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論文

India's Biosafety Policy on Genetically Modified
Crops: A perspective from food security
Monica Racovita

Abstract
Current estimates indicate that India will have a major impact on thecultivation of GM crops worldwide. In addition, it seems clear that for foodsecurity and economic imperatives, India would have strong incentives tobecome a major cultivator of GM crops. Yet, it is less certain whether India
would take this path. What might be desirable for food security aspects andeven declared reason for the government to address GM crops, gets lost in
the ensuing biosafety debates. Thus, in India, questions over the accuracy
and objectivity of scientific data, are connected to organic farming; to farmers
rights; to participation in decision-making; to issues of food sovereignty andeven human security (farmers suicides). To what extent all these aspects
pertain to mainstreaming GM crops for food security is the central question ofthis article.
For this, the study undertakes two case studies: the commercial approvalof Bt cotton (the only GM crops approved so far), and the moratorium on Bt
brinjal (Bt brinjal was close of becoming the first GM food crop approved for
cultivation).
The article is the incipient phase of a research which analyzes both
domestic and international determinants of India’s GM crops policies, in
how the interactions among different stakeholders have shaped the current
state of Indian GM crops policies. The present paper’s objectives are toeither confirm or identify the main stakeholders, identified from a document
analysis, and to draw a sketch of the interactions between them. In addition,
this article briefly draws some attention to what India’s case would mean to
an international regime of GM crops.
The analysis shows that the number and importance of stakeholders
changes from Bt cotton Bt brinjal. In Bt brinjal, NGOs emerge as forefront
players organizing a national level campaign, which in an unprecedented

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move determined the subjection of Bt brinjal to public debates, finallyconcretized into an indefinite moratorium. Even if the actions of the Ministerof Environment and Forests were decisive, he seems just a last minute actor.
NGOs are stronger than ever in India, and unless the new Biotechnology
Regulatory Authority of India (BRAI) will bring significant changes in theregulatory environment (an unlikely event), the NGOs will be probably able
to block any near-future GM crops commercialization attempts, especiallyfood GM crops.
Yet the Government and the industry will continue to pursue GM crops,
fact revealed by the high number of GM crops under research currently in
India and the accompanying large investments in public research institutes.
However, the regulatory problems, especially in enforcement, unlikely todisappear through the creation of BRAI will be major setbacks for attempts
to international harmonization of the regulations in GM crops. They will
also create problems in the event of an increase in the international trade intransgenics.

Introduction
It is currently recognized that agriculture has to meet the growing
demand for food, fight poverty and malnutrition, while being environmentally
sustainable (Graff, Roland-Holst, and Zilberman, 2005). Due to raising foodprices and climatic changes (floods, droughts, saline soils), losing arable
land to the production of biofuels and steady rise in world demographics, thepolicy makers in developing countries are increasingly considering geneticallymodified crops as an instrument to tackle food security (Meijer and Stewart,
2004; Panos Institute, 2005 James, 2008; OECD, 2009).
Yet, GM (genetically modified) crops are a highly contentious subject.
Known interchangeably as transgenic crops, the GM crops are obtainedby introducing new traits (resistance to diseases, poor soils, enhancing
nutritional content, etc) into plants by using recombinant DNA technology.
The sustainers of GM crops claim pest and disease resistance, fighting
drought, cold, floods, poor or polluted soils, increased yields, high nutritional
value (Singh, 2000), along with low dependency on fertilizers and greater
market potential (DaSilva et al., 2002). On the other side, its opponents talkIndia’s Biosafety Policy on Genetically Modified Crops: A perspective from food security

