The Kazakhstan-Japan Nuclear Nexus: Ideas, Norms, and Identities

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Special Feature

The Kazakhstan-Japan Nuclear Nexus: Ideas, Norms, and Identities
DISSYUKOV Almas
PhD Student, University of Tsukuba
Abstract
This article examines Japan’s cooperation with Central Asian countries in the security
ﬁeld based on the example of Kazakh-Japanese interactions in nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful use of atomic energy.
Using constructivism as the main theoretical framework, the author reveals new ideas,
norms, and identities that complement the existing architecture of bilateral perceptions andcooperation. At the same time, the author focuses on restraining norms in the two countries’
behavior, which constrain mutual calls for cooperation.
The author also uses desk research and discourse analysis to explore the numerous
written and oral sources of information he obtained in Kazakhstan and Japan, including
oﬃcial documents, as well as interviews with oﬃcials, former diplomats, researchers, andcivil society groups in the two countries. The article presents a deeper understanding of thepolitical and economic motives of cooperation between the two countries.
The article covers a 30-year period from the moment of the emergence of modern
Kazakhstan in 1991 until the end of 2021.
1. Introduction
In February 2022, Kazakhstan and Japan celebrated the 30th anniversary of the establishment of bilateral diplomatic ties. The Government of Japan (GOJ) became one of thefirst foreign countries to recognize Kazakhstan’s independence in December 1991. Over
three decades, Kazakhstan and Japan have been able to accumulate vast experience inpolitical and economic cooperation, as well as to generate various cooperative approaches
in international fora. As a result, the Government of Kazakhstan (GOK) openly supports
Japan’s aspirations to join the UN Security Council (UNSC) as a permanent member1.
To date, Kazakh-Japanese relations have been studied in detail in terms of political
dialogue, multilateral contacts, and economic cooperation. In contrast, issues of bilateralinteractions in the field of security have never been dealt with in such detail. Indeed, the152

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GOJ’s security engagement in Central Asia (CA) is always limited to its participation invarious regional projects aimed at the eﬀective management of border control, the prevention of drug trafficking, and the retention of energy resource supplies. In addition, thesestudies often ignore the Japanese experience of interaction with “nuclear Kazakhstan” asa possible source of initial security concerns. Partially, these aspects were touched uponin the writings of famous Japanese diplomats and scholars, such as Ambassador (Amb.)
Kyoko Nakayama (Nakayama 2005), Amb. Akira Matsui (Matsui 2007), Amb. Toshio
Tsunozaki (Tsunozaki 2007), Amb. Akio Kawato (Kawato 2008), and Professor Tomohiko
Uyama (Uyama 2004, 2010, 2015). Academic publications of Kazakh authors, such as
those by Mrs. Akerke Sultanova (Sultanova 2018), are limited in quantity and content.
It is important to assess nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation partnership
between the two countries as a good example of security interaction in order to reveal their
missing identities, norms, and ideas, which form mutual similarities and gaps (Collins,
2016:74). Multilateral cooperation is seen as an inseparable part of this process and not as
a separate environment (Suh et al., 2008:108-9). Constructivism shows how Kazakhstan
and Japan form ideas of bilateral relations in the context of global security, including
humanitarian consequences. This approach helps us to understand how the two countries
perceive each other through Alexander Wendt’s “Self and Others” lens, and how theirbeliefs aﬀect bilateral relations. Indeed, actors continually shape international ties throughtheir interactions. Their identities depend on whether these relationships will be directed
toward cooperation or confrontation. At the same time, specific goals are formed on thebasis of how countries see themselves in relation to other nations and the international community in general. This is why state identities, state beliefs, and norms are an important part
constructed by social structures (i.e., shared knowledge, material resources and practices),
rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics (Wendt,
1994:385).
The initial analysis of the foreign policy of Kazakhstan and Japan points to thesimilarity of the two nations in their desire to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.
However, a deeper analysis indicates that over the course of 30 years, these countries havedemonstrated diﬀerent models and strategies of behavior. Kazakhstan’s modern history is
unique. The country was a victim of nuclear tests on Kazakh soil from 1949 to 1989. In
addition, the country hosted several scientiﬁc and industrial reactors, and its people wereinvolved in the management of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster. After the collapse of
the former Soviet Union (FSU), Kazakhstan was de facto a nuclear-weapon state during
the first years of its independence. Despite its tragic nuclear legacy, the GOK, however,does not exclude the possibility of further development of its atomic industry, such as theThe Kazakhstan-Japan Nuclear Nexus: Ideas, Norms, and Identities

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construction of modern nuclear power plants NPPs. Recently, this issue has gained a lotof political attention. Indeed, Kazakhstani oﬃcials make conﬂicting statements that do notgive an exact answer as to Kazakhstan’s intentions regarding NPP construction.
Residents of two Japanese cities̶Hiroshima and Nagasaki̶were the victims of theﬁrst and last atomic bombings that occurred in warfare. It has long been known that the targets of the 1945 atomic bombing included other Japanese cities such as Kyoto and Niigata2.
During the Cold War (1945-1989), 23 Japanese anglers from Lucky Dragon No. 5 became
victims of the high-yield thermonuclear test at the Bikini Atoll in 1954. Poisoned by Castle
Bravo, test fish was later found on 856 Japanese fishing vessels3. In March 2011, one of
the largest nuclear accidents occurred at the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi NPP. Thus, Japan
has experienced three mega nuclear tragedies that have aﬀected its political norms, public
consciousness, and technological standards, as well as foreign policy goals. Nevertheless,Japan does not wish to completely abandon its nuclear energy projects4.
Despite the ongoing debate on Japanese paciﬁsm and the possible shift toward militarism, Japan is still considered “a country with latent nuclear capacity” or “five minutes
from a nuclear weapon” (Baylis et al., 2017:425). In this context, relations between the twocountries can be viewed as an attempt by Japanese authorities to obtain more information
about the impact and use of nuclear weapons. However, the GOJ is forced to reaﬃrm, on aregular basis, the importance of the 1967 Three Non-Nuclear Principles (i.e., not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan)5.
The international community is deeply aware of how the country reacts to North
Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, considering them a direct threat to regional andinternational security. At the same time, Japan continues to cooperate with the US, thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC), and Russia; these nations possess powerful nuclear
arsenals and means of delivery. Japan reacts to nuclear weapons if these arsenals directly
threaten its security. In other cases, this matter does not irritate the Japanese government.
In fact, Japan once considered options for creating its own nuclear weapons and today isunder the US “nuclear umbrella,” which cannot but help inﬂuence Japan’s oﬃcial positionon the reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals (Kase, 2001:56).
In 1991, with the collapse of the (now former) USSR, new nuclear powers appearedon the world map: Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus. In fact, Kazakhstan andJapan were indirect agents of the Cold War. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan
and Japan were able to build relations, despite the initial refuse of Kazakhstan to abandon
its nuclear status without reservation. As a result, Japan began to transform its policy under
two conditions: the absence of the USSR and the appearance of new international challenges; that is, the spread of international terrorism and the emergence of new nuclear states

