Japanese Journal of Applied Psychology
2016, Vol. 42 (Special edition), 16–24

ArticleAnti-Japanese Public Attitudes as Conformity to Social Norms in China:
The Role of the Estimated Attitude of Others and Pluralistic Ignorance
Kengo NAWATA*, LiHua HUANG*, and Hiroyuki YAMAGUCHI*
This study investigated whether Chinese anti-Japanese public attitudes involve conformity to perceived antiJapanese social norms from the perspective of pluralistic ignorance. We surveyed attitudes toward Japan/China
among Chinese/Japanese university students. The results revealed that Chinese participants perceived the attitudes
of other Chinese toward Japan as more negative than their own private attitudes. In addition, publicly expressed
Chinese attitudes are influenced both by perceptions of others attitudes and private attitudes. In contrast, among
Japanese participants, public attitudes were influenced less by others estimated attitudes even though pluralistic ignorance was seen in Japan as a self-other discrepancy effect. These findings suggest that the Chinese conform toanti-Japanese social norms based on exaggerated perceptions and thus do not express positive public attitudes
about Japan in front of other Chinese.
key words: pluralistic ignorance, social norm, anti-Japanese sentiments, anti-Chinese sentiments, Japan–China
relationsJapan and China are geographically close, and due
to recent, profound cultural and economic exchanges in the two countries, there is a need for mutual
cooperation between them. However, Japanese attitudes toward China, as well as Chinese attitudes toward Japan, have been negative (Genron NPO, 2015;
Nippon Research Center, 2007; Cabinet Office ofJapan, 2015). During World War II, Japan was aperpetrator and China a victim, and this historicaldistinction has caused strong tensions between thesecountries. In addition, the recent territorial dispute
over the islands known in Japan as Senkaku and in
China as Diaoyu has frayed the countries relationships with each other.
Therefore, it is necessary to understand the psychological processes by which these negative attitudes are formed and perpetuated. However, with afew exceptions (e.g., Huang, Nawata, Miyajima, &Yamaguchi, 2015; Nawata & Yamaguchi, 2012; Takemura, Hamamura, & Suzuki, 2013; Yokota & Li,2012), few studies have investigated attitudes about
Japan–China relations from a psychological perspective. To improve the relationship between Japanand China, this study investigated the expression ofanti-Japanese attitudes by the Chinese in terms ofpluralistic ignorance (Katz & Allport, 1931; Miller &Prentice, 1994) and conformity to an anti-Japanesesocial norm.
Psychological studies related to international relations have demonstrated that individuals personalities or attitudes affect their behavior toward foreigncountries or foreigners. Most psychological studies
of Japan–China relations (Huang et al., 2015; Nawata & Yamaguchi, 2012; Takemura et al., 2013) investigated relations among individuals variables. For
example, Nawata & Yamaguchi (2012) showed thatnationalism facilitated support for intergroup aggression in Japanese students through collective victimhood and intergroup anger. Although these studies on internal processes are very important, studies
on social influence suggest that the attitudes of others significantly impact and alter individual behavior, even when individuals have no wish to behave ina particular manner. A similar situation arises in theexpression of attitudes toward international relationships. That is, among Chinese or Japanese, personal
interactions may promote the expression of unintended public attitudes. Based on this perspective,
the study examined whether anti-Japanese public attitudes among the Chinese involve pluralistic ignorance.

* Institute of Decision Science for a Sustainable Society, Kyushu University, 744 Motooka, Nishi-ku, Fukuoka 819–0395, Japan

Nawata et al.: Anti-Japanese Public Attitudes as Conformity to Social Norms in China

