研究ノート

China's ODA to Africa and David
Shambaugh's Conceptual Framework:
A Preliminary Application
Nicholas Lemon
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is often accused of ignoring the basic
tenets of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Policy debates ensue chiefly over human rights concerns, anti-corruption andthe rule of law as it is in the PRC’s purview to focus on legitimacy and systemstability over these tenets (Lang 2017, 8). On these grounds, the PRC’s motives
are often held in question. However, this essay is not an indictment of the PRC’s
official development assistance (ODA) but rather a Sino-pragmatist1 assessmentof development in Africa vis-à-vis the PRC using Shambaugh’s (2018) concept of
distance or proximity as a rubric for understanding the scope of the PRC’s
involvement, economic interest, and their effects in Africa (Adem 2013, 245). It
should also be noted that the OECD is not designated in this study as anindependent entity, in place of a state actor, but rather, as individuated states inconcert forwarding their respective agendas. This choice to place the OECD
opposite to the PRC, instead of the US as done in Shambaugh’s article is mainly
to keep consistent with Sino-pragmatism. This seems in accordance with OECD
Secretary- General Ángel Gurría’s stated goals (OECD Global Relations
Secretariat 2018, 2), and diverges from the current Trump administration(“Remarks by President Trump and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg”
2019).
As minor case studies the PRC’s ODA track record in Angola, Nigeria, andKenya a re exa m i ned below to see how t hey l i ne up w it h t he Ch i nese
Communist Party (CCP) ODA policy and Shambaugh’s distance rubric. Angola
a nd N ig er i a a re t a ke n f rom Br äut ig a m’s a r t ic le , “A id ‘w it h C h i ne s e
Cha racteristics’ ” which was published in the Int er n at io n al Jour n al of
Development (Bräutigam 2011, 752-764). Kenya was analyzed using the same
parameter to offer three cases since Shambaugh required a few pairings with
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研究ノートthe PRC to give some comparison. Each African state was selected for theircommon resource-dependent economies and their consistent historical exposure
to the PRC. In light of recent developments this study seeks to gauge whether
the PRC’s ODA has contributed to an untroubled coexistence. This essay isorganized as follows: Shambaugh’s methodology will first be explained in brief;
next, the ODA policy of the PRC will be outlined before finally concluding
where Angola, Nigeria, and Kenya measure up along the proximity rubric.

I. Shambaugh’s Rubric
In his article, “U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia”, Shambaugh (2018)
formulated a rubric for gauging diplomatic and economic closeness to the PRC.
This was placed within the context of the polarity between the US and the
PRC as superpowers vying for control and influence over the region. And in
this case, Shambaugh took the current Trump administration into account asthey have described the PRC as a “strategic competitor” on the global stage (85).
In the context of Southeast Asia, Shambaugh referred to four key factors thatpush Southeast Asian nations away from the PRC: 1) The US, citing its security
footprint and positive public reception in the region; 2) The PRC itself, pointing
to their “dictatorial” approach to relations with Southeast Asian nations such as
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand; 3) The Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN ), despite this intergovernmental organization’s explicit
economic dependence on the PRC, ASEAN is solidly capable of expressing
agency in the presence of the PRC; and finally, 4) “Other” regional powers, such
as Japan, that have diplomatic, economic and cultural clout in the region. This
paper takes equivalent measures into consideration for the case studies below
to conform to the above rubric (Shambaugh 2018, 85).
To mirror the above parameters, such factors in Africa would take thefollowing forms: 1) The OECD, as it is the intergovernmental institution tocontrast with the PRC’s ODA in this paper. The OECD includes the US andJapan among other “Western” influencers (“List of OECD Member Countries”
2018); 2) the policies of the PRC affect how they are perceived in Africa for thevery same reasons as in Southeast Asia; 3) the African Union (AU) with its
many notable differences from ASEAN; the more obvious difference is that the
AU does not merely involve one small region, but the overwhelming majority of
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China’s ODA to Africa and David Shambaugh’s Conceptual Framework: A Preliminary Application