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about a failure to deliver the promises for the products already on the market,
potential threats to biodiversity, environment, and human health, increasing
the dependency of farmers to the biotech multinationals and maintaining an
intensive agriculture (Levidow and Carr, 2007).
One of the main contentions among stakeholders toward GM crops
policies (alongside trade, consumer choice and food security, intellectual
property rights, and research and development) is biosafety (Paarlberg,
2001). An international harmonization mechanism for biosafety signed by
103 countries, although notably not by the United States, is the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety. The protocol designates biosafety as “a range ofmeasures, policies and procedures for minimizing potential risks thatbiotechnology may pose to the environment and human health” (CBD
webpage).
However, on what is a risk and what is an acceptable level for it, is notalways easy to reach a consensus. For GM crops the debates range from a
total rejection (being a live product entirely new, man-made, insufficiently
known, and therefore unpredictable) to considering GM crops as notessentially different from non-GM crops (they are just plants with novel
traits, just as the hybrids of the Green Revolution). Coming to the assessmentof risk for GM crops, its definitions pertaining to public policy include eithera scientific base making a distinction between risk assessment (scientificissues) and risk management (extra-scientific issues) (Deane, 2001; Nunn,
2001) or a consideration, besides of “sound science,” of the discursive contexts
of culturally perceived technology, the influence of institutions on scientificresults, and the ecological and socio-economic factors (McAfee, 1999).
Moreover, risks for GM crops are increasingly perceived as constructed froma wide array of socio-economic and even political factors (Johnston et al.
2008). In this context, the science of biosafety assessment cannot constitutean objective apolitical instrument for settling disputes. The science itself
becomes politicized (Keeley, 2003).
To substantiate the politicization of biosafety policies and hence, thefailure of science to be an objective apolitical instrument for settling disputes,
the EU/US conflict is a good example. It is generally known that US and
EU are the proponents of the two diametrically opposed approaches to GM
policies: the “substantial equivalence” and respectively the “precautionary

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principle.” The substantial equivalence is evaluating the safety of new GM
products by looking for differences between GM products and their non-GM
counterparts. For the precautionary principle, its most famous definition
belongs to the 1992 Rio Declaration: “Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used asa reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.” (United Nations Environment Programme webpage). A
precautionary approach to biosafety regulation includes assessments of novel
GM products on a case-by-case basis, an expansion of the tests evaluating
the differences between GMOs and their non-GM counterparts to detailed
and longterm toxicological and allergenic studies, and even socio-economic
considerations. The international conflict between the EU and US, eachattempting to impose its own regulatory approach, was deemed a “GM Cold
War” (Meijer and Stewart, 2004).
The developing countries are trapped between US conditions binding
development assistance to biotech adoption and EU (for some developing
countries a traditional market) refusal to accept their GM agricultural
products. Yet, some developing countries are in a better position compared toothers. The countries classified as type I (regulatory and research capability,
GM crop export capacity and even GM development) are described to befavored compared to countries from type II (cannot develop GM crops) or type
III ( no capacity, depends on other countries ) (Meijer and Stewart, 2004).
Especially India and China (both type I) are depicted as less dependent to US
or EU in what the commerce with transgenics is concerned, due to their “large
internal market” and their major investments in science and technology (vanden Belt and Keulartz, 2007). Some authors even claimed that the future of
the GM crops depends on the two countries (Feffer, 2004).
India certainly seems to be living to that expectation. For India toaddress specifically biotechnology more than twenty years ago appears now
a visionary decision concretized into an impressive biotechnology sector, withnumerous accomplishments in healthcare and agriculture (Lohray, 2003;
Thorsteinsdottir et al, 2004; Chaturvedi, 2005; Reddy, 2007). In agriculture,even if Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) cotton is the only GM crop approved until
now, the country has the largest biotech research program among developing
countries, following an early designation of biotechnology as a strategic fieldIndia’s Biosafety Policy on Genetically Modified Crops: A perspective from food security

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in 1986. In India, biotech benefits also from a complex regulatory system, oneof the earliest even among developed countries (Johnston et al. 2008).
The future of GM crops in India looks encouraging as well. An OECD
report on the emergence of the bioeconomy (the contribution of biotechnology
to economic output, OECD, 2009, p.22) places India and China as key driversof bioeconomy by 2030. The report predicts that by 2030 40% of the world
workforce would be concentrated in these two countries. The increase inpopulation as well as the increased incomes would lead to increased foodrequirements. The economic growth would increase demand for biofuels as
well. For India, given the importance of agriculture for its economy (over 60%of the workforce engaged in agriculture), the ongoing major investments inresearch and development for GM crops and the extent of the field trials, aswell as the impressive and increasing number of PhD holders in agricultural
biotechnology, the report predicts that the country will become a major
cultivator of GM crops (OECD, 2009).
Yet, India has proven difficult to grasp before, displaying paradoxes atmany levels. In agricultural biotechnology, an over 20 years interest andinvestment in research and development (the Department of Biotechnology
was founded in 1986) brought only the approval of Bt cotton and the near
but failed approval of Bt brinjal. In what the involvement of civil society is
oncerned, India has probably one of the strongest (1.5 million NGOs) andbetter informed civil society in the world (Bound, 2007). They organized astrong anti-GM movement fueled by what they claim the failure of the Bt
cotton (developed by a joint venture Monsanto/Mahyco) even connected bysome to waves of suicides of small farmers in India (Stone, 2002). Moreover,India has the best legislation in the developing world protecting the rights
of farmers against multinational biotech corporations. The Plant Variety
Protection and Farmers’ Rights Act (2001) provides the right to sell seeds
even protected ones (except branded ones); it protects farmers plant varieties;
it assures the traceability of new plant varieties; it does not allow theterminator technology; and it gives protection against innocent infringement(Sahai, 2004). Meanwhile, the Indian authorities not only seem cautious
about the approval of GM crops but keeping GM-free crops is still consideredin some circles as a vital trade interest for India, the country remaining theonly in the world able to certify GM-free soy (Sahai, 2004).

