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Battle at the UN Security Council on Peace
Enforcement in Libya and Syria:
Focusing on the Strategies of BRICS
Daisaku Higashi

Abstract
This paper will discuss battles at the UN Security Council between
Western states and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa) on peace enforcement in Libya and Syria. In this paper, peace
enforcement is almost tantamount to “humanitarian intervention” dueto the purpose of the intervention, which was to protect civilians withina sovereign state, at least in the discussion at the UN Security Council.
I conducted research in New York at the end of 2011 by interviewing
IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) ambassadors to the UN as wellas high-ranked UN officials on this issue. The major result of myresearch is that although BRICS is often categorized as a group that
opposes international intervention against a sovereign state, it is the
IBSA countries that coordinate their votes on UNSC resolutions, while
Russia and China (RC) usually aggressively reject the decisions of the
UNSC on military intervention. In reality, IBSA and RC are
substantially different in identifying their own commitments tohumanitarian intervention against sovereign states that do not havethe capacity or will to protect their own people. And compared to Russia
and China, who oppose humanitarian intervention due to their domestic
problems (for example, how to deal with ethnic minorities), the IBSA
group has a more balanced and flexible attitude to humanitarian
intervention or peace enforcement because of its identity as “newleading democratic states representing their regions.” This paper
discusses (1) an analysis of voting decisions by BRICS states on the
resolutions for Libya; (2) the difference between RC and IBSA on theprinciple of “Responsibility to Protect,” by examining their policies on
Syria; and (3) Japan’s policies on humanitarian intervention,

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recognizing the difference between IBSA and RC. With regard to theJapanese commitment, I will emphasize that while it is difficult forJapan to participate in peace enforcement, Japan can make a significant
contribution to peace-building activities after the intervention, utilizing
its experience to support improving infrastructure, creating job
opportunities, and promoting national reconciliation in post-conflictstates.

Introduction
The Arab Spring that started in January 2011 also began shedding light on
the new challenges of peace enforcement with a humanitarian purpose. While
the military intervention in Libya, with the endorsement of the UN Security
Council resolution aiming to “protect civilians,” was hailed by some international
scholars and government officials as the result of an emerging norm of“Responsibility to Protect,” the difficulty of adopting any UN resolution thatrefers to military intervention in Syria demonstrates how difficult it is to have aunified reaction to humanitarian crises resulting from military conflicts withina state.
This paper focuses on the policies of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China,
and South Africa) on military intervention for the purpose of creating peace orprotecting civilians (what we often call “peace enforcement”) at the UN Security
1

Council. As BRICS countries consistently behave differently from other member
states of the UN Security Council, especially from the Western countries led by
the United States on the issue of military intervention in current world politics,
it is crucial to examine the attitudes of BRICS and identify the motives of theirvoting.
The central argument of this paper is that although BRICS tend to be
categorized as one group with a tendency to oppose military intervention with
UN authorization, IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) on one hand andChina and Russia on the other are quite different in their attitudes to andmotives for voting on humanitarian intervention. And it is the IBSA countries
that coordinate the voting on crucial issues, including military intervention, as agroup of “new democratic countries which represent their regions (India in
2South Asia, Brazil in South America, and South Africa in Africa).” While IBSABattle at the UN Security Council on Peace Enforcement in Libya and Syria: Focusing on the Strategies of BRICS

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shares the idea that military intervention should be the last resort with a very
strict purpose (for instance, to protect civilians) and should not be abused by thepowerful states for the purpose of changing regimes, they still have someunderstanding and support to respect the aspirations of people in totalitarianregimes such as Libya and Syria. On the other hand, Russia and China are very
adamant in opposing any military resolution in Syria; for Russia, Syria underthe Assad regime is one of its most important allies in the Middle East, andRussia is afraid of losing its interests and ally in Syria. As for China, it intends
to keep its alliance with Russia in the UN Security Council, and it is afraid ofcustomizing the military intervention for regime changes.
This paper emphasizes that it is critical to recognize the difference between
IBSA and RC (Russia and China) and identify their motives in order tounderstand the battle of the UN Security Council resolutions on humanitarian
intervention. Thus, regarding Japanese policies on humanitarian intervention,
it is important to make decisions for or against the UN Security Council
resolutions with an understanding of this crucial difference between IBSA and
RC. I also argue that Japan should play a major role in supporting peacebuilding activities, instead of peace enforcement (or military intervention) due
to its character and long-term experience in the fields of peacebuilding.
This paper consists of three parts. First, I will analyze voting decisions by
BRICS states on the resolutions for Libya. Second, I will examine the difference
between RC and IBSA on the principle of “Responsibility to Protect,” byexamining their policies on Syria. Third, I will argue Japan’s policies onhumanitarian intervention and peacebuilding, recognizing the difference
between IBSA and RC.