the African continent (“About the African Union” 2019).
The AU emerged as a surviving union from the Organization of African
Unity (OAU, 1963-1999) and as stated by the AU, “The decision to re-launch
Africa’s pan-African organisation was the outcome of a consensus by African
leaders that in order to realise Africa’s potential, there was a need to refocus
attention from the fight for decolonisation and ridding the continent of apartheid[…] towards increased cooperation and integration of African states to drive
Africa’s growth and economic development.” (Ibid.). With these aims, the AU
was officially launched in 2002 (Ibid.); 4) the final factor is the internal presenceof a complex network of regional organizations within Africa. However, this list
is so complex that it is beyond the scope of this research note, but is a factor
nonetheless. (Specific organizations are listed in the endnotes below)2 (Byiers2017).
After explaining the key factors and influencers in the Southeast Asian
region, Shambaugh gave six categories to nations by their “closeness” to the
PRC. “Closeness” refers to the relationship between each individual state and
the PRC. The six categories from close to distant are as follows: capitulationists(states that align completely with the PRC); chafers (economically dependent
states that wish they weren’t); aligned accommodationists (states that aresatisfied with their relationship with the PRC that also enjoy ties with otherpowerful nations); tilters (states that “tilt” towards the PRC but have territorial
disputes and do not desire strengthening their ties); balanced hedgers (statesthat anchor their security agenda with the West but otherwise have economic
dealings with the PRC); and outliers (states that prefer to remain independent
from the West and the PRC out of distrust and cultural differences) (Shambaugh
2018, 100-103).
Shambaugh mainly focused on the international political economy of theSoutheast Asian region, but this piece more specifically concerns ODA policy incontrast with OECD-DAC principles. And as stated above, the real question isrooted in how the PRC’s financial policies actually affect African nations. In
order to gauge this, it’s important to understand how the CCP developed their
guidelines for ODA.

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研究ノートII. The PRC’S ODA Policy
The PRC’s official guidelines on ODA started with Premier Zhou Enlai’s first
Five Principles after the Bandung Conference of 1955 (Liu 2010, 54). That list
grew in number in January 1964 with Premier Zhou’s Eight Principles for
Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries (Eight Principles
hereon). The Eight Principles were intended to be used as a guideline to provide
aid in the hopes of forwarding a mutual benefit between the PRC and recipient
countries in Africa.
Premier Zhou’s Eight Principles, were as follows: 1) The PRC’s aid is based onequality and mutual benefit between donor and recipient. 2) The sovereignty ofrecipient countries shall not be infringed and the PRC will never attach
conditions for aid. 3) The PRC shall provide aid at interest-free or low-interest
loans and can extend the time limit for repayment. 4) Recipients shall never
become reliant on the PRC. 5) The PRC will do its best to help recipient
countries complete projects which require less investment but yield quicker
results. 6) The PRC will provide equipment of the best quality available atinternational market prices. 7 ) Technical assistance will be provided torecipients so that they master the technology given to them.
8) PRC officials are not allowed to demand any special treatment from recipientsand must live as native experts do while in their country. Yet, the Eight
Principles only live on today as the foundation for opening ties in Africa, andnow the PRC’s ODA policy has shifted gears (Shinxue,“China’s Principles in
Foreign Aid,” accessed December 11, 2019).
PRC aid to African nations was originally rooted in liberation movements
juxtaposed against Western capitalist powers during the Cold War (Mutesa
2010, 170). By 1983, in the sixth National Foreign Aid Working Conference heldby the State Council, the new “Four Principles on Sino-African Economic andTechnical Cooperation” was launched by Premier Zhao Ziyang. Premier Zhao’s
policy was aimed at both encouraging African nations to be self-reliant in their
physical capabilities (liangli erxing) and to show fortitude in their own
endeavors ( jinli er wei) (Liu2010, 56).
From the post-1970s to the post-1990s reforms the PRC promoted a policy
shift towards adherence to labor, environmental and human rights norms (Ibid.).
Privatization and commercialization were embraced by the PRC for these latter
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China’s ODA to Africa and David Shambaugh’s Conceptual Framework: A Preliminary Application

