visited Japan in 2009, 1.71
million Americans went to China. He continues to insist that the idea of Japan coping with the
Chinese threat by keeping the Security Treaty is ignorant of today’s United States-China
relations.１１ The flow of trade, money, and people in the United States-China relations is rapidly
increasing exceeding that of the relations between the United States and Japan. It is difficult toimagine that when more than 1.7 million Americans visit China every year, ordinary Americans
feel hostility toward China. Under such circumstances, it is important for the Japanese people towonder if there is a real Chinese threat to Japan. The Japanese people must also ask why the traderelations between the United States and China are growing faster than the relations between the
United States and Japan when Japan bears huge amount of a host nation support for the UnitedStates forces in Japan.
The same can be said of the North Korean threat. Why did the United States decide on
reducing her troops in South Korea by 12,000 if a North Korean threat was emphasized? China,
South Korea, and Japan all do not wish North Korea to collapse now. If so, pressure on North
Korea will not lead to a solution. A military solution is almost impossible since neighboring
countries would lose much more than they gain. Unless China cooperates, sanctions against
North Korea do not work. Neither the United States nor Japan needless to say South Korea canpersuade China to put pressure on North Korea. After all, diplomacy is the only way to resolve
the North Korean issue. Japan must cooperate with China so that North Korea can make a softlanding. She should not take a tough policy toward North Korea such as showing off military
muscle together with the United States.
In summary, Japan does not face an imminent threat from either China or North Korea.
However, for those who support the Security Treaty in Japan and the United States, there should
be a potential enemy. After the Soviet Union dissolved, China emerged as their potential enemy.
In order to deter China, Japan needs the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa and has to continue to
pay up to 75% of the host nation support. Since keeping the United States troops in Japan
including the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa is less expensive than in the United States
mainland, the United States has no intention to withdraw her troops from Japan. Moreover, sheinsists on building a new Marine Corps base in Henoko, Okinawa, in exchange for relocation of apart of the Marine Corps to Guam. Of course, Japan must pay for the construction costs of a newbase in Henoko and bear about 60% of the relocation costs to Guam. While the United States cankeep her troops in Japan with generous Japanese host nation support, Japan pays the cost for a

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new base and the relocation. These policies all coincide with the United States national interests.

Deterrence of the Marine Corps Bases in Okinawa and the Senkaku Islands
China has been rapidly expanding her economy over the last thirty years and increasing
naval power in recent years. As a result, the argument on the Chinese threat is increasing in Japan.
The major reason why Prime Minister Hatoyama gave in to the bureaucrats in the Ministries ofForeign Affairs and Defense as well as the United States is an idea of deterrence against China. In
order to counter the growing naval and economic power of China, Japan must maintain the
Security Treaty with the United States, they concluded.
Yukio Okamoto, a former diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a former advisor
to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, argues that if the United States Marine Corps withdrew
from Okinawa, China would move into the Senkaku Islands. In the past, China occupied theParacel Spratly Islands when the United States troops withdrew from Vietnam, the Johnson Reef
in the Spratly Islands when Russia withdrew her troops from Danan in Vietnam, and the Mischief
Reef when the United States did from the Philippines, Okamoto says. According to him, Japan
would lose the Senkaku Islands to China because China would first send fishing boats, thenobservatory ships, and finally naval vessels. In such a case, Japan would lose her interests infishing and marine resources, and a boundary line with China would come closer to Okinawa. He
further contends that the Marine Corps in Okinawa is not there to directly defend Okinawa. The
overall presence of the United States armed forces in Japan including the Marine Corps andstrong will of the United States to defend Japan constitute a strong deterrence against the Chinese
territorial ambition. Okamoto concludes that if China moved into the Senkaku Islands under thepresent strong Security Treaty, the Sino-United States relations would certainly deteriorate andChina must avoid this kind of situation for now. In Okamoto’s view, the constant presence of theUnited States forces in Japan brings about a strong deterrence, and that is the essence of the
Security Treaty.１２
However, others bring forward a counterargument. Dustin Wright contends that it isridiculous to imagine a military clash between the United States and China since there are close
economic relations between the two countries. Cheap Chinese imports support American
consumers’ life and Chinese money invested in the United States sustains the American
economy.１３ In fact, the United States depends on China. Such a United States will think twice
whether it is a wise policy to use military means when a territorial issue arises between Japan and
China to defend Japan’s interests. Therefore, Japan cannot rely on the United States to deal withthis issue. Then, why does Japan keep the United States forces in Japan to deter China if shecannot depend on the United States? There is a way that Japan can resolve the territorial issue
without relying on the deterrence of the Marine Corps in Okinawa.
As for who owns the Senkaku Islands, the countries concerned have different interpretations.
On the one hand, the Japanese Government contends that Japan has sovereignty over the Senkaku
Islands since 1895, and consequently, the Senkaku Islands belong to Okinawa Prefecture. In
1895, Japan investigated whether any country possessed the Senkaku Islands, but no country did