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Vis-a-vis the EU/US regulatory conflict, India has an ambivalent position
as well. On one side, it mentions the substantial equivalence (US approach)as a base for risk assessment in official regulatory documents, it sustains ascientifically-based risk assessment, and it is a member of the WTO since2005 (which does not recognize the precautionary principle as a principleof the international law). On the other side, in the official documents it isemphasized that the substantial equivalence is just a starting point and theevaluations will be considered on a case-by-case basis. In the same time,
Indian regulations are following mainly the OECD guidelines, allergenicity
tests were included in 1998 Biotechnology Safety Guidelines, the Cartagena
Protocol was ratified in 2003 and GM mandatory labeling was introduced
in 2005 (all characterizing the precautionary principle-EU approach).
Of course, this is the situation on paper, because in reality, the complex
regulatory system encounters problems with enforcement as illustrated in theinability to prevent or stop the cultivation of the illegal Bt cotton in Gujarat(Jayaraman, 2004).
Under these considerations, it seems clear that India will have a major
impact on the cultivation of GM crops worldwide. In addition, it seems
clear that for food security and economic imperatives, India would havestrong incentives to become a major cultivator of GM crops. Yet, it is lesscertain whether India would take this path. More specifically, what might
be desirable for food security aspects and even declared reason for thegovernment to address GM crops, gets lost in the ensuing biosafety debates.
As stated in the beginning of this paper, generally the concept ofbiosafety, based on the perception of risk, evolved from defining risk
strictly as environmental and human health threats (Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety), to a broader understanding including socio-economic and evenpolitical factors (Johnston et al. 2008). As such, even though biosafety isstrictly speaking the evaluation of environmental and health risks of the GM
products, the overall risk assessment process in India has come to include
also socio-economic concerns over the impact of GM products. It is almost
impossible to talk only about biosafety without socio-economic concerns,
especially because the science itself behind the biosafety is being questioned(due to its proximity to extra-scientific factors and to the uncertainty ofknowledge of a novel science: biotechnology). Thus in India, questions over theIndia’s Biosafety Policy on Genetically Modified Crops: A perspective from food security

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accuracy and objectivity of scientific data, as well as the access of the public tothat data are connected to organic farming, as being better alternative to GM
cultivation; to farmers rights being infringed by biotech multinationals who
are attempting to gain control over the Indian seed market; to participationin decision-making versus a technocratic process; to issues of food sovereignty
and even human security (farmers suicides). Yet to what extent all these
aspects pertain to mainstreaming GM crops for food security is the central
question of this article.
In making its predictions, the OECD report presented above (OECD,2009) fails to consider the particularities of the Indian decision-making
environment on GM crops policies, especially the dynamics of the interaction
between different stakeholders that translate into different decisions
concerning GM crops. Many scholars identified the political environment as
determinant in explaining differences in GM policies for different countries(Jasanoff, 2005; Johnston et al, 2008; Gupta at al., 2008; Ramessar et al.,2009). Yet current analyses of the Indian decision-making environment on GM
crops policies are missing. When covering the decisionmaking environment on
GM crops policies the literature generally covers industrialized countries or
China. This paper represents the incipient phase of a research intended to fillthis gap.
Based on the above-mentioned background revolving around the debateson GM Crops both in the domestic and global contexts, this research, as awhole, analyzes both domestic and international determinants of India’s GM
crops policies, in how the interactions among different stakeholders haveshaped the current state of Indian GM crops policies. In addition, it explores
what are the implications of this political decision-making process for the
future of GM crops in India and its food security strategy. This article briefly
draws some attention to what India’s case would mean to an international
regime of GM crops. Specifically, it examines whether India will expand
the cultivation of GM crops beyond Bt cotton to other GM food crops. A
crucial moment in shaping GM crops policies is the commercial approval ofa particular GM plant and the ensuing biosafety controversies. Thus, these
are the moments of focus for this analysis. For this, the study undertakes twocase studies, selected due to their relevance: the commercial approval of Bt
cotton (the only GM crops approved so far), and the moratorium on Bt brinjal

