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TECHNICAL REPORl DOCUMENTATION PAGE

. Re8TSB/AAR-84/10
o r t No.

2.Governrnent Accession No.
DR
Q A - Q l nAi
n
I'"_
,.--

and S u b t i t l e Aircraft Accident ReportKorean Air Lines McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30, HL7339,
Southcentral Air Pioer PA-31-350. N35206, Anchorage,- Alaska; December i3. 1983
i. Author(s)3.Reciplent's Catalog No.
1

5.ReporE Cate
August 9, 1984
6.Performing. OrganizationCode
8.Ferforming Gqanization
Report No.

1

1G.Work 'Jnit No.

3 . Performing Organization Name and Address

3945A
1 1 .Contract or Grant Nc.

National Transportation Safety Board
Bureau of Accident Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20594

13.Type of Repcrt andPeriod Covert6

12.Sponsoring Agency Name a n d Address

Aircraft AccideEt Zepo:?
December 23, is83

NATIONAL TRAFiSPORTATIOii SAFETY S0ARD
Washington, D . C. 20594
I

15.Supplerneniary Notes

6.Abstract A t 1406 Yukon standard time, on December 23, 1983, Korean Air Lines Flight 084,
a scheduled cargo flight f;-om Anchorage, Alaska, to Los Angeles, California, collided head-orwith Southcentral Air Flight 59, a scheduled commuter flight from Anchorage t o Kenai,
Alaska, on runway 6L-24R at Anchorage International Airport. Both flights had filec
instrument flight rules flight plans, and instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at thetime of the accident. The Southcentral Air Piper PA-31-350 was destroyed by the coYisior
impact, and the Korean Air Lines McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30 was destroyed by impact a x
postimpact fire. Of the eight passengers aboard Flight 59, three were slightly injured. The
pilot wes not injured. The three crewmembers on Flight 084 sustained serious injuries.
The National Transportetion Safety Board determines that t h e probable ceuses oi
the accident were the failure of the pilot of Korean Air Lines Flight 084 to follow seceptec
procedures during taxi, which caused him to become disoriented while selecting t h e runway.
the failure of the pilot to use the compass to confirm his position; and the decision of the pilo?
to take off when he was unsure that the aircraft was positioned on the cor?ec? runway.
Contributing to the accident was the fog, which reduced visibility to a poict t h a t the pilc!
could not ascertain his position visually and the control tower personnel could no: assist thepilot, Also contributing to the accident was a lack of legible taxiway and runway signs ST
several intersections passed by Flight 084 while it was taxiing.

7I

19.security ~
(of

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~

t h i s report)

UNCLASSIFIEDNTSB Form 1765.2~~

21.No.

i i 2f O . S
i e c~u r i ~t y C
t l ai s s~i f i c~a t i o n(of t h i s page)1( R ~ " . 9/74)

UNCLASSIFIEO

Stacemen:
TXis docllment is available
through the Setiona:Technical Inforrnecion
Service, Springfield.
Virginia 22151.

18.Distribu:ionmound fog; taxi route; takeoff;holding; runway 6L/24R: runway 32; disorientation;compass; cockpit rnmagement; taxiway/runway signs;
rulway visibility range (RVR); airport surveillance
detection equipment (ASDE); ground collision

1 7 . K e y Words

of PaSes 1 2 2 . D r i c e

34

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CONTENTS

SYNOPSIS..............................

.......................
........................

1.FACTUAL ZNPORMATllON
1.1 History of the Plight1
1

Flightcrew Interviews
Injuries to Persons
1.3 Damage to Aircraft
1.4 Other Damage
1.5 Personnel Information
1.6 Aircraft Information
1.7 Meteorological Information
1.8 Aids to Savigation
1.9 Communications
1.10 Aerodrome Information
1.11 Flight Recorders
1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information
1.13 Medical ana Pathological Information
1.14 Fire1.15 Survival Aspects
1.16 Tests and Research
1.16.1 Airport Survey
1.16.2 Taxi Route of KAL 084
1.17 Additional Information
1.17.1 Accident History
1.17.2 Runway Incursions
1.17.3 Operation of Foreign Air Carriers in the United States4.......................
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2.ANAJiYSLs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3 Collision Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4 KAL 084 Flightcrew Operational Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.5 KAL 084 Flightcrew Medical and Behavioral Factors . . . . . . . . . . .
2.6 Airport Signs and Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.7 Runway Incursions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.1
1.2

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B ?iCOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.APPENDIXES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3.CONCLUSIONS.
3.1 Findings
3.2 Prohsble Cause..................
...................
...................
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Appendix A-Investigation and Hearing
Appendix B-- Personnel Information
Appendix C-- Aircraft Information
Appendix 3--Transcript of Recorded Transmissions

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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHLNGTON, DX. 20594
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

Adopted: August 9 , 1 9 8 4-

KOREAN AIR LINES McDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-10-30, HL1339
SOUTHCENTRAL AIR PWER PA-31-350, I435206
ANCHORAGE, ALASKADECEMBER 23,1983

SYNOPSIS
A t 1406 Yukon standard time, on December 23, 1983, Korean Air Lines Flight084, a scheduled cargo flight from Anchorage, Alaska, to Los Angeles, California, collided
head-on with Southcentral Air Flight 59, a scheduled commuter flight from Anchorage to
Kenai, Alaska, on runway 6L-24R a t Anchorage International Airport. Both flights had
filed instrument flight rules flight plans, and instrument meteorological conditions
prevailed a t the time of the accident. The Southcentral Air Piper PA-31-350 was
destroyed by the collision impact, and the Korean Air Lines McDonneU Douglas DC-10-30
was destroyed by impact and postimpact fire. Of the eight passengers aboard Flight 59,
three were slightly injured. The pilot was not injured. The three crewrr.embers on
Flight 084 susteined serious injuries.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causesof the accident were the fai1ure.of the pilot of Korean Air Lines Flight 084 to follow
accepted procedures during taxi, which caused him to become disoriented while selecting
the runway; t h e failure of the pilot to use the compass to confirm his position; and t h edecision of the pilot to take off when he was unsure that the aircraft was positioned on
the correct runway. Contributing to the accident was the fog, which reduced visibility toa point that the pilo: could not ascertain his position visually and the control tower
personnel could n-t assist the pilot. Also contributing to the accident was a lack oflegible taxiway and runway signs a t several intersections passed by Flight 084 while it was
taxiing.
1. FACTUAL WFORMATION

1.1

History of the Flight

On December 23, 1983, the pilot of Southcentral Air Flight 59 (SCA 59), a
Piper PA-31-350, filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan for a scheduled
domestic passenger flight from Anchorage, Alaska, to Kenai, Alaska, with a requested
altitude of 2,000 feet. 1/ At 1215:36, 21 SCA 59 was cleared to Kenai via an Anchoragee i g h t departure, as fiied, and to maintain 2,000 feet.
When the clearance delivery
controller advised him while still parked at the terminal gate to expect a delay in his
departure time until 1244 because of dense ground fog, the pilot shut down the engines
and returned with his passengers to the terminal building. The pilot and the passe,:gers
later rebmrded the airplane, and the pilot restarted the engines. He called the tower a t
1234:4’i.
At L244:10, clearance delivery switched SCA 59 t o t h e ground controI
frequency.

-l / All altitude and terrain elevations referred to in this report are mem sea level unless

1otherwise indicated.

-21 All times are Yukon Standard Time based on the 24-hour clock unless otherwise noted.

-2-

A t 1339:36, after about an hour's delay a t his parking spot, the pilot Of SCA 5 9
requested taxi clearance since the runway visual range (RVR) had begun to improve. SCA
pilots need a minimum of 1,800 feet RVR for takeoff at Anchorage. The pilot was given
the option cf departing via runway 6 right (6R) or runway 6 left (6L). The pilot elected touse the full length of runway 6L for his departure in ecco-dance with company policy. He
reported to the ground controller passing the approach end of runway 32 a t 1343:17, andhe reported arriving at taxiway W-3 at 1344:08. (See figure 1.)
A t 1344:18, the pilot of SCA 59 rep?rted on the local control frequency that
he was holding short of.runway 6L and that he wculd be ready for departure as soon as t h e
RVR improved t a 1,800 feet. The local controller responded
it's not quite there Yet,
we got a thousand, I'l let you know when it comes up.""...