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so. Then, Japan incorporated the Senkaku Islands into Okinawa. Japan’s sovereignty had beenrecognized internationally before 1945, and the Senkaku Islands were returned to Japan as a partof Okinawa in 1972. China and Taiwan, on the other hand, argue that they have sovereignty over
the Senkaku Islands that were a part of Taiwan, but ceded to Japan under the Shimonoseki Treaty
in 1895. According to China and Taiwan, the Shimonoseki Treaty was concluded as a result ofJapan’s aggressive war, so they assert that the Senkaku Islands belong to Taiwan. Moreover, they
insist that the Senkaku Islands were on the Chinese maps that the Chinese people had used sinceancient times. However, no country had ever claimed its possession over Japan before 1971.１４
The position of the Obama Administration on the Senkaku Islands issue is that the Senkaku
Islands are under the Japanese administrative rights and the Security Treaty applies to the areas
under the Japanese administrative rights. This was an indirect remark, which was different fromthe statement of the previous Bush Administration saying that the Security Treaty applied to the
Senkaku Islands. The United States Government states that the United States is not in the position
to decide who has sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and hopes that the countries concerned
peacefully resolve the problem. So, the United States recognizes Japan’s administrative rights, butdoes not accept Japan’s sovereignty. The United States maintains a neutral position.１５ This is an
important point since Japan’s only friend, the United States, does not clearly support Japan overthis territorial issue. It is indicative that an international society might not be necessarily
supportive of Japan’s claim over the Senkaku Islands.
If China occupied the Senkaku Islands as Okamoto argued, the United States would notintervene in this issue since occupation would not constitute an attack against the Japanese
territory. Moreover, the United States does not even admit Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku
Islands, and the United States needs Chinese support in economic areas. Therefore, there is little
possibility that the United States takes on China on behalf of Japan over the Senkaku Islands.
Japan cannot count on United States help either militarily or diplomatically once China occupies
the Senkaku Islands. Of course, the United States intervention into this territorial issue is still agray area and no one truly knows whether the United States would intervene or not. However, it
would be difficult for Japan to argue that China invaded Japan by simply occupying the Senkaku
Islands where no one lives. Nevertheless, Japan could contend that China violated the Japanesesovereignty and administrative rights. Since neither China nor Taiwan have recognized Japan’s
sovereignty as well as United States’ neutral position on this matter, whether the internationalsociety would support Japan’s position is uncertain.
Japan has to peacefully resolve this territorial issue through diplomatic channels in case
China occupies the Senkaku Islands. Due to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, Japan cannot
resolve international problems such as the territorial issue by military means. Consequently,
Japan must deal with the Senkaku Islands issue bilaterally or internationally through peacefulmeans. Japan can take the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) if the bilateralnegotiation fails. From the viewpoint of international law, the countries concerned can resolve theissue. Even though China and Japan cannot resolve the issue through the ICJ, Japan should not
rely on the Security Treaty to deal with this problem. Japan cannot benefit from antagonizing
China. It is more important for Japan to maintain overall good relations with China thanmonopolizing ocean resources in the vicinities of the Senkaku Islands and making an enemy of

