論文

Coiste na n-Iarchimí, (the Irish
Republican Army ex-prisoners network)and the Limitations of Hybrid
Peacebuilding in Ireland
Damien Okado-GoughIntroduction
For over 30 years, the conflict in Northern Ireland seemed for many to be
beyond resolution. Known as ‘the Troubles’, it was considered a classic exampleof the intractability of ethno-political conflicts such as in Israel/Palestine,
Lebanon, and South Africa, and the peace process that emerged from it gave
great hope that other conflicts might also be transformed by learning from the
Irish experience.1
Yet although successful levels of conflict transformation have taken place,there remains an uneasy peace between the two main ethno-political groups,
the Irish Catholic, Nationalist, Republican community (CNR) and the British
Protestant, Unionist, Loyalist community (PUL), and a final resolution to this
ethno-political conflict seems as far away as ever. This study outlines some ofthe successes and limitations of the hybrid model peace process in Northern
Ireland and looks at the role of IRA ex-prisoner grassroots peacebuilding andits potential to push the peace process beyond its current limitations.
Through interviews with I R A ex-prisoners a nd observation of theirpeacebuilding work, this study finds that IRA ex-prisoners are engaged insignificant amounts of grassroots peacebuilding work which could provevaluable in moving Northern Ireland beyond an unstable conflict settlement andbringing about a final, more enduring conflict resolution.
Interviews took place face-to-face in West Belfast during February andMarch of 2020. Initially, Coiste’s coordinator provided contact details forpotential interviewees and also selected interviewees and set up times andlocations for interviews to take place. Some interviewees were identified and
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contacted by the researcher independently of Coiste’s management structure,whilst others were recommended by interviewees. All interviewees were male
IRA ex-prisoners (unsuccessful efforts were made to contact female IRA exprisoners) who remain active Republicans through membership of Sinn Fein, thepolitical party closely associated with the IRA, are involved in the Coiste
network and have been involved in their outreach work. All interviewees spenttime in HMP Maze, otherwise known as Long Kesh or the H Blocks by
Republicans. The interviewees were convicted of a range of offences includingt he killing or attempted killing of police or a rmy person nel, bombing,membership of the IRA, and intelligence gathering. Interviews were initiallylimited to one hour by Coiste, but almost all ranged from one hour to one and ahalf hours or more, and some interviewees consented to second and thirdinterviews. Interviews were semi-structured, focusing on life story narratives
a nd i nvest igat i ng reasons for a nd t he persona l ef fects of engag i ng i npeacebuilding work. They were transcribed and analysed by the sole researcher
responsible for the study.

Concepts of peacebuilding
Peacebuilding initiatives can be classified along a conceptual spectrum whichranges from liberal to local peacebuilding, with the concept of hybridity being
an amalgamation of both. Following the end of the Cold War, the international
community was challenged with new security issues including intrastate
conf lict. Spearheading the international efforts to deal with these newchallenges the United Nations, guided by the ideas in its Agenda for Peace2 andBrahami Report, 3 engaged in several conflict interventions in places such as
Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. Framed by Western ideas of liberal democratic
norms, the rule of law, and human rights, all of which provide conditions forcapitalist market economies to flourish,4 these interventions included diplomacy,
peace-making, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, 5 but they more often proved
unsuited to the job resulting in criticisms of the liberal model. Mac Ginty
criticises liberal peacebuilding for its focus on elites to the detriment ofgrassroots, accusing it of being technocratic and top-down, failing to include thepreferences and contextual knowledge of local actors.6 He also criticises it forbeing “operationalized in highly standardized formats that leave little space for146

Coiste na n-Iarchimí, (the Irish Republican Army ex-prisoners network) and the Limitations of Hybrid Peacebuilding in Irelandalternative approaches” and that it employs “set templates” in applying reforms
such as peace negotiations, Security Sector Reform (S SR), Disarmament
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), civil service reform, and good
governance, leaving interventions in places like in East Timor, Bougainville, Sri
Lanka and Mozambique looking more or less the same and unable to respondproperly to local needs.7
The local turn in peacebuilding began in the early 1990s with the work ofJohn Paul Lederach8 and has been developed further by writers such as Mac
Ginty and Richmond. 9 Lederach argued for conflict transformation whereby
local people act as the primary authors of peacebuilding in a bid to create
sustainability by rebuilding relationships within societies through reconciliation,
establishing infrastructures and processes, and increasing human capital. Mac
Ginty and Richmond also place emphasis on the local in terms of local agency,
context , a nd dea ling with loca l pa rt ners , 10 a rg uing that loca lly driven
peacebuilding is a form of resistance against dominant (often neo-colonial)
discourses and practices of the liberal, top-down peacebuilding model.
The hybrid model is an attempt to merge the basic tenets of the liberal modelwith the local turn by advocating a mediation “between local and international
norms, institutions, law, right, needs and interests,” which implies, “thatlegitimacy and agency rest partly at the local level, meaning both state andsociety,”11 and by doing so, generates a positive hybrid peace, “rooted inaccommodation, reconciliation, ema ncipation, autonomy a nd a sense ofliberation.”12 The hybrid approach is now the primary model being employed byinternational actors across the globe, evidence of a realization within the field of
the need for local purchase in peace processes in order for positive forms ofpeace to take hold. Despite problems with the hybrid model,13 Northern Ireland
is widely seen as one of the most successful recent examples of global
peacebuilding, 14 and one that has incorporated both elite and grassroots
peacebuilding.
Yet, the success of the hybrid system in Northern Ireland is limited in one
very significant regard. For the Protestant, Unionist, Loyalist (PUL) community,
it provided a final settlement to the conflict in the shape of local governmental
arrangements which, for them, solidifies Northern Ireland’s place in the U.K.,
but for Republicans, it does not deal with what they believe to be the central
cause of the conflict, Britain’s continued ‘occupation’ of the north east of the
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island and the sectarian division they believe it has fostered, but that it offers
them a peaceful route to independence from Britain, rather than continued‘armed struggle’. The Northern Irish peace process does not deliver for Irish
Republicans what Richmond, above, points out is a central tenet of the local
turn in peacebuilding, that is, “ema ncipation, autonomy a nd a sense ofliberation.” Furthermore, within the current context of rising Catholic
Nationalist, Republican (CNR) political power and Brexit threatening to partiallydecouple Nort hern I rela nd from Brita in as a result of t he wit hdrawa lagreement, between the EU and the UK (insert this phrase between ‘agreement’
and the comma) rising anxieties within the PUL community threaten to further
destabilise the already tenuous peace.

