研究ノート

The Impact of The Syria’s Crisis on The Rivalry
between Iran and Saudi Arabia in The Region:
Iran’s Point of View.

Atefeh BAGHISHADBAD

Introduction
Iran and Saudi Arabia have been viewed as rivals who have historically
been seeking the upper-hand position in the Middle East. Particularly, after the
1979 Islamic revolution of Iran, they competed to gain more regional powerboth politically and economically through the OPEC meetings. Among all theregional developments which impacted the relationship between Iran and Saudi
since 1979, the downfall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003 and the outbreak of
Syria’s conflict in 2011 have been the two major events that caused tension andthe rivalry between the two states.
Many scholars such as Berti (2014:25) have also argued that Iran-Saudi
cooperation became more intensified after Syria crisis started. However, theclose analysis of what happened after the downfall of Saddam’s Iraq shows acouple of significant changes in Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s relationship to Iraq.
It has been said that Iran’s influence in the Middle East has expanded after
the fall of Saddam Hussein as a result of the Shiite government under Maliki’s
leadership being supported by Iran.
It has been also maintained that Saudi Arabia expanded its support for the
al-Qaida group in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein to the establishmentof Maliki’s government (Alisa, 2014). Moreover, Saudi Arabia generally has
supported Sunni groups since 2005, and in particular provided financial aid toradical groups which later emerged as “Islamic State” (Clemons, 2014). By sodoing, Saudi Arabia intended to curtail Iran’s influence in Iraq since Iran gained
more power by successfully establishing the Shiite government there (Dreazen,2014).
In the case of Syria, Saudi Arabia also financially supported Salafist/Jihadist

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研究ノートgroups from 2011 to 2013 (Daou,2012). Until the capture of Mosul by IS in July
2014, Saudi Arabia supported Salafists/Jihadist, a part of which later became
IS in 2006 in Iraq. By so doing, according to Barrett (2014:11), Saudi Arabia
aimed at facilitating the downfall of the Assad regime. On the other hand, Iran
has supported the Assad regime. Despite the early prediction of the Western
media, the Assad regime did not fall (The Guardian,2013,January 7).
Much literature has existed about the prospect of the Middle East power
politics among Iranian scholars. Sariolghalam1 stated that “Turkey and Saudi
Arabia are the benefiters of regional developments and in the end the Saudis
will gain political power while the Turks gain economic and diplomatic power.”(2012, interview with Shargh) Daheshiar, professor of political science in Tehranalso maintained that “recent regional developments will strengthen the Saudis.
Damages inflicted by the Saudi’s potential defeat will be compensated by oilmoney and the United States support and consequently Saudi Arabia will not
be the true victim [of the Syria’s crisis].” ( 2015, interview with Khabaronline)
Therefore, many researchers agreed that the Saudis would expand their power
and that Iran would have no significant place among the emerging politicalpowers of the Middle East.
In light of these developments, this article aims to examine the impact of
the Syria’s crisis and emerging ISIS on the relationship between Saudi Arabia
and Iran. More specifically, it analyzes how the powers of both countries in theregion changed in the last four and half years since the outbreak of the Syria’s crisis. Which of these regional rivals gained more power of influence in the
Middle East and under what circumstance and process it happened? While
many Western scholars such as Algoul(2015) and Dreazen(2014) discussed
the impact of the Syria’s crisis and identified the rivalry between Iran andSaudi Arabia as a sectarian conflict, this article attempts to present Iran’s
policymakers’ viewpoint by answering the above-mentioned question by using
English and Persian sources as well as by the author’s interviews with several
government authorities in Iran that was conducted in March, September andOctober, 2014.
There are three sections in this article. Section one assesses the Iran andSaudi relationship during the Iran-Iraq war, and in the post-war period until
1.

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Adviser to Iranian president Rouhani’s international affairs.

The Impact of The Syria’s Crisis on The Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in The Region

2011. Section two examines Saudi Arabia’s policy towards Syria after the 2011
internal conflict, and the Saudi’s relationship with the Salafist/Jihadist groups.
Section three tries to clarify Iran’s reaction to the Syrian crisis and to evaluate
the consequences.

Ⅰ．Iran-Saudi Arabia Relationship Before Syria’s Crisis
1.1．Antagonism and Temporary Rapprochement(1979-2003)
Iran and Saudi Arabia are the two big powers in the Persian Gulf and in the
Middle East region, and geopolitical and strategic characteristics of these states
have also caused a rivalry between them. During the Cold War in generaland until Iran’s Revolution of 1979, due to the strong ties of both Iran andSaudi Arabia with the West, Iran- Saudi ties were based on peaceful mutual
cooperation despite differences and rivalry. The United States also supported
both states and exercised its political and economic power over them.
Yet the rift between the two states happened right after the Shiite
government of Iran gained power after the Revolution in 1979. Saudi Arabia
feared that its monarchical rule would be lost if a wave of revolution reached
the state, since the Pahlavi’s monarchy ended with the revolution. For 8 years
the Iran-Iraq War (1981-1989) happened and resulted in the highest level ofconflicts between Iran and the Saudis. It was during the same period when the
Saudis established the Persian Gulf Cooperation Organization (GCC) in 1981
to oppose the influence of Iran’s Shiite revolution and to prevent Iran fromexporting revolution to the Arab states. The Saudi decision to support Iraq was
based on the Saudi fear that Iran and its propaganda against the kingdom itself
endangered the Saudi regime and its authority.(Jahner, 2012:40)
A certain level of economic competition also prevailed in the mid 1980’s. In
1985-86, Saudi Arabia flooded its oil into the international market, which caused
the rapid decline in the oil prices. Iran was economically hurt by this as it
caused a big decline of national revenue. According to Okruhilk (2003:114), thishappened in the context of the U.S pressuring Iran: it wanted to exert pressure
on Iran to end the war with Iraq. Diplomatic relations between the twocountries were also temporarily discontinued when 275 Iranian pilgrims were
killed in Saudi Arabia while carrying out anti-American demonstrations on June
31, 1987.