reforms. However, a key point of contention for the PRC has since been their“one-China” policy and its use as a litmus test for opening relations with African
nations directly. This policy contradicts the concept of non-interference andunconditional aid in Zhou’s second principle. The PRC’s second stated goal
ultimately steers a voting bloc within the UN’s General Assembly and potential
temporary members of the Security Council. Finally, the desire to be seen as an
emerging superpower among African nations is not without suspicion (Liu 2010,57).
As of 2015, concessional finance from the PRC totaled $3.1 billion and theirmultilateral dealings in that same year amounted to $233 million. The opacityof donor aid and contributions has provided a clear obstacle to the PRC’s
purported financial clout. The PRC’s Ministry of Commerce’s Department of
Foreign Assistance is at the center of the Chinese system and manages overninety percent of its bilateral funding. The ministry conducts its aid distribution
through joint ventures, programming zero-interest loans and grants, andcoordinating concessional loans with the China Export-Import Bank (Exim or
Chexim Bank). Exim Bank of the PRC is actually a state-owned enterprise andfunctions primarily for the purpose of international issuance (Exim Bank of
China, accessed December 3, 2019).
Eighty-nine percent of the PRCs development cooperation through multilateralorganizations was primarily channeled through the United Nations and nine
percent via regional development banks. But Exim Bank and the regional
development banks are not the sole means by which the PRC distributes funds;
the PRC is also a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB), a multilateral development bank with its headquarters in Beijingthat launched in 2015 (The UN DESA 2015). Current aid relations in the
African region are expected to be a continuation of the above policies, alongwith those following the 2018 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC), where the PRC has vowed to provide $60 billion ineconomic cooperation in the region. The roundtable summit also convened witha declaration of eight major action plans over the next three years (Beijing
declaration adopted at FOCAC 2018).
To contrast the PRC’s ODA with OECD-DAC’s member states: the CCP
favors the practice of non-transparency over the openness of liberal OECD
states. This resulted in the failure of recipients’ understanding of the framework,
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研究ノートrules, and norms regarding their foreign aid policy (Bräutigam 2011, 757). The
PRC’s contributions to the development of African countries have undermined
the Millennium Development Goals carried out by the DAC despite their claim
to support them (Ibid., 762). Critics worry that the PRC is propping up afinancial precedent and that their supporters welcome the counterpoint to the
DAC’s official aid policy (Ibid., 761). Yet, despite being contrasted with OECDDAC it would be disingenuous to ignore the fact that the PRC is a key partnerof the OECD and collaborates with the DAC through the events of the ChinaDAC Study Group. Furthermore, President Xi vowed to “firmly uphold an open
world e c onomy a nd t he mu lt i l at era l t rad i ng sy st em , wh i le opp o s i ng
protectionism and unilateralism.” (Beijing summit declaration at FOCAC 2018).
To further address these deta ils , below is a brief outline of the PRC ’s
involvement in Angola, Nigeria, and Kenya that attempts to explain any
discrepancies between them using Shambaugh’s rubric.

III. Angola
In 2003 Exim Bank distributed finance to Angola based on the policy of the
China-Africa Development Fund. This policy primarily dictated the use of
equity investment capital from the PRC to Angola. From then, negotiations
were made between the Angolan government and Exim Bank to open arenewable line of credit. Between 2003 and 2010 Exim Bank fronted $10 billion
in finance towards post-war reconstruction in Angola. Oil exports were used toback the tranches in a similar fashion to the oil-backed syndicated loans ofWestern banks in Angola. The tranches were used as financial securities thatwere distributed in large packages to represent assets owned by the creditor.
The PRC suggested using Angolan oil to back their tranches to liquidate themmore easily. The PRC did not go through a financial process like the OECDDAC system, and so repayment terms could be for a longer period of time. The
Exim Bank investment in Angola was termed “deeply concessional”. In thiscase, the PRC was considered generous in their financial contribution to Angola.
But this declaration of being “deeply concessional” ignores the reality of thesituation (Bräutigam 2011, 758).
The result of using the tranches as oil-backed credit resulted in the PRC’s
effective micromanagement of the funds they afforded. The PRC disadvantaged
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China’s ODA to Africa and David Shambaugh’s Conceptual Framework: A Preliminary Application