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第1号(Bt brinjal was very close of becoming the first GM food crop approved for
cultivation).
The present paper, as mentioned, is the incipient phase of the research.
In it the objectives are to either confirm or identify the main stakeholders,
identified from a document analysis, and to draw a sketch of the interactions
between them. Basically, the research in this paper focused on three main
topics: identifying stakeholders, interactions between them, and the futureof GM crops in India. Toward these ends interviews were conducted withrepresentatives from a few Indian stakeholders groups. To determine
the interactions between them the interviewees were asked to make anevaluation of the general processes of the moratorium on Bt brinjal and of
the approval of the Bt cotton (the two cases studies), in who and/or what had
most impact on the course of events. The interviewees had thus the possibility
to talk about their own involvement and of the other stakeholders, as well as
make qualitative evaluations of them. Further, to determine the international
stakeholders that are involved in the Indian policies on GM, they were asked
to position India vis-a-vis the EU/US regulatory conflict and vis-a-vis thedeveloping countries. In addition, since in India farmers are a particularly
sensitive issue, with many of the stakeholders claiming that they speak forthe benefit of farmers, a question was reserved on how stakeholders perceive
farmers. At last, the respondents were asked for their view on the future of
the GM crops in India.

1. Background of the two cases in India
In 2001 in Gujarat Mahyco-Monsanto Biotech (MMB) discovered thecommercial cultivation of Bt cotton, a GM crop, a technology for which
MMB had a patent on and was still waiting approval from the Genetic
Engineering Advisory Committee (GEAC). NavBharat, the company that soldthe Bt seeds as a hybrid resistant to bollworm, obtained them by crossing
Bt gene containing cotton with local cotton varieties. The seeds obtained by
NavBharat were sold to farmers in Gujarat since 1998 without mentioningthat they are transgenic seeds and without performing a biosafety assessment
for GM crops, therefore violating the Environmental Protection Act. GEAC
ordered uprooting and burning the standing illegal crops, issuing warnings inIndia’s Biosafety Policy on Genetically Modified Crops: A perspective from food security

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regional newspapers, destroying the remaining seeds and lint from farmers,
and sanitizing the fields (Herring, 2007). Farmers refused, however, and wereeven sustained by the state government (van den Belt and Keulartz, 2007).
Furthermore, the farmers were protected by the Plant Variety Protection andFarmers’ Rights Act passed in 2001 which protects farmers from innocent
infringement. Continuous improvements of the illegal variety by farmers andpostgraduate students of Gujarat Agricultural University have been reported
after that (Gupta and Chandak, 2005).
Bt cotton was approved for commercialization in 2002. Five more events(Bt cotton type modifications) were approved in India since then and they
were incorporated in 522 hybrids (Choudhary and Gaur, 2010). Bt cotton is
generally considered a success story in India, excepting some voices claiming
its economic failure leading farmers to commit suicides (Shiva and Jalees,2006). Yet the current situation of the “illegal” cotton in Gujarat remains
controversial. Some claim that Gujarat is the largest manufacturer of illegal
Bt cotton seeds in the country (Business Standard, April 2008). Others claimthat the cultivation of the illegal cotton died off and that right now, at best
there are just cases of spurious seeds (James, 2008).
In the second case study, the Bt brinjal was considered for development
by ProAgro in 2000 (The Hindu, September 2000) and by others after that,most notably by Mahyco-Monsanto, who by 2006 filled for approval for fieldtrials. GEAC published the plant’s biosafety assessments on their website,
and waited for public comments within 15 days after which it would consider
it for large scale trials, before commercial approval. The reactions against
it, however, pointed toward the insufficiency of the data and questioning its
objectivity since no independent evaluation was performed (The Financial
Express, June 2006). It followed a court trial in September and a Supreme
Court decision on a temporary ban on all GM field trials until an independent
body of scientists can assess GM crops, not base the process on a particularcompany data (The Hindu Business, September 2007). The next step in thecontroversy over the disclosure of bio-safety data on GM food crops was in2007 when the Central Information Commission (CIC) directed MahycoMonsanto to make the data for Bt brinjal public, establishing a precedent of
disclosure of biosafety data before commercialization (The Financial Express,
November 2007). In 2009 GEAC again states the safety of the Bt brinjal and10同志社グローバル・スタディーズ