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研究ノートBut after the Iran-Iraq war Iran’s political atmosphere changed upon thedeath of Ayatollah Khomeini and the consequent replacement of Ayatollah
Khamenei that coincided with the period of Rafsanjani’s presidency. Moderate
foreign policies employed by the Rafsanjani’s administration replaced
revolutionary and ideological policies. Rafsanjani and Prince-Abdolah’s warm
meeting in Pakistan in 1991 was a turning point to break the ice of relations.
This led to a more favorable environment in which Saudi Arabia and Iranreached a period of rapprochement during Rafsanjani’s presidency, for instance,
initiating negotiations of Rafsanjani on oil prices in 1999 at the Vienna meeting
both countries agreed to increase price up to 25$ /barrel from 13$.(Okruhilk:116)
Peaceful relations continued and reached their peak when Khatami came to
power in 1997. In the meantime, there was a sharp rise in trade between thetwo countries to the level of 248.5 million USD in 2001 from 95 million USD in1999 (Okruhik 2003:119). When Iran’s defence minister’s visit to Saudi Arabia
in 1999 and Saudi’s counterpart’s visit to Iran in 2000, Iran and Saudi Arabia
marked a point of mutual cooperation: they signed a security agreement (Hadian,64). Also after September 11, 2011 the two states signed counterterrorism
cooperation agreement in 2002 (Koshki, 2013:736). Thus, the Iran-Saudi
relationship saw some signs of rapprochement during Khatami’s administration.
Yet, as Hadian argues, it is true that the period between 1988 and 2003
saw a limited interaction and the area of cooperation was only seen in theincreasing the number of pilgrims, mutual meetings of the leaders, friendly
participating in international meetings like OIC and OPEC. But both states did
not reach the level of the cooperation and of the mutual understanding about
sensitive regional issues like Persian Gulf security, energy security, and theimplementation of a counterterrorism agreement. Moreover, they could notreach any deep and sustainable agreement in OPEC, to say nothing of in the
security of Iraq. This implies that the two states did not reach to common will
and mutual confidence-building (Hadian,112).
1.2．After The Downfall of Saddam in Iraq (2003-2011)
After a period of optimistic relations, Iran-Saudi ties entered a new stage
since the 2003 United States attack on Iraq which resulted in the fall of Saddam
Hussein. In an interview held by the author on September 10, 2014, Farazmand,
director general of the Persian Gulf stated: “we have entered a specific stage

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The Impact of The Syria’s Crisis on The Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in The Region

since 2003 in which we have not yet exited. Saudi Arabia did not accept the
new Iraq that was formed in 2003 and which favored Iran therefore it plans on
disrupting the new order, consequently forming hardline terrorist groups.”
According to Hadian, Iraq generally plays a very important role in Iran-Saudi
relations. On the one hand, Iraq’s alliance with the U.S. and Saudi Arabia can, as
Hadian maintains, limit Iran’s sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf. Moreover,
Saudi Arabia has always concerned about increasing power of the Shiite in
Iraq, whereas Iran was deeply concerned about the empowerment of the proSaudi Sunnies with anti-Irani and anti-Shiite policies after 2003.
Within this context, the most important event that affected Iran-Saudi
regional relation was the 2005 election in Iraq, which led to the establishment of
the Shiite government that made a close relationship with Iran’s Shiite regime.
There is no doubt that losing Iraq and giving it to the rival was not tolerable
and acceptable by Saudi Arabia. Iran had not expected Saddam Hussein’s
downfall as fast and easy as it happened. In the other words, Iran faced theShiite friend government without any trouble to collapse its enemy and as aresult, gained more regional power in competition with Saudi Arabia.
However, Iranian officials intended to maintain and develop their relations
with Saudi. According to some Iranian political analysts such as Hamid Ahmadi,
since 2005 Ahmadinejad sought the restoration of Iran’s relationship with
Saudi Arabia more than previous presidents. However, it is true that he did
not have the required power and influence to implement it. Moreover, it is said
that regional and international conditions did not favor Iran” (interview by theauthor, Oct 9, 2014). For instance, Ahmadinejad made five official trips to Saudi
Arabia in December 2005, March, November and December 2007 and June 2012
and claimed in an Interview with the author in March 5, 2014 that: “In all trips,
I was warmly welcomed by Saudi officials and there were not any tensions
or any misunderstanding among us, but the third factor, namely, the US and
its policies did not let us [Iran and Saudi,the two main factors] improve ourrelations.”
Regardless of the third American factor which Ahmadinejad mentioned, there
have been various factors that shaped Iran-Saudi relationship, such as Iran’s
nuclear issue, Iran’s influence on Syria, Lebanon and Hamas and the Iraqi Shiite
government that the last one has caused a deep effect. Thus, any substantial
improvement did not happen from 2005 until 2011.