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Later, the two states were able to achieve a visible partnership in this area. Below,
the author describes all possible elements of such cooperation and examines Kazakhstan’s
experiences of interaction with Japan (Kavalski, 2010:4) to answer the following researchquestions: What is the essence of bilateral relations in this area, and what rules are theygrounded in? What are the constraining foundations of joint cooperation?
2. Background information
On August 29th, 1949, the USSR tested its first nuclear bomb, RDS-1, at the
Semipalatinsk test site (STS). Over the next four decades, 456 nuclear and thermonuclear
explosions were carried out at the site. According to the First President of Kazakhstan(FPK), Nursultan Nazarbayev, a person who has been at the center of crucial political decisions and has determined the country’s policy over the past 30 years, the entire territoryof the country resembled one large polygon (2001:26). The nuclear tests were not limited
by one specific site and exclusively by military goals. From 1965 to 1979, a series of 26
nuclear explosions was carried out for scientiﬁc purposes in Western Kazakhstan. The total
power of all nuclear devices tested on and in Kazakhstan’s soil was 2,500 times greaterthan the capacity of Hiroshima’s Little Boy (Nazarbayev, 2001:54).
As often happened in USSR history, almost all Soviet political experiments̶including forced migration, executions, and exiles̶were carried out without warning and in strictsecrecy. Oﬃcially, residents near the STS territories began to receive warnings beforehand,but only in 1953; that is, four years after the ﬁrst test. Perhaps this can be attributed to thedeath of the then-Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. However, the Khrushchev Thaw (1953-1964)
had no positive eﬀect on STS activities. After ten years, the USSR switched to undergroundtests, which also carried new risks and hazards for local people and the surrounding environment. According to official data, more than half a million people suffered as a resultof the tests (Nazarbayev, 1996:89). For example, the direct effects of nuclear testing canalways be observed at Semey Medical University (SMU), where a significant number ofmutilated fetuses are stored6.
The last nuclear test in Kazakhstan’s history occurred on October 19th, 1989; therefore, the STS functioned for 40 years and two months in full operating mode. The FPK
signed presidential decree No. 409 on the STS shutdown on August 19th, 1991, four months
before Kazakhstan gained full independence. This document also incorporated elementsof the 1990 Declaration on the State Sovereignty. In 2009, the UN General Assembly(UNGA) declared August 29th the International Day against Nuclear Tests7.

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According to the FPK, popular activities at the time included the NevadaSemipalatinsk anti-nuclear movement, under the leadership of the famous Kazakh writer
Olzhas Suleimenov, which influenced the official position of Kazakh SSR leadership(Nazarbayev, 1996:161). Thanks to their joint efforts, 11 out of 18 planned nuclear tests
at the STS were stopped in 1989. It is noteworthy that the successful experience of
Kazakhstani NGOs has drawn increased attention from civil society in the US and Japan.
Mr. Suleimenov became the second Kazakh to take part in the activities of the Japan
Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo). However, it took Kazakhstan
approximately ten years to destroy the infrastructure of the test site. On May 27th, 1995, thelast nuclear device was destroyed at the test site. The last testing tunnel was demolished on
July 29th, 2000 (Tokayev, 2001:529). Such success was not possible without the assistanceof foreign partners, such as Japan (Kawabata, 2018).
The history of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was well known in FSU countries. The story of Sadako Sasaki inspired the famous Avar poet Rasul Gamzatov to write
one of the best Soviet songs about WWII: The Cranes8. Soviet experts were also able tovisit the destroyed remains of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a month after the tragedy. In 2016,
Russian authorities decided to share that archival video with the GOJ (Mizukawa, 2016).
No one should have any doubts that this film directly or indirectly influenced the fate of
Kazakhstan and its inhabitants. It is clear that the ﬁlm̶which remained hidden for morethan seven decades̶fueled the interest and desire of Soviet leadership in owning a new
deadly weapon.
However, the bomb dropped on Nagasaki was different from the one used in
Hiroshima. Based on its characteristics, RDS-1 was closer to Nagasaki’s Fat Man9. On
August 9th, 2016, during the 71st Nagasaki Peace Ceremony, Toyokazu Ihara (Dec.), atomic
bomb survivor and author of No More Nagasakis, declared that the 1945 atomic bombings
might be considered nuclear tests of two diﬀerent types of atomic bombs10. This means that
Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Semipalatinsk became elements of a single chain.
By the end of 1991, when newly independent states (NIS) appeared on the world map,
Kazakhstan and Japan had a similar understanding and knowledge of the possible pros
and cons of nuclear weapons, the eﬀects of their direct/indirect use, and the importance offurther proliferation eﬀorts.
In theory, the two sides were able to combine their potential for the launch of majoranti-nuclear initiatives, especially in terms of humanitarian law, environmental impacts,
and changing global public opinion, but this did not happen. As for its part, Kazakhstan wasable to achieve a balance in relations between the government, civil society, and the international community, including with its closest neighbor, Russia, with which Kazakhstan

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広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 9also had nuclear agreements. In Japan, the situation looked a little diﬀerent. The presenceof diﬃcult relations with neighbors required Japan to make well-considered choices.
3. Actions, not words
After the USSR collapsed, a large nuclear arsenal was concentrated in Kazakhstan,which included the uranium industry, as well as experimental and industrial nuclear reactors with powerful scientiﬁc and technological potential (Tokayev, 2001:349). According
to the FPK, Kazakhstan became a nuclear-weapon state against its will (2003:69). Before
the destruction of the last device in May 1995, for three years and ﬁve months, Kazakhstan
was de facto a nuclear-weapon state.
The set of nuclear weapons included 104 ICBMs with 1,216 nuclear warheads. The
effective casualty radius of SS-18 missiles was approximately 12,000 km. In Eastern
Kazakhstan, 40 long-range strategic bombers of the Bear-H6/16 class, equipped with
240 long-range cruise missiles, were also deployed. For example, the distance between
Semey (formerly called Semipalatinsk) and Tokyo is equal to 4,956 km. In May 1983,
Japan, along with the US, opposed the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe
and Asia (Singh, 2013:59). In other parts of Kazakhstan, there were 148 ICBM silos. In
addition, there was considerable potential to produce chemical and biological weapons(Tokayev, 2001:349). For instance, the Ulba Metallurgical Plant (UMP) had 600 kilos of
weapons-grade enriched uranium, enough to fuel more than 20 atomic bombs. In 1994,
these nuclear materials were secretly transported to the US as part of Project Sapphire. Thisarsenal was large enough to destroy all potential adversaries of the former USSR (Tokayev,
2001:23-29).
On December 21st, 1991, speaking in Almaty at the Summit of FSU Countries (theforerunner of the Commonwealth of Independents States, CIS), Nazarbayev noted theimportance of norms such as uniﬁed control over nuclear weapons, non-proliferation, compliance with IAEA standards, and the promotion of international cooperation on WMDrelated issues. Even then, the former Kazakh leader made it clear that it would be preferable
for Kazakhstan and other CIS countries to acquire the status of a non-nuclear-weapon state,rather than to seek recognition as a nuclear power (2009:30-31). The collapse of the USSR
also meant the deterioration of traditional economic ties. To ensure stability, the countries
needed huge ﬁnancial injections and reforms. Kazakhstan understood that nuclear weapons
had to be maintained, and that new investors would not be interested in supporting newrogue states.
Following the Almaty Summit, an agreement was adopted between the four FSU

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republics on joint measures regarding nuclear weapons11. This legal document included thefollowing norms: elimination and non-proliferation commitments, as well as the “no ﬁrst
use” (NFU) principle (Tokayev, 2001:351). At the time, Ukraine and Belarus had alreadyannounced their intention to join the NPT as nonnuclear-weapon states. However, the First
President announced that strategic weapons would remain inviolable in Kazakhstan.
On the one hand, in the 1990s, in Kazakh society, a dispute arose about the futureof the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world. For instance, a small number of ﬁgures,
including military officers, were in favor of maintaining a nuclear arsenal in moderation(20-50 warheads). According to Nazarbayev, it was a dispute, but not a split (2001:34).
In addition, various external agents, including former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi,
offered funds to maintain and manage Kazakhstan’s nuclear program (Ota, 2015). However, Kazakh oﬃcials precisely understood that the appearance of the ﬁrst Muslim nuclear
bomb would attract the excessive attention of extremist groups and could become an instrument of nuclear blackmail (Tokayev, 2001:4). In 1992, Kazakh leadership clearly statedthat Kazakhstan would contribute to international peacekeeping efforts. As mentioned,
Kazakhstan would seek to (1) curtail the arms race and prevent it in space; (2) decrease theproduction and testing of all types of WMD; (3) prohibit the use of existing̶and createnew̶ technologies for WMD production; and (4) destroy chemical weapons (Nazarbayev,
1992:53).
In the early 1990s, the FPK met with UK Prime Minister (PM) Margaret Thatcher,
US Vice President Albert Gore, US Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren
Christopher, the French Foreign Minister (FM) Rolland Dumas, the German FM HansDietrich Genscher, and US Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. One of Nazarbayev’s
closest associates, Nurtai Abykayev, noted that the purpose of all these visits was to voice
Kazakhstan’s position on nuclear weapons (MID, 1998:41). As for his part, the thenKazakh leader designated the main conditions for the further surrender of these arsenals(2009:39-40). Nazarbayev said it is premature to recognize Kazakhstan as a non-nuclearweapon state until the country receives comprehensive security guarantees. He added thatthe country does not intend to distribute or transfer nuclear technologies, components, orfuel (2003:64-67).
As a result, in May 1992, in Lisbon, representatives from Russia, Kazakhstan,
Ukraine, Belarus, and the US signed the protocol for the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty. The Lisbon Protocol also contained their obligations to accede to the NPT as nonnuclear-weapon states12. Two years later, in February 1994, Kazakhstan ﬁnally joined the
NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state (MID, 2014:8). In fact, the voluntary denouncementof nuclear weapons was made in exchange for obtaining a special international status with