The flightcrew of Korean Air Lizes Flight 084 (KAL 084), a M C D O M e l l Douglas
DC-10-30, filed an IFR flight plan for e scheduled cargo flight from Anchxage to S S
Angeles International Airport, California, on December 23, 1983. The requested flying
altitude was Flight Level 330. 3/ At 1352, the Awhorage air traffic control tower
clearance delivery controller cleared KAL 064 to Lo:: -hgeies via an Anchorage eight
departure, the filed route, and told the flightcrew t,; expect Flight Level 330 after
departure.
KAL 084 called t h e Anchorsge ground controller from t h e cargo ramp of theInternational Satellite Terzinal re?uesting engine start. and taxi clearance. The groundcontroller gave the captain an option of departiny the airport via runway 32 or runway 6 3 .
The operating specifications for KAL stated that a prevailing visibility of 1/4 mile w a s
required for takeoff on runway 32 ana that a reading of 600 feet on the touchdown zone,
midfield, end rollout RVR transmissometers was required for takeoff on runway 6R. The
captain selected runway 32 and, a t 1357:37, the ground controller cleared KAL 084 to taxi
to runway 32. The ground controller could not observe KAL 084 taxiing to the runway
because the fog was restricting surface visibility a t the airport to 1/8 mile. He requested
and received a report from the captain when KAL 084 reported entering the east-west
taxiway a t 1401:45. The ground controller then requested the captain to hold short of
runway 32 and change to the local control frequency.
At 1402:36, the captain of KAL 084 reported on the local control frequency
t h a t he was taxiing on the east-west taxiway and was ready for takeoff. A t 140254, thelocal controller cleared KAL 084 to taxi into position and hold at runway 32 and reportedt h e RVR of runway 6R as 1,200 feet, the midfieid RVR as 1,400 feet, and the rollout RVR
as 800 feet. At 1403:39, the local controller requested the pilot of SCA 59 to confirm his
position. The pilot confirmed t h a t he was holding a t the W-3 intersection. A t 1404, KAL
084 was cleared for takeoff on runway 32. The captain acknowledged the clearance. A t:405:28, SCA 59 was cleared onto runway 6L to hold for takeoff by the tower controller
who reported that the RVR nad risen to 1,800 feet. A t 1406:18, the captain of KAL 084
transmitted that he was starting the takeoff roll.
KAL 084 collided with SCA 59 on the ground at the departure end of runway
24R (approach end of runway 6L). The K A L 084 captain sighted t h e PA-31-350, awaiting
takeoff clearance, seconds before the collision and rotated the DC-10-30 and applied left
rudder which caused t h e ncse gear to lift and the center main body gecr to swing t o theright of its previous runway centerline position. The pilot's actions resulted in the centermain and left main gears straddling the PA-31-350 fuselage and t h e nose gear passing
over it.

3/ A level of constant atmospheric pressure related to a reference datum of 29.92 inches
Tif mercury. Each level is stated in three digits that represent hundreds of fee?. For
example, Flight Level 330 represents a barometric altimeter indication of 33,000 feet.

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The PA-31-350 was pushed rearward by the collision impact b u t remained on
the runway. The right wing of the PA-31-350 was sheared off a t the wing root, and theleft wing was separated outboard of the left engine nacelle. There were scrape marks andan indentation along the top of the fuselage extending aft from over t h e cockpit area.
The vertical stabilizer was separated and the PA-31-350 came to rest on its nose gear,left main gear, and aft lower fuselage.
The DC-10-3C continued off the departure end of runway 24R, demozshedseven approach light star2hiow (the approach light system for runway 6L), passed througha wooded area, down a gully, and slued to the right be_'ore coming to a stop. A fire
erupted immediately and destroyed th.. DC-10-30.
No fatalities resulted from the accident. The airport was closed at 1410 andreopened at 2030 for operations on runways 6R/24L and 14/32. The accident sccurred
about 1406:40 during daylight hours, a t latitude 6 1 9 0 ' N and longitude 149059' W.

1.1.1

PLightcww Pntefviews
The pilot of SCA 59 stated in part:. . .about 1330-1345, found out v;eather w a s going back up, gotren above. . .our minimums.. . .went out again and after 5 to 10 minutedelay told to taxi out. . .cleared me to taxi to 6L. . . .
Gate 3 7 . . . .texied out.. . .on the diagonal to the east-west, down theeast-west to W-3. . . .fog wasn't clea-ed. . . .a JAL plane almost mistook
taxiway (W-3) for W-4 (access to runway 6Rf. . . .he started to pull into
it. . .realized. . . .mistake. .. went straight. . . . behind me. . . .fog was
pretty dense.. . .told i o taxi into positim and hold. . . .wait for KAL tojet out on 32. . . .heard them clear KAL. . .for departure.. . .30, 40
seconds later saw headlights down the runway.. . .truck on
runway? . . .lights got bigger and bigger and kept going faster andfaster. . . .ducked below cockpit and told passengers to do the1800.

same..

. .we felt impact.

The pilot also stated that because of his familiarity with the airport layout and slow taxi
speed, he did not have undue difficulty during ?&xiout.
The captain of KAL 084 stated in part:I left the North ramp a t 1357. I was instructed to taxi to runwsy 32, andI turned the aircraft to the left. I could not see the yellow taxi-line, so I
turned slightly to the right, attempting to see the taxi-line. I sa% theline very dimly through the heavy ice fog. While I was concentrating
heavily on following the line, the tower advised me to go on to theeast-west taxiway. I thought I s a w the taxiway on my right and turnedto the right onto it. The visibility was so poor that it was difficult to see
the taxiway markings. I continued to taxi, and my copiiot [the first
officer] confirmed that the northsouth taxiway w a s to the right. A t
that time, we informed the tower that we were entering the east-west
taxiway. The tower then instructed us to hold short on 32 holding point.
We thought runway 32 was to the right of the aircraft. The tower thentold us to taxi into position and hold. I turned right, entered runway 32,
and stopped. Due to the poor visibility, I felt unsure that the aircraft
was on the correct runway. I looked for identifying markings, but could
not see any. I discussed this with my copilot who felt sure that we were

Q

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on the correct runway. After 3-4 minutes of discussion, I consideredtaking runway 6R because of my uncertainty. However, the runway sizeand lighting appeared t o be correct, so I decided t o take off. I asked forclearance. I received clearcnce, and started to take off. 6-7 seconds
after beginning my take-off, I saw the other aircreft directly in front tome. I knew that a head-on collisicn would be fatal for the people aboard
both planes, so I turned slightly to the left and lifted the nose of myaircraft. A moment later, I felt and heard the crash. .. .
The ca-tain slso stated that the pretakeoff checklist was completed before the start of
the takeoff roll.
The first officer of KAL 084 stated in part:. . . .requested taxiing instructions. Ground controi gave us a choice
between runway 32 and runway 6R. After the captain and I discussed the
choice, we decided on runway 32, and informed ground control of ourdecision. Ground control agreed and suggested that we switch fromground frequency to tower frequency. The tower instructed us to tellt h e m when we entered the east-west taxiway. In spite of poor visibility,o'ur aircraft advanced and was able to get onto the east-west taxiway.
We notified the tower of our position, and the tower told us to hold shorton 32 holding point. We held short and asked clearance for takeoff.
After checking power and going through the checklist, we advised thetower that we were rolling. The tower responded, "Roger," so wereleased the brakes and started to roll. When the aircraft's speed
reached about VI, 1 caught sight of a small aircraft about 15 meters infront of us and almost instantly heard and felt the crash. . .

.

Ir seems that I lost my sense of direction due to t h e heavy ice fog, and I
confused the east-west taxiway with the north-south taxiway.

interviews with the crewmembers of K A L 084 substantiated their statements
and did not reveal any physiological or psychological problem that woeld haye affected
their abilities to successfully complete the flight.
1.2

Injuries to Persons
SouthCentrel &.r Flight 59
Injuries
Fatal/Serious
Minor
None
Total

Crew

Passengers

Others

Total
-

0

0
3

0

0
3
6

0
-1
1

5
8

0
0
0

Passengers

Others3

Korean Air Lines Flight 084
Injuries
Fatal
SeriousMinorjNone
Total

Crew
0
3
0
3

0

0

0

0

0

-0

0

0

Total

I
_

0
3
-0
3

1.3

Damage to Aircraft

The Southcentral Air Piper PA-31-350 was destroyed by the collision impact
forces. The Korean Air Lines DC-10-30 was destroyed by t h e collision impact forces,
postcollision impact forces? and postcrash fire.
1.4

Other Damage
There was extensive damage to the runway 6L approach lighting system.

1.5

Personnel Information

The flightcrews of both airplanes were properly certificated and qualified fortheir respective flights. (See appendix B.)
On December 22, 1983, t h e day preceding the accident, t h e pilot of SCA 59
was on duty from 0500 t o i5.30,6 total of 11.5 duty hours. He flew 5 hours during thisperiod. On December 21, 1983: he was off duty for t h e entire 24 hours. He reported for
duty a t 0700 on December 23: 1983, and had flown 2 hours 30 minutes before t h e accident
occurred.
The captain of K A L 084 had logged flights into and out of Anchorage
International Airport ove- a period of 8 years 6 months. During this period he had logged
73 landings and 78 takeoffs from Anchorage. On November 16, 1Y83, he was pilot-incornman6 of K.4L 018 from Kimpo International A i p x t , Seoul, Republic of Korea, toAnchorage, and logged 7 hours 38 3inutes. He remained on the gro'vnd for 48 hours 16
minutes and departed for Los Angeles as pilot-in-command of KAL 084, aboard HL7339(the accident airplane), on November 18, 1983, flying 4 hours 34 minutes. The captain of
KAL OS4 again piloted HL 7339 on December 8? 1983, on a flight 'rom Anchorage to Lo5Angeles, logging 4 hours 43 minutes.

TI-e captain of KAL 084 was the pilot-in-command of KAL 501 from Bangkok,
Thailand, to Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, on December 17, 1983. He logged 6 hours
47 minutes on this trip. On Decembe- 19, 1983, he was t h e pilot-in-command of K A L 502
on a flight from Abu Dhabi t o Seoul. He logged 10 hours 30 minutes on this trip. These
two trips represent the most recent flights flown by the pilot before the accident.
The first officer of K A L 084 had operatcd into and out of Anchorage for aperiod of 3 years 3 months. During ?his time, he logged 66 !andings and 66 takeoffs from
Anchorage.

The flight engineer of KAL 084 had operated into and out of Anchorsge for2 months before the accident. During t h a t time he logged 6 landings and 5 takeoffs from
Anchorage.
On December 22, 1983, t h e captain and the other crewmembers of KAL 081

were nonrevenue passengers on 6 direct flight from Seoul t o Anchorage. The flight took
7 hours 1 9 minutes. They were off duty for 29 hours 45 minutes before reporting for thescheduled cargo flight from Anchorage to Los Angeies on December 2 3 , 1983. Korean Air
Lines provides layover quarters for its crewmembers in Anchorage. The hotel staff, food,ambience, and decor a r e Korean t o create a familiar environment for t h e crews.