Pluralistic ignoranceSocial influence impacts behavior through people s perceptions of group norms or of others opinions. In other words, group norms can affect individual behavior only after they have been perceived
as group norms. Thus, erroneous perceptions of agroup norm can cause one to conform to a nonexistent majority. When most group members misperceive the group norm, all group members behave
differently from the group members average intentions. This phenomenon is called pluralistic ignorance (Katz & Allport, 1931; Miller & Prentice,1994). Pluralistic ignorance is defined as a psychological state characterized by the belief that one s
private attitudes and judgments are different fromthose of others, even though one s public behavior is
identical (Prentice & Miller, 1993, p. 244). For example, a group may have planned a trip, but if itrains heavily on the scheduled day, every individual
will want to cancel the trip because of the rain.
However, all the group members may believe thatthe others want to continue with the trip. Thus, despite each member s individual wish, the trip continues as planned because the members conform toan erroneous perception of the majority attitude. Erroneous perceptions of other members attitudes
lead to group behavior not desired by any individual
member. Past studies have demonstrated that pluralistic ignorance can emerge in many situations, suchas helping behavior in an emergency (Latané & Darley, 1968), drinking on campus (Prentice & Miller,
1993), and establishing romantic relationships(Vorauer & Ratner, 1996).
Process of maintenance of a social norm unsupported by individuals and pluralistic ignorance
Previous studies pointed that social norm was defined as two sides: externalized expectation or standard and internalized believes (i.e., Kitaori, 2000).
From the perspective of the former definition of externalized expectation or standard that others have,this study defined social norm as the collective belief and knowledge of what others should do or
should not do. If a person deviates from the social
norm, others may punish or exclude him/her. Pluralistic ignorance can lead to maintenance of a social
norm; moreover, maintenance of a social norm canlead to pluralistic ignorance. Thus, there is a cyclical（ 17 ）

process in this relationship, which mainly includes
two phases. In the first phase, members of a socialgroup have a cognitive bias toward the erroneous
belief that others attitudes differ from their own.
This self-other discrepancy is often narrowly definedas pluralistic ignorance (Miller & Prentice, 1994). In
the second phase, by assuming and acting upon anerroneous perception of others attitudes, membersof entire groups engage in behavior that they do not
personally support. This conformity is not due to informational but rather normative social influence(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). This estimation of others
attitudes is recognized as a social norm that is acompelling force for group members. This cyclicalprocess maintains the social norm without the support of individuals. In the current study, we define
pluralistic ignorance as cognitive bias in the selfother discrepancy, and conformity to perceived social norm as conformity to erroneous perceptionsof others attitudes.
Pluralistic ignorance occurs in small groups andat a broader social level. Vandello & Cohen (2004)
indicated that pluralistic ignorance can explain Caucasian males violent behavior in the Southern United States, which is called a culture of honor. Similar to males in the North, males in the South do notfavor male aggression. Yet, only Southern males
overestimated others approval of male aggression.
Similarly, Hashimoto (2011) showed that Japan s interdependent culture has persisted not because ofindividual preferences but because of people s overestimation of the general Japanese attitude toward
interdependent behavior and adaptation to the social niche. The violent culture of Caucasian males in
the Southern United States and the interdependentculture of Japan are maintained by social or cultural
norms, although these norms are not supported byindividual members of society.
When people perceive the behavior of others ascomplying with a social norm, they regard it as normal and conform to the norm. Moreover, the norm
may not become internalized as an individual preference. Conformity to the majority thus maintains
the status quo in a group or society. Pluralistic ignorance perpetuates social norms that individuals do
not support personally.