I. Voting Decisions by BRICS on Libya
The year 2011 was a special year in terms of examining the behaviors of
BRICS at the UN Security Council on humanitarian intervention resolutions
because all BRICS countries were members of the Council. The first battle on
humanitarian intervention was conducted in UNSC Resolution 1973, which was
adopted on 18 March 2011. Five countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, andGermany—abstained while 10 countries supported the resolution, whichauthorized “all necessary measures” to protect civilians in Libya from pro-

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Gaddafi forces. Thus, four countries among BRICS, except for South Africa,
abstained from Resolution 1973.
In the process of adopting this resolution, BRICS countries did not havestrong support for military intervention because they were afraid that theresolution could be used not only for protecting civilians but also for regimechange in Libya. Thus, IBSA started consultation among them to decide theirvotes for Resolution 1973. The high-ranked officials at Brazil’s mission to the
UN frankly expressed the details of the process for consultation among IBSA
and BRICS on the resolution;
Of course, we BRICS often made consultations to discuss theresolution; however, it is IBSA which most frequently coordinates
voting because IBSA share the same identities as new democratic
states and have strong affinity. Especially on the humanitarian
intervention, we share the view that we should emphasize politicalsolutions such as preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. We also
share the policies that the military intervention should be the last4

resort, after failing all the measures.

IBSA judged that the Libya resolution submitted by the European countries
was too broad and risked allowing military engagement without limit. The
Brazil mission was especially concerned that there was no mechanism in thedraft of Resolution 1973 on monitoring and evaluating the impact of the militaryintervention in Libya. Thus, the Brazil mission decided to abstain from
Resolution 1973. And the Brazil mission coordinated with South Africa andIndia, who also abstained. The Brazilian officials said, “After IBSA agreed on
the abstention, we (IBSA) consulted with Russia and China and agreed that weall voted the abstention from the resolution 1973 with the same concern that
Brazil has. Thus, we know very well how other BRICS countries vote.”

5

However, at the last moment, South Africa changed the policy and decided
to vote for the resolution. South Africa’s top leadership to the UN explained thereason;IBSA always coordinate the voting with other IBSA countries, while
we also discuss the issue with Russia and China. At the same time,
IBSA also coordinate with other member states in the same region; inour case, we (South Africa) coordinate with Nigeria and Gabon which
are members of the UN Security Council in 2011. And with regard toBattle at the UN Security Council on Peace Enforcement in Libya and Syria: Focusing on the Strategies of BRICS

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Resolution 1973, we found that Nigeria and Gabon would vote for it.
As the country which has the responsibility on the issues in Africa, weneed to respect the relationship with other African members in theCouncil. Thus, although we had already agreed with IBSA on theabstention, we decided to vote for the support at the last moment, tocoordinate with Nigeria and Gabon. But other IBSA countries
6

understood our decision.

The South Africa mission emphasized that it always coordinates with India
and Brazil because IBSA share identities as representatives of their regions andnew democratic states. But it also emphasized coordination with other membersin the same region. It is the same for Brazil, which contended that it also
7

coordinates with other members in the same region (South America).

Resolution 1973 was a historical one, which authorized the militaryintervention to protect civilians in Libya and actually changed the Qaddafi
regime. In this resolution, IBSA first started coordinating its votes and decided
to use abstention, taking the middle ground between the international call for
stopping the possible genocide by pro-Qaddafi forces in Libya and their own
concerns about making regime changes as a result of the military intervention.
Then, IBSA consulted with Russia and China and confirmed that they could
vote together, but South Africa decided to support the resolution by respecting
the support by Nigeria and Gabon, which are African members of the Council.
This process demonstrates the mechanism of coordination and consultation of
BRICS on crucial issues including the authorization of military intervention: the
IBSA countries coordinate votes, then consult with China and Russia as well asother member states in the same region, and make the final decisions.

