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Russia’s Strategy toward the South Caucasus:
A Mid-Term Assessment of the Post-2008
Russia-Georgia War
Rahman Shahhuseynli

1. Introduction
August 8, 2008 has become an important landmark in the studyof international relations, particularly from the perspective of conflict
prevention in the Caucasus where Russia historically holds the key tocontrolling the region. On this day, Russia sent strong signals to the leading
political and military circles of the world that it was about to re-emerge as asuperpower. With these signals, Russia implied that it could become violent
and uncooperative if it deemed its interests were at stake. The message wasdelivered to the destination, allegedly the West, by a full-scale war against
a small pro-western neighboring state, Georgia. For the first time after the
break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia used armed forces against a sovereignstate. Russian troops stationed in Vladikavkaz began penetrating into Georgia
on the eve of the war, on August 6, 2008 (Saakashvili, 2008.)
The Russian army entered the Georgian territories with a large numberof troops, tanks, and armored vehicles as covered by media reporters (Womack,
Parfitt, and Black, 2008). This event was followed by Russian air and naval
operations within hours after the first clash between the Georgians and South
Ossetian separatists broke out. Russia achieved all of its military objectives
and immediate strategic goals within a matter of days. No matter if the sizeof Russian military force deployed was proportionate to that of tiny Georgia,
the result of the war was a total military victory for Russia. Yet a question
remains here if the total military victory in retrospect really meant a longterm victory for Russia in its relation to other states in the region. This is theissue the article tries to examine.
Historically, definitions and perceptions of war have been quite broad. For

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instance, according to a dictionary, the term war derives from the Old HighEnglish noun werra and means “confusion.”The modern English noun war
is explained in two ways: a state of hostile and armed conflict between such
political units as states, countries, and nations; and a general state of conflict,
opposition, and antagonism between “mental, physical, social, or other forces.”

1

Researchers have not always agreed which armed struggles deserve to bereferred to as war. For instance, the prominent American political scientist
Quincy Wright (1890–1970) considered a war to have taken place either when
it was formally declared or when troops of 50,000 were involved (Wright,
1942). According to the British physicist Lewis Fry Richardson (1881–1953),“war is a particular case of a ‘deadly quarrel,’ defined as a violent encounteramong human beings resulting in one or more deaths. He placed all suchencounters on a scale of magnitude, …[as] single murders appear on this scale
as deadly quarrels of magnitude 0, small riots with some ten victims as deadly
quarrels of magnitude 1, and so on. The two world wars appear on this scale2

as deadly quarrels of magnitude 7.”

Although there is little doubt that Word War I and II are the two biggest
destructive and ruinous wars, there are also wars in history without a single
shot such as the War of Bavarian Succession (1778-1779); “war was declared
but no one died despite the fact that fully armed Prussian and Austrian
troops marched to the battle fields.” By contrast, as one expert compares,“two million people were killed in the Korean War, yet war never was
declared”. The Vietnam War (1959-1975) and Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) canbe extended examples for the latter category since no official state of war was
acknowledged and no significant gains were achieved for the “winners” of bothwars (Barash and Webel, 2008, p. 14-15).
As for the consequences of the Russia-Georgia War of 2008, what havenow surfaced are the hidden and unexpressed concerns of a growing numberof countries about Russia’s unreliability and unpredictability. The evolving
consequences of the war mentioned throughout this study make Russia’s
absolute victory in this war questionable and lead to the hypothesis of thisstudy that achieving a total armed victory in a battle does not necessarilytranslate into being the absolute victor given the nature of the contemporary
system of international relations. This study aims to make an evaluation on theoutcomes of the war for Russia. It attempts to investigate how the war Russia

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waged against Georgia impacted Russia’s relationship with other states in3

the South Caucasus (SC). (See the map in Appendix 1) Did Russia’s military
victory bring about a great deal of strategic gain for Russia? These questions
will be answered in this article with the already surfaced facts and statistics
as well as with some projections on how the war would affect Russia’s strategicinterests on and near its borders in the long-term. The explanations are
based mostly on the indirect consequences of the war for Russia vis-à-vis its
relations with the West and the SC. The reason for highlighting the indirectconsequences more is due to the notion of realpolitik. In other words, most of
the concerned parties and states prefer to articulate their concerns indirectly
since direct expressions of such unapproved stances may threaten their own
national interests vis-à-vis Russia.
Background of the Crisis
1.1. Direct and Inner factorsa) Ripe circumstances for ethnic war
The tensions between the Georgians and Ossetians date back to the1920s. During this period the Ossetians made a failed attempt to establish an
independent state. Although the tensions were brought under control with theestablishment of the Soviet Union, it eventually proved to be nothing morethan a temporary halt lasting about seventy years. The bloody clashes started
anew in the early 1990s with the breakup of the Soviet Union after which
passionate Ossetian ambitions for independence resurfaced. During thattime Georgia lost control over two regions adjacent to Russia, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. In spite of the Russian brokered cease-fire in 1992, there wereregular small-scale skirmishes with high and low degrees of severities until
the aforementioned war between Russia and Georgia. According to someestimates, by the time the war broke out, some 13,000 people had died in thetwo separate conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Zurcher, 2007).
When the pro-American Saakashvili came to power in Georgiain 2003
following the so-called “Rose Revolution”, he set forth the goal of restoring
the country’s territorial integrity by solving the decade-long ethno-territorialconflicts within Georgia’s internationally recognized borders. In 2004, theGeorgian government gained full control over one of the formerly separatist
regions, Adjaria, without firing a single shot. That the Georgian leadership

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brought the region under the rule of the central government without
necessarily using force laid out optimism for brining the other two breakaway
regions — South Ossetia and Abkhazia under central government control aswell. A similar approach to the South Ossetia conflict, however, ended up withnot only the loss of territories for the country but also a loss of hope among the
Georgians that they would regain the two secessionist regions any time in theforeseeable future, if not forever. The failed attempt to enforce constitutional
4order by Georgia’s “law enforcement agencies” resulted in a full scale war
between the armed forces of Georgia and the unified troops of Russia andSouth Ossetia.
b) Georgia attempts to shed Russian influence
The socialist by-product of autonomous republic and autonomousoblast
within the republics of the former Soviet Union became a source of headaches
for each independent state to control with the dissolution of the Union. Georgia
unluckily had three of such regions within its boundaries — autonomous
socialist Soviet republics of Adjaria and Abkhazia, and the autonomous oblastof South Ossetia. The prospect for integrating these autonomous regions
into a unified Georgia seemed thin as ethnic clashes broke out between the
Georgians and the non-Georgian inhabitants of these regions on the eve of thecountry’s independence in 1991.All the three regions within Georgia looked to
Moscow for protection against the ethnic Georgians, which provided Moscow
with a chance to enhance its influence in the region.
As the situation gained geopolitical importance through the increasing
involvement of neighboring countries as well as global powers such as the
EU and the US, the Georgian leadership leaned toward the West. Georgia
expressed deep interests in gaining membership to Western institutions,particularly NATO. Georgia’s joining the alliance had been initiated by
Shevardnadze, who preceded Saakashvili as president of Georgia. The country
was actively participating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program
since 2004. The process was accelerated after Saakashvili came to power in2004 (Priego, 2008). Russia’s relations with Georgia reached a new level ofhostility after the Georgian administration made it clear that joining the EU
and NATO was one of its priorities. Saakashvli ordered the display of theEuropean Union flag next to the Georgian one, an open indication of the course

