エネルギーの今 ―CSIS より

Drivers and Ramifications ofU.S. Energy Sanctions―― 米国エネルギー制裁の行方 ――

Jane Nakano
Senior Fellow, Energy and National Security Program, CSIS
米国戦略国際問題研究所（CSIS）エネルギー・国家安全保障部シニアフェロー Jane Nakano 氏による連載第６回（最終回）のテーマは、トランプ政権によるエネルギー戦略「米国エネルギー制裁の行方（Drivers and Ramifications of U.S. Energy Sanctions）」。最終回となる今回は、米国のロシア、イラン、ベネズエラに対するエネルギー制裁に焦点を当てることを通じて、原油価格に不確実性をもたらす、制裁の強化／緩和に導く要因やメカニズムを考察する。

As the global energy market continues its
rebalancing after the collapse of oil prices in
the middle of 2014, the threat of U.S. sanctions
against major oil producing states warrants
attention. The U.S. sanctions against Russia, Iranand Venezuela have very different origins as well
as chances of success, yet they might have important
ramifications for the global oil market.

T

he latest sanction on Russia, per the Countering

America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of2017, is a product of distrust between the White House
and Congress rather than a manifestation of a longterm U.S. vision for bilateral relations with Russia.
Highly concerned with the potential of an unearned
and a hasty lifting of the 2014 sanctions by the Trump
Administration, Congress accorded itself a role inblocking or approving any major step by theAdministration to ease sanctions on Russia.

In terms of substance, the Act goes beyond
strengthening the 2014 sanctions on Russia’s newshale, deep-water and Arctic offshore projects.
Most notable are the extensive new secondary
sanctions. In particular, the Act provides authority
for discretionary sanctions against those supportingor investing to develop Russian oil and gas pipeline
projects. This particular provision, while applaudedby eastern European countries that are wary of
Russia’s geopolitical influence through energy
exports, met some strong criticism from major
European countries. The criticism emerged due inpart for lack of prior consultation from Washington,
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but also for the provision’s potential impact on theNord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, which would
roughly double the transit capacity for Russian gas
supply to Europe and is promoted by several major
western European companies. The project has beena major test of European unity in recent years.
Although the Trump Administration, like his
predecessor administration, opposes Nord Stream2, the pipeline project is not under an imminent
threat of sanctions as the Act only authorizes andnot directs the president to impose sanctions on thepipelines and President Trump appears reluctant toimpose non-mandatory additional sanctions onRussia. Nonetheless, the future of Russia sanctions
is a highly political and complex question due tothe unprecedented role of Congress in its process
as well as continued revelations concerning Russianinterference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

Iran is another major focal point. In mid-October,President Trump declined to certify to Congress
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
a 2015 multilateral agreement aiming to curb Iran’scapacity to advance its nuclear weapons program.
While not a total surprise as the President had been
publicly discontent at the past two certifications,but the decertification decision was notable amidst
a series of public affirmations on the Iraniancompliance, even by several members of hiscabinet, including the Secretaries of Defense andState.
Because the certification process is strictly a米国 特集

domestic affair per the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act (INARA) of 2015, there is no
immediate effect on U.S. sanctions against Iran oron the integrity of JCPOA. Instead of taking an
executive action to re-impose sanctions against
Iran, however, President Trump has put Congressin the position to consider whether to reinstate thesanctions within 60 days. Whether Congress would
re-impose sanctions is the most immediate
question, but equally important is whether by
January 13, 2018 the president would continue towaive sanctions—an action required under INARA.
Meanwhile, how effective the sanctions wouldbe—if re-imposed—is hard to ascertain. Unless theUnited States garners support from its Europeanand Asian allies, the sanctions may not materiallycurtail Iranian oil supply or reduce investment into
the country. Thus far, the European Union remains
committed to the JCPOA so long as Iran remains
fully compliant per the IAEA monitoring. During
the 2012-2015 sanctions, Europe nearly zeroed out
Iranian crude imports, but since the JCPOA has
increased investment in Iran. The new sanctions
could deal some difficulties to U.S. companies andalter oil flows, but likely fall short of causing amajor disruption to the global oil trade.

Although with much fewer headlines, thefuture of U.S. sanctions against Venezuela
merits a closer examination. In response to theMaduro regime’s convening of a Constituent
Assembly to rewrite the country’s constitution, theUnited States imposed financial sanctions in lateAugust, prohibiting U.S. entities from financing or
trading new debts issued by Venezuelan stateowned oil company PdVSA with maturities of over
90 days, as well as barring CITGO, U.S. refining
subsidiary of PdVSA, from transferring profits
back to Venezuela. Venezuela owes international
investors over $100 billion, including an estimated$60 billion in debt that is issued in the UnitedStates or subject to U.S. law. In hopes of pressuring
the Maduro regime without destroying the country’s
economy, the U.S. Treasury Department continues
to allow U.S. export of light crude to Venezuela for

mixing with its heavy crude as well as new debt
issuance and ongoing secondary trading of existing
debt by CITGO.
Following the Maduro declaration of victory in themajor regional elections on October 15, the odds
have risen that the Trump Administration would
tighten the sanctions, such as to prohibit U.S.
export of refined products or even embargo U.S.
imports of Venezuelan crude. The U.S. is one of thefew countries with refineries capable of processing
Venezuelan heavy. The embargo would further
strain Venezuela’s ailing refining capacity, andexacerbate the shortage of fuels like gasoline.
The development could also drive Caracas closer
to Beijing and Moscow. In particular, China has
become Venezuela’s chief banker since 2004.
Reportedly, China has lent over $60 billion and theloans are mostly repaid in the form of oil shipments.
Venezuela might in time replace the U.S. market
by exporting to others, including China, although
at a discount. In the meantime, the tighter sanctions
could impact the global oil markets by forcing
refineries in the United States to turn to alternative
suppliers, and putting an upward pressure on theprice of heavy crude.

B

oth the driving force and mechanics of thesesanctions—expansion or reinstatement—are
far from uniform. Also, they have no directconnections. But, the uncertainty over their timing,
scope and durability could exert upward pressure
on the global oil price level—a welcoming
development to the OPEC and its non-OPEC
partners as they struggle to raise the price level
through production cut.
※著者略歴：Jane Nakano is a senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. Her areas of expertise
include U.S. energy policy, energy security issues in Asia,
global gas market dynamics, and global nuclear energy trends.
She frequently writes and speaks on these issues at conferences
and to the media. Also, she has testified before Congress onenergy issues in Asia. Prior to joining CSIS in 2010, Ms. Nakano
was with the U.S. Department of Energy and served as the lead
staff on energy engagements with China and Japan.

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