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研究ノートIn this regard, Yusefi, an expert on Saudi affairs in the foreign affairs
ministry, stated in an interview with the author on October 6, 2014 that:“following Saddam’s fall which resulted in Iran’s influence in Iraq andfriendly relations with Iraq’s new Shiite government, the northern
section of the Arab world consisting of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are
under Iran’s influence. Saoud Al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s minister offoreign affairs addressed the United States in saying that you havepresented Iraq to Iran on a golden plate. It is obvious that the Saudis
have and will do anything in their power to stop Iran from easily
influencing Iraq and the region.”
But, in contrast to Saudi’s policy and in a more pronounced shift, the UnitedStates agreed to bilateral meetings with Iran, in Baghdad, on the Iraq issue in2007 and 2008 (Katzman, June 4, 2009).
It is certain that regional developments favored Iran after the fall of Saddam
and the Baathist enemy who forced Iran into an 8 year war turned into a Shiiteally, it should be noted that Iran’s increased influence in Iraq alongside its
strong strategic relations with Syria and Lebanon (called the axis of resistance)
has increased Iran’s regional influence and such occurrences have not favored
Iran’s old rivals, the Saudis.
Obviously, Saudi Arabia’s interests in Iraq manifested strong motivation andchallenged Iran in Iraq to stop Iran’s political actions and to change back theregional balance of power toward its favor. Saudi’s policy was to make criticalsituation for both Iran and Maliki’s government by creating and supporting theSalafist/Jihadist groups who will be assessed in the next section. Saudi Arabia
was implementing its anti-Shiite government and anti-Iran policies in Iraq when
the Syria’s crisis happened and gave an unanticipated turn to Saudi to develop
its policy against Iran to exit both Syria and Iraq from Iran’s influence. The
next section will assess Saudi’s strategy to face with Iran after the crisis in
Syria in 2011.

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The Impact of The Syria’s Crisis on The Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in The Region

Ⅱ．Saudi Arabia and the Syria Crisis
2.1．Saudi Arabia’s Strategy Toward the Syria’s Crisis
Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Syria can be regarded as efforts to maintainits regional security that were endangered by the way Iran’s regional positionchanged since 2003. Saudi’s strategy took ideological and non-ideologicalforms. Supporting militant Salafist/Jihadist groups was in line with supporting
Wahhabism as its main ideology, and preserved its national interest both
domestically and regionally. Regarding its non-ideological strategy, Saudi Arabia
has constantly utilized some different means to inhibit Iran’s influence.
For instance, Saudi Arabia has been the main sponsor of conferences called“Friends of Syria” aimed at supporting the Syrian opposition groups. The first
Friends of Syria conference was held in Tunisia on February 25, 2011 with theparticipation of 70 countries including Saudi Arabia. The second conference
was held on March 3, 2012 in Istanbul with the participation of 83 states andinternational organizations, the third on 6 July 2012 in Paris, the fourth on 11
December 2012 in Marrakesh, Morocco as well as some others in 2013 and2014 in which Saudi Arabia played an important role and Iran was intentionally
excluded as a participant (Adami, 2012: 163). Moreover, Saudi Arabia beside
Kuwait and UAE pledged $900 million for Syrian at Donor conference inJanuary 2013 (Al-Arabia news, 2013,January 30).
Financial support by Saudi Arabia for weapon acquisition and smuggling
into Syria as described above was not the only means that Saudi Arabia used.
Presenting advice to prominent people among protesters and linking them withinternational media to create media pressure upon Iran through news channels
such as the al-Arabiyaa T.V. network, al-Hayat and al-Shargh-ol-Awsat are also
among other attempts made by Saudis against Syria(Adami:2013).
It is also true that the Assad government that Iran supported has killed
many secularists and civilians including Arabs and Kurds, as the Washington
Post stated that “for every Syrian that ISIS kills, Assad forces kill seven more”(The Washington Post,2015,September 5). Thus, it goes without saying that
Iran is also responsible for prolonging Syria’s crisis. But from Iran’s viewpoint,
Saudi’s ideological tool has been more destructive. Over more than two decades,
Saudi Arabia has lavished around $100 billion or more on the worldwide
promotion of the Wahhabist sect of Islam that the ruling royal family espouses.

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研究ノートIn 2003, a United States Senate committee on terrorism heard testimonythat in the previous 20 years Saudi Arabia had spent $87 billion on promoting
Wahhabism worldwide (Manthorpe,2013, May). It is generally considered thatthe roots of Salafist groups’ beliefs go back to Wahhabism that emerged in the
17th century. However there are many Salafist groups in the region who evensometimes are against each other, but it is believed the origins of their mindset
is same.
Among all Salafist/Jihadist groups, ISIS is now the most important of them
who is affiliated to ‘Abu-Mosab Zarghawi’ and initially expanded as ‘Al-Qaida
in Iraq’ but was suppressed in 2007 by Iraq’s central government. However,during this same period, ISIS became a means by Saudi to oppose Iraq’s Shiite
government by secretly providing financial and military aid. Dr. Ahmadi, a
University of Tehran lecturer stated in an interview by the author that “Saudi
Arabia attempted to establish militant groups to preserve their interests in theregion in particular in Iraq just as Iran was supported by the Hezbollah, but
this resulted in the formation of an extremist violent group called ISIS.”(October
15, 2014)
The emergence of ISIS goes back to Oct. 15, 2006, when what is known as
the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was established. With the financial and military
support of the Saudis in particular Bandar Bin Sultan, head of Saudi intelligence,
ISIS managed to strengthen its power (Ostadi, 2015). Prince Bandar bin Sultan,
reportedly told Secretary of State John Kerry when Kerry pressed him about
Saudi financing of extremist groups in 2014 that “Saudi Arabia has retaken aleadership role in past months guiding help to the Syrian armed rebels.”(Rogin,2014 ) ISIS, in fact, may have been a major part of Bandar’s covert-ops strategy
in Syria(Clemons,2014).
On the other hand, the Saudi citizens are believed to be one of the mostcharitable people and have funneled hundreds of millions of dollars to Syria and
Iraq in recent years, including to ISIS. In 2006, it was reported that millions of
Saudi Riyals, often collected in the form of Zakat (compulsory charity), were
smuggled to Iraq to pay for missiles and other weapons (Ehrenfeld,2013).
Obviously, Iran’s official response to the policy of Saudi has not been positive,
for instance Javad Zarif Iran’s foreign minister in an interview with Frankforter
Algmaine on February 1, 2013 emphasized that “I believe Saudi Arabia ispursuing the policies in Syria and Iraq which hurt itself and all the region’s