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107that the country planned to pursue. The Defense Ministry of the country wenteven further and began displaying the NATO flag (Toal, 2009).
Seeking membership in the Euro-Atlantic alliance was perhaps one of
the shortest ways, if not the only way for the Saakashvili administration toprotect the sovereignty of the state of Georgia and to assure the integrityof the country. However, such a strategy caused resentment in Moscow andfurther spoiled Russo-Georgian relations (Imnadze, 2010). Thus, Georgia
became a suitable target for Moscow to attack. For the Russian strategists,such an attack would deter the foreign powers in the region and would createa balance between Russia and the West, particularly NATO, which wasaggressively penetrating into what Russia considered to be its traditional
sphere of influence (Medvedev, 2011). Last but not least, the war would
serve as a warning to the rest of the former Soviet republics that might seek
membership in Western institutions in the future.
2.2. Indirect and External factors
A majority of the experts share the perception that the full scale war
in Georgia was not merely Russia’s attempt to respond to “the aggression
against Russian peacekeepers and the civilian population in South Ossetia”(Medvedev, 2008) as Moscow claimed. Rather, it is almost certain that thiswar was Moscow’s response to a set of security and foreign policy related
ventures by the West that were occurring in Russia’s so-called backyard.
Existence of such a “backyard” was formally declared in a new foreign policy
doctrine by then Russian President Medvedev in the immediate aftermathof the Russia-Georgia war. In his speech, the Russian President of thetime described the regions on and near the Russian borders as the “zone ofprivileged interests” (Moshes, 2009, No: 129).As Georgia happens to be locatedin this self-proclaimed zone, it appears more convincing that Russia went to
war with Georgia as part of its strategic interests rather than as a result of
the Georgian supposed aggression against civilian populations.
Although the internal circumstances concerning the long-lasting conflicts
in the Georgian breakaway regions were ripe enough to evolve into a war,
there are mainly three geopolitical factors that may have triggered theRussian attack on Georgia:

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第3号a) Increased Western presence in Russia’s so-called zone of privilegedinterests
Many in the West took the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity
to develop political and economic ties with a part of the world that had been
almost “solely Russian-dominated space since the Tsarist Russian Empire
forced Persia to sign the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828” (Sadri and Burns,
2010). Russian influence over the former socialist republics waned, while thepresence of Europeans and Americans subsequently grew for almost a decade
after the dissolution of the Union. The Russian economy shrank significantlyin the early 1990s, which was followed by an overall downturn in societal
values, education, and domestic security. Despite the countless domestic
problems, Russia seemed determined to keep some sort of control over the
newly independent states by establishing the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), a revised copy of the Commonwealth of Nations once created by
the Great Britain to maintain its contacts with the former colonies.
The transfer of power from the old and sick Boris Yeltsin to the young andaggressive Vladimir Putin as acting president in January of 2000 opened a
new horizon for Russia. On March 26, 2000, Putin won an astonishing victoryin the elections and became President of Russia. This power shift has proved
to be a landmark in Russia’s domestic and international affairs ever since.
The new millennium started with tangible growth for Russia. The rising
prices of energy resources became an incentive for increased fuel productions
from the Russian fields. In 2003, Lukoil, a major oil company of Russia, madea surprising increase of 38 percent in profits. This led to $4.8 billion (10%)
rise in the Central Bank’s currency levels within the interval of the first fourmonths of that year (Goldman, 2007). Russia began to show the early signs of
economic recovery. The economic revival was followed by rebounds in otherfields as well.
Such rapid growth trends gave the Russian leadership more politicalconfidence to re-establish its status as a “super power” at any cost, eventhrough strategic exploitation of its oil and gas wealth (Goldman, 2007).
Although the Russian government expressed alliance with the West againstinternational terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, Moscow soon became awarethat the US establishment of military bases in Central Asia would undermine
Russia’s influence over this region. As one researcher claims, “Putin came toRussia’s Strategy toward the South Caucasus

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see the United States as a global power determined to achieve ‘unipolarity’in world affairs” (Toal, 2009). Simultaneously, on a different front, the EU
enlargements of 2004 and 2007 were interpreted as new threats by Russianpolitical circles as the moves significantly increased the former’s borders with
Russia and created a small EU-surrounded Russian enclave, Kaliningrad.
Kosovo’s recognition as an independent state drove Moscow’s patience tothe breaking point. Moscow had warned that Kosovo’s independence would set
a precedent for the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This rhetoric
was replaced with concrete actions by Moscow after the West supported
and recognized Kosovo as an independent state in early 2008. Many experts
believe that this historical case tempted Russia to accelerate its “creeping
annexation” (Cooley, 2008) of Georgia’s separatists regions. As part of thisannexation Russia had already started providing Russian passports to the
inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which was later used as one of
the main justifications by Moscow for its full-scale war on Georgia. The war
and the consequences of the recognition by Moscow of the separatist regions
within a sovereign state were more proof of Russia’s serious concerns withand intolerance of increased Western presence near its borders. Although
the Western presence in the post-Soviet realm was further solidified throughbilateral partnerships in the form of multi-billion projects until the war brokeout, the tendency slowed down apparently as a result of Putin’s deterrence
policies and threatening rhetoric.
b) Eastward expansion of NATO
NATO’s enlargement toward the east has been one of the most decisive
triggering factors of the Russia-Georgia war (See the map in Appendix 2).
Many experts believe that the war was the last resort for Moscow to stop
NATO’s eastward expansion. The Euro-Atlantic military bloc has always been
regarded as a national threat to Russia by the country’s political and military
circles. This perception is reflected clearly in the newly adopted Russian
military doctrine. The doctrine signed by the then President Dmitry Medvedev
in February 2010 indicates manifestly that “one of the ‘main external threatsof war’ comes from NATO’s expansion east to Russia’s borders” (Sweeney,52010). NATO had absorbed as many as 11 countries into the bloc within ashort period, from 1990 until the breakout of the Russia-Georgia war. Russia

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has repeatedly expressed its grave concerns over these expansionist programs.
Moscow claims that NATO’s eastward expansion violates the terms of thelegal documents Russia and the West have agreed upon. It has been urged byseveral high-ranking Russian officials that Russia agreed to the unification of
the two Germanies on the condition that NATO would not “bring any former
Communist states into the alliance,” this “solemn ‘pledge’” was “made by
the governments of West Germany and the United States in1990” (Kramer,2009). In 1997, the then-Soviet deputy foreign minister Anatoly Adamishinclaimed that ‘‘we were told during the German reunification process that
NATO would not expand’’ (Gordon, 1997). Mikhail Gorbachev made similar
assertions in 1996-1997. Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Foreign Ministersof Russia have claimed on numerous occasions that “…the United States had‘made a commitment not to expand NATO’ and had ‘repeatedly broken this6

commitment’ in the years since” (Kramer, 2009).