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The withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan’s territory was completed on April
21st, 1996 (Tokayev, 2001:467).
In addition, Kazakhstan tried to inﬂuence its closest neighbors and partners in Asia,
whose behavior also aﬀects Japan’s security policy. In June 1993, Kazakhstan welcomed
the official delegation of the DPRK, headed by then-Chairman of the Supreme People’s
Assembly Yang Hyong-sop. During the visit, Nazarbayev expressed concern about
Pyongyang’s decision to withdraw from the NPT (Tokayev, 2001:439). In June 1994, during a discussion on Eurasian Union-related issues with Russia, Kazakhstan proposed forming an Interstate Center for Nuclear Disarmament with the participation of internationalorganizations (IOs) (Nazarbayev, 2009:454). In July 1996, speaking in the Parliamentof Kazakhstan, PRC President Jiang Zemin announced a moratorium on nuclear tests at
the Lop Nur test site (MID, 1998:275) and reassured the guarantees of the NFU principle(Baizakova and McDermott, 2015:14).
(1) The start of cooperation
Kazakh SSR did not have traditions of foreign policy during Soviet times. Principlesof Soviet diplomacy were unsuitable for independent Kazakhstan due to its incompatibility
with new goals and objectives (MID, 1998:14). In reality, Kazakhstan’s modern diplomacy
was started from scratch. According to Tokayev, in the very beginning, the FPK decided
that Kazakhstan would not undermine the non-proliferation regime, increase international
tension, or cause nuclear tensions (Tokayev, 2001:4). Indeed, anarchy is what states makeof it (Wendt, 1992:395).
According to Japanese logic, the nuclear experience is essential for a better understanding of nuclear issues and anti-nuclear responsibility (Cabinet Office, 2017:7). The
Japanese Foreign Ministry (MOFA) often talks about its role as a “bridge” between nuclear
and non-nuclear states. However, Japanese NGOs believe that Japan’s historical legacy
should push Tokyo to form various partnerships and networks that would allow it to more
effectively play the role of an intermediary, especially in its relations with Russia andChina, which have close ties with Kazakhstan.
In May 1992, Nazarbayev received his first Japanese visitor, FM Michio Watanabe.
According to Japanese sources, the meeting did not contribute to the growth of
Kazakhstan’s popularity among Japanese politicians for several subjective reasons (Uyama,
2004:201-202). However, during the meeting, FM Watanabe expressed his concern on
nuclear issues and presented Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles to the FPK. Nazarbayev
reassured FM Watanabe that Kazakhstan, together with other states, would seek toThe Kazakhstan-Japan Nuclear Nexus: Ideas, Norms, and Identities

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completely eliminate nuclear weapons (Tokayev, 2001:422). This may indicate that the
Kazakh leader understood the importance of building proﬁtable economic ties with Japan.
Nazarbayev, as a politician, realized he had to enlist the support of the Japanese government. It was clear that investment and aid would not come if Kazakhstan did not conﬁrm
its peaceful orientation and did not guarantee that it would strive to achieve disarmament.
The GOJ understood that the control and protection of nuclear materials and radioactive waste in the NIS were far from international standards13, and that these countries could
not implement costly nuclear disarmament programs alone14. In the 1993 Diplomatic Bluebook, the MOFA noted that the situation in Kazakhstan, along with Russia and Ukraine,
had a great impact on the security of neighboring states. Reliable control, the removalof nuclear weapons, and accession to the NPT were considered important conditions forinternational security15. The GOJ clearly perceived all possible challenges and risks, andrecognized the importance of comprehensive measures aimed at the complete dismantlingof nuclear infrastructure in FSU countries.
In July 1992, the second paragraph of the G7 Munich Summit’s outcome declaration was entirely devoted to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The document
stipulates that G7-NIS cooperation is only possible if all countries adhere to the principles
of non-proliferation16. In July 1993, the Tokyo G7 Summit’s declaration once again calledon Kazakhstan and Ukraine to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states17. The GOJ
expressed willingness to assist with eliminating nuclear weapons and to clean up thenuclear test site.
The first basic norm was formed against the backdrop of the relationship between
Kazakhstan and Japan, rooted in the fact that Kazakhstan had to fulfill a specific condition to convince the Japanese authorities to help the country. Subsequently, this principle
is intended to be used in economic relations between the two states. Japan will repeatedly
stimulate the signing of important bilateral agreements to legally consolidate Kazakhstan’s
obligations in the investment and nuclear ﬁelds.
In October 1992, the GOJ hosted the Tokyo Conference on Assistance to the NIS,
chaired by the same FM Watanabe. Representatives from 70 countries and 20 IOs attended
the event. The parties agreed that aid coordination, based on the principle of “help for selfhelp,” would be made for each country individually18. Prior to the 1993 Tokyo Summit,
at the G7 Joint Ministerial Meeting to support Russia, Japanese PM Kiichi Miyazawa
oﬃcially announced that Japan would give $100 million to help eliminate nuclear weaponsin FSU countries (MOFA, 2003:74). Later, at the 1999 Cologne G8 Summit, PM Keizo
Obuchi announced the allocation of $200 million for new projects (MOFA, 2003:74).
From 1993 to 1994, the GOJ concluded bilateral cooperation agreements with Russia,

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Ukraine, and Belarus regarding technical assistance in the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Based on these documents, appropriate bilateral technical committees (TCs), under the
auspices of the uniﬁed technical secretariat (TS), were established. On March 11th, 1994, asimilar intergovernmental agreement was signed with Kazakhstan, which entered into force
on the same day19. For Kazakhstan, this became the ﬁrst bilateral institution in relation to
Japan. In this way, Japan could coordinate and monitor its efforts on the ground. At thesame time, this structure underscored the importance of Japanese authorities institutionalizing future relations with Kazakhstan. In addition, this mechanism made it possible to lay
the foundation for further cooperation in the ﬁeld of security.
In 1997, the G8 nations invited CA countries to join the “Program for Preventing
and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials”20. One year later, the G8 statesassured that they would continue to work with the NIS to improve their nuclear safety21. In
July 1997, PM Ryutaro Hashimoto presented his famous Eurasian diplomacy that covered
Russia, China, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. He conﬁrmed that the “peaceful orientation”
of CA nations (e.g., nuclear non-proliferation, democratization, and the fostering of stability) would form one of the three pillars of further cooperation22.
(2) Toward the Hiroshima-Nagasaki-Semey Alliance23
Kazakhstan fulfilled its international obligations by implementing joint agreementswith the US, Russia, and Japan as a source of additional ﬁnancial and technical assistancefor the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and to erase the consequences of operating nuclear
weapons in Kazakhstan (MID, 2005:11). In general, Kazakhstan received ¥1.77 billion($16 million) from Japan, or 7% of the total amount allocated for disarmament and nonproliferation programs in 1993 and 1999. This amount is almost twice the amount given
to Ukraine (3% or ¥750 million), but significantly inferior to the assistance programs for
Russia (81% or ¥20.38 billion) or Belarus (9% or ¥2.23 billion)24.
In October 1992, speaking at the UN General Assembly, the GOK tried to create
new aid opportunities for social-related projects in eastern parts of the country. As a result,
Kazakh experts took part in the preparation of the UN Secretary-General’s report on international aid to the Semey region (September 23rd, 1998)25 and project proposals in fourareas: healthcare, the economy, ecology, and public information. The report was reviewed
at the 53rd session of the UN General Assembly (1998-1999) (Tokayev, 2001:283). In
November 1998, the UN General Assembly adopted a separate resolution on the matter26.
This document created the prerequisites for holding the Tokyo International Conference on
Semipalatinsk. In fact, it also reﬂects a second signiﬁcant norm in Kazakh-Japanese relations. The objective of such cooperation should have an important international status andThe Kazakhstan-Japan Nuclear Nexus: Ideas, Norms, and Identities