（ 18 ）

Japanese Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 42

Anti-Japanese attitudes in China
as pluralistic ignorance
Pluralistic ignorance can manifest itself as prejudice in intergroup relations. O Gorman (1975, 1979)
and O Gorman & Garry (1976) studied attitudes toward racial segregation and demonstrated that Caucasians overestimated other Caucasians support for
it. That is, even people who personally opposed racial segregation perceived that most others agreed
with the policy. This suggests that conformity to an
overestimated discriminatory majority may promote
the expressions of racial discrimination that mostindividuals do not actually support.
Similarly, the expression of negative attitudes
among the Chinese may also emerge as a result of
pluralistic ignorance. One reason why an antiJapanese social norm emerged in China may be that,from the Chinese perspective, Japan was the perpetrator of World War II, and Japanese brutality andviolence have been emphasized in Chinese history
education (Seo, 2009). This could lead to the formation of a social norm in which the expression of anti-Japanese attitudes is acceptable.
Once an anti-Japanese norm is shared in Chinesesociety, it may perpetuate itself, and it may be morenegative than the average private attitude among the
Chinese. Some individuals in China may actually
have positive attitudes toward Japan. However, due
to the anti-Japanese norm, it is difficult for many
Chinese to express positive views toward Japan, atleast on the surface, because of perceived pressure toconform to the social norm. Therefore, they may see
the majority of others conforming to the antiJapanese norm, and thus their belief that others besides themselves dislike Japan is reinforced. Conformity to the anti-Japanese norm is thus selfperpetuating. From this perspective, expressions ofanti-Japanese public attitudes among the Chinese
may be interpreted as pluralistic ignorance and conformity to an erroneously assumed anti-Japanese
norm in Chinese society.
Yokota & Li (2012) conducted pioneering workon pluralistic ignorance in Japan–China relations.
Adopting the methodology of previous pluralistic
ignorance studies, they compared Chinese antiJapanese emotions with Chinese beliefs about others anti-Japanese feelings. The results indicated that
the Chinese believed the anti-Japanese emotions ofothers to be stronger than their own personal antiJapanese feelings. In contrast, in Japan, the self-otherdiscrepancy was not observed after controlling forparticipants attitudes toward a third nation in considering a self-serving bias effect. These results suggest that Chinese expressions of anti-Japanese feelings include an element of pluralistic ignorance.
Yokota & Li s (2012) study provided suggestive
evidence for pluralistic ignorance in Japan–China
relations. Not only in that study but also in mostprevious studies on pluralistic ignorance, individual
attitudes were compared with beliefs about the attitudes of others (Taylor, 1982). Of course, it is important to clarify the self-other discrepancy. However,to understand the processes by which social norms
are maintained, it is necessary to investigate not onlypluralistic ignorance narrowly defined as the selfother discrepancy but also conformity to erroneous
beliefs about others attitudes. Thus, by measuring
public attitude as conformity to others, we examinedthe effect of perceived anti-Japanese attitudes ofothers on the public expression of attitudes by the
Chinese, and corroborated Yokota & Li s (2012)
findings on social norms and conformity.
Overview and hypotheses
This study comprised two surveys in China andJapan and tested three hypotheses, H.1–H.3. In thefirst survey, we examined Chinese attitudes toward
Japan. The item of this survey included two types ofothers : close friends and national society, which isdifferent in social distance and scale from the participants.
People conform to strong social norms. Deviants
are rejected by other group members under strongsocial norms. To avoid rejection, people would show
conformity to the perceived attitudes of others. We
applied the same socio-psychological processes toJapan–China relations and hypothesized H.1–H.3.
Many literature have noted that the anti-Japanese
attitudes is strong in China. Thus, Chinese people
perceives strong anti-Japanese social norm in China.
On the contrary, anti-Chinese social norm in Japanwas less widespread than anti-Japanese social normin China. We tested this phenomenon quantitatively.
H.1. The perceived anti-Japanese social norm in
China is greater than the perceived anti-China social norm in Japan.
Next, we investigated Chinese attitudes towardNawata et al.: Anti-Japanese Public Attitudes as Conformity to Social Norms in China

Japan. If there is a strong anti-Japanese norm in
China, Chinese people may express negative attitudes about Japan in front of other Chinese to conform to other Chinese. We predicted that perceptions of others attitudes toward Japan would be
more negative than the participants own attitudes.
This is the same prediction made by Yokota & Li
(2012). Furthermore, we postulated that people
would deliberately express more negative attitudes
toward Japan to conform to their erroneous perceptions of others attitudes toward Japan. Furukawa(2013) noted that some Chinese do not buy Japanese
products because of pressure to conform to the subjective social norm. This is a typical example of proJapan actions being constrained by conformity toothers perceived negative attitudes. In China, wepredicted that others perceived attitudes would correlate positively with public expression of attitudes
toward Japan.
H.2a. In China, estimates of others attitudes toward Japan are predicted to be more negative thanparticipants own attitudes.
H.2b. In China, the public expression of attitudes
in front of others is predicted to be affected not only
by private attitudes but also by the perceived attitudes of others.
In the second survey, we investigated Japanese attitudes toward China. No studies have found a clear
anti-Chinese norm in Japan. Under the weak antiChina norm, public discrimination is undesirable,
and hate speech is treated negatively in Japan, atleast in public. We hypothesized that the self-otherdiscrepancy would not be observed in Japan, andJapanese people conform only slightly to the perceived negative attitudes of others.
H.3a. In Japan, participants estimates of others
attitudes toward China are predicted not to differ
from participants own attitudes.
H.3b. In Japan, publicly expressed attitudes are
predicted to be influenced largely by private attitudes, but slightly influenced by the perceived attitudes of others.
Methods
Participants
Chinese sample. In China, Chinese university students participated in the survey using a web-based
survey tool provider, SurveyMonkey (www.survey
monkey.com). To recruit participants, the second（ 19 ）