However, the mainstream in the West insist that during the talks in
1990, no mention to NATO expansion had been made by any of the parties.
Philip Zelikow, a senior US official in1990 who was responsible for German
reunification issues, maintained this view during the heated debates between
the former Soviet and American officials over the argument that the Westpromised Moscow that NATO would not expand to the east. In a 1995 article,
Zelikow clarified that “… the option of adding new members to NATO was
not foreclosed by the deal actually made in 1990’’ (Zelikow, 1995). In response
to Adamshin, Zelikow asserted in 1997 that “…the United States made nocommitment at all about the future shape of NATO… in the Treaty on the
Final Settlement with Respect to Germany signed in September 1990” (Kramer,2009).
The idea that the Russian attack on Georgia was an effort to deter theNATO expansion sounds more credible given the fact that the alliance had
started a serious membership process with Ukraine and Georgia. Moscow’s
intolerance of the expansion had been very clear and open. High-ranking
Russian officials have continued to verbally attack the West for such moves
at every opportunity. In his Munich speech in February 2007, Putin described
the intended eastward expansion of NATO as “a serious provocation”. Hinting
at the target of this expansion, he stated that “Russia has a right to ask ‘against
whom is this [NATO] expansion intended?’” (Putin, 2007).

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Although NATO “welcome[d] Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic
aspirations for membership” (NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration) in the
Bucharest Summit in April 2008, it failed to live up to the expectations of
Ukraine and Georgia which were very hopeful about the NATO Membership
Action Plan (MAP). Despite strong US backing, some European countries
blocked the process. Dependent on Russian oil and gas, Germany and France
withdrew their backing for the application in a move to calm Moscow. The
MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia were postponed to the end of theyear. The clause in the final statement read “… We have asked Foreign
Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008
meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP
applications of Ukraine and Georgia” (NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration).
Experts believe that NATO’s undetermined stance on Georgia “opened thedoor for Russia to continue to dominate Georgia while also providing incentive
to take action against Georgia’s NATO membership …” (Sadri and Burns,
2010).
c) Geopolitics of energy
The complex geopolitics surrounding energy resource development in the
Caspian Sea may have only accelerated Russia’s plan for a show of strength
in the region, which occurred in the form of the Russia-Georgia war. Although
the energy issue is secondary as a source of conflict, it is an importantcomponent of both Russian and Western interests in the region. As discussed
above, Russia is willing to use the energy factor as a foreign policy tool, as itis the only soft power the country has vis-à-vis the Europeans. It is almost
certain that the energy factor, namely the EU dependence on Russian oil andgas, slowed down, if not halted the accelerated membership process of Georgia
7

and Ukraine to NATO in 2008.

The South Caucasus region is a potential competitor to Russia in terms ofenergy transportation routes. With the extensive western investments in theenergy sector and transportation infrastructures, the region has the potential
to deliver the energy resources of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to theWestern markets while bypassing the existing Russian routes. Given thecurrent politics in the region, Georgia plays the role of cork for the pipelines
pumping the oil and gas west. This factor alone makes Georgia exceptionally

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important for both the energy-dominant Russia and the energy-dependentWest. Currently, the two biggest energy pipelines, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) deliver most of the Caspian Sea energy
product to the markets. However, Russia appears to view them a serious
threat to its energy transportation monopoly. Moscow is worried that the two
ventures might be expanded by trans-Caspian pipelines to tap Central Asia’s
large deposits (Mir Ismail, 2009).
The BTC oil pipeline and the parallel BTE gas pipeline are central tothe planned Nabucco gas pipeline (See the map in Appendix 3). The Nabucco
gas pipeline is projected to have an annual delivery capacity of 31 billion
cubic meters (bcm). It will carry the natural gas from the Caspian Sea andpotentially from the Middle East region all the way to Austria where it will be
distributed to other European countries (Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project, 2011).
Its capacity would be comparable to the newly launched Russian pipeline8system Nord Stream whose recently completed pipeline, which is the firstcompleted of two parallel lines under construction, will ship 27.5 bcm natural
gas annually to European markets. Upon completion of the second parallel
pipeline in 2012 it will be a major Russian gas pipeline with a potential annual
shipment capacity of 55 bcm (Rian News Agency). Moscow sees Nabucco as
an attempt to undermine Russia’s bargaining power in international energy
markets. Russia has its own proposed alternative route called the SouthStream pipeline project that would deliver the Russian gas through the BlackSea bed to Romania, Bulgaria and eventually to western-European markets.
Although Russia keeps improving its energy export infrastructure, thissystem is not attractive to either the energy producing Caspian states or
the potential European clients. The deep distrust of Russia over its repeatedmanipulation of energy as a tool of control in the past has forced the energy
producers of the Caspian Sea region to bid for alternative routes. Lacking
appropriate soft power to change the status quo, Russia may have opted
for military leverage by attacking Georgia, the strategic checkpoint forregional energy projects. Georgia is also important for security reasons, as
it is one of the shortest air corridors for the West to reach the hot spots inthe neighboring regions. As analysts have argued, “[i]f Georgia could be
brought in line, Moscow could use its political dominance to cut the NATOair corridor into Central Asia, the Western energy corridor, and reduce theRussia’s Strategy toward the South Caucasus

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negative consequences of Russia’s declining economic importance for Georgia
and the former CIS” (Nuriyev, 2007). The Russia-Georgia war may havedelayed certain aspects of the ongoing regional projects. However, the current
constructive negotiations between Europe and the gas-producing nations of
the Caspian region reflect the determination of the interested parties, backed
with strong financial and political support by the West, to continue theeffort to complete Nabucco as it is seen as a viable energy project despite its
geopolitical obstacles.

2. Implications of the Russia-Georgia War to Russia-SC
and Russia-West relations
The Russia-Georgia War can be considered as the benchmark in therelations between Russia and many other countries in the world. This section
tries to highlight the changed nature of the relations between the West andthe South Caucasus states vis-à-vis Russia.
Russia and the West:
Russia’s partnership with the West can generally be classified ascompetitive-strategic with the US, while mostly economic with the EU. It goes
without saying that any healthy and durable partnership is preconditioned
with mutual trust and interests. However, the Russian attack on Georgia
has rightly raised questions among the international community regarding
Russia’s trustworthiness as a partner. Russia’s overwhelming use of force tosolve a long-lasting and complex conflict cast a shadow on its reliability as apartner for not only for the West but also for a number of countries with which
Russia has established relations.
The relations between Russia and the West before this war were notnecessarily smooth. There were constant ups and downs. Despite such hurdles,
there was still a room for cooperation on mutually important global andregional issues. Russia was cooperating with both the US and EU throughvarious tools and channels in various spheres, though it was on better termswith Brussels than it was with Washington.
Although diplomatic relations between Russia and the EU were strainedin the immediate aftermath of the war, economic relations continued as before.