Hybrid peacebuilding in Northern Ireland
The Belfast Agreement is often hailed as a central element of the success ofpeacebuilding in this conflict, establishing new political institutions within
Northern Ireland, between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, andbetween the Republic of Ireland and the British government. As a result of
negotiations by the political elites, there is a devolved administration, based on
Arend Lijphart’s consociational model of democracy,15 with mandatory crosscommunity voting on certain major decisions and a power-sharing executive,
whose ministerial posts are allocated amongst the parties using a form of party
list proportional representation, the d’Hont method.16
For the IRA, it represented the sort of alternative to its armed struggle thatit had been looking for, ending the possibility of a return to Unionist domination
in a local parliament, as well as having the guarantee of a formal role for theRepublic of Ireland in the internal affairs of Northern Ireland, and thenormalization of policing and security (SSR), which saw the withdrawal of the
British army from the streets, the disbandment of the hated Ulster Defense
Regiment,17 and the rebranding of the Royal Ulster Constabulary as the Police
Service of Northern Ireland. Furthermore, it enshrined in law the right of all
citizens to be recognised as being Irish or British, as well as a commitment by
the British government to withdraw from Ireland, if majorities of the people in
the north and south were to vote for it. In October 2003, the IRA undertook
the final act of decommissioning its arsenal, and in July 2005 it announced the148

Coiste na n-Iarchimí, (the Irish Republican Army ex-prisoners network) and the Limitations of Hybrid Peacebuilding in Irelandformal end to its campaign.
DDR formed an important part of the Agreement with all remaining
paramilitary prisoners from organisations who were on ceasefire, about 500
individuals, being released from prison. This measure was considered necessary
for those armed groups to bring their members and supporters along in thepeace process.
The establishment of the political institutions and the absence of the serious
violence that crippled the society for decades, allowed for an increase in thekinds grassroots peacebuilding work that had been ongoing even during thearmed conflict period, as well as more substantive work afterwards. Myriadstate organisations, NGOs, and voluntary groups had been working to establish
cross-community dialogue and cooperation during the violent period, and after
the Agreement and the subsequent large injection of funding, a range of civilsociety groups got involved in peacebuilding at grassroots level. Money from the
British and Irish governments, the European Union’s Peace Program, and fromthe International Fund for Ireland, has been allocated to projects including
infrastructure building, regeneration, employment initiatives, education, training,
mediation, and restorative justice programs, which have transformed many of
those areas of deprivation most affected by the conflict, particularly inner-city,
working-class Nationalist and Loyalist areas of Belfast and out-lying towns andareas along the border. Jarman points out that a lot of these programmes
focused on the softer end of peacebuilding work, which includes building
relationships and establishing trust between both individuals and communities,
including between former combatants.18