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approves it for commercialization yet declining its final word in the matterand subjecting the final decision to the Government. In February 2010, at theend of the first anti GM national campaign, the Ministry of the Environment
institutes an indefinite moratorium on the plant developed by MahycoMonsanto (The Economist, February 2010; India Together, February 2010).

2. Research Methodology and the Process of Data Collection
The main research, of which the present paper is the initial phase,
analyses the main stakeholders and the interactions between them todetermine which stakeholders translate their GM policy preferences into
governmental policy and the mechanism through which they accomplish it, as
well as the implications of this process on the future of GM crops in India. For
this analysis, stakeholders are considered the actors or group of actors able toinfluence the governmental policy.
Several questions guide the research. What is the situation of GM crops
in Indian agriculture? What is the place of GM crops in Indian food security
strategy? How do different stakeholders see the place of GM crops in Indian
agriculture? What is their perception on the future of GM crops in India?
How are GM crops approved for commercialization in India? Do other groups
outside of government have access to decision-making? To what extent?
The research will build on the study of documents, primary (governmental
white papers, press releases, task forces reports, governmental committees
reports, guidelines and regulations) and secondary (published reports andacademic papers), as well as interviews with representatives from the mainstakeholders.
The present paper constitutes the incipient phase of the research. In it
interviews are conducted to either confirm or identify the main stakeholders
and to draw a sketch of the interactions between them. The interviews
focus on three main topics pertaining to the wider research: identifying thestakeholders, interactions between them, and the future of GM crops. As
such, the paper draws mainly on 11 semi-structured interviews conductedin Delhi in August 2010. In a first phase, representatives of major groups
involved are identified through an analysis of academic articles, IndianEnglish media articles, and the Annexures to the Moratorium on Bt brinjal,

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posted on the Ministry of Environment and Forests website. These Annexurescontain selected documents submitted by various interest groups regarding
the approval of Bt brinjal.These selected representatives were interviewed
and some further provided a “snowball” or “chain-referral” sampling (Weiss,
1994). Each interviewee was asked a similar set of questions, but allowed toelaborate on certain subjects as long as they pertained to the research.
To ease the process of the analysis, to each of the respondents a number
was assigned. In addition, to indicate the importance of the information
received from the interviewees, Table 1 below provides some details on theirbackground and thus, their position in the GM debate.
Number Background of respondent
1

National Coordinator, ISAAA (International Service for the Acquisition ofAgri-Biotech Applications) South Asia Office; an international non-profit
organization funded by the biotech industry

2

One of the two organizers of the anti-Bt brinjal Greenpeace campaign

3

Director and founder of Navdanya (Indian NGO), Director of the Research
Foundation on Science, Technology, and Ecology, a leader in the International
Forum on Globalization; won the Alternative Nobel Peace Prize (the Right
Livelihood Award). In 2010, she was awarded the Sydney Peace Prize4

Director of Gene Campaign (Indian NGO), chaired the Planning Commission
Task Force on Biodiversity and Genetically Engineered Organisms, for the
Eleventh Plan. She is a member of the National Biodiversity Board and serveson the Research Advisory Committees of national scientific institutions, theExpert Committee on Biotechnology Policy and the Bioethics Committee of the
Indian Council of Medical Research

5

Scientist working on the development of GM plants in Delhi

6

Scientist working on the development of GM plants in Delhi

7

Scientist working on the development of GM plants and are in positions tohave access to governmental decisionmaking bodies

8

Scientist working on the development of GM plants and are in positions tohave access to governmental decisionmaking bodies

9Exec. Assist. for CIFA (Consortium of Indian Farmers Associations)

10State representative for CRS (Catholic Relief Services)

11

Professor, J. Nehru University, Center for Social Medicine, conducted
colloquium on public acceptance of Bt brinjal, sent letters to Prime-Minister,
Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Science and Technology