Angola by making it so that the proceeds from oil exports were deposited intoa special escrow account at the Exim Bank. The funds in the escrow accountcould only be accessed through withdrawals towards specific expenses. Suchexpenses were limited to projects or the export of equipment and goods byAngolan subcontractors. Effectively, Angolans were dependent on the bank (Leeand Shalmon 2008, 123). In the end, Angolan subcontractors could only accessthirty percent of the credit backed by their own resources (Bräutigam 2011,
758).
From this, we can see that the PRC fixed their aid to contribute almost
completely to their own economic benefit. This is made clear by the actual
effects of their credit policy. Since there is clear indication that the PRC may
have indeed exploited Angola, theorists, such as de Morais (2011, 67) havecondemned the PRC as a “new form of imperialism”. For the reasons above,
Angola might fit in Shambaugh’s “chafers” category. Angolan officials negotiatedwith the PRC with a near capitulationist disposition. Yet, Angola remains asignificant trading partner to rival South Africa with at least some leverage.
Despite the imbalance, it seems that the two nations intend to continue theirlopsided economic relationship (Ma Chenguang, “Angola eager to welcome more
Chinese investors, says ambassador,” China Daily Global, July 25, 2019).

IV. Nigeria
The aid the PRC offered to Nigerian railways in 2007 has been called “rogueaid” due to the lack of bidding and lack of conditions towards partnered reform
policy (Bräutigam 2011, 758). Moisés Naím (2009) ternred this policy “Rogue
Aid” in his article bearing the saue raiue. The World Bank initially suggested
giving $5 million so that private companies could clean up corruption andmismanagement of Nigerian railways. The PRC, in exchange, provided $9 billion
in a id, with “no questions asked ”. This has been criticized as ig noring
development towards anti-corruption and stark humanitarian issues afflicting
the region. The PRC’s Exim Bank was also involved in the reconstruction of
Nigerian railways from Lagos to Kano in 2007. Both cities are key to Nigeriandevelopment and commerce (Bräutigam, 758).
The corporate enterprise, China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation,offered $8.3 billion and Exim Bank offered an additional $2 billion package. Both
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研究ノートoffers were through a line of credit to help build infrastructure in exchange fora preferential access to oil blocks. Like in Angola’s case, this latter concept was
not suggested by the PRC, but rather by Nigeria. Yet, negotiations failed to berealized and the whole plan was discarded. The PRC’s Exim Bank’s $2 billion
loan would have been considered concessional by many experts, had it went
through. Yet, their later offer of $500 million in exchange for preferential credit
for 2 years without any regard to the oil blocks from before was a different
story (Brätingam, 758).
As of 2008, the preferential export credit was not used. Since nothing offeredby the PRC contained the promise of developmental aid, one could not say that
their contributions would fall under DAC guidelines of ODA, nor even Zhou’s
Eight Principles. The intentions of the PRC (via their private civil engineering
corporation, and their Exim Bank) were to secure favorable market advantages
with their competitors, and were ultimately not concessional in nature (Ibid.). In
2010 Nigeria ranked firmly in fourth place of the PRC’s biggest African trading
partners, and the second largest importer of Chinese goods in all of Africa(Egbula and Zheng 2011, 6). Like Angola, Nigeria is on the Atlantic shore andeven f urt her nort h from Cape Town . This places Nigeria at a f urt her
geographical distance from mainland China and it seems that Nigeria also fell
prey to the opacity and sharp exploitation of their own assets by the PRC.
However, Nigeria withdrew from the PRC’s grip, it is thus categorized in
Shambaugh’s rubric as “tilters”, and it handled negotiations in a fashion similar
to the Philippines or Brunei, as it was not afraid to say “no”. Furthermore, theUS remains Nigeria’s most prominent trading partner.