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should be enshrined in international documents.
In September 1999, FM Tokayev̶who became the new president of Kazakhstan in
mid-2019̶took part in the Tokyo Conference, which was attended by more than 200 delegates from 80 diﬀerent IO/ROs and NGOs27. Thirty-eight Japanese organizations, as well as
professional leaders from Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Semipalatinsk, attended the forum. In
his welcoming statement, PM Obuchi stressed that international assistance should be basedon the concept of “human security” (i.e., a comprehensive view of all threats to humanlife and dignity). PM Obuchi also singled out Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Semipalatinsk as
three important “symbols of peace.” In fact, the Kazakhstani participants perceived this as acall for joint action. At that time, Kazakhstan began to project the history of Semipalatinsk
along with the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
In sum, the conference became a starting point for comprehensive partnerships among
various agents of the two countries28. Japan declared its readiness to help improve medical
infrastructure for aﬀected people with the proviso that Kazakh authorities would observe
the ownership and coordination principles. As a result, more than $20 million was pledged
from Japan, the World Bank, and various UN agencies. In addition, Japan announced a
special contribution of $1 million through the Japanese/UNDP Funds29. In December 2006,
the GOJ and the UN decided to extend an additional $2 million to ﬁnance a joint project in
Kazakhstan30. Moreover, GOJ continued to support endeavors aimed at strengthening thetechnical capacity and security of leading Kazakhstan’s research institutions, such as the
National Nuclear Center (NNC), the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC), andthe Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP)31.
In April 2007, based on the findings of the GOJ’s team study tour of Kazakhstan(December 2006), the GOJ decided to extend approximately ¥500 million to boost security
at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant (UMP) and the INP32. Such a decision was made basedon the Kazakhstan-Japan agreement to launch a negotiation process on the conclusionof a bilateral nuclear pact33. In May 2015, then-First Vice-Minister of Energy Uzakbay
Karabalin of Kazakhstan declared that Japanese aid helped to increase the reputation andreliability of the local atomic industry34. This is a vivid example of Kazakhstan’s traditionally high appraisal of Japanese aid and investments.
During the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), the GOJ joined 18
world leaders in a statement expressing support for the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium(LEU) Bank in Kazakhstan at UMP facilities35. However, Japan is not listed among themain donors of the project, which may indicate the presence of restraining norms in theJapanese assessments of the project, such as its proximity to Russia. In addition, alongside
France, Hungary, and the UK, the two countries joined the NSS Gift Basket on Trans-

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port36. Kazakhstan’s participation in this group was dictated by its geographic location andextensive experience in rail communications. However, the initial proposal came from theJapanese MOFA.
This approach suggests that for many years, Japan viewed itself as a major donor to
Kazakhstan, and as a guide that facilitated Kazakhstan’s participation in new security initiatives. This also led to the formation of new norms in relations between the two countries;
it lies in the fact that Kazakhstan is waiting for a speciﬁc invitation or action that will open
the door for new cooperation with Japan.
(3) Promoting regional security in Asia
Nazarbayev expressed his support for nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ)-related
ideas in December 1991 at the CIS Summit (1996:25-26). As a ﬁrst step, in October 1993,
during his talks with Jiang Zemin, the FPK proposed creating a joint group of experts tostudy the problems of Lop Nur and STS (Tokayev, 2001:124). In 1998, Kazakhstan condemned nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, which are located in close proximity to Central Asia. Even earlier, in February 1992, during his visit to Islamabad, theformer Kazakh leader expressed interest in establishing an NWFZ in South Asia (Tokayev,
2001:418).
These ideas signaled to other CA leaders the need for further discussion on the
NWFZ project in Central Asia (CANWFZ). In 1994, security assurance from P5 countries
increased the confidence of the Kazakh leader in the feasibility of a new regional initiative. The CA initiative to create a CANWFZ was set forth in the 1997 Almaty Declaration(Tokayev, 2001:357). This was not a coincidence. During the Soviet era, nuclear explosions
also occurred in Ukraine (two tests), Uzbekistan (two tests), and Turkmenistan (one test)(Nazarbayev, 2001:196).
In September 1997, this idea received additional impetus during the meeting of CA
foreign ministers, which was organized under the initiative of former Uzbek leader Islam
Karimov (Ishiguri, 1999:4-5). The CANWFZ idea was supported by UNGA resolution
52/38 S, “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia,” which called for
the UN Secretary-General to provide full support to CA countries37. As for its part, the GOJ
provided $420,000 to the UN Secretariat to facilitate the negotiation process38. Participationin this process was important for Japan in terms of studying the CA positions toward two
Japanese neighbors, Russia and China, whose voices are vital in discussing the possibilityof creating a similar zone in Northeast Asia.
The expert group, organized by the UN Regional Center for Peace and Disarmamentin Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD), began drafting the treaty in 1998. The next year, anThe Kazakhstan-Japan Nuclear Nexus: Ideas, Norms, and Identities

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additional round of expert meetings was held in Hokkaido. Despite the progress made, theCA countries did not reach a consensus due to the absence of Tajik and Turkmen delegations. The next conference, which was organized in 2000 in Hokkaido, also failed to reachan agreement. All necessary preparations were finalized two years later during the 2002
Samarkand meeting. Despite resistance inside and outside the UN, partly due to the membership of the CA countries in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the GOJ supported the signing of the Semey treaty in 2006 as an eﬀort to strengthen peace and stability
in the region39.
Individual eﬀorts of Japanese diplomacy regarding the CANWFZ only increased the
GOJ’s interest in continuing multilateral dialogue with CA nations as a potentially collective force capable of supporting various international initiatives in Japan (Ishiguri, 2010).
In this regard, Japan’s participation in the creation of the CA, plus Japanese dialogue (CAJ)
in 2004, can be viewed from a new angle. The dynamics of exchanges with the countries
of Central Asia show that the solution of security issues led to the development of Japanesediplomacy in the regional context. Today, Japan is actively leveraging its successful experience as a “bridge-builder” or “catalyst,” which it gained from the launch of the Central
Asia+α dialogue platform.
(4) The role of Hibakusha (atomic bomb survivors)
In 1957, famous Kazakh poet Mukhtar Auezov was one of the ﬁrst Kazakhs to speak
about the danger of Soviet nuclear testing (Auezov, 2017). As the delegate of the III World
Conference against A & H Bombs, he visited several Japanese cities, including Hiroshima(Nazarbayev, 2001:62). Later, poet Olzhas Suleimenov, artist Karipbek Kuyukov, andmembers of numerous Kazakh NGOs also took part in subsequent meetings of the World
Conference against A & H Bombs.
In August 1998, a group of Hiroshima residents who supported the Kazakh nationalteam at the 1994 Asian Games founded the “Hiroshima-Semipalatinsk Project” (Xiaoyu,2018). This NGO is engaged in various programs, including the organization of medical
aid, educational exchanges, mutual visits, and cultural events. Chieko Kobatake (deputy
director) and Akerke Sultanova (project alumna)40, who were part of this group, helped to
distribute and translate the song Zaman-ai (Oh Such Times)̶a symbol of the antinuclear
movement in Kazakhstan, sung by the famous Soviet/Kazakh singer Roza Rymbaeva̶into
Japanese. In 2011, the song underwent a third rebirth in Japan as a protest song against the
GOJ’s further nuclear plans.
In November 2013, the “Earth Identity Project,” together with Kazakhstan’s initiative,
The ATOM Project (Abolish Testing: Our Mission), launched a series of antinuclear events