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China.
It is believed that China and Taiwan began to assert that the Senkaku Islands belonged tothem because the ocean investigation made by the United Nations in 1969 and 1970 reported that
there might be a possibility of estimated 109.5 billion barrels of oil in the vicinity.１６ If the
Senkaku Islands issue does not resolve bilaterally or through the ICJ, China, Taiwan, and Japan
can cooperate with each other to administer the oil reserves instead of one country monopolizing
all the oil reserves. It is important to consider the oil reserves and ocean resources near the
Senkaku Islands from the viewpoint of the East Asian Community. Moreover, in the 21st century,
trade in East Asia is rapidly growing. Many countries in the region sign free trade agreements tofurther promote trade relations, but Japan is behind in this respect.
Concerning the territorial issue, Okamoto states that Japan is the only country in the worldthat has a territorial problem with all the neighboring countries, China, Russia, North Korea, andSouth Korea, surrounding Japan. Even though Japan is surrounded by such a unstableenvironment, Article 9 of the Constitution prohibits Japan from having an attack capability, whichmeans the capability executing a war by herself, Okamoto says.１７ The notion of defending one
country’s territory or natural resources by military means comes from the idea of the 19th and the20th centuries. It is more important for neighboring countries to cooperate with each other in orderto make good use of ocean resources in East Asia. China needs peaceful environment to further
develop her economy. Consequently, there is little possibility that China would cause a problem
with Japan over the Senkaku Islands. Japan can gain more benefits than the status quo, which
relies on the Security Treaty to defend the Senkaku Islands and sacrifice the people in Okinawa, if
she can cooperate with neighboring countries in utilizing marine resources in the vicinity.
Kazuhisa Ogawa discusses that the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa play the role ofdeterrence in preventing a conflict in both the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. The
Marine Corps troops in Okinawa are in a geopolitical location and could quickly intervene in theconflict area. Once a conflict on the Korean Peninsula begins, the Marine Corps troops would besent to Okinawa or air bases in South Korea from the United States mainland by air or combat
areas by Australian high-speed ships from Okinawa. He also points out the importance of thestrategic location of the Japanese archipelago, by which deterrence works against the military
threat to Japan. That is the essence of the Security Treaty, says Ogawa. Concerning the Taiwan
Strait, he continues that the presence of the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa is of importance tothe defense of Taiwan. Ogawa asserts that although there is little chance that China could invade
and occupy Taiwan now, given the fact that the Chinese military do not have such a capability,
there might be a slight possibility that a quick occupation of Taipei by the Chinese military forces
after Chinese missiles attacked vital Taiwanese government facilities could still occur. In order toprevent such an attack, it is significant to show China that the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa
could be quickly sent to Taiwan to prevent such a scenario, Ogawa concludes.１８
Noboru Yamaguchi also asserts that the presence of the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa has
a significant meaning. If the Marine Corps troops are already stationed in Okinawa in case of an
emergency, a bridgehead is already provided so that reinforcements will easily arrive there. He
also cites remarks made by United States Marine Corps Pacific Fleet Commander Keith Stalder.
The commander emphasized that it would take one to two days to reach the Japanese mainland