author, who is Chinese, sent a recruitment e-mail to
her Chinese acquaintances at universities and requested them to forward it to students. Participants
responded in November and December 2011. Afterexcluding the surveys containing incomplete responses, 153 surveys were used in the analysis (66female, 83 male, 4 unspecified). The average age ofthe participants was 21.26 years (SD＝1.94). The locations of the participants universities were distributed as follows: 44 in northeastern China, 21 in eastern China, 20 in northern China, 10 in central
China, 4 in southwestern China, 3 in northwestern
China, and 32 unspecified. The information about
participants majors was not collected, but we did
not recruit only participants who majored inJapanese language or Japanese culture.
Japanese sample. In Japan, Japanese university students participated in the survey using SurveyMonkey (www.surveymonkey.com), as we did in China.
To recruit participants, the first author, who isJapanese, sent a recruitment e-mail to his Japaneseacquaintances at universities and requested them toforward it to students. Participants responded in
November and December 2011. After excluding thesurveys containing incomplete responses, 98 questionnaires were used in the analysis (59 female, 38
male, 1 unspecified). The average age of the participants was 21.08 years (SD＝1.64). The locations of
the participants universities were distributed as follows: 91 in Kyushu, 2 in Chugoku, 1 in Hokkaido, 1
in Kanto, 1 in Kansai, 1 in Shikoku, and 1 unspecified.
For ethical reasons, participants were informedon the first page of the questionnaire that their participation was voluntary, and that they could quit
the survey at any time. All participants in our analyses agreed to participate in this survey. In addition,
participants were notified on the final page of thequestionnaire that the survey did not intend to promote anti-Japanese prejudice, but rather aimed tounderstand the psychological mechanism underpinning prejudice and provide a strategy for future international cooperation.
Measures
The following items is in the survey toward theChinese participants. In the survey for Japanese participants, the terms referring to China and Japan
were reversed. In consideration of social desirability
bias, we used items for positive attitude toward Japan.

（ 20 ）

Japanese Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 42

1. Private attitude toward Japan. Private attitude toward Japan was measured by the item I like
Japan.
2. Perception of others attitudes toward Japan.
(2a) Perceived attitudes of friends toward Japan wasmeasured by the item My friends like Japan, and(2b) Perceived attitude of Chinese society toward
Japan was measured by the item Chinese society
approves of Japan.
3. Public expression of attitudes toward Japan.
(3a) Public expression of attitudes toward Japan tofriends was measured by the item: In front of myclose friends, I would say I like Japan , and (3b)Public expression of attitudes toward Japan in front ofChinese society was measured by the item I would
say I like Japan if I were to give a media interview
for Chinese society.
We measured the five items above, which wererated on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (strongly).
4. The perceived anti-Japanese norm. This
study defined social norm as the collective belief
and knowledge of what others should do or not do.
Table 1

To measure the perception of an anti-Japanese norm
on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5
(strongly), participants rated their agreement withthe following three items: If someone likes Japan,
he/she must not say this aloud in China ; People
who say I like Japan are disliked by other Chinese ;The average Chinese person thinks it is appropriate
to say I dislike Japan . The average score of thethree items (α＝.84) was used for the analysis.
These items were initially written in Japanese. The
second author and a collaborator, who are native
Chinese speakers, translated the items into Chinese,paying careful attention to conveying the same
meaning in both languages and checking it by backtranslation. For Japanese participants, we reversed
the placement of the references to China and Japan.
Results
Table 1 (Chinese samples) and Table 2 (Japanesesamples) show descriptive statistics and correlations
among the variables.

Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables in China (N＝153)
M

1
2

3

4

Private attitude toward Japan
Perception of others attitudes toward Japan(2a) Perceived attitudes of friends toward Japan(2b) Perceived attitudee of Chinese society toward Japan
Public expression of attitudes toward Japan(3a) Public expression of attitudes toward Japan to friends(3b) Public expression of attitudes toward Japan in frontof Chinese society
Perceived anti-Japanese norm

(SD)

1

2a

2b

3.61 (1.71)

1.00

3.07 (1.52)
2.83 (1.63)

.50**
.16*

1.00
.53**

1.00

3.18 (1.73)
2.95 (1.68)

.63**
.53**

.55**
.53**

.49**
.59**

3.04 (1.00) −.04

−.15†

−.13

3a

3b

1.00
.72**

1.00

−.08

−.16*

3a

3b

**p＜.01, *p＜.05, p＜.10†

Table 2

Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables in Japanese (N＝98)
M

1
2

3

4

Private attitude toward China
Perception of others attitudes toward China(2a) Perceived attitudes of friends toward China(2b) Perceived attitudee of Japanese society toward China
Public expression of attitudes toward China(3a) Public expression of attitudes toward China tofriends(3b) Public expression of attitudes toward China in frontof Japanese society
Perceived anti-Chinese norm**p＜.01, *p＜.05, p＜.10
†

(SD)

1

2a

2b

3.92 (1.65)

1.00

3.81 (1.52)
2.69 (1.21)

.56**
.34**

1.00
.47**

1.00

3.64 (1.84)

.78**

.57**

.37**

1.00

3.60 (1.81)

.68**

.62**

.37**

.71**

1.00

1.99 (0.87) −.37** −.39** −.41** −.28** −.27**

Nawata et al.: Anti-Japanese Public Attitudes as Conformity to Social Norms in China

Differences in perceived Anti-Japanese/AntiChinese norms between China and Japan (H.1)
The perceived anti-Japanese norm in China (M＝3.04, SD＝1.00) was significantly higher than theperceived anti-Chinese norm in Japan (M＝1.99,
SD＝0.87), t＝8.52, df＝249, p＜.001, Cohen s d＝1.12. The result supported H.1.
The self-other discrepancy in Anti-Japanese attitudes in China (H.2a)
We conducted a one-way ANOVA (analysis ofvariance) on the three items measuring attitudes toward Japan, (1), (2a), and (2b). The analysis revealed
a statistically significant main effect among the three
items, F(2, 304)＝9.41, p＜.001. Shaffer s multiple
comparison tests were then conducted and showedthat (2a) Perceived attitudes of friends toward Japan(M＝3.07, SD＝1.52, t＝3.75, df＝304, adjusted
p＜.001) and (2b) Perceived attitude of Chinese society toward Japan (M＝2.83, SD＝1.62, t＝5.42, df＝304, adjusted p＜.001) were significantly more negative than (1) Private attitude toward Japan (M＝3.61, SD＝1.70).
Thus, Chinese participants estimated that other
Chinese held attitudes more negative than theirown. In other words, pluralistic ignorance as a selfother discrepancy occurred both among friends andamong members of Chinese society in general. The
result supported H.2a.
The self-other discrepancy in Anti-Chinese attitudes in Japan (H.3a)
We conducted a one-way ANOVA on the three