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Despite the harsh criticisms and condemnations from some EU countries
towards Russia over the war, there seems to be no significant decline in the
trade relations so far. The current nexus of energy cooperation is at the heartof the relations between Europe and Russia. The oil and gas trade is equallyimportant to both sides given the volume of supply to Europe and the volume
of profits to Russia.
According to the statistics of 2008, Russia supplied 33 percent of the9

oil and 40 percent of the natural gas to the EU (EU Energy Portal, 2008) .
Russia was fourth among the EU’s export partners after the US, China andSwitzerland, buying 6.4 percent of the EU’s exported goods and services.
Russia was also the third biggest import partner of the EU, after China andthe US, with the EU buying 10.5 percent their total imports from Russia,
although 74.6 percent of these imports were composed of mineral fuel-relatedmaterials and goods (EU official website, 2010). These are clear indicationsof high-level economic relations. The explanation for this is simple as Europe
does not have any other major energy supplier to replace Russia yet. Moscow,
on the other hand, uses this factor as a foreign policy instrument and puts
pressure on the Europeans when there is something crucial to achieve in its
10

geopolitical agenda. The importance of the EU to the Russian economy iseven greater. The EU is the largest trade partner of Russia with 44.8 percent
of Russia’s imports originating in the EU and 50.2 percent of Russia’s exports
going to EU-member countries (EU official website, 2010).
Russia and the South Caucasus states after the War
The Russia-Georgia war was a wake-up call for all the Central Asia andthe South Caucasus (CASC) states. These states were caught unprepared,
from a policy standpoint, to maneuver in such a situation. Russia’s swift
military operations in the territories of a sovereign state, more importantly
a former Soviet Union member, were a great shock for them. In the courseof the war, the Central Asian countries responded in two different ways.
While Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan did not react to what was
happening in the region in any meaningful way, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
shipped humanitarian assistance to North and South Ossetia (Nichol, 2009),
supposedly to please Moscow.
There is also growing concerns over Russia’s reliability among some of theRussia’s Strategy toward the South Caucasus

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Russia-friendly former socialist states that would otherwise turn to Moscow
for help or alliance. That Russia had acted as a negotiator, a peace-broker, anda peace-keeper between the Georgians and the separatists for a long time, its
full-scale war on Georgia was seen as an extreme contradiction of such earlier
missions. It obviously was a violation of all the norms and rules set forthinternationally for a peace-keeper. In addition, it was an alarm for Azerbaijan
and Armenia since Russia has imposed itself as an informal peace-broker forthem since the early days of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russia is also oneof the formally recognized and accepted negotiators, along with the USA andFrance, of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
11

Minsk Group.

Therefore, the most alarmed countries during the war were the immediateneighbors of Georgia — Azerbaijan and Armenia. Nevertheless, they opted
for being “silent” like some of the Central Asian countries. There were certain
strategic reasons for both of these countries to distance themselves from bothsides and to act neutrally, at least in public, which are discussed below.
Azerbaijan:
Azerbaijan has had a separatist movement in its Mountainous Karabakhprovince since 1988. The ethnic Armenians living in this region haveproclaimed independence although no state, including Armenia, has recognized
it. They receive all kinds of assistance from neighboring Armenia who is stillin a de-facto war with Azerbaijan. For Azerbaijan, any signs of support for
Russia would automatically translate into a justification for the Armenian
support for the separatists in Azerbaijan. Besides, Azerbaijan’s major oil andgas exports flow through the Georgian territories. Siding with Moscow puts
the Azeri-Georgian relations and the country’s pipeline and rail links passing
through Georgia at risk.
About one-fifth of Azerbaijani territories are under occupation of theunited forces of Armenia and the separatist Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The unexpected full-scale war was almost a proof of Russia’s willingness to use
force to “solve” such ethno-territorial conflicts. Azerbaijan may face a similar
attack if it were to attempt to gain back the lost lands by force to restore
the unity of the country. The Azerbaijani fear is not baseless as a possibilityof such a scenario has been repeatedly mentioned by high-ranking Russian

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officials. In a recent interview to Echo Moscow radio and Russia Today TV(August 2011), Russian president openly stated that“…Right after the war,presidents of both Azerbaijan and Armenia visited me. …They said that theywould prefer indefinite and endless negotiations over going through such afive-day military operation. …[The Russia-Georgia war] was a serious lesson to
Azerbaijan and Armenia” (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2011).
Paradoxically, under normal circumstances Azerbaijan should havebacked Georgia to protect its own vital strategic interests as did some Westerncountries. With very few exceptions of humanitarian assistance Azerbaijan
could do nothing for Georgia. Nevertheless, the Russia-Georgia war compelled
the Azerbaijani policy-makers to reconsider the extent and nature of theirrelations with Russia. The war signaled clearly that there was an inevitablenecessity for Azerbaijan (and also for other Central Asia and South Caucasus
states) to make multiple alternative policies to deal with Russia (possibly
including some defensive policies that remain secret to this day) and to beprepared for the worst if a similar scenario is played out within its own
borders — in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Armenia:
Armenia also could not side publicly with its closest ally, Russia,
throughout this war. Armenia would back Russia by all means if it its physicallocation was not part of the current complex geopolitical setting. Armenia issandwiched between Turkey and Azerbaijan along its western and easternborders respectively. Its borders with Turkey have been closed since April
1993, after the Armenian troops occupied a sizeable territory of Azerbaijan,
12

the closest ally of Turkey. Because of the war with Azerbaijan , Armenia’s
eastern borders are non-functional as well. Therefore, any Armenian support
for Russia in this war would seriously strain the Armenia-Georgia relations
13

and would block one of only two lifelines and outlets to the world.

In fact, Georgia is the point of clashing interests between Armenia andRussia. While the attack on Georgia could possibly pay off Russia’s short-term
geopolitical interests, this cut Armenia’s only land route to Russia. Russia
provides Armenia with not only energy, industrial products, and foodstuff,
but also desperately needed military protection. The trade via the Georgianroute alone makes up for about 70 percent of Armenia’s trade. According

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to the Armenian officials, the country lost 600 million USD during thiswar (Nalbandian, 2009), just one of the reasons why Armenia would prefersmooth relations and open borders between Russia and Georgia. However,the perspective for evened Russia-Georgia relations seems unrealistic,
given the still fresh war between the two and the Russian recognition of
the independence of the separatists within the Georgian territories. Thisjeopardizes Armenia’s only northern supply route and forces it to findalternate access to essential supplies for its people and economy.
Under the given circumstances the only option left for Armenia was toturn to its southern neighbor, Iran for strategic partnership. In April 2009,
Armenia signed a deal with Iran to build a rail link between the two countries
that would connect the rail system of former to the Persian Gulf (Bishku,2011). The Armenian gravitation towards Iran endangers Russia’s own longterm strategic interests in the South Caucasus given the fact that Armenia is
the only state in the region to allow the stationing of Russian troops. Russia
would not be pleased to see Armenia significantly improve its relations witheither Iran or the West; such a move could weaken the Armenian dependence
on Russia. It could eventually cost Russia the loss of Armenia.
Recently, the ruling elite in Armenia appear more conscious of theseriousness of the situation after the war. There is a growing concern amongsome Armenian officials that the current security (and economic) deals with
Russia could result in “infringement of Armenia’s sovereignty” (Lobjakas,2009), especially given Russia’s unpredictable maneuvers in the region.