The deficiencies of the hybrid model in Northern Ireland
Despite these positives, Northern Ireland is only enjoying a relative peace,rather than a permanent solution. Small, but potentially deadly armed groups
remain active, and the region has suffered regular ethnopolitical unrest.
Although there has been some softening of the boundaries between them,19 thetwo communities remain deeply divided in many ways, which holds thepotential for future, increased conflict. At the end of the violent conflict, 17 of
the 39 towns in Northern Ireland were highly segregated, although they did
contain a high percentage of the total population of the region, 20 and although
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some level of residential integration has occurred between middle class
Cat holics a nd Protesta nts , over 9 0 % of socia l housi ng rema i ns high ly
segregated. 21 In a 2017 survey, it was found that many people still prefer to send
their children to own-religion schools, and that this had actually increased by
2019. 22 Furthermore, a survey in 2016 found that over half of those living along
the numerous ‘peace walls’ that separate many Catholic and Protestant interface
areas did not want the walls removed, with 78% believing that sectarian
violence would occur as a result. 23
Since the signing of the Agreement, there has been regular outbreaks of
sectarian violence on interfaces over issues such as political/cultural parades
and commemorations. In December 2012 there was a week of rioting acrossNorthern Ireland by members of the Protestant, Unionist, Loyalist (PUL)
community following a decision by Belfast City Council to reduce the number ofdays the British Union Jack would be flown from City Hall. The issue ofcontentious annual parades by the PUL-based Orange Order is never far away
as CNR communities react to these parades skirting or even entering theirareas. So, despite the Belfast Agreement’s success in providing a route out ofviolent conflict, there are limitations to its ability to move beyond, what Burton
calls, conflict settlement to conflict resolution, i.e. a permanent solution to the
problem. 24 This settlement has merely resulted in the end of armed conflict. It
has not provided a route out of the deep sectarian divisions that persist, andwhich will continue to threaten the peace that has been achieved do date.
Herein lies a fundamental flaw in the Belfast Agreement and which renders it
unable to deliver a lasting peace - it was a settlement, not a resolution. Thisremains particularly so for Irish Republicans, who have not given up their goalof a fully independent Ireland. For them, the Agreement was only ever a
steppingstone that enabled them to move onto the next stage of their struggle.
Ryan25 points to four problems with the Agreement. Firstly, it did not confirm
the final constitutional status of Northern Ireland, which remains in limbo, as
the CNR community, growing in size and political strength and confidence,
continues to push for constitutional change. Secondly, being a consociationalarrangement, it inherits well-known flaws in the model: that it deepens culturald iv is ion s by enc o d i ng t hem i nt o it s st r uct u re s ; e st abl is he s c omplex
arrangements that can easily become paralysed; and concentrates too much onpolitical elites, not properly engaging the grassroots. Thirdly, its failure to help
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those at the grassroots level to move beyond sectarianism, and lastly, it does
not have the mechanisms to neutralise rejectionists and spoilers26 who wouldt h r e a t e n i t s s u c c e s s . R y a n a l s o p o i nt s t o e v i d e n c e t o s u g g e s t t h a t
consociationalism in Northern Ireland has caused greater polarization, rather
than less, the latter being what one might expect in the new conditions createdby the ending of violent conflict. Following the signing of the Agreement, themore moderate SDLP and Ulster Unionist Party were overtaken in theirrespective camps by Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party. 27

IRA ex-prisoners and local peacebuilding
There are two broad areas of IRA ex-prisoner peacebuilding activity, thatwhich focuses on shoring up their own constituency base in support of thepeace process and that which focuses on outreach with former enemies. The
former is important in helping to secure the peace that has been ensured todate, and the latter is where IRA ex-prisoners could be providing an alternative
peacebuilding approach which is working to overcome the limitations of thehybrid model and the peace process as a whole.

Working within - ex-prisoner self-help
According to Shirlow et al., ex-prisoners have three specific conf licttransformation roles to play within their communities. 28 They (a) are involved in
the transformation of attitudes and the infrastructural reconstruction of thosecommunities and in the relationships between both communities (b) seek toinfluence policy for these areas but also to affect policy as it reflects on thewelfare of former prisoners; (c) are more broadly involved in the creation ofcommunity narratives linked to current post-ceasefires political processes. The
Coiste network, through a host of different activities, fulfills all of these roles tosome degree.
With hundreds of IRA ex-prisoners having been released and dispersing
throughout the island, many of them having served sentences in the 15-20 year
range, Republicans realized that they needed to increase the resources available
to them in order to help (insert between ‘to’ and ‘with’) with resettlement backinto society, so they took advantage of the many new funding opportunities to
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develop their prisoner support infrastructure.
IRA ex-prisoners formed Coiste na n-Iarchimí (Ex-prisoners’ Committee) in1998 in order to bring together and coordinate a group of fourteen IRA exprisoner groups from different geographical areas on matters such as funding
and access to resources. There were not enough support structures for IRA
prisoners leaving gaol except for voluntary services closely aligned to Sinn Fein
offices, but which did not have the capacity to deal with the large numbers ofprisoners being released under the early release scheme of the Agreement. The
UK government’s prisoners resettlement agencies, the Northern Ireland Agency
for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NIACRO) and the Probation Board
for Northern Ireland (PBNI), who do not distinguish between political and nonpolitical ex-prisoners, are not acceptable to Republicans. 29 Republican prisoners
had to interact with PBNI whilst in prison in order to coordinate with family
and friends when organising visits. However, there were tensions between both
agencies and ex-prisoners following release from prison. 30 Initial EU funding
was secured that allowed for the employment of one full-time officer in each of
the Coiste network's fourteen offices. Funding expanded under the EU’s Peace I
and Peace II programmes, and at one stage Coiste directly employed around 70
people across its network throughout the island of Ireland, including Monaghan,
Kerry, Sligo, Letterkenny, Derry City, South Derry, its various Belfast offices,
Dundalk, South Armagh, and Dublin. 31
Newly released prisoners needed to know how to seek financial assistance,
claim unemployment benefits, secure accommodation, identify job opportunities
and apply for them, and how to secure their general well-being. Informationfrom those in the various regional offices with knowledge and experience of
how to do these things was sent to the Coiste head office in Belfast, and then it
was distributed to all of the other regional offices to be shared amongst theentire IRA ex-prisoner community. In this way common approaches to theseissues evolved within the Coiste network. Ex-prisoners trained as counsellors toprovide emotional support for other ex-prisoners, and others became qualified
trainers to help prepare their comrades for employment. Coiste offices also
provide advice and support to those ex-prisoners who want to access courses
and higher education.
According to the organisation, the majority of the offices in its network are
not currently fully funded, and the vast majority of staff are now voluntary. Of
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Coiste na n-Iarchimí, (the Irish Republican Army ex-prisoners network) and the Limitations of Hybrid Peacebuilding in Ireland