Aircraft Information

The PA-31-350, N35206, was of United S t a t e s registry. The DC-10-30,
HL7339, was of Korean registry.
Both airplanes were certificated, equipped, andmaintained in accordance with applicable Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) andKorean Civil Aviation Bureau requirements. (See appendix C.)
The maximum ramp weight for the PA-31-350 is 7,045 pounds. The maximum
gross takeoff weight (GTO) is 7,000 pounds with a forward center of gravity (CG) limit of
126 percent mean aerodynamic chord (MAC) and a rear CG limit of 135 percent MAC.
For the Eight on December 23, 1983, N35206 weighed 6,568 pounds and t h e CG was 130.2
percent MAC. The pilot's seat was occupied by the pilot. Seat Nos. 3, 5, 7, and 9 behindthe pilot's seat were occupied by passengers. The copilot seat and seats Nos. 6, 8, and 10
behind the copilot.seat were occupied by passengers. Seat No. 4 behind the copilot seat
was unoccupied.
The estimated takeoff gross weight (TOGW) for KL7339 was 502,760 poul~ds.
The cargo weight was 145,260 pounds. The computed CG was 20.9 percent MAC.
According to performance charts, based on the TOGW, t h e temperature of 15 degrees F.,
and the field elevation of 144 feet, the runway length required for takeoff was 8,150 feet.
1.1

Heteomlcgical Information

The surface weather observations for Anchorage International Airport on the
day of the accident were, in part, as follows:
1254:

Indefinite ceiling 0 feet--sky obscured; visibility--1/8 mile;
fog; t e m p e r a t ~ r e - - 1 3 ~ F ; dew point--7'F;
wind 120' at
3 knots; altimeter setting--31.07 inches of Hg; runway 6 R
visual range--800 f e e t variable 1,200 feet.

1350:

Indefinite ceiling 0 feet-- sky obscured; visibility--1/8 mile;
fog; t e m p e r a t ~ r e - - 1 5 ~ F ;~ i n d - 1 5 0 ~a t 3 knots; altimete:setting--31.06 inches of Hg; runway 6R visual range--800
feet variable 1,200 feet.

1415:

Indefinite ceiling 0 feet--sky obscured; visibility--i/l6 mile,
fog; temperature--14' F; dew point--lOO F; wi?d--05O0 at
03 knots; altimeter setting 31.06 inches of Hg; runway 6R
visual range--1,000 f e e t variable 1,60C feet.

The point of observation is the west end of runway 06L.
Surface weather observations at the airport were made by weather observers
empioyed by Northern Weather Service. These observers were certified by the National
Weather Service t o take weather observations. The observer on duty at t h e time of t h e
accident stated:
During t h e entire morning and early afternoon we observed widespreadheavy f o g with visibility conciitions varying from 1/16 mile t o 1 mile.
Runway 6R RVR conditions varied from 6,000 f e e t t o as low as 800 f e e t
and the sky conditions varied from thin obscured t o totally obscured
during the same time period. A t the time I was notified of the accident,
the weather conditions were: sky conditions totally obscured, visibility

-81/16 mile in fog, wir.d 050" at 3 knots, and runway 6R RVR reading W a s
1,000 feet variable t o 1,600 feet. The visibility and sky conditions Wereuniform in all directims from the observation point.

1.8

Aids to Navigation
There were no repwted difficulties with the navigational aids.

1.9

Communications

There were no reported difficulties with communications. The pilots of both
airplanes were on the same radio frequency (local control) at the time of the collision.

1.10

Aemdrome Information

Anchorage International Airport is located 5 miles southwest of Anchorage atlatitude 6190' N and iongitude 149%9' 1V. The field elevation is 144 feet, and themagnetic variation is 24.9 degrees east. The landing area consists of three runways:
runway 6R/24L, runway 6L/24R, and runway 14/32.
Runway 6R/24L is asphalt-surfaced and is 10,897 feet long and 150 feet wide.
Runway 6R is the primary instrument rurway and has six instrument approaches,
Runway 6L/24R is asphalt-surfaced and is 10,600 feet long and 200 feet wide.
A safety area extends westward for 200 feet beyond the threshold of runway 6L. The
magnetic heading for runway 24R is 244.9 degrees. Runway 24R is equipped withhigh-intensity runway edge lights (HIRL), runway end identifier lights (REIL), and visualapproach slope indicator NASI). Runway 6L is equipped with a simplified short apgroachlight system with runw8y alignment indicator lights (SSALR), HIRL, REIL, VASI and RVR
predicated on the midfield RVR for runway 6R/24L. Due to sharply descending terrain
immediately beyond the 200-foot-long safety flea, the approach lights were installed onsteel towers up to approximately 30 feet tall. The pavement is old (originally constructed
about 1949) with a rough surface and is weight restricted when the ground is not frozen toaircraft weighing no more than 12,500 pounds The runway is used primarily for lightaircraft departures and arrivals. The runway has all-weather, white painted runway
makings. Unlighted distance-remaining markers are installed along the side of the
runway. The distance from t h e intersection of runway 6L/24R and taxiway W-1, where
KAL 084 began its takeoff roll, t o the departure end of runway 24R is 2,400 feet.
Runway 14/32 is asphalt-surfaced and is 10,496 feet long and 150 feet wide.
The magnetic heading of runway 32 is 319.9 degrees. Runway 32 is equipped with HIRL,
REIL, and VASI. The runway has all-weather, white pninted runway markings. There isno published instrument approach procedure for runway 14/32. The threshold lights for
runway 32 are embedded in the pavement. There are two published instrument departure
procedures for runway 32, and the runway is used primarily for heavy aircraft departures.
All the taxiways are equipped with standard taxiway edge lights and yellow
markings. Standard size 3 (12-inch-high legend on an 18-inch-high sign face) taxiway
guidance and runway identifier signs as outlined in FAA Advisory Circular, Taxiwax
Guidance Sign System were located as shown in figure 2 and displayed informstion 8s
shown in figure 3. These signs had black lettering on a yellow background. The west sideof the international parking apron between taxiways N-1 and N-2 was equipped withstandard apron edge lighting.

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Taxiway Sign Locations and Condition

Lighted - Lights Operating

IF1

Not Lighted

Lighted - 3 of 7 Lights
OperatingLighted - Lights
OperatingLighted - Lights
Not Operating@

1-

Not Lighted

IGI Lighted - Lights Operating
Figure 3.-Taxiway signs.

4

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6

The Anchorage Terminal Radar Approach Contro! Facility is a level
facility 41 equipped with airport surveillance radar S/ and automated radar terminal
Service. c/-The air traffic control tower & equippa with a BRITE IV 71 display.
Transmissometers 8 / are located north of the touchdown zone for runway 6R, near
midfield abeam taxiway W-3, and south of the touchdown zone for runway 24L.

The PA-31-350 was not equipyed with a cockpit voice recorder or a flight data
recorder, and neither was required.

The remains of the digital flight data recorder were recovered from the DC10-30 and brought to the Safety Board's laboratory for examinatim e l d readout. The
Cockpit voice recorder was not recovered. The digital flight data rcxorder had sustained
significant heat damage, b u t t h e recording tape was removed, cleaned, and mounted forplayback. The entire 25 hours of recorded data were examined; however, no data could befound pertaining to the accident flight. The maintenance recores revealed that therecorder had failed on the inbound Right fro n Seoul and that corrective action by K-AL at
Anchorage was to remove, remount, snd operationally check t h e recorder as satisfactoryon t h e ground. -411 indications are that t'rre r::corder was not operating ddring the accident
sequence.
1.12

D

Wreckage and Impact Jnformaticn

The accident site was Anchorage Tnternational Airport. The coilision occurredat the departure end of runway 24R. The runway w ~ i scovered by a thin layer of snow,
frost, and ice, and there were about 30 inches of snow: on the airport infield area.
PA-31-350.-The
P4-31-350 was pushed backwards about 125 feet by thecollision and came to rest about 380 feet from :he runway 6L threshold identification
lights. (See figure 4.) The fuselage of the airplane was aligned with runway 6L. The
eirplane was resting on t h e left main gear? nose pear. and a f t portion of t h e fuselage. The
right cockpit windshield was crncked through on the right side and the upper section was
missing. The top of the fuselage on the right side was creased and caved inward from thewiadshield attachment area aft to t h e side window rear post. There were black m a r k s on
the dented area.

1

4/ A radar approach con:rol facility which handles an average of 2 0 to 59 hourly
operations between 0700 and 2300 local time for t h e 183 busiest traffic days of t h e year.
/ Search radar which provides azimuth and range information a t lower levels of flight-5withinapproximately a 50-mile radius of the airport.
6/Ansystem of termin8.1 air traffic control which provides flight data-processingautomatedand radar data processing capability. The radar contro1:er's operating position
will display alphanumeric data associated x i t h the secondary radar target.
7/
Radar Indicatw Tower Equipment @:lows viewing of radar indicators under-brightBrightsunlight or high ambient lighting conditions. SXTE radar units a r e 16-inch
television-type radar displays of sufficient brightness. contrast. and resolution for use in
the extremely high and variable iig!lt levels normally encountered in control ?ower cabs.
/!
A transmissometer is an apparatus used to determine visibility by measuring thetransmission of light through t h e atmosphere.
I t is the measurement source fordetermining rtinway visual range (RVR) and runway visibility value (RVV).

