倉田奨励金研究報告書 第 51 集｜2020 年度（第 52 回）助成
人文・社会科学研究部門：1 年助成■受領№1475

東北アジア半導体産業のテクノナショナリズム：
韓国、日本、台湾、中国についてのケーススタディ
代表研究者

朴ソヒアシュリー
東北大学

博士課程学生Technonationalism in the Semiconductor Global Value Chain in
Northeast Asia: Case studies of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and China
Principal Researcher

Seohee Ashley Park,
Tohoku University Doctoral student

この研究は、テクノナショナリズム（TN）に関する理論的議論の理解を深めることを⽬的とする。従
来の研究をレビューすることは、ハイテク産業に対する保護貿易、イノベーションおよび戦略的産業アプローチを提案する。結論として TN が地政学的な関⼼と国家とビジネスの関係を含む包括的な概念であることを⽰する。産業の特徴はグローバルバリューチェーン（GVC）に⼤きく依存し、ハイテク産業の技術⾰新は⺠間部⾨が導いている。また、TN は国家安全保障問題に関する国家とハイテクビジネスによる狭義の概念である。このフレームワークを適⽤して、本研究では北東アジア諸国、すなわち韓国、⽇本、台湾の半導体産業を分析する。研究はまだ進⾏中だが、暫定的な結論では、北東アジアの半導体産業における TN の発露は産業政策に限らず、外交政策においても⽬撃されていることである。
The research aims at improving understanding in the theoretical discussion on technonationalism.
Reviewing conventional works of the literature proposes protectionist, innovationist, and strategic
industry approaches high-tech industries. The findings show that technonationalism is an inclusive
concept embracing geopolitical interest and state-business relations. The nature of industry highly relieson the global value chain (GVC), and technological innovation in the high-tech industries occurs mainlyin the private sector. Also, technonationalism is a narrowly defined concept with state actors involved innational security affairs and the high-tech business actors. Applying this framework, the researcher
analyses the semiconductor industry in Northeast Asian countries, namely South Korea, Japan, andTaiwan. Although the research is still ongoing, the tentative conclusion shows that the manifestation oftechnonationalism in Northeast Asia’s semiconductor industry is witnessed not only in their industrial
policy but also in their foreign policy.

1．研究内容government's engagement in technology affairs

With the rising tension between the United Statesand industries has increased. President Xi Jinpingand China surrounding security, trade, industry,of China declared the 'Made in China 2025' (MICand many other global issues since 2018, the2025) plan in 2015, challenging the current global

倉田奨励金研究報告書 第 51 集｜2020 年度（第 52 回）助成
人文・社会科学研究部門：1 年助成

technological leadership of the United States andliterature review by studying the liberal peace

its Western and Northeast Asian allies, namely thetheories. Liberal theories are rooted in Kantian

European Union, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

liberal internationalism, Schumpeterian liberal

Washington has certainly taken note of it, and thepacifism, and Machiavellian liberal imperialism.

Trump

designated

Schumpeterian liberal pacifist theory analyzes

China as a strategic competitor. Myriad sanctions

that capitalism and democracy are forces forand measurements ban American firms frominternational peace. As the development of

doing business with certain Chinese high-tech

capitalism brought economic rationalism tocompanies, most notably Huawei and ZTE.

individuals, they demanded a democratic

Even a hawkish posture towards China has

government for industrial stability. Thus, wars andbeen supported bipartisanly under the Biden

occupation are accepted as high-cost activities,administration.

and international trade is widened to accessadministration

inexplicitlyresources and materials. From this argument, theAs China is defined as a "national security threat"

democratic peace theory is developed. It is ato the United States, measurements taken by thewell-known theory that democracies do not engage

U.S. government have resulted in geopoliticalin war with each other. The independent variable

competition. The Trump administration's stanceof this theory is a democratic system or democratic

on U.S. commerce with China involves its militarynorm, and the dependent variable is international

allies and partners. Its political economy is difficult

peace. Democracy has been considered a single

to distinguish to what extent domestic orvariable for international peace. However, laterinternational political domain, and whether it issuch an idea was expanded: democratic countries

security or commerce matters. The situation ofshare the political system and norms, andgrowing trade tensions and increasing technology

their interdependency plays a significant role inrivalries between Washington and Beijing is themaintaining peace among them. The interdependency

resurgence of technonationalism, which Richard

is the international cooperative division of labor

Samuels first coined in 1987 to describe theand free trade among them. However, such a

Reagan administration's intervention in Fujitsu's

hypothesis instead points out that the major factor

acquisition Fairchild Semiconductor Corporationof international peace is not democracy itself

and ceased the deal for national security reasons.

but capitalism, so-called capitalist peace. The

Since then, it has been the fundamental organizing

capitalistic economic system and common interests

principle of the rise of Japan as a superpower inof states prevent the outbreak of war.

the 20th century. Also, it has become an academic
concept describing the state's interventionist

In other words, states tend to have compatible

policies in hi-tech industries.

foreign policy preferences as they seek economic
development and capital market integration. However,The

literature

review

partshows

howsuch interdependence has been weaponized andtechnonationalism arises as an antithesis of

has become a source of conflicts among states.