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広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 9in Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki. To date, this is the only large-scale action of public
groups of the two countries in Japan. Akie Abe, a spouse of ex-PM Abe, also attended theevent. Later, Mrs. Abe expressed her thoughts on Twitter about the joint initiative: “Paintings inspire people to fight for a world without nuclear weapons. It would be great if art
reaches its goal and the world rids itself of nuclear weapons” (Li, 2013).
To date, signiﬁcant scientiﬁc, medical, and educational assistance to Semey has been
provided through the Hiroshima International Council for Healthcare of the RadiationExposed, the Nagasaki Association for Hibakushas’ Medical Care, the Japanese Red Cross
Society, the CANVaS Youth Network, and GOJ grant assistance for grassroots projects(kusa-no-ne). However, they are local in nature and only benefit a small group of professionals.
The humanitarian track allows the two countries to talk about the similarities of theirmoral duties (DiFilippo, 2006:195). However, the GOK cannot bring its extensive contacts with Japanese NGOs to a higher political level due to the presence of serious gaps
among anti-nuclear agents inside Japan, especially after the March 11th events; neither
can Kazakhstan interfere with issues related to Japan’s participation in the US “nuclear
umbrella.” Ordinary citizens of Kazakhstan cannot understand the closeness of the USJapan alliance, as well as how the Japanese were able to forgive the US for nuclear bombing.
The UN University and Kyoto University of Foreign Studies tried to connect eﬀorts
by Kazakhstan and Japan several times to develop common approaches in the field of
nuclear disarmament education41. However, these initiatives have remained unrealized.
For example, during an interview with Hiroshima NGOs in 2018, some of them noted thatcooperation with Kazakhstan̶which has good relations with the PRC, South Korea, andRussia̶could help to jointly promote the hibakusha legacy in the Asia-Paciﬁc region.
(5) Political differences
To date, the two nations have not launched any major joint initiatives. An analysisof existing initiatives shows that the countries are kept apart and prefer to work in theirown environment. For example, Kazakhstan favors support for August 29th-related events.
For the Japanese, dates such as August 6th and 9th (the anniversaries of the Hiroshima
and Nagasaki atomic bombings), as well as September 26th (the International Day for the
Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons), are more important. Moreover, the GOJ has notmade any serious attempts to connect Kazakhstan with its multilateral platforms, such as
the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) or Asia Senior-Level Talks on
Non-Proliferation (ASTOP). This fact could be attributed to Japan’s selective disbarment,

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namely, Japan’s opposition to Kazakhstan’s membership in various regional organizations,such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (DiFilippo, 2006:196).
However, in the case of mutual interest, they are forced to work together and seek
compromises. In February 2015, Kazakhstan and Japan were elected as co-coordinatorsof the CTBT ratification. In October 2015, in Nur-Sultan, President Nazarbayev and PM
Abe signed a joint statement that confirmed their commitment to achieve the early entry
into force of the CTBT as part of their “special mission”42. This document became the ﬁrst
statement adopted at such a high political level, where countries appeal to the Annex 2states, including the US, Japan’s ally.
During the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, a follow-up statement was
adopted in support of the CTBT. The text of the document calls once again on the Annex
2 states to take necessary steps for the early ratification of the treaty43. In May 2017, in
Vienna, an additional statement was adopted by the Foreign Ministers of Kazakhstan andJapan, as well as the executive secretary of the CTBTO PrepCom.
In Kazakhstan, this fact was perceived as an opportunity for closer cooperation withJapan on related issues. These documents demonstrate common tasks for the two countries:
the entry into force of the treaty and its further universalization, as well as achievement ofprogress on the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs. However, unlike Japan, Kazakhstan
has opportunities to conduct direct diplomatic consultations with the DPRK, which Japan
could not (or did not want to) use. Moreover, according to eyewitnesses, not all forms of
mutual actions previously proposed by the Kazakh side found support among Japaneseoﬃcials44. Kazakh diplomats attribute this to Japan’s unwillingness to interfere with third
countries in relation to its strategic partners in other parts of the world, such as Iran.
In the past few years, Hiroshima Prefecture and the Japanese Institute of International
Relations have published an annual report, the Hiroshima Report, which includes individual
country assessments in three categories: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation,and nuclear security.
According to reports, Kazakhstan and Japan are constantly in the advanced “blue”
zone, while nuclear powers are in the dangerous “red” or “orange” sectors. At the sametime, the report shows that Japan has also taken into account the participation of official
representatives from Kazakhstan in memorial ceremonies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
However, this is a very subjective criterion; for example, Japanese acting oﬃcials have notyet visited the STS45.
As a result, the GOJ might view Kazakhstan as a country that shares common values, while the lack of joint initiatives only indicates a diﬀerence in perspective on how toachieve and promote these values. Kazakhstan does not wish to be considered by Japan

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as an “other.” In contrast, it wants the GOJ to consider it Japan’s closest ally, as JapaneseNGOs and experts do. Despite attempts by individuals and organizations to bring thetwo countries closer together, these eﬀorts have failed to close the perception gap, whichis shrinking every year due to new challenges and threats that countries need to tackle
together.
(6) Achieving world merits
Today, independent politicians, NGOs, and research centers from both sides use different tools to consolidate Kazakhstan-Japan accomplishments. Based on Figure 1, we canassume that these achievements allow the two nations to demonstrate to the international
community their solidarity in the ﬁght against nuclear threats. However, Japan is using its
nuclear legacy as a tool for understanding the issue and gaining recognition for its practicalcontributions. Japan recognizes the real diﬃculty of fully eliminating nuclear weapons. At
the same time, Kazakhstan is using its nuclear legacy to advance its own policy initiatives.
For example, in 2012, Hiroyuki Moriyama, then-member of the Japanese Parliamentary Friendship League with Kazakhstan, announced in Semey that a group of JapaneseMPs had nominated the FPK for a Nobel Peace Prize46-47. At the time, the head of the
League was another MP from DPJ: Yukio Hatoyama, the former PM of Japan48. It is clearthat the young politician could not speak alone without the consent of his senior colleagues.
In fact, both countries use the “awards factor” to demonstrate their unique roles
as countries capable of evaluating the efforts of foreign politicians and scientists in thefields of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. For instance, in 1998, Dr. Saim
Figure 1. Logos of Japan-Kazakhstan Committee on Cooperation for
the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons i(left) and the 20th Anniversary of Kazakhstan-Japan diplomatic relations ii(right)iTechnical Secretariat, “Kazakhstan-Japan Committee on
Cooperation for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”,
http://www.tecsec.org/?page_id=1578 (accessed 11 June2019).
ii
MOFA, “Press release”, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/
press/release/24/1/0126_05.html (accessed 11 June2019).