five staff in Coiste's head office in Belfast, only one is funded under the EU
Peace IV programme. They say they are currently in rent arrears and can only
continue to operate the office due to the understanding of their landlord. The
Peace IV funding allows for the wages of the full-time officer, plus an additional
10% of her wage for office costs, which, they say does not cover the full costs ofrunning the office. Funding is supplemented by income from a political tourism
project that they operate in West Belfast, in which they show tourists aroundthe area, giving them a political history of the place and the conflict, and whichhas, by chance, become an important outreach activity in their peacebuilding
work.
Coiste also campaigns on behalf of political ex-prisoners who face many
obst acles i n t heir lives because of t heir pr ison records . Th is residua lcriminalisation results in many obstacles to successful resettlement. Despite
there being strong anti-discrimination legislation in Northern Ireland dealing
with employment practices, that very legislation, specifically Section 2 (4) of the
Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, explicitly permits refusal toemploy those who support political violence:In this Order any reference to a person’s political opinion does not include
an opinion which consists of or includes approval or acceptance of the useof violence for political ends, connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland,
including the use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any
section of the public in fear. 32
Ex-prisoners also face problems in other areas, such as accessing mortgages/loans, adopting children, international travel visas, pensions, and applying for
PSV/HGV licenses, which are necessary for those who wish to drive public
service vehicles or heavy goods vehicles. For example, at a Coiste event relating
to these issues, 33 observed as part of this study, an ex-prisoner shared his
experience of his two children being denied entry to the USA because of his
conviction for IRA related offenses. More recently, it was announced that the
British Government’s Victims Payment scheme, which is designed to provide‘Troubles pensions’ for people injured as a result of the conflict will exclude exprisoners. 3 4 The Coiste network is campaigning to have ex-prisoners who
suffered as a result of the conflict included in the scheme. Coiste continues to
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campaign with statutory agencies and through the courts to remove theseobstacles for ex-prisoners.
Many prisoners, particularly those who had served long sentences, needed
even basic advice about what to do to be able to simply function in society. For
example, one interviewee reported being given a £21 unemployment benefit
payment on his release in 1993, after serving a 16-year sentence, and although
he had family to support him, others who left under the same circumstances
did not have family support. Prisoners needed to know how to seek financial
assist a nce , how to sig n on for u nemploy ment benef it s , how to secu reaccommodation, how to look for work, how to apply for jobs, and then to secure
their general well-being. One ex-prisoner who had served almost 20 years,
reported needing help just to use a public telephone. 35 Outreach/support officers
met prisoners outside prisons on their release. Ex-prisoners within the network
trained as counsellors, and a counselling service was established to provide
emotional and mental health support to those finding readjustment to their newlife difficult and who may be falling into addiction. Other ex-prisoners gained
qualifications as employment trainers to assist others preparing for employment.
Coiste also offered help and support for those ex-prisoners who wanted toaccess courses in further and higher education.
In West Belfast, where the Coiste office is situated, one activist, whilst looking
out of the Coiste office window, noticed some of the many political tourists whoconverge on the area throughout the year wandering seemingly aimlesslyaround the area. He suggested organising a tour company from the office togive such tourists guided political tours of the area, showing them various
landmarks linked to events of the Troubles. The company, Coiste Irish PoliticalTours, now provides employment opportunities for upwards of fifteen IRA andUVF ex-prisoners.