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The Impact of The Syria’s Crisis on The Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in The Region

interests.”
Despite Iran’s official opposition, Saudi and ISIS’s relationship continued
in both Iraq and Syria against the States’ official governments. On the otherside, Iran also strongly pursued its supportive policies to protect Iraq and
Syria’s current regimes. But the important event which changed the regionalsituation was to sharp increase of ISIS’s power and facilities since June 2014
and its overt confrontation with Saudi. Iranian officials like Mohtadi,Seniorresearcher of the Middle East Strategic Studies Center in Tehran, consider
it as the wrong investment of Saudi on an unreliable group. (interview by theauthor,2014,October 17). The next part examines more about Saudi and ISIS’s
instable relation.
2.2．Saudi’s Relation with ISISAs it is generally conceived, ISIS is one of the Salafist/Jihadist groups rootedin Wahhabism. The group supported Saudi policies in line with destabilizing
Iraq and challenging its Shiite government. From Iran’s viewpoint theobjective of these activities has been to endanger Iran’s new influence andthe overthrowing of the Assad regime. Foreign minister Zarif stated that:“ISIS is the product of two things. First is the US invasion of Iraq, and theforeign presence that creates a dynamic of resistance. Second is the feeling of
disequilibrium, which has prevailed in some countries in the region since thefall of Saddam. They are trying to change the status quo.”(Tabatabaie,214)
Iranian officials occasionally publish documents which indicate Saudi’s direct
aid to ISIS, for example the Islamic revolution’s news in Iran claimed by the
pictures in December 2014 that Iraqi security forces discovered plenty of foodaid in Takrit and published their pictures which had been sent by Saudi to IS
group with the slogan of “Saudi Arabis, country of humanity” on the packages.24
Financial sponsors such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar allowed ISIS to gain more
control in the region as have been reported by the 'Al-rabt-al-yamani' news
portal. This news portal also pointed out the weight of the Saudi sponsorship.
More precisely, 28 Saudi and 12 Iraqi political and religious figures are said tobe the top of ISIS's financial sponsors list (Fars News 2014). But regardless of
Saudi’s support, the group’s main financial source is oil which has made ISIS therichest terrorist group in world.
On the other hand, it is noticeable that according to Cockburn (2014), Saudi

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研究ノートArabia has adopted two policies regarding the Salafists/Jihadist. Firstly, theyencouraged them as a useful tool of Saudi’s anti-Shiite influence abroad, andsecondly they suppressed them at home as a threat to the domestic status quo,
the ruling of the Saudi royal family in Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi royal family fears domestic terrorist groups. A part of ISIS
members, most of AQAP (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) members arealso the Saudi nationals whose aim is to topple the royal family. The March2011 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on Saudi Arabia details theKingdom’s progress on its domestic al-Qaeda terrorists cells. However, the GAO(the Government Accountability Office) report noted that there was hardly any
efforts to prevent “funding for terrorism and violent extremism outside of Saudi
Arabia.”(Ehrenfeld,2013)
But as ISIS strengthened its own power of influence, and time went by,
Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the top leader of ISIS, claimed the Islamic caliphate on
June 28, 2014 and stated that Malik Abdullah, former Saudi’s king, is not thecaliph. This declaration was made as soon as ISIS found a good opportunity forincreasing its revenue and political power by the capture of Mosul, the second
important city of Iraq. It is reported that the financial gain by capturing Mosul
was not only Mosul’s huge amount oil and tax, but also the fact that the groupreportedly scored $430 million in July 2014 when they looted the main bank in
Mosul. It is clear that ISIS decided not to be dependent on the Saudis anymore.
With the above-mentioned development considered, one of the mostsignificant repercussions of the threat of ISIS’s has been a serious security
threat to Saudi Arabia. It reached a point in March 2014 that Saudi Arabia’s interior Ministry officially designated ISIS as a terrorist entity after someserious threats and attacks on Saudi territories started by ISIS (Mashreghnews,
2015)43. In June 13,2014 , U.S. Treasury Department officials also stated that
Saudi Arabia sees "eye to eye" with the United States on the importance ofhalting activities by the ISIS. It is after this statement that the US launched theformation of the Coalition of Willing against ISIS in which Saudi Arabia, Qatar
and Turkey became members.
However, until 2014 and even after that, many Saudi citizens joined ISIS.
Frank Gardner BBC security correspondent reported on December 18, 2014
that more than 2000 Saudis have been estimated to have joined ISIS and havebrought extremist ideology into Saudi Arabia . He continued to say that the128

The Impact of The Syria’s Crisis on The Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in The Region