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Balmukhanov was awarded the Takashi Nagai Memorial Nagasaki Peace Award for “contribution to the provision of assistance to victims of nuclear weapons testing, to the struggle
for a nuclear-free world”49. In 2008, President Nursultan Nazarbayev received the Grand
Cordon of the Supreme Order of Chrysanthemum for his “outstanding contribution to thedisarmament process, global initiatives on strengthening international security and peace,tolerance and international harmony”50-53. In 2016, he earned the Culture of Peace Special
Award for “leadership in promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,” as well as
Hiroshima City Special Honorary Citizenship for “commitment to the peace movement as
President of Kazakhstan” and “work on the total abolition of nuclear weapons”54-56.
In 2017, Mr. Suleimenov received the Order of the Rising Sun, Gold Rays with
Rosette for his “contribution to the strengthening of Japan-Kazakhstan relations in the ﬁeldof nuclear non-proliferation”57. Two years later, Dr. Tolebay Rakhypbekov was awarded theOrder of the Rising Sun, Gold Rays with Neck Ribbon for his “contribution to the promotion of academic exchanges between Japan and Kazakhstan through medical assistanceand research for the survivors of the atomic bombing”58. In 2020, the same order awarded
Dr. Zhaksybay Zhumadilov, Chairman of the Board of the University Medical Center at
Nazarbayev University, for his “contribution in the ﬁeld of radiation exposure research andstrengthening the health of victims.”
Kazakhstan does not stand aside either. In 2011, Yoriko Kawaguchi was awarded
the Anniversary Medal of the National Nuclear Centre of Kazakhstan for her “contribution to global security promotion and non-proliferation”59. Eight years later, Ambassador
Yukiya Amano’s family received the Nazarbayev Prize for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Worldand Global Security for his “key role in the creation of the low-enriched uranium bank in
Kazakhstan and [contribution] to the settlement of Iran’s nuclear issue”60.
(7) Forming anti-nuclear values
Currently, 15 territorial units of Kazakhstan are members of Japan’s Mayor for Peace
initiative, including two key cities: Nur-Sultan and Semey. Several years ago, Semey was
selected as the Executive City and Lead City by the Mayor for Peace61. In addition, Semey
municipal administration proposed holding one of the general meetings in Kazakhstan andawarding the Kazakhstani provincial city with a new status: regional leader in Central Asia.
In November 2016, speaking at the National Diet of Japan, Nazarbayev declaredthat his visit to Hiroshima included an appeal to world leaders to visit Hiroshima andNagasaki62. It is noteworthy that Nazarbayev visited Hiroshima for the ﬁrst time in 2016,
even though it was his fourth visit to Japan. This visit represented a response to Japan’s
signal to world leaders, especially from then-FM Fumio Kishida (2012-2017), to visit

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Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Originally, the initiative came from the MOFA, and the Japaneseside offered several tour options for Kazakhstan’s consideration, including major industrial centers in Japan (e.g., Nagoya) and a number of disaster-hit places in the Tohoku
region (e.g., Miyagi or Iwate). In the beginning, the Kazakh side leaned toward Nagasaki
due to the previous visit of Mayor Tomihisa Taue to the STS in 201163. Given the role of
FM Kishida, who is native to Hiroshima, the Kazakh group chose Hiroshima, although
Japanese PMs or FMs had never visited the STS64.
In 2004, Secretary-General of Mayors for Peace, Yasuyoshi Komizo, planted a saplingof a second-generation, the atomic bombed gingko tree from Hiroshima in Semey65. In
2015, a Stone for Peace was installed in Semey by one of Hiroshima’s numerous NGOs66.
In mid-2016, the Kazakh side proposed installing a memorial stone devoted to the victims
of nuclear tests in Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park; however, the proposal was declined by
the city due to the great number of similar applications from local organizations. In August
2016, the Daigo Fukuryu Maru Peace Foundation agreed to unveil a new memorial panel
dedicated to August 29th in the municipal Daigo Fukuryuu Maru Exhibition Hall, locatedin Tokyo’s Yumenoshima Park. The public activities of various organizations of the twocountries make it possible to hide existing gaps in bilateral cooperation.
(8) Toward a nuclear alliance
In 1992, the GOJ, together with the US, the EU, and Russia, signed an agreementon the establishment of the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), whose
headquarters are currently located in Kazakhstan at Nazarbayev University (since December 2015). The ISTC coordinates the eﬀorts of a number of public and private entities, aswell as private companies, providing FSU scientists̶formerly engaged in WMD-related
research̶with opportunities to conduct research activities in civilian areas. Over the years,
more than 70,000 scientists from 760 research institutes have received $880 million (theGOJ’s share is $65 million) in support from the ISTC67. For example, in the aftermath of
the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, ISTC environmental and public health research ﬁndings were applied in the Tohoku region (Orazgaliyeva, 2015).
In 2010, Kazakhstan joined the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA),
which was founded by Japan in 1990 to promote cooperation in the ﬁeld of nuclear energy
with neighboring Asian countries68. Today, FNCA member countries interact in eightareas: (1) radiation oncology; (2) mutation selection; (3) radiation safety and radioactive
waste management; (4) nuclear security and safeguards; (5) the use of research reactors;(6) biofertilizers; (7) the use of electron accelerators; and (8) the study of global climatechange69. The National Nuclear Center̶which has various forms of cooperation with key

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energy organizations and companies in Japan̶plays a crucial role in scientiﬁc cooperation.
The NNC is also involved in studying the consequences and responses to the Fukushima
Daiichi NPP accident (NNC, 2014:48-51).
Initially, Japan’s interest in Kazakhstan was limited to traditional energy resources:
oil and gas. In April 2002, in China, speaking at the first annual conference of the Boao
Forum for Asia, PM Junichiro Koizumi announced the GOJ’s readiness to expand energy
cooperation with Central Asia70. Three months later, the delegation of oﬃcial and businesscircles of Japan̶known today as the Silk Energy Mission̶visited four main countries in
the region to discuss new perspective areas of cooperation. In 2004, Kazakhstan and Japansigned their ﬁrst agreement in the ﬁeld of scientiﬁc and technical cooperation, which forms
the basis for the provision of consultative and technical assistance to Kazakhstan71.
In August 2006, PM Koizumi visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. During his talks
with FPK Nazarbayev, the two leaders agreed to enhance cooperation in the energy sector; that is, the development of uranium mines and the introduction of NPPs (Nurgaliyeva,
2015:379). These intentions were reﬂected in the joint statement and a separate memorandum72. In May 2007, the Economy, Trade and Industry Minister of Japan Akira Amari visited Kazakhstan. During the visit, a record number of documents (24) were signed, which
laid the foundation for a “strategic partnership” in the nuclear industry73. That same year,
the two countries also agreed to launch the negotiation process on bilateral nuclear pacts(signed in March 2010). The document stresses that cooperation is based on the experienceof a number of legal frameworks, including the previous agreement between Japan and the
USSR, as well as the two countries’ membership in the NPT, the IAEA, and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group74. In October 2007, the Kazakh Ambassador to Japan was invited to takepart as an observer in the Maritime Interdiction Exercise “Paciﬁc Shield 07,” hosted by the
GOJ under the Proliferation Security Initiative75.
In 2007, Kazatomprom, the Kazakh state-run nuclear power company, acquired asmall stake in Westinghouse Electric from Toshiba of $540 million. Toshiba-Westinghouse-Kazatomprom was seen at that time as the ﬁrst successful industrial alliance between
Kazakhstan and Japan. However, amid the crisis surrounding Westinghouse and Toshibain 2017, Kazatomprom exercised its right and sold Westinghouse’s shares back to Toshiba(Hotta, 2017).
This cooperation was seen as an important channel that could help Japanese companies obtain a contract for the construction of Kazakhstan’s first NPP. Indeed, the Kazakh
side’s plans to build the NPP are still considered a sort of magnet that constantly attracts
the attention of Japanese politicians and TNCs. Japan’s corresponding interest is reﬂectedin the outcome documents of two previous Nazarbayev-Abe summits. According to an