II. Analysis of the Difference Between IBSA
and RC on Responsibility to Protect Syria
As the crisis in Syria deepened every day, the members of the UN Security
Council then faced the decisions on UNSC resolutions for Syria. The first battle
was the resolution that aimed to impose economic sanctions against the Assadgovernment in Syria, which was voted on 4 October 2011. Russia and China
vetoed the resolution, and IBSA and Lebanon abstained. The New York Timespublished an article that said, “Russia and other so-called BRICS nations –88

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Brazil, India, China, and South Africa – objected to the idea of sanctions.”

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IBSA was unified on the opposition to the resolution. The background of the
opposition by IBSA was their mistrust about the use of Resolution 1973 against
Qaddafi in Libya. A Brazilian high-ranked official contends, “Resolution 1973
only authorized the military intervention to protect civilians, but NATO
expanded the meaning of the resolution and continued military operations until
the regime collapsed. It was an abuse of the resolution. That is why we (IBSA)
unanimously opposed the resolution imposing economic sanctions against Syria
because we are suspicious about the motive of the resolution.”

9

Both Brazil and South Africa contend that the reason they abstained,
instead of voting against the resolution, was that IBSA knew that Russia andChina would veto the resolution; thus, they judged that it was better to avoid
unnecessary confrontation with the Western countries, including the United
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States. Top officials in the Indian mission to the UN also argued, “We all knewthat Russia and China would veto the resolution; thus, we could not understand
why the Western countries still decided to vote. It became very difficult for the
UNSC members to have a unified position on Syria after this critical spirit.”

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After opposing the economic sanctions against Syria, BRICS deputy foreign
ministers gathered to discuss Syrian issues and published a joint statement on
24 November 2011 to counter the impression that BRICS just kept opposing any
pressure against the Assad government. In this statement, BRICS deputy
foreign ministers stressed that the “only acceptable way to resolve the internal
crisis in Syria is through urgent peaceful negotiations with participation of allparties, as provided by the Arab League initiative, taking into account the12legitimate aspirations of all Syrians.” However, in reality, Russia and China
adamantly kept opposing any substantial methods against the Assadgovernment, even after the Arab League adopted its resolution requesting thatPresident Assad step down. On the other hand, IBSA gradually changed its
stance as the Assad government continued to oppress its people in a brutal way.
The critical difference was expressed in the vote for the UNSC resolution on
4 February 2012, when the UN Security Council voted to support the request by
the Arab League that demanded the Assad government stop military actions
and President Assad step down. Russia and China again vetoed the resolution;
however, India and South Africa (Brazil is not a UNSC member state in 2012)13

changed its position and decided to vote in favor of the resolution. This was a

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critical step by IBSA which explicitly distinguished their stances from Russia
and China on the resolution concerning Syria.
This reflects the IBSA countries’ stance on the concept of “Responsibility toProtect,” which suggests the International Community has a responsibility toprotect civilians when a state does not have the capacity or will to protect its
own people. IBSA conducted a meeting of the heads of state of those three
14

countries and published the “Tshwane Declaration” on 18 October 2011. In thisdeclaration, IBSA expressed its position on Syria:
The leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the sovereignty andterritorial integrity of Syria. They expressed their grave concern at thecurrent situation in Syria and condemned the persistent violence. They
expressed their belief that the only solution to the current crisis isthrough a Syrian-led all inclusive, transparent, peaceful politicalprocess aimed at effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and15

concerns of the population and at protecting unarmed civilians.

This statement also emphasizes that while military intervention should bealways the last resort, it also embraces “participatory democracy, respect forhuman rights, and the Rule of Law.”

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This attitude of IBSA that is flexible on humanitarian intervention – itdepends on the scale of human rights violation in targeted states – sharply
contrasts with the attitude and policies of Russia and China. Because Russia is
the major ally of the Assad regime, Russia is adamantly opposed to any
resolution that could threaten the existence of the Assad government. And
China keeps following the Russian stance, at least up to now. Chinese experts
argue that there are two main reasons why China continued to follow the17

Russian veto of any resolution against the Assad regime. First, China wants tostay allied with Russia in the UN Security Council. Second, China is very afraidof normalizing regime changes as a result of human rights violations when
China itself faces critical domestic problems, including oppressing some ethnic
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minorities in China. Thus, it is structurally difficult for Russia and China tosupport humanitarian intervention with military operation, especially when
Russia has a critical national interest with the government which oppresses its
own people.
It is critical for the international community – including the Japanese
government – to have a clear understanding of the difference between IBSA and90

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RC on humanitarian intervention. Though BRICS often seems to have the same
polices and attitudes, the fundamental values that IBSA and RC embrace arequite different. And this difference reflects their voting behaviors on the UNSC
resolutions on humanitarian interventions.