3. Gains vs. Losses for Russia
14“Wars should always be the absolute last resort” to handle inter-stateissues, especially the ones of ethnic and territorial in nature. Every war
assumingly generates certain gains for winner and losses for loser. However,complex interdependencies of globalization and the contemporary system ofinternational relations make it difficult to precisely measure the gains andlosses of wars of twenty-first century for parties involved. The Russia-Georgia
war of 2008 is no exception in this regard. From a military perspective,
Russia was supposed to be “winner”. Russia’s biggest tangible gain over the
war must have been its acquisition of a sovereign state’s two small provinces

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which it later recognized as independent states. By doing so, Russia broughtthem under an exclusive Russian geopolitical control, if not under its informal
constitutional jurisdiction. Another big gain for Moscow must have been
the re-imposition its traditional “carrot and stick” approach on the so-called
Russia’s near abroad. Through such a strategic use of force, Russia was able
to scare, even if only temporarily, the republics of the former Soviet Union not
to seek membership in the Western institutions. Nevertheless, the emerging
realities over the war make Russia’s gains questionable, if not altogether invain. Having assessed Russia’s gains against its supposed losses under three
dimensions below —international, regional and domestic, this paper argues
that Russia’s victory in the battle does not necessarily make it the absolutevictor of the war.
a) International
The Russia-Georgia war has become a turning point in the approaches
and perceptions of the West and Russia reciprocally. As one keen observer
claims “… [The war] plunged Russia’s relations with the West to lows not seen
since the end of the Cold War” (Feifer, 2010). After the war Europeans appear
to have become more conscious of and worried about their energy dependency
on Russia and about their energy security in general. The natural gas crises
between Russia and Ukraine in 2009, which severely cut the supplies toEurope for a while, deepened these worries further. Russian unreliability
has been reflected in publicly delivered speeches, articles, and documentsof numerous European politicians, scholars, and organizations. A unified
reflection of such concerns is seen in the EU President Jerzy Buzek’s call for
Europe “to speak with one voice when negotiating with energy partners toenhance the EU’s economic stability and strength” (Buzek, 2009).
There are intensified efforts in Europe to boost alternative energy sources
as well as to multiply the sources of traditional fuels— oil and gas, which can
be clearly seen. One example of such trends is the EU’s Eastern Partnership(EaP) which started on May 7, 2009. This new multilateral approach envisages
five major initiatives, two of which are directly related to cooperation on
15

energy security. In order to diversify their energy supplies, “Europeans
are likely to turn to Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Algeria, Nigeria, Qatar, andIran” (Cohen, 2006). The planned Nabucco gas pipeline is projected to have

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the capacity to deliver natural gas to European countries. According to theofficial projections by the EU, “when fully operational, …[the pipeline] could …
supply between 5-10 percent of the EU’s projected gas consumption in 2020.”(Lobjakas, 2009). Currently Russia is the largest single gas supplier to the
EU. Russian natural gas exports account for 25 to 30 percent of the European
Union’s gas needs, but constitute 90 percent of Russia’s gas exports (Noël,2008). Based on the analysis of the above figures, one can claim that by 2020,
the supply via Nabucco will decrease the European dependency on Russian
natural gas by some 20-30 percent while challenging one of Russia’s biggest
source of revenues.
The ambitious tendency among the biggest global energy consumers to
obtain alternative energy and to multiply the sources of traditional fuels leads
to excessive supplies and affects the demands in the global markets. Such adevelopment means a considerable cut in the revenues generated from energy
sales for Russia. According to the projections, Russia needs the price of oil tobe at least $100 per barrel to recover from the current budget deficits by 2015
(Kudrin, 2011). However, the fluctuating prices of oil (and gas) make such a
recovery unlikely, especially in light of the current oil price, which is around 86
16

dollars per bbl. In addition, the ongoing and projected economic stagnation inmost of the EU countries (UN, 2012) affects the demand for oil and gas not only
from Russia but from other sources as well. Frequent downward tendencies ofenergy prices seriously affects Russia’s fuel-revenue-reliant economy, and may
deprive it of its only soft power — the energy “weapon” which it has shownwillingness to use “when confronted with international crises, such as thosethat occurred in Georgia and Ukraine” (Paillard, 2010). After the war in 2008,
the Europeans have put a lot of efforts into decreasing their reliance on energy
imports from Russia. Formal talks and signing of agreements at the highest
level by the states involved in Nabucco pipeline seem to have intensified
after the Russia-Georgia war of 2008. Although Russia claims that “there is
no gas to fill in the pipe” (Chizhov, 2009), such discouraging (or sometimes
threatening) statements did not make the committed Western countries
any less enthusiastic. The strong Western support for this energy project
is not only for the stability of energy flow to the EU, it is also to strengthen
the small transit countries located in a strategically important geography.
Such a protection shelter is provided by bringing the focus of multinational

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interest onto such countries. The west-bound transit countries for Caspian Sea
energy are highly vulnerable to political and military mistreatments. Georgia
proved to be a good example with the 2008 war. Despite the intimidations by
Russia, the Nabucco-committed countries went ahead with the project, which
also became a full support for Georgia in terms of its energy security. This
was acknowledged by the Georgian administration at the highest level: “AllGeorgia’s natural gas requirements will be covered by the fuel it is to receive
for its role in the Nabucco gas pipeline project. …Georgia will receive 5% ofnatural gas transported via the pipeline free of charge and another 5% at aconcessional price…”(Khetaguri, 2009).
There is also an observed tendency among smaller nations in the vicinities
of Russia that the nature of Russian-Western relations indirectly affects their’
foreign policy priorities, choices, and approaches when it comes to making
a choice between these two power centers. The less antagonism between
Russia and the West, the more impetus there is for the SC states to improveties with both of them spontaneously. Escalated tensions in the Russia-West
relations usually bring about a necessity for regional states to make careful
adjustments to their foreign policies towards the two. It goes without sayingthat the worsened relations betweenMoscow and Western capitals over the
war in 2008 have supposedly made a large number of countries less willingto choose Russia as a long-term partner unless they have no other option.
Even Turkmenistan, a landlocked country which has long been dependent on
Russian infrastructure and routes to export its gas to the world, showed somechange in its stance and “launched a new, China-bound pipeline” in 2009 (Gurt,
2011). Turkmenistan has also pledged to supply natural gas for the Nabucco
pipeline which will allow both sides – Turkmenistan and the EU countries torely less on Russia on energy issue in the future. At an international energy
conference in Ashgabat in November, 2010, Turkmen Deputy PM Baymyrad
Hojamuhamedov reconfirmed his country’s commitment to Nabucco and statedthat “European countries need not worry” since “delivering gas to Europe waspart of Turkmenistan’s plan to diversify its export markets.” (BBC, November
19, 2010). The willingness of the regional countries to bypass Russia is not
limited to energy export issue alone. It is observed in other fields, particularlyin the regional politics. Such a trend can affect Russia’s might seriously if
joined and followed increasingly by many other countries.