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unnamed Japanese oﬃcial, PM Abe’s 2015 tour to CA did not meet his expectations due tounsuccessful negotiations on the NPP issue with the former Kazakh leader76. Kazakh politicians were also upset by constant pressure from the Japanese government, despite strong
public opposition inside of Kazakhstan.
Japanese efforts show that official circles in Japan ignore the sensitivity of the NPP
construction issue for Kazakhstani society in every way, especially their concerns about thepossibility of a reiteration of the Fukushima tragedy in Kazakhstan. According to various
sources, approximately 34,000 Kazakhstanis participated in disaster management after the
Chernobyl accident. Today, the number of so-called “liquidators” in Kazakhstan is close to
5,000 people (Isayev, 2019). Given the high level of civil activity of Kazakhstani citizens,
especially those related to anti-Chinese sentiments, any accident at a future NPP could befatal for local oﬃcials, who would advance the decision on its construction.
4. Conclusion
This study provides a fresh look at the history and content of Kazakh-Japanesecooperation. Today, the focus of their bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the security
ﬁeld is focused on the safe use of nuclear energy, the security of nuclear facilities, and thedevelopment of nuclear technology and medicine. At the same time, a signiﬁcant proportion of eﬀorts is devoted to solving humanitarian challenges related to the negative impact
of radiation on human health and the environment.
Cooperation in this area has been formed for a long time and is based on diverse ideas
and norms that are important for the two countries. In many ways, the speciﬁc rules of suchcooperation allow both countries to loudly express their contributions to global nuclear
security. However, diﬀerent patterns of behavior or identity are all conditioned by the external environment and their external perception. This aﬀects the formation of new political
initiatives and leads to attempts to provide political and economic dividends in exchange
for technological cooperation in the nuclear ﬁeld.
Despite their enormous potential, both countries demonstrate a passive path of cooperation and eﬀorts to shift the current status quo. The two states’ early successes indicatethat Nur-Sultan and Tokyo can act as leaders of the international anti-nuclear movement.
They possess a huge amount of knowledge that could form the core of a systemic educational program for young generations of politicians and leaders. However, the older generations of witnesses to atomic explosions and tests dwindle every day. Against the backdropof other challenges, including the COVID-19 pandemic, people are less likely to recall
nuclear threats.

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Kazakhstan and Japan must accumulate the legacy of hibakusha survivors so that thenext generation of world leaders can understand all the horrors and risks of rash statements
and decisions regarding nuclear weapons. Unlike infectious diseases, radiation does notknow any barriers, and its consequences can poison life on earth for millennia. The casestudy of Kazakhstan and Japan shows that cooperation between the government sector andNGOs can be a powerful tool.
Indeed, the uniqueness of this study lies in the fact that Kazakhstan is a close partnerof Russia and China, while Japan has allied relations with the US. Both states can individually or jointly inﬂuence political discourse among the oﬃcials of these countries regarding
nuclear weapons and their possible use. Kazakhstan is a founding member of the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
which includes nuclear powers such as Russia, China, India and Pakistan. This does not in
any way aﬀect the policy of Kazakhstan, which is looking for possible ways to resolve thenuclear issue, in part or in full, and is not afraid of condemnation from its nuclear neighbors
and partners.
This is a signal to Japan that defense alliances and military commitments do not meanthat the country should not make eﬀorts to achieve any realistic goals in the ﬁeld of nuclear
disarmament. In contrast, Japan itself could act as a “bridge” between the US, China andRussia.
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Notes
1

Foreign Ministry of Japan (MOFA), 2016, “Joint Statement on Friendship, Partnership andCooperation between Japan and Kazakhstan,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/kazakhstan/
pv9912/joint.html (accessed June 7, 2019).
2
Nagasaki National Peace Memorial Hall, “The Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Records,” https://www.
peace-nagasaki.go.jp/abombrecords/b020101.html (accessed June 6, 2019).
3“Daigo Fukuryu Maru”, Daigo Fukuryu Maru Exhibition Hall, http://d5f.org/en/about.html(accessed June 6, 2019).
4
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan, 2015, “Japan’s Energy Plan,” https://www.
enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/brochures/pdf/energy_plan_2015.pdf (accessed June 7, 2019).
5
MOFA, 2014, “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/nnp/(accessed June 6, 2019).
6
In 2010-11, the author of this paper regularly visited the SMU during his trips to the STS together
with European and Japanese journalists as their translator.
7
UN, “International Day against Nuclear Tests,” https://www.un.org/en/events/againstnucleartestsday/(accessed June 6, 2019).
8
NTV.RU, 2016, “Memories of Japan: How the legendary song “Cranes” was created,” https://www.
ntv.ru/novosti/1627258/ (accessed June 7, 2019).
9
CTBTO PrepCom, “29 August 1949-First Soviet Nuclear Test,” https://www.ctbto.org/specials/
testing-times/29-august-1949-ﬁrst-soviet-nuclear-test (accessed June 7, 2019).
10
YouTube, 2016, “Pledge for Peace,” The 71st Nagasaki Peace Ceremony, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=qCS_I1C1vzs&feature=youtu.be (accessed June 7, 2019).
11
The document is available at the following link: https://tengrinews.kz/zakon/mejdunarodnyie_
organyi_i_organizatsii/sodrujestvo_nezavisimyih_gosudarstv/id-H910000006_/ (accessed June 7,2019).
13
Technical Secretariat, “Problems of nuclear legacy in the countries of the former USSR,” http://

The Kazakhstan-Japan Nuclear Nexus: Ideas, Norms, and Identities

175

webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.tecsec.org/ru/?page_id=175 (accessed
June 6, 2019).
14
House of Representatives, 1992, “The 123rd Session of the National Diet of Japan: The 9th Meetingof the Foreign Aﬀairs Committee,” http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/123/0110/12305060
110009a.html (accessed June 7, 2019).
15
MOFA, “Chapter I. The International Situation of 1993,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/
bluebook/1993/c1.html#1 (accessed June 6, 2019).
16
MOFA, 1992, “Shaping the New Partnership,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/
summit/2000/past_summit/18/e18_b.html (accessed June 6, 2019).
17
MOFA, 1993, “Striving for More Secure and Humane World,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/
economy/summit/2000/past_summit/19/e19_b.html (accessed June 6, 2019).
18
MOFA, “Other Major Speeches,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1992/1992appendix-2.htm#(10)%20Opening (accessed June 6, 2019).
19
The text of the document is available at the following link: http://kazakhstan.news-city.info/docs/
sistemsi/dok_perbai.htm (accessed June 6, 2019).
20
MOFA, 1997, “Denver Summit of the Eight Communiqué,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/
economy/summit/1997/communique.html (accessed June 6, 2019).
21
MOFA, 1998, “Conclusions of G8 Foreign Ministers,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/
summit/1998/g8_min.html (accessed June 6, 2019).
22
Office of PM of Japan, 1997, “Address by PM Ryutaro Hashimoto to the Japan Association of
Corporate Executives,” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/0731douyukai.html (accessed June 8, 2019).
23
Until 2007, the official name of the City of Semey was Semipalatinsk. The city was theadministrative centre of the Semipalatinsk oblast (1939-97), on which the STS was located.
24
MOFA, “Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/kyuso/
gaiyo.html (accessed June 9, 2019).
25
UNSG, 1998, “International cooperation and coordination for the human and ecologicalrehabilitation and economic development of the Semipalatinsk,” https://digitallibrary.un.org/
record/262148/files/A_53_424-EN.pdf (accessed June 9, 2019).
26
UNGA resolution 53/1 H, A/RES/67/97, 1998, Assistance to the Semipalatinsk region of
Kazakhstan, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/53/1DTOI (accessed
June 9, 2019).
27
MOFA, “The Tokyo International Conference on Semipalatinsk,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/
europe/kazakhstan/semipala/conf9909.html (accessed June 6, 2019).
28
MOFA, 2004, “Joint Statement “Central Asia+Japan” Dialogue/Foreign Ministers’ Meeting:Relations between Japan and Central Asia as They Enter a New Era,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/
region/europe/dialogue/joint0408.pdf (accessed June 8, 2019).
29
MOFA, “Tokyo International Conference on Semipalatinsk,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/
kazakhstan/semipala/summary9909.html (accessed June 6, 2019).
30
MOFA, 2017, “Press releases,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2007/1/0110.html(accessed June 8, 2019).
31
Technical Secretariat, “Project Report,” http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:
www.tecsec.org/ru/?page_id=14 (accessed June 6, 2019).
32
MOFA, “Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/
disarmament/policy/pamph0812/1-3.pdf (accessed June 6, 2019).
33
MOFA, 2007, “Press releases,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2007/4/1173224_824.