Working without - IRA ex-prisoners outreach
Even before the end of the armed campaigns, Republicans were engaged invarious initiatives which they recognised as forms of outreach. For example, one
ex-prisoner, who served a life sentence, spoke of how before he was released
from prison, it was decided that he would join Sinn Fein’s Prisoner of War
Department, a group within the political party dedicated to IRA prisoners’
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Coiste na n-Iarchimí, (the Irish Republican Army ex-prisoners network) and the Limitations of Hybrid Peacebuilding in Irelandissues, and get involved in a campaign to get release dates for other life
sentence prisoners. As he explained:“I got out on the 21st of December ‘88 and I joined SF POW [Inn Fein’s
Prisoner of War] department the next day. I done my first press conference
campaigning for lifers. And when the journalist asked the question, “Whoare you campaigning for?”,“I’m campaigning for lifers”,“But which lifers are you campaigning for? Just Republican lifers or are you
campaigning for Loyalist lifers as well?”So that was the first time, when your identity was challenged as a
Republican, and you were saying, “Well, I can’t be sectarian. I can’t behypocritical. So I have to campaign for all lifers, Loyalist and Republican,
including the Loyalist who had been sentenced to 15 life sentences forkilling my grandfather. So this is when you start to realise, it’s a bit more
complicated than what you thought. So when I did public meetings,
especially in England, there would have been someone representing the
Loyalist political prisoners and me presenting the Republicans, and that’s
when you realised we had more in common. So that’s when this crosscommunity [work] starts, you know what I mean?”36
As a crucial peacebuilding role within the Republican community, Coiste
supports the peace process by helping to shore up support from the ex-prisoner
community and their families for the new political direction being taken by the
Republican leadership, and in doing so mitigates against possible drift by exprisoners and others towards groups still committed to political violence. For
instance, it is possible that a significant level of deprivation within the exprisoner community could give rise to some drifting towards active militant
Republican splinter groups. The peace process must be seen to be improving
the living conditions of those long-deprived communities for it to retain support.
Coiste, through their efforts, fulfill this role. Coiste also offers opportunities forpolitical and community engagement for ex-prisoners, and in doing so, provides
them with a means to pursue their political objectives, as well as rebuilding thesocial and community networks that can help them construct successful lives
after gaol.
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The Coiste network also engages in significant amounts of peacebuilding
work through outreach with former enemies in both the British state forces andLoyalist paramilitaries, and the PUL community in general. Given that exprisoners in general suffered significantly through their engagement with
British forces and the penal system, this represented a very difficult situation
for many activists. All of those interviewed for this research reported being
subjected to brutality at the hands of the security forces and prisoner staff, withsome having had friends and relatives killed, but as one leading ex-prisoner said,
it was done “because it was the right thing to do.”37
Some of this work has been done as part of initiatives facilitated by thirdparty agencies, such as the Prison to Peace initiative, a consortium of groups
administered by the Community Foundation Northern Ireland charity, which
included ex-prisoner groups from across the political spectrum. Through thisinitiative, ex-prisoners helped developed a learning resource for Local and Global
Citizenship education for the Northern Ireland school curriculum. Based on the
narratives of a number of ex-prisoners covering the themes of becoming
involved in conflict, understanding the prison experience, and contributing toconflict transformation and community development, it saw ex-prisoners
working to dissuade young people from engaging in any form of politicalviolence, but also, through exposing young people to narratives they would nototherwise hear, increased understanding of the Other, and, therefore, worked toreduce sectarianism. Outside of Prison to Peace, Coiste continues this sort ofoutreach work voluntarily, more often with Loyalists or former police or British
army.
Much of Coiste’s outreach work is initiated by themselves. As a means ofstopping and preventing the regular instances of interface violence between
CNR and PUL residential areas in Belfast, in the late 1990s IRA ex-prisoners
engaged with Loyalist paramilitary groups and organized a mobile phone
network that allowed members of each group to coordinate on both sides of theinterfaces to pull rioting youths back from the front lines. An IRA ex-prisoner
who acted as a coordinator of the mobile phone network in West Belfast told of
how he and other Republicans were able to build enduring relationships with
Loyalist paramilitaries and others within the PUL community through this kindof work. He distributed around 30 phones to Republican activists, who were also
given the phone numbers of Loyalists. In the event of interface trouble, both156

