マレーシア研究第２号（2013 年）【Summary】

Introduction
YAMAMOTO Hiroyuki（Kyoto University）
In 1982, Malaysia implemented the Look East Policy programme, which sends
Malaysian students to universities and institutes of technology and trainees to industries andtraining institutes in Japan. These initiatives are funded by the governments of Malaysia andJapan, the latter of which dispatches Japanese teachers to Malaysia. A total of approximately
15,000 Malaysian (about 14,000 in a Japanese source) have come to Japan over a thirty-year
period, either to enrol in specialized courses of higher education or to receive industry andbusiness training. In addition, the Japan International Institute of Technology (MJIIT) wasestablished in Malaysia in 2011; its Japanese professors allow Malaysian students to learn
about the technology of Japan.
With Malaysia’s remarkable progress, the economic situation has drastically alteredsince the Look East Policy began. Government officials and business groups in Malaysia andJapan are reviewing the programme as they ready its second stage, all the while celebratingits 30 th anniversary. However, contrary to the recognized importance of the programme, few
studies of it have been undertaken by Japanese or Malaysian researchers, and those that exist
largely concentrate on the human resource development or investment of the Look East
Policy rather than on its social and cultural aspects. The programme must be understood in
the wider context of the relationship of Malaysia and Japan and of their peoples.
Given this situation, the Japan Association for Malaysian Studies (JAMS) set up a
research project in 2012 to evaluate the achievement of the Look East Policy and to makerecommendations for its future development. As an academic association with a variety ofscholars as members, the JAMS is able to study the Look East Policy in terms of its
development of human resources and investment and its impact on society and culture. This
special issue is composed of four articles based on the research and the discussions
undertaken by the JAMS Look East Policy research project.

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マレーシア研究第２号（2013 年）【Summary】

Look East Policy’s 30 Years and Beyond:Japan-Malaysia Relations
YOSHIMURA Mako
（Hosei University）
Thirty years have passed since 1982 when Dr. Mahathir announced the Look East Policy.
The Look East Policy has taken an important role in the relations between Japan andMalaysia and the Japan-Malaysia relations have further developed, especially economic
cooperation in these three decades.
The relations between Japan and Malaysia have a long history. The first record is theRyukyu ship visit to Melaka (Malacca) in 1463. There have been various forms of migrationsuch as traders, merchants, planters, karayuki-san (Japanese prostitutes), fishermen and so on
since then. The Japanese occupation from 1941 to 1945 had a strong impact on the local
society: memories of food shortages, the massacre of Chinese, as well as conflicts between
Malays and Chinese.
Japan re-started relations with Malaysia after WWII. Japanese direct investment inMalaysia has remarkably increased since the 1980s because of the appreciation of theJapanese yen and the Malaysian government’s policy on foreign direct investment. The
Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement (JMEPA) was signed in 2005.
The economic situations, however, have changed for Malaysia and Japan. For Malaysia,
Japan is not the No.1 investor in the local economy anymore since foreign direct investment
from other countries (such as the USA, Singapore, Taiwan and so on) has also increased inMalaysia. Japanese companies have been expected to provide human resource development
and technology transfer as well as increase exports and create jobs. Yet, it was often pointed
out that the Japanese companies have not contributed as much to human resource
development and technology transfer as the local economy expected. Also, there are somedifficulties with the “localisation” of Japanese companies in Malaysia.
On the other hand, Japanese companies (as multinational corporations) always seek forthe best locations for their production sites in the Asian region. The wage standard has
increased, and the labour shortages have been serious in Malaysia during the past 30 years.
Today, if Japanese companies seek cheaper labour for their labour-intensive production lines,Malaysia is not the best location because there are many other attractive locations withcheaper labour, such as China, Vietnam, Myanmar and/or Cambodia. The situation haschanged since the 1980s.
This paper studies the transformation of Japan-Malaysia economic relations in thesethree decades. It examines the changing position of Japan in the Malaysian economy and theJapanese companies’ evaluations on Malaysian economy. It will also discuss a new stage ofthe Look East Policy and make suggestions for better Japan-Malaysia economic relations inthe future.
110マレーシア研究第２号（2013 年）【Summary】