176

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 9html (accessed June 8, 2019).
Technical Secretariat, 2015, “Ceremony on Completion of the Project to Strengthen PhysicalProtection in Kazakhstan,” http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:www.tecsec.org/
ru/?p=3031 (accessed June 8, 2019).
35
Washington Nuclear Security Summit, 2016, “Joint Statement on LEU Fuel Bank,” http://www.
nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/1/joint-statement-on-leu-fuel-bank (accessed June 13,2019).
36
MOFA, “Good Practices Guide to Secure Railroad Transport of Civilian Nuclear Material,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000144992.pdf (accessed June 13, 2019).
37
UNGA resolution 52/38S, A/RES/52/38S, 1997, Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone inCentral Asia, https://www.un.org/ga/documents/gares52/res5238.htm (accessed June 9, 2019).
38
MOFA, “Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue: Action Plan,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/dialogue/action0606.html (accessed June 11, 2019).
39
MOFA, “Specific Issue: Nuclear Disarmament & Security Assurances,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/
policy/un/disarmament/npt/review2010-3/state1-2.html (accessed June 11, 2019).
40
Project Hiroshima-Semipalatinsk, “Japanese Translation of Zaman-ai,” https://blog.goo.ne.jp/
kazakhstan/e/f0f12db636099c6de1a27cd07a30730d (accessed June 10, 2019).
41
On 10-11 August 2012, the author as a speaker participated in the UNU’s Global Forum on
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education in Nagasaki, co-organized with the MOFA andNagasaki City. In December 2013, the author also took part in the KUFS’ International symposium
on Central Asia.
42
MOFA, 2015, “Joint Statement by PM Abe and President Nazarbayev on the CTBT,” https://www.
mofa.go.jp/files/000107518.pdf (accessed June 11, 2019).
43
CTBTO PrepCom, 2016, “Joint Statement by Japan and Kazakhstan on the CTBT,” https://www.
ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2016/joint-statement-by-japan-and-kazakhstan-on-the-ctbt/(accessed June 12, 2019).
44
Interview with an unnamed source in the MFA Kazakhstan on July 1, 2019.
45
In 2011, former Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, Mayor of Nagasaki Tomihisa Taue, and several
members of the Japanese Parliament visited the STS.
46
Personal blog of Kira Shuji, “Colombian Ambassador’s Courtesy call; Meeting withJapan-Kazakhstan Parliamentary League,” http://kirashuji.com/s/activity_report/?p=294 (accessed
June 6, 2019).
47
Abai.kz, 2017, “The President of Kazakhstan is nominated for the Nobel Prize,” https://abai.kz/
post/48304 (accessed June 6, 2017).
48
Personal blog of Yukio Hatoyama, 2012, “Japan-Kazakhstan Parliamentary Friendship League’s
General Assembly,” http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/activity/detail.php?id=132 (accessed 6 June 2019).
49
NASHIM, “The 2nd Award Profile of the Recipient,” http://www.nashim.org/en/award/pr02.html(accessed June 7, 2019).
50
Cabinet Office, “Summary of the Honors System,” https://www8.cao.go.jp/shokun/en/honorssystem.html (accessed June 10, 2019).
51
According to the Cabinet Office of Japan, awards to foreign citizens are awarded based on thefollowing principles: (1) ceremonial decorations presented to state guests upon arrival; (2) diplomats
leaving oﬃce; (3) foreigners, who have made notable contributions to enhance of bilateral relations.
52
Office of the President of Kazakhstan, 2018, “Events,” http://www.akorda.kz/ru/events/glavagosudarstva-nursultan-nazarbaev-nagrazhden-vysshim-ordenom-yaponii-hrizantemy-na-bolshoi34

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177

lente (accessed June 6, 2019).
Embassy of Kazakhstan (old version), “Official statements,” https://web.archive.org/web/20091115153311/http://www.embkazjp.org/additionalpages/special25062008.htm (accessed June 6,2019).
54
The Goi Peace Foundation, 2016, “2016 Culture of Peace Special Award Laureate,” https://www.
goipeace.or.jp/en/work/award/special-award-2016/ (accessed June 6, 2019).
55
Administration of the City of Hiroshima, “Heads of State in FY2016,” http://www.city.hiroshima.
lg.jp/www/sp/contents/1464747164689/index.html (accessed June 7, 2019).
56
Administration of Hiroshima, “November 2016,” http://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/www/contents/
1485146008141/index.html (accessed June 9, 2019).
57
MOFA, “2017 Autumn Conferment of Decoration on Foreign Nationals,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/
files/000304482.pdf (accessed June 6, 2019).
58
MOFA, “2018 Autumn Conferment of Decoration on Foreign Nationals,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/
files/000415621.pdf (accessed June 10, 2019).
59
Personal blog of Yuriko Kawaguchi, “Profile,” https://www.yoriko-kawaguchi.jp/english/profile/(accessed June 7, 2019).
60
Assel Satubaldina, 2019, “Kazakhstan marks International Day against Nuclear Tests with nonproliferation award, international conference”, Astana Times, https://astanatimes.com/2019/08/
kazakhstan-marks-international-day-against-nuclear-tests-with-non-proliferation-awardinternational-conference/ (accessed January 3, 2020).
61
Mayors for Peace, “Member Cities,” http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/membercity/map/
europe.html (accessed June 10, 2019).
62
House of Representatives, “National Diet welcomes Kazakh President”, http://www.shugiin.go.jp/
internet/itdb_english.nsf/html/statics/english/kangeikai_e161108.html (accessed June 8, 2019).
63
The author translated an interview with Mayor Taue to Kazakhstani and foreign media during his
participation at the International Forum for A Nuclear Weapons-Free World, which was held on
October 12-13, 2011, in Kazakhstan.
64
Interview with an unnamed source in the MFA of Kazakhstan on July 1, 2019.
65
Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, “Newsletter,” http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/hpcf/
heiwabunka/pce73/English/04E.html (accessed June 7, 2019).
66
The Stone for Peace Association of Hiroshima, “Countries that accepted the ʻStone for Peace’,”
http://stone-for-peace.org/english/03worldwide/en-worldwide06.html#link76 (accessed June 7,2019).
67
International Science and Technology Center, “About Us,” http://www.istc.int/ru/about (accessed
June 9, 2019).
68
FNCA, “FNCA Meeting,” https://www.fnca.mext.go.jp/engish/mini/e_18_minister.html#c (accessed
June 10, 2019).
69
Strategy2050.kz, “12 countries participated in the 18th FNCA meeting in Astana,” https://
strategy2050.kz/ru/news/a_18om_soveshchanii_fnca_v_stane_prinyali_uchastie_12_stran__48802/(accessed June 12, 2019).
70
MOFA, 2002, “Asia in a New Century-Challenge and Opportunity,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/boao0204/speech.html (accessed June 12, 2019).
71
JICA, “Agreement on Technical Cooperation between the Government of Japan and theGovernment of Kazakhstan,” http://association.joureikun.jp/jica/act/actdata/110000128/current/
FormEtc/13000018201000000002.pdf (accessed June 11, 2019).
53

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広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 9MOFA, “Prime Minister Koizumi,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_koi/kaz_uz_06/kaz_o.html (accessed June 12, 2019).
73
World Nuclear News, 2007, “Strategic alliance for Kazakhstan and Japan,” http://www.worldnuclear-news.org/Articles/Strategic-alliance-for-Kazakhstan-and-Japan (accessed June 12, 2019).
74
MOFA, “Agreement between the GOJ and the GOK for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear
Energy,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/treaty/submit/session174/pdfs/agree-14_1.pdf (accessed
June 11, 2019).
75
MOFA, 2007, “PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise “Pacific Shield 07”,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/
policy/un/disarmament/arms/psi/overview0710.html (accessed June 12, 2019).
76
Interview was done on June 1, 2016.