Coiste na n-Iarchimí, (the Irish Republican Army ex-prisoners network) and the Limitations of Hybrid Peacebuilding in Irelandsides were able to coordinate a response to bring it to an end.
As part of the shift away from political violence to non-violent politicalstruggle, members of Coiste want to continue to engage in the Republican
political objective of achieving Irish unity, and in doing so, the group offers exprisoners a vehicle to continue their political activism. This also helps tomitigate against any possible drift towards those Republican groups opposed tothe peace process and who remain committed to political violence. Launched ata three-day workshop in October 2002, Coiste’s EU funded ‘Processes of Nation
Building’ project was aimed at Republican ex-prisoners “reaching out throughdialogue to civic society.”38 As a continuation of Coiste’s political education work,
the initiative saw ex-prisoners engage with the Protestant community in thenorth and south, Unionists in the north, churches, political parties, the tradeunion movement, and the business community. Outlining the purposes of theinitiative of Coiste Michael Culbert said it was:“to humanise us and our aims and objectives. Our aims and objectives werevery much tied up in killing people, in other people's image … We hadcome to the conclusion that reform [of the state] would not be given, so,therefore, we had to go for revolution, in the broad terms, and that's why,basically, the tactics were to bomb and shoot the British state out of here,
and that would include the irregular forces which they used also against
our communities. So, that was that, until we came to a situation where
there was an easier way.”
But the Nation Building project had a more pointed goal. While the Republican
leadership in Sinn Fein argued the case of a united Ireland on a national stage
by engaging at an elite level with political and business leaders in the Protestantand Unionist community, the Nation Building project saw ex-prisoners engaging
with Loyalists to reassure them that in the event of a united Ireland, there
would be no reason to consider a return to violence. Built into the Belfast
Agreement is a mechanism for referenda on the issue of Irish unity. If the
British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland believes there is the potential
for a ‘yes’ vote for leaving the UK, they have the power to call such a poll:“… [The referendum is] going to happen, so what we have to do is
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prepare for it. And we’ve been preparing for it this last ten or twelve years,
maybe fifteen years. Through Coiste. We’re their outriders. We’re out there
doing it, and hopefully [middle-class Protestants] will believe the Sinn Feinmessage that economically, socially, health, education-wise, things will be ina much better structure ……. What we have to do is to work very intenselywith people who would have been Loyalist activists. That’s why we always
work with the UDA, or the UVF, to convince them. Because they’ve a
proven record they’d kill [and might do so again in the event of a vote for aunited Ireland]. You know? The grey suits and grey-haired men, they might
fund them, but these guys… you got to get the actors trusting you. And I
think they do trust us. They know it’s over. They know that we would evertreat them as the Nationalists were treated in the north of Ireland. …..
We’re being quite successful in what we’re doing in convincing people thatthe future would be OK.”39
When the funding for the Nation Building project ran out, Coiste committed tocontinuing this kind of outreach on a long-term basis. This work with Loyalists
has resulted in relationships so deep and trusting they would have been
considered unthinkable in the past.
For example, Loyalists have not been able to develop the infrastructures that
Republicans have been able to. This is in part as a result of their position within
the PUL community. Loyalists have a much more working-class base thanRepublicans and have not been able to develop their electoral political base.
Furthermore, their standing within the Protestant, Unionist community is quite
low. They are more often considered criminals, racketeers, and drug dealers.
The ex-prisoner infrastructure, as a result, was comparatively underdeveloped
throughout the conflict, and it remains so. Republican outreach has seen themoffering assista nce to these former enemies, a nd this has seen lasting
relat ionsh ips bei ng bu ilt . Rya n a rg ues int erd e p e n d e n c e is a mea ns ofpeacebuilding.40 Take, for example, Coiste’s political tourism project. Coiste’s
tour guides lead tours while giving the Republican narrative of the conflict. It
was decided that the initiative should be developed by offering the tourists a
more balanced view of the conflict, so Coiste approached Loyalist activists fromthe UVF ex-prisoners in West Belfast and offered to include them in the project.
Now, Coiste’s tour guides bring the tourists to a gate in the ‘peace wall’ that
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divides the Nationalist Springfield Road and the Loyalist Shankill Road and passthem over to UVF ex-prisoner tour guides who give a tour around the Shankill
area, offering their narrative. The Loyalist ex-prisoners are engaged by the
Coiste office to lead tours, providing them with much needed employment. Oneof the Coiste tour guides explained his participation:“I bring the tourists along the Falls Road up through Clonard Monasteryand finish at the gate at Lanark Way. Now, the guy I hand the tourists overto, his father blew up McGurk’s Bar.41 So, his father killed my grandfather,and he’s the person when I get to Lanark Way, I shake hands with. … He
went through the prison the same time as his father, and he works forconflict resolution on the Shankill side of the wall, and I work on my side.
So those are the connections, those are the journeys both of us have beenon. And that’s where we’re at now in trying to say what he did and what I
did must never, never be repeated. And that’s why you’re trying to do theseprojects, to basically lead by example, and that to me is the importantpart.”42
Furthermore, this level of trust between the IRA ex-prisoners and the Loyalist
ex-prisoners is evidenced in the employment training courses offered by Tar
Anall, an IRA ex-prisoner support office based in West Belfast, which is part of
the Coiste network. One sector in which ex-prisoners can find employment is
the security industry, but the UK now requires people to be trained andregistered before being able to take up employment in it. Tar Anall offers
training courses and test facilitation through the British Institute of InnkeepingAwarding Body (BIIAB), a professional organisation that provides training andtesting standards for potential employees in various industry sectors. IRA exprisoners teach the courses and facilitate the tests. Initially, this was done for
their own constituency, but upwards of 200 Loyalists ex-prisoners and theirfamily members have attended the courses. In order to apply to do the exams,
applica nts must provide documentation Tar Ana ll, who then pass that
information to BIIAB. So, Loyalist ex-prisoners from the UVF and the UDA
present personal documentation such as passports, driving licenses, bankstatements, which confirm their home addresses, to IRA ex-prisoners. During
the conflict, this was high grade intelligence information which would have been
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used to target people for assassination. As the coordinator of Tar Anall
explained:“If you want to find employment as a Loyalist ex-prisoner you’re faced withthe same problems as a Republican ex-prisoner. So, they would come to us
and say, “Can you facilitate training around this.” ….. we’ve done it for
hundreds of them. But also we must let people who are coming to us know
who they’re coming to. This is a Republican premises. Most of us who work
here come from Republican backgrounds or are Republican ex-prisoners or
are still active within the Republican movement in some shape or form
regarding the party [Sinn Fein] or community activism. So, they come withthat understanding. But we understand who they are. And there’s a very
respectful approach because we outline what we expect from everybody on
the training course. And they’re very OK with it, when they get theirheads around where they are.”43
Coiste continue their outreach work with the UVF ex-prisoners organisation,
the Ex-prisoners Interpretive Centre (EPIC), the Ulster Defense Association(UDA), and Veterans for Peace whose members are Ex-British military.
Representatives from these organisations have given talks to various groups in
the north of Ireland in a bid to increase understanding and reduce prejudice. In
one event held in 2017, Coiste hosted British army veterans, including a former
SAS member, at an event in West Belfast with the Mairéad Farrell Republican
Youth Committee, a group named after an IRA volunteer shot dead by the SAS
in Gibraltar in 1988. Michael Culbert who chaired the event, said at the timethat the meeting “afforded young people the opportunity to hear the stories ofpeople who were our enemies, and it also provides us with the opportunity to
see the people behind the uniform.”44
Conflict results in the dehumanisation of enemies. Over numerous interviews
conducted as a part of this research, ex-prisoners made the point that theoutreach work has resulted in new relationships between themselves andformer enemies, which at times have become enduring friendships. In doing sothey are demonstrating new forms of leadership within their own community intheir push to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

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Coiste na n-Iarchimí, (the Irish Republican Army ex-prisoners network) and the Limitations of Hybrid Peacebuilding in Ireland“You see in a war, you dehumanise your enemy. I talked about doing it,“We’re not shooting such-and-such dead. We’re shooting a uniform.” It’s deadeasy to shoot a uniform. Mates of mine say to me, “You’re mad, you’ve had
Loyalists up at your house.” and I go, “Yeah”. See my house, it was crowded
in security. I’ve had my house shot at as well. My windows shot through.
We had iron bars on the door. We had a gate on the stairs. We had all that.
See when I got so far into it [peacebuilding work], I took it all down andsaid, “We need to live this change.” It’s no use me talking to these guys andthen barricading myself in when I’m home. But mates of mine were saying,“They could kill you anytime.” And I go, “Yeah, they could. I don’t thinkthey will. They’ll find it easier to do this time.” I don’t check under my car
anymore. I come out in the mornings, and I don’t look about, so I’m a softtarget. We need to change. We all need to change.”45