-12-

Figure 4.-Wreckage of Southcentral Air Piper P.4-31-?50, X35206.
The right wing of the PA-31-350 was sheared from the fuseiage e t the wingroot. All portions of the right wing, right engine and propeller, end right main lending
gear were !oca:ed and identified. The left wing w a s separated just outboard of the leftengine nacelie. The left engine and associated propeller remained attached to the nacellestructure. A l a x e section of engine cowling remained partially ai;ached to the nacellelower structwe. One of the three propeller blade tips was bent i n t h e a f t direction. The
wing span of the P,1-31-350 is 40 feet 8 inches. The distsnce from the sheared right wingroot to just outside of the left engine nacelle is about 1 0 feet 6 inches. The upper half ofthe vertical stabilize? was torn away. The upper portion o f the rudder also was torn away
but remained attached to the vertical stabilizer a t its lower attachnlas: point. The
horizontal stabilizer remained intact and attached to the fuselage s t r x t u r e . Bothsections of the horizontal stabilizer and associated elevetor assembly tip were bent aft.
There was no indication of any preaccident malfunction of the airplane's structure,systs:ms, powrerpisnts. or flight control system.
DC-i0-30.-The DC-10-30 continued straight off t h e departure end of runiu8y24R. smeshed through seven nonfrangible, high-intensity approach iighling towers, slewed
after impact to the right, and came io rest 1,434 feet from the end o f t h e runway 40 feel
north of the extended centerline. (See figure 5 . ) The airplsne fuseiage was centered on aheading of 3 3 0 9 The nose, right. :eft, end body main landing gear were separated fromthe airptanp. The as-built distance between the centerlines of t h e right and left -?ain
Ianding gear was 35 feet. The main body gear were located at the fuselage cenic-xnc inline w::h the right and left main gear. Tile distance from the nose gear 10 :he main
landing gear i s 72 feet 5 inches.

-13-

b

.Figure 5.-Wreckage of Korean 4ir Lines DC-1C-30. Hi7339.
The nose radome was torn sway. The cockpit separated from the fuse'lag-e jilst
aft of the first right exit door and vias angled downward and slightly twisted to the right.
The main cabin structure above the floor line from the cockpit section back to t k aftpressure bulkhead v:as gutted and had teen consume6 by postcrash fire. The empx nage
section had separate? jus: forward of t h e aft pressure bulkheed end wss angled downward
to the left. The left horizonre1 stabilizer was crushed end bent upward a t midpoint.. The
right horizontal stabilizer was attached with no evidence of damage.
The right wing rezeined attached :o :he airplane; i t had been subjecled tointense postcrash %?e. The outhoerd half of the wing s?ruc:ure had been ccnsumed byfire. The trailing edge f!aps had separated from The wing structure end were foilnd d o n g
the wreckage path. An inboard leading edge slat remained attached t o the right wing: it
w a s in the extended position. The left wing remained atteched to the airplane: i t had
been subjected to severe ground inpect forces. SeCtiOLS of the wing's leading edge sbts
and trailing edge fiaps were recovered along t h e wreckage path.
The lef: engine remained attached to its wing structure. The center engine
remained within the enpennage structure. Thz right engine %ad separated from the rightwing and was recovered along che wreckage pslh. T h c x was no indication of any
preeccident melfunction of thc airplane's SCrUCiure. 5ysterns. powerplants. or flight
coptrol system.

-14-

1.13

Medical and Pathological Informatian

The KA.L 084 crewmembers were serious& injnred during :he 8 C C . i d m t
sequence, sufferia coylpression fractures of the spine, fracrures, contusions. End Cuts.
They were hospitalizec2 for about 2 weeks and released. Tne results of :oxicOlOgiCEi
exarninatior. of blood samples taken from the Lhree crewaernbers were negative for
eI.-+rl, 3 a s , and carbon monoxide. A medical examimtion imrr.edia:eiF after theaccidep: ’id not reveal any physiological condition which may have aifec’led theirperformame.

Of the nine persons aboard SCd 59, three were s1fghGy injured. These persors
and the pilot were examined and treated in a hospita: emergency room and zeleesed,
1.14

Fire
-

The PA-31-350 did no: burn. The DC-10-30 Su?sT i x o flames immeilioteiy
after coming to E stop when some of i t s fuel tan& were ?optwed. X t h o ~ g i :t h e initialfire was contained, t h e fire reignired periodically fo: 3 days afrer the eccidenX. ana ?befuselage above the cabin floor and most of the cargo were co~surnedby fire.
1-15

survival Aspects

The accident was survivable since neither :he cockpi: no: cabin areas of ei:her
airplane was penetrated ana the decclerative forces of the co!lision were no? excessive.

1.16

Tests and Reseapch

1.16.1

Airpart Surveyc

On December 26, 1983, Safer!, Boare accident teem invehtigalors ins?ec:ed
the runways and taxiways believed to have been associated wi:h the acci<eDt. There had
been no precipitation or above-f7eezirg tenlpertures a? Anchorrge since the accidenr.
The surface of runway 6Li24R was covered with e thin layer (up t o ii2-inch thick) of o
combination of snow, frost, and ice, which obliterated the white. ali-wea:hei’ runway
markings. Runway 14/32 was covered with a rhin layer of snow, frost. and ice: however.
the runway markings were visible for the firs: 1,000 :eet of runway 33 due io krge
turbojet airplanes blowing away and clearing the frost and snow from :he center po;tionof the runway.
Taxiways W-1, W-2, and N-1 also were covered *;ith N thin leyer of snow,
frost, and ice a t tine time of the inspection. No taxiway surfacc markings wcre vkible
through the snow, frost, and ice. The parking apron surfaces o f the a i p o r t also werecovered with a thin layer of snow, frost, and ice, renderin!: most narkings invisib!e.
All runway, taxiway, and apral e d ~ elighting in thc a:ea of movement of thetwo airplanes involved in the accident was operating norm.‘Ily at the time rf theinspection. The signs identifying runways and taxiways were found in the following
condition (see figures
2 3):

a.
b.
c.
d.

e.
f.
g.

Runway 1 4 - lighted: ail lights operating
Taxiway N-1 - not lighted
Runways 6R, 6Li32 - lighted: three of seven !ights opernting
Runway 6L/24R - lighted; all lights operating
Runway 32/14 - lighted: no lights operating
Hold runway 32 - not iighkd
Runway 32 - lighted: &I1 lights operating

9b

The sign designating runway 6Lj24R was dirty, which reduced the contrast
between its background and lettering.
The most recent airport certification inspection a t :he airport was completed
a t the time withrespect to the aireort q e r a t i n g surfaces, although it was noted that markings on ell
runways wei-e faded. Xli ~ m w e ymarkings et The airport were last painted white during:he summer of 1983.

on December 2, 1983. No violations of 14 CFR Part 139 were no:&Conversion of the nonfrangible approach ligh: towers serving runway 6L, whichwere destroyed in the accident, to frangible structures was planned for fisrel year 1985
according io the most r e c a t Alaskan Region Ten Year Plan issued by the FAA.
The Anchorage air traffic control tower is no: equipped with airport surface
detecting equipmenr (ASDE). ASDE is radar equipment specifically designed to detect all
principal fearurss on the surface 0; an airport including aircraft end vehicular traffic andto present the enrire image on a radar indicator consoie in the control tower. Thisequipment is used to augment visual observation by tower personnel of aircraft and/or
vehicldlar movements on runxeys end texiweys. Cri?eria for installation of ASDE at en
airport is based upon aircraft movements and me:eorological data. The F.-I.4 i s planningt o purchase 29 state-of-the-zzt .-IS.DE. Specifications are to be completed in September
1984. and t h e firs? delivery is expected in March 1988. Twelve of the ASDE's will repbce
existing facilities, and 17 will be new installations. Tine ASDE that was installed a t the
F.a.4 Technica! Center i n Oklahoma City is being moved to Anchorage and is planned to bein place and opera?ionai by the end of i 084.

1.16.2

Taxi Route of KAL 084

SC.4 59 arrived e t the intersection of runway 6L and taxiway W-3 a t 1344.
K A L 084 sta:ted to taxi a: 1355, 11 minutes after SCA 59 had comp!e?ed taxiing. The
Safety i3oaYd investigation teem exemined possible texi routes used by K A L OS4 ro
determine which route was most likely used. A transcript of recorded communications
betwee: Anchorage tower controllers and the pilots of both airplanes was zero-timed to:he start of K.AL 084:s taxi. (See appenoix D.) A SoutkCentral Air Piper TI040 turboprop
airplane was dsed and wcs taxiied a t a speed comparable to that of observed heavy
turbojet aircraft. The transcript was read aloud as the airplane taxied from the perking
ramp to the intersection of runway 6Li24R and taxiway W-1 and to runway 31 by various
mites. .? VJJS audio and video record w a s made by the team member who occupied rhe
copilot seat. The best correlations of time and position were accomplished using the
fo1:owing route (see figure 2):

1.

A left turn of about 240°from the parking spot on the international
Satellite Terminal apron to 8 southerly heading nlong the west edgeof t h e parking apron. Timing started a t 1357:40 when K.-IL 084
confirmed taxi instxctions.

2.

Taxi south on the apron and turning about 5D0 right onto taxiway
W-I.
Turn initiated a t time (1401:45) correspondirs totransmission from KAI, 084 stating that it was entering theeast-west taxiway.

3.

Taxi southwest on tflsiway W-I crosing the east-west taxiway
stopping at the intersection of runway 6L/24R and tssiw.%y iv-1.
The time (1402:42) the Cast-west taxiway was crossed correspop,ded
to the time when K A L OS4 transmitted that it wa$ taxiing 10 t h ehold poin: on the east-west taxiway.

-164.