Figure 1（ 21 ）

items measuring attitudes toward China, (1), (2a),and (2b). The analysis revealed a statistically significant main effect among the three items, F(2, 194)＝37.95, p＜.001. Shaffer s multiple comparison tests
were then conducted and showed that (2b) Perceived
attitude of Japanese society toward China (M＝2.69,
SD＝1.21) was significantly more negative than (1)Private attitudes toward China (M＝3.92, SD＝1.65,
t＝7.23, df＝97, adjusted p＜.001), and (2a) Perceived attitudes of friends toward China (M＝3.81,
SD＝1.52, t＝7.23, df＝97, adjusted p＜.001).
In Japan, friends attitudes toward China were notperceived as negative, but the attitudes of Japanesesociety in general toward China were perceived as
more negative than participants private attitudes.
This reflected pluralistic ignorance as a self-other(social level) discrepancy in Japan. The result partially disproves H.3a.
The effect of perceived attitudes of others on public expressions of attitudes (H.2b, H.3b)
Finally, we examined the effect of the perceived
attitudes of others on the public expression of attitudes. Private attitudes and the perceived attitudes
of others were regressed on public expressions of attitude among Japanese and Chinese participants(Figure 1). The results showed that for the Chinese,
their own private attitudes influenced their public
expressions of attitude (friends, β＝.47, p＜.001;
Chinese society, β＝.44, p＜.001). In addition, theperceived attitudes of others had an effect on the
public expression of attitudes (friends, β＝.32,

Antecedents of public attitudes expressed to other Chinese/Japanese
Note: **p＜.01, *p＜.05, †p＜.10

（ 22 ）

Japanese Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 42

p＜.001; Chinese society, β＝.52, p＜.001). Tests on
the difference of regression coefficients showed anon-significant difference between the effect of perceived attitudes of others and private attitudes(friends, Z＝0.673, p＝.50; Chinese society, Z＝0.128, p＝.90). The impact of perceived attitudes ofChinese others was as large as that of their own private attitudes.
However, among the Japanese, private attitudes
had quite a strong effect on public expressions of attitudes (friends, β＝.66, p＜.001; Japanese society,β＝.63, p＜.001). The perceived attitudes of others
had a relatively small effect on public expressions ofattitudes in front of others (friends, β＝.17, p＝.031;
Japanese society, β＝.15, p＝.051). Tests on the difference of regression coefficients showed that the effect of the perceived attitudes of others was significantly smaller than that of their personal attitudes(friends, Z＝3.91, p＝.002; Japanese society, Z＝3.11, p＝.01).
These results suggested that the intention to publicly say I like Japan is as greatly influenced by perceptions of others attitudes toward Japan as theirown personal attitudes among Chinese. Conversely,
the impact of the perceived attitudes of others on intentions to publicly declare I like China was low inJapan. These findings confirmed H.2b and H.3b.
Discussion
We tested the hypotheses that the Chinese expression of anti-Japanese attitudes involves conformity
to a perceived anti-Japanese norm.
First, we compared anti-Japanese and antiChinese norms. The perceived anti-Japanese norm
among the Chinese was greater than the perceived
anti-Chinese norm among the Japanese. Therefore,
the perceived social norm to exclude those who express positive sentiments about the other country
was stronger in China than in Japan.
Next, Chinese attitudes toward Japan were examined. Chinese participants perceived their friends
and Chinese society in general to have more negative attitudes toward Japan than their own personal
attitudes. Moreover, among the Chinese, public expressions of attitude were influenced not only by
their private attitudes but also by the estimated attitudes of other Chinese. These results indicated that
because the Chinese perceive others attitudes toward Japan to be more negative than their own, theyrefrain from publicly expressing positive attitudes
toward Japan.
The perceived anti-Chinese social norm among
the Japanese was much lower than the perceived anti-Japan social norm among the Chinese. Therefore,
there is no strong anti-China norm in Japan. Although pluralistic ignorance as a self-other, particularly self-society, discrepancy was found in Japan,
regression analysis showed that the perceived attitudes of others had a relatively small effect on public
expressions of attitudes. These findings indicatedthat while the Japanese perceive others attitudes toward China to be more negative than their own,
they do not conform to the perceived attitudes ofothers.
Conformity to the perceived attitudes of others in
China
These results suggest that the public expression ofanti-Japanese attitudes in China does not always reflect actual Chinese attitudes toward Japan. These
results also imply that even individuals who do nothave anti-Japanese attitudes may express them toconform to the perceived anti-Japanese social normin China. Under this anti-Japanese social norm,
people who approve of Japan cannot freely express
their views. Therefore, statements by those who holdanti-Japanese attitudes may account for a large proportion of the publicly expressed sentiments about
Japan in Chinese society. A spiral of silence (NoelleNeumann, 1993) thus seems to surround antiJapanese attitudes, and expression of these attitudes
is perpetuated and reinforced as a self-fulfilling
prophecy in Chinese society. In addition, the resultof the self-other discrepancy found in the study suggested that the perceived negative attitudes of othersreflects pluralistic ignorance.
The underlying cause of the anti-Japanese norm is
not important for it to be perpetuated; this is the result of society s conformity to a perceived norm. Regardless of the reason, once anti-Japanese attitudes
became a social norm, their expression is perpetuated. This is considered similar to the culture of honor in Southern United States, which emerged in theera of cattle breeders but is still maintained today(Vandello & Cohen, 2004).
To create a harmonious relationship between
Japan and China, anti-Japanese public attitudes thatemerge from social norms must be reduced. This
raises the question of exactly how to reduce confor-