Conclusion
It is clear that the hybrid peacebuilding model in Northern Ireland has
resulted in a significant level of conflict transformation, but it is unclear if thepolitical institutions set up under the Belfast Agreement can ultimately delivera sustainable peace. The situation on the ground is now drastically different for
many, with the signing of the Agreement, the new political institutions, the endof the IRA campaign, and the withdrawal of the British Army from the streets,
yet despite the resultant economic and infrastructural development that has
transformed the lives of many of those who suffered most from the conflict, andsome softening in the relationships between the two main communities, thesociety remains deeply divided and suffers regular outbursts of sectarian
tensions at elite and grassroots levels, a situation that may get significantly
worse in the event of Republicans succeeding in winning a future referendum
on a united Ireland, which could happen in the foreseeable future, particularlyin the event of a disastrous Brexit.
The conflict must move from this limbo of being in settlement to moving to a
final phase of resolution and to do so, the deep political divisions, the pains
inflicted by the violent conflict, and the issues of identity that divide the PUL
and CNR communities need to be overcome. The options for this happening areclear: either the CNR community are convinced that their best interests are
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served by remaining in the UK, and they choose to buy in to the UK, or findspace therein in terms of their identity, or conversely, that the PUL community
are convinced that their best interests are served by accepting constitutionalchange and joining with the rest of the people on the island of Ireland inbuilding a new nation together. This is the challenge for PUL and CNR politicalactivists. In the interim, there is a need for continued grassroots peacebuilding
work focused on reconciliation and community building to prevent the situationfrom degrading back into a state of violent conflict.
This study shows that IRA ex-prisoners are pursuing a peacebuilding
strategy to contribute to bringing this about as part of the wider Republican
project of uniting Northern I rela nd a nd the Republic of I rela nd. They
understand the need for a permanent resolution, have a clear idea of what that
resolution looks like, and they have a non-violent strategy to try to realise it.
The hybrid model has enabled Republicans to move from armed conflict topa rlia ment a r y a nd commu n ity polit ics a nd to pursue t heir object ives
nonviolently, and they have, to that extent, embraced it, but the resultant elite
political structures remain unacceptable to them in the long term because of
the continued involvement of the British government and the continued partitionof the island.
Where Republicans will continue to find difficulties is in the underlying
divergence of political and cultural narratives that exist between themselves
and the PUL community. Republicans hold that the IRA’s military campaign
was morally and politically justified. This is a position that many within the
PUL community cannot reconcile with, making it a significant obstacle for
Coiste’s peacebuilding endeavours, and therein lies a serious problem for Sinn
Fein and the ex-prisoners of Coiste. Any move away from their position on thelegitimacy of their armed struggle risks strengthening the hand of those
Republican groups still committed to political violence. It is a difficult balancing
act for them: if they continue to honour the armed struggle, they alienate the
PUL community, but if they cease doing so, they risk losing ground to active
splinter groups. This makes Coiste’s grassroots work all the more important.
T he C o i st e net work h a s a l s o m a de a c o n s ide r a bl e c o nt r i but io n t opeacebuilding by its work providing support, advice, and representation to the
IRA ex-prisoner community and its work within the CNR community. It has
worked to maintain cohesion within their ranks and to combat sectarianism
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wit h i n t he broader CN R commu n it y. Its out reach work wit h t he PU L
community has demonstrably produced results, particularly with regards to its
interface violence de-escalation work and the Loyalist ex-prisoner community
through its training and employment schemes. However, there are limits towhat they can achieve outside of broader political changes taking place inNorthern Ireland.

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Endnotes
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13