Turning about SOD right onto runway 24R and stopping near thecenter of the runwa . Taxi onto the runway corresponded to t h etransmission time 140257) of KAL 084's acknowledgement Of
clearance to taxi onto t h e runway. A transmission from KAL 084,
3 minutes 21 seconds later, s t a t e d t h a t t h e airplane was rolling.

?

1.17.1

Accidenr History

There were four air carrier accidents worldwide between December 7 and 23,
i983, involving collisions on active runways, including the KAL 084/SCA 59 accident.
On December 7 , 1983, a n Iberia Air Lines Boeing 727 collided with an Aviaco
Airlines XcDonneL1 Douglas DC-9 while taking off on runway 33 at Berajas Airport,%Tadrid, Spain. The DC-9 pilot had been cleared to taxi to runway 01. Ail 42 persons
aboord t h e DC-9 and 73 of the 93 persons aboard t h e Boeing 727 were killed. Bothairplanes were damaged. There was a dense fog covering t h e airport et t h e time of theaccident.
On December 19, 1983. a Japan Air Lines Boeing 747 was cleared t o land on
Runway 6R at Anchorage Iniernationai Airport a t t h e same t i m e an sirpori vehicle was ont h e runway taking mnway friction measurements. The flightcrew did not see t h e truck int h e restricted visibility conditions and struck the truck frcm the rear during the landing
rollout. The driver of the truck survived but required amputation of both legs. The
Boeing 747 incurred minor damage, but the truck w a s demolished.
On December 20, 1983, a n Ozark Air Lines DC-9 struck a snow sweeper whilelanding on runway 21 a t Sioux FaUs, South Dakota. The collision broke t h e right wing off
the airplane 1 0 feet from the fuselage. There was an initial fireball at impact, but t h eairplane spun around 180 degrees and t h e fire extiiiguished itself as the airplane proceeded
backward down the runway. The snow sweeper was destroyed. and t h e driver was fatally
injured. No one among the crew or 77 pessengers onboard t h e DC-9 w a s injured. The
weather was 1,000 f e e t obscured ceiling with 1 mile visibility in snow.
1.17.2

Runway Incursions

The Eighth Quarterly Report, issued October 1978, of the Aviation Safety
Reporting S y s t e a (ASRS) of t h e National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)cocrains a n articIe entitled "Human Factors Associated with Runway Incursions." -4 studyof 165 incidents was conducted to focus on the behavioral aspects of potentia1 and actual
runway conflicts on controlled airports. There were 4 1 conflict Occurrences involving
multiple air transport airplanes. The person believed t o have been most responsible fort h e incident was the air traffic controller i n 54 percent cf thc incidents, the pilot in 39
percent of the incidents, and t h e operator of a ground vehicle in 4 percent of theincidents. Three percent of the incidents could not be categorized.
One incident involved a collision (wing tip with motor vehicle), 37 involved
near collisions, and 50 involved less than safe separation. In 37 cases, the problem wasrecognized before a conflict occurred. There was no a c t u a l or threatened conflict in 30
cases. because no other aircraft or vehicle was in t h e vicinity. Either one or both aircraft
was in either t h e hold, taxi, or takeoff phase of flight in 88 percent o f t h c incidents.
Disorientation or confusion accounted for 2 i percent of the pilot-responsible incidents.
There $*:ere factors of cockpit coordination in 1 1 percent and of pilot technique in43 percent of the pilot-res,;msib!d incidents. Airport lighting and markings were factors
i n 4 percent of the incidents, and weather was involved in 4 percent of the incidents.

6

-17-

b

v

1.17.3Operation of Foreign Air Carriers in the United States

Title 14 CFR Part 129, Operations of Foreign Air Carriers, describes rules
governing the operation within the United States of each foreign air carrier holding apermit issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) or appropriate economic or exemption
authority. Each foreign air carrier is to conduct its operations within the United States inaccordanee with operating specifications issued by the FAA.
Applications for theissuance (or amendment) of operating specifications must be submitted a t least 30 days
before beginning operations in the United States. Aircraft operated by foreign air
carriers must hpve a current registration and airworthiness certificate issued or validated
by the country of registry and must have registration marks of that country.
Part 129 states that no person may act as a flight crewmember unless he holds

a current certificate or license issued or validated by the country in which the aircraft isregistered, showing his ability to perform duties connected with operating tnat aircraft.
Each foreign air carrier is to equip its aircraft with radio equipment necessary to properly
use the air navigation facilities and to maintain communications with ground stations in
the United States. Each pilot must be familiar with the applicable rules and procedures of
the areas traversed by him in the United States and be checked on those procedures by theforeig? air carrier. Each foreign air carrier is to conform to the practices, procedures,and other requirements prescribed for United States air carriers for t h e areas to be
operated in.

v

These requirements are in compliance with provisions to the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreements pertaining to international air commerce.
The United States and the Republic cf Korea are signatories of these egreements. Article
37 of the Chicago Convention agreement states that each contracting state will undertaketo collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniforrnit:i in regulations,standards, procedures, and organization in relaticx to aircraft, personnel, airways. andservices in matters which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation. To
this end, ICAO may adopt and amend from time to time international standards andrecommended practices and procedures dealing with:a. Commmications systenls and air navigation aids, including ground markings;
b. Characteristics of airports and landing areas;c. Rules of air and air traffic control practices;d. Licensing of operating and mechanical personnel;

e. Airworthiness of aircraft;c**i. Aeronautical maps and charts;

*

*

*

k. Aircraft in distress and investigation of accidents;and such other metters concerning t h e safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigationas may appear appropriate.
Responsibility for compliance with the provisions of the ICAO ag .cement rests
with the state of registry. Infractions of the agreements may be referred ta the Air
Navigation Committee of ICAO; however, member states do not have the right to inspect
or regulate the operations of the international air carriers of other member states.
Title 14 CFR Part 213. Terms, Conditions and Limitations of Fqreign Air
Carrier Permits, and Part 375, Navigation of Foreign Civil Aircraft Within the UnitedStates, promulgated by the CAB, regulate foreign._- air csrrier service in the United Statesa n d o m p l y with FAA and ICAO directives.
~

-182. ANALYSIS

2.1

GeneralBoth airplanes were certificated and maintained in accordance ,with approved
procedures. There was no evidence of preaccident failure or malfunction of either
airplane's structures, systems, powerplants, or flight eontrol systems, with t h e exceptionof the digital flight data recorder on KAL 084. The pilot of SCA 59 was properly
certificated and qualified f o r this scheduled domestic passenger flight and his actions aid
not contribute to the accident. Tbe flightcrew of KAL 084 were certificated andqualified for this scheduled international cargo flight. All of the involved flightcrew
memb z s held current medical certificates.

2.2

Weather

The surface visibility at Anchorage Internaiional Airport was restricted. as
evidenced by the 1350 surface observation which reported i/8 mile visibility and t h e 1415
observation which reported 1/16 mile visibiiiry. The local controller advised SCa\ 59 thatt h e RVR was 1,000 f e e t at 1344:18, and the RVR did not improve to ?:800 f e e t until
1405:28, at which time SCA 59 was cleared t o taxi into position and io hold c n runway 6L.
An RVR of 1,800 f e e t was the minimum takeoff visibility for t h e pilot of SCA 59.

'me captain of KAL 084 s t a t e d that, a f t e r he began taxiing from the parking
ramp, he could see t h e yellow taxi lines "very dimly through t h e heavy ice fog." Hedescribed the visibility as "so poor that i t was difficult t o see the taxiway markings."
After t h e accident, the first officer of KAL 034 concluded a written s t a t e m e n t as follows:"It seems that I lost my sense of direction due 10 the heavy ice fog, and I confused t h eeast- west taxiway with the north-south taxiway."
The restricted visibiiity caused the flightcrew of K.4L 084 t o experience
difficulties while operating on the taxiways and wnways a t Anchorage Internationai
Airport and adversely a f f e c t e d their operational performance.

2.3

Collision Analysis

According t o applicable performance charts, based on t h e estimated TOGW of502,760 pounds, t h e temperature of 1 5 degrees F., and t h e field elevation of 144 feet. t h edeparture runway length required for KAL 084 was 8,150 feet. The distance from theintersection of runway 6L/24R and taxiway W - 1 , where KAL OS4 began i t s takeoff roll? io
the departure end of runway 2 4 R is 2,400 feet. Based on these data, i t can be concludedt h a t t h e attempted takeoff by the KAL 084 flightcrew would not have been successfuleven if their takeoff run had not been interrupted by t h e collision with SCA 59.
KAL 084 was equipped with three main gears, one being a centered body gear.
Given t h e dimensions of both airplanes, and t h e impact marks on SC.4 59, it appears thatt h e nose gear of KAL 084 struck SCA 59 on t h e right windscreen at the top and grnzed t h eskin of the right fuselage over the cockpit, missed the remainder of the fuselage, andstruck the vertical stabilizer. .4s the captain of KAI, 084 turned l e f t to miss SCA 59, t h emain body gear swung to t h e right and struck t h e left wing of SC.4 59, knocking t h e wing
off outboard of the engine nacelle. The left main gear of KAL 0 8 1 struck t h e right wingof SCA 59 in the area of the engine and sheared off the wing a t the wing root, andcorltiniled beck and struck t h e right horizontal stabilizer of SCA 59. A S a result, while t h ewings and vertical stabilizer were separated, t h e fuselage of SCA 59 remained inr.ect and

-19-

1

the passengers suffered no serious injuries. If the captain of KAL 084 had failed to lakethese actions, either the nose gear or the center main body gear of KAL 084, or both,might have struck the fuselage of the smaller airplane and probably would have resulted in
fatalities aboard SCA 59 and possibly aboard K.4L 084.
2.4