V. KenyaIn 1987 a well-regarded joint project, the Moi International Sports Complex,
was undertaken by the PRC and Kenya, and overseen by Sheng-Li Engineering
Construction Company Ltd. The facility hosted the All-Africa Games and has
served as a major civic center since. And more recently, the Mombasa-Nairobi
Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) began construction in May 2017. The PRC has
been funding part of a $3.8 billion railway connecting Kenya, Uganda, Burundi,
Rwanda and South Sudan to replace a century-old British colonial rail track.
Ninety percent of it is funded by the Exim Bank and ten percent is Kenyan
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China’s ODA to Africa and David Shambaugh’s Conceptual Framework: A Preliminary Application

funded. Like the Angolan and Nigerian cases, the establishment of the deal has
been cited as an effort to directly undermine OECD-DAC policies. This
allegation was also in response to a candid statement by Ugandan President
Museveni following the first conferences with the PRC’s Premier, Li Keqiang:“They don’t give lectures on how to run local governments and other issues I
don’t want to mention.” President Museveni was referring to OECD-DAC’s
official guidelines (The Nation Reporter, “Kenya, China sign standard gauge
railway agreement,” Daily Nation. May 11, 2014).
With statements like these, OECD-DAC countries have a reason to question
the motives of such officials. Accusations relate to a perceived lack of concern
for the public or corruption. What’s more, the PRC has given 21,366 tons of rice
as aid to Kenya. The net worth of such rice is about $22.5 million. The supply
was expected to last about one month and to feed 1.4 million people (Christine
Wangxiaopeng, “China’s Donations to Kenya Are Gigantic.” IOL Business
Report, August 8, 2017). Although this form of aid was aimed to help, rice alone
is not an especially nutritious grain. In comparison to wheat, for example; riceoffers 130 calories per 100 grams, whereas wheat has 327 calories per 100
grams. Rice has 2.7 grams of protein while wheat has 12.61 per 100 grams.
Furthermore, rice is actually produced locally within Kenya where the annual
consumption of rice has increased to twelve percent compared to the next
highest grain, wheat at four percent of dietary consumption. 3
There is a presence of rural farmers of rice in Kenya, and the introduction ofa rice surplus actually reduces the market value of the crop yields of average
agricultural workers. Less income from a cash crop means less ability to afford
more nutritious foods on the market for those agriculturally dependent farmers.
Although the contribution may initially be seen as useful aid, it actually plays arole in further wealth disparity and depreciation of diverse food selections(Achterbosch, van Berkum and Meijerink 2014, 47). One key aspect that has
been debated by post-colonial scholars is the fact that one sure trait of colonial
domination was to create a food dependency on cheap grains. This sort ofthreat to food sovereignty is critiqued by key figures in African agrarian
movements; a prime example came from Nyéléni, Mali (2007, 10).4 If this is the
stance of African people against Western exploitation, then the same may apply
to the PRC.
Kenya is often considered somewhat of an outlier compared to other African
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研究ノートnations by the OECD, and in fact some even describe Kenya’s market as a
success (OECD 2012, 1-7). But their reception of foreign aid is still considerable
and the presence of the PRC’s influence cannot go ignored. Although Museveniis Uganda’s President, the conference involved Kenyan officials, and there is nonews of whether his point was disputed by Kenyan officials. In 2013 President
Uhuru Kenyatta went to the PRC to meet with President Xi Jinping. The two
hit it off really quickly and wound up signing negotiated trade deals worth
around $5 billion (“Kenya’s Kenyatta and China’s Xi Sign $5bn Deals.” BBCNews. BBC, August 20, 2013). President Kenyatta was known for shifting his
gaze towards the PRC and East Asia for potential trade. Despite Kenyatta’s
shift, the US has yet to recede from what is termed an alliance by both the US
and Kenya. This situation places Kenya almost firmly in the center of the US
and the PRC, thus placing it in the “balanced hedgers” category.

VI. Conclusion
The above assessment of development in Africa reveals a complex reality.
The case studies examined, including Angola, Nigeria, and Kenya, were aimed
at following Shambaugh’s distance rubric as it may be considered useful for
Area Studies scholars. Angola proved a n interesting case due to theirgeographical location and being what was eventually deemed a “chafer” state.
In the time of the case study, Angola was considerably dependent on the PRC.
As a “tilter” Nigeria seemed to have been leaning towards the PRC as its thirdlargest African trading partner, but they have demonstrated the ability torefuse the PRC’s financial policies in light of their relationships with OECD
states. Finally, Kenya proved to be the most independent, as they have always
been considered successful in their adaptation of their own capitalist model.
However, t hei r recent t ie s w it h t he PRC revea l a g reater ne ol ib era lundercurrent between both countries that might otherwise be overlooked byoutsiders. Kenya received the term “balanced hedgers” here because they canmaintain “simultaneous commercial ties” (Shambaugh 2018, 102) with the PRC
and OECD states (see Figure 1.). As a final remark, it should be noted that thisstudy was not exhaustive, and that ODA does not fully explain closeness to the
PRC in Shambaugh’s rubric. It is my hope that this study serves as a starting
point for further discussion on matters concerning Sino-African relations.
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China’s ODA to Africa and David Shambaugh’s Conceptual Framework: A Preliminary Application