economic globalization. The author started theInterdependence is deployed as a tool to exert

倉田奨励金研究報告書 第 51 集｜2020 年度（第 52 回）助成
人文・社会科学研究部門：1 年助成

state power over other states. The global economic

extent does technonationalism concern nationaland production network carries security consequences

security?

as such network became a site of state power“national security”; however, this research uses

competition. Economic statecraft is based onJoseph Nyeʼs definition of security using a

asymmetric dependence among states, and it

three-dimensional chessboard; second, what are

resulted

technonationalism,

the features of the economic statecraft in theemphasizing technological autonomy for national

global value chain? As the global commerce

security. In the era of the globalized economy, thenowadays is mainly led by private sectors, it should“balance of dependence” is what decides the

be clearly defined that the stateʼs policies under“balance of power” among states. State power isthe banner of technonationalism are stateʼsderived from controlling international markets andguidance of the business as it originally means or

financial and economic cooperation instruments.

the business sectorsʼ manipulation of the state;

Emerging technologies are crucial to geoeconomics

third, how the asymmetric dependence influences

as they are the basis of strategic industries thatthe international politics? The balance of power iscreate dependencies converted into politicaldecided by balance of dependence, technonationalism

capital.

is to create such imbalances.

However, technonationalism to create a technologicalIn order to build the analytical framework ofimbalance with strategic industries tend to betechnonationalism, this research employs theoverused not only by the media but also byconcept of state-business relations (SBRs) toacademia. Thus, this research intends to set up acapture the manifestation of technonationalism

new framework of technonationalism to analyze

involving business actors, who are the actualstatesʼ economic statecraft. By reviewing andinnovators and leaders of high-tech sectors.

sorting the existing arguments on technonationalism,

Through the framework building, the author

the author adopts a working definition to structure

conceptualizes technonationalism as a narrowly

the overall research. Other scholars' findings fromdefined concept with limited state and businessrevisiting works on technonationalism show that

actors for national security matters, both in

the

the

national defense and economy aspects. The irontechnology itself but the industries applying thosetriangle model is applied to explain how statetechnologies.

globalactors and private actors interact in the dynamic ofproduction network shifted from cooperation totheir negotiation. Also, weaponized interdependencecompetition, states intervened in the market to(WI) is introduced to illustrate how the global

secure their domestic firmsʼ advantageous status

economy network symbolized as the global value

there. Also, the tendency of state competition ischain (GVC) fundamentally changes the nature

shiftedandincoreoffrom

theriseoftechnonationalismAsthenaturegeopolitics

of

is

not

the

involving

military

hardware and territorial factors to geoeconomics

Thereinfluence

areofvarious

economic

definitions

forinterdependence

among states.

deploying economic means. Thus, the author
raises these research questions: first, to what

Based on the assumption that the state-business倉田奨励金研究報告書 第 51 集｜2020 年度（第 52 回）助成
人文・社会科学研究部門：1 年助成

relations are symmetric, the case studies of Southstate-business partnership in the semiconductor

Korean,industry, the policy direction is beholden to theJapanese,

andTaiwanese

domesticsemiconductor industry is still ongoing. The

new phase.

author selects Samsung Electronics of South Korea
cases, TSMC of Taiwan, Elpida Memory, Renesas
Electronics, and Kioxia of Japan. Tentatively
concluded, Japan and Taiwanʼs cases show thattechnonationalism is manifested in their industrial

2．発表（研究成果の発表）
国内外の学会誌、学会講演会等における発表があれば５件程度記載。
記載内容：⽒名、題⽬、誌名、巻、号、⾴（年and foreign policies. In the case of Japan, the state次）、学会名（場所、年次）

actors have put effort into reviving its domestic

ISA 2021 Annual Convention (Virtual Platform),“chip-making” industry by merging memory chipApril 2021

and

each

Technonationalism

conglomerate. As a result, Elpida Memory andSemiconductor Industry

Renesas Electronics were established. Although: Case Studies of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwansystemchipdepartments

fromthe Japanese governmentʼs aid in 2009, Elpida
went into a bankruptcy in 2013. However, Renesas
became one of the major automobile semiconductor
producers in the global market. Kioxia is the caseshowing the Japanese government's effort toprotect its chip industry from foreignersʼ M&A.
South Korea and Taiwanʼs cases are how states use
their domestic semiconductor industry for foreign
policy reasons. So-called the Silicon shield, TSMC
has been a powerful tool to create Taiwanʼsleverage vis-à-vis China and the United States. On
the other hand, South Koreaʼs case with Samsung
is hard to conclude as technonationalism. Fromthe establishment of Samsungʼs semiconductorbusiness until the early 2020s, Samsung and theSouth Korean government have had different
interests in the chip business. The uniquerelationshipbetweenthegovernment

andconglomerates in Korean society is one factor, andthe governmentʼs recognition of the semiconductor
industry is the other. Although it is yet to deducethat the Korean case is precisely the logic oftechnonationalism, as the new government ofSouth Korea from May 2022 declares theinNortheast

Asia’s