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121b) Regional
The biggest strategic gain in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia war
appears to be the pulling of Ukraine off its previous Western orientation.
Although this did not happen as a direct result of the Russia-Georgia war,
the war along with Russia’s “energy card” frightened the general public
and policy makers in Ukraine where about half of the population are ethnic
Russian. As a result, the domestic political circumstances in Ukraine changed
gradually in favor of Russia, culminating with the election of Moscow-backed
Viktor Yanukovich in February 2010. Indeed, the Ukrainian disappointment
over NATO’s failure to promptly address the membership issue had a great
impact on the shifted orientation. Unlike his pro-western predecessor Viktor
Yushchenko, who had passed legislation to make the country’s NATO accession
a strategic goal, President Yanukovich did the opposite. He abolished the statecommission that had been overseeing the country’s preparations for eventual
entry into the Western alliance (Weir, 2010). Although Yanukovich tries
to keep the relations warm with EU, he is “categorically against Ukraine’s
accession to NATO” (EurActiv, 2010). Soon after assuming the presidency heurged the government to pass “the most needed law” (EurActiv, 2010), which
would prevent Ukraine from joining any military alliances.
Unlike in Ukraine, Russia could not manage to change the pro-westernadministration in Tbilisi. Contrary to the Russian calculations, “Georgia…
withdrew from the Moscow-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States,…and signed the Charter on Strategic Partnership with the United Statesa few months later, in January 2009” (Kakachia, 2010). Georgia has also
pushed forward to achieve its most important strategic goal— membershipin Western political and military institutions. Obviously, the war and its
consequences jeopardized Georgia’s bid to join NATO. Nevertheless, NATOhas repeatedly mentioned that Georgia will become a member of the alliance(NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration, 2008; Strasbourg / Kehl Summit
Declaration, 2009; Final Statement, Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Brussels,
2009; Lisbon Summit Declaration, 2010). The “tense relations [between Russia
and Georgia]” (Khelashvili, 2011) seems incurable for the unforeseeable future
while the desires from both NATO and Georgia to embrace each other haveincreased significantly. Ukraine’s changed course of direction and distancing
of itself from the alliance for an indefinite time, if not forever, must have been

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the cost of the mistake NATO made by turning down its membership bid
at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. Yet NATO does not want to lose anotherstrategically important country, Georgia, which was similarly disappointed at
the same summit.
Now that Georgia remains the only former Soviet republic with a strong
aspiration for NATO membership it has gained more strategic significancein the eyes of the alliance than before. Georgia has become a key experiment
whose result will certainly affect the might of the competing powers in
the region. Failing to offer membership to such a keen country —Georgia,
distances NATO from the potential future members which are crucial in termsof expansion. In other words, a disappointed Georgia becomes a “bad example”
to other post-Soviet republics that may seek membership in the alliance in the
future. In order to avoid such a strategically unacceptable scenario NATO has
to facilitate Georgia’s integration to the alliance. Under such circumstances,
Georgia’s membership has become more likely than ever.
Perceptions of Russia’s roles in the region have changed significantly
for the SC countries over its war with Georgia. Russia will never again beconsidered as a truthful broker in the former Soviet realm. The current
nature of the relations between Russia and the countries of the region can be
described as “shaky” at best as it is shaped out of fear of Russia. Most of theregional states have become cautious in their dealings with Moscow after theinfamous attack. Thanks to the long history of interactions between Moscow
and the regional capitals of the former Union, these small and weak states
have familiarized themselves with “Russkie priyomy” (Russian techniques),
which implies that they all have a “Plan B” to deal with unexpected Russian
mistreatments.
There is an unexpressed common perception of Russia among these small
states that they must tolerate Russia’s bullying or pay the price. In retrospect,
the costs of a rebellion against such wrongful treatments of Moscow havebeen quite high for some of the regional states. Russia has manipulated andreignited conflicts of some sort within or across the borders of such states.
Even if there is no tangible reasons for a conflict, Russia is perceived as
being capable of making one from scratch at any cost to achieve its strategic
objectives. The ignition of ethnic conflicts in Azerbaijan and Georgia (NagornoKarabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia) and overthrowing a democraticallyRussia’s Strategy toward the South Caucasus

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elected president and his administration through a proxy in Azerbaijan (in1993) are seen as outcome of the hard works of the Russian strategists in the
Kremlin.
Russia’s loss of faith as a peace-broker in Georgia has deepened the
Azerbaijani and Moldovan concerns over its “mediation” and “peacekeeping”
roles in these countries. Russia’s impartiality over its representation in the
OSCE Minsk Group, which aims to achieve a peaceful solution of NagornoKarabakh conflict, has become highly skeptical after the war. Russian
peacekeeping missions in Trasnistria, where almost all the residents holdRussian passports, is regarded as seriously problematic given the close
17

similarities to the case of South Ossetia. The perceived Russian threat tothe sovereignties of these states would force them to distance themselves
further from Russia and to establish closer ties with the political and military
establishments of the West for better protection and security. The reason why
these states do not bluntly announce their desire for such a course of directionin the future seems to be a fear of Russia. Although the politics of fear pays
off the Russian interests in the short term, clandestine arms supplies toseparatists and the muscle shows in the region trigger public anger withinthese nation-states against the bullying power of Russia. Escalated hatredtoward the state of Russia and the flourishing of nationalistic sentiments inand near its borders by no means serve the broader Russian interests. Such a
scenario bears a high risk for the integrity of the ethnically diverse RussianFederation, if not for its very existence.
c) Domestic
There is little doubt that the Russian political elite in Moscow gained
popularity as life savers during the short period of war. In its televised
address, while Russian tanks were rolling into Georgia’s northern provinces
through the Rocky Tunnel, the then President Medvedev announced that “…
Civilians, women, children and old people, are dying today in South Ossetia,
and the majority of them are citizens of the Russian Federation. … [I]t is my
duty to protect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they may
be. …We will not allow the deaths of our fellow citizens to go unpunished”(Medvedev, 2008). Ironically, this message was being given at a time when the
Russian authorities were being criticized by prominent international human