Figure 1 A
 ngola, Nigeria and Kenya’s Closeness to the PRC with Southeast Asian
Nations included and adapted from Shambaugh’s study, (Shambaugh 2018, 101).
Closer to the PRC
capitulationist
Cambodiachafers
Laos, Myanmaraligned accommodationists
Malaysia, Thailand
tilters
Philippines, Brunei
balanced hedgers
Vietnam, Singapore
outlierIndonesia
Less close to the PRC

AngolaNigeria
Kenya



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研究ノートEndnotes
1234Adem (2013) defines on page 245 the Sino-pragmatist as one who “devote[s] extensive
attention to the nature and impact of Sino-African relations. [A Sino-pragmatist]
however, [is] not necessarily Sino-fanatic or Sino-apologist”. This concept is contrasted
with the Sino-phobe and the Sino-pessimist. As the former “loathes China for proppingup ‘neo-patrimonial regimes’ in the continent.” The latter are “adversarians” against the
PRC. Put simply, this paper takes the PRC’s culture, interests and goodwill as asovereign nation into consideration.
Examples for regional organizations in Africa include the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa(COMESA), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).
Google search “rice” and “wheat”: Daily Values appears on the right-hand side as a
sidebar.
The Declaration of Nyéléni:“What are we fighting against? Imperialism, neo-liberalism, neo-colonialism andpatriarchy, and all systems that impoverish life, resources and eco-systems, and theagents that promote the above such as international financial institutions […] andgovernments that are antagonistic to their peoples; The dumping of food at prices below
the cost of production in the global economy; The domination of our food and foodproducing systems by corporations that place profits before people, health and theenvironment.”

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China’s ODA to Africa and David Shambaugh’s Conceptual Framework: A Preliminary Application

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China’s ODA to Africa and David Shambaugh’s Conceptual Framework: A Preliminary Application

Abstract

China's ODA to Africa and David
Shambaugh's Conceptual Framework:
A Preliminary Application
Nicholas Lemon
There is a debate between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and membersof the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development chiefly
regarding human rights, anti-corruption, and the rule of law. This paper is a
Sino-pragmatist assessment of developments in Africa vis-à-vis the PRC using
D a v i d S h a m b a u g h ’s v e r y n ew c o n c e p t o f p r o x i m i t y a s a r u b r i c f o r
understanding the scope and the PRC’s involvement, intervention and economic
interest in Africa. The objective of this paper is meant to briefly gauge whether
the PRC’s official aid contributes to a peaceful coexistence or a new brand of
neocolonialism. Angola, Nigeria, and Kenya serve as case studies to examine
the PRC’s financial track record to see how they fit into the Chinese Communist
Party’s (CCP) narrative, financial dependence, and thus Shambaugh’s proximity
rubric. This paper shows that each country was selected for their prolonged
trade relationship with the PRC and for the particular aid each received.
Further, the data from these cases are used to illustrate the extent of eachstate’s dependency allegedly caused by the PRC’s “rogue aid” assistance. BothAngola’s use of the China-Africa Development Fund and Nigeria’s 2007 LagosIbadan railway debacle show strong signs of dependency, as is corroborated in
Deborah Bräutigam’s report, “Aid ‘with Chinese Characteristics’” which was
published in the International Journal of Development. Kenya’s soft loans andgrants deals, by small contrast, maintain their interdependence with the PRC.
With all factors considered, this paper demonstrates the applicability of
Shambaugh’s proximity rubric in regions of the world besides Southeast Asian
countries.

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