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from Okinawa by ship, two days to South Korea, three days to South China Sea, and five days to
the Malacca Strait. However, it would take at least three weeks to reach Japan from the west coastof the United States. So, the commander stressed the importance of the forward deployment
forces in a strategic point by the Marine Corps troops.１９
The abovementioned remarks are typical among those who support geopolitics. It is true that
Okinawa is located at the center of a strategic location. From Okinawa, one can easily reach
Siberia in Russia, North and South Koreas, Beijing and Shanghai in China, Taiwan, thePhilippines, and Vietnam. Therefore, Okinawa is indispensable to the United States forces and theUnited States does not want to withdraw her troops from there. In addition to strategic
importance, a generous Japanese host nation support can keep the United States forces in Japan
forever. However, the recent trend shows that the Marine Corps troops are sent to combat areas by
air rather than by sea. In other words, the strategy has changed. Instead of sending the Marine
Corps troops by ships to enemy shores, today’s Marine Corps troops are sent to combat areas byair.
As for the Chinese threat to Japan, Hajime Takano argues that it is inconceivable that China
would attack Japan with nuclear weapons or invade Japan with massive military forces since there
is no rational reason for China to do so. He also contends that it is almost unthinkable that Taiwan
would declare her independence since many people in Taiwan think that Taiwan is alreadyindependent.２０ So, it is unthinkable that China would attack Taiwan. Then, why does Japan need
the Marine Corps in Okinawa to deter China? If Japan keeps the Security Treaty and the Marine
Corps in Okinawa for a purpose of China not occupying the Senkaku Islands, Japan loses morethan she gets through the Security Treaty because it is not certain whether China would do so.
Japan can diplomatically resolve the Senkaku Islands issue.
Both arguments of Ogawa and Yamaguchi mentioned above are based on geopolitics, whichstresses the importance of the strategic location of the Japanese archipelago. However, between
1953 and 1956 the Marine Corps troops were stationed in Gifu and Yamanashi Prefectures, not in
Okinawa. Their main task was to provide support to the United States forces in South Korea. It is
not known why the Marine Corps troops were stationed in Gifu and Yamanashi, but at that time,
there were already large United States Army and Air Force bases in Okinawa. So, there was little
room for the Marine Corps to move in Okinawa.２１ Keeping the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa
for the support of the United States troops in South Korea benefits the United States national
interests, but not Japan’s national interests. Japan’s national interests in this respect are to keep aneutral position, which means not to intervene in a conflict between North Korea and South
Korea. Japan has no obligation to defend South Korea since there is no defense treaty between
Japan and South Korea. Currently, however, under the Security Treaty, Japan has no choice, but tofollow the United States.
In any case, it is obvious that there is no necessity for the Marine Corps to stay in Okinawa.
Given the recent trend that revolution in military technology which is rapidly progressing enables
the Marine Corps troops to be sent anywhere in the world, they could be sent to combat areasfrom the United States mainland by air. So, keeping the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa is not
the best option for the United States, given the fact that the majority of the people in Okinawa
oppose the United States military bases. It is the United States policy that if local people do not

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Takao SEBATA：The Futenma United States Marine Corps Base and Japan’s Foreign Policy

want United States forces, the United States will withdraw her troops. In the process of finding a
relocation area for the Marine Corps troops in Futenma, no town or city in Japan welcomed
United States troops. So, the United States should withdraw Marine Corps troops in Futenma to
Guam without condition.
In case of an emergency, if a bridgehead is necessary as Yamaguchi contended, it should bebuilt in South Korea so that reinforcements will be able to easily arrive near the combat area,
instead of Okinawa. The Marine Corps can be always sent to combat areas from the United States
mainland by air. If the forward deployment forces are that important as Stalder asserted, why did
the United States decide on withdrawing 12,000 combat troops from South Korea? It is because
the United States does not think that North Korea would attack South Korea. Otherwise, it does
not make sense. In terms of a North Korean threat, South Korea faces more threat than Japan
does. So, the United States should keep the status quo or reinforce her troops in South Korea.
However, she decreased her troops there.
As for the North Korean threat, Takano presents four scenarios that North Korea would posea threat to Japan. The first scenario involves a North Korean nuclear attack. Unless Kim Jong-il
completely goes mad, this scenario would be almost one hundred percent unthinkable since there
are no diplomatically, politically, or economically rational reasons, says Takano. The second
scenario is of a North Korean direct invasion of Japan. However, North Korea has no ships tosend her troops to Japan. So, the former would not be able to invade the latter. He continues thatthe third one is of a Second Korean War, which would bring about North Korean attack against
United States forces and bases in Japan. This scenario is not realistic since the South Korean andthe United States forces would easily defeat the North Korean armed forces. Moreover, in thesecond and third scenarios, he says, there is no rational reason to launch an attack. The fourth
scenario involves the problem of refugees. However, millions of refugees from North Korea
would walk into China, instead of coming to an enemy, Japan by sea. As for the role of the
Marine Corps, Takano asserts that in the first scenario, the Marine Corps would not be able todefend Japan against missile attack and in the second one, it is almost impossible to imagine a
North Korean invasion of Japan. Under these scenarios, there is no necessity for the Marine Corps
to be stationed in Okinawa, and the third scenario has no direct relations to Japan, he concludes.２２
Chalmers Johnson also asserts that the United States should move the Marine Corps inFutenma to a base in the United States such as Camp Pendleton, California and thank the people
in Okinawa for their endurance over the last sixty five years.２３ Given the fact that the Marine
Corps troops in Okinawa in many cases hurt local people rather than protect them, the UnitedStates Government should consider Johnson’s suggestion. Keeping the Marine Corps troops in aplace that is not welcomed is not the United States policy. In the long run, building a new base in
Henoko will fail since the local people do not support the presence of the Marine Corps troops.
There are some Americans such as Wright and Johnson who insist that the United States should
decrease the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa. Since there is no inevitable reason why the Marine
Corps should be stationed in Okinawa, people in Okinawa should continue to fight against thepresence of the Marine Corps troops and the construction of the new base.
According to the Mainichi Shimbun, in February 2010, Stalder stated that in fact, removing
North Korean nuclear weapons once the Kim Jong-il regime collapsed was the utmost important