Nawata et al.: Anti-Japanese Public Attitudes as Conformity to Social Norms in China

mity to the perceived attitudes of others. Previous
studies on pluralistic ignorance have shown thatwhen individuals recognize that a perceived norm
reflects pluralistic ignorance, pluralistic ignorance
decreases (Schroeder & Prentice, 1998). This suggests that making the Chinese aware that not many
Chinese sincerely harbor negative attitudes toward
Japan may reduce the anti-Japanese norm. However,
the effectiveness of this strategy is limited only to reducing pluralistic ignorance. A different strategy
would be needed to correct genuinely internalized
anti-Japanese attitudes. That is, psychological studies
must understand both types of anti-Japanese attitudes among the Chinese: genuinely internalized anti-Japanese attitudes and public attitudes conforming to the perceived attitudes of others. Few studies
have examined the latter, and future research is required to develop a more concrete strategy for resolving pluralistic ignorance in intergroup conflicts.
Less conformity to the perceived attitudes of others
in Japan
In contrast to Chinese attitudes toward Japan,
conformity to an anti-Chinese norm was not foundin Japan. This may be due to the absence of a clear
anti-Chinese norm in Japan. The results showed thatthe perceived anti-Chinese norm was very low; theaverage score was 1.99 on a 1–7 point scale. There
are many various social norms; anti-discrimination
might be a dominant norm in Japan. That is, because the anti-Chinese norm is not a dominant force
in Japan, participants might not feel pressured toconform to the perceived anti-Chinese attitude ofothers. Although the score of (2b) Perceived attitudeof Chinese society toward Japan among the Chinese
was similar to the score of (2b) perceived attitudes ofJapanese society toward China among the Japanese,the effect on the expression of personal sentiments
was larger in China than in Japan. The findings supported this interpretation. It should be noted that
this survey was conducted at a time when theJapan–China conflict was not a critical issue inJapan. If a survey had been conducted during a period of intense conflict, for instance, during the territorial dispute, anti-Japanese norms might also havebecome salient in Japan, resulting in pluralistic ignorance and conformity to the perceived attitudes ofothers, like the results for China in the current
study.

（ 23 ）

Limitations
The present research has some limitations thatshould be addressed in future studies. First, there
are some possibility of self-serving bias that people
think their negative attitude is more moderate or
lower than the others. In Yokota & Li s (2012) study,
attitudes toward a third country served to control
any effects of self-serving bias. However, in the current study, attitudes toward a third country were notmeasured, so there was no such control. Future research should measure and control this.
Next, the results showed perceived attitude ofothers had a relatively small impact on expression of
public attitudes among the Japanese. We interpreted
these results as the dominance of an anti-discrimination norm rather than an anti-Chinese norm.
However, because we did not measure perceived anti-discrimination sentiments, it is not well understood at this time whether or not an anti-discrimination norm was actually more dominant than an
anti-Chinese norm. Therefore, further research isnecessary to measure the anti-discrimination normin Japan and confirm the validity of the interpretation.
Third, answers about private attitudes may contain the influence of the norm. It is difficult to eliminate this effect only by improving the methodology
for self-reported answers. Thus, for understanding
the effect of purely private attitudes, controlling forthe effect of the perceived norms or attitudes of others is also necessary.
References
Cabinet Office of Japan 2015 Gaikou ni kansuru yoron chousa[Opinion Poll on Foreign Policies]. Retrieved fromhttp://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h27/h27-gaiko/index.html(In Japanese)
Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. B. 1955 A study of normative andinformational social influences upon individual judgment. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51,
629–636.
Furukawa, I. 2013 Kirai dakedo Kau Hitotachi no Kenkyu [Astudy of people who dislike but buy it], Japan Marketing
Journal, 3, 99–115. (in Japanese)
Genron NPO 2015 The 11th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll.
Retrieved from http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/2015
forum_en.pdf
Hashimoto, H. 2011 Interdependence as a self-sustaining set
of beliefs. Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psy-