The Look East Policy and Industrial Catch-up
ANAZAWA Makoto（Otaru University of Commerce）
This article refers to the background and possible contribution of the Look East Policy toindustrial development in Malaysia in the 1980s. As is well known, the policy was introducedby former Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad in 1982 to emulate Japanese companies
apropos of work ethics, company loyalty, efficiency, long-term management perspectives andso forth. These were the main elements of the so called Japanese management style.
Malaysia, as a late comer to the modern manufacturing industry, tried to catch up to
more developed Asian countries, such as Japan and Korea. It was natural for Malaysia tofollow the successful paths already shown by these more advanced economies. In fact, theimport substitution industrial strategy in light industries during the 1960s and the exportoriented one in the labor intensive industries in the 1970s contributed to rapid industrial
growth in Malaysia.
Malaysia rushed into heavy industrialization － the second stage of the importsubstitution in the heavy industry－in the early 1980s. For this purpose, the government
established the Heavy Industry Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) in 1980. HICOM enteredsteel, automobile and some other industries by setting up joint ventures mainly with Japanesecompanies.
Heavy industrialization required new types of management resources, which were notalways demanded in the early stages of industrialization during the 1960s and 1970s. It wasnecessary to produce a number of talented managers and skilled engineers to sustain thecompetitiveness of the heavy industries and to upgrade industrial fundamentals as a whole.
However, Malaysia was facing a shortage of these human resources at that time. The LookEast Policy should have contributed to supplying these human resources by sending many
students and engineers to Japan and Korea.
It is quite difficult to estimate how effective the Look East Policy was in producing thenecessary human resources for the industrial development. None- the- less, it seems possible
to analyze its contribution by using economic concepts such as human resource development,
organizational capability and total factor productivity (TFP).
The Look East Policy might have accelerated the inflow of foreign direct investment(FDI) from Japan and Korea. The increase in FDI by Japanese companies in the first half ofthe 1980s can be attributed to joint ventures with HICOM. The Look East Policy also
facilitated FDI by Japanese companies by making environments more favorable for them. The
higher growth rates of FDI by Japanese companies in the late 1980s and thereafter, however,can be explained mainly by the appreciation of the Japanese yen since 1985.
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マレーシア研究第２号（2013 年）【Summary】

Look East Policy and Ethnic Politics
SHINOZAKI Kaori（The University of Kitakyushu）
The main pillar of Malaysian Look East Policy (LEP) has been sending its students toJapanese Universities and National Colleges of Technology. The responsibility for sending
students abroad has fallen mainly under the jurisdiction of JPA (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam,
or Public Service Department), an agency that distributes collegiate scholarships toMalaysian students studying both locally and overseas. Though most of the scholarship
recipients are bumiputra, the policy has not faced much criticism concerning the unequal
opportunity among ethnic groups.
Despite the lack of direct criticism toward LEP, many Malaysian people have expressed
concerns about the distribution of scholarships provided by the JPA. When the scholarshipresults became available in May each year, the public commented on how many
non-bumiputra students with excellent academic scores were excluded from the opportunity.
They also criticized the JPA for unfair distribution and lack of transparency in the process ofselection. It has been said that 90% of overseas scholarship went to bumiputra students before
2008.
Responding to the criticism, the Malaysian government has changed the policy on thedistribution of overseas scholarships, moving toward a merit-based system since 2008. In2012, the government introduced a new policy. According to the revised 2012 policy, thestudents that receive the top 50 scores on the SPM (Sijil Perlajaran Malaysia or Malaysian
Certificate of Education) receive JPA scholarships for both pre-university and university, andthe 9A+ SPM students receive awards from the Ministry of Education further education atpre-university. Additionally, SPM students studying engineering in France, Germany, Korea,and Japan gain special scholarships from JPA (LEP program is included here). The 2012
policy revision also provides scholarships for SPTM (Sijil Persekolahan Tinggi Malaysia orMalaysian Higher School Certificate) students who are admitted to government-selected
top-ranking universities. The process for selecting the engineering students and the SPTM
students is guided by four criteria: scholastic ability (20%); ethnicity (60%); status as Sabahor Sarawak bumiputra (10%); and social disadvantage (10%).
Despite the changes to the policy, the 2012 the scholarship program under LEP stillappeared to favor bumiputra students. The Centre for Foundation Studies in Science,
University of Malaya, a main preliminary institution for university programs accepted onlybumiputra students. The award system for the LEP may be changed according to the generaltrend the overseas scholarship policy as a whole.
It is interesting to note that the LEP is often mentioned when the public criticizes theauthorities for its poor performance. In most cases, these critics are non-bumiputra andaccuse the authorities of failing to sense of responsibility, discipline, management skills, andwork ethic from the East. In this context, the Look East Policy has been deemed“unsuccessful.”112