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task to the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa.２４ If that is the case, the Marine Corps should beplaced in South Korea, not in Okinawa. As Stalder himself stated, it would take two days to South
Korea from Okinawa by ship. The Marine Corps troops in South Korea would certainly carry out
their job quicker than the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa. His remarks indicate that there is norational reason why the Marine Corps troops should continue to stay in Okinawa. They could stay
anywhere including Camp Pendleton, or even Gifu or Yamanashi as they were stationed before. In
this respect, the only reason why the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa is stationed there is thehost nation support that the Japanese Government has been paying since 1978.
Since there is almost impossible to imagine a conflict between China and Taiwan, it is notnecessary for the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa to stay there. Even in such a case, the Marine
Corps troops could be always sent to the Taiwan Strait from the United States by air or Japan canalways provide them with bases, if necessary. In other words, there is no need for the UnitedStates forces to permanently stay in Japan. The United States should realize that the majority of
the Japanese people do not want the United States forces to permanently stay in Japan. UnitedStates troops and bases have been here in Japan over the last sixty five years since 1945. Just
because the people in Japan supported the LDP or the DPJ does not mean that the Japanesepeople wished the United States forces to stay in their hometowns. Hatoyama’s failure to find analternative place clearly proved this point. No town or city in Japan was willing to host the
Marine Corps troops. In other words, the United States forces are not welcomed in Japan.

Conclusion
This paper examined the deterrence of the Marine Corps bases in Okinawa, particularly the
Futenma Marine Corps base. It is obvious that there is no significant reason why the Marine
Corps troops must stay in Okinawa. It is inconceivable that China would invade Japan since apeaceful environment is indispensable to China to further promote trade and economic
development. Japan is an important trading partner for China, and China still needs Japanesetechnology for her economic development. Neither country would benefit from a conflict.
In both Japan and the United States, Chinese and North Korean threats are exaggerated. It isdifficult to find a rational reason why China threatens Japan when both countries have close traderelations. Japan should discuss how to use the ocean resources including oil in the vicinities of
the Senkaku Islands instead of relying on the Security Treaty and confronting China with militarymeans. In other words, Japan should be ready to put the Senkaku Islands under an international
administration.
Diplomatic and economic efforts will increase Japan’s security. After Japan abrogated the
Security Treaty or the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa withdrew, no one knows whether China
would occupy the Senkaku Islands. If Japan can maintain good relations with China, she will beable to deal with the Senkaku Islands issue even though there is no Security Treaty or no presenceof the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa. If Japan and China (and Taiwan) can cooperate with eachother on the Senkaku Islands issue, all the countries will benefit from joint development in ocean
resources in the vicinities of the Senkaku Islands. The people of Okinawa would be released fromthe burden if there were no Marine Corps troops in their hometowns. The Japanese people, in

