The Myanmar Military Coup Two Years on:
Its Domestic and Regional Impact

Narayanan Ganesan (Professor)

The Myanmar military or Tatmadaw staged a coup on 1 February 2021 and usurped power from theNational League for Democracy (NLD)-led elected government that was headed by Aung San Suu Kyi.
The NLD had won an overwhelming victory in the November 2020 elections and was scheduled to return
to power in January 2021 when the appointment was delayed by the military in the capital city
Naypyitaw. Then after a month long delay the coup was staged by the military citing widespread voter
fraud during the 2020 election. The 2008 Constitution that was crafted by General Than Shwe contains aprovision that allows for the military to usurp power from an elected government it there is a perceived
threat to national security. And this was the clause cited by the military that claimed the coup was legaland constitutional.
Shortly after the coup, the military cited the Constitution again to impose a 2 year long state ofemergency to stabilize the domestic political situation before arranging for a new election. It thenappointed a State Administration Council (SAC) that was led by the army chief General Min Aung Hlaingand his deputy. When the emergency expired in February 2023, the military extended the emergency byanother 6 months citing an unusually challenging domestic political and security situation – a reference
to widespread resistance to military rule.
Resistance to the coup was indeed swift and widespread. The civilian population immediately embarked
on a Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) that affected many sectors of the public service. Resistance
was notably strong in the education and health sectors leading to a collapse of both the sectors with theattendant disruptions. Banging of pots and the three fingers salute reminiscent of the Thai resistance tothe military coup of May 2014 by General Prayuth Chan-ocha were also popular forms of resistance.
Over time, and with encouragement from the elected civilian government-in-exile, the CDM morphed
into armed resistance against the military called People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) in May 2021. Shortly
afterwards, the SAC labelled the PDFs terrorist organizations.

The shadow government-in-exile is helmed by members of the NLD who have gone into hiding and calls
itself the National Unity Government (NUG). The NUG is active in collaborating with like-mindedorganizations and individuals that oppose the military coup. It has won the support of a number of Ethnic
Armed Organizations (EAOs) that have fought the military for a long time. Such groups that draw on thecountry’s ethnic minorities include the Karen National Union (KNU) and its armed affiliates, Kachin
Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and its armed
affiliates, Chin National Front (CNF) and armed affiliates in particular. These ethnic armies havecollaborated with the NUG and offered training and weapons to the PDFs and more recently operated
alongside each other against the military. There are approximately 20 EAOs in Myanmar and the previous
elected government had a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with 10 of them although theagreement was fraying since 2016.
The political violence between the military and the PDFs and EAOs is widespread and especially intense
in Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Magwe and northern Shan states and the Sagaing region. The army has concededthat the security situation is challenging while the NUG claims to control more than half the country’sterritory. The military regularly uses random and indiscriminate violence to try and suppress the armedresistance. As a result of the ongoing situation, there have been approximately 3,000 civilians who havelost their lives with some 200,000 internally displaced persons. A large number of those who resist themilitary have also been imprisoned. The military has been regularly laying siege to areas with strong
resistance and burning houses and forcing occupants to flee into hiding. EAO and PDF-led ambushes andattacks have been rising and the military has responded with aerial attacks using aircraft and helicopters.
The SAC is determined to stage an election and seek victory for the party that represents the military’s
corporate interests – the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). In order to facilitate thisdevelopment, it has appointed a new Union Election Commission (UEC) and required political parties toregister again in order to compete in the planed elections. The NLD and many other parties have neither
the intention nor the interest in participating in this staged election to legitimize the coup and ongoingmilitary rule. In fact, the NUG has been encouraging attacks against the military and thwart the plannedelections. It has also achieved success in raising its international profile and raising funds from theMyanmar diaspora abroad. In 2023 alone it has raised $100 million and hopes to raise the amount to $250
million. Funds are often raised through direct donations and the sale of confiscated military properties
and planned construction of apartments after the successful completion of the revolution to rid thecountry of military rule.

Both the SAC and the NUG/PDFs/EAOs regard each other as terrorist organizations and are unwilling tocompromise and there are no ongoing attempts to negotiate a truce and end the violence domestically.
Hence, the death and destruction has continued and in fact worsened over time. The general appreciationof the situation is that this is going to be fairly long and drawn out conflict with neither side prepared tonegotiate. Additionally, the violence has not spared urban areas unlike previously where it was limited tothe areas that often housed the ethnic minorities rather than the Bamar majority. Consequently, it isnotable that for the first time in the country’s political history large numbers of Bamar are involved inresisting the military. Urban areas also attract assassinations against military informants, administrativeappointees and allied civilian militia groups called Pyu Saw Htee that are armed and trained by the military.