マレーシア研究第２号（2013 年）【Summary】

Japan-Malaysia Relations, 1982-2012:
From Look East Policy to Diplomatic Lethargy
SUZUKI Ayame(Fukuoka Women’s University)
With deepening economic ties and the symbolic significance of the Look East Policy(LEP) introduced in 1982, Japan and Malaysia were considered to have developed a special
relationship. In the mid-1990s, however, bilateral relations somehow tapered off as evidenced
by the declining visits of Ministers and the absence of cooperation on issues of vital nationalconcern.
This paper tries to explain this somewhat lethargic bilateral relation by examining
official diplomatic documents of each country. Through such examination, the paper
describes Japan-Malaysia relations since the 1990s as “inopportune” as shifting priorities andstrategic relations, and changes in the governments in each country hindered them from
scaling up bilateral relations.
The “inopportune” relations are manifested by key developments from the 1990s. When
Malaysia proposed the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) in the 1990s and urged Japan toplay a bigger role in regional and international security, Japan did not respond positively
given the strong pressure from the United States and constraints by the Peace Constitution.
Instead, support for EAEG came from China, an economy that also provided an export market
unlike Japan, which made Malaysia-China relations closer than ever. Thus, Malaysia started
to strike the balance between Japan and China from the late 1990s. This explains KL’s
hesitation to support Japan’s subsequent initiatives to be a regional and international power,such as the Asian Monetary Fund and the bid to be a permanent member of the United
Nations Security Council.
While the 2000s saw Japan’s active diplomacy in East Asia, Malaysia had then shifted
its orientation toward Islamic countries and China, following the resignation of the Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad, the proponent of the LEP. Accordingly, bilateral diplomatic
relations slowed down with the exception of the prompt conclusion of the Japan-Malaysia
Economic Partnership Agreement in 2004. Najib Razak’s New Economic Model (NEM) could
have boosted the bilateral relations as he attempted to attract Japanese investments and torevive the LEP in line with the NEM. However, the government of Japan was preoccupied
with repairing relations with the United States affected by the issue of U.S. naval bases inJapan and later with post-earthquake reconstruction.
In spite of the sluggish relations in the past two decades, the two countries canstrengthen relations by working on shared values and interests that include the resolve toensure regional security based on an international legal order. Rebranding the LEP in
accordance with the significant economic and social development in Malaysia as well as thechanging regional environment may also strengthen the bilateral relations.
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マレーシア研究第２号（2013 年）【Summary】

Controversy around the concept of Malays in the British administration:
Analysis on the Land Policy in the State of Selangor
TSUBOI Yuji
（Research Fellow, The Toyo Bunko）
This paper reexamines the process of the formation of the official concept of Malays inBritish Malaya through analysis on the land policy in the state of Selangor. As the British
tried to control native society through the land administration, their image of Malays hadtaken its form along with the development of the land policy.
The process of planning and execution of the land policy contained the work toconceptualize Malays. By the beginning of the 20 th century, the British had made their imageof Malays as settled subsistent peasants. They concerned for encroachment of export-oriented
rubber cultivation into Malay lands. The Malay Reservation Enactment in 1913, which
defined officially the Malays for the first time, tried to prevent Malays from selling theirlands to non-Malays. The Rice Land Enactment in 1917, which reserved certain areas for ricecultivation, also showed their principle to distinguish the subsistent sector from the export
sector and enclose Malays within the former.
However, there was a discrepancy between the image of Malays and actual behavior ofMalays. Contrary to expectation of the government, Malays often acquired lands to cultivate
rubber for commercial interests, not for subsistence rice cultivation. The official definition ofMalays contained immigrants from neighboring islands such as Sumatra, Borneo and Java. As
there were a lot of foreign Malays in Selangor, their land tenure was fluid rather than stable.
British district officers, well aware of the situation, were quite critical against the policy
planned by the central government.
Meanwhile, Malay rajas actively backed the land policy to secure Malay lands from thethreat of foreigners. In fact, their image of Malays as subsistence rice farmers was even moreconservative than that of British officials. The process of the formation of Malay image wascollaborative work between British officials and Malay rajas. Controversies around theMalays were conducted not between the British and the Malays, but between the center andthe districts.
The controversy suggested various parties participated in making the policy. Thegovernment was persistent in the image of subsistent Malays in consideration of Malay rajas.
Though the role of Malay rajas in the administration so far had been underestimated, analysis
on the land policy puts the necessity of reexamination on their role.

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