III. Japan’s Policies on Humanitarian Intervention
When we examine the Japanese policies on humanitarian intervention
against states – such as Libya and Syria – that oppress their own people, there
are two aspects to be considered. One is the voting in the UN Security Council
when Japan has a seat on the UN Security Council; the second is the possible
participation in those humanitarian interventions that have militarycomponents.
With regard to the votes in the UN Security Council, I argue that it ispossible for Japan to adopt the principle of Responsibility to Protect,distinguishing it from military intervention aimed at regime changes withoutcertain evidence and grounds, as happened in the invasion of Iraq. And it iscritical for Japan to have a clear understanding of the difference between IBSA
and RC on this principle and to do its best to coordinate, or at least consult, withIBSA countries to obtain agreement or unified stances, even when it is difficult
to invite Russia and China to support resolutions approving humanitarian
intervention. Of course, Japan should have primary consultation with theWestern countries including the United States, but it is very valuable for Japanto make a bridge between the West and IBSA, which share the values of
democracy, human rights, and rule of law.
In terms of actual participation in military intervention, I argue that it isdifficult for Japan to participate in those military interventions because of its
character as a nation, including the terms of its constitution. Japan is also not
expected nor asked by most of the members in the international community to
conduct military operations against foreign countries. However, Japan can playa critical role in supporting peacebuilding after military interventions thatobtain authorization from the UN Security Council. As the report by theInternational Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention (ICSSI), that
expressed the basic view of “Responsibility to Protect,” contends, theinternational community has a “responsibility to rebuild” after the international

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community intervenes militarily in sovereign states to protect civilians.

Japan has already had long-term experience in participating in the criticalaspects of peacebuilding, including UN peacekeeping, economic reconstruction,
supporting police and justice systems, and national reconciliation andDisarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in post-conflict statessuch as Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan. A UN high-ranked official who
is currently working for UN DPKO in New York and used to be the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General in some UN peacebuilding mission,
contended,
In the past, we (UN) had a problem of lack of personnel for UN
peacekeeping, but this problem has been solved because many
developing states, including BRICS, started making a lot ofcommitment and deploying personnel to the UN peacekeeping
operations. But the UN is still lacking personnel that require high-tech
operations; for example, helicopter units that can convey materials by
air, engineer troops that can create good infrastructure, and army thatcan establish roads and transmission. We deeply appreciate it if Japan20

can make contributions in these fields by using its high technology

Japan can contribute to peacebuilding by using this experience in providing
economic assistance, deploying defense forces with high technologies, andpromoting national reconciliation that creates inclusive political structures inpost-conflict states, including ones whose conflicts are terminated by militaryintervention with humanitarian purpose. This is a critical contribution to eventhe humanitarian intervention because it would be in vain if the humanitarian
intervention resulted in a chaotic security situation (possibly civil war);rebuilding states is as important as intervening in states.
In this particular field of peacebuilding, it is crucial for Japan to advance its
cooperation with IBSA that started making a substantial commitment to UN
peacebuilding missions. For instance, India currently dispatch more than 8,000
military personnel to UN peacekeeping operations (No.3 contributors to the UN
peacekeepers in the world), Brazil dispatches 2,500 personnel to UN
peacekeeping, especially in Haiti as a leading country contributing to the Haiti
mission, and South Africa dispatches 2,100 personnel to the UN missions mainly
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in Africa. Moreover, those IBSA countries began positive engagement inbuilding democratic governance, including introducing electoral system and rule92

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of law in post-conflict states. Scott Smith, a visiting scholar in Columbia
University and former UN electoral specialist (and a special assistance to SRSG
in Afghanistan), contends,“Because IBSA are countries which recently became democratic states,
they tend to be more accepted by post-conflict states which just start
introducing new democratic systems. For instance, French electoral
system that was created 200 years ago might be seen too old and too
far in the eyes of people in conflicting states; but it is easier for them toaccept Brazilian or South African democratic system which were justintroduced. IBSA also might have more legitimacy in the eyes of people
in conflicted states because IBSA also became independent afterfighting western occupations, and experienced the transition from22

military dictatorship to democratic states just recently.