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particular the people in Okinawa, would be happier and get more benefit from ocean resources inthe vicinities of the Senkaku Islands under the international administration than keeping theMarine Corps troops that cause a lot of troubles including crime, airplane crashes and car
accidents, and air, water, soil, and noise pollution in Okinawa. If the main task of the Marine
Corps troops in Okinawa is to deter China, Japan should ask the United States to withdraw theMarine Corps there even though such a policy would lead to the abrogation of the Security
Treaty.
If China, Taiwan, and Japan have stakes in the joint development, there will be no conflictover the Senkaku Islands. These three countries can learn from the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), which was an international organization to keep peace among Western
European nations, in particular between France and Germany (then West Germany). France andGermany often went to war in the 19th and the 20th centuries. Therefore, in order to prevent thetwo countries from waging war, France and Germany, along with other Western European
countries, decided on pooling coal and steel that were important resources for starting war at thattime. If China, Taiwan, and Japan can pool ocean resources including oil and share fishing rights,
there would be no conflict among these countries.
In such a case, Japan would not need Marine Corps troops in Okinawa or the Security
Treaty. As a result, Japan would also not have to pay host nation support. Now is the time for thepeople in Japan to get rid of the strategy based on the notion in the 19th and the 20th centuries:
Peace through military might. Now is the time for the Japanese Government to consider theinterests of the Japanese people, not those of the Americans. Keeping the status quo only benefits
the United States.

Notes
１ Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), 29 May 2010.
２ Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), 12 June 2010.
３ Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), 18 June 2010.
４ Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), 21 May 2010.
５ Asahi Shimbun, 12 June 2010. Jitsuro Terashima asserts that the bureaucrats in the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense take the United States intentions into consideration.
Jitsuro Terashima, “Nichibei Domei wa Shinka Saseneba Naranai−Futenma Meiso no Sokatsu
to Kongo” (We must develop the Security Treaty−Summary and future of wandering
Futenma), Sekai, August 2010, 103. Concerning the interests and influence of the bureaucrats
both in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, see Takao Sebata, Japan’s
Defense Policy and Bureaucratic Politics, 1976-2007, Lanham, MD: University Press ofAmerica, 2010.
６ Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), 23 May 2010; and Masahide Ota and Masaru Sato, “Taidan:
Okinawa wa Mirai o Do Ikiru ka?” (A Talk: How will Okinawa live the future?) Sekai, August
2010, 70.
７ Yukio Okamoto, “Nejireta Hoteishiki Futenma Henkan o Subete Toku” (I will resolve all the
problems of a twisted equation, the return of Futenma), Sekai, May 2010, 170.

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http://www.jetro.go.jp/news/releases/20100216144-news; Internet; accessed 10 June 2010.
http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html; Internet; accessed 18 August 2010; andhttp://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5880.html; Internet; accessed 10 June 2010.
１０ Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), 22 May 2010.
１
１ Terashima, “Nichibei Domei wa Shinka Saseneba Naranai,” 109.
１２ Okamoto, “Nejireta Hoteishiki Futenma Henkan o Subete Toku,” 169-70.
１３ Dustin Wright, “Futenma no Fukurokoji wa Washinton de Tsukurareteiru” (Washington
brought about a dead end in Futenma), Sekai, February 2010, 172-3.
１４ http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/; Internet; accessed 24 August 2010.
１５ http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/s/article/2010081701000375.html; Internet; accessed 24 August
2010; http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/s/article/2010081601000585.html; Internet; accessed 24
August 2010; and http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/; Internet; accessed 24 August 2010.
１６ http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/; Internet; accessed 24 August 2010.
１７ Okamoto, “Nejireta Hoteishiki Futenma Henkan o Subete Toku,” 171.
１８ Kazuhisa Ogawa, “Futenma Mondai wa Koyatte Kecchaku Surushika nai” (Only myproposal can resolve a Futenma issue), Chuokoron, May 2010, 126-7.
１
９ Noboru Yamaguchi, “Okinawa ni Kaiheitai ga Hitsuyo na Itsutsu no Riyu” (Five reasons
why the Marine Corps troops in Okinawa are needed), Chuokoron, May 2010, 134-5.
２０ http://opinion.infoseek.co.jp/article/823; Internet; accessed 25 August 2010.
２１ Tomohiro Yara, Sajo no Domei (The alliance on the sand) (Okinawa: Okinawa Taimusu,
2009), 83-4.
２２ http://opinion.infoseek.co.jp/article/823; Internet; accessed 25 August 2010.
２
３ Los Angeles Times, 6 May 2010.
２４ Mainichi Shimbun, 1 April 2010.

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