14
15
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17

18
19
20
21
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William A Hazelton, ‘Look at Northern Ireland: Lessons best learned at home’, inLessons of the Northern Ireland Peace Process, Timothy White (ed), (University of
Wisconsin Press, 2012), p. 36-37.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York, United Nations, 1992).
Brahimi Report, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (New York,
United Nations, 2000)
Michael W. Doyle, “The Three Pillars of Liberal Peace”, The American Political Science
Review, Vol. 99, No. 3 (Aug., 2005), pp. 463-466
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York, United Nations, 1992).
Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace’, Cooperation andConflict, 43(2), (2008): p157.
Roger Mac Ginty, Indigenous Peacemaking, p144.
John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies.
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).
See also Roger Mac Ginty, and Oliver P. Richmond. “The fallacy of constructing politicalorders: a reappraisal of the hybrid turn in peacebuilding” International Peacekeeping,Vol. 23, No. 2 (2016): 219-239; Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Between Resistance and Compliance:
Non-participation and the Liberal Peace’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol.
6, No. 4 (2012): 167-187; Oliver Richmond, ‘Failed Statebuilding Versus Peace Formation’,Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 48, No. 3, (2013): 378-400.
Roger Mac Ginty, and Oliver. P. Richmond. “The Local Turn in PeaceBuilding: A Critical
Agenda for Peace.” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 5 (2013): 763-783.
Oliver Richmond, “The dilemmas of a hybrid peace: Negative or Positive?”, Cooperation
and Conflict, published online 12 June 2014: p. 2.
Oliver Richmond, The dilemmas of a hybrid peace, p. 11
Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond, “The fallacy of constructing hybrid politicalorders: a reappraisal of the hybrid turn in peacebuilding”, International Peacekeeping,
2016
Vol. 23, No. 2, (2016) 219-239.
Neil Jarman, “The Challenge of Peace Building and Conflict Transformation: A Case
Study of Northern Ireland”, Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal 2 (2016): p.130.
Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy” World Politics 21, No. 2 (January, 1969), pp.
207-225“Power Sharing”, Northern Ireland Assembly, accessed August 30, 2020, https://
education.niassembly.gov.uk/post_16/snapshots_of_devolution/gfa/power_sharing
The UDR was a locally recruited battalion of the British Army with a reputation
amongst the CNR community of sectarianism and collusion with Loyalist paramilitarygroups in attacking Catholics.
Neil Jarman, “The Challenge of Peace Building”, p.140
Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, Number Four, Community Relations Council,
September 2016.
Deloitte, “Research into the financial cost of the Northern Ireland divide”, April 2007.
Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, Number Five, Community Relations Council,
October 2018.
ARK, Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 2019, https://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2019/
Community_Relations/OWNMXSCH.html

Coiste na n-Iarchimí, (the Irish Republican Army ex-prisoners network) and the Limitations of Hybrid Peacebuilding in Ireland

23 Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, Number Four, 65.
24 John W Burton, “Conflict Resolution as a Political System”, Working Paper, 1988,
Reprinted August 1993, p.2.
25 Stephen Ryan, “Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland: The Past, Present, and Future”,
Peace and Conflict Studies, 17, No 1, p.77.
26 The Agreement had support of just over half of the PUL community, and those who
rejected it were committed to thwarting it as best they could. On the Republican side,
militarist groups such as the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA vowed to continue
armed actions until Britain declared that they would leave Ireland.
27 Stephen Ryan, “Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland”, p.78
28 Peter Shirlow, Brian Graham, Kieron McEvoy, Felim O hAdhmaill, Dawn Purvis.
Politically Motivated Former Prisoners Groups: Community Activism and Conflict
Transformation. Northern Ireland Community Relations Council, August 2005, p.81
29 Peter Shirlow et al. Politically Motivated, p.33.
30 Michael Culbert, telephone interview with author, September 9th, 2020.
31 Michael Culbert, personal interview with author, March 2nd, 2020.
32 Shirlow et al, Politically Motivated, p.60
33 Ex-prisoner E, Coiste’s Beyond the Wire conference, Crumlin Road Gaol, Belfast, March 6,
2020.
34 Mark Devenport, ‘Troubles pension: Guidance on eligibility published’, BBC News,
August 14, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-53777135
35 Ex-prisoner A, personal interview with the author, March 3, 2020.
36 Ex-prisoner C, personal interview with the author, March 6, 2020.
37 Ex-prisoner B, personal interview with the author, March 4, 2020.
38 An Phoblacht/Republican News, The Process of Nation Building: Coiste Groups Gather
to Discuss the Way Forward, 17 October, 2002.
39 Michael Culbert , personal interview with the author, March 9, 2020.
40 Stephen Ryan, Introduction: Peacebuilding, Reconciliation, and Transformation, Peace
and Conflict Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, p.5.
41 On December 4th 1971, the UVF bombed McGurk ’s bar in Belfast. It was a bar
frequently by the CNR community. Fifteen people were killed in the explosion, including
the IRA ex-prisoner’s grandfather.
42 Ex-prisoner C, personal interview with the author, March 5, 2020.
43 O’Hagan, John, personal interview with the author, March 4, 2020.
44 Peadar Whelan, SAS and British Army ‘Veterans for Peace’ talk to republican youth
group in Belfast, March 31 2017. https://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/26788
45 Ex-prisoner D, personal interview with the author, March 5, 2020.

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Abstract

Coiste na n-Iarchimí, (the Irish
Republican Army ex-prisoners network)and the Limitations of Hybrid
Peacebuilding in Ireland
Damien Okado-GoughThis paper points to the limitations of the hybrid peacebuilding model inproviding sustainable solutions to ethnic conflict situations and, using the casest udy of Nor t her n I rela nd , out l i nes t hose l i m it at ions , a nd a sks i f t hepeacebuilding work of Irish Republican Army ex-prisoners as part of thebroader Republican project to create a unified Ireland, independent from Britain,
can help overcome those limitations. Focusing on the IRA ex-prisoner network,
Coiste na n-Iarchimí, it asks if this work can make further contributions to thepeace process by helping northern Irish society move beyond its imperfectsettlement towards a permanent resolution to the conf lict in Ireland. It
concludes that hybrid peacebuilding has been largely successful in reducing
levels of physical violence by facilitating a conflict settlement, but that it falls
short in bringing about a permanent resolution which can only come about by
overcoming the issues of conflicting identities between the two communities
there, an issue which IRA ex-prisoners are working to address through theirpeacebuilding activities.
Key words: Northern Ireland, Irish Republicanism, hybrid peacebuilding, local
turn peacebuilding, political ex-prisoners, ethnic conflict, conflict transformation,
conflict resolution, reconciliation.

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