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rights organizations for oppressing their own citizens. Despite the mixed voices
among the ordinary Russians, the war surely added to the existing strength of
the Russian leadership at home. The Russia-Georgia war enabled the Russianpolitical elite to further solidify power in the hands of the executive branch.
However, given the multi-ethnic composition of the Russian Federation,
recognizing the two regions as independent states have become a precedent for
separatist movements within Russia itself. Such a precedent only encourages
the long lasting ethnic and religious rebellions in the North Caucasus, whichhave been oppressed repeatedly by the Russian military. Ethnic intellectuals
representing the minorities in the Russian oblasty (provinces) have pointed
to the precedents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to seek greater autonomy,
if not independence from the Federation. As one keen expert asserts, “Russia
took the risk of using the precedent excuse when it played the fragile balance
between recognizing Abkhazia and avoiding its own disintegration. The trick,it seems, was to use the precedent to its fullest, while avoiding antagonizing
domestic separatist forces.” (Martins, 2010).
Although the likelihood of organized separatist movements within the
Russian borders is slim in the foreseeable future, especially given the currently
improved standards of living, it is not beyond consideration. In fact, economic
well-being itself is an essential factor to lead to ethnic self-esteem, which is, intheory, the core of demands for greater autonomy from federations. Five years
after the Russia-Georgia war, it is not easy to foresee whether the minorities
longing for independence will eventually be given such a status. Nevertheless,there is little doubt that by recognizing the independence to South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, Russia has set a precedent that will make it difficult to deny similar
claims among ethnic minorities within its own borders.
Apart from the problematic precedential nature of these recognitions
for the Russian Federation, such an act has generated certain financial andadministrative burdens for Moscow. Although the actual cost of taking care ofthese two regions may not be so huge given the size of the Russian economy,
it will have to spend a lot more to assure their constant adherence to Moscow.
As one expert says, “The Russian Federation has taken on two client statesthat may prove expensive and awkward to manage” (Toal, 2009). Both of them
depend almost entirely on Russian aid. Russian aid for South Ossetia, forinstance, makes up for 99 percent of the latter’s budget (Feifer, 2010). This

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is very risky for these so-called states especially given the fact that Russia
itself has been struggling with budget deficits since 2009. If the economic
situation in Russia worsens, Moscow will have to cut the amount of subsidies
it presently supplies to them. Given that “the revenue from the oil and gas
sectors account [ed] for 47 percent of the total budget revenue in 2011” (Kudrin,2011) on the one hand, and the unpredictable prices of energy on the other,
one can claim that the fate of the separatist governments of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia are at stake, at least in financial terms, unless Moscow continues its“generosity” at the present level.

4. Conclusion
The surfacing regional politics in the South Caucasus resultant of theRussia-Georgia war implies that Moscow has lost a lot, if not all of its softmeans to keep a tangible presence in its once so-called backyard. Russia’s
willingness to use force to change the current flow, which does not seem to bein line with its interests, is the logical result of lacking attractive and realistic
strategies toward this region. The choice of using hard power against a tiny
sovereign state can well be interpreted as an exhaustion of Moscow’s foreign
policy options to deal cooperatively with its former Union members.
In a way, Moscow’s concerns are understandable. The newly independent
states started to look to the West in the early 1990s to help in dealing withthe wreckage of the Soviet legacy. This was a natural evolution, but one
that played out against Russian interests. The pro-Western inclinations of
the majority of the CIS were irritating to the political and military circles in
Moscow who were not willing to release their long-standing hold on them.
Despite using all available means to change the course of events to one morein its favor, Russia’s influence through the use of its soft power on its so-called“near abroad” was rapidly fading away. In the face of increasing Westernpresence, Moscow was in search of a chance to change the status quo and to
disrupt the growing multi-faceted cooperation between the West and former
Soviet republics on its borders. The chance came with Georgia’s miscalculated
attempt to restore the country’s territorial integrity by means of force. Russia
took full advantage of the incident, tested its military might after many yearsof absence from a real battlefield, and healed its pride, though only partially126

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and only in the domestic sphere.
A careful analysis of the events of the last two decades reveals the poor
and immature nature of the Russian strategies toward in the region. Since thedissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has mostly followed two strategies tomaintain its presence in the South Caucasus: (1) by reviving and propping up
the ethnic conflicts through its dubious mediating and peacekeeping missions,and (2) by continuing to obstruct regional economic prosperity and multilateral
partnerships, particularly the ones that embrace the West or Western
support. Although both strategies prove to be outdated and non-functional inlight of the diverse, multi-layered, and multi-sided interactions between theregional states and the rest of the world, Russia firmly clings to them evennow. Moscow’s current stances toward the region are counter-productive andcultivate anti-Russian sentiments and distrust among both the general public
and the political elite in the regional states.
The first strategy is not new for Russia. It is a modernized version of
the traditional “divide and rule” tactic of the Russian Empire. Russia has
successfully used it multiple times in the Georgian-Abkhazian, GeorgianOssetian, and Azeri-Armenian conflicts since the disintegration of theSoviet Union. Once the separatist conflicts in Georgia became hard for
Moscow to manipulate amid intensified Georgian and international efforts
to achieve their resolution, Russia “solved” them promptly by recognizing
their independence unilaterally, yet irresponsibly. While such a “solution”
for Nagorno-Karabakh could prove disastrous for Moscow, given the complex
nature of the conflict and the balance of powers (especially, the fact that
Turkey, a NATO member, is a kin ethnos and the closest ally of Azerbaijan),maintaining the current state of conflict serves Russian interests the best.
Despite serious concerns over Russia’s impartiality and reliability, particularly
after its war with Georgia while being the peacekeeper and mediator, Russia
still enjoys both peripheral (via Armenia) and international leverage (throughits mediation mandate in the OSCE Minsk group) over the conflict. Moscow
regards the conflict as the most influential factor to deter Azerbaijan and does
so whenever it deems necessary.
The second strategy is relatively new for Moscow. Therefore, it seems
Russian strategists still find it hard to effectively implement. Russia started
to use the tactic against some of the newly independent republics once they

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turned to the West for investment and new technology. Moscow instantly
challenged every such initiative on political and legal grounds with an aim
to halt them. Such a primitive and hostile stance on Moscow’s part was
clearly observed in the case of natural resource development in the CaspianSea. When Azerbaijan announced plans to open its sector in the sea for
exploration by the Western oil companies, high-ranking Russian officials
repeatedly reacted with threatening statements that were based on the legal
status of the Caspian Sea. They were sending a warning to not only the
Azerbaijani government, but also “to the British FCO [British Foreign andCommonwealth Office] that the question of the Caspian resources cannot
be examined without the determining of the Caspian’s status” (Shorokhov,
1996). When Azerbaijan, with firm backing from the Western governments
and financial institutions, finally signed the multi-billion product sharing
agreements with foreign oil companies, the Russian Foreign Ministry hastily
issued a statement that “Russia officially recognizes neither the contract
nor the consequences proceeding from it” (Shorokhov, 1996). Russia kept
obstructing various stages of the natural resource development in the region,
from exploration to transport routes. Moscow consistently, yet unreasonably
opposed the construction of BTC, a pipeline of regional cooperation andeconomic prosperity, whose realization has turned the region to one of thefastest developing spots in the world.
Russia still treats the SC republics as its peripheries with little or norespect to their sovereignties, which naturally leads to reciprocal mistrustand further confrontation, not to mention the scars to the their pride. With
the circumstantial exception of Armenia, these republics have received little
tangible economic or political assistance from Russia to advance mutually
beneficial relations. On the other hand, the West has been able to attract
them with its value-based strategies, aid, and extensive investments. This
has naturally cultivated pro-Western sympathies among the SC republics
and has attracted them to the alliances and political institutions of the West,a tendency Russia does not favor at all. Instead of capitalizing on soft power
to compete with and beat the West, Russia helplessly opts for punishing thesmall and weak states of former Soviet republics. The attack on Georgia has
been the most extreme form of such Russian mistreatment in recent times.
The Kremlin seems to have come to realize, a little too late though, that128