Other UN high ranked official at the UN Headquarters who has a many
year’s experience on peacemaking and peace building effort also argue,
It has been the case that the UN activities were led by the Westerncountries; and other states tend to “react” to the initiatives of theWestern states. But now, the tide began to change, especially due toemerging democratic countries like IBSA. Those countries which has
recently experienced critical stage in participating in peacebuilding –for instance, Brazil just experienced the transition from military
dictatorship to democracy, South Africa experienced the national
reconciliation by different ethnicities, and India conducted a drasticchange from socialistic economic system to market-oriented system –have a big confidence that they can contribute to rebuilding a newstate in war-torn regions. And those countries started taking a lot of
initiatives in implementing programs for peacebuilding, including
introducing new electoral systems, new security sectors, and promoting
national reconciliation. This is a completely new tide, and the UN can
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basically welcome those initiatives by IBSA.

The Japanese government should understand this historical tide that somenew democratic states including IBSA started having very positive contributions
to peacebuilding efforts, and it is crucial for Japan to make constant efforts tocreate better cooperation with those states, utilizing Japan’s experience andexpertise on supporting post-conflict states, including rebuilding Japan after theBattle at the UN Security Council on Peace Enforcement in Libya and Syria: Focusing on the Strategies of BRICS

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World War II.

Conclusion
This paper analyzed the process of adopting UNSC resolutions onhumanitarian interventions in two prominent cases– Libya and Syria – andexamined the voting behaviors of BRICS. I emphasized that there is a difference
between IBSA and RC on the fundamental values and identities as IBSA sharedemocracy, human rights, and rule of law. I argued that it is important forJapan to understand this critical difference between IBSA and RC and cooperatewith IBSA on a unified stance on humanitarian crises. I also emphasized thatJapan can play a critical role in engaging in peacebuilding by cooperating withIBSA and other emerging democratic states, even though it may be difficult toparticipate in humanitarian (and military) intervention per se.

Notes
1 Katharina Coleman defines that “peace enforcement operation are forcible military interventions
by one or more state into a third country with the express objective of maintaining or restoring
international, regional, or local peace and security by ending a violent conflict within thatcountry. (Coleman, Katharina. 2007. International Organizations and Peace Enforcement: The
Politics of International Legitimacy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.) Following thisdefinition, this paper uses the peace enforcement as almost tantamount to the word ofhumanitarian intervention.
2 As I introduce later in this paper, high-ranked officials (at the ambassador level) in IBSA sharethe view that IBSA represents their regions with the identity of “new democratic states,”
responding to my interviews at the UN Headquarters in New York in December 2011.
3 BBC, “Libya UN Resolution 1973: Text analyzed,” 18 March 2011.
4 Authors’ interview with high-ranked officials in Brazil’s mission to the UN, 1 December 2011. In
this paper, the “high ranked officials in IBSA mission to the UN are ambassador or deputy
ambassador level.
5 Ibid.
6 Authors’ interview with high-ranked officials in the South African mission to the UN, 1
December 2011.
7 Author’s interview with a high ranked official in the Brazil mission to the UN, 1 December 2011.
8 New York Times, “U.N. Resolution on Syria Blocked by Russia and China,” 4 October 2011.
9 Author’s interview with a high-ranked official in the Brazil mission to the UN, 1 December 2011.
10 Interview with both Brazilian and South African high-ranked officials at the UN, 1 December
2011.

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11 Interview with a high-ranked official in the Indian mission to the UN, 2 December 2011.
12 Joint Communiqué on the Outcome of the Meeting of BRICS Deputy Foreign Ministers on the
Situation in the Middle East and North Africa, 24 November 2011.
13 Reuters, “Russia, China veto UN draft backing Arab plan for Syria,” 4 February 2012.
14 India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum Fifth Summit of Heads of States and Government,
Tshwane Declaration, 18 October 2011.
15 Ibid., item 82.
16 Ibid, item 1.
17 Interviews with several Chinese experts, on the condition of anonymity, in 2012.
18 Ibid.
19 Report by International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention (ICSSI), 2001.
20 Author’s interview with a high-ranked UN official, 2 December 2011.
21 Website of UNDPKO. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ The figure is as of December 2011.
22 Author’s interview with Scott Smith, a former UN electoral officer and the Special Assistance to
the SRSG in Afghanistan (2009-2010), and a visiting scholar in the Columbia University, 30
November 2011.
23 Authors’ interview with a high ranked UN officials (director-level) working for Political Affairs
at the UN Headquarters, 30 November 2011.