KAL 084 Flightcrew Operational Factors

The KAL 084 crewmembers were experienced in operating the DC-IO; thecaptain had logged over 6,000 hours in t h e airplane and the first officer almost
3,000 hours. Additionally, the captain and first officer were experienced in operating at
Anchorage International Airport. The captain had 'ogged 73 landings and 78 takeoffs fromt h e airport in an 8 l/Z-year period prior to the accident, and the first officer had iogged
66 landings an2 66 takeoffs in a 3 3/4-year period.
The captain's decision to use runway 32 for departure was not in accordancewith KAL operating specifications. A prevailing visibility of 1/4 mile was required andthe prevailing visibility at t h e time of t h e accident was 1/8 mi:e. The RVR readings for
runway 6R were above minimums and the capain should have selected that runwaL7 fordeparture. While the captain's decision did not directly bear on the accident since heattempted takeoff on a runway other than t h e runway to which he was cleared, it was an
operational deficiency and indicates performance not i n keeping with that expected of an
air carrier captain.
The Safety Board cannot determine precisely the procedures the KAL crew)

6

x e d while taxiing since t h e cockpit voice recorder was not recovered. Anchorage groundcontrol cleared K A L 084 to taxi to runway 32 a r ~ dasked the flightcrew t o report enteringt h e east-west taxiway. The captain stated that while taxiing, he attempted to keep the
airplane centered on the yellow taxi line but because of snow and ice ground cuver and the
reduced visibility, he could not positively identi?.. his location on the airport once t h eairplane left the cargo ramp. The captain stated that he turned t h e aircraft right fromt h e north apron to what he and t h e first officer believed was t h e east-west taxiway. The
Safety Board believes that the crew actually turned, not about 100' t o the rig>: which
would have turned them onto t h e east-west taxiway, but about 60' right or t o taxiway
W-1. From there, the captain later turned the airplane about 50° right, instead of about
9 0 3 t o what t h e flightcrew believed was runway 32, but t o what was, in fact, runway
24R. The taxi tests strongly support this as t h e most likely taxi route.

Because of the large size of the DC-10-30, which may distort t h e pilot's senseof motion and the restricted surface visibility, the Safety Board believes that t h e captainof KAL 084 could have experienced difficulty in distinguishing between the turn of 60°
instead of 100' or the turn of 50° instead of 90° while taxiing slowly and straining t o see
the taxiway and runway markings, since outside visual cues were limited. It is difficult iounderstand, however, why t h e captain and first officer, following some discussion abou?
runway uncertainty, did not use their directiocal gyros or the standby compass to orient
themselves with regard to headings, especially after they had aligned the airplane withwhat they believed was runway 32 and had discussed i t for 2 to 3 minutes. If any one oft h e flightcrew had checked the heading indicators, i t should have been apparent before
the tekeoff roll that t h e airplane was positioned on the wrong runway. The KAL checklist
did o3t require a pretakeoff heading check; however, other airline checklists requirepretakeoff rlmway confirmation and accepted practice is to check heading indicators
before starting takeoff.

-2 0-

The first officer's statement concerning the sighting of SCA 59--"when theaircraft's speed reached about V1, I caught sight of a small aircraft about 15 m e t e s infront of us. . ."-was most likely inaccurate and may further indicate some degree ofmisperception on his part. The airspeed would have been about 100 knots a t that point,
well below V1, and the accurate judgmeqt of distances in those circumstances would havebeen difficult. These comments were another inu':ication of misperception by the first
officer.
The primary sources of information that are ordinarily available tocrewmembers for guidance on airport surfaces were either partially or completely
unavailable to the crew of KAL 084. A t nighttime or under lirnited visibility conditions,crewmembers rely on runway surface markings such as taxiway lines and runway numbers,
taxiway and runway lights, and runway. and taxiway signs to provide them withinformation concerning their location on the airport. If t h e visibility is adequate, or if the
airport is equipped with ASDE, ground controllers can assist the aircraft crewmembers byproviding information on their location. The flightcrew of KAL 084 operated essentiallywithout external information to assist them while taxiing since the visibility was
restricted and the airport did not have ASDE.

2.5

EAL '184 Plightcrew M e d i a l and Behavioral Factors

The medical examination of the K A L 084 crewmembers immediately after theaccident and the toxicological testing of blood samples did not reveal any physiologicalcondition which might have affected their performance. Each crewmember was wellrested before the flight, having been off duty for over 29 hours prior to the scheduled
departure time. The crewmembers were housed in facilities operated by Korean Air Linesfor employees laying over in Anchorage to insure that crewmembers rest in an undisturbed
environment with Korean food and a familiar atmosphere. The performance of t h ecrewmembers cannot be attributed to fatigue resulting from excessive duty time or tostress created by unfamiliar surroundings. Similarly, interviews with the crew and theirstatements did not reveal any significant event in their lives that may have caused themstress or tension or affected their decisionmaking abilities.
The flight was not
significantly delayed, nor was the crew facing an imminent deadline for completing theflight, such as deteriorating weather a t destination, curfews, or excessive duty time.
From the response of the captain of KAL 084 to questioning, the Safety Board
could not determine why an experienced crew, such as this crew, did not verify whether
they were on the correct runway by checking their heading instruments. The Safety Board
could not find any factor which may have adversely affected the crew's vision,
coordination, or decisionmaking capabilities t o determine that their heading was 80"fromthe correct runway bearing. The failure of the crew to verify the runway heading may
indicate that the initial or recurrent training the crew received or the operatingprocedures established for KAL crewmembers are deficient. It may be that verificstionof runway heading is such 8 rudimentary procedure that the air carrier believed thatspecialized training was not necessary. While such a belief may have been reasonable andreflective of accepted practice, that this crew failed to carry out this basic step indicatesthat a deficiency which needs to be addressed may exist in air carrier crew training andcertification procedures.
The Safety i3oard cannot expiain why the captain of KAL 084 decided to takeoff in the face of his uncertainty as to whether his airplane w a s holding at runway 32.
The captain stated-

b

-21-

. . .1 felt unsure that the aircraft was on the correct runway. . .I
discussed this with my copilot [the first officer] who feit sure that we
Were on the correct runway.
After 3-4 minutes of discussion, I
considered taking runway 6 R beceuse of my uncertainty. However, therunway size and lighting appeared t o be correct so I decided to take off.
~

This Statement indicates that the captain failed io recognize that his
familiarity wi:h the airport wou:d not compe~satefor the Limitations in other sources of
information he would use ordinarily t o confirm the aircraft's iocation. The captain failed
to exercise proper decisionmaking responsibility by relying too heavily on the first
officer's belief that the airplane was on the correct runway. Proper command proceduresshould have dictated to the captain not to commence takeoff without confirming that he
was holding a t runway 32.
The captain's statement indicates that he felt that the first officer, who had a
hig-her level of recent experience a t the airport than the captain, was more certain aboutt h e aircraft's location than the captain was. Tine first officer ste.ted that, "In spite ofpoor visibility? ow- aircraft advanced and was able to get onto the east-west taxiway."
The evidence indicates that K A L 084 was never on the east-west taxiway. Unlike thecaptain, the first officer in his statement did not manifest any uncertainty about thea i r c x f t 3 lccation. The Safety Soard believes that the first officer's strong belief ahout:heir location 3ay heve influenced the captai;:'s decision to commence takeoff. The fi?st
officer's confidence regarding being on the correct runway in the face of the captain's
uncertainties Constituted a slight role reversal in that the captain's overall command
8uthori:y when deciding to take off was influenced by the first officer's comments. In the?EST. the Safety Board has encouraged assertiveness training for first officers, to exercise:heir responsibilities as part of the cockpit team; however, a companion responsibility forcaptains t o exercise positive cockpit crew management must exist. In this instanc2, thecrew concept broke down. This breakdown may have been due to t h e crew's intenseconcentration on the airport surface markings and runway and taxiway signs in order toconfirm their iocation. The Board believes that such a situation may lead to a breakdown
in cer-ving out individual cockpit responsibilities unless the crewmembers have been
trained to recognize and react io the sitcnrion.
Because the crew of KAL 084 commenced takeoff in spite of the uncertainty
regarding :heir location on the airport, the Safety Board is concerned that the crew was
not properly trained in ground operations in marginal meteorological conditis?~existing a t
the time. A cc 7m0n procedure for takeoffs in restricted visibility is for c:ots to crosscheck their gyro/compass heading with the runway heading prior to commencing takeoff.
Crews should be trained to perform such a procedure regardless of how selfevident theirpositioi? nay appear to them. As a resuit of this accident and similar errors in air carrier
ground operating procedures demonstrated by ground collision accidents a t airports duringresrricted visibility conditionst as well as by the ASKS data, t h e Safety Board is concernedchat iiightcrews are not being adequateiy trained in managing cockpit resources andcoordina:ing !heir responsibilities when operating in marginal ground maneuvering
conditicra the: require intense concentration. The need for specific training in groundopcretion procedures for crews is especially important since there are no requiremens forstandardized, illuminated. and easy-to-read runway and taxiway signs a t airports
certificated for air Carrie? operations. When there is obscuration of taxiways and runways
added to reszricted visibi!ity, the need for a crew that is well trained in ground operations
becomes critical. i: is not possibie for air traffic controllers during these conditions toverify an aircraft's locarion on the airport, in the absence of a radar such as ASDE thattracks airport surface traffic, other than relying on t h e crew to accurately report their:ocation.