Table 1. Codification and Background of Respondents.
The respondents were asked to expose their views on who or what wasdeterminant for the moratorium on Bt brinjal and for the approval of Bt

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cotton; how do they position India in the regulatory conflict between EU and
US; what is India’s position toward the developing world; how do they view
the Indian farmers vis-a-vis the GM crops, as a passive or as an active group;and finally, what is the future of GM crops in India.
The interviewees can undergo several classifications. On the acceptanceof GM crops, there are some strongly opposing GM crops (2, 3), some strongly
promoting them (1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9), some stating that they are not acceptable inthe current form, but do not discharge the possibility of becoming beneficial in
the future (10, 4, 11). On their representativeness, they belong to some of themain stakeholders: industry (1), NGOs (2, 3, 4), scientists (5, 6, 7, 8), farmers(9). They also represent some minor ones: humanitarian relief agency (9), andsocial scientists (11). Key representatives from the government are missing
but 7, 8 and 4 worked either as advisers for government, or were part of somegovernmental committees.

3. Analysis of the Cases
For every main topic, the findings are structured around the twocase studies: Bt brinjal and Bt cotton. The topics are the identification of
stakeholders, the interactions between them, and the future of GM crops.
On the identification of stakeholders, in the Bt brinjal case, appear NGOs,
farmers, scientists, biotech industry, and the government, also public opinion,
political parties and external influences (EU and US). In the Bt cotton caseare mentioned Mahyco/ Monsanto, the farmers and the central government
as instrumental in the approval of the GM crops, with NGOs playing a minor,
local role.
In addition, individuals appear as main figures in the decision-making on
the moratorium on Bt brinjal (the Minister of Environment, eminent Indianscientist). When GEAC (Genetic Engineering Advisory Committee) renounced
its right at being the authority with the last word in the commercial approvalof GM crops (Bt brinjal in that case), it created a void of power, which the
Minister of Environment filled in. The reasons for GEAC’s action were
either a mistake (4) or the result of the Minister’s influence (1). In addition,although the Minister of Environment is recognized as the main force behindthe moratorium, regardless of the modality through which he became entitledIndia’s Biosafety Policy on Genetically Modified Crops: A perspective from food security

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to take that decision, the advice of an eminent Indian scientist was mentioned
as weighting heavily in the Minister’s decision (3, 7). There is no mentioningof individuals appearing as main figures in the Bt cotton case.
Moreover, the groups involved in the Bt brinjal case are not homogenous.
In the Bt cotton case all the groups seem quite compact from interviewees’
replies. For the Bt brinjal case, all the NGOs might have acted for instituting
the moratorium, yet almost each acted from different reasons in different
nuances. They cover from lack of transparency and participation indecisionmaking (2), questioning the objectivity and accuracy of Monsanto’s
scientific data (3), to a lack of expertise, enforcement and objectivity inthe biosafety related decisions (4). Moreover, not all NGOs are rejecting
a future beneficial role of GM technologies, or the use of current non-GM
biotechnologies (4).
Among scientists (the majority) consider Bt brinjal safe, some (eminent
Indian agricultural scientist and scientists connected to NGOs) reject it. For
farmers, all the interviewees indicate them as a heterogenous group, withrespondent 9 characterizing them as “highly divided.”
For the interactions between stakeholders, the analysis focuses aroundthe main aspects of the GM debates: the accuracy and objectivity of scientific
data; organic farming, as being better alternative to GM cultivation; tofarmers rights being infringed by biotech multinationals who are attempting
to gain control over the Indian seed market; to participation in decisionmaking versus a technocratic process; external influences over the decisionmaking for GM crops regulation.
On an accuracy and objectivity of scientific data basis, the pro-GM side
contests the results of the con-GM side and vice-versa, sometimes in too
absolute terms to be believable. For example, one opinion states that theresults of the NGO reports on the evaluation of the Bt cotton are “always
biased” and that the scientists that agreed and advised on the moratorium
on Bt brinjal had “no objective reason” for that (1). On the con-GM side there
are claims that “Monsanto does public relations; does not do science” (3). Of
course there are also more reasonable pro and con reactions, like the faith in
the accuracy and objectivity of scientific data, because the same technology
has been used over the world for many years without negative impacts (9),or the need for independent review of the scientific information, because the14