Regional impact and reactions to the conflict
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) of which Myanmar has been a member since 1997
convened a meeting in April 2021 to deal with the coup. General Min Aung Hlaing who attended thismeeting agreed to a Five Points Consensus (5PC) plan that involves dialogue with all stakeholders in thecountry, cessation of violence and a return to democratic governance. ASEAN has also attempted to assist
the country achieve the goals of the 5PC through the appointment of a Special Ambassador. However,there has been no progress on the matter and succeeding Special Ambassadors from Brunei in 2021 andCambodia in 2022 have been unable to persuade the military government to abide by the 5PC. A newappointee from the current ASEAN Chair, Indonesia will soon be appointed to oversee the 5PC.
ASEAN member countries have been unhappy with the ongoing situation and since late 2021 have barred
members of the Myanmar military government from attending Ministerial level meetings. Instead, they
have requested the presence of a senior bureaucratic representative. The SAC has simply responded by
not sending a representative to the meetings to express its displeasure in turn.
Within the ASEAN member countries there appear to be a split position on how to deal with the Myanmar
crisis. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore from maritime Southeast Asia have been morecritical of the SAC and refused to deal with it. Malaysia is the harshest critic that has begun dealing withthe NUG government publicly.

Countries neighbouring Myanmar in mainland Southeast Asia appear more willing to deal with the SAC
government suggesting that de facto power may be regarded as constituting legitimacy. Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand and until more recently, Vietnam fall into this category. Thailand has traditionally borne the bruntof political violence in Myanmar in the form of refugees and undocumented migrants. It already hosts
some 93,000 refugees from the past and there are now additional refugees, especially in the town of Mae
Sot, across from the Myanmar border said to number some 30,000. The country also relies on Myanmar
for workers in the marine, construction, plantation and service sectors in particular and has traditionallybeen home to some 2 million Myanmar workers. Over and above this dependency, up to 20 percent ofThai energy needs is provided by oil and gas from Myanmar.
It remains to be seen how Indonesia will respond to the situation as the new ASEAN Chair going forward.
The situation on the ground in Myanmar does not look promising and is in fact getting worse. Hence, thesituation is likely to lead to protracted and intense conflict for the next 3 to 5 years before some form of
settlement may arise.
Other than ASEAN, India has borne some brunt from a refugee influx from Chin state in the west of
Myanmar into its northeastern states like Assam and Manipur. China, that has a long and porous borderwith Myanmar also maintains ties with some of the EAOs from the northern Shan states and Kachin state.
In fact, 7 of the northern groups often enter into ceasefire talks with the Myanmar military through aChinese intermediary and fly in from Kunming in Yunnan province. This development has always left theMyanmar military suspicious about China’s intentions and goodwill. Ethnic groups like the Wa and Kokang
used to be fighters of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) that was supported by China and collapsed in
1989. Nonetheless, China and Russia have shielded Myanmar from more diplomatic fallout internationally.
Russia has also been a major arms supplier of fighter aircraft and helicopters to Myanmar more recently.

Japan’s special relationship and position
Japan has always claimed a special relationship with Myanmar that dates back to the struggle for thecountry’s independence against the British. The 30 Comrades that led the independence movement andincluded Aung San were trained by the Japanese army. Hence, even after the 1962 military coup that led
to the onset of a lengthy military authoritarian government under General Ne Win that lasted till 1988,
Japan always maintained bilateral relations with Myanmar. This relationship was impervious to theisolationist foreign policy of passive neutrality adopted then as well.

During the semi-democratic period that spanned the 10 years before the 2021 coup, Japan’s bilateralrelations with Myanmar grew considerably and it was the first country to open an international port at
Thilawa in Rakhine state in December 2015. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe provided very generous financial
assistance following the lifting of sanctions against Myanmar and appointed Yohei Sasakawa as Special
Envoy of the Government of Japan to the country. And Japan remains the only foreign country with 2
special economic zones adjacent to Thilawa port although international pressures have led to somedivestments as well. One of the most recent Japanese companies to divest from Myanmar was Kirin
Brewery that had a joint venture with a Myanmar beer producer that is part of the military’s economicempire.
At the present time, Japan’s Nippon Foundation provides support to internally displaced persons from theongoing conflicts. Yohei Sasakawa was also responsible for arranging the truce between the Arakan Armyin Rakhine state and the Myanmar military that has generally held quite well. Japan has allowed Myanmar
nationals to stay on in the country rather than repatriating them after the coup on humanitarian grounds
and there are ongoing negotiations for the country to source more labour from Myanmar. It also has anagreement to source for medical and health care workers from Myanmar annually, just like it does fromIndonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines as well. An interesting observation made by many Myanmar
nationals who are now in exile is that Japan is the only country trusted by both the NUG and the SAC andtherefore uniquely placed to broker a truce. Whether the country will rise to the challenge remains toseen.