-22-

2.6

Airport S i and Environment

The demands OIL the crew of KAL 084 while they were taxiing were notexcessive for a highly experienced crew, despite t h e lack of much of the information t h p t
crews usually rely on to taxi caused by the limited visibiility and absence of ASDE. Tne
Safety Board examined several of t h e runway and taxiway signs at the airpor: todetermine if all of t h e available sources of ground location information external to the
airplane were adequately presented to t h e KAL 084 crew. The KAL airplane passed four
signs identifying runways and taxiways along the route that the Board beEeves it took
while taxiing. One of the four signs, the sign designating taxiway X-?, was not equippeq
for electrical illumination. At night in restricted visibility conditions when additional
guidance is most needed, such as existed at the time of this crash, this s i 5 would provide
no information or guidance to flightcrews. Another of t h e four signs was only partially
illuminated, because o ~ l ythree of its seven lights were operating a t t h e time of t:leaccident. The other two signs, which identified runway 1 4 and runway 6L/24R, were
illuminated.
Airports certificated under 1 4 CFR Part 139 are not required t o havetaxiwayirunway guidance signs installed.
However, if t h e signs are instalied,
14 CFR 139.471b) requires t h a t t h e operator "must show that any guidance signs instaliad
at t h e airport are in operable condition."
For each airport Zertificated under
14 C F R Part 139, the FAA approves ai: .%irport Operations Manual (: 3M), which, in part,lists key elements of the airport, such &s runway lights, that are required to be inspecteddaily to ensure t h a t they are in operable condition.
For many airports, including
Anchorage izternational, the approved AOM does not include guidance signs in t h e list of
key elements. Therefore, although 1 4 CFR 139.47(b) requires that t h e signs be in operable
condition, t h e FAA has not supplied guidance to t h e airport operators on how or when thisrequirement will be met.
The Safety Board believes t h a t as KAL 084 taxied along raxiway X-J1 the crew
thought that they were on the east- west taxiway, and that when they crossed t h eeast- west taxiway, they thought i t was t h e north-south Taxiway and continued to what
they believed was runway 32 but was instead runway 21R. There were no signs along thisground path to indicate, first, that the taxiway they had entered was 1%'-I and. second,t h a t t h e first intersection they then crossed was the east- west taxiway. The crew of KAL
084 had no external source of information to designate either t h e taxiway they were on or
the taxiway they were crossing as the airplane taxied t o the intersection of taxiway W-1
and runway 6L/24R. Since t h e accident, signs have been installed a: both intersections todesignate t h e intersecting taxiways. The FAA should require under 14 CFR Part 139 that
airport operators place appropriate runway or taxiway signs at each intersection along
airport taxiways to designate either the intersecting taxiway or runway.
The crew of KAL 084 did not indicate in their statements that they s a w t.hefully iiluminated sign designating runway 6L/21R. Severgl factors may havc contributed
to the failure of t h e crew of KAT, 084 t o notice this sign, ever, though i t was f d l yilluminated. The sign was dirty, which reduced t h e contrast between its background andlettering. Since the airport surfaces were obscured partia!!y by snow, frost, and ice, thecrew was looking intently for ground markings. $Toreover, the visibility was restricted,
which further fimited t h e crew's ability t o see the sign, par:icularly since the location oft h e DC-10 cockpit is about 30 feet above the ground increases the slsnt range fromcockpit to guidance signs placed aside taxiways and runways.

Q

-23-

Contributing t o the crew's failure to notice the runway sign was that, despite
the different purposes that the runway and taxiway signs serve, the signs had common
shape, color, and dimensional charac:eristics.
The runway and taxiway signs had identicalamber backgrounds with black lettering. The characters on the signs were identically
sized. The signs, which were t h e same height, differed only in their width according t0
the number of characters on t h e sign. The Safety Board is concerned that in Similar
situations other flightcrews or vehicle operators could inadvertently enter an active
runway. Runway and taxiway intersection signs should reflect, in their sizes, shapes,
colors, and dimensions, the particular route they mark; a sign identifying a taxiway
intersection should have a different appearance from a sign identifying a runway, andthese signs should then be installed at airports certificated under 14 CFR Part 139.
2.7

Runway Incursions

The October 1978 ASRS article concerning human factors associated withrunway incursions, as well as the three subsequent accidents described earlier,substantiates problems and causal elements similar to those in this accident. M'hile t h e
December 19, 1983, accident a t llnchorage and the collision a t Sioux Falls involved air
traffic control, the accident a t Madrid was similar to this accident. The Aviaco Airlines
DC-9 pilot did not taxi as instructed a t Barajas Airport during restricted visibility
conditions. WXile the KAL 084 crewmembers did not ignore tower instructions, thefactors of crewmember disorientation, cockpit coordination, and pilot technique cited in
the ASRS article were evident in this accident. Flightcrews must be especially vigilant
during taxi, hold, and takeoff operations and must make extraordinary effqrts if needed tostay aware of their position on t h e airport a t all times. Crew coordination proceduresshould be enhanced and particular alertness should be practiced when visibility is reduced
by inclement weather.
3. CONCLUSIONS

3.1

Findirrgs
1.

Both airplanes were certificated and mairdained in accordance withapproved procedures.

2.

There was no evidence of preaccident failure or malfunction of either
airplane's structures, systems, powerplants, or flight control systems.

3.

The pilot of Southcentral Air Flight 59 (SCA 59) was properly
certificated and qualified for this scheduled domestic passenger flight.
His actions did not contribute to the accident.

4.

The flightcrew of Korean Air Lines Flight 084 fK.%L 084) were properly
certificated and qualified for this scheduled cargo flight.

5.

The flightcrew
certificates.

6.

Both the captain and the first officer of KAL 084 had extensive
experience opersting into and o u t of the Anchorage International
Airport, which should have reduced the probability of crew disorientation
while taxiing in the low-visibility conditions.

7.

The decision of K A L 084's captain to use runway 32 for departure W ~ S
not in accordance with K A L operating specifications.

ofboth airplanes involved held

current

medical-24-

8.

The obscuration of runwa? and taxiway markings at the airport adverselya f f e c t e d the performance of ?he flightcrew of KAL 084 by causing t h e m
to give disproportionate attention to locating t h e runway markings.

9.

The most likely taxi route, taken in error, by KAL 084 was south along
the west side of t h e north apron, right onto taxiway W-1, and right again

onto runway 24R.

3.2

10.

The flightcrew of K A L 084 could have determined that their airplane
was lined up on t h e wrong rtinway if they had cross-checked their
heading indicators.

11.

Based on the estimated takeoff gross weight of KAL 084, ?he runway
length required for takeoff was 8,130 feet. Since the actual length
available t o KAL. 081 on runway 24R was about 2,400 feet, an accident
would have resulted even if KAI, 084 had n o t collided with SCA 59.

12.

By raising the nose of his airplane and turning his s i r p l m e slightly to theleft, t h e captain of K A L 084 avoided inflicting extensive Amage to t h efuselage of SCA 59 end probable fatal injurizs to t h e C'PWS andpassengers onboard both airplanes as r. result of the collision.

13.

Of the four runway and taxiway signs KAL 081 would have pa sed on themost likely taxi rmte i i erroneously took, one had no iliurnination, one
was only partially ii!uminated, and two were fully illuminated.

14.

There was no t a x i w y guidance sign at the intersection of taxiway W - l
and the east-west taxiway.

15.

Operators of airports certificated under 14 CFR Part 139 are notrequired to plhce standardized signs at each taxiway!'runway and taxiway
intersection.

16.

Runway sigrs shou:d be sufficiently different in design from taxiway
signs so that they a l e r t t h e operators of all surface vehicles andairplanes of the nature of the intersection.

17.

Lighted runwayltexiway signs should be inspected daily to ensure theiroperability and maintained as required.

hobable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Bcard determines the? t h e probable causesof t h e accident were t h e failure of :he pilot of Korean Air Lines Flight 084 to follow
accepted procedures during taxi. which caused him t o become disoriented while selecting
the runway; t h e failure of the pilot LO use the compass io confirm his position; and t h edecision of the pilot to take off when he was ui;sure that the aircraft was positioned ont h e correct runway. Contributing to the accident was the fog, which reduced visibility toa point t h a t the pilot could not ascertain his position visually and the control tower
personnel could not assist the pilot. Also contributing to the accident was a lack oflegible taxiway and runway signs a t several intersections passed by Flight 0 8 1 while i t was
taxiing.

l

-25-

4. RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of this accident investigation, t h e h’ational Transportation Safety
Board recommended t h a t t h e Federal Aviation Administration:

Require t h a t airports certificated for air carrier operations install signs
at all runway and taxiway entrances? exits, and intersections t h a t
indicate the identity of t h e runway or taxiway. (Class II, Priority
Action) (A-84-98)
Require t h a t the graphics on taxiwayirunway identification signs be
standardized and of scfficient size t o enable them to be legible toaircraft crewmembers in all rneteoroiogical conditions in which air
carrier operations are authorized. (Class Priority Action) (A-84-99)

Xi.

Require that airport operators inspect and maintain the lights
illuminating airport taxiway!runway identification signs as part of thedaily airport inspection requirements.
(Class II, Priority Action)(A-84-100)
Require at all airports certificated for air carrier operations thatuniform signs be ins?alled which are classified by function (e.g., runway
entrance, runway exit, taxiway intersection) \with each function having aunique shape, color, andlor size so t h a t runway entrance signs are
distinguishable from all other advisory signs on airport property. (Class
II, Priority Action) (A-84-101)
Require that air carriers incorporate in training of their crewmembers
procedures and responsibilities during grounc: operations in restrictedsisibility conditions, t o enable them to operate safely in such conditions.
(Class 11: Priority Action) (A-84-iF2)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD,is!