Saudis do not agree with the government’s attack on ISIS, which was reflectedin an incident that one of Saudi’s pilot who participated in the operation against
ISIS and was threatened with death inside Saudi Arabia. Thus, it is obviousthat Saudi officials not only can not easily prevent its citizens from proving
financial aids to ISIS, but also according to the claim of Conservative factionsin the parliament of Iran “ some Wahhabi clergies suggested the Saudi king to
dedicate some parts of the Hajj income to IS fighters and its families, they also
noticed financial support to ISIS means participation in the fighters’ oblation.”(2015)11
According to the Al-Arabia news in July 2014, a Saudi leading commentator
stated “what did we do wrong? With 3000 - 4000 Saudi fighters in the Islamic
Sate today, we have to admit our political mistake.” By so saying, he inferredthat ISIS has transformed itself to a radical terrorist group that led to a newcrisis not only for the Saudis but for the Middle East as well as the global
world. In this context, the United States started its military campaign in June
2014.
Then, a question should be raised here: what was Saudi’s overall intention
by intervening in Syria? From Iran’s perspectives, Saudi Arabia has benefited
from creating conflicts in order to weaken Iran's influence (the author’sinterview with Dr. Jabbari,October 13, 2014). However, what Saudi Arabia did
not expected was an emerging reality in which ISIS created a crisis both for
the west and the Arab world in which Saudi Arabia holds a dominant regional
power.
Saudi Arabia attempted to place the Syrian crisis under its control in which
ISIS became a strong military power, and turned out to be a well- organized
force. But, as analyzed above, an unexpected development happened: ISIS
turned to Saudi Arabia for its attack after it captured its independent financial
basis. ISIS is currently using its ideological slogan that originated from
Wahhabism but in fact is seeking to change the Middle East's geopolitics.
Historically, Saudi Arabia's investments in terrorist groups such as AlQaida and ISIS have been demonstrably detrimental to their long-term causes.
For example, after Al-Qaida's September 11 attacks on New York, fingers
were pointed towards the Saudis for nurturing such radical beliefs and theinternational community blamed the Saudis for these attacks. Eventually, theUnited States attacks on Afghanistan and the Taliban's defeat wiped out Iran's

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研究ノートdangerous and close enemy thus the Saudis policies concerning Al-Qaida turned
out to be Iran's favor and to the Saudi's detriment.
Regarding ISIS, the situation is more complex as this terrorist group has
surpassed Al-Qaida in terms of violence and extremely radical ideology. On
2nd February 2014, Al-Qaida's leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri officially denied any
affiliation with ISIS (Zelin,2014,February).
The author believes that on the one hand, ISIS's long-term threat became a
big concern for Saudi Arabia rather than Iran because ISIS's origin of existence
is Saudi Arabia. This means that the Saudis, being responsible for the expansionof Wahhabism in the Arab world, enabled the growth of ISIS and nurtured
such a religious extremism. Therefore, ISIS's recruitment within Saudi Arabia's
borders and among the Salafist groups was predictable. The explosion of a
Shiite mosque in the Qatif area in Saudi Arabia on 22nd May 2015, which wasclaimed by ISIS, was a warning sign for its perceived rival, the Saudi regime.
Saudi Arabia said in April 2015 it has arrested 93 people who had ties with
ISIS in Iraq and Syria (The Guardian,2015,April 28). Such religious radicaltendencies are not visible in Iran, with the majority of Shiite who never had
good impressions of the extreme orientation of Wahhabism.
To sum up, although Saudi’s relation with ISIS did not continue officially, thenumber of its citizens and Wahhabi clergies still believe in supporting Salafist/
Jihadist groups in particular ISIS and ideologically, it is not easy to convince
them not to support IS any longer. On the other hand, Iran has been attempting
to respond to the IS developments towards its regional interests which will beassessed in the next section.

Ⅲ．Iran and Syria Crisis
3.1．Iran’s Official Response to The Civil War
After the Islamic revolution in 1979 and the change in Iran's regime froma western dependent monarchy to an Islamic regime that was symbolized in
the expression of Khomeini,supreme leader, “neither East nor West,” Iranand Syria formed one of the most problematic yet strategic partnership in
the past few decades. Iran and Syria do not have a common language, culture
and ethnicity with distinct differences in the political regime (Islamic republic
versus a secular socialistic republic). Moreover, there is a religious difference,

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The Impact of The Syria’s Crisis on The Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in The Region

namely, Iran being Shiite and Syria being Sunni. However, these countries haveformed one of the strongest and most important alliances in the Middle East.
A major reason was that since 1979 one of Iran and also Syria’s main
security concerns in the Middle East was the lack of strategic allies within
the region and beyond. In such a situation, Syria and Iran played a vital rolein the security policies of each other as the strategic alliances. The Middle
East's chaotic environment lacks a security consensus among states. The
absence of a security structure has paved a way for different and often
conflicting agreements. Among them are the Arab league, the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), Collective Security Treaty Organization, Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, Guam Treaty, Organization of Democratic Elections, NATO
Treaty and its subsidiary agreements in the region. In addition, bilateralagreements among the regional and trans-regional countries have created acomplex situation under which Iran and Syria are hardly included. Thus, theMiddle East's current and future security environment is likely to entail various
threats to the both states (Simber, 2014:150).
Before the fall of Saddam in 2003, Iran and Syria signed their first militaryand economic agreements in 1982. This alliance continued despite changes after
the Cold War due to Syria's economic problems, loss of Soviet aid and increased
dependency on Iran which resulted in Iran being of the few foreign investing
countries in Syria (Piotlowski, 2011, p 596).
The cooperation between Iran and Syria has been reflected in various
agreements among which were bilateral agreements after 2003: the ‘strategiccooperation agreement’ in 2004 and the ‘mutual defense treaty’ in 2006 which
resulted in the expansion of naval cooperation in the Mediterranean Sea(Lauren, 2009:29). A contract was signed in 2008 where Iran was to participate
in building a power plant in Syria to maintain this country’s electricity. In 2010,
Iran handed over an advanced radar system to Syria to detect Israeli missiles.
Exchange rates between Syria and Iran were estimated at approximately 5billion dollars in 2010 (Koshki,2013).
But following extensive developments regarding regional countries such as
Tunisia, Yemen and Egypt, the scope of these developments called the ‘Arab
Spring’ reached Syria and president Assad’s opposition started to hold protests.
Consequently, Iran’s position was to continue its complete support of its only
regional strategic ally as it did before 2011. Syria has a crucial role in Iran’131