（ 24 ）

Japanese Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 42

chology, 50, 182–193. (In Japanese with English abstract)
Huang, L., Nawata, K., Miyajima, T., & Yamaguchi, H. 2015
Values and Hostile Intent Attribution to Out-Groups
within China–Japan Relations: The Mediating Role ofPerceived Threats. International Journal of PsychologicalStudies, 7, 97–107.
Katz, D., & Allport, F. H. 1931 Student attitudes. Syracuse, NY:
Craftsman Press.
Kitaori, M. 2000 What is the social norm?: Reviews of locationand ought to do . Bulletin of the Graduated School of Education and Human Development, Nagoya University, 47,
155–165. (In Japanese with English abstract)
Latané, B., & Darley, J. M. 1968 Group inhibition of bystanderintervention in emergencies. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 10, 215–221.
Miller, D. T., & Prentice, D. A. 1994 Collective errors and errors about the collective. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 541–550.
Nawata, K., & Yamaguchi, H. 2012 The role of collective victimhood in intergroup aggression: Japan–China relations. The Japanese Journal of Psychology, 83, 489–495.
(In Japanese with English abstract)
Nippon Research Center 2007 Findings of joint public opinion
poll on relations between Japan and China. Retrieved
from http://www.nrc.co.jp/english/pdf/071126.pdf
Noelle-Neumann, E. 1993 The spiral of silence: Public opinion:
Our social skin. University of Chicago Press.
O Gorman, H. J. 1975 Pluralistic ignorance and white estimates of white support for racial segregation. Public
Opinion Quarterly, 39, 313–330.
O Gorman, H. J. 1979 White and black perceptions of racial
values. Public Opinion Quarterly, 43, 48–59.
O Gorman, H. J., & Garry, S. L. 1976 Pluralistic ignorance: A
replication and extension. Public Opinion Quarterly, 40,

449–458.
Prentice, D. A., & Miller, D. T. 1993 Pluralistic ignorance andalcohol use on campus: Some consequences of misperceiving the social norm. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 64, 243–256.
Schroeder, C. M., & Prentice, D. A. 1998 Exposing pluralistic
ignorance to reduce alcohol use among college students.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28, 2150–2180.
Seo, H. 2009 An image of Japan described in a historic textbook for Chinese middle schools. Journal of the Faculty of
Global Communication, 10, 263–275. (In Japanese)
Takemura, K., Hamamura, T., & Suzuki, S. 2013 Examinationof Japan–China relations from social and cultural psychological perspective: In-group bias and a refusal ofsmall gift acceptance. Organizational Science, 46, 45–55.
(In Japanese with an English abstract)
Taylor, D. G. 1982 Pluralistic ignorance and the spiral of silence: A formal analysis. Public Opinion Quarterly, 46,
311–335.
Vandello, J. A., & Cohen, D. 2004 When believing is seeing:
Sustaining norms of violence in cultures of honor. In M.
Schaller & C. Crandall (Eds.), The pschological foundations of Culture. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Vorauer, J. D., & Ratner, R. K. 1996 Who s going to make thefirst move? Pluralistic ignorance as an impediment to relationship formation. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 13, 483–506.
Yokota, K., & Li, Y. 2012 The effect of belief of others intergroup negative emotion on prejudice. Poster presented at
the 13th annual meeting of the Society for Personality
and Social Psychology, San Diego, LA.
(Received: 2015.6.16; Accepted: 2016.7.19)