JIM SURNETT
Chairman!si

G.H. PATRICK BURSLEY

Member!s!

VERNON L. GROSE
Vember-27APPENDIXESAPPENDIX AINVESTIGATION AND HEARING
1.

Investigation

The Safety Board was notified of the accident about 1900 e.s.t. on
A partial team was dispatched from the Washington, D.C.,
December 23, 1983.
headquarters and arrived onscene on December 24, 1983. Working groups were established
for airworrhiness and air traffic control/operations.
Parties to the investigation were the Federal Aviation Administration, Korean
Air Lines, Southcentral Air, Korean Civil Aviation Bureau, and the State of Alaska. A
representative from the Korean Civil Aviation Bureau was designated as the official
accredited representative.
2.

Public Hearing
A public hearing was not held. Depositions were not taken.

-28APPENDIX BPERSONNEL INFORMATION
Captain Gary R. Holt
Captain Holt, 33, the single pilot aboard Southcentral Air Fliyht 59 was
employed by Southcentral Air on October 24, 1983. He h o l a Airline Transporr Pilot
Certificate No. 246826533, dated December 2 7 , i978, with an airplane rnu!t,iengir,e h n drating, find with commercia! privileges in airplane single-engine !and and sea. ais m ~ s trecent first-class medical certificate was dated December 22, 1983, wi?h the limitationthat the holder shall wear correcting lenses w h i h exercising the privileges of kis airman
certificate.
Captain Holt completed a pilot pro5ciency checkt g?aded sati+xtory, oz'\.
October 24, 1983. He cornpleted his initial ground training and flight trfiining in the F:
31 airplane on October 21, 1983. He flew his first line flight with SouthCenlral Air o?
November 18, 1983.
Captain Holt logged 43 fiight hours with SouthCentra! Air in Xoveaber 1983,
and 72.5 hours in December 1983, for a total of 115.5 flying hours with the conpeny. He
iisted 5,1300 total pilot hours as of October 17, 1383, on his employment recore. Includedin this logged t i m e were 1,503 hours airplane single-engine land, end 3,560 hours airplane
multiengine land. This, together wit3 115.5 hours l q g e d with SouthCentra! Air for t h emonths of November and December, totaled about 5,115.5 flying hoilrs as of the day
preceding the day of the accident.
Captain 3um Kee Lee
Captain Lee, 48, of Korean Air Lines Flizht 084, was employed t.
l:k2.L on
August 17, 1970. He holds Korean Civil Aeronautics Board (KCAB) Airliric Trcinspo.-i Tiio:
Certificate No. 275, dated December 4, 1973, with class ratings in single-en$nt land andrnuftiengine land airplanes, and type ratings in the F- 27, Boeing 7 2 7 , and DC-113. liis
most recent first-class medical certiiicate was dated December 12, 1093, with x
limitations. His last flight check was completed on November 14, :983.
Captain .ee had logged a total of 12,562:45 flying hours as of the da?e of theaccident. He had logged 2,227:22 of his total flying hours as piiot-ln-eomnisnd (PIC). Re
had logged 6,471:35 flying hours in DC-10 airplanes, with 1,789:22 of these hours l o g e 2 as
PIC. For the 3 months prior to the accident, Captain Lee logged 167 hours I6 minutes offlying time.
First Officer Bong Hyun C!ioFirst Officer Cho, 51, was employed by KAL on J u l y 19, 1979. ;!e holds liC.4B
Airline Transport Pilot Certificate No. 486, dated December 29, 19'79, with u :nu?Tiengine
land rating and a DC-1D type rating. He obtained his DC-I0 type rating on February :6:
1980. His most recent first-class medical certificate was dated hugus? 2, 1963%with thelimitation "Holder shall wear lenses that correct for distant visior! and possess glasae5 that
correct for near vision while exercising the privilege of his airman's certificate." His lastflight check was completed on November 9, 1983.

t

-29-

1

APPENDIX BFirst Officer Cho had logged a total of 8,157 hours 2 i minutes of flight time
as of the date of the accident. He had logged 2,995 hours 21 minntzs ir! DC-1G airplanes.
For the 3 months prior t o the accident, First Officer Cho had logged 169 hours 32 minutesof flying time.
Flight Engineer Myong Koo Lee
Flight Engineer Lee, 34, was employed by KAL on February 12, 1979. He holds
KCAB Flight Engineer License No. 27, dated December 29, 1978, with type ratings in
Boeing 727 and DC-10 airplanes.
His second-class medical certificate was dated
His last flight check was completed on
December 23, 1983, with no limitations.
November 3, 1983.
Flight Engineer Lee had logged a total of 2,174 hours 57 minutes of flying time
as of the date of t h e eccident. He had logged 184 hours 13 minut.es of this time in DC-IO
airplanes. For the 3 months prior to the accident, Flight Engineer Lee had logged 136
hours 12 minutes of flight time.

-30-

~

1

APPENDIX CAIRCRAFT INFORMATION

I

1

!
!

PA-31-350 Navajo

The Piper Aircraft Corporation PA-31-350 Navajo is a twin-engine,
retractab!e landing gear, normal category airplane. The fuselage is a conventional
sernimonocoque structare. The airplane i s 34 f e e t 7 1/2 inches in length. The top of t h efuselage measured from t h e ground wi?h the landing Tear extended is 7 f e e t 8 inches inheight. The top of the vertical stabilizer measured from the s t a t i c ground line is 13 f e e t
in height. The wing is a n all-metal, cantilever, semimonocoque struelitre.
The PA-31-350 is powered with turbocharged Avco Lycorning TIO-5404 and
LTIO-340-J series engines. The l e f t engine rotates clockwise, and t h e right engine rotatescounterclockwise hs viewed from the pilot’s seat. The six-cylinder engines develop 350 hp
each at 2,575 rpm. The propellers are Hartzell, three-blade, constant speed, controllable
pitch and iuli feathering.
DC-10-30

The McDonnell Douglas X-10-30 CF is a low-wing, wide-bodycategory airplane powered by three General Electric Model CF6-5OC1 engines which
generate 49,1300 pounds of thrust. The space between the right and l e f t main gea- is 35
f e e t witn the nose gear afid main body gear centered looking a f t from the nose. The
bottom of ?he fuselage measured from the ground with the gear extended is 7 f e e t
6 inches high ahead of t h e wing and 7 f e e t high under t h e wing. The wing span from wing
tip t o wing tip is 165 f e e t 4 inches.

-31-

APPENDIX D
TRANSCRIPT OF RECORDED TRANSMESONSThis transcrbtion covers t h e time period from 1353:44 t o 1407:28, December 23,
1983.

Agencies making transmissions

Abbreviation

Anchorage Tower Ground Control
Anchorage 'Tower Local Control
Korean Air Lines Flight 084
Southcentral. Air Flight 59

GC
LC
KAL 084
SCA 59Time_L

E:%~sedTime

AgencyPansmission

13534

OOrOO

KAL 084

Aiichorage Ground Korean Air
081

1353:47

00:03

GC

Korean Air 084 heavy ground

1435399

C0:Oj

K AL

084 ready for starting

13535300:09

GC

Korean Air 084 heavy start engines
your Liscretion plan runway 32
or 6 3135359

00:15

K AL

Kould like 32

1354:Ol

0@:17

GC

Roger

13552701:43

GC

Korean .4ir 084 heavy, what's
your position?

1355:30

01:46

KAL

Cargo ramp

1355:33

01:49

GC

Roger

l357:32

03:43

KAL

Ground Korean Air 084 request
taxi

1357337@3:53

GC

Korean Air 084 heavy taxi torunway 32

1357:40

03:56

KAL

Roger taxi 32

1359:17

05:33

GC

Korean Air 084 heavy report
entering the east-west taxiway

I359:22

05:39

KAI,

Ah roger1401:45

08:Ol

K AI.

.Inchorage ground Korean Air
084 entering east- west taxiway

APPENDIX D-32-140150

08:06

GC

Korean Air zero eight four heavyroger hold short of runway three
two and contact tower holding
short good day

1401:55

08:11

KAL

Roger

140256

08:52

K-AL

Anchorage Tower Korea zero084

1402:400856

LC

Korean Air 084 heavy tower

1402:42

08:58

KAL

Korean Air 084 we're taxiing
on east-west taxiway to holdpoint1402:48

08:04

LC

Korean 084 heavy, understandrunway 32 for departwe1402:52

09:08

KAL

Affirmative, ready for takeoff

1402:54

09:lO

LC

Korean Air 084 heavy, taxi into
position and hold runway 32

1402:57

0933

KAL

084 roger

1403:W

09:24

LC

The current touchdown Rv'R
is 1200, midfield 1400, roUout
is 8001403:14

09:30

Unknown

Wen, it's moving

1403:20

09:36

LC

Departure on 32 help it a little
bit1403:22

09:38

UnknownYeah

1403:39

0955

LC

Southcentral 59 what intersection
are you a t ?

1403:42

0958

SCA59

I'm at W-3

1403:44

1O:OO

LC

Thank you1404:OO

10:16

LC

Korean Air 084 heavy, runway
32 cleared for takeoff, advise
airborne

1404:04

10:20

KAL

Roger

1405:28

11:44

LC

SQuthCentral 59 t h e midfield
RVR is 1800 taxi into positionand hold 6La

APPENDIX D-33-

1405:32

11:48

SCA59

Roger, position and bold

1406:lS

12:34

KAL

Anchorage tower Korean Air
084, we're rolling

140621

12:37

LC

Korean Air 084

1407:28

13:44

Unknown

What's that smoke art there?

End of Transcript