研究ノートs security policy in the region which provided much efforts in aiding financial,military and moral support to the preservation of the Assad’s regime.
Since 2011, Iran has deployed a few hundred of its al-Qods Forces (aspecial unit of Iran’s paramilitary Revolutionary Guards established after the
Revolution) including 150 officers and members of Hezbollah to Syria. Recently,
one of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’ commanders has publicly announced thatsome of its senior officers have been sent to Syria for non-military consultations(Nerquizan,2013:4).
It is noticeable that Iran forced to deal with the opposition groups inparticular ISIS in both Syria and Iraq at the same time due to ISIS has occupied
some parts of the both states territory. It was reported that following thearrival of 100 Quds Force members to Syria, Iran planned to create a volunteer
militia similar to the National Defence Force in Syria, to fight against ISIS
alongside the weak and demoralized Iraqi army.
One Iraqi intelligence official noted that these deliveries included rockets,
heavy machine guns and multiple rocket launchers in early July, Tehran
reportedly delivered Su-25 aircraft (former Iraqi planes kept by Iran following
the Iran–Iraq War) to Iraq. On 12 August 2014, ISIS captured Jalawla, a town
just 20 miles from the Iranian border. In response, Tehran reportedly assisted
the Kurdish counter-offensive by sending in Iranian army units. According toa peshmerga commander, Iran offered military assistance, training and advice(Tabatabaie, 2014).
In addition and in parallel, on February 2012 U.S. Department of Treasury
designated the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) to providing“substantial technical assistance to the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate
for the purpose of assisting the Syrian regime in its violent crackdown on
protesters. In March 2012 an unnamed U.S. official stated that Iran had “sharedtechniques on Internet surveillance and disruption” with the Assad regime
and provided “unarmed drones that Damascus is using along with its own
technology to monitor opposition forces,” as well as “monitoring tools to help
the regime suppress the opposition.
In September 2012 IRGC, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Commander
Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari explained at a news conference that “there
is no need for external support in order to preserve the security in Syria, since
50,000 popular forces called Jaysh al-Sha‘bi are fighting alongside the Syrian

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The Impact of The Syria’s Crisis on The Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in The Region

military.”(Fulton and Holliday,2013,p:15)
On the other hand, financially, Iran’s trade value with Syria increased fromapproximately 200 million dollars in 2010 to one billion dollars in 2013. Bothcountries have agreed to create a direct shipping line to increase their trade to
two billion dollars by the end of 2015 (Kermani, 2015). At the time when Syria’s exchange reserves were decreasing and the European Union and Turkey’s
sanctions inflicted various damages, Iran provided Syria with financial supportand in March 2011 promised an aid of five billion dollars (Niakuie,2014:134). Also,in March 2014 when Damascus was under pressure to neutralize its businesslosses relevant to a one way suspension of a free trade agreement by Turkey,
Iran signed a free trade agreement with Syria (Nerquizan, 2013:11). Based ona strategic decision, Iran’s government has completely supported the Assadregime by providing arms, oil and financial support (Goodarzi, 2013:21).
Although it seems Iran's political support of Syria is justified to maintain its
own economic interests, two key issues should not be forgotten. Firstly, therelative advantage that Iranian companies have is due to the lack of foreign
investments and it is the least Syria can do in exchange for the 5.6 billion
dollars it has received from Iran since the crisis. Secondly, Syria's future is
uncertain therefore there is no guarantee that Syria will be a reliable place for
Iranian companies to compete with foreign companies or if Iranian companies
will keep their relative advantage in the Syrian market.
To sum up, despite its strategically unfavorable situation in which Iran wasplaced, Iran's investment in Syria is an indication of Syria's strategic priority
for Iran. This is not only limited to economic activities since Iranian authorities
have maintained clear political stances in prioritizing Syria and do not attempt
to hide this policy. In a meeting with Iraq’s former oil minister in September
2013, Rafsanjani explicitly and publicly declared that “Alawite regimes in Syria
are more beneficial for Iran and Iraq. If the Iran-Lebanon chain is broken (via
Syria), detrimental events can be expected”(interview,2013)
3.2．Intense Competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia
Iran has overt wars with terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq to preserve its
alliances, Iran claims that its actions since 2003 are completely legal based oninternational law.33 Iran is a supporter of Assad's government. It is important tonote that Ali Velayati, senior advisor to the supreme leader in Iran stated in an