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Russia lacks value-oriented policies and that the Russian strategies toward
the former Soviet republics are counter-productive. It has been admitted at
the highest level in Russia that “…a stronger integration on a new politicaland economic basis and a new system of values is an imperative of our era”
(Putin, 2011; mentioned in Alexandrova, 2011). It is in this line that the thenRussian Prime Minister Putin has proposed in his recently published article in
Izvestia newspaper (October 3, 2011), to bring ex-Soviet states into “a powerfulsupranational union”, a Eurasian Union, which would be capable of becoming“one of the poles of the modern world” (Putin, 2011; mentioned in Alexandrova,2011). Although the chance of realizing such an ambitious Union seems thin,
Putin has already taken the first initiative to solidify its economic basis. He
gathered the leaders of the CIS in Saint Petersburg to sign an agreement forestablishing a free trade zone. The accord abolishes the export and importduties on many goods, an incentive Russia hopes will lure the republics into its
sphere of influence. As of right now, the initiative has already failed to attract
some of the CIS members such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
who have refrained from signing it for the time being.
Examining the cumulative consequences of the war for Russia in“international”, “regional”, and “domestic” spheres leads to the assertion that
Russia has lost and is still losing over its war with Georgia, especially in theinternational arena. Whether the declining credibility of Russia among theinternational community will bounce back depends more on its own will andefforts rather than those of its neighbors and partners. Such a rebound will
be possible only when Russia abides by international norms and standards,
and only if it respects the sovereignty of other states. These are the two
major cornerstones of the contemporary system of international relations towhich all nations, regardless of size and power, must adhere. Nevertheless,one thing seems to be clear — that the beginning of long-term substantial
gains and sincere regional embracement of Russia are preconditioned on theunconditional return of the occupied territories of sovereign nations on andnear its borders; specifically, in this case, those of Georgia.

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Appendices:
Appendix 1: Map of the South Caucasus states with the separatist regions

Source: Conciliation Resources (http://www.c-r.org)

Appendix 2: Map of the NATO expansion

Source: Wikimedia Commons (http://commons.wikimedia.org)

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Appendix 3: Map of the Nabucco Pipeline Project

Source: European Dialogue (http://eurodialogue.org)

End notes:
1 Webster’s Third New International Unabridged Dictionary, Merriam Webster, 2002.
2 The quotation is extracted from the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968.
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Lewis_Fry_Richardson.aspx (last accessed in December, 2012)
3 The South Caucasusis abbreviated as SC throughout the paper (See the map in Appendix 1).
4 Georgian President Saakashvili repeatedly described the military attack on South Ossetia as
the operations of “law enforcement agencies.”Declaration of Universal Mobilization by GeorgianPresident Mikheil Saakashvili, Tbilisi, 8 Aug, 2008, http://www.president.gov.ge
5 The joining of East Germany to the alliance did not change the number of the member states
as it occurred naturally with the unification of the two Germany in 1990. The rest of the newly
accepted members until the Russia-Georgia war are Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland (March
12, 1999); and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia (March 29,2004) The latest move of NATO expansion came with the acceptance of Albania and Croatia tothe alliance in April 1, 2009.
6 “A Conversation with Sergei Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister,’’ Charlie Rose Show, PBS,
September 25, 2008; mentioned in Mark Kramer, April 2009.
7 It is explained in the last paragraph of “Eastward expansion of NATO” sub-section of this paper.
8 Nord Stream is a huge pipeline system which brings Russian natural gas to Germany via theBaltic Sea bed. The shareholders of the $12 billion, 765 mile long pipeline are Russia’s state

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owned Gazprom (51%), German BASF SE/Wintershall Holding GmbH and E.ON Ruhrgas AG(15.5% each), and Dutch N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie and French GDF Suez S.A. (9% each).
9 Source IMF (DoTS), mentioned in“Russia—Trade Statistics”, EU official website, http://www.
europa.eu (2010). The figures are for the 27 member states of European Union.
10 Blockage from some key European countries to the Ukrainian and Georgian bids for MAP ofNATO in 2008 should be regarded as the output of Russia’s strategic use of energy as a foreign
policy tool.
11 The OSCE Minsk Group was created in 1992 by the Conference on Security and Cooperationin Europe (CSCE) which is now Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
The aim of the group is to encourage a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the conflict between
Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.
12 Azerbaijan and Armenia have technically been at war since the late 1980s over the Armenianpopulated enclave Nagorno-Karabakh. Although the parties signed a ceasefire brokered by
Russia in 1994, no peace agreement has been achieved so far. Regular fire exchanges happen
almost daily.
13 Armenia is a landlocked country. Besides Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia, it is bordered by Iranto the south. Iran and Georgia are the only two friendly windows to the world for Armenia.
14 In the vice-presidential debate between Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Representative
Paul D. Ryan, talking about international affairs and national security J. Biden argued that war
should always be the absolute last resort.
15 The five initiatives are (1) Integrated Border Management Programme, (2) SME facility, (3)regional electricity markets, improved energy efficiency and the increased use of renewableenergy sources,(4) the southern energy corridor, (5) and response to disasters.
16 According to Bloomberg, crude oil (WTI) price is 86.45USD/bbl. http://www.bloomberg.com/
energy/, last accessed on December 14, 2012.
17 One of the main arguments of Russia to justify its attack on Georgia was that it had the right toprotect (R2P) its citizens, the South Ossetians who had been given Russian passports.

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Abstract
Is a military victory in an armed battle necessarily an absolute victory
given the nature of the contemporary system of international relations?
This paper tires to prove that it is not, by shedding light on aftermath of theRussia-Georgia war of 2008. Although Russia indisputably defeated Georgia
in the war, the war has jeopardized Russia’s reputation globally, as well as its
relations with the West and most of the post-Soviet realm. Such a result raises
significant doubts over Russia’s actual gains in the long-term.
This paper makes some evaluations for Russia on the result of the war,particularly on its strategic interests in the South Caucasus in the long-term.
The skepticism about Russia’s absolute victory in this war is further justified (1)by pointing out potential indirect and long-term consequences of the war for
Russia vis-à-vis its relations with the West and the South Caucasus countries,and (2) by highlighting what have been surfacing as actual gains and losses
for Moscow on three layers — international, regional, and domestic, several
years after its attack on Georgia.
Keywords: The Russia-Georgia War, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Russia-South
Caucasus relations, Russia-West relations, NATO expansion, EU enlargement,
energy geopolitics, the South Caucuses, the Caspian Sea