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current regulatory bodies are being influenced by industry (4).
For organic farming, the con-GM side designs them as being better
alternatives to GM cultivation. There are certainly good reasons to believe so.
The organic farming market is emerging as a profitable one (only in US theorganic foods and drinks have grown from $1 billion in 1990 to $24.8 billion
in 2009-OTA, 2010). In the same time, the reports on the performances of theGM crops in the developing world are mixed, as with the Bt cotton in India:
some farmers had unquestioned benefits, other had harvests which could notjustify the higher investment. The industry representatives seem to be awareof these reasons since, unlike with the accuracy and objectivity of scientificdata, they do not position themselves on the opposite side in posting organic
farming and GM cultivation as mutually exclusive. Instead, hey are portrayed
as non-competitors, each addressing different consumer shares (1).
Farmers rights being infringed by biotech multinationals who areattempting to gain control over the Indian seed market is an older
controversy dating back to the Bt cotton case. The stakeholders weredivided then between protecting farmers rights and those trying to simplify
regulation and liberalize trade in transgenics. The main danger from thesecompanies was in their intellectual property rights over the seeds and theterminator technology (it would not allow saving seeds and replanting, since
the plants would bear sterile seeds). Protecting farmers from multinationals
is still the purpose of some stakeholders (3). Yet at the time of the Bt brinjal
controversy, Monsanto was in the impossibility of taking over the Indianseed market on the basis of intellectual property rights, since seeds cannot bepatented in India. Moreover, due to the international battle against biotech
companies and their research and patents on "trait technologies" (seeds thatgrow only if a certain herbicide or insecticide is employed, seeds that would
not germinate in the first generation), Monsanto pledged to not commercialize
the technology for which they had obtained a patent in 1998 (The Guardian,1999). For other stakeholders, Monsanto and the biotech multinationals are
not necessarily the only villains, with both Indian and international biotech
industry promoting their interests in GM crops (4).
Another possibility for Monsanto and the multinationals to gain control
over the seed market is through the establishment of a monopoly. Thispossibility is also questioned by the many variants (Bt cotton and otherIndia’s Biosafety Policy on Genetically Modified Crops: A perspective from food security

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crops currently under research) developed by Indian companies and publicresearch institutions (5, 8). The debate has even pro-globalization proponents
sustaining that multinationals are wrongly perceived, as they can bring many
benefits in technology transfer and the public-private partnerships are being
ignored (9).
For participation in decision-making versus a technocratic process,the majority of the respondents stated that the decision-making should betransparent and inclusive. The importance of experts does not disappear,
however. Beyond the scientific expertise (1, 9), the necessity of expertsin emerging inter-disciplinary fields like biosafety and their inclusion in
regulatory bodies appear (4).
For external influences over the decision-making for GM crops
regulation, EU and US appear in respondents’ replies. Their influence iseither on the approach to regulation, within the EU/US conflict, or directly in
the Bt brinjal case. Therefore, EU appears as influencing the debate throughNGOs funding (9) and through a cultural influence dating back to colonial
times (1), while there are fears that the Minister of Environment might bereplaced at US pressures (11), with an increasing US political influence overGM crops approvals in the future (4, 11). Yet there are respondents which do
not perceive any EU/US influence over Indian approach to regulation (3, 5, 8),with respondent 5 saying that India is “unique.”There is an exception from this oversimplifying picture which still draws
very definite lines between domestic and international divides, surprisingwhen considering that the subject is such a globalized science and industry asbiotechnology. Respondent 2 points out the fact that international/ domestic
line in characterizing stakeholders is arbitrary, that many are in the sametime global and local. This observation is more obvious for stakeholders
immersed in transnational networks like scientists or NGOs, involved insolving local problems but drawing on international resources.
Finally for the future of GM crops in India, the majority of the
respondents seem to agree that more time is needed. BRAI (Biotechnology
Regulatory Authority of India), the autonomous regulatory body proposed
to replace GEAC, is also a hope for better regulations in the future, but it
might take some time to be set in function. The setting of BRAI, or NBRA
(National Biotechnology Regulatory Authority) was recommended in 2004 by

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the Task Force on Biodiversity & Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOS)
for the Environment & Forests Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-2012) to tackle
the lack of standards and procedures for safety assessment and labeling, ofcoordination between governmental departments, of transparency and public
communication, and a lack of specialized individuals for risk assessmentsof GMOs (ICMR, 2004; Planning Commission, 2006). A draft was made andsubjected to public comments in 2008, but seems to have been put aside until
the Bt brinjal controversy.