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研究ノートinterview with Khabaronline on August 30, 2015 as follows:“In Syria a legitimate government still exists because it has arepresentative in the UN. If a country that is a member of the UN
requests aid from another country, this request is legal. We are in
Syria based on their request but those who are joining illegal Salafist
and terrorist groups in Syria are convicted of breaking the law.”
This statement approves Iran's support of the Assad regime whilst notallowing Saudi Arabia to achieve its goals in Syria. Velayati acknowledges that
"Assad's government has been fighting terrorism on behalf of regional countries
in the form of 4-5 years of resistance and as years have gone by, this country
has not weakened and has gained more strength.” (Ibid)
Hossein Yousefi another Iranian politician also in the interview with theauthor on October 6, 2014 emphasized that Saudi Arabia expected the fall of
the Syrian regime in one or maximum two years after breaking the civil war,
and as above-mentioned by supporting the opposition groups achieving the goal
did not seem to be far-fetched. But the emerging confrontation among many
oppositional groups against the Assad regime made the Syrian situation more
complicated: between al-Jabat-al-Nosrat and ISIS, and on the one hand, ISIS andSaudi Arabia. The new conflicting situation was unpredictable for Saudi Arabia
as much as for Iran (Alghoul,2015).
It is true that Iran supported Syria militarily and financially, but in the
begging of crisis in 2011, it was not easy to predict emerging conflict between
Saudi and some Salafist/Jihadist groups, in particular ISIS. ISIS was expectedby Saudi to be a serious threat to Iran and a political tool for Saudi Arabia
to challenge Iran’s regional power. However, everything went wrong for
Saudi. Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declaration of the capture of Mosul in 2014 wasinterpreted a declaration of war not only to the Shiite including Iran, but also to
Saudi Arabia.
The above-mentioned situation is a new threat of ISIS that has been moredangerous to Saudi than Iran. ISIS has been seen as an unexpected successand opportunity by the Iranian government in competition with its rival,
Saudi Arabia. Since ISIS was identified as an international security problem,
Iran attempted to gain reputation and legitimacy by fighting this group and

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The Impact of The Syria’s Crisis on The Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in The Region

criticizing Saudi’s Wahhabism ideology which developed such extreme groups
in the region.
In the light of the progress made by ISIS fighters close to Iranian borders,
Tehran changed its approach to the conflict, further increasing its involvementin Iraq in the effort to pre-empt a potential spillover across its borders(Tabatabaie,2014, p:2). In fact, in contrast to Saudi’s policy to reduce Iran’spresence in Iraq and Syria, not only ISIS could not reverse Iran from Iraq and
Syria but also gave an acceptable excuse to Iran to continuously stay in Iraq
and Syria. In practice, Iran modified ISIS threat to an opportunity to develop
its presence and influence in both the Iraqi and Syrian states to defeat theterrorist groups who occupied territory of the Iran’s alliances. In the otherworld, growing the terrorist groups who were identified as an international
security problem let Iran justify its interfere and also criticize Saudi Arabia as
the Salafist/Jihadist groups main funder.
For Iran, it can be an important achievement that after more than four years
civil war, Assad’s oppositions include Saudi Arabia have not achieved theirobjectives which seemed to be the collapse of the Assad regime, and despite
losing some cities like Aleppo, Palmyra and Deirez-Zor by the Syrian army,
this regime has remained in power and has maintained its main territory like
Damascus, Hama, Tartus and Homs. With Assad appearing on BBC on 10
February 2015 with an obvious self-confident means, powerful TV broadcaststhat are dependent on their government, still recognize Assad as Syrian
legitimate governor. Assad stated in the interview “Syria is not failed state atall, as long as the government and the state institutions are fulfilling their duty
toward the Syrian people, [we] cannot talk about failed states.”7
Finally, it should also be noticed that Saudi’s effort to convince the US to
attack Syria failed in 2013 (According to The Wall Street Journal, Saudi Arabian
intelligence presented the US with proof in February 2013 that the Syrian
regime had already resorted to chemical weapons) , but on the other hand, theUS-led decision to bomb ISIS militant positions in 2015 and even more military
cooperation with Iran to defeat ISIS considered (by Iran) in favor of the Syrian
regime and also Iran. Federica Mogherini, the current High Representative of
the European Union for Foreign Affairs, stated on her visit to Tehran on July28, 2015 that "the valuable cooperation process with Iran (after the nuclear deal)
can be started with Syria."

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研究ノートThus, Iran considers that strengthening its relationship with Saudi Arabia
is crucial. This positon of Iran’s is also evident from other Iranian officials'
remarks. For example, in an interview with Lebanon's Al-Mayadin in June 2015,
Zarif requested that the Saudis "refrain from the delusion of eliminating Iran'srole within the region. As owners of the region, we must have good relations.
Today, cooperation is required to establish security and Iran is prepared tosolve the region's problems." (Ministry of Foreign Affair website, 2015)
Apparently, new circumstances (ISIS-Saudi conflict) have been evaluatedpositively by the regime in Iran. Not only have maintaining the Assad regime
in power after more than four years and Saudi Arabia’s failure (so far) toundermine Iran’s regional power come to be considered as a valuable successby Iran, but also some other political events such as the new moderate
government in Iran since 2013 and its effective interactions with theinternational community, the nuclear deal in July 2015 and also cooperation
with the US-coalition against ISIS have all caused that Iran considers itself inupper hand and legitimate position in the region in comparison to Saudi.