Conclusions
The preliminary investigation constituting the subject of this paper iscomposed of interviews conducted to either confirm or identify the mainstakeholders and to draw a sketch of the interactions between them. For
stakeholders, their number and importance changes from Bt cotton case to
the Bt brinjal one. In Bt brinjal, NGOs emerge as forefront players organizing
a national level campaign, which in an unprecedented move determined thesubjection of Bt brinjal to public debates, finally concretized into an indefinite
moratorium. Even if the actions of the Minister of Environment and Forests
were decisive, he seems more of a last minute actor. Even if they are led
by different motives, the NGOs left aside their differences and worked in acommon front whose efficiency increased thus considerably. In doing so, they
drew also on international resources from the transnational networks inwhich they are integrated. A sure fact is that NGOs are stronger than ever inIndia, and unless the new NBRA/BRAI will bring significant changes in theregulatory environment, the NGOs will be probably able to block any future
GM crops commercialization attempts, especially food GM crops. The powerof NGOs in India is probably without precedent in the developing world,
and they achieved major breakthroughs for farmers rights, conservation of
biodiversity and traditional knowledge.
Another group highly integrated in transnational networks was thegroup of scientists, yet they were not able to utilize that asset. Perhaps one
reason was that they did not dispose of the resources of the NGOs and theirresonance to the public.
The external influences seem to be secondary and working through theIndia’s Biosafety Policy on Genetically Modified Crops: A perspective from food security

17

main actors rather than operating direct interventions. An indication to thisis each party’s accusation over the other’s operating in the name of foreigninterests without further elaboration or proof, which fit the usual strategy oftainting the adversary.
In the middle of this agitation the Government seems to be looking
again for an opportunity to make everyone happy, like in the Bt cotton case.
At that time, the illegal proliferation of Bt cotton satisfied the farmers, who
could have the Bt technology at a much lower price, the industry who could
finally have its product adopted for commercialization through this fait
accompli, and some of the NGOs who could have perceived it as a victory
against Monsanto. For the moment, this is accomplished by the setting of a
new regulatory authority, NBRA/BRAI. Setting this authority has also theadvantage that it can gain more time, which can bring new elements into the
picture (severe pest attacks, increase in international crops prices, China’s
adoption of new GM crops).
Whether this new authority, once instituted, will increase theprecautionary stance of the biosafety policies in India, it remains to be seen.
On another hand, even if providing a more precautionary approach, the new
regulatory autonomous authority might not represent a real chance for an
increased precautionary stance. Considering the political and institutional
environment in India, a truly autonomous, accountable, uncontroversial,transparent, and efficient regulatory authority seems impossible. There isa distance between the existence of a regulation and its efficiency, when
the judicial system must act as the enforcer of rules and regulations, as it ispresently the case in India. The regulatory system has rather a pragmatic
approach, having precautionary provisions which are not enforced since itwould require investments in infrastructure and increased expenditures. This
pragmatism suits US and its substantial equivalence-based approach in thatit proves the strains of a precautionary stance. It might also be the beginningof a third type of regulatory approach, the “Wild East”: one where the rules
and regulations comprise provisions of both EU and US approaches, but they
are followed only when it is beneficial to do so.
The approval process has suffered a halt with the Bt brinjal moratorium,
but it will not be a standstill. Due to the high number of GM crops underresearch currently in India and the accompanying large investments in18

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public research institutes, the Government will continue to pursue GM
crops. Pressures will come also from the private companies, domestic or
multinationals, which invested considerably in GM research. Moreover, thedream of the Green Revolution, of technological miracles delivering solutions
to the standstill in agricultural production, still lingers in the minds ofthe policy-makers. Yet the regulatory problems, especially in enforcement,
unlikely to disappear through the creation of NBRA will be major setbacks forattempts to international harmonization of the regulations in GM crops. They
will also create problems in the event of an increase in the international tradein transgenics.
The pursuit of GM crops for food security is highly unlikely to happen
in India any time soon. There is no advanced research on crops employed infood security policies, like cereals or pulses. After the controversies and thebranding of the Basmati rice, the international partnership wanting to deliver
the Golden Rice (vitamin A enhanced) will surely have no chance in India.
In addition, there are no real scientific developments to prove necessary andbeneficial in the eyes of the NGOs the pursuit of the GM crops to increase
food security.

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