Conclusion
It is certain that the developments such as downfall of Saddam and Syria
crisis sparked new disputes in addition to the already existing differences
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Rafsanjani stated in a meeting with Hoshiar
Zibari, the Iraqi foreign minister that "currently we are witnessing the darkest
relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia where extremism on both sides iscertainly one of the most important reason.”36
For Iran, the crisis in Syria that is one of its most important strategic allies,
and the unstable Iraq, its western neighbour and another strategic ally, are notacceptable. In contrast, for Saudi Arabia, the interfering of Iran in the Arabworld that should be Saudi Arabia’s the sphere of influence is intolerable. As
above-mentioned, Iran has blamed Saudi Arabia for intensifying the criticalsituation in the Middle East by supporting the extreme groups to deal with
Iran’s ambitions the regional dominance. According to the Persian and western
documents, Saudi Arabia considered ISIS as the best means to develop its antiIran policies.
ISIS had been expected to be an obstacle for Iran and an obedient group for

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The Impact of The Syria’s Crisis on The Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in The Region

Saudi and its other supporters in Iraq and Syria, and it seemed ISIS who has
undeniable ideological and political contradiction with Iran would undermine
Iran’s regional power. But just after capturing Mosul, the group became aproblematic issue not only for Saudi but also for the all region. In other words,
before the ISIS threat emerged, the Syrian free army and regional states
including Saudi had concentrated on overthrowing Syria’s regime, but afterJune 2014 all the mentioned groups involved in a two-front war with both
Assad and ISIS that changed the civil war to a war of attrition for all sides.
For Iran, the new situation had both advantages and disadvantages, but
regardless of disadvantages such as the Syria’s regime’s likely collapse,
increasing ISIS’s power in Iraq in areas very close to Iran’s borders andexpending the regional insecurity, Iran decided to take advantage of the ISIS
threat to challenge Saudi Arabia by reminding the public the roots and ideologyof IS is from Wahhabism on the one hand, and also overt fight with the Islamicstate as a global threat to gain more legitimacy for itself on the other hand.
It should be noticed that along with Iran's new developments, such as the2013 presidential election in Iran and resolving the nuclear issue, rapprochementwith the west which strengthened the regime's international reputation, helped
maintain its alliance in power in Syria, and altogether enabled Iran to claim
having the upper hand in Syria and also the region.
The Saudis, on the other hand, are faced with frequent regional crisis.
From Iran's point of view, Saudi Arabia is now faced with a serious security
crisis. Regarding Syria, whether the Assad regime stays in power or will beoverthrown is still unknown. Yet, both scenarios will be threatening for the
Saudis. The Assad regime's preservation will entail Iran's influence to continue
and a defeat for the Saudis, while the prospect of Assad's fall will also not bein the Saudis favor and its national security due to the number of threatening
groups such as ISIS and Al-Nosrat Front, especially since they are defying the
Saudis. The emergence of any serious tensions within Saudi Arabia has given arise to extremist pro-ISIS groups.
To sum up, Syria's crisis has not turned out as a suitable opportunity for
Saudi Arabia to strengthen its regional power. ISIS has also not turned out
as a crippling menace for Iran. After ISIS leader Baghdadi’s declaration of
capturing Mosul, as noted previously in this article, ISIS was also targeting
Saudi. In contrast, Iran considered ISIS a favorable circumstance to justify its

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研究ノートpolicy towards Iraq and Syria, and have continued its involvement by provided
military equipment, and supporting financially some specific groups, andsending troops to both Syrian and Iraq. How the restoration of the relationshipbetween Iran and the IS will happen in the next few years would also shapefurther the regional power politics between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which is tobe noted continuously.

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The Impact of The Syria’s Crisis on The Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in The Region

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The Impact of The Syria’s Crisis on The Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in The Region

Abstract

The Impact of The Syria’s Crisis on The Rivalry
between Iran and Saudi Arabia in The Region:
Iran’s Point of View.

Atefeh BAGHISHADBAD

It is clear that the Iran and Saudi’s response to the Arab spring wasdetermined by the need to expend their regional power and more favorable
direction. From Iran’s perspective Saudi Arabia’s post-Saddam and post-Syria
crisis policies have clearly been to weaken Iran’s regional power due to the
expansion of Iran’s influence in the region since 2003. In the meantime, Syria
as one of the three pillars of Axis of resistance against Israel has always had
a specific place in foreign policy of Iran. Saudi Arabia attempted to abuse its
power by involving in Syria’s conflict and supporting the Salafist groups inparticular ISIS to challenge Iran’s regional power.
This article aims to examine the impact of Syrian crisis and emerging ISIS on
the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran. More specifically, it analyzes
how the powers of both countries in the region changed in the last four andhalf years since the outbreak of the Syria’s crisis. Which of these regional rivals
gained more power of influence in the Middle East? The analysis will be madebased on the author’s interviews with Iran’s foreign policy officials and other
Persian and english sources. Based on the fact that Saudi Arabia is the country
which has become much confrontational against Iran since fall of Saddam in
Iraq in 2003.
This study is significant in the sense that it pays attention to Iran’s
perception of Saudi Arabia’s the years between 2003 and 2015. By so doing,
this article will shed light on the reasons Iran and Saudi Arabia have becomeso conflictual at the time and how despite Saudis efforts, Iran’s regional powerhas been increasing. The article argues that Saudi Arabia exploited the Salafist
radical groups in Iraq in the post-Saddam era and in Syria since 2011 to enjoy
much opportunity to challenge Iran’s expansion of power in the region. But

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研究ノートthe author discusses how to military and financial progress of ISIS in Syria has
gradually become a threat and challenge to Saudi Arabia despite the fact that
the ISIS originally supported Saudi Arabia, furthermore how Iran modified thethreat of ISIS to an opportunity to gain more regional power and legitimacy.
Key words; Saudi Arabia, Iran, ISIS, Syria, Iraq, The regional power

144